Personal Enmity in Roman Politics, 218-43 B.C

PERSONAL ENMITY IN ROMAN POLIT/es, 218-43 B.C.

The Roman Republic was governed by a group of men who agreed far more than they disagreed on the fundamental questions facing the state. The detail of their public bchavioul' can only be unders tood through consideraLion of the personal motives so deeply embedded in Roman society. One of the most importanl such motives is that of personal enmity or hatred (inimicitia). Such enmity coulcl arise in various ways, and was often ccntral (as was its opposite, amicitia, though in difTerenl ways) in the formation of politieal faetions. In partieular faclions opposing such powerful figures as Pompey in the 60s and Caesar in the 50s might be uni ted by nothing more than comrnon hatred of the individual and his power. An important feature loo was the criminal trial, because 01' the highly personal nature of I he Roman adversary system: trials eould both forward and crcate inimicitia, and the author argues that personal faetors were more important than political ones in the famous trials of 111(' late Republic. llavid F. Epstein is Assistant to the President and Lecturer in Departments of History and Classics, the U niversity of ( :hicago. IllC

Personal Enmity in

Roman Politics

218 -43BC

DAVID F. EPSTEIN /

Dr. VEIT GEORG WAENTIG

lauerstraße 5

6900 HEIDElBERG

Telefon 0 62 21/2 75 86

ROUTLEDGE

LDndon and New York

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First published in 1987

by Croom Helm Ltd

Reprinted 1989

by Routledge

11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

29 West 35th Street, New York NY 10001

Contents

( 1\, I, Ilowledgements

1

I 11 11 ocluction

'I

© 1987 David E Epstein

1(011I<111

Attitudes Towards Inimicitiae

1'/". (:
Filmset in Baskerville by Pat and Anne M urphy,

10 Bracken Way, Highcliffe-on-Sea, Dorset

Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

IlIlllldllctory 1lIlllIi..itiac Caused by Personal Grievances 1',,111 il :J1 Causes ofInimicitiae 111111'11 i I iac Produced by Violating Roman Relationshi ps

"I TllISt and Obligation "11'"" itiac Transmitted by Relatives and Friends ""'Y ;IS ;, Source of Inimicitiae ',11,111< iliac Toward New Men 111111111 il ia.. Against the Most Powerful Romans 11111111< ilia.. Arising from Interference in a Roman's

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be

reprintcd or reproduced or utilized in any form or

by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now

known or hereafter invented, including photocopying

and recording, or in any information storage or

retrieval system, without permission in writing from

the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

( :,II"'T

Epstein, David E

Personal enmity in Roman Politics,

218-43 BC

1. Political psychology. 2. Rome - Politics

and Government - 284-476

I. Tide

306'.2 JC89

\ I LI< I,,~ Oll ( 'dllil

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

''''l
Bibliography: p,

Includes index.

1. Rome-Politics and government-265-30 B.G. 2. Interpersonal eonflict-Political aspects- Rome. 3. Rome-Sociallife and customs. 4. Inimicitia (The

Latin word) 5, POliticians-Rome-Psychology. 1. Tide.

DG241.2.E67 1987 320.937 87-3604

ISBN 0-415-04280-1

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of Inimicitiae

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Epstein, David F., 1954­ Personal enmity in Roman politics, 218-43 B.C.

..,,'

12

30

30

34

39

40

43

48

55

56

58

60

62

11 Ision

11111' ,,1111'(ory 1,11,11'1 11 j.... D01l1inating Roman Political Activity I I.. 1lIlIll('n<:e ofInimicitiae on Roman Institutions " " " It I' I (:haracteristic of Inimicitiae I'IIIIII( ill;I(' and the Faetional Organisation of Roman

ISBN 0-415-04280-1

(-~ "-,._-­

Clients as a Source ofInimicitiae

1\ 1,111 ikstations

VI

1'\)1 I' I:

64

64

65

69

74

80

88

90

90

96

Litigation as a Source ofInimicitiae \ .iligation as a Manifestation oflnimicitiae 100

1' ..\ It I' ~): '\'h<: Limits of Current Scholarship Thc Sufficiency of Inimicitiae as a Motive in

102

I'rosecutions 104

Sp<:<:ific Trials 126

( :onclusion

,_

~O1l4

Ilision

127

N .....

130

'" I, • ( Itihliogl'aphy 11101, •

166

170

Acknowledgements

It is a pleasure to acknowledge the assistance I have received over the years it has taken to trans form this study from a dissertation prospectus into a book. My dissertation adviser, Ramsay MacMullen, guided the work du ring its formative stages. His sense ofRoman history focused my development as a graduate student in ancient history in many ways. Professors Gordon Williams and Donald Kagan of the Yale Classics Department also served on the dissertation committee and contributed valuable comments. Professor William V. Harris took his responsibilities as outside dissertation reader more seriously than I had any right to expect. I am grateful for his criticism and encouragement. Professor Erich Gruen, with enormaus generosity, provided detailed comments on Chapters 4 and 5. His kindness was inspira­ tional and educational. His lively correspondence provided some of the keenest intellectual excitement and reward I derived from my work. I am also grateful to Professor Arnaldo Momigliano at the U niversity of Chicago for reading Chapters 3 and 4 and criticising them with his customary sharpness. I should like to thank my editor at Croom Helm, Richard Stoneman, for his efficiency and the anonymous reader for some very helpful suggestions. My parents, Elizabeth and Carl Krumpe, provided the encouragement and financial support without which my task would have been far more difficult. I owe a very special debt to my stepfather, Carl E. Krumpe]r., for introducing me to the study of Classics as my first Greek teacher at Phillips Academy, Andover, several years ago. My largest debt is to my wife Catherine. Despite a heavy burden of other commitments, she found time to read the manu­ script at every stage, and to suggest countless improvements. Her experiences as a dassicist, editor, and lawyer, have left a profound mark on my work. The responsibility for all remaining errors and shortcomings rests, of course, entirely with me. David F. Epstein The University of Chicago VI

For Catherine

1

Introduction

!'eTsonal hatred among leading figures, and its important side elll-ets on a society's political and social developments, are hardly IIl1iqllC to the last two centuries of the Roman Republic. In every ',0' il'ly, including our own, public figures have allowed their IlITsonal feelings to influence their public behaviour. If the loIll'lIomenon of inimicitiae (enmity) was at all unique in Rome, it W,IS Iwcause Roman politicians who prosecuted their inimicitiae in ," Ijec were tolerated by their own society, and because the peculiar '1,l'IliT of Roman politics provided such a fertile source of 1Il1/1l/ritiae. What was distinctive about inimicitiae in Roman III d jI ieal life was that they were so pervasively and violently I.11I'SllCd. Thc term inimicitiae and its Creek counterpart, E'x6ea, were 1I~"'d by the ancient sources (as comparable terms in different 1.1I1!~lIages are used by other peoples) to describe an enormous I.III~C of social relationships in the Roman world. A glance at the I'hr'l(IIiTUS Linguae Latinae and author lexica under 'inimicus' ("lInIlY) and 'inimicitia' will suggest the impossibility of any II,IITOW definition. No two individuals ever hate each other in i'll'l'isely the same way. The human relationship is prior to and qllill' independent of its abstract designation. The term must 1I11'J('fore evolve sufficient vagueness to describe myriad different Iel.ltionships, and its meaning must conform to each individual 1I1.lllifestation, not vice versa. I'. A. Brunt's remarks about the wide connotations of' amicitia' (11 jClldship) apply even more appropriately to in im icitiae: Thc term amicitia is indeed ambiguous within its wide range.

Introduction

Introduction

To determine its exact nuance in any particular context requires tact and discrimination, and is often found where we have not suflicient knowledge of the circumstances to dis­ criminate .1

I':ven if we didn't know that Tiberius' murder would have given (;aius am pIe cause for inimicitiae, and that the Romans would have <'Xpected a slain brother to be avenged, we could guess that Gaius' acl ions against Octavius and Popillius were motivated by illimicitiae, because the effort to destroy the two men conflicted with Ilw agenda and goals of Gaius' political supporters. 4

I

Inimicitiae are an even less definite concept because amicitia in its '\ ideal form conferred sacred obligations. 2 Inimicitiae never did. 3 They created only vague expectations of hostile activity. In this sense one might say that all amicitiae were the same, but that all inimici hated each other in different ways. But this inherent vague­ ness does not diminish the historical importance of the relation­ ship, which lies in the Roman willingness to allow many forms of inimicitiae to influence their public conduct. Inimici used a wide variety of weapons, but shared a burning desire for revenge and a unique commitment to the pursuit of private warfare. Inimicitiae consumed an enormous proportion of Roman republican society's energy. The uselessness of any simplistic dictionary definition creates a fundamental methodological problem in studying inimicitiae. Any survey limited to those relationships specifically described as inimicitiae in the sources would be unnecessarily restrictive. There TI1Ust be some procedure for determining with reasonable con­ fidence whether inimicitiae were at work when their presence is suggested but tbe term is not used. It always requires imagination and great prudence to define motivation or assign relative import­ ance among a variety of motives for a given course of behaviour. But several criteria will generally betray inimicitiae as the driving force in a Roman's conduct. If a common cause of inimicitiae can be recognised, there is good reason to assurne the relationship. I shall discuss the most common causes of inimicitiae in Chapter 3. Confidence in extrapolating inimicitiae when a cause is on record increases because of the humiliation a Roman's prestige suffered, if he showed hirnself reluctant to res pond and retaliate for hostile aets. A Roman, governed by a harsh ethos, simply could not afford to 'turn the other cheek' and expect to maintain his position in society. U ncharacteristic or apparently irrational and unprofitable con­ duct often reveals the emotional pitch of submerged inimicitiae. For example, the sources strongly imply, but do not categorically state, that inimicitiae induced Gaius Gracchus to draft ad hominem legisla­ tion against M. Octavius and P. Popillius, the two men most responsible for the tragedy that engulfed Gaius' brother, Tiberius.

2

'I'here were several very common characteristics of inimicitiae that (an be described, even if the phenomenon e1udes simple lexi­ (ographical definition. Certain behavioural patterns among inimici were reasonably consistent, and discussion of these will help to darify the concept. 'Inimicitiae' differs from the large number of olher Latin words that may be translated roughly as 'dislike' or . hatred' in one important respect. 5 Inimicitiae were generally associated with demonstrations of hostility, whether by action or dl'daration. Because they connoted discrete manifestations rather I km the continuum of astate of mind the word is mostly found in Ihl' plural. 6 Declaring or acting in accordance with one' s hostile I<-dings is of course exactly what gives the phenomenon historical significance. No silent hat red can have the same impact as one ( h;ll'acterised by hostile exchanges. Several passages preserved in IIw correspondence of Cicero i1lustrate the concrete image of III.slile activity that inimicitiae evoked to the Roman mind. In 59 ( :il'l:ro's brother Quintus ordered the people of Apollonis to freeze IIw estate of the late L. Octavius until a debt had been paid to a (lTlain C. Fundanius. Octavius' rightful heir, L. Flavius, was 1I;llllrally distressed and complained to Cicero, leading Cicero to I .. buke his brother. The letter Quintus had written to the Apol­ IOllians threatened unpleasant action and not merely displeasure if IIwy did not co-operate with hirn in the matter: 'Atque ita mihi din:bat Flavius scripturn in ea epistula, .. te [Quintuml aut quasi ;1I11icis tuis gratias aucturum, aut quasi inimicis incommo­ daillrum' (Furthermore, Flavius told me that you wrote in that 11'11 er to the effect that you would either convey your gratitude to IIWIll as friends or make trouble for them as enemies).7 Similarly, whl'n on 4 August 44, Brutus and Cassius assured Antony that . \'O(TIllUS te ad nullas inimicitias' (we challenge you to no enmity), IIIl'Y meant that, whatever their feelings were, he had no hostile .1' I ivity to fear from them. 8 Thc connotation of hostile action meant that inimicitiae could not l'asily !Je secret. This is illustrated by Cicero's strenuous attempt to "';lssurc Ap. Claudius Pulcher 01' his continuing friendship after

3

I ntroduction

Introduetion

Cicero had succeeded hirn as governor 01' Cilicia. Claudius' com­ plaint that Cicero had hindered a deputation from going to Rome to eulogise hirn met with Cicero's denial. Such obstructionism, Cicero observed, would have been very poor strategy on his part: had he been Claudius' open enemy, no act could have done Claudius less harm. H, however, he hated Claudius secretly, no act could more effectively have betrayed his hand by bringing his inimieitiae into the open. 9 The second alternative indicates that stealthy hostility was considered a useful tool to the inimicus; and in fact the most dangerous inimieitiae were latent, capable 01' taking unsuspecting victims by surprise. This was the danger Cicero referred to at the end 01' the Verrines when he belittled the inimieitiae 01' the nobiles toward new men for being so entirely predictable: 'silent and hidden enmities are much more frightening than those openly declared.' 10 In contrast to the stealthy mode described by Cicero, inimieitiae often had another face, characterised by formal, public displays 01' hostility. Men who had quarrelIed frequently would declare their feelings publicly, often borrowing military terminology (denuntiare inimieitias, voeare ad inimieitias [to declare enmity, to challenge to enmityl.l1 H inimieitiae supplanted a friendly relationship the declaration would be accompanied by the announcement that the new inimieus would no longer be welcomed in one's house. This form 01' exclusion was the forerunner ofthat imperial institution­ amieitiam renuntiare (to renounce friendship) by which the emperor expressed displeasure with one of his subjects. 12 Tiberius hirnself traced the institution back to the Republic and the sanction of the mos maiorum (tradition).1:J The exclusion 01' a former friend from one's house is attested in a couple 01' instances for the Republic but is likely to have bcen too commonplace to be reported regularly by the sources. 14 A man was expected to have good reasons for taking up inimieitiae, and an explanation 01' his motives frequently accom­ panied the anno~ncernent 01' hostilities. The in imicus , Iike the duellist 01' more recent times, needed a justification accepted by honourable society. Otherwise he was no better than a gladiator. Publicly sanctioned motives for inimieitiae were so important that inimiei often deliberately sought out pretexts, just as the duellist might slap his rival's face or otherwise insult hirn, in order to fortify the altercation with a socially approved basis. A good illus­ tration 01' such manufactured motives involves the fury 01' Ap. Claudius Pulcher, censor in 50, toward Caelius. The relationship

was especially senSitive because the two had recently become reconciled despite a long familial hostility. Caelius had attempted to block the effects 01' Claudius' wrath by enlisting Claudius' censorial colleague, L. Piso, to counter any action he might take. On discovering these overtures Claudius angrily accused Caelius 01' seeking a 'causa inimicitiarum' (pretext for enmity) to hound hirn more effectively.15 The Romans' pragmatic nature did not comfortably submit to the overriding demands 01' a code 01' honour. Inimieitiae, in the face 01' more pressing exigencies, were often resolved before death. V l"ry few Romans adhered rigidly to their inimieitiae when the price rose too high. One 01' Sallust' s many complaints about his era was the tendency he saw 'ta value friendships and enmities in accord­ ance with convenience rather than on their own merits.' 16 Dio was l'qually eynical: 'Most men's friendships and enmities depend on their own self-interest and thc degree 01' inf1uence others hold.' 17 As a result, inimieitiae frequently ended in reconciliation (reditus in /!,ratiam), a process in many ways similar to a treaty. This is how Cicero characterised the conciliatory note he sent to Crassus, who was on his way to Syria in 54-:

4­

5

Piease consider this note to have the force 01' a treaty rather than a letter, and be assured that I shall most scrupulously observe, and most diligently execute, all I am promising and undertaking for you. IB Ikcause reconciliations were accorded the sanctity 01' a treaty they werc often accompanied by more than mere professions 01' good l'aith. A marriage conriection was a weil recognised prescription for cnding inimieitiae. 19 Banquets provided the most common rcinforcement. These might also serve to announce publicly that good relations had been restorecl: Crassus' journey to his province began almost from my house so as virtually to announce our reconciliation to the Roman pcople. For we agreecl that he would dine with me in the gardens 01' my son-in-law Crassipes. 20 A thircl party was often essential to mediate reconciliations and I,ring them to fruition. 21 As c1iscussecl in Chapter 4-, inimieitiae g"'lcrally involved the suspension of all social relations between illdivicluals. The critical task 01' the mediator was to bring the two

Introduction

Introduction

The third party might also ensure that a reconciliation would be

lived up to. A mediator who had conferred his blessing and thus

committed his prestige would add extra pressure on two inimici to

keep their word because a renewal of hostilities would threaten his

dignitas (honour). Cicero acknowledged that this was an incentive

not to permit his reconciliation with A. Gabinius, orchestrated by

Pompey, to disintegrate: 'If I were untrue to the reconciliation he

arranged, I would of course betray myself above all , but I would

betray hirn only slightly less.'24

Any reconciliation was notoriously difficult to maintain. The

emotions of inimicitiae ran so deep that some Romans believed

sincere reconciliation to be impossible. 25 Dio expatiates on th~

suspicion that always divided former enemies and notes that this

tension could easily be exploited by the overwhelming majority of

people who enjoy enmity among those in power. 26 Nevertheless,

Roman public opinion apparently took reconciliations very

seriously, and expected the terms to be scrupulously observed.

The short-lived rapprochement between M. Livius Salinator and C.

Claudius Nero, the consuls of 207, serves as a good illustration.

When the two shared the censorship in 204, their good relations

broke down amI they deprived one another of their state horses.

l,ivillS IlIlIsl have expccled to g-ain some sympathy when he justi­

lied 1111" I"nwwed nllllilY ill pari hy accusing- Claudius of lacking

'"allw"'I1":;:; ;dllllil Ilw "'To/lcili;,liml. n

"1'111" 1"~i'I"' 1.""111 11';11 /11/11//'/ wOllld livl" IIp to their reconcilia­ 11"11:, ,:, "1'1';111"111 111 (:icn"',,, (!;Iilll Ihal I'olllpey was reluctant to

endorse the murder of Clodius only because he feared that the sin­ cerity of his reconciliation with Clodius several years earlier would be questioned. 28 Cicero's sense ofthe public pulse ensures that his assessment of Pompey's motives was highly credible to his Roman listeners. One of Cicero's letters confirms how much damage a Roman could suffer by defaulting on his promises of reconcilia­ tion. In 54, Cicero became publicly reconciled with Ap. Claudius Pulcher, the brother of his enemy P. Clodius, through Pompey's offices. 29 This reconciliation was strained when Cicero succeeded Claudius as proconsul in Cilicia and significantly improved the province's administration. 30 It came dose to the breaking point when Cicero's son-in-law P. Cornelius Dolabella prosecuted Claudius for maiestas (treason) and ambitus (bribery) in 50. 31 Cicero felt campelIed to dissociate hirnself from the prosecution, and assured Claudius of his continuing friendship, citing not only private bonds but also public pressures: their 'famous reconcilia­ tion' was one 'in which not even a careless error was permissible without suspicion of insincerity.' 32 The pressure to keep faith was sufficiently strong to induce Cicero to take special pains to show extra marks of affection for his former inimieus to enhance the impression of his enduring good faith. He assured Ap. Claudius Pulcher that he had gone out of his way to demonstrate affection toward hirn 'lest anyone suspect I was insincere in becoming reconciled.' 33 Such sentiments help explain why reconciliations occasionally went beyond a mere suspension of hostilities and inaugurated a spirit of co-operation, such as that shown by Cicero to ward Crassus just before the fateful Parthian expedition. Cicero promised to look out for Crassus' interests in Rome dUr'ing the campaign partly to demonstrate his constancy in adhering to their reconciliation, which Pompey had catalysed: 'I shall remain firm in the defence of your interests which I have undertaken in your absence, for the sake of friend­ ship and to strengthen my reputation for steadiness. '34 Roman public opinion, whieh eneouraged former inimici to observe the terms of their reconciliations so carefully, might also work to prevent reconciliations from ever taking place. ARoman risked losing a great deal of prestige if he gained a reputation for reconciling hostilities too easily. Where weakness invited attack, a man perceived as overeager to forgive his inimici encouraged hostility toward hirnself. In 54, Ap. Claudius Pulcher took advan­ tage of that kind of reputation for weakness in engineering the prosecution of M. Aemilius Scaurus, a necessarily hostile act, as I

()

7

antagonists together to reduce their mutual suspicions. The

importance of this kind of direct confrontation is demonstrated by

Cicero's mediation of a quarrel between Atticus and L. Lucceius.

Cicero failed to make Lucceius change his mind by his own efforts,

but thought the quarrel might be resolved if he could induce

Atticus to meet Lucceius. 22 In the absence of a neutral bystander to smooth the way, most Romans would have rebuffed the over­ tures of their inimici, as Cicero appears to have done when Q. Fufius Calenus tried to mend their mutual differences in 44: A courier came from Q. Fufius with a very brief note from

hirn suggesting that we become reconciled. It was really

absurd, just as one might expect, unless perhaps a man whom

you dislike appears to do everything absurdly. I wrote back in

a way that I think you [Atticusl will approve. 23

I

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11

I1

Introduction

Introduction

shall show in Chapter 5. His aim was to eliminate Scaurus from the competition for the consulate and thereby boost the chances of his own brother, C. Claudius, in the race for the same office. 35 Cicero, speculating about Ap. Claudius' possible motives for rendering assistance in such bold fashion, suggested that he might have gauged Scaurus an easy mark for reconciliation after the trial. 36 Conversely, it may have been adesire to avoid that kind of reputation for weakness that motivated Ti. Sempronius Gracchus to take the unusual step of swearing publicly that his intervention on behalf of Scipio Africanus did not mean the end of their inimicitiaeY Men like Sulla hoped to deter any invitation to hostility by cultivating a reputation for not resting until their inimici were utterly destroyed. He circulated a story (it presumably originated in his AIemoires) that before the march against Rome he had dreamt of a goddess who armed hirn with a thunderbolt and told hirn to destroy his foes. Sulla followed her advice in the dream and in Iife. 38 Cicero paid a considerable price in lost prestige because of his alleged reluctance to stay the course in his perennial personal battles. His detractors never tired of belittling hirn for not holding out against his inimici,39 a point on which Cicero hirnself revealed considerable sensitivity. He insisted to his brother in 54 that Pümpey would never succeed in reconciling hirn to A. Gabinius because that would deprive Cicero of every semblance of inde­ pendence. 40 Later, bowing to the inevitable, he tried to make a virtue of necessity when he boasted about his defence of Gabinius: 'I certainly don't regret that my enmities are transient, but my friendships permanent,' and in another passage: 'If Pompey's auctoritas had not reconciled Gabinius and me earlier, Gabinius' misfortunes would have produced the same result now.'41 Cicero's intimate correspondence at the end of 54 does not attest a similar concern for Gabinius' misfortunes. 42

you to assign friendship a priority over all other aspects of human existence. '43 Cicero did not hesitate to invoke his devotion to his friends as an explanation for his dramatic endorsement of the first triumvirate in 54. In a famous letter to P. Cornelius Lentulus, he expatiated on his obligations to Pompey and Caesar personally as justification for his sudden embrace of the triumvirs and their associates. 44 This invocation of friendship is hardly a complete explanation for Cicero's shift in loyalty, but he could not have professed it unless it made sense and would generally ring truc in Roman ears. Fuller analysis suggests that Cicero' s dramatic shift may indicate more indulgence of spite than bowing to obligations. As noted below in Chapter 2, a Roman experienced particular satis­ faction in taking revenge, and Roman society accepted such behaviour. In the same letter to Lentulus, Cicero highlighted his fury at the antitriurnviral elements in cataloguing his rationale for switching sides in 54, demonstrating that the pursuit of deeply feit animosity could justify the dropping of less intense inimicitiae. 45 Cicero blamed the boni who opposed the triumvirate for allowing his exile, for being soft on Clodius, for not preventing the expulsion of hirnself ami his brother from their house, for not acting to make good the pecuniary losses his exile had entailed, and even für rejoicing in his renewed enmity with Crassus. 46

1;1

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The potential damage a Roman's reputation might suffer as a result of becoming reconciled is also apparent in the elaborate attempt to clothe reconciliations in the mantle of patriotism or comparable virtues. The pursuit of one' s inimici was not the principal demand of Roman aristocratic society, and would yield with minimal loss of face when it conflicted with higher values. Patriotic considerations are frequently alleged as such an over­ riding value, as I shall discuss in Chapter 2. Devotion to friendship also took precedence over inimicitiae, or anything else für that matter. Cicero's Laelius professes as much: 'I can confidently urge

Despite the elaborate justifications Cicero offered for his behaviour in 54, he apparently could not convince hirnself that his conduct really had been honourable. At the end of his letter to Lentulus he unconvincingly insisted that his new political position accorded with his own beliefs and had not been coercedY His ultimate justification für his action was opportunism, the virtue and necessity of sailing with the prevailing political wind - the attitude that cost Cicero so much respect among his contem­ poraries and in succeeding generations. 48 Cicero' s conduct in this example was not atypical: the actual impetus toward a reconciliation often was far less lofty than the publidy announced cause. As a result of the paramount role political ambition played in the life of the Roman aristocrat, the pursuit of inimicitiae usually gave way when it conflicted with an opportunity für power and glory. Dio, recognising this priority, incorporated it into the message Philiscus conveyed to the recently exiled Cicero: 'Lovers of power disregard everything in favour of achieving what they wish. They even frequently exchange their dosest friends and relations for their bitterest foes.' 49 Similarly,

8

9

Introduction

Introduction

Caesar' s efforts to induce the most famous reconciliation of the Republic, the agreement between Pompey and Crassus that paved the way for the first triumvirate, were successful mainly because Pompey and Crassus realised they could both make poli~ical hay through co-operation. 50 At no time was the politically ambitious Roman more ready to overlook and resolve inimicitiae than before an e1ection. Victory depended mainly on the favourable impres­ sion of the masses, but also on good relations with as many power­ ful patroni as possible, because of the huge blocs of dient votes they controlled. This was why the author of the Commentariolum Petitionis urged Cicero to come to terms with his inimici as part of his strategy for winning elections.5' Power and inlluence in Rome were not acquired exdusively through victories at the polis. Association with a faction 52 success­ ful in dominating the Roman ruling oligarchy also played an important role. The demands ofthe faction frequently edipsed any pressures imposed by individual animosities. Roman political groupings were hierarchieal, and the very few senators who wielded power at the top of a political pyramid could not allow the inimicitiae of their associates to interfere with their own broader objectives. 53 Individuals acquiesced in subordinating their own concerns because their desire for political power was compelling. Hence reconciliations significantly contributed to the continuous process of forming and reforming political structures in Rome.' Cicero took this for granted when he toyed with the idea of joining forces with the first triumvirate: 'Here are the arguments [for joining the triumvirate]: a very dose association with Pompey and if I wish also with Caesar, together with a reconciliation with my enemies.'54 Power politics was not the whoIe story. Some reconciliations came about for primarily personal reasons, as in the case ofCicero and Crassus. There was never much love lost between the two men, and on several occasions their ill will ignited into inimicitiae. Crassus' son Publius, in spite of his father's feelings, deeply admired Cicero, who not unnaturally returned the compliment. 55 The young Crassus played an important role in mitigating the antagonism between his father and Cicero. When Cicero enraged Crassus by irrtimating in a public oration that he had firsthand knowledge of the Catilinarian conspiracy, Publius' inlluence restrained his father from injuring Cicero. 56 The younger Crassus also induced his father to give Cicero some support in 58. 57 The senior Crassus was quick to support Cicero after his return from

exile in 57 and attributed his reconciliation on this occasion to the inlluence of his son. 58 The importance 01' the formal signposts of inimicitiae, dedara­ (ions of hostility and reconciliations, must not be exaggerated. Romans themselves often disagreed about whether inimicitiae existed in particular instances, because the hostile acts in which inimicitiae most frequently originated were so capable of ambiguous construction. Cicero, seeking to avoid hostilities with powerful nohiles, wrote to Q. Metellus Celer and Ap. Claudius Pulcher at Icngth to convince them that no grounds for mutual hostilities existed. 59 Reconciliations were also ambiguous. It was apparently possible to be ih cloubt whether or not one had taken place: 'Quod sn'ibis de "reconciliata gratia" nostra, non intellego cur recon­ ciliatam esse dicas, quae nurnquam imminutast' (With regard to the statement in your letter abotlt our reconciliation, I can't lI11derstand how you can describe a relationship that has never been troubled as reconciled).60 Evidently, a shift in the tone of a rdationship could constitute a reconciliation, but the formal over­ tures described above could securely cement the rapprochement. The inherent vagueness 01' the concept of inimicitiae should not discourage inquiry. It is possible to identify many inimicitiae at work during the last two centuries 01' the Roman Republic, even when the sources do not use the term, and to describe the predict­ ahle behavioural patterns that characterised such enmity. The intensity of Roman inimicitiae, and the tolerance with which society sheltered the relationship, as described in my next chapter, explain why inimicitiae had such an enormous impact on Roman public life and on the course of Roman history .

10

11

Roman Attitudes Toward Inimieitiae

2

within the oligarchy prompted Polybius to emphasise the difficulty of ascertaining true accounts of events, a problem that will always plague Roman historians. 1 Cicero, writing to his brother, illus­ trated the paranoia Romans feit about the inimieitiae they saw everywhere around them: he was convinced that his contem­ pararies could not treat hirn fairly, but hoped that future genera­ tions free of' disparagement' and 'malevolence' would judge more accurately.2 The Roman attitude toward the inimieitiae that pervaded their lives was highly ambivalent, ranging from outright condemnation to boastful pride, Any phenomenon so widespread must evoke manifold reactions, the product of changing and conflicting values. The Romans were passionately patriotic and deeply com­ mitted to the supremacy of the state' s interests ave I' all private concerns. Because their national interests could be threatened when individuals pursued mutual hostility without regard for higher concerns, they found such pursuits irreconcilable with the ideal Roman polity. At the same time, most Romans aspired to the dignity of consular status, which could only be attained through ruthless competition and the elimination of one' s peers. Such ambition inevitably generated inimieitiae. The Romans would not tale rate inimieitiae when they thought vital state interests, especially the national security, were at stake. This central idea continued throughout the republican period, although the years of revolution caused many Romans to deviate increasingly from its fulfilment. During times of crisis inimieitiae earned praise only from those who confused these enmities with the beneficial competition for glory that so often preceded personal

;1I1illlosity, This kind of confusion is evident in an incident illvolving the consuls of 207, M. Livius Salinator and C. Claudius NeTO, who had been inimiei ever since Claudius' testimony helped scnd Livius into exile after his first consulate in 219. 3 Although the I wo were about to take the field against the Carthaginians, Livius "I'gued that a reconciliation with Claudius was unnecessary. On (lw contrary, he maintained that rivals spurred by inimieitiae would pnform at their peak. The Senate, apprehensive about the cI('structive power of inimieitiae, remained unconvinced and illsisted on a reconciliation. 4 The Romans were fully aware of the dangers inimieitiae posed to IIw state. It is true that rivalry was beneficial in certain circum­ si ances. The duality of the consulate originated in part to institu­ I itlnalise rivalry and prevent the emergence of a new king. This is ;11I obvious reason why joint campaigning for thc consulship is so I"rdy attested in Roman politics. 5 But the Roman desire to cllcourage constructive competition stopped short of tolerating the d,'slructive inimieitiae that so often emerged fra m such rivalry. I'cuds that threatened to submerge the national interest were serupulously defused, It was f'or this reason that the state obliged Ihe consuls of 78, Q. Lutatills Catulus and M. Aemilius Lepidus, I tl swear that their differences would not spark another civil war. 6 Mcmories of Marius and Sulla were still very fresh. In less extreme cases the Senate might use its auctoritas to J'('concile two znimiei. This was what led the Senate, at Fabius' i IIsistence, to persuade the consuls to drop their feud in 207. In ;lIlOther example, the sources claim it was thc Senate that requested Seipio Africanus to betroth his daughter to Ti. Sempronius (;racchlls to guarantee their reconciliation.7 Even if this story is wl'Ong, 8 it nevertheless reflects a credible attitude and aspiration of 11)(' Roman leadership. The Senate's reaction to the inimieitiae lH'tween M. Fulvius Nobilior and M. Aemilius Lepidus du ring the c'arly part of the second century confirms its concern about ptllcntially destructive feuds in sensitive places, and emphasises its capacity to pressure individuals to conform to its collective values. 'I'he feud arose because Lepidus was convinccd that Fulvius' efforts eaused hirn to attain the consulship only in 187, two years late. 9 I lirectly after the rivals were e\ected to the censorship in 179, the Senate sent adelegation headed by Q. Caecilius Metellus, which slln:essfully urged the two inimiei to become reconciled. 10 Others besides the Senate also intervened when they appre­ I)('nded harm from particular inimieitiae. Such an intervention

12

13

Roman Attitudes Toward

In imicitiae

Inimieitiae were everywhere in Roman society. The dissensions

Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

restored good relations between Pompey and Crassus. Their hostility began during their service under Sulla through Crassus' jealousy of the excessive honour the dictator accorded to the still very young son of the detested Q. Pompeius Strabo. 11 The relationship worsened when Pompey deprived Crassus of some credit for the Servile War. 12 After Pompey and Crassus shared a stormy consulate together in 70, a certain C. Aurelius, a Roman knight, induced both men to become reconciled. 13

Sempronius Gracchus, the father of the famous tribunes, most notably benefited from this form of apparent selflessness. (;racchus seems to have been a bitter enemy of both Scipio hrothers during the series of incidents known as the Scipio trials. 21 As tribune in 187, however, he ostentatiously declared his IInwillingness to disgrace the Republic by allowing the imprison­ llIent of so illustrious a citizen as 1,. Scipio. 22 Gracchus was careful 10 swear that his inimicitiae had not ended, successfully heightening his reputation for virtuous patriotism: Livy reports that senior senators admired Gracchus for placing the interests of the Rcpublic above his private feelings. 23

Inimicitiae's destructive power was the subject of such consensus that it could be invoked as a noncontroversial explanation of all of Rome's ills. Cicero claimed at the end of the De Haruspicum Responso that the resolution of domestic anger and interneeine feuding was the only solution to the vast problems facing the Roman state. H Similarly, in the DeAmicitia Cicero contrasted the destructive power of inimicitiae with the virtues of amicitia and concordia: 'The power of friendship and concord can be perceived from the effects of dissension and discord. Which house is so stable, which state so firm that it cannot be completely destroyed by hatred and disagreement?'15 It is noteworthy that when the Romans reflected on their political ideal, the early Roman Republic, they professed to believe that it was free of inimicitiae. The early Romans 'quarrelIed, fought, and feuded with external enemies. Citizens vied with one another to be virtuous.' 16 After Caesar' s death, Cicero urged the Senate to give up 'their long-standing mutual hatred, or love of quarrelling, or whatever one might call it' and to return to 'the peace, friendship, and harmony of old.' 17 The Romans indulged the nostalgie belief that the state had acquired riches, glory and allies during its earliest days, and had steadily declined ever since. 18 Another indication of Roman concern over inimicitiae was the belief that religious institutions ought to be free of private animosity. Cicero betrayed this concern in his letter to Ap. Claudius Pulcher urging that they preserve their public reconcilia­ tion. 19 One of the bonds that should have uni ted them was their 'common membership in an exalted priesthood', which their ancestors so revered that they 'not only thought it improper for friendships [among membersl to be violated, but went so far as to forbid the election to the College of any man who was an enemy of another member' .20 The Romans also implicitly showed their tolerance of certain uncontrolled inimicitiae by praising those who overlooked their private enmities for those of the Republic. The reputation of Ti.

14

Gracchus, not content to rest on these laureIs, tried to gain even IIlore acclaim from this incident later in his tribunate. M. Aburius, his tribunician colleague, threatened to veto any motion con­ f(Tring a triumph on M. Fulvius Nobilior for his campaigns in Greece. Aburius was acting as the agent of M. Aemilius Lepidus, whose feud with Fulvius Nobilior has just been noted. Gracchus persuaded Aburius to drop his threat by asking hirn to consider how history would contrast their tribunates: posterity would rcmember that one tribune, Gracchus himself, had laid down his inimicitiae for the state, while another was pursuing not even his own inimicitiae but those of another. 24 Cicero showed the same instinct for exploiting his reconcilia­ lions. Caesar's role in his exile should have made the two bitter inimici. Cicero's later submission to Caesar and his fellow trium­ virs therefore might have s~emed so unnatural as to damage his credibility. However, Cicero turned his defence of Caesar's interests in the De Provinciis Consularibus to his own advantage with a ready response to the dubious: his primary cancern was with the public good (communis utilitas), not his private resentment (dolor).25 Cicero could not 'be an enemy to a man whose letters, farne, and messen gers [[rom his important war in Gaull fill my ears every day with names of new tribes, nations, and places. '26 In subordinating his inimicitiae to the interest of thc Republic, Cicero claimed to f()llow the example of some of the Republic's greatest heroes - Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, L. Licinius Crassus, M. Aemilius Scaurus, M. Aemilius Lepidus, L. Marcius Philippus, L. and M. Licinius Lucullus, P. Servilius and Q. Caecilius Metellus NeposY The Roman impatience with inimicitiae is also evident in the quick censure and punishment meted out to republican officials whose inimicitiae interfered with their duties. Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, hearing that his enemy Q. Pompeius would succeed

15

Roman Attitudes Toward lnimicitiae

Roman Attitudes Toward lnimicitiae

hirn in Spain, reportedly sabotaged the entire Roman war effort rather than see Pompeius reap military glory, and paid for his anger, as Valerius Maximus teils us, in diminished glory.28 The events following Rome's disastraus defeat at Arausio illustrate further the Roman intolerance of inimici who failed to co-operate in serving their country. The inimicitiae that prevented the two commanders, Cn. Mallius Maximus and Q. Servilius Caepio, from co-ordinating their military activity were a major cause of one of Rome's worst military fiascoes. Servilius, jealous because the consul Mallius had the primary authority, was eager to monopolise all military glory. The fury of the people continued for two years, especially against Servilius. His ',mperium (command) was immediately abrogated, a penalty not imposed since the Tarquins. 29 The tribune L. Cassius Longinus passed a bill in the following year expelling from the Senate anyone whom the people had condemned or deprived of imperium. Servilius was also probably accused during the same year of peculation by the quaestio auri Tolosani. This special court was investigating the dis­ appearance of the treasure seized after Servilius' capture ofTolosa in 106. The charge was not directly related to the defeat at Arausio, but the popular rage against Servilius may have encour­ aged the prosecution. Servilius was apparently acquitted or merely fined. He was not so fortunate in 103, however, when both he and Mallius were convicted of treason. Gruen suggests that Servilius may have escaped execution only narrowly, because his eventual punishment - exile - was not initially offered. Instead he was imprisoned and secured release only through the intervention of a friendly tribune. 30 These unusual measures show the strength of the popular sentiment against the inimici, caused by disbelief in Servilius' claim that the military disaster was an accident. 31 The correspondence between L. Munatius Plancus and Cicero in the spring of 43 illustrates Roman intolerance of unco-operative inimici still further. Plancus assured Cicero in April that he would not allow private resentment (privatae o.ffensiones) to prevent his reaching agreement with his bitterest enemy M. Aemilius Lepidus, who was at the time professing the republican cause. 32 By mid-May Plancus told Cicero that despite his best efforts, co-opera­ tion with Lepidus was impossible. 33 Several days later, Plancus abruptly changed his tune and claimed that he would join forces with Lepidus after all, out of cancern that public opinion would blame hirn for not co-operating because of personal animosity or lack of courage, if Lepidus suffered a disaster. 34 This cancern for

his public image is understandable when one remembers that I'bm:us was eager to show hirnself worthy of the consulate he ,·x lH:cted in 42, especially when he had to live down the charge that 111' owed his political success to Caesar' s favour. 35 Despite this ;lIlguish about creating the correct image, the exceptionally diffi­ , 1111 times in which he lived eventually convinced hirn that his best I'l"ospects lay with the anti-republican forces. Caesar hirnself IIl1derstood as weil as anyone the value of a public image, and was .lware how much he could damage a reputation by hinting that a IlIall's desire to avenge his private foes conflicted with the public illinest. In his self-serving account ofthe civil wars, he tried to dis­ '\Tdit his opponents by claiming that they were goaded by long c'slablished inimicitiae against him. 36 The Romans were also intolerant when non-military officers of , Ihe Republic allowed inimicitiae to interfere with their duties. Their ;lIlitude toward the renewal of enmity between the censors of 204, M. Livius Salinator and C. Claudius Nero, is illustrative. The ""lISors first deprived each other of their state horses. Next (:Iaudius disenfranchised Livius. Livius responded by equally ,I('llioting Claudius and by taking other wildly irresponsible ;IC"( ions. 37 The censors became so unpopular as a result that they IIlade an easy target for prosecution by the tribune Cn. Baebius Tamphilus. The Senate somehow stopped the trial, fearing that I"lIture censors would be at the whim of the populace. 38 Similarly, ( :ato faced considerable criticism when he exploited his censorship lll" 184 to deprive L. Scipio of his state horse. Public opinion ;111 ributed this insult to Cato's insatiable hatred of Lucius' brother, Scipio Africanus, in spite of the latter's recent death. 39

16

The Romans, like all societies, fell far short of their political ideals, including their conviction that private inimicitiae should yidd to the state's interests. This was especially true during the Imbulent century of revolution that followed the murder of Ti. ( ; racchus. The conditions of revolution - especially the increas­ iIIgly violent norms of behaviour 40 - during the last century of the Roman Republic brought irresistible temptations for inimici to (lllse as political partisans and exploit the succession of massacres alld proscriptions that decimated political opposition. H Revolutionary conditions also weakened the authority of tradi­ (iorlal Roman ideals and institutions that had worked to contain Iflimicitiae in the past. Caesar's civil war forced his friend C. M atius to weigh their friendship agaillst devotion to the 17

Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

,

Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

Republic's interests, which he acknowledged Caesar was subvert­ ing. Matius remained loyal to Caesar and even mocked his critics, who insisted that the demands of patriotism outweighed friend­ ship, for being tao philosophical. 42 The horrified reaction of Cicero and others suggests that, however widespread Matius' views may have been, they were still repugnant to republican ideology.43 The Senate' s ability to discipline individual senators, and force them to act in accordance with what the Senate perceived as the national interest, steadily eroded during the revolutionary era. Although the Senate at the peak of its authority may not have been able to induce inimici to give up their hard feelings for each other entirely, it could act decisively to proteet the state against the warst effects of private feuds. The reconciliation arranged by the Senate between M. Livius Salinator and C. Claudius Nero in 207 held throughout the campaigning season that culminated in the defeat of Hasdrubal at the Metaurus, only to break down when the two men became censors tagether in 204. 44 The Senate also induced the two censors of 179 to reach reconciliation, which resulted in a harmonious censorship.45 The events of 78 - 77 illustrate the relative decline of the Senate's power to pressure republican commanders to set aside their personal antagonisms for the national interest. As noted above, the Senate had extracted an oath from the consuls of78, M. Aemilius Lepidus and Q. Lutatius Catulus, that they would not resort to war to settle their differences. Lepidus interpreted his oath as binding hirn only for the year of his consulate. 46 In the ensuing year he showed his contempt for the Senate by raising the successful rebellion that Catulus ultimately defeated at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge. The declining influence of the Senate is evident not only in Lepidus' willingness to risk civil war, but also in the change of strategy the Senate employed in attempting to assert influence. It is noteworthy that the senators had passed over the traditional reconciliation for what they must have considered a more reliable formula for ensuring peace - a specific oath. Apparently, they lacked confidence that the consuls would respect their auctoritas, and live up to the terms of a reconciliation. As the Senate lost its power to insist that Roman leaders act in accordance with the national interest, individuals asserted the supremacy of their own dignitas, the life-blood of a successful political career. 47 A reputation for worsting one's inimici was essential for preserving dignitas. 48

It is impossible to assemble meaningful statlstlcs about the IllITease of inimicitiae during the last century of the Republic. The evidence is impressionistic, but not unreliable, for the ancient sOllrces shared the same impression. Many ancient writers saw an ill('rease in inimicitiae, 01' in same obvious causes of inimicitiae, as a "'lIt ral feature of the decay that ultimately destroyed the Republic. S('ipio Nasica and many others, according to Diodorus, believed I hat fear of Carthage forced the Romans to live in harmony, with 111<' obvious implication that the removal of that fear led to an i II(TeaSe in internal strife. 49 Saint Augustine also saw the destruc­ I iml of Carthage as a tuming point in Roman history . Harmony W
18

19

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Roman Attitudes Toward Inimieitiae

the jurors had not expressed hidden malice in the secrecy of the ballot box, a virtue he considered regrettably rare during his era: 'It is not characteristic of these times, or of these men, or of these customs.'55 The Roman admiration far the pursuit of inimicitiae was theoretically qualified only by the high standards of patriotism pro­ fessed by the age. Even though in reality, as I shall show below, startling (by Dur standards) allowances were made for inimici who placed their feuds above the public interest, the professed ideal was more strict. Cornelia, an exemplary Roman mother, famous for providing her sons, the Gracchi, an excellent education after the death of their father, is said to have written:

r

11 1'1 ~I

You will say that it is beautiful to take revenge on your enemies. I consider revenge as important and glorious as anyone, but only if it can be attained without harm to the Republic. 56 Cicero expressed similar sentiments when he wrote about the dolores (resentments) of several farnaus Roman demagogues. A . dolor, which focused a Roman's wrath on an individual ar group of ! individuals whom he held responsible for wronging hirn, brought out the same emotions and desire for revenge as inimicitiae. Ti. Gracchus displayed dolor at the Senate for disowning the Mancinus treaty to which he had committed so much of his prestige. His brother Gaius' dolor embraced all those whom he held responsible for Tiberius' death. Saturninus' dolor arose when the Senate humiliated hirn during his quaestorship by terminating his super­ vision ofthe Roman grain supply. None ofthese men, in Cicero's eyes, was justified in venting his hostility by becoming a popularis, because disservice to the state was inexcusable. At the same time, Cicero implicitly acknowledged that these hostile responses would be appropriate in another context, for he considered them moti­ vated by cogent reasons, in sharp contrast to those of the dissolute ClodiusY The public acceptability of waging inimicitiae allowed private warfare conceived in Homeric terms to become a vital component of the Roman aristocratic ethos. Cicero's explanation of his plight, after he lost his independence in 54, recalls the personal priarities and even the idiom of a Greek hero: he had yearned from youth 'ta excel by far and to be distinguished above others.' This was now impossible: 'I have been forced to leave some of my enemies

20

Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

unattacked and to defend others. My spirit and even my hatred are not free. '58 Such an attitude suggests the gloria inimicitiarum referred to by Tacitus in his Dialogus. 59 It also gave rise to the curious fashion in which the mere fact of inimicitiae with an important figure might confer dignitas because it implied at the least that one could not be ignored. T. Manlius Mancinus, the tribune in 107, apparently referred to hirnself as Metellus Numidicus' inimicus in a speech probably intended to prevent Metellus from celebrating a triumph far the ]ugurthine War. Metellus responded that Manlius, whom he considered neither friend nor enemy, was trying to appear important by claiming to be his inimicus, and refused to say anything more about the homunculus (worthless fellow) lest he increase his honour. 60 If Manlius was indeed seeking to block Metellus' triumph, he would not lightly have claimed to harbour inimicitiae, for that would undercut his argument. The Romans were quick to disregard as prejudiced the testimony of inimici. 61 The claim of inimicitiae there­ fore must have had independent value for Manlius, making Metellus' explanation quite plausible. In the Pro Caelio, Cicero exploited with devastating effect the importance inimicitiae con­ fcrred on an individual. He dramatised the imagined response of Clodia's venerable ancestor Appius Claudius Caecus to the pro­ ceedings Clodia initiated against Caelius. Cicero's Claudius cannot understand how Clodia could have been either friendly ar hostile to the lowly and dissolute Caelius: 'How could you have been so familiar to hirn that you would give hirn gold or so hated by hirn that you would fear that he might poison you?'62 The admiration and prestige that a lowly figure like Manlius cxpected to derive from inimicitiae with the great is not surprising in a society that assessed a man's status in relation to his ability to overcome his foes. No ambitious Roman could afford to appear reluctant to take up inimicitiae. Cicero brushed aside such reluctance, which might be mistaken for cowardliness, when in 44 Antony ostentatiously requested his consent to recall from exile P. Clodius, the san of Cicero's arch-enemy. Cicero expressed pleasure at the prospect of the young Clodius' return, hoping to improve his relations with Antony and professing complete non­ chalance at the possibility that the young Clodius would inherit his father' s hatred: 'A man of my years need not worry about any danger from a young man like Clodius. Nar should my rank fear his contention. '63 The prestige gained by the pursuit of inimicitiae explains the 21

Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

positive relish the Romans took in doing their enemies ill. Sulla left an epitaph - Plutarch emphasises that he composed it hirnself ­ that no friend had surpassed hirn in kindness, and no enemy in evil. 64 Other Romans echoed Sulla's sentiments. The author ofthe Invectiva in Ciceronem, though perhaps a contemporary of Augustus, attempted to reflect the values of the late Republic when he accused Cicero of being suppliant to his inimici and insulting to his friends, aremark intended as a great insult. 65 Caesar, after receiv­ ing the provinces he wanted in 59, could not restrain hirnself from crowing to the Senate that 'he had secured what he desired in spite of the opposition and whining of his adversaries, and as a result would henceforth stamp on the heads of them all' .66 Romans who fought each other with such pride and zest took great satisfaction in the misfortunes of their enemies. Cicero told Quintus in 56 that he was consoled by the almost daily condemnations of his enemies.67 In other letters Cicero refers to the pleasure he experienced in seeing his enemies thwarted, c1early expecting his correspondents to share his sentiments. 68 Although these were private letters, the Romans' readiness to express similar senti­ ments in public suggests how acceptable society considered them. Sometimes these public sentiments were so extreme and so con­ trary to prevailing patriotic values as to seem to us in poor taste. It is remarkable that Cicero could rejoice quite openly when L. Calpurnius Piso, who had collaborated with Clodius in exiling Cicero, lost his army while governor of Macedonia. Cicero seems to us quite callous when he admits that the magnitude of the disaster was beyond his hopes but in accordance with his wishes. 69 It is true that Piso' s disbanding of his army before returning to Rome can explain most of the loss, but this is not the whole story: many of his men had died of plague and famine and many others must have perished in the fighting against the Danseleti. 70 If Cicero could gloat publiclyon this occasion, it should cause no surprise to find the Romans tolerant of open rejoicing at the death of inimici. Cicero admitted this reaction to Clodius' death. 71 I have already mentioned how valuable it could be for a Roman to persuade the people that he was laying down his inimicitiae for the Republic. Conversely, because of the prestige associated with inimicitiae, Romans often sought and found glory in the claim that their publicmindedness forced inimicitiae upon them as a cross to bear in the national interest. Cicero' s ceaseless attempt to boost his own reputation provides ample and tiresome evidence that this was the most socially acceptable reason for undertaking inimicitiae:

1<'1 those who might wish to corrupt the judiciary 'know that they will find me a great deal more persistent and more forcible against those men with whom I shall take up enmity in the interest of the wdfare of the Roman people'.7 2 Sallust's Cotta uses the same dletorical topos about inimicitiae pursued in the public interest.7 3 'I'he theme could serve to praise others as weil as oneself. 74 Cicero identified inimicitiae endured for patriotic reasons with dw highest form of glory, self-sacrifice for the state.7 5 He con­ sidtTed such selflessness so essential to Rome' s continuing well­ lH'ing that he professed to see the end ofthe Republic approaching !wcause it was becoming impossible to find a citizen who would hrave invidia (envy) for his country's sake 76 Cicero's rhetoric is all Ilw more understandable in the light of the conviction he shared with others that proper attention to the administrative duties of rcpublican office inevitably led to inimicitiae. 77 It was natural for a man like Cicero who boasted of his willing­ IlCSS to endure inimicitiae for the state to advertise his patriotism still further by stressing that all who were hostile to Rome's illterests were automatically his enemies. This claim appears often ('Ilough in Cicero's writings for authors who attempted to repro­ duce his speeches to place the sentiment in his mouth as a mark of authenticity.78 Cicero' s sense of his public image was so strong in this regard that he was prepared to write utter nonsense as long as il strengthened other people' s perception of his patriotism. In the letter to Antony in which he c1aimed no objection to the recall of the son of his arch-enemy P. Clodius, he wrote that his enmity with Clodius had never been personal: 'My dispute with P. Clodius arose when I defended the public interest and he defended his own.' 79 Cicero played on a similar assumption later to cviscerate Antony in the second Philippic. He accused Antony of ndtivating hostility toward hirn as a tactic in mobilising the rcvolutionary elements in the state: no appeal to the lawless could he more effective than inimicitiae with Cicero, the self-professed champion of legitimate government. 80 Gloria and devotion to eountry were not the only socially accept­ able justifications for inimicitiae. A Roman was expected to avenge the wrongs he or his family reeeived from their enemies. 81 Even I'ompey, one of Rome' s most hardheaded practitioners of unsenti­ mental politics, understood that Cicero could not be expected to defend the hated P. Gabinius until his dignitas had been assuaged. 82 I have just mentioned Cicero's sympathy, albeit luke­ warm, with C. Gracchus' desire to avenge his brother's murder,

22

23

,;,.;,, j'.

