Philosophy, Science and Divine Action
Philosophical Studies in Science and Religion Edited by
F. LeRon Shults, Unive...
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Philosophy, Science and Divine Action
Philosophical Studies in Science and Religion Edited by
F. LeRon Shults, University of Agder
VOLUME 1
Philosophy, Science and Divine Action Edited by
F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy and Robert John Russell
LEIDEN • BOSTON 2009
This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Philosophy, science, and divine action / edited by F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy, and Robert John Russell. p. cm. — (Philosophical studies in science and religion, ISSN 1877-8542 ; v. 1) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-17787-1 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Providence and government of God—Christianity. 2. Philosophy and religion. 3. Christianity—Philosophy. 4. Philosophical theology. 5. Religion and science. I. Shults, F. LeRon. II. Murphy, Nancey C. III. Russell, Robert J. BT135.P45 2009 231.7—dc22 2009026641
ISSN 1877-8542 ISBN 978 90 04 17787 1 Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands
CONTENTS
A Philosophical Introduction to “Divine Action” ........................ F. LeRon Shults
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Chapter One Five Models of God and Evolution ..................... Ian G. Barbour
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Chapter Two The Sound of Sheer Silence: How does God Communicate with Humanity? .......................................... Arthur Peacocke Chapter Three The Metaphysics of Divine Action .................... John Polkinghorne Chapter Four Describing God’s Action in the World in Light of Scientific Knowledge of Reality .................................. William R. Stoeger Chapter Five Evaluating the Teleological Argument for Divine Action Wesley J. Wildman ......................................................................... Chapter Six Constraint and Freedom in the Movement from Quantum Physics to Theology .......................................... Philip Clayton Chapter Seven Creation, Providence and Quantum Chance ..... Thomas F. Tracy
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Chapter Eight Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan’s Ass and Schrödinger’s Cat .......................................... Nancey Murphy
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Chapter Nine Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action: The Nexus of Interaction .............................................................. George F.R. Ellis
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contents
Chapter Ten Divine Action and Quantum Mechanics: A Fresh Assessment .......................................................................... Robert John Russell
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Appendix: Overview of the CTNS/VO Series .............................. About the Authors ............................................................................. Index ....................................................................................................
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A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO “DIVINE ACTION” F. LeRon Shults
The slow process of the European construction of the spheres of “science” and “religion” and the hardening of the boundaries between them during the 17th and 18th centuries created an intellectual milieu in which traditional Christian ways of interpreting “religious” experience in the world increasingly came into competition with new “scientific” explanations of the world. The idea of divine action was relatively unproblematic and generally presupposed within Western medieval cosmology, with its philosophical mixture of Neo-platonic active principles and Aristotelian final causes, both of which were ultimately grounded in the divine (the Form of the Good, the Unmoved Mover). However, as early modern science (especially classical mechanics) progressively filled the gaps in human knowledge about natural causes within a mechanical universe, the necessity (and plausibility) of appealing to divine causation gradually diminished. The rise of deism and protest atheism in the 18th and 19th centuries was partially in response to the growing philosophical challenges to the coherence of the notion of divine action, and its alleged incompatibility with human freedom and natural evil. All of this is well known. But where does the discussion stand in light of contemporary science and philosophy?
Philosophy, Science, and Divine Action In our late modern philosophical context might there be new ways to make sense of the claim that God can act in or interact with the world? Many scholars still find such questions irrelevant (at best) and dangerous (at worst). Some scientists believe that discourse about events in the natural world ought to exclude references to theological hypotheses. Some theologians believe that discourse about the supernatural events of divine revelation ought to be insulated from scientific hypotheses. The voices at these polar extremes are often the loudest. In the last few decades, however, a growing number of scholars have been exploring
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new ways of constructing a discourse that teases the boundaries of these academic disciplines in order to pursue more holistic and integrated interpretations of human life in the cosmos. One exemplar of such interdisciplinary exploration that stands out for its scholarly breadth and depth is the Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (SPDA) project, co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory (VO) and the Center for Theology and Natural Science (CTNS). This multiyear collaboration involved over 50 authors meeting at five international conferences, resulting in as many volumes: Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature (1993), Chaos and Complexity (1997), Evolutionary and Molecular Biology (1998), Neuroscience and the Person (1999) and Quantum Mechanics (2001). Each volume carried the subtitle: “scientific perspectives on divine action.” The historical background, bibliographic details, unique interdisciplinary process and impact of the project and the series are described by Robert John Russell in the Appendix (below). This allows me to focus my attention in this Introduction on some general observations about the function(s) of philosophy within the SPDA project, which is the main rationale for showcasing these ten essays in the current book. The 91 essays in the five volumes of the CTNS/VO series could be classified and analyzed in a number of ways. For example, we could group them theologically, exploring ways in which particular themes such as the doctrine of God, creation or anthropology are treated across the volumes. Or we could examine the role played by developments or debates within specific scientific disciplines, such as physics, evolutionary biology or neuroscience. Such mining of the resources within these volumes has already begun in the capstone volume to the project, Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action: 20 Years of Challenge and Progress (CTNS/VO, 2008). Our task here, however, is to provide a more general overview of the major philosophical themes and developments that played a more or less explicit role in the SPDA project. The volumes in the series offer analysis of specific philosophical concepts within both science and theology (such as space, time, matter and causality), as well as engagement with broader philosophical systems that aim to incorporate both science and theology, such as neo-Thomism and process philosophy. As Russell notes in his overview of the series in the capstone volume: “The overarching goal was to engage theology, philosophy, and natural science in a process of constructive dialogue and creative mutual interaction.” He observes that 30 of the 91 essays in the series explicitly
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treated philosophical issues. I think it is also fair to say that all of the essays involve philosophical engagement at least implicitly, insofar as they utilize philosophical categories and attempt to contribute to our understanding of topics that have a long history of philosophical disputation. The chapters in the current volume were selected for inclusion first and foremost because they demonstrate the value of explicitly attending to the philosophical issues that shape the dialogue between science and Christian theology about the idea of divine action in the world. Below I will provide a brief preview of each of these chapters. First, however, I want to back up and briefly outline three of the classical themes in philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics) and three of the shifts in philosophical categories in late modernity (relation, kinesis, and difference), to which we can then make reference as we preview the chapters.
Classical Philosophical Themes and Late Modern Trajectories Many of the particular issues within the complex history of the development of philosophy that are relevant for understanding the role of the idea of divine action in the contemporary dialogue between scientists and Christian theologians are outlined and analyzed in the context of the ten essays that comprise this book. For the purposes of this Introduction, therefore, it suffices to note three of the general areas into which philosophical discourse is often divided: metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. While treatments of these themes are clearly interconnected, for the sake of analysis we can distinguish between the kinds of questions that typically exercise philosophers: What is real? What is true? What is good? Broadly speaking, we are dealing here with the conditions for the human experience of being, knowing and acting in the world. Scientists and theologians operate, more or less self-consciously, within and across these spheres of discourse. One of the main goals of this book is highlighting the way in which philosophical themes and categories function within the dialogue among the disciplines. Like just about everything in philosophy, the meaning of the term metaphysics is highly contested. In general it has to do with discourse about “being,” about the nature and structure of reality. Presuppositions about “that which is” inevitably impact both scientific and theological argumentation. One’s assumptions about the order of the world
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(cosmo-logy) constrain one’s options for thinking about the relation of the divine to (or in) that world. On the other hand, theological ideas about the nature of God (or ultimate reality) shape one’s interpretations of experience within the cosmos. Moreover, concepts such as causality may prima facie appear to be simply neutral scientific notions, but they are wrapped up within broader (or deeper) metaphysical notions about the order of things and their intelligibility. This is perhaps most easily seen in the function of concepts such as space and time. The shift from a Newtonian to an Einsteinian understanding and use of these concepts was clearly of metaphysical import; the idea of “matter” itself was reconstructed in a new vision of the dynamic structure of reality. Such issues cannot be divorced from epistemology. How do (or can) we know what we (think we) know about reality? After the demise of classical foundationalism and the rise of post-positivist philosophy of science, we have become acutely aware of the limits of human knowing. In the most popular interpretations of quantum theory, and in some interpretations of chaos theory, particular kinds of processes and events are viewed as unpredictable in principle, which leads many physicists to acknowledge an intrinsic limit to scientific knowledge. Awareness of the limitations of human knowing is intensified in theological discourse, which is distinguished by its attentiveness to the human experience of being-limited, and the ultimate boundary conditions that ground this experience. In neither discipline does the rejection of apodictic knowledge of the object of inquiry entail the denial of any knowledge of (or valuable engagement with) reality. As a middle way between naïve realism and anti-realism, we find an increasing number of scholars, including several included in this volume, embracing some form of “critically realist” epistemology. If ethics has to do with “acting” then we might expect an interdisciplinary project on divine action to have special bearing on this arena of philosophical discourse. As we will see in the preview below, most of the philosophical energy of the project was devoted to issues of metaphysics and epistemology. However, it will also become clear that questions about morality (divine or human) are almost always in the background and quite often in the foreground in these discussions. This is particularly evident in the significant attention given in the project to two specific philosophical issues: theodicy and freedom. First, there was widespread agreement among the participants that any postulate of “special” divine action in the world exacerbates the theodicy problem. In fact, this is a primary reason that the next series
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sponsored by CTNS/VO is focusing on the issue of natural evil.1 Second, if events in the world (including human actions) are completely (or even partially) determined by God (or the laws of nature), then in what sense can we speak plausibly of human freedom and responsibility? Clearly metaphysical (and epistemological) claims about the relation between necessity and chance in the world are relevant for moral discourse as well. Attending to these three general areas of philosophical discourse provides a synchronic overview of some of the most significant issues in the SPDA project. But we can also see the influence of philosophy if we think diachronically, pointing out historical shifts in the meaning and use of key categories. For most of its history Christian theology has been couched in the categories of Platonism and/or Aristotelianism, and has shared the resistance of both of these ancient philosophical schools to Stoicism. Many early modern scientific developments, however, were motivated by renaissance retrievals of aspects of Stoic philosophy, including some of its atomistic and deterministic elements. This contributed to an intellectual milieu that increasingly challenged Platonic-Aristotelian categories, as well as the Christian doctrinal formulations that relied heavily upon them. Our purpose here is not to recount the difficulties this caused for early modern theologians but to point out three specific categorical shifts in late modern philosophy that have shaped the conceptual space within the dialogue now occurs: the growing preference for relation, kinesis and difference over substance, stasis and sameness. Whence and whither these philosophical trajectories? In Plato’s Sophist the “visitor” convinces Theaetetus that there are five general kinds (genōn): “that which is” or “being” (to on) “rest,” (stasis) “change” (kinesis) “the same” (tauton) and “the different” (heteron). For the most part traditional Western philosophy (as well as science and theology) has followed Plato in starting with the category of being, which has to do with the essence or substance (ousia) of things, as distinct from their relations (or accidental attributes). Plato also tended to value rest over change (or motion) and sameness over difference, tendencies that were hardened in Neo-platonism and registered a profound effect on
1 Nancey Murphy, Robert John Russell and William R. Stoeger, S.J., eds, Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, vol. I (Berkeley: CTNS/VO, 2007).
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Western thought. Although Aristotle challenged Plato’s division between the realm of (unchanging) Forms and the realm of (changing) matter, he still—perhaps even more than Plato—valorized substance (ousia) over relation, rest over movement, and the same over the different. For both of these philosophers the categories of being, rest and identity were dominant in their metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In late modern philosophy, however, one can trace a growing dissatisfaction with this dominance and a struggle to reverse (or at least balance) these tendencies through an emphasis on the philosophical significance of the categories of relationality, dynamism and difference. These trajectories have been motivated by scientific and theological as well as philosophical concerns. In the turn from substance to relationality, Immanuel Kant played an important role, explicitly reversing Aristotle in his first critique by making “substance and accidents” a sub-category “of Relation.” The shift is also evident in physics: from the Cartesian-Newtonian concept of material substances to post-Einsteinian concepts of relativity and field theories. Although they are not included in this volume, several theologians who participated in the SPDA project (e.g., Moltmann, Edwards) also illustrate this trajectory, articulating ideas of God that begin not with abstract notions of unitary substance, but with robustly relational (trinitarian) categories. We can also see a late modern trajectory toward a metaphysical privileging of kinesis (or motion) over stasis (or rest). This is connected to the question of the relation between being and becoming, classically illustrated in the extremes of Parmenides and Heraclitus, whom Plato tried to balance. In his theory of the two realms, however, the temporal movement of material things is not the Ideal; for Plato true knowledge is contemplation of the (static) Forms. Newton’s laws of inertia also presupposed a privileged realm of stasis—the unchanging three-dimensional structure of Absolute Space. Here too Einstein is the easy comparison. The shift from F=ma to E=mc2 represents a new awareness that dynamic energy—kinesis—is an essential and generative feature of the cosmos. According to Einstein (contra Newton), mass, the inertial property of matter by which bodies resist change of motion, should be identified with the energy of that motion. Developments in the fields of quantum mechanics and chaos theory have also confirmed and intensified this philosophical valuation of the dynamic over the static. This has led to non-deterministic and non-linear conceptions of temporality and causality as well, which many believe can open up new ways to imagine the “action” of God in relation to the world.
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One can also trace a third late modern philosophical trajectory in which alterity (as opposed to identity) is increasingly embraced as a key generative category. Here we can point, for example, to Emmanuel Levinas’ emphasis on the primordial relation to the other, which always resists the imperialism of the same, to Jacques Derrida’s notion of differánce and his broader project of deconstruction, to Gilles Deleuze’s portrayal of the arrival of the Disparate as the force that generates intensities of difference, and to Paul Ricoeur’s reflections on the ipseity of the self as it emerges in relations to others. Each of these thinkers (and others) has been influenced in various ways by Kierkegaard and Heidegger, both of whom privileged the category of difference in their philosophical speculations and psychological analyses of human relationships. Already in the late 17th century attention to difference began to transform the field of mathematics, leading to a shift from a substantial to a functional (relational) concept of “number.” This contributed to the emergence of differential calculus, which had a profound influence on physics and related sciences. However, the philosophical turn to alterity (or difference) has not (yet) played as significant a role in the science and theology dialogue.
A Philosophical Preview The essays included in this volume are exemplary in several ways. They are all examples of state-of-the-art contributions to the debate over divine action among scientists and Christian theologians. They also represent the work of some of the most active participants in the SPDA project, and the broader international theology and science dialogue. Mostly importantly for the purposes of this book, they illustrate the care with which and depth to which the project attended to the role of philosophy in this dialogue. The following preview does not attempt to summarize the complex arguments of each essay; rather, it alerts the reader to some of the key philosophical concerns and concepts that are relevant for understanding and assessing the ongoing discussion. The first three chapters included here were written by the three scholars who are widely acknowledged to be the leading figures of the contemporary resurgent interest in international dialogue among scientists and Christian theologians, which picked up momentum in the 1970s and has grown consistently to the present: Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne. The fourth chapter is by William
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R. Stoeger, S.J, one of the foremost Roman Catholic participants in and sponsors of the SPDA project. Wesley Wildman’s contribution in the fifth chapter represents an important (but minority) voice within the project, a voice that challenges the idea of divine agency itself. The remaining five chapters all deal with the more specific question of special divine action in relation to quantum theory. It makes sense for the bulk of the book to focus on this theme, because the desire to construct a plausible model of “special” (or “objective”) divine action was shared by the majority of participants, and engaging theories of quantum phenomena was an important part of the majority of such attempts. As we will see this holds for our last five authors as well: Philip Clayton, Thomas Tracy, Nancey Murphy, George Ellis and Robert Russell. This volume begins with a chapter by Ian Barbour, whose influential taxonomy of “Ways of Relating Science and Theology” first appeared in the precursor volume to the SPDA series, and was later developed in more detail in several places.2 The essay that is included here is the second of Barbour’s contributions to the project: “Five Models of God and Evolution.” Because theologians cannot avoid using philosophical categories in the systematic elaboration of ideas, Barbour commends the explicit and integrative use of philosophy in the engagement between science and theology. In this context Barbour himself illustrates this in two ways. First, he explicitly demonstrates the way in which four particular philosophical issues in contemporary biology (self-organization, indeterminacy, top-down causality, and communication of information) play a role in various models of divine action in an evolving world. Second, Barbour attempts to show the illuminative power of process philosophy, especially the categories developed by Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. He argues that this philosophical system is able both to integrate the valuable insights of the other views and to move beyond them by better accounting for the human experience of interiority and novelty. This engagement with process philosophy, which explicitly challenges substance-accident dualism and begins with relational and dynamic categories, also illustrates the way in which the first two late modern trajectories (outlined above) have impacted the science and religion dialogue. 2
Barbour, ”Ways of Relating Science and Theology,” in Russell, et al., eds., Physics, Philosophy and Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding (Vatican Observatory, 1988), 21–48. The four ways are conflict, independence, dialogue and integration. Cf. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (New York: HarperOne, 1990).
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Arthur Peacocke introduces his essay with a reference to the ancient Israelite prophet Elijah, who experienced the “sound of sheer silence” in his encounter with “the Lord” (1 Kings 19). This story illustrates the way in which the idea of divine action in general, and “personal communication” in particular, play such an important role in interpretations of religious experience, especially in the Abrahamic traditions. Peacocke wants to maintain this intuition, but to articulate it in such a way that makes sense in light of contemporary science. He argues that the most adequate way (philosophically) to account for 20th century discoveries in sciences such as physics and biology is “emergentist monism,” which provides a model of whole-part causation that challenges the ontological dualism and epistemological reductionism of much early modern philosophy. Peacocke challenges interventionist conceptions of the God-world relation, which often presuppose a dualism between immaterial and material “substance,” and offers a “panentheistic” model in which the world is in some sense “in God.” Here too we see the influence of the philosophical privileging of relationality and becoming on the dialogue between science and religion. Like most of the other participants in the project, Peacocke recognizes that his proposal does not solve the “intractable” problem of evil, but he believes it does mitigate the conceptual problem of plausibly imaging the possibility of (personal and moral) divine action in the world.3 John Polkinghorne should also be counted as part of the trio of leading figures who have most significantly contributed to the contemporary resurgence of the dialogue between Christian theology and science. Although the title of his contribution included here is “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” he makes it clear early in the essay that questions about being cannot be divorced from questions about knowing. Polkinghorne favors a version of “critical realism” whose motto is “epistemology models ontology.” Like most physicists, he accepts the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum phenomena, which argues that the indeterminacy displayed in sub-atomic particle experiments is not a result only of the epistemological limits of human observers, but an indication of real openness in the natural world. Unlike many other participants in the series, however, Polkinghorne wants to expand this
3 Peacocke’s engages these and other philosophical issues (including the epistemological implications of critical realism) in more detail in Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural, Divine and Human (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993).
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openness to chaos theory, which deals with macrophysical objects and events. In the context of this particular essay, Polkinghorne focuses on ways in which metaphysical assumptions about the nature of time and epistemological assumptions about the knowability of the future shape our conceptions of divine action in (and divine knowledge of ) the world. The main point for our purposes here is that he too illustrates the importance of explicitly attending to the philosophical mediation of the dialogue between science and religion.4 William Stoeger, S.J., was one of the leading organizers of the SPDA project (representing the Vatican Observatory) and the most active Roman Catholic contributor to the book series. In the essay included here, Stoeger argues that the distinction between primary and secondary causality, which was developed by Thomas Aquinas in his adaptation of Aristotelian metaphysics, provides us with a useful philosophical tool for clarifying the nature of divine action. Variations of this approach, which are often classified as “neo-Thomistic,” comprise one of the most significant and widely shared strategies among contemporary Roman Catholic theologians in the science and religion dialogue. Stoeger suggests that these philosophical categories are “more adequate to both the scientific and the theological data, and lead to fewer difficulties in explicating the essential differences between God and his/her creation, and the ideas of divine immanence and transcendence.” For the purposes of the current volume, this essay provides a clear example of an attempt to maintain and refigure a medieval set of categories in dialogue with contemporary scientific discoveries such as information theory and top-down causality. Wesley Wildman’s essay addresses one of the key issues that has dominated the traditional dialogue between science and theology: the role of “teleology” in arguments for divine action. Most medieval and early modern Christian interpretations of God’s creative and providential relation to the world appropriated (to some extent) the Aristotelian notion of “final” causality. This way of making sense of the apparent purposiveness in nature was increasingly eclipsed by the emphasis in classical mechanics on “efficient” causality. Wildman demonstrates how the problem of linking teleology and divine action was further complicated not only by developments in evolutionary and molecular
4 For an overview of Polkinghorne’s approach to the dialogue, cf. his Belief in God in an Age of Science (New Haven: Yale, 2003).
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biology, but also by the fundamental metaphysical ambiguity that characterizes philosophical discourse. Based on his analysis of the notion of “having an end” throughout the philosophical tradition, Wildman offers several schemata for making sense of this complex conceptual debate. For example, he distinguishes between four types of teleological views in biology, outlines three stages that must be included in any teleological argument for divine action, and delineates the way in which six modes of divine action can be correlated with “teleological loci” in nature. Wildman’s essay illustrates both the material significance of metaphysical questions and the methodological value of philosophical distinctions in the ongoing debate. He also represents the inclusion within the project of a minority position among Christian theologians in the dialogue. In light of the problem of evil and other conceptual issues, Wildman is willing to give up the idea that God acts (intentionally, or in a way analogous to human agency) in the world, and prefers to speak of God (or ultimate reality) as the ground of being.5 The remaining five chapters explicitly try to maintain the idea of intentional or “special” divine action in the world, and do so in a variety of ways, all of which heavily engage quantum theory. We begin with an essay by Philip Clayton: “Tracing the Lines: Constraint and Freedom in the Movement from Quantum Physics to Theology.” Like most of the other contributors to this volume, Clayton argues that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum indeterminacy opens up new possibilities for making sense of divine action. However, he emphasizes the importance of balancing metaphysical courage with epistemic humility as we explore these possibilities. Clayton suggests that instead of thinking of physics and metaphysics in dichotomous terms, we should imagine them as falling at different points on a continuum of abstraction. Questions about divine action require us to move further along the continuum toward abstraction, but should nevertheless be connected to (and in some sense constrained by) questions about the concrete nature of the physical world. On the other hand, Clayton also acknowledges the insight of post-positivist philosophy of science that metaphysical decisions are not simply determined by the data of physical theories. Like Peacocke and others, Clayton commends a panentheistic metaphysics as
5 In his contribution to the capstone volume, Wildman makes this argument more extensively in the context of his classification of the project’s participants. Cf. Wildman, “The Divine Action Project,” Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 176.
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offering the best current option for tracing the lines between quantum physics and theology.6 In his essay “Creation, Providence and Quantum Chance,” Thomas Tracy also (like William Stoeger) utilizes the philosophical distinction between primary and secondary causality. On the one hand, God primarily and directly causes the (continual) existence of all finite things. On the other hand, God can also act through “secondary” causes, producing results indirectly through the operation of finite things. Tracy suggests that quantum theory has led to a philosophical challenge to exceptionless causal determinism, long accepted by scientists and theologians, which opens up a new way to think of God’s special (and objective) action in the world. The kind of divine action in history that is central for the faith of the Abrahamic religions, argues Tracy, requires that there be gaps (of the right sort) in the causal structures of nature. These gaps appear to him to be provided in the indeterminacy of quantum events. For Tracy, such gaps are not created ad hoc in the world by God’s special acts of intervention but are built into structure of the world created by God ex nihilo. Like most of the other contributors who engage quantum theory, Tracy also explicitly makes the connection between metaphysical decisions (about compatibilism and incompatibilism for example) and issues that bear on ethics, such as the plausibility of the idea of human free will and responsibility. Nancey Murphy was another one of the most active of the participants in the project, serving as co-editor for three of the volumes in the series as well as the capstone volume. In the paper included here, “Divine Action in the Natural Order,” she outlines a theory of causation that attempts to account for both scientific phenomena and religious experience. Murphy stresses that the problem of divine action is, at base, a metaphysical problem. “Nothing short of a revision of current metaphysical notions regarding the nature of matter and causation is likely to solve the problem of divine action.” Murphy’s essay also demonstrates the importance of the first two late modern philosophical trajectories outlined above. For example, in her treatment of the metaphysical considerations that shape the dialogue, she traces the role of concepts such as matter, substance, change, and motion in
6 In his chapter in the capstone volume, “Toward a Theory of Divine Action that has Traction,” Clayton commends emergence theory as a valuable and viable metaphysic for incorporating both scientific and theological concerns.
