Philo of Alexandria On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (Philo of Alexandria Commentary)

Philo of Alexandria On Virtues

Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series General Editor

Gregory E. Sterling Associate Editor

David T. Runia Editorial Board

harold w. attridge – ellen birnbaum – john dillon annewies van den hoek – alan mendelson thomas tobin, s.j. – david winston

VOLUME 3

Philo of Alexandria On Virtues Introduction, Translation, and Commentary

By

Walter T. Wilson

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Philo, of Alexandria. [De virtutibus. English] On virtues / Philo of Alexandria; introduction, translation and commentary by Walter T. Wilson. p. cm. – (Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, ISSN 1570-095X ; v. 3) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and indexes. ISBN 978-90-04-18907-2 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Virtues–Early works to 1800. 2. Jewish ethics–Early works to 1800. 3. Conduct of life–Early works to 1800. I. Wilson, Walter T. II. Title. BJ1521.P4613 2011 296.3'699–dc22 2010036405

ISSN 1570-095X ISBN 978 90 04 18907 2 Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is dedicated to the memory of DAVID M. HAY (–)

CONTENTS

General Introduction. The Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series Gregory E. Sterling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Place of the Treatise in the Philonic Corpus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Place of the Treatise in Philo’s Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Title and Integrity of the Treatise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Analysis of the Treatise’s Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Character and Aim of the Treatise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Nachleben of the Treatise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 8 10 16 23 37

TRANSLATION PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA ON VIRTUES On Courage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On Humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On Repentance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On Nobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45 55 79 83

COMMENTARY On Courage, Chapters –: Courage in Peacetime (§§ –) . . . . . . . 93 On Courage, Chapters –: Courage in Wartime (§§ –) . . . . . . . . 119 On Humanity, Chapters –: The Death and Succession of Moses (§§ –) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 On Humanity, Chapter : Introduction to the Survey of Laws (§§ –) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 On Humanity, Chapter : On Lending at Interest (§§ –) . . . . . . . 205

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On Humanity, Chapters –: Prompt Payment of Wages (§ ); Seizing a Pledge (§ ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On Humanity, Chapter : Agricultural Produce for the Poor (§§ –) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On Humanity, Chapter : Priests (§ ) and the Dispossessed (§ ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On Humanity, Chapter : Sabbatical and Jubilee Laws (§§ –) On Humanity, Chapters –: Proselytes and Metics (§§ –) On Humanity, Chapter : Enemies and War Captives (§§ –) On Humanity, Chapter : The Animals of Enemies (§§ –) On Humanity, Chapter : Indentured Servants and Slaves (§§ –) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On Humanity, Chapter : Newborn Animals (§§ –). . . . . . . . On Humanity, Chapter : Mother Animals and Their Young (§§ –) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On Humanity, Chapter : Draught Animals (§§ –) . . . . . . . . . On Humanity, Chapters –: Cultivated Plants (§§ –) . . . . On Humanity, Chapters –: The Ruling Classes (§§ –) . .

219 227 237 245 255 265 275 283 291 305 319 325 341

On Repentance (§§ –) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 On Nobility (§§ –) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Editions and Translations of De virtutibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other Ancient Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Modern Scholarly Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

419 419 419 420

Index of Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index of Biblical Passages Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index of Philonic Texts Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index of Ancient Texts Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index of Modern Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index of Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index of Greek Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

449 449 451 455 463 471 477

general introduction THE PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA COMMENTARY SERIES

Philo of Alexandria (c.  bce–c.  ce) was a member of one of the most prominent families of the large and influential Jewish community in Alexandria. We know more about his brother and his family than we do about Philo. His brother, Julius Gaius Alexander, held a responsible governmental position (Josephus, AJ ., ; .–, .) and became known to the emperor’s family through Herodian intermediaries (Josephus, AJ .–). His praenomen and nomen suggest that the family was associated in some way with Julius Gaius Caesar. It may be that Caesar granted Roman citizenship to Alexander’s grandfather for assistance during the Alexandrian War (– bce). Alexander made the most of his position and became exceptionally wealthy (Josephus, AJ .). Josephus reported that he covered nine of the temple doors in Jerusalem with gold and silver (BJ .–), an act of patronage that attests his immense resources as well as his commitment to Judaism. Alexander’s standing is confirmed by the roles of his two sons. The archive of Nicanor suggests that Marcus Julius Alexander was active in the import-export business that moved goods from India and Arabia through Egypt to the West. He married Berenice, the daughter of Herod Agrippa I and later partner of the emperor Titus, but died prematurely c.  ce (Josephus, AJ .–). His brother had one of the most remarkable careers of any provincial in the first two centuries of the Roman Empire. Tiberius Julius Alexander moved through a series of lower posts until he held governorships in Judea, Syria, and Egypt. When he backed Vespasian in the Flavian’s bid for the throne, his career quickly rose to its apex: he served as Titus’ chief of staff during the First Jewish revolt in – ce (Josephus, BJ .–.; .) and as prefect of the praetrorian guard in Rome after the war (CPJ b). While his career strained his relationship with his native Judaism to the breaking point (Josephus, AJ .; Philo, Prov. and Anim.), it attests the high standing of the family. The most famous member of this remarkable family was paradoxically probably the least known in wider circles during his life. This is undoubtedly due to the contemplative nature of the life that he chose. His choice

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was not total. He may have had some civic function in the Jewish community. At least this would help to explain why the Alexandrian Jewish community selected him to lead the first Jewish delegation to Rome after the pogrom in Alexandria in  ce, a delegation that probably included his brother and nephew of later fame (Legat. , ; Anim. ). The political arena was not, however, where his heart lay; he gave his heart to the life of the intellect (Spec. .–). He undoubtedly received a full education that included training in the gymnasium, the ephebate, and advanced lectures in philosophy. The final training was of enormous importance to his intellectual formation. While he knew and made use of different philosophical traditions such as Stoicism and Pythagorean arithmology, his basic orientation was Platonic. Middle Platonism (c.  bce – c.  ce) had become a vibrant intellectual movement in Alexandria in the first century bce, especially in the work of Eudorus (fl.  bce). Philo became convinced that Plato and Moses understood reality in similar ways, although he was unequivocal about who saw it most clearly. His commitment to Judaism is evident in his training in the LXX: he knew it with the intimacy of one who lived with it from the cradle onwards. He also knew the works of some of his Jewish literary predecessors such as Aristobulus, Pseudo-Aristeas, and Ezekiel the tragedian. He was aware of a significant number of other Jewish exegetes to whom he alluded, but always anonymously (Opif. , , and Migr. –). The most probable social setting for his literary work is a private school in which he offered instruction in much the same way that philosophers and physicians did. One of the ways that he taught was through writing. His treatises constitute one of the largest corpora that has come down to us from antiquity. We know that he wrote more than seventy treatises: thirtyseven of these survive in Greek manuscripts and nine (as counted in the tradition) in a rather literal sixth century Armenian translation. We also have excerpts of another work in Greek and fragments of two more in Armenian. The lost treatises are known from references to them in the extant treatises, gaps in his analyses of the biblical texts in the commentary series, and testimonia. The treatises fall into five major groups: three separate commentary series, the philosophical writings, and the apologetic writings. The three commentary series are Philo’s own literary creations; the philosophical and apologetic series are modern constructs that group conceptually similar but literarily independent treatises. The heart of the Philonic enterprise lay in the three commentary series. Each of these was an independent work with a distinct rationale and

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form. The most elementary of the three is the twelve book Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus that cover Gen :–: and Exod :–:. As the title suggests, Philo used a question and answer format to write a running commentary on the biblical text. The questions are often formulaic, but demonstrate a close reading of the text. The answers typically introduce both literal and allegorical interpretations. Although earlier Jewish authors such as Demetrius (FF  and ) and Aristobulus (F ) used the question and answer device, they did not write zetematic works. The closest literary parallel to Philo’s commentary series is the series of zetematic works which Plutarch composed. The pedagogical character of the format and the listing of multiple interpretations suggest that Philo’s Questions and Answers were written for beginning students in his school who needed to learn the range of possible readings. The Allegorical Commentary shares some features in common with the Questions and Answers, but is profoundly different. Like the Questions and Answers these treatises use the question and answer technique in a running commentary. Unlike the Questions and Answers, the format is no longer explicit but is incorporated in a more complex form of exegesis. Literal readings are largely ignored; instead the focus is on allegorical interpretations which are expanded through the introduction of secondary biblical texts (lemmata). The scope is also different: the Allegorical Commentary is confined to Genesis :–:. While these expansions give the treatises a meandering feel, there is almost always a thematic unity that makes the treatise coherent. Philo was by no means the first Jewish author to use allegory: earlier Jewish writers such as Aristobulus and Pseudo-Aristeas had used allegorical interpretation; however, they did not write allegorical commentaries. Philo’s allegorical commentaries are closer in form to commentaries in the philosophical tradition, e.g., the Platonic Anonymous Theaetetus Commentary, Plutarch’s On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus, and Porphyry’s On the Cave of Nymphs. Yet even here there are considerable differences; for example, Philo’s treatises have more thematic unity than his pagan counterparts. If the Questions and Answers were for beginning students, the Allegorical Commentary was most likely composed for advanced students or other exegetes in the Jewish community. It certainly places much greater demands on the reader, as any modem reader who has worked through them can attest. The third series, the Exposition of the Law, is different yet. It is not a running commentary, but a systematic exposition of the law of Moses. It

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focuses on literal readings and largely ignores allegorical possibilities. Its scope extends beyond Genesis and Exodus to include the entire Torah. Philo wrote an introduction to the Exposition in the form of a biography in the two volume Life of Moses. The work is similar in function to Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus which introduces readers to the Enneads. Philo organized his understanding of the law in three parts (Praem. –). The first part deals with creation, demonstrating the harmony between the cosmos and the law. The second part is the historical or biographical section that consists of biographies that show how the ancestors embodied the law before it was given to Moses. The third and most complex part is the legislative. Just as some later rabbis, Philo worked through the decalogue and then used each of the ten commandments as a heading to subsume the remaining legislation in the Torah. Unlike the later rabbis, he added a series of appendices under the headings of virtues. He brought the series to a conclusion in a treatise On Rewards and Punishments in direct imitation of the end of Deuteronomy. The series was probably intended for a Jewish audience that included but was not limited to the school. If the three commentary series accentuate Philo’s role within the Jewish community, the last two groups of his treatises reflect his efforts to relate to the larger world. The philosophical works use Greek sources and philosophical genres to address some of the major philosophical issues Philo and his students confronted. The apologetic works were probably written—for the most part—in connection with the events of – ce. They were designed to assist Philo in his efforts to represent the Jewish community to the authorities. This expansive corpus is the single most important source for our understanding of Second Temple Judaism in the diaspora. While some of the esoteric and philosophical aspects of his writings reflect a highly refined circle in Alexandria, the corpus as a whole preserves a wide range of exegetical and social traditions which enable us to reconstruct a number of beliefs and practices of Jews in the Roman empire. The difficulty that we face is the limited evidence from other Jewish communities. This can be partially solved by expanding the comparisons to early Christian writings which were heavily indebted to Jewish traditions. As is the case with virtually all Second Temple Jewish texts composed in Greek, Philo’s corpus was not preserved by Jews but by Christians who found his writings so irresistibly attractive that they gave him a post mortem conversion. In some Catenae he is actually called “Philo the bishop.” A number of important early Christian authors are deeply indebted to

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him: Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Didymus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Ambrose in particular. While there is no solid evidence to show that New Testament authors knew his writings, they certainly knew some of the same exegetical traditions that he attests. His writings therefore serve both as a witness to some exegetical traditions of first century Christians and as a source for some second century and later Christians. One of the factors that made Philo so attractive to Christians was the way that he combined Greek philosophy, especially Middle Platonism, with exegesis. The eclectic nature of his thought and the size of his corpus make his writings a particularly important source for our understanding of several Hellenistic philosophical traditions. The combination of Middle Platonism and Jewish exegesis also makes Philo important for the study of Gnosticism, especially for those scholars who argue that the second century Christian Gnostic systems had significant antecedents in Jewish circles. It is remarkable that in spite of the obvious importance of these writings and their complexity, no series of commentaries has been devoted to them. The present series is designed to fill that void. Each commentary will offer an introduction, a fresh English translation, and a commentary proper. The commentary proper is organized into units/chapters on the basis of an analysis of the structure of each treatise. Each unit/chapter of the commentary will address the following concerns: the context and basic argument of the relevant section, detailed comments on the most important and difficult phrases, passages where Philo treats the same biblical text, the Nachleben of Philo’s treatment, and suggestions for further reading. There will be some variation within the series to account for the differences in the genres of Philo’s works; however, readers should be able to move from one part of the corpus to another with ease. We hope that in this way these commentaries will serve the needs of both Philonists who lack sustained analyses of individual treatises and those who work in other areas but consult Philo’s works. Most of the volumes in this series will concentrate on Philo’s commentaries. It may seem strange to write and read a commentary on a commentary; however, it is possible to understand the second commentary to be an extended form of commentary on the biblical text as well. While Philo’s understanding of the biblical text is quite different from our own, it was based on a careful reading of the text and a solid grasp of Greek philosophy. His commentaries permit us to understand how one of the most influential interpreters of the biblical text in antiquity read the text. The fact that his reading is so different from ours is in part the

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fascination of reading him. He challenges us to enter into a different world and to see the text from another perspective. Gregory E. Sterling University of Notre Dame

PREFACE

Even by Philonic standards, De virtutibus is a rather long and miscellaneous treatise, covering everything from the harmony of the cosmic spheres to the ethics of warfare to the particulars of cheese production. In the course of preparing this commentary, I have learned a great deal, not least of all from conversations with friends, students, and colleagues. At the Society of Biblical Literature Annual Meeting in , I gave a presentation on my plans for the commentary, receiving sage advice from the panelists, Greg Sterling, David Runia, David Konstan, and James Royse. Specific chapters were subsequently presented at sessions of Emory University’s graduate New Testament colloquium, with Peter Bing, John Weaver, and Te-Li Lau serving as respondents. I am grateful as well to Gail O’Day and Patrick Grey for the opportunity to contribute a programmatic essay on De humanitate to the Festschrift they edited for Carl Holladay. Greg Sterling also reviewed the finished manuscript of the commentary and made a number of helpful suggestions. Mention should also be made of the hard-working staff at Brill press, especially Liesbeth Hugenholtz, and at TAT Zetwerk, Johannes Rustenburg. Finally, I am indebted to my research assistants for this project, Christina Davis, William Johnson, and Tiffany Walker. To one and all my sincere thanks. This volume of the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series is dedicated to the memory of David Hay, former Professor of Religion at Coe College and an important scholar in both Philonic and Pauline studies (see StPhAnn  [] ). This seemed only appropriate, since it was his idea that I write the commentary in the first place. Although it is not part of De virtutibus, Philo’s reflections in Cher. – capture the spirit of the treatise quite effectively: “For all created things are assigned as a loan to all from God, and none of these particular things has been made complete in itself, so that it should have no need at all of another. . . . Thus through reciprocity and combination, even as a lyre is formed of unlike notes, God meant that they should come to fellowship and concord and form a single harmony, and that a universal give and take should govern them, and lead up to the consummation of the whole world. Thus love draws lifeless to living, unreasoning to reasoning, trees to people, people to plants, cultivated to wild, savage to

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tame, each sex to the other. . . . Thus each, we may say, wants and needs each; all need all, so that this whole, of which each is a part, might be that perfect work worthy of its architect.” Atlanta May , 

ABBREVIATIONS

In general, the abbreviations used for biblical and ancient texts and for modern scholarly literature follow the guidelines set out in D.L. Petersen et al., eds., The SBL Handbook of Style (Peabody: Hendrickson, ) and in The Studia Philonica Annual  () –.

Abbreviations of Subtreatises within De virtutibus Fort. Hum. Nob. Paen.

De fortitudine De humanitate De nobilitate De paenitentia

Abbreviations of Philonic Treatises Abr. Aet. Agr. Anim. Cher. Conf. Congr. Contempl. Decal. Det. Deus Ebr. Flacc. Fug. Gig. Her. Hypoth. Ios. Leg.

De Abrahamo De aeternitate mundi De agricultura De animalibus De cherubim De confusione linguarum De congressu eruditionis gratia De vita contemplativa De decalogo Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat Quod Deus sit immutabilis De ebrietate In Flaccum De fuga et inventione De gigantibus Quis rerum divinarum heres sit Hypothetica De Iosepho Legum allegoriae

xviii Legat. Migr. Mos. Mut. Opif. Plant. Post. Praem. Prob. Prov. QE QG Sacr. Sobr. Somn. Spec. Virt.

abbreviations Legatio ad Gaium De migratione Abrahami De vita Mosis De mutatione nominum De opificio mundi De plantatione De posteritate Caini De praemiis et poenis Quod omnis probus liber sit De providentia Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini De sobrietate De somniis De specialibus legibus De virtutibus

Other Abbreviations G-G

GLAJJ

LSJ

PAPM PCH

PCW

H.L. Goodhart and E.R. Goodenough. “A General Bibliography of Philo Judaeus.” Pages – in E.R. Goodenough, The Politics of Philo Judaeus. New Haven: Yale University Press, . M. Stern, ed. Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism. Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, –. H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H.S. Jones, eds. A Greek-English Lexicon. th ed. with revised supplement. Oxford: Clarendon, . R. Arnaldez, J. Pouilloux, C. Mondésert, eds. Les œuvres de Philon d’Alexandrie. Paris: Editions du Cerf, –. L. Cohn, I. Heinemann et al. Philo von Alexandria: die Werke in deutscher Übersetzung. Breslau: Marcus Verlag, –; reprinted Berlin: de Gruyter, – . L. Cohn, P. Wendland, S. Reiter, eds. Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt. Berlin: G. Reimer, –; reprinted Berlin: de Gruyter, .

abbreviations PLCL

SVF

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F.H. Colson, G.H. Whitaker (and R. Marcus). Philo in Ten Volumes (and Two Supplementary Volumes). Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; London: Heinemann, –. J. von Arnim, ed. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. Leipzig: Teubner, –; reprinted New York: Irvington, .

INTRODUCTION

. The Place of the Treatise in the Philonic Corpus There is general agreement that De virtutibus belongs to a set of treatises conventionally known as the Exposition of the Law, the most carefully structured and thematically cohesive of Philo of Alexandria’s three commentary series.1 Much like the first four books of Josephus’ Antiquitates judaicae, the Exposition essentially treats the entire contents of the Pentateuch, though it does so in a more systematic fashion, a fact signaled in part by the significant number of prefatory and transitional statements inserted into the text. An examination of the most important of these statements not only indicates how Philo has organized the various treatises of the Exposition but also provides some insight as to the commentary’s major themes and aims.2 The introduction to the first treatise of the Exposition, De opificio, begins by asserting the superiority of Moses’ legislation over that of other lawgivers (§§ –). Specifically, by starting with an account of creation, he was able to demonstrate that his law is in harmony with the cosmos. Anyone who observes his law, then, is “a citizen of the cosmos, directing his actions in relation to the rational purpose of nature, in accordance with which the entire cosmos is also administered” (§ ). The introduction to De Abrahamo opens with a reference to “the preceding treatise” in which “the creation of the world has been set forth in detail” (§ ). Since the book of Genesis includes much more than an account of this event, however, in his “examination of the law in regular sequence” Philo must postpone a review of the legislation itself until he has had an opportunity to narrate the lives of the patriarchs (§§ , ). This is essential, he tells us, because these lives are in fact archetypes, “laws endowed with life and reason,” of which the written laws are copies.

1 For a description of the other series, the Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin et Exodum and the so-called Allegorical Commentary, see the General Introduction. 2 For what follows, see Sandmel , –; Morris , –; Borgen ; Borgen , –. Regarding the place of De virtutibus in the Exposition, the manuscript tradition is of little value, though see n.  below.



introduction

Moses made a permanent record of the patriarchs’ virtues in the scriptures in order to show that the statutes he enacted accord with nature. Specifically, the written laws are “memorials” of the lives of ancient men who secured a perfect life by living in accord with nature (§§ –). In the same vein, the conclusion to the treatise refers to Abraham as “himself a law and an unwritten statute” (§ ; cf. Mos. .; .). The introduction to De Iosepho alludes to previous treatises on those patriarchs to whom Moses assigned a special place: “I have described the lives of these three, the life which results from teaching, the life of the self-taught, and the life of practice” (§ ). As comparison with Abr.  indicates, the reference here is to works on Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, each of whom represents a different means of acquiring virtue (cf. Mos. .). The second and third treatises of this trio have been lost, while Philo carries the series forward by describing a fourth kind of life, that of the statesman.3 Having recounted in “the preceding treatises” the lives of the “founders of our nation and in themselves unwritten laws” (Decal. ), Philo then devotes a major section of the Exposition to reviewing the written laws, beginning with the general laws (De decalogo), then the particular statutes dependent on each of them (De specialibus legibus). The basic principle informing the survey is articulated in the introduction to the latter: the ten commandments, examined at length “in the preceding treatise,” are “the main heads under which are summarized the special laws” (Spec. .; cf. Decal. , ; Spec. .).4 This principle guides the structure of the commentary until we reach Spec. .–, where the discussion moves in a different direction. Besides assigning various laws to each of the commandments separately, it is also possible, Philo says, to show that the decalogue in its entirety accords with certain “generally beneficial” virtues: “for each of the ten oracles individually and all in common stimulate and exhort us to prudence and justice and godliness and the rest of the choir of the virtues” (.). Philo claims to have already adequately covered three members of this troop, the “queen,” known alternatively as piety or holiness, as well

3 Abr. – also sketches the lives of Enosh, Enoch, and Noah, representing hope, repentance, and justice respectively. When the second, higher triad (Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob) and Joseph are included, the total number is brought up to seven, a holy number for Philo (Geljon , –); cf. Praem. –, where the seventh figure is not Joseph, but Moses. 4 Cf. PAPM .–; Hecht .

the place of the treatise in the philonic corpus



as prudence and moderation.5 The next task, then, is to elaborate on those laws that most clearly exemplify the virtue of justice, a topic which occupies the remainder of the treatise (.–).6 The introduction to De virtutibus begins by stating that, since the topic of justice has already been discussed, it is possible to dilate on the virtue “next in sequence,” namely, courage (§ ). After doing so, Philo announces the next subject as humanity, the virtue he thinks is most akin to piety (§ ).7 At the beginning of De praemiis et poenis, Philo looks back at the commentary in its entirety, explaining that the Pentateuch consists of three kinds or genres of discourse: () the cosmological, which deals with the creation of the cosmos; () the historical, which records good and bad lives from the past; and () the legislative, which is further divided into the ten general headings and the enactments of specific laws (§§ –). Philo then states that since all of these matters “and further the virtues he assigned to peace and war have been discussed as fully as was needful in the preceding treatises,” he can “proceed in due course” to the topic of rewards for obedience and punishments for disobedience (§ ). Finally, a word needs to be said regarding De vita Mosis, especially since the cross-references in Virt.  and Praem.  assume that the audience is familiar with this two-volume treatise.8 Indeed, as Runia (, ) points out, Philo has assumed from the very beginning of the Exposition that his readers are knowledgeable about the life and accomplishments of the author whose work he is expounding, which is precisely what De vita Mosis provides. However, as most experts concur, this treatise is not actually part of the Exposition, but functions in relation to it as a kind of companion piece.9 Further evidence for this relation can be found in Mos. .–, which contains statements similar to those 5

Cf. Cohen , –. Presumably Philo includes the discussion of justice here, rather than in De virtutibus, so that the books would not be too unequal in length. See Morris , ; Runia , ; Royse , ; Sterling , –. 7 The cross-references in Virt. – and  are presumably to De specialibus legibus – (Royse , ). 8 In addition, the account of Moses’ death and succession in Virt. – supplements the brief description of his death at the end of De vita Mosis (.–). 9 None of the Exposition’s introductory statements refer to it, and the treatise itself has no statements indicating its place in the sequence. In addition, its length and design differ from those of De Abrahamo and De Iosepho. See Goodenough ; Colson, PLCL .xiv– xvi; Morris , –; Geljon , –. For the opposing view, see Nikiprowetzky , –. 6



introduction

in Opif. – and Praem. –. Here Philo explains that the Pentateuch falls into two parts, the historical, which can be further divided into the cosmological and the biographical, and that part which consists of commands and prohibitions (.–). Moses included the former in part in order to show that those who observe the law follow nature and live in accordance with the structure of the cosmos (., ). In relating his laws to the foundation of the cosmos rather than to the founding of some “man-made city,” Moses’ legislation is superior to that of other lawgivers (., ).10 Looking at these various editorial frames and transitional statements as a whole, then, it is obvious that Philo wanted to link the treatises of the Exposition together in a way that his readers could easily follow: (De vita Mosis I–II) First Part: On Creation De opificio mundi Second Part: On History De Abrahamo [De Isaaco] [De Iacobo] De Iosepho Third Part: On Legislation General laws: De decalogo Specific laws: De specialibus legibus .–. Virtues: De specialibus legibus .—De virtutibus Rewards and punishments: De praemiis et poenis

In addition to indicating its particular place in the sequence of treatises that comprise the commentary, consideration of these editorial frames and transitional statements prompts certain observations regarding the function and contribution of De virtutibus within the Exposition as a whole. First, it is a priority for Philo to show that in framing his laws Moses created legislation that was of universal scope and significance. For example, as we have seen, he asserts that since these laws are in harmony with the cosmic order, those who follow them can achieve the goal of living in accord with nature.11 Philo’s recourse to the virtues as a structural and

10 It is also superior insofar as in conveying his commands and prohibitions to the people Moses relied not on compulsion but on exhortation, i.e., reason (.–). 11 For Philo’s concept of natural law, see Niehoff , –; Martens , – . Both draw comparisons with Stoic sources.

the place of the treatise in the philonic corpus



thematic device in presenting the laws is consistent with this assertion insofar as virtue discourse, expressed in various forms, enjoyed a prominent place in the moral, legal, political, and philosophical thought of the time. Extended use of such discourse contributes to his aim of showing how the highest ideals of the prevailing culture are embodied by the Jewish patriarchs and set forth in the Mosaic laws. This has the effect of configuring the Jewish community, one formed by these laws, not as an ethnic group, but as a nation guided by the best philosophical principles12 and constituting the best polity, or πολιτεα,13 which, as such, accords with the divine, cosmic polity.14 Because citizenship in this polity depends not on nationality or ties of kinship, but “on virtues and laws which propound the morally beautiful as the sole good” (Spec. .; cf. .), Philo can even envision a day when each nation would abandon its particular customs and “turn to honoring our laws alone” (Mos. .). In fact, according to Philo it was Moses’ intention that through his legislation “households and cities, nations and lands, and the whole human race might advance to the highest well-being” (Virt. ; cf. Spec. .). Second, the contribution of virtue discourse to the Exposition is not restricted to De virtutibus. As we have seen, the section organized according to the virtues actually begins in the immediately preceding treatise, that is, with the discussion of justice in Spec. .–. As with the rest of De specialibus legibus, what Philo offers in this section is not a running commentary on scripture but a systematic analysis of its contents. Therefore, certain laws are left undiscussed,15 while others are discussed from more than one angle.16 As we have also seen, when introducing that section in Spec. .–, Philo mentions a whole “choir” of virtues, namely, wisdom, justice, piety (known also as holiness or godliness), and moderation, to which he later adds courage (Virt. ) and humanity (Virt. ). Of these six, the first five would have been immediately recognizable as proper members of the philosophical (especially Platonic)

12

Opif. ; Mos. .; Decal. ; Virt. ; Nikiprowetzky , –. Spec. .; Virt. ; cf. Spec. ., ; Virt. ; Praem. ; Wolfson , .– . For the various connotations that the term πολιτεα could have, see Kasher , –. 14 Decal. –; cf. Opif. ; Ios. –; Spec. .; .. 15 Lev :–:; Num :–; Deut :–, etc. 16 See the Parallel exegesis for Virt. –. 13



introduction

canon,17 and references to different formulations of this canon are scattered throughout the Exposition.18 The description in Spec. .– is of particular interest in this regard, because here Philo explains how education in virtue is a priority evident not only in scripture, but also in the ongoing life and practice of the communities that study it: “each seventh day there stand wide open in every city thousands of schools of prudence, moderation, courage, justice, and the other virtues,” which, he says, are treated under two main heads: “one of the duty to God as shown by piety and holiness, and the other of the duty to people as shown by humanity and justice” (cf. Mos. .). It is probably safe to assume that one of Philo’s aims in writing the Exposition was to encourage and facilitate this practice. In the same vein, it is apparent that the application of virtue discourse to major segments of text extends into the earlier portions of the Exposition. For example, when making the transition to the virtue section in Spec. ., Philo asserts that he has already discussed piety/holiness, wisdom, and moderation, which would explain why they are not the subject of specially designated sections. Presumably, what he means by this is that these three virtues pertain to Spec. .–. as a whole, though he may also think that certain laws in the survey pertain more to one virtue than to others.19 At any rate, with this statement Philo signals to his readers that all of the virtues of the canon were somehow addressed by Moses when framing his legislation. It should also be noted that the use of virtues as an organizing device extends into the biographical sections of the Exposition as well. For example, De Abrahamo contains a major section that expounds on the patriarch’s piety (§§ –), then his humanity/justice (§§ –), and then finally his courage (§§ –). Such a move is hardly surprising, since Philo often holds the patriarchs up as exemplars of virtue (e.g., Abr. ). As is frequently noted, despite its name, the Exposition of the Law exposits on more than laws, combining an interest in historical origins and historical biography with an interpretation of the Mosaic legislation. The thematiz-

17 E.g., Plato, Lach. d; Prot. b, b; Gorg. c. The most well-known version of the canon, prominent especially in Platonic and Stoic circles, included prudence, justice, moderation, and courage. Further, North . 18 E.g., Opif. ; Abr. , ; Mos. .; Praem. , . Cf. the commentary on Virt. , ; also the Analysis/General comments for Virt. –. 19 Cf. PCH .; PAPM .–; also see below, n. .

the place of the treatise in the philonic corpus



ing of virtue represents an important way in which these two categories of discourse, the historical and the legislative, complement and reinforce one another. Third, in both its general orientation and specific commentary, the Exposition is seen to exhibit apologetic motives. By this I mean that it embraces a broad set of strategies establishing the excellence of Judaism in response, either explicitly or implicitly, to challenges originating from the non-Jewish host culture.20 For example, as we saw earlier, Opif. – and Mos. . assert the superiority of Moses’ legislation to that of other lawgivers, the primary reference most likely being to Plato’s Respublica and Leges, works in which the Alexandrian appears to have been well-versed.21 From his perspective, it only stands to reason, then, that non-Jews seeking virtue know and honor the Mosaic law (e.g., Mos. .–, ; Spec. .) and that non-Jewish legislators copied from the Pentateuch when framing their own laws (e.g., Spec. .; Virt. ). It is important to remember that such claims are being made in an environment in which the Mosaic law was sometimes criticized for enjoining peculiar or parochial customs.22 According to Philo’s view, by contrast, the reason why the Jews have become “like an orphan” among the nations is because of the rigorous manner in which they observe the highest standards of virtue (Spec. .–), and it is probably only out of envy that certain Greek authors have expressed malice towards Moses (Mos. .–). Philo’s apologetic tone becomes even more explicit in a passage like Spec. .. As he explains there, offering prayers and sacrifices to God on behalf of all humanity is an essential aspect of the cult that Moses established. It therefore astonishes him “to see that some people venture to accuse of inhumanity the nation which has shown such a profound sense of fellowship and goodwill to all people everywhere” (cf. Virt. , discussed below).23 Given that the largest single section of De virtutibus endeavors to demonstrate the humanity of Moses, his laws, and those who follow them, attention to such apologetic dynamics is essential to the interpretive task.

20 Cf. Hecht ; Conzelmann , –; Alexandre a; Pearce ; Barclay . 21 For references to these texts, see PLCL .–. For comparisons with other lawgivers, cf. Spec. .–; .. 22 See part  of the Introduction. 23 Cf. Leonhardt-Balzer .



introduction . The Place of the Treatise in Philo’s Life

In order to grasp their full import, it is essential to bear in mind that Philo’s claims about the law were not mere theoretical ruminations, but emanated from an intense personal involvement in the struggle of the Alexandrian Jewish community for civil rights.24 In Spec. .–, he complains about being drawn into a sea of worries concerning the Jewish πολιτεα. While it is difficult to be certain, many scholars take this as a reference to the civil unrest of – ce.25 In this case, the composition of the Exposition belongs to a period late in Philo’s life, sometime after he led the embassy to Gaius, which he later described as “a campaign on behalf of our polity” (Legat. , cf. –). The crisis necessitating such diplomatic action had historical roots extending back almost to the foundation of Alexandria itself.26 Since the early days of the Ptolemaic era, Jews there had enjoyed the right to organize as a “quasi-independent and self-governing communal organization,” referred to as a πολτευμα by most modern and some ancient authors.27 The rights intrinsic to such an institution, which must have been essential to the preservation of the community’s native customs, continued to be respected under Roman rule, a fact displayed perhaps most palpably in a stele erected in the city by Augustus.28 Significantly, the monument linked official confirmation of the Jews’ civil rights with an acknowledgement of the military service they had rendered representatives of Rome, in this case troops serving under Julius Caesar in / bce.29 In fact, the event commemorated by the emperor would have been just one in a series of armed interventions by Jewish forces in Egyptian politics, usually in ways that aligned Jewish interests with those of Rome.30 The Alexandrian populace, denied its own governing body and despising Roman control generally, resented such interventions and the 24

Philo belonged to a wealthy and politically prominent family. See Morris , – ; Schwartz . 25 Cohn , –; Morris , –; Runia , ; van der Horst , –; cf. Terian , . In addition, Borgen (, –) notes parallels that the Exposition (especially its last four treatises) shows with In Flaccum and Legatio ad Gaium, both written late in Philo’s life. The suggestions of Cohen  also accord with such a dating. 26 For what follows, see especially Tcherikover –, .–. 27 Dawson , . 28 Josephus, C. Ap. ., ; cf. Ant. .; Philo, Flacc. . 29 Cf. Kasher , –. 30 Tcherikover –, .–, –; Smallwood , ; Barclay , –.

the place of the treatise in philo’s life



special privileges accorded the Jews. Reflective of the mood were various anti-Jewish histories of Egypt depicting them as impious invaders from the East who viciously destroyed entire cities and desecrated sacred sites.31 The situation was exacerbated further by the efforts of some elite, Hellenized Jews to obtain citizenship in the Alexandrian polis, a status closely associated with the acquisition of Greek culture, as signified especially through a gymnasium education.32 The imposition of the λαογραφα, or poll tax, beginning in / bce, from which Roman citizens and citizens of Greek cities were exempt, would have created powerful social and economic incentives for them to do so. Indeed, for elite Jews living in Alexandria but lacking Alexandrian citizenship payment of the tax would have been “a mark of extreme political and cultural degradation.”33 Jewish ambitions to improve their situation, however, met with fierce opposition from Alexandrian Greeks, who feared the “corruption” of their city’s citizen body.34 These disputes regarding the Jews’ civic standing came to a head in the pogrom of  ce, during which the Roman prefect Flaccus (egged on by some of the city’s Greek leaders) proclaimed the Jews to be “aliens and foreigners,” a move that, in Philo’s estimation, represented an attempt “to destroy our polity” (Flacc. –).35 The communal rights of the Jews would be reinstated by Claudius some two-anda-half years later, though with the caveat that they were no longer to seek the privileges of Greek citizenship, thereby effectively barring them from future access to the gymnasium.36 In such a volatile environment, Philo followed a strategy that we can assume was embraced by most Alexandrian Jewish elites, one that sought rapprochement with Roman rule and the benefits this could provide.37

31

On the narratives of Manetho, e.g., see Josephus, C. Ap. .–, –; GLAJJ .–. Further, Kasher , –; Conzelmann , –. 32 Tcherikover –, .–; Smallwood , –; Barclay , , , – . 33 Tcherikover –, . (cf. .–; also Kasher , s.v. laographia). Beginning in / ce, the Roman government recognized a new class, ο π γυμνασου, Greekeducated inhabitants living outside one of the πλεις who paid the poll tax at a reduced rate: Tcherikover –, .. 34 Tcherikover –, ., –; Barclay , –. 35 Smallwood , –; Barclay , –. 36 Tcherikover –, .–; .–; Kasher , –; Barclay , –; cf. Josephus, Ant. .–. 37 Cf. Barraclough , –; Dawson , –; Niehoff , s.v. Rome/ Romans.



introduction

Accordingly, it was incumbent upon him to configure Judaism’s relationship with the empire in as positive a light as possible, for example, by making complimentary statements about Rome’s leaders and their achievements (e.g., Legat. –; cf. Flacc. –). More important, in a writing like the Exposition, Philo also endeavors to construct an image of Judaism that makes such a political and cultural strategy plausible. This would have involved examining the Mosaic tradition through the eyes of its “significant others,”38 demonstrating how it establishes the best polity by standards embraced by the Roman ruling classes and is therefore deserving of respect in a world dominated by Roman power. From this perspective, we can see that the Exposition is much more than Philo’s commentary on the Pentateuch; it is also a “commentary on the actual history of the community to which he belonged.”39 Much like the Egyptian Jews of Moses’ time, the members of this group were anxious for citizenship and equal rights (Mos. .). The image of their foundational texts, figures, and events provided by the Exposition would have been particularly relevant in an environment where the acquisition of social status and civil rights was closely tied with being culturally Greek. It is not surprising that in his apologetic reconfiguration of Jewish law and history, Philo’s appropriation of Greek culture is carried out in a manner familiar from contemporary modes of Roman political and moral discourse.

. The Title and Integrity of the Treatise The exposition of the Mosaic law in De virtutibus does not consist of a continuous commentary or a unified thematic argument, but is divided into a number of discreet sections or subtreatises.40 In the definitive critical edition of the text prepared by Leopold Cohn together with Paul Wendland,41 its contents are presented as follows: a. Περ νδρεας, De fortitudine (= Fort. –) b. Περ φιλανρωπας, De humanitate (= Hum. –) 38

Dyck , . Dawson , . 40 As Royse (, ) notes, the contents of De specialibus legibus and De praemiis et poenis “similarly consist of more or less independent sub-treatises, which have varying textual histories.” Cf. Sterling , . 41 PCW .–. Cf. Wendland ; Cohn , –. 39

the title and integrity of the treatise



c. Περ μετανοας, De paenitentia (= Paen. –) d. Περ εγενεας, De nobilitate (= Nob. –) This arrangement has been followed in subsequent translations of the work, including the one prepared by F.H. Colson for the Loeb Classical Library.42 It is important to note, however, that Cohn was the first editor to organize the contents of the treatise this way. In the editio princeps of Philo’s works prepared by Adrien Turnebus in , for example, the subtreatises are presented as independent works separated by other treatises, and in the order De humanitate, De fortitudine, De paenitentia, and De nobilitate,43 while in Thomas Mangey’s  edition, De fortitudine, De humanitate, and De paenitentia appear together (and in that order), but De nobilitate is presented as a separate section after De praemiis et poenis.44 Such dissimilarity in the critical editions can be accounted for when we inspect the manuscript tradition for De virtutibus, which exhibits considerable variation in terms of both the ordering of the subtreatises and their placement within the Philonic corpus.45 This can be seen readily in an examination of those witnesses that preserve at least three of the sections. Below, the subtreatises are listed in the order in which they appear in each of these witnesses using the letter designations assigned above. When no separation occurs between letters, the subtreatises follow one another continuously, while a slash indicates that they are separated by one or more other Philonic works. An asterisk indicates that only a portion of the subtreatise has survived.46

42

PLCL .–. Cf. PCH .–; PAPM .–. = G-G . De humanitate is printed after De vita Mosis, De fortitudine after De iustitia (= Spec. .–), and De nobilitate after De vita contemplativa, while (as Runia ,  explains) De paenitentia follows De humanitate without any break or title. This order was followed by the edition published by Pierre de la Rouière in  (= G-G ), the first major edition to be accompanied by a Latin translation. 44 This was the case despite Mangey’s reliance on ms S, for which see below. The –  edition of C.E. Richter (= G-G ) follows this placement for De nobilitate, as does the English translation prepared by C.D. Yonge in –. 45 For a conspectus of the approximately forty mss containing all or parts of De virtutibus, see PCW .v–xv; G-G –. It is not extant in either the Latin or Armenian versions of Philo’s works. The only significant discovery made since the publication of PCW is a thirteenth-century palimpsest, Atheniensis Bibl. Nat. gr. , which contains De paenitentia + De nobilitate, surrounded by treatises from the Allegorical Commentary. See Alexander . 46 This is a selective and corrected version of the chart in Hilgert , –. Cf. Runia , –; Royse , –. 43



introduction

Manuscripts (Family) Seldenianus XII (S) Parisinus gr.  (C) Monacensis gr.  (A) and three other mss Petropolitanus XX A a (P) Laurentianus plut. LXXXV. (F) Vaticano-Palatinus gr.  (G) Cantabrigiensis Coll. S. Trin. B, Venetus gr.  (H) and nine other mss Leeuwardensis gr.  Escurialensis Y,I, Oxoniensis Coll. Novi 

Contents abcd bcd a/bc* b/a/d abc/bc*/d* bc*/abd bc/a/d bc*/a/d bc*/abc/abc bc*/a b/b/d/a

Evidently, there was a proclivity with the scribes to treat the four sections as self-standing, detachable units. Hence the confusing results. In many cases, the amount of material separating subtreatises in a manuscript is considerable. For example, in ms G (Vaticano-Palatinus gr. ), “bc*” and “abd” are separated by seventeen treatises, including many treatises which are not from the Exposition.47 Yet, for all their diversity, at least two tendencies in the manuscripts can be detected. First, in most of the witnesses De humanitate is immediately followed by De paenitentia. Second, in all but one manuscript, De nobilitate (when it occurs) follows after the other subtreatises, even if it appears independently of them. Still, as the table shows, there is only a single manuscript that supports Cohn’s arrangement of the subtreatises, though, dating from the tenthor eleventh-century, Seldenianus Supra  (ms S) is among the best and oldest of the Philonic manuscripts.48 As the commentary will show, it offers a host of distinct, sometimes idiosyncratic, textual readings over against the rest of the tradition.49 Runia goes so far as to describe it as a “remarkable” but “extremely erratic manuscript,” that is, as the product 47

While the mss usually connect the sections of De virtutibus with other works of the Exposition (e.g., B, E, O, and V place De fortitudine between De vita Mosis and De Iosepho), this is not always the case. For example, in ms G, again, “bc*” is preceded by Spec. .– and followed by Spec. .–, while “abd” is preceded by the Legatio ad Gaium and followed by De fuga et inventione. Cf. Barthélemy , –. In Eusebius’ catalogue (Hist. eccl. ..), De virtutibus is preceded by Quis rerum divinarum heres and followed by De mutatione nominum. See further Runia , –. 48 See PCW .viii–x; G-G . 49 In deciding between textual variants, in his edition Cohn shows a clear preference for ms S, especially from §  onwards, where a fewer number of mss preserve the text. For some of the perils accompanying this decision, see Runia , –; cf. Royse , –.

the title and integrity of the treatise



of “that dangerous phenomenon, an independent and semi-intelligent scribe.”50 Further evidence of its distinctiveness can be found in the large number of subheadings it inserts throughout the work.51 One might question, then, why Cohn and Wendland assigned so much value to it in determining the composition of our treatise. The answer comes from the corroborating testimony provided by Clement of Alexandria, who in book  of his Stromata draws extensively on De virtutibus, excerpting and paraphrasing from its four subtreatises in the same sequence we find them in ms S (see part  of the Introduction). This agreement between two independent sources, one of them written only a century and a half after the original autograph, must be taken seriously in any reconstruction of the treatise’s contents.52 Unfortunately, despite the weight of such evidence, matters become complicated when we examine another element of the treatise’s transmission history, namely, the titles assigned to it by the manuscripts. Here again diversity is the rule.53 Φλωνος περ γ ρετν ς σν λλαις ν!γραψε Μωυσ$ς περ νδρεας κα φιλανρωπας κα μετανοας bek: περ ρετν &τοι περ νδρεας κα εσεβεας κα φιλανρωπας κα μετανοας:—περ νδρεας m: το( ατο( Φλωνος το( )βραου περ ρετν &τοι περ νδρεας κα εσεβεας κα φιλανρωπας κα μετανοας: περ νδρεας vo: Φλωνος περ ρετν &τοι νδρεας κα εσεβεας κα φιλανρωπας κα μετανοας f: το( ατο( περ ρετν, νδρεας κα εσεβεας κα μετανοας κα φιλανρωπας hp: περ ρετν &τοι περ νδρεας κα εσεβεας a: το( ατο( Φλωνος περ νδρας g: περ νδρεας

s:

The title adopted by Cohn (Φλωνος περ ρετν ς σν λλαις ν!γραψε Μωυσ$ς &τοι περ νδρεας κα εσεβεας κα φιλανρωπας κα μετανοας) is a construct, based primarily on S and on Eusebius’ designation for the treatise in Hist. eccl. .. (περ τν τριν ρετν 50 Runia , –. The manuscript is also unique in appending to the treatise an incomplete commentary on Philo’s De mandato decimo. See Cohn . 51 See the apparatus in PCW  for §§ , , , , , , , , , , , , . Many of these are also found in the margin of G2. 52 Mention should also be made of P. Vindob. G , a papyrus of the fifth century, which contains pieces of Virt. – and –. See Harrauer –. As Royse (, –) explains, it appears to agree almost completely with S. 53 See PCW ..



introduction

ς σν λλαις ν!γραψε Μωυσ$ς),54 and adding from the other manuscripts &τοι, so as to form a two-part title, and, more notably, the ref-

erence to a subtreatise on piety coming immediately after the subtreatise on courage. As to the placement of the section on piety, Cohn and Wendland took their cue from the opening sentence of Virt. : Τ+ν δ εσεβεας συγγενεστ,την κα δελφ+ν κα δδυμον /ντως )ξ$ς 1πισκεπτ!ον φιλανρωπαν (“Next we must consider humanity, which is most closely

related to piety, its sister and twin.”). They took this, together with the references to piety in the manuscript titles, as sufficient warrant for positing a lacuna between §§  and , wherein originally stood a section Περ εσεβεας.55 It is important to note that despite its ubiquity in the titles, this is a ghost work, never actually appearing in the texts themselves.56 Although four fragments attributed to a lost Philonic treatise Περ εσεβεας have been found in the Sacra parallela, they indicate nothing about the work’s original literary setting or relationship to other Philonic writings, and so are of little value for the current discussion.57 While it is entirely possible that Philo actually penned a De pietate as part of a larger book, most scholars have expressed reservations concerning Cohn and Wendland’s rationale for situating such a work within De virtutibus.58 As Runia puts it, the introduction of piety into the manuscript titles is best explained “as a deduction on the basis of the transmitted text, rather than a fossilized reference to a lost part of the treatise,” that is, as the result of copyists drawing a false inference from the opening words of § .59 Some copyists even inserted Περ εσ!βειας (F) or Περ εσ!βειας κα φιλανρωπας (HP) as a subtitle before § . In a somewhat more logical editorial move, the scribe of ms G inserted the subtitle Περ εσ!βειας before

54

Cf. Jerome, De vir. ill. : de tribus virtutibus liber unus. As Colson (PLCL .) notes, the phrase ς σν λλαις ν!γραψε Μωυσ$ς was probably not meant as part of the title, but as a note to avoid the impression that Moses acknowledged only three virtues. 55 PCW .xxvi–xxviii, ; PCH .–. Cf. Wendland , ; Cohn , –. Massebieau (, –) conjectured that the lost De pietate originally functioned as a transitional work between De vita Mosis and De humanitate. 56 Hilgert , . 57 For the first three fragments, see Harris , –. For the complex history of the fourth, see Royse ; Royse , –. He further conjectures that De pietate once stood as an independent treatise of roughly fourteen pages in a third-century papyrus codex of Philo’s works. 58 E.g., Schürer , ; Colson, PLCL .xiii–xiv; Royse , –. In support of the theory, see especially Sterling , –. 59 Runia , . Similarly, Schürer , ; Colson, PLCL .xiv.

the title and integrity of the treatise



§ , prompted no doubt by the references to eusebeia in §§  and .60 However, it would be rash to conclude that the formulation of Virt.  necessarily refers to an earlier discussion of piety. In Abr. ; Decal. –; Spec. .; Virt.  and elsewhere, Philo presents eusebeia and philanthr¯opia as complementary pairs, and so a reference to the former in the introduction to a discussion of the latter would not be unexpected.61 Remember that neither Clement nor ms S provide evidence of a section on piety. As Royse (, ) points out, Cohn’s idea that such a section formed part of De virtutibus “requires that both S and the source used by Clement were defective at exactly the same point,” while Colson thinks “Cohn should at least have noted that if it had perished in the second century, its reappearance in the next century only to perish again after some hundred years requires some explanation” (PLCL .xiv). These points, together with the fact that at Spec. . Philo states that he has already discussed eusebeia,62 lead us to the conclusion that if a Philonic De pietate did exist, its original place was not in our treatise.63 We can conclude this section by noting briefly that the phrase περ ρετν also occurs in some of the manuscript titles for Philo’s Legatio ad Gaium.64 There is also some evidence that this work and the In Flaccum were individual contributions within a five-volume series entitled Περ ρετν,65 while some of the manuscripts for De vita contemplativa refer to it as the fourth book of the ρετν or of the περ ρετν.66 Despite such designations, which have long puzzled scholars, these treatises have no particular association with our De virtutibus.67 Note also references to 2σιτης in §§ , ,  and to 3σιος in § . In Decal. , Philo identifies eusebeia as the source of the other virtues, and the introduction to De paenitentia (§ ) has a reference to it as well (cf. Spec. .). Thus piety represents something of a theme for the treatise as a whole; cf. Runia , . See further on Virt. . 62 As Colson (PLCL .xi–xii) suggests, most likely the principal reference here is to the treatment of the first four commandments of the decalogue in the first two books of De specialibus legibus. Note that eusebeia is used twenty-five times in those books (see especially Spec. .; cf. Decal. –). 63 As Royse (, ) points out, it “is easier to imagine the loss of some folios at the beginning or end of a work than in the middle.” He therefore proposes that De pietate occurred after De nobilitate, though this theory encounters many of the same problems as Cohn’s, and has the further difficulty of not explaining why the majority of manuscript titles have the section on piety listed second. 64 See PCW .lviii–lx, . 65 See Eusebius, Eccl. hist. ..; ..; Smallwood , –; Morris , – . 66 See PCW .ix–x, . 67 Royce , ; cf. Borgen , –. 60 61



introduction . Analysis of the Treatise’s Contents

As we have seen, De virtutibus contains four discreet sections.68 Their basic contents can be summarized as follows.69 The first section, De fortitudine, opens with a transitional statement that connects the section with the subtreatise on justice in Spec. .– . The analysis of courage itself is divided into two parts, the first on peacetime courage (§§ –), the other on wartime courage (§§ –), flanked by an introduction (§§ –) and conclusion (§§ –). Philo announces that the type of courage to be discussed is not the sort of reckless brutality admired by the ignorant masses, but courage as a form of knowledge located in the soul and cultivated by the practitioners of wisdom, whose overriding concern is the common good (§§ –). Philo explicates the meaning of this courage in peacetime first by identifying the different scenarios in which it is exhibited (§§ –), then by giving examples of how the law teaches and trains its followers to behave courageously in such situations (§§ –). Virt. – reviews the circumstances calling for true courage, and what resources those who embody this virtue draw on when rising up to face them. Against poverty, to begin with, they are armed, not with the wealth that is “blind,” but with the wealth of nature, which protects the body, and the wealth of wisdom, which abets the soul’s assimilation to God (§§ b– ). Disgrace they overcome by winning not the praise of the thoughtless masses, but the praise earned by the virtuous elite when they demonstrate excellence of character (§ ). Physical blindness is compensated for by the superior vision that prudence furnishes the intellect (§§ –). And physical disease is alleviated by the health of the soul, which occurs when the virtue of moderation prevents the part of the soul that reasons from being overwhelmed by passion (§§ –). Philo now quickly mentions two forms of discipline prescribed by the law for cultivating this virtue. The first of these is evidenced by the various provisions (which he claims to have already covered) having to do with simplicity and the rejection of vanity (§§ –). The second is evident in Moses’ intent to insulate his male followers from any unnatural taint of unmanliness, even going so far as to forbid them from wearing women’s clothes (§§ –; cf. Deut :). 68 As a way of acknowledging the integrity of each section, in the commentary I use the abbreviations Fort., Hum., Paen., and Nob. when referring to their contents. 69 Cf. PCH .–; PAPM ., –, , ; Alexander .

analysis of the treatise’s contents



The discussion of wartime courage opens with an overview of the criteria established by the law concerning the selection of recruits for military service (§§ –), complemented by an historical exemplum showing how a force thus constituted excels in war (§§ –). Like their civilian counterparts, Mosaic soldiers demonstrate courage principally when their souls’ ability to reason is not distressed by any passion that might distract them from their duty to the state. Moses allows two kinds of exemption from the armed forces. First, since vice is contagious, and cowardice is a vice virtually impossible to cure, those deficient in valor are excused (§§ –; cf. Deut :). Further exemptions are granted to anyone who has recently built a house, planted a vineyard, or become betrothed (cf. Deut :–), a practice based not only on the principle of humanity (§§ –), but also on the need to prevent the army from being debilitated by the presence of men whose minds are strained by a lurking desire for absent pleasures (§§ –). Philo asserts that an army of soldiers created in accordance with these principles, and thus healthy in both body and soul, will be invincible on the battlefield (§§ –). Proof of this assertion is provided with an exemplary historical tale in which the Alexandrian recounts the incident at Baal Peor and the Israelites’ war with the Midianites (cf. Num , ). The latter’s strategy, we hear, was to seduce the former away from their piety, the greatest source of their unity (§§ –). Although twenty-four thousand of the Israelite youths were seduced and led into idolatry, their souls ensnared by passion for sex (§§ –), God’s swift punishment on them deterred the rest from a similar fate (§ ). Inspired by their leader to defend the cause of piety, a picked force of twelve-thousand soldiers wreaked vengeance on the Midianites, annihilating their foes without losing a single man, proof that they had God as an ally (§§ –). Philo concludes by drawing a general lesson from the narrative: in times of both peace and war, those who are courageous in practicing the virtues of justice and holiness are assured of divine aid and the eudaimonia it brings (§§ –; cf. Lev :, –; Deut :, ). The second section, De humanitate, has three parts, showing how humanity is embodied and effected by Moses himself (§§ –), by the legislation that he established for the nation (§§ –), and by the classes ruling that nation (§§ –). In a continuation of and conclusion to the narrative in De vita Mosis, the lawgiver is seen to be a model of humanity in two sets of events that occurred as his earthly life drew to a close (§§ –). The first proof of



introduction

his philanthr¯opia has to do with the events surrounding his succession (§§ –). Recognizing the superiority of divine judgment, Moses did not appoint one of his family members as heir, or even the virtuous Joshua, but left the decision to God (§§ –; cf. Num :–). This is the only appropriate practice, he explains, for a nation which is the suppliant of the one true and eternal God (§§ –). Further evidence of Moses’ humanity is to be found in his final messages as leader (§§ –). Once the selection of Joshua had been approved by God, Moses joyously commissioned and charged him before the people, delivering a speech that would go on to become a standard for future rulers (§§ –; cf. Num :–; Deut :–). He then sang a hymn, expressing his thanks to God and his goodwill for the people, teaching his followers the importance of gratitude and astounding the celestial hosts with his cosmically harmonized music (§§ –; cf. Deut :–). Finally, his soul did not depart its earthly home until he uttered prayers to God on behalf of each of the twelve tribes, indicating their essential kinship with God as suppliants (§§ –; cf. Deut :–). In the second part of the subtreatise, Philo reviews a representative selection of laws that he thinks Moses left behind for the people in order to foster humanity in their relationships with others (§§ –). As explained in an introductory transition statement (§§ –), the survey is organized according to different categories of referents: people (§§ –), animals (§§ –), and plants (§§ –). The first subsection, in turn, presents laws concerning interactions with fellow Jews (§§ –), then non-Jews (§§ –), then slaves (§§ –). With regard to fellow Jews, Moses’ followers are forbidden to lend on interest to those who are poor; by doing so they accumulate something better than material wealth, the wealth of virtue (§§ –; cf. Exod :; Lev :–; Deut :–; :–). The wages of the poor are to be paid on the same day, lest they become disheartened (§§ ; cf. Lev :; Deut :–). Creditors may not enter the homes of their debtors to seize a pledge (§ ; cf. Deut :–). Gleanings from the harvests of grain, grapes, and olives must be left for the poor to gather. This way they are not reduced to extreme want, and in their generosity the landowners show they understand that the most essential contributions to the harvest come from nature (§§ –; cf. Lev :–; :; Deut :–). The first fruits of agricultural produce and domesticated animals must be rendered to the priests, an act of piety as well as humanity (§§ ; cf. Lev :–; Num :–; Deut :; :–). A stray animal should be returned to its owner (§ ; cf. Deut :–). Every seventh year arable

analysis of the treatise’s contents



land is to be left fallow, so that the poor may pick whatever grows there (§§ –; cf. Exod :–; Lev :–). In addition, every fiftieth year private properties must be returned to their original owners (§§ –; cf. Lev :–). So concludes the survey of provisions pertaining to fellow Jews (§ ). The first category in the subsection on non-Jews is proselytes, who are to be accorded every privilege and form of assistance, so that they might become, in effect, part of a single harmonious organism (§§ –; cf. Lev :–; Deut :–). Next, in a rumination on resident aliens, Philo takes Deut :– to mean that Jews must live peaceably with Egyptians and not hold a grudge against them, even though they treated the Jews cruelly after initially welcoming them as strangers. Egyptian children of the third generation are even eligible to become proselytes and join the Jewish polity (§§ –). The third and final unit of the subsection on non-Jews concerns the treatment of enemies. In times of war, an enemy army should be offered terms of peace before launching a (defensive) attack against it (§ ; cf. Deut :–). If someone wishes to marry a woman taken captive in war, she must be granted thirty days to grieve. This not only shows mercy on her misfortune, it also checks unbridled lust. In the case of subsequent divorce, she cannot be enslaved, but must be set free (§§ –; cf. Deut :–). Even the beast of one’s enemy must be treated kindly: if it collapses under its burden, assistance must be offered; if it strays, it must be returned to its owner (cf. Exod :–; Deut :–). Through obedience to such laws, one both learns not to take pleasure in the misfortunes of others and takes steps towards ending the feud (§§ –). Such reconciliation, Philo says, is representative of the intent behind Moses’ legislation more generally, namely, to promote concord and fellowship among individuals, peoples, and even the entire human race (§§ –). The last type of human referents are indentured servants and slaves. Those born free but reduced to forced servitude for whatever reason are to be liberated in the seventh year (§§ –; cf. Exod :; Deut :–). All runaway slaves are to be treated as suppliants and afforded temporary protection (§ ; cf. Deut :–). The second category of referents in the survey of laws promoting humanity is animals (§§ –). Moses’ sense of fairness extended even to creatures devoid of speech and reason (§ ); by practicing gentleness towards them, his followers learn to show humanity in fuller measure towards beings like themselves (§ ). Thus the law forbids them from killing newborn domesticated animals until they are at least



introduction

eight days old (cf. Lev :) and, by implication, from killing their own newborn infants (§§ –). Killing a mother animal and its offspring on the same day is also forbidden (cf. Lev :); this includes also pregnant animals and, by implication, pregnant women (§§ –). Furthermore, they are not to cook a lamb in its mother’s milk (§§ – ; cf. Exod :; :; Deut :) or muzzle a threshing ox (§ ; cf. Deut :). Finally, they are not to yoke an ox and an ass together for plowing (cf. Deut :) and, by implication, not to treat non-Jews unjustly (§§ –). The third and final category of referents in the survey of laws is plants (§§ –). Moses extends fairness even to those living things that lack a soul (§§ ). So, for example, the destruction of all food-producing plants is prohibited, even those growing on enemy territory (cf. Deut :). To do otherwise both curtails nature’s purpose for them and shows short-sightedness, since the foe of today can become the friend of tomorrow (§§ –). Additionally, during the first three years after planting, practical steps should be taken to help ensure that the plants reach maturity and bear fruit (§§ –; cf. Lev :–). Having completed the survey of laws, Philo now explains in the third and final section of the subtreatise that one of their important implications is to curb arrogance, pretentiousness, and insolence within the polity, vices that are prominent especially among the ruling classes (§§ –). To counteract this, those in positions of authority are taught by Moses to remember God with gratitude and to “make power,” that is, to imitate God’s benevolence and use whatever virtues they possess to make those around them more virtuous (§§ –; cf. Deut :– ). In so doing, they will avoid the fate of the pretentious man, who for his offenses will be handed over to God for punishment (§§ –; cf. Num :). The third and shortest subtreatise in De virtutibus is De paenitentia (§§ –). The main theme is set forth in the opening paragraph: in his humanity, Moses exhorts “all people everywhere” to repent and join his polity (§ ). While the best state is a god-like perfection, the second best is achieved when one turns from sin to a blameless life (§§ –). The description of Moses’ summons occupies the balance of the subtreatise, which examines the transformation experienced by proselytes from three different perspectives. First, they reject idolatry and worship the one true God (§§ –). Second, they are instantly transformed from a life of complete vice to a life of complete virtue, having abandoned the worst of polities for the best (§§ –). Third,

analysis of the treatise’s contents



the nature of the proselyte’s entire personal constitution is re-ordered, so that thought, words, and deeds are in harmony, as represented by the heart, mouth, and hands of Deut :. It is only this sort of person who is acceptable to God as a suppliant, that is, one who has chosen God, just as the Israelites chose God under Moses (§§ –; cf. Deut :–). The fourth and final subtreatise in De virtutibus is De nobilitate (§§ –). It has two major parts (§§ –, –), framed by an introduction (§§ –) and a conclusion (§§ –). The introduction announces the subtreatise’s two-part thesis: the virtuous alone are noble, even if their lineage happens to be ignoble, while the wicked have no claim to eugeneia, even if they happen to come from an illustrious family (§§ –). The first major section (§§ –) elaborates on the second part of the thesis. The fool born from a noble line estranges himself from the moral excellence of his ancestors (§ ), sullies his family’s reputation (§ ), and deserves to be cut off (§ ), his forebears’ health, strength, and virtue being of no use to him (§§ –). Personified Nobility then delivers a speech informing such individuals of her condemnation (§§ –). This is followed by a set of biblical examples illustrating how degenerate sons can be born to good parents. The first three, Cain (§§ –), Ham (§§ –), and Adam (§§ –), belong to humankind in general, while the last two are peculiar to Jewish history (§ ): of Abraham’s sons all but Isaac were found unworthy (§ ), while of Isaac’s sons, only the younger was well-pleasing (§§ –). The second major section (§§ –) takes up the first part of the thesis, providing examples of virtuous children born to ignoble parents (§ ). The longest discussion here (and the longest of any figure in the subtreatise) is assigned to Abraham (§§ –). Rejecting his father’s idolatry, he sought out the one true God and acquired faith, together with the other virtues, thus becoming “a standard of nobility for all proselytes” (§ ). Abraham’s female counterpart is Tamar, who similarly abandoned idolatry for the cause of piety (§§ –a). The list is rounded out with Zilpah and Bilhah. Although they were concubines, they rose to the status of married women and gave birth to sons who were treated equally with those born to Jacob’s legitimate wives (§§ b–). Philo concludes by affirming that the law judges all persons according to their own conduct and not that of their ancestors (§§ –). The presence of sections on repentance and nobility in a treatise entitled De virtutibus raises certain interpretive questions, since Philo nowhere identifies these concepts as virtues, and these two sections



introduction

(especially the former) are significantly shorter than those that precede. In addition, these two sections lack formal introductions comparable to those of the other sections (see part  of the Introduction), while the section that immediately precedes them, De humanitate, lacks a formal conclusion, unlike De iustitia and De fortitudine.70 For these reasons, most interpreters agree in treating De paenitentia and De nobilitate as appendices or adjuncts to De humanitate.71 This is particularly evident with the section on repentance (§§ –), whose contents can be understood in part as an elaboration of §§ – and , which also discuss proselytes. Perhaps the most obvious connection in this regard occurs in § , where Philo’s plea that “as many did not think fit to worship the Founder and Father of all from the beginning, but later welcomed the rule of one over the rule of many, should be considered our closest friends and relatives,” echoes the argument in § , that Moses inculcated humanity in his followers by commanding them to love proselytes “as friends and relatives.” Meanwhile, the main thesis of De nobilitate (§§ –), that true nobility rests not on birth but on piety and virtue, amplifies certain comments made about Moses (§ ) and the Israelites (§ ) in De humanitate. At the same time, these two subtreatises may also be interpreted as adjuncts not only to De humanitate, but also to presentation of Mosaic virtue in the Exposition more generally. From this perspective, they can be seen to be elaborating on the basic argument that membership in “the best of all polities” (§ ) is defined not in ethnic or national terms, but more decisively in religious and moral terms. This argument, according to which the Jewish ethnos resembles a philosophical movement or a state founded on philosophical principles, is consistent with Philo’s broader aim of demonstrating the universal scope and significance of the Mosaic law (see part  above). De paenitentia contributes to this by depicting the polity’s members as individuals who have made a choice to live an amended life and engage in processes of moral correction. For proselytes, this is represented by the choice they make for religious enlightenment and moral transformation when converting to Judaism. For those who are already members of the polity, this involves deciding to repent

70

Sterling , . E.g., PCW .xxvii–xxviii; PCH .; Morris , –. By the same token, while they are not virtues per se, the sections on repentance and nobility continue the topically organized structure of the treatise, each topic functioning as a key word for organizing illustrative material, drawn mostly from the Pentateuch. 71

the character and aim of the treatise



of any transgressions they may have committed. Philo concentrates on the former, since their presence in the community demonstrates the significance of choice as a defining feature of the polity most dramatically, the sudden and sweeping nature of their transformation testifying to the excellence of its laws and institutions. De nobilitate, in turn, argues that the Mosaic polity does not belong to the race of Israel by birth, but to those who commit themselves to holiness and virtue. By showing Mosaic nobility to consist not in having the right ancestors but in making the right choices, the message of De nobilitate reinforces and complements that of De paenitentia, and it is significant that Philo’s two most prominent examples of noble individuals born of ignoble families, Abraham and Tamar, are proselytes (§§ –).72 Insofar as the observation that the Jewish polity attracted converts from the non-Jewish world was a feature of Jewish apologetic rhetoric,73 Philo’s emphasis in this regard may provide a clue as to his aims in writing, a topic to which we now turn.

. The Character and Aim of the Treatise As the analysis above has shown, over three-fourths of De virtutibus is devoted to humanity and ancillary topics. Seeing how Philo is here introducing “a newcomer to the classical list of virtues,”74 questions arise as to what would have motivated him to devote such a long and rather involved section to the subject and what criteria he may have observed in the selection and organization of its contents. Contemporary scholarship has generally tended to take Philo’s arguments about philanthr¯opia in this section as a contribution to the broader apologetic agenda of the Exposition discussed above.75 The following comments from Katell Berthelot’s monograph, which includes the fullest 72

Differently, Cohn (PCH .) imagined De paenitentia as a summons for nonJewish readers, having been convicted by the arguments in De humanitate, to embrace the true faith, while in De nobilitate Philo turns to his fellow Jews, encouraging them to accept proselytes as equals. For a critique, see PLCL .xv–xvii. For his part, Colson (PLCL .xvii–xviii), judging it to be a work of inferior quality, suggested that De nobilitate did not originally belong to De virtutibus, though the evidence of Clement’s Stromata speaks against this; see part  above. 73 See, e.g., Josephus, C. Ap. ., , , with Barclay , –, –, –. 74 Konstan , . On the same page he writes: “I do not know of a passage in which it is explicitly included in a list of virtues.” 75 E.g., van Veldhuizen ; Dautzenberg ; Borgen a.



introduction

and most recent treatment of De humanitate, are typical: “The presentation of the humanity of the Mosaic law represents the heart of the philonian refutation of certain accusations made by pagan authors. Whether Philo mentions the humanity of the legislator or of the legislation, in both cases it is Moses as well as the law that are defended.”76 Above all, Philo intends to refute the sorts of charges expressed, for example, in Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. /..–, according to which “the Jews . . . alone of all nations avoided dealings with any other people and looked upon all men as their enemies.” Thus when organizing themselves as a nation, “they made their hatred of humanity into a tradition, and on this account had introduced utterly outlandish laws: not to break bread with any other people, nor to show them any good will at all.”77 In estimating the impact of such accusations, it is important to bear in mind the broad significance of philanthr¯opia as a cultural value in Greco-Roman antiquity.78 Here Plutarch, who uses the term frequently, is representative. For him, the concepts of philanthr¯opia, civilization, and Hellenism were “almost inseparable.”79 In Phil. ., for instance, he praises Aratus as the leader who first lifted the Achaeans from semibarbaric obscurity to a state of power and prominence, something he accomplished by “establishing a Hellenic and humane polity” (πολιτευσ,μενος 4Ελληνικ+ν κα φιλ,νρωπον πολιτεαν) for the people. In a case like this, being humane and being Greek are virtually synonymous, particularly when it comes to determining the arrangements by which an ethnos organizes itself.80 As the work of Plutarch further illustrates, humanity also had a place in the philosophical argot of the era.81 One of the more important areas in which the concept figured, for exam-

76

Berthelot , . Many scholars believe that Diodorus’ source was Posidonius; see GLAJJ .–, –. On the “misoxenia/misanthr¯opia motif,” see Schäfer , –; Isaac , –; Pearce  –; also the commentary on Virt. . 78 For surveys, see Tromp de Ruiter ; Le Déaut ; Luck ; Hiltbrunner ; Spicq , .–; Pearson . 79 Martin , ; cf. Aalders , . The Latin humanitas is likewise often associated with culture and civilization, e.g., Nikolaïdis –; Hiltbrunner , –; Nickel . 80 In Plutarch philanthr¯ opia can refer to such things as courteousness, sociability (especially with one’s social inferiors), and clemency, though most prominently it is used to describe “an act of kindness or generosity” (Martin , ). The term is sometimes associated with the virtues of justice and piety, as Konstan (, ) observes. He also notes the frequency with which the term is used by Polybius and Diodorus Siculus. 81 E.g., Hirzel , –. 77

the character and aim of the treatise



ple, was in the promulgation of Stoic universalistic ideals.82 Within such a climate, then, charges of inhumanity can be understood as part of a broader effort to marginalize Jews culturally, politically, and intellectually. According to Berthelot, Philo’s response to such calumny consisted in “affirming that the philanthr¯opia taught by Moses’ law aims at the entirety of creation and not at the Jewish people alone. Indeed, the texts accusing the Jews of misanthr¯opia are about the attitude of Jews regarding non-Jews, and not the relationships of Jews among themselves.” Thus in “De virtutibus, he particularly seeks to demonstrate that the impact of the philanthr¯opia prescribed by Mosaic laws is not limited to the Jewish community but extends to other categories of people as well.”83 The challenge that presents itself, then, is “to prove that Moses’ law prescribes philanthr¯opia towards every individual, even though it does not in fact usually legislate for the category ‘every man’.”84 Accordingly, one of Philo’s priorities is to demonstrate the “universality” of Mosaic philanthr¯opia by showcasing provisions of the law that encourage Jews to practice philanthr¯opia in their interactions with non-Jews. As we have already seen, the Exposition exhibits clear signs of apologetic discourse.85 At the same time, what the topic of philanthr¯opia contributes to this discourse may be more complicated than Berthelot’s comments suggest. In particular, the question of the referents of Mosaic humanity in the Exposition (that is, the recipients or beneficiaries of humane action carried out by Jews) is one that warrants further scrutiny. We may begin with three sets of preliminary observations. The first set has to do with the broader literary setting of De humanitate. Outside of this subtreatise, there are thirty-two occurrences of philanthr¯opia in the Exposition. When examined in terms of referent, these fall under four basic headings.86 In four cases, the referent is not specified. We are told, for example, that those who aspire to virtue must cultivate this trait, but with no indication as to the group or individuals towards whom humanity should be directed (Spec. .; cf. Mos. .; Spec. .; .). In another four cases, the referent is ambiguous. For 82 E.g. Baldry , –, –; Wright ; Schofield , –. Also see the commentary on Virt. . 83 Berthelot , –. 84 Berthelot , . 85 See Part  of the Introduction. 86 This does not include the three occasions in which it is divine, not human, philanthr¯opia that is under discussion: Abr. ; Mos. .; Virt. .

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example, in Spec. ., Philo explains that it is a mark of humanity to share good things with the “worthy” ( ξιοι), which might conceivably include non-Jews along with Jews, though this is not specified (cf. Spec. .; .; .). In over half the cases, there is little doubt that the referents are fellow Jews.87 For example, on a half-dozen occasions the referents are Jewish priests (Spec. .; .; .) or members of their households (Spec. ., , ). There are even occasions when Philo can imply that the philanthr¯opia Jews are expected to observe in their interactions with one another does not apply to their interactions with other people.88 This leaves us with only a few passages where the referents might belong to Berthelot’s “other categories of people” (Abr. , ; Ios. ). Looking at the presentation of humanity in the Exposition as a whole, then, its application to non-Jews does not appear to be a prominent feature. A second set of observations can be made regarding De humanitate itself. As we have seen, the main body of the subtreatise is a survey of Mosaic laws that Philo thinks promote humanity, organized according to the categories of people, animals, and plants. Concentrating on the question of referents here, we find references to non-Jews only in §§ –, –, and §§ – (assuming that 1χρο refers to non-Jews). In sum, then, less than one fourth of the subtreatise concerns humanity as it is expressed by Jews towards non-Jews. In addition, the first mention of non-Jews does not occur until almost half-way through the subtreatise. Finally, no reference is made to non-Jews in either the Introduction (§§ –) or the Conclusion (§§ –) of the subtreatise. It is significant that analyses such as Berthelot’s spend comparatively little time discussing these sections, though it is fair to assume that at least some of Philo’s reasons for writing would be communicated in one or both of them. A third set of observations can be made regarding Virt. , one of the few places where the apologetic profile of the Exposition becomes explicit: “So let those devious slanderers continue to malign the nation as being prone to inhumanity (μισανρωπ7α) and accuse the laws of encouraging uncongenial and unsocial (κοιν8νητα) practices, when these laws obviously grant a share of mercy even to herds of cattle, and the people through the guidance of customs learned from their earliest 87 Besides what follows, see Ios. ; Mos. .; .; Decal. ; Spec. ., , , , , ; ., . 88 E.g., compare Spec. .; .– with Spec. .–; ., .

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youth amend any disobedience in their souls to a civilized disposition.” It is noteworthy that in countering the charge of misanthr¯opia and stating positively what it is that the law promotes, Philo says nothing here about the interaction of Jews with non-Jews. This statement concludes a section of the subtreatise dealing with Lev :, which prohibits sacrificing a mother animal and its offspring on the same day (§§ –). Philo contends that this statute inspired the leaders of other nations to introduce the law that prohibits executing a pregnant woman condemned to death until after her child is born. So non-Jews are indeed the beneficiaries of Mosaic philanthr¯opia, but not as the result of any law about how Jews ought to treat them. Rather the Mosaic law itself serves as a model that inspires other lawmakers to be more humane in dealing with their own people. Taken together, these observations indicate that Philo’s presentation of Mosaic humanity in fact incorporates a broad range of referents and social situations, including many that are internal to the Jewish community. If we were to identify a common denominator for all of this material, it seems that in each case Philo expounds on a situation in which we see, not Jews interacting with non-Jews, but those who possess means, power, or authority interacting with those who do not: landowners pay day-laborers their wages on time, victorious soldiers grant their female captives a period of mourning, farmers do not muzzle their oxen when they tread out the grain, and so on. This particular type of social dynamic is reflected also in the treatise’s Introduction (§§ –) and Conclusion (§§ –), comprising about one third of the subtreatise, which deal with how persons in positions of authority, especially political authority, understand and use their power.89 In the former, Moses makes “humane” rather then selfish decisions about the choice of a successor to lead the nation. In the latter, the ruling classes are exhorted to abstain from insolence and to instead imitate God by using their resources to promote the common good. Attention to this dimension of Philonic philanthr¯opia suggests a different line of inquiry for investigating the Exposition, especially given the fact that the concept of humanity figured prominently in various forms of contemporaneous political discourse. To take just one example: in the literature on kingship (περ βασιλεας), humanity is generally included

89 Note how the Conclusion opens with the language of 9γεμονα (§§ –), recalling the principal issue addressed by the Introduction (§§ , , ).

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among the desiderata of the ideal ruler.90 This attribute comes to expression especially when he protects the weaker from the stronger, when he dispenses benefits to those who most need them, and when he observes restraint in executing the powers of his office. By honoring this virtue in his own character he sets an example for others to follow, and so humanity becomes a moral qualification for the ruling classes generally. Among Philo scholars, E.R. Goodenough contributed as much as anyone to our understanding of this literature.91 In terms of its relevance to the Exposition, however, he restricted himself largely to De Iosepho.92 Among other things, this meant that relatively little attention was paid to the theme of philanthr¯opia (the term does not even appear in the index to his book on Philo’s politics). Another consequence was that relatively little attention was paid to how the sorts of virtues extolled in the kingship literature figured in other forms of political discourse. In fact, however, there are any number of different generic possibilities that might repay consideration in this regard. One genre that seems to have particular potential for comparative analysis is “the account of constitutional origins.”93 Much like the Exposition, examples of this kind of discourse draw extensively on the language of virtue, applying it both to the state’s rulers and to the laws that they establish. One of the fullest examples of this genre is the Antiquitates romanae of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, published beginning in  bce, a work that describes the origins of the Roman ethnos with particular attention to its founders and the polity they established. As he explains in the preface (..–..), Dionysius is writing in part to refute certain strains of antiRoman propaganda, according to which Rome was founded, in essence, by a band of misfits (e.g., ..–).94 His thesis, to the contrary, is that from the beginning Rome was led by men fit to rule, in other words, men preeminent in virtue.95 The elaboration of such a thesis, he says, ought 90

See, e.g., Isocrates, Ad Nic. ; Dio Chrysostom, Or. ., ; ., ; ., ; .; Musonius Rufus, frg. ..; Let. Arist. . Further, Hadot . 91 Goodenough . 92 Goodenough , –. 93 Examples of this genre might include Aristotle’s Athenian Constitution and Xenophon’s Constitution of the Lacedaemonians; book  of Cicero’s Republic; and some of Plutarch’s biographies, such as those of Lycurgus and Numa. Also Josephus, Jewish Antiquities –, for which see Feldman , xxiv–xxix. 94 Cf. Weißenberger . For the background of such propaganda, see Deininger , –. 95 That such men ought to rule their inferiors is “a universal law of nature” (Ant. rom. ..).

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to be of interest to anyone interested in ruling well, since what is being described is the best politeia, based on the judgments of the best leaders, especially the first kings of Rome, and especially Romulus.96 As he puts it in .., the aim is for his readers to learn “that Rome from the very beginning, immediately after its founding, produced infinite examples of virtue in men whose superiors, whether for piety or for justice or for life-long moderation or for warlike valor, no city, either Greek or barbarian, has ever produced.” His history will show that the institutions and customs of Roman society are not accidents of history, but in fact embody the intentional design of its founder, the superiority of whose vision and plan for the state is proven through time as it overcomes all manner of ordeals and obstacles. Of course what Dionysius provides us is hardly an unbiased account. On the contrary, it is apparent that he has extended considerable energy reworking his source material. This is a project that entails an apologetic reconstruction of Roman origins, which are idealized especially according to the principles of Greek political culture. According to Emilio Gabba, Dionysius has accessed this culture especially through the writings of Isocrates, who, not coincidentally, wrote several kingship treatises.97 Dionysius’ efforts in this regard follow what Gabba refers to as “the political theory proclaiming Rome’s Greekness.”98 Specifically, in demonstrating how the Roman state realizes Greek ideals, Dionysius hopes to legitimize Rome as a civilizing power, one whose ascendancy is morally deserved and whose politeia is justifiably a universal politeia.99 Toward this end, Dionysius employs a range of narrative strategies, each meant to prove the essentially Greek character of Rome’s first kings and the constitutional order that they established.100 One of these strategies involves associating specific persons and events in Roman history with a set of conventional Greek virtues, which function as recurring themes of moral assessment. In Dionysius’ retelling, these virtues also represent the standards according to which the Roman politeia was founded. Specifically, in establishing institutions for the state, Romulus believed that good government rested on “first, the favor of the 96 Cf. Ant. rom. ... Dionysius’ interest in amplifying the role of the founder figure is evident, e.g., when the comparatively lengthy account in Ant. rom. ..–.. is compared with its counterpart in Livy, Ab urb. cond. ..–... 97 For what follows, see Gabba ; Gabba . 98 Gabba , . 99 Cf. Martin ; Luraghi . 100 Cf. Cary , xi–xxviii.

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gods . . . next, moderation and justice . . . and, lastly, bravery in war” (..) Recognizing that none of these is the effect of chance, he held that it is “good laws and the emulation of worthy pursuits” that “render a state pious, moderate, devoted to justice, and brave in war” (..).101 As David Balch has shown, these statements belong to a larger section of the Antiquitates that demonstrates how the particular measures adopted by Romulus for regulating the nation fostered such virtues.102 The survey begins with a section on humanity (..–..),103 followed by a section on piety (..–..), and a section on justice and moderation (..–..). The next section records “other deeds reported of this man, both in his wars and at home,” referring to his role in the rape of the Sabine women (..–..) and his leadership in the resulting wars (..–..). The manner in which Dionysius treats the first of these virtues is of particular interest to the current discussion. In the first book of the Antiquitates, it is introduced in a way that that seems to be programmatic: “Such, then, are the facts concerning the origin of the Romans which I have been able to discover after my reading very diligently many works . . . Hence, from now on let the reader forever renounce the views of some who make Rome the retreat of barbarians, fugitives, and vagabonds, and let him confidently affirm it to be a Greek city—which will be easy when it is seen to be the most social (κοινοτ,την) and humane (φιλανρωποτ,την) of all cities” (..; cf. ..). Dionysius will go on to use the terms φιλανρωπα and φιλ,νρωπος over seventy times, narrating how various institutions, laws, and measures enacted by Roman leaders embody and effect this virtue, creating the impression that humanity pervades and permeates Roman society. One of the ways that he does this is by showing how the virtue applies to an array of different referents, including many familiar from our analysis of De humanitate: the poor the hungry the dispossessed/landless debtors foreign residents

..; ..; ..; ..; .. ..; ..– ..–; ..; ..; ..– ..–; ..–; ..– ..; ..; ..–

101 Cf. ..: “men of bravery, justice, and the other virtues are the result of a polity that has been established wisely.” See also ..; ... 102 Balch , –. 103 The section makes no mention of philanthr¯ opia per se, though comparison with .. (quoted below) makes such an identification feasible.

the character and aim of the treatise slaves clients enemies, captives seditious groups

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..; .. ..–.. ..–; ..; ..; ..; ..; .. ..; ..

Among other things, this catalogue is of interest inasmuch as it represents a virtual check list of what ancient political theorists generally identified as the principal sources of social instability.104 And this connects precisely to a point that Dionysius makes repeatedly in his history. On occasion after occasion, the Romans are shown encountering various threats to their social order involving one or more of these groups. And in each case we learn that because those with means or authority are guided in their interactions with these groups by philanthr¯opia, the crisis is resolved in a manner that preserves civic unity. In contrast to other states, which are forever fractured by stasis, the Romans have established constitutional constraints on potential abuses of power that could destabilize their society. Indeed, “so secure was the Romans’ concord (2μνοια), which owed its birth to the regulations of Romulus, that they never in the course of six hundred and thirty years proceeded to bloodshed and mutual slaughter, though many great controversies arose between the populace and their magistrates concerning public policy” (..).105 The cumulative effect of this narrative pattern functions as a guarantee (as Dionysius sees things) of the Romans’ moral excellence, evidenced in the strength, stability, and longevity of their politeia. It is no wonder that Roman rule comes to be admired and emulated by other nations, as we hear in a summary statement about Rome’s second king: “By these means (that is, by fostering acts of philanthr¯opia) Numa came to be beloved of his subjects, the example of his neighbors, and the theme of posterity. It was owing to these measures that civil dissension never broke the concord (2μνοια) of the state” (..–). Transitions in political leadership represented another common and much discussed source of social volatility.106 Consistent with the priorities mentioned above, it is significant that narrating these sorts of scenarios provides occasions for both Dionysius and Philo to demonstrate how 104

See, e.g., Finley , –; cf. Eckstein , –. Romulus recognized that the attributes among the citizens most important for preserving the state were courage in military affairs and unanimity (2μοφροσ:νη) in civil affairs, the latter depending on “the moderate and just life of each citizen” (..; cf. ..–..). 106 For a list of primary texts, see Talbert and Stepp, . 105

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their respective founder figures observe philanthr¯opia. Philo does this in the Introduction to De humanitate, which explains that as Moses neared death he did not choose one of his relatives to succeed him as leader of the Israelites, but left the decision to divine judgment. God then selects a man who, because he is supreme in virtue, will maintain good order (ενομα) for the people (§§ –).107 Dionysius raises the issue of political succession on a number of occasions, which provide him with opportunities to explain how the Romans avoided the particular uncertainties associated with hereditary kingship.108 The succession narrative of Numa in ..–.. is in many regards prototypical. We are told that he ascended the throne not by force or on account of any personal relationship with Romulus, but because he was elected to the office by the Roman Senate owing to his superior wisdom. Later these procedures are institutionalized for the entire state. Indeed, among Rome’s “most humane laws” is the provision that its magistrates are to rule only with the consent of those governed (..; cf. ..–; ..). On the other hand, the antithesis of this ideal is embodied in the violent reign of Rome’s last king, Tarquinius “the Arrogant” (..; cf. ..). Similar language is employed in the Conclusion to De humanitate to summarize the treatise’s contents. Indeed, in Philo’s interpretation, the primary motivation behind Moses’ directives to the people on humanity was to set those in high office “beyond the reach of arrogance and pretentiousness” (§ , cf. §§ –) so as to protect the civic body. Another key to the success, and especially the growth, of the Roman state was the liberal policy it followed in granting citizenship to nonRomans, especially refugees, defeated populations, and freed-persons: In the course of time they contrived to raise themselves from the smallest nation (;νος) to the greatest . . . not only by their humane (φιλανρ8π<ω) reception of those who sought a home among them, but also by granting a share of the polity (πολιτεας) to all who had been conquered by them in war after a brave resistance, by permitting all the slaves, too, who were manumitted among them to become citizens, and by disdaining no condition of men from whom the commonwealth might reap an advantage (..).

107 Not surprisingly, ενομα is extolled as a political asset by Dionysius as well, e.g., Ant. rom. ..; ..–. 108 Here Dionysius may betray the influence of Polybius and his theory of constitutional degeneration, esp. Hist. ..–.

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Of course, even if it was “humane,” this was a policy that had to be defended, particularly insofar as it impinged upon issues of ancestry and ethnic identity, issues that figured generally in the delineation of an ethnos.109 For example, in response to charges that the influx of foreigners had corrupted the nobility of the Roman nation, King Tullus responded that the chief offices and honors of the state “are enjoyed, not by men possessed of great fortunes, not by those who can show a long line of ancestors all natives of the country, but by such as are worthy of these honors; for we look upon the nobility (εγ!νεια) of men as consisting in nothing else than virtue” (..; cf. Virt. , ). The composition and character of the nation, then, are determined not by lineage, but by the moral excellence demonstrated by its citizens, which in turn assures that the policies of the state designed to foster such excellence are successful. The Romans’ willingness to accept virtuous non-Romans into their ethnos regardless of their ethnic, political, or civil status serves as confirmation of this. To sum up: the Antiquitates sheds some light on how the discourse of Greek virtue could be appropriated in an apologetic project of redescribing the constitutional origins of a politeia as the ideal politeia. In particular, Dionysius illustrates the types of situations in which such a politeia might be expected to demonstrate the virtue of philanthr¯opia, and what such observance was thought to reveal about the character of the state and its leaders. Presumably any state with aspirations to being a “universal” (or at least universally admired) politeia would need to address in its modes of self-representation issues of social unity and stability, including how moral configurations of institutional power contribute to these ends. Philo also claims to be describing the ideal or universal politeia, established by the ideal founder. In concert with this, he claims the discourse of Greek political culture as his own, interpreting Greek ideals in terms of his source material and the historical and institutional particularities intrinsic to it. In this manner he demonstrates how those who belong to this politeia embody the highest aspirations of the host culture. This provides a different vantage point from which to understand Philo’s claims regarding Mosaic “universality,” such as expressed, for example, in Hum. : “This above all is what the most holy prophet throughout the

109 Cf. ..–.., where he argues that in their manner of granting citizenship the Romans excel the Greeks.

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whole of his legislation intends to provide, concord (2μνοια), fellowship (κοινωνα), unanimity (2μοφροσ:νη), and a blending of dispositions, from which households and cities, nations and lands, and the whole human race might advance to the highest well-being.” Mosaic humanity is not simply a matter of interaction between Jews and non-Jews, but in fact provides a standard by which all the major institutions of human society can thrive. That Dionysius writes an apology about the origins of the Roman state makes his account especially relevant for comparative analysis. Given Philo’s geopolitical perspective, as well as his own personal experience, any thesis on his part regarding ideal constitutions would need to take into account the realities and representations of Roman rule.110 The evidence proffered by the Antiquitates suggests that claims concerning the virtue of humanity would have been ingredient to such representations, a fact that is confirmed by other sources of the era.111 By advancing comparable claims, Philo’s re-reading of Jewish origins would have resonated with basic elements of imperial ideology and prevailing forms of political rhetoric. Indeed, it is his hope that “all future rulers would find a law to guide them right by looking to Moses as their archetype and model” (Hum. ; cf. Mos. .). The political aspirations of the dominant culture are met in the person and legacy of the Jewish lawgiver.112 At the same time, there are significant differences between these two texts as well, and attention to these differences helps to illuminate some of the Exposition’s distinctive features. Three of these may be mentioned here. First, while they may agree as to many of the typical referents of humanity in the ideal state, the two authors have their own emphases as well. Dionysius includes the role of humanity in patron-client relations, for example, a topic of little interest to Philo, who pays attention instead to the virtue’s significance for human-nonhuman relations. In this he appears to draw on contemporary reflections, familiar from philosophical (especially Pythagorean) circles, on the idea that one can learn virtue from practicing kindness not only to fellow human beings but even to plants and animals.113 110

Cf. Wilson . See, e.g., Ehrhardt ; Adam , –. 112 Dionysius similarly hopes that the current ruling classes will look to Romulus et alii as models of political behavior; see Schultze . 113 Berthelot . She notes a contrast between Pythagorean and Stoic positions in this regard. 111

the character and aim of the treatise



The two authors also differ in terms of how they access Greek culture. Dionysius does this principally through Isocrates, Philo principally through Plato. Among other things, this may help to explain some of the distinctiveness in the moral argot of De humanitate. For instance, in explicating the nature of philanthr¯opia, Philo depends more than Dionysius does on the language of φιλα.114 It is possible that this reflects the influence of Plato’s Leges, where the observance of philia between citizens is emphasized repeatedly as being expressive of their unity.115 Even when Philo does not utilize the actual language of friendship, his interpretations seem to invoke priorities reminiscent of Plato’s friendship ethic. To take just one example, in §§ – he reviews the proscription of lending at interest, which is mentioned among the commercial activities forbidden to citizens in the Leges as well (c).116 Such steps, Plato informs us, are necessary in a state whose purpose is to make its citizens not rich, but friends (c–d). At the same time, they are permitted to lend without interest, though the terms of even these loans are not enforceable, since legal disputes are precisely the sort of thing that should never divide φλοι (Leg. e, cf. d). Philo similarly maintains that Moses’ intent with these laws was to create citizens more concerned with fellowship (κοινωνα) than profit-making. Finally, there are significant differences between the two in terms of literary structure. Dionysius weaves virtue discourse throughout the Antiquitates, especially in the speeches and narrative summaries.117 De virtutibus, by contrast, consists entirely of distinct sections on the virtues, and in this regard the Exposition looks more like the work of a Hellenistic philosopher.118 It can be compared, accordingly, with a text like Iamblichus’ De vita Pythagorica, itself a kind of account of constitutional

114

See Virt. , , , , , , , , . This is not to say that such language is absent from Dionysius, only that he uses it less frequently in conjunction with philanthr¯opia (cf. ..), and usually in connection with alliances between states or between the leaders of states, e.g., ... 115 Morrow , –. Philo is indebted to Stoic conceptions of friendship as well; see Sterling . 116 Cf. c–d; Resp. b–c, a–b. 117 The extensive use of speeches accords with the goal of demonstrating how political differences are resolved by peaceful, rational means. 118 Compare, e.g., books  through  of Aristotle’s Ethica nicomachea and book  of Cicero’s De officiis (a reworking of Panaetius’ Περ το( κα=κοντος). Among philosophers it seems to have been de rigueur to write περ ρετν, e.g., Ps.-Aristotle, De virtutibus et vitiis; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; ., –, , ; .; Porphyry, Vit. Plot. .; .; Damascius, In Phaedr. .–.



introduction

origins.119 One section of the book, chapters –, presents the way of life established by the philosopher/founder according to the virtues of eusebeia/hosiot¯es (), sophia (), dikaiosyn¯e (), s¯ophrosyn¯e (), andreia (), and philia (). This approximates the schema announced by Philo at Spec. .– and continued into De virtutibus, and all the more so if we bear in mind that philanthr¯opia was sometimes understood as a species or extension of philia (e.g., Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..).120 The position accorded philia in the overall presentation is also noteworthy. In certain respects it seems to function as a culminating virtue or metavirtue, inasmuch as one learns how to practice the other virtues through the relationships developed out of friendship. These include relationships with God, with fellow citizens and family members, and even with animals (.).121 Philo similarly seems to understand philanthr¯opia as a means by which other virtues are cultivated. This is articulated most vividly in the description of ideal rulers with which De humanitate concludes. Their commitment to observing humanity in the exercise of their authority in fact belongs to a broader set of social objectives, which entails imparting their prudence, moderation, courage, and justice to others (Virt. ). In this light, philanthr¯opia can be understood both as a specific norm and consequence of obedience to the law as well as a catalyst for the activity of virtue more generally. Before concluding this section, a word should be said concerning the intended audience of De virtutibus and the Exposition, a topic that has generated a range of opinions in scholarship. Goodenough, for example, argued that the Exposition was written for non-Jews, though this position has won few adherents.122 Colson, meanwhile, concluded that Philo had both Jews and Gentiles in view, though primarily the latter.123 Others, including Morris, judge the evidence adduced for a Gentile audience to be unconvincing and consider the commentary to be addressed to congenial Jews.124 To be sure, the rhetoric of the Exposition projects a

119 For an exploration of the broader phenomenon of “institutional history” in antiquity, see Cancik . 120 Cf. Fiore , esp. . 121 Cf. von Albrecht , –. 122 Goodenough ; Goodenough , –; cf. Schürer , ; Böhm , –. 123 PLCL .xv–xvi; .xiv; .xx; cf. PCH .–; Hilgert , –. 124 Morris , –, –, –, ; cf. Sandmel , ; Dawson , ; Reinhartz , ; Niehoff , ; Feldman , .

the nachleben of the treatise



world in which significant numbers of non-Jews are interested in learning about the Mosaic law (e.g., Mos. .). However, Philo never declares explicitly who is audience is,125 and the evidence that non-Jews actually read works written by Jews is actually quite meager.126 Perhaps the most that can be safely said is that the more exoteric and systematic character of the Exposition would have made it accessible to a broader readership than that of Philo’s other commentary series,127 and so possibly could have included non-Jews as well as Jews.128 As the comments above have indicated, however, I think that it is probably more instructive to discuss what kind of composition Philo has created than what kind of audience for whom that composition may or may not have been intended. In the final analysis, Ellen Birnbaum is probably correct in her suggestion that in terms of aims and audiences the Alexandrian may be simultaneously operating on a number of different levels: “Philo’s occasional exhortations about disloyal Jews, apologetic remarks defending the Jews and their practices, and welcoming attitude towards proselytes suggest that the Exposition is probably aimed primarily at Jews and non-Jews—whether hostile or friendly—who know little about Jewish beliefs and practices. Philo may have several aims in mind here: to reclaim the alienated Jews, educate the less knowledgeable ones, assuage non-Jews who may be hostile, and appeal to those who might be interested.”129

. The Nachleben of the Treatise In many respects, the closest parallel to Philo’s Exposition of the Law is the first four books of Josephus’ Antiquitates judaicae, which similarly presents the entire contents of the Pentateuch from a Greco-Roman perspective. Of particular interest for the study of De virtutibus are Josephus’ attempts at summarizing the law in Ant. .– and .–.

125 Occasionally he refers to critics of Judaism in the third person (e.g., Virt. ), but he never addresses them directly. 126 Barclay , –. 127 Royse , . 128 It certainly would be consistent with a work intended (at least in part) for non-Jews, though it would be difficult to produce evidence proving that this would necessarily be the case. 129 Birnbaum , . It is worth noting that the question of Dionysius’ intended audience is similarly unresolved in scholarship; see Hill ; Usher ; Luraghi .



introduction

Given their common subject matter, it comes as no surprise that the two authors can often be found discussing the same biblical texts, as this chart shows: Virt.

Principal Biblical Sources

Ant.

 , ,  –

Deut : Deut :– Exod :; Lev :–; Deut :–; :– Lev :; Deut :– Deut :– Lev :–; :; Deut :– Lev :–; Deut :–; :– Deut :– Exod :–; Lev :– Deut :– Deut :– Exod :– Exod :; Lev :–; Deut :– Lev : Lev : Deut : Deut : Deut : Lev :–

. . .

  –   –  –        , 

. . .– ., ,  . .– .– .– . . . . . . . .–

Besides significant differences in order, Philo’s discussion of individual injunctions tends to be both more systematic and more expansive than what Josephus provides. The following verbal parallels (excluding common references to the biblical text) warrant particular inspection: Virt. : νεωστ δειμ,μενος

Ant. .: νεωστ

Virt. : π<ω τ$ς πολα:σεως

Ant. .: π<ω . . .

Virt. : ψυχ+ν . . . ετολμας Virt. : 2μφυλος Virt. : ο δικαιν Virt. : χρησττητα Virt. : σ8ματι Virt. : π!νητας . . . >δων

Ant. .: ψυχ$ς ετολμ7α Ant. .: 2μοφ:λου Ant. .: ο . . . δκαιον Ant. .: χρησττητι Ant. .: σ8μασι Ant. .: π!νησι . . . >δων

δειμαμ!νους

πλαυσιν

the nachleben of the treatise Virt. : 1ν 1ρημ7α Virt. : 1πικηρυκευσ,μενοι Virt. : τ!κνων γ!νεσιν Virt. : χ=ρα Virt. : τ$ς 1πιυμας ποπληρωες

Ant. .: κατ 1ρημαν Ant. .: κ=ρυκας Ant. .: παιδοποιν Ant. .: γεγαμημ!νην Ant. .: 1μπλησες τ$ς

Virt. : συγκατα:ειν Virt. : νοικεου Virt. : α?τια

Ant. .: :ειν . . . 1π τατ Ant. .: νομοων Ant. .: α?τια



1πιυμας

Although they are fairly numerous, these parallels are too minor and too infrequent to constitute convincing evidence for direct literary dependence.130 In some cases (e.g., Virt.  and Ant. .), the similar wording may be simply a matter of coincidence. In other cases (e.g., Virt.  and Ant. .), it may be that the two authors are drawing on common traditions of legal interpretation. On yet other occasions (e.g., Virt. , ,  and Ant. .), we may have instances of what Runia terms “longdistance reminiscence.”131 For our purposes, then, Josephus does not figure in the Nachleben of the corpus Philonicum. We are on much firmer ground when it comes to Clement of Alexandria, who in book  of the Stromata draws extensively on material from De virtutibus.132 In her helpful study of this borrowing, Annewies van den Hoek describes Strom .– as a “cursory reading” from our treatise, in which Clement “runs through his source from beginning to end in an orderly way.”133 As for his method of utilization, Clement “moves rapidly across his model detaching scraps of sentences from their original contexts . . . In a number of cases, transitions are very abrupt. These harsh juxtapositions of abbreviated thoughts are partly caused by Clement’s disconnected manner of excerpting, but they are also caused in part by the rich complexity of the source material itself.”134 In any given passage, the reader encounters a mix of literal extracts, paraphrases incorporating literal components, and indirect echoes of De virtutibus, intertwined

130 They are (as Runia ,  points out), therefore, of no value for reconstructing the original text of De virtutibus. Cf. Runia , –. 131 Runia , . Note also that in reviewing the biblical exemptions listed in Deut :–, the two authors agree in treating the last exemption first. See the commentary on Virt. . 132 It is possible to track Clement’s borrowings from the citations of the Stromata in the apparatus testimoniorum for PCW , or from those of De virtutibus in Stählin –. 133 van den Hoek , . 134 van den Hoek , –.



introduction

with Clement’s own observations and often punctuated with material culled from other, especially biblical, sources. In general, Clement is drawn to those places where Philo reformulates biblical injunctions, essentially treating the Philonic text “as equivalent to a direct and continuous reading of the Bible.”135 As a consequence, the borrowing comes mostly from the survey of laws in Virt. –, as the following table shows:136 Strom. ..– Strom. .. Strom. ..–.. Strom. ..– Strom. ..–.. Strom. ..–.. Strom. ..– Strom. .. Strom. .. Strom. ..–.. Strom. ..– Strom. ..– Strom. .. Strom. .. Strom. .. Strom. .. Strom. ..–.. Strom. ..– Strom. .. Strom. .. Strom. .. Strom. ..–.. Strom. ..– Strom. ..– Strom. ..– Strom. .. Strom. ..– Strom. ..–.. Strom. .. Strom. ..–.. Strom. ..–.. Strom. ..–..

135 136

Virt. – Virt. ,  Virt. – Virt. ,  Virt. –,  Virt. ,  Virt. – Virt.  Virt.  Virt. – Virt. – Virt. , – Virt.  Virt.  Virt.  Virt.  Virt. – Virt. – Virt. ,  Virt.  Virt.  Virt. – Virt. , , – Virt. – Virt. – Virt. – Virt. ,  Virt. – Virt. – Virt. – Virt. –, – Virt. –

van den Hoek , . Cf. van den Hoek , –.

the nachleben of the treatise



With very few exceptions, the material in the Stromata is presented in the same sequence in which it appears in our treatise.137 The borrowing is unacknowledged, though immediately after the section in which he utilizes De virtutibus, Clement does make reference to “the Pythagorean Philo” as an interpreter of Moses (..).138 While it adapts no more than one seventh of the earlier writing, the Stromata provides important evidence both for understanding the literary integrity of De virtutibus (see part  above) and for reconstructing the treatise’s original text.139 As for his intentions, Clement does not share the Jewish author’s apologetic agenda; rather, his objective is “to show within a Christian polemical situation directed against Marcion and his followers that law and faith cannot be detached from one another.”140 Toward this end, his presentation demonstrates that “the law educates for virtue.”141

137 See Strom. ..– and ..–. There is also a minor deviation in order within ..–, for which see the Nachleben on Virt. –. 138 As Runia (, ) notes, “the reference is puzzling because the words attributed to Philo [there] are nowhere found in his extant works.” Cf. Runia a. 139 Cf. Wendland . 140 van den Hoek , . 141 van den Hoek , .

TRANSLATION PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA ON VIRTUES

ON COURAGE

[Chapters –] Courage in Peacetime (§ ) Having spoken previously on justice and the matters pertaining to it, I proceed in what follows to courage, not the warlike fury that the multitudes take it for, which uses anger as its guide, but courage as knowledge. (§ ) For some, incited by recklessness, assisted by physical strength, and arrayed for battle in full armor, strike down whole throngs of adversaries, enjoying the auspicious but unfitting name of excellence; and although they are deemed to be glorious in this victory by those who decide such things, they have become, from nature and practice, savage and brutal in their thirsting after human blood. (§ ) But there are also those who, although they spend their time at home, their bodies worn away by long illnesses or painful old age, are healthy and youthful in the better part of the soul, filled with resolve and full of the bravest valor. Though they would never touch defensive weapons even in their dreams, through propositions based on good counsels for the greatest common utility, they often correct both the private affairs of each person and the common affairs of their homelands when they fail, equipped as they are with unyielding and unwavering arguments concerning what is beneficial. (§ ) These individuals, then, being practitioners of wisdom, train in true courage, while those others, living in ignorance, an illness hard to cure, train in courage falsely named, which should properly be called recklessness, just as, in the case of coins, they say that the counterfeit is a likeness of the true type. (§ ) Of course, there is no lack of other circumstances in human life agreed to be difficult to endure, poverty and disgrace and impairment and various types of illnesses, against which those of little understanding become soft, unable to rouse themselves for want of valor. Meanwhile, those possessed of prudence and nobility of character arm themselves with determination and much vigor to strive against these things, taking their boasts and threats as the object of much laughter and ridicule, pitting against poverty wealth, not the wealth that is blind, but that which sees distinctly, whose honors and treasures the soul is naturally inclined to store up. (§ ) For poverty has thrown down multitudes, who collapse

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translation

like exhausted athletes softened by unmanliness. But if truth be the judge, not a single person is in want, since each has as a provider the unfailing wealth of nature; the air, the first and most indispensable and constant provision, breathed continuously day and night; then bounteous springs and rivers fed not by winter torrents alone but also by native streams, ever flowing for use as drink; then for food the fruits of all sorts of crops and different kinds of trees, which always bear annual autumn harvests. For no one is at a loss for these, but everyone everywhere enjoys them in great abundance. (§ ) But if some, regarding the wealth of nature as nothing, pursue that of vain opinions, relying on what is blind rather than what can see, and thus taking for their guide on the road that which is impaired, they are of necessity bound to fall. (§ ) That wealth which is the guard of the body, then, the boon and gift of nature, has now been described. But mention should also be made of that wealth which is more honorable, which belongs not to all but to truly honorable and divine men. This wealth wisdom provides through doctrines and theories of logic, ethics, and natural science, from which arise as a result the virtues, which remove excessiveness from the soul, creating a love of contentedness and thrift befitting its assimilation to God. (§ ) For God, being in need of nothing, is in want of nothing, but he himself is completely sufficient in himself. The fool, meanwhile, is in want of much, constantly thirsting after things that are absent for the sake of his ravenous and insatiable desire, which he fans and stirs like a fire until it encompasses everything both small and great. But the good man is in want of little, standing on the boundary between immortal and mortal nature, having certain wants on account of a body that is mortal, but not having many wants on account of a soul set on immortality. (§ ) In this manner they pit wealth against poverty. And against disgrace they pit glory, for the praise that has as its source excellence of character, and from which it flows like an ever-flowing spring, has no acquaintance with those throngs of thoughtless persons accustomed to lay bare the contradictions of their souls through unsound remarks, which at times in their haggling for shameful profits they are unashamed to speak even against individuals of merit. But the number of these is small, for virtue is not prevalent among mortal kind. (§ ) Now as for impairment of the senses, further multitudes living with this have died prematurely because they have not been able to find a preventative cure. Set against it is prudence, the mightiest of our attributes, providing as it does eyes for the mind, which in sharpsightedness surpasses the eyes of the body, as they say, in whole and

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in full. (§ ) For the latter gaze upon the surfaces of visible objects, requiring light from an external source to do so, but the mind penetrates even through the depth of material objects, accurately investigating their whole contents and each of their parts, and inspecting the nature of incorporeal realities as well, which sense is unable to observe. For in effect it possesses all the sharp-sightedness of an eye, but without requiring any external light, itself a star and practically a replica and copy of the heavenly bodies. (§ ) Now illnesses of the body, if the soul is healthy, do very little harm; and the soul’s health lies in a proper arrangement of its faculties, high-spiritedness, desire, and reason, the reasoning part in control and steering each of the others like horses that refuse the reins. (§ ) The particular name of this health is “secure thinking,” because it provides security for the part in us that thinks; for often when the latter is at risk of being washed away by the rush of the passions, the former does not allow it to go under but drags and lifts it up high, endowing it with soul, life, and, in a certain way, immortality. (§ ) All of the things mentioned above are lessons and teachings inscribed in many places of our legislation, persuading the obedient more gently, the disobedient more strictly to scorn things pertaining to the body and appearance, deeming the life lived in accord with virtue to be the sole end, and striving as well for any other things leading to it. (§ ) And if I had not on previous occasions thoroughly reviewed each of the items conducive to simplicity, I would endeavor at this time to extend the discussion, weaving and stringing together the references which seem to lie scattered in different places. But since I have already said all that is appropriate, I see no need to repeat myself. (§ ) Nevertheless, those who are not reluctant, but earnestly commit themselves to read through the books preceding these, ought to notice that nearly everything said about simplicity is about courage as well, seeing that it is the nature of an energetic and noble and highly invigorated soul to scorn everything which vanity is apt to dignify, to the ruin of life in its true sense. (§ ) There is so much earnestness and desire in the law to train and discipline the soul in courage that it legislates even concerning what sorts of clothes ought to be worn, strictly forbidding a man to assume a woman’s dress, so that no trace or even mere shadow of the female might be attributed to him, resulting in the defilement of his male stock. For since it always conforms to nature, its will is to establish laws that are proper and in harmony with each other down to the furthest details, even

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if, owing to their mundane character, they seem to be rather insignificant. (§ ) For since it observed, as though they were inscribed on a plane surface, that the physical forms of a man and a woman are dissimilar, and that the life assigned to each of these forms is not the same (for to one a domestic, to the other a civic life has been allotted), in other particulars it judged it beneficial to appoint laws which, while not the works of nature itself, were in conformity with nature and findings of good judgment. These were the laws concerning daily life and dress and things of that kind. (§ ) For it required the one who is truly a man to act like a man even in these particulars and especially in his clothes, which, since he always has them on both day and night, ought to have no indication of unmanliness. (§ ) And of course in the same manner, by training the woman in appropriate adornments, it forbade her to assume a man’s dress, ultimately guarding against the manly woman as much as the womanly man. For it knew that, as in buildings, if one stone is taken away the others will not stay in the same place.