I

Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

which shows this sense of duty extended to one's relatives. Dido's deathbed speech illustrates the obligation recognised by the Romans to avenge one's spouse: she recalls her accomplishments in life, the building of Carthage and the punishment of her brother for killing her husband. 83 A son was equally duty bound to avenge wrongs suffered by his father. Cato the Eider praised an unnamed young man for securing the conviction of one of his dead father' s in im l:ci: 'One must sacrifice to one's parents not lambs and kids but the tears and convictions of enemies. '84 A good way for a young man to inaugurate a public career, as I shall show in Chapter 5, was to prosecute his father' s accusers. Tradition sanctified patronage and friendship as among the most powerful justifications for taking up in im icitiae. The elder Cato's reputation as a pillar of Roman virtue derived in part, according to Cicero, from his willingness to risk inimicitiae on behalf of his Spanish dients. 85 Cicero hirnself, hoping to evoke the jury' s sympathetic pity by stressing his dose ties with Milo at the end of the Pro Milone, illustrated his devotion by assuring Milo that he had always sought out the enmities of the powerful on his behalf. 86 The pride and delight Romans took in waging inimicitiae neces­ sarily produced suffering among their victims. One man's satisfac­ tion was another's humiliation. The idea that an inimicus might revel in one's own misfortunes horrified a Roman. Plautus' ,Chalinus humorously dissuades hirnself from suicide because of the was ted effort, the expense, and because his death would gratify his inimici. 87 More serious is the conversation Dio records between the recently exiled Cicero and a certain Philiscus in which Cicero asked whether it was not a terrible misfortune for a man to wander about as an exile, a laughingstock to his enemies and a disgrace to his friends, Dio probably invented the story but Cicero's senti­ ments are correctly portrayed. 88 His letters reveal a suicidal agony.89 He expatiated in the Pro Sestio on the miseries his exile had brought to his brother Quintus as weil as to hirnself: he was 'the best of brothers, who showed incredible devotion and unheard-of love, wallowed in great squalor at the feet of our worst enemies' .90 Cicero hirnself had been forced to endure 'the cruelty of his inimici, the crimes of the faithless, and the deceit of the envious' .91 The Romans ofCicero's generation would have under­ stood the sentiments of Velleius Paterculus on the death of Cinna. Velleius, no friend of the populares, believed that Cinna's death was not sufficiently humiliating because it had occurred during the

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mutiny of his army. Cinna deserved to die by the sentence of his victorious enemies. 92 The horror of suffering at the hands of one's inimici was so readily understood that it could be exploited by an orator to pro­ duce indignatio. An audience would have a clear point of reference and would be outraged if told that a man had suffered worse than what inimici or hostes (foes) deserved. 93 A skilful orator might exploit the Roman sensitivity toward suffering at the hands of inimici for other purposes. A vividly painted picture of the future faced by a convicted defendant could evoke sympathy in a jury. Quintilian instructed orators in the art of producing such pathos, suggesting the argument that the convict 'must flee the city, leave all his property or endure whatever his enemy inflicted on hirn' .94 Evidently, nobody deserved to be at the perpetual mercy of an inimicus. Cicero, ever the orator even in his private corre­ spondence, exploited the same pathos to stress his unhappiness in 49. In a letter to Atticus he daimed ironically that he had nothing to look forward to except the hope that one of his inimici would put hirn out ofhis misery.9 5 M. Fulvius Nobilior made a public appeal to the same sentiment in his quest for a triumph in 187, which was opposed by his inimicus M. Aemilius Lepidus. Nobilior begged the Senate to grant a triumph 'lest they allow hirn to be a laughing­ stock to his proudest enemy'. 96 If Roman society tolerated and even encouraged inimicitiae, it did not approve of the extraordinary ferocity inimici occasionally showed one another. A Roman prided hirnself on virtus, a code of conduct that sometimes restrained a man's desire to humiliate his foesY7 The Romans believed that respect for the dead should transcend inimicitiae. Sulla breached this code by ordering Marius' remains exhumed and scattered in the Anio river. 98 He must have been sensitive to the danger of unpopularity posed by such vicious behaviour, because several years earlier, before he feIt secure enough in his power to ignore public opinion, he ostentatiously allowed C. Flavius Fimbria's body to be buried. On that occasion he dedared publicly that he would not imitate the conduct of Marius and Cinna, who had forbidden burial to so many of their victims. 99 In contrast to Sulla, Caesar was greatly admired for his generosity toward Pompey and Cato after their deaths. 100 Cicero's description of Clodius' funeral emphasises the demand of virtus, that respect for the dead override inimicitiae. He professed to see the anger of the gods manifested when Clodius' supporters dis­ graced the funeral of their master: after all, even inimici drew the

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line at desecrating a man's funeral. 101 This did not prevent Cicero from admitting that the maltreatment of Clodius' corpse did not upset hirn, even if he could not praise the deed. 102 The Romans were content with the strict observance of the letter of their moral code. Moralists greatly admired enemies who did not take ungentle­ manly advantage of their opponents, a further sign of the generosity inimici were ideally expected to show each other. Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus earned praise during his prosecution of his inimicus M. Aemilius Scaurus in 104 because he refused to exploit the testimony of Scaurus' renegade slave. 103 L. Licinius Crassus, the future consul of 95, was admired for similar conduct when he prosecuted C. Papirius Carbo. 104 More specifically, the Romans expected magnanimity from vic­ toriaus inimici. It was only decent to show moderation once a decisive victory had been scored. M. Porcius Cato displayed this kind of moderation in the course of his violent disagreement with Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos over whether Pompey should be recalled to counter Catiline. When Metellus fled to Pompey after bitterly denouncing Cato's tyranny and conspiracy against Pompey,105 inimicitiae must have inevitably arisen. Nevertheless, once Metellus had departed from Rome, Cato restrained his anger and persuaded the Senate not t9 depose Metellus from the tribun­ ate, thereby winning popular approval. 106

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Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

Antony adopted a comparably high moral tone in asking Cicero's

consent before recalling the san of P. Clodius from exile: 'Allow me ... to persuade [young Clodius'] impressionable mind that enmities should not be passed on to posterity.' 109 Antony did acknowledge that it was much easier to forget inimicitiae under­ taken for the Republic than those originating in personal insults (contumaciae).110 The Roman ideal of moderation toward one's inimici is also apparent in Cicero's oratory. He must have expected his audience to empathise with hirn when he daimed that it was easier to limit one's enmities than one's friendships.1Il Cicero betrayed the Roman attitude toward overly aggressive inimici in his defence of Caelius, when he tried to forestall anticipated criticism that his dient had been tao vindictive toward his enemies by asking the jury to be indulgent toward Caelius' youth. 112 Elsewhere, Cicero commands moderation toward one's enemies for quite practical reasons: in general men preferred to spare even their worst enemies out of regard for lheir own reputations, humanity, and the fear of reprisals. 113 One of Cicero' s letters to Atticus gives a vivid example of the potential reputational benefits of such moderate behaviour. Cicero worried in early 49 that Caesar was becoming known as the preserver of his enemies while Pompey appeared adesertel' of his friends. 1I4 Caesar had just demonstrated his famous demency by releasing the prisoners taken at Corfinum. j 15 Another limit on inimicitiae was the insistence that individuals bound by certain ties which the Romans considered sacred should not be hostile toward one another. One of these ties was friendship itself. Not only was there no honour, but 'nothing is more dis­ graceful than to wage war with somebody you have known intim­ ately' .116 Family and military ties likewise inhibited inimicitiae. Mos maiorum required subordinates to co-operate with their superiors as if they were family members, on pain of a severely damaged reputation. In his defence of M. Fonteius, Cicero turned this taboo to rhetorical advantage. In fact the witnesses against Fonteius were Gauls whose credibility was low, but Cicero argued that his dient's case was so strang that it could survive impeach­ ment by credible evidence: even if 'he were hated by all of his own (invisus suis omnibus)' and thereby sufTered great loss of reputation, there would still be good cause to acquit him. 117 Similarly, in the second Philippic, Cicero used thc bitter hostility between Antony and his unde to accent his portrait of Antony as depraved and morally bankrupt. llB The ideal of thc family as a sanctuary from inimicitiae explains the Roman horror of litigation, a certain cause

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In its praise of restraint Roman rhetoric about inimici could even approach Christian sentiments. Cicero wrote his philosophical works - especially the De Officiis, dedicated to his san - with the express purpose of instilling the Roman youth with the morality that in his opinion had lapsed so deplorably.107 In spite of the debt these works owed to Greek writing, they must also have expressed Roman moral aspirations, if they were to serve the educational purpose Cicero intended. Cicero certainly did not always practise what he preached, but he was expressing a general piety when he wrote: Certain duties must be observed even toward those from

whom you have received an injury. There is a limit to revenge

and punishment: Ialmost think it sufficient that a man who

has injured you regret his action so that he and others will be

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~. Roman Attitudes Toward Inimicitiae

or manifestation of inimicitiae as I shall show in Chapter 5, between brothers. Cicero was counting on more than friendship when he asked L. Papirius Paetus to help M. Fabius Gallus in his dispute with his brother over a jointly owned property: 'Do not allow brothers to engage in litigation and to settle their differences in a proceeding involving charges of scandalous conduct.' 119 The Romans' disapproval of enmity between a general and his subordinates is evident in one ofCicero's more rhetorical flourishes against Piso. He daimed that: the legates who were with you [Pi so] are alienated; the military tribunes hate you; the centurions and what soldiers remain from that great army, whom you dispersed rather than disbanded, hate you, wish the plague on you, and curse you. 120 This attitude explains why the Romans were so reluctant to allow subordinates to prosecute senior officials. Cicero insisted that Q. Caecilius Niger, who had served as Verres' quaestor in Sicily in 72, not be permitted to prosecute his former commander. He listed several examples of quaestors who had applied for the right to prosecute their superiors and explained that none of them had been 'turned down because of disdain. They were rejected lest the authority of the courts be used to sanction the desire to violate a dose bond' .12\ The dose bond imposed reciprocal obligations. A commanding officer was expected to protect his subordinates, not to indict them. Cicero exploited this sentiment to arouse pity for his dient, the quaestor P. Oppius, accused in a letter by his superior, M. Aurelius Cotta. 122 The Roman attitude toward inimicitiae was complex and ambivalent. The pursuit of inimiciliae alld the destruction of one's enemies were firmly entrenched among those virtues Romans thought necessary for the acquisition of dignitas, virtus, status and nobility ­ qualities the Roman aristocracy pursued from birth. At the same time, the Romans recognised that the single-minded pursuit of personal interests was not compatible with the best interests of the stat~ or of humanity. The Romans sensed a conflict and resolved it only imperfectly, by lame exhortations to inimici not to forget the interest of the state or by efforts to control the worst excesses of inimici toward each other. The ambiguity of the phenomenon of inimicitiae is developed in the next three chap­ ters, as I turn to the causes of inimicitiae and their concrete 28

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manifestations within Roman society in general, and in the criminal courts in particular.

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The Causes of Inimicitiae

Introductory I have discussed the attitudes, conventions, and e1imate in Rome that permitted inimicitiae to exist within certain well-defined if not well-regulated limits. In this chapter I will investigate the causes of inimicitiae. This should help explain why they were such an important part of the Roman political landscape. The unique character of Roman politics is e10sely linked to the extraordinary prevalence of inimicitiae as a locomotive of political and social activity. Roman politics differed from modern western democracy in two fundamental respects. A modern political constituency elects its representative primarily on its perception of his ability to achieve its wishes and monitors his actions e10sely with its eyes on the next election. A politician who used his office to conduct a personal feud would be pereeived as d;verting his time and influence from what should be his exelusive focus. Voters would not tolerate hirn for long. Another master also forbids a modern politician to allow his personal feelings about his colleagues to influence his politieal activity. Western demoeraeies are dominated by competing politi­ cal parties, defining themselves principally through reasonably eoherent and stable ideologies. The latter may change over the deeades - a modern conservative aecepts a platform acknow­ ledging defeat on a broad spectrum of issues bitterly contested by his ideological ancestors. Modern liberals by adopting increasingly progressive policies also demonstrate that the political eentre has moved steadily toward the left. What remains constant, however, is the supremacy of ideology in determining the composition and activity of a modern political group.

The situation was very different in Rome. The Roman Repub­ lic never evolved a system of representative democracy.l Roman magistrates were chosen by the narrow group of citizens who attended the electoral assemblies. The Roman electorate responded to nobilitas and the wishes of their patrons. Questions of policy did not generally have a signilicant effect on Roman campaigns nor did the electorate try to dominate state policy. 2 Onee elected, a Roman politieian was not answerable in the modern sense. There was no institutional procedure for turning elected officials out of office. A Roman would of course return to the eleetorate to secure higher curule rank. But real power during the Republic la)' with the Senate, which was immune from popular scrutiny. Ideological or public eonsiderations were generally not deeisive in guiding a Roman politieian's activity because there were no political parties in the modern sense. Personal relationships, not ideology, provided the most eommon bonds among Roman leaders com peting for power.:l N either the optimates nar the populares offered a political programme in our sense of the ward. 4 The optimates were solely interested in perpetuating the power they had monopolised for eenturies. 1 The tenn popularis did not neces­ sarily designate a Roman who advocated a popular policy, but referred to a politician who used those Roman institutions dominated by the people to enhancc his own personal power. 6 No popularis, with the possible but unlikely exception of C. Graechus, sought eonstitutional reforms aimed at seeuring the dominance of the people 7 The oligarchs were so weil entrenehed that we do not know any contemporary visions, even utopian ones, of a Rome freed from nobiles 8 Whenever popular politicians seemed to threaten the status quo, the established leadership was able to marshai decisive force, until Caesar' s extraordinary campaigns ended the Republic, much to everybody's astonishment. 9 The unique character of Roman politics fostered a selfishly personal attitude toward political power among Roman poli­ ticians, radically different from that of their modern counterparts. Thc Roman thought that he was entitled to office by birth and that it was his to use as he saw fit. He need not warry about a public carefully observant of his actions and likely to turn hirn out of office if he did not perfiJrm satisfaetorily. Furthermore, the ahsence of an ideological focus contributed to the personalisation of Roman politics. Modern political parties dorninated by ideology shield political opponents from questioning each other on purely personal grounds; personal issues are relevant only to the extent

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The Causes 0] Inimieitiae

The Causes 0] Inimieitiae

they affect political issues. Roman senators had no comparable umbrella. It was much hardel' to denounce a man's policy without attacking hirn personally.lO At the same time, a Roman senator's purely personal grievance with one of his peers could have political ramifications. The preservation of dignitas, in the face of personal insults, strengthened a Roman's electability and augmented his network of dients. This type of prestige was a cornerstone in the building of influence and power in Rome. Politics was an arena in Rome far enmities created out of personal as weil as political causes. It is true that the Romans were apt to deny that inimieitiae resulted from personal grievances, but this is more likely to reflect a value judgement than political realities. It was considered far more respectable in Rome to contract inimieitiae in defence of the Republic than out of personal pique. In reality personal grievances and political disagreements could lead to the hostilities that charac­ terised inimieitiae. Often they a~gmented each other because a Roman had so much difficulty separating politics from the rest of his life. Cicero's relationship with his son-in-law, P. Cornelius Dolabella, illustrates the interaction between personal and political causes of inimieitiae. As discussed in the Introduction, the timing of Dolabella's engagement to Tullia acutely embarrassed Cicero because it occurred while Dolabella was prosecuting Ap. Claudius, a man with whom Cicero was determined to remain on good terms. In spite of this difficult predicament and Dolabella' s reputa­ tion far running up debts, Cicero tried to be optimistic about his future son-in-law. ll By 47 relations between the two men had deteriorated to the verge of InlmieZtlae. Cicero was furious with Dolabella for a combination of political and personal reasons and was thinking about compelling Tullia to divorce hirn. Dolabella's infidelity to Tullia had become notorious: at least two other women were involved. At the same time, Cicero considered the radical measures Dolabella enacted du ring his tribunate in 47 intolerable. These induded a cancellation of debts and, even worse, the erection of astatue to the memory of Clodius. For Cicero these actions wcre the equivalent of a notice of divorce on Dolabella's part: 'Now he [DolabellaJ appears to threaten [divorce],' 12 The marriage was not annulled at this time because Cicero feared the unpredictable Dolabella' s possible reaction at the head of an angry mob. Cicero also hoped that Dolabella would take the initiative, presumably leading to a more favourable financial settlement for

the aggrieved father-in-law. 13 The relationship between Dolabella and Cicero improved dramatically over the next year and a friendly divorce was arranged for Tullia in 46. The repayment of the dowry, however, remained an outstanding difference between the two men. 14 The problem was deferred because of Cicero's delight at Dola­ bella's initial reaction to Caesar's assassination. On the very day of the murder , Dolabella, orte of Caesar.' s dosest associates and for that reason honoured with the consulate of 44, dedared for the assassins. He endeared hirnself even more to Cicero by vigorously opposing the establishment of a cult to Caesar in April 44. Cicero was overjoyed when many saw his influence behind Dolabella's actions and he eventually persuaded hirnself that he had been responsible. 15 The dispute over the dowry continued, however, and Atticus prudently urged Cicero not to be so emotional about Dolabella's republicanism, but to exploit his current solvency to collect whatever he could. 16 Cicero was torn between admiration for Dolabella's politics and fury over the debt. On 9 May 44, with a payment foul' months overdue, Cicero assured Atticus of his bitter hostility toward Dolabella and even boasted about the harsh letter he had written to Dolabella concerning the debt Y But he was so pleased two days later by a speech Dolabella had delivered that he wanted to extend the 10an. IB The overdue debt remained unresolved. 19 The final break between the two men came at the end of the year when Dolabella shifted his allegiance to Antony in return for a large bribe, as Cicero alleged. 2o In a letter to Atticus, Cicero explained his hat red of Dolabella in both political and personal terms:

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Now truly I rejoice in the opportunity to show hirn and every­ body else that I am estrangecl from hirn. I shall make our hos­ tility widely known, together with the fact that I hate him for my own sake as weil as the Republic's. My patriotic enmity arose when, after beginning to defend the Republic at my instigation, he descrted its cause in return for a bribe and even did everything in his power to destroy it. 21 Cicero then outlined to Atticus the steps that he thought would pressure Dolabella into repaying the money. 22 Although Cicero explicitly distinguished the political and personal aspects of his dispute with Dolabella, he could not keep them apart in reality and he allowed both equally to colour his conduct.

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The Causes 01Inimieiliae

The Causes 01Inimieiliae

Inimicitiae caused by personal grievances Personal insults or disagreements by themselves were entirely sufficient to start inimieiliae, which often had intense historical con­ sequences. A dispute over booty stolen from the Locrians in 205 sparked a vicious feud between Q. Pleminius and two military tribunes, which ultimately led to fighting within the Roman occu­ pation force. Pleminius ordered the riyal commanders flogged. An enraged mob of soldiers, roused by the tribunes' suffering, retaliated by mutilating Pleminius and leaving hirn near death. 23 Despite the pervasive sexual freedom of the late Republic, there is evidence that an unfaithful wife or relative would reflect poorly on aRoman and hence require the sort of revenge against the adulterer that would lead to inimieiliae. Caesar' s wife was supposed to be above suspicion, and when the Bona Dea incident came to light, Caesar, the newly elected ponlifex maximus, thought he had no choice but to divorce her. 24 Because ofClodius' role in the episode, Cicero wrote later that Caesar ought to have been his worst enemy.25 Other Roman politicians, even when they occupied less sensitive positions than Caesar, acted in the same way. Caesar's own farnaus libido brought hirn many enmities. His relationship with Brutus' mother Servilia was notorious. 26 Brutus must have been embarrassed by the rumours that he was Caesar's san and the resentment he feit on this score may have contributed to his decision to join the conspiracy in 44.21 During the late 60s Caesar's name had also been linked with Mucia, the wife of Pompey. Both ofthe Scribonii Curiones, Caesar's violent enemies at the time, represented the general attitude at Rome when they criticised Pompey for marrying ]ulia, whose father, Caesar, had caused hirn to divorce a wife who had borne hirn three children. Pompey did feel same resentment against Caesar - he referred to hirn as an Aegistheus - but apparently decided that he could not afford a break with Caesar in the late 60s when he had more than enough enemies already.28 Pompey's divorce of Mucia also led to other serious lnimieiliae which I shall discuss below. Adultery or attempted adultery was the cause of the inimieiliae between Antony and P. Cornelius Dolabella, who shared an allegi­ ance to Caesar but otherwise detested each other. Antony's open announcement in the Senate that Dolabella's attempted seduction of his wife, Antonia, had provoked the feud underlines the respect­ ability of personally motivated feuds. 29 Antony and Dolabella allowed their inimieiliae to become a serious inconvenience to

Caesar. 30 As tribune in 47, Dolabella might reasonably have expected Antony, then serving as Master of Horse, to support the revolutionary social measures he introduced. 31 Antony was initially content to watch L. Trebellius, an opposing tribune, counter Dolabella's measures, and left town to quell a mutiny in Campania without resolving matters. After returning to Rome, however, Antony, armed with the Senate's emergency decree, intervened decisively against Dolabella' s supporters and dispersed them with much bloodshed. 32 The continuing violence ultimately required Caesar' s presence to restare order. Such ineffective harsh tactics both infuriated the dictator and cast Antony the support of the Roman masses, who considered his conduct treacherous. 33 It is difficult to attribute Antony's costly shift in political policy to any­ thing other than resentment over Dolabella's affair with his wife. 34 Violent inimieiliae continued between the two men for the rest of Caesar's life. Caesar, after deciding to reward both Dolabella and Antony with consulships for 44, changed his mind and took the consulship hirnself, planning to make Dolabella consul sulfectus after the Parthian campaign had begun. Antony opposed Dolabella's receiving any office and attacked the legitimacy of his election by claiming that the auspices were unfavourable. 35 But Antony's announcement many months before the auspices, that he would forbid Dolabella's election, completely undercut his credibility.36 His hat red of Dolabella was so virulent that he was apparently undeterred by the irritation his manoeuvring must have aroused in the dictator. Caesar had stated categorically that he would order Dolabella to be elected consul before he set out for Parthia, and intended to deal with Antony's challenge on 15 MarchY Adultery was only one of numerous personal insults aRoman feit obliged to avenge. The Roman social structure was based on extremely cohesive families: it was generally impossible to insult one member of a noble hause without drawing the rest of the family into the same disgrace, as is illustrated by the dilemma Pompey faced after learning of his wife Mucia's faithlessness during his absence in the east. He felt obliged to divorce her and suffered adverse political consequences because Mucia was the sister of the Metelli, Celer and Nepos. These two brothers had lent the great prestige of their names to Pompey by participating in his eastern campaigns. They had also represented his political interests in Rome during the 60s. 38 Both men suddenly became Pompey's bitter enemies. Celer's consulate in 60 was a disaster for Pompey in spite of the lang association between the two men. He

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embraced the policies of Cato and Lucullus, who were committed to thwarting Pompey at every turn. Celer's resistance to the rati­ fication of Pompey's eastern settlement was so adamant that L. Flavius, the Pompeian tribune, ordered hirn jailed. 39 During the next year, Celer joined Cato and Cato's ape M. Favonius in fight­ ing the land bill introduced by Caesar to satisfy Pompey's veterans. 40 At the same time Metellus Nepos seems to have shifted his allegiance from Pompey, although he was more subtle than his brother. Cicero wrote to Atticus in April 59 that Curio had told hirn about Nepos' opposition to the triumvirate. 4l Later in the 50s Nepos became an ardent supporter of his cousin Clodius against Milo, who was backed by Pompey.42 Dio offers an explanation for the dramatic political shift of the Metelli. Celer deeply resented the disgrace Pompey brought to his family by divorcing Mucia. 43 The divorce had occurred in very late 62, directly after Pompey's return from the east. In view of Pompey's support of Celer for the consulate in 60, it seems very Iikely that Celer initially swallowed his resentment until he had secured the consulate and could take more effective revenge. 44 In addition to the inimicitiae Mucia created between Pompey and the Metelli, and might easily have created between Pompey and Caesar, she was also responsible for Pompey's hostility toward M. Aemilius Scaurus, who became Mucia's husband after her divorce. Scaurus had treated one of Pompey's children by Mucia exactly Iike his own and expected Pompey to return this kindness by supporting hirn at his extortion trial in 54. Instead Pompey initially remained aloof, furious because Scaurus' marriage to Mucia implicitly belittled her former husband's claims about her faithlessness. 45 Pompey did eventually testify to Scaurus' good character, for reasons not fully understood. 46 He was certainly not motivated by sympathy for Scaurus, as his subsequent actions reveal. When Scaurus was tried for bribery in 52, Pompey deployed troops to ensure that a crowd favourable to Scaurus would not be able to influence the verdictY A proud Roman was insulted almost as much by a word as by a deed. The so-called snub of Marius, a major source of hostility between Metellus and Marius, is a good example. The relation­ ship between Marius and Metellus i1lustrates a recurring difficulty in discussing the causes of inimicitiae. It is often wrong to isolate single causes of inimicitiae, as I have already shown in regard to the c10se relationship between political and personal causes of enmity. Causes tended to interact with one another, and it is doubtful,

in many instances, whether even the principals could have defined any ultimate cause. Furthermore, because inimicitiae are aseries of hostile acts, each perpetuating and escalating the hostility, it is often impossible to distinguish causes from manifestations of enmity. This compounds the difficulty of analysing specific inimicitiae, particularly in the absence of c1ear sources. I shall return subsequently to numerous reasons that led Marius to return to Rome and attack Metellus, his commanding officer, in an unprincipled campaign for the consulate. There was doubtless never any love lost between Metellus, the prominent aristocrat who represented the then dominant Roman faction, and Marius, the desperately ambitious new man from Arpinum whose loyalty to the Metelli seems to have wavered before the break of 107. 48 But a decisive break in the relationship came when Marius requested leave to return to Rome to seek the consulate. Metellus con­ temptuously suggested that Marius, then in his late forties, wait until Metellus' son, then about twenty, was ready to seek the consulate. 49 The sources are very c1ear when they report the enmities Cicero acquired through his biting tongue. His witty remarks and the hatred they brought hirn gave Plutarch material for two chapters in his biography."o Cicero's barbed humour was noticeably in evidence at Pharsalus. His only apparent contribution to Pompey' s war effort was a sarcastic assessment of the republicans' fighting ability - he was too old and ill to fight hirnself. 51 Pompey was so resentful that he began to ignore Cicero, one of the most prestigious figures in his camp, and wondered whether he would not have been better offwith Cicero on thc other side. 52 Pompey's son inherited his father's hatred. He wanted to murder Cicero for advocating that the campaign be abandoned after the defeat at Pharsalus. Only Cato's intervention restrained him. 53 Cicero doubtless convinced few several years later when he denied that he had irritated Pompey at Pharsalus and c1aimed that his jokes had alleviated the tension in the camp. 54 A Roman rnight also ted insulted if he was not given as rnuch attention as he considered his duc. The author of the Commen­ tariolum Petitionis urged Cicero ncver to deny his services to anybody for lack 01' time, for that was a sure means of making cnemics. "" Although this advicc was mainly connected with securing support among the masses, it was also applicable among Cicero's peers within the political dass. 56 :1

Any public humiliation leading to loss of face inevitably

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produced inimicitiae. Cicero exploited this sensitivity when he exposed Verres' corruption. The case involved a Sicilian named Epicrates, the most important citizen of Bidis during Verres' governorship, who had received a substantial legacy from a dose relative. A syndicate, composed of Epicrates' enemies, decided to contest the will knowing weil that justice was for sale in Verres' Sicily. Verres seems to have ordered the syndicate to make an immediate payrnent to his dose associate Volcatius. Epicrates, get­ ting word of this transaction, skilfully confounded his enemies by fleeing to Rhegium. When the syndicate began to grumble about the unavailing bribe it had paid Volcatius, Verres, worrying that the incident was getting out of hand, decided to make Volcatius a scapegoat by ordering hirn to repay the money. Volcatius did so quite happily and retained unaltered his dose association with Verres. Here was Cicero's proofthat Verres had collaborated with the enernies of Epicrates at Bidis from the start. Cicero assured Verres that '[Volcatiusl, after suffering such a disgrace, should have been your bitterest enemy unless he was collaborating with you at the time and dcferring to your reputation rather than his own'.57 Epicrates' tactics brought hirn only a Pyrrhic victory. He eventually lost the legacy and the rest of his property as weil. Verres was not one to give up easily. 58 C. Caecilius Niger, Verres' quaestor in Sicily, vying for the right to prosecute his commander, alleged a similar cause of in im icitiae. A woman from Lilybaeum named Agonis had been robbed of some of her slaves by a Roman admiral. Agonis hoped to get her slaves back by c1aiming that they were the property of Venus, and hence their theft a sacrilege. Caecilius, after hearing about the case, set up a court that found Agonis guilty of declaring that she and her property belonged to Venus. She was punished by having all of her property confiscated and was herself dedared a slave of Venus. On later investigation, Verres overruled his quaestor, and restored Agonis' property after expropriating a sub­ stantial portion for himself. Caecilius alleged the humiliation Verres' actions caused hirn as justifying in im icitiae with his commander. He must have expected his audience to find this explanation convincing, and Cicero could only point out that the enmity between Caecilius and Verres did not appear to have been very enduring. 59

Political causes of inimicitiae

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I have mentioned how difficult it was for the Romans to accord personal respect to their political opponents. The ill will that arose between Cato and Cicero is a good example. Even Cicero's great veneration for Cato was insufficient to prevent their friendship from souring over a political question. After returning from exile, Cicero enthusiastically supported an initiative to invalidate the tribunate of Clodius. Cato opposed t/-.Je me"sure because it also would have nullified his annexation of Cyprus, which had won hirn a great deal of praise from many Romans, induding Cicero. 5O As a result of this disagreement , relations between Cato and Cicero withered, although not to the point of open hostility.61 Certainly this does not mean that every political dispute in Rome led to the destructive hostility that characterised inimicitiae. Nor did the Romans think it healthy when political disagreements affected personal relationships. Cicero admitted as much when he daimed that his continued disagreement with Q. Fufius Calenus over public affairs in 43 might lead to a deterioration of their friend­ ship, even though this would be unfortunate. 62 Elsewhere, he expressed admiration for political rivals whose personal relations did not degenerate into inimicitiae. 63 N evertheless, the unique aspects of Roman society discussed at the outset of this chapter made it much more Iikely that political differences would lead to

in imicitiae. Cicero provides evidence in a speech of another enmity that resulted primarily from differences over policy. I have already mentioned the stormy tribunate of Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos and the confrontation he had with Cato over measures proposed on Pompey's behalf. Metellus had also attacked Cicero für his conduct during the Catilinarian conspiracy and forbidden him to make the speech customarily given by consuls when leaving office. 64 The bad feelings between the two men persisted and Cicero was fearful that Nepos, elected consul in 57, would oppose his recall from exile. It turned out otherwise. In Cicero's words, Metellus, 'in spite of an enmity with me that he attributed to political causes, said that he would sacrifice his inimicitiae to the Senate and the national condition' 65 Cicero in another part of the same speech confirms from his own point of view that his hostility with Metellus arose 'from great public disputes' 66 Aulus Gellius attributed the famous enmity between Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and Scipio Africanus to longstanding 39

The Causes 0] Inimicitiae

The Causes 0] Inimicitiae

differences over policy. It is true that Gellius was not entirely con­ vinced that this caused the mutual hostility: '[Gracchus and Scipiol disagreed time and again over public questions and for this reason, or some other, were not friends. '67 Nevertheless, political disagreement occurred to Gellius as a strong possibility and this is in itself highly suggestive. Similarly, Valerius Maximus claimed that political causes produced the hatred between Cato and Ti. Gracchus. 68 The evidence suggests that L. Marcius Philippus' opposition to M. Livius Drusus' political programme led to inimicitiae between the two. Prior to 91, Drusus and Philippus seem to have been political allies to the extent that Drusus regarded Caepio's pr.osecu­ tions of Philippus and Scaurus as part of a campaign against hirnself. 69 But Drusus' solicitude could not survive Philippus' attack on his legislation: he physically assaulted Philippus and added a clever insult over his bleeding victim before arranging his arrest.7° Philippus later retaliated by persuading the Senate to abrogate Drusus' legislation because it had been passed unconsti­ tutionally.71 U nder these circumstances it is not surprising that Asconius referred to Drusus as Philippus' inimicus or that Cicero called Drusus' supporters inimicissimi of Philippus. 72 The bitter relationship spawned by Drusus' legislation also explains why Philippus became such a prominent suspect in Drusus' subsequent murder. 73

from firsthand experience how difficult it was to maintain lifelong friendships. Friendship might cease to be mutually advantageous, friends might differ on a political issue, or feelings might simply change. Another source of tension arose if one presumed too much on an intimacy and asked a friend to do what was wrong, because it was difficult to explain that honour transcended friendship. The most fertile source of ruptured friendship among the ruling class, however, was the universal and ferociously competitive desire for honour and glory. 75 Very few men were wise enough to prize friendship above power. 76 The behaviour of Q. Pompeius, once a elose associate of Scipio Aemilianus, was a prime example of this human weakness. Pompeius had deelared that he would not seek the consulate in 141 but would join Scipio in supporting Laelius for that office. Scipio took Pompeius at his word and was off his guard when Pompeius did run after all. Pompeius' ensuing victory led to the suspension of his friendship with Scipio and probably to much more bitterness between the two former friends than the words Cicero placed in Laelius' mouth in the De Amicitia suggest. 77 Cicero's own statement elsewhere, that the bitterest enmities pre­ vailed among those who had been the elosest friends,78 suggests the more likely attitude Scipio took toward Pompeius. In an hierarchical society like the Roman, amicitia was for politi­ cal equals. A young man, however, might be associated with senior politicians through other equally sacred obligations such as thc bond uniting a subordinate to his commander. Any perceived violation of this tie was frowned on by Roman society and led to inimicitial'. Cicero, explaining his hatred of Verres, expressed the general sentiment succinctly:

Inimicitiae produced by violating Roman relationships of trust and obligation

Can anybody who considers jides the most sacred quality in life not hate a quaestor who dares to rob, desert, betray and attack his consul, especially after he has shared his councils, taken care of his money, and enjoyed his complete trust?79

Inimicitiae often served as an effective punishment and as a means of discouraging hostile acts in the future. I shall show in my next two chapters how dangerous it was to have inimici. The retaliatory aspects of iniml:citiae are especially apparent when they resulted from a breach of jides (trust). Fides frequently was the Roman substitute for ideology in uniting the factions competing for power. Such political groupings were only as strong as the relationships that bound them, and all Roman politicians had a stake in ensur­ ing the dependability of these ties. Any rupture in the code of conduct governing relationships based on]ides was deeply resented and led to inimicitiae, not just a suspension of all contact. Amicitia, although it was the essential vehiele of political co­ operation, was a relationship subject to great stress. 74 Cicero knew

If this was the reaction of an unaffected onlooker, one can easily understand a consul' s wrath at a disloyal associate. Marius' abuse of his obligations as Metellus' subordiriate contributed to the inimicitiae between the two. Metellus was furious with Marius for using his alleged military incompetence as a platform for his con­ sular campaign, and, in a sharp breach of protocol, demonstrated his hostility by refusing to hand over his army in person when Marius arrived as consul in Africa to take over the command. 80

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Marius soon received a dose of his own medicine. I shall discuss his enmity with Sulla, his own subordinate, at greater length below. It is sufficient to note he re that it was partly caused because Sulla abused Marius' trust by exaggerating his own military achievements at his commander's expense. T. Labienus' relation­ ship with Caesar is another example of inimicitiae developing between a commander and a subordinate who failed to act in accordance with his obligations. Caesar came increasingly to dis­ like his previously highly honoured lieutenant because Labienus had allowed farne and wealth to go to his head and had started acting toward Caesar as an equal. 81 The Romans expected gratia (gratitude) in return for services rendered. Gratia was essential to cement the relationships within the pyramids of friends, proteges and elients that dominated the Roman politicallandscape. 82 Failure to display sufficient gratia was a violation of a sort of contract or expectation and occasioned bitter hostility. Cicero seems to have successfully lent his oratorical talents to T. Munatius Plancus on some unknown occasion, only to see the latter return the favour by prosecuting Sabinus, a friend of Cicero's.83 Cicero professed to hate Munatius more than Clodius and to have taken more pleasure in his conviction and exile than in Clodius' murder. 84 His feelings were so strong that he uncharacteristically prosecuted Munatius for his role in the riots following the death of Clodius. It was only the second time in his life that Cicero acted as a prosecutor, a role he advised his son to assurne only on rare occasions. 85 Asconius remarked pointedly that Munatius, unlike some of the rest of Clodius' supporters such as Q. Pompeius Rufus and C. Sal!ustius Crispus, the historian, never became reconciled with Cicero. 86 Cicero's own apparent lack of gratitude provoked similar out­ rage. A certain Phamea had prornised to support hirn during his campaign for the consulship. For this Cicero acknowledged his gratitude even though he had not made use of Phamea's help. When Phamea faced prosecution in 52, he called in his debt by requesting Cicero' s services as defence counsel. Cicero would have obliged, but was already committed to Scstius' defence on the day appointed for Phamea's hearing, and had to beg off. Phamea was furious despite this legitimate excuse, and Phamea's relative, M. Tigellius Hermogenes, continued to harbour resentment toward Cicero seven years later, long after Phamea's death. 87

lnimicitiae transmiUed by relatives and friends It was not at all uncommon for a Roman to take on the inimicitiae of his friends and relatives even when no personal reason for enmity existecl. The most common example of this hostility by association was the paterna inimicitia, passed from father to son and most frequently manifested in the retaliatory trial, a phenomenon I will discuss in Chapter 5. In his Pro Scauro, Cicero suggested that thc demands of pietas gave special priority to such inherited inimicitiae: a Roman feit more pressure to strike back at his father's inimici than at those he had contracted on his own. 88

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If the Romans routinely took revenge on the prosecutors of their fathers, it is not surprising to find children as inimici of those they considered responsible for the murder of their parents. When Pompey, the adulescentulus carnifex (adolescent executioner), ordered the execution of M. ]unius Brutus, who had surrendered to hirn after the siege of Mutina,89 he earned the enduring hatred of Brutus' son, the later tyrannicide. The young Brutus turned up on Vettius' list of alleged conspirators against Pompey, which suggests that his hostile feelings were so weil known that his name added credibility to a list of Pompey' s purported assassins. 90 Brutus also showed his resentment by not speaking to or saluting Pompey, his fellow senator, until the outbreak of the civil war. 91 Such behaviour accounted for the widespread belief at Rome that Brutus would add his immense prestige to Caesar's cause. 92 But, as already mentioned, Brutus was in the awkward position of harbouring deep personal resentment toward Caesar as weil as Pompey. His decision to join Pompey is therefore not reflective of a Roman's attitude toward a man held responsible for a elose relative's murder. Brutus had the dubious luxury of making an objective political decision in 49 based on personal detestation of both of the principals. The famous enmity between Cicero and Antony is another example of inimicitiae caused in part by the killing of a relative. One of Cicero's victims du ring the Catili­ narian conspiracy was P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura, the stepfather of Mark Antony. Antony elaimed latcr that Cicero had given added cause for resentment by crcating difficulties in releasing Lcntulus' body to his family93 Nephews also inherited the burdens of inimicitiae. The Appii Claudii, sons of C. Claudius Pulcher, and nephews of Clodius, prosecuted Milo after the murder of their unele. 94 The eIder brother deelined to accept the reward to which the conviction of Milo entitled hirn, perhaps to

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The Causes of Inimicitiae

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emphasise the disinterested pietas of his conduct. 95 Appian's shock that Sulla had resigned the dictatorship, even though many horrors from the proscriptions remained unavenged, further illus­ trates how predictably and unitedly relatives responded toward those responsible for killing their kin. 96 Hostilit y toward the murderer of a relative was not surprising or unique to Roman society. But Roman familial solidarity against less extreme inimici pervaded the Republic's entire social struc­ ture. This is true even though it is easy to compile a list of examples of Romans who were related to each other and yet belonged to opposing and hostile factions,97 because such a list can only be compelling if Roman attitudes convincingly demonstrate that such behaviour was unexceptional. In fact the Romans expected relatives to share inimicitiae along with many other aspects of life. Cicero was acutely embarrassed at his sudden marriage connection with Dolabella because he knew that everybody would assurne that his new relationship would thrust hirn willy-nilly into Dolabella's feud with Ap. Claudius at a time when he was desper­ ately trying to maintain his reconciliation with Claudius. 98 Cicero had earlier reflected the Roman attitude that relatives would share inimicitiae when he shrugged off the same Claudius' solitary (among Roman magistrates) opposition to Pompey's motion that anybody hindering Cicero's return from exile would be regarded as an enemy of the state. He considered Claudius' attitude entirely predictable because he was P. Clodius' brother, and could there­ fore be expected to share the latter' s hatred for Cicero. 99 By way of contrast, two other men related less closely to Cicero's inimici won his special gratitude for supporting efforts for his recall. 'His son-in-law C. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, a blood relative of Cicero's cnemy L. Calpurnius Piso, worked tirelessly on Cicero's behalf. Cicero considered C. Piso' s willingness to thwart the interests of his powerful relative unusual and admirable: 'Co Piso, my son-in-law, who for the sake 01' my safcty ignored . . . the enmity of a man who was his kinsman and a consul. >100 The conduct 01' Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos was also a pleasant sur­ prise für Cicero. I have already referred to Nepos' hostility to Cicero and to Ciccro's alarm whcn Nepos acquired the consulate of 57 and the power to work against his recall. Cicero was all the more surprised that N epos did not use his office in that way because 01' Nepos' relationship to Clodius: 'Quintus Metellus, who was my enemy in his own right and a cousin 01' another 01' my enemies, abandoned his private feelings. >101 Cicero' s advice to

