Primitive This innovative edited collection of essays charts the rise, fall and possible futures of the word ‘primitive...
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Primitive This innovative edited collection of essays charts the rise, fall and possible futures of the word ‘primitive’ in architecture. The word ‘primitive’ is fundamental to the discipline of architecture in the West, providing a convenient starting point for the myth of architecture’s origins. With the advent of post-modernism and, in particular, post-colonialism, the word has fallen from favour in many disciplines. Despite this – curiously – architects continue to use the word, particularly to reify the practice of simplicity. Primitive includes contributions from some of today’s leading architectural commentators and practitioners, including Dalibor Vesely, Adrian Forty, David Leatherbarrow, Richard Coyne, CJ Lim and Richard Weston. Structured around five sections, ‘Negotiating origins’, ‘Urban myths’, ‘Questioning colonial constructs’, ‘Making marks’, and ‘Primitive futures’, the essays highlight the problems of ideas of the primitive, engage with contemporary debates in the field of postcolonialism and respond to a burgeoning interest in non-expert architecture. This controversial subject remains, for better or worse, intrinsic to the history of architectural ideas and embedded in both architectural modernism and contemporary practice, and as such cannot be ignored. Considering a broad range of approaches, this book provides a rounded past, present and future of the word ‘primitive’ in the architectural sphere. Jo Odgers is an architect and lecturer at the Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University and previously worked in architectural practice for fifteen years. She is currently writing her Ph.D. on the work of John Wood of Bath in relation to the tradition of occult philosophy. Her next project (with Flora Samuel) is a book entitled Façades. She is an Associate Editor of arq. Flora Samuel is an architect and reader at the Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University. She is currently writing Le Corbusier in Detail for the Architectural Press. She has a particular interest in the narratives implicit within the construction of buildings and was one of the original initiators of the primitive conference from which this book has evolved. She is an Associate Editor of arq. Adam Sharr is a lecturer at the Welsh School of Architecture and principal of Adam Sharr Architects, both based in Cardiff. Previously, he was Lecturer in Architecture at the University of Nottingham and worked in architectural practice. He is Joint Secretary of the Architectural Humanities Research Association (AHRA) and is also Associate Editor of arq (Cambridge University Press). His book Heidegger’s Hut will be published by the MIT Press in 2006.
Primitive Original matters in architecture
Edited by Jo Odgers, Flora Samuel and Adam Sharr
First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2006 selection and editorial matter: Jo Odgers, Flora Samuel and Adam Sharr; individual chapters: the contributors
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Primitive : original matters in architecture / edited by Jo Odgers, Flora Samuel and Adam Sharr—1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical reference and index. 1. Architecture—Language. 2. Architecture—Terminology. 3. Language and culture. 4. Architecture—Psychological aspects. I. Odgers, Jo. II. Samuel, Flora. III. Sharr, Adam. NA2543.L34P75 2006 720.1’4—dc22 ISBN10: 0-415-38538-5 ISBN13: 978-0-415-38538-1 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-415-38539-3 ISBN13: 978-0-415-38539-8 (pbk) ISBN10: 0-203-96744-5 ISBN13: 978-0-203-96744-7 (ebk)
2006005423
For Sylvia Harris Colleague, teacher and librarian
Contents Illustration credits Notes on contributors Acknowledgements Introduction Jo Odgers, Flora Samuel and Adam Sharr
ix x xvi xvii
Part 1: Original matters
1
1
3
Primitive: the word and concept Adrian Forty
Part 2: Negotiating origins
15
2
The primitive as modern problem: invention and crisis Dalibor Vesely
17
3
Origins redefined: a tale of pigs and primitive huts Mari Hvattum
33
4
The primitive hut: fantasies of survival in an all-white world Lorens Holm
43
5
Gottfried Semper’s primitive hut: duration, construction and self-creation Jonathan A. Hale
55
6
Mineral matters: formation and transformation Richard Weston
63
Part 3: Questioning colonial constructs
71
7
Post-colonizing the primitive Felipe Hernández and Lea Knudsen Allen
73
8
Notes for an alternative history of the primitive hut Stephen Cairns
86
9
Reinventing ‘primitiveness’: Henri Lacoste and the Belgian Congo Pavilion at the 1931 International Colonial Exposition in Paris Johan Lagae
96
10 The radicalization of the primitive in Brazilian modernism Styliane Philippou
108
11 The need to be critical Robert Brown
121
Contents
Part 4: Urban myths
125
12 Practically primitive
127
David Leatherbarrow 13 Giants and columns
139
Nicholas Temple 14 The emblematic city: John Wood and the re-founding of Bath Jo Odgers
150
15 Alvar Aalto and the primitive suburb Harry Charrington
166
16 Metaphorical Manhattan – ‘Paradise Lost’ Lorna McNeur
176
Part 5: Making marks
181
17 The perception of self-negation in the space of emptiness: the primitive in Tadao Ando’s architecture Jin Baek
183
18 The ‘primitive surface’: carving, modelling, marking and transformation Stephen Kite
194
19 The modern-day primitive hut? ‘Self-building’ with Jung, Aalto and Le Corbusier Flora Samuel and Sarah Menin
207
20 The wisdom of the sands Simon Unwin
221
Part 6: Primitive futures?
227
21 Digital commerce and the primitive roots of architectural consumption Richard Coyne
229
22 Primitive and the everyday: Sergison Bates, Lefebvre and the guilt of architectural expertise Adam Sharr
240
23 Heart of Darkness: air of comfort Helen Mallinson
251
24 Primitive: from which construction begins Peter Salter
260
25 The United Cultures of Britain CJ Lim
267
Select bibliography
273
Index
279
viii
Illustration credits The authors and publishers gratefully acknowledge the following for permission to reproduce material in the book. Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for the permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder who is not acknowledged here and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of the book. 2
6 10 11 12
© Dalibor Vesely: Plate 2.5. © Man Ray Trust/ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2006: Plate 2.1. © ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2006: Plate 2.4 Plate 4.4 reproduced by kind permission of Norton, and also the British Library and Scott Polar Institute © Richard Weston: Plates 6.1–6.6 © Styliane Philippou: Plate 10.3; © Architectural Review: Plate 10.2 © Robert Brown: Plates 11.1–11.4. © Tonkao Panin: Plates 12.1. © Photo Carlos Naranjo: Plates 12.2–12.5. © Photo Anna
13
Vortmann: Plates 12.6 © Nicholas Temple: 13.1–13.3. © 2005, Photo Scala, Florence, courtesy of the
4
20
Ministero Beni e Att. Culturali: Plate 13.4 Plate 14.2 reproduced by kind permission of Victoria Art Gallery, Bath. Plate 14.4 reproduced by kind permission of the Wellcome Library. © Harry Charrington: Plates 15.1,15.3, 15.4. © Alvar Aalto Foundation: Plate 15.2 Plates 16.1, 16.3, Manhattan section of aerial photograph of the City of New York 1969 used with permission of City of New York Planning Committee. All rights reserved. Plate 16.2: Lorna McNeur with Maria Santeularia Bada © Tadao Ando Architect and Associates: Plates 17.1–17.3. © Mitsuo Matsuoka: Plate 17.3 © Stephen Kite: Plates 18.1–18.3. © Sam Lambert, Wilson Archive: Plate 18.5. © Conway Library, Courtauld Institute of Art: Plate 18.4 © The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles. Photograph Lucien Hervé: Plate 19.3 © Photograph, Flora Samuel, Plate 19.4. © FLC/ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2005, photograph Lorna Davies, Plates 19.5, 19.7; © Plate 19.2 Copyright Alvar Aalto Foundation. Photo Eino Mäkinen; © Sarah Menin, Plate 19.6 © Simon Unwin: Plates 20.1–20.6.
22
© Adam Sharr: Plates: 22.1–22.3
24 25
© Peter Salter: Plates 24.1–24.15 © CJ Lim/Studio 8 Architects: Plates 25.1–25.6
14 15 16
17 18 19
ix
Contributors Jin Baek is an architect and assistant professor at the School of Architecture and Community Design, University of South Florida, where he teaches history and theory of architecture. He earned his Master’s degree from Yale University and completed his Ph.D. at the University of Pennsylvania. His research focuses on cross-cultural issues between modern East Asian architecture and western architecture. He is currently working on a publication that deals with the conception of Christian sacred space in East Asia as it relates to the Buddhist idea of nothingness. Robert Brown is an architect with over twenty years of experience in communitybased projects in the UK, USA, India and Africa, and has published and lectured on participatory design, as well as on architectural pedagogy. He is currently a senior lecturer in architecture at the University of Plymouth, and is also working in private practice with projects in the UK and Japan. Stephen Cairns is based at the University of Edinburgh where he teaches and researches on architectural design and theory. He has published on architecture and urbanism with a particular emphasis on post-colonial theory. He recently edited Drifting: Architecture and Migrancy (Routledge 2004), and is working on a project entitled ‘Difference and Repetition: An investigation of the residential highrise as a global form’. He is co-director of the AOE design research consultancy. Harry Charrington is an architect and Programme Leader for the Architecture and Planning course at the University of the West of England, Bristol. He was the founding editor of Scroope, the Cambridge architectural journal. He worked and taught for many years in Finland and has curated exhibitions, and written books, on Alvar Aalto. He is currently studying for a Doctorate at the LSE. Richard Coyne is based in Architecture and is head of the Graduate School in the School of Arts, Culture and Environment at the University of Edinburgh. He researches in the areas of computer-aided design, digital media and design theory. He is author of three books on the implications of information technology and design with MIT Press, and is co-author of a recent book with Adrian Snodgrass, Interpretation in Architecture: Design as a Way of Thinking (Routledge). He currently heads a research project on the relationship between voice
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Contributors
and public space and a research cluster on Non-Space, both funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. See http://ace.caad.ed.ac.uk/richard/ Adrian Forty is Professor of Architectural History at the Bartlett, University College, London, where he directs the Master’s course in Architectural History, and the Ph.D. programme in Architectural History and Theory. His publications include Objects of Desire (1986) and Words and Buildings (2000). Jonathan Hale is an architect and Associate Professor in Architecture at the School of the Built Environment, University of Nottingham. His publications include: Rethinking Technology: A Reader in Architectural Theory (Routledge 2006); Ends Middles Beginnings: Edward Cullinan Architects (Black Dog 2005); Building Ideas: An Introduction to Architectural Theory (John Wiley 2000). Felipe Hernández is an architect and Lecturer in Architectural Design, History and Theory at the University of Liverpool. He has an MA in Architecture and Critical Theory and received his Ph.D. from the University of Nottingham. He has taught at the Bartlett School of Architecture (UCL), the Universities of Nottingham, Sheffield, East London as well as at the School of Art and Design, Nottingham Trent University. Felipe has published numerous essays and articles examining architectural practices in Latin America through contemporary cultural theory. He is editor of ‘Spaces of Transculturation: Architecture and Identity in Latin America’, in Journal of Romance Studies 2002 2(3); co-editor of Transculturation: Cities, Spaces and Architectures in Latin America (Rodopi 2005); and is currently completing a book on contemporary Latin American architecture. Lorens Holm is the director of the Humanities programme at the School of Architecture, University of Dundee. He has taught at the Bartlett, the Mackintosh, and the Architectural Association. He is a registered architect in the UK and the state of Massachusetts. His Ph.D. research was on architecture and psychoanalysis and his publications use psychoanalytic theory as an interpretive approach to problems of space. Mari Hvattum is a Senior Lecturer at The Oslo School of Architecture and Design. She is trained as an architect and has specialized further in architectural history and theory with particular emphasis on the relationship between historicism and modernism. Recent publications include Gottfried Semper and the Problem of Historicism (CUP 2004). Stephen Kite is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Architecture Planning and Landscape, Newcastle University. His research explores the history and theory of
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Contributors
architecture and its wider connections to visual culture. It has been disseminated widely through key conferences, and published papers and chapters within numerous books and journals including Art History, Architectural Research Quarterly, The Journal of Architecture, Paideuma, and the Journal of Oman Studies. With Sarah Menin he is co-author of An Architecture of Invitation: Colin St John Wilson (London: Ashgate, 2005). Lea Knudsen Allen is currently completing her Ph.D. in the Department of English Literatures and Cultures at Brown University. She has worked extensively on issues to do with postcolonial discourse, transmigration and cultural representation, which is also the topic of her thesis entitled ‘The Mediterranean Imaginary in Early Modern England’. In her dissertation Lea argues that representations of the Mediterranean provided early modern English poets, playwrights and travellers with the means to imagine a metropolitan identity. In addition, Lea teaches at Brown University, and has spoken at other institutions such as the Universities of Maine (USA) and Liverpool (UK). Johan Lagae is a junior faculty member of the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Ghent University. His research focuses on colonial architecture in the former Belgian Congo, Belgian modernism and the architecture of 1930s World’s Fairs. He contributed to numerous books and exhibitions and published in, among others, Journal of Architecture, Third Text and OASE of which he is one of the editors. David Leatherbarrow is Professor of Architecture and Chairman of the Ph.D. Program at the University of Pennsylvania. His recent books are: Topographical Stories: Studies in Landscape and Architecture; Surface Architecture, in collaboration with Mohsen Mostafavi; and Uncommon Ground: Architecture, Technology and Topography. Earlier books include: The Roots of Architectural Invention: Site, Enclosure and Materials, and On Weathering: the Life of Buildings in Time, again with Mostafavi. His research has focused on topics in the history and theory of architecture, gardens, and the city; more recently, on the impact of contemporary technology on architecture. CJ Lim established Studio 8 Architects Ltd in London in 1994. His architecture explores in parallel buildings and landscape design possibilities through narratives, culture and ethnicity and technological inventiveness. He represented the UK in the Venice Architecture Biennale 2004 and was chosen as one of the New British Talents in Architecture by the Guardian and Independent newspapers in 2004. In addition to his practice, he is the Director of the Bartlett Architecture Research Lab at the Bartlett, University College London.
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Contributors
Helen Mallinson is a Principal Lecturer in Architecture. She teaches history and theory at the School of Architecture and Spatial Design, London Metropolitan University. Programmes include ‘Modern Architecture and Modernity’, ‘The Forgetting of Air’, ‘Interpretation … and Ornament’. She was formerly head of the school and a visiting lecturer, critic and examiner in numerous schools of architecture and design. Helen is currently completing a doctoral thesis at the London Consortium on the modernization of air, pneuma and space in the late seventeenth century. Recent articles include: ‘Metaphors of Experience: The Voice of Air ‘ in The Philosophical Forum, June 2004, vol. 35. Lorna McNeur has been a Lecturer in Architecture since 1982 in the USA at the Cooper Union in New York; at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada; and in the UK at the University of Cambridge. She has practised architecture intermittently since 1980. She is also a body psychotherapist who integrates her architecture and psychotherapy work under the umbrella of environmental psychology. She has lectured, published and exhibited her work internationally, most notably: at the Guggenheim, The Cooper Union, and Art Forum in New York; the Architectural Association (AA Files) in London; and The Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge, England. Her forthcoming book is entitled Theatre of the City: The Passion for Public Space (London: Routledge, 2006). Sarah Menin is Lecturer at the School of Architecture Planning and Landscape, University of Newcastle upon Tyne. Having studied architecture, she completed her Ph.D. on parallels in the life and creative works of Aalto and Sibelius, which she is currently publishing as a book. She has written Nature and Space: Aalto and Le Corbusier with Flora Samuel, and has also edited a book of interdisciplinary collection in Constructing Place: Mind and Matter, both published by Routledge. In 2005, her latest book (written with Stephen Kite) – a critical analysis of the work of Colin St John Wilson, An Architecture of Invitation – was published. In addition to her specialist work on the life and work of Aalto, her research explores the place of the psyche in the sphere of architecture, and in particular its effect on the creative imagination, and has been disseminated widely in academic journals and international conferences. Jo Odgers is a Lecturer at the Welsh School of Architecture at Cardiff University in design studio and in history and theory of architecture. Her research interests are the architecture of eighteenth-century England, particularly with respect to the alchemical tradition; and the use of drawing in architectural design. Before entering teaching full time in 1998 Jo Odgers worked as a practising architect in London. Styliane Philippou is an architect and independent scholar. She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Edinburgh. She has taught architectural design, history and
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Contributors
theory at the University of Edinburgh and the University of Plymouth. Her monograph Oscar Niemeyer: Curves of Irreverence will be published by Yale University Press in 2007. Peter Salter taught for many years at the Architectural Association. He was until recently Head of the School of Architecture at the University of East London. His work as Macdonald and Salter is well known throughout the world, notably through the Osaka folly project and the Kamiichi pavilion built as part of Toyama Expo. He now divides his time between teaching (Cardiff, AA) and practice. Flora Samuel is an architect and Reader at the Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University. Her publications include Le Corbusier: Architect and Feminist (2004) and Aalto and Le Corbusier: Nature and Space (2003) with Sarah Menin and, based on her Ph.D. research, ‘La cité orphique de La Sainte Baume’, in Le Corbusier: Le symbolique, le sacré, la spiritualité published by the Fondation Le Corbusier (2004). She is currently writing Le Corbusier in Detail for the Architectural Press with the assistance of a Leverhulme Fellowship. Adam Sharr is a practising architect and Lecturer at the Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University. His book Heidegger’s Hut will be published by MIT Press in 2006. Nicholas Temple is Lecturer in Architecture at the University of Liverpool, having previously taught at the University of Nottingham and University of Pennsylvania, USA. He has a Ph.D. on urbanism in early sixteenth-century Rome and is completing a book on the influence of perspective on architecture (to be published by Routledge in 2006). Simon Unwin became Professor of Architecture at Dundee University School of Architecture at the beginning of 2004, after some years at the Welsh School of Architecture in Cardiff. He is the author of Analysing Architecture (Routledge 2003) and An Architecture Notebook: Wall (2000). His research extracts analytical frameworks for understanding architecture as a spatial discipline. He has lectured widely (publicly as well as to anthropologists and architects) on the intellectual structures people use to establish places for themselves in the world. He is particularly interested in rudimentary place-making in informal landscapes. His current research relates to the theme of ‘threshold’. Dalibor Vesely was born in Prague where he studied Architecture and Art History. He is a Director (Emeritus) of graduate studies in the department of architecture and fellow of Emmanuel College at the University of Cambridge. His interests
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Contributors
include the poetics and hermeneutics of architecture and his research and publications reflect a systematic attempt to restore the humanistic understanding of architecture. This is reflected in his award-winning publication Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation (MIT) – winner of the 2005 CICA Bruno Zevi Book Award presented by the International Committee of Architectural Critics and of an RIBA Trust award (2005). Richard Weston is Professor of Architecture at Cardiff University and the author of numerous books including Materials, Form and Architecture and Utzon, the only extended study written with full access to the architect and his archive. His monograph on Alvar Aalto won the 1995 Sir Banister Fletcher Prize, and Modernism received the International Book Award of the American Institute of Architects.
xv
Acknowledgements The editors would like to acknowledge a number of people for their help in organizing the event in Cardiff from which this book derives: Laura Colvin and Katrina Lewis; Richard Weston and Phil Jones; Caroline Almond, Sam Austin, Ben Bluestone, Jignesh Khakhar, and Ed Wainwright. We are grateful to all the participants for their contributions, notably those whose work we have not been able to include here, and particularly our keynote speakers who established a formidable context for the debate: (in order of their presentations) Adrian Forty, Dalibor Vesely, Hilde Heynen, Peter Blundell-Jones, David Leatherbarrow and Peter Salter. Caroline Mallinder of Routledge has given generous and invaluable support throughout the development of this project.
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Introduction Nowhere are the complexities of the word ‘primitive’ better expressed than within the pages of Gulliver’s Travels, first published in 1726. Gulliver, the shipwrecked traveller, arrives at the land of the Houyhnhnms to find it governed, curiously, by horses. Here, the subject species are the Yahoos who are in every way the same in appearance to Gulliver: ‘The fore feet of the Yahoo differed from my hands in nothing else but the length of the nails.’ They are despicable in their savagery and Gulliver’s only problem is to persuade his new masters that he is not one of them himself. Gulliver slowly begins to realize the extent of the Houyhnhnm’s society – his emerging understanding evolving through his reading of their architecture: Having travelled about three miles, we came to a long kind of building, made of timber stuck in the ground, and wattled across; the roof was low, and covered with straw. I now began to be a little comforted, and took out some toys, which travellers usually carry for presents to the savage Indians of America and other parts, in hopes the people of the house would be thereby encouraged to receive me kindly.1 His first sight of Houyhnhnm architecture gave Gulliver a comfortable sense of superiority, but his awe increased as he entered the first large room with a ‘smooth clay floor’ and moved through ‘a vista’ of rooms beyond, furnished with increasing elegance, causing him to rub his eyes in disbelief. In this world, first appearances are found to be deceptive, simultaneously both ‘primitive’ and its opposite, whatever either of those might be. Swift invites reflection on established mores of behaviour, upon the cruelty of society, on social assumptions, on patronizing paternalism, on what it means to be civilized and sane. He ridicules assumptions deriving from perceptions of unfamiliarity and Otherness. Gulliver’s Travels can be read as a biting satire on colonialism. It can also be read – more mischievously – as a satire on the practices of architects, architectural historians, theorists and critics. A generation ago, it seems that most architects thought that they knew what the word ‘primitive’ meant. It described a simple, unselfconscious harmony of living and making, an attunement often attributed more to the past than the present, supposedly distant from the excesses and vanities of ‘civilization’. Charles Jencks recollects that this was the accepted definition when he xvii
Introduction
met with Reyner Banham, Joseph Rykwert and others for a discussion on the theme in the 1970s. Since then, with the ascendance of postmodernism and – in particular – post-colonialism, much has happened to shake our confidence in the word, to make us more self-conscious about its use. The work of thinkers such as Edward Said and Homi K. Bhabha has had a significant influence outside the often all-too-introvert discipline of architecture, asking powerful questions about attitudes connoted by ‘primitive’.2 It has become a suspect term, carrying connotations of privileged condescension and racism, a designation with potentially invidious consequences in the grasp of a patronizing elite. Yet, curiously, the word ‘primitive’ still bewitches architects. It has been a participant in many an originary myth of western architecture. From neoclassical proponents of the Tuscan and Doric orders to the minimalists of the modern movement, many builders and writers have sought moral or ethical authority in its complexities. In ‘primitive’ have been found opportunities to imagine the beginnings of architecture and find creative potential there, through its promise of temporal and cultural remove. The word has helped them to connect their work with the roots of architecture itself and thus claim authenticity for their endeavours. Frequently, and increasingly from the eighteenth century onwards, the tendency has been to use ‘the primitive’ as justification for rendering simplicity a matter of commitment, distinct from knowing and decadent exuberance. The word has come to frame the cause of architecture stripped bare. Many, explicitly or implicitly, remain haunted by this meaning of primitive: its possibilities for valorizing simplicity; the potentially productive idea of a distant romantic origin; its opportunities for making authenticity claims. As such it cannot be ignored. This book emerged from a conference seeking to revisit ‘primitive’ in architecture – held at the Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University, in 2004 – exploring what relevance, if any, the word might have at the beginning of a new millennium. The contributors are all currently, or have recently been, members of various academic institutions in western Europe or America devoted to the study of architecture and who submitted papers for the conference. This reflects the institutional structures and pressures that often shape such an enterprise in contemporary circumstances. As such, the contents do – for better or worse – offer a representative sample of a certain architectural and academic milieu at this time. The implications of who is included and who has been left out will remain as much a part of the book’s commentary as the detail of the papers themselves. Some of the authors here emphasize difficulties of using the word ‘primitive’, challenging the condescension with which it has been associated. Some, while acknowledging the implications of post-colonialism, are keen to retain some of the term’s previous connotations. Some take a much longer xviii
Introduction
perspective, seeking to contextualize current challenges to ‘primitive’ in a broader historical sweep. If it has been thirty years between Banham, Jencks and Rykwert’s discussion of ‘primitive’ in architecture and this one, could the word provoke further discussion in another thirty years?
Notes 1 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels (1726), ch. 36. 2 Edward Said, Orientalism, London: Routledge, 1978; Homi K. Bhabha, Nation and Narration, London: Routledge, 1990; The Location of Culture, London: Routledge, 1994.