[Chapters –] Courage in Wartime (§ ) To continue, since the events concerning human affairs occur in two times, in peace and in war, it is possible to perceive the virtues that can be examined in both. Now regarding the others mention has already been made and will be again should the need arise. But no cursory examination of the current matters pertaining to courage will suffice, the works of which in peacetime he celebrates in many places of the legislation, always availing himself of such opportunities. These having been recorded in the appropriate places, we will now begin to speak of its works in wartime, once the following prefatory comment has been made. (§ ) When he prepares the muster roll, he does not think it necessary to call upon all the young men, but there are some whom he excuses, stipulating reasonable causes for exemption. These are, to begin with, the quivering and cowardly, seeing how they are sure to be overcome by their innate softness and cause alarm in the other combatants. (§ ) For the vice of one man is likely to be reproduced in his neighbor, and especially in war, when the ability to reason is confounded by apprehensiveness and unable to obtain accurate perceptions of events. For at such a time they are accustomed to call cowardice discretion and fear cautiousness and unmanliness the need for safety, disguising shameless deeds with illustrious and honorable names. (§ ) So, in order to prevent their own

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interests from being harmed by the unmanliness of those who would enter into battle and those of their enemies from obtaining greater glory when they scornfully slay such worthless types, and knowing that a shiftless throng is not an advantage but an impediment to success, he withholds those who lack valor and lose heart out of cowardice. He does this, I suppose, just as no general would compel men suffering from physical illnesses to go to war, weakness serving as their excuse. (§ ) But cowardice is also an illness, more oppressive than those that afflict the body because it deposes the faculties of the soul. For those of the body last at their height for only a short time, while cowardice is a congenital vice, as inbred if not more so than any of our constituent parts from the first years until extreme old age, unless God happens to heal it. For everything is possible with God. (§ ) And he does not even call upon all the bravest men, even though they, being exceedingly vigorous in both body and soul, are willing to fight and face danger on the front lines. But, having commended them for their resolve, because they demonstrate a patriotic and eager and intrepid disposition, he carefully inquires whether they are bound by any compelling circumstances whose force has an influence over them. (§ ) For if someone, he says, has recently built a house but has not proceeded to occupy it, or has just planted a vineyard, putting the shoots into the ground himself, but has not yet had an opportunity of profit from it, or has betrothed himself to a maiden but not married her, let him be released from all military service and so obtain a reprieve through the humanity of the law.1 This is done for two reasons. (§ ) One is that, since the outcomes of war are uncertain, others should not take without toil the possessions of those who labored for them. For it seemed cruel for someone not to be able to have the use of his own, but for one to build a house and another to inhabit it, for someone to plant and someone who did not plant to reap the fruits, for one to court and another to marry without courting, so that they ought not to render vain the hopes of those expecting good things in their lives. (§ ) The other is that when they are waging war with their bodies they should not fall short in their souls. For in that state their minds are certain to be strained by longing for the enjoyment of the things taken from them. For, as those who are hungry or thirsty, when some food or drink appears, seek and run after it straight away in their eagerness to partake of it, so those who have labored for

1

Reading φιλανρωπ7α νμου. See the commentary.

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possession of a lawful wife or a house or a farm, believing expectantly that an opportunity for its use has all but arrived, are disturbed when its enjoyment is taken away. Consequently, even when present, they fail to be present in the better part of the soul,2 through which success or its opposite is realized. (§ ) So he did not think it right to keep these and others like them on the muster roll, but rather those into whom no passion has previously entered and lurks about, so that with free and unbound impulses they might arm themselves to face dangers without hesitation. For just as a full suit of armor is of no advantage to a weak or disabled body (which it discards for want of strength), likewise a vigorous body is of no advantage to a soul afflicted by some passion3 which does not accord with the matters at hand. (§ ) With a view to such things, he selects not only captains and generals and the other leaders of the army, but also each of the soldiers, testing to see how far each is in both good condition with respect to his body and good health with respect to his reasoning ability. He inspects the body to see if it is whole, if it is healthy through and through, and if in all its parts and limbs it is properly coordinated for the postures and movements that belong to each, the soul to see if it is full of bravery and valor, if it is intrepid and full of noble prudence, and if it loves honor and prefers death with glory to a disgraceful life. (§ ) For if truth be told, each of these in and of itself is a power. And should they join together, those in whom they do so will exhibit a certain invincible and unrivalled might in surpassing greatness, prevailing over their enemies without loss of blood. (§ ) Of the statements that have been made the sacred books contain an especially clear proof. The Arabians, whose ancient name was the Midianites, are a most populous nation. Disposed to be antagonistic towards the Hebrews for no reason other than that they worshipped and honored the highest and oldest Cause, having devoted themselves to the Creator and Father of all things, they devised all manner of contrivances and laid down all manner of traps in order to turn them from honoring the One and truly Existent and convert them from holiness to impiety. For in this way they thought to get the better of them easily. But when, having said and done countless things, they had dropped from exhaustion, like those who are about to die, for whom there is no

2 3

Reading τ$ς ψυχ$ς. See the commentary. Reading περ τι κηραινο:σ@η π,ος ψυχ@$. See the commentary.

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hope of deliverance,4 they contrived a stratagem of the following kind. (§ ) Summoning the most beautiful of their women, they said to them, “You see how boundless is the number of the Hebrews. But a defense more troubling than their number is their concord and unanimity; and the highest and greatest source of that concord is their opinion that there is one God, from which, as from a fountain, they have obtained a unifying and unbreakable friendship with one another. (§ ) But a man can be overcome by pleasure, and especially the pleasure of sex with a woman. You are extremely attractive; beauty by nature is alluring, and youth by nature slips into unrestraint. (§ ) Do not fear the names of harlotry or adultery as though they would bring shame upon you, but set against them the benefits accruing from your deed, through which you will transform fleeting disgrace into ageless and unending glory. While to all appearances you are giving your bodies away, since it is a contrivance and stratagem against our enemies, you will be keeping your souls virgin and seal them with the purity that lasts forever. (§ ) And this war will have an extraordinary distinction in being brought to a successful conclusion by women and not by men. For it is our sex, we admit, that will fall to defeat, because in everything pertaining to battle our adversaries are more accomplished, while yours will achieve the victory completely, and beyond that,5 the greatest good, with exploits free of risks. For you shall better them without bloodshed, or rather without even trying, at your first appearance, merely by being seen.” (§ ) Upon hearing these things, the women, having never dreamt of a pure life or tasted proper learning, agreed, given that they had simply pretended to a disposition of moderation, having affected it up to that time. And so, dressing themselves up with expensive clothes and necklaces and all the other things with which a woman is accustomed to adorn herself, and taking pains to make their natural beauty more attractive (for this was no small contest, the capture of youths not likely to be captured), they proceeded to present themselves openly. (§ ) And drawing near, with lewd glances and beguiling words and licentious postures and movements they enticed the weak-minded part of the youth, whose disposition was unstable and unsettled. And having ensnared the souls of those who joined with them through the shameful use of their bodies, they invited them to make in honor of things wrought by hand offerings 4 5

Reading πγνωσις. See the commentary. Reading π!ρα δ ο?σει. See the commentary.

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that should not have been offered and libations that would accomplish no conciliation, and so alienated them from the worship of the One and truly existing God. (§ ) Once they accomplished this they announced it to the men. And they would have been about to lure others of those who were not so stable as well had not the beneficent and merciful God taken pity on their misfortune and without delay exacted punishment on those who had lost their senses, twenty-four thousand altogether, and so pulled back those at risk of being overwhelmed as by a torrent, warning them through fear. (§ ) And the leader of the nation, reciting the doctrines on piety into the ears and the souls of his subjects,6 selected and enrolled a thousand men of merit from each tribe to exact punishment for the trap they had devised with the women in their hope to destroy the whole throng by casting them down from the summit of holiness, though they were able to do so only with those previously mentioned. (§ ) These men, a small number arrayed against many myriads, drawing on both experience and valor, each as though he were himself a company, scorning the danger launched their assault on the thick ranks, killed those who stood in their way, and laid waste both the closely formed columns and all the reserves waiting to fill the gaps in the lines, so that with scarcely a shout they laid low the many myriads, leaving none of the young men arrayed against them alive. They also killed the women who had assented to the men’s unholy plans, but took the maidens alive out of pity for their innocent youth. (§ ) And, though having successfully concluded so great a war, they lost none of their own men but returned in the same numbers and condition as when they entered into the battle, unwounded and whole, or rather, if truth be told, with redoubled might. For the joy of victory produced a strength which was no less than what they had had before. (§ ) And the cause of these things was nothing other than the eagerness to undertake valiantly the fight on behalf of piety, one in which God also fights on the front lines, an invincible auxiliary, guiding their minds with good counsels and instilling their bodies with the mightiest vigor. (§ ) And proof that God was their ally is that many myriads were defeated by a few men and none of their enemies escaped and none of their friends were killed, while neither their number nor physical power was diminished. 6 Reading τοAς Bσ τC DπEρ εσεβεας δγματα κα ταAς ψυχαAς τν Dπηκων 1π7,δων. See the commentary.

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(§ ) For that reason, in the Exhortations he says, “If you practice justice and holiness and the other virtues, you will live a life without war and forever peaceful, or if war does break out, you will prevail over your enemies easily, God commanding your armies unseen, whose concern it is to save the good with might. (§ ) So if a well-equipped army of both infantry and cavalry attacks you with many myriads, or if, having previously seized your fortified positions and those liable to be attacked, they take control of your lands, or if they are furnished with abundant supplies, do not be terrified and fearful, even if you lack all of the things they have in abundance, allies, arms, favorable positions, supplies.” (§ ) For these things are like a cargo ship loaded with all sorts of goods which a violent wind will often suddenly overturn and wreck. But to those who are poor and wretched, God bestows his saving powers like rain and snow on ears of corn withered from drought and lack of water, so that they are revived and produce fruit in fullness. (§ ) From this it is obvious that it is essential to embrace what is just and holy. For those to whom the divine is an ally are exceedingly fortunate, while those to whom it is an enemy are extremely unfortunate. Let what has been said regarding courage, then, suffice for the present.

ON HUMANITY

[Chapters –] The Death and Succession of Moses (§ ) Next we must consider humanity, which is most closely related to piety, its sister and twin. I do not know of anyone else who loved her like the prophet of our laws, for he understood that she leads like a highway to holiness. He used to prepare and train all his subjects for fellowship, exhibiting like an archetypal pattern his own life as a beautiful model. (§ ) Now the actions that he carried out from the beginning of adulthood until old age for the care and protection of each and all of his people have already been described in the two treatises that I wrote concerning the life of Moses. But of the things that he accomplished at the end of his life there are one or two that are worthy of remembrance since they are proofs of his constant and unceasing excellence of character, a distinct seal that he stamped on a soul that had been molded by a divine impression. (§ ) When the appointed time for his mortal life to end had almost come and he knew from clear pronouncements about his migration from that life, he did not imitate other people, whether kings or commoners, whose one intention and prayer is to leave behind children as heirs. Rather, even though he was a father to two sons, he did not succumb to goodwill for kin and affection for family and bequeath the rule to either of them. And even if the claims of his children were under suspicion, he still had nephews who were not without excellence of character, who held as a reward for virtue the highest priesthood. (§ ) But perhaps he did not think fit to draw them away from the divine liturgy, or he reasonably thought that it was difficult for the same person to administer both the priesthood and the kingship effectively, one enjoining the service of God, the other the care of people. And perhaps, too, he did not deem himself worthy to be judge of so great a matter; and to determine who is wellsuited for rule is the greatest of matters, requiring nearly divine power, which alone can readily perceive a person’s character. (§ ) The clearest proof of my claim would be this. He had a friend who had been his pupil from practically his first year, Joshua by name. Moses formed a friendship with him, not in the customary ways

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friendship is made with others, but on the basis of a heavenly and undefiled and divine love, from which in reality all virtue derives. This man shared the same roof and table with him, except when Moses was receiving the oracles in an inspired state and solitude was enjoined. Joshua provided other services as well, always distinguishing himself from the multitude, being all but his lieutenant and sharing in the affairs of state. (§ ) And yet, although he had acquired over long periods of time an accurate measure of his excellence of character in both words and deeds including, most critically, his goodwill for the nation, Moses still did not think it right to leave him behind as his successor, fearing lest he be deceived in reckoning him to be good when in truth he was not, given that the standards of human judgment are likely to be indistinct and uncertain. (§ ) Because, then, he was not quick to trust himself, Moses beseeched and implored God, the overseer of the invisible soul, to whom alone it has been given to accurately inspect the mind, to choose on the basis of merit the one best suited for command, who would care for his subjects like a father. And so lifting up his pure and, as one might put it figuratively, virgin hands to heaven, he said, (§ ) “Let the Lord God of the spirits and of all flesh seek out someone to put over the multitude for its care and protection, a shepherd who shall lead it blamelessly, lest the nation fall apart, like a flock scattered for want of a leader.” (§ ) And yet who among those present would not have been amazed upon hearing this prayer? “My lord,” someone would ask, “what are you saying? Have you not legitimate children or, if not them, nephews? By all means leave the rule to your sons, for they are naturally the primary heirs, or, if you disapprove of them, at least to your nephews. (§ ) But if you have found even them to be unfit, preferring the nation above your closest and most familiar relations, you still have a blameless friend who has given proof of complete virtue to you, the all-wise. Why do you not think fit to approve of him, if the choice is a matter not of birth but of excellence of character?” (§ ) But he will declare, “It is right to make God judge of all affairs, especially great ones, in which a ruling either better or worse leads countless multitudes either to good fortune or to its opposite, misfortune. And nothing is greater than rule, to which has been entrusted the affairs of cities and countries, in war and in peace. For just as a pilot with knowledge and skill is necessary for a good voyage, in the same way a leader who is all-wise is needed for establishing good order for his subjects wherever they may be. (§ ) Wisdom existed not only before

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my own birth but before the whole universe came into being, and it is neither right nor possible for anyone to judge her except for God and for those who love her sincerely, purely, and genuinely. (§ ) I have learned from my own experience not to approve for rule any of those who seem to be suitable. Even in my own case I myself did not choose as a voluntary agent to have responsibility for the care and protection of public matters, nor did I receive it by being selected by some other person. Rather, when distinct oracles and clear pronouncements were plainly declared by God commanding me to rule, I hesitated with prayer and supplication out of consideration for the magnitude of the affair until, when he repeated the command many times, I feared and obeyed. (§ ) How, then, would it be anything but improper not to follow in the same steps and, having had God as approver when I began to rule, in turn give to him alone the selection of my successor without the involvement of human judgment, which is more closely related to the seeming than to the true? Besides, what is being undertaken is the protection not of some ordinary nation, but of the most populous of all nations everywhere, which makes the greatest profession, a supplication of the truly Existent, who is the Creator and Father of all. (§ ) For whatever benefit accrues from the most respected philosophy to its students accrues to the Jews through their laws and customs, namely, knowledge of the highest and oldest Cause of all things and rejection of the error associated with created gods. For no created thing is a god in truth, but in opinion only, since it lacks the necessary quality of eternality.” (§ ) This, then, is the first, most obvious proof of his humanity and faithfulness towards all his compatriots, but there is another that does not fall short of the one just mentioned. For when Joshua, his disciple and imitator of his admirable qualities, was approved ruler on the basis of merit by divine standards, Moses was not downcast, as someone else might have been, because his sons or nephews were not chosen (§ ) but was filled with indescribable joy, because the nation would have a guardian who was in all respects the best—for he knew that one who is well-pleasing to God is necessarily excellent in character. Taking Joshua by the right hand, Moses brought him before the assembled multitude, not concerned about his own end but having added other new joys to the old, not only on account of previous good feelings (in which he reveled lavishly by way of every type of virtue), but also on account of the hope that he was about to become immortal, changing from corruptible life to incorruptible. With cheerful looks expressive of the tranquility in his soul, he said brightly and joyfully: (§ ) “The time has now come

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for me to be released from life in the body; and my successor to govern you is this man, chosen by God.” And he at once proceeded to report the oracular pronouncements of approval, to which they gave assent. (§ ) And then, looking upon Joshua, he exhorted him to be courageous and exceptionally strong in formulating good policies, making sound judgments and carrying out his decisions properly, with uncompromising and vigorous reasonings. And though he spoke these words to someone who perhaps was not in need of exhortation, he nevertheless laid bare what he thought would be beneficial, not concealing his affection for Joshua or for the nation, which, in a way, was spurring him on. (§ ) Moses had also received an oracle to encourage his successor and instill in him all the confidence necessary for the care of the nation, without fear for the burden of rule. He did this so that afterwards there would be a standard and law for all future leaders, who would look to Moses for their archetypal model and not deprive their successors of good counsels out of envy, but rather prepare and train their souls with admonitions and exhortations. (§ ) For the exhortation of a good man is able to rouse those who have lost their resolve, lift them up and render them superior to circumstances and difficulties, and instill in them a noble and intrepid spirit. (§ ) Then, having expressed the appropriate words to both his subjects and the heir of his command, he began to hymn God with a song, rendering the final thanksgiving of his life in the body for the unprecedented and exceptional gifts with which he had been blessed from his birth until his old age. (§ ) He convened in a divine assembly the elements of all that is and the most essential parts of the universe—earth the home of mortals and heaven the abode of immortals—and in their midst sang hymns with every kind of harmony and melody. (§ ) He did this so that both human beings and ministering angels would take heed, the former as pupils receiving a lesson to have a similarly thankful disposition, the latter as witnesses seeing, on the basis of their own expertise, whether there was anything dissonant about his song, all the while incredulous that someone who had been bound in a perishable body was able to create music in the same way as the sun and the moon and the most holy choir of the other stars, harmonizing his soul with that divine instrument, heaven and the whole universe. (§ ) From his place among the aethereal choral dancers, the hierophant mingled with these hymns of thanksgiving to God his genuine feelings of goodwill for the nation in the form of condemnations of their past sins, admonitions and counsels for the present occasion, and exhortations filled with his good hopes for the future, upon which favorable outcomes necessarily follow.

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(§ ) And when he had finished these choral hymns, which had been woven together, as it were, out of holiness and humanity, he began to change from mortal existence to immortal life and gradually became aware of the disjoining of the elements out of which he was composed. His body, like a shell, was being removed from around him, while his soul, being exposed, naturally longed for its migration from it. (§ ) Then, having made the arrangements for his departure, he did not set out for his destination until he had honored all the tribes of the nation with harmonious prayers, calling each of the patriarchs by name. That these prayers will be fulfilled we must believe, since the one who offered them was beloved of God and God himself is a lover of humanity, while those for whom these requests were made were noble and wellborn, arrayed in the highest rank under the command of that general who is the Creator and Father of all. (§ ) [The requests were for true goods, not only that they would accrue to them in mortal life, but above all when the soul is released from the bond of the flesh.] (§ ) For Moses alone, so it seems, having understood the entire nation to have had from the beginning a most essential kinship with things divine—a kinship much more legitimate than that of blood—declared that it was the heir of all the good things that human nature can contain. What he himself had was made available to them, while what he did not possess he supplicated God to provide, knowing that while the fountains of his favors are ever-flowing, they are not free to everyone, but only to suppliants, and suppliants are those who love excellence of character, whose right it is to draw water from those most sacred fountains in their thirst for wisdom.

[Chapter ] Introduction to the Survey of Laws (§ ) These, then, are the proofs to be offered of the lawgiver’s humanity and fellowship, with which he was endowed both through the happy possession of his natural excellence and from the guidance of the sacred oracles. But mention must also be made of the laws that he prescribed for subsequent generations, if not all of them (for that would not be easy to do), then at least those which are most nearly akin to his intentions. (§ ) For he establishes fairness and gentleness not only among the associations that people have with one another, but with great lavishness he also pours them out richly and extends them even to animals who are by nature irrational and to the different species of cultivated trees.

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And what laws he set down concerning each of these must be discussed separately, making our start with people.

[Chapter ] On Lending at Interest (§ ) He forbids them, then, to lend on interest to a brother, meaning not only someone born of the same parents but also anyone who is a citizen and compatriot, deeming it unjust to extract interest from money like offspring from cattle. (§ ) And he urges them not to hold back for this reason and hesitate to contribute, but above all to give freely with unrestrained hands and hearts to those in need, reckoning that a gift is a type of loan, to be repaid by the recipient in better times without constraint and of his own free will. But if they decide not to give, they should at least be most ready and willing to lend, receiving nothing back beyond the principal. (§ ) For in this way the poor are not likely to become more helpless, being required to pay more than they received, while the contributors would not be wronged, though they recovered only what they gave out—and yet not “only,” for along with the principal, instead of the interest which they do not expect to receive, they gain the finest and most honorable of human attributes: gentleness, fellowship, kindness, magnanimity, a good name and a good reputation. What acquisition is a match for these? (§ ) Indeed, even the Great King appears to be the poorest of all when compared with a single virtue. For his wealth is soulless, buried underground in treasuries and vaults, while the wealth of virtue is in the governing part of the soul; and it is to this that both the purest realm of existence, heaven, and the parent of all things, God, lay claim. Need we, then, give any consideration to the wretched prosperity of petty usurers and unscrupulous lenders, people who seem to be kings rich in gold though they have not perceived even in their dreams the wealth that can see? (§ ) And there are those who have reached such a depth of depravity that, having no money, they lend out food at interest in order to receive back more than they gave. They would hardly be quick to give beggars a donation, creating as they do famine in the midst of prosperity and plenty, and drawing an income from the needy stomachs of miserable people, weighing food and drink in a scale so as not to measure out too much. (§ ) So of necessity he commands those who have a share in his sacred polity to refrain from these sorts of pursuits, for these are the practices of a servile and thoroughly illiberal soul altered into savagery and the nature of wild beasts.

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[Chapter ] Prompt Payment of Wages (§ ) Among the commandments conducive to humanity this one is also prescribed. A poor man’s wage is to be paid on the same day, not only because it is just for him to receive the wage for his service without delay once the work for which he was hired has been completed, but also because the manual laborer or load bearer, who “lives for the day,” as they say, suffering hardships with his whole body like a draft-animal, has his hopes set on his wage. If he receives it immediately he rejoices and is fortified to work the next day with redoubled willingness. But if he does not receive it, besides being greatly burdened, his nerves are unstrung by grief and he looses heart, and so is unable to carry out his usual duties.

[Chapter ] Seizing a Pledge (§ ) He further says, let no creditor enter the houses of his borrowers to take by force a security and pledge for a loan, but let him stand and wait outside on the front entrance, asking quietly for them to bring it out. And if they have it, let them not hesitate to do so, since it is fitting that just as the creditor ought not to abuse his power by arrogantly offending his debtors, they ought to provide a sufficient security as a reminder of the repayment of what belongs to another.

[Chapter ] Agricultural Produce for the Poor (§ ) And who is there who would not approve of the ordinance concerning the reapers or grape-pickers? For he commands them at the harvest neither to gather up what falls from the sheaves nor to cut down the whole crop, but to leave some part of the field uncut. Thus he makes the wealthy magnanimous and generous, in that they are to give up something of their own rather than to gape at it all and gather and store it all up at home, guarding it like treasure. At the same time he makes the poor more well-disposed; for since they lack holdings of their own, he allows them to enter into those of their compatriots in order to reap from what has been left behind as though it were their own. (§ ) Again, during the vintage season, when the landowners are having the fruit picked, he orders them neither to gather the grapes that fall nor to re-harvest

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the vineyards. And to those who gather the olives1 he gives the same commands, acting like an exceedingly affectionate2 father whose children have not experienced the same successes, some living in abundance, others reduced to extreme want. In his mercy and pity he summons the latter onto the holdings of their brethren to partake of what belongs to others as though it were their own, not with shame, but as a reparation of their need, a sharing not of produce alone but to all appearances of holdings as well. (§ ) But there are some whose minds are so sullied, mired in moneymaking and sick to death about every kind of gain (though without giving a thought as to where it might come from), that they re-harvest the vineyards and olive groves and over-reap the barley- and wheat-bearing land, convicting themselves of servile and illiberal pettiness, and of impiety as well. (§ ) For they themselves provided little of what was needed for the cultivation; rather the most numerous and essential of the contributions needed for fruitfulness and productivity are nature’s: seasonal rains, temperate mixtures of air, gentle dews (those steadfast nurses of growing things), breezes full of life, and seasons brought forth each year without harm, so that summer does not scorch, frost does not freeze, and the transitions of spring and autumn do not damage the produce. (§ ) And although they understand these things and are constantly seeing nature bringing them to completion and bestowing rich blessings, still they dare to usurp her benefactions and, as though they themselves were the source of it all, share nothing with anyone, practicing at one and the same time inhumanity and impiety. These individuals, since they did not cultivate virtue of their own free will, he admonishes and corrects against their will with sacred laws, to which the virtuous submit voluntarily, the wicked unwillingly.

[Chapter ] Priests and the Dispossessed (§ ) The laws command them to give as first fruits to the priests tithes of grain and wine and oil and domesticated animals and wool, and from the fruit of the fields and the other fruit-trees to present something proportionate to their yield in full baskets with hymns composed to honor

1 2

Reading 1λαιολογο(σι. See the commentary. Reading φιλοστοργτατος. See the commentary.

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God, which the sacred books preserve in writing. They are moreover not to reckon the firstborn of oxen and sheep and goats in their herds as their own, but to regard them as first fruits as well, so that, accustomed both to honor the divine and not to take everything as gain, they might adorn themselves with the queens of the virtues, piety and humanity. (§ ) Again he says, if you see the draft-animal of one of your relations or friends, or of anyone you know in general, wandering in an uninhabited place, bring it back and return it. And if the owner happens to be staying far away, guard it carefully with your own until he returns, when he can receive back his deposit, one which he did not give, but which you, being the finder, return out of a natural feeling of fellowship.

[Chapter ] Sabbatical and Jubilee Laws (§ ) Next are the laws given regarding the seventh year, during which all the land is to be allowed to lie fallow and the poor are to enter freely onto the properties of the rich and pick the fruit that is growing there on its own, a gift from nature. Are these laws not kind and humane? (§ ) For six years, he says, let the owners benefit from the properties in return for owning and cultivating them. But for one year, the seventh, when none of the activities relating to cultivation are being carried out, let those who are landless and moneyless have the benefit. For it would be unjust for some to do the labor while others reap the fruits. Rather, he said this so that, the properties being left in a certain sense without masters, cultivation playing no part, the blessings might proceed sufficient and full from God alone to those who need them. (§ ) And what of the laws ordained regarding the fiftieth year: do they not extend humanity beyond all measure? Among those who have tasted of this legislation, not just by touching their lips but by feasting to the fullest and reveling in its most sweet and pleasant doctrines, who is there who would not say likewise? (§ ) For whatever pertains to the seventh year is repeated, but he has added something even greater, a restoration of private properties that have been relinquished to others on account of unexpected circumstances. For he does not permit us to have permanent ownership of what belongs to another, in this way blocking the roads to greed in order to check that treacherous thing and source of all evils, desire. Nor was it considered to be proper for landowners to

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be divested of their own property forever, paying a penalty for poverty,3 which it is not right to punish, but must be met with mercy. (§ ) There are also countless others among the particular laws enjoining acts of kindness and humanity towards fellow nationals. But, having reviewed these sufficiently in previous treatises, I will content myself with the things that have already been said, which I have included as proof for the case at hand.

[Chapters –] Proselytes and Metics (§ ) Besides setting down laws regarding fellow nationals, he maintains that proselytes are to be considered worthy of every privilege, since, having forsaken their family by blood, their homeland, their customs, the temples and images of their gods and the gifts and honors offered to them, they have traveled to a fine new home, from mythical fabrications to the certainty of truth and the veneration of the One and truly existing God. (§ ) So he commands those of the nation to love the proselytes, not only as friends and relatives, but as themselves in both body and soul— in body by acting in common with them so far as this is possible, and in mind by having the same griefs and joys—so as to appear to be, in their distinct parts, a single organism, joined together and naturally united by the fellowship that it has. (§ ) I will say nothing regarding the food and drink and clothing and other items relating to daily life and basic necessities which the law requires be given to proselytes by the nativeborn, for the latter all follow the ordinances which have to do with the goodwill required of the one who loves the proselyte as himself. (§ ) Furthermore, as a way of increasing and extending the practical effect that humanity naturally has, he issues commands concerning resident aliens as well. He deems it proper for those who have immigrated under pressing circumstances to apportion some measure of honor to those who have welcomed them, in all respects if the latter have treated them well and dealt with them hospitably, or more moderately if nothing more than acceptance should be offered. For to be granted haven in a city to which one does not belong or, indeed, merely to be granted entrance onto foreign soil is by itself ample bounty for those who are unable to dwell in their own. (§ ) But surpassing the standards of fairness still

3

Reading πενας. See the commentary.

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further, he thinks it wrong for them to bear a grudge against those who have treated them badly after welcoming them as strangers, since nominally they are humane even if their actions are not. Thus he explicitly states, “You shall not detest an Egyptian, because you were a sojourner in Egypt.” (§ ) And yet what evil was there that the Egyptians neglected to inflict upon our nation, ever adding new evils to old with schemes contrived for the sake of cruelty? Nevertheless, since they initially welcomed them, neither closing off their cities nor making the countryside inaccessible to those who came, he says that, because of this acceptance, they should be granted as a privilege terms of peace. (§ ) And if any of them should want to cross over to the Jewish polity, they are not to be scorned unyieldingly like the children of enemies, but are to be treated in such a manner that the third generation is invited into the congregation and granted that share of the divine oracles into which the native- and noble-born are also rightfully initiated.

[Chapter ] Enemies and War Captives (§ ) These are the laws that he established regarding the reception they should extend to resident aliens, but there are other kind and most gentle laws regarding war-time enemies. For he does not think it right to consider them as enemies yet—even if they are already at the gates, standing near the walls in full armor and raising their siege towers—until they have sent them envoys making proposals for peace. This way, if they relent they might gain the greatest good, which is friendship, but if they are uncomplying and refuse, the besieged may, having gained the alliance of justice, attack for the purpose of defense in the hope of victory. (§ ) Moreover, should you come to have a desire for a beautiful woman among the plunder, do not, he says, spew out your passion on her as though she were a captive, but in a gentler manner take pity on her change of fortune and relieve her plight by improving everything for the better. (§ ) And you will provide such relief if you cut off the hair on her head, trim her nails, remove the clothes she wore when she was taken captive, and for thirty days leave her alone and allow her to mourn and weep freely for her father and mother and the other members of her family, from whom she has been separated either by death or because they are enduring afflictions in slavery that are worse than death. After these things have been done, join with her as your lawful wife. (§ ). For holiness deems she who is about to enter a husband’s

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bed, not in order to peddle the bloom of her youth for money like a prostitute, but either for love of her partner or for the birth of children, worthy of the ordinances that have been established for legitimate nuptials. (§ ) Each of these laws was appointed most fairly. First, he did not allow unruly desire to go unbridled, but checked its vehemence by granting thirty days remission. Second, he tests whether the man’s love is ravenous and quickly sated and derived wholly of passion, or if it partakes of a purer character, containing some mixture of reason. For reason will constrain desire, not permitting it to carry out an outrage but requiring it to wait the appointed time of a month. (§ ) Third, he shows mercy on the captive, if she is a virgin, because her parents cannot betroth her and arrange for that most prayed-for union, and if she is a widow, because being deprived of her first spouse she is about to have experience of another, and she is menaced by fear of her master, even if he observes equality with her. For that which submits always dreads the strength of that which rules, even if it is very gentle. (§ ) And if anyone, having satisfied and sated his desire, no longer thinks fit to share the company that he has with the captive, he imposes on him no damages but rather admonishes and corrects him so as to improve his ways. For he commands him neither to sell her nor to keep her as a slave, but to bestow freedom on her, and to bestow as well the right to depart securely from the house, so that she might not suffer some irreparable wrong out of the jealousy wrought when another wife comes in creating strife, which she is likely to do, the master being under the power of more recent charms while at the same time unmindful of past ones.

[Chapter ] The Animals of Enemies (§ ) Besides these he pours other laws encouraging gentleness into willing ears: if any draft-animals of their enemies collapse, struggling under the weight of the burdens they bear, he orders them not to pass them by but to lighten their load and help to raise them, teaching them by implication not to exult in the misfortunes of those who hate them. He understood that rejoicing at another’s hardship is an exceedingly wrathful passion, both related to and the opposite of envy; akin to it because each proceeds from passion and both may advance on us in the

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same situations, one all but following on the other; opposite it because one expresses grief at the neighbor’s successes, the other pleasure at the neighbor’s hardships. (§ ) Moreover, he says, if you see an enemy’s draft-animal going astray, leave aside any incitements from the disagreement to indulge in more excessive feelings, and lead the animal back and return it. For you will be helping yourself more than him, since what accrues to him is an irrational and probably worthless animal, but to you the greatest and most honored of all things in nature, excellence of character. (§ ) And there will necessarily follow, like a shadow follows a body, a dissolution of the enmity, for he, having been well treated, is led grudgingly towards a truce, enslaved by this kindness, while the one who has been of aid, using a fine act as mediator, by now has all but directed his mind towards reconciliation. (§ ) This above all is what the most holy prophet throughout the whole of his legislation intends to provide, concord, fellowship, unanimity, and a unity of dispositions, from which households and cities, nations and lands, and the entire human race might advance to the utmost good fortune. (§ ) But up to the present time these are only prayers. Yet for my own part I am persuaded that they will become undeniable realities, when God grants us, just as the seasonal fruits, a harvest in virtues—and may we who have borne a desire for them from practically our first years not be deprived of them!

[Chapter ] Indentured Servants and Slaves (§ ) These laws, then, and others like them, he decreed for the free. In the same spirit, I believe, he also established laws concerning slaves, granting them as well a share of those measures that extend gentleness and humanity. (§ ) Thus he holds that laborers who have submitted themselves to the service of others because of a lack of necessities must not endure anything unworthy of the freedom to which they were born, advising those who might come into possession of their service to recognize the uncertainty of fortune and have some regard for their reversal. And he does not permit debtors who because of short-term loans have undergone the name and condition of this setback or those free persons who have become slaves due to some more pressing necessity to suffer forever, but grants them a full reprieve in the seventh year. (§ ) For lenders who did not recover their debt, or for those who acquired

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individuals who were formerly free in some other way,4 six year’s time of service, he says, is sufficient. And those who are not slaves by birth should not be bereft of good hope forever but are to return to the former liberty of which they were deprived by unforeseen events. (§ ) If someone else’s slave, he says, even a slave of the third generation, in fear of his master’s threats or in awareness of certain offenses, or although having committed no wrong has found his master in some other way to be merciless and savage, should flee to you for refuge, do not ignore him. For to hand over a suppliant is unholy, and even a slave is a suppliant when he has fled to your hearth as to a temple, where he has a right to obtain asylum. This is especially the case when he comes for the purpose of a genuine reconciliation, one reached without betrayal, or if that is not possible, to be sold as a last resort. For when changing masters it is uncertain which way the scale will turn, and the uncertain evil is easier to bear than the known one.

[Chapter ] Newborn Animals (§ ) These, then, are the laws he established regarding relations and strangers, friends and enemies, slaves and free persons, and all people generally. But he conveys fairness and gentleness even to the order of irrational animals, allowing them to draw some benefit5 as well, as from a free-flowing stream. (§ ) For in the case of domestic herds, particularly sheep, goats, and oxen, he commands them to refrain from the immediate use of their newborns, taking them neither for food nor for reason of offering sacrifices. For he took this to be evidence of a savage soul, to lie in wait for newborns in order to separate the children from their own mothers without delay for the sake of the pleasure of the belly or, rather, for the sake of some strange and deviant unpleasantness of the soul. (§ ) So he says to the one who would live in accord with his most sacred polity, “My good man, a great abundance of things to which no blame attends is available for your use. For perhaps this act might have been forgivable, seeing how poverty and want can force people to do many of the things they do not want to do. But your obligation is to prevail in self-control and the other virtues, having been appointed to the finest company, 4 5

Reading F τοAς τρπον. See the commentary. Reading τι χρηστν. See the commentary.

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under the command of nature’s right reason, through which you must become civilized, accepting nothing unfavorable into your mind. (§ ) And what could be more unfavorable than to add to the pains of birth other pains from without by the immediate separation of the newborns? For when they are taken away, the mothers are certain to be troubled on account of the natural affection mothers have towards their young, especially during the time of pregnancy, since the breasts, whose flowing suffers a blockage of the efflux through the lack of suckling, become indurated and distended by the burden of the milk within them and are weighed down with pain.” (§ ) “So give,” he says, “to the mother the newborn to be breastfed, if not for the whole time, then at least for the first seven days, and do not render useless those streams which nature has rained into the breasts by annulling the second of her gifts, gifts which were prepared with great foresight, perceiving from afar with eternal and perfect prudence what would happen thereafter. (§ ) For the first gift is birth, through which that which does not exist is brought into being, the second is the efflux of milk, a most mild nourishment sustaining every tender creature in due season. It is simultaneously drink and food, for the watery substance of the milk is drink, while that which has curdled is food, both being prepared6 with foresight, so that the newborn would not suffer from want (which, always lying in wait, can afflict it at times), but from one and the same application of each kind of nourishment would escape from those cruel mistresses, thirst and hunger.” (§ ) Read this law, you kind and sought-after parents, and hide your faces, you who always harbor murderous intentions towards your infants, setting an evil trap for those being born in order to expose them, you ruthless enemies of the whole human race. (§ ) For towards whom will you come to have goodwill, when you are the murderers of your own children?—you who have done more than your share in laying cities to waste beginning with the destruction of your closest kin, who overthrow the ordinances of nature and pull down all that she builds up, who in the savage and wild cruelty of your soul pit destruction against birth and death against life! (§ ) Or do you not see that our ever finest lawgiver took care concerning the irrational animals lest the offspring be separated from their mother before they have been breastfed? Even more, good 6 Note that PCW .– sets off everything from προτ!ρα (the first word of § ) to the second instance of σιτον (“food”) with dashes, so that προνο7α (“with foresight”) follows on 9τοιμ,σατο (“prepared”) in § ; cf. PLCL ..

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parents, was this established on your account, so that you might be taught familial affection, if not by nature then at least by instruction, having regard for lambs and kids, who have not been prevented from indulging in plentiful stores of essentials. Nature made these things available in the most convenient places, from which easy enjoyment is available for those in need of them, while the lawgiver looks to see with great foresight that no one impedes the beneficent and saving gifts of God.

[Chapter ] Mother Animals and Their Young (§ ) Wishing to sow the seeds of gentleness and fairness in their minds in various forms, he establishes another ordinance akin to the preceding ones, forbidding them to sacrifice a mother and its offspring together on the same day; for if they are to be sacrificed, at least let it be at different times. For it is the height of brutality to kill the source of the birth along with that which was given life in one day. (§ ) And for what reason is this done? Either it is for reason of offering sacrifices or for the belly’s enjoyment. If it is on account of sacrifices, then even their name has been falsely given, for these are slaughters, not sacrifices. Indeed, what altar of God will accept such unholy offerings? And what sort of fire would not split itself in two and stand apart, shunning union with the unpleasant thing? I suppose that it would not abide for even the briefest time, but would extinguish itself immediately with a certain kind of foresight, lest the air and the most holy element of breath be defiled by the ascending flame. (§ ) If this was done for the purpose not of sacrifices but of a feast, who would not condemn the strange and deviant craving of this horrific gluttony? For such people are pursuing aberrant pleasures. But what pleasure do they have eating meat when they are tasting flesh from the mothers and their offspring in the same meal? If someone were to mix their limbs and fix them on spits in order to have his fill of the roast, it does not seem to me that they would stay quiet, but would break into speech, railing bitterly at the extremity of their unprecedented suffering and uttering countless reproaches against the voracity of those preparing a feast that ought to be a fast. (§ ) But there is another law that expels all pregnant animals from the consecrated areas, not allowing them to be sacrificed until they have given birth, regarding what is in the womb as equal with what has already been brought forth; not because that which has yet to come to light has the same status as that which has, but by extension to stop the

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recklessness of those who are accustomed to polluting everything. (§ ) For if things that grow in the manner of a plant and are still considered part of their pregnant mothers and still united with them (but after a period of months will be separated from the joint organism) are, in the hope of becoming living animals, protected by the inviolability afforded the mother, how can creatures which have been given birth and endowed with their own soul and body not be protected even more so, in order to prevent the aforementioned defilement from coming to pass? For the most unholy of all acts is to kill offspring and mother at one time on the same day. (§ ) It seems to me that is was from this precedent that some of the lawmakers derived the law concerning condemned women who are pregnant, commanding that if they have done something worthy of death, they are not to be executed7 until they deliver, lest that which they have in the womb perishes with them when they are killed. (§ ) But while these lawgivers deemed their laws valid for people, Moses surpasses them even further and extends such fairness to irrational animals, so that by practicing on species of different kinds we might exercise humanity even more abundantly and desist from mutually hurting each other, not hoarding our personal goods but presenting them in public for all people everywhere, as for kinfolk and siblings by nature. (§ ) So let those devious slanderers continue to malign the nation as being prone to inhumanity and accuse the laws of encouraging uncongenial and unsocial practices, when these laws obviously grant a share of mercy even to herds of cattle, and the people through the guidance of customs learned from their earliest youth amend any disobedience in their souls to a civilized disposition. (§ ) But being profuse in virtue and resourceful in providing excellent counsels, he endeavors to outdo even himself and carries the contest further. For he orders them not to separate an animal from its mother before it is weaned, whether it is a lamb or a kid or any other animal in their flocks. And he also commands them not to kill a mother and offspring on the same day. Now he bestows upon them lavishly when he says, “You shall not boil a lamb in its mother’s milk.” (§ ) For he deemed it to be wholly improper that the food meant for a living thing should become its seasoning and flavoring when it is slaughtered, and that while nature cared enough for its survival to rain down milk and arranged for it to be conveyed through the mother’s breasts as through

7

Reading μ+ ποκτενεσαι. See the commentary.

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channels, the unpleasantness of humankind would advance to such a point as to misuse the source of its life for the purpose of the consumption of the body it leaves behind. (§ ) But if anyone thinks fit to boil meat in milk, let it be done with no cruelty and without impiety. There are countless herds of animals everywhere, and each day they are milked by cowherds, goatherds, and shepherds, whose largest source of income in tending their herds is milk, sometimes in liquid form and sometimes reduced and congealed into cheese. And since there is such abundance, anyone who boils the meat of lambs or kids or any other animal in its mother’s milk exhibits a terrible unseemliness of manners, which have been severed from that passion that is most indispensable and most closely related to the rational soul, mercy.

[Chapter ] Draught Animals (§ ) I also admire the law, one attuned to those already mentioned as in a fully harmonious choir, which forbids muzzling an ox while it is threshing. For this is the animal who, before the sowing of the deepsoiled plain, cuts the furrows and prepares the fields for heaven and the farmer, the latter so that he might finish sowing in season, the former so that the deep hollows might receive the gifts that come from the rains, storing up and dispensing rich food little by little to the crop until it bears ears of corn and brings its annual fruit to maturity. And after that is accomplished the ox is again required for another service, the cleansing of the sheaves and the separation of the refuse from what is genuine and useful. (§ ) But since I explained the gentle and kind command concerning oxen when they are threshing, I will proceed to describe the law laid down concerning animals when they are plowing, which is the law of the same family. For he forbids them to yoke an ox and ass together in the same team for plowing the land, not only taking into account the dissimilarity of the animals, since the one is clean while the ass is among the unclean, and it is not appropriate to join creatures so alien to one another, but also, since they are unequal in strength, being mindful of those who are weaker so that they are not afflicted and oppressed when interacting with a stronger force. And he does this even though the weaker, the ass, is expelled from the consecrated areas, while the law bids us to offer up the more vigorous, the ox, in the most perfect sacrifices. (§ ) But even so, neither does he disparage the weakness of the unclean nor does he give

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leeway for the clean to employ might rather than right, crying out and declaring simply and openly to those whose souls have ears to commit no wrong against people of other nations when they can be charged with nothing except being of a different race, which is no crime, for nothing that is neither vice nor derives from vice is liable to any accusation.

[Chapters –] Cultivated Plants (§ ) Drawing upon his lavish supply of fairness, he furnishes it richly and exceedingly once more, proceeding from rational to irrational beings, and from irrational beings to plants, about which we must now speak, seeing that the first two, human beings and those that have been endowed with a soul, have already been discussed. (§ ) To begin with, he expressly instructs them not to ravage trees of the cultivated variety or to cut down fruit-bearing fields out of malice before their time or, in general, to destroy any crop, so that the human race might be supplied with a surplus of bountiful foods and live not only from the essentials but from those things conducive to a pleasurable life. For the fruit of the grain has been set apart as a staple for people’s food, while the untold varieties of fruit trees are conducive to a pleasurable life, and in times of need they often become a second source of food. (§ ) Going even further, he does not allow them to destroy the land even of their enemies, and orders them to refrain from cutting down trees and ravaging the country, deeming it improper to bring wrath against human beings down on things which are responsible for no wrongdoing. (§ ) He expects them, then, to consider not only the present but also the future, as though looking down from some distant peak, with the sharp-sightedness of reason. For no one remains in the same state, but all of us experience changes and reversals, so that it is likely that our current antagonists will send envoys making conciliatory overtures and quickly come to terms of peace. (§ ) And to deprive friends of essential foods would be grievous, thereby storing up nothing of assistance for the uncertainty of the future. For that saying was altogether well put by the ancients, that in forming a friendship we must not ignore the possibility of enmity and we must engage an enemy as though a friendship lied in the future, in order that each one, in accordance with his nature, stores up something that contributes to his security and does not, having nothing in words and deeds with which to clothe himself, repent of his extreme recklessness, blaming himself when it is no use. (§ ) This

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saying should also be observed by cities, which in peace should plan for times of war and in war plan for times of peace; nor should they trust in their allies too readily, as though they might not change and turn into adversaries, or distrust their enemies completely, as though they were incapable of being brought into a peaceful alliance. (§ ) And, even if we need not do anything for an enemy in hope of reconciliation, still, no plant is our enemy, but they are all peaceful and beneficial, and the cultivated types are particularly essential, their fruit being either food or a possession equal to food in value. Why then is it necessary to wage war against things that are not war-like by cutting them down or setting them on fire or pulling up their roots, things which nature itself has brought to perfection with streams of water and mild breezes, so that they might pay their annual tributes to humankind as though to a king? (§ ) He also took care, like a good protector, to produce the strength and force that accompanies training not only in animals but also in plants, and especially in cultivated ones, since they are deserving of more attention and lack the same vitality as wild ones, requiring the farmer’s skill to achieve greater power. (§ ) For he commands that the newly planted trees be tended for three consecutive years, both by cutting off excess growths, lest they be weighed down by the burden and exhausted through deficiency by the subdivision of nourishment, and also by making a circle and digging around them, so that nothing causing damage might shoot up beside them and impede their growth. And he does not allow them to pluck the fruit for their own enjoyment, not only because imperfect fruit would come from imperfect plants (for also animals that are not fully grown cannot bear fully formed offspring), but also on account of the damage done the newly planted trees, which are in a way still earth-bound, by hindering them from shooting up. (§ ) Accordingly, many farmers during the springtime inspect the young trees in order to squeeze off any fruit they produce right away, before they achieve any progress and growth, for fear of weakening the parent plants. For if someone were not to take such precautions, what happens is that when they ought to bear fully-matured fruit, they bring forth either nothing or only miscarriages, exhausted by the labor of fruits brought forth before the proper time, which by burdening the branches eventually wear out the trunks with their roots. (§ ) But after three years, when the roots have dug deep and are anchored more firmly in the soil, and the trunk, held up as by unyielding foundations, grows vigorously, it will be able to bear perfectly formed fruit in the fourth year in accord with the perfect number four. (§ ) But in the fourth year

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he commands them not to pluck the fruit for enjoyment, but to dedicate the whole crop as first fruits to God, both as a thank-offering for things received in the past and in the hope of productivity in the future and the revenue derived from it. (§ ) You see how much graciousness and kindness he displays, and how he pours them forth for every kind, first of people, even if they are foreigners or enemies, then of irrational animals, even if they happen to be unclean, and finally of sown crops as well as trees. For one who has already learned fairness in dealing with living things that lack perception will commit no wrong against those endowed with a soul, and one who does not attempt violence against ensouled beings is by extension instructed to take care of those that have reason.

[Chapters –] The Ruling Classes (§ ) Taming the minds of those living under his polity with instructions such as these, he cut them off from arrogance and pretentiousness, the most troublesome and onerous of evils (yet which most people embrace as the greatest of goods), especially when riches and honors and magistracies furnish extravagant surpluses in abundance. (§ ) For pretentiousness arises even in trivial and obscure persons, just as each of the other passions and afflictions and infirmities of the soul, yet it does not undergo much growth, but as with fire, goes dark for want of fuel. But it is obvious in the great, who, as I said, have abundant supplies of this evil in riches and honors and magistracies, of which they have been filled, just as those who have had their fill of much unmixed wine become intoxicated and act offensively towards slave and free alike, and at times even towards whole cities. For “over-indulgence begets insolence,” as the saying of the ancients goes. (§ ) Therefore most excellently does Moses the hierophant exhort them to refrain from all sins, but especially from arrogance. And so he gives them a reminder of the things that are apt to inflame this passion, excessive satiety of the belly and an extravagant surplus of houses and possessions and cattle. For they immediately lose control over themselves, being lifted and puffed up, for whom the only hope of a cure is to never utterly forget God. (§ ) For just as when the sun rises the darkness departs, and everything is full of light, so in the same way when God, the intelligible sun, appears and shines upon the soul, the gloom of the passions and vices is dispelled, and that purest and most

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venerable form, the form of exceedingly brilliant virtue, reveals itself. (§ ) And resolving to curb and eliminate arrogance even further, he names the reasons why they ought to bear the remembrance of God as an image in their minds, never to be forgotten. “For he is giving you,” he says very instructively, “strength to make power.” For the one who has been correctly taught that his vigor and might is a gift from God will consider the personal weakness which he had before benefitting from this gift, and will reject proud and boastful thoughts and give thanks to the source of this change for the better. And a thankful soul is the enemy of pretentiousness, while conversely unthankfulness is akin to arrogance. (§ ) “If,” he is saying, “your affairs are flourishing, if you have received and acquired strength which perhaps you did not expect, make power.” What this means must be explained correctly to those who do not fully discern the significance. Many people endeavor to effect the opposite of the benefits which they have received. For when they become rich they make others poor, or when they enjoy a large share of glory and honor they become the cause of disgrace and dishonor to others. (§ ) But it is incumbent upon the one who is prudent, as far as possible, to make his neighbors shrewd, and the one who is moderate to make them self-controlled, and the one who is brave to make them noble, and the one who is just to make them just, and, in a word, for the good man to make them good. For these, it seems to me, are powers, which a cultured person in any event will embrace as most fitting for him. But incapacity and weakness, their opposites, are alien to an excellent character. (§ ) And elsewhere he teaches the rational nature a most appropriate lesson, to imitate God as much as possible, neglecting none of the things contributing to such assimilation. “Therefore,” he says, “when you receive strength from the all-mighty, grant a share of your strength to others, giving that which you received, so that you might imitate God by giving gifts of the same kind. (§ ) For the gifts of the supreme ruler are of common utility, given to some, not so that they, upon receiving them, might hide them or misuse them to harm others, but so that they might present them in public, just as in a civic feast they summon all they can to make use and have enjoyment of them.” (§ ) So we tell the one who is very wealthy and esteemed and sound of body and learned to make whomever he meets rich and esteemed and sound of body and learned and, on the whole, good, but not to honor envy and malice above virtue and oppose those who might fare well. (§ ) But those who give themselves airs, whose swelling of pretentiousness renders them altogether incurable, the law in all its excellence

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does not bring to human judgment but delivers only to the divine court. For it says, “Whoever attempts to do something with contempt offends God.” (§ ) Why? First, because pretentiousness is a vice of the soul and the soul is unseen except by God. A punisher who is blind must be condemned, having ignorance as his accuser, while the one who can see is praiseworthy, since he does everything with knowledge. Second, because every pretentious man, being full of irrational thoughts, supposes himself to be “neither man nor demigod but an utter deity,” as Pindar says, thinking fit to transgress the bounds of human nature. (§ ) And as his soul so also his body is culpable in all its postures and movements. For he struts about and with neck raised up high neighs and prances and is lifted and puffed up beyond his nature, and sees only by looking askance, out of the sides of his eyes, and hears only to mis-hear. Slaves he treats like beasts, the free like slaves, relatives like strangers, friends like flatterers, fellow-citizens like foreigners. (§ ) He deems himself to be of all the most wealthy, most honored, most beautiful, most vigorous, most prudent, most moderate, most just, most eloquent, most knowledgeable. Accordingly, he assumes that everyone else is poor, unworthy, unhonored, unwise, unjust, unintelligent, outcasts, nothing at all. Of course such a person will, as the hierophant says, have God for his accuser and punisher.

ON REPENTANCE

(§ ) Being fond of virtue, fond of honor, and above all fond of humanity, the most holy Moses urges all people everywhere to become followers of piety and justice, setting before those who repent, as before the victorious, the great prizes of fellowship in the best of polities and enjoyment of everything in it, both great and small. (§ ) For the leading good in bodies is health without illness, in ships a fair voyage without danger, and in souls the remembrance without lapse of those things that deserve to be remembered. But in the second order are the things that effect correction, recovery from illnesses, muchprayed-for deliverance from the perils of a voyage, and, following upon forgetfulness, recollection, whose brother and closest relation is repentance, which stands not in the first and highest order of goods, but in the one after this, winning second place. (§ ) For to never sin at all belongs to God, and perhaps also to a god-like man, while to change from sin to a blameless life is the mark of one who is prudent and not altogether ignorant about what is beneficial. (§ ) Hence, when he gathers such individuals and initiates them into his mysteries, he summons them by offering conciliatory and friendly instructions, which exhort them to train in truthfulness and cast off vanity and to embrace truth and modesty as highest necessities and the sources of good fortune, rising up against the mythical fabrications which parents and nurses and tutors and countless other familiars engraved upon their still delicate souls from their first years, leading them endlessly astray even as they endeavored to bring about the knowledge of what is the best. (§ ) And what can the best of all things be except God, whose honors they granted to things which are not gods, revering them beyond measure, while Him in their vain thoughts they utterly forgot? Therefore all, as many as did not think fit to worship the Founder and Father of all from the beginning, but later welcomed the rule of one over the rule of many, should be considered our closest friends and relations, having displayed a character friendly to God, the greatest route to friendship and kinship. And we must celebrate together with them, just as though, being previously blind, they had recovered their sight, coming from deepest darkness to behold a most brilliant light.

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(§ ) The first and most essential of the means to repentance has now been discussed. But one should repent not only of the errors by which he was deceived for a long time, standing in awe of things created before the Uncreated and Creator, but also in respect to the other essentials of life, passing, as it were, from the worst of bad polities, ochlocracy, to that polity which is most well-ordered, democracy. This entails moving from ignorance to knowledge of things that it is shameful not to know, from foolishness to prudence, from lack of self-control to self-control, from injustice to justice, from lack of valor to bravery. (§ ) For it is entirely excellent and beneficial to desert to virtue without wavering, forsaking vice, that treacherous mistress. And just as a shadow of necessity immediately follows a body that is in the sun, so also the whole fellowship of the other virtues follows the honoring of the God who exists. (§ ) For proselytes become at once moderate, self-controlled, modest, gentle, kind, humane, reverent, just, high-minded, lovers of truth, superior to the love of goods and pleasure; while conversely those who keep themselves far from the sacred laws are seen to be undisciplined, shameless, unjust, irreverent, small-minded, quarrelsome, friends of falsehood and perjury, having sold their freedom for refined cuisine and unmixed wine and pastries and something beautiful to look at, all for the enjoyment of the belly and the parts below it, the consequences of which are the severest injuries to both body and soul. (§ ) Indeed excellent, though, are the instructions he gives leading to repentance, through which we are taught to amend our life from discord to a change for the better. For he says that this matter is not excessive nor far removed, neither in the aether high above, nor at the ends of the earth, nor across the great sea, so that it is impossible to grasp, but is very near, dwelling in three parts of our selves, mouth and heart and hands, symbols for words and thoughts and actions. For mouth is a symbol of speech, heart of intentions, and hands of actions; in these there is good fortune. (§ ). For when one’s purpose is such as one’s speech, and one’s action is such as one’s intention, life is laudable and perfect, but when they are at odds with one another, it is imperfect and blameworthy. If someone does not lose thought of this harmony, he will be acceptable to God, becoming at the same time beloved by God and a lover of God. Wherefore in full accord with these words that oracle was proclaimed, “You chose God today to be God to you, and the Lord chose you today to be a people to him.” (§ ) Excellent indeed is this mutuality of choice, when someone strives to serve the Existent, and without delay God accepts the suppliant as his own and anticipates the intent of the

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one who truly and genuinely comes into his service. And the true servant and suppliant, even should he be one in number, in worth (insofar as he makes his own choice) is all the people, and has become equal in value to a whole nation. (§ ) And this is the case naturally. For as in a ship the helmsman is equal in importance to the sailors and in an army the general to the soldiers (if he happens to be killed they will be defeated just as certainly as if the entire force was conquered), in the same way too the sage contends with the worth of a whole nation, defended by that impregnable wall, reverence for God.

ON NOBILITY

(§ ) To those1 who laud nobility of birth as the greatest good and the source of other great goods let no mild reproach be spoken, since they above all imagine those of ancient wealth and renown to be noble, even though the ancestors from whom they boast descent did not achieve good fortune through extravagant surpluses, since it is the nature of that which fosters the true good to reside in none of the externals, nor again in things of the body, and further not even in every part of the soul, but only in the governing part. (§ ) When God in his gentleness and love of humanity resolved to establish this among us also, he found no more fitting temple on earth than the faculty of reason. For it alone, being the better part, bears the good around as an image, even if some of those who have not tasted or even touched their lips to wisdom might disbelieve. For silver and gold and honors and offices and a body that is healthy and beautiful are like those put in command of basic services compared to the service of royal virtue, having failed to see that light which is most brilliant. (§ ) Therefore, since nobility is the proper inheritance of a mind that has been purified by perfect purifications, one must call only the moderate and just noble, even if they happen to have been born from household slaves or from those bought with money. But to wicked offspring who have sprung from good parents let the estate of nobility be closed off. (§ ) For the fool is without home and city, expelled from paternal virtue, and virtue is in reality the paternity of wise men. With the former ignobility necessarily follows, even if the lives of his grandfathers or ancestors were blameless, since he makes a practice of estrangement and separates himself by the furthest measure from nobility in both words and deeds. (§ ) But not only are the wicked unable to be noble, I see besides that they are all also intractable enemies to nobility, destroying their ancestral dignity and obscuring and even extinguishing whatever is illustrious in their family. (§ ) It is for this reason, it seems to me, that extremely affectionate fathers take steps to disinherit their sons, cutting them off from their home and kin, when the wickedness in them prevails over that particular and all-surpassing goodwill instilled in parents by

1

Reading ΤοAς δE Dμνο(σι. See the commentary.

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nature. (§ ) And the truth of this statement is easy to discern from other cases. What good will the sharp-sightedness of one’s parents do for someone whose eyes have failed in helping him to see? Or the strong voices of one’s parents or grandparents for someone with a slack tongue in explaining himself? What does it benefit one emaciated from a long and wasting illness in regaining his vigor if the founders of his family are enrolled among the victors at the Olympic and all the other great games on account of their athletic prowess? For the ailments of his body remain in the same condition as they were, receiving no improvement from his relatives’ accomplishments. (§ ) In the same way, then, just parents are no advantage to the unjust, nor moderate parents to the undisciplined, nor, in general, good parents to the wicked, any more than the laws are to law-breakers, whose chastisers they become, and the lives of those who strive for virtue are unwritten laws of a certain kind. (§ ) Therefore I think that if God were to shape nobility into a human form she would stand before the rebellious descendants and speak these words: “When truth is presiding, kinship is measured not in blood alone but in similarity of actions and pursuit of the same ends. But you have practiced the opposite, deeming the things dear to me hateful and the things hostile to me dear. For in my presence modesty and truth and restrained passions and humility and innocence are honored, but in your presence they are dishonored. My enemies are shamelessness, falsehood, unrestrained passions, vanity, and the vices, but to you they are the closest of relatives. (§ ) Why, then, having cultivated alienation through your deeds, do you in your speech pretend to kinship by assuming a specious name? For I do not abide fallacies and subtle deceits, since it is easy for someone to concoct fair-sounding words, but it is not easy to change bad morals to good. (§ ) With a view to such things, I now consider and henceforth will hold as enemies those who have kindled the fuel of enmity, and will eye them with distrust more than those reproached for their low birth. For their defense is that they have no kin as an example of excellence of character, but you stand under indictment, being born from great houses whose boast and fame are their illustrious families. For while good models are being established in your presence and, in a way, have grown up with you, you have never been minded to copy their excellence.” (§ ) That he held that nobility lies in the possession of virtue, and that only the one who has this is noble and not whoever is born of fine and excellent parents, is clear from many things. (§ ) To begin with, who would disagree that those sprung from the earthborn man were of noble

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lineage and founders of noble lines? What fell to them was a family more distinctive than those that followed insofar as they were sprung from the first wedded pair, the man and woman who then first joined in mutual intercourse for the propagation of their kind. But all the same, of the two that were born, the elder dared to murder the younger by treachery and, having committed the greatest abomination, fratricide, became the first to defile the earth with human blood. (§ ) What good, then, was nobility of birth to him when he was exhibiting ignobility in his soul? And when God, the overseer of human affairs, saw this he was abhorred and as punishment banished him, not killing him at once lest he have no awareness of his misfortunes, but holding over him in his awareness of a succession of griefs and fears countless deaths, producing a retribution of most painful miseries. (§ ) Among the most notable of those who followed there was a certain man of exceptional holiness whose piety the framer of the laws deemed worthy to be recorded in the sacred books. In the great deluge when cities disappeared in utter destruction (for even the highest mountain peaks were consumed in the growth and rising of the onrushing flood-tide), he alone came through safely with his family, receiving for his excellence of character a prize greater than any can obtain. (§ ) And yet, of the three children born to him and enjoying a share of their father’s bounty, one dared to rail against the source of his safety, his father, with laughter and mockery for some unintentional mistake and laid bare to those who did not know it what would have been right to conceal, bringing disgrace upon the one who begat him. So he derived no advantage from the illustrious nobility of his birth, becoming accursed and a cause of misfortune to his descendants, proper punishments for one who neglected the honor owed parents. (§ ) But why is it right to make mention of these while passing over the first and earthborn man? As regards nobility of birth he is comparable to no other mortal, having been formed by divine hands into the figure of a man’s body with a perfect execution of the molding art, and deemed worthy of a soul coming not from anything already in creation, but from God breathing into him as much of his own power as mortal nature was able to receive. Was this not a surfeit of nobility, which cannot be brought into comparison with any others whose names are held in acclaim? (§ ) For their fame derives from the success of their ancestors, and these ancestors were human beings, creatures mortal and perishable, and their accomplishments were mostly uncertain and fleeting. But his father was not mortal, but the everlasting God. (§ )

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Being in a way His image on account of the ruler in his soul, the mind, it was his duty to keep that image untarnished by adhering as far as possible to the virtues of his creator. Yet when the alternatives were set before him to choose or avoid, good and evil, excellent and shameful, true and false, he eagerly chose false and shameful and evil things, disregarding those that are good and excellent and true, on which account he fittingly exchanged an immortal life for a mortal one and, forfeiting blessedness and good fortune, promptly changed to a life of pain and misfortune. (§ ) Let these examples be landmarks common to all people, warning those who have no share of excellence of character not to pride themselves on the greatness of their families. But apart from these common examples are those peculiar to the Jews. For among the founders of the race are those to whom the virtues of their ancestors were of absolutely no benefit, condemned as they were for blameworthy and culpable actions, being convicted, if not by someone else, then at least by their conscience, which is the one and only court which is not deceived by ploys of speech. (§ ) The first had many children, begotten from three wives, not for the gratification of pleasure but in the hope of enlarging the race. But of the many offspring only one was named heir of his father’s goods, while all the rest, because they failed to show sound judgment and copied none of their father’s attributes, were banished from their home and estranged from their celebrated nobility. (§ ) The one approved as heir in turn begat two twins who bore no likeness to one another in either their bodies or their judgments [except in the hands and in these only on account of a particular plan]. For the younger was obedient to both his parents and was so well-pleasing that he came to be praised even by God, but the elder was disobedient, exercising no control over the pleasures of the belly and the parts below it. Induced by these, he surrendered his inheritance to his junior and then at once regretted the conditions under which he had surrendered it, and then seeking to murder his brother consumed himself with nothing except things that would grieve his parents. (§ ) Therefore, for the younger they offered prayers of the highest order, all of which God granted, deeming that nothing in them was to be left unfulfilled. But to the elder out of mercy they gave a subordinate position so that he would serve his brother, thinking (as is the case) that it is good for the fool not to live under his own authority. (§ ) And if he had in fact endured his servitude willingly, he would have been found worthy of the prizes given to those who come second in the contests for virtue. As it was, when he acted stubbornly and fled from such excellent authority, he became the cause of great reproaches both to himself and

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to his descendants, so that his life, one not worth living, stands recorded as the clearest evidence that nobility of birth is of no advantage to those unworthy of such nobility. (§ ) These, then, are of the blameworthy class, wicked individuals born of good parents who gained nothing from the virtues of their fathers but suffered countless injuries from the vices in their souls. But I can mention others belonging to the opposite and better class, whose ancestors were culpable while their own life was admirable and full of good repute. (§ ) The most ancient member of the Jewish nation was a Chaldean by birth and whose father was an astrologer, one of those occupied with its branches of knowledge who believe the stars and entire heaven and universe to be gods, on whose account, they say, things turn out for each person better or worse, and hold that there is no cause outside of what can be apprehended by the senses. (§ ) But what could be more heinous or provide a more complete conviction of ignobility in the soul than this, that through a knowledge of the many and secondary and created comes an ignorance of the One and Oldest and Uncreated and Creator of all, whose excellence is known through these and countless other attributes the greatness of which human reason cannot contain? (§ ) Having a conception of these things and being under divine inspiration, he left his country and race and paternal home, knowing that if he remained the deceptions of the polytheistic opinion would remain in him as well, making it impossible for him to discover the One, who alone is eternal and Father of all things both intelligible and perceptible, but that if he departed the deception would also depart from his mind, its false opinion being amended to the truth. (§ ) And at once the oracles he received also fanned the deep longing that he had to know the Existent. Guided by these he went in search of the One with the most untiring zeal, and he did not give up before receiving clearer perceptions, not of his being, for that is impossible, but of his existence and providence. (§ ) And for this reason he is the first person who is said to have believed in God, since he was also the first to have an unwavering and certain understanding that there is one Cause above all, and that it exercises providence over the universe and everything in it. And having acquired faith, the most certain of the virtues, he acquired with it all the others as well, so that he was deemed a king by those who had received him, not for his means (for he was a commoner), but on account of his greatness of soul, his mind being that of a king. (§ ) And they certainly continued honoring him as subjects do a ruler, astounded

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at the all-encompassing magnificence of his nature, which was more than human in its perfection. For he formed associations not as they did, but on many occasions under divine inspiration those that are more sacred. So whenever he was possessed, everything changed for the better, his looks, his appearance, his stature, his postures, his movements, his voice; the divine spirit which was breathed upon him from above established itself in his soul, conferring on his body remarkable beauty, on his words persuasiveness, and on his hearers comprehension. (§ ) Would you not say that this immigrant, isolated from all family and friends, was most noble, who yearned for kinship with God and strove in every way to be familiar with him, and being stationed in the best order among the prophets, trusted in none of the things in creation rather than the Uncreated and Father of all, who, as I said, was deemed a king by those who had received him, obtaining his rule not by arms or military forces, as is the practice of some, but by the election of God, who is fond of virtue and rewards the lovers of piety with supreme powers for the benefit of those associated with them? (§ ) This man is a standard of nobility for all proselytes, who, forsaking the ignobility of strange laws and atrocious customs which assign divine honors to stones and stocks and lifeless things in general, have traveled to a fine new home in a polity enlivened with reality and vitality, whose guardian and overseer is truth. (§ ) For this nobility not only did men beloved by God strive but women as well, when they unlearned the ignorance of their upbringing concerning the honoring of objects wrought by hand and were educated in the knowledge of the sovereignty by which the universe is governed. (§ ) Tamar was a woman from Palestinian Syria, reared in a home and city with many gods, full of wooden images and statues and of shrines generally. But when, as though emerging from deep darkness, she was able to see a small ray of truth, at risk of death she deserted to piety, having little regard for her life if it were not lived well. And she took this life to be nothing other than the service and supplication of the one Cause. (§ ) Although she was married to two brothers in turn, both of them wicked, to the elder as her lawful husband, to the younger in accord with the law of inheritance, since the elder had not left offspring, she still kept her own life untarnished and was able to obtain the good repute that belongs to the good and to become a source of nobility for all those who came after her. But even if she was a foreigner, she was still at least free, and of free parents, and they were probably persons of no insignificance. (§ ) Handmaids born beyond the Euphrates in the outlying areas of Babylonia were

on nobility



given as a dowry to their mistresses when they married. But when they were judged worthy to pass over to a wise man’s bed, they initially passed over from the status of concubines to the name and manner of married women, and instead of handmaids were made by their mistresses, one might say, nearly equal to them in honor, who, most incredibly, promoted them to the same rank as themselves. For envy does not dwell in the souls of sages, who, because it is absent, share of their goods with others. (§ ) And the baseborn children from these women were treated no differently than the legitimate, not only by their begetter (for it is not remarkable if he who was the common father of them all showed the same goodwill to those born of different mothers), but also by the stepmothers. For they abolished hatred for their stepchildren and changed it to a solicitude beyond description. (§ ) And expressing goodwill in turn, the stepchildren honored their stepmothers as highly as though they were their natural mothers. The brothers, though considered half-brothers by birth, did not think fit to show a halved affection for one another; rather their passion for giving and receiving love increased twofold and they made up for the apparent discrepancy with their zeal to bring the children from both marriages together in harmony and unity of dispositions. (§ ) Should one, then, have any share with those2 who assume as their own boon the nobility that belongs to others? In contrast to those mentioned, they might rightly be considered enemies of both the Jewish nation and of all people everywhere. Of the former because they give their compatriots leave to make little of a sound and stable life, trusting in the virtue of their ancestors. Of the latter because even if they achieve perfection in excellence of character it does them no good if their parents and grandparents were not blameless. (§ ) Than this I do not know if there could be a more hurtful proposition, that avenging justice will not pursue the children of good parents if they act wickedly and that honor will not follow the good children of wicked parents, since the law examines each person individually, neither praising nor chastising with reference to the virtues or vices of one’s relations.

2

Reading ;τι τονυν μεταδοτ!ον ατο( τοAς. See the commentary.

COMMENTARY

ON COURAGE CHAPTERS 1–4 COURAGE IN PEACETIME (§§ 1–21)

Analysis/General Comments Philo would not have been the first writer to compose an essay περ νδρεας; see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. ., ; .; .; ., ; .; cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..–; Eth. eud. ..–..; Plutarch, Apoph. lac. f; Valerius Maximus, Mem. .. Part of the subtitle provided for the Testament of Judah is περ νδρεας, presumably in reference to the military exploits narrated in :–:. That the Jews enjoyed a reputation for courage is indicated by a number of sources, including Hecataeus of Abdera’s observation that in his provisions for warfare, Moses required young men to cultivate andreia and “the endurance of every hardship” (apud Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..). An acknowledgment of this sort would have garnered particular respect in a Roman context such as Philo’s, where claims regarding courage played a crucial role in constructions of moral and political identity. As Polybius observed, while andreia was “nearly the most important virtue in every state,” this was the case “especially in Rome” (Hist. ..). By the same token, the processes by which one earned and defended a reputation for courage were hardly unambiguous. Both the definition and attribution of νδρεα were matters of contention between different groups vying for honor and power, each asserting that it was uniquely equipped to face risk, endure adversity, and behave in a “manly” (νδρεAος) fashion. While the battlefield persisted as the archetypal setting for its demonstration, any effort to grasp the full significance of andreia and the breadth of its discursive systems must take into consideration the interest ancient authors took in explicating the non-martial dimensions of courage as well, a fact that testifies to the capacity of “masculine” rhetoric to serve a variety of social functions (Rosen and Sluiter ). Most significantly for our purposes, the question of how conceptions of the best life require or bestow courage was one that occupied a number of ancient philosophers. The “remodelled version of andreia” (Hobbs , ) imparted by Plato in his Respublica warrants special attention in this regard on



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account of the profound impact it made on subsequent discussions of the topic. In Plato’s ideal state, courage is manifested not in the citizen body as a whole, but only among those who serve in the military, an elite class known as the Guardians, which is distinguished from the larger, moneymaking class from which they derive, the Producers (e, b, e– a). Those admitted to the former must demonstrate certain physical abilities, as well as courage combined with high-spiritedness (2 υμς or τ υμοειδ!ς), by which Plato denotes a complex cluster of attributes encompassing fearlessness, assertiveness, indignation, and ambition for glory and revenge (a–b, cf. a–c). Recruits undergo an intensive period of physical and intellectual preparation (b–b) designed to foster a true and “holy” conception of the gods (d–c) and instill s¯ophrosyn¯e (a, b–c, c, e, e, a, e), which includes resistance to the desire for luxury (e). Conversely, they are forbidden to emulate the roles of women or slaves (d–e) or to participate in sloth or drunkenness, since such comportment leads to μαλακα, or “softness” (e, cf. d–b). The aim of this training is to produce soldiers who are not only able warriors but also lovers of wisdom (e), their highspiritedness ordered (d–e) so as to obey reason (a–a; cf. Hall , –). Once their courage has been rendered properly “civic” in nature, Plato can then introduce the process by which some of the Guardians are selected for advanced education as potential civic leaders, distinguished from the military class from which they originate, the latter henceforth referred to as the Auxiliaries (b ff.). Their lengthy philosophical curriculum (e–b) culminates in an apprehension of the Form of the Good, to which they endeavor to assimilate (φομοιο(σαι) themselves (c). The knowledge thus obtained enables them to establish the best possible principles for ordering the state and its citizens (a–b). With this, Plato’s account of the state’s structures and defining qualities is complete. Its wisdom resides with these Rulers, its courage with the Auxiliaries. Meanwhile, all three classes exhibit moderation in agreeing that the Rulers ought to rule, and the state achieves justice when each class carries out its own function (c–b). Finally, in order to explicate these qualities fully, Plato must probe their psychological dimensions as well (d–e). He argues that the human personality is divided into three faculties, corresponding to the three classes of the ideal state and (if similarly ordered) manifesting the same virtues (d–e, c–b). Accordingly, for the soul’s spirited faculty to exhibit the proper form of courage, it must, like its civic counterpart, be trained to

on courage –: in peacetime, §§ –



obey the reasoning part and be its ally (e–c). If dominated by the appetitive part, the individual surrenders to avarice and bodily desires; but if it is ruled by the other parts, the soul achieves s¯ophrosyn¯e. Similarly, the soul achieves justice when each part carries out its own function, rendering the psych¯e harmonious and “healthy” (c–e). Further, see Irwin , –. In the course of articulating his vision of the ideal state, Plato raised various issues of abiding significance for the subsequent philosophical conversation about courage. Among those that figure most prominently in De fortitudine, mention may be made of the following. To begin with, Plato assumed that any quality in the state must derive ultimately from the citizens of the state who possess this quality and have the same form (d–e). In explicating the arrangements by which political communities exhibit courage, then, it was incumbent upon him to do the same for human souls. He further assumed that the best form of andreia is that which supports the best interests of the state and, as such, is the product of a state-sponsored process of σκησις (a). While conceding that physical ability is a requirement of good soldiering (§§ , , ), the model of education in courage proffered by Philo similarly concentrates on the psych¯e (§§ , , , , , , , –). Participants in this process are above all σκητα σοφας (§ ), that is, trainees in a broad philosophical curriculum (§ ). Because those who inculcate courage in this manner combine valor with prudence (cf. §§ , ), they are able to reason about what is beneficial in both private and public affairs, offering effective leadership even if they are old or infirm (§ ). Preparation and guidance for this βος πολιτικς is what the Mosaic law imparts (§ ); such civic courage has as its aim service that benefits the common interests (τC κοιν,) of the state (§ ). Second, for Plato, training in courage cannot be separated from education that has as its aim the total transformation of character. Accordingly, its development can only be achieved in conjunction with the development of other “cardinal” virtues, through and in which it is constituted. Insofar as the proper function of the soul’s spirited part is to support reason in its conflict with the appetitive faculty, the cultivation of moderation is especially important in this regard. As we hear in b–c, the spirited part is courageous “when it preserves through pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what is not” (cf. c, a). The same point is made in book  of Plato’s Leges. Courage is demonstrated when standing firm not only against fears and pains but also against desires and pleasures. Institutions must therefore



commentary

be established that will make the citizens courageous in this manner as well (d–c), that is, in a manner informed by s¯ophrosyn¯e (e ff.; cf. Görgemanns , –). Similar priorities are evident in De fortitudine. Against the various adversities he must face, Philo’s courageous man pits the “healthy” ordering of his soul and its faculties, a state otherwise known as s¯ophrosyn¯e, with reason in command, reining in high-spiritedness and desire (§§ –). Indeed, for Philo the essence of courage is to refrain from luxury and vanity, thereby minimizing one’s bodily needs and holding every desire in check (§§ –, –). The law’s regulations promoting simplicity (τυφα) are meant to contribute to this end (§§ –). Third, the ordering of Plato’s ideal state is informed by certain conceptions of a higher reality, the “eternal and unchanging order” of things (c), a reality which only those with proper training in courage (as well as the other virtues) can apprehend. For his part, Philo elucidates the “higher” nature of Mosaic courage by relating it to an additional virtue, one mentioned by Plato only in passing, eusebeia. The Alexandrian takes it for granted that the distinguishing national quality of the Israelites is their holiness (hosiot¯es), in which they offer reverence and honor to God (§ ), guided by correct conceptions of God’s nature (§§ , ). Courage contributes to this state through a steadfast commitment to self-sufficiency, which facilitates the process of assimilation (1ξομοωσις) to God (§ ), so that one stands, as it were, “on the boundary between immortal and mortal nature” (§ ). Finally, Plato problematized more traditional interpretations of courage by allowing female Guardians (c–c), though the way of life prescribed for them is hardly “feminine.” Philo also felt a need to address the role of women in civil life and training in courage, though his opinions on the matter move in a very different direction, a point which first surfaces in chapter . At first glance its exegesis of Deut : seems illfitted to the surrounding discussion. Nevertheless, it plays a crucial role in the treatise’s overall argument by introducing strict gender differentiation in βοι as a basic criterion in the regimen dictated by the law for training in courage. Here Philo articulates what he assumes throughout: courage not only belongs to men rather than to women, it also entails recognizing and resisting womanly threats to one’s manhood, a reality which will loom large in the second part of the treatise (see the Analysis/General comments for §§ –). The contents of De fortitudine fall into two major sections (cf. Alexander , –), as explained in § : courage can be manifested either in

on courage –: in peacetime, §§ –



peacetime (the focus of §§ –) or in wartime (the focus of §§ –). Philo’s point of departure here may be the similar distinction drawn by Plato in Resp. a–b (see also on § ), though from a structural standpoint the analysis of courage preserved in Cicero, Off. .– offers a better parallel, with its introductory comparison of military and civilian forms of courage (.–), followed by precepts for wartime (.–), and precepts for peacetime (.–). For further comparisons between the two texts, see the Analysis/General comments for §§ –. () The prologue (§§ –) sets forth a further distinction, that between true courage and its counterfeit, the latter evidenced by those who slaughter their enemies out of anger. Philo draws attention to both the ignorance and the brutality of these actions, the former being likened to an illness that resists treatment. Even though the multitudes hail such individuals as noble and glorious, their behavior in fact amounts to nothing more than recklessness (ρασ:της). Opposed to this is Philo’s subject, andreia as a form of knowledge located in the soul and esteemed among those who train in wisdom. Because their souls are healthy, they are able to contribute actively and resolutely to what is beneficial (τ συμφ!ρον) for the state. The next section proceeds to describe this form of courage at the expense of the other as the two are exhibited in civilian life. (a) The thesis for this section is given in § a: those of limited understanding are so weakened by cowardice that they falter whenever confronted with situations that are difficult to endure, namely, poverty, disgrace, impairment, and illness. Conversely, the prudent are steadfast in resisting and overcoming all such difficulties. This claim is then demonstrated by identifying the means of resistance to each of these four “foes” by which the truly courageous show themselves to be impervious to external circumstances and superior to the masses. Comparison with Lach. d–e provides some insight as to Philo’s choice of subject matter. There Plato proposes that courage pertains not only to war, but also to “illness and poverty and affairs of state” as well as to “fighting desire and pleasure” (cf. Phaed. c; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..–). (b) Against poverty, then, the courageous pit both the wealth that nature provides to guard the body (air, water, and food) and the wealth that wisdom provides to enrich the soul, the latter consisting of the doctrines of philosophy, from which derive the virtues, which in turn engender contentedness and thrift. Those trained in such qualities achieve a god-like self-sufficiency, while the fool is overwhelmed by unceasing, destructive desires (§§ b–).

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commentary

(c) Against disgrace and disrepute, the courageous pit good fame and the excellence of character (καλοκγαα) from which it originates, even as these attributes are ignored and slandered by the masses (§ ). (d) Against physical impairment, especially blindness, the courageous pit the superior vision of the intellect, “itself a star,” penetrating as it does the depths of both material and immaterial realties (§§ –). (e) Finally, against physical illness, they pit psychic health, the state in which the faculties of the soul are ordered in such a manner that the virtue of moderation can protect the reasoning part of the soul from the torrent of desires and passions, which threatens to sweep it away (§§ – ). (a) The final section is §§ –, where we learn of the relevance to these ideals of the Mosaic law, hitherto unmentioned. Philo avers that all the things he had commended in the previous section are in fact representative of lessons drawn from scripture, whose sole end is a virtuous life characterized by indifference to all bodily and external goods (§ ). This claim is supported with two examples. (b) First, reference is made to various (unspecified) regulations said to encourage simplicity, a value that resonates especially with the emphasis on contentedness in §§ –. Indeed, in Philo’s opinion, everything in the law pertaining to τυφα pertains to courage as well, since a noble and vigorous soul will scorn everything associated with τ(φος (§§ – ). (c) Second, we learn that one of the ways in which the law trains the soul in courage is by insisting on strict differentiation between the sexes, a matter taken so seriously that it extends even to matters of dress (Deut :). Since men and women are by nature unalike, the law assigns to each a different βος, the former political, the latter domestic. In order for a man to be properly courageous, nothing must be done that might confuse these roles. Thus he is prohibited from donning women’s clothes, while women are instructed not to be indecent or manly in their appearance (§§ –).

Detailed Comments () § . Having spoken previously on justice. Referring to the final section of the immediately preceding treatise in the Exposition, Spec. .– , which is subtitled περ δικαιοσ:νης in two manuscripts (S, M). See part  of the Introduction. Philosophers affiliated with various schools

on courage –: in peacetime, §§ –

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wrote books on the subject; see, e.g., Ps.-Plato, De justo; Plutarch, Stoic. rep. b, a, e, f, a; Comm. not. e–f; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. ., , ; .; . (περ δικαιοσ:νης κα νδρεας); .; .; cf. Valerius Maximus, Mem. .. not the warlike fury . . . which uses anger as its guide. Men emboldened by anger and υμς (cf. on § ) rather than by what is noble exemplify a specious form of courage, attacking their foes “like wild beasts” (Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..–); cf. the description of “savage” warriors in the next paragraph. The same general contrast is drawn by Plutarch in Is. Os. d. Cf. Cicero, Off. .: “not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be considered brave and courageous.” Among other things, this means that they will not indulge their anger when conquering a city or administering punishment, being guided instead by placabilitas and clementia (., –). For ρειμ,νιος, cf. Ebr. ; Legat. –; Josephus, Bell. .; Plutarch, Amat. f. courage as knowledge. The treatise opens with an abbreviated form of the definition of andreia provided in Spec. .–, one that incorporates Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic elements: “courage, which deals with the grounds of terror (τC δειν,), . . . is knowledge of what is to be endured (τν Dπομενετ!ων . . . 1πιστ=μην).” Cf. Leg. .; Mut. ; Mos. .. As with any virtue, it can be contrasted with its opposites, distortions that arise when anything is added to or taken away from it (cf. Deut :; :). In this case, the former results in recklessness (ρασ:της), the latter in cowardice (δειλα); cf. Deus ; Ebr. –; Praem. . That courage, like all the virtues, is a form of knowledge (and therefore teachable) was argued by Plato (e.g., Protag. c, b; further, Weiss ), a position that proved to be problematic for some of his interpreters (e.g., Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..). In Lach. d, b, it is defined specifically as knowledge of the grounds of terror and hope, that is, of future evils and future goods respectively (cf. SVF ., , ). That the sphere of virtuous conduct addressed by courage pertained to what must be endured was developed especially in Stoic circles (e.g., Plutarch, Virt. mor. a; Cicero, Tusc. .; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; SVF .; cf. Plato, Lach. c), though Aristotle had also associated courage with endurance, that is, with what the virtuous will endure in accordance with reason for the sake of the noble (Eth. nic. ..; cf. Eth. eud. ..–). Aristotle’s description of the virtue also included the idea that it is a mean between the excess of ρασ:της and the deficiency of δειλα, the same terms used by Philo in Spec. . (Eth. nic. ..; cf. ..; Pears ).

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That the priorities articulated in this fuller definition of andreia inform Philo’s reflections in De fortitudine is evident at a number of points. In both its civil and military forms, true courage must be directed by σοφα (§§ , ), φρνησις (§§ , , ), and λογισμς (§§ , , ). Its attendant qualities are contrasted with recklessness in §§  and , and with cowardice in §§ –, while §§ – surveys different experiences in civil life that are difficult to endure (δυσυπομνητα), and §  explains that Moses picked only soldiers eager to face τC δειν, without hesitation (cf. § ). § . incited by recklessness. For this use of ρασ:ς, see on § . enjoying the . . . name of excellence . . . they are deemed to be glorious. Battles, of course, were frequently waged to prove one’s excellence and attain glory, e.g., Xenophon, Hell. ..; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..; Josephus, Ant. .; Appian, Bell. civ. .. Philo returns to the theme of courage and glory in § . In § , the Midianites will exhibit a very different understanding of ριστεα. nature and practice. These are two of the elements of Philo’s educational “trinity,” for which see Abr. ; Praem. –; Prov. .; Legat. ; etc. A similar process explains the cruelty typically exhibited by jailors: “pitiless by nature and hardened by practice, they are brutalized day by day towards savagery” (Ios. ). savage and brutal. For the imagery, see on Hum. . Such traits were typically attributed to barbarians, e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ... § . long illnesses. On courage in facing illness, see on §§ –. Cicero names Appius and C. Drusus as examples of men who were able to make important public contributions despite their having disabilities (Tusc. .). are healthy and youthful in the better part of the soul. For τ$ς ψυχ$ς in the mss, in PCH . Cohn translates τ@$ ψυχ@$ (i.e., “the better part, the soul”) so as to create a clearer apposition with σμα; cf. § . However, as Colson notes (PLCL .), the former accords better both with the emphasis on 1πιστ=μη in the immediate context (note also the use of λογισμς later in the paragraph) and with Philo’s statements regarding the soul later in the treatise; see on Hum.  and Nob. . Philo identifies the source of the soul’s health in § . filled with resolve and full of the bravest valor. This contrasts with the τολμα attributed to those of little understanding in § . Mosaic soldiers display αρσαλετης and ετολμα of a military nature in §§  and 

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(cf. § ; Somn. .; Abr. ; Ios. ). For the latter’s relationship to courage, see Ps.-Aristotle, Virt. vit. .. For its pairing with φρνημα, cf. Josephus, Ant. .. though they would never touch defensive weapons. Cf. Plutarch, An seni e–f: “the man who is truly public-spirited and who loves humankind and the state and is careful of the public welfare and truly statesmanlike, that man, although he never put on a uniform, is always acting as a statesman by urging those who have power, guiding those who need guidance, assisting those who are deliberating, reforming those who act wrongly, encouraging those who are right-minded,” etc. arguments concerning what is beneficial. What is most expedient for the public good ought to be determined not by μανα (cf. § ) or υμς (cf. § ), but by λογισμς (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..); cf. §§ , ; Ios. ; Spec. .; Aristotle, Rhet. ..; ... Cicero similarly contended that actions cannot be deemed properly courageous unless they are motivated by a desire to champion lawful causes that serve the common good, rather then by selfishness or favoritism (Off. .–, –, –). For his concept of utile, see Long , . § . practitioners of wisdom train in true courage. Like any virtue, courage must be practiced. Indeed, such training must begin at an early age, if we are to “overcome the terrors and fears that assail us” (Plato, Leg. c; cf. Protag. b; Gorg. c; Xenophon, Ages. .; Isocrates, Panath. ; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Plutarch, Rom. .; Philo, Mos. .; Spec. .). As Konstan (, ) observes, “Philo appears here simply to reduce courage to wisdom, eliminating the element of danger that gives courage its specific quality.” To be sure, that element becomes explicit only later, during the discussion of martial courage (e.g., §§ , ), though in §  he will characterize illness and other conditions difficult to endure as a kind of threatening adversary. ignorance, an illness hard to cure. Presumably this is because it besets the soul rather than the body; cf. Leg. .; Prob. ; Plato, Tim. b; Hipp. min. a; and on § . PCW . replaces μααν in the mss with μα7α. The ignorance of those trained in false courage contrasts with both the wisdom just mentioned and the knowledge that informs true courage in § . courage falsely named . . . recklessness. Philo was familiar with Aristotle’s definition of courage as a mean between cowardice and recklessness (Eth. nic. ..; Eth. eud. ..); see Deus ; Ebr. –; Spec. .; Praem. ; cf. Plutarch, Virt. mor. a. The reckless man demonstrates a deficiency of fear and an excess of confidence when facing fearful

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situations, though in fact he is an imposter, pretending to courage he does not possess (Eth. nic. ..–; Eth. eud. ..). For the distinction between courage and recklessness, see also § ; Det. , ; Josephus, Bell. .; cf. Plato, Lach. b, c; Leg. b; Ps.-Plato, Def. a. As Cassius Dio notes, reckless actions often lead men to their own destruction (Hist. rom. ..; ..). in the case of coins . . . the counterfeit is a likeness of the true type. Cf. Det. ; Conf. ; Congr. . Dishonorable people were sometimes called “counterfeit” or “falsely struck,” e.g., Aristophanes, Acharn. –; Euripides, Med. –; Plutarch, Adul. am. b. On the forging of coins in the ancient world, see Jones , –. As Colson (PLCL .) points out, the εGναι that must be supplied to make sense of this clause could have easily fallen out after 1μφ!ρειαν. (a) § . difficult to endure. For Philo’s understanding of courage as knowledge of what is to be endured, see on § ; cf. also Mut. ; Mos. .. poverty and disgrace and impairment and various types of illnesses. The topics to be discussed in what follows are announced: poverty (§§ b–), disgrace (§ ), impairment (§ –), and illness (§§ –). For their relationship to courage, see Plato, Lach. d–e (with Schmid , –), quoted above in the Analysis/General comments. All four were included in Stoic lists of rejected δι,φορα, along with death, pain, ugliness, low birth, and so forth (e.g., Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. ., ; cf. SVF .–; Barney ). Such conditions can burden the soul, making it difficult for it to manifest its virtues (Conf. , ; Sobr. ). Aristotle acknowledges that individuals who face circumstances such as disgrace, poverty, and disease without fear are sometimes referred to as courageous, though only by analogy, insofar as the one who does so “bears some resemblance to the courageous man in that the courageous man also is a fearless person” (Eth. nic. ..). By the same token, the broader scope adopted by Philo for delineating the types of formidable things that the courageous will face bravely reflects the same general criteria used by Aristotle for defining “danger” (τ φοβερν) in Eth. eud. ..–: such things appear likely to cause pain of the destructive kind and they are close at hand. those of little understanding. In Or. .–, Dio Chrysostom argues that a misfortune like illness, financial setback, or the loss of one’s reputation is not in itself a cause for fear, rather “it is only false opinion and weakness on our part that make it so.” Unfortunately, in responding to

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such reversals the great majority of people (cf. the “multitudes” of § ) demonstrate a state of mind much like that of a child bent on touching a flame even though it causes great pain. those possessed of prudence. Referring to the practitioners of wisdom described in the preceding paragraph. The subsequent discussion will show how φρνησις informs acts of courage in both peacetime (§ , cf. § ) and wartime (§ ). As Malherbe () has shown, philosophers often likened prudence to a weapon or defense against vice; cf. Leg. .– ; Prob. . to strive against these things. Dio Chrysostom boasts of his moral superiority over both athletes (cf. Fort. ) and warriors, since the antagonists he has vanquished are indeed “many and mighty,” namely, poverty, exile, and disgrace, not to mention anger, pain, fear, and pleasure (Or. .). (b) not the wealth that is blind, but that which sees. Greek mythology conceived of the god Plutus as blind since he was thought to give wealth away indiscriminately, rather than to those who deserved it, e.g., Aristophanes, Plut. –; Plato, Leg. c; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; Plutarch, Quaest. conv. b. In the Philonic corpus, “sighted” wealth refers to the riches of virtue in the soul, as opposed to material wealth, which is “blind” to the former. See on Hum. . Just as the highest of the senses is the sight of the eyes, the highest faculty of the soul’s governing part is the “sight” of the mind, which in Abr.  is identified as φρνησις (see above; also see on §§ – and Paen. ). In the present context, sighted wealth is shown to have two aspects, the wealth bestowed by nature (§§ –) and the wealth bestowed by wisdom (§§ –). § . who collapse like exhausted athletes. On Philo’s athletic metaphors, see Pfitzner , –; Harris , –. For the language here, cf. Congr. ; Plutarch, Luc. .; also Dio Chrysostom, Or. ., mentioned above. the unfailing wealth of nature. The contrast Philo makes in §§ – is found also in Epicurus, Rat. sent.  (apud Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .): “The wealth of nature is both limited and easy to procure; but that of vain opinions drifts off to boundlessness” (cf. Plutarch, Adol. poet. aud. a; Cupid. divit. e–f). Similarly, in Somn. . the wealth enjoyed by the athlete (see above) of noble pursuits (i.e., food and clothing) contrasts with the wealth of humankind’s vain opinions, which is treasured by “every man who is effeminate and emasculated” (cf. on § ; also Mos. .). The former is superior because, being equally available to all, it exemplifies the principle of justice, while the desire to acquire

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wealth breeds its opposite (Contempl. ; cf. Somn. .). In the current context, nature’s wealth consists of air, water, and food, while in Mos. . it is these three plus fire, and in Praem. – it is food, water, clothing, and shelter (cf. Abr. ; Mos. .; Spec. .; Praem. ); those who are satisfied with these things learn to practice thrift (see on § ) and self-restraint. For Aristotle, by contrast, wealth κατC φ:σιν is wealth which is generated within a household, rather than that which is acquired through buying and selling (Pol. ..). In the Hellenistic world, the Cynics in particular advertised their contentment with “the simplest fare” as a sign of their freedom and self-sufficiency (e.g., Ps.Socrates, Ep. .; cf. Billerbeck ; Desmond , –; Finn , –). For more de victu simplici, see Somn. .–; SVF .–; Vischer , –. bounteous springs and rivers fed not by winter torrents alone but also by native streams. As “the oldest and most fertile of mothers,” the earth is equipped “with flowing rivers and springs like breasts, so that it might both water the plants and provide a bounteous supply of drink for all living things” (Opif. ). According to Aristotle, the bodily condition of a living being depends upon the blend it intakes of air, food, and especially water, “since this is what we take most of, water being present as nourishment in everything” (Gen. anim. .; cf. Theophrastus, Caus. plant. ..). for food the fruits of all sorts of crops. For the gifts that nature bestows on the farmer for the production of food, see on Hum. ; cf. §§ , . That the world’s crops were provided for the benefit of humankind was a Stoic tenet, e.g., Cicero, Nat. d. .: “Then the earth, teeming with grain and vegetables of various kinds, which she pours forth in lavish abundance—does she appear to give birth to this produce for the sake of the wild beasts or for the sake of men? What shall I say of the vines and olives, whose bounteous and delightful fruits do not concern the lower animals at all? In fact the beasts of the field are entirely ignorant of the arts of sowing and cultivating . . . all these products are both enjoyed and tended by men.” For more on the Stoics’ teleological anthropocentrism, see the Analysis/General comments for §§ – and –. everyone everywhere enjoys them in great abundance. A more realistic picture is painted in Opif. , where Philo acknowledges how difficult the necessities of life are to obtain; farmers must labor hard and continuously, battling the forces of nature to obtain even a meager crop. § . the wealth . . . of vain opinions. Cf. on § . relying on what is blind. Cf. on § .

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their guide. Plutus is depicted as a blind leader in Aristophanes, Plut. –; Plato, Resp. b; etc. For the motif of the blind guide, cf. Xenophon, Mem. ..; T. Reub. :; Matt :; :, ; Luke :; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .. § . the guard of the body. In Conf. , the δορυφροι that protect the body are not the gifts of nature, but “wealth, reputation, and honors, which keep it erect and lift it up high and demonstrate its pride” (cf. Ebr. –; Her. ). theories of logic, ethics, and natural science. This threefold division of philosophical doctrine originated with Zeno and was embraced by most Stoics (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .–; cf. Plutarch, Quaest. conv. d; Stoic. repugn. a; Long and Sedley , .–). Their comparison of philosophy to a field, with logic being the encircling fence, natural science the trees, and ethics the crop, is followed by Philo at Agr.  and Mut. –. He expounds on their respective functions in Spec. .: “the logical for accurate interpretation, the ethical for the improvement of character, the natural for knowledge of heaven and the universe.” Cf. Leg. .; Ebr. . contentedness and thrift. Philo pairs εκολα and Hλιγδεια similarly in Prob. , and links both with the more common concept of 1γκρ,τεια (for which see on Hum. ) in Spec. .; .; cf. Mos. .; Praem. ; Hypoth. .. Such qualities contribute to the self-sufficiency (see on § ) that enables one to face life’s vicissitudes with equanimity, e.g., Teles, frg. . (περ αταρκεας): “So if I show you two old men, two poor men, two exiles, one of whom is quite content and tranquil while the other is in total turmoil, isn’t it obvious that it is not old age, not poverty, not lack of citizenship that should be blamed but something else?” Cf. Plutarch, Cohib. ira c: “We must accustom the body to contentedness by plain living and self-sufficiency, for those who need but little are not disappointed with much.” Further, Wilson , . befitting its assimilation to God. For Philo’s 1ξομοωσις doctrine and its relation to the telos of Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic thought, see on Hum. . There, assimilation to God entails imitating divine beneficence, while here the goal is a god-like self-sufficiency; cf. Clement of Alexandria, Paed. ... In Leg. c–d, Plato had associated assimilation to the divine with becoming moderate and temperate (cf. Alcinous, Epit. .), though for closer parallels we must turn to texts demonstrating Pythagorean influence, e.g., Sent. Pythag. : “The one who truly lives like (2μοως) God is the one who is self-sufficient (2 ατ,ρκης) and without property and a philosopher and regards not to need anything,

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even necessities, as the greatest wealth.” Cf. Ps.-Ecphantus, Regn. .– (with Blumenfeld , –); Sent. Sext. ; Porphyry, Abst. ..; ..–. § . completely sufficient in himself. God lacks nothing and needs nothing (Det. ; Spec. .), being “in himself all-sufficient for himself ” (Cher. ; cf. Decal. ), as evidenced especially by the act of creation (e.g., Opif. ; Decal. ). God therefore “needs nothing of anything created” (Spec. ., cf. .) like food (Plant. ); cf. Plato, Tim. e; Aristotle, Mag. mor. ..–; Josephus, Ant. .; C. Ap. .; Acts :; Seneca, Ep. .–. ravenous and insatiable desire. The provisions of the Mosaic law serve to check such cravings, e.g., Spec. .–. desire, which he fans and stirs like a fire. Like a fire, desire can devour the entire body (Spec. .). For the imagery, cf. also Opif. ; Agr. ; Ios. ; Mos. .; Spec. ., . the good man is in want of little, standing on the boundary between immortal and mortal nature. In many respects, achieving self-sufficiency constituted “the general philosophy of the Greek world” (Ferguson , , cf. –; Wilson , , , –), e.g., Xenophon, Mem. ..: “to have no wants is divine; to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme.” For Philo, the preeminent embodiment of such an ideal was Moses, who perhaps more than anyone else eschewed material wealth as blind (cf. on § ), honoring and pursuing instead the wealth of nature (cf. on § ), which included practicing self-restraint in his habits of food and dress. Because he excelled in this regard, “God judged him worthy to appear as a partner of God’s own possessions, putting into his hands the whole world as a portion well suited for his heir” (Mos. .–). At the same time, it has to be conceded that even one who disdains the necessities of life and practices abstinence in such a way is compelled by nature to consume some food and drink, that is, enough to survive (Leg. .). (c) § . against disgrace they pit glory. The second foe to be overcome (cf. § ) is disgrace (δοξα). The status of the sage in the world of human affairs will not be one of good repute, the praise upon which this depends often being debased by flattery, but one of glory (εIκλεια), since this derives from the truth (Sobr. ) and virtue (Abr. ; cf. Xenophon, Mem. ..). Similarly, the soldiers picked for Moses’ army achieve glory through a form of “noble” courage unacknowledged by the masses (§ ,

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cf. §§ –). This contrasts with the scheme of the Midianite women in § , who hope to convert the disgrace attending their shameful actions into glory by luring the Israelites away from their faith. excellence of character. Given its “well-established class connotations” (Hobbs , ), it is not surprising that καλοκγαα figures prominently in Philo’s discussion of nobility; see on Nob.  (it is paired with andreia in Plutarch, Marc. .). Later we will learn that cowardice prevails among the “lowborn” (γεννεAς, § ), while the best soldiers are of noble descent (εγενεAς, § ). throngs of thoughtless persons. The fickle crowds pour out praise and blame indiscriminately (Spec. .), but those trained in courage resist being carried away by their folly: “Some people suppose that what the many deem right is lawful and just, even if it is the height of lawlessness. But they do not judge well, for it is good to follow nature, and the rush of the crowd is inimical to nature’s leadership” (Spec. .–). Philo betrays similarly elitist attitudes elsewhere in the treatise, e.g., §§ , , ; cf. Ebr. ; Mos. .; Flacc. ; Legat. ; and often. Likewise, in Plato’s Respublica, the majority of the people misunderstand and mistrust the philosopher-rulers even though they are the only ones who have been properly trained in courage as well as the other virtues (e– a, d–d). Cf. Cicero, Off. .: “true and philosophical greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which nature most aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among the great.” The few vs. the many motif figures in Philo’s description of military courage as well, e.g., Fort. . Further, Roskam , –; Wilson , . (d) § . impairment of the senses. As the reader soon learns, when discussing the third foe against which the prudent demonstrate courage, Philo has principally π=ρωσις Hφαλμν in mind, for which see Praem. ; Plutarch, Quaest. conv. c. prudence, the mightiest of our attributes. Mosaic soldiers will be required to demonstrate φρνησις as well (Fort. ); cf. Paen. . providing as it does eyes for the mind. Physical sight was frequently employed in antiquity as a metaphor for spiritual or intellectual perception as, for example, in Plato’s parable of the cave (Resp. a–a). Such imagery would have lent itself especially to thinkers who embraced some form of an extramission theory of vision, which emphasized sight’s active, penetrating qualities (see below). The verb 1νομματω, one of the verba

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Philonica, is applied variously to the intellect, the mind, or the soul (Ebr. ; Mut. , ; Somn. .; cf. Plato, Resp. b–c). For similar imagery, see Migr. ; Congr. ; Spec. .. § . the latter gaze upon the surfaces of visible objects, requiring light from an external source to do so. Philo is indebted to Plato’s intromission-extramission theory of vision, according to which a beam of light issuing from the observer’s eye coalesces with light from the sun and in this manner encounters emanations from external objects (e.g., Tim. b–d; Theaet. d–e; Lindberg , –; Turnbull ). In Abr. , for instance, the Alexandrian explains how human sight joins (1νομιλεA) with light coming either from earthly fires or from the heavens “and through both it strikes against (προσβ,λλει) visible objects so as to apprehend them” (cf. Post. ; Plant. ; Ebr. ; Mut. ; Abr. ; Schmidt , –). It is from this perspective that the use of καταλαμβ,νω and Hξυωπα in Fort. – can be appreciated, sight being construed as a process of actively “seizing” and “piercing” external realities (Marcus , ). the mind penetrates even through the depth of material objects . . . inspecting the nature of incorporeal realities as well. While physical eyes can observe only outward surfaces, “the eye of the mind penetrates within, and going deep obtains a clear view of what is hidden inside” (Post. ). Such vision extends beyond the world of sense-perception, as we learn in Opif. : what the intellect is to the soul, the eye is to the body, “for each of them sees, one the objects of thought, the other the objects of perception. The intellect has need of science to gain knowledge of the incorporeal realities; the eye has need of light to gain apprehension of bodies.” Because the eye of the soul is “so translucent, so pure, so keen of vision,” it alone is allowed to look upon God (Conf. ). Further, Plant. ; Ebr. ; Migr. . it possesses all the sharp-sightedness of an eye, but without requiring any external light. While the eyes of the body depend on the cooperation of some external light source to function (cf. Plato, Resp. d– d), “what the soul sees, it sees through itself without the assistance of anything else. For the conceptions of the mind are a light unto themselves” (Mut. ; cf. Deus ). In this it is like the eye of God himself, which “needs no other light to effect perception” (Cher. ). For νου φωτς, cf. Plutarch, Adol. poet. aud. e. itself a star and practically a replica and copy of the heavenly bodies. Given the widespread belief in intraocular light, it is not surprising that comparisons were frequently drawn between the eyes and the heavenly

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bodies (Allison , –). Philo’s focus here, however, is on the human intellect, which in its activity may be likened to the stars, each of which he held to be not only a living being, but mind in its purest form (e.g., Opif. ; Det. ; Gig. ; Her. ; Somn. .; Spec. .). Therefore each person “bears about within himself like images numerous star-like beings, namely, arts and sciences and noble theories corresponding to each virtue” (Opif. ; cf. on Hum. ). Elsewhere Philo likens the mind to the sun, for example, Post. : “For as the sun, when it has risen, shows clearly the objects hidden by night, so the mind sending forth its own light causes all bodies and matters to be clearly apprehended” (cf. Leg. .; .; Plant. ; Her. ; Somn. .). (e) § . illnesses of the body. The last of the four difficult-to-endure scenarios announced in §  is discussed in §§ –. the soul’s health lies in a proper arrangement of its faculties, highspiritedness, desire, and reason. As Philo had asserted in § , if the soul is healthy one may act courageously, even if the body is worn out by sickness or old age (cf. § ). One of the principal threats to this health is cowardice, a malady that leaves the soul incapacitated, a state far worse than that created by any physical illness (§ , cf. § ). For health as a state of εκρασα, cf. Cicero, Tusc. .; Plutarch, Virt. vit. b; SVF .. This is closely related to Plato’s argument in Gorg. b–d that for the soul to be healthy it must achieve a certain organization (τ,ξις) and order (κσμος), a state represented by the virtues of justice and s¯ophrosyn¯e (see below; cf. Resp. e). Philo expounds on the Platonic theory of the tripartition of the soul into λγος, υμς, and 1πιυμα (e.g., Tim. c–b; Resp. d–e; Irwin , –) perhaps most fully in Leg. .–. The first of these faculties, since it is sovereign, is located in the head, its particular virtue being prudence. The second, located in the chest, has as its virtue courage, while the third is placed furthest from the mind in the abdomen, its virtue being moderation. The virtue of justice is realized when reason exercises control over the other two (cf. Leg. .– ; Conf. ; Migr. –; Spec. .–; .–; Runia , – ). steering each of the others like horses that refuse the reins. In Plato’s myth of the chariot (Phaedr. a–b, c–e), only one of the horses is bad and undisciplined. The other is actually a lover of s¯ophrosyn¯e (see below) and responds willingly to the charioteer’s attempts at selfcontrol (cf. Ferrari , –, –). In Philo’s appropriation of the equine imagery, υμς, the seat of anger (e.g., Leg. ., , , ; cf. Plato, Resp. e), is paired with desire as representing the restive,

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unreasoning faculties of the soul that reason must rein in; cf. Leg. .– ; ., ; Sacr. ; Mos. .–; Spec. .; and on Hum. , . Further, Méasson ; Reydams-Schils . § . The particular name of this health is “secure thinking,” because it provides security for the part in us that thinks. As North (a, ) observes, Plato sometimes employed health metaphors to describe s¯ophrosyn¯e, e.g., Charm. a; Gorg. b–d. For Philo, it is through s¯ophrosyn¯e that the soul is healed and cured, in particular of its harmful desires (Leg. ., cf. .; .; .; Spec. .–; Gnom. Epict. ; North a, –). The explanation here is based on the etymological analysis offered in Plato, Crat. e: σωφροσ:νη is the preservation (σωτηρα) of prudence (φρνησις); cf. Ebr. ; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..– . This contrasts with the specious self-control of the Midianite women in Fort. . washed away by the rush of the passions. For the imagery, cf. Somn. .; Fort. ; and especially Mut. : the one who practices courage “is not swept down by any rush of the swirling waters, but can breast the strong current of riches and stem the tide of pleasure’s ceaseless urge.” As we hear in Fort. , only men who are not susceptible to passions are acceptable as recruits for the Mosaic army. (a) § . inscribed in many places of our legislation. What Philo has provided up to this point in the subtreatise is best described as general priorities or objectives relating to courage, which he now imputes to the law. The summarizing statement in §  introduces a pair of examples, the first coming in §§ – and the second in §§ –. persuading the obedient more gently, the disobedient more strictly. The effective moral guide follows a “mixed” method of exhortation, adapting his pedagogical approach to suit the disposition of the learner, obedient students receiving mild forms of instruction like praise and encouragement, recalcitrant students receiving more stringent forms like censure and correction; see Glad , –. This approach could be embraced by legislators as well, as Plato explains in Leg. b: “The laws’ method will be partly persuasion and partly (when they have to deal with characters that defy persuasion) compulsion and chastisement” (cf. b–c). Similar observations are made about Moses’ law in Hum. ; Praem. . to scorn things pertaining to the body and appearance. This thought effectively summarizes much of the preceding discussion. The concern of the truly courageous is not with bodily needs (these being easily met by

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nature’s bounty since through philosophy they have learned contentedness) or with public recognition (since the opinions of the masses are to be disregarded as inspired by thoughtless, shameful motives), but with the health of the soul, assimilation to God, and the comprehension of immaterial realities. For this use of καταφρον!ω, cf. Deus . (b) § . simplicity. The Stoic sage is τυφος because “he is indifferent to good or evil report” (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .), while the Cynic philosopher exhibits the same quality because he adheres to “a way of life that is inexpensive and frugal” (Teles, frg. ., cf. .; Finn , ). As Colson (PLCL .–) notes, Philo’s use of τυφα combines elements of both of these. On some occasions, it is set in opposition to τ(φος, “vanity” (Somn. .–, ; Nob. ), including the vanity of idolatry (Spec. .; Paen. ; cf. Cher. ), the vanity of ο?ησις, “conceit” (Congr. ; Mos. .), and the vanity of φιλοδοξα, “vaingloriousness” (Abr. , ). Such usage needs to be read in light of the broader critique of τ(φος in the Exposition, e.g., Decal. –, where it describes the sort of extravagant arrogance that engenders both human conflicts and contempt towards the divine; cf. Plutarch, Adol. poet. aud. b, d; Rect. rat. aud. b. Elsewhere, τυφα is used to describe those who eschew the pursuit of wealth and fame, embracing instead “penury . . . and a strict and solitary mode of life” (Fug. , cf. ; Somn. .; Praem. ). Such a life is modeled by both the Essenes, who practice frugality and contentment (Prob. ), and the Therapeutae, who are content with simple forms of food, clothing, and shelter (Contempl. –). Given the immediate context (see on § ), Philo’s comments in Ebr.  (on Exod :) may best approximate the meaning here: “For those of us who have made up our mind to stand near the camp of the body take their place with vanity and its followers, while those who desire to behold the spectacle and strive to see things incorporeal, being practitioners of simplicity, make it their habit to dwell as far from the body as possible.” weaving and stringing together the references which seem to lie scattered in different places. This is actually a fair description of the method Philo follows in his exposition of the law in De specialibus legibus and De virtutibus. See part  of the Introduction. I see no need to repeat myself. PCW . corrects δικαιν (S) and δκαιον (ceteri) to δικαι. Cf. Spec. .. § . the books preceding these. Most likely a reference to De specialibus legibus – (see below). In lieu of το:των, A reads το:του, while Cohn (PCW .) conjectures τα:της, which, as Royse (, ) observes, would accord with Philo’s usage elsewhere, e.g., Ebr. .

