Practical Crime Scene Investigations for Hot Zones (Practical Aspects of Criminal & Forensic Investigations)

PR ACTICAL CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATIONS for

HOT ZONES

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CRC SERIES IN PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL AND FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS VERNON J. GEBERTH, BBA, MPS, FBINA Series Editor Practical Homicide Investigation: Tactics, Procedures, and Forensic Techniques, Fourth Edition Vernon J. Geberth The Counterterrorism Handbook: Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques, Third Edition Frank Bolz, Jr., Kenneth J. Dudonis, and David P. Schulz Forensic Pathology, Second Edition Dominick J. Di Maio and Vincent J. M. Di Maio Interpretation of Bloodstain Evidence at Crime Scenes, Second Edition William G. Eckert and Stuart H. James Tire Imprint Evidence Peter McDonald Practical Drug Enforcement, Third Edition Michael D. Lyman Practical Aspects of Rape Investigation: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Fourth Edition Robert R. Hazelwood and Ann Wolbert Burgess The Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Practical Guide to Assessment, Investigation, and Intervention, Second Edition Seth L. Goldstein Gunshot Wounds: Practical Aspects of Firearms, Ballistics, and Forensic Techniques, Second Edition Vincent J. M. Di Maio Friction Ridge Skin: Comparison and Identification of Fingerprints James F. Cowger Footwear Impression Evidence: Detection, Recovery and Examination, Second Edition William J. Bodziak Principles of Kinesic Interview and Interrogation, Second Edition Stan Walters Practical Fire and Arson Investigation, Second Edition David R. Redsicker and John J. O’Connor The Practical Methodology of Forensic Photography, Second Edition David R. Redsicker Practical Aspects of Interview and Interrogation, Second Edition David E. Zulawski and Douglas E. Wicklander Investigating Computer Crime Franklin Clark and Ken Diliberto

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PR ACTICAL CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATIONS for

HOT ZONES Jacqueline T. Fish Robert N. Stout Edward W. Wallace

Boca Raton London New York

CRC Press is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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Taylor & Francis 6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300 Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742 © 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC Taylor & Francis is an Informa business No claim to original U.S. Government works Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 International Standard Book Number-13: 978-1-4398-2053-7 (Ebook-PDF) This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the consequences of their use. The authors and publishers have attempted to trace the copyright holders of all material reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in this form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and let us know so we may rectify in any future reprint. Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access www.copyright. com (http://www.copyright.com/) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For organizations that have been granted a photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com and the CRC Press Web site at http://www.crcpress.com

Dedications

To Paul. Only you know how to keep the family going and take over all responsibilities when a publishing date looms on the horizon. Your name should be on this one. I love you. Jacqueline T. Fish This book is dedicated to my mother, Louise H. Stout (1924–2009), and to my wife, Amy W. Stout, who is truly my best friend and soul mate, in addition to being my travel agent, accountant, and business partner. Affectionately known as the “boss,” due to her ownership of our company, she encouraged me to participate in this project, kicked me when I procrastinated, corrected all my spelling and grammar mistakes, endured the mess in the house while taking pictures, and maintained her sense of humor when I became frustrated with the technology. Amy, I thank you. I am truly blessed! No man succeeds without a good woman behind him. Wife or mother, if it is both, he is twice blessed indeed.

—Harold Macmillan

Robert N. Stout I would like to dedicate this book to all the dedicated, professional emergency responders around the country who have given their lives in the service of God, country, and family. And to our active emergency responders, who are constantly training and preparing, and who have in the past and will continue in the future to put their lives on the line to protect us all from all types and manner of threats. Finally, I would also like to thank my family, friends, and colleagues, who have sacrificed greatly in their support of me and my endeavors over these many years. I love you all. Edward W. Wallace

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Table of Contents

Series Editor’s Note Preface Acknowledgments About the Authors Understanding the Acronyms in This Book Acronyms Used in the Book

1 2

3

xv xvii xix xxi xxv xxvi

The Need

1

References

11

The Threats

13

Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear References

14 16 18 19 20

Laws and Regulations

23

Introduction Part I: Training and Response Federal Laws Federal Regulations Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (Hazwoper)—29 CFR 1910.120 Emergency Response Plan—29 CFR 1910.120(q)(l) Emergency Response Procedures—29 CFR 1910.120(q)(3) Training—29 CFR 1910.120(q)(6) Refresher Training—29 CFR 1910.120(q)(8) Medical Surveillance and Consultation—29 CFR 1910.120(q)(9) Respiratory Protection—29 CFR 1910.134 Confined Space—29 CFR 1910.146 Trenches and Excavations—29 CFR 1926.650, 29 CFR 1926.651, 29 CFR 1926.652 Lock Out/Tag Out—29 CFR 1910.147

23 24 24 25 25 25 26 27 28 28 29 30 32 33

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Table of Contents

Hazardous Material Regulations, Department of€Transportation (DOT)—49 CFR Subchapter C Presidential Directives, Presidential Decision Directives, Homeland Security Presidential Directives Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 Voluntary Consensus Standards NFPA 472—Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents NFPA 473—Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Statutes Title 18 USC 2332(a)—Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 18 USC 921 18 USC 175—Biological Weapons Antiterrorism (BWAT) 18 USC 229—Prohibited Activities 18 USC 831—Prohibited Transactions Involving Nuclear Materials 18 USC 875—Interstate Communications 18 USC 876—Mailing Threatening Communications 18 USC 842(p)—Distribution of Information Relating to Explosives, Destructive Devices, and Weapons of Mass Destruction References Court Documents

4

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33 35 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 40 41 42 44 44 45 47 48

The Protection

49

Definitions Hazards Respiratory Protection Air-Purifying Respirator (APR) Negative Pressure APR Positive Pressure Air Purifying Respirators (PAPRs) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Supplied Air Respirator Chemical Protective Clothing (CPC) Level A Level B Level C Level D

49 50 53 53 53 56 57 59 59 60 61 63 64

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Table of Contents

5 6

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ix

Physical Impacts of PPE on CSIs References

67 70

The Differences

73

References

84

The Equipment

87

Safety Documentation Equipment Recon Equipment Combination Instruments Flammability Measurement Oxygen Toxic Gas Measurement Photoionization Detectors Radiation Detection Radiation Survey Meters Radiation Isotope Identification Radiation Pagers Other Colorimetrics Corrosivity Oxidizer Test Water Finder Paper M-8 Paper M-9 Tape Advanced Detection and Monitoring Fourier Transform Infrared Spectrophotometer Raman Spectrophotometer Flame Spectrophotometry Ion Mobility Spectrometry APD 2000 Sabre 4000 Lightweight Chemical Detector Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectroscopy Surface Acoustic Wave Biological Threat Agent Detection Biological Threat Agent Screening Tests Biological Threat Agent Field Presumptive Identification Tests Evidence Recovery Equipment Solids

87 88 98 99 100 102 103 103 105 106 107 107 107 109 109 112 113 113 114 116 116 118 119 120 121 121 122 123 124 124 125 128 134 136

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x

Table of Contents

Liquids Air/Aerosols/Vapors Packaging Biological Evidence Packaging Chemical Evidence Packaging Radiological/Nuclear Evidence Packaging Evidence Collection and Packaging Support Equipment Equipment for Evidence/Equipment Decontamination

7

139 139 148 149 151 153 156 159

The Personnel (Members)

161

The CBRNE/TIC Crime Scene Investigation Unit CBRNE/TIC CSIU Components Roles and Responsibilities of the Command Staff CSIU Group Leader CSIU Group Safety Officer CSIU Group Communication/Administration Officer CSIU Group Liaison Officer CSIU Group Equipment Custodian CSIU Group Evidence Custodian Roles and Responsibilities of the Operational Staff Tactical Phase Task Force Operational Phase Task Force Crime Scene Phase Task Force Remediation Phase Task Force Investigative/Support Strike Teams The Recon Entry Strike Team Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team Search Entry Strike Team Final Survey Entry Strike Team Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team Temporary Morgue Strike Team Permanent Morgue Strike Team Hospital Strike Team Additional Support

161 162 163 163 164 164 165 166 167 168 169 173 174 174 174 174 176 178 179 180 181 181 182 182

8

The Recon

185

9

The Documentation

195

10

The Screening

205

Aseptic Techniques

214

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Table of Contents

11

Collection, Processing,€and Packaging of CBRNE/TIC Evidence

xi

231

Collection Protocols Protocol for Visible Suspected Chemical Liquid Residue on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces Equipment for Visible Suspected Chemical Liquid Residue on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces Protocol for Suspected Stratified (Layered) Chemical Liquid in a Container Equipment for Suspected Stratified (Layered) Chemical Liquid in a Container Bulk Powder Protocol, Suspected Biological, on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces Equipment for Bulk Powder Protocol, Suspected Biological, on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces Dry Swab Protocol for Visible Powder, Suspected Biological, on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces Equipment for Dry Swab Protocol for Visible Powder, Suspected Biological, on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces Wet Swab Protocol for Visible Powder, Suspected Biological, on Nonporous or Porous Surface Equipment for Wet Swab Protocol for Visible Powder, Suspected Biological, on Nonporous or Porous Surfaces Conclusion

12

243 246 247 250 250 253 253 256 257 260 261

Collection, Processing, and Packaging of Forensic Evidence 263 Latent Fingerprints Fingerprint Processing and Collection Equipment Packaging Equipment Hair/Fiber Evidence Hair and Fiber Processing and Collection Equipment Packaging Equipment DNA Evidence Serological/DNA Processing and Collection Equipment Packaging Equipment Trace Evidence Entomological Explosive Residue Glass Gunshot Residue

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242

263 269 270 270 273 275 275 282 284 285 285 286 289 290

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Table of Contents

Ignitable Substance Evidence Plant Material Evidence Soil Evidence Electronic Evidence Questioned Document Evidence Trace Evidence Processing and Collection Equipment Packaging Equipment Impression Evidence Footwear, Tire, Tool/Weapon, Ballistic, and Bite Impression Evidence Impression Evidence Processing and Collection Equipment Packaging Equipment Conclusion

13

14

Decontamination

300 303 303 304

305

Types of Decontamination Mass Decontamination Technical Decontamination Evidence/Equipment Decontamination

305 305 307 310

The Crime Scene Wrap-Up

319

Search Entry Operations Final Survey Operations Equipment Custodian Operations Post Entries Evidence Custodian Final Briefing

Appendix

Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 Purpose Definitions Policy Tasking Technical and Conforming Amendments to National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1) Technical and Conforming Amendments to National Security Presidential Directive-8 (NSPD-8) Technical and Conforming Amendments to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 (HSPD-2) Technical and Conforming Amendments to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3)

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291 291 292 294 296 298 299 299

319 320 320 321 323

325

325 325 325 325 328 330 330 330 331

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Table of Contents

Index

xiii

333

Contents on CD

Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response—1910.120

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Series Editor’s Note

This book is part of a series entitled Practical Aspects of Criminal and Forensic Investigation created by Vernon J. Geberth, New York City Police Department Lieutenant Commander (Retired), who is an author, educator, and consultant on homicide and forensic investigations. This series, written by authors who are nationally recognized experts in their respective fields, was designed to provide contemporary, comprehensive, and pragmatic information.

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Preface

The identification, documentation, processing, collection, and preservation of physical evidence requires extremely well-trained individuals who are willing to examine crime scenes for both the obvious and the hidden. This is a meticulous and time-consuming responsibility, and many times criminal prosecutions rely solely on the information gleaned from the incident by crime scene investigators (CSIs). Today’s world adds the potential for high consequence events (HCEs) originating from acts of terrorism, accidents, or natural disasters. Protection of the homeland and maintenance of a safe environment for everyday life now include the possibility of terrorism, protection of infrastructure systems, and mitigating the consequences of natural disasters such as the devastating earthquakes in Haiti or Chile, or Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. No matter the situation, our emergency responders face the challenge of working in contaminated environments—whether man-made or natural. The first responders must be trained to perform their jobs and survive those challenges that are presented within the exclusion or hot zones. CSIs must also enter these hazardous and contaminated areas to properly identify, document, process, collect, and preserve physical evidence so that it can be forensically examined in the scientific and sterile laboratory. This publication addresses the paradigm shifts that CSIs must overcome. CSIs are trained to collect and preserve physical evidence without allowing contamination to occur. Currently, in the midst of an HCE, the contamination has occurred before the arrival of the CSI. Everything from equipment to packaging and transportation has been altered, and this book seeks to present a comprehensive reference that contains guidelines and best practices to aid CSIs and keep them safe. The authors worked with the National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT) at Louisiana State University to develop a course for the Department of Homeland Security that provides advanced training for CSIs in contaminated and hazardous environments. When course development was authorized by NCBRT, we found that there were no recognized resources of information pertinent to CSIs. This book is a compilation of professional experience, observations, and conversations with CSIs in the field who have encountered these challenges, lab analysts, and in collaboration with the FBI. This publication is designed to provide a single source of xvii

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xviii

Preface

reliable and court-defensible best practices for CSIs, emergency responders, incident commanders, Hazmat technicians, and military and intelligence officials who will respond to the scene of the next high consequence event. Our primary intent is to share knowledge that promotes safe practices. CSIs and lab personnel can face many unknown threats as they seek to carry out their job responsibilities, whether at the crime scene or in the laboratory. The possibilities of hazards and contamination at chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives/toxic industrial chemical) (CBRNE/TIC) events are recognized and safe practices are contained within these chapters to ensure that at the end of the operation, everyone goes home safe.

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Acknowledgments

The authors wish to express their appreciation to the National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT) at Louisiana State University for allowing them to photograph many of the training events pictured in this publication. The leadership team at NCBRT recognizes the need for training crime scene investigators and is committed to promoting preparedness through training for all emergency responders. All three authors have worked with the dedicated professionals at NCBRT to develop and deliver the course Advanced Forensics Investigations for Hazardous Events at numerous law enforcement agencies nationwide. This program is funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and is provided to crime scene investigators as they prepare to respond to the next CBRNE/TIC incident. More information can be obtained by visiting the NCBRT Web site at www.ncbrt.lsu.edu

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About the Authors

Jacqueline T. Fish Dr. Jacqueline Fish currently serves as chair of the Criminal Justice Department and director of graduate studies in criminal justice at Charleston Southern University. Her career includes seventeen years as a police officer in Knox County, Tennessee, where she invested the majority of her time as sergeant in charge of the Criminal Identification Division. She also worked for nine years as a curriculum designer and developed grant programs at the University of Tennessee’s Law Enforcement Innovation Center. In 2001, Dr. Fish supervised the development and implementation of the National Forensic Academy, a ten-week training program for crime scene investigators at the University of Tennessee. She also participated in development of The President’s DNA Initiative and Challenge for Change youth violence prevention programs, and managed Project Safe Neighborhoods for the U.S. Attorney’s Office Eastern District of Tennessee. She is the coauthor of a textbook entitled Crime Scene Investigation and served as the principal investigator on a National Institute of Justice grant in cooperation with the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) in conjunction with Charleston Southern University. Dr. Fish is a certified instructor for Advanced Forensics Investigations for Hazardous Events and Executive Seminar: Prevention of, Response to, and Recovery from Campus Emergencies, which are DHS-sponsored courses through the National Center for Biomedical Research at Louisiana State University. Dr. Fish and her husband, Paul, live near Charleston, South Carolina. They have two children and enjoy boating, the beach, and traveling abroad.

Robert N. Stout Robert N. Stout has more than 30 years of experience in law enforcement and hazardous materials. His enforcement experience includes serving as sergeant for the Virginia State Police, as deputy/paramedic for the Amherst xxi

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xxii

About the Authors

County Sheriff’s Office, and in motor carrier safety/hazardous material team/environmental crimes investigations for the Virginia State Police. He also was a senior firearms instructor and was involved with tactical teams, hostage negotiations, tactical field force, emergency management, planning and response to disasters, special events, and civil disturbances. His hazardous material experience includes the Virginia State Hazardous Material Team, Hazardous Material Coordinator for Campbell County, Hazardous Material Coordinator for the Virginia Association of Volunteer Rescue Squads, and Paramedic Coordinator/Paramedic for Central Health/Campbell County Rescue Squad. Mr. Stout provided training at the National Fire Academy in the chemistry of hazardous materials and IRHMI basic concepts and concept implementation, as well as FBI training on Hazmat response prior to the Atlanta Olympics. He was involved in course development for VDEM on Hazmat awareness, operations, technician, specialist, and advanced control and terrorism awareness, management, and tactical considerations. He has provided training to numerous law enforcement agencies including the FBI and the Virginia State Police in SWAT operations in a hazardous environment, crime scene operations in a hazardous environment, hazardous materials technician, and other courses. He has been a speaker at various conferences throughout the nation on law enforcement/Hazmat and EMS issues and has participated in WMD training on an international level with DTRA/Department of State/FBI. Mr. Stout has attended numerous training classes on Hazmat, terrorism, and firearms. He is certified in Homeland Security–Level III (CHS) and is a certified instructor, Department of Homeland Security/Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. The president of Evidex, Inc., he has a BA in economics and business administration from Alfred University and a Masters in Education from Lehigh University. He is a member of the Virginia State Police Association, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and the American College of Forensic Examiners International.

Edward W. Wallace, Jr. Mr. Wallace served with the New York Police Department (NYPD) for more than 20 years and during his tenure with the NYPD he performed various law enforcement duties, including crime scene investigator and counter-terrorism investigator. Mr. Wallace held the coveted NYPD rank of Detective First Grade and spent 15 years in crime scene investigations, investigating 2,649 crimes scenes including both World Trade Center attacks and the October 2001 anthrax attack. He has testified as a forensic expert in 393 trials. Mr. Wallace holds certifications in teaching, hazardous materials/weapons of mass destruction, fire investigations, post-blast investigations, crime scene

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About the Authors

xxiii

investigations, and homeland security. Mr. Wallace has more than 25€years of experience as an instructor and has presented numerous training lectures, nationally and internationally, on arson investigations, post-blast investigations, crime scene investigations, and WMD/Hazmat to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies as well as other emergency responders. Currently, Mr. Wallace is the director of forensic training at the New York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner. Mr. Wallace is also an adjunct instructor and WMD training course developer for Louisiana State University at the National Center for Biomedical Research, Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education. He is also a consultant/instructor for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Center for Domestic Preparedness, both of which provide emergency responder training for the U.S Department of Homeland Security. Upon his retirement from the NYPD, Mr. Wallace became the president of Finest Forensic Consultants, LLC, which provides expert consultations for forensics, crime scene investigations, counter-terrorism investigations, evidence, WMD/Hazmat incident investigations, and training in these areas. He also provided considerable content and editing expertise in Crime Scene Investigations, a textbook on crime scene investigations.

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Understanding the Acronyms in This Book

CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives) is the universally recognized acronym for the hazards that pose an immediate threat to the health and safety of first responders. Much has been written about explosives as they are the most accessible and most likely type of weapon a terrorist may deploy. There are numerous training courses and resources on post-blast investigation, so that topic is not specifically covered in this book. The remaining threats, however, have the potential to create mass casualties, including among our emergency responders, whether the events are deliberate or unintentional. TIC (toxic industrial chemicals) can also be used as weapons of mass destruction, whether through intentional or accidental discharge. This book was written specifically to inform crime scene investigators about the paradigm shifts they must recognize when called upon to process the scene of a CBRNE/TIC incident. It is our goal to enhance the capabilities and knowledge of CSIs because a typical unit may be overwhelmed and require assistance from other agencies. Reading this book does not qualify a CSI to work in a hazardous environment, but it will provide insight into the need for advanced training as the nation’s responders prepare for the next attack, accident, or natural disaster involving CBRNE/TIC

xxv

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Acronyms Used in the Book

CBRNE Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives CFR Code of federal regulations CSI Crime scene investigator DHS Department of Homeland Security DOJ Department of Justice EPA Environmental Protection Agency FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive ICS Incident Command System NCBRT National Center for Biomedical Research and Training NIMS National Incident Management System NRF National Response Framework OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration PSST public safety sampling team QA/QC quality assurance/quality control SCBA Self-contained breathing apparatus TIC Toxic industrial chemical USAG United States Attorney General

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1

The Need

The multidimensional threat of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) and/or toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) worldwide is real. Over the last four decades many attacks have been initiated—some successfully, some foiled by ineptitude. It is, however, apparent that the majority of state and local law enforcement agencies throughout this country do not have the resources or the personnel to adequately prepare crime scene investigators (CSIs) to process crime scenes involving the release of CBRNE/TIC agents. First responders have high risks of becoming casualties in today’s world of terrorist reality. The significant dangers that face our public safety professionals have been recognized, and police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical services (EMS) personnel are now receiving more specialized training to deal with the escalating threats to the American public. However, the majority of state and local law enforcement agencies are not preparing their CSIs to process crime scenes that involve the release of CBRNE/TIC agents In this post 9/11 era, why is this the case? The nation’s agency administrators offer many different reasons: • There is no mandate or coordinated effort on the part of the U.S. Department of Justice (US DOJ) or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to have state and local law enforcement agencies trained. • There is a lack of financial resources to adequately prepare and equip state and local agencies to conduct or assist in such crime scene investigations. • Traditionally, agencies relied solely on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to conduct these crime scene investigations. • The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is in charge of training emergency responders for terrorism incidents and is more familiar with the response and recovery needs of the fire, EMS, and hospital communities. FEMA has not yet developed the expertise in the prevention and investigation needs of law enforcement. • There has been no substantial coordinated effort to share information or develop standardized training and procedures between federal agencies and the state and local law enforcement crime scene investigative units.

1

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2

Practical Crime Scene Investigations for Hot Zones

In virtually every incident and event, local agencies are the first responders—and the first forensic presence on the scene of these hazardous situations. With the exception of a few major law enforcement jurisdictions, many state and local law enforcement agencies are not willing to invest funding in training and equipping their Crime Scene Units to respond to CBRNE/TIC incidents. Most state and local law enforcement agencies do not have an independent hazardous materials (Hazmat) team. The typical state and local law enforcement Hazmat capabilities are associated with special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, clandestine lab (ClanLab) teams, and bomb squads or ordinance disposal teams. Unfortunately, these teams have very little forensic evidence capabilities outside of their specialty (e.g., post-blast evidence and ClanLab chemicals). When stand-alone law enforcement Hazmat teams do exist they are typically modeled after a standard fire department Hazmat team, and those team members have not completed forensic evidence processing and collection training outside of CBRNE/TICs. Crime scene units are not high on the priority list when state and local law enforcement agencies make budgetary decisions. The reality of today’s world increases the probability that CSIs will respond to a CBRNE/TIC incident. Remember, hazardous situations are not limited to terrorist activities. Industrial accidents, intentional acts by disgruntled employees, and natural disasters can all create the dangerous and contaminated environments that will require the methodologies contained in this book. When agencies are questioned as to why they are not preparing to conduct crime scene investigations of this nature, the typical answers given include, “This will never happen here, it is not our responsibility, the fire Hazmat teams will do this, the military will do this, or the FBI will handle this,” and lastly, “We don’t have enough crime scene investigators.” Although certain jurisdictions may not be the target of a terrorist attack involving CBRNE/TIC, terrorists may produce the agents or build the devices within, or transport these agents or devices through these jurisdictions to the target when an accident or interdiction occurs causing the release of the agents. Remember, the only difference between a Hazmat incident and a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) incident is intent. Although there are Hazmat and first-responder courses, books, and Web sites containing information for initial responses, there are only a small number of resources and even fewer training opportunities for CSIs to gain this knowledge that is so critical to survival, as well as ensuring the identification, documentation, collection, and preservation of physical evidence within the hazardous environment. The U.S. DHS is cognizant of the need for CSIs to be trained. Through the National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT) at Louisiana State University, the DHS has funded the development and delivery of Advanced Forensics Investigations for Hazardous Environments, a course that is delivered nationwide and is specifically designed for CSIs. The program of instruction is designed to teach

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The Need

3

experienced CSIs to develop the essential skills they need to safely investigate a hazardous environment crime scene. More information about this course is available at www.ncbrt.lsu.edu This text was compiled in an effort to enhance the knowledge of CSIs and encourage readers to seek training in the specific skills necessary to survive processing a contaminated crime scene. The Hazmat team and the safety officer will conduct hazard assessments prior to allowing CSIs to enter the scene. These are the most challenging and stressful conditions under which CSIs will work and they need to be aware of the steps to take to keep themselves safe. This book contains best practices that were developed through research and refined through application of the process in real-world responses. Nothing can replace training, and the range of activities presented in this publication should stimulate readers to seek training and certification in the various aspects of crime scene investigation in hazardous environments. Knowledge and practice substantially increase employee safety and enhance the probability that physical evidence can be safely removed from the contaminated crime scene and delivered to the laboratory for examination and scientific analysis. CSIs should know that when these agents/chemicals are used or the threat exists, a crime has been committed, even if the agents or devices are found to be a hoax, and these crimes require the same forensic attention that any other crime receives. In addition to the CBRNE/TIC evidence that may be present, there may also be forensic evidence including fingerprints, DNA, hairs and fibers, trace/transfer, and other impression evidence. These types of forensic evidence must be located, documented, field screened, processed, collected, packaged, decontaminated, and delivered to a laboratory for analysis. The chain of custody must remain intact throughout the entire process. Various federal, state, and local laws outline the responsibility and authority of each of the emergency responder agencies. Without question it is law enforcement agencies that are responsible for investigating and collecting evidence at crime scenes of this nature. First responders, such as fire department Hazmat teams, Department of Defense assets, and the National Guard Civil Support Teams, are not familiar with the protocols for processing physical evidence. Although it is true that the aforementioned response groups are well trained and certified to deal with certain aspects of CBRNE/TIC incidents, they are not law enforcement officers, they are not trained or certified to conduct forensic crime scene investigations, and there are specific laws that prohibit some of these assets from being involved in law enforcement actions. CSIs should know that these assets will typically be deployed during the Operational Phase of a CBRNE/TIC incident for halting the dissemination of the agents, search and rescue, and to conduct public safety sampling. The operational phase is conducted before the Crime Scene Phase and a considerable amount of time may pass before the scene is safe for crime scene processing.

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4

Practical Crime Scene Investigations for Hot Zones

The FBI has various capabilities and assets to assist in the investigation of a crime scene involving CBRNE/TIC. State and local law enforcement agencies must determine responses to the following questions:

1. Is the FBI going to respond to the scene? 2. Where are the FBI assets coming from? 3. What are their capabilities? 4. How many personnel are they bringing? 5. How long will it take them to get to the scene?

State and local law enforcement agencies must understand that crimes of this nature start out local and end local. What this means is that state and local law enforcement agencies must be capable of initiating the crime scene investigation until other local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies arrive to assist in the investigation, if such assistance is needed or required. Once that aid has cleared the scene and returned to its home base, the original jurisdictional agency must deal with the remediation and recovery phases. You may ask, “Aren’t these incidents classified as federal crimes?” The answer is yes, but they are also state and local crimes, and the law does not prohibit state and local law enforcement agencies from conducting parallel or independent criminal investigations and prosecutions, as was the case with the federal and state prosecutions of the Oklahoma City bombers, McVeigh and Nichols. Also, it is important to note that the FBI may choose not to respond with its various crime scene investigative assets to certain crime scenes involving possible and/or actual CBRNE/TIC agents, or it may deploy only a small nonoperational or advisory presence at the scene. Thousands of anthrax hoaxes have been perpetrated across the country since 9/11, and most responses were conducted by local agencies. More than a dozen locations were the recipients of anthrax-laced letters in October 2001; however, the FBI only responds when a federal official or organization is involved. The 2001 anthrax attacks resulted in the deaths of five Americans—and a federal investigation that lasted 8 years. Hoax or reality, law enforcement and other first responders must answer the calls. The information contained in this book was compiled to provide readers with an awareness of safer ways to respond to the potential CBRNE/TIC hazardous environment. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive Five (HSPD 5; see Appendix A), the president authorized the United States Attorney General (USAG) to lead the federal criminal investigation of all terrorist attacks. The USAG designates such federal criminal investigations to be conducted by the FBI, which obtains authority as the lead federal law enforcement agency for terrorism from the National Response Framework. However, under the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System, the FBI will not relieve the state and local authorities of their incident command should

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it choose to respond to the scene and conduct its criminal investigation. You may review extensive documentation on the National Response Framework (NRF), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the Incident Command System (ICS) using the FEMA Web site (www.fema.gov/emergency/ nims/AboutNIMS.shtm). The transient nature of the possible forensic evidence, especially CBRNE/ TIC agents, is a critical point. The state or local law enforcement agency dealing with the incident may not have the luxury of waiting for other federal, state, or local assets to arrive and assist in the crime scene investigation. Delay may result in the inability to identify and hold the perpetrators responsible for their criminal actions. As for the lack of manpower, a jurisdiction should look to establish mutual aid agreements and/or create task forces with its adjoining law enforcement agencies. Implementing these types of agreements can provide the additional manpower required, as well as distribute expenses for equipment and training. Given al-Qaeda’s propensity to conduct multiple attacks at multiple locations at the same time, no single jurisdiction, including the FBI, has enough trained and certified personnel to properly conduct the crime scene investigation in a contaminated environment. Many crime scene investigators have been certified to conduct arson and explosion investigations (post blast). Investigating scenes involving CBRNE/ TIC agents is an extension of the current duties of a CSI. It is much more fiscally and physically prudent and takes much less time to train and certify a crime scene investigator to operate in a hazardous environment (40-hour U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Hazardous Material Technician Training) than to train and certify a hazardous materials technician in all the crime scene/ forensic evidence disciplines, protocols, and procedures. There are numerous venues that provide tuition-free training for law enforcement agencies to obtain Hazardous Material Technician Training for their crime scene investigators. The U.S. DHS Center for Domestic Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama, is a primary training provider (http://cdp.dhs.gov). Also, agencies can utilize the expertise of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which coordinates training at the host agency’s local facilities (www.fedcenter.gov/training). Responses to accidents, natural disasters, or intentional terrorist acts are becoming more frequent for local law enforcement. Before Ramzi Yousef successfully detonated the 1993 World Trade Center bomb, he experienced several accidental explosions at his apartment in Jersey City, NJ (terrorismfiles.org). Yousef, pictured in Figure 1.1, persevered, however, and perfected the homemade nitroglycerine he used in the bomb (Weiser 1997). The major components of the device were commercially available, including nitric acid, urea, paper, and bottles of compressed hydrogen. This 1,500-pound device was transported in a rental truck to the parking garage of the World Trade Center and detonated on February 26, 1993 (Kelly n.d.).

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Figure 1.1╇ 1993 World Trade Center Attack bomb factory, Jersey City, NJ.

Figure 1.2╇ FBI agents help lead Timothy McVeigh from an Oklahoma courthouse on April 21, 1995. (Source: http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/ oklahoma/oklahoma.htm)

Two years later on April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols deployed the bomb used to destroy the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK, and killed 167 people (Linder 2006). McVeigh purchased the ingredients for the Ryder truck bomb from area farm cooperatives and a racing track (Figure€1.2). He stockpiled the explosive components in a rented storage building. Also in 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a worldwide cult, deployed deadly sarin nerve gas in the world’s largest and busiest subway system in Tokyo, Japan. This attack resulted in the deaths of 12 people and more than 3,800 were treated for injuries in a single day (Olson 1999). Aum Shinrikyo operates high-tech laboratories with equipment and materials purchased over the counter from the same suppliers that supply legitimate businesses (Figure€1.3). The organization

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Aum Shinrikyo’s Sarin Facility

The interior of Satian No. 7, a suspected sarin production plant Chemical plant (the first four stages for production)

Solvent Recovery

Step 1 Emergency stairs

Prefabricated chemical laboratory

Compressor room

Shower room

A room for taking a nap

Steps 4 and 5 Chemical tank (the 5th-stage production) Storage

Steps 2 and 3

Note: Group was preparing to produce 70 tons of sarin in a 30 days period.

Electrolysis Machine room operating room

Office A room with liquid injectors

Storage room

??

Elevator

Door Shutter

Reference: Senate Subcommittee Hearings

Figure 1.3╇ Sarin facility. (Source: U.S. Archives, Hearings on Proliferation, October 31, 1995.)

has deployed both chemical and biological weapons including botulinum toxin and anthrax spores. Boasting a membership exceeding 20,000 in locations around the globe, Aum Shinrikyo is funded through donations as well as legitimate business enterprises. While they are based in Japan, they have also masterminded chemical attacks as far away as Australia. There are numerous well-documented examples of terrorists manufacturing, developing, testing, and utilizing CBRNE/TICs. These include the actual dissemination of biological agents in Dalles, Oregon (1984) by the Rajneeshees (Figure 1.4). Aum Shinrikyo has disseminated both chemical and biological agents in Japan (1990–1995) and in Australia (Figure 1.5). Suspect Bruce Ivins allegedly disseminated a biological agent (anthrax) in Florida, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Virginia, and Washington, DC (2001) (Figure 1.6). In addition to the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda attacks against America are ongoing both domestically and abroad. In 2002 the U.S. Embassy and the water supply for the city of Rome were the targets of an extremist group funded by Osama Bin Laden (Kennedy 2002). More than a dozen major attacks around the world have been masterminded and funded by al-Qaeda.

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Figure 1.4╇ Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh. (Source: http://gesswhoto.com/sheriff-

wasco2.htm)

The terrorists have also attempted to obtain radioactive and nuclear materials, and production and construction plans for dirty bombs and improvised nuclear weapons. It is not a matter of “if” there is another attack, but when that attack will occur (BBC News, 2001). In 1995, Chechen rebels buried a cesium radioactive source in Moscow’s Ismailovsky Park (Krock and Deusser 2003). No one was ever arrested; however it is possible that a dirty bomb could be exploded anywhere in the world. Thefts of nuclear and radiological materials have been reported for a number of years, from medical devices to weapons-grade quality materials. Experts believe that terrorists have the knowledge necessary to build and deploy a dirty bomb. In 2002, Jose Padilla of Chicago was arrested and the investigation revealed he was involved in an al-Qaeda dirty bomb plot. No device was located, but intelligence agencies confirmed Padilla had trained in Pakistan in the mechanics of building a dirty bomb. On Christmas Day 2009, suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to ignite explosives on a Detroit-bound flight carrying more than 200 passengers. In February 2010, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Leon Panetta, testified before the Senate that another terrorist attack against America is imminent. CSIs will be responsible for recovering the evidence that is used to criminally prosecute the perpetrators. The mindset of state and local law enforcement agencies must evolve in order to be prepared for the next incident, accident, disaster, or attack. They must take control of hazardous material incidents within their jurisdiction. All such incidents should be treated as criminal/terrorist in nature until a thorough investigation proves otherwise. When the determination has been

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Figure 1.5╇ Aum Shinrikyo, Tokyo, Bio Lab. (Source: www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/ vol10no1/03-0238-G1.htm)

made that an incident is not a criminal act, then control of the incident can be handed over to the jurisdiction’s fire department Hazmat team. Without this policy in place there is the possibility for criminal/terrorist incident crime scenes to be mishandled or go without detection as a validated threat. In a properly identified CBRNE/TIC criminal/terrorist incident, the operational phase precedes the crime scene phase. The crime scene will be altered

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Figure 1.6╇ Anthrax letter. (Source: http://www.fbi.gov/page2/august08/anthrax_ gallery1.html)

before it can be forensically documented. However, this is justifiable because life safety comes before the crime scene investigation. When a law enforcement entity is in charge, then the scenes can be managed to limit the alteration and/ or destruction of the crime scene. The most prevalent example of a scene that was not properly managed or investigated is the 1984 Union Carbide Chemical Plant release of 27–40 tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas in Bhopal, India (Patel n.d.). This release caused an estimated 14,000 casualties, with approximately 4,000 fatalities on the night of the event (MSNBC 2009). This incident is the world’s largest industrial accident. The wide discrepancies in the amount of MIC gas reported as released, the number of casualties, and the number of fatalities is due to the fact that Indian authorities did not properly investigate this incident. In fact, depending on the source, even the date of the incident is in dispute. What is known is that water was introduced into MIC tank 610, which caused the pressure in the tank to build up, and thus the release of the deadly gas that injured and killed so many innocent victims (Encyclopedia of Earth 2008). What is not known is whether this was an industrial accident or a criminal/terrorist incident. Union Carbide’s stance is that this was an act of sabotage by an unknown person, possibly a disgruntled employee. The only evidence offered consists of employee statements of a person dismantling gauges and valves, and introducing a water hose to tank 610. There was no forensic investigation conducted by the Indian authorities, no photographs, no diagrams, no fingerprint evidence, no DNA evidence, no tool mark evidence, no hairs or fiber evidence, no footwear evidence, no security video evidence, and no samples from the tank or town. Also, there was no management of the mass casualties. The only investigation completed was by a private contractor paid by Union Carbide. No one knows what really happened in Bhopal and whether or not a criminal act was perpetrated.

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We must take action to ensure that state and local law enforcement agencies are equipped and can deploy well-trained and certified CSIs to every CBRNE/TIC incident. Local entities must be prepared and commit the resources necessary to ensure that these incidents are properly investigated and that person(s) who commit such acts are held responsible for their actions under the law. This publication is an effort to provide CSIs with safe practices and standard procedures to protect themselves in the hazardous environment crime scene. Knowledge and information are key to their survival—but these do not replace training and practice. Use this book as a reference and as a starting point to demonstrate the need for additional training and certification for CSIs as our nation prepares for the next terrorist attack, natural disaster, or industrial accident that creates a hazardous environment.

References BBC News (Nov. 16, 2001). Al-Qaeda Nuclear Plans Confirmed. Retrieved from http.// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1657901.stm. David, L. (Dec. 2002). “Night of the Gas: Bhopal, India.” New Internationalist Magazine. Retrieved from www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Asia/Night_Gas_Bhopal.html. Drogin, B. (Mar. 08, 2009). “Anthrax Hoaxes Pile Up, As Does Their Cost.” Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/08/nation/ na-anthrax-threats8. Encyclopedia of Earth (Dec. 9, 2008). Bhopal, India. Retrieved from www.eoearth. org/article/Bhopal,_India. http://www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/ramzi_yousef.html. http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/06/nyregion/suspect-s-confession-cited-asbombing-trial-opens.html. http://jackkellywriter.com/ESSAYS/wtcattack.html. http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/FTRIALS/mcveigh/mcveightrial.html. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/olson.htm. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/08/nation/na-anthrax-threats8. http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/2002/02/21/2002-02-21_4_moroccans_held_in_rome_ter.html. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1657901.stm. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/dirtybomb/chrono.html. http://www1.american.edu/TED/bhopal.htm. http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Asia/Night_Gas_Bhopal.html. http://www.eoearth.org/article/Bhopal,_India. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34247132/. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html HSPD #5 (Appendix A). http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/ NIMS Resource Center. Kelly, J. (n.d.). Terror at the Towers—The First Time. Retrieved from http.jackkellywriter.com/ESSAYS/wtcattack.html.

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Kennedy, H. (Feb. 21, 2002). “4 Moroccans Held in Rome Terror Scare.” New York Daily News. Retrieved from www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/2002/02/21/200202-21_4_moroccans_held_in_rome_ter.html. Krock, L., and Deusser, R. (2003). Dirty Bomb: Chronology of Events. Nova Science Programming on Air and Online. Retrieved from www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/ dirtybomb/chrono.html. Linder, D. (2006). “Oklahoma City Bombing (McVeigh) Trial.” Retrieved from www. law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/FTRIALS/mcveigh/mcveightrial.html. MSNBC (Dec. 12, 2009). “Worst Industrial Disaster Still Haunts India.” Retrieved from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34247132. National Response Framework Resource Center. http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/. Olson, K. (July–Aug 1999). “Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?” Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5. No. 4. Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Retrieved from www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/olson.htm. Patel, T. (n.d.). TED Case Studies: Bhopal Disaster. American University. Retrieved from http://www1.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/bhopal.htm. Terrorism Files (n.d.). Individual Terrorists: Ramzi Yousef. (www.terrorismfiles.org/ individuals/ramzi_yousef.html ). Weiser, B. (Aug. 6, 1997). “Suspect’s Confession Cited as Bombing Trial Opens.” New York Times. (www.nytimes.com/1997/08/06/nyregion/suspect-s-confession-citedas-bombing-trial-opens.html).

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The Threats

Attacks, accidents, and natural disasters will occur. Responding agencies must prepare for these inevitable incidents whether in their own jurisdiction or a neighboring location. Past experience and current events substantiate the ability of terrorists—both international and domestic—to deploy a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Disrupted plots and seized intelligence substantiate concerns that chemical, biological, and radiological attacks pose real threats to America. Organized terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo have demonstrated the potential to attack large populations, and in fact, there exists a significant probability of this occurring. First responders must be cognizant of the real dangers and prepare to deal with the immediate response, as well as process the crime scene safely so that no collateral injuries will occur either to CSIs or laboratory analysts examining the physical and forensic evidence. Dr. Amy Sands of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies testified before Congress: “It is clear we are living in a new security era in which the possibility that terrorists could acquire and use WMD, including chemical and biological weapons, must be seen as real” (Sands 2002). In a pre-9/11 publication, author Jessica Stern defined unconventional warfare as including the improvised use of toxic household products, the deliberate spread of foodborne pathogens, or the intentional release of industrial chemicals as threats we must be prepared to face (Stern 1999). With these realities in focus, this chapter is designed to provide an overview of CBRNE threats. Much more detailed information is freely accessible through government agency Web sites such as the Centers for Disease Control, Department of Homeland Security, and Environmental Protection Agency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) acknowledges that chemical and biological weapons are easy to produce and obtain. Chemical production facilities are vulnerable, and both biological and chemical weapons can be stolen. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Center for Nonproliferation Program (CBWNP) monitors and assesses the production capabilities of other countries in the areas of biological and chemical arms. CBWNP also produces a weekly listserv for chemical and biological weapons and WMD terrorism (http://cns.miis.edu/cbw/listserv.htm). According to Dr. Jonathan B. Tucker of the CBWNP, Russia still maintains the world’s largest stockpile of chemical weapons including millions of munitions filled with nerve agents. Osama bin Laden has proclaimed that al-Qaeda will obtain WMDs (Walker and Tucker 2006). The prospect of future attacks looms ahead. 13

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Chemical Evidence and documents have been found by U.S. troops in Afghanistan establishing that al-Qaeda is developing CBRNE capabilities. We need to be aware of the potential for attack by terrorists, but not overlook the vulnerability of chemical trucks, railroad tanker cars, manufacturing plants, and chemical plants being attacked by domestic terrorists. These physical locations may be targets or they may become victims of industrial accidents—the result is that every one will be processed as a crime scene, thus subjecting CSIs to toxic and hazardous environments. An accident involving a single chemical tanker carrying chlorine or nitric acid can produce mass casualties that can exceed those in a planned chemical weapons attack. Natural disasters are not preventable; they are uncontrollable and cannot be predicted or mitigated in a timely fashion. Earthquakes, floods, and fires as well as environmental disasters such as the intentional release or accidental leakage of radioactive materials may also occur, and all require quick response, yet deliberate actions, to reduce injuries, prevent loss of life, and contain the contamination. Every jurisdiction has the potential to be the responding agency in the event of toxic release caused by a transportation or industrial accident. Have you considered the location of railroad tracks and industrial complexes in your locale? Chemical weapons are more easily controlled and are most effective when used in a confined area, such as an attack on a building; however, when clouds of toxic vapors that remain low to the ground are present, casualties will be devastating. In Bhopal, India, more than 14,000 casualties were linked to the intentional release of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas in 1984. No criminal investigation was conducted—no one was prosecuted for this heinous crime. The incident proves that chemical production facilities are vulnerable—the Bhopal incident was attributed to a disgruntled employee. The agents necessary for production of chemical weapons can be obtained. The aerosolization of a chemical weapon to create a cloud of suspended liquid or solid particles increases the lethality of the weapon. Chemical agents can enter the body through air, contact with skin, and contaminated food or water. Deaths from chemical weapons can occur within one hour of the deployment. Chemical weapons are generally divided into four categories by the symptoms they produce: nerve agents, blister agents, choking agents, and blood agents. Sarin and VX are high-end nerve agents. Tabun and soman are toxic organophosphate compounds developed originally as pesticides. Nerve agents are cholinesterase inhibitors, which cause excessive acetylcholine buildup, which in turn causes the synaptic receptors to become overstimulated. Simply put, nerve agents short-circuit the ability of the central nervous system to control normal nerve functions by blocking the stop signal

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found in the cholinesterase and causing a buildup of the go signal found in the acetylcholine. Symptoms linked to nerve agents include salivation, lacrimation, urination, defecation, gastrointestinal upset, emesis, and miosis (SLUDGEM), which in layman’s terms means that victims exposed to the right dose will lose control of all bodily functions, which can result in the quick death of the victims. Sarin is colorless, nonpersistent, and has a fruity smell. Tabun is colorless, semipersistent, and has a fruity smell. Soman is colorless, semipersistent, and has a camphor smell. VX has a motor oil appearance, is persistent, and smells like sulfur. Routes of exposure are inhalation and skin absorption. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting of the known chemical warfare agents. Blister agents consist of sulfur mustard (H, HD, and HT), nitrogen mustard (HN), lewisite (L), and phosgene oxime (CX). Blister agents, also known as vesicants, are all persistent and range in color from clear to yellow/amber to brown/black. Blister agents attack skin, eyes, the gastrointestinal tract, and the respiratory tract. Mustard agents were used widely during World War I and can be dispersed as a vapor, liquid, or solid. Mustard agents have a delayed effect, while L and CX cause immediate pain and suffering. Sulfur mustard has a garlic odor, nitrogen mustard has a soap and fish-like smell, lewisite has a geranium odor, and phosgene oxime has an indescribable painful smell. Routes of exposure are inhalation, ingestion, and skin absorption. Although stockpiles in Russia have been destroyed, many suspect that other nations have illegally maintained supplies of mustard agents and lewisite. Choking agents, also known as pulmonary agents, are primarily the toxic industrial chemicals chlorine (Cl2) and phosgene (COCL2). All choking agents are nonpersistent and attack the skin, mucous membranes, and the respiratory tract, with death being caused by pulmonary edema. Chlorine smells like swimming pool chlorine or bleach, and phosgene smells like newly mown hay or grass. Routes of exposure are inhalation and skin absorption. Choking agents, like blister agents, were first used in World War I and are more easily obtained due to their everyday industrial uses. Blood agents consists of the toxic industrial chemicals, hydrogen cyanide (AC) and cyanogen chloride (CK), which can be immediately fatal. Cyanide has a distinctive burnt almond odor or peach kernel smell and can be released as an aerosol or gas. Hydrogen cyanide is nonpersistent while cyanogen chloride is persistent. Hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride are used in many commercial applications such as electroplating, mining, and the production of synthetic fibers, plastics, and pesticides, so there are ready supplies in many jurisdictions. Routes of exposure include inhalation, ingestion, injection, and skin absorption. There have been many deaths attributed to hydrogen cyanide as it was the agent used by the Nazis in the death camps to exterminate more than six million Jews during World War€II. In 1995, after initiating five

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simultaneous sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subways, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo deployed a hydrogen cyanide device; however, it was neutralized before it dispersed. Estimates of potential casualties had the release of hydrogen cyanide been successful were 20,000 to 30,000 victims. Although conventional weapons are much more predictable and the injuries are instantaneous, chemical weapons may be designed to inflict nonlethal injuries that can overwhelm the response capabilities of small jurisdictions. Caring for the injured and ill victims creates confusion and may result in the contamination of emergency service providers as they struggle to respond to the casualties while conducting an ongoing containment and investigative operation. In this situation, the use of a chemical weapon resulting in nonlethal injuries becomes a force multiplier for the terrorists conducting the attack (Croddy and Ackerman 2003).

Biological Biological agents are pathogens and toxins that are deliberately used to infect people and create the spread of infectious diseases and consist of viruses, bacteria, fungi, and toxins. The routes of exposure for biological agents are inhalation, ingestion, and injection. Bioterrorism is generally defined as the intentional use of a biological organism or component to cause disease, social disruption, and panic (Pigott and Terndrup 2003). Most bioweapons produce fever, a plague, or infectious disease (Purver 1995). The deployment of a virus or bacteria bioweapons does not create an immediate emergency, as the organisms require a period for incubation and then need to be spread from person to person. Victims of bioterrorism may not be detected for days or even weeks depending on the organism or toxin used in the attack. Terrorists will exploit the ability of creating fear, uncertainty, and confusion rather than high numbers of casualties from actual exposure to the toxin. The CDC has established a classification system for potential biological warfare agents. The most deadly microbes are anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) bacteria, botulinum toxin (Clostridium botulinum, toxin), plague (Yersinia pestis, bacteria), smallpox (Variola major, virus), tularemia (Francisella tularensis), and viral hemorrhagic fever viruses, which are classified in Category A (University of Alabama School of Medicine 2010). Anthrax (B. anthracis) spores are resilient and can survive chemicals, ultraviolet (UV) light, and drying. They have been detected in environments 30 years after the initial contamination. There were 23 identified cases in the United States in 2001–2002, many of which were linked to the anthrax letters in New York, New Jersey, Washington, DC, Connecticut, and Florida (USCDC 2003). Eleven of those cases were inhalational anthrax and twelve were cutaneous (cuts or abrasions in the skin). Inhalation anthrax has an

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incubation period of one to six days. For maximum effectiveness the aerosolized particles need to be about five microns in size. It is difficult to process anthrax to this level of sophistication, and those eleven victims of the anthrax letters were linked by the FBI to a single source: Bruce Ivins, a U.S. Army medical researcher (USDOJ 2010). Cutaneous anthrax exposures occur when abraded skin is exposed to infected animals such as goats, cattle, and sheep (http://www.bioterrorism.cme.uab.edu/CategoryA/Anthrax/summary.asp). Gastrointestinal anthrax is contracted when infected animal meat is ingested. No cases of this type have ever been reported in the United States. Botulinum toxin (C. botulinum) is extremely lethal, and it is confirmed that attempts have been made to aerosolize the toxin. The cases of food-borne botulism in the United States are usually linked to home processing of food or ingestion of undercooked meat. Only about 30 cases a year are reported to the CDC (USCDC 2003). Plague (Y. pestis) consists of three forms: bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic. Bubonic plague is spread by flea bites from infected rats or other vermin, while pneumonic plague is contracted through aerosol inhalation or secondary contact (droplet dispersal) with bubonic plague. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union developed a genetically engineered, dry, antibioticresistant form of Y. pestis bacterium. Several other countries have also developed weaponized forms, including Japan, which utilized bioweapons against the Chinese during World War II. Only about thirteen cases are reported to the CDC annually (USCDC 2003). Smallpox (Variola major) is a DNA virus and is highly contagious. It has been used as a bioweapon since the 1700s. Smallpox virus is quite stable and can remain viable on clothing or other items for months. It is disseminated through aerosol droplets and the incubation period is three to seven days. There is a large susceptible population, as smallpox vaccinations are no longer given. The World Health Organization declared in 1981 that smallpox was eradicated. Smallpox virus is not as readily available as anthrax or plague, but at least ten countries maintain biological weapons research programs. Tularemia (F. tularensis) is highly infectious. Approximately 200 cases are reported each year in the United States (USCDC 2003). It can be contracted through inhalation, by the bite of a tick, through ingestion of contaminated meat, or through an open wound. Tularemia is also known as deerfly or rabbit fever as it can be contracted from wild animals, and it can remain present in nature for a long period of time. It is stable in either a liquid or dry formulation and has been developed into a bioweapon by the Soviet Union and other countries. Viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) include the highly infectious Ebola and Marburg viruses. They cause high mortality and morbidity, and are easily passed from person to person. The viruses are very stable in the environment and large-scale production is possible. The incubation period can be from

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two to twenty-one days, and aerosol dispersal weapons have been created by the Soviet Union and other nations. Category B agents also pose significant risks to the population and are moderately easy to disseminate. Included in this category are brucellosis (Brucella spp.), Q fever (Coxiella burnetii), ricin (made from castor beans), glanders (Burkholderia mallei), and water safety threats. Ricin, for example, is the third most toxic material known. It is easily made from the seeds of the castor bean plant (Ricinus connunis). The plant grows readily in the United States in areas that are hot and the soil is well drained. Ricinus is the latin word for “tick” with the seeds being described as a “bloated tick.” Each seed contains a small amount of the extremely toxic protein called ricin. One castor bean seed contains enough ricin to possibly be fatal to a child. Ricin is classified as a biological threat agent as the ricin can easily be extracted from the castor bean seed, and recipes and procedures for ricin extraction are easily retrieved on the Internet. Ricin is a white powder that inhibits the synthesis of proteins in the body, resulting in severe illness or death. No antidote currently exists for ricin. Food safety threats such as Salmonella, Shigella, and E. coli (Escherichia coli 0157) are also included as Category B agents. Category C agents include Hantavirus and new emerging threats that are easily available and have the potential for high morbidity and mortality rates. For more in-depth information on these agents please review the data available on the CDC Web site at http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp

Radiological Radioactive contamination is the presence of radiation-emitting substances (radioactive material). It is energy that is emitted by atoms that are unstable. Some kinds of radiation travel only a few millimeters while others travel for many meters. While there are many positive uses for radiation, such as cancer treatments and X-rays, excessive exposure will cause tissue damage and can cause radiation poisoning. Radiological incidents involve exposure to radiation or radioactivity through accidents or misuse. Examples of these incidents are traffic accidents involving transportation vehicles carrying research or medical radioactive isotopes, fires in hospitals, university research facilities, or waste storage facilities, and the use of a radioactive dispersal device (RDD). Responders have the potential to become victims due to exposure to the agent or from working in the wrong type of personal protective equipment (PPE) in these contaminated environments. A radioactive dispersal device consists of radioactive materials attached to an explosive such as dynamite. Radioactive fallout can contain hot particles that will contaminate surfaces, buildings, and soil. Victims may be severely injured with unsurvivable wounds. Many victims die from radiation

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poisoning within two weeks of the exposure. In addition to the hazardous environment, responders and CSIs must be prepared to deal with the possibility of mass casualties. There are three basic kinds of radiation: alpha (α), beta (β), and gamma (γ). Alpha particles are heavy and can only travel short distances. However, they can cause damage to living cells if internal exposure occurs. Alpha particles can be inhaled, swallowed, or introduced to open wounds. Alpha radiation is found in nature, rocks, and air as well as consumer products including televisions and smoke detectors. Nuclear power plants and nuclear weaponry are also sources for alpha emitters. Beta particles are lighter than α and can travel farther. Research and therapeutic treatments both utilize β-emitting radioactive materials, and they can also be found in naturally occurring soils and rocks. Gamma rays are strong and can penetrate the entire body. They are energetic photons and are used widely for industrial processes and medical treatments (USNRC 2007). The possibility of a radiological attack using stolen or lost materials is a real possibility. Commercial sites including manufacturing, medical, and research facilities are targets for theft. Reports of lost and stolen radioactive materials from these locations involve small or short-lived devices that would not be suitable for constructing an RDD. Deployment of a dirty bomb could contaminate areas, leaving no choice but demolition to eradicate the levels of radioactivity. It is more likely that a conventional device laced with radioactive materials would be utilized as an RDD. While there may be injuries and even deaths from the explosion, it is not probable that the device would contain enough radioactive materials to harm a large number of people. It is possible, however, that those exposed to the radioactive materials might develop cancer later in life. According to the Nuclear Regulation Commission, a dirty bomb is not considered a weapon of mass destruction, but rather a weapon of mass disruption by creating fear and panic more than fatalities or even injuries (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirtybombs-bg.html).