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the shift from Aristotelian to Newtonian cosmology. In Murphy’s own proposal for understanding divine action in dialogue with contemporary science, chaos theory and top-down causation play a subsidiary role; God acts at the quantum level, activating one or another of the innate powers of a quantum entity, from the “bottom-up” without changing the laws of nature. As she makes clear throughout, Murphy’s philosophical efforts are also motivated in part by a theological desire to avoid exacerbating the problem of evil while making sense of the experience of free-will.7 George Ellis’s chapter is, as he notes, intended largely as a response to Murphy’s, with which he basically agrees. Ellis’s concern is to clarify and make use of the distinction between “Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action.” For the purposes of this introduction, two points about his essay are particularly salient. First, Ellis’s overview of the relevant scientific developments, such as chaos theory and emergent order, shows the significant impact of the late modern philosophical shifts toward privileging relationality and dynamism over substance and stasis. Second, Ellis provides a more detailed treatment of the role of the problem of evil in reflections on divine action. He acknowledges that theories of extraordinary divine action are susceptible to the charge of capriciousness. If God can, and occasionally does act, why does God not act to stop Hitler (for example), or to alleviate contemporary experiences of pain and suffering? Ellis’s own view is that God acts (extraordinarily) only to give revelatory, spiritual or moral insight, not to alter a physical outcome from what it would have otherwise been. This proposal offers a clear example of the way in which moral concerns can play an important role in the treatment of metaphysical and epistemological issues within the science and theology dialogue.8 The final chapter included in this book is by Robert John Russell, director of CTNS, and the main organizer of the project. He was the leading editor of each volume in the CTNS/VO series, and arguably the person most familiar with the general contours of the ongoing debate among the participants during the process as a whole. “Divine Action and Quantum Mechanics: A Fresh Assessment” was the last chapter
7 Nancey Murphy’s chapter in the capstone volume explored “Emergence, Downward Causation and Divine Action,” outlining several key philosophical issues and evaluating a variety of approaches to these themes. 8 Cf. George Ellis and Nancey Murphy, On the Moral Nature of the Universe (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996).
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in the fifth and final volume of the series, and it offers a summary of the key issues in the field, outlines a constructive proposal and suggests directions for future research. Throughout the essay, Russell pays special attention to philosophical aspects of the dialogue, including the metaphysical and epistemological questions that shape the interpretation of quantum mechanics. His own proposal involves the appropriation of theologians like Jurgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, for whom trinitarian reflection plays a central role in articulating the relation between God and the world. Russell also explicitly addresses the two main ethical (or moral) questions that shape Christian discourse on divine action: the problem of human freedom and the challenge of theodicy.9
Conclusion Although showcasing these influential essays from the SPDA project would be sufficient warrant for the production of the current book, its inclusion in the Brill series “Philosophical Studies in Science and Religion” suggests that another motivation lies behind their compilation. Both individually and as a group these chapters illustrate the significant role of philosophy in the dialogue between science and Christian theology over the question of divine action. This is so amply demonstrated in the various essays that I have limited myself in this Introduction to alerting the reader to some of the major philosophical themes and shifts that shape the general context of the dialogue and the particular material and methodological argumentation of each contribution. The project was not intended to offer a final anwer on the question of divine action but to press the dialogue between Christian theology and natural science further in light of the significant scientific (and philosophical) developments of the last century. No single project can accomplish everything, and the organizers self-consciously focused their interdisciplinary exploration by limiting themselves to dealing with those scientific fields that appeared most promising for opening up new opportunities for reconstructing Christian interpretations of the experience of God’s action in the world. Although they welcomed and
9 For a more detailed treatment of these and related issues, cf. Russell, Cosmology—From Alpha to Omega (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008).
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encouraged discussion of the ethical issues raised by the problems of human freedom and theodicy, most of the philosophical analysis focused on metaphyical and epistemological issues. As indicated above, a new series that explicitly treats the problem of natural evil has now been launched, demonstrating that its participants are well aware of the need for ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue about the various and complex questions that must be faced in discussions of divine action. As this dialogue continues to widen, geographically and conceptually, it will be necessary to complement the insights gained and progress made by the CTNS/VO series on divine action by examining the topic from other perspectives and continuing to welcome new voices into the conversation. This will open up new opportunities for critically engaging the deeper philosophical presuppositions that shape the very idea of divine agency in Christian theology. To what extent might early modern metaphysical assumptions about the dyads “natural vs. supernatural” and “immanence vs. transcendence” constrain our options for interpreting encounters with ultimate reality? To what extent might western epistemological assumptions about the capacity of reason and the function of “analogy” in theological language constrain our options for conceptualizing the relation between human and divine intentionality? To what extent might individualistic ethical assumptions about the powerful role of desire for future goods in finite agency constrain our imaginative articulation of the relation of God to time? Our exploration of these and other challenging questions will be enhanced as we increasingly engage the resources of the late modern philosophical turn to alterity and of other (especially non-western) religious traditions.
CHAPTER ONE
FIVE MODELS OF GOD AND EVOLUTION Ian G. Barbour
Is evolutionary theory compatible with the idea that God acts in nature? Through most of Western history it had been assumed that all creatures were designed and created by God in their present forms, but Darwin claimed that they are the product of a long process of natural selection. His theory of evolution not only undermined the traditional version of the argument from design; it also explained the history of nature by scientific laws that seemed to offer no opportunity for God’s providential guidance. However several themes in the biological sciences offer promising new ways of conceiving of divine action in evolutionary history without intervention or violation of the laws of nature. The first section of this essay traces the development of evolutionary theory from Darwin himself to molecular biology and recent hypotheses about complexity. The second explores four themes in recent writing about biological processes: self-organization, indeterminacy, top-down causality, and communication of information. Subsequent sections examine theological models of God’s action in nature based on analogies with each of these four characteristics of organic life. I will suggest that a fifth model from process theology avoids some of the problems arising in other models of God’s relation to nature.
1. Darwinism Evolving Evolutionary theory has undergone significant reinterpretation and modification since Darwin. First, the growth of population genetics and molecular biology is briefly described. Then the expansion of Darwinism is discussed, particularly the recognition that other factors in addition to natural selection influence the direction of evolutionary change. Finally, recent theories of complexity and self-organization are considered.
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1.1. From Darwin to DNA In Darwin’s day, Newtonian mechanics was looked on as the form of science which other sciences should emulate. The Newtonian viewpoint was atomistic, deterministic and reductionistic. It was believed that the behavior of all systems is determined by a few simple laws governing the behavior of their smallest components. Change was thought to be the result of external forces, such as gravity, acting on bodies which are themselves essentially passive. Darwin agreed with the philosophers of science who held that Newtonian physics represented an ideal for all the sciences, and his theory of evolution shared many of its assumptions.1 Darwin held that evolutionary change is caused by natural selection acting on variations among individual members of a species. Under competitive conditions, those individuals with a slight adaptive advantage will survive better to reproduce and pass on that advantage to their offspring. His viewpoint was “atomistic” in assuming that selection acts on separate traits in individual organisms. For him, as for Newton, change was the result of external forces; he held that the direction of change is determined by natural selection, not by the efforts of organisms themselves as Lamark had believed. The assumptions which Darwin shared with Newton are explored in detail in a recent volume by Depew and Weber.2 By the end of the nineteenth century, probability was an important concept in several areas of physics. Maxwell and Boltzmann showed that the probability of different configurations of gas molecules can be calculated even when the motions of individual molecules are too complicated to describe mathematically. Statistical averages can be used to predict the relationship between large-scale variables such as pressure, volume, temperature, heat flow, and entropy. In statistical mechanics and classical thermodynamics, equilibrium macrostates can be calculated without knowing the initial distribution of molecules. Probabilistic reasoning was also important in the merging of population genetics and evolutionary theory early in the twentieth century in the theories of Fisher, Wright, and Dobzhansky. Fisher acknowledged
1
Michael Ruse, Philosophy of Biology Today (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988), 6; idem, The Darwinian Paradigm (New York: Routledge, 1989). 2 David P. Depew and Bruce H. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), Part I.
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the influence of nineteenth-century physics on his ideas about calculating gene probabilities in individual organisms and gene frequencies in populations. The “modern synthesis” in which Julian Huxley, G.G. Simpson and Ernst Mayr were prominent, continued the Darwinian belief that the evolution of species was the result of a gradual accumulation of small changes. If some members of a population are geographically or reproductively isolated from other members, accumulated changes may result in a new species that can no longer interbreed with the original population. In a very small isolated population, gene frequencies may differ, purely by chance, from those in the larger population; the direction of evolutionary change (“genetic drift”) would then be the result of chance rather than natural selection. But natural selection was still viewed as the principal agent of evolutionary change.3 The discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 led to the identification of the molecular components of the genes which population genetics had postulated. The “central dogma” of molecular biology asserted that information is transferred in one direction only, from the sequences of bases in DNA to the sequences of amino acids assembled by the DNA to form proteins. It was claimed that the environment has no direct effect on genes except to eliminate or perpetuate them through selective pressures on the organisms that carried them. Molecular biology has been immensely fruitful in illuminating almost every aspect of evolutionary history, but some of the assumptions initially associated with it have more recently been questioned. 1.2. The Expansion of Darwinism Most of the challenges to the modern synthesis in recent decades should be seen as part of an expanded Darwinism (or neo-Darwinism), rather than as a rejection of earlier insights. For example, it has been claimed that selection occurs at many levels, and not just on the level of organisms in populations. Dawkins speaks of selection at the level of genes; he views organisms as mechanisms by which genes perpetuate themselves. E.O. Wilson speaks of kin selection and others defend group selection. Both philosophers and biologists have argued that selection occurs also at the species level. Whereas an organism produces other organisms by reproduction, and it perishes by death, a species produces other
3
Ibid., Part II.
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species by speciation, and it perishes by extinction. The speciation rate of a species may be as important in the long run as the reproduction rate of individual organisms. Variation and selection occur at several levels at once, and of course changes at one level will influence those at other levels.4 Darwin himself stressed the struggle and competition for survival, but more recent interpretations point to a larger role for cooperation and symbiosis. The idea of punctuated equilibrium defended by Gould and Eldredge challenged the earlier assumption that macroevolution is the result of the gradual accumulation of many small changes. They point to fossil records that show millions of years with very little change, interspersed with bursts of rapid speciation in relatively short periods, especially in the early Cambrian period when all the known phyla and basic body plans appeared in a very short period. They postulate that alterations in developmental sequences produced major structural changes. Their view is holistic in directing attention to polygenic traits, the genome as a system, and the role of regulatory programs in development, rather than to small changes due to mutations in single genes governing separate traits that might be subject to selection. The directions of change are determined by the possibilities of developmental reorganization as well as by selective forces acting on organisms.5 Gould and Lewontin hold that evolutionary change arises from many differing causes, and they criticize explanation by natural selection alone (“panadaptationism”). They point out that one can always postulate a possible “selective advantage” for any trait by making up a “just-so story” of how it might be adaptive, even in the absence of independent evidence for such an advantage.6 But most biologists probably follow Stebbins and Ayala in claiming that all the known data are consistent with an expanded and enriched version of neo-Darwinism in which variation and natural selection are still the main factors in evolutionary
4 R.N. Brandon and R.M. Burian, eds., Genes, Organisms, Populations: Controversies over the Units of Selection (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984); Niles Eldredge and Stanley Salthe, “Hierarchy and Evolution,” in Oxford Surveys of Evolutionary Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 5 Stephen Jay Gould, “Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory,” Science 216 (1982), 380–87; S.J. Gould and Niles Eldredge, “Punctuated Equilibrium Comes of Age,” Nature 366 (1993), 223–27. 6 S.J. Gould and Richard C. Lewontin, “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptionist Programme,” Proc. of Royal Society of London B 205 (1979), 581–98.
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change.7 The communication of information from DNA to proteins is indeed crucial, as the “central dogma” asserted, but other sources of information are significant in determining how genes are expressed in living organisms. Some of this information is in the cytoplasm outside the cell nucleus, and some comes from elsewhere in the organism or wider environment. A complex feedback and regulatory system turns particular genetic programs on and off. Outside influences can also affect the transposition of genes.8 Some biologists have noted that the internal drives and novel actions of organisms can initiate evolutionary changes. The environment selects individuals, but individuals also select environments, and in a new niche a different set of genes may contribute to survival. Some pioneering fish ventured onto land and were the ancestors of amphibians and mammals; some mammals later returned to the water and were the ancestors of dolphins and whales; some forest woodpeckers began to hunt in the mountains. In each case organisms themselves took new initiatives; genetic and then anatomic changes followed from their actions through “genetic assimilation” (the Baldwin effect). The changes were not initiated by genetic variations. Lamark was evidently right that the purposeful actions of organisms can eventually lead to physiological changes, though he was wrong in assuming that physiological changes occurring during an organism’s lifetime can be inherited directly by its offspring.9 Finally, some biologists, including Mayr, Gould, and Lewontin, consider themselves exponents of an expanded Darwinism but insist on the autonomy of biology from physics. They say that even the probabilistic physics of classical thermodynamics cannot serve as a model for evolutionary biology because chance and contingent historical contexts play such crucial roles. We can describe evolution through a unique historical narrative but we cannot deduce its path from predictive laws. These authors also defend the distinctiveness of biological concepts
7 G. Ledyard Stebbins and Francisco Ayala, “Is a New Evolutionary Synthesis Necessary?” Science 213 (1981), 967–71. 8 John Campbell, “An Organizational Interpretation of Evolution,” in Evolution at the Crossroads, David P. Depew and Bruce H. Weber, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985). 9 C.H. Waddington, The Strategy of the Genes (New York: Macmillan, 1957); Robert J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), chap. 10.
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and their irreducibility to the concepts of physics and chemistry, as I will note later.10 1.3. Beyond Darwinism? Darwin’s theory shared many of the assumptions of Newtonian physics; the modern synthesis was influenced by the probabilistic reasoning of statistical mechanics. Future understanding of evolution may be enhanced by recent work on chaos and complexity in the physical sciences. Whereas the linear systems of classical thermodynamics are insensitive to small initial differences and attain predictable equilibrium states, nonlinear thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium are extremely sensitive to very small initial differences and are therefore unpredictable. Prigogine and others have described the emergence of new types of order in dissipative systems far from equilibrium. An infinitesimal difference in initial conditions will lead to alternative endstates and new levels of order described by system-wide relationships rather than by interactions at the molecular level.11 Stuart Kauffman draws from theories of complexity in arguing that evolution is the product of self-organization as well as chance and selection. He looks at the common properties of diverse systems, for example those in embryonic development, neural networks and computer networks. As we will see in the next section, he argues that dynamical systems can achieve new ordered states without any external selective pressures.12 Jeffrey Wicken has insisted that we cannot understand evolutionary history without looking at the entropy, order, and flow of energy in the wider ecosystems within which organisms co-evolve. Moreover, he says, structural and thermodynamic constraints drastically limit the stable combinations when amino acids are randomly assembled to form proteins. These authors adopt a holistic approach
10 Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); idem, “How Biology Differs from the Physical Sciences,” in Evolution at the Crossroads, Depew and Weber, eds. 11 Ilya Prigogine and Irene Stengers, Order Out of Chaos (New York: Bantam Books, 1984). 12 Stuart Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); idem, At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
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that attempts analysis at a variety of levels, avoiding the reductionism evident in much of evolutionary theory. They claim that natural selection works on a field of already selforganized systems.13 In the past, the phenomena of embryology and developmental biology have been poorly understood and have been difficult to incorporate into neo-Darwinism. How do cells differentiate so that the right organs are formed at the right place in the growing organism? Some biologists postulated a “morphogenic field” which imposes a pre-existing plan that guides cells in their differentiation. Others postulated “developmental pathways” which direct growth toward specific anatomical forms. These hypotheses appear increasingly dubious in the light of recent research on genetic and molecular mechanisms in embryological development. Regulatory genes produce proteins that act as “switches” to turn on secondary genes, which in turn control the tertiary genes responsible for protein assembly in cells, tissues, and organs. In recent experiments, the master control gene that initiates the program for the development of an eye in the fruit fly was introduced into cells on its wings, legs, and antennae, and complete eyes developed at these sites. If the control gene for eye development in a mouse is inserted in cells of a fly’s wing, a fly’s eye will develop, suggesting that the control genes for eyes in the two species are virtually unchanged since a common evolutionary ancestor, even though the eye structures of insects and mammals evolved in radically different directions.14 Our understanding of such processes is still very limited, but research on the molecular basis of development holds great promise for broadening our understanding of evolutionary history. For example, the Cambrian explosion of new phyla may well have been caused by changes in the genetic networks that regulate very early development. Even after recognizing the power of molecular explanations, however, one can argue that developmental patterns are constrained by principles of hierarchical organization and the possible forms of physiological structures. The variability of phenotypes is limited by the architecture and dynamics of developmental systems. Goodwin, Ho, and Saunders have defended a structuralism in which a relatively autonomous
13 Jeffrey Wicken, Evolution, Thermodynamics, and Information: Extending the Darwinian Program (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 14 George Halder, Patrick Callaerts, and Walter Gehring, “Induction of Ectopic Eyes by Targeted Expression of the Eyeless Gene in Drosophila,” Science 267 (1995), 1788–92.
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developmental dynamic is the main source of macroevolution.15 Their ideas are controversial and outside the mainstream of current biological thought, but should not be dismissed if they might be able to account for observed phenomena more adequately than neo-Darwinist theory. These authors see themselves as having moved beyond even an expanded Darwinism. If these ideas prove fruitful they may lead to what Kuhn would call a paradigm shift, in which the basic assumptions of Newtonian and nineteenth-century physics will be replaced by an alternative set of assumptions. Or perhaps we could say, in Lakatos’ terms, that the core of Darwinism (the importance of variation and natural selection) will have been preserved by abandoning some of its auxiliary hypotheses (such as gradualism and the exclusive role of selection as a directive force). We could also follow the philosophers of science who hold that in studying complex phenomena we should seek limited models applicable to particular domains, rather than universally applicable predictive laws. Natural selection may be more important in some contexts than in others. As a minimum we can say that we should consider other factors in addition to variation and natural selection, and that we should look at what is going on at a variety of levels. In the discussion that follows, I will be drawing primarily from the advocates of “the expansion of Darwinism,” but I will refer to the work of Kauffman, who considers himself “beyond Darwinism.”
2. Philosophical Issues in Biology Four concepts in recent biological thought require more careful analysis: self-organization, indeterminacy, top-down causality, and communication of information. Each of these concepts is crucial in one of the theological interpretations explored in the subsequent section.
15 Mae-Won Ho and Peter Saunders, eds., Beyond Neo-Darwinism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984); Brian Goodwin and Peter Saunders, eds., Theoretical Biology: Epigenetic and Evolutionary Order from Complex Systems (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989); see also Robert Wesson, Beyond Natural Selection (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
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2.1. Self-organization Evolutionary history does indeed show a directionality, a trend toward greater complexity and consciousness. There has been an increase in the genetic information in DNA, and a steady advance in the ability of organisms to gather and process information about the environment and respond to it. The emergence of life, consciousness, and human culture are especially significant transitions within a gradual and continuous process. But evolution does not display any straight-line progressive development. For the majority of species, opportunistic adaptations led to dead ends and extinction when conditions changed. The pattern of evolution does not resemble a uniformly growing tree so much as a sprawling bush whose tangled branches grow in many directions and often die off. Nevertheless, there is an overall trend. Who can doubt that a human being represents an astonishing advance over an amoeba or a worm? Some authors have argued that if the amino acids in primeval oceans had assembled themselves by chance to form protein chains, the probability of being assembled in the right order to form a particular protein would be fantastically small. It would be highly unlikely to occur even in spans of time many times longer than the history of the universe.16 The argument is dubious because amino acids do not combine by chance with equal probability, for there are built-in affinities and bonding preferences and structural possibilities. Some combinations form stable units which persist, and these units combine to form larger units. Organic molecules have a capacity for self-organization and complexity because of structural constraints and potentialities. Other authors have used hierarchy theory to indicate how advances to a higher level of organizational complexity are preserved. Imagine a watchmaker whose work is disrupted occasionally. If he has to start over again each time, he would never finish his task. But if he assembles groups of parts into stable sub-assemblies, which are then combined, he will finish the task more rapidly. Living organisms have many stable sub-assemblies at differing levels which are often preserved intact and only loosely coupled to each other. The higher level of stability often arises from functions that are relatively independent of variations in the microscopic details. Evolution exhibits both chance and directionality 16 Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe, Evolution from Space (London: Dent, 1981).
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because higher levels embody new types of order and stability that are maintained and passed on.17 Let us examine Kauffman’s thesis that evolution is a product of selforganization as well as of random variation and natural selection. He finds similar patterns in the behavior of complex systems that appear very different—for example, in molecules, cells, neural networks, ecosystems, and technological and economic systems. In each case feedback mechanisms and nonlinear interactions make cooperative activity possible in larger wholes. The systems show similar emergent systemic properties not present in their components. Kauffman gives particular attention to the behavior of networks. For example, an array of 100,000 light bulbs, each of which goes on or off as an adjustable function of input from its four neighbors, will cycle through only 327 states from among the astronomical number of possible states. Genes are also connected in networks; in the simplest case, gene A represses gene B and vice versa, so only one of them is turned on. Kauffman notes that there are only 256 cell types in mammals, and suggests that this may be the result of system principles and not merely an historical accident.18 Many of Kauffman’s ideas are speculative and exploratory, but they reflect a new way of looking at evolution. He finds that order emerges spontaneously in complex systems, especially on the border between order and chaos. Too much order makes change impossible; too much chaos makes continuity impossible. We should see ourselves not as a highly improbable historical accident, but as an expected fulfilment of the natural order. In his book, At Home in the Universe, Kauffman calls for awe and respect for a process in which such self-organization occurs. 2.2. Indeterminacy Many features of evolutionary history are the product of unpredictable events. The particular pair of organisms that mate and the particular combination of genes that are inherited by their offspring cannot be predicted; genetic laws can only be expressed probabilistically for individuals in large populations. Many mutations and replication errors
17 Stanley Salthe, Evolving Hierarchical Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). 18 Kauffman, At Home in the Universe, chap. 4.
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seem to occur at random. A few individuals may form a small isolated population which happens to differ genetically from the average of the larger population, leading to “genetic drift.” Such unpredictability is compounded when co-evolving species interact competitively or cooperatively in historically contingent ecosystems and environments. An asteroid collision at the end of the Permian period may have drastically altered Earth’s climate and its evolutionary history. We can only describe evolution by a historical narrative; we could not have predicted its course. Many of these “chance events” seem to represent the unpredictable intersection of separate causal chains. Two causal chains may each be determinate, but if they are completely independent of each other, no lawful regularity describes their intersection in time and space. The idea of a causal chain is of course an abstraction. When we speak of “the cause” of an event we are selecting from among the many necessary and jointly sufficient conditions the one to which we want to direct attention in a particular context of inquiry. But our ignorance of the immensely complicated and ramifying web of causal influences in evolutionary history does not in itself imply that it is not determined. But an indeterminacy in nature itself seems to be present at the quantum level. In quantum theory, predictions of individual events among atoms and subatomic particles give only probabilities and not exact values. A particular radioactive atom might decay in the next second or a thousand years from now, and the theory does not tell us which will occur. Some physicists think that this unpredictability is attributable to the limitations of current theory; they hope that a future theory will disclose hidden variables that will allow exact calculations. But most physicists hold that indeterminacy is a property of the atomic world itself. Electrons and subatomic particles apparently do not have a precise location in space and time; they are spread-out waves representing a range of possibilities until they are observed.19 Among large groups of atoms in everyday objects, indeterminacy at the atomic level averages out statistically to give predictable largescale behavior. However, in some biological systems, especially in the genetic and nervous systems, changes in a small number of atoms can have large-scale effects. A mutation could arise from a quantum event
19 Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1990), 96–104.
