Philosophy As The Interpreter Of Holy Scripture (1666) (Marquette Studies in Philosophy)

Philosophy as the Interpreter of Holy Scripture (1666)

Philosophy as the Interpreter of Holy Scripture (1666)

By Lodewijk Meyer

Translated by Samuel Shirley

With Introduction and Notes by Lee C. Rice & Francis Pastijn

Marquette Studies in Theology No. 43 Andrew Tallon, Series Editor © 2005 Marquette University Press Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201-3141 All rights reserved. www.marquette.edu/mupress/

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Meijer, Lodewijk, 1629-1681. [Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres. English] Philosophy as the interpreter of Holy Scripture (1666) / by Lodewijk Meyer ; translated by Samuel Shirley ; with introduction and notes by Lee C. Rice & Francis Pastijn. p. cm. — (Marquette studies in philosophy ; no. 43) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-87462-666-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-87462-666-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Bible—Hermeneutics. 2. Philosophy and religion. I. Shirley, Samuel, 1912II. Rice, Lee, 1941- III. Pastijn, F. J. (Francis J.) IV. Title. V. Marquette studies in philosophy ; #43. BS476.M35413 2005 220.6’01—dc22 2005024873

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992. Cover photo of Braine, France, by Andrew J. Tallon, 2004.

CONTENTS Translator’s Preface .....................................................................iii Editors’ Preface ............................................................................v Introduction ..................................................................................1 1. Meyer and the PSSI .....................................................1 2. The Editions of the PSSI .............................................4 3. Meyer and Spinoza ......................................................6 4. Reactions to the PSSI and the TTP............................11 5. Closing Notes ............................................................17

Philosophy as the Interpreter of Holy Scripture [Chapter titles are by the editors]

Prologue ......................................................................................21 PART 1: I. State of the Question ..................................................32 II. The Term ‘Interpreter’ ..............................................35 III. The Sense of an Expression.....................................41 IV. Scripture is Obscure and Ambiguous ......................89 V. Philosophy...............................................................104 VI. The Norm of Interpretation ...................................113 PART 2: VII. Scripture and Philosophy .....................................120 VIII. Truth Is Not Opposed to Truth............................136 PART 3: IX. The Roman Catholic Position ...............................142 X. The Reformed Position...........................................152 XI. The Meaning of the Reformed Position ................157 XII. Scriptural Refutation of the Reformed Position ...................................................................173

XIII. Philosophical Refutation of the Reformed Position ..................................................182 XIV. The Holy Spirit as Interpreter: Meaning.............195 XV. The Holy Spirit as Interpreter: Refutation............202 XVI. Positions of the Socinians and Arminians ..........206 Epilogue ....................................................................................226 Appendices 1. Index of Biblical Citations.......................................243 2. Index of Authors Cited ............................................246 3. Glossary of Sects and Religious Movements in Seventeenth-Century Holland.............................253 4. Decree of the State of Frisia Against the PSSI.....................................................259 5. Propositions Censured by the Curator of the University of Leiden (16 Jan. 1676) .......................261 6. Chronology ..............................................................263 Bibliography............................................................................271

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Translator’s Preface

This work has been considered of sufficient importance to warrant its translation into French by two distinguished scholars, Moreau and Lagre´e. There being no English translation, it seemed to me that I might be rendering some service in undertaking this task, a task particularly laborious for a translator more habituated to Spinoza’s delightfully lucid prose. Meyer was an accomplished Latin scholar, and the complexity of his style is designed to impress this fact on the reader. I have followed the text of the 1674 imprint, while using my discretion as to the division into paragraphs. Samuel Shirley Mevagissey Cornwall

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Editors’ Preface

This translation and notes on the Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres is based primarily upon the edition of 1674, which is a slightly corrected reprint of the edition of 1673. We have also had access to the original edition of 1666 and the Dutch version of 1667. The editorial problems associated with the text of Meyer are often no less difficult than those of his complex (and often pretentious) latinity. The Latin and Dutch texts have a proliferation of italicised passages (often entire paragraphs and pages); but, for the texts to which we have had access, these are seldom literal quotations, but rather re´sume´s (sometimes probably only from memory) or summaries of re´sume´s from sources other than those cited. Meyer also frequently mentions a source or author without indicating a precise location, and occasionally only an author is mentioned (with neither work nor location). Those of Meyer’s paraphrases which we have verified are accurate, though a few are not, and these are indicated in the notes. Meyer is faithful and literal in dealing with the Roman poets as well as with passages from Scripture and with Augustine. With his own contemporaries he is much less so. In the notes references to Spinoza’s Theologico tractatus-politicus and Tractatus politicus are abbreviated respectively as TTP and TP, followed by chapter and paragraph number (e.g., TTP5, 4). References to the Ethica(E) and the Principia philosophiae cartesianae(PPC) follow standard conventions for internal references: e.g., E4P37Schol2 is the second scholium to Proposition 37 of Part 4 of the Ethica. The French translation of Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres by Lagre´e and Moreau has been most useful despite some typographical faults and incompleteness of references, and thanks are due as well to Pierre-Franc¸ois Moreau for his correspondence with us on various manuscript and textual problems.

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Bordoli’s 1997 commentary (Ragione e Scrittura tra Descartes e Spinoza) has been a constant source of notes, corrections, and information on Meyer’s contemporary sources. Finally, the unpublished doctoral dissertation by Thomas McGahan (Cartesianism in the Netherlands, 1639-1676) provides a wealth of additional information and historical background, though the treatment of Meyer is minimal. Completion of work on the manuscript and on many textual problems during the summer of 1999 was made possible by a Summer Research Grant from Marquette University’s Committee on Research, to whose members special thanks are due. Individual contributions and support have come from many. Piet Steenbakkers (Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte, University of Utrecht) provided assistance in securing photocopies of the various editions, as well as a wealth of suggestions. Jacob Adler (University of Arkansas) provided bibliographical and textual assistance. Father Roland Teske, S.J., of Marquette’s Philosophy Department, has been a constant source of assistance, not only in dealing with the complexities of Meyer’s latinity, but also in tracking down authors and sources. The introduction, appendices, and many notes have been reviewed and corrected by Father Teske, Frederick Ablondi (Hendrix College, Arkansas), Paul Bagley (Loyola College of Baltimore), Steven Barbone (San Diego State University), and Douglas Den Uyl (Bellarmine College of Louisville). Dr. John Jones, chair of Marquette’s Philosophy Department, provided a Research Assistant during the spring of 1999; and to Juliana Martonffy are due thanks for her work in proofreading and attending to matters of consistency in format and style. For their longsuffering and assistance during the period of final manuscript preparation (under UNIX troff), personal thanks are also due to John Jenders and Daryl Debroux. Marquette University Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Introduction 1. Meyer and the PSSI The first edition of Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres (hereafter PSSI) was published anonymously in Amsterdam (Eleutheropolis) in 1666. According to Thijssen-Schoute (1950, 253), the work was widely recognised as that of Lodewijk Meyer, then a physician in Amsterdam and formerly a poet, playwright, and student at the University of Leiden.1 The work immediately created a fury of refutations and counter-refutations among the theological and philosophical communities. A Dutch edition appeared in 1667, and new Latin editions in 1673 and 1674. Evidence for the staying power of the PSSI and the controversies which surrounded it is found in the fact that it underwent a fourth edition, long after Meyer’s death, in 1776.2 While Meyer is presently known primarily for his relationship with Spinoza,3 he had achieved a measure of independent renown in his own time. His edition of a dictionary of the Dutch language was one of a number of seventeenth-century efforts to explicitate and partially formalise the elements of Dutch grammar. He served on several occasions as the director of the Ams1.

2. 3.

Meyer was enrolled at the University of Leiden as early as 1654, and received degrees in philosophy and in medicine in 1660. His doctoral dissertation in the former appears in English translation in our edition of Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy and Metaphysical Thoughts (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998). He published both poetry and his own plays prior to 1660. See Appendix 6 for the known chronology. We did not have access to this edition, whose title page indicates that it is a ‘third edition’. See our edition of Spinoza’s Letters (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), esp. pp. 13-22; Meinsma (1983), esp. pp. 194-198, 255-259, and 486-488; and Bordoli (1997, 61-71).

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terdam Theatre, for whose performances he also edited and translated a number of plays. Finally, he was one of the cofounders of the literary society, Nil Volentibus arduum.4 Although a variety of projects and interests marked his own life, his interest in grammar (both its logical structure and its philosophical underpinnings) appears to be a continuous presence in all of his work. He died in 1681, at the age of fifty-one, four years after the death of Spinoza, of whose Opera Postuma (1677) he was also the principal editor. Meyer was Lutheran by confession, though the PSSI contains references to a wide diversity of both protestant and catholic authors. The diversity of religious sects in the Holland of his time (see Appendix 3) made Holland, and especially Amsterdam and Leiden, the intellectual and religious centre of scriptural exegesis and a variety of traditions which argued for a new conception of both the Bible and the method by which it was to be interpreted. At least four major currents or traditions of protestant thought can be distinguished. The first, and earliest, of these can be labelled as humanism. It is characterised by its emphasis upon a return to the texts in their original languages (Hebrew and Greek) and an emphasis upon isolating the sensus genuinus or authentic historical sense of the scriptural texts. This philological approach was one of the principal forces which came to undermine a fundamental thesis of the protestant Reformers: the claim that Scripture is clear in its own right and is ‘its own interpreter’. A second tradition, that of protestant scholasticism, is found in the works of P. Martyr Vermigli and Zanchi. In place of the claim that Scripture is wholly clear, these authors argue for the presence of ‘loci communes’, a series of central passages whose cumulative clarity is such that it can provide the means by which other and less clear passages of Scripture may be understood. The criterion for the interpretation of Scripture in this tra4.

See Suchtelen (1987) and the second section of this introduction for further details.

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dition becomes a collation of passages and their collective agreement with the totality of Holy Scripture. A third exegetical tradition, the school of Saumur, dating from the beginning of the seventeenth century, was distinguished by its methodological rigour and rationalism.5 Though Meyer does not cite directly the representatives of this school, the PSSI has an abundance of references to the works of Daniel Chamier [Chamierus]. Chamier was in continuous correspondence with the theologians of Saumur, one of whose principal goals was, like that of Meyer in the PSSI, to provide a new and fully rational basis of scriptural exegesis which could provide the basis for a reunion of Christendom. A fourth and final tradition was that of an emergent cartesian exegetical method, sharing with the school of Saumur an emphasis upon the sole use of reason as the basis for interpretation. This tradition deserves to be characterised as a ‘school’ even less than the three aforementioned approaches. Ecclesiastical condemnations of the works of Descartes were relatively commonplace in seventeenth century Holland, as elsewhere, and protestant theologians tended to view the doctrine of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ as fundamentally inimical to their tradition and the Reformed faith. While Descartes himself had eschewed any effort to adapt his method to matters of faith or scriptural exegesis, the augustinian elements of his philosophy, emphasised by Mersenne in his own time, had been developed later by theologically minded philosophers such as Ambrosius Victor, Bernard Lamy, and Poisson,6 and it was from these authors that later cartesians were to draw both inspiration and precedent in their efforts to extend or unify the cartesian method. In his Prologue to the PSSI, Meyer carefully positions himself with respect to the ongoing disputes concerning the interpretation of Scripture. He compares the current state of these 5. 6.

See Lagre´e and Moreau (1988, 6-7). See Gouhier (1978), esp. pp. 81-115, for an historical summary of what the author calls l’augustinisme carte´sianise´.

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disputes in theology with the earlier state of philosophy prior to the development of Descartes’ new method of reasoning. The goal of the PSSI is to disqualify utterly the various norms of interpretation proposed by these traditions, and to do this by marshalling the different arguments of the schools one against the other. Having thus eliminated all contenders by arguments whose certainty is clear by the light of reason, he can thus defend his own thesis: philosophy, and only philosophy, is capable of providing clear explanations of obscure passages, of sorting out and evaluating competing interpretation, and most importantly of demonstrating the validity of its own exegetical method. As noted in closing, Meyer does not claim thereby to have resolved all problems concerning the meaning and roˆle of Scripture; but, even with this qualification, his central thesis was sufficiently radical to have elicited a host of theological and philosophical refutations, as well as ecclesiastical condemnations. 2. The Editions of the PSSI A second Latin edition appeared in 1673: a few cryptic phrases from the 1666 edition had been expanded, and a large number of typographical errors had been corrected.7 The edition of 1674, which appears identical (except for pagination) to that of 1673, figured as an appendix to the (anonymous) Tractatus theologicopoliticus (TTP) of Spinoza.8 A Dutch translation of the PSSI appeared in 1667. 7. 8.

The title page of this edition carries the advertisement, ‘ab Authore longe emendatior’, but this is at best a marketer’s exaggeration. This edition forms the basis of the present translation. Significant variances from the first Latin edition and the Dutch edition are indicated in footnotes. References to the TTP and to the TP hereafter are to chapter and paragraph number — e.g., ‘TP4, 5’ is Chapter 4, paragraph 5 of the Tractatus politicus. References to Spinoza’s Ethica are internal — e.g., ‘E4P37Schol2’ is Ethica, Part 4, proposition 37, scholium 2.

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Whether Meyer was the translator of this edition is not known,9 but he certainly oversaw the translation. The Dutch edition clearly follows the Latin text of 1666 in all essential aspects. It makes use of a beautiful and precise language and certainly has literary qualities. The Latin text, while not without literary pretension, tends to be verbose in its use of lengthy (and sometimes ambiguous) phrases. The Dutch version often expands a phrase, and occasionally omits a phrase or entire sentence: we have indicated these omissions and additions in the notes. The Dutch version uses italics: (i) at the beginning of each chapter; (ii) for references and quotations; (iii) when new Dutch terminology is introduced; and (iv) for emphasis of certain phrases. Only the first two uses parallel the use of italics in the Latin text, but even here the Latin and Dutch do not always agree. In the English translation we have followed the Latin edition of 1674, but rendered quotations in quotation marks rather than italics. Where the Dutch and Latin texts do not agree on the scope of a quotation, notes have also been provided. Paragraph division is generally identical in the Latin and Dutch, but differences have not been noted; since the longer paragaphs of the Latin (some as long as 8 pages) have been broken down into shorter segments in accordance with modern usage. Indented paragraphs, which are used in the English version for longer quotations or perspicuity, do not appear in either the Dutch or Latin editions. As a rule with only a few exceptions (which are mentioned in notes), the main text of the Dutch version contains no Latin or Greek. An occasional Greek phrase or term, if it occurs, is transliterated. The Dutch version, unlike the Latin editions, contains many marginal notes. Most of these provide the Latin or Greek equivalents of terminology in the body of the Dutch text. Sometimes this terminology is standard, while in other cases it may well be a creation of the translator. Marginal notes to the 9.

Lagre´e and Moreau (1988, 14) assume that the translator was Meyer, whereas Jacob Adler has suggested in correspondence that it may have been Bouwmeester.

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Latin or Greek are made repeatedly — not just when the terminology is first introduced. Thus the term ‘twijffelsinnigheydt’ most often comes with the note ‘Amphybolia’ (sometimes ‘Amphibolia’) in the margin. And while the Dutch term ‘dubbelsinnigheydt’ comes by definition with the note ‘Ambiguitas’ in the margin, section 16 of Chapter III tells us that both terms mean in fact very much the same; and so the term ‘twijffelsinnigheydt’ is often accompanied by a marginal ‘Ambiguitas’. For marginal notes of other natures, we have given details in our notes. The Dutch translations of poetry are always competent. Sometimes these are celebrated and well-known translations, such as Vondel’s translations of some passages from Vergil’s Aeneid (section 14 of Chapter III). In other instances, though the translations are equally superb, no translator has been identified: examples are the translations of Juvenal and Horace in Chapter III, and of Lucretius in Chapter V. And it happens that the translator seems to have given up on finding an adequate translation, so that the passage is simply omitted in the Dutch version (these omissions are also mentioned in our notes). 3. Meyer and Spinoza The friendship between Meyer and Spinoza most probably began in the 1650s,10 and it is through Meyer that Spinoza made the acquaintance of Johan Bouwmeester, who was to remain among his closest and most faithful friends. Meyer had achieved recognition at that time as both a poet and grammarian, and in 1654 he was asked by a local bookseller to prepare a second edition of Hofman’s Dutch dictionary. It was in this year also that Meyer was enrolled at the University of Leiden in philosophy. We have, however, no documentation for the early years of their relationship beyond the knowledge that both thinkers moved in 10.

See Dunin-Borkowski (1933, 467), who places their first meeting in 1654.

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the same intellectual circles. We know that by 1656 Spinoza was in contact with the circle of friends of Franciscus Van den Enden, including not only Meyer but Simon de Vries, Pieter Balling, Jarig Jelles, Johan Bouwmeester, Adriaan Koerbagh, Jan Rieuwertsz, and Jan Pietersz. Spinoza’s own Korte Verhandeling, probably completed by 1660, was written for a group of friends discussing philosophical questions, and Meyer makes a clear reference to this work in the closing paragraph of the epilogue of the PSSI. The period from 1662 to 1666 is a seminal period for understanding the intellectual genesis both of the PSSI and of Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus. In 1662 Spinoza had completed the first part of what was then conceived as a tripartite Ethica (De Deo), and this was also the year in which Balling’s Het Licht op den Kandelaar appeared.11 At the end of 1662 and beginning of 1663 Spinoza completed the Principia philosophiae cartesianae (whose publication was overseen by Meyer, who also wrote an extensive preface to the work) and the Cogitata metaphysica.12 In the period from 1663 to 1665 Spinoza continued work on the Ethica, which was to evolve into a five-part work. During this same period the consistory of the Reformed Church was engaged in the examination of a series of ‘heretical’ documents published by Mennonites, Anabaptists, and Collegiants.13 In 1665 there appeared a new edition of the Catechism of Rakow (the first Latin edition dated from 1609), and also De jure ecclesiasticorum. The latter work was a frontal attack on both the theses of the Reformed Church and the political aspi11. 12.

13.

An edition and translation of this work by Carl Gebhardt appears in Chronicon Spinozanum 4 (1924-1926). The only letters of Spinoza addressed to Meyer are from this period (Ep12, Ep12A, and Ep15); and, despite Spinoza’s mention of letters from Meyer in the first two of these, none were included in the edition of the letters prepared by his friends in 1677 (nor have any been found since). See Meinsma (1983, 262-266) for a chronology of the consistory’s deliberations.

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rations of the Orangist party, and argued that all jus — divine or human, political or ecclesiastical — was derived from the civitas via contract.14 Sometime in 1665 Spinoza interrupted his work on the Ethica to begin work on the Tractatus theologico-politicus, which was not to appear in print until 1670.15 Beyond the fact that Spinoza had begun his theologico-political work at roughly the same time that Meyer was completing work on the PSSI, whose first edition appeared in 1666, and that both men were in close contact during this period, we have no documentation from which to draw detailed conclusions concerning the relationships and evolution of the two works. Nor can we do more than speculate concerning why Spinoza chose Meyer as the editor of his own work on Descartes. It has been argued that, in his preface to this work, Meyer misinterprets Descartes’ understanding of the analytic and synthetic methods,16 but an alternative hypothesis is that both Meyer and Spinoza ‘radicalise’17 that method as a means of extending it (to both political theory and scriptural exegesis). Spinoza writes to Meyer concerning his 14.

15.

16. 17.

For a summary of the work see Bordoli (1997, 92-97). In his Dictionary Bayle attributes authorship of this work to Spinoza. The condemnations of the Reformed Church of 1674 were directed specifically against four works: the Leviathan, the De jure, the PSSI, and the Tractatus theologicopoliticus. It did not bear its author’s name, and was also published with a false city of origin (Hamburgi, apud Henricum Ku¨nraht). Details of the evolution of the work, and of its relationship to the Ethica, may be found in F. Akkerman, ‘‘Etablissement du texte du Tractatus theologico-politicus,’’ in L’Ecriture sainte au temps de Spinoza et dans le syste`me spinoziste, ed. Groupe de Recherches Spinozistes (Paris: Presses de l’Universite´ de Paris-Sorbonne, 1992), 91-108. See E. Curley, ‘‘Spinoza’s Geometric Method,’’ Studia Spinozana 2 (1986), 151-169. See F. Mignini, Spinoza (Rome: Bari, 1983), 75: ‘‘Spinoza e` presentato da Meyer non gia` come continuatore o anche superatore della filosofia di Cartesio, ma come un filosofo che ha aperto un’altra via e ha posto altri fondamenti alla costruzione della metafisica.’’

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disagreements with Descartes that they are ‘non pauca’, whereas Meyer writes in his own preface to the work that they are ‘multa’. From the period 1663 to 1666 we possess thirty-three letters between Spinoza and his correspondents (Ep8-Ep38); whereas for the period following the publication of the PSSI through 1672 we possess only eight. During this period Henry Oldenburg had been imprisoned in England, Adriaan Koerbagh was condemned by ecclesiastical authorities and was later to die in prison (1669), and the Orangist party was to achieve its political ascendancy. On 26 November 1669 a group of about ten persons met at the inn Stil Malta to ratify the foundation of a cultural academy, Nil volentibus arduum. Among them were Meyer, Bouwmeester, the poet Antonides van der Goes, and the lawyers Andries Pels and Willem Blaauw. Meyer himself was charged with finding a motto for the academy, which was announced eight days later: Latet Utilitas. Documents and proceedings from the academy are known to have existed in the eighteenth century, where they were held by an Amsterdam lawyer, Balthasar Huydecoper. The archives of Huydecoper were discovered in 1982 by D. P. M. Dongelmans.18 They contained thirty pages of notes on 638 meetings of the academy which were held between 1669 and 23 December 1687. The proceedings from which the notes were drawn have never been discovered, and the only documents published by the academy itself are 129 plays (many translations from Latin or French playwrights) and several essays on dramatic art. The notes, however, indicate a gradual move on the part of the academy from plays and literary preoccupations to the general study of grammar and rhetoric. We know also that in 1671 Meyer directed a discussion ‘De bono et malo’. Suchtelen (1987, 398-399) suggests that, as the political and ecclesiastical climate 18.

See his Nil volentibus arduum: documenten en bronnen (Utrecht: Hes Publications, 1982). A summary and analysis of these is given by Suchtelen (1987).

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became more and more hostile to the new philosophy, one roˆle which Nil volentibus arduum undertook was the defence of this philosophy in the face of theological conservatives and political monarchists. 1672 marks the accession of William of Orange as Stadthouder, the invasion of Holland by the armies of Louis XIV, the closing of the Amsterdam Theatre, and the murder of the brothers de Witt. We know that in 1677 Johan Hudde requested of Meyer through the academy that he translate the Satires of Juvenal, and that this was subsequently done in collaboration with Bouwmeester and Pela. By 1677, the year of Spinoza’s death, the academy had succeeded in having the Amsterdam Theatre reopened. Bouwmeester died in 1680, and Meyer the following year. The members of the academy honoured his memory in a reading of his versified translation of the Imitation of Christ by Thomas a` Kempis. We have little textual documentation relating to the evolution of Spinoza’s thought, and no historical documentation concerning his relation to Nil volentibus arduum during its formative years of development, beyond knowing that Spinoza was in continuous contact with many of its members. Any approach to these issues must be based upon comparison of doctrines in texts such as the PSSI and the TTP; but the two works, though their accounts of scriptural exegesis are radically different, are complementary in an important respect. In his writing, both in the Ethica and the TTP, Spinoza generally avoids citations of other authors and explicit refutation or criticism of their positions. Meyer, on the other hand, cites both classical and contemporary authors continuously, and takes issue with them by name. The PSSI, accordingly, contains important information concerning the doctrinal background in which (and more often against which) Spinoza was working in the TTP. Indeed, chapters 13 through 15 of the TTP can be viewed as containing an extended critique of Meyer’s own fundamental conclusions in the PSSI, and perhaps also in part a reaction to the multitude of critiques and refutations of the PSSI whose publications preceded that of the TTP itself.

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4. Reactions to the PSSI and the TTP The first edition of the PSSI appeared in 1666, and was followed four years later by the first edition of Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus (TTP), and both works appeared anonymously. The edition of 1674 contained the PSSI as an appendix, allegedly by the same author, to the TTP. As Meinsma (1983, 327) notes, if it was Meyer’s intention to stir the fires of ecclesiastical controversy, the PSSI and its Dutch translation succeeded eminently. Reactions from philosophers, theologians, and the established ecclesiastical powers were both many and fierce. McGahan (1976, 335-336) divides these reactions into two general categories: Cartesian and Voetian (Reformed). While the dichotomy is a simplification (see Bordoli, 1997, 412-413), it provides a workable framework for sorting the many ‘refutations’ of both the PSSI and the TTP which appeared in the period immediately following the publication of both works. While representatives of the first group accused Meyer (and later Spinoza) of either perverting or misrepresenting the cartesian method, those of the latter argued that the two works exemplified religious heresy and philosophical error as inevitable outgrowths of cartesianism. Samuel Maresius (1599-1673) was appointed professor of theology at Groningen in 1642. His Disputationes theologicae refutatoriae appeared in 1667. It opens with an extended critique of the prologue and first six chapters of the PSSI, and proceeds then to a defence of cartesian rationalism in general and Descartes’ method in particular. Maresius argues with the Socinians that Scripture provides its own norma for interpretation, while reason is the iudex which settles theological controversy He then goes on to accuse Meyer of a species of ‘immoderate cartesianism’. But, despite a prolonged critique of chapter 3 of the PSSI, he concedes to Meyer that lexica, grammatica, rhetorica constitute the norms for interpreting Scripture.19 Jan Pieterszoon Beel[d]thouwer (ca. 1603-1670), a member of the Collegiant circle which met regularly in Amsterdam,

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was accused of Socinianism and excommunicated by the consistory in 1656. He apparently knew Hebrew,20 which he may have learned at the University of Leiden. His treatise, De hooghste en laetste Bedenckinge over Godt, en Goddelijcke Saken, appeared in 1661; and his Antwoordt, op het boeck, genaemt; de Philosophie d’uytleghster der H. Schrifture, an extended critique of the PSSI, was published in 1667. It argues that the texts of the prophets are ‘suyvre’ (pure or uncorrupted); so that, while reason may have an instrumental roˆle in the interpretation of Scripture, it is not valid for the interpretation of biblical phenomena in general, since God himself is the author of the biblical texts. Pierre Serrurier (Petrus Ser[r]arius, 1600-1669)21 moved to Amsterdam, where he married in 1630, and rapidly became an active and well-known member of the Millenarian circle there. He was a friend of Spinoza, and transmitted correspondence between Spinoza and Oldenburg (see Ep14 and Ep25). His Responsio ad Exercitationem Paradoxam appeared in 1667, and is fundamentally mystical in its approach to Scripture, stressing Meyer’s confusion or identification of the lumen naturale with the lumen gratiae Spiritus Sanctus.22 His attitude is part of a tradition which Gouhier (1978, 45-48) characterises as ‘l’augustinisme carte´sianise´’. Appended to his Responsio (pp. 61-82) is a refutation of the PSSI by Jan Amos Komenski (Comenius), a friend of Serrarius and also one of the members of the Collegiant circle in Amsterdam. Komenski defends the cartesian philosophy in mat19.

20. 21. 22.

Disputationes, 6 § 8: ‘‘. . . est enim Philosophia similis vino, quod moderate sumptum acuit ingenium, immoderate, turbat cerebrum et subvertit rationem.’’ See Bordoli (1997, 243). See Meinsma (1983, 196), who claims that his knowledge of Spinoza’s philosophy was superficial. Meinsma (1983, 258) mistakenly gives his year of birth as 1636. See Bordoli (1997, 256-265). Responsio, Ad prologum, 1: ‘‘Sed aliter se res habet in Theologia; quae versatur circa res supernaturales et divinas, adeoque circa Objectum quod non Rationi sed Spiritui est adaequatum.’’

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ters of mathematics, physics, metaphysics, and ethics; but, like Serrarius, he argues that Descartes’ method is unsuited to Scripture, whose author is God, and whose norm of interpretation is ‘Dei lex fidei, vitaeque speique nostrae’. Nicholaus Arnold (Arnoldus, 1618-1680) was appointed to the chair of theology at Friesland, which had been vacated when Coccejus moved to Leiden. Like Komenski, he argues in the Dissertatiuncula (1667) in favour of a cartesianism restricted to the natural order. Scripture must be interpreted using the methods of a theology inspired by the Holy Spirit. Meyer’s attempt to ‘naturalise’ the interpretation of Scripture is the work of a ‘‘homo cartesianus, semi papista, semi Socinianus, totus atheus. . . .’’23 Arnold also provides at the end of his treatise a Latin translation of the decree of the State of Frisia (10 November 1666) against the PSSI (see appendix). Christian Schotanus (1603-1671), professor of Greek and of church history at Franeker, also supporting the decree of the State of Frisia, dedicates his Triumphi Sacrae Scripturae (1667) to the ‘Consiliari In Suprema Curia Frisiae’,24 but sees Meyer’s method as a logical development of that of Descartes. While Schotanus concedes that the truth of Scripture cannot be opposed to that of reason (Triumphi, § 3, p. 16), he argues that philosophy cannot judge or understand divine mysteries because they exceed the power of human knowledge in general. Meyer, accordingly, ‘‘. . . vero in totum abit a Reformatis, quia abit a Christianismo’’ (Triumphi, § 13, p. 57). A more extended argument against not just Meyer, but against the spread of cartesianism in general, is given by Lodewijk Wolzogen (ca. 1633-1696) in his Orthodoxa Fides of 1668. Wolzogen bemoans the appearance of Hobbes’ Leviathan as well as the spread of Descartes’ thought, especially at Utrecht, which has become ‘Acropolis et Capitolium Cartesianismi’. The correct interpretation of Scripture requires three elements — the Holy 23. 24.

Dissertatiuncula, 1 § 2, p. 2. See Bordoli (1997, 273). See Bordoli (1997, 282-285).

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Spirit, reason, and knowledge of the usus loquendi (§ 51, p. 22) — and the use of reason is at best instrumental. Truths concerning salvation are in fact not even comprehensible to reason alone, which, if used constitutively, leads only to error and confusion. Wolzogen offers a detailed and extended epistemological defence of the analogia fidei rejected by Meyer, and of the perspicuitas ad salutem of Scripture in oppositon to Meyer’s textual analysis and rationalistic methodology. Wolzogen’s critique was followed closely by the German theologian Matthias Nethenus (1618-1686), whose Tractatus de interpretatione Scripturae was published in 1675. Citing Luther and Calvin in support of the doctrine of the Spiritus Sancti interna illuminatio, Nethenus tends, however, to confuse the positions of Wolzogen with those of the author of the PSSI.25 Lambert van Velthuysen (1622-1685) studied philosophy, theology, and medicine at the Universities of Utrecht and Leiden. While his generally liberal views brought him into conflict with the Calvinists, he regarded Spinoza’s TTP as both atheistic and fatalistic. Ep42 to Jacob Ostens (24 January 1671) provides an extended critique of the TTP, and received a response from Spinoza.26 His Dissertatio de usu rationis in rebus theologicis bears neither date nor place of publication, but appears in the first volume of his Opera omnia of 1680. Its attack on the PSSI is particularly virulent, possibly in part because some of the PSSI’s critics had identified Velthuysen as its author.27 He follows the Voetian school in assigning to reason only an instrumental roˆle in the interpretation of Scripture: ‘‘Dicimus in cognitione historica, qua tali, rationem rectam, sive Philosophiam veram praestare tantum vicem instrumenti’’ (p. 109c2). Unlike the orthodox Reformed, however, he downplays the inspiration of 25. 26.

27.

See Bordoli (1997, 352-354). Ep69 (Autumn 1675): for further information on Velthuysen, see our edition of Spinoza’s Letters (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 33-39; 225-236; and 323-324. See Bordoli (1997, 310-312) and Meinsma (1983, 458-359).

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the Holy Spirit, concedes to Meyer that reason has an important roˆle in the textual and historical understanding of Scripture, and argues that the ‘gratia divina’ necessary for the interpretation of Scripture is moral rather than theoretical. While he argues that Meyer’s substantive use of reason in interpretation leads to a form of Enthusiasm, his emphasis upon the inscrutability of God and of God’s works moves Velthuysen close to fideism. Balthasar Bekker (born 1634) was often considered a cartesian by his own critics. Perhaps, like Velthuysen, his critique of the PSSI is in part a form of self-defence. The De Philosophia Cartesiana Admonitio Candida & Sincera (1668) is less an attack upon the PSSI than a defence of religious tolerance. The work argues that the author of the PSSI is a cartesian who, like many of Descartes’ followers, ‘probant multa, quaedam improbant’; in so far as Descartes himself never intended his method to be extended to theological truths. Bekker insists that, unlike the intolerant aristotelianism of liberal theology, cartesianism may at least be called upon to support a spirit of tolerance. Reinier Vogelsang (ca. 1610-1679), whose Contra libellum, cui titulus, Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres appeared in 1669, also treats with scepticism the growing tide of cartesian thought. ‘‘Cartesii sane reperta, disciplinam Physicam & Ontologicam quod attinet, perpauca esse, probatu facillimum puto. . . Tantum ferme aliorum inventa compilavit atque digessit, nonnullis addidit, quaedam corrupit.’’28 He contrasts the new auctoritates (Descartes, Clauberg) with the old: ‘‘Quanto rectius et cordatius Aristoteles?’’29 His lengthy critique concludes that Meyer has ignored the fact that Scripture is ‘Verbum Dei’; and, that in going beyond Descartes by attempting to extend the method to theology, Meyer is rather following Epicurus and Lucretius. 28. 29.

Contra libellum, § 7, p. 7. See Bordoli (1997, 333-334) and Meinsma (1983, 328-329). Indignatio justa, 1669, § 33, p. 50; quoted by Bordoli (1997, 335).

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Other assaults by traditionalists on the PSSI in the years immediately following its publication included works by Johannes van der Waeyen (Waijen, 1639-1701),30 Abraham van der Heyden (Heydanus or Heidanus),31 Johannes Coccejus (Kock or Cocceius),32 Samuel Maresius,33 Johannes de Bruyn (or Bruin, 1620-1675),34 Georgius de Raad,35 Jacob Koelman (Koelammnus, Koelmans, or Coelman, 1632-1695),36 and Jean de Labadie.37 In the same period, two critiques in the same tradition explicitly targeted the TTP: the Adversus Anynonymum Theologico-Politicum Liber Singularis (1674) of Regnerus van Mansvelt (1639-1671),38 and the Arcana Atheismi Revelata (1676) of Franciscus Cuperus (Frans Kuyper, 1629-1692).39 In December of 1675 the curator of the University of Leiden, moved by the ecclesiastical authorities, published a proclamation prohibiting the teaching of all cartesian philosophy and declaring that aristotelianism was the sole philosophical method which 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

The Pro vera et genuina reformatorum sententia appeared in 1669. See Bordoli (1997, 154-366). Two works, both arguing against the spread of Cartesian and Socinian philosophy in the universities, appeared in 1672 and 1678. See Bordoli (1997, 368-369) and Meinsma (1983, 358-360). The Consilia was published in 1673, but probably written earlier. See Bordoli (1997, 369-371) and Meinsma (1983, 429-430). The De abusu philosophiae cartesianae appeared in 1670. See Bordoli (1997, 371-377). The Defensio doctrinae cartesianae appeared in 1670. See Bordoli (1997, 378-383) and Meinsma (1983, 518). The Exercitatio de Scripturarum interprete appeared in 1670. See Bordoli (1997, 383). Koelman published a critique of the PSSI in 1669, and of cartesianism in general in 1692. See Bordoli (1997, 384). Labadie published two critiques of the PSSI in 1668: the Interpres interpretis, now lost, and La puissance eccle´siastique. See Bordoli (1997, 384). See Meinsma (1983, 422-433). See Meinsma (1983; 171, 342, and 376).

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could be taught in courses. The identification of Meyer’s PSSI and Spinoza’s TTP with a growing and errant cartesianism, so extensively argued by the theological traditionalists, thus achieved a measure of political success. 5. Closing Notes Though Meyer offers several original claims in the PSSI, it would not be correct to conclude that he has a ‘philosophy’ sensu proprio. He should rather, as Hubbeling and Lagre´e-Moreau suggest,40 be classified as a ‘penseur carte´siano-spinoziste’ — not because he tried to synthesise the two systems, but rather because of his incomplete efforts to forge a transition from one to the other. The Prologue to the PSSI clearly asserts its cartesian intentions: to carry the method of clear and distinct ideas into theology itself. But Meyer can only do this by passing over the limits which Descartes himself placed on his method, and his success in so doing is limited and partial at best. Many of the problems which here remain unresolved are reorganised, rearticulated, and resolved in the TTP itself. Spinoza and Meyer both make use of the distinction between the veritas and the sensus verus of Scripture. Meyer insists, however, that Scripture is literally the verbum Dei, and that the scribes who wrote Scripture were acting primarily in a ‘secretarial function’.41 Spinoza, on the other hand, concludes that scriptural teachings are often completely false, and that the function of exegesis is that of attaining only the true sense of a passage. While in Meyer philosophy is the ultimate arbiter of both the meaning and truth of Scripture, in Spinoza Scripture is interpreted through itself alone, though the meaning given is radically 40. 41.

See Lagre´e and Moreau (1988, 10). One may suppose that there is room here for a Straussian ‘esoteric doctrine’ reading of Meyer’s own text, but it is rather safer here to insist that Meyer is unable to achieve consistency in his own exegetical method.

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different from that of traditional protestant theology. In Spinoza the notion of sola Scriptura promises a programme directed at an approach which is archeological rather than hermeneutical in its methodology. Signs of this approach are also present even in the Ethica.42 Both the PSSI and the TTP follow in what was described earlier as the humanist tradition of bringing both linguistic and historical methodologies to bear upon Scripture and the historical situations of its production. This approach tends by its very nature to remove any religious significance from the reading of the Bible, and to make it ‘one text among others’43 for which a uniform set of scientific protocols and methodologies is required. Both Meyer and Spinoza, as well as their later methodological disciples, stand starkly in opposition to a central thesis of protestantism, which sees Scripture as the focus of religious meaning and life. A careful reading of the Epilogue of the PSSI clearly reveals that Meyer himself is aware that he has not resolved all of the problems which he proposed to the reader in his Prologue. Meyer’s own conclusion that philosophy remains the sole judge of the meaning and truth of Scripture elicits an obvious question: ‘‘If all that is read with certitude in the Bible is already contained in philosophical knowledge, why bother to read the Bible at all?’’ Meyer leaves this question unanswered. Spinoza’s insistence in the TTP that the Bible offers only moral truths about how we ought to act, and no theoretical or theological truths whatever, may be seen as one resolution of Meyer’s problem; but the radical distinction between moral and theoretical domains is 42. 43.

See, for example, E2P7Schol E4P68Schol. See Lagre´e and Moreau (1988, 7): ‘‘Ceci a pour conse´quence de faire conside´rer la Bible comme un texte, et non plus d’abord comme un message. Le recul de la lecture symbolique et alle´gorique laisse la place a` l’histoire du texte et a` un traitement ‘naturaliste’ qui distingue ce qui est originaire, et ce qui est de´vie´, de´ge´ne´re´. Le texte est de´sormais un ensemble de diffe´rences a` ordonner.’’

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not one which Meyer’s own philosophical method could accept even in principle. It is not, however, of the TTP which Meyer speaks in the closing pages of his Epilogue, but rather of the Korte Verhandeling, an earlier effort on Spinoza’s part to reinterpret philosophically terms whose province had been traditionally theological (e.g., providence, predestination, regeneration). This work, and Meyer’s reference to it here, should remind the reader that Spinoza himself had once been a carte´siano-spinoziste. Seen in this light, both the PSSI and the Korte Verhandeling provide precious documentation concerning the historical and doctrinal developments which led from a cartesian world view to a full-bodied spinozism.

Prologue I have no doubt that, as soon as theologians have glanced at the name and title of this book,1 they will regard the author with no calm or impartial feelings; indeed, some of them will even be stirred to anger. So firmly lodged are they in preconceived opinions or obstinately attached to what they have been taught by their masters that they think these opinions are in entire conformity with truth and should be regarded as oracular pronouncements. Therefore they are bitterly resentful and indignant if someone ventures to declare that he holds an opinion at variance with theirs or enters the lists to oppose them and to attack the view they hold. But we live in such fortunate times2 that we may disregard the wrath and indignation of such men, and those who are so weak-minded as not to suffer any man to deviate from them can do no more than abuse him, if they know his name, and make him hated by the rabble and the ignorant mob. It is to save ourselves from this unpleasantness that we have deemed it advisable to come masked onto the stage. This procedure, it is true, does 1.

2.

The 1666 edition bears the title, Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres: Exercitatio Paradoxa, In qua, veram Philosophiam infallibilem S. Literas interpretandi Normam esse, apodictice demonstratur, & discrepantes ab hac Sententiae expenduntur, ac refelluntur. The full title of the Dutch edition of 1667 is De Philosophie d’Uytleghster der H. Schrifture. Een wonderspreuckigh Tractaet; Daer in op een betoogende wijse betooght wordt, dat de ware Philosophie d’onfeylbare Regelmaet van de H. Schrift uyt te leggen, en te verklaren is, en de ghevoelens, die daer af verschillen, overwogen en wederleyt worden. Uyt het Latijn vertaelt. Successive editions bore shorter titles (see our bibliography). The term ‘paradoxa’ may have been intended to call to the reader’s mind Pierre Gassendi’s Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos (1624) and Samuel Maresius’ Theologus paradoxus retectus et refutatus (1649). The Dutch Republic was renowned at the time for its religious tolerance.

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not entirely deprive them of occasion for slander — indeed, it gives them a handle to assail us with invective as being a lightshunner or a man of darkness, one who, condemned by the testimony of his own conscience, has not dared to publish his name because he can expect to deserve no honour from this writing, no praise from the pious. Nevertheless, we have preferred to incur this slight danger — since they are thus likely, like Andabatae,3 to do no more than smite the air and hurl missiles that will miss their unknown mark — rather than to declare our identity and expose ourselves to the inevitable lashings of their tongues. As for any honour and praise that may be showered upon me as the result of the publication of this treatise, I should like those people to know that neither does their abuse affect me nor am I in search of a little glory, for in this work I have served Truth alone. Hence I am also fully aware that if it had been my intention to acquire from this work good name and reputation, I would undoubtedly have gained it, not indeed from them and the crowd that fawns upon them, but from men of good sense and those who care for truth, however paradoxical, and welcome it (and these alone I deem really deserving of the name pious). However, in this treatise I have had as my aim not the pursuit of a little vainglory, not the ensnaring of men’s good opinion, but the dissemination of truth, the good of our neighbour, and the reconciliation4 of a Christendom that is divided and at odds. Taking the treatise as a whole, and from what I have yet to say, this will become clearer than the midday sun to any honest reader who is not minded to put an ill interpretation on these my endeavours. The fact is that I had traversed the field of academic studies and tasted the learning provided both by the Higher Faculties, as they are commonly called, and by the other philosophic 3. 4.

Gladiators made blind by a visor which covered their entire face. The Dutch version has ‘onvoorsichtigen’ (imprudent persons). The Latin version has ‘compositio’, whereas the Dutch version has ‘bevredigingh en vereenigingh’ (pacification and reconciliation).

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disciplines,5 thus satisfying my own aspirations and those of my friends. I would then have returned home to meditate anew at leisure and to submit to the searching test of truth what I had gleaned during all that time from the learned lessons of my excellent teachers and also from the perusal of the erudite books of celebrated authors and from the inspection of records.6 But I thought it advisable first to apply myself to theology, this being a discipline far excelling all others since it shows mankind the way to live well and happily and can also lead them to the eternal salvation of their souls, than which nothing is preferable or more to be desired. But while I was busily engaged in this task, carefully weighing and considering the various Christian sects and their opposing views, comparing and contrasting them, it seemed to me that the situation today is no different from that of philosophy in days of old. For just as all the philosophers of those times can conveniently be classified under two headings: the Dogmatists who claimed to teach and impart to their pupils a science that was certain and indubitable, deriving from true principles, and on the other side the Sceptics who called everything into doubt and held that nothing could be known for certain, so too in our times there are to be found theologians of two kinds, corresponding to the two classes of philosophers. The majority boldly proclaim that they possess a true and clear understanding of matters theological taken from Scripture as its source, and this is what they 5.

6.

Meyer was a practising physician. His dissertation (1660) was on natural philosophy, but he also studied language, physics, alchemy, geology, and geography, in addition to being twice the director of the Municipal Theatre of Amsterdam. The Dutch version has ‘from the inspection of their writings’. Meyer’s description of his studies resembles in some respects Descartes’ own autobiographical comments at the beginning of the Discourse on Method, which goes on to argue for the necessity of a new method for setting the disciplines on a firm foundation, a theme to which Meyer will also shortly allude.

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teach to others, whereas the remainder frankly avow that the greater part, if not all, of what they believe concerning the Christian religion amounts to nothing more than probable deductions from Scripture. So they are submitting these beliefs, they say, as doubtful and uncertain, to the superior and sounder judgment of others, and, speaking as subject to correction, as the saying goes, they are putting forward views to be improved by them. And just as in ancient times dogmatic philosophers were not united into one single body but held various different and opposing opinions, dividing into sects such as Pythagoreans, Platonists, Epicureans, Stoics, Peripatetics, etc., so too in our time dogmatic theologians are very much divided as to the important points of the Christian religion and have produced various and contrary opinions that are cherished to this day. So much passion and fervour have they displayed that the Christian world is torn7 and rent into pieces as if into separate Churches, and its inhabitants are not merely at variance in mind and morals but in some cases have become mortal enemies. For instance in Europe (to say nothing of the Asiatics) there are Catholics, the Reformed Church, Lutherans, Anabaptists, Socinians, Arminians, and others of this sort. And finally, although in both cases every sect claims primacy and superiority over others, boasting and claiming that it possesses and teaches knowledge that is based on unshakable truth, the greater part if not all the doctrines they profess and impose on their followers are not based upon a firm and stable foundation of truth; or if they are, they are such that their expositors are quite incapable of proving and demonstrating with certainty. That this is the case with theologians (I do not speak of philosophers, since they are not so relevant to our purpose) will be manifest to anyone who cares to probe more deeply, along with me, into their method and manner of proof. For whenever there arises among them some difference of opinion regarding the soundness of some doctrine concerning the Faith and Morals, 7.

The Dutch version has ‘is as if torn’.

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then forthwith, as beseems men of their profession, they betake themselves to Scripture, the infallible Word of God, their sacred anchor,8 and seek refuge there. From this they seek out and assemble all the passages they can that support their view, and they expend their energy in pointing out those that favour their argument. This they nearly always do by resorting to such feeble arguments and faulty interpretations that their opponent has no difficulty in refuting them, adapting the said passages to corroborate his own view, or distorting the meaning. Then comes another,9 arrayed in the same arms, to baffle and parry the force and strength of this argument, with equal ease. Thus they are all engaged in combat, while nobody wins the day and gains victory over the enemy. Seeing the miserable plight of Theology, queen of the sciences, and the dire straits to which were reduced her teachers, her followers10 and students, and that I, equally with them, was overwhelmed by waves of uncertainty and doubt, I began to consider whether one might discover the source of these evils, whether there was any hope of emerging therefrom and finding some way of escape. While I concentrated all my efforts on this quest, there came to mind that remarkably successful and excellent Method11 whereby the most noble and incomparable Rene´ Descartes, ‘‘the first who, after so many ages, brought hidden truth to light out of the hideous gloom of dense darkness,’’12 renewed Philosophy from its very foundations, cleansed it from the 8.

9. 10. 11. 12.

The sacra ancora was the largest and heaviest of several anchors on ancient vessels. The sense of ‘sacram ancoram solvere’ is that of taking final recourse in a moment of danger, or appeal to arguments which are ultimately unassailable. Many of the proverbial metaphors in Meyer’s prologue are taken from the Adages of Erasmus (Amsterdam, 1663). The Dutch version has ‘the other’. The Dutch version has ‘Oeffenaers’ (practitioners). The Dutch version has ‘Methode, of beleet’ instead of ‘Methodus’. Lagre´e and Moreau (30) suggest that this verse is a pastiche derived from Lucretius. The Dutch version has four Dutch verses.

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many faults wherewith it abounded and restored it to its own natural splendour. For that is the effect of his thorough disavowal of all prejudices, and his refusal to give assent to anything unless it was clearly and distinctly perceived. I gave long and careful consideration to the question as to whether it might be permitted and useful to me in Theology, just as to him in Philosophy, to call into doubt whatever could be called into doubt, continuing to reject this as false until at last I should arrive at something firm and stable in Theology, where I might safely make a stand. But as I paused here awhile, and to avoid the fate of the fisherman who became wise only after being struck,13 ‘‘I turned my mind in different directions and surveyed the entire field,’’ after lengthy and earnest deliberation it struck me that no danger threatened me from engaging in such doubt, no damage or disadvantage. Indeed, when I called upon theologians themselves to advise me, I found that some of them of considerable authority held, and openly urged upon their pupils, that this procedure was most conducive for the correct understanding and comprehension of Holy Scripture and the theology that derives from it. Thus Zanchius in his Tractatus de S. Scriptura (in Tome 8 of his Works) Quaestio 12, Ch. 1, Rule 3, and Scarpius in his Cursus Theol. in the passage concerning Holy Scripture, Controversy 8, Rule 3, give these instructions:- ‘‘For their study [that is, the study of Scripture] we should betake ourselves to it without any prejudice conceived either from our own head or from the teachings of others, with a mind that is clear, pure, and eager to learn. For prejudice is a grave hindrance to progress. That is why Christ urged his followers to beware of the leaven of the Pharisees.’’14 13.

14.

See Erasmus, Adages (476). ‘Piscator ictus saperem’: the fisherman who trapped fish with his bare hands was bitten by a scorpion, and said, ‘Ictus sapiam’. Having learned his lesson ‘the hard way’, he subsequently acted with prudence. The Dutch version makes no mention of the adage, and there are no italics to correspond to the quotation following. I have been unable to access the text of Scarpius. The quoted text is only a paraphrase of Zanchi’s third rule.

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With this, too, Polanus is in agreement when, in the Syntagma Theolog., Book 1, ch. 45, Quaestio 6,15 ‘‘Among the impediments to discovering the true meaning of Holy Scripture,’’ in the fifth place he lists ‘slowness to learn because of prejudices with which so many are infected’. And Ravanellus in his Biblioteca Sacra, Titula de Scriptura, among ‘‘the means requisite for discovering and grasping the true and legitimate meaning of Scripture and thus for interpreting Scripture,’’ specifies ‘‘a mind free from evil emotions and preconceived opinions.’’ On the same lines is the Confession of the Remonstrants, where it says in Ch. 1, Section 14, ‘‘Not only learned readers but the unlearned too can understand what is necessary for their eternal salvation provided that they do not allow themselves to be blinded by prejudice, by vain self-confidence and other evil emotions.’’ But most authoritative of all is Zwingli who says in his book On the Certainty and Clarity of the Word of God, in Tome 1 of his Works, Ch. 3, ‘‘You will admit that many a time you have perused Scripture in order to select from it some words that will lend support to a view you have already formed and which will confirm the opinion which you are so eager to uphold. It is this, then, which is the sore in all mankind’s traditions, a place painful to the touch.16 It is nothing other than to seek approval for one’s own version by the testimony of Scripture, to impose on Scripture another meaning,17 to enlist the protection and the patronage of Scripture for one’s own error, indeed, to bring over to your side passages of Scripture, however reluctant and unwilling,18 and make them say that of which you are already convinced. Our prejudices are already pervasive, and we carry them in our hands just like one who, with arms in his hand, demands bread from his 15. 16. 17. 18.

The Dutch version omits reference to Quaestio 6. In place of this phrase, the Dutch version has ‘which does not suffer to be touched by the needle’. For ‘another’s meaning’ the Dutch has ‘another meaning’. The Dutch has, ‘to curb to your interpretation the passages of Scripture, though they say the contrary’.

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neighbour, who will find himself assaulted if he does not give it.’’ To this he adds an example, and then concludes, ‘‘Hence we can infer how wrong it is to approach Scripture with strong prejudice’. Relevant to the same point is Hilary’s warning, so often in the mouths of theologians, ‘Meaning is not to be imposed on Scripture, but to be sought from Scripture.’’ Stirred and encouraged by the authority of such eminent men and by the truth of the matter itself, I have embarked on this work, following in Descartes’ footsteps and trying to find out whether, by acting the part of theologian and rejecting in theology whatever can be rejected as doubtful and uncertain, one can arrive at some basic principle which cannot be rejected without involving the total collapse and rejection of theology in its entirety, something that would be the basic principle and foundation of all theological teaching. While engaged in this undertaking, I had spent no great time in my examination before I was struck by the foremost of all the pronouncements of theology, that ‘‘the Books of the Old and the New Testament are the infallible Word of God, the Highest and Greatest.’’19 If anyone sought to remove and reject this too, he would be taking a leap beyond the bounds of theology, and to restrain and confute him one would have to resort not to theological reasoning, that is, authorities sought from Scripture, but to arguments from history and from other sources. To him might be applied that saying of Aristotle, ‘‘one cannot argue with someone who refuses to admit basic principles.’’20 Just as Jurisprudence rests entirely on the Body of Right, and without the Law the lawyer blushes to speak, so too the whole of theology is an edifice raised on the Word of God, and nothing that is not drawn therefrom should be introduced or admitted by a theologian.21 19.

20.

‘Deus optimus et maximus’ (‘almachtige Godt’) was a phrase use by the Socinians, arguing against the existence of hell, thus denying the existence of ‘Deus severissimus et implacabilissimus’. The allusion is probably to Aristotle’s dictum in Metaphysics , 4.

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So having thus discovered and established the foundation of all theology, I thought it right to proceed further and find out what could and should first be constructed thereon. Without overmuch or very difficult mental exertion I perceived and discovered that this was the infallible interpreting of Holy Scripture. The lack of this among theologians was the sole origin and source from which flowed such a diversity of opinions among the dogmatists, none being capable of demonstrating the truth of his opinion above all others, with infallible certainty. That this is the unique cure for these ills, the hinge on which the whole of theology turns when its foundation has been established, is evident from the fact that all its tenets concerning both Faith and Morals must be sought and proved from Scripture, and that they can neither be sought nor proved unless its meaning is known with certainty and made clear. And that is why in all their disputes Christian theologians of all kinds, of all ages and of all countries, straining to the utmost their ability and their learning, have always made this their sole objective, to convince others and to demonstrate that Scripture’s meaning is what they say, and not what their opponents say. Having understood this, I straightway applied myself to devising a method whereby the true meaning of Scripture could be disclosed and shown to be disclosed, and the false interpretations of others could be laid bare and proved to be such, and all this with certainty and infallibility. My intention was to erect the Palace of Sacred Theology not on sand but on rock, and so firmly that when a storm comes down upon it, floods arrive, gales blow and fall in fury on our edifice, it would not crumble, nor collapse, nor totter, but would remain unshaken and strong, resolutely awaiting and despising all that the heavens could throw at it, all the assaults and violence of its enemies. I therefore studied theologians of every kind, of every region and every age; I considered what they had to say concerning the method of interpreting Scripture; I sought to find what rule of exposition they adopted; 21.