Nuclear Nuclear power plants and the transportation systems that support them are well-protected facilities. It is not as likely that a terrorist organization could overwhelm the security measures that are in place; however, accidents do occur that require emergency responders to react to the situations. There have been nuclear power plant accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States and at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union. The Environmental Protection Agency as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission enforces strict compliance measures to ensure the safety of employees and the communities in

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which they are located. The 9/11 Commission Report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004) noted that al-Qaeda had been attempting to make or acquire nuclear weapons for at least ten years. Consideration must be given to the potential for an RDD to be developed as a result of a failed attempt to create a nuclear device. For more information on radiation, please review the data sheets available at http://www.epa.gov/radiation/rert/index.html. CBRNE agents are capable of inflicting enormous casualties. Although the outcome of utilizing conventional explosive devices is more predictable, terrorists claim success when they disrupt lives, create chaos, and fuel uncertainty among the public. Any incident or threat of the deployment of a WMD cannot be effectively managed by routine procedures, and emergency responder agencies must prepare for these events. Chemical attacks are sudden and overt events. Biological attacks are more covert since the time between exposure and the onset of symptoms is controlled by the incubation period. Radiation and nuclear attacks are less likely to occur, but are still considered a risk to the American population. Responders must prepare for the inevitable. CSIs must be ready to conduct and complete a safe crime scene investigation in the hazardous environments created by these threats.

References Alibek, K., Dashiell, T., Dwyer, A., Layne, S., Patrick, W., Ponikvar, D., Rinard, & Sidell, F. (Ed.). (2006). Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (3rd ed.). Surrey, UK: Sentinel House. Croddy, E., and Ackerman, G. (2003). “Biological and Chemical Terrorism: A Unique Threat” in Veenema, T. (Ed.), Disaster Nursing and Emergency Preparedness for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Terrorism and Other Hazards (pp.€300– 329). New York: Springer. Karam, A. (2003). “Radiological Incidents and Emergencies” in Veenema, T. (Ed.), Disaster Nursing and Emergency Preparedness for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Terrorism and Other Hazards (pp. 430–459). New York: Springer. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004). (Philip Zelikow, Executive Director; Bonnie D. Jenkins, Counsel; Ernest R. May, Senior Advisor). The 9/11 Commission Report. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Pigott, D., and Terndrup, T. (2003). “Biological Agents of Concern” in Veenema, T. (Ed.), Disaster Nursing and Emergency Preparedness for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Terrorism and Other Hazards (pp. 354–377). New York: Springer. Purver, R. (1995). Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to Open Literature. Canadian Intelligence Service. www.csis.gc.ca/pblctns/thr/ cbtrrrsm01-eng.asp. Sands, A. (2002). “Deconstructing the Chem-Bio Threat.” Transcript of testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, March 19. Stern, J. (1999). The Ultimate Terrorists. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Stewart, C. (2006) Weapons of Mass Casualties and Terrorism Response Handbook. Sudbury: Jones and Bartlett Publishers. United States Center For Disease Control and Prevention. (2003). “Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report” (MMWR). In CDC (Ed.), (Vol. 51, pp. 28). Atlanta. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5151.pdf. United States Department of Justice. (2010). Amerithrax Investigative Summary. Washington, D.C. United States Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs Press Release (Feb. 19, 2010). Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10nsd.166.html. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2007). Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs. Retrieved from www.mrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/ dirty-bombs-bg.html. University of Alabama. (2010). School of Medicine-Division of Continuing Medical Education. Retrieved from http://www.cme.uab.edu. Walker, P., and Tucker, J. (2006). “Chem Bio: The Real Chemical Threat.” Los Angeles Times. April 1. http://cns.miis.edu/other/tucker060407.htm.

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Introduction CSIs need to have a basic understanding of the laws, regulations, and standards that apply to working in a hazardous environment. Some of these directives detail how CSIs must be trained, while others detail how they must respond. Law enforcement personnel, such as CSIs, are not exempt from these laws and regulations because they must respond. In addition, CSIs also need a basic understanding of the criminal laws relating to WMD/CBRNE since knowledge of the law is necessary in the processing of the crime scene and the collection of evidence. Therefore, this chapter is divided into two portions, the first being the laws and regulations dealing with training and response to a hazardous environment and the second being the criminal laws dealing with WMD/ CBRNE. It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide an in-depth discussion of each law, regulation, or standard, but to provide the crime scene investigator with a brief overview of the particular law, regulation, or standard. It is recommended each CSI obtain additional training in the laws, regulations, and standards and how each pertains to the CSI’s particular situation and job duties. Laws are acts, legislation, or statutes enacted by Congress, the state legislature, or other governing authority and have been signed by the president or other authorized party. Violation of a law may result in a fine, incarceration, or both. Regulations are rules promulgated by various government agencies to achieve a specific agency’s objective. In many cases, they have the full force, effect, and weight of a law. Standards are usually developed by a nongovernmental agency such as a professional organization and may be considered the minimum acceptable set of specifications for a service or product. Standards do not have the force, effect, and weight of law. Some standards may be adopted by legislative bodies and then applied as a regulation, thereby giving them the weight of law. Standards are usually developed by a committee of subject matter experts who then present their document to a larger body of experts who approve or amend the original document. Once approved, the document becomes a Voluntary Consensus Standard. Additionally, there is a General Duty Clause within the Occupational Safety Health Act (OSHA), which provides a requirement that employers furnish employment and places of employment that are free from recognized hazards to the health and safety of their employees. 23

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Full OSHA regulations are avilable online at http://www.osha.gov. OSHA standards 1910.210 are provided for reference purposes in a CD at the back of this book.

Part I: Training and Response Federal Laws Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) was the first law that had the greatest effect on emergency response, training, preparation and planning for a hazardous material incident. SARA had the following impact on hazardous materials response: 1. It reauthorized and amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA is commonly known as the Superfund Act and allows for the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites and requires individuals and companies responsible for the release of reportable quantities of hazardous material to report it to the National Response Center, which is staffed 24 hours a day by U.S. Coast Guard officers. 2. It required OSHA to develop standards for the health and safety of workers who respond to chemical emergencies. As a result the Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response regulation, known as Hazwoper, 29 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) 1910.120 was passed. 3. It led to the establishment of the State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) and Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) under SARA Title III. The Clean Air Act (CAA) established airborne emissions requirements and required certain facilities to make information available to the community regarding the chemical risks and the manner in which they are handled at the facility. The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) requires companies that have facilities and/ or carry oil and other related products to develop emergency response plans and conduct regular training and exercise scenarios. In addition, they have to verify any contractor capabilities and spill resources. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) provides for the proper management and disposal of hazardous waste. Additionally, it provides requirements for underground storage tanks. RCRA is commonly referred to as the “cradle to grave” regulation. CSIs may remove evidence

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that is also hazardous material. As such, it is considered evidence and is not subject to the RCRA requirements; however, after the case has been adjudicated or the hazardous material is not needed, the material must be disposed of in accordance with all laws and regulations. Federal Regulations Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (Hazwoper)—29 CFR 1910.120 As stated under the Federal Laws section, this regulation was promulgated under the legal authority of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 and applies to states that have their own OSHA-approved occupational safety and health plans and to federal employees. Currently, 23 states have their own approved plans. The remaining 27 non-OSHA states are covered by a similar regulation under the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 40 CFR Part 311. The Hazwoper regulation establishes specific requirements for organizations, both public and private, that respond to hazardous materials emergencies. This applies to Evidence Response Teams (ERTs) and CSIs as well as firefighters, EMS, and others. Hazwoper specifically covers requirements for emergency response plans, safety practices, health and safety programs, training, response, medical surveillance programs, emergency response procedures, and post-emergency termination procedures. (State-specific guidelines may be viewed online at www.osha.gov.) Emergency Response Plan—29 CFR 1910.120(q)(l) Requires an emergency response plan to be developed and implemented to handle anticipated emergencies and protect employees from the release of hazardous materials to which they may be exposed to during their duties. The requirements are as follows: 1. The plan shall be developed and implemented prior to the start of emergency operations. 2. The plan shall be in writing. 3. The plan shall be available for inspection and copying by employees, their representatives, and OSHA personnel. The emergency response plan shall include the following: 1. Pre-emergency planning and coordination with outside parties [1910.120(q)(2)(ii)] 2. Personnel roles, lines of authority, training, and communication [1910.120(q)(2)(iii)]

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3. Emergency recognition and prevention [1910.120(q)(2)(iv)] 4. Safe distances and places of refuge [1910.120(q)(2)(v)] 5. Site security and control [1910.120(q)(2)(vi)] 6. Evacuation routes and procedures [1910.120(q)(2)(vii)] 7. Decontamination [1910.120(q)(2)(viii)] 8. Emergency medical treatment and first aid [1910.120(q)(2)(ix)] 9. Emergency alerting and response procedures [1910.120(q)(2)(x)] 10. Critique of response and follow-up [1910.120(q)(2)(xi)] 11. PPE and emergency equipment [1910.120(q)(2)(xii)]

Prior to processing a crime scene involving CBRNE/TICs, an emergency response plan that complies with the above requirements must be developed, implemented, and disseminated to all personnel involved in processing the scene. Note:╇ Emergency response organizations may use the local emergency response plan or the state emergency response plan or both as part of their emergency response plan. In addition, items of the emergency response plan that are being properly addressed by the SARA Title III plans may be substituted into their emergency plan. Emergency Response Procedures—29 CFR 1910.120(q)(3) Response procedures require the following: 1. Requires the establishment of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the following duties of the incident commander [1910.120(q)(3)(i)]: A. Identify, to the extent possible, all hazardous substances or conditions present and address as appropriate site analysis, use of engineering controls, maximum exposure limits, hazardous substance handling procedures, and use of any new technologies [1910.120(q)(3)(ii)]. B. Implement appropriate emergency operations, and assure that the personal protective equipment worn is appropriate for the hazards to be encountered [1910.120(q)(3)(iii)]. C. Ensure CSIs engaged in emergency response and exposed to hazardous substances presenting an inhalation hazard or potential inhalation hazard shall wear positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus while engaged in emergency response, until such time that the individual in charge of the ICS determines through the use of air monitoring that a decreased level of respiratory protection will not result in hazardous exposures to employees [1910.120(q)(3)(iv)].

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D. Shall limit the number of emergency response personnel at the emergency site to those who are actively performing emergency operations. Operations in hazardous areas shall be performed using the buddy system in groups of two or more [1910.120(q)(3)(v)]. E. Ensure backup personnel shall be standing by with equipment ready to provide assistance or rescue. Qualified basic life support personnel, as a minimum, shall also be standing by with medical equipment and transportation capability [1910.120(q)(3)(vi)]. F. Shall designate a safety officer, who is knowledgeable in the operations being implemented at the emergency response site, with specific responsibility to identify and evaluate hazards and to provide direction with respect to the safety of operations for the emergency at hand [1910.120(q)(3)(vii)]. G. Shall implement appropriate decontamination procedures [1910.120(q)(3)(ix)]. H. Operations at a CBRNE or TIC crime scene require the investigation be conducted using the Incident Command System or Unified Command System with the above requirements in place.

Training—29 CFR 1910.120(q)(6) Training shall be based on the duties and function to be performed by each responder of an emergency response organization. The training is competency based, recognizes five levels of training, and requires an annual refresher and documentation. The training levels are as follows: First responder awareness level—These individuals are likely to witness or discover a hazardous substance release and have been trained to initiate an emergency response sequence by notifying the proper authorities of the release. They would take no further action beyond notifying the authorities of the release [1910.120(q)(6)(i)]. First responder operations level—First responders at the operations level are individuals who respond to releases or potential releases of hazardous substances as part of the initial response to the site for the purpose of protecting nearby persons, property, or the environment from the effects of the release. They are trained to respond in a defensive fashion without actually trying to stop the release. Their function is to contain the release from a safe distance, keep it from spreading, and prevent exposures [1910.120(q)(6)(ii)]. Hazardous materials technician—Hazardous materials technicians are individuals who respond to releases or potential releases for the purpose of stopping the release. They will approach the point of release in order to plug, patch, or otherwise stop the release of a hazardous substance [1910.120(q)(6)(iii)].

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Hazardous materials specialist—Hazardous materials specialists are individuals who respond with and provide support to hazardous materials technicians. Their duties require a more specific knowledge of the various substances they may be called upon to contain. The hazardous materials specialist would also act as the site liaison with federal, state, local, and other government authorities in regard to site activities [1910.120(q)(6)(iv)]. On-scene incident commander—This individual will assume control of the incident scene [1910.120(q)(6)(v)]. Each level of training has a list of competencies that shall be completed by the individual and be certified by the employer. It is recommended that CSIs with the potential to process a CBRNE/TIC crime scene be certified at least at the hazardous materials technician level or higher, and supervisors be certified at the technician level and incident commander level in accordance with their department’s needs and requirements. Refresher Training—29 CFR 1910.120(q)(8) Those employees who have been trained as above shall receive annual refresher training of sufficient content and duration to maintain their competencies, or shall demonstrate competency in those areas at least yearly. A statement shall be made of the training or competency, and if a statement of competency is made, the employer shall keep a record of the methodology used to demonstrate competency [1910.120(q)(8)(ii)]. CSIs trained at one of the levels must complete annual refresher training. While no minimum time frame is required for the training, the employee must ensure competency and maintain a record and methodology used to demonstrate the competency. This annual refresher may be done on site and in house and may involve exercises. Medical Surveillance and Consultation—29 CFR 1910.120(q)(9) Requirements for medical surveillance and examinations are found in 1910.120(f) and include the following as to frequency and time of examinations: 1. Prior to assignment [(1910.120(f)(3)(i)(A)]. 2. At least once every twelve months unless the attending physician believes a longer interval (not greater than biennially) is appropriate [(1910.120(f)(3)(i)(B)]. 3. At termination of employment or reassignment [(1910.120(f)(3)(i)(C)]. 4. Signs or symptoms indicating possible exposure to hazardous substances [(1910.120(f)(3)(i)(D)].

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CSIs who are trained to the above levels and must operate in a CBRNE or TIC environment are required to participate in a medical monitoring and surveillance program that is set up and paid for by their employers. Additional requirements for the medical surveillance program are found in [1910.120(f)]. Respiratory Protection—29 CFR 1910.134 CSIs working in a CBRNE/TIC environment will be required to wear some type of respiratory protection. They must be protected from a hazardous atmosphere through a comprehensive program of recognition, evaluation, engineering, administrative, work practice controls, and personal protective equipment, including respirators. Both the agency and the employee work together to ensure the employee’s safety in compliance with this OSHA regulation. Note:╇ Types of respiratory protective equipment, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the levels of protection are discussed in Chapter 4. The following are the major requirements for respiration protection under OSHA: 1. A respirator shall be provided to each employee when such equipment is necessary to protect the health of such employee [1910.134(a)(2)]. A. The employer shall provide the respirators that are applicable and suitable for the purpose intended. B. The employer shall be responsible for the establishment and maintenance of a respiratory protection program. C. The program shall cover each employee required to use a respirator. 2. The employer must develop and implement a written respiratory protection program with required worksite-specific procedures and elements for required respirator use. Additionally, the program must be administered by a suitably trained program administrator. The respiratory protection plan will include the following: A. Procedures for selecting respirators [1910.134(c)(1)(i). B. Medical evaluations of employees required to use respirators [1910.134(c)(1)(ii). C. Fit testing procedures for tight-fitting respirators [1910.134(c) (1)(iii). D. Procedures for proper use of respirators in routine and reasonably foreseeable emergency situations [1910.134(c)(1)(iv). E. Procedures and schedules for cleaning, disinfecting, storing, inspecting, repairing, discarding, and otherwise maintaining respirators [1910.134(c)(1)(v).

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F. Training of employees in the respiratory hazards to which they are potentially exposed during routine and emergency situations [1910.134(c)(1)(vii)]. G. Training of employees in the proper use of respirators, including putting on and removing them, any limitations on their use, and their maintenance [1910.134(c)(1)(viii)]. H. Procedures for regularly evaluating the effectiveness of the program [1910.134(c)(1)(ix)]. 3. Employers must establish and implement procedures for the proper use of respirators. These requirements include prohibiting conditions that may result in facepiece seal leakage, preventing employees from removing respirators in hazardous environments, taking actions to ensure continued effective respirator operation throughout the work shift, and other requirements [1910.134(g)]. A. Facepiece seal protection [1910.134(g)(1)(i)] 1) The employer shall not permit respirators with tight-fitting facepieces to be worn by employees who have [(1910.134(g)(1)(i)]: a. Facial hair that comes between the sealing surface of the facepiece and the face or that interferes with valve function [(1910.134(g)(1)(i)(A)]. b. Any condition that interferes with the face-to-facepiece seal or valve function [(1910.134(g)(1)(i)(B)]. c. If an employee wears corrective glasses or goggles or other personal protective equipment, the employer shall ensure that such equipment is worn in a manner that does not interfere with the seal of the facepiece to the face of the user [(1910.134(g)(1)(ii). d. For all tight-fitting respirators, the employer shall ensure that employees perform a user seal check each time they put on the respirator [(1910.134(g)(1)(iii)]. 4. Employers are required to provide for the cleaning and disinfecting, storage, inspection, and repair of respirators used by employees [1910.134(h)]. 5. Employers are required to provide effective training to employees who are required to use respirators. The training must be comprehensive, understandable, and recur annually, and more often if necessary [1910.134(k)]

Confined Space—29 CFR 1910.146 CSIs may have to enter a confined space in order to process a crime scene or collect potential evidence. Confined spaces present special problems and considerations for CSIs, and may be combined with a CBRNE agent or a

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TIC. A confined space according to OSHA has the following characteristics [1910.146(b)]: 1. Is large enough and so configured that an employee can bodily enter and perform assigned work. 2. Has limited or restricted means for entry or exit. 3. Is not designed for continuous employee occupancy. Tanks, vessels, silos, storage bins, hoppers, vaults, and pits are some examples of confined spaces that may have limited means of entry. A permit-required confined space, as used by OSHA, is a confined space that has any of the following characteristics [1910.146(b)]: 1. Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere A hazardous atmosphere means an atmosphere that may expose employees to the risk of death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue, injury, or acute illness from one or more of the following causes: A. Flammable gas, vapor, or mist in excess of 10% of its lower flammable limit (LFL) B. Airborne combustible dust at a concentration that meets or exceeds its LFL C. Atmospheric oxygen concentration below 19.5% or above 23.5% D. Atmospheric concentration of any substance that could result in employee exposure in excess of its dose or permissible exposure limit E. Any other atmospheric condition that is immediately dangerous to life or health 2. Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing an entrant 3. Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor that slopes downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section 4. Contains any other recognized serious safety or health hazard As shown above, confined spaces may have hazardous atmospheres and limited egress with extremely tight areas making it hard to maneuver. Additionally, confined spaces are usually dark and, due to their construction, limit radio communications. CSIs are not allowed to enter the space until a confined space permit has been issued, and only certified confined space personnel are allowed to work in the confined space. Additionally, the atmosphere must be continuously monitored for oxygen, flammable gases and vapors, carbon monoxide, and other toxic gases and vapors.

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When working in a confined space, employees and CSIs must comply with the following: 1. Implement measures necessary to prevent unauthorized entry into the confined space [1910.146(d)(1)] such as barriers, signs, etc. 2. Provide pedestrian, vehicle, or other barriers as necessary to protect entrants from external hazards [1910.146(d)(3)(v)]. 3. Identify and evaluate the hazards of permit spaces before employees enter them [1910.146(d)(2)]. 4. Provide necessary communications equipment [1910.146(d)(4)(iii)]. 5. Provide personal protective equipment as needed [1910.146(d)(4)(iv)]. 6. Provide ventilating equipment as needed [1910.146(d)(4)(ii)]. 7. Additional requirements as listed in 29 CFR 1910.146. Trenches and Excavations—29 CFR 1926.650, 29 CFR 1926.651, 29 CFR 1926.652 CSIs may have to enter a trench or an excavation in order to process a crime scene or collect potential evidence. Trenches and excavations present special problems and considerations for CSIs, and may be combined with a CBRNE agent or a TIC. An excavation according to OSHA is any man-made cut, cavity, trench, or depression in an earth surface, formed by earth removal, while a trench is a narrow excavation (in relation to its length) that is deeper than it is wide, made below the surface of the ground, and is greater than 4 feet deep [29 CFR 1926.650(b)]. The greatest hazard of working in a trench is trench collapse. This can occur suddenly and without warning. According to an article on Firehouse. com entitled “Rescue Operations for Trench Collapse—Part 1,” soil falling from a height of 10 feet can fall at the rate of 17 miles per hour and trap the worker without any time to react. Additionally, soil weighs approximately 100 pounds per cubic foot, so a victim with 100 cubic yards of soil on top of him or her is pinned with approximately 3,000 pounds of soil, thus suffocating the victim. Additional hazards include asphyxiation due to lack of oxygen in a confined space, inhalation of toxic fumes, drowning, electrocution, explosions, and underground utilities. To safely work in a trench, OSHA requires that each employee in an excavation shall be protected from cave-ins by an adequate protective system designed in accordance with 29 CFR 29 CFR 1926.652(c), unless excavations are less than 5 feet (1.52 m) in depth and examination of the ground by a competent person provides no indication of a potential cave-in. A competent person is one who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, and has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them ([1926.650(b)] (Daley 2002).

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Lock Out/Tag Out—29 CFR 1910.147 CSIs may be subject to Lock Out/Tag Out regulations. These regulations are designed to prevent the unexpected energization or start-up of a machine or equipment, or release of stored energy that could cause injury to employees [1910.147(a)(1)(i)]. It applies if an employee is required to remove or bypass a guard or other safety device or is required to place any part of his or her body into an area on a machine or piece of equipment where work is actually performed upon the material being processed (point of operation) or where an associated danger zone exists during a machine operating cycle [1910.147(a) (2)(ii)(A)(B)] (See Figure 3.1). Hazardous Material Regulations, Department of€Transportation (DOT)—49 CFR Subchapter C After collecting the samples and evidence, CSIs will have to transport the potentially hazardous samples and evidence to the appropriate laboratory for analysis. Usually this is done via a law enforcement vehicle or public safety vehicle according to local protocols. As such, it is considered a noncommercial transport and is not regulated by the Department of Transportation. The

Figure 3.1╇ Lock out/tag out device.

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transporting agency ensures proper hazard classification and proper packaging, and assumes liabilities for the movement of the materials. Due to the hazardous nature of the samples and evidence, it may be necessary to send them to a different laboratory that is too far away to transport via law enforcement/department vehicle. It would be necessary to commercially ship the samples. At that time, hazardous material transportation regulations may apply, and the items will be shipped via Department of Transportation and/or International Air Transport Association (IATA) regulations. The regulations require certification/training in order to ship hazardous materials commercially. Standardized commercial packaging materials are available for shipping laboratory samples. These kits include certified safe containers, labels, absorbent, and documentation forms (see Figure 3.2).

Watertight Primary Receptacle Glass, Metal, or Plastic* *If multiple fragile primary receptacles are placed in a single secondary packaging, they must be either individually wrapped or separated so as to prevent contact between them

Infectious Substance Absorbent Packing Material (for liquids)

Watertight Secondary Packaging Cap List of Contents

Rigid Outer Packaging Infectious Substance Label Proper Shipping Name and UN Number

UN Package Certification Mark Shipper or Consignee Identification

Figure 3.2╇ The triple packaging system endorsed by the World Health Organization.

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Presidential Directives, Presidential Decision Directives, Homeland Security Presidential Directives These are executive orders issued by the president of the United States. They have the full force and effect of the law. Presidents have issued various directives under different names. CSIs need to be aware of these directives, particularly the Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs), as they may affect training, response, equipment, and duties. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 The subject of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5) is the management of domestic incidents. Its purpose is to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system. HSPD 5 directed the secretary of Homeland Security to establish the National Response Plan (which later became the National Response Framework) and to develop and administer the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as a single national approach to incident management. HSPD 5 includes a core set of concepts and defines this core set as the Incident Command System (ICS), Multiagency Coordination Systems, training, identification and management of resources, qualification and certification, and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources. CSIs are required, at a minimum, to take training in the ICS—ICS 100: Introduction to ICS and NIMS; FEMA IS-700: NIMS, An Introduction. Both of these courses are available as online classes. First-line supervisors, mid-level management, and command and general staff personnel have additional requirements for training. Additional information may be found through the FEMA NIMS Resource Center at http://www.fema.gov/ emergency/nims/index.shtm or the State Emergency Management Agency. HSPD 5 is provided in Appendix A of this book. Voluntary Consensus Standards As explained in the introduction, voluntary consensus standards are developed primarily by nongovernmental professional organizations as a means to carry out objectives or activities as determined by agencies and departments and may be considered the minimum acceptable set of specifications for a service or product. Some organization developing standards applicable to CBRNE/TIC and their Web sites are • American National Standards Institute (ANSI)—http://www.ansi.org • American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)—http://astm.org

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• The Chlorine Institute—http://www.cl2.com. • Compressed Gas Association (CGA)—http://www.cganet.com • National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)—http://www.nfpa.org Among the most important consensus standards used for hazardous materials response are those proposed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Standards, as applicable to CSIs and law enforcement agencies, were developed in association with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Capitol Police, the National Association of Bomb Squad Commanders, the National Sheriff’s Association, and others. The operational philosophy established for the NFPA standards was that responders cannot safely and effectively respond to a terrorism or criminal event involving a hazardous material/ TIC/WMD if they do not understand hazardous material response. Therefore, it is recommended that responders be trained to perform their expected tasks and that the NFPA 472 standard apply to all responders regardless of their discipline. The following are the most important standards pertaining to operations in a hazardous material/TIC/WMD incident. NFPA 472—Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents This standard specifies minimum competencies required for those who respond to a hazardous material/TIC/WMD incident in an effort to reduce accidents, injuries, illnesses, and exposure to responders. Competencies are listed for awareness level, operations level, technician level, incident commander, and specialist employees. These are comparable to the OSHA 1910.120 levels discussed earlier in the training stage on page 29. In addition, the standard has mission-specific competencies to include evidence preservation and sampling and other law enforcement–related topics. It is highly recommended that law enforcement agencies, crime scene investigation units, etc., review and comply with this standard. It is a common misconception among law enforcement agencies that these standards apply only to the fire service. It is obvious they do not. NFPA 473—Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to Hazardous Materials/ Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents The purpose of the NFPA 473 standard is to provide emergency medical services (EMS) personnel with guidance on how to deliver basic life support (BLS) and advanced life support (ALS) at a hazardous material/TIC/WMD incident. In addition, the NFPA has three standards on personal protective equipment (PPE), which include the proper selection, care, and maintenance of PPE. CSIs will be wearing PPE while conducting a crime scene investigation and should be familiar with the PPE standards.

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NFPA 1991—Standard on Vapor-Protective Ensembles for Hazardous Materials Emergencies NFPA 1992—Standard on Liquid-Splash-Protective Ensembles and Clothing for Hazardous Material Emergencies NFPA 1994—Standard on Protective Ensembles for€First Responders to CBRN Terrorism Incidents

Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Statutes CSIs understand the importance of knowing the criminal statutes and how to apply them in processing a crime scene. Familiarization with the laws and the elements of crime allow CSIs to recognize potential evidence and identify what items to protect, preserve, and collect. It is no different when working in a CBRNE/TIC environment. Investigators need to have an understanding of the WMD statutes and the elements of the crime to aid in the identification of potential evidence. Many CSIs are unaware of the WMD statutes and have little or no training in these laws, the elements of the crime, or the identification of potential evidence in a WMD/TIC crime scene. Again, it is not the purpose of this discussion of the laws to provide in-depth knowledge of each statute, but to provide a brief overview of each law, with an accompanying case when appropriate. This part of the chapter focuses only on the federal statutes. Many states have similar statutes regarding WMDs; therefore, CSIs are encouraged to obtain additional training in their state’s specific laws. Additionally, CSIs should be aware of the potential to use some of their state’s WMD laws, depending on how they are written, on some nonterrorismrelated cases. While the investigative authority for a WMD/CBRNE crime falls to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and will generally be under the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it is important to realize that local and state CSIs will be assisting the FBI if they have the knowledge, training, and equipment that enables them to do so. As such, it is important to have knowledge of the federal statutes. Title 18 USC 2332(a)—Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) This statute defines a WMD and makes it illegal to use, threaten, attempt, or conspire to use one, including any biological agent, toxin, or vector (U.S. House of Representatives 2010). A WMD is defined as follows: • Any explosive or incendiary device as defined in Title 18 USC, Section 921: bomb, grenade, rocket, missile or mine

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• Any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors • Any weapon involving a disease organism • Any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life 18 USC 921 This statute is incorporated into 18 USC 2332(a) and defines a destructive device. “The term destructive device means (A) any explosive, incendiary, or poisonous gas, (i) bomb, (ii) grenade, (iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, (v) mine, or (vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses” (U.S. Congress 2000). The statute makes it illegal to use, threaten, attempt, or conspire to use a weapon of mass destruction, including any biological agent, toxin, or vector. The statute of limitations provides for the indictment/information being initiated within eight years after the offense was committed. As with most federal statutes, any violation of this statute committed in the United States must affect interstate commerce. This act applies extraterritorially when the offense is against a U.S. national while outside the United States or involves property owned, leased, or used by the United States or any agency, or involves a U.S. national who commits the offense outside of the United States. Extraterritorially refers to the ability of the U.S. government to apply this statute or exercise its authority outside the territory of the United States. Punishment for violation of this statute is imprisonment for any term of years or for life, and if death results from the violation, the death penalty applies or imprisonment for any term of years or for life. There are numerous cases involving this statute; those listed below are representative of indictments brought under this section. Case 1: Larry D. Reynolds was involved in an ongoing dispute with his mortgage company, Countrywide Mortgage (Countrywide). Reynolds was delinquent on his mortgage payments and Countrywide was considering foreclosure. He called Countrywide from his office in Des Moines, Iowa, and attempted to access Countrywide’s automated account system to review the status of his loan. Because of his delinquency he was prohibited from using the automated system, and instead he was transferred to a customer service representative. Reynolds yelled into the phone, “I just dumped anthrax in your air conditioner.” The operator immediately contacted security and Countrywide security determined that the threat was not credible and decided not to

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evacuate the building. Reynolds was arrested and charged with threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction in violation of 18 USC § 2332(a). A jury convicted Reynolds and he was sentenced to 51 months in prison. He appealed his conviction, which was later upheld. (United States of America, PlaintiffAppellee v. Larry D. Reynolds, Defendant-Appellant No. 03-41634) Case 2: Frank Paco Guevara, an inmate, sent a letter containing an unknown substance to U.S. District Judge Mary Lou Robinson. An employee who opened the letter discovered that it contained a white, powdery substance that got onto the employee’s fingers. The letter stated, “I am sick and tired of your games. All Americans will die as well as you. You have now been exposed to anthrax.” He signed the letter “Mohammed Abdullah.” The substance was determined to be hair gel. A full response by local police with hazardous material training, the bomb squad, and the FBI followed. Mr. Guevara was charged under this statute and convicted. He appealed his conviction, which was later upheld. (United States of America, Plaintiff Appellee v. Frank Paco Guevara, Defendant-Appellant No. 03-11299). Case 3: On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb on a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam, Netherlands. The bomb was concealed in his underwear and contained pentaerythritol (PETN) and triacetone triperoxide (TATP), both of which are considered high explosives, along with other ingredients (see Figure€3.3). The device failed to

Figure 3.3╇ Explosives sewn into clothing of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. (Source: www.fbi.gov)

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detonate; he was subdued by other passengers and taken into custody upon the successful landing of the aircraft. He was indicated under this section along with others. The indictment states that PETN and TATP are both explosives within the definition in 18 USC 921(a)(4), and the device used fell under the definition of a bomb, also under 18 USC 921(a)â•›(4). These were used to obtain the indictment under 18 USC 2332a (a)(2) and show the incorporation of 18 USC 921 into the Use of a Weapons of Mass Destruction statute.

Note:╇ At the time of the publication of this book, Mr. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab has not yet gone to trial. 18 USC 175— Biological Weapons Antiterrorism (BWAT) Biological weapons are prohibited, and prohibited actions include the following: 1. Knowingly developing, producing, stockpiling, transferring, acquiring, retaining, or possessing any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon 2. Knowingly assisting a foreign state or any organization to do so 3. Attempting, threatening, or conspiring to do the same 4. Knowingly possessing any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system of a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose. Within this statute are definitions of a biological agent, toxin, vector, and delivery system. Punishment for violation of parts 1, 2, and 3 above shall be imprisonment for life or any term of years, while punishment for violation of part 4 above is a fine and imprisonment of not more than ten years, or both. There is a five-year statute of limitations for noncapital offenses, and the statute authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction and allows for an affirmative defense. An affirmative defense is one in which defendants present an excuse or a reason to counter the charges against them even if the facts supporting the indictment are true. There are also numerous cases involving this statute; the ones discussed below are representative of some of these cases. Case: Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr. Ray Mettetal, Jr., a neurologist in Harrisonburg, Virginia, was formerly a neurosurgery resident at Vanderbilt University. His

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goal was to become one of the best neurosurgeons in the country. Dr. George Allen became the chair of the neurosurgery department at Vanderbilt and advised Dr. Mettetal that he lacked the skills and abilities as a neurosurgeon. After completing his residency in neurology, Dr. Mettetal opened his practice in Harrisonburg, VA. Several years later, Dr. Allen operated on then Vice President Al Gore’s mother for a brain tumor and appeared on various television talk shows. Dr. Mettetal, harboring a grudge against Dr. Allen, traveled to Vanderbilt University in disguise wearing a fake beard and wig. He was reported to the Vanderbilt Police Department (PD) as a suspicious person. The Vanderbilt PD later arrested Dr. Mettetal on trespassing and searched a bag in his possession. In the bag the police found, among other things, sketches and information about an automobile, fake tattoos, and a large hypodermic syringe filled with a clear liquid. Additionally, on his person, they found more identification in the name of Steven Ray Maupin. Once Dr. Mettetal was taken into custody, he refused to answer any questions or confirm his true identity. A search warrant was obtained for Dr. Mettetal’s office and residence, at which time not much evidence was located. After reading about Dr. Mettetal’s arrest in the newspaper, the owner of a storage rental business notified authorities that he rented a storage area to Dr. Mettetal under a different name. A search of the storage area by local law enforcement, state police, and the FBI found a powdery substance in a large jar, which was later identified as the toxin ricin. Dr. Mettetal was arrested and convicted under this section, but upon appeal his conviction was overturned. (United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr., aka Steven Ray Maupin, Defendant-Appellant No. 99-4013)

As can be seen from the statutes, there are some basic differences between the WMD statute and the BWAT statute. These are summarized the following table: WMD Statute

BWAT Statute

Requires an interstate nexus No state of mind requirement Deals primarily with the use of a biological agent Statute of Limitations is 8 years

No interstate nexus required Requires knowing state of mind Criminalizes more activities involving a biological agent Statute of Limitations is 5 years

18 USC 229—Prohibited Activities This statute makes it unlawful to knowingly 1. Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, use, or threaten to use any chemical weapon 2. Assist or induce, in any way, any person to violate the above (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate the above (1)

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A chemical weapon is defined as a toxic chemical and its precursors, munitions, or a device designed to cause harm through toxic properties and equipment designed for use in connection with such munitions/devices. Violations of this section are within the jurisdiction of the United States if it takes place in the United States; takes place outside of the United States and is committed by a national of the United States; is committed against a national of the United States while the national is outside the United States; or is committed against any property that is owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any department or agency of the United States, whether the property is within or outside the United States. The penalty for violation of this section is any term of years and may rise to a death penalty case if a death results. An important part of this law is what is not prohibited. The section does not apply to the retention, ownership, possession, transfer, or receipt of a chemical weapon by a department, agency, or other U.S. entity, or an individual who is authorized by law or a nonculpable person who attempts to destroy or seize a chemical weapon. This allows law enforcement and the military to possess the above for any legitimate government purpose, such as evidence. Case: Joseph Daniel Konopka. Dr. Konopka, aka “Dr. Chaos,” was arrested by University of Illinois at Chicago police in a tunnel under the university. He had in his possession about one pound each of sodium cyanide and potassium cyanide. A search of the Chicago Transit Authority tunnels by various law enforcement and other public safety agencies found additional chemicals in an area in the tunnel where he had been living. He had also been setting fires, disrupting radio and television broadcasts, disabling an air traffic control system, selling counterfeit software, and damaging the computer system of an Internet service provider. Joseph Konopka used the name Dr. Chaos on the Internet, hence his nickname. Dr. Chaos was sentenced to 23 years after pleading guilty to two charges under Title 18 USC 229. After being indicted in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on 13 counts covering 53 crimes, Dr. Konopka was convicted and is serving thirteen years in a federal penitentiary. (United States of America, Plaintiff v. Joseph Daniel Konopka, Defendant)

18 USC 831—Prohibited Transactions Involving Nuclear Materials This statute makes it unlawful for any person to 1. Receive, possess, use, transfer, alter, dispose of, or disperse any nuclear material or by-product 2. Knowingly cause the death of or serious bodily injury to any person 3. Cause substantial damage to property or the environment

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4. Take and carry away nuclear material or nuclear by-product material of another without authority 5. Make an unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of nuclear material or nuclear by-product material belonging to another 6. Use fraud and thereby obtain nuclear material or nuclear by-product material belonging to another 7. Knowingly attempt to obtain nuclear material through intimidation or force 8. Knowingly threaten to use or conspire to use nuclear material The statute defines nuclear material and nuclear by-product material, and has jurisdiction for any act committed in the United States, committed by or against a U.S. national or a U.S. corporation, and if the offender is located within the U.S. after committing the offense, even if the act occurred outside the U.S. The penalty for violation of this statute is 20 years, with the death penalty available if a death results from the acts. Case: Stuart Adelmann. Stuart L. Adelmann used the name of Brian Stuart Von€ Adelmann, Ph.D., along with a counterfeit Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license to order sodium-22 and cadmium-109, both radioactive materials. This was the first indictment and prosecution using Title 18 USC 831. After pleading guilty, he was sentenced to five years in federal prison (Figure€3.4). (United States of America, Plaintiff v. Stuart L. Adelmann, Defendant).

Figure 3.4╇ Stuart L. Adelmann. (Source: www.fbi.org)

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18 USC 875—Interstate Communications This statute makes it unlawful to knowingly send any communication through the electronic wires that demands ransom, extorts money, or threatens the property or reputation of the addressee or of another person. Case: Robert William Bozeman. Robert William Bozeman, a merchant seaman, had his documents revoked by the U.S. Coast Guard. He filed an appeal and discussed his appeal with a Coast Guard lieutenant. Bozeman called the Coast Guard commandant in Washington, DC, and twice threatened to kill the lieutenant. In a call to Bozeman’s house, someone identifying himself as Bozeman answered, and after being asked about the Washington phone call his response was, “If that is the only way I can get my documents back╃.╃.╃.╃to kill him, I guess I will have to do it.” Bozeman was convicted under this statute, and appealed his conviction, which was upheld. (United States of America Plaintiff-Appellee v. Robert William Bozemann, Defendant-Appellant)

18 USC 876—Mailing Threatening Communications This statute makes it unlawful to knowingly send any communication through the U.S. mail that demands ransom, extorts money, or threatens the property or reputation of the addressee or of another person. Penalty for violation of this statute is imprisonment for 5 years. Case: Noel Davila. Noel Davila mailed a letter to the Connecticut State Attorney’s Office containing white powder (Figure 3.5). The letter mentioned anthrax and Osama bin Laden. Davila was convicted of a threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction and delivery of a threat through the U.S. mail. He was sentenced to five years in prison for the delivery of a threat through the U.S. mail, and 30 years in prison for the threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction.

Figure 3.5╇ Envelope sent by Davila. (Source: www.fbi.gov)

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18 USC 842(p)—Distribution of Information Relating to Explosives, Destructive Devices, and Weapons of Mass Destruction This statute makes it unlawful for any person 1. To teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction 2. To distribute by any means information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive device or weapon of mass destruction, with the intent that the teaching, demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a federal crime of violence 3. To teach or demonstrate to any person the making or use of an explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction 4. To distribute to any person, by any means, information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive device, or weapon of mass destruction, knowing that such person intends to use the teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a federal crime of violence Case: Mohammad Zaki Amawi. Mohammad Zaki Amawi downloaded a manual on manufacturing explosive chemicals from the Internet onto a computer disc and provided it to another individual for use in training others. He was charged in an indictment of distributing information regarding explosives, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 842 (p)(2)(A), and faces a separate Section 842 (p)(2)(A) charge carried over from the original indictment involving the distribution of a suicide bomb vest video. (United States of America, Plantiff v. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, Wassim I. Mazloijm, Zubair A. Ahmed, and Khaleel Ahmed, Defendants) Case Study: Washington Mutual Bank was placed into receivership in September 2008. As a result of this action, the stock value plummeted to less than a dollar per share. JP Morgan Chase & Company purchased the Washington Mutual assets from Washington Mutual’s holding company, Washington Mutual, Inc., for a small fraction of the value. Four weeks later, Chase Bank, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) offices in eleven states began receiving threatening letters. Sixty-four threat letters were received that contained an unidentified white powder and threats that the person breathing the powder would die in ten days (see Figures 3.6 and 3.7). JP Morgan Chase & Company received a sixty-fifth letter (no powder included); however, the letter writer threatened of “McVeighing” the corporate headquarters within six month—an obvious reference to the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh.

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Figure 3.6╇ One of the letters mailed to Chase, FDIC, and OTS. (Source: www. uspis.gov and www.fbi.gov)

Figure 3.7╇ Envelope containing threatening letter and white powder mailed to Chase Bank. (Source: www.uspis.gov and www.fbi.gov)

Each of the 65 threat letters bore an Amarillo postmark of October 18, 2008. The letters disrupted business operations for Chase, FDIC, and OTS at each location and required the response of law enforcement, CSIs, other emergency responders, and hazardous materials response teams. Richard Goyette was subsequently convicted in Federal Court in northern Texas for the crimes and received a four-year sentence. He was also ordered to pay $87,734 in restitution for the costs related to the disruption of services and law enforcement investigations of the sixty-five letters. (United States of America, Plaintiff v. Richard Leon Goyette, Defendant)

CSIs are not exempt from the hazardous materials response laws, regulations, and standards. The Hazwoper regulations must be followed. It is also recommended that other standards, such as those established by the National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA), be followed to provide for best practices and ensure the safety of CSIs processing crime scenes involving CBRNE/ TICs or other hazardous materials. In addition, CSIs have to be aware of the criminal statutes and the four components that constitute a WMD along with the elements of each statute in order to recognize, identify, protect, and properly collect and process physical evidence from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene.

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References Daley, M. P. (2002). “Rescue Operations for Trench Collapse—Part 1.” Firehouse Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.firehouse.com/topics/rescue-and-specialops/rescue-operations-trench-collapse-part-1. Shaw, W. A. (Ed.). (2010). OSHA Compliance Manual. Neenah: J.J. Keller & Associates, Inc. Trebisacci, D. G. (Ed.). (2008). Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Handbook (Fifth ed.). Quincy: National Fire Protection Association. United States Department of Justice (2002). WMD Cases, Noel Davila. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Washington: DC. Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/ wmd/wmd_cases.htm#Davila. United States Department of Justice (1996). WMD Cases, Stuart Adelmann. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington: DC. Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/ hq/nsb/wmd/wmd_cases.htm#Adelmann. United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2009). CAA 112(r)—Frequent Questions Emergency Management. Washington: DC. Retrieved from http:// www.epa.gov/oem/content/rmp/caa_faqs.htm. United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2010). CERCLA Overview Superfund. Washington: DC. Retrieved from http://www.epa.gov/superfund/ policy/cercla.htm. United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2009). EPCRA Overview Emergency Management. Retrieved from http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/lawsregs/ epcraover.htm. United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2010). Hazardous Material Transportation Act Emergency Management. Retrieved from http://www.epa. gov/oem/content/lawsregs/hmtaover.htm. United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2009). Oil Pollution Act Overview Emergency Management. Retrieved from http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/ lawsregs/opaover.htm. United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2009). SARA Overview Laws, Policy and Guidance Superfund. Retrieved from http://www.epa.gov/superfund/ policy/sara.htm. United States Department of Labor (2002). Excavations. Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Washington: DC. Retrieved from http://www.osha.gov/ Publications/OSHA2226/2226.html. United States Department of Labor (2003). A Dangerous Worksite: The World Trade Center. Washington, D.C.: Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Washington: DC. Retrieved from http://www.osha.gov/Publications/dangerous_worksite.pdf. United States Department of Labor (2003). OSHA: Employee Workplace Rights. Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Washington: DC. Retrieved from http://www.osha.gov/Publications/3021.html. United States Department of Labor (2010). State Occupational Safety and Health Plans. Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Washington: DC. Retrieved from http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/index.html.

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United States Department of Transportation. (2006). Transporting Infectious Substances Safely. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation Retrieved from http://www.hercenter.org/regsandstandards/Transporting_ Infectious_Substances_Safely.pdf. United States House of Representatives Downloadable U.S. Code. (2010). Retrieved from http://uscode.house.gov/download/title_18.shtml.

Court Documents Grand Jury—U.S. District Court, Eastern Division of Michigan, Southern Division. (2010). Indictment of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. Retrieved from http://www. detroit.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/de010610.htm. United States of America Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert William BOZEMAN, DefendantAppellant, No. 74-1021 (United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. 1974). Retrieved from http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/495/495.F2d.508.html. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Ray Wallace Mettetal, Jr. aka Steven Ray Maupin, Defendant-Appellant, No. 99-4013 (United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 2000). Retrieved from http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion. pdf/994013.U.pdf. United States of America v. Larry D. Reynolds, No. 03-41634 (United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 2004). Retrieved from http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/ opinions/pub/03/03-41634-CR0.wpd.pdf. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frank Paco Guevara, DefendantAppellant, No. 03-11299 (United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 2005). Retrieved from http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/408/408.F3d.252.0311299.html. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph D. Konopka, Defendant-appellant (United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit 2005). Retrieved from http:// cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F3/409/. United States of America v. Richard Leon Goyette, also known as Michael Jurek, No. 2:09-MJ-04 (United States District Court For The Northern District of Texas/ Amarillo Division 2009). Retrieved from http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/img/02-09/0203goyettecomplaint.pdf. United States of America v. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, and Wassim I. Mazloum, Defendants (United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Western Division). Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/ opa/documents/indictment_22006.pdf.

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4

The Protection

Crime scene investigators may find themselves in a unique situation not shared by other agencies and responders. If terrorists or other criminals use a CBRNE/TIC agent, CSIs will be conducting crime scene investigations in a hazardous environment. They will be processing the scene in a potentially contaminated environment and may be collecting and handling evidence that is hazardous or contaminated by the CBRNE/TIC agents. Combining forensic investigation standards as required by the courts along with hazardous material incident operating practices required by federal law results in the need for specific training, protocols, and equipment to allow the safe, efficient, and effective processing of the contaminated crime scene. Failure to follow and take proper precautions may result in cross-contamination of evidence and/or result in injury or death to the crime scene investigator. Therefore CSIs must understand the following: • The use of personal protective equipment (PPE) is vital to the safety of the crime scene investigator and the successful and proper processing of the scene. • Personal protective equipment is designed to protect the CSI from the hazards presented by working in a potentially contaminated environment. • The hazards presented by working in potentially contaminated environments and collecting contaminated evidence. • The types of PPE. • The selection of the proper PPE. • The effects and limits of wearing PPE. • The proper donning (putting on) and doffing (taking off) of PPE.

Definitions The definitions and acronyms associated with working safely in a hazardous environment may be confusing to CSIs as they begin the training process that will allow them to safely work in a hazardous environment. Additionally, the meaning or interpretation of some acronyms may vary slightly. Therefore, the following National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 472 definitions will be used throughout this book regarding personal protection: 49

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PPE

RP + CPC

Figure 4.1╇ Personal protective equipment equation.

PPE (personal protective equipment)—Consists of the equipment provided to shield or isolate a person from the chemical, physical, and thermal hazards that can be encountered at hazardous materials/ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents CPC (chemical protective clothing)—Items made from chemical-resistive materials, such as clothing, hood, boots, and gloves, that are designed and configured to protect the wearer’s torso, head, arms, legs, hands, and feet from hazardous materials RP (respiratory protection)—Equipment designed to protect the wearer from the inhalation of contaminants. The acronym PPE integrates these definitions to mean the total ensemble the crime scene investigator will wear to protect their respiratory system (RP) and their body (CPC) from the hazardous materials. Additionally, combining respiratory protection (RP) with chemical protective clothing (CPC) is personal protective equipment (PPE).

Hazards Every crime scene to which a CSI responds is unique in the hazards present and the potential harm to the investigator. Some of these are body substances, sharps such as needles, etc., light sources such as lasers and alternate light sources, and other hazards. The type of hazards and the potential harm to the CSI are compounded when responding to a crime scene involving a CBRNE or TIC. One commonly used system for classifying and remembering the hazards at a hazardous material incident, which is also applicable to a contaminated crime scene, is the use of the mnemonic TRACEMP. The subdivisions of the TRACEMP classification are as follows: Thermal—Thermal harm includes both hot and cold and results from exposure to extremes in temperature on both ends of the temperature scale. An incendiary or explosive may produce a significant hot thermal hazard, while exposure to a cryogenic material such as liquid oxygen may produce a significant cold thermal hazard to include

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frostbite and cold thermal burn. Additionally, cryogens can freeze human tissue on contact. Cryogenic liquids are refrigerated, liquefied gases that have a boiling point colder than –130°F (–90°C) at a pressure of one atmosphere (14.7€ psi) absolute. (Source: 49 CFR.) Thermal harm, in addition to occurring from the specific hazard, may also occur from the stress of working in PPE. This will be covered later in this section. Radiation—Radiation harm includes both ionizing and non-ionizing radiation. Ionizing radiation is energy that has sufficient force to remove electrons (ionize) from atoms. It may be in the form of waves or particles. This ability to remove electrons may cause damage on the cellular level and affect the entire body. Ionizing radiation types include alpha (α), beta (β), gamma (γ), neutron, and x-ray. Gamma, neutron, and x-ray are in the form of energy. Alpha and β are particles. Non-ionizing radiation does not have sufficient force or energy to remove electrons. Examples of non-ionizing radiation include microwave, infrared, radio, radar, etc. The primary hazard of non-ionizing radiation is the damage potentially caused to tissues if exposed to high levels. For example, exposure to ultraviolet light (UV) may result in a “sunburn” and has been known to cause certain types of skin cancer. Asphyxiation—Asphyxiation harm occurs as the result of lack of oxygen. Asphyxiation is divided into two types: simple and chemical. Simple asphyxiation occurs when the oxygen concentration in the environment is reduced to a level that is too low for the normal requirements of the body. This is usually caused by inert gases, called simple asphyxiants, which displace the oxygen in the environment and lower the oxygen concentration in the environment. Examples of simple asphyxiants include nitrogen and carbon dioxide, among others. Chemical asphyxiation occurs when the flow of oxygen to the blood or tissues is interrupted, thus preventing proper oxygenation of the cells and tissues. Chemical asphyxiants, also called blood poisons, include carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen sulfide, etc. Chemical asphyxiants interrupt the flow of oxygen to the blood or tissues in one of the following three ways: −â‹™ React more readily than oxygen with the blood—Carbon monoxide (CO), for example, has a greater affinity for hemoglobin than oxygen. The hemoglobin then bonds to the carbon monox-

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ide instead of the oxygen and transports the carbon monoxide to the cells, resulting in oxygen starvation and death to the cells. −â‹™ Liberate the hemoglobin from the red blood cells—Hydrazine is an example of one such chemical. It liberates the hemoglobin from the red blood cells, leaving a lack of transportation for the oxygen. The result is cellular oxygen starvation. −â‹™ Cause a malfunction in the red blood cells—Benzene and toluene cause such a malfunction in the ability of the red blood cells to carry oxygen, thereby resulting in lack of oxygen at the cellular level. Regardless of the way a chemical asphyxiant works, the cells of the body are starved for oxygen despite enough oxygen being available in the environment. Chemical—Chemical harm results from exposure to toxic (poisons) and corrosive materials. Both corrosive materials and toxic materials can exist as solids, liquids, or gases. • Toxic materials cause harm depending on the time the responder is exposed to them and the concentration of the material. Exposure to toxic materials may be either acute or chronic. Nerve agents are an example of a material that is extremely toxic. • Corrosive materials are materials that cause full thickness destruction of human skin at the point of contact within a set period of time. In addition, a corrosive is also a material that has a severe corrosion rate on steel or aluminum based on certain criteria (Source: 49 CFR). Examples of corrosives include sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid (muriatic acid), sodium hydroxide, etc. Etiological—Etiological materials cause harm as the result of an exposure to microorganisms or toxins that may cause disease in humans. Biological agents such as anthrax and numerous others are examples of etiological agents. Mechanical—Mechanical harm is one of the most common types of harm encountered in a hazardous material–contaminated crime scene and is the type of harm most often overlooked. It results from contact with mechanical or physical hazards. The types of physical harm include the following: • Trips and falls—Crime scene investigators working in PPE have the additional hazards of working in the PPE as described later on in this chapter. As a result of the additional weight, reduced vision, and bulkiness of the PPE and other stressors, CSIs are susceptible to trips and falls especially when walking up and down steps, walking on uneven surfaces, and working on ladders. • Projectiles and shrapnel—Crime scene investigators may be working in environments that have sharp projectiles or shrapnel, which

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may cause harm in the form of lacerations, abrasions, and punctures directly to the investigator. In addition, the projectiles and shrapnel may damage the PPE worn by the investigator, resulting in exposure to the hazardous materials in the crime scene. Psychological—Psychological hazards and harm may be caused by many factors. One such factor is working in PPE. PPE produces many stressors and may exacerbate feelings of claustrophobia. Additionally, CSIs may be faced with mass causalities, which could include numerous children, and possible causalities among the first responders. CSIs may fear for their own lives, the lives of their colleagues, and their family’s safety.