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Part 1 Original matters
Chapter 1
Primitive The word and concept Adrian Forty
There is a difference between the way that the ‘primitive’ is customarily talked about in architecture, and the way it has been used in other disciplines, where the word is usually quarantined by warnings and disclaimers of all kinds. ‘Primitive’ is not a politically correct term; it is condescending, it tends to denigrate who or what is described by it, and implies an assumption of superiority in whoever uses it. For good reason, then, when people talk about the primitive in anthropology or in art (the two disciplines where it has had most currency), they generally try to make it safe by placing all sorts of protective barriers around it, disclaimers, apologies, scare quotes, long explanatory footnotes, and so on, to show that they are only too well aware of its shortcomings, even if they nonetheless go on to use it for want of anything better.1 Curiously, none of these scruples seems to have touched architecture. All the circumspection with which the ‘primitive’ is treated elsewhere seems to be ignored when it comes to architecture, where people appear quite untroubled by the political and cultural objections to the word. It is as if all the anxiety that has grown up around the ‘primitive’ over the last century has entirely passed architecture by, as if architects and architectural critics had failed entirely to notice that there was anything contentious about the term. Could this indifference be put down to ignorance, to the insularity of architects? Possibly, but another explanation might be that the ‘primitive’ – at least as a concept if not as a word, and I shall come to that distinction later – is so fundamental to our discipline, and has been part of it for so long, that it does not occur to us to make excuses for it. We have come to accept the primitive as so necessary to our whole way of thinking about architecture that to suggest 3
Adrian Forty
that it needs to be accompanied by a disclaimer seems so absurd as not to be worth considering. For as long as there has been architecture, it has been justified, and sustained by reference to primitive building – Joseph Rykwert spelt out this tradition in his book On Adam’s House in Paradise (1972), and left us in no doubt of its importance in architectural thought. From Vitruvius’s time onwards, if not from earlier, the classical system of the orders was justified by reference to ‘primitive’ building; subsequent theories of architecture – Semper’s theory of ‘dressing’, and early twentieth-century modernism – have in turn been legitimized by references to primitive building. If architects seem to be unconcerned by all the reservations that accompany the use of the primitive in other disciplines, it is at least partly because the primitive has been part of architecture for so long as to make any excuses for it seem superfluous. Indeed, one might say that the Greek origins of the word ‘architecture’, from arkhe, meaning a beginning that remains as the hidden essence of a thing, implies that the beginnings of building constitute the discipline, and has given architects grounds for being so much at home with the primitive. If we look at another not-so-distant field, painting, the situation is very different. Although the classical theory of art had its stories of the mythological origins of painting, it never relied upon these in order to find its justification. Indeed the kind of art known as primitive – that is to say either Neolithic art, or African, Oceanic or North American Indian art – was unknown to the art theorists of the classical tradition, and was completely unlike anything that they might have conceived. It formed no part of the discourse of art, and when these new sorts of art were discovered, in the nineteenth century, they were quickly turned to subvert and overthrow the classical tradition of art. Not so in architecture, where the primitive hut, as described by Vitruvius and his successors, was the point of reference for architecture; and when explorers discovered the buildings of distant and previously unknown societies, in the Americas and South Pacific, the resemblance of these structures to the Vitruvian hut only served to confirm the classical tradition of architecture. The primitive hut of antiquity, and actual huts inhabited by savages in far-away places, become in architecture one and the same thing. All this helps to explain why writers on architecture feel thoroughly at home with the primitive and seem able to discuss it without the slightest self-consciousness, whereas writers on art have had extraordinary difficulty with the primitive, and their accounts of what it is are full of contorted qualifications as well as apologies for using the term at all.2 Yet, even if I understand why architects use ‘primitive’ with so little thought for its connotations, I cannot help being surprised at their unconcern. Let us turn now to look at the history of the word. As it is used now, ‘primitive’ exists among a whole constellation of words – ‘savage’, ‘barbarian’, ‘exotic’, ‘aboriginal’, ‘backward’, ‘uncivilized’, ‘naive’, ‘instinctive’, ‘authentic’, 4
Primitive
‘archaic’, ‘native’, ‘tribal’, ‘erotic’, ‘traditional’, ‘outsider’ – to give but a few. Extended to its architectural usage, we would have to add ‘vernacular’, ‘anonymous’, ‘non-pedigree’, ‘spontaneous’ and ‘indigenous’.3 Although nowadays, ‘primitive’ overlaps with all of these, this convergence only came about in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Until the late eighteenth century, ‘primitive’ had no other meaning than ‘at the origins’, or ‘original’, as, for example, in ‘primitive Christianity’. None of the connotations of tribal or native societies, of savages, or of the exotic, applies when we come across the word in the eighteenth century. It is only in the nineteenth century, particularly as a result of social Darwinism, when African, Oceanic and North American Indian societies started to be seen as the precursors of western civilization that they came to be described as ‘primitive’, on account of their supposed position at the early stages of human social development. This fact, that ‘primitive’ in eighteenth-century parlance means nothing more than ‘original’ is quite significant when we come to its architectural usage. When, for example, Sir John Soane talked about ‘the primitive model’, or ‘the progressive state of primitive buildings’ in his lectures, he meant nothing more than the original buildings of mankind, and it is not likely that he was implying any connection between these and the structures put up by the indigenous peoples of the South Pacific, Africa or the Americas. It was not until later in the nineteenth century that the meaning of the word primitive would be extended to include those. To continue with architecture’s use of the word ‘primitive’, we come to a surprise, which is that although notions of the ‘primitive building’ go back to the very origins of architecture, the huts, tents and cabins to which Vitruvius and his successors refer were not described by them as primitive. Neither in Vitruvius, nor in the writers of the Renaissance, nor in those of the seventeenth century or the first half of the eighteenth century, does the word ‘primitive’ ever occur. Even Laugier, whose ‘rustic hut’ was so important to his theory of architecture, did not describe either this or the man who first discovered it as ‘primitive’ – though the word has crept into Wolfgang and Anni Herrmann’s English translation; where Laugier wrote ‘l’homme dans sa première origine’, this has become ‘man in his primitive state’.4 The first instance of the word ‘primitive’ applied to buildings that I have found, in any language, is in the title of the first plate in William Chambers’s Treatise on Civil Architecture of 1759, which is headed ‘The Primitive Buildings etc’. There is no mention of ‘primitive’ in Chambers’s text in either the first (1759) or the second (1768) editions of the book, though, interestingly, in the third, 1791 edition, in which the text was expanded, he does use the word, writing ‘That the primitive hut was of a conic figure it is reasonable to conjecture’.5 By ‘primitive’, it is clear that he simply meant ‘original’. 5
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Nineteenth-century architectural writers who used ‘primitive’ stick to this sense of the word. Even when advancing an alternative theory of architecture, they still, like the classical theorists, resorted to a story of origins; and so for example, when Semper develops his concept of architecture as based in the conjunction of man’s impulse to enclose and to decorate, and the development of craft techniques, he postulates a ‘primitive’ builder. In The Four Elements of Architecture, although his purpose was to reject the old theory of the transmutation of materials as the basis of Greek architecture, nonetheless, he writes, ‘I see myself forced to go back to the primitive conditions of human society in order to come to that which I actually propose to set forth’.6 The same is true when he writes about the movable tent as the ‘most primitive mode’ of roof covering.7 When, however, in Der Stil he distinguished between Hellenic and pre-Hellenic art, the word he uses for the latter is ‘barbaric’.8 Clearly, Semper is important because he proposed an archetypal primitive building, the Caribbean hut, as the basis of his theory of architecture – but his use of the word ‘primitive’ was restricted to the sense of ‘original’. The transformation of the primitive into a word that has force really only occurred in the early twentieth century – and here the outstanding exponent must be Adolf Loos. Loos’s 1908 essay ‘Ornament and Crime’ draws upon a notion of the primitive that is far from Semper’s primitive builders or those of the neoclassical theorists. The argument of Loos’s essay hinges on evolutionism, on the superiority of the civilized West over the uncivilized, cannibalistic and heavily decorated Papuan: ‘Primitive men had to differentiate themselves by various colours, modern man needs his clothes as a mask’.9 Loos turns the primitive into something that is both atavistic, exotic, but also threatening, and this transformation Loos owed to what had been happening in the visual arts, where the discovery of non-western art, and its take-up by the avant-garde, became a way of destabilizing the conventions of art. Loos, of course, turned on its head the avant-garde’s use of the primitive, so that rather than being a model to emulate, it became a warning against cultural degeneracy. From Loos’s time onwards, the primitive, whether it is taken up positively as a model to follow, or negatively, as by Loos, has had the possibility of an exotic, and sometimes erotic charge: it is dangerous and exciting; it leads to outside the world of the familiar, to a destination unknown. All these characteristics were to be investigated by Freud, by the surrealists and by anthropologists; but before we look at the purposes of the primitive, let us look at another matter, the question of where is the primitive? Is the primitive nearby, or is it far away? This question, the location of the primitive, of where do you find it, is particularly relevant to architecture. When Vitruvius describes the origin of building, he starts with the usual speculations about living in caves, making shelters out of leaves, or building, like swallows, out of mud and wattle, and how then, observing the efforts of others, men 6
Primitive
went on to make improvements, and to produce better kinds of hut. All this is entirely speculative and mythical, as it is in every other account of the origins of architecture. Vitruvius then goes on to say that if you go over to Gaul, or Spain, or to Portugal, you can find there buildings just like these mythical original buildings, and concludes: ‘Thus by these examples we can infer concerning the ancient invention of buildings, reasoning that they were similar’.10 This circularity is a pattern that architectural writers follow over and over again – they start off with an account of the mythical origins of buildings, and then go on to add, ‘if you go to such-and-such a place, you will find buildings just like I’ve described, so of course my theory must be right’. Semper does it with his Caribbean hut; and we see exactly the same thing happening with Le Corbusier, another enthusiast for the primitive. In Une Maison un Palais his account of the origins of architecture starts off with speculative archaeological reconstructions of the primitive dwellings: places of worship in the desert, Mesopotamian buildings, but then switches to Brittany, and then finally to the Landes in south-west France. In other words, he takes us from entirely speculative and placeless structures, to ones that are wholly specific and that you can go and see for yourself. Le Corbusier’s description of the fishermen’s shacks in the Landes is a perfect example of how the near-at-hand becomes construed as primitive. Built on sand dunes, under the pine woods, these shacks are the homes of the fishermen who constructed them. They are remote from civilization – they are on an isolated spit of land that the railway does not reach, and as the land does not belong to them, they are simply tolerated guests, without any rights – they build only the simplest shelters out of whatever materials are available. The results, says Le Corbusier, are intuitive and spontaneous, giving them a human and lyrical quality: ‘The fisherman, why shouldn’t he be a poet too – the savage after all is a fine one’.11 He describes the features of these houses – each has a covered porch for sitting under, and a fig tree for shade; and because high tides would wash away the soil of the vegetable garden, they are surrounded with a fence constructed with ‘une sagacité nègre’. Although basic, these shacks have all the attributes necessary to great architecture, and all they need to become great architecture is a more up-to-date interpretation. While Le Corbusier does not actually call them ‘primitive’, his discussion of the shacks includes a whole range of other primitivist terms: ‘spontaneous’, ‘unconscious’, ‘intuitive’, ‘savage’ and ‘Negro’. The fishermen’s shacks of the Landes were not the only places where Le Corbusier found the primitive in the modern world. He also found it in the favellas of Rio de Janeiro, which he contrasted favourably with the over-civilized architecture of the city.12 Siegfried Giedion later followed him, locating the primitive in shanty towns: ‘We realize that often shantytowns contain within 7
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themselves vestiges of the last balanced civilization – the last civilization in which man was in equipoise’.13 There are two things to be said about this procedure, so familiar to architectural thought, of locating the primitive in the here and now, in the familiar – a couple of things that might help us better to understand the particular, quite specific way in which architecture has grasped the ‘primitive’. If we ask at a more speculative, philosophical level, ‘where is the primitive?’, it is not easily answered. The anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss spent a good deal of time wondering about this question, about what divides the ‘primitive’ from the ‘civilized’, for without a satisfactory answer to this, the anthropologist’s whole métier is in doubt.14 The conclusion Lévi-Strauss came to in Tristes Tropiques was that the primitive is, and can only be an imagined ideal. The purpose of studying savages, he writes, is to create a theoretical model of society, so that we may succeed – and here he goes on to quote Rousseau – in distinguishing between what is primordial and what is artificial in man’s present nature, and in obtaining a good knowledge of a state which no longer exists, which has perhaps never existed, and which will probably never exist in the future, but of which it is nevertheless necessary to have a sound conception in order to pass judgement on our present state. Lévi-Strauss continues in his own words, ‘Natural man did not precede society, nor is he outside it’.15 The primitive, therefore, is purely an ideal, necessary to conceive of in order to think about society, but not to be confused with any actual state, whether historical or present. Returning to architecture we can see that, all the way from Vitruvius to Le Corbusier, people have started off by thinking of the primitive state in these ideal terms, as something that never existed and probably never will exist, but then feel compelled to go and find a real, actual equivalent. As a result, the ideal keeps on collapsing into the real – and as soon as this happens, and it becomes an actually existing local example, it loses much of its force as a means of thinking about architecture. Some architectural theorists, aware of this problem, managed to circumvent it – Quatremère de Quincy, for example, refused to posit any geographical origin of architecture, but instead insisted that it was rooted in human nature; and Semper followed this, equating architecture with language – but then succumbed to the need for an extant building and went on to locate his theory of architecture in the Caribbean hut. Even Le Corbusier, in spite of his predilection for finding actual examples of the primitive, nonetheless initially acknowledged the non-existence of the primitive; in Vers une Architecture, he wrote, ‘There is no such thing as primitive man; there are primitive resources. The idea is constant, in full sway from the beginning’’ 16 – yet 8
Primitive
nonetheless he too goes on to identify extant ‘primitive’ buildings in remote parts of France, and to make these his architectural paradigm. If we are to answer the question of ‘where is the primitive?’, then we can say that it is either nowhere, or perhaps more accurately, everywhere. However, architecture has always found it hard to accept this non-specific, nonlocatable property of the ‘primitive’, and instead of just leaving at what it is, an idea, insists upon going and hunting out actual built examples. As soon as we do this, we lose sight of the model, and become absorbed in the actual qualities of these real buildings. If that was the first thing to be said about architecture’s compulsion always to locate the primitive in the here and now, in the familiar, the second goes back to my surprise that architects and architectural writers never seem to have to apologize for using the word ‘primitive’. If the primitive is local, if it is so ready-to-hand, if all you have to do to discover the primitive is to go and find an old railway carriage sitting in an orchard, then the primitive loses much of its strangeness. For ethnographers and anthropologists the attraction of studying remote tribes is to find something so distant from what we already know that we will be able to re-examine all that we believe to be true about our own society. The anthropologists’ dream is to discover a tribe that has never before had contact with western civilization, that is wholly uncontaminated by the values of other cultures, and then to see in what respects it corresponds to, and in what respects it differs from our own. This dream has of course been unrealizable for over a century, possibly even from the start of ethnography, but that does not take away the longing. The strange, the exotic, the unknown, are precisely what makes the primitive fascinating to the anthropologist. However, architecture, as we have seen, has never really exploited the distance of the primitive, its otherness, its exoticism; Semper did not even go to the West Indies to find his Caribbean hut; it was there, ready, waiting for him in the Great Exhibition of 1851. The facility with which architects have been able to find the ‘primitive’ near at hand means that they have never really made use of the primitive to go outside the immediate surroundings of the present. It is this, I think – the ease with which architects have been able to locate the primitive within the familiar, within their own time and culture – that has made apologies for using the word seem irrelevant. If the primitive is just down the road, there is no assumption of cultural superiority or condescension in so naming it. Of course, one of the consequences of this overfamiliarity of the ‘primitive’ within architecture and its lack of distance, is that the primitive has not been exploited to the full. If, as I have suggested, following Lévi-Strauss, part of the force, part of the value of the primitive comes from its distance from western culture, from being both far and near, then architecture has not been able to take advantage of this;
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and we can say that, in a way, the ‘primitive’ remains an underdeveloped concept within architecture. The final theme to consider is the purpose of the primitive in architecture – and here we are looking at the word rather than the thing. When we look at words, the most interesting thing about them is not what they mean, always in doubt, but rather what their job is. Whatever the job ‘primitive’ does in architecture, it must be something big, because you are unlikely to find an architect who does not subscribe to the importance of the primitive. Recognition of the primitive is more or less a reflex action for architects; if you met an architect who told you that the primitive did not matter, or was irrelevant, your first reaction would be, almost certainly, that they could not be serious, that they were having you on. For an architect, having an eye for the primitive shows that you are sensitive to all the things that are not right about contemporary architecture, and that you are aware of the shortcomings of advanced technological culture. Denying interest in the primitive would be suspect because it would suggest an unhealthy complacency about the present. For that reason, the primitive is, so to speak, a compulsory article of faith in the catalogue of any architect’s range of interests. The only person I have come across to have questioned this was Reyner Banham, who, in 1965, at the end of a scathing review of Bernard Rudofsky’s Architecture Without Architects (about which more in a moment) wrote, ‘primitive buildings have only the most marginal and superficial things to teach us’. However, Banham was not really indifferent to primitive buildings, and what in fact he was actually attacking in the review was the convention that architects ought to be interested in primitive buildings. The remark belonged to Banham’s long-standing contempt for the architectural establishment, for what he saw as its complacency with its own traditions; you can tell this from the start of the review: ‘the practitioners of this oldest and most sophisticated of technological arts never fail to drool with delight when confronted with buildings they can describe (however inaccurately) as primitive, rude, vernacular or anonymous’.17 Banham’s point was that if architects, instead of going into raptures about the purity of the forms of peasant dwellings, bothered to look more closely, they would see that ‘primitive’ means squalid and disease-infested, and that we are well rid of it. What, apart from sustaining the architectural belief system, does the ‘primitive’ do? The work of ‘primitive’ has always been to set up an opposition to prevailing norms of taste by appealing to something original, far away, and yet at the same time near at hand. More recently, this opposition has extended to include the exotic, and all kinds of building not produced by professional architects: ‘vernacular’ and ‘anonymous’ building and bricoleur activity of all kinds. Covering an extraordinarily wide range, ‘primitive’ is certainly not a precise 10
Primitive
word; nor has this inexactness disadvantaged it. The real value of the primitive is not so much in what it describes – or fails to describe – but in drawing attention to our own investment in a highly developed, advanced architecture, by its relationship to an alternative, and not necessarily actually existing state of affairs where progress is not valued or is entirely disregarded. Primitive is a mirror: to quote Marianna Torgovnick, ‘For Euro-Americans, to study the primitive brings us always back to ourselves, which we reveal in the act of defining the Other’.18 In architecture, the principal purpose of the primitive, and we have to include with this all its synonyms – ‘savage’, ‘barbarian’, ‘anonymous’, ‘vernacular’ – has been, as Joseph Rykwert says, to renew architecture. ‘The primitive hut … has provided … a point of reference for all speculation on the essentials of building. These speculations intensify when the need is felt for a renewal of architecture’.19 We can go further than this and draw a distinction in the way people have used the primitive – between those who have used it in an affirmative way, so as to point to the continuity of an architectural tradition, and those who have used it in a subversive way, so as to question the values of architecture. Adolf Loos, whom I have mentioned already, illustrates the subversive use of the primitive. Le Corbusier’s use of the primitive, on the other hand, is entirely affirmative, for his references to primitive building are all devoted to showing the existence of eternal values in architecture. What these eternal values were for Le Corbusier changed over time: in the early 1920s, his references to primitive are all devoted to showing that ‘geometry was the language of man’, that geometric proportions were the eternal, timeless basis of architecture. Le Corbusier’s use of the primitive belongs in the tradition of classical theorists of architecture; just like Laugier, he uses it to criticize present abuses by asserting an original model from which architecture has deviated. It is affirmative in the sense that it suggests that architecture has a tradition, with values present since earliest times. This is by far the most common way in which primitive has been used in architecture and there are many examples of it. Siegfried Giedion is another example. In a text written in 1953, he starts ‘We do not regard primitive civilisations from the point of view of an advanced technology’ – though the denial only confirms that this is exactly the viewpoint that is taken for granted – and he continues ‘We realise that they can teach us forms that can be used to express specific social, territorial, and spiritual conditions. From this our social imagination may be able to form an aesthetic unity’.20 In other words, the ‘primitive’ provides the source of the authentic human values that Giedion argued were central to architecture. The subversive use of the primitive in architecture is much less common; Adolf Loos is a rare example. In this respect, architecture is quite unlike other art practices, particularly painting and sculpture, where the primitive has always been made use of to destabilize the tradition of western art. 11
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Gauguin’s discovery of the primitive in Tahiti, Picasso’s interest in African masks, the German expressionist painters’ interest in African sculptors, the surrealists’ interest in tribal imagery, were all subversions of traditional values in art: in no case were they intended to affirm eternal values of art. Instead, they were intended either to threaten bourgeois taste, by revealing a more direct form of expression uncontaminated by cultural over-sophistication, or to assert the presence of the irrational and the unconscious underlying art practice. More recently, in what Hal Foster calls ‘the ethnographic turn’, artists have taken to identifying themselves with ethnic minorities, a primitive ‘other’, so as to draw attention to the assumption of cultural superiority implicit in western art.21 In each successive case, the primitive has been invoked in order to put pressure upon whatever convention of western art was seen at the time as most stultifying. In architecture, the primitive has rarely been used subversively, and the reason for this may be either because primitive architecture has presented fewer opportunities of this kind, or because of the traditional belief that good architecture has always been in touch with the primitive, that the primitive has always belonged to architecture. One architect who invoked the ‘primitive’ with, so he claimed, subversive intentions, was Bernard Rudofsky, in his 1964 exhibition and book, Architecture Without Architects. In the introduction he asserted that it was not just a book of pretty photographs, but ‘that it marks a point of departure for the examination of our architectural prejudices. It is frankly polemic, comparing as it does, if only by implication, the serenity of the architecture in so-called underdeveloped countries with the architectural blight in industrial countries’.22 Rudofsky’s idea was that although the primitive was present in the early phase of modern architecture, it had subsequently been repressed.23 While these ideas about the primitive might have been polemical when Rudofsky first became interested in the primitive in the 1920s and 1930s in Vienna and then in Italy, by the 1960s they were no longer so.24 By 1964 Team X had been enthusing over primitive architecture for over ten years, and Aldo van Eyck had made his famous visit to the Dogon. The travels of van Eyck and of others associated with Team X had put primitive architecture fairly firmly back on the agenda, and, indeed, we can see the effects of it in Dutch structuralism and elsewhere – but none of this was particularly subversive. I have introduced Rudofsky because, in the fairly extensive recent writing about him, we might expect to find the most up-to-date thinking about the primitive in architecture. Here I am disappointed: Felicity Scott takes at face value Rudofsky’s claim to make the primitive polemical, and does not question it. The evidence, however, including Banham’s review, suggests Rudofsky was less polemical than he himself thought.
12
Primitive
All in all, it is surprising how unsubversive the primitive has been in architecture. I cannot help thinking that the way the primitive has been used in architecture has always been astonishingly tame – it has never been dangerous, it has never been the primitive of, say Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, and it has never been allowed to threaten the basic values of architecture. Early Gothic architecture, as interpreted by Ruskin, was far more truly savage, far more disturbing to the established tradition of architecture than have been any number of straw or mud huts, wigwams or igloos. The full potential of the primitive, that is to be more than a source of pleasing effects and formal inspiration, but rather something downright horrifying, has never been realized. The ‘primitive’ in architecture has remained – dare I say it – primitive.
Notes 1 See, for example, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, Claire Jacobsen and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (trans.) New York and London: Basic Books, 1963 (first published 1958), pp.101–2. 2 See, for example, William Rubin (ed.) Primitivism in Twentieth Century Art, vol. 1, New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1984, pp. 5–6. For reactions to Rubin, see Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive. Savage Intellects, Modern Lives, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. 3 These are the words used by Bernard Rudofsky, Architecture Without Architects, New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1964, p. 2. 4 Marc Antoine Laugier, Essai sur l’Architecture, 2nd edn, Paris: Duchesne, 1755 (first published 1753 and reprinted, Paris: Mardaga, 1979), p. 8; and Marc-Antoine Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Wolfgang Herrmann and Anni Herrmann (trans.), Los Angeles: Hennessey & Ingalls, 1977, p. 11. 5 Sir William Chambers, A Treatise on the Decorative Part of Civil Architecture, London: Joseph Smeaton, 1791, p. 16. 6 Gottfried Semper, The Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings (1851), H. F. Mallgrave and W. Herrmann (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 102. ‘Primitive conditions’ is a translation of Urzustände, which, like Chambers’ or Soane’s ‘primitive’, means ‘at the origins’, though with perhaps the added sense of a beginning that continues as the hidden essence of the thing. 7 Semper, Four Elements, p. 111. 8 Ibid., pp. 247–8. 9 Adolf Loos, ‘Ornament and Crime’ (1908), in W. Wang (trans.), The Architecture of Adolf Loos, London: Arts Council, 1985, p. 103. 10 Vitruvius, De Architectura, F. Granger (trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, Bk. II, ch. 1.4. 11 Le Corbusier, Une Maison un Palais, Paris: Editions Crés, 1928, pp. 48–50. 12 Le Corbusier, Precisions (1930), E. S. Aujame (trans.), Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1991, p. 9. 13 Siegfried Giedion, ‘Aesthetics and the Human Habitat’ (1953) in S. Giedion, Architecture You and Me, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958, p. 96. 14 See Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (1955), vol. 1, pp. 101–2; and Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, John and Doreen Weightman (trans.), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, ch. 38. 15 Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, pp. 513–14.