Q. Minucius Thermus, the propraetor of Asia in 51-50, further vividly i1lustrates his assumption that relatives would become involved in the inimicitiae of their kin. He urged Minucius, who was returning to Rome, to leave his province under the command of his quaestor L. Antonius. Failure to do so would disgrace Antonius and oblige Minucius to contend with the hostility not only of his quaestor but of 'three brothers, of the highest birth, who are quick to react and quite eloquent' .102 Sulla's hatred spread among Marius' relatives, and turned the civil war into a personal vendetta. M. Marius Gratidianus, Marius' nephew, was executed with Sulla's approval under Catiline' s gruesome and notorious direction .103 Sulla also extended his hatred to Marius' son, C. Marius, who had died during the siege of Praeneste. His head was brought to Sulla, who could not resist a joke at the comparative youth of the consul.!04 Sulla's wrath embraced even ]ulius Caesar, the nephew 01' Marius' wife. In addition to his birth, Caesar had added to his anti-Sullan credentials by marrying the daughter of Cinna. Sulla tried unsuccessfully to persuade Caesar to divorce his wife and then took steps to ensure that Caesar did not gain the priesthood he was sceking. He may have contemplated executing Caesar because he saw many l\1ariuses in the young man. Caesar pru­ dently withdrew into voluntary exile. I05 The most extensive evidence 01' how readily relatives associated themselves in inimicitiae comes from the exile of Cicero. Cicero was forever mentioning his well-founded concern that his brother Quintus would become involved in his own ruin. Quintus was indeed almost killed in the rioting fomented by Clodius to block a motion to recall Cicero. I06 Furthermore, the Clodians worried the Ciceros by threatening to prosecute Quintus for his administration of Asia after his return in 58. 107 Fran~'ois Hinaro has drawn attention to the virulence 01' inimicitiae inherited by Romans as a crucial element in the (by modern standards) harsh lex Cornelia de proscriptione, which barred descendants 01' Sulla's victims in the proscriptions from holding public office. lOS The burning resentments these men harboured would have made them unfit to be trusted with the responsibilities and temptations of public office. Cicero, who during his consul­ ship opposed restoring thc right to seek office to the Sullan victims, justified his actions in terms only an audience familiar with the consuming rage inspired by familial hatred would understand: 'I excluded from candidature young men who were worthy and

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brave, but who had suffered experiences which, had they attained public office, would have induced them to destroy the Republic.' 109 Inimicitiae also spread among Roman amici (friends). Again it is possible to find evidence that amici did not invariably share their enmities. 110 But this was exceptional. Nepos, a far more reliable source on social mores than historical details, evidently considered Atticus' friendship with Cicero and Brutus at a time when he was also intimate with Antony, a man they both detested, extremely unusual: Atticus, although he enjoyed intimacy with Cicero and was most friendly with Brutus, did not indulge them in their desire to injure Antony. On the contrary, he protected Antony's friends as much as possible when they fled the city, and provided whatever aid they needed. 111 Atticus was that rara avis, a Roman who preferred otium (leisure) to politics. His business interests forced hirn to be friendly with all and to offend nobody.112 He therefore needed to stand aloof from his friends' inimicitiae more than a man who depended on his amici to co-operate in the struggle for power. Among such men, sharing enmities became a kind of topos in references to friendship. Cicero, when stressing the ties of friendship that bound hirn to his correspondents, sometimes mentioned mutual enmities. 1I3 After retuming from exile Cicero commended the affection a few loyal friends had shown hirn by gladly taking up his inimicitiae. 1I4 Similarly, when Cicero explained his political embrace of the triumvirs in 54, he was especially moved because Pompey 'treated my enemy as his own unique enemy in the state' .115 Caesar's serious political dilemma after retuming from his pro­ consulate in Spain illustrates the impracticability of befriending two men who detested each other. His career ambitions required the support of influential amici like Pompey and Crassus, the two most powerful men in Rome at the time. Unfortunately, these two had been inimici for a decade, and Caesar recognised that friend­ ship with one inevitably meant enmity with the other. Caesar's ingenious solution was to reconcile the two, thereby conceiving the first triumvirate. 116 Cicero mirrored Caesar' s assumption that friends shared each other's inimicitiae. Crassus in the course of defending Gabinius had disparaged and alienated Cicero. Cicero later reported that a clique of reactionary optimates, hoping to re­ enlist hirn for the anti-triumviral cause, 'professed to rejoice that

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Crassus was my enemy, and claimed that those who supported Crassus' cause would never be my friends'. 117 The optimates evidently expected as a matter of course that Crassus' anger would spread to Pompey and Caesar. Numerous examples confirm the Roman expectation that amicitia involved sharing enmities. In the first recorded dash between Clodius and Milo in 57, Clodius attempted forcibly to block the eHorts of Milo and other magistrates to have Cicero recalled. Milo countered by enlisting his own band of gladiators, initiating the strect fighting that culminated five years later with Clodius' death. Cicero was duly appreciative of such solicitude: 'Milo not only took up enmities for my sake; he even sought them out.' 118 He subsequently professed to have da ne no less for Milo: 'I sought out the enmities of the powerful for your sake; I fre­ quently offered my body and my very life to your enemies' weapons.' 119 Caelius like Milo paid a price for his elose friendship with Cicero. He had a long-standing quarret with Ap. Claudius Pulcher and his entire family, which had been at least partially alleviated in 50, only to break out anew because Claudius had been insufficiently grateful for same help Caelius had given hirn at his prosecution earlier in the year. As a result, Claudius had deelared war, as Caelius put it. Caelius was espccially worried because Claudius as censor could bring the considerable powers of his office to bear against his enemies. He detcrmined to secure the aid of Claudius' colleague, L. Pisa, whose position could neu­ tralise any attempt Claudius made to exploit his office. But Piso was cool to Caelius' overturcs because of the latter's bond with Cicero, Piso's bitler inimicus since 58, the year Cicero was exifed during Pisa' s consulate .120 Friends were particularly essential when a Roman left the city for an extcnded period of time, opening a breach for his enemies while he could nol adequately defend hirnself. Such protection of an absent friend's position oftcn involved acquiring new inimici. Plancus, writing in April 43 from Gaul, thanked Cicero for the many services he was undertaking on his behalf in Rome. These included 'perpetual quarrcls with detractors on my account' .121 Cicero did no less the same year for D. Brutus, the proconsul of Cisalpinc Gaul. He assured Brutus that he was handling his detractors in Rome with ease. 122 Cicero had received similar services from Caelius during his proconsulate in Cilicia. A letter of appreciation suggests that Caclius must have acquired a rash of new inimici on Cicero's behalf: 'I truly adore you, my Rufus,

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The Causes 0] Inimicitiae whom fortune has provided to increase my dignity, and to take revenge not only on my enemies, but even on those who envy me.' 12]

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Envy as a sour ce of inimicitiae The most fertile source 01' inimicitiae within the nobility, however, was the desperate desire to advance up the rungs 01' the CUTSUS honorum. Among lesser men it was greed. 124 The Roman Republic richly rewarded successful competitors for the tiny number 01' curule offices. These happy few ennobled themselves and their families, thus achieving the goal to which the ruling class collec­ tivcly aspired. Roman society contrasted sharply with modern by offering few attractive alternatives to the rewards 01' public life. It is true that Atticus preferred otium and voluntarily renounced the CUTSILS honorum. As a new man he had little chance 01' attaining the ultimate prize, the consulate, and this may have made the decision easier for hirn. In spite 01' the vast power he wielded behind the seenes, his inf1uenee and prestige cannot be compared to those 01' a prominent Roman political figure. A nobilis with more secure politieal prospects was unlikely to make the same choice. 125 Sallust delicately alluded to the unfortunate circnmstances that forct'd his retirement from public life and left hirn a great deal 01' free time. He chose to write history, explaining that it was cer­ tainly more respectable than farming or hUllting, to say nothing 01' socordia (sloth) and desidia (idleness).126 But Sallust was not about to exaggerate the importance 01' his new pastime: 'Equal glory eertainly does not de"olve on the writer and doer 01' deeds.' 127 Sallust' s extraordinary assessment 01' the difficulties confronted by historians ernphasises his lingering contempt für the occupation: a writer had first to contend with the insuperable task 01' finding words equal to the deeds he was describing. Furthermore, his audienee-, convinced that aU historians yearned for action and were resentful 01' their inability to eompete in the political arena, auto­ matically attributed any eritical analysis to invidia. 128 In general the system oflered small eonsolation prizes to unsuc­ cessful Roman politicians unable to find solace in otium or litera­ ture. This resulted in a bitter competition 1'01' the few hOllOurS the Republic offen'd amI a vast residue 01' envy among the numerous frustrated losers. Cicero had good reason to know in his own right that invidia was the ine-vitable by-produet 01' a political career. 129

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Sallust mentioned the same phenomenon in describing his early political career: 'Although I did not füllow the evil practices 01' others, I was subjected to attack by the same slander and envy as everybody else because 01' my ambition to advance.' 130 Despite this inevitable production 01' invidia, Roman contests for honour did not always culminate in inimicitiae. Invidia for others' achievement was a complex emotion with disparate effects on dif­ ferent personalities. Sornetimes it provided no impediment to normal social relations with the successful cornpetitor. At the opposite extreme, however, it was powerful enough to polarise Catiline and some 01' the nobles who joined his desperate con­ spiracy.131 Cicero was perhaps adumbrating these extremes when he distinguished inimici and competitores: 'We compete with a fellow citizen in one way if he is an enemy, in another if he is a com­ petitor - with the first it is a contest for life, with the second für reputation.' 132 It is always difficult to establish invidia's responsibility for driving men into hostility. An individual himself can rarely assess the precise roll' envy plays in his conduct; the historian is quite helpless in comparison. The ancient sources compound the prob­ lem by their readiness to diagnose invidia, especially when they are trying to belittle their subject, a disparagement nourished by the Roman ideal that competitores should accept defeat gracefully. Intellectuallaziness also encouraged the sources to exaggerate the roll' 01' invidia because it provided an easy and virtually irrefutable explanation 01' hostile conduct. Cicero consoled hirnself with the thought, tiresomely repeated, that his exile resulted from the hostility 01' those who envied his consulate. Many must have resented the incomparable orator, the first new man in living memory to attain the consulate at the earliest legal age, 133 the man who had won not inconsiderable glory by crushing the detested Catilinarians. But invidia was only one 01' numerous motives people had for forcing Cicero out 01' Rome, and nobody can ever gauge its precise relative importance. As an orator, Cicero was also quick to accuse his clients' enemies 01' invidia. In Olle example, he claimed that envy prornpted P. Cornelius Sulla' s ejection from the consulate. 134 EIsewhere, he illustrated the grimness 01' his times by claiming that the name 01' consul conferred more envy than prestige. 135 Cicero was no more generous when he attacked the motives 01' his nemesis, P. Vatinius. He assigned Vatinius' attempt to destroy L. Lucullus to envy 01' Lucullus' military achievernents. l36

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Another farnaus example of inimicitiae shows how far ahostile source could distart historical reality by exaggerating the role of invidia. Plutarch ascribed the hatred between Marius and Sulla to a series of incidents that nourished Marius' envy of the younger nobleman, who had begun his career as his subardinate. Sulla, after accepting Jugurtha's surrender as Marius' representative, supposedly flaunted his role by wearing a seal ring commemorat­ ing this single most decisive act of the war. 137 Marius struggled with his envy, decided that Sulla was beneath it, and continued to allow hirn to serve. 138 Sulla then proceeded to win even more military glory at Marius' expense. He captured Copillus, the chief of the Tectosages, and then persuaded the Marsi to become the friends and allies of the Romans. 139 The last straw came during the German campaign when Sulla, now serving Marius' colleague Catulus, won same notable victaries against the barbarians in the Alps and was so successful in supplying his troops that same provisions were left over for Marius' army.140 Badian convincingly argues that Plutarch's im probable account reflected Sulla's Memoires. 14l Sulla was quite prepared to suppress the truth ~nd exaggerate to achieve his primary objective, dis­ crediting Marius. And yet one further incident must have been especially provoking to Marius. In 91, Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, dedicated on the Capitol same trophy-bearing images tagether with gilded figures representing the surrender ofJugurtha to Sulla. 142 Bocchus could not have made the dedication without the active co-operation of the anti-Marians. 143 The dedication is histarical, and must have piqued Marius' envy and focused his wrath on his former protege, who appeared to be minimising Marius' own gloria. Plutarch claims that only the outbreak of the Social War, adesperate danger that united all Romans, prevented the resentment between Marius and Sulla from boiling over at the time. l44 In spite of much distortion, there can be little quest ion that the distinctive feature of Roman politics - intense competition for a severely limited number of rewards - spawned irritation and envy, and contributed many inimicitiae to the Roman political system, although perhaps not as many as the sources claim. Invidia particularly affected those most successful in securing the highest prizes in republican Rome: military glary, high curule office, and the priesthoods. I have mentioned how envy over military glary played same role in the inimicitiae between Sulla and Marius. It seems to have been

decisive in the enmity between C. Aurelius Cotta, the consul of 200, and L. Furius Purpureo, praetor in the same year. Furius' suppression of same rebelIious Celts before Aurelius could reach camp deprived the latter of the military glory he had anticipated. 145 Furius subsequently persuaded the Senate to award hirn a triumph for his achievements, further compounding Aurelius' disappoint­ ment and bitterness .146 The inimicitiae between C. Claudius Pulcher, the consul of 177, and the two consuls of 178, M. Junius Brutus and A. Manlius Vulso, further i1lustrate how competition for military glory adversely affected Roman relationships. Junius and Manlius, campaigning as proconsuls in 177, had scored a resounding victory over the Histrians. Claudius resented their victory, fearing that it would deprive hirn of a province and of an army. Determined to waste no time, he rushed off to his province without attending to certain formalities required of commanders departing far their provinces. As soon as Claudius reached the proconsuls' camp, he ordered both Junius and Manlius out of the province. They refused to obey, citing Claudius' irregular depar­ ture from Rome. Claudius then unsuccessfully tried to persuade the army to throw the proconsuls into chains. Junius' and Manlius' obstreperousness ultimately forced Claudius to return to Rome, where he bitterly denounced the proconsuls, before attend­ ing to the prescribed rites and setting out afresh for his province with a new army.147 Same ancient authors could take inimicitiae between military rivals far granted, unconsciously revealing how widespread this source of hostility was in Roman society. Nothing shows this so c1early as the sensation which young Scipio's conduct toward L. Marcius Septimius aroused. 148 Marcius, chosen commander by those troops who survived the debäcle in Spain that had destroyed the eider Scipios during the Hannibalic War, succeeded in extri­ cating his men from the disastrous campaign. Even discounting the analysts' exaggeration of the magnitude of Marcius' success, the achievement would be hard to foIlow. 149 Marcius' successor turned out to be none other than P. Scipio, the future Africanus, san and nephew of the fallen commanders, who was desperately anxious to avenge his family and win gloria in Spain as a faunda­ tion far the brilliant career he anticipated. A lesser man than Scipio might yield to the temptation of seeing Marcius' successes as a humiliating amplification of his family's misfortunes and a potential drain on the military credit he hoped to monopolise for hirnself in the aftermath of the tragedy. But Scipio, accarding to

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Cassius Dio, showed surpnsmg goodwill when he accepted the command from Marcius: he paraded his extreme self-confidence by treating Marcius respectably instead of acting toward hirn as an enemy as most men would have done. 150 Next to military glory, a Roman's aspirations focused most heavily on high curule office. The paucity of Roman administra­ tive positions created an enormous weil of resentment among aristocrats unable to fulfil their ambitions. Such envy apparently prompted the inimieitiae between Brutus and Cassius prior to the murder of Caesar and continuing even after the assassination. 151 Caesar resolved an intense rivalry between the two for the city praetorship of 44 in Brutus' favour, claiming that Cassius had a juster case but that he could not ignore Brutus' desires. Small wonder that rumour suspected Caesar of deliberately fostering the feud to spur competition between the two. 152 The immensely prestigious priesthoods were another fertile source of competition, inuidia, and hence inimicitiae. Envy goaded Q. Lutatius Catulus, one of Rome' s most eminent senators during the late 60s, when Caesar - not yet a consular - secured appoint­ ment as the new pontifex maximus in 63. Catulus, hoping to crown his extraordinary career, was so thirsty for the honour that he attempted to bribe the impecunious Caesar not to run. 153 After the election, inimicitiae continued between the two men until Catulus died. It was on display du ring the Catilinarian conspiracy when Catulus joined C. Calpurnius Piso, another inimicus of Caesar, in trying to induce Cicero to bring a false charge against Caesar. 154 When Cicero refused, they spread ugly rumours about Caesar's alleged participation in the conspiracy, leading some overzealous knights to threaten to assassinate Caesar when he left the Senate one day. 155 The inimicitiae between Catulus and Caesar continued the next year when Caesar sought to discredit Catulus' restoration 01' the temple of Capitoline Jove by accusing hirn of embezzlement and demanding a full account of the costs incurred for the monu­ ment. Caesar hoped that his slander would persuade the people to remove Catulus' disgraced name from lhe temple. He appears to have compounded the insult by forbidding Catulus to speak from the rostrum on his own behalf. Caesar ultimately gave up when the entire aristocracy rallied behind Catulus and insisted that his name remain on the temple. 156 Catulus' envy was certainly not the only cause of his bitterness toward Caesar. The sources are unusually informative about their inimicitiae and revcal a wide tissue of interacting causes. The

relationship between Catulus and Caesar is paradigmatic of a truism that must never be lost sight of: inimieitiae, like any complex human emotion, rarely have a single or simple cause. Catulus and Caesar represented opposite political parties. Catulus was a bulwark of the optimate establishment; Caesar exploited the popularis strategy to rise as rapidly as possible within the Roman power structure. Caesar's tactics were on display during his aedile­ ship in 65 when he appealed for mass support by placing statues of Marius on the Capitoline. 1:J7 Catulus responded with a furious attack in the Senate, accusing Caesar of waging all-out war against the government. 158 Caesar also campaigned for the pontificate of 63 as a popularis. First, he supported T. Labienus' transfer to the people of the elections for the college of priests, which undid one of Sulla's reforms. This was only aprelude to what Dio considered a contemptible campaign: Caesar stressed his support for the prosecution of Rabirius and collected votes by serving or flattering anyone. 159 Disgust for such tactics doubtless helped guide Catulus' inuidia at losing the eleetion into inimicitiae against his successful rival. Factional politics also polarised the two. Pompey the Great, the central figure in Rome during the 60s, consistently received Caesar's support and Catulus' opposition. Caesar's loyalty to Pompey was evident when he accused Catulus of embezzling funds for the temple ofCapitolineJove - he hoped that Pompey's name would replace Catulus' on the monument. 160 Finally, some hereditary inimieitiae may have been at work between Catulus and Caesar. Caesar's uncle Marius was responsible for Catulus' father' s suicide during the proscriptions.1 61 !nuidia and inimieitiae alsofrequently arose because ofthe intense pressure Roman public officials feIt to surpass the achievements of their predecessors and successors in office. It was only natural, according to Cicero, to wish disaster on a successor in office so that one's own regime would shine forth more brightly. This state of aff"airs was 'not only not abhorrent to common practice, but ordinary and extremely widespread', and certainly no Roman need feel any disgrace (dedeeus) as a result. 162 This attitude illuStrates once more how generous public opinion could be toward individuals whose ambition exceeded their concern for the public interest. According to Cicero, Ap. Claudius' censorship of 136 followed Scipio Aemilianus', leading to enmity between the two. Similarly, M. Aemilius Scaurus succeeded Ap. Claudius, grand­ son of the censor of 136, as governor of Sardinia and these two naturally became inimiei. Cicero's own consulate before Ap.

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Claudius' resulted in ill will between the two until their farnaus reconciliation .163 The inevi tability of such inimicitiae ha(mted Cicero again just a few years later. When he took over the governorship of Cilicia from Ap. Claudius in 51, tension between the two almost undid their reconciliation. 164 lnimicitiae for his pre­ decessor came so naturally to a provincial governor that certain friends of Claudius could accuse Cicero of providing Cilicia with good government to foil Claudius' regime and damage his reputation. 165 The recurring suspensions of orderly government during the Roman Revolution increased the invidia feit by the Romans toward their successful peers. Loyalty to an ambitious and victorious general replaced the qualifications Romans had traditionally relied on to promote their leaders and to invest the competition for office with respect. The cursus honorum lost the legitimacy which had mitigated invidia by offering generally accepted norms of success. When Pompey taok up the Senate's cause against Caesar, he found hirnself burdened with the ambitions of his fellow senators and no acceptable procedure for arbitrating among them. One of the most notorious aspects of Pompey's unhappy camp at Pharsalus was the incessant bickering between P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio over who would inherit the coveted priesthood they expected Caesar soon to vacate. 166 Many also resented the extraordinary exemption Pompey had granted to his protege, C. Lucilius Hirrus: the right to stand in absentia for the praetorship.167 Such tension continued to plague the republican forces after Pompey's death. Cato despaired when, with Caesar advancing steadily in Africa, M. Octavius demanded a elarification of the command structure: 'Can we be surprised that our cause is lost when we see love ofpower remaining with us even while we are standing on the edge of doom?' 168 The absence of orderly constitutional procedures had likewise infected Q. Sertorius' 'Senate' of rebellious Marians in Spain with increasing invidia. The Sertorians co-operated in a forced unity as long as they confronted a tenuous and potentially disastrous military situation. Eut the atl1losphere changed dramatically in their camp when the military outlook brightened after the alliance with Mithridates and same impressive successes against the Roman forces. Sertorius' su,?ordinates became jealous of their general's pre-eminent position and M. Perpenna exploited their resentment to incite a conspiracy that placed him at the head of the Marian forces in Spain .169

lnimicitiae toward new men The conspiracy of Perpenna reveals another cause of inimicitiae ultimately emanating from invidia arising out of the political dass' s intense competition for power. Perpenna's resentment of Sertorius' position as a commander was aggravated by Sertorius' low birth: he was a Sabine of equestrian status. Perpenna by con­ trast was the son and grandsan of consuls. 170 The Roman nobility feit entitled to the state's most prestigious offices by birth and 'seethed with envy and regarded the consulate as virtually polluted if any new man, no matter how eminent, attained it' .171 New men therefore expected the inimicitiae of the nobiles throughout their political careers. 172 Such invidia was critical in the careers of the two most prominent natives of Arpinum, Marius and Cicero. Metellus' unwillingness to accept Marius as an equal, as reflected in the farnaus snub, contributed to the feud between the two. 173 The nobility as a whole remained openly hostile to Marius until his triumphant return from Germany. At that point, relenting in public at least, it acknowledged that Marius had preserved the state. l74 The hostility aroused by Cicero's origins dogged hirn through­ out his career, even after his consulate. The eminent consular M. Aemilius Scaurus' advice to the young Cicero, urging hirn to advance by constantia (steadfastness) and labor (industry), was quite astonishing. Ordinarily, a new man got no encouragement from the nobility in his quest for a public career. For Asconius, Scaurus' empathy with Cicero's hunger for advancement resulted from the long dormancy of Scaurus' own family.175 The scions of more successful families were unlikely to show the same understanding. Cicero summarised the more typical reaction of the patricians toward new men in the Verrines. He listed some prominent new men, M. Porcius Cato, Q. Pompeius Rufus, C. Flavius Fimbria, C. Marius and C. Coelius Caldus, who endured the inimicitiae of the powerful while seeking the same offices the nobility attained 'through indolence and neglect'. New men were only too aware 'with what envy and hatred certain nobles regarded their dedica­ tion and energy'. The very inevitability of the nobiles' hostility had the advantage of predictability.176 lnvidia from other non-noble groups raised another hurdle on a new man's obstaele course. New men themselves, instead of elosing ranks against the nobility and rejoicing in one another's successes, resented peers who surpassed them. l77 The common people were also averse to new men and

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shared the nobility' s respect and enthusiasm for a long line of noble ancestors. 178 This extremely unrevolu tionary attitude helps explain the persistent success of the nobiles at the poils. 179

Caesar's designation 01' C. Caninius Rebilus as consul to fill out the few hours of the suddenly deceased Q. Fabius Maximus' term debased one 01' Rome's most respected offices. 1M Cicero's reaction - laughter and tears - poignandy reveals his despair. 18 :' The same tyrannical attitude was evident on the famous occasion when Caesar failed to rise to accept unprecedented honours awarded to hirn by the Senate. Seeing his enor too late, he tried to make amends by claiming that he had not seen the dele­ gation and even that one of his seizures prevented his rising. Others blamed the incident on L. Cornelius Balbus, daiming that he had restrained Caesar in an overzealous attempt to increase his master' s superiority .186 Balbus also seems to have been responsible far elrafting elecrees issued by Caesar in the name of the Senate without its approval. Cicero was even more furious to learn that he hael been recoreleel as witnessing 01' even voting in favour of senatorial elecrees of which he hael no prior knowleelge. 187 Even Cacsar's clemency, which implieel domination, provokeel the nobles who consielereel themselves his peers. Caesar had arrogated a right for himself that no Rom all lOuld properly exercise over his fellow citizens. J88 Caesar's stern actions against the anli-monarchical tribunes, C. Epidius M arullus anel L. Caesetius Flavus, also proeluced immense unpopularity. These tribunes had offendeel hirn when they orelereel the removal 01' a crown that hael mysteriously appeared on his statue. The two had then compounded their offcnce hy arresting a man who had addresseel Caesar as king. Caesar reacted by deposing them from office and removing them from the Senate. 189 Caesar further invited hostility when he failed to persuade a suspicious and hostile aristocracy that Antony had spontancously attemptcd the l~'lmous crowning at the Lupercalia. Cicero later emphasiscd this incielent's importance in reinforcing thc conspirators' determination. 190 Caesar apparendy toyed with the idea 01' ac('cpting the tide 01' king, but is unlikcly to have made a firm dccision at thc timc 01' his death: a mysterious oracle that Parthia cOllIeI ollI)' Iw conquered by a king was rnaking the rounds, <md L. COlla planned to proposc to the Senate on 15 March 44 that Cacsar bear the title 'king' in the provinces l91 Furthermore, his dictatorship for life was a unique cc)lltribution to the Roman cOllstitution, with powcrs many Romans found indistinguishable from the monalThy.192 Thc rcport in some sources that Cacsar's iTlimici zcalously supportcd thc honours ,ho\'Vt'l'ed on iIiIrl ernpha­ sises thc inevitability that Cacsar's cxtraordinary position would

Inimicitiae against the most powerful Romans Nothing at Rome attracted invidia, and therefore potentially inimicitiae, as readily as the perception that one member of the oligarchy was collecting too much power and rising above his peers. The Roman leadership could not tolerate even the sem­ blance of one-man rule, which negated all their most cherished values. Regnum (monarchy) was the most hated word in the Roman political lexicon. Every prominent Roman du ring the nearly two centuries under review here, from Fabius Maximus to Caesar, experienced the resentment of his peers for his dispro­ portionate share of glory and prestige. Frequently these invidiae lecl to the hostile actions associated with inimicitiae: denial of triumphs, attempts to hamstring a general's war efforts, prosecutions, etc. I shall have more to say about these manifestations in my next two chapters. Here I shall describe how Caesar provoked this type of invidia, which certainly helped motivate many nobles to join the conspiracy that took his life .180 Caesar could have mitigated the provocation of his achieve­ ments, as Sulla and Augustus successfully did. Instead of sneering at Sulla for resigning the dictatorship, 181 Caesar might have profi ted from Sulla's much bettel' understanding of the sensibilities of his dass. Augustus, in an effort to avoid his adopted father' s mistake, restored the forms of constitutional government, a charade that nevertheless reduced some of the nobility' s resent­ ment. Caesar, in sharp contrast, flaunted his pre-eminent position although weil aware of the hatred his power inspired. On one occasion he kept Cicero waiting in his ante-room, as if the dis­ tinguished consular were a petty dient. Caesar acknowledged the consequences of his behaviour by quipping: 'Can I doubt that I am bitterly resented when Cicero has to wait and cannot see me at his convenience?' 182 Such resentrnent did not prevent Caesar from arrogating to hirnself powers and honours guarded most zealously by oligarchie sentiment. His decision to designate which praetorship a successful candidate would hold infuriated M. Caelius Rufus and C. Cassius Longinus (the future assassin) when they were passed over for the most prestigious urban praetorships in 48 and 44 respectively.183 56

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ereate inimicitiae. 193 Caesar showed that he suspected his inimici 01' as much when he accused Epidius and Caesetius 01' crowning his statue just so they could win credit für undoing the deed. 194 Caesar would have done weil to follow the example 01' Pompey, who became famous for his re!uctance to accept honours. Cassius Dio interprets his rest raint as a conscious effort to minimise the illvidia accornpanying high hünours. Initially, Pürnpey feigned to want no honours 1'01' (wo reasons, according to Dio: in this way he would !essen the resentrnent that would inevitably have followed open expression 01' ambition, but at the same time he atternpted to ca rn glory from the perception that honour followed hirn even against his will hecause he was inelispensable. 195 Pompey lorbade any honours to be awarded to him after his return from the east. Dio explains this as part 01' Pompey' s strategy to nip invidia in the budo Pompey considcred it insufficicnt to reject honours after they had been voted because this would not eliminate the resentment 01' high position that inspired them in the first place. Furthermore, the lIIan who rejected the recognition 01' his peers exposed hirnself to the charge 01' arrogance .196 Pornpey's intention to forbid all honours eventually lapsed, but his continuing caution anel obfuscation frustrated his associates WIIO attempted to understand his true desires. He was mysterious about wh at powers he wanted to accompany his grain comrnand in 57. His public statements indicated that the less powerful cornrnand would be sufficient, but privately he intimated a prefcr­ emT f(lr Mcssius' much more extensive proposal.1 97 Sirnilar vacillation about the clictatorship in 54 prevented Cicero from clivining his intentions. 198 Ultimately, Pompey abandonecl what­ ever ambit ions he had för the office in that year because 01' the general lack of enthusiasm. 199 He e1eclined the same office in 52, accepting the sole consulship instead. After a time he adlccted as fdlow consul his lather-in-Iaw Q. Caeeilius Metellus Scipio, a dccision Dio attribules to Pompey's eagerness to check the invidia certain to follow if he continued to occupy this unprccedented o ffi ce . ~()O

lf invidia against those successful in securing the honours of the Republic could be such a potent source of illim icitiae, it should cause no surprise to lind that tllOse held directly responsible for

thwarting one' s career became targets 01' bitter hostility. Cicero' s correspondence illustrates the kind 01' pressure this placed on pro­ Inagistrates with ambitious quaestors on their staffs. He warneel Q: Minucius Thermus, propraetor in Asia, 01' the inevitable enrnity that would follow if he disgraced his quaestor, L. Antonius, by passing hirn over for the cornrnand of the province before rcturning to Rome. 201 Cicero was careful to follow his own advice sevcral rnonths later when he turned his province 01' Cilicia over to his quaestor C. Coelius Caldus. His fear of alienating the well­ nmnected Coelius outweighed his considerable misgivings about Coelius' youth and foolishness. One alternative would have been to !eave the comrnand to his own brother Quintus, which Cicero was refuctant to do for a nunlber 01' reasons, including the fear that Coelius' revenge might indude spying on his successful rival with thc hope 01' subsequently indicting hinI.2o~ Cicero's candid assess­ me nt 01' his dilemma is espC'cially chilling considering his well­ e1escrved reputation 1'01' honest and conscientious provincial administration. In another example al ready mentioned in Chapter '2, Fulvius Nobilior's feud with Aemilius Lepidus dming the second century began because Aemilius held Fulvius responsible I(Jr setting his career back by causing hirn to attain the consulship two years late. A similar grievance fuelled Lucullus' inimicitiae with his brother-in-Iaw Clodius. Clodius expected to be held in high honour when he joined Lucullus' campaign in the east. When Lucullus failed to pay enough attention to his young relative, Clodius responded by corrupting the tmops and fomenting' a llIutiny .~():l LUCldlus later retaliated at his clivorce proceedings with Clodia when he produced female slavcs who testified that she had cornmittecl incest with her iJrother 204 Any intl'l'ference with a Roman's access to high religious office also createcleneluring ITSt'ntment. The hatn'd cu]minating in Cn. DOlllitius' prosecution 01' M. Aemilius ScaunIs I(n diminishing the sacrec! objects of the ROlllan peopk began when Scaurus refused to appoint DOlllitius to lhe priesthooel his father had held.~o5 In a bizarre inslance 01' sons 1()llowing in their htthers' footsteps, Domitius' son, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, after failing to becorne augur in 50, hlameel CaeJius for his (kl('at ancl becarne his bitter enerny. He mayaiso have heen angry at Caelius f()r blocking his ekct ion to thc pontificate. ~06 Cicero eloquently expresseel tlw passionate c!esire 01' every RonJan to cckbrate a triulllph.~117 Ikcause the desire was so strong, opposition (0 one's triumph was likdy to engender lasting

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hostility. C. l'vlemmius workeel vigorously if unsuccessfully to prevent L. Licinius Lucullus, just returneel from the east in 66, from triumphing. Although Plutarch claims that Memmius' oppo­ sition was inspireel hy loyalty to Pompey amI not by personal animosily,2lJH it is c!ear that therc was enmity between the two. In 60 Lucullus' brother Marcus divorceel his wife because 01' her adultery with Memmius. At the samt' time Memmius hael enough conletllpt for Lucius, as Cicero put it, to seeluce his wife as wel1. 209 The censors, with their enorl1lous power to elestroy political careers by eletlloting senators or clepriving them 01' their slate horses, easily attractcd inimiei/ial'. tv1. Caecilius Metellus' demotion by the censors 01' 214 tilr cowardliness after the battle 01' Cannae is an example 01' the hostility such censorial action could inspire. Metellus as tribune in 213 retaliated by indicting both men. 2lil In another example, Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, lhe censor 01' 131, passcd over in his review 01' the Senate one 01' the tribunes, C. Atinius Labeo. Atinius beuune so angry that he tried, unsuccessfulIy as it turned out, lo impose the death penalty by orclering Mat:edonicus hurled from the Tarpeian rock. 211 Q. Caecilius Metellus Numiclicus brought encluring im'miei/iae on himself when he deprived P. Furius 01' his state horse, and attcl1Iptcel to expcl Saturninus and C. Servilius Glaucia from the Senate. 212 Scipio Ac~milianus' cffort in 142 to demo te Ti. Claudius Aselllls, which had failed because 01' the opposition 01' his col­ leaglle, L. 1'vlutlltllillS, rurther illustrates how even an unsuccessful at te!1l pt by a ccnsor to darnage a senator' s dlj;ni/as could produce hostilily. Claudius' smoulclering rury burst out in 140 when he pmseclltecl Scipio on unknown charges anel taunted him for his inallspicious censorship. Scipio's elefence speech became famous fi)r ilS hiting wit at Asellus' C'xpensc. 2I:J

The Causes 0] Inimiei/iae

Clicrllaw' was the essential ingreclient 01' Roman politics. Political power ckpendc'c1 on thc ability to acquire large numbers 01' clicnts who assisted tlw patron in any wal" required and generally createcl an aura ofpowcr amund polilicians. In retllrnlhe patron provicled the help and prolection that Roman society vvas unable to extend to !1Iost 01' its citizt'lls. 211 A Roman 's image alTlong his clicnts was an incalculablc asset, to \)(' protecled at all costs. Anybody who interkred with the sacrecl relationship !letweell patron amI dient

gravely damaged the patron's status alld ultimately his political career. The Turpilius affair, which occurred after Metellus' snub 01' Marius, remains to be discussed arnong the numerous causes 01' the inimid/ial' betwl'en Marius and Metellus. Metellus had shown great confidence in T. Tllrpilills Silanus, his inherited guest­ friend, by appointing hirn cOl11/T1andcr 01' Vaga. When the people 01' Vaga secrl'tly admittcd J ugurtha within their walls, Turpilius was takclI prisoner along with the entire Roman garrison. He was subsequcntly rell'ased, in spitl' 01' thc' massacrc 01' all 01' his men. Marius, as a member 01' the commission investigating this unhappy event, called vociferously tiJr Turpilius' execution. The events at Vaga rel1ected so poorly on Turpilius 215 that Metellus had little choice but to inl1ict severe punishment, althollgh hc doubtless wished to spare his client execution by scourging. Even if Pilltarch is mistakc'n in claiming that Marills later boastecl pro­ vocatively 01' gellerating an avenging deity against Metelllls, whcn Turpilius was posthumollsly round innocent, Marills' repeatecl demands that Metellus take the harshest measllres against his client may l'xplaill the open enmity between the two that Pilltarch dates fro!1l this incidenl.·21 (; If 1'vlarius' dcmands only seemed to tip l\1etellus toward mC'ting out such a harsh sentcnce, his loss 01' face with his other clients, inevitable rcgardless 01' Turpilius' guilt, could bC' placed at Marius' doo!". P. Rlltilius, lhc trihulle 01' 169, also waged relentless war lO protect his replltat ion flJr pat ronage, which he believed the two cellsors l(lr the same year, Ti. Sempronius Gran'hus and C. Clauclills, had 11l1dcrrllilled. These censors forced one 01' Rutilius' frccdrneTl to tear dowll a hCHlse wall that they clairncd encroachec! on public land, and Ihell fined the ofl(>nclcr in spitc' of Rutilius' opposition. 217 The I riblllle' s prol CTt ion must have seel11ed worthless. A ROlnan's patronage orten ex!ended to dients in the provinces, sOlllelimes l'\Tn 10 eIltire provillccs. Any intcrference with such pro\'incial obligations (,()lIld irrcparably damage a reputatioll ami a political careU', anel was IherefiJre a natural ground fi)r In im iei/lal'. nllrin~~ his qU
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Similar behaviour, he continucd, had recently been exemplified when Cn. Domitius prosecuted M. Silanus for the injuries Domitius' host, Aegritomarus of Transalpine Gaul, had suffered. Cicero conduded by expressing the ho pe that he might follow Domitius' 'example ofhumanity and duty, and encourage his own hosts and friends to regard their lives as safer because of [his] protection' .220 M. Claudius Marcdlus exploited the Roman politician's vul­ nerability to thc charge of letting down his dient in the struggle to nelltralise Caesar dllring the late 50s. He doubtless sent a shiver through all of Caesar' s dients when he ordered a senator from Novum Comum, a colony rccently founded and granted full Roman citizenship by Caesar, to be flogged. Because the law foriJade the flogging of Roman citizens, Marcellus' atrocity under­ lIJined Caesar's grant of citizenship, and all his other henefida as wdl. 221 Cicero lTlay have been alluding to the flogging when he claimed that nobody had irritated Caesar as lTluch as Marcellus. 222 Particular bitterness does appeal' to have characterised relations between Caesar and Marcellus even after the civil war. Caesar was ex(relllely reluctant tu pardon Marcellus, and acted only after the entire Senate had intervencd on Marcellus' behalf. He used the occasion to denuunce Marcellus' aeerhilas (harshness) be fore the assembled senators. ni Even such grudging generosity toward Marcellus was unexpected, and it may explain Cicero's optimism about the new order wh ich caused him to break his resolution not to speak in the Senate, and gratefully address the Pro Mareello to the dictator .

The Causes 01 lnimieitiae

A young man entering public life in Rome joined a political group and inevitably acquired its inimici. The slow ascent up the eurS71S led to invidiae and frequently inimieitiar with those who were Iess successful. The exercise of power at the highest levels was doubly treacherous: both the cOlTlpetition among men of cOlllparable achievements and the hostility felt by the senatorial dass toward the individual who appeared 100 powerful incited men to in im ieiliae. lnimiciliae were an incscapable part of public life at Rome, and were even a function of the extent alld success of a Roman's political activities.

Conclusion It would be impossible to compile a complete list of all possible causes of inimieiliae. No rules governed what might irritate a Roman enough to provoke hirn into ho stile actions. Often aseries of cvents 01' emotions cOlllbined in a Roman's mind to unleash his enmity, and we cannot assess the importance of the individual components of his wrath. He probably could not have analysed thelTl satisfactorily himself. I have tried to show how tightly the causes of inimidliae were entwined with political life in Rome. The Roman politician was confronted with potential inimieiliar in every aspect of his political career, often extending to areas of life we consider strictly personal. 62

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extreme case. No other Roman was as ideological as Cato, so the emotionalism that betrays inimieitiac in the actions of most Roman politicians is more unequivocal. There are many cases in which the role of inimieiliae in motivating Roman political actions is capable of more precise analysis.

Manifestations of Inimicitiae

Inimicitiae dominating Roman political activity

The historical significance 01' inimieitiac derives from their influence on Roman public life. Unfortunately, it is often impossible to analyse the precise role 01' inimidliar in specific Roman historical situations because, as mentioned in the Introduction, inimieitiac did not define obligations 01' channel invariable behaviour patterns. In several cases inimieitiae dominated aRoman' s life, but this was unusual. Generally inimieitiae were one of many elements contributing complexly to an individual's motivation. History is not a chemical laboratory in wh ich diverse ingredients can be scicntifically introduced and their efficacy tcsted in isolation. The amient historian, who has so few ofthe kinds ofsources likely to be most usdul in assessing the role 01' inimieitiae (intimate letters and memoirs 01' othcr recordecl indiscretions that betray true attitudes best because 01' their artlessness), is at a particular disadvantage. The conflicl between Cato and Caesar, which frequently went beyond the bounds 01' polite political disagreement , illustrates the problem. Caesar jailed Cato in 59 amI Cato retaliated several years later by suggesting that Rome expiate Caesar's illegal war by turning hirn over to the cnemy. Such unrealistic extremism suggcsts the erno(ionalism of im 11I idtiac. But Cato was also a notorious ideologue ami Caesar one of the most unprincipled of Romans. Thereforc Cato's response may have been motivated by principle. It is more likely that his motivation was mixed although it is impossible to assess what part of his lengthy opposition to Caesar resulted from personal hat red and wh at part from their broad philosophical and icleological differences. BUI this is an

Every historian must struggle to avoid the dangerous failing of inadvertently colouring his subject with the prejudices and values of his own times. Many modern schalars are reluctant to admit that purely personal motivations like the pursuit of inimieitiae could have played a vital roll' in shaping same of the most important events in Roman history .1 But the intensity with which same Romans pursued such personal goals is reminiscent of Achilles' sacrifice 01' his men and cause in his quest for revenge and self­ glorification. Pompey was one of the most ruthless in marking out the sphere 01' his own glory. His exemplar was Alexander the Great, a king who compared hirnself to Achilles. 2 During one episode of the pirate war, Pompey succeeded in outdoing Achilles' single-minded pursuit of glory. Q. Caecilius Metellus, who had been assigned the province of Crete and was waging an effective war against the pirates, threatened to encroach on the glory Pompey hoped to achieve during his pirate command in 67. Pompey therefore ordcred Metellus to stop fighting and simul­ taneously despatched one of his own officers, L. Octavius, to bolstel' the pi rate resistance and ensure that Metellus would get no credit.:) Pompey' s conduct, not surprisingly, drew same criticism from other Romans, who pointed out that not even Achilles had fought for thc enemy. 4 It is I'emarkable that such conduct was tolerated at all. Wh at is more, Pompey's career attained a new pinnacle the very next ycar with the passage of the lex Manilia, which transferred to hirn the command 01' the war against Mith­ ridates. Equally rernarkable was the behaviour of L. Licinius Lllcullus, praetor in 104. As propraetor the next year, he led the Roman forces in the Servile War raging in Sicily. The Senate, displeased with LucullllS' military progress against the slaves, dis­ patched C. Servilius to succeed him. When news of the appoint­ ment of a successor reached Lucullus, he deliberately destroyed all of his military preparations in the hope of monopolising the war' s glory. Lucullus was prosecuted on his return to Rome - but the

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Manifestations 0] In im ieitiae

charge was bribery, a seemingly mild offence when compared with the enormity 01' his wilful sabotage. 5 It is noteworthy that the ancient sources, who were c10ser to and had more knowledge of Roman republican society than any modern scholar, repeatedly claim or take for granted that obsession with inimieitiae piloted many Romans' lives. Sallust, for example, states that some people in Rome believed Crassus acquiesced in the Catilinarian conspira-:y with the sole purpose of damaging Pompey: Pompey controllcd a large army at the time and Crassus was happy to see anybody's power grow, so long as it was at Pompey's expense. 6 The complex quest ion of Crassus' involve­ ment in the Catilinarian conspiracy is beyond my scope, but it is remarkable that any responsible observer could have believed that Crassus' grudge against Pompey induced his tacit consent in a potential coup d'etat. Cicero, who strove to make his dialogues as realistic as possible, implied a similar assurnption on the part of Laelius. Laelius claims that Scipio Aemilianus' enernies would not allow hirn to come to the aid of the state during its grave hour in the wake of Ti. Gracchus' tribunate, despite Scipio's status as the man of the [JOur'? M. Calpurnius Bibulus, Cicero's own enemy, yielded to a sirnilar passion, and apparently endangered the security of Antioch, which was threatened by the Parthians du ring Bibulus' governorship there. According to Cicero, Bibulus c1aimed that he was prepared to take his chances rather than call for the help 01' Cicero's army in Cilicia, and thereby appeal' indebted to his enerny. 8 A similar assumption about the values that sometimes governed a Roman's conduct is evident in Appian's praise of Fabius Maximus' campaign in 217. The people had recently rewarded M. Minucius Rufus with a co-command in response to his slan­ derous attack against Fabius and his plodding tactics. Such behaviour must have generated ill will and inimieitiae in Fabius. 9 When Minucius proceeded rashly to engage, only Fabius' timely intervention averted disaster. Appian comments: 'Fabius, dis­ regarding the slander, in this way relieved Minucius in his disaster. ' IO The implication is that Fabius might understandably have yielded to his private feelings regardless of the catastrophe it would have meant for the Roman war effort. PassieJIlate inimieitiae guided the lives 01' some of Plutarch's Romans. He attributes T. Quinctius Flamininus' enmity with Cato to the anions Cato had taken against Flamininus' unworthy brother , Lucius. 11 Cato had expelled Lucius, a consular. IrolTl the

Senate for arranging an execution to entertain a lover. Titus was so moved by his brother's misfortunes that he joined Cato's opponents in the Senate, and supported the successful effort to annul the contracts Cato had awarded to the publicans. Plutarch was highly critical 01' Titus' action: 'I do not think that he acted properly or patriotically in yielding to an unquenchable hatred, and supporting a relative who was unworthy and had suffered his just deserts, against a lawful magistrate and an excellent citizen.' 12 In another example Plutarch claims that the young Sulla made his quarrel with Marius the cornerstone of his politics. 13 Sirnilarly, he ascribes Marius' alliance with Saturninus and Glaucia solely to his desire to have his old inimiws, Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, exiled from Rome. 14 Dio stresses inimieitiae as the cause 01' the bitter struggles that paralysed the Caesarians in 48. M. Caelius, furious at Caesar for naming C. Trebonius praetor urbanus instead of himself, in a jealous frenzy opposed everything that Trebonius did, and even incited a debtor' s riot that very nearly cost Trebonius his life. Eventually, P. Serv ilius restored order by bringing troops to Rome and stripping Caelius of his praetorship and Senate seal. Caelius left Rome and joined Milo's conspiracy 'so that . . . he could damage Caesar as much as possible' .15 Livy saw personal wrath as the key to the tribunates of P. Rutilius and Ti. Gracchus. 16 In Cicero' s eyes, inimieitiae dominated the three most influential tribunates of the second century, those of the Gracchi and of Saturninus. 17 Cicero' s respect for the personal motives 01' the three tribunes, however much he disliked their radical politics, makes his testimony all the more valuable. 18 He was not attempting merely to discredit political views and actions he abhorred by attacking the motives of his ideological foes. Asconius, in his introductory remarks to the Pro Milone, claimed that Milo hated Clodius so much that he wished hirn dead and was ready to pay for it. 19 Nothing, however, is quite so telling as Caesar's claim at the beginning of the De Bello Civili that he began the civil war primarily 'to defend hirnself against the insults of his enemies' 20 The work was intended as self-justifica­ tion, and Caesar expected his audience to sympathise with his explanation. This interpretation 01' the major issue at stake in the rebellion is echoed in other Roman sources, which gene rally attribute the civil wars of the late Republic to the private quarrels of inimiei. 21 It is interesting to find the Senate collectively yiclding to fury

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and allowing its passion to dominate state poliey, in a manner very sirnilar to an aggrieved in irnicus. In 173 it ordered M. Popillius Laenas to make restitution to the Statelliates for atroeities he had committcd during his eonsulate. Popillius, after unsuccessfully trying to dissuade the Senate, simply disobeyed 22 But the Senate persisted alld hoped to persuade the consllis of 172 to rnake the stipulated amends. One of the new consllls, however, was the brother of the offender and threatcned to veto any such decree. The Senate responded by refusing to assign the province of Macedonia to either consuJ 01' 172 in spite of the threat many saw in Perseus. FlIrthermore, neither consul was permitted to levy new forces. 23 The Senate had collectively decided that its feud with the Popillii was more important than the national seeurity. The Roman penchant für making inirnieiliae an overriding concern was so comtnon that it was known to and exploited by Rome's national enemies. Caesar reported in the De Bello Gallieo his interview with the German king Ariovistus, who expressed confidence that he would gain favour in Rome by murdering Caesar. Ariovistus even c1aimed that messengers from Caesar's enemies in Rome had brought hirn this information. 24 Although it would he rash to place too tTluch confidence in this self~serving re port that could not be verified, Caesar's commentaries are a propaganda exercise and would not have served their purpose unJess they were credible to thc Roman public. 25 Since inirnieiliae wne wt'll known to inf1uence Roman beha­ viour, they might sornetimes be invoked for sclf-serving purposes, either defensivcly (to produce pity für oneself as the victim of inirnieiliae) or offensively (to denigrate one's rivals für being motivated by spite). Cicero tirelessly portrayed himself as the victim of the machinations of his enemies, hoping to extract sympathy for his exile. Doubtless, he had a point: Clodius was not treating him impartially. But similar claims by other Romans were not always as convincing, and served merely as a face-saving ploy. Catiline's explanation of the troubles he was facing, for example, sounds very much like Cicero's: 'Since I am surroundf'd and driven to the edge of disaster by my inirniei, I shall extinguish the lire engulling me with general ruin. '26 He offerf'd the same selt~ justification as a parting shot when he !eft RorncY Thc same tactic, with a switch in emphasis, could be used offen­ sively, not to save one's own face but to blacken another's. A Roman rnight glorify his cause and attack his enemy's by irnpugn­ ing the purity 01' the cnemy's motives, ascribing thnn (0 merc

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inimieiliae. Hence M. Aemilius Lepidus implied that any objec­ tions the Senate rnight have about his alliance with Antony in 43 could only spring from inirnieiliae. 28 In another example, the con­ spirators of 44 tried to enhance their own respectability and obfuscate the real issues when they claimed that the opposition to the murder 01' Caesar was only a cloak for inirnieitiae against them. 29 The speech 01' C. Licinius Macer, preserved by Sallust, suggests another way in which inirnieitiae were invoked for self-serving, propagandistic purposes. As part of a comprehensive attack on the Sullan state, Macer tried to persuade the people no longer to serve in the army, claiming that '[rustic soldiersJ are being cut down amidst the enmities 01' tbe mighty' .30 Macer's plea is effective only because the Romans nceded assurance that they were risking their lives for something nobler than the private grudges of the power­ fu!. Thc exception that proves the rule is the overriding loyalty Caesar inspired in his Gallic army, in reliance on which Caesar asked his men to take up arms against the inirniei who threatened his dignitas.:n It is clear that by clever manipulation of choice Roman heart­ strings one could turn protestations of inirnieiliae to almost any purpose. Therefore such protestations must always be probed with some mcasure 01' scepticism. Each case must be viewed in context with the understanding that moral and political prejudices might overwhelm a writer's judgement when actions are attributed to inirnieitiae. The inf1uence 01' inimieitiae over Roman politicallife was probably less than it at first seems. At the same time, thc fact that there was distortion is in itself an indication 01' a widespread, rcadily believed phcnomenon.