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everything said about simplicity. Philo refers to laws promoting simplicity in Decal. , but without giving any specifics. Presumably he has in mind those provisions of the law that discourage τ(φος, e.g., Spec. .–; .; .. (c) § . it legislates even concerning what sorts of clothes ought to be worn. Having just argued that those trained in Mosaic courage scorn externals and things of the body (§ ), Philo might be questioned for introducing as his second piece of evidence a provision that focuses on physical appearance. Given the emphasis on τυφα (§§ –), it might have been more apropos for him to discuss the importance of simplicity in dress, as in Somn. .–; Mos. .; Spec. .; Prob. ; Contempl. ; Hypoth. . (and note the negative example set by the Midianite women in Fort. ). At any rate, the subject of gender transgression creates an apt segue to the section on wartime courage in §§ –. Gender-specific dress codes (often intended to discourage adultery and prostitution) were not unheard of in the Greco-Roman world, e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. .; Plutarch, Sol. .; Athenaeus, Deipn. b (quoted below); Ogden . One of the aspects of the ideal polity laid out in Zeno’s Republic that made it so controversial was the requirement that “men and women wear the same dress” (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; cf. Schofield , , ). strictly forbidding a man to assume a woman’s dress. The LXX of Deut : is a fairly literal rendering of the Hebrew original: “A man’s accoutrements (σκε:η) shall not be on a woman, neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment (στολ=ν), because everyone doing these things is an abomination to the Lord your God.” Since σκε(ος can refer to equipment as well as attire, it is possible that what is being prohibited in the first clause includes articles such as weapons (Wevers , ). In this regard it is noteworthy that Josephus restricts the prohibition of transvestitism to the battlefield (Ant. .; cf. b. Naz. a; Sifre Deut. ; Tg. Onq. Deut :). He also knows stories of male warriors disguising themselves as women in order to effect an escape (Ant. .; cf. Plutarch, Aet. Rom. Graec. d) or looters wearing women’s apparel and makeup in order to effect “an excess of lasciviousness” (Bell. .–; further, Edwards ). Seeing how cross-dressing could have various social connotations in antiquity, it is impossible to be certain what specific situation(s), if any, the biblical text was intended to address. Perhaps it is best interpreted together with provisions forbidding other types of “mixtures” thought

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to engender ritual impurity by transgressing social boundaries (Nelson , –; cf. Römer ; Harland ). Philo’s interpretation shows no interest in ritual matters, focusing instead on the perceived violation of nature (see below). § . the physical forms of a man and a woman are dissimilar. As Runia notes, for Philo female bodies differ from their male counterparts not only with respect to their “patent physical and biological differences,” but also in that “the female nature (i.e. primarily her soul) is more affected by bodily and physical matters” (, ); further, Baer , –; Wegner ; Winston . to one a domestic, to the other a civic life has been allotted . . . in conformity with nature. Xenophon, expressing the dominant cultural view, similarly grounds the polarization of sex roles in differences determined by physis: “the god, it seems to me, made nature accordingly: the woman’s for indoor occupations and the man’s for outdoor ones. He made the body and spirit of the man more able to overcome cold, heat, travel, and military service. Thus he assigned him the outdoor occupations. Since he endowed the woman by nature with a body less able to overcome the rigors of cold, heat, travel, and military service, the god seems to me to have assigned to her the indoor tasks” (Oec. .–). Philo is similarly consistent in adamantly rejecting the confusion of what he sees as natural spheres of activity, e.g., Sacr. : “If women were to imitate the habits of men, or if men were to attempt those of women, such manly women and womanly men would bring ill repute upon themselves.” In particular, women are not to have any role in public life, e.g., Spec. . (cf. .– ): “Marketplaces and council halls and law courts and gatherings and meetings where a large number of people are assembled, and outdoor life with full scope for words and actions—in war and peace these are suitable for men, while housekeeping and staying only in the home is suitable for women.” (For the suggestion that Spec. .– is possibly an interpolation from De fortitudine, see PAPM .–.) in conformity with nature and findings of good judgment. In the realm of human decision-making, nature and judgment (γν8μη) could be understood as opposed forces (e.g., Plutarch, Virt. mor. a); this provision of Moses’ law accords with both. The goal of living in conformity with nature was a Stoic concept (e.g., Epictetus, Diatr. ..; ..; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; Marcus Aurelius, Med. ..; cf. Ebr. ; Spec. .; Prob. ; etc.). For the role of γν8μη in matters of conduct, see Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..–. According to Philo, the γν8μη of nature surpasses that of humankind because it always accords with justice (Spec.

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.). The most direct route to righteousness, then, is to willingly incline one’s judgment to the laws and statutes of nature (Somn. .). § . to have no indication of unmanliness. On more than one occasion Cicero castigates Roman magistrates for wearing womanish clothing (e.g., Har. resp. –; Cat. .); while the type of clothing varies, what the subjects of the orator’s vitriol all have in common is that “they disregarded revered traditions and endangered Rome’s authority and reputation” (Heskel , ). Indeed, one of the most obvious ways in which a man might appear to lose a grip on his masculine identity was “by indulging in an excessive focus on his appearance or making himself look like a woman” (Williams , ), which could include “wearing loose, colorful, feminine clothing (including the mitra or Eastern-style turban)” (Williams , ; e.g., Virgil, Aen. .–; Seneca, Ep. .; Aulus Gellius, Noct. att. ..–; ..–; Athenaeus, Deipn. c). For a man to have a dream in which he wears a woman’s clothes is auspicious only for bachelors and actors; for all others it portends either the loss of one’s wife or severe illness, since “those who wear such garments are delicate and weak” (Artemidorus, Onir. .). According to Seneca, Contr. .., it is especially disgraceful for a man of authority to perform his official duties in women’s clothing. Such sartorial self-indulgence was thought to signal one’s incapacity in the face of temptation and an excessive, womanly interest in sex (Edwards , –). As evidence that he had been “bewitched” by Cleopatra, for example, it was said of Antony that he “sometimes wore an oriental dagger at his belt, dressed in a manner not in accordance with the customs of his native land, and let himself be seen even in public upon a gilded couch” (Cassius Dio, Hist. rom. ..–; cf. Plutarch, Ant. –). The Syracusans went so far as to establish a law prohibiting a man from adopting “a fancy and conspicuous mode of dress unless he confessed to being an adulterer or a kinaidos” (Athenaeus, Deipn. b). § . forbade her to assume a man’s dress . . . guarding against the manly woman. In Greek literature and art, female hunters and warriors are usually depicted as adopting the “male” patterns of outfit necessary for such activities (short, sleeveless tunic, boots, weapons; see Parisinou ). Females so dressed (Artemis, Atalanta, etc.) represent marginal, transitional, or dangerous figures: “the wearing of men’s clothes may signal that the wearers are manlike women, creatures on the boundaries between male and female life, or in other ways abnormal” (Veness , ; cf. the more practical approach endorsed by Plato, Leg. e–a, b–c).

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

In keeping with their male patterns of dress and usurping of male roles, the Amazons, the classic example of female gender/societal inversion, display sexual aggressiveness, shun patriarchal marriage, and worship savage, barbarian gods (Tyrrell , –; Veness ). Strabo’s incredulity at such a civilization would have been typical: “Who could believe that an army or city or nation of women could be organized without men? . . . It is tantamount to saying that the men of that day were women, and the women were men” (Geogr. ..). In Roman society, prostitutes and women divorced for promiscuity wore a toga, the traditional symbol of the male Roman citizen, because “such women were believed to behave like men, that is, in their promiscuous actions” (Heskel , ). On the toga muliebris, see McGinn , –, – . As he shows, the establishment of standards for women’s dress was “a problem of some urgency in the Augustan period” (, ).

Parallel Exegesis This is the only sustained treatment of courage in the Philonic corpus, though isolated statements (especially Spec. .–; see on § ) anticipate the discussion here. Courage is the knowledge of what is to be endured (Leg. .; Mut. ; Spec. .; for the association with endurance, see also Deus ; Mut. ; Mos. .), the opposite of cowardice (Leg. .; Abr. ; Prob. ), or the mean between cowardice and recklessness (Deus ; Ebr. –; Spec. .; Praem. ). It enables one to resist bribes (Migr. ), the follies of the multitude (Spec. .– , quoted under § ), and anything that might undermine the soul’s stability (Conf. ; cf. §  above). It is not surprising, then, that it is a desideratum even for civil magistrates (Spec. .; cf. on § ). One of the chief threats to the cultivation of this virtue is pederasty, since it inflicts the soul with “the disease of effeminacy” (cf. §§ – above), turning its victim into “a hybrid of man and woman” (cf. §§ – above), blind to all pressing matters, both public and private (Contempl. –; cf. Mut. ).

Nachleben The portion of the Stromata which borrows from De virtutibus opens with a claim familiar from elsewhere in Clement’s writings, namely, that the Mosaic law is the source of Greek moral philosophy (for this theme

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see Lilla , –; Droge , –; cf. on Hum. ): “So it is clear that the other virtues delineated in Moses supplied the Greeks with the starting point of their whole ethical system” (..). This pertains specifically to the four virtues of the Platonic canon, to which is added a second tetrad (καρτερα, Dπομον=, σεμντης, 1γκρ,τεια) and, stationed above them all, eusebeia. The ensuing segment (..–..) dilates on the last of these with material drawn from Fort. – (see the Nachleben for Fort. –) and a catena of scripture quotations (Prov :; Isa :; :; Prov :; :; :), into which one of the Pythagorean akousmata (“Do not overstep the balance.”) has been inserted (..; for such sayings, see Thom ). There follows a programmatic section (for some reason left unexamined by van den Hoek , –) explaining the meaning and relationship of the virtues (..–..). Courage is defined as knowledge (1πιστ=μη) of what things do and do not cause terror (cf. Fort. ), s¯ophrosyn¯e as the proclivity to make choices which “save the judgments of wisdom” (σ<8ζουσαν τC τ$ς φρον=σεως κρματα; ..a; cf. Fort. ). Both of these are then linked with καρτερα, Dπομον=, and 1γκρ,τεια, “since these virtues follow one another,” and individuals who possess one of them possess them all (..b–..; cf. Fort. , ). This is paired with a similarly programmatic section (..–..) indicating that the means by which such individuals have acquired the virtues is by following God, imitating the divine, and assimilating themselves to the Lord (= Christ?), reflecting Philo’s language of 1ξομοωσις in Fort. . Clement supplements Philo’s point that God is in need of nothing (Fort. ) with the observation that God also “suffers nothing,” drawing on the Stoic concept of π,εια so as to underscore the dominance of 1γκρ,τεια over the π,η as the specific process for approximating the divine nature (..). The section concludes with a statement on the Hλιγοδε=ς of the good man that follows the first half of the last sentence of Fort.  rather closely, though in Clement this quality is explained as a further accomplishment of 1γκρ,τεια, while in Philo it is the manifestation of a soul that desires immortality. This segues rather awkwardly into a section paraphrasing Philo’s exegesis of Deut : in Fort.  and . Clement adheres closely to Philo’s formulation of the statute itself (πειπεAν . . . νδρ γυναικς μπεχνην ναλαμβ,νειν), noting that it teaches men to avoid effeminacy not only in their personal presence, but also in their actions, thoughts, and words (..; cf. Fort. ). As van den Hoek (, ) observes, rather than following the observation in his source that such a provision accords with nature (cf. John Chrysostom, In epist. i ad Cor. ..–), Clement then curiously adapts a

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fragment from Fort. : for Philo the “true” man ought to behave in a manly fashion, while for Clement it is the man who devotes himself to “truth” who does so (..). Clement then reintroduces the virtues of Dπομον= and καρτερα, linking them, as he does elsewhere, with martyrdom; cf. Strom. ..–; ..; etc. Elsewhere in the early church, Deut : was cited in condemnations of stage actors and pantomimes, e.g., Tertullian, Spect. .; Cyprian, Epist. ..–. Further reading: Hobbs ; Konstan ; Rosen and Sluiter ; Wilson a.

ON COURAGE CHAPTERS 5–8 COURAGE IN WARTIME (§§ 22–50)

Analysis/General Comments Complementing the discourse on peacetime courage (see the Analysis/General comments on §§ –) is an exposition of Mosaic andreia as exhibited in wartime, which is divided into two major parts. The first part reviews the law’s regulations governing the selection of military recruits (§§ –), while the second offers an historical exemplum of how an army thus constituted succeeds in combat (§§ –). A principal idea for both parts is that for a soldier to excel on the battlefield, his soul as well as his body must be in good condition, his reasoning ability undistracted by any desire or passion (see especially §§ , – , –, ). This emphasis corresponds with one of the major features (namely, s¯ophrosyn¯e) that had been attributed in the previous section to civilian courage (§§ –). In making such a connection, Philo participates in prevailing analyses of the virtue. As Dionysius of Halicarnassus explained, the best defense that a nation can possess is men who are not only competent in matters of war, but also masters of their passions (Ant. rom. ..). Josephus exploits this notion in an apologetic context, asserting that the endurance that the followers of Moses learn from the law in resisting their desires makes them better fighters (C. Ap. .–). Both of these texts, in turn, reflect the philosophical argument that the realization of courage in its true or full sense depends on training in moderation. A good example of this can be found in the first book of Plato’s Leges, where the topic is expounded at some length. Philo’s section on wartime courage as a whole can be analyzed as follows. () A brief transitional statement provides the rationale for the treatise’s structure. Just as the events of human affairs can be divided into those of peacetime and those of wartime, the same can be said for the demonstration of a virtue like courage (§ ). Since the former has been adequately discussed, Philo now proceeds with the latter.

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(a) As a preliminary matter, he lays out the criteria followed when mustering a Mosaic army, beginning with the reasons for exemption from service, of which there are two. First, it is necessary to exclude the fainthearted (Deut :), since the cowardice that afflicts their souls is likely to infect the other soldiers and render them unmanly when entering the fray (§§ –). (b) Second, Deut :– dictates that further exemptions be granted to those who have recently built a house, planted a vineyard, or become betrothed. In Philo’s interpretation, these provisions were instituted for two reasons. On one hand, it would be inhumane to prevent a man from enjoying what he has just acquired. On the other hand, if such men were to be admitted to the army, they would be preoccupied by their longing for such enjoyment and become lax in the fulfillment of their duties (§§ –). (c) Philo concludes the section by stating that these criteria apply to the selection of officers as well as enlisted men (cf. Deut :), and by listing the positive qualifications for enrollment: the body must be healthy and agile, the soul possessed of valor, prudence, and the love of honor. A force composed of soldiers thus endowed, says Philo, will defeat any adversary, achieving even a bloodless victory in the process (§§ – ). () This claim is then substantiated with an exemplary historical tale drawn from Num  and . Stymied in their attempts to conquer the Israelites, and recognizing that the source of their strength is their common love of God, the leaders of Midian hatch a plot to dissolve the unity of their enemy by enlisting the aid of the Midianite women. Enticed by their beauty, the Israelite men will freely break the law and commit idolatry, bringing about their own downfall (§§ –). The women, lacking any sense of purity or propriety, readily give their consent to the plan and start prostituting themselves (§§ –). Divine punishment of the twenty-four thousand youths who subsequently fall prey to this ploy serves as a warning to the others and spurs a military reprisal on the part of the Israelites. Inspired by pious doctrines recited by their leader, a force consisting of a thousand warriors from each tribe annihilates the Midianite army and puts the guilty Midianite women to death (§§ –). As evidence of their divine support, it is observed that the Israelites won this astonishing victory without suffering a single casualty (§§ –). In contrast to the fuller version in Mos. .–, in recounting the story here Philo exhibits a disinclination to name any of its characters. In fact, Balaam, Balak, and Phinehas do not figure in the account at all,

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and even Moses warrants only passing mention (§ ). Instead, greater space is devoted to describing the consent, character, and appearance of the Midianite women (see §§ –). The result of these editorial moves is a narrative in which attention is drawn to the contrast and interplay between the actual fighting “forces.” The principal conflict is not between the respective nations’ leaders, but between the Midianite women with their feminine wiles and the pious courage of the Hebrew soldiers. () Finally, §§ – concludes De fortitudine as a whole, drawing on elements of Lev  and Deut . In times of both peace and war, those who “practice justice and holiness and the other virtues” are promised divine succor, the basis of human flourishing. This will be the case even if they are confronted by hosts of well-armed and well-equipped invaders. As we saw earlier, in its distinction between civil and martial aspects of courage, De fortitudine shares a basic conceptual and organizational device with the treatment of courage in Off. .– (especially .–). Unlike Philo, however, Cicero makes this distinction so as to demonstrate the superiority of one form of courage over the other. Without neglecting the topic of wartime courage altogether (see .–), he voices disagreement with those who think that the accomplishments of the general outweigh those of the statesman. He suggests instead that the latter’s contribution to the utilitas communis is not only more enduring but less likely to deteriorate into vain ambition for personal glory (.–; cf. Dyck , –). Philo, in contrast, shows no preference for one form over the other. Indeed, for him, excellence on the battlefield counts as essential proof of Mosaic courage. That military andreia is on a par with its civic counterpart can be seen in the way Philo develops another conceptual device familiar from De officiis, a principle that came to be known as the ντακολουα τν ρετν, according to which “the virtues imply one another, not only in the sense that he who has one has all, but also in the sense that he who performs any act in accordance with one does so in accordance with all” (Plutarch, Stoic. rep. e; cf. SVF .–). For Cicero, this entails demonstrating the interrelationship of courage with the other virtues of the traditional Platonic-Stoic tetrad, namely, justice (.–), wisdom (., , , –), and moderation (.–, , –; cf. .). Philo exposes the different facets of courage using a similar procedure, though with a different version of the canon, one encompassing besides courage, wisdom, and moderation, the virtues of philanthr¯opia (which Philo routinely aligns with justice, e.g., Abr. ; Decal. ; Spec. .; cf. Berthelot , –) and its counterpart, the “highest” of the virtues, eusebeia or hosiot¯es (see on Fort. ; Hum.

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). The analysis in De fortitudine is distinctive also in that it explores the nature of these relationships as they pertain to courage in both wartime and peacetime. In this regard, the extent of specific correspondences that the descriptions in §§ – exhibit with those in §§ – is noteworthy. To begin with, the explanation of how courage is informed by wisdom is applied by Philo to military as well as civilian affairs. The one who exhibits peacetime courage is not Hλιγφρων but wields φρνησις (§ , cf. §§ , , ), drawing on the power of his intellect (δι,νοια) to offer beneficial reasoning (λογισμς, §§ , ). Similarly, no one can be enrolled for military service who is Hλιγφρων (§ ), whose δι,νοια is distressed by external yearnings (§ ), or whose deficiencies might confuse the λογισμς of his fellow combatants (§ ). Rather the soul of each fighter must be full of φρνησις and λογισμς (§ ), receptive to divine counsel (§ ). As we have seen (cf. the Analysis/General comments for §§ –), Philo also draws a strong connection between courage and moderation. Those courageous in peacetime refrain from luxury and vanity, minimize their bodily needs, and hold every desire in check (§§ , , –). This engenders s¯ophrosyn¯e, which prevents the reasoning faculty from being “washed away” (κατακλ:ζεσαι) by the tide of the passions (§ ). Likewise, the military rolls include no one into whom any passion has found entry (§ ). Those who are misled by passion are punished as a lesson to others at risk of being similarly overwhelmed (κατακλυσ$ναι), as though by a torrent (§ ). The importance of humanity in the execution of courageous acts is also indicated. Exemplars of peacetime courage offer counsels of the highest public benefit (κοινωφελ!σταται; cf. Mos. .), advancing the common interests (τC κοιν,) of the state (§ ; note that Philo routinely links koin¯onia with philanthr¯opia; see on Hum. , ). The disposition of those enlisting for military service is also expected to be public spirited (κοινωνικς, § ). As Philo explains in § , the army benefits from the application of philanthr¯opia as a criterion in its formation, the law requiring the exemption of men with certain external commitments. In turn, the Israelite soldiers demonstrate humanity when they spare the Midianite maidens out of pity for their youthful innocence (§ ; cf. Hum. ). Finally, the case is made that courage can be properly understood only insofar as it is informed by the virtue of eusebeia or hosiot¯es. In peacetime, courage contributes to this state through a steadfast commitment to self-

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sufficiency, which facilitates the process of assimilation to God (§ ). In wartime, we learn that the Israelites are warriors in a battle on behalf of piety, and, as such, are enlivened by divine power. Indeed, what ultimately carries the day is the manifestation of God’s very self among the foremost ranks, furnishing dramatic evidence of the nation’s unique piety and divine favor (§ , cf. §§ , , –, –). The overall exposition, then, shows not only how Mosaic courage is constituted by the other virtues, but also how this defining quality applies equally to courage in both its forms. All the virtuous qualities that generate authentic andreia in peacetime are manifest in Mosaic soldiers as well. As I have argued elsewhere (Wilson a), Philo’s attention to this matter may reflect growing anxieties harbored among Roman elites during this time regarding the masculine identity of Roman soldiers, who as a group were thought to be not only uncultured, irreverent, and malicious in their comportment, but also especially susceptible to the infiltration of those “Eastern” vices that render a man soft and effeminate (e.g., Sallust, Bell. Cat. .–). Against this background, the patterns of description described above indicate that, by contrast, the moral standards enforced by the Mosaic law permeate Jewish society to such an extent that even its soldiers become paradigms of virtue. Wise, moderate, pious, and humane in their courage, they embody Mosaic dominance over the vice and sensuality of an “Eastern” power (see on § ). As such, their victory over Midian functions for Philo as a formative event in Israelite history—“a political mythology of victory” (Fears , )—of the same moral value and type as Augustus’ defeat of Antony and Cleopatra at Actium. Recasting civil conflict as an epic confrontation of civilizations, Augustan propaganda clarified the meaning of this victory by aligning Roman imperium with the virile and virtuous West, its enemies with the feminized, decadent East (e.g., Zanker , – ; Wyke ; Gurval , –). By subordinating himself to a woman, Antony personified the emasculated male who abandons ancestral customs and succumbs to his desire for sex and luxuries. Cleopatra, on the other hand, becomes an avatar of the promiscuous, extravagant female who usurps the social and political power that properly belongs to men. Augustan rule, meanwhile, is coded as emphatically male, its dominion over Eastern nations justified as an extension of the dominion real men ought to exercise over such gender deviants. This was the logic of a regime “in which Roman Order is re-established externally through the defeat of Cleopatra and internally through the re-domestication of women” (Keith , ).

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As we have already seen, Philo is careful to point out that the Mosaic law relegates women to the domestic sphere and requires men to defend their masculine identity against feminine “defilement” (see on §§ –). The contrariety of male and female as it pertains to andreia informs this section of De fortitudine as well, especially in its portrayal of the Midianite women. Indeed, we can surmise that it was a priority for Philo to construct an image of the women and their activities in which they function vis-à-vis the Israelites not only as an effective enemy but also as a perverse antitype, a moral inversion of Mosaic virtue. This is evident in the women’s contraposition both to qualities attributed to the Israelite army (especially in §§ –, –, –) and to the rules regarding gender differentiation laid out in §§ –. To take the latter first: like their Jewish counterparts, the Midianite women have received training (σκηεAσαι, § , cf. σκ=σας in § ), not in decency of adornment (κσμος, § ), however, but so as to adorn (διακοσμεAσαι) themselves in extravagant (πολυτελ=ς) attire (§ ), unschooled in doctrines that remove from the soul its desire for extravagance (πολυτ!λεια, § ). Rather than “following nature,” as the law prescribes (§§ –), they hope to improve upon their natural beauty (τ 1κ φ:σεως κ,λλος, § ). The fact that they trade in the very sorts of passions that the temperate ought to resist (§§ –) exposes their claims to s¯ophrosyn¯e as utter hypocrisy (§ ). In all this they contradict the Mosaic ideal of womanhood. It is not, however, only in their transgressions, in their profane appearance, harlotry, and idolatry (§ ), that the Midianite women spurn the law. It is also in the fact that they constitute an actual fighting “force” capable of undermining the Israelites, a menace that must be defeated in order to re-establish Mosaic order. This becomes evident when we examine the accumulation of descriptive details Philo offers in the exposition showing how the two sides mirror one another in their motivation and comportment. Like the Israelite soldiers, for example, the women utilize physical “postures and movements” to overwhelm their foes (§ : σχ!σεσι κα κιν=σεσιν, cf. § : σχ!σεις τε κα κιν=σεις). Both sides are encouraged not to be fearful—the Israelites of a formidable enemy (§ ), the women of the sullied reputation they will earn for their misdeeds (§ ). While the latter willingly accept such shame (α>σχ:νη, §§ , ) for the sake of victory, the Israelite soldiers refuse to invest shameful (α>σχρς) action of any kind with fair-sounding titles (§ ). Much like the courageous man of § , the women intend to convert their δοξα into εIκλεια

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through “excellent” conduct (§§ –, cf. § ). Their ριστεα, however, is counterfeit, in contrast to that of the twelve-thousand Israelites chosen for battle in § . Both groups hope that their actions will reap benefits (Bφ!λειαι) for their respective countries (§§ , , cf. § ). The women’s aim is to secure victory without bloodshed (ναιμωτ), having received assurances that they will succeed “merely by being seen” (ατ μνον HφεAσαι, § ). But, in the end, both the Midianite commanders and their female provocateurs fall victim to the same fate they had intended for their enemy. On the battlefield, the Israelite army mows down many myriads “with scarcely a shout” (ατοβοε, § ), achieving precisely the sort of bloodless (ναιμωτ) victory its enlistment procedures were designed to produce (§ ). The reason for this, of course, is that the soldiers champion the cause of eusebeia (§§ , ) against the forces of asebeia (§ ). But more than this, their enemy constitutes a shocking inversion of the gender polarity upon which the law’s regimen of andreia is predicated. The Midianite men explain to the women that by prostituting their bodies it will be female action that overcomes the enemy (§ ). However, even if their ruse meets with success, it will in fact constitute for the men a Pyrrhic victory. Since it will be brought to a satisfactory conclusion by women and not men, the latter are forced to acknowledge that “it is our sex . . . which will fall to defeat” (§ ). Conversely, Israelite courage is defined in overcoming this anomaly through the destruction of masculine women, who usurp male prerogatives, and their effeminate men, who acquiesce to female activity in, of all places, international warfare. In this retelling of the biblical story, then, Philo reshapes the character of Mosaic andreia in ways that would have been more congenial with the discursive systems of imperial power.

Detailed Comments () § . human affairs occur in two times, in peace and in war. In encomiastic discourse it was conventional to divide the praise of someone’s exploits into those of peacetime and those of wartime (Menander Rhetor, Epid. .–), though only the latter would properly fall under the heading of courage (Epid. .). Philo, however, has argued that the virtue is valuable under both sets of circumstances; cf. Contempl. . For the similar division that Cicero makes in his analysis of courage, see the Analysis/General comments on §§ –. Comparison may also be

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made with Josephus’ summary of the law in book  of the Antiquitates, which covers first civil laws (.–), then provisions for the military (.–); cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..; ..–; ..; ... For the basic distinction, see also Hum. . regarding the others mention has already been made. As Colson (PLCL .–) notes, what Philo has in mind here is difficult to say, though the primary reference may be to the immediately preceding treatise, whose treatment of justice reviews first laws of peacetime (Spec. .–), then those pertaining to warfare (Spec. .–). In addition, the (far less systematic) presentation of eusebeia (see § ) in book  of De vita Mosis demonstrates the relevance of that virtue in peace (Mos. ., , , ) and in war (Mos. ., ); cf. Abr. . The similar statement that Philo makes in his overview of the Exposition in Praem.  is somewhat easier to interpret, since presumably it refers not only to these texts, but also to De fortitudine itself, with its obvious division of peacetime (§§ –) and wartime (§ –), as well as the less obvious division between peacetime (§§ –) and wartime (§§ – ) in De humanitate (cf. Abr. , ). he celebrates in many places of the legislation. For references to andreia elsewhere in Philo’s oeuvre, see the Parallel exegesis to Fort. – . Also see on §§ –. the following prefatory comment. Other elements of the so-called Deuteronomic war code are taken up in Hum. –, –. Fort. – contains an extended, occasionally verbose, meditation on Deut :–, which grants four possible deferments from military service. While the allowance of such exemptions would have been a standard practice in the ancient world (cf. ANET .–; –.–, – ; Plato, Leg. c), the Mosaic army would have faced special challenges in this regard. As Nelson (, ) points out, in the worldview projected by Deuteronomy, those serving in the military “are not landless invaders, but a settled population with houses and vineyards.” The “citizen soldiers” comprising such a nonprofessional army would have much to lose, especially when confronted with a numerically and technologically superior opponent (Deut :). In this regard the provisions of vv. – assume a realistic stance regarding the possibility of causalities. (a) § . When he prepares the muster roll. In the biblical text, exemptions are granted on the eve of battle, after the size and composition of the enemy’s forces have been determined (Deut :–). In Deut : and , the LXX replaces “officers” in the original with γραμματεAς as

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those addressing the army (QT LXII  has “judges”), which may have prompted Philo to connect the deferments with the task of drawing up the roll of soldiers. As a practical matter, such a connection would certainly be more logical, at least in the case of the first three deferments (Deut :–), since those to whom they applied would be known in advance of the battle (cf. Rofé , ). For this use of κατ,λογος, see Aristotle, Ath. pol. .; Josephus, Ant. .; cf. Abr. . Such a roll was important not only for ascertaining the total number of soldiers but also for assigning them to their particular units, e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ... Generals, of course, had to be careful to select only the most fit and stalwart men, e.g., Plato, Crit. e–b; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; ... Potential enlistees for the Roman army were required to appear before a recruiting board, the probatio, which assessed the young men’s physical, intellectual, and legal qualifications. In Egypt, this process was associated with a census known as the epikrisis (Le Bohec , –; further, Stauner , –; Peretz , –). there are some whom he excuses . . . to begin with, the quivering and cowardly. In Plato’s Leges, if a man called up for armed service fails to present himself out of cowardice, he is to be prosecuted by the military authorities (a–b). For practical reasons Moses’ law grants such men an exemption. Roman standards of military recruitment also excluded certain categories of persons, though these tended to be such “social undesirables” as slaves, criminals, and the members of certain “degraded” occupations like innkeepers, fowlers, and bakers (Phang , –). Like Josephus (Ant. .), Philo treats the last of the biblical exemptions in Deut :– first, perhaps because of his interest in exploring the “psychological” motivations behind the provisions; see also §§ –. At any rate, : continues the theme of fear from :–: the scribes say to the soldiers, “What man is there who fears and is cowardly in his heart (2 φοβο:μενος κα δειλς τ@$ καρδ7α)? Let him go and return to his house, lest he make cowardly (δειλι,ν@η) the heart of his brother like his own” (cf. Judg :). Such soldiers are fearful despite the assurances given them by the priests in vv. – that they are in fact fighting a sacred war (note especially μ+ φοβεAσε in v. ); cf. QM X –; XV –. In Philo, the cowardice of such men is a matter not of their failure to respond to the priests’ encouragement, but of their innate “softness,” a term often applied to cowards (e.g., Xenophon, Symp. .; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Virt. vit. .; Demosthenes, Or. .; Plutarch, Apoph. lac. a). In terms of the biblical provision’s wording, Philo retains only δειλς (cf. δειλα in §§ , , ), though φοβ!ω will be used in § .

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overcome by their innate softness. In his descriptions of Mosaic andreia, Philo is careful to distance the courageous from any association with μαλακα, a quintessentially feminine characteristic (e.g., Edwards , –; Williams , s.v. mollitia; cf. on §§ –). For example, in §§ –, the one who endures poverty bravely is contrasted with those who have been “softened” for want of valor. Here potential army recruits emasculated by softness are to be rejected, another point on which civilian and military forms of courage approximate one another (see the Analysis/General comments). cause alarm in the other combatants. In contrast to the exemptions of Deut :–, where the issue is the rights of individuals in certain liminal situations, Deut : is meant to prevent the psychological effect of fear within the ranks. Philo replaces the very rare δειλιανω of the LXX with δ!ος . . . 1μποιεAν, for which cf. Mos. .; Josephus, Bell. .. According to Josephus, cowards are excluded from the army lest they “turn to flight during the encounter and aid the enemy” (Ant. .); cf. m. Sot. :. § . the vice of one man is likely to be reproduced in his neighbor. For the language, cf. Her. , where the soul is likened to a block of wax (cf. Plato, Theaet. c–d, c–a): “if it is obedient and appropriately submissive it allows the imprints to sink deep into it, and thus reproducing (ναμαξαμ!νη) the shape of the seal indelibly preserves the forms stamped upon it.” Cf. on Hum.  and . For the possibility of reproducing the vices of one’s opponent, see Migr. . the ability to reason is confounded by apprehensiveness. Reasoning power, an essential component of civic courage (Fort. , –), is put to the test in situations of combat. Like their civic counterparts (Fort. , ), Mosaic soldiers also need to exercise φρνησις (see on § ). Philo appears to have been acquainted with the Stoic definition of γωνα as the species of fear one feels when confronted with a matter that is δηλος (“uncertain, obscure,” cf. § ), e.g., Decal. ; Praem. ; cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .–; SVF ., , ; Josephus, Ant. .. to call cowardice discretion. According to the Aristotelian analysis in Virt. vit. ., cowardice has a certain element of ελ,βεια to it. For δειλα as a deficiency of courage, see on § . § . to prevent their own interests from being harmed by the unmanliness. Unmanliness, either in the troops (e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..) or in their generals (e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..), constitutes one of the most common sources of defeat.

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While cowards might be accustomed to disguising their νανδρα as “the need for safety” (§ ; cf. Plutarch, An. corp. b), this vice is in fact as debilitating in civilian contexts as it is in military ones (cf. §§ , ). a shiftless throng is not an advantage. Cf. the “throngs of thoughtless persons” in § . he withholds those who lack valor and lose heart. The scenario depicted in this paragraph is loosely based on Deut :: “Do not let your heart become faint, do not fear, do not be confounded, do not turn your face from them.” no general would compel men suffering from physical illnesses to go to war. στρατηγς is Mangey’s ( ) emendation for στρατηγοAς (V2OFGK2H2) and στρατηγο:ς (ceteri) in the mss. Bodily infirmities would incapacitate a soldier for field service, e.g., Polybius, Hist. ..; Baldwin . § . cowardice is also an illness. If those suffering from physical illnesses are excluded from participating in war (§ ), the same applies all the more to those suffering from cowardice (cf. Det. ), since such illnesses of the soul are both more harmful and more difficult to cure (cf. Spec. .; and Plutarch’s treatise, Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores). Closely related is the “disease” of effeminacy, since it likewise robs the soul of courage (Contempl. ). Other soul-sicknesses include ignorance (see on § ), deceit (e.g., Spec. .), and vice in general (e.g., Det. ). Cf. Plato, Crat. c: “Now deilia signifies the soul’s being bound by a strong shackle (desmos), for lian (too much) is a degree of strength. Therefore deilia signifies the strongest of the soul’s shackles” (further, Plato, Soph. e; Resp. d–e; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..–; SVF ., ). Counteracting this is s¯ophrosyn¯e, which represents the means and state of health in the soul (see on §§ –). So, even if their bodies have been worn out by physical illness, those whose souls are vigorous and healthy can contribute to the common good (§ ). unless God happens to heal it. For Philo, Moses the lawgiver is the best of physicians for the maladies of the soul. In some few cases (as with Moses himself), these diseases are exscinded altogether, while in others they are cured with “saving medicines” so as to assuage their influence (Leg. .; Det. ; Deus ; Ios. ; Decal. ; Aune , – ; cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; Niehoff , –). Plutarch, meanwhile, contends that God heals the vices of wrongdoers by sending them punishments, which are administered like medicine to a patient (Sera f–a, f; cf. Quaest. rom. e–f). And in a very different context, we hear from Onasander that the general’s speech to his army

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after a defeat is supposed to “cure” the troops of the despondency in their hearts, much like a physician ministers to diseases in the body (Strat. .–). everything is possible with God. God alone can do all things (Somn. .; cf. Opif. ; Somn. .; Ios. ; Abr. , ; Spec. .; Gen :; Matt :; Mark :; Luke :). (b) § . they demonstrate a patriotic and eager and intrepid disposition. The citizens of §  similarly demonstrate courage when they direct their valorous efforts towards what is most beneficial for the common interests of their homeland. bound by any compelling circumstances. According to Deuteronomic ideology, since the spoils of war are gifts from God, it would be illogical for the dangers of war to prevent one’s enjoyment of such material gain (Nelson , ). Functionally, the discharge allowances of Deut :– , to which Philo now turns, are related to the genre of “futility curses” (cf. Deut :–; Bruin ), which concern actions that might contravene the natural order of things or the expected sequence of events: “such exemptions were based on the notion that persons in certain liminal or threshold states would present a special danger if they took part in a sacral enterprise” (Nelson , ). Philo, by contrast, focuses on the laws’ humanitarian (§ ) and psychological (§§ –) aspects. For Greco-Roman parallels, see on §§ –. § . if someone, he says, has recently built a house. Philo breaks up the parallelism of his source, dropping Deut :b, b, and b, condensing the three-fold question + command structure into a single conditional sentence, and postponing the reasons for the exemptions until § ; cf. Agr. . From the wording of Deut :a, only ο>κα is retained. Philo’s rendering of 1γκαινζω (“dedicate”) in the LXX with ε>σοικζω may in fact better approximate the meaning of the Hebrew original (Nelson , ). Josephus (compare his νεωστ δειμαμ!νους with Philo’s νεωστ δειμ,μενος) interprets the provision to mean that the man should be allowed at least one year to enjoy his new home (Ant. .; cf. Deut :), while m. Sot. : includes not only a man who has recently built a house, but also a man who has recently purchased or inherited one or received one as a gift. or has just planted a vineyard. Philo alters 1φ:τευσεν μπελνα in Deut : to μπελνα φυτε:σας. He also adds a note explaining that this is a vineyard the man has planted himself, contrasting with m. Sot. :, which includes not only those “who sink (the shoots) into the ground,” but also a man who has bought or inherited a vineyard or has

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –

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received it as a gift. Philo further changes “he has not enjoyed it” (MT: “he has not rendered it profane;” cf. Lev :–) to “he has yet to have an opportunity of profit from it.” Josephus, Ant. . and m. Sot. : expand the provision’s application to include fruit orchards. or has betrothed himself to a maiden. Philo replaces μεμν=στευται γυναAκα in the LXX with παρ!νον 1γγυησ,μενος (cf. Hum. ). Presumably, he would have disagreed with m. Sot. :, which states that it makes no difference whether the woman is a virgin or a widow, or even a deceased childless brother’s widow awaiting the levir. Philo also changes “he has not taken her” to “he has not married her.” Josephus states that the statute applies to men who have recently married as well as to men who are betrothed (Ant. .; cf. Deut :). let him be released from all military service. In the biblical scenario, exemptions are made on the eve of battle: each man to whom they apply is to “go and return to his house” (Deut :, , , ). Philo envisions instead the exemptions being applied when the muster roll is prepared (see on § ), and so the qualified men do not leave home in the first place. the humanity of the law. ms A reads φιλανρ8πως 2μο(, while all others have φιλανρωπαν 2μο(. Cohn (PCW .), following Wendland (, ), conjectures φιλανρ8πως 2μο( κα στρατηγικς on the basis of Clement’s reading of this passage at Strom. ..– (for which see the Nachleben below): το:τους φεAσαι τ$ς στρατεας 2 φιλ,νρωπος κελε:ει νμος, στρατηγικς μEν . . . φιλανρ8πως δE . . . . Colson (PLCL .–, ), pointing out the unnatural reading thus created, suggests instead φιλανρωπ7α νμου, citing the correction at Spec. . (see PCW .) as a parallel. Mention may also be made of Spec. ., where φιλανρωπαν 2μο( in M (the only extant ms) is similarly corrected to φιλανρωπ7α νμου (see PCW .). This is done for two reasons. The first of these, the humanitarian reason (§ ), follows on the biblical text, while the second, the psychological reason (§§ –), is Philo’s addition. The former anticipates sections of De humanitate that address wartime affairs; see on Hum. –, – . § . others should not take without toil the possessions of those who labored for them. The humanity of the law in this case is expressed in the assumption that those who labor for something should be allowed a hope (1λπς) of profiting from it. Frustrating that expectation by allowing it to pass to someone who has had no part in the work is χαλεπς (“harsh, grievous”); cf. Agr. .

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for one to build a house and another to inhabit it, for someone to plant and someone who did not plant to reap the fruits, for one to court and another to marry without courting. Philo paraphrases the reasons given in Deut : “lest he die in the war and another man dedicate it” (v. ), “lest he die in the war and another man enjoy it” (v. ), “lest he die in the war and another man take her” (v. ). The terminology varies little from that of § . The verb ο>κοδομ!ω is from Deut :. Perhaps Philo uses μν,ομαι (“to woo, court”) here to highlight the “laboring” involved; cf. Agr. ; Fug. ; Ios. . so that they ought not to render vain the hopes of those expecting good things in their lives. ms A reads οδες, while all others have ο δεAν. Mangey (, ) corrects this to ο δ!ον, while Cohn (PCW .) retains the majority reading as an instance of the Attic use of δεAν for the participle (Cohn , ; cf. PLCL .–). In addition, only A has χρηστC τ,, while the rest read χρηστC τν. Colson (PLCL .) suggests χρ$σιν τν. § . strained by longing for the enjoyment of the things taken from them. The second reason for the provisions of Deut :– is now given: those with new undertakings are likely to be distracted by the desire to enjoy them. As we saw with the civil dimension of andreia, because the courageous practice contentedness and self-sufficiency they have only few needs (see on §§ –). Moses does not go so far as Plato, who denied soldiers the right to private wealth, property, and even families (Resp. e–b), though in Philo’s interpretation he did recognize that under certain circumstances such things might divert them emotionally from their service to the state. Although it is much shorter in length, Josephus’ exposition of these laws in Ant. . exhibits some interesting similarities in language with our passage (see also on §§ , ), e.g., compare Philo’s π<ω τ$ς πολα:σεως here with π<ω . . . πλαυσιν in the Antiquitates (though note that ten words intervene between the terms). as those who are hungry or thirsty, when some food or drink appears, seek and run after it. The fool “is in want of much, constantly thirsting after things that are absent” on account of his desire (§ ). The sage, by contrast, is satisfied with the wealth of nature, which is readily obtained in great abundance (§ ). the better part of the soul. V2OF read ψυχ@$, while the rest have ψυχ$ς. The latter is preferable both for the sake of consistency with Fort.  (see above) and as a reference to δι,νοια earlier in the paragraph; cf. Leg. .; Migr. .

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



§ . these and others like them. The provisions of Deut :– are taken as representative cases; those accepted into the Mosaic army are not bound “by any compelling circumstances” (§ ). those into whom no passion has previously entered. As explained in § , the soul of the truly courageous man is preserved by the “health” of moderation, which endows it with life and protects it from being inundated by the passions. In the same vein, Plato reasoned that since two factors contribute to military victory, fearlessness of one’s enemies and fear of ill-repute among one’s friends, anyone who enters the lists requires training in both courage and moderation, that is, he must conquer not only his feelings of cowardice but also “the crowd of pleasures and desires that stimulate him to act shamelessly” (Leg. b–d). Those who fail in this training are discharged from the army (c). For Cicero, a crucial measure of fortitudo is the ability to remain indifferent to external goods and circumstances, so that one never becomes “subject to any man or any passion or any accident of fortune” (Off. .). True men, he says, are not satisfied with overcoming obstacles like fear and pain. They must also overcome any emotions that might disrupt the tranquillitas animi, especially the desire for wealth, pleasure, and glory (.–). to a soul afflicted by some passion. Most of the mss have φ!ρει τι κηραινο:ση π,ος ψυχ$, which Cohn corrects to φερεA τι κηραινο:σης π,ος ψυχ$ς (PCW .). But note the variants: ε> φ!ρει (V2O), ε> φ!ροι (F), and φ!ρειν (GH2). Given the instability of the text at this point, Colson’s suggestion of περ τι κηραινο:σ@η π,ος ψυχ@$ (PLCL .– ; cf. .) is acceptable, since it better conveys the parallel structure of the sentence and accords with Philo’s proclivity for περ with κηρανω, e.g., Ebr. ; Decal. ; Spec. .,  (also with π,ος); Praem. ,  (also with π,ος); Prov. .. (c) § . captains and generals. Officers can be commissioned only after the appropriate discharges have been made. The point of departure is Deut :b: “they shall appoint commanders of the army as leaders of the people.” Philo replaces the unclear “they” of the provision (Nelson , ) with Moses himself, the nation’s 9γεμ8ν (§ ). The titles used here, λοχαγς and στρατηγς, were standard ranks in the Greek military, the former receiving twice the normal soldier’s pay, the latter four times as much (Xenophon, Anab. ..; .., ; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..). In Plato’s Leges, generals are elected from a preliminary list of candidates (all of whom have served or are serving in the armed forces) compiled by the Guardians. The three generals thus chosen then compile a list of candidates for election as

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company commanders (c–e). Onasander, meanwhile, urges that a general be chosen on account of his virtues; in particular, he must be “moderate, self-controlled, vigilant, frugal, hardened to labor, alert, and free from avarice” (Strat. .; cf. Smith ). good health with respect to his reasoning ability . . . full of noble prudence. As argued in §§ –, the good health of the soul, that is, σωφροσ:νη, occurs when its reasoning facility is in control, thus preserving its capacity for φρνησις, “the mightiest of our attributes” (cf. also §§ , ). This ability to reason well is put under particular stress by the vagaries of war (§ ), when the effects of the disease of cowardice become most evident (§ ). As Plutarch explains, if they are to succeed, soldiers, and especially their officers, need to act “with eagerness (προυμα; cf. Fort. ) and reason (λογισμς; cf. Fort. , ),” rather than “with hesitation and delay” (Brut. .; cf. Tim. .; Comp. Ages. Pomp. .). According to Isocrates, the best general is not the one who achieves success through a single stroke of good fortune, “but one who, though loaded with many difficult responsibilities of all sorts, has always discharged them with honesty and wisdom” (Antid. ). Ps.-Plato, Def. a defines courage both as boldness in obedience to φρνησις and as “the state which stands on guard over correct reasoning (λογισμν Hρν) in dangerous situations.” Similarly, Cicero concedes that physical training in preparation for military service is advantageous, but only so that the body will obey the judgments of reason more efficiently, since ultimately it is prudent counsel that determines victory (Off. .). Hence the successful leader busies himself with courage that is “true and wise” (.). Intellectually self-reliant, he can discern the most sensible way to manage risks and dangers (.), recognizing that it is “the rational cause that makes men great” (.). inspecting the body to see if it is whole . . . the soul to see if it is full of bravery and valor. Josephus boasts that the Mosaic army is comprised of “all who excel in strength (K8μη; cf. Fort. , ) of their bodies and in valor (ετολμα; cf. Fort. , , ) of soul” (Ant. .); cf. QM VII . postures and movements. For the varieties of these, see Asclepiodotus, Tact. .–. prefers death with glory to a disgraceful life. The type of glory cherished by Moses’ soldiers resembles that of the sage in Fort.  insofar as it is predicated not on what most people take to be courage (§§ –), but on nobility of spirit. The Midianite women, by contrast, seek glory through shameful actions (§ ).

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



§ . in surpassing greatness. The odd phrase 1κ πολλο( το( περιντος (PLCL .: “sufficient and more than sufficient”) is one of Philo’s favorites (though cf. Josephus, Ant. .), e.g., Mos. ., . without loss of blood. As Tacitus observes, with the Romans it was “a great matter for pride in the event of victory, if the battle were fought without the expenditure of Roman blood” (Agr. .). Cf. Mos. .; Praem. ; Josephus, Bell. .. () § . the sacred books contain an especially clear proof. In Numbers, the account of the Baal Peor incident is positioned in such a way to show that “even the new generation of valiant Israelites was not immune to pagan tendencies” (Levine , ). In De fortitudine, it functions as evidence of their courage and “unrivalled might” (§ ) in overcoming threats to the nation’s piety. Num  is comprised of two parts, vv. – (JE) and vv. – (P). The former relates how at Shittim Israelite men began having sexual relations with the women of Moab, who then led them into idolatry. The latter tells the story of an aristocratic Midianite woman who has sexual relations with the son of an Israelite clan leader. The chapter concludes with God commanding Moses to slay the Midianites “because they deceived you at Peor and through Cozbi” (v. ). The conflation of the two enemy nations, though confusing, is understandable given the alliance they had formed earlier in the narrative (Num :–). In the version of the story Philo offers in Mos. .– (for which see the Parallel exegesis below), no reference is made to the Moabites or the Midianites, the conflict being waged against Balak, who is simply presented as king “of a great and populous portion of the East” (.). In the version of the story here, Philo draws on the biblical narrative in a very selective manner, omitting references to Balaam, Phinehas, etc., basing the story principally on :– , , –; :–, , –, and , focusing on its themes of seduction and revenge. The Arabians, whose ancient name was the Midianites. This historical detail (absent from the parallel account in De vita Mosis), the only item that tethers Philo’s otherwise generic retelling of the biblical story to any specific time or place, offers an important clue regarding his geopolitical bearing. In the Roman imagination, Arabia was a barbarian, Eastern nation given to extravagant luxuries and populated by robbers (e.g., Strabo, Geogr. ..; .., –; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..–; ..; Pliny, Nat. ..–). In his depiction of Augustus’ victory at Actium, Virgil had included “all Arabians” (Aen. .– ; see on § ) among the vanquished. Most likely, this is an allusion

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to the military support Antony received at the time from certain Arabian kings, one of whom was later led in the triumphal procession in Rome (Cassius Dio, Hist. rom. ..; cf. Gurval , ). The addition of this detail helps to solidify the integration of Philo’s Jews into the ethos and execution of imperial power. Jewish courage and warfare not only exhibit the same moral logic as their Roman counterparts, but at decisive moments in their respective histories the two nations have also proven their superiority in defeating a common enemy. Also cf. on § . If there is any biblical basis for the connection that Philo draws here, perhaps it might be the reference to ΑραβM Μω,β in Num : (cf. Jdt :–). Cf. Ant. ., where Josephus explains that the eponymous city of Rekem, one of the Midianites’ five kings (see Num :), “ranks highest in the land of the Arabians.” While Philo does not refer specifically elsewhere in the Exposition to the Midianites, in the Allegorical Commentary, Midian stands for the nurse of things bodily (Conf. ; cf. Mut. –), an interpretation which is not incongruous with their presentation here; cf. esp. §§ , . the highest and oldest Cause . . . the Creator and Father of all things . . . the One and truly Existent. The same three divine epithets are also used in Hum. – to contrast Jewish beliefs with pagan idolatry; see the commentary there for further discussion. For God as “Creator and Father,” see also on Hum. ; cf. Nob. –. having devoted themselves. For Philo’s belief that Israel is especially assigned or allotted to God, see Birnbaum , –, who examines also Spec. ., ; Legat. . laid down all manner of traps. For this translation, rather than “made all possible attempts,” see PLCL .; Aristophanes, Vesp. ; Cassius Dio, Hist. rom. ... convert them from holiness to impiety. In Philo’s interpretation, this is the issue upon which the entire conflict hinges, inasmuch as andreia in war “resides in a single-minded dedication to defending piety, undistracted by any other concern” (Konstan , ). In De fortitudine, as throughout the Exposition, Philo simply assumes that the distinguishing national feature of the Israelites is their holiness, in which they offer reverence and honor to God (see also §§ , , ). Their hosiot¯es is closely aligned with their eusebeia, for which see on §§ , . Indeed Philo uses the two terms so frequently in parallel constructions that they seem to be practically interchangeable (e.g., Opif. , ; Mos. ., ; ., , ; Decal. , ; Spec. ., ; .. ; .; .; Nob.

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –

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; cf. Plato, Euthyphr. b). For him, piety is not simply a pious attitude, but an orientation that entails 2σιτης πρς εν (Abr. ), that is, knowing and following God (Abr. –; Decal. –), the goal of which is assimilation to God and the divine order (see on Fort. ). Cf. Sterling , –, –. having said and done countless things. A reference to the story of Balak and Balaam in Num –, for which see Mos. .–; cf. Feldman . The former’s alliance with the elders of Midian is described in Num :–. no hope of deliverance. Colson (PLCL .) corrects πογνσι in PCW . to πγνωσις. Cf. Mos. ., . they contrived a stratagem of the following kind. Num : and Mos. .– attribute the idea to Balaam (cf. b. San. a). Here Philo probably has in mind Num :–: “Treat the Midianites as enemies and smite them, because they are enemies to you by the deceit by which they deceived you at Peor” (cf. :–). § . You see how boundless is the number of the Hebrews. According to Num :, “Moab feared the people greatly because they were many.” Cf. on Hum. . a defense more troubling than their number is their concord. According to Polybius, a state owes its preservation to two things, “courage against the enemy and concord among the citizens” (Hist. ..; cf. Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..). the . . . source of that concord is their opinion that there is one God, from which . . . they have obtained a unifying and unbreakable friendship. In Aristotle, Eth. eud. .., 2μνοια is identified as the form of friendship that exists in civic bodies (cf. Eth. nic. ..; also on Hum. ). Plato had similarly underscored the observance of φιλα between citizens as being expressive of their unity (e.g., Leg. c–d; Morrow , –; further, Plutarch, Praec. ger. rei publ. d; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; .). According to Philo, the laws of Moses establish principles of justice conducive to the concord of the community that observes them (Decal. ; cf. Plato, Resp. d). The community’s concord and friendship are evident especially when its members gather for worship (Spec. .; Praem. ), since true friendship is based not on bonds of blood or affection, but on “the willingness to serve God, and that our every word and deed promotes the cause of piety” (Spec. .; cf. Mos. .; Paen. ; Sterling , –). Josephus agreed that the 2μνοια of the Jews derived from their common δξα περ εο( (C. Ap. .). Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..: the sorts of

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commentary

friendships that prove to be “unbreakable” are most often formed among individuals who receive the same education and sacrifice to the same gods. For the δξα of God’s unicity, see especially Opif. . As Runia (, ) notes, “many philosophers in Philo’s time would have agreed that God was one, though not in a manner that would have elicited his full agreement” (further, Kenney ). Opposing this are the false doctrines of polytheism, for which see on Nob. . § . the pleasure of sex. The basic assumption guiding Balaam’s advice to Balak is that “there is nothing to which a man more easily falls captive than women’s beauty” (Mos. .). As long as it is directed towards procreation, Philo sees nothing morally objectionable to sexual desire (e.g., Ios. ). The problem is that it all too often leads to the desire for physical pleasure, “which is the starting point of wicked and lawless deeds” (Opif. ; cf. Runia , ; Gaca ). For 9δον=, see also on Hum. , . youth by nature slips into intemperance. Although Num : simply states that “the people” profaned itself with the daughters of Moab, Philo assumes that it is the Hebrew youth who are guilty, seeing “how natural it is for youth to lose its footing” (Ios. ). This is particularly true when it comes to the bodily passions (Her. ; Ios. ; cf. Legat. ), which render one susceptible to the lures of a prostitute (Spec. .). Josephus makes a similar assumption, though he specifies that it is the youth in the Israelites’ camp (Ant. .). Cf. T. Reub. :: “the spirit of procreation and intercourse . . . with which come sins through fondness for pleasure . . . was the last in the creation and the first in youth, because it is filled with ignorance; it leads the young person like a blind man into a ditch and like an animal over a cliff.” The vice of κρασα (the opposite of 1γκρ,τεια, for which see on Hum. ; cf. Paen. ) is subjected to a thorough analysis by Aristotle in book  of the Ethica Nicomachea. As he explains, it is manifested especially in relation to bodily desires and pleasures (..). Cf. Opif. , . § . the names of harlotry or adultery. Num : states that at Shittim the Israelite men began having improper sexual relations with Moabite women. The original reference was most likely to intermarriage and/or concubinage, though subsequent interpreters read all manner of sexual intrigue into the statement (Levine , , –). The LXX, in using 1κπορνε(σαι, appears to take the sexual acts in question as harlotry (Wevers , ; note the use of πρνη in Mos. .), and in §§ –

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



Philo will describe the women as though they were prostitutes. According to Mos. ., the means by which they ensnared the Hebrew youths was by prostituting themselves for hire. The translation of Num : is also noteworthy in this regard. According to the original, Zimri “brought a Midianite woman to his brothers,” that is, as his bride, whereas the LXX states that he “brought his brother to a Midianite woman,” that is, for prostitution (Wevers , ). According to the allegorical interpretation of the passage in Somn. .–, Shittim stands for “thorns” that pierce the soul, while the daughters of Moab are the senses, the daughters of the mind, with which the soul has lewd and lascivious intercourse, “as though they were harlots and courtesans.” As with the longer version in Mos. .–, in retelling this story our author betrays a special interest in its element of seduction: “Philo here links a commonplace of Hellenistic ethics—the problem of reason’s subversion by passion—with the specifically Jewish concern to follow the customs of the ancestors” (Dawson , , referring to Mos. ., ). you will transform fleeting disgrace into ageless and unending glory. The soldiers selected by Moses also prefer renown to disgrace (§ ), though in contrast to the Midianite women their souls are free from any of the passions that might hinder them from acting virtuously (§ ); cf. § . you will be keeping your souls virgin. What is promised the Midianite women constitutes a perversion of Philo’s concept of the virgin soul, that is, a soul undefiled by licentious passions, e.g., Cher. ; Migr. ; Somn. .; QE .; Wilson , –. § . this war will have an extraordinary distinction in being brought to a successful conclusion by women and not by men. The participation of women in military affairs was a theme that fascinated ancient writers. Numerous stories about such participation, most of them involving elements of treachery and seduction, are preserved in Plutarch’s Mulierum virtutes (e.g., see on § ); cf. Graf . See also the tale of Tarpeia in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..–... As Humble () notes, Greek historians ordinarily associated such transgressions of gender roles with the barbarian world, e.g., Herodotus, Hist. .; Xenophon, Anab. ..–. In reality, of course, women often contributed positively to the operations of war, for example, by digging trenches or sharpening tools (e.g., Polyaenus, Strat. .), or, in more desperate situations, by climbing to the rooftops and throwing tiles down on the invaders (e.g., Strat. .–). Women were even known to lead armies



commentary

into battle; among Hellenistic women it is Ptolemaic queens who are most often credited with such activity (Loman ). it is our sex, we admit, that will fall to defeat. In a society in which women take on the responsibilities of war, it is inevitable that “humility and slavery are fastened upon the men” (Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..–; cf. Herodotus, Hist. .). The need to restrict the role of women in society and control female sexuality was an ongoing object of male anxiety in early imperial times (e.g., Edwards , –). This imperative, of course, came to expression in various forms, including patterns of invective that characterized female agency in the political and/or military domains—and the sexual license thought to accompany such incursions—as portents of moral decline and social upheaval (e.g., Sallust, Bell. Cat. ; Lucan, Bell. civ. .–; cf. Wyke , –; Gurval , –). As we saw earlier, imperial ideology, particularly that associated with Actium, projected male ambivalence toward female otherness onto the culture of the vanquished enemy, mapping gender dominance onto the structure of Eastern conquest (see the Analysis/General comments). will achieve the victory completely, and beyond that . . . PCW . prints ο?σει (cf. Cohn , –), while the mss have περιο(σαι (SG) or περαι8σει (V2OF). Colson (PLCL .–) corrects to π!ρα δ ο?σει. Other conjectures include περιο(σαι Nξετε (Mangey , ) and περιποι=σει (Wendland , –). § . having never . . . tasted proper learning. That is, education for virtue, including in this instance especially the virtue of moderation, e.g., Mut. ; Ebr. ; Spec. .; Plato, Leg. d–b, e; Musonius Rufus, frg. ..–. they had simply pretended to a disposition of moderation. The women’s acquiescence to the men’s plans falsifies any claim they might have made to the s¯ophrosyn¯e that Philo had argued in §  constitutes a basic dimension of courage. Their souls are therefore plagued by harmful passions and desires. Not only do they fail in this regard, but through their actions they also subvert the s¯ophrosyn¯e of the Hebrew youth, a point made explicitly by Josephus (Ant. .). As Philo explains in Spec. ., the harlot is a “stranger to decency and modesty and moderation and the other virtues. . . . Each thing she says and does is for the hunting of youth, while she incites her lovers each against the other by offering the shameful prize of herself to the highest bidder.” dressing themselves up with expensive clothes and necklaces . . . and taking pains to make their natural beauty more attractive. The

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



Midianite women’s extravagance contrasts with the contentedness and thrift of the courageous sage described in §§ –, whose virtues drive πολυτ!λεια from his soul. It contrasts even more pointedly with the decorum of the Mosaic women described in §§ –, who are trained (note σκ!ω in §§  and ) in proper adornment, that is, in adornment which accords with physis. As a rule, prostitutes wore more elaborate clothes and jewelry than other women in order to attract clients (e.g., Xenophon, Mem. ..; Plautus, Most. –; Lucian, Dial. meretr. ). Indeed, in certain cities a woman was only allowed to wear gold jewelry, a flowery dress, or clothes with purple borders if she accepted the name of a public hetaira (Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. .; Clement of Alexandria, Paed. .bis..; Athenaeus, Deipn. b; cf. Dalby ). According to Ps.-Philo, L.A.B. :, the Midianite women were stationed before the men “naked and adorned with gold and precious stones,” while Josephus simply states that they were instructed to “increase their appeal” (Ant. .). For evidence of prostitution in Roman Egypt, see Bagnall . § . with lewd glances and beguiling words and licentious postures and movements. Much like soldiers (cf. § ), the women must adopt particular “postures and movements” when engaging the enemy. As Philo explains in Sacr. , the harlot is recognizable not only for her appearance, but also for her comportment. Everything from her gait to the roll of her eyes is used as “bait to entice the souls of the youth; her look is one of boldness and shamelessness; her neck is held high; she assumes a stature beyond what is natural; she grins and titters; the hair on her head is woven in vain and elaborate ways; under her eyes are pencil lines; . . . her expensive clothes are brightly colored with flowers; bracelets and necklaces and every other feminine ornament wrought of gold and jewels hang round her; her breath is laden with fragrant scents” (cf. Congr. ; Fug. ; Spec. .; .). Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Paed. ..; Athenaeus, Deipn. a. having ensnared the souls of those who joined with them. Men are lured to a prostitute’s pleasures like an animal to a trap or a fish to a hook (Opif. , cf. –; Spec. .; .–; Plato, Tim. d; Phaedr. a; further, Wilson , ). As an example of bravery and “political shrewdness” among women, Plutarch relates the story of Aretaphila, the unwilling wife of a despot, who “dangled as bait” her beautiful daughter before the despot’s brother, “a young man and easy prey to such pleasures,” thereby leading to the despot’s demise (Mul. virt. e–e).



commentary

Num : (cf. :) simply states that the Midianites acted deceitfully in the affair of Baal Peor. According to Mos. .–, Balaam’s idea was that the Midianite women would be instructed to withhold their pleasures from the Hebrew youth, using their beauty and enticing speech as lures to ensnare them. Overcome with desire, they would be incapable of resisting the women’s invitation to worship pagan deities. Mos. . would seem to suggest either that Balak ignored this part of the plan or that it was only afterwards that the women were permitted “to have intercourse with whom they would.” Josephus’ version of the encounter goes even further in maximizing its novelistic potential. After an initial dalliance with the Hebrew youth, the Midianite women make plans to depart. Overcome with weeping and “terrible dejection,” the young men implore them to stay and become their wives, in response to which the women give a fairly long speech, indicating that they will do so only if they receive certain assurances, namely, that the men agree to abandon their dietary laws and sacrifice to pagan gods, which they proceed to do (Ant. .–; cf. b. San. a; Sifre Num. , ). invited them to make in honor of things wrought by hand offerings that should not have been offered. Philo draws on similar language when describing the golden calf incident (Mos. .; Spec. .). Num :– states that the people offered sacrifices to “their idols,” though only Baal Peor is mentioned. Whatever happened, the transgression was serious enough that “the Lord became very angry with Israel.” the One and truly existing God. See on § . § . had not the beneficent and merciful God taken pity on their misfortune. Because God is humankind’s benefactor and savior, as well as merciful by nature, he moderates any punishment that must be inflicted on it; see Opif. , with Runia , –. According to Num :, it was on account of Phinehas’ action that God did not “consume the children of Israel.” God . . . exacted punishment on those who had lost their senses, twenty-four thousand altogether. In the LXX, Moses is commanded to make a public example of all the leaders of the people (presumably by executing them; cf. the MT: “impale them in the sun”) in order to assuage the Lord’s wrath (Num :). Moses then instructs the people also to execute anyone in Israel who had been joined to Baal Peor (:). Then, after Phinehas kills Cozbi and Zimri, we hear that “the plague was stopped among the children of Israel,” a plague that took the lives of twenty-four thousand people (:b–). Given how abruptly it is introduced, it is not entirely clear whether πληγ= here refers to the events

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



of :–a (cf. y. San. d) or to some divinely-sent scourge (as in Exod :; :; :; Num :; :; etc.), though the wording of : suggests the former: “Cozbi . . . who was smitten (πεπληγυAαν) on the day of the plague (πληγ$ς) at Peor” (cf. vv. –). The former is certainly the case in Mos. .–, , where Philo interprets the deaths as the result of human punishments (cf. Mut. ). Specifically, Phinehas’ action sets an example for those Israelites “zealous for self-restraint and godliness,” who purge their nation of its defilement by killing the twentyfour thousand apostates in a single day. The brief statement Philo makes here in Fort.  is more ambiguous, leaving open the possibility that the latter might be involved. In his account, Josephus combines the possibilities: those imitating Phinehas killed many of the transgressors, while a disease sent by God destroyed the rest (Ant. .–). In Ps.Philo, L.A.B. : meanwhile, God sends an angel to kill the twenty-four thousand after Phinehas’ deed, in order to protect him from them; cf. y. San. b. overwhelmed as by a torrent. For the imagery, see on § . warning them through fear. It is often the case that individuals not only obey but also learn through fear, e.g., Mos. .; Spec. .; ., ; Praem. ; cf. Plato, Phaed. d; Protag. d–d; Glad , , . Cf. Deus : “I observe that all the exhortations to piety in the law (see below) refer either to our loving or our fearing the Existent.” § . the leader of the nation . . . selected and enrolled a thousand men of merit from each tribe. Now that the nation’s internal problems have been resolved, it can turn its attention to wreaking vengeance on its external enemies for their treachery (Mos. .). In contrast to Num :– and :–, which has Moses responding to God’s command to attack the Midianites and ordering the people to send out a thousand men from each of the tribes (cf. Judg :–), here, as in Mos. . (also Josephus, Ant. .), Moses both initiates the punitive war and selects the soldiers himself (cf. on §§ –). This accords with a general tendency in De Vita Mosis, where the different aspects or offices of the protagonist’s kingship are shown to include not only lawgiver, priest, and prophet (Mos. .–), but also 9γεμ8ν (“leader, general”); see ., , , , , , ; ., , , ; cf. Feldman . Mos. . also explains why Moses decides to limit the avenging force to twelve thousand: a larger army might prove unwieldy to manage, and it would be advantageous to keep the other fighters in reserve. Philo also adds that before dispatching the troops Moses offered favorable sacrifices. For the process of selecting and enrolling an army for a mission, cf. Xenophon,



commentary

Hell. ..; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; ..; ..; ..; Dionysius of Halicarnassis, Ant. rom. ..; Appian, Bell. civ. .; .. reciting the doctrines on piety into the ears and the souls of his subjects. I adopt the simple form of the text proposed by Colson (PLCL . ): τοAς Bσ τC DπEρ εσεβεας δγματα κα ταAς ψυχαAς τν Dπηκων 1π7,δων. Cohn (PCW .) prints τοAς Bσ τC DπEρ εσεβεας δγματα κα τCς ψυχCς τν Dπηκων το:τοις 1π,γων, though B2MV2OFH2 read ταAς ψυχαAς, V2O lack το:τοις, and all the mss have 1π,δων (= 1π7,δων; Wendland conjectures 1παρων). Besides these textcritical considerations, the adopted reading accords better with Spec. .: in order to imprint holiness in their minds, Moses constantly recites (1π7,δει) doctrines concerning the unicity and lordship of God to those zealous in piety. This concept most likely originates with the Phaedo, which explains how those who are pious recite to themselves truths about the soul as though they were incantations (Plato, Phaed. d), the ideal teacher in such matters functioning rather like a charmer (Phaed. e– a); cf. Plutarch, Conj. praec. c; Fac. orb. lun. c. For δγματα here, cf. Fort. ; and for a summary statement of such doctrines, see Opif. – . The substance of Moses’ pre-battle exhortation to the troops is given in Mos. .–: the purpose of their contest, he tells them, is not to win dominion or to acquire booty, but to defend the cause of piety and holiness. His words were such that they “kindled the gallantry of their souls to a flame,” inspiring them to face the enemy “with indomitable resolution” (.). Similarly, according to Cassius Dio, when addressing his troops on the eve of the battle of Actium, Augustus included himself among those whose words and deeds evidence superior piety, while casting aspersions on the eusebeia of Antony (Hist. rom. ..; ..). For eusebeia, see on § . to exact punishment for the trap they had devised. For this use of ναπρ,σσω + δκη, cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..; ..–; ... For μηχαν,ομαι + 1ν!δρα, cf. Spec. .; Josephus, Ant. .. § . arrayed against many myriads. Cf. Num :a: “And they arrayed themselves against Midian, as the Lord commanded Moses.” Philo replaces παρετ,ξαντο 1π with ντιταχ!ντες πρς. The size of the Midianite force is not indicated in the biblical account, though judging from the numbers assigned the booty in :– (e.g., thirty-two thousand virginal females), one could infer that it was quite large. Jose-

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



phus refers to a “countless mass” of Midianites, adding the curious comment that they, anticipating the approach of the Israelite army, secured the passes of the land by which they expected it to attack (Ant. .– ). experience and valor. Perhaps Philo mentions the former to distinguish the fighting group from the weak-willed youths of §§ –; cf. Mos. .. Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses the same two terms to describe a cohort of soldiers who are past the age for compulsory military service (Ant. rom. ..–; cf. Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..). As Plutarch explains, the lack of experience “both engenders rashness in a man, and robs a man of courage” (Comp. Per. Fab. .); cf. Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ... launched their assault on the thick ranks, killed those who stood in their way, and laid waste both the closely formed columns and all those waiting to fill the gaps . . . leaving none of the young men . . . alive. The accounts of the Israelite victory over the Midianites in Mos. . and Josephus, Ant. . reflect the succinctness of the biblical record, which simply states that “they slew every male” (:). For battlefield descriptions similar to the one here, cf. Abr. –; Mos. .–; Spec. .; Polybius, Hist. ..–; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..–; QM IX –. with scarcely a shout. The Jewish men out-do the Midianite women, who had hoped to achieve victory over Israel at their first appearance “without even trying” (§ ). Cf. Abr. , ; Mos. ., , ; .; Prob. . Generals usually sent their armies into battle shouting, e.g., Onasander, Strat. .–; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ... They also killed the women who had assented to the men’s unholy plans, but took the maidens alive. The unholy γνμαι of the Midianites can be contrasted with the γν8μη of the Israelites zealous for service in § ; cf. Schmid , . According to LXX Num , the Israelites “slew every male” among the Midianites (v. ), that is, every male combatant (see Wevers , ), taking “all the booty and all their spoils, from people up to cattle” (v. , cf. v. ). Upon the army’s return, Moses berates the officers for allowing the women to live, since they had played an instrumental role in the Baal Peor affair (vv. –). He then commands them to kill every male captive (the LXX drops “among the little ones” from the Hebrew text, which presumably took v.  to refer to the killing of all the Midianite men) and every sexually active female captive (v. ).



commentary

Only those females who had not had relations with a man are to be kept alive (v. ; the Hebrew text adds “for yourselves;” cf. Deut :– ; Judg :–). In Mos. ., Philo omits the scene from Num :– altogether, stating that both the virginal females and the young boys among the Midianites were shown mercy on account of their “tender age.” As Feldman (, ) suggests, Philo may have dropped the reference to killing every male child because it would have brought to mind the decree of Pharaoh in Exod :,  (cf. Mos. .). Here in Fort. , the status of non-combatant Midianite males is left unstated. Josephus does likewise, stating that the Israelites slew the inhabitants of the land together with their wives, sparing only the maidens (Ant. .). According to Cicero, showing leniency to vanquished enemies is among the basic obligations of the courageous leader (Off. .). Indeed, it was important to the Roman national self-image generally that this temperament be displayed by its fighting forces. Polybius sums up the expected deportment in Hist. ..: “Good men ought to be stern and high-spirited in combat, noble and high-minded when worsted, but moderate and merciful and humane when victorious.” Further, Winkler . The treatment of female war captives is also a topic in Hum. – . § . they lost none of their own men but returned . . . unwounded and whole. With the war over and the booty distributed, the army officers muster the men and report to Moses that “not one is missing from us” (Num :; cf. Wevers , ). Here, as well as in Mos. ., Philo takes this to mean that they returned unhurt as well; cf. Mut. ; Josephus, Ant. . (“unscathed”). In Ebr. –, Philo takes the ο διαπεφ8νηκεν of Num : as a reference to the one who lacks nothing in andreia, that is, his courage contains no element of either cowardice or recklessness (see on § ; cf. Conf. ). Tg. Ps.-J. Num : gives the text a moral sense: during the war not one of the Hebrew soldiers sinned with a Midianite woman. In /– bce, Augustus authorized military aggression against Arabia, noted as an imperial achievement in Res gest. divi Aug. .. In his account of the expedition, Strabo notes that in one engagement the Arab army lost ten thousand men, the invasionary force only two (Geogr. ..–; cf. Bowersock , –; Isaac , –, –). In Philo’s reimagining of the Israelite victory over the Arabs/Midianites, soldiers schooled in the Mosaic law achieve a similarly impressive victory, though, without suffering a single casualty, they are able to do the Romans one, or two, better.

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



the joy of victory. To win a battle without suffering any causalities would be a cause for joy, e.g., Josephus, Bell. .; cf. Polybius, Hist. ..; ..; Onasander, Strat. .. § . the cause of these things was . . . the eagerness to undertake valiantly the fight on behalf of piety. Philo’s accounting for the Israelites’ success reflects an historiographical tradition of combat description (popular especially with Roman authors) in which victory is attributed not to factors like numerical superiority, better generalship, or good fortune, but to the exceptional virtue of the combatants themselves (Lendon ). Such descriptions were wont to analyze battlefield outcomes in “psychological” terms, that is, with respect to the condition of the participants’ ψυχα (cf. Fort. –, –). Polybius, Hist. ..–, for example, explains that Roman military success depends on a combination of ρετ= and εψυχα (cf. ..–; ..–; ..; ..; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..), while Julius Caesar accentuates a clutch of virtues, including courage, greatness of spirit, obedience, and self-control (Bell. gall. .; cf. Plutarch, Caes. .). Inspired by the doctrines that Moses had recited into their souls (see on § ), the Hebrew soldiers exhibit proper courage by acting as defenders of piety, displaying faithfulness to both God and their leader (cf. Mos. .–, –, discussed below in Parallel exegesis). During the golden calf incident, the Levites, out of the same eagerness to defend the cause of piety, had acted similarly, responding to Moses’ summons like troops responding to their general’s signal, slaying all those guilty of apostasy (Mos. .–; cf. Abr. ; Spec. ., ; .; .). Elsewhere Philo singles out eusebeia as the greatest of the virtues (e.g., Abr. ; Mos. .; Spec. .; cf. on Hum. ; Paen. ). In this he differed from other thinkers, who characterized it as a part of justice (e.g., Plato, Euthypr. e) or as one in a list of virtues (e.g., SVF ., ). As he put it, “the supreme source of all that exists is God, just as piety is the supreme source of virtues” (Decal. ). The proper understanding and appropriation of virtue, then, depends on the proper understanding of—and reverence for—God and God’s governance of the world (Sterling , ). In Eth. nic. .., Aristotle had argued that “the courageous person endures and acts in accord with courage for the sake of what is noble.” David Konstan suggests that here Philo adapts this view to his biblical source, substituting eusebeia for to kalon. However, “he also means something more, namely that God allies himself with those who are faithful to him, and it is thanks to His intervention and support that the Hebrews are triumphant” (, ). Indeed,



commentary

it was only through such support that they could defeat such a numerically superior foe (cf. §§ , ). In this, Philo’s position can be compared with other “theologies of victory” being promulgated in the Greco-Roman world, according to which battlefield success proves superior piety (Fears ). The views of Dionysius of Halicarnassus would have been typical in this regard. Recognizing how “the gods take a hand in all actions, and especially in those relating to war,” the Romans were careful to initiate hostilities only when the reasons for doing so could be defended as “pious and just” (Ant. rom. ..–; cf. ..; ..). Because the motives for their wars were always “most holy,” the gods were propitious to them, granting them many victories (..–), which served as evidence of their piety (..). More generally, pietas figures prominently in imperial canons of virtues, as a way of signalling the emperor’s devotion to the state and the gods upon whom its welfare ultimately depends (e.g., Res gest. divi Aug. .; cf. Wallace-Hadrill ; Noreña ). God also fights on the front lines. The parallel account of the battle in Mos. .– makes no mention of divine intervention in its outcome. As Philo goes on to explain (cf. § ), God’s participation in the Israelites’ wars is in fact invisible, consisting of guidance for the soldiers’ minds and energy for their bodies; cf. Praem. . In other situations, it is not God but justice that serves as an ally, e.g., Mos. .; Spec. .; Praem. . The inspiration for the choice of προαγωνζομαι (literally, “to fight before”) here might be Deut :: “For it is the Lord your God who goes before with you (προπορευμενος με Dμν) to fight your enemies with you, in order to save you” (note the interaction with Deut :– in §§ –); cf. :; :; :; :, . Note also how Deut : (see on § ) promises that the Lord will deliver up the nation’s enemies “before you” (πρ προσ8που σου); cf. :; :; :; :. For Deuteronomy’s ideology of the divine warrior, see Miller , –. Greco-Roman mythology, of course, frequently represents gods intervening in human battles (e.g., Homer, Il. .–) or rousing human combatants (e.g., Il. .; .; .; .). In Virgil’s depiction of the battle of Actium, for example, Augustus leads the Italians into battle “with the senators and people, with the Penates and great gods” (Aen. .–) against a cadre of perverse Oriental deities and suprahuman forces of chaos (.–). The outcome of the battle is ultimately determined by the intervention of Apollo, so that “all Egypt and India, all Arabians, all Sabaeans turned their backs in flight” (.–); cf. on §§ , . In this re-imagining, then, both the emperor’s reverence for the ancestral gods and their support for

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



him are demonstrated conclusively in a paradigmatic military conquest over the forces of an alien social and religious order; cf. Gurval , –. § . none of their friends were killed. The term φλος could be used of a military ally (e.g., Xenophon, Hell. ..; Demosthenes, Or. .; Josephus, Ant. ., , ), though this statement has no obvious connection with the biblical text. Perhaps Philo is thinking that each tribe’s warriors were allies to those from the other tribes. neither their number nor physical power was diminished. 1λαττω!ντων is Cohn’s correction (PCW .) for 1λαττω!ντες (S), 1λαττω!ντος (G), 1λαττω$ναι (VOF), and 1λαττωεAσαν (ceteri) in the mss. () § . For that reason. §§ – conclude both the war narrative and the entire subtreatise. Those who support the cause of virtue are assured of God’s saving powers in times of both peace and war. the Exhortations. Elsewhere ο προτρεπτικο refers to Deuteronomy (Agr. , ; Fug. , ; Mut. , ; works by that title are attributed to Antisthenes and Posidonius: Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; ., ), though the thought behind §§ – is actually based (loosely) on a combination of Lev :, – and Deut :,  (cf. :). These texts are similar in that each belongs to a catalogue of blessings/promises and curses/threats (Lev :– and Deut :– respectively) meant to motivate compliance with the law. Both catalogues figure prominently in the treatise that immediately follows ours, De praemiis et poenis, especially §§ –; cf. Borgen , –; Josephus, Ant. ., , –; m. Meg. :. If you practice justice and holiness and the other virtues. In Lev : and Deut :, the precondition for receiving divine blessings is not the cultivation of virtue but obedience to the Lord’s commandments. Versions of the so-called canon of two virtues (for which see on Hum.  and Paen. ) like the one here are meant to summarize virtuous living in general. As Philo explains in Abr. , “the nature which is pious is also humane, and the same person will exhibit both qualities, holiness towards God and justice towards people” (cf. Spec. .; Mos. .). In Theaet. b (which Philo quotes in Fug. ), Plato correlates practicing these virtues with the imitation of God: “one becomes like God when he becomes just and holy, with understanding” (cf. Euth. e; Crito b; Resp. b). For this particular formulation of the canon, see also Deut : (quoted in Sacr. ); : (quoted in Sobr. ; Mut. ); Wis :;



commentary

Luke :; Eph :; Epictetus, Diatr. ..; Plutarch, Adul. amic. a; Ps.-Musonius Rufus, Epist. .. Philo refers to it again at the end of the subtreatise (§ ). you will live a life without war and forever peaceful. Lev :b– a: “And you will dwell in safety on your land, and war will not go through your land. And I will give peace in your land; and you will lie down, and there shall be no one making you afraid.” In the biblical context, these verses refer to freedom from civil strife, while those which follow (see below) refer to the defeat of external enemies (Milgrom , –). In Praem. , Philo offers a more literal rendering of Lev :, adding the explanation that war will not ravage the land because Israel’s enemies will perceive that she has justice as an “irresistible ally.” if war does break out, you will prevail over your enemies easily, God commanding your armies unseen. The aid God sends the Israelites in defeating their foes is real, even if it is invisible (e.g., Mos. .). Deut : promises that God will convert an orderly enemy force into packs of terrified deserters: “The Lord your God will deliver up your enemies who have withstood you, beating them before you; they shall come out against you one way and shall flee seven ways from before you.” Lev :– promises victory even against a numerically superior foe: “You will pursue your enemies, and they will fall before you by slaughter. And five of you will pursue a hundred, and a hundred of you will pursue myriads. And your enemies will fall before you by the sword.” After offering a more literal rendering of the Leviticus passage in Praem. , Philo joins to it in §  the “oracle” of Num :, according to which “there shall come forth a man” to lead the Hebrews in battle and conquer their enemies. For Philo’s messianic ideas, see Hecht ; Borgen . As Mendelson (, ) observes, in articulating the benefits of moral conduct in Fort. –, “Philo does not simply encourage his readers to cling to what is just and holy because virtue is intrinsically good. Instead he spells out . . . the quid pro quo which human beings can expect to operate in their lives. God’s role in the interchanges . . . is active and interventionist.” This contrasts with the perspective of De praemiis et poenis, where in describing divine rewards and punishments the Alexandrian is generally reluctant to involve God directly, relying more on the action of intermediaries. whose concern it is to save the good. Given Philo’s interaction with Deut  throughout this part of the treatise (cf. on § ), the likely source of this language is Deut : (cf. Num :): “For it is the Lord your God

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



who goes before with you to fight your enemies with you, in order to save you (διασσαι DμOς).” Note also the reference to God’s “saving powers” in § . § . if a well-equipped army of both infantry and cavalry attacks you with many myriads, or if, having previously seized your fortified positions . . . Lev :– provides no particular description of the hostile forces, while Deut : refers to them simply as “your enemies who have withstood you.” For Philo’s elaboration of the enemy’s size and composition, we can compare several passages in Deuteronomy, composed after the style of prebattle exhortations, which depict the Israelites defeating a superior foe with divine assistance, e.g., :–; :–; :–; :–; :–. See especially Deut : (“They are a nation great and numerous and more powerful than us, and they have cities great and fortified up to heaven.”) and : (“If you should go forth to war against your enemies and see horse and rider and a people more numerous than you.”). do not be terrified and fearful. The command to “fear not” is a regular part of such exhortations; see Deut :; :; :; :. § . like a cargo ship . . . which a violent wind will . . . overturn . . . like rain and snow on ears of corn. In a kind of parable (Feldman , ; cf. Niehoff , –), divine activity is likened to the weather, whose forces can either thwart human activities or support them. Navigating a trading vessel could be dangerous if the winds were not right, e.g., Flacc. , ; cf. Det. ; Conf. –; Spec. .; .; Wilson , . withered from drought and lack of water, so that they are revived and produce fruit in fullness. The human food supply is susceptible to all manner of destructive forces, “sometimes rain storms, sometimes droughts, or countless other violent changes in nature” (Spec. .; cf. .; Xenophon, Oec. .–), yet providence assures that everyone has enough to eat (see on § ). Similar imagery is used in Hum. , . § . it is essential to embrace. δεA . . . περι!χεσαι is Cohn’s (PCW . ) emendation for ε (or α>ε) . . . περι!χεται in the mss. what is just and holy. See on § . those to whom the divine is an ally are exceedingly fortunate, while those to whom it is an enemy are extremely unfortunate. Since God alone is fortunate (Spec. .), those who wish to be fortunate as well must have him as their ally; this means doing what is well-pleasing to God (Abr. ; cf. Opif. ; Ebr. ; Somn. ). Philo would have been in general agreement with Plato, according to whom “there are two



commentary

patterns set up in reality. One is divine and supremely fortunate; the other has nothing of God in it, and is the pattern of the deepest misfortune.” The evildoer fails to perceive how his unjust practices “make him grow more and more like the one, and less and less like the other” (Theaet. e–a; cf. Tim. e; Leg. a, b; Ps.-Plato, Min. b). For more on eudaimonia (“good fortune, well-being”), see on Hum. . For the contrast with kakodaimonia, see on Nob. .

Parallel Exegesis Fort. – can be compared with the more critical, more esoteric treatment accorded Deut :– in Agr. –. Philo begins by introducing the topic of spiritual warfare: only those who have achieved perfection of soul can withstand the onslaught of “massed bodies of sins” (§ ). This is why in times of war Moses instructs certain types of individuals to remain at home, so that they can acquire greater skill and strength through practice (§§ –). This sets the stage for an imaginary debate regarding the literal meaning of the law between one of the law’s supporters and a “malicious critic,” with the latter making the lengthier and more potent arguments: those with something to defend will actually make for better soldiers (§ ); their possessions will be of no value if they are vanquished, and their absence from the battlefield makes that outcome more likely (§ ); it is unfair for some to enjoy themselves with peacetime activities while others endure the hardships of war (§§ –); it is in fact more onerous to see one’s property captured by the enemy than to die defending it, since then it will still pass to one’s heirs (§§ –). While conceding that the letter of the law perhaps suggests such considerations, Philo does not so much respond to these points as change the subject, proceeding to explore the law’s inner meaning through allegorical exegesis. At this level, what the law concerns are the faculties of the soul (§ ). The man betrothed to a maiden is the beginner, who looks forward to one day marrying paideia; the one who has planted a vineyard stands for those who are progressing, that is, they are still cultivating prudence; and the one who has just built a house represents those who have recently achieved perfection (§ ). The Alexandrian contends that none of these groups should engage in warfare with the sophists (§ ), even the newly perfect, since they are still insufficiently practiced in virtue and unconscious of their wisdom (§§ –; cf. SVF .–).

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



Philo’s most detailed account of Numbers  +  occurs in Mos. . –. As in De fortitudine, emphasis is placed on the elements of seduction and revenge, though this version differs in assigning a greater role to Moses, in failing to mention divine involvement in the victory, and in its discussion of the “pious” apportionment of the booty (cf. Begg ). Following Num :, Philo attributes the idea for the affair of Baal Peor to Balaam, who counsels Balak to use the beauty of the young women in his kingdom as bait, to lure the Israelites to sin and impiety (.–). The women have considerable success with this until Phinehas, seeing one of his compatriots shamelessly consorting with a prostitute, kills them both, an act which, at the command of Moses, others copy, resulting in the deaths of all those who had taken part in the idolatry (.–; cf. Leg. .; Mut. ). The purging complete, Phinehas is rewarded with the blessings of peace and priesthood (.; cf. Num :–; Post. –; Ebr. –; Conf. ; Spec. .–). With the nation’s domestic troubles resolved, Moses turns his attention to those responsible for plotting the affair. From each tribe he dispatches a thousand troops, all under the command of Phinehas (cf. Num :; Josephus, Ant. .), against Balak, exhorting them “to defend piety and holiness” (.–). The Israelites not only win the battle without suffering a single casualty (Num :–), they utterly demolish the cities of Balak’s realm, putting all the adult men and women to death (.–; cf. Mut. ; no mention is made of the death of Balaam and the five kings of Midian in Num :; cf. Josephus, Ant. .). Consequently, upon their return, Moses does not berate the officers for allowing the women to live, as Num :– describes, but instead praises them for their exploits and for placing their spoils in the common stock (.–a). After the soldiers are purified by the high priest (cf. Num :–, ; also :–; no mention is made of Eleazar’s instructions in :–), Moses distributes the booty, half going to the combatants, the other half to the reserve troops (.b–; cf. Num :–, –;  Kgdms :). He then decides that a first fruit offering ought to be made from the spoil, the combatants contributing one item out of every five-hundred to the high priest, the non-combatants one out of every fifty to the Levites (.; cf. Num :–; Migr. ; Her. ). The officers of the army then volunteer to make a special dedication of all the gold ornaments they had plundered (Num :–; cf. Ebr. –), which is taken as evidence of their eusebeia (.– ).



commentary Nachleben

In Strom. .. (see the Nachleben for Fort. –), Clement had identified two canons of virtues, with eusebeia serving as their capstone. On one of the few instances in which he departs significantly from the order of his source (cf. part  of the Introduction), Clement passes over Fort. – , , , – (see below) to the summary of Israel’s monotheistic belief in Fort. , which he extracts and divides. Strom. .. gives a summary of what eusebeia (cf. Fort. , ) teaches, namely, “to worship and honor the highest and oldest Cause.” Strom. .. then explains that the law abets this pedagogical process by putting justice and wisdom (cf. ..) into the mind by teaching abstinence from idolatry and “devotion to the Maker and Father of all things.” Clement continues by borrowing the phrase δξα φ Pς οQα πηγ$ς from Fort. , though for him δξα refers not to Israel’s monotheistic “doctrine,” but to the “opinion” he had just expressed in ... For Strom ..–.. and its use of Fort. –, ,  see the Nachleben for Fort. –. Immediately after the discussion of Deut : (.. –), Clements offers his comments on Deut :–, beginning with a quotation of the biblical text based on Philo’s paraphrase in Fort.  (..). He offers the same two reasons for the law that Philo does, but reverses their order. First, there are military considerations. Men set on their desires are of little use in war, “for they prepare themselves to face dangers without hesitation if they are free in their impulses” (..; cf. Fort. : “with free and unbound impulses they might prepare themselves to face dangers without hesitation.”). Second are humanitarian concerns (for the use of φιλανρ8πως here, see on Fort. ). Since the affairs of war are δηλα, it was deemed unjust “for one not to have use of his own labors and for another to take without toil what belongs to those who work” (..; cf. Fort. : “since the outcomes of war are uncertain, others should not take without toil the possessions of those who labored for them.”). The section concludes by observing how the law exhibits courage of the soul when it legislates that “he who has planted ought to reap the fruit, and he who builds a house ought to inhabit it, and he who is engaged ought to marry, for it does not provide vain hopes” (..). This sentence utilizes a fair amount of material from Fort. , though it expresses the latter’s negative outcomes (e.g., “for one to build a house and another to inhabit it”) in positive terms and inverts the order of the first two items. The theme of hope is reinforced in .. with quotations from Prov : and :.

on courage –: in wartime, §§ –



Clement compresses Philo’s retelling of Numbers  +  into a single paragraph (..–..; cf. Origen, In Num. hom. .–), using largely his own words, though note σωφροσ:νη (cf. Fort. ), κρασα, 9δον= (cf. Fort. ), δελε,ζω (cf. Fort. ), στρατ=γημα (cf. Fort. , ), and, at the end of ..: “fear with its warning pulled back those at risk” (cf. Fort. : “God . . . pulled back those at risk . . . warning them through fear.”). As van den Hoek (, –) notes, for Philo, “it is God who conducts the saving action (Virt. , , –), but using φβος as subject, Clement has the Hebrews themselves gain mastery over their enemies.” The victors are then described as those “valiantly undertaking the fight on behalf of piety” (..), borrowing a phrase from Fort. . The section concludes with a pair of scripture quotations (Prov :; :) elaborating on the themes of piety and fear (..) and a benediction drawn from Barn. :–, b (..). Further reading: Begg ; Feldman ; Niditch ; Wilson a.

ON HUMANITY CHAPTERS 1–4 THE DEATH AND SUCCESSION OF MOSES (§§ 51–79)

Analysis/General Comments The presentation of Mosaic philanthr¯opia in De humanitate falls into three major sections. The first demonstrates the humanity of the lawgiver (§§ –), the second the humanity of his laws (§§ –), and the third the humanity of the ruling classes of the nation for which these laws were established (§§ –). For a more detailed overview of the subtreatise’s contents, see part  of the Introduction. In describing the humanity of the lawgiver, Philo concentrates on certain events that occurred at the end of his life. The Pentateuch preserves two accounts of Moses’ death and succession, Num :– and Deut :–:. The former explains how leadership of the Israelites in military affairs (note especially the language of v. ) is transferred to Joshua. God instructs Moses to ascend a nearby mountain to view the promised land: “once you have seen it, you shall be gathered to your people” (vv. –). This prompts Moses to ask God to appoint his successor, lest the people “be like sheep without a shepherd” (vv. –). He is then told to take Joshua and “lay your hands upon him” in the presence of Eleazar and all the people (vv. –). As v.  goes on to explain, however, Joshua’s command will be subordinate to the oracular authority of the priesthood: unlike Moses, he will not know God’s will directly. The passage concludes with a brief description of the commissioning ceremony itself (vv. –). The latter is a far longer and more complex composition, interweaving various materials concerning Moses’ “threefold succession” (Talstra ), that is, materials concerning Joshua, the law, and the Song of Moses. As with the previous account, Joshua’s role is principally military in nature. Moses informs the people that he will not be crossing the Jordan to lead the conquest of Canaan. Responsibility for this falls instead to Joshua, who is charged to be “strong and bold” (:–). The appointment is ratified by a second ceremony, in which God commissions Joshua before Moses in the tent of meeting (vv. –, ). In addition, between commissioning ceremonies, Moses



commentary

writes down the law in a book and transmits it to the Levitical personnel, who are to read it before the people every seventh year (vv. –; cf. vv. –). And during the second ceremony itself, God instructs Moses to write down a song and teach it to the Israelites “as a witness for me against them” when they turn to other gods after entering the promised land (vv. –; cf. vv. –, where the same function is ascribed to the book of the law). Chapter  then records the song itself, which recounts Israel’s history with Yahweh in terms of divine adoption and blessings (vv. –), Israel’s apostasy (vv. –), the resulting declaration of divine punishment (vv. –), and finally a reversal (vv. –), in which God decides instead to destroy Israel’s enemies and “vindicate his people” (see Nelson , –). The hymnic review is framed by invocations of a heavenly audience (vv. –, ). After teaching the song to the people (vv. –), Moses is instructed by God to ascend Mount Nebo where he will die (vv. –, repeating the announcement of Num :–). But before doing so, he proclaims his final blessing on each of the twelve tribes (:–), much like Jacob before him (cf. Gen :–), though with an emphasis on the law (:, ). Moses then follows God’s instructions (:–) and after dying is interred in the land of Moab, though “no one knows his burial place to this day” (:). Philo’s retelling of these events in De humanitate is organized around two “proofs” of the humanity that Moses demonstrated as his life drew to a close (note the structural use of δεAγμα in §§ , , and ), the first concerning the choice of his successor (§§ –), the second concerning the messages that he delivered to help ensure the people’s welfare (§§ – ). () A brief introduction (§§ –) to these proofs has a two-fold purpose. First, it reminds the reader of the intimate relationship that philanthr¯opia enjoys with eusebeia. This anticipates one of the section’s major arguments: the humanity evidenced by Moses towards his people is an expression of his reverence for God (see also §§ , ) and as such is communicated through specific acts of piety, especially prayer, supplication, and thanksgiving (§§ –, –). Second, it expressly identifies the story that follows as an addendum to De vita Mosis (see part  of the Introduction), which concluded with only a very brief description of Moses’ death (.–). In this regard it is important to note that the last major section of De vita Mosis (.–) assembles material meant to present its protagonist as a prophet, and many of the themes apropos of that presentation continue in Hum. – (e.g., §§ , –). (a) The first proof (§§ –) describes and explains the decisions

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  that Moses made about how his successor would be selected. In its basic plot the story is reminiscent of episodes in the final, “prophetic” section of De vita Mosis where Moses defers judgment in a difficult matter to God (., , , ). Philo explains that when he learned of his impending death, Moses did not, like most rulers, look from among his sons or nephews for a successor (§§ –). (b) Nor did he choose his friend and pupil Joshua, even though there was ample evidence of his virtue and goodwill for the nation (§§ –). (c) Instead, he decided to beseech God to make the decision, since God alone can accurately discern the character of a person’s soul (§§ – ). (d) Rounding out the rather spare narrative are Philo’s speculations as to this decision-making process, set in the form of an exchange between Moses and an imaginary interlocutor (§§ –, cf. §§ , ). Three reasons in particular are proffered. First, Moses believed that divine wisdom is more reliable than human judgment. Second, by leaving the decision to God he was following the historical precedent set when he himself had been appointed to lead the people. Third, he recognized that the decision at hand was a weighty one, the nation’s pre-eminence in piety being contingent upon its good leadership. (a) The second proof (§§ –) describes the last three messages that Moses delivered in his earthly life, each of which confers an important benefit on the nation. First, he commissions Joshua before the people and exhorts him on the art of ruling well (§§ –). In so doing he provides a model for future leaders. (b) In §§ –, he offers a hymn to God, which serves as a model of thanksgiving for the people to follow. Also present are celestial witnesses, who are astounded at how Moses could join his soul so harmoniously with the movements of the universe. (c) Finally, as his soul migrates from his body, Moses offers intercessory prayers to God on behalf of each of the twelve tribes (§§ –). These prayers express his understanding of the nation’s kinship with God, especially as suppliants. Descriptions of the immortality and ascent that Moses achieves upon his death (§§ , , –) act as assurances of the authority of his words, though throughout the main point is that Moses’ final concerns were not about his own destiny but about the well-being of the state. In retelling this story, Philo draws extensively on both of the Pentateuchal accounts summarized above, especially in the following paragraphs:

 §  §§ – §§ – §§ – §  §§ –

commentary Num :– Num :– Num :–

+

Deut :– Deut :– Deut : Deut :–

The basic ordering of events, then, is canonical, with the commissioning of Joshua (§§ –) serving as the linchpin between Num  and Deut –, though Philo may have been anticipating the latter as early as § , which mentions the ruler’s responsibility to protect the nation from the error of idolatry (cf. Deut :, ; :–, ). Even as he maintains the outline (and sometimes the actual wording, e.g., §§ , ) of the biblical record, Philo has reshaped the source material in some significant ways. Perhaps most obviously, all references to the conquest, and indeed all historical and geographical particulars of any kind, have been expunged. With no land to conquer and divide, Joshua now emerges as a moral, not a military, leader. The criteria of succession are recast as a matter not of battlefield prowess but of virtue and wisdom more generally. Also expunged are all biblical references to Eleazar, the priests, and the tent of meeting. No indication is given that the authority bequeathed to Joshua is in any way qualified or shared, though §  at least indirectly suggests that after Moses’ death a new division of labor will be in effect. In §  (cf. §§ , , ), Philo also goes out of his way to explain that when considering the choice of a successor Moses was not motivated by nepotism, introducing a theme that has no obvious basis in the biblical text. This addition reinforces the connection between Hum. – and the final chapters of De vita Mosis (see .– ). It also contributes to one of the major themes of De virtutibus, namely, that in its fundamental character and priorities the Jewish nation is based not on blood but on virtue (see part  of the Introduction). If the “heir” of Moses is chosen with consideration for the latter, then the people he leads are assured of being the “heir” of divine blessings (§§ , ). Finally, no mention is made of the law, so that all treatment of that part of Moses’ legacy is postponed until the review in §§ –. Ultimately, then, each of the four offices embodied by Moses as leader of the nation (Mos. .; Praem. ) is shown in De humanitate to be transferred in some way: the office of king to Joshua, that of high priest to Moses’ nephews, while his work as lawgiver is conveyed by the law itself. Finally, Moses’ prophetic legacy also appears to be preserved, though not

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  by his successor (see on §§ , ), but by his final blessings for the people, oracular pronouncements which they believe “will be fulfilled” (§ ; cf. Mos. .–). The succession account was a popular and flexible genre in antiquity. Besides the actual appointment of the successor, standard features include consultation with divine authorities, words of encouragement for the successor, and indications as to the outgoing leader’s final bequests, legacies, and/or blessings. Besides the numerous examples from political, historical, and philosophical sources surveyed by Talbert and Stepp (), see Xenophon, Cyr. ..– and  Macc :–. The genre overlapped considerably in form and content with that of the testament (for which see von Nordheim , –). Along these lines Hum. –  may be compared especially with the (much more somber) Testament of Moses, which is also heavily dependent on Deut – (cf. Ps.Philo, L.A.B. :–). The characterization of Moses’ encouragement for Joshua as paraenesis (§ ) would also have been in keeping with the occasion projected by such sources insofar as this type of exhortation was generally deemed to be appropriate for someone assuming a new role (Gammie ). In particular, a number of ancient texts present themselves as instruction from a dying or deceased king to his successors regarding proper rule (Perdue ). In biblical literature, the best example of such a succession speech is the “testament” of David ( Kgs :–; cf. Porter , –). In Greco-Roman literature, royal instructions are often delivered at the beginning of a new king’s reign, e.g., Isocrates, Ad Nicoclem; Dio Chrysostom, Or. . Philo’s narrative in Hum. – also bears comparison with accounts that celebrate the noble death of a philosopher, especially Plato’s Phaedo (cf. Döring ). Like Socrates, Moses is as exemplary in death as he was in life, facing the end of bodily existence with serenity, confident in what he has taught his followers about the immortality and ascent of the soul.

Detailed Comments () § . piety, its sister and twin. In part  of the Introduction, the evidence that De humanitate was originally preceded by a treatise “On Piety” was reviewed and found wanting. Other explanations need to be offered, then, as to why Philo mentions eusebeia at this juncture. To begin with, it is worth noting that the term occurs twice near the end of De fortitudine (§§ , ; and cf. 2σιτης in §§ , , , and



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3σιος in § ), and so its presence here might represent an effort to help

link De humanitate with the preceding subtreatise. It is also relevant to recall the foundational role that Philo assigns this virtue: just as God is the source of all that exists, piety is the source (ρχ=) of all virtues (Decal. ; cf. Josephus, C. Ap. .). It stands to reason, then, that Philo might want to introduce the discussion of a virtue by explaining the nature of its relationship to this source (which is the case also with the subtreatise that immediately follows; see Paen. ). Such an approach would be particularly apropos in the case of humanity: elsewhere he speaks of the two together as “queens of the virtues” (Hum. ), the “two main heads” of human responsibility (Spec. .), and summaries of the two tables of the decalogue (Her. ). Virtue in its full sense necessarily attends to both (Decal. ) and thus the two are mutually implicating: “The nature that is pious is also humane, and the same person will exhibit both qualities, holiness towards God and justice towards others” (Abr. ; cf. Demosthenes, Or. .; Polybius, Hist. ..; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; ..; Pausanius, Graec. descr. ..; Winston , –). The pairing of piety and humanity, then, represents something of a thesis for our treatise, which will go on to demonstrate how both the lawmaker himself (Hum. ) and the laws that he established (Hum. ) embody this two-fold ideal (cf. Völker , –). As for the former, it is important to note that in our section Moses is displayed engaging in various acts of piety, including prayer, supplication, and thanksgiving (§§ –, –). Further, Sterling . the prophet of our laws. Only S has 2 προφ=της τν νμων. All other mss have 2 πατ+ρ τν νμων. Although neither phrase occurs elsewhere in Philo’s corpus, the former is more likely to be the original reading, since () he generally associates Moses’ role as prophet with the promulgation of the “oracles,” that is, the sacred books of the law (e.g., Mos. .–; Decal. –, ) and () Hum. – is a continuation of De vita Mosis, which concludes by examining a series of events demonstrating Moses’ prophetic capabilities (.–), and the announcement of this role for Moses here anticipates elements of the story that follows (e.g., §§ , ). In ancient Judaism various texts (rooted especially in Deut :) eulogized Moses as the original or greatest prophet of the Jews (e.g., Decal. ; QG .; .; Josephus, Ant. .; Ginzberg , .; ., –). fellowship. For κοινωνα and its relationship with philanthr¯opia, see on Hum. .