The Dutch version has ‘‘offered or alleged by a theologian.’’

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but I could find nothing that fully satisfied me. So, leaving them all aside, I resolved to make trial of my own resources, to see how far my own strength could carry me. At last, after a difficult and laborious enquiry, I hit upon a method with which I am fully content, one of whose certainty and infallibility I have no doubt whatever, and which I herewith submit to the public scrutiny of theologians, to see and await their verdict. I therefore advise my readers, one and all, to examine and investigate with care and diligence all that I am going to set before the theological world in this little treatise, to subject its contents to the strictest scrutiny, to weigh and judge them at the scales of indubitable Truth, to acknowledge and proclaim at my side if I have been successful; if not, to avoid erring in company with me. For to me it would not be ‘‘a consolation to have had companions in my misfortunes,’’22 since all that I wish is, if I have gone astray, to be shown the right way by those who do not err.23 So my intention, dear reader, is not to beguile you into agreeing with me by refinement of language, by elegance of style, by flowery phrases and colouring affected by orators. No, I aim to set before you my entire argument in stark and simple terms, proving it by means of demonstrative reasoning.24 My appeal is not to the emotions; I seek to instruct. And that is also the reason, reader, why at the outset of this preface I have not striven to endear myself to you and win you over with flattery and with smooth blandishments,25 as writers are prone to do. For I care not whether you be open-minded or ill-disposed;26 nay, I would prefer you to be ill-disposed, even severely critical, since it is equally in your interest and mine that 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

A proverb also cited by Spinoza: see E4P57Schol. For ‘since all. . . err’ the Dutch has, ‘since all that I wish is that those who do not err show the right way to those who have gone astray’. A reference to the 1666 title (. . . apodictice demonstratur. . .). The Dutch has ‘with attractive names’. The Dutch version has ‘gunstigh of ongunstigh’ (favourable or unfavourable).

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this book is being published. If you acknowledge that Truth is demonstrated, this will be entirely a gain for you; if you reject it, this will be your loss. But if you find me in error and show this to be so, this will be to my profit, making me glad that you have been so critical. Truth is single and unique, the objective at which I am here aiming. If this is not what you seek, go no further; but if you seek her, read on boldly, read thoroughly, read again and again, discuss, scrutinise, and then: ‘‘Live on, thrive, and if you have encountered something better than this, As a good friend, tell me; if not, share this with me.’’27

27.

A quotation from Horace, Epistolae I, 6, v. 67-68.

Philosophy as the Interpreter of Holy Scripture. A Paradoxical Treatise. Chapter I 1. 2.

The importance of this enquiry. The divisions of this Treatise.

[1] Right from the outset of the Reformation, among both Catholics28 and the Reformed,29 there has been in progress an earnest and important debate regarding the right to interpret Holy Scripture and the infallible norm30 to be employed. And indeed, this is not without good reason. The books of the Old and New Testaments are acknowledged as the Word of God by all who have enlisted under Christ (except only for Catholics, who superadd the traditions and the dogmatic assertions of their Church), and these books are regarded as the only basis from which must be drawn all the doctrines of Faith and Morals. No one who has the slightest acquaintance with theology will deny that whatever difficulties can arise regarding these teachings always centre and converge on this one question of interpretation,31 the pivot on which alone turn all the disagreements and quarrels among Christians. It therefore follows more clearly than the midday sun that he who is able to reveal the true and genuine meaning of the 28. 29.

30.

31.

The Dutch version speaks here and throughout (except in quoting Chamier) of ‘Papists’ rather than ‘Catholics’. The Dutch version, here and often in what follows, uses ‘Evangelischen’ (Evangelicals) instead of the Reformed (gereformeerden). It also omits ‘A Paradoxical Treatise’ at the head of Chapter 1. The norma interpretationis was understood as the objective criterion for its interpretation, distinct from the iudex interpretationis, the person(s) charged with maintaining and defending that norm. The Dutch version has ‘uytleggingh en verklaringh’.

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Holy Writings and prove them with a certainty beyond all doubt is alone permitted to establish a strong, immovable foundation for Faith and Morals, disproving other opinions and refuting them. On the other hand, those others to whom this special gift32 has not been granted are building on sand and pouring forth words to no purpose; or if perchance they succeed in convincing one or two unstable or over-credulous hearers, their teaching rests on such weak and feeble foundations that it can be shattered and destroyed by the minimum effort of those who take a different view. Though destitute of this gift of interpretation, theologians have taken in hand the exposition of the sacred books, and this has been the root and cause from which has arisen among Christians a multitude of different opinions, so many sects have issued forth in abundance to wage war on one another, so many schisms have developed to plague the Christian world ever since its foundation, and continue to this very day. So much so that the dwellers in the Christian world are driven to misuse sadly against one another, with grievous injury to truth, the missiles which should have been hurled against Heathens, Jews, and Mahomedans, those common enemies of celestial doctrine. As I see it, to reunite the scattered limbs of Christianity and to bring together so many heads to the same belief no better remedy can be suggested than that very one by which the malady could have been prevented and forestalled, namely, a norm and a rule that is sure and utterly reliable, by which the truth of every interpretation should be tried, tested and judged, as by a touchstone. Therefore we should by no means despise, far less condemn, the service rendered by those who have exerted all the force of their genius to discovering this norm, devoting to this a goodly portion of their studies; on the contrary, we should be32.

The ‘special gift’ of which Meyer speaks will emerge as the use of clear philosophical reason, and his use of the phrase in this sense was the basis of many of the ‘refutations’ which followed the first edition of the PSSI. Peter Serrarius writes in his Responsio (1667a, 2-4) that the proper sense of this special gift is ‘gratia Spiritus Sancti frui’.

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stow on them the highest praise and encouragement. So I too, a newcomer and inexperienced athlete in this arena, shall not be ashamed at having expended some time and toil in this search, nor shall I have any qualms in presenting herewith to the theological world the results and fruits of my labour. I make bold to say that my motive is not eagerness to engage in quarrelling or contradiction, nor yet desire for gain or pursuit of glory; it is simply a sincere love of truth that has first driven me to enquire and then urged me to write. It is my hope and expectation that this truth will be attained by all who, with a mind attentive and free from the fog of prejudice, will care to examine the matter diligently with me and to peruse these few pages. [2] That they may advance with surer step and greater profit, I should like them to consider carefully and attentively these three divisions within which the whole of this enterprise will be comprised. The first will set forth some preliminary remarks from which will emerge my own thesis, demonstrated with logical force. The second will mount a defence of my proof from all objections that can be raised against it. The last will set out my refutation of those opinions which differ from mine, and will reply to arguments on which these opinions are wont to rely.33

33.

The prologue and first six chapters provide an exposition of the principal thesis. The answers to objections are given in chapters 7 and 8. Chapters 9 through 16 provide refutations of interpretations which are contrary to those of Meyer.

Chapter II 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

The meanings of the word ‘interpreter’. What it signifies for us. The material object of this word. What a word is. What a sentence is. The division between these two terms. The formal object of the word ‘interpreter’.

[1] The word ‘interpreter’1 (to begin from the predicate) from which originate the verb ‘to interpret’ and the noun ‘interpretation’ (both the act of interpreting and the result) is used by authors with more than one meaning. The more common meanings2 are: first, one who brings together and reconciles parties who are at variance. Thus, in Asconius’ Commentary on Cicero’s second speech In Verrem, ‘interpreters’ are said to be ‘those through whom agreement is produced’. The same meaning also appears in Vergil’s Aeneid IV,3 ‘‘And Thou, Juno, interpreter and sharer of our sorrows.’’ On this Servius comments as follows, ‘‘Interpreter, that is, mediator and conciliator.’’4 Again Cicero in his fifth speech In Verrem,5 has, ‘‘those who are usually the agents or interpreters for the corruption of judgment.’’ Now since such intermediaries probe and inquire into the 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

The Dutch version has ‘Uytlegger, of Verklaerder’. Moreau notes (43) that this enumeration follows exactly that of H. Estienne’s Thesaurus linguae latinae. Aeneid IV, v. 608. For the quotations from Vergil in this and the following paragraph, the Dutch version gives both the Latin and a Dutch translation. See Servius, Servii qui feruntur in Vergilii carmina commentarii, recenserunt Georgius Thilo et Harmanna Hagen (Hildesheim: Georg Olds, 1961), vol. 1, pp. 569-570. In Verrem XII, 36.

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minds of those to whom they are assigned as interpreters, thereafter explaining and disclosing this to them, it came about that ‘interpreter’ acquired a second meaning as one who explains what is obscure. Thus Vergil in Aeneid III,6 ‘‘Son of Troy, interpreter of the Gods,’’ etc. On this passage Servius comments, ‘‘Interpreter, soothsayer, who interprets the mind of the Gods to mortals.’’7 And in Aeneid X, ‘‘Asylas, interpreter of men and Gods.’’8 Here again Servius says, ‘‘He is called the interpreter of the Gods, whom he interprets, and the interpreter of men, for whom he interprets and reveals the mind of the Gods.’’ And Cicero, applying this more specialised sense to the obscurity and ambiguity of a sentence, in his Pro Cluentio 14,9 says, ‘‘Magistrates are ministers of the laws, judges are interpreters of the laws. In short, we are all servants of the law in order that we may be free.’’ Similarly, in his De Partit. Orator.,10 he says, ‘‘so that the judge may interpret the meaning of law in accordance with the particular case.’’ And in his De officiis 1,11 ‘‘There often occur injustices through sharp practice and a cunning and malicious interpretation of the law.’’ Again, when someone who is turning a passage from an unknown language into a known language makes clear and perspicuous what was somewhat obscure, there arises a third meaning of interpreter:— one who translates into another language either by writing or by word of mouth. It is this meaning that Horace uses in his Ars Poetica when he says, ‘‘The faithful interpreter will not strain to render word for word.’’12 And Cicero in 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Aeneid III, v. 359. See Servius, Servii qui feruntur in Vergilii carmina commentarii, recenserunt Georgius Thilo et Harmanna Hagen (Hildesheim: Georg Olds, 1961), vol. 1, pp. 405-406. Aeneid III, v. 175. Pro Cluentio, § 146. De Partit. Orator., § 136. De officiis I, § 33. Ars poetica, v. 133.

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his De finibus bon. et mal., Book 3,13 ‘‘But it is not necessary to translate word for word as undiscerning interpreters do, when the word in question has the same sense and is used more or less frequently.’’ And in his De optimo genere oratorum,14 ‘‘I have translated the most celebrated speeches of two most eloquent orators, but I have done so not as an interpreter, but as an orator.’’ [2] But although this last meaning of the word ‘interpreter’ is also encountered among theologians and is in use when, for example, a debate arises between Catholics and defectors as to the interpretation of Scripture into vernacular or vulgar languages (see Chamier, Panstratiae Catholicae, Tome 1, Book II; Polanus, Syntagmata Theolog., Book 1, Ch. 39, and others) in this work we shall take it in its second meaning. In distinguishing this from its third meaning we are in agreement with Polan, who writes (loc. cit., ch. 45), ‘‘To give warning, first of all, as to the meaning of this word, in this chapter the interpretation of Holy Scripture is not conversion or translation from one language to another, but a clarification of the true meaning and usages of Scripture.’’ And with Chamier (Panstrat., Vol. 1, Book 15, Ch. 1, Section 1),15 when he says, ‘‘When we have finished dealing with the controversies that pertain to this interpretation of Scripture and are a question of wording, — usually called translation or version — it still remains for us to treat of the real meaning of the words.’’ The same point is also made in a general way by V. C. Dannhauer in his Idea of the Good Interpreter and the Malicious Perverter, where he expounds his system in its entirety and regards this discipline as part of Logic, giving it the name ‘Hermeneutics’. So too the learned and reverend John Clauberg, Professor of Philosophy and Theology in the University of Duisburg, calls this study, in his Logica Vet. et Nova, ‘Analytical Hermeneutics’, saying that it deals with ‘‘the enquiry into the real meaning of an obscure sentence.’’ 13. 14. 15.

De finibus bon. et mal. III, 15. De optimo genere oratorum, § 14. The chapter is entitled, ‘‘De sensu litterali et mystico.’’

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[3] It thus becomes clear that the interpreter of whom we are to speak is engaged and occupied with external discourse with view to eliciting and bringing to light the internal discourse; that is to say, he studies words and the sentences they compose so as to seek out and reveal the meaning that is in exact agreement and correspondence with the author’s intention. [4] According to Cicero in his Topics, ‘‘Words are signs of things’, or rather, as I think, ‘signs of concepts.’’16 For primarily we use them to convey to others what we have conceived in our minds, and since concepts are nothing other than representations of things in the intellect, in the second place those things are also denoted and designated by those same words. Now this ‘denoting’ originates entirely not from Nature but from men’s free-will. Of course, I do not deny that its source is in human nature and that it is natural for men to produce sounds and utterances, and indeed to speak, that is, to utter words; but that those sounds and utterances should denote this and not that concept, this and not that thing, depends solely on the arbitrary decision and tradition of men. Now not all that is included within Nature’s ambit is always and everywhere ready to hand, nor is it granted by Nature to any mortal to peer, as in a mirror, into the mind and soul of another. Yet the needs and convenience of men belonging to the same community require them to communicate to one another their thoughts and feelings. So they have been compelled to compensate, by deliberate effort, for what Nature has denied them by giving an arbitrary form to utterances and attaching meanings to them. But this example of human ingenuity did not stop at producing simply sounds and utterances which enable men to converse only when face to face; by further advances it allowed men 16.

For Cicero words are rerum notae, whereas Meyer in fact is following Heereboord (Collegium Logicum, p. 20 in his Meletemata), for whom words represent concepts in the mind rather than objects external to it. Maresius (Disputatio, 1667, III § IV) mistakenly accuses Meyer of following Cicero on this point. See Bordoli (1997, 121-124).

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to converse, as it were, though not present one to another. This they do by creating signs for sounds and utterances, that is to say, letters, by whose variable and multiple arrangement any word that can strike the ears can be presented to the mind through one’s eyes. Thus, by this silent form of speech, we can communicate to others our own sentiments quite as well as by addressing them in person. [5] A sentence, or statement in which something is said or stated of something else, is made up of words as its component parts. Therefore in every sentence there are two elements: that which is said of something, and that of which something is said. The latter is termed by logicians the subject, the former the predicate. In an affirmative statement these are joined by the word ‘is’, in a negative they are disjoined by the words ‘is not’. There can be no statement without these expressions, and that is why they are rightly called the ‘soul’ of the proposition. [6] Therefore, since every sentence is composed of words, and these can not only be uttered by mouth but can also be depicted and indicated by letters, this will also be true of the sentence. So these two forms of expression apply both to sentences and to words: they can be expressed orally or in writing. Our interpreter will be dealing with two modes of expressing both words and sentences, but he will do so in different ways. His primary concern will be with the sentence, his immediate object; his secondary concern will be with words as a remote object, that is, the material and parts from which every sentence is produced, and of which it consists. The interpreter’s primary aim is to determine the meaning of the sentence. Since this largely depends on the words that constitute the sentence and must be extracted from these words, he will not achieve his aim unless he gives these words his careful attention, weighing them and scrutinising them with diligence. [7] Although the sentence is the first and primary object of interpretation, it is not incumbent upon us to consider every aspect of it in this work. Grammar, Rhetoric and other parts of Logic are also concerned with it, but not in the same way as we

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are here doing. Hence philosophers rightly divide the objects of the various disciplines and their constituent parts into the ‘material’ and the ‘formal’. The material object is common to several branches of learning, the formal belongs to a single one. Thus the sentence is also studied by grammarians, but only as to the extent that it is in agreement with the precepts and rules of their discipline; it is also studied by rhetoricians, but only for its style; by logicians, but only insofar as it expresses concepts. Here it will be studied in respect of obscurity, and its meaning must be sought. For if every sentence were clear and perspicuous, not obscure, it would need no interpretation to render it clear, that is, to reveal its meaning. So since it is obscurity that brings a sentence to the attention of our interpreter and makes it the formal object of his study, this requires of us a more protracted discourse.

Chapter III 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

The meaning of a sentence. Clarity and obscurity. These are relative, not absolute, terms. The plurality of meanings and their definitions. The different kinds of clarity and obscurity. Distinction between the truth of a sentence and its true meaning. In every sentence three points to be considered, neglect of which has led theologians astray. What is obscurity in a strict sense, and what ambiguity. Kinds of obscurity. Kinds of obscurity of a single word. Unusual words. Barbarisms. How many causes there can be for the obscurity of a complete sentence. And of a complete period. And of a complete piece of writing. The kinds of ambiguity in respect of the subject. What homonymy is, and its different kinds. Accidental homonymy. Intentional homonymy. How words come to be accepted, and in what different ways. What amphiboly is, and its different kinds. The ways in which a sentence may be accepted. The kinds of ambiguity arising from the spoken sentence. And from the written sentence. The complexity and frequency of ambiguities.

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26. The kinds of ambiguity with respect to ourselves. 27. A comparison between these ambiguities. 28. Is there only one literal meaning to a single sentence? [1] The signification in the wording constitutes the meaning in the sentence, that is, what is conveyed and denoted thereby. And since, as we have said, every sentence is made up of and comprised of words, it is from the signification of the words that its meaning will be constituted and composed. [2] A sentence is said to be perspicuous or obscure in this respect. ‘‘A perspicuous sentence is one whose meaning is evident to the listener or reader at first hearing or at first sight; an obscure sentence is one whose meaning is not evident to the listener or reader at first hearing or first sight.’’ We say ‘at first hearing’ or ‘at first sight’ and ‘to the listener or reader’ so as to cover both kinds of sentence, orally produced or in writing, ‘at first hearing’ having reference to the listener, ‘at first sight’ to the reader. [3] From these definitions it becomes obvious that both perspicuity and obscurity have regard to the understanding of the listener or reader, and so in both cases their nature is entirely dependent on their relation to something else. This is further confirmed by the fact that it frequently happens that a sentence obscure to one person is perspicuous to another, and on the other hand, what is perspicuous to one person is obscure to another. This could not be the case with absolute terms. Hence gravely at fault are those theologians who, when disputing as to the perspicuity and obscurity of Scripture, speak of these not as relative but as absolute terms, drawing a comparison with the sun and its light. Thus an eminent theologian of the Reformed Church writes, ‘‘The perspicuity of Scripture is a property belonging to Scripture itself, one which it always retains whether a man be enlightened or not enlightened, and this is so even though the unenlightened does not see that perspicuity. In the same way the sun in itself is and remains clear, whether a man opens or shuts his eyes, whether he has sight or is blind. This difference in the man

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cannot render the sun either clear or obscure.’’ And another renowned theologian of the Reformed Church speaks as follows, ‘‘The quality of the eye makes no difference to the light of the sun because, whatever kind of eye it may be, it can see the sun only by means of the sun’s light; and so the sun is always bright as long as it is seen by its own light, nor can it be seen otherwise. In the same way Scripture will always be perspicuous because men, whether more gifted or less so, understand Scripture from Scripture, whatever be the measure and degree of their intelligence.’’ [4] The meaning of one and the same sentence, for a number of different reasons soon to be stated and enumerated, can be various and manifold, and distinguishable into many kinds. The distinction that is most appropriate and convenient for our present purpose is that between the simple meaning apparently presented by the words and the true meaning intended by the author.1 That these two meanings occur in sentences becomes manifest when the apparent meaning presented by the words understood in their common usage is not directly that which the author had in mind when, to express his thoughts, he wrote or spoke them. Thus, to illustrate this point with one or two examples from Scripture, when we read ‘the arm of God’, ‘the finger of God’, and when Christ says, ‘This is my body’, ‘I am the way, the truth and the life’, everyone knows what these words denote in common parlance and can gather their meaning in accordance with that signification. Yet no theologian of sound mind will say that this is the true meaning intended by the author. Hence it is clear that these expressions, and therefore the sentence, admit of two meanings. 1.

The Dutch has ‘the true meaning, and the one intended by the author’. Both Wolzogen (Orthodoxa Fides, 1668, pp. 44-45) and Maresius (Disputatio, 1667, III § X) argue against Meyer that Scripture possesses ‘multiplices sensus’. Maresius cites Clauberg in defence of this claim, but the argument which he offers is probably derived instead from Calvin. See Bordoli (1997, 126).

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I do indeed admit that these meanings can sometimes coincide, so that the one the author intended and the one that is presented to the listener or reader from common usage are the same, although the sentence may bear yet another sense. Nor do I deny that the sentence may perhaps on occasion have only one, simple meaning, or even that there may be more than two possible meanings to it.2 However, since there can be at least two distinct meanings, as we have just shown, the difference of meanings in a sentence is established. [5] Since, as I have indicated above, it is in respect of its meaning that a sentence is said to be perspicuous or obscure, and since this meaning is twofold, the simple and the true meaning,3 then perspicuity and obscurity will also be twofold as they are taken to refer to the one meaning or the other. Their definitions can readily be gathered from what has already been said. [6] From what has been said, it is clear that the true meaning of which we are here speaking must by no means be confused with that true meaning which warrants that a sentence be declared true, and which has reference not to the understanding and the thought of the speaker but to the facts of which one speaks. It is a point familiar to anyone just slightly acquainted with the disciplines of the Schools, that with philosophers there is to be found more than one acceptation for truth; among others there are two to be assigned to external discourse, one called logical, the other ethical. On the former depends the truthfulness of the sentence, on the latter its true meaning; a sentence is termed true in respect of the former, its meaning is termed true in respect of the latter. The former is the agreement of the sentence with the facts as they exist in actuality independently of the speaker’s 2.

3.

The edition of 1666 has ‘quamvis adhuc alium sensum aliamve explicationem ferat oratio’. The edition of 1674 has only ‘est omnis alium sensum’. The Dutch has ‘the simple, or literal, and the true meaning’. In the next two paragraphs, where the Latin text has ‘simple’ the Dutch uses ‘of de letterlijcke’ (‘literal’).

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understanding, whereas the latter is the sentence’s conformity with the ideas and concepts in the mind of the one who has produced the sentence, either in writing or orally, no regard being paid to the question as to whether it does or does not agree with the facts. It is this difference between the truthfulness of a sentence and its true meaning that Augustine seems to note in his Confessions, Book 12, Ch. 23: ‘‘I see that there are two kinds of disagreement that can arise when something is reported through signs by truthful messengers. The one arises if there is disagreement as to factual truth, the other if there is disagreement as to the intention of him who makes the report. It is one thing to seek what is true in the circumstances of the creation, it is another thing to find out what Moses, that faithful servant of your faith, wanted the reader or listener to understand by these words.’’ Similar to this is the distinction proposed by Chamier in his Panstratiae Catholicae Tome 1, Book 15, Ch. 3, Section 21: ‘‘I recognise a distinction in true meaning; for it can be taken in an absolute sense as relating only to itself, that is, it asserts nothing that is false or impious; or it can be taken as related only to the particular context, so that it is truly the literal meaning that the context demands.’’4 [7] Therefore, so far as concerns the signification of a sentence there are three things it is important to distinguish, the simple meaning, the true meaning, and the truth.5 The distinct consideration of these meanings and of the perspicuities and obscurities resulting from them will shed not a little light on the aim of this treatise, whereas failure to do this has led interpreters of the Holy Writings and theologians far astray into labyrinthine errors and hallucinatory meanderings. In many instances when they could readily gather the meaning presented by the known words at first glance, they have regarded these Scriptural passages as 4. 5.

In the paragraph cited, Chamier is considering the Catholic position concerning the multiplicity of literal senses. ‘sensus simpliciter dictus, sensus verus, veritas’.

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clear and perspicuous, the perspicuity being that of the true meaning; for they were immediately convinced that the meaning which thus spontaneously presented itself was in agreement with the mind of the holy writer. But sometimes this was far from being the case, these passages being, in respect to their true meaning, obscure and difficult. Thus they have failed miserably in their function of interpreters, having failed to perceive, or having neglected, the different possible meanings. They seized upon the simple meaning as the true meaning and made no further enquiry, as was their duty, as to whether the meaning they assigned to the passage in question was that which the author intended in his writing.6 To illustrate my point with examples, take the words of Christ with which he began the Holy Supper (Matthew 26, verses 26, 27, 28): ‘Take, eat, this is my body’, and ‘Drink ye all of it, for this is my blood of the new Testament’, etc. They clamour and write again and again that these words are clear and perspicuous just as they are, and therefrom they have no difficulty in constructing the meaning, an easy task for anyone. But this is only the simple meaning, not the true meaning, as is claimed and demonstrated by the Reformed. The passage is indeed perspicuous as to its simple meaning, but obscure as to its true meaning. Again, when in Scripture God is called ‘Lord of heaven and earth’ (Matthew 11, 25; Luke 10, 21; Acts 17, 24), ‘King of nations’ (Jeremiah 10, 7) ‘King of kings’ (Timothy 6, 15), and is said to ‘rule over nations’ (Psalm 47, 9), ‘to have begotten a son’ (Psalm 2, 7), ‘to have loved the world’ (John 3, 16), etc., these are words whose signification is obvious, and anyone can quite easily comprehend the meanings of these expressions, but only their simple meanings.7 No one with any pretensions to wisdom will assert that God, in human fashion, is a lord or king, that he begets, or that he loves. That is why true meanings need much 6. 7.

This is the ‘sensus verus’ and not ‘veritas’. Instead of ‘but only their simple meanings’, the Dutch has ‘but not in their literal meaning’.

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further enquiry, and in respect of true meanings these predicates as applied to God are not perspicuous but obscure. Thus it is evident that the Christian laity go far astray when they frequently understand these expressions according to the superficial sense of the words, and so do all the interpreters of Scripture who do the same. So it is the latter above all who should uphold the distinction we make between meanings and the perspicuities and obscurities deriving from them, if they want to avoid continually making disgraceful blunders and being wrecked on the rocks of absurd misinterpretations.8 [8] To return to our theme, we have established two kinds of obscurity, that of the simple meaning which can properly and simply be termed obscurity, and that of the true meaning, which is again twofold. A sentence has either no meaning, or a single meaning, or several. If it has no meaning, it is simply obscure; if it has one or more meanings, it is perspicuous in respect of its simple meaning, but obscure in respect of its true meaning, for there can be doubt as to whether that one meaning or those several meanings also are true meanings. So there is obscurity of true meaning both in a sentence with a single meaning and in a sentence where there are several possible meanings. Now if the single meaning presented is also the only possible one and the sentence admits of no other, then that will also be the true meaning. If not — and that is generally, if not always, the case — it will not be accepted forthwith as true, though it may be true. One will have to enquire, just as in the case of a sentence with several possible meanings, which single meaning or what several meanings were intended by the author. Whether this is feasible is something we shall consider towards the end of this chapter. This variety of possible meanings in a single sentence is generally termed ambiguity, and since it renders a sentence obscure in regard to its 8.

Compare Meyer’s discussion of these examples of anthropomorphisms to that given by Spinoza in TTP4, 4. What for Meyer is a mere form of superficiality is for Spinoza a sign of imaginational and false knowledge of God.

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true meaning, we shall have to consider it after we have dealt with simple obscurity. [9] This obscurity can be of four kinds: obscurity of a single word or expression, obscurity of a complete sentence, obscurity of a period consisting of a combination of several sentences, obscurity of a literary work in its entirety. For it can happen that, 1. One single word or expression can render the entire meaning of a sentence incomprehensible. 2. Although the meaning of every word is clear, their combination and arrangement makes the sentence obscure. 3. The sentences, when each is considered alone, are clear and easy to understand; but the order in which they are connected and interwoven makes the period obscure and difficult to understand. 4. Finally, when periods are clear and intelligible but arranged in a confused way and thrown together at random, the complete literary work which they compose is unintelligible. Cicero touches on some, if not all, of these obscurities in his De Oratore, Book 3, as follows: ‘‘Those who plead their causes before us usually address us so clearly that it leaves nothing to be desired. But as soon as Fusius or Pomponius begins to plead these same causes, I do not have as clear an understanding of what is being said unless I pay the utmost attention. So confused is their speech, so disorderly, with no first point, no second point, with such a torrent of strange words, that an address that ought to throw light on the facts shrouds them in obscurity and darkness, and the speakers themselves seem, as it were, to drown the sound of their own voices.’’ [10] Obscurity of a single word or expression can either be a feature of the native language in which we speak and write, or else of a foreign language. The latter is termed a barbarity, the

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former an oddity. [11] A word or expression is odd and unusual9 when, by reason of its age, it is not merely antique but archaic and obsolete; or when, by reason of its excessive novelty, it is not yet accepted and brought into use. For words are overcome by senility and perish just as men do, and other words in their turn emerge into the light to take the place of the deceased, as Horace says in his Ars Poetica: Just as the woods renew their leaves with the passing of the seasons, the old ones falling, so are words subject to the ravages of age, and the newly born flourish and thrive, as the young are wont to do. We owe a debt to death, we and all that is ours. And a little further on, The works of mortals will perish; far less is the beauty and grace of language likely to be long enduring. Many words now fallen will be born again, and those now esteemed will fall, if that is the will of usage, within whose power is the control, the right and the authority over speech. Whoever uses language so ancient that he appears to be talking not with us but with our remote ancestors, or so novel that he appears to be talking with our descendants, is making himself deliberately unintelligible to his contemporaries. This is acknowledged by Quintilian, in his Instit. Orator., Book 8, ch. 2, where he says: ‘‘Obscurity also arises from words fallen into desuetude, as when one delves into the memoranda of the highpriests, or the most ancient treaties and decaying authors, with the deliberate purpose of extracting therefrom something unintel9.

Instead of ‘unusual’ the Dutch has ‘useless’.

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ligible’. Vossius, too, in his Instit. Orator., Book 4, ch. 1, sect. 8, ‘Neologisms are the enemy of clarity. It is hardly likely that words produced for the first time by the speaker should be familiar to all. Newly coined words are of that stamp.’’10 In the time of Augustus the following obsolete words and expressions existed in Latin: ‘mis’ for ‘mei’, ‘sam’ for ‘eam’, ‘nenum’, ‘nenu’, or ‘neno’ for ‘non’, ‘topper’ for ‘cito’, ‘perbitare’ for ‘perire’, ‘bovinari’ for ‘tergiversari’, ‘dapatilia comisse’ for ‘comedisse opipara’ ‘apludam edere’ and ‘floccos bibere’ for ‘furfure vesci’ and ‘faecem bibere’; as Agelli discusses in Book 11, ch. 7.11 New were ‘favor’, ‘urbanus’, ‘reatus’, ‘munerarius’, ‘piratica’ among others; see Quintilian, Book 8, ch. 3 of his Instit. Orator. — ‘irritare’ for ‘irritum reddere’, Leg. 2, Codic. de Feriis: ‘Quod contra hoc factum fuerit omnibus modis irritatur’. Again, ‘absentare’ for ‘absentem facere’, Claudius, De raptu Proserp.: ‘. . . Patriis procul absentaverit astris’. [12] A barbarous word or expression is one that is introduced from a foreign language into the native language, and is employed contrary to the customary usage of accepted writers. These are of two kinds: some are not native either by custom or by origin, others are native by origin, but not by custom. Those that have entered the language by custom and not by origin vary according to the difference of the languages from which they originate. Thus a barbarous word can be a Hebraism, a Grecism, a Latinism, etc. Examples of barbarous and foreign words of every kind and from every quarter can be seen in Latin in Vos10. 11.

The opening section of De novatis et novis, in Opera Omnia II, 144 (edition of 1697). This entire paragraph of section 11 has been replaced by another in the Dutch version, and both neologisms and obsolete words from Dutch are given as examples. Among the obsolete terms the translator mentions ‘kuyschen’ [to clean] and ‘blutsen’ [to dent], which in fact are still used as Flemish variants; whereas ‘Maetschappy’ [society], mentioned as a neologism, is today standard.

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sius, Lib. de Vit. Sermon. et Glossemat. Latino-Barbar.12 In the New Testament we find, apart from others, Latinisms and especially Hebraisms. Examples of Latinisms are A

 , 
  ,    ,   
  ,   ,     ,  
 ,     , and    `  
 (that is, ‘da operam’, Luke 12, v. 58).13 And there are also Hebraisms of this kind — ‘Amen’, ‘Emmanuel’, ‘Hosanna’, ‘Maranatha’, ‘Messias’, ‘Raca’, ‘Sebaoth’, and many other words of this sort. Furthermore, there are innumerable expressions and idioms14 taken from Hebrew, as is known even to the blear-eyed and to barbers.15 These should be given careful consideration, and failure to do this would delude the interpreter of Holy Scripture. I shall single out one example, one that is familiar and of frequent occurrence. Theologians think that they have found the laurel in the laurel-cake when they make such scrupulous distinctions between the following expressions: ‘credere Deum’, ‘credere in Deum’, and ‘credere Deo’.16 ‘Credere Deum’, they say, is to believe that there is a God, and that he is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, a creator, a preserver, a director, just, merciful, eternal, etc. But ‘credere in Deum’ is not only to believe that there is a God who is omnipotent, omnipresent, merciful, good, etc.; it is also to place in him all one’s hope and confidence in one’s salvation, and thus to believe that he is good to the 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

The Dutch version gives here, for examples of barbarisms in Dutch, a reference to the Woordenschat. The Dutch version transliterates the Greek and translates ‘da operam’. For ‘idioms’ the Dutch has ‘idioms of the New Testament’. A common proverb. The Dutch version has, ‘‘as even common people know.’’ For Augustine, ‘credere Deum’ represents a simple act of faith affirming the existence of God, ‘credere Deo’ represents the acceptance of divine authority as a source of truth, and ‘credere in Deum’ denotes faith in its strongest sense, uniting the believer to God. The Dutch version has ‘Godt gheloven for the first, ‘[aen] Godt te gheloven’ for the second, and ‘in Godt te gheloven’ for the third. Similarly for the occurrences of ‘credere in Christum’ and ‘credere Christo later in the Latin text.

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believer, that he is omnipotent in favour of the believer, that he is merciful towards the believer, and that he directs all things for the believer’s advantage and salvation. ‘Credere Deo’ is to accept his words and to repose in him the faith that is the proper due of one who declares and speaks the truth. The first expression, they say, is appropriate to all men, and even to demons, according to James 2, v. 19. The second is appropriate only to the faithful, it being impious to believe merely in the creation. But this does not apply to the third expression, for it is permissible for men to believe those who proclaim the truth. This is what they say, almost with one voice. Yet I have never found ‘credere Deum’ in Scripture, and it can occur only by ellipsis with ‘esse’ understood or subjoined, as in the case of the passage cited from James’ Epistle. ‘Credere in Deum’ is a Hebraism, equivalent to ‘credere Deo’ both in Greek and in Latin. Thus in the Holy Writing, instances of ‘credere in Deum’ and ‘credere Deo’ occur without discrimination — see John 14, 1; Romans 10, 14; 1 Peter 1, 21, and 2, 6; Romans 4, 3 and 17; Galatians 3, 6; 2 Timothy 1, 12. It is the same with ‘credere in Christum’ and ‘credere Christo’, of which there are numerous instances: see John 2, v. 11 and John 4:38; John 5, 46; John 6, verses 35, 40, 47; John 8, verses 30, 31, 45, 46; and John 10, verses 37, 38, 42. From the penultimate chapter quoted, the point I am making appears more clearly than the light of midday, for both expressions are used of the same things.17 For after the Evangelist has said in verse 30, ‘‘Haec illo loquente multi crediderunt in eum,’’ he immediately adds in the following verse 31, ‘‘Dicebat ergo Iesus in Iudaeis, qui crediderant ipsi, ‘Si vos manseritis’, etc’.’’ That the later ‘credere ipsi’ has the same sense as the prior ‘credere in eum’ is, in their translation, admitted by the theologians themselves who, at the request of the 17.

Instead of ‘things’ the Dutch has ‘persons’. From this point through the end of this section the Dutch version gives all quotations only in Dutch translation, with the exception of the transliterated Greek phrase, which is also translated.

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United Provinces of Holland, translated the Holy writings into their native language. For they translated as ‘qui in eum credebant’, ‘  !" #"$%
&
'  ()!*( ´ + ¸ ’. Finally, to demonstrate decisively that ‘credere in Deum’ is a Hebraism and that ‘credere in creaturam’ in Scripture has the same signification, I shall cite two passages only from the Old Testament. One is from Exodus 14, v. 31 — ‘‘Timuerunt populus ipse Iehovam, credideruntque in Iehovam et in Mosem servum eius.’’ The other is from 2 Chronicles, 20, v. 20, ‘‘Consistens Iosaphat dixit: Audite me Iudaei et Habitatores Ierusalem; firme credite in Iehovam Deum vestrum, et confirmabimini: firme credite in Prophetas eius, et prosperabimini.’’ Now the theologians have translated differently, ‘credebant in Iehovam et Mosi servo eius’, and also ‘credite in Iehovam Deum vestrum et credite Prophetis eius’. Yet in the commentary they attach to the first passage while making reference to the second (for the same applies in both cases) they expressly state, ‘In the Hebrew the idiom is indeed the same, but a difference is assumed from the nature of the case’. From this it is easy to judge how well they discharged their duty, those men who are forever clamouring and writing that meaning should not be imported into Scripture, but extracted therefrom. [13] Obscurity in a sentence can occur either from the displacement of words or from their omission. Displacement occurs when the natural order of its words is disturbed. Quintilian (loc. cit.) calls it a ‘mixing of words’, and adduces as an example this verse of Vergil, Aeneid 1, ‘‘Saxa vocant Itali mediis quae in fluctibus aras.’’ The natural order would be: ‘Quae saxa in fluctibus mediis Itali vocant aras’. Omission is when certain words necessary to the sentence are understood, as in Vergil Aeneid 1, ‘‘Quos ego. . . sed motos praestat componere fluctus.’’18 And in Lucan, Pharsalia 2, Tantone novorum 18.

Aeneid 1, v. 135.

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Proventu scelerum quaerunt, uter imperat Urbi? Vix tanti fuerat civilia bella moveri, Ut neuter.19 This omission of words is found not only in verse but in prose as in Pliny, Book 18, ch. 7, ‘‘In Transpadana Italia scio vicenas quinas libras farris modios pendere, circa Clusium senas’’ (‘senas’ for ‘vicenas et senas’).20 Again in the Gospel according to Luke, ch. 13, v . 9, , - ´ .0/21 .435 67
8
7¸ , -:9 35 . , 1 6´ ; 10/<7>=141 6 `?A@ 5 /B1C C5 .D1 `, , 5E 1 6 ?F-G ` @ 7
. . Erasmus translates, ‘‘And if indeed it does give fruit; if not, you will later cut it down.’’ Beze in his translation fills in what is missing, ‘‘And if indeed it does give fruit, you will leave it; if not. . .’’21 Similarly, in Paul, 2 Corinthians, ch. 5, v. 13, 1 6 @ 1H= -9 1 ´I 1 5 @ 7/21 . , Q1 J ¸ , 1 6`@ 1K8
J0L 9 5 . 5 G /21 . G ´/<6. . That is, ‘sive enim insanimus Deo; sive sani sumus, vobis’. Here Erasmus and Beze have supplied the missing repetitions ‘insanimus and ‘sani sumus’. There are many examples of this kind in Scripture.22 [14] Obscurity in an entire period arises from many causes. The first is brevity; as Horace says in his Ars Poetica, ‘‘I strive for brevity; I become obscure.’’23 Quintilian refers to this passage as follows, ‘‘Some, eager for brevity, even omit words that are necessary to a sentence, and as if it were sufficient that they themselves should know what they mean, they give no 19. 20.

21.

22. 23.

Pharsalia 2, v. 60-63. The Dutch version gives examples in Dutch taken from Van Hooft’s Granida, and transposes the example from Pliny into an equivalent situation in Amsterdam and Antwerp. The Dutch version does not give the Greek and refers neither to Erasmus nor Beze, but refers instead to the ‘nieuwe Oversettingh’ for the second version. The Dutch version transliterates the Greek and translates it, and mentions both Erasmus and Beze this time. Ars poetica, v. 25-26.

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thought to the needs of others. For my part, I consider speech pointless if the listener on his side cannot understand it.’’24 Cicero in his Brutus remarked on this source of obscurity in the writings of Thucydides, and to him can be added Tacitus and Persius among Latin writers. The second cause, the inverse of the former, is the lengthiness of periods. Quintilian again, in a passage often cited,25 speaking of ‘obscurity in the coherence and arrangement of speech’, says, ‘‘Let it not be so long that attention cannot follow it, nor so slow in its movement that the end is deferred through Hyperbaton.’’26 And pertaining to the same fault is loquaciousness, which in the same passage he attacks as follows: ‘‘In some writers there is to be found a crowd of empty words. As they shy away from the common manner of speaking and are seduced by an outward show of brilliance, what they want to say is submerged in an abundance of circumlocution; then, linking that long succession of words with another like it and mixing the two together, they prolong the sentence to a degree where no amount of breath can sustain it.’’27 The third cause of obscurity in periods is the lack of connection, or a faulty connection between the sentences and propositions of which the periods consist. It is the set habit of certain writers to pile up sentence on sentence, but they fail to connect them either with what has preceded or with one another by means of those little words that perform that function, and which grammarians therefore term ‘conjunctions’. Some other writers do make use of conjunctions, but incorrectly, in ways that are foreign to and discordant with normal usage. The fourth cause of obscurity is the confusion and mingling of sentences, as when the natural order is broken and disturbed, creating a ‘husteron proteron’.28 There is a well-known 24. 25. 26. 27.

Inst. Orator. 8, 3, 19. The Dutch version has ‘in a passage mentioned more’. Inst. Orator. 8, 11, 14. Inst. Orator. 8, 11, 17.

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example in Vergil, Aeneid 2: I then went on to say, Young men, hearts so brave in vain, If you are steadfastly determined to follow one Who dares the utmost: you see how matters stand Leaving their shrines and altars, all the Gods, On whose support this empire has rested, have departed. You are coming to the rescue of a city in flames. Let us die, and rush into the thick of the fighting.29 Servius changes the order of these verses as follows: ‘‘Young men, hearts so brave, in vain do you come to the rescue of a city in flames, because all the Gods have departed. So if you are steadfastly determined to follow me as I dare the utmost, let us die, and rush into the thick of the fighting.’’30 The fifth cause of obscurity is tacit ‘prosopopoeia’, or a dialogue where either one speaker or a number engaged in discussion are introduced not expressly, but tacitly. An example of the first kind, from Juvenal, Satire 6:31

28. 29. 30.

In place of ‘creating a ‘husteron proteron’,’ the Dutch version has ‘and the last part is moved forward’. Aeneid II, v. 347-353. See Servius, Servii qui feruntur in Vergilii carmina commentarii, recenserunt Georgius Thilo et Harmanna Hagen (Hildesheim: Georg Olds, 1961), vol. 1, p. 723. In the Dutch text the Latin of Vergil and Servius are untranslated. A note explains that Vergil’s version is so confused that a translation is hardly possible. The note repeats the Latin version by Servius and gives a translation thereof, and then goes on to give a Latin version by Donatus followed by a Dutch translation. Vondel’s version in Dutch of the passage is given. The note goes on to explain that no such examples in verse were found in Dutch by the author, but quotes instead a passage in prose from Hooft’s Henrick de Groot.

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If some God, or someone like the Gods and kinder than destiny, Made you a present of 400,000 sesterces, little man, To what heights would you rise from nothing, what a friend Of Virro’s. Give to Trebius, serve Trebius. Do you want a bit From the loins, brother? O money, it is you Whom he holds in esteem. It is you who are his brother. The same satire32 provides an example of the second kind: Put the slave on the cross. What crime has he committed to deserve Punishment! Where is the witness? Where the informant? Hearken to me, when a man’s death is in question, no delay Can be too long. Fool, do you call a slave a man? He has done nothing. So be it, but this is what I want. This I order. Let my will suffice as reason.33 Then again, in Horace, 1 Epistles, 16, where he concludes thus: The man who is good and wise will dare to say, Pentheus, 31.

32. 33.

The Dutch version has ‘Satire 5’ and provides a translation, and notes in the margin indicate who the speaker for the different parts is. For example, the note explains that ‘Give to Trebius, serve Trebius’ is spoken by Virro to the servants. There are similar notes for the next two quotations. The Dutch version has ‘In Satire 6’. v. 210-233.

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King of Thebes, why will you compel me to suffer And endure undeservedly? I shall take away your goods. My herds, my wealth, my furniture, you can have the lot. I shall keep you in manacles and leg-irons under the charge Of a harsh gaoler. God himself will deliver me as soon As I wish it. I think that what he means is ‘I shall die’. Death ends all.34 Finally, the sixth cause of obscurity is interposition, when one sentence or a number of interconnected sentences are inserted into another sentence or sentences. Quintilian again acknowledges this cause in a passage frequently quoted, when he says, ‘‘Again, the understanding may be halted — unless the insertion be brief — by an interpolation, frequently used by orators and historians to introduce some thought in the middle of a passage.’’35 Vergil, in that passage where he is describing a young colt, after saying, ‘‘You shudder at no idle noise,’’36 after several insertions he returns five lines later with a different figure of speech: Then, if there is a sound of arms far away, He cannot remain still, he pricks his ears, and trembles, And rolls the gathered fire beneath his nostrils.37 This interposition can occur without any marks of parenthesis, as in the example just quoted; or it can be accompanied by 34. 35.

36. 37.

v. 73-79. Inst. Orator. 8, 11, 15. The italics in the Dutch version suggest that the following sentence and quotation from Vergil are part of Quintilian’s remarks. Georg. 3, 79. Georg. 3, 83.

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such signs, as in this passage of Aeneid 3: Tell me, I pray (for favouring oracles have outlined My entire course, and all the Gods by divine signs Have urged me to make for Italy, venturing to a distant land. Only the harpy Celaeno prophesied a different fate, Abominable to relate, and gave warning of frightful wrath, A terrible famine), what early perils must I avoid, What must I do to overcome such grievous toils?38 Examples of this sort are frequently to be met with among writers.39 [15] Obscurity in a complete written work, in my view, can arise only from confusion and dislocation of the disposition and order in which the subject matter is treated. This occurs when the earlier and later parts are indiscriminately mingled, when what should be first, middle and last are confused in a random and disorderly fashion. Certain inscriptions in the Digesta or Pandectae offer examples of this kind of obscurity.40 [16] Hitherto we have been treating of obscurity; we have now to treat of ambiguity. This can exist in a sentence and come into being either from its component parts or from the manner in which the whole is interconnected and bound together. The former is termed homonymy, the latter amphiboly, although this can have the same meaning as ambiguity. For this sense see Quintilian, Institutiones, Book 7, ch. 9: ‘‘There are innumerable kinds of amphiboly, and some philosophers take the view that there is no word that does not have more than one meaning. There are 38. 39. 40.

Aeneid 3, v. 362-368. The Dutch version gives a translation by Vondel. The Dutch version adds an example in Dutch borrowed from Van Hooft’s Baetoos Treurspel. This entire sentence is omitted in the Dutch version.

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very few main categories; it can arise either in single words or in groups.’’41 [17] Homonymy arises when an elemental part of the sentence (either a single word or an expression) has a number of different meanings. Thus the word ‘Taurus’, says Quintilian, can mean an animal, a mountain, a constellation in the sky, a man’s name, and a tree-root.42 Logicians commonly divide homonymy into the accidental and the intentional. [18] In the case of accidental homonymy, a word has different significations by chance and with no reason; there are any number of ways in which this can come about. It may not involve a word’s declension-forms, or it may. In the first case the homonymous word’s meanings may be of the same grammatical class, or of different ones. Belonging to the same class, that of nouns, is ‘ius’, denoting that which is the opposite of injustice (right), and that which can be swallowed (soup); ‘malum’, a type of fruit (apple) and also misfortune (evil). In the class of verbs is ‘edere’, meaning to put forth and also to eat, ‘pendere’ meaning to weigh and also to pay a debt; ‘cernere’ meaning to see, to judge and to sieve. Among participles are ‘passus’, which may be from ‘pando’ and ‘patior’; and ‘succensus’ from ‘succenseo’ and ‘succendo’. In the class of adverbs, ‘ubi’ and ‘hactenus’ may refer to place and to time. Among prepositions, ‘in’ can signify ‘against’, ‘among’, ‘motion to’ and ‘rest in’ a place. ‘Super’ can mean ‘besides’, ‘beyond’, ‘concerning’ and ‘among’. In the category of conjunctions ‘ut’ can signify causality and concession, instead of ‘quamvis’. Belonging to different grammatical categories are ‘latro’, noun or verb; ‘decursus’, ‘neglectus’, ‘impulsus’ and ‘latus’ are 41. 42.

Inst. Orator. 7, 9, 1. Inst. Orator. 8, 2, 13. Spinoza uses ‘Canis’ (the animal and the constellation) in E1P17Schol to exemplify the ambiguity of ‘intellect-will’ when applied to God and to human nature. See Alexandre Koyre´, ‘‘Le chien, constellation ce´leste, et le chien, animal aboyant,’’ Revue de Me´taphysique et de Morale 55 (1950), 50-59.

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each both noun and participle; ‘versus’ and ‘adversus’ are both noun and preposition; ‘qui’ and ‘hic’ are pronouns and adverbs; ‘certo’, ‘intro’, ‘eo’, ‘adeo’, ‘continuo’ are verbs and adverbs; ‘cum’ is an adverb, a preposition and a conjunction, ‘ut’ and ‘modo’ are adverbs and conjunctions, etc. Homonymy arising from declension-forms may be of one term or of several. The former is not so much a matter of the meaning of the term as of its grammatical function, and there are very many variations. Consider how many concurrences there are of declension-forms, of gender endings, of person endings in the conjugation of tenses. In the latter case, it is a matter of meaning, and arises when, through declension, a number of words assume an identical form. These words can be of the same or different grammatical category, and declension can affect one or both words. Here are some examples: ‘Tela’ is a nominative singular feminine noun, and also nominative, accusative and vocative plural of the neuter noun ‘telum’. ‘Avis’ is a nominative singular, and also dative and ablative plural of ‘avus’. ‘Amor’ and ‘canor’ are nouns, and also first person present indicative passive of ‘amo’ and ‘cano’. ‘Is’ is a pronoun, and also 2nd person indicative of ‘eo’. ‘Minime’, ‘maxime’, ‘plane’ are vocatives of ‘minimus’, ‘maximus’, ‘planus’, and also adverbs, negative and affirmative. ‘Imo’ is an adverb, and also ablative of ‘imus’. ‘Circum’ is a preposition, and also accusative of ‘circus’. ‘Adversum’ and ‘secundum’ are prepositions, and also neuter of ‘adversus’ and ‘secundus’.

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‘Quoque’ is a conjunction, and also ablative of ‘quique’. ‘Verum’ and ‘vero’ are conjunctions, and also neuter and ablative of ‘verus’. ‘Porro’ and ‘modo’ are conjunctions, and also ablative of ‘porrum’ and ‘modus’. ‘Eo’, ‘quo’, ‘aliquo’, ‘quocunque’, ‘hac’, ‘ea’, ‘qua’ are adverbs, and also ablatives of ‘is’, ‘qui’, ‘aliquis’, ‘quicunque’, ‘haec’, ‘ea’ and ‘quae’. ‘Uti’ is an adverb, and also infinitive of ‘utor’. ‘Age’, ‘agite’ are hortatory adverbs, and also second person singular and plural imperatives of ‘ago’. ‘Intra’ and ‘sine’ are prepositions, and also second person imperatives of ‘intro’ and ‘sino’. ‘Cis’ is a preposition, and also second person present indicative of ‘cio’. ‘Fili’ is genitive of ‘filum’, and also vocative of ‘filius’. ‘Telis’ is dative and ablative plural of ‘tela’, and also ‘telum’. ‘Suum’ is genitive plural of ‘sus’, and also neuter of ‘suus’. ‘Turbas’ is accusative plural of ‘turba’, and also second person present of ‘turbo’. ‘Ducis’, ‘legis’ and ‘regis’ are genitive singular of ‘dux’, ‘lex’, and ‘rex’, and also 2nd person present indicative of ‘duco’, ‘lego’, and ‘rego’. ‘Vestrum’ and ‘nostrum’ are genitive plurals of ‘tu’ and ‘ego’, and also neuter of ‘vester’ and ‘noster’. ‘Meas’ and ‘eas’ are accusative plurals of ‘mea’ and ‘ea’, and also second person present of ‘meo’ and ‘eo’.

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‘Constiti’ is perfect tense of ‘consto’ and ‘consisto’. ‘Crevi’ is perfect tense of ‘cerno’ and ‘cresco’. ‘Pependi’ is perfect tense of ‘pendeo’ and ‘pendo’. ‘Egero’, ‘egeris’, ‘egerit’, ‘egerimus’, ‘egerunt’ are present indicative of the verb ‘egerere’, and also the future-perfect and subjunctive of ‘ago’. Let this be sufficient. Six hundred similar examples could be produced, did it not weary both reader and us. I shall end with these short verses which provide examples of both kinds. Quid facies, facies Veneris cum veneris ante? Ne sedeas, sed eas, ne pereas per eas, And again, Si qua sede sedes, si sit tibi commoda sedes, Ista sede sede, nec ab ista sede recede.43 [19] A word is an intentional homonym when, for some definite reason, it is used to signify different things. This reason may be in us, or in the things themselves. The reason is in us when, we deliberately give our children the name of another person, famous or dear to us. This type of homonymy is also recognised by Quintilian in his Institutiones, Book 7. ch. 9, where he says, ‘‘When the same name is given to more than one thing or person, this is called M `N M O P N
The Dutch version ends section 18 with a poem of Huyghens, ‘de Heer van Zuilichem’. In the Dutch version the entire section 18 is replaced by a section which gives Dutch examples. No examples involving declension forms are given, but a few nouns yield homonyms of different gender. Also many homonyms whose meanings are in the same or in different grammatical categories are given.

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example, ‘Ajax son of Telamon, or Ajax son of Oileus’.45 The reason is in the things when it is a matter of grammar or rhetoric. It is a matter of grammar that the neuter of an adjective can be understood as a noun, an adjective or an adverb; that a verb can be understood as a noun or a verb; that a participle can be understood as an adjective or participle. As for rhetoric, the reason here is the trope, which embraces metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony, and their various forms and modifications. He who seeks a more detailed explication of these figures of speech should approach the rhetoricians, among them their leader, G. J. Vossius. In his Instit. Orator., Book 4, he deals with this subject in a most enlightening way.46 Every trope is liable to ambiguity. This is obvious from the fact that a sentence expressed in figurative words carries a double meaning. When ‘soul’ is used for ‘man’, ‘stern’ for ‘ship,’ ‘author’ for ‘work’; ‘shepherd’ for ‘minister,’ there is uncertainty and doubt as to whether these words are used in their literal or figurative sense. The same judgment must be made concerning some expressions which must therefore come under this classification. ‘Scrupulum injicere’47 is literally to throw a stone, figuratively it means to cause disquiet. Of this kind, too, are ‘atro carbone notare’ and ‘a limine salutare’,48 as well as many expressions of the same sort. Finally, I think that one can most conveniently classify under this same category expressions known to philosophers as 44. 45. 46.

