Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control : Theory, Politics, Security

Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

For Clara

Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control Theory, Politics, Security

Damien Rogers Australian National University, Australia

© Damien Rogers 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Damien Rogers has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Rogers, Damien. Postinternationalism and small arms control : theory, politics, security. 1. Gun control. 2. Gun control--International cooperation. I. Title 327.1'743-dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rogers, Damien, 1975Postinternationalism and small arms control : theory, politics, security / by Damien Rogers. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7538-9 (hardcover) 1. Arms control. 2. Illegal arms transfers--Prevention. 3. Arms transfers--International cooperation. I. Title. JZ5645.R64 2009 327.1'743--dc22 ISBN: 978-0-7546-7538-9 (hardback) ISBN: 978-0-7546-9606-3 (ebook)

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Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

Contents Preface   Acknowledgements   List of Abbreviations   Introduction  

vii ix xi 1

Part I: Theory, Politics, and Armed Violence 1

Postinternationalism  

27

2

Small Arms Impacts  

51

PART II: Composing Small Arms Control 3 Researchers  

77

4 Intergovernmental Organizations  

101

5

127

United Nations Security Council  

6 Governments  

149

7

173

Civil Society Organizations  

PART III: Eroding Small Arms Control 8 Arms Traders  

201

9

227

Weapons Users  

Conclusion  

249

References   Index  

261 281

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Preface My interest in the topic of small arms and light weapons was first sparked during 2002 when I undertook some research that sought to explain the various destabilizing roles played by these tools of violence in a South Pacific context. Six years later as I prepared this book for publication, Amnesty International released its report entitled Blood at the Crossroads: Making the Case for a Global Arms Trade Treaty (2008). The release of that report coincided with preparations for negotiations over the much-anticipated Arms Trade Treaty by what I describe in this book as the protagonists of small arms control. It was with no small measure of relief, then, that I see the small arms topic is still very much on the international community’s security agenda. The central arguments made in this book—which focuses mainly upon the years 1995 to 2005—will remain valid and I believe prove even more relevant in the future for analysts and policymakers alike. In any case, the various ways in which ideas inform and shape our world should never cease to be of the deepest concern to us all, especially when they bear significantly upon the search for security and the wellbeing of so much of humanity. Damien Rogers

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Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge the Australian National University for providing me with sufficient office space, technical support, and resources with which to write this book, and for funding the field research that took me to both the United States of America and Europe in 2005. My appreciation is extended also to the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for enabling me to attend the second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York between 11 and 15 July 2005. The staff belonging to Saferworld in London and the Small Arms Survey in Geneva also receive my thanks here for their time spent helping me to better understand their organizations’ activities. This book has benefited a great deal from the considered remarks of others. Michael McKinley, Roderic Alley, and Clinton Fernandes each provided valuable comments on an earlier version of this book. The insights and suggestions made by one of Ashgate’s anonymous reviewers were especially constructive and have further strengthened the central argument of the book, as well as its overall organization: I owe you a debt of gratitude for your efforts and hope you consider them well spent. Also, I thank my family and friends for giving me the space and solitude with which to complete this task. Deserving special mention here are my dear friends Carl Patton, Todd Beldham, James Cheatley, Ben Fallet, and Jeremy Hillman. Katrina Lee Koo, Kim Huynh, Jessica Haag, Michael and Heidi Hutchison, John Hutton, David Clarke, Ben Dibley, Neil Ramsey, and Stephanie Koorey each made my time in Canberra an intellectually rewarding experience. Finally and most importantly I must praise my wonderful partner, Clara, for her constant encouragement, unwavering support, and wise counsel where it was most needed, though any and all errors in this book are mine alone, along with any prejudices, grammatical misdemeanours, and deficiencies in expression. Without you Clara, this long night’s journey back into day would have been neither possible, nor meaningful. This book is dedicated to you.

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List of Abbreviations AMACAS American Academy of Arts and Sciences Andean Plan Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ATT Arms Trade Treaty (Control Arms) AU African Union BICC Bonn International Center for Conversion BMS Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects Brahimi Report Report of the Panel of Experts on United Nations Peace Operations CASA Coordinating Action on Small Arms (United Nations) DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations) DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (United Nations) ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS Moratorium Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa EU European Union EU Code of Conduct European Union’s Code of Conduct for Arms Exports EU Programme European Union’s Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FAS Federation of American Scientists Fowler Report Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA G8 Group of Eight Industrialized States

xii

Honiara Initiative

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Agreement in Principle on Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent IHL International Humanitarian Law Interpol International Criminal Police Organization ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) ISS Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) Laureates’ Code Nobel Prize Laureates’ International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers MERCOSUR Southern Cone Common Market MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic MISAC Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Control (International Alert) MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola MONUC United Nations Organizations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola Nadi Framework Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control Measures Nairobi Protocol Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NISAT Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers NORINCO China North Industries Corporation NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NRA National Rifle Association (United States) OAS Organization of American States OAS Convention Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials OAU Organization of African Unity OECD Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi ONUMOZ United Nations Mission to Mozambique ONUSAL United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

List of Abbreviations

Ottawa Treaty

xiii

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and their Destruction PACDAC Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (New Zealand) PADET Peace and Disarmament Education Trust (New Zealand) PIF Pacific Islands Forum PNG Papua New Guinea PRC Peoples’ Republic of China RENAMO Mozambican National Resistance RISA Research Initiative on Small Arms RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) SADC Southern African Development Community SADC Firearms Protocol Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition, and other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community Region SAMs Sanction Assistance Missions SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute UK United Kingdom and Northern Ireland UN United Nations UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda UNAVEM II United Nations Angola Verification Mission II UNAVEM III United Nations Angola Verification Mission III UNCATOC United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime UNCOI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire UNDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNDP United Nations Development Programme UN Firearms Protocol United Nations Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan UNPoA United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects UNROCA United Nations Register of Conventional Arms UN Tracing Instrument International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons

xiv

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US United States of America Wassenaar Arrangement Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies WCO World Customs Organization WFSA World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities WHO World Health Organization (United Nations) WTO World Trade Organization

Introduction Small arms and light weapons feature as vital ingredients in today’s wars. As the tools of violence most frequently finding use in the hands of both professional and amateur soldiers, these weapons kill somewhere between 80,000 and 108,000 persons in conflict each year. This estimated figure roughly equates to between 60 and 90 per cent of all human fatalities occurring in recent conflict (Small Arms Survey 2005a, p. 230). This casualty rate means that over a fiveyear period more people are killed by small arms in war than were killed by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, including those casualties claimed by the fallout of radiation during the five years following the bombings. In addition to inflicting such a high number of deaths and producing devastating effects within conflict zones, these weapons destabilize postconflict settings. In fact, the availability of these weapons can problematize the distinction drawn between conflict zones and postconflict settings since the level of armed violence enduring after an officially-declared cessation of hostilities sometimes remains unacceptably high and forcefuly felt by civilians (Pouligny 2004, p. 14; Muggah 2005: 240—242; Muggah 2006: 190). Small arms also help to transform the nature of some contemporary conflicts. When bearers of these weapons find themselves yielding power and influence otherwise disproportionate to their status, the dynamic and scope of hostilities can be radically altered. In the wake of the Cold War especially, small arms function as vehicles not only for local violence but also for internationalizing violence. During the early 1990s, armed criminality emerged as a crucial characteristic of war, helping to internationalize some internal conflicts (Alley 2004, p. 1). In some locales, such as the poverty-stricken urban areas of South America or southern Africa, the scale and intensity of armed criminality has also problematized the distinction drawn between areas deemed to be conflict zones and those considered  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Small arms and light weapons are defined here as they are defined by the 1997 United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms: that is, small arms are revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns. Light weapons are heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of antiaircraft missile systems; mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm. Throughout this book, the term ‘small arms’ should be taken to include light weapons. At certain times, I refer to firearms as a subcategory of small arms, particularly where I refer to civilian holdings of these weapons. Some authors quoted in this book prefer to use the abbreviation SALW.



Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

to be under the rule of law. The evolution of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations from monitoring the peace between states to helping manage the transition to peace within states reflects a growing recognition of the prevalence, intensity, and magnitude of the armed violence currently occurring within and across international borders. Even in times of peace, affluent societies do not evade the immediate and often lethal consequences of these weapons that are routinely used to perpetrate violent crime. According to Rebecca Peters, “[o]ne of the lessons learned since 2001 is that although guns kill more people than other weapons of war, most gun deaths occur in countries or contexts unrelated to war” (2006: 2). Best estimates place the worldwide civilian death toll from small arms in peacetime at about 200,000 persons each year, with these deaths occurring mainly as homicides, suicides, and unintentional injuries (Cukier and Sidel 2006, p. 14). Besides direct mortalities, the violence associated with these weapons encourages civilians, fearful for their safety and desiring to protect their property, to procure weapons. In less affluent societies, armed violence helps to create millions of internally displaced persons and refugees fleeing from perceived danger. In brief, small arms can facilitate violent crime, provide the means to exacerbate instability, and function as insecurity multipliers. These weapons can help trigger, intensify, and prolong conflict, hindering postconflict reconstruction efforts. The sheer scale of their collective lethality and their ubiquity in recent wars render these weapons a necessary topic of enquiry for analysts concerned with contemporary conflict. The thousands of gun victims suffering daily worldwide makes the challenge of controlling small arms an urgent one for policymakers. Yet many of the world’s policymakers continue to rank the very real effects of these weapons, which are actually used in recent and current wars, far below the threats associated with potential nuclear warfare. The terrorist attacks against the United States of America (US) on 11 September 2001 invigorated debates over enhancing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction, further distracting diplomatic attention away from the continuous devastation wrought by small arms. This distraction has proven costly. As John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty note, “September 11 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ are likely to be exceptions to the complex political emergencies that will dominate the first decades of the twentyfirst century” (2003, p. 5). In spite of all the recent diplomatic posturing over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the new regimes installed following  �������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by both India and Pakistan in 1998, closely followed by North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, the suspected existence of concealed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq (based upon US intelligence reports written in the early 2000s which were either inaccurate, obscure, or misread) and Iran’s declared nuclear ambitions in 2006 have each been the subject of the UN Security Council’s deliberation with respect to whether or not any of these constitute a threat to the international peace. Refer to UN Security Council Resolutions 1172 (1998), 1695 (2006), 687 (1991), and 1696 (2006),

Introduction



the US-led invasions of Afghanistan in late 2001 and of Iraq in early 2003 have both been confronted by insurgencies fought in large part with small arms. These weapons were often sourced from the armed forces which were defeated by the US-led invasions, but whose weapons were neither captured nor destroyed. Adding to these illicit stockpiles, the Coalition Government of Iraq “dismissed almost 400,000 soldiers, and initially refused to allow them to keep their pensions, when at the same time, most of them kept their weapons” (Pouligny 2004, p. 16). The more that small arms prove an obstacle to achieving security in Afghanistan and Iraq, the less appealing becomes the kind of strategic theorizing still preferred by certain policymakers ahead of a full consideration of the actual security challenges registering on the ground. Despite these distractions the international community has responded in various ways to the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. These responses are worthy of detailed, systemic, and critical study for they illuminate the conduct of contemporary world affairs, revealing some of the ways in which its dynamics continue to evolve and register. Understanding the ways in which the international community responds to the challenge of exerting control over small arms might benefit those analysts and policymakers considering other international security initiatives, such as treaties covering the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, or anti-personnel landmines. Small arms control efforts also signal the ways in which domestic affairs can significantly influence and shape the development of foreign policies, especially when security considerations overlap with complex economic and social dimensions. Furthermore, critically examining these control efforts helps reveal some of the ways in which certain international actors willingly impede and deliberately undermine the international community’s cooperative efforts to control these weapons. Indeed, this particular topic deserves urgent attention given that, as Roderic Alley laments, “the international community has failed to produce the problem-solving mechanisms needed to deal with unrestrained SALW transfers busily exploiting globalisation’s opportunities” (2004, p. 1). Book’s Scope This book examines the international community’s various responses to the challenge of controlling small arms since the early 1990s. It describes the major ways in which researchers, governments, intergovernmental organizations, the UN Security Council, and civil society organizations each respond to the immediate and ongoing consequences associated with small arms use. It pays specific regard to the maturing relationships among these particular actors of world affairs and to

respectively. Concerns regarding weapons of mass destruction also include their possession and use by nongovernmental actors.



Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

the nascent interconnectivity among their various strategies for, and approaches toward, controlling these weapons. International Small Arms Community Governments, especially those belonging to intergovernmental organizations, play an essential role in composing small arms controls. This is partly because, as Denise Garcia notes, “[t]he wealth of initiatives promoted by governments suggests that states were the main actors in the advancement of the small arms issue in the international agenda. They acted more as agenda-setters than the nongovernmental actors” (2003, p. 11; see also Garcia 2006, p. 46). Yet nongovernmental actors such as researchers and civil society organizations also play a role as arms control protagonists, helping comprise an international small arms community. This international small arms community encompasses more than the exclusive society of states, which Hedley Bull and Adam Watson argue emerged as an international society in the middle of the nineteenth century (1984, p. 117). The emergence of an international community cohering around the composition of small arms controls has a recent precedent in world affairs. At the successful conclusion of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention, largely a result of the civil society campaign coordinated by school teacher-turned-global activist, Jody Williams, then-UN Secretary-General Annan rejoiced “[o]nly a living, thriving ‘international community’ could come together, across borders and beyond regions, to eliminate this universal plague” (quoted in Brem and Rutherford 2001: 172). While this precedent forewarned powerful governments, enabling them to curtail future attempts to undermine their traditional dominance of security-focused forums, it also signalled the extent of what is possible when various international actors cooperate to achieve collective ends without the support of the world’s most powerful governments. Researchers, governments, intergovernmental organizations, the UN Security Council, and civil society organizations have each attained prominence as arms control protagonists within this international small arms community. Although each member of the international small arms community prefers particular types of responses to the challenge of controlling small arms, each response provides the basis for, cooperates with, or builds upon other major responses. The UN Security Council, for example, authorizes Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs within its peacekeeping operations, while in many cases civil society organizations implement and manage these programs, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) being a good example of when staff belonging to local organizations become engaged with administering these international responses (Nichols 2005, p. 120). There is a high degree of interconnectivity among these responses, creating what Keith Krause describes as a “tangled web of multilateral diplomacy” (2002: 249). Yet not all of these actors wish to establish controls with equal vigour. The distinctions among these arms control protagonists are inherently unstable too.

Introduction



Researchers can become activists—Professor Edward Laurance of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, for example, was central to the establishment of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)—while researchers and activists can hypothetically become state-makers. State-makers can also become researchers or activists, as did Oscar Arias Sánchez, the former President of Costa Rica who now heads the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, a nonprofit organization focusing its efforts in Central America, promoting more just, peaceful, and equitable societies. Perhaps most commonly activists such as Lora Lumpe publish research. The abovementioned actors are not the only ones involved in composing small arms controls. Worthy of particular mention here are former UN SecretariesGeneral Boutros-Ghali and Annan whose very public international efforts helped focus attention on the human tragedies often authored by small arms use, as well as on the desperate need for a timely and coordinated response from the international community. In addition to those arms control protagonists already mentioned, a broad range of actors have mobilized around the UN Small Arms Conference. As Edward Laurance and Rachel Stohl observe, the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has acted as a clearing-house for governments submitting reports in accordance with their commitments under the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UNPoA) and has assisted with weapons collection and destruction programs. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the UN Department for Political Affairs, the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean are just some of the UN Secretariat’s bureaucratic agencies that have become engaged with this issue since the adoption of the UNPoA (2002, p. 15). Some of the UN’s specialized agencies have become active too. Most notably, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) manages numerous projects relating to small arms and has a budget larger than any other UN agency, as well as having more staff (Ibid). In January 2005, for instance, the UNDP Small Arms and Demobilisation Unit sent a consultant to Burundi in order to assess the extent of weapons held by civilians and to help local authorities design a community development program (UN Security Council 2005a para. 29). The World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNDIR), the UN Commission for Human Rights, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Development Fund for Women, the UN Centre for International Crime Prevention, and the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention have each worked in various ways to promote small arms control. They each do so in accordance with their particular strengths and with the principles and purposes of the UNPoA. While not directly involved in negotiating international frameworks for the control of small arms, these actors have important roles enabling the implementation of those agreements.



Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

Other actors neither negotiate agreements, nor help to implement their relevant provisions. They deal instead with the lethal consequences of these weapons, helping to mitigate their deleterious effects. The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) and Medecins Sans Frontiers are two prominent examples of nongovernmental actors involved in ameliorating the conditions confronting victims of armed conflict. Although undoubtedly part of the wider international community, these actors either helping implement control measures or ameliorating the suffering of victims of armed violence do not feature in this book as arms control protagonists. The wider international community is not all of humanity, a meta-society encompassing the world’s entire population. Nor is it an aggregation of all the international actors engaging in world politics. Rather, it is best understood as a collective of international actors that cooperate to varying degrees for particular ends. As Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus understand it, “if there is an international community, it needs to have certain interests common to all its members and a certain set of common values, principles and procedures” (1998: 267). Admittedly, the term ‘international community’ is not only used uncritically by some analysts, but is also invoked disingenuously by some policymakers claiming their policies somehow represent its will or in some way advance its interests. In this book, the term ‘international small arms community’ refers to those international actors—namely, researchers, governments, intergovernmental organizations, the UN Security Council, and civil society organizations— whose interconnected responses to the challenge of controlling small arms result in an emerging mosaic of responsibilities enshrined in international law. These responsibilities in turn engender domestic regulatory regimes covering the manufacture, transfer, and possession of small arms, often under the rubric of maintaining international security. As this book demonstrates, some nongovernmental actors claim a sense of solidarity as arms control protagonists even though such solidarity is sometimes based more upon their consultative role than upon a shared representation in significant decision-making processes. Put simply, the international small arms community is a collective of international actors defining itself as a community through its constructive and often mutuallyreinforcing relationships based around emerging small arms controls. 1995–2005 Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control focuses upon the recent past, reflecting that the international small arms community only began to develop major international frameworks for controlling small arms from about the mid 1990s. Following half a decade of small arms research, the development of instruments of international law rendering governments responsible for establishing, administering, and enforcing domestic regulatory regimes for small arms is of particular salience here. These instruments of international law are

Introduction



different from International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which affords protection to persons who are not, or are no longer, participating in armed conflict. As a body of rules applicable in times of war, IHL places restrictions on transfers of weapons that “are intrinsically incapable of distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants” or are “of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” These instruments of international law also differ from Human Rights Law, which also creates restrictions on weapons transfers. Emanuela-Chiara Gillard explains further: “If it is foreseeable that the recipient state will use the weapons to commit serious violations, then exporting states are prohibited from providing the weapons on the basis of their duty to ensure the respect for fundamental human rights” (2000, pp. 38—39). Even though small arms impacts registered far earlier than the 1990s, and some international actors were well aware of these impacts and attempted to address them at that time, these efforts did not constitute a response of the international small arms community in the way that subsequent interconnected and overlapping efforts do. There are good reasons for this somewhat belated response, as Aaron Karp explains: The small arms issue arose from a broad desire to do something to ease the carnage of global crime, ethnic strife, and secessionist warfare. It also emerged as part of a broader, mostly European project to change the rules of international security and international politics after the end of the Cold War, one that guided European foreign policy throughout the 1990s. Although this project was rarely articulated explicitly, its goals were clear enough. It sought to rid the world of old-fashioned excesses of national interest and power politics, to open the policy process to the broadest and strongest possible consensus, and to elevate the sovereignty of the individual above the traditional sovereignty of the nationstate. In practical terms, this project stressed the role of universally accepted principles as the only legitimate basis for official action (2002: 182).

Other scholars point to a growing awareness of the concept of human security and the grisly details of shock events, such as the Rwandan genocide, as giving the topic contemporary salience (Garcia 2006, pp. 93—95). If the 1990s can be described as the sanctions decade, then perhaps the years between 1995 and 2005 could be meaningfully described as the decade of small arms control efforts. The chronological scope of this book closes with the second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (BMS). This meeting was held at the UN Headquarters in New York between 11 and 15 July 2005. With the United Nations Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (UN Firearms Protocol) having also entered into force the previous week, much of the international small arms community’s attention focused upon the second BMS as a lead-up event to another significant



Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

conference held in July 2006. The purpose of that conference, also held in New York, was to provide an opportunity for policymakers to review their progress towards implementing the UNPoA and to reappraise its viability as a small arms control measure. “A bad outcome” was the phrase chosen by the then-New Zealand Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, Phil Goff, to describe the 2006 UN Small Arms Review Conference. Goff laments that: The meeting was not well organised. The general debate that should have lasted 2 days took 6. There was no provision for separate drafting committees to get on with work on the outcome document while that went on. When negotiations finally got under way, major differences that had been signalled earlier became more entrenched….At the end of the 2-week conference, including some protracted negotiating sessions that lasted up to 18 hours, many paragraphs in the document remained in dispute. When time ran out as the UN interpreters downed tools on the evening of Friday 7 July, the formal outcome was a 2-line report informing the General Assembly that the conference was unable to reach agreement on an outcome document (Goff 2006).

That assessment is likely to be shared by many of those involved in the Conference proceedings, as well as by many of those observing them. IANSA’s Director, Rebecca Peters, provides a civil society perspective when she writes: “By allowing this meeting to fail, governments have squandered the opportunity to take action that would have saved lives around the world. It is unacceptable for two weeks of talking to produce no outcome, particularly when 1000 people are still dying at gunpoint every day” (IANSA 2006). This frustration is reminiscent of the disappointment expressed by the President of the UN Small Arms Conference, Camilo Reyes Rodriguez, who reported to the UN General Assembly in July 2001 that much work remains to be done before “the conscience of humanity is at long last satisfied that all that can be done has in fact been done to alleviate this global tragedy” (UN General Assembly 2001a, p. 23). It appears, then, that the first five years of the new millennium did not witness the rise of effective small arms controls. In fact, the Review Conference’s failure to progress beyond the UNPoA’s original terms reveals the fragile basis upon which the wider international community builds its approaches to major issues featuring on the new security agenda. Book’s Contribution This book makes a modest contribution to the burgeoning literature on small arms. Compared to the numerous vivid and often harrowing accounts of the myriad impacts caused by small arms, the international community’s response to the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons is relatively understudied as a topic. To the best of my knowledge only one other author closely examines the role of

Introduction



small arms researchers as actors in contemporary world affairs; Garcia’s work (2004; 2005; and 2006) meditates upon these researchers as norm entrepreneurs within a constructivist framework. By situating small arms research in the broader context of the international community’s efforts to compose small arms controls, this book signals the interconnected nature of these efforts and highlights the shifting boundaries between the role of the researcher and that of the advocate. No other study assesses the collective capability of those international arms control frameworks agreed by governments acting as member-states of intergovernmental organizations. Some studies pay attention to specific international frameworks. Other studies consider a range of frameworks, but only as an assortment of autonomous instruments of international law. Owen Greene (2000) identifies, for instance, international frameworks existing at the turn of the millennium, but refers only to agreements concerning illicit trafficking without assessing these in terms of their collective capability to exert control. Where studies such as those undertaken by International Alert treat multiple instruments, the focus is upon governments’ progress towards fulfilling their international responsibilities as opposed to an assessment of those frameworks’ collective capability. Arms control analysts often avoid examining the texts of international agreements even though it is probably impossible to fully appreciate the various responses to the small arms issue without a thorough understanding of these instruments of international law. This is because governments help create these international frameworks which in turn shape their future actions by generating particular obligations and commitments. While much literature takes as its topic the sanction regimes or peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN Security Council, the control exerted over small arms by this collective action has rarely been examined. Arms embargoes and DDR programs are important forms of small arms control with strong linkages to the maintenance of international security. Like the abovementioned instruments of international law, arms embargoes and DDR programs constitute international frameworks providing for small arms control. Since small arms are vital ingredients in many of today’s wars, these arms control efforts could prove decisive to the outcome of military interventions, the upholding of ceasefires, the restoration of peace, or the non-resumption of conflict. Important papers critically exploring these control efforts are emerging, as evident in the recent work of Robert Muggah (2005; 2006). Recent small arms literature gives sharp focus to governmental implementation of those international frameworks prompting regulatory regimes for small arms. Some of this literature, such as the Biting the Bullet Project’s so-called ‘Red Books,’ monitors governments’ progress towards fulfilling their international commitments under the UNPoA. Yet it does so within a broader campaign advocating for improved small arms control. Other reports, especially those compiled by the UNDIR, rely solely on information provided by governments in order to illustrate collective progress towards UNPoA implementation. Notwithstanding the important limitations inherent in these reports, analysts have

10

Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

been somewhat reluctant to place these reports’ finding squarely in the context of multiple international frameworks or to explore them in relation to other actors’ strategies for controlling small arms, including UN-authorized arms embargoes and DDR programs. Few other authors deal specifically and significantly with civil society efforts to establish controls over small arms; Holger Anders’ work does, dealing substantially with Saferworld, based in the United Kingdom (UK), and its relationship with the European Union (EU) (2003a; see also 2005, pp. 177—179). The many claims concerning the emergence of global governance and the many arguments heralding the demise of the state in world affairs lend further gravity to the working relationships between governments and civil society organizations, particularly where these concern the field of international security. However, the extent to which civil society organizations are able to exert influence over the development of public policy is difficult to ascertain. Part II of this book addresses each of these broad but relatively understudied themes. The book reveals its originality by demonstrating the nascent interconnectivity among these actors’ arms control efforts as major strategies for and approaches toward controlling these weapons. A good deal of existing small arms literature describes the various roles which firms and brokers play in making small arms widely available. A recent study authored by Mike Bourne (2007) challenges the assumption that belligerents involved in armed conflict need only rely upon nefarious arms brokers peddling weapons drawn almost at will from vast global stockpiles by emphasizing instead the very significant role of legal and grey markets. The pool of published research elaborating a plethora of grisly and often macabre consequences following the ongoing use of these weapons is also already extensive and continues to grow. (One needs to look no further than the Small Arms Survey, based in Geneva, Switzerland, for evidence of this burgeoning literature.) Yet significantly less literature concerns the adverse affects that some international actors have on the international small arms community’s efforts to compose small arms controls. This is a theme that ought to concern analysts and policymakers alike because, while few firms are closely involved in the multilateral negotiation of various international frameworks to control small arms, the ongoing commercial practices of arms brokers seriously erode the efficacy of those controls. So too do the ways in which users of these weapons retain their small arms for immediate use. Part III of this book explores this erosion of small arms control by describing the ways in which the captains of small arms industry, arms brokers, and users of these weapons are able to mitigate the intended effects of those control efforts by resisting and eluding the administrative and enforcement reach of domestic regulatory regimes. Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control differs from much of the existing small arms literature because it refrains from providing a series of recommendations for policymakers, though this in itself does not necessarily preclude active policymakers and reflective practitioners from inducing policy modifications from

Introduction

11

the book’s argument. Unlike much recent small arms research, the book contains little primary information that can be considered new. In fact, it relies heavily upon existing data sets relating to the proliferation, transfer, possession, collection, and disposal of these weapons. Nevertheless, the book contributes to the small arms literature by critically approaching its topic. There is, as I hope this book demonstrates, considerable value in illuminating and then problematizing the international community’s responses to the immediate and lasting consequences caused by the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. Critical Perspective This book is timely, following as it does in the aftermath of the UN Small Arms Review Conference. Its value does not lie in the hope that those policymakers directly involved in reviewing particular instruments of international law will immediately take notice of this book, using its argument to endorse their existing arms control strategies and buttress their existing approaches. Rather, the book seizes upon an opportunity presented by the UN Small Arms Review Conference— or more specifically its failure to progress beyond the original terms of the UNPoA—to adopt a perspective critically reflecting upon the progress made so far by the international small arms community. By a critical perspective, I mean: in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. It is directed towards an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts (Cox 1984, p. 262).

This critical perspective generates a number of profound insights into the topic of small arms control. First, it reveals that the major efforts to compose small arms controls not only emerge from, but also seek to strengthen, a politico-strategic governance architecture currently prevailing in world affairs. Second, it reveals that these efforts are informed by a particular set of beliefs, ideas, and concepts relating to a notion of the political that is best understood as internationalism, but which is hotly contested by many international actors. Third, a critical perspective also reveals that efforts to compose small arms controls are mostly problem-solving attempts. While some of those problem-solvers are deeply complicit in creating and sustaining the problem they seek to address, others are more directly culpable for eroding the efficacy of those controls. The book’s value, then, rests in its deeper and more complex understanding of an increasingly urgent contemporary security challenge.

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Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

Governance Architecture By critically examining the major efforts to compose small arms controls, this book reveals that members of the international small arms community use an existing politico-strategic governance architecture to enhance their status in world affairs. This governance architecture is comprised primarily, but not exclusively, of the UN system, the Bretton Woods institutions, and more recently the World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995 but superseding the older General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The roots of this governance architecture date back at least to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the establishment of the League of Nations, an important experiment based upon the idea of governments cooperating in order to prevent a recurrence of an inter-state conflict unfolding into a global conflagration. Although the League of Nations did not endure beyond Nazi Germany’s and Imperial Japan’s aggressive foreign policies of the late 1930s and the outbreak of the Second World War, its fundamental principle of collective security continues to resonate in world affairs. The 50 governments that signed the UN Charter on 26 June 1945 established, for all intents and purposes, the current politico-strategic governance architecture. In the aftermath of the Second World War, it was consolidated through the strengthened role of intergovernmental organizations, particularly the UN and its Security Council, as well as those dealing with issues of finance, trade, and economic management. These organizations were further augmented by the ongoing promotion of the rule of international law in world affairs. The rule of international law helps preserve this governance architecture as it prioritizes governments as the preferred politico-strategic entities and facilitates cooperation among governments to pursue particular collective ends. As Bull explains: Order in the great society of all mankind has been attained, during the present phase of the modern states system, through general acceptance of the principle that men and territory are divided into states, each with its own proper sphere of authority, but linked together by a common set of rules. International law, by stating and elaborating this principle and by excluding alternative principles— such as the Hobbesian notion that international politics is an arena in which there are no rules restricting states in their relations with one another, or the notion that mankind is properly organised as a universal state based on cosmopolitan rights, or as a universal empire founded on the supremacy of a particular nation or race—establishes this particular realm of ideas as the determining one for human thought and action in the present phase, and so precludes the opening of questions without end and the eruption of conflicts without limit (2002, pp. 134—135).

As an instrument of international law, the Charter of the United Nations has immense importance for contemporary world affairs, though without the continuous

Introduction

13

recognition provided by the world’s governments it could easily have become moribund. This Charter not only embodies respect for the rule of international law and thereby helps entrench the politico-strategic governance architecture, but also provides the mundane mechanisms by which the principle of collective security can be practised. The UN Charter also grants rights and responsibilities to those who sign it. In particular, it creates a powerful and enduring international obligation for UN member-states to cooperate in order to avoid, mitigate, or help resolve conflicts, many of which are fought today with small arms. Article 51 of the UN Charter acknowledges this governance architecture cannot always guarantee international security, yet its inclusion in the Charter enabled this particular governance architecture to take hold following the Second World War (even if it was subsequently held hostage to superpower rivalry during the Cold War). The faith placed in this governance architecture to provide for the collective security of its member-states persists in spite of the failure by UN founders to agree over the means of implementing Article 43, a disagreement precluding the establishment of a UN standing force. According to John Hillen, this disagreement created a situation where “the entire policy structure set up by the UN Charter for the conduct of military operations has never fully been realized” (2000, p. 12). The inability of UN founders to agree over Article 43 resulted in the Security Council’s adoption of its ad-hoc and highly improvised approach to pursuing its responsibilities during both the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Although it has always been an imperfect solution in practice, this governance architecture, especially its collective security initiatives and interventions, has serious bite in world affairs. Since the Second World War, but more particularly since the end of the Cold War, the UN has played an important role in managing conflict. For Michael Pugh, “modern versions of peacekeeping can be considered as forms of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace” (2004: 41). However as Roland Paris points out, “peace-building missions are not merely exercises in conflict management, but instances of a much larger phenomenon: the globalisation of a particular model of domestic governance—liberal market democracy—from the core to the periphery of the international system” (2002: 638). In this sense, the grand vision of those architects responsible for the UN and Bretton Woods institutions will endure as long as the governance architecture can repair itself where it suffers from armed conflict. Yet interventions are also more  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states the following: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

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than exercises aimed at repairing institutions of government into semi-functioning democracies, reforming war-shattered economies into liberal marketplaces, and reconfiguring traumatized communities into societies consisting of vectors of individuals. Paris elaborates: Without exception peacebuilding missions in the post-Cold War period have attempted to ‘transplant’ the values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states….[and] may be viewed as a modern rendering of the mission civilisatrice—the colonial-era belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to ‘civilise’ their overseas possessions (ibid).

There is a strong sense in which those policymakers responsible for these interventions seek to remake the world on their own universalising terms without engaging meaningfully with the plurality of customary practices and traditional hierarchies of the host societies. Generally speaking, where the rule of international law helps to entrench the politico-strategic governance architecture, interventions undertaken as conflict management produce transformative effects in local settings, extending the reach of this architecture and enhancing the status of those who exercise control within it. This holds true for those members of the international small arms community favoring the use of international law to help compose small arms controls and continuing to rely upon arms embargoes and DDR programs to increase the prospects of success for collective action undertaken by intergovernmental organizations. Internationalism US President Woodrow Wilson’s “peace proposals [for the League of Nations] focused primarily on the problem of interstate conflict, but he also believed that these principles were essential to domestic or civil peace as well, because people denied justice and freedom would be prone to disaffection and unrest” (Paris 2004, pp. 40—41). Wilson’s ideas—often described within the context of the Liberal Peace Thesis or the Democratic Peace Theory—reveal a commitment to a particular notion of the political which prioritises governments as the primary actors of world affairs. These internationalist ideas posit that cooperation among governments is the most preferable way in which to achieve mutual benefits, especially in matters deemed essential for international security. This set of ideas  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� There are, of course, important nuances among these terms. Whereas the Liberal Peace Thesis suggests that conflict is less likely to occur where economies are closely connected and frequently interdependent, the Democratic Peace Theory suggests that democratically-elected leaders will be less likely to conduct foreign wars if they fear the displeasure of those who voted them in, and who can vote them out.

Introduction

15

tend to manifest in a belief in collective security, which as Inis L. Claude, Jr describes it: has generally been regarded as a halfway house between the terminal points of international anarchy and world government. Given the assumption that the former has become intolerable and the latter remains, at least for the foreseeable future, unattainable, collective security is conceived as an alternative, far enough from anarchy to be useful and far enough from world government to be feasible. Advocates of collective security have differed as to whether it should be envisaged as a temporary expedient, contributing to the ultimate possibility of world government, or a permanent solution to the problem of order, eliminating the ultimate necessity of world government (2006, p. 290).

Claude continues: Collective security assumes the existence of a world in which every state is so limited by the distribution of power, the reduction of military power levels by a disarmament program, and the lack of economic self-sufficiency, that any state which may develop aggressive inclinations can be held in check by methods which probably need not include the large-scale use of force. It assumes the possibility of securing the acceptance by states of theoretically formidable responsibilities for enforcing the peace, only because it assumes the improbability that it will be necessary to invoke the performance of the most drastic enforcement duties (Ibid, p. 301).

Whereas internationalism is a body of ideas asserting that governments can mitigate the threat of serious interstate conflict by cooperating with other governments, any resulting collective action does not necessarily respond only to state-based threats (though certain governments may be complicit with the emergence and persistence of non-traditional security threats). Since the Cold War’s end, collective action has been used by the wider international community to respond to a plethora of so-called transnational issues gaining salience during an era of intensifying globalization. Typically, issues featuring on the new security agenda are unlikely to be eliminated by governments taking unilateral action. Ranking among the more prominent of these issues are: narcotics trafficking; human trafficking; money laundering; illegal fishing; deforestation; global warming; HIV/AIDS; endemic poverty; organized crime; and terrorism. The international community’s limited success in responding to these separate but at times interconnected transnational issues is especially disturbing given that “no country can afford to deal with today’s threats alone, and no threat can be dealt with effectively unless other threats are addressed at the same time” (Thakur 2005, p. 7). Like the aforementioned transnational threats, the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms is also perceived as a threat common to most if not all governments, and best managed and mitigated by cooperation

16

Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

among member-states belonging to intergovernmental organizations. Indeed, where the wider international community becomes involved in armed conflicts as conflict managers, the devastating effects registered by small arms on the durability of some governments cannot be denied. Significantly, it is partly because these weapons are sought as security enablers by governments and nongovernmental actors alike that the international small arms community’s efforts to exert control over these weapons are seriously attenuated. While all world affairs cannot be characterized as internationalist, the major efforts to compose controls over small arms are informed by and help convey an internationalist orthodoxy. These major efforts form part of an ongoing negotiation between members of the international small arms community and the politicostrategic governance architecture prevailing in contemporary world affairs. But because the deadly and lasting impacts associated with the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms, alarming as their magnitude is, do not represent a serious threat to the core of this governance architecture, the prevailing world order remains largely undisturbed by these weapons. Conversely, members of the international small arms community seize upon the challenge of controlling these weapons as an opportunity not only to strengthen their position vis-a-vis key institutions, but also to further reinscribe internationalism as orthodoxy. In light of these complexities, it is a particular notion of the political that is called upon to determine an answer to the question of who gets to decide who has access to—and therefore the ability to use—these tools of violence. Despite its universalizing tendencies, however, this internationalist notion of the political is far from attaining an absolute supremacy in contemporary world affairs. A range of challenges to its primacy emerge from those state-makers who are not fully convinced of the virtue or indeed the necessity of cooperation. Enjoying benefits such as permanent membership to the UN Security Council and its ancillary veto rights, powerful governments resist the structural restraints over their policymaking implicit in their membership of intergovernmental organizations. Some governments’ zero-sum calculations of national interests fail to perceive any potential benefits from cooperation, as evidenced in the case of those governments involved in crafting resolutions calling for sanction regimes but which nevertheless act as sanction busters. While sometimes authorized by the UN Security Council, so-called ‘coalitions of the willing’ assume operational command of major peacekeeping operations, eroding the Security Council’s ability to effectively manage these collective actions. Perhaps there is, as Ramesh Thakur suggests: a strategic disconnect between the distribution of military, political, and economic power in the real world, and the distribution of decision-making authority in the artificially constructed world of intergovernmental organisations. The most acute manifestation of this is the growing disparity between the soft as well as hard power of the USA and that of all others (2006, p. 4).

Introduction

17

Not all regional intergovernmental organizations authorize interventions or create instruments of international law as their primary response to the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States, and the Caribbean Community have each instead preferred attempts to combat small arms trafficking (Peters 2006: 4). While the activities of some governments might represent a kind of dissent from the primacy of internationalism from within the regulated bounds of the politicostrategic governance architecture, other challenges to internationalism emerge from beyond that regulated environment. A variety of economic and social actors simply do not believe that governments are or ought to be the primary entities in world affairs. Transnational corporations, super-empowered individuals, ethnic minorities, and armed groups are examples of such nongovernmental actors that can disregard civil authority. Those who live at the margins of world affairs—that is, the poor, women, and many indigenous communities—also feature among those who do not endorse the internationalist notion of the political. Where these actors challenge the primacy of internationalism from beyond the prevailing governance architecture, they do so as a kind of dissidence. Some of the most aggressive challenges to this notion of the political emerge from those nongovernmental actors who produce, transfer, possess, and use small arms without official consent or authorization. Circumventing those responses and at times exploiting them to their own ends, these international actors unmask themselves as antagonists of small arms control. The critical perspective taken by this book helps to illuminate the major efforts to compose small arms controls as a series of stances taken in relation to an internationalist notion of the political. It shows for example that some members of the international small arms community assert this notion through the negotiation and implementation of instruments of international law or by observing and helping administer resolutions calling for collective action. It also gives focus to the relationship between these international frameworks and governments’ efforts to establish, administer, and enforce regulatory regimes within their respective areas of jurisdiction. It shows too other members of the international small arms community uncritically endorsing this notion of the political by calling for internationalist responses in their research and advocacy. But at the same time, it shows other international actors contesting this notion of the political either in terms of dissenting from within the politico-strategic architecture or of a more radical dissidence exercised from beyond that architecture. The critical perspective emphasizes the importance of the particular ways in which certain international actors evade existing small arms controls and exposes some of the shortcomings in the international small arms community’s major efforts to compose those controls. The perspective illustrates that the distinction between researchers, governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society organizations as arms control protagonists on the one hand, and arms traders and weapons users as arms control antagonists on the other hand, is both naïve and overly simplistic. This is because

Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

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some of the so-called problem-solvers are in fact an important and ongoing source of the small arms problem. Problem-Solving In spite of some considerable overlaps among the major efforts to compose small arms controls, crucial gaps preclude sufficient geographic coverage of potential flashpoints and actual conflict hotspots, let alone global coverage. Some of the world’s small arms manufacturing capability lies entirely outside the reach of important international frameworks, which are all too often hampered by a conceptual incoherence and a lack of resources with which to operate regulatory regimes or to assist in capability-building projects for other governments. Governmental implementation of instruments of international law and UN Security Council resolutions has also been as fragmented as it has been sporadic. Peter Batchelor and Keith Krause observe that “documents themselves, no matter how well crafted, do not themselves destroy surplus weapons, secure stockpiles, punish illicit traffickers, or increase the security of vulnerable groups” (Small Arms Survey 2002, p. 4). The book’s critical perspective underscores the culpability of some members of the international small arms community for the slow progress that has been made towards composing small arms controls and for the dim prospects for composing improved small arms controls. It acknowledges the central roles played by governments as arms control protagonists, but simultaneously recognizes that governments also play a very significant role in creating and sustaining small arms availability, as well as in creating conditions inviting the use of these weapons. The problem-solving attempts favored by many actors described in this book as arms control protagonists help obscure both this culpability and complicity. This is largely because, as Cox explains, problem-solving: takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble. Since the general pattern of institutions and relationships is not called into question, particular problems can be considered in relation to the specialised areas of activity in which they arise (1984, p. 261).

This is not to suggest that all internationalist efforts are necessarily problem-solving attempts or that all problem-solving attempts are informed by a commitment to internationalism. Rather, it suggests that the major efforts to compose small arms controls are currently best understood as problem solving, forming part of the international community’s ongoing negotiation with the prevailing politicostrategic governance architecture.

Introduction

19

Here, then, this book’s critical perspective reveals the limitations of these problem-solving attempts and the extent to which some of these so-called problemsolvers help to create and sustain the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. It reveals that the internationalist notion of the political informing the major efforts to compose small arms controls is challenged and contested by a range of significant actors who do not wish to endorse the primacy of governments cooperating with each other to achieve their own collective security. Moreover, the book’s critical perspective reveals that the major efforts to compose small arms control are recognized by members of the international small arms community as opportunities to enhance their status within the politico-strategic governance architecture prevailing in world affairs. In so doing, the book signals the need for a more encompassing theory of international relations to help explain the conduct of particular nongovernmental actors; not merely those researchers and members of civil society organizations who wish to endorse the primacy of internationalism, but also those actors who erode the efficacy of small arms controls and in doing so, demonstrate they are able to play significant roles in world affairs. As its title suggests, this book uses postinternational theory as a means of explaining how and why these efforts to compose small arms controls have to date proven ineffective. This does not mean, however, that postinternationalism avoids critical scrutiny here for, as Yale Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach concede, “[w]hile the vocabulary and conceptual elements of postinternational thinking perform the critical function of ‘pointing to’ a different set of factors (and, therefore, a changed ontology) in order to understand global politics, it has not yet acquired anything like complete explanatory or predictive power” (2004, p. 18). Book’s Structure Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control is organized into three parts. Part I contains two chapters. The first chapter introduces postinternational theory by describing its salient features and key concepts and then distinguishes it from mainstream theories of international relations. As interpretive communities cohere around these mainstream theories, they assert contending notions of the political. Postinternationalism differs in its assertion of the political not only because of its unique set of concepts and ideas, but also because its analysis and explanations range across the three main dimensions of world affairs: namely, the politico-strategic, politico-economic, and the politico-social dimensions. Whereas internationalism engenders an analytic framework that proves useful for explaining the development of small arms controls, a postinternational analytic framework helps generate a meaningful and convincing explanation of how and why those small arms controls have to date had only limited effect. Chapter 2 describes some of the difficulties encountered when obtaining and analyzing information relating to the small arms topic. It signals the fragmented and provisional understanding of this topic, yet argues that this does not necessarily

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Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

preclude an understanding of the magnitude of the various consequences of small arms use. To be sure, an awareness of small arms impacts—however imperfect it might be—helps motivate the international small arms community to compose controls for these weapons. Much of this chapter illustrates the multiple and ongoing ways in which small arms constitute a serious contemporary security challenge. It considers small arms impacts as evidence of a tradition of armed violence whose history not only preceded and helped prompt the Westphalian system of states, but which could also help degrade and ultimately outlast that system. Part II consists of five chapters. The first of these, Chapter 3, locates a call to control these weapons in research emerging from the mid 1990s. The chapter begins by paying close attention to five works published by civil society organizations, which were the first major works to articulate the urgency required to address the small arms issue. It then considers the work produced by researchers associated with governments and intergovernmental organizations. The chapter concludes by considering the yearbooks published by the Small Arms Survey, widely recognized by analysts and policymakers as pre-eminent among so-called independent research center writing on this topic. The chapter also identifies a broad shift in the intent informing this pool of research from signalling a new topic ripe for analysis towards attempting to better understand, help shape, and assess the implementation of new international frameworks to control small arms. This shift roughly coincides with the turn of the millennium. Assuming a critical and self-reflective relationship to this literature calling for action to control small arms, Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control nevertheless contributes to it. Chapter 4 examines the major initiatives to control small arms undertaken by intergovernmental organizations. These initiatives take the form of treaties and soft law measures developed within the UN as well as within other regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Focusing first upon the circumstances in which these agreements were negotiated, this chapter discusses each international framework in terms of its current status, technical scope, and geographic coverage. Many of these international frameworks create responsibilities for member-states to regulate the manufacture and trade of small arms. By examining the texts of these instruments, Chapter 4 assesses the degree to which these frameworks, when considered collectively as a mosaic of responsibilities, are capable of controlling these weapons. Enabling the negotiation and encouraging the implementation of those international frameworks is not the UN’s only major effort to compose small arms controls. Building on the aforementioned discussion of international law, Chapter 5 concerns arms embargoes contained in UN sanction regimes and DDR programs of UN peacekeeping operations managed under the auspices of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Both of these arms control frameworks are authorized by the UN Security Council. This chapter examines the processes by which these arms embargoes and DDR programs arise before exploring their strategic capability to exert control over small arms. Both types

Introduction

21

of frameworks are deliberately designed to be conceptually narrow; in the first case, arms embargoes seek only to prevent the transfer of weapons from reaching specific actors; in the second case, DDR programs attempt only to remove these weapons from the immediate reach of belligerents. The DPKO does not hold an exclusive right to undertake DDR programs, however. As Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson have recently shown, more than half of the thirty-six DDR programs occurring between 1992 and 2005 which they assessed did not occur as part of a peace agreement with a UN mandate (2005, p. 2). Chapter 6 examines the ways in which governments fulfil their international responsibilities by establishing, administering, and enforcing regulatory regimes for small arms. It remains difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty a direct causal link between the existence of international responsibilities and specific governmental action on small arms, especially since governments often play pivotal roles in shaping the terms of these responsibilities. Moreover, due to the significant extent to which obligations and commitments to compose small arms controls overlap among treaties and soft law measures—be they of subregional, regional, or global scope—it is even more difficult to identify any one particular instrument of international law determining governmental action. In some instances, governmental action extends beyond the terms of any agreement to which that government might be a party or may precede any such formal responsibility. This chapter also gives focus to some of the operational constraints confronting those governments observing UN arms embargoes or helping to administer DDR programs run as part of UN peacekeeping operations. It signals too a few unintended consequences following on from these collective actions, many of which will frustrate further efforts to compose small arms controls. Chapter 7, the last of Part II, explores the ways in which civil society organizations both advocate instruments of international law and monitor the activities of governments in relation to their relevant international responsibilities. The breadth of IANSA’s membership demonstrates the enormous support among civil society for a campaign to establish new and improve existing controls over small arms. The range of their activities, including focus-group meetings held at the grass-roots level among post-conflict societies, is testimony to the intensity of this ongoing commitment. While particular focus is given here to IANSA’s engagement with the UNPoA—principally because it represents IANSA’s most substantial investment in multilateral arms control negotiations between 1995 and 2005—its engagement with a range of other instruments of international law also receives consideration. Given that IANSA’s membership is broad and its range of undertakings is sweeping, this chapter cannot offer a comprehensive treatment of its campaign, though comparisons with other civil society organizations involved in multilateral arms control negotiations are drawn very briefly in order to both illuminate and contrast IANSA’s conduct and effectiveness. Part II’s focus on the international small arms community’s efforts to compose small arms controls is put into relief by Part III’s focus on those international actors eroding the efficacy of those controls. Part III contains two chapters, the

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Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

first of which examines the various ways in which arms traders sustain the pool of available weaponry in spite of the frameworks designed specifically to regulate small arms proliferation and transfer. More specifically, Chapter 8 identifies particular ways in which the captains of small arms industry and arms brokers are able to resist and elude the emerging set of interrelated frameworks comprising of treaties, soft law measures, and UN arms embargoes, thereby eroding much of the potential efficacy of small arms controls. Chapter 9 identifies particular ways in which weapons users react against controls over small arms possession. Because the previous chapter explores the various ways in which small arms transfers occur in spite of the emerging international controls over them, this chapter gives focus to the local procurement of these weapons by nongovernmental armed groups and civilians for immediate, ongoing, and future use. Focus is given here to those weapons held as government arsenals, civilian stockpiles, and informal caches. Such procurement and retention occurs in spite of the controls that find expression either as instruments of international law or as DDR programs administered as part of UN-authorized peacekeeping operations. By exploiting the operational constraints and strategic weaknesses enshrined in those particular control efforts, both arms traders and weapons users deliberately sustain the challenge of controlling small arms. This book concludes that the challenge of controlling small arms will prove intractable and insurmountable. This is partly because emerging small arms controls are weak and poorly implemented, and partly because the capabilities and incentives of arms control antagonists are strong. The book also concludes that simplistic explanations blaming this situation on inadequate political will and insufficient resources construe this challenge in problem-solving terms without due regard to the culpability and complicity of the problem-solvers themselves. Because these types of explanations serve the interests of those seeking to strengthen the status quo, they are eschewed here as suspect. The chapters of Part II argue that the international small arms community’s major responses to this challenge cohere around a particular notion of the political best understood as internationalism. It contends that this internationalist orthodoxy informs the current strategies to control these weapons that are based upon and also seek to strengthen the prevailing politico-strategic governance architecture. However as Part III illustrates, this belief in internationalism is neither universal nor absolute. There is in fact no common consensus concerning the primacy of governments in contemporary world affairs, even where governments cooperate in order to obtain collective advantage. Indeed, these very assumptions are contested by some international actors and by many analysts of world affairs. Chapters 3 to 10 therefore reveal various stances taken by significant actors in relation to an internationalist notion of the political. This ongoing contest over the notion of the political helps sustain the challenge of controlling small arms, as it does many other political, economic, and social challenges. Before this book considers the international community’s major responses to the small arms challenge—namely, the burgeoning small arms literature; the

Introduction

23

international frameworks negotiated within intergovernmental organizations; the growing number of arms embargoes and DDR programs authorized by the UN Security Council; the actions of governments to establish, administer, and enforce regulatory regimes, observe UN arms embargoes and help to administer UN DDR programs; and the sustained campaigning of civil society organizations—it introduces a postinternational theory of international relations. It does so because this particular theory provides a useful analytic framework for generating an explanation of how and why small arms control efforts have to date had only a limited effect. Combined with this book’s critical perspective, postinternationalism lends much credibility to an assessment that finds these controls to be deeply flawed, poorly implemented, and highly unlikely to prove effective as arms control now or beyond the near-term horizon.

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Part I Theory, Politics, and Armed Violence

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Chapter 1

Postinternationalism An appreciation of the broad range of actors playing significant roles in contemporary world affairs is vital to postinternationalism. Also central to the theory are the bifurcated system within which these various actors exist, the three main parameters within and across which these actors interact, and the turbulence which these interactions help generate and sustain. While it is not possible to fully comprehend the development of postinternational theory without consulting the work of James N. Rosenau, the concepts and ideas informing postinternationalism are not to be equated solely with Rosenau’s work. Indeed, Rosenau has himself developed and refined his own understanding of postinternationalism since first coining the term in the early 1990s (Rosenau 1990; Rosenau and Durfee 2000; Rosenau 2003). The elaboration of postinternational theory also occurs as other analysts deploy its key concepts and ideas as a means of explaining aspects of contemporary world affairs. Without a single authoritative articulation of postinternational theory, plenty of disagreement exists over its precise nature: for Margaret P. Karns (2000, p. 39) postinternationalism is a paradigm, for Mansbach (2000, p. 12) it is a pretheory, and for Ole R. Holsti (2000, p. 118, p. 127) it is both a model and a perspective. There are, therefore, almost as many postinternationalisms as there are postinternationalists. Introducing postinternational theory by identifying its salient features, this first chapter suggests that postinternationalism provides an analytic framework useful for explaining how and why emerging small arms controls are incoherent, fragmentary, resourced poorly, and seemingly of limited effect. The chapter then distinguishes postinternationalism—as a coherent but evolving body of ideas and concepts—from mainstream theories of international relations. Situated within the context of contending interpretive communities, postinternationalists assert their own particular notion of the political, which transcends the three main dimensions of world affairs; that is, the politico-strategic, politico-economic, and politico-social dimensions. It is a notion that is at odds with much of mainstream international relations theory, many of the practices of key policymakers, and the internationalism which informs the major efforts to compose small arms controls. This chapter concludes by signaling a couple of significant limitations inherent in this particular approach to explaining aspects of contemporary world affairs. True to this book’s critical perspective, it warns of the dangers implicit in misreading, though this analytic limitation is not unique to postinternationalism. Like other theories of international relations, postinternationalism will continue to evolve not only on those occasions when its explanatory power is demonstrable and compelling, but also on those occasions when its analytic limitations are

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encountered, interrogated, and revealed. It will no doubt also continue to evolve as the world it seeks to explain transforms in ongoing ways that are sometimes rapid yet at other times appear glacial. Formulating Postinternational Theory Rosenau’s Turbulence in World Affairs: A Theory of Change and Continuity (1990) was published in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the quelling of student protests in Tiananmen Square, and during the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The book was at least in part a response to these historically significant moments, which taken together signaled the end of the Cold War. Reflecting these moments of intense flux and uncertainty, Rosenau’s book illustrates that the discontinuity and change of the early 1990s produced a discernible reconfiguration of the global political landscape. Turbulence in World Affairs suggests that this discontinuity and change was far more powerful than the continuity and stasis that preserved the conventional parameters of international politics during the Cold War. Rather than stimulate these discontinuities and changes, the Cold War did more to suppress a broader, deeper, and more profound transformation of world politics (Rosenau and Durfee 2000, p. 49). This grand transformation is evident in the rise of an increasingly interdependent and specialized labor force, which resulted in an increased number of collective actors appearing on the world stage during the second half of the twentieth century. At the same time, it is evident too in the kinds of actors dominating that stage, many of whom have been altered by the various centralizing and decentralizing tendencies simultaneously informing world politics. Moreover, relationships among these actors have evolved in significant ways, particularly with respect to competing sources of authority. Finally, the grand transformation is also illustrated by a structural bifurcation that fostered new arrangements through which both sovereign-bound and sovereign-free actors pursue their particular goals (Rosenau 1990, p. 7). The roots of this broader, more fundamental transformation reach back to the end of the Second World War, Rosenau explains. Five prime sources enabled this transformation, the first of which was a shift from an industrial to a post-industrial order, largely predicated upon the globalization of certain technologies. The second was the emergence and recognition of an array of important transnational issues, such as HIV/AIDS, pollution, and climate change. The third was the reduced capability of states to assert their authority and to govern in accordance with their will, while the fourth was the accompanying rise of governance subsystems. The fifth saw the rise of the importance of individuals as citizens following a skills revolution (Rosenau 1990, pp. 12—13). In full concurrence with Rosenau, Ronnie D. Lipschutz suggests “the architecture of postinternational politics is emerging in the interstices of the current world system, just as the state system and capitalism grew out of feudalism 300 to 400 years ago” (2000, p. 94). Put simply, this

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broad transformation signals not merely the ending of the Cold War, but also the beginning of the end of the Westphalian experiment. Turbulence in World Affairs describes the period since 1945 as an era of postinternational politics in which the lessons of modern history may no longer be instructive. For Rosenau, the global transformations “are so thoroughgoing as to render obsolete the rules and procedures by which politics are conducted, thereby leaving observers without any paradigms or theories that adequately explain the course of events” (1990, p. 5). For Ferguson and Mansbach, “[t]he current erosion of state authority and capacity signals that the interstate epoch is drawing to a close, and invites us to reexamine old ideas and construct new ones that will both provide a better ‘fit’ with observable reality and a more accurate guide to changing political patterns and attendant norms” (2004, p. 4). These transformations not only diminish the relevance of international history, as the narrative assigned with recording and relating the international past, but also lessen the relevance of much of mainstream international relations theory. Confronted by a new reality emerging in the wake of the Cold War, postinternationalists maintain that existing mainstream theories of international relations do not and cannot make sufficiently meaningful sense out of the events and trends discernible in contemporary world affairs. For example, realism’s statecentric approach in particular yields a highly provisional, partial, and fragmented view of the world. As Ferguson and Mansbach observe, “[m]uch of human affairs has proceeded apart from the state, and arguably the state’s share has further diminished in recent decades” (2007: 545). Analysts relying upon realism’s ideas and concepts are therefore not well equipped to deal with many of the contexts, events, and trends created by these powerful historical shifts. Evidence of the mainstream’s inadequacy in explaining world affairs is not entirely new, however. Many analysts, some of whom may not have been adherents to realist tenets, did not detect the decentralizing forces underpinning the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which were at work for many years before the Union’s collapse. The vast number of analysts surprised by this moment reveals the extent to which their comprehension of world affairs had not kept pace with its changing conduct (Rosenau and Durfee 2000, p. 48). While Rosenau suggests that realism, as a mainstream theory of international relations, is no longer as useful as it once was, others doubt that its parsimonious analytic frameworks have ever been of more than marginal utility to those keen to offer full explanations of world affairs. One could go further still by suggesting the ways in which mainstream theories generate explanations often obscure the significance of important trends and events in contemporary world affairs (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, p. 1). Mainstream theories do so by preferring to engage with certain topics over others, thereby drawing attention away from particular aspects of world affairs, especially those that do not help endorse their preferred approach for explaining world affairs. The ongoing transformation of the global political landscape is so powerful, but the explanatory power of existing mainstream international relations theories

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so weak, that Rosenau claims the need for a new theory of international relations. According to Rosenau, it is necessary for analysts “to break out of the conceptual jails in which the study of world politics is deemed to be incarcerated” (1990, p. 22). While this intellectual incarceration might provide paradigms, analytic frameworks, and concepts that help analysts frame and analyze problems, those same paradigms, analytic frameworks, and concepts can also blind analysts to details which lie beyond their focus and scope (Rosenau 1990, p. 4). In order to remedy this situation, Rosenau offers a new international relations theory in Turbulence in World Affairs, though he is careful to stress postinternationalism’s tentative nature at the outset of his Introduction. As with any theory of international relations, the purpose of postinternationalism is to help explain, give meaning to, or make intelligible aspects of contemporary world affairs. It provides a framework through which to analyze themes, issues, and topics of world affairs—and by analysis, I mean here quite simply the cognitive act of breaking down a complex thing or phenomenon into its constituent parts in order to better understand it. As previously noted, this theory contains four prominent and interrelated concepts. None of these concepts are wholly novel, but when taken collectively they form the salient features of the theory. Other analysts would likely point to different features: Mansbach has, for instance, identified six key features of postinternational theory (2000, pp. 12—18), though he too would most likely recognize the following description as familiar. Broad Range of Actors The number of states in the world increased significantly in the aftermath of the Second World War, due mainly to the decolonization of many parts of Africa and Asia. While appreciating the ongoing significance of states to the conduct of world affairs, postinternational theory does not privilege these actors in its analytic frameworks. Rather than signaling the realization of an ideal political unit, the state is understood as a product emerging from within the specific historical circumstances of early modern Europe. Its endurance as a political entity lies partly in its capability to provide some degree of security to its citizens and to engender a strong sense of national identity at the expense of other identity markers of ethnic, racial, or religious persuasion. Its longevity is also partly explained by its ability to maintain a rule of law that enforces individual property rights and to encourage market-forming activities and long-distance trade (Ferguson and Mansbach 2007: 537). Given that the rise and spread of the state was historically contingent rather than inevitable, its continued prominence as a polity of significance is far from guaranteed. However, any analysis that focuses upon those small arms controls emerging since the 1990s, but which neglects the various roles governments play in composing those controls, would be incomplete. This is because governments, occupying and utilizing the apparatus of states, are central to the international community’s efforts to compose small arms controls. Governments not only support

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small arms research, help negotiate and implement instruments of international law, and sometimes craft resolutions for the UN Security Council, but also establish, administer, and enforce regulatory regimes for small arms, observe UN arms embargoes, and contribute to the administration of UN DPKO DDR programs. Other actors besides governments crowd onto the stage of world affairs. At the same time as the society of states grew in membership, the number of intergovernmental organizations has also increased. According to Peter Willetts, by 1997 there were 300 intergovernmental organizations in existence (cited in Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, p. 108). Established in 1947, the UN is perhaps the most important of these organizations, with its 192 member-states comprising its General Assembly. Other intergovernmental organizations such as the EU, AU, and ASEAN enjoy a regional membership while their policies often register well beyond the jurisdiction of their member-states. Even though some analysts consider these organizations merely to be extensions of state sovereignty, intergovernmental organizations have helped produce various treaties and soft law measures which provide international frameworks for prompting, coordinating, and in some cases precluding governmental action relating to small arms. In addition to helping compose these international frameworks, intergovernmental organizations assist governments with implementing and monitoring these frameworks and with fulfilling their relevant international responsibilities. Any analysis of the emergence of small arms controls that does not feature intergovernmental organizations would be missing a vital part of the puzzle and thereby produce erroneous conclusions. In addition, any explanation of the ways in which small arms controls are composed that does not meditate upon the roles of intergovernmental organizations—not only as sites of interaction and negotiation, but also as enabling actors in and of themselves—would be incomplete. Beyond the official realm, the number of civil society organizations has also grown in the second half of the twentieth century. Willetts estimates that by 1997 there were 10,000 nongovernmental organizations operating exclusively in particular states and 4,700 international nongovernmental organizations whose membership transcends international boundaries. Some of these, such as Greenpeace and the ICRC, aspire towards global reach (cited in Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, p. 108). Over 700 of these civil society organizations are exercised by the impacts caused by the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. One such organization, IANSA, attempts to coordinate much of their activity into a single, coherent campaign. Although not all nongovernmental actors see themselves as civil or concern themselves with the wellbeing of societies, any analysis of emerging small arms controls that does not include civil society organizations will be limited in the conclusions it can reach. Similarly, explanations of the ways in which small arms controls are composed that omit civil society’s engagement will be impoverished. Economic actors now appear abundant too. There are about 60,000 major transnational firms operating throughout the world, many of which have affiliations with a further 500,000 foreign companies (Willetts 2001, p. 357). The

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consequences of the existence and actions of these nongovernmental actors often resonate far beyond the locales they inhabit. In particular, firms manufacturing small arms not only contribute to the world’s growing arsenal, but also increase the world’s productive capacity when granting manufacturing licenses to other firms. Furthermore, the weapons these firms manufacture help fuel armed violence perpetrated by criminal gangs, terrorists, resistance organizations, and other armed groups in many regions throughout the world. Analysis of the capability of emerging small arms controls in which arms traders are absent lacks credibility. Explanations of the ways in which members of the international community seek to exert control over small arms that do not consider the ways in which arms traders can resist and elude emerging small arms controls can only ever be half complete. Also increasing sharply, from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 6 billion in 2000, is the number of the world’s citizens (Rosenau and Durfee 2000, p. 61). Especially significant are those individuals who have benefited from what Rosenau describes as a skills revolution. This skills revolution enables individuals to “become increasingly more competent in assessing where they fit in international affairs and how their behavior can be aggregated into significant collective outcomes” (Ibid, p. 51). Connected to cyberspace, these individuals are capable of engaging in situations almost anywhere in the world (Rosenau 1990, p. 15). Small arms researchers, for example, have benefited from this increased interconnectedness, especially where they can instantly access relevant information and expertise through the Internet, and immediately release online any new contributions to the small arms literature. Arms brokers also benefit from this skills revolution, exploiting weaknesses and loopholes in some regulatory regimes, though many brokers need not do so as they are authorized by governments to undertake arms transfers. In addition to the rise and spread of these better-informed and more capable citizens, super-empowered individuals such as Bill Gates and George Soros can make significant and lasting contributions to the conduct of contemporary world affairs (Ferguson and Mansbach 2007: 538). The post of the UN SecretaryGeneral was recently cited as an actor in its own right, recognized as “a vital source of moral authority” (Kille 2007, p. 24). This position both creates and is inhabited by super-empowered individuals. Bifurcated System By appreciating a broad range of actors playing significant roles in contemporary world affairs, postinternationalism illustrates that while states remain important, world affairs are not merely about the affairs of state. To be sure, governments may for example still forge alliances resembling the bipolarity of the Cold War era in order to confront challenges posed not only by other governments but also by some of the other various actors noted above (Rosenau and Durfee 2000, p. 60). Yet as Dario Moreno explains, “[p]ostinternationalism postulates a bifurcated international system where sovereignty is no longer the ordering principle in

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international politics. In this paradigm the state-centric and multi-centric world coexist and the nation-state is no longer the most important actor in global politics” (2000, pp. 35—36). In other words, postinternationalism prefers to distinguish sovereign-bound actors, who often seek to obtain or maintain roles as state-makers exercising various degrees of control over particular territory, from sovereignfree actors who often take the form of multinational corporations, transnational societies, and ethnic collectivities with little or no interest in obtaining the sovereign prerogatives of states or in exercising control over geographic areas. This distinction is subtler than a divide between governmental and non-governmental actors because some nongovernmental actors seek sovereignty through participating in local electoral contests or engaging in civil war, while some state-makers do not act in full accordance with their sovereign duties, including the basic responsibility of protecting their citizens. This distinction also signals that the power of sovereignty has sometimes been exaggerated: it was only ever a claim to authority and never meant exercising absolute control over territory, citizens, and the legitimate use of force within that territory (Ferguson 2000, pp. 205—206). Postinternationalism’s concept of a bifurcated system helps explain why small arms controls are composed in certain ways. It draws attention to the ways in which sovereign-bound actors shape the international frameworks establishing small arms controls in ways intended to enhance their sovereign power, particularly against threats emerging from beyond their borders, but also from criminals and armed groups based within their territories. Unsurprisingly, then, governments insist on authorizing who produces, transfers, possesses, and disposes of small arms within their territory, and on deciding the amount of regulated weapons produced, transferred, possessed, and disposed of within that territory. Some sovereign-free actors such as civil society organizations and small arms researchers endorse these sovereign prerogatives, as do those arms traders and weapons users who are authorized by their governments and comply with the conditions accompanying that authorization. Even if a government’s ability to exercise authority over its territory is not strengthened by these international frameworks, governmental claims to sovereignty are bolstered at the expense of other actors harboring sovereign aspirations. The concept of a bifurcated system also helps explain why the intended effects of small arms controls are often easily mitigated. Many sovereign-free actors, especially arms traders and weapons users, are the intended objects of small arms control. But because they lack an aspiration to sovereignty, arms traders and weapons users can behave in ways resulting in the erosion of small arms control. Some sovereign-bound actors of low international standing, particularly governments under embargo or ascribed outlaw status, can assist, encourage, and benefit from those arms traders and weapons users resisting and eluding the administrative and enforcement reach of the regulatory regimes covering small arms. While important, sovereignty is not absolute, uncontested, or always necessary in order to procure small arms, though for Bourne sovereignty still

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matters, especially when seeking to obtain supplies of small arms in times of conflict and strife (2007, p. 11). Parameters of Interaction Further to its appreciation of the broad range of significant actors involved in contemporary world affairs and its concept of a bifurcated system within which various actors are distinguished as either sovereign-bound or sovereignfree, postinternationalism discerns three main parameters of interaction. More specifically, these are: an orientational or skills parameter giving analytic focus to the roles played by individuals as citizens; a structural parameter giving analytic focus to collectivities as instrumental to global politics; and a relational parameter focusing its analysis on the significant linkages between the orientational and the structural parameters. First, the concept referred to as the orientational or skills parameter relates to the often expanding and intensifying roles played by individuals in world affairs. In the aftermath of a skills revolution, individuals located throughout the world can better understand, assess, and engage with local, national, regional, and global affairs. Advancements in information and communication technologies enable this skills revolution and amplify its potential effects. These effects range, for example, from the ability to more quickly mobilize protest action against authoritarian regimes to aggressively asserting Islamic fundamentalism. This signals that the “world’s people are not so much converging around the same values as they are sharing a greater ability to recognize and articulate their values” (Rosenau and Durfee 2000, p. 53). This enhanced ability of individuals as citizens registers, albeit unevenly, in many locales across the world. Focusing upon the increasing capabilities of individuals to pursue and achieve their political objectives, analysis of this orientational parameter tends to be focused at a micro-level. This kind of micro-level analysis brings the important work of individuals, especially Professors Laurance and Klare as norm entrepreneurs (Garcia 2006, p. 19), to the foreground of the small arms topic. It provides the basis from which to understand the ways in which individual small arms researchers conduct relationships with individual arms control advocates, resulting in the emergence of small-scale constituencies built around the urgent need for arms control. Enabled by modern communications technology, such relationships can occur irrespective of the individual’s location or proximity to others. Such analysis also provides a basis from which to understand how individual arms brokers conduct relationships with corrupt officials with access to small arms stockpiles or transfer documentation, or with the procurement officers of armed groups, both of which result in the strengthening of the relationships among arms control antagonists. Second, the concept sometimes referred to as a structural parameter focuses analysis on the capabilities of collectivities. While many analysts might treat states as the predominant collectivity in world affairs, especially when the state has been misunderstood and conflated with the nation, they are not the only instance.