Respiratory Protection Respiratory protection prevents the inhalation of hazardous vapors, fumes, dusts, particles, and other materials into the lungs. Therefore, the CSI must have total respiratory protection while processing a crime scene involving CBRNE/TIC materials. There are three types of respirators that allow a crime scene investigator to work in the contaminated atmosphere without being exposed the contaminants in the atmosphere. These are the air purifying respirator (APR), self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and supplied air respirator (SAR). Air-Purifying Respirator (APR) Air-purifying respirators remove contaminants from inhaled air by pulling the air through a filter cartridge or canister. The filter removes the harmful substances and allows the wearer to breathe clean air within the limits of the respirator and the filter. Air-purifying respirators may either be negative pressure respirators or positive pressure respirators depending on their design and configuration. Negative Pressure APR Air is drawn through the filter(s) as the wearer inhales. This creates a negative pressure inside the facepiece, which allows air to be drawn through the filter, be filtered, and the clean air to be drawn into the facepiece. When the wearer exhales, the air is exhausted through a separate exhalation valve in the facepiece. Air-purifying respirators can be either a half face mask or a full face mask. Note:╇ Figures€4.2 through 4.4 showing respiratory protection equipment are representative of each type. Various manufacturers may have different configurations from that shown below.

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Figure 4.2╇ N particulate respirator. Table€4.1╅ NIOSH Particulate Filter Table Class

Description

N95 N99 N100 R95 P95 P99 P100

Filters at least 95% of airborne particles. Not resistant to oil. Filters at least 99% of airborne particles. Not resistant to oil. Filters at least 99.97% of airborne particles. Not resistant to oil. Filters at least 95% of airborne particles. Somewhat resistant to oil. Filters at least 95% of airborne particles. Strongly resistant to oil. Filters at least 99% of airborne particles. Strongly resistant to oil. Filters at least 99.97% of airborne particles. Strongly resistant to oil.

Source: NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health), www.cdc.gov/niosh

Particulate respirators are used for protection from particles such as wood dust, pollen, certain biologicals, and other substances (See Figure 4.2). This type of air-purifying respirator protects by filtering particles out of the air that the user is breathing. Particulate respirators are described by the percentage of airborne particles they will filter out and whether or not they are resistant to oil. Ninety-five percent is the minimal level of filtration that will be approved by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The N, R, and P designations refer to the filter’s oil resistance as described in Table€4.1. The type of half facepiece respirator shown in Figure 4.3 is generally made of silicone rubber for increased durability and comfort and can accommodate many different cartridges and filters. The filters and cartridges may be particulate-only filters such as described in the previous paragraph, or they may be combination cartridges that combine a particulate filter with an organic vapor or other chemical type cartridge.

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Figure 4.3╇ Half facepiece respirator.

Figure 4.4╇ Full facepiece air-purifying respirator.

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Full facepiece air-purifying respirators work on the same principle as the half-mask respirators described above. As shown in Figure€ 4.4, the facepiece extends around the entire face, covering the eyes, nose, chin, and mouth, thereby providing a better seal than the half facepiece respirators while protecting the eyes and face. The filters and cartridges may be particulate-only filters such as those described above, or they may be combination cartridges that combine a particulate filter with an organic vapor or other chemical type cartridge. Positive Pressure Air Purifying Respirators (PAPRs) A battery-powered blower pulls the air in through the filters and blows the filtered air through a breathing tube into the facepiece. The filtered airflow is continuous and therefore considered positive pressure since the blower forces air into the facepiece. These are usually known as powered air-purifying respirators or PAPRs (see Figure 4.5). PAPRs reduce the difficulty in breathing found in the negative pressure air-purifying respirators. Additionally, because of the positive pressure inside the facepiece, any breach in the seal of between the facepiece and the wearer will result in air escaping out of the facepiece. The positive pressure escape of air may prevent atmospheric contaminants from entering the facepiece through the seal leak. Should the blower unit malfunction and not draw air through the filters, the unit reverts to an air-purifying respirator providing the wearer with respiratory protection. An oxygen-deficient atmosphere is an atmosphere with an oxygen content below 19.5% by volume. (Source: OSHA 1910.134(b).)

Figure 4.5╇ Powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR).

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The following OSHA regulations apply when using an air-purifying respirator or a powered air-purifying respirator: • Air-purifying respirators (APRs) and powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) provide no oxygen and cannot be used in an oxygendeficient atmosphere. • Cartridges and filters used in APRs and PAPRs are used specifically for chemical absorption/adsorption, particulate, or a combination of both. Since they are specific and offer limited protection, APRs and PAPRs can only be used in atmospheres in which the level of contamination is known. Additionally, the cartridge must be appropriate for the contaminant. • Filters and cartridges have a limited service life and their ability to filter the contaminants decreases during use. The contaminants in the atmosphere in which an APR or PAPR will be used must therefore have good warning properties to allow the wearer to recognize when the cartridge is nearing the end of its service life. Distinct warning properties include odor, taste, or irritant effects at levels below OSHA permissible exposure limits (PELs). • APRs and PAPRs cannot be used in immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) atmospheres. Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) means an atmosphere that poses an immediate threat to life, would cause irreversible adverse health effects, or would impair an individual’s ability to escape from a dangerous atmosphere. (Source: OSHA 1910.134(b).) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) OSHA 1910.134(b) defines this equipment as an atmosphere-supplying respirator for which the breathing air source is contained within a portable compressed gas cylinder that is designed to be carried by the user (see Figure 4.6). When used properly, SCBAs provide the highest level of respiratory protection and must be used in oxygen-deficient atmospheres or under IDLH conditions. CSIs will be protected against breathing potential hazardous materials or CBRNE/TIC agents in the environment by the SCBA supplying air on demand from an air cylinder carried on the back of the CSIs. SCBAs may be either open circuit or closed circuit. Closed circuit SCBAs do not release the exhaled air into the environment, but instead recirculate the exhaled air by removing the moisture and carbon dioxide, replenishing it with oxygen within a closed system, and returning it to the user. The major advantage of the closed circuit SCBA is that it allows a crime scene investigator to operate

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Figure 4.6╇ Self-contained breathing apparatus.

in a hazardous environment for a longer period of time. The main disadvantage of the closed circuit SCBA is the generation of heat and humidity. The open circuit SCBA stores air in a cylinder under high pressure, and passes the air through a series of regulators to reduce the air pressure to a useable pressure and sends the air to the facepiece to be breathed by the wearer. The breathed air is then released into the environment through an exhalation valve in the facepiece. Open circuit SCBAs are more common than closed circuit SCBAs and will be discussed further. Cylinders are typically rated on supplying 30, 45, or 60 minutes of air; however, the actual time will vary depending on the physical condition of the wearer, required work load, temperature, etc. SCBAs usually weigh between 25 and 35 pounds depending on the manufacturer, model, and cylinder capacity. SCBAs typically have a cylinder pressure of 2200 psi to 4500 psi with 4500-psi cylinders replacing the 2200-psi cylinders in many instances. The cylinders are constructed of steel, aluminum, or a carbon-fiber composite. The carbon-fiber composite-wrapped cylinders are the lightest in weight and are recommended for use by CSIs. Composite cylinders must be hydrostatically tested ever three years, with select types tested every five years, and must be replaced every 15 years. Hydrostatic testing is a method used to pressure test the critical components (cylinder, shell, hose assembly, etc.) for leaks and structural flaws by pressurizing them with a liquid. (Source: OSHA 1910.157.)

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Supplied Air Respirator This type of respirator uses air supplied from a compressor or large cylinder and delivers it to the user through a supply hose connected to the facepiece. Although it is lighter and provides a longer duration of work time than an SCBA, it is limited to 300 feet of hose, thereby restricting the mobility of the user.

Chemical Protective Clothing (CPC) Protecting CSIs from CBRNE/TIC agents will require the use of both respiratory protective and dermal protective equipment. Chemical protective clothing (CPC) includes a suit, boots, and gloves. CPC is divided into two categories: limited-use clothing and reusable clothing. As the name implies, reusable clothing is designed and manufactured for proper decontamination to be used again. Reusable clothing is not recommended for use by CSIs due to the issue of the proper decontamination of the clothing, which could be attacked by defense attorneys. Limited use clothing, sometimes called single use garments, is designed and manufactured for one-time use and is properly disposed of after use. Selection of the proper CPC depends on several factors including the hazards anticipated at the scene, the chemical resistance of the suit material, and the level of protection required. Technical information from the manufacturer should be consulted when evaluating chemical compatibility. CPC may be constructed as a single-piece garment or a multi-piece garment. CSIs must be familiar with the three ways CBRNE/TIC agents can affect CPC. They are penetration, permeation, and degradation. Penetration is the movement of chemicals through zippers, seams, or imperfections in a protective clothing material.€ It may also occur due to physical damage to the suit such as abrasions, punctures, pinholes, an improperly fitted suit, and normal wear and tear. Permeation is the process by which a chemical dissolves in or moves through a material on a molecular basis. This occurs as a three-step process. The first step is the adsorption of the chemical molecules at the outer surface of the material. In the second step, the chemical molecules diffuse through the suit material, and then desorb in the third step on the inner surface of the suit. In most cases, permeation cannot be seen and there will be no visible evidence of chemicals permeating the material. Permeation is measured by breakthrough time and permeation rate. Breakthrough time is the time it takes from the initial contact of the chemical on the outside surface of the

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CPC to the first detection of the chemical on the inside surface of the CPC. This is usually expressed in hours or minutes. Permeation rate is the amount of chemical passing through a given area of CPC in a unit of time. It is generally expressed as micrograms per square centimeter per minute or µg/cm2/min. The higher the permeation rate the faster the chemical passes through the material. Permeation rates can be impacted by several factors such as chemical concentration, material thickness, humidity, temperature, and pressure. For example, the breakthrough time can be decreased by a small increase in temperature. Degradation occurs when there is a physical, harmful change in the material of the CPC. These changes can be caused by a chemical exposure, regular use, or ambient conditions. Discoloration, bubbling, cracking, and soft or sticky suit material are signs of degradation. As previously mentioned, CPE + RP = PPE. The total clothing ensemble that will be worn by a CSI in a CBRNE/TIC environment must include the decision to employ CPC as well as respiratory protection. These are classified into four different levels of protection and are defined in 29 CFR 1920.120—Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response. Level A Level A provides the highest available level of respiratory, skin, and eye protection from solid, liquid, and gaseous chemicals. When the chemical(s) have been identified and present a high level of hazard to the respiratory system, skin, and eyes, level A protection is required (Figure 4.7). According to 49 CFR 1910.120 on the enclosed CD, the following items comprise level A equipment: 1. Positive pressure, full facepiece, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) 2. Totally encapsulating chemical-protective suit 3. Gloves, inner, chemical resistant 4. Gloves, outer, chemical resistant 5. Boots, chemical resistant, steel toe and shank 6. Communications—two-way radio 7. Coveralls (optional) 8. Long underwear (optional) 9. Hardhat (under suit) (optional) 10. Cooling system (optional) 11. Disposable protective suit, gloves, and boots (depending on suit construction, may be worn over totally encapsulating suit)

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Figure 4.7╇ Level A—fully encapsulated chemical-protective suit.

Level B Level B provides the highest level of respiratory protection, but less skin protection. It provides liquid splash protection, but no protection against chemical vapors or gases and is used when the chemical(s) have been identified but does not require a high level of skin protection. Level B is primarily for liquid/splash protection (see Figure 4.8). According to 49 CFR 1910.120 on the CD, the following comprise level€B equipment: 1. Positive pressure, full-facepiece, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)

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2. Hooded chemical-resistant clothing (overalls and long-sleeved jacket; coveralls; one- or two-piece chemical-splash suit; disposable chemical-resistant overalls) 3. Gloves, outer, chemical resistant 4. Gloves, inner, chemical resistant 5. Boots, outer, chemical-resistant steel toe and shank 6. Communications—two-way radio 7. Coveralls (optional) 8. Boot covers, outer, chemical resistant (disposable) (optional) 9. Hardhat (optional) 10. Face shield (optional) Note:╇ Level B–type clothing may be encapsulating and appear to be level A, but the suit is not vapor tight and therefore meets level B standards.

Figure 4.8╇ Level B—chemical protective clothing with SCBA.

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Level C When the types and concentration of the airborne substances are known, all the criteria for using air-purifying respirators and powered air-purifying respirators are met, and atmospheric contaminants, liquid splashes, or other direct contact will not adversely affect or be absorbed through any exposed skin, level C is appropriate. This level, when suitable, is recommended for CSIs processing a crime scene involving CBRNE/TIC environments. Powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs), as previously mentioned in the respiratory equipment section, allow CSIs to work in hazardous environments with the respirators pulling air through the filters and providing positive pressure into the full facepiece (see Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9╇ Level C—chemical-protective clothing with powered air-purifying

respirator.

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According to 49 CFR 1910.120 on the CD, the following comprise level€C equipment: 1. Full-face or half-mask air-purifying respirators (NIOSH approved) 2. Hooded chemical-resistant clothing (overalls; two-piece chemicalsplash suit; disposable chemical-resistant overalls) 3. Gloves, outer, chemical resistant 4. Gloves, inner, chemical resistant 5. Boots (outer), chemical-resistant steel toe and shank (optional as appropriate) 6. Boot covers, outer, chemical resistant (disposable) (optional as appropriate) 7. Coveralls (optional as appropriate) 8. Hardhat (optional as appropriate) 9. Two-way radio Level D Level D may be used when the atmosphere contains no known hazard and work functions preclude splashes, immersion, or the potential for unexpected inhalation of or contact with hazardous levels of any chemicals. This is basically a work uniform affording minimal protection and used for nuisance contamination only (see Figure 4.10). According to 49 CFR 1910.120 on the CD, the following comprise level€D equipment:

1. Coveralls 2. Gloves (optional as applicable) 3. Boots/shoes, chemical-resistant steel toe and shank 4. Boots, outer, chemical resistant and disposable (optional as applicable) 5. Safety glasses or chemical splash goggles (optional as applicable) 6. Hardhat (optional as applicable) 7. Face shield (optional as applicable) 8. Two-way radio Combinations of personal protective equipment other than those described for levels A, B, C, and D protection may be more appropriate and may be used to provide the proper level of protection.

When choosing PPE the following items need to be considered after assessing the crime scene, site hazards, and risks that may be present:

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Figure 4.10╇ Level D—minimal protection.

1. Chemical compatibility—Is the suit material compatible with the chemical environment and does it provide good chemical resistance? Always consult the manufacturer’s permeation guide for the particular suit and suit material prior to use in a hazardous environment. 2. Task assignment and work level—What are the objectives for the entry and how much effort are the team members going to expend. Is it hard, physical type labor? 3. What is the ambient temperature—Working in PPE often produces heat stress, which will be covered later in this chapter.

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4. What are the physical conditions and experience levels of the CSIs working in PPE? 5. What is the time in the exclusion zone and the time required to pass through the contamination reduction zone? 6. What is the route of entry into the crime scene and the exit out of the crime scene as well as intended movement within the crime scene? There is no one type of chemical protective clothing or PPE that will protect the CSI from all hazards. After choosing the correct level of PPE and before using the PPE, CSIs should inspect both the respiratory protective equipment and the chemical protective clothing. The manufacturers’ instructions along with the agency’s protocols for inspecting the PPE should always be followed. If any defects or damage is found during the inspection, do not use the defective piece of equipment and immediately remove it from service. Donning (putting on) PPE procedures is specific for the manufacturer and the level of PPE. It is recommended that the buddy system or a helper be utilized when donning the PPE. This will ensure the proper wearing of the PPE and provide an inspection after the PPE is donned as a final check for any issues prior to entering the contaminated crime scene. Note:╇ Taping of PPE is agency specific. Taping does not provide a liquid- or vapor-tight seal but should be used only to hold a particular piece of PPE in place. ChemTape® is used to tape gloves, boots, etc., to chemical protective clothing. It has been designed and tested with a special adhesive for use on CPC. If used, a tab should be placed on the end of the tape to make it easier to remove. Duct tape should not be used for taping in place of ChemTape® (see Figure 4.11).

Figure 4.11╇ Use ChemTape®, not duct tape, when working in PPE gear.

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Physical Impacts of PPE on CSIs CSIs working in PPE will experience several potential issues working in the gear. Following are some of the issues: 1. Vision—Depending on the level of PPE, vision may be obscured. Working while wearing a full facepiece will decrease the CSI’s peripheral vision as well as the up and down vision. This may result in trips and falls, and may make it more difficult to recognize and collect potential evidence. Couples with the potential for the facepiece to fog up and severe vision problems may result. Note:╇ CSIs who wear glasses to see will be required to have a spectacle kit with their prescription lenses placed inside the facepiece to allow a proper seal of the facepiece. 2. Movement—PPE reduces mobility and dexterity. CSIs will always be wearing at least two layers of gloves plus an additional set of gloves over the outer layer of gloves, resulting in three gloves being worn while processing the contaminated crime scene. Obviously, tactile sensation and manipulative skills will be reduced. 3. Communications—Communicating in PPE is difficult, as the facepiece will muffle the sound of the person who is talking. In addition, if wearing an SCBA, both talking and hearing will be compromised as a result of both the muffling of sound by the facepiece and the SCBA noise. As a result, CSIs will have to rely on hand signals. Radios using hands-free technology and earpieces specifically designed to be used in a contaminated environment may be used. Voicemitters or voice amplifiers, designed to project the wearer’s voice to enable better communication, may also be used. 4. Heat stress—Heat stress is one of the most common and most important hazards CSIs may face while working in PPE. As stated above, working in PPE places physical stress on the CSI that may be exacerbated by the ambient temperature. CSIs need to be aware of the signs and symptoms of heat stress. A. Heat rash is irritation of the skin caused by excessive sweating, especially during hot and humid weather. Heat rash usually does not require medical attention and will resolve itself in a cooler environment. B. Heat cramps are muscle cramps usually caused by excessive sweating and dehydration. They usually occur in the calves, arms, and back, but may occur in any muscle group. CSIs experiencing heat cramps should exit the crime scene, cool down, and drink a

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sports-type beverage. Heat cramps may also be a symptom of heat exhaustion. C. Heat exhaustion occurs when sweating is not enough to keep the body cool and the body overheats. The signs and symptoms may include the following: 1) Pale, cool, clammy skin 2) Excessive sweating 3) Nausea and vomiting 4) Dizziness 5) Fainting 6) Muscle cramps The treatment for heat exhaustion is to remove the victim from the hot environment and cool the victim down, providing a sports-type drink to replace lost electrolytes. If symptoms persist or worsen, seek medical attention. If heat exhaustion is not treated, it may progress to heat stroke, which is a potentially life-threatening medical emergency.

D. Heat stroke is the most serious form of heat stress. It is a true medical emergency resulting from the failure of the temperature regulation mechanisms of the body, which causes a critical rise in body temperature generally above 104°F. The signs and symptoms of heat stoke include 1) Changes in mental state ranging from confusion to personality changes 2) Hot, red skin, sometimes dry 3) Tachycardia—rapid heart beat 4) Rapid and shallow breathing 5) Coma Treatment for heat stroke involves removing the victim from the hot environment and cooling the victim with damp cloths or a fan. Immediately obtain emergency medical help. Note:╇ Certain illnesses and medications may increase the CSI’s susceptibility to heat stress. 5. Cold stress—CSIs may have to work in a contaminated environment when the temperature is low. Additionally, weather conditions such as wind and rain may increase the potential for cold injury. A. Hypothermia occurs when the victim loses heat faster than it can be produced, resulting in a decrease in the core body temperature. Signs and symptoms of hypothermia include the following:

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1) Shivering 2) Slurred speech 3) Confusion 4) Slow, weak pulse 5) Shallow breathing 6) Apathy Treatment of hypothermia includes removing the victim from the cold environment, removing any wet clothing, and covering the victim with warm blankets. In addition, immediately obtain emergency medical help. Prevention of both heat and cold stress is extremely important to avert serious injuries and allow CSIs to work safely, effectively, and efficiently to process the crime scene. Work schedules may have to be modified to allow for rest and rehabilitation periods. Personnel may have to be rotated to minimize heat or cold stress. Employees should provide personal protective equipment that will help protect the body from heat or cold. For example, cool vests may be worn under the PPE in an attempt to help keep the body cool (Figure€ 4.12). While there is controversy on the effectiveness of these vests, the newer phase-change-type vests work better than the older type. These vests typically cool a person through conduction by transferring the heat generated by the body to the phase-change material. According to the firstlinetech.com Web site, the PhaseCore elements are made of sodium sulfate and have an activation point of 82.4°F (28°C) or 89.6°F (32°C) depending on the model. When the body temperature rises above this point, the elements begin to absorb body heat.

Figure 4.12╇ An example of a phase-change material (PCM).

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Additionally, CSIs should recognize and identify the signs and symptoms of heat and cold stress and maintain an optimal level of physical fitness. After decontamination, CSIs will doff (take off) their PPE. Like donning procedures, doffing procedures are specific for each manufacturer and type of PPE. The facepiece and inner gloves are the last pieces of PPE to be removed. CSIs must understand the types of harm and hazards at a CBRNE/TIC crime scene, assess the scene, and pick the correct respiratory protection and chemical protective clothing that will enable them to safely, effectively, and efficiently process the contaminated crime scene.

References http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/topics/respirators/disp_part/default.html. http://www.osha.gov/dts/osta/otm/otm_viii/otm_viii_1.html. National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT). (2007). Advanced Forensic Investigations for Hazardous Environments. Louisiana State University (LSU). Baton Rouge. National Instute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2009). Recommendations for the Selection and Use of Respirators and Protective Clothing for Protection Against Biolobical Agents. Pittsburg: NIOSH. Retrieved from www.cdc.gov/ niosh/nppt/default.html. Noll, G., Hildebrand, M. & Yvorra J. (2005). Hazardous Materials: Managing The Incident (3rd ed.). Chester: Red Hat Publishing Company. Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). (1997 (Revised)). Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response. Washington, D.C.: OSHA. Retrieved from http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3114/osha3114.html. Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). (2009). Assigned Protection Factors for the Revised Respiratory Protection Standard. Washington, D.C.: OSHA. Retrieved from http://www.osha.gov/Publications/3352-APF-respirators.html. Shaw, W. A. (Ed.). (2010). OSHA Compliance Manual. Neenah: J.J. Keller & Associates, Inc. Trebisacci, D. (Ed.). (2008). Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Handbook (5th ed.). Quincy: National Fire Protection Association. United States Department of Justice (DOJ). (2002). Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First Responders, Volume I. Washington, D.C.: NIJ. Retrieved from http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/191160.pdf. United States Department of Justice. (2002). Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First Responders (Percutaneous Protection—Apparel), (Vol. IIc, pp. 207). Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. Retrieved from http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/191521.pdf. United States Department of Justice. (2002). Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First Responders (Percutaneous Protection— Garments); NIJ Guide 102-00, Volume IIb. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. Retrieved from http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/191520.pdf.

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United States Department of Justice. (2002). Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First Responders (Respiratory Protection); Volume IIa. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice Retrieved from http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/191519.pdf. United States Department of Labor. (2009). The Difference Between Respirators and Surgical Masks (Video). Retrieved from http://www.osha.gov/sltc/ respiratoryprotection/index. United States Department of Labor. (2009). Respirator Safety. Donning (Putting on) and Doffing (Taking off) and User Seal Checks (Video). Retrieved from http:// www.osha.gov/sltc/respiratoryprotection/index. United States Department of Health and Human Services. (2008). Guidance on Emergency Responder PPE for Response to CBRN Terrorism Incidents. Washington, D.C.: NIOSH. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2008-132/ pdfs/2008-132.pdf.

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5

The Differences

CSIs will have to make some dramatic changes in the ways they conduct crime scene investigations involving environments contaminated by CBRNE/TIC agents. This chapter discusses the many paradigm shifts to which CSIs must adapt when they move into a hazardous environment to process a crime scene. Most notably is the fact that they have been trained not to introduce any contamination into the scene, but now they must realize that the scene has already been contaminated, and it is up to them to reduce the possibility of cross-contamination as well as make it a priority to keep themselves and others safe from the harmful effects of CBRNE/TIC agents. Another of the many differences from conventional crime scenes is that crime scenes in hazardous environments are most assuredly going to be altered by other emergency responders before the CSIs can conduct their crime scene investigation. In traditional crime scene responses, the area is cordoned off and secured until the CSI arrives to take control of the scene. A CBRNE/TIC incident, however, has four phases and the CSI’s role is moved into the third phase. After the tactical operations team has secured the site, the operation moves into phase two—the operational phase. Public safety is the priority in this phase. Multiple entries may have been made to the primary area by the public safety sampling team (PSST) before the response moves into the investigative stage. Oftentimes major alterations to the scene may have been made prior to the CSI’s arrival. This alteration of the scene is not just the physical appearance or aspects of the scene, but in fact alterations to the CBRNE/TIC evidence and its associated forensic evidence. The samples gathered by the PSST are not for criminal evidence purposes. They are taken to the appropriate public safety laboratory for analysis. These public safety labs are not to be confused with law enforcement forensic laboratories. The public safety labs will conduct confirmatory analyses to identify suspect samples to aid in identifying the appropriate medical treatment that exposed persons may require, to determine proper levels of personal protective equipment (PPE) selections for future work in that environment, and to establish the proper decontamination methodology for the personnel and scene. Basically, think of these labs as answering these questions: • Is this CBRNE/TIC? • What CBRNE/TIC agent is this? • If it is a CBRNE/TIC incident, what is the threat to the emergency responders and the public? 73

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• How do we treat exposed members of the public? • What are the decontamination processes for responders and the environment? Remember, these samples are not taken for the criminal investigation, and the PSSTs do not need a warrant to collect them. CSIs will have to gather the very same samples as the PSST, this time as evidence for a criminal investigation and prosecution. All search and seizure laws will apply. The samples collected by the CSIs as physical evidence will typically be submitted to an FBI-designated laboratory for forensic analysis. This analysis will be more extensive than the public safety laboratory analysis to answer far more probing questions to support the criminal investigation. Here are just a few of the many questions that need to be answered for the criminal investigation: 1. How was the CBRNE/TIC agent or delivery device manufactured, produced, or made? 2. Who manufactured, produced, made, and delivered the CBRNE/ TIC agent or device? 3. Where were the precursor chemicals, biological materials, and radiological/nuclear materials obtained that were needed to produce the CBRNE/TIC agent/device? It would be ideal if law enforcement could handle both the public safety sampling and the criminal evidence collection to mitigate any alteration of the crime scene and any possible forensic evidence contamination or destruction. This is, in fact, the case in a few large law enforcement jurisdictions throughout the country, but unfortunately the majority of the agencies do not have the resources or equipment to follow this model. Just as the work performed during the operations phase of the incident directly impacts the crime scene phase, CSIs should understand that their work during the crime scene phase can impact future public safety sampling operations. For instance, if the public safety sample analysis reveals the presence of a CBRNE/TIC agent, then additional public safety samples, sometimes referred to as environment sampling, will need to be collected from the scene and areas leading outward from the scene. These samples will typically be collected after the crime scene investigation has been completed. This sampling operation is performed to determine how far the CBRNE/TIC agent may have spread or traveled from the scene, thus identifying the extent of its contamination and exposure. These factors directly impact public safety in terms of environmental decontamination/mitigation or site cleanup, and identification/treatment of additional persons possibly exposed to the CBRNE/TIC agent. Although each crime scene is unique, especially in terms of its environmental dangers and safety issues, the most common threats posed to CSIs

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at conventional crime scenes are blood-borne pathogens. To combat this risk, most crime scene protocols and procedures require wearing some type of PPE. Depending on the jurisdiction, this may be as simple as a pair of disposable booties to cover the investigator’s footwear, gloves to cover the CSI’s hands, and a dust mask. A more robust protocol may require wearing a modified version of a level C PPE ensemble to include a chemical protective suit with hood, booties/boots, gloves, and an air-purifying respirator (APR) of some type (dust mask, P95, half face cartridge respirator, or full face cartridge respirator). In this time of heightened awareness, and indeed increased threat, CSIs must prepare and train to process crime scenes involving CBRNE/TICs in hazardous materials PPE ensemble levels, A, B, and C, as described in Chapter 4 (see Figure 5.1). Conventional crime scenes are often complex and may tax CSIs both physically and mentally as they strive to complete the investigation. CSIs are accustomed to working the scene until the final survey is concluded and the packaged physical evidence is ready to be transported to the evidence storage facility. The hazardous environment crime scene contradicts the training of CSIs and standard operational procedures by strictly limiting the time they can work in the scene and restricting the number of tasks they can complete. The increased levels of PPE that must be utilized within the scene of a CBRNE/TIC incident create stress and physical fatigue for CSIs, particularly when level B or level A PPE, are dictated by the environmental conditions. Many CSIs will be required to perform a number of tasks that would normally entail only one or two investigators. It may be necessary for neighboring agencies to supplement a CSI team if the investigation is complex. Physical limitations and time for decontamination processes strictly dictate how long each CSI can remain in the crime scene.

Figure 5.1╇ CSI wearing level-B PPE ensemble using ALS in the exclusion zone.

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Major safety differences create additional stress on the body due to heat buildup and sweating in the suits, loss of dexterity and movement, and limited vision. In addition to the suit, the CSI will be wearing boots, multiple sets of gloves, and face and respiratory protection up to and including a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). PPE is necessary to protect the CSI from the contaminants that may be present in the crime scene. It also hampers the CSI’s ability to function. An SCBA pack on a CSI’s back adds an addition 9–11 inches to the CSI’s profile, as well as increases the CSI’s weight by 35–40 pounds. The suit becomes a sweat-inducing wrap. The face mask and respiratory unit limit the CSI’s peripheral vision and hamper the CSI’s ability to hear and speak clearly. These increased stressors will negatively impact the CSI’s efficiency at skills requiring fine-motor movements and can frustrate the detail-oriented CSI. CSIs must be aware of how they can adjust to this new work setting and still complete their tasks related to the identification, documentation, collection, and preservation of physical evidence in the contaminated environment. Slow and deliberate movements within the scene are also critical due to the potential for re-aerosolizing or cross-contamination. A detailed crime-scene-processing plan will be followed, and each team of CSIs will have specific tasks to complete within a strictly defined timeline.

Figure 5.2╇ Medical monitoring prior to donning PPE.

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Situations that create a need for higher levels of PPE will also generate stress on the entire agency’s response capabilities. Operations will require additional outside personnel to support the crime scene unit, including emergency medical services (EMS) personnel to conduct medical monitoring of the CSIs donning and doffing PPE (see Figure 5.2) and Fire Department Hazardous Materials Technicians (FD Hazmat techs) for rescue, technical decontamination (decon) of the CSIs, and other needs as dictated by the incident (see Figure€5.3). If the crime scene investigative operations require the use of level A or B PPE ensembles, this will limit the amount of time each team of CSIs will be allowed to work in the exclusion zone (contaminated crime scene area), due to a limited air supply from the SCBA. Additional CSIs who are trained and certified to work in level A and B PPE may be required to process the scene. Agencies should practice and train together so that when this situation arises, these CSIs can be available to supplement the team via mutual aid agreements already in effect among agencies. Figure€5.4 provides a graphic display of the four phases that CBRNE/TIC incidents follow. While each of these phases continues at the incident scene, additional CSI team members will be working on

Figure 5.3╇ Fire Hazmat team decontaminating CSI.

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Tactical Phase

Operational Phase

Crime Scene Phase

Remediation Phase

Tactical Phase Task Force

Operational Phase Task Force

Crime Scene Phase Task Force

Remediation Phase Task Force

Recon Entry Strike Team

Ops Collector Ops Facilitator D/A member

Recon Entry Strike Team

Recon Entry Strike Team

Mon/Scrn Operator Mon/Scrn Facilitator D/A member

Mon/Scrn Operator Mon/Scrn Facilitator D/A member

Mon/Screening Operator Mon/Screening Facilitator D/A member

Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team Evidence Facilitator Evidence Collector D/A member

Search Entry Strike Team Searcher Searcher Facilitator D/A member Final Survey Entry Strike Team Mon/Screening Operator Mon/Screening Facilitator D/A member

Evidence/Decon Strike Team Decon Operator Decon Facilitator D/A member

Hospital Strike Teams ER Collector/Operator ER Col/Op Facilitator D/A member Morgue Strike Teams Temporary Collector Temporary Facilitator Temporary D/A member Permanent Collector Permanent Facilitator Permanent D/A member

Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team Evidence Collector Evidence Facilitator D/A member

Search Entry Strike Team Searcher Searcher Facilitator D/A member

Final Survey Entry Strike Team Ops Collector Ops Facilitator D/A member

Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team Evidence Collector Evidence Facilitator D/A member

Search Entry Strike Team Searcher Searcher Facilitator D/A member

Final Survey Entry Strike Team Surveyor Surveyor Facilitator D/A member

Figure 5.4╇ Flowchart model of CSI assignments for large-scale CBRNE/TIC— based on incident phases.

teams including the Evidence Decontamination work stations, teams assigned to hospitals, and the temporary and permanent morgue locations. Note:╇ It is necessary to plan for adequate personnel to man all locations; however, these teams are not included on the chart to enhance readability. All physical evidence collected and packaged in the exclusion zone must be safely decontaminated. The chain of custody must be maintained as the packaged items are cleaned in the decontamination reduction zone before they can be transported to the secure evidence storage facility or the designated crime laboratory (see Figure 5.5). As should be readily apparent by now, the operational tempo of these types of scenes will be much slower than a conventional crime scene investigation. Continuous monitoring of the hazardous environment crime scene is essential for the safety of all personnel. Before entering the scene the incident safety officer must determine the level of PPE required for entry into the exclusion zone. There are numerous direct reading handheld instruments, color-metric tests, and wet chemistry tests (which have multiple uses) that the CSIs must now be trained and certified to use at these scenes as they provide data that will assist in the proper level of PPE being used as well as identifying the probable CBRNE/TIC agents present in the scene (see Figure 5.6).

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Figure 5.5╇ CSI decon operator, decontaminating evidence packaging.

Figure 5.6╇ Direct reading handheld instruments, color-metric tests, and wet chemistry tests.

The personal safety of those involved in the crime scene investigation is the primary concern. These instruments and tests are used to classify the conditions and/or hazards of the environment in the exclusion zone/crime scene and thus determine if it is safe for CSIs to proceed with their assignments.

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Unsafe conditions require immediate evacuation until the situation has been stabilized. The instruments and tests are useful in locating possible CBRNE/ TIC agents within the exclusion zone. When a CBRNE/TIC agent is detected, the instrument readings and test results will be utilized to classify and screen the suspected CBRNE/TIC agent. This classification and screening will assist in identifying the proper collection and packaging protocols, procedures, and equipment to be employed in that particular situation. More definitive information on the equipment and tests can be found in Chapter 6. The second type of equipment that must be discussed is the tools necessary for documentation in the exclusion zone. Remember that all equipment must pass through the decon process before it can be utilized; therefore, your traditional camera will not be part of the gear you use to document the scene. Underwater camera equipment is capable of surviving the decontamination process (see Figure 5.7). It is also possible to utilize wireless communication equipment to securely transmit the crime scene photographs from the exclusion zone to the crime scene unit command post located in the support zone (the cold zone). Many agencies use ruggedized laptops to transmit digital photographs so that the command team can view the crime scene within the exclusion zone. Using standard paper with pencil or pen to write notes, draw sketches, or prepare evidence and photo logs within the crime scene is not recommended. The paper can absorb chemical agents and cannot be decontaminated without destroying the paper and its contents. Paper must be packaged in clear plastic bags so that the contents on the paper can be viewed, and the bags must be properly sealed so that the paper can survive the decontamination process. Paper can also pose a storage hazard. CSIs may have to rely on communicating all the necessary crime scene investigative details to a scribe in the support zone (see Figure 5.8). Again, a ruggedized laptop that can be decontaminated is useful to capture the details (see Figure€5.9). More

Figure 5.7╇ CSI utilizing deconable camera in the exclusion zone.

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Figure 5.8╇ CSI measuring evidence in the exclusion zone and communicating to scribe in the support zone.

Figure 5.9╇ Ruggedized laptop captures data from Leica Scan Station in the exclusion zone.

information about documentation equipment and methodologies are covered in Chapters 6 and 9. The types of collection and packaging equipment required for these scenes create a huge paradigm shift for all CSIs. The collection equipment

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will be individually wrapped, single use, disposable, synthetic or cotton swabs or gauze pads, and sterile or certified chemically clean, metal, chemically resistant plastic, or glass (see Figure 5.10). The packaging equipment will be certified chemically clean glass jars, sterile plastic containers (tubes/jars/containers), plastic sealable bags, polyester/nylon heat seal bags, clean metal paint cans, clean plastic 5-gallon drums, clean 55-gallon drums (metal or chemically resistant plastic), and coolers (see Figure 5.11).

Figure 5.10╇ Chemical-resistant bulb pipette used to collect a liquid chemical agent.

Figure 5.11╇ Certified chemically clean glass primary container and Nalgene secondary container.

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What will be noticeably missing is paper and cardboard packaging. These porous and breathable packaging materials cannot be used in the CBRNE/ TIC-contaminated environment because 1. The agents can be absorbed into the packaging, thus creating additional exposure to the forensic evidence contained within the packaging and creating additional safety issues for those who must handle the packaging. 2. This packaging cannot protect the evidence contained within because it cannot survive the decontamination process that all packaging must go through for it to exit the contamination reduction zone (decon). Forensic biological evidence such as blood must be packaged in sterile or clean glass, plastic, and nylon/polyester packaging. All evidence must be packaged in at least two layers of packaging, and sometimes three layers (primary container, secondary container, and tertiary container), before it can be removed from the exclusion zone (see Figure€5.12). This evidence will receive additional packaging (overpacking) before it can be transported to the laboratory for analysis. The final difference from a conventional crime scene is the chain of custody. CBRNE/TIC crime scene evidence requires additional links as it passes through the decontamination process of the evidence packaging. Overpacking is also required prior to transportation to the laboratory, and this step will also require an additional line on the chain of custody form

Figure 5.12╇ Using heat sealer in exclusion zone.

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Figure 5.13╇ Evidence custodian with transportation packaging.

to ensure proper custody is identifiable at all stages of the process (see Figure 5.13).

References Advant Technologies. (2010). BADD: How To Use Our Test. (PowerPoint Presentation). Phoenix: Advant Technologies. Retrieved from http://www.advnt.org/library. php. Advant Technologies. (2010). BADD: Pro Strips Training. (PowerPoint Presentation). Phoenix: Advant Technologies. Retrieved from http://www.advnt.org/library. php. Advant Technologies. (2010). “Hook Effect.” Retrieved from http://www.advnt.org/ pdf/The_Hook_Effect_Explained.pdf. Ahura Scientific. (2009). First Defender™ User Training. Ahura Scientific. Wilmington, MA. Ahura Scientific. (2009). First Defender™ FlexProbe Training Module, V2.6. Ahura Scientific. Wilmington, MA. Ahura Scientific. (2008). First Defender™ Quick Reference Guide. Ahura Scientific. Wilmington, MA. Ahura Scientific. (2009). TruDefender FT® User Training. Ahura Scientific. Wilmington, MA. Breeze, G., Budowle, B., & Schutzer, S. (2005). Microbial Forensics. Burlington: Elsevier Academic Press. Emanuel, P., Ross, J. & Niyogi, K (Ed.). (2008). Sampling For Biological Agents In The Environment. Washington, D.C.: ASM Press. Evidex, Inc. (2010). Chemical/Biological Sample Collection Kit—The XKit. Lynchburg: Evidex, Inc. Retrieved from www.thexkit.com. Haag, W. & Wrenn C. (2005). The PID Handbook (2nd ed.). San Jose: Rae Systems, Inc. Harris, D. (2007). Quantitative Chemical Analysis. New York: W. H. Freeman.

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Houghton, R. (2008). Emergency Characterization of Unknown Materials. Boca Raton: CRC Press. Idaho Technology Inc. (Producer). (2010). R.A.P.I.D. System Learning. Retrieved from http://www.idahotech.com/Support/Webinars.html. Idaho Technology Inc. (Producer). (2005). Razor Instrument HazMat Demo. Retrieved from http://www.idahotech.com/Support/Webinars.html. Idaho Technology Inc. (Producer). (2008). RAZOR EX Instrument HAZMAT Demo. Retrieved from http://www.idahotech.com/Support/Webinars.html. Idaho Technology Inc. (2010). Presumptive Field Screening of Biological Agents. Retrieved from http://www.fireengineering.com/index/webcasts.html. Kealey, D. & Haines, P. (2002). Analytical Chemistry. Oxford, UK: Bios Scientific Publishers, Limited. Kronenberg, J. L., D. (2002). Summary Report to 20/20 GeneSystems Incorporated on Bio-Identification Kit Testing: Tier I and II (pp. 9). Battelle. Ludlum Measurments, Inc. (2006). Model 2241-2 ERK Training Video. Sweetwater: Ludlum Measurments, Inc. Matthews, R. & Longworth, T. (2006). “Testing of Ahura’s First Defender Handheld Chemical Identifier against Toxic Industrial Chemicals.” Retrieved from http://www.ahurascientific.com/download/pdf/Ahura%20Scientific%20 FirstDefender%20ECBC%20TIC%20Report%20011006.pdf. Matthews, R. & Ong, K. (2005). “Evaluation of Ahura’s FirstDefender Handheld Chemical Identifier Against Chemical Warfare Agents Summary Report.” 46. Retrieved from http://www.ahurascientific.com/download/pdf/Ahura%20 Scientific%20FirstDefender%20ECBC%20CWA%20Report%20Rev%20 0628050.pdf. Moenssens, A., Starrs, J., Henderson, C., & Inbau, F. (1995). Scientifice Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases. Westbury: The Foundation Press. National Center For Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT). (2007). Advanced Forensic Investigations for Hazardous Environments. Louisiana State University (LSU). Baton Rouge. Noll, G., Hildebrand, M. & Yvorra. (2005). Hazardous Materials: Managing The Incident (3rd ed.). Chester: Red Hat Publishing Company. Poore, C., Clark, P. & Emanuela, P. A. (2009). “An evaluation of suspicious powder screening tools for first responders.” Journal of Hazardous Materials, 172. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_ udi=B6TGF-4WGMBB7-1&_user=10&_coverDate=12%2F30%2F2009&_ rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_ acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=23f317687 0312c307b498713fc7b9b88. Proengin, Inc. (2010). “AP2C.” Fort Lauderdale: Proengin, Inc. Retrieved from http:// www.proengin.com/images/pdf/ap2c.pdf. Proengin, I. (2006). “Principle of Proengin Detectors: Flame Spectrometry.” (pp. 89). Fort Lauderale: Proengin, Inc. Rae Systems, Inc. (2005). Application & Technical Notes (3rd ed.). San Jose: Rae Systems, Inc. Rae Systems, Inc. (2003). MultiRae Plus, User Manual. San Jose: Rae Systems, Inc. Rae Systems, I. (2009). Trainer’s Certification. Rae Systems, Inc. San Jose, CA.

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Response Biomedical Corportation (Producer). (2010). Ramp System Demonstration. Retrieved from http://www.responsebio.com/products_demonstration_. Scott Health & Safety. (2007). Prime Alert Biodetection System: How to Use IT. Monroe, N.C.: Scott Health and Safety. Smiths Detection. (2008). “Application Brief AB-033, Mobile FT-IR Analysis of Chemicals Diverted to Clandestine Drug Synthesis. 3.” Retrieved from http:// www.smithsdetection.com/media/Application_Brief_33_AB-033.pdf. Smiths Detection. (2006). “Combining Infrared and Raman Spectroscopy on a Single Platform to Identify Unknown Chemical Hazards, Application Brief AB-076. 2.” Retrieved from http://www.smithsdetection.com/media/SD_App76.pdf. Smiths Detection. (2004). “Application Brief AB-074, Identifying and Managing Chemical Hazards In A Clandestine ‘Meth’ Lab Raid.” Retrieved from http:// www.smithsdetection.com/media/sd_app74.pdf. Smiths Detection. (2004). “Application Brief AB-073, Raman and Infrared for HazMat Response.” Retrieved from http://www.smithsdetection.com/media/SD_App73. pdf. Smiths Detection. (2008). “Application Brief AB-03p, A White Powder Incident and the HazMatID.” Retrieved from http://www.smithsdetection.com/media/ Application_Brief_39_AB-039.pdf. Smiths Detection. (2010). Infrared Spectroscopy for Hazardous Materials Identification, HazMatID Training Course. Danbury: Smiths Detection. Smiths Detection. (2010). Advanced Infrared Analysis for Hazardous Materials. Danbury: Smiths Detection. Smiths Detection. (2005). Sabre® 4000 Operator Manual. Danbury: Smiths Detection. Shaw, W. A. (Ed.). (2010). OSHA Compliance Manual. Neenah: J.J. Keller & Associates, Inc. Trebisacci, D, (Ed.). (2008). Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Handbook (5th ed.). Quincy: National Fire Protection Association. United States Department of Justice. (2001). “An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders.” Washington, D.C.: NIJ Retrieved from http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/190747-a.pdf. United States Department of Justice. (2000). “Guide for the Selection of Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders, Volume I.” Washington, D.C.: NIJ. Retrieved from http://www. ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184449.pdf. United States Department of Justice. (2000). “Guide for the Selection of Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders, Volume II.” Washington, D.C.: NIJ Retrieved from http://www. ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184450.pdf. United States Department of Justice. (2008). Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Radiation/Nuclear Course for Hazardous Materials Technicians, Appendices. Washington, D.C.: NNSA. United States Department of Justice. (2008). Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Radiation/Nuclear Course for Hazardous Materials Technicians, Student Manual. Washington, D.C.: NNSA.

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6

The Equipment

The equipment needs of crime scene units preparing to investigate crime scenes involving CBRNE/TIC are considerable. Sufficient quantities of various types of equipment must be acquired and maintained to safely conduct the scene investigations. The crime scene units must develop robust quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) programs for the equipment and personnel. These QA/QC programs must deal with issues such as maintenance, functionality, calibration, expirations, contamination, certifications of sterility and chemically clean, validated protocols for all aspects of the equipment’s use, personnel health, personnel training certifications, and personnel proficiency testing. The use of QA/QC programs by crime scene units is not new— they are standard in all forensic work; however, the PPE and instruments, especially the safety and screening equipment, will require regular inspection to ensure they are always operational and ready to go at a moment’s notice. This chapter introduces various categories of safety, screening, monitoring, and detection apparatus. In addition, specialty packing supplies and equipment are required to safely collect and preserve evidentiary items retrieved from a hazardous environment. CSIs must be aware of the potential hazards and threats that may be encountered during a crime scene investigation involving a CBRNE/TIC agent. The use of detection and monitoring equipment is an integral part of identifying the potential hazards and threats. It is not the intent of this chapter to cover each detection and monitoring technology in detail or to provide explicit information on the use of the instruments; rather, the information is presented to provide the CSI with an overview of the types of detection and monitoring equipment available for use in a potentially contaminated crime scene. CSIs should obtain additional training before using any detection and monitoring equipment. All detection and monitoring equipment should be used, maintained, and calibrated according to the manufacturer’s instructions.

Safety Safety of personnel is the primary concern, and personal protective equipment and respiratory protection is covered extensively in Chapter 4. Every incident response will be guided by the incident commander and the safety officer. Determinations of operation continuance will remain the responsibility of the command staff. The Crime Scene Investigation Unit (CSIU) 87

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response begins after the public safety sampling team has completed the initial entries, and the CSIU conducts the crime scene investigation employing the additional equipment necessary to work safely in the exclusion zone.

Documentation Equipment Hazardous environments present many challenges to all responders—every action must be pre-planned and suitable equipment must be utilized to ensure the safety of personnel while they conduct the investigation. CSIs require highquality, secure communications equipment as they may be transmitting measurements and other vital information that must be clearly understandable and documented by a scribe in the support zone. Respiratory protection masks will hinder clearly spoken words, and inexpensive radio equipment will only complicate voice transmissions. There are several ways to properly equip the CSIs and ensure the accuracy of information. Respirator masks with built-in communication equipment are available and most respirator manufacturers offer this as an option. There are after-market communication devices available for most masks if the CSIU has already obtained respirator equipment for its personnel. High-quality 900 MHz handheld radios capable of being decontaminated can be used in conjunction with a mask that has been outfitted with a voice amplifier (see Figure 6.1). Regardless of which communication device is chosen, the transmissions must be encrypted for the security of the investigation. This type of equipment is vital for the safety of the CSIs and ensures that all important crime scene documentation information is transmitted to command. Another communication device that provides multiple applications in the exclusion zone is a ruggedized laptop computer that is capable of being

Figure 6.1╇ Communicating via voice amplifier and hand radio.

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Figure 6.2╇ CSI Decon Doc/Admin member using a laptop capable of being decontaminated to capture equipment, evidence, and chain of custody information at the decon line.

decontaminated. This tool can be used to capture crime scene notes and sketches, download photographs from a digital camera, enter photographic data and screening results into computerized logs, and produce evidence logs and chain of custody forms (see Figure€6.2). These computers can be configured with integrated wireless communication networks to transfer the data to command while the CSIs are still working in the exclusion zone. Radios and wireless networks must be encrypted for the security of the investigation and to protect the integrity of the data being transmitted. A low-tech alternative for written documentation is the use of chemicaland water-resistant laboratory notebooks (see Figure€6.3). These notebooks are available in all sizes and as lined, unlined, or gridded. They can be used in the exclusion zone for all types of crime scene documentation and can be decontaminated. A permanent marker or water/chemical-resistant ink pen should be utilized to ensure the survivability of the documentation information. Additional low-tech equipment for documentation includes tape measures and measuring wheels to determine the dimensions of the scene, its contents, and the location/position of the evidence (see Figure€6.4). These tools are considered disposable and will be placed in the hazardous waste at the evidence/ equipment decon station when the scene investigation is completed. Low cost equipment usually cannot be satisfactorily decontaminated on the scene, and it is more cost-effective to replace it than to risk cross-contamination. A step higher on the technology scale is the use of infrared, laser, and sonar electronic measuring devices (see Figure€6.5). These tools are currently used for conventional crime scenes and can be introduced into the hazardous environment as well. Although some of these units can withstand the decon

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Practical Crime Scene Investigations for Hot Zones

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.3╇ (a) Polypaper field notebook and (b) Sharpie pen. (Source╛: Thermo Fisher Scientific)

Figure 6.4╇ Obtaining dimensions of evidence with tape measure.

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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.5╇ (a) Using infrared/sonar electronic measuring device to obtain position of evidence. (b) Leica laser measuring device.

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process, most are considered expendable and will be disposed of with the hazardous waste at the conclusion of the investigation. In terms of technology for measuring crime scenes and plotting evidence, high-end global positioning system (GPS) units, total stations, and scan stations are considered the ultimate tools (see Figures€6.6 and 6.7). GPS units and software utilize the various navigational satellite systems in orbit around the Earth to provide three-dimensional (3-D) position and directional and tracking information. This technology is typically only suitable for outdoor use since it requires antenna lines of sight for the satellites to fix the location. Various types of plans and maps can easily be produced by combining the GPS system with the appropriate computer-aided design and drafting software (CADD) or mapping software. The systems can plot 3-D (latitude, longitude, elevations above sea level) positions of evidence and other items as well. This information can then be easily transferred to plans and maps. The units are Bluetooth enabled and can wirelessly transfer the information to an appropriately configured laptop such as the ruggedized laptop mentioned in Chapter€6. The system can also transfer the data via a USB or SD card. The

Figure 6.6╇ Using the GPS Rover in the exclusion zone.

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Figure 6.7╇ RTK high-end GPS base station.

data port for the GPS rover is weather-resistant and can be subjected to the decontamination process of washing and rinsing, but not submersion. Total stations are automated surveying tools adopted from the engineering and surveying fields and brought into the crime scene division as valuable tools for documentation purposes (see Figures€ 6.8 and 6.9). Once the physical location of the units is fixed, the units can take one measurement at a time in all directions and angles in the line of sight. The accuracy of these units is within millimeters for distances and within 1/1000 of a degree for angles. Some total station models feature one-person operability and prismless mode, while others require two persons. Another benefit of the total station is that it does not need to be situated on high ground to obtain elevation information accurately. If you can establish total line of sight of the scene from the support zone, the equipment does not have to enter the exclusion zone to map the scene or plot the evidence. Also, if the unit cannot measure the entire scene from one position, it can be moved to multiple locations. With the proper positioning, documentation of all the measurements can be merged to complete the scene. In addition, the data can be transferred to a ruggedized laptop via a USB or SD card.

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Figure 6.8╇ Entering data on GPS computer in the exclusion zone.