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in which a single molecular bond in a gene is formed or broken, and the effects would be amplified in the phenotype of the growing organism, and might be perpetuated by natural selection. Such evolutionary unpredictability would reflect indeterminacy in nature and not merely the limitation of human knowledge.20 In chaos theory and nonlinear thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium, an infinitesimally small uncertainty concerning initial conditions can have enormous consequences. In chaotic systems, a very small change may be amplified exponentially. This has been called “the butterfly effect” because a butterfly in Brazil might alter the weather a month later in New York. The effect of moving an electron on a distant galaxy might be amplified over a long period of time to alter events on Earth.21 Deterministic laws can be applied only to closed systems; they are an approximation to reality because actual systems that are extremely sensitive to initial conditions can never be totally isolated from outside influences. According to Stephen Kellert, the unpredictability of chaotic systems is not merely a reflection of temporary human ignorance. Prediction over a long time period would require more information than could be stored on all the electrons of our galaxy, and the calculations would take longer than the phenomena we were trying to predict. Moreover chaotic systems would amplify the quantum indeterminacies that set limits to the accurate specification of initial conditions in both theory and practice. Kellert also notes that in classical physics the behavior of a larger whole is deduced from predictive causal laws governing interactions of its constituent parts. Chaos theory, by contrast, studies the qualitative form of large-scale patterns that may be similar even when the constituents are very different. Chaos theory examines holistic geometrical relationships and systemic properties rather than seeking microreduction to detailed causal mechanisms. Order is a broader
20 On the topic of quantum indeterminacy and its possible role in mutations, see Ellis, Murphy, Tracy, and Russell in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur R. Peacocke, eds. (Rome: Vatican Observatory, and Berkeley, CA: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1995). 21 James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Penguin Books, 1987); John Holte, ed., Chaos: The New Science (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993).
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concept than law because it includes formal, holistic, historical, and probabilistic patterns.22 2.3. Top-down Causality Living organisms exhibit a many-leveled hierarchy of systems and subsystems. A level identifies a unit which is relatively integrated, stable, and self-regulating, even though it interacts with other units at the same level and at higher and lower levels. One such hierarchy is identified structurally: particle, atom, molecule, macromolecule, organelle, cell, organ, organism, and ecosystem. Other hierarchies are identified functionally: the reproductive hierarchy (gene, genome, organism, and population), or the neural hierarchy (molecule, synapse, neuron, neural network, and the brain with its changing patterns of interconnections). Human beings also participate in all the social and cultural interactions studied by the social sciences and humanities. A particular discipline or field of inquiry focuses attention on a particular level and its relation to adjacent levels. We can distinguish three kinds of reduction between levels. a. Methodological reduction is a research strategy that studies lower levels in order to better understand relationships at higher levels. Analysis of molecular interactions has been a spectacularly successful strategy in biology, but it is not incompatible with multi-level analysis and the study of larger systems. b. Epistemological reduction claims that laws and theories at one level of analysis can be derived from laws and theories at lower levels. I have argued that biological concepts are distinctive and cannot be defined in physical and chemical terms. Distinctive kinds of explanation are valid at differing levels. But inter-level theories may connect adjacent levels, even if they are not derivable from the theories applicable to either level alone. A series of overlapping theories and models unifies the sciences without implying that one level is more fundamental or real than another.23
22 Stephen Kellert, In the Wake of Chaos: Unpredictable Order in Dynamical Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 23 For analyses of reduction, see Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 324–37 and Religion in an Age of Science, 165–69; Francisco Ayala, “Reduction in Biology” in Evolution at the Crossroads, Depew
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c. Ontological reduction is a claim about the kinds of reality or the kinds of causality that exist in the world. It is sometimes asserted that an organism is “nothing but organized molecules,” or that “only physical forces are causally effective.” I have defended ontological pluralism, a multi-leveled view of reality in which differing (epistemological) levels of analysis are taken to refer to differing (ontological) levels of events and processes in the world, as claimed by critical realism. In evolutionary history, novel forms of order emerged which not only could not have been predicted from laws and theories governing previously existing forms, but which also gave rise to genuinely new kinds of behavior and activity in nature. We can acknowledge the distinctive characteristics of living organisms without assuming that life is a separate substance or a “vital force” added to matter, as the vitalists postulated. Bottom-up causation occurs when many sub-systems influence a system. Top-down causation is the influence of a system on many sub-systems. Higher-level events influence chemical and physical processes at lower levels without violating lower-level laws.24 Microproperties are not referred to in the specification of the macrostate of the system. Network properties may be realized through a great variety of particular connections. Correlation of behaviors at one level does not require detailed knowledge of all its components. The rules of chess limit the possible moves but leave open an immense number of possibilities that are consistent with but not determined by those rules. So, too, the laws of chemistry limit the combinations of molecules which are found in DNA, but do not determine them. The meaning of the message conveyed by DNA is not given by the laws of chemistry.The holistic and anti-reductionistic character of chaos theory has been described by one of its best-known exponents, James Gleick:
and Weber, eds.; Arthur Peacocke, God and the New Biology (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1986), chaps. 1 and 2. 24 On top-down causation, see Donald Campbell, “‘Downward Causation’ in Hierarchically Ordered Biological Systems” in The Problems of Reduction, Francisco Ayala and Theodosius Dobzhansky, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Michael Polanyi, “Life’s Irreducible Structures,” Science 160 (1968), 1308–12; Elizabeth Vrba, “Patterns in the Fossil Record and Evolutionary Processes” in Beyond Neo-Darwinism, Ho and Saunders, eds.
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Chaos is anti-reductionist. This new science makes a strong claim about the world, namely, that when it comes to the most interesting questions, questions about order and disorder, decay and creativity, pattern formation, and life itself, the whole cannot be explained in terms of the parts. There are fundamental laws about complex systems, but they are new kinds of law. They are laws of structure and organization and scale, and they simply vanish when you focus on the individual constituents of a complex system—just as the psychology of a lynch mob vanishes when you interview individual participants.25
We know little about how memories are preserved in the brain, but computer simulations of neural nets suggest that memory may be stored in distributed patterns rather than at discrete locations. In some computer networks with parallel distributed processing, the nodes in a series of layers can be connected by links whose strength can be varied. In one experiment, the inputs are groups of letters, and the outputs are random sounds in a voice synthesizer. Every time the correlation between an input and the correct output is improved, the strongest links are strengthened, so the network gradually improves its performance. The network can be taught to pronounce written words. The connective patterns involve the whole network and they are learned by experience rather than by being directly programed. Patterns develop in the whole without prior specification of the parts; the readjustment of the parts can be considered a form of top-down causation.26 We should also note that the brain of a baby is not finished or “hard-wired” at birth. The neural pathways are developed in interaction with the environment and are altered by the baby’s experiences. Of all the sciences, ecology is the most holistic in its outlook. No part of an ecosystem can be considered in isolation because changes in one component often have far-reaching ramifications elsewhere in the system. The participants in an ecosystem are linked by multiple connections and cycles. The oxygen inhaled by animals is exhaled as carbon dioxide which is in turn taken in by plants and converted back to oxygen. The food chain connects various life forms. Predator and prey are dependent on each other in maintaining stable populations. A holistic approach is also used in the field of systems analysis which 25 James Gleick, address at 1990 Nobel Conference, Gustavus Adolphus College, quoted in Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory (New York, N.Y.: Pantheon Book, 1992), 60. 26 C. Rosenberg and T. Sejnowski, “Parallel Networks That Learn to Pronounce English Text,” Complex Systems 1 (1987), 145–68.
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studies the dynamics of urban, industrial, and electronic systems. In all these cases, there are of course lawful relations among the parts, but their behavior is analyzed in relation to a larger whole. Holism is both a rejection of ontological reductionism and a claim that the whole influences the parts. Attention is directed to the parts of a particular whole, even though it is in turn a part of a larger whole. The whole/part distinction is usually structural and spatial (for example, a larger whole). Top-down causality is a very similar concept, but it draws attention to a hierarchy of many levels characterized by qualitative differences in organization and activity (for example, a higher level). Levels are defined by functional and dynamic relationships. Patterns in time are emphasized, though of course they are inseparable from patterns in space. 2.4. The Communication of Information Information has been an important term in many fields of science. In the thermodynamics of gases, systems of low entropy are highly improbable molecular configurations, which tend to degrade into the more probable configurations of uniform equilibrium states. This entails a loss of order and pattern that is also a loss of information. Information theory was first developed in World War II in studies of the communication of messages by radio. Communication is more reliable if the signalto-noise ratio is high and if a coded message contains regularities and redundancies which allow the detection of errors. With the advent of computers, instructions could be encoded in a binary representation (0/1 or off/on) and quantified as “bits” of information. The computer responds to the instructions in the program which specify the connections in its electrical circuits. It manipulates the electrical representations of the symbols fed into it (“information processing”) and then activates some form of output. The letters on a printed page are of course the classical case of the communication of information to a reader.27 Information is an ordered pattern (of alphabetical letters, auditory sounds, binary digits, DNA bases, or any other combinable elements) which is one among many possible sequences or states of a system. Information is communicated when another system (reader, listener,
27 Jeremy Campbell, Grammatical Man: Information, Entropy, Language, and Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).
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computer, living cell, etc.) responds selectively—that is, when information is coded, transmitted, and decoded. The meaning of the message is dependent on a wider context of interpretation. It must be viewed dynamically and relationally rather than in purely static terms as if the message were contained in the pattern itself. The information in DNA sequences in genes is significant precisely because of its context in a larger organic system. In the growth of an embryo, a system of time delays, spatial differentiation, and chemical feed-back signals communicates the information needed so that the right proteins, cells, and organs are assembled at the right location and time. Complicated developmental pathways, with information flowing in both directions, connect genes with molecular activities and physiological structures. A genome contains an immense number of possible developmental scenarios, of which only a few are realized. In The Ontogeny of Information, Susan Oyama argues that the meaning and informational significance of genetic instructions depend on what cells and tissues are already present, and on the actual functioning of the developmental system. In place of a one-way flow of information we must imagine interactive construction in a particular context.28 An enzyme speeds the interaction of two molecules by recognizing them (by shape and chemical affinity) and holding them at adjacent sites where they can react with each other. Molecules of the immune system recognize an invading virus, which is like a key that fits a lock, and they are activated to release a specific antibody. The communication between molecules is dependent on properties of both the sender and the receiver. A receptor is part of an embodied action system that implements a response to signals. Stored in the DNA is a wealth of historically acquired information including programs for coping with the world. For example, a bird or animal uses specific visual or auditory clues to recognize and respond to a dangerous predator which it has not previously encountered. Individuals in some species are programed to communicate warning signals to alert other members of the species. Higher primates are capable of symbolic communication of information, and human beings can use words to express abstract concepts. Human information can be transmitted between generations not only by genes and by parental example,
28 Susan Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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but also in speech, literature, art, music and other cultural forms. The storage and communication of information is thus an important feature of biological processes at many levels and it must always be understood dynamically and relationally rather than in purely static and formal terms. Even at low levels, reality consists not simply of matter and energy, but of matter, energy, and information.
3. Models of God’s Action in Nature What models of God’s relation to nature are compatible with the central affirmations of the Christian tradition and also with a world which is characterized by self-organization, indeterminacy, top-down causality, and communication of information? I will examine theological proposals that draw from each of these four characteristics. All four models reject the idea of divine intervention that violates the laws of nature. In none of them is God invoked to fill particular gaps in the scientific account (the “God of the gaps” who is vulnerable to the advance of science). God’s role is different from that of natural causes. In each case, a feature of current scientific theory is taken as a model (that is, a systematically developed analogy) of God’s action in nature.29 Some authors in the first group below do propose a new version of natural theology in which evidence from science is used as an argument in support of theism, even if it does not offer a proof of God’s existence. The other authors are proposing ways in which a God who is accepted on other grounds (such as religious experience in a historical interpretive community) might be reconceived as acting in nature. I have called such an approach a theology of nature rather than a natural theology.30
29
Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1997), chap. 4. 30
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3.1. God as Designer of a Self-organizing Process Until the nineteenth century, the intricate organization and effective functioning of living creatures were taken as evidence of an intelligent designer. After Darwin, the argument was reformulated: God did not create things in their present forms, but designed an evolutionary process through which all living forms came into being. Today we know that life is possible only under a very narrow range of physical and chemical conditions. We have seen also that in the self-organization of molecules leading to life there seems to have been considerable builtin design in biochemical affinities, molecular structures, and potential for complexity and hierarchical order. The world of molecules seems to have an inherent tendency to move toward emergent complexity, life, and consciousness. If design is understood as a detailed pre-existing plan in the mind of God, chance is the antithesis of design. But if design is identified with the general direction of growth toward complexity, life, and consciousness, then both law and chance can be part of the design. Disorder is sometimes a condition for the emergence of new forms of order, as in thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium, or in the mutations of evolutionary history. We can no longer accept the clockmaker God who designed every detail of a determinate mechanism. But one option today is a revised deism in which God designed the world as a manyleveled creative process of law and chance. Paul Davies is an exponent of this position.31 A patient God could endow matter with diverse potentialities and let the world create itself. We can say that God respects the integrity of the world and allows it to be itself, without interfering with it, just as God respects human freedom and allows us to be ourselves. Moral responsibility requires that the world have some openness, which takes the form of chance at lower levels and choice at the human level. But responsible choice also requires enough lawfulness that we have some idea of the probable consequences of our decisions. An attractive feature of this option is that it provides at least partial answers to the problems of suffering and death which were such a
31
Paul Davies, The Cosmic Blueprint: New Discoveries in Nature’s Creative Ability to Order the Universe (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988); idem, The Mind of God: The Scientific Basis for a Rational World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); idem, “Teleology without Teleology” (CTNS/VO, v. III).
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challenge to the classical argument from design. For competition and death are intrinsic to an evolutionary process. Pain is an inescapable concomitant of greater sensitivity and awareness, and it provides a valuable warning of external dangers. My main objection to a reformulated deism is that we are left with a distant and inactive God, a far cry from the active God of the Bible who continues to be intimately involved with the world and human life. One could still argue that God has an ongoing role in sustaining the world and its laws. Some theologians maintain that the world does not stand on its own but needs God’s continual concurrence to maintain and uphold it in what is known today to be a dynamic rather than a static process. According to neo-Thomists, God as primary cause works through the matrix of secondary causes in the natural world. William Stoeger argues that there are no gaps in the scientific account on its own level; God’s action is on a totally different plane from all secondary causes.32 Many neo-Thomists maintain that divine sovereignty is maintained if all events are foreseen and predetermined in God’s plan. God does not have to intervene or interfere with the laws of nature; divine action occurs indirectly and instrumentally through natural processes. This view respects the integrity of science and the transcendence of God, whose action is not like causality within the world. Some theologians hold that God sees all events in timeless eternity without determining them, but I would argue that predestination is not compatible with human freedom or the presence of chance, evil, and suffering in the world. 3.2. God as Determiner of Indeterminacies I suggested earlier that uncertainties in the predictions made by quantum theory reflect indeterminacy in nature itself, rather than the inadequacy of current theory. In that interpretation, a range of possibilities is present in the world. Quantum events have necessary but not sufficient physical causes. If they are not completely determined by the relationships described by the laws of physics, their final determination might be made directly by God. What appears to be chance, 32
Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1967), chaps. 4 and 10; William R. Stoeger, “Describing God’s Action in the World in the Light of Scientific Knowledge of Reality,” in Chaos and Complexity, Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke, eds.
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which atheists take as an argument against theism, may be the very point at which God acts. Divine sovereignty would be maintained if God providentially controls the events that appear to us as chance. No energy input would be needed, since the alternative potentialities in a quantum state have identical energy. God does not have to intervene as a physical force pushing electrons around, but instead actualizes one of the many potentialities already present—determining, for example, the instant at which a particular radioactive atom decays.33 We have seen that under some conditions the effects of very small differences at the microlevel are greatly amplified in large-scale phenomena. In nonlinear thermodynamics and chaos theory, an infinitesimal initial change can produce dramatic changes in the larger system. Similar trigger effects occur in evolutionary mutations and in genetic and neural systems today. Scientific research finds only law and chance, but perhaps in God’s knowledge all events are foreseen and predetermined through a combination of law and particular divine action. Since God’s action would be scientifically undetectable, it could be neither proved nor refuted by science. This would exclude any proof of God’s action of the kind sought in natural theology, but it would not exclude the possibility of God’s action affirmed on other grounds in a wider theology of nature. If we assume that God controls all indeterminacies, we could preserve the traditional idea of predestination. This would be theological determinism rather than physical determinism, since nothing happens by chance. But then the problems of waste, suffering, and human freedom would remain acute. Nancey Murphy has proposed that God determines all quantum indeterminacies but arranges that law-like regularities usually result, in order to make stable structures and scientific investigation possible, and to ensure that human actions have dependable consequences so that moral choices are possible. Orderly relationships do not constrain God, since they are included in God’s purposes. God grants causal powers to created entities. Murphy holds that in human life God acts both at the quantum level and at higher
33 William Pollard, Chance and Providence (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958); Donald MacKay, Science, Chance, and Providence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
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levels of mental activity, but does it in such a way that human freedom is not violated.34 An alternative would be to say that most quantum events occur by chance, but God influences some of them without violating the statistical laws of quantum physics. This view has been explained by Robert Russell, George Ellis and Thomas Tracy, and it is consistent with the scientific evidence.35 A possible objection to this model is that it assumes bottom-up causality within nature once God’s action has occurred, and thus seems to concede the reductionist’s claim that the behavior of all entities is determined by their smallest parts (or lowest levels). The action would be bottom-up even if one assumed that God’s intentions were directed to the larger wholes (or higher levels) affected by these quantum events. However most of these authors also allow for God’s action at higher levels which then results in a top-down influence on lower levels, in addition to quantum effects from the bottom up. The model can thus be combined with one of the models discussed below. 3.3. God as Top-down Cause The idea of levels of reality can be extended if God is viewed as acting from an even higher level than nature. Arthur Peacocke holds that God exerts a top-down causality on the world. God’s action would be a constraint on relationships at lower levels that does not violate lowerlevel laws. Constraints may be introduced not just at spatial or temporal boundaries, but also internally through any additional specification allowed by lower-level laws. In human beings, God would influence their highest evolutionary level, that of mental activity, which would affect the neural networks and neurons in the brain.36 Within human beings, divine action would be effected down the hierarchy of natural levels, 34 Nancey Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan’s Ass and Schrödinger’s Cat,” in Chaos and Complexity, Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke, eds; Nancey Murphy and George F.R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology and Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996). 35 Thomas F. Tracy, “Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps,” and George F.R. Ellis, “Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action: The Nexus of Interaction,” in Chaos and Complexity, Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke, eds. 36 Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural, Human, and Divine, enlarged edition (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), chap. 3, and his “God’s Interaction with the World” in Chaos and Complexity, Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke, eds.; idem, in CTNS/VO, v. III.
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concerning which we have at least some understanding of relationships between adjacent levels. (Peacocke gives a table showing the hierarchy of academic disciplines, from the physical sciences to the humanities, which study successively higher levels, with some disciplines addressing inter-level questions.37) His use of top-down causality seems to me more problematic in the case of divine action on inanimate matter; we would have to assume direct influence between the highest level (God) and the lowest level (matter) in the absence of intermediate levels—which has no analogy within the natural order. Peacocke also extends to God the idea of whole-part relationships found in nature. He proposes that God as “the most inclusive whole” acts on “the-world-as-a-whole.” But this spatial analogy seems dubious because the world does not have spatial boundaries, and it has no temporal ones if we accept Stephen Hawking’s version of quantum cosmology. Moreover the rejection of universal simultaneity in relativity theory makes it impossible to speak of “the-world-as-a-whole” at any one moment. The whole is a spatio-temporal continuum with temporal as well as spatial dimensions. In such a framework God’s action would presumably have to be more localized in space and time, interacting more directly with a particular part rather than indirectly through action on the spatio-temporal whole. One version of top-down causality uses the relation of mind to body in human beings as an analogy for God’s relation to the world. Some authors urge us to look on the world as God’s body, and God as the world’s mind or soul. In using the analogy, we can make allowance for the human limitations that would not apply to God. We have direct awareness of our thoughts and feelings, but only limited awareness of many other events in our bodies, whereas God would be directly aware of all events. We did not choose our bodies and we can affect only a limited range of events in them, whereas God’s actions are said to affect all events universally. From the pattern of behavior of other people we infer their intentions which cannot be directly observed; similarly, the cosmic drama can be interpreted as the expression of God’s intentions.38
37
Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 217. Grace Jentzen, God’s World, God’s Body (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984); Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). 38
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But the analogy breaks down if it is pressed too far. The cosmos as a whole lacks the intermediate levels of organization found in the body. It does not have the biochemical or neurological channels of feedback and communication through which the activities of organisms are coordinated and integrated. To be sure, an omnipresent God would not need the cosmic equivalent of a nervous system. God is presumably not as dependent on particular bodily structures as we are. However, we would be abandoning the analogy if we said that God is a disembodied mind acting directly on the separate physical components of the world. It appears that we need a more pluralistic analogy allowing for interaction among a community of beings, rather than a monistic analogy that pictures us all as parts of one being. The world and God seem more like a community with a dominant member than like a single organism. 3.4. God as Communicator of Information In radio transmissions, computers, and biological systems, the communication of information between two points requires a physical input and an expenditure of energy (the Brillouin-Szilard relationship). But if God is omnipresent (including presence everywhere at the microlevel), no energy would be required for the communication of information. Moreover, the realization of alternative potentialities already present in the quantum world would convey differing information without any physical input or expenditure of energy. Arthur Peacocke has used a rich variety of analogies in addition to top-down causality. Some of these involve the communication of information. God is like the choreographer of a dance in which much of the action is left up to the dancers, or the composer of a still unfinished symphony, experimenting, improvising, and expanding on a theme and variations.39 Peacocke suggests that the purposes of God are communicated through the pattern of events in the world. We can look on evolutionary history as the action of an agent who expresses intentions but does not follow an exact predetermined plan. Moreover, an input of information from God could influence the relationships among our memories, images and concepts, just as our thoughts influence the
39 Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), chap. 3, and Theology for a Scientific Age, chap. 9.
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activity of neurons. Peacocke maintains that Christ was a powerfully God-informed person who was a uniquely effective vehicle for God’s self-expression, so that in Christ God’s purposes are more clearly revealed than in nature or elsewhere in history.40 John Polkinghorne proposes that God’s action is an input of “pure information.” We have seen that in chaos theory an infinitesimally small energy input produces a very large change in the system. Polkinghorne suggests that in imagining God’s action we might extrapolate chaos theory to the limiting case of zero energy. (This differs from quantum theory in which there actually is zero energy difference between alternative potentialities, so no extrapolation is needed). Polkinghorne holds that God’s action is a nonenergetic input of information which expresses holistic patterns. God’s selection among the envelope of possibilities present in chaotic processes could bring about novel structures and types of order exemplifying systemic higher-level organizing principles.41 The biblical idea of divine Word or Logos resembles the concept of information. In Greek thought, the Logos was a universal rational principle, but biblical usage also expressed the Hebrew understanding of Word as creative power. The Word in both creation and redemption can indeed be thought of as the communication of information from God to the world. As in the case of genetic information and human language, the meaning of the message must be discerned within a wider context of interpretation. God’s Word to human beings preserves their freedom because it evokes but does not compel their response.42 But the divine Logos is not simply the communication of an impersonal message since it is inseparable from an ongoing personal relationship. The Logos is not a structure of abstract ideas like Plato’s eternal forms, or like a computer program that exists independently of its embodiment in a particular medium or hardware system. If we believe that one of God’s purposes was to create loving and responsible persons, not simply intelligent information processors, we will have to draw our analogies
40
Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, chap. 9. John Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality (Philadelphia: Trinity International Press, 1991), Chap. 3; idem, “The Metaphysics of Divine Action” in Chaos and Complexity, Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke, eds; idem, The Faith of a Physicist (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 77–78. 42 John Puddefoot, “Information Theory, Biology, and Christology,” in Religion and Science: History, Method, Dialogue, W. Mark Richardson and Wesley J. Wildman, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1996). 41
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concerning the communication of information primarily from human life, rather than from the genetic code or computer programs.