47. 48.

The Dutch has ‘ghelijcknamigheydt’ in the text and ‘Homonymia’ as a note in the margin. Institutiones 7, 9, 2. Opera, III, 164-221. The Dutch text omits the following three phrases: ‘that a participle. . . as an adjective or participle’; ‘which embraces. . . and modifications’; and ‘among them. . . enlightening way’. The Dutch version uses a phrase meaning ‘to put a stick into the wheels’. ‘‘To mark with black carbon,’’ i.e., to blame; and ‘‘To greet from the threshold,’’ i.e., to begin. These metaphors are often used by Meyer himself. The second phrase is not mentioned in the Dutch version.

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‘technical terms’, which mean one thing in common parlance and another thing in specialised disciplines, and sometimes different things in different disciplines. ‘Genus’ has one meaning in ordinary speech, another to grammarians, and another to logicians.49 ‘Conversio’ has one meaning in ordinary language, another to logicians, and another to theologians. ‘Declinatio’ means one thing in common usage, another to grammarians. ‘Ellipsis’ means one thing in geometry, another thing in grammar. ‘Schema’, ‘hyperbole’, and ‘parabola’ signify one thing in rhetoric, another in geometry. ‘Radius’ in common speech and in optics denotes the brilliance emitted by a luminous object, to geometers it is half a diameter, while in anatomy it means a small bone resting on a larger bone, situated between the carpus and the elbow. [20] To the ambiguity of words, in my opinion, there also pertains their different acceptations, though other scholars may disagree; for these can give a double meaning to a sentence because of the two meanings of which they are capable. They are called ‘acceptations’ and also ‘suppositions’ because through them the denotation of the word is supposed and accepted. Numerous examples can be listed.50 First, a word can be taken either in a material or in a formal sense. In a material sense it is taken for what it is in its material being, that is, the letters and syllables of which it is constituted. In a formal sense it is taken as the thing that it signifies. Thus when we say that ‘mus’ is a monosyllable of the third declension, masculine gender, and that ‘bestia’ is a trisyllable of the first declension, feminine gender, the words ‘mus’ and ‘bestia’ are regarded from a material point of view. But when we say ‘mus est bestia’ we are taking them in 49. 50.

In the Dutch version the paragraph ends here, and the examples which follow in the Latin version are omitted. Lagre´e and Moreau (1988, 38) note that Meyer here follows closely the text of Clauberg, Logica vetera et nova, III, ch. 7 (Amsterdam: L. Elzevier, 1654), 232-237; whereas Bordoli (1997, 128-129) argues that Meyer is drastically simplifying the traditional distinctions offered by Clauberg.

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a formal sense, as the things which, by convention, they designate. A second example is this, that a word may be understood either in a broad or a strict sense. In a broad sense it has a wider denotation, in a strict sense a narrower denotation. The word ‘philosophia’ sometimes indicates the whole range of liberal and philosophical disciplines, sometimes only the theoretical and practical studies to the exclusion of those which are merely instrumental — grammar, logic and rhetoric.51 A third example is when a word can be taken either in its true sense or in a derogatory sense. It is taken in its true sense when it is taken for the real thing that it denotes; in a derogatory sense when it is taken as something that bears only a superficial resemblance to the real thing. Thus the nouns ‘Deus’ and ‘philosophia’ or ‘sapientia’ are sometimes taken to mean the true God, true philosophy or wisdom, sometimes to mean the idols of heathens and the mistaken beliefs of men. A fourth example is that a word may be taken either in its special sense or in a titular, extensive sense. It is taken in its special sense when it signifies a single, individual thing. It is taken in its titular sense when it signifies something that is common to many things. Thus ‘academia’ strictly means a wooded area near Athens where Plato was born; in a titular sense it means a place in some city where lectures are provided for students. Finally, a fifth example is when a word is taken either in a collective sense or in a distributive sense. It has a collective sense when it denotes many things in such close conjunction that the predicate cannot be attributed to the components of the subject, as in ‘all the Apostles are twelve, all the Evangelists are four’. It has a distributive sense when the predication can be attributed to each component of the subject; and since the components of the subject are either species or individuals, this distribution has a twofold character. It refers either to the genera of single individu51.

The phrase ‘those which are merely instrumental’ is omitted in the Dutch version.

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als when the predicate refers only to species, as in ‘God wants all men to be saved’, and ‘all the animals were in Noah’s ark’, or to the single components of the genera when the predication can apply to single individuals, as in ‘every man is an animal’. These are the principal kinds of acceptation. Others may be found in the works of the Scholastics, who have discussed them at great length, and generally with more subtlety than utility. [21] Thus far we have been dealing with Homonymy. Let us now come to Amphiboly, which Vossius defines as ‘ambiguity of construction’. But for us, as is clear from what has been said above, this term has here a wider sense, signifying all ambiguity that occurs in the entire sentence and does not originate from a homonymous term or expression. Thus it includes within itself, as a special kind, any ambiguity arising from the construction of the sentence. It takes many forms, by reason of the variety of the syntax of the words of the sentence. I shall give some instances. A genitive so placed between two nouns that it can refer to either is a source of amphiboly. As an example, ‘frater uxoris filium occidit’;52 there is doubt as to whether ‘uxoris’ should be taken with ‘frater’ or with ‘filium’. Valerius Flaccus falls into a similar ambiguity when he begins his Argonautica thus: ‘‘Prima Deum magnis canimus freta pervia nautis.’’ Here scholars argue as to whether the genitive ‘Deum’ must be referred to ‘prima freta’ or to ‘magnis nautis’. Amphiboly also occurs when the relative ‘qui’ takes such a form that it can refer back to either of two nouns of the preceding text, as in Ovid, Metamorphoses 1: Unus erat toto Naturae vultus in orbe, Quem dixere Chaos.53

52.

Either ‘The wife’s brother killed the son’ or ‘The brother killed his wife’s son’. The example is omitted in the Dutch version.

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‘Quem’ can refer either to ‘orbe’ or to ‘vultus’. So many examples of this kind are everywhere to be found that there is no need to produce any more. Again, in an accusative and infinitive construction two accusatives may occur, one the subject and the other the object, rendering the meaning ambiguous, as in the third oracle of Ennius (Cicero, De Divinatione 2): ‘‘Aio te, Aeacida, Romanos vincere posse.’’54 Here we are left in doubt as to who will be victor, who vanquished. A similar example occurs in Plautus’ Mercator, Act 2, Scene 4: ‘‘Pentheum diripuisse aiunt Bacchas.’’55 And again in Quintilian, Instit., Book 7, ch. 9: ‘‘Lachetem audivi percussisse Demeam.’’56 And some hold that there is some sort of amphiboly in Terence, Hecyr., Act 2, Scene 1: ‘‘Itaque adeo uno animo omnes socrus oderunt nurus.’’57 For ‘socrus’ may be subject and ‘nurus’ object, or vice versa. But we would prefer to take this as an instance of Homonymy. ‘Socrus’ and ‘nurus’ are homonymous terms by reason of their case-forms, belonging as they do to the fourth declension where the nominative, vocative and genitive singular as well as the nominative, vocative and accusative plural have the same form. This is the cause of the ambiguity, not the construction of the sentence as in the previous examples, and in the phrase ‘caelo decurrit aperto’ where there is doubt as to whether he hastened through an open sky or whether the sky opened. Quintilian remarks on this,58 and adds one or 53.

54. 55.

56. 57. 58.

v. 6-7. ‘‘There was a single appearance of nature throughout the world, called Chaos.’’ The Dutch version discusses the use of relative ‘die’ here. The quotation is given in Dutch translation, but without reference to Ovid. The Dutch omits ‘the third oracle of’. Mercator, Act 2, v. 39. The Dutch version quotes the Latin, provides a Dutch translation, and briefly explains the ambiguity. The reference following to Quintilian is omitted. Instit. § 10. Hecyr., v. 201. Institut., 8, 9, 10.

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two further examples, which I here repeat because they are relevant to our discussion. ‘‘It occurs,’’ he says, ‘‘when there is doubt as to what the word refers, and the word itself is ambiguous.’’ ‘‘Heres meus dare illi damnas esto omnia sua.’’ This is the kind of ambiguity into which Cicero fell (in his Brutus): ‘‘Loquens de C. Fannii soceri instituto, quem, quia cooptatus in Augurum collegium non erat, non admodum diligebat; praesertim cum ille Q. Scaevolam sibi minorem natu generum praetulisset.’’ For the ‘sibi’ can refer either to ‘soceri’ or to ‘Fannii’. These instances are from Quintilian,59 to which we should add those words of Octavius, spoken to Cicero as the latter approached him, ‘‘quod postremus amicorum accederet.’’ Furthermore, the construction of the sentence can also include the ordering and positioning of words, so that amphiboly arising therefrom also comes under this heading.60 Quintilian again in the same passage:- ‘‘It can arise through the positioning of words, when there is doubt as to what should refer to what.’’ This is a frequent occurrence when a word placed between two other words can refer to either, as when Vergil speaking of Troilus (Aeneid 1) says, ‘‘Lora tenens tamen. . .,’’61 Here it may well be asked whether he is dragged because he holds onto the reins or in spite of his holding onto the reins. A similar debatable point is presented by the following, ‘‘Testamento quidam poni iussit statuam auream hastam tenentem.’’62 It could be asked, does ‘golden’ refer to the statue that is holding the spear, or to the spear which is part of a statue made of some other material. Besides these examples, amphiboly can occur when the meaning 59. 60. 61. 62.

Institut. 7, 9, 12. The Dutch version omits the sentences following, from ‘Quintilian again. . .’ to ‘. . . by the following’. Aeneid 1, v. 477. The Dutch version italicises this verse and continues the italics through ‘other material’. The verse is given in Dutch translation, and preceded by the explanation, ‘Such an example of amphiboly can also be found in Quintilian,’.

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of a sentence extends too broadly and is insufficiently determinate. This is the case with the oracle given to the wealthy Asian king in Herodotus, Book 2:63 KST UV
T W ‘AXY[Z\B] ^_`_W \B] ab_Xc
Zd_ `S ec
Zgf _^_ X)Y[V ] U . That is, ‘Croesus, having crossed the Halys, will destroy a mighty kingdom’. Being thus deceived, ‘he thought he would destroy the enemy’s might, but he destroyed his own’, as Cicero says (De divinatione, Book 2).64 A rather similar point is made by Quintilian in this often quoted65 passage: ‘‘There is often doubt as to which of two antecedents a phrase should be attached to, and this leads to controversy. ‘Haeres meus Uxori meae dare damnas esto argenti, quod elegerit, pondo centum’. The question arises who is to choose?’’66 Again, there is amphiboly when one speaker, or a number of speakers, are introduced without prior announcement, for it is often a matter of doubt whether the author, or some character, or which of a number of characters, is holding forth. Instances of such prosopopoeia or conversation and dialogue are to be found in Ecclesiastes and the Canticle of Canticles, and also in the Prophets and the Psalms, as is acknowledged by Chamier (Panstratiae Catholicae, Tome 1, Book 15, ch. 15, section 27).67 It is also found in writers of satire, as in Horace’s Satires, Book 2, Satire 3. He introduces Damasippus as accusing himself (Horace) of writing nothing, while he himself might appear to be accusing another.68 He begins thus: 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

The Dutch version omits the Greek (and transliteration) and the reference to Book 2. De divinatione, § 116. The phrase ‘often quoted’ is not in the Dutch version. Institut. 7, 9, 9. The chapter is devoted to the style of Scripture. For ‘accusing another’ the Dutch has ‘accusing Damasippus’.

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Sic raro scribis, ut toto non quater anno Membranam poscas, scriptorum quaeque retexens, Iratus tibi, quod vini somnique benignus Nil dignum sermone canas, etc.69 Later on he composes a dialogue between himself and Damasippus in the course of which there is often doubt as to who is speaking. A further example, in my opinion, is to be found in Juvenal, Satires 5: Vin tu consuetis audax conviva canistris Impleri, panisque tui novisse colorem? Scilicet hoc fuerat, propter quod saepe relicta Coniuge per montem adversum, gelidasque cucurri Esquilias, fremeret saeva cum grandine vernus Iuppiter et multo stillaret penula nimbo?70 And again in Satire 6: Dic aliquem sodes, dic Quintiliane colorem. Haeremus: dic ipsa; olim convenerat, inquit, Ut faceres tu, quod velles, nec non ego possem Indulgere mihi. Clames licet, et mare caelo 69.

70.

v. 1-4. ‘‘So seldom do you write that not four times in a whole year do you ask for parchment, while you unweave all that you have written, angry with yourself because, over-generous with wine and sleep, you write nothing worth talking about.’’ v. 74-79. ‘‘Be so good, bold guest, to help yourself from your customary breadbasket, and to know the colour of your own bread. So it was for this, then, that I so often quitted my wife and hastened up the steep of the icy Esquiline, when the vernal sky resounded with cruel hailstones and my greatcoat dripped with streaming rain.’’ In the Dutch version both this and the following example from Juvenal are accompanied by notes in the margin indicating who is speaking.

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Confundes; homo sum. Nihil est audacius illis Deprensis; iram atque animos a crimine sumunt.71 Finally, it is to amphiboly that we should refer cases where an entire sentence or proposition admits of, and ordinarily possesses, in accordance with its common usage in some language, a meaning different from that presented by the words taken in their strict sense. There is a notable example, deserving our attention since it is usually interpreted in a contrary way, to be found in 1 Kings, Ch. 3, v. 12. When Solomon asked for a discerning mind so as to judge the people, God replied: ‘‘Behold, I do according to thy words. Lo, I give thee a wise and understanding heart, so that there has been none like thee before thee, nor after thee shall any arise like unto thee.’’ These latter words have been understood in their strict sense by almost the entire assembly of theologians, and by the ordinary churchmen who follow them with blind enthusiasm, as having this significance, that Solomon had been elevated to such a pinnacle of universal knowledge and wisdom that ipsi, Non similis fuerit, nedum superaverit ullus Pectore sollerti, sive acto vixerit aevo, Seu quondam existat venturus posteris annis.72 Yet this idiomatic expression is quite familiar to the Hebrews, 71.

72.

v. 280-285. ‘‘Please suggest some plausible excuse in this case, Quintilian. We are at a loss. Let her speak herself. It was once agreed, she says, that you could do what you wish, and that I, too, could please myself. Cry out as you will, and confound heaven and sea. I am a human being. Nothing is more bold than these women when detected. Their anger and spirit they derive from their crime.’’ ‘‘There has been no-one to equal him, far less to surpass him, in the understanding of his heart, either in past years or in years to come.’’ The Dutch version has neither Latin nor italics.

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and signifies nothing other than excellence and pre-eminence. So the sacred writer by this passage merely wished to indicate that God had bestowed on Solomon an exceptional and quite uncommon degree of wisdom. That this is certainly so is made perfectly clear from two other passages of the same writer. The one is from 2 Kings, Ch. 18, v. 5, 6, 7, where it is said of Hezekiah, ‘‘He trusted in the Lord of Israel, so that after him was none like him among all the kings of Judah, nor any that was before him. For he clave to the Lord and departed not from following him, but kept his commandments, which the Lord had commanded Moses, etc.’’ The other is from the same book, Ch. 23, v. 25, and speaks of Josiah as follows: ‘‘And like unto him was no king before him, that turned to the Lord with all his heart and all his soul and all his might, altogether according to the law of Moses, neither after him arose any like him.’’ Now since it is said of each of these kings of Judah that there had been no other king like to him in piety, nor would there ever be, the text must either be convicted of falsity or be explained in a non-literal way. For the same affirmation cannot be true of both. If the former surpassed in piety all who lived after him, and the latter all who had lived before him, it must be that they each surpassed the other. Yet the contrary of this is expressly asserted. This is therefore a case of a Hebrew idiomatic expression whereby the author wished to indicate that these kings excelled in piety and in reverence towards God. [22] In the same way as we have been referring the acceptation of words to homonymy, so now for the same reason I think we should refer the acceptation of sentences to amphiboly.73 Of these there are three principal divisions; they may be taken in a composite sense or in a divided sense, in act designed or in act exercised, in identical sense or in formal sense. A sentence is accepted in a composite sense when the components of which its subject or predicate consist are taken as conjoined; it is accepted 73.

Lagre´e and Moreau note that Meyer here follows closely Clauberg’s Logica vetus et nova (III, ch. 8, 238-242).

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in a divided sense when they are taken in separation. Then in accordance with the variation of the form of acceptation, the sentence will be true or false. Thus the sentence, ‘Two and three are five’, is true when taken in a composite sense, that is, if the components of the subject, two and three, are taken conjointly; it is false when taken in a divided sense, the components being taken separately, for it is false that ‘two is five’ and that ‘three is five’. Similarly, the statement ‘Every animal is either rational or irrational’ is true when taken in the composite sense, that is, if the predicate ‘rational or irrational’ is taken in conjunction as one single entity. But if the predicate’s components are taken separately — ‘Every animal is rational’ or ‘Every animal is irrational’ — it is false, the sentence being taken in a divided sense. This difference between composite and divided sense is to be found particularly in affirmations made in the ‘possible’ mode and in those in which there are words signifying a number of things at the same time, or in those where a word is omitted, as in ‘possibile est ridentem flere’. In this sentence either the word ‘man’ is omitted or else the word ‘ridentem’ has two meanings:one, the material meaning, he who laughs (and this is co-incident with the omitted word); the other, a formal meaning, that is, the very act of laughing. So when this assertion is taken in a composite sense, ‘man’ is joined with ‘laugh’, or else — this comes to the same thing — the word ‘ridentem’ is taken in a formal sense, and ‘flere’ is attributed to it. Then the assertion is false, for it is not possible that he who laughs weeps at the same time, joining together laughing and weeping. But when the assertion is taken in a divided sense, ‘man’ and ‘laughing’ are disunited, or the word ‘ridentem’ is taken in a material sense, denoting man, and the flere is predicated of him. Then the sentence is true, for it is possible that he who now laughs, at another time weeps, so that weeping is predicated of the man not in so far as and when he weeps, but in so far as he is a man. And it is in this sense (Luke Ch. 7, v. 22) that Christ replied to the disciples whom John had sent to him, ‘‘The blind see, the lame walk, and the deaf hear.’’

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The second difference of acceptation is either in act designed or act exercised. The acceptation is in act designed when words are taken in their ordinary sense and definition; in act exercised when they taken in a particular sense and as applied to things. For example, that well-known saying of logicians, ‘Definitum et Definitio idem sunt’, should be taken as in act exercised, and then it is true, for a beast is an irrational animal, and an irrational animal is a beast. But it should not be taken in the sense of act designed, for it would be false, since the thing defined is that whose essence is explicated, and the definition is that whereby the essence of the thing defined is explicated. The third kind of acceptation is in either identical sense or formal sense. The acceptation is in an identical sense when the same things, although we signify them by different words and they are represented by different concepts, are reciprocally attributed to one another. The formal sense is when not the things themselves but the different concepts whereby they are represented are predicated reciprocally of one another. Thus, when theologians hold that the attributes of God can be reciprocally predicated of one another — e.g. the intellect of God is his will, his intellect is his justice, etc.74 — they admit this only in an identical sense, not in a formal sense; for in a formal sense or by reason they are distinct from one another.75 Hence Suarez, in his Disputationes Metaphysicae 30, section 6, para. 13, treating of these propositions says: ‘‘If what is discussed is things themselves conceived, those statements are true, because the sense is that the thing which is conceived under the consideration of Justice, or of Mercy, formally and essentially includes the consideration of Mercy, Will, etc. But if the discussion is of things as they are distinctly and expressly conceived by us, then these statements are false. For our mind through inadequate concepts divides a thing that is in itself quite indivisible; and then the 74. 75.

The edition of 1666 has ‘Misericordia Dei est ipsius Justitia, whereas that of 1674 has ‘Misericordia est ipsius Justitia’. Spinoza argues against this distinction in E2P49Cor.

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thing, although in itself entirely the same, does not enter our mind under single concepts in accordance with its own total adequate rationality. Thus if there is duplication in the order relative to our concepts, what is attributed to one cannot be attributed to the other, because the same thing cannot be conceived, when under the same express condition, through the one concept and another.’’ [23] So far we have been considering the sources of the obscurities and ambiguities which commonly occur in speech76 both orally pronounced and committed to writing. Let us now pass on to those which are restricted and peculiar to each of these in turn. Ambiguities peculiar to speech orally pronounced are, I believe, of only two kinds. The one is produced when two letters are pronounced in a similar way, and this varies in accordance with the different pronunciations of different nations. Thus, with us and with almost all other Europeans, the consonants ‘c’ and ‘s’ and occurring before e and i are pronounced in the same way.77 Hence there is no difference of sound between ‘ceu’ and ‘seu’, ‘cedens’ and ‘sedens’, ‘cedebam’ and ‘sedebam’, ‘cella’ and ‘sella’, ‘cellaria’ and ‘sellaria’, ‘cera’ and ‘sera’, ‘cero’ and ‘sero’, ‘cervus’ and ‘servus’, ‘cibi’ and ‘sibi’, ‘cingulus’ and ‘singulus’, ‘cinis’ and ‘sinis’, ‘cis’ and ‘sis’, ‘citus’ and ‘situs’, ‘cive’ and ‘sive’, etc. The Frisians and the Germans pronounce ‘f’ and ‘v’ in the same way,78 so that ‘feritas’ and ‘veritas’, ‘fidebam’ and ‘videbam’ sound the same. The Spanish pronounce ‘b’ and ‘v’ in the same way,79 so that there is confusion between ‘bibere’ and ‘vivere’, ‘belle’ and ‘velle’, ‘betula’ and ‘vetula’, ‘vilis’ and ‘bilis’, etc. Similar examples are to be found among other nations. Again, the vowel ‘e’ and the diphthongs ‘ae’ and ‘oe’, 76. 77. 78. 79.

For ‘speech’ the Dutch has ‘redenen’ [sentences]. The Dutch version has Dutch equivalents. The Dutch versions provides Dutch equivalents of the examples running from ‘ceu’ through ‘sive’. In the Dutch version the Latin examples are retained and also translated.

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when they are pronounced, have a similar sound, so that there is no difference of pronunciation between ‘aedis’ and ‘edis’, ‘aedilis’ and ‘edilis’, ‘aequs’ and ‘equus’. Hence the verse, ‘Dixerat hic aequum, sed tulit alter equum’, with reference to two lawyers who, while arguing as to whether ‘private property belonged to the emperor’, promised the winner a horse to be paid for by the loser.80 See the story told by Melanchthon, Dialectics, Book 4. And sometimes there is further confusion when ‘c’ and ‘s’ are followed by ‘ae’, ‘e’, and ‘oe’, as in ‘caecus’ and ‘secus’, ‘caedes’ and ‘sedes’, ‘coepit’ and ‘sepit’, ‘coeptum’ and ‘septum’.81 So much for the first source of confusion. The second results from the joining together of two words, or the division of one word into two, as in ‘incuria’ and ‘in curia’, ‘ingenua’ and ‘in genua’, ‘sub tilia’ and ‘subtilia’.’ Hence the verse, ‘Filia sub tilia mea et subtilia fila’.82 It was this type of ambiguity which gave rise to a lawsuit in the case of a testator who had two sons, one named Leon and the other Cunctaleon. His will read, ‘Bona do mea cuncta leonti’, leaving some doubt as to whether he left his property to his son Cunctaleon, or all his property to his son Leon.83 This has led to the following short poem: Cunctaleonte Leon cum fratre forensibus armis Decertat, dubio bellaque marte gerit. Belli causa Patris non intellecta voluntas 80. 81.

82.

83.

‘‘One said ‘equal’, but the other brought a horse.’’ In the Dutch version this entire paragraph is replaced by one which discusses the ‘aa’ and ‘ae’ in Dutch. A few examples and a verse are given, with an explanatory note in the margin. In the Dutch version the examples beginning with ‘as in’ are replaced by Dutch examples. A small poem is included which involves a pun concerning a ‘luypaert’ [leopard] and a ‘luy paert’ [lazy horse], which is attributed to Huyghens. The tale is related by Quintilian, Institut. 8, 9, 6.

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Ipse suas utri nempe dedisset opes. His etenim verbis, mea do bona cuncta leonti, Ante parens usus, quam moreretur, erat. Hinc sibi Cunctaleon patris bona vendicat Heres, Poscit et ipse Leon cuncta paterna bona. Tu refer, Antistes, nobis doctissime legum, Utrum ipso maneant jure parentis opes.84 [24] The ambiguities that are specific to speech expressed in writing originate from the fact that not all the variations in style and delivery perceptible to the listener can be reproduced to the reader by writing and letters. Although single words are separated by a small space, the syllabic quantities are marked by accents,85 and the sentences thus composed are punctuated with commas, semicolons, colons and points, and some affective states are denoted by question marks, exclamation marks and parentheses, yet many other things are lacking. Examples are, the interruption of the line of thought (to indicate which some modern writers employ a succession of points, as . . .), indications of irony, command, entreaty, and things of that sort. It is the lack of such indications that frequently leaves the reader in doubt as to the intended meaning. The cause of this ambiguity is not only the absence of such signs and markings but also their neglect, to which can be added their perverted use. Catholic doctors recognise this when, in list84.

85.

‘‘Leon enters into a lawsuit against his brother Cunctaleon, and the contest is of doubtful issue. The cause of the hostilities is the father’s will, which left it doubtful to whom he bequeathed his wealth. For before his death the father had employed this form of words, ‘Mea do bona cuncta leonti’. So Cunctaleon claims to be their father’s heir, while Leon demands all their father’s possessions. Tell us, o learned master of laws, who is the rightful heir to their father’s wealth.’’ Instead of ‘Although. . . by accents’, the Dutch version has ‘Although single words are separated by a small space, and the length of syllables is indicated by some sign,’.

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ing the causes of obscurity in Scripture, they say, ‘‘By reason of indeterminateness it can be made to yield different meanings, resulting either from different ways of punctuating or from different styles of writing or pronouncing, leaving some doubt as to whether a passage is to be understood affirmatively, ironically or interrogatively.’’ A similar view is expressed by Chamier when he says (Panstratiae, Tome 1, Book 15, ch. 15, section 32), ‘‘I admit that there are some ambiguous passages whose meaning can be affected by different punctuation. I admit, too, that they may all have been changed in being committed to writing , or distorted by pronunciation.’’86 But to review in an orderly way the ambiguities that can occur in written speech because of the absence or neglect of such signs and markings, we should consider that verbal utterance can be regarded solely in itself or in so far as it is accompanied by gestures and bodily movements. The possible meaning of a complete utterance, when regarded only in itself, depends on tone of voice, which may affect a single word or the entire sentence. The pronunciation of a single word can be with normal accent, or with emphasis, or be followed by a pause. These three variations ought therefore to be capable of expression in writing. The accentuation mark, although employed by more careful writers, is neglected by most, and this gives rise to ambiguity, as between ‘pendeˆre’ and ‘pendere’, ‘suffocat’ and ‘suffoˆcat’, ‘leporem’ and ‘lepoˆrem’.87 The distinction between these is marked in the following verse: Pendere vult justus, non vult pendeˆre malignus, Suffocat extinguit, suffoˆcat guttura stringit. In sylvis leporem, in verbis quaere lepoˆrem.88

86. 87.

But Chamier goes on to note that Scripture is clear and accessible to all persons. The cause of its obscurities lies with us rather than with God. In the Dutch version the examples (‘pendeˆre’ through ‘lepoˆrem’) are replaced with Dutch examples, and a few verses in Dutch are added.

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This has particular application to Greek, where accents and aspirates are the cause of much diverse interpretation and difference to words, a point familiar to anyone who has but a slight acquaintance with that language. There is no sign for emphasis in writing, leaving it doubtful as to whether or not a word was spoken emphatically. Catholics and Lutherans give emphasis to the little word ‘est’ in the sentence, ‘Panis est corpus Christi’, as if some mystery lurked therein. So, too, there are others who raise their voice at the word ‘omnes’ in ‘Deus vult omnes homines salvari’, in order to deceive the ignorant, just as if all men belong to the elect. (Kekkermann, in his Systema Logicon, Book 3, ch. 1). Finally, the short pause which follows the utterance of a word in uncompleted speech and indicates that this word has reference to what has preceded, is marked by few, and by a comma, whereas it is neglected by most writers, leaving it doubtful whether the word should be referred to what has preceded or to what follows it. There is an example in Cicero’s De Officiis, Book 2: ‘‘Summa quidem auctoritate philosophi, severe` sane` atque honeste`, haec tria genera confusa, cogitatione distinguunt.’’ In this sentence, if a comma is not inserted after ‘confusa’, there is doubt as to whether ‘confusa’ is to be linked with ‘genera’ or with ‘cogitatione’.89 In this category of the ambiguity of a single word resulting from some defectiveness in the writing there should be included that which arises in the Hebrew language because the script of the ancient Jews did not then incorporate the vowels which are now assigned to their letters. ‘‘Those scholars are quite unreasonable who think that Moses made use of vowel-signs in writ88.

89.

‘‘The just man is willing to pay, the wicked does not want to hang. Suffocat extinguishes the fire, suffoˆcat seizes the throat, Seek a hare in the woods; seek charm in language.’’ In the Dutch version the last two sentences of this paragraph are replaced by a discussion of the sentence, ‘Dat Godt Godt is gheloof ick, niet onwaerachtigh is Godt.’

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ing the Pentateuch, or even that Ezra and the men of the Great Synagogue used them. These signs were introduced later by learned Jews, the Massoretes, and then only five centuries after Christ,’’ the illustrious Vossius says in his De Arte Grammatica, Book 1, chapter 31. The reason why the ancient Jews made no use of these vowel-signs is this, that a word was not ambiguous as pronounced, but developed this fault when it was written.90 When to a word that is written with only consonantal letters there are attached different vowel-signs, or when these are attached or assigned to different places, the word suffers a change of form and can therefore have different meanings. Various examples of this ambiguity are to be found in the Old Testament and its translations, as can be seen in Vossius’ work just cited. In the pronunciation of an entire sentence one must take into account punctuation and variation of tone.91 Punctuation is accomplished by control of breathing, whereby through intervals we sustain, suspend or complete the sense. A comma sustains, a colon suspends, a period completes, as Lipsius says in his letter to Hub. Audejantius on the subject of punctuation.92 The pause is least for a comma, medium for a colon, and full for a period. To these three many add the semicolon, which calls for a pause slightly longer than for a comma, but shorter than for a colon. To these pauses in speech there corresponds punctuation in writing, defined by Lipsius as ‘a definite method of notation whereby we separate and divide the text’. This punctuation is indeed no less necessary for written speech than for speech orally deliv90.

91.

92.

The Dutch version of this sentence reads: ‘‘But while the ancient Jews made no use of these vowel-signs, this is a reason why a word that was not ambiguous when it was pronounced, developed this fault when it was written.’’ In Latin ‘distinctio’ denotes a cut between words, a breathing mark if they are spoken, or punctuation if written. The system of punctuation which Meyer here offers is not quite equivalent to the modern one, especially in its distinction between colon and semicolon. The reference to Lipsius is omitted in the Dutch version.

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ered. ‘‘For, by Hercules’’ (these are his words),93 ‘‘the reading and the understanding of the text becomes quite confused unless there are markings to divide it and to lead us, as it were, by the hand.’’ So it is obvious that both obscurity and ambiguity can arise from lack of punctuation, or its neglect, or its perverse use. This is particularly so with the writings of the authors of more ancient times, for in those days they did not have the punctuation signs that we use, nor in their books are to be found different varieties of punctuation. Whatever of this kind is found in them today must be regarded as recent additions. This is also the case with the New Testament, for we must not imagine that the Evangelists and the Apostles punctuated their writings, marking them with the signs of comma, colon and period in the manner in which we find them punctuated today. These were supplied by Christian theologians of a later age when these signs came into use. So it comes about that while one scholar uses one punctuation mark, another considers that none is needed, or else he uses a quite different one, as the resulting interpretation appears to favour his own opinion to a greater or less degree. It would not be difficult to produce numerous such examples, did we not consider it to be superfluous because they become obvious to anyone who examines the writings of theologians. We therefore pass on to the subject of variety in pronunciation, which can be effected by raising or lowering the tone of voice or by some other change of tone, and can take many different forms. Through such variation shades of meaning are expressed, such as questioning, wondering, interrupting, irony, asking, ordering, threatening and suchlike. All these one ought to be able to bring to the reader’s attention in writing, too, if all the variations of spoken speech are to find expression in literary works. We do indeed admit that these varieties of expression can be well understood both through the meaning of the words and their disposition and ordering, and that the first three — ques93.

The Dutch has ‘Want seecker’ [For sure].

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tioning, wondering and interruption or parenthesis — can today be represented by special signs and markings in the text. But in the past, as everyone knows, the ancients, as has already been said, did not possess markings for these three variations. So in interpreting their writings the difficulty which in modern books is encountered only in the case of the other intonations is extended to these three. Therefore since we meet with so many and so definite shades of meaning in sentences and propositions, and since Scripture is deficient in markings and signs to express them, it is inevitable that many of these differentiations which were neither obscure nor ambiguous when they were spoken develop these faults when consigned to writing. It is not my intention to give examples of every kind, let it suffice to enumerate some. In the Gospel according to John, ch. 21, v. 15, 16, 17, addressing Peter, Christ says thrice, ‘‘Simon, son of Jonas, thou lovest me.’’94 These words can be understood in two ways, either that Christ is asking Peter whether he loved him (Christ) — and this is the usual interpretation, with the insertion of a question mark — or that Christ is affirming to Peter that Peter loved him. In the same book of John, ch. 5, v. 39, Christ replied to the Jews who were persecuting him and sought his death, ‘‘You search the Scriptures, for in them you think you have eternal life; and they are they which testify of me.’’ The first words of this verse, h `i h jk lmnhFmloqp i lr lo , can be understood as either in the indicative mood — as Cyrillus takes them, and the commentators on the new Dutch translation agree — or as imperative, which is the opinion of Tertullian, Chrysostom, Augustine and Theophylactus. If taken as indicative, this could be a question, as if Christ were saying, ‘‘Do you search the Scriptures, which testify of me, and yet you will not come to me?’’ Or else it could be a rebuke, as if he were accusing them of stupidity, like this, ‘‘You do indeed search the Scriptures, and they testify of me, and yet you will not come to me.’’ If they are taken as imperative, again 94.

The Dutch version provides both the Latin and a translation.

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Christ may be either ordering them or asking them, ‘‘Let them search the Scriptures.’’ Similarly, when he returned for the third time to his disciples, who were overcome by deep sleep in the garden, and found them still sleeping, he said (Matthew ch. 26 v. 45 and Mark ch. 14 v. 41), ‘‘Dormitis jam et requiescitis’’ (indicative) or ‘‘Dormite jam et requiescite’’ (imperative). In the former case, this would be a question, as if he were saying, ‘‘In this hour of danger that threatens me and you, do you have so much confidence and security when you ought to be most vigilant?’’ In the latter case, it is an ironical granting of permission, like this, ‘‘Hitherto while I was exhorting you not to sleep, I spoke in vain; so sleep now and take your rest. The enemy is close by, who will not allow you to do so, but will force you against your will to be wakeful.’’ So, too, Melanchthon in his Dialectice, book 4, sees irony in the words of Pilate when he questioned Christ, ‘‘What is truth?,’’95 as if to say, ‘‘You are a great fool in wanting to speak the truth at a court, a place where that saying especially holds good, ‘Truth gains hatred, complaisance gains friends’.’’ But these same words can be taken interrogatively, with Pilate asking that it should be explained to him what truth is. Paul, writing in Colossians ch. 2, v. 21, ‘‘Touch not, taste not, handle not,’’ should be understood not as affirming this as a teaching but as reporting the words of others, as Melanchthon says in the passage quoted above. So these words should be interpreted sut s
John 18, 38. The Dutch version gives neither the Greek nor a transliteration.

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comprehension. They assist and promote understanding in those sentences where shades of meaning are expressed by variation of pronunciation, as I recently mentioned. The ironical quality of a statement can scarcely be grasped unless one takes cognisance of the speaker’s gesture. So, too, the threatening nature of speech will not be understood if one fails to recognise the accompanying motion of the hand. Gestures are essential to comprehension when things of which as yet no mention has been made are indicated by a demonstrative pronoun or similar particle, and at the same time are pointed out by finger or some other physical movement. Thus the statements, ‘I do not value you this much’, or ‘so much’, are quite incomprehensible if you do not picture the ‘this much’ or ‘so much’ as demonstrated by some gesture of the speaker. That is why the Jews misinterpreted the words of Christ (John, ch. 2, v. 19). When they asked him for a sign because he drove the merchants out of the temple with a whip, he replied, ‘‘Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.’’ They understood this as referring to the temple of Jerusalem, but he was speaking of the temple of his body, which he may also have indicated by pointing with his finger or by some other gesture, since it was his custom to accompany his words with gestures when talking to his disciples; in John, ch. 20, v. 19, 20, he showed them his hands and his side. [25] From all this it is clear to me that Quintilian was not far from the truth when he thus begins the penultimate chapter of Book 8 of his Institutiones: ‘‘There are innumerable kinds of amphiboly, so that some philosophers hold that there is no word that does not have more than one meaning.’’97 Nor is Vossius at fault in approving this opinion in his Instit. Orator., Book 4, ch. 1, section 10.98 Dannhauer does not disagree with them in his ‘Idea Boni Interpretis’ when he begins the concluding part of the second section of Part 1, para. 47, with these words: ‘‘The equivocal 97. 98.

Institut. 8, 9. Vossius, III, 148, § 11, ‘De amphibolia’.

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meaning of words and sentences is nothing other than an ocean of infinite perplexities. For who will explain the various meanderings of the ambiguities, or what book will encompass even the principal examples?’’ Hence these verses of the poet:99 Quam multa in sylvis Autumni frigore primo Lapsa cadunt folia; aut ad terram gurgite ab alto Quam multae glomerantur aves, ubi frigidus annus Trans pontum fugat, et terris immittit apricis.100 This seems to provide a fitting description for what we have been saying. So there can be no speech that is not liable to ambiguity. [26] Before passing on from this to another subject, I have deemed it advisable here to call to mind yet one more point with regard to ambiguities, which will be of use in what is to follow. It is this, that a speech may be termed ambiguous either in itself and in an absolute sense, or in a sense that is relative and in respect to us.101 It is ambiguous in itself when it is capable of having more than one meaning without our being aware of this and paying attention to it; but when we do notice it, it is said to have a doubtful meaning in respect to us. And since we may be either 99. This example and verse is omitted from the Dutch version. 100. Aeneid, 6, v. 309-312. ‘‘As many as are the dead leaves in the forests that fall at autumn’s early frost, or as many as are the birds that flock together from the vast deep when the cold season drives them overseas and sends them to sunny lands.’’ 101. The final division of ambiguity is: 1) Absolute. 2) Relative: a) to the listener: i) who questions its sense. ii) who does not question sense. b) to the speaker: i) in order to cause doubt. ii) without intent to cause doubt.

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the speakers or writers, or else the listeners or readers, this relative ambiguity can again be of a twofold nature, either in respect to the speaker or writer, or else in respect to the listener or reader. In respect to the speaker or writer, the sentence is of doubtful meaning when willingly and knowingly he speaks or writes in such a way that the sentence can have more than one meaning; it is of doubtful meaning in respect to the listener or reader when he finds in it more than one meaning. Both speaker and writer can again be considered in two ways, either as having or as not having the intention of leaving the listener or reader in doubt as to which of the meanings was intended; while the listener or reader may or may not be in doubt as to the intended meaning. [27] Furthermore, some of these ambiguities may accompany another while others may not, and this can come about in many diverse ways, as can be seen by anyone paying attention and comparing them with one another. I shall touch lightly on the principal ones and those likely to occur. So a sentence may at the same time be ambiguous in itself and in respect to us, or else ambiguous in itself and not in respect to us; but it cannot be ambiguous in respect to us and not ambiguous in itself. Again, a sentence may be ambiguous in itself without this being noticed by the speaker or writer, nor yet by the listener or reader: or it may be noticed by both parties, or by one or the other. Finally, the listener or reader may or may not be in doubt as to the meaning of an ambiguous sentence, or may even fail to notice the ambiguity, while the speaker or writer may or may not have intended to create doubt, or may even have failed to notice that sentence was ambiguous. [28] I have said above among other things that someone may deliver a sentence either orally or in writing which he intends and knows to have more than one meaning, and I believe that no one will doubt this. But whether those several meanings can be intended by the author — if he is indeed a wise and good man, that is, one who knows what he is saying and is not given to deliberate deceit — this is a matter of keen debate, especially among theologians. The affirmative view is held by Cabalists, ac-

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cording to Pico Mirandula in his Apologia, and by Rabbis of the Jews, and also by some Church Fathers and by many Catholics. It is denied by all theologians who have defected from Rome, those who hold and proclaim with one voice that for every sentence in Scripture there is only one true, genuine meaning as intended by the authors, the literal meaning, as they call it.102 As for my opinion on this matter, I frankly avow that it is the universally agreed practice among the writers to signify and intend only one meaning in any single sentence. Nevertheless, I do not see why it may not sometimes happen that by the same words they denote more than one thing. Nor again can we hide the fact that the arguments produced in favour of the opposite view by its adherents — those that I have chanced to see — are not convincing and are so feeble and tenuous that I do not think it worthwhile to waste time in reviewing and refuting them. As to my opinion of the possibility of multiple meanings in Holy Scripture, that is, of there being more than one literal meaning in a single passage, there will be a more convenient opportunity for such a discussion as this work progresses.

102. The Dutch version lacks ‘as they call it’.

Chapter IV 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Scripture is obscure and ambiguous. What makes a true interpreter? What makes a true interpreter of Holy Scripture? And one who executes his task in a proper manner? All expositions of Scripture opposed to truth are spurious. In appearance, the truths of Scripture are not its true meanings. Who is the best interpreter of Scripture, if none are infallible? It is proved by reasoning that all Scriptural truths are true meanings. This is confirmed by authorities. The conditions required by the Reformed Church for a true interpreter of Holy Scripture are also in conformity with ours.

[1] I think that in the previous chapter we have already spoken quite enough and at sufficient length about the general problem faced by the interpreter, to wit, the obscure and ambiguous sentence. Let us now come to the more specific problem on which, in the controversy in which we are at present engaged, our interpreter must concentrate, that is, Holy Scripture. That this is in many passages obscure and ambiguous does not fail to strike anyone who has given even a little study to it, and this is abundantly clear from examples taken therefrom which we have adduced among others. There is also the witness and testimony of so many of the most learned and acute theologians right from the founding of the Christian Church unto this day. In respect of both part and whole of Scripture they have composed and published notes, explanations, observations, commentaries, paraphrases, interpretations and many writings of that sort, some of

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which even surpass in bulk the very books that they seek to clarify. This view is not only expressly held by all Catholics; it is also the view of those who have defected from them. Take this excerpt from Luther’s De Servo Arbitrio: ‘‘I do indeed admit that in the Scriptures there are many passages obscure and abstruse, not by reason of the elevated nature of the theme but because of ignorance of words and grammar; yet this does not hinder the understanding of all things in Scripture. The things in Scripture are all there for us to see, although some passages may still be obscure because of unknown words.’’1 And Chamier in his Panstrat. Catholic., Tome 1, Book 15, ch. 4, section 5: ‘‘The catholic church2 declares expressly and without qualification, first, that there are in Scripture quite a few very obscure passages from which, when they are considered in isolation and in themselves, no definite meaning can be elicited. This can come about in many ways. Sometimes it is the obscure nature of the subject, as in prophecies of things to come, sometimes the wording of the passage is so complex that it yields various meanings because of `

  (homonomy) or  `
    (amphiboly). For example, ‘I and the Father are one’ was understood by the Arians as unity of wills, as when Christ prayed that the disciples should be one, whereas the Catholic Church referred these words to   `
   (substantial unity)’,’’ etc. There are many instances of this sort to confirm my point. 1.

2.

Meyer omits the sentences following, where Luther declares that the linguistic obscurities of some scriptural passages are clarified by others, so that Scripture is overall clear to all who read it. In fact, Meyer agrees with Erasmus, who argued in favour of the general obscurity of Scripture and against the Lutheran view. Chamier argues strongly for the distinction between the ‘catholica argumenta’ and the ‘papistica argumenta’. Lagre´e and Moreau suggest (103) that ‘catholica’ here would better be translated as ‘universal’. The Dutch version consistently uses ‘Catholijcken’ in Chamier’s quotations or paraphrases, but otherwise refers to ‘Papists’ rather than ‘Catholics’.

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There is no doubt that not only is Scripture obscure and ambiguous, but that all the kinds of obscurity and ambiguity that we have listed can occur in it, since it consists of words. Indeed, if not all of these are to be found, at least the greater number of them are, and these the chief ones; and furthermore others of no little importance (such as, as the theologians themselves admit, the  mystical   teaching, both typological and sacramental, `   and ! , "#$&%' ( , reversal of order or anticipation,3 variant readings in both Old and New Testament, and suchlike). It would not be difficult to prove this if it were required at this point and if there were already agreement as to the true method of interpretation. But since this is in fact the object of our enquiry, and it is here required only to admit that some passages in Scripture are obscure and ambiguous and therefore in need of interpretation — which theologians themselves do not deny — it will be enough for our purpose here to bring it to attention. [2] When theologians engage in discussion in this controversy concerning the interpreter of the Holy Writings, the question at issue for them, as also for us here, is concerning the true interpreter. As can readily be inferred from what has been said above, he is not one who will have expounded some sort of meaning or truth in a sentence, but one who will have brought to light the true meaning, that is, the meaning that agrees with and corresponds to the author’s mind and intention, and shown it to be such. So ‘‘a true interpretation will be nothing other than the eliciting and the revealing of the true and authentic meaning of those sentences that are either heard or read’’; or, as Chamier defines it in his Panstratiae, Tome 1, Book 15, ch. 1, section 3,4 ‘an enquiry into what the author is signifying in each passage’.5 Hence it is clear that the true interpreter must not be so concerned with the truth or falsity of the sentence he is interpret3. 4. 5.

The Dutch omits ‘)+*-,/.-0214365 , reversal of order or anticipation,’. The reference is incorrect and should rather be to § 6 rather than § 3. Chamier has ‘Scriptura’ where Meyer has instead ‘Author’.

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ing as with its true or false meaning. He who has enquired into and revealed these meanings by refuting one and confirming another — that is, by showing that this is in conformity with the writer’s thinking — however much it may be opposed to right reason and contrary to truth, is to be regarded as having fully completed his task in every detail. [3] So the true interpreter of the Holy Writings will be one who can elicit their true meanings6 and prove them to be such, and can detect and refute false meanings. Thus his task is divided, as it were, into two parts, and consists in the tracking down and confirming of the true interpretation, and also in the detection and refutation of meanings that are false. It is not enough that this should be effected with some degree of likelihood or probability, as is commonly the case with writings that are not sacred, but with unshakeable certitude and invincible arguments, in which a mind devoted to solid truth can and should acquiesce fully and absolutely. For the question at issue concerns not trivial matters, but matters most serious, not earthly, but celestial, not fleeting, transitory goods but the eternal salvation of our souls, than which nothing more precious or more desirable can be thought of. The entire edifice of our faith must rest not on shifting sands and a weak, unstable foundation but on an unshakeable and immovable rock. [4] This task, the interpretation of the Sacred Books (besides any others, if there be any, which I do not deny) will be discharged in a fitting and proper way by one who is able to lay hold of the truths of the passages to be explained and to detect the falsity of other expositions of these passages, confirming that he has done so by arguments quite free of doubt. I speak of ‘truths and falsities’, which will doubtless appear surprising since in the previous chapter it was with such care and diligence that I distinguished the truths of sentences from their true mean6.

The school of Saumur (to which Chamier belonged) did not speak of the elicitation of ‘true meanings’, but rather of ‘sensus clarior’. See Bordoli (1987, 134-135).

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ings, and in the second section of this chapter I maintained that the true interpreter is one who is concerned not with the former but with the latter. However, the reader will cease to be surprised and will realise the reasonableness of what I am saying if he takes note along with me that writings that are not sacred and merely human on the one hand, and those that on the other hand are sacred and divine, are not on the same footing. In the latter, truths and true meanings are always indissolubly bound together, which is not the case with the former. Therefore he who has extracted therefrom the truths, by so doing has also extracted the true meanings, and he who proves that the explications made by others contain falsities, has also proved that they are false.7 [5] That this is so is evident from the fact that the Holy Writings have for their author God himself who, in making use of scribes,8 led them by the hand, as it were, on the road of truth; and in these scribes was ever present the Spirit of Truth, on whom not even a shadow of falsity or error could fall. It is therefore quite certain that whatever is inscribed in Scripture contains nothing but the purest truth, completely free from any taint of falsity and error. Thus the true meanings of the divine utterances are always in accord with truth, and on the other hand evermore opposed to falsity. From this it follows most evidently that all expositions of Scripture opposed to truth are also opposed to its true meaning and are therefore false, unauthentic, spurious, and should be banished far from the mind of God.9 So he who will detect and show that an interpretation of some passage of the Holy Writings is not consonant with truth but at variance with it, will at the same time discover and prove that it is erroneous, spurious and false, being far removed from the true meaning.10 Therefore he will neither 7. 8. 9.

This paragraph contains a concise statement of the central issue of scriptural exegesis on which Spinoza will disagree with Meyer. ‘Scribes’ here translates ‘amanuenses’ or secretaries. The term comes from Calvin. Instead of‘the mind of God’ the Dutch version has ‘the divine meaning’.

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impose it on others as true nor allow it to be imposed on himself. In this way he will be able to execute worthily and properly the second part of the duty of an interpreter which, as I have said, consists in the detecting and disclosing of false explications of others. [6] But the first part of his task, the search for and the proof of true meanings, is not so easily discharged. Although we have made it clear beyond all hazard of doubt that ‘every true meaning of a passage in Scripture is also a truth’,11 this is not the case with the converse of this statement, namely, ‘every truth is also a true meaning’. For it could have happened that within some one passage of Scripture which admits of more than one meaning there are contained several truths, but only one out of them all did the holy writer of that passage have in mind and intend when he wrote those words. Therefore if one, or several, or even all of the possible truths of a doubtful passage are extracted and proved, it still remains doubtful and uncertain whether this or that one of them, if it be one, or which ones, if more than one is meant (a possibility we have mentioned above) was intended by the holy writer. From this it seems to follow that the true interpreter of the sacred writings as we have described him is abundantly capable in respect of the second part of his task, but not similarly equal to the first. Yet this is the important part, as anyone can judge and as we freely acknowledge. [7] However, even if our interpreter’s mental powers were 10.

11.

Compare Meyer’s principle with Spinoza’s summary in TTP 7, 2: ‘‘I would go further: in seeking the meaning of Scripture, we should take every precaution against the undue influence, not only of our own prejudices, but of our faculty of reason in so far as that is based on the principles of natural cognition. In order to avoid confusion between true meaning and truth of fact, the former must be sought simply from linguistic usage, or from a process of reason that looks to no other basis than Scripture.’’ The Dutch edition has, ‘alle waerheydt oock de ware sin is’.

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not to rise to a higher plane than we have indicated, and could not extend beyond the bounds we have laid down, it can by no means be denied that he far surpasses all others and is by a long way to be preferred at this time when one cannot seek from the Prophets themselves and the Apostles and the other sacred writers the true, genuine and original meaning of Scripture. Nor can anyone plausibly claim that he is sufficiently enlightened by the Holy Spirit in his search for this meaning. In fact, while the others are not able with certainty to detect and expose the false interpretations of others, nor to search out and demonstrate the truths of passages of Scripture, far less to investigate and demonstrate their true meanings, our interpreter will be able at least to elicit the truths, if not infallibly the true meanings,12 and to refute false interpretations. In this way he will save us from assenting to erroneous explications as if they were genuine, and he will guide us, if not to true meanings — if that is denied him — at least to truths, which is not denied him.13 In this there is very little danger, as Augustine tells us in his De Doctrina Christiana, Book 3, ch. 27, thus: ‘‘When from the same words of Scripture can be understood not one, but two or more meanings, even if it is not clear what the writer intended, there is no danger if it can be shown from other passages of Scripture that any one of them accords with the truth.’’ And in his De Civitate Dei, Book 11, ch. 19, ‘‘In the case of many possibilities, whether or not one arrives at the writer’s meaning, yet the occasion to treat of some deep obscurity may yield some other truths.’’ [8] But come, let us see if we cannot break through the 12.

13.

Later Meyer will argue that the central problem of establishing a single true meaning for a biblical text lies in its historical and cultural distance from us — a point with which Spinoza will be in accord, and which the theologians will argue to be false. See Maresius (Disputatio, 1667, IV § XIII) and Bordoli (1997, 136-138). The Dutch omits the phrases ‘if that is denied him’ and ‘which is not denied him’.

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bounds assigned to our interpreter and demonstrate that he can in a fit and proper manner discharge both the first and the second parts of his task. This will be easily accomplished if only we prove that all the truths of any passage which the reader encounters or can encounter are also true meanings. For then he who elicits just one truth will also have elicited a true meaning, and the more truths that are elicited, the more meanings are elicited, and the more pre-eminent an interpreter he will be. Now to make it quite clear that all the truths of Scripture are also true meanings, two important things must especially be taken into consideration with regard to God as the author of the Holy Books: first, that he is omniscient and therefore knows completely both the true and the false signification of sentences pronounced by him, and he not only knows beforehand that these significations may come to mind for listeners and readers but has also foreseen that they will do so. And since nothing can happen beyond the scope of his providence, he has provided that true meanings should present themselves, as Augustine writes in his De Doctrina Christiana, Book 3, ch. 27: ‘‘In fact, in those same words which we seek to understand, perhaps the author has seen the opinion that will be formed, and certainly the Spirit of God acting through him has undoubtedly foreseen that this is the opinion that will present itself to the reader or listener; indeed, seeing that it is based on truth, he has provided that it should so present itself.’’ The second point to consider is that God is veracious, and thus can neither deceive nor be deceived; therefore he has taken good care through his servants14 never to have pronounced orally or consigned to writing anything to deceive readers or listeners, that is, to mislead them to a meaning different from that which he intended to signify in words, or even to raise doubts as to which of several meanings he intended. That is what Polanus seems to be saying in his Syntagma Theologiae, Book 1, ch. 45, question 2: ‘‘No word and therefore no utterance of God is am14.