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Nations, nongovernmental organizations, social movements, bureaucracies of intergovernmental organizations, and large corporations each figure prominently as collectivities. Structural parameter analysis tends to focus at the macro-level in a way perhaps familiar to most observers of international affairs. In terms of the small arms control topic, it provides a basis from which to understand the relationships among intergovernmental organizations, particularly between those drawing upon global membership and those of regional or subregional scope, and between intergovernmental organizations and civil society organizations, especially within the context of emerging instruments of international law. It also provides a basis from which to understand the evolving relationships among civil society organizations, including those describing themselves as international nongovernmental organizations and those which have emerged as local groups, often in conflict zones or postconflict settings. The third main parameter which postinternationalism discerns gives focus to the ongoing interrelationships between individuals operating at the microlevel and collectivities operating at the macro-level. As Mansbach puts it, “[t]he most important aspect of ‘mixing micro-macro’ is the role of individuals in the political universe and their relationship to the collectivities of which they are a part” (2000, p. 9). This ongoing interaction occurs largely around the source of authority in local and world affairs. Postinternationalism treats authority as “effective influence or control,” but not necessarily as “legitimate” in spite of any accompanying justification asserting the contrary (Ferguson and Mansbach 2007: 539). Postinternationalism points to a growing crisis of authority whereby individuals no longer recognize the traditional source of a government’s authority. Moreno is insightful here when he declares: This authority crisis is due to the modern state’s inability to adequately address some of the most critical issues facing humanity. Postinternationalism argues that as citizens’ analytic skills expand, the source of authority has shifted from traditional to performance criteria of legitimacy. Individuals’ readiness to comply with government directives is dependent on their assessment of the performance of the authorities. The less they approve of the performance record, the more likely they are to withhold their compliance or otherwise resist state authority. States and government have consequently become less effective in confronting challenges and implementing policies than they were in the past (2000, p. 27).

The ways in which individual arms traders and weapons users can resist and elude governmental efforts to control small arms clearly illustrate instances of this more general crisis of authority. Indeed, where the nefarious practices of particular arms control antagonists are understood in terms of this crisis of authority, the prospects for immediate and effective small arms control can only be considered dim. Postinternational theory posits that each of these three main parameters of interactions are currently undergoing a broad transformation, signaling the first

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period of global turbulence since the Treaty of Westphalia concluded the Thirty Years War in 1648 (Rosenau 1990, p. 10). Turbulence The concept of turbulence is central to any understanding of postinternational theory. Indeed, Rosenau and Durfee go as far as to suggest that turbulence and postinternationalism are interchangeable terms. Postinternationalism’s particular concept of turbulence highlights significant changes and developments occurring within and across the three above-mentioned parameters of interaction. When the broad range of actors crowding onto the stage of world politics affects the conduct of contemporary world affairs in complex and ongoing ways, significantly altering the familiar patterns and outcomes of global politics, a condition of turbulence exists (2000, p. 50). This concept of turbulence is also underpinned by an awareness of ongoing shifts of the parameters themselves (Rosenau 1990, p. 16). Conditions of turbulence prevail when those main parameters no longer shape or restrain individuals’ micro-level interaction, collectivities’ macro-level interaction, or the crisis of authority informing micro-macro interaction. This is because complex and dynamic historical forces begin to overwhelm the integrity of these parameters (Ibid, p. 10). Turbulence is far from being consistent in its manifestation, however. While continual change is highlighted by postinternational theory, this change occurs more rapidly in some locations than it does in others (Ferguson and Mansbach 2007: 532). This concept of turbulence should not be conflated with violence. Turbulence often exists without recourse to violence, within communities, institutions, organizations, and marketplaces, for example (Rosenau 1990, p. 12). However as Ferguson and Mansbach argue, “violence has been a feature of global life since history has been recorded” (2004, p. 227). The armed violence of Europe’s religious wars fought during the seventeenth century played a crucial role in the development of the Westphalian state system. Armed violence might also play a role in causing fatigue in the prevailing Westphalian architecture, contributing to the decline of that sovereign-bound system (Ibid, p. 230). This suggests that the history of armed violence is perhaps a more appropriate politicohistorical context in which to set an analysis of the small arms topic than is the history of the Westphalian state system. While turbulence and violence are not synonymous, turbulence may lead to or exacerbate armed violence, and armed violence can play a role in stimulating turbulence within each of the parameters of interaction. This reciprocal process emphasizes the importance of small arms as they feature in most modern wars, and highlights the role these tools of violence play in igniting, intensifying, spreading, and prolonging hostilities. In the hands of professional and irregular soldiers alike, small arms have a powerful transformative effect when used in conflict zones, which in turn can encourage foreign interventions that have further transformative effects

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over governmental, economic, and social institutions. While not of the same scale as the broad transformations underpinning turbulence in world affairs, these local transformations are frequent and radical enough to merit attention in a global context. In the hands of criminal groups, these weapons can also undermine the rule of law and help foster the crisis of authority confronting many governments. Turbulence has some significant and immediate effects in contemporary world affairs. In some cases, it results in a shift towards subgroupism; that is, a tendency among individuals and their collectivities to decentralize their loyalties by challenging traditional forms of authority. Rosenau and Durfee are instructive here when they write that “[t]he postinternational paradigm posits subgroupism as arising out of those deep affinities that people develop toward the close-athand associations, organizations, and subcultures with which they have been historically, professionally, economically, socially, or politically linked and to which they attach their highest priorities” (2000, p. 71). As Rosenau and Durfee explain, turbulence is “more than a metaphor for great commotion and uncertainty” (Ibid, p. 50). Its effects transcend the main parameters of interaction and reveal a tension between the contrary yet often simultaneous powerful forces of fragmentation and fusion, a dynamic also informing contemporary world affairs. The tendencies towards greater centralization, deeper integration, and more widespread globalization are matched by those countervailing tendencies which encourage decentralization, engender fragmentation, and assert the primacy of the local (Ibid, p. 51). For postinternational analysis, change is therefore an ongoing contradiction. “To assert that we live in a fragmentative epoch,” Rosenau maintains, “is to say that we have become accustomed to the contradictions, ambiguities, and uncertainties that have replaced the regularities of prior eras.” He goes on to declare that “[c]omprised of nonlinear processes in which every effect is a cause of yet another outcome in a complex and endless array of feedback loops, these contradictions, ambiguities, and uncertainties are, in effect, the regularities of our age of fragmentation” (2000, p. 228). Overall, postinternational theory provides an analytic framework which helps explain certain aspects of world affairs. This framework casts light upon a broad range of actors deserving analytic attention, signaling that various actors are of significance to world affairs because they are politically powerful; that is, they can get their own way in non-trivial matters, which includes influencing and compelling the actions of others, as it does limiting and restraining the actions of others. The framework also reinforces what R.B.J. Walker meant when he explained that critical social movements “have to be evaluated not in terms of some timeless notion of what power is but in terms of their capacity to alter our understanding of what power can be” (1988, p. 146). As this book demonstrates, the analytic framework provided by postinternationalism proves particularly useful in generating a meaningful, convincing, and compelling explanation of how and why small arms controls have developed in a incoherent way, are implemented in a fragmented way, are resourced poorly, and continue to have limited effect.

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Because it draws attention to various actors playing significant roles in world affairs, this analytic framework helps to identify a small arms dramatis personae, which includes those actors belonging to the international small arms community composing small arms controls, as well as those arms control antagonists helping erode those controls. Postinternationalism’s concept of a systemic bifurcation brings into shaper focus the various tensions between sovereign-bound actors composing small arms controls and sovereign-free actors eroding those controls. This tension is central to understanding why the challenge of controlling small arms is both intractable and insurmountable. Competing Notions of the Political Whereas Rosenau and Durfee (2000, pp. 76—93) compare postinternationalism to realism and liberalism, Ferguson and Mansbach (2004, pp. 35—66) contrast it with postmodernism and constructivism. By contextualizing postinternationalism in relation to both mainstream and more marginal theories of international relations, these postinternationalists signal that the discipline of international relations comprises many frameworks for analyzing world affairs. But more than being simply a compendium of divergent analytic frameworks, the discipline of international relations consists of contending and at times overlapping interpretive communities. According to Stanley Fish: Interpretive communities are made up of those who share interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing text, for constituting their properties and assigning their intentions. In other words, these strategies exist prior to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read rather than, as is usually assumed, the other way around (1988, p. 327).

These interpretive communities emerge and are then sustained by providing accounts of the ways in which their subjects of choice participate in world affairs, using their own “analytic languages to articulate their beliefs and observations… [and to] describe and explain how the world looks in the ways peculiar to those in each camp” (Pettman 2001, p. 32). Mainstream interpretive communities tend to use those analytic languages to focus on key dimensions of world affairs. Three main dimensions stand out in particular. Familiar to almost all analysts of world affairs, the first is the politico ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Although Fish is concerned here with attributing meaning to literary works—in particular, Fish is primarily concerned with explaining why, if interpretations of literary works are subjective experiences unique to each individual reader, common readings emerge and are sustained, sometimes for centuries—his concept is broadly applicable to the ways in which practitioners of disciplinary international relations interpret and draw meaningful explanations from world affairs.

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strategic dimension in which state-making activities predominate. This is often described as high politics, the world of diplomacy and of the use of force, with its key themes including the nature and consequences of war and the search for security. Although often subordinated to diplomatic-military concerns, the second main dimension is the politico-economic dimension in which market-making activities predominate. This is a world featuring international trade agreements, WTO negotiations and disputes, global financial instruments, and the commercial affairs of multinational corporations. Key themes here include the pursuit of wealth and the avoidance of poverty. The third of these main dimensions is the politico-social dimension in which self-making activities predominate, though this dimension has yet to achieve the degree of recognition in mainstream disciplinary international relations enjoyed by the other two dimensions (Ibid, pp. 25—26). Religion, ethnicity, race, gender, nationality, profession, and even sports teams are some of the contending but at times complementary markers shaping identities in this dimension of world affairs. Mainstream interpretive communities are also shaped by their differing assumptions about human nature. Those analysts who believe that human beings are flawed and fallen tend to bring pessimistic assumptions of human nature to bear upon their analysis and explanations of world affairs. For them, humanity is largely tragic. Conversely, those analysts who believe that human beings are ultimately redeemable tend to find their analysis and explanations shaped by optimistic assumptions of human nature. For them, humanity is utopian in character. However, some analysts believe that members of the human species are essentially calculating animals seeking to maximize self-interest (which can also entail collective interest) depending upon the prevailing circumstances (Ibid, pp. 30—31). Ralph Pettman articulates a map of the analytic languages dominating the study of contemporary world affairs. His conceptual map is informed by these three main politico-dimensions of world affairs and by these three major assumptions about human nature. It illustrates that within the politico-strategic dimension of world affairs, those analysts who are pessimistic about human nature tend to be realists, whereas those who are optimistic about human nature tend to be globalists. Those analysts who consider state-makers to be calculating tend to be internationalists. The map further illustrates that within the politico-economic dimension of world affairs, those analysts who are pessimistic about human nature tend to be mercantilists, whereas those analysts who are optimistic about human nature tend to be market universalists. Analysts who consider the human nature of market-makers to be calculating tend to be liberalists. Moreover, the map illustrates that within the politico-social dimension of world affairs, those analysts who are pessimistic about human nature tend to be nationalists, whereas those analysts who are optimistic about human nature tend to be collectivists. Those who consider the human nature of identity-makers to be calculating tend to be individualists (Ibid, p. 32).

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It is a crude matrix, as Pettman concedes. Nonetheless, it proves a useful means by which to distinguish mainstream theories of international relations into broad and meaningful clumps around which interpretive communities congregate. It accounts for why different interpretations, analysis, and explanations can be offered for the same aspect of world affairs, depending as they do upon the philosophical orientation, ontological preferences, and analytic languages preferred by various interpretive communities. For V. Spike Peterson, “[i]n this turbulent context, international relations theory is contested terrain” (2000, p. 61). For Ferguson and Mansbach, this reveals a disciplinary mainstream “in considerable disarray. It is split among numerous coteries and cliques that rarely speak to one another and, when they do, sometimes intentionally hinder communication by subverting the language they use” (2004, p. 34). When each of the three main politico-dimensions of world affairs is considered in relation to the assumptions regarding human nature held by interpretive communities, competing notions of the ‘political’ become apparent. In its broadest sense, “politics refers to all those things we do, individually and in concert, to get and use power over others for non-trivial purposes. Politics is always about trying to get our own way to some substantive end. It is always a verb” (Pettman 2001, p. 6). However, for various interpretive communities the precise notion of that which constitutes politics is hotly contested. The contention over this issue within mainstream interpretive communities—and those described below are by no means the only interpretive communities—the rivalry among them, and their co-existence reflect the actual world affairs these communities seek to describe, analyze, and explain. Indeed, the fate of the discipline might provide something of a forecast for the fate of world affairs since the discipline does not merely reflect these world affairs or emerge from within them, but also contributes to them in ongoing ways. Distinguishing postinternational theory, albeit briefly and crudely, from the disciplinary mainstream reveals some of the competing notions of the political informing international relations theory. Realism, Globalism, and Internationalism Ranging across the three main politico-dimensions of world affairs, postinternationalism differs from realism, globalism, and internationalism, each of which has in common a state-centric worldview and is concerned, therefore, primarily with the politico-strategic dimension. By eschewing the assertion that states are necessarily the primary actors in global politics, postinternationalists stress that while governments remain important to the conduct of world affairs, they and their bureaucracies are but one of a broad range of actors playing significant roles in world affairs. Postinternationalists do not share realists’ pessimistic assumptions about human nature. This means that when analyzing state-makers’ conduct, postinternationalists do not necessarily see governments relying upon zero-sum calculations, adopting a kill-or-be-killed ethos, or employing self-help practices

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and strategic alliances in order to best ensure their state’s survival in a lifeand-death struggle within an anarchic world, as realists tend to do. Nor do postinternationalists share the optimistic assumptions about human nature that prevail among globalists. This means that postinternationalists do not tend to examine the merits of and opportunities for global governance, or to give focus to the possibility of the world’s governments coming together to comprise a supreme governing body, a kind of grand world republic along the lines of that imagined by Immanuel Kant (1795, p. 134). According to postinternationalists, “there is no single system of global governance. Rather, there are pieces of governance at the global, regional, sub-regional, national, provincial, local and individual ‘levels’ of human societies worldwide, many of which are linked, some of which are not” (Karns 2000, p. 42). Postinternationalists do share with internationalists an assumption about human nature that considers state-makers to be essentially calculating. This means that for postinternationalists, like internationalists, states do not merely coexist but can cooperate in order to secure collective advantage; that is, states are understood as being capable of operating in such a way that mutual benefits are attainable for all, though when the collective benefits are assessed some states appear more equal than others. Governments are therefore understood as sovereign, as well as subject to the rule of international law and to the procedures of the intergovernmental organizations to which they belong. Both interpretive communities see: the growth of international and regional institutions, as well as the slow but steady advance of international law, as a natural result of states’ efforts to achieve through some measure of collective action what their own territorial constraints make it impossible for them to achieve alone. Post-internationalists also reject the classic realist dictum that norms must yield to expediency in international relations (Ferguson and Mansbach 2007: 543).

However, unlike internationalists, postinternationalists tend to suggest that sovereignty has diminished during the past two hundred years (Moreno 2000, p. 33). This is largely because postinternationalists’ appreciation of the broad range of actors playing significant roles in world affairs is underpinned by a concept of bifurcation, which distinguishes between a state-centric and multi-centric world system. Placing the Westphalian states system in a broader context of a long-standing tradition of armed violence also indicates the contingent nature of sovereign authority. Mercantilism, Market Universalism, and Liberalism Since postinternationalists do not prefer to offer explanations of world affairs by focusing upon particular market-making activities, they differ from mercantilists, market universalists, and liberals. Although postinternationalists are likely to

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recognize the significance of certain economic events or trends to the ways in which contemporary world affairs unfold, the analysis generated by that interpretive community is not held hostage by this politico-economic dimension. Postinternationalists do not tend to make pessimistic assumptions about human nature, as mercantilists do. This means that postinternationalists do not explain market-making activities exclusively in terms of a zero-sum game in which actors involved in commercial transactions are always considered adversaries, as either winners or losers (Balaam and Veseth 2001, p. 43). By extension, this also means that postinternationalists do not automatically accept the necessity of governments applying protectionist trade policies or employing tariffs and import duties as a means of attaining self-sufficiency in crucial sectors such as food production or arms manufacturing. Equally, postinternationalists do not tend to make optimistic assumptions about the human nature of market-makers in the way favored by market universalists. This means that postinternational explanations might not necessarily advocate an economic governance system based upon private property rights, but without governmental regulation or interference. Postinternationalists do share with liberals (and internationalists) an assumption that human beings have calculating natures. When applied to politico-economic analysis, this assumption means that international commerce is perceived as a positive-sum game in which all commercial competitors can derive benefit, though some may derive more benefit than others. Like liberals, postinternationalists focus parts of their explanations of world affairs on those organizations and agreements relating to international finance and resource management, such as the so-called Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, though these intergovernmental organizations are understood by postinternationalists as being sovereign-bound, adding extra nuance to postinternationalist analysis of world affairs. Nationalism, Collectivism, and Individualism Postinternationalism differs from nationalism, collectivism, and individualism because it does not prefer to focus its analysis and explanations purely on the politicosocial dimension of world affairs. This does not mean that postinternationalists are unconcerned by identity politics and social issues. Rather, postinternational analysis takes this dimension into account, but does not do so at the cost of neglecting the politico-strategic or politico-economic dimensions. Postinternationalists do not assume, as nationalists tend to do, that human nature is best understood as adversarial. Consequently, their explanations of world affairs do not necessarily give focus to the zero-sum logic of survival whereby those considered as part of one nation are differentiated from those deemed to be outsiders. Nor do postinternationalists tend to make optimistic assumptions about human nature, as do collectivists. This means that postinternational explanations do not necessarily see social movements, civil society organizations, and nongovernmental organizations as helping to build a better world, or understand

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politics to be mostly about groups of like-minded individuals forming social movements in order to bring about desired outcomes, such as world peace or human and environmental harmony. Postinternationalists share with individualists—alongside liberals and internationalists—an assumption that human beings are calculating animals. This enables postinternationalists to declare that “[i]ndividuals are the most important actors in a postinternational world” (Hobbs 2000, p. 82) and that the “key identities and loyalties in human existence are to self and family/clan, tribe or loved ones, to religion, to professions, to interests associations, to ethnicity (in some societies), even to sports teams, and so on—in short, to relationships and polities other than the state” (Ferguson and Mansbach 2007: 543). Margins of World Affairs While postinternationalists do not comprise a mainstream interpretive community within the discipline of international relations, they do not emerge from the margins of world affairs either. Since its formal inception in 1919 at the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, followed in 1924 by the establishment of a similar department at the University of Southern California (Toulmin 2001, p. 143), the discipline of international relations has broadened its focus from beyond a state-based system in which state-makers acknowledge no superior authority over matters considered of vital interest. As this chapter has demonstrated, the mainstream of disciplinary international relations now comprises of interpretive communities focusing their analysis on at least three main politico-dimensions of world affairs. Yet the discipline is more than this mainstream suggests. Its themes now include, among others, the unsustainable utilization of the world’s resources and associated planetary degradation, the gender inequalities confronting more than half of humanity, and the increasingly polarized distribution of wealth among humanity. However, since the importance of such themes to the discipline remains both disputed and contested, they are often referred to as the margins of international relations. These marginalized interpretive communities also assert their own particular notions of the political. According to Phillip Darby, for example, postcolonial politics: cannot be read from the canon of Western political theory, much less from the archive of [disciplinary international relations], hobbled as it is by its insistence on the primacy of the state, the privileging of the modern (meaning Western) and a circumscribed understanding of what constitutes the political. The politics that we seek must in the first instance be drawn from within non-European societies, tapping sources that give us glimpses of other life worlds. These glimpses will tell us of how people come to terms with external influences and intervention, but they will also tell us much about other concerns, quite unrelated to imperialism and its aftermath (2004: 31).

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Postcolonialists are not alone on the margins, accompanied by interpretive communities including environmentalists and feminists for instance. Some of the analytic frameworks and associated languages used by marginalized interpretive communities to describe world affairs are excluded by the dominant discourses of the mainstream, but nevertheless offer deep insights into other interpretive communities, both mainstream and marginal. They can, for example, offer insights into postinternationalism too, even as it is “languishing on the fringes of theoretical discourse” (DiMuccio and Cooper 2000, p. 189). As Peterson explains, “Rosenau breaks out of a jail cell, but not out of the paradigmatic prison of positivist and masculinist binaries” and “fails to attend to gender as an analytical category and systemic feature of social relations” (2000, p. 62, p. 67). Competing notions of the political, then, abound in disciplinary international relations amongst both mainstream and marginalized interpretive communities. In fact, the various ongoing debates around these competing notions of the political have probably stimulated and consumed as much of the discipline’s energy as have the events unfolding in contemporary history. Here, then, while much mainstream international relations theory expresses a state-centric worldview, concentrating its analysis of world affairs on the politico-strategic dimension of world affairs, postinternationalism is not restricted to this dimension. For Ferguson and Mansbach, the “post-international view is that—although sovereign states and their ‘international’ relations obviously remain important and are likely so to remain—the state-centric world accepted as a given by traditional theories never fully existed, certainly does not exist now, and will never exist” (2007: 531). Postinternational explanations of world affairs differ markedly not only from realist, globalist, and internationalist explanations, but also from those of the other abovementioned mainstream and marginalized interpretive communities. Although postinternationalists do not necessarily prefer any one main politico-dimension of world affairs, their explanations of world affairs are often animated by a preconceived notion that views human nature as calculating. This enables postinternationalism to help generate analysis and explanations ranging across world affairs’ three main politico-dimensions, while forging particular affinities with internationalism, liberalism, and individualism. Consequently, postinternationalism asserts a particular notion of that which constitutes the political. For Ferguson and Mansbach, “[t]he central analytical question for post-internationalists is who or what influences or controls what in global politics—and why? With that question in mind, familiar conceptions of power, distribution of capabilities, international structure, territory, and boundaries in IR take on decidedly non-traditional dimensions” (2007: 539). Just as the notion of the political is in perpetual dispute among international relations’ interpretive communities, there is no consensus over this notion among important actors of world affairs, as the tension between Parts II and III of this book demonstrates.

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Beyond International Relations Theory? In spite of Rosenau’s claims that postinternationalism moves beyond the traditional paradigms of international relations theory, there is a very strong sense in which it is a coherent body of ideas and concepts which merely adds to the pool of international relations theories. Far from representing an intellectual jailbreak, the emergence of postinternationalism is at best only an “escape hatch through which to beat a hasty retreat” (Rosenau quoted in Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, p. 20). Postinternationalism does not move beyond the existing parameters inhabited by international relations theory partly because of its heavy reliance on an objectifying use of reason. Like many international relations theories, postinternationalism is very much a part of the rationalist intellectual tradition. As John Gray explains, “[a] commitment to rationalism…is one of the defining elements of the modernist world-view of which the Enlightenment project is the most powerful expression” (1995, p. 239). While the widespread use of reason produced astounding material results and technological outcomes—many of which in turn helped the spread of Western modernity—and enabled rationalists to describe and explain aspects of world affairs, reason’s excesses are clear, exemplified by the threat posed to the human species by the specter of nuclear annihilation. However, the limitations of reason’s ability to help explain world affairs have seldom been systematically explored (Pettman 2001, p. 24). For Pettman (Ibid, p. 8), “[l]ooking from a mental distance with the light of the mind can certainly illuminate the subject. The point to note here, however, is that it can also blind us to what is going on. It can set limits to what we otherwise might know.” It is a point of particular relevance to the small arms topic, as clearly articulated in the following passage: A scientizing study of the strategic significance of the global trade in small arms, for example, would involve positing a falsifiable hypothesis of some kind, specifying relevant cause and effect variables, deciding on ways to measure how those variables move, doing the measurements, and manipulating the results statistically. It would not involve, of necessity, talking to gun-runners, their suppliers, their customers, or their victims, in non-objectifying ways. It would not require the analyst to engage in the trade itself, either as one of those who profit from it, or as one of those who want to control or ban it. Contrast the more humanistic techniques that involve more qualitative assessments. These would not proceed from the hypothetico-deductive premises. They would try instead to understand the motives and practices of those involved in subjectifying ways. They would actively eschew distancing techniques, favoring descriptions and explanations informed by conversations, rather than structured interviews. They would seek to establish records of personal experience rather than patternseeking comparisons. The point to be noted here is that the assumption that the more scientistic the research approach happens to be, the more valid, reliable or comprehensive

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Rosenau’s reliance on rationalism is perhaps most evident in his scientistic approach to explaining world affairs, for which he has been dubbed by some a ‘prophet of science.’ “Although Rosenau no longer insists upon strict science, he remains determined to develop a vocabulary and analytic framework to account for a dramatically changed reality, and to stay within an empirical tradition,” Ferguson and Mansbach explain (2004, p. 15). However, Ferguson and Mansbach are themselves rationalists too. For them: Post-international theory merges to some extent with critical theorists and postmodernists with respect to the elusiveness of concepts and language generally and about the inherently normative nature of all scholarship. However, post-internationalism parts company with extreme relativists among the postmodernists and some critical theorists epistemologically because it still regards the theoretical quest as being essentially an empirical enterprise. We insist—and here we are in accord with Wendt and most constructivists—that there is an objective ‘reality’ ‘out there,’ however hard it is to analyse objectively because of inadequate information and ‘the spectacles behind the eyes’ we all wear (2007: 547).

So while Rosenau stresses the discontinuity and change occurring in world affairs, his ideas are firmly rooted in the intellectual tradition that both spurred and recorded the history of the Enlightenment project. In corollary, as an interpretive community, postinternationalists are deeply indebted to, and constrained by, the rationalist Enlightenment project. Ferguson and Mansbach take issue with what they would describe as Rosenau’s narrow view of history, which focuses primarily upon European history since the sixteenth century. For them: [a] richer understanding of history suggests that there is more to global politics than a few centuries of European experience and that history does not move in a predictable direction. Few have cared to ponder the world before 1648 or in a non-European context, a significant omission at a time when old historical political forms and ideas are being resurrected or reinvented around the world. In such settings especially, politicians and theorists engage in contests for control of historical meaning—shaping and reshaping the meaning of the past to legitimate interpretations and policies for the present (2004, p. 31).

It is with a degree of irony, therefore, that some postinternationalists seek to expand the historical scope open to enquiry within international relations theory, but confine themselves unnecessarily to the intellectual traditions forged for the most part during the Enlightenment period. The failure to draw on non-Western intellectual

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traditions will continue to impoverish postinternationalism’s explanatory power, especially in what Gray describes as “the dim ruins of the Enlightenment project” (1995, p. 216); postinternationalism is no exception in this regard. Finally, like many interpretive communities within disciplinary international relations, postinternationalists are prone to misreading aspects of contemporary world affairs. By misreading, I mean that the interpretations, analysis, and explanations offered by postinternationalists place more value on certain factors and aspects than they do on others. As previously noted, postinternationalism examines powerful historical shifts that may have been underway for ages, but perhaps does so at the expense of stasis, which can be an equally powerful force. Moreover, while new approaches to explaining world affairs might highlight hitherto neglected actors, nongovernmental actors are not as new as the terms suggests, as many of these types of actors existed before the current states system emerged. And, just because some actors of world affairs play highly visible roles, this visibility does not necessarily equate to significant effects. It would be easy, for example, to mistake IANSA’s participation in multilateral negotiations over small arms control for playing a significant political role in those particular discussions or more generally heralding the emergence of a form of global governance. Similarly, Mansbach exaggerates the consequences associated with the rise of individuals as important actors in world affairs when he writes, “in his conception of the postinternational world, Rosenau has placed citizens squarely at the heart of the analysis; it is their growing skills and escalating participation in world politics, whether as users of e-mail or as demonstrators in Leipzig or Beijing that have brought an end to the Westphalian world” (2000, p. 10, emphasis added). Postinternationalists have also been prone to misreading the intellectual heritage of postinternational theory. While Joseph Lepgold (2000, p. 157), like Ralph B. A DiMuccio and Eric Drew Cooper (2000, p. 183), is correct to situate Rosenau’s ideas squarely in the liberal intellectual tradition, postinternational theory engages with each of the three main politico-dimensions of world affairs and has strong affinities to the traditions of thought associated with internationalism and with individualism too. Ferguson and Mansbach possibly overstate the case, then, when they suggest that “[c]onsonant with its liberal bias, postinternational theory places the individual rather than the state at the center of analysis” (2004, p. 27). It would be more accurate to write that postinternationalism’s analytic frameworks can give focus to individuals where the roles they play and the interactions they undertake merit consideration and treatment. Salutary here is Harold Bloom’s insight—that “[t]o read in the service of any ideology is not, in [his] judgment, to read at all” (1994, p. 29)—a warning especially but not exclusively prescient for postinternationalists. The politics of misreading are, then, a primary means by which interpretive communities cohere, helping also explain why their analysis and explanations, of themselves, favor particular intellectual traditions over others.

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Conclusion Theories of international relations both reflect and inform the conduct of contemporary world affairs. These theories are “not about prediction, though like all human activities [theorizing] may speculate, nor [are these theories] about the assertion of timeless, if sometimes nice, banalities about state behavior.” As Fred Halliday reminds us, theories of international relations form “a discipline concerned with explanation, of historical events and processes, and with the examination, in theoretical and comparative vein, of the concepts underlying our understanding of global affairs” (2005, p. 21). Some of these theories offer more valid, insightful, or relevant explanations than others. Some are more predisposed to addressing certain questions over others. All theories of international relations, however, ought to enable sense-making enterprise. If a better understanding of world affairs makes for better policy responses, then the repercussions of these enterprises can register far beyond the academic institutions in which these theories may have been conceived, articulated, and elaborated. Conversely, in worst-case scenarios “[b]ad theory usually makes for bad policy” (Ferguson and Mansbach 2007, p. 531). Postinternational theory is best understood as a response to powerful historic shifts that produce profound transformative effects on the landscape of global politics, as well as a response to the perceived inadequacies of existing mainstream theories of international relations. It is not itself a mainstream theory of international relations, nor does it emerge from the margins of world affairs. Significantly, postinternationalism does not share a notion of the political with any mainstream international relations theory, as its analysis transcends the three main politico-dimensions into which mainstream interpretive communities can be categorized. Postinternational theory—specifically its appreciation of a broad range of significant actors in world affairs, and its key concepts of a bifurcated system, three main parameters of interaction, and turbulence—cannot adequately explain everything that occurs in contemporary world affairs. Indeed, it probably obscures as much of contemporary world affairs as any other rationalist analytic framework emerging from within the European politico-cultural project of modernity. Nevertheless, this book demonstrates that postinternationalism provides an analytic framework that proves very useful in generating a meaningful, convincing, and compelling explanation of how and why small arms control measures have developed in an incoherent and fragmented manner, are poorly resourced, and continue to have limited effect. In addition, the book’s critical perspective demonstrates that contests over various notions of the political occur not only among interpretive communities analyzing world affairs, but also among those actors who are significant to contemporary world affairs. In particular, it illuminates the tension among various stances taken in relation to an internationalist notion of the political which informs the major efforts to compose small arms controls. With its focus on governments cooperating within intergovernmental organizations, instruments of international law, and UN-authorized collective

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action, an interpretive community described in this chapter as internationalist is well placed to offer insightful explanations of the ways in which small arms controls have been composed. However, by explaining the conduct of those arms control antagonists contesting that internationalist notion of the political and thereby eroding the efficacy of small arms controls, postinternationalism offers a sustained critique explaining why the small arms challenge remains intractable and insurmountable. It is a critique that recognizes the complicity (and in some cases culpability) of those arms control protagonists fueling the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. Significantly, the book’s critical perspective also demonstrates that a sound understanding of the small arms topic casts light back upon the version of postinternational theory offered here, illuminating not only its strengths and the extent of its explanatory power, but also some of its limitations and the extent of its biases.

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Chapter 2

Small Arms Impacts The widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms contribute to a myriad of deleterious impacts that register across local and regional settings, affect affluent and developing societies, and have immediate presence and lasting effect. In fact, the legacies of this armed violence will continue to haunt millions of victims for many years to come as these weapons visit their devastation upon communities in locales spread widely but unevenly around the world. However, empirical analysis claiming to assess and then compare the multifarious consequences following the use of these weapons will be as provisional as it will be fragmentary because accurate and reliable information remains scarce. Yet the uncertainty surrounding assessments of small arms impacts has not frozen policymakers into inaction, nor precluded high-level policy choices, as even a cursory awareness of these impacts appears to help motivate and sustain the major efforts to compose small arms controls. The seriousness and frequency of these impacts renders the control of small arms as one of the most urgent contemporary security challenges confronting policymakers. This chapter begins by describing some of the difficulties involved in analyzing the small arms topic. Foremost among these difficulties are those caused by the absence of an authoritative definition of small arms and the limited information available on the extent of small arms proliferation, transfers, and possession. The absence of baseline information also frustrates attempts to evaluate small arms controls. The chapter then conveys the magnitude of the violence these weapons bring to contemporary world affairs by discerning some of its key politicostrategic, politico-economic, and politico-social consequences. This is germane to analysts and policymakers alike because these dimensions can attract differing degrees of attention from members of the international small arms community as they each respond to this security challenge. These multidimensional small arms impacts not only contribute to a long tradition of armed violence in world affairs that precedes the development of the Westphalian states system, but also highlights a shift away from conflict between sovereign states and towards lowerintensity violence occurring within and across international borders. For Ferguson and Mansbach, these small arms impacts would embody a vital aspect of war occurring in an emerging postinternational world (2004, pp. 227—272). But the argument presented in this book only goes as far as to suggest this armed violence, caused in many cases by sovereign-free actors operating beyond the traditional parameters of interaction, signals a broader transformation that amounts to turbulence in world politics.

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Analyzing Small Arms Defining Small Arms An authoritative definition of small arms has so far eluded the international community. While largely consistent among treaty law, there are important differences in definitions used in soft law measures, sanction regimes, and peacekeeping operations. There are also important nuances in the usage of this term among the work of various researchers and members of civil society organizations. Pro-gun lobbyists seek to distinguish civilian sporting and hunting guns from military-style weapons. Some definitions draw upon the intended usage of these weapons, with certain types of weapons designated as military tools that can be carried by an infantryman, a pack animal, or a light vehicle (Karp 1995, pp. 23—24). These weapons are distinguished from major military weapons such as tanks and aircraft because the latter “typically require an elaborate logistical and maintenance capability that can only be provided by professional military organizations with sufficient technical experience” (Klare 1995a, p. 33). Governments are often keen to distinguish the legal weapons which they authorize from the illicit weapons held without such authorization. According to Péricles Gasparani Alves, further distinction occurs among illicit small arms as: some experts are concerned with the use of small arms in street crime as it relates to the safety of the public: theirs is the so-called nationalist approach which mostly excludes a discussion on light weapons and the security of States. Other experts look at firearms from the point of State security: these are the internationalists who consider illicit trafficking to be a threat caused by the access of guerrilla and insurgency groups to small arms and light weapons. The internationalists rarely address the consequences of illicit trafficking for the safety of a population, only considering them when they threaten the existence of States, or if they involve large-scale killing such as genocide (2000, p. 1).

More often, definitions assert a technical classification based upon the weapons actually used during civil war and internal conflict (Karp 1995, p. 24). Discrepancies in defining small arms matter as the definition ascribed to items subject to control not only has significance for analysts considering them, but also has important military, economic, and social implications for the policymakers agreeing to them. Although contested, the following definition provided by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms has increasingly gained authority among officials, arms control advocates, and small arms researchers. It is, therefore, used to underpin this book: Small arms: revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; submachine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns.

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Light weapons: heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; mortars of calibres of less than 100mm. Ammunition and explosives: cartridges (rounds) for small arms; shells and missiles for light weapons; mobile containers with missiles or shells for singleaction anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems; anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades; landmines; explosives (UN General Assembly 1997a, para. 26).

Ammunition is considered important here because it is a vital ingredient for small arms’ ongoing use. As Greene (2006, p. 3) observes, divorcing ammunition from considerations of small arms control has already proved short sighted as exerting control over ammunition transfers can in turn help control small arms use. Taking a broad and inclusive view, archaic, crude, and homemade weapons of similar propulsion capability also deserve consideration alongside the UN Panel’s definition. Newly developed non-lethal weapons fall outside the UN Panel’s definition because instead of killing, these weapons are “explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment” (Small Arms Survey 2003, p. 25). The qualified success of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty) has discouraged, by and large, the inclusion of anti-personnel landmines in discussions of small arms despite their representing a sub-category in the abovementioned definition (UN General Assembly 1997a, para. 31). Accordingly, this book also excludes treatment of landmines as either small arms or light weapons. Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the precise items subject to control, policymakers seeking to control small arms must necessarily address the following aspects of the issue: proliferation in terms of both organized manufacture and casual craft; transfers in terms of legal trade, grey transfers, and trafficking; possession in terms of existing stockpiles, arsenals, and inventories, civilian ownership, and informal caches; collection in terms of voluntary surrender campaigns, buy-back schemes, and other disarmament initiatives; and the disposal of this weaponry. Each of these aspects must be effectively addressed in a comprehensive, coordinated, and holistic manner if these weapons are to be controlled. Enhanced collection processes will have limited effect if the production of weapons remains unrestrained, for example. Similarly, strict controls over stockpiles will have limited effect if the trafficking of these weapons continues unabated.

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Measuring Aspects of Small Arms Analysis of the challenge of controlling small arms is frequently premised upon inconsistent, incomplete, and at times unreliable information. This is because there are a number of significant impediments frustrating attempts to collect accurate, reliable, and timely information regarding each of the major aspects of the small arms challenge (Haug et al. 2002, p. 2). Some governments are reluctant to release detailed information relating to the quantities of weapons produced legally within their jurisdiction. Weapons produced either by manufacturers without licence or through informal craft elude capture by reporting processes covering only industrial sectors. Where the criminialization of weapons production without licence involves artisan practice, as in Ghana, guilds and associated networks become increasingly secretive (Aning 2005, p. 85). Armed groups possessing productive capability, including insurgents, organized criminals, and terrorists, are even less likely to publicize the extent of the arsenals they produce. Knowledge of the proliferation of these weapons is, therefore, necessarily fragmented and provisional. The absence of both official and unofficial information relating to local guilds, companies, and countries producing small arms, and the value and volume of global production greatly inhibits any meaningful analysis of this aspect of the problem (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 8). This does not appear, however, to curtail many highly varied ‘best estimates’ of local, national, regional, or global proliferation. Collecting accurate, reliable, and comparable information relating to authorized small arms transfers is made difficult by the absence of an international standard concerning officials’ compilation of trade-related information. Although some international agreements with provisions for collecting and compiling transferrelated information exist, they lack universal membership. For example, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and DualUse Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement), which includes such a provision, involves only 40 governments, though this includes all major arms exporters except the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC). Although this agreement prompts participating governments to exchange trade-related information among their officials, this information is not always publicly available. Some governments withhold information claiming their need to preserve commercial-in-confidence relationships with their domestic industry. And, as the Biting the Bullet Project team warns, “[i]t is important to note that information exchange is not transparency” (2006, p. 258). When trade-related information is made available to the public, its release can cast an unfavorable light upon those Western democracies that have some provision for transparency. This bias of transparency renders the US arms trade an expedient subject of analysis and by extension a target of criticism, especially when compared to the Chinese arms trade about which little is publicly known. To complicate assessments, “[v]irtually every illicit small arm that is used in conflict or criminal activity began its life as a legally produced and traded weapon, at some point slipping into the illicit circuit” (Krause 2002: 249).

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It is equally as, if not more, difficult to collect information relating to those small arms transfers occurring as part of a so-called ‘grey market.’ On the one hand, grey market transfers include “the covert supply of arms to conflict protagonists, particularly insurgent groups, by governments and/or state security agencies—usually in pursuance of political objectives through arms transfers in contravention of its own laws and/or other legal frameworks.” On the other hand, they also include transfers resulting from “a failure of due process and/or the manipulation or circumvention of government regulatory structures by illicit arms traders, often facilitated by corrupt state officials or legally authorised agents” (Bourne 2007, pp. 40—41). Actors involved in either type of grey market activity have no incentive whatsoever to make public their clandestine transfers. This means that most transfers occurring between governments as secret trade, aid, or gifts, and between a government and a nongovernmental actor as a clandestine transfer, routinely evade public notice and scrutiny unless otherwise detected and publicized. While few governments maintain accurate and up-to-date information on the regulated trade of small arms occurring within or across their borders, the difficulty encountered when seeking accurate, reliable, and timely information on the trafficking of these weapons is even more intense. This is largely because professional arms brokers and recipients of their consignments deliberately conceal their commercial affairs, especially when they occur as part of the black market. (The unregulated recycling of these weapons from conflict to conflict also hinders accurate assessments of flows.) Michael T. Klare and David Anderson appreciate that their own “ability to reach an understanding of the black-market trade requires [them] to rely on people’s mistakes; since [they] do not know the ratio of successful to unsuccessful transactions, it is impossible to know the full extent of illegal gun-running” (1996, p. 58). Consequently, these analysts rely heavily upon guesswork in order to ascertain the correlation between those weapons detected during monitoring activity and/or seized during enforcement operations, and the wider circulation of those weapons through black markets. These kinds of estimates—sometimes based on elaborate extrapolation of known quantities— might exhibit great accuracy yet lack verifiability, veracity, and therefore a measure of reliability. At best loosely signalling the extent of trafficking, their approach cannot be regarded as authoritative because it does not transcend the limitations inherent in information that has been collected without the reporting and verification processes usually associated with regulated commercial trade. For those dealing directly with the consequences of weapons use, however, distinctions between legal and illicit transfers are meaningless. As Michael Crowley and Greg Puley explain: From the perspective of the triage doctor or the human rights monitor, there is no difference between a chest wound inflicted on a civilian by a bullet acquired through the so-called licit trade, and that caused by a bullet acquired through the so-called illicit trade. To those who mend tissues and remove bone fragments,

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Even though initiatives towards global, regional, and national registers of small arms have been proposed, governments have so far been reluctant to release publicly any specific details relating to their own military and constabulary arsenals. This is presumably out of fear that such publicity might undermine either national security or the government’s ability to enforce the rule of law within its area of jurisdiction (or perhaps because it might do both). In some countries, citizens have shown a reluctance to register their weapons and in many countries there is little in the way of licensing of civilian firearms. Informal caches concealed from authorities in conflict zones or postconflict settings also evade accountability. Collecting reliable information on small arms possession is often a perplexing endeavour. Despite the difficulties encountered in collecting information on the proliferation, transfer, and possession of small arms, researchers and analysts have offered some useful estimates. At the very least, these estimates prove useful for indicating the magnitude of the challenge confronting the international small arms community. For instance, the Small Arms Survey estimates that over 1,100 firms are currently involved in some stage of small arms, light weapons, and ammunition production processes. Signalling the industry’s global distribution, these commercial enterprises occur in at least 92 countries, with the US, the Russian Federation, and the PRC ranking as the world’s major producers (2004, p. 9). The Small Arms Survey also estimates the total value of the global small arms industry to be at least US$7.4 billion, and this for a total volume of between 7.5 and 8 million weapons, and between 10 and 14 billion units of ammunition each year (2003, p. 13). Firms continue to manufacture small arms, in some cases developing and refining associated technologies, in spite of an existing global stockpile estimated at about 639 million known weapons (Ibid, p. 9, p. 57). These stockpiles not only continue to grow even in the wake of the Cold War, but also circulate among users with a high degree of velocity. The Small Arms Survey estimates the value of total legal international trade in small arms to be worth approximately US$4 billion each year (Ibid, p. 97). This might be an underestimate because it remains difficult to ascertain the quantities of these weapons distributed as gifts and aid, or sold at bargain-basement prices. According to the Small Arms Survey’s first yearbook, constabularies possess an estimated 18 million weapons shared among somewhere between 10 and 21 million police officers worldwide, whereas government armed forces possess an estimated 226 million small arms. Nongovernmental armed groups are attributed a total stockpile of less than 1 million weapons. Civilians privately own at least 305 million firearms, representing over half of the world’s stockpile (2001, pp. 65— 89). Excluded from these estimates are stockpiles held as inventories belonging

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to manufacturers and suppliers, as arsenals by private security firms, mercenaries, and state-supported militia, as caches by organized crime groups, and as illegal firearms by civilians. In addition to signalling the scale of small arms availability, the processes by which many estimates are reached also serve as opportunities for small arms researchers, arms control advocates, and officials to cooperate and collaborate, thereby building and strengthening the relationships that can prove important to the composition of small arms controls. These relationships foster a nascent interconnectivity among these arms control protagonists’ efforts, evident in the ways in which their major strategies for and approaches toward controlling these weapons often interrelate. Evaluating Controls The absence of baseline information frustrates attempts to assess the overall effectiveness of small arms controls. In circumstances where weapons collection efforts occur, the absence of baseline estimates of the number and type of small arms which are available in the immediate vicinity obscures any sense of practical progress, regardless of how impressive the reported rate of confiscation and the aggregate number of weapons seized might first appear to be. Even once baseline estimates have been established and disarmament programs are underway, it remains very difficult to determine the quantity of weapons crossing porous borders and finding use in other conflicts, though such recycling undoubtedly occurs. In some cases—exemplified by a buy-back scheme implemented in Northern Afghanistan—disarmament processes are not only easily undermined, but also contribute to deteriorating security conditions. They do so when they provide financial opportunities enabling combatants and criminals to re-arm, improving the quality and quantity of their weapons. The situation in Afghanistan was not helped when the Afghan Government “released scant information regarding the procedures and methodology utilized in the collection process, a lack of transparency that has generated scepticism” (Sedra 2002, p. 38). Figures conveying the rate of disarmament are rendered even less meaningful when inward weapons flows persist without restraint. It is therefore difficult to know with any degree of certainty the extent to which DDR programs included in UN peacekeeping operations are successful in collecting small arms within their specific areas of operation. Information gathered from those weapons collected by peacekeepers and constabularies does, however, prove useful as an indicator of the weapons that are readily available and used in that immediate vicinity (Khakee and Florquin 2003, p. 17). The absence of baseline information similarly frustrates attempts to measure the effectiveness of arms embargoes aimed at preventing weapons from reaching specific actors. Quantifying the amount of weapons transfers that are deterred by this form of collective action is unfeasible. Attempts to measure the effectiveness of those instruments of international law designed to combat

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illicit small arms trafficking are not immune from these concerns either. In this light, law-enforcement action proves somewhat less useful as a means by which the extent of illegal activities can be estimated, than it is a useful way of better knowing about these unauthorized dealings. Even though the absence of baseline information relating to the total number of weapons available for use obscures the practical significance of those weapons collected, members of the international small arms community continue resorting to DDR programs, arms embargoes, and instruments of international law as their favoured methods of small arms control. Clearly, then, the epistemic uncertainty surrounding key aspects of the small arms challenge does not freeze policymakers into inaction nor preclude all high-level policy choices, although it does limit any assessment of the real value of such action. Given the paucity of available information and the lack of veracity concerning the information that is available, it is not yet possible—indeed, it might never be possible—to conduct a meaningful empirical analysis which accurately evaluates the collective impact of small arms controls. Even if such information were available and could be compared over time, fluctuations and shifts in weapons availability could be attributed to factors that are not understood as direct or indirect outcomes of these control efforts. For example, while a downturn in small arms production rates might be attributed to the impact of controls negotiated at multilateral conferences, such a decline could also plausibly be a result of the intensification of globalization and its economic boom-and-bust cycles. Plausible too is the suggestion that the tightening of international financial regulations through institutions such as the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in order to combat organized criminals, terrorists, and other money launderers has a serendipitous effect on combating the nefarious activities of arms brokers. The empirical adventures required to investigate these alternative explanations lie well beyond the scope of this book and the competency of its author, however. The lack of information relating to the precise quantities of small arms currently produced, transferred, possessed, collected, and disposed of does not preclude exploring the major ways in which the international community composes small arms controls. Nor does it preclude identifying the particular ways in which these controls are deliberately weakened and sometimes undermined by certain members of the international small arms community. Nor for that matter does this lack of information preclude examining the ways in which various international actors easily mitigate the intended effects of those controls. In fact, the lack of available, accurate, and reliable information makes these tasks all the more necessary and, as mentioned in the Introduction, these are undertaken in Parts II and III of this book respectively. Here, then, much of the information relating to the small arms topic collected by small arms researchers, arms control advocates belonging to civil society organizations, governments, and intergovernmental organizations is often inconsistent, incomplete, and unreliable. Much of this information is also

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incompatible and therefore cannot be used as the basis for comparative analysis. Even the Small Arms Survey concedes “the total number and global distribution of small arms remains one of the greatest enigmas in the field of international peace and security” (2001, p. 60). All this is not to suggest that the international community cannot develop an understanding of the small arms challenge through a consideration of its major aspects. Rather, it suggests that any meaningful comprehension ought to acknowledge the limitations of the available information and recognize the uncertainty it provokes for those seeking to compose controls over these weapons. This uncertainty should concern not just government officials and representatives of intergovernmental organizations, but all of those members of the international small arms community. Without greater transparency of government-authorized proliferation and transfer in particular, analysts will also be precluded from better comprehending the small arms topic they attempt to describe and explain. Policymakers too will be inhibited from effectively confronting the challenge posed by the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons since controlling small arms requires an holistic approach simultaneously addressing each of its major aspects. Each aspect in turn needs to be considered against the increasing geographic spread of these weapons, distributed not only in those locations of intense use described as hotspots, but also in those areas through which these weapons transit. Measuring Small Arms Impacts The underreporting of armed crime to authorities hinders assessments of small arms impacts, as do the poor recording processes of authorities. Many human rights violations involving these weapons probably go unreported because the victims are dead and witnesses remain silent due to fear of recriminatory violence. Governments also rarely collect information relating to the use of firearms to incite violence. As Phillip Alpers and Conor Tywford recently discovered in the South Pacific, “sometimes the only way to ascertain the relative level of firearmsrelated violence in a community is to prevail upon the institutional memory of the interviewee” (2003, p. 31). The indirect use of these weapons has serious consequences too, even if such usage is as Muggah contends “deeply entrenched and often difficult to discern” (2005: 241). For example, while the most common tools of violence used during the Rwandan genocide were machetes and other farming implements, small arms were ubiquitous companions to the human carnage. Reported mortality rates provided by combatants are not always reliable either as these figures are especially susceptible to inflation and deflation when used as a means of political manoeuvring (Small Arms Survey 2005a, p. 229). Interstices among official information undermine attempts to comprehensively map these impacts. So too does the anecdotal nature of information collected firsthand by researchers and contained in media reports. The results of any attempt to map incidences of armed violence against a geographic location will be

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incomplete, fragmented, and highly provisional, except as an indicator of weapons availability. And since the locations of many of the world’s small arms stockpiles remain unknown, it has so far proven unfeasible to establish precise linkages between weapons availability and the prevalence of their use. Most analysts and policymakers agree that such a link exists, however. Measuring various small arms impacts proves complicated. At the heart of this complexity lies a question of appropriate methodology. Quantitative statistics concerning morbidity rates, injury, and displacement are common, pervading the growing body of small arms literature. The Small Arms Survey, for example, estimates that these weapons are implicated in about five-hundred thousand deaths each year; that is, more than 1,300 deaths per day (2001, p. 1). The epistemological approach to collecting these kinds of statistics is primarily distal, by which I mean “stepping back to look at world affairs in objectifying terms” (Pettman 2001, p. 155). However this approach and, more significantly, the quantitative statistics it often produces, tends to mask the heterogeneous ways in which these deaths occur and can conceal the uneven geographic distribution of these deaths in locales throughout the world. Such an approach can also distort so-called lived experiences because statistics cannot aptly portray the misery, horror, and loss of dignity inflicted upon those who fall victim to these tools of violence. On the other hand, a qualitative approach that is sensitive to the personal experiences of small arms victims relies upon a proximal epistemology. By proximal epistemology, I mean engaging in world affairs not as a neutral observer but as a participant of the subject under regard, in the way that anthropologists do (Pettman 2001, p. 13). According to Béatrice Pouligny: an ethno-psychiatric approach is necessary in order to avoid frameworks and tools which may be totally alien to local forms and logics of social ties, their transformations, and above all, the cultural strategies of dealing with death, mourning, and suffering. As has been argued by some psychiatrists, it makes little sense to speak of trauma, in the psychiatric or diagnostic sense, outside precise historical cultural and social contexts. When violence and fear have become a way of life, when war has become an ordinary condition and no longer exceptional, everyday life has been changed. Such a devastating fragmentation of social ties and individual conscience may contribute to the paralysis of social rehabilitation as well as of peace building intervention, even after war is supposed to be over. In other words, it may obstruct the reconstruction of a possible everyday life in communities that have lived through a long siege of violence and poverty. It explains why it is normally not possible to think about reintegration of former combatants outside of the community frameworks (2004, p. 10).

Like the distal approach, a proximal epistemology also has limits. Again Pouligny is instructive here when she warns of the difficulties presented:

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by contradictory memories and accounts that differ or are unspeakable or even impossible to reconstruct….When a field worker does not know what he is ‘witnessing,’ he or she might tend to (re)present an undifferentiated round of suffering, a carnival of horror, that will exclude any consideration of its political or social dimensions

Pouligny further signals that field workers “may also be tempted to ‘rework’ the account in order to overlay her own ‘authentic’ version of the facts, or may quite simply construct her own narrative. There is also a risk that this version or narrative might ‘simplify’ situations that are highly complex” (Ibid, p. 22). These two approaches, distal and proximal, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Writing specifically about the Holocaust, Martin Gilbert touches upon a point relevant here: “neither their suffering, nor their courage can be adequately conveyed in words. So little is known of the fate and reaction of individuals. Statistics can dull the mind, and examples numb it” (1986, p. 419, emphasis added). Pettman recommends that practitioners of disciplinary international relations employ both ways of knowing as a “double epistemological helix” (2004, p. 10; 2001, p. 4). This approach is useful for conveying the breadth and magnitude of consequences resulting from the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. Having said that, however, a fully representative account proves elusive, especially since experiences of these weapons usage are seldom identical. The selection of referents used to measure the impacts generated by the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms can be a contentious issue. Disputes may arise because ontologies chosen by analysts often reflect their commitment to a particular notion of the political, as discussed in Chapter 1. Notwithstanding the particular referents preferred for analysis, comparisons among various small arms impacts tend to confound rather than clarify attempts to measure impacts. As Yehuda Bauer posits: No graduation of human suffering is possible. A soldier who lost a leg and a lung at Verdun suffered. How can one measure his suffering against the horrors that Japanese civilians endured at Hiroshima? How can one measure the suffering of a Rom woman at Auschwitz, who saw her husband and children die in front of her eyes, against the suffering of a Jewish woman at the same camp who underwent the same experience? Extreme forms of human suffering are not comparable, and one should never say that one form of mass murder is “less terrible,” or even “better,” than another (2001, p. 13).

Although comparing the prevalence and intensity of various small arms impacts proves highly problematic, especially in situations where death by armed violence is unreported or under-recorded, these impacts deserve some elaboration here. The remainder of this chapter illustrates the multiple and ongoing ways in which small arms constitute a serious contemporary security challenge. Small arms impacts are described here in terms of the three main politico-dimensions across which

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postinternational analysis range. Although this chapter gives focus to contemporary impacts, small arms are situated within a long tradition of armed violence in world affairs, whose history not only helped usher in the Westphalian states system, but could also help hasten its demise. Politico-Strategic Consequences The widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms produce effects with considerable politico-strategic consequences. Where existing institutions of government suffer political bankruptcy, small arms enable the emergence of new informal governance arrangements. The violent transition to independence for the Republic of Georgia provides an instructive example of the increased militarization of politics where governmental authority is absent. According to Spyros Demetriou, “[t]he sudden availability of weapons in late 1991 drastically altered the dynamics of political interaction and competition, leading to the militarization of politics, the narrowing of negotiating space, and the recourse to force to settle disputes” (2002, p. 50). Following the indiscriminate distribution of small arms to citizens by the Russian military personnel entrusted with their safe storage, civilians were able to use these weapons as a means of expressing power and were better equipped to achieve their political ends. This so-called ‘politics from the barrel of a gun’ contributed to a political climate in which more than 300,000 people were displaced and tens of thousands of people killed, providing conditions conducive to the further criminalization of Georgian domestic affairs (Ibid, p. 29). Small arms enable those who possess them to contest control over the institutions of government. This is particularly evident when such weapons are in the hands of armed nongovernmental groups and terrorist organizations. All governments are vulnerable to the direct impact of these weapons, with heads of state and other prominent figures the targets of assassination attempts—though governmental representatives cannot claim a monopoly as victims. Rather, these weapons are more frequently used to wage protracted guerrilla war against governmental military forces, such as that undertaken by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Conflict in the Solomon Islands, beginning in 1998, is a further example of a resort to arms as a way of articulating grievances directed at the government, as well as at rival factions. By the middle of 1999, 50 people had been killed in the Solomon Islands by local militia armed with small arms, intensifying resentment and prolonging conflict resulting in the killing of a further 50 people by the end of 2000. Although these hostilities concluded with the Townsville Peace Agreement of August 2000, incidents of armed violence persist (Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 39). Sometimes governments fall after their elected representatives are taken as hostages by opponents brandishing small arms. A vivid instance of this occurred in 2000 when seven armed men led by businessman George Speight forcefully entered the Fijian Parliament, taking hostage Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudry alongside most of his Cabinet. The associated trauma has both immediate and long-

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term consequences for the individuals directly involved as well as for Fijian society at large. Five people died from gunshot wounds inflicted during the hostage-taking episode. During the 56 days that the hostage situation dragged on, the rule of law was disregarded in many locales where violence and rioting prevailed (Ibid, p. 34). Consequences following this unseating of a democratically-elected government are serious and lasting. This coup d’état has, as Brij Lal notes: dislocated the process of political reconciliation, severely strained race relations, and shattered the foundations of the nation’s economy just when Fiji was gradually emerging from the debris of 1987. The images of looting and burning, thuggery, and violence on the streets of Suva, the worst in the history of Fiji, will forever remain deeply embedded in the collective consciousness of its people, and the recovery from the wreckage and ruin will be long and hard (quoted in Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 33).

Here, a lack of effective law enforcement combined with forced internal displacement engendered widespread violence, including looting, destruction of property, and arson. This was followed by longer-term effects upon migratory flows, widespread unemployment and redundancy, inert key industries discouraging economic recovery, increases in sexual violence against women, and trauma experienced by many children that will no doubt continue to haunt them and their communities for many years to come (Alpers and Twyford 2003, pp. 35—37). Commodore Frank Bainimarama has tried to justify Fiji’s most recent coup in December 2006 as a response to the former Government’s unsatisfactory handling of the previous coup plotters (BBC 2006b). It is not only unauthorized small arms whose impacts register in the politicostrategic dimension of world affairs. Authorized small arms are also prone to misuse. Some weapons have been stockpiled by, or on behalf of, candidates campaigning for public office. These weapons are used to intimidate voters and ballot monitors alike, thereby undermining the democratic electoral process. Such intimidation occurred in Papua New Guinea (PNG) during 1997, signalling the further politicization of the constabulary and military (Capie 2003, p. 94). Incumbent officials seeking re-election do not hold monopoly over ballot-box intimidation, as supporters of opposition candidates take up arms with similar intent to influence democratic processes. According to Bill Standish, by August 2002 30 people had died in violence associated with PNG’s electoral process, many directly from firearms use (cited in Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 54). Overenthusiastic responses from the constabulary to increases of violent crime also demonstrate the misuse of authorized force, which in PNG includes human rights violations, arbitrary raids on homes, rape, property theft and damage (Anere et al. 2001, p. 28). The illfated millennium bank heist in 1999 in Port Moresby ended when police disabled a moving helicopter containing five armed robbers before gunning down each of them as they emerged from the wreckage. This example of excessive use of force is not isolated: claims persist that the constabulary have summarily executed

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suspected criminals, some of whom were unarmed (Capie 2003, p. 91, p. 93). The UN estimates that the PNG Defence Force murdered at least 64 people between 1991 and 1995 (Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 47). As authorities encounter increasing difficulty in enforcing domestic law, the inclination to deploy military force instead of the constabulary gathers momentum, though in some cases officials have been hesitant to do so (Gasparini Alves 2000, p. 36). Chris Smith observes of Central Asia: The availability of weapons of increasing firepower has facilitated a warlike situation as militants become increasingly able to mount operations more akin to insurgency than to militancy or terrorism. Consequently, the response of the security forces—which are themselves poorly trained and even more poorly disciplined—has been excessive. As both sides have become progressively brutalised, so the incidence of rape, torture, and murder has increased (1995, pp. 76—77).

Here, misuse is not merely tolerated or condoned by governments, but is encouraged while IHL is violated and concepts of human rights find little currency. Providing the means by which inter-communal rivalries are fuelled and exploited, these weapons articulate and create grievances, escalate disputes with civil authorities into full-scale conflict, and are used to wage and prolong civil war against governments. The rise of intra-state conflict, largely fought with small arms, following the Cold War’s end was accompanied by an increase of peacekeeping operations authorized by intergovernmental organizations. During UN operations in Albania, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia, and more recently East Timor, to name just a few, the widespread availability of small arms directly threatened the security of peacekeepers. Following the unravelling of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 2000, more than 250 UN peacekeepers were abducted in Sierra Leone by members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Berman 2000, p. 12). At least six of them were murdered. The number of UN peacekeepers killed during operations conducted in the 1990s represents half of the total reported number of peacekeeper casualties since the UN’s inception (Capie 2003, p. 6). Even where small arms are consigned for deactivation they can continue to kill: two explosives experts died during a demobilization demonstration in El Salvador, with the blast injuring four other soldiers, as well as a journalist and cameraman also in attendance (Godnick et al. 2002, p. 17). Inexperienced peacekeepers operating in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have also received criticism for not shouldering weapons during patrols in postconflict settings, thereby enhancing perceived insecurity. Even where intent to use force might be absent, the perception of the need for armed capability diminishes faith in security. Here, then, small arms impacts have considerable politico-strategic consequences. These contemporary impacts form part of a long tradition of armed

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violence in world affairs, the history of which precedes the development of the states system. For Ferguson and Mansbach, the “system of sovereign states was at least partly the result of an effort to limit and regulate collective violence, both between and within states following the destructive pre-Westphalian religious wars, and to legitimize the use of violence by sovereigns against opponents” (2004, p. 230). The ongoing tradition of armed violence not only fosters crises of authority and threatens the existence of particular governments, but also threatens to erode the very existence of the states system itself. Politico-Economic Consequences Closely related to those politico-strategic concerns are the significant politicoeconomic consequences of small arms impacts. Conflicts sustained by these weapons help debilitate the infrastructure enabling and regulating domestic economies, displace and scatter labour forces, and prevent easy access to natural resources (where these resources are not destroyed). According to Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor, “[t]he threat and use of small arms touches both formal and informal commercial transactions, including trading patterns, and household and national agricultural production. In many situations, small arms availability can be a direct cause of declining food security” (2002, p. 30). They go on to note the high medical costs associated with treating firearms-related injuries, the rise of armed banditry, and resulting high transport costs, each of which contribute to declining economic activity. Beyond conflict zones, small arms gain currency as commodities. Sometimes these weapons form the basis of a lucrative trade whereby corrupt members of the constabulary or armed forces steal weapons from armories, transferring these to criminal groups as occurred in PNG during the 1990s (Capie 2003, p. 101). Experienced in exploiting weak-willed and corrupt authorities, organized crime groups transfer these weapons to generate revenue contributing to their profitability, as they do with other commodities such as narcotics, diamonds, and timber. Consequently, officials forego opportunities to collect taxation revenues, further impeding governmental capabilities to administer human development projects (Muggah and Batchelor 2002, p. 33). Mercenariness may also be invoked where governments desire to quell unrest, restore order and their authority, or at least assert a competitive claim for the legitimate use of force over a contested area of jurisdiction. In 1995, the Government of Sierra Leone hired Executive Outcome, a South African private security firm, which made immediate military gains against the RUF, led by Foday Sankoh. Following an agreement between the warring parties, which included a provision requiring the Government to terminate its contract with the private security firm, officers of Executive Outcome left the country. Armed hostilities quickly resumed (Berman 2000, p. 11). Although mercenaries from Sandline International, hired in 1997 by the PNG Government, were never active in an operational sense, they played a minor role

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in prompting a peace process leading toward the Lincoln Agreement (Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 45). In this case, corporate armed actors were introduced into a conflict zone in order to reinforce the contracting Government’s politicostrategic capability, though as Muggah and Batchelor point out the “costs of private security for businesses, including government agencies, in countries such as South Africa, Brazil, Nigeria and the US have reached alarming proportions. In many of these countries, the value of the private security industry often exceeds national expenditure on policing” (2002, p. 26). The privitization of force is, for Ferguson and Mansbach, a key feature of postinternational war that exposes the limited capability of some states to effectively confront armed conflict. They trace the history of privatized force back to at least those “Westphalian States [that] willingly used mercenaries, privateers, and trading companies that had their own armies to extend state influence” (2004, p. 257). Combatants’ easy access to small arms hinders conflict resolution, thereby squandering economic development opportunities offered by external actors. Involvement in contemporary conflicts, in which small arms are the predominant weapons, consumes a significant quantity of the UN’s resources. According to the UN Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, “[i]n one way or another, virtually every part of the United Nations system is dealing with the direct and indirect consequences of recent armed conflicts fought mostly with small arms and light weapons” (UN General Assembly 1997a, para. 20). The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that the government of El Salvador spent 25 percent of its annual Gross Domestic Product responding to armed violence, signalling that governments too foot the bill for small arms’ use (Godnick et al. 2002, p. 13). Donor states such as New Zealand redirect funds initially intended for development aid into humanitarian assistance and specific disarmament processes, seeking to help resolve conflicts erupting in places such as the Solomon Islands (Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 42). Small arms impacts therefore register immediate and long-lasting politico-economic consequences, many of which hinder postconflict economic reconstruction efforts. Politico-Social Consequences Perhaps the most apparent small arms impacts are those generating politico-social consequences. Rather than combat personnel, it is civilians—especially women and children—who now incur the highest numbers of casualties inflicted by these weapons during conflict. This is because government and irregular forces find it all too easy, and often expedient, to ignore the distinction between combatants and civilians. As Mary Kaldor points out, “[b]ehaviour that was proscribed according to the classical rules of warfare and codified in the laws of war in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, such as atrocities against non-combatants, sieges, destruction of historic monuments…now constitutes an essential new mode of warfare” (1999, p. 8). Civilians using small arms as part-time combatants undermine their claims to protection afforded by IHL to those entitled to civilian

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status. Ferguson and Mansbach attribute this unwelcome development to a unique combination of technology and ideology, considering it to be a feature of postinternational war (2004, p. 263). Individuals belonging to affluent societies suffer from the illegal use of legallyheld small arms. In recent years, schools and shopping malls in the US have hosted several incidences of gun-related violence. The high-profile shootings carried out by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold at Columbine High School, Colorado not only register as personal trauma for witnesses and the relatives of victims, but also as violent images engraved upon the collective psyche of Americans viewing media coverage of, or popular documentaries focusing on, this incident or the others similar to it. This is not only an American social problem, however. In 1996 at Dunblane, Scotland, 16 primary school students and their teacher were shot dead by Thomas Hamilton. Martin Bryant, a lone gunman embarking upon a shooting spree at Port Arthur, Tasmania, killed 35 people and injured a further 19 in 1996. Harris and Klebold, Hamilton, and Bryant represent only four of the many highprofile shooters using small arms reported in the media over the past decade. These weapons also play a prominent role in suicides with approximately 75 percent of Australia’s firearms-related mortalities in 1999 determined as suicides (Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 54). Unintentional injuries and accidental death also result from the illegal use of these weapons. According to Wendy Cukier and Victor W. Sidel, “[w]hile conflicts and wars are fuelled by the arms trade, the shocking reality is that more people are killed with guns each year in countries not at war” (2006, p. 3). The armed violence occurring in cities such as Rio de Janerio and São Paulo is so intense as to blur the distinction between areas under the rule of law and those locations deemed to be conflict zones, especially given that “non-fatal outcomes of firearm-related violence represent a largely unknown—and likely very large— dimension of the problem” (Peres 2004, p. 17). Brazil does not hold a monopoly over urban violence, however. A recent WHO Report begins by explaining that: Violence is a universal scourge that tears at the fabric of communities and threatens the life, health and happiness of us all. Each year, more than 1.6 million people worldwide lose their lives to violence. For everyone who dies as a result of violence, many more are injured and suffer from a range of physical, sexual, reproductive and mental health problems (2002, p. 7).