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  a beautiful model. As a νμος ;μψυχος (Mos. .; .; cf. Abr. – ; Ios. ; Nob. ), Moses not only establishes and enforces the law, his moral character sets an example from which others can learn what is right (cf. Hum. , ). In this he fulfills what would have been generally expected of the ideal ruler (Klassen ) who, inasmuch as he imitates the heavenly ruler, “reproduces the divine image” on earth (Goodenough , ). Philo is obviously familiar with such themes, though, as Wayne Meeks observes, his appropriation of them is distinctive inasmuch as “Moses’ paradigmatic office is founded upon a mystic vision,” the one that he has after ascending Sinai (, ). Having beheld “the form of virtue in perfection” and “the archetypal essence of everything that exists,” Moses himself becomes an image “beautiful and godlike” that others can behold and imprint on their own souls (Mos. .–; cf. Exod :; Post. –; Somn. .; QE .; further, Mack ). § . the care and protection of each and all of his people. De vita Mosis had concluded by noting the “concern and protection for each and all” that Moses extended to his people (.), a sentiment that is resumed here (see the next note). On 1πιμ!λεια, see § . the two treatises that I wrote. That Philo composed De humanitate in part as a supplement and conclusion to De vita Mosis, and on the relationship of the latter to the Exposition, see part  of the Introduction. He makes reference to that treatise also in Praem. . In lieu of δυσ, CG2 read τρισ, in agreement with the division of De vita Mosis in the mss; see Royse , , . excellence of character. As one of the defining virtues of the noble, ruling classes (e.g., Philo, Mos. .; Legat. ; Xenophon, Ages. .; Musonius Rufus, frg. ..–.), it is not surprising that καλοκγαα figures prominently in the succession story; see also §§ , , ; Nob. , , , . a distinct seal . . . a divine impression. Philo frequently employs the imagery of the seal and impression to explain the relationship between intelligible and sense-perceptible realities, specifically, how the latter are created or shaped as copies of the models provided by the former, adapting metaphors familiar especially from the writings of Plato (Tim. e, c–d; Theaet. c–a) and Middle Platonism (Runia , – ; Dillon , ). Popa () notes how such imagery indicates the similarities between a paradigm and its corresponding replica(s), even as it marks the difference between the oneness or transcendency of the former and the multiplicity and transience of the latter. For Philo’s own explanation of the metaphor, see Spec. .–. One of the places

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where it figures prominently is in his interpretation of the creation story. The human being modeled after the divine image, for instance, can be construed as “a kind of idea or genus or seal” (Opif. , cf. , ; and for complications attending the use of the metaphor in this instance, Runia , –; see also Opif. –). For a different application, cf. Mos. ., where we learn that the model of the sanctuary was stamped on Moses’ mind. It is also possible to speak of divine virtues and moral truths being “impressed” on the soul through obedience to Moses and his laws (Spec. ., ; .; .; and see on Fort. ; Hum. ). (a) § . clear pronouncements. The first proof (§§ –) of Moses’ humanity focuses on the decisions he made concerning the selection of a successor to lead the people. In Deut :, , Moses is informed directly by God that the time for him to die has drawn near (cf. Deut. Rab. .), though this occurs only after Moses has commissioned his successor before the people (:–). More likely Philo is following the sequence of events in Num :–, which begins with a divine pronouncement regarding Moses’ death (vv. –), though he fails to mention its explanation as to why Moses was being forbidden to continue with the Israelites into the promised land, that is, because of his disobedience in the wilderness of Zin (Num :–; cf. Mos. .–). According to the basic scenario of the testamental genre, the eponymous patriarch will have foreknowledge of his impending death, which is sometimes explicitly attributed to divine revelation, as in T. Levi :; T. Abr. :–; cf. Xenophon, Cyr. ... migration. On μεταν,στασις, see on § . one intention and prayer. This contrasts with the prayers that Moses offers in §§ – and –. On the desirability of male heirs in antiquity, see Wilson , . children as heirs. The succession of kings and emperors was ordinarily determined by familial relation, either biological ties or legal adoption, e.g., Legat. –; Josephus, Ant. .; Bell. .; .; Tacitus, Ann. .. Further, Evans ; and on § . One of the problems perceived in the institution of monarchy was that kings will typically want their children to inherit the rule even if they are not worthy (Aristotle, Pol. ..). In Legat. , Philo approves of the fact that the emperor Augustus received sovereignty “not through lineal succession as a portion of his inheritance but because he himself became a source of veneration.” Later in De humanitate Joshua is explicitly identified as Moses’ κληρονμος (§ ). For rules of inheritance among “commoners,” see,

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  e.g., Num :– (the passage that immediately precedes the account of Joshua’s succession) and cf. Hum. . In Plato’s Leges, a father is expected to bequeath his estate to one of his sons, though it may be whichever of them “he deems worthy to be his heir” (c–a). On Greco-Roman practices of inheritance see Lacey , –; Fox . two sons. Exodus reports that Moses had two sons, Gershom and Eliezer (:–). According to Cher. , Zipporah was found to be pregnant with the former (Exod :–) “through no mortal agency,” though it is unclear if and how this singles him out for any special purpose. At any rate, neither he nor his brother were found to be suitable for the priesthood (Mos. .). goodwill for kin. The εIνοια of Moses (§ ) and his successor (§ ) is directed above all at the nation. ενοας συγγενικ$ς is Mangey’s (, ) emendation (followed by PCW .) for ενοας συγγενεας (S) and ενοα (γ,πη A) συγγενικ$ (ceteri) in the mss. under suspicion. According to some rabbinic traditions, Moses had hoped to appoint one of his sons to take his place, but God deemed them unworthy “because they concerned themselves little with the Torah” (Ginzberg , .). Feldman (, ) mentions additionally the rabbinic tradition that identified Gershom as the youth who reported the prophesying of Eldad and Medad to Moses in Num :–, a narrative in which Joshua also plays a role. nephews. There are substantial biblical narratives describing how Aaron and his four sons (Exod :) were consecrated to serve God as priests; see esp. Exod :–:; Lev :–:. The older two die not long afterwards, when they offer “unholy fire” before the Lord (Lev :– ; Num :–; cf. Philo, Mos. .). When Aaron himself dies, he is succeeded in the office of high priest by his son Eleazar (Num :– ; Deut :). The question, though, is why Philo bothers to mention Moses’ nephews in this context at all. While both Aaron (Num :; Deut :) and Eleazar (Num. :, , –) are mentioned in the accounts that serve as his principal sources in Hum. –, no indication is given that the latter is being entertained as a possible successor to Moses. In attempting to discern Philo’s motive in § , considerations regarding the literary relationship of De humanitate to De vita Mosis (as discussed above) may provide a clue. The description of Moses’ death with which the latter concludes (Mos. .–) is immediately preceded by an account of the rebellion of Korah (Num ), which in Philo’s interpretation is spurred by the charge that Moses had bestowed the priesthood on his brother and nephews because of their relation to

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him (.–; cf. .; .–). The outcome of that story proves that Moses had in fact not given precedence to his own family but had selected them according to “the piety and holiness that he observed in their characters” (.). The concern to show that Jewish leadership is determined by virtue, not nepotism, carries over into Hum. –. § . difficult for the same person. The career of Moses himself had demonstrated that for the offices of king and priest to be combined in the same person was not only feasible but desirable (Mos. .; and on his priesthood, .–). And historically, of course, such a combination would not have been uncommon, as Philo acknowledges in Legat. ; cf. Leg. .–; Mos. .; QE .; further, Goodenough , –  (who sees the combination as an aspect of the ideology of Hellenistic kingship). But within the narrative world of the Exposition, it seems that Moses is unique in this regard, presumably because he alone has been initiated into the mysteries of the priesthood by God himself (Mos. .). Feldman (, ) conjectures that with his statements here Philo may have in mind the specific example of John Hyrcanus; see Josephus, Ant. .–. the care of people. Ancient political theorists agreed that kingship is the art of caretaking, 9 1πιμελητικ= (e.g., Plato, Pol. d–e), and so 1πιμ!λεια figures naturally in a narrative about royal succession (see also §§ , , , , ). It is generally classified among the “royal” virtues, (e.g., Legat. , ; Ep. Arist. ; Isocrates, Ad Nic. ; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .–), representing a particular expression of the king’s humanity (e.g., Dio Chrysostom, Or. .–; .). (b) § . He had a friend. In Spec. ., Philo complains that most people, since they are led only by their own desire, enter into both friendships and enmities without forethought, recklessly exchanging one for the other. He espouses instead a philosophical view, according to which the true basis of friendship is not pleasure or utility but virtue (cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; ..; Cicero, Amic. .–; .). That extreme care must be taken in choosing one’s friends was a moral cliché (Sir :–; :–:). True friendships are rare (Cicero, Amic. .– ; ., ), requiring time and intimacy (Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..– ). One will therefore have only few friends (Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..– ; ..–; Plutarch, De amicorum multitudine). Particular care must be taken in this regard by those in positions of power, since they are often the object of flattery or treachery (Plutarch, Praec. ger. rei publ. f–b). The “friends of the king” were accorded special honors and often served in important capacities for the government (cf. Flacc. ;  Chr :;

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –   Macc :; :; :; Ep. Arist. ; Josephus, Ant. .; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Samuel , –). Thus the choice of friends is among the king’s most important decisions, and he must be especially careful that his relatives earn their offices through merit, not kinship (Isocrates, Ad Nic. –, –; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .–, –). By the same token, if a king has no friends, he exposes himself to the charge of being a tyrant (Cicero, Tusc. .; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .–). who had been his pupil. For Moses as a teacher with “pupils,” see Mos. ., ; Spec. ., , ; and on Hum. . Joshua. The son of Nun is a secondary character in the Philonic corpus. He is mentioned briefly in Mos. . as the Rπαρχος who leads the battle against the Amalekites (cf. Exod :–), while Moses took “a more important part in the fight” (cf. the somewhat more generous portrait in Josephus, Ant. .). He is not mentioned at all in the account of the spying mission (cf. Num –) in Mos. .–, though in Mut. , Philo explains that the name that Moses gives him (Num :) means “safety of the Lord,” a name for the best possible state (cf. also Ebr. ; QE .). Here and in what follows his qualifications as successor are shown to derive largely from his association with Moses. a heavenly and undefiled and divine love. According to the Stoic definition, ;ρως is a disinterested and educative impulse whose sole end is friendship (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; cf. SVF .–). Philo expresses the same thought also in Abr. ; Spec. .. Elsewhere he speaks of the Israelites as a community of friends (Mos. ., , , ; ., , ), and of their adherence to practices that foster φιλα, e.g., Spec. .–; Praem. . The basis of their common bond, of course, is their worship of the one God (Spec. ., ; Fort. ). Speaking of proselytes in Paen. , he avers that those who embrace “the rule of one” and become friends of God must be embraced as “our closest friends and relations.” shared the same roof and table. The bonds between friends are strengthened if they regularly seek out each other’s society and have a shared life, including commonality of counsel, possessions, etc. (Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Plutarch, Amic. mult. a). Friendship implies κοινωνα (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .) and living out the maxim κοινC τC φλων (Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .). In Prob. –, Philo offers their “custom of sharing roof, life, and board” as proof of the Essenes’ humanity and fellowship. Cf. Sterling , .

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receiving the oracles. In Exod , Moses goes to the mountain to receive the commandments accompanied by Joshua his “attendant” (vv. –), but when he draws near to the Lord he is instructed to come alone (v. ). QE . interprets this last verse to mean that “when the prophetic mind becomes divinely inspired and filled with God, it becomes like the monad” (cf. Decal. ; Mos. ., ). On Philo’s theory of inspiration, see Mos. .–; cf. Decal. ; Praem. ; Winston . The Alexandrian’s overall presentation of Joshua tends to preclude any notion that he had a share in Moses’ mystical experiences or prophetic abilities, though cf. QE .. provided other services as well, . . . being . . . his lieutenant. Friends, of course, render services to each other (Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; ..), and according to the biblical record Joshua was Moses’ ερ,πων (Exod :; cf. Num :). Philo’s designation, Rπαρχος, could serve as both a military (as in Mos. .) and political (e.g., Cassius Dio, Hist. rom. .; Arrian, Anab. ..) title. Drawing on Exod :–, Spec. . explains how Moses also appointed δι,δοχοι to assist in the responsibilities of governing. sharing in the affairs of state. For this use of συνδιοικ!ω, see Spec. .; Aristotle, Ath. pol. .; .. Before succeeding Augustus on the throne, Tiberius had served as a “partner in his powers” (Tacitus, Ann. .; cf. Seutonius, Tib. .). § . his excellence of character in both words and deeds including . . . his goodwill for the nation. Because Moses possesses the qualities of leadership most fully, he is able to discern them in others. Mos. .– explains Moses’ own appointment to the kingship. He did not assume office by force, but was selected by God on account of his virtue, his καλοκγαα, and his εIνοια towards all the people (.). Accordingly, he seized every opportunity “in both word and deed” to advance the common good and benefit his subjects (.; for the harmony of speech and action, see on Paen. ). As an important instance of this, Philo points out that Moses did not seek to designate his sons as δι,δοχοι, instead allowing the power of reason “to subdue any natural affection he had for his children” (.). Later it became necessary to squelch rumors that he had chosen family members for the priesthood out of fraternal rather than national εIνοια (Mos. .– ). In reading §§ –, it is important to bear in mind that εIνοια and φιλα are virtual synonyms (Sterling , ; e.g., Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; ..). Thus we can see that the true test of Joshua’s friendship with

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  Moses (§ , cf. § ) is his “friendly” disposition towards the people, while Moses’ friendship with Joshua trumps any “friendly” sentiments he has for his family (§ ). reckoning him to be good when in truth he was not. In general, rulers ought to be chosen not by lot (cf. Plato, Resp. a; Leg. b–e), but by applying “the strict test of truth” (τ+ν κριβ$ β,σανον τ$ς ληεας), which is to be carried out by the people, and then ratified by God (Spec. .–). Here by contrast the responsibility belongs to God alone, who discerns matters κριβς (Hum. ). One of the areas in which divine judgment surpasses its human counterpart is in the task of choosing leaders (QG .). This is because in their thinking human beings tend to focus “on what is likely and convincing and contains much that is reasonable, but not on the unadulterated truth, putting their trust in appearances rather than in God” (Opif. ; cf. Ebr. ; Praem. ; Aet. ). the standards of human judgment are likely to be indistinct and uncertain. A topic on which Philo discourses in Deus – (cf. Prov. .). Human beings by and large possess little capacity for consistency in the standards (κριτ=ριοι) by which they make judgments (γνμαι) and enter into relationships, but are subject to a variety of internal and external sources of instability (βεβαιτης). Foreseeing all future events, and piercing into the recesses of all things, including human souls (cf. Hum. ), God’s judgment suffers from no such defect or uncertainty. For his part, Socrates did nothing νευ τ$ς τν εν γν8μης, so as to confer on others only benefits (Xenophon, Mem. ..). We are later informed that Joshua had been approved by κριτ=ριοι εAοι (§ ; and on the need for divine rather than human judgment in this affair, cf. also §§ , , ). (c) § . beseeched and implored. According to Num :–, Moses asked God to appoint his successor (cf. Abot R. Nat. , ; Sifre Num. –; Sifre Zuta ). Although this is the only place where καικετε:ω is used in the Philonic corpus (cf. Josephus, Ant. .), elsewhere Moses is portrayed as beseeching God, for example, in Mos. ., where he asks what should be done with the man who blasphemed the name of the Lord (Lev :–). De vita Mosis actually relays several incidents in which the leader of the people, lacking confidence in his own ability to decide a difficult case, defers to divine standards and entreats God to act as judge, each case being presented as evidence of Moses’ prophetic vocation (., , ; cf. Mos. .; Spec. .; Hum. , ). In this Philo differs from Josephus, who seems to be embarrassed by such episodes (Feldman , ).



commentary

the overseer of the invisible soul. A rather distinctive theological feature of the Exposition is the designation of God as overseer of all, ;φορος το( παντς (Abr. ; Ios. ; Spec. .), a role associated especially with the execution of divine justice in human affairs (Ios. , ; Decal. , ; Spec. ., ; Nob. ). In this capacity God perceives the thoughts, fears, and intentions of the human soul, even though it is “invisible” to all others, e.g., Abr. ; Ios.  (also with δι,νοια; cf. Homer, Il. .; Od. .; .); Hum. . Elsewhere Philo uses the synonym 1ππτης (Hypoth. .; cf.  Macc :; Let. Arist. ; Musonius Rufus, frg. ..–; Epictetus, Diatr. ..). The idea of an all-surveying deity was wide-spread (e.g., Job :; :; Ps :;  Macc :; Josephus, Bell. .; Sent. Pythag. ; Plutarch, frg. ) and became a topic of philosophical, especially Stoic, reflection as well. In a treatise entitled SΟτι π,ντας 1φορ7O τ εAον, for example, Epictetus argues that since all human minds are attached to God “like parts and offshoots of his being,” God perceives and oversees every action “as something belonging to him and sharing in his nature” (Diatr. .; cf. Dobbin , –). Philo can similarly argue that the human soul is an inseparable fragment or extension of the divine soul, e.g., Opif. ; Det. ; Deus  (cf. Tobin , –). For the concept that the soul, like God, is invisible, see also Ios. ; Mos. .; cf. Plato, Tim. d; Phaed. b, d. best suited for command. The δι,δοχοι of Spec. . chosen to assist Moses in governing the people are similarly the “best” (ριστνδην), in other words, possessed of “good sense, ability, justice, and godliness” (cf. Mos. .; Spec. .; Hum. ). care for his subjects like a father. Inasmuch as the business of kingship is 1πιμ!λεια νρ8πων (§ ), it functions as a criterion in the selection process. Moses himself had been chosen to care for the people (Hum. ; Mos. .), which he did throughout his life (Hum. , cf. §§ , ). The particular image of the king caring for his subjects like a father was wellknown. Besides Ios. ; Mos. .; Spec. .; cf. T. Mos. :; Homer, Od. .–; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Seneca, Ep. .; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; .; Cicero, Resp. .–; Stevenson . lifting up his pure . . . hands to heaven. Philo elaborates on Num :, which simply has, “And Moses said to the Lord.” Raising one’s hands to heaven would have been a familiar posture for prayer, including thanksgiving (Abr. ) and petitionary (Mos. .) prayers, as well as oaths (Spec. .). Cf. Deut : (perhaps Philo’s inspiration here); Pss :; :; :; Lam :;  Macc :; Josephus, C. Ap. .. The

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  idea that the hands thus lifted up to heaven (understood to be the purest part of existence; see § ) ought to be “pure,” that is, purged of impious intentions, would also have been familiar, e.g.,  Tim :; Josephus, Bell. .; Seneca, Nat. quaest. , pref. . as one might put it figuratively, virgin. As Cher. – explains, God converses with mortals whose nature is “truly virginal,” into whose “virginal soil” the Father of all things and the Husband of wisdom deposits “the seed of good fortune” (cf. Wilson , –). The Exposition is distinct in including far fewer instances of allegorical interpretation than Philo’s other commentary series, though there are scattered references to meanings in the biblical text beyond the literal or obvious (e.g., Opif. ; Abr. , , ) and on occasion we even encounter a full-blown allegorical exposition (e.g., Ios. –). For some of the reasoning behind the application of such τροπικς language, see Post. –. § . the Lord God of the spirits and of all flesh. The LXX translator of Num : rendered “the spirits of all flesh” in his source to “the spirits and all flesh” (as in Num :), creating a distinction that would not have been discordant with Philonic anthropology. Like others (see BGAD, s.v. πνε(μα a), the Alexandrian understood the human personality to be a composite of πνε(μα and σ,ρξ, e.g., Opif.  (cf. Gen :); Gig. –,  (cf. Gen :); Deus –; Her. –. He follows the text of LXX Num : closely, except for replacing 1π τ$ς συναγωγ$ς with 1π τ$ς πλη:ος (συναγωγ= occurs nowhere in the Exposition; see PAPM .–). The following verse, however, has been completely rewritten, with only ποιμ=ν retained (cf. Agr. ; Post. ). No doubt Philo found its military connotations (for the language, cf. Deut :– ; Josh :;  Sam :, ; :) inappropriate for his version of the story, in which the conquest of Canaan plays no part. care and protection. Philo regularly joins 1πιμ!λεια and προστασα to summarize the responsibilities of leadership (e.g., Ios. , ; Hum. ), including Moses’ responsibilities as shepherd (Mos. .) and father (Ios. ). Shepherds, of course, were expected to exercise “care” in tending their flocks (e.g., Dio Chrysostom, Or. .). a shepherd. ποιμ!να is Cohn’s (PCW .) emendation for ποιμ!νος (C2FG1HP) and ποιο:μενος (SC1G2A) in the mss. Biblical authors frequently liken rulers to shepherds ( Sam :;  Chron :; etc.) and of course Moses himself had been a shepherd (Exod :; cf. Mos. .–; Agr. –; Ps.-Philo, L.A.B. :; Josephus, Ant. .–). Indeed, not only is shepherding a kind of training ground for kingship, but “the only perfect king . . . is one who is skilled in the knowledge of shepherding”



commentary

(Mos. .). Also see Philo, Ios. – (cf. Homer, Il. ., etc.); Plato, Pol. d, e–b; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Xenophon, Cyr. ..; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; .–. Meanwhile, the image of sheep without a shepherd was a common metaphor for a helpless or defeated people, e.g.,  Chr :; Jdt :; Matt :; cf. Ezek :–; Zech :–; :; Josephus, Ant. .;  Bar. :. The condition of such a flock deteriorates quickly into confusion and disorder (Somn. .–). scattered. PLCL . (with n. ) prints σπορ,δην, which is in all the mss except S, which has 1π /ρους. PCW . prints σπορ,ς, while PCH . has σπορCς 1π /ρους, positing an allusion to  Kgdms :. For discussion see Cohn , . Besides the fact that there is nothing grammatically objectionable about σπορ,δην, Philo only rarely refers to the book of Kings (cf. Deus , ), and such an allusion adds little to the narrative here. (d) § . My lord. A ruler could be referred to as δεσπτης (e.g., Spec. .–) inasmuch as his relation to the state is analogous to that of a master to his household (Spec. .; cf. Aristotle, Pol. ..–), though Philo rarely refers to Moses as such (e.g., Mos. .; cf. .). someone would ask. §§ – interrupt the retelling of the biblical narrative with an imagined exchange between Moses and an anonymous onlooker, repeating a fair amount of the material from §§ –. For this manner of question and answer, cf. Her. –; Mos. ., ; Decal. –. It is also a feature in some of the Platonic dialogues, e.g., Leg. d–b. Cf. Nikiprowetzky , –; Conley , –. they are naturally the primary heirs. Moses’ action exemplifies one of the major theses of De nobilitate (§§ –), namely, that superior lineage is not necessarily a guarantee of superior virtue. This is supported with biblical examples (§§ –) of sons who profited nothing from the excellence of their fathers, in some cases being disinherited for their vice and depravity. Instead, only the one who demonstrates virtue is truly noble and “approved as heir” (δοκιμασες κληρονμου, § ; cf. §§ , ). Further, see on § . § . proof of complete virtue. Since most people honor virtue with their words but not with their actions, the only way to determine someone’s true character is through various tests (Abr. –; cf. Sir :– ;  Macc :). Indeed, virtue only becomes conspicuous and meritorious as one overcomes challenges and adversities (e.g., Seneca, Prov. .; .–; further, Fitzgerald , –). Philo is also familiar with the idea that God tests for virtue, e.g., Leg. .–; .; cf.  Macc :; Josephus, Ant. .. The concept of ρετ+ τ!λεια was associated

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  especially with Aristotle, for whom eudaimonia itself could be defined as “complete virtue in action” (Eth. nic. ..; ..; ..). Philo’s ideal ruler must also possess this if he is to make decisions that result in wellbeing for his people (see on § ). With the addition of this comment in § , it becomes clear that Joshua is in possession of the same three essential qualities exhibited by Moses when he was appointed king by God (see Mos. .): καλοκγαα (§ ), εIνοια for the people (§ ), and virtue. the all-wise. Philo often alludes to the philosophical commonplace that the sage alone is king: Post. ; Sobr. ; Migr. ; Mut. ; Somn. .; Abr. ; Prob. ; QG .; cf. Musonius Rufus, frg. ..– .; Epictetus, Diatr. .., ; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; Goodenough , –; also on Paen. ; Nob. . The term π,νσοφος, however, is familiar, not from philosophy (though cf. Heraclides Ponticus, frg. ), but from the poetry of the tragedians, e.g., Aeschylus, Suppl. ; Euripides, Herc. . The epithet is applied to Moses also in Abr. ; Mos. .; Spec. .; ., , . Hum.  goes on to explain that his successor will need this quality as well. On Moses as a “super-sage,” see Winston a. § . leads countless multitudes . . . to good fortune. If an individual’s decisions regarding virtue and vice have consequences for his or her own fortune (see Nob. ), then those of a king are of even greater moment, since he determines the course of “great and populous cities with all their inhabitants, and the constitutions of the cities and the management of matters private, public, and sacred” (Spec. .; cf. Xenophon, Cyr. ..; Musonius Rufus, frg. ..–). Hence the considerable attention paid in ancient literature to the art of ruling well (see Hadot  for sources). For his part, Moses’ highest aspiration was to provide through his laws not only for the well-being of his own people but for that of the entire human race as well (Hum. ). His teachings may be regarded as the truest and best philosophy precisely because through them people can obtain good fortune (Mos. .). The law accomplishes this because, in contrast to other philosophies, its teachings put belief into practice (Mos. .). Further, Völker , –; Runia . In his Antiquitates, Josephus agrees in identifying eudaimonia as the law’s standard and aim (e.g., ., ). This is summed up in Moses’ farewell address to the people (.–), especially its concluding appeal: “I have compiled for you both laws and a constitution . . . If you guard their orderliness you will be judged the most fortunate of all people” (.; cf. Feldman –, –, ).

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a pilot with knowledge and skill. Since ruling well is an art, indeed “the most noble of the arts” (QG .), kingship should be assigned to the one who is demonstrably most skilled at it. The analogy of a wise ruler to a trustworthy captain was a commonplace: besides Leg. .–; Spec. .; QG .; cf. Ps.-Phoc. ; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; .. On the importance of the pilot, see Paen. . a leader who is all-wise. In Wis , the world’s rulers are exhorted to heed King Solomon and “learn wisdom” (v. ) since “the desire for wisdom leads to sovereignty” (v. ). Wisdom is among the desiderata of the ideal ruler in the kingship literature as well, e.g., Isocrates, Ad Nic. – ; Let. Arist. , ; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..– ..; Plutarch, Numa .; Goodenough , –. good order for his subjects. Among the most important benefits that a leader can provide is ενομα (e.g., Plato, Leg. b; Aristotle, Pol. ..; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..; ..), which is associated with good and just government generally (e.g., Plutarch, Lyc. .; .; Numa .; .). In part, the good order that he bestows on his subjects reflects the good order accompanying his assumption to office. This is another reason why the true king is the sage, since he receives dominion not by force of arms but as a gift and acknowledgement from God for his superior virtue. On this basis he brings peace and good order to those who follow him (Abr. ; cf. Spec. .). § . Wisdom existed . . . before the whole universe came into being. In order to determine who possesses the wisdom necessary for ruling well, it is best to turn to wisdom herself. The allusion to Prov  (cf. Ebr. ) is appropriate to the current context inasmuch as the self-encomium of Sophia there underscores her role in statecraft: “Through me kings reign and potentates decree justice. Through me nobles become great and monarchs rule the earth” (:–). The source of this power is identified in the stanza that follows, which announces the origin of Sophia in primordial times and her unique role in God’s creative activity: “The Lord brought me forth, the beginning of his ways for his works. He established me before the age, in the beginning, before He made the earth” (:– ; cf. Kayatz , –). Through wisdom, then, the principle that orders the civil realm is predicated on and an extension of the principle that orders creation. These assertions went on to be the subject of a significant amount of reflection in the Second Temple period. Besides Det. ; Her. ; see also Wis :, , –; :, ; :–, ; Sir :; QH IX ; Q XXVI ; Früchtel , –. Sophia’s long history affords her unique insight into human nature, certainly better than that

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  acquired by Moses in his “long” test of Joshua’s virtue (§ ). those who love her sincerely, purely, and genuinely. Prov : goes on to explain what is required of those who would attain Sophia and thus rule well: “I love those who love me, and those who seek me will find me.” On this reciprocal love, see Fox , –; and cf. Wis :, –; :; Sir :. Solomon, of course, loved wisdom above everything else (Wis :), and learned from her δλως (:). Elsewhere Philo speaks of wooing wisdom δλως κα κααρς (Ebr. ; cf. Ios. ; Spec. .; Hum. ). On “virtuous” er¯os, see Wilson , –. § . my own experience. Philo here briefly summarizes the call of Moses in Exod :–:. That episode is punctuated by four objections raised by Moses in response to the divine summons (:, ; :, ), which are interpreted here as “prayers and supplications” (similarly, Josephus, Ant. .). The version of the story narrated in Mos. .– reports only the second and the fourth objections, taking Moses’ refusal as a sign of his α>δ8ς (.). While Philo does not ignore the first and the third objections altogether (see, respectively, Fug.  and Leg. .), the fourth objection, that Moses was “slow of speech and tongue,” earns special attention (e.g., Sacr. ; Det. ; Migr. –; Her. ): Moses did not become king through strength of arms, or an account of his wealth or his gifts of speech, but because he had “God alone for his heritage” (Praem. ). Certain rabbinic interpreters were less kind in their appraisal of Moses’ reluctance, suggesting that God punished him for his obstinacy by transferring the priesthood from him and his descendants to Aaron and his line. Other traditions explain that he was urged to undertake the mission for seven days, relenting only when shown all the future generations of Torah scholars who would be dependent on him (Ginzberg , .–). The reluctance of a prospective leader to assume command is also an element in some Greco-Roman succession accounts, e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..–. distinct oracles . . . were plainly declared. For this oracular language, cf. Mos. .; .–; Decal. ; also see on Hum. , , . prayer and supplication. Note how ποτνι,ομαι, αρ!ω, and 1πιτ=δειος occur both here and in § ; also καικετε:ω (§ ) and κετε:ω (§ ); 1πιμελ!ομαι (§ ) and 1πιμ!λεια (§ ). Clearly Philo wants to paint the appointments of Moses and of Joshua as parallel incidents. For the supplication language, see on Hum. . For more on Philo’s prayers, see Borgen . § . without the involvement of human judgment. According to Spec. ., rulers are to be chosen according to the “free choice” of

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“the whole people.” This freedom is only apparent, however, as we learn from Praem. : God appointed Moses king “by the free judgment of his subjects,” that is, God “created in them the willingness to choose him.” Cf. on § . the most populous of all nations. A nation’s populousness was generally seen as an indication of its success (e.g., Fort. ; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..). According to Deuteronomy, the Israelites were “as numerous as the stars of heaven” (:; :; cf. Gen :; :;  Kgs :; and for the actual number of the wilderness generation, Exod :; Num :; :), which in : is interpreted as a sign of divine blessing. Philo similarly associates the nation’s size with its unique role: when Moses turned away from the Egyptians to join the Israelites, he is rewarded “with the kingdom of a more populous and stronger people, the very people which was destined to be consecrated out of all others to offer prayers forever on behalf of the human race for its deliverance from evil” (Mos. ., cf. .; Spec. .; and for a very different explanation of Jewish fecundity, Spec. .). The vastness of their population seems to have been part of the pagan perspective on Judaism as well, e.g., Josephus, C. Ap. ., with Barclay , . the truly Existent. §§  and  present three divine titles that elsewhere Philo deploys both individually and as a group (e.g., Fort. ) when distinguishing the God of the Israelites from false, pagan deities: 2 Uν /ντως (cf. Exod :; Opif. ; Abr. ; Mos. .; Decal. ; Spec. ., –; .; Fort. ; Hum. ; Paen. , ; Nob. ), “the Creator and Father of all” (cf. Hum. ; Nob. –), and “the highest and oldest Cause” (see below). § . the most respected philosophy. That Moses was the first and/or best philosopher, and that as such Greek philosophers borrowed from his wisdom, was a staple of Hellenistic Jewish apologetics, e.g., Artapanus, frg. .; Aristobulus, frg. .; .; .; Josephus, C. Ap. .–; . (cf. the Nachleben for Fort. –). For his part, Philo held that Moses was the quintessential “philosopher king” (Mos. .), having attained “the very summit of philosophy” (Opif. ). It therefore stood to reason that Greek philosophers of both past and present had “received their virtueloving opinions directly from Moses as from a source” (QG .; cf. .; .; .; further, Elter –, –). The most “respected” philosophy, then, is that which, like Moses’, is predicated on a critique of polytheistic religion (e.g., Cicero, Nat. d. .–; cf. Attridge ) and makes knowledge of the one true God possible; see Post. –; Spec. .–.

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  the highest and oldest Cause. In the Mosaic context, philosophical endeavors are associated broadly with the “search for the true God” (e.g., Spec. ., –; .; .), which takes place above all in the study and practice of the law, e.g., Mos. .–; Decal. –; Spec. .– , . Further, Nikiprowetzky , –. This entails in the first place not mistaking any part of the universe for its creator (Decal. ), since “its cause is God, by whom it has come into being, its matter the four elements, from which it was compounded, its instrument the word of God, through which it was framed, and the motive . . . the goodness of its architect” (Cher. ; cf. Spec. .; .; Nob. ; Plato, Tim. e, c–e, e; Runia , –). the error associated with created gods. There are several places in the Exposition where Philo voices concern about Jews who have abandoned the God of their fathers for pagan idols, e.g., Spec. .; Praem. ; further, Sandelin . The most insidious form of this threat is Egyptian animal worship, since it honors lifeless images rather than “the everliving God,” transforming the souls of worshippers into the nature of the beasts they worship (Decal. –; cf. Spec. .–; .; also Wis :–; Let. Arist. –; Niehoff , –). Paradigmatic in this regard is the golden calf incident, which Philo interprets in part as a crisis in leadership brought on when Moses temporarily took leave of the people (Mos. .–, –; Spec. .; .–). Specifically, when he was summoned to the mountain, “the vices that spring up in the ruler’s absence” took hold of them (Spec. .) and they began behaving “as though authority had ceased to exist” (Mos. .). As in the account of Moses’ death and succession in Deuteronomy (see, e.g., :, ; :–, ), the prospect of the permanent absence of that authority raises a concern that such vices might reappear. the necessary quality of eternality. Among all peoples the Jews stand alone in their “service of the uncreated and eternal” God, refusing to worship idols, which are “created and naturally liable to destruction” (Spec. .; cf. Opif. ; Decal. ; Spec. ., ; Nob. ). Indeed, there is nothing in the sense-perceptible realm that possesses the same temporal status as God, because there is nothing in that realm that has been assigned eternality. Instead the entire sense-perceptible realm “is in a process of becoming and changing and never remaining in the same state” (Opif. ; cf. Plato, Tim. d–c). (a) § . Joshua, the disciple and imitator. The second proof (§§ –) of Moses’ humanity describes the three messages that he delivered before

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his death, beginning with the two-part commissioning speech in §§ – . In lieu of Ιησο(ς in the rest of the mss, G2 has Ιωσο:ας, evidence perhaps for the tampering of Jewish interpolator; the same occurs in § . Further, Runia , –; Royse , ; both responding to Barthélemy , –. See also on Paen. . In the rubrics of philosophical pedagogy, students were expected to imitate the model set by their teacher, e.g., Seneca, Ep. .–; Billerbeck ; Wilson , –. In the Exposition, Philo conceives of Judaism as a philosophical school, one whose “disciples and followers” study the wisdom of the law (Spec. ., , ; ., ; and see on § ). Accordingly, he conceives of Joshua not simply as a king but (like his predecessor: Mos. .) a philosopher-king, in which case comparison may be made with succession stories such as those recounted in Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. .–; Cicero, Acad. .–; cf. Mejer , –. Josephus similarly underscores Joshua’s status as Moses’ student, e.g., Ant. . (Joshua “made Moses his teacher of piety”); . (he had received from Moses “a complete education”). According to rabbinic traditions, Joshua was acknowledged as the people’s teacher when Moses, his “father and teacher,” died (Ginzberg , .–; cf. m. Abot :). See also on Hum. . For φοιτητ=ς used of a student in a philosophical school, cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; SVF ., . Moses was not downcast . . . Depression is a characteristic of the wicked (Spec. .). The countenance of the sage, by contrast, is marked by joy and gladness, not depression and scowling (cf. Praem. ). Like others (e.g., Plutarch, Vit. pud. e; cf. Josephus, Ant. .), Philo associates κατ=φεια with λ:πη (Decal. ; cf. Abr. ; Ios. ; Praem. ), the latter being one of the four basic irrational passions identified by the Stoics (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .–; SVF .–) and characterized as a “shrinking” of the soul (Cicero, Tusc. .). As such, it is a form of false judgment to be extirpated; cf. Graver , –. . . . that his sons or nephews were not chosen. According to Sifre Deut. , Moses was saddened by the fact that one of his sons had not been appointed to lead the people, while other rabbinic sources explain that it was Moses’ sincerest desire that Joshua be appointed his successor, e.g., Sifre Num. ; Sifre Zuta . § . filled with indescribable joy. In Josephus’ version of the farewell address to the people, Moses rejoices at the people’s “good things” (Ant. .). On a number of occasions, Philo’s treatment of χαρ, is familiar from the Stoic doctrine of επ,ειαι, the positive emotions of the fully rational person (Mut. , , ; Congr. ; Det. ; Abr. ; QG

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  .; ., ), joy, along with caution and well-wishing, generally being among them (see SVF .–; also Seneca, Ep. .–; .; Plutarch, Virt. mor. b; further, Inwood , –; Graver , –). Indeed, joy is the best of these good emotions because it “expands” the soul (Migr. ; cf. Plutarch, Virt. mor. a; Cicero, Tusc. .). It can be an appropriate expression of one’s philanthr¯opia, when things go well for others (Migr. ). It could also be understood as a reward for virtue, e.g., Praem. , –, . According to certain rabbinic traditions, Moses spent his final hours full of joy gazing at a vision of the heavenly Temple (Ginzberg , .–), while other traditions have him mourning over the fact that he would not be allowed to enter the holy land (Ginzberg , .). taking Joshua by the right hand. Philo omits the divine command in Num :–,  for Moses to lay his hands upon Joshua and invest him with some of his spiritual δξα. Cf. Deut : (Joshua “was filled with the spirit of knowledge, for Moses had laid his hands upon him.”). For Philo, the basis of Joshua’s leadership is his possession not of the spirit or of prophetic authority (cf. Sir :; Josephus, Ant. ., ; Justin Martyr, Dial. ; Tg. Ps.-J. Num :), but of virtue. brought him before the assembled multitude. Philo continues to summarize Num :–, though without any mention of Eleazar or his oracular authority (for which cf. Exod :; Lev :; Deut :), to which Joshua is to submit. In Philo’s version of events Joshua is never “presented” to the priests (for which cf. Num :; :) but only to the people. In his parallel account, by contrast, Josephus constantly associates Joshua with Eleazar as a way of suggesting the former’s piety, e.g., Ant. .; ., , , , , . not concerned about his own end. For the expression, cf. Sir :; Menander, Mon. . Facing the prospect of death with equanimity is a manifestation of one’s commitment to a virtuous rather than physical life (e.g.,  Macc :;  Macc :). In the Greco-Roman world, it is Socrates especially who is paradigmatic in this regard. On his last day he “seemed happy . . . meeting death fearlessly and nobly” (Plato, Phaed. e, cf. d), demonstrating the principle that “the true philosophers practice dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men” (e). Foundational to the agenda of Hellenistic philosophy generally were efforts to undermine the sorts of conventional beliefs about death that might trigger emotional distress (Nussbaum ). As Epictetus puts it, the sage ought to face dire prospects “with a smile, cheerful and serene” (Diatr. ..–; and cf. his reflections on ελ,βεια in .). Or from

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Epicurus: “The correct recognition that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable” (Ep. Men. ). Further, Fitzgerald , – ; Droge and Tabor , –. he reveled lavishly. The sage “luxuriates” in his virtues, e.g., Spec. .; .; Hum. . he was about to become immortal. See on § , which the statements here anticipate and summarize. tranquility in his soul. The greatest obstacle to achieving tranquility is overcoming the fear of death and the desire to remain in the body. This is accomplished by recognizing that with death the soul changes for the better, not the worse (Plutarch, Tranq. b; cf. Seneca, Tranq. .–). § . released from life in the body. Philo’s description (cf. Leg. .; Plant. ) reflects the Platonic view, according to which death is the release or separation (παλλαγ=) of the soul from the body, and being dead is the state in which “the soul is separated from the body and exists alone by itself,” undisturbed by any of the perceptions or emotions that arise from the body (Phaed. c, cf. d–e, b, c; Bostock , – ). See also on §§ , . he . . . proceeded to report the oracular pronouncements of approval. Philo does not narrate God’s response to Moses’ request (Num :– ), but has Moses convey the response to the people during the subsequent commissioning ceremony, for which see Num :–. Aaron’s appointment had been similarly based on τC χρησ!ντα λγια (Mos. .). Leaders would sometimes be required to undergo a “scrutiny” (δοκιμασα) to determine whether they met the qualifications for a particular office (e.g., Lysias, Or. ). to which they gave assent. Num : reads, “And you shall put some of your glory upon him, so that the children of Israel will hearken to him (ε>σακο:σωσιν ατο().” § . courageous and exceptionally strong in formulating good policies. For the content of the commissioning speech, Philo turns to Deut :: “Be courageous and strong (νδρζου κα ?σχυε); for you shall go in before this people into the land which the Lord swore to your fathers to give to them, and you shall give it to them for an inheritance.” The terms νδραγαα and νδραγαζομαι are ordinarily associated with warfare (e.g., Mos. ., , , ; ., ; Spec. .; .; .; cf.  Macc :, ; :; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; ..; ..; Ps.-Plutarch, Apoph. lac. b; Goodenough , –), and so the use of the latter here would accord with the biblical scenario of impending conquest. Philo, however, opts not to develop the mili-

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  tary connotations, but immediately associates the courage expected of Joshua with the promulgation of wise policy. This interpretation brings to mind especially Fort. , which argues explicitly against bellicose forms of courage in favor of civic ones. Individuals properly exhibit this virtue by offering prudent counsels that advance the public good. exhortation. Philo elsewhere refers to the contents of Deuteronomy as παραιν!σεις, e.g., Spec. .; .; Agr.  (cf. Mos. .; Decal. , ; Hum. ; Gammie , ), though he can also use προτρεπτικο (see on Fort. ). Further, Engberg-Pedersen . The exhortation of a kingship treatise could also be designated paraenesis (e.g., Isocrates, Ad Nic. –; Dio Chrysostom, Or. ., ). making sound judgments. The formula ε>σηγεAσαι γν8μην can be used of a proposal that is introduced to a political body, e.g., Det. ; Ios. ; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ... Compare especially Josephus, Ant. ., where it is not Joshua alone, but Joshua together with Eleazar and the elders who are appointed by Moses to put before the people the best possible proposals after he is gone. his affection . . . for the nation. PCW . follows the majority of mss with φιλοεν!ς. S reads φιλεον 1ς, though it fits the “nationalistic” context of §§ –a less clearly. A has φιλοκεν!ς. § . Moses had also received an oracle. Moses received a divine oracle regarding his own appointment as king (§ ); he now receives one regarding the appointment of Joshua. The LXX translation of Num : departs from its source by adding a second charge to the commissioning speech that Moses is to make before the people: “you shall give [Joshua] a charge (1ντελ@$) before all the congregation, and you shall give a charge (1ντελ@$) concerning him before them.” Philo now proceeds to summarize the latter, still drawing on Deut , though adding little that was not already stated in § . the care of the nation. See on § . without fear. Central to the biblical appeal is for Joshua not to fear: μ+ φοβο(, μηδE δειλα (Deut :, cf. :). would look to Moses for their archetypal model. Just as Moses “looked upon” Joshua when commissioning him (§ ), so future leaders will “look upon” Moses as their model. The presentation of moral models plays a vital role in ancient exhortation and instruction. Besides Abr. –; Ios. ; Spec. .; cf. Isocrates, Evag. ; Josephus, Ant. .; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; further, Wilson , –, –. For the formula παρ,δειγμα . . . ποβλ!πουσι, see Plato, Resp. c: those inquiring after the true

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nature of the virtues seek out individuals who embody those virtues and “look upon them as types and models, so that whatever we discern in them of good fortune . . . will necessarily apply to ourselves, in the sense that whoever is like them will have the portion that is most like theirs” (cf. c; Tim. a; and above, on § ). deprive their successors of good counsels out of envy. The problem of envy is a topos of paraenetic literature (e.g., Isocrates, Demon. ; Ps.Phoc. –, with Wilson , –). A concern sometimes raised is that it might interfere with one’s willingness to aid others and exhort them to virtue (e.g., Dio Chrysostom, Or. /.–). Envy was also classed among the typical vices of rulers and the ruling classes (e.g.,  Macc :; Herodotus, Hist. .; Seneca, Tranq. .; Plutarch, Numa .; and as a succession topic, Josephus, Bell. .). Accordingly, warnings against envy are a staple of Greco-Roman orations on political harmony, e.g., Dio Chrysostom, Or. ., ; .. prepare and train. As in § , Moses holds up his life as an archetype and model so as to prepare and train others, though here it is not his subjects but their future rulers. admonitions and exhortations. In Spec. ., Philo distinguishes “admonitions and exhortations” from direct commands as part of what Moses imparts in scripture, specifically in Deuteronomy. The pairing of Dπο=κη and παρανεσις was conventional (e.g., Polybius, Hist. ..; Strabo, Geogr. ..; Ps.-Plutarch, Lib. ed. c). § . to rouse those who have lost their resolve . . . and instill in them a noble and intrepid spirit. Paraenetic instructors embraced various approaches in their teaching—censure, praise, encouragement, and so on—depending on the particular situation or needs of their students (Glad , –), thereby manifesting a “philanthropic” pedagogy (Clement of Alexandria, Paed. ..–..). What Philo describes here accords especially with consolation, a mode of paraenetic discourse whose main purpose is to instill fortitude in its recipients as they overcome the grief and uncertainty accompanying the loss of a loved one (for a review of the literature, see Kassel ). It is part of Moses’ profile as the ideal teacher in the Exposition that he offers encouragement to the Israelites when they are disheartened, e.g., Mos. .–. The terms ναππτω and κατ,πληκτος are found also in Mos. ., where it is the spies who encourage the Israelites not to be fainthearted. In Fort.  and , possession of a disposition that is κατ,πληκτος is listed among the requirements for military service. (b) § . the heir of his command. In his will, Augustus named

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  Tiberius “heir” to the throne (Seutonius, Aug. .–; Cassius Dio, Hist. rom. ..–). Gaius, in turn, is κληρονμος to be 9γεμ8ν after Tiberius (Philo, Legat. ). he began to hymn God with a song. §§ – describe “The Song of Moses” (Deut :–). In Deut :–, Moses is instructed by God to write down a poem (cf. Josephus, Ant. .) for the people of Israel (the more indeterminate νρωποι of §  may reflect Deut :). This is to serve as a witness against them when they break covenant in the promised land and turn to other gods. Philo mentions this function for the song only in passing (§ , cf. § ), concentrating instead on its more hopeful elements (e.g., Deut :). The final words attributed to Moses in T. Mos. :–:, replete with warnings about the nation’s apostasy, capture the tone of the biblical text more accurately. Philo assumes that singing occurs in two ways, not only as an activity of the voice, but especially as an activity of the mind. It therefore can influence and improve the soul (e.g., Spec. .) and advance the pursuit of virtue (e.g., Plant. ), especially the virtue of eusebeia (Spec. .). Further, Feldman ; Leonhardt , –. The song of Moses is the “great song” (e.g., Det. ) or the “greater song” (e.g., Sobr. ), that is, in contrast to the song at the sea (Exod :–, for which see Mos. .). For
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thanksgiving that God’s role as benefactor is acknowledged (e.g., Mos. .–; Spec. ., , ). While Deut :– does enumerate certain blessings that the nation as a whole has enjoyed, there is nothing in the chapter that singles out Moses as a special beneficiary in this regard. Philo’s concentration on the latter may reflect his emphasis on the personal dimensions of thanksgiving, for which see Leonhardt , ; cf. Zeller , –. Reflection on one’s good fortune ought to lead one to offer hymns and songs (Plutarch, Tranq. d). § . a divine assembly. In § , the people had “assembled” for Joshua’s commissioning ceremony. Now a divine counterpart is summoned. the elements of all that is. Philo assumes a four-element cosmology (e.g., Opif. ; Mos. .; cf. Plato, Tim. b; SVF .; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .–; .; etc.) and, like others, associates the elements with angels (see § ) or other heavenly powers (Gig. –; Decal. –; Contempl. –; Aet. –); cf. Jub. : (“the angels of the spirit of fire, the angels of the spirit of the winds,” etc.); Wis :; Gal :; :, ; Col :, , ;  En. :–; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .–; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; Delling , –. According to Mos. .–, Moses’ stature was such that God gave him control over the stoicheia, which in . function as instruments of divine punishment (cf. .–; Wis :). It is appropriate that Moses should summon them on this occasion insofar as the elements function also as instruments through which God conveys benefits to humanity, for which it ought to be thankful (Mos. .). earth . . . and heaven. Before Moses recites his poem in the biblical account, God instructs him to summon the elders and officials of the people, “that I may speak all these words to them and that I may call heaven and earth to witness against them” (Deut :; cf. :, ). In Philo’s account, they are witnesses to the harmony of Moses’ song (see § ). with every kind of harmony and melody. Like Philo himself (Congr. –), Moses had received an education in music, consistent with the enkyklios paideia (Mos. .–). More important, in his person, speech and life were in harmony (Mos. .; cf. Paen. ), and in this he set an example for others to follow (Mos. .). Indeed, the provisions of his law “seek to attain to the harmony of the universe” insofar as they accord with the principles of nature (Mos. .). On the “harmony and melody” of the law, cf. also Decal. ; Spec. .. § . He did this so that both human beings and ministering angels. The summons in Deut : (cf. :, ; :) indicates that the song is

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  directed to recipients of both heavenly and human derivation: “Rejoice, O heavens, with him, and let all God’s sons worship him. Rejoice, O nations, with his people, and let all God’s angels strengthen themselves in him.” Angels for Philo are those “rational incorporeal and immortal souls created by God” (Wolfson , .) that have not descended into physical bodies, being endowed with “a more divine constitution” than those that have (Plant. ; and cf. Plato’s myth of the chariot in Phaedr. a–e, with Ferrari , –, –). As such they are consecrated for service to God, “whose wont it is to employ them as ministers and helpers, to have authority over mortals” (Gig. ; cf. Conf. ; QE .). They function as intermediaries (e.g., Abr. ; Mos. .– , ) and ministers of God’s heavenly sanctuary (Spec. .). Further, Wolfson , .–; Winston and Dillon , –. In Jewish literature, references to angels worshipping God (e.g., Isa :–; Dan :;  En. ), specifically with Rμνοι (e.g., T. Levi :–; T. Abr. :; Ps.-Philo, L.A.E. :), are abundant. Human participation in such worship is implicit in a few of the Psalms (e.g., :–; :–) and described more explicitly in texts like  En. :–, where the elect join not only the angelic hosts, but also “the other forces on earth (and) over the water . . . blessing, glorifying, and extolling . . . the Lord of the Spirits.” The scenario of people worshipping in the presence of heavenly beings is also familiar from the Qumran literature, e.g., QH III –; XI – (with Kuhn , –); Q– (with Newsom , –). Other texts depict human beings learning angelic hymns, e.g., T. Job :–; Apoc. Abr. :–. Further, Bietenhard , –; Mach , –. a lesson to have a similarly thankful disposition. That the law consists of διδασκαλα, see on Fort. . These teachings are concerned specifically with shaping the disposition (δι,εσις) or intention of those who subscribe to them (e.g., Spec. .; .; Hum. ; invoking a Stoic concept, cf. SVF .–, –, ). On the importance of a thankful disposition, see especially Mos. .. witnesses seeing . . . whether there was anything dissonant. In this they are extensions of God’s activity as ;φορος (§ ). Angels in Jewish literature are often assigned the task of observing humanity, e.g.,  En. :–; Apoc. Zeph. :–. Mention may also be made of  Cor :–  (cf. :), which may reflect the belief that “the angels are present in the community due to a concern for proper worship” (Sullivan , ). Borgen () suggests that their role here as musical “critics” corresponds to the question which in some apocalyptic and rabbinic texts

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angels raise in protest to the ascension of Moses or some other human figure into heaven (cf. Schultz ). Philo is also familiar with the idea of angels as guides and fellow-travelers in the soul’s ascent, e.g., Migr. –. to create music in the same way as the sun . . . moon . . . stars. Heaven is the original archetype of all musical instruments (Somn. .), and music in its perfected form is produced “by the harmony of the movement of the stars” (QG .). Such motion is an expression of their existence as pure intellect (Gig. ). To the extent that it participates in such existence, the capacity to offer heavenly “hymns of praise and blessing” resides also in the human mind (Somn. .; cf. Migr. ). One of the hallmarks of Pythagorean cosmology was the “harmony of the spheres,” the doctrine that the orderly movements of the heavenly bodies are governed by numerical ratios corresponding to the tones of the musical scale. The measured intervals of a lyre’s strings, then, could be made to correspond proportionally to the distances between the heavenly bodies: “If the celestial notes made up the same scale measured on the strings of earthly lyres, then heaven and earth would indeed be joined harmoniously” (Miller , ). Moses achieves such harmony not with the lyre, but with his voice, “the chief and most perfect of all instruments” (Post. ; and cf. on § ). Philo notes how harmonious music can emulate the harmonious arrangement and movement of the heavenly bodies especially in his account of the creation of the cosmos (Opif. ; and on the lyre, Opif. ). Such emulation includes harmonies based on the number four, the number of the elements (see § ): Opif. ; Mos. .. Further, Runia , , –, , . Besides the comments that follow, see also Ios. ; Spec. .; ., ; Praem. ; Aristides Quintilianus, Mus. .–; Barker , s.v. spheres: harmony of. Philo’s oeuvre contains some rather extensive reflections on the nature and importance of music, for which see Feldman ; Ferguson . the most holy choir of the . . . stars. The image of the celestial choir is found in biblical sources (e.g., Pss :–; :–) and elsewhere in Philo’s writings (e.g., Opif. ; Plant. ; Congr. ; Mos. ., ). The stars are not gods (Spec. .; Nob. ), but divine souls consisting of intellect in its purest form; they therefore move “in the manner most akin to intellect—the circle” (Gig. ; cf. Plant. ; Somn. .; Winston , ; Scott , –; also on § ). harmonizing his soul with that divine instrument. Observing the movements and beauty of the heavenly bodies instills in the soul a love of

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  contemplation and serves as a guide to philosophy (Opif. ; Mos. .; Spec. .–; Praem. ). Indeed, through such contemplation the soul can elevate itself so as to not only contemplate but actually ascend to the heavenly realm, anticipating its disassociation from the body and ascent after death (Opif. ; Runia , ; cf. Borgen ; Colpe ). The sage “soars away from earth into the heights, travels through the aether and accompanies the revolutions of the sun and moon and the whole heaven” (Spec. ., cf. .; .; .–). Informing this theory of the ascent are certain presuppositions regarding the cosmic affinity of the soul. Ruminating on Gen :, for example, Philo suggests that the soul of the sage is the likeness and counterpart of a star, “a heaven on earth having within it . . . pure forms of being, movements ordered, rhythmic, harmonious, revolving as God directs” (Her. ; cf. Opif. ; Leg. .; Det. ). In alluding to the “circuits” of the mind and the analogy between heavenly revolutions and human processes of thought, Philo draws on Plato, Tim. e–c, a–e, c–d (Runia , –). See further Fort. : the mind is “itself a star and practically a replica and copy of the heavenly bodies.” During his ascent on Sinai, Moses had listened for forty days and nights to “the full and perfect harmony” of the heavenly bodies going through their movements (Somn. .). Now he creates such music himself. A similar activity is attributed to the Israelites in Conf. –, whose song fills the cosmos, the /ργανον of all, with harmonies (cf. Somn. .). As the Pythagorean philosopher Panaceus put it, “the task of music is not merely to relate to one another the parts of musical sound, but to bring together in a harmonious relation all natural things,” including “not only the individual soul but the soul of the universe as well” (Aristides Quintilianus, Mus. .; cf. Ptolemy, Harm. .–). § . From his place among the aethereal choral dancers. The Myth of Er (Plato, Resp. b–b; cf. Cicero, Resp. .–) describes a mysterious region between heaven and earth that mortals are able to view after they die. In this expanse eight concentric whorls, representing the planets and stars, spin around a cosmic spindle resting on the knee of Necessity. Moving on the rims of these whorls are the Sirens, singing in perfect harmony and accompanied by the three Fates: Lachesis, who chants the things that were, Clotho, who chants the things that are, and Atropos, who chants the things that are to be. At the moment of death Moses begins his ascent to the aethereal region, the region of astral harmony (see on § ), revealing to the Israelites past, present, and future (see below).



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James Miller has admirably traced the theme of the cosmic dance in antiquity, including its appropriation by Plato (, –; e.g., Tim. c–d, a–d; Cratyl. e–a) and by Philo (, –), who draws on it often in the Exposition, e.g., Opif. , ; Spec. .; ., ; .; .. The cosmic movements reveal “the most wonderful motions and rhythmic dances performed in harmonic sequences by means of numerical proportions and concordant revolutions” (Opif. ). In its ascent the soul joins these movements, “being carried around in the dances of the planets and fixed stars in accordance with the laws of perfect music . . . (so that) it peers beyond the whole of sense-perceptible reality and desires to attain the intelligible realm” (Opif. ). Since it is the substance out of which they are made (Opif. ), it is only to be expected that the dance of the heavenly bodies occurs in the α>=ρ (cf. Spec. .; .). The soul emanates from the aether (Leg. .; cf. Josephus, Bell. .) and it is to the aether that the soul of the sage returns after death (Her. ; cf. Wilson , ). It is the purest and holiest of all substances (Mos. .; .), the substance of heaven, and so distinct from the four elements out of which the sublunary world is made (QE ., ; though for inconsistencies in Philo’s theory of aether, see Dillon , –). Further, Waszink . the hierophant. According to Mos. .–, as Moses passed from mortal to immortal life, he was in a state of possession (κατασχεες) and prophesied (εσπζειν) in the form of oracles (χρησμο) to each of the tribes (cf. .–; Josephus, Ant. .). His role as revealer parallels or overlaps with his role as prophet elsewhere, e.g., Decal.  (God choose “his prophet Moses . . . as of all the best suited to be hierophant;” cf. Mos. .), though on other occasions it is associated with his role as priest (e.g., Spec. .–) or lawgiver (e.g., Spec. .; Hum. , , –; cf. Paen. ). Perhaps Wolfson (, .–) is correct in supposing that the prophetic role is primary, encompassing the other roles (cf. Meeks , –). At any rate, it is on Sinai that Moses’ status as supreme hierophant is realized (Goodenough , –) and, as Meeks observes (, –), Philo’s description of that event parallels and anticipates the description of his death (see Mos. .–; .–). Both the foundational and culminating events of Mosaic kingship are predicated on mystical ascent. He is no ordinary leader, then, but a “leader on the way” for those who aspire “to ascend in their thoughts to the aethereal height” (Conf. ). condemnations for their past sins. The Song includes an indictment of the people for the apostasy they will commit after God has given them

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  the promised land (Deut :–). Philo refers to these events from his own perspective. By contrast, when the Song itself surveys the “past,” the focus is on the nation’s blessings (vv. –), not its sins. admonitions and counsels for the present. After delivering the Song to them, Moses implores the people to take its warnings to heart, so that they might “observe and do all the words of this law” (Deut :). As we have seen, Philo postpones any mention of such words until §§ – so as to make a clear distinction between the lawgiver and his law. Philo often pairs νουεσαι and σωφρονισμο in a way that makes them nearly synonymous, e.g., Leg. .; Post. ; Deus  (also with ;λεγχος); Ebr. ; Migr. . The latter refers literally to teachings of or appeals for moderation or sound judgment (cf. Engberg-Pedersen , –). Paul, at least, would have agreed that admonition can be conveyed through hymns and songs (see Col :, with Pokorn´y , ). good hopes for the future. The only “good hopes” expressed by the Song have to do with the bloody destruction of the nation’s enemies. Although she is deserving of punishment, Israel will be vindicated, so that no one might suppose that the God of Israel is weak (Deut :– ). (c) § . holiness and humanity. §§ – describe Moses’ third and final message, intercessory prayers on behalf of each of the twelve tribes. The pairing of hosiot¯es and philanthr¯opia (cf. Decal. ; Spec. .) hearkens back to the treatise’s introduction, § , where the latter was identified both as a “highway” to the former and as the “sister and twin” of piety. §  had indicated that the Song was intended for both angels and people. to change from mortal existence to immortal life. The biblical account simply states that Moses ascended Mount Nebo to be “gathered to his kin” (Deut :). Philo interprets this in terms of his basic thanatological principle: “The death of worthy persons is the beginning of another life. For life is twofold; one is with a corruptible body; the other is without the body and incorruptible” (QG .). Because it has been made in the divine image, the rational part of the soul participates in the realm of the immortal, e.g., Opif. , ; Deus ; Spec. .. Its immortal existence begins when the soul “removes its habitation from the mortal body and returns as if to the mother-city from which it originally removed its habitation to this place. For when it is said to a dying person, ‘Thou shall go to thy fathers’ (Gen :), what else is this than to represent another life without the body, which only the soul of the sage



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ought to live?” (QG .). This depiction of psychic “return” (see below) presupposes the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul, familiar from Pythagorean-Platonic traditions. Philo also seems to take for granted that such return is to be attained only by the wise (a notion that may have originated with Chrysippus: Dillon , –). And even among the wise it is possible to maintain a differentiation in terms of one’s experience of the afterlife, inasmuch as immortality is conceived as a matter of cultivating reason and virtue (e.g., Opif. –; Spec. .). The disembodied souls of most of the virtuous dead join the company of angels (Sacr. ; QG .; and cf. § ), though in cases of exceptional virtue the soul may rise higher, to the realm of the intelligible (Sacr. –; QG .; cf. Her. ). And beyond this, there are a few, including especially Moses himself, who advance higher still, being drawn into the very presence of God (Sacr. ; QE .); cf. Plato, Phaedr. a–a; Deut. Rab. .. Further, Wolfson , .–; Burnett . Plato’s arguments for the immortality of the soul are laid out most methodically in the Phaedo (for which see Bostock ; and for a broader survey, Guthrie ). For evidence regarding the development of these theories in Middle Platonism, see especially book  of Cicero’s Tusculanae disputationes (with Douglas ) and book  of the same author’s De republica (with Dillon , –). The concept of the soul’s immortality made an impression on a number of Hellenistic Jews besides Philo; cf. Wis :; :; :– (with Winston , –);  Macc :; Ps.-Phoc. –, –; Josephus, Ant. ., ; Bell. .; .; . (further, Cavallin , –). and gradually became aware. As David Winston has argued, in Philo’s view the mode of prophetic inspiration enjoyed by Moses was unique inasmuch as it was not, as it was with Noah or the patriarchs, “a product of psychic invasion and displacement” (, ). The inspired state, then, does not render him unaware or passive. Cf. QE . (on Exod :): “whatever soul comes too near in desiring the vision of God does not perceive when it is being consumed. But as for that (soul) which stands far off at a distance, no longer do the tongues of flame burn it but warming it moderately, they kindle it with vitality. This is said in reference to the dissolution and rapture of the most perfect and prophetic mind.” Also cf. QE .. the disjoining. Abr.  summarizes Philo’s understanding of the afterlife: “death is not the extinction of the soul but its separation and disjoining (δι,ζευξιν) from the body and its return to the place whence it came . . . from God.” Cf. Fug. ; Plato, Phaed. b; and above, on § .

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  the elements out of which he was composed. In concert with the prevailing philosophical and scientific opinion, Philo holds that the human person is a composite being, created from the same four elements as the cosmos itself (e.g., Opif. ; Decal. ; cf. Plato, Tim. e, c, b; Gross , –). Elsewhere, following Gen :, he describes the human body as a mixture of earth and water (e.g., Opif. –; Spec. .). The body reverts back into these elements at death, while “the soul whose nature is rational and celestial will depart to find a father in the aether” (Her. ; cf. Spec. .; Plato, Tim. e; Cicero, Tusc. .–). For this use of συγκερ,ννυμι, cf. Plato, Tim. a;  Cor :. His body, like a shell, was being removed from around him. Cohn (PCW .) adds περιπεφυκτος after δκην on the analogy of Ios. , but the text makes sense without the emendation. In that passage the mortal body is also described as an /στρεον, literally, an oyster shell, a metaphor derived from Plato, Phaedr. c; cf. Resp. d–a. his soul . . . longed for its migration. For μεταν,στασις, cf. § . When the soul undergoes its migration from the body, the latter resolves into the elements out of which it was made (Migr. –). Philo likens Moses’ Sinai ascent to a migration to a divine city, a region beyond the heavens where “there is no place but God” (QE .). In the Phaedo, Plato speaks of death as the departure (μετοκησις) from the body (c) for a “journey abroad” (ποδημα: e, b–d; cf. Apol. e), while Cicero can assert that, by imitating the harmony of the heavenly realm of the spheres with their music, some of the sages “have gained for themselves a return to this region, while others have obtained the same reward by devoting their brilliant intellects to divine pursuits” (Resp. .). § . his departure. The one who had led the Exodus of his people (e.g., Mos. ., ; .) now undergoes his own ;ξοδος from life in the body, this time leading the way for those “making a path to heaven” (QE ., cf. .; Mack ). For the term used in reference to death, cf. Wis :; :; Luke :; and esp. Josephus, Ant. .. set out for his destination. Literally “colony” or “settlement” (ποικα). Philo regularly likens the Exodus to a colonizing emigration (Mos. ., , , etc.), bringing the story into accord with the conventions of Greco-Roman historiography (see Weinfeld , –; Wilson ; and for the terminology of §§ –, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..). This language is then also applied figuratively to the journey of the sage’s soul after death. Just as the soul “emigrates” from heaven into the body at birth (Opif. ; cf. Nob. ), it undertakes a return journey

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upon death, taking the body as a place not to dwell but to sojourn, “as in a foreign land” (Her. ; cf. QG .). Thus the one who had led the Israelites to their new home now returns to his home, heaven (cf. Mos. ., also with ποικα). Philo can also use this imagery to describe the emigrations of the soul in its search for virtue and the true God (esp. Abr. –), which he will apply later to the experience of the proselyte (Hum. ; Nob. ; cf. Praem. , ). with harmonious prayers. After 1ναρμονοις PCW . prints ριμ< δ8δεκα seclusi. S has τν ριμν in lieu of ριμ<. calling each of the patriarchs by name. “The Blessing of Moses” (Deut :–) is comparable to other speeches in which a leader or founder figure gives a blessing at the end of his life, esp. Gen :– (which also mentions the individual tribes), though the former is distinct inasmuch as its material is set within a hymnic framework. The lion’s share of the blessings concentrate on the nation’s security and success in military matters, poised as it is to embark on a conquest of the promised land. On the twelve patriarchs, cf. Mos. ., . these prayers will be fulfilled. God grants fulfillment to prayers both because he is by nature kindly (εμεν=ς) and because those who render God genuine service are worthy of divine favor (Mos. .; cf. Praem. ). For Philo’s understanding of petitionary prayer, see Dowd . In Mos. .–, he refers to Moses’ final prayers on behalf of the people as inspired prophecies: the fact that some of them have been realized, he says, creates confidence that someday the rest will be fulfilled as well. Indeed, nothing less should be expected of words uttered by “a true seer, an interpreter of God, and alone gifted with foreknowledge of the hidden future” (Mos. .). Cf. T. Mos. :. beloved of God and God himself is a lover of humanity. For the former appellation, cf. Deut :, in which “the beloved one” (2 Wγαπημ!νος) is a collective for the people of Israel (Wevers , ), though Philo may take it as a reference to Moses. For God as a lover of humanity, cf. Deut : (“He spared his people, and all his sanctified ones are under his hands.”); elsewhere in the chapter God is “the Helper” (2 βοης); see vv. –. See also on Paen. . For divine philanthr¯opia, see on Nob. . noble and well-born. επατρδης is Philo’s term for native-born Jews as opposed to proselytes (see Hum. ). What makes the former “wellborn” in this context is that they can trace their ancestry back to one of the patriarchal tribes. For εγεν=ς, see the Analysis/General comments for De nobilitate.

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  arrayed in the highest rank. The language of τεταγμ!νος τ,ξιν is usually employed by Philo in a figurative sense (e.g., Decal. ; Spec. .; Hum. ), though the usage here seems to be more than metaphorical, given the military bearing of Deut . that general who is the Creator and Father of all. στρατ,ρχης is the general of an army, e.g., Josephus, Bell. .. Philo’s description of the Midianite war has God taking the role of foremost combatant and warrior of piety (Fort. ) and concludes with the promise that in future wars the Israelites would be saved by God’s unseen command (Fort. ; cf. Decal. ; Praem. ). The epithet “Creator and Father of all,” which has a Platonic provenance (Plato, Tim. c), underscores that the God with whom the Israelites enjoy a special relationship is the universal God (Runia , –); cf. Abr. ; Mos. .; Decal. , ; Spec. ., ; .; Fort. ; Hum. ; Praem. . § . [The requests . . . the flesh.] Cohn’s arguments that this section is an interpolation (, –) are helpfully summarized and critiqued by Colson (PLCL .). Besides being omitted by S, the sentence interrupts the flow of the passage and presents some grammatical peculiarities (e.g., 1π,ν in lieu of 1πειδ,ν). While Philo can speak of breaking the “bond” of the σμα (e.g., Ios. ; cf. Plato, Phaed. d; Tim. b, d– e), he does not apply this imagery to the σ,ρξ (cf. Josephus, Bell. .) and, at any rate, such imagery seems inconsistent with that of § . We might point out additionally that the expression here for “true goods” is found nowhere else in the Corpus Philonicum (cf. Plutarch, Virt. prof. c), while νετος is used elsewhere only in Leg. .. § . a most essential kinship with things divine. Deut  includes various reminders of Israel’s kinship with God: he is their father (vv. , ) and mother (v. ); they are his children (vv. , , , ). In claiming that this relationship existed “from the beginning,” Philo may have in mind the story of Abraham, whose greatest desire was kinship with God (see below, also Nob. ). The true bond of kinship is established not through lineage or ancestry (cf. §§ , ), but by offering the sort of τιμ= to God that children ought to offer their father (Spec. .–; cf. Deut :). Recognizing one’s kinship with the divine is the basis of piety (Plato, Leg. d–b). Such kinship is cultivated through the faculty of reason (Abr. ; cf. Plato, Tim. a). the heir of all the good things that human nature can contain. The people, like their new leader (§ ), are found to be worthy as “heirs.” Inheritance is a crucial motif for the theology of Deuteronomy: the nation is God’s “portion” and inheritance (:), while Israel’s inheritance



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is the land (:) and the law (:). Cf. Deut :; :, ; Jub. :– ; Ps.-Philo, L.A.B. :; QS IV ; XI , ; QH III ; Foerster and Hermann , –. As one might expect, Quis rerum divinarum heres (whose major figure is Abraham) contains sustained reflections on the theme. In Her. , for example, we hear that the one who desires to inherit “the good things of God” must abandon the body and its senses, in essence becoming a fugitive from oneself. To accomplish this is to become “an heir of wisdom” (Her. –). only to suppliants. Although it fairly describes Moses’ words and actions in Deut , the language of supplication (κ!της, κετε:ω) does not derive from that or any other Pentateuchal source (cf. Sir :;  Macc :; :; :; :; :; Heb :). In the Greco-Roman world, it was customary for a group to assert its piety by depicting its members (or their ancestors) as κ!ται (see Aeschylus, Suppl. –, –, and passim). In Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. .., for instance, the Trojans led by Aeneas represent themselves as suppliants, having left their homeland and dependent on the gods and divine oracles for their hope and welfare (cf. ..–; Polybius, Hist. ..–). One of the ways in which Israel’s special position in relation to God and the rest of humanity is established for Philo is through its role as intercessor for the nations, e.g., Spec. .; .; further, Nikiprowetzky , –. This is an identity grounded in the Exodus narrative: when the Israelites migrated to Egypt, they “suffered countless wrongs from the inhabitants, and when no assistance from other people appeared to be forthcoming, they became suppliants of God and sought refuge in his help” (Spec. .; cf. Mos. .–, , ; QE .). This status is reflected in their worship practices, e.g., Spec. .; ., , . Moses himself is frequently presented as a suppliant, often in an intercessory role (e.g., Mos. ., ; ., , , ; Spec. .; Praem. ). This is an extension of his role as εροφ,ντης and beloved of God (Spec. .–; cf. Hum. ). their thirst for wisdom. The water imagery may have been inspired by Deut :; :, , , though wisdom was frequently likened to a river or fountain, e.g., Prov :; :;  Esd :; Sir :; Bar : (πηγ+ τ$ς σοφας); Philo, Ebr. ; Spec. .; Cicero, Nat. d. .. Elsewhere Philo associates such fountains of wisdom especially with the spring of Gen : (e.g., Fug. –; Post. –), and divine kindnesses generally are likened to water from springs, free, life-sustaining, and everflowing, e.g., Opif. ; Cher. ; Her. – (again in an Abrahamic context); further, Zeller , –.

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  Parallel Exegesis As we have seen, Hum. – is an elaboration of the account of Moses’ death that concludes De vita Mosis. That account opens as follows: “When he was about to undergo his migration (ποικα) from there to heaven and leave mortal life to become immortal, he was summoned by the Father, who resolved his twofold nature of body and soul into the nature of a single element (ε>ς μον,δος νεστοιχεου φ:σιν), thoroughly transforming him into mind, beaming like the brightest sun” (Mos. .; cf. Opif. ; Her. ; Mos. .; QE .). This “resolution” of Moses’ body and soul (contrast the “separation” language of Hum. , ) might be construed as a reference to his apotheosis (cf. QG .), were it not for the comments that immediately follow, which have Moses prophesying not only about the future of the twelve tribes (.–), but also about his own future, relating “how he died and was buried with none present . . . in a tomb no one has seen” (.). This parallels Sacr. –, where a description of Moses’ “passing” (μεταν,στασις) is quickly followed by a reminder about his tomb (cf. Gig. ). Moses, then, is no “divine man,” that is, even he is not immune from human mortality. Such argumentation may represent a critique of traditions that saw in Deut :– a reference to Moses’ bodily ascension (Feldman ; Meeks , – ; and again cf. QG .), as well as an effort to distance the account of Moses’ death from Hellenistic deification stories, where “the absence of the body is a central sign of the hero’s translation into heaven” (Scott , ; and for such stories cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..–; ..; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..–; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; Ovid, Metam. .–). In this regard comparison may be made with texts like T. Mos. :; Ps.-Philo, L.A.B. :, which are also careful to mention Moses’ death and burial (on Josephus, see below).

Nachleben Unlike Philo, Josephus has no compunction about depicting Joshua as Moses’ successor both as general and as prophet (Ant. ., , ), though he shares Philo’s apparent concern to dispel any notion that Moses ascended bodily at death: “While he was bidding farewell to Eleazar and Joshua . . . a cloud suddenly stood over him and he disappeared into a certain ravine. But he has written of himself in the sacred



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books that he died, because he was afraid that they might dare to say that because of the abundance of virtue surrounding him he had gone up to the Divinity” (Ant. .; cf. .–). The suggestion that “Josephus may here be contradicting the near-deification of Moses that . . . Philo reflects” in Hum. – “as well as the common rumor of Moses’ assumption,” is made by Feldman (, ), though he does not include for consideration Philo’s comment in Mos. . (see above). Feldman goes on to suggest that the details of Josephus’ account may betray the influence of Sophocles’ Oedipus Coloneus (, ; cf. Lohfink , – ). Early Christian authors often interpreted Joshua (Ιησο(ς) as a type or figure of Jesus (e.g., Irenaeus, frg. ; Justin Martyr,  Apol. ; Origen, Comm. Jo. .) and the story of his succession could be referenced as a paradigm of transition in ecclesial leadership. In Hom. Num. ., for example, Origin, apparently drawing on Hum. , , argues that in the selection of Joshua “no thought was given to consanguinity or kinship” and holds this up as an apt criterion for the selection of Christian bishops (further, Trigg ; van den Hoek , ; cf. Ps.-Ignatius, Heron. ; Isidorus Pelusiota, Epist. .; Theodoret, Quaest. Num. ). In the Stromata, Clement makes no mention of the succession story, though in his summation of Philo’s De vita Mosis in ..–. there is a passing allusion to Moses’ death: “the princess gave the child the name Moses, an etymological derivation from the fact that she had rescued him from water . . . previously his parents had given the child a name on his circumcision: he was called Joachim. And he had a third name in heaven, after his ascension—as the mystics say—Melchi” (cf. Krauss , ). Elsewhere in describing Moses’ death Clement quotes from the lost Assumption of Moses (or perhaps from the lost ending to the Testament of Moses; see Tromp , –): “Joshua, son of Nun, saw a double Moses being taken away, one with the angels, the other honored with burial in the mountains near the ravines” (..). Origen similarly refers to a short, extra-canonical book in which “it is said that two Moseses were visible, one alive in the spirit and one dead in the body” (In Jesu Nave .). Further, Lohfink , –. For the combination of philanthr¯opia and eusebeia in Hum. , cf. Eusebius, Coet. sanct. .; Athanasius, Apol. sec. .; Apollinaris, Frg. in Psalm.  (on Ps :–); Sozomenus, Hist. eccl. pref. .; Runia , . Prov :– (see on Hum. ) was a much debated christological text, especially in connection with the Arian controversy. Besides the passages

on humanity –: death & succession of moses, §§ –  discussed by Dowling , see Ps.-Ignatius, Tars. ; Tertullian, Herm. ; Origen, Comm. Jo. .; Lactantius, Inst. .. Philo’s contention in Hum. , that philosophy furnishes the power to perceive God, is developed perhaps most famously in Clement, Strom. ..–, which contains numerous paraphrases and reminiscences of De congressu eruditionis gratia (van den Hoek , –; cf. Augustine, Civ. .). The Pythagorean-Platonic concept of the music of the spheres (see on §§ –) was embraced by a number of early Christian thinkers (e.g., Clement, Protr. .–), especially Ps.-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia; further, Miller , –. Further reading: Feldman ; Feldman ; Meeks ; Miller , –; Perdue ; Scott , –.

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 5 INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEY OF LAWS (§§ 80–81)

Analysis/General Comments This chapter introduces the second (and longest) section of De humanitate, recalling the introduction to the first (cf. §§ –, and note the repetition of φιλανρωπα, δεAγμα, and κοινωνα). While §§ – had extolled Moses’ humanity as 9γεμ8ν, §§ – now does the same for his legacy as νομο!της. Philo organizes the section around three broad categories of moral recipients—people (§§ –), animals (§§ – ), and trees (§§ –)—presented in the reverse order of creation (see Gen ). The first of these, in turn, is organized in a fashion that reflects the set of social polarities identified by Philo in § : Jews and non-Jews, friends and enemies, free and slaves. Moral responsibilities to fellow Jews are surveyed first (§§ –), including especially those who are poor or dispossessed. Next come groups which do not consist of 2μοενεAς (§§ –): proselytes (who are to be regarded as φλοι, §§ –), metics (§§ –), enemies and war captives (§§ – ). Finally there are indentured servants and slaves (§§ –). In its basic progression of topics this arrangement has the effect of presenting the reader with increasingly marginalized and/or deprived referents, beginning with the free but poor Jew and ending with what from Philo’s perspective would be the quintessential “non-person,” the non-Jewish slave.

Detailed Comments § . humanity and fellowship. κοινωνα could be understood as an expression of philanthr¯opia (e.g., Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. .) and the two occur regularly as parallel terms (e.g., Strabo, Geogr. ..; Plutarch, An seni c, e, e; Josephus, C. Ap. .). Thus it is not surprising that Philo will refer to the former repeatedly in his review of the law (§§ , , , , , , ; cf. §§ , , ), which for him

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stands preeminent among all law codes in enjoining both fellowship and humanity (Spec. .; cf. Decal. –; Spec. .; Berthelot , –). his natural excellence. The good king is inclined by nature (φ:σει) to be both gentle and humane (e.g., Dio Chrysostom, Or. .). On Moses’ natural gifts, see Mos. ., ; .; cf. Praem. , . if not all of them. Philo does not claim to survey all the provisions pertaining to humanity, only those which he thinks best reflect Moses’ intentions when framing the law. As we have seen, the schema adopted for the section allows him to be fairly comprehensive in this regard, though among the most noteworthy omissions in terms of referents mention may be made of widows and orphans, who are nowhere explicitly identified as beneficiaries of philanthr¯opia, even though the task of ensuring justice for these groups may be fairly described as a Mosaic priority (e.g., Exod :–; Deut :–; :; cf. Spec. ., ; .; .–). See on §§ , , , . § . fairness and gentleness. The terms 1πιεκεια and 9μερτης are often paired, both as private (e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..) and public (e.g., Plutarch, Thes. .) virtues. Both are also regularly associated with philanthr¯opia, both individually (e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; Epictetus, Diatr. ..) and jointly (e.g., Plutarch, Vit. pud. c–e). Among ancient leaders Numa was particularly renowned for his “gentle and humane” policies (e.g., Plutarch, Comp. Lyc. Num. .). These concepts will figure prominently in the survey of Mosaic humanity that follows, lending some thematic coherence to its divers contents. For fairness, cf. §§ , , , , , . For gentleness, cf. §§ , , , , , , , , . people . . . animals . . . trees . . . For this basic three-fold division of living things, see Ps.-Plato, Theag. b; Aristotle, Eth. eud. ...

Parallel Exegesis De humanitate not only continues the survey of laws begun in De specialibus legibus (see part  of the Introduction), it often covers many of the same pieces of legislation, as this chart shows.

on humanity : the survey of laws, §§ – Hum.

Principal Biblical Source(s)

Spec.

–

Exod :; Lev :–; Deut :–; :– Lev :; Deut :– Deut :– Lev :–; :; Deut :– Lev :–; Deut :–; :– Deut :– Exod :–; Lev :– Lev :–; Deut :– Deut :– Deut :– Deut :– Exod :– Exod :; Lev :–; Deut :– Deut :– Exod :; Lev : Lev : Exod :; :; Deut : Deut : Deut : Deut : Lev :–

.–

  –   – – –  – – –  – – –  – – –



.– . .–, – .– .–; .– .– .–, –

.– .–

A particular contribution of De humanitate to the Exposition consists not only in demonstrating the humanitarian dimensions of these various individual provisions, but also in gathering them together in this way. The blocks of biblical text that figure most prominently are Exod – (the so-called Covenant Code) and Deut –, sources which were popular with other Jewish moralists; cf. especially the Sentences of PseudoPhocylides, the Testament of Issachar, and book  of the Sibylline Oracles. Further, Sterling ; Wilson , –. It is not surprising that Hum. – also exhibits a number of parallels with Philo’s outline of Jewish customs in Hypoth. .–, since the latter also names philanthr¯opia as one of its themes (.; cf. πρOος and τιασς in .): Hypoth. . Hypoth. . Hypoth. . Hypoth. . Hypoth. .

do not abuse a slave food for the poor against abortion do not maltreat animals do not defraud animals of their offspring prematurely

cf. Hum. – cf. Hum. –,  cf. Hum. – cf. Hum. – cf. Hum. 



commentary

Hypoth. .

do not separate captive children from their parents Hypoth. .– on the sabbatical year

cf. Hum. – cf. Hum. –

In keeping with its epitomizing proclivities, the obligations listed in part  of the Hypothetica are communicated in a form that is far more compressed than what we find in De humanitate. It should also be noted that most of the items listed here are parallels only in a very general sense. For example, Hypoth. . states that the death penalty is imposed on anyone who injures, confines, kidnaps, or sells someone else, either free or slave. Hum. – also discusses the appropriate treatment of slaves, though with reference to the legislation in Exod :; Lev :–; Deut :–; :–. Perhaps the closest parallel comes from the command not to defraud animals of their offspring, though no specific reference is made to Lev : (cf. Hum. ) and, as Colson (PLCL .–) notes, the meaning of the Greek at this point in Hypoth. . is very difficult to discern. Again, Hypoth. .– explains the rationale for the sabbatical year, though the accent is not on how it benefits the poor (as in Hum. –), but on how it benefits the land.

Nachleben The Hypothetica, in turn, has a large number of parallels with Josephus’ summary of the law in C. Ap. .–, though the literary relationship between those two texts is complex. For details, see Sterling ; Sterling ; Wilson , –; Barclay , –. On account of some basic similarities in structure, Berthelot (, –) raises the possibility of direct influence of Hum. – on C. Ap. .–. The most significant parallels are the following. C. Ap. . C. Ap. . C. Ap. .– C. Ap. .– C. Ap. . C. Ap. .

all children to be raised no interest on loans kindness to foreigners and proselytes enemies’ trees not to be cut down no abuse of female captives only lawful use of animals

Hum.  Hum.  Hum. – Hum.  Hum.  Hum. 

As with the parallels from the Hypothetica listed above, Josephus’ treatment of the common items is far more abbreviated than the expositions

on humanity : the survey of laws, §§ –



provided in De humanitate. Besides the differences in order, it should also be emphasized that the degree of verbal continuity between the two texts is quite low, though it is interesting that in C. Ap. . Josephus says that the laws on animals teach “gentleness and humanity,” a pairing also found in Hum.  (though there it describes the legislation on slavery); cf. on Hum. . Taken as a whole, these similarities do not provide sufficient evidence for direct literary borrowing (cf. part  of the Introduction). What they do suggest is the importance of certain texts and themes for the construction of Jewish apologetic arguments during this era, particularly in conjunction with the subject of the law’s humanity (cf. Dautzenberg , –). Indeed, these similarities between De humanitate and C. Ap. .– support Vermes’ (, ) observation that in the latter, “Josephus claims, in brief, that the main message of the law in the domain of human relations is philanthropy (φιλανρωπα) and a gentle disposition towards not only fellow-Jews but all mankind” (cf. Wilson , –; Barclay , ). Further reading: Wilson .

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 6 ON LENDING AT INTEREST (§§ 82–87)

Analysis/General Comments Credit was a structural feature of the Roman economy, extending through every segment of society and supporting all manner of personal, commercial, and political undertakings. Abusive lending and excessive debt must have been routine, or at least they are routinely cited by ancient historians as leading causes of social tension. Tacitus’ complaint is typical: “the curse of usury . . . is inveterate in Rome, a constant source of sedition and discord” (Ann. .; cf. Appian, Bell. civ. ..). Historians also record numerous measures meant to address debt-related problems. The lex Genucia ( bce), to name one, banned interestbearing loans altogether (Livy, Ab urb. cond. ..), though it is impossible to say how widely or for how long it was observed. Later, the lex Valeria ( bce) allowed debtors who had gone bankrupt to repay one fourth of each outstanding loan (Royer , –). The financial panic of  ce, precipitated in part by over-extended borrowing, required massive imperial intervention in the form of interest-free loans (Wolters ). Greek society, of course, had hardly been immune to such problems (Asheri ). Cities sometimes attempted to alleviate debt crises by temporarily absorbing their citizens’ interest payments (Ps.-Aristotle, Oec. ..). Nevertheless, by the first century bce “public and private debt had reached a critical point in the Greek East” (Crawford , ). Documentation from Hellenistic and Roman Egypt evidences widespread borrowing activity, the standard interest rate for monetary loans being one percent per month (Taubenschlag , – ; Tcherikover –, .–). Lending tended to be of a private rather than institutional nature, creditors being drawn largely from “the landed civic aristocracy” (Bagnall , ), for whom the practice often turned out to be an effective way of investing surplus capital. On the other hand, most of the farmers to whom they lent were faced with a recurring need for credit, and the rate of delinquency and default was high (Rowlandson , –). Friends



commentary

and family might try to assist each other with interest-free loans (Pestman ). Given their broad social and economic importance, it is not surprising that matters relating to credit also drew the attention of political theorists. Like others, Plato believed that widespread indebtedness created the conditions for political upheaval (Resp. c–d, cf. e–a). Accordingly, in his model constitutions money-lending policies are carefully circumscribed, as part of an effort to regulate economic life more generally and minimize the corrupting influence of greed. To lend at interest is mentioned among the commercial activities forbidden to citizens in the Leges (c, cf. c–d; Resp. b–c, a–b). Such steps, we hear, are necessary in a state whose purpose is to make its citizens not rich, but friends (c–d). At the same time, they are permitted to lend without interest, though the terms of even these loans are not enforceable, since legal disputes are precisely the sort of thing that should never divide φλοι (e, cf. d). No doubt the treatise’s original readers would have quickly recognized the moral code being invoked. Friends were expected to be available to one another with interest-free loans, especially in an emergency (Millett , –). Lysias even goes so far as to say that “we see the best proof of a man’s friends” in their willingness to contribute in this manner (Or. .). In contrast to the calculating self-interest that guides commercial relationships, friends are supposed to “vie with each other in giving and not getting benefit” (Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..) in such a way that perpetuates the friendship and fosters civic solidarity. That lending without interest is taken up by three different Pentateuchal sources serves as an indication of its importance in Judaism, though in explaining how the practice ought to be observed they vary in such particulars as the status of the prospective borrower, the types of items involved, the motivation of the lender to participate, and the terms used to describe the transaction itself. Two texts (Exod :; Lev :–) ban lending on interest to fellow Israelites who are impoverished. That each of them is to be treated “as a stranger and resident alien” (Lev :) may indicate that they are landless as well (Milgrom , –). In a third text (Deut :–), interest is prohibited for all loans with fellow Israelites but sanctioned for those with aliens, with no indication in either case as to the borrower’s socio-economic status. These statutes can be taken, though, as supplementing an earlier text (Deut :–) that had expressed the positive obligation to assist poor and needy Israelites with loans. As for the types of loans, Exod : speaks of monetary ones only, to which Lev : adds loans of food-

on humanity : on lending at interest, §§ –



stuffs, while the list in Deut : includes both of these as well as “anything that you may lend out.” The concern of Deut :, by contrast, is with the loan’s sufficiency rather than its content: “lend to him as much as he wants according to his need.” The texts are similarly divergent in identifying the reasons why creditors ought to participate in the desired lending practices. Exod : attaches no motive clause directly to its command at all (though cf. :), while Lev : grounds the appeal in a reminder of the Exodus narrative. The readers of Deut : hear that compliance will help ensure divine blessing on “all your works upon the land” that they currently possess (cf. :). Lev : is alone in indicating, albeit cryptically, the anticipated outcome for the borrower, which presumably represents an additional rationale for the practice: “your brother shall live with you” (cf. Deut :). The expectation here would seem to be not that the borrower take up residence with the lender, but that he not be compelled, like the destitute so often are, to roam in search of work. While the terminology for the act of lending itself varies (Exod :: 1κδανεσ@ης; Lev :: δ8σεις; Deut :–: 1κτοκιεAς; cf. Deut :, : δανιεAς), the texts all incorporate some reference to τκος, the standard term for the interest applied to a loan. The particular formulation of Lev :, to take “neither interest nor increase,” may involve a technical distinction in the kinds of interest that could be charged, the latter referring perhaps to advance interest or compound or accrued interest (Wevers , ), though it could just as well be a hendiadys. Although the evidence that Hellenistic Jews observed these statutes is limited (Taubenschlag , –; Tcherikover –, .– ), the topic continued to be of interest to Jewish moralists. Ben Sira’s advice, for example, expresses the sort of prudential view one expects of a gnomic author (:–). Lending to a neighbor is advisable, he says, since at some future point you may need to borrow from him yourself (cf. Hesiod, Op. –). Still, many people are reluctant to lend for fear of being defrauded, and dealing with creditors can be a source of frustration. Nevertheless, it is better to obey the law and be patient with debtors, especially if they are poor. For his part, Philo’s treatment of the issue contrasts the virtue that attaches to those who follow the law with the vice that attaches to those who do not. The discussion shows a basic, three-part structure. () An initial summary (§§ –) explains both what the Mosaic statutes prohibit, lending to fellow Jews at interest (§ ), and what they promote, active support for those in need (§ ).



commentary

() Next, the moral significance of the statutes is illustrated with contrasting sets of character descriptions (§§ –). Positive outcomes are identified for those associated with compliance to the law, both the borrower, and especially the lender, who acquires a whole list of honorable attributes (§ ). This is juxtaposed with the depravity of three character types: the rich but virtueless king (§ a), the petty usurer (§ b), and the unscrupulous profiteer, who creates “famine in the midst of prosperity” (§ ). () The conclusion then asserts that the polity established by Moses averts the very traits these types embody, namely, servility and savagery (§ ). The chapter as a whole is replete with the technical language of money-lending: ρχαAος, δανεζω, δ,νειον, ;ρανος, κχρημι, κομζω, συμβ,λλω, τκος, etc. (see Millett , –).

Detailed Comments () § . to lend on interest to a brother. The initial presentation depends especially on the interpretation of lending obligations given in Deuteronomy. Of the legal texts surveyed above, Deut : is alone in its unqualified prohibition of lending on interest to an δελφς, while only Deut :, ,  has the unaugmented form of δανεζω (cf. Exod :; Deut :), which is picked up also in Jewish wisdom texts (Pss :, ; Prov :; Sir :;  Macc :). On its own, the term says nothing about the type of loan Philo has in mind, which will be specified only later in the sentence. meaning . . . anyone who is a citizen and compatriot. That δελφς in Deut :– possesses a nationalistic meaning is indicated by its opposition to λλτριος (“alien, foreigner”). Although Philo is familiar with the distinction (e.g., Spec. .), he defines the word here in terms of two positive criteria. As for the latter, the reader knows from previous passages that Moses called his 2μφυλοι and 2μοενο “brothers” as a way of signaling the mutual affection they ought to share, especially when one of them is in difficulty (Spec. ., , ); cf. Josephus, Ant. .. The former, that a brother is also a citizen (literally, a citizen of one’s town, στυ) is absent from the biblical sources, though Deut : describes the loan recipient as living “in one of your cities (πλεων).” At any rate, the additional stipulation does bring out the term’s potential political connotations more clearly, in which case we can compare Aspasia’s encomium of Athens (Plato, Menex. e–a), according to which the citizens of

on humanity : on lending at interest, §§ –



the polis regard one another as siblings. Philo’s definition is reminiscent also of Aristotle’s position in Eth. nic. .., to the effect that the claims of friendship extend to include φυλ!ται and πολAται. Cf. on § . deeming it unjust to extract interest from money. It is hardly surprising that the criterion of justice would be introduced in an evaluation of money-lending (it will resurface again in §§ , , , and ). Aristotle, for instance, includes usury under the category of unjust acts (Eth. nic. ..–). In the biblical ambit, obedience to the laws on lending is a characteristic of the righteous (Pss :–; :; Prov :; Ezek :–), while τκος is δικα (Pss :–; :); cf. Josephus, Ant. .. The verb 1κλ!γω can apply to any collection of money (for tolls, taxes, etc.; e.g., Spec. .–; Cassius Dio, Hist. rom. ..), though only infrequently to loan-interest (e.g., Theophrastus, Char. .; cf. Philo, Spec. .; Legat. ), while χρ=ματα presumably includes foodstuffs (see § ) and other goods in addition to money; cf. Deut :. like offspring from cattle. Aristotle explains that τκος came to be used as the term for interest because “just as offspring (τικτμενα) resemble their parent, so interest (τκος) is money born of money” (Pol. ..). Generating wealth in this way is “contrary to nature” because “its gain comes from the money itself,” which was originally created only for the purpose of exchange. Plato similarly decries moneymakers (χρηματιστα) who collect interest from their clients “like offspring (1κγνους) from its parent” (Resp. e–a, cf. a; Polit. a). § . above all to give freely . . . to those in need. In moving from negative to positive requirements, the objects of moral responsibility are now designated more specifically as those in need (ο δεμενοι; cf.  Macc :; Plato, Phaedr. d) and then, in § , the poor (ο π!νητες), reflecting the types and order of characterizations found in Deut : 2 1πιδεμενος in v.  (cf. vv. –), 2 π!νης in v.  (cf. Exod :; Lev :). That passage also communicates a special concern regarding the disposition of the lender in his dealings with such borrowers, in particular that he not harden his “heart” or close his “hand” against them (Deut :), complying instead with unity of action and attitude. Philo also addresses what we might call the psychology of lending (e.g., “with unrestrained hands and hearts”), though while the potential cause for reluctance in Deuteronomy is the approaching sabbatical cancellation of debts (v. ), in §  it is the lack of financial benefit associated with the interest-free loans themselves. The positive responsibility of the readers in Deut  is expressed with the charge to “open your hands wide to him, lend to him as much as he needs” (v. , cf. v. ), with the second clause serving



commentary

to clarify the first (Wevers , –). Philo, however, seems to take this as establishing a priority of discrete actions, to fill or extend the hand being a sapiential idiom for almsgiving, e.g., Prov :; :; Sir :; Ps.-Phoc. , . This conforms with his belief that in assisting the needy it is more appropriate to give gifts (χαρζεσαι; cf. Sir :) than loans (Somn. ., cf. .–). Such generosity could be interpreted as an act of philanthr¯opia (Dio Chrysostom, Or. .–). It could have political ramifications as well. According to Plato, Leg. c–d, states seeking to avoid social disorder need to establish formal mechanisms that encourage well-off creditors to share (κοινωνεAν) with their needy debtors, partly by remissions and partly by distributions, out of a sense of fairness, or 1πιεκεια (for the terminology, see on § ). Cf. Democritus, frg. : “When the powerful . . . give gifts (χαρζεσαι) to those without means this shows pity . . . and the citizens are in concord.” a gift is a type of loan. The command in Deut  that the readers should give (δ8σεις, v. ) to their brother is grounded in a reminder that God is giving (δδωσιν, v. ) them the land upon which that brother is in need. While Philo is familiar with the concept of imitating God by bestowing gifts (e.g., Hum. ), the moral logic of §  emphasizes the social rather than the theological dynamics of reciprocity. Even with a gift, he says, there is the prospect of repayment, and such a scenario seems to be especially commendable in his eyes inasmuch as the return is made willingly, without the obligation imposed by a formal loan. This attention to the recipient’s reciprocity, absent from the biblical texts, is familiar from Greco-Roman ruminations on the social significance of economic exchange. As Millett (, ) observes, prevailing norms made it incumbent upon “the good citizen” to assist family, friends, and neighbors in need “with gifts, interest-free loans . . . and other non-monetary kindnesses.” Granting a χ,ρις to someone who was impoverished was thought to be especially noble, since financial self-interest would not be a motive (Aristotle, Rhet. ..–; Seneca, Ben. ..–; ..–; Pliny, Ep. .) and, formally at least, would not have been considered a loan (Dio Chrysostom, Or. .). By the same token, it was necessary to be discriminating with one’s largesse, bestowing it only on the morally worthy, specifically, on those who would show proper gratitude, including the will to make a return (Cicero, Off. .–; Seneca, Ben. ..; ..; ..). For Aristotle, “the very existence of the state” depends on the reciprocal obligation of its citizens “not only to repay a kindness done one (χαρισαμ!ν<ω), but at another time to take the initiative in performing a kindness oneself (χαριζμενον),” with the understanding that “one

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

ought to return services rendered . . . just as one ought to pay back a loan” (Eth. nic. ..–; ..; cf. ..). This entailed no inconsiderable social obligation for the recipient of a “gift.” As a moral priority, requiting a kindness outranks even showing affection for family members, since “no duty is more imperative than that of proving one’s gratitude” (Cicero, Off. .), and so one must be ever “watching for an opportunity to repay” (Seneca, Ben. ..). Requital was especially important in dealing with one’s social superiors. Clients, for example, in Roman society were obliged to exchange financial χ,ριτες with their patrons so as to strengthen philanthr¯opia between them, even if the long-term nature of the relationship was asymmetrical (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..–). The Romans in general seem to have been virtually obsessed with the moral problem of ingratia (Inwood ). Against this background the moral excellence of both donors (who give to the deserving) and recipients (who show themselves to be deserving) in §  emerges more clearly. Josephus similarly points out that the lender who acts in accordance with biblical rules can expect to receive the borrower’s gratitude (εχαριστα) in lieu of interest (Ant. .). they should . . . be most ready and willing to lend. In order to generate the maximum amount of goodwill and gratitude, one’s giving had to be done “willingly, promptly, and without hesitation” (Seneca, Ben. ..; cf. ..; ..). () § . the poor are not likely to become more helpless. The poor, who will figure prominently as an object of moral concern also in §§ , – , and –, are mentioned by name for the first time in the treatise here, further specifying the “needy” of §  (cf. Deut :). Lending without interest as an obligation to the poor is developed especially in the wisdom literature; besides Exod : and Lev :, see Ps :– ; Prov :; :; Sir :–; and for the international context, cf. Instr. Amenem. .–: “If you find a large debt against a poor man, make it into three parts; forgive two, let one stand.” Among ancient authors of all kinds it is simply taken for granted that this is the population most vulnerable to the problems associated with indebtedness (e.g., Plato, Resp. c, e; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..–; ..–) and most deserving of philanthr¯opia in the form of debt relief (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..–; Plutarch, Sol. .–). Philo betrays his aristocratic perspective on the issue in Spec. . (cf. Somn. .–), assuming that anyone forced to borrow at interest must be in the utmost straits (πορ8τατος).



commentary

gentleness, fellowship, kindness . . . Deut  spells out the consequences of compliance for both parties in the lending exchange: the needy will not fail off the land (v. ), while the lender will enjoy divine blessing (v. ). Philo attends to the former in passing, concentrating instead on the benefits that accrue to the latter. The “finest and most honorable of all things” for humankind are, of course, the virtues (Praem. ; cf. ρετ= in Hum. ). The first three listed here (9μερτης, κοινωνα, χρησττης) figure prominently throughout De virtutibus as ways of characterizing the moral excellence of the law (§§ , , , ). They hearken back especially to the section’s introduction (§§ –): the qualities ingredient to the law accrue to those who obey it. The moneylender of Spec. ., by contrast, is despicable precisely in his deceitful claims to fellowship, kindness, and humanity (cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. .–). Wisdom authors tended to associate lending to the poor with the virtue of mercy (1λεημοσ:νη, οGκτος), e.g., Pss :, ; :; Prov :; :; Sir :; Luke :–. Philo’s outlook accords more with that of Josephus, for whom this is an act of χρησττης (Ant. .) contributing to κοινωνα (C. Ap. .; cf. Ps.-Phoc. –). . . . high-mindedness, a good name and a good reputation. The contribution made by the items in the second half of the list to the treatise’s overall argument is less clear. The fourth item, μεγαλνοια, does not belong to Philo’s usual clutch of virtues—though in Contempl.  it names the disposition according to which the wise freely give (χαρισ,μενοι) of their possessions so as to benefit others—while its seems difficult to classify the last two items as virtues in the usual sense at all. Perhaps the closest either comes to that status is in Fort. , where we learn that the sage does enjoy a certain εIκλεια, though Philo insists that this will be accorded him not by the general public (cf. § ), but only by those who understand virtue (cf. Praem. ). The good reputation enjoyed by the lender of § , by contrast, belongs more plainly to the prevailing “moral matrix” of Greco-Roman gift exchange and its (often implicit) rules, one of which was the “absolute duty of any recipient of generosity that he should praise the giver of concrete gifts or services, who thus accumulated honor by giving” (Dixon , , cf. ). Elites strove for “the much-cherished image of liberalitas,” a reputation confirmed and enhanced through numerous donations, thereby proving one’s worthiness to occupy an elevated position in society and be accorded dignitas (Verboven , –, –). Favors to those in need not only foster fellowship, justice, and humanity, they also bring upon the donor laudatio, gloria, magnificentia (Seneca, Ben. ..–; ..; ..–;

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..). A promise to relieve the debts of the poor would quite predictably win the speaker praise, love, and admiration from all the citizens for his φιλανρωπα and μεγαλοψυχα (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..). For the virtue-list in its entirety, cf. Gnom. Epict. : οδEν κρεAσσον μεγαλοφροσ:νης κα 9μερτητος κα φιλανρωπας κα εποιας. For such lists, cf. on Paen. . § . the Great King appears to be the poorest. The Great King (by which Greek authors usually mean the King of Persia, Alexander, or the Roman emperor) is here representative of a common character type in moral literature (e.g., Ps.-Anacharsis, Ep. ), the man rich in possessions but poor in wisdom. His wealth pales in comparison with that of the sage, whose possessions consist of the virtues, stored in the soul, and of which God alone is the true source (Fort. , ; cf. Fug. –; Somn. .; Plato, Resp. e). his wealth is soulless, buried underground. Material wealth is ψυχος (cf. Fug. ), irrelevant to the life of the soul, especially its governing part, which aspires to divine virtue (see below, and cf. Fort. ). Given the emphasis throughout §§ – on using such wealth properly, Philo’s description of the King here also evokes the ancient critique of illiberality, according to which riches ought to be put to good use (e.g., to help one’s friends), not vainly hoarded (Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..–; Teles, frg. A.–; Sir :–; etc.). No one guilty of the latter can expect to earn εφημα (§ ); cf. Seneca, Ben. ..: “The wealth that you esteem, that you think makes you rich and powerful, is buried under an inglorious name so long as you keep it.” The miser who would rather hide his money than lend it out was something of a cliché in parables and comedy, e.g., Antiphon, frg. . virtue is in the governing part of the soul. Stoic psychology divided the soul into eight parts, the highest and directive part being the 9γεμονικν, the rational faculty and abode of virtue, e.g., Plutarch, Virt. mor. b–c; cf. Philo, Opif. , ; Abr. ; Mos. .; Spec. .. It is therefore the only aspect of human existence in which true goodness can be found (Nob. ; cf. Fort. , ). Also see on Nob. . the purest realm of existence . . . and the parent of all things. Philo reasons that, as God’s dwelling-place, the heavenly realm must be made from the purest of all substances (e.g., Opif. ; cf. Mos. .; Decal. ; Spec. .; Ps.-Aristotle, Mund. .a), even if its precise nature is uncertain (Abr. ; Dillon , –). Heaven’s pre-eminence in creation is analogous to that of the soul in the human personality (e.g., Her. ). Therefore “the soul is most nearly akin to heaven, the purest



commentary

realm of existence, and . . . to the Father of the world” (Decal. ). The latter is often referred to as 2 γεννητ+ς τν 3λων, e.g., Mos. ., ; Decal. ; Spec. .. petty usurers and unscrupulous lenders. Both Hβολοστ,της and τοκογλ:φος were pejorative terms for professional moneylenders, their activities being associated with greed and deceit (Fug. ; Spec. .– ; Praem. ). The former (literally, an “obols-lender”) is perhaps best illustrated by Theophrastus’ “shameless man,” who will engage in any occupation no matter how disgraceful, even making small loans at high interest to street venders, putting the profits “straight into his mouth” (Char. .; cf. Antiphanes, frg. ). The latter (literally, a “notcherupper of interest”) is similarly the target of ridicule, e.g., Lucian, Men. , . the wealth that can see. For Plato, πλο(τος that is not blind but keen of sight (Hξ βλ!πων) is wealth whose use is guided by wisdom (Leg. c). Philo employs the metaphor as well, though for him “sighted” wealth refers to the riches of virtue in the soul, as opposed to material wealth, which is “blind” to the former (see on Fort. ; cf. Fug. ; Abr. ; Mos. .; Nob. ; Praem. ). Just as the highest of the senses is the sight of the eyes, the highest faculty of the soul’s governing part is the “sight” of the mind, which in Abr.  is identified as φρνησις (cf. Deus ; Aristotle, Top. .). In their delusion, those possessed only of blind wealth have never even dreamt of its counterpart (Spec. .; .). The moneylender of Spec. . also suffers from blindness, though of a more mundane variety: having no vision of the time of repayment, he will be fortunate to get back what he originally laid out, much less any profit. § . lend out food at interest. Surplus agricultural produce was frequently used to make loans in kind, usually repayable after the next harvest and usually at high rates of interest (fifty percent was normal in Roman Egypt). Wealthy landowners even created grain “accounts” at village granaries to facilitate such transactions (Lewis , , ; Rowlandson , , ). Lev : and Deut : specifically mention foodstuffs (βρ8ματα) among the items that may not be lent out at interest. With fluctuations in the market value of commodities, of course, such loans might still result in profit for the lender, a problem that occupies rabbinic sources (e.g., m. B. Mes. :–). That the law’s humanity is reflected in provisions that assure an adequate food supply is a theme to which Philo will return, e.g., §§ , , and especially chapters – (§§ –).

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They would hardly be quick . . . For the use of ταχ: γ ν with a “sarcastic” or “contemptuous” tone (Denniston , –), cf. Ps.Demosthenes, Or. .; Epictetus, Diatr. ..; ..; PLCL .. to give beggars a donation. The term ;ρανος originally designated a common meal, then later an (usually) interest-free loan collected from multiple contributors for a friend in need (Millett , –). Such assistance was a demonstration of philanthr¯opia (Demosthenes, Or. . –), while refusing to help marked one as illiberal (Theophrastus, Char. .). Philo’s usage here retains something of the term’s meal element (see below; and cf. Plutarch, Comp. Stoic. abs. c). Hypoth. . mentions the obligation to contribute food to the poor (τροφ+ν 1ρανζουσι) as though it were an offering to God, that is, without any thought of return, and a beggar (μετατης) is precisely the sort of person who would need such a handout (Flacc. ; cf. Fug. ; Somn. .). creating . . . famine in the midst of prosperity and plenty. Professional lenders were routinely maligned for taking advantage of the misfortune of others (Spec. .; Demosthenes, Or. .; .; etc.). Here the focus is on the needless want that their unscrupulous activities create for society’s most vulnerable (cf. Spec. .; Flacc. –). Plato outlaws the abuses of moneylenders because their shameless greed “increases pauperism and poverty” in the state (Resp. e–a). For κατασκευ,ζω used of scheming or fraudulent activities, cf. Demosthenes, Or. ., ; .. drawing an income from the needy stomachs of miserable people. Philo’s γαστρς ;νδειαν echoes Deut :, , according to which the recipient of an interest-free loan is to be a brother in need, 1νδε=ς (cf. Sir :). Such people ought to be helped, not exploited; cf. Prov :: “The one who increases his wealth by interest and usury gathers it for the one who pities beggars.” That they are among the λιοι (a general category for the weak and afflicted, e.g., Spec. .) only underscores the depravity of those who victimize them. weighing food and drink in a scale. The lenders’ fastidiousness brings to mind Theophrastus’ “mistrustful” man, who refuses to lend out anything without first weighing it (Char. .). Especially in times of economic crisis, it would not have been unusual to see mobs of people waiting in public places to have small amounts of food measured out to them, often at “famine” prices (Demosthenes, Or. .; Garnsey , ). On just weights and measures, cf. Spec. .–.

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commentary

() § . his sacred polity. As the “best” of its kind (cf. Spec. .; Paen. ; Nob. ), the Mosaic πολιτεα corresponds with the divine, or cosmic, constitution (Decal. –), revealed by God (Decal. – ) through the holiest of lawgivers (Paen. ), inculcating piety and holiness in its adherents (Hum. , ; Nob. ). For ερO πολιτεα, cf. Mos. .; Spec. ., , . a servile and thoroughly illiberal soul. Philo often dramatizes the meaning of νελε:ερος by juxtaposing the term with δουλοπρεπ=ς, as in Fug. , where the pair is similarly applied to ill-fated usurers (cf. Hum. ). In the Aristotelian tradition, the life of the “illiberal man” is by definition servile and misanthropic (Virt. vit. ..–), since he will stoop to even the most degrading activities in order to satisfy his greed, including money-lending (Eth. nic. ..–; cf. Plutarch, Vit. aere al. f) and exploiting the poor (Rhet. ..–). altered into savagery and the nature of wild beasts. In a Platonic context, the “transformation of souls” describes the process of metempsychosis (e.g., Leg. c–e; Runia , –). Philo appropriates this language as a way of representing the degree of moral degradation brought on by vicious practices. Human beings have a natural inclination for κοινωνα, but by engaging in conduct that selfishly harms others their nature is changed into something savage and uncivilized, even subhuman (Spec. .; cf. Decal. ; Fort. ; Prov. .), which, put differently, means that they have forsaken the divine rules of philanthr¯opia and eusebeia (Decal. –). The predatory and ruthless actions of professional moneylenders are readily classified among such practices (cf. Spec. .; Demosthenes, Or. .; Plutarch, Vit. aere al. a, e).