Drawbacks to using the total station include the capability of measuring only one point at a time, it requires one or two persons to set up and operate, can be difficult to set up and use while wearing PPE, it requires a datum point to fix the unit’s position in the scene, and its use necessitates extensive training. These units can be washed and rinsed in the decon process, but not submerged. The Scan Station 2 Laser Scanner Unit is a computer-controlled digital camera combined with a 3-D laser scanner that can photograph and measure anything in its field of view—360 degrees around the unit, 45 degrees below the unit, 90 degrees above the unit, and out to a distance of 134 to 150 meters. It uses many of the same technologies as the total stations, so it is engineeringsurvey accurate but fully automated (See Figure€ 6.10). Scan Station 2 Laser Scanners can be set up by one person and be remotely operated by means of a laptop computer or an onboard computer. It takes 50,000 3-D measurement points a second, does not require a datum point to fix its position, and,

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Figure 6.9╇ Marking evidence location in the exclusion zone using Total Station.

comparatively speaking, is user friendly. Much like the total station, the Scan Station 2 can be moved around the scene and the operator can merge all the scans, and it does not require fixed locations. The Scan Station 2 Laser Scanner system integrates with CADD software which may be used to produce highly accurate, detailed two-dimensional (2-D) and 3-D crime scene plans, as well as sophisticated 3-D animations. The data is captured directly into a ruggedized laptop. Some scanners feature on-board computers; the data can be transferred by Bluetooth or by using USB or SD cards. Although this technology is extremely useful to CSIs in the exclusion zone, the Scan Station 2 will not survive the decontamination process and will end up in the hazardous waste. Units are very expensive and currently only larger agencies have access to this technology. However, it may be possible to utilize the system outside the exclusion zone, and the documentation capabilities far exceed the ability of CSIs to measure and sketch the scene on a comparable basis. There are several types of photographic equipment that can be utilized at a CBRNE/TIC crime scene. Single lens reflex (SLR) digital cameras are used for conventional crime scenes, but these camera systems will not survive the decon process and will be placed in the hazardous waste. Images will have to be transferred to a ruggedized laptop in the exclusion zone or

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Figure 6.10╇ Leica Scan Station 2 automatically captures digital photographs and measurements simultaneously.

be transferred at the evidence/equipment decon station, via USB or compact flash card reader, to a noncontaminated computer. Another piece of equipment that can be attached to the SLR digital camera is a device known as an enterprise digital assistant (EDA) (see Figure€6.11). This is a mobile computer with 3.5-G wireless connectivity in WWAN, WLAN, WPAN, and IrDA. The EDA features built-in GPS and a 2-D digital bar code scanner with a 2 megapixel color digital camera. These instruments have a built-in micro SD slot, USB, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth capabilities for additional memory expansion and data transfer. These units are very rugged and can be washed down during the decon process. EDAs offer additional software that provides the capability of creating photo logs that include the photographer’s name, the date, and the time. Bar code information (labels) containing the photograph’s descriptions can be produced for each photograph. Outdoors, GPS locations of the photographer’s position for each photograph are also recorded. The unit will also provide wireless transmission of the images outside of the exclusion zone via an encrypted secured network in real time. As the photographs are being taken,

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Figure 6.11╇ EDA attached to digital SLR camera.

the images are being sent to the Crime Scene Unit’s command post in the support zone where they can be instantly viewed. This unit can also be used to create evidence logs, capturing the same types of information as captured for the photographs. When attached to a bar code label maker, evidence labels that include data about the evidence and its associated photographs are embedded in the bar code. In addition to the wireless transmissions of the images, units can store the images on their hard drives, adding to the ways the images can be transferred safely from the exclusion zone. With the addition of evidence tracking software, this unit can be used at the evidence/equipment decon station and the evidence custodian station to create an automated evidence chain of custody. A new alternate light source (ALS) has now been introduced to the market that can be taken into the exclusion zone and is deconable (see Figure€6.12). The Polilight® Flare Plus Alternate Light Source does not have a fan and can be decontaminated with soap and water. A low-tech and low-budget alternative is a simple underwater digital camera that is used in the exclusion zone to capture all the crime scene photographs (see Figure€6.13). These cameras are either simple point and shoot digital cameras placed in underwater housings or waterproof digital cameras that require no housings. The camera housings or the camera itself can be easily decontaminated and then transferred to the support zone for downloading and viewing. The downside with these types of cameras is that their photographic capabilities are very limited and, forensically speaking, will limit the CSI’s ability to utilize more advanced forensic photographic techniques.

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Figure 6.12╇ Polilight Flare Plus alternate light source. (Source: Rofin Forensics.)

Figure 6.13╇ Digital camera in underwater camera housing.

Recon Equipment Detection is defined as the discovery of a contaminant while monitoring involves measuring the amount of the contaminant present in the environment. Detection and monitoring equipment is used for two purposes by CSIs. The first is environmental monitoring or atmospheric monitoring to ensure the environment is safe for CSIs to conduct their investigation. Potential hazardous environments include corrosive atmospheres, fire or explosion hazards, toxic environments, oxygen levels (low or high), radioactivity, and others. The

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results of the environmental monitoring will determine the appropriate level of personal protective equipment (PPE), the location and size of the hazard zones, decontamination procedures, and ensure safe operations while processing the potentially contaminated crime scene. The second purpose for using detection and monitoring equipment is to field screen the potential evidence for hazards such as corrosiveness, flammability, radioactivity, and volatility. Receiving laboratories require the results of the field screening to determine the general characteristics of samples/evidence, and to ensure the correct packaging and safe transport of the evidence to the receiving laboratory. Some detection and monitoring instruments use destructive testing methods that use up some of the sample. If only a small amount of the material is available, CSIs should only use nondestructive screening methods. The majority of detection and monitoring instruments used by CSIs are classified as direct reading instruments. They provide readings and information at the time the sample is taken. Direct reading instruments are used to monitor toxic substances, oxygen levels, flammable environments, ionizing radiation, and other chemical and biological hazards. When using any detection and monitoring instrument, CSIs must be aware of the lowest level of concentration at which the instrument will react, how sensitive and selective the instrument is, the reaction time or how long it takes the instrument to respond, and the recovery time or the amount of time it takes the instrument to clear. These vary from manufacturer to manufacturer. Additionally, some instruments may be single reading instruments that detect and monitor only one item or contaminant at a time, such as a flammable atmosphere. Other monitors may be combination instruments that will monitor flammable atmospheres, toxic atmospheres, and oxygen levels. Note:╇ Detection and monitoring equipment shown and discussed are representative of the equipment available for use and not a discussion or endorsement of specific brands. Combination Instruments A representative example of a direct reading, combination instrument is the MultiRAE Plus, manufactured by RAE Systems (see Figure€6.14). The MultiRae Plus is a 4-gas meter with a photoionization detector (PID) included with the basic 4-gas detection. The standard configuration of the MultiRae Plus includes percentage of oxygen (O2) in the air, flammable vapors as a percentage of lower explosive limit (LEL), and two toxic gas sensors, carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrogen sulfide (H2S), typical of monitors used in confined spaces. The two toxic gas sensors may be replaced with other sensors such as chlorine (Cl2), hydrogen cyanide (HCN), and others as determined by the user (see Figure€6.15). The MultiRae Plus or a similar instrument will be the workhorse

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Figure 6.14╇ MultiRae Plus monitoring device.

Figure 6.15╇ Various sensors contained within the MultiRae Plus.

for the CSI. It will be used both in environmental or atmospheric monitoring and field screening of samples and evidence. The CSI should never go into a potentially contaminated crime scene without a meter of this type. The MultiRae Plus has an internal pump that is capable of drawing a sample approximately from 100 feet and passes the sample over the sensors, which react to and provide a direct reading of that particular sensor. The pump will stall or shut off if it gets blocked, thus protecting the pump from potential damage. The MultiRae Plus runs on a rechargeable battery, but it can also run on AA batteries if necessary (www.raesystems.com). Flammability Measurement The measurement of flammability or lower explosive limit (LEL) is an important measurement for CSIs. There is no protective clothing that will protect

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the crime scene investigator from fire. Therefore, the crime scene investigator should NEVER process a potentially contaminated crime scene in which the environment is flammable. About 90 seconds after the MultiRae Plus is turned on, the screen will alternate between the sensor and the sensor reading. The LEL sensor is sometimes referred to as a combustible gas sensor or combustible gas indicator (CGI). LEL does not determine if there will be an explosion, but rather indicates whether the environment is flammable. A newer term is LFL for “lower flammability limit.” All terms are used interchangeably and for the purposes of this discussion mean the same thing. In order to understand the LEL, it is necessary to discuss flammable range. Flammable range refers to the difference between the minimum and maximum volume percentages of the material in air that forms a flammable mixture. (Source: Title 49 CFR § 173.115 (h).) For example, methane has a flammable range of 5–15% (see Figure€6.16). If there is 5% methane and 95% air, the methane will burn and this is called the lower explosive limit (LEL). Below that methane will not burn since there is not enough fuel. It is too lean. Therefore, if there is 3% methane and 97% air, it will not burn because there is not enough methane or fuel. If there is 15% methane and 85% air, the methane will burn and is this is called the upper explosive limit (UEL). Above that, methane will not burn since there is too much fuel and not enough air. It is too rich. Therefore, if there is 20% methane and 80% air, methane will not burn because there is too much methane and not enough air. Any concentration of 5% methane to 15% methane in air will burn. This is called the flammable range. If the LEL sensor is calibrated for methane, the LEL sensor will read up to the LEL (5% methane). At that time the meter will read 100%. The LEL sensor does not “see” anything past the LEL. At 2.5% methane, the LEL sensor will read 50%. Once the LEL is exceeded, there is the potential for a fire. The MultiRae Plus is set at the factory to low alarm at 10% of the LEL and high alarm at 20% of the LEL. This is a built-in safety factor. If the meter is 0% Fuel

100%

Flammable Range Lean

100% Air

Rich

5%

15

LEL

UEL

0% Air

Figure 6.16╇ Flammable range for methane (not to scale).

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calibrated for methane and the environment being monitored has methane in it, then the meter reading will be accurate. Because some gases burn hotter or colder than the calibrant gas, the meter reading may not be accurate if the environment contains a flammable gas other than methane. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss conversion factors for obtaining correct LEL readings in other environments. An atmospheric reading of 10% of the LEL with resulting alarm should signal to the crime scene investigator the potential for a flammable environment and the CSI should exit the crime scene until the source of the flammable vapors can be located and the flammable vapors dispersed. There are different types of LEL sensors, with the most common sensor being the catalytic bead sensor, which is used in the MultiRae Plus. Inside the LEL sensor housing are two wires (beads), one of which is coated with a catalyst and exposed to the sample. If the sample contains a flammable vapor, it will produce a higher temperature on the coated bead than on the uncoated bead. This will increase the resistance on the coated bead as compared the uncoated (reference) bead and results in a reading on the meter. Knowing how the LEL sensor operates allows the CSI to understand the basic limitations of the sensor. These are as follows: 1. It will not measure concentrations above the LEL. 2. Since it requires oxygen in the air to operate, an oxygen-deficient atmosphere may render the LEL sensor inaccurate. Generally, this is around 15% of oxygen. 3. The sensor will not detect flammable dusts or flammable mists. 4. The sensor has a response time that varies according to manufacturer. Oxygen The measurement of oxygen is also an important measurement for CSIs. An oxygen-deficient environment is defined by OSHA as an environment with less than 19.5% oxygen, while an oxygen-enriched atmosphere is defined as an environment with greater than 23.5% oxygen. Both extremes are dangerous to the crime scene investigator. An environment with less than 19.5% oxygen requires CSIs to wear a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and the lack of oxygen may affect the LEL sensor. A low oxygen reading also indicates that oxygen is being displaced by something else. If an oxygen reading of greater than 23.5% is obtained, increased flammability must be considered along with other hazards before processing the contaminated crime scene. The oxygen sensor generates electrical current that is proportional to the oxygen (O2) concentration. Oxygen (air) passes into the sensor housing via a diffusion barrier in the top of the sensor housing. This permits the required amount of air into the sensor. A sensing electrode (cathode)

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and a working electrode (anode) are located inside the housing. Between the cathode and anode is an electrolyte. A chemical reaction occurs between the wool-like lead in the anode and the oxygen that generates an electrical current proportional to the amount of oxygen consumed. The reaction is 2 Pb (lead)╯+╯O2 (oxygen)╯=╯2 PbO (lead oxide). This is a chemical reaction that does not stop when the instrument is shut off. Since there is oxygen in the air, the sensor will keep reacting until all of the lead has been converted to lead oxide. This results in sensor failure within one to two years. Remember: An oxygen-deficient atmosphere has <19.5% oxygen and is a life hazard, while an oxygen-enriched environment has >23.5% oxygen and is a fire hazard. Toxic Gas Measurement Toxic gas sensors are electrochemical sensors. The electrolyte in the sensor is specific to the toxic gas the sensor is designed to detect. In the MultiRae Plus there are two toxic gas sensors that are labeled Tox 1 and Tox 2. The toxic sensors take measurements in parts per million (ppm). Remember: Toxic gas sensors are specific to one toxic gas. Photoionization Detectors Photoionization detectors (PIDs) measure volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and some inorganic gases such as ammonia (NH3). Definition: Volatile organic compounds (VOCs) include any compound of carbon, excluding carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, carbonic acid, metallic carbides or carbonates, and ammonium carbonate, that participates in atmospheric photochemical reactions. (Source: 40 CFR Part 51.100(s).) Volatile organic compounds have a high vapor pressure and as a group are flammable and toxic. Numerous VOCs are man-made chemicals and are found in paints, pharmaceuticals, and refrigerants, and are used as industrial solvents. VOCs are also found as components of petroleum fuels such as gasoline, hydraulic fluids, paint thinners, and dry cleaning agents. A PID is very accurate and sensitive but is not selective. Depending on the manufacturer and the instrument, it can detect VOCs as low as 10 parts per billion (ppb) to as high as 10,000 parts per million (ppm). The PID, however, will not identify gas that is present. The PID on the MultiRae Plus will detect VOCs in a range of 0–2000 ppm.

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â•…

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.17╇ (a) Oxygen sensor in MultiRae; (b) Hydrogen sulfide sensor in Multirae.

The PID uses an ultraviolet (UV) light as a source of energy to remove an electron from the sample molecule (see Figure€6.17). As the sample of the gas enters the instrument, it passes over the UV light. If the UV light has enough energy it will ionize the gas into positive and negative components. The ionized (charged) gas will flow to the appropriate plates in the sensor producing an electrical current in proportion to the amount of contaminant gases, which is measured and displayed as concentration on the meter. VOC molecules and others need a certain amount of energy to remove an electron. The amount of energy needed to remove the electron is known as its ionization potential (IP). The energy of the UV light must be greater than the ionization potential for a particular substance for the PID to be able to detect it. Ultraviolet lamps are available in output energies of 9.8 electron volts (eV), 10.6 eV, and 11.7 eV. If the ionization potential of the gas is less than the eV output of the ultraviolet lamp, the PID can “see” the gas and detect it. For example, the ionization potential of benzene is 9.24 eV; therefore, a PID with a 10.6-eV bulb can “see” the benzene and will display a reading. The IP for chlorine is 11.32 eV; therefore, a PID with a 10.6-eV bulb will not “see” the chlorine since it does not have enough energy to remove an electron from the chlorine. Ionization potentials are found in the manufacturer’s reference material for the instrument, the NIOSH Pocket Guide, and other response materials. Interpretation of PID data is difficult since it does not identify what gas is present; therefore, it should be used in conjunction with other detection/monitoring equipment. As a rough rule of thumb for CSIs, any reading on the VOC should be considered to have high vapor pressure and possibly be flammable and toxic until otherwise verified. Flammability

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can be confirmed with the LEL sensor; however, differences in response time between the PID and the LEL sensor may have to be taken into account when monitoring and confirming the presence or absence of a reading on the LEL. Any reading on the LEL would indicate the material is flammable. The PID is calibrated with isobutylene, and as with the LEL sensor, the actual reading of the material may be higher or lower than the meter reading. Correction factors are beyond the scope of the discussion for this chapter. PIDs do not measure air, certain toxic materials such as carbon monoxide (CO), hydrogen cyanide (HCN), natural gas, acids such as hydrochloric acid (HCl), nitric acid (HNO3), and other materials such as freon. The PID is very good at telling the CSI “something is there,” but it cannot tell the CSI what it is. (Sourceâ•›: www.raesystems.com) Radiation Detection Radiation monitoring is one of the first tools used in monitoring a potentially contaminated crime scene. While it is anticipated that the scene will already have been monitored for radiation by the first responders, if it was not done, then the crime scene investigators will have to do it. Additionally, CSIs will have to screen any potential evidence for radiation prior to submitting the evidence to the laboratory. The types of radiation most likely to be encountered at a crime scene are alpha (α), beta (β), and gamma (γ). Readers are encouraged to review the radiation hazards (TACEM) section in Chapter€4. Neutron radiation is found only in nuclear weapons and power plants. Although a new field called “nuclear forensics” is being developed, it is beyond the scope of this book and is limited at this time to specific governmental agencies. There are many different types and manufacturers of radiation detection and identification instruments on the market. Again, it is not the intent of this chapter to discuss each one, but only to provide an overview of instruments along with an example of each. Radiation detectors use one of three detection technologies. They are Geiger-Müller tubes (GM), scintillation crystals, and semiconductor sensors. The type of sensor technology used determines which form of radiation will be detected. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the operation of each technology. The Geiger-Müller tube will detect α, β, and γ radiation and is the workhorse for the crime scene investigator. A scintillation detector, for example, detects only γ radiation and may have a limited use at a potentially contaminated crime scene after the initial scene survey. Many radiation detection meters allow for the exchange of probes on the meter. It is the probe that determines the type of radiation that can be detected by the instrument.

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Radiation Survey Meters A radiation survey meter measures the amount of radiation in roentgens per hour (R/hr) or counts per minute. The radiation survey meter measures the amount of radiation the CSI will receive if the CSI remains at a specific location for one hour. The roentgen (R) is broken down into smaller units, such as a milliroentgen or 10–3 R and microroentgen or 10–6 R. The readings are usually given in R/hr, mR/hr, or µR/hr. Therefore 1 R/hr€ =€ 1000€ mR/hr€ = 1,000,000€µR/hr. The readings are usually given in R/Hr, mR/Hr, or µR/Hr. Therefore 1 R/Hr╯=╯1000 mR/Hr╯=╯1,000,000 µR/Hr. As shown, a µR is an extremely small number. A reading of 1 R/Hr would mean the CSI would have to be exposed to that amount of radiation for 1 hour to receive that dose. If the exposure lasted 30 minutes or 1/2 hour, the dose would be 0.5 R. CSI units need to establish action levels for radiation. When in doubt, CSIs should consult radiation experts for their help and advice. Figure€6.18 shows a Ludlum 2241-2 typical survey meter equipped with a model 44-9 Geiger-Müller pancake-type detector, which will detect α, β, and γ radiation. This model is extremely popular and is used by many hazardous materials teams and crime scene units. The meter can be connected to other

Figure 6.18╇ Radiation meter with pancake probe attached.

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probes such as a model 44-2 γ detector, known as a “hot dog” because of its shape. Each meter and probe is calibrated as a unit and should not be interchanged with other units. Note the green tags applied to the meter and probe. This is a picture of one of several training units, hence the tags ensure that the meter and appropriate probe stay together as a unit. A meter and probe used in a response would not have these tags. Radiation monitors are not intrinsically safe and have the potential to be an ignition source in a flammable environment. Additionally, the instrument should be turned off prior to changing probes as some probes can have an operating voltage of 1200 volts. The Ludlum 2241 as shown operates on D-cell alkaline batteries and can operate for approximately 200 hours. It automatically autoranges, which means it converts and displays the appropriate units such as µR, mR, and R. With the proper training, CSIs could be able to differentiate between α, β, and γ types of radiation (www.ludlums.com). Radiation Isotope Identification Each radioactive isotope gives off a type of emissions that is distinct for that particular radioactive isotope. By using a multichannel analyzer and an instrument that detects γ radiation, such as a scintillation detector, a spectrum for that particular isotope can be generated. Known as gamma spectroscopy, this spectrum is a unique signature or fingerprint for that isotope. The spectrum is then compared to the library in the instrument and identified. The instruments can identify both naturally occurring and man-made radioisotopes. The instruments tend to be small, handheld, and easy to operate, and they also have a dose rate system. Figure€6.19 shows a typical handheld radiation isotope identifier that is manufactured by Thermo Scientific. Other manufactures also make comparable devices (www.thermoscientific.com). Radiation Pagers Radiation pagers, also known as personal radiation detectors (PRDs), are similar to radiation survey meters as far as the technology used. When the pager is turned on, it calibrates itself to the background and alerts the wearer to a level above the background. The wearer can be alerted via a vibrating alarm, an audible alarm, or a combination of both. Most radiation pagers detect γ radiation, but a few also detect neutron radiation. The pagers are extremely sensitive and may alert the wearer if he or she around someone who has been recently treated with radiopharmaceuticals as the result of chemotherapy (see Figure€6.20) (www.thermoscientific.com). Other An example of a more advanced radiation detector is the FH40 manufactured by Thermo Scientific (see Figure€6.21). It is highly sensitive and has the

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Figure 6.19╇ Thermo Scientific identiFINDER™ isotope identifier. (Sourceâ•›: Thermo Fisher Scientific)

Figure 6.20╇ RadEye Personal Radiation Detector, manufactured by Thermo Scientific. (Source╛: Thermo Fisher Scientific)

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Figure 6.21╇ FH40 NBR known as the “blue sausage,” manufactured by Thermo Scientific. (Sourceâ•›: Thermo Fisher Scientific)

ability to discriminate natural background radiation (NBR) from man-made radioactive sources. Colorimetrics Colorimetric detection uses chemical reagents that have the ability to produce a visible color change when a material is detected by the particular chemical reagent. Typically, colorimetrics use papers or strips impregnated with the chemical reagent that causes the color change. The color change is then compared to a color chart provided by the manufacturer to interpret the reading. They tend to be fast, easy to use, inexpensive, and require minimal training. One major disadvantage of colorimetrics is the ability of the user to discriminate the various colors on some tests. As with all detection and monitoring devices, the user must understand the principles behind the test and its detection limits. Corrosivity Corrosive materials are materials that may severely damage or destroy living tissue or damage certain metals by chemical action. Corrosives are further classified into acids and bases. For the purposes of this discussion, acids dissociate (ionize) in water to form hydrogen ions (H+) while bases, also called hydroxides, form hydroxide ions (OH–). (H+) are the active ingredient in

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acids while the (OH–) are the active ingredient in a base. Corrosive materials have a pH. Most CSIs are familiar with the term pH. pH╯=╯–log(H+) and is represented on a pH scale. The pH scale ranges from 0 (most acidic) to 14 (most basic), with 7 being neutral. The “–” in front of the log(H+) indicates the pH scale is an inversely proportional scale. This means that if one side goes up, the other side goes down. For example, as the (H+) concentration goes up, the pH number goes down. As the (H+) concentration goes down, the pH number goes up. “Log” in the formula stands for logarithmic scale, which means there is a factor of ten between each pH number. For example, if the pH of a material goes from a pH of 6 to a pH of 3, it does not mean the (H+) concentration has doubled. Since there is a factor of 10 between each number, it means the (H+) concentration has actually gone up 10╯×╯10╯×╯10 or 1,000 times. Acids have a pH below seven while bases have a pH above 7, with a pH of 7 being considered neutral. An example of a pH scale from the EPA showing some examples along with environmental effects is shown in Figure€6.22 (www.epa.gov). pH is easily measured in a crime scene by the use of pH paper. The sample material is brought to the pH paper usually by the use of a pipette and a drop of the liquid is placed on the pH paper. The color change on the pH paper is

Environmental Effects

Basic

Examples

pH = 0 pH = 1 pH = 2 pH = 3

Battery acid

All fish die (4.2)

pH = 4

Frog eggs, tadpoles, crayfish, and mayflies die (5.5)

pH = 5

Acid rain (4,2–4.4) Acidic rain lake (4.5) Bananas (5.0–5.3)

Rainbow trout begin to die (6.0)

pH = 6

Acidic

Neutral

pH Value

pH = 7 pH = 8 pH = 9 pH = 10 pH = 11 pH = 12 pH = 13 pH = 14

Sulfuric acid Lemon juice, Vinegar Orange juice, Soda

Clean rain (5.6) Healthy lake (6.5) Milk (6.5–6.8) Pure water Sea water, eggs Baking soda Milk of magnesia Ammonia Soapy water Bleach Liquid drain cleaner

Figure 6.22╇ pH scale. (Source╛: www.epa.gov.)

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compared to a color chart that accompanies the pH paper. This process is covered in detail in Chapter 10. Solids, liquids, and gases may be corrosive and can have a pH; however, for pH paper to work, the material must contain water. pH paper comes in multi-ranges for acids and bases and is usually in whole pH numbers, but it can be obtained in smaller units (see Figure€6.23). A pH <2 or >12 is considered an extremely strong corrosive material and is hazardous to CSIs. After placing a drop of the substance on the pH paper, the color on the paper is compared to a color chart supplied by the manufacturer and the pH is determined. The pH paper may be interpreted as acidic, alkaline, neutral, or bleached. An acid will turn the pH paper orange to red with red indicating a material that is strongly acid. pH paper has limitations. The perception of the color by the CSI interpreting the reading may vary between two different individuals. Additionally, dyed or strongly colored solutions may render the pH paper difficult or impossible to accurately read. The pH of a material may also be tested using pH meters. The meters vary in size from extremely portable pH meters (see Figure€6.24) to laboratory bench pH meters, and also vary in price. They are more complicated to

Figure 6.23╇ pHydrion Jumbo Insta-Check pH paper.

Figure 6.24╇ Small handheld pH meter.

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use than pH paper in that they require calibration prior to use, and they also require the placing of the probe or electrode into the sample. If not cleaned and documented correctly, the placing of the probe into the sample could result in cross-contamination and be something a defense attorney could attack in court. Oxidizer Test Oxidizers can cause some materials to react vigorously; therefore, field screening for the presence of an oxidizer is critical. Oxidizer tests can use various reagents to detect different oxidizers and peroxides. Potassium iodide paper, also known as KI paper or starch paper, is widely used. The use of potassium iodide starch paper will detect the presence of some oxidizers by changing from white to gray, blue, or black depending on the oxidizing potential of the material and its strength. An oxidizer will react with the KI and release iodine (I2), which bonds with the starch and produces the color on the paper. Any shade of dark color from gray to blue to black indicates an oxidizer. Figure€6.25 shows Potassium Iodide–Starch Test Paper both before and after a drop of common oxidizer material was placed on the paper. Notice the dark black color indicating a positive reaction for an oxidizer.

Figure 6.25╇ Starch test paper used to detect the presence of an oxidizer.

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Water Finder Paper Water finder paper detects the presence of water in the sample. It does not detect whether the sample is water, but rather that water is present and the sample is therefore probably an aqueous solution. The paper changes from white to lavender in the presence of water. The paper will detect extremely small amounts of water. The paper is impregnated with anhydrous copper II sulfate that turns lavender when in contact with water. Many substances have water in them; therefore, it may be helpful to know if you are not dealing with a pure substance. Water finder paper validates the pH paper results since pH paper requires an aqueous solution in order to work. Additionally, knowing that water is present in a substance will help determine the use of other field presumptive equipment, which will be discussed in the Advanced Detection and Monitoring section of this chapter. Figure€6.26 shows water finder paper both before exposure to water (white) and after exposure to water (lavender). M-8 Paper M-8 paper is a chemical agent detector originally used by the military in combat conditions to warn of a possible nerve agent or blister agent attack.

Figure 6.26╇ Water finder paper.

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Figure 6.27╇ M-8 paper with color chart displayed.

It has been adopted for civilian use and used to screen suspicious liquids. A drop of the suspicious liquid is placed on the paper, which selectively turns color in the presence of a nerve or blister agent. The paper contains three dyes that are suspended within the paper and are sensitive to nerve and blister agents. It is important not to rub the paper on the surface of the material or dip the paper into the liquid. The presence of a color indicates a possible nerve or blister agent. If the paper turns a gold color, it is possibly a G-type nerve agent; if the paper turns red it is possibly an H-type blister agent; if the paper turns green, the liquid is possibly a V-type nerve agent. M-8 paper produces many false positives when used as a civilian screening tool. Depending on the concentration and viscosity of the agent, the reaction time of the M-8 paper is around 20 seconds. Figure€6.27 shows a packet of M-8 paper with the accompanying color chart. Each booklet of M-8 paper contains 25 sheets of perforated detection paper allowing 50 tests. M-9 Tape M-9 tape is also a chemical agent detector. It has an adhesive backing on it and comes in a roll approximately 30 feet long by 2 inches wide. The tape contains a red dye indicator suspended in the paper. The paper produces red spots when in contact with nerve agents and blister agents. Unlike M-8 paper, M-9 tape does not differentiate between the types of chemical agent present. It is more sensitive and reacts faster than M-8 paper, but like M-8 paper will produce a false positive in the presence of many organic compounds. Figure€6.28 shows a roll of M-9 tape with a piece cut off the roll. The box has a built-in cutter to enable a piece of the M-9 tape to be cut from the roll. The piece has been curled up to expose the brown back of the tape. This brown back is removed to reveal the sticky side, which is then placed on an item. Note: M-9 tape should never be placed on skin. The green side of the tape is the indicating side of the paper. As a reminder, due to the number of false positives, a positive result on either of or both the M-8 paper and the M-9 tape does not necessarily mean

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Figure 6.28╇ M-9 tape.

Figure 6.29╇ Convenient method for colorimetric testing called the “tiger paw.”

a chemical agent is present. Additional detection methods would need to be utilized to confirm the result of the M-8 paper and M-9 tape. As one can imagine, the manipulation of the papers may be difficult due to the number of papers and the fact the CSI will be in some form of PPE. A simple method for combining papers, sometimes called a “bear paw” or “tiger paw,” is described below (Figure€6.29):

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1. While wearing gloves, cut off a strip of M-9 paper from the roll long enough to hold the other papers in the vertical position on the M-9 paper. Turn the M-9 paper over and remove the brown backing. 2. Attach the M-8 paper, pH paper, water finding paper, and oxidizer paper halfway down on the sticky side of the M-8 paper. 3. Fold the M-8 paper over so it is even and holds the other papers. These may be made up ahead of time and placed in a sealed Ziploc® bag for use at a potentially contaminated crime scene. Advanced Detection and Monitoring Detection and monitoring technologies have made great strides in the past several years. Instruments that used to be available only in a laboratory setting have been miniaturized, ruggedized, made deconable, and are now available for use in crime scenes as a presumptive identification tool. Remember: Only the laboratory can positively identify a substance. When using these advanced technologies, the CSI must be aware of their operating parameters, their detection limits, and the proper use, storage, and maintenance of these instruments, and CSIs must maintain competence in the use of these instruments and in the interpretation and application of the information provided by the instruments. Several different technologies must be used to verify the results of any instrument. In addition, the results must be compared with the chemical and physical properties of the substance. Only then can any critical decisions be made in the field. Fourier Transform Infrared Spectrophotometer When an unknown substance is exposed to an infrared beam the following can happen: 1. The infrared beam can pass through the sample without undergoing any change. 2. The infrared beam is partially absorbed. 3. The infrared beam is scattered. The partial absorption of the infrared beam is the basis for infrared spectroscopy, while the scattering of the infrared beam is the basis for Raman spectroscopy, which will be discussed in the next section. Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FT-IR) measures how an unknown substance interacts with infrared light. As the substance is exposed

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to the infrared beam it may absorb specific frequencies of the infrared beam. The absorption of the infrared beam results in a spectrum, or a molecular infrared fingerprint. Each chemical substance has its own unique infrared fingerprint. The spectrum of this unique infrared fingerprint is then compared to spectra contained in a library, a process called spectral library matching. The instrument then displays the best matches. FT-IR can be used with substances containing covalent bonds, such as most organic material, but it is not able to identify ionically bonded substances such as pure table salt. The FT-IR also “sees” water, which can obscure other organic peaks since many materials contain water. Additionally, the FT-IR cannot “see” components of mixtures that are less than 10% of the mixture. The sample must be placed on the detector, and in the case of solids and powders, pressure must be applied to ensure the proper absorption of the light. Small amounts of solids should be used as the amount of applied pressure, usually about seven to ten pounds, may initiate some sensitive explosives. The FT-IR does not identify biological materials, but may display a warning screen saying the sample may be a biological material and further testing is needed. Figure€6.30 is an example of an FT-IR, called the HazMat ID, manufactured by Smith’s Detection.

Figure 6.30╇ HazMat ID.

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The database libraries in the HazMat ID include WMD—nerve and blister agents, toxic industrial chemicals, white powders, explosives and propellants, WMD precursors, common chemicals, forensic drugs and ClanLab precursors, and pesticides. No sample preparation is required and the entire system can be submerged in a decon solution. A positive identification of a sample using the HazMat ID occurs when the correlation between the sample spectrum and the library spectrum is above 95%, the spectrums visually match, and the physical properties of the sample compare with the HazMat ID result. The HazMat ID system comes with ReachBack™, 24/7/365 technical support to answer any questions regarding any result on the HazMat ID. The manufacturer of the HazMat ID (Smith’s) will interpret the spectrum of a suspicious substance obtained by the HazMat ID if a copy of it is sent to ReachBack. The HazMat ID 360 provides enhanced mixture analysis, Bluetooth wireless communication and decision support software (www. smithsdetection.com). Raman Spectrophotometer Raman technology is complimentary to the FR-IR; however, it measures the scattered or reflected portion of the beam. Raman spectroscopy uses a laser beam to produce the reflection and obtain a molecular “fingerprint” or spectrum of the substance. This spectrum is then compared to known spectra in the library and results are displayed based on probability. Note:╇ Laser stands for light amplification by simulated emission of radiation. Since Raman technology uses a laser, it can “see” through clear glass and some other materials without opening the container or coming in contact with the substance. As with the FT-IR, the physical properties of the sample must be compared with the Raman results. The Raman is not sensitive to water, but may be inhibited by the fluorescence of some chemicals and biological materials. High fluorescence will lead to long detection times, resulting in the sample not being identified. Raman should not be used on dark-colored substances or potential explosives as the heating produced by the laser may cause ignition. Safety precautions must be observed at all times when dealing with a laser. Similar to the FT-IR, the Raman detects biological materials and proteins poorly. Figure€ 6.31 shows an example of a Raman spectrophotometer manufactured by Ahura Corporation known as the FirstDefender. The FirstDefender uses a 300-milliwatt (mW) laser that can be projected outside the instrument; therefore, safety precautions must be observed when operating the FirstDefender in this mode. It has Point-and-Shoot™ identification, which allows it to operate through glass or translucent plastic. It also has an integrated vial holder, which allows a sample to be placed in the vial and the vial to be placed inside the instrument for identification. The library contains explosives, toxic industrial chemicals (TICs), toxic industrial materials

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Figure 6.31╇ FirstDefender by Ahura Corporation.

(TIMs), chemical warfare agents (CWAs), narcotics, precursors, and white powders and uses nondestructive technology. Incorporating both the FT-IR and the Raman technologies provides a complementary set of sample identification based on the strengths of each particular technology. For example, a sample containing water would be analyzed using Raman technology since water does not interfere with Raman technology. The presence of water in a sample could be detected using the previously mentioned water finder paper. A positive result on the water finder paper would lead to the sample being run on the Raman. Conversely, a material with high fluorescence would be run on the FT-IR since fluorescence does not interfere with the FT-IR. Raman spectroscopy is currently being studied to provide the identification of substances such as human saliva found at crime scenes while preserving the DNA evidence (www.ahura.com). Flame Spectrophotometry Flame spectrophotometry/photometry burns material and measures the light emitted by the hot atoms of the material as they cool. Humans see this light as colors. Flame photometry is similar to watching fireworks. Certain

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Figure 6.32╇ AP2C flame photometry detector.

elements and compounds give off a distinct characteristic color when heated and burned. For example, the color green in fireworks is produced by the element barium, with the compound being used in fireworks to produce the green color being barium chloride (BaCl2). Flame photometry is similar except the detector can “see” more colors than the human eye. A flame photometry detector (FPD) draws the sample into a hydrogen flame at which time the molecules reduce or degrade into smaller and simpler portions. Light is emitted and read by the detector. Figure€6.32 shows an AP2C, a flame photometry detector manufactured by Proengin, Inc. The AP2C burns the sample in a hydrogen flame using a special form of hydrogen. It then analyzes the light spectrum of the flame looking for the specific light spectrum of sulfur and phosphorous found in chemical agents. If atoms of phosphorous are detected, the instrument alarms for G-series nerve agents, which contain phosphorous. If atoms of sulfur are detected, the instrument alarms for mustard agent (HD), which contains sulfur. If both phosphorous and sulfur are detected, the instrument alarms for V agent, which contains both atoms. The AP2C comes with a scraper (S4PE) and is used to detect persistent agents in a liquid form. The scraper is rubbed on the potentially contaminated surface and heated, which converts the sampled liquid into a vapor that can be analyzed by the AP2C. The AP2C has a fast response time, high sensitivity, and returns to zero quickly after a detection. Flame spectrophotometry can also be used for the detection of toxic industrial materials (TIMs) (www.proengin.com). Ion Mobility Spectrometry Ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) instruments measure the mobility of ions, or the time it takes for ions to drift through clean, dry air at atmospheric pressure. The sample is ionized by a source of energy. The source is usually a radioactive source, corona discharge, or other sources capable of providing the appropriate source of energy. The ions enter a drift tube through an electronic gate in which the drift times from the gate to the collector plates are monitored. From the time of travel to the collector plates, a spectrum is generated, which is then compared to spectra contained in the internal library.

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Figure 6.33╇ APD 2000 chemical and radiation detector.

An alarm sounds and/or a display is generated if a match is made. There are several IMS instruments on the market with the newer ones being able to particulate aerosols and vapors. APD 2000 The APD 2000 detects chemical warfare agents and γ radiation (see Figure€6.33). Specifically it can detect G-series nerve agents (GA, GB, GD, VX), mustard agents (HD), lewisite (L), pepper spray, and mace. It was one of the first detectors on the market to detect chemical warfare agents and pepper spray. It operates on 6 C batteries. According to the manufacturer, it can detect G-series agents down to 15 ppb, H-series agents down to 300 ppb, and V-series agents down to 4 ppb (www.smithsdetection.com). Sabre 4000 The Sabre 4000, by Smiths Detection, is a portable trace detector that can detect chemical warfare agents, explosives, narcotics, and some toxic industrial chemicals (see Figure€6.34). According to the manufacturer it can detect over 40 threat substances in approximately 20 seconds. It can analyze trace particle samples or vapor samples. The narcotics detected are cocaine, heroin, THC, methamphetamine, and others. It will detect explosives such as RDX, PETN, TNT, Semtex, TATP, NG, ammonium nitrate, and TICs such hydrogen cyanide (HCN), phosgene (COCl2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and ammonia (NH3). Additionally, nerve and blister agents are detected as part of chemical warfare agent detection. The display is color coded to show the status of the instrument, with green showing

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Figure 6.34╇ Sabre 4000.

the instrument is ready, yellow showing the instrument is analyzing, and red when the instrument detects a chemical warfare agent, explosive, narcotic, or toxic industrial chemical. It is important to remember that this instrument is a trace detector and it is therefore easy to “overload” the instrument (www.smiths detection.com). Lightweight Chemical Detector The Lightweight Chemical Detector (LCD) by Smiths Detection samples the air for vapor and gases to detect airborne chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals. It uses corona discharge, which is nonradioactive, to ionize the sample. The detector is a “point source” detector, which means it only samples air in the vicinity of the rain cap. The instrument can be operated in three modes: 1. CWA or Standard Mode—In this mode the LCD samples the environment once every five seconds and provides a visual and audible

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warning alarm when chemical warfare agents are detected. It is operated with the rain cap in place (see Figure€6.35). 2. Survey Mode—In this mode, the rain cap is replaced with the survey nozzle (see Figure€6.35). This mode is used to sample a specific site, such as a container, personnel, or equipment. It samples once every second and provides a visual and audible alarm when a chemical warfare agent is detected. 3. Toxic Industrial Chemical (TIC) Mode—In this mode the LCD samples once every five seconds and provides a visual and audible warning when certain preprogrammed TICs are detected. Figure€ 6.35 shows the LCD with a rain cap (right side) and with the rain cap replaced with the survey nozzle (left side). The LCD operates on four AA batteries that provide approximately 100 hours of operation at a temperature of 68°F (20°C). Lower temperatures will reduce battery life. When the instrument detects a chemical warfare agent it also provides a visual agent identification with the two-letter agent identification code such as VX. Additionally, it provides a dose hazard level reading of high (H), medium (M), or low (L). It also shows the concentration of the identified substance displayed as a series of solid bars. Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectroscopy Gas chromatography/mass spectroscopy (GC/MS) uses two instruments: a gas chromatograph along with a mass spectrometer. The gas chromatograph separates chemical molecules as they travel through a capillary column. Due to the difference in chemical properties, the chemical molecules will separate in the

Figure 6.35╇ Lightweight Chemical Detector (LCD) (www.smithsdetection.com).

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Figure 6.36╇ Hapsite field portable GC/MS.

column and take different amounts of time (retention time) to come out of the gas chromatograph. This can take several minutes. As the molecules come out of the gas chromatograph, they travel to the mass spectrometer where they are ionized and detected using their mass-to-charge ratio. A graph is produced using the fragmentation time and detection peak. Since each molecule has a unique fragmentation peak, it can be matched against known graphs to identify the compounds. GC/MS is an advanced field-portable detector that can detect vapors given off by solids and liquids and gases in the air. Additionally, it can identify mixtures and concentrations of individual components. It requires highly trained and skilled operators with a knowledge of chemistry to produce accurate results. The initial costs are higher than other instruments discussed in this chapter, and it requires continuous training of the operator and maintenance for the instrument to function properly. GC/MS can provide laboratory results, but it is still considered a field presumptive test. Figure€6.36 shows a field-portable GC/MS called the Hapsite by Inficon (www.inficon.com). Surface Acoustic Wave Surface acoustic wave (SAW) technology uses a piezoelectric crystal to presumptively identify an unknown substance. The crystal produces an electric current when subjected to pressure. A polymer coating is applied over the crystal in order to collect the sample (vapor) and the results are compared to a library. If a match is found, the instrument will alarm. Biological Threat Agent Detection Biological threat agent (BTA) detection in the field is more difficult and complicated than chemical agent detection. Biological threat agents are living

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organisms and some of the most toxic substances known, and may occur naturally in the environment. Additionally, they may be a bacteria, a virus, or a toxin and be present in amounts that are not visible to the human eye, but still in potentially dangerous quantities. Additionally, BTAs may be found as solids or liquids. CSIs must be aware of the sensitivity and specificity of each technology used and have additional training in the proper use and interpretation of technologies for detecting BTAs. A “biological agent” means any microorganism (including, but not limited to, bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae, or protozoa), or infectious substance, or any naturally occurring, bioengineered or synthesized component of any such microorganism or infectious substance, capable of causing

A. Death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism; B. Deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or material of any kind; or C. Deleterious alteration of the environment. Source: 18 U.S.C. § 178 : US Code–Section 178: (1).

Biological Threat Agent Screening Tests BTA screening tests do not presumptively identify the BTA agent, but rather determine if a sample could be a biological threat agent or not. These tests use general characteristics of biological material such as protein, pH, and others. BioCheck™ Powder Screening Test Kitâ•… The 20/20 BioCheck kit by 20/20 Gene Systems, Inc., is a fast, simple, and inexpensive test for crime scene investigators to rapidly screen powder samples for the presence or absence of protein in the sample. It is sometimes known as the “20/20 test.” All biological threat agents contain protein; therefore, a positive result on the protein test (a purple color) indicates the sample contains protein and additional presumptive field testing is needed. A positive result does not mean the sample is a BTA, but only that it contains protein. Numerous substances contain protein, such as food products, vitamin supplements, etc. The test is conducted by placing the provided swab in the sample and rolling it over one time to cover the surface of the swab with the sample. The swab is then placed into the protein tube and read in 5 minutes. A purple color indicates a positive result for protein. If the test is negative, a positive control swab is added to ensure the kit is working. The protein test requires at least 100 µg of powder

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Figure 6.37╇ BioCheck powder screening kit.

or more to conduct the test and should be associated with visible powder for the results to be meaningful. It is important to remember that while the test will detect as little as 12 µg of protein or 100,000 anthrax spores, it is possible some BTAs could be dispersed in the sample and would not be detected by the protein test. Figure€ 6.37 shows a positive protein test (labeled 1) and a neutral pH test (labeled 2). The pH test is discussed in the next paragraph. Note:╇ Protein test strips are available at local pharmacies. These test for specific proteins in the urine and are designed for diagnostic purposes only and are not for detection of possible protein found in BTAs. The BioCheck Powder Screening Test Kit also checks the pH of the sample (tube labeled 2 in Figure€6.37). The pH test indicates whether the material being tested is acidic (pH solution turns reddish pink), basic (pH solution turns blue), or neutral (physiological) pH (pH solution does not change color: it remains a pale yellow or light orange). The pH test provides additional information about the sample. For most biological material to be viable, the pH should range from 4 to 10. A pH greater than 10 is too basic for the organism to be viable, while a pH less than 4 is too acidic for the organism to remain viable. Specifically, materials that may contain dangerous bioterrorism agents are likely to have a neutral pH. (A neutral pH does NOT mean a bioterrorism agent is necessarily present, only that further testing may be needed if the protein test is positive). Note:╇ The pH of the human body is 7.35 to 7.45. The instructions for the pH test state to wet the pH swab in the solution then rub it in the sample and place it in the pH tube (labeled 2) (www.biocheckinfo.com). This introduces a potential contaminant into the sample, which may be challenged in court. Therefore, it is recommended that a small amount of

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the sample be split from the sample using a sterile Dacron swab, and that both the protein test and the pH test sample be taken from the split sample. Starch Iodine Testâ•… The starch iodine test uses a solution of iodine in water that, when applied to a small segregated portion of the sample, will cause the iodine solution, which is normally brown, to turn black. The presence of starch will NOT rule out the presence of a biological threat agent. Since starch is present in many food products, the results, used in conjunction with other screening tests, may lead the investigator to suspect that the material may be a food product. The iodine solution may be made ahead of time and stored in an amber-colored glass bottle. GenPrime Prime Alert Systemâ•… The GenPrime Prime Alert System is used to field screen powders for the presence or absence of microbes (see Figure€6.38). It is considered a “broad” microbe screening tool since it determines if any microbes are present, not just one, such as anthrax. A nonfluorescent dye that can only bind to a cellular material found in microbes is introduced into the sample. The dye molecules change shape and become fluorescent if binding occurs. This fluorescent signal can be detected and quantified using GenPrime’s handheld instrument called a fluorometer. If there are no microbes in the sample, the dye will not become fluorescent, and therefore the instrument would not detect the signal A positive result (reading over 1500) suggests that the powder contains suspicious levels of microbes and should be treated as a potential biological threat. The sample requires preparation before being “read” by the fluorometer. The sample preparation requires a very small

Figure 6.38╇ GenPrime Alert System.

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amount of powder. If enough powder is present to use the Prime Alert, there is enough “cell-prep” solution to be sent to the laboratory for analysis. The “cell-prep” solution does not destroy the microbes; therefore, the receiving laboratory is able to use the solution for testing. The Prime Alert System also comes with lateral flow antibody test kits for ricin, botulinum toxin, and Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) (www.genprime.com). Biological Threat Agent Field Presumptive Identification Tests Biological threat agent field presumptive identification tests attempt to determine the specific BTA agent. They use different technologies and involve many manufacturers. As with the other tests discussed in this chapter, it is important for the crime scene investigator to understand each test and its limitations. Specificity and sensitivity are extremely important in the use and interpretation of these tests. Additionally, the CSI using these tests should be trained and experienced in the proper use of any field presumptive identification tests. Lateral Flow Immunoassay Test Stripsâ•… Lateral flow immunoassay test strips have been around since the 1960s and are similar to home pregnancy tests. They are also called handheld assays or HHAs. Typically they are single-use tests that use an antigen/antibody reaction that is specific to a particular BTA. They are easy to use and provide a qualitative result, a yes or no, for the presence of a particular BTA. The test uses antibodies that bind to specific proteins associated with a particular biological threat agent. A typical test strip consists of the following components: 1. Sample pad—After appropriate sample preparation, the potential BTA sample is applied to the absorbent pad. 2. Wick—An absorbent pad that draws the sample across the reaction membrane by capillary action. 3. Reagent pad—Contains the specific antibodies for the particular BTA the test is designed to detect. 4. Reaction membrane—An area on the strip where the specific antibodies are immobilized in a line across the membrane. This area would also contain the control for the test to ensure the test is functioning properly. The above components are usually fixed to an inert backing material. The test works by placing the appropriate amount of the prepared sample (as recommended by the manufacturer) on the sample pad. A reagent called a signal reagent specific to the particular BTA dissolves into the sample and binds to an antibody or antigen on the sample. The sample is drawn across the reaction membrane by capillary action where a second antibody or antigen specific to the BTA is immobilized on the reaction membrane. The second antibody

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contains dye, gold particles that are nanometers in size, or other material designed to generate the end color of the test. Gold particles are commonly used and produce a red color. If the suspected BTA is present in amounts above the threshold level of the test, a colored line will appear indicating a positive result for that test. Additional sample flows to the control area on the reaction membrane and forms a color to indicate the test is functioning properly. Figure€6.39 is a schematic of a typical lateral flow immunoassay test. Lateral flow immunoassay tests are subject to false positives due to crossreactivity of the test, improper sample preparation, improper reading and interpretation of the test, and other factors. False negatives can also result Lateral Flow Assay Architecture Analyte

Test line Control line (Antibodies) (αlgG Antibodies)

Antibodies conjugated tag (Gold, Latex, Fluorophore, etc.) Capillary Flow

Sample pad

Conjugate pad

Wicking pad

Nitrocellulose membrane

Backing

Test line (Positive)

Control line (Valid Test)

Control window Test window

C T

C T

C T

C T

Sample well

S

S

S

S

Positive Negative Inconclusive

Figure 6.39╇ (a) Assay test architecture diagram. (Source╛: spaceresearch.nasa. gov); (b) Handheld assays (Source╛: www.dugway.army.mil).

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from not enough of the prepared sample being placed on the test or using the test after its expiration date. Lateral flow immunoassay tests are vulnerable to an effect called the “hook effect.” It is important for CSIs using lateral flow immunoassay tests to understand this effect. This occurs when too much sample (antigen) is added to the handheld assay, thus exceeding the amount of the material, such as colloidal gold, designed to produce the colored line, which results in a false negative. In order to prevent the hook effect, some tests require diluting the sample material prior to using it on the test. Lateral flow tests are constantly being improved, with each new generation of the test having better selectivity and sensitivity than the previous generation and resulting in few false positives. Handheld assays are available for anthrax, plague, brucellosis, tularemia, Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), Staphylococcal enterotoxin B, botulinum toxin, ricin, smallpox, Q fever, and others. Manufacturers such as Advant Biotechnologies and others have placed several HHAs into one device, requiring only one sample device that is capable of detecting several BTAs simultaneously. For example, the Advant system can detect and identify five separate BTAs. Advant manufactures the Biowarfare Agent Detection Devices, abbreviated as BADD™, using lateral flow immunoassay technology. Some manufacturers of immunoassay tests, such as Alexeter Technologies, have incorporated a “reader” to help ensure that the results of the test are not misread. Additionally, the reader can document the results and provide an alert to a positive result. The RAMP® system by Response Biomedical Corporation uses immunoassay technology that combines the use of fluorescence with a proprietary internal standard (see Figure€6.40). According to the manufacturer, this provides an increased level of sensitivity, specificity, and reliability for BTA detection. The RAMP system consists of a single-use, disposable test cartridge and a portable

Figure 6.40╇ RAMP Biodetection System. (Source╛: Response Biomedical Corporation)

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scanning fluorescence reader. The sample is prepared according to the manufacturer’s instructions, is added to the test cartridge, and is then inserted into the reader. RAMP provides a positive or negative result in minutes. Tests are available for anthrax, ricin, botulinum toxin, and smallpox. Polymerase Chain Reactionâ•… Polymerase chain reaction, also known as PCR, is a technique used to replicate or amplify a piece of DNA from an undetectable amount to a detectable amount by generating thousands to millions of copies of the original DNA. DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is found in humans and almost all other living organisms. DNA is the hereditary material or genetic information that is used in the development of the organism. DNA is a double-stranded helix, often described as a ladder, as represented in Figure€6.41. The sample is first heated so the DNA separates (unwinds) into two pieces of single-stranded DNA. This process is called denaturing. Using the original strand of DNA as a template, an enzyme called “Taq polymerase” synthesizes two new strands of DNA and, after cooling, results in the original piece of DNA being duplicated. The heating and cooling process is called thermal cycling. Each of these strands of DNA is used to create two new copies, a process that continues until a detectable amount of DNA is synthesized. Figure€6.42 depicts the PCR process. PCR is automated and controlled by a thermocycler and is specific and sensitive in its ability to identify BTAs. The process is utilized in the laboratory to detect and identify BTAs, and new advances in the technology allow

Base pairs

Adenine

Thymine

Adenine

Cytosine

Sugar phosphate backbone

Figure 6.41╇ Diagram of the DNA helix. (Source╛: www.nlm.nih.gov)

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A

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T

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G

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Heat to 95° C DNA Strands will separate

(a)

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55° C Primers bind to template DNA strands A

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72° C Taq polymerase synthesizes new DNA strands AC TG TGAC

T CGA AGC T

AC TG TGAC

(c) T CGA AGC T

Two new DNA Molecules

Figure 6.42╇ The polymerase chain reaction. (Source╛: www.spaceresearch.nasa.gov)

automated processing of the sample, which makes PCR a viable tool in the field. There are several types of field-deployable PCR units available. Idaho Technologies manufactures a portable PCR system designed to detect and identify BTAs known as the Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device (RAPID) (see Figure€ 6.43). It uses Idaho Technology’s LightCycler® Instrument technology and can test for anthrax, ricin, smallpox, and plague. Idaho Technology also manufactures the RAZOR EX system, which is another field-useable PCR test (see Figure€6.44). The RAZOR can simultaneously test up to 12 real-time PCR samples and can test for anthrax, Brucella, botulism A, Coxiella, E. coli 0157, tularemia, ricin, Salmonella, smallpox, and plague. Smiths Detection uses LATE (Linear-After-The-Exponential)-PCR in their Bio-Seeq PLUS. LATE-PCR amplifies only one side of the DNA molecule, resulting in a higher proportion of single-stranded DNA. According to the manufacturer, this allows probing over a much wider temperature range

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Figure 6.43╇ RAPID (Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device). (Source╛: Idaho Technology)

Figure 6.44╇ RAZOR—field use PCR unit. (Sourceâ•›: Idaho Technology)

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than is possible with symmetric PCR. Tests are available for anthrax, tularemia, plague, and orthopox. The technology for detecting and identifying biological threat agents is evolving at a fast rate. Microcantilevers, nanowires, quantum dots, and handheld spectrometers are a few technologies currently being developed and tested for use in the field. CSIs must be familiar with the detection and monitoring instruments available for use during an investigation, the pros and cons of each one, and the sensitivity and selectivity of each technology. In addition, CSIs should receive extensive training in the proper use and interpretation of all instruments used during an investigation. All detection and monitoring equipment, field screening tests, and field presumptive tests should be used in conjunction with the receiving laboratory.