4. God’s Action in Process Theology Process theology shows similarities with each of the four models above, but also differs because it adds a fifth idea, that of interiority. Christian process theology combines biblical thought with process philosophy, the attempt of Alfred North Whitehead and his followers to develop a coherent set of philosophical categories general enough to be applicable to all entities in the world. Process theology is advocated by Charles Birch and John Haught.43 4.1. Biology and Process Philosophy Many features of contemporary science are strongly represented in process philosophy. Whitehead was indebted to quantum physics for his portrayal of the discrete, episodic, and indeterminate character of all events. He was indebted to relativity for his view that all entities are constituted by their relationships. Process thought is evolutionary in stressing temporality and change. Becoming and activity are considered more fundamental than being and substance. The continuity of evolutionary history implies the impossibility of drawing absolute lines between successive life forms historically, or between levels of reality today.44 Each of the four themes outlined earlier can be found in process philosophy: a. Self-organization is a characteristic of the basic units of reality, which are momentarily unified events (Whitehead called them “actual occasions,” but I will refer to them simply as “events,” which reminds us of their temporal character). No event is merely a passive product of its past. All events are also products of present creative activity in which organization is realized—that is, pattern and structure which are temporal as well as spatial. But self-organization is analyzed by 43
Charles Birch and John Haught, in CTNS/VO, v. III. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1925); Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan,1929). See Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, chap. 8, or Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues, chap. 11. 44
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process thought in a distinctive way. Interiority is postulated in every event, providing a unifying center for the organizing activity. b. Indeterminacy is assumed by process thought not only in the quantum world but at all levels of integrated activity. Both order and openness are present at all levels. At lower levels, order predominates, while at higher levels there is more opportunity for spontaneity, creativity, and novelty. c. Top-down causality is defended in process writings. Process thought is holistic in portraying a network of interconnected events. Every event is a new synthesis of the influences on it; it occurs in a context which affects it and which it in turn affects. This can be called a relational or ecological view of reality. Not even God is self-contained, for God’s experience is affected by the world. More specifically, reality is taken to be multi-leveled. Events at high levels of complexity are dependent on events at lower levels. But genuinely new phenomena emerge at higher levels which cannot be explained by the laws describing lower-level phenomena. Charles Hartshorne’s version of process philosophy makes extensive use of the concept of hierarchical levels with differing characteristics, and he gives a careful critique of reductionism.45 d. The communication of information is not prominent in early process writings, which is not surprising since its scientific importance was not recognized prior to World War II. However the idea that a concrescing event takes other events into account resembles the contextual and relational character of information in action. James Huchingson notes that information always involves selection from among possible states; he proposes that Whitehead’s “actual occasions” are information-processing entities that select from among the possibilities provided by God and previous events. Moreover information from the world feeds back to God; this feedback leads to relevant readjustment, as in cybernetic systems. Huchingson finds holism and top-down causality in the role of information in both process thought and systems theory. A system works as a whole to restrict the ability of its components to realize all possible states. New forms of order are generated at higher levels of organization, according to both process and systems thinking.46
45
Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953). James Huchingson, “Organization and Process: Systems Philosophy and Whiteheadian Metaphysics,” Zygon 11.4 (1981): 226–41. 46
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4.2. Interiority Interiority is the most controversial theme in process thought. Reality is construed as a network of interconnected events which are also moments of experience, each integrating in its own way the influences from its past and from other entities. The evolution of interiority, like the evolution of physical structures, is said to be characterized by both continuity and change. The forms taken by interiority vary widely, from rudimentary memory, sentience, responsiveness and anticipation in simpler organisms, to consciousness and self-consciousness in more complex ones. Human life is the only point at which we know reality from within. If we start from the presence of both physical structures and experience in human life, we can imagine simpler and simpler structures in which experience is more and more rudimentary. But if we start with simple physical structures totally devoid of interiority, it is difficult to see how the complexification of external structures can result in interiority.47 The approach and avoidance reactions of bacteria can be considered elementary forms of perception and response. An amoeba learns to find sugar, indicating a rudimentary memory and intentionality. Invertebrates seem to have some sentience and capacity for pain and pleasure. Purposiveness and anticipation are clearly present among lower vertebrates, and the presence of a nervous system greatly enhances these capacities. The behavior of animals gives evidence that they suffer intensely, and even invertebrates under stress release endorphins and other pain-suppressant chemicals similar to those in human brains. Some species exhibit considerable problem-solving and anticipatory abilities and a range of awareness and feelings. Conceptualizing interiority requires that we try to look on an organism’s activities from its own point of view, even though its experience must be very different from our own.48 We noted earlier that evolutionary change can be initiated by the activity of organisms in selecting their own environments (the Baldwin effect). Their diverse responses and novel actions may create new 47 Charles Birch, A Purpose for Everything (Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third Publications, 1990); Birch and Cobb, The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 48 Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, 1981); Charles Birch and John B. Cobb, Jr., The Liberation of Life.
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evolutionary possibilities. Among the creatures who were the common ancestors of bison and horses, some charged their enemies head on, and their survival would have been enhanced by strength, weight, strong skulls and other bison-like qualities. Others in the same population fled from their enemies, and their survival depended on speed, agility, and other abilities we see in horses. The divergence of bison and horse may have arisen initially from different responses to danger, rather than from genetic mutations related to anatomy. Emotions and mental responses are not uniquely determined by the genes, though they occur in nervous systems which are the product of an inherited set of genes. Organisms participate actively in evolutionary history and are not simply passive products of genetic forces from within and environmental forces from without.49 In the study of human beings, psychology was once dominated by behaviorists who correlated observable stimuli and responses and claimed that mental life is inaccessible to science. But the more recent cognitive psychologists talk about perception, attention, memory, intention, mental representation and consciousness. These issues are highly disputed today, but some authors have been trying to relate data from three sources: phenomenological self-description, neurological research on the brain, and computer simulations of neural nets.50 Others insist that subjectivity, which always involves a particular perspective or point of view, cannot be represented in the objective framework of science.51 We are each aware of our experience despite the difficulty of studying it scientifically. It is this direct awareness that leads us to attribute subjectivity to other humans, animals, and even to lower forms of life. While the terms consciousness and mind should be restricted to organisms with a nervous system, it is reasonable to attribute rudimentary forms of perception and experience to organisms as simple as the amoeba. I would argue that in the light of evolutionary continuity and in the interest of metaphysical generality we should take experience as a category applicable to all integrated entities, even if consciousness appears only in higher life forms.
49 C.H. Waddington in Mind in Nature, John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Griffin, eds., (Washington DC: University Press of America, 1977). 50 Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). 51 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
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4.3. Christianity and Process Theology In process thought God is the source of order and also the source of novelty. God presents new possibilities to the world but leaves alternatives open, eliciting the response of entities in the world. God is present in the unfolding of every event but never exclusively determines the outcome. This is a God of persuasion rather than coercion. For process theologians, God is not as an omnipotent ruler but the leader and inspirer of an interdependent community of beings. John Cobb and David Griffin speak of God as “creative-responsive love” which affects the world but is also affected by it. God’s relation to human beings is used as a model for God’s relation to all beings.52 Process theologians stress God’s immanence and participation in the world, but they do not give up transcendence. God is said to be temporal in being affected by interaction with the world, but eternal and unchanging in character and purpose. Classical ideas of omnipresence and omniscience are retained, but not even God can know a future which is still open. Compared to the traditional Western model, God’s power over events in the world is severely limited, especially at lower levels where events are almost exclusively determined by their past. The long span of cosmic history suggests a patient and subtle God working through the slow emergence of novel forms. Christian process theologians hold that the life and death of Christ are the supreme examples of the power of God’s love and participation in the life of the world. The cross is a revelation of suffering love, and the resurrection reveals that even death does not end that love. Process thought shares insights with each of the theological models described earlier, but it differs at crucial points. a. Like God the designer of a self-organizing process, the God of process thought is the source of order in the world. But the process God is also directly involved in the emergence of novelty through the interiority of each unified event. Deism is avoided because God has a direct and continuing role in the history of the world. b. Like those who say that God determines quantum indeterminacies, process thinkers hold that God influences systems that are not fully determined by past events. It is never an absolute determination, 52 John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An Introduction (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976).
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for God always works along with other causes. In process thought God’s activity occurs at higher levels of organization in addition to the quantum level. This avoids a reliance on quantum events alone which would perpetuate the reductionist’s assumption that only bottom-up causality operates within natural systems. c. Like those who postulate God as top-down cause, process thinkers stress God’s immanence and participation in an interdependent many-leveled world. But process thought has no difficulty conceptualizing the interaction between the highest level (God) and the lowest (inanimate matter) in the absence of intermediate levels, because God is present in the unfolding of integrated events at all levels. Hartshorne has indeed used the analogy of the world as God’s body, though we must remember that in the process scheme the body is itself a community of integrated entities at various levels. Most process theologians, however, insist on a greater divine transcendence and greater human freedom than the analogy of a cosmic body suggests. Using a social rather than organic analogy they imagine us, not as cells in God’s body, but as members of a cosmic community of which God is the preeminent member. d. The idea that God communicates information to the world is consistent with process thought. God’s ordering and valuation of potentialities is a form of information within a larger context of meaning. God also receives information from the world, and God is changed by such feedback. The communication of information occurs within the momentary experience of integrated events at any level, rather than by bottom-up causality through quantum phenomena alone, or through the trigger points of chaos theory, or by top-down causality acting on the whole cosmos. God, past events, and the event’s present response join in the formation of every event. Process thought uses a single conceptual representation for divine action at all levels, whereas some of the authors mentioned earlier assume very different modes of divine action at various levels in the world. At the same time, process thought tries to allow for differences in the character of events that occur at diverse levels. The idea of God’s self-limitation or kenosis in recent theology is in many ways similar to the assertions of process theology. Some theologians have suggested that God voluntarily set omnipotence aside in creating a world. They hold that the life and death of Christ reveal a God of love who participates in the world’s suffering. They suggest
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that, like a wise teacher or the parent of a growing child, God respects the integrity of the created world and the freedom of human beings, but does not abandon them. They balance the classical emphasis on transcendence, eternity, and impassibility with a greater emphasis on God’s immanence, temporality, and vulnerability.53 Feminist authors have urged that patriarchal images of power as coercive control be replaced by the images of empowerment, nurture, and cooperation that are associated with women in our culture. They propose the image of God as Mother to balance the traditional image of God as Father.54 Many feminists are sympathetic to the idea of kenosis, but with the caveat that divine vulnerability and suffering love must not be cited to support the submission and self-abnegation of women. Power as control is a zero-sum game: the more one party has, the less the other can have. Power as empowerment is a positive-sum situation and does not imply weakness in either party. Empowerment and the nurturing of growth and interdependence also seem to be appropriate features of a model of God in an evolutionary world. Proponents of self-limitation hold that God is in principle omnipotent but voluntarily accepts a limitation of power in order to create a community of love and free response. The goal is relationship and transformation, not kenosis in itself. Moreover, the use of personal images of the relation between God and the world suggests that God might influence events in the world without controlling them, so we do not end up with a powerless or deistic God. God’s dialogic relation to human beings serves as a model of divine activity throughout nature. Process thought agrees with many of these assertions. However, it holds that the limitations of God’s power are not voluntary and temporary but metaphysical and necessary—though they are integral to God’s essential nature and not antecedent or external to it. The role of God in process thought has much in common with the biblical understanding of the Holy Spirit. Like the process God, the Spirit works from within. In various biblical passages, the Spirit is said to indwell, renew, empower, inspire, guide, and reconcile. According to 53 W.H. Vanstone, Love’s Endeavor, Love’s Expense (London: Dartmon, Longman, and Todd, 1977); Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 86–93; Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe. 54 Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroads, 1992).
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Psalm 104, the Spirit creates in the present: “Thou dost cause the grass to grow for the cattle and plants for man to cultivate. . . . When thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created; and thou renewest the face of the ground.” The Spirit represents God’s presence and activity in the world. This is an emphasis on immanence which, like that in process theology, does not rule out transcendence. Moreover, the Spirit is God at work in nature, in human experience, and in Christ, so creation and redemption are aspects of a single activity.55 Process thought similarly applies a single set of concepts to God’s role in human and nonhuman life, and it is not incompatible with the idea of particular divine action and human response in the life of Christ. The Holy Spirit comes to us from without to evoke our response from within. It is symbolized by the dove, the gentlest of birds. Other symbols of the Spirit are wind and fire, which can be more overpowering, but they usually represent inspiration rather than sheer power. I have elsewhere tried to show that the process view of God is consistent with other aspects of the biblical message.56 4.4. Some Objections Let me finally note some possible objections to process thought. a. Is panexperientialism credible? Process thinkers attribute rudimentary experience, feeling, and responsiveness to simple entities. They hold that mind and consciousness are present only at higher levels in more complex organisms, so they are not panpsychists as the term is usually understood. Rocks and inanimate objects are mere aggregates with no unified experience. There are no sharp lines between forms of life in evolutionary history or among creatures today. It appears that for matter to produce mind, in evolution or in embryological development, there must be intermediate stages or levels, and mind and matter must have some characteristics in common. No extrapolation of physical concepts can yield the concepts needed to describe our subjective experience. Process thought interprets lowerlevel events as simpler cases of higher-level ones, rather than trying
55 G.W.H. Lampe, God as Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); Alisdair Heron, The Holy Spirit (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983). 56 Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, 235–38.
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to interpret higher-level events in terms of lower-level concepts or resorting to dualism. However, Whitehead himself was so intent on elaborating a set of metaphysical categories applicable to all events that I believe he gave insufficient attention to the radically different ways in which those categories are exemplified at different levels. In that regard, Hartshorne, Griffin, and other more recent process thinkers are more helpful. I have also questioned whether Whitehead’s understanding of the episodic character of moments of experience provides an adequate view of human selfhood. I would argue that we can accept more continuity and a stronger route of inheritance of personal identity, without reverting to traditional categories of substance. b. Is this a God of the gaps? In earlier centuries, God was invoked as an explanation for what was scientifically unexplained. It was held that God intervened at discrete points in an otherwise law-abiding sequence. This was a losing strategy when the gaps in the scientific account were successively closed. According to process philosophy, by contrast, God does not intervene unilaterally to fill particular gaps. God is already present in the unfolding of every event, but no event is attributable to God alone. God and the creatures are co-creators. The role filled by God is not a gap of the kind that might be filled by science, which studies the causal influence of the past. The contribution of God cannot be separated out as if it were another external force, for it operates through the interiority of every entity, which is not accessible to science. God’s influence on lower-level events would be minimal, so it is not surprising that the evolution of new forms has been such a long, slow process. c. Can we worship a God of limited power? The God envisaged by process thought is less powerful than the omnipotent ruler of classical theology. But different kinds of power are effective in different ways. The power revealed in Christ is the power of love to evoke our response, rather than the power to control us externally. Moreover, the God of process thought is everlasting, omnipresent, unchanging in purpose, knows all that can be known, and has a universal role and priority in status reminiscent of many of the traditional divine attributes. But I would grant that the numinous experience of the holy and the Christian experience of worship seem to require a greater emphasis on transcendence than we find in Whitehead himself. We can adapt Whiteheadian categories to the theological task
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of interpreting the experience of the Christian community without accepting all of his ideas. d. Is process thought too philosophical? Metaphysical categories seem abstract and theoretical, far removed from the existential issues of personal life which are central in religion. Some process writers use a technical vocabulary which is understandable only after considerable study, though process ideas can be expressed in a more familiar vocabulary. No theologian can avoid the use of philosophical categories in the systematic elaboration of ideas. Augustine drew from Plato, Aquinas from Aristotle, Barth from Kant, and so forth. However, we do always need to return to the starting point of theological reflection in the formative events and characteristic experiences of the Christian community. Imaginative models are more important than abstract concepts in the daily life of the church. No model is a literal or exhaustive representation, and we can use different models to imagine different aspects of God’s relation to the world. In our search for universality we must be in dialogue with people in other social locations, since economic interests, cultural values, and gender affect all our interpretive categories. Perhaps, after all, we should return to the biblical concept of the Holy Spirit. This will help us to avoid the separation of creation and redemption that occurred in much of classical Christianity. It is free of the male imagery so prominent elsewhere in Christian history. It will help us recover a sense of the sacred in nature that can motivate a strong concern for the environment today. The Spirit is God working from within, both in human life and the natural world, which is consistent with process thought. The theme of the 1991 assembly of the World Council of Churches in Canberra, Australia, was a prayer in which we can join: “Come, Holy Spirit, renew thy whole creation.”
CHAPTER TWO
THE SOUND OF SHEER SILENCE: HOW DOES GOD COMMUNICATE WITH HUMANITY? Arthur Peacocke1
[Elijah] got up, and ate and drank; then he went in the strength of that food forty days and forty nights to Horeb the mount of God. At that place he came to a cave, and spent the night there. Then the word of the Lord came to him, saying, “What are you doing here, Elijah?” He answered, “I have been very zealous for the Lord, the God of hosts; for the Israelites have forsaken your covenant, thrown down your altars, and killed your prophets with the sword. I alone am left, and they are seeking my life, to take it away.” He said, “Go out and stand on the mountain before the Lord, for the Lord is about to pass by.” Now there was a great wind, so strong that it was splitting mountains and breaking rocks in pieces before the Lord, but the Lord was not in the wind; and after the wind an earthquake, but the Lord was not in the earthquake; and after the earthquake a fire, but the Lord was not in the fire; and after the fire a sound of sheer silence. When Elijah heard it, he wrapped his face in his mantle and went out and stood at the entrance of the cave. I Kings 19: 8–13 (NRSV)
1 This essay amplifies and extends a train of thought concerning the significance of “whole-part constraint” in relation to divine action which has engaged me since 1987; cf. fn. 1, p. 263, of my “God’s Interaction with the World,” in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy and Arthur Peacocke, eds. (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory; Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1995), henceforth CAC. I have used the term “wholepart constraint” to avoid any possible Humean implications of “downward/top-down causation” previously employed in this context. Perhaps this was unnecessarily cautious (cf. my guarded language in fn. 22, p. 272, in CAC!), since I continued to envisage a causative influence of the “whole” on the parts in complex systems (i.e., of the system on its constituents), as my essay in CAC, 272–76, 282–87, shows. Here I take the opportunity to emphasize this and to take account of other concepts that have been used to describe the whole-part and the mind-brain-body relation so that the inclusive notion of “whole-part influence” (as I here denote it) can be applied as an analogy for divine action, especially in relation to God’s communication with humanity, that is, with possible divine effects on human consciousness (an approach which I developed earlier in my Theology for a Scientific Age, 2nd enlarged edition, [London: SCM Press; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993], esp. in chap. 11—henceforth TSA).
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When Elijah in extremis and in flight from the wrath of Jezebel sought a message from God and stood expectantly on the “mount of God,” Horeb, what brought him to the mouth of his sheltering cave was not the great wind, the earthquake, or the fire, but—we are told—“a sound of sheer silence,” from the depths of which Elijah is addressed by God.2 The story encapsulates the directness and immediacy of such experiences and at the same time exemplifies their baffling character. For it is not only these archetypal figures and events in the tradition which have this character, but also the widespread “religious” experiences of humanity—both those inside and those outside of religious tradition.3 The content of such experiences will be the concern of the last section of this essay, but their very existence raises questions about the general nature of God’s interaction with the world and with humanity, especially when both are viewed in the contemporary perspectives of the natural and human sciences. The track of inquiries into “scientific perspectives on divine action” in the CTNS-Vatican Observatory series of research conferences has inevitably led to the question of how God possibly can communicate with a humanity that is part of the natural world and evolved in and from it. The natural and human sciences clearly provide a context entirely different from the cultural milieu of the legends concerning Elijah—and indeed from that of even a hundred years ago. The dominance of the essentially Greek, and unbiblical, notion in the Christian world that human beings consist of two distinct kinds of entity (or “substance”)—a mortal, physical body and an immortal “spirit” (or “soul”)—provided a deceptively obvious basis for envisaging how God and humanity might communicate. The divine “Spirit” was thought then to be in some way closely related to, and capable of communication with, the human “spirit”—both were capable of being, as it were, on the same wavelength for inter-communication. This ontology of “spirit” was not physicalist insofar as it was understood that “spirit” was not part of the
2 I Kings 19: 12 (NRSV). The implicit paradox is well illustrated by the alternative translations: “a low murmuring sound” (NEB); “a faint murmuring sound” (REB); “a sound of gentle stillness” (RV, footnote); and, of course, the familiar “a still small voice” of AV and RV. 3 See also sec. 4.1 below, “Revelation and ‘Religious Experience’,” and fn. 80.
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causal nexus of the physical and biological world which the natural sciences continue to explicate. The basis for such an ontology has been undermined by the general pressure of the relevant sciences towards a monistic nondualist view of humanity. In what follows we shall examine (2.1) the perspectives of science on the world4 and advocate an “emergentist monism” as the epistemology and ontology most appropriate to these perspectives. The relation of wholes to parts in the systems of the world, which bears upon how effects and influences are transmitted in the world, is discussed (2.2) and the idea of “whole-part influence” is again utilized (2.2.1). Other terms used in this context are also surveyed and related to this notion (2.2.2). The idea of a “flow of information” between, and even in, systems proves to be illuminating (2.3), especially when the world is viewed (2.4) as a “System-of-systems.” The mind-brain-body relation is considered (2.5) in the light of the foregoing and it transpires that the details of the relation between cerebral neurological activity and consciousness (the concern of many of the essays in this volume [Ed: v. IV of CTNS/VO Series, Neuroscience and the Person]) cannot in principle detract from or particularly illuminate the causal efficacy of the content of the latter on the former. In other words, “folk psychology” and the holistic language of personhood are held to be justified and vindicated. The nature of communication between persons is then analyzed (2.6) and found to be mediated entirely through patterns within the physical constituents of the world, consistently with the monist feature of this approach and without eliminating the place for consciousness and intention in interpersonal communication. With this as background, the inquiry can then move on to considering God’s interaction with the world (3) and to distinguishing between various modes of this relation (3.1). In section 3.2, reasons for eschewing any attribution of “intervention” by God will be given, while recognizing that the key problem of the “ontological gap(s)” at the “causal joint” of divine interaction may, in principle, never be soluble—though its location can usefully be discussed and affirmed to be holistic and everywhere. How God may be best conceived as bringing about events, or patterns of events, in the world will be addressed in section 3.3, and an earlier hypothesis of the author—of divine holistic action on the
4 Here, and elsewhere, the “world” = “all-that-is,” including humanity—that is, everything other than God.
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world-as-a-whole by “whole-part influence”—will be further developed. This leads to a reinstatement of the traditional model of God as a personal agent in the world, albeit in a new perspective. On this foundation it proves possible to move on to the question of how God could affect the content of human thinking instantiated in human-brains-in-human-bodies—that is, of how God could communicate with a humanity embodied in the natural world. This will entail consideration (4.1) of the status of what has traditionally been called “revelation” in human experience and, more particularly, religious experience. Finally, we can then examine (4.2) how God might be considered as communicating with humanity and whether such communication can be regarded as “personal.” As it happens, a perceptive—indeed magisterial—treatment earlier this century by Oliver Quick, in relation to sacramental theology, provides a useful conceptual framework for linking the steps in this inquiry.5 His approach was based on a working distinction in human experience which can be extended to God’s relation to the world. There are two ways, he suggested, in which “outward” things or realities—those which occupy space and time and are in principle, at least, perceptible to human senses (basically, the “physical”)—may be related to our “inward” mental lives, which do not occupy space and time and are not perceptible to the senses. The “outward” things or realities may take their character either (1) from what is done with them in implementing “inward” mental states; or (2) from what is known by and through them of “inward” mental states. The first is an instrumental relation and the second a symbolic one. This broad distinction in human experience has a parallel in God’s relations to the world, to “all-that-is,” which, in the Jewish and Christian monotheistic traditions, may be viewed (1) as the instrument whereby God is effecting some purpose by acting on and doing something with and through it; or (2) as the symbol in and through which God is signifying and expressing God’s eternal nature to those who have the ability to discern it. We need to postulate ways in which God can effect instrumentally particular events and patterns of events in the world, in order to render intelligible how God might be known symbolically through particular events or patterns of events. These are what they
5 Oliver C. Quick, The Christian Sacraments (London: Nisbet, 1927; repr. 1955), chap. 1.
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are, and not something else, because of God’s intention and purposes to communicate to humanity. Quick’s analysis points to the need to clarify the instrumental mode of God’s interaction with the world in order to underpin the possibility of God’s symbolic, communicating action on human-brains-in-human-bodies, that is, in our thinking. So what are the features of the world unveiled by the sciences that are relevant to such an inquiry?