Parallel Exegesis While reviewing the legislation on the sabbatical remission of debts (Spec. .–), Philo pauses to explain what is meant by “brothers” in Deut :–, which segues into a digression on the Mosaic prohibition of interest-bearing loans (.–). Such lending, we hear, exploits the poor, who ought to be extended instead philanthr¯opia, which will allow them to repay their creditors when the proper occasion arises. The professional moneylender, meanwhile, is maligned especially for the vanity and imposture of his work. Pretending to fellowship, humanity, and goodness, he is in fact self-deceived and universally detested. Comparatively little attention is given to his law-abiding opposite, as in Hum. –.

on humanity : on lending at interest, §§ –



Nachleben Clement’s borrowing from De humanitate begins in Strom. .., where he announces that what follows concerns sharing, or μετ,δοσις (cf. Hum. , , , etc.), and fellowship, or κοινωνα (cf. Hum. , , , etc.). The ensuing summary of biblical lending rules (..–; cf. Paed. .) is based on Hum. –a, b (van den Hoek , –). Clement agrees with his source that the law prohibits lending on interest to a “brother,” and that this designates a 2μφυλος as well as someone born of the same parents, though with the further stipulation that this someone also “has participated in the same logos.” As in Hum. , the interest taken from loans is condemned as ο δικαιν. Instead, one should “give gifts with unrestrained hands and hearts to those in need,” quoting Hum. , though there is no indication that for Clement this refers to anything other than a loan. He adds that such χ,ρις originates ultimately with God (cf. Hum. ), and that the one who shares in this way receives as interest the same virtues listed in Hum. b, minus κοινωνα. The church fathers inveigh against usury frequently, emphasizing especially its deleterious effects for the borrower (Maloney ). Besides the biblical passages mentioned above, much of this discussion is inspired by Luke :–, e.g., Tertullian, Marc. .; Cyprian, Test. .; Gregory of Nyssa, Contra usurarios. A concluding section of Basil’s anti-usury homily on Psalm  resembles Hum. –: out of admiration for the lawgiver’s philanthr¯opia one ought not to burden the poor with debt, but rather give to them without expectation of a return, knowing that “the same thing is both a gift and a loan” and that the giver will receive “great things in return,” that is, from the Lord (Hom. .). What may be the most detailed patristic treatment of the theme, Ambrose’s De Tobia, draws on Hum. – (Tob. –), as well as on Somn. .–, –; . (Tob. , –, , ). Further reading: Millett ; Royer .

ON HUMANITY CHAPTERS 7–8 PROMPT PAYMENT OF WAGES (§ 88); SEIZING A PLEDGE (§ 89)

Analysis/General Comments Deut :– spells out the law of prompt payment: “You shall not unjustly handle the wage of a poor man and a needy man among your brethren or among the proselytes who are in your cities. You shall pay his wage on the same day; the sun shall not go down upon it, because he is poor and has his hope in it, lest he shall cry out against you to the Lord and it shall be a sin for you.” Bereft of both land and regular employment, wage laborers as a whole would have been classed among the poor and vulnerable (Nelson , ; cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. .–). This would be the case even if such status is not made explicit, as in Lev : (“You shall not unjustly treat your neighbor, and you shall not steal. And the wage of the wage laborer shall not lie with you until morning.”) or in most subsequent interpretations of the law (though cf. Ps.-Phoc. ). T. Job :– makes a further distinction between the destitute poor, who are to receive alms and food, and the working poor, who are to receive wages at the end of the day. Most later interpretations also ignore Deuteronomy’s restriction of the law to fellow Israelites and proselytes (though cf. Sifre Deut. ), tending instead to generalize its application, as we see with Tob : (“Do not keep over until the next day the wage of anyone who works for you.”); cf. Luke :;  Tim :; Josephus, Ant. .. A restriction of the law to fellow Israelites may be implicit in Lev :, which juxtaposes the rule with one about the “neighbor” (cf. Sir :). According to Plato’s Leges, citizens are forbidden to use gold or silver currency, “except for purposes of such daily (κα 9μ!ραν) exchange as it is almost necessary for artisans to use, and all who need such things in paying wages to wage laborers (μισος μισωτοAς), whether slaves or immigrants” (Leg. a). The responsibility to pay wages promptly is taken seriously, as we learn from Leg. c–d. Anyone who has hired an artisan is obligated to pay his wage according to whatever prior



commentary

agreement the two had reached regarding the work. Those who fail to abide by the agreement and pay on time are liable to pay double the original fee, and after a year interest is applied on any money still owed. Processes are also established for the arbitration of wage disputes (b). Hired workers formed a substantial segment of the total supply of agricultural labor, the demand being greatest during the harvesting and vintage seasons. The pool for this workforce would have included not only the landless poor, but also smallholders and tenant farmers, who supplemented the incomes generated by their own properties by hiring themselves out (Garnsey ; and on the relation between wage labor and tenancy in Roman Egypt, Rowlandson , –). To their employers, they would have been virtually indistinguishable from the slaves with whom they often worked side-by-side. Varro, for example, takes it for granted that a large estate will draw on the labor supplied by both groups, though freemen are preferable, he says, when cultivating terrain that is “insalubrious” (Rust. ..–). There would have been a need for casual labor in urban centers as well, for example, in the building trade (Meggitt , –). On the nature and importance of such labor in the Greco-Roman world, see Burford , –; Erdkamp . For the typical wage earned by day laborers in Roman Egypt, see Lewis , , cf. . Deut :– legislates the rights of access that a lender has to the pledge (τ 1ν!χυρον) that a borrower has put up as security against a loan: vv. – stipulate the general rule, which is supplemented in vv. – with an accommodation for borrowers who are poor (cf. : ). The Hebrew text of the former envisions a scenario in which the borrower hands over a deposit to the lender as collateral to secure a loan (“When you make your neighbor any sort of loan,” etc.); cf. Mek. R. Ishm. .; Bord . In the LXX, by contrast, the lender demands that the borrower hand over the deposit on a loan that is in default, so as to pressure repayment: “If your neighbor owes you a debt (Hφελημα) . . . you shall not go into his house to take his pledge. You shall stand outside and the person who is in your debt shall bring out the pledge to you.” Both versions emphasize that the integrity of the borrower’s home (and, by implication, family) is to be respected by the lender. The interpretation of vv. – proffered by Philo is potentially applicable to either scenario, though the (extrabiblical) reference to the use of force (μετC βας) seems to imply the situation of a delinquent loan, not two parties entering into a loan agreement. Josephus similarly depicts a situation in which a borrower has become “shameless” as to the repayment, going on to

on humanity –: prompt payment of wages, §§ –



explain that the lender may legally enter the borrower’s home to search for the pledge only if he has obtained a court order allowing him to do so (Ant. .; cf. m. B. Mes. :; b. B. Mes. b). Just such an incident is narrated in Ps.-Demosthenes, Or. .–, –. For a discussion of the problems and procedures of debt in the ancient world, see the Analysis/General comments for chapter . Both in terms of the canonical order and the structure of Philo’s presentation, §  would be better placed before § . So why has he arranged the material this way? Two observations can be made. First, looking at how §§ – fits with what precedes (§§ –), it is possible that he wanted to create a juxtaposition of social give-and-take: the well-off have responsibilities towards those who are economically dependent on them, both in terms of what they should give (i.e., loans and/or wages) and in terms of what they are allowed to take (i.e., pledges). Second, looking at how §§ –  relates to what follows (§§ –), he may have wanted to juxtapose provisions that raise issues of physical boundaries: landowners must not transgress the property of the poor, rather they must make their own property available to them.

Detailed Comments () § . A poor man’s wage is to be paid on the same day. Philo’s language (μισν π!νητος αημερν ποδιδναι) draws on Deut :– : “ . . . a poor man’s wage (μισν π!νητος) . . . you shall pay on the same day (αημερν ποδ8σεις).” it is just for him to receive the wage for his service. The criterion of rendering what is just (δκαιον) reformulates the prohibition of Deut :: “You shall not unjustly handle (οκ παδικ=σεις) the wage of a poor man, etc.” Earlier in the Exposition Philo had explored the idea that compliance with this particular statute functions as a form of instruction in justice (see Parallel exegesis). The parallelism of Lev : also associates the law with just dealing: “You shall not unjustly treat (οκ δικ=σεις) your neighbor, and you shall not steal. And the wage of the wage laborer shall not lie with you until morning.” Similarly, for Josephus withholding a poor man’s wage is tantamount to theft, “since we know that God has granted him this instead of land and other possessions” (Ant. .; cf. b. B. Mes. a; Sifre Deut. ). without delay. Deut : stipulates that the wage must be paid by sundown (cf. Spec. .; T. Job :; Matt :), while Lev : simply



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states that the payment may not “lie with you until morning” (m. B. Mes. : appears to be an effort at harmonization). “lives for the day,” as they say. The adage that human beings are “creatures of the day” (1φ=μεροι) is usually informed by general ruminations on the transitoriness and difficulty of life (e.g., Pindar, Pyth. .–; Ps.Plutarch, Cons. Apoll. a; and cf. on Nob. ). Philo’s application of the sentiment here seems to focus more specifically on the laborer’s perspective (see below), namely, he has no concern for any future beyond meeting his daily needs (cf. Strabo, Geogr. ..). For 1φημερβιος (which is preserved only in S; the other mss have 1φ=μερος), cf. Ptolemy, Apotel. ... suffering hardships with his whole body like a draft-animal. Josephus agrees in limiting the application of Deut :– to individuals who work with their bodies (Ant. .; cf. b. B. Mes. b), while m. B. Mes. : broadens it to include a fee paid for the rent of someone’s animals or tools. Insofar as wage laborers use the physical effort of their bodies to provide someone else a “service” (Dπηρεσα), they are comparable to both slaves (§§ –; cf. Aristotle, Pol. ..) and animals (§ ; cf. Mos. .). Like animals, they can serve as load bearers (χοφροι): Decal. ; Spec. .; Hum. ; Flacc. . To those they served, it would only have been natural, then, to class workers and animals together (e.g., Thucydides, Hist. ..; Xenophon, Hell. ..–). has his hopes set on his wage. Deut :– appends to its charge a pair of inducements for obedience: “he is poor and has his hope (1λπδα) in it, lest he shall cry out against you to the Lord and it shall be a sin for you.” Philo ignores the scenario threatened by the latter altogether (cf. Jer :; Mal :; Jas :), while expanding the pragmatic and psychological dimensions of the former. It would have been generally assumed that laborers are “counting on and looking for” their wages (T. Job :; cf. Job :). Indeed, Philo takes it for granted that the whole bearing of a laborer’s psychic state hangs on the receipt of his wage. If his expectation is met, he is filled with joy and “redoubled willingness” to work the next day; if not, grief renders him incapable of fulfilling the demands of his labor. Such elucidations reflect an elitist perspective, both in the emphasis on the employer’s self-interest in complying with the law, and in the assumption that the poor are content with their condition so long as they know where their next meal is coming from (cf. Fitzgerald , ). Comparable sentiments are echoed in Agr. –. In contrast to the husbandman, who is both skilled in his work and concerned to see his crops succeed, “the one who works the soil is by definition a wage laborer and as such has but

on humanity –: prompt payment of wages, §§ –



one end in view, his wage, and cares nothing at all about doing his work well.” Cf. Burford , –. Josephus, by contrast, focuses on the poor man’s practical requirements: “God does not desire that the worker should lack the use (χρ=σεως) of the things for which he has toiled” (Ant. .). his nerves are unstrung by grief. In the face of the difficulties and suffering that necessarily accompany human existence, one must not be passive, “nerveless and unstrung.” Rather, it is necessary to “fortify the mind’s nerves” (1ρρωμ!νοι τοAς διανοας τνοις) so as to mitigate the onslaught of life’s misfortunes (Cher. ; cf. Ios. ; Decal. ). For an elite like Philo, this entails actively fostering in oneself virtue, especially the virtue of courage (see above, on Fort. ), which renders one impervious to grief (for which see on Hum. ). Laborers, by contrast, as we learn here, are dependent on their employers to provide them with the means by which they can fend off despondency. For the terminology, cf. Galen, Loc. affect. .–; Rufus Medicus, Onom. . () § . let no creditor enter the houses of his borrowers. In Deut :– , the borrower is “your neighbor” (πλησον σου) who is in “your debt” (δ,νειν σου). Philo depersonalizes the transaction by employing more formal roles for the two parties involved: δανειστ=ς and χρε8στης, for which see Plutarch, Vit. aere al. e; Artemidorus, Onir. ..–. a security and pledge. 1ν!χυρον is the more common term for a pledge or surety (e.g., Ps.-Demosthenes, Or. .), though it is largely interchangeable in meaning with K:σιον, as in Somn. .–; cf. Ios. . Borrowers with no land might pledge instead collateral in the form of moveable property, jewelry perhaps, though even common household items like pots or an oil flask could be offered (Millett , ). The lender is not allowed to search through the debtor’s house to seize whatever he likes as a pledge (especially something whose value exceeds that of the loan); rather it must be selected and submitted by the debtor (Rofé , –). let him stand and wait outside on the front entrance. The creditor of Deut : is simply to stand outside (;ξω στ=σ@η) while he waits for the debtor to bring out the pledge. Philo has him 1ν προ:ροις, on an entranceway or porch leading to the front door(s). Inasmuch as the term is used especially of the entrance to the αλ= (e.g., Homer, Od. .), Philo seems to envision a larger and more complex structure than that suggested by the biblical text. Cf. Alston , s.v. prothura; and on the domestic architecture of Roman Egypt, , –. Alston notes that



commentary

an emphasis on the gateway, and the clear demarcation between house and street it created, was a traditional feature of Egyptian architecture (, –). let them not hesitate to do so. As elsewhere (e.g., §§ –, –), Philo reframes biblical legislation in reciprocal terms, explaining not only the stronger party’s responsibility to the weaker but also the weaker party’s to the stronger. In this case the borrower ought to surrender the property pledged as security as soon as the lender requests it, so that its absence will serve as a reminder to him of the obligation to repay the loan. Josephus follows suit, though with more specifics: the borrower ought not to try to delay bringing out the pledge by arguing with the lender over his right to confiscate it (Ant. .). by arrogantly offending his debtors. As Philo explains in §§ –, hybris is a vice that plagues the rich in particular. For the expression πρς τ ααδ!στερον 1φ Rβρει, cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..; ..; Theophrastus, Char. ., .

Parallel Exegesis The scenario of Deut :– is brought up as a matter of social justice in Spec. .–, in conjunction with a broader survey of Mosaic justice carried out in Spec. .–. Specifically, for Philo the prompt payment of wages exemplifies the just distribution of material resources from the haves to the have-nots. The former have more than ample resources to meet their needs, and so cannot be excused for refusing to recompense workers for their service without delay. Laborers, on the other hand, who are by definition counted among the needy (ο 1ν 1νδεας; cf. 1νδεο(ς in Deut :), should be allowed to take their wages home with them at the end of the day. The provision constitutes a warning against committing more serious δικ=ματα like robbery and theft (cf. Lev :). Deut :– supplements :– with a rule on the poor man’s pledge (cf. :). Because it is in some manner essential to him, one must observe mercy in handling it and return it to him at sunset. This restates a rule from Exod :–, which in turn is subjected to a sustained allegorical or, more to the point, anti-literal interpretation in Somn. .– . The wealthy Alexandrian is altogether incredulous that a borrower could become so desperate that he would need to pledge something as trifling as his himation, or that a lender could be so ruthless as to demand such a thing as security for what could only be a miniscule loan (though

on humanity –: prompt payment of wages, §§ –



cf. ANET Sup. ). Instead, it is necessary to interpret the garment as a figure for logos, which human beings need to adorn and defend themselves. In Spec. ., Philo briefly mentions Deut :, which forbids creditors from demanding a borrower’s mill or upper millstone as a surety, in his survey of laws relating to the seventh commandment, since “one who deprives another of the means of preserving his existence is well on the way to murder.”

Nachleben Clement’s summation of Hum.  in Strom. .. opens with a fairly literal restatement of Philo’s rendition of the law (μισν π!νητος αημερν ποδιδναι; νυπερ!τως . . . Dπηρεσαις μισν). He then takes up Philo’s explanation that failure to pay a poor laborer’s wage promptly saps his willingness (προυμα) to work in the future, though this is attributed specifically to the resulting lack of nourishment (hirelings were sometimes paid in food: Lewis , ). In Ador. .–, Cyril of Alexandria interprets Deut :– in light of the command regarding almsgiving in Luke :. In his paraphrase of Hum.  at Strom. .., Clement follows Philo both in rejecting the creditor’s recourse to violence and in stipulating the borrower’s responsibility to comply with the creditor’s request: “Let not the creditor enter the debtor’s house to take the pledge by force, but let the former ask him to bring it out, and let not the latter, if he has it, hesitate to do so.” Also like Philo, Clement seems to take into account the possibility that the borrower will no longer be in possession of the property that was originally identified (by the borrower?) as security on the loan. Further reading: Bord ; Burford , –; Goldenberg .

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 9 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE FOR THE POOR (§§ 90–94)

Analysis/General Comments Granting the hungry right of entry to one’s land in order to gather residual agricultural produce seems to have been a tradition in many ancient societies (Nelson ,  hypothesizes as to the cultic origins of the practice). The so-called Farmer’s Almanac, for instance, advises Sumerian farmers to leave needy children and gleaners enough fallen kernels to sustain themselves during the harvest (Kramer , , ). Plutarch, meanwhile, takes it as a demonstration of Cimon’s philanthr¯opia that passing strangers were permitted to enter onto his country estates and help themselves to the best of the ripe fruit (Cim. .; cf. Aristotle, Ath. pol. .). This sort of hospitality (ξ!νια) is institutionalized by Plato in Leg. a: if a foreigner sojourning in the city passes along a vineyard or orchard, he may, together with one attendant, take some of the choice fruit as a gift. Citizens thirty and older are similarly entitled to certain kinds of fruit on their neighbors’ lands (c). Lev :–; :; Deut :– instruct Israelite landowners to leave behind portions of their agricultural produce for certain classes of the landless to collect. By granting the latter legal access to the land’s three most important and widely grown products (Safrai , ), these observances would have obviated the need for begging and preserved their dignity, as illustrated by Ruth :–. Lev : contains two prohibitions concerning the grain harvest, one on reaping and one on gleaning: “When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not completely crop off the harvest of your field; and you shall not gather that which falls from your harvest” (similarly, Lev :). The farmer must not take the entirety of the yield for himself; moreover, the reapers must not return to the field in order to retrieve any stalk dropped during the harvest. The landless are permitted onto the field so that they may gather the leftover produce for themselves. Lev : then applies the double prohibition to the grape harvest: “You shall not re-harvest your vineyard, neither shall you gather the grapes of your vineyard.” The first line of the verse refers



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to grapes left on the vine after the harvest, while the second most likely (see on § ) has to do with grapes that have fallen on the ground. All this is to be left for the needy as well. Deut :–, finally, is a set of laws on “forgotten” clusters. The first verse forbids reapers from returning to the field in order to retrieve a sheaf of grain left behind during the harvesting (rabbinic interpreters later set the limit at two sheaves per field: m. Peah :; Sifre Deut. ). The same principle is applied in v.  to olives left on the branches after the olive trees have been beaten, and in v.  to grapes left on the branches after the vintage, essentially repeating Lev :a. Such fruit is not to be re-harvested but left for the needy. () In commenting on these laws, Philo treats first those that apply to grain-harvest time (1ν μEν τ< μ=τ<ω), then those that apply to vintage time (1ν δE καιρ< τ$ς Hπ8ρας). The section’s opening sentence introduces the basic structure according to the different kinds of laborers involved: εριστCς F τρυγητ,ς. Accordingly, §  addresses the responsibilities of the former with an interpretation of the grain harvesting provisions in Lev :. This is followed in § a with a discussion of the laws pertaining to the grape (Lev :; Deut :) and olive (Deut :) yields. The sequence in which the three crops are presented (reversing the order of Deut :–) may reflect an effort on the Alexandrian’s part to follow the rhythms of the agricultural calendar more closely, grain being harvested in April and May, grapes in August and September, and olives from late October through the end of January (Lewis , –). Perhaps a similar motive informs his reversing the order of the individual provisions within both Lev : and Deut :: apparently he envisions workers gathering up fallen produce during the harvest but returning to retrieve any remnants after the harvest. Familial imagery in §  describes the kind of relationship that compliant landowners establish with the needy. () Having presented the relevant legislation, Philo then elaborates in §§ – on the implications attending disobedience. In particular, these paragraphs constitute an extended caricature of the illiberal man, augmenting the portrait of §§ –. Refusing to obey God’s law or acknowledge nature’s bounty, he convicts himself of impiety as well as inhumanity. The legislation on the sabbatical year, which also grants the poor access to agricultural produce, is discussed by Philo in §§ –.

on humanity : agricultural produce, §§ –



Detailed Comments () § . neither to gather up what falls from the sheaves nor to cut down the whole crop. Philo summarizes Lev : (cf. Lev :) fairly closely, though the order of its provisions is reversed, and of the actual wording only τC ποππτοντα is retained (setting up a parallelism with § ; see below). Although this is the paragraph in which Philo deals with laws pertaining to the grain harvest, it is noteworthy that no mention is made of the law of the forgotten sheaf. Instead, some of the language of Deut : is incorporated into the summary of Lev :. Note in particular the use of μ=τ<ω and δραγμ,των (cf. μ=σ@ης μητν and δρ,γμα in Deut :). In contrast, Josephus’ summary of the grain-harvest laws lacks specific references to either fallen produce or an uncut section of the field. Instead, the landowner’s contribution of grain to the poor consists of sheaves that he deliberately leaves behind for them: “when reaping (μντας) and gathering do not glean the crops, but leave some of the sheaves (δραγμ,των) behind for the destitute” (Ant. .; and for the question of the landowner’s intentionality, see m. Peah :–:, with Brooks , –). some part of the field. The Hebrew of Lev :a specifies a certain “corner” (peah) that is to be reserved for the poor and the alien: “When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap your field to its very border” (similarly, Lev :). Certain rabbinic sources take this as a reference to the last furrow or far edge of the field (e.g., t. Peah :), while the Mishnah simply stipulates that it must constitute no less than one-sixtieth of the field’s produce (and possibly more, depending on the size of the field, the number of poor people, and the extent of the yield: m. Peah :; and for the variety of crops to which the rule applies, :–). The LXX, however, ignores the stipulation of an edge or corner altogether: “When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not completely crop off the harvest of your field.” The condensed version of the law preserved in Lev : is somewhat closer to the original: “When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not completely crop off the remainder (τ λοιπν) of the harvest of your field.” Similarly, Philo simply refers to a “part” (μ!ρος) of the field that must remain uncut, without specifying its size or location. For κλ$ρος, see Rowlandson , – and s.v. kleros. magnanimous and generous. Elsewhere μεγαλοφροσ:νη is associated with the observance of lending (Spec. .) and sabbath (Spec. .) laws. The term could be associated with acts of generosity, e.g., Josephus, Ant. ., .

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the poor . . . lack holdings of their own. Lev : stipulates that the produce left behind is meant for the poor and the alien, typical representatives of society’s landless, vulnerable classes, while Deut :– (see below) mentions the alien, the orphan, and the widow. Philo includes only the poor, bringing the discussion into accord with the broader focus of Hum. – (cf. §§ , , ). Josephus (Ant. .–) and the rabbis (m. Peah :–, etc., though cf. :) similarly understand the beneficiaries of such legislation to be simply “the poor.” Philo and Josephus agree in characterizing such people in terms of what they lack, indeed as those who have nothing of “their own.” § . the vintage season. Many tracts of land in Roman Egypt were devoted to viticulture (Lewis , ). The labor-intensive nature of its operations were well-known (White , –); as Philo notes, a grower must endure “endless hardships” in cultivating a vineyard (Praem. ). Cf. Ios. ; Spec. .; Fort. ; Hum. . On the cultivation of fruit trees, see on §§ –. For Hπ8ρας . . . δρεπομ!νοις, cf. Plutarch, Quaest. conv. e; Aelian, Anim. .. neither to gather the grapes that fall nor to re-harvest the vineyards. Philo follows the text of Lev : rather closely, though, as with the treatment of Lev :, he inverts its two lines: “You shall not re-harvest (1πανατρυγ=σεις) your vineyard (μπελνα), neither shall you gather the grapes (Kγας) of your vineyard.” The first provision refers to grapes left on the vine after the harvest. Cf. Deut :: “And when you harvest your vineyard you shall not re-harvest what was left behind you.” According to m. Peah :, the pickers are to leave behind any grapes belonging to a “defective” cluster, that is, a cluster lacking both a “shoulder” (a wide upper part) and a “pendant” (a cone-shaped lower part). Perhaps this is also what Josephus has in mind when he speaks of the “small bunches” (1πιφυλλδες) that should be left for the poor (Ant. .). In the MT of Lev : the second provision has to do with “fallen fruit,” presumably grapes that have fallen to the ground during the vintage. The meaning of Kγας in the LXX, however, is ambiguous: the term could refer instead to individual berries remaining on the vine after the harvest (Wevers , ). y. Peah : sets the limit for such remnants at three berries per branch (cf. Isa :), while Q puts it at ten (Baumgarten ). Sensing the parallelism between Lev :b and b, Philo removes the ambiguity in his version by repeating τC ποππτοντα from the former and applying it to the latter. Josephus, by contrast, does not specifically mention fallen fruit in Ant. .–. Presumably he understands the second line of Lev : as a clarification of the first rather than as a separate provision.

on humanity : agricultural produce, §§ –



those who gather the olives. Olives are often mentioned together with grapes as the two major grove crops (Safrai , ), and both were widely grown in Roman Egypt (Lewis , ; cf. White , –). Note that PCW . prints 1λαιαλογο(σι (with SAG1HP), while PLCL . has 1λαιολογο(σι (with CG2F2). This mirrors a textual discrepancy in Deut :, where the witnesses are divided between 1λαιαλογ=σ@ης and 1λαιολογ=σ@ης. In both cases the latter is probably correct; as Wevers observes, “one can gather olives, but not olive trees” (, ). like an exceedingly affectionate father. S reads δικαιτατος, while the rest of the mss have φιλοστοργτατος. Cohn (PCW .) conflates the two into φιλοστοργτατος κα δικαιτατος, which, as Runia (, ) points out, represents a rather questionable editorial decision. Fathers were expected to be φιλστοργος towards their children, e.g., Abr. ; Mos. .; Nob. ; Josephus, Ant. .; Bell. .; Epictetus, Diatr. ..; cf. Plutarch, Soll. an. a. On motherly affection, see on § . According to Deut :, compliance with the laws of forgotten produce is rewarded, appropriately enough, with increased productivity for the landowner (“the Lord God shall bless you in all the works of your hands.”); cf. Josephus, Ant. . (God “will make the earth better disposed to the growing of fruits.”). While Philo will go on to extol the bounties of nature upon humanity (see below), these are not represented as being contingent on human obedience to the law. Rather, for him the primary result of obedience is not agricultural but social: in their compliance landowners are seen to be treating the poor as though they were family members, that is, siblings (δελφο) and children (παAδες) of the same πατ=ρ, Moses. In Ant. ., by contrast, Josephus suggests that compliant landowners act not as the brethren of the poor but as the benefactors of the poor (Feldman , ), from whom they receive gratitude (χ,ρις); cf. on § . () § . whose minds are so sullied. The descriptions in this paragraph are familiar from the ancient caricature of the “mean” or illiberal man (cf. on §§ –). Several of the same elements are combined, for example, in Ps.-Aristotle, Virt. vit. .: “It belongs to illiberality (νελευερας) to set a very high value on money and to think nothing that brings gain (κ!ρδος) a disgrace—a menial and servile and sullied (δουλοπρεπ+ς κα Kυπαρς) way of life.” Among other things, such conduct manifests μισανρωπα. See also the more extended critique in Teles, frg. A.– . For Philo, νελευερα is a problem that plagues especially those who

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wield power. For example, in Spec. ., he denounces grasping rulers who hoard not only money but also “illiberal” vices that sully (Kυπαινο:σας) the civic life of their cities. For the imagery, cf. also Plutarch, Cupid. divit. d: just as a shiny coin becomes sullied (Kυπαρν) when it comes in contact with a money purse, children catch the taint of avarice from their fathers if they are greedy. sick to death. As noted in LSJ, δυσανατ,ω (“to long for death”) is often confused with δυσανατ!ω, which generally means “to struggle against death” (as in Plato, Resp. b). In De vita Mosis, Philo uses the term in the sense of “to be sick to death” or “to the point of death” (.; ., ). they over-reap the barley- and wheat-bearing land. The apparent neologism ναερζουσι is Philo’s rendering of συντελ!σετε . . . 1κερσαι in Lev :, that is, to make a total cropping in the harvesting. For a practical farmer like Varro, decisions about how to dispose of the afterharvest ought to be determined by the bottom line: “When the harvest is over the gleaning should be let, or the loose stalks gathered with your own force, or, if the ears left are few and the cost of labor high, it should be pastured. For the thing to be kept in view in this matter is that the expense must not exceed the profit” (Rust. ..; cf. White , –). Wheat and barley were the staple cereal crops in Roman Egypt (Lewis , ), the region being famously productive of the former (Mos. .). According to a fourth-century source, during the reign of Augustus Egypt exported twenty million modii of wheat annually to Rome (cf. Josephus, Bell. ., ; Garnsey ). servile and illiberal pettiness. For the combination of δουλοπρεπ=ς and νελε:ερος see on § , which this paragraph complements: the illiberal man is as grudging with his goods as he is with his money. These descriptors are applied to the sole use of μικροψυχα in the Philonic corpus. In Rhet. ..–, Aristotle submits that it is elderly men who are especially representative of this moral defect. They desire nothing great for themselves and are illiberal (νελε:εροι) in dealing with others (cf. Plutarch, Tranq. an. d; Pollux, Onom. .). In the current context it serves as a counterpart to the magnanimity (μεγαλοφροσ:νη) of the well-off who obey the Mosaic law in § . impiety as well. See on §  below. § . the contributions needed for fruitfulness and productivity are nature’s. Although agriculture requires both the farmer’s skill (Det. – ; Agr. –; cf. on Hum. ) and labor (Opif. , –), a good harvest depends ultimately on the “invisible works” of physis (Her. ,

on humanity : agricultural produce, §§ –



; Mut. –; Spec. .–), a manifestation of God’s power and providence (Opif. ; Deus ). On the boons of nature to humankind, cf. on Fort. . In § , Philo will make the case that the work of the ox also makes a vital contribution to farming. seasonal rains. The starting point for Philo’s list of nature’s blessings may be Deut :, which names the seasonal rains as the source of the same three agricultural products Philo has just discussed: God “will give the rain (τν Dετν) to your land in season (κα Xραν), the early rain and the later rain, and you will gather in your grain, your wine, and your oil.” Cf. Lev : (τν Dετν . . . 1ν καιρ<); Deut : (τν Dετν . . . 1π καιρο(); Deus ; Praem. ; m. Taan. :; and below on § . These would include above all the winter rains (Fug. ; Mos. .; Spec. .), though Philo was well aware that the fertility of his homeland relied instead on the summer flooding of the Nile (Fug. –; Abr. ; Mos. ., –, , ). Rains that fall out of season can rot the crops (cf. b. B. Bat. b; Gallant , ). temperate mixtures of air . . . breezes full of life, and seasons. Ancient people, of course, had no notion that seasonal changes in weather are the result of cyclical deviations in the tilt of the earth’s axis relative to its orbital plane. Instead they attributed the fluctuation of seasons to the movements of the heavenly bodies. Because they are ordered in such a way as to have a close affinity with the earth and its atmosphere, their revolutions “convert and change” its weather into the seasons. Hence in an important sense it is possible to affirm that “they cause all things on earth to grow, both living beings and fruit-bearing plants” (Opif. ). See also Opif.  (“the revolutions of the sun and moon, by means of which the summer and winter and the solstices of spring and autumn occur”); Somn. .; Abr. ; Spec. .; . (which attributes changes in the air to the moon). In this Philo is expressing a rudiment of ancient science. According to Ps.-Aristotle, Mund. , for instance, all the elements of the universe work in concert, “the stars and the whole heavens move continually, and the all-shining sun makes his double journey . . . bringing the four seasons of the year as he moves forwards to the North and back to the South. There are rains in due season, and winds, and falls of dew . . . all are the results of the first, original cause.” See also Manilius, Astron. .– (and for discussion of these texts, Taub , –, –). Further, Seneca, Nat. ..; Pliny, Nat. ., –, ; Röhr . Philo’s use of εκρασα may reflect another rudiment of ancient science, namely, that the circulation of different kinds of air helps plants

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to grow. In support of the claim that the air has such salutary effects, Theophrastus avers that “sometimes, in spite of poor soil, the air rears the crop to maturity by its fine mixture (εκρασα) of qualities . . . and by the appropriate winds” (Caus. plant. ..). Cf. Philo’s comments in Opif. : the maturation of a cultivated plant occurs in part “through the fine mixture (εκρασα) of winds which warm it and nurse it in a combination of cool and milder breezes.” Indeed, among nature’s most important works is “the air well-mixed by winds and breezes to make the yearly seasons” (Spec. .; cf. Abr. , ; Spec. .; Praem. ). For Seneca, the winds, together with nature’s other boons on the farmer, furnish empirical evidence of divine providence: “We cannot complain against god, our author, if we have corrupted his benefits and cause them to be evil. He gave winds to maintain the temperature of the sky and earth, to produce and check moisture, to nurture the crops of the fields and the trees, crops which the very agitation of the wind ripens—for this movement, along with other causes, draws the nutriment to the top so that the crops do not wilt” (Nat. ..; cf. Gale , –). gentle dews. At Migr. , Philo cites Gen :: “May God give you the dew of heaven and the fatness of the earth.” Cf. m. Maas. Shen. :; Q – (dew and frost); Spec. .. Dew would have been counted among the basic manifestations of divine providence, for example, Plutarch, Quaest. conv. a: “What is not in our power to provide we pray to the god to grant, such as gentle dews (δρσους μαλακ,ς) or sunshine with mild breezes, so that nature may always have a replenishment of what is lost and thus preserve the balance of the elements.” Theophrastus notes that the Egyptian air is “misty and sheds much dew” (Caus. plant. ..; cf. Aristotle, Meteor. ). seasons brought forth each year without harm. The four seasons are responsible for the birth of plants and animals (Opif. , ). Specifically, the changing conditions in the air (see above) that they effect occur expressly for the preservation of life (Spec. .; .). If the seasons do not alternate properly, the crops will become barren (Praem. –). the transitions of spring and autumn. The agricultural products of the earth reach full growth at the spring and autumn equinoxes, in spring the produce of grain and in autumn the produce of the vine (Opif. ; cf. Mos. .; Decal. ; Spec. ., ; ., –; .). Elsewhere τροπα refer to the solstices: Opif.  (quoted above); cf. Aristotle, Meteor. .; Theophrastus, Caus. plant. ... § . although they . . . are . . . seeing nature . . . bestowing rich blessings, still they dare to usurp her benefactions. The sine qua non of God’s

on humanity : agricultural produce, §§ –



relationship to creation is his will to confer rich benefits (εεργετεAν . . . πλουσαις χ,ρισι) upon it (Opif. ). Indeed, according to Deus , it is “incumbent on his blessed and felicitous nature to be beneficent (τ εεργετεAν).” Thus God continues to serve as creation’s benefactor even in the face of human sin and ingratitude (Opif. ). Among God’s chief blessings are those of nature, including especially the seasonal crops (e.g., Spec. .). In describing the dynamics of euergetism, it is possible to make a distinction between benefactors, who control the resources of benefaction, and brokers, intermediaries who channel gifts to their beneficiaries (cf. Saller , s.v. brokers). Philo’s illiberal landowners not only fail to fulfill their responsibilities as brokers, in their impudence they assume the prerogative of the benefactor to decide on whom benefits should and should not be conferred. In this they are guilty of frustrating nature’s purpose (see also on §§ –). Instead they ought to appreciate nature’s gifts and imitate God by sharing with others (cf. on §§ –; also Seneca, Ben. ..–; ..; Batten ). practicing at one and the same time inhumanity and impiety. In their greed these individuals are seen to be not only inhumane, by neglecting to provide for the less fortunate, but also impious, by refusing to acknowledge both God’s command and what God has provided for them. Embodying these two vices, they represent the antithesis of the Mosaic ideal (see on § ). Cf. Prob. ; Josephus, C. Ap. .. they did not cultivate virtue. Just as they have contributed little to the cultivation of their crops (§ ), they have contributed little to the cultivation of their virtue. As elsewhere, Philo assumes that virtue is not simply to be had, but something that can be acquired only through hard work, e.g., Congr. ; Ios. ; Spec. .; Praem. . Cf. Ps.-Phoc. –  (with Wilson , –). admonishes and corrects. The same pairing is found in § . Human nature is such that people must be chastened into acting humanely towards others. Because such speech requires boldness, it must be backed up by the speaker’s moral character (Plutarch, Quom. adul. amic. e). voluntarily . . . unwillingly . . . Obedience to the law is praiseworthy only when it is done willingly, not out of compulsion (Spec. .; cf. Aristotle, Rhet. ..; Rickert , –). The same principle applies to the practice of benefaction. The true measure of a benefit is not the gift’s extrinsic value, but the attending animus, the inner disposition of the benefactor in giving it (Seneca, Ben. ..–). For the issue of willingness in obeying God’s command, cf. Hum. , .

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commentary Parallel Exegesis

Somn. .– interprets the reaping of Lev : figuratively (cf. Sir :) as the power to make distinctions among the perceptions yielded by understanding (δι,νοια), whether they are genuine and profitable or not, a power that ultimately rests with God. While reviewing the feast of the sheaf (Spec. .–; cf. Lev :– ), Philo presents a list of nature’s benefactions (., cf. .) similar to that of Hum. , though it includes such non-meteorological items as soil and rivers.

Nachleben Clement’s summary of Hum.  in Strom. ..–.. follows Philo’s reversal of the injunctions in Lev : as well as his partial conflation of the verse with Deut : (;ν τε τ< μ=τ< τC ποππτοντα τν δραγμ,των ναιρεAσαι, κτλ.). At the same time, his formulation of the first injunction drops Philo’s κλ=ρου μ!ρος in favor of a less specific sort of obligation, one that actually coheres better with the biblical text: landowners are simply to leave “something” (τι) uncut (cf. Lev :a). He concurs that observance of these statutes represents for the welloff an excellent training in magnanimity and sharing, but sees their fulfillment ultimately as a manifestation of the justice and goodness of God, “who dispenses food to all ungrudgingly” (..). In formulating the commands regarding grape- and olive-gatherers (..), Clement relies on the first part of Hum. . As van den Hoek (, ) observes, Clement’s emphasis on these laws as a means of meeting the physical needs of the landless differs from Philo: “in Clement, the poor have the chance to get real food by gleaning the residue while in Philo their morale is improved.” In Praep. ev. ., Eusebius contrasts the humanity of Deut :– with Plato’s injunction against gathering fruit from someone else’s property (Leg. e–a). Further reading: Brooks ; Downing ; Milgrom , – .

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 10 PRIESTS (§ 95) AND THE DISPOSSESSED (§ 96)

Analysis/General Comments From a biblical perspective, it would have been logical to include priests in a section dealing with obligations to the poor inasmuch as they too were landless and therefore reliant on contributions from landowners for their survival (Brooks , –), including gifts of the same foodstuffs mentioned in §§ –: grain, wine, and oil. To this is added the gift of domestic animals, which may have prompted a connection with the law about returning a lost beast to its rightful owner. () An array of relevant statutes in the Pentateuch attests to the importance of tithing in ancient Israel, though they also present some significant inconsistencies (Jagersma ). To begin with, the sources differ as to the composition of the tithe. Lev :– applies the obligation to all produce and pure animals (cf.  Chr :–), while Deut :; : limits it to grain, wine, and oil (cf. Num :, ; Neh :). Later, the rabbis held that all cultivated produce was subject to tithing (m. Maas. :). The sources also differ as to the recipient of the tithe. In Lev :–  it is intended to support the temple priests, while in Num :– it is to be set aside for the Levites, who in turn tithe to the priests. According to Deut :–, every third year the tithe is to be given to the Levites, resident aliens, orphans, and widows; otherwise it should be consumed in Jerusalem by the landowners themselves. An additional complication arises when considering the relationship between rules on tithes (δεκ,τη or 1πιδ!κατα) and those on first fruits (παρχ= or πρωτογεν=ματα). For example, Num  stipulates that it is the priests who are entitled to the first fruits (cf. Exod :; Deut :–), while in Deut :– it is “the whole tribe of Levi.” Num  also stipulates that the Levites are to render a tithe (1πιδ!κατον) of their tithe to the priests (v. ), which is then confusingly referred to in vv. – as the first fruits (παρχ=) of the tithe. We also have texts like Deut :; :, which list tithes and first fruits together, implying some sort of relationship but without clarifying its nature. Philo hardly

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helps matters when he speaks of the duty “to give tithes as first fruits” (§ ; cf. Congr. ; Spec. .; .; Jdt :; Callimachus, Hymn. .), conflating what are in fact two different offerings, the former being a fixed percentage given when the harvest is finished, the latter an unspecified amount of the earliest and best of the crop given when the harvest begins. Like most subsequent interpreters, both ancient and modern, Philo’s interpretation of the diverse biblical statutes on tithing incorporates various efforts at harmonization. In this regard, he may be compared with Josephus, whose solution to the conundrum posed by the Pentateuch’s disparate legislation on sacred revenues is to posit three separate annual tithes, one paid to the Levites and priests (Ant. .; cf. C. Ap. .; Num :–), one to support the landowners’ feasting and sacrifices in Jerusalem (Ant. .; cf. Deut :–), and a third for widows and orphans (Ant. .; cf. Deut :–). The rabbis adopt a comparable strategy, distinguishing first (Num :–) and second (Deut :–) tithes (Haas , –). One can only assume that a regular excise of   or   would have been far too high to be implemented in practice. For evidence that Diaspora Jews actually observed these statutes in some form, see Josephus, Ant. .–; Safrai , –. The setting aside of tithes for sacred purposes was a practice common to many ancient Near Eastern societies (Milgrom , –), and is evidenced in the Greco-Roman world as well (e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; ..; Lysias, Or. .). The same goes for offerings of first fruits (e.g., Isocrates, Paneg. ; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Epictetus, Ench. .; Plutarch, Pyth. or. a; Porphyry, Abst. ..; see Tracy , – and passim). Mention may also be made of the Egyptian πμοιρα, which constituted “a tax of one sixth, or in some cases one tenth, on wine, fruit and vegetables. It was an old temple tax taken over by Ptolemy Philadelphus” (Jones , ; and cf. LSJ, s.v.). For first fruits legislation, see also on § . () The Mosaic law of lost property is stated in Deut :– (cf. Exod :): “When you see the calf of your brother, or his sheep, wandering on the road, you shall not overlook them; you shall turn them back to your brother and return them to him. And if your brother is not near you and you do not know him, you shall bring it inside your house and it shall stay with you until your brother seeks them, and you shall return them to him. Thus shall you do with his donkey . . . his garment . . . and everything that your brother has lost.” Philo modifies the legislation on

on humanity : priests and the dispossessed, §§ –  a number of points, including the animal’s species, owner, and location (see below). He also omits its provisions regarding the restitution of inanimate property (cf. Josephus, Ant. .). Possibly, this focus reflects the proximity of §  to § , both of which have to do with the need to conduct (κομζειν) animals to those who have a rightful claim on them. The former paragraph is the counterpart to a discussion about the treatment of draft-animals belonging to one’s enemies in Hum. –, which is based on Exod :–. Note the use of Dποζ:γιον, πλαν,ω, π,γω, and ποδδωμι in both passages.

Detailed Comments () § . tithes of grain and wine and oil and domesticated animals and wool. Philo’s list is based on Deut :, though with several modifications that bring its stipulations into line with priorities advanced in other biblical texts, especially Lev :–. The verse refers to “the tithes (τC 1πιδ!κατα; cf. δεκ,τη in :) of your grain, wine, and oil, as well as the firstborn of your oxen and sheep” (cf. :). To begin with, the Alexandrian takes the tithe to apply not only to the three agricultural products mentioned but also to the oxen and sheep (as in Lev :–; cf. Jub. :–), expanding the application to include all domesticated animals (see below). He then expands the list further with a fifth item, wool, whose inclusion here may have been inspired by Deut :, which mentions the first fruits of grain, wine, and oil together with “the first of the fleece (κουρν) of your sheep” (cf. Josephus, Ant. .; Tob :–; m. Hul. :). Finally, Philo departs from his root text when he indicates that the specified items are to be set apart not for the enjoyment of the contributors themselves, but for the benefit of the priests (again as in Lev :–; cf. Jdt :). from the fruit of the fields and the other fruit-trees. Deut : mentions tithing “the produce of the field (γρο(),” though for the basic distinction being made here see Lev :, which stipulates that tithes apply to everything from the land, “whether the seed from the ground or the fruit of the tree” (cf. Neh :; Josephus, Ant. ., ). to present . . . their yield in full baskets with hymns composed to honor God. Deut :– enjoins a first fruits ceremony for all landowners in the land of Israel, incorporating an historical creed that recounts the Israelites’ oppression in Egypt, the exodus, and the settlement of the land, which is their “inheritance” from God (cf. Fuhs ). They are to

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commentary

take portions of their first fruits to the temple and present them to the priest in baskets, which he then sets before the altar while they recite the liturgical declaration. In a fuller description (Spec. .–), Philo notes that the rite differs from a feast, not only because no animal sacrifice is involved but also because it occurs recurrently throughout the harvesting season, as the different crops ripen (cf. Somn. .), rather than at a fixed time each year. The first fruit offerings as a whole are assigned for the benefit of the priests, he says, since no food-producing land or income-producing property has been allotted to them. Cf. Josephus, Ant. .–. In Spec. .– and Somn. ., Philo follows the LXX in using κ,ρταλος to refer to the basket, while here he uses instead the more common ταλ,ρος, a Homeric term (e.g., Il. .). the firstborn of oxen and sheep and goats . . . as first fruits. In addition to the first fruits of the land, the firstborn “of all creatures” belong to the priests (Num :–). Those of human beings and of unclean animals are to be redeemed, while those of cows, sheep, and goats are to be offered as sacrificial victims (cf. Spec. .–; T. Levi :– ; Did. :–). the queens of the virtues, piety and humanity. Philo’s analysis of the tenth commandment in Spec. .– identifies the laws on first fruits as a lesson not only in piety and humanity, but in 1γκρ,τεια as well (.–). For this pair of virtues, see on Hum. . For the queen(s) of the virtues, cf. Decal. ; Spec. ., ; Praem. ; Cicero, Off. .; Sterling . () § . draft-animal. While the directive in Deut :– only refers specifically to the case of a lost calf, sheep, or donkey, the final provision (“everything that your brother has lost”) makes it germane to all types of animals (cf. m. B. Qam. :). Philo limits the application to yoked animals; cf. §§ – and Exod :. of one of your relations or friends, or of anyone you know. The scope of the biblical legislation includes lost property belonging to all fellow Israelites, even nonlocal “brothers” who are personally unknown to the reader. In contrast, Philo expands the application to include nonIsraelites but limits it to individuals that the reader knows. Perhaps this is because he envisions a different set of circumstances for the restitution of the property. In Deut : the owner leaves home and “seeks” what he has lost, while in Hum.  it is the finder who acts, either restoring the lost property directly to the owner or safeguarding

on humanity : priests and the dispossessed, §§ –  it until he returns home and then returning it to him, which would not be possible if the finder was unknown to him. According to m. B. Mes. :, the finder is to retain the lost property until he is able to determine whether or not the claimant is a deceiver. Philo’s interpretation of the law renders such a proviso unnecessary, since the former already knows the latter. wandering in a uninhabited place. The original of Deut : assigns no specific location to the lost animals, implying that one has an obligation to return them wherever they might be found. The LXX, on the other hand, considers animals lost when they are found wandering 1ν τ@$ 2δ<. This qualification, in turn, is contradicted by m. B. Mes. :: “[If] one found an ass or a cow grazing by the way, this is not lost property. [If he found] an ass with its trappings upset, a cow running in the vineyards, lo, this is lost property.” Philo does not take up the question of roadways as a location for lost animals, placing them instead 1ν 1ρημ7α. Perhaps Philo imagines people encountering oxen wandering around in the desert (cf. PLCL .: “in the wilderness”), though this could also be a more general reference to animals found on vacant land, with no one around to claim them. Josephus applies the law of lost property to two cases: gold or silver found κα 2δν and farm animals found κατ 1ρημαν (Ant. .). The former appears to be Josephus’ own extrabiblical addition (cf. .; though cf. also m. B. Mes. :–), while the latter may be based on a tradition reflected also in Hum. . In either case the finder is obliged to proclaim the find publicly; cf. m. B. Mes. :– . guard it carefully with your own until he returns. The finder of Deut : is commanded to bring the lost animal of a nonlocal Israelite into his ο>κα: the ground floor in many ancient farmhouses served as a stable for cattle (Tigay ). Philo’s “with your own” would apply equally well to the arrangements of a large estate, where the animals would have their own enclosures (e.g., Columella, Rust. ..). The owner of Deut : resides in a different locale than the finder and goes looking for his animal, which seems to have strayed a good way from home. Philo’s animal has wandered a relatively shorter distance while its owner is away and the finder lives close enough to know when he has returned. his deposit. According to Lapin, in m. B. Mes. : “the idea that a find is considered a kind of unpaid deposit is implied” (, ).

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commentary Parallel Exegesis

Philo surveys the various sources of revenue for priests and Levites in Spec. .–. These include, for the former, the first fruits of all agricultural products and domesticated animals (.–, cf. .–, ) and, for the latter, all tithes (.–; cf. Congr. –). Belkin (, –) notes the apparent contradiction between these statements and the description in Hum. , where we hear that both tributes belong to the priests (though in fairness what Philo gives here is a highly condensed summary.) A similar discrepancy is evident in Josephus’ review of these laws as well. According to Ant. . and  the tithes belong to the Levites and the priests, while in Ant. . they belong to the Levites alone. Insofar as the number of Levites was declining during this era, it is likely that in actual practice tithes would have increasingly accrued to the priests (Milgrom , ; cf. Josephus, Ant. ., –; Vita ; b. Yebam. b). As part of his discussion of the eighth commandment (Spec. .–), Philo reviews Moses’ regulations on deposits (.–; cf. Exod :– ). These include deposits not only of money or goods, but also of animals, whose protection is a matter of κοινωνα. If such an animal should happen to die or be stolen while under deposit, restitution must be made to the owner. Further see Ps.-Phoc. , with Wilson , .

Nachleben Clement paraphrases Hum.  in Strom. ..–. He takes the requirement to submit tithes and first fruits to priests as an illustration of the need to revere God and share with one’s neighbor. These laws, then, provide instruction not only in piety, but also in humanity, κοινωνα (see Hum. ), and justice; cf. Josephus, C. Ap. .. Perhaps the most extended patristic meditation on the tithing laws is Origen, Hom. Num. .–. Further, Vischer . Clement quotes almost all of Hum.  in Strom. .., with a tag explaining that the law also teaches its followers “to bear no malice to an enemy,” apparently interpreting the deuteronomic provisions on lost property in the light of the related law in Exod :. Clement also inverts Philo’s arrangement of material, placing the summary of Hum.  after the summary of Hum. – (in ..–). This transposition has a double effect. First, it brings the treatment of sabbatical and jubilee laws

on humanity : priests and the dispossessed, §§ –  into closer proximity with the treatment of reaping and gleaning laws in ..–.. (based on Hum. –), which also have to do with provisions for the poor. Second, together with the addition of 1χρς, the paragraph now segues into the next section, which concerns strangers, evil-doers, and enemies (..–..). Cf. also Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. .. Further reading: Heinemann , –; Milgrom , –, –; Oppenheimer , –.

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 11 SABBATICAL AND JUBILEE LAWS (§§ 97–101)

Analysis/General Comments It would have been customary in the Greco-Roman world for a tract of land (χ8ρα, χωρον, τ!μενος) dedicated to a deity to be left untilled (νεσαι), e.g., Thucydides, Hist. ..; Plato, Leg. c; Plutarch, Publ. .. Indeed, to cultivate such land is sacrilege, e.g., Thucydides, Hist. ..–; Plutarch, Per. .; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ... By contrast, Israelite religion emphasized the consecration not of particular portions of arable land but of the land in its entirety at particular times. The fullest version of the fallow law is given in Lev :–, which expands on an earlier statute preserved in Exod :– (Milgrom , –). While the two texts concur that the work of cultivating the land must be suspended every seventh year, they differ as to the particulars of how and why this is to occur. There is, to begin with, an apparent disagreement on the question of whether the seventh is a fixed year. Exod :–, addressing its readers individually (σπερεAς τ+ν γ$ν σου, κτλ.), gives the impression that it is up to each farmer to determine what sort of rotational scheme will be implemented for his fields. In Lev :–, the fallow is an institution to be honored simultaneously by all landowners throughout “the” land. Both texts also link the sabbatical to the sabbath, though they do so in different ways. Lev :– explicitly designates the practice as “a sabbath rest for the land.” Exod :– lacks such an interpretation, though it can be inferred insofar as the rule on the fallow year is adjoined to a parallel rule on sabbath observance in :. There is also disagreement as to the beneficiaries of the sabbatical aftergrowth. According to Exod :–, whatever the land yields of itself during that year is for the beggarly poor of the nation, with any remainder going to the wild animals. In Lev , by contrast, septennial access to fallow produce is restricted to those with some previous attachment to the owner’s property: the food is “for you, your male slave, your female slave, your hired worker, the stranger who lives with you, your cattle, and the wild animals that are on your land” (vv. –). This discrepancy



commentary

points to a more fundamental difference between the two texts regarding the practice’s rationale. In Exodus the intent seems to be primarily socio-economic in nature (though the resulting lack of agricultural work must have had serious consequences for peasant households: Houtman , ). In Leviticus, humanitarian considerations take a back seat to explicit theological justifications. The land’s rest is “a sabbath to the Lord” and the law represents one of a number of mechanisms identified in the chapter meant to prevent the alienation of the Israelites from the land that the Lord has given them (Bergsma , ). On the manumission of indentured servants in the seventh year, see on §§ –. There is ample evidence for the observance of the sabbatical during the Second Temple period. Besides Jub. :; :–; QS X –; QM II ; Josephus, Ant. .–; .–; ., see m. Shebiit (with Newman ), which sets down a wide range of forbidden agricultural activities for the seventh year. Participants would have been rendered especially vulnerable in times of drought, siege, or war; see  Macc :, –; Josephus, Ant. .; .; .; Bell. .. For non-Jewish perspectives on the sabbatical year, see Tacitus, Hist. ..–, with GLAJJ .–. The inalienability of ancestral land is a principle attested in many ancient societies (Ginzberg –, –), including ancient Greece (Finley ). Presumably an underlying motivation was the desire to preserve the integrity of family cult sites and burial places (van der Toorn , , ). In Plato’s ideal state, the right of disposal does not exist at all, since “the land is sacred to all the gods” (Leg. b–c). Allotments of property may not be sold or divided; rather they are to remain forever in the possession of the original owner and his heirs (Morrow , –); cf. Aristotle, Pol. ..; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Fox , , . In reality, of course, various social and economic pressures often forced landowners to resort to selling off property. In order to prevent excessive private indebtedness, as well as the excessive concentration of private wealth in a small number of hands, ancient kings would issue a proclamation of “release,” either shortly after their ascension or in times of economic crisis (cf. Neh :–). In Ptolemaic Egypt, such edicts were known as προστ,γματα τν φιλανρωπν (Smith ; cf. Spicq , .–). According to an edict proclaimed by Ptolemy Euergetes II in  bce, for example, those forced out of their homes for certain offences were pardoned and allowed to recover their property, and arrears in grain, money, and corvée were remitted (Hunt and Edgar

on humanity : sabbatical and jubilee laws, §§ –  , –). Perhaps the best-known analogy from the Greco-Roman world for this sort of economic reform is the σεισ,χεια of Solon, which included the remission of private debts, the manumission of debt-slaves, and the release of mortgaged property; see Aristotle, Athen. Const. .–; .; Plutarch, Sol. .– (a φιλανρ8πευμα); Austin and Vidal-Naquet , –. Against such a background what most distinguishes the biblical “release” is its periodicity: “You are to count off for yourself seven sabbaths of years . . . You shall proclaim with the sound of a trumpet in all your land on the tenth day of the seventh month . . . You shall consecrate the fiftieth year and proclaim a release upon the land for all its inhabitants” (Lev :–). During that year, while the dispossessed return to their own properties and kinship groups, no agricultural cultivation is permitted (:–). In addition to the return of sold or mortgaged land, each Israelite who has been reduced to debt-bondage is to be released or redeemed as well, “so that he may return to his paternal possession” (:; cf. vv. –; and below on §§ –). There is little evidence that the jubilee’s economic provisions were ever observed during the Second Temple period. Besides m. Bek. : (a list of items which do not revert to the original owners) and Sifre Num. , see m. Arak. :–: (with Neusner , –). In most texts of the period it takes on principally chronological (e.g., Jubilees) or messianic (e.g., QMelchizedek) significance; further, Bergsma , –. Hum. – falls into three major segments. () Philo begins with a summary rendition of the fallow law, conflating Exod : and Lev :. This law extends kindness, humanity, and justice to the laboring, landless poor by granting them access to what they need to survive (§§ –). In this it complements the law on gleanings, which Philo had discussed in §§ –. () The legislation on the fiftieth year also expresses humanity. Not only are the provisions of the seventh year repeated, but private property that has been alienated from its owners is to be restored. Such actions show mercy especially to those who have suffered unexpected financial setbacks (§§ –). () A transitional summary indicates that the section of the subtreatise on laws that extend humanity to fellow nationals has come to a conclusion (§ ).



commentary Detailed Comments

() § . the land is to be allowed to lie fallow and the poor are to . . . pick the fruit. The initial statement of the law draws on elements of Exod : (note νεσαι//ν=σιες and φιεμ!νην// φεσιν), though in identifying its object of concern Philo appears to be attempting a compromise between this text and the list in Lev : (quoted above). The former’s socio-economic dimension is retained, even intensified (see below), though the primary beneficiary is no longer the beggarly poor (ο πτωχο) but the working poor (ο π!νητες), those whose job it is to work (πονεAν) the land (§ ). Indeed, in Philo’s estimation one aim of this law is to ensure that the latter are not reduced to begging or the appearance of begging (Spec. .). Especially in times of crisis, peasant households would have resorted to eating wild plants to supplement their food supply, including plants growing on fallow fields, though they would have needed the landowner’s permission to gather them (Gallant , –). kind and humane. For χρηστC κα φιλ,νρωπα, see on § . In Hypoth. ., the provision requiring that sabbatical year produce be left for those in need is held up as “a great proof ” of the law’s humanity. § . none of the activities relating to cultivation are being carried out. Lev  permits six years of normal agriculture activities (i.e., sowing, pruning, and harvesting), but in the seventh year all fields and vineyards (Exod : adds olive groves) are to be left uncultivated (vv. – ). During that time the landowner is not free to harvest the aftergrowth, disposing of the produce as he will (v. ). Rather it can only be used to meet the needs of those attached to his property (v. ; see Milgrom , ; differently, Gerstenberger , –). Josephus briefly summarizes the fallow laws in Ant. .: Moses gives the land a respite every seventh year from ploughing and planting, just as the land’s people rest from their work every seventh day. No restrictions are attached to the use of the afterharvest. The land’s natural produce is for all who want it, both compatriots (cf. Exod :) and aliens (cf. Lev :). unjust for some to do the labor while others reap the fruits. Those who work the land ought to reap its benefits even when it is not being worked. Philo’s interpretation of Exod :– both modifies (see above) and intensifies its socio-economic dimension. Concerning the latter, note in particular the juxtaposition of ο πλο:σιοι with ο π!νητες, and of ο κτ=τορες with ο κτ=μονες. Presumably the Alexandrian

on humanity : sabbatical and jubilee laws, §§ –  understands the individuals listed in Lev : to be representative of the latter classes. Such a schema has no place for the non-human beneficiaries mentioned in Exod : or Lev :. the properties being left in a certain sense without masters. In the biblical ambit, the sabbatical year has the effect of returning the land to its original state, to its condition on the sabbath of creation (Milgrom , ), to the wild (nature) from which it was claimed. This accounts for the references in both Exod : and Lev : to wild animals: “they function as representatives of the wilderness, the ‘counter world,’ which takes possession of the cultivated land” (Houtman , ). Philo ignores the wild animals (cf. Spec. .) and the ‘wild’ counter order altogether, concentrating instead on how the sabbatical creates (the semblance of) a social counter world, one where the poor and landless enter the estates of the rich at will and take whatever food there they want, thus gaining some measure of social and economic independence (Spec. .). As Aristotle notes, a household without a master exhibits a “democratic” ethos: all its members are equal and everyone does what he likes (Eth. nic. ..); cf. Strabo, Geogr. ... blessings might proceed sufficient and full from God alone. Lev :– depicts the sabbatical year as a time of special blessing (ελογα), during which the people recognize God’s sovereignty over the land and their reliance on divine generosity as expressed through its abundance. προαπαντσαι is Mangey’s (, ) emendation (followed by PCW .) for προσαπαντσαι in the mss (S and G2 omit). () § . those who have tasted of this legislation, not just by touching their lips. Plato often speaks of “tasting” philosophical teachings and inquiries, e.g., Theaet. c; Resp. b, d, b; Leg. a. The φιλσοφος is therefore a φιλσιτος (Resp. c). Philo employs the same figure (which may have been proverbial; cf. Homer, Il. .; Lucian, Merc. cond. ) in Spec. .; .; Legat. , ; cf. Nob. . § . whatever pertains to the seventh year is repeated. This description (cf. Decal. ; Spec. .) is not technically correct, since Lev  nowhere explicitly prescribes a general remission of debts for the fiftieth year like that which Deut :– prescribes for the seventh (cf. Sifre Deut. : “The sabbatical year releases loans but the jubilee year does not.”). Perhaps, like Josephus (Ant. .; cf. Milgrom , –), Philo infers that such a remission would be observed in the fiftieth year, a natural enough assumption given the extended attention given to debtbondage in Lev :–. It is also worth noting that the term used for



commentary

release throughout Lev , φεσις, is also used in Deut :–,  of the remission of debts, consonant with the prevailing idiom (Wevers , ); cf. Spec. ., ; and for allegorical applications of the term, cf. Sacr. ; Migr. ; Congr. . Alternatively, with this statement Philo may not be referring to debt-relief at all, but focusing instead on how the fallow laws stipulated for the jubilee year in Lev : parallel those for the sabbatical year in :–, which he has just discussed (in §§ – ). The Alexandrian was certainly familiar with the additional sabbatical provisions of Deut :–, – (cf. Spec. ., ), though for the current presentation he postpones their treatment until §§ –, where they are included under the category of individuals reduced to slavery. a restoration of private properties. “Each one shall depart to his κτ$σιν” (Lev :, cf. v. ). According to the proclamation of “liberty” issued by Ptolemy V (reigned – bce), each man was to return 1π τν >δων κτ=σεων (Dittenberger , no. ). that have been relinquished. παραχωρ!ω is used of property ceded to the state in Legat. ; Josephus, Ant. .. on account of unexpected circumstances. The legislation of Lev :–  says nothing about the circumstances under which individuals may have been alienated from their family and property, giving the impression that the release applies to all the land’s inhabitants, regardless of their social status or economic situation. This sort of universalism is commensurate with the theological agenda of the Levitical author, for whom the aim of the legislation is to honor the Lord’s ownership of the land and to restore the terms of the Lord’s original disposition of the land and its people, the latter being understood as tenants of the former (v. ). Philo, by contrast, views the legislation in strictly economic terms. He names only the poor and unfortunate as beneficiaries (cf. Spec. .), apparently generalizing from the specific cases outlined in Lev :–, –. permanent ownership. Lev :– explains that a family’s land is not to be sold in perpetuity (ε>ς βεβαωσιν). If adverse circumstances compel a man to sell part of his property, provisions should be made by his kin for its redemption; if this is not possible, it is returned to him in the jubilee year. Under certain conditions an ancient contract might include a provision exempting the purchase from the year of release, rendering the transfer of property an “absolute sale” or “beyond reclaim” (Weinfeld , –). According to Lev :–, the possibility of such permanent transfer is restricted to urban dwellings in non-Levitical cities (cf. Spec. .–). For παγκτησα, cf. SIG ..

on humanity : sabbatical and jubilee laws, §§ –  that treacherous thing and source of all evils, desire. In Spec. .– , Philo discourses at length on the tenth commandment, οκ 1πιυμ=σεις. For him desire constitutes the most devious and intractable of the passions since, of all of them, “it alone originates within ourselves” (Decal. –). Identifying it as the source of all evils was common enough (e.g., Spec. .; Plato, Phaed. b–c; further, BDAG, s.v. 1πιυμα ), though proverbially such disapprobation was reserved for the love of money, as in  Tim :; cf. Ps.-Phoc. , with Wilson , –. Like the other passions (Spec. .), desire is therefore to be regarded as 1πβουλος (Decal. ), a designation that goes back to Aristotle (Eth. nic. ..). As Isocrates observes, most people “are possessed of more desires for things evil than for things good” (De pace ). Cf. on Fort. , ; and on erotic desire, §§ –. paying a penalty for poverty. Reading πενας with Mangey (, ) against πεν7α in PCW . and the mss. As Colson puts it, the poverty of which Philo speaks “is not that to come if their property is not restored, but that which they have undergone” (PLCL .). () § . countless others among the particular laws . . . having reviewed these sufficiently in previous treatises. The title of De specialibus legibus is περ τν 1ν μ!ρει διαταγμ,των (cf. Mos. .; Decal. ). No doubt the “previous treatises” to which Philo refers are the four volumes of that work, which immediately precedes De virtutibus in the Exposition (Royse , ). For the use of philanthr¯opia there, see part  of the Introduction. kindness and humanity. φιλ,νρωπος is paired together with χρηστς so frequently in Greek literature that the two are virtually synonymous, e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. /..; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Musonius Rufus, frg. ..; ..–; Josephus, Ant. .; Plutarch, Quaest. conv. b; Stoic. repug. e. Philo also uses the combination frequently, e.g., Ios. , , ; Spec. ., , ; .; Paen. . the things that have already been said. This transitional paragraph draws on language familiar from that of the subtreatise’s introduction in § , and concludes the discussion of humanity extended by the Mosaic law to fellow nationals that had begun in § .

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commentary Parallel Exegesis

An extended explanation of the fallow laws in Spec. .– provides four reasons for their establishment. First, they contribute to a broader scheme that divides time into cycles based on the sacred number seven (.; cf. Decal. –; Spec. .). Second, they curb greed among the landed classes, inuring them to temporary privation (.–; cf. Spec. .–; Praem. –). Third, the observant learn the benefits of not placing excessive burdens on others. Philo digresses here with a series of a minore ad maius arguments: if the earth requires periodic rest, how much more so human beings (.–). In the case of the land, “the amnesty which it has in the seventh year and its rest from labor . . . give it a productiveness in the next year which causes it to bear twice as much if not more than in the previous years” (.). Like other ancients (White , –; Gallant , –; Bergsma , –), Philo was aware that regular fallowing was necessary to ensure the land’s fertility (cf. Hypoth. .). Finally, these statutes are a manifestation of the law’s humanity. Specifically, household masters learn to share some of their resources with the working poor, but without feeling that in order to do so they must surrender anything of their own investment or effort (.– ; cf. Hypoth. .). The examination of the jubilee in Spec. .– follows immediately upon that of the sabbath in .–. Philo gives two reasons for obedience to Moses’ enactments regarding the former. First, it is a way of acknowledging God’s lordship over the land (cf. Lev :). Second, it would be unjust to deprive a citizen of his λ$ξις, that is, the land that had been originally allotted to his family (cf. Plato, Leg. a). Philo also delves into some of the year’s specific provisions. Since sales of real estate are not permanent, when calculating a property’s purchase price the number of years remaining until the jubilee should be taken into consideration (cf. Lev :–). If an impoverished man is forced to sell off property, his family has a responsibility to buy it back, if at all possible, before the jubilee (cf. Lev :–). The law of release does not apply to land that has been consecrated (cf. Lev :–). Given Philo’s urban setting, it is perhaps not surprising that a disproportionate amount of attention is given to Lev :–, which exempts houses in walled cities from the rule of property inviolability (§§ –). The original owner’s right to redemption is restricted to a single year after the sale; after that it becomes the permanent possession of the purchaser. The Alexandrian sees this as a mechanism by which proselytes may establish themselves in

on humanity : sabbatical and jubilee laws, §§ –  the land and not be barred altogether from owning their own property. This exemption does not apply to houses in the Levitical cities (§§ – ; cf. Lev :–).

Nachleben Clement paraphrases Hum.  in Strom. ... He begins by stating that the fallow produce is for the working poor, following Philo, but then adds that it is also for “those who want” (τοAς βουλομ!νοις). Little use is made of the material in Hum. , except possibly for Clement’s concluding thought, namely, that these prescriptions prove that the law is not only χρηστς but also a teacher of δικαιοσ:νη (cf. Philo’s δικον). In Strom. .., Clement follows Hum.  closely, repeating without comment Philo’s assertion that the same enactments apply in the fiftieth year as in the seventh, and that such legislation was meant both to curb desire and prevent the dispossessed from being permanently punished for their poverty. To this paragraph he appends a triple citation from Proverbs (:; :; :), taking his cue perhaps from the reference to 1λεεAσαι at the end of Hum.  (cf. 1λεημοσ:ναι and 1λεν in Strom. ..), and a short digression on γ,πη (cf. Hum. ), from which, he says, are derived other important social virtues (..), among them χρησττης (cf. Hum. ) and φονα (cf. Hum. , ). As an aside, Clement mentions that the biblical injunctions just outlined have other, more “natural” explanations, but without indicating what they might be (..). Patristic literature pays scant attention to the jubilee, except indirectly, in expositions on the significance posed by the number fifty. For Origen, it symbolizes the remission of sins (Comm. Matt. ..; cf. Luke :), while Hippolytus associates it with the φεσις of Pentecost (In Psalm. .; cf. Acts :). Further, O’Brien . Further reading: Bergsma ; Newman ; Robinson ; Weinfeld , –.

ON HUMANITY CHAPTERS 12–13 PROSELYTES AND METICS (§§ 102–108)

Analysis/General Comments As this juncture the survey of Mosaic legislation on humanity shifts from laws pertaining to fellow Jews to those pertaining to non-Jews, beginning with two classes of individuals to whom προνομα, or “privilege” (§§ , ), ought to be extended: those who have joined the Jewish community (§§ –) and those who have settled in its midst (§§ –). This structure reflects a number of biblical texts (Lev :, , ; Num :) where the proselyte is paired with the alien. References in the Torah to gerim (“strangers” or “aliens”) are usually rendered in the LXX with προσ=λυτοι (Wevers , , ), which Philo takes to mean proselytes, though his more customary designation for such individuals is 1π=λυτοι or related terms (Birnbaum , ). In the biblical ambit, προσ=λυτοι are often associated with other types of marginalized or dispossessed people (Exod :; Lev :–; :; Deut :; cf. Philo, Somn. .–; Spec. .–; .–), which would help to explain why they are introduced at this point in the treatise, immediately after a lengthy discussion of laws on the humane treatment of the poor (§§ –). The subject of proselytism is one that earns special consideration in Philo’s Exposition, including De virtutibus. For a review of some of the issues involved, see the Analysis/General comments for De paenitentia. (a) The section opens in §  with a general statement on the honorable reception to be accorded proselytes. Given the total resocialization they must undergo, abandoning not only previous beliefs but also previous associations, they are deserving of every consideration. (b) The nature of their treatment is then specified with reference to two laws that speak of the obligation to love (γαπOν) the proselyte, Lev :– (§ ) and Deut :– (§ ). Philo infers from the former that native-born Jews are to love the proselyte “in both body and soul,” that is, both practically and emotionally, so as to further the harmony of the community, which ought to function as a single organism. The

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commentary

Deuteronomic passage, meanwhile, obligates the community to provide proselytes with the basic necessities that they need for daily life. The biblical basis for the next paragraph, §§ –, is Deut :–. This is one of a handful of occasions in which the Pentateuch’s ger is rendered by the LXX not with προσ=λυτος but with π,ροικος (Kidd , –). Philo, in turn, takes the latter not in its usual sense, “temporary sojourner,” but interprets it with reference to a similar but politically more distinct term, μ!τοικος or “resident alien” (Birnbaum , ). In most Greek cities, a legal distinction was observed between foreigners (ξ!νοι) and metics, non-citizens permitted to reside and work in a city under certain conditions. Such individuals, mostly immigrant artisans and traders, would have been afforded certain legal protections, though they were barred from holding office, owning certain types of property, serving in the military, or sharing in public honors (e.g., Aristotle, Pol. .., ; Eth. eud. ..; Oec. ..; Whitehead , –; Hennig ). Additionally, each metic was required to obtain the sponsorship of a citizen, who served as his legal representative, or προστ,της (Aristotle, Pol. ..; Ath. pol. .). Generally, the metic population (which could be quite large, e.g., Aristotle, Pol. ..) was viewed with suspicion, as a source of political and social instability (e.g., Philo, Legat. ), and had a reputation for valuing private gain over public good: “they think that their homeland is not the polis but their possessions” (Lysias, Or. .; cf. Bakewell ). In Plato’s Leges, metics are not ordinarily allowed to remain in the city more than twenty years, so as to limit the “corrupting” influence of their banausic activities (a, a–c, b–c, b–c, c–a; Morrow , –; Whitehead , –). In biblical law the alien is sometimes paired with the (landless) hireling, e.g., Exod :; Lev :, ; cf. Milgrom , –. Like Abraham before them (Abr. , , ; cf. Nob. ), the Jews who migrated to Egypt were metics, or at least in Philo’s judgment deserved to be treated as such, “for strangers . . . must be regarded as suppliants of those who welcome them, and not only suppliants but also metics and friends, eager to obtain equal rights with the citizens because they differ little from the native inhabitants” (Mos. .). It is probably safe to infer that elements of this characterization reflect the political environment of Philo’s own time: “The Jews of Alexandria . . . were ‘citizens’ only in relation to each other as members of the politeuma. Their status vis-à-vis the Greeks was that of metics, aliens with the right of domicile. They occupied an intermediate position between the Greek citizens of Alexandria and the wholly unprivileged Egyptians, who lacked any sort of franchise”

on humanity –: proselytes and metics, §§ –  (Smallwood , ). Since Alexandrian citizenship was restricted to those born of citizen parents (or individuals who acquired it through a special grant: Delia , –), the most that the large majority of Jews in the city could hope for was not “equal rights” but the status of 1πιτμοι κ,τοικοι or “privileged settlers” (Flacc. ; cf. Barclay , – ). The readiness with which acceptance into the Mosaic politeia was extended to “unprivileged” Egyptians (Hum. ) would have contrasted with such illiberality, drawing comparison instead with the enlightened policies of Greek reformers like Cleisthenes (Aristotle, Pol. ..) and Solon (Plutarch, Sol. .), who encouraged foreign artisans to settle in Athens with a promise of citizenship. The Romans also prided themselves on the philanthr¯opia evidenced in their fair treatment of foreign residents and their openness to admitting new citizens (Polybius, Hist. ..; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..–; cf. ..– ; ..–; ..; Josephus, C. Ap. .; and see part  of the Introduction). (a) As with the section on usury (Hum. –), Philo departs from his biblical source by constructing the summary in reciprocal terms, indicating not only the responsibilities of the stronger party, namely, to exhibit humanity, but also those of the weaker party, namely, to show gratitude. Indeed, the focus is on the latter: immigrants ought to express appropriate respect for their native-born hosts, even if all they have been granted is the right of residence (§ ), and even if they are subsequently treated poorly (§ ). The history of cruelties inflicted on the Israelites in Egypt is taken as an extreme example of the latter. Even after having experienced such atrocities, Moses’ followers are instructed to live peaceably with the Egyptians on account of the initial welcome that they offered the Israelites (§ ). (b) With the final paragraph the tables turn. Certain Egyptians now appear, in effect, as resident aliens, that is, as outsiders seeking membership in the Jewish polity. Such individuals are not to be scorned as enemies, but (in the third generation) invited to join the community and partake of all those privileges enjoyed by the native-born (§ ).

Detailed Comments (a) § . having forsaken their family. Among our sources for proselytism in the Philonic era, the text that conveys most dramatically the social dislocation experienced by a convert is a text of Egyptian

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provenance, Joseph and Aseneth (on which see Chesnutt ). The latter repudiates not only idolatry (e.g., :–; :), but also all ties and commitments associated with her previous life (e.g., :–), undergoing a kind of social “death” before being incorporated into the Jewish people (e.g., :; :–; :). As a consequence, she becomes “an orphan, and desolate, and abandoned by all people” (:), even her biological family (:–). Cf. on Nob. . their customs . . . their gods . . . Roman authors complained about citizens whose attachment to Judaism led them “to flout the laws of Rome” (Juvenal, Sat. .–) and “renounce their ancestral religions” (Tacitus, Hist. .). The break that proselytes make with their old ways is underscored also in Spec. ., ; .; Paen. –; Nob. . Further, Feldman , –. traveled to a fine new home. The proselyte’s prototype and standard is Abraham, who left his home and traditions to discover the one true God and settle in a better ποικα (Nob. –; cf. Migr. –; Somn. .–; Abr. –). Philo accordingly speaks of conversion as a passage or pilgrimage to piety, and of converts as emigrants and refugees (Somn. .; Spec. ., ; .; .); cf. Amir , –. See also on Hum. . The LXX, meanwhile, simply speaks of proselytes as those who have “come to” the community and “entered” the Lord’s assembly (Lev :; Deut :–; cf. Exod :–; Num :). from mythical fabrications to the certainty of truth. Unlike other lawgivers, who have “deceived the masses by concealing the truth with mythical fabrications” (Opif. ; cf. Post. ; Spec. ., , –; .; Paen. ; Aet. , ), the teachings of Moses are predicated on a clear perception of the truth, much like those of a philosopher (cf. Musonius Rufus, frg. ..–; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. .–). the One and truly existing God. Philo often emphasizes the oneness of the God whom converts from paganism now worship (e.g., Somn. .; Spec. .; .; Paen. , ; Nob. –, ; QE .). This serves as the most effective guarantee of the unity that they share with nativeborn Jews (Guerra , –); cf. on Hum. . (b) § . to love the proselytes . . . as themselves. A restatement of Lev :: “The προσ=λυτος who comes among you shall be as the native-born (ατχων), and you shall love (γαπ=σεις) him as yourself, because you were προσ=λυτοι in the land of Egypt” (cf. Deut :); therefore they should not be afflicted (Lev :). Philo reasons that just as the Israelites were newcomers to Egypt, proselytes are newcomers to the truth (QE .). Taken together with Deut :–, such love can be

on humanity –: proselytes and metics, §§ –  understood as an instrument and extension of the love that God shows proselytes (see below), who “must be considered our closest friends and relations” (Paen. ). For some rabbinic interpreters, the term ger could similarly be taken as a reference not to a “stranger” or sojourner, but to a proselyte; he should not be cheated or deceived, or shamed on account of his former status (e.g., b. B. Mes. b). the same griefs and joys. When the Israelites celebrate the first fruits festival (cf. on § ), they are to “rejoice” in all the good things the Lord has given them, not only with their families, but also with “the Levite and the προσ=λυτος who is with you” (Deut :; cf. Exod :–; :; :; Num :; Deut :; :). In Plato’s opinion, one of the forces that binds a well-governed state together is “a fellowship of both pleasure and grief (9δον$ς τε κα λ:πης κοινωνα), when, as far as possible, the citizens rejoice and grieve alike” at the same things (Resp. b, cf. b). a single organism, joined together and naturally united. The metaphor of the state as a human body, both being composed of interdependent μ!λη, was a cliché of political discourse, especially in appeals for Yρμονα (e.g., Spec. .; Josephus, Bell. .–; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..–; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; .; .; Aelius Aristides, Or. ., –; cf. Momigliano ). In a speech to the citizens of Tarsus, for example, Dio Chrysostom likens the στ,σις of a civic body to a disease that has invaded a human body (Or. .). An instance of such strife involves a group called the linen workers, who appear to be agitating for greater civil rights (§ ). Dio advises his hearers to regard such people as fellow “members” of the body and “enroll them all as citizens . . . just as worthy (ξους) as yourselves” (§ ; cf. Philo’s ξιο(σαι). Doing so will preserve their city’s health, just as a growing body preserves its own health, provided that whatever growth it incurs “is in keeping with the rest of the body and naturally united (συμφυ=ς) to it” (§ ). Against such a background, συμφυ!ς in the mss seems acceptable, over against Colson’s (PLCL .) proposed emendation, συμφυεAς; cf. Somn. .; Aristotle, Phys. ..a–; Plutarch, Conj. praec. f; Lyc. .. § . food and drink and clothing. A reference to Deut :–: the Lord God “executes judgment for the προσ=λυτος and the orphan and the widow, and loves the προσ=λυτος so as to give him bread and clothes.” Philo takes this as specifying the responsibilities that Jews themselves are to observe in loving the proselyte (cf. :: “And you shall love the προσ=λυτος.”). Meeting the basic needs of the προσ=λυτος is a subject of concern in a number of biblical texts (Lev :; :; Deut

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:; :–, –; :–), which are alluded to here only in passing. Note that when Philo discusses certain of these laws elsewhere (Hum. , –), he does not mention their specific application to proselytes. basic necessities. In Leg. e–c (cf. b), Plato outlines a provision that requires a certain proportion of the total annual product of the soil to be sold (not given) to foreign residents, including in the first place foreign laborers (δημιουργο; cf. Spec. .). Denied the right of legally owning land (e–a), this segment of the population would have been economically dependent and generally “in need of necessary food.” (a) § . those who have immigrated . . . to apportion some measure of honor to those who have welcomed them. This would have been a pragmatic measure as much as anything, inasmuch as aliens were suspected of undermining native traditions and laws (e.g., Plato, Leg. a). Cf. Mos. .: “In order to secure themselves metics usually honor the customs of their hosts, since dishonoring these entails danger at the hands of the original inhabitants.” if the latter have treated them well . . . Not all metics were necessarily accorded the same status, even in the same city. Some jurisdictions, for example, recognized a special class of privileged metics, who ranked with citizens for purposes of taxation and military service, and required no προστ,της. See LSJ, s.v. >σοτελ=ς. . . . and dealt with them hospitably. Hospitality for the stranger, or φιλοξενα, is a topic of special moral concern in a range of Hellenistic Jewish sources (e.g., T. Job :–; T. Zeb. :–; Ps.-Phoc. –), though it is evident in non-Jewish contexts as well (e.g., Epictetus, Diatr. ..). In the Exposition, Abraham (himself an immigrant) is the principal exemplar of such hospitality (e.g., Abr. , , , ); cf. T. Abr. (A) :–, with Allison , –. § . the standards of fairness. In his epitome of the law, Josephus argues that Moses promotes 1πιεκεια (see on § ) for friendly foreigners (“to those who want to come and live under the same laws with us, he gives a gracious welcome”), though at the same time he was careful to avoid “corrupting our customs” by admitting less serious visitors (C. Ap. .–). He sees the hospitable attitude of Jews towards the proselyte as an expression of their philanthr¯opia and magnanimity (.). to bear a grudge against those who have treated them badly. The Israelites are not to be found guilty of committing the same inhospitable

on humanity –: proselytes and metics, §§ –  crimes that their oppressors committed against them (cf. Mek. R. Ishm. .). The formula μ+ μνησικακεAν was a standard component of Greek amnesty settlements and oaths; see Aristotle, Ath. pol. ., with Rhodes , –. Its use here anticipates the diplomatic application of τ ;νσπονδον in the following paragraph, for which cf. on § . You shall not detest an Egyptian, because you were a sojourner in Egypt. Deut : (“You shall not detest an Egyptian, because you were a sojourner in his land.”) belongs to a chapter that conveys various boundary rules for the Israelite community. (The same verse also mentions the Edomites, though their example would not suit Philo’s purposes here; cf. on Nob. –.) Its appeal to historical remembrance is paralleled in Exod :; :; Lev :; and Deut :, though in those cases the appeal functions to motivate an attitude of acceptance towards the προσ=λυτος, not the π,ροικος (cf. Pons ). Philo discusses the latter infrequently (and note that 3τι π,ροικος 1γ!νου κατ Α?γυπτον here is found only in the margin of S and in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. ..), though see Cher. – (cf. Lev :) and Conf. – (cf. Gen :). Spec. .– (cf. Lev :) provides an interesting case of a law prohibiting what Philo takes to be an example of mistaken humanity, that is, priestly first fruits given to a π,ροικος. § . what evil was there that the Egyptians neglected to inflict upon our nation . . . for the sake of cruelty? The injuries endured by the biblical Jews after being welcomed into Egypt are recounted in Mos. .–. Of course for Philo’s original readers such a narration would have brought to mind far more recent events in Egyptian history as well, inasmuch as the mobs that attacked the Alexandrian Jews in  ce probably included a significant number of Egyptians (see Flacc. , ; Gruen , –). Stigmatized as “foreigners” (Flacc. ), Philo’s coreligionists were subjected to “atrocious” and “unprecedented” forms of cruelty (Flacc. , ; cf. Legat. –; and on the Egyptians’ reputation for Bμτης, see Polybius, Hist. ..). For Philo’s anti-Egyptian rhetoric, see Niehoff , –. As Pearce (, ) notes, Philo “associates no other group more closely than the Egyptians with the vice of abusing strangers,” a vice that marks them as inhumane and uncivilized, e.g., Abr. ; Spec. .; QE .. since they initially welcomed them. As Philo explains in Mos. ., the Israelites were formally welcomed in Egypt when they first migrated there in search of food, having found “sanctuary in the pledged faith of the king and the pity felt for them by the inhabitants” (cf. Gen :– ; Ios. ; Hypoth. .; Pearce , –), but were subsequently

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enslaved. According to Seder #Olam , the Egyptians’ mistreatment of the Jews began as soon as the last of Jacob’s sons died. (b) § . like the children of enemies. During the pogrom, the Jews were treated as though they were enemies of the state (Flacc. –, cf. , ). the third generation is invited into the congregation. Philo draws on Deut : (“If sons be born to them, in the third generation they shall enter the congregation of the Lord.”) while ignoring Deut :–, which forbids the Ammonites and Moabites and their descendants from ever joining the community. For the stipulation of the third generation, cf. Deut :; QT XL . Exactly how this would apply to the situation of proselytes in Philo’s own context is not specified. It was seen as a sign of its generosity that in the Roman state former enemies could become fellow citizens (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; cf. Balsdon , –); cf. on § . the native- and noble-born. See on Hum. ; also the Analysis/General comments for De nobilitate.

Parallel Exegesis Philo mentions the laws dealing with proselyte-love on three different occasions in De specialibus legibus. In .–, he raises the question of how a clear vision of God’s true nature may be obtained. Such a vision has been achieved in fact by Moses (.–) and in turn by all those who follow him, either from birth or through conversion. Philo explains that the latter are called προσ=λυτοι because they have recently entered (προσεληλυ!ναι) a new polity (.). For their part, the former are to grant these “refugees” friendship and goodwill (.). Later Philo reviews the παραιν!σεις of Deuteronomy, beginning with :– (.–). This includes the exhortation of :– to have compassion for widows, orphans, and proselytes (.). The last of these is deserving of mercy because they have “crossed over” to piety, to the worship of the truly existing God, in whom they have found refuge (.). Finally, among the duties of the king enumerated in .– is the obligation to administer justice to the weak and humble (.), justified by a citation of Deut :– (.). The proselyte is included in this group because, estranged from his kin, he is “a pilgrim to truth and the honoring of the One,” and “an immigrant to a fine new home” (.). Further, see the discussion of De paenitentia.

on humanity –: proselytes and metics, §§ –  Nachleben Clement’s interaction with Hum. – in the Stromata consists solely of a quotation of the first sentence of § : “Does it not command (them) to love 1π=λυδας, not only as friends but as themselves in both body and soul?” (..). Since this is offered with no further comment, we can infer that, in contrast to Philo, Clement takes it as a reference to strangers. He similarly passes over most of the material in §§ –, focusing on the presentation of Deut : in § . One who obeys the law must “bear no grudge against those who have done ill. Thus he explicitly states, ‘You shall not detest an Egyptian, because you were a sojourner in Egypt’ ” (..). He departs from his source, however, when he takes the term Egyptian to be representative of the gentiles (;νη) or of those “who belong to the world” (cf. Strom. ..: “By Egyptian the world is designated allegorically.”). Cf. Asterius, Comm. Psalm. .–. In several texts outside of the Exposition, Philo draws on the experience of the alien as a metaphor for the earthly life, for example, QG .: “every wise soul lives like an immigrant and sojourner in this mortal body, having (as its real) dwelling-pace and country the most pure substance of heaven” (cf. Agr. ; Conf. –). In patristic literature (cf.  Pet :; :), the concept of Christian life as a peregrinatio in this world became a common motif, as in Diogn. :–; : (with Blanchetière , who underscores the possibility of Philonic influence);  Clem. :; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. ..–; Asterius, In Psalm. XIV Hom. I. Further, Solignac ; Kidd , –. Further reading: Berthelot , –; Kidd ; Pearce , – .

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 14 ENEMIES AND WAR CAPTIVES (§§ 109–115)

Analysis/General Comments Sections of Deut – present themselves as elements of a code for sacral war: :– (cf. Fort. –), –, – (cf. Hum. –); :–; :–; :; cf. Gottwald ; Rofé . The rules in Deut :–, for besieging an enemy city, make a basic geographical distinction. Cities within the land of Israel are to be annihilated: “You must not let anything that breathes remain alive . . . so that they may not teach you to do all the abhorrent things that they do for their gods” (vv. –). Cities that are “far off ” must first be offered terms of surrender: “if they answer you peacefully and open (the city) to you, all the people you find in it shall be tributaries to you and your subjects (Dπ=κοοι).” If they refuse to submit, the Israelites are to invest the city, kill every male, and take all its women, cattle, and goods as spoil. The validity of such an enterprise, invading foreign territory in order to subjugate its population, is simply taken for granted, the resulting plunder interpreted as a gift from God (vv. –; cf. Noort ). Such directives are paralleled in other ancient societies. Plato, for example, assumes that states follow separate rules of war for indigenous and foreign foes, though in his case it is the former who receive more lenient treatment (Resp. a–c). According to Roman policy, if a city surrendered before a siege began it was required to give up its arms and hostages but was otherwise to be left intact (e.g., Caesar, Gall. .–; .). It was considered unjust to kill the inhabitants of a city that had surrendered (e.g., Livy, Ab urb. cond. ..–; Cicero, Off. .; cf. Watson , –). In Strat. .– , Onasander identifies a more pragmatic reason for treating a defeated city humanely: the report of such treatment will make it more likely that other cities will submit when they are besieged. Philo’s discomfort with such matters can be inferred by the thoroughgoing manner in which he reworks his source material in § . To begin with, Deut :–, with its authorization of total warfare, is ignored. As for the scenario tendered by :–, Philo reverses the military

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roles, presenting the Israelites as defenders, not aggressors, and speaks of friendship, not subjection, as the outcome for the compliant foe (cf. Heinemann , –). All this renders the connection with §§ –  somewhat incongruous, since there he raises the problem of how to treat female captives, instruction far more applicable to besiegers than to the besieged. Here Philo’s source material is Deut :–, which is connected to :– by the topic of plunder (προνομ=); see :; :–. During a foreign war of conquest (note :: “When you go out to war,” etc.) an Israelite solider may choose a captive woman as a wife for himself, though the marriage may be consummated only after she completes what amounts to a rite of passage, through which she separates from her old family and is incorporated into a new one (Nelson , ). In this “liminal state” she sheds certain observable signs (hair, nails, clothes) representative of her former status and is allowed to mourn the loss of her previous kin for thirty days (Deut :–); cf. Pressler , –. The relatively extended discussion that Philo accords the problem of captive women reflects a common source of moral apprehension in antiquity. The absolute power of a conquering army over a defeated city was often expressed in the sexual violation of its women (Kern , –), and the prospect of such a scenario evoked terror (e.g., Jdt :). By the same token, the excessive brutality accompanying military victory was not always viewed with indifference. The Athenians, at least, “seem to have been all too aware that in the act of sacking a city one is particularly susceptible to committing hubristic outrage” (Dué , ), with Ajax’s violation of Cassandra after the fall of Troy constituting perhaps the most infamous case (Euripides, Tro. –; Pausanias, Descr. ..). Of course in actuality the treatment accorded female captives would have varied widely, even in the same war. During the JewishRoman war, for example, Titus dealt with the female captives of Gischala leniently (Josephus, Bell. .–), while those of Jerusalem were not so fortunate (.–). It was considered a sign of good discipline and self-restraint when generals accorded their female prisoners decent treatment, e.g., Polybius, Hist. ..–; ..–. Although the most that captive women could typically expect was a life of humiliation and servitude, some could at least imagine the prospect of marrying their captors (Homer, Il. .–). Alexander the Great in particular was well-known for his humane treatment of women captured in war (Plutarch, Alex. .–; Quintus Curtius, Hist. Alex. ..–; ..; Arrian, Anab. ..–); he even planned to marry one of them (Quintus

on humanity : enemies and war captives, §§ –  Curtius, Hist. Alex. ..–; Arrian, Anab. ..–). Julius Caesar was similarly famous for his 1πιεκεια (cf. §§ , , , , , , ) towards captives (Plutarch, Caes. .). () Philo offers his interpretation of Deut :– in § . Even if the besiegers are at the city gates, they must not be treated as enemies until they have rejected overtures of peace and friendship. Only then can the besieged count on having justice as their ally. (a) The substance of the law of the captive woman is recounted in §§ –. If someone desires a beautiful woman found among the plunder, he must take pity on her misfortune and grant her thirty days reprieve to mourn her loss. To do otherwise is to treat her like a prostitute, not a legitimate wife. (b) Philo next offers three arguments as justification for the law (§§ –). First, he says, it curbs unbridled lust. Second, it tests the genuineness of the soldier’s love for the woman. And third, it grants her an appropriate grieving period. () The chapter’s final paragraph (§ ) summarizes the provision of Deut : (in the case of subsequent divorce the woman must be set free) by interpreting the captive wife as the “unloved” woman of the next passage in the biblical text, Deut :–.

Detailed Exegesis () § . raising their siege towers. In contrast to the biblical text, Philo’s narrative casts the Israelites as defenders not aggressors; cf. Josephus’ depiction of the enemy as )κουσως (Ant. .). Philo also dramatizes the scene with some vivid details. On the )λ!πολις, or “taker of cities,” see Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..–; ..; Josephus, Bell. .; .; Kern , –. (Note that τCς )λεπλεις is supported only by S; most other mss have ταAς πλεσιν. Cf. )λεAν τ+ν πλιν in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. ...) envoys making proposals for peace. Despite its language—“If you draw near to a city to overcome them by war, call them out peaceably (1κκαλ!σ@η ατος μετ ε>ρ=νης)”—what Deut : presupposes is not so much a proposal of peace to be discussed (for Philo’s diplomatic language, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Cassius Dio, Hist. rom. ..; ..) as a “nonnegotiable demand for submission” (Nelson , ). At any rate, the responsibility for the choice of violence is made to rest with the enemy. The extrabiblical addition of

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envoys is paralleled in Josephus, Ant. . (cf. .–), according to which “an embassy with heralds” should be sent to parley with the enemy (cf. Philo, Mos. .; Spec. .). The practice of a besieged city sending envoys or asking for terms of peace is familiar from various historical sources; cf.  Kgdms :; Jdt :–:;  Macc :–; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; ... the greatest good, which is friendship. Once reconciled, former political enemies would draw up terms of “peace and friendship” (e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..; ..). The desirability of hostile states reaching this sort of agreement through diplomatic means is taken up again later (§§ –), in conjunction with Philo’s interpretation of Deut :; cf. Begg ; Eckstein . having gained the alliance of justice. The norms of justice generally allowed for the use of violence in self-defense, or μυνα; see Ps.-Phoc.  (with Wilson , –); also Cicero, Resp. .; and Parallel exegesis below. Obviously, the citizens of a besieged city would rank among those in the greatest need of allies; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ... The war sermon prescribed for the priest in Deut :– is supposed to assure the troops that they have as their ally not justice but God’s very self; cf. Josephus, Ant. .. The motif of sacral war is more prominent in Fort. –, where God is identified as the Israelites’ ally in battle, even the “foremost combatant.” (a) § . a beautiful woman among the plunder. All the goods, cattle, and women of the defeated city belong to the Israelites as “the plunder (τ+ν προνομ+ν) of your enemies which the Lord your God is giving to you” (Deut :; and cf. :–, to which Philo now transitions). On the social and economic significance of plunder in the Roman world, see Mattern , –. spew out your passion on her. Philo uses 1ναπερε:γω elsewhere only in Decal. , with reference to the lust of adultery. For the moral problem of pathos, cf. on Hum. –. It should be noted that Deut :– does not actually forbid battlefield rape. Nor does it prohibit a soldier from violating an enslaved captive with whom he has no intention of entering into matrimonial arrangements (Nelson , ). All the same, Philo takes it to mean that sexual relations are acceptable only later and in the context of marriage (cf. § ). take pity on her. If they were at all civilized, soldiers, or at least their officers, were expected to show compassion for the plight of captive

on humanity : enemies and war captives, §§ –  women, especially if they belonged to noble families, since they would be among those suffering the greatest reversal (e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..–). Of course, the treatment dictated by Deut :– can only be described as humane “if one accepts the legitimacy of aggressive war in the first place” (Nelson , ). In Fort. , Philo had drawn attention to the pity for maidens taken in battle displayed by the Israelites during their war with the Midianites (cf. Num :). § . cut off the hair of her head. Philo replaces ξυρ!ω (“shave”) in the LXX (retained by Josephus, Ant. .) with ποκερω (“cut off ”). In times of mourning it would have been customary for women to cut their hair, while men let it grow (Plutarch, Quaest. rom. a–b). Cutting the hair is also a symbolic act associated with certain transition rituals; cf. Lev :–; Num :. In contrast to the MT, both the LXX and Philo understand the actions of Deut : (cut the hair, pare the nails) as being performed by the man upon the woman, and not by the woman herself. for thirty days leave her alone. The customary period of mourning was seven days (Gen :; Jdt :; Sir :; etc.). Josephus thinks that thirty days ought to be sufficient for any reasonable woman to lament (Ant. .). Perhaps the principal reason behind the biblical injunction was to ensure the legitimacy of the first child of the new union. The whole issue of the non-Israelite woman’s integration into Israelite society was a source of no small concern among post-biblical authors, who addressed it in various ways (e.g., Stern ). Rabbinic sources, for example, assume that she will decide to convert to Judaism after the thirty days, or after a year, or at least that she will be persuaded to accept the Noahide commandments; see Elman . The Temple Scroll, meanwhile, envisages a much lengthier transition period, appending to Deut :– as follows: “She is not to touch pure foodstuffs, for seven years, or eat the peace offering until seven years pass” (Q LXIII – ). Philo, by contrast, seems to assume that she will be assimilated quickly and without any qualifications. allow her to mourn and weep freely for her father and mother. According to Hypoth. ., children, even if they are captives, are not to be separated from their parents. This seems to differ from what Philo assumes here, though perhaps he is thinking of very young children, not young girls of marriageable age. § . for love of her partner or for the birth of children. No provision is given in Deuteronomy for the captive woman’s wishes or for the prospect of childbearing, though both are addressed also by Josephus in Ant. .. He also indicates that the man shares her interest in producing

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offspring (note that the immediately preceding section, .–, is on levirate marriage). For the theme of love in marriage, see Ps.-Phoc. – , with Wilson , –. legitimate nuptials. To join with one’s captive in wedlock would not have been unheard of, though to do so entailed a certain amount of risk, inasmuch as the woman’s familial and political loyalties would always be suspect. Such anxieties were expressed in cautionary tales narrating a captive’s betrayal of her new spouse, e.g., Plutarch, Mulier. virt. c– e, e–d. More often such women became concubines, though as Ruth Scodel observes, the “process of transferring loyalties is similar in marriage and in forced concubinage, but in the representation of concubinage after capture in war, the gift-exchange of normal marriage is replaced by the violent death of the woman’s kin, and the tension inherent in the woman’s mobility from house to house is dramatically increased” (, ). In light of such tensions in transferring loyalties, it is perhaps not surprising that Josephus (referring to Lev :) interprets the law as prohibiting priests from marrying female captives (Ant. .; cf. .; C. Ap. .–). (b) § . the man’s love is ravenous and quickly sated. As Plutarch observes, love that is not accompanied by friendship and virtue is “cloying and quickly sated (Yψκορον)” (Amat. a–b). reason will constrain desire, not permitting it to carry out an outrage. The imagery of reason reining in desire (including the desire to commit sexual hybris) like a charioteer controlling an unruly horse was developed most famously in Plato’s Phaedrus (see esp. a–e), and its influence is evident in subsequent texts, such as Plutarch, Virt. mor. b–c;  Macc :; Philo, Agr. ; Somn. .–; see also on Fort. . Josephus also views the ban on committing any hybris against female war captives as evidence of the law’s philanthr¯opia (C. Ap. .; for philanthr¯opia in treating male war captives, see Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. /..). On the problem of desire (epithumia), see also on Hum. . § . if she is a widow. Deut : mentions only the woman’s parents, implying that the captive is a virgin. Josephus (Ant. .) and Sifre Deut.  agree that a woman who has been previously married may also be taken; cf. b. Qidd. b. that which submits. For the use of Dπακο:ω here, cf. Deut :– : just as the conquered people are subjects (Dπ=κοοι) submitting to terms laid down by their subjugators, the woman submits to her husband. According to Josephus, the law dictates that a woman should submit to

on humanity : enemies and war captives, §§ –  her husband, not for any hybris, but so that she might be properly directed (C. Ap. .); cf.  Pet :, with Elliott , –. () § . having satisfied . . . his desire. Josephus introduces his summary of Deut : with a similar phrase: ε> δ 1μπλησες τ$ς 1πιυμας (Ant. .). For analysis of this and other parallels, see part  of the Introduction. to bestow freedom on her. For this use of χαρζεσαι, cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ... Freeing a captive would have been understood as an exceptional act of magnanimity; see Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Plutarch, Flam. .–. jealousy wrought when another wife comes in creating strife. Deuteronomy’s segment on the treatment of a female captive concludes with a rule stipulating her rights in the eventuality of divorce: “if you do not want her, you shall send her away free and in no way shall she be sold for money” (:). Philo takes this to mean that the woman must be allowed to leave the captor’s household. The reasoning as to why this is necessary is based on his identification of the captive woman with the “unloved” wife of the passage that immediately follows, Deut :– (“If a man has two wives, one of them loved and one of them hated,” etc.). Instead of strife between two wives, however, the situation will be one of strife between the previous wife and the current wife, which will be resolved, Philo assumes, to the detriment of the former. (He also seems to take it for granted that two women attached to the same man will be divided by jealousy and loathing; cf. Sacr. ; Congr. ; Plutarch, Conj. praec. c.) As noted above, post-biblical authors voiced concern over the practice of Israelite soldiers marrying their captives. The proximity of Deut :– to the descriptions of domestic discord that follow was seen as justification for such concern. According to b. Sanh. a, for example, the juxtaposition of Deut :– with :– “teaches that anyone who marries a beautiful captive woman will have a wayward and rebellious son from her.” Similarly, the interpretation of Deut :– offered by Sifre Deut.  seems to read Deut :– as though it were a continuous narrative: “His father must have fallen in love with a comely native woman and thus introduced a disturber into his house, so that the son became stubborn and rebellious, and will in the end cause his father to die an unnatural death.” Further, Elman .

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commentary Parallel Exegesis

The unease that Philo apparently felt in approaching Deuteronomy’s war code noted above is reflected in his re-working of the material in Spec. .– as well. Inasmuch as the Israelites here take on the role of besiegers and not defenders, he adheres to his source material more closely than in Hum. , though he explains that they are not in fact engaged in a war of conquest or expansion (as Deut :– clearly indicates), but are exacting punishment on the seditious members of an alliance. The Israelites must not attack the rebellious city immediately or out of anger, but should dispatch heralds to propose terms of reconciliation (for a similar policy, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..). If the insurgents accept, the siege must be called off, but if they persist, the Israelites are to annihilate their enemy, confident that they have justice on their side (§ ). Women, both married and unmarried, are to be spared, since they had no part in the city’s “wrongful aggression” (§§ –).

Nachleben In Strom. ..–.., Clement follows the order and wording of Hum. – rather closely, except for dropping the transitional introduction (§ a) and the third of Philo’s reasons for admiring the legislation of Deut :– in § . As in Hum. , the biblical scenario is inverted: before the siege of their city begins, the Israelites must send envoys to the attackers in hope of reaching a peaceful resolution (..). If this is not possible, afterwards the victorious soldiers should join with female captives not as though they were prostitutes, but only for the birth of legitimate children (..; cf. ..). When formulating the provision in Deut :, Clement relies largely on Hum.  (..). The most interesting departure from his source material comes in the reasoning he infers behind the command to have the captive cut her hair, which he takes as part of the test of the man’s love for her, that is, to see if “he will cling to her even after she has become disfigured” (..). This is paralleled by certain rabbinic interpretations, which see Deut : “as a law designed to protect the Israelite from being seduced by the beautiful captive woman and thereby abused by her” (Stern , ). In Ep. , Ambrose interprets the actions of Deut :– (cutting the hair, taking off the old garments) symbolically, as steps taken by the soul to cleanse

on humanity : enemies and war captives, §§ –  itself of sin and spiritual troubles; cf. Ep. ; Beyenka , , –; Origen, Hom. Lev. .; Jerome, Ep. . Further reading: Elman ; Kern ; Scodel .

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 15 THE ANIMALS OF ENEMIES (§§ 116–120)

Analysis/General Comments This chapter reflects many of the same priorities as the one that precedes it. Just as “gentleness” must be observed in dealing with an enemy’s female relatives, the same applies to his animals. Chapter  is in fact the first of five consecutive chapters that begin with references to Zμερος or 9μερτης (see §§ , , , , ; cf. QE .–). In chapters  and , moral action guided by this virtue is presented as a means of checking π,ος, sexual passion in the former (see §§ , ), hostile passion in the latter (§ ). The material for chapter  is provided by Exod :–, where concern for one’s fellow Israelites and their means of livelihood is extended even to enemies: “If you find the ox of your enemy (1χρο() or his draft-animal (Dποζυγ<ω) going astray (πλανωμ!νοις), you shall turn them around and return (ποδ8σεις) them to him. And if you see your enemy’s draft-animal fallen (πεπτωκς) under its burden, you shall not pass it by (παρελε:σ@η), but you will help to raise it with him” (cf. the more restrictive interpretation given in Deut :–). These provisions are presented by Philo in reverse order, perhaps because he sees verse  as a better climax to the section, inasmuch as what it espouses would have represented a more significant step towards reconciliation (see below). () To the summary of each law (§§ a, a) Philo appends comments extolling their respective psychological benefits. Exod : is interpreted as a lesson in averting the passion of Schadenfreude and, by implication, its kin and counterpart, envy (§ b). () Exod :, on the other hand, is seen as having a two-way effect. The baser motives of the benefactor are banished (§ b), his thoughts turned to the possibility of reconciliation (§§ b), while the disposition of the beneficiary is “led” (much like the animal itself) towards a cessation of hostilities (§ a). In Philo’s interpretation at least, the intent of these provisions has more to do with the human participants than with the plight of the animal, though consideration for the arguments offered

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in §§ – suggests that the latter would not have been entirely irrelevant to him. () The whole section closes with a flourish in §§ –, a summary transition that names several of the subtreatise’s major values and goals (concord, fellowship, etc.), projecting an image of universal harmony reminiscent of the famous prayer of Alexander the Great.