‘Servants or copyists’ in the Dutch version, once again the scribes who wrote the sacred texts.

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biguous from him, or as far as relates to him. For God does not speak ambiguously as if deliberately intending to raise doubts and uncertainty in man, or as if intending that his words should have a doubtful or uncertain meaning. Not even once does the Holy Spirit lapse into the fault of ambiguity. He who gave man speech and understanding neither wishes to nor can lapse into this fault.’’ Since it is imputed as a vice in men knowingly and willingly to frame their words in this way, and furthermore by nods, gestures and bodily movements to direct all the resources of a deceitful mind to the end that readers or listeners may understand a meaning not intended by them, or give several meanings where the intended meaning is doubtful, I believe there is no one so brazen and so impious as to ascribe such a terrible crime to God, the Great and Good,15 the most perfect being, on whom could fall not even a shadow of falsity or deceit. Therefore such a grave imperfection should be far removed from him, and since the reader or listener encounters no truths in Scripture which the Spirit of God has not foreseen he will encounter — indeed, has provided for this — and since the reader or listener may encounter all these, it follows that all these truths in that passage were deliberately intended by him, and that they are therefore also true meanings. This is again proved by an axiom so much quoted by philosophers: ‘‘It is pointless to do through much what can be done through less.’’16 From this is deduced another axiom, likewise universally agreed, ‘He who says and writes much in few words speaks and writes better than he who says little in many words’. So, too, he who in one simple sentence teaches two truths is better than he who teaches only one to the exclusion of the other. Best of all and pre-eminent is he who signifies in one sentence all the truths he can comprehend. Now since, as is said, 15. 16.

The Dutch has ‘d’Almachtighe Godt’. A variant of Occam’s razor: ‘Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem’.

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God and nature do nothing in vain,17 and since it is universally agreed that the Holy Spirit has written in the best way, no one can deny or call into doubt that this has been so in the transcription of God’s oracles. [9] This thesis of ours is supported by the authority of many of the most learned men of every age. To begin with the most ancient, the earliest are the Rabbis of the Jews who, to emphasise this point, compare the Word of God to a red-hot blade. For just as this blade, when it is rendered white-hot by fire and enveloping flames and is then placed on an anvil and beaten with a hammer, scatters abroad and sends forth in all directions sparks and glowing cinders, in the same way, they say, all meanings in conformity with truth that are extracted and elicited by interpretation from the Holy Writings are like sparks and tiny torches whereby God has willed to liberate the hearts of men from the fog of unknowing and the darkness of ignorance, and to brighten and illuminate their minds with the saving light of wisdom and knowledge. And they support this opinion of theirs by Psalm 62, v. 12, which says, ‘‘God hath spoken once; twice have I heard this, that power is of God.’’ That is to say, according to their interpretation, God has pronounced a single, simple sentence, but one containing a multiplicity of meanings, for I understood it in two ways, that is, in a multiplicity of ways (a definite number for an indefinite one), eliciting therefrom many meanings. Therein resides God’s power, which is such that it can so arrange the words of his sentence that in one simple sentence he teaches the listener and the reader many truths. Augustine seems to follow the Rabbis in this direction. The most famous passage on this subject is in his Confessions, Book 12, ch. 31. ‘‘Thus, when one says, ‘He18 thinks as I do’, and another, ‘No, he [i.e., Moses] thinks as I do’, it seems to me more conformable to religion to say, ‘Why does he not rather agree with both, if both are true?’ And if one sees a third, a 17. 18.

Aristotle’s axiom, taken up by the mediaevals. See Politics I, 2. In place of ‘He’ (God), the Dutch version has ‘She’ (Scripture).

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fourth truth, and some other quite different truth in these words, why should one not believe that Moses saw them all? It was through him that the one God adapted the Holy Writings to the understanding of the many who would be likely to discern in them divers true meanings. As for me, I do not hesitate to declare from the bottom of my heart that if I were writing something from a position of highest authority, I would prefer to write in such a way that my words would resonate with as much truth as each man could assimilate on this subject, rather than to set down one true thesis so clearly as to exclude other opinions whose falsity I would not find offensive. Therefore, my God, I shall not be so rash as to refuse to believe that this great man has deserved this much from you. In these words he must certainly have understood, and conceived as he wrote them, whatever of truth we have been able, and unable, to find here, or as yet cannot find, although it can be found.’’19 The 26th chapter of the same book comes close to expressing the same thing:20 ‘‘I could have wished, if I had been Moses then — for we all come from the same mould, and what is man, if thou art not mindful of him? — I could have wished, if I had been he at that time and had been instructed by thee to write the book of Genesis, that I had been granted such a gift of expression and command of style that not even those who cannot yet understand how God creates would refuse to accept words which seem to exceed their power of understanding, and that those who already have this capacity should discover that whatever true belief they had acquired by reflection had not been omitted in the few words of thy servant. And if some other should have perceived yet a different meaning in the light of truth, this too would not 19.

20.

For Augustine the human author, inspired by God, foresees all possible senses of the sacred text. For Thomas Aquinas (De potentia), the author sees no more than some of them, but the Holy Spirit, seeing them all, guides the author. The italics in the Dutch version suggest that the quotation begins with the paragraph.

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fail to be comprehended in those few words.’’ A passage not unlike this occurs in his De Doctrina Christiana, Book 3, ch. 27: ‘‘In the Divine Words, what more generous and more fruitful provision could have been made than that the same words could be understood in several ways which other teachings, no less divine, render plausible by their witness’. From this he derives the rule, ‘If in the Holy Writings there are ambiguous passages that cannot be explained, they can be understood in both senses, if that is not opposed to the rule of faith.’’21 And this, I think, is that vast treasury of meanings lurking in the depths of the Sacred Books, proclaimed and mightily extolled by some of the Fathers. Thus Jerome, Letters to Paulinus, 103, ch. 7: ‘‘The Apocalypse of John contains as many holy meanings as words. I have said too little in comparison with the book’s merits. No amount of praise is enough. In single words lie hidden a multiplicity of meanings.’’ And in his commentary on the Epistle22 to the Ephesians, ‘‘Each of the sentences, syllables, apices and points in Holy Scripture is crammed with meaning.’’23 Thus Basil in chapter 1 of his book De Spiritu Sancto tells theologians that, besides words and sentences, they must explain the apices of letters, the letters themselves, and syllables. And finally Chrysostom, in his Genesin. Homil. 21, says, ‘‘I do beseech you all, do not just simply traverse what is contained in the Holy Writings. Nothing is there written that does not possess a wealth of meanings. Since the Prophets were inspired in their sayings by the Divine Spirit, their words being written by the Spirit contain within themselves a mighty treasure. And be not surprised that I promise to exhibit to you in this enumeration of names an abundance of hidden meanings. For there is not even a syllable or a tiny apex in the Holy Writings that does not have in its depths some great treasure.’’ There are many passages where Thomas Aquinas makes 21. 22. 23.

De Doctrina Christiana 3, 10; and 3, 27. The Dutch version has ‘the third chapter of the Epistle’. The reference is incorrect. It should be Letter 53 to Paulinus, ch. 9.

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the same point, as in Summa Theologiae, Part 1, qu. 1, art. 10, and in Book 2 of his Sententiarum Distinct. 12, art. 2-7, and elsewhere. But the most eloquent of all passages is in his Quaestiones de Potentia Dei, to be found in Tome 8 of his works. In qu. 4, art. 1 he says: ‘‘Another thing to avoid24 is seeking to confine Scripture to a single meaning, thus excluding other meanings which contain truth and can be harmonised with Scripture without injury to the text. For it belongs to the dignity of Holy Scripture that it can contain many meanings within the bounds of a single letter; thus it may be in accord with the various intellects of men, and every man may marvel that he can find in Holy Scripture the truth that he has conceived in his mind. And this may also provide a more convincing defence against the infidel; for if some passage in Scripture which one is seeking to understand should appear to be false, one can have recourse to another possible meaning of this passage. Hence it is not incredible that it was divinely granted to Moses and other writers of Scripture that they themselves should know the various truths that men could understand and should signify these within the bounds of one series of letters in such a way that any of them could be the author’s meaning. So if in addition some truths are made to fit the text by commentators on Holy Scripture, truths which the author did not envisage, there is no doubt that the Holy Spirit, the principal author of Holy Scripture, did envisage them. So every truth that can be made to fit with Holy Scripture without violence to the text is its meaning.’’ Not very different from this is the precaution urged upon us in the interpretation of the writings of others by John Clauberg, renowned and learned both as a philosopher and theologian, and a most eminent professor of both these disciplines in the Academy of Duisburg. In his Logic. Vet. et Nov., Part 3, ch. 7, qu. 43, he says, ‘‘Do not be hasty to limit the meanings of the words of a sentence if the author’s wisdom is such as to war24.

After ‘to avoid’ the Dutch version adds in parentheses and not in italics, ‘that is, what should be avoided’.

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rant a wider signification for them, and if the other rules of interpretation forbid it not.’’ ‘‘This rule,’’ he goes on to say, ‘‘has a particular importance in the explication of the Words of God. His words and his works, seeing that he is consummately wise, consummately good and powerful, should be deemed majestic and vast rather than narrow and confined.’’ [10] Lastly, there is this to be added, that our interpreter should also measure up to the conditions which theologians demand for the supreme judge of controversy, conditions which can be adapted without inconsistency to the matter in hand. Some theologians enumerate three, others four.25 First, ‘he should be incapable of error, and this should be perfectly clear’. For since all theological dogmas must be of indubitable truth and cannot be constructed without interpretation, and since furthermore there can be no authenticity in anything but that which corresponds to the Sacred Text which is infallibly true, it is clear that it must be entirely free from error and that the author must show that this is so. Secondly, ‘there cannot be any appeal from him’, that is, ‘his interpretation is not to be tested by comparison with anything else’. For an appeal, strictly speaking, belongs to the judge. Thirdly, ‘he should not be biased, inclining to one side rather than another’. Fourth and last, ‘he brings about agreement’, or, as others put it, ‘he has the capacity to inculcate definite knowledge in men’. The last three conditions are based on the first and are deducible therefrom. For since the first condition demands that the true interpreter be completely immune from error and that this should be manifest, the truth of his exposition should likewise be manifest and acknowledged and therefore not to be tested by reference to anything else. For what more can we ask than to know the true meaning for certain? Truth cannot be directed by partisan zeal; truth alone can extort agreement and implant in minds 25.

Meyer takes his enumeration from Whittaker, Controversiae de concillis contra Pontificos impris Robertum Bellarminum jesuitam in sex questiones distributa, qu. 5, ch. 8, arg. 3 (499-500).

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an infallible understanding. That these four conditions are all requisite in the case of our appointed interpreter is obvious, we think, to anyone who is willing to adapt and modify them to suit him. Therefore we think it pointless to look for others.

Chapter V 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

The true interpreter of Scripture; the views of the Catholics, the Reformed Church, and our view. Description of philosophy. Its principal cause. Its instrumental cause. Its certitude. What for us is the ordinary persuasion of the Holy Spirit. Truth that is disclosed by ordinary means is not subordinate to, far less opposed to, truth that is disclosed by extraordinary means.

[1] But with what faculties should he be furnished, with what supports assisted, with what standard, with what method must he be equipped, he who is capable himself of providing a true explanation of Holy Scripture and of rescuing it from the false interpretations of others, thus discharging the task of a real interpreter? Catholics claim that the right and the proper standard for the interpretation of Holy Scripture and for passing judgment on the spuriousness or authenticity of the interpretations of others is vested solely in the Roman Church. Therefore, they say, no one is a true interpreter unless his explication is confirmed and corroborated by the approval of that Church. This opinion is vigorously opposed by all Christians who have defected from the Roman Church. They contend that, besides other factors conducive to this undertaking, such as an acquaintance with the original languages, a knowledge of the liberal arts, the assistance of pious and learned interpreters, etc., Scripture itself is the unique and the best rule, an infallible norm for the guidance of all interpretation. We, however, for reasons as yet to be reviewed, do not accept either of these two views. Our intention here is to present a new thesis, a paradoxical one, to wit, that this task belongs to

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true philosophy, which is the certain and infallible norm both for explicating the Holy Books and for investigating their explications. It is in this sense that we would wish the title of our treatise to be understood, that sense in which Reformed Theologians, too, hold Scripture to be both its own interpreter and also the judge over theological controversies; that is, the norm and rule for interpreting and judging. [2] But under the title of the philosophy which we are here discussing (to venture on some preliminary remarks on the subject of our controversy, for we seem by now to have treated exhaustively of the predicate), under the title of philosophy, I say, we understand not opinions and conjectures concerning the nature of things given to the world by the divine Plato, the great Aristotle or any others, but true and indubitably certain knowledge which Reason, free from any veiling prejudice and sustained by the natural light1 and acuity of the intellect, cultivated and fostered by study, diligence, practice, experience and usage, draws forth and arranges under the most certain light of truth. It starts from principles that are immovable and known through themselves, and proceeds through legitimate inferences and logical demonstrations which are clearly and distinctly perceived. [3] That this philosophy owes its origin to God, the Good and the Great, the father of light and the fount of wisdom, is agreed by all. For ‘‘every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning,’’ as James says in his Epistle, ch. l, v. 17. And God ‘‘giveth wisdom unto the wise, and knowledge to those that know and comprehend’’ (Daniel 2, v. 21). And ‘‘the Lord giveth wisdom; out of his mouth cometh knowledge and understanding’’ (Proverbs 2, v. 6). The same thing is readily gathered from 2 Chron., ch. l, v. 12. And ‘‘all 1.

The opposition between the ‘lumen naturale’ and the authority of tradition is at the heart of Descartes’ ‘methodological doubt’. See Meditations 1 and 2. Much of what follows here is a summary of the cartesian method from the Meditations and the opening pages of the Discourse on Method.

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wisdom is from God, and is with him for ever’’ (Ecclesiastes 1).2 Passages that bear clear witness to this are to be found not only with sacred writers but also with the profane, and even with pagans. Thus Plato in his Timaeus says, ‘‘No gift more excellent than philosophy has ever been bestowed, or will be bestowed, by God on mortals.’’3 Lucretius, addressing Mummius on the subject of wisdom, begins the fifth book of his De Rerum Natura thus: Quis potis est dignum potenti pectore carmen Condere, pro rerum maiestate hisque repertis? Quisve valet verbis tantum, queis pingere laudes Pro meritis eius possit, qui talia nobis Pectore parta suo, quaesitque praemia liquit? Nemo, ut opinor, erit, mortali semine cretus. Nam si, ut ipsa petit, majestas cognita rerum Dicendum est, Deus ipse fuit, Deus, inclyte Memmi, Qui princeps vitae rationem invenit eam, quae Nunc appellatur sapientia, quaque per artem, Fluctibus e tantis vitam, tantisque tenebris, In tam tranquilla et tam clara luce locavit.4 Similarly, the father of Roman eloquence, Cicero, says in his Tusc. Quaest., Book 1, ‘‘Philosophy is the gift and the inven2. 3. 4.

The reference in the Dutch is ‘Syrach., cap. 1, v. 1’. Timaeus 47b. De rerum natura, Book 5, v. 1-12. ‘‘What man of powerful inspiration can compose a poem worthy of the majesty of things and of these discoveries? Whose eloquence is such as to enable him to praise according to his deserts one who acquired and bequeathed to us such fruits of his genius? No one, I think, born of mortals. For if one is to speak as the loftiness of the subject demands, it was a God, yes, a God, renowned Memmius, who first discovered that way of life which is now called wisdom, and by his art, rescuing our life from such mighty storms and such profound darkness, set it down in a light so calm and so clear.’’

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tion of the gods.’’ And all Christian philosophers are in agreement with these pagans. Clement of Alexandria in his Stromat., Book 1, ‘‘God is the cause of all good things; but of some goods he is the principal cause, as in the case of the Old and New Testaments, of other goods he is the cause by consequence, as in the case of philosophy.’’5 Melanchton, on the Epistle of Paul to the Colossians, ch. 2, v. 8: It is manifest that there are natural true notions implanted at the creation in the minds of men, and these are the norms of truth and certitude, as the principles of number, order, figures, the natural laws of morals and physics, principles from which many arts derive. Indeed, Paul calls the natural laws God’s truth, and says that the law is written in men’s hearts. And it is clear that God approves of numbering, writing, reading, architecture and the art of medicine. In Exodus 31 it is said of an architect, ‘‘God has filled him with this wisdom.’’6 God has instituted the learned computation of the year, and teaches it, and bids us count. The Acts of the Apostles show that languages are the gift of the Holy Spirit, and the same is said of the art of medicine in Ecclesiastes 38.7 God has given knowledge to men so that he may be glorified in his wonderful works. Let us therefore acknowledge that the arts deriving from the notions implanted in men’s minds at the creation 5.

6. 7.

The passage is a paraphrase from § 20, which deals with philosophy’s contribution to the attainment of truth. But earlier (§ 17) Clement speaks of philosophy as a form of ‘theft’ which only may be beneficial to christian understanding. See Cle´ment d’Alexandrie, Les Stromates, texte grecque, traduction et notes par Marcel Caster, 5 vols. (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1951), Se´ries ‘‘Sources chre´tiennes,’’ tomes 30, 38, 278, 279, 428. Book I is in vol. 1 (tome 30). Exodus 31, 3 (speaking of Betsaleel). In Dutch, Syrach., Ch. 38, § 6.

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are good things, gifts of God. Let us realise that they are reminders and testimonies of God, because they show that God is wise. And indeed the natural law attests the existence of God, and teaches us what he is. See Conimbricenses, Proaem. Dialect.; Masius, Proaem. Physic., sect. 1, qu. 6; Kekkermann, Praecogn. Philosop., Book 1, ch. 3; Timplerus, Exercitat. Philosop., sect. 2, quaest. 4; Magirus, Prolegom. in Aristotelis Ethicam; Casmanus, Philos. Christian., ch. 4; and a considerable number of others.8 [4] But in fact the assertion that God is the first and principal cause of philosophy occasions us less difficulty than the question of the natural light or human reason. Some maintain that this is an instrumental cause, others a remote or secondary cause. Some of our modern theologians hold it to be so tiny, so slight and inconsiderable a thing that, when it is a question of perceiving and getting to understand the essences and the natures of things, it gropes quite blindly. Instead of the marrow and the kernel, they say, it gathers nothing but husks and rind, and has to feed on dry nutriment that can by no means satisfy the hunger for solid knowledge. Indeed, some of them have gone so far as to assert, without blushing, that it is nothing at all. But how mistaken is this opinion, how distant from the truth and unacceptable is demonstrated by the entire choir of the illustrious mathematical disciplines which, as is well known to their practitioners, do indeed penetrate into the essences of the things of which they treat and into the properties which necessarily flow from them, demonstrating them in a strictly logical way.9 That the same result can be achieved in metaphysics as in physics was proved in his writings, worthy of immortality, by that new star, brightest and most splendid, that arose for the 8.

Between the references to Kekkermann and Timplerus the Dutch version also mentions Alstedius, Encyclopae. Book 3, ch. 2, and Praecogn. Philos. Part 1, ch. 13.

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world of philosophy in this our age, the most noble Rene´ Descartes.10 In consequence, those for whom truths, clear and manifest, cannot illuminate the eyes of their minds stand in need of hellebore to purge away the viscid humours of clinging prejudice and preconceptions with which their brains are clogged and beset on all sides, and thus disperse and dissipate the dense vapours of fixed belief that issue therefrom and cloud their understanding. For this incomparable man, by his example, showed what power in the investigation of things is possessed by reason or the human mind when it is freed from hindrances and obstacles to understanding, and dependent on its own strength and faculties, provided that it accepts nothing but what is clearly and distinctly perceived, and advances with cautious progress from what is simplest and better known to the complex and less known, according to the true method of directing the intellect.11 And indeed, if the natural light or reason is so slight a thing or non-existent as these people proclaim, what is it, pray, that would make us human beings, distinguishing us from irrational animals? But I think I see here a common, wide-spread phenomenon, one that has therefore given rise to the proverb, ‘Art has no enemy or despiser except the ignorant’. For wherever I find a lesser theologian misusing philosophy and neglecting his natural reason, there I find an outstanding example of a despiser of philosophy and natural reason. On the contrary, many excel9.

10.

11.

Meyer is here in complete accord with Spinoza. See the appendix to E1: ‘‘veritas humanum genus in aeternum lateret; nisi Mathesis, quae non circa fines, sed tantum circa figurarum essentias, & proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis norman hominibus ostendisse.’’ Descartes attempted to develop his metaphysical views in a synthetic or axiomatic fashion in his Principles of Philosophy, which in turn was the basis of Spinoza’s own reaxiomatisation in his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, whose publication was overseen by Meyer, who also provided a lengthy preface summarizing the advantages of the axiomatic or synthetic method. This is a general summary of Descartes’ method as he characterises it in Meditation 3.

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lent and eminent theologians who are also philosophers are forever celebrating human reason and its offspring philosophy with the highest praises, raising them to the skies with the most lavish encomium. For all their efforts,12 and however much certain theologians decry reason and dismiss it, it has long been demonstrated that it clearly and distinctly perceives very many things, and that it cannot be mistaken in affirming what it clearly and distinctly perceives, but must pursue the truth.13 And since God, as they themselves admit, is the fount and origin of all truth, he must also be the author and preserver of all true philosophy or wisdom. [5] And since, in addition to the truth closely bound to it, every clear and distinct perception possesses certainty, all the teachings that this true philosophy or wisdom conveys will be solid and sure, incapable of being called into doubt by arguments of any kind. Thus the mind that is eager for truth can, and should, find full and complete conviction in what it tells us, as in something beyond cavil; nor should we seek greater certainty than this. [6] Furthermore, there is no clear and distinct perception that cannot engender within us an awareness of itself; and since, as has been said, God is the cause of every clear and distinct perception, he will also be the cause of this inward awareness.14 And since this awareness persuades, dictates, testifies and inspires in us the conviction that what we perceive is undoubtedly true, there is nothing wrong or incongruous in calling it the persuasion, dictation, testimony and inspiration of God or the Holy Spirit. Hence it is obvious how distant from reality, in what vain toils enmeshed are the theologians who, while holding the natu12. 13. 14.

The Dutch version has, ‘Whatever she [philosophy] is, then,’. Instead of ‘must pursue’ the Dutch has ‘necessarily arrives at’. Serrarius (Responsio, 1667, p. 17) counters this argument with the claim that neither reason nor perception possess ‘‘illa Certitudo. . . quam Divina Veritas sibi conjunctam habet. In Divinis enim & Sensus & Ratio deludi possint. . . .’’

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ral light to be a slight thing or non-existent, have sought for something else to assume its title and be put in its place, something they call the supernatural light, though they cannot clearly explain what it is, as we shall show in chapter 14. This opinion of theirs originated, I think, in this way: regarding as indubitable that saying of Aristotle, ‘‘there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses,’’15 they have never separated the mind from the senses. Seeing that knowledge deriving from the senses is quite mutilated and imperfect or even non-existent, and claiming that natural reason is nothing other than that,16 they have regarded reason as a slight and negligible thing, and have proclaimed it to be so. However, it sometimes happened that in perceiving and gaining understanding of certain things they made use of pure intellect, and gaining thus a glimpse of true and solid knowledge and realising that this was a completely different thing from knowledge deriving from the senses, they made a sharp division between the two. Firmly convinced that sensory knowledge alone pertained to human nature, they considered the other kind to be of a higher nature and divine, and so gave it the name ‘supernatural light’. At any rate, in my opinion it is clear that what we have been saying can be clearly understood under these titles. Therefore we shall continue to understand these terms in this way until such time as they prove that by these terms they mean something else, and it is as they maintain — unless it is pure fiction, of which you may find not a trace in reality outside their brains. [7] From what has been said it can readily be seen how worthless is the opinion of those who hold that, in respect of certainty, nature is subordinate to grace, science to revelation, truth ordinarily revealed to truth extraordinarily revealed; and not merely subordinate, but opposed.17 Each of these should be regarded as on an equal footing. Truth cannot be contrary to itself 15. 16.

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2, 19. The distinction between the innate ‘lumen naturale’ and the ‘lumen naturae’ (custom or convention) is taken up by Descartes in Meditation 4.

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or surpass itself, although it may be got and acquired in diverse ways. Here is an illustrative example. If it is revealed to one man through the extraordinary light of grace that God is omniscient, while the same thing is demonstrated to another by the natural light in logical fashion, both will perceive the same truth clearly and distinctly, certainly and infallibly, since the proposition is the same.18 The truth will neither be contrary to itself nor will it produce a greater certainty in the one than in the other, since neither can possibly doubt it. On this matter see also chapter 8.

17.

18.

Bordoli’s verdict (1997, 140) on this argument is at best an understatement: ‘‘La presentazione meyeriana della tesi riformata e` tutt’altro che imparziale.’’ This is probably an incorrect reading of Descartes, who claims only that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true, but not its converse. Deductive method (perceiving clearly the implications of a claim) takes us from truths which are clearly and distinctly known to truths which are simply known to be true (without necessarily being themselves clear and distinct). See Meditation 3, and also Spinoza’s own Prolegomenon to his PPC1.

Chapter VI It is shown that philosophy is the infallible norm for the interpretation of Scripture 1. By arguments. 2. By the regular practice of theologians. 3. And by examples. [1] So far we have dealt with the subject and the predicate of our controversy, and we have laid the foundations on which we shall forthwith proceed to build the entire structure of our demonstration. This will be easily done, for it will spontaneously suggest itself to anyone who recalls what we have said and pays careful attention. For in chapter 4 we demonstrated that all the truths contained in Scriptural passages are also true meanings, and that all expositions of these passages which are not in harmony with truth are false. So the true interpreter of the Holy Writings is one who can elicit the truths of the sentences therein contained and show that he has done so, and can also reveal and demonstrate that the interpretations formulated by others are not in conformity with what is true. Since, then, as we have shown in the preceding chapter, philosophy is the true, certain and indubitable knowledge of things, deduced from principles known by the natural light and logically demonstrated, it can with certainty elicit the truths of Scriptural passages, prove that they are so elicited, investigate the explications of others to see whether they agree with, or are opposed to, truth, and show without any doubt whether they are of the one kind or the other. From this it most evidently follows that philosophy is the sure and infallible norm both for interpreting the Holy Writings and for examining interpretations; and furthermore that he who is learned in philosophy, one on whom has shone its true and pure light, can fulfil correctly and worthily all that is required of an interpreter of the Divine Word.

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Still, this should not be understood as meaning that one who has but a superficial acquaintance with philosophy and has but tasted it with his lips, and so is imbued with little or moderate knowledge of the liberal arts and disciplines, is capable of penetrating, understanding and explicating all the passages of the Holy Writings, even the more difficult and abstruse. He will grasp only the things of which he has already gained some understanding in his studies of philosophy, and he will understand more things and more sublime things as he makes descents more frequently and more profoundly into Nature’s secrets and her deepest recesses, helped by the light and keenness of his intellect, making greater and more penetrating advances in the understanding of things. And this is exactly what has happened, as all are agreed, in the case of theologians who, from the founding of Christianity right up to our times, have been engaged in the study of the Holy Books. For they were not all endowed in equal measure with the faculty of interpretation; but as each excelled in talent, in learning and knowledge, the more worthily did he play the part of an interpreter of the Holy Writings, elucidating more passages of more difficulty, and doing so more correctly and more satisfactorily. So it will suffice to accept this argument of ours with this limitation, nor is there need to extend it further. Then again, every interpretation that has been made with the help of philosophy, or has undergone its examination and secured its approval, is true and authentic. This is clear from the fact that, of the things required in the norm of interpretation which we have enumerated, following the theologians,1 in the last section of chapter 3, there is not one that is not in exact agreement with philosophy. For since philosophy is true, it is free from all danger of error; and because it cannot deceive, there will be no need whatsoever to examine any interpretation attested by it by reference to any other norm. Resting as it does on a foundation that is immovable and inflexible, it is not guided by partisan zeal. And finally, being certain and indubitable, it can 1.

The Dutch version omits the phrase, ‘following the theologians’.

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extort consent from the minds of men, and convey to them a knowledge that is firm. Furthermore, there is an old and true saying, for ever quoted by theologians when they are discussing the interpreter of Scripture, ‘Each is the best interpreter of his own words’. This saying they also apply to God, and with very good reason, since it befits him better than any mortal. For mortals are mendacious and deceitful, and being often a prey to their emotions and with an eye to their own advantage or profit, they speak in one sense and then explain their words in another sense. But he on whom not even a shadow of a lie or of deceit can fall is always one and the same in both speaking and interpreting, and remains so. Therefore since, as we have said in the preceding chapter, he is the author of philosophy, to him should be ascribed every interpretation made public under the guidance and the approval of philosophy.2 Therefore there can be no reason to deny to philosophy3 as well the title of true norm of interpretation. [2] Our thesis is supported not only by the arguments already reviewed but also by the regular practice of theologians of every age. The majority of the Older Fathers, such as Justin the Martyr, Dionysius the Areopagite, Origen and others, followers of the philosophy of Plato, used no other norm when confronted by a knotty problem in the Holy Writings. Others, nearly all of them eclectics, when elucidating the more difficult and obscure passages of Scripture, applied their own doctrines which they gathered from all schools of philosophy. In succession to them, after a lengthy period of barbarity had intervened, there appeared those learned men called Scholastics, followers of Aristotle. Whenever a dispute arose as to the meaning of the divine utterances, they advanced no opinion that was not supported by Aristotle’s tenets;4 and this they did with such impetuous zeal that 2.

3.

Serrarius (Responsio, 1667, p. 22) objects against this claim that, if the genuine sense of a scriptural passage comes from God, then it is appropriate to inquire of God as to its meaning. Instead of ‘philosophy’ the Dutch version has ‘him’ [God].

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Trithemeus says of these learned men that ‘‘secular philosophers have befouled theology by their fruitless curiosity,’’ and Antonius Sadeel says in the preface to his book on the Word of God, ‘‘By confusing philosophy with theology, those Scholastics should be called philosophers rather than theologians.’’ Following in their footstep, though not so closely, came all Christians who defected from Rome, until at last in our age the light of Cartesian philosophy dawned on some theologians who began to feel disgust for interpretations of the Holy Letters5 that were not illuminated by the rays of this light. [3] Finally, clear testimony and confirmation is provided for this by numerous instances where the more difficult texts of Scripture are explained with the help of philosophy. So many are they that if I undertook to include them all here, this treatise of ours would turn into a mighty tome. Let it suffice to have produced one of two of the principal examples. Let the first be concerned with God to whom, speaking of him as of a man, the Holy Book assigns human limbs, hands, eyes, ears, heart, etc., and attributes to him human emotions, anger, repentance, love, etc, ascribing to him operations of the senses and differences of movement appropriate to animals. But no theologian of sane mind will maintain that any of this belongs to God; for that most perfect and infinite Being is not, in any true or proper sense, bounded and confined by a corporeal mass such as we carry with us. So, too, he is not agitated by emotions, nor does he use senses as instruments for perceiving things, nor does he employ movement of the limbs to get to one place from another. It is for this reason that, rightly and unanimously, theolo   gians warn us that such things are said of God ´
(in a manner appropriate to mortals),6 but must be understood and ex    plicated (in a manner appropriate to God). However, 4. 5. 6.

The Dutch version has ‘tenets of the Peripatetics’. The Dutch has ‘Scripture’ in place of ‘Letters’. Here and in the following paragaph the Dutch version circumscribes the Greek text without transliteration.

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who has taught them this? Who has shown them what is   ? Not Scripture, for Scripture nowhere explains what    is attributed to God  ´   and what are his real attributes;   what should be interpreted and what quite literally. It is therefore Nature, it is therefore philosophy which shows clearly by the natural light that God exists, and what should be ascribed to him, and what denied. But at this point, I think, I hear theologians making vigorous objections and affirming that, while in some places Scripture     does indeed speak  ´   , in other places it speaks   ; that from these they are quite capable of seeing what    is , and so they do not need the services of philosophy in the elucidation of these passages. But let them calm down and answer this question. Since some passages appear to assign to God a human body and others deny it, I should like to know from them whence comes their assurance that the latter speak in a strictly literal way and should be so understood, while the former speak figuratively. For if someone were to maintain the exact contrary, asserting that all those passages which their opponents  

assume to be  ´    are in fact literally accurate, and  !

conversely those passages in which they see  should be understood figuratively, thus making them easier to explain and more straightforward — by what process of reasoning, I ask, would they convict this interpreter of error? By what arguments would they find his explication false? Surely they must resort to arguments taken from philosophy, in which they must seek refuge, like their predecessors, as in a safe anchorage, unless they wish to pour out words to no purpose, spending their labours in vain. Another example is the sacrament of the Eucharist, whose first words,7 ‘This is my body’ are taken by Christians in different ways. Papists explain them thus, ‘This is substantially changed into the body of Christ’; Lutherans understand them in 7.

In place of ‘whose first words’ the Dutch version has ‘while the words of this institution’.

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this way, ‘This bread is locally united with the body of Christ’; while the Reformed interpret it thus, ‘This bread is the sign of the body of Christ’. Of these differing explications, which is true and which is false? Which corresponds to the meaning that Christ had in mind when he spoke these words? It is philosophy that tells us; by its assistance the Reformed have confirmed their opinion and have shown that the views taken by the Catholics and Lutherans are absurd. From the science of physics they have demonstrated that bread, with its accidental qualities remaining intact, cannot be transformed substantially into another body,8 nor can one and the same body be in more than one place at a time, nor can two bodies occupy one and the same place.9 And they have refuted other absurdities which necessarily result from the opinions of these sects.10 The last example to be produced is that of the Holy Trinity, which for some theologians has an air of mystery,11 while for others it is a monstrosity, crammed with a medley of every absurdity.12 The former, in their efforts to defend their view against the ferocious assaults of the latter and to preserve it intact — although they have no knowledge or understanding of it — have sought out from the innermost shrines and sanctuaries of metaphysics what very strange words, what ridiculous distinctions! And when they failed to find them, they invented them afresh! How much better it would have been not to have deemed it a mystery, but with the help of philosophy to have tried to discover what it was in accordance with the true rules of logic before deciding what it was — as C. Kekkermann did. This would 8.

9. 10. 11.

The reference is to the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, whereby the substance of bread and wine is transformed into Christ’s body and blood, while the accidental forms remain. The reference is to the Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation, whereby the bread/body and wine/blood are ‘consubstantial’ or co-present. In place of ‘opinion of these sects’ the Dutch has ‘their opinion’. The Dutch has ‘which by some theologians is considered to be a mystery’. So ‘mystery’ here is to be taken in its technical theological sense.

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have been much wiser than to betake themselves, with so much enthusiasm and toil, into the deepest caverns and darkest corners of metaphysical speculation and fiction, so as ‘‘to safeguard their opinion against the missiles of their opponents.’’ In fact that great man,13 so very learned in all parts of Aristotelian philosophy, in his System. Theol., Book 1, ch. 3, explains and proves that doctrine — though for this he has earned little gratitude from theologians — relying on the immovable foundations of philosophy; and this he does in such a way that, with only a few changes and additions, nothing more could be desired by a mind devoted to truth. This would not be difficult to demonstrate if consideration of our programme permitted. Still, the point we sought to make becomes manifest; to wit, in his explanation of the Holy Trinity he summoned philosophy to his assistance, as did others in arguing for and against. With these three examples we bring to an end our proof, and likewise the first part of our treatise in which we promised to explicate and demonstrate our own thesis.

12.

13.

The others are the antitrinitarians, with whose teachings Meyer will deal in the closing chapters. Moreau and Lagre´e (1988, 120) note that it is also likely that Meyer has in mind Spinoza, who wrote to him (Ep12, 26 July 1663) while Meyer was overseeing the publication of the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy. With reference to chapters 8 amd 10 of the Metaphysical Thoughts (an appendix to the PPC), Spinoza writes: ‘‘As to my saying that the son of God is the Father himself, I think it follows clearly from this axiom, namely, that things which agree with a third thing agree with one another. However, since this is a matter of no importance to me, if you think that it may give offence to some theologians, do as seems best to you.’’ Spinoza adds that, ‘‘. . . what theologians mean by the word ‘personalitas’ is beyond me. . .’’; and then indicates that Meyer may edit or delete the passages as he deems fit. The reference is again to Kekkermann. For a summary of Kekkermann’s aristotelianism and his attack on the ‘new method’ in philosophy, see Bordoli (1997, 150-152).

Chapter VII 1.

The task facing one who bases his proof on the authority of a book. 2. What is true wisdom, and what is apparent wisdom. 3. True philosophy and true wisdom is not condemned in Scripture by Paul in his Epistle to the Corinthians in certain passages in chapters 1, 2, and 3. 4. Nor in chapter 2, v. 14. 5. Nor in the Epistle to the Colossians, chapter 2, v. 3. It now remains for us to examine objections that can be raised against our thesis, and to dispose of them. These objections are of two kinds, those sought from the Holy Writings and those from other sources. I shall reply to the latter in the next chapter, to the former in this chapter. There are many passages to be found in the Word of God in which philosophy or wisdom (these words, though different, indicate the same thing) seems to be condemned by the sacred writers and rejected not only as useless but even as harmful to the divine doctrine. All such passages, when they are misunderstood and ill-explained, could afford opportunity to our opponents to attack our thesis and to condemn it as contrary to the divine utterances. We feel it incumbent on us to prevent the inconsiderate and the over-hasty from seizing on this point; and in order that this may be conveniently effected, it is preferable to make a start at a rather higher level. [1] He who, as is reasonable, aims to base his thesis with certainty on the authority of some book should not be thought to have achieved his objective if he does no more than produce from it some passages wherein are found words identical or similar to those he used to express his thought, or even words that seem to give some approval to what he is maintaining. No, it is his further duty to demonstrate that the author of this writing gave approval in those words to the very same thing that he him-

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self was trying to prove, and that he intended this to be expressed. For our discussion is not about words or probabilities, but about reality and unshakable certainty. So they seem to be trifling and to be ploughing the sand with immobile oxen, all those theologians who, that they may show the truth of their own dogmas and denounce the falsity of others, scrape together and heap up from all quarters so many passages of Scripture in which they find words which are the same as their own, or not much different. They omit the most important thing, the demonstration that carries clear conviction that the sacred writers of these passages intended the same thing for which they themselves are arguing. Therefore it seems they have no right to expect or demand from their opponents any refutation of their proofs or reply to their objections other than a simple and mere negation of their arguments. This they must admit is all they are entitled to, unless they are willing to show themselves far removed from rational discussion and quite unacquainted with the genuine method of demonstration. If we were minded to take this well-trodden road, we could also rightly refuse at this point to make a lengthy reply, and simply deny that there are any texts of the Holy Books which oppose or contradict what we have asserted, since this has not yet been proved, or could ever be proved, by any theologian. But for the present we prefer to take a more liberal line and gird ourselves for our defence, and show that none of the passages adduced by theologians from God’s Word are opposed to our thesis or invalidate its proof. [2] That this objective may be properly attained, we must first of all reflect that the word ‘philosophy’ or ‘wisdom’ is ambiguous,1 and is commonly applied both to true and apparent 1.

Moreau and Lagre´e (1988, 138) note that Spinoza also uses the word ‘philosophy’ in two senses in the TTP. In the first sense (e.g., TTP14), philosophy is simply the quest for truth; whereas, in the second (e.g., TTP11), it refers to speculations which lie at the origin of the division of Christianity into sects.

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wisdom. True wisdom (of which we spoke in chapter 5) is that which consists in solid knowledge of God and of created things, and in the indefatigable search for the true good. Apparent wisdom on the other hand, is that which flaunts vain opinions and conjectures concerning God and created things, devised by the human mind when it is bemired with prejudices deriving from the senses and from a faulty education and upbringing, relying on a few superficial observations. These opinions it has formed through reasoning that is merely plausible, perceived obscurely and confusedly, which it must necessarily defend by minute and empty distinctions and over-refined subtleties. Furthermore, with blind impetuosity and obstinate toil it seeks and pursues goods that are not true but apparent, that pertain to the fleeting comforts of this life, such as honours, riches, pleasures, fame and other such things. And since this apparent wisdom is eager for unsubstantial things, it stands in need of a barrage of words, a grandiloquence, so as to impose upon the eyes of the mind and inveigle men. All these things, since truth longs to be seen naked, true wisdom despises and rejects as useless and an obstacle to progress; it declines any ornamentation, and is content merely to be taught. [3] After these remarks, let us proceed to those passages of Scripture in which either philosophy or wisdom appears to be condemned. The most important place we shall give to the passages in Paul’s first Epistle to the Corinthians, chapters 1, 2 and 3, for two reasons; first, several similar texts appear here together, and second, when these have been disposed of the explication of other texts will automatically follow. At the beginning of the Epistle, the Apostle reproves the divisions that have arisen among the Corinthians, detailing their causes and origin; he criticises the vanity and ambition of certain doctors who, under the cover of wisdom and eloquence, solicited and canvassed the leadership of that Church. At the same time he reproves the folly of his audience who, through their admiration of such doctors, were split into parties on opposite sides. To bring them back to the road of salvation he urges them not to adhere to such giddy

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schismatics, and to that end he shows them at some length the difference between the heavenly doctrine of salvation and worldly wisdom, between the spiritual man and the animal or carnal man, between eloquence that is divine and simple, and eloquence that is human and inflated. But let us select and examine individual passages that may be relevant to our purpose. In chapter 1, v. 19, we have, ‘I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent’, and in verse 20, ‘Where is the wise? Where the scribe? Where the disputer of this age? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?’ And in chapter 2, v. 6, ‘We speak not the wisdom of this world nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought’. And in chapter 3, v. 19, 20, ‘The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written, he taketh the wise in their own craftiness’. And again, ‘The Lord knoweth the thought of the wise, that they are foolish’.2 In these passages nearly all interpreters take the words ‘the wisdom of the wise, the understanding of the prudent, the wisdom of this world, of this age, and of the princes of this age’ to mean philosophy, and they cry out that it is thus condemned. But wrongly so, for what the Apostle means and criticises is not true philosophy but apparent philosophy. This is evident from his aim as previously stated, for true philosophy cannot be the cause of schisms, being true and pursuing the true good. This is also manifestly proved from what the Apostle says concerning it; for God will not destroy true wisdom, or bring it to naught, nor has he made it foolish, nor does he regard it as folly, since he is its author and it teaches nothing but what is true and good, things that are eternal. It is apparent wisdom that is meant, which, proceeding from the brain of men, catches at vain probabilities and pur2.

Serrarius (Responsio, 1667, pp. 29-30) argues against Meyer that in these passages the wisdom of which the apostle speaks is ‘‘simpliciter & absolute, sine ulla limitatione, omnem Mundi Sapientiam, etiam eminentissimorum Philosophorum, & non vulgarium. . .’’ For details of Serrarius’ argument, see Bordoli (1997, 152-154).

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sues goods that are hollow and fleeting.3 That is why the Apostle calls it a human wisdom, of this world, of this age, of the princes of this age; and this he does either in respect of its cause — for it is created and cultivated by men of this world and this age — or in respect of its object, for it concerns itself with the things of this world and this age. As for those who are furnished with this wisdom, ‘God taketh them in their own craftiness, and he knoweth their thoughts that they are vain’. This can by no means refer to those who possess true wisdom, for this is a glorious gift of God, its sincere praise being so often proclaimed in Scripture and its indefatigable study so often recommended. Thus the Apostle James (ch. 1, v. 5) bids us pray to God for it, in these words, ‘If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask it of God, that giveth to all liberally and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him’. Our explication of these passages is in agreement with that of the eminent doctor of the early Church, Clement of Alexandria, when he says in his Stromat., Book 1, ‘‘In calling them [the Greeks] wise, Scripture is not criticising those who are truly wise, but those who think they are wise. It is of them that it says, ‘I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and bring to naught the understanding of the prudent’. And the Apostle goes on, ‘Where is the wise? Where the scribe? Where the disputers of this age?’’’ Similarly in Book 5, ‘I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and I will reject the understanding of the prudent, of those who think they are wise, and are quarrelsome’. And again in Book 1, ‘‘Only the Lord knows the disputes of the wise, that they are vain — Scripture here uses the term ‘wise’ of the sophists, who engage in oratory and unnecessary arts.’’ And a little further on, ‘‘Of these and those like them who concern themselves with a vain style of oratory, Holy Scripture very aptly says, ‘I will destroy the wisdom of the wise’.’’4 3.

Spinoza makes a similar point toward the end of the appendix to Ethics I, where he quotes a number of dicta: ‘so many heads, so many opinions’, ‘brains differ as much as palates’, and ‘everyone is wise in his own sight’.

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The Venerable Bede,5 too, takes this line when in his commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 3, where he follows St. Augustine6 he says: ‘‘The Lord knows the thoughts of men, that they are vain. Sometimes in Scripture the word wisdom is used for cunning, a misuse of the word, not a quality of the thing. Hence it is also said, ‘Where is the wise man? Where the scribe? Where the disputer of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?’’’ And Anselm on 1 Corinthians, ch. 1, v. 19, ‘‘The Apostle is attacking wisdom and cunning that are proved false and deceitful, when he says, ‘Where is the wise? Where the scribe? Where the disputer of this age?’.’’ This is as much as to say, ‘The cunning of such men is of no worth’. And there is his invective against the Jews and Gentiles. See also what he says in chapter 2.7 No different from these is the view taken by Saint Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on this Epistle, ch. 1, v. 19:8 ‘We should also consider that men, however evil they may be, are not entirely deprived of the gifts of God, nor are the gifts of God condemned in them; what is condemned and destroyed in them is what proceeds from their wickedness’. For this reason the Apostle does not simply say, ‘I will destroy wisdom’, because all wisdom is from the Lord God, but ‘I will destroy the wisdom of the wise’, that is, the wisdom which the wise of this world have de4.

5.

6. 7.

All three passages are paraphrases. See Cle´ment d’Alexandrie, Les Stromates, texte grecque, traduction et notes par Marcel Caster, 5 vols. (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1951), Se´ries ‘‘Sources chre´tiennes," tomes 30, 38, 278, 279, 428. Book I is in vol. 1 (tome 30), Book V in vol. 4 (tome 279). See Bedae Venerabilis Opera, 10 vols. (Turnholti: Typographi Erepols, 1955-1980), Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, vols. 118a-123c. Of Bede’s four known exegetical works on the epistles, three are devoted to the Acts of the Apostles. I have been unable to locate the passage which Meyer paraphrases in the fourth (In Epistolas VII Catholicas), which deals with the epistles. The Dutch version has, ‘‘as gathered by him from St. Augustine’s works.’’ The Dutch version has, ‘‘See also what he says about chapter 2.’’

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vised for themselves against the true wisdom of God; for as it says in James ch. 3, ‘This wisdom descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish’. Similarly, he does not say, ‘I will condemn prudence’, for it is the wisdom of God that teaches true prudence. No, he says, ‘the prudence of the prudent’, that is, that which is considered worldly prudence by those who think themselves prudent in wordly matters, so as to cleave to the goods of this world. Or, as it says in Romans ch. 8, ‘The prudence of the flesh is death’. In the same sense Cajetan9 comments on this passage as follows: ‘‘It is significant that he does not simply say, ‘I will destroy wisdom and intelligence’, but he adds ‘of the wise’ and ‘of the intelligent’, because neither wisdom nor intelligence is contrary to the cross of Christ, being not opposed to truth. It is the wisdom of the wise (that is, wisdom as practised by those who possess it) and intelligence of the intelligent (that is, intelligence as practised by those who possess it) of men who are called wise and intelligent in the world — this is what is contrary to the Gospel, this is what God destroys and condemns. For reasons stated, no part of philosophy or of science is contrary to the Gospel, for nothing that is true is contrary to another thing that is true. Now the sciences are in themselves true, and the Gospel is true; but the presumption of men in extending propositions and ambiguous reasoning beyond their proper limits brings about a 8.

9.

Thomas Aquinas’ Exposition in Pauli Epistolas is in vol. 13 of the Parma Edition (Fiaccadori, 1852-1873), and in the second of the two volumes of the Taurin edition (D. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Theologica, ed. R. A. Verado, R. M. Spiazzi et al., Torino-Rome, 1954). The section devoted to 1 Corinthians through 7, 9 may have been written (or dictated) by Aquinas, but the balance of the commentary on 1 Corinthians is part of an exposition of that epistle in the Postilla written by Peter of Tarentasia. Meyer paraphrases the passage. See the annotated catalogue of Thomas Aquinas’ works by I. T. Eschmann, O.P., pp. 381-493 in Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas, tr. L. K. Shook, C.S.B. (New York: Random House, 1956). Thomas de Vio Cajetanus.

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contrariety to the Christian faith.’’ That this is the meaning of St. Paul is confirmed by what he himself says about his style of speaking. In chapter 2, v. 4, he says that his speech and his preaching did not take the form of persuasive words of human wisdom, and in verse 13 he says that he speaks not with words that are taught by human wisdom. In thus attacking and criticising the vain eloquence of the Corinthian doctors he shows that he himself10 has not had recourse to ostentatious words, long-winded oratory, grandiloquence and rhetorical ornamentation, devices needed by human and apparent wisdom for the purpose of recommending its erroneous dogma and thrusting it on the credulous, as I have previously noted. Thus it has been abundantly proved, I say, that these passages are in no way an obstacle to our thesis. [4] Following the line of thought of the Apostle, we come now to a passage which not only would-be theologians but also the most serious theologians are constantly quoting against those who esteem and defend philosophy, claiming it to be a difficulty that has no answer and no solution. It occurs in chapter 2, v. 14, and runs as follows: ‘The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned’. From this passage they think that it decisively follows that the philosopher and the wise man has no capacity for spiritual things. For by    `
s  , which they translate as ‘natural man’,11 they claim that the Apostle means man gifted with no other knowledge than can be acquired by the natural light furnished with just its proper instruments. So even the theologians who translated the Holy Writings into the vernacular language by order of the  States of the United Provinces have translated the word  as ‘natural’, although in their marginal annotations they concede 10. 11.

The Dutch version has, ‘‘that he himself, in conveying the true and salutary meaning,. . .’’ The Dutch version transliterates the Greek and has ‘soulless or animal man’.

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that the strict meaning is ‘animal’. But they are all mistaken; for — apart from the fact that in both sacred and profane writers the word is never to be translated by ‘natural’ but by ‘animal’ — the Apostle is not here speaking of the man who has acquired true knowledge of what is true and good only by the natural light, since it is the part not of the true, wise man, but of the vain, foolish man to pass judgment on what is unknown to him. What is expressly spoken of here is the man who regards as folly what he cannot grasp or understand. Therefore it does not apply to the true philosopher, for he is one who suspends judgment until he perceives a thing clearly and distinctly.12 It applies either to the man who is completely boorish, deprived of all knowledge, one who ‘follows the blind impetus of his emotions’, as Erasmus explains in his annotation on this passage, or to one who ‘lives like an animal, who thinks of God in carnal terms, imaging in God what he sees in bodies’, as Cardinal Hugo says on this passage. Or else it is said of pseudophilosophers, who are regularly in the habit of condemning forthwith and deeming as folly whatever escapes their understanding and their intellectual capacity. And in contrasting these with spiritual men, in a highly significant way the Apostle calls them animal-like, since, being constantly concerned with things that are relevant to our animal life, that is, vegetative and sensual life (such as food, clothing, and also honours, riches, pleasures, etc.), they never turn their minds away from the senses and what is sensual. Being totally immersed in these things, they pay no attention to spiritual things, that is, things that concern the rational soul, which is spirit (such as knowledge of God and of ourselves). To these things they pay no heed, and keep them at a distance. St. Jerome seems to say the same thing with regard to this passage: ‘He who has not the spirit of God is animal-like, for he who thinks there is nothing after death lives as animals do. So he 12.

The reference is to Descartes’ ‘methological doubt’. See Meditations 1 and 4.

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gives himself up to his appetites and his lust, doomed to perish in eternal death’. And Bede, in his exposition of this passage, taken from the works of St. Augustine, ‘Those whose thoughts are carnal, and who hope and desire from God carnal things in this life or after this life, are animal-like’. And a little further on, ‘What carnal man does not go astray through the false imaginings of his heart, creating for himself the kind of God that pleases his carnal feelings, believing in something that is as far removed from God as is vanity from truth?’ And again, ‘he who lives according to the demands of his body is called carnal, or animal-like; carnal, because he pursues carnal things; animal-like, because he is at the mercy of the dissolute wantonness of his soul which is not controlled by his spirit nor restrained within the bounds of the natural order, because he does not submit himself to God’s government’. So, too, Dionysius the Carthusian, in this excerpt, ‘Animal-like man, that is, carnal man, whose emotions and intellect dwell on sensible things’. St. Anselm agrees with these two authors on this passage, employing almost the same words. And Erasmus, in his annotations on this passage, ‘   , as following the mind, that is, human emotions: And in fact, when Paul divides man into three parts, flesh, soul and spirit, he here seems to have misused the word soul for flesh’. Zwingli’s opinion seems to be no different when, in commenting on this passage he says, ‘‘Anima here derives from animal —   . It has the same signification as ‘carnalis’. For man (in so far as he is not born again from God’s spirit) is flesh not only in respect of body but also of soul. For flesh in itself does not think. And the affections of the flesh are in the soul, not in the flesh. Therefore it is only the man guided by his emotions who is flesh, whom he here calls animal-like.’’ Furthermore, that this is the true meaning of the passage is confirmed not only by the texts on which we have commented but also those that now follow. In chapter 3 he calls those same men carnal in whom there is jealousy, disputation and discord, which cannot have reference to those who are truly wise. There is also the passage from James, ch. 3, v. 14, 15 and 17 where, in

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contrasting true wisdom with apparent wisdom he says, ‘But this wisdom that is from above is pure, peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality and without hypocrisy’. But that other wisdom is ‘earthly, sensual and devilish’, and its results are ‘envying, strife, confusion and every evil work’. Here we should note that the word employed in Greek is "!#$% &' , and so the same epithet by which Paul characterised the man who has no capacity for spiritual things is here applied by James to apparent wisdom. Finally, all that I have said would become much clearer if, as the discussion demands, it could be explained and clarified what the Apostle meant by ‘the things that are from God’s spirit’ and ‘spiritual discernment’. But the requirement of our undertaking, which I think we have met in full, does not permit us to embark on this vast sea, since we have already spent far too long a time in the discussion of these matters. Yet I do not think that our time has been spent in an unbefitting way, because the subject has here been extensively treated, and also because taking example from this, anyone can quite easily deal with other passages of Scripture which treat of this subject. Therefore we shall here omit the explication of those passages. [5] Still, before laying down our pen, we must elucidate yet another passage quite briefly — for it requires no laborious interpretation — where the word philosophy is most expressly used. This is loudly acclaimed as a text of major importance and significance, not indeed by the more discerning theologians but by those of the lower order of churchmen who, being without solid knowledge, nevertheless pride themselves on their wonderful wisdom, and when mention is made of philosophy, hastily and thoughtlessly give vent to their opinions. The passage occurs in Paul’s Epistle to the Colossians, ch. 2, v. 8, and goes as follows: ‘Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ’. They think that here the Apostle is exhorting the Colossians to beware of philosophy, but they go quite grossly astray. For by this word is intended not knowledge

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of things but the various Jewish sects, as is the opinion of many of the most serious theologians. Dannhauer, among others, gives an excellent explanation and clarification of this passage in his Idea of the Good Interpreter and the Evil Calumniator, Part 1, Section 3, Art. 7, v. 79, and I should therefore like to reproduce here the entire passage. The question is, what is the meaning of the word ‘philosophy’ in Colossians, ch. 2, v. 8. Undoubtedly it is the meaning given to the word at the time the Apostle wrote. Now at that time the word philosophy among the Jews meant nothing else but the various Jewish sects. For the contemporary historian Josephus expressly refers to the three sects, Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes, as the three philosophies (Antiquities, Book 18, ch. 2), and in his a´(*),+.-.),/10.23(*4+4 0.25*/ , Book 2, chap. 7,13 Eusebius divides the sects prior to the time of the Hasmoneans into two families: one who followed only the Law, and the other who accepted additions to the Law. The former he calls (Praepar. Evangelic., Book 8) 0.23(*4 +40.25 687 5*9:5;9:<6=<9:<68>?25*6.4 25*6 14 (philosophy in accordance with the written word); the latter @:-.).=<9:27 <6 (speculative). Furthermore, Chrysostom in his homily 64 on Matthew says, 9:5A9:</ 0.23(*4 +40.25 /B- ´ C-.9:5*@.<EDF-.9:5G9:</E9:4 H K=2+9:4 HIC*5J=4HK+25*/ , that is, in Casaubon’s interpretation,15 ‘after the coming of Christ the rule for right living16 was tightened’. Compare Joseph Scaliger (Elench. Trihaeresii Nicolaii 13. 14. 15. 16.