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16 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, F. Etchells (trans.), London: Architectural Press, 1927, p. 66. 17 Reyner Banham, ‘Nobly Savage Non-Architects’, New Society, 2 September 1965, 6: 153. 18 Torgovnick, Gone Primitive, p. 11. 19 Joseph Rykwert, On Adam’s House in Paradise, New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1972, p. 183. 20 Giedion, ‘Aesthetics and the Human Habitat’, p. 96. 21 Hal Foster, The Return of the Real, Cambridge MA and London, 1996, ch. 6, ‘The Artist as Ethnographer’. 22 Rudofsky, Architecture without Architects, p. 3. 23 Felicity Scott, ‘Bernard Rudofsky: Allegories of Nomadism and Dwelling’, in S. W. Goldhagen and R. Légault (eds) Anxious Modernisms, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, p. 237, fn.74. 24 Felicity Scott, ‘"Primitive Wisdom" and Modern Architecture’, Journal of Architecture 1998, 3(3): 253; and Scott, ‘Bernard Rudofsky: Allegories of Nomadism and Dwelling’, p. 216.
14
Part 2 Negotiating origins
Chapter 2
The primitive as modern problem Invention and crisis Dalibor Vesely
The notion of the primitive is a relatively new phenomenon. Its modern understanding would have no relevance before the eighteenth century, when it had a very different meaning and was known under different names. The currency it has today is as a result of the development of modern culture and it should be seen not as something obvious and positive, but as an invention, as a symptom of crisis, and an attempt to come to terms with the crisis. In contemporary usage the term ‘primitive’ seems to have two primary meanings: one, related to the cultural nature of the primitive; the second, to its chronological meaning. The first meaning is defined by a particular place of the primitive in the achieved levels of the civilizational process. In that process primitive is usually seen as less developed, as retrograde, as a symptom of nostalgia or regressive utopia The first is closely linked with the second meaning, which is chronological, in other words, temporal and historical. In the temporal sense the primitive, as the term already indicates, is related to ancient primitivus, meaning the first, or ‘primordium’ meaning the origin or beginning. In well-balanced cultures the primitive or primordial is integrated with the rest of culture and serves as its foundation and ground. In traditional societies the process of integration takes a form of regular renewal of the link between the more advanced strata of culture and the foundations in the primordial level of reality. Typical forms of renewal are religious ceremonies, rituals, mythical and poetic narratives, theatre and art in general, but also reflective thinking in the form of philosophy or theology. The process of integration can be described as a continuity of reference between the more abstract levels of a particular culture and its ground. 17
Dalibor Vesely
2.1 Man Ray, Black and White, 1926 Source: Man Ray Trust/ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2006
The primitive, as we know it today, has its origin in the discontinuity of the process of integration (Figure 2.1). In such a situation the foundations of culture do not disappear but take a form of an alienated and distant reality, which asks for a special treatment and also for a new name. It is only under these conditions that such distinctions as elementary–cultivated, primitive–civilized and so on can be made, and the emancipated primitive reality can stand in contrast to the rest of culture. The first signs of cultural discontinuity and thus a possibility of speaking about the primitive in modern terms, can be seen in the sequence of renaissances known also as renovatio or rinascimento – new beginning. The process culminated in the sixteenth century, when the so-called primitive people and societies were for the first time discovered. The ‘discovery’ of the primitive was supported by the awareness of progress, manifested in the battle of the ancients and the moderns, followed by the confrontation of the problematic nature of highly advanced civilization and the virtues of the primitive societies embodied in the notion of bon sauvage, the historicism and the theory of evolution in the nineteenth century and the clear sense of a new beginning in the twentieth century. At the time of the avant-gardes of the twentieth century the primitive was elevated to the status of a movement known as primitivism.
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The primitive as modern problem
History of the primitive In the classical tradition there is no room for the primitive in the modern sense. We find in its place reference to origins in the form of the myth of creation (Greek mythology, orphic tradition) turned later into cosmogonic speculations (Hesiod’s Theogony) and finally into cosmology and philosophy addressing the question of origins, using such terms as arche or, more explicitly, a rational version of arche known as aition – cause or source. On a most general level the primordial, or in other words the original, is discussed as the question of Being which is still with us today. There is no need to speak about the oscillation between the higher level of culture represented by the city and civic life and the more natural level of culture, exemplified in the tendency to move away from the cultivated life of the city as it was adopted, for instance, by the Cynics, Epicureans and Stoics. It is instead important to realize, that all these tendencies and movements appeared in the epoch of Hellenism, a time of deep cultural crisis. In the Christian tradition the question of origins was absorbed in the story of creation linked closely with cosmology. The equivalent of the primordial, or the primitive, was represented by the state of innocence in the paradise which once was. The paradise at the beginning of the biblical time was the Christian analogy of the classical golden age at the beginning of time from which everything that follows is derived and is seen as less perfect. The effort to preserve the continuity between the achieved levels of culture and the natural foundations of culture continued, more or less uninterrupted until the eighteenth century. The continuity was challenged in the sixteenth century, but only seriously so during the Enlightenment.
The emergence of the primitive The tendency that contributed to the discontinuity of the traditional culture and to the emergence of the primitive was the process of individualization manifested most clearly in the Renaissance villa. In its early history the Renaissance villa represents a flight from the city to the country and nature but at the same time it aims to provide a perfect equivalent of the city. This apparent contradiction is the very essence of the modernity of the villa. The origin of the modern villa is associated with a deep sense of political crisis sensed in the villa literature of the period. Giuseppe Falcone writes: It seems to me that the city, if I am not mistaken, for the most part today is nothing other than a patent theatre of misery and filled with every infelicity, and so it happens in those persons in which the good and blessed life because of sloth [otio] lapses and languishes.1
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The desire to move closer to the country can best be understood on cultural and religious grounds, as part of the historicism and naturalism of the period of the Reformation. ‘The life in the country is much older and therefore much more noble than that of the city’.2 This is a typical argument legitimizing the villa and the whole movement known as villeggiatura, by the authority of history. The Reformation and the villa movement shared a similar aim: to abolish all mediating links and institutions that might influence the direct communication with God and ‘divine’ nature. As a result: The villa is a world at rest with itself. Evil has been banished to the distant city. It was precisely because of this, that the domain of the villa could become a paradise. The paradise is now founded on the trust in the stability of the moral individual.3 It is in this context that we can understand the references to villa as ‘locus amoenus’ or ‘paradiso terrestris’ which appear so often in contemporary literature. What is meant by such references is a place where man can cultivate his humanity and find his salvation. The goal of the solitary life – vita solitaria – in the villa is not asceticism but the consistent cultivation of one’s self. Cultural crisis, solitary life and the turn to the primitive belong together. The next important contribution to the emergence of the primitive was the idea of progress, closely linked with the new historical awareness in which the present generation was seen as different and potentially better than the previous or ancient. This new confidence was most explicitly manifested in the famous battle of the ancients and moderns. The major disputants in the quarrel used usually one of three arguments: that knowledge is cumulative and therefore the moderns superseded the ancients; that modern men are the real ancients and in many ways better than them; or that the human race is like a single man, a giant with a dwarf on his shoulders. The last argument was expressed most clearly by Pascal in one of his Pensées: The whole sequence of mankind during so many centuries should be considered as a single man continually existing and continually learning. At each stage of his life this universal man profited by the knowledge he had acquired in the preceding stages, and he is now in his old age.4 This opened the question we can ask even today: if the earlier civilizations in their childhood were younger or older than we are. The debate between the old and new created a duality that would soon be seen as a duality between the modern as cultivated and progressive and the ancient as primitive and regressive. This vision was based on the assumption that all experience and
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The primitive as modern problem
knowledge are cumulative. The fact that they are not was expressed later in the eighteenth century in new terms, familiar to us as ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’. The distinction between these two terms is made commonly in reference to their modes of development, according to which civilization, defined most often as ‘techniques’, is a continuous and cumulative process, susceptible to generalizing methods of natural science and capable of universal diffusion. Culture on the other hand, defined most often as ‘creativity’, occurring as unique, is not susceptible to these methods and is not transferable. The qualitatively different development of culture can follow the progressive development of civilization only to a limited extent. Culture then appears very often as anachronism, stagnation or even regress. It was in this, not always well-understood, discrepancy between the development of civilization and culture that the modern notion of the primitive was finally formed. In the new situation the cultural and the chronological meaning of the primitive became practically identical, and the primitive could be used as an antithesis to civilization, either as a confirmation of the superiority of civilization or as a critique of its malaise. The close link between the primitive and the natural or Nature may explain the vast amount of literature devoted to the subject during the eighteenth century. However, in spite of its complexity and extent, the content of the literature was dominated mostly by two characteristic attitudes to the primitive – one, based on the assumption that the primitive state of the society is close to the golden age and speaks therefore about the unspoiled truth of reality and the natural goodness of man; the second attitude can be described as anti-primitive, in which the primitive is seen as a brutal and miserable form of existence with no sign of civilization; in fact it is seen as the other side of civilization (Figure 2.2). This polarization of the primitive is reflected in the romantic construct of the natural man and society, exemplified in the appeal of a simple life in far-away places, which may be termed exotic, and which may be characterized by the praise of ‘the noble savage’. This phrase was introduced into the English language, probably for the first time, by Dryden in his ‘Conquest of Granada’, where we find the following lines: I am as free as Nature first made man, Ere the base laws of servitude began, When wild in woods the noble savage ran.5 In the description of the famous journey of the Bougainville around the world, the author de Fréville described the South Sea islands as ‘a happy land’, with ‘the best built and most handsome inhabitants one could ever see. The women especially seemed to have been embellished with all the graces’. More important, de Fréville also found among these islanders ‘humanity, rectitude, and the frankness of the Golden Age’.6 Lord Monboddo, similarly, observed in his Of the 21
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2.2 The Kanaka Village, New Caledonia, Exposition Universelle, Paris 1889 Source: Le Monde Illustré, 27 June 1889
Origin and Progress of Language that the ‘golden age may be said yet to exist … in the South Sea, where the inhabitants live, without toil or labour, upon the bounty of nature in those fine climates’.7 The anti-primitive attitude can be illustrated with similar quotations but for the sake of space and time I shall mention only one example. Apologists of the slave trade used a brutish stereotype of a slave to argue that the blacks were better off as slaves in the New World than in the cruel environment of their native Africa.8 A former governor of Jamaica, Philip Thicknesse, based racism upon biology. In his Memoirs and Anecdotes he admitted that Negroes are ‘a species of the human race …[but of] … an inferior and very different order’. Their bile, he observed, is black; that of the white man, yellow, ‘proof their being of a very distinct race of the human kind’.9 This attitude was reinforced by social Darwinism, which led through the unfortunate link of the primitive with race to the monstrous consequences of the modern totalitarian regimes. The critical steps in this development were the slave trade, the colonial mentality and experience, the biological interpretation of culture and the general tendency towards a scientistic understanding of life. This development, together with the positive attitude to the primitive was reflected in the problematic nature of the newly created collections and museums of primitive art, the foundation of ethnographic and anthropological institutions and university departments.
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The primitive as modern problem
From the primitive to Primitivism It was mainly in the domain of art that the primitive was transformed into primitivism. Primitivism is a completely new phenomenon that could not have come to existence before the end of the nineteenth century. Only then did the inner development of European art reach a level of autonomy and creative freedom that made it possible to move from imitation to an independent creation and selfexpression. The best way to illustrate the nature of primitivism is by looking at differences in the representation of a subject dear to everybody interested in the primitive. Such a subject was the life of the child. The interest was based on the belief that the history of individual men reproduces the history of the race and that if we wish to understand what has happened to mankind since the Fall, we have only to watch the child as it matures. It gradually loses its primeval innocence and innate wisdom; the same happens in the society as a whole. It was partly for that reason, that the representation of children became such a favourite subject for the artists of the nineteenth century, particularly for the Romantics. In his painting Earth Children Otto Runge represents earth as a female deity surrounded by children in a quasi cosmic setting. Paul Klee, in sharp contrast to Runge, is not interested in the external image of the child, but in how a child would draw or paint. This is highly significant. The possibility for an artist of a very sophisticated culture to move into the world of a child and simulate its mode of creativity depends on a radically new vision of creativity associated closely with the new vision of an avant-garde artist as a new kind of creator-genius. The generation of artists at the beginning of the twentieth century believed that there is a close affinity between the manifestation of the creative powers of nature and genius. The genius eventually comes to be seen as the sole expression of that creativity. The concept of genius represents a transition from a long tradition of creative imitation to self-expression. In this transition the unity of representation, sustained by the communicative space of culture, was replaced by fragmentary individual achievements aspiring to represent the world in its wholeness. In its original sense, genius was a power of inspiration, invention and creativity derived either from the divine or from nature and known as ingenium – hence ingenium loci.10 It was through the appropriation of the ingenium and through its identification with the qualities of exceptional individuals that the modern notion of genius came into existence.11 In the Romantic understanding, later taken up by the expressionists and surrealists: The creativity which brought forth independent and organically evolved works of art was given to the artist by great creative nature, the productive force and originating spirit in the centre of life. The artist could create like nature, because, being a force of this creative nature, he possessed in his soul an unconscious formative power 23
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which enabled him to identify himself with the formative energies of the world.12 The formative energies of nature extended now to art were exemplified in the process of crystallization, very often referred to in the period of art nouveau and immediately after. Following the idealistic vision of creativity, the Viennese art historian Alois Riegl writes, ‘All artistic creation is thus essentially nothing other than a competition with nature [ … ] And the fundamental law according to which nature forms dead matter is that of crystallisation’13 (Figure 2.3). Crystallization is seen by Riegl as a cosmic principle which brings together nature and art. In the opening ceremony of the exhibition Ein Dokument deutscher Kunst, on the Mathildenhöhe in Darmstadt, (1901) a ‘prophet’ exhibiting a large crystal recited, ‘This is the symbol of a new life, in this sign it is disclosed, young souls, young year, the time has arrived, you have not waited in vain.’14 The symbol of the crystal in the early twentieth century plays the role of mediator in the battle against historicism; it is a symbolic transmitter in the move towards abstraction as the revelation/constitution of absolute truth. In the retrospective assessment of the early avant-garde, influenced very strongly by French cubism, Ozenfant writes: On the whole and in spite of personal coefficients one can detect a tendency which might be described metaphorically as a tendency towards the crystal. The crystal in nature is one of the phenomena that touch us most, because it clearly exemplifies its movement towards geometrical organisation. Nature sometimes reveals to us how its forms are built up by the interplay of internal and external forces. The crystal grows and stops growing, in accordance with the theoretical forms of geometry; man takes delight in these forms
2.3 W. Hablik, The Crystal Palace in the Sea, 1914
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because he finds in them what seems to be a confirmation for his abstract geometrical concepts. Nature and the human mind find common ground in the crystal as they do in the cell and as they do wherever order is so perceptible to the human senses that it confirms those laws which human reason loves to propound in order to explain nature. In genuine cubism there is something organic, which proceeds outwards from within.15 The process of crystallization is the clearest manifestation of the primitive mode of creativity that ‘proceeds outwards from within’. The ‘proceeding outwards from within’ shows that primitivism is not a return to origins but an attempt to be original, to be the origins. Paul Klee again: ‘I want to be as though new-born, knowing nothing about Europe, knowing no pictures, entirely without impulse, almost in an original state … one wanted to seize life at its lowest levels, at its origins.’16 This tendency can be summarized by a typical expressionist aim to reach the secret place where primeval power nurtures all evolution. It is important to emphasize that primitivism is not necessarily primitive, nor is it a primitive art. It is a search for the primordial, essential and original mode of creativity. ‘I draw and paint’, writes Emil Nolde, ‘to grasp something of the primal essence’.17 The child-like quality of many expressionists’ paintings, cannot be described as primitive; they are a result of a highly sophisticated form of primitivism. This is quite clearly reflected in the admiration for the paintings of Henri Rousseau, which Kandinsky describes as ‘magic realism’. He writes: ‘Henri Rousseau, who can be designated the father of this realism, has shown the way … his versatile talent is, for the moment, the most important to us’.18
Primitivism as a form of emancipation The admiration of Henri Rousseau, as well as the very much discussed inspiration derived from primitive art, did not serve as real inspiration but rather as a confirmation of the Primitivist artist’s own effort. Paul Klee makes this very clear when he says, If my pictures sometimes make a primitive impression, it is because of my discipline in reducing everything to a few steps. It is only economy, or if you like, the highest professional sensitivity; in fact the precise opposite of the primitive.19 This statement is a clear illustration of the fundamental difference between primitivism and the primitive. It shows that primitivism is an artificial modern phenomenon, while the primitive is a vague residuum of the Enlightenment
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and Romantic understanding of the past, of the origins and of the elementary. In the final judgement the primitive can be seen as an external understanding of its own nature, as something to approximate or imitate. The essence of primitivism, on the other hand, is in the creative process, motivated by the search for originality and universality. What makes the primitive and primitivism truly primitive are not external characteristics, but the negation of history, inherited tradition and culture. If we accept this understanding of primitivism, then we can find it in areas of modern art and architecture where it is not apparent or expected, for instance in Malevich, who describes the non-figurative elements of his paintings as ‘the primitive marks on the body of the aboriginal man,20 or in some contemporary high-tech structures that follow the principles of elementary growth or movement, for example the work of Calatrava. A good example illustrating the nature of modern primitivism is the work of Hans Scharoun. In his Berlin ‘Philharmonie’, the main hall was no doubt deeply influenced by the history of music auditoria and yet Scharoun describes the process of its making as a direct dialogue with the nature of music and with the nature of space seen as a landscape. He writes: The construction follows the pattern of a landscape with the auditorium seen as a valley and there at its bottom is the orchestra surrounded by a sprawling vineyard climbing the sides of its neighbouring hills. The ceiling, resembling a tent, encounters the landscape like a skyscape. 21 The indeterminate, changing perceptual structure of the concert hall is held together by the constructive imagination of the architect and the musical experience of the audience. It is interesting to see how early Scharoun anticipated the close link between his own imagination and public experience. In one of his drawings for the ‘Glass Chain’, he illustrates the place and the role of the artist among the people, his ability to embody and represent their will and elevate it to the higher level of what he calls a ‘spiritual’ existence.22 The image can be complemented by his statement: ‘Do we reach pure creativity through reflection, through knowledge? No – man is the centre.’23 What is meant by ‘man’ here is, no doubt, the architect himself as a creative genius. It is a sign of the avant-garde mentality that the architect sees himself as a sole agent, fully responsible for everything related to creativity. This illusion culminates in the belief that the world is essentially his own world. Everything created under such conditions is bound to be unique and yet claims are often made for a universal validity of the result. This paradox can be sustained only by a self-centred culture, prepared to share this paradox as a norm. The same paradox illustrates the nature of modern primitivism, which is 26
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closely linked with a subjective mode of creativity, while at the same time it characterizes the common culture of the whole epoch. The concentration on private experience, imagination and fantasy contradicts the very nature of architecture, which is always open to a shared public culture; and yet in some recent tendencies architecture is created in a way similar to surrealist automatism or to the automatism of action painting. The architects of the Coop Himmelblau Partnership are very much aware of this affinity when they say ‘We conceive of architecture which would engage complicated human procedures and psyches and which would represent a personal statement, with all the attendant strengths and weaknesses implied – not unlike the way art is made.’ The main precondition of such an approach is a full emancipation from the historical precedents and the continuity of tradition. In the author’s own words: It is a kind of release from fixed ideas … and for that reason we never talk about architecture for fear that inhibitions about what is possible functionally or what others have done before us in similar circumstances will creep in … We have to be self-monitoring, or else we could get side-tracked. We avoid analysis, but remain aware of our bodies and our hearts.24 This highly introverted approach brings us not only to the heart of modern primitivism but also to the very essence of surrealism. In surrealism, as we know, creativity is oriented towards the pre-reflective-unconscious reality. The surrealists were deeply convinced that man had lost his vital contact with reality, and that his primordial links with nature are as important for his social and cultural life as is a dream for the life of the individual. They also believed that the return of culture to its archaic origins was as crucial for the sanity of mankind as is a return to oneself in a dream. The primordial or primitive side of surrealism is well illustrated in Max Ernst’s The Eye of Silence (Figure 2.4). The landscape in the painting is not a vision of an ordinary human eye but rather, of an insect surrounded by a threatening nature. The latent meaning of the painting is very rich but cryptic. The significance of the single eye refers to the subhuman because it is less than two and, given its location, it alludes to the extra human powers that are in mythology incarnated in Cyclops. Architecture was not a very critical subject for the surrealists and yet they found some already existing buildings fascinating. One of them was the ‘Palais Ideal’ of the postman Cheval, who became for the surrealists what Henri Rousseau was for the cubists. ‘What has always passionately summoned me in such works’, wrote André Breton, ‘is their explosive disdain, their self-generation entirely outside the cultural line assigned to our epoch’.25 In his autobiography Cheval describes the origins of the idea of the ‘Palais’: ‘I have built a palais, chateau or grottoes in a dream. I can’t express it very well, but it was so pretty, 27
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2.4 Max Ernst, The Eye of Silence, 1943 Source: ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2006
picturesque that for ten years it remained ingrained in my memory and I couldn’t shake it off.’26 The decision to build the Palais, Cheval describes as being initiated by accident, coming across a bizarre stone on the road: It was a sculpture of bizarre shape that it would be impossible for man to imitate; it represented all species of animals and all species of caricatures. I said to myself if nature can make sculptures, I could make masonry and architecture, this is my dream.27 The ultimate goal of the surrealists was to grasp the mystery of life revealed through automatism as the spontaneity of desire, and the mystery of the world revealed through objective chance as the spontaneity of nature manifested in crystal. The role of crystal in surrealists’ thinking appears in Breton’s short comment: ‘The great secret of the environment of things and of our own freedom in relation to these things can be discovered in this way: the crystal possesses the key to every liberty.’28 The vision of the crystal appears at the end of the surrealist exploration of the human unconscious, at the end of a journey which started with the interpretation of dreams, hallucinations and automatic writing in the interior, went through the city, discovering there objective chance and the poetics of encounters and led finally to the subterranean world of the cave, to discover there the ultimate mystery of creation in the crystal. The crystal became an essence and substitute of everything that can be seen in nature and also an inspiration to move beyond imitation and perception to the level of pure creation.
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This brings us back to our earlier discussion of the process of crystallization as a paradigm of primitivism and the role of crystal in the art of the twentieth century. The vision of the crystal played a decisive role already in art nouveau, later in expressionism, cubism and surrealism, but became most conspicuous in the architecture of expressionism. So far, the less-known beginnings of expressionist architecture in Prague are, from our point of view, most revealing and interesting. The unusual and in many ways provocatively unique treatment of the architectural body and space – the use of crystalline forms, the geometrical articulation of surfaces and the attempt to reduce spatial problems to the problems of plane or relief – was motivated by the attempt to achieve an emancipation from illusionistic perspectival representation, to overcome historicism and to grasp the ‘truth’ of reality on its most primordial level (Figure 2.5). The architect Pavel Janak, one of the main protagonists of the movement, outlined the main principles of the new architecture in his seminal text ‘The Prism and the Pyramid’.29 The text is based on the assumption, taken mostly from Wilhelm Worringer (Abstraction and Empathy) and other sources, that European architecture is defined by two traditions, one classical in the south, represented by horizontality and verticality exemplified by the prism, the other Christian in the north, represented by forces that challenge the inertia of matter and are exemplified most clearly in gothic and baroque art.30 The best example of forces that move matter beyond its natural state is in crystallization, not influenced by matter and gravity. The oblique, diamond-like shaped planes of the crystal represent a movement that transforms the passive natural reality into an animated, more abstract and thus a spiritual reality. The highest
2.5 J. Chochol, Villa in Prague-Vysehrad, detail, 1912–13. Source: Dalibor Vesely
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2.6 Daniel Libeskind, Victoria & Albert Museum, extension, 1998
form of spiritually abstracted matter is the pyramid. The content of the text illustrates very well the general tendency of primitivism to reduce the whole body of culture to the most elementary generic principles from which, it was believed, the new culture would grow. It may be interesting, as a final point, to see just visually the spectrum of different forms of primitivism manifested in the phenomenon of crystallization, from the first romantic precedents through the symbolists and art nouveau examples to its continuity in cubism and expressionism and its reappearance in contemporary deconstructivism and neo-expressionism (Figure 2.6). The language of contemporary authors is very often too obscure and it is necessary therefore to read between the lines to understand their true meaning. Daniel Libeskind has this to say about his own way of thinking and approach: Architecture is neither on the inside nor the outside. It is not a given nor a physical fact. It has no history and it does not follow fate. What emerges in differentiated experience is architecture as an index of the relationship between what was and what will be. Architecture as nonexistent reality is a symbol, which, in the process of consciousness, leaves a trail of hieroglyphs in space and time that touch an equivalent depth of originality.31 The depth of originality in the text coincides quite clearly with the depth of contemporary primitivism.