Detailed Comments () § . laws encouraging gentleness. For 9μερτης, see on §§ , . if any draft-animals of their enemies collapse. Philo retains Dποζ:γιον from Exod : as the object of the injunction, but intensifies its πεπτωκς to describe the animal’s condition with προπ!σ@η (cf. Deut :). A different kind of stress that animals must endure is addressed in § . to lighten their load. Exod : specifically mentions the beast’s burden (γμος), a detail that is not picked up by Deut : or Josephus, Ant. .. In m. B. Mes. :, by contrast, the duty of assistance imposed by the law involves relieving the animal’s burden, not the animal itself: “If he unloaded it and loaded it up again, unloaded and loaded it up again, even four or five times, he is liable.” The rabbis also assume that, at least under ordinary circumstances, one performs the commandment with the enemy’s assistance. For the problems associated with interpreting the Hebrew of Exod :b, see Houtman , –. Cf. Parallel exegesis below. teaching them by implication. That the laws concerning the treatment of animals were meant to have broader moral implications is a view shared by Josephus in C. Ap. .: by forbidding them to abuse even beasts of burden, Moses instructed his followers in gentleness (see above) and humanity “by implication” (πρρωεν); cf. Spec. .; Hum. , ; PAPM .–. rejoicing at another’s hardship is an exceedingly wrathful passion, both related to and the opposite of envy. The juxtaposition of 1πιχαιρεκακα (for which cf. Sacr. ; Agr. ) and envy, including their association as forms of passion with grief and pleasure, is established more clearly by Aristotle: “Righteous indignation is the observance of a mean between envy and rejoicing at another’s hardship, and these qualities are concerned with grief and pleasure felt at the fortunes of one’s neighbors. The righteously indignant man is pained by undeserved good fortune;

on humanity : the animals of enemies, §§ –



the envious man exceeds him and is grieved at the good fortune of others; while the man who rejoices at another’s hardship so far falls short of being pained that he actually feels pleasure” (Eth. nic. ..). Elsewhere he includes both 1πιχαιρεκακα and envy among the most vicious pathoi (Eth. nic. ..), holding that anyone who displays one will of necessity display the other (Rhet. ..; cf. Ben-Ze"ev ). Zeno similarly classes 1πιχαιρεκακα as a species of pleasure and envy as a species of λ:πη (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. ., ; for the latter, cf. Plato, Phil. a–a). In the narrative sections of the Exposition, the condition described here by Philo is embodied perhaps most palpably by the Edomites, who envy the Israelites their liberation from Egypt just as they had previously rejoiced at their slavery (Mos. .–; cf. Ios. ). That envy can become an obstacle to doing good and benefiting others is also noted, e.g., in Spec. .; .–; Hum. ; Nob. . It is a manifestation of divine philanthr¯opia that envy is banished from God’s presence (Abr. ). one expresses grief at the neighbor’s successes, the other pleasure at the neighbor’s hardships. The relationship between 1πιχαιρεκακα and φνος is explained in almost identical terms by Plutarch at Curios. c (cf. the material just cited). At Cohib. ira a, he argues that the former is in fact the worse of the two, since what it strives for is “not that it may itself avoid suffering evil, but that at the cost of suffering evil it may utterly ruin its antagonist; and the most unlovely kind of desire is innate in it, inasmuch as it is a craving to pain someone else.” () § . an enemy’s draft-animal. In its discussion of Exod :, Mek. R. Ishm. . wrestles with the question of the enemy’s identity: is he a gentile, a lapsed proselyte, an apostate Jew? Philo seems to take him to be any person who has shown one hatred (see § ). leave aside any incitements . . . to indulge in more excessive feelings. Philo may understand Exod : to be the more “noble” of the two laws (see below) since it involves restoring, and not just assisting, the animal; it also involves resisting the impulse towards baser actions like stealing or harming the animal (cf. QE .). For this use of Dπ!κκαυμα (literally, “kindling”), cf. Nob. ; Plutarch, Cons. Apoll. c (with λ:πη). Among the mss, only S has παραλιπ8ν (the rest have καταλιπ8ν), though it is supported by Clement of Alexandria, Strom. .. and the snippet of Hum.  preserved in the Sacra Parallela (Runia , ). For more on the indirect tradition for Philo’s writings, see Cohn a.

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excellence of character. For Philo, καλοκγαα is the sum of the virtues (Abr. ; Spec. .; Praem. ; cf.  Macc :–; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Ps.-Aristotle, Mag. mor. ..; Epictetus, Diatr. ..), and as such summarizes the aim of the law’s instruction (Mos. .; cf. Xenophon, Mem. ..). It is evidenced especially when those in power use their resources humanely, for instance, when landowners pay their day-laborers’ wages on time (Spec. .; cf. Fort. ; Hum. , , , ; Nob. , , , ). Greeks often attributed the virtue to elites who spent their wealth in ways that were properly civic-minded, e.g., Dittenberger , no. , , ; Schmitz , –. § . there will necessarily follow. Among the mss, only S has Nπεται, though the reading is supported by Clement of Alexandria, Strom. ... G1 has Nψεται; C has δι!ξεισι; all others have δι!ξειμι (“to pass through, to recount”). a dissolution of the enmity. The idea that the action enjoined by Exod : should be undertaken with a view to reconciliation was part of its standard interpretation, e.g., Ps.-Phoc. ,  (“If an enemy’s animal falls along the way, help to lift it up . . . It is better to make a gracious friend instead of an enemy.”) and  Macc :, where the injunction is taken as evidence that “reason, through the law, can prevail even over enmity.” Philo applies the same logic to Exod :. The importance of seeking an end to hostility in one’s personal relations was a basic moral priority, e.g., Sir : (“Do not become an enemy instead of a friend, for a bad name inherits shame and reproach.”) and Let. Arist.  (“We must show liberal charity to our opponents so that in this manner we may convert them to what is proper and fitting for them.”). Pythagoras bade his disciples to interact with others in such a way “as not to make friends into enemies but to turn enemies into friends” (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .). Efforts towards this end would have been expressive of philanthr¯opia, e.g., Appian, Bell. civ. ... a truce. This use of ;νσπονδος anticipates the more “political” application of the term in §§ –, which seems to be more typical (e.g., Mos. .; Spec. .; Thucydides, Hist. ..; ..; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..), though cf. Spec. .. In §  it represents the conditions under which Egyptian proselytes are welcomed into the Jewish commonwealth. () § . concord, fellowship, unanimity, and a unity of dispositions, from which households and cities, nations and lands, and the entire human race might advance to the utmost good fortune. For similar

on humanity : the animals of enemies, §§ –



virtue lists, cf. Spec. .; Hum. ; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .. Political theorists argued that eudaimonia ought to be the ultimate aspiration of a government for its people (cf. on § ). According to Aristotle, for example, it is the lawgiver’s business to determine how a “fellowship” (κοινωνα) of citizens, whether it be a polis or a nation, may best work together to achieve such good fortune (Pol. ..; cf. Morrison , –). Ps.-Plato, Def. e defines a politeia as “a fellowship of many people, sufficient in itself for eudaimonia.” That 2μνοια, the first item in Philo’s list, constituted the most fundamental precondition of such a state was a political axiom (e.g., Aristotle, Eth. eud. ..–; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; Plutarch, Arat. .; Lyc. .), and Xenophon even extols it as “the greatest blessing” that a city can achieve (Mem. ..). John Ferguson argues that beginning in the fourth century bce a basic shift occurs in how the practical source of harmony is construed: “Hitherto homonoia has been regarded as the natural product of a society in which the citizens practice philia. Now it is to be imposed upon the citizens by a ruler whose own motive is philanthr¯opia” (, , referring to Isocrates, Phil. ; cf. Sheppard –). It is within this ideological vein that concordia would go on to become one of the leading themes of imperial propaganda (, ; cf. Salamone ). At first glance it is a bit difficult to understand how returning lost animals to one’s enemies could possibly have the effect of reconciling whole cities and countries. No doubt he indulges in a bit of hyperbole here, though Philo may in fact believe that actions like this foster such lofty aspirations, either insofar as they are exemplary of what should be done on a larger scale (cf. §§ , –), or because he thinks that it is through such interpersonal resolution and the harmony of smaller social configurations that all of humanity will achieve eudaimonia. § . these are only prayers. No doubt petitions for unanimity or concord figured prominently in many ancient prayers (e.g., Pliny, Nat. ..), though the most famous of these was the one offered by Alexander the Great. Nine-thousand people representing the nations of his newly-conquered empire gathered for a grand banquet at Opis, and while pouring a libation he prayed (εIχετο) for their collective 2μνοια and κοινωνα (Arrian, Anab. ..–). As Tarn (, .–) argues, this appears to have been a defining moment in Alexander’s ambition to become “reconciler of the whole world” (διαλλακτ+ς τν 3λων: Plutarch, Alex. fort. c; cf. καταλλαγ= in Hum. ).

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for my own part I am persuaded. For this form of declaration, cf. Agr. ; Spec. .; Plato, Gorg. b; Demosthenes, Timocr. . a harvest in virtues. For the imagery, cf. Congr. .

Parallel Exegesis QE . argues that Exod : embodies “an excess of gentleness” insofar as it encourages people to help rather than harm their enemies and places a prohibition on greed. Philo goes on to suggest that the returned animal constitutes a kind of peace offering. The soul of the one who gives it is rendered more gentle, while the recipient puts aside rancor and the desire for revenge. In QE . (note that here the canonical order is maintained), we are informed that the law in Exod : exhibits both humanity and gentleness, aiding both the enemy and the animal by lightening the burden of the latter. Having expounded on the literal meaning, Philo proceeds to interpret the prescribed action symbolically as the soul of the sage unloading the sensual burdens of the body.

Nachleben Clement draws on Hum. – in Strom. ..–. He follows the wording (and order) of the restatement of the injunctions in Exod :–  at §§ a and a closely, but works more freely with the remaining material, dropping the statements in §§ b and b– altogether. He concurs that obedience to Exod : implicates training in the avoidance of 1πιχαιρεκακα, though he adds that those thus trained have also learned to pray for their enemies (cf. Matt :). As for the next verse, while acknowledging that the excellence of character its action conveys will lead to a dissolution of enmity between the parties, he understands such nobility to be rooted in the practice of forgetfulness, μνηστα (..). From the list of virtues in § , Clement mentions only the first item, 2μνοια, as ingredient to eudaimonia, and then argues that this law encourages one not only to observe καλοκγαα but also to inculcate it in miscreants as well (..). In lieu of the vision of universal harmony projected by §§ b–, appeal is made to these laws as evidence that God is good “from beginning to end” (..), a contribution to the refutation of Marcionite dualism that we find elsewhere in the book (van den Hoek , ). Clement rounds off the section in .. with a set of

on humanity : the animals of enemies, §§ –



biblical allusions (cf. Matt :; :–; Luke :–). Subsequent patristic authors continued to cite Exod :– both as evidence of the law’s Feindesliebe and as an anticipation of Matt :. See especially Adamantius, De recta in deum fide .–; also Theodoret, Quaest. Exod. ; Procopius of Gaza, Comm. Exod. –; Cooper , –. Further reading: Ben-Ze"ev ; Cooper ; Ferguson , –.

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 16 INDENTURED SERVANTS AND SLAVES (§§ 121–124)

Analysis/General Comments It is only at this point that a basic social division in Philo’s presentation of Mosaic humanity as expressed toward people comes into view. At §  (cf. § ) we hear that the preceding material had pertained to “the free,” while what follows covers legislation about slaves. These categories, however, are not as clear-cut as they might seem. The female captive of §§ –, for example, hardly enjoys the status of a free person (at least initially), while from an elite perspective the Dπηρεσα rendered by the manual laborer of §  would have been indistinguishable from that provided by slaves (see §§ –). On the other hand, the laborers discussed in §§ – are not, as Philo is at pains to tell us, really slaves at all. Rather than viewing its four paragraphs as a distinct section over against §§ –, then, this chapter is best taken as treating the last in a series of increasingly marginal and deprived social types (cf. the Analysis/General comments for chapter ). First-century Jews were fully integrated into the slave economies of the Greco-Roman world, both owning and serving as slaves (Martin ; Hezser ). Philo was well-aware that many of the Jews living in Rome were freedmen (Legat. ; cf. Tacitus, Ann. ..; Harrill , – ), and, like most elites of the time, it was difficult for him to imagine not owning (domestic) slaves of his own (Spec. .). Indebtedness was one of the more common causes of forced servitude (e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Josephus, Ant. .; Appian, Ital. .; cf. Chirichigno ; Wiedemann , –), though to the ancient mind the status of individuals reduced to this condition would not have been the same as that of slaves. Varro, for instance, differentiates debtbondsmen, or obaerarii (of which he says there are many in Egypt), from the slaves and hired laborers who work the land alongside them (Rust. ..; cf. Taubenschlag , ). The plight of Israelites driven by economic hardship into this sort of servitude is a topic of concern in the Pentateuch, which is careful to draw a distinction between such



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individuals and slaves, the latter being of foreign origin. Although the legislation as a whole evidences numerous discrepancies, the relevant sources agree that the former can lose their free status only for a limited period of time. The first of these is Exod :: “If you buy a Hebrew slave, six years he will serve you, and in the seventh year he shall go out free without having to pay.” Here, as often in the Pentateuch, the LXX renders ‘ebed in the original with παAς (cf. Wright ). This law, in turn, is subject to reinterpretation by the framers of Deut :–, which addresses not only the length but also the nature of the Israelite’s service. The first and last verses of the passage are of particular interest: “If your brother is sold to you, a Hebrew man or a Hebrew woman, he shall serve you six years, and in the seventh you shall send him out free from you . . . It shall not seem difficult for you when they are sent out free from you, because they served you six years for the annual wage of a hireling (μισωτο().” The six-year term of compulsory labor is seen as discharging the Israelite’s financial obligation to the reader, regardless of what the original debt may actually have been (cf. Lasserre , – ). Note also that now a single law applies to both genders (cf. Exod :–). That the Israelite’s status is that of a hired laborer and not a slave is maintained also in Lev :–: “If your brother who is with you is abased and is sold to you, he shall not serve you with the servitude of a slave. He shall be with you as a hireling (μισωτς) or sojourner; until the year of release he shall work for you.” This text actually belongs to a longer passage organized according to a series of increasingly dire setbacks experienced by an impoverished Israelite (cf. Spec. .). First he is forced to sell off his property (:–); then he falls under the authority of the reader (probably as a tenant farmer) and is extended interest-free loans (:–; cf. on §§ –); finally, if he defaults on his loans he enters the reader’s household, with the debtor’s wages—but not the debtor himself—becoming the reader’s property (thus he is not literally “sold” to his creditor: Milgrom , ). In contrast to the other two laws, here indentured Israelites are not to be released on an individual basis, after a six-year term, but altogether, every fifty years (cf. Josephus, Ant. .; .; m. Qidd. :). The text goes on to forbid the practice of selling Israelites as slaves; instead the readers are to import δο(λοι “from the nations around you” (:–; cf. Cardellini ). Although Philo draws out the ethnic aspects of this legislation in Spec. .–, – (see Parallel exegesis below), when treating slavery in De humanitate such distinctions are not explicitly mentioned. Instead,

on humanity : servants and slaves, §§ –



the chapter is structured according to social/legal categories, discussing first individuals born free but reduced to servitude by economic pressures (§§ –), then those who have been born into slavery (§ ). Perhaps the Alexandrian simply presupposes the ethnic restrictions regarding servitude and manumission as indicated earlier in the Exposition. By the same token, perhaps he means to universalize the ethnic scope of his source material (i.e., even indentured non-Jews must be released in the seventh year), so as to make the chapter cohere better with the focus of §§  ff. on non-Jews. At any rate, when demonstrating Mosaic humanity towards the latter category of slaves (§ ), Philo turns to Deut :– : “You shall not hand over (παραδ8σεις) to his master a slave coming from his master who has attached himself to you. He shall dwell with you; he shall dwell among you in whatever place pleases him; you shall not afflict him.” The instruction for the slave to “dwell with you” indicates that this is a law concerning not local runaways but persons who have fled from foreign countries (Hamilton , –). They are to be returned neither to their masters nor to their previous status, but should be allowed to begin a new life, not only free, but free to choose their place of residence. By essentially ignoring v. , the Alexandrian again sidesteps the ethnic dimensions of his source material, reading v.  as an order not to hand over (1κδιδναι) any runaway, foreign or otherwise, but to provide him temporary protection, until he is either reconciled with his master or sold to a new one, his status as a slave being left unchanged. As we have seen, the chapter is divided into two parts: () Out of consideration for the uncertainty of fortune, Moses decreed that those reduced to forced servitude, whether for indebtedness or for some other reason, should suffer nothing unworthy of their freedom, but must be returned to their original status after six years of service (§§ – ). () Furthermore, anyone in servitude, even someone born into slavery, who has run off from his master for any reason must be granted refuge as befitting his status as a suppliant, to be either reconciled with his current master or sold to a new one (§ ).

Detailed Comments () § . slaves. Like most authors of the time (but in contrast to the LXX Pentateuch), Philo’s preferred designation for a slave is δο(λος,

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though his oeuvre includes several other terms that appear to be roughly synonymous with it, including ερ,πων, ο>κ!της, and παAς (cf. Straus ), and he is not adverse to using such terms interchangeably (e.g., Spec. .). Besides discussing the institution itself, the Alexandrian often draws on the imagery of freedom/slavery when constructing his allegories of the soul, e.g., Prob. –; for overviews, see Heinemann , –; Garnsey , –. It is important to bear in mind that patterns of slave ownership were not consistent across the empire, and regional peculiarities would have shaped Philo’s exposure to the institution: “Although domestic slavery was not uncommon in the moderately prosperous households of Roman Egypt, and freedmen in some contexts played a role in management, there is little reason to believe that chattel slaves made a significant contribution to the agricultural labour force” (Rowlandson , ). gentleness and humanity. That Moses extended justice to slaves is a refrain of the Exposition of the Law, e.g., Spec. .; .–, –; .–. It would have been taken as evidence of a city’s humanity that its laws and customs afforded even slaves certain rights or protections, e.g., Demosthenes, In Mid. ; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ... For the pairing of φιλανρωπα with 9μερτης, cf. Spec. .; ., ; Nob. ; Demosthenes, In Mid. ; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Josephus, C. Ap. .. § . laborers. Julius Pollux explains that the term $τες refers to “free men who because of poverty must serve (δουλευντων) to repay money” (Onom. .). Those who have fallen into such debt-bondage, or ητεα, are to be differentiated from slaves, since their loss of status is not permanent (e.g., Isocrates, Or. .; cf. Euripides, Alc. –; Plato, Euth. c–d; Harris , –). Of course just such a perception would have been commonplace, inasmuch as $τες performed the same menial jobs as δο(λοι (e.g., Aristotle, Pol. ..). must not endure anything unworthy of the freedom to which they were born. The indentured Israelite must not be reduced to the “servitude of a slave” (δουλεα ο>κ!του: Lev :; cf. Deut :). Exactly how such service might have differed qualitatively or quantitatively from that of a slave is difficult to say (see Philo’s attempt to fill in this gap at Spec. .), though in terms of its social bearing the prohibition would have resonated with both Greek and Roman lawmakers, who were similarly concerned to prevent the permanent loss of free status among their citizens. Solon famously outlawed the lending of money on the security of the borrower’s person (Aristotle, Ath. pol. .; Harris ). Roman

on humanity : servants and slaves, §§ –



law similarly protected plebs from enslavement to their creditors; those who fell arrears were liable instead to forced labor until their debts were paid off, but they could not be chained or sold as slaves (e.g., Livy, Ab urb. cond. ..; ..–; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..–). the uncertainty of fortune. Reflection on the vicissitudes of human experience and the universality of suffering represented one of the enduring themes of ancient wisdom, for example, Isocrates, Demon.  (“Taunt no one with his calamity, for fortune is common to all and the future is unseen.”); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; .. (τ!κμαρτον πρOγμα τ:χη); cf. Ps.-Phoc. , – (with Wilson , –, –); Philo, Spec. .; also on § . short-term loans. The expression 1φημερινν δανεων may not be as unusual as Colson (PLCL .) suggests, inasmuch as an 1φημερς was the ledger of debtors and their debts kept by a money-lender (δανειστ=ς), as in Plutarch, Vit. aere al. d. A struggling borrower would presumably make many appearances in such a record. setback. Literally, an “attack” or “assault.” Ambiguity concerning the term’s application here generated a number of different readings in the manuscript tradition, none of them particularly appealing. Besides προσβολ$ς in S, A, variants include προβολ$ς (“projection”) in H, P; περιβολ$ς (“covering”) in C, G2; παραβολ$ς (“comparison,” followed by Mangey , ) in F; and δουλεας (“slavery”) in G1. Whatever the term’s meaning, it probably refers back in some way to the μεταβολ= that had concluded the previous sentence. a full reprieve in the seventh year. The temporary reprieve (1κεχειρα) afforded slaves every seventh day anticipates the full reprieve that Exod : and Deut : prescribe for them in the seventh year (Spec. .– ; cf. Mos. .). § . in some other way. Reading (with the preference expressed in PLCL .) F τοAς τρπον in G1. PCW . prints F τρπον with S. Other mss have πρ τν (A) or πρς τν (ceteri). six year’s time of service. Manumission for deserving slaves was conventional in Roman urban society (see, e.g., Bradley , –), a practice that must have struck many of its observers as unnatural (see the defense mounted on its behalf by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in Ant. rom. ..–), though even a Greek author could advise masters to promise slaves liberation after a specified period of time, in order to “make them work willingly” (Ps.-Aristotle, Oec. ..). Cicero’s comments in Phil. . give some evidence that there may have been a certain expectation for slaves to be manumitted after six years of service, though it is

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questionable to what extent this ideal was actually observed (Wiedemann ). If a six-year term was in fact conventional, it is odd that Jewish authors like Philo and Josephus (see Ant. .) failed to point out the similarity of Roman practice with the provisions in Exod : and Deut :. On manumission in Roman Egypt, see Taubenschlag , – . On the practice of corporate manumission in Jewish synagogues, see Harrill , –. are to return to the former liberty of which they were deprived. No mention is made of the subcase presented in Exod :– and Deut :–, according to which the indentured Israelite can waive his right to freedom in the seventh year and opt for permanent subservient status, in order to stay with the family he acquired during his term of service; cf. Leg. .; Cher. –; Josephus, Ant. .. () § . even a slave of the third generation. Proceeding to the chapter’s second example of Mosaic humanity for slaves, Philo now has in mind primarily individuals who have been born into slavery as opposed to those driven into temporary servitude by economic hardship, the former presumably being more likely to run away. Although he maintains elsewhere that slaves who serve well can look forward to liberation (Spec. .; and see the discussion of Roman manumission above), here he seems to take for granted that at least some slaves (and their children) will endure their status for life. Probably these are assumed to be foreign-born slaves, though the distinction drawn in Spec. .– is not applied here. In Spec. . (cf. .), Philo recognizes the difference between a house-born slave (ο>κογεν=ς) and one that has been bought with money (ργυρ8νητος). merciless and savage. “[T]he sadistic cruelty with which some Roman slave-owners visited their slaves is notorious” (Bradley , ). For the image of the cruel master, see Spec. .; Seneca, Ira .; cf. Hezser , –. he has fled to your hearth as to a temple. For the hearth as a sanctuary for suppliants, see LSJ, s.v. 1φ!στιος. Temples would have been common places for people to seek refuge (e.g., Spec. .; .), including most notably runaway slaves (e.g., Prob. –; Achilles Tatius, Leuc. Clit. .; Llewelyn , –). In some cases an inscription would be posted promising asylum (Drijvers , –). The logic informing this sacred practice could be reformulated as a general rule of conduct, as in Instr. Ankh. .: “Do not cast a slave into the hands of his master.” The law in Deut :– describes a slave who has “attached himself ”

on humanity : servants and slaves, §§ –



to the reader, perhaps as a tenant farmer or hired hand; the reader is not to “afflict him,” that is, enslave him. By contrast, Philo assumes that the runaway will stay with the one to whom he has fled only temporarily. for the purpose of a genuine reconciliation. A slave might seek out a friend of his master (or a freedman a friend of his patron) for intercession after committing some misdeed, as we see in Pliny, Ep. . and (possibly) Paul’s letter to Philemon; cf. Lampe . By introducing this as the slave’s objective in fleeing, Philo fundamentally reconfigures the scenario of Deut :–, where the slave hopes to escape not only his master but also his slave status. changing masters. Plutarch knows of “a law for slaves who have lost hope of freedom, permitting them to ask for their current master to be exchanged for a more reasonable one” (Superst. d). Of course no law would have permitted a slave to flee in order to do so. Indeed, the Romans prescribed penalties for anyone who failed to hand a fugitive over to his master or to a magistrate (Llewelyn , –; and for Roman Egypt, Taubenschlag , –). Cf. Leg. ., where Philo reads Deut : as an allegory of the soul that flees its former masters, ignorance and the passions, to become a slave of wisdom.

Parallel Exegesis In contrast to Hum. –, Philo’s previous discussions of manumission in the Exposition retain the ethnic distinctions delineated in the biblical sources (cf. m. Qidd. :–). Among the Mosaic provisions that establish “gentleness and humanity” according to Spec. .– is the law that requires Israelites to set their indentured brethren free after six years. This is to be done out of the sense of kinship (συγγ!νεια) that they ought to feel for one another. In their servitude the latter are to be treated not as slaves (even though this is the name usually used for them), but as $τες and μισωτο (§§ –). As such, they should be given sufficient food and clothing, and not burdened, threatened, or overworked like an animal (§ ). In the seventh year they should be sent away with adequate provisions (see Deut :–), which will serve as a safeguard against the whole process of indebtedness and indentureship repeating itself all over again (§§ –). A bit later there is Spec. .–, which follows the sequence of laws in Lev :–. Fellow Israelites in want are to be extended interest-free loans. If they default on their loans, they are to be treated as μισωτο and not as though they were slaves “by nature”

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(φ:σει). If they cannot provide the ransom price for their freedom right away, they are to be released either after six years of servitude or in the jubilee, whichever occurs first (Josephus, Ant. . also attempts a harmonization of the sabbatical and jubilee years, though in a different way). On the other hand, the law does permit the purchase of foreignborn slaves (who are presumably slaves “by nature,” cf. Garnsey ) in order to furnish “that most indispensable possession, domestic service” (§ ).

Nachleben Clement gives a compressed summary of Hum.  and  in Strom. .., ignoring Hum.  and  but following his source in dropping any ethnic references found in the biblical legislation: anyone reduced to servitude by poverty or debt is to be granted a reprieve (1κεχειρα) in the seventh year. Clement is much freer when dealing with § , essentially rewriting the law so that it no longer specifically concerns slaves at all. Picking up on Philo’s identification of the runaway as κ!της, he generalizes Deut :– as a prohibition not to hand over (1κδιδναι) any suppliant for punishment (..a). The unit concludes with a list of quotations from Proverbs :, :; :; :; :. In C. Cels. ., Origen cites Exod : as evidence for the superiority of the Mosaic law over the laws of other nations, while Basil takes its sixyear term of servitude to stand figuratively for the period required for the expiation of sins (Ep. .). Eusebius compares the law with Plato, Resp. c, which discourages Greeks from enslaving fellow Greeks (Praep. ev. .). Wiedemann (, ) notes that many Christians manumitted deserving slaves at Easter, after they had served for six years (referring to Gregory of Nyssa, Or.  and Codex Theodosianus ..). On the corporate manumission of slaves in early Christianity, see Harrill , –. For manumissio in ecclesia, see Herrmann-Otto , –. Further reading: Berthelot , –; Garnsey , –; Harrill ; Hezser ; Wiedemann .

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 17 NEWBORN ANIMALS (§§ 125–133)

Analysis/General Comments With § , our author segues from the discussion of Mosaic laws he thinks promote humanity in dealing with other people to a section which focuses on the fair treatment of animals (§§ –; see the Analysis/General comments for chapter ). That this immediately follows a chapter on the treatment of slaves (§§ –) is hardly surprising, given the functional similarity of the two groups in the elite mind, for example, Aristotle, Pol. ..: “the usefulness of slaves diverges little from that of animals; bodily service for the necessities of life is forthcoming from both, from slaves and from domestic animals alike.” That Philo shared this opinion is evident from texts like Deus ; Mos. .; and Spec. .. For him the principal distinction between animals and slaves is that the former are λογος, devoid of speech and reason (cf. Opif. ; Spec. ., ; .). The use of this appellation, however, was not universally endorsed, and in fact signals our author’s position in a longstanding philosophical debate (Dierauer ; Sorabji ). For their part, Platonists marshaled a variety of arguments meant to demonstrate that animals are in fact possessed of reason, albeit in imperfect forms. Since human beings have a kinship in reason with animals, they ought to extend them justice; see especially Plutarch, De sollertia animalium; Porphyry, De abstinentia (which draws in part on Theophrastus’ theory of animal sacrifice; see Clark ); Sextus Empiricus, Pyrr. .–. This view was contested by the Epicureans, who held that while domestic beasts may live in some sort of co-operative agreement with their human masters, all animals are by nature irrational (Lucretius, De rerum nat. .–; Porphyry, Abst. .–; cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .). The most rigorous objections to the Platonic position, however, came from the Stoa, where λγος represented “the categorical boundary marker between humans and animals” (Gilhus , ), the latter acting in accordance not with reason but with their natural constitutions (SVF .–). Since people have no community in reason with animals,

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they have no community in justice with them either (SVF .–; Marcus Aurelius, Med. .; cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Pohlenz , .–). Philo’s familiarity with this debate is evidenced by his De animalibus, in which his nephew Alexander rehearses many of the stock arguments of the New Academy, only to be refuted by his uncle, who draws heavily on Stoic traditions (Terian ). The latter concludes: “To elevate animals to the level of the human race and to grant equality to unequals is the height of injustice. To ascribe serious self-restraint to indifferent and almost invisible creatures is to insult those whom nature has endowed with the best part” (Anim. ). This conviction has important implications for understanding Philo’s stance in this section of De humanitate. What makes these provisions of the law noteworthy is not any affinity that humans have with the animal world but rather the ontological distance separating the two groups. The practice of Mosaic humanity is so pervasive and all-encompassing that it extends even to human interactions with “almost invisible creatures.” Thus to the structural dichotomies stated at the beginning of §  can be added the categories of rational vs. irrational. Stoic arguments for the irrationality of animals played a role in their concept of teleological anthropocentrism: animals exist for the sake of human beings and their primary purpose is to serve them, e.g., Cicero, Fin. .; Epictetus, Diatr. ..–; ..–; SVF .–; cf. Xenophon, Mem. ..; Dierauer , –. Philo expresses a similar view at various points in the Exposition, e.g., Mos. .–; .; Spec. . (“irrational creatures are intended to be ready for the use and service of people”); .–. The theme of humankind’s sovereignty over the animals figures especially in his account of the creation (Jobling ; Borgen ). Adam is appointed to rule over all earthborn creatures as God’s Rπαρχος (Opif. ; cf. Praem. ). This dominion over the animals is so complete that he is even given authority to assign their names (Opif. ). At the same time, Philo’s inclinations at this point in De humanitate accord with various Jewish traditions that enjoined mercy for animals, as evidenced, e.g., in Prov :; T. Zeb. :;  En. :–:; Ps.-Phoc. – ; Josephus, C. Ap. .–. However, in order to understand the logic that informs the reflections in Hum. –, we must turn to Pythagorean opinions concerning kindness to animals, which have been helpfully reviewed by Berthelot . Although she does not discuss this particular passage, Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. . would be representative of what she calls

on humanity : newborn animals, §§ –



the a minori ad maius argument: Pythagoras “ordered abstinence from living things for many other reasons, but mainly because the practice tended to promote peace. For once human beings become accustomed to loathe the slaughter of animals as lawless and contrary to nature, they would no longer make war, thinking it even more unlawful to kill a human being.” A similar report of Pythagoras’ teaching on the subject is given by Porphyry, Abst. ..: “One who abstains from all animate creatures, even those that do not make a social contract with him, will abstain all the more from harm to his own kind” (cf. ..). Following such a rule in the treatment of animals, Porphyry says, safeguards and expands the observance of justice between people. Comparable is Plutarch, Esu carn. f–a, where kindness to animals is presented as a kind of “training” in humanity: “Who could wrong a human being when he found himself so gently and humanely posed towards other non-human creatures?” Cf. Plutarch, Inim. util. c; Quaest. conv. e– b; Sollert. e–f, a; Cato .; further, de Fontenay . For his part, Philo does not employ these sorts of arguments in an effort to reject animal sacrifice or the consumption of animal flesh, but he does assume a similar analogy between behavior towards animals and behavior towards other people, maintaining that the law “extends such fairness to irrational animals so that by practicing on species of different kinds we might exercise humanity even more abundantly” (Hum. ). This manner of training in virtue is seen as a distinctive advantage of the Mosaic law over the laws of other nations (§§ –; cf. Josephus, C. Ap. .). After a transitional statement in § , Philo presents five statutes he thinks illustrate the “fairness and gentleness” that the law extends to animals: §§ – . It forbids killing newborn animals until they are at least eight days old (Lev :); it forbids, by implication, the exposure of infants. §§ – . It forbids killing a mother animal and its offspring on the same day (Lev :), including also pregnant animals; it forbids, by implication, executing pregnant women. §§ – . It forbids cooking a lamb in its mother’s milk (Exod :; :; Deut :). §  . It forbids muzzling a threshing ox (Deut :). §§ – . It forbids yoking an ox and an ass together for plowing (Deut :); it forbids, by implication, treating the people of other nations unjustly.



commentary

Looking at the section as a whole, several observations can be made. To begin with, insofar as the laws presented are cast in the form of prohibitions, it is probably more accurate to say that Moses does not so much promote “fairness and gentleness” (§§ , ) as he does curtail unfairness and brutality (cf. §§ , , ). As one would expect of an ancient discussion of animals, assertions regarding the correct understanding of nature (§§ , , , , , , , ), of food (§§ , , , , , , , , ), and of sacrifice (§§ , , , , ) occur with some regularity. In addition, the focus on the mother-child relationship in §§ – affords Philo an opportunity to exposit on the role of philanthr¯opia in family ethics and of the law in teaching familial affection (§ , cf. § ). His main point, however, is communicated in the sorts of arguments a minori ad maius mentioned above, which are placed at the end of the discussion for the first (§§ –), second (§§ –), and fifth (§ ) laws (note that the treatment of the third, fourth, and fifth laws is relatively brief) and so serve an important structural role in the section. Chapter  can be outlined as follows: () The transitional statement in §  segues from the section dealing with different categories of people to the category of irrational animals. (a) The chapter proper opens with a summary of Lev :: the newborns of domesticated animals are off limits for immediate use, either as food or for sacrifice (§ ). (b) Moses is then made to speak directly to one of his followers, arguing that such a measure both accords with the life of reason and selfcontrol (§ ) and prevents unnecessary pain from being inflicted on the mother (§ ). So, to avoid rendering her breastmilk useless, a gift prepared with great foresight by nature, she should be given the newborn for at least the first seven days (§§ –). () Philo then turns to address his readers, especially those parents who have failed to see that this measure was established to teach them to show greater affection within their own families and not contravene the laws of nature by killing their own newborns (§§ –).

Detailed Comments () § . relations and strangers, friends and enemies, slaves and free persons. Before proceeding to the discussion of animals, Philo recapitulates some of the major categories that had structured the previous sec-

on humanity : newborn animals, §§ –



tion (§§ –; cf. part  of the Introduction). According to Xenophon, in his teaching Socrates endeavored to benefit “both house and household, relatives and friends, city and citizens” (Mem. ..). Philo similarly underscores the ubiquity of Moses’ teaching, though in contrast to Xenophon’s rhetorically expansive list, his is based on social contrasts. For similar dichotomies, cf. Spec. .; .; Plato, Resp. b; Aristotle, Oec. ..; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Dio Chrysostom, Or. /.; Gal :; Col :. The subsequent discussion will add the dichotomy of rational/irrational. fairness and gentleness. Philo never speaks of the obligation to extend philanthr¯opia as such to plants and animals, reserving the term for relations between νρωποι (Berthelot , ; cf. Josephus, C. Ap. .– ; Plutarch, Esu carn. a). The implication would seem to be that treating non-human subjects properly contributes only indirectly to philanthr¯opia, as a form of practice or training (cf. on § ). The pairing of 1πιεικ=ς and Zμερος (for the latter, see on § ) occurs at the beginning of the following chapter as well (§ , cf. § ) and so plays a structural role in the text. The former term also connects this section thematically with the section that follows, on plants; see §§ , . irrational animals. The primary distinction between animals and people is that the former lack λγος; see the Analysis/General comments above. Cf. §§ , , . to draw some benefit. As Colson (PLCL .) observes, τι χρηστν in G1 and PCH . is grammatically preferable to τινος χρηστο( in the other mss and PCW .. as from a free-flowing stream. Plutarch utilizes the same imagery when describing the fair treatment of animals in Cato .: “Law and justice we naturally apply to people alone; but when it comes to beneficence and generosity (χ,ριτας, cf. χ,ρισαι in Hum. ), these often flow in streams from gentleness (9μερτητος) like water from a rich stream (πηγ$ς) even down to irrational animals.” As an example of such χρησττης, he mentions the owner who looks after his horses and dogs even after they have passed their prime. For his part, Philo’s use of the metaphor anticipates the argument in §§ – that the “stream” of mother’s milk ought to be allowed to flow to its offspring. In lieu of εμενο(ς in the mss, Mangey (, ) conjectured εν,ου (followed by PCH .), though as Colson (PLCL .) observes, the former can also be applied to a bounteous flow of water, as in Aeschylus, Pers. .



commentary

(a) § . domestic herds, particularly sheep, goats, and oxen. Philo can use Zμερος not only of “gentle” people (as in § , cf. §§ , , , ) but also of “tame” animals (§§ , ) and “cultivated” plants (§§ , , , ) insofar as they live peacefully with human communities and contribute to human life; cf. Opif. ; Spec. ., ; Praem. ; Jobling , . Only the tamest of animals (including the three mentioned here) are fit for sacrifice (Spec. .–; cf. Lev :–, –; Gilhus , ). Although he occasionally argues that even wild creatures exist for the sake of people (e.g., Mos. .–; Spec. .–), when discussing human responsibility to the non-human world Philo usually restricts its scope to domesticated animals and cultivable plants, e.g., Opif. –; Deus ; Mos. .. Similarly, when discussing human responsibilities to animals, Plato mentions only the “tame” sort, such as sheep, goats, and oxen (e.g., Leg. d; cf. Aristotle, Pol. ..; Porphyry, Abst. ..). to refrain from the immediate use. The question of who will have the use or enjoyment (πλαυσις) of what nature provides runs throughout the chapter; cf. §§ , , . Philo here refers to Lev :, though its provision for a seven-day waiting period is not mentioned until § : “Regarding a calf or a sheep or a goat, when it is born, it shall be under its mother seven days, but on the eighth day and beyond it will be acceptable for a sacrificial gift, a burnt offering for the Lord.” Exod : communicates a similar rule for a firstborn calf, sheep, or draft animal, except that they must be given up on the eighth day; cf. Spec. .–; Josephus, Ant. .. neither for food nor for reason of offering sacrifices. The former is Philo’s addition to Lev : (see on § ), rendering its provision more general in application. A similar interpretive move will be made during the discussion of Lev : in § . pleasure of the belly . . . unpleasantness of the soul. The translation tries to convey the parallelism of Philo’s thought (though the sentence structure is awkward: PLCL .); separating the newborn from its mother at birth corrupts both the body and soul of the perpetrator. Moralists influenced by Pythagorean traditions maintained that most people do not kill animals in order to survive, but for the pleasure (9δον=) that accompanies eating them. Such habits tend to aggravate the bestial (ηρι8δης) side of human nature (cf. Philo’s Bμ$ς . . . ψυχ$ς earlier in the paragraph) while weakening its gentle (Zμερος) side: Plutarch, Sollert. e–f; cf. Esu carn. d; Porphyry, Abst. ..–; ..; ..–; Seneca, Ep. .; Philo, Spec. .–, –; and §  below.

on humanity : newborn animals, §§ –



(b) § . My good man. Hum. – (following the punctuation in PCW .– rather than PLCL .–) takes the form of an imagined address to a fellow Jew in need of further instruction regarding the significance of the biblical injunction against sacrificing newborns; cf. the exchange in §§ –. poverty and want can force people to do many of the things they do not want to do. In making his case for vegetarianism, Plutarch concedes that primitive people may have been driven to eat flesh by a scarcity of food (Esu carn. c–d, cf. f; Porphyry, Abst. ..; ..; ..), but that situation hardly applies to his readers: “How many plants grow for you! What vintages you gather! What wealth you may draw from the fields and what pleasant sustenance from the trees!” Cf. Ovid, Met. .– . Philo emphasizes the abundance of food available to people at Fort. ; Hum. . your obligation is to prevail in self-control. In its Mosaic operations, a crucial function of the sacrificial cult is to exemplify and instill 1γκρ,τεια, expelling from its participants desire, pleasure, and greediness, e.g., Spec. ., , , , . The same applies to the Pentateuch’s dietary legislation, e.g., Spec. .–, , . This virtue figures prominently also in Chaeremon’s account of the Egyptian priests, most of whom “abstained altogether from animate foods” (Porphyry, Abst. ..–..). appointed to the finest company, under the command of nature’s right reason. Stoic doctrine defined 1γκρ,τεια as “a disposition never overcome in that which concerns right reasoning (λγον Hρν)” (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; cf. Aristotle, Eth. eud. ..–; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. .). For the martial imagery, cf. Hum. ; Paen. . § . the natural affection mothers have towards their young. The Stoa held both that nature creates in parents an affection for their offspring and that this affection is the ultimate source of all associations: “from this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such.” This impulse is so fundamental that it is evident even among animals in the way they bear and raise their young. See Cicero, Fin. .– (cf. Epictetus, Diatr. ..–; Plutarch, Sollert. anim. a; Aristotle, Hist. anim. .; Columella, Rust. ..– ; ..;  Macc :–); and on the role of parental affection in the Stoic’s ο>κεωσις doctrine, Blundell . It was widely agreed that nature instilled this affection especially in mothers, both through the experience of pregnancy and labor pains, (e.g., Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Plutarch,



commentary

Am. prol. a;  Macc :–) and from the act of breast-feeding (e.g., Ps.-Plutarch, Lib. ed. d). the breasts, whose flowing suffers a blockage of the efflux. If the milk is left unused it will begin to curdle in the breasts (Hippocrates, Epid. ..; Aristotle, Hist. anim. .) and the mother can become ill (Aristotle, Hist. anim. .; cf. Dean-Jones , –). Soranus recommends that a mother who is not going to nurse should bind her breasts and apply heat, so as to dry up the milk (Gyn. .–, cf. .). For this use of 1πρροια, cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. .. § . at least for the first seven days. Lev : (cf. Exod :) stipulates that the newborn animal “shall be under its mother seven days, but on the eighth day and beyond it will be acceptable for a sacrificial gift.” In Leviticus we encounter various kinds of seven-day ritual periods (e.g., :; :). In this case it symbolizes that the animal has reached “maturity,” that is, by this time any defects invalidating it for sacrifice could be detected (b. Hul. a). The waiting period may also have had something to do with the ritual impurity associated with birthing (cf. :–; :). At the same time, “experience probably also taught that the accumulating milk might be problematic for the mother animal” (Gerstenberger , ), a point that Philo will develop at some length. Columella recommends that a newborn lamb be left with its mother to suckle for at least two days (Rust. ..); if the lamb is taken away thereafter to be slaughtered, the mother should be given the offspring of other ewes to nurse, so that the surviving lambs will have sufficient sources of milk (..). streams which nature has rained into the breasts. For the imagery, cf. Opif. ; Spec. .; Aet. –; Plutarch, Am. prol. f–a. In Hum.  (see below), Philo similarly assumes that the sole purpose of the mother’s milk is to feed its young (cf. Agr. ; Sobr. ; Porphyry, Abst. ..). To frustrate this purpose prevents the animal from living in accordance with its natural function and perverts the aspect of nature it embodies (cf. Spec. .–; Epictetus, Diatr. ..–; Beagon , –). Among the mss, S alone reads πηγ,ς with no additional clarifiers; C has πηγCς το( γ,λακτος, G1 has πηγCς τCς το( γ,λακτος, and the rest have πηγCς τCς 1ντς ε?σω το( γ,λακτος (which Mangey ,  takes as a corruption of πηγCς παγ!ντος ε?σω το( γ,λακτος); see the discussion in Cohn , . prepared with great foresight. Ordinarily Philo emphasizes how creation has been prepared specifically for the benefit of humankind (e.g., Opif. –; Spec. .; see the Analysis/General comments above), though on occasion he can widen the scope to include the animal world

on humanity : newborn animals, §§ –



more generally. For example, in Spec. . he celebrates how “the land has richly provided all that it yields for the sustenance of the various kinds of animals without number, both tame and wild, sustenance not only to be enjoyed on the spot and for the moment, but also for later, through the foresight of animal-loving nature.” For Philo it is axiomatic that the creator takes thought for what has been created. Cf. Opif. –, , ; Spec. .; Praem. , ; Aet. –; Prov. .–. For this specific endowment, comparison may be made with Ps.-Plutarch, Lib. ed. c–d: in its πρνοια (cf. Hum. ), nature assures that the same animal that gives birth to a newborn is also able to feed it, even providing a “double source of nutrition.” § . that which does not exist is brought into being. Not a statement to be taken in the strict sense (cf. Decal. ), since for Philo nothing comes into being out of the non-existent (Aet. ). Rather all living things derive from (and return to) not τ μ+ /ν but the four elements (e.g., Spec. .; cf. Plato, Tim. e–a). every tender creature. The reading πOν Yπαλνυχον ρδουσα is preserved only in S. The other witnesses have 1ν YπαλοAς μ!λεσι δο(σα (AP2) or 1ν Yπαλ, μα δ ο[σα (ceteri). LSJ, s.v. Yπαλνυχος includes the reference here as dubia lectio. simultaneously drink and food. According to ancient science, the menstrual blood that had nourished the embryo in the womb is concocted over the course of the pregnancy into milk for breast-feeding the newborn after partition (e.g., Aristotle, Gen. anim. .; Hippocrates, Epid. ..; Plutarch, Am. prol. f–a; King , –, ). Like the blood from which it is derived, the milk has two components, namely, a watery substance, whey, and a thicker and more nourishing ingredient, curds (Aristotle, Hist. anim. .; Soranus, Gyn. .–; Galen, De san. tuen. .; Dean-Jones , –; Aly ), the mixture varying according to the species (Aristotle, Hist. anim. .; .). those cruel mistresses, thirst and hunger. For the imagery, cf. Mos. .; Spec. .. According to Contempl. , it is nature itself that has set them up as δ!σποιναι. () § . murderous intentions towards your infants. Philo’s invective draws in part on the image of the child-slayer, familiar especially from Greek tragedy, e.g., Aeschylus, Ag. –; Euripides, Herc. fur. – ; Med. –; Iph. Aul. ; cf. Josephus, Ant. .; Lebeck , –. When Moses’ parents left him on the banks of the Nile they realized that what they had done was tantamount to murder (Mos.



commentary

.–), even if circumstances compelled them to do so (cf. Josephus, Ant. .; Bell. .). in order to expose them. Infant exposure was widely practiced in both the Greek and Roman worlds, apparently by rich and poor alike (Eyben ; Patterson ; Riddle , –, –). Jewish and Christian moralists stood practically alone in their categorical rejection of such conduct, e.g.,  En. :; Ps.-Phoc. –; Josephus, C. Ap. .; Sib. Or. .–; .–; Did. :; Apoc. Pet. ; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Tacitus, Ann. .. The extent to which infanticide was nevertheless still practiced among Jews of the time is debated; see Reinhartz ; Schwartz . For the beginnings of the anti-exposure tradition in Exod :–, see the Parallel exegesis below. Aristotle knows of certain localities where exposure is frowned upon (Pol. ..; cf. Aelian, Var. hist. .; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..), while Dionysius of Halicarnassus reports that Romulus forbid the exposure of all male infants and the firstborn of all female infants, except in cases where the child was born deformed (Ant. rom. ..–; cf. ..). The latter may reflect “late-republican Roman anxiety about the prevalence of exposure” (Harris , ), though the evidence for this is admittedly thin. Certain Stoic philosophers spoke out against infanticide as a contravention of nature, e.g., Musonius Rufus, frg.  (with Geytenbeek , –). Epictetus points out that even sheep and wolves do not abandon their offspring (Diatr. ..–); cf. Seneca, Contr. ..; Tacitus, Germ. .; Pliny, Nat. ..; Stobaeus, Anth. .. (Hierocles). Of particular interest for the study of our passage are Philo’s statements in Hypoth. ., which set the prohibition of abortion (which was often linked with exposure as a moral problem) in parallel with the prohibition of mistreating newborn animals: those obedient to the law “are not to frustrate the generative power of men by surgery, or that of women through abortifacients or other means; they are not to treat animals contrary to what is appointed by God or even by a law-giver—they are not to destroy their seed or defraud their offspring.” Although the connection is not drawn out as clearly as it is in De humanitate, it seems that the Alexandrian still sees the two forms of conduct as logically and morally analogous. § . towards whom will you come to have goodwill . . .? Another kind of a minori ad maius argument (cf. Analysis/General comments above): if parents cannot treat their own children humanely how will they learn to treat anyone with εIνοια (cf. § ; Spec. .)? Porphyry also deplores the de-humanizing aspects of infanticide; parents who murder their children surpass even wild animals in cruelty (Abst. ..).

on humanity : newborn animals, §§ –

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§ . took care concerning the irrational animals. The first human was established by God over the terrestrial world “as a kind of charioteer and pilot, so that he could guide and steer earthly affairs, taking care (1πιμ!λεια) of animals and plants like a governor (Rπαρχος) acting on behalf of the first and great King” (Opif. ). Insofar as his heirs fulfill this commission, they act as agents of divine providence; cf. Opif. –, . Even more . . . was this established on your account. Philo lays out his hermeneutical principle in Spec. .: “For you will find that all this scrutiny of the animal is a symbol intimating in a figure the reformation of your own character, for the law does not prescribe for irrational creatures but for those possessed of mind and reason.” The principal aim of Moses’ legislation regarding the treatment of animals is the edification of those who observe it. Thus an important task for the interpreter is to discern what lesson or implication can be drawn from such legislation for human morality; cf. Let. Arist. ;  Cor :–. As Berthelot points out (, –), the sort a minori ad maius argument employed here (cf. Analysis/General comments) is Philo’s “trump card” in his argument regarding Mosaic humanity, and he will have occasion to use it again (see especially the summary argument in § ), though it can be found outside of De humanitate as well, for example, QE . (on Exod :): “For who would disregard any human being, with whom he has a single natural kinship, when he has been taught by the divine law and is accustomed not to disregard even a beast?” Comparison may also be made with b. B. Mes. b, which draws a conclusion qal wahomer: what is true of oxen (they should not be muzzled when threshing) is all the more true of people (workers should not be deprived of their food). if not by nature then at least by instruction. This is a variation on the observation Philo makes elsewhere that the attainment of virtue requires three elements, namely, nature, instruction, and practice (e.g., Abr. – ; Ios. ; Mos. .; Praem. ; cf. Plato, Resp. a; Aristotle, Pol. ..; Xenophon, Mem. ..; Ps.-Plutarch, Lib. ed. a–b; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .). Here, however, physis refers principally not to the nature residing in the individual (cf. Fug. ), but to the individual’s ability to learn from nature; cf. Post. ; Ios. ;  Cor :, with Schrage , .–. Moses would have been ideally situated to pass on such learning, having been instructed himself in the most essential tenets of nature through the divine oracles (Opif. ). available in the most convenient places. The number and location of the female’s breasts vary depending on the specific needs of the individual species (Aristotle, Hist. anim. .; Part. anim. .).

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the lawgiver looks to see with great foresight. As Philo had explained earlier in the chapter, the female’s ability to produce breast-milk at the appropriate time was provided by nature “with great foresight (1κ πολλο( το( προμηο(ς), perceiving from afar” what the newborns would require (§ ). The foresight embodied in Moses’ laws accords with and acts to secure that of nature; cf. Spec. ..

Parallel Exegesis Exod :– describes a situation in which during the course of a fight between two men one of them (presumably inadvertently, cf. m. B. Qam. :) strikes a pregnant woman resulting in a miscarriage. If the woman survives, the assailant must pay compensation for the lost offspring; if she does not, he must pay “life for life” (cf. Josephus, Ant. .; Houtman , .–). In the LXX version, by contrast, the penalty is determined not by the condition of the mother but by the status of her fetus. If it is “imperfectly formed” the assailant pays the fine, but if it is “perfectly formed,” then he must be executed (cf. Feldman , –; Wevers , –; on the question of the fetus’ formation, cf. Soranus, Gyn. .; m. Nid. :–). Philo deals with this law at Spec. .– (cf. Heinemann , –), in conjunction with his exposition of the decalogue’s commandment against murder (Spec. .–). The passage opens with a paraphrase of the text, though Philo imagines the assailant fighting directly with the pregnant woman (§ ; cf. Congr. ; Josephus, Ant. .). He then proceeds to the main topic: the ordinance, he says, carries with it the prohibition “of something else more important,” namely, infant exposure, reasoning that if destroying a fetus, which is still part of its mother, is forbidden, then the destruction of a newborn, which has become an independent organism, is even more reprehensible (§§ , –; cf. Josephus, C. Ap. .). Philo emphasizes throughout that such crimes break the laws of nature and frustrate the child’s ability to partake of the gifts nature intends for it (cf. Plutarch, Am. prol. d; Pliny, Nat. hist. .). After accusing parents who practice infanticide of being pleasure-lovers and misanthropes (§§ –), he offers a graphic description of the different ways in which they murder their children outright (§ ) or abandon them in a deserted place, where they will most likely be devoured by wild animals (§ ; cf. Ps.-Phoc. ; Seneca, Contr. ..). Perhaps some traveler will take the foundling and raise it (§ ; cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; Longus, Daphn. .;

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ordinarily, of course, it would be brought up in slavery, e.g., Pliny, Ep. .–), though even in this case the kindness shown the infant by a stranger only serves to bring into relief the callousness of its parents, who “must be judged the cruelest and most ruthless” of human beings (§ ). Cf. Niehoff , –.

Nachleben In Strom. ..–.., Clement draws selectively on Hum. , , and , adding several comments regarding the superiority of the law. Right away he recognizes the philosophical pedigree of his source material: “It seems to me that Pythagoras took his concept of gentleness towards irrational animals from the law.” This contributes to Clement’s broader thesis that the Greeks were dependent on Moses for their understanding of virtue (van den Hoek , ). Philo’s paraphrase of Lev : from Hum.  is then given, with a note that the injunction on breast-feeding “nurses” (νατρ!φων) its adherents in gentleness (..). Philo’s second reference to the law (in Hum. ) is then given, accompanied by a onesentence summation of Hum. –: to tear the newborn away from its supply of milk dishonors physis (..). The tone of .. is familiar from the invective of Hum. –, though it is aimed not at parents but “the Greeks” who commit infanticide, even as they inveigh against the law (perhaps anticipating Hum. ). The final section (..–..) draws on Hum. : if the law prohibits the offspring of irrational animals from being separated from their mothers, this applies even more so to human offspring, who should never be exposed, a norm to be learned if not from nature then at least by instruction. Most patristic authors accepted the Stoic view that animals lack reason and therefore have no community in justice with human beings, e.g., Tertullian, Res. –; Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. opif. –; Ambrose, Noe .; Augustine, Mor. eccl. ..–; Lib. .–. Rather, they were created to serve people: “their life and death are subordinated to our use” (Augustine, Civ. .; cf. Gen. litt. .; Origen, C. Cels. .–). Only on rare occasions is this viewpoint challenged, e.g., John Chrysostom, Hom. Gen. .–; Lactantius, Inst. ... Further, Sorabji , – ; Clark . Early Christian objections to exposure focused especially on the threat of subsequent incest, the assumption being that many abandoned children would be forced into a life of prostitution, e.g., Justin,  Apol. ;

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Minicius Felix, Oct. ; Tertullian, Apol. .– (cf. Nat. .); Boswell , –. Clement assures his readers that each abandoned child has a special guardian angel to rear him or her (Ecl. ). Further reading: Berthelot ; Dierauer ; Gilhus ; Sorabji ; Terian .

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 18 MOTHER ANIMALS AND THEIR YOUNG (§§ 134–144)

Analysis/General Comments Chapter  is a continuation of chapter  (note the summary in § ), adding two more rules relating to the treatment of mother animals and their offspring. The first, like the law reviewed in Chapter , is a sacrificial rule (Lev :), while the second is a dietary one (Exod :; :; Deut :). In his exposition of these regulations, Philo develops two points familiar from the previous section: first, that the law educates its followers to respect the proper purpose of the food that nature has provided; second, that by observing laws enjoining fairness to animals they learn to be even more humane in dealing with other people. At the same time, this chapter is longer than its predecessor and its argumentation more involved, as several new implications are drawn out. Its contents can be summarized as follows. () The next example of Moses’ effort to promote gentleness is the command against sacrificing a mother animal and its offspring on the same day. There are two conceivable motives for such brutality, both of which must be rejected. This cannot be considered a legitimate sacrifice, since it is in fact a source of defilement, and it cannot be considered a proper meal, since it is motivated by gluttony and a perverse desire for aberrant pleasures. The repulsiveness of the act is dramatized with matching examples of personification: the flame of the altar flees the unholy sacrifice and extinguishes itself, while the roasting limbs of the two animals break out into speech, castigating the voracity of their killer (§§ –). (a) Our author then infers that this law was also meant to forbid Jews from sacrificing pregnant animals; even if the fetus does not have the same status as a newborn, it still possesses the potential to become one. Then, taking this interpretation as sufficiently established, he goes on to make two claims regarding its significance. First, he suggests that observance of the implied law reinforces observance of the stated law, arguing a minori ad maius, that is, if a being that is not yet a living animal

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is safeguarded in this manner, a creature endowed with its own body and soul will be protected with even greater seriousness. Second, he contends that the lawgivers of other nations were inspired by this law to be more humane in dealing with their subjects, ordering that a pregnant woman condemned to death must not be executed until she has delivered her child (§§ –). (b) This is then taken as a demonstration of the superiority of Moses and his legislation. While other lawgivers extend fairness to people (having learned this from one of Moses’ laws!), he excels them by extending this principle to animals, cognizant of the fact that by “practicing” thus on irrational creatures his followers would accustom themselves to be even more humane in dealing with rational ones. Thus criticisms that accuse Jews of being inhumane are not only unjustified but ironic, insofar as laws like this foster humanity both within the Jewish community and in other nations (§§ –). () The capstone to Philo’s argument is the set of laws that make it illegal to boil a lamb in its mother’s milk. Moses has two reasons for issuing these commands. First, to cook an animal in the substance intended to nurture it represents an abuse of nature’s gifts. Second, since milk from other sources is readily available, there is no excuse for engaging in such merciless conduct (§§ –). What connects this section with the one that precedes is that both discuss laws that have something to do with the treatment of animal offspring and their mothers. It is noteworthy that in De humanitate Philo does not address familial humanity directly, but only indirectly, through the discussion of fairness to animals.

Detailed Comments () § . gentleness and fairness. The scribe responsible for S added a subheading to chapter  (Φλωνος περ γ’ ρετν\ περ 9μερτητος κα 1πιεικεας) that would have been more suitably placed before chapter , which similarly opens with a reference to the virtues of 9μερτης and 1πιεκεια. That chapter also discusses a sacrificial rule concerning mother animals and their offspring (see on § ). Tg. Ps.-J. on Lev : argues that this law encourages people to follow God’s example and “be merciful on the earth.” forbidding them to sacrifice a mother and its offspring together on the same day. Lev : reflects ancient taboos about mixing parents and children: “You shall not slaughter an ox or sheep and its (ατ$ς) young

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on the same day.” The Greek rendition of the law departs from its source in applying the prohibition not to both parents (cf. QT LII –), but only to the mother (cf. b. Hul. b). Philo makes this explicit with μ=τηρ, even as he generalizes as to the type of sacrificial animal involved. The use of συγκατα:ω would appear to restrict its application further, as in Josephus, Ant. .: “The law forbids us to sacrifice an animal on the same day and in the same place with its parent.” Cf. Philo’s )ν καιρ< κα 9μ!ρ7α μι7O in § . The reading συγκατα:ειν is given only by S, though it finds support in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. ... The other mss have κατα:ειν. to kill the source of the birth along with that which was given life. Although it would have been apropos, in the section on animals Philo nowhere mentions the law in Deut :– against taking a mother bird with its young. Cf. Hypoth. .; Ps.-Phoc. –. Josephus cites it as an illustration of the law’s “gentleness and humanity” (C. Ap. .). § . slaughters, not sacrifices. Generally υσα and σφ,γιον are parallel terms (e.g., Amos :; Spec. .–; and cf. the use of σφαγι,ζω in Spec. ., , , etc.; also σφ,ξεις in Lev :), though the latter is used of human sacrifice in Abr. , , –, . For Philo, one of the principal aims of the Mosaic sacrificial system is to abet the training of Jews in humanity and fellowship, curbing injustice and viciousness (Spec. .–). unholy offerings. Sacrifices presented by those who are not morally worthy, such as the unjust or the gluttonous, are rendered “unholy” and therefore unacceptable (e.g., Cher. ; Plant. ; Mos. .; Spec. ., ). In order to make a proper offering, one must be pure in body and soul, the former cleansed by ablutions, the latter purged of its passions (Spec. .–, cf. .–, –). Nikiprowetzky (, – ) observes that the “spiritualization” in Philo’s interpretation of the sacrificial cult is influenced partly by biblical traditions like Isa :– and Mic :– (cf. Sir :–) and partly by the philosophical critique of ritual piety current at the time (see also Ferguson , –). The latter sometimes decried the savagery that accompanied the act of sacrificing animals, for example, Plutarch, Esu carn. a–b: “I rather wonder both by what accident and in what state of mind the first man who did so, touched his mouth to gore and brought his lips with the flesh of a dead creature, he who set forth tables of dead, stale bodies and ventured to call food and nourishment the parts that had little before bellowed and cried, moved and lived. How could his eyes endure the slaughter when throats were slit and hides flayed and limbs torn from

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limbs? How could his nose endure the stench?” Lucian ridicules the element of irony in the act: “Although the notice says that no one is to be allowed within the sacred grounds who has not clean hands, the priest stands there all bloody, just like the Cyclops of old, cutting up the victim, removing the entrails, plucking out the heart, pouring the blood about the altar, and doing everything possible in the way of ‘piety’ ” (Sacr. , with Caster , –). Further, Laporte , –; Calabi ; Gilhus , –. what sort of fire would not split itself in two. Such an occurrence, of course, would have been a wonder; cf. Pausanias, Graec. descr. ..; ..; Dan :–. would extinguish itself immediately. A sacred fire polluted by some miasma would have to be extinguished and re-lit, e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; ..; Plutarch, Aet. Rom. Graec. a; Arist. .; cf. Philo, Mos. .–. air and the most holy element of breath be defiled by the ascending flame. Sacrifices can be defiled by physical impurities, to be sure (e.g., Spec. .), though impurities of the moral variety pose the gravest threat (e.g., Spec. ., ; cf. Hum. ). “Breath,” or πνε(μα, here probably refers to aether (as in Leg. .; cf. Euripides, Suppl. ), the purest and holiest of all substances (Mos. .; .). As such it would be especially susceptible to pollution. For the interchange of fire, air, and aether in the sacrificial ritual, see Mos. ., ; cf. Conf. ; Aristotle, Cael. .; .; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; Cicero, Nat. d. .; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .. § . horrific gluttony . . . aberrant pleasures. The sacrificial system promulgated by Moses teaches its participants to recognize desire and gluttony as “impure” vices that profane any sacrifice associated with them. Instead, they learn to “let self-control (1γκρ,τεια), that pure and stainless virtue which disregards all concerns of food and drink and claims to stand superior to the pleasures (9δονα) of the stomach, touch the holy altars” (Spec. ., cf. .–, ). Similar arguments had been advanced in the previous chapter, especially in §§ –. their limbs . . . would break into speech. Such personification is part of Plutarch’s polemic against carnivorism in Esu carn. e: “For the sake of a little flesh we deprive them of sun, of light, of the duration of life to which they are entitled by birth and being. Then we go on to assume that when they utter cries and squeaks their speech is inarticulate, that they do not, begging for mercy, entreating, seeking justice, each of them say: ‘I do not ask to be spared in case of necessity; only spare me your

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arrogance! Kill me to eat, but not to please your palate!’ ” He goes on to lament the cruelty and waste that attend such unnatural meals. Arnobius of Sicca similarly bestows a human voice on an ox, who complains about the unfair conditions of his sacrifice: “Is this, then, O Jupiter, or whatever god you are, humane or right, or should it be considered at all just, that when another has sinned I should be killed?” The ox goes on to argue that animals “love their young and . . . have reason and utter articulate sounds” (Adv. nat. .). For a similar sort of personification, cf. Josephus, Ant. .. (a) § . pregnant animals. That the prohibition of Lev : extends to the fetus is testified also in QMMT B : “[Concerning pregnant animals,] we have deter[mined that one must not sacrifice] the mother and the fetus on the same day.” Cf. QT LII  (“You shall not sacrifice to me any cow, sheep or she-goat which is pregnant.”); Q  ii –  (cited below); Bernstein , –. The fact that the text asserts rather than assumes this determination suggests that it was contested, or at least not universally endorsed (cf. m. Hul. :). Whether Philo’s interpretation is based on some halakhic tradition (Alon , ) or simply something he logically deduced from the biblical text on his own (Berthelot , ) is impossible to say. At any rate, in his view pregnant animals are barred from all areas consecrated for the purpose of sacrifice, and so effectively have the same status as unclean animals (cf. § ). This would contrast with Greek practice, where cultic laws sometimes prescribed the sacrifice of pregnant cows, sows, or ewes in order to stimulate agricultural fertility (Jamesdon , –; Rosivach , ). by extension. Literally, “from afar” (μακρεν). Philo’s manner of interpretation in the Exposition often involves him drawing out what he sees as the unstated implication(s) of a particular law, e.g., Spec. .–, , ; ., ; cf. Plato, Leg. a–b, e–a. See also on Hum. . § . things that grow in the manner of a plant . . . in the hope of becoming living animals. Philo espouses the Stoic position on the development of the fetus; while it is still in the womb it is “nourished by nature like a plant,” becoming a living animal (ζ<ον) only at birth, when its body is chilled by the air and acquires a soul (Plutarch, Stoic. repug. e–f, c–d; cf. Prim. frig. c; Comm. not. e; Aëtius, Plac. .; Nardi , –); see also on § . Earlier, Aristotle had suggested that the fetus is like a plant insofar as it possesses a nutritive,

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though not sentient, soul (Gen. anim. .). For the derivation of ψυχ= from ψ(χις, cf. Aristotle, Anim. .. Also see Parallel exegesis below. § . some of the lawmakers derived the law concerning condemned women who are pregnant. It was part of Jewish apologetic to contend that Moses was the oldest, and therefore most venerable, of all lawmakers, and that the legislators of other nations, recognizing the superiority of his accomplishment, emulated his laws, e.g., Aristobulus, frg. ; Josephus, C. Ap. .–, –. The fullest development of this theme in the Exposition is located in Mos. .–, –. The law’s preeminence, Philo says, is proven both by the fact that it has remained unchanged over the ages and because it has the special distinction of being the only law code that is honored by people from all parts of the world, both Greeks and barbarians; cf. Spec. .. Further, Droge , –; Pilhofer , –; Niehoff , –. This particular law was known at Athens (Aelian, Var. hist. .), though according to Plutarch the Greeks copied it not from the Jews but from the Egyptians (Sera d), a point corroborated by Diodorus, who includes it in a survey of “especially old” Egyptian laws: “Pregnant women who had been condemned to death were not executed until they had been delivered. The same law has also been enacted by many Greek states, since they held it entirely unjust that the innocent should suffer the same punishment as the guilty, that a penalty should be exacted of two for only one transgression, and, further, that, since the crime had been actuated by an evil intention, a being as yet without intelligence should receive the same correction, and, what is the most important consideration, that in view of the fact that the guilt had been laid at the door of the pregnant mother it was by no means proper that the child, who belongs to the father as well as to the mother, should be dispatched” (Bibl. hist. ..). Further, see the Nachleben below. Finally, the possibility of an analogy between killing a pregnant animal and killing a pregnant woman is suggested by Q  ii –: “[And whoever] divulges the secret of his people to the pagans, or curses or [preaches] rebellion against those anointed with the spirit of holiness and leads astray [his people, or disobeys] God’s word, or slaughters an animal carrying a live fetus, [or] a pregnant woman [ . . . ].” they are not to be executed. Reading μ+ ποκτενεσαι with AP2 against φυλ,ττεσαι, which is printed in PCW . and PLCL . but supported only by S. As Runia (, ) notes, the latter “looks very much like an attempt to circumvent the awkward repetition of two verbs beginning with πο- (which Philo may have introduced as deliberate contrast).”

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(b) § . by practicing on species of different kinds we might exercise humanity even more abundantly. The acquisition of humanity and gentleness owes something to nature and something to practice, or μελ!τη (Spec. .; cf. Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. .; and on Hum. ). As for the latter, Philo agrees with the Pythagoreans that one learns to act more humanely towards people by practicing kindness towards animals: “Who could wrong a human being when he found himself so gently and humanely disposed towards non-human creatures?” (Plutarch, Esu carn. a). Thus they “made a practice of kindness to animals so as to inculcate humanity” (Plutarch, Sollert. f; cf. Quaest. conv. e; Cato .; Porphyry, Abst. ..–). Unlike these authors, Philo restricts his use of philanthr¯opia to relations between people (see on § ), rendering the addition of 1ν τοAς 2μογεν!σι in PCW . (from Clement of Alexandria, Strom. ..) unnecessary. our personal goods . . . as for kinfolk and siblings. Moses teaches each of his followers to make what is properly his own (ο>κεAος) available for the common good, in effect viewing all people as members of his extended family. With this we may compare the Guardians of Plato’s Respublica, who regard one other as ο>κεAος so completely that no conflict ever arises for them between personal and communal interests (b–c). For the more immediate context of Philo’s statement, though, we must turn to the Stoic doctrine of ο>κεωσις (Pembroke ; Striker ; Annas , –), according to which human beings possess a natural inclination to develop attachments with other people. The basis for this is the instinctive concern they have for their offspring, from which “is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such . . . The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one person should feel another one to be akin to him” (Cicero, Fin. .). This feeling of “appropriation” or “familiarization” is then taken as foundational for understanding the responsibilities of communal life and the implementation of justice. Among the psychological devices developed for cultivating such universal other-regard, perhaps the most famous was an image sketched by Hierocles, where the moral relationships between the self and others are depicted as a set of concentric circles (Stobaeus, Flor. .). The innermost circle is drawn around the individual, the next around the immediate family, and so on, with the outermost circle representing the entire human race. The individual’s task within this schema is to “bring the circles somehow towards the center,” drawing each group into a closer sphere of affinity and obligation, treating uncles and aunts like parents, cousins like siblings, and so on. Eventually, as Brad



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Inwood puts it, “one’s feeling of concern and love for all mankind would be rendered equal in intensity with one’s concern and love for oneself ” (, ). Once individual needs are seen as continuous with the needs of humanity, it is only logical that such world-citizens will be inclined to share all of their goods (γαC π,ντα) with those who need them, even with people they do not know or who live in a different city (SVF .). It is important to remember, however, that since what ultimately binds the members of this community together is the faculty of reason that they all possess, the moral circumference of Stoic ο>κεωσις does not embrace irrational animals. The Pythagoreans saw things differently, arguing that people who achieve ο>κεωσις with all animate creatures will be less likely to commit injustice against any particular species of animal, especially their own kind (Porphyry, Abst. ..–; cf. ..; ..; Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. .). § . malign the nation as being prone to inhumanity. As part of the Exposition’s broader agenda of demonstrating the humanity of the Mosaic law (see parts  and  of the Introduction), Philo also has occasion to point out how some of its various provisions have the effect of curbing its opposite, μισανρωπα. This pertains specifically to the fifth commandment (Decal. ) and the laws concerning oaths (Spec. .), newborns (Spec. .), slaves (Spec. .), and gleanings (Hum. ). Like all Alexandrian Jews, he had first-hand experience of anti-Jewish slander (e.g., Flacc. –; Legat. –), including the accusation of inhumanity: “it leads me to wonder, how some people dare to accuse of inhumanity the nation that has shown a profound a sense of fellowship and goodwill to all people everywhere” (Spec. .; cf. Ios. ). The Contra Apionem testifies to the malevolence and persistency of this cultural stereotype. There we see Josephus refuting charges from no less than three sources, Lysimachus (.), Apion (.), and Apollonius (., ), to the effect that Jews are misanthropes who follow an unsociable and inhospitable way of life (cf. Ant. .–; .; .; .; .). References to Jewish endogamy, dietary laws, and cultic exclusivity figure prominently in such anti-Jewish rhetoric, e.g., Philostratus, Vita Apoll. .: “the Jews have long been in revolt not only against Rome but against all humanity . . . a race that has made its own a life apart (βον μικτον), that has no share (κοιν=) with the rest of humanity in the pleasures of the table or in their libations or prayers or sacrifices.” Cf. Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. /..– (Posidonius); .. (Hecataeus); Tacitus, Hist. ..–; Juvenal, Sat. .–; and for the “misoxenia/misanthr¯opia motif,” see Schäfer , –; also Feldman

on humanity : animals and their young, §§ –

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, –; Berthelot , –; Isaac , –. Like Philo, Josephus counters in part by arguing that Moses taught his followers humanity through his laws regarding the fair treatment of animals (C. Ap. .). Indeed, the theme of philanthr¯opia figures prominently in how Josephus organizes his apologetically-oriented presentation of the law in Contra Apionem, especially in .– (see Wilson , – ). He sums up many of his main points in the treatise’s conclusion, maintaining that the laws “teach not impiety but the most genuine piety, encourage not inhumanity but the sharing (κοινωνα; cf. on § ) of possessions, hating injustice and tending to justice, banishing sloth and extravagance, teaching us to be independent and hardworking” (., cf. .). uncongenial and unsocial practices. The Jews, of course, would not have been the only group accused by its critics of being unsociable or inhospitable; see, e.g., Isocrates, Antidos.  (on the Athenians); Plutarch, Lyc. . (on the Spartans). Cf. Isaac . customs learned from their earliest youth. The acquisition of virtue depends on three elements: nature, instruction, and practice (see on Hum. ). The last of these was addressed in the preceding paragraph: 1ν τοAς νομοιογεν!σιν σκ=σαντες. Now we hear that the Jews also heed Moses’ instruction on humanity, represented here by νμιμοι, as in Sobr. . The use of the term (found only here in De humanitate) with reference to the instruction of youth is reminiscent of Leg. d–d, where Plato reflects on what sort of unofficial “customs” ought to be observed in the rearing of children. If their upbringing is too lenient, he says, they grow up to be “morose and irascible.” But if it is too severe, they become “meanspirited and inhumane, and thus unfit to associate with others” (d: the sole use of μισ,νρωπος or μισανρωπα in the treatise). Instead, it is best to pursue a middle way, one that will cultivate virtue (cf. Phaed. d–e). amend any disobedience in their souls to a civilized disposition. Stoicism identified the irrational passions of the soul as different forms of “disobedience” to reason (SVF ., ). Desire, for example, is a “longing disobedient to reason” (/ρεξιν . . . πει$ λγ<ω), while pleasure is “an elation of the soul disobedient to reason” (;παρσιν ψυχ$ς πει$ λγ<ω). The sage endeavors to purge his souls of such passions, rendering it τιασς, “gentle” or “civilized” (Leg. .). The vice of μισανρωπα was sometimes seen as a manifestation of hubris or arrogance, e.g., Isocrates, Antidos. ; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .. For μεαρμζω, see on § ; Paen. .

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() § . You shall not boil a lamb in its mother’s milk. Philo cites the Greek text of Exod :; :; Deut : (dropping ατο( at the end), which had replaced “kid” in the original with ρ=ν (Exod : also has προσοσεις in lieu of )ψ=σεις; cf. Sasson , –). Laws like this may reflect ancient taboos concerning the commingling of life and death: “the milk that is naturally associated with the life of the animal was given a reverse role and was now applied to the dead animal” (Carmichael , ; he goes on to suggest that Philo’s take on the provision here reflects his interest in Heraclitus’ doctrine of opposites; cf. Wolfson , .–). Like other stipulations (Exod :; Lev :–; Deut :–), the law may also express anxieties about violating the motherchild relationship (Keel ). Other interpretations, concentrating on the Exodus texts, restrict the law’s application to certain pilgrimage festivals (Haran ; Knauf ; Labuschagne ). For his part, Philo gives two justifications for the law. First, it prevents the purpose that nature intended for the mother’s milk (i.e., to sustain the life of its offspring) from being frustrated, the same point made regarding Lev : in §§ –. Second, there is no necessity for using the mother’s milk, since milk from others sources is readily available; cf. § . As an example of perverted ingenuity in gluttony, Pliny mentions the practice of certain cooks who prepare fish in a garum made from their own companions (Nat. hist. .; cf. Plutarch, Quaest. conv. e– b). § . nature cared enough for its survival to rain down milk and arranged for it to be conveyed through the mother’s breasts. For the argument and language here, see on §§ –, . the intemperance of humankind. The vice of κρασα describes those who have no control over their desire for pleasures, instead indulging in incontinent and licentious acts, e.g., Opif. , ; Abr. ; Ios. –; Mos. .; Decal. , ; Spec. ., ; ., , , ; .; Praem. . Further, see on Fort. . § . if anyone thinks fit to boil meat in milk. The Mishnah interprets the provision of Exod :; :; Deut : to carry with it a general prohibition against cooking meat in milk or eating meat with cheese (m. Hul. :–; later rabbinic texts took it to include the total separation of dairy and meat dishes: b. Hul. a–a; Houtman , ). What Philo says here may be taken as evidence that Alexandrian Jews did not observe a similar prohibition (Belkin , ; Heinemann , – ), though his concession may be more rhetorical than real. While meat cooked in milk may have been “a favorite gastronomic indulgence”

on humanity : animals and their young, §§ –

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in ancient Near Eastern societies (Nelson , ; cf. Labuschagne , ), it does not appear to have been as prevalent in the GrecoRoman world (where milk served primarily as a drink or as an ingredient in bread, porridge, etc.: Gutsfeld , ; cf. the Nachleben below), though food boiled in milk was thought to have medicinal qualities (Hippocrates, Affect. inter. , ; Pliny, Nat. hist. .–). sometimes in liquid form and sometimes reduced and congealed into cheese. It is unclear how much milk a city-dweller like Philo would have consumed on a regular basis (see Dalby , ; Gutsfeld , ). Various types of cheese, however, would have been readily available, principally from sheep’s and goats’ milk; cf. Xenophon, Mem. ... For the vocabulary of cheese production, cf. Aristotle, Hist. anim. .; Theocritus, Idyl. .–. the meat of lambs or kids or any other animal. m. Hul. :,  expands the list of animals covered by Exod :; :; Deut : to include wild beasts, fowl, and cattle (but not fish and locusts), though they are not to be boiled in milk from any source. Philo, meanwhile, appears to accept the possibility of cooking an animal in milk as long as the milk does not come from its mother. a terrible unseemliness of manners. In Plato’s Respublica, σκαιτης is used to describe the μισλογος, the man who refuses to participate in rational discourse: “he no longer makes use of persuasion through words, but achieves all his ends by force and savagery like a beast, living in ignorance and ineptitude (σκαιτητι)” (d–e; cf. Plutarch, Adol. poet. aud. f). In Philo’s usage the term has an even more negative connotation, referring to individuals who are utterly uncivilized and inhumane, e.g., Spec. .; .. Dio Chrysostom sees it as a manifestation of arrogance (Or. .). that passion that is . . . most closely related to the rational soul, mercy. The Stoics classified ;λεος as one of the passions (cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Rhet. ..; ..), specifically as a species of λ:πη (that is, the “grief ” one feels at undeserved suffering), along with envy, distress, anguish, etc. (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; cf. SVF ., – , ; Cicero, Tusc. .; Plutarch, Stoic. rep. b–c). The positive value Philo assigns the concept reflects a Jewish emphasis, e.g., Sir :; :; :; and especially T. Zeb. :: “show mercy to your neighbor and have compassion towards all, not only towards people, but also towards irrational animals” (cf. Porphyry, Abst. ..). As Konstan (, ) notes, Philo further elevates mercy’s status by assigning it “a place of privilege in relation to reason.” Elsewhere in the Exposition, the language

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of ;λεος is a regular part of Philo’s interpretation of the law, which extends mercy especially to the needy (e.g., Spec. .; .) and to those who have experienced misfortunes (e.g., Decal. ; Spec. .; .).

Parallel Exegesis This is the only place in Philo’s surviving oeuvre where the provisions in Lev : or Exod :; :; Deut : are discussed. Reflections relevant to his statement about the status of the fetus in Hum.  are offered in Spec. .–, –, in conjunction with his exposition of Exod :– (see the Parallel exegesis for chapter ). He concurs with the opinion current among certain (presumably Stoic) philosophers that the fetus is part of its mother until birth, and only at that time becomes a separate and independent being (see on § ). Nevertheless, out of respect for the creative work of nature, Moses made a distinction between an unformed fetus and a formed one, the latter being an νρωπος in waiting, like a statue in a studio waiting for its public unveiling (cf. Heinemann , –). Anyone who causes it to die must die himself, the same penalty as for a homicide (Spec. .).

Nachleben Clement follows Hum. – in Strom. ..–.., though he trims and simplifies his source material considerably. He opens by repeating Philo’s paraphrase of Lev : in § . It was from this precedent, Clement says, that the Romans derived the law that a pregnant woman condemned to death was not to be executed until after she delivered, lending some specificity to Philo’s argument regarding Moses’ influence in §  (cf. Ulpian, Dig. ..). Then, jumping back to § , Clement maintains that the law explicitly ( ντικρυς) prohibits the slaughter of all pregnant animals as well, and by implication seeks to curb the injustices that human beings commit against one another (..). He buttresses the latter assertion by repeating the principle Philo had adduced in § , to the effect that extending fairness to animals is a form of practice in humanity towards other people (..). Next comes the ban in Exod :; :; Deut :, which Clement assumes to be directed not at those who actually cook newborns in milk, but “those who kick the bellies of certain animals before parturition, in order to feast on flesh

on humanity : animals and their young, §§ –

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mixed with milk” (..; cf. Plutarch, Esu carn. a). The reason why this is forbidden is taken from Hum. : what was intended to nourish the animal should not become an instrument in its destruction (..). It is significant that Clement omits Philo’s statements regarding the status of the fetus in relation to a newborn in Hum. . Elsewhere he holds that an embryo acquires a soul at the moment of conception (Ecl. .–). The injunction not to boil a lamb in its mother’s milk was much discussed among patristic authors. Theodoret interprets it literally, taking it as an instance of philanthr¯opia (In Exod. ). Ambrose, by contrast, sees the lamb as a reference to Christ, with the milk representing the human nature that he derived from his mother (Instit. ; Exp. ps. ..). Augustine, unable to envision a scenario in which one would cook an animal in milk (cf. § ), similarly sees the lamb of the text as the lamb of God, and the command as a prophecy that the infant Christ would not be “cooked” by the men sent by Herod to kill him (Quaest. Hept. on Exod :; cf. Chromatius, Quaest. Exod. ). Further, Moorhead ; Vasantharao . Runia (, ) notes that Iˇso#dad de Merv (c.  ce) cites Philo when discussing this law in his Commentary on Exodus. Further reading: Calabi ; Gilhus ; Nikiprowetzky , –.

ON HUMANITY CHAPTER 19 DRAUGHT ANIMALS (§§ 145–147)

Analysis/General Comments This short chapter brings the section on kindness towards animals to a close with an explanation of two Deuteronomic injunctions, both of which have something to do with the use of oxen, : and :. Nelson (, ) has suggested that these laws originally belonged to a farmer’s code of conduct that mirrored the agricultural cycle: :– (sowing, plowing); :– (reaping); : (threshing); cf. Nielsen , –. Philo’s presentation reverses the injunctions’ canonical and logical order (putting threshing before plowing), presumably so that the analogy he adduces from : to the realm of human affairs can function as the section’s concluding statement (§ ). () Thus he begins with the law in Deut : which forbids muzzling an ox while it is threshing (§ ). The provision’s underlying principle, evident elsewhere in Deuteronomy (e.g., :–), is that those whose work contributes to the success of a project deserve some share of its profits. Josephus makes the point explicit: “Do not muzzle the mouths of oxen when they thresh the ears of corn on the threshing floor, for it is not right to bar from the fruit those who joined in the labor and exerted themselves for its production” (Ant. .). He includes this law among other provisions regulating the distribution of agricultural produce (.–), which he says ought to be shared with others, even with non-Jews (.). For his part, Philo justifies the command by pointing out how the ox had contributed to the agricultural process not only at the final stages but also from the very beginning. In fact, Hum.  has more to say about the effects of the animal’s plowing than its threshing, perhaps in order to strengthen the continuity with what follows. () A lengthier treatment is accorded Deuteronomy :, which forbids the yoking together of an ox and an ass for plowing. This shows, Philo says, the inappropriateness of joining together animals that are disparate, not only in terms of ritual status but also in terms of strength,



commentary

and so safeguards the weaker from being harmed by the stronger (§§ – a). By analogy, then, the law teaches Jews to do no harm to the people of other nations and races when it is in their power to do so (§ b). Insofar as this sort of a fortiori argumentation has characterized the entire discussion of animals (see the Analysis/General comments for chapter ), it creates an apt conclusion for the section. It was widely recognized that oxen made the most effective draught animals, though mules could be employed as well (Isager , , , , ; Burford , ). The former were useful not only for the two activities Philo mentions, but also for irrigation and heavy transport. Nevertheless, in Roman Egypt they “seem to have been relatively scarce and costly to keep” (Rowlandson , ). In the same vein, most farmers would not have owned their own threshing equipment. Instead they would have taken their harvest to the village threshing floor, where rents and taxes in kind were collected (Rowlandson , , –, –). In such a scenario, compliance with the provision of Deut : was probably not in the farmer’s best interest, since the animal eating his grain would have belonged to someone else.

Detailed Comments () § . a fully harmonious choir. More often Philo thinks not of a choir of laws, but of a choir of virtues, e.g., Abr. ; Spec. .; .; .; Praem. ; cf. Plutarch, Fort. rom. e. forbids muzzling an ox while it is threshing. Philo’s formulation of the command departs from LXX Deut : (ο φιμ8σεις βο(ν λοντα) only slightly: βο(ν λοντα μ+ φιμο(ν (S reads κημο(ν, under the influence of  Cor :; see Royse , ). Seeing how a farmer relies on his ox for a good harvest (Prov :), it is incumbent upon him to ensure that it is well provided for: “A righteous man knows the needs of his beast” (Prov :; cf. Philo, Hypoth. .; Hesiod, Op. –; Aristotle, Hist. anim. .; Ps.-Phoc. ; Josephus, C. Ap. .). The Mishnah extends the biblical rule to all types of cattle (m. B. Qam. :), further stipulating that if the grain has the status of a heave offering, the owner is to hang a feed bag around the animal’s neck with unconsecrated produce of the same kind as it is threshing (m. Ter. :). Although they do not address the issue directly, the authors of the ancient farming manuals probably would not have agreed with the idea behind this rule, since for them it is important that the quality and quantity of a working ox’s food be carefully

on humanity : draught animals, §§ –

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regulated (e.g., Columella, Rust. ..–). Comparison with  Cor :–;  Tim :; and b. B. Mes. b (cf. m. B. Mes. :) indicates how readily the provision would have lent itself to application in the human realm (and note how in Ant. .– Josephus juxtaposes the command with laws about sharing agricultural produce with people). Given that a major aim of the section is to draw out such moral implications, it is somewhat surprising that Philo does not avail himself of the opportunity to do so here, especially since he has already likened agricultural laborers (who were sometime paid in kind) to beasts of burden (§ ). the deep-soiled plain. For the expression, cf. Spec. .; Mos. .; Praem. . The best land for growing grains, of course, has deep soil, e.g., Theophrastus, Caus. plant. ... prepares the fields for heaven and the farmer. Earlier Philo had identified nature as the most important element in agricultural production (§ ); here the emphasis is on the cooperation of various agents: divine, human, and bovine (cf. Opif. ; Decal. ). A similar description of the oxen’s two-fold contribution is given in Spec. .: because the services they render are so vital to the whole process they are just as deserving of sabbath rest as the slaves who labor beside them (cf. .). On the use of oxen in plowing, cf. Varro, Rust. .; Columella, Rust. ..–. so that the deep hollows might receive . . . the rains, storing up and dispensing rich food . . . to the crop. For this process, cf. Theophrastus, Caus. plant. ..–; ... For the imagery, cf. Plato, Crit. d: “the deep soil absorbed the rain and stored it away as it created a reservoir with a covering of clay soil above it; and, as it distributed the water it had absorbed from the high places into its hollows, it produced an abundant flow of water to feed springs and rivers throughout every region of the country.” to cleansing of the sheaves. The process of threshing tended to be “a tedious operation, involving not merely the detachment of the straw from the heads, but the removal of the beard, and finally of the chaff ” (White , ). The ox would have been hitched to a pole and made to walk around the threshing floor, trampling the stalks either with its hooves or by pulling a threshing sledge. For more on the process, see Homer, Il. .–; .–; Hesiod, Op. –; Varro, Rust. .; Columella, Rust. ..–; Pliny, Nat. hist. .–; White , –, –; Isager , , ; Whittaker , –. () § . he forbids them to yoke an ox and an ass together. Lev : is the law on forbidden mixtures: “You shall not mate your cattle with

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commentary

a different species; and you shall not sow your vineyard with diverse seed; and you shall not put on yourself an adulterated garment woven out of two (kinds of thread).” This is explicated further in Deut :–: “You shall not sow your vineyard in hybrid fashion, lest the produce and the seed be rendered holy, the seed which you sowed with the produce of your vineyard. You shall not plow with an ox and an ass together. You shall not wear an adulterated garment of wool and flax together.” The most striking change in the latter is that the prohibition against mating different animal species has become one against plowing with them, perhaps reflecting circumstances in which the breeding of mules had become acceptable (Milgrom , –; cf. Philo, Spec. .– ). For both Josephus and m. B. Qam. : the rule applies to any two animals of different species, the former reasoning that “nature does not rejoice in the association of dissimilar things (τν νομοων)” (Ant. .). one is clean while the ass is among the unclean. The two animals are dissimilar (νοκειος) insofar as the ox belongs to one of the species of sacrificeable animals (e.g., Lev :), while the ass, like other equids (e.g., the camel), is unclean (Exod :; Lev :–, –; Deut :–). Given how obviously foolish it would be to yoke the two together (Wevers , ), it is likely that the law’s apparent concern for the welfare of the latter in fact “overlays an older issue of ritual purity” (Nelson , ). they are unequal in strength. Cf. Columella, Rust. ..: “You must be on your guard when pairing oxen together not to yoke one which is inferior in height or strength with one which is more powerful; for either of these circumstances quickly proves fatal to the weaker of the two.” Presumably the pairing of animals as physically unequal as an ox and an ass would have been unthinkable. the most perfect sacrifices. For this expression, cf. Decal. ; Josephus, Ant. . (whole-burnt offerings); Plutarch, Superst. c; Iamblichus, Myst. .. § . those whose souls have ears. The hearing of the soul is superior to that of the ears since it is receptive to the divine voice (Decal. ; cf. Spec. .; .). What the soul hears is not the language of the tongue but the language of the mind: Plutarch, Gen. Socr. e–f. commit no wrong against people of other nations. Philo’s unflattering correlation of non-Jews with the weaker, unclean ass of Deut : makes it unlikely that he is thinking of proselytes (pace Colson PLCL .), especially after what he has said about them in §§ –. It may be

on humanity : draught animals, §§ –

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instructive to compare the interpretation offered here with  Cor :– :, where Paul urges his readers to separate themselves from what is “unclean” and not be “yoked” with unbelievers (cf. Phil :). Perhaps this refers specifically to inter-marriage (cf. Sir :; T. Reub. :), though the intended scope of activities is probably much broader (Furnish , ). Philo appears to have unbelievers en bloc in mind as well, though he does not, like Paul, use the imagery of the yoke to refer to positive forms of social interaction with them; nor is he using the imagery to refer to interactions with proselytes understood to be “yoked” with Jews in their obedience to the Torah (cf. Jer :; Acts :; Gal :;  Bar. :; m. Abot :). Rather, in his analogy it is the discrepancy between the two subjects not in ritual status but in power that comes to the fore; thus for him the imagery of the yoke refers not to positive but to negative forms of social interaction, that is, situations in which Jews commit injustices against socially weaker non-Jews. While the meaning of the text is far from clear, a negative association for the imagery is also evident in Q  ii –: “Do not change your lack which [ . . . ] lest it be a hybrid like the mule, or like a garm[ent of two materials, or] (with) wool and with linen, or (lest) your work (be) like he who tills with an ox and an ass together.”

Parallel Exegesis Philo discusses the laws of forbidden mixtures elsewhere in Spec. .– . The command not to breed cattle of different species is taken as a warning against adultery (.–; cf. .–; Josephus, Ant. .– ). The command not to plow with an ox and an ass, meanwhile, illustrates a principle of justice, teaching judges not to discriminate against the “meanly born” (δυσγενεAς) when rendering decisions (.–). Similarly, the provision regarding mixed garments is meant to prevent a superior force from causing unnecessary damage (.). Finally, the directive not to sow a vineyard with diverse kinds of seed has three reasons behind it, all of a practical nature: it prevents the agricultural cycles from being confused (.–), it prevents the different species from harming each other in their competition for nourishment (.), and it prevents the soil from being overburdened (.–).

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commentary Nachleben

Clement utilizes Hum. – in Strom. ..–, shortening his account mainly by omitting Philo’s description of the ox’s two-fold contribution to farming in § b. The quotation of Deut : prompts him to cite  Tim : (though note that he uses the version of the Lord’s command from Matt : not Luke :): “And the same law commands us not to muzzle an ox while it is threshing; for the laborer is worthy of his food” (..). He proceeds immediately to Deut :, following Philo’s explanation of the text in Hum.  and b rather closely. The law may have in view the dissimilarity of the animals mentioned, he says, but the main point is that it is unjust to wrong a person of a different race and “bring him under the yoke” (..). He concludes by appending his own “allegorical” interpretation of the text based on the ritual distinction drawn by Philo in Hum. b: “the cultivation of the word is not to be assigned on equal terms to the clean and the unclean, the believer and the unbeliever, as the ox is accounted a clean animal and the ass unclean” (..). When Deut : is cited elsewhere in patristic literature, it is usually in conjunction with Luke : (e.g., Tertullian, Adv. Marc. ..; ..) or as part of  Cor :– (e.g., Origen, Princ. ..; ..; C. Cels. .; Didymus Caecus, Comm. Zech. .; Tertullian, Marc. ..). As in  Tim :–, the text could be readily construed as an argument for the material support of church officers, though it could be seen as placing certain limitations on such support as well. In Did. apost. ., for example, bishops are instructed to draw on ecclesial revenues but not exhaust them, “as when the unmuzzled ox works the threshing floor eats but does not consume the whole” (cf. Const. apost. .). References to Deut :, by contrast, are scarce. Gregory of Nyssa takes the “riddle” of the law on forbidden mixtures to mean that virtue and vice must not be allowed to grow together in the same soul, so that it is left divided in its commitments (Inst. christ. c). For Paterius, the verse conveys a lesson not to join fools together with the wise when teaching, otherwise the former will prevent the latter from learning (Exp. Vet. Nov. Test. ). Further reading: See the bibliographies for chapters  and .

ON HUMANITY CHAPTERS 20–21 CULTIVATED PLANTS (§§ 148–160)

Analysis/General Comments The third and final section of the body of De humanitate presents Mosaic laws that Philo believes extend fairness (1πιεκεια) to plants (see §§ , ). As with the discussion of animals, he refrains from explicitly applying the terminology of philanthr¯opia to describe the relationships and virtues thus fostered, though he clearly understands such relationships as having implications for how human beings learn to interact with one another (see the Analysis/General comments for chapter ). In §§ – , two illustrations are provided, both concentrating on the responsibilities Moses’ followers have towards cultivated (as opposed to wild) trees. The first illustration (§§ –) is negative in its orientation (they must not be destroyed), while the second (§§ –) is more positive (steps must be taken to ensure that they grow to maturity and bear fruit). The two units end on a similar note, indicating what Philo sees as the appropriate and intended outcome of Moses’ directives regarding plants, namely, that they offer their produce as a yearly tribute to the people (§ ), who in turn give the produce of the fourth year as an offering to God (§ ). The section as a whole is organized as follows. () A brief transitional statement introduces the discussion: Moses extended fair treatment not only to living things lacking logos, but even to those lacking psych¯e (§ ). Thus to the structural dichotomies stated at the beginning of § , we may add the categories of ensouled vs. soulless. (a) He opens the discussion of the first illustration by extrapolating from Deut : a general prohibition against the destruction of all foodproducing plants, a rule that applies at all times and at all places. Such a ban respects the fact that the human race is dependent on the yield of these plants for its survival and thriving (§ ). (b) Next Philo summarizes the law in Deut : itself, which is now seen as an extreme test of the generalizing interpretation he has just given it. Even trees on enemy territory are to be spared from ravaging (§ a). Three rationales are offered for the biblical injunction.

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commentary

First is an argument from justice: it is unreasonable to inflict punishment on living things that have committed no crime (§ b). Second, from a pragmatic perspective the practice of total war is shortsighted, since the enemies that one attacks today may become friends and allies tomorrow (cf. § ). Prudence would suggest, then, that one avoid creating unnecessary animosity. The argumentation here affords the Alexandrian an opportunity to articulate some ruminations of a more gnomic nature on the vicissitudes of human existence (§§ –). The third reason is predicated upon the same sort of teleological anthropocentrism that was observed in the section on animals (see the Analysis/General comments for chapter ). To destroy fruit-bearing plants frustrates the purpose that nature has established for them, namely, to serve humankind, much like the subjects of a realm serve their king (§ , cf. § ). (a) Philo opens his discussion of the second illustration with what he sees as the unexpressed intention behind the commands in Lev :, namely, that all newly planted trees are to be nurtured during their first three years so as to ensure that they reach maturity and bear fruit (§ ). In summarizing the law, he replaces its injunction to purge the young plant of its “impurity” with instructions about pruning the tree and working the earth around it. Israelites are forbidden to partake of its fruit during this period not because such food is ritually unclean, but because allowing it to grow might damage the tree (§ ). In this light, the law is now seen as supplying the reason for the agricultural practice of squeezing off any budding fruit as soon as its appears so that it will not sap the young tree of its energy (§ ). (b) Thus properly cultivated, in its fourth year the plant reaches a level of strength and “perfection” that enables it to bear mature fruit (§ ). In accord with the command of Lev :, Moses’ followers are to dedicate this initial harvest in its entirety as a first fruit offering to God (§ ), partly in the hope of being granted abundant yields in the years to come (cf. Lev :). () A final paragraph (§ ) concludes both the section on plants and the entire survey of Mosaic laws promoting philanthr¯opia, drawing on themes with which the survey had begun (cf. §§ –). Those who obey the law are taught to extend kindness even to animals and plants, which by extension trains them to interact with their fellow human beings more humanely (cf. § ). In times of war it would have been routine to lay waste the fields and forests of one’s enemies whenever possible so as to weaken and demoralize the indigenous population (besides Spec. .; .; cf. Herodotus,

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Hist. .; Thucydides, Hist. ..; Xenophon, Hell. ..–; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..–; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; ..; Hasel , –, –). Logs hewn from local forests could be used for the construction of siege works (e.g., Thucydides, Hist. ..–; Polybius, Hist. ..; Josephus, Bell. .–, –) or to construct and fortify the invading army’s camp (e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; ..; Polyaenus, Strat. ..). During the siege of Jerusalem, Titus’ troops were forced to range as far as ten miles to find timber for their siege works, so that “sites formerly beautified with trees and parks were reduced to an utter desert” (Josephus, Bell. .–; .). Outside of Judaism, efforts to curtail such practices surface only infrequently. Plato, for example, makes the case that his readers ought to do everything in their power to preserve good relations with fellow Greeks. This means that in times of war they ought not ravage the land of other Greeks or burn their homes (as they would with foreign adversaries), but should be content with destroying only that year’s harvest. The attitude guiding this policy “should be that of people who will one day be reconciled (διαλλαγησομ!νων; cf. Hum. ) and will not always be at war” (Resp. a, d, a). Diodorus Siculus reports that in India there is never any shortage of food, even in wartime: “For although both parties to the conflict kill one another in their hostilities, yet they leave uninjured those who are engaged in tilling the soil, considering that they are the common benefactors of all, nor do they burn the lands of their opponents or cut down their trees” (Bibl. hist. ..). As with so many other elements of this ethnography, Diodorus’ idealized description of exotic India serves to underscore just how normative such destruction would have been; cf. Arora , –. For the rabbinic concept of bal tashchit (the ban against wanton destruction), see Schwartz .

Detailed Comments () § . Drawing upon his lavish supply of fairness. This paragraph basically repeats § , reminding the readers of the introductory outline provided for the main body of De humanitate there. As observed earlier (see on § ), Philo speaks of human responsibilities towards plants and animals as a matter of fairness (1πιεκεια; cf. §§ , , ) not φιλανρωπα, which is reserved for relations between νρωποι. The two spheres of moral action are related insofar as the fair treatment of

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non-human subjects fosters humane relations among people; besides the discussion that follows, see §§ , . those that have been endowed with a soul. Philo, following the Stoics, held that while plants share with other living things the principles of cohesion (Nξις) and growth (φ:σις), they lack the faculty of senseperception and are therefore inanimate ( ψυχα). In this they differ from people and animals, both of which are ensouled (;μψυχα); see Anim.  (with Terian , –), , ; Opif. , –, ; Leg. .; .; Agr. ; Her. ; Deus –; cf. SVF ., , ; Früchtel , –. Also see on § . This deviates from the position articulated by Plato, who described plants as animate and, as such, capable of sensing both pleasure and pain (Tim. b–c; cf. Porphyry, Abst. ..; ..; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .). Aristotle, meanwhile, held that while plants are in fact possessed of a soul, this soul lacks the faculty of reasoning (τ νοητικν) as well as the faculty of sense-perception (τ α>σητικν), possessing only the faculty of nourishment (τ ρεπτικν), which is what enables them to grow and reproduce (De an. .–; cf. Plotinus, Enn. ..; .., ; ..; ..; and for the tripartition, cf. Opif. ; Spec. .; QG .). By contrast, Philo, again reflecting Stoic theory, attributes the perpetuity of plant species not to any inherent faculty of the vegetative soul but to the seminal substances with which its seeds are equipped; see Opif. –, with Runia , –. (a) § . not to ravage trees of the cultivated variety or to cut down fruit-bearing fields out of malice . . . or . . . to destroy any crop. Philo universalizes the ban of Deut : to include the destruction of all food-producing plants under any circumstances. Perhaps the sort of situation he has in mind is indicated in Spec. ., where we learn that the best states appoint land-stewards (γρονμοι) to prevent farmers from harming their neighbors (and presumably also their neighbors’ property) out of malice (1π λ:μ@η); cf. Plato, Leg. b–e; b. B. Bat. a. The generalizing version of the biblical injunction proffered by Ps.Phoc. / appears to be similarly local in its scope of action: “Keep away from a neighbor’s field, and so do not trespass. Harm not any fruit growing in a field” (cf. Wilson , ). By the same token, the verbs that Philo has chosen here (δενδροτομ!ω and κερω; the LXX has 1ξολερε:ω and 1κκπτω) are ordinarily used to describe the ravaging of a countryside during wartime, which is clearly the concern in the discussion that follows; cf. Contempl. ; Legat. ; Herodotus, Hist. .; .; Thucydides, Hist. ., .

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a surplus of bountiful foods. The wealth that nature offers humankind includes air, water, and “the fruits of all sorts of crops and different kinds of trees . . . For no one is at a loss for these, but everyone everywhere enjoys them in great abundance” (Fort. ). A provision like Deut : ensures that nature’s purpose is not thwarted by human malevolence or thoughtlessness; cf. Hum. , , , , . According to b. B. Qam. b–a, a palm tree able to produce even one kab of fruit may not be cut down. For τροφν φνων, cf. Ios. , ; Aristotle, Hist. anim. .; .; Theophrastus, Caus. plant. ..; ..; ... live not only from the essentials but from those things conducive to a pleasurable life. The majority of mss read ζ@$ δ!, which is followed here, over against περιουσι,ζ@η δ! in CG2 (perhaps responding to περιουσ7α μ!ν in the preceding clause) and printed in PLCL .. As Colson observes in a note on that page, the reading offered by PCW . (περιουσ7α ζ@$ δ!) is dubious owing to the unusual position of δ!, while περουσι,ζω is problematic since that verb normally takes the dative. Given his general attitude towards material luxuries, it is not surprising that elsewhere in the Exposition Philo expresses reservations about “living delicately” (Yβροδαιτος), e.g., Mos. ., ; ., ; Spec. .–, . At other points, however, he acknowledges that what has been provided for humankind by nature is more than just the bare necessities (cf. Porphyry, Abst. ..–; ..), but also includes things that can make life enjoyable, e.g., Opif. ; Mos. .; Spec. ., ; Praem. , . (b) § . he does not allow them to destroy the land even of their enemies, and orders them to refrain from cutting down trees. Deut :– is the final element of an extended section dealing with sacral war (:–; cf. Niditch , –; also Analysis/General comments for chapter ). The first provision of this unit explains that fruit-bearing trees are not to be confused with the enemies whom the Israelites are being ordered to destroy (see vv. , –): “Should you besiege a city many days, making war against it to capture it, you shall not destroy its trees by laying an iron (axe) upon them, but you shall eat of it and not cut it down.” This rule appears to be born out of two considerations, the first being of a practical nature: a besieging army may not have brought all the provisions it needs for a long siege (n.b.: “many days”) and so may require the fruit of such trees as a food source (cf. v. ). Second, there is an “anthropomorphizing” argument, one that recognizes the impropriety of cutting the tree’s life, and therefore its productivity, short (cf. v. ; Nelson , ). Philo mentions the former consideration in the course of his

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discussion of the provision in Spec. . (see Parallel exegesis). In this section the focus is on the latter. The Alexandrian expands the scope of the injunction somewhat by applying it to the treatment of enemy territory in general, and not just to a situation in which an enemy city is being besieged; cf. Josephus, C. Ap. .–: “he held that decisions made even towards enemies should be fair (1πιεικεAς; cf. Hum. ); for he does not allow us to set their country on fire or to cut down cultivated trees.” The rule in Deut : goes on to indicate that the ban on destruction applies only to fruit-bearing trees. Other kinds of trees are to be cut down for siege works though not, by implication, for firewood or as an act of total warfare, as we see, for example, in  Kgs :,  (cf. Tigay , –; Hasel ). improper to bring wrath against human beings down on things which are responsible for no wrongdoing. Warfare motivated by Hργ= is irrational and wanton (see on Fort. –), all the more so if it is directed at amoral things such as plants. Like animals, they lack the faculty of reasoning (see Analysis/General comments) and therefore partake of neither virtue nor vice (Opif. ; cf. Epictetus, Diatr. ..–). Compare Josephus, Ant. ., a comment no doubt inspired by the anthropomorphization of Deut :b: “if they had a voice at their disposal they would plead their case with you: although they are not responsible (α?τια) for the war, they were badly and unjustly treated.” With this we can contrast the opinion proffered by Porphyry in Abst. ..: since plants lack the faculty of sense-perception, they can suffer neither harm nor injustice (cf. ..). § . with the sharp-sightedness of reason. As  Macc : puts it, when “the fruit trees of the enemy are not cut down” this becomes a means by which “reason through the law can prevail over enmity.” Philo similarly presupposes that the law about trees has been framed so as to foster a more rational attitude towards the conduct of warfare. For reason’s power over the emotions, cf. Hum. ; and for its Hξυωπα, Fort. –. Porphyry argues that reason directs one to avoid inflicting injury on any living thing: “the person who is led by reason maintains harmlessness towards fellow-citizens too, and further still towards strangers and all human beings . . . someone who does not restrict harmlessness to human beings, but extends it also to the other animals, is more like the god; and if extension to plants is possible, he preserves the image even more” (Abst. ..). no one remains in the same state, but all of us experience changes and reversals. A piece of proverbial wisdom, as found, for example, in Isocrates, Demon. : “Consider that nothing in human life is stable.” Cf.