The influence of inimicitiae on Roman institutions Many Romans, like Iago, f
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A1anifestations of Inimicitiae

toward rnen who lived for their feuds, and in part by the firmness of the oligarchs' grip on power, whieh let thern exploit the struc­ tures of government to fulfil their private goals with impunity. This value system by whieh men routinely subordinated the interests of the state to their own private goals and ambitions conferred on inimieitiai' a distinctive power to shape the course of Roman institutional history . Roman inimiei considered no office too sacred to be abused for their own private purposes. This was why the tradition forbade inimiei from serving in the same priestly college. 32 The Romans evidently feared that two inimici holding concurrent priesthoods would put their private quarrels before their religious duties and paralyse the college' s ability to fulfil its funetions. Needless to say the tradition had been unable to prevent inimiei from serving together, and it became completely unenforce­ able in 63 when pontifical elections were transferred to the people.:n No abuse of the state religions was so dramatic as the consecra­ ti on of one's enemy's property. P. Rutilius, convinced that he had been dishonoured by the censor, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, enlisted this enlightened manipulation of a sacred institution in their feud.: H C. Atinius Labeo, tribune in 131, followed his example when he was omitted from the Senate by Q. Caecilius Metellus ]\;[acedonicus, the eensor of the same year. Having first proposed to have Metellus executed but prevented by a tribune favourable to Metellus, Labeo succceded in bankrupting Metellus by dedicating his property to the gods. Metellus was obliged to spend the rest of his days relying on the charity of others. 35 Clodius employed the same tactic during his tribunate in 58 against his inimici. He dedicated Gabinius' property to the gods, and Cicero's house to Libatas. Clodius' property was in turn consecrated by his fellow tribune, L. Ninnius, who acted as Cicero's faithful bene­ factor throughout that year. :J6 The Roman military system also was routinely abused by the pass ions of inimieitiae. It was a truism in Rome that a military cause that depended on the co-operation of two inimici was hopdess, As discussed in Chapter 2, the Senate insisted that the bitleI' inimici M. Livius Salinator and C. Claudius Nero, consuls together in 207, become reconcilcd bdore taking the field in that dangerous year when Hasdrubal threatened Italy. Cicero revealed a similar cancern when he confessed in June 43 that he feIt much more 0plimislie aboul the repuhlical1 cause now that L. Munatius Planeus and Brutus wne on good (erms.:H

One need not look far to discover why the Romans despaired when inimiei were ealled on to eo-operate. One of the greatest military disasters during the period between 218 and the eollapse of the Republic - Arausio - was eaused in large part by the feud between the commanding offieers. 38 This tendency of Roman generals to subordinate the national interest to their own personal grudges was so notorious that Rome's more perceptive national enemies attempted to exploit it. Hannibal seems to have been par­ ticularly astute in this regard. He knew from prisoners and his own observations of the military situation that relations were extremely tense between Q. Fabius Maximus and the impetuous Master of Horse, M. Minucius Rufus. 39 This information induced him to provoke ]\;[inucius (0 engage, with the near disastrous conse­ qucnces für the Romans I have already mentioned. Other opportunistic enemies of Rome also tried to enlist the power of inimieitiae to wreak havoc on the Roman military system. Spartacus hoped his slave rebellion would profit from the animosity between Pompey and Crassus. Crassus feared, after Pompey had been assigncd to the Servile War, that he would be forced to share the credit for defeating Spartacus, and espeeially dreaded sharing it with an inimieus. He therefore made every effort to engage the slaves as quickly as possible in the hope of delivering the deeisive blow 40 Spartacus took Crassus' feeling into account and tried to negotiate, with the expectation of relatively favourable terms. 41 To negotiate with rebellious slaves was of course incon­ eeivablc for a Roman cornmander, and Spartacus' overtures were scornfully rejeeted. It is noteworthy that Crassus' fears about losing credit for winning the war materialised and added a further cause of resentment between Pompey and Crassus. 42

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Ir neither religious sc rupIe nor national security could rest rain a Roman' s obsession with his private battles, other less revered Roman institutions could yicld to comparable abuse with even greater aplomb. Priuilegza, laws directed at partieular citizens 01' c1asses 01' citizens, wne oceasionally passed at Rome even though they were technically illegal,4:J and afforded a rather direct means 01' thwarting inimiei. In 104-, L. Cassius Longinus proposed a mcasurc, not technically a priuilegium but with similar force, that would expcl from thc Scnate all persons deprived 01' their imperium by the people. Q. Servilius Caepio, consul in 106, had had his imperium withdrawn in 105 bcci!uSC 01' his role in the catastrophe at Arausio. Asconius claims that Cassius sought to humiliatc Servilius 'propter simultatcs' (hecausc 01' enmity)+4 Thc 1ll0St

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famous legislative abuse of this kind occurred in 58. Clodius, enraged at Cicero over the Bona Dca trial, sponsored a bill man­ dating the exile 01' any Roman responsible for executing his countrymen without trial. Cicero went into voluntary exile, and Clodius soon rernoved what little mystery there was about the pur­ pose 01' this decrt'e by proposing a measure that exiled Cicero by namc. 45 Ad hominem legislation did not net'd to be disguised in the fancy dress of high-minded measures against traitors 01' tyrants, but could appeal' in everyday streetclothes. For example, Caesar, who succeeded in winning great popular esteem through his building programmes, decmation of buildings, and beast shows, hoped to crown his aedileship with a magnificent gladiatorial show. Mean­ while, his colleague M. Calpurnius Bibulus had been edipsed and lost credit even for projeets for which he contributed equally with Cacsar. Suetonius reports that Caesar' s inimiei - presumably induding Bibulus - passed a law restricting the number of gladiators that could be used for such occasions, and Caesar had to content hirnself with Icss spectacular games. 46 First-century annalists farniliar with such legislation enacted to injure one's inimici invented comparable legislative abuses to illustrate the animosities 01' an earlier period. Valerius Antias records the estab­ lishment of a special criminal inquiry to investigate what had become 01' the money L. Scipio had extracted from Antiochus. Thc story served to embroider the feud between the Scipios and Cato, who instigated the Petillii to introduce the legislation. Antias offered a similar explanation for the conduct of L. Furius Purpurio, the consul 01' 196, who supported the Petillii in their effort to pass the bill, but hoped to broaden its scope to include money taken frorn other kings and peoples. Furius' intention was to embarrass his inimiws Cn. Manlius Vulso, to whom he had recendy shown enrnity by opposing his request für a triumph, and who might have bet'n subjeet to the broader law fm his activities against the GaulsY Few Romans hesitated to exploit the powers of any curule office to damage their inimiei. Tht' censors, charged with the vague mission 01' protecting Roman mor;llity, were 01' all magistrates in the best position to employ the powers of their office against inimici. Because this had been al1ticipated, censors were routinely obligcd to swear that they would act in the best interests of the Republic and not out 01' personal spite .48 This oath seems to have given litt]e comfort to Romans whose inimiri were about to assurne office, as is is shown bv the bitter opposition to Cato's bid for the

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censorship of 184. The Roman leadership knew that Cato, if c1ected, would in his eagerness for revenge, destroy the reputations of the many who had injured him. 49 Other offices also served the private purposes of inimiei. I have mentioned the perception that the tribunate was the vehiele used by some of Rome' s most famous demagogues for revenge on wholl" classes against which they had personal grievances. Livy notes an exarnple 01' a consul exploiting his power to preside over the elections of his successors to secure thc dekat of an inimicus: in 189, M. Fulvius Nobilior returned from his province to hold the elections für the consuls of 188, and secured the defeat of his inimiws M. Aemilius Lepidus. 50 Aemilius held Fulvius responsible für the injury done to his career and the incident deepened the rift between the twO. 51 Inimiei also enlisted (he powers of the praetorship. As soon as they entered office, praetors published edicta, specifying the principles by which they woulri govern. These edicta were routinely ignored, according to Dio, to oblige friends and punish enernit's, until the enactment of I he lex Comell'a in 67, whieh obligated praetors to honour their original pronouncements throughout their year 01' office. 52 The apprehension uf Romans whose inimiei held high office llnderlines the routinent'ss with which the powers of public office were enlisted in the struggle against privatt' foes. Cicero played on that fear in trying to persuade the jury that Clodius had initiated the fighting that resulted in his death, daiming that terrm at Milo's prospects for soon beeoming consul prompted hirn to take (he initiative 53 Cicero showed the same fear that inimici would cxploit the powers of office when he advised Q. Minucius Therrnus not to offend his quaestor L. Antonius by passing hirn over in the search for a successor in his province. The reasün für squcamishly sidestepping offence was evident: the three Antonii hrothers were due to be tribunes for three consecutive years, and therefor<: would have ample means of expressing their dis­ pleasure.'>4 Cicero had similar worries on his own account; his blackest moments during his exile came when he learned 01' inimiei at taining positions 01' power in Rome who might use their offices to work against his recall. 55 He naturally assumed they would try. Thc same logic played the decisive role, as Cicero explained to At tieus, in his decision tn remain neutral during the preliminary negotiations between Pompe)' and Cacsar in 49. Cicero had no cksire to offend Caesar at a time when Pompey was offering hirn a second consulate and a triumph.'>6 Thc potential dangers 01' incur­ ring the wrath 01' the powerful were so weil recognised that those

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Manifeslalions olInimieiliae

prepareel to risk it were held in consielerable awe. C. Scribonius Curio was initially greatly admireel in 50 for demaneling that POl1lpey anel Caesar disbancI their armies simultaneously. He was considered the only Roman prepareel to take up enmity with the two most powerful men of his day in elefence of his ideals."? Need­ less to say, the respect he commanded must have evaporated when his real roll' as Caesar's deputy became known. Because the Romans routinely abused their most cherished institutions in their struggles with inimiei, one can only expect to find them exploiting the ad hoc measures introduced in times of crisis, when orelerly government had broken down, for the same pUl·pose. Inimieiliae played a notarious roll' eluring the proscrip­ tions of the first century. Sulla was unwilling to stop the carnage his adherents perpetrated on their inimiei. 58 The Sullan proscrip­ tions were probably no warse in this regard than those initiated by Marius several years earlier - Appian claims that there was a good deal of 'unlicensed murder' at that time.'!' Sulla and Marius also glutted their OWll feelings during their respective slaughters. N umerous stories of their bloodthirstiness and the personal satis­ faction each took in the death of many of his victims suggest the emotional intensity of inimieiliae. Both Sulla and Marius, for example, reportedly derived special satisfaction when the severed heads of some of the proscribed were brought to them. 6o The memory of the excesses committeel by inimiei uneler Sulla anel Marius created new terror in 49 when another round of pro scrip­ tions was feared. Ap. Claudius Pulcher's recent quarrels with such prominent Caesarians as Curio, M. Caelius, and P. Cornelius Dolabella contributed, according to Cicero, to his decision to leave ltaly.61 Inimieiliae also increased the abuses and atrocities that occurreel during the proscriptions of 43. The turmoil following the creation of the seuJIld triumvirate was exploited by many, includ­ ing Antony's wife Fulvia, to eliminate their private enemies, and the triumvirs themselves eliel not hesitate to indulge their personal feelings 62 Antony's savage abuse of Cicero's body became especially notorious 6 :i

When Verres hael particularly insulted Q. Lutatius Catulus by stealing a lampshade intended to be dedicated in atempIe Lutatius was in charge of building, Cicero, urging Lutatius to act against Verres as forcefully as possible, suggested that he proceed with 'the severity of a judge and even with the farce of an inimieus and accuser'.64 I have alreaely described in Chapter 1 Sulla's symbolic dream before his first cflpture of Romc in 88 about a goddess arming him with a thunderbolt. It is an idealised paradigm of the violence that inimieiliae conjured up for the Roman mind. The evils expected from inimiei were so intense that they entered the popular conception of hell, where some men imagined they would meet their inimiei. 65And indeed the cruelties inimiei inflicted on each other made this quite understandable. Pleminius' dispute with two military tribunes in 205 soon led to his mutilation either by the tribunes themselves or by soldiers sympathetic to them. 66

Wh at exactly might a Roman expect once he knew he hael acquired an inimieus? Cicero used inimieiliae as a synonym for every form of savagery, a model by which violence can be measureel.

Pleminius retaliated by torturing the two tribunes to death and forbidding their burial. 67 The first symptom of inimieiliae, once the infection had taken hold, was usually the camplete suspension of all soeial contact. The Romans, unaffected by our J udeo-Christian ethic, made no attcmpt to conceal or control their hostile feelings. Rather, they considereel such attempts quite remarkable. Livy was amazed that eluring an early Roman festival' pIeasant and courteous conversa­ tions were held with enemies' .68 Brutus' silence towards Pompey until the outbreak of thC' civil war, as discussed in Chapter 3, was more typical. Similarly, when Marius returned to Africa in 106 as consul anel as Metellus' successor, Metellus could not bring himself to transfer his anny in person to his former subordinate, now his bi ttel"est enemy, lest 'he see what he had been unable to endure hearing abou t' .69 It is difficult in a modC'rn society, in which merit advancement forms so strong apart of our ethos, to appreciate how damaging thc complete suspension of all social contact between inimiei might be to a Roman's carcer. ThC' Roman constitution provideel only the barest skeleton of a bureaucratic structure. Therefore, many of the functions performcd in a modern society by senior bureaucrats and (op-Ievel appointces devolved in Rome upon the magistrate's consilium (council). The consilium provieled its leader with expert military, aelministrative, religious and judicial aelvice that coulel be obtaineel from no other source. Its monopoly on counsel was especially pointed when the magistrate was away from Rome, anel thc Senate was unavailable for continuous consultation. 70

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Conduct characteristic of inimicitiae

ManijeslatioJls of lnimieitiae

Membnship in a consilium was honourable and valuable because it provided members 01' the Roman elite, who could hold office only infrequently and 1'01' relatively short periods, influence in the highest decisions 01' state. The magistrate does not seem in practice to have exercised complete free choice in selecting the membership 01' his consilium. Nevertheless, he was in a position to exclude his inimiei, and in any case a consilium exerted influence over a magistrate in proportion to his conlidence in it. 71 A passage in the Pro Flaeeo suggests that the Romans could not conceive an inz'mieus belonging to a governor's stafr. Cicero, playing on his audience's incredulity to prove that his dient was not an inimieus 01' C. Appuleius Decianus, asked rhetorically: 'Why then as praetor did he invite you, his inherited inimieus, to join his eonsilium?>72 A rupturc in social relations was only the prelude to the hostile activity the Romans expected from inimiei in every area 01' life. At their worst, inimzdtiae attacked what a Roman guarded most, his honour, his property and his civic rights. An attack on an enemy's honour was pcrhaps the most characteristic feature 01' inimieitiae, typirally beginning with a slanderous assault on every aspect 01' his public and private li fe . A glance through the second Philippie, 01' the lnveetivae preserved with the work 01' Sallust, indicates that Roman society countenanced free slander 01' enemies, having no restrictivc standard 01' propriety. 73 It seems that such verbal attacks nevcr backftred by enlisting the audience's sympathies with the abused. No area 01' publie life was beyond exposure and ridicule. The goal was to destroy a man's auctoritas, the most elusive and at the same time the most essential component 01' power in Rome. One 01' the most effective taetics was to challenge a magistrate' s official arrangements. If he was unable to defend thc decisions to which !Je had committed his prestige, men would be much less likely to unitc their /()rtunes with his in the future. Provincial settlements were a favourite because the Roman administrative system allowed governors such a free hand in managing the empire. A provincial enactment, unlike a law that necded the support 01' many, was generally the work 01' one man. Sole authorship was a two-edged sword, however: although it pro­ vided a chance to exer! great individual power, it also provided an ideal opcning I(lr an enemy to l(lCUS his aggression precisely on his target. Such attacks were not only ideal, but also tolerated and even expected. Cicero betrays how readily the Romans ascribed such hehaviour to inimieitiae. Verres' successor had assessed the provincc 01' Sicily in accordance with the rate establislH'd by 76

Manijestations o/lnimieitiae

Verres' predecessor, ignoring Vertes' own assessment. Such action, Cicero implies, would be natural from an inimieus. But this explanation that first came to mind was impossible because the successor was V erres' friend. Cicero therefore concludes that Verres' assessment must have been outrageous. 74 Although Cicero's sentiments were arranged with a view to rhetorical effect, the rhetoric must have rung true to be effectivc. lVlore illustrative is the conduct 01' Pompey, who played the typical inimiws after the lex Manilia transferred the Asian command to him from his old foe Lucullus. 75 On reaching Asia, Pompey systematically overturned everything Lucullus had done sincc 74; rewards and punishrnents bestowed by Lucullus were revoked, and counter-edicts were issued invalidating all ~f Lucullus' arrangements. 76 Lucullus took his revenge in kind several years later by sabotaging Pompey's attempt to have his eastern settlement ratified by the Senate. Military prestige was the largest promoter 01' Roman aue/arZtas amI therefore provided an inviting fteld on wh ich inimiei could unleash their passiolls. A general had to reckon on interference from his enemies in Rome at every stage 01' the campaign. Efforts might be made, for instance, to strip inimiei 01' their commands in the middle 01' a war. C. Publicius Bibulus, tribune in 209, was apparently motivated by inimieitiae when he introduced a bill to abrogate the command ofM. Claudius Marcellus, a man who had al ready held the consulship foul' times. Marcellus, however, suc­ ceeded in defending his conduct to thc people so effectively that he was elected to his fifth consulship.77 There were 01' course many lesser ways in wh ich Znimici might interferc with a general' s ability to campaign without going so rar as to terminate his command. C. Calpurnius Piso, smarting from his ineffective struggle to prevent Pompey from getting the pirate command, interlered with Pompey's efforts to levy troops anel assemble equiprnent 1'01' his campaign. Plutarch claims tbat Piso was motivated by fury and envy. Dio supports this l~xpl
Manifestations of Inimieitiae

Manifestations 01Inimieitiae

established inimiei, exploiting the exacting conditions prescribed 1'01' awarding triumphs,79 viewed the debate over whether ar not a

But political expedicncy is not the whole story. We have, first,

the most nearly probative evidence that can be imagined: contem­ porary assessment by knowledgeable sources such as Cicero. We have already seen examples 01' contemparary attribution 01' hostile acts specifically to settled, formal passion rather than profit. Mare­ over, we can surely trust our own assessment, at least when inde­ pendent knowledge concerning the antagonists provides a larger context against which to judge the hostilities. The sentiment against Metellus remained strong even after Marius and Furius defected to the optimates and Marius led the counterattack that left Saturninus dead and his rcvolutionary programme in shambles. Marius continued to oppose the recall 01' Metellus even after his actions against Saturninus.9 2 Furius used his tribunician veto to prevent Metellus from returning even though he had recently dcmonstrated his loyalty to the broader political goals 01' the optimates by proposing that the property 01' Saturninus and his associates be confiscated. 93 Furius put a lot on the line by each 01' these politically inconsistent actions; in the year following the tribunate he paid dearly far offending the followers 01' Saturninus and far infuriating those who supported the recall 01' Metellus. He was first prosecuted by C. Appuleius Decianus, whose name and conduct at the trial suggest that he was acting on behalf 01' the bereaved Saturninians: Furius was acquitted because Decianus expressed regret 1'01' the death 01' Saturninus. 94 Later, he was tried again, this time by the tribune C. Canuleius, 1'01' vetoing the recall 01' Metellus. On this occasion, however, the mob is reported to have torn Furius to pieces before his case came to trial. 95 The pervasive influence 01' in im ieitiae in Roman society extended beyond the vicious manifestations I have been describing. As indicated above, the Romans were often prepared to allow their inimieitiae to become the dominant element 01' their lives, and to employ every form 01' savagery to overcome their inimiei. One consequence 01' this attitude was a general Roman reluctance to take up inimieitiae except as a last resort. This was true despite protestations that deferencc to the mighty and careful avoidance 01' offence were humiliating. But actions speak louder than words, and in reality the threat 01' inimintiae was an important and effective weapon that helps explain why so much 01' Roman politics procecded by consensus, the weaker senators always on guard lest they step on the toes 01' the men who really counted. The senators at the top commanded deference because the wider a politician's connections and possibilities for holding the highcst offices 01' state, the gTeater his opportunities to destroy his enemies.

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grant should be made as an excellent opportunity to find fault with the military accomplishments 01' their foes, and score points against them whatever the ultimate outcome 01' the discussion. A general seeking a triumph I11USt have held the magistrate' s command (imperium). Lack 01' the magistrate's imperium was at least part 01' the objection offered by the inimiei 01' Scipio in 205. 80 In addition, triumphs were awarded only far battles that had ter­ minated a war,81 and on condition that the general swear that at least five thousand 01' the enemy had perishcd, to prevent the immortalisation 01' minor skirmishes. 82 Also, a triumph could only honour a just war (i.e. one autharised by the Senate).83 These requirements, especially when they were not subjeet to strict proof, invitcd challenges from inimiei bent on persuading the Senate that a rival's military achievemcnts had been exaggerated. In other instances the sources attribute opposition to triumphs to inimieitiae without stating what particular objections were advanced. 84 Exile, the consummatc legal injury short 01' execution, figured prominently in the tactics 01' inimiei. Cicero, the most famous victim 01' this extreme measure, succinctly evokes its power in his ddence 01' Sulla. He wonders rhetarically what Torquatus could hope to gain by his prosecution 01' Sulla when Sulla was already ruincd: Was Torquatus striving 1'01' 'exsilium inimici' (the exile 01' his enemy)?85 Another target was P. Popillius Laenas, who as consul in 132 presided over the execution without trial 01' many 01' Ti. Gracchus' supporters. 86 C. Gracchus gratified his emotional resentment by procuring the exile 01' his foe Popillius, an exile Cicero frequently likened to his own. 87 Similarly, Cicero considered inimieitiae as an element in the exile 01' Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus,88 and his analysis is con­ firmed by other sources. Metellus created considerable resentment through his vigorous censorship in 102. He tried to expel Saturninus and C. Scrvilius Glaucia 1'1'0111 the Senate and deprived P. Furius 01' his state horse. 89 Saturninus and Glaucia enlisted C. Marius, an old inimicus 01' Mctellus dating back to the Jugurthine war, and tcgether they engineered the exile 01' Metellus. 9o I am not suggesting that inimieitiae alone were responsible 1'01' this drastic step against Metellus. Münzer is right to sec political calculation in Saturninus' decision to drive Mctellus out 01' Rome; nobody represented a greatcr threat to the revolutionary planno's 01' 100. 91

Manifestations 0] lnimidtiae

Manifestations 0] lnimieitiae

In unguarded moments Cicero provides evidence that his actions were sometimes inhibited by the fe ar 01' incurring inimieitiae. Such fear is likely to have influeneed his behaviour mueh more frequently than he admits because it was considered so eowardly to be dominated by the powerful. This public attitude explains why Cicero admitted his inglorious motives only to his more intimate eorrespondents. While still a rather insecure new man in 65, Cicero begged Atticus to understand why bitterness had arisen between himsdf and Atticus' unele Q. Caecilius. Caecilius had asked Cicero's help in opposing A. Caninius Satyrus, an apparent participant in a seheme to defraud Caecilius. Cicero refused-because Satyrus was a elose friend 01' L. Domitius, whom Cicero considerecl crucial to his eareer. 96 He hoped Atticus would show greater sympathy for his action than Caeeilius, who had broken off all friendship. In another moment 01' candour, Cicero did not conceal from his brot her that he had forced himself 10 refrain from prosecuting the detested Vatinius because 01' his fear that he would offend Pompey and suffer for it. 97 He offered very diffeiOent reasons 101' his restraint both in public and in his famous letter to Lentulus, discussed in the Introduction.

interests there. Sallust explains that Crassus urged Piso' s appoint­ me nt 'because he knew him to be Pompey's bitter eneml" .99 The coalition 01' senators that deeply resented Pompey's extraordinarl' career was also glad to have Piso in Spain making as much trouble as possible 1'01' him: 'They saw in him [Piso) some protec­ tion against Pompey, whose power was even then becoming alarming.' 100 The Catonians harvested the inimieiliae between M. Calpurnius Bibulus and Caesar 1'01' similar purposes. The extremists dom in­ ated bl' Cato were uneasy about Caesar' s prospects 1'01' the consul­ shi p in 59. As soon as Caesar' s chances became sure, Cato rallied the opposition around Bibulus in the hope that he could restrain Caesar' sexcesses. Cato was so desperate to get Bibulus elected that he even endorsed the use 01' bribery during the campaign. A variety 01' reasons must have induced the Catonians to support Bibulus as the instrument 01' their resistance to Caesar. Bibulus had recendy married Cato' s daughter Porcia, a sign that he enjoyed Cato' s full confidence. 101 But the optimates surely also eonsidered that Caesar and Bibulus had been inimiei ever sinee their aedileship in 65, when Caesar had eelipsed Bibulus and received a disproportionate amount 01' gloria at Bibulus' expense. I02 The relationship between the two men worsened in 62 when both were praetors. 103 No souree says specifically that Caesar's opponents took these inimicilial? into account. However, Suetonius cloes say that the optimates uni ted behind Bibulus as soon as it appeared likely that L. Lucceius, a man very elose to Caesar, would also be elected consul. They feared, aeeording to Suetonius, that Caesar woulcl be completely unrestrained if he attained 'the highest magistraey with a sympathetic and like­ minded eolleaglle' .104 Presumably it entered their calculations that an old ini7llicus like Bibulus would be the most likely to thwart Caesar's every move. Valerius Antias' version 01' the Scipio trials describes how another group exploited inimieitiae. According to Antias, a group 01' senators opposecl to the Scipios seeured the appointment 01' Q. Terentius Culleo to conduct the investigation 01' Seipio Asiaticus' finaneial dealings with Antioehus, confident that bitter hostility toward the Scipios would lead to the guilty verdict they were seek­ ing. The truth or falseness 01' Antias' account does not affect the point that he ami Livy believed that a faction hostile to the Scipios enlisted thc inimieitial? of Terentius, hoping that he would use his investigatory powers to injure Seipio as mueh as possible.lO· '

Inimicitiae and the factional organisation of Roman politics The signifieanee 01' inimieitial? as a positive rather than inhibitory force in Roman history is explained only pardy by the Roman tendency to use the powers 01' state 1'01' private purposes. Roman politics was dominated by factions, loose organisations 01' poli­ ticians, united primarily by personal bonds rather than ideology. So me of the most important works 01' modern seholars in Roman history have altempted to dcfine these bonds.98 Analysis 01' all the elements that induced a Roman to unite his fortunes with a group of men bent on attaining a specilie objeetive is weil beyond my subject. I shall onll' diseuss the potential 01' inimieitiae to provide Roman politicians a reason to co-operate, and in some cases even to supply a faction with its primary raison d'f!tre. I have discussed what Romans expected onee two men were known 10 be inimici. This force could be harnessed by a faction and directed against threatcning indivicluals. M. Crassus succeeded in having Cn. Calpurnills Piso appointed quaestor pro praetorl? to Spain in 65 with the hopl' that Piso would work against Pompel"s

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Manifestations of lnimieitiae

Manifestations of lnimieitiae

Hut the roll" played by inimieitiae in Roman factional politics ran deeper than this. lnimieitiae were not merely ripe fruit grown on someone else's hostility tree, plucked and used by factions for their own ends as they found it convenient. Sometimes inimieitiae were a faction' s very essencC'. The Roman ability to let inimieitiae grow into an obsession could impel aggrieved members 01' the nobility to build power structures designed to undo their inimiei, just as they built coalitions to monopolise the highest honours 01' the state. This point has often been missed by schal ars because 01' the tendency originated by Münzer to believe that factions were rigid groupings bound by ties 01' relationship and aml·citia. Both elements were undoubtedly important in clC'termining the political connec­ tions a Roman made, but thcy obscure the fact that Roman poli­ ticians frorn disparate backgrounds often uni ted to achieve very limited objectives. This helps to explain why it is so difficult to generalise about the factions that dominated Roman political history . One objective that might unite Romans was the destruc­ tion 01' a shared inimiew. I06 The reasons why political groupings were frequently organised along lines 01' inimieitiae are adumbrated by Dio in his comments on the reconciliation Caesar achieved between Pompey and Crassus prior to the formation 01' the first triumvirate. Caesar made the effort, according to Dia, because he needed powerful friends, and understood that he could not have the friendship 01' Pompey or Crassus without securing the enmity 01' the other. This was to be avoided at all costs because men worked harder against their enemics than for their friends. More­ over, the fruits 01' inimieitiae - keeping an inimicus out of power ­ could be enjoyed by many who shared the hatred; but the beneficiary of amieitia who acquired power pleased no one, pre­ sumably because the Romans were too jealous 01' power 107 The upshot ofDio's observation is that hatred had much more adhesive power than friendship in uniting the members 01' any potential faction. It would be amistake to cxaggeratc the tendency for Roman inimiei to pool their political power. The frequent complaints by prominent Romans, attributing their opposition to factions 01' their in im iei, have an air 01' convenient excuse about them, and recall the remarks of other Romans who saw inimiei behind their every sctback. Pompey, failing to have his way in 60 after return­ ing frorn the east, c:laimed that his opponents were jealous 01' him and, according 10 Dio, repented that he had dismissed his legions and subjccted himsclf to the power of his encmies. IIIH Cacsar, in

his own works, constantly rnaligns the motives 01' the men who were working against hirn du ring his proconsulate in Gaul by referring to them as inimici. 100 But the evidence suggests that both Pompey and Caesar had a point, that the political groups opposing them were composed of men whose hostility had reached the emotional pitch of inimieitiae, and who were prepared to go to extreme lengths to undo their enemies. The intensity of the hostility in each case hel ps explain why compromise proved so clusive, and why the two stalemates led to extraordinary solutions, the first triumvirate and Caesar' s civil war. The naive political hallucination and extremist ideology of which Cato' s factions in these cases have been so rnuch accused is only part of the motivation - and perhaps not the most important part - of lhe force that bore such a large share 01' the blamc for the dCSlrtlction of the Republic. 11o Among the men who resisted Pornpey in the late 60s, Q. Caec:ilius Mctellus Celer, cos. 60, is especially interesting because the sources indicate unequivocally that inimieitiae decisively influ­ enced his opposition. As I have al ready mentionecl in Chapter 3, he and his brother Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos had supported and served with Pompey in the cast until Pornpey divorced their sister l\1ucia for adultery and made both men his bitter enemies. L. Licinius Lucullus was also weil known for his enmity with Pompey. Plutarch claims that Lucullus and Pompey maintained some exterior politeness, but his own evidence tagether with what is known from other sources dues not bear hirn out. 111 The low point in the relationship between the two men came in the after­ math 01' the enactment 01' the lex Manilia, by which Pompey took over the col1lmand 01' the Mithridatic war from Lucullus. Pompey took some satisfaction, according to Plutarch, simply because 01' thc injury the law did lo LuculluS l12 Once in Asia, Pompey struve to hUll1iliate Lucullus as much as possible, as discussed above. When the inimiei met in Galatia, their ill will culminated in blows, and they werc physically separated only with grcat difficulty. One can scarcely imagine a more extraordinary scene in Roman politics. Thc spark of the explosion was an exchange of insults, Pompey snecring at Luc:ullus' appetite for lucre, and Lucullus retorting by remarking on Pompey's powerhunger. 1 J:l After lhe conference, Pompey undermined Lucullus' aUlhority by inter­ kring with his cOl1lmands, depriving hirn 01' troops, and belittling his military achievernents. Lucullus contenled himself by observ­ ing that Pompey had made a military reputation by usurping glory

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Manifestalions 01 Inimicilial'

that rightly belonged to others. 114 U nder these eireumstanees, even iey politeness hetween the two is highly unlikely. The Senate had hoped to find in Lucullus a champion of the optimate eause after the [ex Manilia foreed hirn to leave Asia prematurely. Lueullus, however, preferred retirement and the scnsual indul­ genee that made hirn so famous. 115 But a life of pleasure eould not provide Lueullus as much satisfaetion as exacting revenge from his old enemy. He eame out of retirernent to join Cato's resistanee to Pompey's demands after his return from the east. Lueullus led the light in the Senate for the resolution to consider all Pompey's eastern acta individually instead of ratifying them m Moc. More­ over, he insisted that the Senate consider his own acta in Asia that Pompey had overturned, and deeide wh ich of the two sets of arrangements it preferred. 116 Certainly, Lueullus' opposition to Pompey in the late 60s did not result entirely from in im icitiae. As a lixture of the oligarchie establishment, he would have been opposed to any Roman enjoying a successlon of extraordinary eommands enabling him to build up the colossal power Pompey had acquired. But the intensity of his opposition highlighted by his sudden willingness to leave his heloved lishponds was surely a function of inimicitiac, and Lucullus' passion provided the Ca[onians with a potent energy source for battling the pretentions of Rome's most powerful general. Other inimieiliac also fuelled Cato's faction, although it is more difficult to isolate their role among the reasons other prominent Romans had for opposing Pompey. I have had many occasions to rnention thl' animosity between Pompey and Crassus. It is there­ fore not surprising that Crassus turns up as one of the leaders of the resistance to Pompey's demands after the return from Asia. 117 Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus was another prominent force opposing Pom pey .118 Pompey had taken extraordinary measures, already alludecl to, to prevcnt Metellus from sharing any of the glory I<Jr defeating the piratl's and was even on the verge of sailing to Crcte t() 1<Jr(T Metellus to stop carnpaigning. After the dash in Crete, Pornpey gave Mctellus anothlT grievance by thwarting his ho pe to have two captured Cretan commanders march in his triumph. Pompey prrsuadecl a tribune to disallow the honour on the grouncl that thl' Crctans had surrendered to himself rathlT than to Mctellus, and thus deprivecl his rival of even this moderate glory.ll!) Thnc is also evicll'ncl' to suggest that inimicitiac contributecl to the stubborn, unpragmatic rcsistance [0 Cal'sar a decadc later,

whieh eventually forced Caesar into a risky and unwanted civil war. 120 I have already diseussed the notorious inimicilial' between M. Calpurnius Bibulus and Caesar that had begun in 65. Bibulus, with Cato's support, proposed in 53 that Pompey be named sole consul, and later became a prominent opponent of Caesar' s bid for a seeond consulship.121 His humiliating memories of his consulship in 59 with Caesar doubtless prornpted him to do everything possible to make sure that Caesar would not become consul again. The Catonians would have counted on Bibulus (0 take an even Iarger roJe in the struggle against Caesar in 51 and 50 had he not served at the time as proconsul of Syria. Caesar's history indieates that the two men were bitter inimici during the eivil war I22 We do not know why M. Claudius Mareellus, consul in 51, hated Caesar, but his eonduet du ring the consulate and later suggests inimicilial', not just polite political disagreement. In April 51 he suggested that Caesar's army be dismissed, that a suecessor be appointed, and that Caesar not be allowed to stand for the consulship il1 absl'ntia. 123 The proposal was opposed by Marcellus' fellow consul Ser. Sulpicius and eventually died when Marcellus was unable to persuade the Senate to formulate a deeree. J24 The consul then besmirched Caesar's dignilas, as diseussed in Chapter 3, by flogging one of his clients. Marcellus was again in the fore­ front of the opposition when he led the effort in September 51 to terminate Caesar's command on 1 March 49. J25 Caesar's own reluctance to pardon Marcellus after the civil war strengthens the impression suggested by Mareellus' aetions that personal animosity guided their dispute. 126 Th~~ anti-Caesarian faction also eounted C. Claudius Marccllus, another prominent inimicuJ of Caesar, among its members. Pompey had supportecl his bid lör the consulate of 50 because Marcellus was Caesar's implac:able {Öl' in spite of his marriage to Octavia, Caesar's grandniece. 127 The animosity may have arisen when Caesar offerecl Oetavia to Pompey as a wife despite her marriage to Marc:ellus, in hopes of forming a new marriage alliance after the c1eath of ,}ulia. 128 The dominant theme of Marcellus' consulship in 50 was opposition to Caesar, marked by repeatecl attcflIpts to Clmform the Senate to his own uncom­ promising attitude. Early in his consulship, Marcellus unsuccess­ fully proposed Caesar's immediate repJacement as proconsul. 129 His opposition did prevent the two legions, sent by Caesar as reinfon.:eflll'nts for the eastern front, froll} leaving Ilall" I:HI When Mareellus made a second clTort to strip Caesar of his c01l11l1and, he

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Manzfestations cf lnimicitiae

Manifestations ollnimicitiae

was outmanoeuvred by c. Scribonius Curio, who persuaded a large majority of the Senate (370 out of 392) to vote in favour of disarming both Caesar and Pompey.131 Provoked by the vote, Marcellus tauntingly dismissed the Senate: 'Be victorious with Caesar as your master!' 132 This snide remark was characteristic of the man who opened the debate by declaring Caesar a thief and calling on the Senate to proclaim hirn a public enemy ifhe failed to lay down his arms. 133 Marcellus next proceeded to force the Senate's hand. Without its authorisation he gave Pompey a sword and bade hirn defend the fatherland. Simultaneously he put under Pompey's command the legions destined for Parthia and em­ powered hirn to raise new troops for the imminent struggle. 134 Marcdlus' persistent opposition to Cacsar cannot be ascribed to the fanatical republicanism that motivated Cato and, to a lesser extent, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Rather than leaving Italy with Pompey, Marcellus trusted to his marriage tie to Caesar and to Caesar' semerging reputation for clemency .135 His cowardliness in not committing hirnself to take the field for the cause that benefited so much by his opposition as consul, tagether with his abject supplication of Caesar on his cousin' s behalf in 46,136 suggest that Marcellus' fight was not for a political callse but to gratify personal hatred. He would have been pleased had Pompey humiliated ar eliminated Caesar. It did not happen that way and Marcellus must have sought a hasty, self-abasing reconciliation with Caesar after Pompey !eft Italy. Same evidence also suggests that the consuls of 49, L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C. Claudius Marcellus, were Caesar's inimici. Caesar's opponents were crowing that both men had been elected to strip Caesar of his position along with all his dignitas, while Sero Sulpicius Galba, a rival candidate, had been defeated because he was Caesar' siegate and friend. 1:J7 Lentulus' opposition to Caesar is weil documented. As conslll-elect in 50 he supported Marcellus' uq~ent request (unautharised by the Senate) that Pompey begin levying forces. UH On 1 J anuary 49, he opposed the desire of a large majority of the Senate to :'ompromise with Caesar and head off civil war; instead, Lentulus called Caesar a plunderer and urged war .1:iY lnimz'citial" should not be pressed as an explanation of Lentulus' conduct in 49, however, becallse he was notoriously greedy and expected great financial and other gains from a civil war. 1+11 Much less is known about C. Claudius Marcellus, the other consul in 49. Rut we da know that, along with his future fellow consul, he sllpported the exhortation of C. Marcellus, the

consul of 50, to Pompey to take up arms against Caesar. 141 More­ over, Velleius' cryptic general remark that Marcellus as consul acted 'with more savageness than was fair', 142 suggests that he was driven by more than a difference of political opinion with Caesar. The Catonians also attempted to exploit the inimicitiae toward Caesar of two other men, L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Scribonius Curio. 14 :i Caesar, however, succeeded in persuading both men to give up their opposition. Paullus' inimicitiae with Caesar served as an asset during his campaign for the consulate, helping hirn to secure election. l44 Although the origin of his hostility is unknown, it probably did not result frorn commitment to political principle - at least, Caesar' s succcss in buying hirn off du ring the consulate suggests not. Paullus henceforth became one of Caesar' sagents in Rome,145 but seems to have played no role in the civil war; it is a fair guess that neither side trusted hirn. The case of C. Scribonius Curio is mare difficult. Curio was l1otoriously unstable and unpredictable, but Caesar's enemies felt sure his inimicitiae with Caesar would lead hirn to support their cause. 146 After all, Curio's antipathy to Caesar was as weil known as his father' s. The elder Curio had publicised a dialogue that denounced Caesar' s consulate and administration in Gaul. 147 The work rnust have made rather racy reading if it was Suetonius' source for same remarks about Caesar attributed to Curio ­ Caesar was 'Nicomedes' Bithynian brot hel' .14H Both Curiones are reported to have berated Pompey far marrying J ulia in their desire to ernbarrass Caesar: the union was shameful because Caesar' s amorous intervention had destroyed Pompey's earlier marriage to Mllcia. 14Y The eider Curio also alluded in his speeches to Caesar' s cornplicity in the first Catilinarian conspiracy as weil as a subse­ quent l"OUp d'etat Caesar allegedly plotted with Cn. Calpurnius Piso. 1511 The youngcr Curio later infuriated Caesar by becoming a rallying point for the anti-triumviral forTes in 59. 151

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The heavy financial clernands of a carnpaign for the aedileship seem to have forc-ed Curio to seek Caesar's financial assistance in 51. 152 Caesar refllsed, presumably because he mistrusted Curio personally and consiclered it not worthwhile to buy up an aedile, whose power to advance his cause in Rome was only marginal. Caelius' conviction that Caesar's rebllff would enSllre Curio's support for the POlnpeians 1c'3 must have been widely shared by all who knew of thc hostility between the Curiones and Caesar. Curio's sudden alteration of his political plans could only have reinforced Caelius' conviction that he would support Cacsar's

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Manifestation.\' of Inimieitiae

opponents. Curio deeided to run for the tribunate when one of the tribunes-eleet, Servaeus, was convicted and needed to be replaeed. 154 The tribunate, unlike the relatively powerless aedile­ ship, gave Curio the power to exert much more pressure on Caesar. Onee eleeted tribune, Curio hinted at what Caesar could expect in the coming year. He let it be known that he would resist any effort on Caesar's part to secure a triumph and a second eonsulate. 155 He apparently also intimated that he would ass ist efforts to ttTminate Caesar's proconsulate. 156 Curio even signed his name (0 the anti-Caesarian decrees of 29 September 51. 157 But Curio suddenly changed his tune early in his tribunate, and beeame Caesar' s enthusiastic and unwavering ally.158 His adherence was the more valuable because his decision influenced his friene! Caelius to side with Caesar, although Caelius also attributecl his allegianee to hatred of Ap. Claudius Puleher. 159

their foes. Every Roman office, seellar and sacred, eould be amI was turned to this purpose. Therefore inimieitiae make up a most essential part of our understanding of the history of all Roman institutions. But the intluence of inimieitiae has another import­ ance: they played a significant role in uniting Roman public figures and setting the agenda für collcctive action. In examining the ways and places in which inimieitiae influenced Roman life, I have deliberately passed over one important eategory of examples. My fifth chapter is a case study of that category: the infiltration of inimieitiae into the Roman judicial system.

Apparcntly, inimieitiar even among the supporters of the principals could playa decisive role as Romans chose sides in the impending eivil war. Caelius believed that Curio's change of policy originated in the pontifieal college's refusal to interealate a month. 160 Hostile sources claimed that Curio had been bribed. Whether money changed hands 01' not was prnbably known for sure only to Caesar and Curio and their intimates; the evidenee is inconclusive 161 Curio's motive does not affect the main point here: the anti­ Caesarians hoped to enlist Curio becausc they expected to be able to harness his inimieitiae toward Caesar for use in their own fight against the defiant proconsul. This ploy was not unheard-of 01' foolish; it was mercly unsuceessful in this case because of Curio's ul]('xpected and dramatie switeh in allegianee.