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Conclusion The primitive in the form of primitivism is not a peripheral or secondary phenomenon. It grew out of the depth of modern culture of which it is the main characteristic. The influence of primitive art and other external influences was only marginal and can be seen more as a confirmation of the already existing tendency rather than as a generative influence. This is illustrated well by Picasso: ‘The African sculptures that hang around my studio are more witnesses than models.’32 The current use and misuse of the term primitive should be seen in terms of its shallow and deep meaning. The shallow meaning refers usually to the origins, return to nature, more elementary, primitive way of life or to the earlier stages of civilization. The deep meaning is what I have tried to outline in this paper. Before we indulge in tracing the shallow manifestations of the primitive, we should remember that such indulgence is not only futile, but could also be dangerous. There is probably nothing more dangerous in our time than a one-dimensional cultivation of the primitive, which sooner or later encounters what has been ignored but cannot be eliminated; that is, the given state of our civilization, its science and technology, its level of cultural development and general level of rationality. It is certainly not very clever to ignore the emancipatory tendency of the primitive, which leaves behind a large body of culture. The characteristic expressionist motto: ‘I would rather be barbarized than intellectualized’,33 can serve as a sobering reminder of the consequences that we have seen so many times during the last century and can see still today. We do not as yet understand fully the nature of these consequences, and what is really happening in the cultural space defined by the complementarity of modern primitivism and highly intellectualized culture.
Notes 1 Falcone, La Nuova Vaga et Dilettevole Villa, Brescia 1564, preface, fol. i; in J. S. Ackerman, The Villa, London: Thames & Hudson, 1990, p.113. 2 R. Bentmann and M. Muller, The Villa as Hegemonic Architecture, trans. by T. Spence and D. Cranem, London: Humanities Press, 1992, p. 113, n168. 3 B. Rupprecht, ‘Villa, zur Geschichte eines Ideals’ in Probleme der Kunstwissenschaft, vol. II, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1966, p. 244. 4 J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, London: Macmillan, 1924, p. 68. 5 John Dryden, The conquest of Granada by the Spaniards: in two parts, London: pr. by T. N. for H. Herringman, 1672. 6 Joseph Banks, Supplément au voyage de M. de Bougainville, ou Journal d’un voyage autour du monde fait par MM. Banks et Solander (Paris 1772). 7 James Burnet, Lord Monboddo, Of the Origin and Progress of Language (Edinburgh 1774), p. 3. 8 J. R. Constantine, ‘The Ignoble Savage, an Eighteenth Century Stereotype’, Phylon, 27, pp. 171–9.
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9 Philip Thicknesse, Memoirs and Anecdotes of Philip Thicknesse: Late Lieutenant Governor of Land Guard Fort, and Unfortunately Father to George Touchet, Baron Audley (London: printed for the author 1788), p. 24. 10 E. Grassi. ‘Ingenium und Scharfsinn’ in Die Macht der Fantasie, Frankfurt a. M.: Syndikat, 1984, pp. 65–70. 11 ‘Genius’, in R. G. Saisselin, The Rules of Reason and the Ruses of the Heart, Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1970, pp. 89–96; ‘Genie’ in P. E. Knabe, Schlüsselbegriffe des kunsttheoretischen Denkens in Frankreich, Dusseldorf: Verlag L. Schwann, 1972, pp. 204–38. 12 A. K. Wiedmann, Romantic Roots in Modern Art, Old Woking, Surrey: Gesham Books, 1979, p. 155. 13 Alois Riegl in Karl M. Swoboda and Otto Pacht (eds), Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste (Graz. privately printed 1966), p. 22. 14 Georg Fuchs, ‘Das Zeichen’, in Ein Dokument deutscher Kunst. Die Ausstellung der KünstlerKolonie in Darmstadt 1901. Festschrift (Munich 1901). 15 Amédée Ozenfant, Charles-Edouard Jeanneret, La Peinture Moderne, Paris: Cres, 1925, pp. 137– 8. 16 J. Spiller (ed.) The Thinking Eye. The Notebooks of Paul Klee, R. Mannheim (trans.), London: Lund Humphries, 1961, p. 95. 17 Emil Nolde, Jahre der Kampfe, Berlin: J. Bard, 1931, p. 177. 18 Wassily Kandinsky in Essays uber Künst und Künstler, 2n edn, M. Bill (ed.), Bern-Bumpliz: BenteliVerlag, 1963, pp. 42–3. 19 Paul Klee, The Thinking Eye, p. 451. 20 Kasimir Malevich, ‘Suprematism’ in Modern Artists on Art, L. Robert (ed.), New Jersey: Herbert, Prentice-Hall, 1964, p. 96. 21 Peter Blundell-Jones, Hans Scharoun, London: Academy Editions, 1995, p. 178. 22 E. Janofske, Architektur-Räume, Wiesbaden: F. Vieweg und Sohn, 1984, p. 35. 23 Ibid., pp. 137–8. 24 Coop Himmelblau, Blau Box, London: Architectural Association, 1988, p. 16. 25 André Breton, Arcane 17, Paris: Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1971, p. 51. Originally written 1944. 26 Dalibor Vesely, ‘Surrealism, Myth and Modernity’, in Architectural Design: 2–3 (Surrealism and Architecture) London: AD Profiles 11, 1978, p. 92. 27 Ibid. 28 André Breton, Surrealism and Painting, New York: Harper & Row, 1965, p. 205. 29 Pavel Janak, ‘Hranol a pyramida’ in Umelecky mesicnik, 1 (1911/12), pp. 162–70. 30 Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy. A Contribution to the Psychology of Style, Michael Bullock (trans.), London, 1953. 31 Daniel Libeskind, ‘Çountersign’, AD Academy Editions Architectural Monographs 1991, 16: 110. 32 Florent Fels, Les Nouvelles littéraires, artistiques et scientifiques, 4 August 1923, 42: 2. 33 A. K. Wiedmann, Romantic Roots in Modern Art, p. 245.
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Chapter 3
Origins redefined A tale of pigs and primitive huts Mari Hvattum
Eighteenth-century origin theory, as far as architecture is concerned, is somewhat like the story of the three little pigs. The first little pig built his house of straw, and was eaten by the wolf for his foolishness. The second little pig built his house of sticks. It withstood a little longer, but in the end the wolf huffed and puffed and blew it all down, and alas, the pig was eaten. The third little pig, however, was a sensible pig. He built his house of bricks, and saved his life. Permanence pays off; only with the arrival of the enduring and the monumental, can pigs – and architecture – rest safely (Figure 3.1). This little tale mirrors neoclassical theories of the origin of architecture in a remarkably precise way. The notion of the origin of architecture as a gradual evolution from precarious, inarticulate and primitive structures into a stable, permanent form is echoed in virtually all eighteenth-century origin tales, of which there are many. William Chambers’s Treatise of Civil Architecture from 1759, for instance, could well have served as an illustration for the pig-tale’s progression from straw to sticks to stone (Figure 3.2). Quatremère de Quincy introduced a slightly different version of this tripartite origin theory, in which the cave, the tent and the hut were seen as the gradually evolving origin-types of architecture. Yet the point remains that according to neoclassical theory, the history of architecture was founded on permanence – literally on monumentality, in the sense of ‘that which endures’. It was within this intellectual construct that the story of the primitive hut found its place in enlightenment thinking. The primitive hut was the precursor to architecture’s life-saving permanence in stone. There are several interesting assumptions underlying the enlightenment obsession with origins. One such assumption has to do with the autonomy 33
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3.1 ‘Then I’ll huff, and puff, and blow your house down!’ from The Three Little Pigs
of the architectural work. Just like the tale of the three pigs, neoclassical origin theory harbours a curious claim to autonomy on behalf of architecture. Establishing the ossified hut as an eternally valid paradigm, it construes architecture as an imitation of an original, architectural type. As Abbé Laugier wrote, ‘All the splendours of architecture ever conceived have been modelled on the little rustic hut I have just described. It is by approaching the simplicity of this first model that … true perfection is achieved’1 (Figure 3.3). This was 1753 and, for the first time, the meaning of architecture was seen as intrinsic to the work itself, unconnected to issues of representation, situation or action. As Caroline van Eck comments in her discussion of Laugier: The novelty in Laugier’s approach … lies in his attempt to break with the Renaissance tradition of mimesis, and define architecture not as a civic art, whose meaning lies in the decorous representation of social, religious or philosophical values, but as the material art of construction.2 In eighteenth-century thinking on architecture, as in eighteenth-century aesthetics in general, the work is legitimized by claiming for itself an absolute autonomy. From this point of view architecture is about architecture. It imitates its own types, adheres to its own laws, and can be judged by its own, intrinsic criteria – criteria which were set in stone in the eldest little pig’s primitive hut. This monumentalizing notion of the origin of architecture has been an influential one, deeply impacting on the twentieth-century discourse and practice of architecture. ‘Modern architecture had to go the hard way’, wrote 34
3.2 The development of architecture Source: William Chambers, Treatise of Civil Architecture (1759)
Origins redefined
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3.3 ‘Allegory of Architecture Returning to its Natural Model’, Charles Eisen Source: Frontispiece to M.-A. Laugier, Essai sur l’architecture (2nd edn 1755)
Siegfried Giedion in 1948; ‘it had to reconquer the most primitive thing as if nothing had ever been done before’.3 This reconquest, of course, was a reconquest of a pure and original architectural type. It was the eldest little pig’s house in stone, now rebuilt as a concrete slab system, representing nothing but pure, primitive permanence. Postmodern notions of archetype would come to echo the modernist dream of capturing the primitive essence of architecture, and would – just like its modernist predecessor – locate such essence in architectural form itself. Even the deconstructivist rebellion against the immovable and monumental involuntarily confirms this idea, in so far as it substitutes the ephemeral for the immovable, yet accepts the structure of the dichotomy. In contemporary discourse, theorists such as Hans Ibelings identify aesthetic autonomy as a key feature of contemporary architecture, thus testifying to the continued legacy of the enlightenment conception.4 However, parallel to this monumentalizing history runs a different line of argument. It is a less continuous line, more like a trace made up from certain moments of resistance; resistance, that is, to the pig-tale’s smug morals and its automatic assertion that architecture originated with the first building. In the following, I want to examine some such moments of resistance, located in the work of mid-nineteenth-century theorists such as Gustav Klemm, Gottfried Semper and Carl Bötticher.
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The primitive hut reconstructed The resistance of which I am talking emerged, not from architecture, but from other fields, in particular the young discipline of anthropology. Harry Francis Mallgrave has explored Semper’s intellectual debt to the anthropologist, Gustav Klemm,5 who wrote extensively on the origin of human society, including the origin of architecture. At first glance he seems to have accepted Quatremère’s tripartite origin theory, reiterating the types of the cave, the tent and the hut. Yet, Klemm‘s Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit (1843–51) is both radical and original, as a closer examination will reveal. He did, indeed, refer to Quatremère’s three types, yet he did not see them as the origins of architecture. This ‘origin’, in Klemm’s mind, was situated not in buildings nor building types, but in a human urge, from which all art is born. As Klemm puts it, ‘man has the urge to manifest his experiences externally, and to adorn his environment with these representations’.6 He called this essential human need for representation a Kunsttrieb – an urge for art – a phenomenon that went through several historical stages parallel to the general development of human society. In its earliest form, the Kunsttrieb came to expression in phenomena like knots and dance, both rhythmical representations of temporal order. These primitive constructions were ‘mimetic narratives’ of the life of the nation, wrote Klemm and, as such, they were primary vehicles for man’s orientation in the world.7 Only in more advanced stages of cultural development did these simple means of representation fuse into architecture, ‘the adornment of these holy places called forth art, namely architecture, dance, music’.8 Seeing architecture essentially as reification of ephemeral decoration, Klemm radically overthrows neoclassical origin-theory with its search for an original building and its predilection for permanence. Klemm’s gradually reified Kunsttrieb opens, instead, a story of architecture in which buildings echo acts which echo urges. Architecture, from this perspective, is a mimetic response to a universal human urge to communicate and coexist with one’s fellow beings.
Carl Bötticher: Der Baumkultus der Hellenen A scholar who might have sought inspiration in Klemm’s ideas about sacred adornment was the Berlin art historian, Carl Bötticher. Leaving aside Bötticher’s ambiguous tectonics for a moment, I want to focus on one of his lesser-known works, Der Baumkultus der Hellenen from 1856 (Figure 3.4). This little book contains a very similar idea to the one we have just encountered in Klemm – that it was ‘the adornment of these holy places’ that ‘called forth’ architecture. The origins of architecture, far from being found in architecture itself, were to be found in the ephemeral arrangements of worship.9 Bötticher criticized traditional
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3.4 ‘The Tree of Artemis’ Source: Karl Boetticher, Der Baumkultus der Hellenen (1856)
art history for having ignored this link. The obsession with style and appearance, he argued, had led to a neglect of the purpose for which man builds. To ignore this purpose is to ignore the very meaning of the Greek temple, for in the eyes of the ancients you could not divorce ritual practice from the building or the artefact accommodating it.10 Cultic practice and its physical setting formed one indivisible knot of meaning and should be studied accordingly. Der Baumkultus der Hellenen was precisely such a study, uncovering the hidden links between ritual and artefact in ancient Greek tree worship (Figure 3.5). The question of how this interest in the ephemeral squares with Bötticher’s earlier insistence on tectonic autonomy would provide a fascinating object of study. Here, however, it is enough to conclude that with his 1856 publication, Bötticher radicalizes Klemm’s implied criticism of neoclassical origin-theory, and situates praxis back at the centre of architectural discourse.
Semper and the poetics of architecture This brings us to another important theorist of the nineteenth century, Gottfried Semper. Semper repeatedly criticized neoclassical theory for its obsession with the primitive hut and its idea of architecture as an imitation of itself; yet he kept returning to the topic of origins, clearly with something in mind other than the original abodes of Laugier or Quatremère. Semper insisted instead that the origins of architecture be sought, not in architectural form itself, but in the preconditions that shaped it; like Klemm, he defined these preconditions, not as archaeological facts but as human urges:
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3.5 ‘Tree sacellum with several aedicula’ Source: Karl Boetticher, Der Baumkultus der Hellenen (1856)
We make for ourselves a tiny world in which the cosmic law is evident within the strictest limit, yet complete in itself and perfect in this respect; in such play we satisfy our cosmogonic instinct. The imagination creates these images by presenting, expanding, and adapting natural scenes to our mood, so that we believe ourselves capable of discerning the harmony of the whole in a single event. 11 Art, essentially, is born out of man’s need to make sense of the world. Like Klemm before him, Semper identifies play and ritual as key moments in the ordering process of art. Through these means, Semper tells us, man captures the creative law of nature ‘as it gleams through the real world in the rhythmical sequence of space and time movements’.12 Ritual acts find their corporeal manifestation in the motifs of practical arts: ‘the wreath, a string of pearls, scrolls, round dances … the beat of an oar, and so on’ that Semper identifies as ‘the beginnings out of which music and architecture grew’.13 From its ephemeral beginning in ritual movement, the ordering activity of art is embodied in artistic motifs, and finally fused in works of architecture. Weaving, for instance, is simultaneously a ritual imitation of cyclical time and the technical origin of the wickerwork wall (Figure 3.6). Weaving runs through the history of architecture as a constant motif, yet is continuously transformed and metamorphosed into new guises, a development Semper traces in his famous theory of Bekleidung. With these ideas in mind, we can understand Semper’s fascination with the Caribbean hut. It caught his interest in a crowded Crystal Palace, not as
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3.6 Egyptian vegetal entanglement Source: Gottfried Semper, Der Stil (1860–3)
an original model for architecture, but as an early example of how ephemeral acts of weaving and joining had fused and metamorphosed to form an actual building (Figure 3.7). Semper’s ‘primitive hut’ was not an unequivocal entity but the composite product of four distinct elements – the mound, the hearth, the enclosure and the tectonic structure. These elements, in their turn, originated in four distinct techniques, each with a strong link to ritual practice. This theory was nothing if not radical. Locating the origins of architecture in ritual, Semper overturned the neoclassical notion of architectural origins as an actual or imaginary ‘primitive hut’.14 Rather than looking for the origin of architecture in architectural form, Semper located it in human action. In one of his late essays. he stated this quite explicitly; ‘In a most general way, what is the material and subject matter of all artistic endeavour?’ he asked, and answered: ‘I believe it is man in all his relations and connections to the world.’15 Semper’s notion of art as an ordered embodiment of human action has ancient precedents. Aristotle had touched on something similar, when he wrote that tragedy is ‘not an imitation of men but of actions and of life’.16 Semper’s rethinking of the origins of architecture had, in fact, much in common with Aristotle. Mimesis, in the Greek tradition, was not a copying of something already there, but a creative interpretation of reality as a whole. It was an act of ordering, primarily associated with the rhythmic movement of music and dance.17 For Semper too, art was an ordering activity. His meticulous analysis of techniques and materials in Der Stil was intended to reveal this: the ritual ordering of reality and its slow reification into the motifs of art, craft and architecture. A work of architecture will inevitably echo this origin, presenting a configured ‘image’ of human praxis. This is precisely the kind of mimesis that characterizes the poetic work in an Aristotelian sense. Paul Ricoeur calls it a kind of ‘emplotment’, a gathering of reality into a plot that confers a certain 40
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3.7 ‘The Caribbean Hut’ Source: Gottfried Semper, Der Stil (1860–3)
readability to our actions and lives.18 Semper’s musing on the primitive origin of architecture thus constitutes not only a radical critique of enlightenment origin theory but also, in a certain sense, a poetics of architecture, in which the act of building may be seen, not as a formal or structural concern, but as a creative interpretation of human life and action.
Origins redefined Klemm’s Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte, Bötticher’s Baumkultus and Semper’s Der Stil inaugurate a different kind of architectural history. No longer a history of building types or orders, this is a history of the evolving techniques that brought architecture into being and of the human situations for which buildings were built. It is a history in which the primacy of structure has been given over to surface and where the obsession with stability and form – so characteristic of eighteenthcentury neoclassicism – has given way to a new interest in the ephemeral preconditions of form. From this point of view, the ephemeral decoration of the altar, the precarious architecture of the procession, or, in Semper’s words, the ‘haze of the carnival candles’, are not phenomena at the margins of architectural discourse. Rather, the ephemeral constitutes the very essence of architecture, as a primordial example of the mimetic transformation from the ritual act to its built 41
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embodiment. At a time when aesthetic autonomy yet again is being hailed as the credo of contemporary architecture, there is reason to heed such seemingly fragile and ephemeral notions. Rather in the spirit of the two littlest pigs we may search for the origin of architecture, not in the immobile permanence of architectural form, but in the urges and acts that call forth such form.
Notes 1 Laugier, Essai sur l’Architecture (1753). Marc-Antoine Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Wolfgang and Annie Herrmann (trans.), Los Angeles: Hennessey & Ingalls, 1977, p. 12. 2 Caroline van Eck, Organicism in Nineteenth Century Architecture, Amsterdam: Architectura & Natura: 1994, p. 96. 3 Siegfried Giedion, Fernand Léger and José Louis Sert, ‘9 Points on Monumentality’, Architectural Review, September 1948, p. 126. 4 Hans Ibelings, Supermodernism: Architecture in the Age of Globalization, Rotterdam: NAi, 1998. 5 Harry Francis Mallgrave, ‘Gustav Klemm and Gottfried Semper, the meeting of ethnological and architectural theory’, RES, Journal of Anthropology and Aesthetics, Spring 1985, 9: 69–79. 6 Gustav Klemm, Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit, vol. 1, Leipzig: Teubner, 1843–51, p. 214. 7 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 8 Ibid., p. 23. 9 Introduction to Der Baumkultus der Hellenen nach den gottesdienstlichen Gebräuchen und den überlieferten Bildwerken dargestellt, Berlin: Weidmann, 1856 pp. 11–17. 10 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 11 Prolegomenon to Der Stil (1860–3), Gottfried Semper, Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts; or, Practical Aesthetics, Harry F. Mallgrave and Michael Robinson (trans.), Santa Monica: Getty, 2004, p. 82. 12 Ibid., p. 82. 13 Ibid. 14 This point is elaborated by J. Rykwert in ‘Gottfried Semper and the Conception of Style’, in A. M. Vogt, C. Reble and M. Frölich (eds), Gottfried Semper und die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts., Basel: Birkhäuser, 1976, pp. 68–81. 15 Gottfried Semper, ‘On Architectural Styles’, Zurich lecture, 1869 in The Four Elements of Architecture and other Writings Harry F. Mallgrave and Wolfgang Herrmann (trans. and ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 269. 16 Aristotle, Poetics, 1450a. 17 See, for example, L. Golden, Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis, Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars, 1992. 18 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 45–51.
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Chapter 4
The primitive hut Fantasies of survival in an all-white world Lorens Holm
… what we call our civilization is largely responsible for our misery, and we should be much happier if we gave it up and returned to primitive conditions. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents As Scott lay dying in his tent, he wrote thirteen letters to his family and countrymen in addition to his last diary entries: For four days we have been unable to leave the tent – the gale howling about us. We are weak, writing is difficult, but for my own sake I do not regret this journey, which has shown that Englishmen can endure hardships, help one another, and meet death with as great a fortitude as ever in the past … Had we lived, I should have had a tale to tell of the hardihood, endurance, and courage of my companions, which would have stirred the heart of every Englishman. These rough notes and our dead bodies must tell the tale …1 It was a great adventure. It reaffirmed the enduring romance that the English have with Englishness. All the evidence suggests that Scott was deeply fulfilled by his own death. Antarctica marked the last gasp of European expansionist exploration. It was the good fight: conquest without the subjugation of indigenous peoples, exploration without exploitation of the environment, its drives untainted by the lure of economic gain, development, new markets (Figure 4.1).2
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4.1 The last page of Scott’s diary Source: All images reproduced from Robert Falcon Scott, Scott’s Last Expedition, London: Smith Elder & Co., 1913, except where noted otherwise
I will sidestep the question of how or in what ways the Antarctic expedition huts are primitive (what relation do they have to the purist villas of Le Corbusier?) in order to pursue another line of thought. I will focus on the narratives in which they are set. This paper will claim that they – the huts, the tents, the narratives of the explorers – are nothing if not enactments of architecture’s fantasy of origins. I will look at the role of what I call the originary object (which is not exactly the same thing as a primitive hut), in the intersecting narratives of exploration (Scott, Amundsen) and narratives of the primitive hut (Vitruvius, Laugier, Le Corbusier). Hostile conditions impose a kind of primitivism upon the subject. Hostile conditions produce the modernist tabula rasa that allows anything – and nothing – to happen. The narrative of the primitive hut is the site where fantasy meets the ground zero of survival: the fantasy of being first, the fantasy of surviving, the fantasy of death. Fantasy is a defence against failure; the myth of origins is where the formal and aesthetic arguments of architecture and European conquest expire.