The reference to a´LNMPOQ:MPR*ST LNUVO?UVSWTYX.R , is not mentioned in the Dutch version. This Greek passage and the following are not present in the Dutch version, even in transliteration. The Dutch version has ‘translation’ rather than ‘interpretation’. The Dutch version has ‘right living according to the law’ instead of ‘right living’.

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Serrarii, ch. 22); Drusius (Resp. ad Serrar., Book 1, ch. 2; Book 1, ch. 18; Book 4, ch. 3); Frantz. (Orac. 106), and Asselman (Miscell. Selec., 3). The propositions of this philosophy were disputes concerning the Law. For example, is it lawful on the Sabbath day to eat an egg which a hen has layed on the Sabbath? Should feet be lifted from the ground — for thereafter one may strike against stones? See Matthew 6, 5; 9, 11; 23, 14, 23; and 12, 2: Luke 5, 22, and 15, 12;17 and Mark 7, 3 and 4. This, then, is the opinion of Dannhauer, confirmed by the entire context of this chapter. Again, even if it be granted that here the word ‘philosophy’ denotes knowledge of things, Paul does not say that one must beware of philosophy, but of being despoiled through philosophy. From this it evidently follows that here should be understood not true philosophy but apparent philosophy, or, as others say, not philosophy taken in the proper sense, in itself and absolutely, but philosophy taken improperly and per accidens. For true philosophy (as is clear from what has been said above) cannot despoil anybody. This is also the opinion of Calvin in his commentary on this passage: ‘‘Since many falsely believe that here Paul is condemning philosophy, we must define what he understands by this word. In my judgment he means whatever men devise from themselves when they wish to be wise from their own sense, and in so doing they are not without some outward show of reason to lend some specious probability.’’ And a little further on, ‘‘But let us remember that under the title of philosophy Paul has condemned only all the counterfeit doctrines that spring from the human head, whatever colouring of reason they may have.’’ St. Ambrose is in accord with Calvin, writing on this pas17.

The Dutch version has ‘Luke 5, 33, and 18, 12’.

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sage, ‘‘He gives the name ‘earthly philosophy’ to the kind that seduces those who wish to be esteemed as prudent in this world. This philosophy consists of arguments and certain minute subtleties.’’ And a little further on, ‘‘He who becomes engaged in these disputations will never escape, or only with difficulty. For he will become entangled in probable causes and fictitious matters, considering nothing so true as that which is seen and understood in the elements of things.’’ Almost in the same manner, too, does St. Anselm write on this passage: ‘‘I urge you to walk in Christ and take care — that is, beware with wary circumspection — that no one should deceive you, leading you astray through an earthly philosophy which consists of arguments and subtleties and leads you into error while, using probable causes and fictions, nothing is deemed to be as true as that which is discerned in the elements of things’. And a little further on, ‘Or take care that no one deceives you through philosophy, that is, through a philosophical interpretation of mere appearance18 and through the vain treachery — that is, deprived of all utility and all truth — of such words. For this is after the tradition of men, that is, of the seeming-wise, who with some pretence of prudence expound their false doctrines in accordance with the elements of the world.’’ Similarly, Cajetan also remarks on this passage, ‘‘To philosophy, in so far as it is concerned to steal men away from the Christian faith, he attaches vain deceit, because it is not the function of philosophic truth to steal Christians away unless deceit is conjoined with it.’’ And because there are two ways in which deceit can be conjoined with philosophy, he adds, ‘‘in accordance with the traditions of men, in accordance with the elements of the world.’’ For vain deceit is joined with philosophy either according to the tradition of men — say, Stoics, Peripatetics, etc. — or from the elements of the world, that is, one measures and judges what is of the Christian faith according to the elements of the world, that is, causes that are celestial and elementary and 18.

The Dutch version has ‘Afgoden’, idols or false deities.

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causes composed of both these. For this is the characteristic of vain deceit; in so far as judgment can depend on causes of this kind, it does not stretch out to the sublime mysteries of Christ, which we believe through faith.19 Besides these, see Hyperius, Aretius, Marloratus, Estius, Piscator and Hemmingius on this passage. The last of these, after he had traversed nearly all the parts of philosophy and paid tribute to their utility and their glory, finally concludes, ‘‘Therefore, since all parts of philosophy are useful, being outstanding gifts of God, it is a kind of sacrilege to condemn philosophy in general.’’ And the exegesis that follows confirms that this was the Apostle’s meaning, for he adds, ‘‘vain deception according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world’’; that is to say, according to human wisdom transmitted by animal-like men, and according to opinions concerning the elements and principles of natural things (at that time many different opinions were rife among Greek philosophers) and not according to Christ, who is truth and the true wisdom of God. That is why Calvin adds to what has preceded, ‘‘That which follows next concerning vain deception I explain thus:— Beware of philosophy, which is nothing else but vain deception — so that the addition is quite appropriate.’’ And John Piscator on this passage, ‘‘And by ZJ[.\.]\_^ ´ `*^ a:]\ 20 the Apostle makes clear what he means by the word ‘philosophy’.’’ Therefore the particle ‘et’ does not have the force of the copulative conjunction but of the interpretative ‘sive’, and the earlier term is explained by the later, as if he were saying ‘per philosophiam, sive inanem deceptionem’.21 So the sense is, as Kekkermann says in his Praecogn. Philosoph., Book 1, ch. 4, ‘‘Beware of vain decep19.

20. 21.

The italics in the Dutch version suggest that the quotation (paraphrase) beginning with ‘in accordance with. . .’ ends at the paragraph with ‘through faith’. In place of the Greek the Dutch version has ‘ydele bedriegingh’ (vain deceit). The Latin phrase is translated in the Dutch version.

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tions and the inventions of diverse opinions, which are hawked about under the name of philosophy by men who assume the title of philosophers.’’ Thus Paul warns the Colossians against the inventions of Platonists, Epicureans, Stoics and especially the Sophists who at that time were flourishing in Greece, and who argued eloquently on both sides on any topic and, by proposing opinions that were advanced with subtlety and eloquence and thus bore an outward show of true wisdom, sought to turn away the Colossians from the salutary teaching of Christ. It is in this sense and to this end that he says in verse 4, ‘‘This I say so that no one may impose on you by the plausibility of his words.’’ Theodoretus takes the same view on this passage: ‘‘The speech which he earlier called plausible and persuasive he here calls philosophy.’’ But he is not referring to true philosophy, which does not deprive us of celestial truth, but rather induces us to acquire it and arms us for its defence. So let those good people, and the laymen who follow them with blind enthusiasm, cease in future to use this passage to pour scorn on philosophy and to defend their own erroneous opinions. For on our side we not only have reason but a considerable number of serious theologians of every kind, such as, besides those already cited, Clement of Alexandria (Stromat., Books 1 and 5), Zanchi and Beze on this passage, Melchior Cano (Locor. Theol. Book 9, ch. 9), Alsted (Praecognit. Theolog., Book 2, ch. 10), Cagliari22 (Philosoph. Christian., Part 2). To all these we can add Augustine, and conclude the present chapter with his words from De Ordine, Book 1, ch. 11: ‘‘Holy Scripture bids us avoid, not philosophers in general, but the philosophers of this world.’’ And again: ‘‘He who thinks that all philosophy should be shunned is in fact telling us not to love wisdom.’’

22.

The Dutch version has ‘Calmannus’.

Chapter VIII 1. No teachings of true philosophy are contrary to theology. 2. That ‘nothing comes from nothing’ and ‘the same thing cannot be reproduced numerically’ are not principles that are true philosophically1 and false theologically. [1] We have resolved the chief objections that can be made to our thesis from the Holy Writings. We do not think it necessary to treat of them all, since that argument has been thoroughly dealt with by several authors quoted in the preceding chapter. We therefore pass on to those arguments that can be raised externally to God’s Word. Since most of these are of little importance and can readily be resolved by anyone by means of the distinction made in the preceding chapter, I would omit them all, if it were not that one of them seems to present some difficulty. It is as follows. ‘Philosophy seems to advance many teachings which seem to clash head-on with theology and with Holy Scripture’. From this one may easily infer that philosophy ought by no means to be considered as the genuine and legitimate interpreter of Scripture. For how can the true meaning be elicited from the Holy Writings, and when elicited be demonstrated with solid arguments, by a discipline which sometimes teaches and affirms opinions not merely far removed from the Holy Writings but even — and this is more important — contrary to them, in accordance with that common saying, ‘There are many propositions which are true theologically and false philosophically’?2 In reply, we grant that philosophy that is apparent and erroneous may assert and maintain some things in opposition to the holy utterances, but we emphatically deny that this holds of true philosophy. We therefore say that what is true or false in theology is also true or false in true philosophy, and conversely that 1.

The Dutch version has ‘are principles that are not true philosophically’.

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whatever is true or false in the latter is also true or false in the former. It can never be that what is true in the one is false in the other. At all points they both agree and accord with each other in truth and falsity in perfect harmony. I cannot sufficiently wonder at the additional assertion, that there are some things that are true theologically and false philosophically. For truth is always one and the same, and being always consistent with itself never changes face, never assumes a different countenance from time to time, whatever be the discipline or the writing in which it is transmitted. Since truth is nothing other than the agreement of discourse with things, how, I ask, could one and the same discourse agree with things in one book, yet disagree with them when transmitted in another? Surely, since God is immutable and the author of both philosophy and theology, it is absurd to imagine that in the one he can teach that something is true while teaching in the other that it is false, and conversely that something is false in the one which he teaches as true in the other.3 Thus the light of grace cannot repudiate as false what the natural light declares to be true, and that which Scripture asserts to be consonant with truth, Nature cannot reject as incongruous with truth. Otherwise, one and the same thing could be simultaneously both true and false, than which nothing is more contrary to reason. This is just what Mornay says in the clearest possible way in his preface to his book, De Veritate Religionis: 2.

3.

Moreau and Lagre´e (1988, 145) suggest that this last statement (which is not the position with which Meyer began his exposition in this paragraph) involves the thesis of ‘double truth’ attributed to the Latin Averroists and condemned in 1270 by Steven Tempier, the bishop of Paris. But it differs radicallly from the version of that thesis offered by Siger of Brabant and Boetius of Dacia. The Dutch version has, ‘‘. . . it is absurd to imagine that in the one he can teach that something is true in theology while teaching in philosophy that it is false, and conversely that something is false in theology which he teaches as true in philosophy.’’

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The axioms and principles of Nature — of Nature, I say, which God has made — cannot be contrary to God himself. Furthermore, God is reason itself, truth itself. Therefore all other reason, all truth, depends on him, is referred to him, and cannot even have any existence externally to him. So it is certainly not the case that what is true and rational in Nature is false and irrational in theology; for theology is certainly opposed, not to Nature, but to the corruption of Nature, which is itself opposed to true and authentic Nature.4 So let it be an assured and accepted fact, and remain so, that there can be no conflict whatever between philosophical and theological truth. [2] However, our opponents may perhaps remain unconvinced unless it is shown in more detail that propositions usually counted as true theologically and false philosophically are in fact not so. To prove the view they take, they bring forward some propositions, such as ‘nothing comes from nothing’, ‘the same thing cannot be reproduced numerically’, ‘the world is eternal’, ‘a virgin cannot give birth’,5 ‘one is not three’, ‘a heavy body falls downwards’, ‘fire consumes the matter that is in contact with it’,6 4.

5.

6.

Bordoli (1997, 154) comments on this (literal) quotation as follows: ‘‘Le citazione che segue, da Du Plessis Mornay, conferma il de´tournement che Meyer impone alla tesi ortodossa assunta letteralmente, poiche´ il teologi francese, leader della scuola di Saumur, contesta i principi dommatici riformati in nome di un’attitudine ad un tempo piu` vicina ai riformati e piu` filologica e dunque meno teologizzante. Anche in questo caso ci troviamo in presenza di un uso funzionale, sebbene testualmente corretto, delle fonti.’’ An argument developed by Cicero (De inventione rhetorica, I, 29, 44) and later taken up by mediaeval dialecticians: ‘‘Virgo si peperit, cum viro concubuit.’’ The argument probably comes from Peter Damien (1007-1072) in his De divina omnipotentia. Cf. Moreau and Lagre´e (1988, 145).

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‘from privation to a fixed state there is no return’, and other sayings of this kind which they do not hesitate to classify with these. Come, then, let us humour them by examining a few of them, and show that these people are completely mistaken. First, they assert that ‘nothing comes from nothing’,7 and they say that this is philosophically true, and rightly so, since this is a self-evident principle and counted as one of the common notions. Yet they say that it is theologically false, because the Holy Writings teach us that God created the visible world and all that is therein from nothing. To this we reply by a plain denial. However carefully and diligently we study those texts, nowhere have we been able to find anything bearing any resemblance to this, apart from 2 Maccabees, ch. 7, v. 28.8 This text, being apocryphal and therefore having doubtful authority with most Christians, and furthermore admitting of an explanation favourable to philosophy, does nothing to support their argument. ‘‘But,’’ I seem to hear them reply heatedly, ‘‘does not Moses quite expressly teach this when he begins his five books thus, ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth’, that is, he made them from nothing. For is not the word ‘creation’ to be interpreted thus?’’ But let me put to them this question: ‘‘Since in many other places in the earlier chapters of Genesis the word ‘create’ means to ‘produce from pre-existing material’, who has taught them that at the very beginning of the book it means production from nothing? From what source have they derived such an interpretation?’’ Certainly not from Scripture, for it is not found anywhere there, nor from philosophy, which maintains the contrary, as they themselves acknowledge. It therefore comes either from their own brains or an accepted tradition. Therefore, until they prove that this axiom is theologically false, it must remain true and indubitable both in theology and philosophy. 7. 8.

See Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle, I, qu. 17. ‘‘Regard the heavens and the earth and behold all that is in them, and know that God has produced them all from nothingness, and that the race of men has been produced in the same manner.’’

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The second principle they advance is ‘the same thing cannot be reproduced numerically’. This they grant is true philosophically, since for the procreation and conservation (which is nothing else but continuous procreation)9 of every individual there must be a concurrence of individual partial causes. But they proclaim that this is false in theology; for theology teaches that on the last day of the final judgment, numerically identical bodies will rise again. This they prove by references to Job, ch. 19, v. 25, 26, 27,10 and 1 Corinthians, ch. 15. But indeed, one cannot sufficiently wonder that men of such standing, otherwise so intellectually acute, should cling to opinions either taught them in infancy or acquired by upbringing or hastily seized with blind enthusiasm, with the result that they hold tenaciously to them, teach them and defend them without accurate proof or impartial examination. For this teaching of the resurrection of the same flesh is contrary to sound reason, as we have said, nor can it be in any way inferred from the Scriptural passages quoted. The first passage, taken from the Old Testament, is so confused in the Hebrew text, so disorderly and obscure, that no satisfactory sense, and far less the resurrection of the same flesh, can be drawn from it. A merely superficial examination of the second passage is enough to show that it teaches the resurrection of new bodies, not the same bodies. So, if they are bent on convicting this proposition of falsity in theology, they must produce other arguments as proof. And since no such arguments are to be found in God’s Word, the proposition is equally sure and sound in theology as in philosophy. As for the other principles listed by us above, the same holds good of them, as is shown by Kekkermann at some length (Book 1 of Praecognit. Philosoph., penultimate chapter) and by 9. 10.

The claim that creation and conservation of the material universe are identical activities in God is argued by Descartes in Meditation 3. Job 19: ‘‘I know that my defender lives, that he will raise himself up last upon the earth. After my awakening he will bring me close to him. And in my flesh shall I see God.’’

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Alsted (Praecognit. Theologic., Book 2, ch. 10). who there also examines and refutes most11 of the arguments by which the enemies of philosophy try to promote a war between philosophy and theology. We reply briefly — for we do not think it worthwhile to deal with this at greater length — that all those propositions, when they are freed from any wordy ambiguity and are correctly and justly distinguished and differentiated, and proved to be true legitimately by philosophical reasoning, can in no way whatever be contrary to theology or Holy Scripture, but must agree with them most closely. For Holy Scripture, (as says, according to Kekkermann, the Third Lateran council held in the year 1180) is not contrary to the truth of Nature, because truth does not contradict truth.

11.

The Dutch version has ‘veel’ (many).

Chapter IX 1.

The Church, the Fathers, the Councils and the Roman Pontiff are not the infallible norm for the interpretation of Scripture. 2. They are not guided by the Spirit of God, nor can they extract with certainty and demonstrate the truths contained in the Holy Writings. 3. They are subject to error. [1] Hitherto we have been constructing our own thesis as a sort of citadel; we have fortified it with ramparts and provided it with bulwarks; and thereafter we have defended it against the assaults and attacks of the enemy, and preserved it intact. It finally remains for us now — and this is the last part of our enterprise — to descend into enemy territory, to attack their strongholds, to take them by storm and demolish them, so that our side may be the more secure and glorious. Our opponents are divided into two sections, the Catholics and the Reformed,1 the latter supporting the former in this matter. The latter we shall attack in subsequent chapters, the former we shall attack forthwith and finish them off speedily, defended as they are by a thin low rampart and lightly armed troops. For this reason we would not have made war on them, and we would have refrained from attacking those not worthy of our steel. For whoever is of so lowly a spirit and so stupid as to give assent with blind fervour and acquiesce in the fictions of men of straw — fictions not only devoid of all sound reason but even subversive of it, and this in matters relevant to our eternal salvation — such a one should occasion no difficulty for the honest and sincere lover of bountiful truth, I have always thought. Neverthe1.

The Dutch version has ‘‘the Papists and the Reformed and those who agree with them,’’

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less, lest our thesis should halt in any respect and be faulty, I have thought it proper to devote this chapter to their refutation. As we have indicated above, they maintain that the right and power to discover the meaning of Scripture and to explain it is vested in the Church, the Fathers, the Councils and the Roman Pontiff; and they maintain that it is they who are endowed with sure and infallible authority whereby they are enabled to interpret the Holy Writings and to judge of the interpretations of others. In consequence, nobody is permitted to question or contradict their explanations or the opinions they express concerning other interpretations. Against this tyranny all those who cherish Christian liberty have mounted a keen and eager opposition so as to shake off a yoke that is intolerable to men of conscience, and they have reduced the proponents of this attitude to the most painful embarrassment. For whenever the opponents of this view make it manifest that this right of interpretation does not belong to the Church, its proponents reply that by the Church they understand the Fathers and the Doctors of the Church. But when in turn the difficulties and absurdities of this refuge are exposed, they argue that all these objections are easily, and with complete certainty, removed by the Councils, especially the General Councils. When this is once again proved by their opponents to be false, they finally produce their last refuge, the Roman Pontiff, by whom, they maintain, the Councils are confirmed as the true and infallible interpreters of Scripture. Even more, they say that to him pertain all the qualifications of a true and indubitable interpreter, one who is beyond all hazard of error. Thus Bellarmine himself does not blush to say, ‘‘If the entire Council were to stand on one side and the Pontiff alone on the other, the Pontiff should be believed rather than the entire Council.’’ Thus the magnificent and splendid word ‘Church’, under which they take cover and within which is comprehended the Fathers, the Councils and the Pontiff, is finally limited and reduced to the Pontiff. Since all these arguments reveal quite well of themselves on what a weak and unstable foundation they rest, and since they have also been treated at some length by their op-

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ponents, we shall pass them over, and with a few unanswerable arguments we shall demonstrate and prove that their opinion is erroneous. [2] The first argument is drawn from the number of true interpreters of the Holy Writings, whom we make out to be divided into three classes only. 1. The writers of the New and the Old Testament, when, in their lifetime, they expound and explain either in writing or orally their own view of some doubtful sentence in their work, in accordance with that old saying, ‘Every man is the best interpreter of his own words’. 2. Those whom the Holy Spirit of God inspires with his own power, in an extraordinary and direct way, when they are engaged in interpretation. 3. Those who can elicit with certainty, and can prove that they have elicited, the truths of the divine utterances. In this list of interpreters, that is, those in the second and third categories (for the first have long since quitted the living and can no longer be regarded as part of the Christian world) neither the Church nor the Fathers nor the Councils nor the Pope can be counted. For the visible Church (of which we are here speaking,2 for the invisible Church, being an assembly of all those who from the beginning of the world have been, are, and will be chosen for life eternal, cannot in this life deliver its opinion regarding the interpretation of Scripture) consists of the reprobate and the elect. Now the reprobate can neither be guided by the Spirit of God nor can they infallibly understand and teach the truths of his oracles. And therefore neither can the Church regarded as a whole. Now if Catholics3 want to make this claim for their 2.

The Dutch version opens the parentheses with ‘(for the invisible. . .’.

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Church alone, if it does not consist entirely of reprobates, it is bound to contain very few of the elect, since not only are all the laity completely ignorant of the Holy Writings but also most of the clergy and even the priests. Moreover this task, which they regard as the privilege of their Church, can by no means be assigned to the laity because, although they constitute the greatest part of the Catholic Church,4 they are not permitted even to read the Holy Books, far less to interpret them. This is forbidden and prohibited under the most severe penalties. As for the Fathers, the Councils and the Pope, their many mutually contradictory interpretations show that in their interpreting they have not been inspired in any extraordinary way by the divine power, nor have they elicited with certainty and demonstrated the truths of the sentences contained in the Holy Writing. With regard to the Fathers, we have this admission from Bellarmine himself who, in his books of Controversies, not infrequently refers to their contradictory expositions of one and the same Scriptural passage. Thus in Book 2, ch. 2 of his De Christo he says: ‘‘We do not follow the Fathers, since they each uphold5 their individual opinions which are in contradiction with others. Take for example the blessed Cyprian, whom we do not follow when he teaches that baptism is ineffective when administered by a heretic; for we know that on this question the other Doctors do not agree with him.’’ The fact that the General Councils, too, are in disagreement with one another in their explication of many passages will become clear to anyone who reads their opinions and compares them with one another; so this does not stand in need of any elaborate proof. Finally, that the Pontiffs have given many contradictory explications of Scripture and have issued contrary de3. 4. 5.

The Dutch version has ‘Papists’ instead of ‘Catholics’. The Dutch version has, ‘‘. . . although they constitute with the Papists the greatest part of the Church,. . .’’ The Dutch version has, ‘‘We do not follow the Father when they each uphold.’’

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crees even in matters of faith is abundantly attested by Canonical Law. Thus Innocent I infers in his Epistle 3 that the Eucharist should be given even to little children, basing himself on John, ch. 6, v. 53, ‘‘Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, ye have no life in you’’; but those who came after him have taught, and still teach, the contrary. Thus Gregory wished to restore marriage to priests, whereas his successors refused. The same Gregory maintained that he who assumed the title of universal bishop was the precursor of the AntiChrist, yet his successors assumed that title. More examples of this kind are to be found in Chamier, Panstrat. Catholic., Tome 1, Book 3, ch. 13.6 To this may be added with reference to the Popes — so as to undermine the monstrous authority exceeding even the Councils which Bellarmine assigns them under the guise of two corollaries — that many were heretics, and many were impious, profane and criminal. That there were heretics among the Popes is acknowledged by many from the evidence of their own writings.7 Conspicuous among others were Eleutherus, Liberius, Felix, Anastasius and John XXII.8 Chamier gives a full account of their heretical teachings, and claims them in spite of objections made by Catholics9 who try as best they can to exculpate the heads of their Church (loc. cit., chapters 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13). Canonical Law admits that the Pope himself may lapse into heresy; quite a number of Catholics declare this explicitly, and Chamier himself proves it with arguments in the same book, chapter 8.10 That there were 6.

7. 8. 9.

Book 3 of Chamier is devoted to arguing against the position that the Pope is the supreme arbiter of controversies concerning Scripture, and attacks Bellarmine by offering a lengthy list of heretical popes. Meyer appears to be drawing on Chamier’s exposition in most of what follows in this chapter. The Dutch version has, ‘‘much from the works of Papist authors.’’ See Chamier, Book 3: Eleutherus (§ 7), Liberius (§ 10), Felix (§ 12), Anastasius (§ 11), John XXII (§ 13). The Dutch version has ‘Papists’.

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among them villains and impious men is attested by Platina in his Vitae Pontificum, as well as by many other historians. Such were, to cite just a few, Stephanus VI, Sergius III, John XII (as he is called by some, John XIII by others), Sylvester II, Boniface VIII, Benedict XIII and finally Alexander VI, whose crimes and impieties are listed by Chamier, loc. cit., ch. 6.11 Whether in their interpretation of Scripture men of this kind are enlightened by the Spirit of God, or having a faculty for discovering and proving the truths of the divine utterances, and whether they possess an authority of the exaggerated kind attributed to them by Bellarmine — this is a question I entrust to the judgment of those who have a clear brain and a healthy mind in a healthy body. [3] So much for the first argument. The second argument we deduce from the qualifications which theologians maintain are requisite in the true interpreter. From these we construct the following syllogism: The infallible interpreter of the Holy Writings cannot err, nor be guided by partisan zeal, nor give occasion for appeal to higher authority. But he can compel assent, and imbue men with knowledge that is certain. But the Church, the Fathers, the Councils and the Roman Pontiff can err, can be guided by partisan zeal, etc. Therefore they are not infallible interpreters of the Holy Writings. The major premise we discussed in chapter 4, section 10. To con10. 11.

The chapter is entitled, An Episcopi Romani confirmarint haeresin. Chamier, ch. 6 (An Ecclesia sit infallibilis): Stephanus VI and Sergius II (§ 7), John XII (§ 9), Sylvester II (§ 14), Boniface VIII (§ 17), Benedict XIII (§ 18), Alexander VI (§ 19).

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firm the minor premise (though this has some confirmation from what we said in our proof of the first argument, and the fact that the Church and the Councils consist of men, and the Fathers and the Popes are men, who may lack those qualifications) we shall proceed by stages. First, that the Church is capable of error is evident from the fact that in the time of the Ancients the Eucharist was given to quite small children, a subject on which Augustine and others have much to say. Moreover, shortly after the time of the Nicene Council, the greater part of the Christian world embraced a heresy, as we read in Sulpicius Severus, Book 2.12 So, too, in the time of the Arians almost the whole world was infected with the poison of that heresy, as is attested by Vincent of Lerins,13 who also declares that it is not impossible for the entire Church to deviate from the faith. More on this subject is to be found in Chamier, Panstrat. Catholic., Book 2, ch. 16. Now if the first qualification is lacking in the Church, the others will also be lacking; for they are all based on the first, as we have shown above.14 That the Fathers can err is evident from their frequent failure to grasp the true meaning of Scripture, as Bellarmine clearly tells us in De Verbo Dei, Book 3, ch. 3, sections 9 and 10, where he says, ‘‘The Fathers have repeatedly erred in their exposition of the Holy Writings, taking figuratively what should have been taken literally, and taking literally what should have been taken figuratively.’’ He adduces examples from Origen, Papias, Justinus, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Lactantius and others. Jerome also tells us the same thing when he writes in his Epistola ad Theophilum, Tome 3, ‘‘I know that my attitude to the Apostles is different 12. 13. 14.

There is no reference to Severus in the Dutch version. Vincentius Lirinensis (ca. 450) is cited frequently also by Chamier. The Panstratiae Catholicae, from which Meyer almost literally takes this argument, was the classical source of arguments against ‘papism’ in the seventeenth century. See Bordoli (1997, 157) for a guarded evaluation of his use of Chamier here and above.

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from that to the other expositors.15 The former always speak the truth, the latter sometimes go astray, being but men.’’16 In the same way he also says that some of his commentaries on the sacred books have fallen from him, that he has poured them out rather than written them. Not only did the Fathers err; quite a few of them, moreover, were guided by partisan zeal. They often say things out of kindness and love. In his Encheiridion ad Laurentium (De purgatorio et Oratione pro Mortuis), Augustine admits that he and others have gone astray in some way through excess of love, as when he thinks of his friends and of his beloved mother Monica. Often through fear of some people they are silent about some things, as Augustine again testifies in his Letter to Januarius 119, ch.19: ‘‘I dare not be too bold in rebuking many things of this kind in order to avoid scandals touching certain holy or factious persons.’’ Often through excessive deference, often through the tyranny of certain popes and emperors they were driven to make absurd interpretations of the Sacred Books, as is abundantly attested by the Council of Arimini and the Council of Berenger. To this the Papists make this reply: they do not indeed deny that one or another of the Fathers has sometimes been subject to error; but when they are all in agreement they have always taught the truth, they have never strayed from the truth, and it is only to that extent that they are held to be infallible interpreters. To this we reply that, first, this reservation is worthless. For if one of them can err in the interpretation of one Scriptural passage, and another in another, why should they not all be capable of error at the same time? Then again, there are very few passages, perhaps none at all, about whose meaning all the Fathers altogether have been of the same mind. Furthermore, they have all, or at least nearly all, been in error together in their exposition of Proverbs 8. Finally, it is not true that for Catholics17 the unan15. 16. 17.

Jerome directs his criticism here primarily at Origen. Epistola 82, § 7. The Dutch version has ‘Papists’.

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imous agreement of all the Fathers is the norm for interpretation; all their writings bear witness that they sometimes follow nobody’s exposition, sometimes the exposition of only one or two, even when other and better Fathers disagree. This is often shown by Polanus in every chapter of his Symphonia Catholica and in his Syntag. Theolog., Book 1, ch. 45, Qu. 7. Councils too can err. This is made clear by the First Nicene Council when it condemned the soldiers who, after professing Christianity, then rejoined the army, lawful though it was. The Council had prescribed certain rules of penitence which became causes of many superstitions in the Church, diminishing and obscuring the merits of Christ. It would have prohibited marriage for those in holy orders, had not Paphnutius prevented it. Finally, that the Roman Pontiffs can err is revealed by their frequent serious mistakes in the interpretation of God’s Word. For example, Boniface VIII, in his De Majoritat. et Obedient., ch. 1.18 In seeking to prove that the supreme power, secular and ecclesiastic belonged to him, he produces this passage from Saint Luke, ch. 22, v. 38, ‘Behold, here are two swords’, and he interprets this in his favour. Likewise ‘Cephas’, he says, signifies the head, whereas John, ch. 1, v. 43, says that ‘Cephas’ means ‘rock’. Similarly, Pope Siricius in his Epistola 1 to Himerius of Tarragon, ch. 7, and Innocent I in his Epistle 3 to Exuperius, bishop of Toulouse, with regard to the passage in 1 Peter 1, 16, ‘Be ye holy, for I am holy’, and in Paul, Romans, 8, 8, ‘They that are in the flesh cannot please God; but ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit’, they interpreted this so as to deduce from it that priests must abstain from marriage. Yet Peter is speaking of all the faithful, and Paul of all those who have not yet rid themselves of their carnal nature through the Spirit of Christ. One could produce six hundred19 such examples, but let these suffice, for it is wearisome to dwell longer on such trifles. If anyone wants any more, and the answers to the arguments whereby Papists estab18. 19.

The Dutch version references ch. 2 instead of ch. 1. The Dutch version has ‘veel andere’ (many other).

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lish and confirm their opinion, let him consult Chamier,20 so often quoted, and Polanus, and others.

20.

Chamier, Books 2-3.

Chapter X 1. The pronouncements of a number of the Reformed. 2. From these their thesis is defined and briefly considered. Having crushed in a brief encounter their skirmishers and those enemies of ours who are without spirit and without arms, let us turn our forces away and direct them against the Reformed and those who follow their banners. Against these we shall need a stouter heart and more prolonged warfare, for they are doughty fighters, remarkable for their generalship, well equipped for defence with arms and bulwarks; and, most importantly, they have never yet been assailed by anyone, as far as I know, far less conquered and crushed. The belief that they hold, however confusedly and obscurely propounded, nevertheless appears quite plausible, and is supported by many and various arguments which have an impressive appearance. Therefore we must devote far more time to this, and our discussion must be more protracted. But this is our last hurdle, and when we have surmounted it we can look for an assured peace and tranquil rest. Come then, and with no further delay let us attack the enemy in a spirited fashion. [1] Chamier (Panstrat. Catholic., Tome 1, Book 16, ch. 6), while making no mention of the Holy Spirit, defines the opinion held by the Reformed as follows, ‘‘The universal Church believes that there can be no safer, surer, truer interpretation of Scripture than that through Scripture itself.’’ This is said more expressly by Polanus (Syntagmat. Theolog., Book 1, ch. 45, qu. 5), ‘‘The norm for interpreting Scripture and for judging whether an interpretation is true or false is Holy Scripture itself, which is the voice of God.’’ But Wandelinus takes a slightly different view (Theolog. Christian. Prolegom., ch. 3, thesis 6, explicat. 1), ‘‘The supreme right to interpret Scripture belongs to the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture, or to Scripture which is the voice of the Holy Spirit.’’

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Walaeus employs almost the same words in his Enchiridion Religionis Christianae, in the passage on the interpretation of Scripture, ‘‘Holy Scripture is its own interpreter, or rather it is the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture.’’ And in the passage in Commun. Theologic. de Scripturae Interpretatione, ‘‘We say that God himself speaking in the Scriptures is the supreme interpreter of the Scriptures’’; and further on, ‘‘We say that God has so opportunely arranged Scripture that it is not only its own norm but also its own interpreter.’’ Here again the role of interpreter of Scripture seems to be assigned to God and the Holy Spirit, as Whittaker says in his Disputatio de Scriptura contra huius temporis Papistas, Controvers. 1, qu. 5, ch. 8, ‘‘We take the view that the supreme judgment and authority for interpreting the Scriptures should not be assigned to the Church, but to Scripture itself and to the Holy Spirit which sometimes speaks openly in Scripture, and sometimes unobtrusively1 confirms the Scriptures in our hearts.’’ Tilenus explains this yet more clearly, lucidly and distinctly in his Syntagm. Disputat. Theolog., Part 1, disput. 8, thes. 1 and 2, ‘‘The true Church of Christ claims for the Holy Spirit alone speaking in Scripture the supreme right and authority for interpretation, and it maintains that the true meaning of Scripture, in respect of its internal certitude2 (
    ) proceeds from it alone; and as to its external conviction, this is best taken from Scripture itself.’’ Scarpius (Cursus Theologicus de Sancta Scriptura) expresses himself at much greater length, as follows:

1. 2.

The Dutch version has ‘also unobtrusively’ instead of ‘sometimes unobtrusively’. The Latin is ‘interna persuasio’, rendered in the Dutch version as ‘innerlycke verseeckerheydt en ghewisheydt’ (security and certitude). This is one of many occurrences in the Dutch version where we find two synonymous terms replacing a single term in the Latin. The usage is common in both seventeenth century and modern Dutch.

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The opinion of the orthodox is this: The supreme right, authority and decision for the interpretation of Scripture lies with the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture, nor is the interpretation of Scripture attached to some definite seat and to a succession of men, as the Papists would have it, but must be assigned to the Holy Spirit unobtrusively confirming the Scriptures in the hearts of the faithful. There is no contradiction in our saying that this belongs to Scripture and also to the Holy Spirit; for the Holy Spirit is said to be the supreme interpreter because, in order to be firmly persuaded of the true meaning of Scripture, we ought to be enlightened through the Holy Spirit. Otherwise we could never attain that certitude (   ) which is in the minds of the faithful, whatever be the means to which we may have recourse. And this is the internal conviction, which affects only ourselves; for this is not the way in which we constrain others so as to receive the meaning and the judgment of the Holy Spirit. Scripture itself, or the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture, is said to be the supreme interpreter and judge in respect of external conviction. Therefore to convince others we must resort to this external judgment of Scripture. [2] We have deemed it advisable to be so expansive on this subject partly to elicit therefrom the opinion of the Reformed, partly to make clear how they themselves express and define it, which, in my judgment, they do in a very obscure and confused way. Indeed the earlier writers, without any mention of internal or external conviction, refer sometimes to Scripture, which is the voice of God or the Holy Spirit, and sometimes to God, or the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures. By using these terms they seem to me to mean nothing other than Scripture itself, and thus they maintain that Scripture is its own interpreter. The later writers, making distinction between internal and external conviction, assign the latter to Scripture and the former to the Holy Spirit.

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And this is what they seem to mean by the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures, although soon afterwards they confuse Scripture with the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture. However, as far as we can gather from their words, we think that what they have in mind is this, that Holy Scripture is the sure and infallible norm for interpreting itself and the rule by which, as an instrument available to the senses, the original and authentic meaning of the Holy Word must not only be elicited and proved externally, but, once elicited, be evaluated and probed. But, they think, none of the faithful can be fully and completely convinced of it unless there is added the testimony of the Holy Spirit which, like an internal cause imperceptible to the senses, seals within their hearts the truth of the interpretation. But if this is their view, while it does not involve a flagrant contradiction, it is not completely free of difficulty.3 For if, besides Scripture itself, the Holy Spirit is necessary for a full conviction of the interpretation, Scripture will not be a sufficient and infallible norm, as they claim, possessing all the qualifications for a true interpreter as enumerated above. For if it cannot err in interpretation or leave room for appeal, if it can imbue men with a knowledge that is certain and compel their assent, there is no additional need of the testimony of the Holy Spirit; for what more than this can one demand? And if there is need of the testimony of the Holy Spirit, Scripture cannot compel assent nor can it imbue men with certain knowledge; it will leave room for appeal, and be subject to error.

3.

The difficulty, as Bordoli (1997, 159) notes, is a logical one: ‘‘Questo significa che la polarita` tra certezza oggettiva (della Scrittura) e certezza soggettiva (del credente) resta irrisolta, che´ e` proprio lo spirito santo a colmare la lacuna. Ma, se e` cosi`, la Scrittura non basta a se stessa. E se, d’altronde, Scrittura e spirito si identificano, allora perche´ distinguerli analiticamente?’’

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But putting aside these considerations which we have merely touched on in passing, let us refute one by one each part of this thesis, affirming first of all that Scripture is not the norm for its own interpretation.

Chapter XI 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

An explanation is given of the thesis of the Reformed, which maintains that Scripture is its own interpreter. The difficulties of this thesis. The signification of words and sentences becomes known to us not by Nature but by social intercourse. The common use of language is not the interpreter of Scripture. This has not been established by the Reformed, nor can it be. No Scriptural passage is clear of itself; they are all ambiguous. Nor is it always the case that one passage can be explained through another, or obscure passages through those that are clear. The difficulties that are found are not removed by the general rules proposed by the Reformed. Nor by the solution proposed by a certain person.

[1] Under the title of Scripture we here understand the words, expressions, modes of speech, propositions and other such things which are related to external discourse and the languages which the sacred writers employed. We exclude internal discourse and the meaning of sentences and propositions; for if this were known and established, it would not require interpretation, nor could it be the norm for interpretation. For who would seek to elicit, or want someone to elicit for him, the meaning of a sentence he has already grasped? Or who would attempt to explain an obscure and doubtful passage of Scripture through the meaning of another passage while disregarding as irrelevant the

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words and modes of expression? No one, I imagine, who has correctly perceived that the interpreter’s occupation is with words and what concerns words, and that from these he tracks down the meaning and investigates it by bringing together and comparing the words and expressions of a sentence already understood with the words and expressions of a sentence which he is still trying to understand. It follows that, in maintaining that Scripture is its own interpreter, the Reformed and those who think with them can intend nothing other than this, that the meaning of both single words and entire sentences which are unclear must be investigated and elicited with the help of other Scriptural words and sentences whose meaning is known and established.1 This is also confirmed by Walaeus (Enchirid. Religion. Christian., passage on the interpretation of Scripture) in these words: ‘‘Scripture elucidates its obscure passages by comparing them with clearer passages; a celebrated example of this is Nehemiah ch. 8, v. 9. Similarly in many places in the New Testament Christ and the Apostles explain the more obscure Scriptural texts by the clearer Scriptural texts.’’ And Danaeus (Hagog.2 Christian. ad. loc. Commun., Part 4, Book 3, ch. 6): ‘‘The way to interpret Scripture from Scripture, as Augustine says to Volusenus,3 is to bring together passage with passage, to compare Holy Scripture with Holy Scripture, to draw the explanation of one obscure passage from another easier passage of the same Scripture.’’ Whittaker expresses a similar opinion at some length in his Disputatio de Scriptura Sancta contra huius temporis Papistas, Controvers. 1, qu. 5, ch. 13, under the title ‘Scripture must be interpreted from Scripture’, where he says: ‘‘Scripture interprets itself most clearly and lucidly if we are willing to hearken to it at1.

2. 3.

Bordoli (1997, 159) notes that the summary of the Reformed position given by Meyer in these opening paragraphs ‘‘. . . opera una drastica riduzione filologica della tesi riformata.’’ The Dutch version has ‘Isagog.’. The Dutch version has ‘Volusianus’.

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tentively as it interprets itself. If this is not true of every passage so as to leave not a shadow of doubt, it is true of most passages, of those passages that are most important, and of the principal tenets of our faith. We have examples of this interpretation in Scripture;4 for when it speaks rather obscurely, sometimes it explains itself immediately in the same passage, sometimes in increased measure in other passages.’’ This he illustrates with a few examples of both kinds, and then adds, ‘‘There are countless examples of this kind where it is apparent that the Holy Spirit, if its words seem somewhat obscure, thereafter explains them clearly and delivers the reader from all doubt.’’ And later on, ‘‘In order to impart a true understanding of one passage, it is the custom of Scripture to pass us on to another. In this way we do not halt and rest on any one part of Scripture, but embrace the entire body of the Holy Books in our reading and meditation. Therefore we should compare passages with passages if we want to acquire a firm understanding of something in Scripture.’’ Basil, too, is of the same opinion in his ´

 or Reg. Brevior., Interrog. 276, ‘‘What seems ambiguous and obscurely phrased in some passages of Scripture is made comprehensible by what is straightforward and clear in other passages.’’ [2] But this view, thus explained, however plausible5 it may appear at first sight, is fraught with many considerable difficulties on closer inspection and careful examination. For what is the connection between one passage of Scripture and another? What right or privilege is possessed by one passage so that another has to be interpreted through or from it? If the things that Matthew or Mark tell us of Christ’s sayings seem a little obscure to the reader, are they to be elucidated by what Luke or John say, and vice versa? Would not any one of the sacred writers, if still alive, have just cause to complain that his writings serve only to explicate others, or to be the subject to their explication? Would 4. 5.

Isaiah 51, 1; Gen. 11, 1; Exodus 20, 4. The Dutch version has ‘aenghenaem’ — which means ‘acceptable’ in Meyer’s Dutch (‘pleasant’ in modern Dutch).

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they not claim with good reason that interpreters have done violence to them and their writings and maltreated them; for they had entrusted to writing the truths they held for certain in order to make them known to posterity and to later generations, and not in order to explain the works of others, or conversely be explained by them. When Paul wrote to the Romans, was he not equally visited by divine inspiration as when he wrote to the Corinthians, or as when Peter or any other of the Apostles or Evangelists did their writing? Why should this one have to be explained through that one, or that one through this one, or why should one even have to be explained through himself? Surely every passage of Scripture stands by its own authority, possesses its own truth and its special meaning which does not depend on another passage, nor ought to be determined through another; nor do we ever read that any right to interpret another has been granted to any one Apostle. But let us grant that one passage of Scripture has the right to interpret another; how can we be certain, I ask, that the signification of one passage is exactly the same as that of another? For although the same or similar words and modes of speech occur in both, the meaning may be different, and the words in one passage may be taken literally while in another they may be taken figuratively or allegorically or in some other way. ‘‘For in Scripture the same words or the same expression does not always convey the same meaning and signification; it sometimes means something different, or even contrary,’’ as Stapleton says, with many illustrative examples, in his Controversiar., Book 2, ch. 10.6 Therefore, along with Dannhauer in his Idea Bon. Interpret. et Malitios. Calumniator, Part 1, sect. 3, Art. 11 (sc 95, we maintain, ‘‘Comparison drawn from the analogy of mere bare proportion has no argumentative force, but only an illustrative 6.

Stapleton, a Catholic theologian, argues against the Protestant device of collating passages by emphasising the diversity of Protestant readings. One of his examples is the dictum, ‘this is my body’.

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force by probable reasoning. There is a non-sequitur in ‘This is the meaning of a parallel passage; therefore it is also the meaning of this passage’; ‘A word is understood in a certain way in another passage; therefore it must be so understood here’. This would in fact be an argument from a particular case.’’ Then again quite frequently (I quote Stapleton from the same passage), ‘‘A saying may be understood as like or unlike not so much from the likeness or unlikeness of the facts themselves but from the sentiments and preconceptions of those who are drawing the comparison.’’ But let us once again grant that the sacred writers, in two or more different passages, intended to indicate and signalise the same thing. Then the meaning of the passage which is going to interpret other passages must necessarily be known and established; otherwise it could not fulfil its function. But how is it to be known? If reply is made that it will be known through another passage, we shall ask the same question of the latter, and continue asking until we come to one or more passages (since Scripture is finite, this cannot go on to infinity or turn into a circular argument without manifest absurdity) where either we come to a halt, or decide that these passages cannot be explained through others. But the meaning of these passages, since it is employed to interpret other passages and must therefore be clearly established, is still open to the further question as to how it becomes known. To this question it seems to me there can be no answer but that it is known through itself. For the Reformed claim that Scripture, in all points that are necessary to be known for salvation, is lucid and clear, so that Christians who are quite simple and uneducated can understand it. This is in accord with that saying of St. Augustine, (Epistol. 3 ad Volusen), ‘‘What is necessary for salvation is attainable in them [the Scriptures] with no great difficulty.’’ And again, ‘‘The manner of speech in which Holy Scripture is composed is accessible to all, though penetrable for only a few. The straightforward part of its message it conveys, like a familiar friend without pretensions, to the hearts of the unlearned and learned alike. Those parts that it shrouds in mystery it does not

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couch in elevated language so as to keep at a distance those who are rather slow and lacking education, just as the poor man is far removed from the rich, but in simple style it opens its arms to all men, not only nourishing them with manifest truth but schooling them with a hidden truth, the same message appearing in what is evident and in what is hidden.7 But lest what is clear should be treated lightly, that same clear message is hidden away, and what is hidden away8 is somehow renewed, and being renewed comes sweetly to our hearts.’’ And in his De Doctrin. Christian., Book 2,9 ch. 6: ‘‘Those who utterly fail to find what they seek, suffer from hunger, whereas those who do not seek because they have it ready to hand, find that familiarity takes away appetite. In both cases listlessness is the danger. That is why the Holy Spirit, so magnificently and so wholesomely, has so arranged the Holy Scriptures that in the plainer passages it eases our hunger, and in the more obscure passages it banishes our listlessness. For there is practically nothing elicited from those obscurities which is not found elsewhere quite plainly expressed.’’ Yet what sentence is said to be clear through itself, what meaning known through itself? As for myself, to speak the truth, among all the theologians whom I have so far chanced to see, I have failed to find anything solid on this subject, such as to withstand a more searching scrutiny. So I think it unnecessary to devote time to reviewing and refuting their opinions. But to dispose of this one exceptional point (namely, that certain passages are clear through themselves) which we mentioned above, and which is the only one they can plead on their behalf, we shall first recall to memory some assertions we made at the beginning of this treatise. [3] We said earlier in chapter 3 that words are the marks 7. 8. 9.

Instead of this clause the Dutch version has, ‘‘presenting the one as clear, the other as hidden.’’ For the two occurrences of ‘hidden away’ the Dutch version has ‘begeert’ (longed for). The reference in the Dutch version omits ‘Book 2’.

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and signs of concepts and things, that it is from these that every sentence is composed, and that it consists of them. So things and concepts are indicated by signs,10 and every sentence will signify a number of concepts and things, having either a conjunctive or a disjunctive mutual relationship. We also said above in the same chapter that the denotation of every word, and therefore the meaning of the sentence, owes its origin not to Nature but to human convention, and continues to depend on the usage of mankind,11 in whom is vested the control, the right and the norm of language. From this it follows that all significations of words and meanings of sentences are learnt not from Nature or the researches of the natural light but through association with those who speak that language, that is, by speaking and listening, or they are learnt orally from a teacher, or else gleaned from dictionaries or grammars. [4] So when the Reformed maintain that some passages of Holy Scripture are clear and perspicuous through themselves, they cannot mean the sort of perspicuity whereby the principles of the sciences, commonly referred to as basic and common notions, are said to be clear through themselves.12 For the latter are understood by the natural light without any proof, which cannot be the case with the former, as we have just demonstrated. What they seem to mean is the sort of perspicuity whereby the meaning of a sentence is understood by anyone who has knowledge and experience of the language in which it is expressed, without any interpretation or explanation of the words. So the phrase ‘through itself’ (per se) does not exclude a prior knowledge of that language, acquired by usage or teaching, but only the need for interpretation. Now if this is their intended meaning, they are making 10. 11. 12.

The Dutch version has ‘concepts are the signified’. The Dutch version has ‘gewoonte en gebruyk’ (custom and usage). In his preface to Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, Meyer likens the common notions to the axioms and definitions of the synthetic (axiomatic in our sense) method.

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common linguistic usage to be the interpreter of Holy Scripture. For since they maintain that the more obscure passages are explained through the clearer passages and the meanings of the latter through themselves, — that is, as we have already said, through common usage — in any case Scripture will not, precisely speaking, be its own interpreter; it will simply be that some passages of Scripture will interpret others, as they themselves acknowledge. But for Scripture in its entirety the interpreter will be the common usage of language, a remote interpreter13 for passages that are obscure, and a proximate interpreter for the clearer passages. Nevertheless, this is not the proper and legitimate interpreter of the Holy Writings; indeed, it is almost the unique source of false interpretations. This is clearly shown, in my opinion, by the fact that the great mass of mankind, from whom derives the common usage of language, go far astray; concerning God and things divine they entertain and foster concepts that are perverse and monstrous. If one were to apply these concepts to the Holy Writings and employ them in the task of understanding and explaining Scripture, one would surely fabricate and publish expositions that are far removed from the meaning intended by God and the sacred writers.14 [5] Despite my diligent and painstaking enquiries and researches, I have failed to discover anything else that the Reformed can claim to be clear through itself in sentences. Hence it is obvious that they do not wish or are unable — if some of them are so ignorant and unreflecting — to grasp the following point: there are many passages in God’s Word which do indeed consist of words and constructions known from common linguistic usage and which for that reason are clear and perspicuous, but 13. 14.

The Dutch version adds ‘uytlegger’ (interpreter), which makes clear that the term (which is lacking in the Latin text) is to be understood here. In the Appendix to Ethics I, Spinoza argues that such prejudices and fabrications necessarily arise from a teleological view of Nature, but also suggests that this error was implicit in the human authors of Scripture.

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which are nevertheless not accepted by interpreters in the obvious sense presented to the reader at first glance. They are made to yield another sense, sometimes a very different one. Earlier we brought to notice some such instances in chapter 3, section 7, to which can be added the following: in Matthew 5, v. 34, 37, ‘Swear not at all’, etc., and ‘Let your communication be ‘Yea, yea, and Nay, nay’,’ etc. And Matthew 5, v. 39, 40, 41, ‘‘Resist not evil, but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man shall sue thee at the law and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever will compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain,’’ etc. And there are many other such examples, whose obvious and evident meanings from common linguistic usage they would surely not reject if from them they could deduce and derive the perspicuity of sentences. [6] But still, what is for them, or must be for them, a passage clear through itself? Earlier in chapter 3 we dealt at some length with obscurity and clarity in a sentence, and we distinguished the one and the other in respect of a two-fold meaning, namely, the simple meaning and the true meaning, both of which we furthermore distinguished from the truthfulness of the sentence. Thus in every sentence the interpreter must carefully consider these three aspects; for when he has found one, he must not be convinced that he has found the others. It may be that the simple sense of a sentence is known, but not its true sense and its truthfulness; but it is not possible for its truthfulness or its true sense to be known without its simple sense. Then again, simple meanings may be known, and the truthfulness, whereas the true meaning is not known. And finally, the simple sense and the true sense may be established, while the truthfulness of the sentence is not known. All this is self-evident to anyone who pays attention. Therefore when it is claimed that in the Holy Writings a sentence is clear and perspicuous through itself, we may be talking about the perspicuity of either the simple sense or the true sense. But clearly we are not referring to the former, for two rea-

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sons. First, as we have just said, this would be to make common linguistic usage the interpreter of Scripture. Secondly, what is here at issue is not what is simply said, but the true meaning of the Holy Writings. For the subject of our discussion is not just any kind of interpretation, but the genuine and authentic interpretation; and since in their view this is to be done through passages that are clear of themselves, the clarity we seek will also be not of any kind of meaning, but only of true meaning. Mercury is not made out of any kind of wood whatever,15 nor can true meaning be got from any kind of meaning whatever. So what they are speaking of is the latter, that is, the perspicuity of true meaning. Now with regard to this perspicuity we frankly admit that we cannot see how a passage can be perspicuous through itself, and we heartily desire them to instruct us. For since in every passage there is, or at least can be, a two-fold meaning, there must necessarily be a criterion ( 



 ) whereby these meanings may infallibly be distinguished or, if there is only one meaning, it may be confirmed that there are not more than one. So it would carry no weight if someone were to say in reply that the simple meaning and the true meaning often coincide, that the passages where this occurs and which have only a simple meaning are the only passages which they regard as clear through themselves, and not the passages which have more than one meaning. For since this is not always the case, as the examples we have adduced make clear, a sign or norm must be produced whereby we can ascertain with certainty whether this is indeed the case. So it will be not through themselves but through the criterion ( 



 ) or that sign or norm that these passages will be known to be as they are — which is contrary to the hypothesis. Furthermore, the alleged exception collapses completely because there is no sentence that does not admit of more than one sense, as is clearly shown by what we have said in chapter 3. In particular, the celebrated theologian among the Re15.