Conclusion No simple pattern can dcseribe all the diverse manifestations of Roman inimieitiar. Sometil11es inimici merely engaged in a formal­ istic derlaration 01' hatrecl and suspension 01' social relations. At the opposite extreme inimieitz'ae impellcd Romans insatiably to seek the destruetion 01' their enemies, in disregarcl even 01' the most saered traditions. They fc)Uncl it easy to clon the hernie rloak and assurne its ideal 01' the supremilcy 01' the individual with honour intact. Beeausc RlHhan society was tolerant 01', 01' at least powerless to restrain, its Achillesl's, in elfeet it encouraged ils members to shrink at nothing in vindil'ating their own honour anel vanquishing

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5

In analysing the causes 01' inimidtiae in Chapter 3, I passed over litigation, probably the must common souree 01' hostility.1 The Roman prosccutor amI the men who supported him by contribut­ ing hostile speeches or darnaging evidence generally could expect to evoke far more personal resentrnent than the rnodern prose­ eutor, insulated by the more irnpersunal traditions 01' thc modern criminal justicc system. Thc convieted Roman found it almost irnpossible to view his prosecutor as a mere agent 01' an unbiascd judicial system, lIlutivated solely by his duty to the public to ferret out alleged wrongs. The reasons for this difference are clear enough. In Rornc thc prosenItor was not a public servant who chose his target disintnestedly, but a private citizen who competed for tlw privilege , intnestcd more often in personal objectives than the comillon weal.'2 Rivalry ami ambition to secure a reputation I(lr puhlic :;pcaking often induecd young rnen to display their talents by prosecuting distinguisheel public ligures I(lr whom thcy had no personalfeding, positive or negative. Other successlul proseClllors rnight attain far more tangiblc rewards ranging from lIloney to seniority rights in the Senale. It was difficult I(lr a prose­ culor to avoid giving the impression that he was hUlltillg glory allel profit in thc wreckage 01' his vietilll'S career. Not ollly the victirns lhernsdves, but also Roman society at large pictun>d Roman prosecutors as vultures who c1isgraccd the farnily n'Ul1('.:' The principal reason why a dc/(:nclant could not accept his prose­ cutor as anylhing but an irlllllicus was the ('xtraor'dinary darnage conviction would c1o. lts inhnent c1isgrac(' ami accOlnpanying

punishment - fine, exile or loss of curule honours - destroyed everything the Roman aristocrat spent his life pursuing. Some­ times, as in our society, even an unsuccessful prosecution could ruin a reputation and block access to the cursus honorum. For example, acharge of peculation supported by Cato's testimony appears to have destroyed the candidacy of M' Acilius Glabrio for the censorship in 189 although no verdict against Glabrio was ever reached. 4 Cicero hints at the strategie possibilities of prosecution for its own sake when he intimates that in this fashion Ap. Claudius Pulcher hoped to damage M. Aemilius Scaurus' candi­ dacy lor the consulship - Scaurus was competing with Claudius' brother for the' honour. 5 Roman prosecutors did not like to confine themselves strictly to the matters at issue. No rules of evidence protel'ted a defendant from the most ferocious personal attacks on all aspects of his public and private life. 6 Under modern American law, all evidence must meet standards of relevance in order tu be admissibleJ Moreover, evidenl'e concerning a defendant's charal'ter or his past crimes or unsavoury al'ts is ordinarily inadmissible to prove his propensity to commit the crime for which he is on trial, because even if the evidenl'e is relevant, it is thought to create too much undue preju­ dil'e toward the accused to be useful. 8 The trial judge retains the disl'retionary power to exclude any relevant evidenl'e whose pro­ bative value is similarly outweighed by the risk of prejudice, confusion or time-l'onsumption. 9 The Roman practil'e not only did not curtail use of such evidence categorically, it did not set standards 01' reliability that the evidence must meet in order to be introduced. The Roman defendant was therefore exposed to two risks: muckraking and fabrication. This lack of restraint helps to explain why prosecutor and defendant could so rarely avoid inimicitiae: it was a very rare Roman whose auctoritas l'ould survive unscathed the publil' ainng and slandering l'haracteristic of the law courts. The exceptions, defendants who did not conceive personal hostility for their prosecutors, were greatly admired, perhaps because they were so uncommon. Plutarch praised L. Licinius Murena for maintaining cordial relations with Cato even after Cato had prosecuted hirn, albeit unsuccessfully, for bribery.l0 Plutarch used the story tu illustrate Cato's unusual determination to maintain amicable relations with men who may have feit offended by his commitment to uphold justice, suggesting that M urena might not have been able to muster the same friendliness lor a different prosecutor. 11 Furthermore, had the prosecution

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PART 1: Litigation as a source of inimicitiae

Inimicitiae and the Courts

I nimicitiae and the Courts

resulted in a conviction, Murena might have found Cato's pro­ fessionalism less bearable. In general, however, a prosecutor would have to reckon with the inimicitiae of his victim as a matter of course, as many examples in the sources attest. Q. Fufius Calenus relied on this commonplace to counter the charge that he was Antony's friend. Any suggestion of intimacy between the two was disproved by Fufius' assertion that, despite his own benificia, Antony had taken legal action against him.J2 Cicero showed that animosity followed prosecution in a sUf'Cinct characterisation of Murena's prosecutors: 'habet eos accusatores, non qui odio inimicitiarum ad accusandum, secl qui studio accusandi ad inimicitias dcscenderint' (His accusers have not been driven to prosecute by their inimicitiae, but have been driven to inimicitiae by their passion for prosecuting).13 Cicero hirnself assurned that his prosecution of Ver res would cost hirn inimicitiae,14 ancl that his threat at the end of the Verrines to battle judicial corruption through prosecution would cast hirn many more: 'Do you intend to accept such an enormous task, to take up such great enmities with so many men?' he asked himselfrhetoric­ ally.15 Prosecution so inevitably produced inimicitiae that it coulet serve as a synonym for taking up enmity. Thus, when referring to P. Cornelius Dolabella's prosecution of Ap. Claudius, Cicero casually characterises it 'tuis inimicitiis suscipiendis' (when he took up inimicitiae with yoU).16 The deep embarrassment Cicero feit as a result of Dolabella's action shows how the Roman expectation of family cohesiveness necessarily involved a prosecutor' s relatives in inimicitiae with his victim. Dolabella had uncxpectedly becorne Cicero's son-in-law du ring the proceedings, and Cicero worried that the prosecution mighl disturb the dclicate re('(mciliation he was trying to maintain with Ap. Clalldius. 17 Even when a defendant's wrath was rendered toothless by conviction, the same family cohesiveness guaranteed that the su('(:t'SSfllI prosccutor could not cscape inimicitz'ae engen­ derecl by his suit, for thc convicted man's sons and friends were cluty-houncl to take revenge. Ciccro expected Verres' son to show his enmily eventually, although he professed nonchalance at the prospect. IB A sitnilar expectation is implicit in Cicero's clramatic request that young L. Sestius, son 01' his dient, read out the resolutiullS 01' the clecurions 01' Capua 'so that your boyish voice rnight al ready give SOlTle idea to your enernies what it will in all likclihoocl accolTlplish when it matures'. J9 Cicero leaves the iclentity 01' these illimiti ambiguous, but there can be little cloubt

that the prosecution was meant to take note. Apparently, the Romans found it unsurprising that the son of a convicted man would harbour inimicitiae not only for his father's prosecutor, but also 1'01' the prosecutor' s sons. Otherwise, C. Appuleius Decianus could scarcely have explained his inimicitiae with L. Valerius Flaccus as Cicero daimed he did: 'You attribute your inimicitiae to the prosecution your father brought as tribune against his father L. Flaccus, the curule aedile. '20 Cicero' s expectation that sons would retaliate judicially for their fathers' convictions is confirmed by Roman tradition. Such revenge was one 01' the very few honourable justifications for con­ ducting a prosecution. Numerous examples of sons indicting their fathers' prosecutors suggest how willingly the Romans accepted the obligation 2L The intensity of this duty's pressure on sons is illustrated by a story preserved in Asconius: Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos, the consul of 98, who had been prosecuted by C. Scribonius Curio, demanded on his deathbed that his identically named son, the future consul of 57, swear to accuse Curio. 22 The demands of such filial pietas were so widely appreciated that Valerius Maximus could rely on them to illustrate one 01' his moralistic exempla: L. Crassus, who had inaugurated his public career with a celebrated prosecution of C. Papirius Carbo, was so confident that his administration of Gaul would be faultless that he allowed the son of the accused Carbo to accompany hirn to his province, knowing full well that the young man hoped to build a case against hirn. 23 Cicero, although professing to admire sons who avenged their fathers in this way, was always ready when it suited his purpose to turn such tJietas against the accusers. He readily incited the jury to suspect that an accuser' s motivations were rooted in pietas rather than in a public-minded zeal for bringing criminals to justice. Hence the implieation that Albius Oppianicus' loyalty to his father induced hirn to bring suit against A. Cluentius Habitus: he was a man 'driven to prosecute by pietas' 24 Cicero resorted to the same strategy in the Pro Caelio when he implied quite cogently that L. Sernpronius Atratinus had ulterior motives for prosecuting Caclius, who had brought one unsuccessful suit against Atratinus' father and was preparing anotheL 25 Sons 01' convicted men resent­ ful 01' the family stigma occasionally sought a stronger outlet for their outrage than a retaliatory prosecution. Q. Lutatius Catulus exploited the Sullan proscriptions to engincer the exeeution 01' M. Marius Gratidianus. One souree suggests that Catulus was

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motivaled by his desire to avenge his father, who had been driven to suicide by Gratidianus' prosecution. 26 A prosccutor could also expect the enmity of his vietims' friends. An example ofthis lransference is Cicero's refusal to undertake the prosecution of A. Gabinius, a friend of Pompey. He feared that such a prosecution would irritate Pompey, with whom he could not afford a feud in 54: 'I'm restraining myself from prosecuting hirn [Gabiniusl, with difficulty, by Hercules; still I'm exercising restraint . . . because I don't want a fight wilh Pompey.'27 Cicero hirnself raged uncontrollably against T. M unatius Plancus for prosecuting Cicero's friend Sabinus. His fury was compounded because he had defended Munatius on an earlier occasion, and eonsidercd hirn ungrateful. 28 The eertainty that a proseeution would generate intense and widespread inimieiliae resulted in two distinetive phenomena at Rome. There was a great admiration of young men who under­ took justifiable proseeutions regardless of the risk of incurring enmity.29 Furthermore, the most powerful Romans, who had the most extensive resourees for damaging their inimiei, generally were not prosecuted. Any fruits gained from a prosecution were not worth the priel' 01' an undying feud with a man capable 01' exaeting the most harmful revenge. Brunt noted the relative infrequency 01' prosecutions against the prineipes 01' Cicero's era, and advanced it as an argument against Taylor's claim that Roman politics con­ sisted of 'unending prosecutions brought from political motives by [a man' s] political enemies'. 30 The exemption noted by Brunt is bettel' interpreted as the exception that proves Taylor' s general rule. I cannot, however, agree with the implications 01' Professor Taylor's sta.tement that politieal motives underlay most Roman prosecutions. A defendant's fury was usually not restrictcd to the prosecutor. Any hostile appearance in court might result in inimieiliae. Hostile testimony, 01' the appearance of giving hostile testimony, accounled for sorne of the most famous inimieiliae 01' the Republic. I have al ready diseussed in Chapter 2 the inimieiliae between M. Livius Salinator amI C. Claudius Nero during the Hannibalie War, which apparently originated in testimony given by Claudius Ieading to Livills' eonviction and exile in 218. Three decades la tel', as mentioned above, Cato's hostile testimony fatally compromised M' Aeilius Glabrio's chanees 1'01' beeoming eensor. Glabrio designed a eounterattack to make Cato unpopular and to destroy Cato's own hopes 01' attaining the same office. 3l Similarly, the )

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most dramatic feud of the late Republic, between Cicero and Clodius, began when Cicero destroyed Clodius' alibi at the Bona Dea trial and thereby very nearly secured his convietion. 32 lnimieiliae generated by hostile court appearances could even spread to a defendant's backers. Antony listed hostile testimony against one of his friends as a partial cause of his enmity with Cicero. 33 Like adverse witnesses, jury members became the targets 01' inimieiliae, for they were not considered merely the impersonal agents of Roman justice. Cicero notes this phenomenon in the Pro Cluenlio when he says that 'jurors ... consider the man they have condemned to be their inimicus'. 34 A letter to Atticus after the Bona Dea trial suggests with some rhetorical embellishment the danger jurors might face after reaching a guilty verdict: 'Twenty-five jurors were so courageous that in the face 01' extreme danger they preferred to risk their lives rather than destroy everything.' 35 The wave of inimieiliae generated by prosecutions often swept past prosecutors, defendants, and their families to touch defence lawyers. The pl'Ofessional ethos 01' Roman lawyers was not suffi­ eiently reserved to insulate the legal debate 1'1'0111 the effects 01' personal feelings. Cicero decried this tendency in the course of defending his representation of L. Licinius Murena against the attacks 01' Murena' s prosecutor SeI'. Sulpicius Rufus. Because Sulpicius was a friend of Cicero, he accused Cicero 01' violating the obligations of amieilia by defending Murena.:l6 Cicero had a more idealised vision of the proper relationship between legal opponents, insisting that it was entirely proper for a lawyer to defend even complete strangers whom his friends were prosecuting. 37 Brunt, who believes that amicable relations between opposing lawyers were the norm, places unwarranted emphasis on the friendly references Cicero occasionally rnakes to his opposition.:1 8 It was Brunt hi111self who demonstrated in the same artide that the Romans often used the term' amicus' to describe non-intimates, conveying the very same blandness that the term' friend' does in English. 39 Even if Cieero's tone was actually warm, it may havc been his way 01' winning his audience by fulfilling its expectations. The audience's receptivity to a corclial relationship betwecn lawyers wOllld have made such a taetie worthwhile. 40 Occasionally, thc meaninglessness 01' Cicero's prof(~ssions of friendship 1'01' his colleagues becomes transparent. He could hardly have had much frienclly feeling left for L. Manlius Torquatus, his 'familiaris et necessarius' (dose and intimate friend), whoJn he accusecl 01'

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violating their friendship du ring the course 01' Sulla' s trial. 41 Torquatus' reference to hirn as one 01' the three foreign tyrants 01' Rome must have additionally stung his ever-sensitive insecurity as a new manY Cicero labels L. Herrenius Balbus a 'friend' in Pro Caelio 25, but subsequently dismisses him as a liar.'13 It is doubtful whether Balbus and Cicero were ever intimate. Thc evidence reinforces Plutarch's claim H that bitter attacks on one'sjudicial opponents were the norm, and that, despite his occa­ sional cordiality, Cicero was often especially harsh and eamed a great deal 01' odium. Brunt admits that Cicero subjected Hortensius to a withering barrage in the Vl:Trines, resulting in lifelong uneasy relations between the two men, which might have degenerated evcn further without the good offices of Atticus, a close friend 01' them both. 45 Cicero' s own defence speeches indicate that opposing proseelllors orten trained their fire on hirn: 'Because the prosecu­ tors have attacked the zcal 01' my defence. ., and even the fact that I look thc case, ... I must begin by speaking a few words on my OWIl behalf. '46 Such stalemenls cannot be explained entirely by Cicero's hypersensitivity and sense 01' self-importance. Asconius reports lhat !\1ilo' s prosenltors did their best to provokc hatred against Cicero to help counter his tenacious and effective advocacy for his client. 47 Other sources confirm that Cicero's advocacy was a fertile source 01' enmity. The au thaI' 01' the Commentariolum Petitionis assumed that enemies acquired in the Jaw courts would oppose Ciccro's candidaey for the consulatc. 4A Dia, recagnising that public speaking might secure some friendship 1'01' the advocatc, neverthcless thuught that on the whole the speaker would gain more cnmities than fi'iendships because men were inhcrl'nlly disposed tu feel more resentment Ihan gratitude. Dio regarderl CiccrcJs experiencc as paradig1l1atic. 49 Neither Dia nor thc author of thc Comml'll/ariolurn Petitionis specifies who these cnemies were, but because Cicero preferred defending to prosccuting, il is sak tu assurne that they included prosecutors whom hc opposuJ as weil as the few defendants he prosccuted.

Inimidtiae and the Courts

Prosecutions werc pcrhaps the most significant single generator 01' private hostility in Rome. Inimieitz'ae had a profound influencc on thc Roman jurlicial system, however, not so much because they wen: a common product 01' prosc,cutions but because they so

frequently directly causedjudicial proceedings. The Roman courts provided the most convenient outlet 1'01' conducting private war­ fare. Roman judicial tradition gene rally encouraged this practice by considering inimieitiae a socially acceptable basis 1'01' prasecu­ tion. Indeed, as indicated above, sons who used the courts to retaliate against their fathers' prosecutors were tolerated and even admired. It was not only reverence 1'01' filial piety, however, that engen­ dcred this acceptance 01' inimiei as prosecutors. The Romans thought they could exploit enmity as an engine to secure zealous prosecution. Justice was most Iikely to prevail, according to this notion, when a prosecutor pursued his quarry with the single­ mindedness imparted by inimieitiae. Inimieitiae's role as the hound of truth is most clearly visible in Cicero's speech at the inquiry where he competed with Q. Caecilius Niger 1'01' the right to prosecute Verres. Caecilius professed to be an inimiws 01' Verres and openly argued that the feud qualified hirn to undertake the prosecution. 50 Cicero admitted that this was a legitimate recom­ mendation. 51 He was therefore at some pains during the speech to prove that the inimieitiae between Verres and Caecilius were a fabrication. 52 Cicero reversed hirnself 011 the existence 01' the quarrel when he wished to emphasise the honour 01' defeating Caecilius in competition for thc right to prosecute. Caecilius' request to prosecute was dcnied 'even though he had been injured by Verres, and was pursuing legitimate inimieitiae'. 53 This reversal reaffirms the Roman identification 01' interestedness with effective­ ness while highlighting the cluplieitous side 01' Cicero' s character. Although inimieitiae were thought to enhance a prosecutor' s effectiveness, they were not intended as a licence to fabricate evidence. A jury was somewhat na'ively expected to distinguish thoroughness from distortion. Inimiei/iae guaranteed the searing inquiry necessary to determine the truth; the jury was the institu­ tional safeguard against obvious bias, guaranteeing as weil as it could that the prosecutor's zeal stayed on a truth-finding course. The eager prosecutor on whom the system prided itself therefore curiously bore the seeds 01' his own destruction, 1'01' the very interestedness that made hirn effective could be used to undermine his credibility. Skilful defence lawyers could soften the impact 01' adverse evidencc by convincing the jury that its existence 01' intro­ ductiol1 was thc produet 01' the prosecutor' s inimieitiae. Hence Hortcnsius, making his best effort to defend Verres, tried to provoke the jury's distrust by implying that Cicero was motivated

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Inimieitiae and the Courts

Inimieitiae and the Courts

by a private grievance. 54 The fact that the existence of inimieitiae could cut two ways is particularly striking in light of Cicero's assertion that the same individuals occasionally served both at the inquiry to select the prosecutor (divinatio) and as jurors at the sub­ sequent trial. 55 In that case inimidtiae could be used both to recom­ mend and to deprecate the same man to the same audience. The ambiguous Roman view of the role of inimieitiae in the judicial system forced orators to pitch their appeal at whichever attitude their case required. This ambivalent Roman attitude explains why prosecutors who advertised their inirnieitiae as enhancing their ability to prosecute were ncvertheless obliged to swcar that they were undertaking the prosecution in good faith. 56 Furthermore, both prosecutor and defence counsel tried to appeal' objective lest they inadvertently damage their cases by allowing passion to distort the truth, or appeal' to. In his denunciation of Clodius, however, Cicero turned this need for caution on its head to gain a tacticaJ advantage. Because every Roman must have been acquainted with the feud between Cicero and Clodius du ring the 50s, Cicero feared that anything he might say about his opponent would be vitiated by the suspicion that it was coloured by bitterness. 57 He assuaged this suspicion and even reversed its force by rnaintaining, throughout his fierce attack on Clodia in thc Pro Caelio, that he was really exercising restraint for fear 01" straining the patience 01" the jury, who expected him to cmbellish the truth as a result of his notorious I"eud. This taetic left unspoken the inference that Clodia deserved far worse, and would have got it 'nisi inccderent mihi [Ciceroni] inirnicitiae cum istius mulieris viro - fraU-ern volui dicere' (if I were not restraint'd by my inimieitiae with that wornan's husband - I meant brother).58 Witnesses in Rorne also were open to attack on the basis 01' their inimieitiar. Thc juries keenly sensed the temptations the witness stand presented to inimiei, and ideally were on constant guard against its misuse 59 The deduction that inaccuracy followed hosti­ lity was so strong that it could be overcome only by an appeal to an even stronger sentiment, such as national pride. The Romans prided themselves on their integrity as a people, especially in com­ parison to the treacherous Greeb. It was this sensibility that enabled Cicero to undermine the testimony 01' Greek witnesses by intirnating that Greeks were inherently opportunistic, contrasting thern to three hostile Roman witnesses, all with private grievances against Flaccus, who restrained their hostility anel gave

unirnpeachable testimony. 60 When not seen in the strong light 01" distrust of the Greeks, however, even Roman witnesses with grudges were unconvincing. Cicero cites several juries that rejected the testimony of the most eminent witnesses in the belief that it was tainted by inimieitiae:

Valerius Maximus repeats Cicero's examples and adds a few ofhis own. 62 An interesting detail in his account of Q. Pornpeius' trial contradicts Cicero' s version: the jury believed the compelling evidence of the Servilii and the Metelli against Pornpeius but voted acquittal nevertheless for fear of creating the impression that the mighty could destroy their inimiei in the courts. 63 Suspicion of hostile witnesses was so strang at Rome that Valerius Maximus could believe that a jury's fear of appearing receptive to hostile evidence exceeded its desire to discover the truth. A corollary to the Roman jury's sensitivity to testirnony from hostile witnesses reinforces the proof that inimieitiae entered the jurors' consciousness. Special weight was given to favourable statements by men who were known inimiei 01' were even thought to have grounds for inimieitiae. Asconius considered the friendly testimony of P. Servilius Globulus an important contribution to the acquittal of C. Cornelius on acharge of treason in 65. 64 As tribune in 67, Cornelius had ignored his fellow tribune Globulus' veto,65 setting the stage for inimieitiae. By failing to fulfil the expectation of hostility, Globulus lent his testimony special credence. 66 An anecdote about the Scipio trials further suggests how much help a defendant might derive from the favourable testimony of an inimieus. Livy claims that laudatory statements made by Ti. Grau"hus about his inimicus Scipio Africanus helped to establish Scipio's 'magnitudo animi' (greatness of soul).67 The value of such evidence did not go unnoticed by M. Cato, who played a prominent role behind the scenes in bringing the Scipios to trial. 68 He reportedly tried to turn his own enmity with Ti. Gracchus to similar advantage by insisting that Gracchus prcside at one 01" his trials, hoping to impress the jury both by his

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The wisest of juries did not believe the testirnony 01' Cn. and Caepio and ofL. and Q. Metellus against Q. Pompeius, a new man. A suspicion of passion and of inimieitiae destroyed their reliability as witnesses, and shook the juries' confidence in the irnpartiality promised by their honour, lineage and accomplishrrients. 61

Q.

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Inimieitiae and the Courts

confidence in putting himself into the hands 01' an inimieus and by his discernment in choosing a man 01' such integrity.69 The Romans also tried to ensure that individual jurors would not allow their own inimieitiae to influence their verdicts. As in an American court, Roman judicial procedure allowed a defendant to challenge potential jurors, and the right naturally was used to eliminate inimiei. 70 The Verrines provide an example 01' how Verres took advantage 01' this right in his effort to sec ure acquittal. While governor 01' Sicily, he had directed his tithe collectors to remove the entire harvest 01' a farm inherited by the wife 01' the consul C. Cassius Longinus. Cassius was understandably offended, and Verres saw to it that he would have no opportunity to express his hostility as a juror. Cicero, who believed that he had as much to gain as Verres had to lose from Cassius' inimieitiae, assured Verres that Cassius had not been neutralised: if Cassius could not servc as a juror, Verres would still see and hear hirn in the witness box'?! Cicero apparently could not resist this bon mot even though he must have realised that he was compromising the value ofCassius' testi­ mony by revealing Verres' mistreatment and thereby suggesting that Cassius might have cause to embroider the truth. Defendants certainly were right to fear jurors prejudiced by the passions 01' inimieitiae. Dio, who had no motive to distort, reports that P. Cornelius Spinther voted to condemn Clodius for adultery at the Bona Dea trial 'because 01' private hatred' . 72

The ambivalent Roman attitude toward inimiei who resorted to prosecutions, combined with the devastating effect a prosecution might have on one's victim, suggests that prosecutions originating in inimieitiae ought to have been quite common in Rome. 73 Scholars routinely acknowledge the importance 01' inimieitiae in some prosecutions, but in general have preferred to seck a political explanation for trials even when this necessitates considerable con­ jecture. This tendency is most evident in the work 01' Erich Gruen, the most knowledgeable contemporary scholar on republican trials. Gruen states at the outset 01' his work on the criminal courts that inimieitiae were a potent source 01' trials. 74 He is generally more inclined, however, to interpret a trial as the work 01' a faction attempting to dominate Roman politics by neutralising opposing politicians. This technique is implicit in the title 01' his first book,

Roman Polities and the Criminal Courts. Gruen freely admits that the lineaments 01' his political groupings and the judicial activity allegedly carried out on their behalf are highly speculative, and reviewers have agreed. 75 The chapters on the courts during the Ciceronian era in The Last Generation oJ the Roman Republie show a similar emphasis on factional politics as the engine 01' Roman pro­ secution, although that work's perspective is broader and fre­ quently advances other motives. 76 As a result, the composite picture 01' Roman trials that emerges from Gruen's works seems to me distorted, even though Gruen almost always sets out the evidence meticulously. He generally prefers a factional explana­ tion to a personal one wheneyer, as in the vast majority 01' cases, the sources are yague about the prosecutor's motives. When the sources suggest that a trial had predominantly personal causes, Gruen frequently fills in a speculative political background. Thc reader is left with the impression that factional strife playcd a far larger role in the history 01' the Roman courts than the sources warrant. It is time to redress this imbalance by focusing on the role 01' inimieitioe in the Roman judicial system. This survey is meant to supplement, not to supplant, Gruen's work. He has amply demon­ strated that factional politics olten did play a kcy role in the Romanjudicial system. Avarice and ambition among Roman pro­ secutors accounted for other trials as mentioned in the first part 01' this chapter. And 01' course trials occasionally originated in a variety 01' motives leaving evidence that is too vague to assess the importance 01' any single cause. 77 Certainly, inimieitiae often played a contributory rather than the principal role in a prosecution. Many Romans who were unwilling or unable to act as prosecutors, or to induce others to undertake prosecutions, would have joyfully helped in any way they could to convict an inim/:eus. My investiga­ tion will focus on trials where inimidtiae see m to have been the primary moving force, but other motives for prosecution should not be lost sight 01'. The ancient sourees, whose evidence about the attitudes 01' their contemporaries or near-contemporaries is our most reliable sign­ post, often attributed particular prosecutions to raw inimieitiae without the slightest hint that any broader political considerations were involved. This should act as a check on modern readiness to embroider a factional context from the prosopographical records. The historian' s microscope ('an not help but complicate our under­ standing 01' any historical eyent: indeed, part 01' the historian's

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PART 2: The limits of current scholarship

Inimieiliae and Ihe Courls

Inimieiliae and Ihe Courls

mISSion is to add a unifying focus to aseries of apparently unrelated facts or to demonstrate the broader significance of seem­ ingly trivial events. His zeal to find complexity is fuelled by a widespread prejudice that any simple historical explanation is either simplistic or indicative of the insignificance of the issue. Complexity is not always a virtue, however; if untrue, it can obfuscate as readily and completely as oversimplification. Ancient history , dependent as it is on extrapolation from a limited but well­ combed body of facts, is especially prone to overinterpretation.

Catulus and C. Calpurnius Piso placed enormaus pressure on Cicero to bring a false charge against Caesar during the Catilinarian conspiracy: 'Both were in the midst ofbitter inimieiliae wi th Caesar.' 82 The reasons for their hatred are clear: Piso was angry because Caesar had prosecuted hirn for killing a Transpa­ dane Gaul; Catulus was still smarting from the humiliation of losing the recent election for ponlifex maximus to Caesar. 83 M. Caelius Rufus, reporting to Cicero about his feud with Ap. Claudius Pulcher in 50, also shows an appreciation of the power of inimieiliae to bring about prosecutions, and furnishes same interest­ ing details concerning the occasional difficulty of finding a suitable charge on wh ich to impale inimiei - further demonstrating that the identity of the defendant was sometimes more critical than the criminal charge. Inimieiliae between Caelius and Claudius intensi­ fied dramatically when Caelius appealed for protection to L. Calpurnius Pisa, Claudius' colleague in the censorship. Clalldius responded by joining Caelius' enemy L. Domitius Ahenobarbus in prosecuting their common foe. Claudius and Domitius had some difficulty finding acharge, and finally settled on an alleged violation of the lex Seanlinia, wh ich prohibited pederasty. Caelius answered with some charge-fabrication of his own. He accused Claudius of violating the same law, creating a major embarrass­ rnent for the censor. 84

The sufficiency of inimicitiae as a motive in prosecutions In several examples already mentioned, Romans themselves blamed trials on inimieiliae. In each, a defence attorney attempted to save his dient by c1aiming that the prosecutor was acting out of inimieiliae. Such a protest could have succeeded only if Roman juries found it plausible that inimidliae were sufficient to mobilise the machinery of the Roman judicial system. Other passages sug­ gest the Romans believed that inimiei were constantly scouting for charges to file against their personal enemies. In one, Cicero urged the genuineness of acharge that Verres had joined a tithe­ farming partnership by insisting it was' not concocted by inimici at Rome, but exported to Rome from the provinces'. 78 The unspoken assumption in this argument is that inimiei might con­ coct charges. Cicero's conviction that inimieiliae were an entirely sufficient cause of prosecutions is implicit in other public and private utterances as weIl. It animates his praise of Cato, who accused L. Licinius Murena, even though 'induced by no inimiti­ liae and wounded by no injury' .79 The power of inimieiliae is equally acknowledged in a letter to Atticus in which Cicero explained how Hortcnsius had blundered in his management of the Bana Dea trial. In his intense zeal to convict Clodius, Hortensius 'had hastened [0 take the case to judgement because he was carried away by his haU'ed' BO In another work Cicero praised Milo far prosecuting Clodius out of devotion to the public good with no ulterior motive, such as private animosity.81 Although the remark is absurd, it underscores how common private motivations for pmsecutions were. OthlT sources confirm that the Romans believed that prose­ cutors or those responsible for prosccutions needed no incentive other than inimieilial'. Sallust IIad no doubt why Q. Lutatius

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Aside from the contemporary evidence, there is also the test i­ mony oflater sources that inimieiliae could be the major impetus of a trial during the Republic. Livy implies that a personal grudge indllced M. Caecilius Metellus, tribune in 213, to prosecute the censors P. Furius and M. Atilius. These two censors earned Caecilius' hatred by depriving him ofhis state horse, removing him from his tribe, and disenfranchising him, because he had conspired to abandon Italy after the catastrophe at Cannae. 85 Diodorus showed his appreciation of the power of inimieiliae within the Roman judicial system in his account of the Pleminius episode. He assigns the decision of the military tribunes to take up the cause of the Locrians and threaten to indict Pleminius, to fury at Pleminius' unwillingness tu share the Locrian spoil, not to shock at his conduct or self1ess concern for the Locrians. 86 The two tribunes were unable to carry out the prosecution because they were execllted first. 87 Similar causes of trials are related in the narratives of other historians. Valerius Maximus asserts that L. Cornelius Balbus prosecuted his illimieus L. Valerius for personal reasons. 88 Aulus Gellius strongly implies that revenge underlay the prosecutiol1 ur

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Scipio Aemilianus by Ti. Claudius Asellus, tribune in 140; Scipio had deprived Asellus 01' his state horse. 89 Gruen admits that per­ sonal considerations were paramount in the case, but also attri­ butes apart 01' his motivation, on the basis 01' extremely speculative evidence, to a Claudian faction's struggle to achieve supremacy by eliminating potential competitors. 90 Asconius' explanation ofCn. Domitius' prosecution 01' M. Aemilius Scaurus after Scaurus had not co-opted him into a priesthood reveals the same assumption about the power 01' inimicitiae to spark litigationYl Once again, Gruen admits that Domitius' prosecution 01' Scaurus grew out 01' a 'personal grievance'. He qualifies this admission, however, by surmising that 'personal vendetta and popular enthusiasm ... need not be the only elements, involved in the affair' .92 Gruen fleshes out this conjecture by noting that Scaurus was princeps senatus and a promineut leader ofthe Metellan faction and that, on the basis 01' extremely tenuous indieations, Domitius may have had connections with some anti-Metellan groups, and concludes that the trial 01' Scaurus may have represented a test 01' strength between the Metelli and their opponents. 93 No source directly supports Gruen' s view, and a sufficient cause 01' the prosecution is on recOl'd. Onee again Gruen seems guilty 01' allowing his histori­ cal imagination to distort rather than to explain. Unsupported hypothesis must never overwhelm reasonable explanations 1'01' which there is contemporary support.

The sources state unequivocally that prosecutor and defendant, 01' their backers, were inimici in only a small number 01' the trials on record. One such case concerns the Scipio trials. Many sources testify to the enmity between the Scipios and Cato the Censor, although specifics 01' the feud are meagre. But even allowing 1'01' some exaggeration in the evidence, there is evcry reason to believe that antithetical pcrsonalities and the ciimate 01' jealousy arising out 01' the Scipios' unique prestige within the Roman government would have embittered their relations with Cat0 94 In addition, Cato as a new man who enjoyed a brilliant career doubtless pro­ voked rescntment in a family as noble as the Scipios. Cato's inimicitiae apparently found an outlet in thc judicial proceedings known as the Scipio trials. Several sources imply that he instigated the Petillii in their attaek against the Scipios,'J5 Livy's account,

derived from Valerius Antias, adds that Cato aided the Petillii more overtly by speaking in favour 01' a special criminal inquiry to investigate Lucius Scipio's conduct, and by dissuading two trihunes from vetoing the measure. 96 Antias' account 01' Lucius' trial is almost certainly false, but Livy claims that Cato's speech, 'de pecunia regis Antiochi', was still extant in his day. It was probably transferred from some other context by Livy, and consti­ tutes further evidence 1'01' Cato's support 01' the judicial measures taken against his inimici the Scipios. 97 The private motives 01' P. Rutilius, the prosecutor 01' the two censors 01' 169, C. Claudius PlIlcher and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, are also weil attested. His animosity induced hirn tojoin the equestrian struggle against the censorship that year. Claudius was narrowly acqllittcd, and Rutilius did not pursue his case against Gracchus. 98 In another case discussed above, foul' distin­ guished consulars, animated according to Cicero and Valerius Maximus by private animosity, collaborated in the prosecution 01' Q. Pompeius in the early 130s. 99 One ofthe prosecution witnesses, Q. Metellus Macedonicus, was believed to have been so hostile to Pompeills that he sabotaged the Roman war effort in Spain when he learned that Pompeius had been appointed to succeed hirn .100 In an effort to explain the hostility 01' the consulars at Pompeius' trial, modern scholars have speculated about Pompeius' factional ties, especially his connection with Scipio Aemilianus. 101 It is true that, as a new man and a protege 01' Scipio, Pompeius owed Scipio a great deal. And yet it is very unlikely ti'dt any bond remained between the two after 142, when Pompeius duplicitously can­ vassed 1'01' the consulship after promising his support to Scipio's alter ego, Laelius. 102 It is therefore unlikely that the Metelli and the Caepiones chose to prosecllte Pompeius as an indirect means 01' attacking Scipio Aemilianus; rather, Scipio must have rejoiced in the prosecution 01' a man he could only have considered an ingrate. Similarly, there is no warrant 1'01' believing that the Servilii Caepiones were co-operating in the prosecution 01' Pompeius because 01' loyalty to the Metellans, as implied by Grllen. 103 The language 01' the sources suggests instead that they had their own reasons for disliking him. 104 The trial 01' Pompeius is therefore best seen as the response 01' a group 01' nobles to a new man who thrcatened their monopoly on the highest curule honours. Cicero spoke with personal knowledge 01' the inimicitiae every new man faccd when in summarising Pompeius' career he said: 'Didn't Q. Pompeius, a man 01' obscure and humble birth, secure the highest

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honours after making many enemies amI enduring great dangers and hardships?' lOS The sources also suggest that inimiei faced each other as prose­ cutor and defendant in the trial 01' Q. Minucius Scaevola in 119. The prosecutor, T. Albucius, had spent his youth in Athens and later pompously cultivated his Hellenophilism. 106 Scaevola arouseel his ire when, passing through Athens on his way to Asia to serve as praetor, he anel his entire retinue scorned Albucius' pretensions by sarcastically aeldressing him in Greek. Lucilius Scaevola attributed his inimiLiliae with Albucius to this very incident. 107 Any factional interpretation 01' the prosecution 01' Scaevola is entirely speculative. The pOOl' fragments 01' the senmd book 01' Lucilius' satires and two other passing references are the only surviving record 01' the trial. 108 Gruen admits that it is impos­ sible to place Scaevola in any faction in 119. 109 Even if his affilia­ tion at the time 01' his trial could be ascertained with certainty, it would remain to be proved that an opposing faction plotted the trial and enlisted Albucius as prosecutor. What we 00 know about the hostile rdatiollship between Albucius and Scaevola lllakes inirnieilial' a more attractive explanation 01' the trial's causation. Indeed. wh at little cvidence we have 01' the trial itself supports this vicw. The fragments 01' Lucilius, almost all intended to represent speeches delivered by Albueius and Scaevola, 1\() have an unusually nasty tone, even allowing 1'01' the customary ferocity exhibited in speeches at Roman trials. Albucius freely added accusations 01' assault, possibly murder, sexual misconeluet, and even gluttony to the basic charge 01' extortion .111 Such sensationalism betrays the emotional pitch iniml:citiae frequently createel. M. Junius Brutus' prosecution 01' M. Aemilius Scaurus, pro­ bably in 114,112 is another example 01' a trial in which we know inimici faced each other. Gruen, although he acknowledges the inimiLitiae between Brutus and Scaurus, surmises that the trial may have had political overtones because one 01' Brutus' relatives, D. Junius Callaicus, had been allied with a coalition 01' extreme anti­ Gracchans, as shown by his support 01' L. Opimius in 121. The trial might be interpretcd, Gruen concludes, as a reflcction 01' further hostility bctween the anti-Gracchan extremists 01' 121 and the Metellan faction as enlboclied by M. Aemilius Scaurus. 113 The search für a factional background 1'01' the trial must not over­ shadow the personal gruclge Brutus harboureel against Scaurus. Cicero reports that the two wcre inimiei, a fact reinforccd hy thc notoriety of the trial 1'01' the ferocity 01' its false charges. 114 It may

be unwise to read tao much into Brutus' motivations, because his hahit 01' indiscriminate prosecution, wh ich brought much discredit on his family, 115 makes it likely that he requireel little incentive to undertake any prosecution. However, if one is to emphasise any theory for the prosecution 01' Scaurus at all, it is bettel' to emphasise the one for which there is direct support. M. Aemilius Scaurus himself used the criminal courts on several occasions to pursue his private feuds. I have already no ted pas­ sages in Cicero and Valcrius Maximus indicating that his test i­ mony at the trials 01' C. Memmius and C. Flavius Fimbria was ignored by juries because it was considered tainted by inimieitiae. 116 Little evidencc exists for either trial. Even their dates are quite uncertain, although the very end 01' the second century is most Iikely.1I7 Gnce again, Gruen acknowledges the role 01' inimieitiae, and then grafts a factional interpretation onto the niggardly evidence: no source supports his conjecture that Scaurus appeared in court as the avenger 01' the Metellan faction on both occasions. 118 Same additional information, however, emphasises the motive attributed to Scaurus by Cicero and Valerius Maximus, by suggesting what might have sparked Scaurus' enmity against Memmius. During his tribunate in 111, C. Memmius brought Jugurtha to Rome under safe conduct, in tending to use the king' s evidence to accuse Scaurus 01' bribery.119 Two years later Memmius and Scaurus took opposite sieles when L. Calpurnius Bestia appeared before the Mamilian commission which investigated irregularities in Roman relations withJugurtha, and in fact Cicero preserves ajibe Scaurus made at Memmius' expense during that inquiry .120 As in the examples dis­ cussed above, a factional interpretation, resting on tenuous and circumstantial evidence, must not crowd out inimieitiae, the motive underlined by the sources 1'01' Scaurus' behaviour, especially when independent testimony reinforces the existence 01' ill1:mieitiae. Cicero and Valerius Maximus both indicate that inimieitiae played a very significant role at the trial 01' M. Claudius Marcellus in the 90s.1 21 Here Gruen accepts that L. Licinius Crassus' testi­ mony was prompted by private animosity, and even attacks the highly speculative factional interpretation advanced by Ernst Badian. 122 Cicero also explicitly attributes the prosecution by M. Aemilius Scaurus (son ofthe consul 01' 115) ofCn. Cornelius Dola­ bella in the early 70s to inimieitial'.123 Dolabella, the last enemy Scaurus had inherited from his father, had assisted Q. Servilius Caepio in proseclIting the eider Scaurus. Gruen, acknowlcclging

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the feud between Scaurus and Dolabella, weaves a political context for the trial based on speculation that Dolabella may have been linked to the Marians. 124 This interpretation cannot be ruled out. But the testimony we have for the trial emphasises Scaurus' pielas in avenging his father and not any political motives he may have had. At about the same time, C. Rabirius was prosecuted alld acquitted for religious violations. Cicero characterises his accuser, C. Licinius Macer, as an inimicus. 125 Although the evielence in the examples discusseel thus far is meagre, inimieiliar have been recoreleel in the sources and must be consielereel the most likely generator 01' each trial. Fuller evielence allows more complex analysis in other cases. Occasionally the sources suggest that a criminal trial serveel as a magnet for a man's inimici. J ust as temporary factions 01' inimici were createclto battle a Roman' s political pretensions, so inimiei, motivateel by nothing more than mutual hat red 01' their victim, co-operated in bringing suit against their cOlllmon enemy. The Bona Dca trial of Clodius is an excellent example. For all 01' its notoriety, Cloelius' offenee need not have been blown up into the juelicial rause diebre that it became. It might easily have been quietly hanelled by the religious authori­ ties, ami quickly forgotten. 126 But Cloelius' inimiei coulel not resist a splendid opportunity to cmbarrass ancl humiliate hirn. Several sources note that the Corndii Lentuli were elriven to attack Cloelius hy personal gruelges. L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus was the rnain aecusalor, backed up by two 01' his relatives, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Cornelius Lentulus Niger. 127 Valerius Maximus teils us that a Lentulus, presumably the principal aeeu.mlor, 'hostili voce peroraverat' (argueel in a hostile (one), suggesting astronger motive than outrage at Cloelius' religious offencc. 12B Moreover, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, a juror at the trial, voteel, aecording to Dio, to eondemn Clodius because 01' a private gruelge .129 The combineel evidence about the Lentuli suggests that their rcasons for using the courts against Clodius were personal, cven if we cannot know why they feIt so bitter. The sources suggest that other distinguished Romans also may have been motivatcc! by inimidlicU' to participate in the prosecution 01' Cloelius. L. Licinius Lucullus, an important character witness against Cloelius, had becn married to Cloelius' sister, anel was theref()rc in a position to proelUCT slaves who tcstifieel that she ancl Cloelius had committed incl'st. l :jO His reason for co-operating can oe traccd to his inlmielliae with Clodius who, in a fit of pique at 108

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what he consielered ill-treatment at the hands 01' his brother-in-Iaw, undermined Lucullus' army in the east, as discussed in Chapter 3. Hortensius also appears to have collaborated with the prosecution because of sOllle personal grudge against Clodius. t:ll Personal animosity mayaIso have played a role in drawing Cicero into the Buna Dca trial. It was not, however, animosity between Cicero and Clodius thal incluced Cicero to give his hostile testimony, inaugu­ rating the bitter feud between thc two men that continued until Cloclius' sudden death. Cicero's wife Terentia had hated Clodius sinci? 73 when Clodius accused Catiline of seducing her half-sister, the Vestal Virgin Fabia. She used her considerable influence with Cicero to persuade hirn to destroy Clodius' alibi at the Bona Dca trial, and avenge the insult her entire family had suffered because 01' Clodius' earlier accusation. 1:l 2 lnimiei 01' Caesar mayaIso have played their role at the Bona Dea trial. Clodius' sacrilege must have been a terrible embarrassment for hirn as the new and highly controversial ponlifex maximus. His inimiei woulel have questioned his fitness to serve in the office, and must have enjoyed the shadow the nolorious events cast on his wife. Their interest was to inflate the scandal with the hope 01' inereasing Caesar's loss 01' face. Inimieiliae with Caesar may there­ lore explain why C. Calpurnius Piso and Q. Lutatius Catulus co­ operated in prosecuting Clodil1s. 1:l:J Both men had already c1emon­ slrateel their inimieiliae in 63 when they tried to persuade Cicero to bring false charges against Caesar in connection with the Catilina­ rian conspiracy 134 The BOl1a Dca trial shows not only how inimiei could unite in undertaking a prosecution, but also how a trial might serve the purpose 01' very disparate inimieiliae. N umerous inimiei whose motives varied widely might exploit the same trial to pursue their own feuds. The trial of L. Valerius Flaccus in 59 provides another example 01' inimici co-operating to convict a common foe. Scholars have generally interpreted the li"ial as part 01' the struggle between the triumvirs and their opponents, and it would be lla'ive to deny all political implications to a trial in 59, in which Pompey, the most prominent triumvir, took such a conspicuous interest. J:J5 But this shoulcl not minimise the erucial roll' played by inimieiliar. Cicero says that the principal prosecutor, D. Laelius, undertook the trial at the request of his elose assoc'iatc Pompey, who hatecl Flaccus. 1:J6 Unforlunately, we cannot know why Pompey anel Flaccus were such biller enemies; it is nol at all elear that PompC'y' s role as a triumvir was rcsponsible frl!" this falling out. Nor do thc sourccs 109

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providc any evidence that the other two triumvirs shared the hatred Pompey feIt 1'01' Flaccus. There is therefore no reason to believe that the trial belonged to the triumviral agenda. In fact, D. Laelius, thc man who actually undertook the prosecution, may have been only too happy to oblige Pornpey because the trial satis­ fied his own indinations. Cicero re/crs to him as abittel' enemy 01' the defendant;137 again we cannot know what lay behind his enmity. Scholars who view the trial as the work 01' the triumvirs' political circlc cmphasisc thc roll' 01' L. Cornelius Balbus, the Spanish financier who collaborated with Pompey and Caesar. 13B It is true that he co-sponsared (as a subseriptor) the prosecution of Flaccus,IJ9 butthere is no evidencc that he did so as an agent ofthe triumvirs. Indeed, a passage in Valerius Maximus suggests that Balbus was an inimieus of Flaccus in his own right, and even before the trial in 59 had attempted to use the courts to destroy his cnemy.1,H)

Creticus, gave testimony favourable to Flaccus. 14B As discussed in Chapter 4, Metellus certainly had a violent personal feud with Pompey, who had been so reluctant to share any of the gloria he had garne red du ring his campaign against the pirates. We do not know, however, whether Metellus' bitterness extended to the entire triumvirate. Hence, his appearance for Flaccus may have resulted simply from adesire to exploit every opportunity to oppose Pompey. It is also worth noting that Flaccus had served under both Servilius and Metellus. 149 The enduring bond that united a Roman and his subordinates may explain why both men were willing to testify favourably, A comparable motive may account far the support of Cn. Domitius Calvinus, the bitter anti­ triumviral tribune of 59. He had served as legate under Flaccus in Asia. 150