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Scott’s story Most of us are familiar with Scott’s epic. Scott and his men died on the way back from the pole, having been trumped by a month by Amundsen. Scott’s polar party set off from their wintering quarters at Cape Evans in late October 1911 (the beginning of the south polar summer), and arrived at the pole on 18 January 1912; they stayed long enough to confirm Amundsen’s bearings, take a couple of photographs, and – thoroughly demoralized – began the 800-mile walk home. Two died en route. The remaining three were tent-bound for more than a week in a snowstorm, and died for lack of food, water, and fuel, within 11 miles of a supply depot they had laid on the way out, the so-called ‘one-ton depot’, which was itself only 100 miles from base. Scott’s last journal entry was of 29 March. The tent with frozen bodies and texts were found by a search party the following spring (Figure 4.2). Beside the bitter circumstances, what makes Scott’s story so intense were his journals and letters. In Scott’s narrative, south polar exploration becomes an originary gesture that is confirmed by current (perhaps misplaced) nostalgic interest in the huts.3 A group of white, middle-class professional men march in the name of their country into a featureless whiteness. Their sledges carry heraldic banners. Along the way they test their physical and moral fibre to its limits. Their white skin is burnt black by exposure. Human nature – or rather, their natures – are cast into high relief by this tabula rasa. There is no thing to distract them from these truths, for their destination is a cartographic fiction on a featureless white plateau. The plateau is oceanic. The pole is not found by orienteering but by navigation. To arrive there is to arrive at nothing, with no place to
4.2 The south polar plateau with a plan of Scott’s route to the pole
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occupy. The South Pole turns out to be a non-place, to which they were not even entitled priority. A comparison between Amundsen’s and Scott’s reactions on reaching the pole makes clear their different abilities to mobilize narrative in their favour. They both knew that what was at issue was how their deeds were represented to a waiting world, and that deeds done in a vacuum are meaningless. Scott’s interpretation of the race as a projection of Englishness was shared by the milieu within which it was conceived and received. In an address to the Royal Geographical Society, Scott’s sponsor, Sir Clement Markham, described Scott’s controversial decision to man-haul: Captain Scott therefore resolved that the journey from the foot of the glacier to the pole, a distance of 1,200 miles there and back, should be done by himself and his men dragging their own provisions and constant weights. This is the true British way … In my mind, no journey ever made with dogs can approach the height of the fine conception which is realised when a party of men go forth to face hardships, dangers, and difficulties with their own unaided efforts, and by days and weeks of hard physical labour succeed in solving some problem of the great unknown. Surely in this case the conquest is more nobly and splendidly won.4 Scott situated his deeds in a context of heroic failure that people could understand; Amundsen regarded the problem of communicating his success as largely a question of getting to the nearest telegraph point. Amundsen celebrated his victory robustly; Scott bitterly protested the events that brought Amundsen to the pole ahead of him. Yet Amundsen can stand at the South Pole and regret not being at the North, and Scott can with his dying hand still play to the image of class and country. Amundsen had embarked on the expedition ostensibly to go to the North Pole, and turned his ship around mid-route. Standing at the South Pole (Figure 4.3), he wrote: I cannot say – even though I know it would have a much greater effect – that I stood at my life’s goal … I believe no human being has stood so diametrically opposed to the goal of his wishes as I did on that occasion. The regions around the North Pole had attracted me since the days of my childhood, and so I found myself at the South Pole. Can anything more perverse be conceived?5 We can ask after the object that so eluded them, how it functioned in their narrative. The object is given its definitive treatment in the theory of the drives. This is where psychoanalytic theory has its greatest speculative reach. In Freud, each drive has an object, the attainment of which leads to satisfaction. Drive is 46
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4.3 A sledging party on the south polar plateau
sometimes translated as instinct, but it needs to be distinguished from animal instinct, and may be understood as goal-directed behaviour generally. The drive is the flywheel of the psyche. Lacan advanced drive theory from a close reading of Freud’s paper ‘Beyond the pleasure principle’, in which Freud contemplates a death drive. All psychic activity goes toward death. In Lacan, the end point of life is modelled as an object, objet a. This psychical object organizes the subject’s life: the subject’s discourse focuses on it; the discourse always screens him/her from it. It thus organizes the subject’s life by not being there, which is why Lacan sometimes refers to it as ‘the lost object’ (think how the imminent non-arrival of the Apocalypse organizes the lives of fundamentalists). It is always already lost. Our lives are experienced as a succession of objects, one displacing the next, but they are all pretenders to the psychical throne. The drive ends in its final object, death (the object of life is death), which is not so much the object finally attained as the cessation of all objects in the cessation of the drive.6 We have seen how the pole is given the form of a place in the language of exploration, even though it is a cartographic fiction. When the pole becomes the object of a race – also a construction of the narrative – arguably neither of them attained it: Scott because he was second, Amundsen because he was incapable of enjoying it. Finally, it becomes the intractable point of Scott’s death. We might describe this as the migration of the object across the surface of the narrative. Lacan’s diagram of the visual field models the relation between subject–image–object, in so far as the drive manifests visually (Figure 4.4). The object of the drive, objet a, is shown by the gaze – more a position than an object. The diagram resembles the diagram of perspective in which an image of an object is projected onto a picture plane from a projection point occupied by 47
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the viewer, but it can be understood more generally to define the shifting relations between a subject and its object. The image need not be a visual image. The triangulating lines are equally lines of sight and insight. These syntactical lines of thought position the object within the symbolic matrix of the subject’s world. The image is as much a source of knowledge of the object, as it is a defence against it. We do not experience our own death, at least not in any way communicable to others; or more precisely, not in any way that others can communicate it back to us (we are always first at our death/we never get there). Scott’s last letters project past the point of his death to the imagined reception of his death by others (a retrospective view of his own death). They are not a little narcissistic. They become incredibly eloquent, melodramatic even. Eloquence is a symptom of the point where language fails. Ponting, the expedition photographer, notes that when the polar party start the return journey, Scott’s diary entries register anxiety almost every day. They also become repetitious: reports of the same sledging conditions every day. In psychoanalytic terms, anxiety is a symptom of proximity to death, and repetition, of an encounter with the real (there is nothing more real than one’s death).7 By late March, the horror of his death no longer registers in his text. Instead, he writes letters which project an image of his men as heroes in a world that will take care of their families, as if proximity to the object had become so unbearable that his language was no longer able to engage in any meaningful way with the health and safety of his men, and instead covers it with a melodramatic image. Drama segues into melo.8
4.4 Lacan’s diagram of the visual field Source: reproduced from Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, New York: Norton, 1981, with the kind permission of Norton
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Le Corbusier’s story The reason for spending so much time with the way narrative constructs its lost object (pole as cartographic fiction, object of a race no one won, and death) is because a similar form of migration and screening occurs in the iterations of the primitive hut myth. Le Corbusier’s version of the myth has several affinities to Scott’s narrative. In Vers une Architecture, he writes ‘Primitive man has brought his chariot to a stop, he decides that here shall be his native soil’. This is a narrative of colonization as much as it is a narrative of the first architecture. It repeats Scott’s obsession with marking out a path through uncharted territory, in which the charting and the path are part of the same gesture. This narrative opens the chapter ‘Regulating lines’. Regulating lines are the geometry that harmonize the elements of the plan and elevations. Placing the discussion of regulating lines behind a façade of originary colonization (‘here shall be his native soil’), tends to naturalize them as innate to man and the universe. When Le Corbusier returns to the question of regulating lines in subsequent chapters, he waxes lyrical, he begins to soar. Scott resorted to melodrama when the proximity of his death became unbearable. Le Corbusier’s aesthetics is about to founder, and if he does not know it, his text does. You employ stone, wood, and concrete, and with these materials you build houses and palaces. That is construction. Ingenuity is at work. But suddenly you touch my heart … and I say ‘This is beautiful.’ This is Architecture. Art enters in.9 The text repeats this ‘Ode to Building’ almost verbatim, twice. If we trace the path of the object across the discourse, we shall see that – as in the Scott/Amundsen narrative – it is efficacious by virtue of eluding it. For Vitruvius and Alberti, the hut is a historical but insignificant beginning, the aftermath of a fire. The primitive hut is simply when building began; the construction of an aesthetic edifice appears elsewhere in their texts. In his Essai sur l’architecture (1753) Laugier makes it clear that he is not talking about a real object, but the product of a thought experiment: ‘Let us look at man in his primitive state …’. It is a symbolic object, a model for aesthetic judgement: ‘it is by approaching the simplicity of this first model that fundamental mistakes are avoided’.10 In Le Corbusier’s text, the hut has drifted toward the imaginary. The narrative simply projects an image of an object, although an object and a discipline lie behind it. The symbolic object is found elsewhere in Le Corbusier, in his maison dom-ino, conceived in 1914 and not so much an image (what’s there to look at?) as a prescription for thought and design. Although he does not call it ‘primitive’ or ‘hut’, it is the twentieth-century counterpart to Laugier’s hut and, like Laugier’s, it is stripped to its essential thought-elements: slabs, columns, an asymmetric geometry.11
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By the time the story makes it into Le Corbusier’s text, it begins to sound trite, and we have to ask what could drive a thoroughly modern man to reproduce such naïveté, let alone repeat it (repetition is a disturbance of language, a stutter). What is so melodramatic about aesthetics?12 Aesthetics is the central tenet of architecture, its proper core. All the rest is peripheral (in Laugier’s terms, all the rest is introduced by ‘licence’ or ‘caprice’) – construction, law, the pro-forma of practice. Yet, aesthetics is exactly where the discipline cannot account for itself. Aesthetics is the soft centre, the sore spot or lesion, in the well-formed discipline. There is, finally, no answer to: why columns, not pilasters; why the straight axis, not the meander; why the strip window, not the vertical window; why early Jim Stirling, not late Jim Stirling? We have all had these sorts of disastrous conversations, usually with non-architects (this is where we are usually called arrogant). They always start amicably enough, but everyone comes away feeling that they were trapped. Once outside the cultivated coterie of the school, not even disagreement is possible. There is a sense that anyone can say anything and that anything is possible because the conversation has lost its bearings. It is, finally, a question of language, a recognition that aesthetic precepts are a matter of speaking the same language. One of the effects of the school is to form a common language so that disagreement is possible. The anxiety of these dinner conversations is not that you like what I do not, but that language is failing; that the common points of reference born of language are beginning to slip and even such basic articulations as the same and the different begin to fade. If language fails, the possibility of reference to an objective world fails. The purpose of the primitive hut (at least in post-Renaissance versions of the myth) is to vindicate the aesthetic claims of architectural discourse either by naturalizing them, or by demonstrating their axiomatic logic. This purpose is at odds with how it functions. The Tahitian hut cannot, as a material and historical beginning, embody timeless principles. The symbolic object that embodies these principles – Laugier’s thought experiment, Maison Dom-ino – is consensual and as such, cannot demonstrate logical priority. The imaginary object, Le Corbusier’s tent, has a rhetorical force (the tent was derived from Moses’ tabernacle in the desert – nothing like the Word of God to ballast an argument); but as a fantasy, it cannot ground the discourse in nature or logic. It relates to discourse like a façade thrown over a disgruntled plan, to hide its lack of resolution. This does not mean that Tahitian huts or Maison Dom-ino are forbidden, but only that when we incorporate them in our designs, we are not using them as primitive huts but as something else. Nor does it mean that architecture is a lost cause, but only that we must acknowledge a constitutive lack in its aesthetics. The lack of the object keeps discourse open to interpretation. The recovery of a real first hut (no precedents) that embodied 50
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architecture’s aesthetic, would be the death of architecture: it would end our ability to say anything speculative about architecture.
Space: identity What primitive conditions? What return? In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud was referring to the unmediated drives, before fulfilment of the drives was prevented by the forms of civilization. Think: unbounded sexual and aggressive energy. Civilization is constituted of all the ways the drive is bound into a structured life, by goals, careers, law, art, war. It would be a mistake to attribute to Freud the thesis that you could strip away civilization to arrive at its origins in the pure state of the drive, for without the object, the drive would cease to coalesce into recognizable forms and would disperse into nothingness – rather like the south polar plateau. Origin, for Freud, is not a starting point, but a dynamic interaction between drive and its repression, like the way origin in Darwin’s Origin of the Species was not an ape, but the process of evolution. Scott and his men do not disperse into whiteness – this would be tantamount to psychic collapse – they bring their identities with them. They brought heraldic banners. Scott’s hut was organized to reflect the naval chain of command. When things became desperate, Scott’s text projected an image of Englishness as a life-and-death struggle against emptiness, onto the Antarctic tabula rasa. A page of writing, a long trek to nowhere, photographs of exposure-blackened faces that resist the white plateau; all these are essays in identity, essays against the dissolution of the spatial subject (Figure 4.5).
4.5 The exposureblackened face of Petty Officer Forde
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What is primitive about Scott’s narrative? Not the harsh environment. Nor that he leaves behind civilization. The narrative exposes the primitive conditions of identity, what has to happen in order for you to be you. Identity is a matter of projection. It involves a screen and requires a certain sort of reflective space that is not the visual space of architecture. Your image screens its object, death (think of this next time you stand before a mirror, contemplating your age). You have to be held away from your image, in order for it to function. An image, an object, the lines between. We need to revise how we think about space in the light of the psychoanalytic account of identity. We need to loosen the hegemony of perspective space. Although Lacan’s apparatus resembles the perspective diagram, and perspective space may be taken to be the conscious form of space, the space defined by the distribution of subject, image and object, is unacknowledged in architectural discourse and in Scott’s narrative of identity. These texts describe a line through the landscape; Lacan’s diagram describes the space of consciousness, an extension without measure, that precedes the spatial and temporal distances of architecture and makes them possible. The astounding thing is that visual space is itself a projection upon the screen. This is where the intersection of architecture and psychoanalysis becomes really speculative. This does not mean that the visual space of architecture is ‘flat’, somehow two-dimensional; but only that the space ‘in your head’ is always one dimension greater, always n + 1. The space in your head is more robustly dimensional, than the space ‘out there’. It constitutes an unconscious space, even though it is the space that makes consciousness possible, in so far as consciousness is based upon reflection. Scott’s narrative of identity and Le Corbusier’s myth of the primitive hut trace a line through the landscape. This line is the form of a life and the form of a discourse. What looks to be two treks with opposite sense – Scott moving toward his death, a discourse in search of its origin – is really a single axis with an ambiguous sense. Note that Lacan’s diagram is symmetrical. All paths are constructed forward (memory is not a return journey). This line is one of Freud’s most used metaphors for the hard work of psychoanalytic theory (‘the difficult defile’), and it is the metaphor for memory traces on the psyche in his earliest texts (‘path-breaking’, ‘trailblazing’).13 This long trek into a white interior relentlessly pursuing an elusive object, the anti of Kurtz’s trek into the jungle in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, has an affinity to the art of Richard Long and Hamish Fulton, in which a long walk is represented to an audience through photographs. Where, in all these practices, is this primitive space? It is not in the long line through the landscape, nor in the image; it is – paradoxically – the already complex dialogic space between the line and the image of the line. 52
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Scott’s narrative suggests that collective identity is not cumulative, a quantity to which we all contribute: a little bit of each of us, all holding hands. My identity is a matter of me finding a screen for myself; collective identity is a matter of me finding a screen upon which you can project too. Scott’s genius was to recognize such a screen in the south polar plateau. We can all view Scott’s image (= the image he saw, the image of himself, both, that is the beauty of ambiguity). When we accede to this image of Englishness, we step into his position and view it the way he did: we identify with Scott. It is amazing how architectural identity is. It is all about position and view. Every façade is a material surrogate of the screen, and promises – even if it does not deliver – the possibility of projection. This explains the necessity for facades, and why, even in the case of 1960s projects that do not have them (Metabolists), we tend to put them on anyway. We are all identities. The possibility of me articulating my identity to myself – the who I am – is predicated on this space. We are all ineluctably spatial from the beginning. We do not really know how we are spatial because – like all things unconscious – it is hidden from us; but we like space, space is inherently delicious, beguiling. Space must be what Vitruvius had in mind when he said ‘delight’. Architecture is the conscious form by which we return to space, time and again. We keep battering at the gates. Through these forms, we contemplate space; and the pleasure of such contemplation is the pleasure of contemplating ourselves. Architecture is a lure, even though we know not toward what.
Notes 1 Robert Falcon Scott, Scott’s Last Expedition, vol. 1, London: Smith Elder & Co., 1913, pp. 606–7. 2 Sanjay Chaturvedi, The Polar Regions: A Political Geography, New York: Wiley, 1995, pp. 59–81. 3 David L. Harrowfield, ‘Historic Sites in the Ross Dependency, Antarctica’, in Polar Record, 24 (October 1988): 151. 4 Markham’s address to the British Association, ‘Antarctic Discovery at the British Association’, 9 September 1912, after news of Amundsen’s success in reaching the pole first, but before news of Scott’s death. Published in the Journal of the Royal Geographical Society. 5 Quoted in Roland Huntford, Scott and Amundsen, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1979, p. 488. Translated from R. Amundsen, Sydpolen vol. II (first published Norway, 1912), p. 120. 6 For Freud’s treatment of the drives, see ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’ (1905), ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915), ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920)’, and Civilization and its Discontents (1930). For Lacan’s development of the drive as it manifests in the visual field, see The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, New York: Norton, 1981, the sections ‘Of the gaze as objet petit a’ and ‘The Partial Drive and its Circuit’. The diagram is on p. 106. The lost object is on p. 185. 7 Herbert G. Ponting, The Great White South, London: Duckworth, 1921, p. 268. 8 Laura Mulvey notes that in melodrama, when the drama (i.e. the predicament of the characters) becomes unbearable, the dialogue fades out and is replaced by music. See Laura Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1989.
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9 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture, New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1982, pp. 141, 165, 187. The primitive hut myth is on p. 65. 10 Vitruvius, ‘The Origin of the Dwelling House’ in The Ten Books On Architecture, New York: Dover Publications 1960, bk 2, ch. 1. Leon Battista Alberti, On the Art of Building in Ten Books, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988, pp. 7–8. Marc-Antoine Laugier, Essai sur l’Architecture Wolfgang and Annie Herrmann (trans.), An Essay on Architecture, Los Angeles: Hennessey & Ingalls, 1977 (first published 1753). 11 For a discussion of maison dom-ino, see Barry Maitland, ‘The Grid’ and Peter Eisenman, ‘Aspects of Modernism: Maison dom-ino and the Self-referential Sign’, in Oppositions 15/16, Spring/ Winter 1979. 12 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, London: Hogarth Press, 1975, pp. 19–20. The opening quote is on p. 23. 13 For a discussion of Freud’s metaphors, ‘path-breaking’ and ‘trailblazing’, see Jacques Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ in Writing and Difference, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978, pp. 196–231, especially pp. 198 and 200ff.
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Chapter 5
Gottfried Semper’s primitive hut Duration, construction and self-creation Jonathan A. Hale PHAEDRUS: But all these delicate devices making for the permanence [durée] of the edifice were as nothing to those which he employed when he elaborated the emotions and vibrations of the soul of the future beholder of the work … None perceived, when confronted by a mass so delicately lightened and so simple of aspect, that he was being led to a sort of bliss [bonheur] by insensible curves, by minute and all-powerful inflections … SOCRATES: That is divine. I once heard dear Phaedrus, an expression quite similar, and quite the contrary. One of our friends, whom it is useless to name, said of our Alcibiades who was so beautifully made: ‘Looking at him, one feels oneself becoming an architect! … ’1 Paul Valéry’s poetic parallel between the processes of perception and cognition in architecture – taken from the quasi-Platonic dialogue Eupalinos or the Architect written in 1923 – provides an opening through which to examine the relationship between the concept of time as duration and the idea of the self as a ‘work in progress’ as described in the writings of the French philosopher Henri Bergson. In the second part of this paper a further architectural parallel is suggested: the use of Bergson’s ideas as a means to uncover the deeper significance of the writings of Gottfried Semper – particularly his description of the construction of the ‘primitive hut’ in the essay The Four Elements of Architecture from 1851.
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Bergson’s Becoming – the self as a work-in-progress Bergson was Valéry’s countryman and near-contemporary – being twelve years the senior of the two – and spent much of his life elaborating a similar set of notions regarding the interpenetration of past and present in the lived experience of time. This was memorably encapsulated in his challenging and influential concept of duration. That Valéry might have been pleased by the comparison is less obvious; his distaste for intellectual ‘system-building’ would have made him somewhat suspicious of Bergson’s underlying philosophical motives. However, after receiving a personalized copy of the 1934 collection La Pensée et le Mouvant (translated as The Creative Mind in 1946) Valéry’s opinion had somewhat shifted, as A. E. Pilkington observed: Valéry’s admiration and sympathy for this series of unsystematic reflections in a personal mode (as opposed to his mistrust of the large theories of L’Évolution Créatrice) is easy to understand, as it relates to one of his most permanent convictions. Bergson, in ‘becoming what he has discovered’, has achieved something through philosophical reflection analogous to what Eupalinos achieved through meditation on the problems of construction: in the exercise of his art and through his ‘organic’ involvement in it, each man has ‘constructed’ himself.2 The sense that a true apprehension of the outside world involves an act of perceptual construction – by implication, also an act of perpetual construction owing to the constant flux of the body’s sensory impressions – is what Bergson was attempting to describe in terms of a novel, phenomenological concept of lived time as ‘duration’. Perception seen as a constant activity as opposed to a series of isolated acts, gives rise to an understanding of time as equivalent to our lived experience of it, as opposed to the abstract mathematical measuring of conventional, homogeneous time – observed merely as a dimension of space according to Bergson – marked out by observing one object moving relative to another, such as in the movement of a hand around the face of a clock. For Bergson, it is clear that the consciousness of ‘real’ time involves the construction of a historical dimension uniting the endless succession of transient events. Through the accumulation of the traces of change it might be possible to transcend the eternal present of the clock-hand to gain a sense of the continuity of the past into the future. ‘There are changes, but there are underneath the change no things which change: change has no need of a support. There are movements, but there is no inert or invariable object which moves …’3 Bergson seems to be allowing the relationship between ideal and reality – or, more specifically, being and becoming in the Platonic conception of
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creation – to pivot about the notion of duration, in his understanding of the ‘real’ depth of existence: We are seeking only the precise meaning that our consciousness gives to this word ‘exist’ and we find that for a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly. Should the same be said for existence in general?4 The idea expressed here of the self in a continual process of becoming provides a means by which to consider the significance of the temporal aspects of fabrication in architecture.
Duration in architecture – the poetics of process True to Bergson’s intriguingly materialistic impulse, a number of possible precedents for his extended meditation on the theme of temporal depth can be found among the architectural writers of the mid-nineteenth century, most notably the German architect and theorist Gottfried Semper. Semper, like Bergson and the school of phenomenological thinkers he inspired, cherished a deep desire to understand the nature of things-inthemselves. The world into which the later phenomenologists were trying to reimmerse the living body – the perceived world of which the perceiving body is also inescapably a part – was likewise for Semper the focus of much of his most original thinking. By considering the history of architecture in terms of the history of tectonic processes – developing from a series of primeval, archetypal generative impulses – Semper was attempting to re-establish the principles of aesthetic authority in architecture that were being steadily eroded in the postenlightenment climate of historicism and rapid industrialization. The philosophical context of German idealism had also contributed significantly to a denuded sense of material reality; between John Locke and Immanuel Kant the external world had progressively dissolved into a realm of subjective sensations and individual perceptions, until the famous disappearance – in Kant’s system – of the world of things-in-themselves behind the veil of appearances available to human apprehension. This unsettling intellectual outlook, coupled with the art-historical uncertainties of the post-J. J. Winckelmann world of catalogued styles and a growing ‘world’s fair’ consumption of newly discovered cultures, had contributed to a general sense of bewilderment – neatly summed up in the title of Heinrich Hübsch’s 1828 publication In What Style Should We Build?5 The architectural profession itself was undergoing its own crisis of creative values, as the engineers of the mid-nineteenth century began to take control of the great building tasks of the new industrial age. 57
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The recurring desire to re-evaluate the authority of the past in terms of the preoccupations of the present was a significant characteristic of the nineteenth-century architectural debates, witnessed by Viollet-le-Duc’s similarly dramatic re-reading of Greek temple architecture along structural rationalist lines.6 The search for academic respectability for the ‘builder’ Viollet’s radically materialist position also led him irresistibly back to the cradle of western thought in Ancient Greece, as indeed it did for Gottfried Semper in his parallel search for some ground of certainty and authority in architecture. Rather than settle with the kind of spatial typologies that had grown out of the late eighteenth-century primitivism of the Abbé Laugier7 and Quatremère de Quincy8 – or even the later structural typologies such as Violletle-Duc’s (1854–68, 1876) geometrical geology of mountains, cathedrals and crystal forms9 – Semper was determined to go further back into the mists of pre-history if necessary, in his search for the ultimate forming principles in architecture. Inspired by his early visits to the Jardin des Plantes in Paris and the influential work of its curator and codifier, Georges Cuvier, Semper had decided to attempt a similarly evolutionary classification of architectural form in terms of functional and material characteristics. Working from the familiar Vitruvian myth of the origin of building in the communal effort of protecting the newly-discovered fire,10 Semper then proceeded to analyse the components of the archetypal ‘primitive hut’: The first sign of human settlement and rest after the hunt, the battle, and wandering in the desert is today, as when the first men lost paradise, the setting up of the fireplace and the lighting of the reviving, warming and food preparing flame. Around the hearth the first groups assembled; around it the first alliances formed; around it the first rude religious concepts were put into the customs of a cult. Throughout all phases of society the hearth formed that sacred focus around which the whole took order and shape. It is the first and most important, the moral element of architecture. Around it were grouped the three other elements; the roof, the enclosure and the mound, the protecting negations or defenders of the hearth’s flame against the three hostile elements of nature.11 In spite of the obvious significance of the hearth in this conception, it is the promise of the ‘type-processes’ – as opposed to type-forms – involved in the assembly of the architectural setting that grasps Semper’s attention. As he goes on to describe: At the same time the different technical skills of man became organised according to these elements: ceramics and afterwards metal
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works around the hearth, water and masonry works around the mound, carpentry around the roof and its accessories. But what primitive technique evolved from the enclosure? None other than the art of the wall-fitter, that is the weaver of mats and carpets.12 He acknowledges the strangeness of the final statement and goes on to justify the importance of textiles from the historical point of view. As the making of mats and floor-covering is clearly observable even in the earliest cultures without sophisticated clothing, the craft of weaving can claim a comparable history to that of pottery. The relationship of body decoration to the patterns of early textiles supports a similar claim to primacy, and Semper’s study of ornamental patterning of artefacts as well as architectural wall decoration had suggested a similar textile origin for the repetitive, regular motifs he discovered. To illustrate the significant survival into the present of this seemingly archaic notion, Semper also discusses the etymology of the German word for wall, Wand and its common root with Gewand, meaning dress. The suggestion is that the woven material that formed the original enclosing ‘wall’ might provide an important clue to the architectural potential of this most crucial element of the builder’s vocabulary – the masonry structure that came to supplant the fabric screen, for Semper is seen as secondary. It is in his later magnum opus Der Stil, (Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts or Practical Aesthetics) from 1860,13 that the type-process of the woven wall is carried to its ultimate analytical conclusion, with the further distinction that the knot is actually the fundamental building-block of human production. As the basic unit of ‘energy’ within the tectonic process, the knot in Semper’s thinking offers a striking anticipation of the atomic model of matter. It is also for Semper an early metaphor for the structure of the cosmos itself: ‘The knot is perhaps the oldest technical symbol and, as I have shown, the expression for the earliest cosmogonic ideas that arose among nations.’14 For Semper, the knot also has its history tied up in its etymology, so to speak, as Joseph Rykwert has precisely explained in an essay from 1976: By a curious use of word-play, Semper foreshadows his later reference to the knot as the essential work of art … when he considers the term Naht: the seam, the joining. It is, he says, an expedient, a Nothbehelf for the joining of two planes of similar or dissimilar material. But the very juxtaposition of Noth and Naht suggests a connection. The seam is an analogue and symbol which has archaic roots, for the usage of joining originally separated planes. Here he presents the reader with a primary and most important rule of art in its simplest form: to make a virtue out of a necessity.15
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The central theme of this discussion, that of the sense of art as the ‘becoming’ or revealing of emerging patterns of order in time and space, is here encapsulated in Semper’s notion of the knot as the archetypal joint or seam in the process of uniting human effort into productive and meaningful action. The significance of the knot in various of the world’s creation myths, as well as the ritual role of dressing and decorating cult objects, can be taken as representative of the deepest human urge to commemorate both the uniqueness and the cyclical recurrence of the fleeting experience of the here and now. As Bergson described in his analogy of concrete duration with the indivisible succession of notes in a musical melody, it is the continual effort to discern a meaningful pattern in the relentless unfolding of present events that has provided an urgent impetus to the representation of temporal order in art. As Rykwert again suggests: The work of art (Semper says) … is man’s response to the world which is full of wonder and mysterious powers, whose laws man thinks he might understand but whose riddle he never resolves, so that he remains forever in unsatisfied tension. The unattained completeness he conjures with play – and by building a miniature universe for himself. In this the cosmic law can be observed within the smallest dimensions of a self-contained object. By inference therefore, the pleasures of art are analogous to those of nature. ‘And yet’ Semper observes, ‘primitive man takes more pleasure in the regularities of the oarstroke and the handbeat, of the wreath and the bead necklace, than in the less differentiated ones which nature offers him directly.16 For Semper the building’s physical fabric is by definition ‘invisible’, or meaningless, until its ordering principles are revealed through its overlaid dressing or cladding. This idea may also have its roots in the shared etymology of cosmos and cosmetic, both of which imply order: here referring to a far-from-superficial treatment of surface which might thus portray an underlying cosmological structure. This may be achieved by the literal application of a surface coating or even a metaphorical overlaid patterning, as in Louis Kahn’s striated concrete with its exaggerated regular grid of recessed day-work joints. That ornament – in the sense of emerging pattern based on the process of fabrication – should have primacy over any underlying structure is also suggested by Bergson’s insistence that we learn to see change without the need for any unchanging support hidden beneath it. Both kinds of surface, Semper’s woven clothing and Kahn’s ‘tattooed’ skin, present the joint as the archetypal unit of an emerging temporal order and both tectonic processes also illustrate a set of principles that may lie at the origin of the patterns of western logical thought.17 The progress of early Greek philosophy from the pre-Socratic account of the endless flux of the four elements – evolving 60
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into and out of countless combinations ‘in accordance with the arrangement of time’18 – makes a dramatic shift in the later Platonic abstraction of being as the transcendental goal of becoming. This distinction drove a philosophical wedge between the everyday reality of material things and their idealized theoretical models. This unfortunate separation of ideas from things highlights the central criticism of both Semper and Bergson’s allegedly brutally materialist conceptions of reality. This assumption is usually based on a neglect of both men’s efforts at establishing a synthesis between the idealist and the material-determinist positions. In Semper’s case, I would argue, he succeeds in setting out the basis for a new conception of constructional poetics in architecture. This is based on the original Greek notion of poiesis as the ‘art of making’, or in other words, those ‘technical procedures with implicit transcendent objectives’.19 It is thus potentially a kind of making from which meaningful form gradually emerges. This somewhat goes against Kenneth Frampton’s description of the importance of tectonic thinking in architecture, which in some ways actually reinforces the above dilemma: The beginnings of the Modern, dating back at least two centuries, and much more recent advent of the Post-Modern are inextricably bound up with the ambiguities introduced into western architecture by the primacy given to the scenographic in the evolution of the bourgeois world. However, building remains essentially tectonic rather than scenographic in character and it may be argued that it is an act of construction first rather than a discourse … Thus one may assert that building is ontological rather than representational in character and that built form is a presence rather than something standing for an absence. In Heidegger’s terminology we may think of it as a ‘thing’ rather than a ‘sign’.20 I would argue that Semper’s work, particularly the analysis of the typological processes found in the primitive hut, demands a combination of ontological and scenographic readings in order to understand the potential of a tectonically articulated architecture to communicate a sense of temporal order. In the sense that the knot or the joint marks the path of a process of becoming – the boundary at which something ‘begins its presencing’, to use Heidegger’s term – it can also be read as an element of ‘text’: part of a continuously unfolding narrative of the human body’s encounter with the materiality of the world. This is also suggested by a further etymological link between the words text, textile and tectonic. The idea that a language of architecture might emerge from the process of its own construction is paralleled in Bergson’s later concept of the self as a project of continual self-creation. Thus, as I suggested at the outset, this connection might provoke a deeper understanding of architecture as contributing to our sense of self-awareness. 61
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To conclude, I would like to return to Valéry’s opening references to the empathic projection of the self into the world, through the contemplation of the tectonically – and even functionally – articulated object. The collision of form and material (what I would like to call the ‘tectonic event’) that is played out in the observer’s imagination when faced with an object ‘so beautifully made’, provides both an image of the process of production (for example the encounter between the building and its makers) as well as – and in many ways more intriguingly – a projection of the future encounter between the building and its users in the traces left behind by the similarly productive processes of creative inhabitation. It is this emergence of a narrative dimension which lends a space its sense of temporal richness, suggesting the continuity of the past into the future, as encapsulated in Bergson’s concept of duration.