The Dutch version has, ‘‘The carpenter’s wood is not made of any kind of wood.’’

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formed, Daniel Chamier, in his Panstrat. Cat., Tome 1, Book 16, ch. 1, section 1, asserts in these terms that there is no passage of Holy Scripture that cannot be explained in different ways:16 ‘‘It is certain that there is nothing so straightforward, so perspicuous and so sure that cannot be turned differently, and even have contrary meanings. Experience tells us that all heresies owe their origin, or at least their growth, to a faulty understanding of the Scriptures. For what is more frequent in the controversies of the Holy Fathers than the refuting of objections which heretics have gathered from some passage? Finally, in these unhappy times it is not only members of the universal Church who vigorously defend their faith from the Scriptures; Papists, too [and I would add Lutherans, Anabaptists, Socinians, Arminians and all other Christians], often dare again and again to misuse Scripture and to claim its authority as their own. This could not come about unless the same passages were understood by different people in different ways.’’ So since there is nothing in the Holy Writings that can not be found to be ambiguous, nor can any sense be true except that which agrees with the writer’s intention, and since this is not evident through itself, no passage will be clear through itself. [7] Furthermore, there are many passages of Scripture which cannot be compared with other similar passages because they occur only once in the Holy Books. Many such instances are given by Stapleton in his Controvers., Book 11, ch. 10.17 Nor again is it always possible in the explication of Scripture to arrive at passages which they call clear; one must often halt at the more obscure passages, of which quite a number are to be found in the Old Testament in the writings of the Prophets and also in the Book of Job, and in the New Testament in the Apocalypse of John. When the meanings of these passages despite their obscuri16.

17.

Meyer neglects to note, however, that Chamier goes on to argue that Scripture is always clear on reflexion, despite the fact that some passages may appear obscure at first sight. Most of the examples given by Stapleton are from St. Paul.

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ty are nevertheless explained by interpreters, they are not drawn from clear passages, and so not from Scripture but from elsewhere — unless it is maintained that the obscure can be explained through the obscure, thus leading to open contradiction. [8] Finally, all these difficulties are not solved, nor is the thesis of the Reformed supported, by the rules which they propose to that end, such as: — One must not always adhere to the letter. One must elicit the true literal meaning, which is sometimes the strict meaning, sometimes a figurative meaning. Frequently one must also look for an allegorical meaning. — The strictly literal meaning must always be retained in the explication of Scripture, unless it is false.18 — One must always retain (this is Augustine’s rule) the strict meaning of words unless there is good reason to regard it as a trope. — When what is said ( ´  ) gives rise to an absurdity when taken in its strict sense, one must have recourse to the intended meaning (   ).19 — What is said in a figurative way must not be interpreted literally, and vice versa. — One should take subjects in a way that makes sense with their predicates, and predicates to be in accord with their subjects; that is, it is from the nature of the subject that the predicate should be determined. — If there is a didactic utterance warning us against crime or villainy, or bidding us do what is useful and beneficial, it should not be taken figuratively. But if it appears to bid us commit a crime or villainy and forbids what is useful and beneficial, it is a figurative mode of speech.20 18. 19. 20.

See Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, Book 3, ch. 10. See ch. 6, § 3 of Meyer. See Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, Book 3, ch. 16.

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— In the interpretation of Scripture consider above all what befits God.21 — Meaning should not be imported, but be innate, and words should be understood in their natural sense. If, in addition to Scripture, these rules have to be employed in interpreting God’s Word, at any rate Scripture does not appear to be a sufficient norm for its own interpretation, which is contrary to their own thesis. Furthermore, I should like to ask the authors, the supporters and compilers of all such rules this question: How can one know what is said in Scripture literally, what figuratively, and what allegorically? How can one know what sense is false? What is the good reason that indicates a trope? When does the literal wording (! ´ "#$% ) give rise to difficulty? What subjects make sense with what predicates? How can one know what utterance forbids crime and villainy, or urges us towards the useful and the beneficial? Whence can one understand what befits God, whether a meaning is innate, etc.? If they know, let them tell us, and at the same time they will indicate the method for explaining Scripture. But I have never been able to discover any of these things in them or in others, except for this one thing which I remember having read somewhere or heard from someone, something which I think it worthwhile to add here and to consider. [9] If my memory does not fail me, in discussing whether Holy Scripture should be explained according to right reason, this man affirmed that Scripture should in no way be subject to our reason, and after this assertion he went on to ask: What then will be the evidence that one passage should be understood and interpreted literally, and another figuratively? He replies as follows: When Scripture in any place delivers a clear and open teaching, that is, dogmatizes ( &$')(+*#,-/., ), and then in another passage appears to maintain the contrary incidentally and by way of consequence, the former clear passage must be understood 21.

See ch. 6, § 3 of Meyer.

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strictly and literally, while the latter must be interpreted figuratively so as to accord with the former. For example, the Holy Writings clearly tell us dogmatically ( 021354+67891:<;8 ) that God is one, and in other passages speak of God in the plural, giving the impression that he is not one. So since the earlier is an express teaching and the later a deduction through consequence, the later texts are not to be taken strictly and must be explained in conformity with the earlier texts which are to be taken strictly. Similarly, we are told to beware of imagining God as corporeal, for it says in Deuteronomy 4, ‘‘Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves (for ye saw no manner of similitude, etc.) that ye make you no graven image, the similitude of any figure,’’ etc. . . . And further on, ‘‘If ye make you a graven image, the likeness of any thing,’’ etc., ‘‘I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day that ye shall soon utterly perish from off the land,’’ etc. These passages tell us clearly that God is incorporeal. Therefore it is by this precept, not reason, that we are required to interpret in accordance with this precept all the texts which seem to indicate that God is corporeal. This is the view taken by this man, whereby he imagines that he has answered the question fully and satisfactorily.22 But he is sadly mistaken. What for him can be said to be perspicuous in Scripture? For it consists entirely of words, and there are no 22.

The doctrine which Meyer here attributes to an unnamed source is found also in Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus, ch. 15. Not only the general doctrine, but also the illustrative examples and one of the counterexamples are the same in both works. One of Spinoza’s annotations to the TTP refers the reader to this passage of the Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres. In Spinoza, the doctrine is attributed to Judah Alfakhar. Moreau and Lagre´e (1988, 178, n. 16) suggest that Meyer learned of the doctrine from Spinoza, who found it in the works of Alfakhar. Examination of the writings of Alfakhar reveals, however, only a superficial resemblance. It seems that Meyer had indeed forgotten (or perhaps prefers not to name) the source of the teaching he discusses here. See ‘‘Letters of Judah Alfakhar and David Kimhi,’’ translated with introduction and notes by Jacob Adler, in Studia Spinozana 11 (2000).

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words so clear as not to admit of more than one sense, as we have just shown. What is clear for him, another will judge obscure. As Stapleton says (Controvers., Book 10, ch. 3): ‘‘Manifest passages of Scripture are not manifest to all. What is manifest to one is obscure to another of slower intellect or of different attitude. ‘This is my body’ is clear for us, but obscure for Berenger, Wycliffe, Lutherans and Calvinists. ‘The Word was made flesh’ is clear to us, but obscure to Arians, Nestorians, Eutychians and Apollinarists.’’ And although for one man Scripture appears to teach dogmatically ( =2>?5@BACDE/FD ) that God is incorporeal, there are many others who will be brought to a contrary view through the same Scripture. Nor does the text cited prove anything, for the stupid and those of limited understanding who imagine God as corporeal will urge in reply that when Moses said ‘‘Take heed, for you have not seen a similitude,’’ etc., he intended only this, that there is no body to which God can be compared or likened. But let us grant that there is something in the Sacred Writings that is clear and perspicuous. If they were to assert that it declares dogmatically ( =2>?5@+ACDEGFD ) that ‘nothing is something’ or that ‘something is nothing’, must this still be understood literally just as it is, however much it is contrary to reason? Indeed, Let the Jew Apella believe it, Not I. . .,23 nor anyone of sound mind, nor even he himself. For whenever Scripture seems to contradict itself, he will be compelled to admit that one may use one’s reason to decide which passages are to be understood and interpreted literally and which are not so, and should be taken figuratively. Examples are, ‘‘God does not repent’’ (Num. 23, 19; 1 Sam. 15, 29, etc.), and ‘‘God repented 23.

Horace, Satires I, 5, v. 100. The quotation has been eliminated in the Dutch text.

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that he had made men’’ (Gen. 6, 6), and ‘‘The Lord repented of the evil which he had thought to do unto his people’’ (Exod. 32, 14). Many other instances of this kind are quite frequent. So I think that there will be no one so unreflecting as to use this means of escape as a remedy for the difficulty that confronts them in the above-mentioned rules; for there is nothing more evident in the Holy Writings, especially in the New Testament, and more habitual in Christ than to teach by using parables and figurative modes of speech. The Evangelist Mark (ch. 4, v. 33, 34) expressly bears witness to this in these words: ‘‘And with many such parables spake he (Jesus) unto them, as they were able to hear. But without a parable spake he not to them.’’ Therefore to deal with this difficulty other remedies will have to be sought and applied.24 It is indeed true that when Reformed theologians are engaged in explaining a text of the Holy Writings and in examining the interpretations of their opponents, they summon philosophy (as we noted above) to their assistance for this purpose and borrow from it principles known by the natural light and proven conclusions, by which they strengthen and confirm their exposition of an ambiguous passage. But when in their treatment of common places they have to make explicit their view as to the interpreter of Scripture, with one accord they withdraw this function from philosophy and assign it to Scripture, in theory denying what they affirm in practice. They do not see the numerous grave difficulties with which this doctrine is fraught,25 and the feeble and fallacious arguments by which it is supported, as we shall soon see.

24. 25.

This entire sentence is lacking in the Dutch version. Instead of ‘fraught’ the Dutch version has ‘fraught, as we have just seen,’.

Chapter XII 1. The thesis of the Reformed is not proved by Nehemiah 8, 9. 2. Nor by 2 Peter 1, 20. Having discussed at sufficient length, as I think, the thesis of the Reformed, let us now pass on to the reasons by which they eagerly support and defend it. While engaged in examining these reasons, I am sometimes struck with astonishment that such learned men, in other matters quite painstaking and keen-sighted, so subtle and strict in scrutinizing and demolishing their opponents’ arguments, should be so lax and slow-witted in propounding and supporting their own arguments, since these are so lacking in any kind of foundation or solidity. By their example they illustrate that saying of Christ (Luke 6, 42),1 ‘‘Men can see the mote in the eyes of others, but do not perceive the beam in their own eye.’’ I am surprised, too, that theologians toil under the burden of their own prejudices — which they above all others ought to have kept at a distance — in that they embrace an opinion which is preconceived and transmitted from their forefathers together with the supporting arguments without any scrutiny of the former or the latter. For even a superficial examination would have revealed the futility of the latter and the weakness of the former,2 and then they would have sought out the truth, and finding it, would have embraced it. This I hope, and am confident, they will yet do, along with me. But let us return from this diversion to our set path. We shall therefore divide their arguments, whose refutation we must here begin, into two classes. The first will contain their non-artificial arguments, that is, testimonies taken from the 1. 2.

The Dutch version cites Luke 6, 4. The Dutch version has, ‘revealed the futility of that opinion and the weakness of these arguments’.

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Holy Writings which the Reformed imagine support their thesis. The other consists of artificial arguments drawn from reason, on the analogy of faith, and from other sources. The principal passages quoted from Scripture are two, one from the Old Testament and the other from the New.3 [1] The passage from the Old Testament occurs in Nehemiah, ch. 8, v. 9, where it is narrated of Ezra and others that ‘Legebant librum illum, legem Dei explanate et exponendo sensum, dabant intelligentiam per Scripturam ipsam’ (They read that book, the Law of God, plainly, and by explaining the sense gave them understanding through Scripture itself). From this it is inferred that if at some previous time Scripture was explained through itself, it was justifiable for this to be done at the present time too. See Chamier, Panstrat. Catholic., Tom. 1, Book 16, ch. 6, section 10;4 Scarpius, Curs. Theologic., passage De Scriptur. Controv., 8; Alsted, Praecogn. Theolog., Book 2, ch. 95; and others. But we reply that this passage in the original Hebrew admits of other versions besides that which is here offered, which is that of Tremellius and Junius. For Piscator translates the last words, in which the main force of the argument resides, as ‘inter legendum’ (while reading), and in the scholia to this chapter he 3.

4.

For the translations which Meyer utilises, see Moreau and Lagre´e (1988, 189). He customarily quotes from Tremellius’ translation of the New Testament, and also from Tremellius’ Latin translation of the ‘Syriac version’ which he mentions. For the Old Testament, most quotations are from the version of Franc¸ois de Jon (Junius), which was published in 1580 (one year after that of Tremellius). Both translations also appeared in a single edition (two volumes: one for each of the Testaments): Biblia Sacra, ed. I. Tremellius and F. Junius (Hannover: C. Schleichius, 1618). A copy of this edition also existed in Spinoza’s own library. See the Catalogus van de Bibliotheek der Vereiniging het Spinozahuis te Rijnsburg (Leiden, 1965). Chamier, Panstratiae catholicae, vol. 1, Book 16, ch. 6 § 10 (entitled ‘‘Scripturae interpretandae certissimam rationem esse ab ipsa Scriptura’’) cites Nehemiah 8 using Tremellius’ translation.

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says that the Hebrew means ‘in lectione’ (in the course of reading). So, too, the old translator, following the Septuagint, did not translate ‘dabant intelligentiam per Scripturam ipsam’ (they gave them to understand through Scripture itself), but ‘intellexerunt quum legeretur’ (they understood when it was read). And Ravanellus in his Biblioteca sacra Titul. de Scriptur., Distinction. 7, Num. 7,5 declares that this version corresponds to the Hebrew text and can be admitted. Now since, as Ravanellus says in the passage cited, ‘‘when there are two interpretations, both agreeing with the text, it is proper for the translator to follow either without being at fault,’’ it follows that if the Reformed wished to quote this passage in support of their thesis, they ought to show clearly that their interpretation is the only authentic one. But as it is evident that their thesis acquires no corroboration from this source, let us examine the passage in its entirety. We must therefore take the text from the original Hebrew, thus: ‘Legebant in libro, in lege Dei, expanso, et cum attentione, et intellexerunt lectionem’. Vatablus interprets the passage in a fairly similar way, ‘Legerunt in libro ipso in lege Dei, explanate, et apposuerunt intellectum, et intellexerunt Scripturam ipsam’. The Syriac interpretation is almost in full agreement, ‘Dumque legerent librum legis Domini expansum, percipiebant eum et intelligebant lectionem eius’. The commentators on the vernacular version, made by order of the States of the United Provinces, do not diverge far from this; they translate the last part of the original text in the margin, ‘et apponendo intellectum, intellexerunt lectionem, hoc est, id quod legebatur, seu Scripturam, seu in congregatione’. And yet — this seemed to me surprising as I read it 5.

The title of the section (p. 563) is ‘‘On the Clarity of Scripture.’’ Peter Ravanel (died 1680) is the author of the Bibliotheca Sacra sive Thesaurus Scripturae Canonicae Amplissimus, which Bordoli (1997, 163) suggests that Meyer is using in many cases for both scriptural citations and for commentators. The work, whose first two volumes appeared in 1650, provides a lengthy listing of passages in the Old and New Testaments with both literal and figurative meanings.

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— in the actual text, except for the last phrase, they followed Tremellius and Junius. From all the above this is the sense that we gather: ‘‘Ezra and the others read in the book which was the Law of God and which was [and this is my opinion] spread out [expanso], that is, opened and unfolded,’’ although many have ‘explanate’ (plainly). For the Jews of that time did not have books of paper, bound in our fashion and divided into leaves and pages, but books that could be unrolled and rolled up. Like all the ancients generally, they used to write on tree-books, that is, on bark, which they closed by rolling them up and then opened by unrolling them. Hence the term ‘volumes’ (volumina, from volvo — to roll). A similar practice is continued among Jews of today, who preserve the Pentateuch in their temples in a form that can be rolled up and unrolled. So they used to read in a book that was unfolded in this way and laid open, and ‘‘they applied their intellect,’’ that is, they paid attention or were attentive, both as readers and as listeners, and they ‘‘understood the reading’’ or ‘‘that which was read,’’ that is, ‘‘they comprehended the meaning and the sense’’ — which again is applicable to both readers and listeners. Now if this was the authentic meaning of this passage, as we think, it is obvious that it does nothing for the case of the Reformed. [2] The second passage, which occurs in the New Testament, is from 2 Peter, ch. 1, v. 20, and goes as follows, ‘‘If you know this first, that no prophecy of Scripture is of private interpretation.’’ Chamier (Panstrat. Cathol., Tom. 1, Book 1, ch. 19, and Book 6, ch. 3, sections 1 and 2),6 and Polanus (Syntagm. Theol., Book 1, ch. 45, qu. 6, med. 1), Walaeus (Loc. Comm. Theol., passage De Scriptur. Interpret.), Fayus (Enchirid. Theol. Disp., 26, Thes. 8, 9, 10), and others think that by these words the Apostle teaches that the Scriptures should not be explained 6.

Chapter 19 is entitled ‘‘De prophetiae proprie interpretatione.’’ Chapter 3 of Book 6 is a refutation of Stapleton, and cites 2 Peter 1 to justify the claim that the faithful have the right and ability to understand Scripture themselves.

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according to one’s own mind and private meaning which anyone can fashion for himself and impose on Scripture. The Scriptures should be explained in the same spirit as that in which they were first set out, that is, in accordance with the dictation of the Holy Spirit — as they gather from the lines following, for the Apostle adds, ‘‘For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but the holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit.’’ From this it can be deduced that all interpretation must be made according to the Scriptures. ‘‘For since whatever Epilysis (explanation) is produced [I quote Chamier]7 should be from the Holy Spirit, it must necessarily have as its source an inspiration that is either ordinary or extraordinary. But we no longer expect extraordinary inspiration, and it is a long time since the Church distanced itself from the prophecies of the Enthusiasts along with the paraclete of Montanus. So there remains ordinary Inspiration which, as no one will deny, is not to be sought from Scripture.’’ It is this seeking that he later calls a careful comparison of passages. we reply, firstly, that, as Walaeus notes, some read not  But    

 

´
 (explanation) but ´
(impetus),8 and among these is Calvin himself (as Beze remarks in his notes on this passage) who interprets it as ‘impulsus’ (impulsion) or ‘instinctus’ (instinct),9 and writes that he is well satisfied with this interpretation. even if we retain the common reading  Secondly, ´
  ,10 this word sometimes denotes impetus. So whether the former reading or the latter meaning is adopted, Peter’s words have a slightly different sense and should be turned thus, ‘‘No prophecy of Scripture is of of private instinct or impetus’’; that is 7. 8. 9. 10.

Vol. 1, Book 1, chap. 19 § 7, takes as an example the inspiration by which Daniel was able to understand and interpret the dreams of the king. The Greek is transliterated in the Dutch version. The Dutch version has ‘impulsion or stimulus’ and omits the Latin terms. Transliterated in the Dutch version.

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to say, the prophets in their pronouncements did not speak or write from their own prompting or impulse. And that this is the meaning of this passage is affirmed unhesitatingly by Nicol. Hemmingius, commenting on this passage in these words: ‘‘The word ´ is ambiguous in Greek, signifying sometimes impetus or impulsion, sometimes interpretation. But the antithesis clearly indicates here that it should be taken as impetus, by which men are carried away or driven to say or do something. It is opposed to the Holy Spirit, which is the author of prophecy, and this is shown by three considerations: the invariable consensus of the Prophets, the certitude of their predictions, and the wonderful miracles whereby the truth of their prophecies is sealed. To this may be added the approval of Christ and the Apostles. So Peter is not speaking here of interpretation, but of the certitude of prophecy.’’ Marloratus is in agreement when he says, ‘‘The meaning of words may be two-fold. To the Greeks the word ´  , signifies movement and impetus just as well as interpretation. Thus almost all accept. . ., etc. However, the second sense seems simpler, so that Peter is saying that Scripture was not produced by man or by human impulsion’. And a little further on, ‘So Peter bids us above all to have faith in the prophecies as the indubitable oracles of God, since they did not issue from merely human movement.’’ Such, then, are the views of Hemmingius and Marloratus, and it will also be clearly evident from what we have yet to say that their explication fits perfectly with what has preceded and with what follows. Thirdly, the word ´ (explication) perhaps does not here denote ‘the investigation and exposition of true meaning’ with which the commentators of the Holy Books are concerned, but ‘interpretation’ which the Prophets, in their capacity as God’s envoys and conveyors of the divine utterances, employed in the task of publicising their prophecies, by which they proclaimed and made known to mankind, not their own opinions and the figments of their own brains but the counsels of the Almighty, not what was dictated by their own mind but what was put into their

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mind by the Spirit of God. That this is the meaning of this word in this passage emerges quite clearly from the entire context of the Apostle. For he had previously said (v. 16), ‘‘For we have not followed cunningly devised fables when we made known to you the power and the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye-witnesses of his majesty, and heard a voice come down from heaven, bearing witness to his honour and glory,’’ and ‘‘he held for sure the prophetic announcement concerning the coming of Christ, his majesty and power,’’ etc.11 The assurance and certainty of this he proves from the fact that, ‘No prophecy of Scripture is of its own explanation’, that is, it does not proceed from the human brain of the Prophets, which is subject to error and hallucination, as he himself makes clear and confirms when adding, ‘‘For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit.’’ Hence Cajetan, too, says of this passage, ‘‘He here touches upon the difference between scientific writings and prophetic writings. A learned man teaches and writes, in accordance with his own interpretation, what he sees in the light of the active intellect, whereas a Prophet says and writes what he sees in the light of divine revelation, and not in accordance with the interpretation of his own judgment.’’12 The Venerable Bede does not distance himself from these words when he comments on this passage as follows, ‘‘None of the holy Prophets preached the doctrines of life to peoples according to his own interpretation; what they had learnt from the Lord, this they urged their listeners to act upon. And the celestial mysteries they had perceived in secret, they delivered to the people of God quite simply either by speech or in writing, unlike the divines of the pagans who delivered to their crowds of dupes what they had fashioned from their own hearts, as if they were responses13 of a divine oracle.’’ 11. 12.

As is almost always the case, Meyer is here providing a re´sume´ of the text (possibly from memory) rather than quoting it. Meyer takes this quotation directly from Chamier, vol. 1, Book 19 § 4.

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In the same way Erasmus, in his Annotationes in Novum Testamentum, says of this passage, ‘‘The Greek word  ´ 14 derives from the verb ‘to loosen’, appropriate to things that are entangled; or else from the verb ‘to go to, to undertake’, which better agrees with that which follows. For it was not of their own will that they undertook to give voice to prophecies, but through the impulsion of the Spirit.’’ And again Dionysius the Carthusian on the same passage, ‘‘Every prophecy in Scripture, that is, every prophecy contained in Holy Scripture, comes not from individual interpretation; that is to say, it is not revealed through human invention, nor is it discovered by the particular sense of the Prophets.’’ Therefore, whether the one or the other or both significations of the word ´    which we have already considered were intended by the Prophet,15 the Reformed can draw nothing from this passage to support their thesis. However, let us be generous and grant them that the word ´ !    here means ‘indication of the true sense’; one can still not infer from this that Scripture is its own interpreter, but rather the contrary. For when the Prophet writes, ‘‘No prophecy of Scripture is of its own interpretation,’’ the word ‘propriae’ (its own) does not refer to interpreters, for no mention has been made of them nor does the word ‘interpreter’ occur anywhere in the preceding verses. It must refer to prophecy or the Prophets; and so the sense will be — No prophecy of Scripture, or (if by prophecy of Scripture, Scripture itself is to be understood) no Scripture must be interpreted through itself or by Prophets. This certainly clashes head-on with their thesis. And yet the Syriac version seems to favour this meaning of the passage, ‘‘Knowing this before all, that every prophecy is not the explication of its own writing.’’ The Arabic version is even clearer, ‘‘Knowing this before all, that every prophecy of Scripture does not itself explicate its own sense.’’ 13. 14. 15.

For ‘responses’ the Dutch version has ‘advice’. Transliterated in the Dutch version. The Dutch version has ‘intended by the Apostle,’.

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But although we may again grant that the word ‘propriae’ (one’s own) does refer to interpreters, and that in this passage the Apostle intends to teach that the Scriptures must not be explained according to the interpreter’s own mind but in accordance with the dictation of the Holy Spirit, this still does not ratify their claim that Scripture is its own interpreter. For — apart from the fact that there is here no consequential relation, nor does proof come from what we reported above from Chamier regarding the ordinary Inspiration of the Holy Spirit to be sought from Scripture — even he who interprets the Word of God through true philosophy can quite rightly be said to explain it not from his own mind and individual sense but by the dictation of the Holy Spirit,16 as is clear from chapters 5 and 6. And so from this some light is brought to prove our thesis. But we have dwelt too long on this. The other passages of Scripture which are brought forward we pass over, as being of so little weight that anyone can easily perceive their insignificance. Such are John 10, 34, where Christ defends himself against the Jews by quoting a passage from the Old Testament. Also Acts 17, v. 11, where the Beraeenses are said to have examined the Scripture to see whether what Paul preached was in fact so. And Acts 9, v. 22, where Paul is said (according to Beza’s version) to have confounded the Jews with his proof by comparing testimonies.17 And others of that kind.

16. 17.

This is a peculiar interpretation of Descartes’ lumen naturale, and one with which Descartes did not agree. The Dutch version has, ‘. . . to have convinced Jews with his proof by supporting testimonies’.

Chapter XIII The principal arguments by which the Reformed attempt to prove that Holy Scripture is its own interpreter are set out and answered. We come now to the arguments of the second class which, as we have said, are sought from reason, on the analogy of faith, from the dispositions of Scripture, and from other sources. They are:1 [1] ‘‘All controversies concerning matters of faith should be decided and adjudicated from Scripture. But every interpretation of Scripture is some kind of controversy concerning matters of faith. Therefore every interpretation of Scripture should be decided and adjudicated from Scripture.’’ Thus Chamier argues in his Panstrat. Cathol., Tom. 1, Book 1, ch. 6: ‘‘The major premise,’’ he says, ‘‘has been discussed at length and demonstrated in Book 1. The minor premise is self-evident. For example, if you are required to explain ‘This is my body’, whatever sense you assign to it is bound to support one section of the contending parties. If you understand it as ‘This is transubstantiated into the body of Christ’ or ‘This is the sacrament of the body of Christ’, you are supporting the Papists. If you understand it as ‘This bread is locally joined to the body of Christ’, you are siding with the Lutherans. If you understand it as ‘This is the bare and empty sign of the body of Christ’, or ‘This is the sacrament of the body of Christ’, you are going over to the Anabaptists. If finally you understand it as ‘This bread is the body of Christ’, you are betaking yourself to the bosom of the Universal Church. So the principle used for judging between these controversies 1.

The Dutch version provides no section numbers, but clearly distinguishes the different arguments. So, for instance, where the English version has ‘[4]’, the Dutch has, ‘‘Het vierde bewijs zy. . .’’

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will also show and confirm the true and legitimate meaning of these words. It is agreed that these controversies are adjudicated from Scripture. So why is it not agreed that this sense is explained by Scripture?’’ To make a satisfactory reply to this argument we must take into consideration a twofold distinction. The first is that the word ‘Scripture’ can be taken either formally or materially. In the material sense it signifies the words, expressions, modes of speech and sentences which the Prophets, Evangelists, Apostles and the other writers of the Holy Books used in transcribing the divine utterances. In the formal sense it denotes the intention which these same sacred authors wished to express by these words and the meaning they had in mind when they wrote those words. The second distinction is this, that the phrase ‘matters of faith’ may be taken in a broad sense or in a strict sense. If taken in a strict sense, it comprises only things that are necessary to believe for salvation; these are commonly called Articles of Faith, and are contained in summary form in the Symbol of the Apostles. Taken in a broad sense, it includes everything that can in any way be referred to the Faith. With these preliminaries completed, we concede the major premise, but with this distinction — that all controversies concerning matters of faith (that is, matters necessary to be believed for salvation) ought to be decided and adjudicated by Scripture, that is, by the true sense of Scripture (for we think that no other sense is intended by Chamier’s proof in Book 1). We deny the minor premise, to wit, that the interpretation of Scripture — that is, the words, expressions, etc., of Scripture — is some kind of controversy concerning matters of faith, at least, strictly speaking. For neither the words, expressions, etc., of Scripture nor their interpretation (as is obvious) constitute an article of faith or a controversy concerning the same, nor does anyone regard them in that light, or can so regard them, as far as I know. For, as is generally agreed, all the dogmas of the Faith which a Christian has to know for his salvation must be sought from the authentic and legitimate sense of Scripture alone. But since the sense is

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known through interpretation, interpretation must precede the sense, and thus also the dogmas; therefore it can by no means be ranked among them. Then again, the reasoning is circular. For it is from the true sense of Scripture that the articles of faith are derived and the controversies surrounding them decided and settled; yet that sense comes from the interpretation of words. So if interpretation were an article of faith or a controversy about one, it would also have to be derived or resolved from the true sense of Scripture; and since the latter is constructed from the interpretation of words, the interpretation of words would be derived or resolved from itself — than which nothing could be more absurd. Furthermore, as to the proof of the minor premise, this amounts to nothing. For although he who shows and demonstrates the authentic meaning of the saying, ‘This is my body’, will thereby also be able to resolve and adjudicate the controversy as to how ‘Christ’s body’ must be taken in the Holy Eucharist, it does not follow that the interpretation of Scripture is a controversy about matters of faith. There are two problems here to be distinguished — how the body of Christ must be understood in the Holy Supper, and in what sense the proposition ‘This is my body’ is to be interpreted. The former, if it contains something necessary to believe for salvation, must be determined from the true sense of Scripture; while the latter is by no means a controversy about matters of faith, strictly speaking. That is why Chamier is wrong in concluding that the principle for the adjudication of controversies about matters of faith in the strict sense shows and confirms the legitimate sense of the words of Scripture, while on the other hand the true and legitimate sense of the words of Scripture is the unique norm and principle for the adjudication of controversies concerning matters of faith.2 [2] Secondly, ‘‘If Scripture is authentic, perfect and lucid, therefore it is the best and the most certain interpreter of itself. But the former is true; therefore so is the latter.’’ Thus does 2.

Chamier, Book 16, 6 § 2.

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Chamier again argue in the cited passage, section 3. And on his side is Whittaker, who says, (Disputat. de Scriptura S., controvers. 1, qu. 5, cap. 8, argum. 14), ‘‘The parts of the antecedent argument have been demonstrated by so many full controversies. The consequence is self-manifest. For if Scripture is perfect, it must necessarily contain what pertains to faith. But whatever is necessary for its interpretation pertains to faith. Therefore this must be contained in it.’’ To this argument we reply by conceding the antecedent (since its main force seems here to be concerned with the perfection of Scripture, as is evident from the proof of its consequent; otherwise it could be denied in respect of its perspicuity — please see what we said above on chapter 11, 6) and by denying the consequence. As regards its proof, we say — as a result of the distinction concerning matters of faith made in reply to the preceding argument — that if by ‘whatever pertains to faith’ we must understand the dogmas necessary to be known for salvation (it is only in respect of these that the Reformed assert Scripture to be perfect), we concede the major premise, but deny the minor. For ‘whatever is necessary for the interpretation of Scripture’ cannot be regarded as in this category, far less the interpretation itself, as we have already shown in refuting the earlier argument. But if what is understood is ‘the things that concern the Faith in any way whatsoever, and can be reduced thereto’, then on the contrary we concede the minor premise but deny the major, since it has never been proved in this sense either by Chamier or by any theologian who sides with him. [3] ‘‘If the interpretation of Scripture is to be done in accordance with 
 ’  


 (the analogy of faith),3 it must therefore be done in accordance with Scripture, too. But the first is true; therefore so is the second.’’ This is once again the argument of Chamier, loc. cit., section 4, and he goes on: ‘‘The antecedent is evident from Paul, Romans 12, 6,4 ‘Having gifts differing according to the grace that is given us, if it is

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prophecy, let us prophesy    ’  !" #$%&('$)*+,& ’ — according to our proportion of faith.’’ He rejects the interpretation of others,5 namely, ‘that each man has a mode of revelation according to the proportion of his faith’, that is, in accord with the measure of his faith,6 and says that a far more fitting sense of the passage would be that ‘‘each man in prophesying, that is, in searching out the mysteries of doctrine, should always strive to remember the proportion of faith, that is, the doctrine concerning faith. The consequence scarcely needs illustration, except against Papists who wrongly interpret the Rule of Faith [and this, too, he understands by the analogy of faith] so as to include unwritten traditions.’’ But other theologians draw from this passage of Paul not an argument but a rule or means of interpretation, like this: ‘‘Every interpretation of Scripture must be guided and directed on the analogy of faith.’’ Analogy of faith is for them the constant and unvarying sentiment of Scripture in the clear and least obscure passages from which the fundamental dogmas of the Christian religion are sought, a summary of which is to be found in the Symbolum of the Apostles, in the Decalogue, in the Dominical Prayer, and in what is transmitted to us from the entire Catechism. See Whittaker, Disput. de Scriptura Sacra contra huius temporis Papistas, Controv. 1, qu. 5, cap. 11, med. 7: Scarpius, Curs. Theolog., passage ‘De Sacra Scriptura’, Regula 9, secund. gener. 1; Polanus, Syntagm. Theolog., Book 1, cap. 45, qu. 6, med. 19,7 of those things that should be employed in meditation; Zanchi, Tractat. de Sacra Scriptur., qu. 12, cap. 3, caus. 6, ‘obscuritat. Scripturae’; Beze on the same passage; and others. But we reply: if by - ’  !" #$.&/'$)*+,& 8 we under4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

The Dutch version has Romans 16, 6. Specifically, the interpretations of Bellarmine, St. Anselm, and Cajetanus. The Dutch version has ‘mate des gheloofs’. The Dutch version cites med. 10 instead. The Dutch version provides neither the Greek nor its transliteration, but translates as ‘de gelijckvormigheydt des geloofs’.

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stand the principle, rule and canon of faith, which is Scripture itself, the major premise appears ridiculous, as being a tautology. But if it means ‘proportion of the doctrine of faith’,9 as it appears in the catechism of the Reformed, the antecedent is absurd, since the doctrine as a whole must be derived from no other source than the true sense of the Holy Writings. But if it means ‘the constant and unvarying sentiment of Scripture in its clear passages’, this has been abundantly refuted in chapter 11. If, finally, one must understand it as ‘the Symbolum of the Apostles, the Decalogue and the Lord’s Prayer’, it is in part absurd, in part already refuted, since the first must be confirmed and deduced from Scripture, while the latter are parts of Scripture itself. The passage from Paul, which is quoted as proof of the antecedent, proves nothing, for the word ‘prophetemus’ is not found in the Greek but was introduced by Beze (whose version is followed by Chamier) and it is in the subjunctive mood. The rest of the interpretation is modified to suit this, thus making Paul appear to order or persuade, whereas he simply affirms in the indicative (this is Erasmus’ translation, from which the Vulgate does not much differ) that, ‘‘We are one body in Christ. We are each members one of another, but possessing different gifts in accordance with the grace granted to us, or prophecy in accordance with our portion of faith, or ministry in the administration,’’. . , etc. Hence it is evident that by 01243 ’ 23 576 89:372;01<>=9?0@A< 10 one should not understand ‘proportion of the doctrine of faith’ nor ‘rule of faith’ nor anything of the kind, as Chamier would have it, but in fact that which he rejects, ‘the measure of his faith, that is, the faith which each has’, as appears in the Syriac version and is approved by Wolgangus Musculus in his commentaries on this passage. Or else ‘the measure of our knowledge by which we know God and matters divine from Scripture’, as Piscator says in his scholia on this passage, where he disproves and rejects Chamier’s previous exposition of this passage as spurious and inauthentic. 9. 10.

The Dutch version has ‘conform to the doctrine of faith’. The Greek is transliterated in the Dutch version.

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Beze and Pareus also admit this interpretation, as likewise Martyr (Beze refers to him)11 in the passage cited, and Chrysostom: ‘‘Although it (prophecy) is also a grace, it is not spread abroad in a uniform way, but takes its measure from those who receive it, and flows in only to the extent that it finds a receptacle of faith to receive it.’’ And Ambrose, too, ‘‘It [prophecy] is given according to the capacity of the receiver, that is, to the extent that is required by the cause for which it is given’. And Jerome, ‘according to the faith which is given and granted to each by God.’’ And Theodoretus, ‘‘He who is the giver of good things measures his grace according to each one’s faith.’’ That is why Erasmus paraphrases this passage, ‘‘The gift of prophecy in the explication of the mysteries of Scripture is allotted according to the measure of faith, which alone, and not their other merits, God regards, with no cause for pride, since he communicates his good to others.’’12 However, even if one admits the earlier version of Beze and his insertion, it has still to be demonstrated that prophecy and prophesying do not here denote prediction and the predicting of the future — as Musculus explains in this passage — but interpretation and interpreting, and that ‘analogy of faith’ here denotes Scripture itself. I cannot believe that this is so easily done. Finally, on the question of the consequence, something could still be said for a different acceptation of the major premise. But I think I have done enough to break the force of this argument. [4] ‘‘Whatever it is that explains matters divine most lucidly and most manifestly, it is from this that the interpretation of Scripture must be sought. But Scripture itself explains matters divine most lucidly and most manifestly. Therefore Holy Scrip11. 12.

The reference is to Peter Martyr Vermigli, but the Dutch version has ‘and according to the latter’ (referencing Pareus instead). The Dutch version is slightly different: ‘‘He received the gift of prophecy in the explication of the mysteries of Scripture according to the measure of faith, and this alone is considered by God, and not the other merits, so that he, without vanity, communicates his good to others.’’

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ture interprets itself.’’ Thus does Polanus argue (Syntagm. Theolog., Book 1, cap. 45, qu. 7, arg. 1), and Alsted (Praecognit. Theolog., Book 2, cap. 95). The former proves the minor premise thus, ‘‘because it is the voice of God, than which no voice can be clearer or more manifest.’’ The latter expresses himself with this comparison, ‘‘Just as there is no need for anyone to lend light to the sun, so there is no need for us to bring in light from elsewhere to add to the brilliant light of the Holy Writings.’’ We reply by making a distinction. The word ‘exponere’ denotes either ‘to set out, declare, manifest’, or ‘to explicate or interpret’. Then again, the phrase ‘matters divine’ may mean either ‘things which man must know for his salvation, the dogmas of faith’, or ‘discourse concerning such matters’. So if ‘res divinas exponere’ means ‘to convey and set out matters necessary to be known for salvation’, we concede the minor premise but deny the consequence of the major. For the conveying and the treating of certain matters in a most lucid and most manifest way does not include the interpretation of itself, or of a book dealing with these same matters. But if we are to understand it as ‘the interpreting of discourse concerning the articles of faith, or the interpreting of Scripture’ — and this is the sense in which these words must be taken so that a conclusion that solves the problem can legitimately be drawn — we accept the major premise but deny the minor; for we have demonstrated the contrary in chapter 11, and the proof offered is insufficient. For even if we concede — though quite improperly — that Scripture can be called the voice of God and that no other book treats of matters divine more lucidly and more manifestly, it does not follow that ‘it explains matters divine most lucidly and most manifestly’, that is, that it interprets discourse on the articles of faith, or Scripture; since the clarity of the composition of a book does not prove that it is the interpreter of other books or of itself. The only thing that is proved is this, that Scripture is the clearest and most manifest exposition of matters divine (on which our opinion has been given in chapter 11), and not that it is the interpreter of discourse concerning the articles of faith, which is the only question at issue.

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[5] ‘‘Scripture itself can make a man wise, unto salvation’’ (2 Timothy 3, 15). Such is again the argument of Polanus and Alsted in the cited passages. But we deny the consequence. For we are not so lynx-eyed13 as to be able to see how, from the proposition that the understanding of Holy Scripture can make a man wise unto salvation, it follows that Scripture is its own interpreter. [6] ‘‘Scripture, being inspired by God, serves in a divine way for instruction and refutation; therefore it also serves to teach its own true sense and to rebut any false sense.’’ This is once again the argument of Polanus and Alsted in the cited passages. Once more we deny the consequence. For Scripture does not draw out from itself its own true sense, or rebut a false sense drawn out by others, however serviceable we grant its comprehension to be in teaching the true dogmas of faith and refuting the false; for that is how the antecedent should be limited. If it is taken in a wider sense, so that this utility of Scripture is extended so as to embrace the teaching of all that is true and the refuting of all that is false, this will be false, as is quite obvious. [7] ‘‘The sense of Scripture is Scripture itself, as Jerome correctly writes with reference to the Epistle to the Galatians. The Gospel does not reside in the words of Scripture but in its sense; it lies not on the surface but in the marrow; not in the leaves of discourse but in the root of reason.’’ This is another argument of Polanus, loc. cit.. To this we reply once again by denying the consequence. For in no way can we follow the reasoning here. [8] ‘‘Scripture teaches the way14 to interpret itself. This it does by examples; for there are two ways of teaching, one by rules or precepts, the other by examples.’’ Polanus (whose argument this is) produces examples of interpretation in Scripture itself — Matthew, ch. 2, v. 17, 18, 23; ch. 3, v. 3; ch. 4, v. 13, 14, 13. 14.

This phrase ‘sharp-eyed’ is in the Dutch version. In the Latin text, ‘modum’, and in the Dutch ‘mate en middel’.

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15, 16; ch. 5, where the Decalogue is set out; and ch. 8, v. 16, 17. And other examples are to be found in great number in the New Testament. Indeed, he says that the whole of the New Testament is an interpretation of the Old Testament. Thus does Paul interpret his own words (Romans 10, 8). Similarly, he interprets Scripture through Scripture (Romans 13, 9). To this argument we reply by denying the consequence. For a writing that transmits a way of explaining itself does not thereby explain itself through itself; for it may transmit a way of explaining itself through something else. The argument would be a cogent one if Scripture either taught that it should be interpreted through itself or else provided the way of interpreting itself through itself. Of these the author meant the second, or perhaps both, as seems to be suggested by what he adduces as proof, ‘Paul interpreted Scripture through Scripture’. But then the antecedent is denied, nor is it proved by the examples he produces. The earlier ones report that certain prophecies about Christ have been fulfilled; in the later ones certain passages of the Old Testament are explained, but not through other passages, which should have been the case in order to prove what he aimed to prove. [9] ‘‘He who is the author of Scripture, the supreme lawgiver and teacher of the Church is also the supreme and infallible interpreter of Scripture. God alone is the author of Scripture, the supreme lawgiver and doctor of the Church. Therefore. . .,’’ etc. This argument is used by Alting (Scriptor Theolog., Tom. 1, part 2, loc. 2 ‘de Forma Scripturae’, controvers. 2), by Whittaker (Disput. de Scriptura s., controvers. 1, qu. 5, cap. 8),15 and Walaeus (Loc. Comm. 5 Theolog. loc. de Scripturae Sanctae Interpretatione). The first-named says, ‘‘The major premise is obvious, for every man is the best interpreter of his own words, and it is the lawgiver who best explains the meaning of the law. The minor premise is supported by the clear testimonies of Scripture: 15.

Whittaker’s argument is that, since God alone has produced Scripture, and since the legislator has the supreme power to interpret law, God is the final interpreter.

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1 Timothy 3, v. 16; James 4, v. 12; Matthew 23, v. 8, 10, and ch. 17, v. 5.’’ We reply that what ought to be proved is not proved, that is, that Scripture is its own interpreter. No one denies that God is the infallible interpreter of Scripture. But if one goes further and says that Scripture is the voice of God, and so when it is also proved that God is the interpreter of Scripture, it is also proved that Scripture is its own interpreter, we reply that the consequence is void. For an author may compose two or more treatises without one being automatically the interpreter of another or some of others, or some being the interpreters of themselves. [10] The last argument — ‘‘The supreme and infallible interpreter of Scripture is one who never errs in interpreting, is not guided by partisan zeal, and leaves no ground for appeal. These qualities apply only to the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture and therefore to Scripture. Therefore, . .,’’ etc. Thus again does Alting argue, and in almost the same way Whittaker16 and Walaeus in the cited passages. ‘‘The consequence of the major premise is sound,’’ asserts Alting, ‘‘because he who errs or can err, and likewise he who is guided by partisan zeal which blinds the mind, is not infallible, and he who leaves ground for appeal is subject to higher authority and therefore cannot be supreme. The minor premise is proved by the fact that the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture, and thus Scripture itself, is truth itself. It is no respecter of persons, has no superior, and is the alpha and omega, the first and the last.’’ We reply by denying the minor premise, to wit, that the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture, or Scripture itself, is an interpreter that never errs, etc. As to the proof, we say that it merely demonstrates that the Holy Spirit or Scripture never errs, that it is not guided by partisan zeal and that it leaves no ground for appeal, all of which we freely concede. But it does not prove that it is the interpreter, which is here the only point at issue. Our answers to these ten arguments are enough, we think, 16.

Whittaker, quaestio 5, ch. 8, arg. 8.

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to reveal how feeble is the reasoning by which the Reformed endeavour to establish their thesis. As for other arguments that may be found in writers, they may easily be answered in the same way. So we pass on to the second part17 of the thesis maintained by the Reformed.

17.

The Dutch has ‘het ander deel’ (the other part).

Chapter XIV 1.

What is the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit, and what forms does it take? 2. What is its ordinary form? It is not as maintained by theologians.

[1] The Reformed, as we explained from their own writings in chapter 10, besides maintaining that Holy Scripture is its own interpreter, attribute its own particular role, and an important one too,1 in this matter to the Holy Spirit, namely, that its testimony seals the true interpretation internally in the minds of the faithful, with full conviction. Holy Scripture, it is claimed, is alone the external norm for interpretation, leading the way to that 
   (certitude).2 In order to bring to light the difficulties involved in this opinion — leaving aside those already raised, one might ask its proponents what is to be understood and denoted by the internal testimony or the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit, for those words can be taken in many ways. If they reply that they mean that no one can be completely certain of the meaning of the Holy Writings, from whatever source derived3 or by whatever means investigated, unless he perceives its truth clearly and distinctly by the natural light of his intellect and is intimately conscious of that perception within himself — which is required in every case of certainty beyond any doubt — if this clear and distinct perception together with its consciousness is what they call the internal persuasion and the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, then 1. 2. 3.

The Dutch version has ‘the most important one too’. The Dutch version has neither Greek nor transliteration, but rather ‘internal certitude’. The Dutch has ‘from where it is obtained’.

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they will hold the same opinion as we do, as is readily apparent from what we have already said in chapters 5 and 6.4 But if they say they do not mean the natural light of the intellect or that which is built on it, but the supernatural light of the Spirit, not innate in reason but adventitious, not included in the mind and acquired but infused and breathed in, by whose rays the mind, being thereby illuminated and strengthened, acquiesces in that which is enjoined on it, I again put to them this question — since they maintain that the inspiration of the Holy Spirit is of two kinds, ordinary and extraordinary, do they mean the former or the latter? All are agreed that the extraordinary light of the Divine Spirit shone upon the Prophets, Evangelists, Apostles and the other writers of the Holy Books in their task of understanding and interpreting God’s Word. ‘‘To them,’’ says Polanus, ‘‘the Holy Spirit revealed, through a direct revelation without toil and trouble, the true meaning of Scripture.’’ ‘‘No more of this is now expected [these are Chamier’s words], and it is long since that the Church bade farewell to the prophecies of the Enthusiasts, along with the paraclete of Montanus.’’5 So they must be referring to ordinary inspiration. [2] But, in fact, what for them is the ordinary light of the Holy Spirit — dictation,6 testimony, inspiration, persuasion? Chamier (Panstrat. Catholic., Tom. 1, Book 1, ch. 19, section 8)7 asserts that ordinary inspiration must be ‘sought from Scripture’, and later he writes in section 13 that it is ‘the careful com4. 5.

6.

7.

The Dutch version has ‘said about philosophy in section 6 of chapter 5’. See chapter 11 § 2 concerning the distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ inspiration of the Holy Spirit: also Chamier, Panstratiae Catholicae, Book 1, ch. 19 § 7. I.e., a ‘dictation’ by God to the authors of the text, who acted as secretaries only. The Latin version has ‘dictamen’, and the Dutch ‘voorspelling, voorschrift’. In § 8 Chamier is arguing both against the thesis of extraordinary inspiration and against the ‘papist’ thesis on the authority of the Magisterium and Councils.

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parison of passages’. The same view is taken by Polanus (Syntagm. Theol., Book 1, ch. 45, qu. 4). From the fact that ‘‘. . . Bellarmine declares in Book 3 of his De Verbo Dei, ch. 3, section 11, that Scripture must be explained according to the dictation of the Holy Spirit, he concludes that it must be explained according to the Scriptures, and not according to the private dictation of a Spirit outside the Scriptures.’’ In agreement with these two, I believe, are also those who assign interpretation of the Scriptures to ‘the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture’, or ‘Scripture, which is the voice of the Holy Spirit’, writers many of whom we reviewed in chapter 10.8 But if this is what they intend to be denoted by their ordinary light, or dictation, of the Spirit, they are falling back to a question that has already been refuted, and there is nothing different from that in what they are proposing; so it would have been quite enough for them to maintain that Scripture is its own interpreter. However, in fact they seem to mean something else, a kind of illumination of the intellect and a working of the Holy Spirit by which the faithful are inwardly persuaded of the true and authentic sense of the Holy Writings. Chamier (Panstrat. Catholic., Tom. 1, Book 16, cap. 1) when disputing against Bellarmine and others9 on the subject of ‘‘the Spirit by which the Scriptures are to be understood’, maintains that this Spirit is not ‘the impetus of a mere man who, girding himself for the task of reading and interpreting the Scriptures, fashions as he pleases entirely by his own efforts a sense which he then attributes10 to the Holy Books. 8.

9. 10.

Whittaker is cited, as well as Tilenus and Scarpius. See Bordoli (1997, 169): ‘‘La formalizzazione dommatica dell’internum Spiritus sancti testimonium, cui Meyer si riferisce, si trova nella scolastica riformata (ad esempio Gerhard, Loci Theologici, 1885, I, 36, fonda su di esso, identificato con il vivente experiri del Cristo, l’auctoritas della Scrittura). Piu` sfumata la posizione dei riformatori: Lutero, ad esempio, dialettizza molto gli a¨usserlichen e gli innerlichen Stu¨cke (Werke XVIII 136).’’ Chamier is arguing against both Bellarmine and Stapleton. The Dutch version has ‘toevoeght’ (adjoins).

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It is the special efficacy coming from the Holy Spirit and adapted to each of the faithful which brings it about that he understands Scripture, that is, he grasps the true and authentic sense.’’11 Scarpius (Curs. Theolog. loc. de Sacra Scriptura, controvers. 8 contra Pontificios, argum. 2): ‘‘The perception of the true sense comes through the illumination of the Holy Spirit,’’ which (argument 1) he seems to call ‘the internal testimony’ by which Scripture is recognised as possessing divine authority. This is also confirmed by what Chamier says (Panstrat. Catholic., Tom. 1, Book 6, ch. 1, sections 5 and 7). He wished to refute the calumny of the Catholics12 who ‘‘cry out that the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit which engraves in their hearts the authority of Scripture and carries conviction is nothing else but the private spirit of pride,13 common to all heretics of our times, who chatter a great deal about special and extraordinary revelations and ´     [enthusiasms].’’14 Chamier replies that the Reformed ‘‘. . . are not here dreaming about something extraordinary; they simply recognise something that is in all the other articles of faith, namely, that we have need, absolutely, of the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit so that we may give assent in full faith to the Holy Books.’’ In the same sense Calvin too (Institution. Relig. Christian., Book 1, cap. 7, section 4) says,15 ‘‘One must seek this persuasion at a higher level than is attainable by human reasoning, or judgment, or conjecture; namely, from the secret testimony of the Spirit.’’ And a little further on, ‘‘I reply that the testimony of the Spirit is of higher excellence than any reasoning. For just as God alone is a proper witness of himself in his discourse so too 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Chamier, Panstratiae Catholicae, Book 1, chap. 16 § 6. Chamier, Panstratiae Catholicae, Book 1, chap. 16 § 7: it is Stapleton who is being attacked. The Dutch version has ‘Papists’. The Dutch version has ‘vanity’. In the Dutch version the Greek does not appear and is not transliterated. The reference and quotation (a re´sume´) come from Chamier, Book 1, chap. 16 § 7.

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that discourse will not find faith in the hearts of men until it is sealed by the inner testimony of the Spirit.’’ See also Zanchi, Tractat. de Sacr. Scriptur., qu. 2, part. 4, prop. 7; Walaeus, Locor. Theol. de Scriptura Sacr. Autorit.; Scarpius, Curs. Theolog. loc. de Scriptur. Controvers. 6; Alting, Oper. Theolog. part 1, loc. 2; and Polanus, Syntagm. Theolog., Book 1, ch. 16, who defines this internal testimony of the Holy Spirit as ‘‘. . . the internal revelation of the Holy Spirit which, by internal inspiration, teaches us in our hearts in such a way as effectively to persuade us to believe firmly that holy Scripture, as we have it in the books of the Apostles and the Prophets, is truly and indubitably the Word of God.’’ If we modify the last words as follows, ‘to believe firmly that the meaning of Scripture, whether discovered by our own efforts or taught us by another, is undoubtedly true and authentic’, this definition will include what, in my judgment, the Reformed theologians intend to indicate by the internal persuasion of the holy Spirit with regard to the true meaning of Scripture. [3] But, to give my frank opinion, I have to say that although I hear the words of this definition, I fail to grasp its sense and meaning. What is obscure is clarified by the equally obscure, and the same thing by its own self. For what is internal revelation? What is internal inspiration? What is it to be effectively persuaded? What is it to believe firmly? Furthermore, what is it that is defined? Is it the action of the Holy Spirit or its effect? If it is the effect, what is it in the souls of the faithful, and how does it affect them? For nothing is here introduced except external denominations.16 So if by the internal revelation of the Holy Spirit and its internal inspiration they mean the clear and distinct perception produced in the minds of the faithful by the Holy Spirit through the natural light of the intellect, and if by efficacious persuasion and firm faith they mean the inmost consciousness of that perception and full acquiescence in it, their opinion 16.