Both Gruen and Münzer buttress their factional interpretation of Flaccus' trial by stressing that two staunch opponents 01' the triumvirs, P. Servilius Isauricus and Q. Caecilius Metellus

Because the sources provide no firm evidence of any political motivation for the trial of Flaccus, and an abundance of testimony that Flaccus' inimiei were a powerful force at the trial, it seems most probable that the trial originated in inimieitiae, rather than in the desire of the triumviral forces to punish their political opposi­ tion. Although the opponents ofthe triumvirate and the supporters of Flaccus coincided to some extent, it is misleading to stress the role 01' political animosity toward the triumvirs in bringing Flaccus to trial, at the expense of the inimieitiae that figure so prominently in the sources. A further detail of Flaccus' career, however, pro­ vides the most telling evidence that his prosecution was not politi­ cally inspired. In 57, Flaccus served as legate to L, Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, the proconsul in Macedonia. 151 Yet Calpurnius was a strong aclherent 01' the triumvirs. He had close ties with Caesar, who marriecl his daughter while consul and helped hirn secure the consulate with Gabinius in 58. 152 Calpurnius conducted his consulate in the interests 01' the triumvirs, notably by support­ ing Clodius' efforts to exile Cicero. 153 If Flaccus' trial in 59 really had been caused by triumviral politic:king, it would be odd to find either that Flaccus would assoc'iate with Calpurnius or that Calpurnius would eleet to be accompanied to his province by a legate with such good c:ause to be opposed to the triurnvirs. 154 The trial 01' T. Munatius Bursa in 52 01' 51 15 :, is another example 01' a prosecution which the sources attribute to inimieitiae, For Gruen, who acknowledges the roll' of private animosity in motivating the prosecutiol1, the trial belongs to an offensive against Pompey by those men bent Oll his destructiol1. 1',(j It is true that Munatius favoured Pompey's interests during iJi, tribunate in

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We know the names 01' several other hostile witnesses whose politics are unknown, but whosc reasons 1'01' co-operating in the prosecution of Flaccus are deal' enough. In each case, it was not because they were cornmitted to the triumvirs, but because they dctested Flaccus. M. Lucro frecly admitted that he was furious with Flaccus for his involvement in the conviction of one 01' his freed­ men,141 P. Septimius also had a personal grudge because Flaccus had exposed his ClVerseer as a rnurdercr. 142 M. Caelius' inimieitiae with Flaccus originated when he was removed from the lists of assessors, 143 C. Appuleius Decianus professed to have a family feud with Flaccus: because his father had brought Flaccus' father to trial, Decianus bclieved that Flaccus nursed a grudge against him .144 vVhether 01' not Flaccus felt such a grudge, it is deal' that as governor he had opposed Decianus' interests. 145 Decianus' appearance against Flaccus is therefore best interpreted as revenge for those actions. Not a shrecl 01' cvidcnce suggests that he was assoeiated with the triumvirs 01' acted on their behalf at the trial. The motives of two other supporters 01' the prosecution are less clear, but thcre is no warrant for believing they were motivated by loyalty to the triumvirs, Falcidius claimed that he had been forced to bribe Flaccus for the right to collect revenue from Tralles. 146 His appearance at Flaccus' trial may have been tied to his resentment over that expense. The motives 01' Caetra are entirely unknown. 147

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52, and that Pompey made adesperate effort to protect Munatius from condemnation during the trial, although the very intensity of his support backfired when the jurors voted to condemn so as not to appeal' to be Pompey' s slaves. 157 It is also true that Pompey' s opponents, especially Cato, supported the prosecution of Munatius and worked hard to secure his conviction. 158 But the evidence is undear on what we would most need to know to be sure that the prosecution was politically inspired: did Pompey's opponents mark out Munatius for prosecution because they con­ sidered this the most promising means of striking hard at Pompey, and then approach a prosecutor to carry out the mission for thern? The evidence suggests that other forces generated the trial. I have already described how Munatius, although indebted to Cicero for some unknown service, prosecuted Cicero's friend Sabinus, thereby surpassing even Clodius as Cicero's bitterest enemy. The intensity of Cicero' s feelings combined with his ecstatic reaction to Munatius' conviction suggest that his chief source 01' delight in the trial was his personal hatred of the man, not Munatius' elose affiliatior,s with Pompey. His personal motivations did not prevent Cicero from rejoicing, as always, that his actions met with the approval of the optimates. 159 Although litigation subsided during Caesar's dictatorship, 160 it remained a tempting outlet for inimici. A dispute about the African command at the beginning of the civil war in 49 led to a quarrel between Q. Ligarius and L. Aelius Tubero. Ligarius, along with P. Attius Varus, rdused to turn the province over to Tubero, who had been appointed by the Senate. Political loyalties did not provoke the argument between Ligarius and Tubero, because both were Pompeians at the time. Ligarius incurred the lasting enmity of Tubero and his son Quintus by refusing them permis­ sion to land, 01' even to draw water in Africa despite the illness of the YOllnger Tubero. 161 Quintus Tllbero subsequently brought Ligarius to trial in 46 on acharge of treason. Cicero, perhaps by cmphasising the personal motivations of the prosccution, success­ fully defcnded Ligarius in a court presided over by Caesar, whose dictatorship empowerecl him to hear the case. 162

trials are known through one 01' two terse references in the sourees, usually lacking any indication of why they occurred. Even when these fragmentary notices do not specify that inimicitiae existed betwcen a prosecutor and his victim, however, they often preserve the traces of inimicitiae. When such traces are present and evidence to support a factional interpretation is extremely tentative, the inference that inimicitiae were the basis of the trial is attractive. 1 have shown in Chapter 3 how easily a perceived attack on a man's honour might lead to inimicitiae. The courts provided an excellent opportunity to avenge wounded honour, as the case of Ti. Claudius Asellus shows. As censor in 142, Scipio Aemilianus disenfranchised Asellus. Even though Asellus recovered his rights, he apparently did not forget the insult he suffered at Scipio's hands. As soon as he became tribune in 140, Asellus brought charges against Scipio. 163 It is impossible to rule out Gruen' s hypothesis that Asellus was pursuing some broader political objec­ tive on behalf of the Claudian group.164 But Aulus Gellius strongly implies that wounded honour precipitated the prosecution of Scipio, and no source offers any evidence that a more complex motive was involved. 165 Similarly, the prosecution ofM. Antonius s(Jrnetime after his censorship in 97 is best attributed to inimicitioe originating in woundcd pride. M. Duronius, tribune perhaps in 97, had intemperately urged the repeal of a piece of sumptuary legislation, and earned expulsion from the Senate at the hands of the ccnsors of 97, L. Valerius Flaccus and M. Antonius. 166 Wc also know that Duronius later prosecuted Antonius for bribery.167 Again a factional background is conceivable within the bare frame­ work provided by the sources. In light of what the bare facts them­ selves imply about thc personalrelationship between Duronius and Antonius, however, it is safest to accept inimicitiae as Duronius' motive, especially because his political affiliations, if any, are cornpletely unknown 168

Anyone who has wrestled with the survlvmg evidence for Roman trials must be struck by the extremely patchy evidence for most known prosecutions. Luck or extl'aordinary notoriety has preserved reasonably full details abaul a small number of trials, and only these are open to safe interpretation. Thc vast rnajority of

Caesar's inimicitiae with Catulus, intensified by the campaign for ponti/ex maximus in 63, blossomed into his prosecution of Q. Lutatius Catulus in 62 for embezzling funds intended for the reconstruction of thc temple of J upiter Capitolinus. Gruen inter­ prets this prosccution as part 01" the maintenance 01' steady judicial pressure on the inimici of Pompey', sidestepping the inimicitiae bctween the principals themselves, the explanation that deserves the primary emphasis. He supports this view by focusing on Caesar's intention, as a final insult, to remove Catulus' name from the building in favour of Pompey's.16'1 This stress is

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misplaced, however, because 01' Dio's claim that Caesar made the proposal not to glorify Pompey, but to increase his own popu­ larity.170 Caesar's action is rcminiscent 01' his speech in favour 01' the lex Gabinia in 67 which was also motivated by his desire to ingratiate hirnself with the people, although Pompey was the apparent beneficiary.17I A detail from Suetonius about the out­ co me of Caesar' s suit confirms that personal motives rather than Pompeian partisanship fuelled the confrontation with Catulus in 62. He reports that Caesar withdrew his measure at the first wave of optimate opposition .172 Had Caesar been a truly dedicated Pompeian, he would not have buckled so readily under the easily anticipated opposition of the optimates. Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos demonstrated that same year how tenacious Pompey's true adhercnts could be. 17 :J The sum of the evidence therefore suggests that Caesar's primary aims were to humiliate Catulus and increase his own popularity. Inimicitiae generated by frustrated ambition for a high religious office, the augurate, also led to a trial in 50. M. Antony's defeat of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus created bitter animosity between Domitius and Cadius (one of Antony's supporters) as already mentioned. 174 Domitius' rage at his setback passed to his son Gnaells who prosecuted a certain en. Saturninus because of his supporl I4, was more diffuse. Plancius, a JH'W man, had

defeated Laterensis despite his illustrious lineage at the aedile elec­ tions in 55. Laterensis' resentment at this humiliating defeat suggests the inimicitiae of a noble toward new men .179 At the same time, ambition for the prestige of the aedileship doubtless needled hirn into action. IBO

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Because some prosecutions resulted from family feuds, cases known to involve such feuds and lacking other justifications often are most satisfactorily analysed in terms of family loyalty. A notorious feud raged between the Servilii and the Luculli during the late Republic. IBl We do not know when it began, but one episode, if it was not the ultimate cause, must have intensified the bitter feelings of the Servilii: L. Licinius Lucullus reacted to the news that the Senate had appointed C. Servilius to replace hirn as commander of the Roman forces in Sicily in 103 by disbanding his forccs and sabotaging the military initiatives his army had taken. IB2 Servilius the Augur, a member of the family different from the one who succeeded Lucullus, brought Lucullus to trial and secured his conviction. IB3 The sources do not say why Servilius the Augur embarked upon the prosecution, but it is a fair guess that he shared the resentment his relative feit when Lucullus' treason dashed his hopes of winning military glory, or that he shared some other aspect of his family's hostility toward the Luculli. The sons of the convicted Lucullus inherited hatred of Servilius the Augur from their father and were greatly admired when they brought hirn to trial, albeit unsuccessfully.IB4 In other trials, the divergence of the prosecutor's individual interests from those of his political associates is a good indication that family feeling rather than politics was responsible. A coali­ tion's priorities often left no room lor the pursuit of private grudges, wh ich could only distract members from the most impor­ tant concerns of a political group - the acquisition of power and the implementation of policy. This kind 01' tension between private and public impulses marks the career of C. Gracchus, whose backers came to power in 123 with an overwhelming agenda for social reform. Gaius undoubtedly shared his associates' goals, but he could not lorget the brutal murder of his brother Ti. Gracchus a decade earlier. Revenge against those responsible for Tiberius' murder became a leitmotiv of his career. Plutarch reports that he never missed an opportunity to refer to his dead brother in public orations. 11I5 Gaius gave notice early in his tribunate that he intendecl to seek revenge. He introduced two pieces 01' Iegislation 115

lnimicitiac and the Courts

tailored to secure the convlcllons 01' two 01' his brother' s most vigorous opponents, M. Octavius and P. Popillius 1.aenas. 186 These atternpts to use the Roman judicial system for what had become a private feud appeal' to have been very unpopular with the faction that brought Gracchus to power, perhaps because it could not afford to ciivcrt its limited resources from its central goals. Gracchus withdrew his legislation against Octavius, daim­ ing that he was obliging his mother Cornelia. 187 The people, who overwhelmingly supported the election 01' Gracchus, were never­ theless pleased that Octavius was not brought to trial 188 They may have shared the more practical sentiments Cornelia conveyed to her son when she urged hirn not to allow his feelings to injure the Republic's interests. 189 Popillius, the intencied victim 01' C. Gracchus' other proposed legislation, escaped prosecution by going into voluntary exile. 190 The Icgislation may weil have had broader ramifications, but Gracchus' pursuit 01' Popillius, presumably through a dause that made the measure retroactive, seems to have sprung from per­ sonal hatred rather than Irom the Gracchan political agenda. 191 Gracchus' politicaJ supporter~ would not have wanted to alienate the public, with whom Popillius was quite popular. Diodorus reports that Popillius was escorted out 01' Rome by weeping crowds who regretted that they had permitted themselves to be bribed against hirn. )l)2 It is true that this account 01' Popillius' departure from Rome is not consistcnt with Cicero's, but the claim that Popillius enjoyed somc measure 01' popular support should not be dismissed out 01 hand, for he had supported many 01' the measures urged by the Gracchans. 193 The reform-minded followers 01' C. Gracchus may have assessed his continuing value to their cause differently than Gracchus himsel!", obsessed by Popillius' clash with Tiberius. Yet another recurring pattern of criminal trials involves retalia­ tory prosecutions, in which a defcndant presses charges against his prosecutor. As in cases f"alling into other patterns, the sources orten do not state explicitly that irtimicitiaf engendcred or strengthened by thc original prosecution inspin~c1 the relaliatioll. However, thc inevitability with which irtimicitiae followed prosccution makes this an obvious infcrence, cspecially when the sou rces do not readily suggest any other explanation. Counter-prosccution was a particu­ larly gooel path 01' revenge because it was sure to cause the inimiwI considerable disCOlnf()rt, ('ven if he were acquittcd. This kind 01' 116

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exchange 01' prosecutions occurred between M. Aemilius Scaurus and P. Rutilius Rufus. Their rivalry far the consulship 01' 115 may weil have led to inimicitiae as political rivalry so often did in Rome. 194 Whether or not their inimicitiae sprang from that com­ petition, Rutilius, defeated at the poils, prosecuted Aemilius far bribery. Aemilius, although acquitted, was unwilling to let the matter rest. He immediately struck back with a counter-prosecu­ tion on identical charges, which also failed. 195 Gruen interprets these trials as part 01' the conflict between the Metelli and their opponents. l96 But the sources do not mention that either man was prosecuted because 01' his factional associations. Moreover, the reconstruction ·01' those associations is itself highly speculative. Gruen admits that we cannot recover the date at which Scaurus became a dose collaborator with thc Metelli. 197 The evidence far the political ties 01' P. Rutilius is even more tenuous. Whatever connections he may have had with the anti-Metellan Scipionic Circle belong to the 130s, almost twenty years earlier. 198 In fact, by 109 Rutilius must have switched camps, for in that year he served as Q. Caecilius Metellus' legate in Africa during the war against J ugurtha. 199 Gruen believes that Rutilius remained staunchly anti-Metellan untill15, but had a change 01' heart some­ time between 115 and 110, switched to the Metellan camp, and was ultimately weil rewarded first with the military assignment under Metellus, and finally with the consulship in 105. 200 How­ ever, there is no evidence that Rutilius' anti-Metellan associa­ tions, assuming he had any, continued into the 11 Os. 201 There is good reason to doubt that Rutilius ever opposed the Metelli. The absence 01' any real evidence 01' his allegiances makes any factional interpretation 01' the counter-prosecutions uncertain and unneces­ sary in the light 01' the burning desire to retaliate that Aemilius must have fell. lnimicitiae also help to account for C. Sempronius Rufus' pro­ secution of M. Tuccius. In 51, Tuccius filed an unknown charge against Sempronius. Before the case came to trial, Sempronius countered with his own complaint against Tuccius. Sempronius' motive was not purely revenge. Any prosecution would have served his immediate purpose, which was to delay his own trial by introducing another case that would take precedence and push his court date further back on the docket. 202 But so long as any judicial victim would serve Sempronius' purposes, he could think 01' no more desirable target than his own prospective prosecutor - M. Tuccius. 203 Sempronius' tactic was in the end too blatant; he was 117

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hirnself convicted on acharge of false accusation. Though Roman defendants were often unable to conduct their own retaliatory prosecutions, especially when they had been con­ victed and exiled, they might still engage in retaliation through the agency of their sons, other relatives or friends. Pietas provided all the incentive a son needed to avenge his father. In the absence of other evidence, it should be accepted as the primary motive when a prosecutor indicted his father's former accusers. The prosecution of M. Caelius Rufus in 56 is an excellent example. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the charges were brought by L. Sempronius Atratinus to avenge Caelius' judicial activity against Atratinus' father, L. Calpurnius Bestia. Gruen accepts the conelu­ sion of many scholars that the proseClltion originated in filial loyalty, but suggests that the trial quickly became an arena for the Clodians to combat Pompey. 20+ There can be no doubt that the Clodians, led by Clodia, were co-operating with the prosecu­ tion 20S But both the Clodians in general and Clodia in particular were hostile toward Caelius for reasons apart from his affiliation with Pompey. The hostility ofthe Claudian family is reaffirmed by two subsequent efforts it made to destroy Caelius in the courts. In 54 Servius Pola, acting on its behalf, prepared to prosecute Caelius 206 Ap. Claudius Pulcher used the same retainer to pro­ secute Caelius in 50 under the Scantinian law, provoking Caelius' retaliatory prosecution as mentioned above. The intervention of Cloclia in Atratinus' prosecution of Caelius is best attributed to her detestation of Caelius after he broke off their affair, rather than to any political opposition to Pompey. 207 Gruen deduces a political motivation for Clodia' s participation because of her reference to L. Lucceius in connection with her testimony regarding Caelius' allegcd attempt on the life of Dio, the Academic philosopher sent by Alexandria to Rome to prevent the Roman recognition of Ptolemy Auletes. 2oB Lucceius was a elose associate ofPompey, and slancler of the one wO'Jlcl have blackened the other. It is not at all elear, however, that Clodia's charges reflectecl so poorly on Lucceius' moral character. She did not accuse Caelius of turning over gold to Lucceius to arrange the assassination of Dio, as Gruen c1aims. 209 She did accuse Caelius of trying to bribe Lucceius' sen'ants to commit the murcler. 2lo It is true that a stain of guilt would have attached to Lucceius if the murcler had been com­ mitted in his house,211 but Pompey would scarcely have been held responsible for the greed of Lucceius' slaves. There is simply no evidcnce that Pompey had strong feelings one way or the other

about the trial of Caelius. Caelius' other aecusator, L. Herennius Balbus, admitted that his motives were highly personal, declaring quite openly that he would not have made the accusation ifCaelius had not brought charges a second time against his friend Bestia. 212 Herennius is a good example of how a defendant might count on his friends as weil as his family to share his inimieitiae and use the courts to avenge his prosecution. The legal battle between the Claudians and the Servilii illus­ trates how an entire clan might participate in a counter-prosecu­ tion on behalf of one member. In 51, C. Claudius Pulcher, the brother of Ap. Claudius Pulcher and the notorious Clodius, was accused of extortion committed du ring 55 - 53, while he was pro­ consul in Asia. The ensuing legal and illegal manoeuvres, which need not be discussed in detail, involved an attempt by Claudius to have M. Servilius use some of the ill-gotten funds to bribe the prosecution into mismanaging the cxtortion suit. Claudius' con­ viction suggests that Servilius botched the job. This apparent mis­ handling of the bribe inspired such fury in C. Claudius' son that, when Servilius himself was prosecuted for extortion by Q. Pilius, he testified against hirn in a way that seriously compromised his father as weil as himself. 213 He claimed that Servilius had received money from the senior Claudius to purehase the co-operation of the prosecutors at the earlier extortion trial. 2lf Although Servilius was acquitted, young Claudius soon paid for his actions in his own coin. The Servilii clan co-operated in an effort to convict him on a charge of extortion. 215

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In the cases discussed so far, the sources either explicitly say inimieitiae were the cause of the prosecution, or supply strong evidence from wh ich that infcrence can be drawn, by showing why the parties might weil be inimiei and why inimiei might turn to the courts. In other cases the evidence is more tenuous because the traces of inimieitiae that might have inspired the prosecutor are fainter. In these cases the course of inimieitl:ae cannot be recon­ structed, but their presence in some form is detectable through circumstantial evidence. The evidence strongly suggests that L. Opimius and P. Decius were inimiei, a fact that may account für Decius' prosecution of Opimius in 120. 216 Opimius was charged with having placed Roman citizens in prison without trial, and with rnurdering the Gracchans in 121. 217 The nature of the charge might tempt one to conclude that Decius was acting as an avenging spirit of the decimated Gracchans. Such a conclusion would be 119

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rash, however, because no source links Decius with the Gracchans. We da know, on the other hand, that Opimius' father sometime after his consulship in 154 had a sharp exchange with a Decius, who may weil have been identical with the tribune of 120 218 In this incident, Opimius' laughter at Decius' effeminate attire earned the consular a disrespectful retort. 219 Whatever the original motives for the proseeution of Opimius were, the anti-Gracchans became heavily involved in the trial. They had to intervene to save their hero, no matter what the prosecutor's original motives may have been. The political flavour thc trial lOok on is indicated by the fact that the Gracchan renegade C. Papirius Carbo undertook Opimius' defence. Factional politics transformed this trial, even though there is no evidence that they played any role in Decius' decision to launch the prosecution. 220 Sometimes the evidence of inimicitiae between prosecutor and defendant is fragmentary in a different way. In such cases the pro­ secutor's hostility is clearly indicated but the defcndant's responses are unknown. The sources may preserve, for example, aseries 01' hostile actions involving prosecutions for which the accounts are one-sided, omitting the counterattacks that perpetuate the cycle. The most we can concludc with confidence, however, is that some form of continuing inimiciliae was involved. The prosecution of L. Sergius Catilina by Clodius in 65 is this kind of case. 221 Prosecutor and defendant had been on bad terms at least as early as 73, when Clodius accused Catiline of seducing the Vestal Virgin Fabia. 222 In 65 Clodius again was the aggressor, presumably motivated by inimicitiae, although we lack evidence, as in the first trial, of any­ thing Catiline had done to provoke Clodius. A bitter personal feud between Clodius and Catiline would help explain not only these two trials, but also why Clodius' role during the Catilinarian conspiracy and its aftermath was so ambivalent. Asconius makes the puzzJing statement that Clodius wanted to join the Catilinarian conspiracy, but changed his mind at the last minute. 223 Plutarch claims that Clodius acted as Cicero's staunch supporter and pro­ tector during the course of the conspiracy. 224 Cicero' s portrayal of Clodius during the 50s as an heir to Catiline's legacy of revolution and violence 22 " despite Clodius' actual opposition to the con­ spiracy suggests that Clodius and Catiline were spiritual kin unable for personal rcasons to co-operate in the political arena. Cicero rclied on their spiritual atlinity to claim that they had co­ operated, and conveniently forgot thc bitter feud. Clodius' support 01' Catilinarianisrn was !lot cntire1y consistent with his

hatred 01' its leader. He wanted to thwart Catiline's threat to Cicero' s life even while toying with the idea of joining the cause Cicero so resolutely opposed. Clodius could not ultimately recon­ cile the sympathy with Catiline's cause that he expressed with his desire to destroy Catiline. Another trial that may have been motivated by inimicitiae, although the sources provide HO indication of any injury the pro­ secutor suffered at the hands of the defendant, is L. Manlius Torquatus' prosecution of P. Cornelius Sulla in 62. Gruen sees the trial as 'an ideal occasion für Pompey' s political foes to score an indirect hit' on the general. 226 As evidence of Sulla's political con­ nection with the Pompeians, he cites Sulla's marriage to Pompey's sister. 227 Whether this rnarriage tie shows such a political connec­ tion in 62 is uncertain, however. C. Memmius, Pompeia's first husband, died fighting Sertarius in 75. 228 A letter from Cicero in 45 mentions a Pompeia, perhaps the same woman, as the wife of P. Vatinius. 229 Because we do not know when Pompeia married Sulla or how long the marriage lasted, Gruen's reconstruction must remain speculative. Moreover, no evidence survives to suggest that Pompey' s enemies played any role at the trial. On the other hand, as Gruen hirnself suggests, 230 there is abundant reason to believe that L. Manlius Torquatus was responding to his own private feelings when he undertook the prosecution. An acri­ monious feud had been raging between the Manlii and Sulla for at least three years. Sulla and P. Autronius Paetus had been elected to the consulship far 65. Before they were to have taken office, both men suffered the disqualifying disgrace of conviction for bribery, and the two men who brought the charges, L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus, were elected in their place. 231 The identically named son 01' Manlius Torquatus, who became Sulla' s prosecutor in 62, had participated in the earlier bribery trial. 232 It is a likely assumption that Sulla harboured bitter feelings toward the whole Manlii family, wh ich had attained the highest honours by wrecking his career. The trial of Sulla in 62 should be considered part of the continuing hostilities between Sulla and the Manlii that began with Sulla's disgrace in 66 and endured long after Sulla' s acquittal in 62. 233 In the course of the defence, Cicero assumed that the prosecution was a continuation of the earlier judicial activity against Sulla. 234 It is true that he had a stake in persuading the jury that Manlius was bringing the accusation out of inimicitiae, and not because the case had any intrinsic merit. Still we would not expect hirn to make repcated

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references to the bitter enmity unless the argument had credibility. The trial of C. Antonius in 59 is another example of a prosecu­ tion that appears to have been motivated by inimicitiae despite the lack of all but the barest outline of the hostility. It seems deal' that Caesar was the driving force behind the prosecution. Cicero accused hirn of as much. 2:J5 Furtherrnare, P. Vatinius, one of Caesar's dosest associates in 59, openly admitted emending his 'lex de alternis consiliis reiciendis', which permitted challenging alternate jurymen in forming a panel, with a view toward depriving the accused Antonius of its benefits. 236 Gruen is right to suggest that Caesar may have induced the tribune to take this action. 2:J7 Thehostility between Antonius and Caesar appears to have been longstanding. In the 70s the young Caesar unsuccess­ fully prosecuted Antonius, and it is fair to assurne that they were chronically at odds until Caesar eventually pardoned Antonius sametime during his dictatorship. 238 The strength of their inimicitiae is suggested by M. Antony's failure to im'lude Antonius, who was his unde, in the general recall of exiles. Antony very iikely did not undertake this exdusion, which Cicero branded a sin, without same prodding from Caesar. External pressure, doubtless Caesar's, is also implied by Q. Fufius Calenus, who tried to defend Antony by arguing that he was not in a position to recall anyone he chose. 239 Gruen regards Caesar's role in the pro­ secution of Antonius in 59 as evidence of friction between the newly-formed first triumvirate and its opponents, calling the trial 'the first instance of triumviral collaboration in the judicia' .240 There is no apparent reason, however, why the triumvirate should have focused its wrath on Antonius, for he was not among the vociferous opponents of the new coalition. 241 1t is more likely, given what we know about the hostility between Caesar and Antonius, that Caesar's personal feelings account for the trial. Circumstantial evidence also suggests that inimicitiae motivated the prosecution of P. Vatinius in 54, in which his enemy C. Licinius Calvus appears to have been the principal prosecutor. 242 As in Antonius' trial discussed above, Gruen, although recog­ nising the animosity between Vatinius and Calvus, implies that Calvus' prosecution was motivated by political opposition to the triumvirate and dcsirc to strike indirectly at one of its weak points . .?43 1t is deal' that Vatinius was aligned with the triumvirate, whose decision at Luca to advance his career led to their support of his successful campaign against Cato for the praetorship of 55. 244 The unsavoury tactics used by Vatinius during this campaign 245

were to provide potential prosecutors all the ammumtlon they needed to attack hirn through the courts after his office expired. Calvus' links to the opposition forces are, on the other hand, quite tenuous. He is routinely considered an anti-triumviral poet though his lampoons against Caesar and Pompey are more remi­ niscent of modern political cartoons than of serious criticism of the new regime in Rome. 246 Gruen buttresses his identification of Calvus as an opponent of the triumvirate by pointing to his speech against M. Livius Drusus Claudianus, who was prosecuted just before Vatinius in 54. 247 However, the evidence does not support Gruen 's hypothesis that Drusus, like Vatinius, was tried by anti­ triumviral forces because of his association with the political alliance that had so recently reasserted itself at Luca. 248 The only firm connection between Drusus and the triumvirs dates from 59, when Cicero mentions hirn as a likely candidate for patronage from Caesar. 249 But many allianccs shifted in the volatile 50s, and there is no evidence whatever that Drusus was prosecuted in 54 because he was a Caesarian. Evcn if the Lucretius who prosecuted Drusus was the same as the Q. Lucretius who served on Pompey's side during thc civil war, we could not condude that he opposed Cacsar in 54. 250 Service on either side during the civil war is hardly indicative of a man's political affiliations at an earlier time when Pompey and Caesar were still associated, Nor does the fact that Cicero defended both Vatinius and Drusus show that the political motivations for their prosecutions were alike, for the cir­ cumstances of his representation differed. Thc triumvirs pressured Cicero into defending Vatinius. 251 There is no evidence that they had already forced his hand in the case of Drusus. Cicero's com­ plaints about the heavy workload he faced in 54, cited by Gruen as evidence that his heart was not in the defence of Drusus, seem to reflect the general harassment of overwork, not the resentment of forced service to the triumvirs. 252 Two other trials in 54 in which Calvus defended supporters of the triumvirate further undermine the theory that political friction accounts for the trial ofVatinius. The first case was that ofCalvus' dient C. Porcius Cato, whose career, like Cicero's, was pro­ foundly altered by the conference of Luca. 25 :1 Cato demonstrated his loyalty to the triumvirs by using his tribunate in 56 to advance the objectives of Pompey and Crassus. 254 This tribunician activity, which was legally questionable, led to his indictment in 54. 255 Despite Cato's strang political association, the trial did not necessarily originate in anti-triumviral politics. The twenty-two­

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year-old prineipal accusator, C. Asinius Pollio, may have wanted nothing more than to launeh his political career by conducting a prosecution, as so many Romans did. 256 Seneca's suggestion that Calvus retained his friendship with Pollio despite his defence of Cato shows that ideological fevers were not running very high at this trial. 257 Nevertheless, the triumvirs very likely stood by Cato, just as they supported Vatinius later in the summer. Calvus' con­ tribution to Cato's defence could not have escaped their notice, nor ean we imagine that Calvus was blind to the triumvirate's interest in the case. And yet we have no evidence that Calvus' actions were involuntary, or that his real feelings were anti­ triumviral. 258 Several weeks after Cato was acquitted, Calvus spoke in defence of C. Messius, another supporter of the triumvirate. Messius was a e10se associate of Pompey who demonstrated his devotion in 57 by urging that Pompey be given an even more sweeping grain­ command than the consuls had proposed. Pompey was pleased despite his public denial of desire for the more extensive power. 259 Messius, summoned from Caesar's staff in Gaul, was prosecuted by P. Servilius Isauricus, an intimate ofCato. 260 It would be over­ hasty to conclude that this prosectltion represented an attack on the triumvirate by ilS opposition in Rome, for we have no evidence that it was politically inspired. Whatever its motivation, however, Caesar cannot have been pleased by the recall of his legate to stand trial in Rome. Yet again Calvus took a position favourable to Caesar by appearing for the defence. 261 In short Calvus' judicial activity in 54 appears to have been politieally inconsistent, making any hypothesis about his political affiliations suspect. Inimieitiae are a mueh more promising explana­ tion of his prosecution of Vatinius. The prosecution of 54 was not the only time lhey c1ashed in court. Unfortunately, the sources do not reveal how frequently or on what occasions Calvus prosecuted Vatinius, or how their differenees began. 262 Eut the other judicial aetivity very likely preeeded the trial in 54, beeause Calvus seems 26 :J We [0 have died prematurely, either in 54 or shortly thereafter do know that Calvus had expressed an eagerness to prosecute Vatinius in 56, even if we cannot be sure that a trial took place in that year. 264 Calvus' hat red of Vatinius does not prove that lhe enernies of the triumvirate failed to eneourage the proseeution. But the evidence for polilical support is so weak that it cannot be presumcd the dominant motive for the trial. Two years later, in 52, inimieitiae probably played a key role in 124

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C. Memmius' indictment of Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica. Memmius himse!f had been charged with an offence re!ated to the electoral illegalities of 54, when he made a bid for the consulate, but repeated delays prevented the case from reaching court until 52.265 Almost nothing is known about this trial other than that Memmius was convicted, but Gruen is certainly right in

suggesting that Pompey, who had supported Memmius' consular

266 campaign in 54, would not have eome to his aid two years later. Bitter inimieitiae had blossomed between the two. The year had

begun auspiciously for Pompey as he forged another glittering

marital alliance, this time with Cornelia, the daughter of

Metellus,267 the man subsequently indicted by Memmius. The

name of Pompey's new father-in-I aw evoked some of the Repub­ lic's greatest heroes. Pompey had further achieved the unprece­ dented honour of a sole eonsulship, and therefore occupied that office for a third time 268 These triumphs soon soured. His marriage must have been still young when Memmius, perhaps encouraged by the age discrepancy between the bride and Lhe groom,269 sent Cornelia abillet doux. The messenger who delivered the letter was Curtius Nicias, a man who enjoyed excellent 270 relations with both Pompey and Mcmmius. When Cornelia, not interested in the proposal, informed her husband, Pompey sum­ marily forbade Nicias his house, as discussed in my lntroduction. Pompey's wrath undoubtedly included Memmius, the actual culprit, despite their earlier political association, and Memmius, who had already shown his eontempt for Pompey, must have reciprocated the inimieitiae. Prior to his conviction on charges of e!ectoral illegalities dating back to 54, Memmius hit on a brilliant if ultimately unsuccessful sche me to extricate hirnself from his judicial predicament and at the same time to deal a hard blow to Pompey and his newly acquired in-Iaws. The law under which Memmius was charged provided immunity to any defendant who 27l convicted another individual of the same offenee. To save him­ self, Memmius pressed eharges against Pompey's new father-in­ law, Metellus,272 Pompey responded by taking the extraordinary step of elevating Metellus to share his consulship, thereby eonfer­ 273 ring on him immunity from prosecution. In pressing charges Memmius clearly had more al stake than his personal feelings: he was trying to avoid convietion. But the inimieitiae that arose so recently between Memmius and Pompey' s entire family seems to havc played some role in Memmius' choice of virLims.

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Conclusion The criminal prosecution was one 01' the most destructive legiti­ mate weapons available to Romans. Its dual nature - clestructive­ ness within a legitimate framework - provided templations and opportunities to those whose interests extended beyond the public­ spirited objectives the judicial system was meant to facilitate, but instead encompassed purely private goals. Political interpretations 01' many trials, especially in the work 01' Professor Gruen, obscure the in im idtiac that often animated private prosecutions. The influence 01' inirnicilia(' on the Roman courts highlights the irnportam"e 01' inirniciliac in Roman e!aily life. At the same time it exposes a judiciaJ system powerless to shield its objeetivity from one 01' the most distinclive forces in Roman social life.

6

Conclusion

Scholars have long recognised the importance 01' personal con­ siderations in Roman republican politics. The Republic was governed by a group 01' men who agreed far more often than they disagreed about fundamental public questions facing the state. Ideology rarely played a critical roll' in shaping their coalitions. Roman political behaviour thus can be understood only by examining the social background in which leaders rcsponded to deeply embedded private motives. Earlier studies have focused on friendship, nobility and familial relationships as Roman substi­ tutes for the ideological imperatives that govern modern western politics. The emphasis in this study has been on in im icitiae. Personal hatred as a powerful force in politics affects a11 societies in same degree. But the pervasiveness and intensity 01' inimicitiae at Rome made them a unique phenomenon. This distinctiveness arose from two sources. First, Roman society was unusual in a110wing inimiciliae to compete along with other more conventional values such as patriotism and humanity in guiding a public figure's conduct. A reputation for successfu11y pursuing inirnicitiae was a vital asset to a Roman politician seeking to establish and maintain an influential voice within Roman governing cirdes because there was so much admiration and respect for men who battled and destroyed their foes. At the same time, the Romans were committed to main­ taining the supremacy 01' the state's interests and perceived that unregulated inimicitiae coule! dash with the community's best inlerests. Roman society was never very successful, however, in defining acceptable behaviour or in regulating the conduct 01' its most powerful citizens. The revolutionary ronditions 01' the last 126

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Conclusion

Conclusion

century 01' the Republic eroded the inlluence 01' those values and institut ions that had traditionally worked to restrain inimiei who threatelled the national interest. Powerful generals working essen­ tially for their own interests seized power from an increasingly feebk Senate. Inimieiliae therefore assumed particular force in shaping public conduct. Thc distinctive Roman constitution and the value set by Roman society on political success were the second major reason for the predominant inlluence 01' inimieiliae. A Roman politician built power alld inlluence through a network 01' friends, relatives and clients unitecl by the bonds of trust. Any violation or interference with these bonds had the potential for destroying careers and therefore sparked inimieiliae. The Roman constitution reinforced inimieiliae among thc Roman politician's priorities: the Roman ruJing dass was not accountable to the governed in the modern democratic sense, and this insulation gave the leaders even more freedorn to devote their energics to the destruction of their cnemies. Rather than being guided by any public accountability, the llobiles, who respeeted no ambition outside ofthe eursus honorum, competed viciously for the tiny number of curule offices. Losers received no consolation prizes. They faced social extinction uncomf(Jrted and unbuoyed by ideological conviction and resolve. Envy against t he successful and fortunate was the inevitable byproduct. Special hostility devolved on those few - Scipio Africanus, Scipio Aemilianus, Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar - who succeeded in monopolising a grossly disproportionate share 01' the prestige 01' governing, because such careers damaged the ambitions 01' their fellow oligarchs. New men who attempted to attain offices, already 100 scarce to satisfy the ambitions 01' the cstablished nobiles, encountered especial hostility. The inimieilzae 01' thc governing dass strongly inl1uenced the course 01' Roman history , ancl 01' its institutions. Some prominent Romans - Pompey and Caesar stand out during the last years 01' the Republic -- rivalled epie heroes in subordinating the state's intercsts to the personal priority 01' deslroying their foes. Thc most sacred Roman institutions, allel the most prestigious curule offices, were subverted by thc passions 01' inimieiliae. Even more irnportant för the understanding 01' Roman history is the extent to which inimieiliae inl1ueneed the inf()rmal hlctional structure 01' Roman society. Some 01' the most powerful Roman factions, such as those that opposed POlTlpey in the 60s and Caesar in the 50s, coalesced in a rdativcly short time, anel compriscd members whose comlIlon

sense of purpose arose from inimieiliae individually eontraeted with the two most dominant and suecessful figures 01' the late Republic. On eaeh occasion, inimieiliae, by contributing to the extraordinary solutions 01' the first triumvirate and Caesar' s dictatorship, played a significant role in destroying the Republic. The criminal trial was a partieularly important manifestation 01' inimieiliae. Prosecution invariably led to inimieiliae because of the highly personal nature of the Roman adversary system. Roman prosecutors more often took cases for personal reasons than as impersonal agents asserting the judicial interests 01' the state. At the same time prosecution, with its almost unlimited power to destroy enemies, became one of the most common outlets for inimieiliae. J udicial practice aided personally motivated lawsuits by accepting inimieiliae as an excellent qualification in the competitive process for selecting prosecutors. This approbation was tempered (in practice only imperfectly) by the fear that a prosecutor's inimieiliae might exceed constructive zealousness and distort the objective search for justice. Close investigation of the trials 01' the second and first centuries B.C. reveals that many were motivated by private animosity with­ out any hint 01' broader factional significance. Occasionally, inimieiliae went beyond prosecutor and defendant. Groups of Romans collaborated in a prosecution motivated by common feelings 01' inimieiliae against the defendant. The criminal trials are much less valuable evidence for charting the political history of the Republic than is commonly believed.

128

129

No/es

Notes

1. Peter A. Brunt, 'Amicitia' in the Late Roman Republic', PCPS, vol. 11 (1965), p. 11. 2. On these sacred obligations, see ibid., p. 7 and n. 1. 3. J. Hellegouarc'h, LI' vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la republique (Paris, 1963), p. 186, suggests that inimidtiae were not the opposite of amiCi/ia because they conferred no obligations. Franc;ois Hinard, 'Paternus inimicus. Sur une expression de Ciceron' , in Milanges de liUerature et d'epigraphie latines, d'histoire aneienne et d'anheologie; Hommage a la memoire de Pierre Wuilleumier (Paris, 1980), pp. 199 - 200, mentions the obligation (devoir) of inimici to defend themselves against the hostility of their enemies, but concedes that this cannot be equated with the obliga­ tions conferred by amicitia. 4. Sec pp. 115-16 irifra. For the murder of a relative as a cause of inimieitiae, see pp. 43 - 4 irifra; for the obligation to avenge a sJain relative, see pp. 23 - 4 infra. 5. For a discussion of nther Latin terms eonnoting 'dislike' or 'hatred' , see Hellegouarc'h, LI' vocabulaire latin, pp. 188 fL 6. Ibid., pp. 186 - 7. CL Hinard, 'Paternus inimicus', p. 200, and J. Marouzeau, Quelques aspects de la formation du latin liUeraire (Paris, 1949), p. 189. 7. Cie. QFr. 1.2.10. 8. Brutus et Cassius apo Cie. Farn. 11.3.4. 9. Farn. 3.10.6. 10. Verr.2.5.182. 11. Cie. Phi!. 5.19: 'At ille homo vehemens et violcntus [Antonius] . inimicitias mihi [Ciceroni] denuntiavit', and Cie. Flacc. 2: 'Etenim cum a clarissimis viris iustissimas inimicitias saepe cum bene meritis eivibus depositas esse vidissem, non sum arbitratus quemquam amicum rei publicae, postea quam L. Flacci amor in patriam perspectus esset, novas huic inimicitias nulla accepta iniuria denuntiaturum.' CL p. 3 and n. 8 supra. For a discussion of the military terminology used to deseribe inimieiliae. see Hellegouarc'h, LI' vocabulaire latin, pp. 186-7. Similarly the Romans sometimes publicly dissolved an amieitia with a foreign state. See Polyb.33.12.5. 12. On amldtiam ,muntiare sec Roben Samuel Rogers, 'The Emperor's Displcasure', TA PA, vol. 90 (1959), pp. 224 fL 13. Tat'. Arm. 6.29.3. 14. The actual exdusion from an cnemy's house is attested in only two 01' the examples 01' amieitiam renuntiare cited from the Republic by Rogers, 'The Emperor's Displeasure', pp. 226-7. Pompey banned Curtius Nicias from his hOllse (Suet. Gramm. 14) ami Antony was no Jonger we1come at the house of the eider Curio after corrupting his son (Plut. Auf. 2.5).

15. Caelius apo Cic. Farn. 8.12.2. C. Scribonius Curio, hoping to make his shift of allegiance from Pompey to Caesar more credible in 50, provides another example of the artificial search for an acceptable pretext (App. BCiv. 2.27). CL also Caesar's fear that the expulsion of the two tribunes C. Epidius and L. Caesetius had given his enemies the pretext against hirn they needed (ibid., 2.109). 16. Cat. 10.5. 17. Cass. Dio 37.39.3. CL his very similar remarks at 48.29.3 in refer­ ence to the reconciliation between Antony and Octavian at Brundisium in 40. 18. Farn. 5.8.5. 19. For a famous example, see p. 13 and n. 7 irifra. 20. Cic. Farn. 1.9.20. CL Plut. Cic. 26.1. On such reconciliatory dinners, cL Cicero's crack when he heard that Vatinius also wanted a reeonciliation: 'Surely, it' s not possible that Vatinius also wishes to dine with me' (Plut. Cie. 26.2), and cL Cass. Dio 44.34.7, for the banquet held by the tyrannicides and the Caesarians after Caesar's murder. 21. Cicero emphasised how important a third party was when he attempted to explain his reconciliation with Caesar after the conference of Luca in Provo Cons. 25: 'Cur igitur exspectem hominem aliquem qui me cum illo in gratiam reducat? Reduxit ordo amplissimus, et ordo is qui est et publici consili et meorum omnium consiliorum aue tor et princeps.' 22. Cic. Au. 1.11.1: 'tarnen habet [Lucceius] quiddam profecto quod magis in animo eius insederit, quod neque epistulae tuae neque nostra adlegatio tarn potest facile delere quam tu praesens non modo oratione sed tun vultu illo familiari tolles.' It would, however, be amistake to emphasise the formality of the third party getting the two principals together. See Cie. Sest. 130: 'meeum [Cicerone] absens beneficio suo rediit [Metellus Nepos] in gratiam.' 23. Cie. Au. 15.4.1. It is difficult to agree with Brunt's conte nt ion (' "Amicitia" " p. 9) that Cicero accepted Fufius' reconciliation proposal. The weight Brunt places on Cicero's assertions of friendship for Fufius in the Philippics is misplaced considering Brunt's own statement (ibid., p. 8) that the term' amicus' was often used mere1y to express politeness. Dio, judging by the savage speech against Cicero he attributed to Fufius (46.1 - 28) was unaware of any reconciliation between the two men. CL also Dio's remark (46.29.1) about Cicero's resentment ofFllflUS' speech. 24. Rab. Post. 33. 25. Cic. Farn. 3.9.7. 26. Cass. Dio 45.8.3 - 4. 27. Val. Max. 2.9.6; Livy 29.37.10. 28. Mil. 21. For Pompey's reconciliation with Clodius, see Robin Seager, Pompey, A Political Biography (Berkeley, 1979), p. 126 and n. 1. 29. Farn. 1.9.4, 1.9.19; QFr. 2.12.2 - 3. For Pompey's role, see the frag­ ment of a lost letter quoted by Quint. Inst. 9.3.41: 'ego cum in gratiam redierim cum Ap. Claudio, et redierim per Cn. Pompeium.' D. R. Shaekleton Bailey, Cicero '5' Leuer.f to AUieus, 6 vols (Cambridge, 1965 - 8), vol. 1, p. 314, rejeets Erich Gruen's attempt, 'Pompey, the Roman Aristoeracy, and the Conference of Luea', Hist., vol. 18 (1969), p. 103, n. 145, to date the Quintilian fragment to 50.

130

131

The abbreviations are as in the second edition of the Oxford Classical Dictionary .

Chapter 1

Notes

Notes

30. Cic. Fam 3.7.2,3.8.2,3.8.7; Alt. 6.1.2. 31. Cic. Fam. 3.10.1, 3.10.5, 3.12.2, 3.12.4, 3.15.2; Alt. 6.6.1. Cf. Erich Gruen, The Last Generation oj the Roman Republic (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 353-4. 32. Cic. Fam. 3.10.9. Cf. ibid., 3.12.4. In a similar vein Cae1ius (ap. Cic. Fam. 8.6.1) urged Cicero to support Claudius during his trial 'ne parum simpliciter et candide posuisse inimicitias videaris'. 33. Fam. 3.12.4. Cf. ibid., 3.10.8. 34. Ibid., 5.8.5. For Pompey's role in the reconciliation, see ibid., 1.9.20. 35. See Gruen's discussion of the trial in Last Generation, pp. 332-3. 36. Scaur. 33. 37. See p. 15 znfra. 38. Plut. Sull. 9.7- 8. 19. Pseudo-Sallust Inuectiua in Ciceronem 5: 'Irnmo vero homo levissimus [Cicero], supplex inimicis.' Cf. Cass. Dio 39.63.5, who mentions that Ci,:ero acquired the sobriquet, 'the deserter'. Crassus' reputation apparently suffered from a similar failing (Plut. Crass. 7.7). 40. QFr.3.1.15. 41. Rab. Post. 32, 19. 42. QFr. 3.9.1. 43. Amze. 17. 44. Fam. 1.9.11 ff. See especially ibid., 1.9.11: 'non putavi famam inconstantiae mihi pertimescendam, si quibusdam in sententiis paulum me immutassem meamque voluntatem ad summi viri de meque optime meriti dignitatem aggregassem.' 45. Ibid., 1.9.20. 46. The exile: ibid., 1.9.14. The soli attitude of the boni toward Clodius: ibid., 1.9.10, 1.9.15. The failure to prevent Cicero's expulsion from his house: ibid., 1.9.5. Cicero's peeuniary losses: ibid., 1.9.5. The boni rejoicing in Cicero's renewed enmity with Crassus: ibid., 1.9.20. 47. Ibid., 1.9.21. 48. Ibid. Cf. Cic. Plane. 94; Balb. 61; and Thomas N. MitchelI, 'Cicero before Luca', TAPA, vol. 100 (1969), p. 320. 49. Cass. Dio 38.29.4. 50. The sources on the reconciliation are Suet. Iul. 19.2; Plut. Crass. 14.1-4; Caes. 13.3-4; Pomp. 47.1; App. BCiu. 2.9; and Cass. Dio 37.54.3 - 57.1. For speculation about the motives of Pompey and Crassus, see Cass. Dio 37.56.3-5. I cannot accept the view ofG. R. Stanton and B. A. MarshalI, 'The Coalition between Pompeius and Crassus 60 - 59 Be', Hist., vol. 24 (1975), pp. 212 ff., that no reconciliation took place. See Seager, Pompey, p. 83. 51. Cicero, Comment. Pet. 40. 52. The term 'faction' is used throughout this study in its most general English sense of a group or coalition. Latin jactio has a more specific meaning as Robin Seager has shown in 'Faetio: Some Observations' ,jRS, vol. 62 (1972), pp. 53-8. 53. On consensus politics see Badian's remarks in his review of Gelzer's Kleine Schriften, jRS, vol. 57 (1967), p. 219. 54. Au. 2.3.4.