Notes 1 Valéry, ‘Eupalinos or, The Architect’, in Dialogues, Princeton, NJ: Bollingen Press, 1956, pp. 74–5. 2 A. E. Pilkington, Bergson and His Influence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 101. 3 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, New York: Philosophical Library, 1946, p. 147. 4 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, New York: Random House, 1944, p. 10. 5 Heinrich Hübsch, ‘In What Style Should We Build?’ in In What Style Should We Build?, Santa Monica, CA: Getty Center, 1992. 6 Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-Le-Duc, Lectures on Architecture, Benjamin Bucknall (trans.), New York: Dover Books, 1987. 7 Marc-Antoine Laugier, An Essay on Architecture (1753), Wolfgang Herrmann and Anni Herrmann (trans.), Los Angeles: Hennessey and Ingalls, 1977. 8 Quatremère de Quincy, A. C., Dictionnaire d’Architecture, 2 vols, Paris: [n. pub.], I, 1789, II, 1832. 9 Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-Le-Duc, Le Massif du Mont-Blanc. Étude sur sa construction géodésique et géologique…, Paris: [n. pub.], 1876. 10 Vitruvius, On Architecture, Frank Granger (trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983, II, 1.2. 11 Gottfried Semper, The Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings, Harry Francis Mallgrave and Wolfgang Herrmann (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 102. 12 Semper, The Four Elements, p. 103. 13 Gottfried Semper, Style in the Technical and Tectonic Arts; or, Practical Aesthetics, Harry Francis Mallgrave and Michael Robinson (trans.), Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2004. 14 Semper, The Four Elements, p. 217. 15 Joseph Rykwert, ‘Preface to London Lecture by Gottfried Semper’, RES, 6, 1983, p. 125. 16 Joseph Rykwert, The Necessity of Artifice, London: Academy Editions, 1982, p. 127. 17 Indra Kagis McEwan, Socrates’ Ancestor, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 41ff. 18 Anaximander Fragment, in Early Greek Philosophy, Jonathan Barnes (trans.), London: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 75. 19 Alberto Perez-Gomez, Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983, p. 126. 20 Kenneth Frampton, ‘Rappel à l’Ordre: The Case for the Tectonic’, Architectural Design 1990, 3–4: 20.
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Chapter 6
Mineral matters Formation and transformation Richard Weston
6.1 Vanadanite 6.2 Tourmaline 6.3 Meteorite 6.4 Mica 6.5 ‘Paesina’ stone 6.6 Charoite Source, all pictures: Richard Weston
At the opening of the Darmstadt Artists’ Colony in 1901, Peter Behrens presented a Zeichen or sign. It took the form of a crystal, and was offered as an emblem of transformation: just as carbon, under conditions of intense heat and pressure can metamorphose into diamond, so everyday life could be raised to a higher plane by art. More famously, crystal metaphors came to fascinate the German expressionists, stimulating the ‘Glass Dream’ of Paul Scheerbart and Bruno Taut and related utopian visions. Although impervious to the esoteric traditions to which Taut’s ‘Crystal Chain’ was heir, John Ruskin was equally fascinated by ‘crystalline beauty’. It emerged, he wrote in Ethics of the Dust,1 ‘under harmonies of law which are wholly beneficent, because wholly inexorable’. Looking at a piece of vanadanite (Figure 6.1), it is easy to share his delight in the multiplication of tiny cubes. Whereas the early Modernists might have seen this as an example of the ‘mass production aesthetic’, to Ruskin it exemplified the endless deviations from perfect repetition characteristic of that ‘natural’ aesthetic Alvar Aalto articulated in a lecture in 1944. If you are designing a housing scheme, [he suggested], imagine that the houses are like flowers on a branch of a cherry tree, all similar, yet no two exactly alike, varying according to their position on the branch or the direction of the sun or wind. Over the past two years I have scanned numerous minerals and fossils. What fascinates me most about them is the combination of formation according to inner order – genetic, in the case of Aalto’s flowers, geometric in minerals – and 63
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transformation by time and environment. The ‘ruined city’ discovered in a few millimetres of the lustrous black surface of tourmaline (Figure 6.2) is enriched by microscopic inclusions of quartz. A meteorite (Figure 6.3) and slice of mica (Figure 6.4) share similar lattice structures, but radically different histories: the Widmanstetten patterns of the former can evolve only in conditions of near zero gravity and unimaginably slow cooling, while the structure of the latter is rendered fuzzy by dendritic growths that, at points of intersection, may resemble snow crystals. ‘Paesina’ stone (Figure 6.5), an intricate marble from Tuscany, evokes in miniature the processes of sedimentation, uplift and faulting that built the mountains where it occurs; and with a similarly uncanny fidelity to origin, charoite (Figure 6.6) – discovered only recently in the banks of a Siberian river – offers a vivid image of turbulence and flux. Seen as obeying autonomous and inexorable laws, nature and technology functioned as ‘primitive’ references within modernism. How fitting, therefore, that minerals and fossils should now be imaged and transformed using the latest digital production techniques.
Notes 1 John Ruskin, The Crown of Wild Olive and The Ethics of the Dust, London: Cassell, 1909, p. 296.
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Part 3 Questioning colonial constructs
Chapter 7
Post-colonizing the primitive Felipe Hernández and Lea Knudsen Allen
The notion of primitivism is inseparable from the question of colonialism. Considering that one of the main strategies of colonialism consists of constructing rationalized cultural identities of the colonized Other through which the self can be understood and emerge as superior, primitivization lies at the core of colonialism and the colonial enterprise. Primitivization takes place within the asymmetrical distribution of power (mainly military and economic, in that order) between the colonizer and the colonized, which authorizes the former to render the latter, the dominated one, an inferior other: a primitive. Other authors in this volume have already referred to the negative connotations implicit in the word ‘primitive’. They have discussed how the primitive denigrates whatever is designated by it and suggests the superiority of whoever uses the term. For this reason, it is not our intention in this essay to expand on this situation but to examine how primitivism can, counter-intuitively, challenge the authority of the colonizer. In so doing, we will first elaborate on the ambivalence of the primitive in the colonial situation, and its discourse, which emerges from the colonial desire ‘for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite’.1 Second, we will examine the primitive as a means of resistance both against colonial authority and in opposition to processes of modernization. In the final section of this essay, we will analyse an architectural case study in which notions of the primitive were used in order to oppose – as well as challenge – traditional architectural historicity and to resist processes of modernization.
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Primitivizing the other: disavowal and ambivalence in colonial discourse Various postcolonial theorists have analysed the colonial strategy of constructing identities of the colonized Other which are comprehensible to the colonizer and which permit the latter to emerge as the dominant party in the relationship. Homi Bhabha, for example, in his book The Location of Culture, elaborates extensively on the colonizer’s attempt to create ‘doubles’ of itself in the colonized, a task that is achieved via language, religion, education, etc. Although the task is never fully achieved and the doubles remain forever incomplete, always in a process of formation, Bhabha stresses that such doubles, or partial copies, need to be disavowed in order for the colonizer to maintain its authority. In other words, as the colonizer needs to negate its double in order to reaffirm its authority, the colonial strategy is rendered ambivalent, an ambivalence which, as such, disrupts the authority of the colonizer. Bhabha illustrates this process via the concept of mimicry, which, in his words, ‘emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal’.2 At this point, we would like to draw attention to the process of disavowal through which the desired Other is denied validity and becomes, in Bhabha’s words, ‘almost the same but not quite’. Disavowal is achieved largely through the implementation of different forms of discrimination that deny the validity of the Other – as well as its cultural production. This denial can only operate in relation to an assumed referential, hence superior, socio-cultural system: the European rational system exemplified by the Enlightenment/post-Enlightenment period. Therefore, the Other is always understood – and emerges, becomes visible – in its relation to European norms. As Bhabha himself puts it: ‘colonial authority requires modes of discrimination (cultural, racial, administrative …) that disallow a stable unitary assumption of collectivity’.3 It is here that the notion of primitive, in the colonial context, plays an important role.4 Ethnologists and, in particular, anthropologists used the term ‘primitive’ to describe all kinds of social, cultural and political practices that did not comply with the European model, which was taken as the referent. Ethnologists and anthropologists took it as their task to identify, describe and translate unintelligible, ‘primitive’ practices in order to make them accessible to a European audience. This process of cultural translation is examined by Tejaswini Niranjana in her book Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context. Niranjana advances a critique of anthropology’s project of translation as one which supports the creation and maintenance of a hierarchical system that grants authority to European and, later, to North American cultures: The ‘primitive’ becomes the anthropologist’s civilizational other. Because it does not depend on logic or consistency, the primitive society’s science is defective compared to ours. The unity of the 74
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human consciousness does not preclude – in fact, it helps construct – an inner hierarchy: primitive thought needs to be translated into modern, for it is that which is not yet modern. The hierarchy also indicates to us the operation of a teleological model of history.5 Two issues are clear in the previous paragraph. First is the disavowal of the colonized through its primitivization. This process depends on the indissoluble association of anthropological and ethnographic discourses with western classical notions of knowledge, reality and representation. Such an association provides a solid foundation upon which to build a system of cultural superiority. The second, which can be considered as a result of the former, refers to the conjecture of a teleological model of history which (re)presents the primitive as an imperfect realization – in relation to the western classical notions of knowledge, reality and representation. However, more than simply dismissing the primitive for not conforming to the classical ideal, such a (western-centred) model of history erases all traces of the pre-colonial past while, at the same time, attempting to deny the effects of colonization. Mary Louise Pratt presents an interesting interpretation of Alexander Humboldt’s notes about the architectures he found while travelling through South America. Pratt shows how South American indigenous architecture is rendered imperfect, as well as aesthetically incompetent, in relation to the western classical canon mentioned above: American architecture, we cannot too often repeat, can cause no astonishment, either by the magnitude of its works or the elegance of its form, [Humboldt] writes, but it is highly interesting, as it throws light on the history of the primitive civilizations and the inhabitants of the mountains of the new continent. While in Greece, religions became the chief support of fine arts; among the Aztecs, the primitive cult of death results in monuments whose only goal is to produce terror and dismay.6 Pratt’s main point is that ‘the European imagination produces archaeological subjects by splitting contemporary non-European peoples off from their precolonial, and even their colonial pasts’.7 Such splitting occurs during the construction of a history of subjects who did not have a history – at least, not as part of the linear western historicity – and who would only attain historical subject-hood through the scholarly historicizing methods of the colonizer. In other words, the colonized are withdrawn from their own history in order to be inserted into the western teleological historicity devised to grant itself authority. However, the splitting Pratt refers to in her analysis of Humboldt’s passage can also refer to the ambivalent simultaneous recognition and disavowal 75
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of difference. In his notes, Humboldt affirms that indigenous American architectures are not comparable, in scale and image, with Greek and Roman classic architectures, which are taken as superior referents. Indigenous architectures are recognized as different and disavowed, but disavowal is, nonetheless, followed by another form of recognition – the fact that, for Humboldt, indigenous architectures throw light on the history of primitive civilizations – which reveals the existence of an erased pre-colonial past. It is the incoherence of this splitting, the double inscription of the colonial relation in a homogenizing universal history, which renders colonial discourse ambivalent and undermines its claim for cultural authority. Postcolonial critics and subjects have identified the ambivalence inherent in the colonial discourse and have developed strategies to contest and resist the colonizer’s claims for cultural authority. According to Bhabha: Resistance is not necessarily an oppositional act of political intention, nor is it the simple negation or exclusion of the ‘content’ of another culture, as a difference once perceived. It is the effect of an ambivalence produced within the rules of recognition of dominating discourses as they articulate the signs of cultural difference and reimplicate them within the deferential relations of colonial power – hierarchy, normalization and so forth.8 Thus far, we have inscribed the notion of the primitive at the centre of postcolonial discourse. We have shown that the primitivization of the Other was one of the discriminatory strategies used by the colonizer in order to support its claims to cultural authority. However, the ambivalence of the primitivizing strategy, as well as the primitive’s double inscription as the recognition of difference and its disavowal, allow for an appropriation of the primitive in order to resist western cultural domination and to destabilize the hierarchical discursive structures that render it inferior. The next section examines the way in which various artists, writers and architects have used the primitive as a means of resistance. Nevertheless, we will also shed light on the numerous political questions and theoretical shortcomings that arise from such an operation.
Primitive as resistance The primitive as an aesthetic is perhaps most familiarly associated with modernist avant-garde art: Kingsley, Matisse, Picasso, Gauguin, Stravinsky come readily to mind. In spite of the differences in their referents – Africa, Tahiti, pagan Russia – the aesthetic of the primitive is characterized, not simply by an exoticization or fascination with geographically distant cultures and practices, but by a certain ambivalence. This is evident in a text such as Heart of Darkness – perhaps the 76
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most often referenced novel in discussions of primitivism – for Conrad has been read as participating in either nineteenth-century colonialist discourse – Africa is the site of dangerous, sexualized superstitious beings – or in modernism’s critique of colonialism – Marlow’s encounter with ‘the horror! The horror!’ in Africa allows him to see metropolitan life as merely ‘insignificant and silly dreams’.9 In other words, the encounter with Africa precipitates Marlow’s realization that the foundations of empire, with its ideals of rationalization, scientific progress, civilization and moral superiority, are tenuous at best, false delusions at worst. Thus, while primitivism has long been used, as we pointed out earlier, as an aesthetics/politics of promoting European superiority and colonial power, it contains within itself the germs of a critique of this very discourse. Following from the previous section, the concept of the primitive, within a colonial context, is inherently based on the assumption of a universal progress from nature to civilization. Jacques Turgot’s optimistic view of historical development – ‘the total mass of the human race … marches always, although slowly, towards still higher perfection’ – is characteristic of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and provides the basic philosophy legitimating colonial domination. During this period, as it had been at least since the sixteenth century, a perceived lack of culture (property, commerce, religion, etc) becomes justification for bringing ‘truth’ or ‘enlightenment’ to non-western peoples. Thomas Macaulay’s view of history as a march of progress underpins his assertion of British superiority over India and informs his colonial policies: We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population.10 The need for interpreters to bridge the gap between ‘us’ and ‘the great mass of the population’, the assertion that only ‘by degrees’ educated Indians may be made ‘fit vehicles’ and the use of terms such as ‘enrich’, ‘refine’ and ‘taste’ point to the belief that non-Europeans are technologically, intellectually and culturally backward – and thus in need of ‘cultivation’. On the other hand, and nearly coincident in time, we find the phenomenon whereby the Other – especially the figure of the Oriental philosopher – was used to satirize or comment upon the moral failings of metropolitan Europe; this privileged perspective was warranted in part owing to the fact that the East was seen as the birthplace of almost all ancient civilizations and 77
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religions. Recognition of ancient civilizations often led, however, to a reifying of the East as a static space untouched by western notions of progress. For instance, The Illustrated London News, paraphrasing James Fergusson’s evaluation of Indian architecture, emphasized that ‘Hindu architecture is so conservative that it varies little at different periods’ (July, 1886). William Jones’s discovery of a similar linguistic pattern between Sanskrit and classical Greek and Latin provides another instance of positioning Indian civilization within the realm of European antiquity.11 Yet, it is notable that both Enlightenment and Romanticist engagements led to the development of new genres that made use of ‘Oriental’ motifs to criticize European social arrangements.12 Other figures of primitivism include rusticism, the noble savage, the cult of the child and Greek and medieval revivals. Concomitant with accelerated industrial and commercial expansion, these forms of primitivism can be seen as reactionary responses to the Age of Enlightenment; as a character in Thomas Love Peacock’s Crotchet Castle (1831) observes, ‘Men never begin to study antiquities till they are saturated with civilization’.13 It is precisely in this opposition between ‘civilization’ and ‘antiquity’ that the problem of the ambivalence in the primitive enters; in spite of the idealization of the past, or the rustic or the non-European, the construction still maintains the notion of historical progression – implicitly one looks back to the primitive in order to discover ‘man in all the truth of nature’.14 It is not until the early twentieth century that the optimism of empire and colonialism begins to decay within the metropolitan centre itself. As we have seen with Conrad, primitivism becomes more unsettling; it becomes used to point to the ‘darkness’ inherent in western subjects and institutions: Well, you know, that was the worst of it – this suspicion of their not being inhuman. It would come slowly to one. They howled and leaped, and spun, and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity – like yours – the thought of your remote kinship with this wild and passionate uproar. Ugly.15 Turning on its head such claims as ‘the monstrous shapes of the Puraneic deities are unsuitable for the higher forms of artistic representation’,16 modernist artists appropriated so-called tribal or primitive art in order to disrupt the blind assumption of superiority implied by Birdwood’s statement. Interestingly enough, the very traits which condemned primitive art earlier – ‘They showed little knowledge of perspective, but tell their story naturally’17 – became desirable for the modernist project. At the same time, then, that the primitive is used as a mode of legitimating European narratives of progress and civilization – as a reserve of unsullied “human” expression which contains the prehistory of modernity – it is used 78
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as an alienating strategy by the avant-garde who exploited its potential to ‘transcend our sense of civilized experience’.18 Whatever the motivation for using images of the primitive, their introduction and dissemination in the work of European artists ‘forever change[d] the European discourse on representation, on mimesis and subjectivity’;19 for, as Gikandi continues, summing up a host of postcolonial scholarship: ‘English modernism … was generated by a crisis of belief in the efficacy of colonialism’.20 Modernist primitivism, then, both affirms the imperatives of colonization and helps usher in a critique of its ideologies and forms of representation. We have been discussing metropolitan uses of the primitive; another place to consider the way the primitive has been used as a site of resistance is in the work coming out of the ‘periphery’ itself; or rather, by considering the primitive as a strategy used by postcolonial writers, artists and architects to reclaim or rewrite their own past. Resistance, it has been stated, is ‘an alternative way of conceiving human history’.21 It is perhaps obvious, thus, that postcolonial writers and artists have conceived of their task as one of searching for alternate forms of expression in an attempt to escape from the inherited imperial – normal or standard – language.22 As in the case of the Negritude movement, which set out to reject western cultural domination by affirming black ‘consciousness’ and experience (as Leopold Senghor wrote, ‘there is difference, but not inferiority or antagonism’), tropes of primitivism began to be used as affirmative sites of difference in the early twentieth century. Claude McKay – Jamaican-born immigrant to the USA, whose sonnet of resistance ‘If We Must Die’, inspired by the race riots of 1919, was later used by Churchill as a rallying cry against the Nazis – was one of the earlier postcolonial intellectuals to use the concept. In his autobiography A Long Way from Home, he writes, ‘My damned white education has robbed me of much of the primitive vitality, the pure stamina, the simple unswaggering strength of the Jakes [the urban vagabond in Home to Harlem] of the Negro race’.23 That phrase, ‘primitive vitality’, points to an essentializing of ‘the Negro race’ or of the primitive in general (in another poem, the sight of a ‘Primitive Canoe’ causes McKay to ruminate on the contrasts between ‘this hard land of fretful nights and days’ and a ‘dim unknown land’ which ‘intoxicate[s] me’) – but, simultaneously, to the way that the primitive provides an ideal precisely in its difference from the norms of western culture – summed up here as ‘white education’. On the other hand, the primitive can be used, not as with McKay as an embrace of the very terms used to denigrate and affirm inferiority under colonialism, but as a counterpoint to the discourses upholding colonial superiority. Incorporating or using folk traditions, storytelling, the supernatural and magical, non-standard language and Creole or colonial history are deliberate 79
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ways in which postcolonial writers (and others) work to transform the discourses/ forms of the European West. This is both a strategy of entering into the dominant discourse in order to ‘make it acknowledge marginalized or suppressed or forgotten histories’24 and a proprietary claim to the very traditions which had served to demark their dispossession. Although Derek Walcott states in one of his poems ‘I had entered the house of literature as a houseboy, filched as the slum child stole’,25 in effect he creates new forms through appropriation. His verse epic Omeros, taking its title from the Greek word for Homer, recalls the events of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey but in a Caribbean setting. Walcott, indeed, calls his work ‘a mulatto of style’. These two versions of resistance – accepting the very terms already given (primitive vitality, ‘simple’ strength) and affirming the validity of this position, and using classical or western forms to tell new stories – are united in that both must decide how to engage with their colonial past. As Edward Said has pointed out, ‘post-imperial writers of the Third World … bear their past within them … as urgently reinterpretable and re-deployable experiences’.26 As one of those ‘reinterpretable and re-deployable’ categories, the primitive has been used in a range of forms in numerous attempts to answer the question: ‘How does a culture seeking to become independent of imperialism imagine its own past?’27
Architecture and the question of multiple cultural origins In the first part of this essay we inscribed the notion of primitivism into postcolonial discourse. There, we examined a traditional approach to primitivism in which the West, or the colonizer, used the rhetoric of primitivism in order to support a discriminatory ideology against the non-western – be it African, American, Asian or Austral-Asian. However, at the end of this section, it was demonstrated that postcolonial discourse enables alternative readings and appropriations of the concept of the primitive in order to develop strategies of resistance that destabilize the western colonial ideology. In the second section, we looked at a wide range of examples in which the notion of the primitive, and the primitive itself, has been appropriated in literature, painting, music and other arts as a means to resist and/or challenge prevailing values and cultural narratives. Two different attitudes were explored: on the one hand, modernist metropolitan uses of primitivism in order to disrupt codes of representation (as in Picasso’s cubist paintings), revealing a crisis in the belief of the efficacy and ethics of empire. On the other hand, postcolonial re-appropriations of the primitive by non-western subjects in order to re-imagine their own past, as well as insert alternative experiences and knowledges into the western European 80