Criminal intent can generate the use of unauthorized small arms. Although lawenforcement agencies often directly link weapons trafficking to organized narcotics trafficking, the criminal use of unauthorized weapons is much broader. Such weapons are used in a range of illicit activities such as poaching, cattle-rustling, armed robberies, banditry, kidnapping for ransom, hostage taking, hijacking, homicide, and bank heists. Media reports from countries such as PNG and the US routinely report shootouts between gangs and constabulary, as well as among gangs (Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 52). Isolated, not to mention widespread or

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endemic, violent crime represents a serious threat to the safety of ordinary citizens and the constabulary, undermines the rule of law, and weakens the authority and legitimacy of some governments (Gasparini Alves 2000, p. 2). In Rio de Janeiro, there are reports suggesting these weapons can be easily hired and that areas exist, particularly in the favelas and morrows, where law-enforcement teams cannot enter at night out of fear for their own safety (Ibid, p. 15). In Central America, social violence and armed crime have increased following the ending of the Cold War and the cessation of its proxy conflicts, with organized crime and civilian militias inheriting surplus weapons. Although homicide rates appear stable in the region, the use of small arms in perpetrating homicides has increased (Godnick et al. 2002, p. vii). In Kosovo, organized criminals intimidating politicians and administrators alike use unauthorized weapons to blend criminal activity with political violence (Khakee and Florquin 2003, p. 7). In some cases where the rule of law is disregarded in favour of traditional or customary protocol, small arms are used in order to violently articulate grievances caused by intra-communal rivalry and inter-tribal dispute. The Eastern Highlands Province of PNG, for example, hosted two tribal clashes involving small arms resulting in 25 people being murdered in 1999, with further clashes occurring in the Southern Highlands resulting in the murder of a another 120 people. The availability of these modern weapons, including hand-grenades and rocket launchers—as opposed to traditional weapons of bows and arrows or spears and shields—in locales where tribal or ethnic tensions persist not only increases mortality rates, but also enables the prevalence of lethal retributive justice as a form of informal extrajudicial dispute resolution as an accepted norm of behaviour (Capie 2003, p. 92). Julie Flint and Alex de Waal describe how Sudanese traditions were radically altered by easy access to small arms: The Kalashnikov rifle changed the moral order of Darfur. The Abbala had lived by an honour code that included loyalty, hospitality, strenuous self-discipline when herding camels and communal responsibility for homicide. The principle of paying diya, or blood money, to the kin of an individual killed in a feud ensured that violence was a collective responsibility. In the era of spears and swords, and even the early rifles, a killing was a deliberate and individual act readily traceable to the man responsible. Fights rarely had more than a handful of fatalities. The AK-47 – capable of slaughtering an entire platoon, truckload of people, of family – swept this aside. Blood money for a single massacre could exceed the camel wealth of a whole lineage. The sheer number of bullets fired made it impossible to ascertain who had shot whom. Young men with guns were not only able to terrify the population at large, but were free of the control of their elders. (2008, pp. 46—47)

In Afghanistan, local warlords use small arms to maintain control over areas outside the capital, Kabul, showing that the rule of law in urban settings functions contiguously with the might-is-right logic dominating rural hinterlands. According

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to Mark Sedra, in northern Afghanistan the “lawlessness, which pervades the region, has seriously hindered the efforts of the UN and the international aid community to deliver humanitarian assistance, arousing fears of an impending humanitarian disaster” (2002, p. 14). Knowledge of small arms impacts can lead to a lack of public confidence in the rule of law, prompting civilians to stockpile weapons. In the highlands of PNG, tens of thousands of homemade weapons abound (Capie 2003, p. 93). In urban settings such as in Port Moresby some women are forced to sleep in so-called rape cages or in bedrooms protected by steel bars and barbed wire (Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 52). Weapons held in order to facilitate the resolution of community disputes, for reasons of self-defence where perceptions of inadequate and ineffective police protection exist, or as a means of overthrowing abusive regimes, simultaneously enhance and undermine perceptions of security. In corollary with increased perceptions of personal insecurity and diminished respect for law-enforcement capabilities, citizens seek weapons for self-defence. Fearful citizens also hire private security firms, as occurred in Central America during the aftermath of the Cold War. Yet many weapons carried by private security officers, themselves often inadequately trained, are carried illegally. The emergence of these firms not only indicates increased perceptions of insecurity, but also contributes to the intensification of that insecurity (Godnick et al. 2002, p. 15). Affluent individuals arming themselves for protection in poverty-stricken areas sometimes undertake social cleansing using small arms. In some instances, these purges of desechables (disposable ones) occur as sport for wanton affluent boys (Jaramillo 1995, p. 101; see also Klare and Andersen 1996, p. 7). In East Timor, Indonesian-backed militia were supplied with a lethal combination of weapons and stimulants, producing drug-crazed killers. The use of these drugs complicated the reintegration of these combatants back into their societies (Muggah and Berman 2001, p. 35). This reintegration process is necessary in order to prevent increased resort to armed crime in postconflict societies. Without adequate means of reintegrating into their civilian societies, ex-combatants often turn to criminal use of unauthorized weapons for reasons of financial security, prestige, or simply the lack of viable alternatives. If they are not killed outright then victims of small arms in conflict zones are often denied immediate access to a range of social services. These include healthcare and education, as related infrastructure is damaged, rendered inoperable, or crippled by staff shortages created in many instances by fear of gun violence: hospitals and schools without staff function only as shelter. In Bougainville, the destruction of hospitals and the blockade of medical supplies did little to assist the treatment of outbreaks of whooping cough, malnutrition, and malaria, as well as leprosy and tuberculosis. Postconflict societies seldom evade tight fiscal restraints over social services spending due to retarded economic recovery following periods of intense instability, as reflected in Fiji’s interim budget of 2000, which was 10 percent lower than forecast the previous year (Asian Development Bank 2001). During recent conflict in Bougainville, nongovernmental organizations’

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staff-members were targeted for theft, intimidation, and armed violence, which encouraged aid agencies to withdraw from the area (Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 36, pp. 48—49). A similar exodus of foreign aid agencies operating in the Solomon Islands occurred following the crisis unfolding there in 2000. As Godnick et al. point out, “‘[p]ost-conflict’ does not necessarily mean ‘postviolence’” (2002, p. 33). In fact, while the distinction between conflict zones and postconflict settings might be significant to the donor community, it rings hollow for small arms victims. Pouligny elaborates: Human security—defined as the real and perceived safety of people—often remains precarious and even deteriorates in the troubled period after wars are officially declared over. If the barometer of a ‘post-conflict’ situation is greater security and guarantees of ‘protection’ for the civilian population, then it is a rare apple indeed. Post-conflict environments often bear little resemblance on the ground to what is implied in their definition. Rather, epidemiological evidence from studies carried out by the ICRC, the IRC, the Small Arms Survey, and others indicate that death and injury rates often stay high (as in Afghanistan, El Salvador, or Iraq). This is particularly the case when the issue of widely circulated small arms, light weapons, and unexploded ordinance is not effectively addressed as an integral part of peace processes or as a component of crossborder ‘interventions.’ Armed violence is part of the new political landscape, and civilians often make rational decisions to possess weapons because security is not ensured (2004, p. 14).

Violence using small arms has engendered conditions of forced migration, as occurred in East Timor during 1999 where “[m]ore than half of the East Timorese population were forcibly displaced from their homes in the days and weeks following the elections” (Muggah and Berman 2001, p. 28). In addition to internal displacement, forced migration takes place across international borders, as the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide illustrates. According to the UN Refugee Agency, “[m]ore than 200,000 people crossed into Tanzania in one 24-hour period. Hurtling in the opposite direction, one million Rwandans crashed into the tiny lakeside town of Goma in what was then Zaire and today has been renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (2005: 18). Refugee camps seldom afford sanctuary to those having fled intense violence, however. In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, Interahamwe militiamen continued to harass refugees by taking control of the camps and “[g]overnment authorities who were responsible for security either refused or were unable to control the gunmen who used the sites as rear bases, recruited young people to their cause, and intimidated and sometimes murdered civilians who showed an interest in returning to Rwanda under its new government” (Ibid). Finally, the spectre of child soldiering looms large on the landscape of contemporary conflict as inherent characteristics of small arms invite use by children. Governmental forces active in conflict have recruited children under the

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age of 16 but as young as seven, often relying upon dubious methods, such as forceful abductions, followed by coercion to force children to remain and fight. Schools and refugee camps are specifically targeted for recruitment. Those joining voluntarily do so for reasons of fear, survival, and revenge, with some having witnessed the murder of relatives and members of their wider community. Others acknowledge the lack of any viable alterative. Once in combat service, child soldiers are used for a variety of tactical military purposes such as deploying or detonating explosives, for gathering intelligence, as informants, and for logistical support as porters of weapons and supplies. Child soldiers also commit sexual torture, rape, and inflict beatings upon civilians. However this use of terror is also used introspectively as female child soldiers are often harassed and exploited sexually by their male colleagues, forced to take contraceptives or undertake abortions if they fall pregnant, and frequently become a ‘girlfriend’ to an older, male soldier (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2003, p. 17). The abuse of children operating in combat scenarios is not restricted to their involvement in governmental military forces: state-sponsored militias, often acting under informal command structures and directed by government officials or military leadership, similarly recruit and employ children as irregular troops. Forces opposing governmental military forces not only deploy children as part of their fighting ranks, in some cases representing up to 40 percent of the group’s combat capability (Ibid, p. 14), but also forcefully recruit children. This inflates their fighting numbers as a means of enhancing the group’s political bargaining power during peace and postconflict settlement negotiations, as occurred in Burundi during 2003 (Ibid, p. 8). Identified and pursued as targets vulnerable to exploitation as sources of intelligence, children are at times (though somewhat less plausibly) considered as agents of influence within their families and communities. Where child soldiers exist in large numbers within military or rebel forces, there is often little in the way of a demobilization strategy for them. If such a strategy does exist, it is often not supported by effective implementation processes. In circumstances where demobilization strategies are effective, females are often disadvantaged. In Angola, the reintegration phase of the DDR program dealt only with combatants belonging to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), neglecting women and girls abducted and taken as ‘wives’ (Ibid, p. 6). The prevalence of child soldiering in contemporary conflict frequently results in the deaths of children as combatants, severe physical and psychological injuries sustained during combat service, and the social dislocation caused by movements required by war. Less frequently, this can result from their capture and detention by hostile forces, as the at least three children held by the US military at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba demonstrates (Ibid, p. 4). Not simply collateral bystanders or combatants, children are viewed as targets during war. Lamenting the consequences following conflicts since 1995, Grac’a Machel writes:

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more and more of the world is being sucked into a desolate moral vacuum. This is a space devoid of the most basic human values; a space in which children are slaughtered, raped, and maimed; a space in which children are exploited as soldiers; a space in which children are starved and exposed to extreme brutality. Such unregulated terror and violence speak of deliberate victimization. There are few further depths to which humanity can sink (UN General Assembly 1996, para. 3).

The lack of educated youth will only further hinder the longer-term development of postconflict societies. There is a sense in which the fate of the child solider functions as a synecdoche for all small arms victims. It brings to the foreground the human faces that lie at the center of this contemporary security challenge. Conclusion Drawing its examples from various conflict zones and postconflict settings, this chapter does not claim to offer a comprehensive, exhaustive, or fully representative account of small arms impacts. Instead, it recognizes that experiences of small arms use are rarely identical. Although the causes of contemporary conflict are many, varied, and contestable, not to mention historically contingent, small arms are rarely the main cause of conflict, crime, or terror. While not the primary cause of conflict, the availability of these weapons may nevertheless help trigger, intensify, and prolong the conflicts in which they feature (UN General Assembly 1997a, para. 38). Dispersed widely but unevenly among locales throughout the world, the ‘carnival of horror’ (to use Pouligny’s phrase) articulated here illustrates that the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms generate direct and indirect impacts of disturbing magnitude. These impacts continue to register upon a broad range of victims: official and nonofficial combatants, including child soldiers; civilians, including those referred to as internally displaced persons or as refugees; and employees of development agencies operating in postconflict settings. Where human rights violators successfully target entire communities, genocide threatens. Conflicts sustained by, and violent crimes perpetrated with, these weapons devastate local markets and national economies, threatening the viability of governments. Where such conflict and crime is unrestrained, significant impediments confront regional security and economic development. Postinternational theory helps make sense out of these multifarious impacts. By ranging across the three main politico-dimensions of world affairs, analysis informed by postinternationalism enables the seriousness of these politico-strategic, politico-economic, and politico-social ramifications to resonate forcefully and clearly. It helps situate contemporary small arms impacts within a longer tradition of armed violence preceding the emergence of many of today’s political, economic, and social structures. The consequences following from small arms use not only

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highlight the powerful and immediate transformative effects which these weapons can have over governments, economies, and societies, but also reveal why various members of the international community seek to compose small arms controls in spite of the difficulties of analyzing the small arms topic. Even an imperfect understanding of the multifarious consequences of these weapons helps motivate, inform, and sustain the major efforts to compose small arms controls, though Khatchik Derghoukassian possibly overstates the case by suggesting “empirical evidence linking SALW proliferation and the loss of life has been crucial to bring international attention on the security threat of this lesser category of weapons” (2004, p. 7). The key concepts of postinternationalism also help to make sense out of the major efforts to compose small arms controls. Each of the following five chapters of Part II explores these efforts, considering in particular the maturing relationships among members of the international small arms community and the nascent interconnectivity among their strategies for, and approaches toward, controlling these weapons. Part III goes on to explore the ways in which arms traders and weapons users mitigate the intended effects of these controls. By taking a critical perspective, the ensuing chapters of Parts II and III reveal that these efforts represent various stances taken in relation to an internationalist notion of the political.

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PART II Composing Small Arms Control

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Chapter 3

Researchers Researchers play a significant role in the composition of small arms control. Since the mid-1990s, these small arms researchers have attracted considerable attention towards an increasingly urgent topic that had previously been absent from the international security agenda. In addition to exploring an important new topic for conventional arms control analysts, small arms research is often conducted with a view to inciting decisive governmental action. From around the turn of the millennium, these researchers have also published literature as a means of shaping the negotiation and implementation of international frameworks for small arms control. More recently, research has become one of the major means by which civil society organizations prosecute their arms control campaigns (this use of research as a tool for monitoring governmental behaviour is dealt with in detail in Chapter 7). By writing about and seeking to inform various negotiations occurring within intergovernmental organizations, researchers sustain themselves as members of the international small arms community. The growing pool of small arms literature has proven useful not only to those analysts of world affairs seeking to better comprehend this topic, but also to those policymakers seeking to better control these weapons. Consequently, the interaction between small arms researchers and the civil society organizations, policy divisions of governments and intergovernmental organizations, and independent research centers that host these researchers and help disseminate their work deserves analytic treatment. Postinternationalism’s concept of parametric interaction is useful here, helping to illuminate the ways in which small arms researchers as individuals can produce meaningful and significant effects on larger collectivities. Notwithstanding the competing policy prescriptions sometimes expressed in the small arms literature, there is a strong tendency among researchers to describe the small arms topic in problem-solving terms. This means that the small arms literature tends to meditate upon the multifaceted nature of this problem, focusing upon the proliferation, transfer, possession, or use of these weapons. It also means that where these researchers call for action to control small arms, this call has by and large been for governments to cooperate within a politico-strategic governance architecture providing for instruments of international law and, to a lesser degree, opportunities for collective action. This reveals a deeply-held belief in internationalism—that is, the notion that by cooperating together governments are best placed to confront contemporary security challenges—underpinning much of the research on small arms.

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Civil Society Organizations Resulting from a workshop hosted in February 1994 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AMACAS), the first major publication focusing specifically on the small arms topic was Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (1995), edited by Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed. Building upon a few articles written by authors such as Karp, Smith, and Klare that appeared in serials during 1993 and 1994 (Garcia 2003, pp. 14—15; Garcia 2006, pp. 33—42), Lethal Commerce presents small arms as an important emerging topic for the consideration of conventional arms control analysts and policymakers alike. It does so by focusing upon the prevalence of, and intense consequences following from, the ongoing use of these weapons. As its editors remark in their preface, the “project’s aim has been to survey the state of current knowledge on the growing international proliferation of small arms and light weapons, assess the impact of such weapons on ethnic and national conflicts around the world, and explore possible avenues for controlling this lethal trade” (Boutwell et al. 1995, p. 5). Dissatisfied with an arms control literature dominated by concerns over major conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, Karp argues that while so far neglected as a topic small arms deserve analytic attention as vital ingredients in contemporary conflict. Karp observes that: Major weapons such as tanks and aircraft that determined the balance of power between states and symbolized international alliances are scarce on modern battlefields. The weapons of mass destruction that still dominate strategic thinking and international diplomacy remain even further in the background of actual combat. Instead it is the flow of small arms and light weapons that is most relevant to the incidence of internal conflicts and the outcome of recent wars. Though minor in physical terms, these weapons are major in effect (1995, p. 17).

Klare also notes that the apparent neglect of small arms in the broader arms control literature reflects a disproportionate preoccupation with major conventional weapons. He goes on to add that “while recent changes in the international system may be responsible for a decline in the trade in major weapons systems, they appear to be stimulating an increase in the trade in small arms and other light weapons” (1995a, p. 33). For Klare, while the former continues to dominate the minds of arms control analysts the latter has emerged largely unnoticed. The inference here is that most conventional arms control analysts have been slow to respond to important shifts in contemporary world affairs. Karp and Klare, among others, assert that a new security agenda reflecting these important shifts within contemporary world affairs ought to be accompanied by a refreshed security literature. Put simply, this collection of essays represents the first significant attempt by researchers to

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present small arms as a very serious topic that had hitherto been neglected within the more general arms control literature. Published after the first International Pugwash Workshop on the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, held near New Delhi, India in late 1995, Light Weapons and International Security also sought to signal the importance of this emerging topic and to contribute to this refreshed security literature. Its opening chapter suggests “the need for a new paradigm that better describes the nature and impact of the conventional arms trade in the post-Cold War era” (Klare 1995b, p. 3). This new paradigm suggested by Klare comprises of two parts: ‘diffusion,’ preferred over proliferation “because it better describes the spread of arms throughout the world and at all levels of society”; and ‘global violence,’ preferred ahead of ‘arms race’ because it emphasizes “the growing worldwide incidence of armed violence within and between groups, tribes, and communities” (Ibid). This proposed paradigm’s focus is mostly confined to the role played by small arms in contemporary conflict and the related affects on international security. As the twentieth century drew to a close, few works accompanied Lethal Commerce and Light Weapons and International Security as major publications focusing specifically on small arms. A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America by Klare and Andersen was published in 1996, followed in 1998 by Lora Lumpe’s and Jeff Donarski’s The Arms Trade Revealed: A Guide for Investigators and Activists. Both are publications of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), a non-profit organization established in 1945 by the atomic scientists involved in the Manhattan Project. Like Lethal Commerce, these two studies raised awareness of the small arms topic, the former taking a regional approach, the latter scrutinizing the activities of a single government—albeit the world’s largest arms producer and the source from where, in 1996, more than 160 of the world’s 190 governments received either some kind of weapons or military training (Lumpe and Dornaski 1998, p. 6). Focusing upon the region of Latin America, A Scourge of Guns begins with an endorsement by 1997 Nobel Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias Sánchez emphasizing the gravity of the book’s central concerns. Attempting to promote the small arms issue onto the security agenda of the international community in general, and of the OAS in particular, the book appeals to a comparison with narcotics trafficking. It notes that narcotics trafficking, while a relatively new security issue, has already been the subject of decisive governmental action in the form of stricter border controls and targeted law-enforcement investigations. According to the Nobel Laureate, the main similarity is that “both the arms trade and drug trafficking constitute a sinister quid pro quo in a market of death and suffering for millions of human beings” (Sánchez 1996, p. i). Key differences between guns and drugs however, including the existence of a regulated small arms trade and the lawful

 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Although this volume deals with conventional arms in the broad sense, small arms receive frequent, significant, and particular treatment.

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use of these weapons as tools of national security and domestic policing of law and order, do not evade the attention of Klare and Andersen. By informing their readership of the official processes underpinning the US legal arms trade within a “pragmatic ‘how to’ handbook,” Lumpe and Donarski encourage US citizens to bring pressure to bear on their policymakers. Even after the First Persian Gulf War had demonstrated that unrestrained and unregulated arms trade allows accumulations of weapons that present very real threats to regional stability and seriously undermine the prospects of peace, some US policymakers still assumed the international community could: manage crises that erupt as a result of excess arms production and exporting (including diplomatic tensions among themselves, wars among importers, massive refugee flows and financial insolvency) better than they can manage the alternative. The alternative would involve challenging major arms corporations and labor unions by reining in domestic arms production; reducing reliance on arms trading as the principal diplomatic currency; and decreasing reliance on arms exports for perceived strategic gains (Lumpe and Dornaski 1998, p. 3).

The Arms Trade Revealed favours a grassroots advocacy using bureaucratic transparency because this approach would demonstrate that US communities are concerned, organized, and active over this issue. Although drawing upon the success of grassroots movements used during the campaign against the manufacture and use of anti-personnel landmines which resulted in the Ottawa Treaty, the authors do not mention key differences between landmines and other types of weapons. Attention is given instead to the applicable acts of legislation and amendments, the location of useful documents published by US Government departments containing details of transfers, and the addresses of websites monitoring and reporting on this trade. The Arms Trade Revealed not only functions as a practical guide facilitating further research into the small arms topic, but also encourages an activism prompting policymakers to act differently, presumably in accordance with the code of conduct devised by Lumpe. Put bluntly, the book calls to action those who will in turn call others to action. Here, then, researchers describe small arms both as a serious topic to be considered by conventional arms control analysts and as an urgent problem to be confronted by policymakers with responsibilities for international security. In so doing, small arms researchers insert themselves onto the crowded stage of world affairs as an actor among those who manage the international security agenda. Although mainstream international relations theory more often than not neglects the roles which researchers play in world affairs, through its concept of parametric interaction and its appreciation of the broad range of actors playing significant roles  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� For details of this ‘Framework for Limiting the Negative Consequences of Surplus U.S. Arms Production and Trading’, refer to , accessed 31 March 2007.

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in world affairs, postinternationalism appreciates the significance of researchers. These researchers help raise awareness and create knowledge of the small arms topic by identifying and analyzing its major aspects and, as Chapter 2 described, by conveying the magnitude of small arms impacts. A Multifaceted Problem The abovementioned works published under the auspices of civil society organizations portray the small arms topic as an urgent problem comprising at least four major aspects. Identifying these major aspects as small arms proliferation, transfer, possession, and use, the research then analyzes this problem as it manifests in various local, state, regional, and global contexts. Lethal Commerce was the first of these publications to introduce proliferation as a major aspect of the small arms topic. In particular, Ksenia Gonchar and Peter Lock (1995, p. 117) identify a manufacturing over-capacity within the former Soviet Union that resulted in firms either developing new weapons technologies and marketing them abroad or closing down production. Other firms continue producing weapons for sale, but do so without official approval. Also identifying the small arms production capability within certain countries (including brief histories of firms manufacturing these weapons), A Scourge of Guns confines its assessment of proliferation to domestic arms manufacture within the region of Latin America without considering the external production capabilities contributing to the massive flows into the region. Identifying transfers as another major aspect of the small arms topic, Klare (1995a, p. 34; 1995b, pp. 15—25) discerns four main channels of supply for these weapons: government-to-government transactions, authorized commercial sales, government covert operations, and clandestine black-market sales. Distinguishing the black market from the corruption of regulated channels—a grey market which relies upon bid-rigging, bribing officials, and fraudulent end-user certificates—R.T. Naylor (1995, p. 49) explains in more detail its structure and how traffickers can operate through an elaborate, though necessarily concealed, network. Although some trafficking operations may be vulnerable to law-enforcement operations, many of these networks are well established and competent in moving a diverse range of illicit goods and are therefore no longer sensitive to such governmental action. In greater detail than its two predecessors, The Arms Trade Revealed identifies the different ways in which weapons transfers occur as legal trade from the US, including an overview of the relevant frameworks through which US policymaking, lawmaking, and trade oversight occur. According to Lumpe and Donarski (1998, p. 8), US legal weapons trade occurs as foreign military sales handled by the Pentagon, direct commercial sales involving US weapon-producing firms, the leasing of surplus US military stockpiles, gifts to other governments under aid programs, and the presidential provision of weapons abroad in situations deemed an emergency. In addition, small arms are also transferred under the aegis of antinarcotics trafficking measures. Due to the different characteristics of these transfer

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methods, the US Government’s published figures on its weapons transfers are often unreliable, significantly under-representing their volume, value, and quality. A Scourge of Guns also identifies transfer as a major aspect of the small arms topic. Small arms transfers are distinguished here as entering the Latin American region through legal government trade, covert transfers in which there is some official involvement though the transaction is not known of or consented to by all affected parties, or through clandestine trafficking. Klare had previously identified each of these as generic channels of supply. Klare and Anderson go further in the following passage to discuss the diffusion of these weapons within the region: Indeed, it is not sufficient to speak of the arms trade (in the traditional sense of arms transfers from one nation to another) when referring to the flow of weapons in Latin America, as the phenomenon is much more complex. It is more useful to speak of the diffusion of arms, suggesting the dispersion and recirculation of arms through multiple channels to all levels of society (1996, p. 4).

Flows of small arms into the region occurring through these channels of supply, the circulation of these weapons within the region, the recycling of weapons for different purposes, and the leakage from government-held stockpiles are each understood as important elements of the transfer aspect of the small arms topic. By considering official stockpiles, civilian possession, and unauthorized caches of these weapons, Lethal Commerce identifies possession as another major aspect of this topic. Precise details are given of the types of weaponry held by Colombia’s military and constabulary forces, by criminal syndicates and insurgent groups, and by civilians. However, as Daniel Gracía-Peña Jaramillo observes, “[r]eliable figures on this haemorrhaging of government weapons are impossible to come by, as both army and guerrilla estimates are either inflated or downplayed for political purposes” and “a constant change in regulations and poorly kept records meant that no one really knows how many [civilian] guns were actually registered” (1995, pp. 107—108). Lethal Commerce also identifies the use of these weapons as another major aspect of this topic. Smith cites examples where these weapons are used to prolong and intensify ethnic or civil conflict, especially where these conflicts spread to adjacent areas and undermine the rule of law. He also cites examples where these weapons are used by military and constabulary forces in brutalizing ways as a means of responding to increasing militancy among insurgents in the areas, for example, of Jammu, Kashmir, and the Punjab. Statistics of annual civilian mortality in the Punjab area are compared against quantities of AK-47 assault rifles seized by authorities as evidence of explicit causation, enabling Smith to speculate that the “growing proliferation of and access to small arms is increasing both the communal polarization and the incidence of violence” (1995, p. 76). In Colombia, the use of these weapons—vital to the enduring conflict among authorities, guerrilla groups, and drug cartels—coincides with intra-social violence as social cleansing takes place as a purge of desechables. Mortality is quantified here by

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statistics comparing combat casualties to political murders (Jaramillo 1995, p. 101). However, this treatment of weapons use within Lethal Commerce is narrow, focusing as it does exclusively upon conflict zones. Primarily concerned with examining weapons use in contemporary conflict, Light Weapons and International Security is equally narrow in its treatment of this major aspect. Exploring linkages between the trafficking of narcotics and of light weapons, Tara Kartha concludes that what: was perhaps once the domain of the sly black marketeer and superpower strategy, the business of moving weapons seems to have taken a life of its own. As it merges with the drug mafia, the sheer volume and profits involved are enough to classify it as an industry—well organised and obeying its own rules (1995, pp. 81—82).

Jacklyn Cock usefully contextualizes ongoing weapons use against a social setting, highlighting that the “demand for light weapons is socially constructed; the supply is socially organised” (1995, p. 95). Klare and Anderson similarly broaden the relevance of use as a major aspect beyond those locales representing trouble spots or the countries regarded as experiencing emerging or full-blown ethnic, civil, or internal conflict. The deadly consequences of small arms use can, and frequently do, spill over international borders, contributing to increases in criminal behaviour, widespread lawlessness, and the weakening of regional stability. Here, then, small arms research identifies the proliferation, transfer, possession, and use of small arms as major aspects of this topic, situating these aspects in various geographic contexts. However, the quality of research published by civil society organizations is frustrated by the lack of reliable data, leaving its authors to rely upon anecdotal information found in newspapers and other broadcast media, and upon evidence received from obliging government departments or collected first-hand. Given this is an inevitable consequence of the epistemic uncertainty previously noted in Chapter 2, the lack of available, relevant, and reliable information is unsurprising since these authors are publishing pioneering literature on a topic often cloaked in official secrecy, obscured by commercial-in-confidence protection, or deliberately concealed as clandestine activities undertaken by blackmarket brokers or corrupt officials enabling grey market transactions. Small arms literature published by researchers hosted by civil society organizations ought not then to be judged in terms of its provision of highly limited quantitative information, but rather, this limited provision should be viewed only as an inevitable weakness in establishing an important new topic for arms control analysts. Conceding that the elaboration of this topic within their book signals “the enormous gaps in our current understanding of the nature and scope of the topic” (Boutwell et al. 1995, p. 5), the editors of Lethal Commerce imply that identifying such gaps is an important first step towards collapsing these newly exposed knowledge interstices. The hope here is that such a collapse will in turn realize a complete and knowable profile of this topic from which decisive governmental

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responses can be formulated and implemented. In fact, the editors of and contributors to this volume deliberately describe the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms as a problem in search of a solution. By writing about this topic as a multifaceted problem to be managed or solved by policymakers, researchers not only inform subsequent research into this topic, but can also aspire to influence the ways in which policymakers attempt to control these weapons. The final section of Lethal Commerce explores the prospects of establishing multilateral controls over small arms, differentiating these prospects from past or existing controls over major conventional weapons. In so doing, researchers not only describe the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms as a problem to be urgently confronted by policymakers, but also call for a particular kind of solution. Calling for Internationalism Much of the small arms research published before the turn of the millennium includes recommendations for possible future action, with some quick to point to the expansion of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) as a remedy (Dyer and Goldring 1995, p. 128). Other recommendations include: introducing domestic arms censuses and regional arms trade registers; strengthening and harmonizing governmental import and export controls; increasing governmental efforts to suppress arms trafficking; reducing official stockpiles and the arsenals belonging to nongovernmental armed groups; and establishing a ‘weapons buyback’ fund administered by the UN or some other intergovernmental organizations (Klare and Andersen 1996, pp. 95— 99). For Jo L. Husbands, “a focus on the stages and processes of conflict provides a way to array a wide variety of potential policy tools. Such an approach illuminates the problem of light arms proliferation and could simplify the task of identifying, assessing, and ultimately implementing different arms control strategies” (1995, p. 133). This particular approach, which is selective rather than ad-hoc, would in any case rely upon a broader framework through which to exert control over small arms. Published in 1999, Jeffrey Boutwell’s and Michael T. Klare’s Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence specifically reviewed existing and emerging multilateral attempts to control small arms transfers, though some chapters of this volume also deal with prospective controls. As its editors remark, this book: surveys the wide range of policy options open to the international community. From local initiatives in countries such as South Africa to regional agreements in West Africa to international policies being proposed by the United Nations, the authors take a critical look at the feasibility of various types of instruments for controlling the trade in small arms and light weapons (1999b, p. 3).

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Opening with a useful summary of the small arms literature, its core chapters review and evaluate unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral control measures emerging from various regions, including Europe, North and South America, Africa, and Central Asia. In particular, the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials (OAS Convention), the Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa (ECOWAS Moratorium), the European Union’s Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms (EU Programme), and the European Union’s Code of Conduct for Arms Exports (EU Code of Conduct) each receive treatment in Light Weapons and Civil Conflict. So too do various UN efforts such as Security Council arms embargoes, Disarmament Commission Guidelines for International Arms Trade, and the work of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. The domestic restraints on US exports receive special attention here “not because U.S. laws are typical but because U.S. weapons production and weapons exports constitute such a major part of the world weapons market” (Goldring 1999, p. 102). In short, this collection of essays recognizes that the existing controls under review are weak, limited, and easily undermined, if not simply ignored for the frequently claimed reasons of inadequate resources and insufficient political will. Since the turn of the millennium, the focus of small arms research published by civil society organizations has broadened from identifying an urgent problem for policymakers managing the international security agenda to examining and reporting on the implementation of international frameworks designed to prompt controls over these weapons. This research seeks not only to reflect the nature and scope of the small arms problem, but also to help prompt, shape, and construct responses to it. In their concluding essay, Boutwell and Klare convey a strong sense of leading the way towards a practical solution, offering a range of policy options for consideration. This is particularly evident in the following passage: Ultimately, what is needed is the establishment of a multilayered regime covering the international transfer of small arms and light weapons, similar to the existing regimes covering nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Such a regime should consist of a matrix of national, regional, and international control measures—acting like a series of dams or filters—to screen out illicit sales and narrow the allowable scope for legal transfers (1999b, p. 221).

It appears from this brief passage that the book’s contributors now consider their comprehension of the small arms topic to be significantly developed and advanced from the initial drawing of its contours, and that they are now in a position to offer policy advice. Indeed, small arms researchers, including those hosted by civil society organizations, continue to offer policy advice favoring particular courses of action to address this challenge.

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Like Lethal Commerce, Light Weapons and Civil Conflict resulted from a workshop held by AMACAS. Although both AMACAS and FAS are civil society organizations, AMACAS tends more toward scholarly work, though its conferences include participants from government departments and policy advocacy groups. On the other hand, FAS is primarily a policy advocating think tank. According to R. Kent Weaver, these types of institution typically “combine a strong policy, partisan or ideological bent with aggressive salesmanship and an effort to influence current policy debates” (1989: 567). To complicate matters, “the boundary between objective policy evaluation and policy advocacy has become blurred” (Ibid: 564). This is especially the case where advocacy groups cite a wide range of research to justify their policy recommendations. For the most part, where a call for action has been articulated by researchers hosted by civil society organizations, it has preferred instruments of international law and, to a lesser extent, opportunities for collective action whereby governments cooperate within the broader politico-strategic governance architecture. Such a call is underpinned by a belief in internationalism; that is, the notion that by cooperating together governments are best placed to confront contemporary security challenges. Unsurprisingly, this belief in internationalism is also evident in the small arms research undertaken by intergovernmental organizations. Intergovernmental Organizations Addressing the UN Security Council on 25 January 1995, then-Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali made the following, oft-quoted statement: These issues [disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction] are of paramount importance both to the security of humankind and to the release of economic, scientific and technological resources for peace and human progress. In the present paper, however, devoted as it is to the Organization’s recent experience in handling specific conflicts, I wish to concentrate on what might be called ‘micro-disarmament.’ By this I mean practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in hundreds of thousands (UN General Assembly 1995, para. 60, emphasis added.)

In so doing, Boutros-Ghali acknowledged the increasing importance of small arms to questions of international security, nominating these weapons as a threat alongside long-standing concerns over weapons of mass destruction. (Care is taken, however, not to relegate those weapons as mere anachronistic Cold War relics.) Although not the first individual to draw attention to the small arms topic, Boutros-Ghali was the first high-profile figure in contemporary world affairs to do so (Laurance and Stohl 2002, p. 4). The status of the forum in which this

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super-empowered individual delivered his report not only formally introduced the challenge of controlling small arms onto the international community’s security agenda, but also ensured its ongoing priority as an item on that agenda. While the former Secretary-General assumes a high degree of professional responsibility on behalf of the wider international community, he was himself responding to a request made by President Alpha Oumar Konaré of the Republic of Mali, an African state experiencing conflict prolonged by the availability of small arms. Boutros-Ghali revealed as much when he stated the following: A pilot advisory mission I dispatched to Mali in August 1994 at the request of that country’s Government has confirmed the exceptional difficulty of controlling the illicit flow of small arms, a problem that can be effectively tackled only a regional basis. It will take a long time to find effective solutions. I believe strongly that the search should begin now…and I intend to play my full part in this effort (UN General Assembly 1995, paras. 63—65).

Rather than researchers’ call for action analyzed earlier in this chapter, it was Mali’s diplomatic overtures in 1994 that resonated more forcefully within the UN, helping prompt some of the international frameworks examined in the following chapter. According to Graciela Uribe de Lozano, the UN General Assembly also recognized the small arms topic as deserving the international community’s attention in its discussions dating as far back as its 43rd session in 1988 (1999, p. 164). Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’ is a document of considerable significance to the composition of small arms controls. It helped prompt the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms Report, preceded the emergence of a body of international law, and contextualized this issue within the UN Security Council’s peacekeeping operations. It also preceded UN General Assembly (1995) Resolution 50/70 B, which requested research into this topic before much of the early small arms research was in circulation. Two further UN reports in particular stand out from a multitude of writings concerning this topic: first, the Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1997) and second, the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1999). For Garcia, these two Reports prove particularly useful in assessing emerging small arms norms because they help to reflect any assessments shared among UN member-states in the General Assembly (2006, p. 18). Problem-Solving The ‘Foreword by the Secretary-General’ to the abovementioned 1997 Report foreshadows a pair of assumptions recurring throughout both UN Reports: that is, nongovernmental actors bear a high degree of culpability for the deadly consequences following small arms use, and the preferred solutions to the challenge of controlling small arms are government-based. For example, Annan

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emphasizes that when in “the hands of irregular troops operating with scant respect for international and humanitarian law, these weapons have taken a heavy toll of human lives.” He goes on to argue that some “of the most protracted armed conflicts in the world at present are those in which a recurring cycle of violence, an erosion of political legitimacy and a loss of economic viability deprive a State of its authority to cope with either the causes or the consequences of an excessive accumulation, proliferation and use of small arms” (UN General Assembly 1997b). The Report’s recognition of government culpability is mentioned only once and is expressed rather timidly in the following passage: States have the right to export and import small arms and light weapons. The misuse of that right and the relatively recent awareness of the problems caused by the accumulation of small arms and light weapons have resulted in insufficient recognition being accorded to the need to better control the transfer of such weapons (para. 45).

Such assumptions reveal a commitment to the internationalist notion of the political also embedded in the small arms research disseminated by intergovernmental organizations. Bourne affirms this assumption when he writes: “While the broad range of misuse and associated constituencies of concern have created a degree of fragmentation in the framing of the problem, SALW concerns are dominated by the destructive impacts of the weapons of rebel groups, criminals, and repressive governments” (2007, p. 5). Like much small arms research produced and disseminated by civil society organizations at this time, the 1997 UN Report recognizes proliferation, transfer, possession, and use as major aspects of the small arms problem, though it concedes that the “full extent of the destabilizing consequences of excessive accumulation, proliferation, transfer and use of small arms and light weapons is only beginning to be assessed” (para. 21). Accordingly, the Report explores the consequences associated with the widespread availability of these weapons in regional contexts: Africa, Central America, South Asia, and Europe each receive attention as the “effects and consequences [are] unique to specific regions, subregions, and States” (para. 62). At the same time, by noting that the issue of anti-personnel landmines was being dealt with in another forum and that progress was being made towards the UN Firearms Protocol by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Public Health and Safety, the General Assembly’s call for controls over small arms avoided duplicating work undertaken elsewhere (Garcia 2003, p. 16). The 1997 UN Report makes 24 recommendations in order “to reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons in specific regions of the world where such accumulations and transfers have already taken place […and] to prevent such accumulations and transfers from occurring in future” (para. 78). Included among these recommendations for the consideration of UN member-states is the use of domestic legislation, regulation, and administrative procedures in order to determine conditions of civilian

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possession, help exercise effective control over this legal possession, and prevent trafficking. According to the Report, UN member-states should help strengthen the capability of governments to confront this issue by supporting disarmament, demobilization, and disposal programs in postconflict scenarios. Weapons control elements should be included in peace settlements whose implementation UN peacekeeping operations assist. Intergovernmental cooperation, specifically information exchange at subregional and regional levels, should be encouraged. UN member-states should also initiate studies dealing specifically with the marking and tracing of weapons, reducing legal proliferation and transfer, and the closely related issue of ammunition. Most importantly, the Report recommends that UN member-states “should consider the possibility of convening an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects, based on the issues identified in the present report” (para. 80k). It refers to the OAS Convention as a possible model for a UN instrument of international law. The purpose of 1999 Report was to follow up progress on each of the Panel of Experts’ 24 recommendations, to propose further recommendations, and to further prepare for the UN Small Arms Conference. The Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms found that: most of the recommendations in the 1997 report were in the process of being implemented. A few recommendations had been almost completely implemented, while for a few others implementation had not yet begun. The degree of progress with respect to most of the recommendations was encouraging as a whole, but differed according to the nature of each recommendation and to whom it was addressed (UN General Assembly 1999, para. 58).

The legacy of these two reports, especially as the latter builds upon the diplomatic momentum generated by the former, is evident in the UNPoA, as the following chapter reveals. Garcia goes further (2006, p. 35), suggesting that establishing this Panel of Governmental Experts and deciding to convene an international conference on small arms trafficking demonstrates governmental leadership of arms controls protagonists’ major efforts to compose small arms controls. Here, then, the UN’s most significant contribution to the pool of small arms literature occurred as a way of preparing, organizing, and directly informing the actions of its member-states. This research recommends a series of measures to exert control over small arms that will in turn help reinscribe the existing politicostrategic governance architecture through instruments of international law and, to a lesser degree, collective action. The action envisaged in this research therefore follows a problem-solving approach and reflects a belief in internationalism. When the UN began preparing to take action on small arms, some researchers broadened their focus to include these preparations. This suggests, as Garcia explains, that “[a]wareness-raising regarding the problems caused by small arms and light weapons proliferation on the international agenda happened in two parallel processes during the 1990s: one was a ‘knowledge-generation process’

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and the other was an ‘acknowledgement of the problem’ process that took place within the United Nations General Assembly” (���������������������������������� 2004, p. 6; see also Garcia 2006, pp. 34—35����������������������������������������������������������������������� ). While Chapters 4 and 5 examine various instruments of international law and particular UN Security Council resolutions as international frameworks providing for small arms control, this chapter illustrates that intergovernmental organizations, especially the UN, have also made valuable and appreciable contributions to the burgeoning literature on small arms. Governments As mentioned, research disseminated by civil society organizations during the 1990s sought to establish small arms as a new topic for conventional arms control analysts and to place issues associated with these weapons onto the international security agenda. During the early part of the new millennium, small arms research then encouraged intergovernmental organizations to negotiate and implement international frameworks to control these weapons, while also aspiring to help shape those frameworks. At the same time, intergovernmental organizations conducted their own research as a means of prompting, informing, and coordinating their member-states’ responses to the small arms topic. Subsequently, some governments further explored the topic against certain geographic regions with particular relevance to their own foreign policy objectives. In the US, for instance, the Defence Intelligence Agency commissioned the RAND National Defence Research Institute to undertake a study entitled Arms Trafficking and Colombia. Released in 2003, the report concludes that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) “has the resources and ability to strategically manage its weapons supplies and could pose a threat to the United States should it choose to do so.” It continues, more broadly, that: small-arms transfers have had a negative impact on regional stability in Latin America. Ready access to weapons has helped to both entrench and empower guerrilla and paramilitary forces in Colombia. Not only has this situation threatened the security of the fourth-largest economy in Latin America, it has also triggered highly deleterious cross-border flows of refugees, drugs, and violence that have already had a negative impact on Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador (Cragin and Hoffman 2003, p. xxi).

Not all governments are equally active in this regard, as few disseminate small arms research. While the small arms research disseminated by governments is by no means those governments’ only response, it remain significant because it claims to help shape aspects of those governments’ foreign, defence, and trade policy, including any subsequent engagement with international frameworks negotiated within intergovernmental organizations. In those few instances where governments do disseminate small arms research, the research is most often commissioned to

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researchers not ordinarily employed by the government or its bureaucracy. As Weaver points out, “[t]he research product of contract researchers more often consists of reports for specific government agencies than books or monographs for an academic audience….The research agenda for contract researchers is set primarily by what the agency is willing to pay for” (1989: 566). David Capie’s Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia (2002) and Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific (2003) were both commissioned under contract. In both books, Capie explicitly acknowledges New Zealand’s Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC) for commissioning his research. The Peace and Disarmament Education Trust (PADET), a trust entity operating under its own deed, provided the funding and set the terms of reference. Both studies’ aims are very similar, notwithstanding their different geographic focus. Capie’s 2002 study specifically: seeks to make a contribution to the growing literature on the subject by offering the first comprehensive study of small arms production and transfers, both licit and illicit, in Southeast Asia…[and] contains some policy suggestions that decision makers in ASEAN and regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum might wish to consider to meet the small arms challenge (p. 2).

The 2003 study “offers an introduction to the problems presented by small arms and light weapons in the Pacific Islands. It seeks to fill an analytical and policy gap” (p. 17). Officials from New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade presented that book’s findings to an intergovernmental seminar on implementing the UNPoA in the Asia-Pacific region, held in Bali in 2003. According to New Zealand’s thenMinister for Disarmament and Arms Control, Hon. Marian Hobbs, “Dr Capie’s efforts appear to be already bearing fruit,” “[t]he manuscript has already provided an informative and useful tool for government officials,” and “Dr Capie’s book will be a valuable resource to us and all who have the same intention” (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2003). The New Zealand Government can, therefore, claim part adherence to its international commitments by citing Section III, paragraph 18 of the UNPoA, which urges governments “to develop and support action-orientated research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.”

 ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� According to these terms of reference, “PADET wishes to engage a qualified researcher to write a report on the domestic production and transfers, legitimate and illicit, of small arms in the Southeast Asian region” and “PADET wishes to contract research into the legal and illegal transfers of small arms in South Pacific countries.” This information was obtained through a request for Official Information, the correspondence of which is held by me.

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Problem-Solving Capie’s research contributes to the growing pool of small arms literature by identifying and then analyzing the major aspects of this topic against particular regional and subregional contexts. Whereas Under the Gun does not consider proliferation as a major aspect of the small arms topic because no Pacific Island government possesses a manufacturing capability, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia does consider production capability. Indeed, Capie’s 2002 study provides a brief historical account of the origins of Southeast Asia’s manufacturing capability and of the rationale informing the establishment and maintenance of this capability. It refers specifically to the desire by some governments to obtain a greater sense of autonomy in pursuing their national security through an independent small arms production capability, though important economic incentives are not absent from such calculations either (2002, p. 8). In Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia, Capie defines transfer to include any transaction resulting in the change of ownership or control, including “not only direct sales of small arms, but also exchanges, barterarrangements, gifts, thefts, loss, loans and transactions conducted for foreign aid or credit” (Ibid, p. 3). Although this definition develops nuance from the structural distinctions articulated in Klare’s earlier work, Capie then goes on to simplify these, perhaps for analytical convenience, into a “three-part typology…(1) clearly lawful transfers; (2) ‘black market’ or illicit transfers; and (3) ‘grey market’ transfers” (Ibid, p. 4). The 2002 work (Ibid, p.10) also identifies the legal weapons flowing into the Southeast Asia from the PRC and the US, distinguishing these from illicit weapons flowing into and within Southeast Asia, as well as from those weapons produced, held, and traded legally among regional governments. Transfers occurring as leakage from government stockpiles in the Pacific receive Capie’s attention in Under the Gun. The book notes that poor security surrounding military armories and constabulary arsenals is often due to inadequate reporting processes and the corruptibility of personnel with either access to these weapons or responsibility for their safe storage. According to Capie, the impacts relating to weapons caches abandoned during the Second World War are overemphasized by media reports, though abandoned ammunition, most of which probably remains buried and undisturbed, finds use in homemade weapons (2003, p. 110). In a very brief chapter, Under the Gun links weapons availability to their actual use in PNG, particularly to their role in fostering incidents of violent crime, engendering wider cultures of lawlessness and impunity, encouraging human rights abuses and violations, and undermining democratic electoral practices. Following the lead of Light Weapons and Civil Conflict, existing legislative controls within the Pacific region are identified in Under the Gun. There is a particular focus upon various definitions of key terms such as firearms and possession, though more emphasis is given to the inadequate resources provided for administering and enforcing this legislation (2003, p. 60). Capie’s cataloguing

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of existing domestic legislation belonging to Pacific governments highlights the limited regional coordination and exposes loopholes and inconsistencies in licensing procedures, weapons-marking, storage, and penalties for non-compliance, each mentioned as specific issues needing improvement (Ibid, pp. 116—122). Southeast Asia is noteworthy for the absence of such coordinated controls or even a shift towards harmonizing approaches to strengthening domestic legislation within ASEAN. Here, then, these two examples of contract research reiterate the established major aspects of the small arms topic within particular regional and subregional settings. Both studies conclude with a chapter providing policy recommendations intended to help solve the small arms problem, as if answering the call to collapse the knowledge interstices proclaimed by the editors of Lethal Commerce. Like the earlier research disseminated by civil society organizations and by intergovernmental organizations, it calls for a particular type of response too. In fact, many of Capie’s policy recommendations echo those articulated by the UN Reports of 1997 and 1999. For example, Capie writes that there “is no state in ASEAN that does not need to take at least some national action to address weaknesses in its regulation of arms production, possession, brokering or transfers” (2002, p. 103) and “the legal framework for the control of firearms and ammunition in the [Pacific] region needs attention in several areas” (2003, p. 117). These recommendations reiterate paragraph 80(c) of the 1997 UN Report, which reads: “All States should ensure that they have in place adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the legal possession of small arms and light weapons and over their transfer.” Capie’s approach to the small arms topic builds upon earlier small arms research, signalling a cognitive continuity among small arms research regardless of the organization hosting and disseminating that research. Many of his recommendations reiterate those contained within the UN Reports published in the preceding decade. In fact, by the time these works were published the international small arms community had not only begun to favor the problem-solving recommendations of the UN Reports, but was also designing and implementing practical measures derived from these Reports and in accordance with the UNPoA, signalling the interconnectivity between research and instruments of international law. Both studies signal that New Zealand’s foreign policy is in tune with an underlying consensus among arms control protagonists that sees government-based action, under the leadership of intergovernmental organizations, as representing the preferred means of composing small arms controls. In this light, contract research is best understood as a governmental response to the small arms challenge. As a relational interaction between an individual as a small arms researcher and a government as a collectivity contract research is a commercial transaction. The research produced as a result of such a transaction does not place the small arms issue onto the international security agenda; rather, the commissioning of such research such contract research reflects small arms’ established position on that agenda. By favoring particular courses of action for their client governments, this

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contracted research reveals its commitment to an internationalist notion of the political. Independent Research Centers The burgeoning of small arms literature during the first five years of the twentyfirst century coincided with the proliferation of so-called ‘independent research centers.’ This in turn coincided with the better harnessing of the Internet and those information and communication technologies through which these researchers disseminate much of their literature. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), based in Pretoria, South Africa, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) among many others, each maintain a website containing their respective research on a range of contemporary security issues, including small arms. These are for all intents and purposes what Weaver calls ‘universities without students.’ For Weaver, these think tanks: tend to be characterized by heavy reliance on academics as researchers, by funding primarily from the private sector (with varying mixtures of foundation, corporate and individual funding), and by book-length studies as the primary research product. Although these organizations often address specific legislative proposals, their horizons have traditionally been long-term, focused on changing the climate of elite opinion (1989: 564).

Written in 1989 and focusing on US domestic politics, Weaver’s definition needs updating here as some of these independent research centers now source funding from the international small arms community, including various governments. More than a technical fiscal difference, this can strongly influence the type and scope of activities undertaken by researchers. Established in 1999 and attached to the Graduate Institute for International Studies of the University of Geneva, Switzerland, the Small Arms Survey is widely regarded as the pre-eminent research center currently publishing small arms literature. Although other research centres such as ISS, BICC, and SIPRI continue publishing high-quality research on this topic—thereby providing a vital source of information for policymakers—the Small Arms Survey is the only institute dealing exclusively with questions regarding these weapons. The Survey states its key objectives as follows: to be the principal source of public information on all aspects of small arms; to serve as a resource centre for governments; policy makers, researchers, and activists; to monitor national and international initiatives (governmental and non-governmental) on small arms; and to act as a clearing house for the sharing of information and the dissemination of best practises. The Survey also sponsors

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field research and information-gathering efforts, especially in affected states and regions (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. ii).

Since its inception, the Small Arms Survey has released 22 Occasional Papers and nine Special Reports, each of which are available on its official website, as are a range of relevant official documents. Since 2004, seven book-length studies have also been published under its auspices. The website also contains hyperlinks to other relevant research institutions. Not yet available online, however, are the many unpublished background reports which inform important chapters of the Small Arms Survey yearbooks. Each year since 2001, the Small Arms Survey has disseminated a yearbook as its flagship publication. Enabling each publication to explore a particular theme, an evolving research agenda underpins these yearbooks, though major aspects of this topic—namely, proliferation, transfer, possession, and use—consistently receive chapters in each volume. The inaugural yearbook, Small Arms Survey 2001, identifies world production trends over time, provides estimates of both the volume and value of global small arms production occurring in 2000, and explores changes to the internal composition of this industrial sector. It notes a decline in overall production capability, an increase in the number of firms involved in producing these weapons, and a shift away from governmental control and towards privatization. Ammunition is acknowledged as representing an increasingly important element of overall production output as “the value of global ammunition production was almost double the value of global small arms production” (Ibid, p. 14). Other major aspects receive comparable treatment. Chapters in ensuing yearbooks build upon these profiles, revising them where new information comes to hand, reflecting the yearbooks’ problem-solving approach to the multifaceted small arms issue. Particular instruments of international law receive attention in these yearbooks. Providing a general survey introducing “recent multilateral action,” the 2001 volume distinguishes these international frameworks as being either global, regional, or subregional in scope. Although useful as a catalogue of small arms controls, that volume does not engage in comparative analysis, nor does it express an appreciation that these frameworks emerge as a suite of controls, despite acknowledging that “progress at one level [is] spurring progress at another” (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 251). Rather, 12 major instruments are examined in turn as autonomous international frameworks. The 2002 yearbook devotes a chapter to describing the UN Small Arms Conference and the UNPoA, though the contributions of other initiatives to the UNPoA also receive attention (Small Arms Survey 2002, pp. 209—210). Another chapter examines prospective ways of strengthening elements of existing frameworks. The subsequent yearbooks—Development Denied (2003),  ��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Figures given here are as at December 2008. For more up-to-date figures on publications, and further information on the Small Arms Survey, refer to its website at .

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Rights at Risk (2004), Weapons at War (2005), Unfinished Business (2006), Guns in the City (2007), and Risk and Resilience (2008)—continue to discuss emerging norms of governmental behaviour in international law and international politics, and the importance of monitoring international agreements, among a range of other issues. The yearbooks’ ongoing treatment of these instruments of international law is complemented by the Survey’s occasional case studies dealing with the operation of specific measures in particular locales. These shed important light on the international community’s efforts to compose small arms controls. The Small Arms Survey constitutes an important part of the international small arms community’s efforts to compose controls over small arms. It is a by-product of the ongoing negotiation between the international small arms community and the existing politico-strategic governance architecture, receiving funding support from some governments and intergovernmental organizations. In mid 2005, the project managers of the Survey proposed broadening its mission statement to include nominating itself as “a support mechanism for international, regional, and national initiatives,” which they describe as “a logical extension of the original core mission” (Small Arms Survey 2005b, p. 2). This broadening of purpose would further embed this research center in the politico-strategic governance architecture, encouraging its problem-solving approach by curtailing its ability to engage critically with the small arms challenge. The decision to release the yearbooks during significant international meetings suggests the project’s managers are less concerned with changing policy positions than they are with providing a resource for the international small arms community. Like contracted research, these yearbooks are less a call for international action than they are attempts to help shape intergovernmental policy. Academic Scholarship The Small Arms Survey shares much in common with Weaver’s studentless university. As Weaver explains in the following passage:

 ����������������� According to the Small Arms Survey 2005 (p. vii), its editors “are extremely grateful to the Swiss Government for its generous financial and overall support of the Small Arms Survey project….Financial support for the project was also provided by the Governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The project has also received financial support for the various research projects from the Geneva International Academic Network (GIAN), the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). The project further benefits from the assistance and support of a number of governmental and international agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, and the World Health Organization.”

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The label ‘universities without students’ naturally raises a question: if these places are doing the same thing as university faculties, why should they exist at all? The answer is that research from the two types of organizations is usually somewhat different, for several reasons. First, university-based researchers face a different set of incentives; interests in substantive policy issues and in the policy process is rarely rewarded as much in the university as are theoretical contributions to the researcher’s discipline. At think tanks, these priorities are reversed. A second reason university-based research may differ from that at think tanks is that university-based researchers are less likely to have contact with policy activists and other policy researchers than those at think tanks. For both of these reasons, the “studentless universities” are more likely than universities to produce research that is attuned to current policy debates. This research is also likely to take a different form—more likely books and monographs than articles in refereed academic journals. And it is more likely to include conclusions about how current policy should be modified, even if those conditions are grudgingly tacked on by the researcher in the last chapter (1989: 566).

Compared to researchers hosted by civil society organizations, the policy divisions of governments and intergovernmental organizations, and independent research centers, academics based in universities have until recently published little scholarly work on the small arms topic. However, since 2002 three prominent academic journals—Brown Journal of World Affairs (2002, 9:1), SAIS Review (2003, 23:1), and Contemporary Security Policy (2006, 27:1)—have each published special editions dealing with this topic. These peer-reviewed scholarly journals differ from serials, such as The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and Arms Control Today, which are published by nongovernmental organizations with specific policy advocacy goals. Numerous papers dealing specifically with this topic have also been delivered at conferences of the International Studies Association, signalling the increasing currency that this emerging topic enjoys among academics. Following half a decade after Brian Wood’s and Johan Peleman’s The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents (1999) and Lumpe’s Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms (2000), Garcia’s Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms (2006), The Global Gun Epidemic: From Saturday Night Specials to AK-47s (2006) written by Cukier and Sidel, and Bourne’s Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms (2007) are three recent book-length academic studies dealing specifically with this topic. Other book-length academic studies also devote chapters to the topic, such as Alley’s Internal Conflict and the International Community: Wars Without End? (2004) and Elke Krahmann’s New Threats and New Actors in International Security (2005).

 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� See, for example, the Archived Papers of the International Studies Association Conference in 2007—particularly, Clifford; Alison; Glatz; Lounsbery et al; de Soysa and Ormhaug; Derghoukassian; and Kenki—available at <www.isanet.org>.

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The role played by academic research in composing small arms controls is, however, less apparent in comparison to the research disseminated by civil society organizations, governments and intergovernmental organizations, and independent research centers. Where academics, such as Greene of Bradford University, contribute research to civil society organizations they do so for the most part not primarily to educate their students, but in order to pursue specific policy objectives. Some academics, such as Klare, also act as consultants to various UN panels, as well as contribute research to civil society organizations, research centers, and scholarly journals. Laurance too was a consultant to the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, and helped establish IANSA. He has also authored research published by AMACAS—in both Lethal Commerce and Light Weapons and Civil Conflict—by the Small Arms Survey—as an Occasional Paper with Rachel Stohl in 2002 and as a principle author of a chapter in the 2002 yearbook, while every yearbook to date acknowledges his contribution—and in 2002 in the Brown Journal of World Affairs. This underscores the complex and dynamic relationship between individual researchers as citizens and various collectivities seeking to compose small arms controls. Finally, a recent initiative attempts to bring the diverse array of small arms researchers closer together, at least in cyberspace. The Research Initiative on Small Arms (RISA) has an overarching goal “to enlarge the global epistemic community that provides the evidence-based knowledge needed to achieve the policy goals of the global effort to prevent and reduce the negative effects from small arms and light weapons” (RISA 2004). Since its emergence in 2004, RISA has published a special edition of the HFG Review, entitled Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Call for Research (Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation 2005), including five brief chapters which collectively pose a further set of research questions. The influence of this very recent harnessing of a global epistemic community remains to be seen however, but merits a brief mention here, especially as the call for action by researchers has now given way to a call for more research guided by a renewed research agenda. Such an initiative would be seen by many postinternationalists as further evidence of the skills revolution, enhanced and enabled by evolving information and communications technologies. Despite this flurry of scholarly attention, small arms literature has been largely neglected as a topic of enquiry in its own right. This is noteworthy because researchers were among the first to identify and, by calling for action, respond to the problem of the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. It is noteworthy also because researchers continue to seek to inform policies developed  �������������������������������������������������������������������������� Along with Mike Bourne, Owen Greene of the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford is a member of the Biting the Bullet Project team, which is responsible for writing Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Action by States and Civil Society, International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action, and Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006: Assessing the First Five Years of the UN Programme of Action.

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by governments and intergovernmental organizations that, if implemented, will both guide and restrain decisive action. Conclusion Hosted by civil society organizations, the policy divisions of governments and intergovernmental organizations, and independent research centers, researchers were among the first to identify the small arms topic as a serious issue for contemporary world affairs. Their early research argues that small arms deserve sustained treatment as a topic for conventional arms control analysts and as an urgent problem for policymakers managing the international security agenda. Indeed, the small arms literature now constitutes a major response to the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons, sustaining a role for researchers as members of the international small arms community, though this role may be neglected by mainstream international relations theory. Postinternationalism not only appreciates researchers as actors, but also gives focus to the complex and dynamic interactions between individuals as researchers and host institutions, and between these research organizations and intergovernmental organizations and their member-states. The small arms topic was first conceived as a multifaceted problem for policymakers within four major works disseminated by civil society organizations, but has in turn been developed and elaborated by a range of researchers. The identification of the major aspects of this topic—in particular, the proliferation, transfer, possession, and use of these tools of violence—and the placing of these aspects in various geographic contexts demonstrates a cognitive continuity among individual researchers. This is not to negate the important differences among the pool of small arms research, but rather to emphasise the common problemsolving approach taken by these researchers, even those associated with the Small Arms Survey, which is widely regarded as publishing literature par excellence on this topic. Largely if not exclusively driven by policy-advocating civil society organizations—in particular, AMACAS and FAS—the small arms literature published between 1995 and 2000 called for decisive international action. This call has been predominantly in the form of a call for governments to cooperate within the existing politico-strategic governance architecture. At the same time, some of this research—especially research produced under contract and by independent research centers—is a by-product of researchers’ ongoing negotiation with that governance architecture. Calling for action to be taken under UN leadership, many researchers reveal their strongly-held internationalist orthodoxy. The following chapter examines the ways in which intergovernmental organizations attempt to compose small arms controls, efforts which are not only informed by internationalism, but which enshrine this belief in instruments of international law.

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Chapter 4

Intergovernmental Organizations Intergovernmental organizations play a vital role in the composition of small arms controls. Since the late 1990s, these organizations have enabled the negotiation and implementation of numerous international frameworks that have resulted in many of their member-states undertaking responsibility for licensing, permitting, or authorizing small arms manufacture and transfer within their respective areas of jurisdiction. Because these member-states are also responsible for criminalizing those related activities which do not have official authorization, these frameworks help strengthen the dichotomy between sovereign-bound and sovereign-free actors. Called for by small arms researchers and subjected to ongoing review by advocates, these international frameworks are central to the interconnected efforts of arms control protagonists. This chapter introduces the major instruments of international law that have recently been negotiated as a means of providing frameworks for domestic regulatory regimes controlling small arms. It notes briefly the historical circumstances from which a few of these frameworks emerged, indicating reasons for obstacles and trade-offs occurring during their negotiation within intergovernmental organizations. International frameworks are distinguished here as either treaties or soft law measures. Each is analyzed in terms of its current status, technical scope, and geographic coverage. No single instrument of international law is favored as a panacea, however. As an intergovernmental organization with global reach, the UN strongly encourages the implementation of these frameworks, though regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations, including the OAS, EU, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have taken important initiatives too. This chapter gives focus to that ongoing interaction among subsystems of governance, illustrating some of the ways in which emerging regional and subregional agreements lead the development of global measures in some respects, but follow in others. By scrutinizing the texts of these measures, this chapter assesses the degree to which these international frameworks—when considered collectively as a mosaic of responsibilities comprising of obligations and commitments—are capable of controlling small arms. Such an assessment is necessary given that the problem these frameworks seek to solve is multifaceted, comprising as it does several major aspects, each of which needs to be effectively addressed in order for the small arms challenge to be overcome. The small arms problem is also geographically vast, with its major centers of production, weapons flows, hotspots of intense use, and myriad of deleterious impacts spread widely but unevenly throughout the world. This chapter reveals that in spite of their varying historical circumstances

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and strategic weaknesses, these international frameworks reflect, enshrine, and entrench a deeply-held belief in internationalism; that is, a preference for a particular notion of the political that further strengthens the existing politicostrategic governance architecture. Treaties Before the turn of the millennium there was very little in the way of an established international legal basis from which to draw guidance for establishing small arms controls (Dahinden 2002, p. xix). Referring to international controls in general, Andre Stemmet notes “it has to be conceded that international law is a weak regime” (2002, p. 27). Nevertheless, treaty law serves as a basis for some international frameworks for small arms controls developed by intergovernmental organizations and, according to Glenn McDonald and Silvia Catteneo, “treaties are the clearest expression of states’ consent to be legally bound” (Small Arms Survey 2003, p. 216). Since the late 1990s, four treaties seeking to foster domestic regulatory regimes over small arms have emerged: first, the OAS Convention entered into force on 1 July 1998; second, the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition, and other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community Region (SADC Firearms Protocol) entered into force on 8 November 2004; third, the UN Firearms Protocol entered into force on 3 July 2005; and fourth, the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Protocol) entered into force on 5 May 2006. For Greene, these kinds of treaties break new ground because “[i]nternational norms, rules and institutions are being developed in a range of issue areas where there is little history of substantial international co-ordination” (2000: 152). The OAS, first considering small arms trafficking in 1990 as an issue related to narcotics trafficking and other organized criminal activities occurring in South America, held at least three Group of Experts meetings on the issue between October 1993 and May 1996. These meetings led to the development of common import, in-transit, and export authorizations among OAS memberstates, codified in the Model Regulations for the Movement of Firearms, their Parts and Components, and Ammunition. As James P. McShane recalls, during these meetings and their intervening periods “[a] consensus developed that to both comprehend and effectively combat illicit firearms trafficking, there had to be a greater understanding of how the legal trade occurred. There was also a growing sense that loose controls over the legal trade were the real problem when it came to illicit trafficking” (1999, p. 174). Drafted by a few OAS member-states describing themselves as the Rio Group—namely, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela—the OAS Convention was adopted on 13 November 1997 and, following its ratification by the Bahamas and Mexico, entered into force on 1 July 1998.