Evidence Recovery Equipment When collecting and packaging forensic evidence in a CBRNE/TIC crime scene, much of the equipment currently utilized for conventional crime scenes can be used in this hazardous environment. There are some exceptions— most notably, paper or cardboard packaging CANNOT be used. CBRNE/ TIC evidence collection and packaging have specific rules and most involve the use of primary, secondary, and tertiary containers (see Figure€6.45). Also, much of the conventional crime scene equipment utilized at a CBRNE/TIC will be discarded as hazardous waste. Equipment that is utilized in the exclusion zone must be subjected to the decontamination process and then be recertified to ensure it is clean. For the most part it is extremely costly to attempt to recycle the collection equipment. The topic of this section is collection and packaging equipment. Protocols and procedures are covered in Chapter 11. It is important to understand that the protocols will dictate the equipment. The protocols will answer the questions concerning equipment selection for collection, quantity, and packaging. The laboratories that conduct the analysis of the evidence developed these protocols, which are subjected to strict testing and validation processes before they can be certified for use in the field. The crime scene unit supervisor must identify the laboratories responsible for conducting the analysis of the CBRNE/ TIC agents in order to obtain these protocols. The local FBI weapons of mass destruction (WMD) coordinator can provide assistance and should help to establish coordinated training as well as determining the proper transit procedures for contaminated evidence. Remember that the FBI does not always respond to these types of incidents, and local and state laboratories (and protocols) should be identified for the majority of these events. Although protocols should be universal, they are not. It is recommended that Crime Scene Unit

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Figure 6.45╇ CBRNE Sampling and Collection Kit. (Source╛: Evidex, Inc.)

supervisors contact their local and state public health and environmental laboratories and establish partnerships before the CBRNE/TIC response is necessary. These locations should be predetermined and memos of understanding signed as agencies continue to increase their level of preparedness. The collection equipment to be utilized will be chosen based on characterizing the suspected evidence as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear and then employing the appropriate protocol. This characterization is conducted during the recon entry utilizing the instruments discussed earlier in the chapter. The characterization is based on the properties of the evidence: • • • • •

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Radioactivity Corrosivity (pH) Flammability/explosivity Toxicity/volatility Presence of protein

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• Physical state (solid, liquid, or gas) • Location of the evidence • How or if it is containerized Solids For solids suspected of being biological, the collection equipment will consist of individually wrapped disposable and sterile plastic or metal instruments, synthetic fiber swabs, and gauze pads. Instruments include spoons, scoops, spatulas, core samplers, shovels, scalpels, emergency medical technician (EMT) shears, tweezers, hemostats, trace evidence vacuum canisters, swabs, and gauze pads (Figures€6.46 to 6.51).

Figure 6.46╇ Sterile plastic spoons for collecting bulk powders.

Figure 6.47╇ EMT shears with blunt edges to reduce accidental punctures.

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Figure 6.48╇ 2" × 2" sterile gauze pads.

Figure 6.49╇ Scoopulas can be used for gathering bulk powder samples.

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Figure 6.50╇ Sterile swabs.

Figure 6.51╇ Spatula.

For solids suspected of being chemical, the collection equipment will consist of individually wrapped disposable and certified chemically clean, chemically resistant plastic; chemically clean glass and metal instruments; cotton fiber swabs; and gauze pads. These instruments are spoons, scoops, spatulas, solid-phase microextraction sampling needles (SPME), core samplers, shovels, scalpels, EMT shears, tweezers, hemostats, swabs, and gauze pads (see Figures€6.52 and 6.53). Finally, for solids suspected of being radiological/nuclear, the collection equipment will consist of individually wrapped disposable and certified chemically and radiologically clean plastic and metal instruments (long handled when available), cotton fiber swabs, and gauze pads. These instruments are spoons, scoops, spatulas, core samplers, shovels, scalpels, EMT shears, extended reach grapplers or grabbers, tweezers, hemostats, trace evidence vacuum canisters, adhesive lifters (latent fingerprint/footwear gel lifters), lint brush rollers, filter paper, Benchkote®, swabs, and gauze pads.

Figure 6.52╇ Copan tubes—sterile swabs with wetting solution.

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Figure 6.53╇ Disposable suture kit.

Liquids When dealing with liquids suspected of being biological, the collection equipment will consist of individually wrapped disposable and sterile plastic instruments, synthetic fiber swabs, and gauze pads. These instruments are spoons, cups, syringes and tubing, bulb pipettes, graduated pipettes and bulb, coliwasa tubes, tweezers, hemostats, swabs, and gauze pads (see Figures€6.54 to 6.58). For liquids suspected of being chemical, the collection equipment will consist of individually wrapped disposable and certified chemically clean, chemically resistant plastic and glass instruments, cotton fiber swabs, and gauze pads. These instruments are spoons, syringes and tubing, solid-phase microextraction sampling needles (SPME), bulb pipettes, graduated pipettes and bulb, coliwasa tubes, tweezers, hemostats, swabs, and gauze pads. Finally, for liquids suspected of being radiological/nuclear, the collection equipment will consist of individually wrapped disposable and certified chemically and radiologically clean plastic and metal instruments (long handled when available), cotton fiber swabs, and gauze pads. These instruments are spoons, cups, syringes and tubing, bulb pipettes, graduated pipettes and bulb, coliwasa tubes, tweezers, hemostats, swabs, and gauze pads. Air/Aerosols/Vapors The equipment needed for collecting air samples suspected of being biological will include electrical and mechanical devices. Three basic bioaerosol collector

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Figure 6.54╇ i-Chem jar used as primary and secondary collection device.

Figure 6.55╇ Syringe and tubing for collecting wet blood samples.

Figure 6.56╇ Bulb Pipette used for sampling and collection.

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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.57╇ (a) Graduate pipettes and (b) bulb.

Figure 6.58╇ Coliwasa tube.

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types are impactors, impingers, and filter traps. All three types involve electrical air vacuum pumps or centrifugal impellers, which draw air samples into the collector assembly. The units have controls to regulate airflow and the sample volume, and the pumps must be calibrated before use. These units each trap the possible biological agents utilizing different media. Impactor samplers use agar plates, adhesive-coated microscope slides, and agar cartridges. Impactors are advantageous for collecting trace amounts of aerosolized biological agents; however, a major disadvantage is that agents can be damaged or killed by the force of the impact if the airflow velocity is not properly regulated. Impinger samplers trap air samples on various liquid media including deionized water, phosphate buffered saline solution, modified Stuart’s media, and various broths. Some of the advantages of the impingers are that the bioagent’s impact with the liquid is far more survivable than that of the impactor, it can inhibit dehydration of the bioagent, various bacteria and toxins can be collected, and the flexibility of the laboratory analysis. Disadvantages of impingers include the glass collector, which makes it difficult to handle the liquid media, especially when the CSI is wearing PPE. Also, the team must have a good idea of the suspected agent to identify the proper liquid media to use. Filter samplers trap bioagents on various diameter filters that can be made from different media and are designed to trap particles of specified micron ranges. These filters are made into cartridges, and the advantage of this sampler is its ease of use. However, the disadvantages are that the impact can damage or kill the agent and the agents can dry out and die on the filter. Chemical aerosol collection equipment offers a wide variety of choices. Sorbent tubes and air vacuum pumps provide an easy way to trap aerosolized chemicals or vapors. Sorbent tubes are glass or metal tubes packed with an absorbent solid material, such as activated charcoal, carbonized molecular sieve (CMS), and Tenax®. The tubes can be packed with one type of absorbent media or a combination of media. Utilizing the sorbent tubes requires a battery-powered high-flow sampling pump and clean, clear, flexible Tygon® tubing. Other types of tubing can be used as long as they are clean and do not off gas any chemicals or absorb chemicals. To collect aerosolized chemicals with sorbent tubes, the air pump will be calibrated to ensure the flow rates, and additional equipment will be required to calibrate the pump. The standards are bubble meters and rotameters. The sorbent tube/pump system will be calibrated in the support zone just before its use in the exclusion zone, just like many of the handheld instruments used to classify chemicals. Once the pump unit has been calibrated, it can be utilized to collect aerosolized/vapor chemicals in the exclusion zone; however, a new sorbent tube must be opened and attached to the pump in the exclusion zone. You will need to have several pumps to collect numerous sorbent tube samples from within the exclusion zone. The sorbent tubes can have chemicals breakthrough and contaminate the pump. Some tubes have

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color change indicators to warn of chemical breakthrough, but in PPE it is easy to miss those indicators. Err on the side of caution and use one pump per sorbent tube. The advantages of using sorbent tubes are ease of use, they can assist in qualitative and quantitative laboratory analysis, they perform better with vapors, and their low (parts per billion) detection limits are excellent for trace amounts of chemicals. Disadvantages of sorbent tubes include that their fragile glass construction is susceptible to breakage, they require extensive preparation work before they can be utilized, they are vulnerable to contamination during preparation and storage, they require numerous pumps, breakthrough is possible during use, and samples collected on sorbent materials can lose concentration levels over time if not analyzed quickly (see Figures€6.59 and 6.60). Another piece of equipment used to collect aerosolized chemicals and vapors are negative-pressured canisters, sometimes referred as vacuum canisters (see Figures€6.61 and 6.62). These are typically made of stainless steel and come in all shapes, sizes, and volumes. Chemically inert materials line the interiors of these canisters and the manufacturers typically provide certifications of the canisters being chemically clean. The canisters work with specialized valves called restrictor valves that are available in individual diameter sizes or can be found in an adjustable diameter valve. Valve diameter sizes are used to control the intake of product over a specified period of time. These valves are treated in the same fashion as the interior of the canisters. These valves come with quick-release locking systems, and once a valve is used it

Figure 6.59╇ SKC air sampling pump.

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Figure 6.60╇ SKC personal air sampler pump.

should not be attached to another canister to collect another sample. The advantages include ease of use (turn on the valve, close the valve), they can assist in qualitative and quantitative laboratory analysis, their low (parts per billion) detection limits are excellent for trace amounts of chemicals, and they maintain concentration levels better than other methodologies. The main disadvantages of the canisters are that analysis of samples collected with canisters that contain water vapor or carbon dioxide can be problematic. Bag sampling is similar in concept to the canisters previously listed, but a vacuum has to be created, via an air pump, for the bag to fill with sample (see Figure€6.63). This methodology poses numerous safety issues and is not recommended. Solid-phase microextraction (SPME) sampling needles are another type of equipment for collecting aerosolized chemicals that has grown in popularity (see Figure€6.64). SPME needles are designed to collect samples on a tiny fiber coated with a variety of liquid polymer substrates. This fiber is protected inside of a gas chromatograph (GC) micro-needle. To sample, you must press the plunger of the needle to expose the fiber that will absorb the sample (solid, liquid, or gas). Once the sampling is complete, the plunger is drawn back to pull the fiber inside the needle. No additional preparation, aside from decontaminating the SPME needle housing, is required. The needle can then be injected in the GC port, where the fiber is exposed and the sample is desorbed into the GC for separation and analysis. Advantages of SPME are that no solvents are required for preparation, it is simple to use, it assists in qualitative and quantitative laboratory analysis, and it has low (parts per trillion)

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Figure 6.61╇ Restek vacuum air sampler.

Figure 6.62╇ Vacuum air sampler.

detection limits that are excellent for trace amounts of chemicals. Also, there is no significant loss of sample during storage, and the one-step collection and preconcentrations of the sample allow immediate GC analysis, which can be used with numerous analytical instruments.

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Figure 6.63╇ Tedlar air sampling bag.

Figure 6.64╇ SPME sampling needle. (Source╛: Sigma-Aldrick/Supelco.)

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Impingers can also be used for collecting chemicals. They collect air samples in a liquid media contained in a glass impinger through the use of a battery-powered air pump. The advantages and disadvantages are the same as listed previously for bioaerosols. Radiological/nuclear aerosols can be collected using specialized air pumps and cartridge filters (see Figures€ 6.65 to 6.67). The pump creates a vacuum through a specialized filter that is placed in screw-type housing with O-rings in front of the vacuum inlet. The filters are designed as a cartridge system, usually made of cellulose ester membranes or glass microfibers, and are manufactured in varying efficiencies to collect particulates of differing micron sizes. Each filter also requires a specific flow rate. The filters must be certified as radiologically clean before they can be used, and the units require individual filters and housings for each sample to be collected. This eliminates any cross-contamination that may occur if the housing is reused with different filters. As with any of the pumps/vacuums, the flow rate of the unit must be calibrated. The advantages of these systems are their ease of use. The disadvantages of these systems are the possibility of filter breakthrough contaminating the entire system and the re-aerosolization of radiological/ nuclear material caused by the exhaust fan. Bag samplers and impactors, previously described in the Air/Aerosols/Vapors section of this chapter.

Figure 6.65╇ RAD Air Sampler. (Source╛: F&J Specialty Products, Inc.)

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Figure 6.66╇ FJ-46P filter holder. (Source╛: F&J Specialty Products, Inc.)

Figure 6.67╇ TEDA impregnated charcoal cartridges. (Source╛: F&J Specialty Products, Inc.)

Packaging Now that the evidence has been collected, it has to be packaged in a manner that will allow it to survive the decontamination process. The packaging equipment, just like the collection equipment, will be chosen based on characterizing the suspected evidence as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear and then employing the appropriate protocol. The characterization is based on the properties of the evidence: radioactivity, corrosivity (pH), flammability/explosivity, toxicity/volatility, and presence of protein; and the physical state: solid, liquid, or gas. Regardless of whether the evidence is a CBRNE/ TIC agent or conventional forensics, all will share several packaging similarities. At a minimum every item of evidence will be contained in two layers of packaging (primary and secondary). In some cases a third layer of packaging (tertiary) must be applied before the evidence can leave the exclusion zone (see Figure€6.68). All packaging layers must be labeled appropriately.

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Figure 6.68╇ Glass jar is primary container, plastic jar is secondary container, nylon/polyester heat-seal bag is tertiary packaging.

Biological Evidence Packaging For all types of biological evidence including solids, wipes/swipes, swabs, liquids, and some aerosol collector samples, the primary packaging will be sterile plastic. This consists of wide-mouth jars with screw-top lids, centrifuge tubes with screw-top lids, trace evidence vacuum canisters, and culture swab kit tubes (see Figures€6.69 to 6.72). The secondary containers for solids, wipes/swipes, swabs, trace evidence vacuum canister, and some aerosol collector samples can be clean plastic resealable bags or nylon/plastic heat-seal bags. For liquid samples the secondary container will be a sterile rigid container, plastic or metal, of an appropriate size to hold the primary container and sterile Dacron gauze pads of sufficient quantity to act as a cushion and to absorb all the liquid held in the primary container should it break. The trace evidence vacuum canisters and some aerosol collector samples can be placed in these secondary containers as well (see Figures€6.73 and 6.74). These rigid secondary containers are then placed into tertiary packaging consisting of either resealable plastic bags or nylon/polyester heat-seal bags of the appropriate size (see Figure€6.75). This tertiary packaging serves as an added layer of protection to ensure that the decontamination solution does not penetrate the secondary container. If this were to occur, the primary container and potentially its evidence could be subjected to possible contamination or destruction. It also ensures that the evidence labels and other essential information survive the decontamination process intact.

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Figure 6.69╇ Sterile plastic wide-mouth jar—screw-top style.

Figure 6.70╇ Sterile plastic trace evidence vacuum canister.

Figure 6.71╇ Sterile plastic centrifuge tube with screw-top lid.

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Figure 6.72╇ Sterile culture swab kits with wetting agent tube.

Figure 6.73╇ Sterile plastic secondary container with screw-top lid.

Chemical Evidence Packaging For chemical evidence including solids, wipes/swipes, swabs, liquids, and some aerosol collector samples, the primary packaging is certified clean glass, wide-mouth jars of various volumes including Teflon®-lined screw-top lids (see Figure€6.76). Silica septa coatings are acceptable but not necessary for these containers.

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Figure 6.74╇ Clean metal secondary containers with friction lids.

Figure 6.75╇ Heat sealing the primary and secondary containers.

The secondary containers for all chemical samples will be a clean, rigid container made of plastic or Teflon-lined metal that is of an appropriate size to hold the primary glass container. Sterile/clean cotton gauze pads act as a cushion and can absorb all the liquid held in the primary container in case of breakage. This secondary packaging will require tertiary packaging of either a resealable plastic bag or a nylon/polyester heat-seal bag of the appropriate size for the reasons outlined previously in Chapter 6.

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Figure 6.76╇ Chemically clean primary container for chemical evidence.

Radiological/Nuclear Evidence Packaging The primary packaging for radiological/nuclear evidence, including solids, wipes/swipes, swabs, liquids, and some aerosol collector samples, will be certified chemically and radiologically clean plastic (polyethylene) wide-mouth jars of various volumes with screw-top lids, resealable plastic bags, nylon/ polyester heat-seal bags, and metal Teflon-lined cans. The secondary containers for solids, wipes/swipes, swabs, trace evidence vacuum canisters, and some aerosol collector samples should be clean, plastic resealable bags. For liquid samples the secondary container will be chemically and radiologically clean, rigid containers made of plastic or metal that are of an appropriate size to hold the primary container. Chemically and radiologically clean cotton gauze pads of sufficient quantity act as a cushion and can absorb all the liquid held in the primary container in the event of a break in the primary container. The secondary packaging for liquid evidence will require tertiary packaging of either a resealable plastic bag or a nylon/polyester heat-seal bag of the appropriate size. Depending on the radiological source and the energy it is emitting, primary, secondary, or even tertiary packaging may not be

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sufficient to contain the radiological energy. If this is the case, the use of a type B, radiological transportation container, made of lead or concrete, or a “pig,” made of depleted uranium, may be required to safely remove the packaged radiological/nuclear evidence from the exclusion zone. There is one more area of packaging equipment to be discussed, and that is the final transportation packaging, which is sometimes referred to as overpacking. This packaging occurs after the evidence has passed through the decon process and the evidence logs and overpacking steps are completed by the evidence custodian. Overpacking prepares and protects the evidence for transportation to the laboratory. The equipment needed for this type of packaging consists of clean 5-gallon plastic buckets with O-ring lids, clean gallon metal cans with lids, rigid or nonrigid coolers, and clean rigid plastic, hinged, waterproof sealed, locking cover cases with pressurization valves (see Figures€6.77 to 6.81).

Figure 6.77╇ Rigid and non-rigid containers used for overpacking.

Figure 6.78╇ Pelican case used for overpacking.

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Figure 6.79╇ Five-gallon buckets with lids used as overpacking.

Figure 6.80╇ Single overpack container.

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Figure 6.81╇ Multiple overpack containers placed in rigid outer case for transportation to lab.

Evidence Collection and Packaging Support Equipment To support the evidence collection and packaging operations, CSIs will need some additional equipment. To transport all the equipment to the exclusion zone, they will need handcarts or hand trucks and evidence/equipment bins (see Figure€6.82 ). To work in the contaminated environment you will need clean, sturdy, portable plastic tables and clean plastic sheeting to cover the tables (see Figure€6.83). Disposable, absorbent, plastic-backed medical “chucks” should be used to ensure a clean work surface for each item of evidence and to absorb any accidental spills (see Figure€6.84). Trash containers will also be required for the collection of the investigative debris. Finally, if heat-seal bags will be utilized to secure physical evidence, a clean heat sealer and a power source will be needed. Sizes vary for heat sealers; however, a 24 to 30-inch model with a sliding cutter on the heat seal arm and an adjustable heater control is recommended. Anything smaller than 24 inches is too small, especially for larger bulky items of evidence, and anything larger than 30 inches becomes too cumbersome to transport and use

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Figure 6.82╇ Using handcart to transport equipment and evidence bins.

Figure 6.83╇ Work table covered with clean plastic sheeting.

in small areas. If you are in an indoor scene where electricity is available you may need extension cords but be aware of the additional safety concern involved with the use of extension cords. If no electricity is available in the crime scene utilize a rechargeable portable battery electric supply unit. These systems can be used indoors or outdoors (see Figure€6.85).

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Figure 6.84╇ Use clean medical chucks on workspace.

Figure 6.85╇ Rechargeable portable battery supplies power to heat sealer in exclusion zone.

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Lastly, it must be understood that much, if not all, of this support equipment will be going into hazardous waste because it cannot survive the decontamination process, and more often than not, the cost and effort to decontaminate some items exceeds the replacement expense.

Equipment for Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Now that the evidence has been collected and packaged it must be decontaminated so that it can be safely transported to the laboratory for analysis. This process requires the following equipment (see Figure€6.86): • Large ground tarps to cover the ground of the entire evidence/equipment decontamination area, to catch any decontamination solution or water rinse that may accidentally spill or drip • Clean, sturdy collapsible plastic tables • Clean plastic sheeting to cover the tables • Clean, disposable, absorbent, plastic-backed medical chucks to ensure a clean work surface and to absorb any accidental spills of the decontamination solution and rinse • Large, deep, clean, plastic bus pans for catching decontamination solution and rinse run-off, and for evidence/equipment drying, screening, and evidence/equipment transfer • Clean plastic 5-gallon buckets or mop buckets, for decontamination solution and water rinse • Clean sponges for decontamination washing and rinsing • Large garbage pails with hazardous waste liners for hazardous debris • Fifty-five gallon hazardous waste containers with liners and sealing/ locking lids • Decontamination solutions including dish washing soap, bleach, and water • CBRNE/TIC monitoring and screening instruments • Plastic/metal folding chairs • Ruggedized laptop • Heat sealer, nylon/polyester heat seal bags, and an electrical supply source • Digital SLR camera and ABFO scales • Wipe, swipe, swab, adhesive lifters, and vacuuming evidence collection equipment

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Figure 6.86╇ Decon operator and facilitator decontaminating equipment.

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Terrorist attacks involving CBRNE/TIC agents can cause mass fatalities and mass destruction. All levels of law enforcement (local, state, and federal) must fully engage their resources to identify, prevent, and deter terrorism as they do for no other crime. No longer can it be said that terrorism is solely a federal law enforcement issue. Should law enforcement and our intelligence agencies fail in the identification and prevention of a terrorist attack, local law enforcement must be prepared to begin the investigation of the attack. Successful investigation of a high-consequence event (HCE) can be realized when crime scene personnel develop and continually enhance their knowledge and the skills needed for crime scene management. Developments in technology, along with improvements in the analysis and interpretation of physical evidence recovered from hazardous environment crime scenes, place even greater importance on properly documented and preserved evidence. While the response to an HCE will be multiagency/multijurisdictional, local law enforcement will start the criminal investigation and should have a response plan and assignments for all its personnel. CSIs should already be trained and be practicing the FBI’s 12-step process for crime scene investigation management. They must be prepared to set up their teams to conduct a crime scene investigation in potentially deadly environments of CBRNE/TIC agents. Every member of the crime scene investigation unit should be trained to safely operate in these environments, and each member should be assigned a specific role to perform at a hazardous environment crime scene investigation.

The CBRNE/TIC Crime Scene Investigation Unit The makeup of a CBRNE/TIC Crime Scene Investigation Unit must be uniform for all jurisdictions so there are no conflicts with assignments and missions when mutual aid agreements are enacted. Joint training and planning should be conducted with all mutual aid partners and the local medical examiner and the coroner’s office for fatality issues. (For clarity, the term medical examiner will be used throughout this text.) In a CBRNE/TIC incident, the potential for fatalities increases. The medical examiner’s office typically has statutory authority over fatalities and will conduct joint operations and investigations with law enforcement. These joint operations consist of teams of medico-legal death investigators (MLIs) and CBRNE/TIC crime scene investigators. Although victims who self-report to 161

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the hospital without being previously identified at the scene are decontaminated by the hospital staff, the CBRNE/TIC CSIU is responsible for any possible evidence on the victims. Members of a joint operation team will also report to the hospitals to gather evidence and document injuries and wounds. All members of the CSIU should be comfortable and familiar with the tasks they will be expected to perform in a CBRNE/TIC crime scene investigation.

CBRNE/TIC CSIU Components The CBRNE/TIC CSIU will be made up of two components: the command staff and the operational staff (see Figure 7.1). The command staff is composed of the group leader, safety officer, communication/administrative officer, liaison officer, equipment custodian, and evidence custodian. The operational staff is composed of the Tactical Phase Task Force, the Operational Phase Task Force, the Crime Scene Phase Task Force, and the Remediation Phase Task Force. In addition, the Evidence/Decon Strike Team, Hospital Strike Teams, Morgue Strike Team, and Backup Team are also part of the operational staff. It should be noted that based on the size and type of incident, CSI Group

CSI Group Leader

Command Staff

Operational Staff

Safety Officer Communication Administration Officer Liaison Officer

Equipment Custodian

Evidence Custodian

Figure 7.1╇ Command staff organizational chart.

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numerous teams of each team type listed above may be needed to accomplish the crime scene investigation mission. At incidents such as these, CBRNE/TIC CSIU will be working in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) under an Incident Command System (ICS). This being the case, CSIs must understand and conform to the operational titles of the ICS. For your reference, the ICS and NIMS are contained in the appendices.

Roles and Responsibilities of the Command Staff CSIU Group Leader The CSIU group leader is responsible for the overall planning and operations of the crime scene investigation and interfaces with the incident commander (IC), incident command safety officer, investigation and intelligence section chief, and all others necessary to obtain the required safety and investigative information (see Figure€7.2). The CSIU group leader will use this information to plan and execute the crime scene investigation mission. In addition to making all team assignments for the operation (based on the incident and the capabilities of the team and determining and requesting additional investigative resources as required), the CSIU group leader conducts all major briefings, debriefings, and requests for the CBRNE/TIC CSIU of the incident command staff via the chain-of-command. The CSIU group leader also reviews the preliminary crime scene perimeters, as well as the various hazardous zones, established by the first responders and determines and prioritizes the number and size of scenes and hazardous zones as needed.

Figure 7.2╇ Public Safety Sampling Team leader briefs CSIU group leader.

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Figure 7.3╇ CSIU group safety officer briefs the team.

Additional duties of the CSIU group leader include surveying the preliminary crime scene; evaluating physical evidence possibilities; preparing the crime scene narrative; planning the search; ensuring that all evidence is properly recorded, collected, stored, and transported; and conducting the final survey. Although these are the CSIU group leader’s responsibilities, the CSIU group leader will delegate these tasks to others in the CBRNE/TIC CSIU to perform on his or her behalf. CSIU Group Safety Officer The group safety officer is responsible for the overall safety of the CBRNE/ TIC CSIU, ensuring that safety procedures and practices are observed and identifying hazardous or unsafe conditions before and during the mission (see Figure€7.3). The group safety officer plans measures to protect the group including scheduling medical checks; issuing dosimeters and PPE; planning decontamination and rescue procedures, work periods, and rehabilitation times; and planning for emergency medical care. Also, the group safety officer takes immediate action to terminate and prevent unsafe actions or missions, and controls the team’s access to the exclusion (hot) zone and coordinates the backup teams assigned to the CBRNE/TIC CSIU. The group safety officer also assists in the final survey. CSIU Group Communication/Administration Officer The CSIU group communication/administration officer is responsible for handling and documenting all of the communications between the following entities:

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• The CBRNE/TIC CSIU command (CSIU group leader, safety officer, and liaison officer) and the IC staff and section chiefs • The CBRNE/TIC crime scene investigation strike teams in the exclusion (hot) zone and the group’s command staff in the support (cold) zone • The CBRNE/TIC crime scene investigation strike teams in the contamination reduction (warm) zone • The CBRNE/TIC crime scene investigation members in the support zone • The Hospital Strike Teams, Morgue Strike Team, and the unit’s command staff in the support zone The group communication/administration officer is also responsible for assisting in the final survey (see Figure€7.4). CSIU Group Liaison Officer The group liaison officer acts as the representative for the leader of the CBRNE/ TIC CSIU. The liaison officer provides lines of authority, responsibility, and communications and acts as the unit’s point of contact (POC) for the IC staff and section chiefs and coordinates mutual aid assets assigned to assist the CBRNE/TIC CSIU. The group liaison officer also coordinates pre-planned joint agency operations and assists in the final survey (see Figure€7.5).

Figure 7.4╇ CSIU group communication officer taking information from Hospital Strike Team.

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Figure 7.5╇ CSIU group liaison officer tracking mutual aid assets in computer

system.

CSIU Group Equipment Custodian The group equipment custodian ensures that all the CBRNE/TIC CSIU’s equipment and supplies are inventoried, maintained, operable, calibrated, not expired, radiologically clean, certified chemically clean or sterile, of sufficient quantities, and documented. The equipment custodian transports the CBRNE/TIC CSIU’s equipment and supplies to the scene and prepares the equipment and supplies. The equipment custodian stages an area for equipment preparation, storage, issuing, and return and also issues and tracks the equipment to various CBRNE/ TIC crime scene investigation strike teams (see Figure€7.6). When appropriate, the equipment custodian also ensures that equipment and supplies are stored in a temperature-controlled environment. This person documents the equipment and ensures that all reusable equipment has been properly decontaminated or packaged by the Evidence/ Equipment Decon Strike Team for shipment to the manufacturer for decontamination or replacement. The equipment custodian ensures that all returned equipment does not require decontamination or that it has been decontaminated, documented, packaged, and transported back to the command and that all non-reusable and destroyed equipment is replaced and documented to maintain a sufficient inventory. The equipment custodian requests additional supplies via the chain of command and assists in briefing the team’s command and in the final survey.

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Figure 7.6╇ CSIU group equipment custodian issuing thermal imaging camera.

CSIU Group Evidence Custodian The group evidence custodian ensures that proper evidence documentation, screening, collection, and packaging protocols are being followed. The group evidence custodian also supervises the decontamination of all evidence and ensures that the proper chain of custody (COC) has occurred and is maintained and documented. This person stages an area for evidence receiving, storage, and shipping and receives and documents all evidence from all strike teams (see Figure€7.7). The group evidence custodian is also responsible for ensuring that all of the following occur: • Collected evidence has been attached to associated equipment blanks and control blanks. • Evidence, blanks, and controls are packed for shipping to their appropriate laboratories. • Packed evidence, blanks, and controls have the appropriate paperwork attached. • Packed evidence, blanks, and controls, with the appropriate paperwork attached, are placed in the temporary security storage while awaiting shipping. • Packed evidence, blanks, controls, and associated paperwork are transported to the appropriate laboratories. • Packed evidence, blanks, controls, and associated paperwork are received by the appropriate laboratories.

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Figure 7.7╇ Group evidence custodian takes custody of Recon Strike Team camera after decon.

This person requests assistance for the delivery of evidence to the appropriate laboratories via the chain of command. Lastly, the group evidence custodian assists in briefing the team’s command and in the final survey.

Roles and Responsibilities of the Operational Staff The remaining CBRNE/TIC CSIU personnel will be assigned to the operational staff based on the various response phases, special investigative locational needs, and investigative logistical support needs. The FBI breaks down a CBRNE/TIC incident into 4 response phases (see Figure€ 7.8a–h). Theses phases are: • The tactical phase • Reconnaissance of threat −â‹™ Define the perimeters of the scene −â‹™ Searches for secondary explosive devices or additional CBRNE/TIC agents −â‹™ Search for human hostile threats (e.g., active shooter) −â‹™ Search staging areas for threats • Removal of hostile threat −â‹™ Render safe procedures for explosives −â‹™ Apprehend or eliminate human hostile threats −â‹™ Secure all staging areas −â‹™ Provide emergency responder force protection for all operations • Must be completed or controlled before moving to Operational Phase

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• The operation phase • Search and rescue of viable victims • CBRNE/TIC agent recon −â‹™ Stop any active dissemination −â‹™ Classify agent/TIC • Public safety sampling • Scene stabilization • Crime scene preservation • The crime scene phase • Scene recon −â‹™ Documentation −â‹™ Classify agent/TIC −â‹™ Screen evidence • Scene processing −â‹™ Collect evidence −â‹™ Process evidence −â‹™ Package evidence • The remediation phase • Mitigation and clean up • Restoration of the environment Based on these phases, the CBRNE/TIC CSIU operational staff will be organized into phase-specific investigative task forces. Tactical Phase Task Force The Tactical Phase Task Force conducts exclusion zone crime scene investigations associated with tactical operations, such as secondary devices that were rendered safe by an explosives technician or explosive ordnance disposal team, and/or the shooting of a suspected terrorist by a special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team.

Tactical Phase Operational Phase Crime Scene Phase

Remediation Phase

Figure 7.8╇ (a) Four phases of operation organizational chart.

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Tactical Phase Task Force Recon Entry Strike Team Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team Mon/Scrn Opr. Mon/Scrn Fac. D/A Person

Sample Coll. Sample Fac. D/A Person

Search Entry Strike Team Final Survey Entry Strike Team Searcher Searcher Fac. D/A Person

Surveyor Surveyor Fac. D/A Person

Figure 7.8╇ (b) Tactical phase task force (entering the exclusion zone).

Tactical Phase Task Force

Evid. Decon Strike Team

Hospital Strike Teams

Morgue Strike Teams

Decon Opr. Decon Fac. D/A Person

ER Coll/Opr. ER Coll./Opr Fac. D/A Person

Temporary Collector Facilitator D/A Person

Permanent Collector Facilitator D/A Person

Figure 7.8╇ (c) Tactical phase task force (outside the exclusion zone).

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Operational Phase Task Force Operational Phase Task Force

Evid/Decon Strike Team

Hospital Strike Teams

Morgue Strike Teams

Ops Coll. Ops Fac. D/A Person

Decon Opr. Decon Fac. D/A Person

ER Coll./Opr. ER Coll. Fac. D/A Person

Temporary Collector Facilitator D/A Person

Entering the Exclusion Zone Permanent Collector Facilitator D/A Person

Figure 7.8╇ (d) Operational phase task force (outside the exclusion zone).

Crime Scene Phase Task Force Recon Entry Strike Team Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team Mon/Scrn Opr. Mon/Scrn Fac D/A Person

Sample Coll. Sample Fac. D/A Person

Search Entry Strike Team Final Survey Entry Strike Team Searcher Searcher Fac. D/A Person

Surveyor Surveyor Fac. D/A Person

Figure 7.8╇ (e) Crime scene phase task force (entering the exclusion zone).

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Crime Scene Phase Task Force

Evid. Decon Strike Team

Hospital Strike Teams

Morgue Strike Teams

Decon Opr. Decon Fac. D/A Person

ER Coll./Opr. ER Coll./Opr. Fac. D/A Person

Temporary Collector Facilitator D/A Person

Permanent Collector Facilitator D/A Person

Figure 7.8╇ (f) Crime scene phase task force (outside the exclusion zone).

Remediation Phase Task Force Recon Entry Strike Team Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team Mon/Scrn Opr. Mon/Scrn Fac. D/A Person

Sample Coll. Sample Fac. D/A Person

Search Entry Strike Team Final Survey Entry Strike Team Searcher Searcher Fac. D/A Person

Surveyor Surveyor Fac. D/A Person

Figure 7.8╇ (g) Remediation phase task force (entering the exclusion zone).

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Evid. Decon Strike Team

Morgue Strike Teams

Decon Opr. Decon Fac. D/A Person

Temporary Collector Facilitator D/A Person

Permanent Collector Facilitator D/A Person

Figure 7.8╇ (h) Remediation phase task force (outside the exclusion zone).

Operational Phase Task Force The Operational Phase Task Force is a CBRNE/TIC crime scene investigative strike team that works with the search and rescue (S&R) team upon its arrival at the scene. Since the first priority is life safety, there is a high probability that evidence will be encountered during S&R team operation. To prevent evidence from being destroyed or lost and to not burden the S&R teams with evidence concerns or slow them down with their vital life safety mission, it is important for the CBRNE/TIC CSIU Operational Phase Task Force to deal with evidence issues. The Operational Phase Task Force is responsible for documenting the following: • Viable victims being removed from the scene • The locations from which viable or deceased victims were recovered from where possible evidence was discovered, and where body parts were discovered • Deceased victims awaiting removal in the crime scene phase In addition to documenting, the Operational Phase Task Force preserves and safeguards any body parts and/or possible evidence discovered by the search and rescue team. This team may possibly collect and package any evidence discovered and assists in briefing the team’s command and in the final survey.

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Crime Scene Phase Task Force Upon transitioning to the crime scene phase, the CBRNE/TIC CSIU Crime Scene Phase Task Force will be responsible for conducting the exclusion zone crime scene investigation. Remediation Phase Task Force Upon transitioning to the remediation phase, the CBRNE/TIC CSIU Remediation Phase Task Force will be established and placed on standby at the scene to deal with any possible evidence not previously discovered during the crime scene phase. Investigative/Support Strike Teams Ideally, these phase investigative task forces will consist of numerous strike teams, which are based on the investigative needs of the particular phase of the incident. The strike teams will be made up of three persons: 1. The strike team leaders identified as operators, collectors, and searchers or surveyors 2. The strike team facilitators 3. The strike team document/administrative member Investigating the exclusion zone crime scene will require four specialized exclusion zone entry strike teams. As the specific duties of each strike team are discussed, you will notice that the job descriptions seem almost identical; this is because the strike team members work together to complete one task across crime scene perimeters. Because of the redundancy of the duties, we will only describe the exclusion zone task force member duties, but know that these duties will be relatively identical for the remaining task forces. The Recon Entry Strike Team The Recon Entry Strike Team is responsible for initiating the preliminary survey of the scene, conducting CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring, and conducting a preliminary plain view search. In addition, the Recon Entry Strike Team locates, evaluates, screens, and prioritizes physical evidence possibilities. It also prepares narrative descriptions (to include the scene, monitoring, evidence, and screening) at the scene. Other duties include documenting the scene and evidence photographically/videographically, preparing/obtaining a sketch of the scene and placing evidence locations on the diagram, recording the evidence (plotting), and assisting with the final survey.

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Figure 7.9╇ Recon Entry Strike Team conducting evidence screening in the exclusion zone.

• The Recon Entry Strike Team consists of a monitoring/screening operator, a monitoring/screening facilitator, and a recon document/ administrative (D/A) member (see Figure€7.9). • Recon Entry Strike Team Monitoring and screening operator duties consist of obtaining all mission-essential equipment from the equipment custodian; conducting equipment operability tests, calibrations, fresh air readings, background readings, and documenting the results; and conducting CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring. Other responsibilities include locating, describing, and screening evidence as well as assisting in plotting evidence. The recon monitoring/screening operator also briefs the unit’s command and Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team and assists with the final survey. • The recon monitoring/screening facilitator assists in obtaining all mission-essential equipment from the equipment custodian; conducting equipment operability tests, calibrations, fresh air readings, background readings, and documenting the results; and also CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring. Other duties include assisting with locating, plotting, and screening evidence, as well as assisting in briefing the unit’s command and Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team and with the final survey. • The recon document/administrative (D/A) member is responsible for obtaining all mission-essential equipment from the equipment custodian, conducting equipment operability tests and documenting the results, controlling exclusion (hot) zone communications to the team’s command, and assisting in locating evidence. Other

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responsibilities include documenting the scene conditions, air monitoring, evidence screening, and providing results in the narrative. In addition, the recon D/A member obtains or prepares a sketch of the scene and documents the scene conditions and evidence location by plotting on a pre-obtained sketch or on the sketch prepared by the D/A person in the exclusion (hot) zone. Additional responsibilities include documenting the scene conditions, evidence, and the evidence screening/testing results by photography/videography; assisting the monitoring/screening facilitator when necessary; and assisting in briefing the unit’s command and Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team. Finally, this person is responsible for assisting with the final survey. Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team The Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team is responsible for conducting CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring; collecting, field-testing, processing, and packaging evidence; and depicting the evidence photographically/videographically (pre- or post-testing and/or processing). Other duties include preparing narrative descriptions (collecting, packaging, decon, COC, and possible detailed search results), conducting a detailed search (if jurisdiction protocols allow), transporting all evidence and equipment to decon, and assisting with the final survey. • The Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team consists of a sample collector, a sample facilitator, and a sample D/A member (see Figure€7.10). • The evidence recovery sample collector is responsible for obtaining all mission-essential equipment from the equipment custodian; conducting equipment operability tests, calibrations, fresh air readings, background readings, and documenting the results; and conducting CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring. Other duties include field-testing and processing evidence, collecting and security-sealing all evidence in the primary packaging, and placing all the primary packaging into the secondary packaging. The evidence recovery sample collector also conducts a detailed search (if jurisdiction protocols allow), transports equipment to decon, hands off equipment to the Decon Evidence/ Equipment Team (if jurisdiction protocols allow), briefs the unit’s command and Search Entry Strike Team, and assists with the final survey. • The sample facilitator is responsible for obtaining all missionessential equipment from the equipment custodian; conducting

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equipment operability tests, calibrations, fresh air readings, background readings, and documenting the results; and conducting CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring. Other duties include field-testing and processing evidence, collecting and security-sealing all evidence in the primary packaging, and placing all primary packaging into secondary packaging. The sample facilitator must also conduct a detailed search (if jurisdiction protocols allow), transport all evidence to decon, brief the unit’s command and Search Entry Strike Team, and assist with the final survey. The Sample Facilitator also seals the secondary packaging for all evidence and hands off the evidence to the Decon Evidence/Equipment Team (if jurisdiction protocols allow). • The evidence recovery sample document/administrative member is responsible for obtaining all mission-essential equipment from the equipment custodian, conducting equipment operability tests and documenting the results, and controlling exclusion (hot) zone communications to the team’s command. Other duties include documenting the evidence using photography/videography, assisting the sample facilitator when necessary, assisting in the detailed search (if jurisdiction protocols allow), and transporting equipment to decon. The evidence recovery sample D/A member must also hand off equipment to the Decon Evidence/Equipment Team (if jurisdiction protocols allow), assist in briefing the unit’s command and Search Entry Strike Team, and assist with the final survey.

Figure 7.10╇ Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team (collector and facilitator) sealing evidence.

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Search Entry Strike Team Search Entry Strike Team duties include conducting CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring; initiating a detailed search of the scene; and locating, evaluating, screening, and prioritizing any previously undetected physical evidence. Other responsibilities include preparing narrative descriptions (to include the scene, monitoring, and evidence screening) at the scene, depicting the new evidence photographically/videographically, recording (plotting) the new evidence on the sketch of the scene, and assisting with the final survey. • The Search Entry Strike Team consists of a searcher, a searcher facilitator, and a searcher D/A member. • The Search Entry Strike Team searcher is responsible for obtaining all mission-essential equipment from the equipment custodian and conducting equipment operability tests, calibrations, fresh air readings, background readings, and documenting the results. Other duties include conducting CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring, conducting a thorough crime scene search in an attempt to discover any previously unseen evidence, and describing any new evidence. The Search Entry Strike Team searcher also assists in the plotting of any new evidence, assists with screening any new evidence, briefs the unit’s command and Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team of any new evidence, and assists with the final survey. • The searcher facilitator assists with obtaining all mission-essential equipment from the equipment custodian and assists with conducting equipment operability tests, calibrations, fresh air readings, background readings, and documenting the results. Other duties include providing assistance with conducting CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring; conducting a thorough crime scene search in an attempt to discover any previously undetected evidence; and describing, plotting, and screening any new evidence. The searcher facilitator assists in briefing the unit’s command and Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team of any new evidence and assists with the final survey. • The searcher D/A member is responsible for assisting with all mission-essential equipment from the equipment custodian, conducting equipment operability tests and documenting the results, and controlling exclusion (hot) zone communications to the team’s command. Other duties include assisting in conducting a thorough crime scene search and attempting to discover any previously undetected evidence; documenting the scene conditions, air monitoring, and

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evidence screening, and recording the results in the narrative; and documenting the scene conditions and evidence location by plotting on a pre-obtained sketch or on the sketch prepared by the recon D/A member. This person also documents the scene conditions, evidence, and the evidence screening/testing results through photography/ videography, assists the searcher facilitator when necessary, assists in briefing the unit’s command and Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team, and assists with the final survey. Final Survey Entry Strike Team The Final Survey Entry Strike Team is responsible for conducting a review with all unit members as well as a briefing with all investigative and command authorities. Other duties include re-entering the crime scene, conducting CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring, and conducting a final survey sweep of the crime scene to ensure that all work has been completed and that all CBRNE/TIC CSIU materials/equipment have been removed. The Final Survey Entry Strike Team also prepares narrative descriptions (to include the scene, monitoring, and conditions) at the scene, depicts the scene final survey photographically/videographically, and assists with the final survey. • The Final Survey Entry Strike Team consists of a surveyor, surveyor facilitator, and a surveyor D/A member (see Figure 7.11). • The surveyor is responsible for obtaining all mission-essential equipment from the equipment custodian and conducting equipment operability tests, calibrations, fresh air readings, and background readings, and documenting the results. Other duties include conducting CBRNE/TIC environmental (air) monitoring, conducting a thorough sweep of the crime scene for CSIU investigative/operational deficiencies, describing any deficiencies, and taking corrective actions. The surveyor also briefs the unit’s command and assists with the final survey. • The surveyor facilitator’s duties include obtaining all missionessential equipment from the equipment custodian and conducting equipment operability tests, calibrations, fresh air readings, and background readings, and documenting the results. Other responsibilities include conducting CBRNE environmental (air) monitoring, conducting a thorough sweep of the crime scene for CSIU investigative/operational deficiencies, describing any deficiencies, and taking corrective actions. The surveyor facilitator also briefs the unit’s command and assists with the final survey.

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• The surveyor document/administrative member is responsible for assisting with obtaining all mission-essential equipment from the equipment custodian, conducting equipment operability tests and documenting the results, and controlling exclusion (hot) zone communications to the team’s command. Other duties include assisting in conducting a thorough sweep of the crime scene for CSIU investigative/operational deficiencies and documenting the scene conditions, air monitoring, and deficiencies, and taking corrective actions, recording the results in the narrative. The surveyor D/A member also documents the final survey scene conditions by photography/ videography, assists the surveyor facilitator when necessary, assists in briefing the unit’s command, and assists with the final survey. Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team The Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team consists of a threeperson team that works the decontamination line for all phases of the incident. This team is responsible for decontaminating and documenting any evidence and/or equipment recovered from any of the exclusion zone entry strike teams. The Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Team also documents ambulatory and/or deceased victims processed through decontamination, and documents and tracks previously identified viable victims rescued by the search and rescue team who are going through the decontamination process. This team documents, examines for evidence, screens, field-tests, processes, collects, and packages any evidence from ambulatory and previously identified viable and/or deceased victims processed through the decontamination process who were recovered from any of the response phases. Members of the Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team ensure that all decontaminated evidence recovered is delivered to the

Figure 7.11╇ Decontaminating and screening evidence packaging.

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evidence custodian. They are also responsible to see that all decontaminated equipment is returned to the equipment custodian as well as documenting and reporting all equipment being placed into hazardous waste. They will assist in briefing the team’s command and in the final survey. The Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team consists of a decon operator, a decon facilitator, and a decon D/A member. Temporary Morgue Strike Team The Temporary Morgue Strike Team is a three-person team assigned to the temporary morgue. The Temporary Morgue Strike Team is responsible for documenting and tracking previously identified deceased victims who are recovered, decontaminated, and delivered to the temporary morgue. Members of this team also assist in the medico-legal death investigation and with the victim identification investigation by photographing victims’ unique features, obtaining inked fingerprints, and/or using other forensic methods. The team also ensures that all decontaminated equipment is returned to the equipment custodian, as well as documenting and reporting all equipment being placed into hazardous waste. Finally, this team assists with briefing the team’s command and with the final survey. The Temporary Morgue Strike Team consists of a temporary morgue collector, temporary morgue facilitator, and temporary morgue D/A member. Permanent Morgue Strike Team The Permanent Morgue Strike Team is a three-person team assigned to the morgue. The Permanent Morgue Strike Team is responsible for documenting and tracking previously identified deceased victims transported from the temporary morgue and assisting in the medico-legal death investigation. In addition, the Permanent Morgue Strike Team assists in the victim identification investigation by photographing victims’ unique features, obtaining inked fingerprints, and/or using other forensic methods. Responsibilities also include taking possession of any physical forensic evidence removed from the victims by the medical examiner/coroner–pathologist; documenting, examining, screening, field-testing, processing, collecting, packaging, and decontaminating received evidence; and ensuring that all decontaminated evidence recovered is delivered to the evidence custodian. The team also ensures that all decontaminated equipment is returned to the equipment custodian, as well as documenting and reporting all equipment being place into hazardous waste. Finally, this team assists with briefing the team’s command and with the final survey. The Permanent Morgue Strike Team consists of a permanent morgue collector, permanent morgue facilitator, and permanent morgue D/A member.

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Hospital Strike Team The Hospital Strike Team is a three-person team assigned to the hospital emergency rooms (ERs) that provide care for injured victims from a hazardous environment. The team works the emergency room’s receiving/decontamination line where it documents ambulatory victims who have reported to the hospital on their own and were not previously identified, documented, or decontaminated at the scene. This team is also responsible for documenting, examining for evidence, screening, field-testing, processing, collecting, packaging, and decontaminating any evidence from ambulatory victims who have reported to the hospital on their own and were not previously identified, documented, or decontaminated at the scene. The Hospital Strike Team ensures that all decontaminated evidence recovered is delivered to the evidence custodian and all decontaminated equipment is returned to the equipment custodian, as well as documenting and reporting all equipment being placed into hazardous waste. Finally, this team assists with briefing the team’s command and with the final survey. Hospital Strike Teams consist of an emergency room collector/operator, emergency room facilitator, emergency room D/A member. Realistically, there may not be enough people to place three on each strike team. In such cases, the various facilitators would fill the role of the D/A member. Remember, depending on the size of the incident, it may be necessary to activate mutual aid agreements to obtain the appropriate number of qualified CBRNE/TIC CSIs. Also, for smaller scenes, if the CBRNE/ TIC CSIU does not have enough personnel to fill all the phase task force assignments, it may reassign strike team members, who worked in a previous phase’s task force, after they have been appropriately rehydrated and are physically fit to assume an additional role in the incident investigation. Additional Support Backup team members will be required to support the CBRNE/TIC CSIU operations. These backup teams are not members of the CBRNE/TIC CSIU; they are Hazmat-trained personnel from another unit, agency, or department assigned to the CBRNE/TIC CSIU. They are capable of entering the exclusion and contamination reduction zones to assist the CBRNE/TIC CSIU. Their duties may include one of the following tasks: rescuing CBRNE/TIC CSIU members from the exclusion and contamination reduction zones and delivering supplies, equipment, and materials in and out of the exclusion and contamination reduction zones to CBRNE/TIC CSIU members. The backup team also assists in any other areas as directed by the CBRNE/TIC CSIU command staff. Upon assignment to the CBRNE/TIC CSIU, these assets will report to the CBRNE/TIC CSIU’s liaison officer. The Tactical Phase Task Force, the Crime Scene Phase Task Force, and the Remediation Phase Task Force all utilize the four exclusion zone Entry

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Strike Teams, but the Operations Phase Task Force only has one exclusion zone Entry Strike Team, known as the Operations Entry Task Force. These task forces combine the duties of the four exclusion zone task forces into this one task force. This is because Operations Phase Task Forces will be attached to Search and Rescue Teams, should the incident require such actions. The Operations Phase Task Force will work alongside the Search and Rescue Teams and when decedents, body parts, and evidence are discovered, they will move in to document, screen, collect, process, and package, as required. If there is a large pile of debris it will have to be removed to rescue potential viable victims. In this case the decedents and evidence on the top of the pile have to be processed and removed as they are found, so that the search and rescue efforts can continue. If the CBRNE/TIC CSIU will be operating with the Search and Rescue Teams, its members will need search and rescue training. The CSIU personnel must not become an anchor by slowing the Search and Rescue Team down and hindering its vital rescue mission. Below is a list of training courses that can assist CSIs in preparing for CBRNE/TIC crime scene investigations. Chemical/Biological—Dougway Proving Grounds, Special Programs Divisions http://www.acbirc.net/ Advanced Chemical and Biological Integrated Response Course Explosives—New Mexico Tech, EMRTC http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training_ndpc.htm Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings Urban Search and Rescue—TEEX http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training_ndpc.htm Structural Collapse Technician 1 Structural Collapse Technician 2 Advanced Structural Collapse 3 Advanced Structural Collapse 4 Additional training for CBRNE CSIUs may be offered by the following agencies: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) http://www.trainex.org/ Hazardous Materials Incident Response Operations (165.5) Emergency Response to Hazardous Material Incidents (165.15) Sampling for Hazardous Materials (165.9) Air Monitoring for Hazardous Materials (165.4) Radiation Safety at Superfund Sites (165.11)

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Radiation Safety, Overview, Practical, and Advanced Course, Chemistry for Environmental Professionals—Fundamentals (165.21) Chemistry for Environmental Professionals—Applied (165.21) Advanced Environmental Crimes Training Program U.S. Department of Homeland Security â•… http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/training/ Radiation—NISA, UNLV, Bechtel, Nevada â•… http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training_ndpc.htm â•… WMD Radiological/Nuclear Responder Operations Course â•… WMD Radiological/Nuclear Awareness Course Radiation—FEMA, EMI â•… http://training.fema.gov/ â•… Radiological Emergency Response â•… Radiological Emergency Response Operations Biological—Louisiana State University, NCBRT â•… http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training_ndpc.htm â•… Emergency Response to Domestic Biological Incidents â•… Public Safety WMD Response—Sampling Techniques and Guidelines â•… Advanced Forensic Investigations for Hazardous Environments Chemical—Center for Domestic Preparedness â•… http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training_ndpc.htm â•… WMD Emergency Responder Hazardous Materials Technician â•… WMD Crime Scene Management for Emergency Responders â•… WMD HAZMAT Evidence Collection Explosives—FBI â•…http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/current/communications/2007_10_ communications02.htm â•… Post-Blast Investigators â•… Large Vehicle Bomb Advanced Post-Blast Investigations Course Explosives—ATF â•… http://www.atf.gov/explarson/arson_explosives_training.htm â•… Advanced Explosives Investigative Techniques Course Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) â•… http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/training.htm â•… Clandestine Laboratory Training Additional training is available from many local organizations: Confined Space Training and Confined Space Rescue Training Rescue Rope Training OSHA rule 29 CFR 1910.146

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8

The Recon

During the operations phase of the incident, the Public Safety Sampling Team (PSST) will make multiple entries into the crime scene to assess and classify the threat. The PSST will recover public safety samples that will be used to in an effort to identify the suspected agent or chemical and to mitigate the risks to the public and responders. These PSST members should follow the FBI 12-Step Crime Scene Management Process. The process includes documenting the original appearance of the scene and the evidence, as well as limiting the alteration to the crime scene, evidence contamination/crosscontamination, or destruction. For these reasons it is imperative that the CBRNE CSIU be closely involved with the PSST planning and operations. Remember, these PSSTs will be conducting work that will be directly impacting the crime scene investigation. In a cooperative environment, the CBRNE CSIU Team Leader and command staff work directly with the PSST during their operations (see Figure€ 8.1). Upon completion of the PSST operations, the CBRNE CSIU Team Leader and Command Staff will only require a short briefing, and copies of all the PSST scene documentation paperwork, environment screening results, photographs, sketches, sampling screening results, and the public safety samples are vital to assist in formulating the CBRNE CSIU’s operations. This documentation will be considered evidence and will be placed into the crime scene investigations case folder. After the PSST briefing is complete, the CBRNE CSIU group leader will conduct a command staff meeting to formulate the group’s operational plan. This information will then be conveyed to the CSIU’s operational staff through a briefing to determine staff assignments and the plan to achieve the group’s mission in a safe manner (see Figure€8.2). The first operational aspect of a CBRNE/TIC crime scene investigation is known as the Recon Entry. In crime scene vernacular this process is known as the crime scene walk-through, and it is the equivalent of initiating the preliminary survey if you follow the FBI’s 12-Step Crime Scene Management Plan. Whatever the terminology of your agency, this step is the first entry into the crime scene by the CSIs (in this book it is referred to as the Recon Entry to eliminate confusion). It is where the CSIs will conduct a plain view evidence search. The CSIs will not touch anything at this point in the crime scene investigation, but just identify the plain view evidence. The CSIs will be following the same crime scene documentation standards followed at conventional crime scenes: photography, sketching and measuring, and creating 185

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Figure 8.1╇ Public Safety Sampling Team leader shares information with CSIU Team Leader.