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canon. In this section, we will elaborate further on the latter strategy by focusing on the impact that primitivism had on twentieth-century architecture in Latin America. Particular attention will be paid to the first fifty years of the century when primitive motifs were appropriated by various architects in order to construct a sense of identity in relation to their pre-colonial past – from which, according to the architects themselves, they had been severed as a result of many years of colonial domination. The first half of the twentieth century was a time when, on the one hand, the governments of Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil, as well as most Latin American nations, began to advocate national modernization which, to some extent, implied the deletion of an indigenous historical past and the adoption of Euro-American social, cultural and political models. On the other hand, there were nationalist movements opposing the governments’ ‘developmentalist’ agendas and calling for the recuperation of the same (lost) indigenous past that the former group wanted to erase. In spite of the fact that both movements sought to erase a shameful colonial past, their means and aspirations were opposed. The search for a national identity, therefore, developed between these two extremes, a situation that could not but engender tensions and conflicts. In many cases, antagonism led to popular revolts and violent incidents.28 One such violent incident was the Mexican Revolution that began in 1910. Mexican revolutionary artists were among the first to appropriate primitive motifs, not only as an aesthetic but as the centre of their political agenda. They declared that art belonged to the people in the same way that Mexico belonged to the Indian people. This group of revolutionaries included Gerardo Murillo, an artist of Spanish origin who joined the revolution and adopted the name of Dr Atl (Water), David Alfaro Siqueiros, Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco and the architect and painter Juan O’Gorman. These artists took it as their task to reveal a counter-history based on the return to a mythical past, an original pre-colonial moment that would provide the foundations for the development of a post-colonial29 – and, in the case of Mexico, post-revolutionary – culture. For them, primitivism was the means to reach for the lost past they wanted to recuperate, oppose the government’s modernizing aspirations and dismantle colonial hierarchies whose effects were still felt throughout Mexico and the rest of Latin America. The architect Juan O’Gorman was an active militant of primitivism. However, like most architects of his generation, at the beginning of his career O’Gorman was a fervent follower of Le Corbusier and an advocate of functionalism. He designed a series of twelve ‘functionalist’ houses, and various schools, in and around Mexico City. Most notable among his early work is the joint house and studio for Frida Kahlo and Diego Rivera with whom O’Gorman carried out various projects and had a long-lasting friendship. This well-known 81
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project consists of two regular rectilinear volumes organized around a courtyard whose shape is reminiscent of Ozenfant’s studio in Paris designed by Le Corbusier in 1922. Much has been said about O’Gorman’s ‘Mexicanist’ impetus in this project – that the line of cacti and the outside wall, for example, are essentially Mexican – however, such affirmations are difficult to sustain given the evident formal, functional and, even, structural connection with modernist European buildings. During the mid-1930s O’Gorman became disillusioned with the principles of modern architecture as well as with professional practice. He thus retired from practice and devoted his time to easel- and mural-painting. For nearly fifteen years, O’Gorman produced work closer to that of other revolutionary artists, particularly that of his friend Diego Rivera, whose favourite subject was the indigenous worker and his/her direct relation to Aztec ancestors. This is why, when O’Gorman returned to architectural practice in the 1950s to collaborate in the design of the Ciudad Universitaria (university campus) in Mexico City between 1950 and 1952, his work showed a dramatic transformation. He was no longer interested in the purity and abstraction promoted by modernist architects – and found in his early projects – but in the inclusion of powerful allusions to a pre-colonial past. This is clear, for example, in the design for the central library at the university in which he collaborated with Gustavo Saavedra and Juan Martinez de Velasco. Their original scheme was for a pyramid, which, occupying a central location on the campus, would make a direct connection – visually and symbolically – with Aztec architecture. This design was modified into a large cubic tower standing on a lower plinth. However, both tower and plinth were covered with colorful images of mestizo workers and soldiers, Aztec imagery and traditional pagan motifs. According to O’Gorman himself, the mural was conceived in order to enlighten the masses about the greatness of their pre-colonial past and the blessings of the revolution. As Edward Burian enthusiastically and optimistically puts it, ‘O’Gorman’s mural represented a shift to a didactic, symbolic, allegorical architecture as well as mythological imagery and occasionally compositional devices from preColumbian culture’.30 O’Gorman’s own house, designed between 1949 and 1953, the same time he was working on the murals for the university library, also illustrates his adherence to the nationalist ideology. Like the central library at the university, his house shows an amazing combination of materials, forms, imagery and symbolism. The house is almost completely covered in brightly coloured mosaics and contains a rich variety of sculptural elements such as Aztec gods and warriors as well as snakes, jaguars, monkeys and other animalistic imagery made of local stone. The main entrance to the house is guarded by giant figures on either side of the door.31 Paradoxically, O’Gorman’s house shows, nonetheless, a rationalist arrangement of spaces and a subtle separation of the areas dedicated 82
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to different social classes: servants and elites. He also uses mass-produced metal-frame windows, which are also found in his earlier functionalist buildings. The central library at the university also contains these kinds of contradictions. Behind the colourful walls there is a functionalist building, which, unavoidably, uses cement (a material symbolically linked with progress, modernization and globalization32) and numerous mass-produced elements, such as prefabricated concrete panels and blocks. Far from negative, the contradictions found in the work of O’Gorman are evidence of the antagonistic attitudes towards national identity, culture and architecture during the mid-twentieth century in Mexico. Such contradictions bring to the fore the enormous and unbridgeable differences that coexist in the various nations of Latin America. It is precisely here that we see the effects of the post-colonial appropriation of primitivism as a mode of resistance. While it is impossible to assert that O’Gorman successfully establishes a connection with an imagined pre-colonial past, his work does clearly unsettle the univocality of Euro-American architectural discourse. Given the fact that O’Gorman appropriates from a variety of cultural sources – he uses Mexican Aztec and Mayan motifs and also elements from classical antiquity and modernist architecture – his work, as well as that of many other architects and artists of his generation, ‘posits itself as the returning gaze of the colonized, a reappropriation of identity that lays claim to the rhizomorphous continuity of multiple cultural origins’.33 In other words, the same primitivism that was at the centre of the West’s colonial discriminatory strategy is transformed into ‘a form of cultural affirmation and a reformulation of identity starting from non-Western autochthony’.34 It is important to underline that O’Gorman’s use of the primitive is not an essentialist move that ignores the violence of colonization and the multiplicity of cultures and social groups that coexist in the space of Mexico and the rest of Latin America. In not returning to an idealized, homogeneous pre-colonial past he avoids essentializing identity. As we have noted throughout this paper, one must, however, proceed with caution when discussing the degree to which (non-western) post-colonial subjects can transform western dominant narratives. It is also important to be careful about the recuperation of an imagined pre-colonial past. This can be seen in the work of Edward Burian, for example, whose unproblematic acceptance of O’Gorman’s success is alarming precisely because it is based on his implicit assumption that the past is transparent. When referring to O’Gorman’s university library, Burian affirms that ‘in one of the landmark symbols of modern Mexican architecture, O’Gorman, architect and painter, was able to reconnect to a mythical past for political and racial purposes’ (our emphasis).35 Such a facile celebration of the appropriation of primitivist motifs in the construction of national identities and nationalist agendas poses numerous 83
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political questions. Most importantly, it draws our attention to the way in which critics, artists, architects and writers have naively assumed that the concept of the primitive can be disassociated from its colonial usages. The politics of using the primitive as a site of resistance presents problems because, to a large extent, it is an attempt to ‘recover forms already established or at least influenced or infiltrated by the culture of empire’.36 It is for this reason that the primitive, as we stated at the opening of our essay, cannot be understood without its colonial context.
Notes 1 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 86. 2 Ibid., p. 86. 3 Ibid., p. 111. 4 It is important to note, however, that Bhabha never refers to the notion of primitivism, nor does he use the term itself. 5 Tejaswini Niranjana, Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context, Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1992, pp. 69–70. 6 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travelling Writing and Transculturation, London, New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 134. 7 Ibid., p.134. 8 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, pp. 110–11. 9 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, New York: Dover, 1990, p. 66. 10 Thomas Macaulay, ‘Minute on Education’ (1835), in Politics and Empire in Victorian Britain: A Reader, Antoinette Burton (ed.), New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 20. 11 See also Pierre Sonnerat, Voyage aux Indes Orientales et à la Chine, for a similar attitude: ‘We find among the Indians the vestiges of the most remote antiquity ... We know that all peoples came there to draw the elements of their knowledge ... India, in her splendor, gave religions and laws to all the other peoples; Egypt and Greece owed to her both their fables and their wisdom’ (1996: 18). 12 See Alan Richardson’s edited collection: Three Oriental Tales: History of Nourjahad, Vathek, the Giaour, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002. 13 Thomas Love Peacock, Crotchet Castle (1831), Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 1999, p. 49 [electronic resource]. 14 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, W. Conyngham Mallory (trans.), New York: Tudor, 1935, bk I. 15 Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 35. 16 George Birdwood, The Industrial Arts of India, London: Chapman & Hall, 1880, p. 125. 17 Ibid. 18 William Rubin, Primitivism in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern, New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1984, p. 254. 19 Simon Gikandi, Maps of Englishness: Writing Identity in the Culture of Colonialism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 163. 20 Ibid. p. 161. 21 Said, Culture and Imperialism, New York: Vintage Books, 1994, p. 216.
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22 While we wish to maintain the full range of meanings in the term ‘language’, it is significant that imposing its own literary tradition onto the other is a strategy of domination and cultural imperialism practised by the colonizer. In a speech before the Edinburgh Philosophical Society in 1846, Thomas Babington Macaulay offered a toast ‘To the literature of Britain … which has exercised an influence wider than that of our commerce and mightier than that of our arms … before the light of which impious and cruel superstitions are fast taking flight on the Banks of the Ganges!’ 23 Claude McKay, A Long Way from Home, New York: L. Furman, 1937, p. 229. 24 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 216. 25 Derek Walcott, ‘Another Life’ in Collected Poems, 1948–1984, London: Faber & Faber, 1986, p. 294. 26 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 212. 27 Ibid. p. 214. 28 Felipe Hernandez, ‘Spaces of Hybridization: The House of the Architect’, in Cruelty and Utopia: Cities and Landscapes of Latin America, Jean-Francois Lejeune (ed.), New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2005, p. 111. 29 Please note that our use of the hyphen in ‘post-colonial’ refers to the period after colonialism, while the non-hyphenated ‘postcolonial’ refers to scholarly discourse. 30 Edward Burian, ‘Modernity and Nationalism: Juan O’Gorman and Post-Revolutionary Architecture in Mexico, 1920–1960’, in Cruelty and Utopia, Lejeune (ed.), p. 220. 31 For a more detailed description, and images, of the house, see Keith Eggener, ‘Contrasting Images of Identity in the Post-war Mexican Architecture of Luis Barragán and Juan O’Gorman’, in Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies 2000, 9(1): 27–45; or Burian, ‘Modernity and Nationalism’ in Cruelty and Utopia, Lejeune (ed.), p. 30. 32 For more information about cement’s symbolic relation with progress, modernization and globalization, see Adrian Forty’s essay ‘Cement and Multiculturalism’ in Transculturation: Cities, Spaces and Architectures in Latin America, Felipe Hernandez, Mark Millington and Iain Borden (eds), Amsterdam–New York: Rodopi, 2005, pp.144–54. 33 Erik Camayd-Freixas and José Eduardo Gonzaléz, Primitivism and Identity in Latin America: Essays on Art, Literature and Culture, Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2000, p. x. 34 Ibid, p. xiv. 35 Burian, ‘Modernity and Nationalism’ in Cruelty and Utopia, Lejeune (ed.), p. 220. 36 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 210.
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Chapter 8
Notes for an alternative history of the primitive hut Stephen Cairns
Historically, arts discourse in the West has tended to characterize the ‘primitive’ in two distinctive frames. The first depicts the primitive as an attractive state, holding something the West or modernity has lost. Here the primitive is imagined as being in tune with nature and able to serve as a reservoir of essentially unchanging and noble truths; and because these truths are usually caricatured as fragile and under constant threat, they are seen to need protection or conservation, an impulse James Clifford has named the ‘salvage paradigm’.1 The second frame depicts the primitive as a repulsive condition. Here the primitive is conceived as a more violent, marauding and threatening state, not so much in need of protecting, conserving or salvaging, as controlling and guarding against. Furthermore, both the attractive and repulsive depictions of the primitive – ‘what we should emulate or, alternately, what we should fear’2 – are often entangled, such that a positive assessment of the primitive cannot help but be coloured by a negative one, and vice versa. The noble savage and the cannibal, that is, are almost always co-present.
Theory and the primitive Recent theoretical writing has captured something of this entanglement, and has self-consciously activated the violent and marauding conception of the primitive to alternate ends. Theorists often gathered under the heading of ‘poststructuralism’ – Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari, Kristeva, Barthes and others – have redeployed the critical potential of the primitive as a condition of radical and threatening difference. The primitive in this disparate body of theory 86
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circulates in the guise of terms such as ‘paganism’, ‘nomadism’ or ‘savagery’. The primitive is, in this context, activated as agent of disruption, interruption and potential. With its themes of corporeality, base materiality, irrationality, or alternate rationalities, the idea of the primitive serves as the vehicle by which to question, as Spivak puts it, ‘the millennially cherished excellences of western metaphysics: the sovereignty of the subject’s intention, the power of predication’.3 It acts as a provocation to radical forms of invention. In the context of this redeployment, the long-standing notion of the primitive-as-reservoir has come to seem anachronistic. The primitive, now loosened from its essentialist moorings, is reasserted as a generative force. No longer merely a mute resource awaiting reverential interpretation by external (western) agencies, the primitive is affirmed as a principle of newness and potential in its own right. For all of this recent affirmation of the primitive, the cultural-political dimensions of this recognition are, at best, implicit. Reasserting the primitive as a generative force in western theory, seemed to carry with it the possibility that those cultures to whom the term ‘primitive’ was historically attached might now themselves find a place from which to speak, to act and to articulate their own desires and aspirations. Yet, there is nothing in this theoretical work that offered such an explicit or particular politics of representation. Without such particularity, the appreciation for a newly radicalized notion of the primitive begins to appear as yet another form of orientalism in which a generalized mode of creativity and potential is extracted from heterogeneous subjects whose only unifying trait would be a relative lack of material resources. Post-colonial critics such as Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha, have, in various ways, commented on this paradox. They have sought to exploit the openings that this animated and threatening primitivism offers to a consideration of a crosscultural politics of representation, while at the same time critiquing the latent ‘macrological nostalgia’ and ‘primitivistic reverence’ that they say persists in this theoretical work.4 As Spivak points out (in the context of her critique of Kristeva’s book on Chinese peasant women) the interest ‘French theorists’ such as Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze and others have in ‘reaching out to all that is not the West’ is ultimately a form of self-interest. As she puts it: [i]n spite of their occasional interest in touching the other of the West, of metaphysics, of capitalism, their repeated question is obsessively self-centred: if we are not what official history and philosophy say we are, who then are we (not), how are we (not)?5 Spivak characterizes this theoretical engagement with difference as a kind of crisis management in which the West turns to the primitive only in order to manage its heterogeneity and to confirm and enrich its own identity.6 Homi Bhabha advances a similar argument suggesting that the notion of culture is 87
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often used to domesticate difference into the project of universal theorymaking, citing a number of (mostly contemporary) illustrative exemplars: ‘Montesquieu’s Turkish Despot, Barthes’ Japan, Kristeva’s China, Derrida’s Nambikwara Indians, Lyotard’s Cashinahua pagans’.7 In each instance theory’s proper name is doubled by a culturalist ‘ethnic’ representative, which stands for difference incorporated. In this doubling theory enacts a ‘strategy of containment where the Other text is forever the exegetical horizon of difference, never the active agent of articulation’.8 Indeed, one of the central arguments of Bhabha’s book The Location of Culture is that anthropology’s culture-concept functions repressively in the context of radical difference primarily because of its spatiality. He argues that, in spite of the sophisticated self-reflexivity of contemporary theory, ‘[t]he Other is [still] cited, quoted, framed, illuminated, encased in the shot/reverse-shot strategy of a serial enlightenment’.9 In this sense, the other is spatialized: located, fixed, grounded and thereby known through the culture-concept and so ‘loses its power to signify, to negate, to initiate its historic desire, to establish its own institutional and oppositional discourse’.10 The artistic avant-garde from the turn of the last century is, of course, one of the classic sites of the West’s engagement with the primitive. It is a site that has come to orient some of the key theoretical debates in art criticism in recent times, and is where this line of post-colonial criticism finds its most sustained development in relation to the arts. The Susan Hiller edited collection, The Myth of Primitivism: Perspectives on Art usefully encapsulates the key post-colonial parameters of these debates.11 Ethnographic material from Africa and Oceania that so inspired the European metropolitan avant-garde, was, on the one hand, openly understood to be a ‘resource’ for the enrichment of European art (Picasso, for example, famously appreciated ‘what one could gain’ from this alter-tradition)12 and, on the other, produced in communities that were always, relative to Europe, materially under-resourced. Primitivism in art, it was argued, not only relied on the processes of colonialism that enabled these materials to be accessed in the first place, but could itself be construed as another, more subtle, form of (cultural) resource extraction. The event that served as a lightning rod for this line of criticism was the Museum of Modern Art’s 1984 exhibition ‘“Primitivism” in 20th Century Art’. Hal Foster, in his critique of this exhibition, invoked Ricoeur who, he suggests, ‘wrote presciently of a moment when “the whole of mankind becomes a kind of imaginary museum”’. Echoing the critiques of Spivak and Bhabha, Foster suggests that this primitivism represents a kind of ‘closure’ or ‘claustrophobia’.13 He concludes by arguing that: rather than seek or resuscitate a lost or dead other, why not turn to vital others within and without – to affirm their resistance to the
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white, patriarchal order of Western culture? … On this reading the other remains – indeed, as the very field of difference in which the subject emerges – to challenge Western pretences of sovereignty, supremacy, and self-creation.14 These cultural-political questions raise important themes to do with appropriation, ownership, repatriation, agency and resistance in the relationship of art production to cultural difference. They are questions that are still very much alive, as more recent books on art and primitivism suggest. We might think by way of example here of Flam and Deutch’s Primitivism and Twentieth-Century Art: A Documentary History,15 or Pinney and Thomas’s Beyond Aesthetics: Art and the Technologies of Enchantment.16 This latter collection, written from the perspective of an anthropology of art, outlines perhaps the strongest post-colonialist critique to date. Developing the central thesis of Alfred Gell’s book Art and Agency,17 it explores the idea that the art product in tribal contexts never simply bears the impression of an artist’s agency, but that this agency is itself distributed through the social and material context in which the work is being made. In this analysis, artistic agency and its social and material milieu are given a kind of mutually soliciting power. Agency cannot, then, be located in any particular individual, but is dispersed among a community and into the material realm too because material objects are assumed to have ‘the capacity to stand in networks of human social agency’.18 This can be seen to be a radical extension of the kind of post-colonially-inspired critiques being advanced by Foster and others during the early debates on primitivism in art. Significantly, because this work is anthropologically-framed, it is energized empirically by carefully specified social, geographical and material situations. It represents a kind of situated theory. In this sense, the anthropological concept of culture has been radicalized and reactivated, not as a domesticating device as Bhabha charged, but as an enlivening and enabling condition.
Architecture and the primitive In architecture the status of the primitive appears to be much more clear cut. It is the first framing, that of the primitive as the noble savage (rather than cannibal), that figures most prominently in the key chapters of the history of architectural theory. As a consequence, it is a history that is remarkably free of the ambivalent and contorted play of fear and desire that marks the appearance of the primitive in the arts more generally. However, the freedom that comes with a wholehearted ennobling of the primitive is a blind and unproductive one. With primitivism’s internal tensions seemingly resolved, the motivation for thinking critically about the problematic of otherness and difference more generally becomes
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dissipated in architecture. It is remarkable, for instance, that while the Museum of Modern Art’s 1984 exhibition ‘“Primitivism” in 20th Century Art’ provoked controversy and heated debate, and generated a range of important reconsiderations of the politics of art,19 the Bernard Rudofsky-curated Architecture Without Architects, held in 1964 at the same institution, and which relied on a primitivist depiction of non-western architectures as organic, authorless, cultural creations, generated little controversy. Of course, the twenty-year difference between these exhibitions is crucial as it was precisely in this period that the theoretical discourse I sketched above began to have its effects, and the critical reception of the Primitivism show could be counted as one of those effects. Nonetheless there has been little, even belated, critical reflection on the 1964 show,20 and it still remains widely regarded within architecture as an appropriate and timely corrective to the excesses of architectural modernism. All of this confirms what Adrian Forty pointed out in his keynote paper in the conference that inspired this book: that, historically, architecture has remained relatively untouched by the controversy that the primitive has generated for the other arts. Part of this immunity may be related to the form that the primitive most commonly takes in architecture. In architecture the trope of the primitive is given its most consistent expression through the idea of the primitive hut. Joseph Rykwert’s book On Adam’s House in Paradise (first published in 1972)21 is perhaps the most influential encapsulation of the history of this idea. For him the primitive hut is ‘the paradigm of building: as a standard by which other buildings must in some way be judged’.22 He argues that the primitive hut functions as a resource that underpins architecture’s very rationale, grounding questions of ‘why we build and what we build for’, while offering a set of principles to which architects could appeal in order to reform ‘corrupt custom or practice’.23 In this intellectual context, the primitive hut ‘retain[s] its validity as a reminder of the original and therefore essential meaning of all building for people: that is, of architecture. It remains the underlying statement, the irreducible, intentional core’.24 There is little sense that the primitive is a threatening or difficult condition in Rykwert’s account. On the contrary, again and again culturally, geographically and historically diverse examples, Rykwert demonstrates the persistently benign and noble values that seem to radiate from this idea. Rykwert’s book effectively raises the stakes around the question of the primitive. Not only is this a matter of thinking through the question of architecture’s relation to the primitive, as if it were one idea among many; but because the primitive hut is as old as architectural theory itself,25 and because of its special status as original architecture, to broach the primitive is to raise fundamental questions about architecture itself. At a time when the culturalpolitical debates around the question of difference and otherness have such prominence across all the arts and beyond, it becomes more important than 90
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ever to explore the idea of the primitive (as one embodiment of difference and otherness) in an institutionally-specific way.