55. The sources on the warm relationship between Cicero and P. Crassus are collected by Münzer, PW, s. v. 'Licinills (63)', col. 291. 56. Plut. Crass. 13.4 - 5. 57. Cass. Dio 38.17.3. 58. Plut. Cic. 33.8. I see no reason for rejecting Plutarch's account of this reconciliation as Brunt does in ' "Amicitia" " p. 9. 59. Q. Metellus Celer: Fam. 5.2. Ap. Claudius Pulcher: ibid., 3.7, 3.8, 3.10. 60. Ibid., 5.2.5.

132

Chapter 2 1. Polyb. 18:35.8. Cf. Matthias Gelzer, Kleine Schriften, 3 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1962-4), vol. 2, p. 74: 'Die inimicitiae gehören von jeher zum Wesen der Nobilität', and ibid., vol. 1, p. 81, n. 127. 2. QFr. 1.1.43. 3. Livy 27.37.10; Val. Max. 4.2.2. See H. H. Scullard, Roman Politics 220-1508(;, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1973), pp. 67-8. 4. Livy 27.35.5-9; Val. Max. 7.2.6. 5. See the discussion in U rsula Hall, 'Vating Procedure in Roman Assemblies', Hist., vol. 13 (1964), pp. 300-1 and Christian Meier, Res Publica Amissa (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 178 - 80. 6. App. BCiu. 1.107. 7. Livy 38.57.3-8; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 4.4; Val. Max. 4.2.3. 8. On the accuracy of the story see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Sempronius (53)', col. 1404, and David Stockton, The Gracchi(Oxford, 1979), p. 24. 9. Livy 38.43.1. 10. Ibid., 40.45.6-7. The scenario advanced by Münzer, Röm. Adelsparteien, pp. 200 ff., and accepted by Scullard, Roman Politics, 2nd edn, pp. 180 - 1, that the reconciliation was staged as a result of an agree­ ment between the Fulvii and the Aemilii by which a Fulvius acquired a priesthood in return for Aemilius' censorship, reaches beyond the evidence. It rests in large part on the currently much-criticised hypothesis that Roman ruling families acted as rigid, cohesive political units. See Meier, Res Publica Amissa, pp. 19 - 20, 170 ff., and Hampl's review of Scullard, Anze(/ter jür die Altertumswissenschaft, vol. 6 (1953), pp. 90 ff. Cf. Filippo Cassala, 1 gruppi politici romani 7Iel III secolo A. C. (Trieste, 1962), p. 19. 11. Plut. Crass. 6.5, 7.1. 12. Ibid., 11.10-11; Plut. Pomp. 21.3. Frank E. Adcock, Marcus Crassus, Millionaire (Cambridge, 1966). p. 26 and Bruce A. MarshalI, 'Crassus' Ovation in 71 H.C', Hzst .. val. 21 (1972), pp. 669 - 73 anel MarshalI, Crassus: A Political Biograph;' (Amsterdam, 1976), p. 33 deny that this incident would have caused enmity between the two. But see Allan Masan \Vard, MarcuJ Crassus and the Late Roman Republic (Columbia, 1977), pp. 97, n. 46 and 99, n. 1, and Robin Seager, PomplJ, a Political Bio./traphy (Berkeley, 1979), p. 22. 13. Plut. Pomp. 23.1-2; Cran. 12.4-5. On the different names assigned to Aurelius by Plutarch in these two accounts, sec Ward, Marcu.l'

133

No/es

No/es

Crassus, p. 109, n. 37. App. RCiv. 1.121 also mentions the reconciliation but confuses the date. See Gelzer, Kleine Schriften, vol. 2, p. 165.

suggests, the story was invented to explain Pompeius' military failures, it says something about the Roman attitude that Pompeius would have thought this the most effective means 01' distraeting the people from the facts. 29. Livy Per. 67. 30. For the series 01' trials after Arausio, I have closely followed Gruen's aecount in Roman Polili<:s, pp. 161-5. 31. Aucl. ad Her. 1.24. 32. Plancus apo Cie. Fam. 10.11.3. 33. Ibid., 10.21.1. 34. Ibid., 10.18.2. 35. Ibid., 10.7.2; Cic. F·am. 10.6.2-3. 36. BCiv. 3. Cf. ibid., 4 where Caesar disparages Cato's motives: 'Catonern vetcres inimicitiae Caesaris incitant et dolor repulsae.' On Caesar's public image, sec Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Publi<: Image (Ithaca, 1983).

37. The sources on the censorship of Livius and Claudius are collected in MRR, vol. 1, p. 306. 38. Livy 29.37.9-17. 39. Plut. Cal. Mai. 18.1. Cr. A. E. Astin, Calo the Censor (Oxford, 1978), p. 81. 40. Cic. De Off. 27; App. BCiv. 1. 1- 4. The increase in violence during the late Republic seems indisputable. Cr. A. W. Lintott, Violence in Repubhwn Rome (Oxford, 1968) and Erich Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley, 1974), p. 433. 41. See pp. 73-4 infra. 42. Cie. Fam. 9.28.2. 43. See Erik Wistrand, Caesar and Contemporary Roman Sodety (Göteborg, 1978), pp. 22-3. 44. Münzer, PW, S. v. 'Claudius (246)', col. 2776; 'Livius (30)', col. 897. 45. See p. 13 supra. 46. App. BCiv. 1. 107. 47. D. C. Earl, The Moral and Political Traditions of Rome (Ithaca, 1967), pp. 57-8. Cr. Helmut Wegehaupt, Die Bedeutung und Anwendung von dignitas in den Schriften der republikanischen Zeit (Diss. Breslau, 1932). 48. See pp. 7-9 supra, pp. 21-2 infra. 49. Diod. 34/35.33.5. On the metus Carlhagini.r and its significance in Roman history, see Gelzer, 'Nasicas Widerspruch gegen die Zerstörung Karthagos', in Kleinl: Schriften, vol. 11, pp. 39-72. Cr. Wilhelm Hoffmann, 'Die römische Politik des 2. Jahrhunderts und das Ende Karthagos', Hist., vol. 9 (1960), pp. 340-4; William V. Harris, Warand Imperialism in Repl1bliwn Rome, 327 -70 B.e. (Oxford, 1979), pp. 127 - 8. 50. August. De czv. D. 1.30. 51. Polyb.6.57.5. 52. Seep.48andn.124infra. 53. See p. 5 and n. 16 supra. 54. Plut. Mar. 8.6. 55. Farn. 3.12.1. 56. Nep. fr. 1. The authenticity 01' the Cornelia letters is much dis­ puted. They are accepted by Friedrich Leo, Geschichte der Römischen Lileratur (Berlin, 1913), p. 305; Henri Bardon, La lilleralure latine inconnue (Paris, 1953), pp. 88 fr.; Münzer, PW, S.V. 'Cornelia (407)', cols. 1594- 5; and A. S. Gratwiek, in E. J. Kenney (ed.), The Cambridge History of Classiwl Lzteralure, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1982), vol. I, pp. 145 - 6. But see Hugh Last, CAH, vol. 9, p. 56, n. 1. The question of authentieity does not aftect the value of the letters as a mirror of the sentiments of the late Republic. 57. Har. Resp. 44: 'Fuit in his omnibus causa, etsi non iusta, - nulla enim potest cuiquam male de re publica mcrendi iusta esse causa, ­ gravis tamen ct cum aliquo animi virilis dolore coniuncta.' 58. QFr. 3.5.4. On the heroic ethos, cl'. T. P. Wiseman, 'Competition and Co-operation', in 1'. P. Wiseman (ed.), Roman Politiwl Lift: 90 RC-Ai) 14 (Exetcr, 198:»), pp. 10-13. 59. Tal'. Dial. 40. CL Syme, Rom. Rev., p. 13. 60. For Mctellus' speech see ORF, 2nd edn, pp. 211-12. Münzer,

134

135

14. Har. Resp. 63. 15. Amic. 23. Cr. ibid., 24. 16. Sall. Cal. 9.2. Cr. Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.91.

17. Cass. Dio 44.24.3. 18. Ibid., 44.24.4. Although this speech seems to be a free composition of Dio's, it contains Cieeronian mannerisms and it has even been sug­ gested that some excerpts made by Tiro from the speech delivered by Cicero became part 01' the tradition. See Fergus Millar, A Sludy of CaJJius Dio (Oxford, 1964), pp. 51-2 19. See p. 7 ;upra. 20. Fam. 3.10.9. 21. On the relations between Gracchus and the Scipios see Scullard, Roman Polilics, 2nd edn, pp. 295-6. 22. Livy 38.57.3-4, 60.3-4; Val. Max. 4.1.8; Cass. Dio 19.65; Gell. NA 6.19.6-8. The story that Gracchus also intervened at one point for Africanus, Livy 38.52.9-53.7; Cass. Dio 19.65, is rejected by Scullard, Roman Polilir;, 2nd edn, p. 299 as a doublet ofthe end ofL. Scipio's trial. 23. Livy 38.53.6. For Gracchus' oath see Livy 38.57.4; Val. Max. 4.18; Gell. NA 6.19. 24. Livy 39.5.5. For the date 01' Gracchus' tribunate see Scullard, Roman Polilies, 2nd edn, p. 297. 25. Provo Gons. 18. 26. Ibid., p. 32. 27. Ibid., pp. 18-22. Cr. Gelzer, KleineSehriften, vol. I, pp. 165-7 and Fran<;ois Hinard, 'Paternus inimicus. Sur une expression de Ciceron' , in Melanges de lilleralure el d'epigraphie lalines, d'hisloire ancienne el d'areheologie; Hommage la memoire de Pierre Wuilleumier (Paris, 1980), p. 208. On Cicero's reconeiliation with Caesar see also Cie. Balb. 61; Pis. 81- 2; Planc. 93.

a

28. Val. Max.

9.~).7.

The entire story has been questioned by Miltner,

PW, S.V. 'Pompeius (12)', col. 2056 and by Erich Gruen, Roman Polilics and Ihe Criminal Courls, 149 -78 }l C. (Cambridge, 1968), p. 35, n. 60 becausc Appian does not mention it in Hzsp. 76. Even if, as Miltner

Notes

Notes

PW, s.v. 'ManJius (61)', eol. 1190, and Gruen, Roman Politics, p. 133, n. 158 argue that Manlius opposed Metellus' triumph request. 61. See pp. 98 - 9 infra. 62. Cacl. 34. Similarly, Cicero seems highly sareastie in Cat. 1.23 when he addresses Catiline: 'Quam ob rem, ut saepe iam dixi, profieiseere ae, si mihi inimieo, ut praedieas, tuo eonflare vis invidiam, reeta perge in exsilium. ' 63. Alt. 14.13b.5. For Antony's letter see Alt. 14.13a. For the tone of Cieero's letter see D. R. Shaekleton Bailey's eomments in his edition of Cicero '5 Leiters to Altieus, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1965 - 8), vol. 1, p. 228. 64. Plut. Sull. 38.6. Cf. the similar sentiments expressed in Plaut. Per. 755 - 6: 'quom bene nos, Iuppiter, iuvisti, dique alii omnes eaclipotentes, eas vobis gratis habeo atque ago, quia probe sum ultus meum inimieum.' 65. [Sallustllnveetiva in Cieronem 5. Cf. ibid., 7. On the authorship of this work see Ronald Syme, Sallust (Berkeley, f964), pp. 314 ff. 66. Suet. Iul. 22.2. For the authentieity of the remark see Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Stalesman, trans. P. Needham (Oxford, 1968), p. 88, n. 1. 67. QFr.2.4.6. 68. Gabinius: QFr. 2.8.1, 3.1.24. Piso: QFr. 3.1.24. T. Munatius Plancus Bursa: Fam. 7.7.2. Similarly, Caelius apo Cie. Fam. 8.14.1 expatiated on the great pleasure Cicero missed in 50 by not being present to see the face of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus when the latter was rejeeted for the augurate. CL Cieero's antieipation of Ap. Claudius' vindication in his trial in 50 (Fam. 3.10.1): 'Ages [Claudiusl vietor ex inimieorum dolore triumphum iustissimum', and the pleasure Cicero expeeted Crassus to dcrive frorn Pompey's discomfiture in 59 (Alt. 2.21.4). 69. Pis. 95. 70. Ibid., 98. On the fighting see also ibid., 84, 92 and on the plague ibid., 85. Für Piso's disbanding of his army see ibid., 47, 96. 71. Phil.2.21. 72. Verr. 2.5.183. Cf. Lq!,. Man. 71; Pis. 4; Phil. 2.1;AIt. 1.15.1, 1.19.6; QFr. 1.1.19. 73. Sa1l. H. '2.47.4. 74. Cie. Planc. 77; Sest. 86; Nep. Cato 2.4. 75. Sest. 139. 76. Har. Resp. 60. 77. Cie. Flaa. 87: '0 eondieiones miseras administrandarum provin­ eiarum, in quihus diligentia plena simultatum est.' CL Cie. QFr. 1.1.26; SaU. Cat. 52.7; lug. 85.3; Plut. Cat Min. 18.4,44. f 1-45.2. 78. Cie. Phil. 2.1; 12.21; Fam. 12.28.3. CL [Cic.] InSallustium Crispum Oratio 11; Cass. Dio44.33.2. 79. Alt. 14.13b.4. CL Red. Pop. 21 where Cicero, eontrasting his hehaviour with Marius', stresses that eonsiderations of state alone guided his aetions toward his inimici. 80. Phll. '2.'2. 81. For Cicero revenge is apart ofnaturallaw (1nv. Rhet. 2.161). 82. Cie. Alt. 4.18.1. 83. Aen. 4.656: 'ulta virum poenas inirnico a fratre recepi.' 84. Plut. Cat. Mai. 15.3.

85. Cie. Div. Caee. 66. Cf. ibid., 67-68. 86. See p. 47 and n. 119 infra. 87. Plaut. Cas. 424 - 6. 88. Cass. Dio 38.23.1. On Philiscus see Miliar, A Study of Cassius Dio, pp. 49 fL 89. The referenees are eollected in Miliar, A Study ~f Cassius Dio, p. 49, n.9. 90. Sest. 145. 91. Ibid. 92. Vell. Pat. 2.24.5. CL Pliny's refleetions on Q. Caeeilius Metellus Maeedonieus, who narrowly eseaped being hurled from the Tarpeian Rock by the order of his inimicus, the tribune C. Atinius Laheo (HN 7.145): 'quis hune iure felieem dixerit periclitatum ad libidinem inimici . ?' .. penre. 93. Cie. Inv. Rhet. 1.105. 94. Inst. 6.1.19. 95. Alt. 9.12.4. 96. Livy 39.4.13. 97. On this code of eonduet see Earl, The Jo,foral and Politieal Tradition of Rome, pp. 31 fL 98. Cie. Leg. 2.56; Val. Max. 9.2.1. 99. App. Mith. 60. 100. Val. Max. 5.1.10; Plut. Caes. 56.6; Cie. 40.5; Mor. 91A, 205E. 10 1. M1I. 86. 102. Ibid., 33. 103. Cie. Deiot. 31; Val. Max. 6.5.5; Cass. Dio 27.92.1. Plutareh reverses the roles of Domitius and Seaurus (Mor. 91D). 104. Val. Max. 6.5.6. 105. Plut. Cat. Min. 26.2-29.4. 106. Ibid., 29.4. 107. Cie. Div. 2.4. CL Klaus Bringmann, Untersuchungen zum späten Cicero (Ruprecht in Göttingen, 1971), p. 230. 108. Off. 1.34. CL ibiel., 1.88. 109. Antony apo Cie. Alt. 14.13a.3. 110. Ibid. 111. Red. Pop. 22 - 23; Sull. 48. 112. Cael. 77. 113. Quinet. 51. 114. Alt. 8.9a.1. 115. Caes. BCiv. 1.23. CL Shaekleton Bailey, Cicero '5 Leiters toAltieus, vol. 4, p. 338. 116. Cie. Amie. 77. 117. Font.34. 118. Phil. 2.56, 99. 119. Fam. 9.25.3. Cf. D .R. Shaekleton Bailey, Cicero: Epistulae ad Familiares, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1977), vol. I, p. 454. 120. Pis. 96. CL Cie. Off. 3.79 for the opprobrium Marius ineurred by falsely aceusing his eornmander Metellus. 121. Div. Caee. 63. E. Badian has eliseussed the prosopographieal and ehronologieal problems raised by the passage in 'Three Non-Trials in

136

137

---l.

No/es

No/es

Cicero', Klio, vo!. 66 (1984), pp. 291-309. On the relationship between quaestors and their commanders see L. A. Thompson, 'The Relationship belween Provincial Quaestors and their Commanders-in-Chief, Hist., vo!. 11 (1962), pp. 339 - 55. 122. Pro Oppio fr. 11 (ed. Fr. Sehoell): 'Misericordiam movemus, si ab iis nos impugnari dicimus quorum auxiliotuti esse deberemus, ut Cicero pro Oppio.' Cf. Gruen, Last Generation, p. 269.

1. Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee, Hannibal's Legaey, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1965), vo!. 1, pp. 307 - 11. 2. Christian Meier, Res Publiea Amissa (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 7 ff. and paJsim, analyses the motivations of Roman voters in greater detai!. 3. Slrassburger, PW, s.v. 'Optimates', cols. 775 Ir, surveys the modern scholarship leading to this conclusion. See espeeially his estimate of Gelzer's work, ibid., eols. 779·-80. 4. Ibid., cols. 793-4. 5. Ibid., co!. 793. 6. Meier, PWSupplement, vol. 10, s.v. 'Populares', cols. 561-2. 7. Ibid., co!. 557. 8. Ibid., eols. 561 - 2. 9. Ibid., co!. 561. 10. See H. H. Scullard's comparison of Roman politics and British publie life in Roman Polities 220-150 B.G. 2nd edn (Oxford, 1973), p. 3. 11. For Cicero' s concern about Dolabella' s debts see Alt. 7.3.12; Fam. 2.16.5. For his optimism see Au. 6.6.1; Fam. 3.12.2, 3.15.2. 12. Au. 11.23.3. For Dolabella's alIair with Metella, the wife of P. Cornelius Spinther, see ibid. Dolabella was also seeing Antonia, which caused hirn some trouble with her husband and cousin M. Antony. See pp. 34-5 infra. Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Cornelius (141)', co!. 1302, has collcctcd the sources for the radical legislation of Dolabella's tribunate. The passage that refers to the statue of Clodius depends on a conjecture, which D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cieero's LeUers to Auicus, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1965-8), vol. 5, pp. 291-2, considers thc best Purser ever made. 13. Au. 11.23.3; Fam. 14.13. 14. The sources arc collected by Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Cornelius (141)', col. 1303. 15. For the sources on Dolabella joining the tyrannieides sec ibid., co!. 1304; f(lr the incident in April, sec ibid., co!. 1305. FOt' the perccption of Cicero's inlhH'llce Oll Dolabella, sec Cie. Phi/. 1.30; Fam. 9.14.1- 2. Cicero takes credil filr lhe episode in All. 16.15.1. 16. The sourecs are colkcted by Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Cornelius (141)', co!. 1305. 17. All. 14.18.1, 14.19.5. 18. Ibid., 14.20.2. 19. Ibid., 16.3.5 Uuly 44); ibid., 15.13a.1 (Octobcr 44). 20. Ibid., 16.15.1; Cic. Phi!. 1.29.

21. Alt. 16.15.1. 22. rbid., 16.15.2. 23. Livy 29.9.2-3; Diod. 27.4.1. 24. The sources are eolleeted by Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politieian and Statesman, trans. Peter Needham (Oxford, 1968), p. 60, n. 1. 25. Har. Resp. 45. 26. Plut. Brut. 5; Cat. Min. 24.1-3; Suet.Iul. 50.2; Maerob. Sat. 2.2.5; App. BCiv. 2.112. 27. App. BCiv. 2.112 mentions it as a possible motive. 28. Suet. Iul. 50.1. For Pompey's deeision not to open hostilities with Caesar, see Fluss, PW, s.v. 'Mucia (28)', co!. 449. 29. Cie. Phil. 2.99. 30. Plut. Ant. 11.5-6. 31. Ibid., 9.r. 32. For the sourees, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Cornelius (141)', col. 1302. 33. Plut. Ant. 9.5. For an assessment of how mueh politieal eredit this action cost Antony with the 'rabble', see Gelzer, Caesar, p. 262. 34. For Antony's motivation, see Plut. Ant. 9.1 - 2 and Cie. Phil. 2.99. 35. For the sourees, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Cornelius (141)', col. 1304. 36. Cie. Phi!. 2.81. More generally on Antony's abuse of his augurate, see ibid., 2.99, 3.9. 37. Ibid., 2.80, 288. 38. Celer had served as Pornpey's lieutenant in Asia in 66 (Cass. Dio 36.54.2-3) and had oceupied the praetorship in 63, presumably with Pompey's blessing, beeause we know that Pompey supported his eam­ paign for the consulate in 61 (Cass. Dio 37.49.1). Nepos was one of Pompey's legates du ring the pirate war and also served in the ensuing campaign against Mithridates. See Münzer, PW, s. v. 'Caeeilius (96)', co!. 1216. 39. For the sources on Celer's eonsulate, sce MRR, vo!. 2, p. 183. 40. Cass. Dio 38.7.1-2. 41. All. 2.12.2. 42. Cie. Sest. 89; Alt. 4.3.3-4; Cass. Dio 39.74. 43. Cass. Dio 37.49.3. No souree states explieitly that Nepos' opposi­ tion to Pompey also resulted from the treatment of Mueia. Erieh Gruen, 'Pompey, the Roman Aristoeraey, and the Conferenee of Luea', Hist., vol. 18 (1969), pp. 82 - 3, aeeepts Dio's explanation ofthe enmity between Celer and Pompey. Ernst Badian, Studies in Greek and Roman History (Oxford, 1964), p. 41, uses the turmoil stirred up by the divoree ofMueia as a supporting parallel for his speeulation that Drusus' divoree of Servilia for adultery may have oeeasioned the quarrel between Servilius and Drusus. 44. This is the explanation offered by Syme, Rom. Rev., p. 33. 45. Ase. pp. 19 - 20 (Clark). r see no reason for rejeeting Asconius on this point as Robin Seager does in Pompey: A Political Biography (Berke1ey, 1979), p. 135. 46. Ase. p. 28 (Clark). Cf. Erieh Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republie (Berkeley, 1974), p. 336. 47. Cie. QFr. 3.8.3; App. BCiv. 2.24. The other sources on Seaurus' trial are Cie. Off. 1.138; QFr. 3.2.3; Quint. Inst. 1.138. Cf. Gruen,

138

139

Chapter 3

Noles

Noles

Last Generation, p. 348.

48. On Marius' early relations with the Metelli, see Thomas F. Carney, A Biograph). ofG. Marius (Salisbury, 1961), pp. 20 ff. 49. Cass. Dio 26.89.3; Sall. lug. 64.4; Plut. Mar. 8.6. Alfredo Passerini, Gaio Mario, eome uomo politieo (Pavia, 1934), pp. 24- 5, suggested that the snub was Marian propaganda, and is followed by Carney, G. Marius, p. 27, n. 140. But even as such it must have reflected a credible attitude or it would not have served those purposes. 50. Gie. 26-7. Cf. Cic. Farn. 9.16.1. Scipio Aemilianus earned a similar reputation. See Alan E. Astin, Seipio Aemilianus (Oxford, 1967), pp. 3-4. 51. For Cicero's illness at Pharsalus, see Plut. Gie. 39.1. His remarks are recorded in ibid., 38.2-8, and Macrob. Sat. 2.3.7-8. 52. Macrob. Sat. 2.3.8: 'Cupio [Pompey] ad hostes Cicero transeat, ut nos timeat.' See also Plut. Gie. 38.2. 53. Plut. Gie. 39.2. 54. Cic. Phil. 2.38-40. Cicero was responding to Antony's charge that his jokes had alienated Pompey. 55. Cicero Gomment. Pet. 45-9. 56. Ibid., 49. 57. Verr.2.2.58. 58. For the Epicrates episode, see ibid., 2.2.53-61. 59. For the Agonis episode, see Cie. Div. Gaec. 55 - 60. 60. Dom. 22- 3. 61. Plut. Gat. Min. 40.4. See also ibid., Gie. 34.3; Cass. Dio 39.22.1. 62. Phil. 10.2: 'a quo [Caleno] ita saepe dissentio, ut iam verear ne, id quod fieri minime debet, minuere amicitiam nos tram videatur perpetua dissensio.' Cicero must be reflecting the general Roman attitude despite his sarcasm. For a similar sentiment, cf. Dio's claim that Cicero was so angry at Fufius' pro-Antony speech that he set aside the public interest and began to abuse his opponent (46.29.1). 63. Off. 1.87. 64. For Cicero's resulting hatred of Metellus, see Farn. 5.2.6-8. Other sources on the incident are collected in MRR, vol. 2, p. 174. 65. Sest. 72. 66. Ibid., 130. 67. Gell. NA 12.8.1. Cf. ibid., 6.19.6. 68. Val. Max. 3.7.17. 69. Florus 2.5.5-6. 70. The sources on Drusus' attack on Philippus are collected in Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Livius (18)', cols. 873-4. Drusus' joke is recorded by [Aur. Vie.l, De Vir. Ill. 66.9: 'Philippo consuli legibus agrariis resistenti ita collum in comitio obtorsit, ut multus sanguis effiueret e naribus: quam ille [Drusus] luxuriam opprobrans muriam de turdis esse dicebat.' 71. For the sources, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Marcius (75)', col. 1564. 72. Asc. p. 69 (Clark); Cic. Provo Gons. 21. 73. For the sources see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Marcius (75)', col. 1564. 74. See Matthias Gelzer, The Roman Nobility, trans. Robin Seager (Oxford, 1975), pp. 101 ff. Of course this does not mean, as Peter A. Brunt, , "Amicitia" in the Late Roman Republic', PGPS, vol. 11 (1965),

140

pp. 1 ff., points out, that all amieitiae in Rome were perceived in purely political terms. 75. On the dangers that threatened friendship, see Cic. Amie. 33 - 5,

n.

I I

76. Ibid.,63. 77. Ibid., 77. Other sources on the incident are Cic. Tuse. 5.54; Plut. Mor. 200C. Astin, Scipio Aerm:tianus, pp. 311 - 12, argues that Pompeius' behaviour embittered Scipio to a much greater extent than Cicero indicates. 78. Amie. 34. Cf. ibid., 78. 79. Verr. 2.3.6. 80. Plut. Mar. 10.1; Sall. lug. 86.5. 81. Cass. Dio 41.4.4. Ronald Syme, 'The Allegiance of Labienus', jRS, vol. 28 (1938), pp. 114-15, who stresses a different reason for Labienus' desertion, concedes that his envy of Caesar played a role in the dispute. 82. On gratia, see]. Hellegouarc'h, Le voeabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la republique (Paris, 1963), pp. 202 ff. 83. Cic. Farn. 7.2.3. Cicero's defence of Munatius is perhaps referred to in Plut. Gie. 25.1. See D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Gicero: Epistulae ad Familiares, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1977), vol. 1, p. 352. 84. Farn. 7.2.2-3. 85. Off. 2.50. Cf. Quint. Inst. 12.7.3. 86. Asc. pp. 37-38 (Clark). 87. Cic. Alt. 13.49.1-2; Farn. 7.24.1-2. 88. Scaur. 45. 89. For the sources on Brutus' execution, see MRR, vol. 2, p. 90. There is some debate about whether the execution was officially condoned. See Seager, Pompey, p. 16. The young Brutus is unlikely to have been interested in the technicality. 90. Cic. Alt. 2.24.2. Cf. L. Hayne, 'L. Paullus and his attitude to Pompey', Ant. Glass., vol. 41 (1972), p. 150. The attitude of Hayne's subject, L. Aemilius Lepidus Paullus, whose father's death was also Pompey's responsibility, was less striking. But Hayne (ibid., pp. 147 - 55) traces a persistent hostility to Pompey throtlfihout his eareer. Cf. Gruen, Last Generation, p. 302. 91. Plut. Brut. 4.3; Pomp. 64.5. 92. Plut. Brut. 4.1. 93. Plut. Ant. 2.1-2; Cie. Phi!. 2.17. 94. Cie. Mil. 59; Ase. pp. 34,38-9,41,54 (Clark). Cf. Gruen, Last Generation, p. 338. In another famaus example of a nephew's pietas, T. Labienus' judieial atlaek on the pathetic C. Rabirius was eertainly partially motivated by the death of his unde Q. Labienus with the Saturninians in 100. Cf. Gruen, Last Generation, pp. 278-9. 95. Asc. p. 54 (Clark). Cf. Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Claudius (298)', col. 2854; B. A. Marshall, A Historiea! Gommentary on Aseonius (Columbia, 1985), p. 206. 96. App. BGI'v. 1.103. 97. Meier, Res Publica Amissa, pp. 170 ff. 98. Caelius apo Cie. Farn. 8.6.2; Cic. Farn. 3.10.1. 3.10.5, 2.13.2.

141

Notes

Notes

99. Pis. 35. Elsewhere (Fam. 3.10.8), when it suited his purpose, Cicero c1aimed that Claudius had not been his enemy during his conflict with Clodius, but feit obliged to add how unusual this was. Cf. Fran<;ois Hinard, 'Paternus inimicus. Sur une expression de Ciceron', irr Mi/anges de littirature et d'epigraphie latines, d'histoire aneienne et d'arehCologie; Hommage Cl la memoire de Pierre Wuilleumier (Paris, 1980), p. 207. 100. Red. Sen. 38. 101. Ibid., 25. 102. Fam.2.18.2. 103. For the sources, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Marius (42)', col. 1827. 104. App. BCiv. 1.94. 105. Plut. Caes. 1; Suet. lul. 1.2-3. On the young Caesar's trouble with Sulla, see Gelzer, Caesar, pp. 20-1. 106. For the sources, see Münzer, PW, S.v. 'Tullius (31)', col. 1293. 107. Gruen, Last Generation, p. 293, n. 128, cites the passages that show Cicero's concern. 108. Hinard, 'Paternus inimicus', pp. 208-10. Cf. Gruen, Last Generation, pp. 414-16. On the lex Comelia, see Giovanni Rotondi, Leges publieae populi romani (Milan, 1912), p. 349. 109. Pis. 4. Cf. Cic. Att. 2.1.3; Leg. Agr. 2.10; Quint. lnst. 11.1.85; Pliny HN7.117; Plut. Cie. 12.2. 110. Brunt,' "Amicitia"', pp. 17-18. 111. Nep. Att. 9.3. 112. Ibid., 11.5: 'nullas inimicitias gessit [AtticusJ, quod neque laedebat quemquam neque, si quam iniuriam acceperat, non malebat oblivisci quam ulcisci.' 113. Fam. 15.4.12, 15.21.2. 114. Red. Sen. 38, 20; Plane. 77. 115. Fam. 1.9.11. 116. Plut. Crass. 14.1; Pomp. 47.2; Cass. Dio 37.55. 117. Fam. 1.9.20. 118. Har. Resp. 7. On the origins of the inimieitiae between Milo and Clodius, see also Cic. Sest. 86 and Asc. p. 30 (Clark): 'Miloni et Clodio summae erant inimicitiae, quod et Milo Ciceronis erat amicissimus in reducendoque co enixe operam tr. pI. dederat, et P. Clodius restituto quoque Ciceroni erat infestissimus ideoque summe studebat Hypsaeo et Scipioni contra Milonem.' 119. Mil. 100. 120. Caelius apo Cic. Fam. 8.12.1-2. 121. Fam. 10.11.1. 122. Ibid., 11.14.2. 123. Ibid., 2.9.3. Cf. Caelius apo Cic. Fam. 8.12.4: 'A te peto ut meas iniurias proinde doleas, ut me existimas et dolere ct ukisci tuas solere. ' 124. Cic. Amie. 34. 125. On Atticus' decision, see Shackleton Bailey, Cieero's Letters to Attieus, vol. 1, p. 5. 126. Sall. Cat. 4.1-2. 127. Ibid., 3.2. 128. Ibid.: 'plerique quae delicta reprehenderis malevolentia ct invidia dicta putant.' It is true that writing history appears a bit more attractive in

comparison with politics in ibid., lug. 3 - 4, but this was because corruption had become so prevalent in Sallust's time that the honours of public office had been devalued. 129. Sull. 1: 'communis ambitionis invidia.' 130. Cat. 3.5. See also lug. 3.3. 131. Sall. Cat. 20.7-8: 'Nam postquam res publica in paucorum potentium ius atque dicionem concessit, semper illis reges tetrarchae vectigales esse, populi nationes stipendia pendere; ceteri omnes, strenui, boni, nobiles atque ignobiles, volgus fuimus sine gratia, si ne auctoritate, iis obnoxii, quibus, si res publica valeret, formidini essemus. Itaque omnis gratia potentia honos divitiae apud illos sunt aut ubi illi volunl; nobis reliquere pericula repulsas iudicia, egestatem.' Cf. ibid., 37.10. See also Gruen's analysis of the political disappointments suffered by Catiline, P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura, P. Autronius Paetus, L. Vargunteius, Q. Curius and L. Cassius Longinus in Last Generation, pp. 417 ff., 429 and n. 107. 132.0.tf. 1.38. 133. On the magnitude of Cicero's accomplishment in attaining the consulship SUD anno. see T. P. Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate 139sc-14AD (Oxford, 1971), pp. 106,166-7. 134. Sull. 1. 135. Ibid., 81. 136. Vat. 24. Similar conditions (according to Cicero) precipitated Vatinius' attack on L. Domitius (Vat. 25). Other orators were equally quick to see invidia as a source of hostile action when it suited their purposes. Fabius Maximus showed how common such charges were by anticipating that his opposition to Scipio would be ascribed to jealousy of the younger man, and c1aiming that no invidia could exist between two men so disparate in age, 10 say nothing of glorious achievements (Livy 38.40.8-14). Scipio's response stressed that a man of Fabius' distinction could envy a young competitor (Livy 28.43.2 - 8). 137. Sull. 3.8-9; Mar. 10.8-9. 138. Plut. Sull. 4.1. 139. Ibid., 4.2. 140. Ibid., 4.3-5. 141. E. Badian, Lueius Sulla, the Deadly Reformer (Sydney, 1970), pp. 8-9. 142. Plut. Sull. 6.1- 2; Mar. 32.4. For the date, see Badian, Lueius Sulla, p. 12. 143. Badian, Lueius Sulla, p. 12. 144. SrLl!. 6.2; Mar. 32.5-6. 145. Livy 31.10-11.3,31.21-22.3; Cass. Dio fr. 58.6; Zonar. 9.15; Oros. 4.204. 146. Livy 31.47.4-49.12; Cass. Dio fr. 57.81. 147. Cass. Dio fr. 41.10. 148. For Marcius' eo.gnomen, secJohn D. Briscoe, A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI-XXXIII (Oxford, 1973), p. 171. 149. For Man'ius' command after the death of the Scipios, see Münzer, PW, S.V. 'Marcius (107)', cols. 1591 ff. 150. Cass. Dia fr. 57.40. Cf. Livy 26.20.3.

142

143

Notes

Notes

151. The eontinuing tension between the two tyrannieides led to an attempt at reeoneiliation in 42. See Cass. Dio 47.35.1; Plut. Brut. 34-5. 152. Plut. Brut. 7.1-5; Caes. 62.5; App. BCiv. 2.112, 4.57. 153. On the eampaign for the pontifieate, see Plut. CaeL 7.1-4; Cass. Dio 37.37.1-3; Suet. Iul. 13; Sall. Cat. 49.2; Vell. Pat. 2.43.3. For Catulus' aspirations and disappointment, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Lutatius (8)', col. 2091. The attempt to bribe Caesar is recorded by Plut. Caes. 7.2. 154. Sall. Cat. 49.1. 155. Ibid., 49.4. Cf. Suet. Iul. 14.2. 156. Cass. Dio 37.44.1-2,43.14.6; Suet. Iul. 15. For Caesar's refusal to allow Catulus to speak from the rostrum, see Cie. Au. 2.24.3 and Gelzer, Caesar, p. 55. Shaekleton Bailey, Cieero's Leuers to Auiws, vol. 2, p. 401, denies this interpretation. 157. For the sourees, see MRR, vol. 2, p. 158. 158. Plut. Caes, 6.6. 159. On the eampaign, see Cass. Dio 37.3.1-3. Dio's claim that Caesar also stressed his vote against the death penalty far the Catilinarians as part of his eampaign reveals confused ehronology. 160. Cass. Dio 37.44.1. 161. On the in im ieitiae between Marius and L. Lutatius Catulus, eonsul in 102, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Lutatius (7)', eol. 2079. 162. Cie. Scaur. 32-3. 163. For these examples, see ibid., 32. 164. Cf. p. 7 supra. 165. Cie. Au. 6.1.2. 166. Plut. Pomp. 67.9. Cf. Gelzer, Caemr, pp. 238-9. 167. Caes. BCiv. 3.82.5. 168. Plut. Cat. Min. 65.5. 169. Plut. Sert. 25.1. 170. Ibid., 25.2. On the contrast between the origins ofPerpenna and Sertorius, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Perpenna (6)', col. 897. William V. Harris, Rome in Etruria and lJmbria (Oxford, 1971), p. 288, advanees another explanation of Perpenna's motives. 171. Sall. Cat. 23.6. Cf. Plut. Cat. Mai. 16.4 on the opposition of the nobiles to Cato's bid for the eensorship. Wiseman, New Men, pp. 100 ff., diseusses the nobility's attitude toward new men. 172. Brunt, who does not believe that inimieitiae were eommon, thinks they were mainly direeted against new men. See' "Amieitia" " p. 13. 173. On Metellus' aristoeratie eontempt for Marius, cf. Carney, C. Marius, p. 26 and n. 139. 174. Livy Per. 68. 175. Ase. pp. 22 - 3 (Clark). On the relationship between Cicero and M. Aemilius Seaurus, sec Thomas N. MitchelI, Cicero: TheAseending Years (New Haven, 1979), p. 3. 176. The quotations are from Cie. Verr. 2.5.180- 2. 177. Cicero Comment. Pet. 13. Cf. Wiseman, New Men, pp. 104-5. 178. Cicero Comment. Pet. 14. 179. On the popular attitude toward the nobility, sec Wiseman, New Men, pp. 105-6. 180. My aeeount owes much to Zwi Yavetz, ]ulius Caemr anrl his Puh/ie

Image (Ithaea, 1983), pp. 195-203. 181. Suet. Iul. 77: 'Sullam neseisse litteras, qui dietaturam deposuerit.' 182. Cie. Au. 14.1.2. Cf. ibid., 14.2.3. 183. Cass. Dio 42.22.2; Plut. Brut. 7.2-5. 184. For the sourees, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Caninius (9)', eol. 1479. 185. Fam. 7.30.1-2. 186. Plut. Caes. 60.8; Suet. Iul. 78.1. The sources on the ineident are eolleeted in Gelzer, Caesar, p. 317, n. 4. For Caesar's explanations ofhis behaviour, see Cass. Dio 44.8.3; Plut. Caes. 60.7. 187. Fam. 9.15.4. Far the identification of Balbus, see Shaekleton Bailey, Cicero: Epistulae ad Familiares, vol. 2, p. 352. 188. Cf. PaulJal, LaguerreezviieaRome(Paris, 1963), pp. 464-5.

144

145

189. For Caesar's confliet with C. Epidius Marullus and L. Caesetius Flavus, see Gelier, Caesar, pp. 318-19, with full sourees. 190. On the festival of the Luperei, see ibid., pp. 321 - 2, with sourees. See espeeially Cie. Phil. 13.41: 'Tu, tu, inquam, illum oeeidisti Luperealibus. ' 191. For the sourees, see Gelzer, Caesar, p. 323, n. 1. On the mueh debated question about Caesar's royal ambitions, see ibid., pp. 318 ff., and espeeially p. 318, n. 4, and Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age oJ Caemr (Berkeley, 1949), p. 175 and n. 51. 192. On the title and its implieation, see Gelzer, Caemr, p. 320. 193. Cass. Dio 44.7.3-4,44.9.1; Plut. Caes. 57.3. 194. App. BCiv. 2.108. 195. Cass. Dio 36.24.6. 196. Ibid., 37.25.3. 197. See Seager's diseussion in Pompey, pp. 110 ff. 198. Qf'r. 3.8.4: 'Velit nolit seire diffieile est.' Cf. Seager, Pompey, p. 139. 199. QFr.3.9.3. 200. Cass. Dio 40.51.1. 201. See p. 73 infra. 202. Fam. 2.15.4; Au. 6.6.3-4. Cf. Cie. Pis. 4, where Cicero expeets his opposition to restorillg the right to hold office to the Sullan vietims to eost hirn inimieitiae. 203. For Clodius' motive, see Plut. Luc. 34.2. Other sources on Clodius' role in fomenting The mutiny are Cass. Dio 36.14.4,36.17.2; Cie. Har. Resp. 42. 204. On the charge that Clodia had committed ineest, see Plut. Cic. 29.4; Cie. Mil. 73; Cass. Dio 37.46.2. Other sources on the divoree are Plut. Lue. 38.1; Caes. 10.6. 205. Ase. p. 21 (Clark): 'Cn. Domitius ... iratus Seauro quod eum in augurum collegium non cooptaverat, diem ei dixit apud populum et multam irrogavit.' The other sources on the proseeution are eolleeted in MarshalI, Asconius, p. 132. Far the senior Domitius' priesthood, see Suet. Ner.2.1. Asconius may be mistaken in claiming that it was the augurate rather than the pontifieate that Domitius did not reeeive. See MarshalI, Asconius, pp. 129 - 32 for a summary of the seholarly debate. 206. Caclius apud Cie. fam. 8.14.1. Cf. ibid., 8.12.1, 8.12.4, and

;

Notes

Notes

Shackleton Bailey, Cicero: Epislulae ad Familiares, vol. 1, pp. 429-30. 207. Pis. 57 - 63. 208. Cal. Min. 29.5. Cf. Plut. Luc. 37.2. For the fragments of Memmius' speech, see ORF, 2nd edn, p. 402. 209. Au. 1.18.3: 'Quamquam ille pastor Idaeus Menelaum solum con­ tempserat, hic noster Paris tarn Menelaum quam Agamemnonem Iiberum non putavit.' Ernesti interpreted Cicero' s joke as a reference to the seduc­ tion of L. Lucullus' wife, and is followed by Shackleton Bailey, Cicero's LeUersloAuicUJ, vol. 1, pp. 331-2. 210. Livy 24.43.2-3. 211. See p. 70 infra. 212. See pp. 78-9 infra. 213. For the sources on Scipio's censorial actions against Claudius Asellus, see MRR, vol. 1, p. 474. For Asellus' revenge, see p. 113 infra. 214. On clientage and its role in Roman politics, see Gelzer, The Roman Nobility, pa55im. 215. Sall. lug. 67.3: 'Turpilius praefectus unus ex omnibus Italicis intactus profugit. Id misericordiane hospitis an pactione aut casu ita evenerit, parum conperimus, nisi, quia illi in tanto malo turpis vita integra fama potior fuit, improbus intestabilisque videtur.' 216. Plut. Mar. 8.6. The sources on the Turpilius affair are Plut. Mar. 8.1- 6; Sall. lug. 66- 69; App. Pun. fr. 3. Erich Gruen, Roman Polilics and Ihe Criminal Courts, 149-78 B.C. (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 152 ff., believes that Marius may have exploited this episode later in his propaganda eampaign against Metellus by emphasising that Metellus had violated the sacred ties that bound patrons and clients. See especially the evidence cited on p. 153, n. 90. For Marius' boast, see Plut. Mar. 8.5. Passerini rejects the story in Caio Mario, p. 18. 217. The source of Rutilius' wrath is recorded by Livy 43.16.3 - 5 and Val. Max. 6.5.3. For his attack on the censors see p. 105 infra. 218. On Sthenius' suffering under Verres, see Cic. Verr. 2.2.83 ff. 219. Ibid., 2.2.117. 220. Ibid., 2.2.118. 221. For the sources on the Ilogging, see Münzer, PW, s.V. 'Claudius (229)', col. 2761. 222. Fam. 6.6.10. 223. Ibid., 4.4.3.

1. Cf. Ernst Badian's essay debunking the rornantie vISion that has dominated the modern portrait of T. Quinctius Flamininus, Tilus Quinclius Flamininus: Philhellenism and Realpolilik (Cincinnati, 1970), and especially his remarks about the private motivations of Roman politicians on pp. 25, 47 - 8. Badian has had something to say on this theme in 'Tiberius Gracehus and the Beginning of the Roman Revolution' , Aufslieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt, Part 1, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1972 - 3), vol. 1, p. 692, with referenee to the dolor of Ti. Gracehus. 2. For Pompey's admiration of Alexander, see Peter Green, 'Caesar

and Alexander', AmericanJournal of Ancieni His/ory, vol. 3 (1978), pp. 5 - 6. 3. Plut. Pomp. 29.4. Cass. Dio 36.18.1 claims that Octavius had not been sent to do any fighting, but to take over the cities. When Metellus refused to co-operate, however, Oetavius did become involved in the Cretan resistanee to Metellus (Cass. Dio 36.19.1- 2). It seems unlikely that Oetavius would have taken such a drastic step without Pompey's authorisation. 4. Plut. Pomp. 29.4-6. 5. For Lueullus' conduet, see Diod. 36.9.2. For the trial, see p. 115 infra. I have diseussed the similar conduct of Q. Caecilius Metellus Maeedonicus, who wanted to prevent his inimicus Q. Pompeius from gaining any glory in the Spanish campaign 01' 141, on pp. 15 - 16 supra. 6. Cal. 17.7. 7. Rep. 1.31. 8. Farn. 2.17.6. Cf. Alt. 6.5.3. 9. Plutarch (Fabius 10.5) claims that Fabius found Minucius unendur­ able after his elevation. Cf. Livy 22.27.1- 2, who characterises Minucius as 'vix tolerabilis' as a result of his good fortune and the public favour he enjoyed. Cass. Dio 14.57.16 claims that Fabius was not angry with the Roman people or with Minucius. But his account rellects the rhetorical tradition that glorified the conduct and wisdom of Fabius Maximus. See Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Minucius (52)', col. 1961. 10. Hann. 13. 11. Plut. Flam. 18.3-19.7; Cal. Mai. 17.5. Cf. Alan E. Astin, Calolhe Censor (Oxford, 1978), p. 85. 12. Plut. Flam. 19.7. On Cato's expulsion of Lucius, see Astin, Calo, pp. 79- 80. For Cato's dispute with the publicans, see E. Badian, Publicans and Sinnm (Oxford, 1972), pp. 35 - 7. 13. Mar. 32.3. 14. Ibid., 28.4-5. Cf. Plutarch's speculation (An/. 9.2-3) that Antony's dramatic shift in policy in 47 was occasioned by his suspicion that Dolabella was having an affair with his wife. 15. Cass. Dio 42.24.3. 16. For Rutilius' wrath, see Livy 43.16.3 - 5. For Livy's views on the tribunate of Ti. Gracchus, see the sources that depend on hirn: Flor. 2.2.2; Oros. 5.8.3. 17. Ti. Gracehus: Brul. 103; Har. Resp. 43. C. Gracchus: Har. Resp. 43; Rab. Pad. 14-15; Brul. 126. Saturninus: Ses/. 34; Har. Resp. 34. 18. See p. 20 supra. 19. Ase. p. 32 (Clark). 20. BCiv. 1.22. Cf. ibid., 1.23, and Erik Wistrand, Caesar and Conlern­ porary Roman Society (Göteborg, 1978), p. 39. 21. Paul J al, La guerre ävile a Rome (Paris, 1963), pp. 37 - 42. 22. Livy 42.8.7-9.6. 23. Ibid., 42.10.10- 13. 24. BGal!. 1.44.12. 25. Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Polilician and Sialesman, trans. Peter Needharn (Oxford, 1968), p. 172, takes Caesar at his word about the conversation with Ariovistus. 26. SaH. Cal. 31.9.