The distinction between external and internal denominations comes from Suarez. For Spinoza’s similar use of the term (to distinguish between true and adequate ideas), see E2P43Schol.

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is no different from ours, as we explained at the beginning of this chapter. But if they intend to designate something supernatural, exceeding the powers of Nature and passing beyond her ordinary course — something they are always chattering about and parading — let them beware lest they are passing over into the camp of the Enthusiasts of old, or of those fanatical and overactive men who have recently come on the scene, called Quakers — something that they so eagerly proclaim they wish to avoid. For the Church has long since distanced itself from17 the prophecies and spiritual revelations of the Enthusiasts together with the paraclete of Montanus, as we have often reported from Chamier.18 The theologians of today quite properly reject the absurdities of the Quakers about the light and the spirit, and also their internal illuminations. For the Quakers exalt their own spirit above the Holy Scriptures, and they boast in extravagant terms that they trample underfoot all reason, all the liberal disciplines together with the knowledge of the original languages. But indeed, our theologians19 are not far distant, I think, from these people. For with regard to that supernatural testimony of the Holy Spirit, they bring forward many of its effects and related matters, and they talk a great deal about other things; but still they nowhere set out, nowhere explain, its essence and its nature, of which they may perhaps be quite ignorant. For however carefully and diligently I have perused their books from cover to cover, and however attentively I have enquired within my own self and earnestly requested numerous others, learned and unlearned alike, to enquire within themselves as well, all this toil has been in vain, and I have found nothing to satisfy my mind. Quite a number of men have frankly admitted along with me that they have found within themselves nothing but that clear and distinct perception accompanied by consciousness of it and acquiescence in it, nor could they find among others, however much they 17. 18. 19.

The Dutch version has ‘distanced itself from and rejected’. Book 1, chap. 19 § 7. The Dutch version has only ‘they’.

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boasted of it, anything else of which they could form a true and real conception. It is true that some20 claimed that they had often felt something supernatural and heavenly, and even now they discover it within themselves; but when this was submitted to an exact and careful examination, it turned out to be just some natural emotion,21 or the experience of an imaginary good, something that gives rise to a feeling of pleasure, as not only I clearly realised, but sometimes they too. From all these considerations it becomes abundantly clear, we think, on how weak and unstable a foundation their thesis rests, even if the arguments by which they busily endeavour to sustain it were not answered. Nevertheless, in order not to leave unassailed anything by which they might defend themselves, and to remove anything that might be for anyone a cause of doubt, we shall explain their arguments briefly in the following chapter and assess their force.

20. 21.

The Dutch version has ‘anderen’ (others). Spinoza will speak of the power of imaginatio rather than of the affects; but finds in imaginational cognition a positive ability to conceive what may be beyond the limits of the intellect. See the closing sections of TTP1 (on prohecy).

Chapter XV A consideration of the reasons by which the Reformed endeavour to prove that the Holy Spirit is the interpreter of the Holy Writings. Alone among theologians whom I have encountered, Whittaker (Disputat. de Scriptura S. Controvers. 1, qu. 5, cap. 8) and after him Scarpius (Curs. Theolog. loc. de Scriptura, controvers. 8) advance three arguments by which they try to prove that the authority to interpret the Holy Writings pertains not just to Scripture but also to the Holy Spirit. And although, as nearly all do, they also associate with this the right to judge all controversies concerning the faith, we shall leave aside that point and in our consideration we shall concentrate only on such matters as are relevant to the question before us. The first argument1 is: If Scripture is recognised to be such in no other way than through itself and through the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit in each of the faithful, then the supreme authority to interpret Scripture lies with Scripture alone and with the Holy Spirit. But the major premise is proved by the controversy concerning the authority of Scripture. Therefore. . . But we reply, taking the antecedent in parts, firstly by denying that Scripture is recognised to be such through itself.2 For nothing is known through itself except primary and common notions.3 Now since Scripture is known to be the Word of God 1. 2. 3.

See Whittaker (Disputatio de S. Scriptura, 1588), p. 498. As is often the case, Meyer offers a re´sume´ only. I.e., recognised to be sacred. Meyer mentions the common notions in his account of the ‘synthetic method’ in his preface to Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy. Common notions are implicit in rational knowledge, though they may not be consciously known. For Spinoza’s explanation, see E2P47Schol.

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from the marks of divinity in it, it is known to be the Word of God not through itself but through those marks. Next, we make a distinction in ‘the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit’. For if they mean the clear and distinct perception produced by the natural light from the Holy Spirit together with consciousness of it and acquiescence in it, so far as concerns this point we concede the antecedent;4 for this is not contrary to our thesis, as is clear from what has been said in the previous chapter. But if what they have in mind is some supernatural illumination, we deny that there is such a thing, for that smells of Enthusiasm and Quakerism. It has not been explicated, far less proved, by any theologian; because all the arguments which they usually produce to that purpose, either here or in the passage about the authority of Scripture, can be easily answered from what has already been said. As for the consequence, perhaps doubts can be raised here too; for although ‘Scripture can be recognised to be such through itself and through the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit’, it does not seem also to follow that it must be interpreted only through itself and the testimony of the Holy Spirit. It might be explained in another way, an infallible way, such as we have already proposed. The second argument5 is as follows: That which alone has the power to engender faith, alone has the supreme authority to interpret Scripture. But only Scripture together with the Holy Spirit has this power. Therefore to these alone must this supreme authority be attributed. The proposition is proved from Romans 10, 17. Faith is born from the sense of Scripture rightly perceived. But the sense of Scripture must be sought only from Scripture; indeed, it is Scripture itself, and the perception of the true sense comes about through the illumination of the Holy Spirit. The minor premise is proved by the fact that only the 4. 5.

The Dutch version has ‘we concede the antecedent for what concerns this part’. See Whittaker (Disputatio de S. Scriptura, 1588), pp. 499-500.

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Holy Spirit can infuse faith. We reply, first, by denying the consequence of the major premise. Its manner of proof, indeed, causes me great astonishment. It concerns in part not the major but the minor premise, namely, when it says ‘faith is born from the sense of Scripture rightly perceived’. And in part it includes the point which is at issue, that is, that the sense of Scripture must be sought from Scripture alone, and the perception of the true sense comes about through the illumination of the Holy Spirit. Secondly, with regard to the minor premise in so far as it contains matters relating to the Holy Spirit, we reply by conceding or denying it in accordance with the distinction made in the reply to the first argument. The final argument6 is: If the Scriptures are to be interpreted and understood with the same Spirit with which they were written, then it is necessary that all who seek to interpret and understand them should consult the Holy Spirit and be dependent on its persuasion. But the major premise is true. Therefore. . . We reply: If by ‘the same Spirit’ is to be understood the same extraordinary inspiration of the Holy Spirit by which the holy men of God, Prophets and Apostles, were impelled in their writing, we deny the antecedent. It was to these men alone that inspiration was peculiar and granted, and today it no longer has any place in the Church. But if what is denoted is the support of that same Spirit as it operates, however, in diverse ways, this could be granted and accommodated to the proving of our thesis by saying that philosophy is that very support by which the Holy

6.

See Whittaker (Disputatio de S. Scriptura, 1588), p. 503. Whittaker’s third argument deals with the power of the supreme judge in matters of scriptural controversy, and is dealt with by Meyer in chapter 4 § 10.

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Spirit interprets the Scriptures in our time.7 But if what they are saying is that this same Holy Spirit explains the Holy Writings in a different way, not through philosophy but through some supernatural revelation, it lies with them to define what it is and to prove its existence, as I have emphasised again and again.

7.

Bordoli (1997, 173) comments on this passage as follows: ‘‘La filosofia, e non piu` la fides o l’auctoritas, dev’essere l’adminiculum mediante il quale l’uomo pensa se stesso e la sua soddisfazione.’’

Chapter XVI 1. The thesis of the Socinians is explained. 2. And that of the Arminians.1 3. Both of these and the Reformed are in agreement with one another on the question of the clarity and obscurity of Scripture, but they differ from us. 4. The position of the Reformed as to the disposition of the intellect: how they differ from the Socinians, the Arminians and us. 5. The view of the Socinians and the Remonstrants on this subject, and the matters on which they sometimes2 differ from each other, and sometimes from the Reformed. 6. The view of the Socinians as to the norm of interpretation. 7. The Reformed maintain that reason is not the norm of interpretation, and they appear to attribute this view to the Socinians and Remonstrants, but falsely. 8. Our own view concerning the norm of interpretation is set forth, and it is shown to differ from that of the Socinians, the Arminians and the Reformed. 9. The argument against this view is refuted. Up to this point we have been attacking the enemy; we have led our forces into their territory and attacked and destroyed their citadels. Having gained victory, we now intend to take a look at those who support our party and are, though not totally, on our side, not differing much from our position, as far as can be gathered from their writings.3 To crown our work,4 we shall 1.

2.

The Dutch version has ‘Remonstranten’ (Remonstrants). Where the Latin edition sometimes refers to Arminians and sometimes to Remonstrants, the Dutch refers only to Remonstrants throughout this chapter. The qualifier ‘sometimes’ does not occur in the Dutch edition.

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discuss together to what extent we agree, or disagree, with one another and with the defeated enemy and, to render our position secure from all sides, we shall try to find out whether they can be brought over to our side, be reconciled with us and firmly allied by treaty. The people concerned are Socinians or Arminians, whose opinions we shall first track out so that our objective may be more swiftly achieved. [1] The Socinians, to begin with the older sect, do not appear to be consistent in this matter. Sometimes they assert that the role of interpreter of the Holy Writings pertains only to reason, sometimes they require in addition the grace and the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Thus in the Catechism of Rakow,5 ch. 3, when the question is put, ‘‘Whence comes such a difference of opinion on the understanding of Scripture,’’ the answer is, ‘‘This is because men read Holy Scripture carelessly, or do not bring to it a heart that is sincere and free from all impediments and desires, or they do not beg for the divine help — that is, the grace of the Holy Spirit — which God has promised to all who call on him for it night and day.’’ But on the other hand Ostorodt (Institutiones, cap. 4), ‘‘so if reason, that is, the mind or the intellect, shows quite clearly that a Trinity of Persons in God is false, how could it ever enter the mind of a man of intelligence that this is true and capable of 3.

4. 5.

Bordoli (1997, 174) summarises their differences as follows: ‘‘Meglio ancore: la loro sententia, per quanto si puo` giudicare dai loro scritti, non dista molto da quella della PSSI, ossia, appunto, il loro accordo con essa non e` completo. Dunque: arminiani e sociniani non sono filosofi ma teologici, poiche´ accettano la rivelazione di Dio come dato d’autorita`. . . .’’ The Dutch version has, ‘As a conclusion,. . .’. The Catechism of Rakow was an exposition of the doctrine of Socinus. First published in 1605, it was translated into Latin in 1609 and into Dutch in 1659. For Faustus Socinus (1519-1604), see our appendices, and also K. O. Meinsma, Spinoza et son cercle (Paris: Vrin, 1983), 375-377. The Socinian theses were well known in Holland thanks to Christopher Ostorodt who, prior to his expulsion in 1598, had translated many of the works of Socinus into Dutch. See also Lagre´e and Moreau (1988, 233).

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being proved by the Word of God?’’ And Smalcius (contra Frantsium Disp. 4, De Justificat.), ‘‘There is not a particle of the Christian religion that does not agree with reason, and an opinion that does not agree with reason can have no place in theology.’’ In the last two passages mention is made only of reason, while in the first mention is made of the Holy Spirit. The author of the Brevis Disquisitio contra Valer. Magnum, de Acatholicorum credendi regula (whom the celebrated and learned professor of Theology Johan. Hoornbeek of the Academy of Leyden, in his Socinianism. confutat., Tom. 1, Lib. 1, cap. 6, declares and proves to be a Socinian) in chapter 4 brings onto the stage sometimes reason, sometimes the Holy Spirit, in these words: ‘‘It must be denied that no one can grasp with certainty the sense of the Holy Writings unless he is inwardly illuminated and instructed by the Holy Spirit.’’ Then a little later, ‘‘Therefore it is absolutely necessary to ascribe to it [he is speaking of sound reason] the faculty of understanding and judging the Holy Writings. The obscurity of the Holy Writings is not so very great at all points. Why, some texts are so clear that they can be understood immediately by anyone who hears and reads them. And the explication of the more obscure passages is not necessary for everybody. But if someone should make earnest enquiry, he will be helped in his investigation by the Holy Spirit. And that which he does understand, whether or not it be from the Holy Spirit, can stand firm only through the judgment of sound reason. For the gift of the Holy Spirit does not suppress reason but exalts it and illuminates it, so that by its help reason6 can do what it could not do by itself, or do more easily what it could do only with difficulty (as is apparent in the explication of some of the more difficult passages of Scripture). For to carry out its operations the Holy Spirit makes use of the means which it finds in us to be most suited to its operations. Just as it provides me with an eye to see, an ear to hear, so for judging and for understanding it assuredly uses my reason, the unique instrument for under6.

For ‘reason’ the Dutch version has ‘Schrift’ (Scripture).

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standing and judging. Furthermore, just as any man can read with his eyes the sacred texts and hear them with his ears without the inner help of the Holy Spirit or the special illumination of eyes and ears, so he may no less understand and judge those same sacred texts through the benefit of sound reason even if the illumination of the Holy Spirit is not added to him. This is especially so in matters which are simply necessary for salvation.’’ And in chapter 7, ‘‘In order to discern the authority of the Holy Writings and their authentic meaning, one must also have recourse to those principles which are called philosophic.’’ And a little further on, ‘‘It must be established that these principles and others like them, which are known to anyone of sound mind, are the foundations of our knowledge concerning the authority of the Holy Writings and their true sense.’’ And again further on, ‘‘One will find no difficulty in deciding from Scripture what is necessary for salvation, provided that one employs diligence and does not permit himself to be imposed on by emotions and preconceived opinions. This is particularly so if one also seeks from God the gift of the Holy Spirit. With the help of these principles even he who cannot read the Holy Writings or has never seen them or does not know of their existence, if only he hears from someone else a summary account of the Christian religion, can learn as much as is necessary for salvation.’’ These are the words of the anonymous writer. But J. Slichtingius in his book De S. S. Trinitate adversus Balt. Meisnerum, page 67, putting completely aside the Holy Spirit, makes mention of nothing but reason in this matter, as follows: ‘‘In the words recorded and expressed in Scripture in such a way that no one of sound mind can doubt their meaning, the clearest matters are dealt with, or else the matters at issue are obscure, concerning which doubts may rightly be raised as to whether in their reading in Scripture they have or do not have a certain meaning. In the former case we grant this assertion, ‘Scripture is the most perfect norm of faith and morals’, chiefly because it is quite certain that Scripture contains nothing that is opposed to manifest reason or which involves a real contradic-

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tion. But if it is a question of things that are obscure, anyone can see that this cannot be decided without the use of reason. However, reason is not to be employed as if there could be something opposed to Scripture when Scripture affirms or denies a thing, but only to make clear whether Scripture does contain some affirmation. If it is clear that it does contain that affirmation, reason, whatever it may say in contradiction, must necessarily be wrong.’’ A little further on, ‘‘We do not have recourse to reason whenever Scripture clearly declares the contrary, but whenever there is doubt as to Scripture’s intended meaning.’’ And again, ‘‘It is not for reason to assume the role of judge if the intended meaning of Scripture is clearly established. But when there is doubt as to whether Scripture has defined a thing in a particular way, to reject reason is nothing other than to extinguish a light in darkness and also to put out one’s eyes. The arguments of Meisner are correct whenever reason opposes or contradicts Scripture or the Holy Spirit speaking in men and in the Scriptures, but not when it assists and guides us in the perception of the intended meaning of Scripture or of the Holy Spirit.’’ And the same writer in the same book, page 79, ‘‘Again, we never have recourse to reason when the meaning of Scripture is clearly established. For why should we set truth in opposition to truth? We have recourse to reason only when there is doubt as to the meaning of Scripture or of the truth of some dogma outside Scripture.’’ And on page 84, ‘‘It is false that direct, manifest reason is a principle that is foreign and alien to matters divine, as Meisner here affirms, especially when the question at issue is whether Scripture does or does not say something, as is here the case.’’ From all this we conclude in brief that the view of the Socinians regarding the understanding and interpretation of Scripture is as follows: What it is necessary to know for salvation is presented and expressed so clearly in the Holy Writings that anyone of sound mind and free from prejudice and passions can immediately understand it. As for what is obscure, it is not necessary for all, but its intended meaning and sense can be elicited

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and judged by reason, that is, by the soul’s faculty of judging and reasoning as well as by what is dictated, enjoined and discovered by that same faculty. This would be made swifter and easier with the additional aid of the Holy Spirit, although its presence is not absolutely necessary.7 [2] The Arminians make clear their view on this matter in Confess., cap. 1, and particularly in the Intelligentia, Sect. 14, and De Interpretatione, Sect. 16. In the De Intelligentia they speak as follows: ‘‘However, although some parts of those books [the Holy Books] may be rather obscure (especially to the unlearned and the inexperienced), such is their clarity and perspicuity, particularly in the parts necessary to understand for eternal salvation, that all readers, not only the learned but laymen (but furnished with common sense and judgment) can grasp their meaning quite sufficiently provided that they do not let themselves be blinded by prejudice, overconfidence or other evil emotions, but examine this Scripture with piety and diligence.’’8 Episcopius, too, acknowledges and defends this as the view held by his people in his Defensione Catechism. Remonstr. contra Heidan, page 32, and furthermore he declares in Disputat. 3 de Scripturae perspicuitat., Thes. 3, ‘‘To attain to this understanding nothing else is necessary than the force to apprehend and perceive those words which are set before us clearly and meaningfully; this force is natural, and natural for all who are gifted with reason, whatever be their status. Therefore there is no need for erudition acquired over a long period, or of a painfully laborious consequence, or of some other supernatural light added to this power and exalting it so as to elicit this understanding. For it must be said that the affections interposing, which sometimes seem to obfuscate and suppress the force of comprehension, do 7.

8.

For both Arminians and Socinians the norm of interpretation is recta ratio, but in cases of passages which are unclear or ambiguous, the light of the Holy Spirit is required to establish absolute clarity. See Bordoli (1997, 175). The Dutch version has only, ‘with diligence’.

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not hinder the power of comprehension but only the will or act of comprehending.’’9 But in De Interpretatione they maintain the following view: ‘‘The best interpretation is one which expresses most faithfully its native and literal sense, or at least comes as close to it as possible. For that sense is alone the true and living Word of God from which we are born again, as from an incorruptible seed, to the hope of eternal life. Now we call the native and literal sense not so much that which is presented by words taken in their strict sense (as is most often the case) as that which, although not gathered from words when rigorously understood, is nevertheless most in conformity with right reason and the mind and intention of him who produced the words, whether the meaning is enunciated literally or figuratively. It is that which can and should be recognised from the purpose and context of each passage, from the subject treated, from what has preceded and what follows, and also from a comparison of similar passages and from the consideration of obvious absurdities which would otherwise result, and from other similar arguments and factual indications.’’ What is to be understood by right reason is explained in the Apology in the same section as follows, ‘‘Right reason does not here signify the force by which a man from the exercise of reason can devise or discover from himself what is is right and in accord with the divine will; it signifies only the force by which he can apprehend the sense clearly and perspicuously revealed by God,10 or can elicit it from the verbal context, from what has preceded and what follows, correctly or in a way that conforms with the intention of him who produced the words.’’ And further on, ‘‘The force of right reason, that is, of reason when it fits the correct sense that is in conformity with the words of Jesus 9.

10.

The distinction between intellect and will is important within the cartesian system, for it is the latter which is said to be the cause of error (analogous to ‘lack of attention’). See Descartes’ Meditation 4. The Dutch version has, ‘by which he can clearly and perspicuously apprehend the sense revealed by God,’.

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Christ.’’ There are many texts of this kind to be found in the Apology in the cited passage. So I think that the thesis of the Remonstrants is as follows: In the Scriptures there are passages that are clear and perspicuous, and some that are obscure. In the former is contained what is necessary for salvation, and understanding has its part to play; in the latter, interpretation has a part to play, and both of these can function without any illumination of the Holy Spirit, simply through the force and faculty of right reason; provided that, in the first case, understanding is not hindered by prejudice, overconfidence or other evil emotions, and Scripture is examined with piety and diligence; and in the second case, that in addition one should carefully examine the purpose and the context of the passage, the material dealt with, and that which precedes and follows. [3] So far we have been examining the views of the Socinians and Arminians with regard to the interpretation of Scripture. Let us now see in what respects these two agree with the Reformed and with us, and in what respects they disagree, so that one may grasp and perceive their opinions yet more distinctly and clearly. But it must be here observed at the outset that our discussion is not about the understanding and interpretation of matters treated and transmitted in the Holy Writings by which we judge or dispute their truth or falsity, their goodness or badness. Our discussion concerns only the particular understanding and interpretation by which we seek out and discover the sense of the words and the intended meaning of the speaker, and which enable us to show and prove that we have in fact discovered it. But in this interpretation there are some things that relate to the one who understands and explains — a man, say, or a human intellect — and other things that relate to that which is understood and explained, to wit, the Word of God. In what concerns the Holy Writings the Reformed, the Socinians and the Remonstrants are agreed that certain passages are clearer and that others are more obscure, and that everything the knowledge of which is requisite for eternal salvation is contained in the clearer

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passages, and the understanding of the more obscure passages is not necessary for everyone. This we deny, as is manifest from what we have said in chapter 11. But in those matters which concern the human intellect there is a vast difference between them, both as to the disposition of the intellect required for it to understand and interpret and also as to the norm according to which the interpretation must be conducted. [4] On the question of the disposition of the intellect, the Reformed maintain that no one can attain to the true sense of the Holy Writings, both in its clearer and its more obscure passages, unless he is illuminated inwardly by the Holy Spirit. This is clear from the Censura in Confess. Remonstrant., cap. 1, sect. 14 and 16 where, among other matters the Leiden professors speak as follows, ‘‘If by right reason the Remonstrants here understand the use of reason not as yet illuminated by the Holy Spirit, they are no less crazy in siding with reason or against reason than are the Socinians. But if they are here speaking of the man who is illuminated through the Holy Spirit, we acknowledge that his right reason is capable of judgment as to the authentic meaning of Holy Scripture, but only if in his inquiry it follows the dictation and guidance not of his own natural reasoning faculty but of the Holy Spirit.’’ Similarly, the celebrated and most reverend Abraham Heidanus, a most vigilant and eloquent preacher and a most learned professor of theology at Leiden, writes in his much acclaimed work, De Causa Dei against Episcopius, Book 1, cap. 6, ‘‘The perspicuity of Scripture is a property that resides in Scripture and which it will always retain whether a man be illuminated or not, and even though he who is not illuminated fails to perceive that perspicuity’. And later on, ‘God has regulated Scripture in such a way that from its entirety a Christian can learn and apprehend excellently, perfectly and clearly God’s11 intended meaning and his assured will in all dogmas necessary to the Faith, aided by the illumination of the Spirit.’’ See other references in the same pas11.

The Dutch version has ‘his’.

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sage, and many other passages, and compare what we said in our review in chapter 10. This thesis of the Reformed is denied both by Arminians and Socinians, with whom we too agree. That the Arminians deny it is made clear from their Apology in Censuram Profess. Leidens, cap. 1, sect. 14, where among other things these words occur, ‘‘If you say that this light of the Holy Spirit is a prerequisite for the understanding of the true sense, you are enlarging an absurdity.’’ And a little later, ‘‘The Remonstrants maintain that the meanings of Scripture that are necessary to know can be understood by man without the internal and special illumination of the Holy Spirit.’’ And in section 16 where, after repeating the words just quoted from the Censura, the author of the Apology asks, ‘‘What is it to rave with reason, if not this?’’ So, too, Episcopius in his Defension. Catechism. Remonstrat. contra Heiden., page 32, declares, ‘‘The Remonstrants teach that each and all can understand the true sense and intended meaning of Holy Scripture without the internal light of the Holy Spirit.’’ That the Socinians here side with the Remonstrants is evident from the Brevis Disquisit. contra Valer. Magnum de Acatholicorum credendi regula, ch. 4, where we find these words: ‘‘It must be denied that no one can with certainty comprehend the true sense of the Holy Writings unless he is inwardly illuminated and instructed by the Holy Spirit.’’ And a little later, ‘‘Just as anyone can read with his eyes and hear with his ears the sacred texts without the inward help of the Holy Spirit or the special illumination of his eyes and ears, so he may no less understand and judge those same sacred texts with the assistance of sound reason, even if the illumination of the Holy Spirit is not yet added to him.’’ The same point is made explicit from the quoted passages of Slinchtingius where, in disputing against Meisnerus about the interpretation of Scripture, he always has recourse to reason, never to the illumination of the Holy Spirit. [5] Against the Reformed, the Remonstrants and the Socinians maintain that a sound mind and the light of the natural intellect, provided that a man is free from prejudices and is not

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overwhelmed by evil emotions, are quite sufficient for the understanding of the Holy Writings in their clearer passages, if he shows diligence. For the Remonstrants say in Confess., cap. 1, sect. 14, ‘‘Not only the learned but laymen too (but furnished with common sense and judgment) can comprehend their intended meaning (the clearer passages) sufficiently well, provided that they do not allow themselves to be blinded by prejudices, overconfidence or other evil emotions, but examine the Scriptures with piety and diligence.’’ And the Socinians in Cateches. Racov., cap. 3, in accounting for differences of opinion regarding the understanding of Scripture assign this as a cause, ‘‘Men either read Holy Scripture carelessly, or do not bring to it a heart that is sincere and free from all hindrances and desires.’’ See other texts to the same effect, previously quoted by us. But furthermore, in the interpretation of the more obscure passages, the Remonstrants assert expressly in their Confessions and in the Apology, cap. 1, sect. 16, that the true sense can and should be discerned from the purpose and context of each passage, from the matter treated, from what has preceded and from what follows, and also from a comparison of similar passages and from the obvious absurdities that would otherwise result, and other such arguments and factual indications. In these passages the Socinians summon reason to their aid, as is clear from their testimonies already quoted, and most clearly of all from Slichtingius when he says, ‘‘If it is a question of matters that are obscure, anyone can see that nothing can be accomplished without reason.’’ And a little further on, ‘‘For we do not have recourse to reason whenever Scripture openly affirms the contrary, but whenever there is doubt as to the intended meaning of Scripture.’’ From the same author we have cited many passages to the same effect, which can be seen above. But what is here assumed under the title of reason, whether it is the discursive faculty of reasoning and judging, or whether it is the dictates or discoveries which have been uncovered and extracted by discursive reasoning and experience or in some other way, they themselves do not clearly declare and af-

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firm, although they seem to understand both the one and the other. Indeed, they do in fact understand them both, if the author of the Brevis Disquisit. contra Valerium Magn. de Acatholicorum credendi regula is a Socinian, and is expounding the thesis of the Socinians, as is the opinion of the celebrated theologian Johan. Hoornbeek, quoted by us above. [6] Thus, too, they do not clearly explain whether in their interpretations of the Scriptures they use only reason as the means and instrument for tracing and eliciting the meaning of the Holy Writings, or whether they use reason additionally as a norm according to which all interpretation must be directed and decided.12 That same writer is an exception; later on in many places in his book he appears to affirm the latter, especially in chapter 7. When he is about to expound his true opinion about the norm, he says, ‘‘Therefore we must deny that there is no other means of getting to know with certainty the truth on the question13 of faith than to pray and then consult the Holy Spirit from the Holy Writings. It must be maintained that the Holy Writings are quite certainly the norm for deciding controversies over faith, and at the present time they are the only norm if the unwritten traditions, under whatever name they appear, are completely excluded. Still, to discern the authority of the Holy Writings and their authentic intended meaning, those principles called philosophic must also be used.’’ And after calling upon metaphysics, logic, mathematics, ethics and history for the understanding of Holy Scripture, he concludes thus, ‘‘These principles and others like them which are known to anyone of sound mind are, it must be maintained, the foundations of our knowl12.

13.

Bordoli (1997, 175-176) comments on this passage as follows: ‘‘Questo e` un punto fondamentale. Meyer si stacca, mantenendo l’accordo sul generale razionalismo (e filologismo) e sulla tolleranza in esso implicata, dalla tradizione dei bijbelse humanisten, rifiutando la concezione strumentale della ragione in nome di una prospecttiva fondata su di un razionalismo integrale.’’ For ‘question’ the Dutch version has ‘matters’.

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edge as far as concerns the authority of the Holy Writings and their true sense. Therefore he who is moderately equipped with these, whether by natural endowment of mind or by experience, will know from these principles that the Scriptures are holy, and he will without difficulty discern from the Scriptures what is necessary for salvation.’’ [7] The Reformed (to return to them) indeed do not deny that for the understanding of the clearer passages of Holy Scripture there is required ‘‘. . . a sound mind,14 free from prejudices, not blinded by evil emotions, diligently examining the Word of God.’’ But they deny that this is sufficient unless, as we have said, there is added to it the illumination of the Holy Spirit. Thus, over and above that illumination they do concede that in the interpretation of the more obscure passages there should be a consideration of ‘‘. . . the purpose and the context of each passage, of the matter that is treated, of what has preceded and what follows, a comparison with similar passages, and, finally, a regard for the obvious absurdities that would otherwise follow, and other arguments of this kind, and factual indications,’’15 from which the sense of the passage is discerned. Besides this, reason must be employed, meaning both the faculty itself and its dictates and findings. But the faculty they take to be no more than an object or instrument for perceiving and understanding the Holy Writings, and all the other things as a means or instrument for tracing and eliciting the meaning of the Holy Writings. In no wise do they regard the former or the latter as an argument, a canon or norm according to which interpretation must be instituted or which should govern its procedure. This duty and task they assign only to Holy Scripture, so that it becomes its own interpreter and norm of interpretation (as we explained fully in chap14. 15.

The Dutch version has ‘een gesondt verstandt’, often meaning simply ‘common sense’. The italics in the Dutch version suggest that the quotation device should be as follows: . . . a comparison with similar passages’, and, finally a regard for ‘the obvious absurdities. . .

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ters 10 and 11), and they make every effort to show that the Socinians and the Remonstrants assign this task to reason, as is clear from Censur. in Confessionem Remonstrant., cap. 1, sect. 14 and 16, and from Hoornbeek’s Socinianism. confutat., Tom. 1, cap. 6.16 However, I have not found this expressly conveyed in their writings, nor have I been able to gather this from them, not even from the passage just quoted from the Brevis Disquisitio contra Valer. Magn. For Amandus Polanus, the well-known writer of the Reformed, in his Theologiae Syntagma, Book 1, cap. 45, qu. 6, where he discusses the means for discovering the true sense and usage of Scripture, lists in the fifth place among the methods to be employed in meditating over Scripture, ‘‘. . . the order and method for investigating sense and usage. The first consideration is that of the subject treated; the second, of the theme that is under discussion; the third, the arguments by which the theme is explained or confirmed, along with the circumstances, that is, the persons, the context, the place, the time, the antecedents and the consequences.’’ In the seventh place he lists, ‘‘The comparison of one passage with other parallel and similar passages, of the more obscure with clear and manifest passages dealing with the same thing.’’ And in the eighth place, ‘‘The bringing together of the passage to be explained with other passages that are different or even apparently contradictory, and their reconciliation.’’ And finally in the twelfth place, ‘‘A knowledge of the arts and disciplines, especially grammar, rhetoric, dialectic and physics.’’ Similar passages occur in other writers, too. If all this is regarded by the Reformed as coming under the title of means, why cannot the Remonstrants and the Socinians take the same view?17 But indeed, they do seem to take this view, and in the same way as the Reformed, as is evident from Smalcius (preface, contra Frantsium) when he says, ‘‘Where there is 16. 17.

The Dutch version has ‘Tom. 1, lib. 1, cap. 6’. The Dutch version of the question suggests, ‘. . . why cannot they view these as such with the Remonstrants and the Socinians?’

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need for interpretation, we say that it is not reason that should be the chief guide; we teach that it is from the Holy Writings themselves that interpretation should be sought, and thus we are totally dependent on the mouth of our Master, the Holy Spirit.’’ So these texts offer to the Reformed no firm ground for concluding that the others are establishing reason as the norm of interpretation, in spite of their eager efforts to take this as proven.18 But whatever view be taken of the thesis of the Arminians and the Socinians, it does not affect us whose purpose is to find out not what these or those think, but what truth dictates. [8] Finally, to expound our own view, that which we consider to be the true view concerning the norm of interpretation and to compare it with views we have discussed, we say that no one can be certain that he understands the true and authentic sense of a clearer passage of Scripture and has also elicited and explained the sense of an obscurer passage unless he has investigated and searched it out through and by true philosophy as an infallible norm, nor can he demonstrate with certainty to others that this is the true sense except through that same norm. So we establish true philosophy as the touchstone which can infallibly test, and through which it can be demonstrated with complete certainty, whether a certain sense of Holy Scripture, be it understood without difficulty or elicited with much toil, is in conformity or not with the intention of the writer. From this it is obvious that our thesis differs from that of the Socinians and Arminians: 1. Firstly, in respect of the certainty and infallibility both of comprehension and interpretation, of which they say not a word, whereas we expressly assert it. 2. Secondly, in respect of the perspicuity of Scripture in matters that are necessary for salvation and are clear through themselves, which they affirm and we deny. 3. Finally, in respect of the interpretation of the more 18.

The Dutch version has ‘to attempt to prove this’.

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obscure passages, where they seem to be willing to employ reason, a consideration of the circumstances and of things preceding and following, a comparison with other similar or dissimilar passages, etc., whereas we make philosophy our norm and boldly proclaim it. In this last point we also differ from the Reformed, who maintain that Scripture is itself its own norm; we also differ from the Reformed on the second point, where on the question of the clarity and perspicuity of Scripture they do not disagree with the Socinians and the Remonstrants. Both of these points we have abundantly refuted in chapter 11. Finally, with regard to the illumination of the Holy Spirit, we have already affirmed that this is not necessary for the simple understanding of the Word of God, siding with the Socinians and the Remonstrants against the Reformed, and we proved this in chapters 6 and 14. So nothing remains to be said concerning the views of the Socinians and Arminians, and their agreement or difference with the views of the Reformed and with our views; and we believe that we have completely achieved the objective which we set ourselves at the beginning of this chapter. [9] Still, before laying down our pen and bringing our treatise to a close, we should here deal with an absurd argument19 which the learned Hoornbeek (Socinianism. confutat., Tom. 1, book 1, cap. 6, sect. 2, arg. 4) advances against the Socinians, one which could also be used as an objection to our thesis, namely: ‘‘If philosophy or reason is the infallible norm of interpretation of the Holy Writings, then Scripture and its interpretation is subject to reason (or philosophy), which is contrary to the dignity and truthfulness of Scripture. One would rightly shrink with horror from attributing such a thing to one’s own judgment. Hence John (1 Epistle, ch. 5, v. 9) carefully distinguishes between and even opposes the judgment of the Holy Spirit and the 19.

Instead of ‘deal with an absurd argument’ the Dutch version has ‘resolve the contradiction’.

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testimony of Holy Scripture on the one hand and that of men on the other; ‘If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater’, and similarly in his Gospel, ch. 5, v. 34, ‘But I receive not testimony from man’.’’ The same author says something quite similar in the same chapter, sect. 1, page 91, ‘‘In such matters of doubt, to introduce and to hearken to reason as an argument or norm for deciding the intended meaning of Holy Scripture is a quite extraordinary 
 


´  ´ 
   (change over to a different category),20 and that reason should dare to arrogate to itself this function is as unworthy of Scripture as it is something shameful in itself.’’ To deal with this difficulty, one has only to recall to memory the distinct meanings of the word ‘Scripture’ as mentioned in chapter 13, argument 1, namely, that the word ‘Scripture’ can be taken in the material sense, denoting the letters, words, syllables, and the sentences composed of them, or else in the formal sense, signifying the meanings and the things expressed and designated by those words and sentences. Now we by no means think it unworthy of the letters, words, syllables and sentences which must come under the title of Scripture when its interpretation is discussed, that they should be subject to sound reason or philosophy. Right reason and true philosophy, as we have shown above and as will not be denied by any man of sound mind, are excellent and remarkable gifts granted by God to the human race, whereas letters, syllables, words and sentences are nothing other than speech-sounds or their silent marks signifying concepts and things according to human custom and convention, and are there20.

The phrase is from Aristotle (Metaphysics G, 9, 992a17, and D, 28) and prohibited the passage of one genus (  ) to another. Aristotle utilises it to demonstrate the impossibility for the demonstrations of one science to be moved to those of another science whose proper object is different. Descartes, in support of his own thesis of unified science, explicitly rejects the thesis in the Regulae (Rule 1). The Dutch version here and after appears transliterated, and translated as ‘unjustified jump to another category’.

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fore not to be compared in any degree of dignity with those extraordinary gifts of God. Therefore it is not ‘shameless’, nor should anyone ‘shrink with horror from arrogating to his own sound judgment, or right reason, or true philosophy, the interpretation of the words of Scripture’. It would indeed be shameless, and one would rightly shrink with horror, if one were to subject to these the divine utterances and oracles conveyed by these words; for one would be doing violence to one’s own mind,21 since truth can by no means be made subject to truth, far less be opposed to it, whether it be dictated by Nature or revealed by Scripture. For truth always has God for its author, as we taught in chapters 5 and 8. Hence it also follows that every interpretation of Scripture achieved with the help of right reason or true philosophy rests not on human but on divine testimony, and so the passages cited from John are in no way opposed to our thesis. And this is even less so with that other argument he produced, that it would be !"#$ #% &'(!´& ')# ´ **+-, !. + ' . Schlichting, in his Contra Balthas. Meisnerum, lib. de S. S. Trinitate, page 84, has already denied that ‘‘. . . right and manifest reason is a foreign and alien principle in matters divine, especially when the question at issue is whether Scripture does or does not say some thing, as is the case here.’’ Since in the interpretation of Scripture reason can be employed as an object22 and instrument (as Hoornbeek admits in several passages in the cited chapter) and the philosophic disciplines as means (as we have just said that Polanus maintains) without /!"#0$ #% &' !´& '1# ´ **+2, !. + ' , we do not see why this function of norm cannot be assigned as well to the one as to the other without jumping from one category to another. And this is all the more so if it is true, as Hoornbeek says in the cited chapter, sect. 1, distinct. 21, ‘‘The axioms of universal and everlasting truth, 21. 22.

The Dutch version has ‘doing violence to the proper sense and meaning’. The Dutch version has ‘’t onderwerp’ (the subject), and ‘subjectum’ appears as a note in the margin.

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such as ‘The same thing cannot be and not be at the same time’, are not assumed by theology from Nature or reason as from a prior principle; these axioms are part of a common truth, and are so rooted in divine truth that in them reason does not find fault with Scripture nor Scripture with reason. These two derive from the same source, and they hold good everywhere and universally.’’ Moreover, we should not attribute great importance to axioms of this sort produced in great medleys by the Peripatetics; for in the search for truth they are not so much aids — under which title they are imposed on young people — as hindrances by which their progress is interrupted. For what reason prevents us from using an argument from mathematics to solve a question in physics, or a conclusion from physics to support a thesis in medicine? I at least see none. That fine distinction between the liberal disciplines devised by the Peripatetics and usually preserved by them with such zeal, whereon that 3/45607 68 9:;4´9 :<6 ´ =>=? @ 4A?>: seems to depend, does not appear to me of such importance that because of it things that are interconnected in Nature and can therefore be known the one by means of another should be separated from one another so that one cannot be proved from another. But we have now reached the end of our journey. We have considered and refuted the opinions of those differing from us, the Arminians and Socinians and likewise the Reformed and the Catholics.23 Furthermore, we have preserved our thesis intact from the accusations of our opponents and from such charges as could be brought against it. Again, after explaining it quite fully and extensively, we have proved it to be true and indubitable. So let philosophy remain everlastingly the infallible norm of interpretation of the Holy Writings, since this is what reason urges and dictates and is confirmed by the practice of theologians of every age, and objections brought against it can easily be answered. Rejecting all the other norms of interpretation which we 23.

The Dutch version has ‘Papists’.

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have considered and refuted, may it thrive in the future and grow in Christ’s Church, so that by its help dissensions among Christians may be appeased, the uncorrupted teaching of heavenly truth be more and more established and spread abroad, and our souls may at last enjoy eternal salvation and possess everlasting blessedness.

Epilogue I have given long and careful deliberation, dear reader, to the question as to whether I should put into print and thrust into the light of day this progeny of mine, now mature but likely to appear unripe and monstrous to the majority of theologians, or whether I should keep it to myself and condemn it to darkness for ever. That which occasioned this deliberation and made me undecided what course to pursue was a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages which, I believe, are likely to result from its publication. Believing that it would be to your interest to know how many these are and of what kind, I consider it not irrelevant to our undertaking to review them here in brief. The disadvantages, to speak first of them, were two in number and of some importance; one of them concerns me, the other the Christian Churches, in which I feared that this treatise would give rise to disturbances; for almost all novelty is wont to cause them anxiety. But — and this is the main point — it is not some trivial dogma of no particular importance in religion that is here made public and discussed, but one of such weight that it undoubtedly has a premier role in Christianity next to the authority of the Holy Writings. It is the foundation and base on which rest all the other articles of faith and morals, from which they originate and derive as from their source. Since we have shown that on this point all the Churches we know of that adhere to Christ go wildly astray and are far distant from the truth, it must surely happen that some, acknowledging and discarding their error and embracing the truth we have demonstrated will change their opinion; but others who, for the sake of gain or honour, or impelled by hope or blind zeal or obstinacy, cling tenaciously to opinions they have received, will fiercely resent what I say. So, with the former defending our position to which they have just acceded while the latter uphold their traditional beliefs and assail us, there would be prolonged disagreement and strife. And, as

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usually happens in matters of religion, the fighting would be fierce as for hearth and home, with extreme violence and passion, not without considerable damage and disgrace to the Christian name. As for me, the disadvantage that lies in wait is hatred by theologians who disapprove of and reject my thesis, the kind of bitter hatred that usually flares up in their midst, and which I shall no doubt incur against myself. Since it is generally the nature of these men to claim supremacy above the learned, being firmly convinced that the utterances of God have been entrusted to them alone and must be interpreted by them alone, and that the worship of God is in their charge, they immediately fire up with resentful anger if anyone else dares to intrude on their territory. And since each of them has the fixed belief that what he teaches is in strict conformity with truth and far removed from any community with error, they consider that the divine majesty and glory suffers diminution if any dogma they have already established is uprooted and a claim made that another should take its place, — and all this in spite of internecine fighting among themselves. So each of them regards it as the part of his duty and devotion to prevent and hinder that whereby his religious conviction might suffer any injury or damage. Thus anger is succeeded by hatred with which they pursue anyone who does not subscribe to their opinions and is not afraid to propose for the scrutiny of the theological world something that even in the slightest degree questions their maxims. To vomit forth the poison of this anger and hatred of theirs, they make him an object of detestation for the common people among whom they hold such considerable authority. They traduce his name in a most shameful way, loading him with calumny and invective as the worst of heretics, one who foments opinions that are abominable and pernicious; and they urge and exhort that he be shunned as something worse than a dog or a snake.1 If they succeed in their aim, it follows that 1.

The Dutch version has ‘worse than pestilence and deadly poison’.

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their victim, as though marked with black chalk, is avoided and deserted and despised by all. Thus he is gradually deprived, if he is a merchant, of his business, if he is an artisan, of his employment. Finally he is stripped of his property and the means of gaining a livelihood so that, reduced to dire poverty and misfortune, he is compelled to spend the rest of his days in misery. And to add to his misfortunes and to preclude all compassion, they proclaim that the ills of which they themselves are the instigators are the just penalty which he is now paying to the Most High for his impiety and his execrable opinion, and are the clear indications that plainly convict him of heresy and condemn him. Our little craft, too, might be carried away in a storm like that, and, since we live among men and often need their assistance and help, it could be dashed against similar rocks, overwhelmed by waves and sunk in the deep if we were to commit it to such a raging sea, so exposed to fierce tempests and threatening certain shipwreck. These two disadvantages seemed to me so weighty that for some years I have been putting off the printing of this treatise and have often resolved never to permit it to be printed or published. An important point besides these considerations was this, that being taught by experience I had observed, and held it as certain, that in all Christian sects the priests and clerics2 as well as the commons and laymen are so tenacious of opinions with which they were imbued both from infancy and from their upbringing that you could sooner touch the sky with your hand than dislodge from their minds even a single one of their beliefs, though it had never been seriously examined. Thus I would not only have squandered time and effort in writing this work but would also lose them in publishing it. All these thoughts were finally overcome and my mind changed by a consideration of the advantages and the abundant fruits which, so I firmly hope, the Christian religion will gain from this. Furthermore, of the two disadvantages I have men2.

The Dutch version has ‘heads and leaders’.

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tioned, I had imagined the first to be more serious, and likely to bring upon the Church more serious troubles, than in fact I recently found to be inflicted in a case similar to, if not more important than, mine. For while I was hugging my writings to myself, other writings appeared which seemed likely not merely to shake but to uproot and overthrow dogmas of much greater importance, nay, the very foundation of the entire Church. But these did not arouse controversy3 except among the more erudite.4 The second disadvantage I might be able to avoid and escape by suppressing the author’s name. This would be likely to bring some condemnation and contempt on this treatise and my thesis from those who are in the habit of valuing writings from the name of the author, or of condemning as rubbish, blank pages not worth reading, whatever is published without the author’s name. But I did not regard this as of great importance, so that either I must undergo the danger involved in the said disadvantage or else, being indifferent to critics of that kind, I should fail in my duty to the studies and the interests of more favourable readers and deny them such advantages as would accrue. Of these advantages the first and most important is this. For some centuries the interpretation of the Holy Writings has been placed in doubt, and its interpreters have not succeeded in 3. 4.

The Dutch version adds, ‘easily and without rebuke’. It is difficult to know what these ‘other writings’ were. Hobbes’ Leviathan, whose closing sections deal with scriptural exegesis, appeared in 1651, and was widely circulated in Holland in the years following. But the 1660s in Holland marked a period of more widespread ecclesiastical censorship. Two years after the first edition (1666) of Meyer’s work, Adriaan Koerbagh was condemned and executed. The ‘more erudite’ here may refer to those who can read Latin, but Meyer either translated or oversaw the translation of his own work into Dutch in 1667, only one year following its Latin edition. Spinoza’s own Tractatus theologicopoliticus appeared in 1670; and shortly thereafter Spinoza, perhaps mindful of Meyer’s example or experience, took pains to make sure that a planned edition of that work in the Dutch vernacular should not be published.

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eliciting unerringly its true meanings, nor in demonstrating that they have thus succeeded. As a result, a host of sharp disagreements and contentions have sprung into being among Christians, and they endure to this day, while fresh ones continue to arise. Through the method and norm we have established in this book any interpreter of the divine utterances would no longer wander about uncertainly but would make steady progress on a firm footing. Thus the weapons of disputes and contentions which are so ardently and fiercely brandished would be taken away, and peace restored and established for ever throughout the Christian world. The second advantage is this: as a result of our thesis the task of interpreter will not labour under such great difficulties as heretofore. Since we have shown that all the truths of the Scriptures are also true meanings and that several meanings can occur in any sentence, of those many meanings some will be easier to investigate and discover and will be more manifest than if there were only one meaning to be elicited. For it would be less of a task to arrive at some meanings where there are many than to unearth the sole meaning where there is only one. That our thesis permits this facility to be added to the interpretation of the Holy Writings is acknowledged by Chamier himself (Panstrat. Cathol., Tom. 1, Book 15, cap. 15, section 31) in these words, ‘‘If there were several [literal meanings], this, it appears, would make Scripture easier. For the difficulty of Scripture, if there is any, consists in discovering the true sense. But when there are many things, they are usually easier to find than when there is only one, as experience teaches us in every field of enquiry.’’ The third advantage is that our method provides a short 5 cut for the work of interpretation. On the question of the meaning of a passage it would not be necessary to consult theologians and interpreters of the Divine Word and commentators of all ages and countries and of every sect, and carefully weigh their opinions. Equipped with the norm we have provided, anyone will be able by his own efforts to search out and elicit the mind of God, 5.

The Dutch version has ‘is sufficient’.

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look into what others have searched out and elicited, and decide whether this is undoubtedly authentic. The amount of time thereby saved, the amount of toil and trouble avoided will not escape anyone who will consider the number and extent of the commentaries on the Holy Books that are worn out by the hands of Christians. These three advantages have regard to interpretation itself, making it surer, easier and swifter to accomplish. The remaining three advantages have regard to other points: the adulteration of the Holy Writings, the different readings, and finally the translation or version.6 Let us take these one by one. The fourth advantage is this, that this method of interpretation of ours can also serve to detect the mutilations and alterations of the manuscripts, both Hebrew and Greek. None of these, if we are to believe an eminent person well skilled in these matters, has been fortunate enough to escape interference from the hands of the ill-disposed, so as not to be contaminated and befouled with many faults. The fifth advantage is this, that it is useful for studying the different readings of Holy Scripture, distinguishing between the spurious and the authentic. Of these there is a liberal crop in both Testaments, so that in the Old Testament ‘‘. . . their abundance and confusion are such that the Rabbis themselves confess that it is difficult to distinguish true from false; and if one were to compare and examine all the manuscripts of the New Testament, one might discover almost as many differences as words.’’7 This is 6.

7.

See Lagre´e and Moreau (1988, 250). The last three advantages are probably drawn from the Critica sacra of Cappel, published in Paris in 1650. In Book 6 of this work, Cappel discusses the ‘sensus verus certissimus et indubitatus canon’ after rejecting the principle of textual antiquity as a criterion of authenticity. His work was the basis of the Protestant textual exegesis of the School of Saumur. See also F. LaPlanche, L’Ecriture, le sacre´, l’histoire (Amsterdam: APA, 1986), Part 2, chap. 4. The italics in the Dutch version suggest that the quotation begins with the phrase, ‘if one were to accept. . .’.

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the bold opinion of that same person who is considerably experienced in every form of this Doctrine and its literature. Finally, the sixth and last advantage is this, that for those who are ignorant of the original8 languages and have had no opportunity to study them, this is of no little help in enabling them to detect false translations of the Holy Books, arising either from defective texts or from spurious readings. That there may be, and indeed are, translations of this kind is confirmed by the widespread occurrences of mistakes. These last three advantages rest on the same foundation and derive in the same way from our norm of interpretation. For since there is nothing in Scripture that is not in conformity with truth, and since this truth can undoubtedly be elicited, and shown to be elicited, by our method, then also by this same method every corrupt text, spurious reading and mistranslation resulting in faulty teaching will be detected, and will be comprehended and proved to be what it is. This will banish all possibility of lapsing into error and of taking it and accepting it for truth. This is a danger that threatens all other interpreters and which they cannot escape as long as they lack the touchstone by which they can discover with certainty which passages are genuine and which corrupt, and can distinguish unerringly true from false readings, and infallibly determine which translations are correct and which are faulty and wrong. We have to say that we do not know where else they can acquire such a touchstone. These are the considerations which have persuaded me to print and publish this writing instead of suppressing it, considerations which far outweighed the two disadvantages I have cited when they were subjected to the just balance of my judgment and carefully weighed. Therefore, as soon as a suitable opportunity presented itself, I girded myself to the task and completed it in the form in which it is now given to the literary world. Apart from the two disadvantages already mentioned, another of perhaps a no less significant weight has not escaped my attention. 8.

The Dutch version has ‘Oriental’.

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There will be considerable numbers, especially theologians, who will rise up against me, my thesis and my treatise, and will unsheathe their pens. Unless I am willing to desert my own cause, I will have to join battle with them and in my turn draw the weapons of disputation. But this has never had so much influence with me as to make me even contemplate, far less decide, to withhold this writing from publication. If anyone should think fit to devote some hours to perusing this little treatise and to weigh in the balance of his judgment what he finds written there; and if he should apprehend with certainty and show with good reason in a public writing that the proof of our thesis is built on a faulty foundation or is falsely and wrongly deduced from true principles, or else that it cannot be properly defended and protected against attacks which may be levelled against it by others, or that the opinions of its opponents cannot be convincingly attacked and refuted and their arguments correctly answered and disposed of — then we too, in a public writing, after frankly admitting our error will thank them heartily for having taken the trouble to reveal to us our mistakes and to prevent others from being entangled and led astray by these same errors. We would hold nothing to be more precious, more important and desirable than to be taught the truth and to be brought back to the right road, if we have deviated from it. Perhaps someone else who has not rightly understood our intended meaning may bring forward problems and raise difficulties such as to give him pause, and be an obstacle to others in preventing them from understanding the force and evidence of our demonstration in every detail, or from seeing the complete vindication of our thesis against objections hurled against it, or from understanding our refutation of differing opinions, and so not giving our thesis their whole-hearted consent.9 If so, we shall try at once as best we can to rid them of those doubts and to dispel those mists that obscure the light of bountiful truth. Our time 9.

The Dutch version replaces this clause with, ‘and that he might consent to these’.