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As a regional organization comprising of 35 member-states, the OAS spans two continents and has an almost hemispheric scope, though only 29 of its members have ratified the OAS Convention: Canada and the US are two memberstates featuring among the ranks of those yet to ratify (see , accessed December 2008). Even though the US played a significant role in articulating the Convention’s text and signed the Convention in November 1997, by the end of December 2008 it had yet to ratify the Treaty despite its compatibility with US Government policies and domestic regulations (Schroeder 2004, p. 32). In fact, this non-ratification of the OAS Convention has recently been contextualized among the US Government’s attitude to other treaties, including the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Verification Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, each of which the US Government has also failed to ratify. Although the effects of the US’ failure to ratify the OAS Convention are somewhat mitigated because the US Government continues to act in ways consistent with its provisions, the efficacy of the instrument is inhibited because the US, as the OAS’ most powerful member-state and one of the world’s leading weapons producers, has only observer status at the Consultative Committee meetings and cannot exercise a vote. As Matthew Schroeder points out, “[e]xhortations by American diplomats to comply with the Convention ring hollow when their own country has not ratified it” (2004, p. 33). Developed as a component of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCATOC), the UN Firearms Protocol refers specifically to its parent Convention and could only enter into force after UNCATOC itself had entered into force on 29 September 2003. This Protocol, a draft of which was requested by the UN Commission for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 1998, has its origins in a study on firearms regulation conducted in 1995 by the Vienna-based Centre for International Crime Prevention (Brem and Rutherford 2001: 176). On 31 May 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted the Protocol, opening it for signature. The opening for signature of this Treaty was somewhat retarded in comparison to its two complementary Protocols—also supplementing UNCATOC are the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea—both of which were agreed and signed in 2000. However, relative to many other non-‘arms control’ treaties its negotiation could be considered expedient (Small Arms Survey 2002, p. 237). The protracted negotiation of the UN Firearms Protocol was due in part to disagreement over the definition of key terms, the applicability of weapons-marking requirements, and the status of non-commercial transfers of these weapons. The opposition of the US National Rifle Association (NRA) to domestic regulation of civilian ownership complicated negotiations: however, since the NRA involved itself so closely in the negotiation phase, any future opposition to this Protocol

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could be subject to charges of hypocrisy (Small Arms Survey 2002, p. 238). (Such charges could also be targeted at any NRA opposition to the OAS Convention, the negotiation of which the NRA was also closely involved with.) During its negotiation, the draft text of the Protocol was weakened in its technical scope, excluding controls over arms brokers, government-to-government transfers, and weapons-marking standards (Small Arms Survey 2002, pp. 237—240). This Treaty entered into force on 3 July 2005 after ratification by 45 of its 60 signatories (see , accessed 1 April 2007). Unlike the ‘hemispheric’ OAS Convention, the UN Firearms Protocol is potentially global in its geographic coverage. Although it represents an important development towards controlling small arms through regulation, the primary purpose of the UN Firearms Protocol is to provide UN member-states with a means of combating organized criminals. On this basis, it seeks to restrict the scale and conduct of their illegal activities by combating and reducing the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in these weapons across international borders; however, Article 4 specifically limits its application to “where those offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group.” Developed contemporaneously with the UN Firearms Protocol, the SADC Firearms Protocol did not rely upon the diplomatic momentum generated from within the UN. Indeed, it was often ahead of discussion facilitated by the UN in terms of its technical focus, even if it was not as far advanced in its negotiation phase (Stott 2003, p. 3). Established in 1980 and for the following 12 years operating without the guidance of a formal framework or foundational charter, SADC enlarged its membership from nine to 14 member-states. In 1992, the organization was formalized under a Memorandum of Agreement concerning development integration, the promotion of security, and the defence of peace within its subregion (Solomon 1999, p. 151). At that time, the subregion was struggling to overcome the legacies of conflicts in Namibia and Mozambique during the late 1980s, as well as the increasing lawlessness resulting from widespread and ongoing small arms use in post-apartheid South Africa. The origin of the SADC Firearms Protocol can be traced to an SADC Council of Ministers meeting held in 1999 at Maputo, Mozambique, which called for a regional policy on small arms that would include a non-legally binding declaration (adopted in 2001), the Protocol, and a plan of implementation (Stemmet 2002, p. 23). The Treaty was signed by 13 SADC member-states on 14 August 2001. Entering into force on 8 November 2004, the SADC Firearms Protocol has been ratified by nine of SADC’s 14 member-states, leaving Angola as the only member-state not to have signed the Treaty (see , accessed 1 April 2007). The Nairobi Protocol is the most recently negotiated treaty providing a framework for domestic regulatory regimes controlling small arms. Like the SADC Firearms Protocol, it is subregional in scope, focusing on the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa—a subregion notable for its recent conflicts. The

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international dimensions of these conflicts are illustrated by the UN sanction regimes targeting Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, and by the UN peacekeeping operations hosted by Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda. Building upon a declaration by the foreign ministers of ten governments located within southern Africa on 15 March 2000, the Second Ministerial Review Conference of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa opened the Nairobi Protocol for signature on 21 April 2004 (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2006, p. 4). Designed by a panel of governmental experts, this Protocol was immediately signed by 11 governments of the subregion. Somalia, a key source of unregulated weapons since its Government ceased to function in 1991, followed suit by signing the Protocol in June 2005. The Protocol entered into force on 5 May 2006 after it was ratified by eight signatories (see , accessed 8 March 2007), its ratification no doubt expedited by the international attention given to the subregion’s prolonged and intense conflicts and by the external support received from the UK Department for International Development, and the civil society organizations Saferworld, SaferAfrica, and the Security Research and Information Centre. Enshrining Internationalism Despite each of these treaties emerging from within different intergovernmental organizations and framing their justifications for composing small arms controls in terms reflecting their own unique historical circumstances, all four treaties share a commonality in their purpose. As the first of these treaties to undergo negotiation, the OAS Convention states its objective as: to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials; to promote and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information and experience among States Parties to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials (Article II).

Following the OAS Convention, the UN Firearms Protocol states its almost identical objective more succinctly: “to promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation among States Parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition” (Article 2). The stated objectives of the subsequent SADC Firearms Protocol extend beyond preventing, combating, and eradicating illicit manufacturing and trafficking of small arms by addressing also “their excessive and destabilising accumulation…possession and use in the Region” (Article 3(a)). This does not, prima facie, preclude from consideration government-authorized

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manufacture and trade. The stated objectives of the Nairobi Protocol are as wide-ranging as the SADC Firearms Protocol, but also specifically “encourage accountability, law enforcement and efficient control and management of small arms and light weapons held by States Parties and civilians” (Article 2(e)). There is a clear continuity, then, among these early instances of intergovernmental organizations’ small arms control efforts, with the objectives of each treaty drawing from and building upon the objectives of previous frameworks. The evolution of the treaties’ objectives shows an increasing, but still somewhat reticent, acknowledgement of the roles played by states in sustaining the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. The continuities in the treaties’ objectives also indicate the ongoing interactions among subregional, regional, and global intergovernmental organizations. In particular, it suggests that regional and subregional organizations, acting as governance subsystems, can help influence and shape discussions occurring within the governance architecture of global reach while, at the same time, the actions of the UN can shape the work of regional or subregional intergovernmental organizations. In this sense, postinternationalism’s recognition of this type of structural interaction among collectivities illuminates the evolution of small arms control efforts by intergovernmental organizations. These treaties create obligations for state-parties to either license, permit, or authorize weapons transfers as either imports or exports; mark weapons at the time of their manufacture or import into their territory; and keep records pertaining to known weapons inventories, including their location. These treaties concomitantly create obligations for state-parties to criminalize certain activities relating to small arms that do not have official approval or consent. Since regulating this sector necessarily relies upon the enactment of criminal offences for breaches of these regulations, state-parties are obliged to develop the capability to maintain effective control over the people and goods transiting their international borders, as well as to administer and enforce these laws where persons act contrary to their provisions within a state-party’s area of jurisdiction. Because nongovernmental actors are largely dealt with in such treaties as the source of the ongoing small arms problem while governments are ascribed the role of problem-solvers, these agreements not only distinguish sovereign-bound actors from sovereign-free actors, but also strengthen the dichotomy between them. In order to buttress the domestic regimes regulating small arms manufacture and transfer, these treaties seek to facilitate cooperation among state-parties by improving information flows. This enables the more timely and accurate identification of legal operators, thereby increasing the likelihood of detecting, apprehending, and prosecuting illegal operators. For this reason, the OAS Convention, the SADC Firearms Protocol, and the Nairobi Protocol each call for engagement with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), while the latter two agreements also call for engagement with the World Customs Organization (WCO). Cooperation among law-enforcement agencies is promoted by each of the four treaties, as is the exchange of training, technologies, and other forms of assistance among these agencies. In so doing, these treaty obligations—

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and more specifically the domestic regulatory regimes they foster—create a plausible deterrent to would-be offenders, though given the probable extent of contemporary trafficking, whether or not this deterrence is sufficient remains highly contestable. The preambles of both the UN Firearms Protocol and Nairobi Protocol refer explicitly to Article 51 of the UN Charter which, as mentioned in the Introduction, recognizes the rights of UN member-states to act unilaterally if they are attacked. This explicit link is significant because it seeks to legitimize the manufacturing, transfer, possession, and use of small arms for the purposes of securing UN member-states from external threats. Governments therefore recognize small arms not only as threats to governmental security that can also undermine the rule of law, but also as security-enabling tools of governments that help maintain the rule of law. Such a distinction can be problematic, however, when UN memberstates rely upon the versatility of small arms as a means of providing defence from external military threats and of maintaining the rule of law within their areas of jurisdiction, yet use these weapons to violate the human rights of their citizens. When governments use small arms to violate their citizens’ human rights, they contribute to a crisis of authority, prompting their citizens to acquire weapons in order to either protect themselves from governmental excesses or provide for their own security when a government is seen as being unable or unwilling to do so. Here, then, there is an implicit assumption in each of these treaties suggesting that governments which cooperate with other governments are best placed to manage the threats posed by these weapons, including to their own monopoly over the legitimate use of force within their respective jurisdictions. In other words, the ways in which these treaties provide for domestic regulatory regimes over small arms reveals a commitment to internationalism. Because most state-parties are members of more than one intergovernmental organization, the geographic coverage of these treaties overlaps, reflecting and enshrining an internationalist notion of the political. By reiterating the primacy of governments and casting nongovernmental actors in the role of problem-makers, these treaties also rely upon and subsequently help strengthen the existing politico-strategic governance architecture. These instruments of international law also seek to forge relationships beyond that politico-strategic governance architecture. Building upon the provisions for exchanging information among governments, these treaties also aim to strengthen formal links with some nongovernmental actors. The OAS Convention calls for relevant academic studies to be undertaken, while the UN Firearms Protocol invokes the support of the small arms industry. The SADC Firearms Protocol, the Nairobi Protocol, and the UN Firearms Protocol each call for cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations, while the latter was specifically open for signature to regional economic integration organizations where at least one member-state is also a state-party to the Protocol. The OAS Convention spurred participants of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) to establish a registry of buyers and sellers of small arms, as well as a database of transit points

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used to transfer these weapons across borders (Schroeder 2004, p. 26; see also Greene 2000: 178). However, explicit calls for strengthening formal links with civil society organizations are noticeably absent from these treaties, though both the SADC Firearms Protocol and the Nairobi Protocol contain reference to enhancing public involvement in and support for composing arms controls. Such omissions are not surprising, however, given that fostering formal linkages with these other arms control protagonists neither necessarily reinforces the primacy of the internationalist notion of the political, nor strengthens the prevailing politicostrategic architecture. Strategic Weaknesses In spite of all their commonality, significant differences exist among these international frameworks, particularly where they seek to foster domestic regulatory controls over differing aspects of the small arms problem. The OAS Convention is the only treaty that does not oblige its state-parties to destroy those weapons seized as evidence of illegal manufacturing or trafficking, or confiscated through successful prosecution. Only the SADC Firearms Protocol and Nairobi Protocol oblige state-parties to establish and maintain inventories of government-held arsenals and to destroy those weapons deemed surplus to requirements. These are also the only two treaties to prohibit unrestricted civilian access to light weapons while providing for voluntary weapon-surrendering initiatives and public awareness campaigns. Three of these treaties are also unique in terms of technical provisions: only the UN Firearms Protocol obliges state-parties to prevent the reactivation of deactivated weapons; only the OAS Convention provides for extradition among its state-parties; and only the Nairobi Protocol addresses corruption within governments. Thus, even though these treaties interrelate, conceptual differences render these international frameworks an incoherent response to the multifaceted problem of small arms. As mentioned in Chapter 2, if policymakers wish to reduce the widespread availability and curb the ongoing use of these weapons, then they must collectively compose controls that address small arms proliferation, transfer, collection, and disposal in a comprehensive, coordinated, and holistic manner. In addition to lacking a consistent and coherent objective to exert control over all major aspects of the small arms problem, the international frameworks so far examined in this chapter are constrained by their limited geographic reach. While all four treaties examined in this chapter have now entered into force, the rate of ratification limits their collective geographic coverage. Indeed, there are approximately forty governments which are signatories to any one of these treaties, but which have failed to ratify the relevant instrument. More specifically, six of the 34 signatories to the OAS Convention have yet to ratify; 28 of the 52 signatories to the UN Firearms Protocol have yet to ratify; three of the 13 signatories to the SADC Firearms Protocol have yet to ratify; and three of the 12 signatories to the

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Nairobi Protocol have yet to ratify. Among those governments that have signed but not yet ratified treaties, Austria, Brazil, PRC, Germany, India, Italy, South Korea, UK, and the US are considered by the Small Arms Survey to be either major or medium-sized producers of small arms. In addition, there are almost 100 governments under no small arms treaty obligations whatsoever, including the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Israel, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Singapore, Spain, and Switzerland, countries also considered as either major or medium-sized producers of these weapons (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 16). Significantly, much of the world’s capability to produce small arms therefore remains outside the geographic reach of these international frameworks. Even though these treaties encourage and enable state-parties to coordinate those administrative and enforcement activities which they may wish to undertake, little is offered in the way of restricting state-parties’ freedom of action when authorizing small arms proliferation, transfer, or possession. In other words, there is no effective means enshrined in these treaties by which to regulate and control state-parties’ activities, including restraining production volumes, deterring destabilizing transfers, or preventing excessive accumulations. The UN Firearms Protocol specifically excludes consideration of government-to-government transfers and there is little in the other treaties creating legal constraints on state-parties when transferring weapons to other governments. Consequently, as parties to treaties, governments continue authorizing transfers to countries involved in conflict. Sometimes transfers are intended to reach nongovernmental actors, thereby fuelling “one of the most contested concepts in international law: the unresolved dilemma between the norm to sovereign territorial integrity and people’s right to self-determination” (Garcia 2006, p. 187). While state-parties are quick to claim status as members of the international small arms community, they are unsurprisingly less keen to acknowledge the ways in which they help stimulate and perpetuate the very problem they claim to address. Furthermore, once a treaty is in force, signatories to it should refrain from acting in any way that either undermines the intent of that treaty or is inconsistent with its articles. Those articles bind all state-parties that have ratified the treaty. However, a treaty applies only to those governments that have signed and ratified it, and confers neither rights nor duties on any government until it enters into force. (There are, moreover, many derogations and reservations relating to these treaties.) Where state-parties are obliged to abide by treaty provisions, specific activities undertaken by these governments face constraints. In spite of these constraints, governments do not surrender the power to act in ways contravening   For more up-to-date figures, please refer, respectively, to (accessed 22 December 2008), (accessed 19 September 2006), (accessed 22 December 2008) (accessed 19 September 2006).

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their obligations. Instead, governments violating their treaty obligations do so aware that those actions may carry consequences, some of which are perceived and calculated in advance. “States may have many reasons, both political and economic,” Ted Legget suggests, “for wishing to appear to be in line with global trends on arms control, while actually fostering illicit commerce” (2000, p. 210). Although there is no single universally-accepted central authority regulating all affairs among governments, officials can enter into binding arrangements regarding their government’s conduct. While governmental consent is required for such an obligation to exist, the authority to observe and cast judgment upon any government’s actions remains decentralized, dispersed albeit unequally among actors of contemporary world affairs. The treaties examined in this chapter contain no formal mechanism through which state-parties can find assurance that other state-parties are abiding by its articles and provisions; that is, there is little oversight of the administration of governments’ conduct relating to these treaties. Aside from Article 16 of the UN Firearms Protocol—which explicitly directs stateparties to resolve disputes through the International Court of Justice—there is no compulsion to seek recourse from a higher authority in order to derive judgment on a state-party’s conduct, including its interpretations of certain provisions. Consequently, there are no indications of the shape a penalty for non-compliance might take, if such an act of non-compliance were ever detected. Because these treaties seek to preserve or restore governmental monopoly over the legitimate use of force, hints of government culpability in instances of small arms misuse are rare, if not wholly absent, in both the Preambles and the texts of all four treaties. It is a particularly cruel irony given that the official misuse of small arms, a significant factor motivating the call for international action explored in the previous chapter, is partly perpetuated and entrenched by the current efforts to compose small arms controls. These controls enable human rights violations, for example, to occur through official misuse: according to Amnesty International, “[s]ustained by the easy availability of small arms, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other human rights violations have been committed in eastern DRC” (2005, p. 12). In spite of peace agreements, “[l]arge-scale unlawful killings of civilians by armed forces continue to be committed on a regular basis” (Ibid, p. 15). DRC is by no means an exception in this regard, however. The US Government’s prosecution of its so-called ‘War on Terror’ has resulted in its “exports of these weapons hav[ing] now increased to some states that are known to be violators of human rights [and in turn]… many states have begun to export and misuse these weapons in the name of combating terrorism” (Laurance 2002: 199). Although there are provisions within these treaties calling for the exchange of criminal-related information and law-enforcement expertise among state-parties, this information remains concealed from the public for stated reasons of operational security. The cloak of official secrecy continues to shield law-enforcement activities from citizens’ view as provision for either domestic public oversight or civil society scrutiny is absent—as are, therefore, transparency and accountability. These treaties therefore not only fail to check the impunity often associated with

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official small arms misuse, but also render governmental abuses within a state’s jurisdiction less visible to the gaze of the international community. They also enable the easy concealment of covert arms transfers deliberately intended to destabilize other governments. Such destabilizing transfers are unlikely to help (unwitting) recipient governments compose effective regulatory controls over small arms. Where governments are party to a treaty, inadequate infrastructure can pervert attempts to act in accordance with international obligations. As Stemmet notes, “[t]he ideal of addressing the small arms/light weapons problem by means of regulation, namely to reach legally binding agreements at bilateral, regional and global levels, will be ill served if effective national measures are lacking” (2002, p. 27). The fulfillment of multilateral objectives depends upon governments possessing a domestic capability that can operationalize their obligations through the active detection, investigation, and prosecution of illegal operators, accompanied by the imposition of penalties sufficient to deter other would-be offenders. Yet this capability is not always present: for example, although SADC includes a subcommittee consisting of representatives at the ministerial level which shares intelligence on a broad range of transnational matters, most of its conflict-weary member-states have limited access to the resources necessary to fully implement and effectively operationalize the SADC Firearms Protocol. This includes their very limited access to basic technologies such as computer databases and weapondestruction tools (Stott 2003, p. 7). Where governments do act in accordance with their treaty obligations, progress has been uneven. In April 2002, many OAS member-states were not yet in full compliance with the OAS Convention, with less than half having nominated a central point of contact for the exchange of information, while even fewer governments had enacted the domestic laws enabling the exchange of information, or having the necessary record-keeping processes in place (Schroeder 2004, pp. 26—27). Interpretations of governmental behavior differ, as it remains difficult to know if this uneven progress results from either a lack of sufficient political will or the inadequate provision of resources, or perhaps some combination of the two. All this is not to suggest that governments have been prevented from taking action in accordance with the provisions of these treaties, or deterred from going beyond these provisions by enacting stricter controls. Rather, it signals that any government undertaking such actions does so under no treaty obligation and without prejudice to either future inactivity or foreign policy reversals. Signatories already respond in ways that might create norms, if not for the purposes of customary international law, then at least in setting precedents for government behavior in contemporary world affairs. However, given the significance of their strategic weaknesses—that is, a conceptual incoherence, the limited geographic reach and administrative and enforcement capabilities of state-parties, and the limited resources available to implement and enforce these agreements—much doubt exists over these international frameworks’ capability to exert control over small arms. The dismal record to date, in which small arms continue to be widely available and subject to ongoing use, does little to assuage such doubt.

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Soft Law Measures Treaties are not the only instruments of international law through which intergovernmental organizations seek to compose small arms controls. In fact, as Garcia explains, “[w]hen issues are new on the international security agenda and are surrounded by scientific and factual uncertainty, as well as the need for fast response and flexibility in norm creation, legally binding instruments may not be the most suitable response” (2006, p. 200). A soft law measure constitutes a commitment by governments to cooperate for a common end and to refrain from acting in any way which undermines the intent of that particular measure (Fischer 2002, p. 159). The operative verb in such instruments of international law is ‘should’ rather than ‘shall,’ meaning that soft law measures are not legally-binding instruments whereby state-parties explicitly consent to be bound by a series of articles. Consequently, a government’s behavior relating to these measures cannot be the subject of a legal dispute among governments. While soft law measures are “not ‘law’ in the sense of producing legally binding rights and obligations… [they can and do] spur the development of new rules of customary international law and/or lay the foundations for new treaty law” (Small Arms Survey 2003, p. 219). In other words, where a treaty binds those state-parties that have ratified the instrument and proscribes certain activities by its signatories once it enters into force, governments neither sign nor ratify soft law measures. Instead, these measures apply to all those governments involved in their negotiation, except where a government has “consistently and persistently” objected to the rule or to the expression of that rule (Ibid, p. 218). The power of a soft law measure lies in the norms it creates which in turn influence and prescribe the conduct of governments. In this respect, the conduct of governments relating to soft law measures is just as important as, if not more important than, the instrument’s actual text. It provides a source from which to develop norms and to inform customary international law with respect to controlling small arms, but only after a sufficient period of time has elapsed, though that which constitutes ‘sufficient’ is a highly contestable matter. Since the late 1990s, at least a dozen major soft law measures providing for regulatory regimes over small arms have undergone negotiation and achieved consensus within intergovernmental organizations (though one of these has failed to take hold). Most of these soft law measures emerge from and focus upon specific regions and subregions. Its potential for global geographic coverage renders the UNPoA unique among these international frameworks, while one other measure specifically engages so-called ‘developed countries’ which spread throughout the world, possess significant weapons-producing capability. Regional Internationalism Adopted in March 1997 by the member-states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Bamako Declaration was among the first attempts to express a

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multilateral response to the challenge of controlling small arms at the continental level. This declaration sought to “[l]aunch an appeal to the various actors in society: women, young people, elected representatives, members of the armed forces, communicators and educators, to work for the building of peace and democracy, and for development in a spirit of solidarity and tolerance.” Calling upon nongovernmental actors to assume an important role in providing a workable and durable solution to the small arms problem, this declaration—a single page in length—obscures the role played by some governments in creating, intensifying, and prolonging many of the deadly consequences associated with small arms. There is a strong sense in which this Declaration seeks to justify any and all action to control small arms, but offers little in the way of practical steps enabling the composition of small arms controls. While commendable for its recognition of the urgency needed to respond to this issue and useful for diplomatic posturing, the Bamako Declaration is moribund as an international arms control framework. The OAU followed up its 1997 Declaration with a more robust Declaration in 2000: the African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Since the emergence of this Declaration, the AU has replaced the OAU, and to date much of the AU’s efforts appear to be directed towards fulfilling its member-states’ commitments under the UNPoA. At the AU Summit held in Khartoum in January 2006, the Windhoek Position was endorsed as “a basis for the African common position, and for debate and negotiation at the UN Review Conference in June/July 2006” (Gamba 2006, p. 3). As a regional organization, the focus of the AU’s efforts on UNPoA implementation signals a partial shift away from a preference for regional internationalism towards a preference for global internationalism; having said that however, crucial subregional responses have taken shape within the continent. According to Monica Kathina Juma, “these developments have influenced and shaped international trends in terms of the development of desirable governance frameworks for dealing with SALW” (2006: 2). A regional response has also emerged from within the South Pacific where member-states of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) adopted the Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control Measures (Nadi Framework) in March 2000. Building upon the Agreement in Principle on Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Material (Honiara Initiative), the Nadi Framework seeks to establish new and harmonize existing domestic legislation dealing with small arms among PIF member-states (Alpers and Twyford 2003, p. 108). Under the Nadi Framework, member-states involved in transferring small arms are supposed to inform other member-states whose territory the consignment is transiting. Member-states are also expected to share information relating to the identities of any authorized dealers and users of these weapons, any relevant criminal intelligence, and any useful operational, enforcement, and legislative experiences. Progress towards implementing the Nadi Framework has sought to incorporate PIF member-states’ commitments under the UNPoA, including “any substantive issues arising out of the [2001 Small Arms]

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Conference” (Ibid, p. 109). The Nadi Framework refers specifically to governmental possession of these weapons—justifiably so, given the recent crises unfolding in Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, and Fiji, each facilitated in part by the lax security controls over government arsenals. Unlike all other measures discussed in this chapter, an individual’s right to possess and use a small arm as a civilian is inscribed here as a privilege conditional upon community safety, signaling the residual force of customary practice in the Pacific’s traditional ways of life. A regional response has also emerged from within the EU, comprising of three separate but interrelated instruments which represent “a framework for multilateral arms policies that, while still containing serious shortcomings, is, at present, undoubtedly the most sophisticated regional approach to conventional and small arms control” (Anders 2003a, p. 12). First, in June 1997 the EU Council adopted the EU Programme, which encourages cooperation among lawenforcement agencies targeting illicit manufacture and trafficking of small arms. Second, the EU Code of Conduct, providing a framework for restraining transfers of conventional weapons by EU member-states into locations where there is a risk that these weapons will facilitate internal repression, international aggression, or constitute a threat to regional security, was established by the EU Council in June 1998. Third, the EU Joint Action on Small Arms, which is a legally-binding measure promoting the provision of requested support to those countries negatively affected by the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons, was adopted in December 1998 (Ibid, pp. 7—8). The negotiation of this framework occurred as the European arms-manufacturing industry underwent restructuring and transnationalization following the end of the Cold War, a time when economic competitiveness replaced superpower interests as the primary factor informing arms exports decisions. At the same time, however, policymakers were acutely attentive to the role played by European arms transfers in the 1991 Gulf War and to the potential benefits of restraining future destabilizing transfers (Bauer and Bromley 2004, p. 2). Like the EU framework, member-states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have agreed to abide by a tripartite framework. First, the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers commits memberstates transferring arms to consider various factors pertaining to the recipient government. Adopted in November 1993, it discourages exports that might be used to commit human rights violations or threaten governmental security. Second, the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons consists of six sections which devote specific attention to combating illicit activities, introduce common export criteria and controls over government-held stockpiles, and, unlike most measures, also provide for disarmament processes in postconflict settings. This measure was adopted in November 2000. The focus on disarmament here reflects that much of Southeastern Europe—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro—suffered intense conflict during the 1990s, and that the “activities of established criminal networks coupled with porous borders and weak arms exports controls has in the past resulted in weapons being trafficked to Western Europe

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and beyond, including in some cases to conflict zones” (Saferworld 2005, p. 1). The third pillar of the OSCE framework is the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, which provides for the destruction of ammunition that is surplus to requirements and was adopted in November 2003. Subregional Internationalism As one of the earliest subregional soft law measures concerning small arms, the ECOWAS Moratorium shapes governmental controls over small arms and has been especially significant in Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal (Agboton-Johnson et al. 2004, p. 9). Subregional in geographic coverage, 15 West African governments declared this voluntary measure on 31 October 1998. This measure does not discriminate between governmental and civilian activities, aiming instead to promote confidencebuilding among ECOWAS member-states and their neighbors by choosing to not manufacture, import, or export light weapons—though participants can apply for exemptions, particularly when replacing damaged or obsolete weaponry that will be destroyed (see accessed 27 September 2006; for details on exemptions, see Ebo with Mazal 2003, p. 20). The ECOWAS Moratorium has been effective despite finding expression in, as Stemmet puts it: the weakest possible language: it merely “declares” a moratorium, without focusing on any specific measures of implementation: more than half of the onepage text consists of the Preamble. It therefore amounts merely to a voluntary political decision by the heads of State: no provision is made for movement towards implementation of the moratorium in national legislation or for an institution that could monitor and effect implementation (2002, p. 22).

Awash with these weapons for reasons linked to the Cold War and to the continent’s decolonization, West Africa was host in the 1990s to most of the world’s small wars and intra-state conflicts. As Herbert pointed out in 2000, “no less than half a dozen of the 16 regimes governing in West Africa are still products of military coups. A good many others are maintained in office as a front for military power holders” (2006, p. 34). The apparent success of the Moratorium lies not in spite of, but quite possibly because of, a subregional context that witnessed circumstances nearing endemic civil war. While the idea of a subregional moratorium is commendable, the implementation of this measure has not necessarily lived up to this ideal. According to Greene, “[i]n several ECOWAS countries, the military and the arms transfer licensing authorities were apparently unaware that their government had declared the Moratorium” (2000: 160). The ECOWAS experience, born out of a context rich in strife and suffering, implies that nothing much will be done regarding this issue in other parts of the world until the situation there is as bad as in parts of Africa during the 1990s.

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More recently, another subregional soft law measure has emerged. On 25 June 2003, Foreign Ministers from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru adopted the Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (Andean Plan). The Plan itself was largely derived from the UNPoA and was articulated with technical support and financial resources provided by SaferAfrica. This pledge to take action can be traced back to the Lima Commitment, agreed in June 2002. In May 2005, government experts from the Andean community met, recommending “the preparation of Community legislation to regulate control of the importation, exportation and movement of firearms, explosives and related material in the subregion” (Andean Community 2005). Like the OAS Convention, the Andean Plan can be seen as a tool combating the subregion’s organized criminals and narcotics traffickers, though “[a]ll of the Andean countries have been arms suppliers to the Colombian conflict at one or the other of its stages” (Godnick and Vásquez 2003, p. 20). Global Internationalism Described by Steffan Sohlman (1997) as “the first global multilateral agreement covering exports controls on both conventional weapons and sensitive dualuse goods and technologies.” the Wassenaar Arrangement was established in September 1996. Its purpose is to prevent destabilizing accumulations of weapons by promoting the transparency of transfers of certain goods, materials, and technologies. It was envisaged that transparency would follow from the exchange of information relating to authorized transfers among participating states. The Wassenaar Arrangement consists of two major lists, one dealing with dual-use goods and technologies, the other with munitions including small arms. Like EU member-states abiding by the EU Code of Conduct, the 40 participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement are expected to exercise restraint in exporting listed items to any region experiencing circumstances causing concern to the wider international community, or where these items might be used for military purposes by a government that behaves in a manner causing concern to the international community. Such behavior presumably includes internal repression and international aggression, along with grave breaches of IHL and Human Rights Law. Participating states, most of which are considered as ‘developed countries,’ meet at least once each year when both lists are subject to review as well as being revised on an as-required basis. Consensus is required to revise any item on these lists. Although originally focused upon weapons of mass destruction, in December 2002 the participating governments agreed to intensify their sharing of terrorismrelated information, adopting Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons. This reflects something of a shift in contemporary perceptions of security threats following the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 and the legacy of the 1991 Gulf War, which register concurrently in the minds of

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many policymakers. These guidelines echo the UNPoA and the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (von Tangen Page et al. 2005, p. 12). As mentioned in the previous chapter, following a recommendation by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, the UN General Assembly announced on 15 December 1999 its decision to hold a conference focusing on the illicit trade in small arms at New York between 9 and 20 July 2001. The resulting UNPoA has been proclaimed “the centerpiece of multilateral efforts” (Krause 2002: 248), “a milestone achievement in multilateralism” (UN General Assembly 2003, para. 5), “a watershed event” (Brem and Rutherford 2001: 181), and “the central global agreement on preventing and reducing trafficking and proliferation” of small arms (Biting the Bullet 2003, p. 4). Over 150 governments reached consensus on the UNPoA, a significant achievement given the ongoing debates around fundamental elements of the small arms challenge, including the roles of governmental and nongovernmental actors sustaining it. Garcia provides an insightful account of the complex debate, when she writes: the position of African nations was energetically sustained throughout the final moments of negotiation of the final version of the Program of Action during 2001. The African countries were particularly keen on advancing the clause on barring the sale of weapons to non-state actors. On the one hand, it has been pointed out that this enthusiasm was generated by the fact that African nations are those most affected by the illicit traffic of small arms. On the other hand, the inclusion of this clause would serve some African regimes particularly well, as some African nations are ruled by dictatorships, and the barring of the sale of weapons to non-state actors would be beneficial to such leaders who would not want to see their positions challenged by well-armed hostile movements (2006, p. 186).

The UNPoA is the broadest-ranging and most inclusive of all the international frameworks providing for regulatory regimes controlling small arms. It perceives the challenge of controlling these weapons as including conflict prevention methods, the abolition of child soldiering, and humanitarian recovery. In other words, the UNPoA is not merely an arms control measure, but also responds to various impacts created, at least in part, by the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons. Following in the aftermath of the agreement on the UNPoA in 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted on 8 October 2005 the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (UN Tracing Instrument). As Garcia points out, “[p]rior to this, there were no harmonized regional or international system in place addressing marking, tracing, and record keeping” (2006, p. 117). While the UN Tracing Instrument addresses an important aspect of the small arms issue, it was criticized by arms control advocates for being too slow in the making—as it took four years to negotiate—for being ambiguous, for excluding ammunition,

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and for raising the possibility that governments will not be required to release relevant information publicly (Garcia 2006, p. 133). Also since the agreement on the UNPoA, the UN has commission Groups of Governmental Experts to consider the important issues of brokering and ammunition, legal instruments for which are well overdue. Entrenching Internationalism Like the aforementioned treaties, these soft law measures emerge from within particular intergovernmental organizations in response to unique historical circumstances. Unlike those treaties obliging state-parties to regulate industrial and commercial sectors, soft law measures tend to encourage restraint over official transfers. Whereas the ECOWAS Moratorium prohibits the import and export of these weapons by its participants, the EU Code of Conduct, the OSCE Document, and the Wassenaar Arrangement each provide a set of criteria against which participants ought to assess proposed transfers. The EU Code of Conduct, for example, contains eight criteria against which potential exports are to be assessed before they should be authorized for transfer. This focus on sovereign-bound actors reflects an acknowledgement that governments can be complicit with the problem they seek to solve. Not all attempts to restrain officially-authorized transfers are expressed so strongly, however. Whereas the UNPoA calls for governments to assess export applications in light of “the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade,” the Nadi Framework merely urges PIF member-states to “notify one another when firearms, explosives, other related materials and prohibited weapons are in transit through their respective territories.” The OSCE Document, the Andean Plan, and the UNPoA also call for brokers of small arms to be regulated, and for their professional activities to be authorized, a measure which would further enhance governments’ ability to control and restrain transfers. This serves to strengthen the dichotomy between sovereign-bound and sovereign-free actors in a way that reinforces the existing politico-strategic governance architecture. Beyond restraining officially-authorized transfers of small arms, soft law measures also address other major aspects of the challenge of controlling these weapons, some of which may have been addressed by particular treaties but neglected by others. While not all measures encourage better stockpile management and improved security of government-held stockpiles, the OSCE Document, Andean Plan, and the UNPoA each do so explicitly, as do the SADC Firearms Protocol and Nairobi Protocol. Moreover, these five international frameworks also call for cooperative law-enforcement operations targeting illegal production and trafficking, as well as public awareness campaigns and weapon-surrendering initiatives aimed at civilian users. Each of these measures further provides for the destruction of surplus government-held weaponry, as well as of those weapons seized and confiscated from criminal users. This commonality between soft law measures and treaties, which creates a mosaic of responsibilities comprising

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of obligations and commitments, is further strengthened where governments implement more than one of these frameworks. Many of these soft law measures interconnect and create a mosaic of commitments to better control small arms. The UNPoA recognizes this and encourages governments to strengthen existing moratoria, as well as any other regional and subregional attempts to prevent and combat small arms trafficking. More specifically, the EU Code of Conduct refers to the Wassenaar Arrangement, the EU Joint Action on Small Arms welcomes the ECOWAS Moratorium, and the Andean Plan refers to the UNPoA. The linkage between the ECOWAS Moratorium and the Wassenaar Arrangement has proven particularly valuable because weaponsproducing governments participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement, as well as former Cold War opponents, former colonial masters, and major arms-producing firms, have each supported the Moratorium (Herbert 2000b, pp. 26—29). Soft law measures also interconnect with treaties. Whereas the EU Code of Conduct refers to treaties regarding weapons of mass destruction, the Andean Plan refers to the OAS Convention. Adopting definitions of key terms appearing in previous treaties, the UNPoA builds upon an emerging mosaic of obligations by selecting standards and identifying norms from those treaties: its Preamble recognizes that the UN Firearms Protocol “establishes standards and procedures that complement and enforce efforts to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.” The UNPoA also encourages governments to conclude, ratify, and implement other “legally binding instruments aimed at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.” The Biting the Bullet Project team deems that this creates a “web of mutually reinforcing commitments” (2003, p. 4). This interconnectivity further helps to focus attempts to control small arms through regulatory means and to establish norms around these small arms control efforts. It is significant to note that these international frameworks, be they of subregional, regional, or global scope, tend to inform, as they are in turn informed by, the progress of other agreements. The UNPoA has, for example, built upon and overtaken some regionally focused soft law measures, while other instruments of international law have been informed by the UNPoA as it gathers momentum. This is significant because, as a recent Biting the Bullet publication notes: “As a general rule, where a sub-region has developed substantial regional agreements and programmes of action to address SALW issues, the states within that sub-region have made more progress towards national implementation of the PoA” (2006, p, 4). Informed by a belief in internationalism, these instruments of international law not only help entrench the primacy of this notion of the political, but also help strengthen the existing politico-strategic governance architecture. Like treaties, soft law measures also strengthen connections among intergovernmental organizations. In particular, the UNPoA seeks to strengthen links with Interpol, while the ECOWAS Moratorium seeks support from the AU and the UN. Like the UN Firearms Protocol and the Nairobi Protocol, the EU Code of Conduct, the Andean Plan, the OSCE Document, and the UNPoA each

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refer to the UN Charter, particularly to Article 51. The interconnectivity among the major efforts to compose small arms controls is evident in and further enshrined by those instruments of international law that refer explicitly to Security Council resolutions authorizing collective action. The EU Code of Conduct refers to the importance of supporting UN sanction regimes, while the OSCE Document gives focus to UN peacekeeping operations. Section II, paragraph 15 of the UNPoA encourages governments “to take appropriate measures, including all legal or administrative means, against any activity that violates a United Nations Security Council arms embargo.” As Elizabeth Kirkham and Catherine Flew observe: Whilst it is recognised that the UNPoA contains measures that relate only to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons […], if implemented fully, many of these would serve to strengthen the international apparatus of control, information exchange and provision of assistance relating to arms proliferation and misuse as a whole. In turn, this would greatly enhance the implementation of UN arms embargoes (2003, p. 8).

The Security Council reciprocated this interconnectivity when it “welcomed the results of the [2001 Small Arms] Conference and expressed the Council’s support for the actions that were agreed upon” (Rodriguez 2002: 175). Despite the fact that governments are its primary authors, the UNPoA calls for the participation of some nongovernmental actors, casting them in the role of arms control protagonists. Referring specifically to the potential role to be played not only by regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations, the UN Security Council, the WCO, and Interpol, but also by researchers and civil society organizations, this measure seeks to develop relationships with arms control protagonists beyond the prevailing governance architecture. Of particular relevance is paragraph 18 of Section III, which states the following: States, regional and subregional and international organizations, research centres, health and medical institutions, the United Nations system, international financial institutions and civil society are urged, as appropriate, to develop and support action-orientated research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

The UNPoA is not the only soft law measure invoking the involvement of these nongovermental actors: Section A of the Andean Plan seeks the “active involvement of civil society in formulating and implementing a national program of action” while the EU Joint Action provides for financial and technical assistance to the ICRC in particular. While the negotiation of soft law measures may foster willingness among governments to undertake action against illicit small arms manufacture and transfer, thereby enabling the better coordination of their efforts to compose small

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arms controls, these measures also prove useful for identifying those governments experiencing delays or difficulties in implementing international frameworks. The adoption of soft law measures encourages the international small arms community—other governments, civil society organizations, and researchers—to use them as a touchstone from which to scrutinize governments’ conduct. Indeed, the BMS in 2003 and in 2005 in New York, along with the UN Small Arms Review Conference held in 2006 also in New York, are pertinent to this undertaking. By creating a further source of external pressure upon those UN member-states displaying hesitancy or reluctance to follow through with and deliver on their commitments, soft law measures interconnect with the major efforts to compose small arms controls, including small arms research and arms control advocates. While treaties and soft law measures interrelate at both a technical and strategic level, these instruments of international law also seek to formally interconnect with other arms control protagonists’ strategies for, and approaches towards, composing small arms controls. Strategic Weaknesses Focusing upon such commonality among soft law measures tends to obscure the extent to which these international frameworks are conceptually incoherent. Representing a substantial range of commitments to compose small arms controls undertaken by UN member-states while also addressing some of the most disturbing consequences of small arms use, the UNPoA is broader in its conceptual scope than any of the treaties examined earlier in this chapter. However, as an autonomous framework the UNPoA contains reference neither to restraining the volume of small arms being produced, nor to reducing flows of small arms. Nor does it contain provision for oversight of official discretion pertaining to authorized transfers. (The need for such oversight is evident in recent arms transfers by the Group of Eight Industrialized Sates (G8), some of which have reached conflict zones, embargoed actors, and dubious regimes in recent years (Control Arms 2005)). Importantly, a definition of small arms is absent here too (Krause 2002: 250). The UNPoA is further limited by its neglect of regulating civilian ownership. As President of the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference, Rodriguez expressed his “disappointment over the Conference’s inability to agree, due to the concerns of one State, on language recognizing the need to establish and maintain controls over private ownership of these deadly weapons and the need for preventing sales of such arms to non-State groups” (UN General Assembly 2001a, p. 23). The US Government prevented consensus, though as is common in multilateral negotiations the known position of one delegation may also represent views and positions held by others. Even though other soft law measures deal with important aspects neglected by the UNPoA, some of these frameworks still have a very narrow focus. While most soft law measures seek to restrain officially-authorized transfers of small arms in order to limit their misuse, only the ECOWAS Moratorium restrains

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authorized production. The Wassenaar Arrangement, ECOWAS Moratorium, and the Nadi Framework do not provide for better stockpile management or for weapons collection and destruction programs. The Andean Plan, ECOWAS Moratorium, EU Code of Conduct, and the Wassenaar Arrangement do not place restraints on civilian ownership. This conceptual incoherence is common to both treaties and soft law measures and is important as these inconsistencies preclude a coherent response to the multifaceted challenge of controlling small arms. Just as state-parties are quick to claim status as arms control protagonists but help fuel the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms, governments with commitments under soft law measures undermine their claims to protagonist status by their actions. In addition to this conceptual incoherence, limited governmental capabilities dog these international frameworks. While negotiated within the UN General Assembly, the UNPoA does not necessarily apply to all UN member-states as some—specifically, Comoros, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Mauritania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, and Tuvalu—attended neither the 2001 Small Arms Conference, nor the 2006 Review Conference. 23 other UN member-states attended only one of these meetings (UN General Assembly 2001b; UN General Assembly 2001c; UN General Assembly, 2001d; UN General Assembly 2006a; and UN General Assembly 2006b). Because soft law measures are based on the consent of all parties, they are sometimes criticized as embodying little more than the lowest common dominators. The danger here is that “consensus is simply another name for allowing a reluctant state to impose its veto.” For Peters, consensus is a codeword for the “tyranny of the minority” (2006: 8). Excepting the UNPoA, soft law measures are undermined by their limited geographic coverage. Even though most governments participate in at least one of the major soft law measures introduced in this chapter, a number of key armsproducing governments do not. In particular, Brazil, PRC, Egypt, India, Israel, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and Taiwan, each considered by the Small Arms Survey to be either major or medium–sized producers of small arms (2001, p. 16), do not belong to either the EU Code of Conduct, OSCE Document, ECOWAS Moratorium, Nadi Framework, Andean Plan, or the Wassenaar Arrangement. In addition, because fewer than 40 countries regulate brokering activities, transfers of small arms continue regardless of the original production location (Biting the Bullet 2005, p. 6). Where governments consent to soft law measures, they do not necessarily always behave in accordance with their commitments, either acting in ways contravening these commitments or making uneven progress towards their fulfillment. The implementation of the UNPoA is an instructive example in this regard. According to the Biting the Bullet Project: After four years since the PoA was agreed, we are obliged to emphasise how little has so far actually been achieved in many respects….The scale of the

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interventions is generally not sufficient to have more than a local or marginal impact on the problems of SALW trafficking, proliferation and misuse….Many States have not really even put in place the basic mechanisms and procedures for PoA participation (Ibid, p. 10).

Just as treaties are undermined by state-parties failing to fulfill obligations, governments that are reluctant to abide by their commitments compromise the efficacy of soft law measures. Regardless of the reasons behind such reluctance— whether it is deficient infrastructure, insufficient resources, or inadequate political will—very limited means are available to compel governments to remedy their conduct in light of their commitments. This is especially so since the so-called ‘naming and shaming’ of those governments not acting in full accordance with their commitments has so far done little to inspire remedial action. Although most soft law measures aim to provide greater transparency surrounding small arms transfers, information exchanged through diplomatic channels usually remains confidential among governments as it circulates within the classified domain of the diplomatic channels used by defense or trade officials. Information pertaining to the quantity, type, and destination of officially-authorized small arms transfers therefore often falls beyond the scrutiny of civil society organizations, remaining unavailable also to commercial operators, arms control advocates, and small arms researchers. Although guidelines encourage officials to consult with other governments, the decision to transfer any item covered by the Wassenaar Arrangement, for instance, lies with the exporting authority, as it does within the EU Code of Conduct. Officials exercise discretion by judging what constitutes a destabilizing accumulation on a case-by-case basis when authorizing arms transfers. Confidentiality provisions ensure that information relating to the justifications surrounding officially-authorized transfers of these weapons or the denial of such transfers will, as Article IX of the Guidelines and Procedures for the Wassenaar Arrangement puts it, “remain confidential and be treated as privileged diplomatic communications.” This limits the effects of any improved transparency and accountability upon participating governments. While the details of these soft law measures are publicly available, specific information relating to the proposed, authorized, and prevented arms transfers occurring under their auspices is not. Sovereign-bound actors, then, both protect and use their sovereign prerogatives, further marginalizing those sovereign-free actors with an interest in the small arms issue, be they arms control protagonists or antagonists. Conclusion In July 2001, six-and-a-half years after Boutros-Ghali presented the supplement to his earlier ‘Agenda for Peace’ to the UN Security Council, the then-SecretaryGeneral Annan acknowledged that:

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Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control The world is flooded with small arms and light weapons numbering at least 500 million, enough for one of every 12 people on earth. Most of these are controlled by legal authorities, but when they fall into the hands of terrorists, criminals and irregular forces, small arms bring devastation. They exacerbate conflict, spark refugee flows, undermine the rule of law, and spawn a culture of violence and impunity. In short, small arms are a threat to peace and development, to democracy and human rights (2001, p. 1).

Even though these particular remarks celebrate the consensus reached over the UNPoA, such rhetoric and its attendant gestures must have been all too familiar to the wider international community by the turn of the millennium. Well briefed about the seriousness of the impacts associated with the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms, and recognizing the urgency required to control these weapons, policymakers began to negotiate and implement various international frameworks. This is not to suggest that these weapons, or the impacts they generate, are under control. Rather, it is merely a recognition of the fact that in the late 1990s member-states of various intergovernmental organizations were appreciating the dynamic contours and extreme magnitude of small arms impacts and have since agreed to numerous instruments of international law in an effort to compose small arms controls. These instruments of international law now comprise a mosaic of responsibilities shaping efforts to compose domestic regulatory regimes for small arms. By creating this mosaic of responsibilities, these instruments of international law constitute the central element of the international small arms community’s response to this urgent problem. In spite of the varying justifications emerging from within different intergovernmental organizations for addressing this problem, a strong commitment to the internationalist notion of the political informs these international frameworks, which in turn helps strengthen the prevailing politicostrategic governance architecture. Indeed, the instruments of international law considered here need to be understood as part of an ongoing negotiation between arms control protagonists and the politico-strategic governance architecture prevailing in contemporary world affairs. However, as an interrelated suite of international frameworks this mosaic of responsibilities has limited capability to exert control over small arms. Despite each of the four treaties examined in this chapter having entered into force, the geographic coverage of these frameworks is limited by the reluctance of many state-parties to ratify these agreements. Furthermore, while this chapter also introduces twelve soft law measures providing for regulatory regimes over small arms, relatively few governments act in a manner fully consistent with these frameworks. Where these international frameworks do take hold with their provisions realized as obligations and commitments, a conceptual incoherency precludes an effective, coordinated, and holistic response to the multifaceted problem of controlling small arms.

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Moreover, the negotiation and implementation of these international frameworks does not necessarily restrain those governments seeking to protect, pursue, and promote their sovereign interests. Even though insufficient resources and inadequate will might explain why some governments fail to act in full accordance with their international obligations and commitments, the mosaic of responsibilities is in itself a deficient mechanism for controlling small arms, with its primary deficiencies rooted in its conceptual incoherence, limited governmental capability, and a lack of resources. Significantly, much of the world’s weapons manufacturing capability falls beyond the reach of these international frameworks, particularly where treaty obligations are concerned. These international frameworks providing for domestic regulatory regimes over small arms are therefore rendered vulnerable to exploitation by a range of actors who contest the primacy of the internationalist notion of the political. While many governments criminalize unauthorized manufacture, transfer, and possession of small arms, the strengthened dichotomy between sovereign-free and sovereign-bound actors does not actually reduce the demand for these weapons and has yet to make an appreciable difference to the ease with which these weapons can be acquired. As Part III of this book demonstrates, the intended effects of these control efforts are easily mitigated by those international actors who produce, transfer, and use these weapons. But before the book considers those recalcitrant figures, the following chapter suggests the frustration caused by the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons to UN peacekeeping operations has not gone unnoticed by the UN Security Council. It explores the ways in which the Council composes two other kinds of international framework for controlling small arms through its resolutions authorized under the UN Charter.

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Chapter 5

United Nations Security Council By crafting resolutions authorizing sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations, the UN Security Council can create international frameworks that provide for small arms controls. Given that these resolutions, taken by the Security Council under the UN Charter, are to be respected by all of the UN’s 192 member-states, they generate responsibilities resonating throughout the politico-strategic dimension of world affairs. Some of these resolutions create obligations to implement, administer, and enforce sanction regimes, many of which contain arms embargoes that seek to prevent arms transfers from reaching targeted actors. Others encourage commitments, typically in the form of troop deployments, logistical support, and other resources required to establish and maintain peacekeeping operations, many of which involve DDR programs that seek to remove these weapons from the immediate reach of particular belligerents. When actioned, these responsibilities often have powerful transformative effects, particularly across local institutions of government, economies, and societies affected by conflict. But because this collective action seeks to maintain or restore international peace and security by preserving an existing order built upon governmental authority over particular areas of jurisdiction, these international frameworks can be understood as a response not only to instances of ongoing armed violence, but also to a broader, more profound condition of turbulence. Commencing with a brief outline of the formal procedure by which arms embargoes and DDR programs receive Security Council authorization, this chapter analyzes these two very different forms of arms control in terms of their strategic capability. It describes some of the ways in which the negotiation of resolutions within the Security Council is sometimes subject to considerations far removed from the immediate issues at hand. These resolutions nevertheless frequently serve to strengthen the dichotomy between sovereign-bound and sovereign-free actors, although resolutions identifying particular nongovernmental groups involved in armed conflict can help to enhance those groups’ standing as international actors despite their sovereign-free status. The chapter also describes the ways in which the effects of these considerations continue to shape mandates for collective action, often manifesting as strategic limitations for the arms control components of UN Security Council resolutions. This chapter notes the resemblance between various instruments of international law negotiated within intergovernmental organizations and the collective action authorized by the Security Council. In particular, both of these types of international framework help to create a mosaic of responsibilities comprising of obligations and commitments. This resemblance is brought into sharper focus by observing

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that the composition of international law by intergovernmental organizations enshrines and entrenches a particular notion of the political, which is identical to that asserted (at times forcefully) by the Security Council’s collective action. The chapter draws to a close by considering the UN’s monitoring processes, indicating some of the many difficulties confronting the Security Council when enforcing its resolutions. Authorizing Collective Action Founded in 1945 at the United Nations Conference on International Organization held in San Francisco, California, the UN was established in order to “maintain international peace and security” (UN Charter 1947, Article 1(1)). Under Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, the Security Council is granted primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security among UN member-states. The ability of the Security Council to recommend or introduce measures in order to maintain or restore international peace and security when it determines a threat to the peace exists, or that a breach of this peace or an act of aggression has occurred, is enshrined in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. Such preventative or remedial measures include sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations. For Andrew Mack and Asif Khan, these measures lie on a continuum of policy responses available to the Security Council, suggesting that sanction regimes not only help build international support for the potential collective use of force, but also grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the eventual use of that force by virtue of being “a crucial rung in an escalation ladder of coercive measures” (2000: 286; see also Tostensen and Bull 2002: 399). In accordance with Article 35(1) and (2) of the UN Charter, potential breaches of the international peace are brought to the Security Council’s attention by way of diplomatic representation by a UN member-state, or by a government that is not a member of the UN but nevertheless consents to the obligations inherent in the pacific settlement of disputes. Once an item is on its agenda as a subject of discussion, the Security Council determines if a breach of the peace exists and as a matter of course encourages diplomatic solutions by inviting parties to the conflict to inform its deliberation. The Security Council’s deliberation on the nature of the threat to international peace posed by a conflict, as well as the appropriateness of a UN response, has been far from consistent and unanimous throughout its 64-year history, however. Reflecting the relative military power distributed among governments during the establishment of the UN in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the UN Security Council has five Permanent Members: the US, UK, Russia, PRC, and France. Each of the Permanent Members can veto any measure perceived as interfering with the pursuit of their interests. Consequently, the utility of the Security Council was frequently held hostage by superpower rivalries during the Cold War. However, by January 1992 the then-US President George Bush (Snr)

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was able to espouse the following optimistic view regarding the First Persian Gulf War and the emergence of a new world order: The U.N. was all too often paralyzed by cruel ideological divisions and the struggle to contain Soviet expansion. And today, all that’s changed. And the collapse of imperial communism and the end of the cold war breathe new life into the United Nations. It was just one year ago that the world saw this new, invigorated United Nations in action as this Council stood fast against aggression and stood for the sacred principles enshrined in the U.N. Charter (1992).

The frequency of Security Council resolutions authorizing collective action has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, signalling that the power of veto no longer impedes the Security Council in the way that it did during the organization’s first 45 years. Since 1947, the Security Council has authorized 63 peacekeeping operations, 45 of which have been authorized since 1991. The absence of mandatory embargoes during the Cold War, save for embargoes targeting Southern Rhodesia (1966—79) and South Africa (1977—94), signals this disabling fracture of the Security Council along capitalist and socialist preferences, rather than any perceived weakness inherent in sanction regimes. Since the end of the Cold War, at least 16 sanctions regimes have been authorized (Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General 2006). As Simon Chesterman and Béatrice Pouligny put it, the “sharp increase in the recourse to sanctions appears to have had less to do with a consensus on their utility than with the more general political consensus that emerged within the Council after the Cold War” (2003: 504). This is not to suggest that the power of veto has become obsolete. Its use is evident in the self-immunization of the Security Council’s five Permanent Members against all UN enforcement action and, more specifically, in the retention of the comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq that the US Government proved reluctant to lift until it invaded and occupied that country in 2003 (Cortright et al. 2000, p. 18, p. 56). Since the end of the Cold War, the US Government has also cast at least eleven vetoes in relation to resolutions regarding Israel, reflecting the so-called Negroponte doctrine (Thakur 2006, p. 308). Nor does this suggest that the Security Council is now unanimous or even consistent in its appraisal of contemporary conflict as a threat to international peace. According to information collated by Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen (2006), there is a mismatch between the incidences of armed conflict and the UN Security Council’s collective action between 1990 and 2005. Consensus surrounding the necessity of potential UN peacekeeping interventions in major armed conflicts occurring in Southern Osettia, Chechnya, Tibet, and Northern   All figures cited here, unless otherwise indicated, are as up-to-date as possible at the time of writing. For more up-to-date information, refer to .

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Ireland remains elusive among members of the Security Council primarily because these high-profile examples fall within the so-called spheres-of-influence of the Russian Federation, PRC, and the UK respectively (Williams 2005: 164), with each wielding the power of veto. The potential conflict of interest between the responsibilities granted to the Permanent Members of the Security Council to preserve or restore international peace and their status as the five largest arms producers in the world has not gone unnoticed either (Kirkham and Flew 2003, p. 12). Incidentally, non-Permanent Members of the Security Council, particularly Nigeria, Mexico, India, and the Philippines, have similarly “resisted peacekeeping in their own civil wars, even as they have participated in peacekeeping missions elsewhere” (Fortna 2004: 281). The selectivity of recent collective action is often influenced by the perceived national interests of Security Council members and “[t]he letter of the law, as imbedded in the text of resolutions, loses prominence, while the most powerful states, especially the United States, interpret the spirit of the resolutions to meet their own particular interests” (Cortright et al. 2000, p. 6). The ongoing sanctions against UNITA, for instance, were in part encouraged by the importance of the Angolan government’s oil exports to France, the UK, and the US, as well as Angola’s importance as an arms market for Russia (Vines 2003, p. 252). At the same time, as Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull argue, in “anticipating the responses of domestic constituencies, government representatives in the Security Council may be guided more by shifting popular sentiments at home than by the merits of the case itself” (2002: 396). To further complicate matters, diplomatic objectives—and the interests upon which these objectives are based—vary among Security Council members, as they do between the Security Council and the General Assembly. The calculations informing which conflicts are determined by the Security Council to threaten international peace and security have less to do with the actual causes, conduct, and consequences of armed violence occurring in remote parts of the world than they do with the ways in which those conflicts impact on the interests of Security Council members. Where collective action authorized by the Security Council does address instances of ongoing armed violence, these instances are often best understood as turbulence in world affairs. This is because armed nongovernmental groups engaging in contemporary conflict alter the ways in which global politics unfolds. Some of these groups—whether they mastermind and carry out terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., trade in conflict diamonds, or deploy child soldiers in situations of war—are not constrained by the conventional parameters of interaction into which they are often categorized. Moreover, the transformative effects of armed violence, including the destruction of public institutions, markets, natural resources, and traditional ways of living, are matched by equally profound transformations following from Security Council collective action. Here, then, armed conflicts and the associated international security responses both play important roles in the re-making of the maps of local and global politics.

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Reasserting Internationalism As mentioned in the Introduction, UN peacekeeping operations, especially those authorized since the end of the Cold War, embody an ongoing experiment in liberalization, reforming the political and economic institutions of conflict-affected countries. Paris elaborates further in At War’s End: In the political realm, liberalization means democratization, or the promotion of periodic and genuine elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, and respect for basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience. In the economic realm, liberalization means marketization, or movement toward a market-orientated economic model, including measures aimed at minimizing government intrusion in the economy, and maximizing the freedom for private investors, producers, and consumers to pursue their respective economic interests (2004, p. 5).

In prompting such liberalization, UN peacekeeping operations help transform local forms of governance into institutions that can easily become component parts of the prevailing politico-strategic governance architecture. These operations reflect the internationalist notion of the political that informs the Security Council’s resolutions to take collective action. Equally, they also shape governance institutions emerging in the aftermath of conflict in light of this preference for governments cooperating together in order address issues relating to international security. Situated within these kinds of peacekeeping operations and thus within this context of strategic and economic reform, DDR programs are a further form of “social engineering” (Pouligny 2004, p. 14), all the more significant because they have now become “something of a ‘post-conflict reconstruction orthodoxy.’” (Muggah 2005: 242; Muggah 2006: 193). Rather than refashion particular governance institutions in local settings, sanction regimes seek to alter an actor’s behaviour in ways intended to restore or maintain order. Despite the advice of numerous sanction committees and panel of experts’ reports—many of which imply arms embargoes are incapable of arresting flows of small arms and have by and large proven futile in limiting target actors’ capability to wage war (Shields 2005, p. 11)—these measures continue to be invoked by the Security Council. Even though effective implementation, administration, and enforcement of sanction regimes proves elusive, sanctions remain an important means of posturing for the 15 members of the Security Council. After all, “when sanctions are meant as a signal of disapproval or as a gesture of support for international norms, the very fact of nations joining together to impose such sanctions is itself a manifestation of success” (Cortright et al. 2000, p. 16). By asserting this internationalist notion of the political, which is enshrined and reinforced by the instruments of international law examined in the previous chapter, UN peacekeeping operations and sanction regimes seek to produce

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outcomes that strengthen the dichotomy between sovereign-bound actors seeking to obtain or maintain roles as state-makers exercising various degrees of authority over particular geographic areas, and sovereign-free actors who care little for sovereign prerogatives and territorial control. They do so because these collective actions occur as part of the ongoing negotiation between the UN Security Council and the politico-strategic architecture of which the UN Security Council is a part. There is, however, a sense in which the Security Council’s collective action can diminish the preference afforded to governments as the primary actors of world affairs. Although governments are the prime actors administering sanction regimes, non-governmental actors—such as Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaida and insurgent groups in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Angola—are, or have been, targets of arms embargoes. By using its collective measures to deny nongovernmental actors unrestricted access to arms procurement, the Security Council necessarily grants a limited degree of recognition to them as significant international actors that represent a force to be reckoned with (Naylor 2000, p. 178). A similar recognition is granted to those belligerent nongovernmental actors involved in contemporary conflict to which the Security Council responds with peacekeeping operations and with whom, in some cases, the UN helps to negotiate peace settlements. Moreover, UN member-states that assist embargoed actors (be they sovereignbound or sovereign-free) to acquire small arms implicitly challenge this notion of the political by advancing their specific interests at the expense of cooperating with other governments in a positive-sum game. The international frameworks providing for small arms controls are further undermined by those governments which are party to treaties providing for small arms control but are also the target of a sanction regime: while Liberia has signed the UN Firearms Protocol, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and the DRC are each signatories to the Nairobi Protocol. This incongruous interconnectivity does little to strengthen the international small arms community and its efforts to compose small arms controls. Instances of cooperation between the UN Security Council and regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations such as the EU, AU, or ECOWAS can help buttress the existing governance architecture. This is particularly evident where various UN peacekeeping operations are coordinated among more than one organization. Although the Security Council’s delegation of enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter has in the view of some analysts exposed the UN’s lack of contemporary relevance, exercising this policy choice represents “not the marginalization of the UN but the emergence of a new division of labour in the field of peace operations which will stretch existing UN capabilities to the limit,” as Peter Viggo Jokobsen contends. He goes on to write: “This division of labour limits the role played by the UN in Chapter VII operations to authorization, monitoring and civilian support, but leaves the UN in the driver’s seat with respect to Chapter VI activities” (2000: 175). This cooperation among intergovernmental organizations is equally evident where regional organizations, such as the EU, duplicate some of those arms embargoes imposed by the UN Security Council, though the EU also imposes

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arms embargoes autonomously from the UN, targeting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Myanmar, PRC, and Zimbabwe, for instance. The EU’s negotiation of embargoes has been quicker than similar negotiations occurring in the UN Security Council. EU arms embargoes are voluntary, however. According to Vanessa Shields, as at 31 March 2005 there were 13 EU and UN embargoes in force, one of which is “an autonomous UN arms embargo, two are EU embargoes with wider scope than their UN counterparts, six are EU arms embargoes that duplicate UN arms embargoes, and four are autonomous EU arms embargoes” (2005, p. 6). Such cooperation among intergovernmental organizations authorizing collective action reinforces current governance configurations, illustrating the ways in which subsystems of governance at the global, regional, and subregional levels interconnect in order to achieve their particular ends. In short, whereas those treaties and soft law measures negotiated within various intergovernmental organizations help enshrine and entrench the commitment to internationalism and strengthen this politico-strategic governance architecture, the Security Council’s resolutions for collective action forcefully assert this particular notion of the political, helping extend the reach of the governance architecture to areas where governmental authority has been eroded or, in some cases, has collapsed under the burden of conflict. Indeed, sanction regimes in particular “are often a biting and devastating tool of economic coercion and need to be understood as instruments of forceful diplomacy” (Cortright et al. 2003, p. 7). The Security Council’s preference for these international frameworks is unsurprising given its centrality to the politico-strategic governance architecture prevailing in world affairs. Authorizing Arms Embargoes within Sanction Regimes Since the early 1990s, the Security Council has crafted resolutions establishing at least 13 sanction regimes that compose small arms controls in the form of arms embargoes. These resolutions are articulated in accordance with Article 41 of the UN Charter, which authorizes measures that “include complete or partial interruption of economic relations, and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Consequently, arms embargoes almost always constitute only a single element of a wider sanction regime and usually accompany restrictions over the trade of other commodities and resources, and the prohibition of activities such as granting travel visas to targets or facilitating their international travel. As Angela Woodward explains: Arms embargoes are intended to halt the flow of weapons and the provision of training and related services to the government, regime or a named militia within the target state or states. They are often accompanied by sanctions regulating transportation, particularly aviation sanctions and naval blockade, which reduce

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The intent here, then, is for an arms embargo to help limit a targeted actor’s capability to wage war by restricting their access to weapons procurement. They feature as part of a wider set of restrictions encouraging a target to behave in accordance either with the Security Council’s will in respect to a specific set of circumstances, or with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter: namely, the prevention of acts of aggression or breaches of the peace, or the restoration of peace where it has been compromised. Hence, those arms embargoes undergoing periodic review also “become part of a wider negotiating process between the international community of states and a targeted elite” (Brzoska 2003: 522). Narrow Conceptual Focus As an international framework designed to exert control over small arms, these embargoes have a very narrow conceptual focus. They do not refer to exercising control over the proliferation of these weapons and lack provisions aimed at disarming combatants or at removing and disabling those weapons already available in these locations. Consequently, an arms embargo is less likely to prove effective where its target is largely self-sufficient in its military production, as was the case with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Andreas 2005: 341). In addition, because arms embargoes obviously cannot be applied retrospectively, they do little to limit the ability to wage war of those actors who have already procured and stockpiled a sufficient quantity of weapons. (Incidentally, although most sanction regimes authorized by the Security Council impose embargoes on the supply of weapons to targeted actors, arms embargoes do not in and of themselves expressly prohibit UN member-states from purchasing or otherwise acquiring arms exported by those actors.) Nevertheless, embargoes seek to create geographic enclaves in which the transfer of weapons to a targeted party is at least impeded or curtailed, and ideally prevented. As arms embargoes exist only as components of particular Security Council resolutions they are inherently conceptually narrow, focusing only on controlling small arms transfers in particular situations. Compared to the vast areas of jurisdiction covered by the various instruments of international law examined in the previous chapter, the collective actions authorized by the Security Council tend to concentrate upon very specific locales. While these embargoes often operate in some of the world’s deadliest trouble spots, not all trouble spots receive an equal share of the Security Council’s attention, deliberation, and resources. In contrast to the domestic regulatory regimes fostered by many governments’ responsibilities under international law, this collective action is also almost always temporary

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and in many cases very short-lived, especially when contextualized against the duration and intensity of many contemporary conflicts. Strategic Limitations In addition to a narrow conceptual focus, arms embargoes have significant strategic limitations, some of which reflect concessions made by members of the Security Council during their crafting of resolutions. Since May 2000, the Security Council’s negotiation of various embargoes has been somewhat impeded by disagreement over important practical issues such as an embargo’s duration. On the one hand, the Governments of France and Russia support the periodic review of an embargo’s effectiveness and the regular assessment of its wider consequences, while on the other hand the US and the UK Governments oppose the inclusion of such ‘sunset clauses’ in embargoes. Such opposition is not always intractable, however. Both the US and the UK do accept sanctions containing sunset clauses but continue to protest against their inclusion. This disagreement has its roots in the contrasting perspectives taken on the humanitarian consequences following the imposition of the sanction regime targeting Iraq, “which is in a class by itself as the longest, most comprehensive, and most severe multilateral sanctions regime ever imposed” (Cortright et al. 2000, p. 8). While this might appear to be simply a technical issue of little strategic importance, a Permanent Member exercising its veto in decisions regarding an embargo’s termination can cause embargoes without sunset clauses to endure indefinitely. Conversely, all Security Council members must accept the need for an extension to sanction regimes with predetermined timeframes (Brzoska 2003: 523; see also Chesterman and Pouligny 2003: 508—509). Sunset clauses may in principle enable the target of a sanction regime to apply pressure upon a single member of the Security Council to withhold its consensus, thereby drawing the term of a sanction to a possibly premature close. As Chesterman and Pouligny point out: even when there is agreement to impose sanction on a state or other actor, this agreement may in fact stem from different reasons particular to the various states imposing the sanctions. This leads to problems when implementing sanctions, and, in particular, when evaluating whether sanctions should be modified or lifted (2003: 506).

The effectiveness of arms embargoes may also be impaired by delays in their authorization and implementation. The formal deliberation of the Security Council, including the negotiation of any preventative or remedial course of action, can take considerable time. This lapse of time may provide armed actors involved in conflict with notice to acquire weapons, and to do so expediently. The Rwandan genocide stands as a powerful example of the efficacy of embargoes advertised and then delayed (though this example is also atypical in one important

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respect as Rwanda held a seat on the Security Council at that time). Embargoes directed at Yugoslavia following the unfolding of the Kosovo crisis in 1998 and at both Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 were similarly ineffective (Tostensen and Bull 2002: 383) due to their delayed implementation, while “the arms embargo against Liberia seems to have been effective in stopping arms shipments to that state, although this may be because Liberia has already obtained the weapons it needs and therefore is not seeking to acquire more” (Shields 2005, p. 12). Not all of the Security Council’s negotiations result in resolutions whose measures are mandatory. The Security Council has also authorized voluntary sanction regimes targeting Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Yemen. Just as the legally-binding nature of treaty law is a key distinction between it and its soft law counterpart—signalled by the use of the operative verbs ‘shall’ in treaties and ‘should’ in soft law measures—arms embargoes can be distinguished as being either obligatory or recommendatory in status (Woodward 2003, p. 6), though all resolutions made under Chapter VII are mandatory. This distinction becomes important when monitoring the implementation of embargoes because, where responsibilities are political rather than legal, “the verification process can only assess states’ adherence to, rather than compliance or non-compliance with, the obligation” (Shields 2005, p. 4). The decision to observe a voluntary embargo and the differing interpretations of its precise scope can easily undermine the intent behind that embargo through inconsistent application, leaving it in some cases “open to exporters to define what classifies as weapons and munitions, and there is considerable scope for the spirit of the embargo to be abused” (Kirkham and Flew 2003, p. 11). The technical scope of an arms embargo, as articulated in resolutions crafted by the Security Council, is also often vague. This leaves UN memberstates—including those targeted by a sanction regime, alongside those with responsibility for its implementation and administration—with considerable latitude in determining precisely what constitutes a serious breach of the letter of a particular embargo and which activities might be inconsistent with its intent. Most frequently, embargoes refer only to the sale or supply “of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts” (see, for example, UN Security Council 2006a, para. 15), without reference to the technical definitions used to underpin treaties negotiated within the UN, as well as within regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations. The definition provided by the UN Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms has not gained currency among those crafting Security Council resolutions either. The absence of criteria by which sanction regimes are deemed sufficiently successful for their lifting also contributes to those measures’ strategic limitations (Tostensen and Bull 2002: 378).