Figure 8.2╇ Continual briefings keep all team members apprised of the situation.

evidence logs. The goal of the recon entry is to classify the evidence, describe the morphology, fix and measure its location in the scene, and determine the type of processing required. However, the CBRNE/TIC crime scene recon entry has several major differences from a conventional crime scene walk-through: 1. CSIs will receive the intelligence from the PSST and Bomb Squad operations, which can include X-rays, photographs, public safety samples and locations, sketches, sample screening results and classifications, safety issues, and environmental monitoring results. 2. Before the standard crime scene walk-through documentation can occur, the environment will have to be monitored, screened, and documented to ensure the scene is safe for the CSIs to enter and work. 3. The crime scene will have to be monitored and screened to locate CBRNE/TIC evidence. 4. The located CBRNE/TICs will have to be screened and tested to be classified.

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Why does the environment and CBRNE/TIC evidence need to be screened if the PSST has already completed these steps? The answer is simple: The PSST team members are not usually law enforcement officers, and they entered the crime scene to conduct their monitoring and screening for the purpose of public safety operations. The CSI cannot rely on their work for the criminal investigation. CSIs will have to do their own monitoring and screening to support their investigation, and more importantly their safety. Think of it this way: To rely on the PSST work for the criminal investigation is to rely on hearsay. The CSI did not witness the PSST conducting the monitoring or screening. Most importantly, the conditions in the scene may have changed for better or worse since the time that the PSST conducted its monitoring and screening operations. Once the CBRNE CSIU operational staff has been briefed by the command staff (group leader, group safety officer, the evidence and equipment custodians), the Recon Strike Team will report to the equipment custodian to obtain all mission-essential equipment. It is critical that all the equipment that will be utilized for monitoring, screening, documentation, communications, and safety are documented for the following: • • • • • • • • • • • •

Serial numbers Make and model Quantities Calibrated (fresh air or other) Tested with positive and negative control tests (QA/QC) Background radiation ranges identified Fully charged batteries Valid expiration dates Communication networks are synced and operating Computer software and hardware are all functioning SCBAs are fully charged and regulators are operating Chemical protective clothing (CPC) is free of defects

The equipment custodian must create and maintain detailed records of all this information in the various equipment logs. Additionally the equipment custodian must document the date/time and the names of the persons issued the equipment. After setting up all the equipment and placing it on the handcarts for transportation, the Recon Entry Strike Team will proceed to the Medical Monitoring Team location. Vitals (heart rate, blood pressure, respiratory rate, and temperature) of every team member must be checked and recorded to ensure each person is physically fit to go operational in their PPE (see Figure 8.3). Once the Medical Monitoring Team has approved the Recon Strike Team members, they will don their PPE and receive their final safety briefing from the CBRNE CSIU

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Figure 8.3╇ Medical monitoring is essential before CSIU team members don PPE.

Figure 8.4╇ CSIU team member donning PPE.

group safety officer (see Figure€8.4). Before the Recon Strike Team suits up in PPE and heads down range to the exclusion zone, the Rescue Team must be set up and in place and the technical decontamination lines operational. The monitoring/screening operator is the Recon Strike Team’s leader and will lead the team down range with a multi-gas/PID meter and extend a probe containing wet pH paper in front. Following the operator is the Recon Strike Team’s facilitator carrying radiation detection equipment and any other

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appropriate monitoring and screening equipment, as well as assisting in wheeling the handcart with the equipment. The third team member is a Recon Strike Team D/A member who will wheel the handcart transporting the equipment. The D/A member will also handle communications between the team and command as well as complete the documentation. Upon arrival at the entrance to the exclusion zone, the Recon Strike Team members will perform the following: D/A member: Notifies the CBRNE CSIU command (communications officer) the team has arrived at the entrance to the exclusion zone and that the Operator is commencing environmental monitoring and screening around or at the entrance. Operator: Takes the wet pH paper on the probe and slowly exposes the paper around the entrance (bottom, middle, and top) and reports the results to the D/A member. Hands the pH probe to the facilitator. D/A member: Reports the results of the pH paper to command. Operator: Slowly examines the entrance with the multi-gas/PID meter in the same manner as the pH paper and reports the results to the D/A member. Passes the meter to the facilitator. D/A member: Reports the results of the multi-gas/PID meter to command. Facilitator: Takes possession of the radiation detector and provides the Operator any other meters or monitors, chemical or other, as required for the scene. Operator: Scans the entrance with additional meters or monitors, chemical or others, as required for the scene. D/A member: Reports the results of the additional meters or monitors to command. Operator: Returns the radiation meter to the facilitator who provides various chemical warfare agent and TIC monitors/meters (ion mobility spectrometer, flame spectrometer, or flame ionization spectrometer) when the scene calls for such instrumentation. The entrance is then scanned with the aforementioned equipment. D/A member: Reports the results of the chemical warfare agent monitor to command. If the environment is suspected of being contaminated by a chemical warfare agent or TIC, the CBRNE CSIU Recon Entry Strike Team must utilize multiple chemical monitors/meters of different analytical modalities to assess the scene and classify the possible chemical. Remember, these chemical instruments are considered presumptive field tests; if different analytical modalities are employed, and all classify the environment as being contaminated by the same possible chemical, then the CSI’s confidence level should be high that the threat has been correctly classified.

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The D/A member reports all of the readings from the instruments to command. Simultaneously they are recorded by the communications officers in the support zone and the command staff will review the information. Based on the results of the monitors, meters, and papers, the CBRNE CSIU command staff (safety officer) and Recon Strike Team will determine if it is safe to proceed with the recon operations. If the command staff or the Recon Strike Team deems the environment unsafe for the Recon Strike Team to proceed with the mission, the Recon Strike Team will exit the scene to the contamination reduction zone for decontamination. Some of these decisions are no-brainers. For instance, if the LEL is alarming at the predetermined turn back or the oxygen level has dropped below 19.6% and this was not the situation when the PSST made entry into the exclusion zone, then there is a problem at the scene that will need to be identified and mitigated before the CBRNE CSIU group can continue its operations. If it is deemed appropriate to proceed, the Recon Strike Team will make entry into the exclusion zone. Upon receiving the green light the Recon Strike Team will perform the following: D/A member: Steps up to the front of the team. Photographs the entrance to the exclusion zone and reports them to command. Note:╇ Given the intelligence provided by the PSST, many of the photographs that the CBRNE CSIU Recon Entry Strike Team will be required to take can be pre-planned and documented on a photo log in the support zone prior to proceeding to the exclusion zone. The Recon Entry Strike Team can use this photo log as a guide while working in the exclusion zone. Operator: At this point the operator retrieves the pH probe and the multi-gas/PID meter from the Facilitator and makes entry into the exclusion zone with the pH probe extended in front of the team (see Figure 8.5). D/A member: Reports to command that the Strike Team has made entry into the exclusion zone and is proceeding to conduct environmental monitoring and screening. Facilitator: Follows behind the operator, monitoring and screening the environment for radiation and, when necessary, chemical warfare agents (see Figure 8.6). D/A member: Follows the facilitator into the exclusion zone with the handcart and the equipment. Operator: Screens and monitors the exclusion zone in the same manner as performed at the entrance (low, medium, and high) with the pH and the multi-gas/PID meter and reports the results to the D/A member (see Figure€8.5).

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Figure 8.5╇ Monitoring and screening the exclusion zone with pH paper and a multi-gas/PID meter.

D/A Member: Relays the results of the pH and multi-gas/PID meter to Command. Facilitator: Reports the results of the radiation and chemical monitoring and screening results to the D/A member (See Figure€8.6). D/A member: Relays the results of the monitoring and screening results to command. Operator: Screens the exclusion zone with a thermal imaging camera to identify any thermal threats. Reports the results to the D/A member (see Figure€8.7). D/A member: Relays the results of the thermal imaging screening to command. Facilitator: Obtains the alternate light source (ALS), screens the exclusion zone, and reports the results to the D/A member (see Figure€8.8). D/A member: Relays the results of the ALS screening to command (see Figure€8.9). It should be noted again that depending on the readings of the instruments inside the exclusion zone, the Recon Entry Strike Team may not be able to complete all of the environmental monitoring and screening tasks. If safety issues are identified the team is required to evacuate the exclusion zone. However, if the scene can be fully screened the command staff and the

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Figure 8.6╇ Using a radiation meter to monitor and screen the exclusion zone.

Figure 8.7╇ Monitoring and screening the exclusion zone with a thermal imaging camera.

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Figure 8.8╇ Screening the exclusion zone with an alternate light source.

Figure 8.9╇ Results are reported to command while CSIU team members are in the exclusion zone.

Recon Entry Strike Team will analyze the monitoring and screening results to determine if it is safe to continue the recon operations. If it is not safe to continue, the Recon Entry Strike Team will evacuate the exclusion zone and proceed to the contamination reduction zone to complete the decontamination

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process. If the scene is deemed safe to proceed, the Recon Entry Strike Team will continue with the scene documentation. Currently there are no handheld, direct reading instruments for classifying an environment for biological agents.

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The Documentation

9

Documentation is an essential part of any crime scene investigation. Everything that is associated with the crime scene investigation must be documented in writing and becomes part of the permanent case file. Juries are composed of a more informed citizenry whose demands for facts are based on testimony but are substantiated by documentation. Defense attorneys will seek any opportunity to create a perception of faulty protocol or weak documentation. Remember, defense attorneys do not try to prove their client’s innocence, but rather to create reasonable doubt and gain acquittal or dismissal of charges. One of the most frequently used defense tactics is to attempt to discredit the CSI. When the physical evidence creates linkages that may associate the defendant to the crime and the crime scene then the defense attorney will attempt to cast doubt on the training and actions of the CSI at the crime scene. Every step taken and all evidence developed by the CSI are subject to be tainted by the same doubt. This also creates the possibility that lab results will be mitigated to some degree. Defense attorneys who are successful in creating that level of reasonable doubt in the minds of those in the courtroom may prevent the lab analyses from being presented to the jurors or the judge. The documentation of a crime scene investigation starts with the initial call assigning the CSI to respond to a crime scene and continues through every aspect of the response. On-scene operations and actions taken before and during the CBRNE CSIU operations must be painstakingly documented. The completed crime scene investigation signals the end of the documentation process. The Recon Entry is the first exclusion zone operation conducted by the CBRNE CSIU group. After the Recon Entry Strike Team has thoroughly monitored, screened, and documented the environment of the exclusion zone and it has been deemed safe to continue the recon mission, the Recon Entry Strike Team will begin documenting the physical appearance of the exclusion zone crime scene and plain view evidence, CBRNE/TIC evidence, and forensic evidence. The three methods of documenting the physical appearance of the scene and evidence are written notes, photographs, and sketches. Written documentation is a very detailed written description of a crime scene. While written documentation can be very exact (e.g., using measurements to list the precise location of an item of evidence), in most cases you will not know exactly where the evidence or other items described in the scene are located within a crime scene without a visual reference of the scene. 195

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In this environment writing notes is very cumbersome and requires specialized pads and pens to do so. In most cases it is more advantageous to communicate this information via the radio to the group’s communication officer so that it can be captured on paper in the support zone. In some locales, all radio transmissions are recorded and can be digitally transcribed to create the written narrative. Photographic documentation is a two-dimensional representation of a crime scene. Photographs provide the reader of written documentation with a visual reference of the scene. However, photographs contain some degree of spatial distortion, because they present a single-point perspective and may therefore mislead the viewer as to the spatial relationships of the information portrayed in the photograph. In contaminated environments you will have to utilize specialized photographic equipment, or a combination of computer software and hardware, as well as communications equipment to safely transmit the photographic images out of the exclusion zone. Finally, sketching documentation is a two-dimensional representation of a crime scene. Of the three methods of documenting a crime scene, sketches drawn to scale provide the viewer with the most defined or clearest understanding of the spatial relationships of a crime scene and the important information contained within it. Sketches tie together all information presented in the written and photographic documentation and can be used in many aspects of a criminal investigation. For example, CSIs may pre-plan many of the steps in the FBI 12-step process during the operational briefing. Detectives may also utilize the documentation to pinpoint the locations of witnesses and suspects and to assist in their debriefings. For operations conducted in CBRNE/TIC crime scenes, sketches of the scene may have already been prepared by the PSST or plans may have been obtained by the Incident Command Staff. If these pre-drawn plans are available, the CBRNE CSIU group can obtain copies and prepare one set to safely enter and exit the exclusion zone with the Recon Entry Strike Team. The D/A member of the Recon Entry Strike Team will be responsible for taking these plans or sketches into the exclusion zone to verify accuracy so they may be used for the crime scene investigation. If the plan or sketch is not accurate it cannot be used, and the D/A member will then be required to prepare an original crime scene sketch. To prepare a plan or sketch of the crime scene in a CBRNE/TIC contaminated crime scene, the D/A member will need the following supplies or equipment (depending on availability): standard paper and pencils with transparent packaging, specialized pads and pens that require no packaging, ruggedized laptop computer with CAD software, total stations, scan stations, GPS units, and other measuring devices. The D/A member is responsible for all the documentation methodologies previously described and receives assistance from the Recon Entry Strike Team

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operator and facilitator. Upon completion of the environmental monitoring and screening the Recon Entry Strike Team will perform the following tasks: D/A member: Notifies command that Recon Entry Strike Team is continuing the recon operations. Completes long-range or overall photographs of the crime scene (see Figure 9.1). The D/A member steps up and has the operator and facilitator follow behind. Photographs the exclusion zone crime scene. Notifies command when the photography is completed. Note:╇ Given the intelligence provided by the PSST, many of the photographs that the CBRNE CSIU Recon Entry Strike Team need to take can be preplanned and documented on a photo log in the support zone, prior to proceeding to the exclusion zone. The Recon Entry Strike Team can use this photo log as a guide while in the exclusion zone.

Figure 9.1╇ CSIU document/admin member taking long-range photographs with a deconable camera.

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The photographic methodologies employed for CBRNE/TIC crime scenes will be the same as those used for conventional crime scenes to include longrange or overall photographs, medium-range or evidence positioning photographs, medium-range or evidence positioning photographs with evidence numbers and scales, and finally, close-up photographs with evidence numbers and scales. It should be noted that the CBRNE/TIC samples identified by the PSST will be among the first pieces of evidence identified, documented, and screened by the CBRNE CSIU Group’s Recon Entry Strike Team as the concerns of transient properties and safety issues are the highest priorities. Typically CSIs will perform an assessment of all the evidence located in the crime scene. The CSIs will determine whether the evidence is in danger of being contaminated or cross-contaminated, destroyed or lost, or displays transient properties, and whether there may be safety issues associated with the evidence. Once the assessment has been completed, the evidence that was deemed to be endangered, transient, or to have a safety issue will be documented, screened, collected, processed, and packaged first. D/A member: Upon completion of the long-range or overall scene photographs, begins the medium-range or evidence positioning photographs of all the identified plain view evidence, starting with the first item of evidence as numbered by the operator and reported to command as the assignment is completed (see Figure€9.2).

Figure 9.2╇ Medium-range photos being taken with a deconable camera.

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Figure 9.3╇ Operator places evidence markers after medium range photos are

taken.

Facilitator: Aseptically provides the evidence numbers and scales to the operator. Operator: Completes evidence assessment and places evidence numbers and scales next to all the identified plain view evidence (see Figure€9.3). D/A member: Upon completion of the evidence numbering by the operator, begins the medium-range photographs with evidence numbers and scales of all numbered plain view evidence (see Figure€ 9.4). Begins with the first item of evidence as numbered by the operator and report the photographs to command. D/A member: Upon completion of the medium-range photographs with evidence numbers and scales, begins close-up photographs of all the numbered plain view evidence (see Figure€9.5). Again, begins with the first item of evidence as numbered by the operator and report the photographs to command. D/A member: Upon completion of the close-up photographs with evidence numbers and scales, the D/A member produces a sketch of the crime scene or verifies the accuracy of a plan or sketch brought into the exclusion zone. Plots all the identified plain view evidence on the sketch or plan and reports this information to command. Operator: Obtains measuring device (tape measure, electronic measuring device) from the facilitator or assists in the setup and operation of the high-end measuring and plotting equipment (total stations, scan stations, or GPS). Obtains the dimensions or measurements of the

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Figure 9.4╇ Taking medium-range photos after evidence markers have been placed in the scene.

Figure 9.5╇ D/A member taking close-up photographs of physical evidence.

crime scene for the crime scene sketch or plan and the measurements of the location for identified plain view evidence (see Figure€9.6). Facilitator: Retrieves the measuring device from the equipment bins and aseptically passes it to the operator. If high-end measuring and

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Figure 9.6╇ Operator taking measurements of evidence location in exclusion zone.

plotting equipment (total stations, scan stations, or GPS) is being used, assists in the setup and operability of the devices. Assists in obtaining the dimensions or measurements of the crime scene for the crime scene sketch or plan and the measurements of the location for identified plain view evidence. D/A member: Reports the location, position measurements, condition, and all other identifiable physical characteristics of all the identified plain view evidence, starting with the first item of numbered evidence, to command (see Figures€9.7 to 9.9). Operator: Aseptically returns the measuring device to the Facilitator or assists in the dismantling of the high-end measuring and plotting equipment (see Figure€9.10). Facilitator: Aseptically obtains the measuring device from the operator or assists in the dismantling of the high-end measuring and plotting equipment. D/A member: Reports the results of the measurements and plotting to command. Upon completion of the measuring and plotting of the scene and all the plain view evidence, the Recon Entry Strike Team will continue with its recon mission by screening the CBRNE or TIC evidence. There may be additional documentation in the form of written notes and photographs associated with this screening.

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Figure 9.7╇ Measurements must be relayed to command for documentation purposes.

Figure 9.8╇ Electronic measuring devices may also be used to document evidence location in the exclusion zone.

Figure 9.9╇ Documenting the crime scene with a Scan Station 2.

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Figure 9.10╇ Packing up ruggedized laptop for transport out of the exclusion zone.

Documentation is not limited to the recon operation, but will be associated with all decon operations, evidence recovery and processing operations, evidence custodian operations, search operations, final survey operations, and the final briefing associated with ending the crime scene phase. These areas of documentation will be covered in subsequent chapters.

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10

The Screening

Once the initial crime scene documentation has been completed, the next task for the CBRNE CSIU Group’s Recon Entry Strike Team is to screen and classify the CBRNE/TIC agents who were located with the monitoring and screening equipment utilized during the initial recon entry. This equipment and additional analytical instruments will be employed to classify the CBRNE/TIC evidence and requires extensive documentation—both written and photographic. The CBRNE/TIC evidence must be screened for several reasons, but mainly for evidence protection and for personnel safety. The evidence is initially screened to classify it as chemical, biological, or radiological/nuclear material. This classification assists in the identification of the proper collection and packaging equipment to be utilized in subsequent steps. Remember that chemical evidence will require chemically clean glass, chemical-resistant plastics, stainless steel, and cotton for collection. The primary packaging of chemical evidence must be chemically clean glass. Biological evidence requires sterile plastics and synthetic materials for collection. The primary packaging for biological evidence is sterile plastics. Radiological/nuclear evidence requires chemically and radiologically clean plastic and metal instruments, or cotton materials, for collection. The primary packaging for radiological/nuclear evidence will require chemically and radiologically clean plastic and metal containers. Personnel safety is of utmost importance. The team members handling, transporting, and analyzing the CBRNE/TIC evidence must have a thorough understanding of the potential threats posed by the evidence. The same applies to all other CSIU personnel handling the evidence post collection. Finally, CSIs must understand that the receiving laboratory will not accept the evidence until four basic but critical characteristics of each item of CBRNE/TIC evidence have been determined. Think of these characteristics as questions you would want to know for your safety: • Is this evidence radioactive? • If it is radioactive, what type of radiation is it suspected of being, α, β, γ, or neutron? • Do we have an idea of the type of isotope? • Finally, what are its energy or activity and dose rate? • Is this evidence corrosive? • If so, is it a base or an acid, and what is its strength? • Is this evidence flammable or explosive? • Is this evidence toxic or volatile? 205

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Most of the required screening is nondestructive to the physical evidence and will not result in consumption of the evidence. Examples of the instruments required for the basic screening are • Radiation—radiation detector • Flammabilty/explosivity—combustible gas indicator and ion mobility spectrometry • Toxicity/volatility—photoionization detector Corrosivity is the only required screening that necessitates consumption of a small amount of the evidence to determine its pH. This is the minimum required amount of screening; however, more extensive analysis can be performed within the exclusion zone if there are copious amounts of the evidence present and a jurisdiction has the equipment with validated protocols. This type of analysis will use multiple analytical modalities to further classify the suspected CBRNE/TIC evidence, which should point the CSIs in the direction of the possible identity of evidence. More importantly, it will assist the CSIs when requesting laboratory confirmatory analysis. Depending on the state of the evidence, some of these screening and analysis methodologies are nondestructive and require no consumption of the physical evidence including flame spectrometry, flame ionization detection, and Raman spectroscopy (see Figures 10.1 to 10.3).

Figure 10.1╇ Radiation detection—Ludlum.

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Figure 10.2╇ Flame spectrometry—AP2C.

Figure 10.3╇ Ramen spectroscopy—Ahura First Defender.

Other screening methodologies will require a small amount of the physical evidence and will be destructive, including pH paper, water paper, oxidizer paper, M-8 paper, M-9 paper, Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FT-IR), gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS), protein test, handheld assays (HHAs), Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device/Polymerase Chain Reaction (RAPID/PCR), RAMP, and Razor-EX/ PCR (see Figures€10.4 to 10.18).

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Figure 10.4╇ pH paper tests for corrosivity, strengths of acids and bases. Positive (blue) base test shown.

Figure 10.5╇ Water paper test turns violet in the presence of water.

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Figure 10.6╇ Oxidizer paper test showing positive results for presence of an oxidizer.

Figure 10.7╇ M-9 tape indicating positive reaction for chemical agent.

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Figure 10.8╇ M-8 paper indicating positive reaction for nerve gas.

Figure 10.9╇ Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FT-IR)—Ahura TruDefender.

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Figure 10.10╇ Hazmat ID (FT-IR).

Figure 10.11╇ Sabre 4000 ion mobility spectrometer.

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Figure 10.12╇ Field Portable Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GC/ MS)®. (Source: Inficon, Hapsite.)

Figure 10.13╇ 20/20 kit used for determining the presence of protein in an unidentified powder.

Control window Test window

C T

C T

C T

C T

Sample well

S

S

S

S

Positive Negative Inconclusive

Figure 10.14╇ Handheld assays.

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Figure 10.15╇ Prime Alert Biodetection System and GenPrime 320.

Figure 10.16╇ RAPID, PCR DNA technology for biological agent detection. (Source: Idaho Technology, Inc.)

Figure 10.17╇ RAMP biodetection.

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Figure 10.18╇ RAZOR, EX/PCR DNA technology for biological agent detection. (Source: Idaho Technology, Inc.)

Aseptic Techniques The Recon Entry Strike Team’s operator and facilitator will be conducting the screening and analytical tests utilizing aseptic techniques that include changing gloves between items of evidence to be screened and tested. The aseptic techniques were designed to eliminate possible sources of contamination and consist of over/under steps. The facilitator’s hands are always over and the operator’s hands are always under. The facilitator makes all materials and equipment available to the operator from the higher position to reduce the potential of contaminants being transferred from the evidence area via the operator’s gloves. If you are not familiar with the aseptic techniques, here is a detailed explanation: Facilitator: Hands the operator a new pair of clean gloves between each item of evidence to be screened, tested, collected, processed, packaged, decontaminated, and over-packed. The facilitator passes the gloves downward to the operator’s hands, which are always placed under or below the facilitator’s hands.

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Operator: Accepts gloves from beneath the facilitator’s hands, and dons them over the outermost pair of gloves for the PPE (see Figure€10.19). Facilitator: Opens all equipment needed to screen, test, collect, process, package, decontaminate, and over-pack the evidence (see Figure€ 10.20). The handles or the end of the equipment that will not touch the evidence will be presented downward towards the Operator’s hands (see Figure€10.21).

Figure 10.19╇ Donning clean gloves for evidence collection.

Figure 10.20╇ Facilitator sets up evidence collection kit.

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Operator: Retrieves all equipment from under the facilitator’s hands and never touches the end of the equipment that will come in contact with the evidence (see Figure€10.22). Facilitator: Prepares the next items or equipment that the operator will need to complete the task at hand and aseptically provides the items or equipment to the operator as needed (see Figure€10.23). Operator: Retrieves all other additional items or equipment required to complete the tasks from the facilitator and seals and secures all

Figure 10.21╇ Facilitator aseptically opens and offers the evidence collection instruments to the operator/collector.

Figure 10.22╇ Operator/collector aseptically receiving evidence collection media from the Facilitator.

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primary containers or packaging. The operator places the primary container or packaging into the secondary packaging being held and controlled by the facilitator (see Figures€10.24 to 10.28). Facilitator: Controls the secondary packaging and once the operator transfers the primary container or packaging into the secondary packaging, seals the secondary packaging and initials the seals with the initials of the operator. If tertiary packaging is required, the facilitator places the sealed secondary packaging containing the primary container into the tertiary packaging, then seals and initials as outlined for the secondary packaging (see Figure€10.29).

Figure 10.23╇ Facilitator provides primary container to operator/collector using aseptic handling procedures.

Figure 10.24╇ Operator/collector collecting possible chemical evidence.

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Figure 10.25╇ Operator/collector sealing primary container of possible chemical evidence with Parafilm.

Figure 10.26╇ Aseptically applying the custody seal on the primary container of possible chemical evidence.

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Figure 10.27╇ Operator/collector aseptically places sealed primary container into the secondary container held by the facilitator.

Figure 10.28╇ Tertiary package is heat sealed by the facilitator.

Figure 10.29╇ Facilitator must initial the seals on the tertiary packaging.

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Operator: Upon completion of screening, testing, collecting, processing, and packaging of an item of evidence the operator discards the used equipment and gloves in the hazardous waste and prepares to receive a set of new, clean gloves for the next item of evidence (see Figure€10.30). Facilitator: Upon completion of packaging and sealing an item of evidence, the Facilitator places the evidence in the evidence transportation bin, then cleans up the work area of all the debris, and sets up the next item of evidence to be collected (see Figure€10.31). Note:╇ Although the aseptic technique examples shown above were from an evidence collection operation, the methodologies displayed will be utilized for the Recon Entry Strike Team’s screening operations.

Figure 10.30╇ Operator/collector must discard outer gloves after each item of evidence is collected to prevent cross-contamination.

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Figure 10.31╇ Facilitator prepares the next evidence collection kit for use.

While the operator and facilitator are conducting the screening and testing, the D/A member will relay the results of the screening and analytical tests to the communication officer in the support zone for written documentation. The D/A member will also take photographs as documentation of the colorimetric tests, such as the papers and protein tests. The D/A member will photograph these tests both pre-test and post-test to document any color changes. Upon completion of the basic documentation of the crime scene and evidence, the Recon Entry Strike Team will perform the required screening of the possible CBRNE/TIC evidence, and if sufficient quantities of the suspected CBRNE/TIC evidence are present, more extensive analysis can occur. The screening and tests follow the numerical sequence of the possible CBRNE/TIC evidence as assigned by the operator. The Recon Entry Strike Team will continue its operations with the following tasks: D/A member: Notifies command that the Recon Entry Strike Team is continuing the recon operations by screening and testing the possible CBRNE/TIC evidence located by the team. Facilitator: Hands the operator a new, clean set of gloves to utilize for screening the first CBRNE/TIC item of evidence and then prepares all the equipment the operator will need to conduct the screening and analytical tests. Labels the paper test with the evidence number

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it will be used for, then lays it out for the D/A member to photograph, pre-test, and for the operator to test (see Figure€10.32). D/A member: Takes the pre-test photographs of all the paper test kits and notifies command of the photograph and that the first test will be conducted at this time (see Figures€10.33 to 10.35).

Figure 10.32╇ Facilitator sets up screening and testing equipment/kits.

Figure 10.33╇ Operator must change gloves between each screening and testing.

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Figure 10.34╇ D/A member photographs the paper test kits pre-testing.

Figure 10.35╇ Test paper kit consists of pH, water, oxidizer, M-8, and M-9 papers.

Note:╇ The first test to be performed on the suspected CBRNE/TIC evidence will be for pH. The pH test is a colorimetric paper test requiring a small amount of the evidence, and it make sense to perform all the other colorimetric paper tests (oxidizer, water, M-8, and M-9) at the same time. For an effective way to set up the papers, see Chapter 5 pages 107 and 108. These papers and the equipment needed for the test should be prepared in the support zone by the Recon Entry Strike Team prior to entry. The team should construct enough of these paper test kits to handle all the possible evidence

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that would require their use and then an equal number for backup, in case of an accident. Once the actual number of these tests has been determined, the Facilitator should label them with the evidence number for which they will be used. It is also a good idea to have them all displayed at one time for the D/A member to take one pre-test photograph of all the tests, as opposed to taking individual pre- and post-test photographs for each item of evidence. Since a small amount of evidence is required for the paper tests and instruments like the Raman spectroscopy, FT-IR, and GC/MS, then it is best to perform these instrumental analyses at the same time as the papers. Operator: Aseptically retrieves and dons the gloves. The facilitator then provides the screening and testing equipment for the first CBRNE/ TIC item of evidence (see Figure€10.35). Operator: Conducts screening and analytical tests and reports the results to the D/A member. Discards the used equipment (see Figure€10.36 to 10.39). D/A member: Upon completion of the paper screening test and analytical exams for a particular item of evidence, reports the results to command for documentation (see Figure€10.40). Facilitator: Aseptically passes the five-gas meter or CGI with PID to the operator. Operator: Screens the evidence with the meter and reports the results to the D/A member (see Figure€ 10.41). Places the CGI/PID on the

Figure 10.36╇ Operator collects a small amount of the evidence for screening and testing.

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Figure 10.37╇ Paper screening tests of the evidence.

Figure 10.38╇ Conducting FT-IR analytical test of the evidence.

Figure 10.39╇ Using Raman spectroscopy to analyze evidence.

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Figure 10.40╇ Command must be informed of the results of the screening and analytical exams.

Figure 10.41╇ Screening evidence with CGI/PID.

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Figure 10.42╇ Screening evidence for radiation.

Operator’s work table, then retrieves the radiation detector meter from the Facilitator (see Figure€10.42). D/A member: Upon completion of the CGI/PID screening for a particular item of evidence, reports the results to the command staff for documentation. Facilitator: Aseptically passes the radiation detector meter to the operator. Operator: Screens the evidence with the radiation detection meter and reports the results to the D/A member. Places the radiation detection meter on the operator’s work table and retrieves the IMS meter from the Facilitator. D/A member: Upon completion of the radiation detection meter screening for each specific item of evidence, reports the results to Command for documentation. Facilitator: Aseptically passes the IMS instrument to the operator. Operator: Screens the evidence with the IMS instrument and reports the results to the D/A member. Places the IMS instrument on the operator’s work table and retrieves the flame spectrometer instrument from the facilitator. This process will continue with any other additional analytical instruments the CBRNE CSIU Group Recon Entry Strike Team select for screening

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and monitoring. Once an item of CBRNE/TIC evidence is completely screened, analyzed, and documented, the operator will discard the gloves used for this item in the hazardous waste, and then aseptically retrieve new gloves and screening equipment from the facilitator. The process will be repeated for each item of CBRNE/TIC evidence. Once all the CBRNE/TIC evidence has been screened, analyzed, and documented as described above, the D/A member will take the post-test photographs of the paper screening tests and report these photographs to command (Figure€10.43). Upon completion of this photograph, the D/A Member will take postscreening and analysis close-up photographs of all the CBRNE/TIC evidence and report completion of photographs to command. While the D/A member is conducting this photography, the operator and facilitator gather all the equipment and hazardous waste so that they may exit the exclusion zone. Once the Recon Entry Strike Team has completed all its tasks, the D/A member will notify command that their operations are complete and that they are proceeding to the contamination reduction zone for equipment drop off/decontamination and their personal decontamination (see Figure€10.44). They will request that the Decontamination Teams be notified and ready for their arrival. Upon entering the contamination reduction zone, the Recon Entry Strike Team members will make their way to the Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team to drop off their equipment and hazardous waste. Once the Decontamination Strike Team takes control of the equipment and hazardous debris, the Recon Entry Strike Team members will proceed to the technical decontamination line for their personal decontamination (see Figure€10.45).

Figure 10.43╇ Facilitator places post-test paper screening results for photographs.

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Figure 10.44╇ Equipment and hazardous debris are submitted to evidence/equipment decontamination dropoff point.

Figure 10.45╇ Team members proceed through technical decontamination after exiting the exclusion zone.

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Figure 10.46╇ Post-doffing medical monitoring for all team members is required.

Once the Recon Entry Strike Team completes the technical decontamination, it will proceed to the medical monitoring station for post-doffing medical checks (see Figure€10.46). After Recon Entry Strike Team members have cleared medical monitoring, they will continue to the CBRNE CSIU command post and retrieve all their documentation forms, sketches, and photographs. These items will be reviewed and provided to the CBRNE CSIU group for the briefing session. This briefing is conducted to plan the Evidence Recovery Strike Team’s operations. After the briefing the Recon Entry Strike Team members will be given some time for rehabilitation and to complete their paperwork associated with their operation. Upon appropriate rehabilitation, this team can return to the group’s operational staff to complete another assignment of additional operations or tasks if needed. Is it possible for one Recon Entry Strike Team to complete all the required work that may be present at a CBRNE/TIC crime scene? The answer will depend upon the complexity of the scene and the required levels of PPE. Remember, if CSIs are wearing a one-hour air cylinder with their SCBA, this will mean they may have 20–40 minutes of actual work time in the exclusion zone before they have to exit to the contamination reduction zone for decontamination and doffing of their PPE. The CBRNE CSIU Group may require multiple Recon Entry Strike Teams to complete the recon operations. Each Recon Entry Strike Team will make entry into the exclusion zone and resume operations where the last team left off until the operation is complete. One way to deal with the personnel issues associated with these multiple entries is to enact mutual aide agreements to obtain more CSIs or other Entry Strike Teams may be assigned to the recon operations. Team members must have time to be physically rehabilitated before they can be assigned to another team. The recon entry will be followed by the evidence recovery entry.

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Collection, Processing,€and Packaging of CBRNE/ TIC Evidence

11

The Recon Entry Strike Team’s operation is completed after its post-operational briefing. At the briefing the photographs and sketch of the scene will be shown to the CBRNE CSIU group. The locations and types of evidence will be discussed as well as the results of all the CBRNE/TIC evidence screening, monitoring, and analytical testing. Once this briefing is completed, the CBRNE CSIU Group enters into the Evidence Recovery Phase of the operation. The assigned Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will now coordinate with the evidence custodian and the equipment custodian to formulate the evidence collection, processing, packaging, and documentation plan. This plan will identify the correct protocols, procedures, and equipment required for each item of evidence, both CBRNE/TIC and Forensic, located by the Recon Entry Strike Team. Simultaneously the CBRNE CSIU Group Safety Officer will review the data to see if the current PPE and decontamination solution are still sufficient or require change. Once the evidence plans have been formulated the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will be issued all the necessary safety equipment (communications, meters/monitors, and PPE); evidence documentation (camera), collection, processing, and packaging equipment; and support equipment by the equipment custodian. The equipment custodian is responsible for maintaining and documenting the inventory, status, operability, and quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) tests of all the equipment. Equipment inventory records will reflect the date, time, and personnel who received the equipment. After the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team has received the equipment, it will build all the evidence collection, processing, and packaging kits in the support zone. This includes creating the evidence labels to include all available information. All primary packaging or containers will be labeled on the outside of the packaging or containers (see Figure 11.1). Secondary packaging or containers should be labeled on the inside if this packaging is clear or transparent. If the secondary packaging or containers are opaque they will be labeled on the outside and will require a clear or transparent tertiary packaging with a label on the inside (see Figure€11.2). The labeling of the secondary or tertiary packaging or containers is performed in this manner to protect the evidence label and its information from destruction during the decontamination process and adds an additional level of containment. Remember, when preparing the evidence kits, the collection equipment and 231

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Figure 11.1╇ Glass primary container and opaque secondary containers—both labeled on the outside.

Figure 11.2╇ Secondary container is placed into a clear nylon/polyester heat-seal bag as the tertiary container. Label is on the inside of the bag.

primary containers should not be opened in the support zone. Also, when preparing the kits, buddy tab the custody seals and Parafilm® by peeling back a small portion of the seals and films to make it easy to remove while wearing PPE in the exclusion zone. Regardless of the type of CBRNE/TIC evidence or forensic evidence, all collection and packaging kits will have several aspects in common: • A labeled primary container • A labeled secondary container

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• An individual clean towel to act as an independent clean work surface • A new, clean set of nitrile gloves Specific types of CBRNE/TIC evidence or forensic evidence collection and packaging kits may require the addition of following equipment/supplies: • Parafilm® (buddy tabbed)—used to seal the lids of primary container jars and tubes • Custody seals (buddy tabbed)—used to tamper-proof the lids of primary container jars and tubes • Unopened collection instruments or equipment of the appropriate type for the evidence to be collected (these may be buddy tabbed) • Labeled tertiary containers or packaging (see Figure 11.3)

(a)

(b)

Figure 11.3╇ (a) Example of buddy tab on custody label. (b) Use Parafilm to secure lid to container.

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There are two additional types of kits that the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will need to prepare in the support zone. The Murphy Kit is for those times when accidents happen with the collection, processing and packaging instruments, and equipment inside the exclusion zone. Every evidence collection, processing, and packaging kit required for the evidence recovery operation should be duplicated, but instead of making individual duplicate kits, all this equipment is placed into one large bag. Equipment Blank Kits are unopened evidence collection instruments or equipment and unopened primary containers of the exact types and lot numbers utilized for the collection and packaging of the CBRNE/TIC evidence at the CBRNE/TIC crime scene. Equipment blanks are utilized as a QA/QC check for the integrity of the evidence collection and packaging equipment and to defeat any evidentiary cross-contamination allegations. These equipment blanks will be packaged, and the packaging will be labeled so that it is associated with the specific items of evidence for which they are prepared (see Figure 11.4). Once completed, the equipment blanks will be treated as evidence and placed on the chain of custody (COC) form with its associated evidence and submitted to the Evidence Custodian before the team enters the exclusion zone. Once preparation of the evidence collection, processing and packaging kits, the Murphy Kit, and the Equipment Blank Kits is complete, the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will need to prepare some documentation. The protocols and their equipment will be recorded on the evidence logs. The evidence logs will also contain the • • • • • • •

Unique case number Evidence number assigned to a particular item of evidence Classification/type of evidence State (solid, liquid, or gas/vapor) of the evidence Morphology (size, shape, color, volume, mass, etc.) of the evidence Exact location of the evidence in the scene Results of all screening, monitoring, and analytical tests conducted on the evidence (if required)

In addition to the evidence logs, all items of evidence being submitted to a laboratory for analysis require a Request for Lab Analysis (RFLA) form to be prepared. Each item of evidence will be listed on this form, with an area to describe the analysis to be performed on the evidence. In terms of paperwork, the last item of documentation will be the COC form, which accompanies the RFLA form, the evidence, and the equipment blanks to the laboratory. For a CBRNE/TIC crime scene, the COC will document the names of the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team collector, Evidence/ Equipment Decon Strike Team operator, evidence custodian, and the name

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of the officer transporting the evidence to the lab. The Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will prepare most of these logs and forms in the support zone prior to entering the exclusion zone. The evidence custodian will control the paperwork for completion. The evidence custodian will also be responsible for collating the RFLA forms and the COC forms with associated evidence and equipment blanks when the custodian over-packs the evidence for transportation to the laboratory (see Figure€11.4). Once all the equipment and paperwork is ready, the Evidence Recovery Strike Team will load all its equipment on the handcarts for transportation into the exclusion zone. The team members must proceed to the medical monitoring station to have their vitals checked to ensure they are fit to go operational in their PPE (see Figure€11.5). Once the Medical Monitoring Team has cleared the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team members, they will don their PPE and receive their final safety briefing from the CBRNE CSIU group safety officer (see Figure€11.6). Before the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team suits up in the PPE and proceeds downrange towards the exclusion zone, the rescue team must be set up and in place and the technical decontamination lines operational. After the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team members have donned their PPE, they will enter the exclusion zone with their equipment (see Figure€11.7). The Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team operator/collector is the team leader and will direct the team downrange. Unlike the Recon Entry Strike Team, the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will only require a multi-gas

Figure 11.4╇ Evidence custodian will maintain RFLA and COC forms while the Evidence Recovery Strike team recovers the evidence.

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Figure 11.5╇ Completing the medical monitoring step prior to donning PPE.

Figure 11.6╇ Donning PPE in the support zone.

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(CGI)/PID meter. Following the operator/collector is the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team facilitator and D/A member transporting all the equipment on a handcart. Upon arrival at the entrance to the exclusion zone the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team members will perform the following: D/A Member: Notifies the CBRNE CSIU command (communications officer) that the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team is at the entrance to the exclusion zone and that the operator/collector is commencing environmental monitoring and screening around or at the entrance. Operator: Will now slowly examine the entrance (bottom, middle, and top) with the multi-gas (CGI)/PID meter and report the results to the D/A member. D/A Member: Reports the results of the multi-gas (CGI)/PID meter to command.

Figure 11.7╇ Preparing to enter the exclusion zone with equipment being transported on a handcart.

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All of the readings are recorded by the communications officers in the support zone and the command staff will review the information. The CBRNE CSIU command staff (safety officer) and Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will determine if it is safe to proceed with the Evidence Recovery operation based on the meter readings. If the command staff or the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team deems the environment unsafe for the team to proceed with the mission, the team will exit the scene to the contamination reduction zone for decontamination. If it is deemed appropriate to proceed, the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will make entry into the exclusion zone. Upon receiving the green light the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will perform the following: Operator: At this point the operator will make entry into the exclusion zone, with the multi-gas (CGI)/PID meter and screen the exclusion zone (bottom, middle, and top) and report the results to the D/A member (see Figure€11.8). D/A Member: Reports that the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team has made entry into the exclusion zone and is conducting environmental monitoring and screening. Facilitator: The facilitator will follow behind the operator with the handcart and the equipment. D/A member: Follows the facilitator into the exclusion zone with the handcart and the equipment and reports the results of the environmental monitoring and metering to command (see Figure€11.9).

Figure 11.8╇ Using multi-gas/PID meter to monitor and screen entry to exclu-

sion zone.

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Figure 11.9╇ D/A member reports results monitoring and screening to command.

The command staff and the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will analyze the monitoring and screening results and determine if it is safe to continue the evidence recovery operations. If unsafe conditions are present the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will evacuate the exclusion zone and proceed to the contamination reduction zone for decontamination. If the scene is deemed safe to proceed into, the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will continue with the scene documentation and setup. The Evidence Recovery Entry Team’s operator/collector and the facilitator will assemble the evidence documentation, collection, processing, and packaging tables and equipment while the D/A member takes close-up photographs of all the located evidence before the collection and processing operations: D/A member: Will notify command that the team is continuing its operations by setting up the various workstations. The D/A member will take close-up photos of evidence prior to collection and processing (see Figures€11.10 to 11.13). Upon completion of the precollection/preprocessing close-up photographs of the evidence the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will begin evidence collection, processing, and packaging utilizing the aseptic techniques highlighted in Chapter 10.

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Figure 11.10╇ Facilitator setting up workstation tables.

Figure 11.11╇ Preparing evidence collection kits for use in the exclusion zone.

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Figure 11.12╇ Assembling the portable superglue fuming chamber in the exclusion zone.

Figure 11.13╇ D/A member taking close-up photos of evidence in exclusion zone.

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Collection Protocols The next section of this chapter deals with collection protocols for CBRNE/ TIC evidence. Several points need to be discussed with regard to collecting and processing an item of CBRNE/TIC evidence. Remember, these items may also contain various types of forensic evidence. For example, if screening and testing of an unlabeled glass jar with a screw-top lid indicates the presence of a possible liquid chemical agent, the jar will need to be examined and assessed for traditional forensic evidence before the suspected liquid chemical agent can be collected. In this case the jar should be examined and processed for hairs and fiber evidence, DNA evidence, and latent fingerprint evidence. An assessment of all the possible evidence on or in the jar must be performed to determine how the processing for each type of forensic evidence can possibly impact the other types of evidence present on and in the jar. The proper order of collection and processing methodologies or protocols can be determined only after this assessment has been completed. In this case, if any hair and fiber evidence is located on the jar, it will be carefully documented, collected, and packaged first, utilizing the appropriate forensic standards for this type of evidence. Jar lids typically contain both a ridged edge and a pebbled surface, neither of which are usually conducive for latent fingerprints. A swab of the jar lid will be performed for possible DNA evidence. The jar can now be safely opened without fear of damaging or destroying the possible DNA evidence. The next item of evidence to be collected and packaged is the suspected liquid chemical agent from inside the jar (see Figure 11.14). Once the entire suspected liquid chemical agent is collected and packaged the jar and the lid can be processed for latent fingerprints. Move the jar to a clean workspace to eliminate the possibility of contaminating other potential items of evidence. If latent fingerprints are developed they will be documented, collected, and packaged. Finally, the jar and its lid will be packaged. Do not develop tunnel vision. The CBRNE/TIC evidence is the key to your investigation, but do not overlook the possibility of potentially crucial forensic evidence as well. And the reverse is equally as valid: don’t focus on the forensic evidence to the detriment of the CBRNE/TIC evidence. Remember, a crime scene investigation is also about “public safety.” The goal is to identify, apprehend, and convict the person(s) responsible for a CBRNE/TIC attack. Based on a combination of the work conducted at the crime scene and other criminal investigative methods, the perpetrator may not have the means or opportunity to commit a similar attack again. The following protocols, procedures, and methodologies present some examples of best practices for collecting and packaging only a few of the various types of CBRNE/TIC evidence a CSI may encounter at a CBRNE/ TIC crime scene. These examples are by no means an all-inclusive set of

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CBRNE/TIC evidence collection protocols, but are meant to provide CSIs with a clearer understanding of the nuances involved in CBRNE/TIC evidence collection protocols. CSIs must understand that they should work with the laboratories that will be conducting the analysis to develop CBRNE/ TIC evidence collection protocols, such as the ones we have provided, for a wide variety of CBRNE/TIC evidence possibilities. Once these protocols are developed they should be tested and validated before they are utilized. Upon validation, the CSIs must be trained, practiced, and certified in their proper use. Also, if CSIs ever encounter a CBRNE/TIC evidence collection situation for which their protocols are not exact, they must immediately contact the laboratory that will be conducting the analysis for guidance.

Protocol for Visible Suspected Chemical Liquid€Residue on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces Facilitator: Sets up the workstation by removing the clean work surface from the labeled nylon/polyester heat-seal bag and carefully placing it (using limited energy and movement) on the designated work area. Removes all the items from the nylon/polyester heat-seal bag and sets them on the clean work surface (see Figure€11.15). Retrieves the clean nitrile gloves and with limited movement, aseptically hands them to the operator/collector. Operator: Dons nitrile gloves. Requests the primary container, which is a chemically certified clean glass jar with Teflon cap. Facilitator: Retrieves the jar, loosens the cap, and transfers the jar by holding it from above the cap and so that the operator/collector can retrieve the jar by its bottom. Operator: Opens the jar and secures the cap. Requests the hemostats/sterile cotton gauze pad for the collection of the suspect chemical residue. Facilitator: Retrieves the sterile hemostats and sterile 2"╯×╯2" cotton gauze pad, opens the handle end of the packaging, peels the packaging back to expose the area to be held by the operator/collector, and positions the exposed end downward. Upon transfer of the hemostats, opens the 2"╯×╯2" sterile cotton gauze pad, peels the packaging back to expose the pad, and positions the exposed pad downward. Once the collector has obtained the appropriate sampling kit, discards the packaging into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the Parafilm®, custody seal, secondary packaging, and tertiary packaging. Operator: Removes the sterile hemostats by grasping the exposed section of the handles and pulling downward. Removes the sterile 2"╯×╯2" cotton gauze pad from its packaging by opening the

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Figure 11.14╇ Evidence collection kit for suspected chemical liquid residue on nonporous and some porous surfaces.

hemostats and grasping the gauze pad by the edges at the center of the pad, so that when the tool is closed, half the pad is above the tool and half is below the tool. Safely approaches the evidence using very limited energy and movement around and within the liquid residue. Using the sterile 2"╯×╯2" cotton gauze pad, collects the evidence by performing two 1"╯×╯1" S-shaped wipes—one top to bottom and one left to right—through the suspect liquid chemical residue. Note:╇ The cotton gauze pad shall be placed in the suspect liquid residue so that the hemostats holding the pad do not come in contact with the residue. To accomplish this, the operator/collector will place a small portion of the bottom edge of the gauze pad into the residue, and then rotate the tool counter clockwise, so that the bottom of the tool is now sandwiched between sections of the gauze pad, making the tool incapable of coming in contact with the product. The operator/collector should always bring the primary container over the top of the evidence location as close as possible to the evidence for transfer to the primary container, as opposed to bringing the evidence to the primary container, which may be located a distance away from the original source of the material. This limits the possibility of accidental re-aerosolization and additional contamination of the environment.

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Operator: Places the cotton gauze pad into its primary container, the certified chemically clean glass jar, being careful not to get residue on the outside of the jar. Caps the jar and discards the hemostats in the hazardous waste receptacle. Facilitator: Aseptically hands the Parafilm® to the operator/collector by removing the backing from the film and hanging the film downward. Discards the Parafilm® backing into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the custody seal. Operator: Retrieves the Parafilm® from bottom of the film and place the Parafilm® around the lid in a clockwise manner, thus securing the lid to the container. Facilitator: Aseptically hands the custody seal to the operator/collector by removing the backing from the seal and hanging the seal downward. Discards the custody seal backing into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the secondary container. Operator: Positions the glass jar by the custody seal, safely below the Facilitator’s hands, and carefully guides the hanging custody seal to the side of the glass jar at a location that will not obscure or cover the evidence label. Places the seal over the top and down the opposite side of the container. The custody seal must be, at a minimum, secured directly to one side of any primary container, below the Parafilm® and directly to a non-Parafilm®-covered portion of the container’s cap, lid, or cover. Facilitator: Retrieves the secondary packaging (the Nalgene 500-mL container with screw top), removes the cap, and while holding the container by its base, points the open end slightly downward toward the operator/collector. Operator: While holding the primary container by its cap, places the primary container into the secondary container. Facilitator: Caps the secondary container while moving away from the operator/collector. Retrieves the tertiary container (the nylon/polyester heat-seal bag) and places the sealed secondary container into the bag. Heat-seals the secondary container, initials the seal with the operator’s initials, and places the evidence in the transport bin for transportation to the decon team. Cleans up debris generated at the clean work area and places it in the hazardous waste receptacle; prepares the work area for the next piece of evidence. Operator: Removes the outer gloves used for the collection of the evidence and discards them in the hazardous waste receptacle; waits as the Facilitator prepares to collect the next piece of evidence. D/A member: Notifies command that the evidence has been collected.

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Note:╇ This protocol may also be utilized if a suspected chemical agent is aerosolized in a closed or defined environment (such as the interior of a building or room) where numerous vertical and horizontal surfaces are present and the suspected chemical agent is not visible. For situations where the chemical residue is viscous, such as a gel or paste, this protocol can be utilized for this type of evidence. However, if the CSI assessment reveals that the residue could be collected without an absorbent material, then the protocol for this is simply a modified version of the current protocol. The difference between the two protocols is the collection tools. Replace the hemostats and cotton gauze pad used in this protocol with a chemically clean, stainless steel or chemical-resistant plastic spatula and you have the viscous chemical residue protocol. Obviously, the viscous chemical residue would be scooped up and placed in the chemically clean glass jar, but all the rest of the protocol’s materials, equipment, and methodologies are the same. If the situation involves a suspected biological agent instead of a chemical agent (which may not be visible) the only changes to the above protocol involve the types of materials. Utilize a 2"╯×╯2" synthetic gauze pad, replace the chemically clean glass jar with a sterile plastic container, and replace the 500-mL Nalgene container with a nylon/polyester heat-seal bag as the secondary container. Follow all the remaining steps, materials, equipment, and methodologies for the protocol to collect a nonvisible suspected biological agent on some porous and nonporous surfaces. Equipment for Visible Suspected Chemical Liquid€Residue on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces 1. Primary Container—one evidence-labeled (on outside of jar) certified chemically clean glass jar with appropriate screw-top lid 2. Secondary Container—one evidence-labeled (on outside of jar), clean Nalgene (chemically resistant plastic) jar of an appropriate size to contain the primary container, with a clean, absorbent material to act as a cushion and to absorb any chemical residue should the primary container break, and an appropriate screw-top lid 3. Tertiary Container—one evidence-labeled (on the inside of the bag), clean, nylon/polyester heat-seal bag of an appropriate size to contain the secondary container 4. One section of Parafilm® of the appropriate size to wrap around the lid of the primary container 5. One properly labeled custody seal, buddy tabbed, to place on the primary container

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6. One new, unopened set of clean hemostats or a suture removal kit with tweezers 7. One new, unopened, sterile cotton gauze pad or the sterile cotton gauze pad from a suture removal kit 8. One clean work surface 9. One set of new clean nitrile gloves

Protocol for Suspected Stratified (Layered) Chemical Liquid in a Container Facilitator: Sets up the workstation by removing the clean work surface from the labeled nylon/polyester heat-seal bag and carefully placing it (using limited energy and movement) on the designated work area. Removes all the items from the nylon/polyester heat-seal bag and places them on the clean work surface (see Figure€11.15). Retrieves the clean nitrile gloves and with limited movement and aseptically hands them to the operator/collector.

Figure 11.15╇ Stratified layer collection kit with Coliwasa tube.