2. The World 2.1. Scientific Perspectives on the World—Emergentist Monism The underlying unity of the natural world is testified to by its universal, embedded rationality which the sciences assume and continue to verify successfully. In the realm of the very small (the subatomic) and of the very large (the cosmic), the extraordinary applicability of mathematics—the free creation of human ratiocination in elucidating the structures, entities, and processes of the world—continues to reinforce that it is indeed one world. Yet, the diversity of the same world is apparent not only in the purely physical—molecules, the Earth’s surface, the immensely variegated denizens of the astronomical heavens—but even more strikingly in the biological world. New species continue to be discovered, in spite of the depredations caused by human action. This diversity has been rendered more intelligible in recent years by an increased awareness of the principles involved in the constitution of complex systems. There is even a corresponding “science of complexity” concerned with theories about such systems. It will be enough here to recognize that the natural (and also human) sciences increasingly give us a picture of the world as consisting of a complex hierarchy—or more accurately, hierarchies—a series of levels of organization of matter in which each successive member of the series is a whole constituted of parts preceding it in the series.6 The wholes are organized systems of 6 Conventionally, the series is said to run from the “lower” less complex systems to the “higher” more complex systems—from parts to wholes—so that these wholes themselves constitute parts of more complex entities, rather like a series of Russian dolls. In the complex systems I have in mind here, the parts retain their identity and properties as isolated individual entities. So the systems referred to are those which, loosely speaking, were the concern of the first phase of general systems theory. In those systems the parts (“elements”) of the complex wholes are physical entities (e.g., atoms,
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parts that are dynamically and spatially interrelated—a feature (sometimes called a “mereological” relation) which will concern us further below (section 2.2). This feature of the world is now widely recognized to be of significance in relating our knowledge of its various levels of complexity—that is, the sciences which correspond to these levels.7 It also corresponds not only to the world in its present condition but also to the way complex systems have evolved in time out of earlier simpler ones. What is significant about this process in time and about the relation of complex systems to their constituents now is that the concepts needed to describe and understand—as indeed also the methods needed to investigate—each level in the hierarchy of complexity are specific to and distinctive of those levels. It is very often the case (but not always) that the properties, concepts, and explanations used to describe the higher level wholes are not logically reducible to those used to describe their constituent parts, themselves often also constituted of yet smaller entities. This is an epistemological assertion of a nonreductionist kind, and its precise implications have been much discussed. With reference to a particular system whose constitutive parts (or “elements”) are stable (see footnote 6), I think it is possible to affirm that there can be “theory” autonomy in the sense indicated above (that is, the logical and conceptual nonreducibility of predicates, concepts, laws, etc., of the theories applied to the higher level) without there being “processautonomy” (defined to mean that the processes occurring at the higher level are more than an interlocking, in new relations, of the processes in which the constituent parts participate).8
molecules, cells) which are either individually stable or which undergo processes of change (as, e.g., in chemical reactions), themselves analyzable as being the interchange of stable parts (atoms in that case). The internal relations of such elements are not regarded as affected by their incorporation into the system. 7 See, e.g., TSA, 36–43, 214–18, and figure 3, based on a scheme of W. Bechtel and A. Abrahamson in their Connectionism and the Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), figure 8.1; for a bold extension of the schema developed there, see Nancey Murphy and George F.R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology and Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), chaps. 2, 4. 8 See the Appendix to this essay and my God and the New Biology (London: Dent, 1986, repr. Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1994), chaps. 1, 2, henceforth GNB. Whether or not this statement about theory- and process-autonomy applies to the relations between distinctive systems is a matter which will be examined further in sec. 2.4 and the Appendix. [Editors’ Note: the appendix to this essay is not included in the current volume].
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When the nonreducibility of properties, concepts, and explanations applicable to higher levels of complexity is well established, their employment in scientific discourse can often, but not in all cases, lead to a putative and then to an increasingly confident attribution of a causal efficacy to the complex wholes which does not apply to the separated, constituent parts, for “to be real, new, and irreducible . . . must be to have new, irreducible causal powers.”9 If this continues to be the case under a variety of independent procedures and in a variety of contexts, then new and distinctive kinds of realities at the higher levels of complexity may properly be said to have emerged.10 This can occur with respect either to moving synchronically up the ladder of complexity, or diachronically through cosmic and biological evolutionary history. This understanding accords with the pragmatic attribution, both in ordinary life and scientific investigation, of the term “reality” to that which we cannot avoid taking account of in our diagnosis of the course of events, in experience or experiments. Real entities have effects and play irreducible roles in adequate explanations of the world. We have been assuming, with the “physicalists,” that all entities, all concrete particulars in the world, including human beings, are constituted of fundamental physical entities—whatever it is that current physics postulates as the basic constituents of the world (which, of course, includes energy as well as matter). This is a monistic view (a constitutively-ontologically reductionist one)—everything can be broken down into fundamental physical entities and no extra entities are to be inserted at higher levels of complexity to account for their properties. I shall denote this position as that of “emergentist monism,” rather than as “nonreductive physicalism,” for those who adopt this latter label for their view, particularly in their talk of the “physical realization” of the mental in the physical, often seem to me to hold a much less realistic view of higher level properties than I wish to affirm
9 Samuel Alexander, as quoted by Jaegwon Kim, “Non-reductivism and Mental Causation,” in Mental Causation, John Heil and Alfred Mele, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 204. 10 William C. Wimsatt has elaborated criteria of “robustness” for such attributions of reality for emergent properties at the higher levels. These involve noting what is invariant under a variety of independent procedures; this is summarized in GNB, 27–28, from Wimsatt’s paper “Robustness, Reliability and Multiple-Determination in Science,” in Knowing and Validating in the Social Sciences: A Tribute to Donald T. Campbell, Marilynn Brewer and Barry Collins, eds. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981).
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here—and also not to attribute causal powers to that to which higherlevel concepts refer.11 If we do make such an ontological commitment about the reality of the “emergent” whole of a given total system, the question then arises: How is one to explicate the relation between the state of the whole and the behavior of parts of that system at the micro-level? The simple concept of chains of causally related events (A→B→C . . .) in constant conjunction (à la Hume) is inadequate for this purpose. Extending and enriching the notion of causality now becomes necessary because of new insights into the way complex systems in general and biological ones in particular behave. This subtler understanding of how higher levels influence the lower levels, and vice versa, still allows application in this context of the notion of a “causal” relation from whole to part (of system to constituent)—never ignoring, of course, the “bottom-up” effects of parts on wholes, for the properties of wholes depend on the properties of the parts being what they are. 2.2. The Relation of Wholes and Parts in Complex Systems A number of related concepts have been developed in recent years to describe these relations in both synchronic and diachronic systems—that is, respectively, both those in some kind of steady state with stable, characteristic emergent features of the whole, and those which display an emergence of new features in the course of time.
11 My view of emergent monism is in harmony with that of Philip Clayton, to whom I am much indebted for his shrewd and useful comments on this essay. Note that the term “monism” is emphatically not intended (as is apparent from the nonreductive approach adopted here) in the sense in which it is taken to mean that physics will eventually explain everything. Note also that this position is distinct from that of “dual-aspect monism” or “two-aspect monism,” which could appear to be purely epistemological, being about how an entity is viewed from two different perspectives. Even when the “two” and “dual” refer to distinct properties of a single entity, there is not in these terms any implication of a causal relation between the “aspects” (any more than between the wave and particle aspects of the single entity of the electron). Talk of “two aspects” is not strong enough to include an affirmation that the higher level is real and has causal efficacy.
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2.2.1. Whole-Part Influence (or Constraint) The term “downward-causation” or “top-down causation” was, as far as I can ascertain, first employed by Donald Campbell12 to denote the way in which the network of an organism’s relationships to its environment and its behavior patterns together determine in the course of time the actual DNA sequences at the molecular level present in an evolved organism—even though, from a “bottom-up” viewpoint, a molecular biologist would tend to describe the organism’s form and behavior, once in existence, as a consequence of those same DNA sequences. Campbell cites as an example the evolutionary development of efficacious jaws made of suitable proteins in a worker termite. There are imprecisions and a lack of generalizability in Campbell’s example and I prefer to use actual complex systems to clarify this suggestion. One could cite, for example, the Bénard phenomenon13—at a critical point a fluid heated uniformly from below in a containing vessel ceases to manifest the entirely random “Brownian” motion of its molecules, but displays up and down convective currents in columns of hexagonal cross-section. Moreover, certain auto-catalytic reaction systems (for example, the famous Zhabotinsky reaction and glycolysis in yeast extracts) display spontaneously, often after a time interval from the point when first mixed, rhythmic temporal and spatial patterns the forms of which can even depend on the size of the containing vessel. Many examples are now known also of dissipative systems which, because they are open, a long way from equilibrium, and nonlinear in certain essential relationships between fluxes and forces, can display large-scale patterns
12 Donald T. Campbell, “‘Downward Causation’ in Hierarchically Organized Systems,” in Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems, Francisco J. Ayala and Theodosius Dobzhansky, eds. (London: Macmillan, 1974), 179–86. A valuable and perspicacious account (with which I entirely agree) of emergent order, top-down causation (fully illustrated by its operation in the hierarchical organization of the modern digital computer), and the physical mediation of top-down effects has been given in Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe, 22–32. For brevity here, I refer the reader to that recent excellent exposition. For earlier expositions of the hierarchies of complexity, of the relation of scientific concepts applicable to wholes to those applicable to the constituent parts, and of top-down/downward causation and whole-part influence (as discussed below), see GNB, chaps. 1, 2; TSA, 39–41, 50–55, 213–18 (esp. figure 3); and CAC, 272–76. 13 For a survey with references, see Arthur Peacocke, The Physical Chemistry of Biological Organization (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, 1989), henceforth PCBO.
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in spite of random motions of the units—“order out of chaos,” as Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers dubbed it.14 In these examples, the ordinary physico-chemical account of the interactions at the micro-level of description simply cannot account for these phenomena. It is clear that what the parts (molecules and ions, in the Bénard and Zhabotinsky cases) are doing and the patterns they form are what they are because of their incorporation into the system-as-a-whole—in fact these are patterns within the systems in question. This is even clearer in the much more complex, and only partly understood, systems of genes switching on and off and their interplay with cell metabolism and specific protein production in the processes of development of biological forms. The parts would not be behaving as observed if they were not parts of that particular system (the “whole”). The state of the system-as-a-whole is affecting (that is, acting like a cause on) what the parts, the constituents, actually do. Many other examples of this kind could be taken from the literature on, for example, self-organizing and dissipative systems15 and also economic and social ones.16 We do not have available for such systems any account of events in terms of temporal, linear chains of causality as previously conceived (A→B→C→ . . .). Hence, in my recent writings I adopted the term “whole-part constraint” to describe the effects on the constituent parts of their being incorporated into systems of this kind, because the term “causation” often has tended to denote simply a regular chain of events (sometimes, too, simply in terms of a Humean conjunction). A wider use of “causality” and “causation” is now needed to include the kind of whole-part, higher- to lower-level, relationships that the sciences have themselves recently been discovering in complex systems, especially the biological and neurological ones. Here the term “whole-part influence,” will be used to represent the net effect of all those ways in which the system-as-a-whole, operating from its “higher” level, is a causal factor in what happens to its constituent parts, the “lower” level. Such a “causal” relation within a particular system is one that relates entities which are, because of the mereological
14 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos (London: Heinemann, 1984). 15 PCBO; Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos; Niels H. Gregersen, “The Idea of Creation and the Theory of Autopoietic Processes,” Zygon 33 (1998): 333–67. 16 Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos.
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nature of the system, in some sense the same; so this “causal” relation might, adding confusion, entice some to regard the higher level as possessing a somewhat “metaphysical” character. 2.2.2. Other Analyses Various interpretations have been deployed by other authors to represent this whole-part relation in different kinds of systems (and notably the mind-brain-body one—see section 2.5), though not usually with causal implications. a. Structuring causes. The notion of whole-part influence is germane to one that Niels Gregersen has recently employed17 in his valuable discussion of autopoietic (self-making) systems—namely that of structuring causes, as developed by Fred Dretske18 for understanding mental causation. Gregersen and Dretske refer to the event(s) that produced the hardware conditions (actual electrical connections in the computer) and the word-processing program (software) as the “structuring causes” of the cursor movement on the screen connected with the computer; whereas the “triggering cause” is usually pressure on a key on the keyboard. The two kinds of causes exhibit a different relationship to their effects. A triggering one falls into the familiar (Humean) pattern of constant conjunction. However, a structuring cause is never sufficient to produce the particular effect (the key still has to be pressed); there is no constant relationship between structuring cause and effect. In the case of complex systems, such as those already mentioned, the system-as-a-whole often has the role, I suggest, of a structuring cause in Dretske’s sense. This idea helps in responding to two features that Thomas Tracy19 has found to be problematic in my own earlier use of “top-down” explanations.20 Tracy was, firstly, concerned with the supposition that 17
Gregersen, “The Idea of Creation.” Fred Dretske, “Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior,” in Mental Causation, 121–36. Another example of his is as follows. A terrorist plants a bomb in the general’s car. The bomb stays there until the general gets into the car and turns the ignition key and then is killed by the detonation of the bomb. The “triggering cause” of his death is his turning on the engine, but the “structuring cause” is the terrorist’s action. 19 Thomas F. Tracy, “Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps,” in CAC, 306–7, fn. 39. 20 In the first 1990 edition of TSA and before my espousing the of “whole-part constraint” in the 1993 enlarged edition of TSA and, more especially, in CAC, 263–87. 18
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“top-down explanations cannot be analyzed in terms of structures of bottom-up explanation.”21 The particular examples of systems already given and the considerations which lead to distinguishing structuring from triggering causes serve to explain why such “top-down” explanations could not, by their very nature, be analyzed in “bottom-up” terms. That is the whole point of identifying them as such. For example, in the Bénard case, it is not the properties, as such, of the individual molecules of the water in a heated beaker which explains why they suddenly abandon random collisions and move in serried ranks with the same velocity in one direction at the critical point—or why suddenly, in the Zhabotinsky reaction, in a particular spatially defined band at certain (periodic) positions vertically in the reaction test tube, all the cerous irons should become ceric. In both examples, it is a distinctive structuring property of the whole, and of the new relations among the constituents involved, that is the operative factor. Tracy also finds problematic “the move from whole-part explanation to treating the whole (or the nature of the system) as a cause.”22 I have shared this concern, for that is why I moved away from Campbell’s terminology of “causation.”23 However, provided “causation” is given a wider than chain-sequence (Humean) sense consistent with the holistic behavior of complexes, as already discussed, it can still be applied to the whole-part relation. b. Propensities. The category of “structuring cause” is closely related to that of propensities developed by Karl Popper, who pointed out that “there exist weighted possibilities which are more than mere possibilities, but tendencies or propensities to become real”24 and that these “propensities in physics are properties of the whole situation and sometimes even of the particular way in which a situation changes. And the same holds of the propensities in chemistry, biochemistry, and in biology.”25 Hence Popper’s “propensities”26 are the effects of Dretske’s structuring causes in the case that triggering causes are random in their operation (that is, genuinely random, no “loading of the dice”).
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Tracy, “Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps.” Ibid. 23 In CAC, 272, fn. 22. 24 Karl Popper, A World of Propensities (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990), 12. 25 Ibid., 17. 26 Cf. my urging in TSA that there are propensities in biological evolution, favored by natural selection, to complexity, self-organization, information-processing and–storage, and so to consciousness. 22
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c. Boundary (limiting) conditions. In the discussion of the relations between properties of a system-as-a-whole and the behavior of its constituent parts, some authors refer to the boundary conditions that are operating.27 It can be a somewhat misleading term—“limiting condition” would be better but I will continue to use it only in this wider, Polanyian, sense. A more recent, sophisticated development of these ideas has been proffered by Bernd-Olaf Küppers: [T]he [living] organism is subservient to the manner in which it is constructed . . . Its principle of construction represents a boundary condition under which the laws of physics and chemistry become operational in such a way that the organism is reproductively self-sustaining. . . . [T]he phenomenon of emergence as well as that of downward causation can be observed in the living organism and can be coupled to the existence of specific boundary conditions posed in the living matter.28
Thus a richer notion of the concept of boundary conditions is operative in systems as complex as living ones. The simpler forms of the idea of “boundary condition” as applied, for example, by Polanyi to machines are not adequate to express the causal features basic to biological phenomena. Indeed the “boundary conditions” of a system will have to include not only purely physical factors on a global scale, but also complex inter-systemic interactions between type-different systems (see section 2.4 below). Willem Drees has also emphasized, with respect to the Bénard phenomenon, the role of the conditions at the actual, physical boundary of the fluid in its physical environment in determining the behavior of the billions of constituent molecules. He asserts that in this case one could replace the term “top-down” causation by “environment-system” interaction. The environment determining the temperature is simply a physical system so, he argues, . . . There is no sense in which the system-as-a-whole has a specific, “emergent” causal influence. All the causal influences can be traced locally
27 For example, Michael Polanyi, “Life Transcending Physics and Chemistry,” Chemistry and Engineering News (August 21, 1967): 54–66; and idem, “Life’s Irreducible Structure,” Science 160 (1968): 1308–12. In his discussion, and mine in this essay, the term “boundary condition” is not being used, as it often is, to refer either to the initial (and in that sense “boundary”) conditions of, say, a partial differential equation as applied in theoretical physics, or to the physical, geometrical boundary of a system. 28 Bernd-Olaf Küppers, “Understanding Complexity,” in CAC, 100.
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But the system is what has a boundary—and only the system can have it. It is because the system-as-a-whole is an entity, immersed in a conditioning environment with which it has a boundary, that it undergoes holistic reorganization of its constituent units. Indeed the Bénard phenomenon is independent of the shape of the container provided its dimensions are large with respect to convection cell size (the very condition that makes physical boundary effects negligible). The theory that has to give an intelligible account of all this has to deal with properties of the system-as-a whole—the temperature dependence of the viscosity and density of aggregates of molecules, their thermal conductivity and the mutual interplay of all these factors together in the behavior of the whole assembly. It is not enough, therefore, to pinpoint only the “environment-system” interaction as uniquely determinative. For it is only because of the nature of the entire system-as-a-whole that under such boundary conditions the constituent molecules manifest their unexpected, bizarre behavior. It is a case of “whole-part influence” in the sense defined above. There is a sense in which the system-as-a-whole, because of its distinctive configuration, can constrain and influence the behavior of the parts to be otherwise than if they were isolated from this particular system. Yet the system-as-a-whole would not be describable by the concepts and laws of that level and still have the properties it does have, if the parts (in the Zhabotinsky case, the ceric and cerous ions) were not of the particular kind they are. What is distinctive in the system-as-awhole is the new kind of interrelations and interactions, spatially and temporally, of the parts. d. Supervenience. Another, much debated term which has been used in this connection, especially in describing the relation of mental events to neurophysiological ones in the brain, is that of “supervenience.” The term, which does not usually imply any “whole-part” causative relation, goes back to Donald Davidson’s employment of it in expounding his view of the mind-brain-body relation as “anomalous monism.”30 The 29
Willem B. Drees, Religion, Science and Naturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), 102. 30 Donald Davidson, “Mental Events,” in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
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various meanings and scope of the term in this context had been formulated and classified by Jaegwon Kim as involving: the covariance of the supervenient properties with, the dependency of the supervenient properties on, and the nonreducibility of the supervenient properties to, their base properties.31 Another definition has been proposed elsewhere by Nancey Murphy.32 In the wider context of hierarchical systems (prescinding from the mind-brain-body problem, for the moment—see section 2.5 below) the term “supervenience” may be taken to refer to the relation between properties of the same system that pertain to different levels of analysis . . . higher-level properties supervene on lower-level properties if they are partially constituted by the lower-level properties but are not directly reducible to them.33 One can ask the question: [H]ow are the properties characteristic of entities at a given level related to those that characterize entities of adjacent levels? Given that entities at distinct levels are ordered by the part-whole relation, is it the case that properties associated with different levels are also ordered by some distinctive and significant relationship?34
The attribution of “supervenience” asserts primarily that there is a necessary covariance between the properties of the higher level and those of the lower level. When the term “supervenience” was first introduced its attribution did not imply a causal influence of the supervenient level on the subvenient one.35 Its appropriateness is questionable for analyzing whole-part relations, which by their very nature relate, with respect to complex systems, entities that are in some sense the same. Yet, in the context of the physical and biological (and, it must also be said, ecological and social) worlds, the mutual interrelations between whole and parts in any internally hierarchically organized system often, 31 Jaegwon Kim, “Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 257–70; repr. in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 32 Nancey Murphy, “Supervenience, and the Downward Efficacy of the Mental: A Nonreductive Physicalist Account of Human Action,” in CTNS/VO, v. IV. 33 Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe, 23. 34 Kim, “Non-reductivism and Mental Causation,” in Mental Causation, 191. 35 However, utilizing her definition of supervenience, Nancey Murphy has suggested (personal communication, July, 1998) “that the supervenient level may involve additional circumstances that cannot be described at the subvenient level, and these additional circumstances can have a causal impact on the series of events. Thus, the causal connections will show up (be intelligible) only at the supervenient level of description.”
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we have seen, appear to involve causal effects of the whole on the parts. We shall continue, therefore, to use the term “whole-part influence,”36 rather than the terms 1–4 above, to refer to the subtle interlocking influences of the whole of any particular hierarchically organized system on its constituent parts. 2.3. Flow of Information A general concept which has often been found to be applicable to understanding the relation between higher and lower levels in a single, hierarchically stratified complex system is that of there being a flow of information from the higher to the lower level. The higher level is seen as constraining and shaping the patterns of events occurring among the constituent units of the lower one. Although “information” is a concept distinct from those of matter and energy, in actual systems no information flows without some exchange of energy and/or matter. Nevertheless, as an interpretative concept it is useful not only in the more obvious context of the mind-brain-body relation but also in considering the relation of environment to biological processes, including that of evolution.37 Thus, the case of the worker termite cited by Donald Campbell could well be interpreted as manifesting a temporal flow of information: information about the environment is, over a long period of time, impressed indirectly (via the effect of the environment on the viability of organisms possessing mutated DNA) on the DNA. This DNA then shapes the functioning of the organism that is capable of producing viable progeny. The concept of information is indeed apt for situations in which a form at one level influences forms at lower levels. This process can at least be conceived as a process of transfer of information, as distinct from energy or matter. John Puddefoot has usefully distinguished between: a. “Information” in the physicists’, communication engineers’, and brain scientists’ sense, that of C.E. Shannon—the sense in which “information” is related to the probability of one outcome or case
36
It must be stressed that the “whole-part” relation is not regarded here necessarily, or frequently, as a spatial one. “Whole-part” is synonymous with “system-constituent.” 37 Cf. Jeffrey S. Wicken, Evolution, Information and Thermodynamics: Extending the Darwinian Paradigm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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selected out of many, probable outcomes or cases. In this sense it is, in certain circumstances, the negative of entropy. b. “Information” in the sense of the Latin informare, meaning “to give shape or form to.” Thus, “information” is “the action of informing with some active or essential quality,” as the noun corresponding to the transitive verb “to inform,” in the sense of “To give ‘form’ or formative principle to; hence to stamp, impress, or imbue with some specific quality or attribute” (quotation from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, sense II). c. “Information” in the ordinary sense of “that of which one is appraised or told” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, sense I.3).38 Puddefoot points out that information 1 is necessary to shape or give form, as information 2, to a receptor. If that receptor is the brain of a human being, then inter alia information 3 is conveyed. In this essay the term “information” (as well as its associates) is being broadly used to represent this whole process of 1 becoming 3—and only modulating to 3 when there is a specific reference to human brain processes in which 1 acquires meaning for human beings. Briefly, the mathematical (often digital) information 1 is the necessary basis of 2 (often “syntax”) which can in human mental experience become 3, with semantic content. I am not intending here in any way to imply that 3 is reducible to 1—that semantics is reducible to syntax—only that 1 is the necessary pre-condition for the manifestation and emergence of 3.39 Information 1 and 2 are often applicable to the higher- to lower-level interactions in hierarchically stratified physical and biological systems. The transition from information 1 and 2 to information 3 is, of course, ambivalently related to the opaque mind-brain-body relation, though it has been widely employed in that context. The concept of information 1, or its flow, has been used to attempt to define living entities40 but biologists have often been skeptical as to its general usefulness in,
38 John C. Puddefoot, “Information and Creation,” in The Science and Theology of Information, C. Wassermann, R. Kirby, and B. Rordoff, eds. (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1992), 15 (my numbering). For further discussion, especially in relation to biological complexity, see PCBO, 259–63, and in relation to evolution, 263–68. 39 The transition from 1 to 3 is also closely akin to that from semiotics to semantics and coheres well with the emergentist-monist position. 40 See PCBO, 259–63; Frank J. Tipler, The Physics of Immortality (London: Macmillan, 1995), 124–27.