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Authorizing DDR Programs within Peacekeeping Operations Like sanction regimes, UN peacekeeping operations receive their mandate from and are often amended through Security Council resolutions. When invoked under Article 42 of the UN Charter, such measures are usually undertaken only after diplomatic efforts to ease tensions, invoke a cessation of hostilities, or resolve conflict have been exhausted. Unlike the sanction regimes that UN memberstates are obliged to observe, peacekeeping operations are resourced by voluntary contributions from member-states, with such commitments usually prompted by appeals from the Secretary-General. (The issue of member-states’ provision of resources is dealt with in Chapter 6.) While consistent with the Security Council’s responsibilities as enshrined in the UN Charter, the particular objectives of each peacekeeping operation vary according to the circumstances of its deployment. Because the UN has continued to develop its capacity to deploy peacekeeping operations since authorizing its first large-scale enforcement operation in the Korean peninsula in 1950 (Hillen 2000, p. 226)—with its operations now responding to increasingly complex circumstances and with mandates that are increasingly ambitious—there are now at least four discernible types of, or analytical distinctions drawn over, UN peacekeeping operations. As Virginia Page Fortna explains: Observer missions are typically small in size and involve unarmed monitors. Traditional peacekeeping missions are somewhat larger and involve lightly armed military units (often in addition to observers). They are usually authorized to use force only in self-defence. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions supplement traditional peacekeeping forces with large civilian components to monitor elections, train or monitor police, monitor human rights, and sometimes temporarily to administer the country. All three of these types of mission are based on the consent of the parties and are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Enforcement missions are authorized under Chapter VII, and do not necessarily require the consent of the belligerents. Their forces are generally better armed and larger, mandated to impose peace by force (2004: 270, emphasis added).

There are however a myriad of other distinctions drawn over these operations by analysts and “[d]ifferent analysts use different typologies to classify the many operations that have been mounted in five decades of UN experience,” as Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel observe (2001, p. 9). In practice, these analytical distinctions dissolve as many peacekeeping operations are perhaps more aptly described as ‘Chapter VI-and-a-half actions,’ a term coined by former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (Chesterman 2003: 370). The widespread availability of small arms constitutes a situational threat to almost all contemporary peacekeeping operations, especially given that peacekeepers are sent “where they are most needed rather than where peace is

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easy to keep” (Fortna 2004: 281). As noted in the Introduction, the legacies of weapons availability help problematize the distinction between conflict zones and postconflict settings, a situation that endangers those peacekeepers regardless of any formal recognition of a situation of war. Yet DDR programs are not established primarily to offer protection to UN forces, but rather are established because small arms are vital ingredients of conflict, helping to trigger and to prolong hostilities. While peacekeeping operations dating back to the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) in 1989 have had some form of arms control component, a UN report released in 2000 notes that, although the UN’s engagement in DDR programs is “relatively recent, it has rapidly become a well-established feature of post-Cold-War peacekeeping” (UN Security Council 2000e, para. 9). The term ‘DDR’ has become increasingly prevalent among Security Council parlance, especially in resolution texts. Drawing upon the Report of the Secretary-General on The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (2000), DDR is defined here as follows: Disarmament is the collection of small arms and light weapons and heavy weapons within a conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of combatants; it should also comprise the development of arms management programmes, including the safe storage and their final disposition, which may entail their destruction. Demining may also be part of this process; Demobilization refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life. It generally entails registration of former combatants; some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs; discharge, and transportation to their home communities. It may be followed by recruitment into a new, unified military force; Reintegration refers to the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training and job- and income-generating projects (UN Security Council 2000e, paras. 6 (a), (b), and (c)).

Of the 45 UN peacekeeping operations conducted since the early 1990s, 18 of those managed by the DPKO were authorized by resolutions referring explicitly to the administration of DDR programs (refer to accessed 16 October 2006). In the case of Rwanda, a DDR program was authorized by the Security Council, but overtaken by events on the ground. In contrast to the Rwandan example, the UN peacekeepers operating in the Central African Republic—officially known as the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)—had a formal role in the existing disarmament process that was limited to safeguarding previously collected weapons and monitoring their destruction. Important as this role was, once MINURCA peacekeepers discovered the disarmament process was far from complete, they

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began to actively pursue disarmament with the financial support of the UNDP (UN Security Council 1998b, para. 28). DDR programs are largely underpinned by a basic assumption: since small arms are used to create and articulate grievances, and can thereby engender and exacerbate insecurity, removing these tools of violence from the hands of particular belligerents will diminish conditions of insecurity in targeted locales. (However, even where it is believed that most available weapons have been surrendered, insecurity can persist as belligerents resort to alternative tools of violence, such as knives, axes, and farming tools, thus reigniting conflict (Douglas and Hill 2004, p. 24)). This rationale is supported by the UN’s experience in Angola during the early 1990s, where UNITA was not disarmed and subsequently refused to accept unfavourable election results, and reverted to paramilitary operations in order to pursue its politics (MacQueen 1998: 410; see also Alden 2002: 343). In order to counter their (ultimately justified) suspicions that UNITA had not disarmed, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had secretly established an elite paramilitary force with troop strength estimated at between 1,500 and 10,000 (Dzinesa 2004: 656). This led to what Jaremey McMullin dubs an ‘Angola Anxiety,’ whereby the Security Council vigorously pursues DDR programs in order to avoid similar scenarios that disrupt peace (2004: 626). As Ball and Hendrickson explain, “in a post-conflict setting, DDR may be a necessary component of improving security but it is by no means a sufficient condition” (2005, p. 11). Successful DDR programs, according to Robert Muggah, Philippe Maughan, and Christian Bugnion, function as: a temporary intervention designed to reduce insecurity. In laying the basis for security, DDR is supposed to establish the preconditions for development to take hold. DDR is not a substitute for development. Nor should it be carried out indefinitely….DDR includes a cluster of specific activities to reduce the number of weapons in the hands of ex-combatants, to ensure short-term reintegration assistance, to reform the security sector and to ensure the repatriation of foreign ex-combatants to their place of origin (2003, p. 5).

These DDR programs, then, are intimately linked to their parent peacekeeping operation’s objectives, while also contributing to subregional and regional security by taking out of circulation some of those weapons that might otherwise have been recycled from one conflict to another. Narrow Conceptual Focus Just as arms embargoes focus exclusively upon preventing arms transfers from reaching targeted actors, DDR programs focus exclusively upon removing these weapons from the immediate reach of particular belligerents. By focusing upon disarming combatants, DDR programs do not exert control over the proliferation of small arms, the transfer of these weapons beyond, or circulation within, areas of

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UN operations, and in most cases do not cover government-held stockpiles even where large surpluses of these weapons might exist. The prospects of successful disarmament are also easily undermined where weapons are collected and stored, but not destroyed. For instance, while the collection of over 200,000 small arms by the United Nations Mission to Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is commendable, none of these weapons were transferred to a centralized depot from the regions in which they were initially taken into custody, nor were they deactivated or destroyed. While these weapons may not have been used to reignite the conflict in Mozambique, loose controls over stockpiles resulted in significant leakages whereby collected weapons became commodities for organized criminal groups, either for their illegal use or for trafficking purposes, slipping into the black market (McMullin 2004: 632). As with arms embargoes, the technical mandates for DDR programs are also frequently vague, sometimes referring to peace accords that are not attached to Security Council resolutions. ONUMOZ is a useful example of this. In some cases, such as the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), resolutions are informed by ceasefire agreements over which the Security Council exerted scant influence and played little role in articulating (MacQueen 1988: 401—402; see also Dzinesa 2004: 650). This is important because: In the advent of a peace agreement, a large number of these armed groups are not officially considered as protagonists of the conflict, and therefore evade inclusion in programs. Similarly, a lack of emphasis on weapon holders not covered by DDR mandates (eg. civilians and militias) often constitutes a major flaw in many processes, especially in countries where ‘everybody is armed’ according to common belief (Pouligny 2004, p. 7).

The DDR program in Tajikistan, for instance, “primarily lessened the appearance, rather than the volume, of illegal small arms,” which are widely held by members of the public, as well as by political and criminal groups (Heathershaw 2005: 28). Where DDR programs are explicitly provided for in Security Council resolutions, definitions of small arms remain absent. Although this approach might allow force commanders operating on the ground to exercise the flexibility necessary in order to achieve their mission’s objectives, it does not always translate into an effective arms control strategy. For the most part, DDR programs administered as part of UN peacekeeping operations rely heavily on voluntary compliance. Former Secretary-General Annan articulated this point when he wrote in early 2001: The tracking down of armed groups and their disarmament by force are not peacekeeping functions….Any recommendation I make concerning the assistance MONUC can provide to the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, or resettlement process will be based upon the assumption that MONUC will not be called upon to use enforcement action. In some cases, it is anticipated that armed groups/elements serving with allied forces may present

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themselves to MONUC for voluntary disarmament and demobilization. MONUC may be called upon to assist (UN Security Council 2001c, para. 103).

If successful, such an approach is heavily indebted to other aspects of its parent peacekeeping operation, including security sector reform and postconflict development. Incoherent Mandates A disconnect among the various collective actions authorized by the Security Council represents a lost opportunity to exert control over small arms. During the 1990s in particular, the Security Council responded to conflicts in Angola, Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia in such a way that sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations coincided; in Haiti, sanction regimes were followed almost immediately by the authorization of a peacekeeping operation there. However, resolutions mandating these activities do not always explicitly connect arms embargoes with DDR programs. UNMIL’s mandate, for example, did not extend to enforcing the arms embargo targeting Liberia, not only exposing “a serious security gap that threatens the integrity of the mission as a whole” (Aboagye and Bah 2004, p. 17), but also enabling weapons to flow to other combatants and criminals in the immediate region and beyond. Similarly, both UNAVEM III and the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) did little to ensure the sanction regime targeting UNITA was impermeable, thereby enabling UNITA to generate revenue from the sale of diamonds, which it subsequently used to procure further weapons (Dzinesa 2004: 657). More recently, UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed contiguously as a response to conflicts in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as in the DRC, Sudan, Central African Republic, Angola, and Burundi. Yet as Festus B. Aboagye and Alhaji M.S. Bah explain, “at the operational level, disparities in the DDDR processes between the contiguous missions in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire provide a gap through which some of the deadly arsenal could fall into the hands of excombatants roving as regional mercenaries” (2004, p. 17). Similarly, sanction regimes targeting Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, have undergone contiguous implementation without mandates referring explicitly to their neighbouring regimes. There is, however, a nascent interconnectivity evident in some very recent resolutions which provide force commanders with the mandates to cooperate with contiguous deployments: United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and the United Nations Organizations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) are instructive examples of such interconnectivity, with ONUB’s mandate referring explicitly to “deterring foreign combatants from infiltrating the border, curtailing the flow of illegal weapons and assisting in the monitoring of the arms embargo against the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (UN Security Council 2005b, para. 32).

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In short, the calculations inherent in the Security Council’s crafting of resolutions authorizing sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations can negatively affect the strategic capability of their auxiliary arms embargoes and DDR programs. In particular, considerations removed from the immediate issue at hand, including the superpower rivalry sustaining the Cold War and the Permanent Members’ perceptions of their own national interests—which include ongoing access to oil resources and shifting domestic public opinion—have served to both incite veto use and encourage consensus regarding Security Council resolutions. Just as the influence of powerful member-states both enables and impedes the multilateral negotiations occurring within intergovernmental organizations, it also enables and impedes the negotiations within the Security Council that shape the resolutions authorizing these two particular forms of arms control. Sometimes this results in a disconnect among these international frameworks that does little to strengthen the emerging mosaic of responsibilities. In fact, as international frameworks for small arms control, UN-authorized arms embargoes and DDR programs do not compensate for the strategic weaknesses of the instruments of international law examined in the previous chapter. This is partly because the arms control components of UN Security Council collective action have a very narrow conceptual focus, aiming either to prevent small arms transfers from reaching particular actors or to remove small arms from the grasp of particular belligerents. It is also partly because UN Security Council collective action is almost always designed as a temporary measure and is usually focused on a specific area of operations. Because arms embargoes and DDR programs rely heavily upon governments for their operation in much the same way as domestic regulatory regimes fostered under international law rely upon governments to be established, the poor administrative and enforcement capability of many governments, and the limited amount of resources available for administrative and enforcement tasks, also contribute to the strategic weaknesses of UN-authorized arms embargoes and DDR programs as international frameworks. As the Chapter 6 illustrates, these international frameworks are implemented in uneven ways, further constraining arms control protagonists’ major efforts. UN Monitoring Processes UN sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations are nearly always complex undertakings, potentially involving all UN member-states. Monitoring these collective actions is an immense task, which also requires the provision of resources, expertise, and political will if these actions are to have effect and are not reduced to mere paper tigers. As the remainder of this chapter shows, sovereignfree actors such as civil society organizations work together with sovereign-bound actors in order to effectively monitor these undertakings, which attempt to counter not just armed violence but also the underlying condition of turbulence of which armed violence is sometimes a symptom.

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Monitoring Sanction Regimes The Security Council first instigated sanction committees as a means of monitoring the implementation and administration of its sanction regimes in 1996. Tasked with collecting, compiling, and analyzing reports issued by UN member-states regarding their own conduct in relation to particular embargoes, these early committees proved somewhat ineffectual until the Security Council enlarged their mandate to include investigating suspected instances of non-compliance (Shields 2005, p. 10). The first sanction committee with an investigative mandate was led by Canadian ambassador, Robert Fowler. Until the release of the Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA (Fowler Report) in 2000—which named Zaire, Togo, Burkino Faso, and Bulgaria as among those responsible for undermining the sanction regime imposed upon UNITA (UN Security Council 2000b, para. 51; for a discussion of the Fowler Report, see Vines 2003, pp. 249—253)—little official information was publicly available regarding the impact of embargoes upon their targets and the methods by which the regime’s provisions are circumvented. While the Fowler Report was criticised by France for its apparent bias against francophone countries, its findings disputed by those named within it, and few of its recommendations implemented by the Security Council, the Report’s value lies in the new level of transparency accorded to sanction violations within the UN system (Brzoska 2003: 524). Since the release of the Fowler Report, the Security Council has established sanction committees for almost all of the regimes it authorizes—although Sudan and Cambodia are notable exceptions in this regard (Cortright et al. 2000, p. 123, p. 140)— and these committees issue regular reports signalling implicit shortcomings inherent in arms embargoes. The use of a panel of experts to provide independent reports to sanction committees was another enduring initiative informing the Fowler Report, though the first panel was designed to monitor the 1995 arms embargo targeting the Hutus in Rwanda (Chesterman and Pouligny 2003: 506). These panels are significant since, according to Alex Vines, “[s]anction committees and the [Security] Council are normally bogged down by diplomatic procedure, protocol and consensusseeking, but independent panels are not tied to these norms and can provide information that members of the Council may dissociate themselves from” (2003, p. 251). The ongoing efforts of various civil society organizations in exposing sanction violations and detailing the humanitarian consequences associated with the imposition of sanction regimes complement the work of these in-house committees (Chesterman and Pouligny 2003: 506). The overlap here signals further nascent interconnectivity among the international small arms community, especially as sanction committees draw at times upon necessary expertise from outside the UN system, interacting with sovereign-free individuals. However, even though the now routine establishment of these sanction committees partly compensates for the UN’s insufficient monitoring capability, the “sanction committees established in each case to oversee implementation

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[have] varied in effectiveness according to the degree of politicization of the particular episode, its relative priority for the major players, and the leadership provided by the committee chairs” (Cortright et al. 2000, p. 5). In some cases, UN member-states suspected of violating arms embargoes deliberately delay and frustrate panels’ investigations, which rely upon member-states’ collaboration for their information (Kirkham and Flew 2003, p. 17). A recent sanction committee report, dealing with sanctions targeting Al-Qaida and the Taliban, speculates a few reasons for the non-reporting of over half of all UN members: In addition to the possible lack of political determination to submit such reports, other possible factors were also identified, such as (a) reporting fatigue; (b) lack of resources and technical capacity; and (c) coordination difficulties at the national level. Recognition of the possible presence of Al-Qaida or those associated with the network within its territory furthermore appears to be a stigma to some states (UN Security Council 2004b, para. 19).

Another recent development of particular significance is the establishment of an Analytical Support and Sanction Monitoring Team which, like the panels of experts, informs sanction committees’ work (see, for instance, UN Security Council 2005). As with the Fowler Report however, the Security Council has demonstrated its reluctance to pursue the recommendations of these reports, sometimes, as Michael Brzoska notes, “for political reasons, sometimes because their implementation would have required resources that member states were unwilling to mobilize” (2003: 524). Regardless of the specific reasons for lapses in the administration of arms embargoes—which range from incompetence to wilful negligence and corruption—and notwithstanding these recent monitoring processes, verifying a UN member-state’s compliance with an embargo remains a difficult task for the Security Council. While the reports issued by sanction committees help illuminate suspected violations of these embargoes, the deterrence effect created by socalled naming-and-shaming of those contravening a sanction regime is difficult to measure, and alternative punishments have not yet been instituted or routinely applied. Although force, including naval blockades and border patrols, is sometimes used to ensure targets do not succeed in violating an embargo of their own accord, the collective use of force has not yet been employed to enforce provisions of sanction regimes on those member-states whose non-compliance is detected. Consequently, there is little in the way of penalties and, thereby, deterrence for so-called sanction busters. When Liberia was denounced for breaching a sanction regime, a secondary sanction regime was imposed upon it. The impact of this sanction regime may well have been negligible, especially given Charles Taylor and “Liberia [were] on many governments’ list of culprits anyway, and there are few who have less power, money, and friends at the world organization” (Brzoska 2003: 531). In general, however, such secondary sanction regimes are seldom

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applied, diminishing the UN’s already limited capability to implement its sanction regimes. While such sanction-busting governments hinder the efficacy of UN Security Council-authorized collective action, they also assert a different notion of the political by placing their narrowly-defined national interests ahead of the internationalist ideal of governments cooperating together to in order achieve mutual benefit. Monitoring Peacekeeping Operations Just as the Security Council establishes committees to review and report on particular sanction regimes, it also requests that the Secretary-General provide regular reports detailing the conduct of the peacekeeping operations it authorizes. Former Secretary-General Annan also initiated reviews himself in order to improve the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The Report of the Panel of Experts on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) (2000) produced many frank and far-reaching recommendations, including “that legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programs into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict” (UN Security Council 2000d, para. 4�������������������� 7(c)).�������������� In doing so, however, the Brahimi Report took a “disproportionate focus on disarmament and demobilisation, at the expense of longer-term activities such as reintegration,” much like those “[d]onors and governments [that] continue to prioritize, even fetishize, the gathering of hardware” (Muggah 2005: 246; see also Muggah 2006: 197—198). In contrast to the Fowler Report, the Brahimi Report had almost twothirds of its recommendations acted upon in some way. Using this monitoring capability, the Security Council has in particular increased the speed with which its operations are deployed and according to Mats Berdal this represents “some evidence of a capacity on the part of the organisation to respond to criticism and adopt functionally to new tasks and changing circumstances” (2004: 91). Unless the Security Council undergoes significant reform, however, little is likely to change in the near term to improve the drafting, observation, and enforcement of its arms embargoes, as well as the planning and conduct of its DDR programs. In any case, reform introduced from within the UN might simply serve to entrench existing constraints with respect to the collective action authorized by the Security Council. Remarking upon the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Thakur laments: the report is itself state-centric in its approach to Security Council reform. The regions of the world are divided and grouped according to numbers of states. Yet India by itself has more people than all of Africa with 53 countries, as well as the Americas with 35 states. To ignore population as a criterion of representation seems as odd as to insist on operationalising it mathematically to the exclusion of all other criteria (2005, p.12).

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The extent of and ramifications following any major Security Council reform remain to be seen; as Brzoska warns, “[s]anctions reform at the UN, like all UN reform, stops where major powers want it to stop” (2003: 533). Conclusion Granted the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security among UN member-states, the UN Security Council relies upon sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations as the central tools through which it expresses and enforces its will. In so doing, and increasingly since the early 1990s, the Security Council has responded, and continues to respond, to the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms, preceding the major efforts of small arms researchers, intergovernmental organizations, arms control advocates belonging to civil society organizations. Together with treaty law and soft law measures, arms embargoes and DDR programs help constitute an emerging mosaic of responsibilities to compose small arms controls. Like treaties, arms embargoes generate obligations for governments, and like soft law measures DDR programs invite voluntary commitments. These international frameworks also interrelate at a conceptual level as some instruments of international law generate various responsibilities for governments to regulate international small arms transfers and obligation exist among all UN memberstates to refrain from transferring arms to embargoed actors. Since governments can be party to various treaties, abide by certain soft law measures, and have status as UN member-states, some of these international frameworks overlap in terms of their geographical reach. An internationalist notion of the political not only informs the negotiation of instruments of international law and the crafting of UN Security Council resolutions, but is also asserted, sometimes forcefully, by the collective action authorized by the Security Council. However, like the instruments of international law fostering domestic regulatory regimes for small arms examined in the previous chapter, the resolutions authorizing arms embargoes and DDR programs are strategically weak as international frameworks for controlling small arms. The weaknesses of the arms control components within UN Security Council collective action lie in their narrow conceptual scope, their temporary nature, and their often very specific geographic focus. Just as the domestic regulatory regimes depend upon the administrative and enforcement capabilities of the governments that establish them, so too do arms embargoes and DDR programs rely upon governments for their operation. This reliance of governments, many of which have very limited administrative and enforcement capabilities, and the provision of insufficient resources to animate and sustain arms control efforts, contributes to the strategic weaknesses inherent in these international frameworks. As Part III of this book will demonstrate, other international actors exploit these weaknesses and hotly contest the internationalist notion of the political informing

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the major efforts of arms control protagonists. But before Part III explores ways in which arms traders and weapons users mitigate the intended effects of those efforts to compose small arms controls, the following chapter briefly examines the ways in which governments fulfil their obligations and commitments under these international frameworks.

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Chapter 6

Governments Governments are vital to the composition of small arms controls, playing several roles as arms control protagonists. A few governments help facilitate small arms research, encouraging and supporting the efforts of some contract researchers and independent research centers, as well as some of those civil society organizations contributing to the burgeoning small arms literature. As member-states belonging to various intergovernmental organizations, many governments help negotiate and implement those instruments of international law that provide frameworks for domestic regulatory regimes over small arms. As members of the UN Security Council, a few governments even help craft resolutions invoking sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations, the mandates of which articulate two different types of international framework for controlling small arms. As UN member-states, governments observe these arms embargoes and contribute to the administration of some of these DDR programs. But most importantly, many governments establish, administer, and enforce domestic regulatory regimes for small arms within their respective jurisdictions. The first section of this chapter examines some of the ways in which governments seek to operationalize those instruments of international law described in Chapter 4. By establishing, administering, and enforcing regulatory regimes for small arms, governments are acting here mostly as member-states cooperating within various intergovernmental organizations. The need for governments to demonstrate and reinforce their authority through these domestic regimes underscores the significance of a broad range of nongovernmental actors playing roles in world affairs, as well as illustrating an important interaction between governments as collectivities and weapons manufacturers, arms brokers, dealers in firearms, and gun-owning civilians as individuals. The second section of this chapter identifies some of the major constraints facing governments operationalizing the arms control components of those UN Security Council resolutions described in Chapter 5. While the success of these arms controls do not necessarily translate into effective sanction regimes or peacekeeping operations, the resolutions articulating these international frameworks can seriously impair the operation of those small arms controls. Particular focus is given here to the often unintended consequences of these arms embargoes and DDR programs, some of which result in outcomes that will hinder subsequent efforts to compose small arms controls. Even though governments make uneven progress towards fulfilling their relevant international responsibilities, that which they have already made represents significant progress towards composing small arms controls. While this progress has been uneven and can sometimes produce unwelcome outcomes, most

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governments continue to demonstrate a strong commitment to the internationalist notion of the political. In fact, this chapter argues that many governments are quick to seize upon these international frameworks as opportunities to exercise and reinforce their authority, strengthening the politico-strategic governance architecture of which they are an important element. These governments do so by composing small arms controls in ways that strengthen the dichotomy between sovereign-bound and sovereign-free actors, though governments express this commitment to varying degrees. Having said that, however, any progress made by governments towards establishing, administering, and enforcing small arms regulatory regimes, observing arms embargoes, or contributing to UN-authorized DDR programs is best understood in light of the strategic weaknesses of these emerging frameworks, many of which were described in the previous two chapters. Regulatory Regimes The international small arms community has expended much effort in developing instruments of international law as frameworks providing for regulatory regimes over small arms. As outlined in Chapter 4, member-states belonging to various intergovernmental organizations have negotiated a total of four treaties and a dozen soft law measures; the former can create legal obligations for governments to act in accordance with certain treaties while the latter can generate political commitments to act in ways that are consistent with certain soft law measures. Many governments now act in ways fulfilling at least some of these international responsibilities, working towards establishing, administering, and enforcing domestic regulatory regimes for small arms within their respective jurisdictions. Although some governmental efforts to compose small arms controls may occur independently of these international responsibilities, many of these efforts nevertheless align with those responsibilities. There are, of course, various ways in which governments seek to operationalize these frameworks, including establishing a legislative basis for regulatory regimes as well as a capability to administer and enforce these regimes’ control over the proliferation, transfer, possession, collection, and disposal of small arms. Small Arms Proliferation Most governments have some longstanding laws concerning small arms manufacture, though some laws are more sophisticated than others. In some instances, governments have enacted legislation but have chosen not to establish accompanying regulatory systems. While establishing a sound legislative basis is often a necessary condition for creating small arms regulatory regimes, it is an insufficient one on its own. Many governments have recently reviewed their

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existing laws controlling small arms proliferation in light of the UNPoA, with some approving new licensing procedures, closing loopholes, and addressing craft production within their regulatory regimes (Biting the Bullet 2006, pp. 187—188). Governments have taken further steps towards establishing regulatory regimes over small arms manufacture by enacting legislation providing for small arms to be marked uniquely during the production process. At the same time, such legislation criminalizes small arms manufacture that does not adequately include these markings, introducing various penalties including the revocation of operating licenses, fines, and terms of imprisonment of up to six years. Over 50 governments now administer regulatory regimes requiring authorized small arms manufacturers to comply with weapons-marking requirements. These unique markings usually identify the country of manufacture, the manufacturer, and the particular weapon’s serial number. Some markings also include the year of production as well as the type and calibre of the weapon. A few governments have further extended their regulatory regimes to include marking ammunition uniquely during its production. Enabling governmental agencies to administer and if necessary enforce these marking requirements, some governments have also introduced record-keeping requirements for arms manufacturers. A number of governments have made progress in various ways towards establishing, administering, and enforcing these marking requirements, though others declare small arms manufacture nonexistent within their areas of jurisdiction, announcing that no responsibility to mark weapons exists (Parker and Cattaneo 2008, pp. 47—54). Small Arms Transfer Governments have also made progress towards regulating international small arms transfers. Most governments have enacted legislation and established regulations and administrative procedures controlling the export and import of small arms either into or from their areas of jurisdiction, though import controls are more common than are export controls. Some governments also assess the risk of diversion as part of their export controls, though only a few require that they be notified if their small arms exports are retransferred. In addition, some governments take into consideration human rights records and the protection of fundamental freedoms as well as the risk of terrorism and armed crime when assessing small arms export applications. Other governments have merely reviewed existing export and/or import control legislation (Biting the Bullet 2006, pp. 147—148, pp. 152—153). As a form of import regulation, some governments require weapons to be marked uniquely in accordance with local arms-manufacturing requirements at the time they are imported into their area of jurisdiction. Other governments do not require such markings for all incoming small arms: for example, Russia argues that its “Armed Forces and State paramilitary organizations use only domestically produced small arms and

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light weapons, so that the problem of marking imported weapons of that type does not exist” (Parker and Cattaneo, p.55). In terms of export controls, some governments rely upon end-user certificates listing weapons’ intended recipients while several others have reviewed, amended, or plan to implement such systems. Information and documents provided as part of the certification process are verified by governments, with some utilizing their diplomatic posts in recipient countries for this purpose while others rely on open-source information. A few governments also conduct post-delivery checks, including on-site inspections. In addition, approximately eighty governments regulate small arms consignments transiting their territory in some way, though some regulations are more effective than others: small arms consignments must be accompanied by an armed escort when transiting Hungary, for instance. Hong Kong and Singapore, both major commercial shipping hubs, have strong regulatory controls in place concerning small arms consignments. At the same time, there are a handful of governments claiming that they neither export small arms nor have small arms transit their territories, precluding the need for such systems (Biting the Bullet 2006, pp. 156—162). A subject of much contention among arms control protagonists, the regulation of small arms brokering can be complex. As Sarah Parker and Silvia Cattaneo point out, arms brokering “is often distinct from that of exporters/importers, particularly because it does not entail actual acquisition or possession of the weapons by the broker” (2008, p. 20). Some governments point to existing general legislation that could be applied specifically to regulate small arms brokering while at least 30 governments are in the process of introducing new or amending existing legislation with provisions specifically addressing brokering. At least 35 governments currently have such legislation in place, with some covering broker registration and licensing, the use of end-user certificates, penalties for breaching these provisions, and arrangements for their extraterritorial application. Only a few of these emerging regulatory regimes specifically address the financing of illicit brokering activities, however. The relevant US law does so by defining brokering in broad terms that include transporting, financing, and freight forwarding where these activities enable small arms manufacture, export, or import. US citizens engaging in small arms brokerage are also subject to this law’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (Garcia 2006, p. 99). Some governments concede that no specific brokering controls exist in their territories, but declare that reviews are being undertaken or that revisions to existing legislation are planned. A few governments claim a monopoly over small arms brokering activities within their areas of jurisdiction, thereby rendering irrelevant the need for brokering controls. Others claim that small arms brokering does not occur in their areas of jurisdiction, arguing that it is therefore not an issue requiring regulation in their country (Parker and Cattaneo 2008, pp. 19—22).

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Small Arms Possession Over 130 governments have enacted legislation that criminalizes unauthorized small arms possession and at least 50 governments have recently reviewed their relevant legislation, frequently resulting in the tightening of administrative procedures and the adding of teeth to the relevant enforcement provisions. Many governments require civilians holding small arms to be registered as firearms owners, with licenses issued only after applicants satisfy certain screening procedures. For example, in many jurisdictions applicants with criminal records or histories of violence or psychological illness receive extra scrutiny. Governments also restrict the number and type of weapons eligible for authorized civilian possession, with many governments outlawing civilian ownership of fully automatic and semiautomatic assault rifles. Sometimes ammunition is also regulated by restricting sales to the calibre listed on a firearms user’s license. Governments also create gun-free zones, where licensed firearms owners may not take their weapons, in some cases extending a ban to all public places (Biting the Bullet 2006, pp. 203—205). Private security firms are also regulated by some governments and, once these firms are registered, those governments can conduct routine inspections of their premises and armories (Ibid, pp. 193—194). Comprehensive administration and enforcement of regulatory regimes would require that inventories of arms manufacturers and retail gun outlets are also subject to routine inspection. Governments have taken important steps towards better controlling official arsenals and stockpiles. Some governments have established sound legislative bases for managing small arms stockpiles and have detailed procedures administered and enforced by either military forces or the constabulary. Meanwhile, other governments undertake reviews of their existing systems and procedures, often with a view to identifying areas of improvement. In some cases, serious weaknesses in storage areas have been remedied by building new armories, and deficient storage depots have been closed and their stockpiles transferred to more secure locations (Biting the Bullet 2006, pp. 190—191). Governments take into consideration a range of public safety and security factors, including the remoteness of facilities to the general public and any environmental risks associated with these weapons (especially in the event of a natural disaster) before selecting appropriate locations in which to stockpile officially-held small arms. Physical security measures such as underground storage, the use of surveillance and alarm systems, and guard dogs have been introduced, as have procedures controlling access to stockpiled weapons, including dual keys required to unlock facilities. Many governments have introduced inventory management systems and accounting controls using electronic databases. These databases enable weapons to be easily registered as they enter or depart a storage facility, as well as the regular review of inventories on anywhere from a daily to an annual basis. A few governments have also adopted procedures to secure small arms during transportation by operational units or authorized personnel. In addition, governments provide training to

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stockpile managers and their staff, though some admit to having no specialist training for small arms arsenal security (Parker and Cattaneo 2008, pp. 27— 30). Some governments mark uniquely official arsenals (Ibid, p. 50) and others such as the Netherlands deem any state-owned small arms found without adequate marking to be illegal and require such arms to be destroyed. Many governments have established records of small arms held by governmental agencies and by civilians, in some cases relying upon computerized databases (Ibid, pp. 56—57). Some governments have also adopted certain procedures that must be followed if small arms leakage occurs, such as submitting an appropriate official report detailing the loss. Where stockpile security is breached, some governments impose administrative and disciplinary penalties upon those directly involved or responsible, though in circumstances where theft is detected governments have pursued criminal prosecutions (Parker and Cattaneo 2008, pp. 30—31). Some governments, however, claim not to have any significant stockpiles of small arms in their area of jurisdiction and are therefore not concerned with stockpile security and management. Small Arms Collection and Disposal As an important part of broader crime prevention strategies, many governments collect small arms through voluntary surrender campaigns and buy-back schemes, including exchanging authorized and unauthorized weapons for cash payments and in-kind rewards such as food vouchers. Governments such as New Zealand’s conduct ongoing firearms amnesties, though such amnesties do not usually extend to crimes perpetrated with surrendered weapons. Government law-enforcement agencies also seize illegal weapons, confiscating many of them after the completion of appropriate judicial processes (Biting the Bullet 2006, pp. 215—216). Some governments undertake disarmament initiatives as part of broader postconflict reconstruction agendas, with many programs managed by intergovernmental organizations or civil society organizations (Ibid, p. 212). Governments also support DDR programs within peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN Security Council, an issue receiving separate treatment later in this chapter. Many governments review regularly the extent of their own arsenals, though few seem willing or able to assess whether or not this inventory is adequate to satisfy their security and constabulary needs. Where governments do identify small arms as surplus to requirements, these weapons are sometimes separated from required weapons and marked accordingly. Sometimes governments identify small arms that are surplus to requirements but dispose of these weapons through trade or by donating them to other governments, education providers and training instructors, or museums. Some governments claim to possess no small arms that are considered surplus to requirements, while others admit a surplus but have not yet calculated the number of these or identified the specific arms (Parker and Cattaneo, pp. 34—39).

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Governments also deactivate small arms collected from ex-combatants during DDR programs and from civilians during gun amnesties, and illicit weapons seized from criminal gangs. Some governments deem any unmarked small arms to be illicit in their territories, though it is unclear if authorities routinely and actively seek to remove these unmarked weapons from circulation, destroy them, and impose penalties on offenders. Other governments confiscate unmarked weapons before either remarking or destroying them (Ibid, pp. 49— 50). Yet sometimes the weapons collected by governments—perhaps originally stored in official stockpiles—can become part of official arsenals. “If they are absorbed into state arsenals and are used by state forces, then this constitutes a form of disposal of a located weapon,” Parker and Cattaneo explain (2008, p. 37). According to the Biting the Bullet Project team. In countries dealing with small arms primarily in terms of crime prevention, including post-conflict countries where crime, banditry and youth violence have replaced political and factional armed violence, the disposal of weapons confiscated by public security authorities has become an issue of increasing importance. This is both because of the often weak stockpile management capacity of some states and, at times, the dispersion of confiscated weapons among the police, judges and other actors in the legal system in cases when small arms are being used as evidence in a criminal investigation (2006, p. 218). Hence, it is important for governments to retain the confidence of their citizens, especially where these citizens are disarming and placing faith in that government to provide for their security needs. This need is greatest in postconflict theatres, where a crisis of authority may already exist. When deactivating weapons, governments use a variety of methods including bending, splitting, cutting, crushing, shredding, boring a hole through the barrel, dismantling, burning, melting, smelting, converting to scrap metal, detonating, or dumping at sea, each of which is suggested in the Report of the Secretary-General, Methods of Destruction of Small Arms, Light Weapons, and Explosives (UN Security Council 2000, paras. 20—33 quoted in Parker and Cattaneo 2008, p. 38). Many governments seize those opportunities to also destroy surplus ammunition. Where governments intend to destroy these surplus weapons and ammunition, they sometime request assistance from the UNDP (Ibid, p. 37). While some governments embrace very public opportunities to destroy weapons collected through DDR programs, surrendered during amnesties, or seized as illicit weapons, few publicly destroy surplus official weapons (Ibid, p. 40). Embracing Internationalism In accordance with various instruments of international law, governments have made progress towards establishing, administering, and enforcing domestic regulatory regimes for small arms. By regulating small arms proliferation, transfer, and possession within their territories, these governments employ a problem-solving approach, creating an immediate distinction between lawful and

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unlawful activities. As sovereign-bound actors, governments can grant licenses or permits to manufacturers, brokers, and users of small arms, and can conduct routine inspections of factories, premises, and storage facilities. They can also collect and dispose of surplus small arms. While these governments can determine the appropriate amount and particular types of small arms produced, transferred, and possessed lawfully within their areas of jurisdiction, only those governments committed to the ECOWAS Moratorium have responsibilities to restrict the total amount of small arms produced legally within their territories. Furthermore, governments not only establish penalties for illicit small arms manufacture, transfer, and possession, but also target law-enforcement operations at detecting and deterring these unauthorized activities. Enshrined in domestic law, the distinction created between lawful and unlawful activities serves to sharpen the dichotomy between governments that are sovereign-bound, and weapons manufacturers, arms brokers, and civilian firearms users that are sovereign-free. By exercising their authority over these weapons manufacturers, arms brokers, and weapons users, governments recognize the significance of these actors to the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. This implicitly acknowledges that, despite the fact that many weapons-producing firms engage in lawful commerce with governments and private consumers, most of the weapons replaced by such acquisitions are neither deactivated nor destroyed. Instead, they are held in poorly-secured stockpiles or armories, sold at discount prices in order to offset the expense of weapons procurement, or in some circumstances are simply given away. Consequently, lawfully-produced and traded small arms can end up in the hands of criminals and belligerents inciting armed violence. Moreover, the unlawful activities of unauthorized firearms users often represent a credible threat to governments, as illustrated by Chapter 2’s discussion of the politico-strategic consequences of small arms impacts. Those actors subject to regulatory regimes, then, conduct activities that can manifest as challenges to a government’s authority. By drawing attention to this interaction between governments as collectivities and weapons manufacturers, arms brokers, and firearms users as individuals, postinternationalism helps illuminate some of the ways in which governments embrace international frameworks underpinned by an internationalist notion of the political as an opportunity to both exercise and reinforce their sovereign prerogatives. Cooperation Exercising and reinforcing their sovereign prerogatives, governments choose to cooperate with a range of arms control protagonists. As mentioned in Chapter 3, some governments contribute funding to researchers and research centers such as the Small Arms Survey and the ISS; they also help to fund civil society organizations such as IANSA, Gun Free South Africa, and the Biting the Bullet Project (Biting the Bullet 2006, pp. 238—242). Governments have also hosted, participated in, or contributed to multilateral conferences focused upon building the

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capability of other governments to establish domestic regulatory regimes for small arms. Many governments provide funding to intergovernmental organizations for specific small arms projects, though others provide “non-project specific funding to multilateral and regional institutions such as UNDP, which is then channeled into projects related to SALW” (Ibid, p. 236). Governments also provide funding to World Bank trust funds for DDR and small arms deactivation purposes. In addition to these multilateral efforts, governments also cooperate on a bilateral basis, providing financial support to particular governments for specific ends. For example, donor governments have helped recipient governments develop new laws and accompanying regulations, build new armories and establish sound stockpile management systems and practices, and collect and deactivate surplus weapons, including those confiscated following law-enforcement operations (Ibid, p. 238). To the same end, some governments have donated software to help with firearms registration (Parker and Cattaneo 2008, p. 78). In some cases, governments provide financial support for tracing projects, law-enforcement training courses, and technical assistance to other governments (Ibid, pp. 51—52). Governments provide equipment and technical expertise to assist with surplus small arms and ammunition destruction and with weapons recovery and destruction training. At times, governments have provided funds to help train law-enforcement officials to collect statistical data on stockpiles (Ibid, p. 40). During the five-year period immediately following the adoption of the UNPoA, approximately US$660 million has been spent on about six hundred different activities assisting nearly 100 countries to implement that soft law measure. Capability building, DDR programs, small arms destruction, and research feature as the issues most frequently addressed. While DDR programs received the lion’s share of funding (US$458 million), this was closely followed by the destruction of small arms and ammunition and then by stockpile management. Significantly, those DDR programs and destruction activities conducted by intergovernmental organizations received much of this funding (Maze and Parker 2006, p. 11). Much of these governmental efforts to assist the implementation of the UNPoA occur through intergovernmental organizations, many of which are regional in scope (Ibid, p. 12). As Kerry Maze and Sarah Parker explain: 32 states and 22 international and regional organizations have provided PoA assistance, though 15 states and six organizations can be considered to be the main providers of the assistance, contributing at least US$ 2 million each to activities in affected states since 2001. Among these donors, however, five states and four organizations are responsibilities for over 95% of the funding, each of them providing almost US$ 20 million of more (2006, p. 7).

Notwithstanding these efforts, it remains unclear as to exactly how much assistance towards UNPoA implementation the international small arms community provides and how this assistance is focused upon the most urgent cases. This knowledge gap is important since those governments and societies most affected by small

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arms trafficking possess the least amount of resources to address this problem and have proven themselves least likely to ask for international assistance (Patokallio in Maze and Parker 2006, p. ix). In addition to these capability-building efforts, governments have fulfilled certain responsibilities by providing information detailing their own efforts to compose small arms controls. While some governments designate national points of contact for small arms issues, many have not yet done so (Ibid, p. 9). And while some governments nominate agencies responsible for handling requests relating to small arms tracing (Ibid, p. 58), the contact information provided can quickly become outdated. Many governments have reported on their progress towards implementing their international responsibilities, some taking the opportunity to provide copies of legislation and policies (Biting the Bullet 2006, p. 252). Examining the information submitted by governments, Parker and Cattaneo conclude that, between 2002 and 2008, 145 UN member-states have reported at least once on their progress towards implementing the UNPoA (2008, p. 10). While some governments share information among themselves on small arms transfers, particularly exports from their territories, much of this information frequently remains confidential (Biting the Bullet 2006, p. 255), although some governments do make such information publicly available. Governments also release information concerning assistance provided to other governments, intergovernmental organizations, researchers and civil society organizations, though a surge in this reporting does not necessary reflect a surge of activity; rather, it merely indicates the importance some governments attach to submitting reports highlighting their own efforts. Governments also cooperate with other governments by providing legal assistance and sharing relevant information, especially through Interpol (Parker and Cattaneo 2008, p. 16). Many governments cooperate in order to undertake transborder law-enforcement operations, with various law-enforcement, bordercontrol, and customs agencies working together, sharing information and intelligence on unauthorized small arms. Perhaps the best-known example of this occurred when the South African and the Mozambican authorities cooperated, destroying tons of military weapons during Operation Rachel (Garcia 2006, pp. 69—70; see also Faltas et al. 2001, p. 15). (Significantly, this operation has been ongoing since 1995, before many of the relevant instruments of international law were negotiated and agreed.) Specialist training in border management has also been provided with a specific focus on searching, tracing, and seizing trafficked small arms, as well as on document examination (Biting the Bullet 2006, p. 177). Some governments establish transnational taskforces focusing on detecting and deterring unauthorized small arms transfers, comprising of networks of police, customs, and intelligence professionals (Ibid, p. 256). Information and intelligence exchanged among governments is vital to the success of many law-enforcement operations interdicting small arms traffic. As governments make progress towards establishing and then strengthening domestic regulatory regimes for small arms manufacture, transfer, and possession,

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they not only demonstrate their commitment to an internationalist notion of the political, but also embrace this notion in order to strengthen their own sovereign authority. Featuring as part of an ongoing negotiation between governments and the politico-strategic governance architecture prevailing in contemporary world affairs, the establishment of these domestic regulatory regimes seek to undermine the capabilities of those sovereign-bound armed groups aspiring to overthrow governments or those sovereign-free actors disregarding the appeal of civil authority. At the same time, it bolsters existing claims to sovereign authority, endorses the rule of international law, and helps further entrench the politicostrategic governance architecture. However, this progress towards operationalizing various instruments of international law does not necessarily translate into effective control over small arms. This is because the international frameworks for small arms control suffer from serious strategic weaknesses, the most evident of which is the lack of a common and coherent objective to control all of the major aspects of the small arms problem, specifically proliferation, transfer, possession, collection, and deactivation. Also contributing to these frameworks’ strategic weaknesses are the limited administrative and enforcement capabilities of many governments adhering to their international responsibilities, as well as the provision of insufficient resources to prompt and sustain these arms control efforts. Understood from this perspective, the rigorous efforts of a single state will do little to compensate for the strategic weaknesses of those international frameworks or for their uneven implementation. In spite of these serious limitations, the international frameworks providing for small arms control authorized by the UN Security Council help repair and extend the politico-strategic governance architecture prevailing in contemporary world affairs. Security Council Resolutions As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the UN Security Council discharges its core responsibility of maintaining international peace and security by authorizing resolutions for collective action, the mandates for which can articulate international frameworks for composing small arms controls. Although the responsibility for mandating such action lies with the UN Security Council, the responsibility for their operation lies with governments as UN member-states. While distinguishable as discrete arms control efforts, UN arms embargoes and DDR programs must be considered as integral components of the sanction regime or peacekeeping operation of which they are a part because, in practice, these arms embargoes and DDR programs are often pursued in competition with other operational priorities. In the case of sanction regimes, governments observe arms embargoes alongside exercising vigilance over travel visas, prohibiting certain financial transactions, and restricting the international trade of lucrative commodities, most notably diamonds, timber, and oil. In the case of peacekeeping operations, governments

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help administer DDR programs as well as monitor ceasefire agreements, reform security sectors, and help run ‘free and fair’ elections. While effective arms control efforts do not necessarily translate into successful sanction regimes or peacekeeping operations, the ways in which the UN resolutions authorizing collective action are crafted can have a significant bearing upon the operation of those arms embargoes and DDR programs. As a result of the way in which the UN Security Council crafts its resolutions authorizing sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations, the implementation of these resolutions can face serious operational constraints, in some cases limiting the efficacy of arms embargoes and DDR programs as arms controls. In other cases, however, effective arms embargoes and DDR programs can result in unintended consequences that will hinder current and future efforts to compose further small arms controls. Nevertheless, the collective action authorized by the UN Security Council helps to repair, strengthen, and extend the politico-strategic governance architecture by preventing arms transfers from reaching certain actors considered to be threats to the international peace and by removing small arms from the hands of particular belligerents who could invoke armed violence, reigniting conflict. Observing Arms Embargoes An essential difference between the various instruments of international law negotiated within intergovernmental organizations and those arms embargoes authorized by the UN Security Council lies in the exclusion from the Security Council’s deliberation of most of the governments that are obliged to respect the Council’s will. Unlike treaties requiring ratification by state signatories, and unlike soft law measures agreed to by participating governments, arms embargoes declared as mandatory by the Security Council must be adhered to by all UN member-states. This key difference has serious implications for a government’s capability, not to mention desire, to observe the terms of an arms embargo (Woodward 2003, p. 3). Many of the administrative processes and enforcement procedures necessary for governments to observe arms embargoes are the same as those required to administer and enforce the regulatory regimes established by governments in accordance with their responsibilities under international law. Moreover, as Shields points out: A common law state must transform its international law obligations into national legislation in order for them to apply in its territory. This is often by adopting an Act to give effect to UNSCRs or sanctions generally, followed by secondary legislation (such as a regulation) to give effect to a specific embargo. The regulation can establish the offences committed by breaking the embargo and consequent penalties. In contrast, civil law states have a ‘monist’ tradition, whereby the adoption of an international law instrument serves to automatically incorporate it into the state’s domestic law. The monist tradition

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can be problematic as offences and penalties are found in the state’s penal code and, consequently, may not be directly tied to that state’s implementation and enforcement of each individual arms embargo (2005, pp. 8—9).

Some governments who willingly accept the rights and privileges accompanying UN membership nevertheless lack the infrastructure necessary to exert effective control over small arms transfers. Such governments take all administrative care while authorizing their nationals to undertake activities involving small arms transfers, but assume no enforcement responsibility. Unable to expediently establish domestic legislation reflecting Security Council resolutions, other governments exert little if any control over transactions involving small arms occurring within their territory or across their international borders. Some governments claim that the national implementation of arms embargoes suffers unavoidable delays and refuse to prosecute known traffickers in order to shield their own international standing: in 1998, the UK Government admitted as much (Wood and Peleman 1999, p. 35). Due to these delays, such transactions might occur in accordance with domestic law while placing that government in violation of its international obligations (Chesterman and Pouligny 2003: 506—507). According to the Biting the Bullet Project, in light of the “international attention focused on arms embargo violations in recent years, the failure on the part of states to ensure that their national legislation provides for prosecution of those who violate UN and other arms embargoes can only be regarded as amounting to a critical failure of political will” (2006, p. 174). Where governments are obliged to observe arms embargoes, but possess inadequate border control infrastructure and/or insufficient resources with which to control the vast volumes of trade and movement of people across their international borders, Sanction Assistance Missions (SAMs) can provide valuable assistance. SAMs assist governments, especially those immediately surrounding target actors’ territory, by providing the latest communications technologies enabling front-line inspectors to verify official documents and accompanying cargos in real-time. When supported by powerful UN member-states, as in the case of the arms embargoes targeting Yugoslavia during 1991—1995, SAMs can help sanction regimes to become “the most effective in history.” Yet: The requisite resources for establishing such arrangements, however, are likely to be available only in cases where the interests of the wealthiest states are at stake. In Africa, where Western efforts to resolve conflict have been minimal, such monitoring mechanisms have been nonexistent. In the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) imposed sanctions and attempted to establish a regional monitoring system, but a lack of resources and the absence of assistance from the United States and Europe undermined the effectiveness of these efforts. If the SAMs system is to have relevance beyond Europe, a system for sharing resources and technical capacity will be necessary (Cortright et al. 2000, p. 70).

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Arms embargoes are also easily undermined where governmental will to observe them is wavering, or worse, is largely absent. According to Mack and Khan: The level of resources allocated to monitoring, assessing, and enforcing sanctions is a function of the degree to which the perceived interests of major powers are engaged; it may be politically impossible to implement sanctions successfully when they are not. Thus implementation of UN sanctions directed against Rwanda, Liberia, and Somalia, where the major powers have only minor interests at stake, have generated so little effort that the regimes have been described by one UN insider as ‘atrophic’. By contrast quite extraordinary efforts have been devoted to the sanctions imposed on Iraq where the perceived vital interests of major powers were engaged (2000: 283).

As Gilbert Barthe points out, some governments in the developing world— whose territory the outlines of which were to a large extent defined by European imperialism—may have long-standing tribal affiliations motivating them to refrain from fully implementing an embargo (quoted in Kirkham and Flew 2003, p. 19). Reports issued by Human Rights Watch (1995) and Amnesty International (1995) also pointed to several non-neighbouring governments violating arms embargoes targeting the Rwandan conflict, identifying France, UK, and PRC, as well as South Africa, Albania, Bulgaria, and Israel as so-called sanction busters. As a former imperial power, France provided arms to the Habyarimana Regime and the Sindikubwabo Interim Government in Rwanda, deliberately avoiding UN monitors operating at known points-of-entry and contravening the very sanction regime it had authorized (Woodward 2003, pp. 28—29; see also Jakobsen 2000: 173). Like France, PRC covertly contravened this embargo rather than overtly veto the adoption of Resolution 918 (1994). Rwanda, a non-Permanent Member of the Security Council between 1994—95, was therefore the only dissenting vote cast during the adoption of this Resolution on 17 May 1994 (McNulty 2002: 117). It is sometimes more convenient for the Security Council’s Permanent Members to deliberately contravene an arms embargo than it is to exercise their power of veto in order to either prevent a resolution or weaken the terms of a sanction regime. The exact reasons for governments contravening arms embargoes are probably as varied as the instances of contravention, however. When governments do observe UN arms embargoes, they embrace the internationalist notion of the political informing the UN Security Council’s authorization of collective action. By curtailing the sovereign prerogatives of governments targeted by UN sanction regimes to access ongoing supplies of small arms, those governments observing arms embargoes help the Security Council’s attempts to maintain international peace and security. In doing so, they help strengthen the resilience of the politico-strategic governance architecture from instances of armed violence. As this chapter demonstrates, although this commitment to internationalism is embraced by UN member-states it is at times

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weakly asserted by some governments, especially those who deliberately allow lapses in the observation of arms embargoes as a means of furthering their own national interests at the expense of collective security aspirations. Various arms control antagonists also quickly and easily exploit the weaknesses in the operation of these international frameworks, as Chapters 8 and 9 demonstrate. And where sanction regimes do prove effective, unintended consequences can follow, in some cases resulting in unwelcome outcomes hindering a targeted government’s current and future capability to establish, administer, and enforce a domestic regulatory regime for small arms in its area of jurisdiction. Such consequences ultimately impede the international small arms community’s efforts to compose small arms control. Unintended Consequences Successful arms embargoes tend to preserve, reinforce, or exacerbate the asymmetric power relations characterizing many contemporary conflicts, favoring a particular party to a conflict at the expense of neutrality (Tostensen and Bull 2002: 384). Where a party is disadvantaged in this way, it becomes increasingly vulnerable to violent recriminations from rival forces, as was the case between 1991 and 1995 when the embargo targeting Yugoslavia “had the effect of preserving a balance of military power that significantly favoured the Serbs...[and] tended to lock in place this imbalance and impeded the ability of the emerging Bosnian state to defend itself” (Cortright et al. 2000, p. 65). Perverse consequences can also result where sanction regimes prove effective. While primarily an economically coercive instrument, sanction regimes can have conflict-like impacts, engendering human suffering on a massive scale, including civilian casualties and attendant social dislocation. When this occurs, tension is exposed between the ways in which the Security Council discharges its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security and its commitment to respecting human rights as enshrined in the UN Charter and its ancillary declarations, specifically the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1947) (Mack and Khan 2000: 284). ����� The Government of Iraq made the following statement to the UN in 1996 with respect to the sanction regime aimed at it: The people of Iraq are today facing veritable destruction by a weapon that is just as dangerous as weapons of mass destruction; this has so far led to the death of 1 million persons, half of whom were children. This destruction, which is a form of genocide inflicted on the Iraqi people, is a crime punishable under international law regardless of whether it is committed in time of war or peace (Permanent

 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� For a discussion dealing with the institutional arrangements, and shortcomings therein, between peacekeeping operations with human rights components and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, please refer to Howland 2004: 9—10.

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Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations Office at Geneva, ������� quoted in Tostensen and Bull 2002: 376).

Saddam Hussein’s entourage thrived as the general Iraqi population suffered immense hardship. “Baghdad was quite successful in blaming the UN for the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, both within the country and worldwide,” Brzoska laments (2003: 520). Perverse consequences can, furthermore, emerge in cases where a government targeted by sanction regimes controls and uses domestic media organizations in such a way as to embolden its popular support (Mack and Kahn 2000: 282; see also Tostensen and Bull 2002: 376—377). Former Secretary-General Annan has warned too of the dangers associated with sanctions’ collateral impacts on third parties; often those “neighbouring countries that bear much of the economic and trading loss from compliance have not been compensated by the rest of the international community and, as a result, have allowed sanctions to become porous” (2000, p. 2). Sanction regimes can also “harm those very social sectors within a targeted country that might be most supportive of the norms being protected by the UN Security Council” (Cortright et al. 2000, p. 4). This includes those members of a nascent civil society who might otherwise have been in a better position to help organize and conduct local arms control campaigns, encourage and monitor military and constabulary use of small arms, and encourage transparency over governmental stockpiles, official transfers, and weapons procurement. Finally, sanction regimes can also encourage the informalization and in some cases the criminalization of markets as “[c]risis economies under sanctions develop close (or closer) linkages to the illegal spheres of the world market. Those who wield political power may develop these linkages in order to ensure the supply of goods that can no longer be obtained legally” (Chesterman and Pouligny 2003: 511; see also Cortright et al. 2000, p. 4). Peter Andreas demonstrates the ways in which governments targeted by a sanction regime develop links to, cooperate with, and even encourage the activities of traffickers and other organized criminals. He concludes that: The imposition of comprehensive sanctions by the international community unintentionally encouraged much closer state-criminal ties and large-scale smuggling, and now in the post-sanctions period, the international community has blamed organized crime and corruption for blocking much needed reforms. Rarely is there any Western acknowledgement of having contributed to the problem in the first place (2005: 357).  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Note, also, as Cortright et al. observe, “[t]he principle of civilian immunity applies no less in the application of sanctions than in the conduct of war. This suggests that sanctioning authorities bear the fundamental responsibility for mitigating unintended consequences and for ensuring that the measures enacted to uphold international norms do not cause suffering disproportionate to the ends served” (2000, p. 26).

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This kind of criminalization—of the government, the economy, and society— depletes the resources available to a government and limits its capability to adhere to any responsibilities that it might have under international law to compose small arms controls. It can, moreover, undermine any governmental will to support such obligations and commitments. This criminalization also empowers those international actors who are able to mitigate the intended effects of the major efforts to compose small arms controls. Thus, strengthening sanction regimes might, albeit unwittingly, intensify this process of criminalization, as well as help to proliferate and prolong its deleterious effects. This, in turn, encourages and intensifies a crisis of authority for many governments, demonstrating the significance of sovereignfree actors, particularly where they corrupt sovereign-bound actors who become part of the small arms problem under consideration here. Here, then, where an arms embargo features as part of an effective UN sanction regime, it can help generate unintended consequences that ultimately hinder the efforts of arms control protagonists. Some of these consequences manifest as unwelcome and perverse outcomes, including the weakened capability of a targeted government to administer and enforce a domestic regulatory regime for small arms, as well as undermining the prospects of local sovereign-free civil society organizations taking root and flourishing as arms control protagonists. Other perverse outcomes might include the fostering of mutually-beneficial partnerships between governments targeted by sanctions and members of the criminal fraternity who establish, control, and exploit black-market activities in the area. While arms embargoes are intended to help mitigate the effects of armed violence on the politico-strategic governance architecture, they do not necessarily assist arms control protagonists and, in some cases, actually hinder them. Arms embargoes are not the only examples of collective action presenting considerable challenges to those seeking to operationalize international frameworks, nor are they alone in generating outcomes unfavourable to the long-term objectives of the international small arms community. Administering DDR Programs As one of the major resource providers for DDR programs, governments play an important role ensuring their operational effectiveness. So much so that when governments do not provide sufficient resources—for whatever reasons—such programs are often greatly inhibited. DDR programs administered as part of peacekeeping operations managed by the DPKO also receive funding from various other sources, including the UN’s assessed budget, the World Bank, and the UNDP, as well as from host governments and bilateral security-related funds (Ball and Hendrickson 2005, pp. 4—8). But despite occasional cooperation among these agencies, “they also regularly endorse competing and even contradictory philosophies and approaches” (Pouligny 2004, p. 4). Some funding sources impose specific constraints. When drawn from the UN’s assessed budget, for example, funds cannot be used to plan DDR programs before the Security Council authorizes

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collective action and cannot be used to assist reintegration initiatives perceived as development projects (Ball and Hendrickson 2005, p. 17). Yet this funding stream is less vulnerable to those wider considerations to which the negotiation of Security Council resolutions are sometimes subjected because individual UN member-states cannot withhold their dues in order to hinder or prevent particular DDR programs. By contrast, funding from development agencies and the World Bank tends to focus upon postconflict development without engaging military (or pseudo-military) actors in disarmament activities. Ball and Hendrickson surmise that the “multidisciplinary nature of DDR processes militates strongly against any one type of organization (development, peace support, diplomatic) being able to manage all the necessary functions, [though] coordination of donor support for DDR processes needs to be improved” (Ibid, p. 18). In addition to insufficient funding, inadequate troop contributions from UN member-states can retard the establishment of entire operations, confining the geographic coverage of some DDR programs. The deployment of ONUB, for instance, was significantly delayed because UN member-states were “slow to respond to requests for specialized units and some troop contributors […] requested delays in previously agreed deployment timelines, while others have deployed troops without necessary equipment” (UN Security Council 2004c, para. 38). According to Phillip Sibanda, the Chief Military Observer of the UNAVEM III, the Security Council declined to authorize the 15,000 troops that UNAVEM III requested, opting instead to authorize only half this figure (cited in Dzinesa 2004: 654). Given the unusable road network in war-torn Angola, the difficulties encountered by UN personnel were compounded by the inadequate provision of aircraft. The number of troops and the technical resources available to them were, according to Gwinyayi Albert Dzinesa, “grossly insufficient to cope with the complex and rapidly deteriorating scenario in Angola, which would soon lead to a relapse of war” (2004: 654). In some cases, too few personnel were available to monitor so-called secured weapons, resulting in leakages (Ibid: 653). A similar situation emerged in Mozambique where the “massive influx of Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) troops has led to overcrowding in some areas (almost 221 per cent of capacity at one camp), resulting in shortages of food and other essential items, inadequate lodging and storage facilities and potential health hazards” (UN Security Council 1994a, para. 8). A subsequent Report by the Secretary-General notes that “some of the [assembly] areas are overcrowded, while others are virtually empty: capacity utilization ranges from a low of 3 per cent to a high of almost 420 per cent” (UN Security Council 1994b, para. 6). Deficient preparedness, often created at least in part by delays in troop and equipment commitments, creates self-imposed handicaps. For instance, UNMIL offered a one-off cash payment of US$300 to those combatants willing to relinquish their weapons. The collection sites, anticipating about a thousand combatants per day, were unprepared both financially and logistically for the 12,000 combatants who appeared, most of whom bore arms. Widespread discontentment among belligerents at the collection sites resulted in riots and the DDR program was

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suspended on 17 December 2003 resuming on 15 April the following year (Douglas and Hill 2004, pp. 13—14). According to Aboagye and Bah (2004: 7), the “lack of adequate facilities and personnel to process the large number of [Government of Liberia] combatants that turned up at Camp Scheffelin pointed to the unsuitable timing of the start of the programme and the lack of preparedness of UNMIL and other stakeholders.” The imminent arrival of the rainy season, combined with the lack of functioning infrastructure, only exacerbated the challenge of collecting weapons. Further operational constraints are exposed where the administration of DDR programs is coordinated poorly. Civil society organizations assist regularly with the administration of DDR programs under the auspices of some peacekeeping operations, an involvement necessitated by governments’ reluctance to provide sufficient resources and expertise. However in certain situations, such as occurred in Liberia, nongovernmental staff lack the required training and necessary authority to identify and then exclude those individuals who do not qualify for inclusion within the program, rendering any subsequent screening activities largely irrelevant (Nichols 2005, p. 120). Civil society support is not restricted to UN peacekeeping operations, however. Save the Children worked closely with UNICEF in helping to administer DDR programs in Afghanistan under the ISAFled intervention there. While these DDR programs suffered from many of the same constraints as those directly managed by the DPKO, civil society organizations confronted the additional complexity of managing relationships among civil society organizations with competing agendas, contested definitions and criteria, and overlapping funding streams (see Chrobok 2005). Likewise, further operational constraints are exposed where DDR programs are conducted poorly. Poorly-conducted DDR programs can be partly explained by inadequate resources as well as by the time constraints on planning caused by governments’ delays in the provision of those resources. Where the numbers of program participants are underestimated, for instance, weapons-storage facilities are placed under strain and in some cases, as occurred in Mozambique, weapons that are collected are secured poorly, placing ex-combatants and UN personnel in grave danger (UN Security Council 1994a, para. 7). When peacekeepers lack a sophisticated understanding of local conditions, they mistakenly “sometimes tend to look for constituted armies, a hierarchy, and officers with whom to negotiate” (Pouligny 2004, p. 7). At other times, traditional practices and customary rituals are not fully exploited within the context of DDR programs, though for Alden respect for indigenous protocol “is no substitute for energetic commitment on the part of the international community” (2002: 353—354). The selection of unsuitable and obscure collection sites—again a consequence of a lack of resources, planning, and expertise—can result in many unrealized collection opportunities. In Tajikistan, combatants registered for disarmament but did not remain in assembly points, retaining their weapons. Following the murder of four UN staff-members in July 1998, United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) withdrew from the capital, Dushanbe, and discontinued

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its monitoring of collection points (Smith 1999: 245—249). Disarmament opportunities observed outside collection points have not always been pursued despite UN troops being aware of large quantities of weapons flowing across international borders: in Mozambique, peacekeepers could only passively observe weapons trafficking—in some cases noting the licence plate numbers of vehicles conveying illicit weapons into neighbouring countries—because they were not authorized to seize such weapons (McMullin 2004: 636). A similar scenario unfolded in Somalia, where US Force commanders operating in hostile conditions narrowly interpreted their mandate to disarm combatants by choosing only to disarm them where they directly interfered with the delivery of humanitarian aid, if they disarmed anyone at all (Hillen 2000, p. 218). Originating in the operation’s mandate but exacerbated by decisions taken on the ground, this shortcoming is significant as many heavy weapons were not surrendered and were probably transferred to nearby conflict zones (Paes 2005: 256). This signals the necessity for peacekeepers “to embark on cordon and search operations to recover these weapons” (Aboagye and Bah 2004, p. 17), as well as the need for governments to have consistent mandates—or more specifically consistent interpretations of the same mandate—when their troops are involved in multinational operations. Much has been made by the world’s press of the allegations of sexual harassment within the UN Secretariat and within some peacekeeping operations (������������������������������������������������������������������������� see UN General Assembly 2005).������������������������������������������� Less attention, however, has focused upon those DDR programs demonstrating an institutionalised bias based on gender and professional background: in such cases, the technical application of the term ‘combatants’ becomes a matter of some significance. Where the term ‘combatants’ is interpreted narrowly for DDR purposes, it tends to neglect women as targets for disarmament. UNMIL reported that women’s involvement in DDR programs did not correspond to the estimate of women’s involvement in the conflict (Douglas and Hill 2004, p. 14). While some women claim status as survivors of conflict and as victims of sexual violence, others must bear culpability as perpetrators of sexual violence targeting other women. Some female soldiers deliberately sought to capture female prisoners as a means of providing an alternative target for rape and other acts of sexual violence by their male counterparts (Ibid, p. 11). Where women are neither targeted by DDR programs as combatants or as noncombatants contributing to ongoing hostilities in support roles, nor involved in the administration of DDR programs, opportunities to identify hidden weapons caches are not fully realized. Moreover, disarmament initiatives focused solely upon those in possession of weapons neglect those women who have handed weapons to men, as well as those, male and female, who have disarmed prior to the DDR program’s commencement. Perverse Outcomes As previously mentioned, effective arms embargoes can preserve, reinforce, or exacerbate the asymmetric power relations of those armed actors involved in a

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conflict. This logic holds too for the disarming of rival factions by peacekeepers. Where insecurity persists, “demobilization may put at risk those who indeed agreed to disarm, and may create tremendous asymmetries between stakeholders, thereby further undermining prospects for meaningful stability and security” (Pouligny 2004, p. 5). Such insecurity is most likely—and most damaging—in locales with pre-existing crisis of authority. The bias against professional backgrounds implicit in ONUMOZ’s reintegration program—in which officers who had received considerable education and attained relatively high levels of professional and managerial skills were not differentiated from those general combatants who prior to taking up arms had found subsistence working as peasants in rural hinterlands—may have encouraged the criminalization of Mozambique’s postconflict society. Former military officers utilize their command and control skills along with their technical and operational expertise in leadership roles within organized criminal groups (Alden 2002: 350). The weapons used by such criminals are, as Muggah reveals, “often the very ones looted from the country’s own arsenals and inventories to begin with” (2005: 241; see also 2006: 193). The criminalization of postconflict settings is a disturbing phenomenon not only because it resembles and in some cases intensifies the criminalizing effects created and fostered by some sanction regimes, but also because peacekeeping operations are usually deployed in order to secure a long-term peace, not just to monitor short-term ceasefire agreements, important as these may be. Frustration and resentment can combine to produce ‘spoilers’ of the peace process where combatants are excluded from DDR programs. By spoilers, I mean, as does Stephen John Stedman, those “leaders and factions who view a particular peace as opposed to their interests and who are willing to use violence to undermine it” (2006, p. 103). In Mozambique, those who belonged to government-run militias were not considered to form part of the government’s military forces and were thereby excluded, without exception, from the DDR programs and their associated benefits (Alden 2002: 347). In Liberia, ex-combatants were excluded from the DDR process because they were without weapons; some had surrendered arms to the previous (regional) peacekeeping operation, others had relinquished weapons to their former commanders, while several combatants may have shared a single weapon during the conflict (Nichols 2005, p. 134). These so-called spoilers can play a significant role in the aftermath of conflict, undermining security where they have access to or knowledge of weapons caches. They can also undermine economic recovery if they do not receive the assistance and benefits afforded to those able to take advantage of DDR programs, turning instead to banditry and engaging in other criminal enterprises. Spoilers also undermine social cohesion if the ex-combatant’s role as outcast is reinforced by the lack of available new roles, leaving them to rely upon weapons as their primary means of ensuring basic personal security, personal economic survival and, in some cases, restoring or enhancing personal prestige within the community. Like effective arms embargoes, effective DDR programs can generate adverse consequences for local communities, host governments, and the international

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community. Because DDR programs focus upon disarming combatants, they are seen by some as rewarding those who take up arms as a means of pursuing political ambitions, while neglecting those who abstained from involving themselves in the conflict (Faltas et al. 2001, p. 7). Indeed, war criminals rank among these instigators of violence receiving such ‘rewards’ and ‘benefits’ (Pouligny 2004, p. 7). Successful DDR programs not only run the risk of forging a culture of dependency, or what Muggah describes as a “reintegration industry” (2005: 247; see also 2006: 199), but where DDR programs in contiguous countries operate simultaneously but without coordination can also create weapons flows into collection points from beyond the local catchment areas. A good example of this occurred in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, where different incentives offered between the two programs limited the effectiveness of each (UN Security Council 2004e, paras. 53—71). As Ryan Nichols explains: The lack of coordination and communication between UN officials in neighbouring countries was apparent when, in March 2004, Côte d’Ivoire announced the details of its own forthcoming DDR programme—taking many UNMIL officials by surprise. Confounding Liberia’s DDDR, is the fact that in Côte d’Ivoire, ex-combatants will be receiving considerably more money than Liberians when (and if) the disarmament process finally takes place. This has prompted speculation that many Liberian fighters may be holding back weapons in order to cash them in next door (2005, p. 128).