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Sir :–; Ps.-Phoc.  (with Wilson , –); Syr. Men. – ; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Ps.-Plutarch, Cons. Apoll. e–f. In Ios. –, Philo makes a similar observation regarding the vicissitudes of international power: “For nothing at all anywhere has remained in the same condition; everywhere everything has been subject to changes and reversals. Egypt once had hegemony over many nations but now is in slavery. The Macedonians in their day of success flourished so greatly that they held dominion over the whole inhabited world, but now they pay to the tax-collectors annual tributes imposed by their masters. Where is the house of the Ptolemies, and the fame of the Diadochoi, whose light once shone to the furthest boundaries of land and sea?” our current antagonists will send envoys making conciliatory overtures and quickly come to terms of peace. A similar extrabiblical scenario is envisioned in conjunction with the interpretation of Deut :–  in Hum. ; the occupants of the besieged city must be granted the opportunity to send envoys to discuss terms of peace, with the goal of achieving φιλα between the parties (see below). § . the uncertainty of the future. A gnomic commonplace; cf. Xenophon, Anab. .. ( δηλον παντ νρ8π<ω 3π@η τ μ!λλον Nξει); Philo, Cher. ; Hum. ; Legat. ; Sir :–; :; Ps.-Phoc. – ; Theognis, El. –; Demosthenes, Or. .; Seneca, Marc. .; Plutarch, Camil. .. Since the future is δηλον, those who have enjoyed good fortune should always give consideration to the unfortunate (Demosthenes, Or. .). Certainty regarding future events belongs to God alone (Philo, Deus ). that saying was altogether well put by the ancients. Wariness (πιστα), says Aristotle, is characteristic especially of the aged, with whom neither love nor hate is strong, “but according to the precept of Bias, they love as if they would one day hate, and hate as if they would one day love” (Rhet. ..). Elsewhere he uses the saying to illustrate how a proverb can be turned into a maxim: “One’s character would appear better if one were to declare that it is not right, as they say, to love as if one were bound to hate, but rather to hate as if one were bound to love” (..; on the distinction between proverbs and maxims, see Wilson , –). In Sophocles, Aj. –, the saying is rendered without attribution: “our enemy must be hated as one who will someday become a friend, and in helping a friend I shall aim to assist him as one assists a man who will not remain a friend forever, since for most mortals the harbor of friendship cannot be trusted.” The version attributed to Bias

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(one of the Seven Sages) by Diogenes Laertius includes only the saying’s first half: “He advised people to measure life as if they had both a short and a long time to live; to love their friends as if they would some day hate them, the majority of people being bad” (Vit. phil. .). As these last two examples indicate, the saying was usually taken as advising caution when forming friendships; cf. also Demosthenes, Or. .. To embrace such an attitude, however, exposed one to accusations of fickleness and opportunism. Crassus, for example, is described as the sort of man who frequently changed his political views, “and was neither a steadfast friend nor an implacable enemy, but readily abandoned both his favors and his resentments at the dictates of his interests” (Plutarch, Crass. .). According to Cicero, Scipio condemned the saying attributed (he thinks wrongly) to Bias as an attack on genuine friendship, since the one who followed its advice would “regard everything as an instrument to serve his own selfish ends” (Amic. .–). Cf. Sterling , – . we must engage an enemy as though a friendship lied in the future. Once reconciled, former political enemies would draw up terms of “peace and friendship” (e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; . .); cf. Begg ; Eckstein . An act of philanthr¯opia might expedite the process (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..). The goal of transforming enemies into friends is mentioned also in Hum. , –. repent of his extreme recklessness. For this use of εχ!ρεια, see Shorey , –; cf. Polybius, Hist. .e.. § . which in peace should plan for times of war. Philo offers one rationale for such preparedness in Ios. : “just as in peace we must give forethought to preparations in war, so, too, in times of plenty we must make preparations against dearth. Wars and famines and times of adversity in general are uncertain (δ=λους; cf. Hum. ), and we must stand ready to meet them, and not wait until they have come to look for the remedy, when nothing is available.” Cf. Thucydides, Hist. ... nor should they trust in their allies too readily . . . Another piece of proverbial wisdom. This time cf. Sir :: “If you would gain a friend, put him to the test, and do not put your trust in him quickly.” Cf. Sir :; Hesiod, Op. ; Gnom. Democr. ; P. Ins. .; .; Ps.-Phoc.  (with Wilson , ). For a narrative illustration of this principle from the realm of military affairs, see Josephus, Bell. .–. . . . or distrust their enemies completely, as though they were incapable of being brought into a peaceful alliance. Diodorus Siculus re-

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counts how Antigonus besieged Eumenes and a small group of his friends in the fortress of Nora. Although originally bent on destroying his enemy, after a year the former “changed his plan and invited Eumenes to participate in his undertakings” (Bibl. hist. ..–). Compare the sage advice offered the king in Let. Arist. : “we must show abundant munificence (φιλοτιμαν) to our opponents so that in this manner we may convert them to what is proper and fitting for them.” It would not have been uncommon for parties to change sides during the course of a conflict, e.g., Isocrates, Plat. ; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; ..; ..; Plutarch, Brut. .; Philo, Flacc. ; Josephus, Bell. .. It was expected that enemies who had renounced their hostilities in order to seek reconciliation would be treated with philanthr¯opia (Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..–; cf. Demosthenes, Or. .–). § . in hope of reconciliation. Plato encourages his readers to observe a policy of restrained ravaging during times of war out of the hope that one day they will be reconciled with their (fellow Greek) adversaries (Resp. a, d, a, quoted in the Analysis/General comments). Similar is Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; also cf. Herodotus, Hist. .; .; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ... Reconciliation with one’s enemy is identified as a goal of human action also in Hum. . Why then is it necessary to wage war against things that are not warlike . . . ? Deut :b also poses a rhetorical question: “Is the tree in the field a person that it should enter the palisade from you (i.e., because of you)?” For problems in translating this verse, see Nelson , ; Wevers , –. things which nature itself has brought to perfection. That fruit-bearing plants be allowed to reach their proper maturation is a concern that unites the two examples of humanity provided in Hum. –. Plotinus entertained the possibility that, as living things, even plants ought to be accorded some measure of eudaimonia, which in their case would mean allowing them to bear their fruit (Enn. ..). that they might pay their annual tributes to humankind as though to a king. Like the people who work it (see on § ), the land itself pays an “annual toll and bounded tribute,” which is “for the sustenance of the various kinds of animals without number” (Spec. .; cf. Opif. –; Decal. ). Here Philo concentrates on the tribute paid to humankind, personifying the plants as peaceful subjects. As he had explained in Opif. , humankind was given charge over the plants of the earth, to care for them like a governor, acting as an agent of the great King (cf. Agr. ). In Ant. ., Josephus similarly justifies the prohibition of Deut : by

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arguing that fruit-bearing tress were created for the service (Bφελεα) of people. The utility of plants to humankind is emphasized by other authors as well, such as Pliny; see Morton . (a) § . a good protector. Greek democratic leaders liked to style themselves as the προστ,της το( δ=μου (Plato, Resp. c–d, c–d). training. Plants, like people, require appropriate training if they are to succeed; cf. Mos. .; Spec. .–; Pfitzner , –. PCW ., based on ληπτικ=ν in S, prints λειπτικ=ν. The other mss have ληπτον γ$ν. Mangey ,  conjectures λητικ=ν. cultivated ones . . . lack the same vitality as wild ones. Some ancient scientists held that certain plant species are inherently wild because they resist cultivation, while others held that for every plant there exists both a cultivated form and a wild form, the former having benefited from the farmer’s attention (Theophrastus, Hist. plant. ..). the farmer’s skill. Like other elites of his time, Philo was fascinated with farming and frequently avails himself of agricultural imagery; cf. Fitzgerald . The basic procedures of horticulture are laid out by Theophrastus in Hist. plant. ..: “In tillage and tendance some measures are common to all trees, some peculiar to a kind. Common to all are spading, watering, and manuring, and further pruning and the removal of dead wood.” Cf. Caus. plant. ..; Philo, Det. –; Agr. –; Spec. .. § . he commands that the newly planted trees be tended for three consecutive years. Lev :– appears to be part of a cultic code concerning offerings of agricultural goods grown in the promised land. Milgrom (, ) translates the Hebrew of the first verse as follows: “When you enter the land and plant any kind of fruit tree, you shall treat its foreskin with its fruit as foreskin. Three years it shall be forbidden to you; it shall not be eaten.” The most likely meaning of the command in the first sentence is that the farmer is to pluck the closed buds of juvenile trees before any fruit emerges, since such fruit is unclean and therefore unfit for consumption (Milgrom , –). This would appear to be how the LXX translators took it: “you shall purify its impurity (περικααριεAτε τ+ν κααρσαν ατο(). Its fruit shall be impure to you for three years.” Ancient taboos attached to such produce reflect basic knowledge regarding horticultural development. Grapevines, for example, reach maturity only after at least three years, while with fig trees it can be five to seven years (Eilberg-Schwartz , –). Especially in dry areas like Egypt, it would have been customary to sow vines,

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olives, and orchard trees in nursery beds, where they would be better able to establish strong root systems. The young plants would receive such special nurturing for two to five years before being transplanted (White , ). Philo’s rendition of the text divests the injunction of its sacral considerations, elaborating instead on what he sees as the practical agricultural implications, inferring from the verse not only that the tree’s buds are to be plucked (§ ), but also that its superfluous growths are to be pruned and the soil around it trenched so as to prohibit the growth of competing vegetation (§ ). Like Josephus (Ant. .), he presents the rule as though it applies to all produce grown in any locale. Texts like QMMT B – (cf. Q  –) and t. Or. :, by contrast, restrict its application to farms in the land of Israel (cf. m. Qidd. :), while other authorities further restrict its application to vineyards (b. Ber. a; cf. Jub. :–; Kister , –). The halakhah in m. Or. : introduces the factor of the farmer’s intentionality into the equation: if a tree is planted for lumber or as part of a fence, and not to produce fruit, then it is not subject to the statute; cf. Neusner , –. by cutting off excess growths . . . Philo infers that the biblical law includes the practices of pruning and trimming, for which see Det. ; Agr. ; Somn. .; Theophrastus, Caus. plant. ..; ..–; ..; ..; ..; Varro, Rust. ..–; Columella, Rust. ..–; ..–; Arbor. .–; .–; .–; Pliny, Nat. hist. .–; White , –; Eilberg-Schwartz , –; Isager and Skydsgaard , –. . . . and also by making a circle and digging around them. Theophrastus advises his readers to carry out this procedure with care, lest the plant’s root system be damaged by the digging (Hist. plant. ..); cf. Caus. plant. ..; ..; Columella, Rust. ..–; ..–; Arbor. .– ; .–; Philo, Spec. .; Geoponica ..; ... which are in a way still earth-bound, by hindering them from shooting up. In lieu of χαμαζηλα in the mss, Mangey (, ) conjectures χαμαλο(σαι. For the problems attending the translation in PCH ., see PLCL .. § . squeeze off any fruit they produce right away. Failure to remove the immature fruit stunts the growth and productivity of the juvenile tree (Milgrom , ); cf. Ios. ; Theophrastus, Caus. plant. ..; ..; .., ; Plutarch, Fac. c. exhausted by the labor of fruits brought forth before the proper time. From Josephus’ view, the fruit produced by trees during their first three years is unsuitable for use because it “has not been borne

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by them in season (κατC καιρν), since nature has used force in an untimely fashion” (Ant. .). As Theophrastus explains, trees and vines sometimes sprout so profusely that “they are unable to concoct their fruit properly, the drive turning in the direction of vegetative growth instead, pulled (as it were) in that direction by the great amount of such growth present.” Procedures like pruning and spading “reduce the amount of food and help to increase the power of the tree” (Caus. plant. ..– ; cf. ..–; ..–; ..; Hist. plant. ..). Without such care, it wastes itself on leaf production, bearing defective and/or little fruit; cf. Michelini . (b) § . held up as by unyielding foundations. The tree’s root system must be fully established before the tree can begin to bear mature fruit, e.g., Theophrastus, Hist. plant. ..–; Caus. plant. ..–; ... This would be particularly true for plants like the olive and the vine, which have naturally shallow root systems (Caus. plant. ..). For the architectural metaphor, cf. Opif. ; Sacr. ; Theophrastus, Caus. plant. ... it will be able to bear perfectly formed fruit in the fourth year. The fourth-year offering is acceptable not because the produce is ritually pure but because the tree has grown to the point that the fruit it produces is fully-formed. in accord with the perfect number four. The significance of the fourth year in Lev : is explained in Plant. – (cf. Parallel exegesis below). The number four, in fact, “involves deep principles both of physics and ethics” (§ ), as can be discerned by the fact that there are four cosmic elements, four seasons, four (equal) sides to a square, and so on; cf. Abr. ; Somn. .. For the privileged position assigned this number in the Philonic worldview, see especially Opif. –, with Runia , –. Among other things, it is representative of the principles of justice and fairness. Implicit in all such arithmological ruminations is the Pythagorean τετρακτ:ς, for which see Thom , –. § . dedicate the whole crop as first fruits. According to Lev :, in the fourth year the plant’s yield is to be set aside: “all its fruit shall be holy, a laudation (α>νετς) to the Lord.” Since this is the first crop that the tree has produced, Philo logically deduces that this refers to a type of παρχ=, for which see on § . As Wevers notes, the designation of the fruit as holy “means that it has been set apart for sacred use, presumably for the use of the priests” (, ); cf. Josephus, Ant. . (“before four years let him neither offer first fruits to God from it nor enjoy them himself.”); QMMT B – (“Concerning the planting of

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fruit trees which are planted in the land of Israel, their produce is to be considered as first fruits belonging to the priests.”); QT XXI –; Jub. :–, . Mention may also be made of the provision regarding the fourth-year offering in m. Maas. Shen. :: “When the produce became [too] abundant, they ordained that [the produce] should be redeemed [even if it grew] a short distance from the city wall [of Jerusalem, and the farmer would bring coins into the city instead of produce].” Like later rabbinic interpreters (cf. m. Sanh. :), Josephus merges this offering with the second tithe of Deut :– (for which see the Analysis/General comments for chapter ): “in the fourth year . . . let him carry it to the holy city, and let him consume it with the tithe of the other fruit, feasting on it with his friends and with orphans and widows” (Ant. .). Cf. Baumgarten ; Kister , –. both as a thank-offering . . . and in the hope of productivity in the future. Philo generally understands first fruits to be a kind of thankoffering, e.g., Spec. ., , –; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ... As he explains in Spec. ., the best kind of thankoffering takes into account “two kinds of time . . . the past, because our days have been spent in abundance . . . and the future, because we have set aside and prepared resources to meet it, and are full of bright hopes” (cf. Spec. .–). The χαριστ=ριος offered by Cyrus in Xenophon, Cyr. .. evidences a similar two-fold perspective. In Philo’s case, the element of hope is prompted by the promise of Lev :: “But in the fifth year you may eat the fruit, its product an increase to you.” () § . how much graciousness and kindness he displays. This is the only place in the treatise where ]λαος is used to describe Moses or his laws; cf. Fort. . Elsewhere χρηστς is paired with φιλ,νρωπος (§§ , ) or Zμερος/9μερτης (§§ , ). people . . . animals . . . trees . . . Philo concludes his survey of the laws with a retrospective statement that includes a reference to the same threefold division that had been announced in its introduction (§ ). foreigners or enemies. Referring to Hum. –. irrational animals, even if they happen to be unclean. Referring to Hum. –. one who has already learned fairness in dealing with living things that lack perception will commit no wrong against those endowed with a soul. A φαντασα is a perception or “presentation” imprinted on the soul through the senses and retained by the memory. Since plants do not have a soul (see on § ), they are incapable of receiving these,

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e.g., Opif. , ; Deus –; Plant. ; Her. ; Somn. .. This reflects the Stoic view, for which see SVF .; Epictetus, Diatr. ..–; Sorabji , – (similarly, Plutarch, Am. prol. d; Porphyry, Abst. ..). Plato, by contrast, held that plants are animate, and as such are capable of receiving pleasant as well as painful sensations (Tim. a– b), while Aristotle held that although plants are in fact possessed of a soul, this soul lacks the faculties of reasoning and of sense-perception (τ α>σητικν), possessing only the faculty of nourishment (De an. .–); cf. Sprague ; Murphy . For his part, Philo uses the observation that plants are inanimate as a way of carrying the a minori ad maius argument articulated in Hum.  a step further. If the followers of Moses are accustomed to treating even inferior beings like plants with mercy, they will be all the more reluctant to commit injustices against their fellow human beings. As Berthelot (, ) notes, Philo advances a similar argument earlier in the Exposition when discussing the sabbatical year legislation: “If the different parts of the earth which cannot share in any sensations of pleasure or pain yet have been granted rest, how much more must this be the case with people, who possess the faculty of sense-perception which is common also to the irrational animals, but also the special gift of reason” (Spec. .). In addition to the sources mentioned above (see Analysis/General comments for chapter ), cf. Porphyry, Abst. ..: “Someone who does not restrict harmlessness to human beings, but extends it also to the other animals, is more like the god; and if extension to plants is possible, he preserves the image even more.” And according to Iamblichus, the followers of Pythagoras were taught “not to harm or destroy a cultivated and fruitful plant, and in like manner, not to harm or destroy a living being harmless by nature to the human race” (Vit. Pythag. .; cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .).

Parallel Exegesis Near the end of his survey of Mosaic laws that exemplify the virtue of justice (Spec. .–), Philo discusses laws pertaining to warfare (.–). In .–, he provides a relatively full explanation of Deut :–, elaborating on elements of the text not mentioned in Hum. –. He begins with a paraphrase of Deut :a: justice is observed (cf. Josephus, Ant. .) when the fertile fields and fruitbearing trees of a hostile polis (cf. Hum. ) are not destroyed (.).

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A reformulation of the rhetorical question in :b follows: why should one commit hostilities against a living thing whose nature and fruits are Zμεροι, and that has demonstrated no ill will towards humankind (.; cf. Hum. )? He proceeds to point out that these trees are necessary because they supply the attackers with the provisions they need to sustain the siege and achieve victory (cf. Deut :a: “you shall eat of it”); it is not only people but also plants who must pay annual tributes to their lords (.; cf. Hum. ). The discussion concludes with a quick reference to Deut :: trees that do not bear fruit or have lost the power to produce fruit may be cut down to build siege works, ladders, and towers (.). A very different interpretation is developed in Agr. –, where the trees of Deut : are allegorized as intellectual activities dealing with logic (τ λογικν). The mind is to use these to build a barrier preserving those activities that delve into the nature of things (τ φυσικν) and into moral responsibilities (τ Wικν). For the philosophia tripertita, see on Fort. . In Plant. –, Philo offers an extended meditation on Lev :– , in which the cultivated tree is interpreted allegorically as a person’s moral purpose, which must be pruned of its vices (cf. Leg. .). Those who are still at a preliminary stage in their training must engage in the husbandry of the soul. First they must migrate to the promised land, that is, to the way of wisdom (§§ –). Next it is necessary to remove any uncleanness that might harm the trees that have been planted in the soul’s orchard (§§ –). The tree of friendship, for instance, must be pruned of the vices associated with courtesans and flatterers (§ – ), while the tree of piety must be pruned of superstition and fraud (§§ –). Jacob is then held up as an exemplar of the soul that can train itself (§§ –). In §§ –, Philo interprets the three years of Lev : to mean that the soul’s fruit must remain uncorrupted through past, present, and future. Next we are to learn from Lev : that only fruit (that is, virtue) that has achieved the level of perfection associated with the number four is worthy as an offering of thanks and praise to God (§§ –; cf. Somn. .–). Finally, the fruit of the fifth year in Lev : is taken as a reference to the sense, through which the fruits of instruction supply nourishment to the mind, and to Issachar, the fifth son, whose name means reward (§§ –).

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commentary Nachleben

The arguments of Hum. – form the basis for Clement’s discussion of Deut : in Strom. ... He follows the generalizing interpretation of the law that Philo had given in the first sentence of §  rather closely, except for changing the subject of the sentence from Moses to 2 χρηστς λγος (cf. Hum. , ). In lieu of the rationale Philo had provided for the law in the second half of the paragraph, Clement adds a spiritualizing interpretation that anticipates the allegory of ..– (see below): it is not right to destroy any kind of cultivated fruit, “neither fruit of the soil nor fruit of the soul.” He then quotes Philo’s restatement of the law itself from the beginning of Hum. , though without mentioning the amplification of the text that follows in §§ –. The basis for Clement’s reflections on Lev :– in Strom. ..– .. is Hum. –. He essentially skips the introductory comments of Hum. , noting instead that “even farmers derive advantage from the laws in such things” (..). He then proceeds to cite the first half of §  verbatim, afterwards jumping to the beginning of § , loosely following Philo’s summary explanation of Lev :, including the explanation that the fourth-year sacrifice of produce is to be understood as first fruits (..). Appended to this in ..– is Clement’s own, allegorizing interpretation of Lev :–. The three years of husbandry are taken as a reference to the three years of catechetical instruction required of initiates, while the fourth-year sacrifice is taken as a reference to the canon of four virtues which catechumens consecrate to God through their conduct. During their instructional period, they are to eradicate the growths and weeds of sin so that the “shoot of faith” might grow strong. Having done so, they can then aspire to ascend to “the fourth abode of the Lord,” for which see van den Hoek , –. On the whole, patristic authors accepted the Stoic view that human beings have no particular moral obligations to observe in their use of plants since the latter lack the faculty of sense-perception. “Christ,” writes Augustine, “judged that we have no community in justice (societas iurus) with beasts and trees, and sent the devils into a flock of swine, and withered a tree by his curse, when he had found no fruit in it” (Mor. eccl. ..; and on the inability of plants to feel: Civ. .; further, Sorabji , –). For similar arguments regarding the treatment of animals, see the Nachleben for chapter . Further reading: Hasel ; Isager and Skydsgaard, .

ON HUMANITY CHAPTERS 22–24 THE RULING CLASSES (§§ 161–174)

Analysis/General Comments This section constitutes the third and concluding part of De humanitate. Humanity is seen to characterize the founder of the Jewish politeia (§§ –), its laws (§§ –), and now, its ruling classes, those with a special responsibility to follow Moses’ example in leading the people and ensure that the constitution he established is upheld. Note in particular how the section opens with the language of 9γεμονα (§§ – ), recalling the main problem raised in §§ – (see §§ , , ). As discussed in the Introduction (part ), it is not surprising that issues relating to this problem would figure prominently in a presentation on philanthr¯opia, since it was a virtue applicable especially to those in positions of authority. At this juncture in the presentation, the Alexandrian’s objective is to show how the Mosaic law teaches “the great” to abstain from those vices most apt to cause them to use their power inhumanely, and instead to imitate God by employing their resources to promote the common good. In Philo’s mind, this is an important implication of the legislation that he has just finished surveying (see § ). It was conventional in ancient political thought to locate the origins of social conflict in a class struggle between the haves and the have-nots. Remedying such situations involved diagnosing the vices peculiar to each side. The rich, of course, corrupted by their wealth, tended towards decadence, avarice, and insolence, while the neediness of the have-nots left them envious of the rich and prone to subversive tendencies. A top priority for any lawmaker, then, was to develop forms of civic organization that alleviated such tensions. This was often accomplished through forms of moral education aimed at the rich, and especially intended to foster among them “a proper and salutary attitude towards property and, consequently, towards their poor fellow citizens” (Fuks , ; cf. Ober , –). In the ideal state proposed in Plato’s Leges, for example, the discrepancy between rich and poor is minimized through a system of fixed

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property allotments (c–a, etc.). In states that have already been established, however, where the discrepancy will always be great and such drastic measures are impractical, it appears that the survival of the community will depend on a different principle, namely, the willingness of the rich to share (κοινωνεAν) their wealth and property with havenots whose situation has become critical. This they will do voluntarily, out of a sense of fairness, or 1πιεκεια (d–e; cf. Fuks , – ). Such social sharing is often depicted by means of virtue discourse as well. According to Dio Chrysostom, for example, if the king is truly to become the savior and guardian of his people he must govern in such a way that “his prudence avails to help even the imprudent . . . his moderation serves to restrain even the immoderate . . . his justice gives of itself even to the unjust, and his courage is able, not only to save the less valiant but even to fire them with greater courage” (Or. .; cf. below on § ). Similarly, Plutarch held that by educating his own character to be moderate and well-ordered, a ruler trained the character of the citizen body to be likewise (Praec. ger. rei publ. a–b, f). Indeed, it is “the noblest end of any polity” for its king to inculcate “a blessed life of friendship and concord” in his subjects. He does this especially by displaying his own life as “a conspicuous and shining example of virtue” (Numa .). As an example of this sort of leadership, Xenophon holds up Agesilaus, who “prided himself less on reigning over others than on ruling himself, less on leading the people against their enemies than on guiding them all to virtue.” This occurred insofar as the people imitated the qualities that he exemplified (Ages. .). Philo’s exposition on humanity as exhibited by the ruling classes can be divided into three parts. () With the survey of laws completed, Philo informs us that the teachings they embody have the effect of curbing arrogance, pretentiousness, and insolence within the polity, vices that plague especially the ruling classes (§§ –). () The bulk of the section, §§ –, is devoted to reflections on Deut :–, which serves as both a rhetorical capstone and a hermeneutical key for the material in the subtreatise as a whole. From it the Alexandrian deduces a description of the sources, symptoms, and cure for these spiritual afflictions. A superabundance of worldly wealth causes its possessors to become “puffed up” (§ ). However, if they remember God, the divine light of virtue will dispel the vices that darken their souls (§ ). Such remembrance has a two-fold effect. First, they will give thanks to God (§ ). Second, they will imitate God’s munificence

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(§ ) and “make power,” that is, make others around them more virtuous (§ ) by dispensing benefits of common utility (§§ , ). In the course of the discussion Philo contrasts two options for the social use of power: some individuals enrich and aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors, while some impart what strengths they have to others so as to enhance the public good. () Finally, the characteristics and fate of the “pretentious man” are described with reference to Num :. His actions not only fail to foster the common good, they are offensive to God. Since his spiritual maladies are beyond cure, he will be handed over to God for punishment (§§ – ). In its underlying priorities, the section as a whole is reminiscent especially of Plato, Leg. a–d and e–a. The former passage contrasts the arrogant man, whose pride brings chaos and ruin to himself and his community, with those who honor the gods and emulate the divine to the extent that they embody the virtues (see on § ). The latter argues that the highest honor belongs not to those who simply embody wisdom, moderation, and the other virtues, but to those who are also able and willing to impart these virtues to others with a generous spirit. Elements of Philo’s argument are also reminiscent of the Stoic doctrine of ο>κεωσις, for which see on Hum. . In Fin. .–, for example, Cicero argues that everyone is imbued with a natural inclination to be a protector of the human race and to benefit as many people as possible, especially through the communication of wisdom.

Detailed Comments () § . Taming the minds of those living under his polity. Here Philo sums up one of the main points to be deduced from his survey of the laws. Moses’ intent in offering this instruction (Dφ=γησις; cf. § ) was to “tame” or “civilize” (1ξημερο(ν) the citizens of his politeia (cf. Prob. ). This is familiar from one of the principal goals of philosophical instruction, namely, “to civilize and amend (μεαρμζειν; cf. Hum. ) the intractable and untutored elements of the human character” (Plutarch, Alex. fort. a; cf. De esu e; Cicero, Off. .). The concept also has a place in political discourse, where the malleability of the human character is similarly presupposed, for example, Plutarch, Pomp. .: “by nature man neither is nor becomes a wild or an unsocial creature, but is transformed by the unnatural practice of vice, whereas he may be

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civilized by new customs and a change of place and life . . . even wild beasts put off their fierce and savage ways when they partake of a gentler mode of life” (cf. Plato, Leg. a; Isocrates, Ad Nic. ). In order for human communities to succeed, such customs must be established and enforced by the people’s leaders (e.g., Plutarch, Quaest. rom. f; Tim. .), whose first responsibility is to “tame” themselves (Philo, Mos. .; Plutarch, Numa .). One of the few rulers who actually lived up to such standards was Numa; under his reign, “not only was the Roman people tamed (9μ!ρωτο) and charmed by the righteousness and mildness of their king, but also the surrounding cities,” so that the entire region experienced peace, concord, and prosperity (Plutarch, Numa .). he cut them off from arrogance and pretentiousness. Pretentiousness (λαζονεα) belongs to those passions of the soul which must be “tamed” by the power of reason ( Macc :–). As a vice, it is the functional opposite of philanthr¯opia, as Philo indicates in Spec. . (see Parallel exegesis below; cf. Spec. .–; Gnom. Epict. ). In his opinion, some of the provisions of the law were established specifically to abate it, e.g., Spec. ., ; .. In Decal.  it is coupled with arrogance (Dπεροψα) as one of the leading sources of social instability and conflict. It is incumbent upon those in high office, therefore, “to hate pretentiousness as a thing pernicious and utterly evil” (Spec. ., cf. .; Ios. , ; T. Ios. :). § . pretentiousness arises even in trivial and obscure persons . . . yet it does not undergo much growth. Insolence is not likely to be exhibited by the working poor, says Lysias, “but by those who possess far more than the necessities of life . . . For the wealthy purchase with their money escape from the risks that they run, whereas the poor are compelled to moderation by the pressure of their want” (Or. .–). The same passage points out that the strong and the young are also more likely to commit acts of hybris, for which see below. it is obvious in the great, who . . . have . . . riches and honors and magistracies. Those who are wise do not pride themselves in such precarious possessions as wealth, health, honors, or high office, but put their trust solely in God (Abr. –; Spec. .). Pretentiousness was a vice associated with the ruling classes, and especially with those consumed with the pursuit of power and fame: “Let kings and royal stewards and those who would be foremost in their cities and hold office engage in money-getting. These are driven to it, their ambition and pretentiousness and vainglory compel them, engaged as they are in giving banquets, bestowing favors, paying court, sending gifts, supporting armies, buying

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gladiators” (Plutarch, Cupid. divit. e; cf. Sera b; Pel. .; Philo, Spec. .–; Wis :). Pretentiousness ranks among the more offensive traits of the tyrant, e.g., Decal. ;  Macc :; Herodotus, Hist. .; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .; Lucian, Cat. . become intoxicated and act offensively. Intoxication abets hybris: “men are more insolent when drunk” (Aristotle, Pol. ..; cf. Plato, Leg. a; Plutarch, Sept. sap. conv. a; Philo, Abr. –; Mos. .; Spec. .). This reality posed a significant social and legal problem for the ancient Greeks: “the social dangers of drunken violence, committed above all by the upper classes during and after their symposia, were taken very seriously indeed from archaic times onwards, and produced notable legislation” (Fisher , –, and s.v. drink and hybris). For the metaphorical application of this language to arrogance more generally, cf. Plato, Leg. d: the vices of the shameful man include “anger, lust, insolence, ignorance, covetousness, and extravagance; and these also— wealth, beauty, strength, and everything which intoxicates a man with pleasure and turns his head.” For this use of 1μπαροιν!ω, cf. Philo, Ios. ; Contempl. ; Flacc. ; Josephus, Ant. .; Lucian, Cat. . over-indulgence begets insolence. The saying, “Over-indulgence is bred by wealth, and insolence by over-indulgence,” was attributed to Solon, one of the Seven Sages (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .). Philo was particularly fond of the sentiment expressed in the second part of the saying, of which he offers sundry versions in Post. ; Agr. ; Abr. ; Mos. ., ; Spec. .; Flacc. ; cf. Pindar, Ol. .; Theognis, El. ; Herodotus, Hist. .; Menander, Mon. ; Ps.-Phoc. ; Josephus, Ant. .. That the gnome may have originated in symposial culture, see Mathieu . In the moral evaluation of antiquity, hybris encompassed both an arrogant, self-assertive disposition (Cairns ) as well as the sorts of insulting actions expressive of such a disposition (Fisher , s.v. brutality, verbal insults). For Aristotle, hybris “consists in causing injury or annoyance whereby the sufferer is disgraced, not to obtain any other advantage for oneself besides the performance of the act, but for one’s own pleasure.” Such pleasure derives from showing one’s superiority over the victim. “That is why the young and the wealthy are given to insolence” (Rhet. ..). For the association of hybris with wealth, see also Rhet. ..; Plato, Leg. b–c; Demosthenes, Or. ., ; Lysias, Or. .– (quoted above); Ober , –; Fisher , s.v. wealth and hybris. In biblical literature, the problems posed by the vice are surveyed most fully in the book of Proverbs; see :; :; :; :;

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:; :, ; :; :–; :, ; :; :; :; :. As a distinguishing vice of the upper classes, it was included among the major sources of civic unrest and social upheaval. As Aristotle observes, “when the men in office show insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against one another and against the constitutions that afford the opportunity for such conduct” (Pol. ..). Elsewhere he analyzes the problem in more explicitly economic terms. As a rule, he says, the poor will accept their lot and keep quiet only so long as they are not treated insolently by the rich. However, given the latter’s general proclivities, rulers must be vigilant in preventing such conduct (Pol. ..; cf. ..; .., ; Plato, Leg. c; Ober , –; Fisher , s.v. stasis). Philo’s familiarity with such discourse is evident in Mos. .–, where he attributes the stability and longevity (and hence superiority) of the Mosaic constitution in part to its founder’s recognition that “insolence is the enemy of law.” Accordingly, the need to curb hybris was basic to his work as a lawgiver; cf. Decal. , ; Spec. .; ., , , ; Hum. . Lycurgus was similarly determined to banish hybris from his state, establishing policies according to which the citizens would “seek preeminence through virtue alone” (Plutarch, Lyc. .–). () § . most excellently does Moses the hierophant exhort them. For Moses’ role as the supreme revealer (cf. § ), see on § . Philo sometimes refers to the contents of Deuteronomy as “exhortations,” or παραιν!σεις; see on § . he gives them a reminder. A recurring Deuteronomic refrain is the admonition to “remember” (:; :; :; :; :; :, , ; :; etc.). Deut :– (cf. :–) contributes to this theme with an appeal for the people not to forget (μ+ 1πιλ,@η) their dependence on God and the lessons they learned in the wilderness while they are flourishing in the promised land. Such forgetfulness threatens the very basis of their relationship with God since it engenders covenantal disobedience (:), pride (:), false self-reliance (:), and idolatry (:–). Philo concentrates on the second of these. His Dπμνησις may derive from μνησ=σ@η in Deut : (cf. :). Cf. Spec. .–: “indeed it is proper in wealth to remember your poverty, in distinction your insignificance, in high offices your position as a commoner.” Such reflection abets the practice of virtue, since “people who having had both good and ill before their eyes have rejected the ill and are enjoying the good, necessarily have a grateful character.” See also Spec. ., ; and for the general sentiment, Wilson , –.

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excessive satiety of the belly and an extravagant surplus of houses and possessions and cattle. A paraphrase of the scenario set forth in Deut :–: “when you have eaten and are full, and built fine houses and dwelt in them, and your oxen and sheep have multiplied, and your silver and gold have multiplied, and everything that you have has multiplied.” These are the very items which Moses, in contrast to all other rulers, chose to eschew for himself, even though he could have possessed all of them in abundance: “In dress and food and other aspects of life, he made no exaggerated gesture so as to render his dignity more majestic” (Mos. .–). Strabo explains the historical origins of hybris in Geogr. ..: “In ancient times the world was full of barely-meal and wheatmeal, as now of dust; and fountains then flowed, some with water, others with milk and likewise with honey, and others with wine, and some with olive oil; but, by reason of their satiety (πλησμον$ς) and luxury, people fell into insolence.” they immediately lose control over themselves. Cases like that of Alcibiades must have been all too common. As long as he remained under the tutelage of Socrates, he was able to keep his unseemly vices in. But once he was on his own and enjoyed a measure of success, he became “proud in birth, confident in wealth, puffed up with power, and much yielding to temptation” (Xenophon, Mem. ..–). being lifted and puffed up. See Deut : (cf. :), where the people are told to beware, lest “you be exalted in heart” (Dψω@$ς τ@$ καρδ7α). For φυσ,ω, see on § . Cf. Josephus, Ant. ., where Moses warns the Israelites not to act insolently (1ξυβρσαι) on account of the wealth they will acquire after crossing the Jordan. to never utterly forget God. Philo’s 1κλαν,νω (cf. Congr. ; Mos. ., , ; Spec. .; Paen. ) may represent an effort to convey the reinforced verb of Deut : (1Cν λ=@η 1πιλ,@η, κτλ.). § . God, the intelligible sun. In Somn. .–, Philo explains that the term Zλιος can be used in several senses, not only as a figure for God, but also as a figure for the mind, sense-perception, or the logos. The imagery employed here is best-known from the myth of the cave (Plato, Resp. a–a), and especially from the metaphor of the sun (Resp. b–c; cf. Wheeler ) which helps to introduce it. Just as the sense-perceptible world is illuminated by the power of the sun, the intelligible world is illuminated by the form of the good, “that which gives truth to the things known and the power (δ:ναμιν) to know to the knower” (d). Cf. Opif.  (“The intelligible surpasses the visible in brilliance and brightness just as much, I believe, as sun surpasses

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darkness.”); Ebr. ; Abr. ; Spec. .; .. Plutarch is also fond of the metaphor, e.g., Is. Os. a; E Delph. d–e; Def. orac. c, d–e; Fac. e; Quaest. plat. f–a; cf. Plotinus, Enn. .., . The symbolism of light in general plays a prominent role throughout the corpus Philonicum (Klein , –; Nikiprowetzky ). In this instance the Alexandrian may be somewhat overeager in his efforts to deploy the imagery, since its contribution to the surrounding argument seems rather tenuous. Perhaps the point is that although those in high positions may be “visible” (περιφανεται, § ) to the public, they are actually living in the darkness of their vices and need to be converted to the light, much like those who become proselytes (see on Paen. ). Or perhaps the Platonic idea that those illuminated by the form of the good are endowed with δ:ναμις connects with the exposition of Deut : in §§ –. Note that what must be the original reading, ες 2 νοητς, is supported only by S; the other mss avoid such Platonizing language with εοποητος or something similar. the gloom of the passions and vices is dispelled. “In the gloom of night, the eyes are dimmed and seem nearly blind”—similarly, when the soul “focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and passes away, it opines and is dimmed, changes its opinions this way and that, and seems bereft of understanding.” But when it turns its attention to “something illuminated by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and apparently possesses understanding” (Plato, Resp. c–d). Compare Philo’s reflections in Leg. .: “Just as the sun when it has risen fills the gloom of the air with light, so virtue also, when it has risen in the soul, illuminates its mist and scatters its deep darkness.” The imagery underscores how the development of virtue depends upon the prior act of God; without the gift of divine light, human souls toil in the darkness (Mendelson , ). the form of exceedingly brilliant virtue. Just as the rising sun fills the heavens with light, “the rays of virtue . . . cause the whole region of the understanding to be flooded with pure brilliancy” (Plant. ). Also see on Paen. . For the “light” cast by virtue, cf. Leg. .; Conf. –; Migr. ; Her. ; Somn. .; Nob. ; Arius Didymus, Lib. phil. sect. .; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Plutarch, Numa .; Plotinus, Enn. ..–. § . eliminate arrogance. When functioning properly, the law of a state “does away with violence, eliminates insolence (Rβριν κααιρν), reproves folly, chastises wickedness, and in private and public relations helps all who are in need” (Dio Chrysostom, Or. .).

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bear the remembrance of God as an image in their minds. For this use of γαλματοφορ!ω, see on Nob. . strength to make power. This resumes the exposition of Deut :– begun in § . In their complacency, the people might start to imagine that the prosperity they are enjoying in the promised land is the result of their own efforts: “Do not say in your heart, my strength and the might of my hand has made for me this great power. But you shall remember the Lord your God, that he himself gives you strength to make power” (:–). Given the context, it is likely that δ:ναμις here refers to wealth (cf. :–; Wevers , ), and this is the meaning assigned by Philo when interpreting the passage elsewhere (Sacr. –; Agr. ). In §§ –, by contrast, ποι$σαι δ:ναμιν has nothing to do with acquiring material goods, but with imparting virtues to others and thereby imitating God. will consider the personal weakness which he had. Philo explains in Spec. . (cf. QE .) that leaven is forbidden from the temple sacrifices (Lev :) on account of the rising it produces, signifying that no one approaching the altar “should be lifted and puffed up by pretentiousness.” Instead, “gazing on the greatness of God, let him gain a perception of the weakness which belongs to the creature, even though he may surpass others in prosperity; and . . . let him reduce the exaltation of boastful presumption, purging treacherous conceit.” give thanks. In Sacr. –, Deut :–, – is similarly understood as being addressed principally to those who fail to honor God, either because their affluence has caused them to forget the spirit of thankfulness or because they arrogantly attribute whatever success they have achieved to themselves. For the distinctive emphasis we encounter on εχαριστα in Philo’s oeuvre, see on Hum. . The operations of the sacrificial cult in particular were designed to inculcate gratitude, e.g., Spec. ., –, –. unthankfulness is akin to arrogance. Ingratitude, like arrogance, will ultimately be punished by God, e.g., Opif. ; Deus , ; QG .. Cf. on §§ –. § . those who do not fully discern the significance. Philo is not afraid to contrast his interpretations with those of others who, he thinks, have missed the deeper or true intent of scripture, e.g., Conf. , ; Sobr. ; Plant. ; Abr. , ; cf. Hay . Many people endeavor to effect the opposite of the benefits which they have received. As Philo sees it, Moses’ instruction for the rich defies the prevailing moral logic of the world, according to which the pursuit

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of social goods like wealth and status is construed in competitive terms, being acquired for oneself only at the expense of others. For the “limited good” perspective, see Gilmore ; Lawrence , –. they become the cause of disgrace and dishonor to others. As Plutarch observes, to point out a neighbor’s faults under any circumstances is likely to cause pain, “but when a man intermingles praise of himself with censure of another, and uses another’s disgrace to secure glory for himself, he is altogether odious and vulgar, as one who would win applause from the humiliation of another” (De laude a); cf. Betz . § . prudent . . . moderate . . . brave . . . just. Philo invokes the traditional canon of primary virtues, familiar from Platonic and Stoic literature (North ), as well as elsewhere in his corpus. At Abr. , for example, he asserts the tetrad’s superiority to wealth and reputation (cf. Opif. ; Leg. .–; Sacr. ; Cher. ; Post. ; Agr. ; Ebr. ; Prob. ; Mos. .; QG .; Jastram ; and see on Paen. ). In a famous passage, he describes the sabbath as the time Jews have set aside for studying philosophy and “the principles of virtue’s lore.” Every seventh day, therefore, “there stand wide open in every city thousands of schools of prudence, moderation, courage, justice, and the other virtues” (Spec. .–). As we have seen, the canon also partly informs the structure of the Exposition itself; see Spec. . and part  of the Introduction. to make their neighbors shrewd . . . self-controlled . . . noble . . . just. In the ideal state of Plato’s Leges, the highest honors are awarded to moderation, prudence, and any virtue “which the possessor can communicate to others as well as display in his own person” (e). The responsibility for doing so falls especially on those with means and ability. The good judge, for instance, “will secure (παρασκευ,ζοντα) for those who are good both the permanence and the increase of what is just” (d). Plutarch observes that on occasion even tyrants can wield their power towards virtuous ends. Having obtained sovereignty illegally, they turn out to be mild and beneficent to the people. Hieron and Peisistratus, for example, “maintained good order everywhere, promoted husbandry, and made (κατασκευ,σαντες) the people everywhere moderate and hardworking, instead of derisive and loquacious” (Sera a). Cf. also Dio Chrysostom, Or. . (quoted in the Analysis/General comments). For these . . . are powers. In Rhet. .., Aristotle defines virtue as “the power (δ:ναμις) to provide and preserve good things, a power productive of many and great benefits, in fact, of all things in all cases.” Accordingly, the greatest of the virtues are judged to be justice, courage, and liberality, since it is through them that one’s role as a benefactor to oth-

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ers is most fully developed. (Note the different understanding of δ:ναμις in relation to virtue at work in Eth. nic. ...) This understanding of the virtues as powers or capacities is probably indebted to Plato; see, e.g., Hipp. min. d–e; Resp. a–b, b–d, b; Leg. a–b; cf. Ps.Plato, Def. b; Isocrates, Panath. ; Epictetus, Ench. ; Plutarch, Dion .; Numa .; Let. Arist. ; Philo, Migr. ; Fug. ; Mut. – ; Spec. .. incapacity and weakness . . . are alien to an excellent character. Plutarch argues that causing harm is incompatible with that which is good: “By its nature anger is the farthest removed from favor, wrath from goodwill, hostility and the spreading of terror from humanity and compassion; for to the one set belongs virtue and power, and to the other weakness and vice.” Those possessed of the former set are enabled to follow God’s example and bestow favors on others (Suav. viv. d–e). Similarly, in one of his kingship orations, Dio Chrysostom argues that only the virtuous are truly powerful. On the other hand, anyone given to lawlessness, licentiousness, and insolence is “a weaker man than the lowliest beggar” (Or. .–; cf. Höistad , –). § . to imitate God as much as possible, neglecting none of the things contributing to such assimilation. The Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic identification of the telos (i.e., 2μοωσις ε< κατC τ δυνατν; see Baltzly ) was derived principally from Plato, Theaet. a–b (cf. Tim. c–d; Resp. c, a–b; Annas , –), which Philo cites at Fug. . Such assimilation entails “following along the highways that the virtues mark out” (Opif. , cf. ; Deus ; Abr. –, ; Decal. –; Spec. .). Further, Dillon , –, , ; Belletti ; Helleman ; van Kooten , –. Also see on Fort.  and Nob. . imitate God by giving gifts of the same kind. In Spec. .– (cf. Abr. ), Philo links the doctrine of assimilation with the topos that those who rule well must imitate God: “For God and God’s beneficent powers ever make it their business to transform the error of the worse wherever it exists and convert it to the better. These things good rulers must imitate if they have any aspiration to be assimilated to God.” Cf. Let. Arist. : “As God showers blessings upon all, you too in imitation of him are a benefactor to your subjects.” Further, Let. Arist. , ; Musonius Rufus, frg. ..–; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .–; .–; ., –; Plutarch, Princ. iner. f–a; Blumenfeld , , , – ; van Kooten , –, –. One of the principles informing the process of imitation is articulated by Plutarch: “the spectator is not

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advantaged by those things at the sight of which no ardor for imitation arises in the breast, not any uplifting of the soul arising from zealous impulses to do the like (1ξομοωσιν). But virtuous action straightaway so disposes a man that he no sooner admires the works of virtue than he strives to emulate those who wrought them” (Per. .). Also compare Epictetus, Diatr. ..–: “Next we must learn what the gods are like: for whatever their character is discovered to be, those who are going to please and obey them must endeavor as best they can to resemble them. If the deity is faithful, they must also be faithful; if free, they also must be free; if beneficent, they also must be beneficent” (cf. Seneca, Ep. .– ). § . common utility. Since it is in the nature of God (Spec. .), the divine injunctions (Decal. ; Spec. .), and the divine virtues (Spec. .) to promote the common welfare, it is incumbent upon the leaders of God’s people to do so as well (Ios. , ; Mos. .; Spec. .; .), as an expression of their philanthr¯opia (Mos. .). For this use of κοινωφελ=ς, see also Epictetus, Diatr. ..; Plutarch, Aem. Paul. .; and on Fort. . The use of δημωφελ=ς in Plutarch, Sera a; Sull. .; Ps.-Plutarch, Un. rep. dom. b is comparable. It is a special task of the law-maker to train the citizens to make the property that they own privately “common property in use” (Aristotle, Pol. ..). in a civic feast they summon all they can. The communal dimensions of Greco-Roman civic festivals were often emphasized. A first-century ce inscription from Akraephia (in Boeotia), for example, boasts how the benefactor “made a distribution throughout the city to all citizens, residents, and slaves.” Meals were provided not only for all of the city’s citizens but also for their wives, children, and adult slaves; “he did not even pass over the booth-holders and those who were putting on the festival, but gave them a meal at his own expense by public invitation” (Hands , –). As John D’Arms notes, such feasts functioned as mechanisms of both social harmony and social control (, ). Cf. Spec. .; Schmitt-Pantel ; Wörrle . § . to make whomever he meets . . . good. It is fundamental to the success of any state that its laws and customs “render the people’s private lives pious and temperate, and make (περγ,ζεται) the general character of the state civilized and just” (Polybius, Hist. ..; cf. Xenophon, Oec. .–); cf. on § . not to honor envy. Avoiding envy is essential to the task of assimilating oneself to God, as emphasized especially by Plato in Tim. e: “The (Demiurge) was good, and in him that is good no envy ever arises

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concerning anything; and being devoid of envy he desired that all should be, as far as possible, like himself.” Cf. Phaedr. a (quoted by Philo at Prob. ; Spec. .); Resp. c; Herrmann . Those who suffer from this vice are least likely to contribute to the process of communicating virtues to others (Plato, Leg. e), preferring instead to monopolize them, hindering the aim of the state as a whole to become virtuous (a). That envious emotions engender civic strife and undermine communal harmony was a cliché of ancient political discourse (Wilson , –). See especially Herodotus, Hist. ., where envy is paired with hybris (see on § ) as the vices that lie at “the root of all evil” in the tyrant: “having all that his heart can desire, he should rightly be envious of no one, yet it is contrariwise with him in dealing with his citizens; he is envious of the success and survival of the good, and glad at the success and survival of the wicked” (cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. /.; Plutarch, Phoc. .). Elsewhere Philo observes that envy can make it impossible to act in ways that benefit others (e.g., Spec. .; .–; and see on Hum.  and Nob. ); God manifests philanthr¯opia by banning it from the divine realm (Abr. ). Mention may also be made of the following passage from Musonius Rufus, which weaves together many of the same themes as we find in §§ –: “In general, of all creatures on earth, humankind alone resembles God and has the same virtues that he has, since we can imagine nothing even in the gods better than prudence, justice, courage, and moderation. Therefore, as God, through the possession of these virtues, is unconquered by pleasure or greed, is superior to desire, envy (φνου), and jealousy, is high-minded, beneficent, and humane (φιλ,νρωπος) . . . so also humankind in the image of him, when living in accord with nature, should be thought of as being like him” (frg. ..–). () § . who give themselves airs. μ!γα or μ!γαλα πν!ω can mean “to give oneself airs,” as in Aeschylus, Ag. ; Euripides, Andr. ; Philo, Mos. .; .. whose swelling of pretentiousness. 1πιτ,σει τ$ς λαζονεας is Cohn’s (PCW .) conjecture based on τοAς 1πτασιν τ$ς λαζονεας in F. S has Dπ λαζονεας, which is printed by Mangey , . delivers only to the divine court. Those plagued by the vices just mentioned will be judged not by the people but by God. There are two reasons for this (see § ). First, the full and true character of the soul is invisible to all except God, and pretentiousness is a vice of the soul.

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Second, the pretentious transgress the limits of human nature, offending God by thinking themselves to be like God. Whoever attempts to do something with contempt offends God. Num : stipulates the penalty for those who commit intentional or rebellious sins: “But the person, be he citizen or stranger, who acts highhandedly reviles the Lord, that person shall be cut off from among his people.” The LXX renders the verse, “And whoever does something with a hand of contempt, either one of the inhabitants or one of the sojourners, this one offends (παροξ:νει) God; he shall be cut off from his people.” As Wevers (, ) notes, this translation “considerably mitigates the sin of arrogance by calling it a provocation of deity rather than a blasphemy of the Lord” (cf. m. Ker. :). As in Spec. ., Philo takes the injunction as evidence that God hates and punishes those guilty of arrogance and self-conceit, rendering its 1ν χειρ Dπερηφανας with the grammatically smoother 1γχειρ@$ . . . με Dπερηφανας. For Dπερηφανα (this is its only occurrence in Philo’s extant corpus), see Spicq , .–. It is often found together with hybris, e.g., Lev :; Prov :; Sir :–; Demosthenes, Or. .; Polybius, Hist. ..–; ..; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ... § . the soul is unseen except by God. For this concept, see on Hum. . Similar thoughts are expressed regarding the fate of tyrants in Prov. .–. Cf. T. Gad :: “The person who is just and humble is ashamed to commit an injustice, not because someone else will pass judgment on him but out of his own heart, because the Lord considers his inner deliberations.” Pretentiousness had been identified as an affliction of the soul in § . “neither man nor demigod but an utter deity,” as Pindar says. This line, otherwise unknown, is printed as frg.  in Pindar’s corpus; cf. Ol. .. Philo quotes more fully from Pindar’s poetry in Aet. ; cf. Prov. .. Among mortals, of course, tyrants are the ones most likely to “have assumed to be called gods and to have temples dedicated in their honor.” But in the end, having been convicted not only of pretentiousness but also of impiety, they will be dragged away from their shrines like fugitive slaves (Plutarch, Is. Os. c); cf. Spec. .. Cohn (PCH .–) took §§ – as a reference to Gaius Caligula, though the description is too general and the point too indirect for such an allusion to be likely; cf. PLCL .. transgress the bounds of human nature. Dionysius of Halicarnassus expresses a common sentiment: “All things that wax too great, when they reach the peak of eminence, incur the displeasure of the gods and are

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brought to naught again. And this is the fate which comes especially to the stubborn and haughty spirits and those that transgress the bounds of human nature” (Ant. rom. ..). § . he struts about and with neck raised up high neighs and prances. Bulls, horses, asses, and men are alike, says Plutarch, in that they all “act insolently through over-indulgence and satiety (κρον κα πλησμον+ν 1ξυβρζουσι).” The same passage quotes a line from Sophocles: “You prance, as does a colt, from glut of food, For both your belly and your cheeks are full” (Quaest. rom. f). Philo draws the same kind of analogy in Somn. .–: “Just as skittish horses raise their necks high, so all the devotees of vainglory set themselves up above everything, above cities, laws, and ancestral customs.” Eventually they set themselves up as tyrants and subjugate the people. Cf. Fug. , ; Somn. .; Mos. .; Decal. ; Spec. .; QG .;  Macc :; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Epictetus, Diatr. ... lifted and puffed up. In their comportment the rich and powerful show themselves to be “puffed up” by arrogance, conceit, boastfulness, and related vices, e.g., Mos. .; Spec. .; .; Praem. ; cf. T. Levi :–;  Cor :, –;  Cor :; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; Cicero, Off. .. Like Philo, Plato emphasizes the judgment that awaits such individuals: “He who bursts with pride, lifted up (1παιρμενος) by wealth or honors or by physical beauty . . . whose soul is afire with the insolent belief that so far from needing someone to control and lead him, he can play the leader to others—there’s a man whom God has deserted.” Before long divine justice will exact the due penalty from him, his household, and his city (Leg. a–b; cf. Gorg. e–a; Plutarch, Is. Os. c). Slaves he treats like beasts, the free like slaves, relatives like strangers, friends like flatterers, fellow-citizens like foreigners. Such a moral orientation would be the opposite of that indicated by the Stoic doctrine of ο>κεωσις, for which see on Hum. . § . most wealthy, most honored, most beautiful, most vigorous. Even though a man may be possessed of matchless courage, strength, beauty, and wealth, if there is “within him nothing but injustice and insolence . . . such a life is obviously not happy but wretched” (Plato, Leg. d–e). For this list of attributes, cf. Plato, Leg. c; Xenophon, Cyr. ..; Plutarch, Tranq. an. e; Frat. amor. a; Eusebius, Praep. ev. d (= Ariston, frg. ).

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commentary Parallel Exegesis

Among the regulations set down for those appointed to act as judges under the Mosaic politeia (Spec. .–) is the rule not to show favor to the poor when rendering a decision (Exod :). Before explaining the provision itself, Philo is prompted to remind his readers that its author is someone “who has filled practically his whole legislation with injunctions to show mercy and humanity, issuing severe threats against the haughty and pretentious” (.). Indeed, Moses agreed with the ancient tradition (cf. Aelian, Var. hist. .) that the greatest good for humankind is to imitate God, and that in no action do people resemble God more than when they are generous with one another (.). The rich then, ought not prance about in an insolent and boastful manner, but should use their wealth to alleviate the plight of the poor. Likewise the strong should support the weak (.), while the wise should “banish a grudging spirit” and benefit their neighbors, especially the young, by imparting their knowledge to them (.).

Nachleben Clement moves without transition from the discussion of Lev :– (Strom. ..–..) to the quotation of Deut : (Hum. ), passing over the introductory material in §§ – and lightly reworking Philo’s initial explanation of the verse in § : “if your affairs are enlightened (φωτισ@$), if you have received and acquired strength in knowledge (1ν γν8σει), make power” (..). Clement proceeds to offer an explanation of his own, namely, that the verse shows how the good things of life are God’s gifts, whose recipients, acting as “ministers of divine grace,” are obligated to sow such benefits by making those around them more virtuous. This is illustrated with reference to the same qualities listed in Hum. , though goodness is promoted from the last to the first position, while prudence is demoted from first to fourth (..). In .., Clement states that all this applies to 2 γνωστικς, who, being made after the likeness and image of God, imitates God and neglects nothing that might contribute to his assimilation to God (see Hum. ). This is coupled with a second list of virtues, which represent the means by which this assimilation occurs: self-restraint, endurance, justice, control of the passions, sharing, and benefaction. The quotation of Matt : that follows in .. indicates not only the status of those who achieve this

on humanity –: the ruling classes, §§ –



goal (“greatest in the kingdom”) but also the means by which they do so (“who shall do and teach”); in this way they give gifts of the same kind that they have received (see Hum. ), that is, gifts of common utility (see Hum. ). Material from Hum. –, including the quotation of Num :, is used to introduce the paraphrase of Philo’s treatise on metanoia, which immediately follows in ..–... Further reading: Fisher ; Fuks ; Helleman , –; Ober .

ON REPENTANCE (§§ 175–186)

Analysis/General Comments For the function of this section within the treatise, and its relationship to De humanitate, see parts  and  of the Introduction. There it was suggested that De paenitentia contributes to Philo’s broader argument regarding the superiority of the Jewish ethnos by showing how its polity consists of individuals who have made a choice to live a virtuous life and engage in processes of moral correction. For proselytes, this is constituted by the choice they make for religious enlightenment and moral amendment. For Jews, it is represented by the decision they make to repent of any wrongdoing. In his descriptions, Philo concentrates on the former, since the experience of proselytes demonstrates the significance of choice as a defining feature of the polity most dramatically, the sudden and sweeping nature of their transformation testifying to the excellence of its laws and institutions. See also the Analysis/General comments for De nobilitate. At its root, the concept of μετ,νοια involves a change (μεταβολ=) or turning (τροπ=) of some kind (Abr. –; cf. Spec. .; Praem. , –). In keeping with ordinary Hellenistic usage, this may simply be the reversal of a previous judgment or a change of mind, often accompanied by regret, e.g., Hum. ; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Plutarch, Sera d; Behm , –. More often, metanoia is for Philo, as for most Jewish authors, an explicitly religious concept, signifying a decision that brings about a change in one’s relationship with God. In the majority of cases, what is being described is the repentance of Jews for transgressions against the law (cf. Isa :; Jer :; :; Sir :–; :), the sort of change familiar from the all too frequent appeals in scripture for the people to “turn” or “return” to God (στρ!φω and cognates; see Bertram ; Nave , –; cf. Ios. ; QG .). Philo portrays this as a change through which “the maladies of the soul” are healed (for the medical analogy, cf. on § ), the whole-burnt sin-offering symbolizing the “wholly sound frame of mind” to which the penitent aspires (Spec. .; cf. Mos. .; Spec. ., , ; Praem. ). The Day of Atonement is a particular occasion



commentary

in the life of the community for “purification and escape from sins” through repentance (Spec. .). At the same time, metanoia can also be used to describe the conversion of non-Jews to Judaism (cf. Jos. Asen. :; :–). Here Enoch is representative; forgetting his previous life and abandoning his home and country, he is “transferred” from ignorance to instruction, from vice to virtue, from an old life to a new one (Abr. –; Praem. –; QG .; cf. Sir :; see Parallel exegesis). The metanoia of Caleb similarly represents “a total change of the man himself,” both heart and soul (Mut. –). Although the language of conversion is not applied to him directly, the manner of his description in Nob. – shows that in his search for God Abraham serves as “a standard of nobility for all proselytes” as well (§ ). The same may be said for the description of Tamar in Nob. – (Birnbaum , ). In connection with this, it should be noted that Philo did not always feel it necessary to utilize the language of μετ,νοια when speaking of proselyte conversion. In Mos. ., for example, 1πηλ:ται are described as those who “have changed (μετεβ,λοντο) to a sound mind,” while later in the same treatise he expresses the wish that someday the peoples of every nation will make a similar change and honor the laws of Moses alone (Mos. .; cf. Spec. .). Elsewhere in the Exposition proselytes are likened to settlers who have left their native land and “traveled to a fine new home” (§ ). As is frequently observed, metanoia occupies a rather uneasy place in the history of Greco-Roman moral thought, a fact of which our author must have been aware (see the references in Further reading). While the Philonic sage will repent of any sins that he has committed (Leg. .; Fug. ), the Stoic sage will not need to repent in the first place, since he cannot give false assent to anything. It is only inferior persons, rather, those who do things badly, who have to deal with regret (SVF .; cf. Cicero, Tusc. .; Mur. ; Epictetus, Ench. ; Seneca, Ben. ..–; Marcus Aurelius, Med. ., ). The Stoics further categorized μεταμ!λεια, a concept closely related to μετ,νοια (cf. Ios. ; Spec. .; QG .; .; Fulkerson ), as a species of λ:πη, and as such incompatible with the life of wisdom (SVF ., ; cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..). Yet even a Stoic like Seneca could acknowledge that for those who fall short of perfection “the most dependable change toward integrity comes from repentance” (Nat. , pref. ; cf. Ira ..–; Ep. .–), and Plutarch can describe metanoia as an act of reason working through

on repentance, §§ –



the conscience to chastise and reform the soul (Tranq. an. f). Seen in this light, the case can be made that repentance is in fact necessary for moral improvement, and that the ability to engender repentance in others is a requisite of the successful moral instructor (Virt. mor. c; cf. Adul. amic. a, c). With regard to the latter, the change that Socrates was able to effect in Alcibiades was often seen as exemplary: “by convicting (1ξελεγχομ!νου) him of his faults he turned (;στρεφε) his heart” (Adul. amic. f; for the numerous versions and interpretations of this scene in antiquity, see Graver , –). Similarly, in the Cebetis tabula, the path to true paideia and well-being goes through metanoia, by which individuals are cured of all their vices and enabled to consort with all the virtues (.–.; .–.; cf. Jaeger , –). Hierocles of Alexandria could even go so far as to assert that repentance “is the very beginning of philosophy: the flight from both senseless deeds and words and the first preparation for a life that is without regret” (In aureum carmen .; translation from Sterling , –). Even if they did not utilize the language of repentance per se, the pedagogical curricula embraced by many philosophers demonstrated comparable methods and aims. Long (, –), for example, has shown how Epictetus, inspired especially by Socratic models, in designing his lectures drew on a combination of protreptic and elenctic forms of discourse so as to compel his students to “rethink their ethical beliefs and convert to a fundamental change of outlook and behavior” (, ). Of course Epictetus’ rationale for such communication rests on a basic anthropological assumption, namely, that his students, like the large majority of people, being immoral, ignorant, and unhappy, stand in need of such amendment and need to be told so frankly (e.g., Diatr. .. and often). Philosophers were not shy either when it came to depicting the dramatic results that their teaching could achieve. Seneca, for example, describes for Lucilius the “sudden change” that he has experienced in himself: “I feel . . . that I am being not only reformed but transformed. I do not yet, however, assure myself . . . that there are no elements left in me which need to be changed . . . And indeed this very fact is proof that my spirit is altered into something better—that it can see its own faults, of which it was previously ignorant” (Ep. .–). As this statement indicates, the processes of fault-finding and correction did not end with the animus transfiguratus. The Epicurean and Pythagorean traditions in particular evidence extensive and multidimensional networks of correctional practices involving the participation of all group members (for the



commentary

former, see Philodemus’ Περ παρρησας, with Glad , –; for the latter, Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. .–; .; .; Carm. aur. –, with Thom , –). De paenitentia contributes to the overall presentation of the Mosaic polity in the Exposition by depicting its members as individuals who have made a choice to live an amended life and engage in processes of moral correction. For proselytes, this means a choice for the moral transformation they undergo when converting to Judaism. For those who are already members of the polity, this means “changing” any transgressions that they have committed. The subtreatise’s focus is on the former, since their presence in the community demonstrates the significance of choice as a defining feature of the polity most dramatically. This is a polity that is defined not simply in ethnic or national terms, but more decisively in social, religious, and moral terms (cf. Michel ). In this the polity resembles a philosophical group or a state founded on philosophical principles (cf. part  of the Introduction). Given this focus, it is perhaps not all that striking that Philo does not explicitly associate the process of proselyte conversion with the ritual of circumcision (cf. Spec. .–; Cohen , –; and for the problem of uncircumcised proselytes in QE ., see Nolland ). The composition of De paenitentia may be analyzed as follows. () The character and scope of the lawgiver’s philanthr¯opia are, Philo says, further manifested in the invitation he extends to “all people everywhere” to join his polity and enjoy “everything in it,” implying that those who accept the invitation will have the same status as native-born Jews (§ ). () The rationale for repentance is explained in terms that indicate its general significance for the polity and, indeed, for all humankind. While the ideal for mortals is a god-like perfection, the reality is that all people sin and require some means of amendment. Those who are wise recognize the benefits of correction (§§ –). () The description of Moses’ summons to humanity is resumed in § . The balance of the subtreatise discusses three different aspects of the proselyte’s moral amendment (cf. Dietrich , –). It is interesting to note that the same three aspects are included in the (much shorter) description of Tamar in Nob.  in the same order and employing similar metaphors: upon seeing the light of truth, she deserts to the Israelite camp, where she becomes God’s servant and suppliant. The use of a similar schema here suggests that Philo understands conversion generally to entail three basic components: the acceptance of

on repentance, §§ –



monotheism, moral reform, and a new identity predicated on one’s relationship to God (cf. Borgen , –). (a) To begin with, those who accept Moses’ invitation are initiated into the truth of monotheism. Rejecting the idolatrous fables of their youth, they now honor the “Founder and Father of all,” and so are befriended by God and God’s worshippers as they emerge “from deepest darkness to behold a most brilliant light” (§§ –). (b) With this change in religious belief, there is a change in the moral comportment of the proselyte, who forsakes not only his former gods but also his former vices, deserting the worst polity in order to join the best. Just as a shadow follows a body, “the whole company of virtues” immediately and of necessity follows one who learns to honor God (cf. Völker , –, –). Contrasting lists of virtues and vices dramatize the extent of this transformation (§§ –). (c) The final aspect of the proselyte’s amendment is evident in the re-ordering of his entire personal bearing, so that thought, words, and actions are now in harmony, concepts represented figuratively by the reference to heart, mouth, and hands in Deut :. Only such an integrated self is acceptable and valuable as a “true servant and suppliant” to God, who has chosen the proselyte just as the proselyte has chosen him, a notion derived from Deut :– (§§ –). Because the choice that the proselyte makes is the same choice that Israel made under Moses, he is equal in value to an Israelite. Indeed, insofar as he makes this choice, he becomes “equal in value to a whole nation” (§ ). The ongoing debate about the nature and extent of Judaism’s status as a proselytizing religion need not detain us here (for varying assessments of the evidence for Jewish proselytizing during this period, see McNight ; Feldman , –; Goodman, ; Cohen , –). What Philo discusses in this subtreatise contributes little to our understanding of the means by which non-Jews became attracted to Judaism, the various types and levels of attachment that non-Jews could have with Jewish communities, or the social processes through which they became proselytes. The Alexandrian is obviously proud of the fact that his religion attracts Gentile converts and feels that they should be accorded a warm welcome (cf. Josephus, C. Ap. .; also the Analysis/General comments for chapters –). Nevertheless, what interests him here is not the life of the typical proselyte but the proselyte as an ideal moral type, that is, the individual who undergoes an immediate and total moral transformation as the result of choosing a new and superior way of life. The claim that proselytes come into possession of the whole set of virtues “at once”



commentary

(ε:ς, § ; cf. ^μα in § ) is redolent in particular of certain Stoic beliefs regarding the sage, whose transition from a state of complete vice to a state of complete virtue was thought to be sudden and instantaneous (see on § ). Associating membership in the Mosaic polity with such an ideal demonstrates both its character as a community of moral choice and the capacity of its laws to foster such amendment.

Detailed Comments () § . fond of virtue, fond of honor, and . . . fond of humanity. The same three epithets are used of God in Opif. , cf. ; Mut. . followers of piety and justice. Within the so-called canon of two virtues, the first form of excellence (usually eusebeia or hosiot¯es) pertained to “vertical” morality, that is, obligations owed to the gods, parents, and the dead, while the other (usually dikaiosyn¯e or philanthr¯opia) encompassed the “horizontal” dimension, that is, obligations owed to friends, neighbors, and fellow citizens. The scheme serves Philo particularly well as a way of explaining the organization of the decalogue, its first table of commandments naming duties towards God, the second duties towards humanity (Her. ; cf. Decal. –; Berger , –; Sterling , –). See further on Fort.  and Hum. . For the particular formulation of the canon cited here, see also Praem. ; cf. Spec. .; Hypoth. .; Let. Arist. , ; Isocrates, De pace –; Panath. , , ; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Seneca, Ep. .. Josephus utilizes it often, e.g., Ant. .; ., ; .; .. Philo uses ζηλωτ=ς and cognate terms elsewhere in the Exposition to describe the process of striving for virtue, e.g., Abr. ; Spec. .; .; Fort. ; Nob. , ; Praem. ; further, Seland , –. as before the victorious, the great prizes. “For where the prizes offered for virtue are greatest, there are found the best citizens” (Thucydides, Hist. ..; cf. Demosthenes, Or. .). Examples of athletic imagery abound in the Philonic corpus; for the full metaphorical field, see Pfitzner , –; Harris , –. For the usage here, see especially Praem. , –, , , ; cf. Wis :;  Macc :; Plato, Phaedr. b– e; Resp. c, c–d; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ... the best of polities. Philo makes the same characterization in Spec. .. What constituted such a polity was, naturally enough, a topic of vital interest among political theorists, e.g., Plato, Resp. b–c; Leg. a; Aristotle, Pol. ..–.

on repentance, §§ –



() § . remembrance . . . recollection. Philo usually differentiates μν=μη from ν,μνησις by making reference to Ephraim, whose name

symbolizes the former and means “fruit-bearing,” and Manasseh, whose name symbolizes the latter and means “out of forgetfulness.” Although remembrance is younger, it is superior, because it keeps every memory “fresh and distinct” in the mind and so prevents one from committing an error out of ignorance (Leg. .–; cf. Sobr. –; Migr. –; Congr. –; Mut. –). Of course what Philo says here has nothing to do with the Platonic theory of anamn¯esis, for which see Phaed. e– a, with Franklin  (cf. Phaedr. c–a; Resp. a); and for the theory’s reception in Middle Platonism, Dillon , , –. For the importance accorded the training of the memory in Pythagorean regimens of self-criticism, see Thom , –. in the second order are the things that effect correction. In the moral hierarchy, the “unbroken perfection of virtues stands nearest to divine power.” Ranking second to this is repentance, “just as a change from sickness to health is second to a body free from disease” (Abr. ; cf. Somn. .). This is because even after the penitent are restored, the “scars and impressions” of their old transgressions remain imprinted on their souls (Spec. .; cf. Abr. ; Plato, Gorg. d–a; Winston , – ). For this use of 1πανρωσις, cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; Epictetus, Diatr. ... recovery from illnesses. Repentance elsewhere is likened to being healed or cured of a disease, e.g., Leg. .; .; Ios. ; Spec. ., , ; Praem. ; cf. Isa :; Hos :; Plutarch, Sera d–e; Lat. viv. d–e. Medical imagery is pervasive in Philodemus’ Περ παρρησας; see Konstan , –. For more on the “philosophical art of soulhealing,” see Nussbaum , – and passim. following upon forgetfulness. 1κγινομ!νη is Cohn’s (PCW .) emendation for 1γγενομ!νη (SF) and 1γγινομ!νη (ceteri) in the mss. Mangey (, ) conjectures 1κ λ=ης 1γγινομ!νη. § . to never sin at all belongs to God, and perhaps also to a godlike man. No doubt the individual with the best claim to the title theios an¯er in Philo’s opinion would have been Moses, “the holiest of those yet born” (Mos. .; cf. Josephus, Ant. .). At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that even a perfect man cannot escape from sin inasmuch as he, like all people, is a created being (Spec. .; cf. Mos. .; also Fug. : “To do no sin is peculiar to God; to repent, to the sage.”). The attribution of sinlessness points instead to the ideal sage as envisaged by Stoic thinkers. Incapable of error or of assenting to anything



commentary

false (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .–), even Zeus cannot surpass him in virtue (Plutarch, Comm. not. a); cf. SVF .–. For a close reading of Paen. , see Holladay , –. For the Philonic doctrine that God does not experience repentance, see especially Deus ; QG ., with Alexandre , . to change from sin to a blameless life. In this the patriarchs, and especially Abraham, serve as models for future generations. Not only did they commit no deliberate offenses, but when “chance led them wrong they besought God’s mercy and propitiated him with prayers and supplications, and thus secured a perfect life” (Abr. ). For the language of “change,” see Analysis/General comments; also Sterling , . not altogether ignorant about what is beneficial. Since responding to correction can often be difficult, it is sometimes necessary to remind those receiving it of the benefits it confers, e.g., Plutarch, Adol. poet. aud. a; Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. .; Glad , –; Konstan , s.v. συμφ!ρω; cf. Paen. ; Josephus, Ant. .; Crook , –. The concept of moral choice was a critical one in Stoic philosophy. It is not simply the fact that the sage always acts virtuously. Rather, “he always chooses what has to be chosen.” And what has to be chosen “refers to the benefits (Bφελ=ματα) which follow from being virtuous. The good, virtue, is the only source of that which is truly beneficial to life. That is the essence of virtue, and therefore the virtuous man’s acts of choice never fail to be beneficial” (Long , –; cf. Gourinat ). (a) § . initiates them into his mysteries. Moses’ promulgation of the law is likened to the work of a mystagogue, who reveals divine secrets to the initiated, e.g., Cher. , –; Sacr. , ; Somn. .; Mos. .; QG .; cf. Riedweg , – (also note Moses’ designation as hierophant in Hum. , , and ). In this he is made to look like one of the philosophers, who often employed the vernacular of the mystery cults to convey the sense of awe and illumination that accompanied the teaching they offered (Wilson , –). In Phaed. c, for instance, Plato characterizes training in the cardinal virtues as a kind of ritual purification that prepares one for philosophical τελετα; cf. Phaedr. b–c; Plutarch, Is. Os. a, d–e; Epictetus, Diatr. ..– ; Riedweg , –. he summons them by offering conciliatory and friendly instructions. In their efforts to reform the character of those under their care, philosophical guides gave a great deal of thought to the manner in which they employed modes of correction, blame, reproof, and so on. For correction to be effective, and least likely to cause harm or resentment, it had to be

on repentance, §§ –



offered in a spirit of friendship, that is, out of a genuine desire to benefit the recipient. The correctional practices prescribed by Philodemus in Περ παρρησας, for example, are explicitly viewed as an extension of “the ethic of friendship” cultivated within the Epicurean community (Glad , , cf. –). mythical fabrications which parents and nurses . . . engraved upon their . . . souls. Book  of Plato’s Respublica envisions the sort of education that the ideal state will provide for its young. First of all, nurses and mothers will agree not to expose their children to false μ(οι, that is, stories that convey a false image of what the gods are really like (d). Such discretion is necessary because a child is “delicate” (Yπαλς), that is, his or her soul is “most malleable and takes on any pattern (τ:πος) one wishes to impress on it” (a; for the imagery, cf. on Hum. ). The Mosaic polity in comparison not only protects its members from false stories about the divine (see the references on Hum. ), it can also “deprogram” those whose souls have already been deluded by such fabrications. Such unlearning represents a challenge, however, since “the instructors of sin are legion, nurses and tutors and parents and the laws of cities, written and unwritten, which extol what should be derided” (Her. ; cf. Spec. .). Yet, as Plutarch observes, even those who have been corrupted by a poor upbringing and immoral companions still can choose to repent and reform themselves (Sera d– e). § . things which are not gods. For Philo’s critique of idolatry, see esp. Decal. –; further, Wolfson , .–; Sandelin ; Niehoff , –; see also on Hum. . For the formulation here, cf. Mos. .;  Kgdms :; Jer :; :; :; Acts :; Gal :; Josephus, Ant. .. the Founder and Father of all. Elsewhere God is the “Founder and Maker” (Spec. ., ) or the “Father and Maker” (Decal. ; Spec. .; .; cf. Plato, Tim. c, with Runia , –) of all things; cf. Elliott , –. Royse (, ) conjectures that the original reading here is preserved by S, δημιουργν, which a copyist uncomfortable with Platonic concepts changed to πατ!ρα, which is found in CG2H2 (cf. Somn. .). welcomed the rule of one over the rule of many. Philo disparages polytheism as πολυαρχα elsewhere in Spec. .; .. The undesirability of a divided command was axiomatic in both warfare and government, e.g., Thucydides, Hist. ..; Xenophon, Anab. ..; Josephus, Ant. .; cf. Philo, Conf.  (citing Homer, Il. .–). For



commentary

the Alexandrian this principle is evidenced in God’s rule of the heavens. In particular, the first commandment and the laws it summarizes establish “the monarchical principle by which the cosmos is governed” (Decal. , cf. ; Spec. .; .). Tamar is a prototypical proselyte insofar as she unlearns the errors of her idolatrous upbringing by becoming schooled in this principle (Nob. ). Philo often emphasizes the oneness of the God whom converts from paganism now worship (e.g., Somn. .; Spec. ., ; .; Nob. –, ; QE .). This serves as the most effective guarantee of the unity they share with native-born Jews (Guerra , –). our closest friends and relations. The convert not only turns away from the mythical fabrications and the πολυαρχα of polytheism, but in doing so turns his kinfolk “into mortal enemies” (Spec. .). For the social acceptance to be extended proselytes by the Jewish community, see on Hum. . The basis of the friendship that the members of the community have with one another is the friendship that they have with God (see below); cf. Spec. ., ; Fort. ; Sterling . In extending friendship to converts, the members of the community demonstrate the same fondness for humanity (§ ) and friendly disposition (§ ) as Moses himself (Ware , –). a character friendly to God. Plato’s ideal politeia is crafted by the philosopher-kings with the aim of making the character (_ος) of each citizen as dear to God (εοφιλ=ς) as possible (Resp. d, cf. e). The translation “friendly to God” attempts to show the correlation of εοφιλ!ς with φιλτ,τους and φιλαν earlier in the sentence. In Paen. , the term is juxtaposed with φιλεος (“lover of God”). See also on Hum. ; cf. Nob. . being previously blind, they had recovered their sight. According to Stoic doctrine, all but the sage are morally blind. Even those who are close to attaining virtue but have yet to achieve it are no less mired in vice than those who are a long way from it, “and just as the blind are blind even if they are going to recover their sight a little later, so those who are making progress continue to be stupid and depraved until they have attained virtue” (Plutarch, Comm. not. a; for ναβλ!πω with this sense, see SVF .). coming from deepest darkness to behold a most brilliant light. The experience of moving from darkness into light or of recovering one’s sight was frequently invoked to describe events of spiritual or intellectual enlightenment. The soul’s power to learn is likened by Plato to an eye that has to turn (στρ!φειν) from the darkness of ignorance to “the brightest

on repentance, §§ –



thing that is,” namely, the good (Resp. c, cf. e–a). Like initiates in a mystery (cf. μυσταγωγ!ω in § ), students of philosophy could be said to “have seen a great light, as though a shrine were opened” (Plutarch, Virt. prof. d–e; cf. Seneca, Ep. .–). Similarly, the eyes of initiates into the Mosaic mysteries are anointed by the sacred guide until they behold “the hidden light of hallowed words” (Somn. .). In the same vein, the proselyte’s experience of conversion entails being rescued “from the darkness . . . from the foundations of the abyss” (Jos. Asen. :, with Chesnutt , ; cf. Sir :; T. Gad :). For Philo, Abraham is again prototypical: “opening the soul’s eye as though after a deep sleep, and beginning to see a pure beam instead of deep darkness, he followed the light and discerned what he had not beheld before,” that is, divine providence (Abr. ). Tamar likewise glimpsed “a little ray of truth” when she emerged from the dark (Nob. ). For Philo’s light imagery, see on Hum. . (b) § . standing in awe of things created before the Uncreated and Creator. Recognizing the objects of the world for what they were, that is, created and ephemeral things, the Jewish nation corrected the fundamental error being committed by the rest of humanity, “choosing instead the service of the Uncreated and Eternal” (Spec. .). For the divine epithet γ!νητος, see also Mos. .; Decal. ; Nob. . ochlocracy . . . democracy. Besides cities built with stone and timber, there are cities that people “carry about established in their souls” (Conf. ). The best of such soul-cities adopts for its constitution democracy, since such a polity is ruled by law and honors >στης (Conf. ; cf. Plato, Resp. c; Ps.-Plato, Menex. b–a; Aristotle, Pol. ..). In this context, “equality” means that each part of the soul will possess the status and power appropriate to it, that is, the passions and senses will be subject to the rule of reason (cf. on Fort. –). Such a soul will be free of revolt and turmoil (Abr. –). For Philo’s other statements on the superiority of democracy, see Agr. ; Deus ; Spec. .. Its counterfeit is “rule by the mob,” that is, rule based on inequality and lawlessness (Conf. ; cf. Opif. ; Fug. ; Somn. .; Decal. ). Further, Goodenough , –; Barraclough , –. In Praem. , Philo stresses the need for recent converts to avoid the /χλος and its many vices and distractions. knowledge . . . prudence . . . self-control . . . justice . . . bravery. Prefacing the usual tetrad (see on Hum. ) here is 1πιστ=μη, which may function as a kind of meta-virtue, reflecting the idea that the virtues are forms of knowledge (and hence teachable), e.g., Plato, Meno c–d; Prot.



commentary

b; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .–; cf. Philo, Det. ; Congr. . For the corresponding list of vices, cf. Opif. ; Post. ; Agr. ; Her. ; Plato, Resp. b, b. § . to desert to virtue. Proselytes leave behind not only friends and family, but also their homeland, and so can be spoken of as “refugees deserting to the camp of piety” (Spec. .; cf. Post. ; Somn. .; Nob. ; Praem. , ). From this point forward, the text of De paenitentia is preserved only in S, C, and G2. See PCW .xxviii, . a shadow . . . follows a body that is in the sun. For this figure, cf. Decal. ; Hum. ; also the imagery of illumination in § . the honoring of the God who exists. At Sinai God forbade the worship of other deities, summoning everyone “to honor the God who truly exists, not because he himself was in need of such honor . . . but because he wanted to lead the human race . . . to the primal and most perfect good” (Decal. ). Cf. on Hum. , . § . proselytes. References in the Torah to gerim (“strangers” or “aliens”) are usually rendered in the LXX with προσ=λυτοι (Wevers , , ), which Philo takes to mean proselytes, though his more customary designation for such individuals is 1π=λυτοι or related terms (e.g., Hum. –; Nob. ; cf. Birnbaum , ). at once. Stoic doctrine made no allowance for degrees or intermediate states of virtue and vice (e.g., Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; Long and Sedley ,  explain this as a manifestation of the Stoics’ monistic psychology). Thus the soul that is making progress “deals in absolute badness right up to its acquisition of the absolute and perfect good.” At that point the sage “changes (μεταβαλ8ν) in a moment from the greatest possible worthlessness to an unsurpassable virtuous character, and has suddenly shed all the vice of which he failed to remove even a part over a considerable time” (Plutarch, Virt. prof. c–d; cf. Comm. not. e, e, quoted below, a, quoted above; further, SVF .–). This state supervenes only after much progress and without the sage’s awareness (Philo, Agr. ; Plutarch, Comm. not. e, b). The transition of Philo’s proselyte to a life of virtue is similarly instantaneous and complete, though it occurs as a matter of conscious choice, when he accepts and is accepted by God. Cf. Praem. ; Winston , . moderate, self-controlled, modest, gentle, kind, humane, reverent, just, high-minded, lovers of truth, superior to the love of goods and pleasure. The amended life that non-Jews attain through admission to the Mosaic polity encompasses a whole spectrum of the sorts of virtues to which people in the Greco-Roman world aspired generally. For a similar

on repentance, §§ –



list, see Musonius Rufus, frg. ..– (cf. ..–; ..–): “God’s command and law is that we be just, kind, beneficent, temperate, high-minded, superior to toils, superior to pleasures, free of all envy and malice.” Cf. Josephus, Ant. .; and on Hum. , . With regard to its internal structure, the first nine items in Philo’s catalogue are single terms, beginning and ending with words that have the same stem (σ8φρων and μεγαλφρων). This is followed by the compound terms ληεας 1ραστα and κρεττους χρημ,των κα 9δον$ς. If the latter is taken as naming two qualities, the total tally of virtues is brought up to twelve, a number of significance elsewhere in the Exposition, especially with reference to the twelve tribes and the twelve signs of the zodiac, e.g., Opif. ; Mos. ., , , ; Spec. .; ., ; Praem. . The arrangement of items within the list reflects some of the same terminological connections drawn by Philo in De humanitate. For example, σ8φρων is associated with 1γκρατ=ς in Hum. , while Zμερος is paired with χρηστς at Hum.  (cf. § ), and χρηστς with φιλ,νρωπος at Hum. , . undisciplined, shameless, unjust, irreverent, small-minded, quarrelsome, friends of falsehood and perjury. It was customary to juxtapose a list of virtues with a list of corresponding vices so as to dramatize the breadth of difference between opposing choices or ways of life, for example, Epictetus, Diatr. ..– (cf. ..–): “You have but to will a thing and it has happened, the reform has been made . . . Instead of shameless, you will be self-respecting; instead of faithless, faithful; instead of dissolute, self-controlled.” Cf.  Macc :–; Gal :–; Col :–; QS IV –; Ceb. tab. .–.; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .– ; Julius Pollux, Onom. .–; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .. Philo uses virtue/vice lists to delineate the convert’s moral transformation also in Abr.  (quoted in Parallel exegesis); see also Sacr. –; Mut. ; cf. on Nob. . The Alexandrian was especially adept at crafting vice catalogues, most famously at Sacr. , but for comparable rolls see also Post. ; Agr. ; Praem. , ; Prov. .. The Stoics held that those who have yet to achieve the perfection of the sage “are all in the same degree vicious and unjust and unreliable and foolish” (Plutarch, Comm. not. e). Lists like the one here show Philo’s basic view of the nonJewish world to be similar. Further, Vögtle , –; Kamlah , –. The list here is coordinated, though only partially, with the preceding list of virtues (cf. Alexandre , ). The lead terms, κλαστος and σ8φρων, form a conventional antithesis (cf. Plato, Leg. a–c; Philo,



commentary

Nob. ; etc.), while νασχυντος contrasts with α>δ=μων, δικος with δκαιος, σεμνος with σεμνς (though at this point the order changes), and Hλιγφρων with μεγαλφρων, while “friends of falsehood and perjury” counters “lovers of truth.” As with the catalogue of virtues, the first set of items consists of single terms (though there are only six to match the previous nine), followed by a set of compound terms. Once we move beyond the first of the latter, however, the structure of the list quickly deteriorates, as our author cannot help but dilate on the non-proselytes’ overindulgence in food, drink, and sex. Critiques of extravagant banqueting abound in the Philonic corpus, e.g., Opif. –; Ebr. –; Somn. .–, –; Ios. –; Spec. .; ., ; Contempl. –; cf. Wendland , –; further, Edwards , –, . (c) § . to amend our life. One of the principal goals of philosophical instruction is “to civilize and amend (μεαρμζειν) the intractable and untutored elements of the human character” (Plutarch, Alex. fort. a); cf. Hum. . he says that this matter is not excessive nor far removed. In Philo’s interpretation, Deut :– is addressed not only to Jews who have broken their covenant with God (cf. Mut. –), but also to non-Jews who would join this covenant. In its original context, Deut  conveys Moses’ assurance to the Israelites that they will be restored from the exile to which they will have been sentenced (cf. Praem. ) once they “return to the Lord.” Deut :– both encourages and challenges them to do so, arguing that the terms of the covenant are neither unintelligible nor inaccessible (Tigay , –): “Because this commandment which I command you today is not excessive (Dπ!ρογκος) nor is it far (μακρ,ν) from you. It is not in the heaven above . . . nor is it beyond the sea (π!ραν τ$ς αλ,σσης) . . . The word is very near (1γγ:ς . . . σφδρα) you, in your mouth and in your heart and in your hands to do it.” Philo abbreviates the citation by dropping the pair of indirect questions in vv.  and . He also changes the subject of the discourse from 9 1ντολ+ αRτη (presumably a reference to the rest of Deuteronomy) to τ πρOγμα, so that what is now “near” is not the law per se, but the proselyte’s opportunity to convert and follow the law. Elsewhere, he takes “this commandment” as a reference to the good (Post. ; Somn. .; Praem. ) or to virtue (Prob. ). Bar :–, meanwhile, takes it as a reference to wisdom, while in Rom :– the text is subjected to a christological reading (cf. Koch , –; Bekken ). nor at the ends of the earth, nor across the great sea. PLCL . (cf. Cohn , –) explains that the insertion of γ$ς οIτε π!-

on repentance, §§ –



ραν, which is supported by none of the mss, is justified by parallel Philonic constructions where the reference to sea in Deut : is similarly expanded to include both land and sea. It is worth noting, however, that Philo can cite the text without such expansion (Post. ) and that variations exist in the formulae employed for the expanded version, the closest to ours being Praem.  (π!ραν αλ,ττης F 1ν 1σχατιαAς γ$ς), which reverses the order of items, and Mut.  (περ,των γ$ς κα αλ,ττης), which lacks 1σχατιαAς; cf. Somn. .; Spec. .. For 1σχατιαAς αλ,ττης, cf. Aelius Aristides, Panath. .. mouth is a symbol of speech, heart of intentions, and hands of actions; in these there is good fortune. The same symbolic meanings are drawn from Deut : in Post. ; Somn. .; Praem. ; Prob.  (cf. Leg. .; .; Spec. .). In Mut. –, Philo explains that Moses mentions these three parts of the human person because they correspond to the three basic categories or venues of human morality (cf. Conf. ; Congr. ; Mos. .; Spec. .). When they are brought into accord for the good, one achieves eudaimonia (cf. Praem. ). Of the three, to be wrong in the area of intentions is the least serious but the most difficult to reform, while to be wrong in the area of actions is the most serious and therefore warrants the most severe punishments. Philo offers an interpretation of Deut :– in Praem.  that closely approximates the one given in Paen. –, except for an addendum further defining the eudaimonia achieved through the three-fold harmony as wisdom and prudence, the former standing for the worship of God and the latter for the management of human life (cf. Deut :; and for the canon of two virtues, see on § ). Further, Cohen , –. § . when they are at odds with one another. Because the disposition of the wicked man is inherently discordant, he comes to despise the virtuous and everything that they think, do, or say, “for it is impossible and unviable that concord should ever come into being from harmony and disharmony” (QG .). The sophists are a particularly egregious example of individuals whose words do not correspond with their choices or their actions (e.g., Post. ). this harmony. When someone’s teaching about virtue conforms with his practice, he seems “to be genuinely musical, producing the most beautiful harmony (Yρμοναν), not on the lyre or some other pleasurable instrument, but actually rendering his own life harmonious (σ:μφωνον) by fitting his deeds to his words” (Plato, Lach. d, cf. e; Aristotle, Pol. ..; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Epictetus, Ench. ; Plutarch, Stoic. rep. b; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .). For Philo,



commentary

of course, Moses’ life is a special instance of such harmony (Mos. .), and in this he sets an example for his followers (Mos. ., cf. .; Ios. ; Spec. .; Hum. ; QE .). In C. Ap. .–, Josephus extols Moses’ special accomplishment as a legislator by highlighting his ability to put deeds into harmony with words, thereby making the truth of his doctrines more accessible to the masses, educating them through both verbal instructions and training in character (cf. Barclay , –). beloved by God and a lover of God. Those who are God-lovers are also God-beloved, since any affection one expresses for God is necessarily reciprocated (Abr. ; Prob. ; cf. Her. ; Paen. ). The descendents of Abraham and Sarah comprise the most beloved by God of all nations (Abr. ; cf. Birnbaum , –), while the love between God and Moses, evident especially through the execution of latter’s priesthood, was unsurpassed (Mos. .; cf. Hum. ). According to Mos. ., certain people joined the Jews in their departure from Egypt because they were attracted to the nation’s God-beloved quality (cf. Hypoth. .). You chose God today to be God to you, and the Lord chose you today to be a people to him. The block of laws presented in Deut – concludes in :– with Israel and God making mutual declarations of acceptance. Deut :a + a is quoted here with only minor modifications. The citation of v. a alters σου to σοι, while in the citation of v. a, σε and περιο:σιον (cf. Exod :; Deut :) are dropped, and the order of ατ< and λαν is reversed. In the original context of Deuteronomy, each pronouncement is accompanied by specific commitments made by the covenant partners to one another (cf. Rendtorff , –, –, –). Israel will observe God’s ordinances and “obey his voice” (v. b), while God will raise his people “above all the nations” (v. ). As Birnbaum (, –) notes, Philo ignores these conditions so as to focus on reciprocal acceptance, not obedience to the law, as the basis upon which proselytes enter the Jewish community. Cf. Alexandre , – . The text printed for this sentence in PCW . is from S, with support for all significant variants provided by Clement, Strom. ... In lieu of ε]λου, C has ντηλλ,ξω and G2 has ντηλλαξ,τω, while in lieu of ε]λατο, C and G2 both read ντηλλ,ξατο. Such variants could hardly represent misreadings, but reflect the influence of the Aquilan translation, which uses the verb ντηλλ,ξω (“to exchange, take in exchange”) in Deut : (though what this is supposed to mean is far from clear: Nelson , ). Runia (, ) suggests that the replacement of τν εν by τν κ:ριον in C, G2, and of τ /ν by εν in C (G2 has ε<) also

on repentance, §§ –



reflects Aquilan variants, and takes all of this as support for Barthélemy’s () theory of a Jewish interpolator. For full discussion of the variants, see Katz , –; Royse , –; cf. on Hum. . § . mutuality of choice. One of the earliest and most crucial steps in the establishment of the ideal Platonic state is taken when the people make the right choice (α]ρεσις) between alternative βοι (Leg. e–e; cf. βος in § ). One of these is the “healthy” life, the life of temperance and the other virtues, which in all respects is pleasant and gentle. Opposed to this is the life of ignorance, licentiousness, and vice, which is characterized as extreme and violent. Selecting the former ensures that the “whole existence” of each citizen will be more fortunate (εδαιμον!στερον). Conversion to the Mosaic polity similarly entails a decision to choose what is excellent and abandon what is base (Praem. ; cf. Spec. .; .; Josephus, Ant. .). By the same token, Philo is also careful to point out that the freedom to make such a choice is in fact a limited freedom. As he puts it in a fragment from the lost fourth book of Legum allegoriae, “strictly speaking the human mind does not choose the good through itself, but in accordance with the thoughtfulness of God” (translation from Winston , , who emphasizes the Stoic background of Philo’s reflections on freedom and determinism). The opportunity to repent, then, is provided only through the grace and forethought of God (Leg. ., ; Cher. ; Abr. –; QG .; .; cf. Plutarch, Sera d–e; Dietrich , –; Bailey , ). Read through the lens of Deuteronomy :–, the dynamics of this opportunity are interpreted as a reciprocity of choice: God “anticipates the intent” (προαπαντOν τ< βουλ=ματι) of the convert, while the convert makes the decision to become God’s suppliant and servant. In discussing the welcome accorded proselytes, Josephus underscores how the affinity that Moses’ followers feel for one another is a matter not so much of birth as of choosing the right way of life (C. Ap. .). the Existent. See on Nob. . God accepts the suppliant as his own. Since the Israelites themselves were προσ=λυτοι in Egypt and suppliants of God, they understand that the proselytes’ journey leads them away from polytheism and towards familiarity (ο>κεωσις; cf. 1ξοικειο(σαι here) with honoring the one God and Father of all (QE .; cf. Mos. .–; Leg. .). The experience of Tamar would appear to be paradigmatic in this regard. Upon seeing the light of truth, she deserts to the Israelite camp and becomes God’s “servant and suppliant” (Nob. ; cf. Spec. .; Praem. –; QG .). For Philo’s language of supplication, see on Hum. .



commentary

even should he be one in number. Philo infers from its use of σοι and σε that Deut :– does not speak to proselytes en masse but addresses each one individually. In Decal. –, he explains that such use of the second-person singular in divine discourse is meant to teach “that each single person, when he is law-abiding and obedient to God, is equal in worth to a whole nation (>στιμς 1στιν 3λ<ω ;νει).” insofar as he makes his own choice. The meaning of κα,περ ατς αρεAται is so unclear that PCH . translates instead Mangey’s (, ) proposed correction, λλοι ε?ρηται (referring to Decal. –; see above). The translation in PLCL . (“what God’s own choice makes him”) depends on reading κα 3περ in lieu of κα,περ (cf. .). The translation used here is from Katz , . Cf. PAPM .: “du fait qu’il est choisi.” § . the helmsman. The helmsman has responsibility for the safety and welfare of his sailors, not vice versa, an observation that could be applied to the art of ruling, as in Hum. ; QG .; cf. Plato, Pol. e– a; Resp. e, d; Leg. e. the general . . . the sage. Philo was familiar with the Stoic paradox that the sage alone is king, since he alone is capable of ruling responsibly, e.g., Sobr. ; Migr. ; Mut. ; Somn. .–; Abr. ; QG . (cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; Cicero, Mur. ; Clement, Strom. ..; Höistad , –; also on Hum. ). By extension he is not only a king, but also a general (Plutarch, Reg. imp. apophth. b; Tranq. an. a; Stoic. rep. b–e; Clement, Strom. ..). In fact, “no one is consul or praetor or general, no one even a police magistrate, except for the sage” (Cicero, Acad. .). Such language served as a way of communicating the preeminent and indispensable role that the sage played in the world, which, as Philo puts it elsewhere, is that of “the first of the human race, as a pilot in a ship or a ruler in a city or a general in war” (Abr. ). defended by that impregnable wall. Antisthenes likened the sage’s reasonings to walls (τεχη) of defense which never crumble or are betrayed (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .). For the psychic citadel that the sage constructs to protect himself from vice, cf. Leg. .; Migr. ; Somn. .; Prob. . Such martial imagery was especially popular among the Stoics, e.g., Epictetus, Diatr. ..–; ..; Seneca, Ep. .–; .–; though cf. Sent. Pythag. : >σχς κα τεAχος κα 3πλον το( σοφο( 9 φρνησις. Further, Malherbe . reverence for God. Philo uses εοσ!βεια interchangeably with εσ!βεια (for which see on Fort. ), e.g., Spec. .–. In Opif.  it is

on repentance, §§ –



hailed as “the greatest of virtues,” an epithet used also of piety in Spec. .. Cf. Abr. ; Mos. .; Spec. .; and for the particular usage here,  Macc :. The term is found only infrequently outside of Jewish texts, though cf. Ps.-Plato, Epin. c, a. Further, Wander , –.

Parallel Exegesis In Abr. –, Philo analyzes the nature of repentance within the context of a three-tiered scheme of moral types (the so-called lesser trinity). In the lowest class is Enosh (cf. Gen :), the lover of hope, who is eager to gain true excellence. His name means νρωπος since only those who set their hopes on God can be called truly human (§§ –). Representative of the second class is Enoch, the “recipient of grace,” whose “transference” in Gen : symbolizes his “changing from a worse life to a better,” a turning brought about by divine forethought (προμ=εια), which explains why it was beneficial (§§ –). The two-fold meaning of “he was not found” in the biblical text is then revealed. First, it refers to the fact that the convert’s previous life is blotted out. Second, it indicates that in his new life he will be “naturally hard to find” (§ ). The latter observation segues into a drawn-out digression (no doubt with certain autobiographical touches, cf. Spec. .–) extolling the advantages of the solitary life (§§ –). While the worthless man haunts public spaces and meddles in his neighbors’ affairs, the man of worth prefers a life of seclusion and study, which better enables him to pass “from ignorance to instruction, from folly to prudence, from cowardice to courage, from impiety to piety, and again from voluptuousness to self-control, from vaingloriousness to simplicity” (§ ). For all the benefits it confers, though, repentance still comes second to perfection. The latter is symbolized by Noah, whose name means both “just” and “rest,” the former representing the chief of the virtues, the latter the opposite of turmoil and confusion (§§ –). A man who was “just and perfect in his generation” (Gen :), Noah acquired all the virtues and exercised them continually (§§ –). Cf. VanderKam , –. The parallel account of the three-fold scheme given in Praem. – opens with very similar comments about Enosh (§§ –). Superior to him and in second place is Enoch, who was “suddenly possessed” with a yearning to abandon his inbred vices and “seek refuge” in the life of virtue (§ ). The prizes awarded him for this choice (α]ρεσις) are of two types



commentary

(§ ). First, “transference” signifies the new home given him after fleeing his native land, friends, and family (§ ). Second, “not found” refers to his solitude. The convert must shun great gatherings of people, since “a crowd is another name for everything that is disorderly, indecorous, discordant, culpable” (§ ). The first place, again, is awarded to Noah, the one who attained to justice. He, too, receives a pair of prizes, salvation from general destruction and the custody of all living things (§§ –).

Nachleben In Strom. ..–.., Clement treats material from De paenitentia as though it were an extension of the attacks on pretentiousness that conclude De humanitate, showing no interest in what the former has to say about proselyte conversion (cf. the comments on repentance in ..– ..). In the selection of material, focus is placed on those passages where Philo is interpreting biblical texts: Num : in Hum. –; Deut : in Paen. ; and Deut :– in Paen. –. Clement adheres to Philo’s paraphrase of Num : at the end of §  closely, together with the first reason given as to why pretentiousness offends God in § . However, rather than proceeding to describe the pretentious man or his punishment (§§ –), Clement transitions without interruption to Paen.  and the instructions about repentance that Deut : is supposed to convey: “For pretentiousness is a vice of the soul, of which, as of other sins, he orders us to repent, adapting our way of life from discord to a change for the better through these three things: mouth, heart, hands” (..), the three items being assigned the same symbolic value as in Paen.  (..; cf. Protr. ..–). While Clement follows the wording of Hum.  + Paen.  closely (perhaps most notably altering μεαρμζεσαι to Yρμοζομ!νοις), the resulting fusion significantly alters the application of the biblical text. Mouth, heart, and hands now represent not the harmony that proselytes attain at conversion, but the three areas of the moral life in which the readers are to repent of their sins (cf. Mut. –), especially pretentiousness. Clement then follows his source in connecting this verse with Deut :–, which is cited in the same version Philo offers in § , except for changing σοι (back) to σου (..). The ensuing interpretation draws on the first sentence of § : “For him who strives to serve the Existent, being a suppliant, God accepts as his own.” Clement retains the identification of the penitent (not proselyte) as God’s suppliant and servant, but abbreviates the description

on repentance, §§ –



of divine action, dropping references to the mutuality of choice, that is, to God accepting the suppliant “without delay” and to God’s anticipation of the suppliant’s intent. This focus on the penitent continues into .., where Clement offers his own interpretation of Philo’s statement regarding the significance of the proselyte “though he be only one in number” (§ ). As van den Hoek (, ) observes, Philo’s argument that a virtuous individual stands against the worth of a multitude, “is transposed by Clement to the unity and diversity of the believers and the admission in the fullness of Christ” (cf. Strom. ..). For the latter’s concept of restoration, or ποκατ,στασις, see Méhat . Further reading: Alexandre ; Bailey , –; Dietrich , –; Holtz , –; Michel ; Nave , –; Winston .

ON NOBILITY (§§ 187–227)

Analysis/General Comments Anyone who has studied biblical genealogies appreciates the importance ancient Israelites attached to matters of kinship and descent. In fact, the ability to trace one’s lineage to a notable forebear constituted one of the most important means for asserting one’s place, power, and status in Jewish society (Wilson ). Claims regarding ethnicity and ancestry continued to play an important role for Jews in the Second Temple period, even as the processes informing the negotiation of identity became increasingly contested and multifaceted (e.g., Porton ; Cohen ; Barclay , –). To take just one example, in keeping with ancient biographical (e.g., Plutarch, Pyrrh. .–) and encomiastic (e.g., Menander Rhetor, Epid. .) conventions, Josephus establishes his credentials in the opening of his Vita by recounting his noble (i.e., priestly and royal) family lines (§§ –). In Roman society, of course, issues of ancestry were fundamental to the arrangements of power, prestige, and privilege for many centuries (Gelzer ; Crawford ). Yet by the time of Augustus, the number and influence of great families had diminished significantly. As the rise of new nobiles became commonplace, there was an increasing need to reassess nobility as a concept. In particular, explaining the relationship of noble birth to virtue became a common topic, especially in philosophical circles. This was not a new discussion, however, but one that had roots in Greek thought (Vessey ). For example, treatises περ εγενεας are attributed to Aristotle (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .), Metrodorus (., ), Diogenes of Babylon (Athenaeus, Deipn. e), and Plutarch (frgs. –); cf. Stobaeus, Anth. .. According to a schema attributed to Plato, claims to eugeneia normally come in four different forms. The first depends on good ancestors, that is, ancestors who were beautiful, honorable, and just. The second depends on princely ancestors, that is, ancestors who held high political posts. The third depends on illustrious ancestors, that is, ancestors who held military command or won renown in the games. The fourth and (Plato thinks) highest form of nobility is due to an individual’s own excellence, especially his generosity and high-mindedness (Diogenes Laertius,



commentary

Vit. phil. .–). As this example indicates, the analysis of nobility often entailed making distinctions between conflicting opinions as to its true source. The treatment of eugeneia in Aristotle’s On Nobility, of which several fragments have been preserved, is of particular interest, since it is possible that Philo drew from this treatise (and related Aristotelian texts) when writing De nobilitate (Schuhl , –). One portion of the extant text (frg. –) surveys competing definitions of the subject (Schuhl , –). Lycophron, to begin with, is said to have held that any discussion of nobility is moot, since there is no difference between the nobly born and the lowly born, while Socrates is quoted as saying that nobility is a matter of having noble, that is, virtuous, ancestors. Simonides, meanwhile, is reported as stating that nobility depends on having a long line of affluent ancestors. For his own part, Aristotle develops what might be referred to as an aristocratic theory of nobility, according to which it is that form of moral excellence which is transmitted to individuals from their ancestors: “Those are correct who give preference to ancient excellence . . . for nobility is excellence of stock (ρετ+ γ!νους) . . . Now this happens when the stock has a good start. For an origin has the power of producing many products like itself. When, therefore, there has been a man of this kind in the stock—a man so good that many generations inherit his goodness—that particular stock is bound to be good.” This is because “the origin counts more than anything else.” Therefore individuals are noble “not if their father is nobly born, but if the originator of the stock is so” (frg. ; translations from Chroust , ; cf. Schuhl , –). Other passages in the Aristotelian corpus expand on this basic description. In the Politica, for instance, the Stagerite repeats the definition of nobility as “excellence of stock,” adding that those who possess such excellence are citizens to a greater extent than those who do not. Within the same context he makes two additional assumptions, namely, that the well-born will also be free and wealthy, and that they are the most fit to hold political office (..–; cf. ..; ..). Elsewhere, in drawing a distinction between noble birth and noble character, he implies that a moral responsibility is imposed on each succeeding generation for the continuation of its excellent pedigree: “The idea of noble birth (εγεν!ς) refers to excellence of stock, that of noble character (γενναAον) to not degenerating from the family type, a quality not as a rule found in those of noble birth, most of whom are good for nothing. For in the generations of men there is a kind of crop as in the fruits of the field; sometimes, if the

on nobility, §§ –



race is good, for a certain period men out of the common are born in it, and then it deteriorates” (Rhet. ..; cf. Pol. ..; ..). Descent from noble stock, then, is no guarantee of one’s own nobility, especially if one is far-removed generationally from the originator of that stock’s eugeneia (cf. on §  below). While Aristotle’s aristocratic stance on nobility continued to have its proponents throughout antiquity (e.g., Ps.-Plutarch, frg. ), by Philo’s time the position represented generally by followers of the Stoic school was regnant, especially in philosophical circles, where the “ancestry vs. virtue” topos became so common that it could be the subject of satire (e.g., Juvenal, Sat. ). In particular, the Stoic doctrine of the sage was intrinsically opposed to the notion of inherited nobility: “Any man, whatever his social status or ethnic origin, had within him the innate potentiality of achieving uirtus” (Vessey , ). Typical in this regard are Seneca’s reflections in Ep. . While certain privileges are reserved for the well-born, “a noble mind is free to all” since anyone can choose to study philosophy (§ ). Neither Socrates nor Cleanthes came from distinguished families; “philosophy did not find Plato already a nobleman, it made him one” (§ ). If Lucilius conducts himself in a manner worthy of such sages, he can claim them all as his ancestors, since true nobility resides in virtue (§§ , ). Issues of birth are irrelevant anyway, since the vicissitudes of time and fortune have jumbled everyone’s family lines, a point made by Plato (Theaet. e): “Every king springs from a race of slaves, and every slave has had kings among his ancestors” (§ ; cf. Ben. ..–). Even if we have glorious forebears, they cannot live our lives for us or lend us their glory. Rather “the soul alone renders us noble” (§ ). As Seneca’s letter illustrates, the use of historical exempla is common in such discourse, as is the appeal to authoritative Greek sources. Indeed, the idea that the true or highest form of nobility derives not from aristocratic birth but from personal merit is one that was pervasive in Greek literature, and is expressed not only by Plato, but by authors such as Democritus, Euripides, Menander, and Anaximenes (McDonald , –); further, Vessey ; Alexandre , –. Philo was hardly impervious to these sorts of reflections, though in his application of the topos he focuses primarily not on social distinctions (e.g., slave vs. free), but on religious-ethnic ones (Holtz , –). As we have seen, the Alexandrian was familiar with the Stoic paradox that the sage alone is king (see on Hum. ; Paen. ). An aspect and implication of this is that the sage alone is noble (SVF .–; Plutarch, Adul. am. e), a concept with which he was also familiar. In



commentary

Sobr. –, for example, he explains that only the one who has obtained wisdom can, like Abraham, obtain friendship with God (cf. Gen :). Therefore he alone is rich, he alone is of high repute, he alone is king, he alone is free, and “he alone is nobly born, for he has registered God as his father and become by adoption his only son” (cf. Prob. , – ). This is not to say, however, that in Philo’s depiction of the Mosaic politeia matters of ancestry are altogether irrelevant. The pure descent of its priests, for instance, is assumed (e.g., Spec. ., , ; though, as Himmelfarb ,  notes, Philo is also concerned to show that “priestly status reflects some kind of merit”), and ethnos is used freely throughout the Exposition in reference to both the biblical Israelites and the contemporary Jewish community (Birnbaum , ). Philo reminds his readers that Moses forbade marriage with λλοενεAς (Spec. .; cf. Cohen , –). Indeed, the offspring of such unions constitute a “bastard host,” over against “true-born” Israelites (Mos. ., cf. .). As we have seen, proselytes of Egyptian extraction may be initiated into same polity as “the native- and nobly-born,” but only after three generations (Hum. ). As Philo acknowledges in Nob. , individuals born into noble families do enjoy certain advantages, insofar as they grow up surrounded by models of good conduct, and it may be the case that one owes the title of nobly-born not to oneself alone, but “to the surpassing virtues of father, grandfather, and ancestors” (Ios. ). Even those who have betrayed their noble lineage through wrongdoing are said to retain certain “seeds” or “roots” of nobility which can be nurtured so as to produce qualities conducive to virtue (Praem. –). Balancing such statements, however, is Philo’s repeated emphasis that nobility depends ultimately not on any inheritance from one’s ancestors but on the decision to live a life of holiness and virtue. In Hum. –, for example, he refers to the patriarchs’ descendants as “noble and wellbred,” but then quickly adds that the most essential form of kinship is that which one establishes with the divine. Claims to Jewish ancestry and kinship are in fact worthless unless substantiated in a commitment to piety and honoring God (Abr. –; Spec. .). This is because among the good there is no kinship but holiness (Mos. .). Thus what truly matters for the politeia is not nobility of birth but nobility of the soul and of the spirit (e.g., Ios. ; Mos. .; Fort. ). In Spec. .– , Philo expresses a particular concern with those who take pride in their high birth but then through their misconduct ruin the prestige of their ancestral heritage. He concedes that the virtues exhibited in the

on nobility, §§ –



founders of the Jewish ethnos are like “imperishable plants” inasmuch as they confer benefits to generation after generation of descendants, even to those who are morally unworthy of them (cf. Praem. ). Yet this special legacy bears with it special responsibility: “Let no one think that good lineage is a perfect blessing and then make light of noble actions, but reflect that greater anger is due to one who while his parentage is of the best brings shame upon his parents by the wickedness of his ways. For the one who has his own examples of excellent character to copy but reproduces nothing so as to accomplish a sound life is surely guilty” (Spec. .; cf. Ios. , ; Mos. .). The nobly born who falsify the excellence of their high lineage not only alienate themselves from their kin (Spec. .), ultimately they “will be dragged right down and carried into Tartarus itself,” while the proselyte, the one who has decided to join the camp of God, will enjoy a place firmly fixed in the heavens (Praem. ). Insofar as eugeneia consists not in having the right ancestors but in making the right choices, it has a close connection with metanoia (the subject of De paenitentia), and it is significant that in De nobilitate Philo’s two most prominent examples of admirable individuals born of ignoble families, Abraham and Tamar, are proselytes (§§ –). The former is even held up as “a standard of nobility for all proselytes” (§ ). Because the Mosaic politeia is predicated wholly on virtues and laws that promote virtue, it is possible for those outside the ethnos to convert their foreignness into a tie of kinship by means of “a transcendency of virtues” (Spec. .). Philo summarizes his position in Spec. .: God approves all those who embrace the truth in purity, whether they are proselytes, “because their judgment led them to make the passage to piety,” or native-born, “because they were not false to the nobility of their birth” (cf. Josephus, C. Ap. .). By applying the “ancestry vs. virtue” topos in this manner, Philo participates in a broader political conversation about the proper criteria for determining the composition of the ideal politeia. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for example, explains that originally the Romans assigned positions of authority not to those possessed of great fortunes or a long line of illustrious ancestors, but to those who were morally worthy, “for we look upon the eugeneia of men as consisting in nothing else than virtue” (Ant. rom. ..; cf. part  of the Introduction). As the following outline indicates, De nobilitate contributes to the discussion of eugeneia in the Exposition principally through the exploration of specific historical examples. As Borgen (, –) observes, the survey in §§ – is comparable to lists of biblical persons found in



commentary

other sources, e.g., Sir :–:;  Macc :–;  Macc :–; Heb :–; cf. Leg. .–. The parallel with Wis :– is particularly instructive, insofar as it similarly contrasts heroic and villainous types, and the individuals reviewed remain anonymous. Philo’s tendency “to identify scriptural characters or groups of people with ways or kinds of thinking” (Runia , ) is evident at many points in the subtreatise. As for its basic structure, comparison may also be made with Valerius Maximus, Mem. . (“Of those born in a humble situation who became illustrious”) and . (“Of those who degenerated from famous parents”). () The introduction contrasts the common conception of nobility, according to which it is predicated on ancient wealth and renown (§ ), with the true conception, according to which it is established in the faculty of reason (§ ). The main thesis of the treatise follows: the virtuous alone are noble regardless of their ancestry, while the wicked offspring of nobility have relinquished any right to the title (§ ). (a) The first major section (§§ –) dilates on the second part of the thesis. In his conduct, the fool born from a noble line not only estranges himself from the moral excellence of his ancestors (§ ), he also sullies the family name (§ ). Thus his father is right to cut him off (§ ). Just as his ancestors’ health and strength are of no use to him when he becomes ill, their virtues cannot remedy his vices (§§ –). (b) Personified Nobility then appears to condemn such rebellious offspring (§§ –). True eugeneia, she says, it attained not through ancestry but by practicing truth, humility, and self-restraint. Those who practice instead vice and yet still pretend to nobility earn her enmity. Indeed, their behavior is inexcusable since, unlike the low born, they enjoyed the advantage of growing up surrounded by models of good conduct. (c) The ensuing section (§§ –) provides examples in support of the second part of the thesis, showing that its principle is reflected in human history and experience. While all of the individuals discussed are familiar from the Jewish scriptures, the fact that none of them is mentioned by name lends the lessons to be drawn a more universal relevance. As Philo explains in § , the first three examples represent “landmarks common to all people.” (d) To begin with there is Cain (§§ –). As the first child of the first wedded pair, he was born under extraordinary circumstances. Nevertheless, he committed the worst of abominations and polluted the earth with blood, suffering divine retribution in the form of countless deaths.

on nobility, §§ –



(e) Next there is Ham (§§ –), whose father was a man of exceptional piety and nobility. Yet he disgraced his father when he mocked him for a certain lapse in judgment, exposing what should have remained hidden, and so became not only accursed himself but also a source of misfortune for all his descendents. (f) Departing from the canonical order, Philo next discusses Adam (§§ –). Although he alone in human history could claim to have a divine father, having been formed directly by God (§§ –), he corrupted the divine image in his soul by disregarding the good and choosing evil. He thereby forfeited a blessed life of immortality for one of pain, death, and misfortune (§ ). (g) The final two examples are peculiar to the Jews, since even among the founders of that race there were individuals who derived no benefit from the virtues of their forebears (§ ). Of Abraham’s many children, for instance, all but one failed to imitate their father’s excellent qualities and so were banished from their heritage (§ ). (h) Of Isaac’s children, in turn, only the younger was well-pleasing, while the elder was disobedient, on account of an inability to control his desires (§ ). He was therefore subordinated to his brother, since fools must never be left to their own devices (§ ). Yet he rebelled even against that authority and so became the source of reproach both to himself and to his descendants, serving as further proof that nobility is of no value to those morally unworthy of it (§ ). (a) The second major section (§§ –) takes up the first part of the thesis, furnishing examples of virtuous individuals born of ignoble parents. Following a transitional statement (§ ), the section is divided into male (§§ –) and female (§§ –) examples, the latter being further divided into examples of free (§§ –a) and enslaved (§§ b–) women. (b) Abraham is accorded extended treatment, not only as an illustration of a virtuous man sprung from wicked parents, but as “a standard of nobility for all proselytes,” that is, for all those who forsake the ignobility of strange laws and join that polity which is governed by truth (§ ). Fathered by an astrologer and idolater, he abandoned his paternal home and its polytheistic beliefs in search of evidence regarding the existence and providence of the one and self-existent God (§§ –). Having acquired faith, “the most certain of the virtues,” he acquired all the other virtues as well, and so came to be acknowledged by his contemporaries as a king, a status confirmed by his prophetic appearance and ability (§§ –).



commentary

(c) Tamar likewise abandoned the darkness of the idolatry in which she was raised, committed herself to the cause of piety, and became a source of nobility for all those who followed her example (§§ –a). (d) Finally, we have Zilpah and Bilhah (§§ b–). Even though they were concubines, they were judged worthy to assume the status of married women (§ ), so that their children with Jacob were treated no differently than those born of his legitimate wives, even by their stepmothers (§ ) and stepbrothers (§ ). () The author concludes by rejecting those who admire noble lineage rather than noble actions (§ ) and affirming that the law judges persons according to their own merit and not that of their ancestors (§ ). It is not surprising that De nobilitate was a favorite with Renaissance scholars. It appears to have been the first of the Alexandrian’s works to be published in an English translation (by Lawrence Humphrey in ; see Hilgert , –; G-G –). As Runia (, ) also notes, Nob. – “is found as part of the late Byzantine cento De mundo, which was the first Philonic text to be printed” (by Aldus Manutius in ; see G-G ).