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for example, understanding development,41 though it has an obvious application—one which was of historical significance—in interpreting the relation between nucleotide sequences in DNA and amino acid sequences in proteins and so in relation to heredity, that is, to “genetic information.” The notion of “flow of information” is therefore a conceptual tool ready to hand, as it were, to interpret the relation of higher to lower levels in a particular hierarchically stratified complex, but it must be used warily. But what of the relation between distinct systems? To this latter issue we must now turn. 2.4. The World-as-a-Whole 42—An Interconnected and Interdependent “System-of-Systems” The world consists of myriads of individual systems which are themselves very often hierarchically stratified complex systems of stable parts. We have been exploring their internal (“whole-part”) relationships. But these individual systems themselves can interact in a highly ramified manner across space and time. For distant events in space (for example, flaring spots on the Sun shower cosmic rays on the Earth which affect its climate and the evolution of its living organisms); and in time (for example, the elliptical orbits of the planets about the Sun, hence the seasons of terrestrial life; and the relation of the Earth’s axis to the plane of its motion to the north-south seasonal patterns). The individual systems of the world are increasingly demonstrated by the sciences to be interconnected and interdependent in multiple ways with, of course, great variations in the strengths of mutual coupling. Thus all wave functions of all sub-atomic particles (indeed of all matter) only go asymptotically to zero at an infinite distance from their maximal value, so that there is a finite, if small, chance of finding that particular particle anywhere.43 On the Earth’s surface, the ecological interconnectedness of
41 Michael J. Apter and L. Wolpert, “Cybernetics and Development. I. Information Theory,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 8 (1965): 244–57. 42 By the “world-as-a-whole,” I here mean all-that-is, or ever has been; all that is created, i.e., all that is not God. (The outer dashed circle in figure 1 on p. 85 is meant to denote this). 43 Recall also the notorious gravitational effect of the motion of an electron at the edge of, say, our galaxy on the collisions of macroscopic billiard balls; Michael Berry, “Breaking the Paradigm of Classical Physics from Within,” Cercy Symposium on Logique et Théorie des Catastrophes, 1983.
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all forms of life (including human), as well as their matter and energy cycles, themselves related to atmospheric and geological ones, has in recent years become increasingly apparent in all its baffling intricacies. These interactions between individual systems over space and time are as real in their mutual influencing as anything else described by the natural sciences, and their existence cannot be ignored in our reflections on the nature of the world and of God’s relation to it, simply because we can never have one comprehensive theory of them. This character of the world-as-a-whole suggests that it is metaphysically plausible to perceive it as a System-of-systems (using the word “system” with the weight already attached to it in the light of complexity theory of individual systems). Such an epistemological assertion would have, as always, a putative ontological significance. In that case, the “world-as-a-whole” is not “simply a concept”44 nor “an abstract description,”45 but could at least provisionally be regarded as an holistic reality at its own level—even if the coupling between systems is much looser and more diffuse, and therefore less classifiable, than it is within a particular individual hierarchically stratified system clearly demarcated from its environment. The apprehension of all-that-is in its holistic unity as a System-of-systems is, of course, scarcely vouchsafed to the limited horizons and capacities of humanity, though every advance in the sciences serves to reveal further cross-connections between its component systems. Such interconnectedness would be transparent to the omniscient Creator, who continuously gives its constituents and its processes existence and in Whom all-that-is exists, from a sacramental, panentheistic perspective. The relation between higher and lower levels within an individual hierarchically stratified system I have been designating by the pantechnicon term “whole-part influence.”46 This influence, I suggested, can often be regarded as a flow of information. We now have to ask: Can these notions be applied to the relations between systems in the world-as-a-whole? In order to respond to this question, it turns out
44 Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Providence in an Indeterministic World,” CTNS Bulletin, 14.1 (Winter, 1994): 26. 45 Idem. “Three Types of Indeterminacy,” in The Concept of Nature in Science and Theology, part I, vol. 3 of Studies in Science and Theology of the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1995), 175. 46 See sec. 2.2 above.
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to be necessary to clarify the relation between theory- and processautonomy and this issue is discussed in the Appendix. There I conclude that, although theory-autonomy can occur without process-autonomy with respect to the internal relations of a particular system of stable parts, in the relation between two mutually interacting type-different systems both the theories applicable to and processes of each can be autonomous with respect to the other. From that discussion it transpires that we shall have to recognize that the interactions and relations between distinctive systems are unlikely to be describable in the same way as those within hierarchically stratified systems of stable parts. We are regarding the world as a “System-ofsystems,” but not as a hierarchically stratified one, so that the principles of “weak” nonreducibility do not have to apply to the relation between the component systems of the world.47 Indeed, if we could have a cosmic-global science of the world-as-a-whole as a System-of-systems, the theories (and predicates, concepts, laws, etc.) of that science would be expected to manifest not only theory-autonomy but also ex hypothesi process-autonomy since the processes going on in that whole System consist of the changing relations among type-different component systems (often containing type-different component parts). Earlier we noted that when a particular hierarchical system was considered, the idea that there can be envisaged a “flow of information” from the higher level to the lower one could sometimes be usefully employed. Is this notion of the “flow of information” any help in thinking of the multiple interactions between individual systems in the world “System”? Such interactions are obviously highly variegated, multiple, and overlapping, as Gregersen says, for “we face a criss-cross interpenetration of different kinds of operational systems . . . a world of naturally polycentric systems . . ., a nexus of realities,48 or “a network of influences.”49 47 For “weak” nonreducibility, see the Appendix. If the systems in question are themselves part of an actual hierarchy of organization and are themselves stable, then the analysis may well revert to that applicable to the internal relationships within a larger hierarchical system of stable parts, each of which is then itself a system. For the world-as-a-whole, it is the interaction between systems not so described that is chiefly under consideration—“ . . . the reality of the ‘world as a whole’ is itself a result of the interpenetrations between the type- and code-different systems observed . . . ” (Gregersen, “The Idea of Creation and the Theory of Autopoietic Processes,” 337). 48 Ibid. 49 Gregersen (personal communication, 12 November, 1996), describing my own view.
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The world may be conceived of as an interconnected web of type-different systems interacting in specific ways and mutually influencing each other.50 A common factor then discernible in the multiple interactions between such systems (in the whole cosmic System) is the transfer of information whereby patterns of events in one system affect patterns of events in another—and the interchange between the myriad systems of energy and/or matter are ex hypothesi variegated beyond the possibility of generalization. The use of the concept of information is thus particularly apt for elucidating these interactions since it is, conceptually at least, independent of those of matter and energy—though in nature it never occurs without their exchange. 2.5. The Mind-Brain-Body Relation and Personhood Much of the discussion of the relation of higher levels to lower ones in hierarchically stratified systems has centered on the mind-brain-body relation, on how mental events are related to neurophysiological ones in the human-brain-in-the-human-body—in effect the whole question of human agency and what we mean by it. A hierarchy of levels can be delineated,51 each of which is the focus of a corresponding scientific study, from neuroanatomy and neurophysiology to psychology. Those involved in studying “how the brain works” have come to recognize that properties not found in components of a lower level can emerge from the organization and interaction of these components at a higher level. For example, rhythmic pattern generation in some neural circuits is a property of the circuit, not of isolated pacemaker neurons. Higher brain functions (e.g., perception, attention) may depend on temporally coherent functional units distributed through different maps
50 Gregersen (personal communication, March, 1998) has expressed this point to me thus: “[P]erhaps the most curious feature about our universe is that it starts out as a unity and ends up in a plurality of systems . . . . forever based on the same uniform matter, always interacting with one another in ever-new constellations of mutual influences (thus certainly interlocked) but nonetheless appearing in type-different forms, thus also operating by virtue of type-different causalities” (emphasis original). 51 As indicated in the legend to fig. 1 on p. 85, where the schema of Patricia S. Churchland and T.J Sejnowski is depicted (“Perspectives in Cognitive Neuroscience” Science 242 [1988]: 741–45). The physical scales of these levels are, according to these authors, as follows: molecules, 10–10m; synapses, 10–6m; neurons, 10–4m; networks, 10–3m; maps, 10–2m; systems, 10–1m; central nervous system, 1m, in human beings.
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and nuclei.52 So that even an in-principle physicalist, such as Patricia Churchland, can express (with T.J. Sejnowski) the aim of research in cognitive neuroscience thus: The ultimate goal of a unified account does not require that it be a single model that spans all the levels of organization. Instead the integration will probably consist of a chain of models linking adjacent levels. When one level is explained in terms of a lower level this does not mean that the higher level theory is useless or that the high-level phenomena no longer exist. On the contrary, explanations will coexist at all levels, as they do in chemistry and physics, genetics and embryology.53
The still intense philosophical discussion of the mind-brain-body relation has been broadly concerned with attempting to elucidate the relation between the “top” level of human mental experience and the lowest, bodily physical levels. In recent decades it has often involved considering the applicability and precise definition of some of the terms used above in section 2.2 to relate higher levels to lower ones in hierarchically stratified systems. The question of what kind of “causation,” if any, may be said to be operating from a “top-down,” as well as the obvious and generally accepted “bottom-up,” direction is still much debated in this context.54 Earlier (section 2.2), when discussing the general relation of wholes to constituent parts in a hierarchically stratified complex system of stable parts, I used “whole-part influence” and other terms and maintained that a nonreductionist view of the predicates, concepts, laws, etc., applicable to the higher level could be coherent. Reality could, it was argued, putatively be attributed to that to which these nonreducible, higher-level predicates, concepts, laws, etc., applied; and these new realities, with their distinctive properties, could properly be called “emergent.” When this emergentist monist approach is applied to the mental activity of the human-brain-in-the-human-body then, “we must look to vernacular [“folk”] psychology and its characteristic intentional idioms of belief, desire, and the rest, and their intentional analogues in systematic psychology” in order to elucidate its nature.55
52 Terrence J. Sejnowski, C. Koch, and P. Churchland, “Computational Neuroscience,” Science 241 (1988): 1299–1306, see p. 1300. 53 Churchland and Sejnowski, “Perspectives in Cognitive Neuroscience,” 744. 54 See, for example, the collection of papers in Mental Causation, Heil and Mele, eds. 55 Kim, “Non-reductivism and Mental Causation,” 193.
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Mental properties are now widely regarded by philosophers as epistemologically irreducible to physical ones, indeed as “emergent” from them, but also dependent on them56—similar terms have been used to describe the relation of “higher” to “lower” levels as in the context of nonconscious, complex systems (see section 2.2.2). In the mind-brain-body case the idea that mental properties can be “physically realized” has also been much deployed.57 Jaegwon Kim has argued that, if this latter concept (which overlaps that of supervenience in many treatments) is taken to mean that a microstructure physically realizes a mental property by being a sufficient cause for that property, and if for mental properties to be real is for them to have new, irreducible causal powers, then the nonreductive physicalist is thereby committed to downward causation (in a strong nomological sense) from the mental to the physical levels.58 Kim then argues that, because there is complete causal closure at the physical level alone, mental properties cannot, in fact, have real causal powers irreducible to physical ones. Hence there is a conflict between the postulate of downward causation (derived from the nonreducibility, and the need for causal efficacy, of the mental) and the physicalist’s assumption that a complete physical
56 Broadly, this is the “nonreductive physicalist” view of the mental-physical relation, which has been summarized (ibid., 198) as follows: a. Physical Monism. All concrete particulars are physical. b. Anti-reductionism. Mental properties are not reducible to physical properties. c. The Physical Realization Thesis. All mental properties are physically realized; that is, whenever an organism, or system, instantiates a mental property M, it has some physical property P such that P realizes M in organisms of its kind. d. Mental Realism. Mental properties are real properties of objects and events; they are not merely useful aids in making predictions or fictitious manners of speech. 57 The idea of mental states being “physically realized” in neurons was expanded as follows by John Searle, Minds, Brain and Science, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 26 (emphasis added): Consciousness . . . is a real property of the brain that can cause things to happen. My conscious attempt to perform an action such as raising my arm causes the movement of the arm. At the higher level of description, the intention to raise my arm causes the movement of the arm. At the lower level of description, a series of neuron firings starts a chain of events that results in the contraction of the muscles . . . [T]he same sequence of events has two levels of description. Both of them are causally real, and the higher-level causal features are both caused by and realized in the structure of the lower level elements. What follows in the main text here shows that I am not satisfied with Searle’s parallelism between the causality of the mental and physical; it is not enough. I argue later on in this essay for a joint causality whereby the mental influences the physical level in the brain. 58 Kim, “Non-reductivism and Mental Causation,” 202–5.
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theory can in principle account for all phenomena (causal closure). Steven Cain has succinctly summarized these conclusions of Kim: “. . . the nonreductive physicalist cannot live without downward causation, and the nonreductive physicalist cannot live with it.”59 Crain argues (and I agree) that it is Kim’s assumption that a physical microstructure in “physically realizing” a mental property is its sufficient cause, which leads to the exclusion of any causative role for mental properties, for in the wider range of physical, biological, and other systems discussed in section 2.2, the causative effects of the higher levels on the lower ones were real but different in kind from the effects the parts had on each other operating at the lower level. Thus, what happens in these systems at the lower level is the result of the joint operation of both higher- and lower-level influences—the higher and lower levels could be said to be jointly sufficient, type-different60 causes of the lower-level events. When the higher-lower relation is that of mind/brain to body, it seems to me that similar considerations should apply. Up to this point, I have been taking the term “mind,” and its cognate “mental,” to refer to that which is the emergent reality distinctive especially of human beings. But in many wider contexts, not least that of philosophical theology, a more appropriate term for this emergent reality would be “person,” and its cognate “personal,” to represent the total psychosomatic, holistic experience of the human being in all its modalities—conscious and unconscious, rational and emotional, active and passive, individual and social, etc. The concept of personhood recognizes that, as Philip Clayton puts it, We have thoughts, wishes and desires that together constitute our character. We express these mental states through our bodies, which are simultaneously our organs of perception and our means of affecting other things and persons in the world . . . [The massive literature on theories
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Steven D. Crain, in an unpublished paper, kindly made this available to me. See the illuminating discussion of type-different causalities by Gregersen in his “Three Types of Indeterminacy,” 173–74. He remarks: The Humean concept of causality that still prevails in the philosophical debate . . . . thinks of causality in terms of general laws applicable on systems of events and processes . . . Non-Humean concepts of causality normally think of causality in terms of influencing conditions and events that in their totality make up the effect. . . . My suggestion is that there exist quite different types of causality that can neither be subsumed under general laws nor be measured through additions and subtractions” (173). In line with this, he espouses an “holistic” supervenience theory as against Kim’s “physicalist” one, as in his “Divine Action in a Universe of Minds,” paper presented at the ESSSAT Conference, Durham, March 31–April 4, 1998. 60
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of personhood] clearly points to the indispensability of embodiedness as the precondition for perception and action, moral agency, community and freedom—all aspects that philosophers take as indispensable to human personhood and that theologians have viewed as part of the imago dei.61
There is, therefore, a strong case for designating the highest level, the whole, in that unique system which is the human-brain-in-the-humanbody-in-social-relations as that of the “person.” Persons are inter alia causal agents with respect to their own bodies and to the surrounding world (including other persons). They can, moreover, report on aspects of their internal states concomitant with their actions with varying degrees of accuracy. Hence the exercise of personal agency by individuals transpires to be a paradigm case and supreme exemplar of whole-part influence—in this case exerted on their own bodies and on the world of their surroundings (including other persons). Thus, the details of the relation between cerebral neurological activity and consciousness cannot in principle detract from the causal efficacy of the content of the latter on the former and thus on behavior. In other words, “folk psychology” and the real reference of the language of “personhood” are both justified and necessary. 2.6. Communication Between Persons We are aiming at understanding better, in the light of what we now know through the sciences about human nature, how God might be conceived of as communicating with humanity. Let us remind ourselves first how human persons communicate with each other. How do we get to know each other, not only by description, but also by acquaintance—that is, get to know what is, as we say, “in each other’s mind”?62 All communication at its most basic level is mediated through the senses—hearing, sight, touch, taste, and smell. The physical
61 Philip Clayton, “The Case for Christian Panentheism,” Dialog 37.3 (Summer 1998): 201–8 (quotation on 205); see also his “Rethinking the Relation of God to the World: Panentheism and the Contribution of Philosophy,” chap. 4 in God and Contemporary Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), in which the nuances of panentheism are well developed. Broadly, they amount to a stronger form of immanence in which God is seen as in, with, and under the very processes of the world almost in a sacramental modality. See also TSA, passim. 62 See the articles in CTNS/VO, v. IV by Leslie Brothers and Marc Jeannerod.
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intermediaries are vibrations in pressure in the air, electromagnetic waves, physical pressure, changes of temperature, molecules, etc. Our genes, culture, nurture, and education have enabled human beings to decode patterns of these physical intermediaries so as to convey information about the content of the consciousness of the one attempting to communicate. These patterns can be immensely complex, associated with long histories, for example, in language and in the objective carriers of a cultural heritage such as books, tapes, paintings, sculptures, CDs, etc. They can be woven in time, as in music, drama, and language; and they can be more bodily based, as we now know from research into “body language” and communication through “eye-to-eye” contact. In all these ways individual persons communicate with each other and also with the wider human community—past, present, and future. The receptor of this “information”63 in the individual person is the individual human brain which stores this variegated “information” that constitutes knowledge of an other’s state of consciousness (which is, under a different description, of the state of an other’s brain). This occurs at different levels and is integrated into a perception of the other person. Such knowledge of the other person can be recalled, with varying degrees of rapidity and accuracy, into consciousness. On a nondualist view, this process can be regarded as a re-activation of the brain to reproduce the original patterns that previously constituted this conscious awareness of the other person64—as long as it continues to be recognized that these conscious “mental” events are a nonreducible reality that is distinctive of the human-brain-in-the-human-body. It seems that all the processes involved in inter-communication between human persons can be investigated and described at different levels by the methods and concepts appropriate to the level in question without invoking any ontologically distinct, special, “psychic” medium, unknown to the natural sciences, as the means of communication. This is not to say that the meaning of what is communicated can be reduced simply to physical patterns in the media in question, for the interpretation of these necessitates a recognition of their distinctive kind 63 The scare quotes around “information” are meant to indicate that I in no way wish to pretend that the mind-brain-body relation will be eventually subsumed entirely into information theory, useful as that is in delineating key aspects of the relation; see sec. 2.3 above. 64 Presumably it is therefore at some point in brain development and function that autism, in which interpersonal communication is impaired, is to be located, as was suggested to me by John Marshall in the conference discussions.
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of reality. But it is to stress that all communication between human beings, even at the most intimate and personal level, is mediated by the entities, structures, and processes—that is, by the constituents—of the world. The subtly integrated patterns of these means of communication do in fact allow mutual comprehension between two human individuals of each other’s distinctive personhood. This knowledge of two persons of each other, this knowledge by acquaintance, is notoriously not fully expressible in any of the frameworks of interpretation appropriate to the various modalities of the interaction process. There remains an inalienable uniqueness, and indeed mystery, concerning the nature of the individual person and of the interaction between two persons. Both the sense of personhood, of being a person, and also awareness of interpersonal relations are unique, irreducible emergents in humanity. Recognition of the rootedness of the means of interpersonal communication in the constituents of the world does not diminish or derogate from the special kind of reality that constitutes persons and their mutual interactions. For in such communication between persons there occurs a subtle and complex integration of the received sense-data with previous memories of that person, under the shaping influence of a long-learned cultural framework of interpretation that provides the language and imagery with which to articulate the relation in consciousness. So recognition of the physical nature of the means of communication between persons in no way diminishes the uniqueness and “in depth” character that can pertain to personal relationships at their most profound level for the individuals concerned, which are, indeed, often the most real and significant experiences of people’s lives.
3. God’s Interaction with the World 3.1. Modes of Interaction This interaction has been variously classified in the history of Christian thought:65 (1) the creative activity of God; (2) the sustaining activity of God; (3) God’s action as final cause; (4) general providence; (5) special providence; (6) miracles. Since we human beings are individuals, the
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For example, by Michael J. Langford, Providence (London: SCM Press, 1981), 6.
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question of how God can communicate with us is an instance of 5, God’s special providence—namely, how God can affect our thinking and so events, or patterns of events, in our brains. That God might be able to do so at all is, of course, an aspect of 4 that results from the character of 1 and 2, into which 4 is often subsumed.66 For the purposes of the ensuing discussion, I shall be taking a broadly panentheistic view of the relation of the being of God to that of the world.67 When more distinctly Christian theological matters are under consideration, I have a broadly “modalist” understanding of the Trinity insofar as such a view is apophatic (that is, reticent) concerning the ontology of God, but recognizes the threefold character of the Christian experience of the personal God as transcendent, incarnate, and immanent (the “economic” Trinity).68 3.2. Intervention? The successes of the sciences in unraveling the intricate, often complex, yet rationally beautifully articulated, web of relationships among structures, processes, and entities in the world have made it increasingly problematic to regard God as “intervening” in the world to bring about events that are not in accordance with these divinely created patterns and regularities that the sciences increasingly unravel. Indeed for most scientifically educated Christians, their very belief in the existence and nature of the Creator God depends on this character of the world. The 66
As discussed in TSA, chap. 9, where references are given. For my understanding of panentheism, see TSA, 158–59, 370–72. Briefly, it is “the belief that the Being of God includes and penetrates the whole universe, so that every part of it exists in Him but (as against pantheism) that His Being is more than, and is not exhausted by, the universe,” Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 2nd rev. edit., Frank L. Cross and Elizabeth A. Livingstone, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 1027. In contrast to classical philosophical theism with its reliance on the concept of necessary substance, panentheism takes embodied personhood for its model of God—cf. Clayton, “The Case for Christian Panentheism”—and so has a much stronger stress on the immanence of God “in, with, and under” the events of the world. This was the thrust of my essay, “Biological Evolution—a positive theological appraisal,” in Evolutionary and Molecular Biology (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory; Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1998), namely, that “God is the Immanent Creator creating in and through the processes of the natural order,” and that the very processes of biological evolution, as revealed by the biological sciences, “are God-acting-as-Creator, God qua Creator. . . . The processes are not themselves God, but the action of God-as-Creator.” This, of course, is why I also do not wish to resort to any micro-interventionist action of God to steer evolution. 68 See TSA, 347–49. 67
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transcendence of God, God’s essential otherness and distinct ontology from everything else, always allows in principle the theoretical possibility that God could act to overrule the very regularities to which God has given existence. But, setting aside the immense moral issues about why God does not intervene to prevent rampant evil, more fundamentally this gives rise to an incoherence in our understanding of God’s nature, for intervention suggests an arbitrary and magic-making agent far removed from the concept of One who created and is creating the world science reveals. That world appears increasingly convincingly as closed to causal interventions from outside of the kind that classical philosophical theism postulated (for example, in the idea of a “miracle” as a breaking of the laws of nature). So the problem is: How can one conceive of the God who is the Creator of this world affecting events in it without abrogating the very laws and regularities to which God has given existence and all the time sustaining it in existence? It has been intensified by the general skepticism among philosophers, theologians, and scientists (if not in the general public) about the existence of a “supernatural” world which, by postulating an ontological category of immaterial “spirit,” provided a route or channel, as it were, along which divine influences could operate to manipulate matter and human beings. Such dualism is not intellectually defensible today, and has few supporters, not least with respect to human nature. Theists find themselves asserting that the only ontological dualism to which they are committed is that between God and the world—that is, to the absolute difference between an infinite and necessary being and the contingency of the entire created order. This is also a premise of this essay. But, as Austin Farrer, long since noted,69 this inevitably leads, in all hypotheses concerning how God might bring about particular events (5 in section 3.1) to the problem of the “ontological gap(s) at the causal joint,” for if God in God’s own Being is distinct from anything we can possibly know in the world, then God’s nature is ineffable and will always be inaccessible to us so that we have only the resources of analogy to depict how God might influence events.70 From a panentheist point of view, the problem of God’s interaction with the world is mitigated—though the intractable problem of evil
69 70
Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation (London: A. & C. Black, 1967). For a fuller discussion see TSA, 148–52.