An alternative history of the primitive hut One way of framing this line of inquiry would be to propose an alternative history of the primitive hut. The aim of such a history would be to explore how the internal tensions held within the notion of primitivism I charted above, came to be resolved within the field of architecture. It would interrogate precisely how architecture’s embrace of the primitive managed to hive off and domesticate primitivism’s more troubling and threatening dimensions, and how the (ultimately more interesting and productive) tensions that the primitive seems to present for the other arts were resolved in architecture. Such an alternative history would be attentive to the institutional positioning of the primitive in architecture and would explore its productive potential and political consequences. It would borrow the theoretical vigour of the ‘pagan’ and the ‘nomad’ to exploit the critical possibilities that theory has opened, while retaining the kind of scepticism post-colonial criticism reserves for a theoretical practice that underinvests in the contingencies of specific histories of difference and their worldly circumstances. Such an alternative history might begin with a re-examination of Marc-Antoine Laugier’s An Essay on Architecture (first published in 1753),26 perhaps architecture’s best-known formulation of the idea of the primitive hut. In the remainder of this chapter I would like to sketch such a re-examination in order to offer a sense of how this alternative history might develop. For Laugier the failures of the architecture of the mid-eighteenth century were all too evident in the fashionable ornamental ‘excesses’ of the Rococo and in the medievalism of the Gothic. His version of the primitive hut embodies a set of essential principles – that happen to consist of the basic components of Classical architecture: column, entablature and pediment – that amount to a structural-functional basis for architectural composition.27 Laugier suggests: From now on, it is easy to distinguish between the parts which are essential to the composition of an architectural Order and those which have been introduced by necessity or have been added by caprice … Let us never lose sight of our little rustic hut.28 Laugier’s primitive hut is a theoretical deduction predicated upon a generalized figure of ‘man’ who, ‘by imitating the natural process’,29 comes to discover the correct and proper principles of architecture. Laugier does not rely on empirical evidence of the building practices of contemporary or historical ‘primitive’ 91
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peoples to make his case. The famous and influential frontispiece to the second edition of his Essay (published in 1755) by illustrator Charles Eisen (Figure 3.3), dramatizes the theoretical character of Laugier’s primitive hut by omitting any identifiable agent guiding the construction process. The construction appears to have unfolded with such inevitability and autonomy that, as Anthony Vidler points out, ‘[t]he first man, so often shown building Adam’s hut, is nowhere to be seen’.30 Laugier’s narrative of the primitive hut was, as is widely noted (by Rykwert, Herrmann, and Vidler among others), indebted to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s fiction of primitiveness as embodied in the figure of the noble savage. Yet, as Vidler notes, ‘Laugier, in contradistinction to Rousseau, had chosen to eliminate altogether the social roots of dwelling’.31 Laugier preferred to use ‘architectural criteria derived from the internal logic of architecture’ rather than ‘the external influences of customs or mores’.32 Vidler develops this point by comparing the respective frontispiece images of Laugier’s Essay and Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, (also designed by Charles Eisen), both of which were published in the same year, 1755. Rousseau’s image (Figure 8.1) depicts a Hottentot raised by Dutch missionaries on the Cape of Good Hope, demonstrating, to the Governor of the Cape and his aides seated outside the walls of their fort, his desire to ‘return to his fellows,’ gesturing toward a group of huts on the shore, his true home. ‘Nothing’, noted Rousseau with delight, ‘can overcome the invincible repugnance they have in assuming our mores and living in our way’. The hut, however rudely built, here became a principle of social happiness, not of architecture.33 While Rousseau’s image places the primitive hut in a complex scene of crosscultural contact in order to illustrate the ‘incompatibility of primitive life with civilized mores’,34 Laugier’s image isolates the primitive hut in an open landscape, uncomplicated by anything other than the threat of bad weather. Laugier’s anthropology was of a speculative and non-empirical kind, and the omission of an evident human agency from the graphic representation of his primal architectural scene underscores the theoretical and autonomous status of his primitive hut. His anthropology is, at the same time, shot through with emerging empirical evidence of contemporary primitive life. This anthropology, Herrmann notes, was gleaned from classical sources ‘such as Diodorus Siculus, Pliny, Vitruvius, Tacitus and others’, but was supplemented by contemporaneous ‘accounts given by missionaries and travellers about the life of modern savages in North America and elsewhere’, including the influential missionary ethnography of Joseph-François Lafitau’s Customs 92
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8.1 Frontispiece of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, designed by Charles Eisen, 1755
of the American Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times.35 In addition, as Geoffrey Symcox shows, the figure of the noble savage emerges from the pre-existing wild man myth, a crude and threatening figure who was, in effect, ‘disciplined and domesticated’ to emerge ‘in the eighteenth century as the refined and rational Savage’.36 The noble savage cannot, then, be simply accepted as a self-evident predicate upon which a case for architecture’s proper values might be deduced. Rather, he emerges through a complex play of classical anthropology, mythological tradition and a growing body of contemporary ethnographic material. This figure, who was later to be subsumed into the nineteenth-century doctrines of evolutionist anthropology, begins to emerge in the Enlightenment as an analytic category of cultural anthropology.37 Laugier’s influential essay on the idea of the primitive hut, elucidating as it does a set of autonomous architectural principles, can be shown to rest upon experiences of the primitive that are delivered to it and managed by way of an institutional exchange with anthropology. Architecture’s immunity from the more troubling dimensions of the primitive – its corporeality, materiality, mutability and radical difference, for instance – relies on this institutional exchange. In this sense, anthropology touches actual ‘primitive’ states through its ethnographic field techniques so that architecture does not have to. In effect, 93
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it allows architecture a vicarious experience of the primitive, to touch the primitive while keeping its hands clean. This laundered primitive is not an isolated quirk of eighteenthcentury architectural theory. Architecture’s vicarious (anthropologically-mediated) relationship with the primitive can be shown to operate in any number of contexts: in Vitruvius’s account of the origins of architecture; in Gottfried Semper’s interest in the nineteenth-century German anthropologist Gustav Klemm’s account of the material and ornamental basis for architecture; in Le Corbusier’s reference to ‘savage’ and ‘nomadic’ dwellings in his theorization of a modern urbanism; in Aldo van Eyck’s relation to Marcel Griaule and Ruth Benedict in his proposal for distinctive social forms and architectural counter-forms; and even in the Arcadian primitivism that informs Kevin Lynch’s notion of cognitive mapping and urban imageability. While an often culturalist interest in the architectures of others remains a minor knowledge within architecture, the primitive remains the Other against which key moments in architectural theory are constructed. In this sense the dominant strands of architectural scholarship are threaded together by an uncritical reliance upon the primitive. It is time for architecture to attend more critically to its primitivist subtext in order to generate a productive engagement with the full critical potential of the primitive. Paying serious attention to this subtext is a risky business as it necessarily opens onto a more fluid and mutable set of conditions in which forms, materials and social agencies interact in complex and unpredictable ways. But, as the work on ‘art and the technologies of enchantment’38 suggests, this risk is intellectually rewarding and politically necessary.
Notes 1 Clifford, ‘Of Other Peoples: Beyond the “Salvage” Paradigm’, in Discussions in Contemporary Culture, Hal Foster (ed.), Seattle: Bay Press, 1987, pp. 121–30. 2 Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, p. 3. 3 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘French Feminism in an International Frame’, Yale French Studies 1981, 62: 157–84, esp. p. 157. 4 Ibid. p. 160. 5 Ibid. pp. 158–9. 6 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in The Post-Colonial Critic, Sarah Harasym (ed.), London: Routledge, 1990, p. 8. 7 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 31. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 ‘However impeccably the content of an “other” culture may be known, however anti-ethnocentrically it is represented, it is its location as the closure of grand theories, the demand that, in analytic terms, it be always the good object of knowledge, the docile body of difference, that reproduces a relation of domination and is the most serious indictment of the institutional powers of critical theory’. Ibid.
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11 Susan Hiller (ed.), The Myth of Primitivism: Perspectives on Art, London: Routledge, 1991. 12 Michel Leiris and Jacqueline Delange, cited in Hiller, p. 12. 13 Hal Foster, ‘The “Primitive” Unconscious of Modern Art’, October 1985, 34: 58–70, esp. p. 69. 14 Ibid., pp. 69–70. 15 Jack Flam and Miriam Deutch (eds), Primitivism and Twentieth-century Art: A Documentary History, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. 16 Christopher Pinney and Nicholas Thomas (eds), Beyond Aesthetics: Art and the Technologies of Enchantment, London: Berg, 2001. 17 Alfred Gell, Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 18 Nicholas Thomas, ‘Introduction’, in Pinney and Thomas, Beyond Aesthetics, p. 5. 19 See ‘Part IV. The Museum of Modern Art’s 1984 Primitivism exhibition and its aftermath’, in Flam and Deutch, Primitivism, for a selection of key articles in this debate. 20 An obvious exception is Felicity Scott’s work. See Felicity Scott, ‘Bernard Rudofsky: Allegories of Nomadism and Dwelling’, in Anxious Modernisms: Experimentation in Postwar Architectural Culture, Sarah Goldhagen and Rejean Legault (eds), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 215–37. 21 Joseph Rykwert, On Adam’s House in Paradise: The Idea of the Primitive Hut in Architectural History, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1981. 22 Ibid., p. 190. 23 Ibid., p. 192. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., p. 13. 26 Marc-Antoine Laugier, An Essay on Architecture, Wolfgang Herrmann and Anni Herrmann (trans.), Los Angeles: Hennessey and Ingalls, 1977. 27 Ibid., p. 12. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Anthony Vidler, ‘The Hut and the Body: The “Nature” of Architecture from Laugier to Quatremère de Quincy’, Lotus International 1981, 33: 102–11, esp. p. 105. 31 Anthony Vidler, The Writing of the Walls: Architectural Theory in the Late Enlightenment, Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1987, p. 20. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. p. 20. 35 Wolfgang Herrmann, Laugier and Eighteenth Century French Theory, London: A. Zwemmer, 1962, p. 46. Rousseau’s interest in Lafitau’s work is also noted by Geoffrey Symcox, ‘The Wild Man’s Return: The Enclosed Vision of Rousseau’s Discourses’, in The Wild Man Within: An Image in Western Thought from the Renaissance to Romanticism, Edward Dudley and Maximillian E. Novak (eds), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972, p. 233. 36 Ibid., p. 224. 37 Hayden White, ‘The Forms of Wildness: Archaeology of an Idea’, in Dudley and Novak, The Wild Man Within, p. 10. 38 Pinney and Thomas, Beyond Aesthetics, p. 5.
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Chapter 9
Reinventing ‘primitiveness’ Henri Lacoste and the Belgian Congo Pavilion at the 1931 International Colonial Exposition in Paris Johan Lagae With its monumental scale, its use of axial symmetry, its obus-shaped cupolas, and its Africanizing decoration, the Belgian Congo pavilion at the Paris International Colonial Exposition of 1931, designed by architect Henri Lacoste (1885–1968), presents itself at first sight as a striking example of what the architectural historian Jean-Claude Vigato has referred to as ‘the colonising of the vocabulary of exotic architecture through the architectural principles of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts’.1 Describing it as an ‘overblown and regularized hut’, Vigato proved very critical of the project.2 His critique is echoed in a statement by Paul Greenhalgh who, in his historical survey of World’s Fairs, labelled it as an example of ‘mock African’ exhibition architecture, that only serves as a stage set conceived ‘to mentally transport the visitor away from Europe’ and in his view lacks all ‘serious architectural considerations’.3 There should be no doubt that the essence of Lacoste’s design was precisely such a mental transportation, but I would like to argue that the critiques formulated by Vigato and Greenhalgh are rather too reductive in their assessment of the pavilion. Henri Lacoste was not just another art deco architect seduced by a then-popular taste for exoticism, but one of the first Belgian designers who displayed a genuine interest in African art and architecture at a time when the Congo was still regarded as an architectural terre vierge. A close
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reading of the pavilion’s architecture will reveal the undeniable functionalist character of the design and will illustrate how the architect skilfully responded to the constraints of both building site and programme. By focusing on the intriguing structural solution of the cupolas, I will indicate how this pavilion can be seen as a form of reinventing ‘primitiveness’ that blurs preconceived notions of western architectural discourse, although Lacoste himself might not have been aware of the architectural ambivalence his striking project generates.
The ultimate ‘Théâtre des colonies’ In many respects the International Colonial Exposition of 1931 was the ultimate ‘théâtre des colonies’.4 Occupying an immense site on the periphery of Paris, the so-called Parc de Vincennes, and presenting over thirty sections, it was one of the largest colonial exhibitions ever. In his opening speech, the French Minister of Colonies in a striking way underlined the extent to which the exhibition architecture turned the event into an imaginary trip across the continents: ‘You just have made, mister president, a tour de monde in a quarter of an hour.’5 Some pavilions were almost exact replicas of existing structures, such as the reconstruction of part of the temple of Angkor Vat. Others consisted of a bricolage of ‘indigenous’ built forms, as was the case in the Madagascar pavilion or that of l’Afrique Occidentale Française. Only a select number of pavilions were designed in a contemporary idiom, such as the Musée des Colonies, a good example of 1930s official classicism blended with art deco decoration. In the context of the exhibition, the inspector general of artistic education and museums at the Ministry of Fine Arts, Emile Bayard, published a book entitled L’Art de reconnaître les styles coloniaux de la France.6 The book is pervaded by a western architectural conception that presupposes ‘monumentality’, ‘durability’ and ‘history’ to be conditions inherent to any architectural tradition. It is telling that Bayard only briefly discussed l’Afrique noire, while he gave ample attention to colonies with a heritage considered as monumental, such as North Africa. The large-scale mud mosques of Djenné also could be described in western architectural terms, and Bayard significantly sought to link these impressive ensembles to certain stages of western civilization, positioning them within a larger evolutionist discourse that proclaimed Africa as the ‘dark continent’ in need of western civilization. As such, Bayard’s discussion of the exhibition’s architecture embodies what Patricia Morton, in her recent study of the 1931 Colonial Exposition, has described as the thencurrent ‘architectural physiognomy of the colonies’. Further, ‘like the science that catalogued corporeal differences between races, architectural physiognomy detailed physical indicators of difference among cultures that allowed them to be allotted places in an evolutionary hierarchy’.7 97
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Inventing a Congolese architecture It was precisely this western preconception of architecture – being by definition, monumental, durable and embedded in history – that had been the major obstacle for Belgian architects designing a Congo pavilion. Indeed, ever since the Congo needed to be represented at an international or universal exhibition, the argument had been that no inspiration was to be found in the indigenous built forms of the country. In the Livre d’Or of the 1905 Universal Exhibition in Liège it was formulated as follows: ‘because no relic of an indigenous public building of importance is to be found anywhere in the Congo, it is meaningless to search for representative morphological elements amenable to transformation in a stylistic manner’.8 As a result, since 1885, when the Congo Free State was founded, Congo pavilions had been built in a variety of styles, ranging from beaux-arts classicism and art nouveau, to Viennese secession and a bizarre form of classicist orientalism. Twice, in 1885 and in 1905, a colonial building formed the model.9 Some architects had tried to give their design a certain African flavour by using decorative schemes that clearly referred to geometrical patterns of Congolese artefacts. Being probably the most imaginative Belgian architect of his time, Henri Lacoste was one of the first architects not to reject Central African building forms as a possible source of inspiration.10 By combining beaux-arts design principles with a formal language that explicitly referred to African ‘huts’, he actually succeeded in ‘inventing’ a native architecture that was highly praised at the time (Figure 9.1). Using the technique of axial composition, Lacoste created a symmetrical composition from one privileged point of view located near the main entrance of the site, linking the three pavilions visually by means of a colonnade and marking the focal point of the central axis by surmounting the main pavilion with three cupolas whose shape recalled African pain de sucre, as some contemporaries commented.11 This solution allowed Lacoste to mask the irregular shape of the whole complex that resulted from the site’s contours as well as to minimize the visual impact of one of the main circulation paths of the exposition that ran across the building plot. The Belgian Congo section comprised three main pavilions as well as some commercial stands, a pigeon house and a model colonial house in copper. To emphasize his preferred direction of approach, Lacoste designed an entrance porch bearing Africanizing totems in the form of armoury. The initial designs for this entrance were even more daring, including one project with four gigantic elephants and another with female figurines that seem inspired by the female bodies that are characteristic of sculpted stools of indigenous chiefs of the Katanga or Maniena region. Lacoste’s design was highly praised by the colonial establishment as well as by the professional milieu. The French critic Robert Cogniat
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9.1 Congo pavilion at the Paris Colonial Exposition, 1931. View from the main entrance Source: L’Emulation (1931), 12, plate 29
wrote that the Congo pavilion ‘proved that the architect had understood the plain and instinctive grandeur of the art nègre and that he had succeeded in interpreting it without deforming its essence’, while architect Jean Gallotti labelled the project a ‘majestueux palais nègre’.12 While Lacoste suggested that the overall composition was inspired by the layout of a Congolese chief’s residence, the Africanizing character of the project is most explicit in its decorative scheme.13 At the time of the design, Lacoste had not set foot in the Congo.14 However, he did extensive research by studying the collections of the Congo museum in Tervuren, by reading articles on African art in contemporary publications, and by visiting exhibitions. Ever since Lacoste had operated as an architect on archaeological missions in Syria and Greece, he had displayed a keen interest in other cultures that not only surfaced in his architectural work, but also nurtured his courses as a professor of art history at the Brussels Academy of Fine Arts.15 During the preparation of the design of the Congo pavilion, Lacoste developed a profound knowledge of African art, as is revealed by his use of rare sources for the decorative scheme. Instead of using the well-known geometrical patterns of the so-called velours du Kasaï, as had been the case, for instance, in the Congo pavilion of the 1930 Antwerp World’s Fair, Lacoste instead turned to abstract animal motifs of Yombé textiles for the main pavilion’s mosaïc floor.16 For the decoration of the exterior colonnade, Lacoste freely drew inspiration from Congolese masks and
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9.2 View of one of the colonnades with Africanizing capitals Source: L’Emulation (1931), 12, plate 30
figurines in the museum’s collection, such as those from the Bembe or the Songye people (Figure 9.2). The design of the benches in the section’s garden were based on a zoomorphic Congolese drum that was one of the museum’s masterpieces and that had already been on display at the African village of the 1897 Colonial Exhibition in Tervuren. Lacoste also used sources of non-Congolese origin. Some of the capitals of the colonnade were in fact based on artefacts from the Ivory Coast and Gabon. In the decoration of the canvases that masked the industrial skylights on the inside of the main pavilions, as well as of the outer walls of the section’s pigeon house, reference is made to cave paintings that had recently been discovered by the German explorer Leo Frobenius in Rhodesia and South Africa. In this respect, Lacoste was no doubt heavily influenced by the exhibition l’Art nègre: les arts anciens de l’Afrique noire, that ran at the Brussels Palais des Beaux-Arts in 1930 and which had such items on show.17
An architecture, ‘Modern’ in spirit Since the 1920s a broad interest in African artefacts had surfaced in Belgium that induced a shifting perception. No longer seen as mere curiosities testifying to a ‘primitive otherness’, sculptures, textiles, objects of Congolese origin were gradually being regarded as examples of ‘traditional’ craftsmanship worth collecting. It was also at that time that a number of innovative ethnographic studies were published, such as Joseph Maes’s Aniote Kifwebe of 1924, a 100
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book that discussed the original use of some of the Congolese masks in the collection of the Tervuren museum.18 There should be little doubt, however, that aesthetic rather than ethnographic principles underscored Lacoste’s selection of African elements to be integrated. For the architect the commission to build a Congo pavilion provided a unique opportunity to develop fully his imaginative skills. As an ‘invention’ of a traditional Congolese architecture the 1931 Congo pavilion responded perfectly to the lure of exoticism typical of colonial expositions and the art deco vogue of the time. This does not mean, however, that Lacoste was a mere formalist, or that the pavilion was nothing but a stage set. In this respect, it is important to underline that Lacoste did not only design the exterior but also the exhibition stands within. The archival fund of the project enumerates numerous detailed studies of circulation routes, exhibition stands, innovative lighting solutions and so on, illustrating how Lacoste formulated apt answers to the specific demands of each of the section’s participants. On a more general level, he provided a passage hidden from view that allowed the section’s staff easy access to the showcases. Even some of the decoration was based on a functionalist reasoning. In his personal note on the pavilion, Lacoste explained how his assumption that the industrial skylights, because of the temporary character of the pavilion, would not be perfectly waterproof had informed the decoration of the canvases masking them. Imprinted with a drawing based on cave paintings, stains from incoming rainwater would, according to Lacoste, easily be overlooked, because they would be understood as belonging to the image itself.19 Marcel Temporal, who commented upon the 1931 Colonial Exposition for l’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, considered the pavilion of the Belgian Congo, together with those of Madagascar, Togo/Cameroon and the Dutch Indies as good examples of a ‘modern’ architecture that ‘united the spirit of the colonial style, which they should represent with a formal logic resulting from functional demands’.20 The statement is striking, considering that all the examples mentioned were, in one way or another, re-interpretations of indigenous architectures. Yet, it remains in tune with Temporal’s critical stance towards what he considered the ‘empty formalism’ of the pavilions built in an undecorated, modernist style. His reading of the Congo pavilion can therefore be ascribed to a more general trend in 1930s architectural discourse that sought to re-evaluate the relationship between architecture and ornament.
Displaying authenticity and progress The 1931 Colonial Exposition took place in a context of economic turmoil. The essence of Belgium’s participation in it was to counter international critiques of the fact that one of the smallest European nations was governing one of the 101
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largest and potentially most rich territories on the African continent. For this reason the message to be conveyed was one of a colony in full process of modernization.21 The interior displays put great emphasis on technological progress and Lacoste skilfully designed a presentation that incorporated part of a bridge, an aeroplane, a replica of the interior of an ocean steamer and impressive dioramas of the mining industry.22 As such, the interior display of the ‘modernized’ Congo formed an ambivalent alliance with the exterior design that aimed at evoking an image of the ‘authentic’, that is, pre-industrial Congo. Hence, the 1931 Congo-pavilion exemplifies an ‘architectural ambivalence’ in the sense that ‘an invented hybrid exterior acts as mediator between a prestigious western presence in the interior and an absent, native environment considered not worth showing’.23 One element of Lacoste’s design, namely the obus-shaped cupolas, is of particular importance in this respect because it blurs this dichotomy between inside and out. Indeed, the structural design of the cupolas asks for a reading that goes beyond the categories of the ‘primitive’ or the ‘modern’. The cupolas consisted of a structural wooden frame left unconcealed on the inside and covered with straw on the outside (Figure 9.3). Made of prefabricated elements, this frame permitted easy assemblage on site and created large spans without secondary supports. It was a French entrepreneur, Louis Hartmann, who introduced Lacoste to this structural solution, referred to as a charpente en lamelles.24
9.3 View of the main cupola, showing the charpente en lamelles Source: L’Emulation (1931), 12, plate 31
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In 1928 the magazine La Technique des Travaux dedicated a special issue to the charpente en lamelles, describing it as a totally new, promising concept of constructing in wood.25 This diamond-patterned lamella roofing system was built up of relatively short wooden members oriented with their deeper section perpendicular to the surface of the structure and bolted together at an angle so that each was intersected by two similar adjacent members at its mid-point. The interlocking diamonds thus formed are triangulated, giving the whole structure its stability. Since the lamellas brace each other at frequent intervals, even concentrated or live loads are rapidly dispersed through the network of intersecting diamonds. The circular segments generally used in the lamella system closely follow the parabola, which represents the pressure line of a uniformly distributed load placed on an arch, making it an extremely efficient system that uses the minimum of material.26 The origin of the system was German. Developed by Fritz Zollinger in the early twentieth century, it was patented as the Zollinger-Bauweise in 1910 and put into practice on a large scale in Germany during the reconstruction period after the First World War.27 In the context of a housing shortage that necessitated new solutions for quick and cheap construction, the Zollinger-Bauweise allowed a significant reduction of building material as well as assembly time. During the interwar period numerous housing settlements were constructed according to this principle, but also it was applied to warehouses, exhibition halls, sports centres, churches, and so forth. Hugo Häring used it in several of his projects, among them the widely acclaimed farm complex at Garkau, near Lübeck (1924).28 As well as in Germany and France this mode of construction also made its appearance in other European regions, such as Scandinavia and Italy, and was successfully used in the United States. Up until the 1960s and 1970s, the charpente en lamelles or lamella roof received frequent mention in the professional press. The charpente en lamelles thus had already a certain tradition by the time Lacoste applied it to his 1931 Congo pavilion. Normally used for arched roof constructions, it was unusual to use it for the construction of a cupola. The system could only be played out to its fullest advantage in arched roofs as this allowed for the construction of a roof with the minimum number of different members. Not only were a large number of different timber members needed for the construction of the cupola, but the determination of their precise shape proved a difficult undertaking. This was owing to the form of the node that resulted from the way that the system is put together. Indeed, mathematically, such cupola structure is difficult to describe.29 An analysis based on CAD models suggests that the building of the cupola probably took place in a process of trial and error, with a large amount of adjustments made on site.30
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An architectural hybrid? Whatever the method used actually to construct the cupola, the result was by all accounts intriguing. On the one hand the lamella roof induced associations of standardization, efficiency, economy and rationality, making it a mode of construction that was perfectly in tune with the functionalist tenets of modernism during the interwar years. Paul Peirani, writing for La Technique des Travaux, labelled the use of the lamella roof in Lacoste’s design as a solution of ‘totally modern simplicity’.31 On the other hand, because of its appearance, this structural system was simultaneously reminiscent of building techniques of, what were still considered at the time, ‘primitive’ societies. When discussing this mode of construction in the magazine Architettura e Arti Decorative in 1931, the Italian modernist architect Gaetano Minucci, pointed out this duality.32 Responding to industrial, economical and organizational criteria, the lamella roof had, according to Minucci, precedents in ‘simple, primitive constructions’ such as the indigenous huts of Samoa, a picture of which he included on the title page of his article. It is precisely this duality of the structural solution of the cupolas, being at once ‘modern’ and ‘primitive’, that allows us to read Lacoste’s design as an ‘architectural hybrid’, a term coined by Patricia Morton to describe a form of architectural ‘crossbreeding’ between the metropolitan and the colonial, that blurs preconceived notions of western architectural discourse as well as the bounda