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Operator: Dons nitrile gloves. Requests the primary container, a chemically certified clean glass jar with Teflon cap. Facilitator: Retrieves the jar, loosens the cap, and transfers the jar by holding it from above the cap. Directs the operator/collector to retrieve the jar from its bottom. Operator: Opens the jar and secures the cap. Requests the clean 18-inch glass Coliwasa tube from the facilitator. Facilitator: Retrieves a clean glass Coliwasa tube and opens the top end (the end opposite of the side used to collect the suspect evidence). Peels back the packaging to expose the area to be held by the collector; positions the exposed end downward. Discards the tube packaging into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the Parafilm®, custody seal, secondary packaging, and tertiary packaging. Operator: Removes the clean glass Coliwasa tube and its center glass rod plug by grasping the exposed sections of the Coliwasa tube and plug by pulling downward. Assembles the Coliwasa tube by inserting the glass rod plug into the Coliwasa tube. Safely approaches the evidence utilizing very limited energy and movement around the jar, and then carefully opens the jar. Note:╇ The jar and lid should be examined and processed for hair/fiber and DNA evidence before the layer chemical liquid is collected. Note:╇ The operator/collector should always bring the primary container over the top of the evidence location and as close as possible to the evidence for transfer to the primary container. Do not attempt to take the evidence to the primary container, which may be located a distance away from the original source of the material. This limits the possibility of accidental re-aerosolization and additional contamination of the environment. Operator: While maintaining pressure on the glass rod to maintain its seal, places the tip of the Coliwasa tube on the interior wall of the collection jar. Raises the glass rod slowly, transferring the suspect liquid to the container. Depending on the approved collection plan the operator/collector may have to repeat this collection process several times until the appropriate amount of evidence has been collected. Caps the evidence jar, and lightly re-caps the suspect evidence jar. Discards the Coliwasa tube in the hazardous waste receptacle. Note:╇ Once the appropriate amount of evidence is collected to meet the laboratory protocols, the remaining liquid evidence in the suspect jar will have to be collected and packaged in the same manner as outlined above. The jar must be emptied before it is processed for latent fingerprints.

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Facilitator: Aseptically hands the Parafilm® to the operator/collector by removing the backing from the material and hanging the film downward. Discards the backing into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the custody seal. Operator: Retrieves the Parafilm® from the Facilitator and places it around the lid in a clockwise manner to secure the lid to the container. Facilitator: Aseptically passes the custody seal to the operator/collector by removing the backing from the seal and hanging the seal downward. Discards the custody seal backing into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the secondary container. Operator: Positions the glass jar by the custody seal, safely below the Facilitator’s hands, and carefully guides the hanging custody seal to the side of the glass jar at a location that will not obscure or cover the evidence label. Places the seal over the top and down the opposite side of the container. The custody seal must be secured directly to one side of any primary container, below the Parafilm®, and directly to a nonParafilm®-covered portion of the container’s cap, lid, or cover. Facilitator: Retrieves the secondary packaging, a Nalgene 500-mL container with a screw top. Removes the cap, and while holding the container by its base, points the open end slightly downward toward the operator/collector. Operator: While holding the primary container by the cap, places the primary container into the secondary container. Facilitator: Caps the secondary container while moving away from the operator/collector. Retrieves the tertiary container (the nylon/polyester heat-seal bag) and places the sealed secondary container into the bag. Heat-seals the secondary container, initials the seal with the operator’s initials, and places the evidence in the transport bin for transportation to the decon team. Cleans up debris generated at the clean work area and places it in the hazardous waste receptacle; prepares the work area for the next piece of evidence. Operator: Removes the outer gloves used for the collection of the evidence and discards them in the hazardous waste receptacle; waits as the Facilitator prepares the materials for collection of the next item of evidence. D/A member: Notifies command that the evidence has been collected. Note:╇ If the chemical liquid is not stratified, this protocol can be utilized for this type of evidence as well. However, if the CSI assessment reveals that the liquid could be collected without a Coliwasa tube, the procedures are simply a modified version of the current protocol. The difference between the two protocols is the collection tools. Replace the Coliwasa tube in this protocol

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with a chemically clean, graduated glass pipette and bulb or chemical-resistant plastic bulb pipette for the nonstratified liquid chemical protocol. All the rest of the materials, equipment, and methodologies remain the same. Equipment for Suspected Stratified (Layered) Chemical Liquid in a Container 1. Primary Container—one evidence-labeled (on outside of jar) certified chemically clean glass jar with appropriate screw-top lid 2. Secondary Container—one evidence-labeled (on outside of jar), clean Nalgene (chemically resistant plastic) jar of an appropriate size to contain the primary container, with a clean, absorbent material to act as a cushion and to absorb any chemical residue should the primary container break, and an appropriate screw-top lid 3. Tertiary Container—one evidence-labeled (on the inside of the bag), clean, nylon/polyester heat-seal bag of an appropriate size to contain the secondary container 4. One section of Parafilm® of the appropriate size to wrap around the lid of the primary container 5. One properly labeled custody seal, buddy tabbed, to place on the primary container 6. One new, unopened clean Coliwasa tube 7. One clean work surface 8. One set of new, clean nitrile gloves

Bulk Powder Protocol, Suspected Biological, on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces Facilitator: Sets up the workstation by removing the clean work surface from the labeled nylon/polyester heat-seal bag and carefully placing it (using limited energy and movement) on the designated work area. Removes all the items from the nylon/polyester heat-seal bag and places them on the clean work surface (see Figure€11.16). Retrieves the clean nitrile gloves and with limited movement and aseptically passes them to the operator/collector. Operator: Dons nitrile gloves. Requests the primary sterile plastic container. Facilitator: Retrieves the sterile plastic container, loosens the cap, then transfers the sterile plastic container by holding the container from above the cap. The operator/collector retrieves the tube by its base.

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Figure 11.16╇ Sample kit and final packaging for bulk powder suspected biological sample.

Operator: Takes possession of the container from the facilitator as described above, opens the container, and secures the cap. Requests the sterile spatula/spoon for the collection of the suspect powder. Facilitator: Retrieves the sterile spatula/spoon and opens the end opposite the side that will be used to collect the suspect evidence. Peels back the packaging to expose the area to be held by the collector and positions the exposed end downward. Discards the spatula/spoon packaging into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the Parafilm®, custody seal, and secondary packaging. Operator: Removes the spatula/spoon by grasping the exposed section of the spatula/spoon and pulling downward. Safely approaches the evidence using very limited energy and movement around and within the powder residue. Uses the spatula/spoon to collect all the evidence by gently scooping up the powder. This collection effort may require multiple scoops. Note:╇ The operator/collector should always bring the primary container over the top of the evidence location and as close as possible to the evidence for transfer to the primary container. Do not attempt to take the evidence to the primary container, which may be located a distance away from the original source of the material. This limits the possibility of accidental re-aerosolization and additional contamination of the environment. Operator: Holds the sterile plastic container at a slight angle to the floor. Places the spatula/spoon containing the suspect powder deep into the primary container along the side of the container facing the floor, and gently rotates the spatula/spoon to deposit the powder in

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the sterile plastic container. Upon collecting all the evidence, places the lid on the container then discards the spatula/spoon in the hazardous waste receptacle. Facilitator: Aseptically hands the Parafilm® to the operator/collector by removing the backing from the material and hanging the film downward. Discards the Parafilm® backing into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the custody seal. Operator: Retrieves the Parafilm® from the bottom of the film and places the material around the lid in a clockwise manner, which secures the lid to the container. Facilitator: Aseptically hands the custody seal to the operator/collector by removing the backing from the seal and hanging the seal downward. Discards the custody seal backing into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the secondary container. Operator: Positions the sterile plastic container next to the custody seal, safely below the facilitator’s hands. Carefully guides the hanging custody seal to the side of the sterile plastic container in a location that will not obscure or cover the evidence label. Places the seal over the top and down the opposite side of the container. The custody seal must be secured directly to one side of the primary container, below the Parafilm® and directly to a non-Parafilm®-covered portion of the container’s cap, lid, or cover. Facilitator: Retrieves the secondary packaging, a clean nylon/polyester heat-seal bag. Opens the bag and holds it along one side by the top and bottom corners, positioning the opening toward the operator/collector. Operator: While holding the sealed primary container by its cap, places the primary container into the secondary container along the side of the bag below that being held by the facilitator. Facilitator: Heat-seals the secondary container, initials the seal with the operator’s initials, and places the evidence in the transport bin for transportation to the Decon Team. Cleans up the evidence debris generated at the clean work area and places in the hazardous waste receptacle then prepares the work area for the next evidence. Operator: Removes the outer gloves used for the collection of the evidence and discards them in the hazardous waste receptacle; waits as the Facilitator prepares to collect the next evidence. D/A member: Notifies command that the evidence has been collected. Note:╇ If the CSI assessment reveals that a bulk powder suspected of being a biological agent, which is on a porous surface or some nonporous surfaces, could be collected without a spatula, then the protocol is simply a modified version of the current protocol. The difference between the two protocols is

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the collection tools. Replace the spatula from this protocol with a clean/sterile trace evidence vacuum canister and its HEPA vacuum for the bulk powder for suspected biological agent on nonporous and some porous surfaces–vacuum protocol. In this instance you are now vacuuming up the evidence and the vacuum canister will act as the primary canister. Two caps are required for sealing instead of one, but all the rest of the materials, equipment, and methodologies are the same. Equipment for Bulk Powder Protocol, Suspected€Biological, on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces 1. Primary Container—one evidence-labeled and biohazard-labeled (on outside of jar) sterile, wide-mouth plastic jar with appropriate screw-top lid 2. Secondary Container—one labeled (on the inside of the bag), clean, nylon/polyester heat-seal bag of an appropriate size to contain the primary container 3. One section of Parafilm® of the appropriate size to wrap around the lid of the primary container 4. One properly labeled custody seal, buddy tabbed, to place on the primary container 5. One new, unopened sterile plastic spatula/spoon 6. One clean work surface 7. One set of new, clean nitrile gloves

Dry Swab Protocol for Visible Powder, Suspected€Biological, on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces Facilitator: Sets up the workstation by removing the clean work surface from the labeled nylon/polyester heat-seal bag and carefully placing it (using limited energy and movement) on the designated work area. Removes all the items from the nylon/polyester heat-seal bag and places them on the clean work surface (see Figure€11.17). Retrieves the clean nitrile gloves and with limited movement aseptically passes them to the operator/collector. Operator: Dons nitrile gloves. Requests the primary sterile plastic container. Facilitator: Retrieves the sterile plastic container, loosens the cap, and then transfers the sterile plastic container by holding the tube from above the cap. Instructs the operator/collector to retrieve the tube by its base.

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Figure 11.17╇ Collection kit and final packaging for dry swab protocol for visible powder suspected biological sample.

Operator: Takes possession of the container from the facilitator as described above, opens the container, and secures the cap. Requests the sterile synthetic swab for the collection of the suspect powder. Facilitator: Retrieves the sterile synthetic swab and opens the shaft end of the swab (opposite the swab head). Peels back the packaging to expose the area to be held by the collector and positions the exposed end downward. Discards the swab’s packaging into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the Parafilm®, custody seal, and secondary packaging. Operator: Removes the sterile synthetic swab by grasping the exposed section of the swab shaft and pulling downward. Safely approaches the evidence using very limited energy and movement around and within the powder residue. Collects the evidence by gently rolling the swab head in the visible powder. Note:╇ The operator/collector should always bring the primary container over the top of the evidence location and as close as possible to the evidence for transfer to the primary container. Do not attempt to take the evidence to the primary container, which may be located a distance away from the original source of the material. This limits the possibility of accidental re-aerosolization and additional contamination of the environment. Operator: Places the sterile synthetic swab into the primary container, which is a sterile plastic container. Places the sterile plastic container’s cap over the opening and exerts pressure on the sterile synthetic

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swab’s shaft, which is protruding from the container. In one quick, sharp movement, snaps the shaft downward to break off the excess shaft. Immediately seals the sterile plastic container and discards the shaft end in the hazardous waste receptacle. Facilitator: Aseptically hands the Parafilm® to the operator/collector by removing the backing from the material and hanging the film downward. Discards the Parafilm® backing into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the custody seal. Operator: Retrieves the Parafilm® from the bottom and places the Parafilm® around the lid in a clockwise manner, which will secure the lid to the container. Facilitator: Aseptically hands the custody seal to the operator/collector by removing the backing from the seal and hanging the seal downward. Discards the custody seal backing into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the secondary container. Operator: Positions the sterile plastic container next to the custody seal, safely below the facilitator’s hands. Carefully guides the hanging custody seal to the side of the sterile plastic container in a location that will not obscure or cover the evidence label. Places the seal over the top and down the opposite side of the container. The custody seal must be secured directly to one side of the primary container, below the Parafilm®, and directly to a non-Parafilm®-covered portion of the container’s cap, lid, or cover. Facilitator: Retrieves the secondary packaging, a clean nylon/polyester heat-seal bag. Opens the bag and holds it along one side by the top and bottom corners, positioning the opening toward the operator/collector. Operator: While holding the sealed primary container by its cap, places the primary container into the secondary container along the side of the bag below the side being held by the facilitator. Facilitator: Heat-seals the secondary container, initials the seal with the operator’s initials, and places the evidence in the transport bin for transportation to the Decon Team. Cleans up the evidence debris generated at the clean work area and places it in the hazardous waste receptacle, then prepares the work area for the next piece of evidence. Operator: Removes the outer gloves used for the collection of the evidence and discards them in the hazardous waste receptacle; waits as the Facilitator prepares to collect the next evidence. D/A member: Notifies command that the evidence has been collected. Note:╇ If the CSI assessment reveals that powder suspected of being a biological agent, which is on some porous or nonporous surfaces, could be collected

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Figure 11.18╇ Collection kit and final packaging for dry swab biological sample using Copan kit.

without a separate sterile synthetic swab and a sterile plastic container, then the protocol is simply a modified version of the current protocol. The difference between the two protocols is the collection tools. Replace the separate sterile synthetic swab and sterile plastic container from this protocol with a sterile Copan culture kit. Obviously, with the Copan culture kit, you will not need a separate sterile plastic container for the primary container, because the Copan kit has its own primary container (see Figure€11.18). All the rest of the materials, equipment, and methodologies are the same. Equipment for Dry Swab Protocol for Visible Powder, Suspected Biological, on Some Nonporous and Porous Surfaces 1. Primary Container—one evidence-labeled and biohazard-labeled (on outside of jar) sterile plastic centrifuge tube with screw-top lid or a Copan swab tube 2. Secondary Container—evidence-labeled and biohazard-labeled (on the inside of the bag), clean, nylon/polyester heat-seal bag of an appropriate size to contain the primary container 3. One section of Parafilm® of the appropriate size to wrap around the lid of the primary container 4. One properly labeled custody seal, buddy tabbed, to place on the primary container 5. One new, unopened sterile synthetic swab or Copan swab 6. One clean work surface 7. One set of new, clean nitrile gloves

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Wet Swab Protocol for Visible Powder, Suspected Biological, on Nonporous or Porous Surface Facilitator: Sets up the workstation by removing the clean work surface from the labeled nylon/polyester heat-seal bag and carefully placing it (using limited energy and movement) on the designated work area. Removes all the items from the nylon/polyester heat-seal bag and places them on the clean work surface (see Figure 11.19). Retrieves the clean nitrile gloves and with limited movement, aseptically passes them to the operator/collector. Operator: Dons nitrile gloves. Requests the primary sterile plastic container. Facilitator: Retrieves the sterile plastic container, loosens the cap, and then transfers the sterile plastic container by holding the tube from above the cap. Instructs the operator/collector to retrieve the tube from its bottom. Operator: Takes possession of the container from the Facilitator as described above, opens the container, and secures the cap. Requests the sterile synthetic swab for separating the evidence powder from the rest of the suspect powder. Facilitator: Retrieves the sterile synthetic swab and opens the shaft end of the swab, opposite the swab head, which will be used to separate the evidence powder from the suspect powder. Peels back the packaging to expose the area to be held by the operator/collector and positions the exposed end downward. Discards the swab’s packaging

Figure 11.19╇ Collection kit and final packaging for wet swab, suspected biological powder on nonporous or porous surface.

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into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the Parafilm®, custody seal, and secondary packaging. Operator: Removes the sterile synthetic swab by grasping the exposed section of the swab shaft and pulling downward. Safely approaches the evidence using very limited energy and movement around and within the powder residue. Separates an appropriate amount of the suspect powder residue into a pile away from the main body of the suspect powder. Note:╇ This dry swab may be packaged as evidence or discarded as protocol dictates. If this swab is to be collected, follow the dry swab protocol. Facilitator: Retrieves the second sterile synthetic swab and opens the shaft end of the swab, opposite the swab head, which will be used to collect the suspect evidence. Peels back the packaging to expose the area to be held by the collector and positions the exposed end downward. Discards the swab’s packaging into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the PBS (phosphate buffered saline), Parafilm®, custody seal, and secondary packaging. Operator: Removes the sterile synthetic swab by grasping the exposed section of the swab shaft and pulling downward. Holds the swab parallel to the floor with the swab head facing the Facilitator. Facilitator: Opens the PBS and dispenses 2–3 drops of PBS on the swab head from above the swab head. To prevent cross contamination, do not touch swab head with PBS bottle. Operator: Safely approaches the evidence and utilizing very limited energy and movement around and within the powder residue collects the evidence by rolling the wet, sterile synthetic swab in the previously gathered suspect powder residue. Note:╇ The operator/collector should always bring the primary container over the top of the evidence location and as close as possible to the evidence for transfer to the primary container. Do not attempt to take the evidence to the primary container, which may be located a distance away from the original source of the material. This limits the possibility of accidental re-aerosolization and additional contamination of the environment. Operator: Places the sterile synthetic swab into its primary container, the sterile plastic container. Places the sterile plastic container’s cap

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over the opening and exerts pressure on the sterile synthetic swab’s shaft, which is protruding from the container. In one quick, sharp movement, snaps the shaft downward to break off the excess shaft. Immediately seals the sterile plastic container and discards the shaft end in the hazardous waste receptacle. Facilitator: Aseptically hands the Parafilm® to the operator/collector by removing the backing from the material and hanging the film downward. Discards the Parafilm® backing into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the custody seal. Operator: Retrieves the Parafilm® by the lower edge and place the Parafilm® around the lid in a clockwise manner, which secures the lid to the container. Facilitator: Aseptically passes the custody seal to the operator/collector by removing the backing from the seal and hanging the seal downward. Discards the custody seal backing into the hazardous waste receptacle and prepares the secondary container. Operator: Positions the sterile plastic container by the custody seal, safely below the Facilitator’s hands, and carefully guides the hanging custody seal to the side of the sterile plastic container in a location that will not obscure or cover the evidence label. Places the seal over the top and down the opposite side of the container. The custody seal must be secured directly to one side of the primary container, below the Parafilm®, and directly to a non-Parafilm®-covered portion of the container’s cap, lid, or cover. Facilitator: Retrieves the secondary packaging, a clean nylon/polyester heat-seal bag. Opens the bag and, holding the bag along one side by the top and bottom corners, positions the opening toward the operator/collector. Operator: While holding the sealed primary container by its cap, places the primary container into the secondary container along the side of the bag below the side being held by the facilitator. Facilitator: Heat-seals the secondary container, initials the seal with the operator’s initials, and places the evidence in the transport bin for transportation to the Decon Team. Cleans up the evidence debris generated at the clean work area and places it in the hazardous waste receptacle, then prepares the work area for the next piece of evidence. Operator: Removes the outer gloves used for the collection of the evidence and discards them in the hazardous waste receptacle; waits as the facilitator prepares to collect the next piece evidence. D/A member: Notifies command that the evidence has been collected.

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Figure 11.20╇ Collection kit and final packaging for wet swab using PBS suspected biological powder on nonporous or porous surface.

Note:╇ If the CSI assessment reveals that powder suspected of being a biological agent, which is on some porous or nonporous surfaces, could be collected without a separate sterile synthetic swab, a sterile plastic container, and a bottle of PBS, then the protocol is simply a modified version of this protocol. The difference between the two protocols is the collection tools. Replace the separate sterile synthetic swab, a sterile plastic container, and bottle of PBS from this protocol with a sterile Copan culture kit. Obviously, with the Copan culture kit, you will not need a separate sterile plastic container for the primary container and a bottle of PBS, because the Copan kit has its own primary container and a tube with a sponge soaked in PBS (see Figure 11.20). Use the Copan’s swab to separate a small amount of powder from the main body of the powder, wet this swab with the supplied PBS tube, discard the PBS tube, and roll the wet swab in the separated powder. All the rest of the materials, equipment, and methodologies are the same. Equipment for Wet Swab Protocol for Visible Powder, Suspected Biological, on Nonporous or Porous Surfaces 1. Primary Container—one evidence-labeled and biohazard-labeled (on outside of jar) sterile plastic centrifuge tube with screw-top lid or Copan swab tube 2. Secondary Container—evidence-labeled and biohazard-labeled (on the inside of the bag), clean, nylon/polyester heat-seal bag of an appropriate size to contain the primary container

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3. One section of Parafilm® of the appropriate size to wrap around the lid of the primary container 4. One properly labeled custody seal, buddy tabbed, to place on the primary container 5. Two new, unopened sterile synthetic swabs or one Copan swab 6. One bottle of PBS or a red Copan tube 7. One clean work surface 8. One set of new, clean nitrile gloves

Conclusion By now it should be apparent that specific written protocols should be developed for all possible CBRNE/TIC evidence matrices. These protocols are written descriptions of the detailed procedures to be followed in the collection of evidence and appropriate packaging, labeling, preservation, transportation, and storage of evidentiary materials to the analytical laboratory. The use of specific evidence collection, processing, and packaging protocols improves the evidence consistency, reduces the chance for error, and most importantly, defines the steps to enhance the safety of the personnel on scene.

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In most cases the methods and procedures of the collection, processing, and packaging of forensic evidence will not be much different than the current standards employed for a conventional crime scene investigation. The focus of this chapter is on the areas where there are deviations from the forensic evidence collection standards due to the CBRNE/TIC environment and potential contamination of the evidence. Additional constraints include the need to place the items of evidence in a glove box at the lab to be safely analyzed. CSIs are reminded that even in such a hazardous environment no item of evidence is touched, moved, presumptively field tested, or processed before it has been thoroughly and properly documented. Evidence collection and packaging kits will be prepared in the support zone by the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team. Labels for all primary, secondary, and tertiary containers/packages will also be completed and applied to the appropriate packages in the support zone. All evidence collection and packaging efforts will continue to incorporate the aseptic techniques described in previous chapters.

Latent Fingerprints Most CSIs will agree that latent fingerprint processing creates circumstances where fingerprint powders and chemicals can be distributed within the crime scene. There is a great chance of contaminating or cross-contaminating other forensic evidence. This is one of the primary factors CSIs must consider when establishing the specific order in which the various items of forensic evidence will be documented, screened, presumptive field tested, processed, collected, packaged, and preserved (see Figures 12.1 and 12.2). Keep in mind that the specific order in which evidence will be collected is based upon the transient, volatile, or perishable properties of the evidence, as well as the degree of its danger of being lost, destroyed, or contaminated. Evidence that may be compromised should immediately be documented, collected, and packaged when possible. This standard is especially important when CSIs encounter a single physical item of forensic evidence. The item may possess numerous other types of forensic evidence. For example, a piece of metal bomb fragment may have hair and fiber evidence, explosive residue evidence, and serological/ DNA evidence as well as latent fingerprint evidence. CSIs who are trained to recover latent fingerprints must prioritize the recovery of the individual 263

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Figure 12.1╇ Swabbing jar for DNA before beginning to collect sample or processing for latent prints.

Figure 12.2╇ Removing possible chemical agent for evidence before processing for latent prints.

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types of forensic evidence so as not to compromise or destroy other types of forensic evidence present. In a crime scene involving CBRNE/TIC agents, documentation, screening, presumptive field testing, processing, collection, packaging, and preservation of the potential agents should be conducted before any latent fingerprint processing occurs to ensure evidence is not contaminated by the fingerprint powders and chemicals. When individual items of evidence require processing for latent fingerprints, they should be thoroughly documented. All other categories of potential forensic evidence on the item must have been processed first. Then the item that may contain additional forensic evidence should be removed from its environment to an area that does not contain any potential evidence associated with the crime under investigation. In this location the evidence can be processed for the presence of latent fingerprints without fear of contaminating other evidence (see Figure€12.3). Finally, after all CBRNE/TIC agent evidence and physical forensic evidence has been recovered from the location, the physical location itself, including walls, table surfaces, etc., may be processed for latent fingerprints if the investigation reveals that this is required. When developing latent fingerprints, it is important to understand the cross-contamination issues associated with fingerprint processing. A singleuse fingerprint brush and a small amount of powder should be used for every individual item of evidence. Pour a small amount of powder onto or into a prepared disposable surface/package for transferring the powder to the brush. Never place a brush into the jar of fingerprint powder (see Figure€12.4). This brush and the powder should be discarded after its use and a new brush and a small amount of new powder should be poured onto or into a new disposable surface/package for use on the next item to be processed.

Figure 12.3╇ Keep latent fingerprint workstation away from scene to prevent contamination while processing for latent prints.

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Figure 12.4╇ Pour a small amount of latent powder onto a clean work surface to avoid cross-contamination of powder and items of evidence.

This method should be employed for all subsequent items processed for latent fingerprints and is designed to eliminate the possibility of crosscontaminating potential DNA from one item of evidence to another by means of the brushes and powder. There are prepackaged single-use powders and brushes or aerosolized fingerprint powders that can be utilized (see Figure€12.5). These methodologies eliminate the possibility of cross-contaminating potential DNA from one item of evidence to another. Note: Avoid cross contamination of powder and items of evidence. Remember, sebaceous gland materials found in fingerprints contain DNA. When processing an item of evidence, if no fingerprints of value are developed on the items but smudges are found, these smudges, which are suggestive of finger digits, will be photographed as described in the following paragraph and then swabbed for potential DNA evidence. Once latent fingerprints have been developed utilizing the standard methodologies (powders or chemicals), all latent fingerprints deemed of value for submission to a latent fingerprint examiner should be photographed following the standard forensic photographic techniques for latent fingerprint documentation. It is especially critical that a proper, unobstructed closeup photograph incorporating an American Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO) scale be taken of each latent fingerprint (see Figure€12.6). This ensures a quality digital image that can be used to enter the latent fingerprint into an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). Depending on the CBRNE/TIC agent used, decontamination of the latent fingerprint may not be possible without destroying the latent impression. However, a laboratory analyst utilizing a glove box containing the appropriate equipment may be able to remove the latent fingerprint from the packaging

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Figure 12.5╇ Single-use fingerprint powder by Armor Forensics.

Figure 12.6╇ Use an ABFO scale to photograph latent prints before lifting them.

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to perform further documentation, analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification. Upon completion of the examination the analyst can repackage the latent fingerprint and decontaminate the packaging so the latent fingerprint can be removed from the glove box and safely stored. After completion of proper photographic and other documentation the developed latent fingerprint can be lifted and transferred to the appropriate backing card (see Figures€12.7 and 12.8). Each backing card will be labeled manually. Once this is accomplished each lift will be sealed in two sets of clear nylon/polyester heat-seal bags in a manner that allows easy viewing of a bar code label or manual label and the latent fingerprint. Utilize the labeled primary and secondary packaging or containers prepared by the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team prior to entry into the exclusion zone. When securing the item in the primary and secondary packaging, be careful not to obscure any labeling information or the latent

Figure 12.7╇ Lifting developed latent print with fingerprint tape.

Figure 12.8╇ Transferring tape lift to fingerprint backing card.

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Figure 12.9╇ Latent print enclosed in primary and secondary packaging.

fingerprint. Carefully remove the air from the packaging before heat-sealing the nylon/polyester bag. Follow the labeling methodologies with the primary packaging labeled on the outside of the packaging or containers. Secondary clear packaging or containers will be labeled on the inside of the packaging or containers. Secondary opaque packaging or containers will be labeled on the outside of the packaging or containers (see Figure€ 12.9). Tertiary clear containers will be labeled on the inside of the packaging or containers. Once sealed, the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team facilitator will initial all seals with the initials of the operator/collector. The package will be placed in the evidence bin to be transported to the evidence reduction zone for decontamination. Whenever using heat-seal bags follow the initialing techniques described above, regardless of the type of evidence. Fingerprint Processing and Collection Equipment The following is a list of some of the collection equipment issued by the equipment custodian to the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team for use in processing and collecting latent fingerprint evidence from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene:

1. Fingerprint powders (white, black, and fluorescent) 2. Single-use fingerprint powder application brushes 3. Magnetic fingerprint powders (white, black, and fluorescent) 4. Magnetic fingerprint powder application brushes 5. Clean, disposable powder work surfaces (paper towels, paper or plastic plates or bowls, aluminum trays, or plastic resealable bags) 6. Clear fingerprint lifting tape (various widths)

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7. Fingerprint backing cards (white, black, and fluorescent) 8. Clear acetate sheets 9. Portable fuming kit 10. Cyanoacrylate 11. Forensic/alternate light source (handheld eye protectors) 12. Flashlight 13. Nitrile gloves 14. ABFO scale 15. Magnifying glass

Packaging Equipment The following is a list of some of the packaging equipment issued by the equipment custodian to the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team for use in packaging latent fingerprint evidence recovered from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene:

1. Plastic impulse bag sealer (heat sealer) 2. Clear nylon/polyester heat-seal bags 3. Ruggedized laptop computer with evidence tracking software 4. Evidence labels (standard or bar code) 5. Clean/sterile scissors 6. Black permanent marker

Hair/Fiber Evidence Hair and fibers are excellent examples of transfer evidence and they can be found on just about any surface and at any location. It is this ease of transfer that makes hair and fiber evidence so susceptible to being lost by any number of accidental means. Care and diligence must be observed by all emergency responders in a hazardous environment to ensure that evidence is not accidentally lost. As stated previously, the specific order in which evidence will be collected is based on the transient, volatile, or perishable properties of the evidence as well as the degree of its danger of being lost, destroyed, or contaminated. Pieces of hair and fiber evidence are among the first items to be collected, especially in situations such as a metal bomb fragment with multiple types of forensic evidence as exemplified in the latent fingerprint section. After the proper documentation has been completed on the item of evidence and location of the evidence, the appropriate method of collection must be determined. There are several standardized methodologies for collecting and packaging hair and fiber evidence; however, not all are appropriate for hairs and fibers being collected and packaged from a CBRNE/TIC

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Figure 12.10╇ Collecting a hair from a surface to be processed for latent prints.

crime scene. If the hair and fiber evidence is located on an item of evidence containing other types of evidence, specifically DNA and latent fingerprints, the recommended method of collection is to place individual hairs and fibers on a piece of fingerprint tape. Unroll an appropriate length of clear 4-inchwide fingerprint-lifting tape, inverted with the sticky side up, and place it on a prepared clean work space. Use sterile disposable tweezers to remove the hairs and fibers from the item of evidence and transfer them to the tape (see Figure€12.10). Once all the hairs and fibers have been transferred to the tape, cut a sheet of clear acetate to cover the tape containing the hair and fiber evidence. Ensure that the acetate sheet is sized to leave a 1-inch border on three sides and sufficient area on one side to place an evidence label. Cover the tape with the acetate sheet. If an item of evidence or an area of the scene has no other evidentiary concerns other than hairs and fibers, the clear 4-inch-wide fingerprint lifting tape can be cut to a manageable size and applied directly to the surface of the item of evidence or area of the scene. Use the necessary pressure to ensure that the adhesive of the tape captures the hairs and fibers (see Figures€12.11 and 12.12). The evidence can now be packaged in two individually prepared nylon/ polyester heat-seal bags as the primary and secondary containers (see Figure€ 12.13). CSIs must be careful not to cover any labeling information when sealing the packaging and remember to remove all the air from the

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Figure 12.11╇ Using adhesive tape and acetate to secure the hair evidence.

Figure 12.12╇ Applying 4-inch tape to lift hairs/fibers from carpeting.

packaging before sealing. Once sealed, the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team facilitator will initial all seals with the initials of the Strike Team’s operator/collector. The evidence package will then be placed in an evidence bin to be transported to the contamination reduction zone.

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Figure 12.13╇ Facilitator seals hair/fiber evidence into secondary packaging.

Collecting and packaging hair and fiber evidence in this manner will provide the laboratory analyst the ability to view the evidence through the packaging with the naked eye and with various microscopes. The laboratory analyst will also be able to place the items of evidence into a glove box and employ the proper analysis and decontamination equipment to conduct further examinations. Another methodology for collecting hairs and fibers from an item of evidence or an area of the scene that has no other evidentiary concerns is the trace evidence vacuum canister system. Simply attach a clean, new trace evidence canister to the hose of a 1 horsepower HEPA vacuum and vacuum the item or area (see Figure€12.14). When finished, the vacuum is shut off and the canister’s top and bottom are sealed and packaged as outlined in Chapter 11 (see Figure€12.15). Due to the vacuum’s exhaust fan and its potential ability to re-aerosolize the agent and cause further contamination, the use of this methodology should be thoroughly assessed in relationship to the scene and the suspected type of CBRNE/TIC agent present at the scene. Hair and Fiber Processing and Collection Equipment The following is a list of some of the collection equipment issued by the equipment custodian to the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team for use in

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Figure 12.14╇ Collector vacuums hair/fiber from carpet for trace evidence

collection.

Figure 12.15╇ Packaged vacuum trace evidence canister containing hair and

fiber evidence.

processing and collecting hair and fiber evidence from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene:

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1. Clear, 4-inch-wide adhesive tape 2. 8½"╯×╯11" acetate sheets 3. Trace evidence vacuum canisters 4. One-horsepower, high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) vacuum (vac)

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5. Clean/sterile scalpels 6. Clean/sterile hemostats 7. Clean/sterile utility knives and blades 8. Clean/sterile scissors 9. Clean/sterile tweezers 10. Forensic/alternate light source (handheld eye protectors) 11. Flashlight 12. Nitrile gloves

Packaging Equipment The following is a list of some of the packaging equipment issued by the Equipment Custodian to the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team for use in packaging hair and fiber evidence recovered from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene:

1. Plastic impulse bag sealer (heat sealer) 2. Clear nylon/polyester heat-seal bags 3. Ruggedized laptop computer with evidence tracking software 4. Evidence labels (standard or bar code) 5. Clean/sterile scissors 6. Black permanent marker

DNA Evidence Serological/DNA evidence (e.g., blood, feces, saliva, semen, sperm, sweat, tears, urine, vaginal fluids, etc.), as well as its collection, packaging, and analysis, is the evidence type most impacted by a CBRNE/TIC environment. The forensic standard for collection and packaging serological/DNA evidence from a conventional crime scene is accomplished by swabbing wet evidence or rehydrating dried stains on a swab, allowing the swab to dry, and packaging the dried swabs in paper or cardboard packaging. Clearly, given the safety concerns and the possible destruction of the evidence during the decontamination process, the use of paper and cardboard is not possible; therefore, sterile plastic, nylon, and/or glass containers must be utilized. For recovery of whole wet blood evidence from nonabsorbent material in a CBRNE/TIC crime scene, a sterile, purple-top Vacutainer® containing EDTA (ethylenediamine tetraacetic acid) preservative and blood drawing kits consisting of sterile tubing and sterile needles are recommended. The sterile Vacutainer® can be either plastic or glass. A new clean/sterile set of hemostats is required to hold the butterfly needle of the blood drawing kits. The method is simple: hold the butterfly needle with the hemostats and place the needle into the blood with the tapered edge of the needle facing down. Next place

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the Vacutainer® into the holder attached to the butterfly needle via tubing. Once the operator/collector is ready, push the Vacutainer® down to puncture the septum and start the vacuum drawing the blood. After the Vacutainer® is filled with the appropriate amount of blood, it is removed. Discard the butterfly needle into the sharps hazardous waste receptacle and the remainder of the equipment into the regular hazardous waste. The Vacutainer® is the primary container. It will be placed in a plastic sterile centrifuge tube, which is used as the secondary container. The interior of the centrifuge tube will be padded with two sterile 2"╯×╯2" synthetic gauze pads to act as a cushion and an absorbent material capable of absorbing the entire contents of the Vacutainer® should it be ruptured. Place the secondary container in tertiary packaging consisting of an appropriately sized nylon/polyester heat-seal bag. Care should be used to not cover any labeling information when sealing the packaging, and all the air from the packaging should be removed before sealing. The facilitator will place the operator/collector’s initials on all seals and place the package into the evidence bin for transport to the decontamination reduction zone (see Figure€12.16). For the recovery of whole wet blood evidence from absorbent material in a CBRNE/TIC crime scene it is recommended that a sterile swab be utilized. Typically, a sterile synthetic swab is placed into the wet blood and the blood is absorbed onto the swab (see Figure€12.17). A purple-top Vacutainer® is opened and the wet swab is placed in the Vacutainer® in a manner that permits it to be recapped (break the swab shaft to fit the Vacutainer®). Once the Vacutainer® is recapped, it should be packaged by utilizing the methods previously outlined above. The swab is not allowed to dry before it is packaged in the EDTA Vacutainer®. It is necessary to do this as quickly as possible to stop the blood from absorbing any additional CBRNE/TIC agent present in the environment. If the blood is subjected to toxicology as well as DNA analysis, wet blood is best suited for these examinations.

Figure 12.16╇ Wet blood evidence collection kit and finished packaging.

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Figure 12.17╇ Collector swabbing wet blood to collect evidentiary sample.

When an item of evidence containing dried bloodstains is too large to be examined in a glove box (such as a wall of a room or side of a box) the area containing the stain should be cut from the substrate (see Figure€12.18). As long as the stain is in a stable state and is not complicated by being a part of or interfering with any other evidence it is recommended the stain be cut from the substrate where it is located. This is preferable to rehydrating the stain with PCR-grade deionized water then swabbing the wet stain, which would allow the wet evidence to potentially absorb more CBRNE/TIC agent and degrade the genetic markers as it re-dries. Once the evidence has been cut out of the host substrate it should be placed in an appropriately sized and properly labeled sterile plastic screw-top container, which will act as the primary packaging (see Figure€12.19). The facilitator will hold open the secondary packaging (a nylon/polyester heat-seal bag) and secure the primary container inside using the heat sealer, and then place the operator/collector’s initials on the seals. The package is then placed into the evidence bin for transport to the contamination reduction zone. If there is a dried bloodstain on an item of evidence that cannot be cut from the substrate where it is located without damaging or destroying the main item of evidence, or if other types of evidence are present on the main

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Figure 12.18╇ Collector cutting dried blood evidence from material.

Figure 12.19╇ Placing cutting of dried blood evidence into primary packaging.

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item and the item is too large to be collected or too large to fit in a glove box, then rehydrating the dried stain is necessary. Use PCR-grade deionized water to wet a sterile synthetic swab (see Figure€12.20). Rehydrate and absorb the blood into the head of the swab. Open a purple-top Vacutainer® and place the wet swab in the Vacutainer® in a manner such that it can be recapped. Once the Vacutainer® is recapped it should be packaged and labeled utilizing the method previously outlined for Vacutainers®. If an item of evidence contains dried bloodstain evidence and the item is of a size that may fit into a glove box, the entire item should be recovered. Before the item is packaged it must be examined to identify the presence of any other types of forensic evidence. If other types of forensic evidence are present they should be assessed and processed appropriately. Examining an item of evidence for the presence of latent fingerprints will not interfere with DNA analysis of serological evidence found on the item; however, it is preferable to have uncontaminated serological evidence. This can be accomplished by carefully removing the serological evidence first using the swab/rehydration method and packaging methods previously outlined in this section. After these steps have been taken the item can be processed for latent fingerprints. The packaging of physical items of evidence will be conducted in the

Figure 12.20╇ Collector rehydrates dried blood evidence.

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same basic manner as previously described in this section utilizing two sets of appropriately sized nylon/polyester heat-seal bags and evidence labels. Saliva evidence is typically not found in quantities large enough to allow the use of Vacutainers®. Each item suspected of containing possible saliva evidence will have to be assessed to determine how it will be collected and packaged. For example, items such as a cigarette butt or a piece of discarded chewing gum can be collected and examined in a glove box utilizing single-use sterile tweezers and a sterile plastic container with an appropriate sealing top for its primary container. Once the evidence is sealed in its primary container, follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. Larger items, such as a water bottle, soda can, or even an air-purifying respirator (APR), can also be collected and packaged for submission to the lab as the entire item will easily fit in a glove box. Packaging of physical items of evidence will be conducted by utilizing two sets of appropriately size, prelabeled, nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. Ensure the item has been examined and processed for the presence of other types of forensic evidence. Latent fingerprint powders will not impact any DNA analysis of the suspected saliva, but it is preferable to collect any uncontaminated evidence for analysis. The possible saliva evidence can be removed by utilizing the dry swab method for wet saliva and the rehydration swab method for dried saliva. In either case, once the evidence is collected on the swabs it is placed in the primary container (a sterile plastic container with cap). After the evidence is sealed in its primary container, follow the secondary packaging methods previously described in this section for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. For larger items of serological evidence, blood, or saliva that will not fit into the glove box when packaged, it is recommended that the area suspected of containing the serological evidence be cut out and packaged. Remember, this can only be accomplished after the item is examined to determine the presence of any other types of forensic evidence. If other types of forensic evidence are present, they should be assessed and processed appropriately. Upon completion of these tasks the evidence can be cut from the item and packaged in the appropriate sterile plastic container with lid. After the evidence is sealed in its primary container, follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. CSIs should also be reminded that when serological evidence is cut from an item, this item should also be collected and packaged separately for storage and possible future examination. As stated earlier in the latent fingerprint section, if a latent impression is developed and evaluated as having no value then it should be documented and collected as possible serological evidence. Utilize the dry swab method of collection and its associated packaging as outlined previously in this section.

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When the evidence contains bloodstain patterns, complete the documentation and then collect representative evidence from each of the identified patterns. Samples will be collected and packaged based on • • • • •

Type of substrate on which the blood is located Physical state of the bloodstain—wet or dry Need to collect the entire item Size of the item allowing it to fit in a glove box Whether the bloodstain can be safety removed (cut out) of the substrate

A final consideration is if the removal of the bloodstain will affect any other forensic evidence that may be present. Once this assessment has been made and any other forensic evidence that may be present has been processed, determine which of the collection methodologies previously outlined in this section will be utilized. If the bloodstain patterns are on an article of clothing, the item is thoroughly documented, all other forensic evidence is collected and/or processed, and representative bloodstain evidence is removed from the item of clothing. Then it can be collected and packaged according to previously outlined procedures. Keep in mind that working with CBRNE/TIC agents in a hazardous environment dictates different packaging requirements. Clothing containing bloodstain evidence cannot be packaged in paper. Large sheets of nylon/ polyester heat-seal material must be employed to safely secure this type of evidence. Use two sheets of nylon/polyester heat-seal material (enough to cover the entire article of clothing without folding or having the clothing extending beyond the edges of the sheets) for the front and back. Additional sheets of the same material should be cut to insert between the front and back of the clothing. This will prevent any one side of the clothing from touching another side. Once all the sheets are in place, the sheets and clothing should be rolled up from bottom to top and the roll secured with an evidence label (see Figure€12.21a–d). Seal the evidence in primary and secondary containers using the packaging methods previously described in this section for nylon/ polyester heat-seal bags (see Figure€12.22). Because the collection and packaging materials (nylon/polyester, plastic, and glass packaging) do not allow items to air dry this evidence must be stored in a cooled environment and be transported to the appropriate laboratory immediately. The laboratory will determine the best way to store, test, and analyze the evidence based on laboratory confirmation of the agent(s) present in the hazardous environment.

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(a)

(b)

Figure 12.21╇ (a) Place nylon/polyester material inside to separate front of clothing from back. (b) Place all layers inside nylon/polyester heat-seal bag.

Serological/DNA Processing and Collection Equipment The following is a list of some of the collection equipment issued by the equipment custodian to the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team for use in processing and collecting serological/DNA evidence from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene: 1. Sterile cotton swabs (Note: Swabs containing the growth medium calcium alginate should not be utilized for the collection of DNA evidence.) 2. Sterile cotton gauze pads

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(c)

(d)

Figure 12.21 (continued)╇ (c) Roll up item of clothing to prevent loss of hairs, fibers, or other trace evidence. (d) Secure edge of rolled package with label.

Figure 12.22╇ Clothing secured in primary and secondary packing with labels clearly in view.

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3. Sterile cotton culture collection swab kits 4. Sterile synthetic polyester swabs 5. Sterile synthetic polyester gauze pads 6. Sterile synthetic polyester culture collection swab kits 7. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-grade deionized (DI) water 8. Clean/sterile bulb pipettes 9. Sterile scalpels 10. Clean/sterile syringes with blunt-end needles 11. Clean/sterile Vacutainers® with ethylenediamine tetraacetic acid (EDTA) 12. Clean/sterile Vacutainers®—no preservatives 13. Clean/sterile needles and tubing for Vacutainers® 14. Clean/sterile hemostats 15. Clean/sterile locking forceps 16. Clean/sterile utility knives and blades 17. Clean/sterile scissors 18. Clean/sterile tweezers 19. Forensic/alternate light source (with handheld eye protectors) 20. Flashlight 21. Presumptive blood tests 22. Presumptive seminal tests 23. Nitrile gloves

Packaging Equipment The following is a list of some of the packaging equipment issued by the equipment custodian to the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team for use in packaging serological/DNA evidence recovered from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene:

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1. Clean/sterile screw-top, centrifuge tube (plastic) 2. Clean/sterile, screw-top, wide-mouth evidence bottle (plastic) 3. Parafilm® 4. Clean/sterile culture collection swab kits (plastic) 5. Clean/sterile Vacutainers® with EDTA (plastic or glass) 6. Clean/sterile Vacutainers®—no preservatives (plastic or glass) 7. Plastic impulse bag sealer (heat sealer) 8. Clear nylon/polyester heat-seal bags 9. Ruggedized laptop computer with evidence tracking software 10. Evidence labels 11. Tamper-indicating serrated evidence tape 12. Black permanent marker

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Trace Evidence Trace evidence can consist of almost any physical materials (electronic, entomological, explosive residue, glass, gunshot residue, ignitable substances, plant material, soil, etc.). Most of the conventional procedures currently employed to collect and package the evidence types listed above will be employed in a CBRNE/TIC crime scene. There are a few exceptions, particularly dealing with the use of cardboard and paper. The presence of a CBRNE/ TIC agent requires the CSI to employ chemically clean glass containers, sterile plastic containers, and appropriately sized nylon/polyester heat-seal bags and nonstatic plastic bags. Entomological Entomological evidence can assist in answering many forensic questions regarding the crime under investigation. Living creatures, including insects, will be affected before humans by CBRNE/TIC agents and are typically used as sentinels for the identification of the presence of these agents in certain industries. Dead insects can be collected and examined to identify their cause of death and the possible presence of CBRNE/TIC agents (toxicology). Typically, dead specimens are collected and placed in chemically clean/ sterile glass or chemically clean/sterile plastic screw-top containers with an entomological preservative (Hood’s reagent). However, when collecting entomological evidence for the purpose of identifying CBRNE/TIC agents from the specimen, the use of entomological preservatives is not recommended. The primary packaging remains the same. Once the evidence is sealed in its primary container, CSIs should follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags as secondary containers for entomological evidence. There may be a few specific instances where live insect evidence may be beneficial to a CBRNE/TIC agent crime scene investigation. The most common example is maggots feeding on a victim killed by a CBRNE/TIC agent. The live maggots will be collected using the standard methodologies of scooping with a single-use sterile or chemically clean plastic, chemical-resistant plastic, or stainless steel disposable scoop or spoon. Place the maggots in boiling water to kill them and keep them straightened. The maggots will be filtered from the water and placed in the primary packaging and secondary packaging as outlined for dead insects. The boiling water used to kill the maggots should be collected and packaged in a similar fashion as the maggots.

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Explosive Residue The type and location of explosive residue evidence will determine the collection and packaging methodologies required. One standard methodology utilizes sterile cotton gauze pads and single-use, sterile tweezers or hemostats to transfer the residue to the gauze by conducting 6"╯×╯6" S-shaped wipes, left-to-right and then top-to-bottom (see Figure€12.23). The gauze pad will be packaged in a chemically clean glass jar for the primary packaging. Once the evidence is sealed in the primary container, follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. Another standard method for explosive residue collection and analysis is to utilize scanning electron microscope pedestals with carbon sticky tape (see Figure€12.24). The pedestals are tamped into the possible explosive residue so that it adheres to the carbon tape on the pedestal’s platform. The pedestals are placed back into their plastic storage holders, which serve as the primary packaging. Once the evidence is sealed in its primary container follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/ polyester heat-seal bags. The final method is to collect the entire item containing the residue. If this is not practical, collect a portion of the item containing the residue. The item has to be able to fit into a glove box or safety hood, and it may be necessary cut out evidence from a substrate that possibly contains explosive residue.

Figure 12.23╇ Collector recovering possible explosive residue with tweezers and cotton gauze pad.

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Figure 12.24╇ SEM residue evidence collection kit.

Employ sterile, single-use scalpels or scissors and tweezers or hemostats to secure the sample. Once this is accomplished, the primary and secondary packaging will be the same as outlined for the explosive residue wipes. Before cutting out anything ensure that the item is thoroughly documented, especially by means of photography under alternate light source (ALS) illumination (see Figures€12.25 and 12.26). Just like blood, explosive residues can produce unique pattern evidence, and they will be treated similar to bloodstain pattern evidence. Thoroughly document and collect representative samples from each of the identified patterns. The conclusion on how to collect and package the evidence will be based upon the substrate of the example. You must determine whether • • • • •

The explosive residue is wet or dry The entire item can be collected Item dimensions allow it to fit in a glove box It should be cut from the substrate Cutting it will affect any other forensic evidence present

Once these considerations have been taken into account, CSIs will choose one of the previously mentioned methods of collection and packaging. If explosive residue patterns are visible on an article of clothing, document and process all other forensic evidence before beginning to remove representative explosive residue samples. The item of clothing should also be collected and packaged. If the article of clothing contains explosive residues only visualized utilizing an ALS, the entire article of clothing should be collected, packaged, and submitted to a laboratory where it can be properly examined and sampled.

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Figure 12.25╇ Collector examines article of clothing using an alternate light source.

Figure 12.26╇ Collector cutting possible explosive residue from item of evidence.

Large sheets of nylon/polyester heat-seal material will be necessary to package an article of clothing containing explosive residue evidence. Two sheets of appropriately sized material that will cover the entire article of clothing without folding or having the clothing extending beyond the edges of those sheets should be utilized for the front and back. Additional sheets should be

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cut to insert between the front and back of the clothing. This will prevent any one side of the clothing from touching another side. Once all the sheets are in place the sheets and clothing should be rolled up from bottom-to-top and secured with an evidence label. After the roll is sealed, a secondary sheet of nylon arson heat seal material can be used to package and seal the roll. As with any other evidence, the appropriate evidence label must be attached. Glass In most cases glass evidence will be examined and collected by utilizing the standards currently practiced in conventional crime scenes. The methods employed will depend on factors such as

1. Why the glass is being taken 2. What information can be obtained from the analysis of the glass 3. Type of glass 4. Whether the pieces are large or small 5. How much glass is present 6. What quantity of sample is needed 7. The presence of other types of forensic evidence on the glass

Once these questions are answered, the proper methods of documentation, examination, presumptive field-testing (for other types of evidence including GSR (gunshot residue), explosive residue, chemicals, biologicals, etc.), field processing, collection, and packaging can be identified and executed. The glass must be carefully examined for the presence of other types of forensic evidence. If other forensic evidence is identified it must be processed accordingly before any presumptive field-testing, field processing, collection, and packaging can occur. Clean/sterile tweezers and hemostats can be used to collect small, individual samples of glass (see Figure€12.27). For large samples possibly containing important ballistic damage evidence, sturdy sheets of clear acetate of the appropriate size can be used to slide under and be placed over the glass. For bulk samples of small shards of glass, clean/sterile shovels and brushes can be employed. For packaging glass evidence, clean/sterile containers (glass or plastic), clean Teflon®-lined paint cans, plastic boxes, and sturdy sheets of acetate can be used as the primary packaging. Once the evidence is sealed in its primary container, follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. It should be noted that glass, unlike much of the previously discussed evidence types, can be easily decontaminated due to its nonporous characteristics.

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Figure 12.27╇ Recovering glass fragments in the exclusion zone.

However, decontamination should not be attempted in the field and should be conducted in the controlled environment of a laboratory. Gunshot Residue Gunshot residue (GSR) evidence is very similar to explosive residue evidence, and it will be treated utilizing the same protocols. GSR pattern evidence will typically be of a more manageable size, which will make it more suitable to collect the entire item and submit it to the lab. More often than not GSR is not visible to the naked eye (especially on clothing) and will require the use of an ALS and a series of chemical treatments to make it visible. When possible, it is more appropriate to collect the entire item for submission to the lab. The collection and packaging of a particular item containing GSR evidence will be determined by location and substrate of the GSR. As with many other types of evidence, the items must be examined for the presence of other types of forensic evidence, and they must be documented, collected, processed, and packaged accordingly when found. When GSR is located and removal of the item possessing the GSR is not an option, the preferred method is to utilize the GSR scanning electron microscope pedestals with carbon sticky tape. The collection and packaging methodologies will be the same as outlined previously in the explosive residue section.