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remains—because the total web of natural events, in this perspective, is viewed as in itself the creative and sustaining action of God but, of course, not identical with God.71 This points us in the direction of postulating that the “ontological gap(s)” between the world and God is (are) located simply everywhere72—or, more precisely, because the world is “in God,” God can influence the world in its totality, as a System-of-systems. 3.3. Whole-Part Influence as a Model for God’s (Special, Providential) Interaction with the World I have elsewhere expounded this model (using the term “constraint,” now replaced by “influence”) in an attempt to render intelligible how God might be conceived of as influencing particular events, or patterns of events, in the world without interrupting the regularities observed at the levels the sciences study; the reader is referred to those texts for a fuller account.73 Only with a plausible account of how God can affect the world “instrumentally” can we proceed to address the question
71 For panentheism, see TSA, chap. 9 and fn. 67, above. The metaphor of natural events as, in some sense, God’s actions should not, in my view, be stretched to include a metaphor employed by some authors of the world as God’s body. The first has, like all metaphors, an “is/is-not” aspect—namely, in this case, my emphasis on the ontological distinction between God and the world. The second might tempt us unwarrantedly to seek for a divine analogy for the human brains and nerves whereby human decisions effect events in their bodies! 72 Cf. my remarks in CAC (p. 287, first para.) which apply here too: “[T]he present exercise could be regarded essentially as an attempt, as it were, to ascertain where this ontological gap, across which God transmits “information” (i.e., communicates), is most coherently “located,” consistently with God’s interaction with everything else having particular effects and without abrogating those regular relationships to which God’s own self continues to give an existence which the sciences increasingly discover.” This concurs with Gregersen in his article, “Three Types of Indeterminacy” (fn. 14, p. 184), in which he says: “We cannot expect to find the causal ‘routes’ of divine action and their subsequent ‘joints’ with natural causes. The most we can do, is to suggest meaningful localizations of possible divine actions.” 73 TSA, passim, especially 157–60; and CAC, 272–76, 282–87, where I proposed: If God interacts with the “world” at a supervenient level of totality, then God, by affecting the state of the world-as-a-whole, could, on the model of whole-part constraint relationships in complex systems, be envisaged as able to exercise constraints upon events in the myriad sub-levels of existence that constitute that “world” without abrogating the laws and regularities that specifically pertain to them—and this without “intervening” within the unpredictabilities we have noted [I had in mind here the inprinciple, inherent kinds, i.e., quantum events, though the remarks would also apply to the practical unpredictabilities of chaotic systems]. Particular events might occur in the world and be what they are because God intends them to be so, without at any
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of how God might communicate “symbolically” with humanity (see section 1). Initially, I will prescind from any analogy with the mind-brain-body relation or with personal agency. The model is based on the recognition that the omniscient God uniquely knows, across all frameworks of reference of time and space, everything that it is possible to know about the state(s) of all-that-is, including the interconnectedness and interdependence of the world’s entities, structures, and processes. By analogy with the operation of whole-part influence in real systems (see section 2.2), the suggestion is that, because the “ontological gap(s)” between the world and God is/are located simply everywhere in space and time, God could affect holistically the state of the world (the whole in this context). Thence, mediated by the whole-part influences of the world-as-a-whole (as a System-of-systems) on its constituents, God could cause particular events and patterns of events to occur which express God’s intentions. These latter would not otherwise have happened had God not so intended. This unitive, holistic effect of God on the world could occur without abrogating any of the laws (regularities) which apply to the levels of the world’s constituents74—by analogy with the exercise of whole-part influence in the systems discussed in section 2.2. Moreover, this action of God on the world may be distinguished from God’s universal creative action in that particular intentions of God for particular patterns of
point any contravention of the laws of physics, biology, psychology, or whatever is the pertinent science for the level of description in question (283). Ernan McMullin has raised the question of how this proposal of mine relates to quantum indeterminism in his, “Cosmic Purpose and the Contingency of Human Evolution,” Theology Today 55 (1998): 407 and fn. 50. As he points out, in my view God does not definitively know the future, but has a maximally conceivable capacity to predict it based on total knowledge of present events and of the laws and regularities of natural processes (TSA, 128–33). In the case of quantum events, this would, to respond to his query, have to refer to God’s prediction of the statistical outcome of multiple quantum events and not individual ones—if the standard “Copenhagen” interpretation of quantum mechanics is assumed. In his article, McMullin’s other query about the proposal concerns how the interaction between an ontologically distinct God and the world might be conceived of without being the forbidden sort of intervention. This is met by the suggestion of the interaction being analogous to a flow of information, as described later in this section. 74 Note that the same may be said of human agency. Also, this proposal recognizes explicitly that the “laws” and regularities which constitute the sciences usually apply only to certain perceived, if ill-defined, levels within the complex hierarchies of nature.
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events to occur are effected thereby—and the patterns could be intended by God in response inter alia to human actions or prayers. The ontological “interface” at which God must be deemed to be influencing the world is, on this model, that which occurs between God and the totality of the world (all-that-is), and this, from a panentheistic perception, is within God’s own self. What passes across this “interface,” I have also suggested,75 may perhaps be conceived of as a flow of information, but one has to admit that, because of the “ontological gap(s)” between God and the world, which must always exist in any theistic model, this is only an attempt at making intelligible that which we can postulate as being the initial effect of God seen from our side of the boundary, as it were.76 Whether or not this use of the notion of information flow proves helpful in this context, we do need some way of indicating that the effect of God at this, and so at all, levels is that of pattern-shaping in its most general sense. I am encouraged in this kind of exploration by the recognition that the concept of the Logos, the Word, of God is usually taken to emphasize God’s creative patterning of the world and so God’s self-expression in the world. The panentheistic inter-relations of God and the world and the interaction of God with the world, including humanity, I have attempted to represent in figure 1 (overleaf ).77 This is a kind of Venn diagram and represents ontological relationships. It has the limitation of being in two planes so that the “God” label appears dualistically to be (ontologically) outside the world; although this conveys the truth that God is “more and other” than the world, it cannot represent God’s omnipresence in and to the world. This limitation may be surmounted by noting that “God,” in the figure, is denoted by the (imagined) infinite planar surface of the page on which the circle representing the world is printed. For, it is assumed, God is “more than” the world, which is nevertheless “in” God. The page underlies and supports the circle and its contents, just as God sustains everything in existence and is present to all.
75 TSA, 161,164; CAC, 274–75, 285. John Polkinghorne has made a similar proposal in terms of the divine input of “active information” in his Scientists as Theologians (London: SPCK, 1996), 36–37. 76 Morever, I would not wish to tie the proposed model too tightly to a “flow of information” interpretation of the mind-brain-body problem (see also fn. 63 above). 77 This is an elaboration of fig. 1 of TSA to include a depiction of the multi-leveled nature of human beings. While it hardly needs to be said, the infinity sign represents not infinite space or time, but the infinitely “more” that God’s being encompasses in comparison with that of everything else.
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∞ GOD
∞
G O D
G O D
∞
GOD
∞ GOD
is represented by the whole surface of the page, imagined to extend to infinity (∞) in all directions the WORLD, all-that-is: created and other than God, and including both humanity and systems of non-human entities, structures, and processes the human WORLD: excluding systems of non-human entities, structures, and processes Gods interaction with and influence on the world and its events tip and shaft of a similar double-shafted arrow perpendicular to the page; Gods influence and activity within the world effects of the non-human world on humanity human agency in the non-human world personal interactions, both individual and social, between human beings, including cultural and historical influences
Mental experiences [conscious and unconscious] Brain and CNS Systems Maps Networks
Multi-leveled HUMANITY
Neurons Synapses Apart from the top one, these are the levels of organization of the human nervous system depicted in fig. 1 of Patricia S. Churchland and T.J. Sejnowski, “Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience,” Science 242 (1988): 741–745.
Figure 1. Diagram representing spatially the ontological relation of, and the interactions between, God and the world (including humanity).
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So the larger dashed circle, representing the ontological location of God’s interaction with all-that-is, really needs a many-dimensional convoluted surface78 not available on a two-dimensional surface. The point and tail of a double-shafted arrow have been placed at the centre of this circle to signal God’s immanent influence and activity within the world. The present form of this figure is meant to stress particularly the many-leveled nature of the human recipients of divine communication. 3.4. God as “Personal” Agent in the World I hope the model as described so far has a degree of plausibility in depending on an analogy only with complex natural systems in general and on the way whole-part influence operates in them. It is, however, clearly too impersonal to do justice to the personal character of many (but not all) of the most profound human experiences of God. So there is little doubt that it needs to be rendered more cogent by the recognition that, among natural systems, the instance par excellence of whole-part influence in a complex system is that of personal agency. Indeed in the previous section, I could not avoid referring to God’s “intentions” and implying that, like human persons, God had purposes to be implemented in the world. For if God is going to affect events and patterns of events in the world, then one cannot avoid attributing the personal predicates of intentions and purposes to God—inadequate and easily misunderstood as they are. So we have to say that though God is ineffable and ultimately unknowable in essence, yet God “is at least personal” and personal language attributed to God is less misleading than saying nothing! That being so, we can now legitimately turn to the exemplification of whole-part influence in the mind-brain-body relation (section 2.5) as a resource for modeling God’s interaction with the world. When we do so the ascendancy of the “personal” as a category for explicating the wholeness of human agency asserts itself and the traditional, indeed biblical, model of God as in some sense a “personal” agent in the world is rehabilitated—but now in a quite different metaphysical, nondualist
78 Recall Augustine’s representation of “the whole creation” as if it were “some sponge, huge , but bounded” floating in the “boundless sea” of God, “environing and penetrating it . . . everywhere and on every side” (Confessions, VII.7).
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framework and coherently with the worldview (cf. section 3.2, above) which the sciences engender.79 When I was using nonhuman systems in their whole-part relationships as a model for God’s relation to the world in “special providence,” I resorted to the idea of a “flow of information” as being a helpful pointer to what might be conceived as crossing the “ontological gap(s)” between God and the world-as-a-whole. But now as I turn to more personal categories to explicate this relation and interchange, it is natural to interpret a “flow of information” between God and the world, including humanity, in terms of the “communication” that occurs between persons—not unlike the way in which a flow of Shannon-type information metamorphoses in the human context into information in the ordinary sense of the word.80 Thus whatever else may be involved in God’s personal interaction with the world, communication must be involved, and this raises the question: To whom might God be communicating? We would not be deliberating here on “scientific perspectives on divine action” if it had not been the case that humanity distinctively and, it appears, uniquely has regarded itself as the recipient of communication from an Ultimate Reality, named in English as “God.” But in what ways has the reception of communication from God been understood and thought to have been experienced?
4. God and Humanity 81 My account so far of how God interacts with the world has been chiefly concerned with devising a model for (1) the “instrumental” kind of relation. Now we have to think through the implications of this model for explicating (2) God’s “symbolic” relation, that is, God’s communicating relation to the world. It is clear that all mutual interactions between human beings and the world (the solid and dashed single-shafted, double-headed arrows of fig. 1) are through the mediation of the constituents in the physical
79 See TSA, 160–66, and, more recently, CAC, 284–87, for an elaboration of this move and a discussion of the extent to which it is appropriate, if at all, to think of the world as the “body” of the ultimately transcendent God, who has a panentheistic relation to that same world. 80 That is, Puddefoot’s 1 → 2 → 3; see sec. 2.3 above. 81 The sequence of thought in this section is more fully amplified in TSA, chap. 11.
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world of which human beings are part and in which human actions occur. Furthermore, all interactions between human beings (the pairs of solid single-headed arrows in fig. 1) also occur through the mediation of the constituents of the physical world, including the cultural heritage coded on to material substrates.82 Such interactions include, of course, communication between human beings, that is, between their states of consciousness, which are also, under one description, patterns of activity within human brains. This raises the question: How, within such a framework of understanding, can one conceive of God’s self-communication with humanity? This in turn raises the traditional question: How might God reveal Godself to humanity? How (in what way) can we conceive of God communicating with and to humanity in the light of the foregoing? 4.1. Revelation and Human Experience In communication between human beings some of our actions, gestures, and responses are more characteristic and revelatory of our distinctive selves, of our intentions, purposes and meanings, than are others. “It’s not what you say but the way you’re saying it.” This prompts us to seek in the world those events and entities, or patterns of them, which unveil God’s meaning(s) most overtly, effectively, and distinctively— constituting what is usually called “revelation,” for in revelation God is presupposed to be active. The ways in which such a revealing activity of God have been thought to occur in the different ranges and contexts of human experience can be graded according to the increasing extent to which God is said to be experienced as taking the initiative in making Godself explicitly known. a. General Revelation. If the world is created by God then it cannot but reflect God’s creative intentions and thus, however ambiguously, God’s character and purposes;83 and it must go on doing so if God continuously interacts with the world in the way we have proposed. Hence there can be a knowledge of God (and by inference, of God’s purposes), however diffuse, which is available to all humanity through
82 83
Cf. sec. 2.6 above. The locus classicus is, of course, Romans 1:19–20.
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reflection on the character of the created world, its entities, structures, and processes, and in personal and social experience. b. Revelation to members of a religious tradition. Belonging to a religious tradition provides one with the language and symbols to articulate one’s awareness of God at any instant and as a continuing experience. The tradition provides the resources that help the individual both to enrich and to have the means of identifying his or her own experience of God. Thus there is a general experience of the ordinary members of a continuing religious community which may properly be regarded as a mode of revelation that is an enhancement of, and is more explicit than, the general revelation to humanity. This kind of what one might call “religiously general” revelation arises when there is a confluence between, on the one hand, the streams of general human experience and general revelation and, on the other hand, those of the recollected and re-lived particular and special revelations of God that a tradition keeps alive by its intellectual, aesthetic, liturgical, symbolic, and devotional resources. These all nurture the unconscious of the adherents to that tradition and so shape their conscious awareness of God. c. Special revelation—revelation regarded as authoritative, and so as “special” in a particular tradition. Some experiences of God by individuals, or groups of individuals, are so intense and subsequently so influential that they constitute initiating, “dubbing” experiences which serve in the community to anchor later references to God and God’s relation to humanity, even through changes in the metaphorical language used to depict that ultimately ineffable Reality. The community then regards them as special, even if not basically different from those referred to in 2 above. So it is not improper to seek in history those events and entities, or patterns of them, which appear to have revealed God’s meaning(s) most overtly, effectively, and distinctively. That there should be such a knowledge is entirely coherent with the understanding of God’s interaction with the world as represented in figure 1. The double arrows denote an input into the world from God that is influential in the whole-part constraining manner already discussed and thereby conceivable as an input of “information” in the sense of altering patterns of events in the world. The states of human brains can properly be considered to be such patterns so, in the model I am deploying, there can be a general revelation to humanity of God’s character and purposes in and through human knowledge and experience of the world.
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The Jewish and Christian traditions have, more than most others, placed a particular emphasis on God’s revelation in the experienced events of a history. Such “special” revelation, initiated (it is assumed) by God, has been regarded by Christians as recorded particularly in the Bible. How we are to receive this record today in the light of critical and historical study is a major issue in contemporary Christianity since it involves a subtle dialogue of each generation with its own past. d. Revelation and “religious experience.” My attempt to discriminate between modes of revelation according to the degree to which God is experienced as taking the initiative in making Godself explicitly known is helpful only up to a point, for there must be avoided the not uncommon tendency to press the distinctions too sharply and to ignore the smooth gradations between the different categories of revelation already distinguished. It is notable from a wide range of investigations how widespread such religious experience is, even in the secularized West, and that it is continuous in its distribution over those who are members of a religious community and those who are not.84 The evidence suggests that the boundary between “general” revelation and revelation to members of a religious tradition is very blurred. But so also is the boundary between the latter and “special” revelation, for there are welldocumented non-Scriptural accounts over the centuries of devotional and mystical experiences, regarded as revelations of God, among those who do belong to a religious tradition. It is also widely recognized that the classical distinction between “natural” and “revealed” theology has proved difficult to maintain in modern times, for it can be held that the only significant difference between supposedly “natural” and supposedly “revealed” insights is that the former are derived from considering a broader (though still selected) range of situations than the latter. The same could also be said of the subsequently more widely favored distinction between “general” and “special” revelation, for the range of, and overlap between, the
84 See, for example, David Hay, Religious Experience Today: Studying the Facts (London: Mowbray, 1990). Typical questions concerning “religious experience” to which positive responses from between one third and one half of people in “Western” countries were obtained were: “Have you ever been aware of or influenced by a presence or power, whether you call it God or not, which is different from your everyday self?” or, “Have you ever felt as though you were very close to a powerful spiritual force that seemed to lift you out of yourself?”
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means whereby insights are gained into the divine reality has had to be recognized.85 There is therefore a gradation, but there are also differences in intensity and the degree of explicitness with which these “religious” experiences are received as revelations of God as their initiator—rather as a variegated and rough terrain may be accentuated to give rise to distinctive hills and even sharp peaks without loss of continuity. The questions now that follow are: How does our understanding of God’s interaction with the world, including humanity, relate to human revelatory experiences of God? How can the notion of religious experience be accommodated by, be rendered intelligible in, and be coherent with, the understanding of God’s interaction with the world that we have been developing?86 4.2. How Does God Communicate with Humanity? If God interacts with the world in the way already proposed, through a whole-part constraining influence on the whole world system, how could God communicate with humanity in the various kinds of religious experience? It has been noted that the interpersonal relationships which we know of occur through the mediation of the constituents of the world. This suggests that religious experience that is mediated through sensory experience is intelligible in the same terms as that of the inter-personal experience of human beings. It is therefore plausible to think of God as communicating with human persons through the constituents of the world, through all that lies inside the dashed circle representing the world in figure 1—that is, via the nonhuman constituents represented by the inner dotted circle in the figure. God is seen as communicating “symbolically” through such mediated religious experiences by imparting meaning and significance to constituents of
85
As David Pailin (“Revelation,” in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Alan Richardson and John Bowden, eds. [London: SCM Press, 1983], 504–6) puts it, the ultimate justification of a supposed “revelation” is “by showing that the resulting understanding is a coherent, comprehensive, fruitful and convincing view of the fundamental character of reality.” 86 These questions are rendered more pertinent by the recognition of the important role played in recent years by “religious experience” as part of inductive and cumulative arguments which claim to warrant belief in God.
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the world or, rather, to patterns of events among them.87 Insights into God’s character and purposes for individuals and communities can thereby be generated in a range of contexts from the most general to the special. The concepts, language, and means of investigating and appraising these experienced “signals” from God would operate at their own level and not be reducible to those of the natural and human sciences. The interpretation of mediated religious experience would have its own autonomy in human inquiry—“mystical” theology cannot be reduced without remainder to sociology or psychology, or a fortiori to the biological or physical sciences. What about those forms of religious experience which are unmediated through sense experience? Brown subdivides them into the mystical, “where the primary import of the experience is a feeling of intimacy with the divine,” and the numinous, “those experiences where awe of the divine is the central feature.”88 Swinburne divides them, on the one hand, into “the case where the subject has a religious experience in having certain sensations . . . not of a kind describable by normal vocabulary,” and on the other hand, religious experiences in which “the subject . . . is aware of God or of a timeless reality. . . . [I]t just so seems to him, but not through his having sensations.”89 The experience of Elijah at the mouth of the cave on Mount Horeb was of all kinds: God communicated to him, not only through the natural phenomena of wind, earthquake, and fire, but eventually, apparently, and paradoxically, in an unmediated way—through “a sound of sheer silence,” an image of absolute nonmediation. In such instances, is it necessary to postulate some action of God whereby there is a direct communication from God to the human consciousness that is not mediated by any known natural means, that is, by any known constituents of the world? Is there, as it were, a distinctive layer or level within the totality of human personhood that has a unique way of coming into direct contact with God? This was, as we saw in section 1, certainly the assumption when the human person was divided into ontologically distinct parts, one of which (often called the “spirit” or the “soul”) had this particular capacity.
87 This may properly be thought of as a “flow of information” from God to humanity, so long as the reductive associations of such terms are not deemed to exclude—as they need and should not—interpersonal communication. 88 David Brown, The Divine Trinity (London: Duckworth, 1985), 37, 42–51. 89 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 251.
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Now, we cannot but allow the possibility that God, being the Creator of the world, might be free to set aside any limitations by which God has allowed his interaction with that created order to be restricted. However, we also have to recognize that those very self-limitations which God is conceived of as having self-imposed are postulated precisely because they render coherent the whole notion of God as Creator with purposes that are being implemented in the natural and human world we actually have and which the sciences increasingly unveil. Such considerations also make one very reluctant to postulate God as communicating to humanity through what would have to be seen as arbitrary means, totally different in kind from any other means of communication to human consciousness. The latter would include the most intensely personal inter-communications, yet even these, as we saw above, are comprehensible as mediated subtly and entirely through the biological senses and the constituents of the world (section 2.6). So, to be consistent, even this capacity for unmediated experience of God cannot but be regarded as a mode of functioning of the total integrated unity of whole persons—persons who communicate in the world through the world’s own constituents. For human beings this communicating nexus of natural events within the world includes not only human sense data (“qualia”) and knowledge stored in artefacts, but also all the states of the human brain that are concomitant (or whatever word best suits the relation of mind-brain-body) with the contents of consciousness and of the unconscious. The process of storage and accumulating both conscious and unconscious resources is mediated by the various ways in which communication to humanity can occur—and all these have been seen to be effected through the natural constituents of the world and the patterns of events which occur in them. When human beings have an experience of God apparently unmediated by something obviously sensory—as when they are simply “waiting upon God” in silence—they can do so through God communicating via their recollected memories, the workings of their unconscious and everything that has gone into their Bildung, everything that has made them the persons they are. All of this can be mediated through patterns in the constituents of the world, including brain patterns. Experiences of God indeed often seem to be ineffable, incapable of description in terms of any other known experiences or by means of any accessible metaphors or analogies. This characteristic they share with other types of experience, such as aesthetic and interpersonal experience, which are unquestionably mediated through patterns in the events of this
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world. Experiences of God could take the variety of forms that we have already described and could all be mediated by the constituents of the world and through patterns of natural events, yet could nonetheless be definitive and normative as revelations to those experiencing them, for if God can influence patterns of events in the world to be other than they otherwise would have been but for the divine initiative—and still be consistent with scientific descriptions at the appropriate level—then it must be possible for God to influence those patterns of events in human brains which constitute human thoughts, including thoughts of God and a sense of personal interaction with God. The involvement of the constituents of the world in the so-called unmediated experiences of God is less overt and obvious because in them God is communicating through subtle and less obvious patterns in the constituents of the world and the events in which they participate. The latter include the patterns of memory storage and the activities of the human brain, especially all those operative in communication at all levels between human persons (including inter alia sounds, symbols, and possibly Jungian archetypes), and the artefacts that facilitate this communication. On the present model of special providential action—as the effects of divine whole-part influence—it is intelligible how God could also affect patterns of neuronal events in a particular brain, so that the subject could be aware of God’s presence with and without the mediation of memory in the way just suggested. Such address from God, whether or not via stored (remembered) patterns of neuronal events, could come unexpectedly and uncontrivedly by the use of any apparently external means. Thus, either way, it would seem to the one having the experience as if it were unmediated. The revelation to Elijah at the mouth of the cave had both this immediacy and a basis in a long prior experience of God. On examination, therefore, it transpires that the distinction between mediated and unmediated religious experiences refers not so much to the means of communication by God as to the nature of the content of the experience—just as the sense of harmony and communion with a person far transcends any description that can be given of it in terms of sense data, even though they are indeed the media of communication. We simply know we are at one with the other person. Similarly, in contemplation the mystic can simply be “aware of God . . . it just seems so to him” (as Swinburne puts it), and both experiences can be entirely
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mediated through the constituents of the world. So it is not surprising that those experiencing such communications from God experience them as intensely personal, for this is the kind of experience closest to them in ordinary life. What the treatment in this essay has therefore been pointing to is that an intelligible account can be given of how God can communicate personally to human beings within a world that is coherent and consistent with the descriptions of that world given at other levels by the natural and human sciences. Certainly, for Elijah, “the sound of sheer silence” left no doubt about the personal nature of the command he had received and its meaning for him personally.90
90 Editor’s note: the original chapter included an appendix on the distinction between theory-autonomy and process autonomy, which has been omitted for this edition.