While the payment originally nominated for Côte d’Ivoire’s DDR program was US$900, the corresponding payment in Liberia was, as previously mentioned, US$300. When news of a failing DDR program spreads beyond its specific area of operations, the reputation of DDR programs suffers, as does the reputation of UN peacekeeping operations more generally. The operational disconnect among the key components of DDR programs jeopardizes their overall efficacy. For example, where reintegration projects fail to match expectations, benefits derived from disarming combatants are squandered when ex-combatants remobilize and reacquire arms. In Mozambique, the reintegration projects were remarkable “more for their dark comedy than for their success,” as ex-combatants received training as electricians before returning to villages without electricity: however, in “raising expectations beyond what the market could offer” (McMullin 2004: 629) ONUMOZ’s experience is not unique. The increasing number of demobilized fighters in Liberia, for instance, was not reflected by a proportional increase in the number of reintegration opportunities offered by UNMIL (Paes 2005: 255). The poor coordination between UNMIL’s disarmament and demobilization programs and the UNDP’s Liberian reintegration activities only exacerbated this disconnect (Ibid: 259). Moreover, targeting excombatants for disarmament without addressing civilian-held stockpiles is a partial (and therefore potentially dangerous) response to the widespread availability of small arms.

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The way in which the UN Security Council crafts its resolutions authorizing peacekeeping operations can shape the ways in which those DDR programs are administered. The effectiveness of these arms control measures also depends upon the provision of sufficient resources by UN member-states. While instances of armed violence in target locales may become less frequent, less intense, or less prolonged as a result of DDR programs, these measures also have significant impacts beyond this direct result. For instance, when DDR programs help forge a close alliance between governments and sovereign-free criminal actors—thereby undermining the traditional sovereign-bound/sovereign-free dichotomy—a condition of turbulence may exist. Such an impact is ironic given it is this condition of turbulence that these measures were originally intended to combat. Since these DDR programs, underpinned by an internationalist notion of the political, form an important part of peacekeeping operations, they contribute to repairing and extending the politico-strategic governance architecture. However, some of the unintended consequences of these efforts can encourage outcomes that foster the criminalization of the state, thereby undermining the international small arms community’s efforts to curtail the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. Conclusion The international small arms community has expended much effort in composing international frameworks providing for small arms control. The development of these instruments of international law negotiated within various intergovernmental organizations and the resolutions authorized by the UN Security Council signals a high degree of interconnectivity among arms control protagonists’ major efforts. Considered collectively, these international frameworks create a mosaic of responsibilities—that is, a set of specific obligations and commitments—for governments whose collective jurisdiction covers much of the world. Governments are therefore vital to the composition of these small arms controls, with many acting in ways aligned to these international obligations and commitments by establishing, administering, and enforcing domestic regulatory regimes, as well as by observing UN arms embargoes and contributing to UN-authorized DDR programs. Indeed, many governments have made appreciable progress towards establishing regulatory regimes over small arms manufacture, transfer, and possession while some governments have also made progress in terms of the collection and disposal of small arms in their territories. Focusing upon these major aspects, governments employ a problem-solving approach called for by small arms researchers and relied upon by intergovernmental organisations. By establishing domestic regulatory regimes, observing arms embargoes, and contributing to the administration of DDR programs, these governments seize upon the opportunity to strengthen their sovereign authority by embracing the internationalist notion of the political which informs those international frameworks.

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However, governmental progress towards fulfilling the mosaic of responsibilities created by intergovernmental organizations and the UN Security Council has been uneven. This uneven progress is best understood in the context of these international frameworks’ strategic weaknesses, which are evident in the lack of a common, conceptually coherent objective, limited governmental capability and geographic coverage, and the provision of insufficient resources. Indeed, the progress made by governments in accordance with those responsibilities may well be far from adequate to ensure that those international frameworks are fully implemented. Furthermore, even if these international frameworks were fully implemented, the impact they would have against the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms remains far from certain. In fact, the Biting the Bullet Project argues that “the inadequacies and divergences in state’s approaches to the regulation of SALW export and import control are likely to be significantly contributing to the illicit trade in SALW” (2006, p. 149). There are, moreover, significant consequences following on from the operationalizing of these international frameworks, especially the UN-mandated arms control efforts. Although these frameworks are not intended to be, and cannot be considered as, comprehensive arms controls, they can nevertheless generate unintended and perverse outcomes which expose the high cost of strengthening and extending the politico-strategic governance architecture. As the two chapters of Part III show, a range of actors playing significant roles in world affairs easily circumvent and exploit these international frameworks, though sometimes the problem-solvers themselves are complicit with this problem or are directly culpable for the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. But before this book examines those arms control antagonists, the last chapter of Part II illustrates the ways in which civil society organizations uncritically endorse the internationalist notion of the political.

Chapter 7

Civil Society Organizations The formal launch of IANSA’s campaign in May 1999 signalled the beginning of another major effort to compose small arms controls. According to IANSA’s Founding Document, this campaign’s objective is to facilitate civil society action aiming to enhance the security of persons by preventing small arms proliferation and misuse (IANSA 1999, p. 2). As a network comprised of civil society organizations sharing a concern over the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms, IANSA’s membership includes many high-profile organizations, including Human Rights Watch, OXFAM, and Amnesty International, though lesser known members include Physicians for Social Responsibility, Comic Relief, People and Planet, and the Asian Brotherhood Concern. Located in over 100 countries, IANSA’s membership gives it extensive geographic reach, especially as many of these member-organizations have representatives based in the world’s major capitals. As a civil society organization, IANSA coordinates the activities of its sevenhundred or so members, relying heavily upon their ongoing engagement with a range of actors involved in contemporary world affairs to generate and sustain any leverage or momentum it can. This approach is, as Cukier and Sidel describe, a “‘campaign of campaigns’ or ‘network of networks’” (2006, p. 226). Even though IANSA is a significant actor involved in the composition of small arms controls and positions itself as the predominant civil society organization engaging in gun control advocacy, its campaign does not formally direct the activities of its members. Furthermore, not every civil society organization exercised over this issue campaigns for stronger small arms controls. This chapter explores two important elements of IANSA’s arms control campaign. It begins by examining IANSA’s advocacy for small arms controls. This advocacy effort includes raising awareness of the urgent need to control these weapons and the lobbying of particular governments to improve existing domestic regulatory regimes. It also includes IANSA’s members providing opportunities for officials to engage in informal discussions leading to agreements on international frameworks, informing those frameworks by contributing to multilateral discussions concerning their conceptual scope, and in some cases articulating draft texts. The chapter then goes on to examine IANSA’s monitoring of governments’ behaviour vis-à-vis their responsibilities derived from certain instruments of international law and Security Council resolutions. Of particular relevance here are two major reports authored by the Biting the Bullet Project, which assess governments’ progress towards implementing the UNPoA and were disseminated immediately prior to the first and second BMS, respectively. A further report was released in 2006, coinciding with the UN Small Arms Review Conference.

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Even though IANSA is a sovereign-free actor, its campaign largely endorses the internationalist notion of the political informing the negotiation and implementation of instruments of international law and the crafting of UN Security Council resolutions. This stance encourages governments, intergovernmental organizations, and to a far lesser extent the UN Security Council to engage with IANSA over the composition of small arms controls. Yet this stance also curtails the scope available to IANSA to act critically, undermining the organization’s ability to get its way over non-trivial matters where its priorities do not converge with those of other arms control protagonists. This underscores the relatively limited bargaining power that IANSA has within important multilateral processes and its circumscribed ability to shape multilateral discussions from outside the closed doors of those diplomatic conference rooms. While IANSA and its memberorganizations are collectivities, certain individuals have been key in launching and steering its arms control campaign. The important roles these individuals play in enabling and shaping this collectivity illustrates an important interaction brought into focus by postinternationalism. Despite featuring as one of the broad range of actors playing significant roles in composing small arms controls—as its extensive membership and the range of its activities illustrate—IANSA is less vital to this process than are governments, intergovernmental organizations, and the UN Security Council. This has to do with the ongoing negotiation between civil society organizations and the politico-strategic governance architecture prevailing in world affairs, which suggests that parametric change is not currently taking place in this instance, as arms control protagonists’ efforts to compose small arms controls do more to contain turbulence than to create it. Advocacy As Chapter 3 demonstrates, arms control advocates feature prominently within the small arms research community. These advocates, some of whom now belong to IANSA, employ the publishing and dissemination opportunities presented by civil society organizations in order to articulate and assert a call for action to control small arms. This research has been used by these advocates not only as a means of articulating the urgent need to control these weapons, but also as a means of enhancing their own credibility as experts when dealing with other social movements, governments, and intergovernmental organizations involved in addressing the problems posed by small arms (Kirsten 2004, p. 18). Indeed, research helps strengthen the international small arms community when it serves “to contribute to dialogue among researchers and users of research, such as NGO activists and diplomats, concerned with international security issues that states are either unwilling or unable to address” (Brem and Rutherford 2001: 170). In addition to these research endeavours, arms control advocates also organize grassroots movements. They sometimes employ letter-writing campaigns or use the Internet in order to build a broad constituency well aware of small arms’

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deadly impacts. The momentum generated by grassroots movements within one location can register in another and even resonate throughout a wider region. Each year the Global Week of Action Against Small Arms coincides with International Gun Destruction Day. In July 2004, activities ranged from the destruction of weapons deemed surplus to military requirements and confiscated by constabulary in South America to a flame of peace ceremony held in Cambodia. In that week alone, advocates from 45 countries drew attention to the costs associated with the misuse of these weapons, and in 11 countries a total of 35,000 guns were destroyed (IANSA 2004, p.7). Although focused primarily upon mobilizing citizens to pressure their governments into taking action, these sorts of awareness-raising activities necessarily rely upon existing, and forge new, transnational connections among social movements and civil society organizations with shared concerns. This kind of convergence is a vital source of power for many social movements and arms control advocates are no exception in this regard. Protests are important as much for their symbolism as for their potential to build and consolidate support among social groups with disparate interests. Other grassroots activities include establishing and maintaining gun collection programs for weapons surrendered voluntarily by members of the public. Weapons collection programs organized by Gun Free South Africa, for example, were followed by the South African Government’s announcement of a twenty-four hour gun amnesty in late 1994 (Kirsten 2004, p. 4). In 1996, Gun Free Zones were first established in South Africa’s rural areas, such as the village of Mapela where ‘No Gun’ signs, resembling ‘No Smoking’ signs, were displayed in prominent areas where gun possession was no longer tolerated. In Brazil, Viva Rio forged relationships with local communities, encouraging them to assert control over those small arms held by members of their communities within their immediate locales (Ibid, p. 19, p. 14). In these circumstances, as sovereign-free actors, arms control advocates help broaden the onus of responsibility for controlling small arms from the exclusive legislative and enforcement authority of governments to include local communities, where the impacts of these weapons are often most keenly felt. Fostering ongoing working relationships with those individuals and groups positioned within domestic political arenas proves useful for advocates in encouraging governments to adopt, as part of both domestic and foreign policy, stronger national and international controls over these weapons. Gun Free South Africa was directly involved in the South African Government’s formulation of its domestic gun policy and resultant legislative reforms (Ibid, p. 16). In Cambodia, the Working Group for Weapons Reduction, a coalition of local and foreign civil society organizations, was involved in the Government’s weapons collection and destruction program and encouraged officials to destroy those weapons considered surplus to requirements (Anders 2003b: 6). Saferworld’s liaison with the British Labour Party while it was in opposition during the early 1990s engendered both parliamentary scrutiny over incumbent policy and a clear plan of action for the opposition if it were elected. The Labour Party’s General Election victory in 1997 coincided with the UK’s presidency of the EU, enabling their tabling of

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the proposed Code of Conduct in 1998 (Anders 2003a, p. 17). The work of arms control advocates has also enabled certain policymakers to legitimize and expedite their intended legislative reforms. For example, former Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, was quick to respond to the mass shootings occurring in 1996 at Port Arthur, Tasmania, by introducing legislative reform of existing gun controls. Yet, as Adéle Kirsten observes, before the shootings the Australian-based Coalition for Gun Control “had largely been ignored” (2004, p. 5). This suggests that while civil society organizations may play a role in preparing the groundwork for tighter gun control legislation, they are unlikely to be able to prompt reform on their own. Although only governments can become signatories to treaties, arms control advocates have identified and collaborated with like-minded governments in order to help prompt and negotiate international agreements. The successful and rapid conclusion of the recent campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, culminating in the Ottawa Treaty, is a case in point. The conclusion of this Treaty demonstrates that arms control advocates can realize their vision, signalling the ability of a well-organized and coordinated civil society campaign to overcome opposition from some of the world’s most powerful governments, including the US, Russia, PRC, India, and Pakistan. While Ramesh Thakur and William Maley suggest that “any account of the Ottawa conference to sign the [anti-personnel landmine] convention will be grossly deficient if NGOs are not given prominent attention” (1999: 285), Jody Williams goes further by suggesting the coalition between nongovernmental organizations and like-minded governments could constitute a new global ‘superpower’ (Brem and Rutherford 2001: 181). Here, coalitions of like-minded governments comprise mostly of so-called ‘medium-sized’ countries such as Canada, Norway, and Switzerland. Decisions within these coalitions are reached by majority vote, rather than on a consensual basis. In this respect, the achievement of the Ottawa Treaty signals an alternative diplomacy beyond the conventional UN frameworks for multilateral negotiation. It is therefore symbolically significant that IANSA formally launched its arms control campaign at the 1999 Hague Appeal for Peace Conference, which celebrated the entry into force of that Treaty (Ibid: 169). Establishing IANSA IANSA’s origins can be traced back further than its official inception in May 1999. According to IANSA (1999, p. 1), its strategic vision was forged during two preparatory meetings leading to its establishment. Held in Canada in August 1998, the first preparatory meeting “explore[d] ways in which civil society groups and institutions around the world could work together more effectively to advance policies and actions to control the diffusion and misuse of small arms, and to respond to the devastating consequences of small arms for individuals, local communities, states, and the international community.” The second preparatory meeting, held in Brussels in October 1998, “reach[ed] agreement on the scope and nature of IANSA amongst a wider international audience.”

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Prior to this, in January of 1998, Edward Laurance of the Monterey Institute of International Studies organized the Preparatory Committee for an International Campaign on Light Weapons. The purpose of this meeting was to bring together individuals and groups interested in developing a campaign to control these weapons. A website was established to complement the Preparatory Committee’s work by enabling the easy exchange of research and ideas. This initiative followed a working session that drafted a Proposed Convention on the Prevention of the Indiscriminate and Unlawful Use of Light Weapons, which took place during the signing ceremony for the Ottawa Treaty during early December 1997 (Brem and Rutherford 2001: 177; see also Laurance and Stohl 2002, p. 4; Cukier and Sidel 2006, p. 222). These various meetings produced a consensus among arms control advocates that developed “around the need, not for one campaign, but rather for a network of campaigns under the umbrella of an International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)” (Clegg 1999: 50—51; Garcia 2005: 234—247). First mobilizing in 1998, and then formally established in the following year, IANSA’s campaign is the most recent major effort to help compose small arms controls and it relies heavily upon emerging information and communications technologies to build constituencies that can in turn influence and shape the views of those collectivities composing international frameworks for small arms control. Despite the innovative ‘new diplomacy’ enabling the Ottawa Treaty to enter into force within only six years of its inception, the challenge of controlling small arms requires a more complex response. This is not only because small arms are more varied in type, more widespread, and used more frequently than anti-personnel landmines, but also because many governments throughout the world authorize military, constabulary, and civilian possession of these weapons. UN peacekeepers also rely upon these weapons in order to fulfil their mission’s mandate (Clegg 1999: 49). Confronting this challenge requires IANSA to draw upon participants from many social movements and civil society organizations, including former members of the landmine ban campaign. This makes for a “more diffuse campaign than that of the [international campaign to ban landmines]” (Brem and Rutherford 2001: 178). The diffuse campaign is further complicated by the fact that some of the governments with which these coalitions must engage have very powerful economic interests in the arms industry, while for others the arms trade has been an important dimension of foreign policy and a useful foreign exchange earner (Clegg 1999, p. 50). The successful campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines not only encouraged advocates to persist in their collective and coordinated efforts to help establish small arms controls, but also galvanized resistance to their anticipated influence in subsequent multilateral small arms control forums. The UN reasserted its claim as the pre-eminent institution through which to confront the most crucial issues on the international security agenda, reorganizing its implementing agencies and establishing the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) during 1998 in order to better facilitate and coordinate its activities over this issue (Brem and Rutherford 2001: 175—176). Some governments were also reluctant to endorse the precedent

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set by the new diplomacy informing the Ottawa Treaty and therefore limited civil society organizations’ involvement in the UN Small Arms Conference to a more conventional role. Civil society organizations were granted a single morning in which to deliver presentations each of no more than five minutes duration, their public gallery access was limited to open sessions, and they were excluded from negotiation sessions. It is likely that some governments, including Algeria and PRC, sought to deny the participation of those civil society organizations primarily concerned with publicizing poor human rights records (Batchelor 2002: 38—39; see also Atwood 2001). These conference arrangements did not, however, preclude the usual informal opportunities in the so-called margins for civil society organizations to exchange information with governments and lobby for their positions. Nor did these arrangements prevent official delegations from Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the UK from including among their ranks civil society representatives seeking better controls over small arms (Krause 2002: 256; Small Arms Survey 2002, pp. 203—223). Details regarding proceedings in closed sessions were presumably given by those representatives to those who were excluded from the conference sessions. Nor did it deter advocates outside the Conference attracting media attention to the issues at hand. While the UN Small Arms Conference did not deny the rise of a new diplomacy it did, in part, curtail that rise as governments reasserted their primacy in arms control negotiations within a reinvigorated UN framework. Indeed, the very act of that reassertion is clear recognition of the potential power of this new diplomacy. Proposing International Frameworks Although advocates have proposed new small arms controls that policymakers could adopt, these have for the most part generated little interest and even less momentum. In 1997, eight Nobel Peace Prize-winners, led by the former President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias Sánchez, expressed their collective concern over the devastation caused by the uncontrolled spread of military weapons. Entitled the Nobel Prize Laureates’ International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers (Laureates’ Code), this declaration attempts to foster existing concern by calling upon “citizens of the world [to] demand that leaders support this Code as well as similar efforts on the national and regional level.” Since its announcement, the Laureates’ Code has attracted support from a further ten Nobel Peace Prize recipients. Expressing their concern not only over the uncontrolled spread of small arms but also over the ongoing proliferation of tanks, armoured combat vehicles, aircraft, encryption software, thermal-imaging equipment, and super computers, these advocates encourage citizens from around the world to apply pressure upon their governments to take a specific course of action outlined in this Code. In particular, the Laureates’ Code suggests that governments supplying these weapons should ensure that any recipient is of a sufficient moral pedigree; that

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is, that recipients observe human rights, comply with IHL, and show respect for democracy. The Code also recommends a link to the UNROCA as a way of monitoring the arms trade among governments. In so doing, this measure proposes to hold governments accountable for the transfer of these weapons and for their deadly consequences, though unlike the provisions of the four treaties examined in Chapter 4, it does so without distinguishing authorized trade from trafficking. The Laureates’ Code also fails to set out the precise means by which an importing government’s behaviour should be assessed and is also unclear as to where the onus of responsibility for enforcing these assessments falls. Although these Nobel Laureates might very well be high-profile opinion-makers with excellent intentions to improve the condition of humankind, their modest role as prominent actors of world affairs—signalled by the more hopeful than optimistic tone of the Code’s language—is demonstrated by the limited outcomes it has so far achieved. An admirable call for collective action to arrest the devastation caused by the transfer of military weapons, the Laureates’ Code received little if any commitment from governments, none of which were involved in its articulation. However, while governments did not accept the Code, it did gain some publicity and influenced the articulation of the EU Code of Conduct (Alley 2004, p. 49). More recently, arms control advocates have proposed an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which builds upon the norms articulated in the UNPoA. A briefing paper released by Arms Control in June 2005 states the following: The proposed Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a coherent response to the commitments in the Programme of Action by drawing together and consolidating states’ current obligations under international law. It is a simple clear framework which provides a universal standard for international arms transfers to stop arms getting into the wrong hands. The ATT was inspired by Nobel Peace Laureates and developed by lawyers, human rights organisations, and humanitarian NGOs. It now enjoys the support of a growing number of governments, as well as more than 600 civil society organisations worldwide. In March 2005, following the lead of Costa Rica, Finland, Tanzania, Kenya and others championing the ATT, the UK government pledged to promote the ATT during its presidencies of the G8 group of nations and the European Union in 2005 (Control Arms 2005, p. 4; see also Control Arms 2006).

Replicating the Ottawa Process by identifying a core group of governments supporting the proposed Treaty, Control Arms—a campaign run by Amnesty International, Oxfam International, and IANSA—is likely to help further refine the draft Treaty and increase the number of governments supporting its content before engaging those governments likely to weaken or oppose it. There is discernible momentum for this initiative, culminating in a decision made by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 10 October 2006 to commence work on such a treaty. While 139 governments voted to open negotiations on the treaty, 24 governments, including Russia and China, abstained from voting. The

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US was the only government to vote against the motion (BBC 2006a). Recent progress has been encouraging. In 2007, over a hundred governments provided UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon with their views on the feasibility, scope, and draft parameters of an Arms Trade Treaty. This was followed in 2008 by a series of meetings of a UN Group of Governmental Experts, which resulted in a Report entitled Towards An Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards for the Impact, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms. In late October 2008, nearly one hundred and fifty governments voted for a resolution establishing an Open-Ended Working Group to further consider the prospective Treaty (Control Arms 2008). Despite these encouraging signs, it remains to be seen if such a proposal can be realized as an enduring, robust, and comprehensive instrument of international law and if so the extent to which necessary trade-offs and concessions will water down its provisions. Winning Coalitions While so far unsuccessful at prompting international frameworks providing for small arms control, civil society organizations do provide opportunities for officials to engage in informal discussions which may lead to negotiations of these kinds of frameworks. IANSA’s members have provided opportunities for officials to engage in informal discussions resulting in subregional soft law measures, for instance. The then-President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konaré, first raised publicly the idea of a moratorium for ECOWAS member-states at a conference organized by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) in Oslo during April 1998. Within six months, the 15 heads of state belonging to ECOWAS had declared the Moratorium (Brem and Rutherford 2001: 179). Working under the auspices of a UN Regional Disarmament Centre in 1999, the ISS helped raise awareness of small arms control among governmental representatives belonging to the OAU. It also helped develop mutual understanding on the small arms topic by leading a series of workshops culminating in the Bamako Declaration, which in turn informed the UN Small Arms Conference (Krause 2002: 254). These organizations also seek to influence the conceptual scope of these frameworks as they undergo negotiation within intergovernmental organizations. At least one member-organization of IANSA has faithfully followed the Ottawa Process in a regional context. Saferworld identified a core group of European governments sympathetic to their arms control vision and then facilitated informal meetings among these governments during which it circulated research and fostered a consensus for the EU Code of Conduct. It did this without directly confronting the opposition of those EU member-states deemed unsympathetic. The consensus emerging among these core governments made it easier to subsequently enlist the support of other EU member-states (Anders 2005, p. 185). The EU Code of Conduct’s provision for a confidential consolidated Annual Report of all EU member-states’ transfers is an important step toward greater transparency. Although this reporting process remains classified by EU member-states, thereby evading

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the ongoing scrutiny of civil society, some governments such as Sweden publish publicly their reported transfers. Other governments such as France continue to oppose the publication of these reports outside diplomatic channels (Anders 2003a, p. 19). According to Sibylle Bauer and Mark Bromley, an annual summary of national reports has been published since 1999 even though no obligation exists for EU member-states to make such information available. “The agreement to publish a consolidated report,” they contend, “can be attributed to successful pressure from the European Parliament and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as the insistence of the 1999 Finnish EU Presidency” (2004, p. 5). Not all of Saferworld’s agenda translated into tangible outcomes from these intergovernmental negotiations, however. IANSA has also been heavily engaged in the multilateral processes leading to the UNPoA, the only small arms-specific soft law measure of global reach. At the UN Small Arms Conference, IANSA claimed a membership of over 320 organizations drawn from 70 countries (Krause 2002: 256), signalling that it was an important actor with which to be reckoned. According to Laurance and Stohl, the contributions of these civil society organizations could not be ignored by those managing the Conference because “[i]ts members had been conducting extensive research for several years, and as a result had produced a wide body of knowledge on the causes and consequences of the proliferation and misuse of small arms, as well as extensive policy recommendations on how to solve the problems associated with these weapons” (2002, p. 18). The significance of this contribution is enshrined in the instrument itself: paragraph 16 of its Preamble recognizes “the important contribution of civil society, including non-governmental organizations and industry in, inter alia, assisting Governments to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.” Notably, the UNPoA is the only international framework providing for small arms control to both acknowledge the role of, and seek support for, civil society. Various members of IANSA also participated in a series of meetings in the late 1990s held by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which led to the UN Firearms Protocol. As Cukier and Sidel explain, the “focus of these meetings was examining the current status of and standards for national legislation, import/export controls on commercial shipments of firearms, as well as marking and tracing standards. Regional meetings provided an opportunity to expand international cooperation among gun control organizations” (2006, p. 221). Thus, IANSA’s advocacy for instruments of international law extends to both soft law measures and treaties, though its contribution varies from case to case. It also demonstrates IANSA’s appetite as a collectivity to engage with sovereign-bound policy and legislative processes as frequently and as intensely as possible. Civil society organizations can form issue-based policy coalitions with particular governments where their policy interests converge. In so doing, they can seek also to influence those governments’ perception of their policy interests, encouraging the pursuit of those interests in multilateral settings. Such a ‘winning’ coalition is attractive to both civil society organizations and officials

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because it promotes an ongoing dialogue in which ideas and information can flow between advocates and official policymakers. Each becomes familiar with the other’s position and aware of the other’s potential negotiating flexibility, in turn increasing the standing of both within the wider international community when each is able to claim the support of the other (Anders 2003a, pp. 14—15). The maturing relationships among these arms control protagonists demonstrate a cohesive and resilient international small arms community composing small arms controls. This sense of solidarity was momentarily enhanced on 16 March 2006 when IANSA addressed the UN Security Council, presenting a series of papers encouraging the Council to assist in establishing international legal frameworks controlling small arms, to strengthen its enforcement of arms embargoes, and to emphasize the importance of DDR programs in its peacekeeping operations (IANSA 2005). Sometimes such interconnectivity among these major efforts to compose small arms controls is viewed negatively, however. In postconflict settings, international civil society organizations working closely with peacekeeping operations can be seen by some local nongovernmental organizations as colluding outsiders; that is, as part of the “‘invasion’ by international NGOs arriving in the country with UN soldiers,” as Pouligny puts it (2003: 363). The strategies employed by these international civil society organizations are informed by their own ‘universalist’ principles that are not necessarily easily transplanted into war-torn postconflict settings. In fact, local social organizations are often neglected, quite possibly because they are “insufficiently understood and widely marginalized” (Ibid: 372). While there might be significant interaction between international civil society organizations and local actors, there is often little in the way of meaningful and sustained negotiation and few genuine cultural transactions. This tends to result in arms control efforts that are informed more by the ideologies of the West with its ‘best practices’, than by traditional practices permeating host societies. Such a disconnect has potentially serious ramifications for the sustainability and acceptability of such ‘imposed’ arms controls. Pro-Gun Lobby Not all civil society organizations engaged in the negotiation of those international frameworks providing for small arms controls advocate within the policy bounds prescribed by IANSA. The inclusion of US Congressman and serving member on the NRA Board of Directors, Robert Barr, as an official delegate to the UN Small Arms Conference demonstrates “the US position on civilian possession of firearms was clearly linked to the importance of these domestic lobby groups for the Bush government” (Krause 2002: 258). Barr’s participation within the delegation of the UN’s most powerful member-state excluded from the UNPoA’s conceptual scope aspects relating to regulating either civilian possession of these weapons or arms transfers to nongovernmental actors. Immediately prior to the Conference, the then US Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security

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Affairs, John Bolton, identified both the longstanding recreational use of these weapons enjoyed by US citizens and the right to bear arms as enshrined by the Second Amendment of the US Constitution as informing the official US position. Bolton expressed the position in terms of its reservations: We do not support measures that would constrain legal trade and the legal manufacturing of small arms and light weapons….We do not support the promotion of international advocacy activity by international or nongovernmental organizations, particularly when those political or policy views advocated are not consistent with the view of all member states….We do not support measures that prohibit civilian possession of small arms….We do not support measures limiting trade in SALW solely to governments….The United States also will not support a mandatory Review Conference (cited in Derghoukassian 2004, p. 4).

In so doing, at least in the view of one observer, “he stripped the conference of its agenda, its goals, and any trace of hope. When he stepped down from the speakers’ podium, the conference was, for all practical purposes, completely over” (Karp 2002: 177). Karp ���������������������������������������������������������������� does however elaborate beyond this hyperbole ������������������������ by suggesting that the Conference’s failure ������������������������������������������������������� was underpinned by “the inherent intractability of the issue, the lack of a unifying normative principle to guide international consensus, the reassertion of the primacy of the national interest in international politics, and the ambivalence of small arms activist and their supporters” (Ibid: 179). The incorporation of the NRA’s views into the text of the UNPoA signals the powerful influence of the NRA in shaping US foreign policy. The nature and extent of this influence emerges from the NRA’s close relationship with the domestic arms industry, from which it receives funds enabling it to finance certain politicians’ election campaigns. Once elected, these politicians in turn ensure the ongoing defence of gun-users’ rights and the advancement of certain corporate interests in Washington, D.C. (Derghoukassain 2004, p. 20). It also informs a more general US policy on multilateral arms control agreements reflected in the major treaties providing for small arms control, specifically the OAS Convention and the UN Firearms Protocol, which the US Government helped negotiate but has yet to ratify. Enduring throughout multilateral negotiations, this position underscores the relative bargaining power of the US Government as a global hegemon where it pursues its interests among the international community.  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ As Batchelor points out, US opposition to NGO advocacy seemingly excludes the NRA members included in the US delegation (2002: 40).  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������� According to Cukier and Sidel, US Senator Jesse Helms blocked financial aid requested by members of ECOWAS to help implement its moratorium and opposed disarming Iraqis on the grounds that taxpayers’ money should not be used to “promote policies in foreign countries that may very well be a violation of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution” (2006, p. 224).

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Significantly, there is no gun-control organization within the US whose influence on US foreign policymaking remotely compares to that of the NRA. For Derghoukassian, “the gun control movement [is best seen] as the societal countermovement to the gun market expansion.” He explains further that “[w]ith an agenda too much dispersed, a focus on narrowly local issues or communities and unable to assume a leading role in transnational advocacy groups, the U.S. gun control community were unable to globalize” (2004, pp. 15—17). The multiple layers of jurisdiction covering firearms legislation in the US—specifically at the federal, state, and municipal levels—discourage cohesion among domestic gun control movements, which in any case are more preoccupied with local impacts of weapons misuse than with any of their international effects (Cukier and Sidel 2006, p. 208). Without a domestic lobby contesting the NRA’s influence, the US Government is unlikely to alter its foreign policy position with respect to controlling small arms through multilateral means. Despite their contending purposes, both IANSA and NRA recognize the importance of maximizing the official role granted to civil society organizations within the UN Small Arms Conference and its follow-up meetings (Batchelor 2002: 39; see also Atwood 2001). In fact the NRA was, for a time, the only firearms-related nongovernmental organization accredited with consultative status at ECOSOC (Cukier and Sidel 2006, p. 223). The NRA was also responsible for establishing the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA), a coalition of nearly 30 organizations located in over 13 countries, each sharing a common interest in preserving civilian gun-ownership rights (Batchelor 2002: 38). While the NRA demonstrates a powerful influence over the formulation of US foreign policy, specifically with respect to multilateral efforts to compose small arms controls, there is little evidence available to suggest that IANSA’s campaign has an equally appreciable and comparable impact on the negotiation of international frameworks. Endorsing Internationalism Notwithstanding IANSA’s presence at various multilateral meetings (and in some cases their facilitation of such forums), assessing their influence over the negotiation of international frameworks for small arms controls remains problematic. One reason for this is that while officials’ calculations include considerations of arms control advocates’ proposals, they are also mindful of other governments’ positions. In the case of subregional instruments, calculations also include the regional implications of any agreements reached. In light of these complexities, IANSA’s member-organizations may provide important negotiating opportunities, though their input is but a single factor in a complex negotiating process. Keen to celebrate negotiated outcomes and to bolster support for new agreements, officials are often prone to exaggerating the role played by civil society organizations in shaping instruments of international law, especially where the provisions are not legally binding upon governments.

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As mentioned, some civil society organizations engage with European governmental policymaking with respect to small arms controls. Some of these governments appear sensitive to the concerns and recommendations offered by arms control advocates, at times recognizing their contributions as helping to strengthen emerging international frameworks. However, as Anders concludes: the existence of nongovernmental advocacy by itself or even if coupled with support by sympathetic governments, is clearly not sufficient to achieve policy change. This is particularly so where specific policy elements are concerned rather than the general acceptance of the need for controls in certain areas of the arms trade (2005, p. 193).

In fact, policy developments are most easily discerned in those cases where the positions of civil society organizations and governments coincide. Since IANSA’s policy ‘success’ occurs mostly, if not exclusively, in those ‘winning’ policy coalitions where IANSA’s objectives coincide with governmental interests, serious doubt must necessarily persist regarding its ability to either enable or curtail governments’ decision-making within intergovernmental organizations. This is highlighted where governmental interests are at odds with and prevail over the objectives of IANSA’s arms control campaign. This in turn sharpens analytic focus on the limitations of IANSA’s arms control campaign, especially when contextualized against the other major efforts to compose small arms controls. This is not to diminish their significance as arms control protagonists, however. Assessing the extent of IANSA’s influence over the negotiation of the UNPoA is similarly problematic, but at the same time particularly insightful. As one observer of the process maintains, “[i]n a slow pantomime, governments began looking to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for good ideas, while the NGOs looked to the governments for a sense of what was feasible.” Besides suggesting that all small arms are marked at the time of their manufacture, Karp writes, “the NGO agenda consisted almost exclusively of taking ideas from governments and parroting them back” (2002: 180—181). Significantly, the text of the UNPoA did not reflect some of IANSA’s key positions which, if incorporated, could have helped prevent many weapons from reaching belligerents and criminals. According to Krause, the “experience of the UN Conference suggests that NGO influence was perhaps more important at the national than at the global level, and that it was more effective in agenda setting than in achieving particular outcomes” (2002: 257). He goes on to posit that IANSA’s members “appear to have exercised their influence by broadening the stakeholder base at the national and regional levels,  ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� See also Anders (2003a: 20) who writes, “although non-state actors have played important roles in the creation of the EU regime on arms, governmental interests and governmental leadership have remained key to achieving policy change on the level of the EU…[consequently] there is not sufficient evidence for claiming a shift towards the governance of European arms controls.”

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by pushing governments to develop policies where none exist, and by raising the level of awareness and expertise that states can bring to the negotiating table” (Ibid: 258). Endorsing Krause’s assessment, Batchelor concludes “[a]lthough they had been able to exert some influence over other negotiation processes at the subregional and regional levels, and at the PrepCom meetings, the NGO Community had a fairly limited impact on the Conference negotiations, as delegations focused on following instructions from their capitals” (2002: 39). In short, while IANSA attracts attention to the urgent need for governments to compose small arms controls, and its member-organizations have been involved in building support for subregional, regional, and global instruments of international law, the assertion that it has made a discernible difference in establishing these international frameworks is somewhat problematic. This is especially so given the extent to which IANSA’s engagement with instruments of international law varies, and that nongovernmental organizations unaffiliated with IANSA were also present at some of these meetings, including the UN Small Arms Conference. IANSA’s unwillingness to disturb or contest the internationalist notion of the political— which informs the negotiation and implementation of instruments of international law and the crafting of UN Security Council resolutions for collective action—can help explain why its arms control campaign has been unable to effect significant policy change relating to these international frameworks. By endorsing this internationalism, IANSA’s arms control campaign draws upon recognition by governments to provide its sense of legitimacy as a member of the international small arms community. According to Stefan Brem and Ken Rutherford: Over the last years, committed states have strengthened their cooperation with interested NGOs and acknowledged the importance of NGOs in conducting and disseminating research, educating the public, and providing advice to governments on small-arms issues. In sum, a core group of states decided that it was in their hands to strengthen the collaboration with interested NGOs in order to build a solid coalition to situate the SALW crisis at the top of the international political agenda (2001: 181, emphasis added).

This is not to say that governments prescribe the range of issues for which civil society organizations must necessarily campaign. Rather, it is to acknowledge as does Krause that “the NGO network ‘maps onto’ the concerns of like-minded states (usually middle-powers) that provide support for it” (2002: 259). While this does not deny IANSA a role in multilateral arms control efforts, it does acknowledge that such a role depends upon widespread governmental consent and it is with, for the most part, medium-sized governments that arms control advocates have established productive working relations. In other words, medium-sized governments, especially those with a vested interest in a substantive and ongoing commitment to internationalism—be it on a global, regional, or subregional scale—benefit from the engagement of civil society organizations. This engagement serves to endorse

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the primacy of governments where they cooperate for collective security ends. While IANSA’s members might develop their responses, enlarge the scope of their involvement, and improve the sophistication of their approach, these developments do not necessarily influence the behaviour of policymakers in discernible ways, especially in non-trivial matters relating to international security. Significant too is the emergence of a coalition of like-minded and actionorientated governments before IANSA’s establishment. As Garcia asserts: The wealth of initiatives promoted by governments during the period 1995—99 within the UN and through the coalition of like-minded states […] is an indicator that states had a stronger sponsorship role in the advancement of the issue of small arms within the international agenda than non-governmental actors in that period. They acted as agenda setters and elevated the small arms issue to a position of prominence within the international agenda. The role of some states, like Canada and Norway, was key in the making of a coalition of like-minded states that played a central role in advancing the global efforts to control small arms (2005: 243).

In fact, the small arms literature, an emerging body of international law, and the collective action authorized by the UN Security Council each occurred before the establishment of IANSA. This chronology underscores the limited extent to which civil society organizations have exercised leadership over arms control protagonists’ efforts to compose small arms controls. While civil society organizations’ impact on multilateral small arms control processes may be debatable, their involvement in various multilateral processes and the formal recognition of this involvement by certain instruments of international law has had a profound impact upon arms control advocacy. This official recognition not only provides those advocates with necessary resources and a sense of legitimacy as arms control protagonists, but also enables a broader civil society constituency to be cultivated. IANSA can claim success in consolidating support for efforts to compose controls over small arms. In this light, the UN Small Arms Conference was particularly important in fostering interest and further consolidating civil society support for arms control advocacy. According to Batchelor, “[i]t mobilised new organizations to join the NGO community and helped build relationships between NGOs from different parts of the world, and from different sectors…The Conference was also useful for building better relations between the NGO community and governments” (2002: 40). The meetings preceding and following the Conference also offered IANSA opportunities to develop policy recommendations, nurture partnerships, and improve their capability for future campaigning. Here, then, as a civil society organization, “IANSA is significant, in part because it represents the coming together of a range of groups from many countries concerned about the problems of small arms and firearms from a variety of perspectives” (����������������������� Cukier and Sidel 2006,

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p. 228).����������������������������������������������������������������������� The Conference also enabled relationships among researchers and civil society organizations to mature. For Laurance, it was an: occasion for the creation, dissemination, and sharing of knowledge that firmly established the SALW problem as global in nature….and has set in motion a host of post-Conference studies and conferences designed to connect the knowledge on small arms problems with that of international law, human rights, and public health, to name a few (2002, p. 197).

Arms control advocates clearly do important work, and the civil society organizations to which many of them belong are significant actors involved in the composition of small arms controls. Yet IANSA’s influence over the negotiation of the international frameworks examined in Chapter 4 has so far refrained from contesting the underpinning internationalist notion of the political prevailing among arms control protagonists. This endorsement of internationalism will almost certainly ensure IANSA’s ongoing marginalization in the more significant matters relating to the composition of small arms controls because it does nothing to enhance the importance of sovereign-free actors in relation to their sovereignbound counterparts. In foregoing this opportunity, and by cooperating with governments on terms set by those sovereign-bound actors, IANSA fails to take full advantage of its sovereign-free status in world affairs. Monitoring In addition to advocating the establishment of certain instruments of international law, civil society organizations seek to encourage the implementation of existing frameworks by monitoring governments’ behaviour in relation to their responsibilities under such instruments. Sometimes this monitoring occurs within formalized processes assessing small arms controls with a view to improving them. At other times, it occurs as publicly-available reports scrutinizing the gap between specific international responsibilities and a government’s arms control policies and practices. The UNPoA is an illustrative example in this regard as civil society organizations monitor progress towards the full implementation of this instrument from both within UN processes and beyond the UN’s conference rooms. Endogenous Monitoring IANSA has engaged with the UNPoA review process by giving various presentations during both BMS. At the first BMS, side-events staged by civil society organizations were significant in maintaining a sense of enthusiasm for the UNPoA, fostering the momentum built since the 2001 Conference. According to one observer, these sideevents enabled interaction among officials, representatives from intergovernmental organizations, and members of civil society organizations, thereby strengthening

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relationships among these actors (Batchelor 2003: 3). At the second BMS, IANSA presented formally to delegates a series of personal testimonies, which were both horrific and emotionally moving. However, as Stephanie Koorey describes: the arms control NGOs, co-ordinated through IANSA, confused delegates by showing a presentation on machete victims, leaving its main adversary, the US National Rifle Association which represents the interest of sporting shooters and self-defence advocates, wondering if IANSA was re-visiting the definition of small arms that had been established eight years before. IANSA failed to take the opportunity to elaborate its position on small arms availability and misuse, instead spending most of the morning session pointing out to delegates that being shot is unfortunate and largely preventable, and that firearms can be used coercively. This told the conference nothing new, and many considered the presentation to be unhelpful (2006: 4).

Put simply, these presentations implied that because small arms feature as a vital ingredient in perpetuating armed violence they ought to be controlled. This key message merely endorses the existing objectives of the UNPoA without contributing to the utility of the BMS itself, the purpose of which was to evaluate progress towards fulfilling those objectives. During its allocated session, IANSA provided very little evidence of its progress towards assisting governments with their implementation of the instrument. In any case, many officials were absent from the conference room during that particular session. This was a high-profile opportunity squandered by IANSA, damaging its credibility in the eyes of many who witnessed its performance. Civil society organizations are also involved in the monitoring of collective action authorized by the UN Security Council. While the resolutions authorizing arms embargoes are crafted by the UN Security Council, some of the Panels of Experts assisting Sanction Committees include members of civil society organizations, as noted in Chapter 5. The formalized processes reviewing sanction regimes in more general terms also incorporate input from researchers and members of civil society organizations. For example, in collaboration with government officials but under the leadership of the UN, researchers and members of civil society organizations have undertaken a series of studies described as the Interlaken (1998-99), Bonn-Berlin (1999-2001), and Stockholm (2001-03) Processes. Whereas the Interlaken Process was convened by the Swiss Federal Office for Economic Affairs, the Bonn-Berlin Process and the Stockholm Process were organized by nongovernmental actors: BICC and the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, respectively. Besides government and intergovernmental officials, private bank representatives and academics from institutions such as the Watson Institute for International Studies of Brown University, Harvard University, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geveva), the University of Notre Dame, and the Free University of Amsterdam also attended the Interlaken Process. The BonnBerlin Process included participants from universities as well as from so-called

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‘independent research centres’ and civil society organizations, including SIPRI, NISAT, BICC, the Center for Conflict Resolution, Saferworld, and International Alert. The Stockholm Process also included representatives from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. The purpose of these studies was to review the efficacy of sanction regimes with two broad aims in mind: first, to increase the effectiveness of these regimes in altering the behaviour of their targets; and second, to limit adverse collateral impacts on non-target populations, predominantly civilians. Various outcomes of the Interlaken Process include “a consensus on the potential advantages of financial sanctions over comprehensive economic embargoes” and a recognition that, although financial sanctions are unlikely to be effective as autonomous measures, they “may offer additional valuable tools to demonstrate the determination of the international community and to support a growing sense of individual accountability of targeted elites for the unlawful acts of states by seeking control over their financial assets and transactions” (Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs 1999, pp. 5—6). This process identified and elaborated the practical means by which credible financial sanctions could be targeted, assisted in part by the better harnessing of technologies, the intensification of cooperation among governments, the further developing of those frameworks through which governments share information and expertise, and the improvement of ways in which governments use domestic law to reflect their international commitments. Focusing upon arms embargoes and travel-related sanctions, the Bonn-Berlin Process identified key ‘deficits and deficiencies’ resulting from poor implementation and administration, provided a broad range of potential solutions for these deficits and deficiencies, and identified from among these potential solutions a few areas for further consideration (Brzoska 2001, pp. 10—11). Notably, nongovernmental participants of this process suggested the important monitoring roles played by civil society organizations should be expanded and strengthened (Norris 2000: 2). The Stockholm Process explored particular ways in which sanction regimes might be better implemented. This included the routine establishment of sanction committees and an in-house UN database enabling timely access to relevant information, and the wider involvement of governments in the sanctioning procedure whereby it is made clear that “sanctions regimes are ‘owned’ by the international community” (Wallensteen et al. 2003, p. v). Members of the Stockholm Process also recommended assistance to those governments lacking effective administrative infrastructure, including the provision of model domestic legislation for those governments without such legislation. The increasing involvement of multiple actors in these formal review processes signals a nascent interconnectivity among their various approaches towards composing controls over small arms, strengthening the bonds of commonality among the international small arms community.

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As mentioned in Chapter 5, some civil society organizations also manage and implement certain aspects of DDR programs, exemplified by Save the Children’s activities in Afghanistan. However, there is no multi-actor review process comparable to the Interlaken, Berlin-Bonn, and Stockholm Processes for those DDR processes authorized as part of UN peacekeeping operations, though some insightful reports expressing lessons learned are available from the UN DPKO Best Practices Unit. Here, then, as sovereign-free actors, arms control advocates belonging to IANSA participate in these review mechanisms, which are intended to monitor progress towards international frameworks’ implementation and to identify areas that could be strengthened in light of the purpose of these frameworks. However, these endogenous review mechanisms are led by the UN, meaning that the recommendations emerging from these review processes are unlikely to be actioned if they serve to weaken the politico-strategic governance architecture. In fact, the participation of these sovereign-free actors within the processes driven by sovereign-bound actors does not signal what postinternationalists would describe as parametric change. Rather, while an interaction among collectivities occurs, the result of this interaction serves simply to perpetuate the bifurcating distinction between sovereign-bound and sovereign-free actors. Consequently, the resulting efforts to help compose small arms controls deliberately seek to counter the broader turbulence in world affairs. Exogenous Monitoring While some of IANSA’s member-organizations seize upon opportunities to participate in the formal review processes that form part of the international frameworks created by various intergovernmental organizations and the UN Security Council, others seek to develop more autonomous relationships with these actors. Such relationships are developed through the provision of reports that scrutinize the distance between governments’ responsibilities under international law and their actions. These types of reports exist beyond any formalized review processes. Resembling researchers’ call for action explored in Chapter 3, these reports are significant contributions to the small arms literature, exploring this important aspect of the small arms topic against various subregional, regional, and global contexts. Policymakers might use these reports to improve the ways in which they evaluate, observe, or implement their arms control responsibilities. They might also use these reports as a means of embarrassing other policymakers whose will to take action in accordance with their responsibilities appears insufficient, if not entirely absent. More than a call for action, then, these reports present information, analysis, and assessments primarily as a means of monitoring the conduct of certain governments in order to encourage the effective implementation of small arms controls.

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Since March 2003, International Alert has published a series of reports under its Security and Peace Building Programme: Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Control (MISAC). The objective of these reports is: to better implement international and national small arms control measures. By working with governments, donors and NGOs its intention is not only to develop a better level of understanding regarding the scope and nature of international and regional small arms control but to directly assist stakeholders in working towards the full implementation of small arms controls (Grillot 2003, p. 6).

Focusing upon the subregions of Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Black Sea, Central America, MERCOSUR, and West Africa—though the series broadens its focus to a regional perspective of Eurasia and Latin America—these reports compare governments’ domestic regulatory regimes for small arms against their relevant obligations and commitments (see Godnick and Vàzquez 2003; Grillot 2003; Agboton-Johnson et al. 2004; Dreyfus et al. 2003). In particular, these reports assess governments in terms of the weapons manufactured under their jurisdiction, the basis of their domestic regulation of trade and possession, and their law enforcement capabilities. The findings of the MISAC reports informed the analysis of a ‘cross-regional’ report, entitled Implementing International Small Arms Controls: Some Lessons from Eurasia, Latin America, and West Africa, which concluded this three-year initiative. The report reveals the differing regional experiences of implementing the emerging mosaic of responsibilities. It notes that although the “motivation of joining NATO or the EU has been a positive factor in getting governments to modernise SALW legislation and practice in South Eastern Europe…in Latin America and Africa, there is no similar motivation” (von Tangen Page et al. 2005, p. 36). Helpful for maintaining momentum for composing small arms controls, the report links inducements with various key impediments to a full adherence to the responsibilities of the 29 countries analyzed. For example, a constant refrain pervading many of the reports’ various conclusions suggests that the lack of sufficient resources is one of the main obstacles hindering the matching of official governmental policy to its practices; unsurprisingly, the limited role played by civil society organizations is presented here as another common obstacle which ought to be removed by expanding and strengthening their presence during implementation effort. ‘Red Books’ Given the large extent to which the UNPoA’s provisions overlap with other soft law measures examined in Chapter 4, reports monitoring the implementation of this agreement are also germane to assessments of governments’ adherence to other relevant responsibilities. One report recognizes that “it is neither possible nor desirable to distinguish between efforts to implement the PoA and these

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other associated regional and international agreements” (Biting the Bullet 2003, p. 4). (Of course, this only applies where these responsibilities are neither more onerous than those expressed by, nor extend beyond the scope of, the UNPoA.) Even though most governments attending the UN Small Arms Conference agreed to participate in two further meetings as a means of reviewing their progress towards full implementation of this instrument, the UNPoA does not specifically delegate to civil society organizations the task of monitoring governmental activities. Nevertheless, the Biting the Bullet Project—currently comprising of researchers from International Alert, Saferworld, and the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University in cooperation with IANSA—has produced three major reports focusing exclusively upon the UNPoA. Often referred to as the ‘Red Books’—reflecting the colour of their covers—the first of these reports assesses the extent to which 156 UN member-states uphold their commitments under the UNPoA in terms of each government’s control over the following important aspects of the problem: the ongoing proliferation of these weapons in terms of both organized manufacture and casual craft; transfers of these weapons in terms of legal trade, grey transfers, and illicit trafficking; weapons possession in terms of both existing stockpiles and informal caches; and, lastly, any disarmament processes, disposal techniques, and reintegration efforts undertaken by the government in question. The second and third volumes examine the relevant progress by over 180 UN member-states. The similarity between the information contained in the MISAC reports and that contained in the Red Books signals the cooperative working relationship among IANSA’s memberorganizations. Whereas the first two Reports—entitled Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Action by States and Civil Society and International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action—were published in order to contribute to the BMS process, the third Report focuses instead upon “thematic examinations of progress towards implementation of the PoA in a way that aims to be of the most use to inform debates at the Review Conference” (Biting the Bullet 2006, p. 4). According to its authors, the timing of IANSA’s first Report deliberately precedes the first BMS held at New York in July 2003 so that it might assist officials to “identify strengths, weaknesses and priorities for the future” (Biting the Bullet 2003, p. 4). Yet the timing of the Report compromises the extent of its information and, by extension, the quality of its analysis because some governments, complying with the letter of their commitments, only released their official information during the BMS process itself. The first Report’s tone is as overly optimistic as its findings are largely uncritical. The authors’ preference for suggesting the “glass has been slightly filled” rather than remaining “over 95 per cent empty” reflects a tone which does not easily reconcile with its central findings; that is, there was “little evidence to suggest any overall success so far in reducing the scale and impacts of SALW trafficking and proliferation” (Ibid, p. 5). The report’s tone also appears inconsistent with its recommendation that “NGOs and other civil society groups

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should take opportunities for constructive, even if sometimes critical, relationships with governments to promote inclusive social engagement in efforts to implement the PoA and related agreements” (Ibid p. 7, emphasis added). The tone of the second Report is less rose-tinted, however. Its authors acknowledge that they “are obliged to emphasise how little has so far actually been achieved in many respects,” before admitting the: scale of the interventions is generally not sufficient to have more than a local or marginal impact on the problems of SALW trafficking, proliferation and misuse. Our examination shows that there are indeed some countries and sub-regions that have achieved substantial progress in more than one of these areas. These were already emerging by 2003, and have in several cases maintained their momentum. In many other countries and regions, promising early indicators of imminent action have proved misleading: they have not been properly followedup. Many States have not really even put in place the basic mechanisms and procedures for PoA participation (Biting the Bullet 2005, p. 10).

The third Report similarly distances itself from the first Report’s tone by suggesting, “[w]hile it is important to recognise some positive developments (“the glass has begun to be filled”), it is at least as important to face the fact that implementation is not on track towards overall effective action (“the glass remains almost empty”)” (Biting the Bullet 2006, p. 4). While each of these three reports analyzes governmental progress towards fulfilling commitments under the UNPoA, none considers whether or not the Program itself is actually capable of effectively controlling small arms. In other words, while much of the Red Books focuses upon policymakers making good on their international commitments, the hard work of analyzing the strategic capability of the UNPoA to stem the problems at hand is not confronted here. Notwithstanding the value of these various publications as a useful compilation of data, the analysis and conclusions drawn by these Reports’ authors appear to be of limited policy utility to the international small arms community. The effects of their recommendations are also not easily discerned. This is not to say that some governments will not endorse a Report’s findings as a means either of enhancing their own international prestige or of diminishing that of another government. There is, however, a lack of strong evidence suggesting governments have altered their policies and practices in accordance with the wishes of those civil society organizations campaigning under the auspices of IANSA, where those wishes do not already coincide with existing governmental interests. As previously noted in Chapters 4 and 5, the diplomatic tactic of naming-and-shaming has proven a weak and ineffectual deterrent, even when deployed by the UN Security Council. Monitoring governmental progress towards fulfilling the objectives of the UNPoA from beyond the UNPoA’s formal review process, the Red Books do not appear to bear upon that review process in any significant way, especially as they do

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not necessarily compel governments into a specific course of action that those governments would not otherwise take. Where rose-tinted appraisals of progress towards implementing international frameworks occur from beyond these frameworks’ formal review processes, such reporting aims to establish and maintain a readership consisting of diplomats and other governmental officials acting as arms control protagonists. Where this occurs, as in the case of the first Red Book, it reveals part of IANSA’s ongoing negotiation with the politico-strategic governance architecture aimed at encouraging those arms control protagonists to enable civil society participation in multilateral arms control negotiations. As part of this ongoing negotiation, IANSA’s campaign assists governments and intergovernmental organizations with their problem-solving approach, and frequently does so without assessing whether or not those frameworks are sufficient to exert control over small arms, or what the consequences of such control might mean. Like small arms researchers, these civil society organizations are sovereign-free actors adopting the common problem-solving approach held by sovereign-bound actors, and therefore help to strengthen the politico-strategic governance architecture, consolidate the macrolevel interactions that form the basis of much of world affairs, and mitigate the effects of turbulence. However, by strengthening this governance arrangement IANSA also encourages the ongoing marginalization of its member-organizations’ roles in world affairs. Uncontested Internationalism The monitoring that occurs beyond the formal processes supporting various international frameworks appears no more likely to effect policy change in the way small arms controls are implemented than do those occasions where civil society organizations are engaged in formal monitoring and reviewing activities. IANSA’s ongoing involvement with these processes, however, reveals an enduring commitment to internationalism. Despite the diversity evident among efforts to compose small arms controls, IANSA shares with other major arms controls protagonists a notion of the political that prefers governments cooperating together as a primary means of maintaining international peace and pursuing collective security. In fact, when it comes to composing small arms controls, internationalism has become something of an orthodoxy around which a nascent interconnectivity takes hold and the maturing relationships among arms control protagonists develop. By endorsing the internationalist notion of the political which underpins the major efforts to compose small arms controls, IANSA neglects advancing other key philosophical assumptions commonly held by many social movements. More specifically, it contests neither the primacy of governments nor the assumption that human nature is calculating. Since those arms control advocates following IANSA’s guidance avoid contesting the particular notion of the political deeply embedded in the structures informing contemporary world affairs, IANSA’s

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campaign serves to endorse the legitimacy enjoyed by state-makers and to support the existing governance architecture. To do otherwise would require IANSA to reinvent itself as a ‘critical social movement,’ which R.B.J. Walker defines as: distinguishable in part by their capacity to recognize and act creatively upon the connection among structures, processes, and peoples that do not enter significantly into the calculations of conventional political actors or that are denied by movements of a more reactionary character. Recognizing connections, critical social movements are able to engage not only in struggles around specific problems but also in struggles that recognise the emancipatory potential inherent in certain kinds of connections and solidarities. Acting on such connections and forging new solidarities, critical social movements have the capacity to extend the horizons of our political imagination. Reacting to the intolerable, they extend the boundaries of the possible (1988, p. 3).

IANSA’s uncritical endorsement of internationalism comes at the expense of fostering alternative governance arrangements. Such an endorsement does nothing to prompt a reconfiguration of the prevailing governance architecture, without which IANSA’s campaign will have little opportunity to make a discernible difference to the ways in which small arms controls are composed. Instead, these arms control advocates and the civil society organizations to which many of those advocates belong are likely to continue participating in multilateral settings, but any increased level of engagement by civil society organization within intergovernmental organizations does not necessarily translate into more effective political engagement. Nor does it signal the emergence of a global public policy or any other form of global governance. Karp is mindful of the contrast between the “[v]iolent antiglobalization demonstrators in Seattle in 1999 [that] totally eclipsed the meeting of the World Trade Organization they came to protest….[and the UN Small Arms Conference which] never rose above analytic sobriety” (2002: 181). Rather than fostering alternative governance arrangements, IANSA’s campaigning appears to support Pouligny’s claim that “although they often criticise the actions of governments and international organisations or specific aspects of their policies, NGOs rarely challenge the broader notion of political and economic principles which constitute the framework of their actions” (2000, p. 34). Here, then, despite Derghoukassian’s observation that “[t]he landmines case inaugurated a novel modality of ‘new internationalism’ centered on the collaborative process of NGOs and moderate states” (2004, p. 3), no such new internationalism is evident with respect to controlling small arms. Much the same can be said of Krause’s concept of a ‘new multilateralism’ (2002: 259). Similarly, perhaps Garcia misses the point when she writes that: The problems associated with the spread and availability of small arms are of an eminently international nature, and solutions can only be understood in the new framework of global governance [which…] encompass the multi-layered

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and highly complex (political and legal) common understanding that form the relations between states and other actors in international politics (2006, p. xvii).

As Part II of this book demonstrates, there has not been a shift within the major efforts to compose small arms away from an internationalist notion of the political— which prefers governments acting together in order to confront urgent security challenges—and towards a notion of the political which prefers governmental and nongovernmental actors playing equal roles as sovereign-free and sovereignbound actors within a harmonious global governance system. In fact, by relying upon a critical approach, this book argues that the major efforts to compose small arms controls are preferred because they call for, enshrine, entrench, reinforce, and reassert this notion of the political. Conclusion There is much evidence indicating that civil society organizations have become increasingly involved in the composition of small arms controls. At times, this involvement has been welcomed and even facilitated by governments and intergovernmental organizations alike. Evident too is the high degree of nascent interconnectivity between the campaigns of civil society organizations and the small arms literature, instruments of international law, the UN’s collective action, and governments’ domestic regulatory regimes. Yet because IANSA’s campaign deliberately maps onto the concerns and interests of certain governments and onto the existing security agendas of intergovernmental organizations, civil society organizations following IANSA’s lead have not always fully exploited the power available to them as social movements and as sovereign-free actors. There is far less available evidence indicating that IANSA has been able to prompt new international frameworks providing for small arms controls, be they either treaties or soft law measures of global, regional, or subregional scope. Nor is there much available evidence to suggest that their advocacy for, or monitoring of, multilateral processes necessarily demonstrates an effective political engagement at the global level. In fact, the record to date suggests that civil society organizations, especially those under IANSA’s leadership, have yet to clearly demonstrate an ability ‘to get and use power over others for non-trivial purposes.’ Other civil society organizations not affiliated to IANSA have, however, proven politically effective in pursuing their objectives during multilateral negotiations occurring at intergovernmental organizations. More specifically, the NRA—with its representatives included as members of the US delegation to the UN Small Arms Conference, to the UN meetings preceding the UNCATOC, and to the OAS—was responsible for preventing consensus over regulating both civilian possession and transfers to nongovernmental actors.

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Despite the diversity evident among the major efforts to compose small arms control, a particular notion of the political remains uncontested by a broad range of actors playing significant roles in the composition of those controls. Broadly speaking, state-makers collaborating within intergovernmental organizations continue to be preferred as the prime actors composing controls over these weapons. This commitment to internationalism goes hand-in-hand with arms control protagonists’ ongoing negotiation with the politico-strategic governance architecture, which is consequently further justified, embedded, projected, and uncritically endorsed. Yet while awareness of the nature and extent of the myriad of deleterious impacts generated by the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms compels some international actors into taking action, the responses examined in Part II of this book serve to reinforce what has become something of an internationalist orthodoxy. The following two chapters of Part III signal that not all international actors share this commitment to internationalism: Chapters 8 and 9 illustrate some of the ways in which arms traders and weapons users seek to evade and resist those treaties and soft law instruments emerging from within intergovernmental organizations, as well as those arms embargoes and DDR programs authorized by the UN Security Council. In so doing, Part III illustrates how these arms control antagonists contest the notion of the political in differing ways and with differing degrees of success. Their ability to do so illuminates the weaknesses inherent in these international frameworks as well as the uneven progress towards their implementation, signalling that the challenge of controlling small arms is likely to remain intractable and insurmountable.

PART III Eroding Small Arms Control

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Chapter 8

Arms Traders Arms control protagonists are quick to acknowledge the culpability of firms and brokers in helping to fuel the widespread availability of small arms. While this acknowledgement is especially evident in their penchant for regulating arms traders, arms control protagonists appear less keen to explicitly recognise these international actors as potential antagonists of arms control composition. This lack of recognition is significant given that arms traders possess technical expertise and operational flexibility frequently superior to governments’ administrative and enforcement capabilities, and can draw upon a common pool of commercial ploys that help to erode the efficacy of small arms controls. In fact, by helping fuel the widespread availability of small arms in spite of emerging regulatory controls, arms traders play a key role in stimulating not only armed violence, but also some of the broader transformations taking place in world affairs, generating a condition of turbulence. Before identifying particular ways in which firms and brokers can mitigate the intended effects of the emerging controls over small arms proliferation and transfer, this chapter distinguishes those arms traders that are authorized by governments from those commercial operators that are not. This distinction is of analytic importance, revealing slightly different stances taken in relation to the internationalist notion of the political which informs those major efforts to compose small arms controls examined in Part II. Authorized arms traders operating within regulated environments, but whose commercial practices nevertheless erode small arms controls, challenge the primacy of internationalism by taking a dissenting stance against it. Unauthorized firms and brokers operating beyond the administrative and enforcement reach of those regulatory regimes established in accordance with international law also challenge that notion of the political, but do so in a radical manner as dissidents outside the prevailing politico-strategic governance architecture, in what is commonly referred to as the black market. Some of the key concepts of postinternational theory cast light upon the significant roles played by these arms control antagonists. Firms and brokers are, for instance, sovereign-free actors often motivated more by powerful corporate incentives than by the collective security interests of the international small arms community; as individuals who can exploit emerging information and communications technologies, arms traders are becoming increasingly significant to outbreaks of armed violence. Given the commercial practices of arms traders are not only changing the face of the global arms market and shaping the dynamics of contemporary conflict (Amnesty International 2006, p. 9) but are also eroding small arms controls and encouraging the crisis of authority confronting many

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governments, their conduct and motivations ought to be of concern to arms control protagonists. Indeed, awareness of the ways in which arms traders hinder the major efforts to compose small arms controls is useful to those policymakers who, involved in composing small arms controls, wish to improve the efficacy of these frameworks. It is equally meaningful to those analysts who merely wish to better comprehend the reasons why the international community’s response has to date proven to be of limited effect. Broad Range of Arms Traders Arms traders are not a homogenous, monolithic entity, but are instead part of a heterogenous industry consisting of various actors pursuing their own differing interests. One of the most useful distinctions within this industry is that which is often drawn between those captains of small arms industry directly involved in weapons manufacture and arms brokers who ensure small arms users are able to access these weapons. Both play significant roles in ensuring the widespread availability of small arms and are, therefore, important arms control antagonists in their own right. Captains of Small Arms Industry The international small arms community explicitly recognizes the significance of firms manufacturing the tools frequently used to facilitate violent crime, initiate, conduct, and prolong armed hostilities, and hinder postconflict reconstruction efforts. According to the Small Arms Survey: the presence of new and increasing numbers of companies and countries that produce small arms—and who are willing to sell to anyone, anywhere, at any price—means that it is now easier for authoritarian governments, non-state actors, terrorists, and criminals to obtain weapons that are newer, more sophisticated, and more lethal than ever before” (2001, p. 48).

The Biting the Bullet Project points out that “[a]s access to modern machine technology becomes widespread, small-scale producers are becoming increasingly capable of producing significant quantities of highly capable and sensitive firearms, including semi- and fully-automatic weapons. The issue of ‘craft’ production also cannot be dismissed as a small or peripheral issue” (2005, p. 299). Intergovernmental organizations include weapons-producing firms as intended objects of control in important international frameworks. These frameworks in turn shape domestic regulatory regimes focusing on weapons manufacturers. The notable exception among arms control protagonists in this regard is the UN Security Council. Given that its five Permanent Members rank among the largest producers and exporters of conventional arms, the Security Council is less likely to explicitly condemn

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the role its Permanent Members’ industries play in threatening peace, intensifying insecurity, and contributing to contemporary conflicts, many of which are objects of Security Council resolutions. Despite the broad recognition of their role as international actors sustaining the widespread availability of small arms, weapons-producing firms evade easy characterization. At one end of the production scale, commercial entities are structured as state-owned manufacturing plants in countries where central planners continue to exercise a heavy hand in managing domestic economies. China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) is a prime example of such a state-owned enterprise producing large quantities of small arms, including derivatives of the near ubiquitous AK-47, for PRC’s own defence purposes as well as for export. As a means of facilitating its external trade, NORINCO maintains more than 20 offices outside PRC. Also located at this end of the production scale are those multinational corporations fulfilling ongoing commercial contracts for government defence organizations and representing the military-industrial complex found in many Western liberal democracies. Colt Manufacturing Company is one such firm privately owned by shareholders. It supplies small arms to the US armed forces, including the M16 assault rifle used during the Vietnam War. At present, Colt is a major supplier of weapons to the US military in Iraq as well as to many of the private security firms currently contracting throughout that country. These two commercial enterprises, and hundreds of others like them, provide ongoing employment for thousands of workers and generate foreign exchange revenue, neither of which are insignificant concerns for policymakers responsible for managing domestic economies. At the other end of the production scale, commercial entities are structured as family-owned businesses operating with fewer than a dozen employees (Small Arms Survey 2004, p. 10). West African blacksmiths in particular, repairing damaged weapons, also produce weapons as craft. According to Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, weapons produced as craft in Ghana “are now known regionally for their competitive prices, their effectiveness, and their accessibility—thus raising concerns that they might one day represent a significant source of weaponry for armed groups. Indeed, some local blacksmiths now possess the requisite knowhow to copy imported AK-47 assault rifles” (2005, p. 79). Where production occurs: [u]nder the guise of producing trinkets, gold ornaments, and basic farm implements, blacksmiths secretly [continue] to manufacture the more profitable small arms which then [slip] outside the purview of the law and the state. Not only [does] clandestine manufacture continue to grow, but it also [engenders] networks and mechanisms designed to elude law-enforcement agencies (Ibid, p. 81).