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and whatever is ours we shall think well employed if we can bring some light and some aid to a neighbour in his search for truth, and a truth of such importance. Finally, it may be that someone is firmly attached to his own opinion acquired from his teachers in boyhood or assimilated with blind enthusiasm; and therefore, in the belief that anything that differs from it even before he examines it is straightway false and deserving his hatred and repudiation, he will attack us and gnaw away at our thesis and treatise, which he cannot impugn with solid arguments and reasoning, by obtuse commentary and quibbling, and will vent his rage on the author with abuse and calumny. Or he may assemble in a pile many passages of Holy Scripture and, without any deduction or demonstration of the true sense, draw them up in a well-manned battle-line and set them against our thesis in irregular assaults, as is frequently the custom of theologians. To him and to others like him we shall not deign to make any reply; for as my sole aim in this treatise is to elicit truth, I do not care to compete in invective and cross swords with one who merely uses invective, nor to thrust back his calumnies down his throat — he deserves no other reply. I have always been averse to that kind of vulgar outburst with which many writers, as if seized with ungovernable madness, tear each other to pieces with the most violent and bitter words as though they were lashing and biting each other; and they sharpen their pens which (according to an eminent philosopher of our times) should be instruments of humanity, as if they were sword-points with which to leap upon and assail most wantonly the reputation of another. Besides, I do not have enough time, which I have dedicated entirely to my studies and the search for truth, so as to spend some in replying to a quibbler or a trivial accumulator of Scriptural passages. That would be a disgraceful waste; for such passages can shed no light nor be of any help in deciding this controversy, since it is the norm for investigating and discovering their meanings that is the subject of discussion and debate. So let everyone into whose hands this treatise may fall know in advance

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that if there are published some writings opposing it (which will perhaps be quite numerous) to which he sees no reply, that I regard them as dust, or rather, mere scurf. So I wish to give prior warning to anyone who is eager to write against me and attack my thesis and treatise, and I ask him to concern himself with the matter itself, abstaining from all gibes and calumny, and to be restrained, if he wants any reply to his writing from me. Furthermore, so that all may proceed more clearly, let him not, as theologians usually do, confuse and confound this question of the norm of interpretation of the Holy Writings with that other question about the judge of theological controversies, or with any other question that may be related to it. Let him carefully separate and distinguish these questions and address himself only to the examination and study of the first, leaving aside all the others. If he does this, I in turn pledge my word that I will welcome him in the same fashion with humanity and goodwill, and will satisfy his doubts and the difficulties he raises to the best of my ability in the confident hope — indeed, without the slightest doubt — that he will finally attain the truth with me, and will surrender to it and quit the arena. To achieve this end more easily and more happily, and to anticipate, as far as we are able, any scrap of doubt that could open the way to contradiction, we shall attempt to remove one objection — in my opinion, one of some weight; for we are firmly convinced that with its removal all will be plain sailing. This difficulty is as follows; if philosophy is the norm of interpretation of the Holy Writings in the way we have maintained, the Holy Writings themselves appear to be useless, written and transmitted to us in vain. For if the truths of all the meanings of Scripture, to be elicited and investigated with the help of philosophy, ought to be clear before they were elicited and investigated, what need is there to have recourse to Scripture and to consult it, in order to extract and learn these truths? Or what need to explain and expound Scripture by means of these truths, since these truths, already known, are not better known by means of these explanations, or even confirmed? So since in this way Scripture serves

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neither to teach truth nor to establish it, it seems to be of no use. But this finding is opposed to the unanimous agreement of Christian Churches of every country and every age, which have always proclaimed and pronounced with one voice that Scripture is of the highest and greatest utility. To find a reasonable solution to this knotty problem, and to explain it clearly, we think that the whole question must be referred back. All words can be considered in two ways: they can be taken absolutely or relatively. Taken absolutely, there is again a twofold division: they can be pronounced orally, or else written by hand. In the former case they are vocal sounds produced by the mouth and projected into the air. But when they are written, they are characters and marks inscribed and depicted on paper or other material. In both cases they can be said to be real entities. Considered from a relational perspective, when attention is given not so much to their nature as to the respect and relatedness included therein, they are signs of other things. And they are not natural signs, as they are called, which have some connection in nature with the thing signified, but arbitrary signs, as deriving their signification from human convention and decree, as we said in chapter two. And since the essence of a sign depends entirely not on nature but on reason, they are to that extent nothing other than entities of reason. Therefore considered absolutely, they can be known only through themselves alone; but considered relatively and as signs, they can be known only through the medium of other things, the things signified, since it is the property of relative things ‘to be and to be known simultaneously’.10 For example, the words ‘man’ and ‘tree’, when considered as vocal sounds or pictures composed of letters,11 can be understood through themselves. But when they are regarded as signs of concepts or things denoted by these words, they cannot be understood apart from these. And since knowledge of what is absolute is prior to 10. 11.

The Dutch version has only, ‘to be known simultaneously’. For ‘pictures composed of letters’ the Dutch version has ‘or written by pen’.

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knowledge of what is relative, the concept or thing on the one hand and the word considered absolutely on the other hand must be known before the latter can be known as sign and the former as what is signified. For we first know ‘man’ or ‘tree’, and these words through themselves, and then we decide among ourselves that these words will signify those concepts or things, or else we learn that this signification has already been decided by others. Since with philosophers cognition takes many forms, intellectual, sensual, or even a more rudimentary form if there be such, the form we are here discussing need not necessarily be rigorous and intellectual, though it may be; sensual cognition is enough, or something more rudimentary, if such can be found. For to know what is denoted by ‘man’ or ‘tree’, I do not have to have a clear idea of their inmost nature. It is enough that I have seen them once or a number of times, or got to know them by a different sense, or attained some knowledge of them in some other way, a point I familiar to all. From all these considerations, as that the words do not contain in themselves any analogy or anything of the concepts or things signified by them, it is not difficult to deduce how much help they can afford to the mind in acquiring knowledge of things. In the first place, no words taken in isolation with their meaning unknown can ever produce in the understanding ideas of the things they denote. If you were to hear or read a hundred times or more the words ‘God’ and ‘omniscience’ by no means would you thereby be brought to the knowledge of God or omniscience. Again, although these words are set before us in conjunction in a sentence and we have some sensual or more rudimentary knowledge of the things they designate, still in no way can they give rise to intellectual cognition; for the former mode of cognition (or any inferior mode) is not capable of generating the latter. For example, if someone were to encounter the statement ‘God is omniscient’, — someone who has only a rudimentary, not a rigorous, understanding of what God and omniscience are — he will not thereby attain to a true and intellectual understanding of this statement as a whole, so as to perceive clearly

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and distinctly in his mind that God is omniscient. Finally, however much we have clear and distinct ideas presented to the mind of things signified by words — e.g., God and omniscience — yet the sentence ‘God is omniscient’, either read or heard, will not be cause through itself of the proper understanding that God is omniscient, but only the occasional or impulsive cause, or something of the sort. For these words cannot bring it about by true causality that someone should have certain and evident assurance that omniscience pertains to God’s nature; they can only be the occasion or incitement whereby the intellect is roused and induced to contemplate more carefully the ideas of God and omniscience, to compare them one with another, and thus to apprehend that the latter is necessarily included in the former. Now since all books are formed of and comprise sentences interconnected and conjoined, it most evidently follows that the greatest and most useful assistance they can provide in getting to know and understand things truly and correctly consists only in this, that they inspire the reader to think and they urge him towards ideas which he already possesses in his mind in clear and distinct form, to contemplate what is denoted by the words in those books, to compare them and to see whether one is included in or connected with another. In no way can they lead the intellect either of itself or through itself to a true knowledge of things; far less can they implant in the mind clear and distinct ideas if these were not already infused and implanted in it, nor can they infuse, impress, or in any other way generate such ideas. With these preliminary remarks, to remove the difficulty mentioned above we say that Holy Scripture, being in accord with other books in being composed of sentences, must also be in accord with them in the teaching of truth. So its function is only to rouse its readers and to impel them to think about the matters set out therein, to look into them and consider whether the facts are as there set out.12 To succeed in this, philosophy and whatever clear knowledge they already possess must be summoned to their assistance, so that it may be seen in what way the

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predicate is in agreement with the subject, and that the truth of a statement may be extracted, and at the same time its true sense elicited and deduced. From this it is clear that in interpreting Scripture through philosophy truth does not always take precedence over the sense, and it is certainly not superfluous to refer to Scripture and to consult it. This is not so that Scripture may of itself generate truth in our minds or render it clearer or more distinct or confirm it; but, as we have said before, its function is to provide occasion and material for our thinking, thinking about things on which perhaps we would never otherwise have reflected. It is in respect of that which concerns the highest blessedness of men and thus conducive to their good beyond all else, and not in respect of teaching truth, that the utility of Scripture is greatest, far surpassing the utility of other books. In just the same way the utility of all books everywhere is judged and assessed as great or little in accordance with the excellence or lowliness of the subjects of which they treat. From this again, it is clearer than the midday sun how far from the path of truth do they deviate and go sadly astray, those theologians who are convinced, and convince others that a solid knowledge of sacred theology can be gained simply from reading the Holy Writings without consideration or contemplation of anything else; and thus commending only the reading of Scripture they dissuade and deter others from the study of philosophy and the other liberal disciplines. For without these no perfect knowledge of even a single thing, no clear and distinct idea can thus be acquired. Indeed, no false or defective idea can be corrected simply by reading the Bible; for if so, then all who assiduously read the Holy Books ought to have the same concepts of matters treated in them. Since this is not the case, we must try and explore another way to bring this about, that is, by a solemn rejection of all prejudices, a diligent contemplation of the things 12.

This appears to contradict Meyer’s own treatment of Scripture in his prologue and opening chapters as verbum Dei. See Bordoli (1997, 112) for a more detailed discussion of the issue of consistency.

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themselves, and as a result a true knowledge of those same things, which is what philosophy is. Therefore we give notice to all who are concerned with theology and who will understand and accept the truth of our thesis (for we do not believe that they are all so blinded that its light will not shine on any of them, or so obstinate that it will not win any adherent) and we ask them to strain every nerve and direct all their energies to the acquisition of true philosophy, if they are not already imbued with it, and under its auspices and leadership, rejecting the prejudices and dogmas which have found their way into theology with no sure and unshakable foundation, to discover and establish new teachings or to confirm and demonstrate the truth of the old. Although philosophy is still confined to a very small and narrow circle and thus cannot contribute very much to this end, and since among ancient philosophers, except for mathematicians, one can find nothing solid and demonstrated with certainty, and more recent philosophers have devised and discovered only a few things of this kind, we deem it the wiser course to know few things with certainty than to accept as true and certain many things that are false and dubious, and to thrust them upon others. Further, there is a quite reasonable hope that in these times, when its chief founder and propagator, Rene´ Descartes, first lit a torch for the world of letters and showed the way by his example, that the boundaries of philosophy will be extended far and wide by those who will tread in his footsteps. On the subject of God, the rational soul, man’s highest felicity,13 and other subjects such as concern the acquisition of eternal life, there will be published works of authority in the interpretation of Scripture, 13.

This triad recalls the title of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling, the Short Treatise on God, Man, & His Well-Being, probably written in the early 1660s and circulated among Spinoza’s circle, but unpublished until the nineteenth century. See Bordoli (1997, 116-117) for further discussion of the relationship between Meyer’s theological project and the methodology employed by Spinoza in this early work.

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and these will prepare the way, making it even and straight, whereby the Church of Christ, hitherto divided and torn by continual dissensions, will come together in sweet friendship.14 Bound by these close and gentle ties, united for the future and of one mind in this land,15 may it thrive, flourish, increase, attract and entice into its bosom nations as yet estranged from it, and finally triumph in blessedness in the heavens.16

14. 15. 16.

The Dutch version has, ‘may smoothly unite and come together in friendship and love’. For ‘land’ the Dutch version has ‘earth’. For this phrase the Dutch version has, ‘and they finally may participate in the perfect blessedness in the heavens’.

Appendix 1 Index of Biblical Citations Genesis: Exodus: Numbers: Deuteronomy: 1 Samuel: 1 Kings: 2 Kings: 2 Chronicles: Nehemiah: 2 Maccabees: Job: Psalms: Proverbs: Ecclesiasticus: Jeremiah: Daniel: Matthew:

6, 6 14, 31 32, 14 23, 19 4 15, 29 3, 12 18, 5-7 23, 25 1, 12 20, 20 8, 9 8, 9 7, 28 19, 25-27 2, 7 47, 9 62, 12 2, 6 8 1, 1 10, 7 2, 21 2, 17-18 & 23 3, 3 4, 13-16 5 5, 34-37 & 39-41 6, 5 8, 16-17

ch. 11 §9 3 §12 11 §9 11 §9 11 §9 11 §9 3 §21 3 §21 3 §21 5 §3 3 §12 11 §1 12 §1 8 §2 8 §2 3 §7 3 §7 4 §9 5 §3 9 §3 5 §3 3 §7 5 §3 13 §8 13 §8 13 §8 13 §8 11 §5 7 §5 13 §8

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Mark:

Luke:

John:

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9, 11 11, 25 12, 2 17, 5 23, 8 & 10 23, 14 26, 26-28 26, 45 4, 33-34 7, 3 & 4 14, 41 23, 34 5, 22 5, 33 6, 42 7, 22 10, 21 12, 58 13, 9 15, 12 22, 3 1, 43 2, 11 2, 19 3, 16 4, 39 5, 29 5, 34 5, 46 6, 35 & 40 & 70 6, 53 8, 30-31 & 45-46 10, 34 10, 37-38 & 42 14, 1 20, 19-20

7 §5 3 §7 7 §5 13 §9 13 §9 7 §5 3 §7 3 §24 11 §9 7 §5 3 §24 11 §9 7 §5 7 §5 12 3 §22 3 §7 3 §12 3 §13 7 §5 9 §3 9 §3 3 §12 3 §24 3 §7 3 §12 3 §24 16 §9 3 §12 3 §12 9 §2 3 §12 12 §2 3 §12 3 §12 3 §24

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21, 15-17 9, 22 17, 11 17, 24

3 §24 12 §2 12 §2 3 §7

4, 3 & 17 8 8, 8 10, 8 10, 14 10, 17 13, 9 1&2&3 15 5, 13 3, 6 2, 4 2, 8 2,21 6, 15 3, 16 1, 12 3, 15 1, 5 1, 17 2, 19 3 3, 14-15, 17 4, 12 1, 16 1, 21 2, 6 1, 20 1, 16 5, 9

3 §12 7 §3 9 §3 13 §8 3 §12 15 13 §8 7 §3 8 §2 3 §13 3 §12 7 §5 7 §5 3 §24 3 §7 13 §9 3 §12 13 §5 7 §3 5 §3 3 §12 7 §3 7 §4 13 §9 9 §3 3 §12 3 §12 12 §2 12 §2 16 §9

Paul: Epistle to the Romans:

1 Corinthians: 2 Corinthians: Galatians: Colossians: 1 Timothy: 2 Timothy: James:

1 Peter: 2 Peter: 1 John:

Appendix 2 Index of Authors Cited Meyer’s references are often incomplete or oblique. Not included in the listing below are the many popes to whom he refers (but whom he never quotes). Missing also (for want of information) are Cagliari, Fayus, and Marloratus. Agelli, Antonio (1532-1608): Italian playwright. Alsted, John Henry (1588-1638): German theologian. Bayle describes him as a prolific writer, one of whose goals was to summarize all the subjects in the arts and sciences within a single method. Alting, John Henry (1583-1644): A conservative theologian who taught at Groningen. Ambrose, St. (340-397). Anselm, St., of Canterbury (1033-1109). Anselm: Probably Anselm of Laon, an eleventh-century theologian who was the author of a line by line commentary on the Scriptures. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.). Asconius [Asconius Pedianus] (ca. 3-88): Roman grammarian of the first century, a commentator on Cicero and teacher of Titus Livius and Quintilian. Augustine [Aurelius Augustinus] (354-430). Basil (329-379): Bishop of Caesarea. Bede, the Venerable (673-735). Bellarmine, Robert (1542-1621): Catholic cardinal and Jesuit, one of the most respected theologians of his time according to Bayle. He was widely respected by Protestant theologians as well.

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Beze [or Beza], Theodore de (1519-1603): A disciple and friend of Calvin in Geneva, who also taught Greek at Lausanne. Cajetan [Cajetanus], Thomas de Vio (1468-1533): Dominican cardinal and papal legate at the imperial diet of Augsburg, the author of many commentaries on Aquinas. Calvin, John (1509-1564): Author of the Institutiones Religionis Christianae (1536). Canus, Melchior [Melior Cano], O.P. (1509-1560): Professor at Alcala, author of a commentary on Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologica and of De locis theologicis. Casmanus [Otto Casmann] (1562-1607): Rector in Stade and author of several philosophical and scientific workd, including Philosophiae et Christianae et verae asertio. Chamier, Daniel (1565-1621): French Protestant theologian and critic of Bellarmine. His Panstratiae catholicae was written for the Synod of Rochelle (1596). He was also a delegate of the Reformed Churches of France at the Synod of Dordrecht. Bayle describes him as rude and inflexible. Chrysostom, John (347-407). Cicero, Marcus Tullius (106-43 B.C.). Clauberg, John (1622-1665): German philosopher and logician who promoted cartesianism in Germany. His Logica vetus et nova (Duisburg, 1656) was in Spinoza’s personal library and he heavily influenced the logic of Port Royal. Claudian, Claudius [Claudius Claudianus]: Latin poet of the fourth century A.D., whose De raptu Proserpinae imitated Ovid. Clement of Alexandria (ca. 160-220). Conimbricenses: The Conimbricenses were a school of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Jesuit philosophy professors at the University of Coimbra. Their commentaries on Aristotle and other texts included summaries, explanations, and review questions; and they were widely used as texts in schools throughout Europes. Their works went through more than one hundred printings in Europe alone, and were also translated into Chinese. Principal

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thinkers in the school included Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1597), Cosmos Maggalliano (1553-1624), Emanuel de Goe¨s (1560-1597), Sebastiao do Couro (1567-1639), and Calthazar Alvarez (1561-1630). Cyrillus [Cyril of Scythopolis] (ca. 524-558). Damian, Peter (1007-1072). Daneau, Lambert (1530-1593): Protestant theologian and jurisprudentist who was a pastor in Geneva and later in Leiden. Dannhau[w]er, Johann Conrad (1603-1666): author of the Hermeneutica Sacra sive Methodus exponandarum S. Literarum proposita & vindicata (1654). Descartes, Rene´ (1596-1650). Dionysius the Carthusian (1402-1471): Commentator on the Pauline Epistles. Episcopius [Bischop], Simon (1585-1643): Dutch theologian and disciple of Arminius, who fled to France after the condemnation of the Remonstrants in 1619. He edited the Confession of the Remonstrants (1622). Erasmus Desiderius (1466-1536): Meyer frequently makes use of his annotations on the New Testament. Heide, Abraham van der (1597-1678): Dutch Protestant pastor who opposed the Remonstrants. He was a cartesian and professor at Leiden. He wrote in opposition to the decree of 1676 prohibiting the teaching of Descartes’ philosophy. Hemmingius [Hemmingsen], Niels (1513-1600): Professor of theology in Copenhagen. Herodotus (ca. 484-425 B.C.). Hilary of Poitiers (303-367). Hoornbeek, John (1617-1666): Professor of theology at Utrecht and Leiden, he was active in the apostolate to the Jews. Horace [Quintus Horatius Flaccus] (65-8 B.C.). Hugo [Cardinal Hugh of St. Cher] (1200-1263): A Dominican

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who compiled the first concordance to the Bible, and was also the first to divide the Old and New Testaments into chapters. Hyperius, Andreas (1530-1563). Jerome [Hieronymus], St. (331-420). Junius, Franciscus [Franc¸ois de Jon] (1545-1602): A translator of the Old and New Testaments. The translation by Tremellius (quem vide) was also popular in the seventeenth century. A combined edition, edited by Junius and Tremellius was published in 1618 (Hanoviae: C. Schleichus), and was also in Spinoza’s library. Juvenal [Decimus Iurius] (42-125). Kekkermann [or Keckermann, or Kekkerman], Bartolomaeus (1571-1609): German intellectual who attempted to systematise all of the sciences, author of the Systema theologiae (1615). Leringius [St. Vincent of Lerins] (died ca. 450): Catholic apologist, author of Commonitorium pro catholicae fidei antiquitate et universitate adversus profanas omnium haereticorum novitates. Lipsius, Justus (1547-1606): A leading apologist for the revival of Stoicism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Lucan [Marcus Annaeus Lucanus] (39-65). Lucretius [Titus Lucretius Carus] (98-55 B.C.): Roman poet. Luther, Martin (1483-1546): His De servo arbitrio dates from 1525. Magirus, Johannes (16th century): Author of the Phsyiologica peripatetica (first edition, Frankfurt, 1597), which saw many later editions and was used by Isaac Newton in his studies. Martyr [Vermigli], Peter (1500-1562): Calvinist theologian who taught in Strasbourg and Zurich. Masius, Salernitanus [Salernitano Masuccio] (15th century).

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Misner, Balthazar (1587-1626): Anti-Socinian theologian, author of Consideratio theologiae pholinianae (1619). Melanchton, Philipp (1497-1560): German theologian and co-author of the Confession of Augsburg, author of the Dialectica (1533). Montanus [Arias Montano Benito] (1527-1598). Mornay, Philippe du Plessis (1549-1623): A friend of Henry IV, called ‘The Pope of the Huguenots’, author of De la ve´rite´ de la religion chre´tienne contre les athe´es, e´picuriens, juifs, mahome´tans et autres infide`les (Paris, 1582). Meusel [Musculus], Wolfgang (1497-1563): A Benedictine who converted to Lutheranism in 1527, he was a preacher in Augsburg and a professor of theology at Bern. Ostorodt, Christopher (1575-1611): Polish Socianian pastor, expelled from Amsterdam in 1598. Ovid [Publius Ovidius Naso] (ca. 43 B.C.-16 A.D.). Paphnutius, St. (fl. 370). Pareus, Ambrosius [Ambroise Pare´] (1510-1590). Pico de la Mirandola (1463-1494). Piscator [Fischer], John (1545-1625): Professor at the University of Herborn, one of the editors and commentators of the works of Luther. Platina, Bartolomeo (1421-1481): Author of Vitae Platinae historici liber de vita Christi ac omnium pontificum qui hactenus ducenti fuere, which was an attack on Pope Paul II. Meyer appears to have used this work as a source for his references to earlier popes. Plato (429-347 B.C.). Plautus [Publius Terentius Afer] (250-184 B.C.). Pliny [Gaius Plinius Secundus] (23-79): Roman historian and encyclopaedist. Polanus [Amandus Polan von Polandorf] (1561-1610): Professor of the Old Testament at Bale, author of Syntagma theologiae christianae (1617). Quintilian, Fabius [Marcus Fabius Quintilianus] (35-100).

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Ravanellus, Peter: His Bibliotheca sacra was published in Geneva in 1650. Sadeel, Antonius (1534-1591): This was one of the several pseudonyms used by Antoine de la Roche Chandieu, a French noble and Reformed theologian who wrote a number of critiques directed against the spread of rationalism and platonism. His major work on scriptural exegesis, written under the name of ‘Sadeel’, was De verbo Dei scripto (1580). Scarpius [Francesco Scarpa] (17th century): Member of the School of Saumur. Schlichting, Jonas (1592-1661): Socianian theologian, and author of biblical commentaires. Ser[r]arius, Peter [Pierre Serrurier] (1600-1669): Millenarian author, personal friend of Spinoza. Servius [Marcus Servius Honoratus] (4th century A.D.): Latin grammarian and commentator on Vergil. Smalcius, Valentine (1572-1622): Socinian theologian. Stapleton, Thomas (1535-1598): Catholic apologist who fled England for Flanders, and later became Professor of Sacred Scripture at Louvain. Sulpicius Severus, Alexander (3rd century). Suarez, Francisco (1548-1617): Spanish Jesuit theologian. Terence [Publius Terentius Afer] (194-159 B.C.). Theodoretus (393-460): Commentator on the Pauline Epistles. Theophylactus (11th century): Commentator on the Pauline Epistles. Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274). Tilenus, Daniel (1563-1633): Calvinist theologian who became a convert to Arminianism. Timplerus [Clemens Timpler] (fl. 1600): Professor of grammar at Steinfurt, author of Metaphysicae systema methodicum (Steinfurt, 1604).

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Tremellius, I. (16th century): Translator of the Old and New Testaments. Trithemeus [John Tritheim] (1462-1516): Abbot of Spanheim and a reputed magician, as well as scriptural commentator. Valerius Flaccus [Gaius Valerius Flaccus Balbus Setinus] (ca. 45-92): Latin author of epic verse. Valerus Magnus: Capuchin apologist, author of Judicium de catholicorum et catholicorum credendi regula (Prague, 1628). Vatablis [Franc¸ois Vatable] (ca. 1500): Translator and editor of many of Aristotle’s works. Vergil [Publius Vergilius Maro] (71-19 B.C.): The spelling ‘ Virgilius’ is a corruption. Vossius, G. J. (1577-1649): Historian and grammarian. His Institutiones oratoriae dates from 1606, and his Opera Omnia was published in Amsterdam in 1641. Walaeus [Anthony de Waele] (1573-1639): Theologian at Leiden. Wendelin [or Wandelin, Wendelinus], Mark Frederick (1584-1652): Anti-Lutheran theologian at Leiden, author of Theologiae christianae (Hannover, 1634). Whit[t]aker, William (1548-1595): Cambridge theologian and critic of Bellarmine, Stapleton, and the Arminians. His Disputatio de S. Scriptura dates from 1588. Zanchi [Zanchius], Jerome (1516-1590): Italian reformer and professor of Scripture at Heidelberg and Neustadt, author of De sacra Scriptura Tractatus (1613). He was regarded as a moderate Catholic apologist, and proposed dialogue with Protestant theologians. He converted to Calvinism late in life. Zwingli, Ulrich (1484-1531): Swiss reformer.

Appendix 3 Glossary of Sects and Religious Movements in Seventeenth-Century Holland A full account of the history and development of the movements and sects at this period can be found in Meinsma.1 but we offer a brief reference summary of the principal ones here. ANABAPTISTS: They rejected the baptism of children, and preferred to refer to themselves as ‘Baptists’. The movement began in Zurich, where in 1525 Konrad Grebel underwent a second public baptism. It quickly spread throughout southern Germany and the Netherlands. Its adherents aspired to a community of true believers, rejecting both eccelsiastical and political institutions, as well as private property. Melchior Hoffmann gave to the movement a revolutionary and apocalyptic character with his prophecy of the coming of a new kingdom of God. The New Jerusalem was founded at Munster by Jan Beuckelzoon of Leiden and Jan Matthysz of Haarlem. On 25 June 1535 the city 1.

See K. O. Meinsma, Spinoza et son cercle, traduit du ne´erlandais par S. Roosenburg, appendices latins et allemands traduits par J.-P. Osier (Paris: Vrin, 1983). Many corrections and bibliographical additions to the Dutch edition of 1896 have been made in this translation. For more detailed studies of the religious movements in seventeenth-century Holland, see also Pierre Clair, Libertinage et incre´dules (Paris: CNRS, 1983); Karlfried Grunder and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggeman, ed., Spinoza in der Fru¨hzeit seiner religio¨sen Wirkung (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1984); H. G. Heimbrock, Vom Heil der Seele: Studien zum Verha¨ltnis von Religion und Psychologie bei Baruch Spinoza (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1981); and H. J. Siebrand, Spinoza and the Netherlanders (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1988).

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was retaken by the troops of its bishop. The leaders of the Anabaptists were tortured and executed, and their bodies were hung in cages from the church clock (the cages remain today). The movement in the Netherlands was more moderate, and under the leadership of Menno Simons changed its name to ‘Mennonite’. ANTITRINITARIANS: They rejected the dogma of the Trinity and the divinity of Christ. Their teachings had roots in the early church, but enjoyed a strong revival in the sixteenth century under the leadership of H. Denck and Sebastian Franck: their teachings were also accepted by the Anabaptists, Enthusiasts, and Socinians (quod vide). One of the most famous supporters was Michael Servet, who was executed by Calvin’s order. ARIANS: Supporters of the teachings of Arius (died in 336), who denied the divinity of Christ. In seventeenth-century Netherlands, the term ‘Arian’ was primarily used as an insult directed at Antitrinitarians. ARMINIANS: Supporters of Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609), also called ‘Remonstrants’. In 1604 an academic debate on divine election was held at Leiden between Arminius and Gomarus, the former arguing that it was provisional and dependent upon providential faith. The polemic quickly became political, with the Remonstrant position supported by the Grand Pensioner. The stathouder Maurice of Orange took sides with the Counter-Remonstrants or Gomarists. At the Synod of Dordrecht (1618-1619) the Counter-Remonstrants achieved a pyrrhic victory. The Remonstrant position, supported by John de Wit, retained political power: this position was based upon biblical humanism and religious tolerance. The Remonstrants founded their own church, which continues to exist in the Netherlands today. BAPTISTS: Disclaiming membership in the Anabaptist sect, they also rejected baptism for children. The movement was born in England, and spread widely in its colonies. John

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Bunyan (author of The Pilgrim’s Progess) was a Baptist. BORELISTS: Supporters of Adam Boreel (1603-1666) who founded a group of collegiants with Daniel van Breen and Michael Comans. They rejected every religious authority and any confession of faith. Boreel is sometimes (and incorrectly) cited as the author of A Light on the Candlestick, a work by Pieter Balling.2 BROWNISTS: Followers of Robert Browne (1549-1636) who argued for total separation of church and state and the autonomy of local ecclesiastical communities with total independance from synods and bishops. One of its important disciples was John Robinson (1576-1625), who was the spiritual leader of a group of Brownists at Leiden, and emigrated to the British colonies in the new world in 1620 on the Mayflower. As Puritans, Browne and Robinson supported the Gomarists, but their notion of the church was similar to that of the Remonstrants. CALVINISTS: Disciples of John Calvin (1509-1564). Calvinism was the official state religion of the Netherlands. The religion is notable for its rigorous orthodoxy, intolerance, moral rigidity, and rigid identification of divine grace with predestination. Salvation is assured by faith rather than by works. State and church are conceived as wholly independant entities. COLLEGIANTS: The Collegiants of Rijnsburg were born when the Remonstrant community of Rijnsburg found itself without a pastor. Under direction of the Van der Kodde family, a group of people from Warmond became established at Rijnsburg. They rejected all ecclestiastical authority and recognised only the authority of Scripture. Many Collegiant groups3 developed throughout the Netherlands, and many Mennonites joined them. The Collegiants were 2.

A Latin translation of Light on the Candlestick is included among Boreel’s Works, and was consequently attributed to him, though he was only the translator.

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less a definite religious sect than a general movement, and the term was often used in the seventeenth century as an umbrella for dissidents of many kinds.4 COUNTER-REMONSTRANTS: Also called ‘Gomarists’, they adhered to a strict doctrine of predestination, and were politically supported by Prince Maurice of Orange (vide Arminians). THE CURIOUS: Not really a sect or movement, they supported communication with divinity through observation of and meditation about the world about them and proposed travel expeditions to further such understanding. Many of them were present in the French army during the war with Holland. ENTHUSIASTS: The Enthusiasts, also called Schwa¨rmer or ‘Spiritualists’, opposed all dogma, confessions of faith, and ecclesiastical authority. Their members were often found in Anabaptist communities. GOMARISTS: Also known as Counter-Remonstrants, they were disciples of Franciscus Gomarus (1563-1641) who accepted a strictly orthodox interpretation of predestination. INDEPENDENTS: Also known as Congregationalists, they were also opposed to all forms of religious authority. LUCIANISTS: This was not a movement or sect so much as a poetic term applied in the seventeenth century to free3.

4.

A collegium was an independent discussion group, typically devoted to an unconventional religious view. Collegiant (as dissident religious movements were often called) meetings began in Amsterdam in the early seventeenth century, were interrupted to some extent in 1648, but drew the attention of the Consistory in 1650. Cornelius Moorman, Daniel van Breen, and Adam Boreel (1603-1666) were among the leaders of these small discussion groups, which met regularly to discuss and interpret scriptural passages. See Louis Van Bunge, Johannes Bredenburg (1643-1691): Een Rotterdamse Collegiant in de ban van Spinoza (Rotterdam: Universiteits Erasmus Drukkerij, 1990).

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thinkers. The name is derived from Lucian (120-180), who derided the Greek gods. The term was applied to Spinoza’s friend and teacher Franciscus Van den Enden. LUTHERANS: This movement was founded by Martin Luther (1483-1546) and had few adherents in Holland. The two principal factions in the seventeenth century were centered in Wittenberg and Helmstadt. Colerus, Spinoza’s first biographer, was a member of the more rigorous Wittenberg faction. MENNONITES: Disciples of Menno Simons (1496-1561), an Anabaptist who argued for pacifism and religious tolerance. MILLENARIANS: They believed in the proximity of the return of Christ, and their followers were often members of Anabaptist communities. QUAKERS: Also called ‘Tremblers’, the movement was founded by George Fox (1624-1691) and had many supporters in Holland. They opposed all ritual and emphasized a personal religious experience based upon the ‘inner light’. They were also pacifists. Some researchers believe that what is probably Spinoza’s earliest work, the Korte Verhandeling, may have been written at the request of Quaker friends, and perhaps may have been used as a discussion topic at informal Quaker meetings.5 In the seventeenth century there was an influx of English Quaker leaders into the Netherlands. SOCINIANS: They were disciples of the two cousins Laelius (1526-1562) and Faustus (1539-1605) Socinus. The De Jesu Christo Servatore, a principal document of the movement, was published in 1594.6 Banished from Poland in 1656, they were very numerous in seventeenth-century 5.

Two articles by Richard H. Popkin explore these and other possible relationships. See ‘‘Spinoza, the Quakers, and the Millenarians,’’ Manuscrito 6 (1982), 113-133; and ‘‘Spinoza’s Relations with the Quakers in Amsterdam,’’ Quaker History 73 (1984), 14-28.

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Holland,7 and their members exercised considerable influence among Arminian and Mennonite communities as well. They placed great emphasis on freedom of the will, and argued that scripture could always be reconciled with reason. TRINITARIANS: They accepted the doctrine of the Trinity. Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Catholicism were Trinitarian positions. In 1653, six pastors delegated by their Synods wrote to the Dutch Assembly to complain about the proliferation of heresy and the publication of heretical books. An edict issued by the Assembly in September of that year prohibited both the sale and possession of heretical books. The effects of this and other edicts which followed are difficult to assess, beyond the fact that there was a cessation, but only a brief one, of Collegiant meetings in Amsterdam. In general the civil authorities were reluctant to take any genuinely effective actions in response to the Consistory’s repeated complaints until they were goaded into lashing out against Adriaan Koerbagh, for whose works a formal trial of heresy was begun in 1668.8

6. 7.

The work was actually written by Faustus Socinus (Rakow, Poland: Typis Alexii Rodecii, 1594). Amsterdam was the place of publication of the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum (ed. A. Wiszowaty and F. Kuyper. Irenopoli [i.e., Amsterdam]: 1660), a massive ten-volume compilation of the works of Faustus Socinus and his followers.

Appendix 4 Decree of the State of Frisia Against the PSSI The translation from Dutch into Latin is by Arnoldus, Dissertatiuncula [...], 1667, pp. 56-58. The Latin text is reprinted in Bordoli (1997, 419-421). Ordinum Frisiae Deputati. Omnibus hasce lecturis, visuris, auditurisque Salutem. Cum postremis hisce temporibus multifaria seges fanaticorurn hominum suppullulet, qui perniciosis admodum dogmatibus obstetricantur, eaque typis vulgare praesumant, ut varios errores spargendo Ecclesiam Christi infestent, adversum quos, quominus populus Dei seducatur, Christiani Magistratus est sollicite` attendere. Quare cu`m Nobis constaret, librum Latino jJjomate exaratum, sub titulo Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres, S. Exercitatio paradoxa, qua veram Philosophiam infallibilem S. literas interpretandi normam esse apodicte` demonstratur, & discrepantes ab hac sententia expenduntur ac refelluntur, extare, Visum Nobis est, eundem librurn serio` interdicere; cum ut titulus ejus praefixus prodit, compluribus scateat positionibus blasphemis, quibus author, cujus nomen subticetur, quantum in se est, sacro-sanctum verbum Dei in dubium vocare nititur, atque adeo omnem religionis certitudinem evertere. Proinde omnibus in Provincia nostra Bibliopolis & Typographis strenue` mandamus, ne praedictum librum imprimant, aut imprimere faciant, aut alibi impressum in hanc Provinciam inferant, vaenum exponant vendantve; illis vero`, penes quos impraesentiarum reperitur, ut eum extemplo supprimant; mulctandi alia`s non tantudm librorurn confiscatione, sed & quinquaginta aureis Frisiacis Equitibus, distribuendis ex aequo inter loci Magistratum, pauperes, & accusatorem. Quo fine

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omnibus etiam Magistratibus Praetoribus injungimus, non tantu`m, ut hoc Placitum nostrum locis solitis affigant & promulgent, sed etiam, ut vigili curaˆ ab immorigeris praedictam mulctam sine ulla procrastinatione aut dissimulatione exigere adnitantur. Actum in Collegio Ordd. Deputatt. 10. Novemb. 1666. W. Uma vidit. Ad mandatum Nobiliss. & Potent. DD. Depp. Ordd. G. Kutsch.

Appendix 5 Propositions Censured by the Curator of the University of Leiden 16 January 1676 The Latin text is reprinted in Bordoli (1997, 420-421). 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Patribus Veteris Testamenti ante ultima tempora non fuisse collata vera & permanentia bona, ipsamque salutem non fuisse ipsis reapse patefactam. Non potuisse habere conscientiam tranquillam. Spiritum S. in ipsis non produxisse effectus Deo, ut Patre, dignos, nec ipsis, ut Filiis dignos. Obnoxios per omnem vitam fuisse imperio Diaboli & metui mortis. Solu`m decalogum fuisse foedus gratiae in Veteri Testamento, inscriptionem vero` legis in cordibus fidelium non esse inter bona Veteris Testamenti. In rebus fidei normam & mensuram veritatis esse claram & distinctam perceptionem. Scripturam loqui secundum erronea vulgi praejudicia. Omnipraesentiam Dei esse efficacissimam Dei voluntatem, qua omnia sustentat, & gubernat, explicandam ab operatione qua extra se aliquid producit. Angelos posse esse praesentes in spatiis dissitis, in iisque simul operari. Omnem Philosophiam esse religionis expertem, summumque hominis bonum esse animum suaˆ sorte contentum. Mundum ortum esse ex certis principiis, veluti seminibus.

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Eum extensione infinitum esse, ita ut impossibile sit dari plures mundos. Animam hominis nil nisi cogitationem esse, eaˆque sublataˆ posse hominem vivere, & moveri. Nihil ad humanam naturam facere praeter cogitationem. Voluntatem hominis absolute` esse liberam, & indeterminatam, & aeque` infinitam esse ratione objectorum, ac est Dei voluntas. Deum posse fallare [sic], si velit. Habere nos facultatem, quaˆ cavere possumus ne unquam erremus. Errorem vero tantu`m esse in voluntate. De omnibus rebus esse dubitandum, etiam de Dei existentia, & ita dubitandum, ut habeantur pro falsis. Homines habere ideam adaequatam de Deo. Philosophiam esse S. Scripturae interpretem.

Appendix 6 Chronology 1536 1565 1579 1594 1600? 1602 1603 1609 1610 1614 1618 1619

1628 1629 1630

Calvin publishes the Institution of the Christian Religion. Beginning of the war of independence of the Spanish-Dutch region against Spain. The ‘‘Union of Utrecht’’ establishes the United Provinces. Publication of Socinus’ De Christo Servatore. The Espinosa family emigrates from Portugal to Nantes, and thence to Amsterdam. Foundation of the East India Company. Arminius and Gomar debate at Leiden on the questions of tolerance and freedom of the will. Foundation of the Bank of Amsterdam. Uytenbogaert, a disciple of Arminius and teacher of Oldenbarneveldt, publishes the Remonstrant Manifesto. H. de Groot begins work on the De Imperio Summarum Potestarum (published in 1647). The Thirty Years War begins. The Synod of Dordrecht condemns Arminianism and puts Oldenbarneveldt to death. The Collegiant sect is formed. Descartes is a soldier in the army of Maurice of Nassau. Descartes is living in Holland. 18 October: Lodewijk Meyer is baptised at the Old Church in Amsterdam. 4 November: Johannes Bouwmeester is born in Amsterdam.

PSSI 1632 1633 1636 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1645

1647

1648 1649 1650

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24 November: Birth of Baruch d’Espinosa in Amsterdam. Papal condemnation of Galileo, who is placed under house arrest. Descartes decides not to publish Le Monde. Carried clandestinely to Amsterdam, Galileo’s Discourse Concerning Two New Sciences is published by Elzevier. The founding of the Portuguese Synagogue of Amsterdam. Spinoza is registered as a student in the Hebrew school. Naude´, a ‘‘libertine’’ philosopher, publishes his Considerations Politiques sur les Coups d’Etat, a work inspired by Machiavelli. Beginning of the English civil war. Descartes’Meditationes de Prima Philosophia is published. Jansenius publishes Augustinus. Hobbes publishes De Cive. Milton publishes the Areopagitica, a manifesto for freedom of the press. Herbert of Cherbury publishes his De Religione Gentilium. Descartes’ Me´ditations Metaphysiques published in French translation. 20 March: The curator of the University of Leiden prohibits mention of the name of Descartes in theses and in disputations. The Peace of Munster. Definitive establishment of the United Provinces. Charles I of England is executed. 11 February: Death of Descartes. 6 November: A failed coup d’e´tat by William II of Orange. Jan de Witt becomes the Grand Pensioner

Meyer

1651

1653

1654

1655 1656

1657

1658

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of the Netherlands. Beginning of the Anglo-Dutch War. Cromwell institutes the Act of Navigation. Hobbes publishes the Leviathan. Meyer begins writing poetic verses. 30 March: Bouwmeester is enrolled in philosophy courses at the University of Leiden. Meyer oversees the publication of Alhardt Ko´k’s Radt Van Avondtuuren. A decree by the States General prohibits the publication and diffusion of Socianian works and ideas. End of the Anglo-Dutch War. Spinoza begins to meet with a group of ‘churchless Christians’ (Balling, Jelles, Rieuwertsz, Franciscus van den Enden) in Amsterdam. An edition of Hofman’s Nederlandtsche WoordenSchat (first edition, 1650) appears under Meyer’s editorship. 19 September: Meyer is enrolled as a student in philosophy at the University of Leiden. Meyer edits De Christlyke Gho´dt-ghe-leertheidt of Wendelinus. 27 July: Spinoza is banished from the Jewish community in Amsterdam. He begins the study of humanities, Latin, philosophy, and theatre at the school of the ex-Jesuit, Van den Enden. 6 October: Decree of the States of Holland and of Frisia prohibiting the teaching of Cartesianism. Meyer translates into Dutch the Medulla Theologica of Ames, and dedicates it to his teacher Senguerd. The play Philedonius of Franciscus van den Enden is produced in Amsterdam. Spinoza is still studying with Van den Enden, and may also be enrolled at the University of Leiden. Meyer publishes the comedy, De Looghenaar, which is produced in Amsterdam on 8 April.

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1659 1660

1661 1662

1663

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27 May: Bouwmeester receives a doctorate in medicine from the University of Leiden. 25 September: Meyer is enrolled in courses in medicine at Leiden. Spinoza begins work on the Tractatus De Intellectus Emendatione (unfinished). Adriaan Koerbagh receives a doctorate in medicine from the University of Leiden. Restoration of the Stuarts in England. Spinoza leaves Amsterdam and moves to Rijnsburg, where he is a familiar visitor among Collegiant circles. He begins work on the Korte Verhandeling. 19 March: Meyer receives a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Leiden. 20 March: Meyer receives a doctorate in medicine. Beginning of the reign of Louis XIV. 16 October: Meyer marries Constantia Caret at the Old Church. Founding of the Royal Society. Oldenburg is its joint-secretary, and Boyle and Newton are charter members. Spinoza completes the first part of the (tripartite) Ethica (De Deo). He begins work on the Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae and the Cogitata Metaphysica. Het Licht Op den Kandelaar is published anonymously in Amsterdam. Simon Joosten de Vries meets with Spinoza at a meeting of the ‘Spinozistic Circle’ in Amsterdam (Ep8). EP12 and EP12a from Spinoza to Meyer, the latter concerning the publication of the Principia. Spinoza is installed at Voorburg. He there publishes the Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae with the Cogitata Metaphysica as appendix.

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1664 1665

1666 1667 1668

1669

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31 July: Spinoza writes to Oldenburg and introduces Petrus Serrarius 3 August: Spinoza writes Ep15 to Meyer concerning Meyer’s editorship and preface to the Principia, which is published several months later. Beginning of the (second) Anglo-Dutch War. The new edition (revised and enlarged) of the Catechism of Rakow is published in Amsterdam (first Latin edition, 1609). De Iure Ecclesiasticorum is published in Amsterdam. 16 January: Spinoza’s Ep20 to Blyenbergh on the interpretation of Scripture. Spinoza makes several visits to Amsterdam, where he probably visits with Meyer during March and April.. 26 May: The new Amsterdam Theatre opens, with Meyer as its director. Spinoza completes the first drafts of parts II and III of the (tripartite) Ethica. He writes to Bouwmeester (Ep28). Meyer publishes the PSSI anonymously (Jan.-Feb). 10 July: Spinoza’s Ep37 to Bouwmeester. End of the Anglo-Dutch war. Meyer’s PSSI appears in a Dutch translation. Spinoza’s Ep40 to Jelles mentions Voss as a friend. Meyer publishes and produces in Amsterdam the tragedy, Ghulde Vlies. Adriaan Koerbagh’s Een Bloemhof is published. The author is condemned by ecclesiastical authorities, and imprisoned 19 July. The fifth edition, in three parts of Wordeschat, with Meyer listed as editor. 15 October: Adriaan Koerbagh dies in prison.

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1670

1671

1672

1673

1674

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26 October: Founding of the society Nil Volentibus Arduum. Meyer publishes the comedy, Het Spoockend Weeuwtje. Spinoza publishes (anonymously and in Latin) the Tractatus theologico-politicus: ecclesiastical condemnations follow. Posthumous publication of the Pense´es of Pascal. Spinoza is installed in the Hague, where he prevents (possibly at the suggestion of Jan de Witt) the appearance of the vernacular edition of the Tractatus theologico-politicus (see Ep44). Allusions to the PSSI in Ep52 from Van Velthuysen to Ostens. Louis XIV invades Holland. The French army occupies Utrecht (May). William II of Orange becomes stadthouder (July). The Amsterdam Theatre is closed. 20 August: Jan de Witt and his brother are massacred by a mob, probably inspired by Calvinist clergy. Spinoza declines the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg (Ep47, Ep48). Spinoza visits the military camp of the Prince de Conde´. Huygens publishes the Horologium Oscillatorium. Meyer composes a poem for Bouwmeester on the occasion of his forty-third birthday. 13 November: The French occupation of Utrecht ends. 19 July: The States of Holland publish a formal condemnation of the Tractatus theologico-politicus and ‘other heretical and atheistic writings’ including the PSSI and the works of Hobbes and the Socinians. Malebranche publishes the Recherche de la Ve´rite´,

Meyer

1675

1676

1677

1678 1680 1681

1685 1687 1688 1689

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which is accused of being of Spinozist inspiration. Spinoza completes and circulates the Ethica, but declines to publish it. He begins work on the Tractatus politicus. Spinoza writes to Schuller (Ep72) expressing his distrust of Leibniz. 16 January: The curator of the University of Leiden issues a new promulgation against Cartesianism. Spinoza’s Ep76 to Burgh. The Synod of The Hague orders an inquiry into the authorship of the Tractatus theologico-politicus. 21 February: Death of Spinoza. His friends edit and publish the Opera Posthuma and Nagelate Schriften, all of whose contents are condemned by the political authorities and Calvinists the following year. 28 December: The Amsterdam Theatre is reopened, with Bouwmeester and Pels as its directors. Meyer translates into Dutch Racine’s Andromaque. 22 October: Death of Bouwmeester. Bossuet writes the Politique Tire´e de l’Ecriture Sainte and also his Discours sur l’Histoire Universelle, and succeeds in preventing the publication of Richard Simon’s Critical History of the Old Testament (which draws its inspiration from the Tractatus theologico-politicus). 25 November: Meyer is listed in the registry of deceased persons in the Old Church in Amsterdam. Louis XIV revokes the Edict of Nantes. Newton publishes the first edition of the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. The ‘‘Glorious Revolution’’: William III becomes King of England. Locke publishes his Letter on Tolerance and his Essay on Civil Government.

Bibliography Works of Meyer [First edition] Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres. Exercitatio paradoxa in qua veram philosophiam infallibilem S. Literas interpretandi normam esse, apodictice demonstratur et discrepantes ab hac sententiae expenduntur ac refelluntur. Eleutheropoli, anno 1666. [Second edition] Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres, ab Authore longe emendatior. Published under the general title: Danielis Hensii pp, Operum historicum, editio secundi priori editione multo emendatior et auctior, accedunt quaedam hactenus inedita. Lugd. Batav. apud Isaacum Herculis, 1673. [Third edition] Spinoza, Benedictus de. Tractatus theologicopoliticus cui adjunctus est Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres, ab authore longe emendatior. (Amsterdam), 1674. [Fourth edition] Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres. Exercitatio paradoxa, tertium edita et appendice Iochimi Camerarii aucta; cum notis variis et praefatione D. Io. Sal. Semleri. Halle Magdebourg, 1776. De Philosophie d’uytleghster der H. Schrifture. Een wonderspreuckigh Tractaet. Vrystadt: 1667. [Dutch translation, translator and edition unknown.] La philosophie interpre`te de l’Ecriture sainte. Traduction, notes et pre´sentation par Jacqueline Lagre´e et Pierre-Franc¸ois Moreau. Paris: Intertextes, 1988. Inaugural Dissertation on Matter (1660). Translated by Samuel Shirley, with introduction and notes by S. Barbone and L. Rice. In Baruch Spinoza, The Principles of Cartesian Philosophy and Metaphysical Thoughts. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998; 144-159.

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De materia ejusque affectionibus, motu et quiete. Amsterdam: Francisci Hackii, 1660. [Reprinted in Rene´e Bouveresse, Spinoza et Leibniz: L’ide´e d’un animisme universel. Paris: Vrin, 1992; 305-312.] Texts Acta der Particuliere Synoden van Zuid-Holland 1621-1700. IV d., 1657-1672, uitgegeven door W. P. C. Knuttel. ’sGravenhage 1912. Advisen Van sommige Theologanten Van Utrecht, Harderwijck, en ’s Her- togenhosch, over het boeck Van D. Ludovicus Wolzogen, Genaemt De Scripturarum Interprete [. . .]. Uytrecht, 1669 (Knuttel, Catalogus, 9797). Advijs Van de Theologische Faculteyt tot Leyden, Op het versoeck vande Staten van Hollant en West-Vrieslant, Gegeven; Rakende het Bewuste Boeck, genaemt den Uytlegger der H. Schrift [. . .]. 1669 (Knuttel, Catalogus, 9796). Allinga, Petrus. (1682). Fax Dissidi Extincta seu Exercitationes Pacificae ad nonnullas quaestiones problematicas, quae hodie in Belgio potissimum moventur. Amstelaedami, 1682. Amama, Sixten. (1628). Antibarbarus Biblicus in VI Libros distributus [. . .]. Amstelodami, 1628. Amyraut, Moise. (1662). E´
  `  , Sive de Ratione Pacis. Salmurii, 1662. Arminius, Jacobus. (1629). Opera Theologica [. . .]. Lugduni Batavorum, 1629. Arnoldus, Nicolaus. (1667). Dissertatiuncula, De Theologiae supra Philosophiam Dominio Cum brevibus stricturis ad Librurn sub titulo Philosophia Scripturae Interpres. Franekerae, 1667. Bayle, Pierre. (1697). Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, Rotterdam, 1697. (Second Edition, Rotterdam 1702).

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Bayle, Pierre. (1727-1731). Oeuvres Diverses. 4 vols. The Hague, 1727-1731 (reprint, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964-1968). Beeldthouwer [Beelthouwer], Jan Pieterszoon. (1667). Antwoordt, op het boeck genaemt; de Philosophie d’uytleghster der H. Schrifture, Voor de Lief hebbers des Waerheyts. Het tweede lidt des Antwoordts bestaet, dat de Boecken der Propheten, soo wel te verstaen zijn, als andre [sic] boecken: en mercktcyckens in haer hebben, dat sy door Godts last geschreven sijn. Amsterdam, 1667. Beeldthouwer, [Beelthouwer], Jan Pieterzoon. (1673). Antwoort op het Boek genaemt de Philosophie d’Uytleghster der H. Schrifture. In Amst., 16 Maart, 1673. Bekker, Balthasar. (1668). De Philosophia Cartesiana Admonitio Candida & sincera. Vesaliae, 1668. Bekker, Balthasar. (1693). De Friesche Godgeleerdheid van Balthasar Bekker. Begrijpende alle desselfs’ werken in Friesland uitgegeven, en ’t gene daar af geoordeeld, en daar over voorgevallen is. Waar van enige stukken nooit voor desen zijn gedrukt geweest. Amsterdam, 1693. Bellarmino [Bellarmine], Roberto Francesco Romolo. (1605). Disputationum [. . .] De Controversiis Christianae Fidei Adversus Huius temporis Haereticos [. . .]. 4 vols. Ingolstadii, 1605. Bellarmino [Bellarmine], Roberto Francesco Romolo. (1628). Disputationum Roberti Bellarmini Politiani et Societate Iesu S.R.E. Cardinalis de controversiis Christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos, quatuor tomis comprehensarum. Editio ultima, ab ipso auctore locupletata, emendata, cum licentia ipsius evulgata, & in Germania post alias omnes editiones in lucem data. Coloniae Agrippinae: Sumptibus Antonii et Arnoldi Hieratorum Fratrum. 4 vols. in 1. Bellarmino [Bellarmine], Roberto Francesco Romolo. (1721). Disputationum. Editio prima neapolitana iuxta Venetam anno MDCCXXI, Xisto Riario Sforza. [reprint, Neapoli:

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Apud Josephum Giuliano, 1856-1862.] 6 vols. [Vols. 1-4, De controversiis; vol. 5, In psalmos explanatio; vol. 6, De scriptoribus ecclestiacis.] Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum quos Unitarios vocant, Instructa Operibus Omnibus Fausti Socini Senensis [. . .], Johannis Crellii Franci, Jonae Slichtingii a` Bucowietz [. . .] exegeticis & Johannis Ludovici Wolzogenii Baronis Austriaci, Quae omnia simul juncta totius Novi Testamenti explicationem complectuntur. Irenopoli [=Amsterdam], post annum Domini 1656, 8 vols. Bordoli, R. (Editor). (1994). Jean-Maximilien Lucas, Johannes Ko¨hler (Colerus), Le Vite di Spinoza, seguite da alcum frammenti dalla Prefazione di Jarig lelles alle opere Postume. Prefazione di F. Mignini. In Appendice, La Biblioteca di Spinoza, Ed. P. Pozzi. Macerata, 1994. Brenius [de Breen], Daniel. (1666). Opera Theologica. Quorum Catalogum versa Pagina post Commonitionem, de tractatu D. Brenii, Operum Episcopii secundae parti inserto, exhibet. Amstelaedami, 1666. [Contains the Breves annotationes in Vetus & Novum Testamentum.] Broun, Joannes. (1670). Libri duo in priori, Wolzogium, in libellis duobus De interprete Scripturarum, causam orthodoxam prodidisse demonstratur : in posteriori, Lamberti Velthusii sententia Libertino-erastiana, in libello vernaculo de idololatria & superstitione, naper proposita, detegitur & confutatur : veritas quoque orthodoxa ab adversariorum, sive Libertinorum, sive Erastianorum, sive aliorum, exceptionibus vindicatur, & XXXII assertionibus, sententiae Velthusianae oppositis, illustratur ac confirmatur, quibus praefixa est praefatiuncula, in qua quaedam de Natura Ecclesiae visibilis & invisibilis, ut & Communionis Ecclesiae, separationem illegitimam jam in Belgio coeptam convellentia, breviter ac summatim proponuntur. Amstelodami: Apud Henricum ab Aquisgrano.

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