CHAPTER THREE
THE METAPHYSICS OF DIVINE ACTION John Polkinghorne
1. Introduction ‘Metaphysics’ is not a popular word in contemporary culture but, in fact, no one can live a reflective life without adopting some broad view of the nature of reality, however tentative and subject to possible revision it might need to be. Even militant scientific reductionists, for whom “physics is all,” are metaphysicians. They claim to be able to extend the insights and laws of physics into regimes, such as human behavior, in which their total adequacy is an untested hypothesis. They are certainly going beyond (meta) physics. Anyone who wishes to speak of agency, whether human or divine, will have to adopt a metaphysical point of view within which to conduct the discourse. The conceptual edifice thus constructed must be consonant with its physical base, but it will no more be determined by it than the foundations of a house completely determine the character of the building. In each case, there is constraint but not entailment. Metaphysical endeavor in general, and talk of agency in particular, will inevitably require a certain boldness of conjecture as part of the heuristic exploration of possibility. In our present state of ignorance, no one has access to a final and definitive proposal. The test of the enterprise will be the degree to which it can attain comprehensiveness of explanation and overall coherence, including an adequate degree of consonance with human experience. The principal strategy of nearly all writers on divine agency has been to appeal in some way to an analogy with human agency, though our ignorance about the latter makes this a precarious undertaking.
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Metaphysical theories are ontologically serious. They seek to describe what is the case. It is a central philosophical question how what is the case is related to our knowledge of the world. There is clearly no certain and simple way in which to make the connection. There has been a strong tradition since Immanuel Kant which emphasizes the unknowability of “things in themselves.” The spectacles we wear behind the eyes (the presuppositions we bring to our interpretation of the world) and the epistemic blinkers imposed by our having to view reality from the limitations of a human perspective are held so to refract and limit our perceptions of the way things are that reality is inaccessible to us. It is not necessary to give way to such metaphysical despair. Of course there is no deductive way of going from epistemology to ontology. In fact, an important aspect of the connection is precisely the problem of induction: what degree of knowledge could lead to an ontological conclusion? Yet almost all scientists believe that they are learning about the actual nature of the physical world that they investigate. Consciously or unconsciously, they are critical realists. One could define the program of critical realism as the strategy of seeking the maximum correlation between epistemology and ontology, subject to careful acknowledgment that we view reality from a perspective and subject to pushing the search for knowledge to any natural limits it may possess. Its motto is “epistemology models ontology”; the totality of what we can know is a reliable guide to what is the case. It has to be a critical realism because in some regimes (such as the quantum world) what is the case is so counterintuitive in terms of common sense expectation that it cannot be reduced to a simple-minded objectivity. We have to respect its idiosyncrasy, but that does not prejudice its reality. One can see how natural this strategy is for a scientist by considering the interpretation of the uncertainty principle in quantum theory. Heisenberg’s original discovery was epistemological; he showed there were intrinsic limitations on what could be measured. Very shortly, he and almost all other physicists were giving the principle an ontological interpretation. It was treated as a principle of actual indeterminacy, not mere ignorance. There was no logical necessity to make this transition. It could not be deduced. This is clearly established by the existence of alternative interpretations in which there is complete determinacy, but in ways that are hidden from human knowledge. One such interpretation is Bohm’s
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version of quantum theory,1 where a hidden wave guides the perfectly determined motion of purely classical particles. Another is many-worlds quantum theory,2 in which the perfectly deterministic Schrödinger equation controls all that is, but its consequences are spread between parallel universes, not simultaneously open to human observation. Neither of these interpretations has commended itself to the majority of physicists. They have freely (and in my view rightly) made the metaphysical decision to interpret quantum theory as indicating an intrinsic indeterminacy in physical reality. I have been arguing3 that it is a rational and attractive option to pursue the same strategy in relation to other intrinsic unpredictabilities which we discover in nature. We should treat these epistemic limitations as being ontological opportunities for fruitful metaphysical conjecture.
3. Some Questionable Metaphysical Strategies 3.1. Primarily Science-Based: Physicalism Our growing recognition of the remarkable powers of self-organization displayed by complex physical systems far from equilibrium has encouraged some to adopt a refined form of physicalism. They suppose that this will enable the completion of an adequate descriptive program of human experience on the basis of natural science alone.4 I have already stressed that such a claim is metaphysical in character, however much it may seek to hide that fact behind the language of physics. 1 David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); Bohm and B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory (London: Routledge, 1993). 2 H. Everett, Reviews of Modern Physics 29 (1957): 454. See also, Alastair Rae, Quantum Physics: Illusion or Reality? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), chap. 6. 3 John Polkinghorne, Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding (London: SPCK Press, 1988) chaps. 3 and 5; idem, Science and Providence: God’s Interaction with the World (London: SPCK Press, 1989), chap. 2; idem, Reason and Reality: The Relationship Between Science and Theology (London: SPCK Press, 1991), chap. 3; and idem, “The Laws of Nature and the Laws of Physics” in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and C.J. Isham (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1993; Berkeley, CA: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1993), 437–448. 4 See Bernd-Olaf Küppers, “Understanding Complexity” in CTNS/VO, v. III.
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Such a strategy may be defended on the grounds that science has already explained much which was not understood by previous generations and why should we set limits to its eventual successes? Indeed it can be argued that the lessons of history encourage this point of view. The boundaries between organic and inorganic matter, between living entities and inanimate objects, are no longer perceived as total barriers to the advance of scientific explanation. Why should consciousness or human agency be thought to be different? I would respond by pointing out that the lessons of history are more ambiguous than this argument acknowledges. Even within physical science itself there are many phenomena (the stability of atoms, superconductivity, the energy sources of stars) which only proved intelligible in terms of an extremely radical revision of then currently accepted physical principles, represented by the advent of quantum theory and relativity. When one considers the big ugly ditch which seems to intervene between physical talk (however complex and sophisticated in terms of neural networking or whatever) and mental talk (even at the most elementary level of perceiving a patch of pink), there seems no reason to suppose that its bridging will not require the most drastic revision, in unforeseeable ways, of our understanding of the nature of reality. In the words of the sharp-tongued theoretical physicist, Wolfgang Pauli, it is no use simply claiming “credits for the future,” waving one’s hands and hoping that one day present understanding will turn out this way. Physical science seems light-years distant from the unaided understanding of the mental or the intentional, an indispensable requirement for an adequate metaphysical strategy. Moreover, the reductionist program that underlies physicalism is threatened by developments in physical science itself. The non-locality found in quantum theory shows that the subatomic world is one which cannot be treated atomistically.5 The vulnerability of chaotic systems to the smallest influences from their environment, consequent upon the exquisite sensitivity of such systems to fine details of their circumstance,6 shows that they are never truly isolable. Physics is taking a holistic turn. The possibility of the existence of holistic laws of nature is one which should not be discounted. 5
See, e.g., Polkinghorne, The Quantum World (London: Longman, 1984), chap. 7. See, e.g., James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (London: Heinemann, 1988), chap. 1. 6
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Certainly such laws would be more difficult to discover than the familiar laws governing the behavior of parts, and their form would surely be different from that of the differential equations which are the staple of current localized mathematical physics. Yet it would be a Procrustean imposition on science to deny that it could have access to such laws. It is clearly worthwhile to pursue the program of reductionist explanation as far as it can legitimately be pursued, but that is a methodological strategy for investigation, not a metaphysical strategy determining the total nature of reality. The dawning holism of physics points in a more hopeful direction if science is eventually to find a satisfactory integration into a comprehensive and adequate metaphysical scheme. One final criticism of too great a reliance on the principle of selforganization needs to be made. The insights of non-equilibrium thermodynamics seem helpful in relation to the generation of structure and long-range order. Agency, however, seems to correspond to an altogether more flexible and open kind of time-development than that corresponding to typical self-organizing patterns, such as convection columns or chemical clocks. 3.2. Primarily Theology-Based: Primary Causality At least since Thomas Aquinas, there has been a tradition of theological thinking which seeks to explain divine agency by appeal to the distinction between primary and secondary causality. A notable modern exponent of this point of view has been Austin Farrer with his idea of double agency.7 The secondary web of created causality is treated as being complete and unriven. Yet the primary causality of God is supposed nevertheless to be ineffably at work in and through these created causalities. How this is so is not explained. Indeed Farrer would regard it as risking monstrosity and confusion if one were to attempt to discern the “causal joint” by which divine providence acts. It is not clear to me what is gained by so apophatic an account of God’s action. In the end, the answer seems to be “God only knows.” I agree with Arthur Peacocke’s judgment on the paradox of double agency that it “comes perilously close to that mere assertion of its truth . . . since
7 Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (London: A&C Black, 1967).
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Farrer on his own admission can give no account of the ‘causal joint’ between the agency of the Creator and even human action.”8 This seems to me to be a strategy of absolutely last resort, only to be undertaken if it proves impossible to make any satisfactory conjecture about the causal joint of God’s agency. I do not believe we are in so desperate a case, and I make my own suggestion in the course of what follows. 3.3. Top-Down Causality The causality which physics most readily describes is a bottom-up causality, generated by the energetic interaction of the constituent parts of a system. The experience of human agency seems totally different. It is the action of the whole person and so it would seem most appropriately to be described as top-down causality, the influence of the whole bringing about coherent activity of the parts. May not similar forms of top-down causality be found elsewhere, including God’s causal influence on the whole of creation? It is an attractive proposal, but it is important to recognize that without further explanation top-down causality is a far from unproblematic concept. Its uncritical use would amount to no more than sloganizing. It seems to me that two important difficulties have to be faced and discussed. The first is one I have already referred to in discussing the limitations on the insights provided by the principles of self-organization. If one is to give an account of intentional agency, it will require something much more open and dynamic than simply the generation of long-range order or the propagation of boundary effects. Striking as instances of this kind can be (involving the coherent motion of billions of molecules), they are often fully explicable in terms of a bottom-up approach, generating long-range correlations between localized constituents (phase transitions in physics are good examples of this kind of phenomenon). True top-down causality will have to be more open and more non-local than that. I believe that chaotic dynamics, with its picture of the open exploration of proliferating possibilities within the confines of a strange attractor, may offer an important clue to
8 Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural and Divine (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 149.
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how this might come about. Self-organization offers the prospect of the generation of different patterns of spatial order; chaotic dynamics offers the prospect of the generation of different temporal patterns of dynamical history. The latter seems much closer to notions of agency than the former. The second point, closely related to the first, is that if there is to be room for the operation of true top-down causality, then there will have to be intrinsic gaps, a degree of underdetermination in the account of the bottom-up description alone, in order to make this possible.9 It is to the possible identification of the source of this intrinsic openness that I now turn.
4. Ontological Gaps It seems to me that our experience of human agency is basic and by itself sufficient to indicate that a metaphysical scheme affording no scope for top-down causality would be seriously defective. Yet metaphysics must be consonant with its physical basis and so it is necessary to consider whether there are appropriate intrinsic gaps already known to us in the bottom-up description of the physical world. There seem to be two broad possibilities: 4.1. Quantum Theory May not agents, human or divine, act in the physical world by a power to determine the outcomes of individual indeterminate quantum events, even if the overall statistical pattern of many such events may still be expected to lie within the limits of probabilistic quantum laws?10 This form of causality would actually be effected in the basement of subatomic processes. The proposal requires, of course, the adoption of the metaphysical strategy of interpreting quantum theory as involving
9 See Thomas Tracy, “Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps” (CTNS/VO, v. III). 10 William Pollard, Chance and Providence: God’s Action in a World Governed by Scientific Law (London: Faber, 1958); see also Nancey Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan’s Ass and Schrödinger’s Cat” (in this volume); and Tracy, “Particular Providence” (CTNS/VO, v. III.).
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intrinsic indeterminacies, but that is a strategy consciously or unconsciously endorsed by the great majority of physicists. For agency thus exercised, these microscopic determinations would have to have their consequences amplified up to the macroscopic level. There are a number of difficulties about this proposal in relation to human and divine agency. One relates to the amplification effect. Exactly how the quantum world interlocks with the everyday world is still a question of unresolved dispute. In essence, this is the measurement problem in quantum theory.11 Until this question is settled, the micro-macro boundary is a difficult barrier to cross with confidence. One might hope that a way around this might result from the sensitivity of chaotic systems to small triggers. Very quickly, there seems to be established a dependence of the behavior of such systems on details of what is going on at the level of quantum indeterminacy. Yet the grave and unresolved difficulties of relating quantum theory to chaos theory,12 or of what is often called “quantum chaos,” makes this a perilous strategy to pursue. There is a particular difficulty in using quantum indeterminacy to describe divine action. Conventional quantum theory contains much continuity and determinism in addition to its well-known discontinuities and indeterminacies. The latter refer, not to all quantum behavior, but only to those particular events which qualify, by the irreversible registration of their effects in the macro-world, to be described as measurements. In between measurements, the continuous determinism of the Schrödinger equation applies. Occasions of measurement only occur from time to time and a God who acted through being their determinator would also only be acting from time to time. Such an episodic account of providential agency does not seem altogether satisfactory theologically. 4.2. Chaos Theory The exquisite sensitivity of chaotic systems certainly means that they are intrinsically unpredictable and unisolable in character. In accordance
11
See, e.g., Polkinghorne, Quantum World, chap. 6. Joseph Ford, “What is Chaos, that we should be mindful of it?” in The New Physics, ed. Paul Davies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 12
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with the realist strategy already discussed, I propose13 that this should lead us to the metaphysical conjecture that these epistemological properties signal that ontologically much of the physical world is open and integrated in character. By ‘open’ is meant that the causal principles that determine the exchange of energy among the constituent parts (bottom-up causality) are not by themselves exhaustively determinative of future behavior. There is scope for the activity of further causal principles. By ‘integrated’ is meant that these additional principles will have a holistic character (top-down causality). The deterministic equations from which classical chaos theory developed are then to be interpreted as downward emergent approximations to a more subtle and supple physical reality. They are valid only in the limiting and special cases where bits and pieces are effectively insulated from the effects of their environment. In the general case, the effect of total context on the behavior of parts cannot be neglected. Of course, with present ignorance, it is no more possible for me to spell out the details of the subtle and supple physical reality I propose than it is for the physical reductionist to spell out how neural networks generate consciousness, or for those who rely on quantum indeterminacy to spell out how it generates macroscopic agency, or for those who rely on an unanalyzed notion of top-down causality through “boundary conditions” to spell out how it actually operates. We are all necessarily whistling in the dark. I prefer the tune I have chosen because it has a natural anchorage in what we know about macroscopic physical process and because it exhibits certain promising features which I will now discuss. For a chaotic system, its strange attractor represents the envelope of possibility within which its future motion will be contained. The infinitely variable paths of exploration of this strange attractor are not discriminated from each other by differences of energy. They represent different patterns of behavior, different unfoldings of temporal development. In a conventional interpretation of classical chaos theory, these different patterns of possibility are brought about by sensitive responses to infinitesimal disturbances of the system. Our metaphysical proposal
13 See n. 3 above. See also Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief: Theological Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker (London: SPCK Press, 1994; printed in the United States as The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994]), chap. 1.
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replaces these physical nudges by a causal agency operating in the openness represented by the range of possible behaviors contained within the monoenergetic strange attractor. What was previously seen as the limit of predictability now represents a “gap” within which other forms of causality can be at work. Because of the unisolability of chaotic systems, this new agency will have a holistic top-down character. It will be concerned with the formation of dynamic pattern, rather than with transactions of energy. In a vague but suggestive phrase I have proposed that it might best be thought of as “active information.” There seems a hope that here we might discern a glimmer of how it comes about that intentional agency is exercised, either by our minds upon our bodies or by God upon creation. It is important to recognize that, in this scheme, the significance of the sensitivity of chaotic systems to the effect of small triggers is diagnostic of their requiring to be treated in holistic terms and of their being open to top-down causality through the input of active information. It is not proposed that this is the localized mechanism by which agency is exercised. I do not suppose that either we or God interact with the world by the carefully calculated adjustment of the infinitesimal details of initial conditions so as to bring about a desired result. The whole thrust of the proposal is expressed in terms of the complete holistic situation, not in terms of clever manipulation of bits and pieces.14 It is, therefore, a proposal for realizing a true kind of top-down causality. It may fittingly be called contextualism, for it supposes the behavior of parts to be influenced by their overall context. This implies a strong form of anti-reductionism in which processes are capable of being modified by the context in which they take place. This will be so for “cloudy” chaotic systems, but there will also be some “clockwork” systems, insensitive to details of circumstance, in which the behavior of the parts will be unmodified. Thus, one can understand the successes of molecular genetics in describing the (mechanical) behavior of DNA, without having to suppose that this justifies a claim that all
14 The discussion of Peacocke in Theology for a Scientific Age, p. 154, does not correctly represent my view. I have never supposed agency to be exercised through (calculated!) manipulations of individual atoms and molecules. See n. 3 above.
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aspects of living systems are adequately described in this reductionist fashion.
5. A Metaphysical Proposal The classical metaphysical options were materialism, idealism, and dualism. None seems satisfactory. Materialism implausibly devalues the mental. Idealism implausibly devalues the physical. Dualism has never succeeded in satisfactorily integrating the disjoint realms of matter and mind and it faces the problem of how to account for the apparent continuity of evolutionary history, in which a world which was once a hot quark soup (apparently purely material) has turned into the home of human beings. In consequence, in the twentieth century some have felt encouraged to explore the possibility of a dual-aspect monism, in which the mental and material are conceived of as being opposite poles (or phases, as a physicist might say) of a single (created) reality. A key idea may well be that of complementarity. Quantum theory discovered that the apparently qualitatively different characters of wave and particle were present in the nature of a single entity, light. This proved possible to understand when quantum field theory identified the feasibility of reconciling these complementary descriptions as due to the presence of an intrinsic indefiniteness. (A wavelike state is associated with the presence of an indefinite number of photons.) The essence of complementarity is its ability to hold together apparently irreconcilable characteristics (spread out wave and point-like particle) in a simple reconciling account. We experience the apparently qualitatively different realms of the material and the mental. May not the understanding of this duality be found in the intrinsic indefiniteness associated by our hypothesis with the behavior of chaotic systems, influenced by both energetic transactions and by active information? Of course consciousness is a much more profound and mysterious property than history formation by active information, but at least the latter seems to point in a mildly hopeful direction. In common with all the other metaphysical proposals here discussed, a dual-aspect monism based on a complementary mind/matter metaphysic, is largely conjectural and heuristic. We do not have the knowledge to produce definitive proposals of a fully articulate kind.
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Nevertheless, I believe this is a sensible and hopeful direction in which to look for an understanding consistent with our knowledge of physical process and with our experience of human agency. It would afford a picture of reality which would also be hospitable to the theological concept of divine providential interaction with creation. Motivation for belief in divine providence is found in the religious experiences of prayer and of trust in a God who guides.
6. Some Comments There are well-known relationships, due to Leon Brillouin and Leo Szilard, which connect the transfer of units of information (in a communications-theory sense) with minimal transfers of energy. This might seem to imply that for a physical system there could not be a totally pure distinction between energetic action and active information. Careful analysis would be required before such a conclusion was firmly established. It is not clear that active information is subject to exactly the same constraints as communications theory imposes on the storage of elements of passive information.15 Even if that were so, it would simply reflect the embodied character of human beings. We are mind/matter amphibians and are never in the state of being pure spirits. God, in any case, is not embodied in the universe and there does not seem to be any reason why God’s interaction with creation should not be purely in the form of active information. This would correspond to the divine nature being pure spirit and it would give a unique character to divine agency in a way that theologians have often asserted to be necessary. (God is not just an invisible cause among other causes.) A world open to both bottom-up and top-down causality is a world released from the dead hand of physical determinism. It is a world of true becoming, in which the future has novel aspects not predictable from the past. It is a world of true temporality.16 God knows things as they really are and this surely implies that God knows the temporal in its temporality. Divine knowledge of temporal events must be knowledge of them in their succession, not just that they are successive.
15
See the discussion in Bohm and Hiley, Undivided Universe, 35–38. Cf. C.J. Isham and J.C. Polkinghorne, “The Debate over the Block Universe” in Quantum Cosmology, 135–144. 16
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This implies, I believe, that the God who is the creator of a world of becoming must be a God who possesses a temporal pole as well as an eternal pole.17 Because the future of such a world is not yet formed, even God does not yet know it. This is no imperfection in the divine nature. God knows all that can be known, but the future is still inherently unknowable.
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Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, chap. 7.
CHAPTER FOUR
DESCRIBING GOD’S ACTION IN THE WORLD IN LIGHT OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY William R. Stoeger
1. Introduction I intend this brief essay as a “trial balloon.” I shall sketch how we can describe God’s action in the world, accepting with critical seriousness both our present and projected knowledge of reality as we have it from the sciences, philosophy and other non-theological disciplines, and our present knowledge of God, his/her relationship with us and our world, and his/her activity within it. By saying that we shall accept the knowledge we have from both ranges of experience with “critical seriousness,” I mean accepting it as indicating something about the realities it claims to talk about, after carefully applying the critical evaluations of such claims which are available within the disciplines themselves, and within philosophy and the other human sciences. This obviously involves beginning with a number of definite presuppositions, some of which favor neither the sciences nor religion and spirituality, and some of which do. But it also involves the presupposition that the claims of each have been carefully examined in the light of the different ranges of experience and certain principles of interpretation and validation. I shall not spend time here going through that process step by step, but instead shall simply assert some general results in each area which derive from such a distillation. It will be somewhat obvious to those in the respective fields what critiques I have applied to reach the results I shall assert. Then I shall attempt to marshall these results into a roughly-sketched, integrated theory of God’s action in the world. The input into this integrated, coherent theory of God’s action will not consist of highly technical assertions—either from science or from philosophy and theology—but rather assertions which more or less describe the general character of the world as we know it from the contemporary sciences and the limits of our knowledge of it, and
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the general character of God’s action in the world as we know it from contemporary Christian belief and theology. The latter has already developed a great deal in response to the input and challenges mediated to our culture by the sciences. In other terms, we wish to attempt to describe more adequately God’s action in the world, given that we know that the world, its structures, and processes, are presently best described in such and such a way (from the sciences and philosophy) and that God and his/her relationships to the world are presently best described in such and such a way (from theology and philosophy). What we know from each set of disciplines must critically interact with what we know from the other set according to certain principles (which we shall later outline). This interaction should modify each set of disciplines—particularly in our interpretation of the conclusions each one reaches at a philosophical level—and allow us to describe God’s action in the world in an integrated way. Implicit here, as Stephen Happel has pointed out to me,1 is the methodological problem of how these two languages are to be integrated. This is an issue which is important, but one which is best treated after allowing the interaction to occur via the critical apparatuses which are already available and functioning. The two languages of science and religion/theology, though different, are not isolated from or out of contact with one another. They continue to be in dynamic interaction in our common cultural and academic fields. In describing what we know about the world and about God, and his/her relationship to us and to physical reality, I need to employ a language, a set of categories, and certain philosophical presuppositions. In particular, I assume a weakly critical-realist stance and use some of the language, categories, and metaphysical presuppositions of Aristotelianism and Thomism, most notably the notions of primary and secondary causality. Other categories might have been chosen and other assumptions might have been made instead. I have chosen these because, in my opinion, they are more adequate to both the scientific and the theological data, and lead to fewer difficulties in explicating the essential differences between God and his/her creation, the relationships between them, and the ideas of divine immanence and transcendence. It is important to note also that I use the term ‘law’ in the context
1 Personal communication. Here and elsewhere in this paper I am indebted to Happel’s very helpful comments.
describing god’s action
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of both physical processes involving inanimate entities—“the laws of nature”—and free human actions. ‘Law’ is any pattern, regularity, process, or relationship, and by extension that which describes or explains a pattern, regularity, process, or relationship. Thus it applies, in the range of the ways I use the word, not only to the inanimate and non-human, but also to the human and the divine. ‘Law’ is a word used to specify, describe, or explain order. It does not necessarily imply determinism. As I use it throughout the paper, modified by various adjectives and adjectival phrases, its meaning should be clear. 1.1. Presuppositions An obvious presupposition we make in pursuing this discussion is that the sciences give us some knowledge of reality. We are not able to specify that correspondence precisely, because we do not have an independent handle on reality as it is in itself. Furthermore, our knowledge of it is always only provisional and corrigible, and its certainty is only relative, not absolute.2 But we are still reasonably persuaded to maintain that there is correspondence, however precarious and uncertain it may be. The care we exercise in validating and confirming scientific knowledge indicates that this is what we as scientists are intending to do. And unless reality is extraordinarily malevolent and contrary, the intersubjectively applied criteria used in scientific observation, theory, and experiment assure us that the sciences give us some purchase on the structures and the dynamics of the physical, chemical, and biological world of which we are a part. We presuppose in doing this that in its interaction with us, reality reveals something of what it is. It could be very devious, it is true, but we presume it is not so devious as to reveal