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Ignitable Substance Evidence Ignitable substance evidence is very similar to liquid and solid chemical evidence and will be treated in the same basic manner. Once located, the suspected ignitable substance will be collected and packaged according to its physical state—liquid or solid. For liquid samples and semi-solids (pastes and gels), collection may be performed by utilizing chemically clean equipment such as Coliwasa tubes, Nalgene syringes, cotton gauze pads, chemically resistant plastic or stainless steel spatulas or spoons, and finally, where necessary, utilize the direct pour method. Many ignitable liquids when mixed with water will float to the top. They are typically volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and are transient. When collecting this type of evidence the head space in the primary packaging must be limited to ensure that the liquid evidence will still be present when the evidence reaches the laboratory. Consult with the scientists prior to collecting the sample and they will be able to advise you as to the amount of head space needed in the primary container. Once collected, the liquid evidence will have to be placed in a primary container consisting of a chemically clean glass jar with its appropriate leak-proof screw top. Once the evidence is sealed in its primary container, follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. For solid samples, the evidence sample will need to be collected as is, provided it is of an appropriate size to fit in the primary container and achieve the appropriate head space requirements. More importantly, remember that the sample must fit into a glove box or safety hood. If the sample is too large it will need to be cut to the appropriate size utilizing chemically clean/sterile tools, such as scalpels, saws, hammer and chisel, etc. These tools are single use, so sufficient quantities of these tools must be present to complete sampling operations. After the sample is collected, place it in the primary container—a chemically clean glass jar with its appropriate leak-proof, screw top, Teflon®lined arson cans with the appropriate lids, or nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. If there is a chance the materials may puncture the nylon heat-sealed bags, then the bags should not be used as a primary container. Upon sealing the evidence in the primary container follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. Plant Material Evidence Plant material evidence is similar to blood evidence, and in conventional crime scene processing it is usually packaged in paper products. Paper is not an option in a CBRNE/TIC crime scene. To collect plant material CSIs must utilize instruments that are both certified chemically clean and sterile, such as shovels, trowels, scoopulas,

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spoons, scrapers, and sod cutters. It should be noted that whenever possible the entire plant including the roots should be collected. The primary packaging for plant material may consist of • • • • • • • •

Sterile screw-top centrifuge tubes Plastic, sterile screw-top wide-mouth sample jars Sterile/chemically clean wide-mouth screw-top glass jars Sterile Vacutainers® with no preservatives Nylon/polyester heat-seal bags Teflon®-lined arson paint cans and lids Sterile plastic evidence tubes Sterile plastic storage bins with locking lids

Once the evidence is sealed in its primary container follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. As stated earlier, this type of evidence is similar to serological evidence and must be kept cool and be transported to the laboratory immediately. Soil Evidence Soil evidence, like electronic evidence, requires considerable assessment to establish if, when, and how it is to be collected. CSIs must avoid bias when developing an evidence collection and sampling plan. The probative value of the evidence and the impact of the subsequent analyses on the investigation must be considered. For example, answers must be sought to the following questions: 1. What is the identification of the possible CBRNE/TIC agent? 2. What is the physical state of the possible CBRNE/TIC agent? 3. What is its status—is this an active or abandoned clandestine manufacturing laboratory? 4. Are copious precursors, waste products, and finished products present? 5. Is this an illegal dump site containing possible waste products and excess precursors from a clandestine manufacturing laboratory? 6. Are there enough materials to sample from the waste or has it seeped into the ground or water? 7. Are there unusual amounts of dead foliage or wildlife in the surroundings? 8. Is there confirmation of a release and is it indoors or outdoors? 9. What is the location of the release? 10. Is the release overt or is it covert? 11. When did the release occur? 12. What was the duration of the release

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13. What were the meteorological conditions at the time of the release and subsequent days after? 14. Did the release generate an immediate law enforcement response? These considerations can assist CSIs with making a determination as to whether soil samples need to be collected, the location of samples to be collected, the manner in which the samples will be collected, and the quantity of the sample to be collected. In a perfect world all of the previous questions would have answers; in the real world, some of these questions will be unanswered and CSIs will have to rely on experience and training to fill the gaps. For example, in the following scenario, surface soil samples may be collected from the field. An outdoor overt aerosol release of a blister agent has occurred at a suburban high school football game played on natural turf. The halftime show began at 1:00 p.m. There was a slight inversion occurring, with temperatures above 60°F and 15 mile per hour (mph) winds out of the north. Victims displayed immediate onset of signs and symptoms. Response by law enforcement was immediate.

It should be obvious that other types of sampling such as air, surface, and possible liquid samples will be collected in attempt to capture the agent. When collecting soil evidence to identify CBRNE agents in the soil CSIs should utilize single-use, chemically clean and sterile collection equipment made of inert, chemically resistant materials that will not alter, contaminate, or affect the sample in any way. These equipment items are recommended for soil collection: plastic shovels, spatulas, trowels, scrapers, syringes (with the end cut off), soil core samplers, spoons, and scoopulas (see Figure€12.28). The primary packaging of a soil sample should consist of a combination chemically clean and sterile wide-mouth jar with the appropriate screw-top lid. This type of packaging will ensure that any chemicals and microbes present in the soil sample came from the soil and not the collection or packaging equipment. Once the evidence is sealed in its primary container, follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heatseal bags. Thus far this section has covered collecting soil samples for the purpose of identifying the presence of CBRNE agents. Soil evidence may contain class or individual characteristics and therefore may play an important role in the investigation. The collection and packaging equipment previously outlined for CBRNE soil samples will be utilized for the standard forensic soil samples as well. Soil is an excellent example of trace/transfer evidence when transported from the scene of a crime by the suspect via shoes, clothing, or vehicles (e.g., tires, underbody, floor mats) or to the scene of a crime from

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Figure 12.28╇ Using a core sampler to recover soil evidence.

locations associated with the suspect. When clandestine graves or burial sites are linked to the investigation, soil samples may establish the linkages needed to associate the suspect with the crime scene. The collection and packaging previously identified for CBRNE/TIC soil samples will be utilized for standard forensic soil samples as well. If an investigation reveals suspicious footwear impressions and/or tire impressions found in soil at a crime scene, impression evidence must be cast and representative soil samples adjacent to the impression areas must be collected. Again, apply conventional methods for casting impressions in this environment; however, you must utilize the proper collection and packaging techniques to ensure that the evidence survives the decontamination process. Electronic Evidence Electronic evidence is an important type of evidence in that it may contain extremely valuable information concerning potential terrorist and/or criminal activities and plots. Computers and other electronic equipment that can store data including personal digital assistants (PDAs) cell phones, global positioning systems (GPSs), and cameras can present serious issues of possible electronic data evidence destruction if not collected properly. These issues are only multiplied when dealing with this type of evidence in a CBRNE/TIC

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environment, especially in the cases of chemical environments, which can be potentially devastating to electrical components. In most cases, if a thermonuclear device or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) bomb is detonated, it will destroy most non-EMP shielded electronics, which includes the majority of nonmilitary and noncritical infrastructure electronics. Also, any device producing a strong magnetic field or static electric discharges has the potential to destroy electronic data storage media. Several types of assessments need to be conducted in order to develop a plan for dealing with electronic evidence. The safety of the CSI is always the primary concern, so an assessment must be performed before electronic evidence can be forensically examined and collected to ensure it has not been sabotaged with explosives. The bomb squad or explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) unit should perform an examination (e.g., X-ray, trace explosive detection scan) to ensure that the electronics may be handled safely prior to the entry of the crime scene unit teams. The second assessment deals with conducting a thorough presumptive analysis of the environment to determine which of the CBRNE/TIC agents are possibly present in the environment. After the agent is presumptively classified, an assessment can be made of its potential harm to the electronic evidence present. This assessment will also identify what forensic examinations can be performed on the electronics in the field and which analyses must be conducted in the lab. Chemically speaking, environments containing strong oxidizers, acids, and/or bases are typically harmful to electronics, and priority should be given to removing the electronic evidence from such environments. The next assessment for electronic evidence deals with power supplies and the determination of whether or not the device is powered on or off. Obviously, if the electronic evidence is off, the concerns of powering down the electronic evidence and changing time-stamped data and settings information is lessened. If the electronic evidence is off, no attempt should be made to power it on in the exclusion zone. If the electronic evidence is running on outlet-supplied electricity, an assessment will have to be made for each type of device, as to what (if any) impact removing the device from its electrical power supply would have on the device and its electronic data storage media. For desktop computers that are on, the standard practice is to simply pull the plug, so as not to alter any settings and or data information that may be time stamped. This would be the case if one were to shut off the computer using the start-shut down procedure or by pushing the power button until the computer shuts off. If the electronic evidence is running on battery-supplied electricity an assessment will have to be made as well. CSIs must determine what impact shutting off the device, removing the battery from the device, or allowing the battery to run until it drains and shuts off the device will have on the device and the electronic data storage media. In cases involving laptop computers it may be necessary to pull the

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battery to protect the settings and data. No matter what type of electronic device it is, a forensic electronics expert should be consulted regarding the proper steps to follow in order to prevent destruction of potential evidence and permit the analyses of the device(s) at the laboratory. The final assessment is to check the electronic evidence for the presence of other types of forensic evidence such as latent fingerprints, DNA, hairs, and fibers and process them accordingly. Remember, if the environment is destructive to the electronic evidence, the need to remove the electronics from this environment will, in most situations, outweigh the need to conduct field forensic examinations and processing. In these cases the forensic examinations will be performed in the laboratory. Obviously, if the environment is not adversely impacting the electronics the other types of forensic evidence collection may be completed in the field, if appropriate. A note of caution concerning processing electronic evidence for latent fingerprints: avoid using cyanoacrylate (glue) fuming techniques on electronic evidence because this may cause irreversible damage to the electronic device. When documenting electronic evidence it is extremely important to complete written, photographic, and labeling documentation of all the components and their electronic connections to other devices, especially regarding computers. It is always a good practice to collect all the equipment attached to the computer, such as printers, scanners, cables, speakers, and monitors. If for some reason this cannot be accomplished or is impractical, at a minimum collect the computers, cables, printers, and scanners. These items are important because they may have been used to produce documents that may link directly back to the specific scanners or printers. After the electronic evidence has been properly documented, field-tested, and processed, it should be immediately placed into the primary packaging, consisting of appropriately sized, antistatic, nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. Once the evidence is sealed in its primary container, follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags. Questioned Document Evidence Questioned document evidence is subject to being adversely impacted by exposure to CBRNE/TIC agents. CSIs should note that paper materials exposed to CBRNE/TIC, specifically chemical agents, may never be able to be decontaminated to the point where they can be safely handled without PPE or a glove box. Questioned document evidence must be carefully packaged so that the contents are clearly viewable by the examiner in the lab. Some documents that CSIs may encounter are lab notes, surveillance notes, maps, financial records, and equipment purchase receipts. These documents may contain (and be useful for) latent fingerprints, DNA, handwriting analy-

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sis, indented writing, ink analysis, copy machine analysis, printer analysis, typewriter analysis, and tool marks. Document evidence can be collected by utilizing clean/sterile polyester film, 8½"╯×╯11" polyester sheets, trowels, scrapers, photo developing tongs, and spatulas. For indented writing, carefully avoid applying pressure to items to be examined (see Figure€12.29). The primary packaging can consist of clear nylon/polyester heat-seal bags and clean or sterile plastic storage bins with locking lids. Use the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags once the evidence has been secured in the primary container (see Figure€12.30).

Figure 12.29╇ Evidence collection kit for questioned documents.

Figure 12.30╇ Properly packaged questioned documents with labels not obstructing document contents.

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Trace Evidence Processing and Collection Equipment The following is a list of some of the collection equipment issued by the equipment custodian to the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team for use in processing and collecting trace evidence from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene:

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1. Scanning electron microscope gunshot residue (GSR) kits 2. Explosive residue collection kits 3. Clean/sterile 150-pound magnets 4. Clean/sterile rolling, heavy-duty magnet 5. Fly tape 6. Insect nets 7. Large, clear low-tack contact paper 8. Polyester film 9. Double-sided tape 10. Clear, 4-inch-wide adhesive tape 11. 8½" × 11" polyester sheets 12. Sterile cotton gauze pads 13. PCR-grade deionized water 14. Clean/sterile bulb pipettes 15. Clean/sterile Coliwasa tubes 16. Sorbent tubes, 6 mm (various media) 17. Sorbent tube air pump 18. Vacuum air sampling canisters 19. Trace evidence vacuum canisters 20. One-horsepower HEPA shop vac 21. Flexible casting material (black, white, and brown) 22. Clean/sterile scalpels 23. Clean/sterile syringes with blunt end needles 24. Clean/sterile hemostats 25. Clean/sterile utility knives and blades 26. Clean/sterile non-sparking tools (e.g., shovels, hammers, pry bar) 27. Rechargeable battery power tools (18 V or higher) 28. Clean/sterile scissors 29. Clean/sterile tweezers 30. Clean/sterile plastic shovels 31. Clean/sterile spatulas 32. Clean/sterile trowels 33. Clean/sterile scrapers 34. Clean/sterile sod cutters 35. Clean/sterile syringes (with end cut off) 36. Clean/sterile soil core samplers 37. Clean/sterile plastic sampling scoop

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38. Clean/sterile spoons 39. Clean/sterile brushes (e.g., dust, paint, scrub) 40. Clean/sterile plastic dust pans 41. Forensic/alternate light source (handheld eye protectors) 42. Flashlight 43. Nitrile gloves

Packaging Equipment The following is a list of some of the packaging equipment issued by the equipment custodian to the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team for use in packaging trace evidence recovered from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene:

1. Clean/sterile screw-top centrifuge tube (plastic) 2. Clean/sterile screw-top wide-mouth sample jars (plastic) 3. Sterile/chemically clean wide-mouth, screw-top glass jars 4. Parafilm® 5. Clean/sterile Vacutainers® with no preservatives (plastic or glass) 6. Plastic impulse bag sealer (heat sealer) 7. Clear nylon/polyester heat-seal bags 8. Clean/sterile Teflon®-lined arson paint cans and lids 9. Clean/sterile plastic evidence tubes, small to large 10. Clean/sterile plastic storage bins with locking lids 11. Clean/sterile test tube/Vacutainer® transport tubes 12. Sorbent tubes, sterile/EPA-certified-clean containers 13. Clean/sterile trace evidence vacuum canisters 14. Evidence labels 15. Tamper-indicating serrated evidence tape 16. Black permanent marker 17. Ruggedized laptop computer with evidence tracking software 18. Evidence labels 19. Tamper-indicating serrated evidence tape

Impression Evidence Impression evidence (e.g., footwear, tire, tool/weapon, ballistic, bite) is any type of evidence made by a hard object applying force on a softer object and transferring an image of the harder object to the softer object in three dimensions. Impression evidence is also created when a softer item coated with some sort of contaminant (e.g., ink, paint, blood) leaves an image of the softer object on the harder object. This image can be either patent (visible) or latent (invisible) in what is termed two dimensions because it does not contain much

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depth or height details, but in reality it is three dimensions above the hard surface. Another way impression evidence is created is when a soft object removes a contaminant (e.g., wax, dust, paint) from a harder surface, leaving a patent or latent impression of the softer object on the harder object. The most common types of impression evidence are footwear, tire, tool/weapon, and dust, and unfortunately they are one of the types of forensic evidence most commonly destroyed by emergency responders. Footwear, Tire, Tool/Weapon, Ballistic, and Bite Impression Evidence Footwear, tire, tool/weapon, ballistic, and bite impression evidence can be left as three-dimensional or two-dimensional, patent or latent evidence. Regardless of the dimensional characteristics of the evidence, if it is patent it first must be documented photographically using the standard process with a tripod, scales, and oblique flash angles from multiple positions around the impression. Latent impression evidence must first be located utilizing oblique lighting techniques, ALS, chemicals, and/or powders. Once the latent impressions have been made visible they will be photographed in the same basic manner as for visible impression evidence. Next, each impression must be assessed to determine if other types of forensic evidence are present. If other evidence is identified it must be documented, collected, processed, and packaged before the impression evidence can be processed and collected. The impression evidence will be assessed to determine the best methodologies for processing and collecting based upon the location, substrate, and medium of the impression evidence. Typically, three-dimensional impression evidence in soft materials such as mud, skin, snow, soil, and wood will be cast with casting materials such as dental stone and flexible casting material. Dental stone is typically used for footwear and tire impressions, while flexible casting materials are typically used for tool, ballistic, and bite marks. Regardless of the casting material, the impression evidence will be prepared for casting by carefully removing loose debris. The casting materials are placed into the impression evidence in such a manner as to avoid damaging the impression. The cast will be allowed to properly cure before attempting to remove it from its substrate (see Figure€12.31). After the casts have been removed from the substrate, they will be labeled and prepared for their primary packaging and protected with bubble wrap (if necessary) (see Figure€ 12.32). The primary packaging will consist of an appropriately sized clean/sterile plastic storage bin with locking lid, clean/sterile screw-top wide-mouth sample bottle, or sterile/chemically clean wide-mouth screw-top glass jar. Once the evidence is sealed in its primary container, follow the secondary packaging methods previously described for nylon/polyester heat-seal bags.

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Figure 12.31╇ Casting a tool mark found in a wooden surface in the exclusion zone.

Figure 12.32╇ Footwear cast in primary packaging.

It should be noted that after some three-dimensional impression evidence (such as ballistic and tool/weapon) has been cast, the substrate may be cut out, packaged, labeled, and removed to the laboratory for further analysis in the same manner as the cast. Two-dimensional impression evidence on hard materials such as cardboard, concrete, wood, metal, tile, and other similar surfaces/materials can be made by a contaminant on the soft material transferring an image of the soft material to the hard surface. In such a case an assessment must be made to determine if it is best collected by utilizing lifting methods similar to latent

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fingerprints, or by covering the impression with a clear protective material and cutting the entire substrate containing the impression. If it has been determined that the impression is best collected by utilizing gelatin lifters or electrostatic lifters, as in the case of dust impressions they will be treated in the same manner as latent fingerprints, including packaging and labeling. If the preferred collection method is to cut out the entire surface where the impression is contained it will be packaged and labeled in the same manner previously outlined for a cast (see Figures€12.33 and 12.34).

Figure 12.33╇ Bubble wrap is used as over-pack to protect shoe-wear impression prior to being placed in a rigid tertiary container for transport to the lab.

Figure 12.34╇ Gelatin lift of footwear impression sealed in primary packaging.

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Impression Evidence Processing and Collection Equipment The following is a list of some of the collection equipment issued by the equipment custodian to the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team for use in processing and collecting impression evidence from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene:

1. Dental stone casting kit 2. Canned air 3. Flexible casting material 4. Rubber gelatin lifters 5. Impression foam 6. Presentation board, low and medium tack 7. Cooking spray 8. Magnetic fingerprint powder 9. Magnetic fingerprint powder application brushes 10. Fingerprint ink 11. Fingerprint ink roller/applicator 12. Rolls of 24-inch width white paper 13. Clean/sterile scalpels 14. Clean/sterile hemostats 15. Clean/sterile locking forceps 16. Clean/sterile utility knives and blades 17. Clean/sterile non-sparking tools 18. Rechargeable battery power tools (18 V or higher) 19. Clean/sterile scissors 20. Clean/sterile tweezers 21. Forensic/alternate light source (handheld eye protectors) 22. Flashlight 23. Nitrile gloves

Packaging Equipment The following is a list of some of the packaging equipment issued by the equipment custodian to the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team for use in packaging impression evidence recovered from a CBRNE/TIC crime scene:

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1. Plastic storage bins with locking lids 2. Rolls of bubble wrap 3. Nylon wire ties 4. Clean/sterile screw-top, wide-mouth sample jars (plastic) 5. Parafilm® 6. Plastic impulse bag sealer (heat sealer) 7. Clear nylon/polyester heat-seal bags

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8. Clean/sterile plastic evidence tubes, small to large 9. Ruggedized laptop computer with evidence tracking software 10. Evidence labels 11. Tamper-indicating serrated evidence tape 12. Black permanent marker

Conclusion The methodologies outlined above will be performed by the Evidence Recovery Entry Recon Strike Team with the a facilitator and operator/collector in the same manner as outlined in the Chapter 11 for the CBRNE/TIC evidence. CSI units should produce protocols similar to those outlined for CBRNE/TIC evidence for forensic evidence. As stated previously for the Recon Entry Strike Team, depending on the complexity of the scene, the amount of evidence present, the type of CBRNE or TIC suspected of being present, and the PPE required for the scene, the CBRNE CSIU Group may require multiple Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Teams to complete the evidence recovery operations. Once all the plain view evidence has been documented, collected, processed, and packaged, the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team will gather up all its debris, equipment, and evidence to prepare to exit the exclusion zone. When the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team is ready to exit, the D/A member will notify command that the team’s operations are complete and they are exiting the exclusion zone. The command staff will notify the Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team, the Technical Decontamination Team, the Medical Monitoring Team, and the Evidence custodian that the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team members are en route to the contamination reduction zone for evidence, equipment, and debris drop-off, followed by their technical decontamination.

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13

Decontamination

Decontamination in its basic definition is the removal of any hazardous materials or substances from a person, place, or thing to halt or prevent exposure, to the extent possible, to protect life, the environment, and property. No CBRNE/TIC scene exclusion zone operations, public safety or crime scene, can occur before the decontamination area is set up and fully operational. The following factors are utilized to determine the types of decontamination methodologies required for a CBRNE/TIC scene: a jurisdiction’s capabilities, equipment and personnel, the complexity of the scene, the location and terrain of the scene, the weather conditions, the availability of water, the ability to contain and control the runoff, the type of CBRNE or TIC suspected of being present, the number of people requiring decontamination, and the ability to deal with post-decontamination.

Types of Decontamination There are several types of decontamination methodologies and each is utilized for specific purposes and has its unique equipment and personnel needs. There are dry decontamination methodologies and wet decontamination methodologies. However, the three most common methodologies of decontamination are mass decontamination, technical decontamination, and specialized decontamination for evidence and equipment, all of which typically utilize water. Having said all of this, CSIs should know that simply removing a contaminated person’s clothing before performing any of the aforementioned decontamination processes can remove a large amount of the contaminate. This being the case, CSIs will document, screen, collect, process, and package the clothing and possibly collect evidence from the clothing since they are potentially contaminated with CBRNE/TIC evidence. Mass Decontamination Mass decontamination is used when large numbers of contaminated persons require immediate decontamination that cannot be performed in a timely fashion by technical decontamination (see Figure 13.1). It can be as simple as a single fireman with a hand line and fog nozzle or as complex as specialized mass decontamination tents or trailers that are pre-plumbed for the supply of water and to capture its runoff, are HVAC controlled, and 305

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Figure 13.1╇ Mass decontamination.

are prewired for electric and lighting. Either method is capable of decontaminating large numbers of people in a short amount of time. In most cases persons going through mass decontamination are decontaminated in their clothing. Once decontaminated, these persons will need to be directed to gender-specific facilities to have their wet clothes removed and collected. They may be allowed to take personal showers, if the facilities can accommodate this, and will be issued coveralls. If no personal showers are available at the scene, those affected persons will be instructed to take a personal shower as soon as possible. As a CSI you are concerned with the evidence on the clothing. Life safety comes first, evidence second. If a mass decontamination is set up, the Incident Commander has made a decision that the decontamination process could not be conducted by a technical decontamination operation and that mass decontamination is required due to the urgency of the situation. This being the case, the CBRNE CSIU Group’s Decontamination Strike Teams should screen and monitor the runoff then take numerous samples of the decontamination runoff as evidence for laboratory analysis when appropriate. Remember, mass decontamination only uses water. It still may be possible to identify CBRNE agents or TIC materials in the water. Also, if the clothing of the decontaminated persons is going to be collected, then request that each decontaminated person’s clothing be individually packaged and properly documented to ensure its association to its owner. These bags and their contents can be screened and monitored by the CBRNE CSIU Group’s

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Decontamination Strike Teams and, when appropriate, collected, processed, and package as evidence for laboratory analysis. Technical Decontamination Technical decontamination is typically performed for small numbers of people, emergency responders, and the deceased, where expediency is not a major issue. A modified version of this decontamination method is also utilized for the injured who require transportation to a hospital. These technical decontamination setups can be as simple as baby pools and garden hoses and as sophisticated as shower trucks and tents. A basic decontamination operation can consist of two separate wash stations, a gross wash and rinse station followed by a final wash and rinse station (see Figure€13.2). The wash stations lead to a doffing or disrobing station that is across the vapor barrier line, which denotes the border between the contamination reduction zone and the support zone. One or two persons man these wash stations in PPE at the same level of the Entry Teams or one level lower, depending on the suspected CBRNE/TIC and the environment. The decontamination stations will be equipped with water hoses, buckets of decontamination solution (typically soap and water), and brushes (see Figure€13.3). Each station is equipped to capture its runoff and have elevated stepping surfaces that are capable of allowing water to pass through to the base of the station and are utilized to keep the person being decontaminated from standing in the contaminated runoff. In between each of the stations are elevated stepping surfaces to keep the person being decontaminated from recontaminating the bottom of their

Figure 13.2╇ Exclusion zone entry team going through a two-stage technical decontamination process.

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Figure 13.3╇ Team member waiting to proceed to the second wash/rinse station.

footwear or contaminating the decontamination work area. Once persons being decontaminated have finished their final wash and rinse, they will be thoroughly screened with meters and monitors of varying modalities for the suspected CBRNE agent or TIC (see Figure€ 13.4). Remember, there are no direct-reading handheld meters or monitors to screen for biological agents. If the meters and monitors detect the CBRNE agent or TIC of concern, then the persons must be brought back to the start of the decontamination line to go through the process again. If the CBRNE agent or TIC of interest is not detected, then the decontaminated person may proceed past the vapor barrier into the support zone doffing and disrobing station. After doffing or disrobing, the effected persons should take a personal shower if such showering facilities are present at the scene. If no showering facilities are present at scene, then these persons should be directed to take a personal shower as soon as possible. For Exclusion Zone Entry Team members, upon completion of the decontamination process, they will report to the medical monitoring station to have their vitals checked. It is highly recommended, wherever and whenever possible, that the technical decontamination line be modified for the CBRNE CSIU Group’s Evidence Decontamination Strike Team to set up a screening and evidence documentation, collection, processing, and packaging station at the front of the technical decontamination line to screen the nonemergency responders for the presence of CBRNE agents or TIC materials on their persons and clothing. If CBRNE agents or TIC materials are detected, then these persons can be directed to special disrobing and decontamination tents where evidence on their persons and clothes can be properly collected for laboratory analysis and where they can obtain a more private decontamination.

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Figure 13.4╇ Decon team member prepares to screen entry team member. Doffing/Disrobing Station tent is in the background.

The CBRNE CSIU Group’s Evidence Decontamination Teams will also be responsible for taking control of evidence discovered during the decontamination of nonambulatory victims requiring medical attention. For evidence located on the exterior of deceased victims going through the decontamination process, the CBRNE CSIU Group’s Evidence Decontamination Strike Teams will have to work closely with the medical examiner’s or coroner’s medico-legal death investigators (MLIs) to deal with these issues. Remember, deceased victims are the jurisdiction of the medical examiner’s office and to remove evidence from their persons will require the permission of the MLIs on the scene. The CBRNE CSIU Group should have memorandums of agreements with their medical examiner’s office or coroner’s office and should train with the MLIs to prepare for CBRNE/TIC fatalities or mass fatalities, so that everyone knows what each other’s responsibilities are going to be at these crime scenes. One last thing on this topic, under a unified command, ICS, the incident commander for mass fatality management will typically be a representative of the medical examiner’s office.

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Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Evidence/equipment decontamination is, as the name implies, decontamination for evidence and for equipment that is capable of being decontaminated. Unlike the two previous decontamination operations, which are typically run by a Fire-Hazmat Team and for which a CBRNE CSIU Group Evidence Decontamination Strike Team is assigned to deal with evidence issues, the CBRNE CSIU Group and its assigned Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team run the evidence/equipment decontamination operation specifically to support the crime scene investigation. The evidence/equipment decontamination operation will be located parallel to the technical decontamination line, which is set up to support the decontamination of the CBRNE CSIU Group’s Exclusion Zone Entry Strike Teams. The evidence/equipment decontamination setup will resemble the letters “T I”. The top of the “T” is the evidence/equipment drop-off table (see Figure€13.5). This table should be covered with new, clean plastic sheeting, on top of which will be placed new, clean “chucks.” These chucks will be replaced upon completion of each Entry Team’s decontamination operation. Perpendicular to the center of the drop-off table and 3 feet away are the Decontamination Tables. These tables will have the plastic sheeting and chucks as described for the drop-off table and four large, deep, empty plastic dishpans (see Figure€13.6). These dishpans will be used to collect the runoff of the decontamination solution. The first pan is used to collect the runoff, and the sponges are used for the first soap and water wash. The second pan is used to collect the runoff, and the sponges are used for the first water rinse. The next two dishpans will be used to conduct a second soap and water wash and a second water rinse (see Figure€13.7). The side of the decontamination

Figure 13.5╇ Equipment/evidence bins placed on the drop-off table at the decontamination line.

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Figure 13.6╇ The first decontamination table contains four dish pans.

Figure 13.7╇ Facilitator retrieves a new, clean sponge from bucket number four water rinse.

table closest to the technical decontamination operations is the work area of the Evidence/Equipment Strike Team operator. The opposite side of the decontamination table is the work area of the Evidence/Equipment Strike Team facilitator. The table acts as a barrier between the operator and facilitator and aids in maintaining the aseptic technique (see Figure€13.8). On the

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Figure 13.8╇ Facilitator aseptically hands off new, clean sponge from second water rinse.

ground of the Facilitator side of the table are four buckets lined up with the four dishpans. The first and third buckets contain soap, water, and sponges of the same color. The second and fourth buckets contain water and sponges of the same color, but a different color from that used for the soap and water washes. In between the first decontamination table and the second table is a hazardous waste container for the hazardous debris. A second decontamination table, continuing in line with the first decontamination table, will be set up with plastic sheeting; chucks; a vapor line, indicating the demarcation line separating the contamination reduction zone from the support zone; and two dishpans, one set placed on either side of the vapor line (see Figure€13.9). The dishpan located in the contamination reduction zone has a chucks in it and is used to dry the decontaminated item before it is screened for contaminant (see Figures€13.10 and 13.11). The dishpan located on the support zone side of the vapor barrier has a chucks inside it and is used to transfer the screened decontaminated item into the support zone so that it may be delivered to the evidence custodian (see Figure€13.12). Also present between the two dishpans in the contamination reduction zone are the screening instruments of different modalities, which will be used to screen the post-decontaminated items to ensure that they are free of contamination. The letter “I” in the “T I” table configuration is the D/A member’s table, which is parallel to the first decontamination table and about 5 feet away from the facilitator’s edge of the first decontamination table. The D/A member utilizes this table for the documentation and PPE equipment. The D/A

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Figure 13.9╇ Second decontamination table with two dishpans and two different chemical monitors for screening.

Figure 13.10╇ Screening decontaminated item with a flame spectrometer.

Figure 13.11╇ Using an ion mobility spectrometer to screen a decontaminated item.

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Figure 13.12╇ Evidence custodian awaiting decontaminated items from the decontamination line.

member will document all items being transferred from the exclusion zone Entry Strike Teams to the Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Team. The D/A member will record all instrument and equipment serial numbers and lot numbers and whether these items were decontaminated or placed into the hazardous waste. Finally, the D/A member will screen all decontaminated items, document the results, and, when appropriate, transfer the items across the vapor barrier for delivery to the evidence custodian and equipment custodian (see Figure€13.13). The following is an example of how the CBRNE CSIU Group Evidence/ Equipment Decontamination Strike Team will operate upon an Exclusion Zone Entry Strike Team dropping off evidence and/or equipment. Upon an Exclusion Zone Entry Team depositing its evidence and or equipment at the Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team drop-off table: Facilitator: Retrieves new, clean gloves and aseptically hands them to the operator. Repeat for the D/A member. Operator: Aseptically receives new, clean gloves from the facilitator and dons them. Approaches the drop-off table, takes an inventory of items present, and assesses the items to determine what can be decontaminated and in what order. Reports the information to the D/A member. D/A member: Aseptically receives new, clean gloves from the facilitator and dons them. Approaches the drop-off table and documents the

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Figure 13.13╇ D/A member documents items delivered and the screening results for the Decontamination Strike Team.

inventory of the items present, as dictated by the operator. Records all evidence information per the label and adds the name of the Evidence/Equipment Strike Team’s operator to the chain of custody form for all the evidence; all monitoring/screening instruments by manufacturer, make, model, and serial numbers; all other equipment by manufacturer, make, model, serial numbers, and lot numbers; and the disposition of the items as hazardous waste debris or as transferred to evidence custodian or equipment custodian. Transfers this information to the command staff, evidence custodian, and equipment custodian. Operator: Once the items on the drop-off table are inventoried, assessed, and documented, properly discards items that cannot be decontaminated into the hazardous debris receptacles. Once this is accomplished, doffs the outer gloves and discards in the hazardous waste and requests a new set of gloves from the facilitator. Facilitator: Retrieves new, clean gloves and aseptically hands them to the operator. Operator: Aseptically receives new, clean gloves from the facilitator and dons them. Approaches the drop-off table and retrieves the first item to be decontaminated, per the assessment, transports it to the first decontamination tables and places it over dishpan number one. Facilitator: Retrieves new, clean sponge soaked with fresh, uncontaminated soap and water from bucket number one and aseptically hands it to the operator over dishpan number one.

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Operator: Aseptically receives the soap and water sponge from the facilitator. Begins the first wash by releasing the soap and water from the sponge on all sides or surfaces of the items from top to bottom. Then wipes the items with the sponge from top to bottom on all surfaces and sides. Ensures the runoff is falling into dishpan number one. Once the first wash is complete, aseptically places the sponge into dishpan number one, then moves the item over dishpan number two and requests a water sponge from bucket number two. Facilitator: Retrieves new, clean sponge soaked with fresh uncontaminated water from bucket number two and aseptically hands it to the operator over dishpan number two. Operator: Aseptically receives the water sponge from the facilitator. Begins the first water rinse by releasing the water from the sponge on all sides or surfaces of the items from top to bottom. Then wipes the items with the sponge from top to bottom on all surfaces and sides. Ensures the runoff is falling into dishpan number two. Once the first rinse is complete, aseptically places the sponge into dishpan number two, then moves the item over dishpan number three and requests a soap and water sponge from bucket number three. Facilitator: Retrieves new, clean sponge soaked with fresh, uncontaminated soap and water from bucket number three and aseptically hands it to the operator over dishpan number three. Operator: Aseptically receives the soap and water sponge from the Facilitator. Begins the second wash by releasing the soap and water from the sponge on all sides or surfaces of the items from top to bottom. Then wipes the items with the sponge from top to bottom on all surfaces and sides. Ensures the runoff is falling into dishpan number three. Once the second wash is complete, aseptically places the sponge into dishpan number three, then moves the item over dishpan number four and requests a water sponge from bucket number four. Facilitator: Retrieves new, clean sponge soaked with fresh uncontaminated water from bucket number four and aseptically hands it to the operator over dishpan number four. Operator: Aseptically receives the water sponge from the Facilitator. Begins the second water rinse by releasing the water from the sponge on all sides or surfaces of the items from top to bottom. Then wipes the items with the sponge from top to bottom on all surfaces and sides. Ensures the runoff is falling into dishpan number four. Once the first rinse is complete, aseptically places the sponge into dishpan number four. Moves the item to the second Decontamination table and places the item into dishpan number five. Doffs outer gloves and places them in the hazardous waste receptacle and requests a new

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set of gloves from the Facilitator. Then proceeds to the drop-off table and retrieves the next item to be decontaminated and starts the process again. D/A Member: Doffs outer gloves and places them in the hazardous waste receptacle and requests a new set of gloves from the facilitator. Facilitator: Retrieves new, clean gloves and aseptically hands them to the operator. Repeats for the D/A member. D/A Member: Approaches the second decontamination table, retrieves the first screening instrument from the table, and uses the instrument to aseptically screen all sides or surfaces of the item as it lies in dishpan number five. If the first instrument detects CBRNE/TIC on the item, immediately notifies the operator to retrieve the item and start the decontamination process again. If nothing is detected with the first instrument, retrieves the second instrument and screens it in the same manner as the first. If the instrument detects CBRNE/ TIC, notifies the operator as before. If nothing is detected, the item may be transferred across the vapor line and placed in dishpan number six so that it may be retrieved by the evidence custodian or equipment custodian personnel. Discards the outer gloves in the hazardous waste receptacle, documents the results of the screening, and notifies the command staff, evidence custodian, and equipment custodian to retrieve the items when enough items are ready to be retrieved. Note:╇ If the item was found to be contaminated, the operator will don new gloves and aseptically remove the chucks and the item from dishpan number five. The operator will discard the chucks into the hazardous waste receptacle and start the decontamination process for the item again. While this occurs, the D/A member must screen dishpan number five with the instruments. If no CBRNE/TIC materials are detected, the dishpan can be re-lined with a new chucks and used for the next items. If, however, the instruments detect CBRNE/TIC, the dishpan must be replaced with a new one as it will need to be decontaminated. The Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team may have additional duties, such as transferring the digital images from a digital camera. As stated in previous chapters, this will be dependent on the photographic equipment and techniques utilized to document the scene and evidence.

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14

The Crime Scene Wrap-Up

Once the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Teams complete their mission, there are several possible CRBNE CSIU Group operations that may be required in order to complete the crime scene investigation. These operations will be dependent on the nuances of each CBRNE/TIC crime scene. These operations are the search entry and the final survey entry. The same operator, Facilitator, and D/A member methodology previously described in the Aseptic Techniques section, will be used by three-person strike teams for both of these entries.

Search Entry Operations The search entry operations, when deemed necessary, will follow the evidence recovery operations. When would a search of a crime scene not be required? One example is the white powder mail cases, when an envelope containing a threat letter and suspicious powder was delivered to a location by the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and was opened by an unsuspecting victim. In this type of investigation, the envelope, the letter, and any powder present should be located, collected, processed, and packaged. Upon completion of the evidence recovery operations the CBRNE CSIU Group will not require an exclusion zone entry by a Search Entry Strike Team. All that will be required to complete this crime scene investigation is an exclusion zone entry by the Final Survey Entry Strike Team to ensure that all the required exclusion zone work was performed and that the Exclusion Zone Entry Strike Teams have not left any of the CBRNE CSIU group’s equipment and their hazardous waste debris in the crime scene. If all the evidence at the CBRNE/TIC crime scene is not in plain view and it is unknown whether additional evidence may be found, this step becomes more complicated. Upon completion of the documentation, collection, processing, and packaging of all the plain view evidence by the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team, the Search Entry Strike Team will make an entry into the exclusion zone and aseptically conduct a crime scene search utilizing the standard forensic search methodologies. If the Search Entry Strike Team uncovers additional evidence, the evidence location will be documented in written notes, on the sketch, and by photographs. The Search Entry Strike Team members will document the evidence discovered by the search and exit the exclusion zone. Once they have passed through the decontamination and 319

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medical monitoring stations they will brief the CBRNE CSIU group. Recon entry and evidence recovery entry operations will be performed to deal with this newly found evidence. Upon completion of the evidence recovery operations the investigation will transition to the final exclusion zone entry, the final survey entry.

Final Survey Operations The Final Survey Entry Strike Team will typically make the final exclusion zone entry. Their mission is to ensure that all of the previous entry operations were completed per the plan and that none of the CBRNE CSIU equipment or hazardous debris has been left in the crime scene. Equipment Custodian Operations Post Entries The equipment custodian will be actively monitoring the equipment needs of the CBRNE CSIU Group for all the operations of the crime scene investigation. The equipment custodian issues all the equipment to the various strike teams and tracks its use, location, and/or disposition. All equipment brought to the Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team is inventoried, documented, and decontaminated on site, packaged for shipping to the manufacturer or a specialized contractor for decontamination, or disposed of with the hazardous waste. The status and disposition of all the CBRNE CSIU equipment is reported to the equipment custodian. Equipment that has been decontaminated on site will not be returned to inventory until decontamination of the instrument has been confirmed by laboratory analysis. The equipment custodian will ensure that the Evidence/Equipment Decon Strike Team has properly packaged this equipment for storage until decontamination confirmation has been received. Once this information has been received, the equipment custodian will follow manufacturer’s specification for returning the equipment to service. Items requiring the manufacturer or a specialized contractor to decontaminate the equipment will be appropriately packaged and the packaging decontaminated. This equipment will be delivered to the equipment custodian who will over-pack the equipment and ensure that it is safely delivered to the entity responsible for performing the decontamination. Each of these individual determinations will be properly documented to ensure the tracking and disposition of the equipment. All the equipment that has been placed into the hazardous waste will be documented so that the equipment custodian can account for its disposition to maintain inventory records and order new equipment to maintain the CBRNE CSIU Group’s readiness.

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Evidence Custodian The evidence custodian will be fully involved in all evidence collection planning and will ensure that the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team uses the correct equipment and protocols. Based on the Evidence Recovery Plan, the evidence custodian will obtain the appropriate over-packing and transportation equipment for all items of evidence to be collected and submitted to a laboratory for analysis. Upon completion of the preparation of the evidence recovery and packaging kits by the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team, the evidence custodian will take possession of the Laboratory Evidence Screening Forms, the Evidence Request for Laboratory Analysis Forms, the Evidence Chain of Custody Forms, and the Evidence Collection and Packaging Blanks (Controls). The evidence custodian will set up the evidence custodian work station within the support zone in close proximity (eyesight) to the Evidence/ Equipment Decontamination Strike Teams’ operations, which are within the contamination reduction zone. The evidence custodian will be monitoring all the Evidence Recovery Entry Strike Team(s) and the Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team(s) operations. After the evidence has been properly decontaminated it is turned over to the evidence custodian. This is where the evidence is received after passing through the decontamination process. Since the evidence custodian is in the support zone no personal protective equipment is necessary. It is recommended that the evidence custodian wear nitrile gloves since the evidence may still be damp from the decontamination procedure. The evidence custodian ensures that potentially contaminated evidence is appropriately handled, identified, contained, stored, and transported to the receiving laboratory in accordance with all federal, state, and local laws regarding hazardous materials, and in conjunction with the receiving laboratory protocols. The evidence custodian will protect any potential chemical and/or biological evidence from sunlight and heat. Chemical/biological evidence should be kept cool but not frozen. This is to ensure that any potential biological evidence does not start to grow while in the packaging or die due to heat. Potential chemical evidence should be kept cool so the chemical material does not heat up and produce vapors that would raise the vapor pressure inside the container, possibly resulting in a leak or breach of the material. The equipment blanks that were prepared in the cold zone prior to the evidence collection will be matched with the appropriate pieces of evidence. The evidence custodian will then attach the necessary documentation on each piece of evidence as required by local protocols while ensuring the chain of custody is unbroken and documented. The evidence is then situated into a hard over-pack container such as an insulated cooler or other container as specified by the laboratory. Ice may be placed inside the container with the evidence placed on top of the ice to keep it cool.

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Dry ice should not be used unless specified by the receiving laboratory. The evidence should never be frozen unless it was frozen when collected. Consultation with the receiving laboratory should always occur prior to the final packaging of the evidence to ensure the proper handling of the contaminated evidence received by the laboratory. Once all the evidence is properly documented and packaged in an over-pack container for transport to the laboratory, the evidence custodian should seal the over-pack with evidence tape in accordance with local protocols. A pouch containing documentation for the lab may be placed on the outside of the container. Upon notification by the Evidence/Equipment Decontamination Strike Team(s) that evidence is ready for transfer to the evidence custodian, the evidence custodian will have the evidence collected and delivered to the evidence custodian work station. Once the evidence arrives at the workstation, the evidence custodian will document the evidence’s presence at the workstation and in the custodian’s possession on the Chain of Custody Form. The evidence custodian will ensure that the packaging has been performed appropriately per the protocol for each item, type, and classification of forensic evidence. If deficiencies are identified they will be documented and the evidence custodian will take immediate actions to correct them. Once the evidence custodian has thoroughly documented the evidence, the equipment blanks for the items of evidence will be located and attached to the appropriate evidence. The evidence and equipment blanks will then be properly overpacked and prepared for transportation to the appropriate laboratory per the protocols for the type and classification of the evidence. All the Laboratory Screening Forms, Chain of Custody Forms, and the Evidence Request for Laboratory Analysis Forms for all the evidence that has been over-packed and packaged for transportation will be reviewed to ensure that they have been properly completed. Any deficiencies will be documented and corrected by the evidence custodian. Upon verification that all paperwork has been completed and the transportation packaging has been verified, the paperwork will be placed in a resealable plastic bag and attached to the outside of the transportation packaging. When all items of evidence are ready for transport to the appropriate laboratories, the predetermined law enforcement representatives responsible for the transportation of the evidence will report to the evidence custodian work station. Once the transportation officers are present, the evidence custodian will document the transportation officers’ identification and brief the officers on what is being transported, its proper handling procedures, and all the associated paperwork. Finally, the evidence custodian will obtain the officers’ signatures on the Chain of Custody Forms, place them back into the resealable plastic bag attached to the transportation package, and hand over the transportation package to the transportation officer.

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For evidence and/or victims’ property collected from any of the other decontamination lines or off-site locations, such as the Hospital Strike Team(s) or any of the Morgue Strike Teams, the evidence custodian shall assign personnel to obtain these items and deliver them to the evidence custodian work station for documentation and transportation processing as outlined in the previous paragraphs.

Final Briefing Once all the crime scene work is completed the CBRNE CSIU Leader will conduct a briefing with the CSIU, the Law Enforcement Intelligence and Investigation Section Chief, the Incident Commander, all other appropriate law enforcement investigative agencies, prosecutors, environmental protection agencies, and public health agencies. Upon completion of the briefing, if no additional exclusion zone crime scene work is required, the CBRNE CSIU can scale back its personnel and equipment to support the next phase of the incident, the Remediation Phase. It is during this phase of the incident that a cleanup contractor will be awarded a contract to clean up the area or the environment. This process may or may not be delayed depending on the incident. If it is ultimately deemed necessary, the cleanup contractor, working with environmental agencies and health agencies, will identify the extent of the cleanup required by conducting extensive environmental sampling and testing. Finally, a cleanup plan will be developed and implemented. While this entire process is going on a small CBRNE CSIU presence will be on scene in a standby capacity should the cleanup contractor locate or identify possible evidence not located by the CBRNE CSIU during the Crime Scene Phase. This book was compiled so that CSIs will have a single reference source as they begin to train and prepare for the ongoing incidents, crimes, disasters, and terrorist attacks that result in hazardous crime scene environments. While it is not possible to document every potential scenario or address every type of event that CSIs may face in their careers, adoption of these basic principles and proven best practices will form the foundation upon which they can build their knowledge, skills, and abilities in order to keep themselves safe as they perform the responsibilities required of today’s Crime Scene Investigators. God bless every one of our public safety responders.

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Appendix

For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary The White House February 28, 2003

Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 Subject: Management of Domestic Incidents Purpose (1) To enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system. Definitions (2) In this directive: (a) the term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Homeland Security. (b) the term “Federal departments and agencies” means those executive departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, together with the Department of Homeland Security; independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United States Postal Service. (c) the terms “state,” “local,” and the “United States” when it is used in a geographical sense, have the same meanings as used in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296. Policy (3) To prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the United States Government shall establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. The objective of the United States Government is to ensure that all levels of government across the Nation have the capability to work efficiently 325

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and effectively together, using a national approach to domestic incident management. In these efforts, with regard to domestic incidents, the United States Government treats crisis management and consequence management as a single, integrated function, rather than as two separate functions. (4) The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary shall coordinate the Federal Government’s resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any one of the following four conditions applies: (1) a Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary; (2) the resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities; (3) more than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President. (5) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry out, the authorities of Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law. All Federal departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Secretary in the Secretary’s domestic incident management role. (6) The Federal Government recognizes the roles and responsibilities of State and local authorities in domestic incident management. Initial responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally falls on State and local authorities. The Federal Government will assist State and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests are involved. The Secretary will coordinate with State and local governments to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise activities. The Secretary will also provide assistance to State and local governments to develop allhazards plans and capabilities, including those of greatest importance to the security of the United States, and will ensure that State, local, and Federal plans are compatible. (7) The Federal Government recognizes the role that the private and nongovernmental sectors play in preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary will coordinate with the private and nongovernmental sectors to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise activities and to promote partnerships to address incident management capabilities.

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(8) The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the United States, or directed at United States citizens or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the Federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States, as well as for related intelligence collection activities within the United States, subject to the National Security Act of 1947 and other applicable law, Executive Order 12333, and Attorney General–approved procedures pursuant to that Executive Order. Generally acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General, in cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall also coordinate the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States. Following a terrorist threat or an actual incident that falls within the criminal jurisdiction of the United States, the full capabilities of the United States shall be dedicated, consistent with United States law and with activities of other Federal departments and agencies to protect our national security, to assisting the Attorney General to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice. The Attorney General and the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two departments. (9) Nothing in this directive impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense, including the chain of command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures. The Secretary of Defense shall provide military support to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. The Secretary of Defense shall retain command of military forces providing civil support. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two departments. (10) The Secretary of State has the responsibility, consistent with other United States Government activities to protect our national security, to coordinate international activities related to the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from a domestic incident, and for the protection of United States citizens and United States interests overseas. The Secretary of State and the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two departments. (11) The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible for interagency policy coordination on domestic and international incident management,

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respectively, as directed by the President. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall work together to ensure that the United States domestic and international incident management efforts are seamlessly united. (12) The Secretary shall ensure that, as appropriate, information related to domestic incidents is gathered and provided to the public, the private sector, State and local authorities, Federal departments and agencies, and, generally through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, to the President. The Secretary shall provide standardized, quantitative reports to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security on the readiness and preparedness of the Nation—at all levels of government—to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. (13) Nothing in this directive shall be construed to grant to any Assistant to the President any authority to issue orders to Federal departments and agencies, their officers, or their employees. Tasking (14) The heads of all Federal departments and agencies are directed to provide their full and prompt cooperation, resources, and support, as appropriate and consistent with their own responsibilities for protecting our national security, to the Secretary, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State in the exercise of the individual leadership responsibilities and missions assigned in paragraphs (4), (8), (9), and (10), respectively, above. (15) The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to the Homeland Security Council, and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). This system will provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system; multi-agency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources. (16) The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to the Homeland Security Council, and administer a National Response Plan (NRP). The Secretary shall consult with appropriate Assistants to the President (including the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy) and the Director of the Office

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of Science and Technology Policy, and other such Federal officials as may be appropriate, in developing and implementing the NRP. This plan shall integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan. The NRP shall be unclassified. If certain operational aspects require classification, they shall be included in classified annexes to the NRP. (a) The NRP, using the NIMS, shall, with regard to response to domestic incidents, provide the structure and mechanisms for national level policy and operational direction for Federal support to State and local incident managers and for exercising direct Federal authorities and responsibilities, as appropriate. (b) The NRP will include protocols for operating under different threats or threat levels; incorporation of existing Federal emergency and incident management plans (with appropriate modifications and revisions) as either integrated components of the NRP or as supporting operational plans; and additional operational plans or annexes, as appropriate, including public affairs and intergovernmental communications. (c) The NRP will include a consistent approach to reporting incidents, providing assessments, and making recommendations to the President, the Secretary, and the Homeland Security Council. (d) The NRP will include rigorous requirements for continuous improvements from testing, exercising, experience with incidents, and new information and technologies. (17) The Secretary shall: (a) By April 1, 2003, (1) develop and publish an initial version of the NRP, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies; and (2) provide the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security with a plan for full development and implementation of the NRP. (b) By June 1, 2003, (1) in consultation with Federal departments and agencies and with State and local governments, develop a national system of standards, guidelines, and protocols to implement the NIMS; and (2) establish a mechanism for ensuring ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS, including regular consultation with other Federal departments and agencies and with State and local governments. (c) By September 1, 2003, in consultation with Federal departments and agencies and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, review existing authorities and regulations and prepare recommendations for the President on revisions necessary to implement fully the NRP. (18) The heads of Federal departments and agencies shall adopt the NIMS within their departments and agencies and shall provide support and

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assistance to the Secretary in the development and maintenance of the NIMS. All Federal departments and agencies will use the NIMS in their domestic incident management and emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities, as well as those actions taken in support of State or local entities. The heads of Federal departments and agencies shall participate in the NRP, shall assist and support the Secretary in the development and maintenance of the NRP, and shall participate in and use domestic incident reporting systems and protocols established by the Secretary. (19) The head of each Federal department and agency shall: (a) By June 1, 2003, make initial revisions to existing plans in accordance with the initial version of the NRP. (b) By August 1, 2003, submit a plan to adopt and implement the NIMS to the Secretary and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall advise the President on whether such plans effectively implement the NIMS. (20) Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, Federal departments and agencies shall make adoption of the NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for providing Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, or other activities. The Secretary shall develop standards and guidelines for determining whether a State or local entity has adopted the NIMS. Technical and Conforming Amendments to National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1) (21) NSPD-1 (“Organization of the National Security Council System”) is amended by replacing the fifth sentence of the third paragraph on the first page with the following: “The Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities.”. Technical and Conforming Amendments to National Security Presidential Directive-8 (NSPD-8) (22) NSPD-8 (“National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism”) is amended by striking “and the Office of Homeland Security,” on page 4, and inserting “the Department of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council” in lieu thereof. Technical and Conforming Amendments to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 (HSPD-2) (23) HSPD-2 (“Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies”) is amended as follows:

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(a) striking “the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)” in the second sentence of the second paragraph in section 1, and inserting “the Secretary of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; (b) striking “the INS,” in the third paragraph in section 1, and inserting “the Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; (c) inserting “, the Secretary of Homeland Security,” after “The Attorney General” in the fourth paragraph in section 1; (d) inserting “, the Secretary of Homeland Security,” after “the Attorney General” in the fifth paragraph in section 1; (e) striking “the INS and the Customs Service” in the first sentence of the first paragraph of section 2, and inserting “the Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; (f) striking “Customs and INS” in the first sentence of the second paragraph of section 2, and inserting “the Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; (g) striking “the two agencies” in the second sentence of the second paragraph of section 2, and inserting “the Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; (h) striking “the Secretary of the Treasury” wherever it appears in section 2, and inserting “the Secretary of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; (i) inserting “, the Secretary of Homeland Security,” after “The Secretary of State” wherever the latter appears in section 3; (j) inserting “, the Department of Homeland Security,” after “the Department of State,” in the second sentence in the third paragraph in section 3; (k) inserting “the Secretary of Homeland Security,” after “the Secretary of State,” in the first sentence of the fifth paragraph of section 3; (l) striking “INS” in the first sentence of the sixth paragraph of section 3, and inserting “Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; (m) striking “the Treasury” wherever it appears in section 4 and inserting “Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; (n) inserting “, the Secretary of Homeland Security,” after “the Attorney General” in the first sentence in section 5; and (o) inserting “, Homeland Security” after “State” in the first sentence of section 6. Technical and Conforming Amendments to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3) (24) The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned the responsibility for administering the Homeland Security Advisory System to the Secretary of

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Homeland Security. Accordingly, HSPD-3 of March 11, 2002 (“Homeland Security Advisory System”) is amended as follows: (a) replacing the third sentence of the second paragraph entitled “Homeland Security Advisory System” with “Except in exigent circumstances, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall seek the views of the Attorney General, and any other federal agency heads the Secretary deems appropriate, including other members of the Homeland Security Council, on the Threat Condition to be assigned.” (b) inserting “At the request of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice shall permit and facilitate the use of delivery systems administered or managed by the Department of Justice for the purposes of delivering threat information pursuant to the Homeland Security Advisory System.” as a new paragraph after the fifth paragraph of the section entitled “Homeland Security Advisory System.” (c) inserting “, the Secretary of Homeland Security” after “The Director of Central Intelligence” in the first sentence of the seventh paragraph of the section entitled “Homeland Security Advisory System”. (d) striking “Attorney General” wherever it appears (except in the sentences referred to in subsections (a) and (c) above), and inserting “the Secretary of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; and (e) striking the section entitled “Comment and Review Periods.” GEORGE W. BUSH ### http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html, HSPD #5.

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