Detailed Comments () § . To those who laud nobility. Reading ΤοAς δE Dμνο(σι with the majority of mss, as suggested by Runia , . PCW . prints Δι κα τοAς Dμνο(σι, though this is supported only by F, while S has Κα τοAς Dμνο(σι. Variations among the mss as to the subtreatise’s opening suggest to Colson (PLCL .xviii) that copyists endeavored to link what had originally been a self-standing treatise (see parts  and  of the Introduction) to De paenitentia by appending a connecting conjunction. that which fosters the true good . . . to reside . . . in the governing part. Cf. on Hum. . For the imagery of a quality “residing” in the soul, cf. Opif. ; Spec. .; Paen. . § . gentleness and love of humanity. For this pairing, see on Hum. . As Runia (, ) notes, “Philo often conveys the biblical doctrine of God’s love for humanity with the term φιλανρωπα.” It is in God’s nature to exhibit humanity (e.g., Mos. .), which is a manifestation of his role as savior (Abr. ; cf. Titus :). Further, Opif. ; Abr. , ; Spec. .; Hum. . In the Greco-Roman world, divinities are “philanthropic” particularly by virtue of the benefactions they bestow on humanity. Ferguson (, –) notes that the term is applied espe-

on nobility, §§ –



cially to Prometheus, Heracles, and Asclepius. See, for example, Plato, Leg. d; Aelian, Nat. an. .; .; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Musonius Rufus, frg. ..– (cited above under Hum. ); Josephus, Ant. .; Plutarch, Numa .; Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. .; additional examples in Le Déaut ; Berthelot , –. no more fitting temple on earth than the faculty of reason. Elsewhere the head is described as a temple for the mind (QG .; QE ., ), and the soul as a temple for the indwelling of God (Somn. ., ). Cf. SVF .: “It is not necessary to build temples for the gods, but to have the divine in the mind alone.” It is the faculty of reason, or λογισμς, that serves as “ruler” within the governing part of the soul (Opif. , with Runia , –; cf. Plutarch, Virt. mor. c; Cohib. ira d). bears the good around as an image. On certain occasions statues of the gods were carried around in processions (van Kooten , – ). Elsewhere for Philo it is thoughts that the intellect bears around (e.g., Opif. , ; Hum. ), or the intellect itself is said to be carried about as an image by the body (e.g., Opif. , ; Mos. .). Runia (, ) calls γαλματοφορ!ω “perhaps the most remarkable of all the so-called verba Philonica” (i.e., words recorded only or for the first time by Philo among extant authors; see further Runia , –; Runia , –). Cf. Plato, Tim. c; Symp. b; Cicero, Leg. .– ; Sent. Sext. ; Porphyry, Marc. : “A shrine must be adorned for (the sage) because of wisdom in his heart, a shrine with a living statue, the intellect, for God imparts his form to the one who honors him.” those who have not tasted or even touched their lips to wisdom. For the figure, see on Hum. . silver and gold and honors and offices. Aspiring to such marks of worldly success is not objectionable as such, so long as they are acquired justly and used properly, for example, to help one’s friends and family or to serve one’s country (Fug. –; cf. Det. ; Sobr. ; Conf. ; Her. –). The Stoics listed noble birth, together with wealth, fame, and other such attributes as preferred indifferents (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .–; cf. on Fort. ), subordinate to the virtues (cf. Abr. ). As Cassius Dio complains, what some men look upon as good conduct often turns out to be an incentive to wrongdoing, for example, boasting of high birth, pride in wealth, loftiness of honors, conceit of power (Hist. rom. ..–). those put in command of basic services. This would include such things as magistracies assigned to the custody of prisoners or to defending the city walls (Aristotle, Pol. ..).



commentary

royal virtue. Since each virtue is sovereign over a certain aspect of life, the one who possesses them wields power like a king, e.g., Leg. .; Post. ; Congr. , ; Mut. ; Somn. .; Abr. . Cf. on § . having failed to see that light which is most brilliant. The omission of the last four words of the sentence in S together with the sudden change in metaphor suggest some sort of instability in the textual tradition. PCW . sets ργυρος . . . Dπηρεσαν off with dashes (so that the final phrase here applies to τινες) and prints a lacuna before αγοειδ!στατον. For further discussion, including a critique of Mangey’s translation of the sentence, see PLCL .. For the idea that material wealth is “blind” to the true riches of virtue, see on Hum. ; and on virtue’s supremely “brilliant” light, see on Hum.  (cf. Paen. ). § . a mind that has been purified. The faculty of reason is likened to a temple, “the good” being the divine image housed within it (see above). Those who would partake of its benefits, then, must purify their minds, just as those who intend to participate in sacred rites must purify their bodies (cf. Leg. .; Det. ; Abr. ; Praem. –, ; Plato, Phaed. c; Soph. c, b). The agent of such purging is perfect virtue (Somn. .; Spec. .; cf. Fug. ; Mut. ; Alexandre , – ). one must call only the moderate and just noble. Those who are good enjoy good fortune only because they are moderate and just, and they do so regardless of whether they are strong or weak, rich or poor (Plato, Leg. e, cf. d, c). With this statement Philo advances the first part of the subtreatise’s thesis; in §§ – he will support it with examples of individuals acknowledged to be noble not on account of anything good they inherited from their ancestors but because of the virtues they themselves exhibited. even if they happen to have been born from household slaves or from those bought with money. For our author, labels like “home-bred,” “purchased,” or “captured in war” are matters of human convention only, having no basis in the law of nature (Prob. ; cf. Abr. ; Spec. .; .; cf. Aristotle, Pol. ..). In this he approximates the Stoic position on slavery, for which see Bradley ; Garnsey . Hagar, for example, was “a slave in body, but free and nobly born in spirit . . . an Egyptian by race but a Hebrew by choice” (Abr. ; cf. Chariton, Chaer. ..). In their comportment, slaves may exhibit qualities of the free and well-born, just as those who are well-born often show themselves to be servile (Prob. –; cf. Epictetus, Diatr. ..; Dio Chrysostom, Or. .). Philo will give examples of the former in §§ b–.

on nobility, §§ –



to wicked offspring who have sprung from good parents let the estate of nobility be closed off. This is the second part of the subtreatise’s thesis and the theme of §§ –. Such offspring are rightly rejected both by their families (§§ –) and by Nobility herself (§§ –), a point illustrated with five examples (§§ –). (a) § . the fool is without home and city. The wicked man is unfit to have any part in the community of the wise or in the virtuous “city” of which they alone enjoy citizenship. Even should he sit as a councilor or hold administrative offices, he is an exile and a deserter from God, without home or city, e.g., Leg. .–; Gig. ; Congr. ; Prob. –; QG .. As Aristotle observes, the city-less man either ranks low in the scale of humanity or sets himself above it. Either way he is subject to condemnation (Pol. ..; cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .). In Zeno’s ideal polity, “the good alone are true citizens” (Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .); cf. Cicero, Acad. pr. .; Mur. . virtue is in reality the paternity of wise men. For the ancient debate concerning the relationship between nobility and virtue, see the Analysis/General comments. As Philo explains in Prob. , the glory of the sage differs from that of so-called heroes insofar as his is a matter of volition and virtue, not good birth. Cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. .: “And so when a man is well-born in respect to virtue, it is right to call him ‘noble,’ even if no one knows his parents or his ancestors either.” Further, Aristotle, Pol. ..; Cicero, Off. .; Plutarch, Mar. .. § . destroying their ancestral dignity. It was of the utmost importance to preserve the ξωμα of one’s noble lineage, particularly on those occasions when it had to be displayed in public venues, e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Plutarch, Arat. .. When a crime is committed by individuals who are nobly-born, the guilt is in effect doubled, since they not only disgrace themselves, they also discredit the honor of their families (Ios. ); cf. Isocrates, Areop. ; Plutarch, Her. mal. e– f. extinguishing whatever is illustrious in their family. The nobly born who have falsified the sterling of their high lineage will be dragged down into profound darkness (Praem. ). Yet, even if the illustriousness of the family is extinguished for a time, the remaining sparks of nobility can be fanned into a flame so that it shines with all its previous glory (Praem. ). For this use of λαμπρς, cf. Nob. , ; also Prob. ; Legat. ; Josephus, Vita , ; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..; Strabo, Geogr. ..; ..; Plutarch, Sull. ..



commentary

§ . affectionate fathers. For the affection fathers were expected to show for their children, see on Hum. ; cf. Nob. . to disinherit their sons. Disinheriting a bad son could be perceived as an act of virtue, e.g., Aristotle, Pol. ..; cf. Praem. ; QG .; Demosthenes, Or. .; Cicero, Rosc. Amer.  (with Dyck , – ); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ..–. In Plato’s Leges, a father may disown his son only after a vote of approval from the entire clan (e–d), while according to Lucian he must provide sufficient grounds for such action in a court of law (Abdic. , ). § . victors at the Olympic . . . games. Having an ancestor who won a victory at the Olympic games would serve as proof of an illustrious family, e.g., Pindar, Pyth. .–; Thucydides, Hist. ..; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; cf. Deus ; Agr. . § . just parents are no advantage to the unjust. Parents ought to bequeath to their offspring not only their property but also certain unwritten (see below) ancestral customs that show them how to live. Children who abide by such customs deserve to be commended because their obedience is freely given, in contrast to the situation with written laws, where compliance is enforced (Spec. .; cf. Aristotle, Rhet. ..). Cf. Prob. : the glory achieved by the wise derives from virtuous accomplishments “freely willed by themselves,” while that of socalled heroes is inherited from their ancestors “and is not of their own volition.” Cf. Nob. . chastisers. For the law as a κολαστ=ς of wrongdoers, see Josephus, Ant. .; Plutarch, Adv. Col. c. In Hum. , it is God who assumes this role. the lives of those who strive for virtue are unwritten laws. The popular notion that the king is a “living law” to his subjects (e.g., Mos. .; cf. Goodenough ; Klassen ) is extended to the virtuous, whose lives constitute “animate and reasonable laws” insofar as they establish both a standard for others to follow and a basis upon which written laws may be subsequently enacted. The preeminent examples of such individuals are the patriarchs, who had no teacher or guide except the law of nature (Abr. –). Abraham, then, was “a law himself and an unwritten statute” (Abr. ; cf. Decal. ). For a survey of the other ways in which the concept of unwritten law functions in Philo’s writings, see Martens . (b) § . if God were to shape nobility into a human form. In her speech, Nobility rebukes the rebellious children of noble parents for their vices (§ ), their hypocrisy (§ ), and their failure to emulate

on nobility, §§ –



the models of good conduct with which they grew up (§ ). For the anthropomorphic representation of abstract qualities such as virtues in antiquity, see Stafford . In Crito a–e, for example, Socrates carries on a dialogue with the laws of the city. A somewhat closer parallel comes from Cat. ., where Cicero has the personified Patria offer “testimony” against the accused: “She addresses you, Catiline, and though silent somehow makes this appeal to you: ‘For some years now you have been behind every crime, involved in every scandal, etc.’ ” Cf. Tzounakas . Further, cf. Plato, Leg. b–e; Teles, frg. .–; Demetrius, Eloc. –; Quintilian, Inst. ..–. In Greco-Roman art and literature the majority of such personifications are female (Nike, Eukleia, Hygieia, etc.); see Stafford . For the personification of virtues on imperial coinage, see Noreña . Also see the discussion of fictio personae in Lausberg , §§ –. modesty and truth and restrained passions and humility and innocence. For similar lists of virtues, cf. Somn. .; Herm. Sim. ..; Clement of Alexandria, Quis. div. .–; Marcus Aurelius, Med. .; .. shamelessness, falsehood, unrestrained passions, vanity, and the vices. The list of vices is made to mirror the list of virtues in a rather mechanical fashion. T. Dan. : has a similar though shorter list of contrasting virtues and vices; cf. Ebr. ; Somn. .; Contempl. ; Lucian, Dial. mort. .; Plotinus, Enn. ... For more on Philo’s catalogs of virtues and vices, see on Paen. . § . pretend to kinship by assuming a specious name. The sort of deceitful and hypocritical conduct portrayed in this paragraph was associated especially with flatterers, e.g., Plutarch, Praec. ger. rei publ. a; cf. Adol. poet. aud. a–b; Sterling , –. § . they have no kin as an example of excellence of character. παρ,δειγμα is Cohn’s (PCW .) addition, printed in brackets. As Colson notes, a “partitive genitive after μηδEν is doubtful Greek” (PLCL .). A similar expression is used in Spec. .. A term with “wellestablished class connotations” (Hobbs , ), καλοκγαα constituted one of the defining virtues of the ruling nobility, and so naturally occurs in tandem with εγ!νεια (e.g., Ios. ; Spec. .; cf. Plutarch, Arist. .; Vit. pud. b); see on Fort. ; Hum. , . The term will appear again at §§ , , . you stand under indictment, being born from great houses. When passing sentence on condemned criminals, the judge in Plato’s Leges is instructed to be more severe with citizens, since they failed to abstain



commentary

from malicious acts despite having the benefit of an excellent upbringing and education. If, on the other hand, the offender’s children manage to escape taking on their father’s bad character, they are to be held in honor (e–a). good models . . . in a way, have grown up with you. Philo may have in mind the portrait busts often found in elite homes: “the display of imagines of a patron’s ancestors in his atrium vividly illustrated his distinguished heritage and confirmed his high social status” (Stirling , ). On the nobilitas conveyed by such displays, see Montanari . to copy their excellence. Those blessed with noble lineage have an obligation to imitate the models of excellence their forebears have provided (Spec. .). In QG ., Philo explains that the well-born are “not those who have sprung from good fathers or grand-parents and are content with that alone, but those who are themselves emulators of their piety” (cf. Niehoff , ). (c) § . the possession of virtue. The task of acquiring virtue is a matter of the λογισμς alone (Leg. .; cf. Nob. ), and requires a life of austerity and toil (Spec. .); cf. Sacr. ; Det. ; Migr. ; Mut. ; Somn. .; Plato, Resp. e; Leg. c. that only the one who has this is noble . . . is clear from many things. Philo now proceeds to give scriptural illustrations of the points made in §§ –. (d) § . the earthborn man. The first negative example is Cain (§§ –). In the Exposition, his father is referred to not as Adam but as 2 γηγεν=ς (Opif. , , ; Abr. , ; Nob. ), underscoring his representative function and inviting comparison with Greek myths according to which the first people “were born from the earth and not reproduced from each other” (Plato, Pol. b; cf. Herodotus, Hist. .; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Schweizer ). the elder . . . the younger. Philo explores the meaning and implications of Genesis  especially in the so-called Cain Trilogy, consisting of De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini, Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat, and De posteritate Caini (Mendelson ). He takes Cain’s name as a figure for possession (κτ$σις), since in his self-conceit he believes that everything belongs to him rather than to God (Cher. ; Sacr. ; cf. Cher. ; Post. ). In this he represents the self-loving principle in the human soul, opposite to and contending with the God-loving principle, Abel (Sacr. , ; Det. , , ; cf. Josephus, Ant. .;  John :–; Quinones , –; Roskam , ). Armed with “plausible sophistries” (Det. , cf. –, –; Post. ), the former launches an attack against the

on nobility, §§ –



latter, though in eliminating the faculty through which one acquires a knowledge of God, the crime it commits is actually psychic suicide insofar as the soul dies to the life of virtue (further, Warnach ; Najman ). The latter, meanwhile, though it seems to have died, is alive to God, as Gen : shows, since there Abel is found “acting as God’s suppliant and using God’s voice” (Det. , cf. –, , ; Post. ; Zeller , –). the greatest abomination. Fratricide is the worst of sacrileges (Spec. .; cf. Det. ; Post. ; Ios. ; Josephus, Ant. .). The effects of the first such crime are particularly heinous insofar as it polluted the earth while it was still pure and just giving birth to every kind of plant and animal, thus bringing “death against life, sorrow against joy, and evil against good” (Praem. ; cf. Gen :–). Tales of fratricide haunted the historical imaginations of Greco-Roman peoples as well; see, e.g., Hardie ; Alaux . § . the overseer of human affairs. For this designation, see on Hum. . as punishment banished him. Banishment was a common penalty in the ancient world, e.g., Leg. .; Det. ; Spec. .–; Flacc. ; Legat. . For the topic περ φυγ$ς, see Teles, frg. ; Musonius Rufus, frg. ; Cicero, Tusc. .–; Ad fam. .; Dio Chrysostom, Or. ; Plutarch, De exilio; and on Ovid’s exile poetry, Williams . holding over him . . . a succession of griefs and fears. For the image of fear “hanging over” someone, cf. Mut. ; Somn. .; Polybius, Hist. ..; ..; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ... countless deaths. That Cain was allowed to live after committing such an abomination raised questions for Philo (and other biblical interpreters) about the nature of divine judgment (Mendelson , – ). The act resulting in Cain’s separation from God was more serious than that committed by Adam because it was carried out voluntarily and with forethought; consequently it warranted greater punishment (Post. –; QG .). Philo surmises that since scripture never gives a record of Cain’s death, what the “sign” of Gen : indicates is that he in fact never died. Instead, he was subject for all eternity “to that which consists in ever dying,” since “folly is a deathless evil” (Det. –; cf. Post. ; Conf. ; Fug. –). God effected this eternal affliction by extracting from Cain the passions concerned with the good, pleasure and desire, leaving only those concerned with the bad, grief and fear, represented respectively by the “groaning” and “trembling” of Gen :. Bereft of all joy and hope, what he subsequently experienced was “many grave and manifold



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deaths” (QG .), a life in which some evil thing was always either present or in the offing (Det. , ; Praem. –). For Philo’s teachings on the death of the soul, see Zeller ; Wasserman , –. Elsewhere, the text of Gen : inspires a very different take on the nature of Cain’s suffering. What had originally announced the sentence awaiting Cain’s slayer (“Cain is avenged sevenfold.”) is transformed by the LXX into an amplification of the sentence imposed on Cain himself (“Sevenfold has it been avenged from [1κ] Cain.”). In QG ., Philo interprets this to mean that God’s punishment fell upon all five of Cain’s senses, plus his powers of speech and procreation (cf. T. Benj. :–; Josephus, Ant. .). (e) § . Among the most notable. Next there is Ham (§§ – ). Philo could have underscored the universal character of this example (see on § ) by noting, as he does in Praem. , that Noah is known also among the Greeks, though by a different name, Deucalion; cf. Theophilus, Ad Autol. .–; Bolgiani ; West . a certain man of exceptional holiness. The reference to Noah follows naturally upon that to Adam inasmuch as the former represented “a second genesis of man” (QG .), the father and founder of a new race (Abr. , ; Mos. .; Praem. ). Most often he is praised for his righteousness (Agr. , , ; Plant. , ; Sobr. ; Congr. ; Abr. , , , ; Praem. –; cf. Gen :; :), though his discovery that all things ought to be attributed to divine grace is also deemed noteworthy (Leg. .–; Deus –; cf. Gen :). He was indeed “perfect” (Gen :), though only in comparison to the people of his time (Abr. , ; cf. b. San. a; Gen. Rab. .). Accordingly, he belongs to the first and lesser trinity of “living laws” introduced in Abr. –. For an overview of Philonic texts on Noah and the flood narrative, see Lewis , –. the great deluge. In QG ., Philo explains that “the whole earth” was covered by the flood, which for an ancient person like himself means that it “almost flowed out beyond the Pillars of Heracles.” The waters rose so high that “even the air, except for a small portion belonging to the moon” was completely washed away (Abr. ; cf. Mos. .). § . rail against . . . his father, with laughter and mockery. The biblical account simply states that Ham “told” his brothers of their father’s nakedness (Gen :). Embellishments comparable to those made here occur in QG . and are taken as evidence that Ham was the sort of individual who delighted in the misfortune of others. For the mockery theme, cf. Sobr. ; Josephus, Ant. .; Pirqe R. El. ; Cav. Tr. (E) .. Elsewhere Philo explains that Ham is called the youngest of Noah’s sons

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

in Gen : not because of his age (cf. Gen :), but on account of his insolent tendencies (Sobr. ; cf. QG .). for some unintentional mistake. God saved Noah from the flood because he had committed no deliberate wrong (Mos. .). The nakedness described in Gen : represents according to Philo “a deprivation of virtue due to a turning or change of condition, when the soul becomes foolish and deranged.” The harmful effects of this “change of condition” were mitigated because Noah did not spread them abroad, but rather stayed “in his house” and repented (Leg. .–; cf. Abr. ; QG .–). For this use of παρασφ,λλω, cf. Ps.-Plato, Epin. b. Philo expounds on the nature of Noah’s drunkenness in Plant. – and (rather more obliquely) in De ebrietate. For the distinction between intentional and unintentional sins, see Post. ; Fug. –; Spec. .; further, Wilson , . becoming accursed. Ancient commentators were troubled by both the severity and the object of Noah’s curse in Gen :. Assuming that the crime must have been more serious than that indicated by the text, certain rabbinic interpreters suggested that Ham had either castrated his father or sexually abused him (b. Sanh. a; Gen. Rab. .; cf. Baumgarten ; that the crime was maternal incest, see Bergsma and Hahn ). Philo, by contrast, believes Ham to be deserving of punishment because he not only saw and told of his father’s nakedness, he also chose to mock him for it (see above). The fact that Canaan and not Ham is named in the curse demanded some special explanation as well. Josephus, for one, asserts that Noah would have addressed the curse directly at his son, but could not “because of his nearness of kin” (Ant. .; cf. Feldman ; Feldman a), while according to Gen. Rab. . he was unable to do so because his sons had been previously blessed by God (Gen :) “and a curse cannot be in the same place as a blessing.” Philo’s solution to the problem is to turn Canaan into Ham’s accomplice. In Sobr. –, we learn that Ham and Canaan are different names for vice, the former for vice in its quiescent state, the latter for vice when it becomes actualized. Seen from this perspective the two represent a single subject, so that when Noah curses one he curses the other as well, since both are guilty of “the same wickedness” (QG ., cf. ., ; Leg. .). For other efforts to implicate Canaan in his father’s crime, see Pirqe R. El. ; Gen. Rab. .. neglected the honor owed parents. Pirqe R. El.  similarly interprets Ham’s crime as a breach of the fifth commandment; cf. Decal. –; Spec. .–. Laws and customs forbidding the neglect of parents

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are found throughout the ancient world, e.g., Plato, Leg. b–d, e– a; Epictetus, Diatr. ..; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .; cf. Demosthenes, Or. .: “for the man who neglects his parents I regard as unworthy of trust and hateful alike to gods and men.” Further, Wilson , –. (f) § . the first and earthborn man. As Runia (, ) notes, Nob. –, Philo’s third negative example, is a kind of summary of Opif. –. The most important themes that our passage has in common with the earlier account include the story of Adam’s creation in Gen : (reconciled with that in Gen :–), the explanation of his superiority over all subsequent human beings, and his exchange of eudaimonia for kakodaimonia. Missing are the giving of names (Gen :–) as a further demonstration of Adam’s excellence (Opif. – ) and the account of Eve’s creation (Gen :–) and her role in the first sin (Opif. –). On Nob. –, see also Levison , –. he is comparable to no other mortal. The original human being is superior to all those who follow because his maker was superior, that is, he was created directly by God, while the rest have their origin in other human beings. In fact, with each successive generation the excellence of the human race further degenerates from this acme, much like successive copies of an artwork stand at a greater distance from the original: “in each generation they receive capabilities and qualities of both body and soul that are fainter and fainter” (Opif. , cf. ). Also cf. Aristotle, Rhet. .., quoted in the Analysis/General comments. For the Stoic doctrine that men of the past were naturally superior to those of succeeding generations, see Cohoon and Crosby , –. As Seneca puts it, such men were “fresh from the gods” (Ep. .). formed by divine hands into the figure of a man’s body . . . a soul coming . . . from God breathing into him. An allusion to Gen :: “And God formed (;πλασεν) the human being from clay from the earth, and inbreathed onto his face a breath of life, and the human being became a living soul.” Philo’s language in this sentence (especially τ!χνης πλαστικ$ς) draws attention to the idea that Adam’s body was molded by God much like a sculptor molds a work of art, as we see also in Opif. –: “the Craftsman took clay and formed a human shape out of it,” (§ ; cf. Leg. .; Spec. .), “carefully fashioning” his body to have “the most beautiful appearance possible,” exhibiting proper proportionality, symmetry, and color (§ ). Cf. QG .: “the molded man . . . was molded into an earthly statue.” For similar imagery, cf. Aristotle, Part. anim. .; Epictetus, Diatr. ...

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whose names are held in acclaim. S reads 3σα διωνομ,ση, which PCW . corrects to 3σαι διωνομ,σησαν. The other mss have ϊδων (>δων N) HνομασεAσαν. For διονομ,ζω (“distinguished by name, widely known”), cf. Contempl. ; Legat. . High birth, of course, would be one of the more important reasons why a person’s name would be widely known, e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ... § . creatures mortal and perishable. Cf. Marcus Aurelius, Med. .: “We must pass at last to the same bourne whither so many wonderful orators have gone, so many grave philosophers . . . so many heroes of old, and so many warriors, so many tyrants . . . men of large minds, lovers of toil, men of versatile powers . . . and many another such of humanity’s perishable and transitory life.” Further, Wilson , –. uncertain and fleeting. All things human—beauty, health, strength, wealth—are uncertain and fleeting (Ios. –); cf. Plutarch, Praec. ger. rei publ. f; Suav. viv. b; further, Wilson , –, –; and on Hum. . § . Being in a way His image on account of the ruler in his soul, the mind. An allusion to Gen :– (for other places where this text is made to coalesce with Gen :, cf. Opif. –; Det. –; Plant. –; Her. –; Spec. .; Tobin , –). For Philo, the term “image” in the biblical passage is used with reference to the νο(ς, the capacity for knowledge and thought, which holds the place of ruler (9γεμ8ν) in the soul much like God is the ruler of the cosmos (Opif. , cf. Opif. ; Mos. .; Spec. .; Plato, Tim. c; Phaedr. c; Aristotle, Mund. .a; Plutarch, Is. Osir. a). As Runia (, ) notes, “in Philo nous is very often in effect equivalent to the rational part of the soul and is responsible for guiding the soul in its entirety, including its senses and passions.” He also notes Det.  as an important parallel. Philo frequently equates Adam with mind in his allegorical expositions (Leg. ., ; .; Cher. ; etc.). to keep that image untarnished. According to Ps.-Plutarch, frg. , nobility is not a matter of wealth or ancient ancestral reputation. Rather “the one begotten from virtue grows in his father’s image (ε>κονζεται), since it is goods of the soul which are transmitted to descendents. And this is what nobility truly is, assimilation to morality.” Adam’s actions contrast with those of Tamar, who managed to keep her life “untarnished” (§ ). For the use of κηλδωτος here, cf. Wis :. by adhering as far as possible to the virtues of his creator. As Lilla (, ) observes, Philo’s κα 3σον οQν τε _ν is reminiscent of the expression κατC τ δυνατν in Plato’s famous definition of the telos in

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commentary

Theaet. a–b: “That is why a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means becoming as much like God as possible; and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and pious, with understanding.” For Philo’s 1ξομοωσις doctrine, see on Hum. . he eagerly chose false and shameful and evil things. Philo presents the first sin as a matter of human “choice” in Opif.  as well, though there both Adam and Eve are implicated: “They passed by the tree of immortal life . . . through which they could have enjoyed the fruits of an age-long life of good fortune, and chose (ε]λοντο) that ephemeral and mortal existence, not a life but a time span full of misfortune.” he exchanged an immortal life for a mortal one and, forfeiting blessedness and good fortune, promptly changed to a life of pain and misfortune. Opif.  explains that it is on account of bodily pleasure (9δον=) that the first couple “exchange the life of immortality and good fortune for the life of mortality and misfortune.” As Runia (, ) notes, the immortality that they forsake is understood by Philo as a spiritual condition, applicable to the soul and not the body; cf. Spec. .; Zeller , –. He also notes the structural role played by the eudaimonia/kakodaimonia pair in Philo’s account of the fall (, ). The accompanying moral change that the two undergo (“from innocence and simplicity of character to cunning”) in Opif.  (also with μετ!βαλεν) is left out of the description here. For the pains they had to endure, cf. Gen :–; Opif. . (g) § . among the founders of the race. The account proceeds from examples common to all humanity to those peculiar to the Jewish people. As Philo observes in Praem. , of the three founders of the race only Jacob was blessed in all his children. PCH . proposes that παδων or πογνων has fallen out after ρχηγετν, since it would be improper to refer to such figures as “founders” of the race. On the other hand, as Colson (PLCL .) notes, it may be that Philo is using the term more loosely, that is, in the sense of “ancestors” (cf. Nob. , ). convicted . . . by their conscience . . . the one and only court. Even the well-born become as slaves when their conscience convicts them of injustice (Prob. ). The conscience is established in the soul like a judge, examining and correcting all of a person’s thoughts and deeds. The followers of Moses abet its proper functioning through their study of philosophy (Opif. ; cf. Det. ; Spec. .). For the judicial imagery, cf. Plant. ; Conf. ; Decal. ; Plato, Gorg. e; Lysias, In Andoc. ; Demosthenes, Or. .; Aeschines, In Tim. ; and for a survey of relevant texts from the Exposition, see Bosman , –.

on nobility, §§ –



§ . of the many offspring only one was named heir. Abraham bequeathed his real wealth, the perfect virtues, to his true-born and wise son, Isaac, while “the bastard thoughts bred of his concubines” received only the mundane duties relegated to secular education. These have as their mothers either Hagar, whose name means sojourning, since she only sojourns with wisdom, or Keturah, whose name means incenseburning, since she offers the fragrance but not the substance of learning’s food (Sacr. –; cf. QG .–). For other references to Gen :–, see Leg. .; Conf. ; Migr. ; Praem. . Josephus interprets the passage to mean that Abraham sent his sons and grandsons to found colonies. He also preserves a legend attributed to Cleodemus (also known as Malchus) according to which three of the sons accompanied Heracles in his campaign against Libya and Antaeus, and that the hero married one of their daughters, who bore him a son (Ant. .– ). (h) § . approved as heir. The final negative example concerns the sons of Isaac. For the legal terminology, cf. Isaeus, Men. . For the principles that Moses followed in choosing his heir, see Hum. –. two twins who bore no likeness to one another. Josephus deduced from Gen :– that Jacob resembled Esau in everything except hairiness (Ant. .). [except in the hands and in these only on account of a particular plan]. Colson (PLCL ., –) follows PCW . (cf. Cohn , ) in bracketing these words as spurious. While it is difficult to disagree with their description of the addition as inept, it should be pointed out that there is nothing in the manuscript tradition to support this conclusion, and accepting this identification forces us to assume that Clement’s use of ο>κονομα in Strom. .. (see the Nachleben below) is coincidental; cf. QG .. the younger was obedient . . . the elder was disobedient. Efforts to vilify Esau (the progenitor of the Edomites) appear early and often in ancient texts (e.g., Obad :; Mal :–;  Ezra :; Ps.-Philo, L.A.B. :; Rom :–; Heb :–; Gen. Rab. ., –), while Jacob becomes a paragon of virtue (cf. Jub. :–; :–; Tg. Ps.-J. Gen :). Philo goes so far as to claim that the twins represent “two contending natures of good and evil” (Sacr. ; cf. Congr. ; Praem. ; QG ., , ), Esau being named after his folly, Jacob after his practice of things excellent (Sacr. ; cf. Leg. .; Ebr. –; Sobr. ; Somn. .; Abr. ; Ios. ). Esau is depicted as “disobedient and stiffnecked by nature” (Congr. ), a man “of fierce temper and lust,” who

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commentary

“armed the irrational part of the soul to war against the rational,” while his brother is “gentle and humane, a lover of excellence of character, of equality and humility . . . the champion of reason and antagonist of folly” (Praem. ). Further, cf. Migr. –; QG .–, –. For Esau’s γροικα (Leg. .; cf. Praem. ; Gen :), cf. SVF .. For the identification of Esau with Rome, see Hadas-Lebel , –; Bakhos . he surrendered his inheritance to his junior. Jacob’s acquisition of his brother’s birthright (πρωτοτκια) is likened to the victory of the sage over passion (Leg. .–) or of “labor striving for the good . . . over the craving that pursues evil” (Sacr. , cf. –, , , ; Leg. .). In QG ., Philo explains that the deal Jacob struck in Gen :– should be construed not as an act of greed but as an effort to relieve his brother of the sort of abundant wealth that leads wicked men to sin! then seeking to murder his brother. As in Mos. ., Philo collapses the story of how Jacob acquired his brother’s birthright (Gen :–) with the story of how he acquired his brother’s blessing (Gen :–). It is only after the second incident that Esau plans to kill Jacob (Gen :). grieve his parents. Jub. :– preserves a tradition according to which Isaac withdrew his preference for Esau (Gen :) on account of the wickedness he committed after Jacob stole his blessing: “Now I love Jacob more than Esau because he has increasingly made his deeds evil. And he has no righteousness because all of his ways are injustice and violence. And now my heart is vexed on account of all his deeds. And neither he nor his seed is to be saved for they will be destroyed from the earth” (vv. –). Cf. QG ., . § . for the younger they offered prayers. Of course, the blessing in Gen :– is pronounced by Isaac alone. Perhaps Philo reasons that since Jacob was obedient to both of his parents (§ ; cf. QG .), both would have offered prayers on his behalf. he would serve his brother. Referring to Gen : (cf. :; :): “And by your sword you will live, and to your brother you will be enslaved.” For Philo this illustrates how “that which is base and irrational is by nature a slave,” while in contrast those who pursue virtue enjoy not only liberty, but also leadership and sovereignty (Leg. .; cf. Prob. –). The law of nature dictates that the latter will have “all fools in subjection” (Prob. ). In the case of a fool like Esau, such slavery constitutes a blessing, since through it his inner tumult and rebellion becomes subservient to the lover of self-control (Congr. –; cf. QG

on nobility, §§ –



., ). If he had in fact consented to become the sage’s slave (see § ), his ignorance, insolence, and unruly passions would have been amended through admonition and correction (Leg. .–; cf. Prob. ; Garnsey , –). As it is, by refusing such servitude he suffers “anarchy in the soul” (QG .). it is good for the fool not to live under his own authority. For this use of ατεξο:σιος, cf. Epictetus, Diatr. .., , , . § . the prizes given to those who come second in the contests for virtue. The highest prize in virtue is awarded to those whose ruling impulses are “of free and noble birth,” who embrace what is excellent on their own and not in imitation of others (Abr. ). The image of virtue as a prize, particularly a prize worth having for its own sake, was common, e.g., Plato, Phaed. c; Ps.-Plato, Def. a; Aristotle, Eth. nic. ..; ..; Philo, Mos. .; Spec. .. For Philo’s athletic metaphors, see on Fort. ; Paen. . he acted stubbornly. S reads ααδησ,μενος (cf. Hum. ), while the other witnesses have either παυαδσας (HP) or παυαδι,σας (FG2); cf. Plato, Apol. a. fled from such excellent authority. It is not Esau who flees, of course, but Jacob (Gen :; cf. Migr. –; Fug. –; Somn. .; QG .–). Perhaps our author has in mind Gen :–, where Esau leaves Canaan for Edom (note that the passage is immediately followed by a record of Esau’s descendants). the cause of great reproaches both to himself and to his descendants. Jub. :–: relates an extra-biblical account (cf. Amos :) in which Esau attacks Jacob with a mighty throng, only to be killed by his brother in battle. As a result, the sons of Esau “bowed their necks” to “the yoke of servitude” (cf. Gen :) and became servants for Jacob’s sons until they went down into Egypt; cf. T. Jud. :–. For his part, Philo has little to say about Esau’s descendants, though the incident in Num :–, where the Edomites refuse the Israelites’ request for safe passage, is recounted in Mos. .–; cf. Post. ; Gig. ; Deus –, , , ; Migr. ; Spec. .. his life, one not worth living. In QG ., Philo points to Gen : (“Behold, I am about to die . . . ”) as evidence that Esau, that is, the wicked man, “hastens to death every day, reflecting on and training for dying.” Cf. Plato, Gorg. b: it is better for a corrupt person not to be alive at all, since he necessarily lives badly. For the cliché of “a life not to be lived,” see Ios. ; Prob. ; Flacc. ; Aeschines, In Tim. ; Lysias, In Andoc. ; Teles, frg. A.; ..



commentary

(a) § . others belonging to the opposite and better class. Here the treatise segues from examples of wicked individuals sprung from good ancestry (§§ –) to examples of good individuals sprung from wicked ancestry (§§ –), illustrating the first part of the subtreatise’s thesis in § . Over half of the section is devoted to a single case, that of Abraham (§§ –). (b) § . a Chaldean by birth. Abraham’s Chaldean origins are indicated in Gen :, ; :. The study of the stars came to be so closely associated with his home country that eventually “Chaldean” denoted astrologers of any nationality; see Herodotus, Hist. .; Strabo, Geogr. ..; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..–; ..; ..; Cicero, Div. ..; Arrian, Anab. ..; Josephus, C. Ap. .; Sib. Or. .–. As Philo notes in Migr. , the renown of the Chaldeans in this regard is “quite beyond that of other peoples.” It is likely that Jewish apologists emphasized the Chaldean roots of their nation as a response to slanders that its origins were in fact Egyptian; see Josephus, Ant. .–; Roitman . Philo points out that Moses was not only Chaldean (Mos. .), but also schooled in both Chaldean and Egyptian forms of astrology (Mos. .–). According to Josephus, Abraham was responsible for introducing astrology as well as mathematics to the Egyptians (Ant. .–). For Abraham as Kulturbringer, see also Ps.-Eupolemus, frg.  and Artapanus, frg. , with Holladay , – . For conceptions of Abraham as an astrologer among Greco-Roman authors, see Siker , –. For more on Philo’s conceptions of Abraham in general, see Sandmel . γ!νος is Cohn’s (PCW .) emendation for γ!νει (FE) and γ!νους (ceteri) in the mss. whose father was an astrologer. Post-biblical sources identify Terah as either an idol priest or an idol maker, e.g., Jub. :–; Apoc. Abr. :– (cf. Josh :). According to Philo, he represents Socratic self-knowledge. When he and Abraham migrate to Haran (Gen :), the place of the senses, they dissociate themselves from the speculations of astrology in order to examine their own nature as human beings. The report that Terah died in Haran (Gen :) explains why his name means “scentexploring,” since he explored but did not come to possess virtue, having failed to join Abraham in his further migration from self-knowledge to the knowledge of God (Somn. .–; Abr. –; cf. Migr. –; Congr. –). its branches of knowledge. τC μα=ματα here would include especially varieties of mathematical knowledge, which were necessary to and closely associated with the astral sciences e.g., Juvenal, Sat. .–;

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

cf. Plato, Resp. e. In Philo’s court, astronomy is the “queen” of the sciences (Congr. –). As he explains in Abr. , the Chaldeans investigate “numerical order” as it applies to both the revolutions of astral bodies and the alterations of meteorological occurrences, supposing that “the course of the phenomena of the world is guided by influences contained in numbers and numerical proportions.” For a sense of some of the actual mathematics involved in ancient astronomy, see Evans , –. As a student of astrology, Abraham himself can be aptly referred to as a μαηματικς (Mut. ; cf. Somn. .; Mos. .; Praem. ; QG .). who believe the stars and entire heaven and universe to be gods. The characterization of the Chaldeans’ worldview proffered in Migr.  turns them into proto-Stoics: “These men surmised this visible universe to be the only thing in existence, either being itself God or containing God in itself as the soul of the whole. And they made fate and necessity divine.” Cf. Her. ; Somn. .–; Abr. ; Wolfson , .–, ; .–. A number of prominent Stoics, most notably Posidonius, defended the practice of astrological divination, lending it a degree of intellectual respectability (Barton , –; Jones ). For Philo’s own conception of the astral bodies, see on Hum. –. § . what could be more heinous. It is not simply the case that the Chaldeans are misguided. Rather, because they attribute “to that which is created the powers of the Creator” and persuade others to worship God’s works rather than God, their doctrine is the source “of great evils and impiety” (QG .); cf. Abr. ; Wis :–; Sib. Or. .–. the One and Oldest and Uncreated and Creator of all. For God as “the One,” see on Hum. . For “the Uncreated and Creator,” see on Paen. . Comparable statements are made in Fort. ; Hum. –, . § . Having a conception of these things. Philo explains how Abraham inferred the truth of monotheism from his contemplation of the heavenly bodies in Abr. : “opening the soul’s eye as though after a deep sleep, and beginning to see a pure beam instead of deep darkness, he followed the light and discerned what he had not beheld before, a charioteer and pilot presiding over the world.” According to Josephus, it was actually Abraham’s perception of irregularities in the heavenly movements that led him to acknowledge “the power of their commander” (Ant. ., with Feldman , –). Cf. Jub. :–; Apoc. Abr. :–; Ps.Philo, L.A.B. :; Gen. Rab. .. he left his country and race and paternal home. See Gen : (“Go out from your land and from your kin and from the house of your father . . . ”). Abraham’s second migration not only further separates him from



commentary

his homeland, it drives him into the wilderness (Gen :), a venture he undertakes without complaint “since those who seek God and yearn to find Him love the solitude which is dear to Him” (Abr. ). In his abandonment of all prior associations (cf. Abr. , with Borgen , –), Abraham resembles a proselyte; cf. on Hum. ; Paen. . the deceptions of the polytheistic opinion. For Philo’s critique of polytheism, see on Paen. . For the expression πολ:εος δξα, see Opif. ; Her. ; Decal. ; Praem. . Tamar is similarly said to turn from polytheistic worship in § . For the monotheistic opinion, see on Fort. . things both intelligible and perceptible. The distinction is Platonic, e.g., Phaed. b; Tim. c; Resp. d–e; cf. Opif. , ; Abr. , ; Mos. .; Dec. ; Spec. .–, ; .. if he departed the deception would also depart. Before he could obtain a clear vision of the God who for so long had remained imperceptible, Abraham first had to have “departed and changed his habitation” (Abr. –). Indeed, what he accomplishes is “the best of all migrations,” the passage of the soul from trusting in the heavens to trusting in the One who guides the heavens (Her. –; cf. Migr. –, –). Ancient interpreters agreed that when Abraham left his homeland he also left its polytheistic ways, e.g., Jdt :–; Jub. :–; Ps.-Philo, L.A.B. :; Josephus, Ant. .–. For the imagery of vain thoughts “emigrating” from the mind, see also Ebr. . § . the oracles he received. According to Philo, Abraham received not only an oracle directing him to leave Haran (Gen :–), but also an earlier one that had directed him to Haran in the first place, corroborating his initial comprehension of God’s existence (Abr. , ). the Existent. Like future proselytes, Abraham is driven by a desire to know τ /ν (cf. Abr. ; Paen. ; Praem. ). With such knowledge comes an understanding of God’s beneficence and providence (Spec. ., ). Cf. Fort. , . As Philo explains in Contempl. , the Existent “is better than the good, purer than the One, and more primordial than the Monad.” receiving clearer perceptions . . . of his existence and providence. Abraham did not see God, rather “the Lord was seen by Abraham” (Gen :), that is, Abraham apprehended only what God deigned to reveal of his nature (Abr. –). Specifically, what appeared to him at this point was not the Existent, the Cause of all, but rather God’s sovereign power, that which Scripture refers to as “the Lord” (Mut. –; cf. Sacr. – ; Abr. –; Völker , –; Sandmel , –). In

on nobility, §§ –



Praem. –, Philo draws a distinction between individuals who have inferred the Creator from the movements of the heavenly bodies and those (like Jacob) who through divine revelation have been granted a vision of God, not of God’s true nature, to be sure, but of God’s existence; cf. Det. . Philo takes for granted a necessary correlation between the reality of God’s existence and the reality of God’s providential activity in the created order; cf. Opif.  and Ebr. , with Frick , –. § . the first person who is said to have believed in God. Because Abraham is “first” in faith (cf. Gen :), he is “the first, the founder of the nation,” a role further signified by the title “elder” (Abr. –, cf. ). His status is akin to that of the sage, who is “the first of the human race, as a pilot in a ship or a ruler in a city or a general in war, or again as a soul in a body and a mind in a soul, or once more heaven in the world or God in heaven” (Abr. ). According to Josephus, Abraham was the first who dared to declare that God was the one δημιουργς of the universe (Ant. .). there is one Cause above all, and . . . it exercises providence over the universe. In Somn. .–, Abraham abandons astrology in order to worship “the first Cause of all things” (cf. Nob. ). That God’s ongoing providential activity in the world can be logically deduced from his relationship to it as the Cause of its existence is suggested also at Prov. ., cf. ., –; Opif. , ; Decal. ; Spec. .; Praem. ; Frick , –. faith, the most certain of the virtues. Cohn (PCW .) follows Mangey (, ) in printing πστιν in lieu of 1πιστ=μην (cf. §§ , ) in the mss. De Abrahamo concludes with an extended meditation on Gen : (§§ –). The patriarch put his trust not in such precarious things as health, wealth, fame, or noble birth, but in God, the Cause of all things, thus acquiring “the one sure and infallible good” (§ ) and attesting to his possession of “the queen of the virtues, faith in the Existent” (§ ; cf. Her. ; Sterling , ). Further, Deus ; Migr. –; Her. –; Praem. –; cf. Neh :–; Sir :;  Macc :; Rom :–; Heb :–; Jub. :–. The certainty of Abraham’s faith contrasts with the uncertainty of human fortune and experience described in § . he was deemed a king. After Sarah died, Abraham approached the sons of Heth about purchasing a burial cave in which to lay her body (Gen :–; cf. Jub. :–; Josephus, Ant. .). Their desire, however, was to simply give him a tomb: “No, lord; rather hear us. A king (Hebrew: “prince”) from God are you among us . . . ” (Gen :; cf. Wevers ,



commentary

). In its original context, such an ascription probably reflected the exaggerated politeness that often accompanied legal negotiations of this sort (Tucker ). For Philo, however, it serves as proof that Abraham is a sage, since the sage alone is king. Possessing each of the virtues, he rules over those who lack them (Mut. –; cf. on Paen. ). As such, Abraham alone is nobly born, having been adopted by God himself (Sobr. –) and able to practice the most noble of the arts, the art of ruling (QG .). What impressed the Hittites was not the patriarch’s material resources (he was only a sojourner after all; Gen :), but the kingship he displayed in his mind (Mut. ), evidenced by the fact that he did not grieve excessively over his wife’s death (Abr. ). Since his kingdom is a gift from God and not won through force of arms (see Nob. ; cf. Praem. ), it confers numerous benefits on its citizens (Abr. ). Sandmel (, ) notes that the rabbis also regarded Abraham as a king, though their starting point was Gen :. his mind being that of a king. Kings were expected to exhibit a certain “nobility of mind,” e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ... For the Stoic paradox that the sage alone is king, see on Hum. ; Paen. . As Philo explains in Prob. , noble souls display a certain kingly quality. The mss read φρον=ματος Uν βασιλικο(. Owing to the odd grammatical structure, Mangey (, ) conjectures μεστς or Dππλεως after φρον=ματος (cf. Hum. ), while Colson (PLCL .) suggests λαχ8ν. § . whenever he was possessed, everything changed for the better, his looks, his appearance, his stature, his postures, his movements, his voice. Inspiration was sometimes thought to be accompanied by certain physical transformations. According to Virgil, for example, when the Sibyl began to deliver her prophecies “suddenly neither countenance nor color was the same . . . her heart swells with wild frenzy and she is taller to behold, nor has her voice a mortal ring” (Aen. .–; cf. Lucan, Bell. civ. .–; Lucian, Jup. trag. ). Similarly, every time Moses was inspired, he was “transfigured into a prophet” (Mos. .) and became “another man, changed in both outward appearance and mind” (Mos. ., cf. .; Her. –). Further, Berchman , –. on his words persuasiveness, and on his hearers comprehension. Levison (, –) observes that in this description Abraham is presented not only as the ideal prophet but also as the ideal orator (cf. Cicero, Orat. .). Josephus similarly lauds the patriarch’s powers of persuasion (Ant. ., , –). For the orator speaking like one “possessed,” cf. Appian, Bell. civ. ...

on nobility, §§ –



§ . isolated from all family and friends. Abraham gave up not only his native land but also his native tongue, “the tongue of sky-prating astrology,” in order to learn the language of reason, living the life of an immigrant and stranger (Somn. .–). Accordingly, he severed all ties with “fellow-clansmen or wardsmen or schoolmates or comrades or blood relations on father’s or mother’s side or country or ancestral customs or community of nurture or home life,” since any one of them might have distracted him from his search for the true God (Abr. ). On the virtues of the solitary life, see the Parallel exegesis on De paenitentia. See also on Hum. . kinship with God. In the corpus Philonicum, the familial relationship that human beings enjoy with God is established through the inbreathing of the divine spirit (Opif. ) or, more often, through the possession of reason, e.g., Opif. , ; Decal. ; Spec. .; Praem. . Prophetic figures (like Abraham, see below) evidence a special kinship with God since they have been “changed into the divine” (QE .); cf. Plato, Tim. c; Prot. a; Resp. b; Leg. d–a; Graffigna . stationed in the best order among the prophets. Attention is drawn throughout the section to Abraham’s inspired status and oracular experiences (see also §§ , , ; cf. Philip , –). In Her. , –, Philo interprets the ;κστασις that fell upon the patriarch in Gen : as evidence of his prophetic inspiration, a fact confirmed by Gen :. He describes how while Abraham was in such a state, his mind was “evicted at the arrival of the divine spirit,” resulting in a state of “ecstasy and divine possession and madness” (§§ –); cf. QG .; ., . For the accounts of Abraham’s prophetic visions in Genesis Rabbah, see Sandmel , –. obtaining his rule not by arms . . . but by the election of God. In this he is like Moses, the ideal ruler; cf. Mos. .; Hum. –; Praem. . the lovers of piety. Cf. Abr. : “He who was a follower of piety (cf. on Paen. ), the highest and greatest virtue, made every effort to follow God and to be obedient to the things commanded by him.” On eusebeia, see on Fort.  and Hum. . For the expression “lovers of piety,” see also Spec. .. § . a standard of nobility for all proselytes. In abandoning both the idolatry and the associations of his youth, Abraham becomes a prototype for future proselytes (Nob. , ; cf. Hum. ; Paen. –). Accordingly, many of his accomplishments mirror those of a convert to Judaism. Most important, he “amends” his way of life (Nob. ; cf. Paen. ), learns the truth (Nob. ; cf. Hum. ), begins to worship the One



commentary

God (Nob. –; cf. Hum. ), the Existent (Nob. ; cf. Paen. ), and Father (Nob. , ; cf. Paen. ), and thus travels “to a fine new home” and polity (Nob. ; cf. Hum. ; Paen. , ). Borgen (, –) suggests that Abraham may have been seen as a model for the experience of proselytes also in his reception of the divine spirit (§ ). For Abraham as the first convert, cf. b. Suk. b; Str-B .; Porton , . traveled to a fine new home. For this language, see on Hum. . (c) § . women as well. As noted in the Analysis/General comments for De paenitentia, the description of Tamar in Nob.  (which has little basis in the biblical text) presents in condensed form the three different facets of conversion outlined in Paen. –, indicating that she, too, functions for Philo as a “standard” for proselytes (§ ); cf. b. Sot. a. Particular emphasis is laid on how she, like Abraham, spurned pagan idols (cf. § ) to worship the one Cause (cf. § ; further, Petit , ). Note also the similarities between Nob.  and Paen. –, including especially the similar ways in which εοφιλ=ς, μαα, and μοναρχα are used. § . a woman from Palestinian Syria. This is contradicted by other post-biblical authors (Jub. :; T. Jud. :; cf. Gen. Rab. .; Menn , –, ), who identify Tamar as an Aramean woman, presumably reasoning that the matter in which she was “more righteous” than Judah (Gen :) was her insistence not to intermarry—as he had (Gen :–)—with a Canaanite, going so far as to trick her own father-in-law into having sexual relations with her (cf. Ps.-Philo, L.A.B. :, with Polaski ). In contrast, it would appear that “Philo assumes that, since she is not said like Rebekah and Rachel and Leah to come of the line of the patriarchs, she belonged to the idolatrous people around” (PLCL ., cf. ). He assumes also that she was born of free parents (§ ). Since the biblical account states nothing explicitly about her ancestry or upbringing, Tamar would not seem to provide a particularly good example of a noble person born of ignoble lineage (§ ); it is her husbands, not her parents, who are said to be wicked. For the designation “Palestinian Syria,” see Abr. ; Prob. ; Herodotus, Hist. .; .; .; Josephus, Ant. .. emerging from deep darkness, she was able to see a small ray of truth. Cf. on Paen. . she deserted to piety. Cf. on Paen. . service and supplication. Cf. on Paen. . the one Cause. Cf. Fort. ; Hum. .

on nobility, §§ –



§ . married to two brothers in turn, both of them wicked. See Gen :– (also with πονηρς). T. Jud. :– explains that in their wickedness the brothers were goaded by the treacherous schemes of their mother. She devised such schemes against Tamar because she “was not the daughter of Canaan as she was.” On Er and Onan, cf. Leg. .–; Post. –; Deus –. her lawful husband. For this use of κουρδιος, see Homer, Od. .; also Hum. . in accord with the law of inheritance. When his elder brother dies without leaving an heir, Onan takes his place as Tamar’s husband, in keeping with the law of levirate marriage. See Deut :–, with Weisberg ; cf. Spec. .; and for the rabbinic discussion, Belkin , –  (who treats also Spec. .–); for discrepancies between Gen  and the deuteronomic passage, see Menn , –. For his part, Philo makes no reference to the levirate law, representing the arrangement instead as an 1πιδικασα, which under Athenian law was a formal claim to an inheritance. If a deceased man left a daughter but no sons, the estate would fall to her, but only as its 1πκληρος. A male relative who wanted to claim the inheritance would have to claim the daughter as well, since “[p]ossession of her estate cannot ideally be separated from her hand in marriage” (Todd , ). The discussion of the law in Todd , – does not make it clear if the claimant would necessarily be the deceased’s next of kin (as PLCL . states), though the fact that the deceased could nominate a husband for his daughter in his will would seem to suggest that different types of arrangements were possible. There was also an expectation that the husband of the 1πκληρος would give her a son: “If she were to die childless, then presumably . . . he would inherit the property by default. This might therefore provide some temptation to onanism” (Todd , ; cf. Plutarch, Sol. .–). This last point might account for why Philo employs the term here. The reading adopted by PCW ., κατ 1πιδικασας νμον, is found in none of the mss, though S has κατ 1πιδικασαν νμου, while the others have κα ;χοντι 1πιδικασας νμου. she still kept her own life untarnished. Elsewhere Philo subjects the story of Tamar to elaborate, sometimes strained, allegorical interpretation (cf. Petit ). We learn that her name means palm tree, a sign of the mind’s victory over the body, Er, which is slain (Leg. .). When she presents herself as a harlot (Gen :–), this is virtue making trial of the lovers of learning, to see which of them will remove her veil and behold her beauty (Congr. –). Judah, the mind bent on purchasing



commentary

piety, gives her a pledge of steadfastness, consistency, and discipline (cf. Gen :), his failed inquiries as to her whereabouts (Gen :–) demonstrating that in all the region governed by that which is morally excellent there is no soul that plays the harlot (Fug. –; for different interpretations of the three items given in pledge, cf. Mut. –; Somn. .–). Widowed of the human pleasures, she receives divine impregnation in the form of seeds of virtue and thereby bears noble deeds (Deus ). Here, in contrast, Tamar’s purity is evidenced in her remaining unaffected by the moral depravity of her husbands. a source of nobility for all those who came after her. Having failed to give his third son, Shelah, to Tamar in marriage (Gen :, ), Judah has two sons with her himself, Perez and Zerah (Gen :–), who continue the family line (cf. Gen :; Num :–). (d) § . Handmaids born beyond the Euphrates. Zilpah and Bilhah, who together represent the final example (§§ b–), belonged to the house of Laban, in the city of Nahor, in Mesopotamia (Gen :; cf. Hess , ). They are identified as Leah and Rachel’s respective παιδσκαι (Gen :, ; :, , –, ; :–), rendered here with ερ,παιναι (cf. Josephus, Ant. .). given as a dowry to their mistresses when they married. That the maids constituted the brides’ dowries (cf. Spec. .) is Philo’s interpretation of Gen :, , which states that Laban gave them to his daughters as wedding gifts; cf. Demosthenes, Or. .. passed over from the status of concubines to the name and manner of married women. Gen : (cf. Rosen-Zvi ) refers to Bilhah as Jacob’s παλλακ= (cf. Sacr. ; Migr. ; Her. ; Congr. –). In the ancient Near East, a man usually established a relationship with a concubine when his legal wife did not bear offspring; if she later did have children, they would have priority in the inheritance over those born of the concubine (Rainey , –). In the Roman world, by contrast, a concubine was a woman “living in an avowed monogamous relationship with a man who did not have a legal wife” (Treggiari , ). Any children resulting from the union were illegitimate and as such had no legal claim on their father’s property (Treggiari , ). Not surprisingly, most concubines were either slaves or freedwomen (Rawson ). Perhaps Philo inferred from Gen : that Zilpah and Bilhah had achieved the status of γυναAκες (for similar elevations, cf. Josephus, Ant. .; .; Feldman a, –; Niehoff , –), and some Roman men did end up eventually marrying their concubines (Treggiari , –). Yet, in commenting on the verse elsewhere Philo still refers

on nobility, §§ –



to the two as concubines (Deus –). According to Congr. , – , one pair of Jacob’s partners were “freeborn legitimate wives,” while the other pair were “slaves and concubines.” Josephus, meanwhile, maintains that the latter “were in no way slaves but only subordinates” (Ant. .), while T. Naph. :– asserts that their father was in fact a free and nobly born Chaldean who had been taken captive and then purchased by Laban, who gave him one of his slaves as a wife. envy does not dwell in the souls of sages. Sages never grudge good things to others but banish envy from their souls, e.g., Spec. .; cf. .; Praem. ; Völker , ; and see on Hum.  and . Envy constitutes an obstacle to attaining virtue both for oneself and for others, e.g., Plato, Leg. a: “We want everyone to compete in the struggle for virtue in a generous spirit . . . The envious man, who thinks he has to get the better of others by being rude about them, makes less effort himself to attain virtue and discourages his competitors by unfair criticism.” Cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. /.–: the sage uses reason to purge his mind of envy, jealousy, and greed out of his eagerness “insofar as he can, to aid all people” (cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. .). § . the baseborn children . . . were treated no differently than the legitimate. The sons born of Leah and Rachel are legitimate, while those of Bilhah and Zilpah are not (Leg. .; Deus ; Sobr. ; Her. ). Bilhah’s name means “swallowing,” signifying the soul that gives birth to perishable, not divine, offspring, while Zilpah’s name should be interpreted as “a walking mouth,” that is, the power of sophistic rhetoric (Leg. .–; .; Congr. –). In Greek legal custom, typically a νος is the child born of a concubine and acknowledged as such by the father; thus “the nothos can have a patronymic but is not a legitimate (gn¯esios) offspring” (Patterson , ). The idealized portrait of family affairs presented in §§ – would have had the effect of counteracting anxieties harbored among ancient people about the social status of children born from such unions; see Byron . the common father of them all showed the same goodwill to those born of different mothers. This contradicts Gen :, which states not only that Jacob loved Joseph more than all his other sons, but that Joseph’s brothers knew this and hated Joseph for it; cf. Ios. . the stepmothers . . . abolished hatred for their stepchildren. The stereotype of the lethal stepmother was well established in the early empire: “it was . . . assumed that in her heart she hated her stepchildren and was secretly plotting their demise” (Gray-Fow , ; e.g., Juvenal, Sat. .–; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ..; Lucian, Abdic. ;



commentary

Tacitus, Ann. .; Quintilian, Inst. ..; cf. Spec. .). Contrariwise, the most famous example of a good stepmother in Philo’s time would have been the younger Octavia, sister of Augustus and fourth wife of Mark Antony, who raised her own children alongside the children of his second and third marriages (Gray-Fow , ). § . the stepchildren honored their stepmothers. For the obligation to honor one’s stepmother, see Spec. .–; Wilson , . It was not always observed, e.g., Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. ... though considered half-brothers. μ!ρει 9μσει is Cohn’s (PCW .) emendation for μ!ρει Zμισυ (S), μ!ρει Zμισυ τ$ μξει (G2), μ!ρει τ$ μξει (F), and μνη τ$ μξει (HP) in the mss. to show a halved affection. S reads 1φ 9μισεα στ!ργειν, while the remaining mss have 1φ 9μισεας στοργ$ς. From this point on the text of F is mutilated, its place in Cohn’s apparatus being taken by its twin, Vaticanus gr.  (PCW .xxviii, ). harmony and unity. Readers familiar with Genesis  would be quick to challenge such claims. Note in particular verse , where Joseph brings back a “bad report” about his illegitimate brothers to their father (cf. T. Gad :–; Gen. Rab. .; also Jos. Asen. :–). In Ios. –, Philo follows the narrative of that chapter rather closely, taking due notice of the envy, hatred, and bitterness that Joseph’s brothers harbored against him. More often, though, he underscores the twelve’s harmony (Sobr. ; Somn. .–; Mos. .; Spec. .; Praem. –, –), and can even assert that, unlike his father and grandfather, Jacob “met with no mishap in any part of his household” (Praem. ). () § . Should one, then, have any share with those . . . Reading ;τι τονυν μεταδοτ!ον ατο( τοAς with PLCL . and SG2H2, against PCW . and Vat.  (see above), which have τ τονυν μεταδοτ!ον τοAς. As Colson notes, in Philo’s writings this verb is used only with the genitive. rightly be considered enemies of both the Jewish nation and of all people everywhere. For the subtreatise’s universalizing tendencies, evident especially in §§ –a, see Analysis/General comments. Philo concludes with two brief points: those who claim the nobility of their ancestors as their own undermine the cultivation of virtue (§ ); in keeping with justice, the law judges all persons individually, with no respect for their family relations or history (§ ; cf. Spec. .). § . avenging justice. For the tradition that Δκη wreaks vengeance on those who transgress the law, see Post. ; Spec. .; Plato, Leg.

on nobility, §§ –



a (cf. on Hum. ), e; Epin. e; Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. hist. /..; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. ... Compare also Plato, Leg. d, according to which Retribution (Ν!μεσις), the messenger of Justice and overseer of all things, visits judgment on children who are disobedient to their parents. On the role of the Furies in Greek thought, see Maharam . Further, Alexandre , – .

Parallel Exegesis The treatise Quod omnis probus liber sit is an extended defense of the Stoic paradox that the virtuous alone are free, since they alone are free from the domination of the passions and cannot be persuaded or compelled to do wrong (cf. Galloway , –). As a basic principle, this parallels and supplements the argument developed in De nobilitate that the virtuous alone are noble (even if they are not free, § ), and at certain points the concepts of freedom and nobility overlap, e.g., Prob. ,  (quoted above), , , , . As in De nobilitate, Philo illustrates his thesis with numerous examples (see especially Prob. – ). However, unlike our text, the vast majority of these examples are derived from non-biblical sources (though cf. the reference to Esau in § ), and so the text as a whole has a more “secular” tone. For a similar concentration of biblical examples we must turn to the treatise that immediately follows De virtutibus in the Exposition, De praemiis et poenis. Philo explains that once they have been trained in the law, the citizens of Moses’ polity are sent out to be tested in the “sacred arena” of virtue. The obedient are rewarded as “true athletes” while the disobedient are shamed and punished (§§ –). Such rewards and punishments may be classified under individuals, families, cities, countries, and so forth (§ ). Honors paid to individuals are treated first, beginning with the so-called lesser trinity, Enosh (§§ –), Enoch (§§ –), and Noah (§§ –). For his righteousness, the last of these receives a two-fold prize, salvation from destruction and responsibility for all living creatures, since “the Creator judged it right that the same man should end the condemned and begin the innocent generation.” Next comes the greater trinity, whom, Philo notes, all belong to the same family (§§ –). Abraham’s reward for learning the truth of God’s existence is faith in God. Because he has learned to believe in God he has learned to disbelieve in everything else, especially everything



commentary

found in the sense-perceptible world, and so he is allowed “to gaze and soar beyond not only material but all immaterial things, and to take God for his sole stay and support” (§§ –). For Isaac, the one who acquired virtue “through nature,” the reward is joy, which consists in a life free from fear and grief (§§ –; thus representing the opposite of Cain in Nob. ). And Jacob, “the man of practice,” who shunned no toil or danger in his pursuit of the truth, has for his crown the vision of God, “the conceptual world ruled by its charioteer” (§§ – ). When he turns to rewards given to families, Philo insists that this type pertains only to Jacob, since he alone fathered only good children, while of the many children born to his grandfather all but one was found to be unworthy, and one of his father’s sons turned out to be “wild and indocile, brimful of fierce temper and lust” (§§ –). This family tree is then subjected to allegorical interpretation. Abraham passed from ignorance to knowledge, and ignorance is multiform; there are therefore many offspring for him to discard. Isaac represents the naturally-gifted soul, which lies on the border between virtue and vice; once it matures, however, the two separate. Finally, the soul that has not only good nature and good instruction, but also practice in virtue “becomes the plenitude of virtues” (§§ –).

Nachleben Clement paraphrases small portions from De nobilitate in Strom. ..– .., which is organized in terms of three comparisons, and in ..– .., which gives some concluding reflections on the worthiness of the sage. A transitional sentence (“But nobility itself is exhibited in choosing and practicing what is best.”) serves to contrast the concept of nobility with that of pretentiousness, which had just been discussed in ..– .. (see the Nachleben for De paenitentia; and for the language of choosing, cf. Nob. ). As with the previous section, those passages from Philo that Clement does draw on entail biblical allusions. Unlike his source, he refers to some of the (male) biblical figures by name. First there is a comparison of Adam and Noah (reversing the non-canonical order of the presentation in Nob. –). He begins by wondering what benefit (cf. /φελος in Nob. ) Adam derived from the nobility he inherited from God. Although his father was no mortal (..; cf. Nob. ), “he eagerly chose shameful things . . . and neglected those that are true and excellent, on which account he exchanged an immortal

on nobility, §§ –



life for a mortal one” (..). Clement follows the text of Nob.  closely, shortening the lists (“false and shameful and evil things” becomes “shameful things,” while “those that are good and excellent and true” becomes “those that are true and excellent”) and altering Wλγησεν to Wμ!λησεν. More interesting are two additions: when he made his choice Adam was actually “following his wife” (cf. Strom. ..–..), and the exchange he experienced was “not forever” (cf. Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. ..–; ..–). His counterpart is Noah, though interest is expressed not in his progeny (as in Nob. ), but in his origin, which “was not the same as Adam’s” (..). Nevertheless, he was saved (cf. Nob. ) through a divine visitation (1πισκοπ=; cf. Nob. ) because he had dedicated himself to God. Next Isaac is compared with Abraham’s other sons. Clement follows the text of Nob.  almost verbatim, except for changing ποδεχη to διαδ!χεται, and dropping the reason why the other sons were not found to be worthy heirs, namely, that they reproduced none of their father’s attributes. Finally, the twin sons of Isaac himself are compared in .., using language drawn from the beginning of Nob.  and the end of Nob. . The younger son was “well-pleasing,” though only to his father, not both parents, and so is the recipient of “his” prayers. Descriptions of the elder’s disobedience and the selling of his birthright are dropped, leaving only the statement that he served the younger, since “it is the greatest good for the fool not to live under his own authority,” a slightly modified version of Philo’s axiom in Nob. . A concluding paragraph announces that the “plan” (see the text-critical note on § ) evidenced by these events was “prophetical” insofar as it proves that all things belong to the sage, a Stoic tenet backed up with a citation of Gen : (cf. Sacr. ). This text, Clement says, conveys two teachings. The first is that the readers should desire one thing only, God’s mercy, through which the promises made to the worthy are realized (..–..). The second is that the sage is a king, another Stoic tenet, this one backed up with a citation of Gen : (cf. Nob. – ). The section concludes with the observation that the subjects of the sage obey him voluntarily on account of his desire for virtue (cf. Nob. ). Of all the biblical narratives alluded to in this subtreatise, Philo’s influence on the reception history of the Cain narrative was perhaps most profound. As Quinones (, ) puts it, “the greatest revolution . . . in the history of the Cain-Abel theme was the first, when the biblical brothers were transformed by Philo and later by Augustine into universal, rival, and contending principles.” Cf. Didymus Caecus, Comm. Gen.



commentary

– (with Geljon ); Ambrose, De Cain et Abel (with Savon , .–, –); and chapter  of Augustine’s De civitate Dei. Further, Glenthøj ; Schrenk , –. Further reading: Alexandre ; Böhm , –; Byron ; Holtz , –; Schuhl , –; Vessey ; Wendland , –.

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INDEX OF SOURCES It should be noted that the first three sections of these indices do not contain all references, but only include those texts cited or discussed in some detail. Page numbers joined by a dash indicate a reference on each of the pages concerned, not necessarily a continuous discussion. Index of Biblical Passages Cited Genesis : : : : : : : : : : : :

           

Exodus : : :– :– : : :– :–

       

Leviticus :– : : : : :– : : :

 ,  ,  , – –    

: : : :– :– :– : : : :– : : :– :b–a :– : Numbers : :– : : :– : :b– : :– : :– :– : : :– :

,  –,       –                  ,       

 : : : : : Deuteronomy : : :– : :– : :– : : : : : : : :– :– : : : : :– : : : : :– : : :– :– : :– : :– :– : : : :– :–

index of sources  –                – ,       , –      –     ,     ,   ,    

: :– : : :– : : :– :– :– : : : : :– : :– : :– : :– : :– : : : : : : :

    , –     , –    –    , –        –    

Proverbs :– : :– : :

    

Tobit :



Wisdom : :

 

index of sources



Sirach : :

 

 Maccabees :– :

 , 

Baruch :



 Corinthians :–



 Corinthians :–:



Index of Philonic Texts Cited De opificio mundi            –                      ,           ,      Legum allegoriae .  .–  .–  .–  .  .–  .  . 

De cherubim   –   

     

De sacrificiis  –  –  

     

Quod deterius    –

   

De posteritate Caini       De gigantibus  

 

Quod deus immutabilis sit –     



index of sources

De agricultura – –  

–   

De plantatione   – 

   

De ebrietate  

 

De sobrietate  –

 

De confusione linguarum         De migratione    

   

Quis heres   – –    –   

     –     

De congressu  – – – 

    

De fuga  

 

De mutatione nominum   –    –    De somniis . . .– .– . .– . .–

     ,   

De Abrahamo    –  – –   –  –      

                 , 

index of sources –      –    

   ,       ,  , 

De Iosepho    –   

      

De vita Mosis . . . .– . . . .– .– . . . . .– . . . .– . . . . . . .

   –                     



. . . . . .

     , 

De decalogo   –     –

      – 

De specialibus legibus .  .  .  . ,  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .–  .–  .  .  . ,  .  .–  .  .  .  .–  . 



index of sources

De specialibus legibus (continued) . ,  . ,  .  . ,  .–  .  .  .– – .  .  .  .–  .–  .– ,  .–  .–  .  . – . ,  . ,  .–  .– – .–  .–  .–  .– – De praemiis et poenis –          –  –  –  –    –   –   –         

 –  Quod probus  – 

     

De vita contemplativa   –    In Flaccum –    

    

Hypothetica . .

 

Legatio ad Gaium       De animalibus 



Quaestiones in Genesim .  . – .  . ,  .  .  .  . – .  .  .  .  .  . 

index of sources Quaestiones in Exodum .  . 

. . .

  , ,  

Index of Ancient Texts Cited (a) Greek and Roman texts Aristides Quintilianus Musicus .  Aristotle Ethica nicomachea .. – ..  ..  ..–  ..–  ..  ..  ..  De nobilitate frg.   Politica ..  ..  ..  ..  ..–  ..  ..  Rhetorica ..  ..  ..  .. – ..  Ps.-Aristotle De mundo   Oeconomica ..  De virtutibus et vitiis . 

Arrian Anabasis ..–



Cassius Dio Historiae romanae ..–  Cicero Academica .  De amicitia .–  In Catilinam .  De finibus .–  .  De officiis .  . , ,  .  .  De republica .  Tusculanae disputationes .  Columella De re rustica ..



Democritus fragmenta 



Demosthenes Orationes .



 Dio Chrysostom Orationes .  .–  .  .  .– – .  .  .  /.–  Diodorus Siculus Bibliotheca historica ..  ..  ..–  ..– – /..–  ..  Diogenes Laertius Vitae philosophorum .  .  . ,  .  .  .  Dionysius of Halicarnassus Antiquitates romanae ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. – ..  ..–  ..–  .. ,  ..  ..  ..  .. –

index of sources ..– .. Epictetus Diatribai ..– . ..– ..–

 –

   

Epicurus Epistula ad Menoeceum   Gnomologium Epicteteum   Herodotus Historiae .



Hierocles of Alexandria In aureum carmen .  Iamblichus De vita Pythagorica .  . – .  Isocrates Antidosis  Ad Demonicum   De pace 

  – 

Julius Pollux Onomasticon .



Juvenal Satirae .–



index of sources Lucian De sacrificiis 



Lysias Orationes . .– .

  

Marcus Aurelius Meditationes .  Musonius Rufus fragmenta ..–  ..–  Onasander Strategicus . .–

 –

Philostratus Vita Apollonii .



Plato Cratylus e c Critias d Gorgias b–d Laches d d–e Leges b–d d d–e a–b b e

           

a e–e d–e b–c a c d–d e–c c–a d Phaedo e e c b–d e Politicus b Respublica a d–c e a d–e c–e b–c b a d a c d c–d d c e–a b–b Theaetetus a–b b e–a Timaeus c e

                            –    –   –  –  –

 Ps.-Plato Definitiones a e

index of sources

 

Plutarch Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur f  De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute a ,  c  Amatorius a–b  An seni respublica gerenda sit e–f  Brutus .  Cato .  De cohibenda ira c  a  De communibus notitiis contra Stoicos e  a  Comparatio Lycurgi et Numae .  Comparatio Periclis et Fabii Maximi .  Crassus .  De cupiditate divitiarum e – De esu carnium a–b – c–d  e – f–a  a  De Iside et Osiride c  De laude ipsius a 

Lycurgus .–  Mulierum virtutes e–e  Numa .  .  Pericles . – Philopoemen .  Pompeius . – Quaestiones convivales a  Quaestiones romanae f  De sera numinis vindicta d–e  a  De sollertia animalium e–f  f  De Stoicorum repugnantiis e  e–f  c–d  Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum d–e  De superstitione d  Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus c–d  d–e  Ps.-Plutarch De liberis educandis c–d  fragmenta   Polybius Historiae .. ..

 

index of sources .. .. Porphyry De abstinentia .. .. ..–.. Ad Marcellam 

 

 ,   

Seneca De beneficiis ..  ..  ..  Epistulae morales .–  .  .  .  .  Naturales quaestiones , pref.   ..  Sententiae Pythagoreorum  –   Sophocles Ajax –

Tacitus Agricola . Annales . . Historiae . Teles fragmenta . .



   

 

Theophrastus De causis plantarum ..  ..–  ..  Characteres .  .  Historia plantarum ..  Thucydides Historiae ..



Valerius Maximus Memorabilia .–   Varro De re rustica ..– ..

 

Stoicorum veterum fragmenta .  .  .  . 

Virgil Aeneid .– .– .–

  , 

Strabo Geographica .. ..

Xenophon Agesilaus .



Stobaeus Florilegium .



 



index of sources

Xenophon (continued) Anabasis ..  Cyropaedia ..–  Memorabilia ..–  ..  ..  ..  Oeconomicus .–  (b) Jewish texts Dead Sea Scrolls Q  ii –  Q  ii –  QMMT B   B – – Q LXIII –  QT LII   LXII    Enoch :–

.  .–  .–  .  .  .  .  .  .  . – .  .  . – .  .  . – . ,  .  . ,  . , – . – Bellum judaicum .–  .  Contra Apionem . – .  .–  .–  . , ,  . 



Genesis Rabbah .  Joseph and Aseneth :  :  Josephus Antiquitates judaicae .  .  .  .  . 

Jubilees : :– :–:

  

Letter of Aristeas  ,    Mishnah Baba Mesia : : Maaser Sheni :

  

index of sources Peah : Sotah :



(c) Christian texts  –

Ps.-Philo Liber antiquitatem biblicarum : 

Arnobius of Sicca Adversus nationes . 

Ps.-Phocylides Sentences /  / 

Augustine De civitate Dei .  De moribus ecclesiae catholicae ..  Quaestiones Heptateuchum Exod : 

Sifre Deuteronomy    

Basil Homiliae .

Talmud Hullin a Sanhedrin a

Didascalia apostolorum . 



 

Targum Ps.-Jonathan Lev :  Testament of Job :  Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs Testament of Reuben :  Testament of Gad :  Testament of Judah :–  Testament of Zebulon : 

Eusebius Historia ecclesiastica .. – Origen Homiliae in Numeros .  In Jesu Nave .  (d) Egyptian texts Instruction of Amenemope .–  Instruction of Ankhsheshonqy . 

INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS Aalders, G.J.D.,  Adam, T.,  Alaux, J.,  Alexander, M.,  Alexander, P.J.,  Alexandre, M., , , , , , , , ,  Allison, D.C., ,  Alon, G.,  Alston, R., – Aly, A.A.,  Amir, Y.,  Annas, J., ,  Arora, U.P.,  Asheri, D.,  Attridge, H.W.,  Aune, D.E.,  Austin, M.M.,  Baer, R.A.,  Bagnall, R.S., ,  Bailey, J.N., ,  Bakewell, G.,  Bakhos, C.,  Balch, D.L.,  Baldry, H.C.,  Baldwin, B.,  Balsdon, J.P.V.D.,  Baltzly, D.,  Barclay, J.M.G., –, , , , –, , ,  Barker, A.,  Barney, R.,  Barraclough, R., ,  Barthélemy, D., , ,  Barton, T.,  Batten, A.,  Baumgarten, A.I.,  Baumgarten, J.M., ,  Beagon, M.,  Begg, C.T., , , ,  Behm, J., 

Bekken, P.J.,  Belkin, S., , ,  Belletti, B.,  Ben-Ze"ev, A., ,  Berchman, R.M.,  Berger, K.,  Bergsma, J.S., –, –,  Bernstein, M.J.,  Berthelot, K., –, , , , , , , , , , , ,  Bertram, G.,  Betz, H.D.,  Beyenka, M.M.,  Bietenhard, H.,  Billerbeck, M., ,  Birnbaum, E., , , –, , , ,  Blanchetière, F.,  Blumenfeld, B., ,  Blundell, M.W.,  Böhm, M., ,  Bolgiani, F.,  Bord, L.J., ,  Borgen, P., , , , , –, , , , , , ,  Bosman, P.,  Bostock, D., ,  Boswell, J.,  Bowersock, G.W.,  Bradley, K., –,  Brooks, R., , – Bruin, W.M.,  Burford, A., , , ,  Burnett, F.W.,  Byron, J., ,  Cairns, D.L.,  Calabi, F., ,  Cancik, H.,  Cardellini, I., 



index of modern authors

Carmichael, C.M.,  Cary, E.,  Caster, M.,  Cavallin, H.C.C.,  Chesnutt, R.D., ,  Chirichigno, G.C.,  Chroust, A.H.,  Clark, G., ,  Cohen, N.G., , ,  Cohen, S.J.D., –, ,  Cohn, L., , –, , , , –, , , , , – , , , , , , – , , , , , , ,  Cohoon, J.W.,  Colpe, C.,  Colson, F.H., , , –, , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , , –, ,  Conley, T.M.,  Conzelmann, H., ,  Cooper, A.,  Crawford, M., ,  Crook, Z.A.,  Crosby, H.L.,  Dalby, A., ,  D’Arms, J.H.,  Dautzenberg, G., ,  Dawson, D., –, ,  Dean-Jones, L., – de Fontenay, E.,  Deininger, J.,  Delia, D.,  Delling, G.,  Denniston, J.D.,  Desmond, W.D.,  Dierauer, U., –,  Dietrich, E.K., , ,  Dillon, J., , , , , ,  Dittenberger, W., ,  Dixon, S.,  Dobbin, R.F., 

Döring, K.,  Douglas, A.E.,  Dowd, S.,  Dowling, M.,  Downing, F.G.,  Drijvers, H.J.W.,  Droge, A.J., ,  Dué, C.,  Dyck, A.R., ,  Dyck, J.,  Eckstein, A.M., , ,  Edgar, C.C., – Edwards, C., , , ,  Edwards, D.R.,  Ehrhardt, A.A.T.,  Eilberg-Schwartz, H., – Elliott, J.H., ,  Elman, P., , ,  Elter, A.,  Engberg-Pedersen, T., ,  Erdkamp, P.,  Evans, J.,  Evans, J.K.,  Eyben, E.,  Fears, J.R., ,  Feldman, D.M.,  Feldman, L.H., , , , , , , , –, , , , , –, , , –, , , ,  Ferguson, E., , ,  Ferguson, J., , ,  Ferrari, G.R.F., ,  Finley, M.I., ,  Finn, R., ,  Fiore, B.,  Fisher, N.R.E., ,  Fitzgerald, J.T., ,  Fitzgerald, W., ,  Foerster, W.,  Fox, M.V.,  Fox, R.L., ,  Franklin, L.,  Frick, P.,  Früchtel, U., , 

index of modern authors Fuhs, H.F.,  Fuks, A., –,  Fulkerson, L.,  Furnish, V.P.,  Gabba, E.,  Gaca, K.L.,  Gale, M.R.,  Gallant, T.W., , ,  Galloway, L.E.,  Gammie, J.G., ,  Garnsey, P., , , , , , ,  Geljon, A.C., –,  Gelzer, M.,  Gerstenberger, E.S., ,  Geytenbeek, A.C.,  Gilhus, I.S., , , , ,  Gilmore, D.G.,  Ginzberg, E.,  Ginzberg, L., , , , – Glad, C.E., , , , , –  Glenthøj, J.B.,  Goldenberg, D.M.,  Goodenough, E.R., , , , , , –, , , ,  Goodman, M.,  Görgemanns, H.,  Gottwald, N.K.,  Gourinat, J.B.,  Graf, F.,  Graffigna, P.,  Graver, M.R., –,  Gray-Fow, M.J.C., – Gross, J.,  Gruen, E.S.,  Guerra, A.J., ,  Gurval, R.A., , , ,  Guthrie, W.K.C.,  Gutsfeld, A.,  Haas, P.J.,  Hadas-Lebel, M.,  Hadot, P., ,  Hahn, S.W.,  Hall, R.W., 



Hamilton, J.M.,  Hands, A.R.,  Haran, M., , ,  Hardie, P.R.,  Harland, P.J.,  Harrauer, H.,  Harrill, J.A., , ,  Harris, E.M., ,  Harris, H.A., ,  Harris, J.R.,  Hasel, M.G., , ,  Hay, D.M.,  Hecht, R.D., , ,  Heinemann, I., , , , , ,  Helleman, W.E., ,  Hennig, D.,  Hermann, J.,  Herrmann, F.G., ,  Herrmann-Otto, E.,  Heskel, J., – Hess, R.S.,  Hezser, C., , ,  Hilgert, E., , , ,  Hill, H.,  Hiltbrunner, O.,  Himmelfarb, M.,  Hirzel, R.,  Hobbs, A., , ,  Höistad, R., ,  Holladay, C.H., ,  Holtz, G., , ,  Houtman, C., , , , ,  Humble, N.,  Hunt, A.S., – Inwood, B., , , – Irwin, T., ,  Isaac, B.H., , , , , , , –, – Isager, S., –, ,  Jaeger, W.,  Jagersma, H.,  Jamesdon, M.H.,  Jastram, D.N.,  Jobling, D., , 



index of modern authors

Jones, A.,  Jones, A.H.M.,  Jones, J.R.M.,  Kamlah, E.,  Kasher, A., , – Kassel, R.,  Katz, P., – Kayatz, C.,  Keel, O.,  Keith, A.M.,  Kenney, J.P.,  Kern, P.B., –,  Kidd, J.E.R., ,  King, H.,  Kister, M., ,  Klassen, W., ,  Klein, F.N.,  Knauf, E.A.,  Koch, D.A.,  Konstan, D., –, , , , , , – Kramer, S.N.,  Krauss, S.,  Kuhn, H.W.,  Labuschagne, C.J., – Lacey, W.K.,  Lampe, P.,  Lapin, H.,  Laporte, J., ,  Lasserre, G.,  Lattke, M.,  Lausberg, H.,  Lawrence, L.J., ,  Lebeck, A.,  Le Bohec, Y.,  Le Déaut, R., ,  Lendon, J.E.,  Leonhardt, J., , – Leonhardt-Balzer, J.,  Levine, B.A., ,  Levison, J.R., ,  Lewis, J.P.,  Lewis, N., , , , , –  Lilla, S.R.C., , 

Lindberg, D.C.,  Llewelyn, S.R., – Lohfink, G.,  Loman, P.,  Long, A.A., , , , ,  Luck, U.,  Luraghi, N., ,  Mach, M.,  Mack, B.L., ,  Maharam, W.-A.,  Malherbe, A.J., ,  Maloney, R.P.,  Mangey, T., , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , – Marcus, J., , , , ,  Martens, J.W., ,  Martin, D.B.,  Martin, H.,  Martin, P.M.,  Massebieau, L.,  Mathieu, J.M.,  Mattern, S.P.,  McDonald, W.C.,  McGinn, T.A.J.,  McNight, S.,  Méasson, A.,  Meeks, W.A., , , ,  Meggitt, J.J.,  Méhat, A.,  Mejer, J.,  Mendelson, A., , , – Menn, E.M., – Michel, A., ,  Michelini, A.,  Milgrom, J., , , , , – , , –, , , , – Miller, J.L., , ,  Miller, P.D.,  Millett, P., , , , , ,  Momigliano, A.D.,  Montanari, E.,  Moorhead, J.,  Morris, J., , , , , , 

index of modern authors Morrison, D.,  Morrow, G.R., , , ,  Morton, A.G.,  Murphy, D.,  Najman, H.,  Nardi, E.,  Nave, G.D., , ,  Nelson, R.D., , , , , , , , –, , , , , ,  Neusner, J., ,  Newman, L.E., ,  Newsom, C.,  Nickel, R.,  Niditch, S., ,  Niehoff, M., , , , , , , , , , , ,  Nielsen, E.,  Nikiprowetzky, V., , , , , , ,  Nikolaïdis, A.G.,  Nolland, J.,  Noort, E.,  Noreña, C.F., ,  North, H., , , ,  Nussbaum, M.C., , ,  Ober, J., , –,  O’Brien, D.P.,  O’Brien, P.T.,  Ogden, D.,  Oppenheimer, A.,  Parisinou, E.,  Patterson, C.B., ,  Pearce, S., , , ,  Pears, D.,  Pearson, B.A.,  Pembroke, S.G.,  Perdue, L.G., ,  Peretz, D.,  Pestman, P.W.,  Petit, M., – Pfitzner, V.C., , ,  Phang, S.E.,  Philip, F., 



Pilhofer, P.,  Pohlenz, M.,  Pokorn´y, P.,  Polaski, D.C.,  Pons, J.,  Popa, T.M.,  Porter, J.R.,  Porton, G.G., ,  Pressler, C.,  Quinones, R.J., ,  Rainey, A.,  Rawson, B.,  Reinhartz, A., ,  Rendtorff, R.,  Reydams-Schils, G.,  Rhodes, P.J.,  Rickert, G.,  Riddle, J.M.,  Riedweg, C.,  Robinson, G.,  Rofé, A., , ,  Röhr, J.,  Roitman, A.D.,  Römer, W.H.P.,  Rosen, R.M., ,  Rosen-Zvi, I.,  Rosivach, V.J.,  Roskam, G., ,  Rowlandson, J., , , , , ,  Royer, J.P., ,  Royse, J.R., , –, , , , , , , ,  Runia, D.T., , , –, , , , , , , –, , – , –, , , , , , , , , , , , , –, – Safrai, S.,  Safrai, Z., ,  Salamone, G.,  Saller, R.P.,  Samuel, A.E.,  Sandelin, K.G., , 



index of modern authors

Sandmel, S., , , , , – Sasson, J.M.,  Savon, H.,  Schäfer, P., ,  Schmid, W.T., ,  Schmidt, H.,  Schmitt-Pantel, P.,  Schmitz, T.,  Schofield, M., ,  Schrage, W.,  Schrenk, S.,  Schuhl, P.M., ,  Schultz, J.P.,  Schultze, C.,  Schürer, E., ,  Schwartz, D.R., , , – Schwartz, E.,  Schweizer, E.,  Scodel, R., ,  Scott, A., ,  Scott, I.W.,  Sedley, D.N., ,  Seland, T.,  Shorey, P.,  Siker, J.S.,  Skydsgaard, J.E., ,  Sluiter, I., ,  Smallwood, E.M., –, ,  Smith, C.J.,  Smith, H.S.,  Solignac, A.,  Sorabji, R., , –, ,  Spicq, C., , ,  Sprague, R.K.,  Stafford, E.,  Stauner, K.,  Stepp, P.L., ,  Sterling, G.E., , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Stern, D., ,  Stevenson, T.R.,  Stirling, L.M.,  Straus, J.A.,  Striker, G.,  Sullivan, K.P., 

Talbert, C.H., ,  Talstra, E.,  Tarn, W.W.,  Taub, L.,  Taubenschlag, R., , , , – Tcherikover, A., –, ,  Terian, A., , , ,  Thom, J.C., , , ,  Tigay, J.H., , ,  Tobin, T.H., ,  Todd, S.C.,  Tracy, S.V.,  Treggiari, S.,  Trigg, J.W.,  Tromp, J.,  Tromp de Ruiter, S.,  Tucker, G.M.,  Turnbull, R.G.,  Tyrrell, W.B.,  Tzounakas, S.,  Usher, S.,  van den Hoek, A., –, , , –, , , , , ,  van der Horst, P.W.,  VanderKam, J.C.,  van der Toorn, K.,  van Kooten, G.H., ,  van Veldhuizen, M.D.,  Vasantharao, C.,  Veness, R., – Verboven, K.,  Vermes, G.,  Vessey, D.W.T.C., , ,  Vidal-Naquet, P.,  Vischer, L.,  Vischer, R.,  Vögtle, A.,  Völker, W., , , , ,  von Albrecht, M.,  von Nordheim, E.,  Wallace-Hadrill, A.,  Wander, B., 

index of modern authors Ware, J.P.,  Warnach, W.,  Wasserman, E.,  Waszink, J.H.,  Watson, A.,  Wegner, J.R.,  Weinfeld, M., , ,  Weisberg, D.E.,  Weiss, R.,  Weißenberger, M.,  Wendland, P., , –, , , , , ,  West, M.L., ,  Wevers, J.W., , , –, , , , –, , , , , , , , , , – Wheeler, S.C.,  White, K.D., –, , ,  Whitehead, D.,  Whittaker, J.C.,  Wiedemann, T.E.J., , , 



Williams, C.A., ,  Williams, G.D.,  Wilson, R.R.,  Wilson, W.T., , –, , , , , , , , , , , –, , , –, , , , , , , , , –, , , , – ,  Winkler, K.,  Winston, D., , , , –, , , , ,  Wolfson, H.A., , , , , , , – Wolters, R.,  Wörrle, M.,  Wright, B.G.,  Wright, M.R.,  Wyke, M., ,  Zanker, P.,  Zeller, D., , , –, 

INDEX OF SUBJECTS Aaron, , ,  Abel, – Abraham, , , , , , , , –, , , –,  Actium, , , , ,  Adam, , , –, –, – aether, –, ,  Alexandria, x, , ,  aliens, , , –, , , –, ,  allegory, , ,  almsgiving,  ancestry, , –, , –,  angels, –, – anger, , , , ,  animals, , , , , , , –, , , –, –  passim, –, – anthropomorphization, –,  apologetic, , , –, , ,  Arabia, –, ,  arrogance, , , , , – , –, – assimilation, , , , , ,  astrology, –, ,  athletics, , ,  Baal Peor, , ,  Balaam, , , –, ,  Balak, , , –, ,  banishment,  banqueting,  benefaction, , , –, , –, , –, ,  Bilhah, , – blessings, , –, , – , –, , 

blindness, –, , ,  breezes, – Cain, –, – canon of virtues, , , , – , , , , ,  captives, , –, –,  cave, myth of the, ,  Chaldeans, –,  chariot, myth of the, , , , ,  cheese, – choice, , –, , –, , , – circumcision, ,  civil rights, –, ,  class struggle,  clothing, –, –, , –, , ,  coins, , , ,  concubines, , , , – consolation,  cosmic dance,  courage, – passim cowardice, –, , , – , –, ,  Cynics, ,  debt, , –, –, – , –, –, – decalogue, , , ,  deferments, military, –, –  democracy, , ,  deposits, , – desire, –, , –, , –, –, , , –  dew, – disease/illness, –, –, , –, –, , , , 



index of subjects

divine warrior,  divorce,  Edomites,  Egypt, –, , , , , , , , –, –, – , –, , –, , , ,  Eleazar, , , , , , ,  endurance, , , , ,  enemies, , , –, –, –, , , –, ,  Enoch, , ,  Enosh, ,  envoys, –, ,  envy, , , –, , –, , – Epicureans, , , , ,  Er, myth of,  Esau, –,  exposure, , – farming, , , –, , –, – fear, –, –, , ,  fetus, , , –, –  first fruits, , –, , , –,  flatterers, , , ,  flood, the, – food, –, , , , – , , , –, – , –, , , –  forgetfulness, , –,  four (number), ,  fratricide,  freedmen/freedwomen, , , , ,  friendship, , –, , , , , , –, , ,  fugitives, , , , 

gentleness, , , , –, , , , –, , – ,  gleaning, , , , , , ,  golden calf incident, , ,  greed, , –, , , , , , , , ,  grief, , –, , –, , ,  Guardians, the, , , ,  gymnasium, x,  Hagar, ,  Ham, – harmony, , , , , – , –, , –,  harmony of the spheres, , – ,  harvest, , –, , , , ,  health, –, , –, , , –, , , , ,  hierophant, ,  high-spiritedness, , ,  holiness, , –, , , , , , , , , , , ,  hospitality, ,  humanity, – passim idolatry, , , , –, –, , , , , ,  illiberality, , –, , – , ,  image of God, , , , ,  imitation, , , , , – , , , , –, , –, , ,  immortality, , , , , , , , –, , ,  inheritance, –, , , , , , –

index of subjects insolence, –, –, , , ,  inspiration, , , – intercession, ,  intoxication,  Isaac, , , , –, , – , – Jacob, , , , , , –, , –,  Joseph, , – Joshua, , –, –, , , –, , , –  joy, , –, ,  jubilee, , , , –,  Judah, – justice, , –, –, , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , ,  kingship, , , , –, – , , , , , , , ,  kinship, , , , , , , , –, ,  laborers, –, , , , –, , ,  landlessness, , , , , , –, , ,  lending, , –, , , ,  leniency, , –,  light, –, , –, ,  liminality, , ,  list of virtues/vices, , –, , –, –,  lost property, , – manumission, –, , –  martial imagery, ,  medical imagery, , 



mercy, , , , , , , , –, , , ,  metics, – Midianites, –, –, , ,  milk, , –, , , –  moderation, , –, –, , , , , , , ,  music, –, , ,  mysteries, , ,  nature, , –, , , , –, –, –,  Noah, , , –, –, – nobility, – passim Numa, , –, ,  Octavia,  offerings, , , , , , ,  officers, , , –, –, ,  Olympic games,  oneness, , ,  Overseer, ,  oxen, –, , – parable,  passions, , , , , – , , , , , , , , , , , ,  personification, , –, ,  Phinehas, , , –,  piety, , –, –, –, , –, –, , , , –, , , –, , , , , , , –, – Pindar,  plants, –, , –, –  passim pleasure, , , , , , –, , –, , – , , , –



index of subjects

pledge, –,  plunder, , , – Plutus, ,  poor, the, , , – passim, , –, , , , ,  poverty, , , , , , , , , , ,  prayer, –, , , , – , , , , , , , , ,  pretentiousness, , –, , –, ,  priests, , , –, , – , , , –,  prophets, –, , –, , , , , – proselytes, , , , , – , –, , –, , , ,  prostitutes, , , , , – , , , , ,  providence, , –, , , , – prudence, , , , , , , – , , , , , , , , ,  pruning, , , – Pythagoreans, , , , , – , , , , –, , , –, , , ,  rain, , , , ,  reaping, , , ,  reason, –, –, –, , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , –,  reciprocity, , , ,  recklessness, , –, , , ,  reconciliation, , , , , ,  remembrance, , ,  repentance, – passim Romulus, –, , 

ruling classes, – runaways, , – sabbath, , –, , , ,  sabbatical, , , , –, ,  sacrifice, , –, , , –, , , –, , ,  Schadenfreude,  seal, , – seasons, , –,  Seldenianus,  self-sufficiency, –, ,  sense-perception, , , , , – sex, , ,  shepherd, ,  sieges, , , , ,  sight, , –, , ,  singing, – slaves, –, , , , , , , –, , , , , , , – softness,  solitude, –, ,  Solon, , ,  Sophia, – stars, , , –, , –  Stoicism, , , , –, , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , , –, , , , , , , , –, , –, –, , – , , , , ,  succession, , , , –, , –, ,  sun, the, , –, , – suppliants, , , , , , , , –, , –  Tamar, , , , –, , , , , , –

index of subjects teleological anthropocentrism, , ,  temples, , , , – Terah,  testament, ,  thankfulness,  thank-offering,  thanksgiving, , , – threshing, , –,  tithes, –, ,  tranquility,  trees, , –, , , – , , , , –, – 

vanity, , , , , 

universalism, , , , , , , ,  unwritten laws, , , 

Zeno, , , ,  Zilpah, , –



wages, , –, ,  war code, , ,  wealth, –, , , , – , –, –, –, – widows and orphans, , , , , , , ,  wisdom, , , , , , , , –, , , , , – , , , –, , , , , , , , –, , 

INDEX OF GREEK TERMS γαλματοφορ!ω, ,  γαπ,ω, ,  γ,πη, ,  γωνα,  δι,φορα,  δικος,  δοξα, ,  α>=ρ,  α]ρεσις, ,  κρασα, , ,  λογος,  ν,μνησις,  νδραγαα,  νδρεα, , , , , , , –

, , , , –, , , ,  νελευερα,  νελε:ερος, ,  παρχ=, ,  ποικα, –, ,  ρετ=, –, , , , , , ,  Yρμονα, ,  σ!βεια,  σκ!ω, , ,  τυφα, , , – φεσις, ,  γενναAος,  γν8μη, , , ,  δειλα, , –,  δεκ,τη, ,  δημιουργς,  δι,νοια, , ,  δικαιοσ:νη,  Δκη,  δξα, –,  δουλοπρεπ=ς, ,  δο(λος, – δ:ναμις, –

1γκρ,τεια, , , , ,  1γκρατ=ς,  ;νος, – ε>ρ=νη,  ;κστασις,  1λεημοσ:νη,  ;λεος,  1λπς,  1ν!χυρον, ,  1νομματω, – 1ξομοωσις, , , ,  ;πηλυς, ,  1πιδικασα,  1πιεκεια, , , , , ,

, , 

1πιεικ=ς, ,  1πιμ!λεια, , , –, ,



1πιυμα, ,  1πιστ=μη, , , , ,  1πιχαιρεκακα, –,  ;ρως,  εγ!νεια, , , , –, –

, 

εγεν=ς, , ,  εδαιμονα, , , , –,

, , , 

εεργετ!ω,  εIκλεια,  εκρασα, ,  ελ,βεια, ,  εIνοια, , , ,  ενομα, ,  εσ!βεια, –, , , , –

, –, , , , –, , , , , ,  ετολμα, ,  εχαριστα, ,  ;φορος, ,  1χρς, , 



index of greek terms

ζηλωτ=ς,  9γεμονα, ,  9γεμ8ν, , , , ,  9δον=, , , , ,  _ος,  Zμερος, –,  9μερτης, , , –, ,

,  αρσαλετης,  εοσ!βεια,  ητεα,  ρασ:της, ,  υμς, , , ,  υσα,  εροφ,ντης, , , ,  κ!της, ,  >στης,  κακοδαιμονα, , ,  καλοκγαα, , , , ,

, , , 

καρτερα, – κ,τοικος,  κληρονμος, ,  κοινων!ω, ,  κοινωνα, , , , , –

, , ,  κσμος, ,  κτ$σις,  λαμπρς,  λογισμς, –, , ,  λγος, , , ,  λ:πη, , , , ,  μαλακα, ,  μεγαλοφροσ:νη, , ,  μεγαλοψυχα,  μελ!τη,  μεταμ!λεια,  μεταν,στασις, , ,  μετ,νοια, , , , –,



μ!τοικος, 

μισανρωπα, –,  μισς,  μισωτς,  μν=μη,  νος,  νο(ς,  ξ!νια,  ο>κεωσις, , , ,  ο>κονομα,  2μνοια, , , , – 2μοφροσ:νη, ,  Hξυωπα, ,  Hργ=,  3σιος, ,  2σιτης, , , , –, –

, , 

Hφελημα, 

παιδεα, , ,  παρανεσις, , ,  π,ροικος, ,  πατ=ρ,  π!νης, , , , ,  πνε(μα, ,  πολιτεα, , , , –, , ,

, , , –

πολτευμα, ,  πολυαρχα, – πολυτ!λεια, ,  πρνοια,  προνομ=,  προνομα,  προσ=λυτος, –, –,

–, , 

πτωχς,  K8ξ, 

σ,ρξ, ,  σκαιτης,  σοφα, , ,  στ,σις, ,  στοιχεAον,  στρ!φω, , 

index of greek terms σωφροσ:νη, , , , –,

, , , , , , ,  σ8φρων,  τ,ξις, ,  τκος, – Rβρις, –, –, –,

–

Dπακο:ω,  Rπαρχος, –, ,  Dπερηφανα,  Dπεροψα,  Dπμνησις,  Dπομον=, – φαντασα,  φνος,  φιλανρωπα, , –, , –

, –, –, –, , – passim, , 



φιλα, , , –,  φιλοξενα,  φλος, , ,  φβος,  φρνησις, , , , , ,

, , , 

φ:σις, , , , , –,

, ,  χαρ,,  χ,ρις, , ,  χρηστς, , , ,  χρησττης, , ,  ψυχ=, , , ,  Bμτης,  Bφελεα,  Bφ!λημα, 