Company structures aside, “it is often difficult to distinguish between end producers that sell final products (e.g. rifles) to buyers, and intermediate producers—

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companies that produce parts or components for small arms that are then sold by end producers” (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 11). To further complicate matters, the actual process of producing a small arm can occur across multiple jurisdictions. Just as weapons-producing firms evade easy characterization, the motives informing proliferation vary. During much of the Cold War it was almost commonplace for both superpowers to produce weapons for transfer to client actors as a means of fuelling the ideological rivalry between democratic liberalism and communist socialism—though in early phases of the Cold War the desire for plausible deniability meant weapons were sourced from beyond official channels. The legacies of these transfers are readily apparent in many of the locales currently hosting conflict or recovering from hostilities: both the US and the former Soviet Union, for example, provided weapons to armed groups active in Africa, Central Asia, South America, and Southeast Asia. More recently, a significant proportion of the world’s manufacturing infrastructure, established during the Cold War for politico-strategic rather than commercial reasons, has been reduced by the radical neo-liberal reform of those economies controlled formerly by Soviet planners and, more generally, by the gradual rationalization of the arms industry throughout the world. Like many industries, the small arms industry is at once transformed by globalization while functioning as its vehicle. By globalization, I mean here what Kaldor means when she describes it as “the intensification of global interconnectedness—political, economic, military, and cultural” (Kaldor 1999, p. 3). When Kaldor goes on to note that “[t]his process of intensifying interconnectedness is a contradictory process involving both integration and fragmentation, homogenization and diversification, globalisation and localization,” she reveals an understanding of globalization that would be familiar to most postinternationalists. Since the end of the Cold War, direct governmental control over firms manufacturing small arms has eased, especially within the former Soviet Union, as these firms are increasingly owned privately and operated commercially rather than being managed as state-owned enterprises. This is not to suggest that no stateowned or subsidized arms manufacturing plants exist, but rather to signal a broad trend towards private commercial ownership within this industry. These economic reforms appear to follow US economic leadership. According to Derghoukassian: The growth of the gun business in the 1990s is the consequence of aggressive marketing efforts that were put in place in the last two decades in the U.S. and created a powerful lobby to preserve an expanding business. These efforts are best understood within the free-market logic of neoliberal economics that predominated U.S. economic policy since the late 1970s and, eventually, became the driving force of globalization. Though aggressive marketing is an inherent logic for almost any consumer product to maintain competitiveness, guns are not the kind of good that needs renewal every few years like cars or computers. The gun business, therefore, needed greater creativity to expand the naturally more restricted limits of its market. More than demand, thus, it was the supply-side

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of the gun business that was active in creating incentives for potential buyers (2004, p. 13).

However, while the total number of firms manufacturing these weapons has increased following the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the broadening of the range of weapon-types produced and the spread of the geographic distribution of these firms, the estimated rate at which these weapons are produced has actually declined (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 7). Arms Brokers The international small arms community similarly recognizes brokers as important international actors sustaining the widespread availability of small arms. A recent report issued by Amnesty International defines ‘international arms brokering’ as: activity carried out by individuals or companies to mediate, arrange or facilitate an international arms transaction between a buyer and seller in return for a fee or material reward or benefit. Brokering activity does not necessarily involve the actual purchase, possession or delivery of the arms directly by the brokering agent, although this is often linked in practice. Rather, the brokering activities focus on mediation and may include the provision of vital technical, logistical and financial information to customers about arms suppliers and prospective clients and sub-contractors in different countries, the facilitation of documentation and/ or payment between buyer and seller, and/or the arrangement of transportation, finance or insurance services for the delivery of the arms cargo in question (2006, p. 58).

The Small Arms Survey acknowledges that arms brokers “are increasingly involved in the transfer of new and surplus weaponry into contemporary conflict zones. Most of these transfers have dubious legitimacy, contravening national and/ or international law and occurring in the grey and black markets of the global arms trade” (2001, p. 95). According to Amnesty International, the “[g]rowing state-sponsored out-sourcing and the increasing private mediation of international arms distribution and procurement is adding to the risk of arms being delivered, diverted and used for grave human rights violations” (2006, p. 3). Much of the Fowler Report submitted to the UN Security Council in 2000 deals with the vital role played by brokers in procuring weapons for UNITA, thereby enabling conflict in Angola to endure. Subsequent UN Sanction Committee reports also document brokering activities, but rarely do so with the candour so forcefully articulated by the Fowler Report. Intergovernmental organizations such as the EU explicitly recognize “that the availability and accumulation of massive quantities of conventional arms and especially their illicit trafficking, often associated with destabilizing activities, are disturbing and dangerous phenomena, particularly for the internal situation of affected states and for the respect of human rights” (EU

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Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking, emphasis added.) While somewhat less developed than the treatment of weapons-producing firms as objects of control, there has been some progress towards establishing new and improving existing controls over arms brokers in important agreements which constitute an emerging body of international law. As mentioned in Chapter 6, at least 35 governments have enacted legislation covering broker registration and a further 30 are making progress towards introducing new or amending current legislation. Like captains of the small arms industry, arms brokers evade easy characterization. In many cases, firearms dealers supply local markets without contravening domestic law. In other cases however, brokers deal on behalf of governments whose international responsibilities render such transactions improper and illegal; the Iran-Contra affair provides a much-publicized example of such arms-length brokering. In addition to these weapons, some brokers traffic missiles, attack helicopters, and make claims about accessing nuclear materials, though not all brokers are of so dubious a pedigree. More often than not, contemporary arms brokers are entrepreneurs possessing professional military and security expertise who are driven by financial incentives. Brokers are prepared to find and exploit legislative loopholes, employ transport agents and secretive financial transactions, and engage in morally repugnant, though in some cases technically legal, business practices of selling arms to human rights violators, repressive governments, and perpetrators of genocide (Wood and Peleman 1999, pp. 12—13; see also Amnesty International 2006, p. 59). Manufacturers that market and distribute their own products, and those brokers who maintain their own inventories, blur the distinction between firms and brokers. Brokers of small arms benefit from Cold War legacies since covert operations conducted by governments—specifically, the US, the UK, France, the Soviet Union, and East Germany (Wood and Peleman 1999, pp. 6—12)—established transfer routes beyond regulated channels. These channels enable certain individuals to acquire skills of strategy necessary for successful arms brokering. Normally maintained exclusively by governments, these skills include establishing and utilizing secret bank accounts, cut-out men, and shelf companies. Brokers in less developed countries sometimes mimic these skills of strategy, with some brokers emerging as former combatants with closely forged relationships with those belligerents fuelling weapons demand. As with firms operating in the aftermath of the Cold War, the intensification of globalization further enables many of the world’s brokering activities. Again, Wood and Peleman are instructive when they write: The increasing globalization of trade and electronic info-commerce make it easier than ever for experienced arms dealers and operators to circumvent national arms control systems and to exploit the weakest links in a fragile international regulatory chain. Globalization has enabled the aviation industry to move away from traditional public ownership and regulation. Cross-border mergers between

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airlines, marketing alliances, leasing, chartering, franchising and offshore registration of fleets, crews and companies all make it very difficult to monitor and regulate the airspace and freighting industry. Brokers and shipping agents have become skilled exploiters of these new market realities (1999, p. 11).

While the commercial relationship between militaries and the transport industry has its roots dating at the very least back to the logistical support provided by the private sector to the US military during the Second World War, the changing nature of the transport industry now enables certain sovereign-free actors to build and maintain relationships with captains of the small arms industry. Given the ease with which arms control protagonists attribute blame to arms brokers for the widespread availability of small arms, particularly where these weapons find use in conflict zones, it is sometimes convenient to over-emphasize the role played by these actors. “There is little reason to see them as representatives of illicit globalization, nor even as the pre-dominant actors in the parts of the global market that supply conflicts,” Bourne cautions (2007, p. 117). While brokers of small arms undoubtedly facilitate weapons transfers to belligerents involved in conflicts, this does not necessarily mean they are more significant than an array of other actors that, while yet to receive the kind of analytic treatment currently devoted to brokers, play roles that are equally if not more significant to small arms’ widespread availability. Here, then, arms traders are significant to the erosion of small arms control by virtue of their ongoing role in fuelling the widespread availability of small arms, particularly in those areas in which armed violence occurs. Because the effects of this armed violence can register as politico-strategic, politico-economic, and politico-social consequences, these sovereign-free individuals can help stimulate some of the broader transformations taking place in contemporary world affairs. Since arms traders are increasingly the objects of concern for arms control protagonists, their ongoing activities are used to strengthen the dichotomy drawn between sovereign-bound and sovereign-free actors, a bifurcation illuminated by postinternationalism. While the interactions among arms control protagonists seek to mitigate the effects of armed violence and counter the condition of turbulence, the ability of arms traders to evade and resist these efforts is a revealing example of a crisis of authority that can have very real and very lasting effects on the state, as Chapter 2 demonstrates. As sovereign-free individuals, arms traders also make good use of emerging information and communications technologies when responding to powerful commercial motives and profit incentives. Manufacturing and trading small arms is after all big business and as an industry it is, as Tom Diaz (2000) alludes, making a killing. While Chapter 2 provides some estimates around this industry, it is important to note that the nature of the small arms industry, particularly the motives informing production and trade, is at once informed by considerations of military strategy (including for national defence purposes, to support client armed groups, and to undermine and destabilize rivals) and of economic prosperity (including short-term commercial gains and sources

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of ongoing employment). The global small arms industry is so complex that it defies reductive categorization and, as the Small Arms Survey notes, “although it is frequently treated as a single entity, the industry is in fact highly differentiated” (2005, p. 39). Dissenting From Internationalism Few arms traders attend relevant international conferences on small arms as official delegates. Not many arms traders exert much in the way of direct influence over the development of foreign policy with respect to instruments of international law or over the legislature establishing domestic regulatory regimes controlling small arms. A notable exception here is the Manufacturers Advisory Group of the WFSA, which has submitted reports in accordance with the UNPoA recommending standards and specifications for weapons marking (Laurance and Stohl 2002, p. 19). But where firms—or more specifically those who represent their interests—do help compose small arms controls, their influence can be highly disproportionate when they belong to powerful industrialized countries, especially if weakening international arms control frameworks helps to protect or advance such corporate interests. Whereas few arms traders are routinely involved in composing instruments of international law, none are routinely involved in crafting Security Council resolutions establishing arms embargoes. While few arms traders participate in multilateral negotiations of international frameworks, the ongoing commercial practices of these operators are of enormous significance to the efficacy of those frameworks. Notwithstanding the number of regulated firms and authorized brokers abiding by their host government’s international responsibilities, many such actors are capable of undermining the intent of these responsibilities by deliberately hindering their government’s ability to regulate the manufacture and trade of these weapons. Hard evidence of these commercial practices is scarce, however this should not be taken to mean that there is no scope for such practices to occur. Authorized Arms Traders The small arms industry can meaningfully be differentiated between those commercial operators that are authorized and regulated by governments and those arms traders that are not. By authorized and regulated, I mean quite simply those operators engaging in commercial activities with explicit governmental consent, whereas by unauthorized and unregulated I mean those operators engaging in commercial activities without such consent. In this sense, illicit production and trafficking of small arms occurs where regulated firms and authorized brokers engage in activities that breach domestic legislation and regulation, though such technical and administrative breaches are not necessarily minor infringements. It also occurs where unregulated producers and unauthorized brokers commit offences

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against domestic legislation, usually but not necessarily always in contravention of their governments’ responsibilities under international law and UN Security Council resolutions. Grey markets blur this distinction, due mostly to the lack of clarity surrounding the appropriate authorization of small arms manufacture or trade: for example, “[g]rey-market transhipment occurs when the authorisation of the state is unclear, often involving state officials acting in an official capacity but without appropriate authorisation” (Bourne 2007, p. 126). Although there is no easy way of identifying all of those arms traders dispersed throughout the world producing and transferring small arms without governmental consent, it might be possible to identify those firms and brokers that are registered and authorized by governments. Yet since information relating to their commercial activities is scarce and often protected by those directly involved in these transactions, there is no easy way of accurately determining the proportion of those arms traders who engage in practices hindering their government’s ability to adhere to its international responsibilities. Nor is it possible to determine the frequency of such subversive practices. Similarly, it is not currently possible to estimate the extent to which authorized brokers defy arms embargoes or the cumulative quantity of small arms reaching embargoed actors. Sufficient evidence does exist, however, to indicate that regulated firms and authorized brokers do engage in a variety of subversive practices, including intentionally evading detection where the wider international community has reinvigorated its monitoring and surveillance of embargoed actors. Regulated firms can misreport the type, volume, and value of weapons they manufacture, often exploiting authorities’ inadequate monitoring efforts. Once produced, weapons that have remained unreported are easily diverted into the socalled ‘black market,’ though such diversions are not necessarily undertaken for mercantile advantage. Like regulated weapons-producing firms, authorized arms brokers can misreport the content, volume, and value of particular consignments. The destination of weapons consignments provided to officials may also be misleading or false. On one occasion in 1992, Polish authorities granted an arms export licence on the basis of an end-user certificate issued by the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen, a country which ceased to exist in 1990 (UN Security Council 2003a, para. 44). Declaring a false destination enables brokers to transit their consignment through a foreign country that is of no particular concern to the wider international community, but which exerts inadequate control over its international borders and is unable to prevent these weapons from flowing elsewhere than their stated destination. The use of such countries as a staging post is particularly prevalent among brokers, but is also employed by armed groups in order to resist arms embargoes. Manufacturing firms have also granted permission for their weaponry to be reproduced under licence to foreign-owned companies based offshore, with some firms providing design plans, technological support, and expertise in order to facilitate manufacture. Granting these production licences enables firms located in and operating under the jurisdiction of one government to establish and maintain an

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arms-length commercial relationship with firms operating in another government’s territory. This kind of arrangement circumvents governmental authority, limiting its ability to adhere to its international responsibilities. According to Pete Abel: [The] close manufacturing arrangement between Heckler & Koch (Germany) and Royal Ordnance (UK) raised serious concerns that the two companies were exploiting inconsistencies between German and UK export controls in order to evade arms export embargoes. After reports emerged that H&K MP5 weapons had been identified in Bosnia and Serbia, apparently breaching the UN arms embargo levied in 1991, Heckler & Koch stated that the weapons in question ‘were made under licence by Royal Ordnance at its small arms factory in London, before 1987,’ and that H&K did ‘not know how many MP5 barrels have been delivered to Enfield.’ Prior to the UN embargo, it was not illegal for UK firms to export to Yugoslavia, although it was for German firms (2000, p. 90).

In this respect, firms not only circumvent governmental authority and control— and in this case defy an arms embargo—but also encourage the spread of small arms production capabilities throughout the world, intensifying the challenge of exerting control over the proliferation of these weapons. Like those firms selling production licences to foreign companies, some brokers conduct commercial activities from home soil, but register their companies in locations under foreign jurisdiction. Mil-Tec Corporation, which sold weapons to the Rwandan Ministry of Defence, was registered in the Isle of Man, but used a postal address (and telephone and fax numbers) in East Sussex (Wood and Peleman 1999, p. 32). In circumstances such as these, the transferred weapons might never reach the territory from which the broker actually operates, thus denying host authorities both the opportunity to monitor or inspect cargo and the ability to seize or confiscate weapons. Some brokers merely facilitate contracts between suppliers and those who demand these weapons without ever taking possession of those arms. Without direct access to consignments, enforcement authorities necessarily rely upon paperwork generated and authorized by foreign governments, and upon inspections conducted by foreign law-enforcement agencies. In spite of the emerging mosaic of responsibilities outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, few governments have yet to enact and enforce specific laws controlling brokering activities, especially where these activities occur beyond their area of jurisdiction. As Chapter 6 mentions, only about a quarter of all UN member-states have enacted regulations that specifically control brokering activities, or have expressed their intent to do so in the near term. Of those governments who do have regulations, few enact legislation of extra-territorial scope and even fewer possess the capability to enforce the terms of any such legislation (Amnesty International 2006, pp. 63—70). Thus, much trafficking goes undetected and, even if detected, unpunished.

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Authorized brokers do not necessarily source all of their weapons directly from the regulated production line, as some arrange supply from legally-held stockpiles and illicit arsenals, disguising weapons’ illicit origins before reintroducing them into the regulated environment. Just as Samuel Cummings, one of the world’s most notorious arms brokers, purchased weapons left over from the Second World War and sold these to belligerents in postcolonial Africa, South America, and East Asia (Wood and Peleman 1999, p. 10; see also Naylor 2001, pp. 214— 215), contemporary arms brokers purchase surplus weapons held in government stockpiles. As Wood and Peleman explain: Surplus stocks from former Soviet military bases all over Eastern Europe have turned into warehouses for weapons brokers based in Western Europe. Shopping lists circulate between traders and suppliers; when a recipient is found who cannot buy in the mainstream government markets, the weaponry is shipped by civilian cargo companies to a transit point, from where it is transported to a final destination in a war zone. Once the war is over, large quantities of weapons are stockpiled or exported abroad, often through the same brokering channels that were used as supply channels during the war (1999, p. 44).

According to the Fowler Report, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty included arms reduction requirements that meant some countries reduced and disposed of weapons stockpiles. Similarly, some former Warsaw Pact countries wishing to become members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have also sold off their non-NATO standard equipment (UN Security Council 2000b, para. 39). Weapons that are surplus to military and constabulary requirements and are held in poorly-secured stockpiles are especially vulnerable to leakage. Even though former Soviet-bloc countries have been identified as being especially prone to leakage, they are not alone in this regard. Cameroonian armed forces, for instance, trafficked weapons from their own official stockpiles, helping fuel internecine conflict in neighbouring Chad in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In February 2001, an explosion at the central armoury in Yaoundé is suspected to have been a deliberate ploy aimed at obscuring the extent of missing official weapons (Atanga 2003, pp. 26–27, fn. 18). It is worth noting here that stockpile leakage creates commodities not only for exchange but also for immediate use, as the following chapter explores. Regulated firms and authorized brokers operating with criminal intent rely upon their own informal and personal networks in order to avoid law-enforcement efforts intended to support the domestic regulated environment. In saying this, however, I do not mean to slander the efforts of many law-enforcement officers, but rather wish to signal the complex and dynamic challenge of monitoring these industrial and commercial sectors, as well as to highlight the difficulties involved in verifying commercial and official documents issued or authorized by a foreign government without a centralized, time-sensitive repository enabling such verification. Such difficulties must be contextualized against the broader challenge

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of monitoring the enormous volume of goods and increasing sophistication of transactions occurring as contemporary trade across international borders. Here, then, regulated firms and authorized brokers can hinder their host government’s ability to regulate the manufacture and trade of small arms in a variety of ways, none of which are particularly inventive or complex. While each of these subversive practices lacks a high degree of sophistication, they nevertheless appear to be relatively effective when deployed against the current monitoring procedures used by governments. Firms’ and brokers’ modus operandi for misreporting the type, quantity, value, and destination of the weapons they manufacture and trade depends as much upon specific record-keeping regulations as it does upon the level of resources devoted to their administration. Notwithstanding the particular method favoured, regulated arms traders exploit the uneven development of domestic regulatory regimes as well as the strategic weaknesses of international frameworks. Such firms seek official authorization for their commercial affairs and operate within an area of jurisdiction that exist within the bounds of the politico-strategic governance architecture, but avoid the administrative reach of the regulatory authority. In so doing, regulated arms traders contribute to a growing crisis of authority in which governments are judged by their citizens as lacking the capability and resources required to perform their administrative and enforcement duties. It is in this way that regulated arms traders demonstrate their dissent from the internationalist notion of the political around which most arms control protagonists cohere. International Criminals In addition to, and usually in concert with, the abovementioned practices of regulated arms traders, authorized brokers can resist the arms embargoes authorized by the UN Security Council. And by resist, I mean here that arms brokers can refuse to comply fully with those laws and regulations derived from their host government’s international responsibilities by transferring weapons to those actors targeted by arms embargoes. These arms brokers are not just criminals under some government’s domestic law, but where the arms trafficked find use in war crimes and crimes against humanity arms brokers are complicit with violations of International Criminal Law. In order to defy the intent of the parent sanction regime, these brokers must avoid authorities’ detection of their illicit cargo. When trafficking weapons to embargoed actors via overland routes, brokers can avoid detection by transporting their consignments to countries that border areas occupied by embargoed actors and then entering this territory though largely uninhabited areas or traversing terrain which proves difficult to monitor. In Kosovo, mules were used as a means of ferrying illicit weapons across the alpine border from Albania (Khakee and Florquin 2003, p. 29). Roméo Dallaire, Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR), recalls the:

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Ugandan border was hard to monitor because of its altitude, its terrain and mistfilled valleys, and I suspected that the [Rwandan Patriotic Front] was already sneaking all kinds of supplies into the country, using an old Viet-Cong ploy: loading up bicycles and taking the stuff over the tiny mountain paths that crisscrossed the border” (2003, p. 88).

Without timely intelligence, adequate numbers of armoured personnel carriers, helicopters, night-vision equipment, and sufficiently well-trained troops, effective monitoring proved increasingly elusive as tensions intensified in and around Rwanda during 1994. Porous borders provide a multitude of trafficking opportunities, especially in land-locked territories targeted by UN sanction regimes, such as Rwanda and Afghanistan. Brokers can also avoid detection by using devious flight plans in order to deliver weapons to embargoed actors, at times deceiving even the flight crews. One flight, which began as a humanitarian aid mission, left the UK for Kilimanjaro. Upon arrival there the crew received instructions to fly via Cairo to Bulgaria. Once in Bulgaria, the aircraft was loaded with small arms and the pilot was told to fly to Chad, but during refuelling at Cairo the destination was altered to Oman. It then altered again in mid-flight to South Yemen, a country then experiencing civil war and under an international arms embargo (Wood and Peleman 1999, p. 60). At other times, aircraft simply land and unload en route without informing authorities (Ibid, p. 54). Rather than land and unload illicit cargoes at airports, arms brokers can use improvised landing strips in remote locations or deploy unusual means of delivery including airdrops to pre-planned locations. Aircraft are a particularly attractive means of delivery where roads and railroads are in poor condition or have been damaged by disaster or conflict. Where ships are the preferred conveyance for arms trafficking to embargoed actors, their re-registering while on the high seas and beyond any government’s effective jurisdiction can deliberately obscure the intended destination of weapons consignments, fooling those officials authorizing export permits. Unauthorized transhipments at sea similarly deceive authorizing officials. In 1992, an authorized shipment of arms from Poland rendezvoused with a fishing vessel off Somalia’s coast after having put in at Latvia where only a small portion of the cargo was offloaded even though the entire cargo was signed for (UN Security Council 2003a, para. 48). Brokers are not the only beneficiaries from such transactions. Incentives also exist for the port state to collude in these activities. “The skimming of arms,” as Bourne suggests, “can be a cheap means of arms acquisition by the transhipment state…many stocks of arms skimmed during transhipment are resold on local and regional black markets to other illicit recipients” (2007, p. 126) The use of two sets of documents—one maintained for ‘official’ use and for perusal by enforcement authorities and the other recording actual transactions—enables brokers to ‘cook the books’ and provide plausible records to any law-enforcement officers inspecting their holds. Where coastlines are remote, vessels receiving

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transhipped weapons can put in at concealed bays and coves, with their unloading activities undetected by surface patrols. Brokers using more conventional commercial routes such as roads, railroads, airports, and seaports can avoid detection by disguising their illicit cargo as medical supplies, agricultural equipment, and other forms of development aid (Wood and Peleman 1999, p. 53). Weapons transferred from PRC to Somalia have been labelled as ‘Uniforms and General Cargo,’ for instance (UN Security Council 2003a, para. 68). Sometimes even the crew transporting such cargo remains unaware of its nature. When they do become aware that they are transporting weapons, they are led to believe they are conducting authorized governmentto-government transfers (Wood and Peleman 1999, p. 31). Brokers can also rely upon the sheer volume of general international trade to provide some cover for their illicit cargoes, with unauthorized consignments sometimes concealed among authorized cargo (Amnesty International 2006, p. 8). In practice, surveillance activities supporting arms embargoes are scarce, if not nonexistent. (The exceptions, of course, emerge from the presence of interests of powerful governments possessing enforcement capabilities, most evidently in the Gulf and Yugoslavia.) Where surveillance is conducted, it is often targeted by poor intelligence. Brokers can easily evade patrol units simply by waiting for them to retire at nightfall. At other times, brokers can provide either inducement or intimidation to patrol teams, though unsurprisingly there is little hard evidence of this practice. Brokers can take full advantage of the immense difficulties confronting governments observing arms embargoes targeting sovereign-free actors, such as those which, focusing on Al-Qaida and the Taliban, are “not restricted to the territory of any specific country or region” (UN Security Council 2005c, para. 114). Arms brokers who utilize a range of skills, technologies, and tools in order to circumvent UN arms embargoes and deliberately fuel armed conflict—which in some cases damages the politico-strategic governance architecture—foster a crisis of authority on a global scale. As sovereign-free actors, these arms brokers demonstrate their ability to evade the small arms controls composed by arms control protagonists, particularly instruments of international law and domestic regulatory regimes. Even though the UN Security Council has recently provided for the prosecution of arms brokers for their involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity, it is too early to tell if such measures will create a deterrence effect. For the time being, it seems that all but the most high-profile of these international criminals can operate with relative impunity. Pariah Governments Arms brokers are sometimes assisted by embargoed groups that have good relations with a neighbouring or nearby government that allows weapons to be stockpiled in its territory. UNITA, for instance, used Zaire as a staging post and as a storage point for weapons it procured through brokers while under UN arms

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embargo. But when Zaire’s President Mobutu was overthrown, UNITA leaders quickly shifted their procurement activities to Togo (UN Security Council 2000b, para. 35). Governments such as Togo and Zaire neighbouring territory controlled by embargoed armed groups can grant official documentation, specifically endusers certificates, to support trafficking activities by providing legitimate cover for illicit consignments. These examples of ‘sanction busting,’ already identified by Chapter 6, encourage, embolden, and enable brokers to continue eroding the intended effects of arms embargoes. While these pariah governments are culpable for violations of arms embargoes and, by extension, the consequences of such violations, the UN must in certain circumstances also bear some degree of responsibility for lapses in arms embargoes. According to a Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia: Some blame must also be placed on the United Nations for contributing to a perception that the embargo need not be taken seriously. In a number of instances, certain United Nations agencies had knowledge of apparent violations of resolution 733 (1992) that could have been verified and publicly reported to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somali. In one incident, in June 1992, an aircraft used for the delivery of Somali currency to Ali Mahdi was previously under contract to a United Nations agency, and still displayed United Nations markings at the time of the incident. It was widely held by Somalis that the aircraft carried illegal weapons. The United Nations conducted an investigation which concluded that there were no weapons on the aircraft. The fact that the findings were never published contributed to a prevailing attitude among Somalis and others that they need not comply with the arms embargo (UN Security Council 2003a, para. 21; see also Amnesty International 2006, pp. 50—52).

In circumstances such as these where embargoes have no normative value, arms brokers can act with a sense of impunity while increasing the widespread availability of these tools of violence. As Bourne (2007, p. 227) notes, even states whose claim to effective control over territory is at best nominal still appear to be able to obtain small arms relatively easily from the international market. Conversely, nongovernmental armed groups who may actually exercise control over territorial and economic resources find it much more difficult to procure arms from the global market. Bourne goes on to note: Thus money, networks, and territory, and even differences in regional political economies of SALW spread, do not explain the construction of autonomous arming by any kind of state, nor the specificities and vulnerabilities of limited autonomous arming by non-state actors. The primary remaining distinction between types of forces is that of internationally recognised juridical sovereignty…This non-state threshold is a ‘glass ceiling’ in arming patterns

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The cooperation between embargoed actors, their neighbours, and arms brokers undermines attempts to reinforce and extend the existing politico-strategic governance architecture, which is already undermined by those so-called sanctionbusting governments that knowingly authorize or allow their nationals to act in ways contravening those embargoes. This is especially the case in those locales where UN peacekeeping operations coincide with sanction regimes, such as in Angola, Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia during the 1990s. Targeted by arms embargoes, governments involved in conflict possess little if any surplus capability with which to patrol international borders in order to detect and deter arms trafficking. Nor can they monitor industrial and commercial sectors in order to detect and deter unregulated production not only as large-scale production but also as small-scale craft. Where UN peacekeepers are deployed as de facto border patrol resources in order to enhance border patrol capabilities, embargo-monitoring efforts merely offer a deficient and nearly always temporary compensation for what is often woefully inadequate, if not entirely absent, governmental capability. For Bourne, “there appears to be a reciprocal relationship between conflict and the establishment of organized black market” (2007, p. 163). As Naylor puts it, a “conflict zone is for weapons what an offshore banking centre with strict secrecy laws is for money—with the added advantage that anyone attempting to probe the secrets of the zone’s arms business risks considerably more than the mere indignity of deportation” (2001, p. 219). The legacies of the sources and routes established under conditions of conflict and embargo prove durable, frustrating postconflict reconstruction efforts. Here, then, regulated arms traders can hinder a government’s ability to regulate small arms manufacture and trade occurring within its area of jurisdiction. Regulated firms and authorized brokers can routinely exploit the strategic weaknesses of the international frameworks providing for regulatory regimes as well as those domestic regulatory regimes which have so far been unevenly developed and haphazardly enforced. Brokers have proven themselves adept at exploiting the practical difficulties confronting those observing arms embargoes that are concerned primarily with preventing weapons from reaching the hands of particular belligerents. Although they seek official authorization to conduct their commercial activities, arms traders operating within regulated environment can act in ways that are contrary to the objectives of arms control protagonists. These particular arms traders are in fact arms control antagonists who do not share the internationalist notion of the political informing the major efforts to compose small arms controls. The ways in which these significant international actors resist and evade the administrative reach of governments, fuelling the widespread availability of small arms, reveals a dissenting stance against that notion of the political by failing to prefer governments cooperating to achieve mutual benefits for all.

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Dissident Challenges to Internationalism While authorized arms traders can dissent from the notion of the political informing the composition of small arms controls, unauthorized arms traders use many of the same commercial ploys but can contest internationalism as dissidents from beyond the enforcement reach of domestic regulatory regimes. Black Market Merchants Operating within the jurisdiction of governments regulating small arms manufacture and trade, unauthorized arms traders help erode the efficacy of small arms controls. This erosion of control is especially evident where these black market merchants deliberately elude law-enforcement investigations provided for by some instruments of international law. (Almost all of these agreements provide for information-sharing relating to authorized operators, any operator’s conviction records, or intelligence relating to any trafficking.) And by elude, I mean that these unauthorized arms traders conduct their business affairs in such a way as to place them, for the most part, beyond the enforcement reach of the domestic regulatory regimes established in accordance with emerging international frameworks. Significantly, many of the countermeasures deployed by unauthorized arms traders against law-enforcement investigations can also prove of use to those regulated firms and authorized brokers intending to evade domestic regulations or defy UN arms embargoes. Unauthorized arms traders can use fraudulent identities as part of a web of deception aimed at misleading, confusing, and eluding law-enforcement investigations. They can act as impostors of well-known authorized traders, seeking to introduce unregulated weapons into regulated markets, as occurred during the Lebanese Civil War when three individuals each separately but falsely claimed to represent Colt Manufacturing Company at a meeting held by the Lebanese Government in 1980 (Fisk 2005, p. 949). Individuals, and the companies they represent, can also provide false or misleading information to authorities at the initial point of their registration as regulated firms and authorized brokers. Relying upon registrars’ inability to verify information, applicants are almost assured that administrators will remain unaware of any previous trafficking-related convictions. In these circumstances, the true identities of those who organize, manage, and derive profit from manufacturing and brokering activities remains concealed from authorities. Put simply, governments are unable to prosecute offenders if they cannot ascertain their identity. Problematically for arms control protagonists, where there is no effective verification of an applicant’s identity by administrators, the distinction between an authorized and an unauthorized arms trader is undermined and even rendered irrelevant. Unauthorized brokers wishing to hinder investigations—and to evade accountability and punishment following successful enforcement action taken against them—have used deliberately complex company arrangements in

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conjunction with the strict confidentiality provisions of banks as a means of concealing their identity. This ploy also helps to obscure links between their true identity and the illicit trafficking activities with which they are involved. Sometimes a nominated director represents a front company but remains unaware of the firm’s business dealings. These front companies can do business with transport agents “whose headquarters is designated by one of several dozen brass-plates on the door of a small Cayman Islands office, staffed by one secretary who sits watching American soaps for the whole working day” (Naylor 2001, p. 225). Such armslength business arrangements are used to distance commercial dealings from those individuals responsible for them and from those accruing their proceeds. Unauthorized brokers and their transport agents can use aircraft and vessels, many of which were procured at low cost in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War (Amnesty International 2006, p. 37), registered under a so-called ‘flag of convenience.’ Some governments, such as Liberia under Taylor’s rule, collect revenue derived from fees charged for conveyances registered under their jurisdiction, but do not actively seek to verify the applicants’ information and have little in the way of any enforcement capability by which to control those conveyances operating under its flag (Raab and Milward 2003: 428). These countries’ registers remain closed to foreign scrutiny, frustrating investigations by protecting registered clients’ identities and associated details. These registers are significant, given the major flags of convenience—the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, and Panama—have granted authorizations to just under half of the world’s maritime transport capacity (Amnesty International 2006, p. 33). Aircraft that sub-lease over-flight permissions but use the leaser’s callsign, and unregistered aircraft that act as a ‘phantom’ by deliberately resembling another registered aircraft, obscure the aircraft’s identity, misleading authorities monitoring airspace (Wood and Peleman 1999, pp. 53—54). In addition to the difficulties encountered when trying to untangle deliberately complex company arrangements, financial transactions also prove difficult for authorities to trace. This is especially so when funds are funnelled through ‘tax haven’ institutions often used as a means of laundering ill-gotten gains. However, the secrecy provided by offshore banks is often exaggerated. Naylor declares: Even where secrecy is extremely tight on paper, the key to penetrating it is usually no more complicated than a $100 bill. Precisely for that reason, it has long been an adage among users of foreign banks for illicit purposes that real bank secrecy comes not from legislation but from keeping one’s mouth shut— and working where possible using multiple or false passports as identification. Under those circumstances, a bank in New York open to the full force of the law can be just as effective, and just as discrete, as one in Nauru protected by all manner of legal barriers to information flows (2000, pp. 174—175).

The Financial Action Taskforce of the OECD recently proposed a set of measures that might help lift the corporate veil in these fiscal paradises, though its motivations

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for doing so were not directly related to combating arms trafficking. Officials from the US Treasury Department opposed the plan that if approved would have targeted the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and Grenadines (Amnesty International 2006, p. 8, fn. 20). It is worth noting, however, that as ‘epicentres of globalization,’ the world’s largest cities, specifically London, New York, and Tokyo, not only provide banking expertise to shift funding surreptitiously, but also provide the kinds of cosmopolitan societies in which “criminals and even entire criminal organizations [can] blend into legitimate institutions in ethnic neighbourhoods” (Mittelman and Johnston 1999: 112). Instead of hard currency, blood diamonds have been used by belligerents involved in contemporary conflict as a means of financing weapons procurement, particularly in West Africa: for example, UNITA generated an estimated US$500 million from diamond revenues in 1997 (MacQueen 1988: 418). Al-Qaida has also purchased diamonds from Sierra Leone at discounted prices, on-selling them in Europe in order to help finance its activities (Raab and Milward 2003: 426). Although the international community has made some progress towards restricting this trade under the auspices of the Kimberley Process, a recent report from Global Witness claims that while “the scheme makes it more difficult for diamonds from rebel held areas to reach international markets, there are still significant weaknesses in the scheme that undermine its effectiveness and allow the trade in blood diamonds to continue” (2006, p. 2). Financial transactions are sometimes complemented by, or in lieu of hard currency payments replaced with, the granting to arms brokers of extraction rights for other natural resources. For example, Taylor “sold off as much of Liberia’s timber and mineral wealth as he could get his hands on. And, when still more funds were needed to equip his forces, Taylor sought to gain control over the diamond trade in Sierra Leone” (Klare 2001, p. 200). By some accounts, ships offloading arms in Liberia depart with cargoes of timber (Amnesty International 2006, p. 26). France and China, both importers of Liberian timber, objected to timber’s inclusion in a sanction regime during deliberations within the UN Security Council (Ibid, p. 24), once more illustrating the ways in which the Council can be held hostage to its Permanent Members’ perceived national interests. The multiple sources of revenue used to finance wars and procure weapons also complicate investigations into arms trafficking, especially as accompanying: the unparalleled expansion of international migration in the last two decades has come the formation of underground trade diasporas, regional and global networks based on extended family or ethno-sectarian loyalties that are well  ������������������������������������������������������ For further details of these measures, please refer to (accessed 31 March 2007), specifically Tax Co-operation: Towards a Level Playing Field (2006).

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When authorities are seen to be closing in on a trafficking operation, brokers can quickly dismantle and abandon their operation, immediately establishing new companies in other territories to take their place (Wood and Peleman 2000, p. 137). In this respect, the leasing rather than purchasing of aging aircraft and other conveyances mitigate any capital losses incurred by brokers if their operations are detected and assets seized as evidence, and confiscated as a penalty if prosecutions are successful. Here, the burden of such losses falls on the asset owner’s shoulders, not on the leaser who engages in indictable criminal offences. Such preferences contribute to the mobility and flexibility of trafficking operations. Without significant proof of a high evidential standard, brokers are unlikely to confess the true nature of their commercial practices when confronted by investigators. Instead, they provide flimsy cover stories and implausible but difficult to disprove excuses. When Wilhelm Tertius Ehler, an experienced arms broker operating out of South Africa in the mid and late 1990s, was informed that Colonel Bagosora (whom he had helped obtain weapons) was not a Zairian defence official, but a high ranking officer of the Rwandan Hutu-in-exile Government, Ehler simply replied that he was ‘shocked’ (Wood and Peleman 1999, p. 29). Similarly, when Israeli arms dealer Yair Klein was prosecuted for supplying weapons and training to the Medellin drug cartel operating out of Colombia, he claimed to have thought “his trainees were ranchers in Colombia who wanted to defend themselves against leftist guerrillas” (Ibid, p. 75). Such responses, while not surprising, are nevertheless disingenuous. Unauthorized arms traders can manage the risk of detection by routine monitoring and the prospect of any subsequent prosecution as another potential operating cost. This risk is managed where the operator’s cumulative net profits derived from their illegal commerce exceed the financial penalties of prosecution. The risk is further managed in circumstances where routine monitoring and related enforcement action are predictable, circumstances which are most likely to arise when a government lacks sufficient resources for such actions. Black market merchants not only appreciate that law-enforcement officers are unlikely to discover them, or if discovered, will be unable to successfully prosecute them, but also take practical steps to reduce the likelihood of detection and prosecution. Law-enforcement officers can be offered bribes to ‘look the other way’ during routine monitoring of manufacturing, commercial, and export sectors. If government officials prove impervious to inducements and threats, then brokers can obtain counterfeit documents, specifically fraudulent export authorizations and fake end-user certificates in order to mislead local law-enforcement officers. (However, particular transfers of weapons have been halted when authorities discovered fakes, as occurred in 1995 in the Ukraine and in Russia (UN Security Council 2000b, para. 37).) Such counterfeit documentation also enables brokers to

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more easily transit their consignments through third countries, avoiding the close scrutiny of those countries’ monitoring and inspection as their cargo is likely to be considered a legitimate transfer. Here, then, where arms traders are not authorized by the governments whose territories within which at least part of their commercial affairs occur, they are able to rely upon a number of ploys to assist them in eluding enforcement action. In so doing and through contributing to armed violence by supplying small arms to belligerents, they further stimulate a crisis of authority confronting many governments and intensify broader transformations in which sovereign-free actors—especially individual arms brokers—possess significance far beyond the influence normally associated with the orientation parameter. Like the regulated arms traders operating from within the regulated environments examined earlier in this chapter, unregulated arms traders contest the internationalist notion of the political that informs much of the efforts of arms control protagonists. However, unlike those regulated arms traders who demonstrate their dissent from within the bounds of the politico-strategic governance architecture, unregulated arms traders contest this notion of the political by taking a dissident stance against it from beyond the reach of small arms regulatory regimes where these regimes exist. Dark Networks The black market for small arms is not a single, autonomous, unified, or global economic underworld, fully detached from the regulated environments covering arms manufacture and trade. Rather, the ‘small arms black market’ is a phrase used here to denote a darker side of globalization in which authorized and unauthorized operators co-exist within various politico-economic spaces, some of which have been affected by armed conflict. The “key variables in delineating and examining arming patterns in pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict periods are,” according to Bourne, “the control of the territory of the conflict-complex, and the control of the economic space and resources of the conflict-complex” (2007, p.182). The confluence of globalization’s intensification with the post-Cold War era, during which many governments reduced both their stockpiles of and demand for conventional weapons, has facilitated a significant growth in this illicit commerce. “This situation, in which the terms of trade turn progressively against the legal market,” argues Naylor, “will persist until illegally available second-hand stocks approach exhaustion, a point that is today nowhere in sight. When the phenomenon of lower cost is added to the traditional black-market advantages of anonymity and rapid delivery, the competitive balance shifts decisively in favour of the black market” (2000, pp. 158—159). However, with sobering insight, Bourne cautions that, “globalisation appears to have failed to generate a global black market or grey market structure of spread” (2007, p. 241). The reality of illicit arms dealing is more complex than simplistic analytic dichotomies imply. The distinction between regulated and unregulated operators is blurred by the illegal practices undertaken by authorized arms traders and by

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the commercial practices undertaken by unauthorized merchants. Sometimes regulated arms traders can be coerced into engaging in unlawful practices. According to Peter Bleach, a UK-based military equipment broker and former intelligence officer, an insurgent group based in West Bengal approached him for 2,500 Kalashnikov rifles in 1995. After agreeing to supply the weapons, he was then subjected to intimidation by his customers, though on this particular occasion the weapons were unwittingly delivered into the hands of local law-enforcement officers. Despite Bleach’s efforts to keep the UK Security Services informed of the deal—indeed, Bleach claims to have been encouraged to pursue the business arrangement by officers belonging to Special Branch—he was arrested by Indian authorities (Wood and Peleman 1999, pp. 16—24). Unauthorized arms traders can corrupt those employed to administer and enforce regulatory regimes. Bribes, extortion, and intimidation go hand-in-hand with colluding officials who routinely monitor and authorize arms exports, and issue end-user certificates. Such situations have become so commonplace that for Naylor: the end-user certificate ceased to be a technique of control so much as a tool for the personal enrichment of corrupt officials in the purchasing country, and a means by which selling countries could establish an alibi (the weapons were supposed to go elsewhere) whenever news of a sale to some embargoed or illegal destination leaked out” (2001, p. 217).

In PNG, corruption appears to have little need of external stimulus, especially as “the real arms dealers are shown to be much closer to home than the ‘foreign gunrunners’ so often blamed by public figures.” Alpers maintains “[p]oliticians and civil servants emerge as being deeply implicated in the small arms trade, with each election seen as an opportunity to seize votes, political influence, and resources at gunpoint” (2005, p. 30). Government officials have acted illegally in foreign jurisdictions by posing as officials from other foreign governments. Colonel Bagosora, a Rwandan national mentioned earlier in this chapter suspected of perpetrating genocide, purchased weapons confiscated by the Seychelles Government by identifying himself as a member of the Zairian Ministry of Defence and presenting a fraudulent end-user certificate with which to support this claim (Wood and Peleman 1999, p. 28). In other cases, state-makers—rather than their officials—are culpable. As already mentioned, Taylor appropriated the apparatus of government to pursue his own private interests. But Taylor is not alone in his kleptocracy: other West African leaders, such as President Blaise Campaore of Burkino Faso and Foday Sankoh, as Vice-President of Sierra Leone “are at the center of a network that uses war for means other than power. Their power is based on terror and the use of the state for their own purposes. The means for this are guns, diamonds, and increasingly timber, all under the mantle of whatever legitimacy a failed state can provide” (Raab and Milward 2003: 426). Yet Bourne would probably note that even a failed

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state appears to have more legitimacy in the eyes of the international community than even the most ‘successful’ nongovernmental armed groups. The distinction between sovereign-bound officials as regulators and sovereignfree commercial operators as either regulated or unregulated arms traders is also blurred by the selective application of the rule of law. In some situations, firms and brokers operate without authorization, but are nonetheless tolerated by authorities. Craft production in West Africa persists regardless of the official policy, for instance, because law-enforcement officers are reluctant to investigate gunsmiths creating weapons for traditional purposes and customary usage (Aning 2005, p. 98). The Philippines also has a significant informal production capability, with an estimated 3,000 gunsmiths operating in the south of the country (Capie 2002, p. 21, pp. 72—73). In other conflict settings, such as Indo-China, Sri Lanka, and South America, nongovernmental actors have engaged in craft production with varying levels of outputs (Bourne 2007, p. 67). The distinction between legal and illicit is further undermined by specific enforcement activities undertaken by some government agencies. As James H. Mittelman and Robert Johnston point out: a realm of cooperative and conflictual relationships blurs the lines between the legal and illegal. For example, in order to collect actionable information that leads to arrests and interdictions, intelligence services must cooperate with and attempt to recruit defectors from organized crime groups and terrorist organizations. This process often means turning a blind eye to the activities, past and present, of individuals who may have broken laws but are the only ones with firsthand experience and insight into the opaque world of the terrorist groups, organized crime gangs, and other illicit groups with which they are associated (1999: 106).

Thus, while grey market activities rely upon the lack of clarity surrounding officially-authorized arms manufacture and trade, the distinction drawn between regulated and unregulated small arms activity is not always sustainable. While such a distinction may still be of analytic use, the various ploys at the disposal of both types of sovereign-free actors help to fuel the widespread availability of small arms, causing destruction irrespective of the weapon’s status in law. Highly-organized unauthorized arms traders can form networks in pursuit of their ends. Networks have been described by Raab and Milward “as appropriate devices to tackle public management problems and to successfully coordinate political, social, and economic action….Because the problem is bigger than any single organization, collaborating with other organizations is necessary if there is any hope of making progress in alleviating the problem” (2003: 413—414). As illustrated by Chapter 7, civil society organizations have adopted this organizing principle, establishing IANSA as a network of networks coordinating a campaign drawing on over 700 members and in some cases fostering coalitions of likeminded governments. IANSA is a good example of ‘bright networks’ that engage in “a legal and overt governance form that is supposed to create benefits for the

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participating actors and to advance the common good and does not—at least intentionally—harm people” (Ibid: 419). While the contrast between IANSA’s objectives as an arms control protagonist and the objectives of unregulated arms traders as arms control antagonists could not be greater, both share sovereign-free status. Resembling IANSA’s approach to organizing their arms control campaign, black market merchants form networks because they enable them to circumvent certain administrative processes and reduce their exposure to law-enforcement investigations. Because these networks probably prove relatively successful and occur beyond regulatory regimes’ administrative and enforcement reach, they directly contest the internationalist notion of the political informing the composition of small arms controls. These networks are best understood as ‘dark networks’ in which: there is a set of individuals and organizations that constitute a network striving to achieve ends that create collective-action problems for governments all over the world…This network may be strictly a terrorism network, or it may be connected to other illegal networks such as arms smuggling, money laundering, and drug dealing. These connections among illegal networks in the problem space can be critical to the success of their wicked ends….Forgetting the requirement to be functionally non judgemental in the social sciences, the actors and organizations that cooperate in the problem space are called dark networks, in that their activities are both covert and illegal (Ibid: 415).

David Kinsella notes that “[b]ecause black market arms transfers occur in a lawless environment, one without formal mechanisms of contract enforcement, parties to these transactions must rely more heavily on trust (often reinforced by threat) than is the case for legal market transactions” (2006: 105). Maturing relationships among sovereign-free (and to a lesser extent sovereign-bound) actors involved in these networks strengthen these relationships. Discussing the nexus between organized crime and terrorist groups, John T. Picarelli asserts “[w]hen such interactions are closely timed and repeated, it becomes an increasingly likelihood that bonds of trust will evolve between the groups that can serve to cement common bonds” (2006: 20). The Tri-Border Area of South America, comprising of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, has emerged as a subregion where dark networks coalesce. West Africa, specifically Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso, is another. These maturing relationships are encouraged in part by the lack of governments exercising a legitimate monopoly over the coercive use of force and, in part, by the mining and distribution of diamonds, a highly valuable and exchangeable currency for dark networks (Raab and Milward 2003: 431). These strengthening ties, and the significance they pose to those composing small arms controls, appear to endorse Bourne’s observation that:

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The role of brokers is the dominant (almost sole) explanation given for the access to conflict groups and embargoes governments to supplies of SALW. Yet simple reference to [the] role of unregulated actors has little explanatory value, particularly when it leads to the exclusion of other aspects of SALW spread to conflicts that offer opportunities for more nuanced analysis” (2007, p. 38).

It also obscures the importance of those weapons already held by users of small arms and those weapons that remain within easy reach of small arms users. Conclusion Often absent from the formal processes enabling the composition of small arms controls, firms and brokers help to fuel the widespread availability of these weapons while engaging in commercial practices that erode those controls’ intended effects. In some cases, these commercial operators are authorized, enabled, or assisted by governments that also negotiate and implement the frameworks designed to foster regulatory controls for small arms. However culpable these governments might be, they are rarely held to account for their actions. Like some governments, authorized brokers can act as sanction-busters, though unlike governments these brokers possess flexible corporate identities and can change business names, premises, and contact details almost immediately when their illegal enterprise is detected or appears at risk of imminent detection. These regulated arms traders rely upon governments of dubious pedigree, exploit the inconsistent implementation and irregular enforcement of small arms regulatory regimes and arms embargoes, and take advantage of those international frameworks’ strategic weaknesses. Whereas regulated firms and authorized brokers can hinder a government’s ability to fulfil its responsibilities under international law and thereby contribute to the erosion of small arms control, commercial actors that are neither registered nor authorized by their governments also erode controls’ efficacy by eluding the enforcement reach of domestic regulatory regimes. Evidently, then, the commercial activities of firms and brokers reveal the extent to which the existing sovereign-bound controls fail to restrain the widespread availability of small arms sustained by both legal and illicit commerce. This distinction, between regulated and unregulated, authorized and unauthorized, serves to endorse the monopoly over the so-called legitimate use of force enjoyed by many governments by disadvantaging those armed nongovernmental groups violently contesting key institutions of civil governance. Whereas governments acting as sanction-busters undermine the notion of the political informing the major efforts to compose small arms controls, unregulated production and unauthorized transfers explicitly contest this internationalist orthodoxy, despite their clandestine nature. This is especially so where small arms proliferation occurs unchecked and illicit transfers are successfully transacted. Indeed, the challenge of controlling small arms is sustained by the contest

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over this notion of the political by a broad range of actors, including weaponsproducing firms and arms brokers. This contest is ongoing, remains unresolved, and is, perhaps, unresolvable. Also contesting the primacy of internationalism are those actors involved in the ongoing use of these weapons, many of which are obtained in ways other than those international transfers described in this chapter. The following chapter, the book’s penultimate, explores some of the particular ways in which key users of these weapons obtain arms intended for immediate use (rather than as tradable commodities) and retain those arms when confronted with disarmament initiatives.

Chapter 9

Weapons Users Like arms traders sustaining the widespread availability of small arms in the face of emerging manufacture and transfer controls, weapons users persist with their almost insatiable appetite for small arms. This is possible largely because the development and implementation of controls over weapons users have often lagged behind supply-side controls at a time when small arms circulate with a high degree of velocity and find immediate and ongoing use in most of the world’s trouble spots. As Neil Cooper suggests, “the reality of contemporary arms diffusion requires a corresponding shift to a system of regulatory diffusion that incorporates a greater focus on recipient initiatives, an enhanced role for civil society and a shift to an outputs/impacts model of regulation” (2006: 118). Militaries, constabularies, private security firms, civilians, organized crime groups, and nongovernmental armed groups are each emerging to varying degrees as objects of small arms control. Unsurprisingly, this broad range of actors proves antagonistic to the composition of controls over their possession of small arms. Supplementing the weapons which they already possess with arms obtained from various sources—including existing governmental stockpiles, caches captured during combat operations, nearby recently concluded conflict, and members of the criminal fraternity—some of these actors contribute to the crisis of authority confronting many governments around the world. Belligerents who are targeted by DDR programs administered as part of UN peacekeeping operations, but nevertheless retain their small arms in the face of these disarmament efforts, perpetuate this crisis. Moreover, weapons users reveal themselves as antagonists of these emerging small arms controls by acting in ways eroding their efficacy and by challenging the internationalist notion of the political informing their composition. Before identifying the particular ways in which these weapons users mitigate the intended effects of the emerging international frameworks providing for control over the possession of small arms, this chapter distinguishes those users authorized by governments to possess small arms within their areas of jurisdiction from those users possessing these weapons without official authorization. Authorized weapons users can contest the internationalist notion of the political by expressing a form of dissent from within the regulated bounds of the politicostrategic governance architecture, whereas unauthorized weapons users do so from beyond that regulated environment, as dissidents. By challenging the primacy of internationalism—that is, the preference for governments to work together in order to best address contemporary security challenges—users of small arms signal that a bifurcated world politics includes a broad range of actors playing significant roles, some of whom stimulate the

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armed violence reshaping the map of global politics across its three main politicodimensions. Those actors which are sovereign-free erode the efficacy of small arms controls while benefiting from (and further assisting) the broader transformations taking place in world affairs because they can have impact well beyond the orientational parameter normally associated with individuals and small groups. This broadening of the parameters of interaction, which postinternationalists describe as turbulence, is particularly evident in cases where individuals or small groups of sovereign-free status possess small arms in spite of the international small arms community’s best efforts to limit that possession. The chapter concludes that, despite the efforts of arms control protagonists examined in Part II of this book, the various practices of arms traders and weapons users examined in Part III mean that the challenge of controlling small arms is an intractable and insurmountable one. Broad Range of Weapons Users Small arms are overwhelmingly the weapons of choice used in contemporary conflict, preferred by most combatants ahead of nuclear, biological, chemical, and major conventional weapons. Compared to those other weapons of war, a combination of characteristics inherent in and unique to small arms make them particularly attractive to a diverse array of potential users. These weapons are inexpensive, widely available, simple to use, durable, portable, easily concealed, and lethal (Boutwell and Klare 1999a, p. 6; see also Boutwell and Klare 1998: 1—2). To be sure, these characteristics enable nongovernmental armed groups to engage governmental military forces, as well as other armed groups, in protracted conflict, regardless of whether or not these are described as intra-state, internal, or civil wars (Alley 2004, p. 1), or as low-intensity, ethno-political, or social conflicts (Mitchell 2003, p. 77). Although much of the burgeoning small arms literature draws attention to the deadly consequences resulting from the ongoing use of small arms by government forces and rival armed groups, not all users of these weapons are directly involved in conflict as combatants. Rather, as tools of violence these weapons are demanded and used by a broader range of actors, specifically constabularies, private security firms, and civilians, including organized and opportunistic criminals. The international small arms community recognizes the importance of these actors possessing small arms. Such recognition is reflected not only in some of the work published by small arms researchers, including those associated with various civil society organizations, but also in the texts of some instruments of international law. Whereas agreements relying upon export criteria, such as the  ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� The constabulary, ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ used here in its broad sense, includes prison services, customs officers, anti-poaching units of national parks and wildlife reserves, police reserve forces, and special constables.

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EU Code of Conduct and the Wassenaar Arrangement, acknowledge governments as ongoing users of these weapons, other instruments give more focus to nongovernmental actors. Upon agreeing to the Andean Plan, the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers recognized the link between the trafficking of these weapons and terrorists, drug traffickers, transnational organized criminals, and mercenaries. Similarly, the Preambles of the SADC Firearms Protocol and the OAS Convention note the connection between these weapons and “drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime, mercenary, and other violent criminal activities.” As Chapter 4 mentions, the UN Firearms Protocol specifically and exclusively targets organized crime groups, while the Nadi Framework provides for civilian possession of these weapons, but only when consistent with the interests of the local community. Recognizing these actors’ importance does not necessarily render them objects of small arms control. In fact, user-focused controls negotiated multilaterally are underdeveloped in comparison to those instruments of international law fostering regulatory regimes over the manufacture and trade of these weapons. While most instruments of international law tend to focus upon supply-side controls, the collective actions authorized by the UN Security Council target specific belligerents using small arms. Even though UN arms embargoes and DDR programs are user-focused controls, they are selectively applied in accordance with the Security Council’s deliberations and are only temporary measures when they are operationalized. They do not in and of themselves constitute a holistic approach to controlling small arms use and, as Chapter 6 argues, these types of collective action are not always easy or expedient for UN member-states to observe, monitor, and enforce. Researchers have been singled out from among arms control protagonists for particular censure over their lack of focus on this important aspect of the small arms issue. Some small arms research lags behind those policymakers recognizing the need for meaningful and useful research into the demand for these weapons. Other research explores the demand dimension of weapons use, but is “frequently imbued with normative and bureaucratic interests that encourage a prescriptive (as opposed to an empirical) approach to arms control” (Brauer and Muggah 2006: 139). Such research is prized more for its intended policy utility than for its analytical clarity and sense-making qualities. This is not to suggest that meaningful and useful research into weapons users and their stockpiles has not yet been conducted; indeed, best estimates drawn from that research have been cited in Chapter 2. In spite of the difficulties encountered in collecting and analyzing relevant information, these estimates of the global small arms stockpile are nevertheless meaningful for analysts and useful for policymakers, signalling the stockpile’s scale and distribution among weapons users. Even though it is possible to categorize weapons users as either militaries, constabularies, private security firms, civilians, organized crime groups, or nongovernmental armed groups, these categories prove malleable, with some users shifting from category to category. In conflict situations, officially-

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constituted militaries blend with politico-mafioso armies supporting organized crime. Moreover, ad-hoc and part-time combatants help problematize the strict demarcation drawn between combatants and civilians (Pouligny 2004, p. 7). A conflict’s outcome can help further dissolve the basis of such categories, as insurgencies and so-called rebel armies that successfully obtain power over the apparatus of government legitimize themselves (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 82). Certain researchers appear attentive to this: in their study of human security in West Africa, for instance, Florquin and Berman prefer the term ‘armed groups’— which they define “as groups equipped with small arms and light weapons that have the capacity to challenge the state’s monopoly of legitimate force”—over ‘insurgents’ and ‘militias’ because governments “change frequently and often violently…an armed group formed ostensibly to protect the state may soon find itself in opposition to it…[and] a group might support the state politically and still challenge its monopoly on coercion” (2005, p. 1). Authorized users of small arms acting in unlawful ways also undermine the basis of these categories. Where civilians, as registered firearms owners, breach conditions of their firearms licences, they too become criminals of sorts. As authorizing actors, governments and their military and constabulary forces can act in criminal ways too. Officers employed by law-enforcement agencies belonging to the Iraqi Government have recently used these weapons in order to commit crimes such as car jacking, hostage taking, and highway robbery. As Robert Fisk maintains, these men are “cops by day, killers by night” (2005, p. 1244). So too in Cameroon, where members of the security forces commit crimes or act as accomplices to crime, as junior and middle-ranking officers of the constabulary and military are responsible for initiating and coordinating much of the violent crime occurring in the country’s major urban centers (Atanga 2003, p. 43). There are also many instances where government employees have sold weapons illegally from official stockpiles (Mtonga and Mthembu-Salter 2004, p. 290). A recent study signals the extent to which Russia’s state security apparatus has become criminalized not just since the dismantling of the Soviet Union, but more recently under former President Vladimir Putin. “Russian organised crime,” one expert concludes, “has not only benefited immensely from the protection, weapons, and skills it can buy from corrupted members of the security forces, it has also infected it” (Galeotti 2006: 485). Such activities, and others like them, undermine the analytical distinction drawn among these categories of weapons users. In spite of the malleability of such analytic distinctions, users of small arms are easy enough to categorize, but prove difficult to characterize. The size and composition of the world’s police forces varies enormously, as does the size and composition of the world’s militaries. Private security firms are sometimes hired in order to supplement or bolster a government’s weak military or constabulary capability. At other times, they are hired by civilians to protect private property and provide personal security. Militias and organized crime groups prove equally difficult to characterize, especially given “their ability to stay flexible and adapt

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quickly to changing pressures and circumstances” (Raab and Milward 2003: 430). The difficulties associated with identifying and characterizing insurgent groups is not only an analytic problem but is also a concern for those UN peacekeepers attempting to restore or maintain peace by disarming belligerents as many combatants do not resemble the more typical images associated with professional soldiers (Pouligny 2004, p. 7). Notwithstanding these analytic quibbles, the global small arms stockpile has reached a disturbing magnitude: this world arsenal probably stands somewhere between 550 million and 638 million firearms (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 88; Small Arms Survey 2002, p. 103). As the previous chapter observes, this arsenal continues to grow as proliferation persists; the world’s small arms stockpile increases at a rate faster than that which natural obsolescence and deliberate deactivation can currently reduce it. Regardless of the exact size of this stockpile, substantial quantities of these weapons remain widely available and are frequently put to ongoing use in ways generating both immediate and lasting effects. The ways in which only a few of these weapons are used in specific contexts can, as demonstrated by Chapter 2, have vastly disproportionate effects. The confluence of weapons users is not a temporary feature of contemporary world affairs either, since “the ongoing intra- and inter-state conflicts in many parts of the world, together with attempts by the international community (e.g. UN, NATO) to deal with them, means that the demand for new small arms from governments and non-state actors will continue” (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 48). These weapons users—many of whom are sovereign-free and emerge from what postinternationalists describe as the orientational parameter of world politics—not only contribute to instances of armed violence but also help reshape the kinds of interactions transforming world affairs. Such transformation is especially evident where these interactions provoke and prolong the crisis of authority confronting many governments. Understanding Demand Reasons motivating demand for and possession of small arms vary and are often contingent on highly dynamic circumstances. Naylor understands small arms as  ���������� While the Small Arms Survey 2002 Yearbook revised its estimate upwards to 638 million firearms from the Small Arms Survey 2001 Yearbook’s estimate of 550 million, this revision reflects a mixture of potential stockpile increases, additional information becoming available, and improved estimating procedures and techniques. Subsequent yearbooks, however, refrain from offering revised estimates, focusing instead on refining and reexpressing global stockpiles in terms of regional, subregional, and governmental contexts. This shift in attention is due, at least in part, to the enormous difficulties encountered when attempting to obtain reliable and accurate information pertaining to quantitative estimates of these various stockpiles. It is also, no doubt, to present research and analysis in terms more relevant to particular policymakers facing specific national, sub-regional, or regional realities.

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“a capital good, demanded not for their own sake (except by a handful of oddball collectors), but for what they will accomplish” (2000, p. 178). Most, if not all, governments refer to the right to self defence enshrined in international law by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Constabularies use small arms to maintain the rule of law within their government’s jurisdiction. Often placed in harm’s way, UN peacekeepers also rely upon these weapons in order to fulfil mission objectives. Some civilian users claim legitimate small arms possession based upon cultural and customary usage, retaining weapons as ‘family possessions’ (Khakee and Florquin 2003, p. 17). Others claim privilege as sporting shooters or cite necessity as game-hunters and farmers of livestock. Where the rule of law appears tenuous, civilians demand weapons as a means of self protection and of protecting private property (Lamb 2004, p. 322). In other cases, these weapons serve the purposes of organized criminals who often have little or no concern for commonly-held notions of social justice. These weapons also feature as poaching tools in Africa’s game reserves and national parks (Mwakasungula and Nungu 2004, p. 90). The possession of and easy access to these weapons has enabled repressive governments to commit human rights violations, often with impunity. Such weapons are also used by those contesting the apparatus of the state, both as an aggressive means of recourse against perceived grievance and as a means of expressing a communal right to self-defence. Naylor notes that “[i]n all too many cases the demand for weapons is ultimately a surrogate for the demand for social justice” (2000, p. 178). In Burundi, for example, the government established community-based militia, known as gardiens de la paix, drawing upon some 30,000 civilians as a means of providing protection for communities against rebel attacks (UN Security Council 2004a, para. 46). Other users have relied upon the possession of these weapons as a means of enhancing their social standing within local communities. Weapons possession does not always equate to weapons use, however, as some of those in possession of weapons do not actually use them during conflict, with some joining belligerents after combat operations had ceased (Khakee and Florquin 2003, p. 13). The threat, perceived or actual, of weapons use can have similar coercive effects to those of actual weapons usage. Less varied but equally powerful are the main reasons informing resistance to disarmament programs established in postconflict settings, especially where the imminent danger posed by other people’s access to these weapons remains forcefully felt. As a kind of localized security dilemma, these immediate concerns abound, deterring participation in disarmament programs. Combatants and others who possess weapons are unlikely to embrace disarmament if security conditions are perceived to be inadequate, with some weapons stored in clandestine caches as insurance against further deterioration of security. As Faltas et al. point out: People will be reluctant to give up their arms unless the motives that drive them to want firearms are convincingly addressed. Attempts to forcibly disarm them will typically heighten their desire for private firepower. So practical disarmament can only work in the context of a dual effort to improve the capacity of the state

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to enforce the law, on the one hand, and to create effective safeguards against the abuse of state power, on the other (2001, p. 3).

Significantly, a lack of viable employment opportunities in contemporary postconflict settings also encourages membership of militia groups or engagement in other forms of illegal activity as a means of generating income. In other circumstances, reluctance to disarm is sometimes embedded in long-standing cultural practices. In Afghanistan, for instance, “guns have become an inalienable part of Afghan culture, a sign of manhood that are fired in the air at celebrations such as weddings or to mark the birth of a child” (Sedra 2002, p. 37). Pouligny goes as far as to suggest that “[i]n many countries, to deprive a male inhabitant of his gun is like questioning his virility” (2004, p. 9). Here, then, personal security, economic opportunity, social status, and longstanding cultural practice can help motivate combatants to retain their small arms in the face of disarmament initiatives. Enabling a sense of security and social standing for many of those who possess or sometimes as a last resort use them, while creating opportunities to prosper for others, small arms assist their users to obtain and use power over others for non-trivial purposes. Small arms are therefore tools of violence that are best understood as political instruments. Unsurprisingly, attempts to exert control over the possession of these tools of violence have been— and continue to be since most of these attempts are ongoing—a highly charged and contentious issue. As demonstrated by Part II of this book, the major efforts to compose small arms controls have been informed by an internationalist notion of the political. Because these arms control efforts occur as part of an ongoing negotiation between members of the international small arms community and the politico-strategic governance architecture prevailing in world affairs they not only call for governments to respond collectively and enshrine the rule of international law, but also tend to reinforce and extend the existing governance architecture. However, the broad range of weapons users identified here do not necessarily endorse this notion of the political. In fact, the practices of these weapons users erode the efficacy of small arms control by actively contesting the primacy of internationalism. Dissenting from Internationalism Weapons users can be distinguished between those who are authorized by their governments to possess small arms and those who are not. By authorized, I mean quite simply those users who have received explicit permission from their government to carry and operate a firearm in that government’s area of jurisdiction. In this sense, illicit use occurs either when an authorized user possesses or operates a firearm in contravention of their permit conditions or when an unauthorized user possesses and/or operates any firearm in contravention of domestic law. Here, governments differ from both authorized and unauthorized users since

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they are themselves the authorizing actors directly involved in negotiating and implementing international frameworks providing for regulatory regimes covering small arms possession (which in some cases extend to their own arsenals and stockpiles) as well as being responsible for establishing, administering, and enforcing those regulatory regimes. In most cases, governments rely upon their arsenals of small arms to help enforce the rule of law, including laws relating to firearms’ possession, within their respective areas of jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the usefulness of best estimates, there is no easy way of identifying all of those actors located throughout the world possessing small arms without their government’s permission. Even identifying those users authorized to possess these weapons and quantifying those weapons held by the world’s authorized actors proves unfeasible, as Chapter 2 explains. The velocity with which these weapons circulate among users is also unknown and is probably unknowable. Research profiling the distribution of small arms, particularly those weapons held by nongovernmental armed groups, is of limited utility too if it does not consider the ways available to these actors to replenish or increase stockpiles and the ease with which access to sources of these weapons may be obtained. Similarly, there is no accurate way of knowing precisely how many users retain their weapons in the face of disarmament initiatives, regardless of whether these efforts are led by international actors, national authorities, or local community groups. There is evidence indicating some of the ways in which authorized weapons users hinder a government’s ability to adhere to its international responsibilities. There is also evidence indicating some of the ways in which unauthorized operators elude enforcement investigations and targets of DDR programs resist disarmament initiatives, as this chapter goes on to illustrate. Awareness of these subversive practices is an essential part of any comprehension of the major efforts to compose small arms controls because various actors possessing weapons exploit easily and frequently the strategic weaknesses inherent in these frameworks, as well as their uneven implementation. Appreciating that these practices help to mitigate the intended effects of those controls over the possession of small arms is crucial not only to those policymakers who are involved in composing these controls and wish to strengthen them, but also to those analysts aspiring to better understand and then explain the reasons for the international small arms community’s so far largely ineffectual response to this urgent issue. Authorized Firearms Users Gun-owning civilians and private security firms can hinder a government’s ability to abide by its international responsibilities, mitigating the intended effects of domestic regulatory regimes which license civilian firearms possession. Civilians, including personnel employed by private security firms, can provide registrars with false details relating to their identity at the point at which they apply to become registered firearms users. This is easily achieved where background checks on applicants are weak or nonexistent. In PNG, poorly-maintained intelligence

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databases are often unable to identify those applicants who might have criminal records, including violent offences or serious mental health problems (Alpers 2005, p. 111). Where reasons for the permit application are required, administrative staff processing applications seldom question less-than-honest reasons given (Boer 2004, p. 120). As with the arms traders examined in the previous chapter, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized weapons users has little utility in circumstances where administrative processes are insufficiently critical of information they receive and where they are without adequate verification capabilities. Once registered, authorized firearms users can misreport both the quantity and the type of weapons held, thereby excluding some weapons from the registers maintained by authorities. Such misreporting enables two or more similar guns with identical markings to be held under a single permit—of which one is considered legal while the others function as ghost weapons for either illicit use or sale. Where licences are automatically renewed, users that no longer have valid reasons for possessing a firearm can retain it; in Lesotho, for instance, a business owner may seek a firearm in order to protect his or her business but can then sell that business while retaining the firearm (Perfole 2004, p. 66). Weapons transferred from deceased users to their offspring, following customary hereditary protocol, similarly evade poor administrative and monitoring processes, as do those authorized firearms which are subject to pawning and pledging. Relying upon the limited monitoring capabilities of authorities, authorized firearms users can make their arms available to those who are not authorized to use or possess them. Weapons users who are authorized to carry small arms as part of their professional duties—such as military personnel, members of the constabulary, and agents employed by private security firms—sometimes take their weapons home after working hours, either lend or lease them while off-duty, and occasionally retain them once their term of service lapses (Molomo et al. 2004, p. 27; see also Best and Von Kemedi 2005, p. 36). Some weapons in the hands of off-duty constabulary and military have been used to perpetrate domestic violence, while in Iraq such armed violence often has criminal and political motivation. In countries such as Albania and Romania, private security companies acquire their weapons by leasing them from constabulary arsenals (Page et al. 2005, p. 36). Where routine inspections of inventories are rare, record keeping is lax, and audits are non-existent, firearms armouries are increasingly porous. By seeking permission to possess firearms, authorized weapons users recognize the authority of governments to exercise control over certain activities occurring within their respective areas of jurisdiction. Like authorized arms traders and some of the civil society organizations examined in Part II, these sovereign-free actors endorse the primacy of governments along with those governments’ sovereign prerogatives. However, like those regulated arms traders authorized by their governments to produce and transfer small arms, civilians that are authorized to possess firearms can employ various means with which to hinder their government’s

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ability to fulfil its responsibilities under international law. In so doing, they exploit the strategic weaknesses and operational limitations inherent in the international frameworks providing for small arms controls, helping mitigate the intended effects of these efforts, and challenging the internationalism informing their composition. Because this challenge emerges from within the regulated bounds of the politicostrategic governance architecture, it is best understood as a form of dissent against the primacy of the internationalist notion of the political. Authorizing Governments Governments can help to mitigate their own international responsibilities concerning their small arms arsenals. This is especially important because official government accumulations are subject to close scrutiny where relevant instruments of international law apply. The SADC Firearms Protocol and the Nairobi Protocol, for instance, oblige state-parties to establish and maintain inventories of weapons held by military, security, and constabulary forces as well as to enhance the security of such stockpiles. Applicable here too are various soft law measures, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the ECOWAS Moratorium, the EU Code of Conduct, and the OSCE Document, each of which generates commitments to prevent destabilizing accumulations within governmental stockpiles. Yet where such accumulations could be deemed to be of concern to the wider international community, these governments can invoke a shield under the necessity for secrecy or cite Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify their existing holdings and intended acquisitions. Governments can dilute their potential international responsibilities as frameworks undergo negotiation and articulation. When contrasted against the responsibilities to regulate authorized manufacture and trade, and to target lawenforcement efforts at combating unauthorized manufacturing and trafficking of these weapons, the responsibilities to control official small arms stockpiles are underdeveloped. The UN Firearms Protocol and the OAS Convention both construe governments as important elements of the solution to the problems generated by the widespread availability and ongoing use of illicit small arms, but do so without acknowledging the complicity of those governments sustaining the availability and stimulating the use of these weapons. Consequently, these two treaties are without obligations for member-states to restrict the volume of weapons they accumulate. Regardless of the reasons given by policymakers, the underdevelopment of controls over official stockpiles reinforces governmental claims to the exclusive use of legitimate force within its area of jurisdiction, collectively reaffirming the principle of sovereignty as paramount in contemporary world affairs. Contrasted against those agreements fostering regimes regulating the proliferation and transfer of small arms, relatively few governments have responsibilities concerning the civilian possession of these weapons within their jurisdictions. As already mentioned, the UN Firearms Protocol, the OAS Convention, and the UNPoA are silent on controls over civilian possession of

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these weapons. Many governments do not have domestic laws covering civilian firearms possession resulting from their international responsibilities referred to in Chapters 3 and 4. The US Government is of particular significance here since it refuses to uniformly register its civilian gun ownership despite its citizens holding a considerable share of the world’s small arms (Small Arms Survey 2001, pp. 86—87). US domestic regulatory controls over civilian firearms ownership and possession are permissive relative to many other countries. These permissive controls continue to generate serious problems for US domestic enforcement agencies and health care providers, diverting resources away from other health and social services (Cukier and Sidel 2006, p. 6). Loose controls also pose challenges to those countries bordering the US or located within its region. The so-called ‘ant trade’ across the US-Mexico border occurs where weapons are purchased legally by individuals in US territory, but then trafficked across the border into Mexico where they are used to commit crime. This trafficking continues to occur in spite of recent efforts by US border-control agencies (Boutwell and Klare 1998: 5), although the majority of such border-control efforts are focused on the illegal movement of people rather than of weapons. Accordingly, the lax control over civilian gun ownership perpetuated by US domestic policy contributes to the widespread availability of these weapons in the US as well as the broader region. It also informs US foreign policy which helps dilute the provisions relating to civilian ownership of those international frameworks that the US Government negotiates or to which it is a party. Even after responsibilities for regulating civilian firearms possession are agreed, governments can erode the efficacy of those controls by entering into debates over the interpretation of the nature, extent, and applicability of these responsibilities. Such debates exploit the lack of consensus over the meaning of ancillary terms found in the texts of multilateral arms control agreements. In particular, ‘excessive’ and ‘destabilizing’ are two such terms abounding in these agreements referring to the quantities of accumulations and transfers of small arms deemed unacceptable to the wider international community. Reaching a common interpretation over what exactly constitutes ‘excessive’ transfers and ‘destabilizing’ accumulations, a distinction that the UN Panel of Governmental Experts found difficult to draw, remains elusive. Significantly,����� the Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms concedes: The terms ‘excessive’ and ‘destabilizing’ are relative and exist only in the context of specific regions, sub-regions, or States. The mere accumulation of weapons is not a sufficient criterion by which to define an accumulation of weapons as excessive or destabilizing, since large numbers of weapons that are under the strict and effective control of a responsible State do not necessarily lead to violence (UN General Assembly 1997a, para. 36).

Consensus is elusive because a small number of weapons can prove highly ‘destabilizing,’ as those used in the Fiji coup of 2000 have proven (Capie 2003, p.

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106), and because a few weapons transferred to criminals, terrorists, or insurgents are often automatically and uncritically deemed as ‘destabilizing.’ The path to consensus is further complicated by the fact that large stockpiles held by a so-called ‘responsible’ government might not appear to some as ‘excessive,’ though the application of the term ‘responsible’ is itself highly contingent; such assessments are both provisional and circumstantial. As Graciela Uribe de Lozano points out, “[t]he basic problem here, of course, is in defining when a government can be considered ‘responsible’ in matters of arms control and when such weapons are thought to be ‘in the wrong hands’” (1999, pp. 166—167). By virtue of their vital role in negotiating and implementing the various international frameworks for controlling possession of these weapons, governments erode the efficacy of these frameworks by unevenly implementing them and by only sporadically enforcing the domestic regulatory regimes which they establish in accordance with those frameworks. In addition to authorizing civilian possession of these weapons, governments rank among their chief users and, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, occasionally transfer weapons in contravention of arms embargoes. Where governments allow or facilitate the proliferation, transfer, or stockpiling of these weapons, but do not officially authorize them, they cast themselves in the role of arms control antagonists. While governments are not alone in their intransigence, they are the only international actors that feature simultaneously as both protagonists confronting the challenge of controlling small arms and as antagonists sustaining this challenge. Here, then, governments are not merely complicit with those actors they authorize to possess and use small arms, but are also on some occasions culpable of breaching international law in ways that contribute directly to armed violence. When governments do so, they act as sovereign-bound actors pursuing their own national interests over the collective security interests of the international small arms community. Subordinating the collective security interests of the world’s governments to their own narrowly-defined national interests, these governments contest the primacy of internationalism. Compared to the dissent demonstrated by those authorized firearms users examined earlier in this chapter, the dissent demonstrated by governments is far more serious, coming as it does from a key component of the politico-strategic governance architecture. It undermines the ongoing negotiation between those governments that present themselves as problem-solvers while helping to fuel and prolong the problem they seek to solve, and the prevailing governance architecture. It underscores the centrality of sovereignty in world affairs, particularly to sovereign-bound actors concerned more with preserving and enhancing their own position within contemporary world affairs than with reducing the incidence of armed violence or curbing such incidences’ intensity, duration, impact, and legacies.

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Dissident Challenges to Internationalism Authorized firearms users and governments are not the only weapons users eroding the efficacy of emerging small arms controls, as unauthorized firearms users can also use a variety of methods to ensure their immediate and ongoing access to such weapons. Unauthorized Firearms Users Many civilians perceive a desperate need to possess small arms in order to help protect themselves and to protect their private property, but may be disqualified from registering as firearms users, be unable to afford registration fees, or be unwilling to wait for time-consuming application processes to run their course (Perfole 2004, pp. 58—59). Unauthorized weapons are also sought as tools for criminal enterprise. Firearm users residing within the jurisdiction of governments regulating small arms possession can acquire and retain small arms without official authorization. More than simply refusing to participate in disarmament initiatives exemplified by arms amnesties, voluntary weapons-surrendering campaigns, and government-run buy-back schemes, unauthorized users must ensure their weaponry eludes law-enforcement investigations over the entire period of its unauthorized possession. Perhaps the easiest way in which unauthorized firearms users maintain possession of small arms is by concealing them in a myriad of locations, including homes, nearby forests, caves, wells, and in some cases buried underground. From a law-enforcement perspective, dormant small arms are extremely difficult to detect. So too are those weapons left over from nearby conflict as caches or those carried by refugees fleeing nearby conflict, with both examples occurring recently in Zambia (Mtonga and Mthembu-Salter 2004, pp 291—292). Even where unauthorized firearms users are not in direct possession of weapons, they can maintain immediate access to those that are held legally, but secured poorly. Poorly-secured governmental stockpiles are especially vulnerable to leakage. “Combatant groups and criminals alike seem satisfied with the rich and easily available domestic supply of firearms within PNG,” Alpers argues, “while the leakage of weapons and ammunition from state-owned stocks remains a major hazard. It must be emphasized that existing local stockpiles, and not cross-border trafficking and smuggling, are the primary source of firearms misused in crime, conflict, and intentional and unintentional death and injury in the Highlands” (2005, p. 121). Civilian stockpiles are also vulnerable, though for different reasons as Katleho Perfole relates: “legal and illegal firearms are frequently lent by their owners to friends, neighbours, or relatives who might need them for temporary/ short-term security” (2004, p. 59), or for any other reason. If they are willing to steal, unauthorized firearms users appear spoilt for choice given the easy access to some weapons held as government stockpiles, on the local premises of dealers in firearms and manufacturing plants, and stored in civilian homes. Taken together, official and civilian stockpiles represent a significant

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source of weapons for immediate use by unauthorized users. During the period 1994—2002 in South Africa, for instance, the Defence Force and Police Service each year lost on average about 190 firearms and 1,450 weapons respectively; over the same period, South Africa’s civilian firearms owners each year lost on average about 20,810 firearms (Lamb 2004, p. 328). Even though such leakages might be an unintentional consequence of an authorized weapons user’s negligence, governments can hold those permit holders accountable by prosecuting them through judicial procedures. However, it can be difficult for authorities to prosecute unauthorized users when not in possession of their weapons, though weapons can be seized as evidence of an offence and then destroyed if the authorities deem this appropriate. Unauthorized weapons users do not necessarily have to steal weapons from legally-held stockpiles in order to obtain them for immediate use. They can instead have weapons made for them by local producers. As Andrew Charman points out, Malawi “has an extensive home-based small arms industry at village level, producing ‘home-made’ weapons. The industry has been sustained by a demand for low cost and low maintenance guns for (illegal) hunting and crop protection against game” (cited in ����������������������������������������������������� Mwakasungula and Nungu 2004�������������������������� , p. 88). As noted in the previous chapter, there is a growing artisan production in different parts of the world with craftsmen also repairing damaged weapons, thereby increasing the pool of weaponry available for immediate use by those not authorized to possess them. Unauthorized firearms users can also make illicit purchases from those responsible for guarding locally-stored weapons, licensed dealers in firearms, and corrupt officials. A common enough anecdote illustrates this point well: “an illegal firearm was taken from a villager during a police raid. The villager was not detained because he surrendered the firearm voluntarily. A few days later the firearm was believed to be in the possession of another villager who had bought it from the police officer” (Perfole 2004, p. 60). Often paid poorly, those who are charged with guarding arsenals and security stockpiles, like those officials who grant fake end-user trade certificates, are vulnerable to collusion and corruption. Moreover, mercenaries from nearby countries can carry weapons, surpluses of which are put out for hire (Best and Van Kemedi 2005, p. 35). In the Central African Republic, retreating Congolese troops sold weapons to locals in order to support themselves and their dependents (UN Security Council 1999, para. 38). Even peacekeepers, such as those deployed as part of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, return home with weapons collected in conflict zones, which are ready for resale and immediate use (Best and Van Kemedi 2005, pp. 24—25). When unauthorized possession of small arms occurs, it can be as part of the dark networks noted in the previous chapter. Yet the activities of organized criminals can go even further than corrupting law-enforcement officers and officials, as Mittelman and Johnston explain:

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criminal groups are alternative social organizations that in some respects challenge the power and authority of the state to impose its standards, codified as law. These groups constitute an alternative system by offering commerce and banking in black and gray markets that operate outside the regulatory framework of the state; buying, selling, and distributing controlled or prohibited commodities such as narcotics; providing swift and usually discreet dispute resolution and debt collection without reference to the courts; creating and maintaining cartels when state laws proscribe them; and arranging security for the so-called protection of businesses and sheltering them from competitors, the state, and rival criminals. Adding to the concentration of unaccountable power amassing with economic globalization, organized crime groups are tapping into a global system of arms trade and raising and channelling immense amounts of money for this purpose. Insurgents in different regions increasingly rely on organized crime groups, and their armed forces are now intermingled with Serbs, Croats, and other soldiers of fortune, demobilized at home and seeking new employment opportunities (1999: 114—115).

The rise of vigilante groups in South Africa taking justice into their own hands signals dissatisfaction with an ineffective governmental judicial system. Citizens have also relied upon organized crime groups as service providers, as evident in the protection rackets run in the former Soviet Union and the people-smuggling operations emerging out of Asia (Mittleman and Johnston 1999: 119—121). Members of the Yakuza provided relief supplies to victims of the Kobe earthquake in 1995, contrasting with the tardy official response (Picarelli 2006: 9). Hezbollah in Lebanon have consolidated domestic support by funding health care, other social services and, most recently, cash handouts to aid those whose homes were destroyed by Israeli military strikes in 2006. Here, then, dark networks that make small arms available for immediate use to unauthorized firearms users elude the law-enforcement efforts that support regulatory regimes for small arms. Because they do not seek the permission of a government, unauthorized firearms users take a dissident stance against internationalism and act as sovereign-free actors operating beyond the regulated bounds of the prevailing politico-strategic governance architecture. These dark networks not only contribute to the growing crisis of authority confronting many of the world’s governments, but also compete with the legitimacy of the state. Their activities can lead to the decomposition, reconfiguration, or corruption of civil society, especially where the state is viewed as playing a courtesan role that “services clients, especially wealthy or upper-class ones” (Mittleman and Johnson 1999: 116—117). Mittleman and Johnston elaborate the following: Some countries are cast literally in this role, offering or promoting a sex industry, now organized transnationally in eastern Asia, in which the state does not provide social protection for its young women and men (or children) but rather

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tacitly forsakes safeguarding the local culture in favour of global market forces. For other countries, the courtesan role is less blatant and more figurative but nonetheless emblematic of the interregnum between a Westphalian, interstate system and a more multilevel, post-Westphalian world order (Ibid: 117).

Dark networks including small arms users therefore contribute significantly not only to a crisis of authority around the world but also to a condition of turbulence where the primacy of the state in world affairs is undermined and contested by individuals and small groups as sovereign-free actors. Combatants Just as unauthorized firearms users elude the reach of law-enforcement investigations within regulated environments, combatants can resist the disarmament component of DDR programs. By resist, I mean that by retaining unauthorized weapons or by maintaining access to caches and other sources from which they can immediately supplement their existing stockpiles, combatants mitigate the intent behind those DDR programs. Combatants can use an array of methods with which to deliberately resist DDR programs, including those that are administered as part of UN peacekeeping operations as well as the many disarmament initiatives undertaken outside DPKO’s auspices. (While this subsection’s focus is on the former, relevant and salutary lessons can be learned from the latter.) At other times, local force commanders subvert DDR programs, rendering them into the service of their own political purposes. The simple practice of concealing weapons as hidden caches within conflict zones and postconflict theatres proves effective against those peacekeeping operations which are authorized to provide incentives for disarmament, but which are without authority to conduct search and seizure operations. In Nicaragua during early 1990, for instance, large numbers of combatants were unimpressed with the peace agreement and the associated peace dividend, and by 1991 had rearmed with weapons they had previously hidden (Atanga 2003, p. 21). In Sierra Leone, the RUF hid much of its arsenal in neighbouring Liberia in order to resist the 2001 disarmament initiatives (Bourne 2007, p. 137). While the concealment of weapons can be very simple, in some cases such as in Kosovo clandestine storage facilities have become more sophisticated as a reaction to active weapons collection initiatives and DDR programs (Khakee and Florquin 2003, p. 20). Combatants can erode the efficacy of DDR programs by giving them partial support, preferring to only surrender either obsolete, low quality, or damaged weaponry, as occurred during the initial phase of the Mozambique DDR program (UN Security Council 1994a, para. 7). In these circumstances, collection programs capture only a fraction of belligerents’ caches and where DDR programs exchange money for surrendered weapons they may even assist combatants to upgrade their arsenals. While this limited participation might be seen by some as a symbolic gesture of endorsement for such programs, it also signals the reluctance of ex-

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combatants to fully disarm or, seen more cynically, reveals a keenness to withhold their best weaponry for future use. Flint and de Waal illustrate something of a worst-case scenario in Darfur, where a sham disarmament ceremony—in which 300 militiamen hand over their weapons—was organized for a visiting delegation that included the UN Special Representative. The weapons were handed back the following day (2008, p.145). In Angola, both the UN and the Government expressed concern regarding the caches of small arms held by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi’s personal security detachment which, in reality, was a small contingent of UNITA’s battle-tested fighters (MacQueen 1988: 412). This concern was not misplaced given the subsequent resumption of hostilities in Angola already noted in Chapter 5. Force commanders can abuse DDR programs, taking advantage of administrative processes with weak screening procedures by refusing to provide detailed lists of those combatants under their command (Nichols 2005, p. 114). Some commanders have been unwilling to identify the precise number of their combatants, perhaps because they believe that by overestimating the forces and weapons under their command their negotiation position is strengthened and their bargaining power increased; in Burundi, armed forces withheld both troop lists and information relating to munitions stockpiles (UN Security Council 2004d, para. 24). Pouligny is erudite on this point (though she writes in relation to the ISAF intervention), when she writes: As in Afghanistan today, every commander tends to inflate the number of his men, to show political superiority and to draw more entitlement from the donors. In Kabul and Mazar, the commanders made up smaller units for disarmament, by taking bits from several military units. This is just one of the strategies that can be used to hide significant forces and weapons.

The situation is even more complicated when, as in Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, or in various places in Africa, local militias have been paid and armed by external powers. It is even more the case in Afghanistan due to the war against terrorism. Such situations are very difficult to manage in DDR programs, among other reasons because former patrons are inclined to apply double standards to their former clients, and are reluctant to reveal any information regarding the actual strength and composition of these forces (2004, p. 9). Force commanders can continue to exert control over former combatants by coercing them into relinquishing the inducement money provided in return for surrendering their weapons at official collection points. Commanders can also disarm those under their control in order to either reallocate their weapons to less valued fighters or sell these weapons to non-combatants who then benefit in terms of financial gain, health care, and training opportunities through their involvement in DDR programs (Nichols 2005, p. 121). According to Nichols, “[t]he power that faction leaders continue to exercise over their followers is significant: during a post-disarmament uprising of disgruntled ex-combatants in Tabmanburg, UNMIL

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troops had to bring in a former LURD commander to quell the rioting” (Ibid, p. 127). In continuing to exercise such control, commanders compress the effect of DDR programs, ensuring their power base remains unchanged in the face of international intervention. Meanwhile, any lucrative black market activities with which they may have been engaged during conflict remain unmolested (Pouligny 2004, p. 19). Yet local force commanders do not hold a monopoly over the abuse of DDR programs. If incentives for surrendering weapons are sufficient, individuals (not necessarily directly involved in hostilities as belligerents) who do not possess weapons may attempt to steal them. Those who receive funds for their weapons might also seek to procure more arms in order to obtain further compensation (Faltas et al. 2001, p. 7). In Liberia, 3,000 of the 13,000 ex-combatants disarmed were probably disarmed twice a result of poor screening procedures (Nichols 2005, p. 113). Where cash incentives are high, belligerents can hand in weapons but use funds to purchase more arms, which in some cases prove more lethal than the weapons surrendered. In addition to retaining access to at least some of those weapons under their control, combatants can continue to source new weapons in order to either replenish depleted stocks or increase the size and quality of their arsenals for immediate use. In Northern Afghanistan, weapons collected under disarmament programs were then either held by local factions or transferred for safe storage to the control of warlords in adjacent areas and factions outside the immediate region (International Crisis Group 2003, p. 8). Significantly, such weaponry was neither transferred to an independent authority, nor destroyed. Consequently, these weapons can easily be requisitioned informally from official stockpiles, as raids on armories represent relatively simple military operations. Many of the 12,000 weapons collected from armed nongovernmental groups by the Government of Sierra Leone but not destroyed were recaptured following the collapse of the peace process in May 2000 (Faltas et al. 2001, p. 14). During the Malian insurgency, armed nongovernmental groups relied heavily on weapons they captured during combat operations or seized from official stockpiles, eventually supplementing these sources with weapons purchased illegally from soldiers and Malian officers (Florquin and Pézard, 2005, pp. 51—53). Yet combatants are not the only sources of weapons in conflict zones and postconflict settings; as Virginia Gamba laments over the case of Sierra Leone, “so many of the weapons used by the RUF were obtained by seizing arms from the peacekeeping force itself: the contingents of Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Jordan, Zambia, and India have all suffered heavily in this regard” (2003, p. 132). At other times, hard-line leaders of armed groups can exert influence over combatants by inducing them to refuse to participate in DDR programs at all, as occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UN Security Council 2003b, para. 21). Here, then, the efficacy of these DDR programs is eroded where weapons that have been collected are neither destroyed nor permanently deactivated. Easy access to official stockpiles due to poor armory controls is exacerbated by combatants

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who use the financial incentives and employment opportunities inherent in DDR programs as a means of fostering patronage while targeting their rivals for demobilization (International Crisis Group 2003, p. 23). Thus, it is not merely the disarmament component of DDR programs that is vulnerable to exploitation as economic incentives are also abused, undermining the assistance intended for those ex-combatants attempting to reintegrate into civilian life. Also, demobilizing combatants and then reintegrating some of them into the national armed forces is not always seamless. In the Solomon Islands during 2001, the lack of discipline of these so-called ‘special constables’ contributed to further lawlessness, which perpetuates cycles of violence and impedes weapons collection initiatives. As the Angolan experience testifies, failed DDR programs can result in dissatisfied ex-combatants storming demobilization encampments and compounds. It can trigger aggression and reignite tensions that can contribute to renewed conflict, which in turn can create conditions necessitating and impeding future weapons-collection initiatives. The legacy of failed disarmament attempts not only undermines confidence in current and future DDR programs, but also emboldens those combatants unwilling to relinquish their weapons; or worse, encourages those who desire to subvert DDR programs to their own advantage. This subversion, while producing very dangerous outcomes for local communities in postconflict settings, also fosters insecurity beyond the immediate vicinity of the conflict zone. In conflict zones and postconflict settings, regulated environments tend to either function very poorly or not exist at all. Often the availability and use of small arms, as vital ingredients for conflict, form part of the reason for the failure of the rule of law. Designed as a means to remove small arms from the hands of belligerents, DDR programs within UN peacekeeping operations are easily eluded. While many of these combatants and local force commanders resisting DDR programs are sovereign-free (although some of course aspire to achieving sovereignty), their ability to mitigate the intended effects of DDR programs by retaining access to small arms for immediate or future use demonstrates a particular stance taken in relation to internationalism. This stance is best understood as a form of dissidence because these weapons users challenge the internationalist notion of the political, but do not form part of the politico-strategic governance architecture prevailing in contemporary world affairs. In fact, the more significant these actors become to the pursuit of international security, especially if these actors are individuals or small armed groups, the broader the parameters of interaction become. It is this broadening of parameters that in turn helps to stimulate and intensify what postinternationalists describe as a condition of turbulence. Unregulated Weapons Users There are some locations where small arms possession is not authorized, but is not technically illegal. Conflict zones in which armed groups either control territory or contest a government’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its

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jurisdiction are good examples of areas in which regulated environments simply do not exist. While the territory may belong to a government that forms part of the politico-strategic governance architecture, the area in particular may not be subject to any international frameworks providing for control over small arms possession. In some cases, the emerging mosaic of responsibilities concerning weapons possession is reinforced and extended by DDR programs administered as part of UN peacekeeping operations deployed to those conflict zones which the UN Security Council deems a threat to international security. However, while 47 peacekeeping operations have been authorized by the Security Council since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has not authorized interventions for every recent conflict. Consequently, these unregulated spaces expose the costs associated with the mosaic of responsibilities’ patchy coverage. In circumstances where governmental authority has been eroded and the rule of law is no longer observed or is even non-existent, black markets flourish. The situation in Burundi is instructive in this regard. According to Nelson Alusala, “[t]en years of armed conflict have turned Burundi into an open theatre for the illicit arms trade, whose lethality has made almost every citizen a victim” (2005, p. 1). A recent UN report supports this view: While hostilities have generally ceased, criminality appears to have increased, aided by the thousands of weapons in circulation. Attacks, ambushes and harassment of individuals or groups along the main roads are commonplace… Refugees and internally displaced persons have also reported cases of rape and general insecurity during the return process. Furthermore, some uncontrolled [Burundi Armed Forces] (FAB) elements are allegedly involved in criminal activity, and elements belonging to the armed parties regrouping in assembly areas have been cited as harassing local civilians (UN Security Council 2004a, para. 17).

As Capie notes, “some groups also manufacture their own military weapons and ammunition. The sophistication of these operations varies enormously. Many armed group can service their own arms or produce simple homemade firearms, but some have also been able to manufacture high quality weapons” (2004, p. 6). Lawlessness in areas such as these present especially troublesome scenarios for those policymakers seeking to better control small arms. As noted in the Introduction, the widespread availability of these weapons blurs the analytical distinction between conflict zones and postconflict settings, just as the rise and persistence of armed criminality blurs the distinction between areas under the rule of law and those deemed conflict zones. For some combatants, this blurring represents opportunities: for example “[m]ost of the bandits who operated under the guise of fighters and took advantage of the [Malian] rebellion to rob civilians and loot villages kept their arms and continued to pursue their illicit activities” (Florquin and Pézard 2005, p. 59).

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Unauthorized actors can form dark networks among themselves in these unregulated areas while forming relationships with coerced and corrupt lawenforcement officers and officials who administer regulatory regimes in other areas. This can include some DDR programs, especially those that are exploited to the extent that they ultimately serve combatants’ ends. Where such networks are sustained and gather momentum, they coalesce around a set of beliefs that challenge the primacy of internationalism. New forms of authority, based on criminality, gather legitimacy in conflict theatres and postconflict settings where dark networks provide much-needed public services. Indeed, “[n]ew forms of criminality infringe the principle of sovereignty, the centrepiece of the Westphalian state system” (Mittleman and Johnston 1999: 115). As driving forces within these dark networks, sovereign-free actors utilize a set of practices in order to exploit the strategic weaknesses and uneven implementation of the international frameworks providing for small arms regulatory regimes. Because these networks form part of a broader response to the state’s preponderance in world affairs, especially where governments cooperate for collective advantage, they challenge the primacy of internationalism, doing so from beyond the regulated bounds of the politico-strategic governance architecture as a kind of dissidence. In this context, then, governments are best understood as important, but certainly not the only, actors existing in what some postinternationalists refer to as the post-Westphalian world order. In addition, as an actor playing significant roles in contemporary world affairs, the state is not a static entity, enduring without change through the centuries; it is instead better understood as a dynamic, reflective, composite feature of world affairs, which is made and remade as it oscillates between responding to domestic and external pressures, to historical traditions, and calculations of future aspirations. Conclusion Like arms traders, weapons users are able to mitigate the intended effects of the international community’s efforts to compose small arms controls. Many of these sovereign-free actors not only easily circumvent these instruments of international law and DDR programs, but can also exploit some of these arm control efforts in a way that subverts them into the service of their own political ends. By retaining their arms for immediate and ongoing use, weapons users not only erode the efficacy of the international frameworks governing the possession of small arms, but also contest the internationalist notion of the political which predetermines who has legitimate access to these tools of violence and in which circumstances their possession and use are to be restricted. Some of these weapons users not only infect the state in the way that organized crime groups explored in the previous chapter form dark networks, but also help provide alternative public services which in turn compete with the authority of governments. In certain circumstances, international actors relying on small arms as political tools have also reconfigured

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civil society. Weapons users targeted for control by the international small arms community are, therefore, not devoid of politics, nor do they assert an anti-politics. Rather, like other key international actors targeted for control by arms control protagonists, they engage in a set of practices and activities which do not endorse the primacy of the internationalist notion of the political. These stances taken against internationalism are part of a broader transformation of global affairs, just as the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms contribute to a tradition of armed violence in world affairs, which precedes and will likely outlast the Westphalian system of states and their sovereign prerogatives. Contextualized against those efforts to compose controls over small arms discussed in Part II, which contain strategic weaknesses that continue to dog these measures, the recalcitrance of small arms antagonists erodes the intended effects of those efforts. The actions of arms traders and weapons users expressing dissenting or dissident stances in relation to the internationalist notion of the political therefore renders the challenge of controlling small arms intractable and insurmountable.

Conclusion Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control set out to explore the major ways in which the international community has composed controls over small arms since the early 1990s. It examined the ways in which governments, exercising their sovereign prerogatives, establish, administer, and enforce domestic regulatory regimes for small arms manufacture, transfer, and possession, as well as collect and deactivate surplus weapons circulating within their territories. Difficulties confronting governments either observing UN-authorized arms embargoes or contributing to the administration of UN-authorized DDR programs received consideration too. The book also examined the ways in which intergovernmental organizations negotiate and implement various instruments of international law that create obligations and commitments for governments to regulate small arms within their respective areas of jurisdiction. It examined the ways in which the UN Security Council crafts resolutions authorizing sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations where many of these recent collective actions have included arms embargoes and DDR programs as arms control components. In addition to those actors’ efforts to compose international frameworks providing for small arms control, this book examined the ways in which civil society organizations conduct campaigns advocating small arms control and monitoring governments’ actions in light of their international responsibilities. Researchers, who were among the first to draw attention to small arms as an urgent security issue, were also examined here, with specific focus given to the ways in which they draw the topic’s contours, describe its major aspects, and distinguish it from other conventional arms control topics. To be sure, the burgeoning literature on small arms, which helps inform and shape other efforts to compose small arms controls, is so extensive and continues to grow at such a rate that it is sufficient to constitute a major effort in its own right. As this book explored the major ways in which the international community composes controls over small arms, it paid close attention to the maturing relationships among arms control protagonists and to the nascent but evolving interconnectivity among their various strategies for, and approaches toward, the composition of those controls. It signalled, for example, that governments not only provide funding that reaches individual researchers, independent research centers, and civil society organizations, but can also include researchers and representatives of civil society organizations in their official delegations to important multilateral meetings. It signalled too that as member-states of intergovernmental organizations many governments shape instruments of international law, although relatively few feature as members of the UN Security Council crafting resolutions that include arms embargoes and DDR programs.

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While governments have proven themselves vital to the composition of small arms controls, they are not the only arms control protagonists whose efforts interconnect with those of others who also seek to compose controls over these tools of violence. For instance, researchers call for and help prompt governmental action, appear on UN Panels of Experts, and work within or alongside civil society organizations campaigning for the development of new, or the improvement of existing, small arms controls. Furthermore, intergovernmental organizations negotiate and implement instruments of international law that explicitly link to other international frameworks, be they treaties, soft law measures, or resolutions authorized by the UN Security Council. In some situations, civil society organizations assist with the administration of UN-authorized DDR programs, the mandates for which increasingly connect with mandates for collective action occurring in contiguous areas. This nascent but evolving interconnectivity, Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control argued, demonstrates a strong sense of cohesion among arms control protagonists to the extent that an international small arms community emerges and is sustained. Adopting a critical perspective for its examination of the recent composition of small arms controls enables this book to emphasize the relationship between the underlying structures informing contemporary world affairs and the actors residing within those structures. In other words, arms control protagonists cannot be understood in isolation from those structures that give them status and varying degrees of power in world politics. In order to be more fully understood, arms control protagonists must be situated within the specific politico-historical contexts from which they emerge and which they subsequently help shape. Framing the argument in this critical way reveals that efforts to compose small arms controls occur as part of an ongoing negotiation between arms control protagonists and the politico-strategic governance architecture prevailing in contemporary world affairs. While the ongoing negotiation between arms control protagonists and the politico-strategic governance architecture is mutually reinforcing, this sustained pattern of interaction also creates opportunities for emerging, and helps to strengthen existing, relationships among sovereign-free actors. The opportunity to develop or strengthen these relationships between sovereign-free actors and their networks is not limited to arms control protagonists, however. In fact, this ongoing, dynamic, and complex negotiation also creates opportunities for arms traders and weapons users, as arms control antagonists, to develop and strengthen their own relationships and networks and to contribute to the crisis of authority confronting many governments. By resisting, evading, and eluding small arms controls, these actors sustain the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms, oftentimes fuelling the armed violence that occurs throughout the world. Attempts to compose small arms controls also provide opportunities for individuals and small groups to interact, both among themselves and with larger collectivities, with seemingly disproportionate effect beyond their orientational parameters. This,

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in turn, stimulates broader transformations that induce a condition of turbulence that ought to prompt a reshaping of our understandings of world politics. Adopting a critical perspective on the topic of small arms control, this book also revealed a body of ideas that at once informs arms control protagonists’ major efforts and helps to partly explain why these efforts tend to reinforce and extend the existing governance architecture. Internationalism as it is described here is that body of ideas suggesting governments, particularly when acting cooperatively, are best placed to manage contemporary security challenges, especially those including the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms which are complex, dynamic, transnational in nature, and global in scope. As demonstrated by Part II, internationalism does indeed inform the major efforts to compose small arms controls. Yet this does not necessarily mean that internationalism provides the best analytic framework with which to generate explanations relating to the composition of those controls. Instead, the critical perspective used here posits that such internationalist explanations are likely to justify the ways in which those efforts occur, giving analytic primacy to governments and intergovernmental organizations at the expense of other significant actors; and, where nongovernmental actors receive analytic treatment, this treatment is likely to be biased towards understanding power in narrow politico-strategic terms. The critical perspective of this book suggests that, instead of being a function of the prevailing governance architecture comprising institutions such as the UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the WTO, a broader internationalist discourse could itself serve as an underlying structure that is deeper and more profound than the prevailing politico-strategic governance architecture. The remainder of this Conclusion briefly identifies three major analytic implications drawn from this book’s main arguments. These implications—one each concerning theory, politics, and security—ought to be of deep concern not only to those arms control protagonists examined in this book, but also to those analysts wishing to provide better explanations of how and why the international small arms community’s efforts have been unable to restrain the proliferation, transfer, and use of these weapons. This is because these implications signal that the challenge of controlling the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms is intractable and insurmountable. Theory In corollary with its critical perspective, this book employed a postinternational analytic framework in order to help make sense of the topic of small arms control. Rather than offer the reader an analysis of an emerging postinternationalist world, this book instead provided a postinternationalist analysis of the small arms control topic. To that end, the preceding argument relied heavily upon concepts and ideas salient to postinternational theory that enabled an explanation of how and why the international community’s efforts to compose small arms controls have to

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date been so ineffectual. For instance, postinternationalism’s appreciation of the broad range of actors playing significant roles in world affairs helped to identify a dramatis personae of arms control protagonists. In addition to governments and intergovernmental organizations, postinternational theory signalled the significance of other actors such as civil society organizations and researchers, both of which play important roles in the composition of small arms controls. It also signalled that those arms traders and weapons users deliberately seeking to erode the efficacy of those controls reveal themselves as arms control antagonists by fuelling contemporary conflict and by stimulating turbulence. Understood through a postinternationalist analytic framework, these arms control antagonists inevitably extend the cast of the dramatis personae deserving sustained analytic consideration. Moreover, postinternationalism’s concept of bifurcation helped to explain why small arms controls are composed in ways that seek to strengthen sovereign authority. In a turbulent world where sovereign-bound and sovereign-free actors interact with great frequency, sovereign-bound actors use arms control measures in order to strengthen their claims to exert control over certain territory, as well as their exclusive right to the legitimate use of force in that territory. Postinternationalism’s concept of parameters of interaction cast light upon the ways in which individuals, such as researchers or ‘super-empowered’ UN Secretaries-General, can have significant effects on the broader collectivities that shape major small arms controls, though not all ‘super-empowered’ individuals make immediate or lasting effects on this issue, as the fate of the Nobel Laureates’ Code illustrates. This concept of parametric interaction also illuminated the ways in which individual arms brokers and so-called ‘dark networks’ can exploit the weaknesses of emerging small arms controls, often with profound impacts in conflict zones and postconflict settings. In times of peace, major urban centers too can suffer the grim realities that so often accompany unregulated small arms possession. It is these interactions among the three main parameters identified by postinternationalism that stimulate broader transformations of world politics which cause, for postinternationalists, a profound condition of turbulence whereby world affairs drifts into waters largely uncharted by mainstream international relations theory. Understood in this way, turbulence is a feature of contemporary world affairs which the major efforts to compose small arms controls seek to ameliorate and, if possible, reverse. The book also relied upon postinternationalism’s insight into the contingent nature of the Westphalian states system in order to situate the contemporary international security agenda within a longer tradition of armed violence. The history of armed violence precedes the emergence of the states system and will almost certainly outlast that system, at least in its current manifestation. This insight highlights the role that small arms—by being widely available and subject to ongoing use—play in igniting, intensifying, and prolonging instances of armed violence. This is important because armed violence not only helped to create the states system, but may also play a role in its disintegration. The problems associated

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with small arms are therefore not as recent as many arms control protagonists might suggest. Here, then, this book used some of postinternational theory’s key concepts to help explain how and why the international community’s major efforts to compose controls over small arms to date appear so ineffectual. As a coherent body of ideas and concepts, it proves a particularly useful means by which to explicate a topic which has, as the editors of the Small Arms Survey 2001 Yearbook observe, “been variously defined as an arms control and disarmament issue, a human rights and humanitarian law issue, a public health or economic development issue, a problem of post-conflict disarmament, or as an issue of terrorism and criminality” (p. 2; see also Atanga, 2003, p. 31). By helping to generate a compelling explanation of this topic, the version of postinternational theory used here demonstrates the value of analysis which gives focus to the underlying structures informing world affairs without being captured by, or deeply implicated with, those structures in the way that internationalism might be. In this sense, Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control might also be understood as a very modest intervention in the politics of mainstream international relations theory because it embodies a commitment to emancipation from the closed structures dampening debate over various notions of the political. However, while postinternationalism might reveal and help compensate for particular shortcomings in disciplinary international relations, there are discernable limits to its explanatory range and power. Emerging as it does from the Western Enlightenment project, postinternationalism shares with most mainstream theories of international relations an excessive reliance on reason as the primary way of knowing. Such a reliance on reason means that a postinternationalist analysis of the small arms topic can never be fully complete, neglecting as it does Pettman’s double espistomological helix of proximal and distal ways of knowing. Postinternationalism, therefore, lacks an understanding of what it might actually be like to be an official representative attending an arms control forum, or an arms broker facilitating a shady deal with an international criminal, or a victim of small arms usage. Postinternationalism’s reliance on reason privileges the scientistic or empirical approach, a bias which is particularly limiting when applied to the small arms topic since reliable empirical data on the issue is scarce and difficult to obtain, as outlined in Chapter 2. In some cases, comparisons based on this data tend to confound more than they clarify. Notwithstanding these analytic limitations, the implication to note here— which ought to be of deep concern to both arms control protagonists and analysts seeking to explain how and why the major efforts to compose controls over small arms appear ineffectual—is that a refusal to challenge those explanations of world affairs which justify existing approaches to international security issues is to invite, and then be held hostage by, an unnecessarily limited comprehension of the small arms control topic. The obvious danger accompanying this unduly narrow comprehension of the topic lies in an inadequate identification of the complex, wide-ranging, and dynamic problem-at-hand which is likely, in turn, to lead to the

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development of far-from-perfect solutions. While a postinternationalist analysis of the small arms topic cannot hope to resolve all of the multifarious problems caused by the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms, it could help provide a clearer picture of this complex and dynamic issue and thereby provide a better basis from which to design more comprehensive responses or with which to better compensate for any deficiencies or inadequacies that are evident in current efforts to compose small arms controls. Politics This book has argued that the major efforts to compose small arms controls are underpinned by an internationalist notion of the political. This notion of the political takes as sacrosanct the assumption that governments cooperating together are the preferred means of confronting contemporary security challenges, including those threats posed by the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. As Part II of this book demonstrated, each major effort to compose small arms controls represents a stance taken in relation to this notion of the political: small arms research calls for an internationalist response; instruments of international law enshrine and entrench a version of internationalism; UN Security Council resolutions assert, sometimes forcefully, an internationalism; domestic regulatory regimes embrace internationalism; and civil society campaigns uncritically endorse internationalism. This point is crucial to understanding the reasons why controls over small arms are composed in the ways they are, for internationalism itself predetermines the answer to the vexing question: who decides who should enjoy access to small arms? The answer, which is often presented as a self-evident truth in order to stifle meaningful debate, favours existing sovereign-bound governments, even though modern governments have been responsible for killing more people than other type of political entity in all of recorded human history. Arms control protagonists prefer certain responses to the challenge of composing small arms controls, especially where the response offers an opportunity for them to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the prevailing politico-strategic governance architecture. The five chapters of Part II demonstrate the ways in which particular members of the international small arms community justify, project, embed, and uncritically endorse the prevailing governance architecture of which they are, or seek to be, part. Yet since these preferred responses strengthen the existing governance architecture by either co-opting or excluding nongovernmental actors, the potential membership of the international small arms community—and by extension the unique contributions that potential members could make—is seriously circumscribed. According to the Biting the Bullet Project team, for example, “weapons for development schemes are perhaps more successful in bringing actors together to address weapons collection and security issues than in collecting weapons themselves” (2006, p. 212). As such, the current configuration

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of, and subsequent engagement among, arms control protagonists at best inhibits, or at worse prevents, effective control over small arms. For Karp: It is no exaggeration to say that efforts to deal with the issue would be more aggressive today if the [2001 Small Arms] conference had never taken place. Even worse than the under-whelming final document was the climate of hopelessness it left behind. The whole issue has acquired a bad taste that will take some time to wear off (2002: 178).

Internationalism therefore not only informs and enables some arms control protagonists’ major efforts to compose small arms controls, but also marginalizes and disables the full potential of other arms control protagonists’ efforts. This internationalist notion of the political is shared not only among those arms control protagonists examined in Part II, but also by an interpretive community within mainstream disciplinary international relations. This interpretive community, described simply in Chapter 1 as internationalists, provides analysis and explanations of world affairs that is are once informed and constrained by a particular assumption about human nature and a preference for identifying governments as the primary actors in world affairs. Much of the work produced by these internationalists focuses upon the politico-strategic dimension of world affairs. It therefore tends to illuminate and reflect only some of the key efforts of arms control protagonists; namely, intergovernmental organizations’ instruments of international law, be they treaties or soft law measures, and the UN Security Council’s resolutions. Despite these internationalists’ explanatory power, most of the practitioners actually participating in mainstream disciplinary international relations do not share their assumptions regarding human nature or their preference for analyzing governments within the Westphalian states system. Those interpretive communities existing on the fringes of the disciplinary mainstream also refuse to share those assumptions and analytic preferences. Moreover, not all actors of world affairs embrace the internationalist notion of the political either. As Part III of this book demonstrated, arms traders and weapons users challenge it in various ways. When weapons-producing firms, arms brokers, and authorized firearms users challenge the primacy of internationalism from within the regulated environment of the politico-strategic governance architecture, they demonstrate a form of dissent. When arms traders, criminal groups, and combatants challenge the primacy of internationalism from beyond the enforcement reach of domestic regulatory regimes, they do so as dissidents. Tension among the various stances taken in relation to the internationalist notion of the political therefore erodes the efficacy of small arms controls. The second analytic implication deserving acknowledgement here, then, is that the challenge of composing small arms controls is inextricably linked with the far greater challenge of building a substantive consensus among all actors of world affairs—not merely governments, though governments remain crucially important—around this particular notion of the political. Without a common and

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sustainable consensus regarding the notion of the political, this specific puzzle of world affairs is likely to remain unsolved. Furthermore, without a corresponding reformation of the underlying structures of world affairs and a reconfiguration of the various actors of world politics, the prospects for such a consensus are weak. Again, Karp is not far from the mark when he writes: The UN Small Arms Conference had the misfortune of being conceived in the last light of an era when it seemed possible to redesign international affairs, minimizing the role of squabbling states. By the time the conference convened the climate had changed. Strengthening the state was the order of the day. With their own particular needs foremost in mind, jealous of their prerogatives as states, there was no longer any chance for agreement, least of all within the UN. African governments arrived at the conference bent on keeping weapons out of the hands of rebels. Islamic governments were determined to sustain the flow of support to the Palestinians and Kashmiri Muslims. Delegates from Latin America sought to stymie the flow of guns to rebels and narcotics traffickers. China and Russia just wanted to keep prying eyes out of their own affairs. Meanwhile some European countries and the United States were striving to protect domestic liberties. The search for agreement took the only path left open, accepting the lowest common denominator and adopting diluted recommendations (2002: 187—188).

Given that a substantive (let alone common) consensus surrounding internationalism has not yet been reached and is, in fact, highly unlikely to be reached in the foreseeable future, the prospects for effective small arms control appear dim and these weapons will continue to be widely available and find ongoing use, no doubt with the all-too-familiar lethal consequences. Reaching a common understanding of what precisely constitutes politics is important not only for those seeking to compose small arms controls but also for those engaged with other contemporary security challenges, however these may be defined. As the contrast between Parts II and III illustrates, a series of contests over the notion of the political has both enabled and restrained the challenge of composing small arms controls. This contest is unavoidable and probably without remedy, meaning that the effective control of small arms will remain an intractable and insurmountable challenge for the international community. Furthermore, that contest is also a central dynamic informing contemporary world affairs, warranting further attention from, and consideration by, policymakers. The small arms control topic thus reflects a much deeper ongoing tension in contemporary world affairs, one which could also sustain and sharpen the analytic focus of much research into other important questions of contemporary conflict and international security.

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Security This book has also argued that the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms generate impacts that have serious politico-strategic, politico-economic, and politico-social consequences. While researchers, governments, intergovernmental organizations, the UN Security Council, and civil society organizations have each been prompted into action by an awareness of the grisly and macabre impacts associated with small arms, the international small arms community’s major responses to the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons have so far proven ineffectual as reliable arms controls. In particular, the mosaic of responsibilities comprised of various instruments of international law, UNauthorized arms embargoes, and UN-authorized DDR programs suffers from strategic weaknesses rooted in its conceptual incoherence, inadequate geographic coverage, the limited administrative and enforcement capability of states, and the provision of insufficient resources. In addition to these strategic weaknesses, these international frameworks are unevenly implemented and sporadically enforced by governments. Where these international frameworks are negotiated, implemented, and enforced, they are still subject to sovereign prerogatives, including those of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council that are pursued, on occasion, in blatant disregard of their special responsibilities enshrined in the UN Charter. Moreover, the domestic regulatory regimes fostered under some of those international frameworks have also developed unevenly. The international community does not address the major aspects of the small arms topic—specifically, proliferation, transfer, possession, collection, and deactivation—in a coordinated, comprehensive, and holistic manner. In this context, placing blame on insufficient will and inadequate resources as the prime reason for the international community’s inability to curb these weapons’ availability and use continues to construe the challenge of composing controls over these weapons as a problem to be solved, without paying due regard to the complicity of some of the problem-solvers themselves. As a mode of explanation this line of reasoning, while not necessarily invalid, is highly suspect because it is advanced by, or on behalf of, those whose interests lie in preserving the status quo it serves. Accordingly, this book eschewed those simplistic explanations blaming the existence of insufficient political will and the provision of inadequate resources as prime reasons for the international community’s failure to exert adequate control over these weapons. Rather, the book contended that even if sufficient political will could now be mustered and adequate resources be summoned and effectively marshalled, the international small arms community would not necessarily be in a better position to exert control over small arms, leaving it confronting a challenge that remains intractable and insurmountable. In spite of the maturing relationships among members of the international small arms community and the nascent interconnectivity among their strategies for, and approaches toward, controlling these weapons, these strategic weaknesses and operational constraints enable captains of the small arms industry, arms brokers,

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and a range of weapons users to easily circumvent these emerging controls. In short, there are multiple methods—which can be used separately, successively, or in concert—that authorized arms traders and weapons users, authorizing governments, and unauthorized arms traders and weapons users can employ in order to resist, evade, and elude the emerging controls over the manufacture, transfer, and possession of small arms. Arms traders and weapons users are not the only actors within world affairs contributing to the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms. Governments are also complicit in sustaining the small arms challenge as they exercise their sovereign prerogatives in order to authorize the manufacture, transfer, and possession of these weapons within their respective areas of jurisdiction. Beyond this complicity, some governments are also culpable of breaching either their own domestic legislation regarding small arms or their international obligations and commitments under instruments of international law. Instances of such culpability can be seen in governments authorizing covert transfers of weapons to actors under international arms embargoes, for instance. Such complicity and culpability by governments significantly mitigates the intended effects of controls composed by intergovernmental organizations relying upon governments as the primary means of exerting control over small arms. As this book demonstrated, in addition to this role as arms control protagonists, certain state-makers also figure as significant antagonists of small arms control. State-makers enabling, encouraging, or coercing unauthorised operators in their lethal commerce dissolve the dichotomy drawn between arms control protagonists composing small arms controls and arms control antagonists eroding the efficacy of those controls. A close examination of their illicit activities highlights vulnerabilities, weaknesses and gaps within the mosaic of responsibilities. Thus, the analytical dichotomy used to structure this book—that is, the distinction drawn between the arms control protagonists examined in Part II and the arms control antagonists examined in Part III—is unsustainable and dissolves. This distinction is unstable primarily because the problem-solvers are part of the problem they seek to solve. More problematically for those composing small arms controls however, is a nascent interconnectivity among arms traders and weapons users and those officials administering and enforcing domestic regulatory regimes for small arms. Indeed, when dark networks connect with particular members of the international small arms community not only are the domestic regulatory regimes undermined, but also the dichotomy between arms control protagonists and antagonists is further eroded. Ominous here is the sign portending that the politico-strategic governance architecture actually helps to sustain the challenge of composing small arms controls, revealing that not all members of the international community are equally committed to the various efforts to compose small arms controls. Perhaps most alarming, however, are the best estimates which suggest that, despite the abovementioned efforts of the international small arms community, the global stockpile of small arms increases because, quite simply, the rate of

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proliferation exceeds the combined rate of natural obsolescence and deliberate deactivation. At the same time, advancements in technology render new weapons more lethal, while existing weapons appear to continue to circulate with a high degree of velocity. In any case, given the multiple and ongoing ways in which these emerging small arms controls are frequently circumvented, this assessment holds a high degree of validity, regardless of whether these international frameworks are treated by analysts as autonomous instruments or as a collective mosaic of responsibilities. As the Biting the Bullet Project team warns, “[u]nfortunately, there is no evidence suggesting that the overall scale or impact of the problems of SALW trafficking, proliferation, and misuse have been reduced over the past five years” (2006, p. 265). This brings us to the Conclusion’s third and final analytic implication drawn from the book’s main arguments. In spite of receiving more than a decade of the international small arms community’s attention, small arms continue to evade effective control. Where the problems relating to these weapons have not already manifested in an immediate and urgent lethality, the threat posed by them has not diminished. However, the emerging small arms controls, even if fully implemented, are unlikely to enable the effective control of small arms or, by extension, contribute to the security of the vast majority of the world’s small arms victims. The profoundly inadequate nature of the international frameworks designed by the international small arms community as the primary means of controlling these weapons ought to be of serious concern to anyone involved in international security, including policymakers and analysts alike. Final Reflections Finally, then, small arms have immense resonance on the ground, yet in spite of all the violence, havoc, misery, and insecurity these tools of violence enable, the noisy effects of these weapons are not so easily amplified in the conference halls of diplomats. Although the international community discerns these impacts as a serious issue deserving sustained attention, small arms’ cumulative effects do not currently disturb the core of the existing politico-strategic governance architecture. Unfortunately for the millions of victims of these weapons, these grisly and macabre consequences so far appear sustainable for those who, wielding power within contemporary world affairs, occupy the best positions from which to confront this challenge. These weapons elude the international small arms community’s control not merely because the varying impacts generated by small arms have not yet reached a magnitude sufficient to radically reform the ordering of contemporary world affairs in the way that, say, a potential nuclear showdown between the US and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Control of these weapons proves elusive primarily because the current control strategies rely upon an exclusive politicostrategic governance architecture and are underpinned by an internationalist notion

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of the political that is hotly contested by a range of international actors. From a critical perspective, the challenge of composing small arms controls is not so much an international security problem in search of a solution, as it is an opportunity for members of the international community to further strengthen, and extend the reach of, the governance architecture sustaining and enhancing their roles in world affairs. This book demonstrates that imposing effective control over small arms therefore poses an intractable and insurmountable challenge to the international community as it is currently configured. Accordingly, simplistic explanations blaming the existence of insufficient political will and the provision of inadequate resources as prime reasons for the international small arms community’s failure to exert adequate control over these weapons—which continue to be widely available throughout the world, experiencing frequent and ongoing use with devastating and disturbing consequences—ought to be eschewed. In its place, this book offers an insightful, compelling, and sustained postinternationalist critique of small arms control as a crucial issue in contemporary world affairs, revealing that the problemsolvers themselves are deeply implicated in the actual problem they claim to be addressing on behalf of humanity.

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Index

Afghanistan 3, 57, 68–9, 136, 191, 233, 244 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 64, 167, 243 Taliban, the 144, 214 African Union (AU) 17, 31, 119, 132 Windhoek Position 113 Albania 162, 235 Algeria 178 American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AMACAS) 78, 86 Amnesty International 173, 179, 190 Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (Andean Plan) 116, 118–23, 229 Angola 104, 132 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 71, 130, 139, 214–15, 219, 243 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 139 Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA (Fowler Report) 143, 145, 205, 211 United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) 140 United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) 166 United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) 141 Ant trade 237 Anti-personnel landmines 4, 88, 196 Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty) 53, 80, 176–80

Arias Sánchez, O. 5, 79 Nobel Prize Laureates’ International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers (Laureates’ Code) 178–9 Arms brokers 10, 34, 55, 118, 152, 156, 205–8, 212–14, 220, 222 Cummings, S. 211 Arms Trade Treaty 179–80 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 17, 31, 91, 93 Authority 35 Crisis of 35–7, 65, 107, 155, 165, 169, 207, 212, 214, 221, 231, 241–2, 250 Sources of 28 Bamako Declaration see Organization of African Unity (OAU) Bifurcated system 32–42, 191, 207, 223, 250 Sovereign-bound actors 33, 42, 106, 118, 123, 132, 156, 159, 165, 238 Sovereign-free actors 33, 106, 118, 123, 132, 143, 156, 159, 165, 175, 188, 195, 224, 235, 241, 247 Black market 55, 81, 92, 209, 216–17, 221, 246 Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) 94, 189 Brazil 67–8, 122, 175 Brahimi Report see United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Bretton Woods institutions 12–13, 42, 250, see also Politico-strategic governance architecture Bulgaria 143, 162 Burkino Faso 143, 224 Campaore, B. 222 Burundi 5, 71, 232, 246

Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control

282

United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) 105, 141, 166, 243 Cambodia 141, 143, 175 Cameroon 211, 230 Capie, D. 91–4 Caribbean Community 17 Central African Republic 240 United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) 138–9, 141 Chad 211 Child Soldiers 70–2, 117, 130 China north Industries Corporation (NORINCO), see Peoples’ Republic of China Cold War 28, 32, 115, 128, 142, 204, 206 Aftermath of 1, 7, 13, 15, 29, 64, 68–9, 114, 129, 131, 246 Collective security 12–13, 15, 19, 163, 238 Collectivities 34–5, 177 Colombia 82–3, 220 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 90 Colt Manufacturing Company, see United States of America Conflict diamonds 65, 130, 141, 160, 219–220, 222, 224 Kimberley Process 219 Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) 177 Côte d’Ivoire 141, 170 Criminalization 62, 106, 151, 164–5, 169 Critical social movements 37, 196 Cyberspace 32, 94, 98 Information and communication technologies 34, 94, 98, 161, 177, 207 Internet 32, 94, 174 Dark networks 224–5, 240–242, 247, 258 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 105, 110, 121, 132, 141 United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) 141, 244 East Timor 69–70

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 115, 132, 161 Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa (ECOWAS Moratorium) 85, 115, 118–23, 156, 180, 183, 236 El Salvador 64, 66 United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 138 End-user certificates 152, 209, 215, 220, 222, 240 Enlightenment Project 45–6, 253 Ethiopia and Eritrea 105, 136 European Union 10, 31, 114, 132–3 European Union’s Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms (EU Programme) 85, 114 European Union’s Code of Conduct for Arms Exports (EU Code of Conduct) 85, 114, 116, 118–23, 179–81, 229, 236 EU Joint Action on Small Arms 114, 119–120 Federation of American Scientists (FAS) 79, 86 Fiji 62–3, 69, 114, 237 Former Republic of Yugoslavia 114, 134, 161, 163, 210 Bosnia and Herzegovina 114, 133 Kosovo 68, 136, 212, 242 Fowler Report see Angola France 130, 135, 143, 162, 181, 219 Georgia 62 Ghana 54, 115, 203 Globalization 28, 37, 58, 204, 206–7, 221 Global Week of Action Against Small Arms 175 Governance Global 10, 41, 47, 196–7 Subsystem of 28, 106, 133 Grey markets 10, 55, 81, 92, 209, 223 Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 71 Gun Free Zones 153, 175

Index

Haiti 141, 243 Honiara Initiative see Pacific Island Forum (PIF) Human Rights 151 Human Rights Law 7 Human Rights Watch 173, 190 Violations of, 56, 59, 63, 92, 107, 110, 114, 116, 178, 205, 232 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 163 Human Security 7, 70, 230 India 122, 130, 176 Individuals 34, 47, 67, 114 Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 94, 156, 180 International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) 5, 21, 31, 47, 156, 223, see Chapter 7 International Alert 9, 192–3 International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) 6, 31, 70, 120 International Community 3, 15–16, 116 International small arms community 4–6, 16–17, 57–9, 94, 96, 109, 121, 143, 174, 182, 186, 191, 229, 250, 254 International Court of Justice 110 International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) 106, 119–120, 158 International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 7, 66, 179 Violations of 64, 116 Internationalism 14–18, 86, 107, 133, 156, 159, 162, 186–8, 195–8, 233, 250, 254–6 Dissent from 17, 212, 216, 236, 238 Dissident of 17, 217, 221, 241, 245, 247 Interpol see International Criminal Police Organization Interpretive communities 19, 38–44, 47 Iraq 3, 80, 114, 116, 129, 135, 162, 163, 230, 235, 243 Israel 122, 129, 162 Kashmir 82

283

Korean War 137 Landmines, see Anti-personnel landmines Laurance, E. 5, 34, 98, 177 Laureates’ Code see Arias Sánchez, O. League of Arab States 17 League of Nations 12, 14 Lebanon 217 Hezbollah 241 Liberia 132, 136, 162, 224 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 4, 141, 166–70, 243–4 Taylor, C. 144, 218–19, 222 Malawi 240 Mali 244, 246 Konaré, A.O. 87, 180 Mass shootings Columbine High School, Colorado 67 Dunblane, Scotland 67 Port Arthur, Tasmania 67, 176 Mercenaries 65, 229, 240 Mexico 130 Mozambique 104 Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) 166 Operation Rachel 158 United Nations Mission to Mozambique (ONUMOZ) 140, 167–9, 170, 242 Myanmar 133 Nadi Framework see Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Protocol) 102, 104–111, 118–119, 132, 236 Namibia 104 National Rifle Association (NRA) 103–4, 182–4, 189, 197 Netherlands 154, 176 New Zealand 8, 66, 91, 154, 176 Nicaragua 242 Iran-Contra affair 206 Nigeria 115, 130

284

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Norm entrepreneur 9, 34 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 211 Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) 180 OAS Convention see Organization of American States (OAS) Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 58, 218 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 114 OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons 114, 116, 118–23, 236 OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition 114 OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers 114 Organization of African Unity (OAU) 112–113 African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons 113 Bamako Declaration 112–113, 180 Organization of American States (OAS) 102–3, 197 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials (OAS Convention) 85, 89, 102, 105–111, 116, 119, 183, 229, 236 Organized criminal groups 54, 104, 140, 169, 223, 230, 232, 241 Ottawa Treaty see Anti-personnel landmines OXFAM 173, 179 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 113 Agreement in Principle on Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosive, and Other Related Material (Honiara Initiative) 113

Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control Measures (Nadi Framework) 113, 118, 122, 229 Papua New Guinea (PNG) 63–5, 67–9, 92, 222, 234, 239 Bougainville 114 Sandline International 65 Parameters of interaction 34–6, 80, 252 Orientation or skills 34, 221, 231, 250 Relational 35, 93, 98, 156 Structural 34–5, 106, 181 Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) 54, 56, 92, 122, 130, 133, 162, 176, 178, 180, 214, 219 China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) 203 Philippines 130, 223 Politico-dimensions 19, 207 Politico-economic 39, 41–2, 65–6 Politico-strategic 38–41, 62–5 Politico-social 39, 42–3, 66–72 Politico-strategic governance architecture 12–14, 16, 86, 89, 96, 107, 118–119, 131, 133, 159, 160, 162, 165, 171–2, 191, 195, 216, 246, 250–251, 258 Private security firms 69, 153, 228, 230, 234–5 Problem-solving 11, 18–19, 22, 84, 87–90, 92–4, 95, 156, 172, 195, 238, 257–8 Reason 45, 253 Red Books 9, 192–5 Refugees 2, 70 Research Initiative on Small Arms (RISA) 98 Rosenau, J. 27–8, 44–7 Russian Federation 56, 130, 135, 152, 176, 180, 230 Rwanda 132, 143, 162, 210, 222 Genocide 7, 59, 70, 135 United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR) 105, 138, 141, 212–213

Index SADC Firearms Protocol see Southern African Development Community (SADC) SaferAfrica 105, 116, 175 Saferworld 10, 105, 175, 180–181, 190, 193 Sanction regimes Analytic Support and Sanction Monitoring Team 144 Bonn-Berlin Process 190 Interlaken Process 190 Sanction Assistance Missions (SAMs) 161 sanction busters 16, 144–5, 161–2, 214–16 sanction committees 131, 143–4, 189, 205 Stockholm Process 190–191 Security Agenda 8, 15, 78–80, 85, 87, 89–90, 93, 112, 187, 197, 252 Senegal 115 Seychelles 122 Sierra Leone 132, 141, 224, 244 Executive Outcomes 65 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 64, 242 Sankoh, F. 65, 222 Skills revolution 28, 32, 34, 98 Small Arms, definition of, 1, 52–3, 136, 140 Small Arms Survey 10, 22, 70, 94–6, 157 Solomon Islands 62, 66, 70, 114, 245 Somalia 105, 122, 132, 141, 162, 168, 213–15 South Africa 104, 122, 129, 162, 240 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 104, 111 Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition, and other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community Region (SADC Firearms Protocol) 102, 104–11, 118, 229, 236 Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) 107, 192 Sovereignty 33–4, 41 Soviet Union 29, 81, 204–5, 211 Spoilers 169–170

285

Sri Lanka 62 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 94, 190 Subgroupism 37 Sudan 105, 132, 143 Darfur 68, 243 Super-empowered individuals 17, 32, 86, 252 Tajikistan United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) 140, 167 Terrorism 2, 116, 130 Al-Qaida 132, 144, 214, 219 Togo 143 Transformation 28–9, 35, 130, 231 Turbulence 36–8, 130, 142, 171, 191, 195, 207, 242, 245, 250 Uganda 105 United Kingdom (UK) 130, 135, 161, 162, 175 Department of International Development 105 United Nations Charter 12–13, 128, 133, 257 Article 51 13, 107, 120, 232, 236 Article 43 13 Chapter VII 132, 136, 137 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 5, 167 United Nations Commission for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 103 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCATOC) 103, 197 United Nations Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (UN Firearms Protocol) 7, 88, 102, 103–11, 119, 132, 181, 183, 229, 236 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 5, 139, 155, 157, 165, 171 United Nations General Assembly 8, 31, 87–8, 103, 117, 179

286

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United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms 87 1999 Report of the, 87, 89–90, 93–4 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNDIR) 5, 9 United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 5 United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms 52 1997 Report of the, 52–3, 87–9, 93–4, 117, 136, 237 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 2 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 20–21, 138, 166–7, 242 Report of the Panel of Experts on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) 145 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) 84, 179 United Nations Secretaries-General 32, 137 Annan, Kofi 4–5, 87–8, 123–4, 140, 145, 164 Ban, K. 180 Boutros-Ghali, B. 5, 86–7 Hammarskjold, D. 137 United Nations Security Council see Chapter 5 Power of veto 16, 128–130, 135, 142, 162 United Nations Small Arms Conference 5, 89, 95, 117, 120, 122, 178, 180, 184, 186–8, 197, 255–6 Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (BMS) 7, 121, 188–9, 193 International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (UN Tracing Instrument) 117–18 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradi-

cate the Illicit Trade In Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UNPoA) 5, 9, 89, 91, 93, 95, 112–13, 116, 117–23, 150, 157–8, 179, 181–3, 185–6, 192–4, 236 United Nations Small Arms Review Conference 8, 11, 121–2, 193 United States of America (US) 54, 56, 80–82, 85, 90, 92, 103, 110, 121, 129–130, 135, 152, 176, 180, 182–4, 204, 219, 237 Colt Manufacturing Company 203, 217 UN Tracing Instrument see United Nations Small Arms Conference Universal Declaration of Human Rights see Human Rights War Criminals 170, 212 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement) 54, 116–23, 229, 236 Weapons of Mass Destruction 1–2, 78, 86, 116 Westphalian system of states 20, 29, 36, 41, 62, 65, 242, 247, 252 Williams, J. 4, 176 Wilson, W. 14 World Bank, 42, 157, 166, see also Bretton Woods institutions World Customs Organization (WCO) 106, 120 World Forum on the Future of Sports Shooting Activities (WFSA) 184, 208 World Trade Organization (WTO) 12, 196, see also Politico-strategic governance architecture Yakuza 241 Yemen 136, 209, 213 Zaire 143 Zambia 239 Zimbabwe 133