146

147

Chapter 4

Notes

Notes

27. Ibid., 34.2: 'At Catilina ex itinere plerisque eonsularibus, praeterea optumo quoique litteras mittit: se falsis eriminibus eireumventum, quoniam faetioni inimieorum resistere nequiverit . 28. Lepidus apud Cie. Fam. 10.35.2. 29. App. BCiv. 2.123. 30. Sall. H. fr. 3.48.27. 31. BCiv. 1.7. 32. See pp. 14-15 supra. 33. See Lily Ross Taylor' s diseussion in Party Polilies in Ihe Age oj Caesar (Berkeley, 1949), pp. 94-5. 34. Livy 43.16.10. 35. Pliny HN 7.144. Cf. Cie. Dom. 123; Livy Per. 59. 36. Cie. Dom. 125.

was an important motive. Other sources confirm how dangerous it was to have had an inimieus during SuIla's terror. See Cass. Dio 1'1'. 109.10 ff. Cicero preserves a speeifie example: Oppianieus, claiming to be empowered by SuIla, exploited the proseriptions to do away with some 01' his enernies (Clu. 25). Cf. Cie. Rose. Am. 87. 59. App. BCiv. 1.73. 60. Val. Max. 9.2.1-2. Cf. Cass. Dio fr. 109.4. For SuIla's partieipa­ tion, 01' at least aequieseenee, in atroeities committed before and during the proseriptions, see Plut. Sull. 32.1; App. BCiv. 1.94,96; Cass. Dio fr. 109.4; Livy Per. 88; Oros. 5.21.7 -10; Rhel. Her. 1.25, 4.31. For similar stories about Marius' eruelty, see Plut. Mar. 44.4-8; App. BCiv. 1.73; Florus 2.9.14-15; Oros. 5.20.4. See also the story of C. Graeehus' severed head being brought to Opimius: Plut. C. Gracch. 17; Cie. De Or. 2.269; Florus 2.3.6; Pliny HN33.48; Val. Max. 9.4.3; [Aur. Vic.l De Vir. /ll. 65.6. 61. See All. 9.1.4 together with D. R. Shaekleton Bailey, Cieero's Letters 10 Allieus, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1965-8), vol. 4, p. 359. 62. For the abuse of the proseriptions by the triumvirs and others, see App. BCiv. 4.5, 4.15. 63. Plut. Cle. 46.3,48.6; Anl. 20.3-4; Cass. Dio 47.8.3; App. BCiv. 4.19-20. 64. Verr. 2.4.69. For another example 01' inimieiliae connoting savage­ ness, see Cie. Leg. Man. 28: 'qui [Pompeyl saepius eum hoste eonflixit, quam quisquam eum inimieo concertavit.' Cf. also Appian's (unfortun­ alely eorrupt) statement about Sulla's war against the Marians in 83

37. Fam. 11.15.1.

38. I have diseussed the jealousy between Cn. Mallius Maximus, eos. 105, and Q. Servilius Caepio, cos. 106, whieh led to the disaster at Arausio on p. 16 supra. 39. Polyb. 3.104.1. Cf. Plut. Fab. Max. 11.1. 40. Plut. Crass. 11.3-4; App. BCiv. 1.120. 41. App. BCiv. 1.120. 42. Plut. Crass. 11.10-11; Pomp. 21.3-4. Cf. Allan Mason Ward, Mareus Crassus and Ihe Laie Roman Republie (Columbia, 1977), pp. 96 - 7. 43. Cie. Leg. 3.44; Sesl. 65; Dom. 43. The prohibition went back to the XII Tables. See H. F. Jolowicz and Barry Nieholas, Hislorieallnlroduction 10 Ihe Sludy oj Roman Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 29, 109. 44. Ase. p. 78 (Clark). 45. The sources are set out in MRR, vol. 2, p. 196. 46. lul. 10.2. On Caesar's eclipse 01' Bibulus, see ibid., 10.1; Cass. Dio 37.8.2. 47. Livy 38.54- 55. Antias' fabrieations are exposed by Plinio Fraeearo, Opuscula, 3 vols. (Pavia, 1956 - 7), vol. 1, pp. 309 - 24. Cf. H. H. Seullard, Roman Polilies 220-150 B.e, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1973), pp. 294- 5. For Furius' enmity with Manlius, see Livy 38.44.11 ff.; 39.6.4. Für Cato's enmity with the Seipios, see pp. 104-5 injra. 48. Zonar. 7.19. 49. Livy 39.41.2. 50. Ibid., 38.35.1. Lily Ross Taylor, Roman Voling Assemblies (Ann Arbor, 1966), pp. 104-5, discusses how a presiding magistrate might aet to prcvent the eleetion 01' an inimicus. 51. Livy 38.43.1. Acmilius also blamed Fulvius 1'01' preventing hirn from gaining the eonsulate 01' 189 (ibid., 37.47.6-7). 52. Cass. Dio 36.40.2. Cf. Jolowicz and Nieholas, Hislorieallnlroduction 10 Ihe Sludy oj Roman Law, p. 98. 53. Mil.25-6.

(BCiv. 1.84). 65. Cie. Clu. 171.

66. Diod. 27.4.4. Livy 29.9.7 reports that it was the tribunes' soldiers who mutilated Pleminius. 67. Diod. 27.4.5; Livy 29.9.10. 68. Livy 5.13.7. 69. Sall. lug. 86.5. 70. On consilium, see Mommsen, Röm. Slaalsr., vol. 1, pp. 307 1'1'. 71. On the eomposition of the consilium, see ibid., pp. 315 ff. 72. Flaec. 77. 73. Riehard A. Bauman, The Crimen Maieslalis in Ihe Roman Republic and AU,L;uslan Prineipale Oohannesburg, 1967), pp. 246 - 51, surveys the evidenee and concludes that the erimen maieslalis was not used to suppress freI' speech during the Republie. 74. Verr. 2.2.139.

56. Ibid., 7.26.2, 8.1ID.7, 8.12.2. 57. App. BCiv. 2.27. 58. Plut. Sull. 31.1. Cf. ibid., 31.10, where Plutareh asserts that more were killed for their wealth than beeause of hatred, implying that hatred

75. On the inimieiliae between lhe two, wh ich apparently dated back to the time both men served under SuIla, see Plut. Lue. 4.5. 76. Plut. Lue. 36.1; Pomp. 31.1-2; Strabo 12.558; Cass. Dio 36.46.2. On tampering with an inimicus' provineial arrangements, see Ap. Claudius Pulcher's suspicions about Cieero's behaviour in Cilieia, p. 54 supra. 77. Livy 27.20.11-21.4; Plut. Mare. 27. Cf. Fabius Maximus' pro­ posal after the Pleminius affair that Scipio be stripped 01' his eommand (Livy 29.19.6; Plut. Fab. Max. 26.3), and the efforts 01' L. Quinetius, praetor in 68, to send suceessors to Lueullus' provinees (Plut. Lue. 33.4-5).

148

149

54. Fam. 2.18.2. 55. All. 3.10.1, 3.22.2.

Notes

Notes

78. Plut. Pomp. 27.1; Cass. Dio 36.37.2. Cf. Fabius' efforts to thwart Scipio's African campaign: Plut. Fab. Max. 25.4-26.2; Livy 29.19.3-9. 79. On the minimum requirements 1'01' a triumph, see Mommsen, Röm. Staalsr., vol. I, pp. 126-33; Ehlers, PW, s.v. 'Triumphus', cols. 497-9; H. S. Versnel, Triumphus (Leiden, 1970), pp. 164-95. 80. For the lack 01' the magistrate's imperium as part 01' Afrieanus' difli­ eulty in seeuring a triumph in 206, see Livy 28.38.4; Val. Max. 2.8.5; Cass. Dio 17.56. No souree mentions specifieally that Scipio's inimiei played a role in the discussions about Scipio's bid für a triumph, but it is a fair assumption that Fabius opposed it because he had belittled Scipio's aehievements in Spain when the Senate was debating whether to assign Scipio Afriea as a provinee (Livy 28.43.3-6). 81. M. Claudius Marcellus' inimiei raised this charge (Plut. Mare. 22.1; Livy 26.21.4). Cf. [Aur. Vict.] De Vir. lll. 45.6 and Val. Max. 2.8.5, who is confused about the objeetions raised to Mareellus' triumph. M. Aemilius Lepidus used the same taetic to oppose M. Fulvius Nobilior's triumph in 187 (Livy 39.4.9). 82. Val. Max. 2.8.1; Livy 38.47.5-6. 83. This was the prineipal charge raised by the opponents 01' Cn. Manlius Vulso lo his triumph over the Gauls in Asia in 187 (Livy 38.45.7-46.15). Livy attributed the opposition to malignitas (38.50.3). Manlius himself not surprisingly implied that inimiei were trying to block his triumph (Livy 38.47.5). 84. See Sulpicius Galba's opposition to L. Aemilius Paullus' triumph (Plut. Aem. 30.5 - 8; Vell. Pat. 1.96), and the opposition to the triumphs 01' Q. Caeeilius Metellus Creticus and Q. Mareius Rex deseribed by Sall. Cat. 30.4. 85. Sull. 90. 86. For the sourees, see Volkman, PW, S.v. 'Popillius (28)', eols. 63-4. 87. Dom. 82, 87; Red. Pop. 6; Red. Sen. 37; Leg. 3.26; Rep. 1.6. 88 . .'lest. 37. 89. Ibid., 101; App. BCiv. 1.28; Cass. Dio 28, fr. 95.2. Ernst Badian, 'The Death ofSaturninus', Chiron, vol. 14 (1984), p. 138, suggests that the attempt to deprive Furius 01' his horse was unsuecessful. 90. For the sources on the exile 01' Metellus, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Caecilius (97)', col. 1220. 91. Ibid. 92. Plut. Mar. 31.1- 2; Oros. 5.17.11. Badian, 'The Death 01' Saturninus', pp. 137·- 8, stresses the persistence 01' Marius' inimieitiae with Metellus after the exile. 93. Erieh Gruen, 'Politieal Proseeutions in the 90's B.C.', Hist., vol. 15 (1966), pp. 33-4 dated Furius' tribunate to 100. His date is aeeepted by Badian, 'The Death 01' Saturninus', pp. 132 - 3. For Furius' proposal to confiscate the property 01' the followers 01' Saturninus, see Oros. 5.17.10. We do not know to what dcgree - if any - Furius supported the revolutionary programme 01' Saturninus. The only evidenee is Cass. Dio 28, fr. 95.3: 'He was unstablc. After first assoeiating with Saturninus and Glaueia, he changed sides, and deserting to the opposing party, he joined in attacking his former colleagues.' This is not enough to support Grucn's

claim epolitical Prosecutions', p. 32) that Furius reached the tribunate 'obviously as a popular candidate' . Furius' support may have been limited to co-operating in the effort to have Metellus exiled. On Furius' veto ofthe bill to recall Metellus after he had declared his allegiance to the boni, see App. BCiv. 1.33; Oros. 5.17.11. Cf. Fran<;ois Hinard, 'Paternus inimicus. Sur une expression de Ciceron' , in Melanges de lilterature eI d'epigraphie latines, d'histoire aneienne eI d'areheologie; Hommage a la memoire de Pierre Wuilleumier (Paris, 1980), p. 206. 94. Cic. Rab. Perd. 24-25; Val. Max. 8.1, damno 2. 95. On the prosecution 01' Canuleius, see App. BCiv. 1.33. Cass. Dio 28, 1'1'. 95.3, refers vaguely to an indictment 01' Furius 1'01' acts performed during his tribunate. I cannot accept Gruen's claim epolitical Prosecu­ tions', pp. 34-6) that Furius was only tried once after his tribunate and that Canuleius and Decianus co-operated in the proseeution. Appian implies that Canuleius' motive in prosecuting Furius was Furius' opposi­ tion to the recall 01' Metellus. It is diflicult to imagine a man principally motivated by loyalty to Metellus co-operating with men attempting to avenge Saturninus. Cf. Badian, 'The Death 01' Saturninus', pp. 130- 2. 96. Alt. 1.1.4. 97. QFr. 3.2.2, 3.4.2. 98. Two valuable surveys 01' the scholarly debate about how Roman politicians organised to pursue political power are Erich Gruen, Roman Polities and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 sc. (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 1-7 and Scullard, Roman Polities, 2nd edn, pp. xvii-xxxiii. Argument about the' durability and cohesiveness ofthe bonds that united Roman politicians continues. Two recent studies, T. P. Wiseman, 'Competition and Co­ operation', and J eremy Paterson, 'Polities in the Late Republic', both in 1'. P. Wiseman (cd.), Roman Politieal Life 90 BC-Aß 69 (Exeter, 1985), surpass even Christian Meier's sccpticism about the strength 01' Roman factional unity in his pioneering work, Res Pubh"ca Amissa. Cf. Paterson's extreme conclusion (p. 35): 'Parties, factions and family groups in Roman politics are largely the ereation 01' modern commentators.' My concern in what follows is to describe one hitherto neglected unifying force in Roman politics - inimieitiae. 99. Cat. 19.1. On the inimieitiae between Pompey and Cn. Calpurnius Piso, see Erieh Gruen, 'Pompey and the Pisones', California Studies in Classieal Antiquity, vol. 1 (1968), pp. 159ff. 100. Sall. Cat. 19.2. 101. On the date, see Miltnel', PW, s. v. 'Poreia (28)', eols. 216 - 17. 102. Suet. lul. 10; Cass. Dio 37.8.2. 103. Caes. BCiv. 3.16.3. 104. lul. 19.1 105. Livy. 38.55.1-3. On the historicity 01' Antias' aeeount, see Fraccaro, Opuseula, vol. 1, pp. 316-17. 106. Cf. Matthias Gelzer's suggestion in Kliene Schriften, 3 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1962 - 4), vol. 1, pp. 204 - 5, that the opposition to Scipio Africanus in the 180s eonsisted 01' disparate Roman politicians united by fear 01' Scipio's 'Herrschaftsansprüche'. 107. Cass. Dio 37.55.2 <-l. 108. Ibid., 37.50.5-6.

150

. I ,

151

No/es 109. BCiv. passim.

110. Seager, Pompey, p. 82, n. 63, has colleeted the sources that attri­ bute the eivil war to Cato. 111. On the exterior politeness, see Plut. Luc. 41.4. 112. Pomp. 30.8. 113. Plut. Luc. 36.4; Pomp. 31.7-8; Cass. Dio 36.46.1-2; Vell. Pat. 2.33.2. 114. Pompey's actions against Lueullus: Plut. Pomp. 31.9-10; Luc. 36.4. Lueullus' eountercharges: Plut. Pomp. 31.11-13. 115. Plut. Luc. 38.2. 116. Plut. Pomp. 46.6; Luc. 42.5-6; Cat. Min. 31; App. BCiv. 2.9; Vell. Pat. 2.40.5; Cass. Dio 37.49.3-4. 117. Plut. Luc. 42.4; Crass. 14.1; Pomp. 47.2; App. BCiv. 2.9; Cass. Dio 37.54.3. 118. Vell. Pat. 2.40.5; Florus 2.13.9. 119. Vell. Pat. 2.40.5; Cass. Dio 36.19.3; Florus 2.13.9. 120. Cf. D. R. Shaekleton Bailey, 'The Roman Nobility in the Seeond Civil War', CQ, vol. 10 (1960), pp. 253 - 67, and espeeially p. 266: 'Above all, family tradition and connections counted for much less and purely personalfaetors, usually untraeeable, for mueh more [i.e., in determining a Roman's allegianee in the eivi! wad than MünzeI' for one cared to admit.' 121. Proposal that Pompey be named sole eonsul: Plut. Pomp. 54.6; Cat. Min. 47.3; Cass. Dio 40.50.4; Ase. p. 36 (Clark). Opposition to Caesar' s second consulship: Eutropius 6.16.2. 122. Caes. BCiv. 3.16.3. 123. Suet. Jul. 28.2. For the date, see Gelzer, Caesar, pp. 172 ff. 124. Cie. Fam. 8.1.2, 8.2.2, 8.5.3. 125. Ibid., Fam. 8.8.5-6, 4.9.2; Alt. 8.3.3; Livy Per. 108; App. BCiv. 2.26; Cass. Dio 40.59.1. 126. See p. 62 supra. 127. Cass. Dio 40.59.4; App. BCiv. 2.26. 128. Suet. Jul. 27.1. 129. App. BCiv. 2.27. 130. Hirtius Bel/um Gal/icum 8.55.1; Cass. Dio 40.66.1. 131. Plut. Pomp. 58.6-8; App. BCiv. 2.30. 132. App. BCiv. 2.30. 133. Plut. Pomp. 58.6. 134. Hirtius Bel/um Gallicum 8.55.1; Plut. Pomp. 59.1; Ant. 5.2; App. BCiv. 2.31; Cass. Dio 40.64.4. 135. For the sourees, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Claudius (216)', eols. 2735-6. 136. On Mareellus' eowardliness see Cie. Alt. 10.15.2. On his behaviour on his eousin's behalf in 46, see Cie. Fam. 4.4.3; Marcel/. 34. 137. Hirtius Bel/um Gal/icum 8.50.4. Cf. Suel. Jul. 29. 138. Plut. Pomp. 59.2; Cass. Dio 40.66.2. 139. Plut. Caes. 30.6. 140. Caes. BCiv. 1.4.2; Vell. Pat. 2.49.3; Cie. Alt. 11.6.6. 141. Cass. Dio 40.66.2-3. 142. Vell. Pat. 2.49.3.

152

No/es

143. App. BCiv. 2.26. 144. Ibid. 145. On the bribe, see Suet. Jul. 29.1; Plut. Pomp. 58.2; Caes. 29.3; App. BCiv. 2.26. No souree supports Erieh Gruen's idea, The Last Generation Ci/ihe Roman Republic (Berkeley, 1974), p. 475, that Caesar's promise to support Paullus' desire for a provineial eommand eaused his shift in allegianee. 146. App. BCiv. 2.26; Cass. Dio 40.59.4. 147. On the eider Curio's dialogue, see Cie. Brut. 218-19. 148. Suel. [ul. 49.2. Cf. ibid., 52.3, for Curio's famous remark in a speech that Caesar was 'omnium mulierum virum et omnium virorum mulierem' . 149. Ibid.,50.1. 150. Ibid., 9.1-3. 151. Cie. Alt. 2.19.3. Cf. ibid., 2.18.1, 2.8.1. 152. Caelius apo Cie. Fam. 8.4.2. The evidenee that Curio originally intended to run for the aedileship is indireet. He went to the trouble 01' aequiring some panthers (essential far the games put on by the aediles) whieh he gave away, mueh to Caelius' delight, when his plans ehanged (Caelius apo Cie. Fam. 8.9.3, 8.8.10). Cf. Münzer, PW, S.V. 'Seribonius ( 11 )', col. 869. 153. Caelius apo Cie. Fam. 8.4.2. 154. Ibid. 155. Varro apo Non. 147.15. 156. Caelius apo Cie. Fam. 8.5.3, 8.10.3. 157. Ibid., 8.8.5-6. 158. For the sourees, see MRR, vol. 2, p. 249. 159. Caelius apo Cie. Fam. 8.17.1. 160. Ibid., 8.6.5. 161. W. K. Laeey, 'The Tribunate ofCurio', Hist., vol. 10 (1965), pp. 318-19, denies that there was any bribe. He is followed by Gruen, Last Generation, p. 473 and n. 87. But surely Lacey's faith in the argument from silenee - the bribe is not mentioned by the eontemporary sources - is misplaeed. For another explanation 01' Curio's motive, see Gruen, Last Generation, pp. 477-8.

Chapter 5 1. Cf. Peter A. Brunt, '" Amieitia" in the Late Roman Republie', PCPs, vol. 11 (1965), p. 13: '1'0 proseeute or testify against a man on eharges involving his caput or existimatio was neeessarily a hostile aet. It might initiate a feud, or betoken that a feud already existed. It was perhaps

the most eommon eause 01' enmity, or its most flagrant manifestation.' 2. On the motives 01' Roman proseeutors, see Erieh Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 H.C. (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 6-7. Michael C. Alexander, 'Praemia in the Quaestiones 01' the Late Republic', CPhil., vol. 80 (1985), pp. 20-32, diseusses the rewards 01' proseeution. On the proeedure by whieh a prosecutor would bring his vietim (0 court, see A. H. J. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero 's Time (Oxford, 1901), pp. 459-60.

153

Noles

Noles

3. Cie. Brul. 130: 'Isdem temporibus M. Brutus, [in quol magnum fuit, Brute, dedeeus generi vestro, qui, eum tanto nomine esset patremque optimum virum habuisset et iuris peritissimum, aeeusationem faetitaverit, ut Athenis Lyeurgus.' Cf. Cie. Off. 2.49-51; Quint. Insl. 12.7.3. 4. Livy 37.57.9-15. Livy 37.57.15 claims that Glabrio withdrew in order to make Cato, a eompeting eandidate and also a new man, unpopu­ lar. In this wa y he hoped to foist the full force 01' the jealousy nobiles feit toward new men on his rival. But an ambitious man like Glabrio would seareely have withdrawn if he thought he had a chance 01' winning the e1eetion and eompletely diserediting Cato. 5. Cie. Scaur. 30, 33-5. 6. See James Leigh Straehan-Davidson, Problems 011he Roman Criminal Law, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1912), vol. 2, pp. 121-4. 7. See Edward W. Cleary (ed.), MeCormiek on Evidenee, 3rd edn (St. Paul, 1984), pp. 540-8; Federal Rule 01' Evidenee 402. 8. See MeCormiek on Evidenee, pp. 553 - 4; Federal Rule 01' Evidenee 404. 9. See MeCormiek on Evidenee, pp. 541-8; Federal Rule 01' Evidenee 403. The law 01' evidenee in England is basieally the same as its Ameriean counterpart. Other safeguards against sensationalism are built into the modern Continental legal system. No rules 01' evidenee restriet what the court may consider. However, the examination 01' witnesses by the judges rather than by adversary parties, together with the use 01' a panel 01' judges rather than a jury as the finder 01' fact, del1ates the means by whieh inl1am­ matory evidenee distorts judieial results. See John H. Langbein, Comparalive Criminal Proeedure: Germany (St. Paul, 1977), pp. 69 - 70. 10. Ca/. Min. 21.9. 11. Ibid., 21.10. 12. Cie. Phil. 8.18. 13. Cie. Mur. 56. 14. Verr. 1.51,2.2.16,2.3.130,2.5.183. 15. Ibid., 2.5.180. 16. Fam. 3.10.5. Cf. Cie. Rose. Am. 55: 'Nemo nostrum est, Eruei, quin sciat tibi inimieitias eum Sex. Roseio nullas esse; vident omnes qua de causa huie inimicus venias', whieh shows how a proseeutor eould auto­ matieally be ealled a defendant's inimieus, and Cie. Fam 3.11.2, where Cicero refers to all the supporters 01' a prosecution as the defendant's mlm'e!. 17. See p. 7 supra. 18. Verr. 2.3.162. 19. Sesl. 10. 20. Flae. 77. Cf. Fran,;;ois Hinard, 'Paternus inimieus. Sur une expres­ sion de Ciceron' , in Melanges de !illeralure el d'epigraphie lalines, d'hisloire aneienne el d 'arehiologie; Hommage Cl la memoire de Pierre Wuilleumier (Paris, 1980), p. 202. 21. On the honourability ofproseeuting one's father's aeeuser, see Cie. Off. 2.49-50; Aead. 2.1; Plut. Lue. 1.2. I note the following examples 01' sems taking judieial revenge on the proseeutors 01' their fathers: the Lueulli prosecuted Servilius: Plut. Lue. 1.2; Cie. Off. 2.50; Aead. 2.1; Quint. Insl. 12.7.4; Cotta proseeuted Carbo: Cass. Dio 36.40.4; Val. Max. 5.4.4;

Oppianirus proseeuted A. Cluentius: Cie. Cluenl. passim. The Gallii brothers who proseruted M. Calidius in 51 (Cie. Fam. 8.4.1, 8.9.5) may have been the sons 01' Q. Gallius, prosecuted by Calidius in the 60s (Cie. Brul. 277; Val. Max. 8.10.3); Metcllus threatened to proseeute C. Scribonius Curio but the suit was withdrawn: Ase. p. 64 (Clark) with B. A. MarshalI, A Hislorieal Commenla~v on Aseoniw (Columbia, 1985), pp. 230-1; Apul. Apol. 66. 22. Ase. p. 6:~ (Clark). 23. Val. Max. 3.7.6. For the bitterness between Crassus and the younger Carbo, see Cir. De Or. 3.10. 24. Cluenl. 172. 25. Cael. 2: 'Sed ego Atratino, humanissimo atquc optimo aduleseenti, meo nceessario, ignoseo, qui habet cxcusationem vel pietatis vel neees­ sitatis vel aetatis.' Cf. Hinard, 'Paternus inimieus', p. 203. On Caelius' judieial aetivity against Atratinus' father, see Cael. 1, 16, 45, 76, 78. Cf. Cieero's similar strategy in Rab. Perd. 14, eharging Labienus with prose­ ruting Rabirius to avenge his uncle Q. Labienus, who had fallen with the Salurninians in 100. 26. The sourees tür the proseeution and suieide 01' the eIder Lutatius are colleeted by Münzer, PW, S.V. 'Lutatius (7)', col. 2079. Für the sourees on the execution 01' Marius, see Münzer, PW, S.V. 'Marius (42)', eol. 1827. For Catulus' role in the murder, see Schol. Bernesia on Luean 2.173, p. 62 (Usener). 27. QFr, 3.2.2. Cf. ibid., 3.4.2. 28. See p. 56, n. 83 supra. 29. Cie. Acad. 2.1; Plut. Lue. 1.2; Quint. Insl. 12.7.3. 30. Brunt, ' "Amicitia" " p. 14; Lily Ross Taylür, Party Polilin in Ihe Age 01 Caesar (Berkeley, 1949), p. 7. 31. Livy 37.57.13-15. 32. Cie. Alt. 1.16.2,1.16.4; Plut. Cie. 29.1; Srhol. Bob. pp. 85-6 (Stangl); Val. Max. 8.5.5. 33. Phil. 2.3. 34. Cluenl. 116. 35. All. 1.16.5. 36. Mur. 7. 37. Ibid., 8. Cf. Cie. Sull. 48-9. 38. '''Amieitia''', p. 15. 39. Ibid., pp. 7--8. 40. Cf. Christopher P. Craig, 'The Aecusator as Amicus: An Original Roman Taetie 01' Ethical Argumentation', TAPA, vol. 111 (1981), pp. 31-7, who sees Cicero's professions 01' friendship für rivallawyers as part 01' a reeurring tactir in his oratory. 41.Sul/.2. 42. Ibid., 22. 43. Cael. 26. 44. Cie. 27.1. 45. '''Amicitia''', p. 15, n. 2. On Cieero's treatment 01' Hortensius in the Verrines, sec especially 1.33-4, 2.2.192, 2.3.7 Ir., 2.5.174-7. Für the good ol1ices 01' Attieus, see Nep. All. 5.4. 46. Mur. 2. Cf. Verr. 2.3.6; Sull. passim.

154

155

Notes

Notes

47. Ase. p. 37 (Clark). 48. Cicero Comment. Pet. 14. 49. Cass. Dio 38.12.5. 50. Div. Caee. 28-9, 52, 55-60. Caeeilius had apparently advaneed . inimieitiae as a qualifieation for proseeuting P. Gabinius on so me earlier oeeasion. See ibid., 64. 51. Ibid., 64. 52. Ibid., 52-8. 53. Verr.2.1.15. 54. Cie. Verr. 2.3.6: 'Et in hoc homine [Verre] saepe a me quaeris, Hortensi, quibus inimieitiis aut qua iniuria adduetus ad aeeusandum deseenderim?' Cicero hirnself resorted to the same teehnique in Mil. 5. 55. Verr. 2.1.15. Cf. Greenidge, Legal Proeedure, p. 460. 56. Greenidge, Legal Proeedure, p. 459. 57. Mil. 78; Cf. Har. Resp. 2.

n.s. vol. 17 (1970), p. 233; Chester G. Starr, AJPhil., vol. 91 (1970), pp. 250-1; E. J. Weinrib, Phoenix, vol. 23 (1969), pp. 317-18. 76. Erieh Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republie (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 260-337. 77. Cf. ibid., pp. 309-10. 78. Verr. 2.3.141. Similar assumptions about the inevitability offaeing proseeution by inimiei are implieit in ibid., 2.5.74, 77. 79. Mur. 64. 80. Au. 1.16.2-4. Cf. ibid., 1.14.5. 81. Sest. 89. 'Deseendit [Milo] ad aeeusandum. Quis umquam tarn proprie rei publieae causa, nullis inimieitiis, nullis praemiis, nulla hominum postulatione aut etiam opinione id eum umquam esse faeturum?' Cf. Cie. Clu. 42.; Dom. 49, where inimieitiae are also implieit as a basis far prosecution. 82. Cat. 49.2.

59. Cie. Font. 24. On the obligations ofjurors in this regard, cf. ibid., 25. 60. Flae. 10-11. 61. Font. 23. For other examples, see ibid., 24, 26. 62. Val. Max. 8.5.1-5. 63. Ibid.,8.5.1. 64. Ase. p. 61 (Clark). 65. Ibid., p. 58, with Marshall's commentary, Aseonzus, pp. 219-20. 66. Cf. Val. Max. 8.5.4, who attributes Corne1ius' aequittal to the tendeney to discount testimony by inimiei. 67. Livy 38.57.1. 68. Plut. Ca!. Mai. 15.2, 32.4; Livy 38.54.1- 2; Gell. NA 4.18.7; Cass. Dio fr. 65. 69. Val. Max. 3.7.7. 70. Pseudo-Aseonius p. 210 (Stangl): 'neeesse fuerat ... permittl aeeusatori ae ren, ut ex illo numero reieiant, quos putaverint sibi aut inicos aut ex aliqua re incommodos fore.' Thomas Slangl explains in PSfudo-aseoniana (Paderborn, 1909), p. 72, why he rejeets the evidenee of the bulk of the manuseripts and prefers to read (with Hotman) inieos for inimieos. The textual eontroversy does not affeet the point here - it is clear that a dcfendant would consider an inimicus both inicus and ineommodus as a juror, and would therefore exercise his right to eliminate hirn. On reiectio in general, see Theodor Mommsen, Röm. Strajr., pp. 214 - 16. 71. Var.2.3.97. 72. Cass. Dio 39.6.2. 73. Cf. A. H. M. Jones, The Criminal Courts ~fthe Roman Republie and Prineipate (Totowa, 1972), p. 16. 74. Roman Politlcs, p. 7: 'They kriminal proseeutions] also served to air and often to aggravatc personal rivalries.' 75. Ibid.: 'Dcmonstrablc conclusions emerge only rare1y. The his­ torian is eonfronted with mueh eonfusion, with inadequate and inferior sourees. Conjecture and hypothesis dog his steps throughout.' The point is frequenlly repeated. For reviews that make the same point, see T. P. Wiseman,jRS, val. 60 (1970), p. 213; E. R. A. Sewter, Grr'ree and Rome

83. Ibid. For Caesar's proseeution of Piso, cf. Quint. Ins!. 12.7.4. 84. Cae1ius apo Cie. Fam. 8.12.1-3. On the lexScantinia, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Seantinius (91)', col. 352. 85. Livy 24.43.2-3. 86. Diod. 27.1 - 4. 87. Livy 29.8.5-·9.12,29.16.4-22.10,34.44.7-8; Diod. 27.4.1-8; Val. Max. 1.1.21; App. Hann. 55. 88. Val. Max. 7.9.3. Cf. ibid., 6.5.3. 89. Gell. NA 3.4.1. 90. Roman Polities, p. 31. 91. Ase. p. 21 (Clark), quoted on p. 59, n. 205 supra. 92. Roman Polities. pp. 173-4. 93. Ibid. Cf. ibid., 'Polities and the Courts in 104 B.C.', TAPA, vol. 95 (1964), pp. 107-8. 94. Far the feud between Cato and the Seipios, see Alan E. Astin, Cato theCensor(Oxford, 1978), pp. 70-3. 95. See p. 99 and n. 68 supra. 96. Livy38.54.11-12. 97. H. H. Seullard, Roman Polities 220-150 BC., 2nd edn (Oxford, 1973), p. 294. 98. Livy 43.16.11-16; Val. Max. 6.5.3. Cf. Seullard, Roman Polities, 2nd edn, pp. 204-5 and E. Badian, Publieans and Sirmers (Oxford, 1972), pp. 40, 42. 99. Cie. Font. 23; Val. Max. 8.5.1. 100. Val. Max. 9.3.7. Cf. Cass. Dio fr. 82. I have diseussed this ineident on pp. 15 - 16 supra. 101. For the scholarly debate on this point, see Gruen, Roman Polities, p. 34 and n. 59. 102. See p. 41 supra. 103. Roman Polities, p. 37: 'The Metelli and their friends had utilised the extortion tribunal 10 attaek a man who had been a protege of the Seipionie eircle and who was (perhaps) still a friend of Seipio hirnself. ' 104. Cie. Font. 23. 105. Verr. 2.5.181. The same type of animosity, aeeording to Livy (37.57.9-58.2), prompted C. Sempronius Rutilus to impeach M. Acilius

156

157

58. Cael. 32.

Notes

Notes

Glabrio, a candidate for the censorship 01' 189, for embezzlement. 106. Cie. Brut. 131. 107. Cic. Fin. 1.3.9: 'Hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus.' 108. Cic. Brut. 102; De Or. 2.281. For diseussions 01' the relevant Lueilius fragments, see Friedrich Marx, Lueilii Carminium Reliquiae (Leipzig, 1904), pp. 29-44; Conrad Ciehorius, Untersuchungen zu Lueilius (Berlin, 1908), pp. 237 -51. 109. Roman Polilies, pp. 112-13: 'Scaevola's political connections at this juncture are by no means easy to makI' out.' The interpretation 01' this trial advanced by Gruen, ibid., p. 115, that the prosecution was supported by extreme anti-Gracchans resentfu1 of the lukewarm support Scaevola gave them, is entirely speculative. Cf. Gruen's own gualification, ibid: 'Political motivation perhaps ought not to be overstressed in this case. Scaevola's accuser T. Albucius had a personal grievance.' 110. Ciehorius, Lueilius, p. 238. 111. Cic. Brul. 102 indicates that Scaevo1a was on trial for extort;on. For the accusations 01' assault, see Lueil. 2.54-5; sexual misconduet: Lucil. 2.67 - 9 and Ciehorius, Lueilius, pp. 240 -1; gluttony: Lueil. 2.67 - 9 and Cichorius, Lueihus, pp. 240-1. On the possibility that the assaull charge included an aecusation 01' murder, see Lueil. 2.73-4 and Ciehorius' speculative remarks in Lueilius, pp. 242 - 4. 112. For the date, see Gruen, Roman Polilies, p. 125. 113. Ibid., pp. 125-6. 114. Fonl. 38: 'M. Aemilium Seaurum, summum nostrae Clvltatis virum, scimus accusaturn a M. Bruto. Extant orationes, ex guibus intellegi potest mulla in illum ipsum Scaurum esse dicta, falso; guis negat? verum tarnen ab inimico dicta et obiecta.' 115. Cic. Brul. 130; Off. 2.50; Clu. 141. 116. See p. 99 supra. 117. Gruen, Roman Polilies. pp. 174- 5. 118. Ibid., pp. 175-6. 119. Sall. lug. 32.1. See Gruen's diseussion, Roman Polilies, pp. 140-1. 120. De Or. 2.283. 121. Cie. Fonl. 24; Val. Max. 8.5.3. 122. Erieh Gruen, 'Political Proseeutions in the 90's He', Hisi., vol. 15 (1966), p. 51. 123. Scaur. 45. 124. Erich Gruen, 'The Dolabellae and Sulla', A]Phil., vol. 87 (1966), pp. 389-99. 125. Rah. Perd. 7. For the date see Gruen, Lasl Generalion, p. 530. 126. Gruen, l"asl Generalion, p. 273. 127. Thc sources on the roje 01" the Lcntuli at C!odius' trial are Cie. Har. Resp. 37; Val. Max. 4.2.5; Schol. Boh. pp. 85, 89 (Stangl). 128. Val. Max. 4.2.5. 129. Cass. Dio 39.6.2. cr. Cie. Mil. 39, which refers to this Lentullls as an inimicus of Clodius. 130. Cass. Dio 37.46.2; Plut. Gie. 29.4; Cie. Mil. 73. The othcr sources on Lucullus' appearance against Clodius are Cie. Alt. 1.14.7, 1.16.9. 131. See p. 102 and n. 80 supra. 132. See David F. Epstein, 'Cicero's Testimony at the R(!1Ia Dca Trial',

CPhil., vol. 81 (1986), pp. 229-35. 133. For Lutatius Catullls' attitude toward the prosecution 01' Clodius, see Cie. Alt. 1.16.5; Plut. Gie. 29.7; Cass. Dio 37.46.3. C. Calpurnius Pisa's attitude ean be dedueed I"rom Cic. Alt. 1.14.5. 134. ün inimieiliae toward Caesar as a motive for Catulus' and Piso's support of the prosecution of Clodius, see J. P. V. D. Balsdon, 'Fabula Clodiana', HZ.II., vol. 15 (1966), pp. 68-9. 135. Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Valerius (179)', eols. 34- 5. See especially col. 34: 'Doch wichtiger war vielleicht, dass die Triumvirn in Valerius ein Mitglied der wiederstrebenden Nobilität unschädlich zu machen wünschten.' Münzer's analysis is c10sely followed by Gruen, Lasl Genera­ lion, pp. 289 - 91, who nevertheless aeknowledges the diversity 01' motives that uni ted Flaccus' aecusers. 136. Flae. 14. 137. Ibid., 13. 138. Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Valerius (179)', col. 35; Gruen, Lasl Genera­ lion, p. 290. 139. Schol. Bob. p. 93 (Stangl). 140. Val. Max. 7.9.3. Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Valerius (179)', col. 35 and 'Cornelius (69)', cols. 1262 - 3, convincingly estabJishes the identities 01' the Valerius and the Cornelius Balbus mentioned in the passage. 141. Cic. Flae. 10,87-8. 142. Ibid., 88. 143. Ibid., 11. 144. Ibid., 77. Cicero did not believe that any hereditary feud existed (ibid.). 145. Ibid., 74, 77-8. 146. Ibid., 90-3. 147. For Cactra's partieipation in the trial, see Schol. Bob. p. 95 (Stangl). 148. Cic. Flae. 100. See Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Valerius (179)', col. 35; Gruen, Lasl Generalioll, pp. 290-1. 149. On Flaecus' early military service. see Cie. Flae. 6. Cicero apparently (the beginning of his speech is only fragmentary) suppresses the fact that Flaecus served with distinction under Pompey in 66 (Cass. Dio 36.54.2-4). He may have feared that any allusion to that service, however weil it reOected on Flaceus' military reputation, would have damagcd his dient's case. The jury would have heen reminded that the inimieiliae that now existed between Pompey and Flaceus had arisen bdween commander and subordinate. Such animosity was extremely unusual, and suggested that the subordinate was ungrateful and virtually unfilial. Cf. Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Valerius (179)', col. 32. On inimieiliae between commanders and their subordinates, see p. 28 supra. 150. Cie. Flae. 31, 68. 151. Cic. Pis. 54. 152. Cass. Dio 38.9.1; Plut. Gal. Min. 33.7; Gaes. 14.8; Pomp. 48.4; Suet. lul. 21; App. BCiv. 14. 153. Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Calpurnius (90)', eols. 1387-8. For the triumvirate's support ofClodius, sec Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Polilina1l (md Sialesman, trans. Peter Needham (Oxford, 1968), pp. 88-9 ami C,.[zer,

158

159

Notes

Notes

Cicero, ein biographischer Versuch (Wiesbaden, 1969), p. 137. 154. For the influence commanders had in determining their legates, see Premerstein, PW, s.v. 'legatus', col. 1141. Gruen has suggested, in 'Pompey and the Pisones', Califomia Studies in Classical Antiquity, vol. 1 (1968), pp. 163--7, that the triumvirs may not have been united in their support of Calpurnius for the eonsulship, and that familial hatred of Pompey motivated Piso both during and after his consulship. The sup­ porting evidenee is, however, inconclusive. Calpurnius eo-operated with Clodius when Clodius turned against Pompey in 58 (Cic. Pis. 16,28-9; Dom. 66). But it is unclear from Cicero's prejudiced account how active that co-operation was. Cicero attributed Calpurnius' support ofClodius to ambition to secure a province through Clodius' agency, and not to hatred of Pompey (Pis. 28). Furthermore, Calpurnius' actions during the civil war are difficult 'to explain if he harboured enmity for Pompey, as Gruen has suggested. Despite his relationship with Caesar, which should have drawn hirn toward Caesar's camp, Calpurnius left Rome and condemned his son-in-Iaw's conduet, much to Cicero's satisfaction (Fam. 14.14.2; Alt. 7.13.1). He demonstrated continuing loyalty to Pompey by urging a negotiated settlement after Caesar's successful Spanish campaign in 49 (Plut. Caes. 37.1). Cf. Cass. Dio 41.16.4. 155. For the date of the trial, see Marshall, Asconius, p. 183. 156. For Gruen's interpretation, see Last Generation, pp. 346-7. 157. Cass. Dio 40.55.3. The other sourees 101' Pompey's support of Plancus are Plut. Pomp. 55.8-9; Cat. Min. 48.8; Val. Ma;:. 6.2.5. 158. For the attitude of the boni, see Cie. Fam. 7.2.2. For Cato's roll", see Plut. Cat. Min. 48.8; Pomp. 55.9; Cass. Dio 40.55.2; Val. Max_ 5.2.5. 159. Fam. 7.2.2. 160. Ibid., 9.181, 4.3.4. 161. Caes. BCiv. 1.31.3; Pompon. Dig. I 2.2.46; Quint. Inst. 5.13.31. 162. Lig. 9, 11, 23, 24, 29. 163. The sources for the prosecution are eolleeted in Ji1RR, vol. 1, P 480. 164. Roman Politics, p. 31. 165. NA 3.4.1. 166. For the date of Duronius' tribunate, see MRR, vol. 2, p. 7 and n. 3. For Duronius' efforts to have the sumptuary legislation repealed and his expulsion from the Senate, see Val. Max. 2.9.5. 167. Cie. De Or. 2.274: 'cum audisset te censorem [Antoniuml a M. Duronio de amhitu postulatum. ' Gruen, 'Politieal Prosecutions', p. 41, n. 58, argues that Cicero must be mistaken in implying that Duronius pro­ secuted Antonius during the latter's censorship, and suggests that the prosecution may have occurred before the eensorship. But Cicero may weil have rlleant that the prosecution occurred after Antonius had acquired the rank of censor. Furthermore, if the trial oceurred before the u'nsorship, it is most odd that Valerius Maximus (2.9.5) does not refer to it when discussing the censors' motives for expelling Duronius. For the sequence of events, see Münzer, PW, s. v. 'Duronius (3)', cols. 1862 - 3. 168. Gruen's speculation, 'Political Proseeutions', p. 41, n. 56, about Duronius' factional tit's is not dccisive. 169. Last Generation, pp. 266-7. But cf. ibid., p. 77 where Gruen

emphasises the continuing inimicitiae between Caesar and Catulus. 170. Cass. Dio 37.44.2. 171. Plut. Pomp. 25.8.

. 172. lul. 15.

173. See p. 26 supra. 174. See p. 59 supra. 175. Caelius apo Cie. Fam. 8.14.1. Cie. Phil. 2.4 mentions other con­ vietions of Antony's supporters. Cf. Gruen, Last Generation, pp. 355 - 6. 176. Alt. 2.1.9 and see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero's Lelten to Attieus, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1965-8), vol. 1, pp. 350-1. 177. Plut. Cat. Min. 7.1-3. Cf. Gruen, Last Generation, p. 272. 178. Cie. Sul. 90; Mur. 56. Cf. Alexander, 'Praemia', p. 27. 179. Cie. Plane. passim. Cf. Gruen, Last Generation, pp. 319-20. 180. Cie. Planc. 79. 181. Cie. Provo Cons. 22. Cf. Hinard, 'Paternus inimicus', p. 205. 182. See pp. 65-6 supra. 183. On the identity of Servilius, see Gruen, Roman Politics, pp_ 176 - 7. Cf. E. Badian, 'Three Non-Trials in Cicero', Klio, vol. 66 (1984), pp. 301 - 6. The sources on the proseeution ofLucullus are Plut. Luc. 1. 2; Cie. Verr. 2.4.147; Acad. 2.1; Off. 2.50; Quint. Inst. 12.7.4. 184. See p. 93, n. 21 supra. For the date, see Badian, 'Three Non­ Trials', pp. 302 - 4. 185. C. Gracch. 3.5. 186. The sources on the legislation against Octavius and Popillius are collected in Greenidge, Clay, Gray, So UTCeS , pp. 31-2. 187. Plut. C. Gracch. 4.3; Diod. 34.25.2. 188. For the popular support for C. Graechus, see Plut. C. Gracch. 3.2. For tht· sentiment in favour of withdrawing {he legislation against Octavius, see ibid., 4.4. 189. Nep. fr. 1, quoted on p. 20 supra. It is not known on what occasion Cornelia expressed these sentiments hut they do suit the context of the legislation against Octavius. Cf. Münzer, PW, S.V. 'Octavius (31)', col. 1822. 190. Plut. C. Gracch. 4.3. 191. Gracchus' use of the term 'inimicos', presumably to describe Popillius and his supporters, in a fragment of a speech against Popillius (Gell. NA 1.7.7), strengthens the impression that he was driven by per­ sonal motives. For the wider politieal implications of the legislation, see Gruen, Roman Politics, pp. 80 - 4. 192. Diod.34-35.26. 193. Cie. Leg. 3.26. Cf. David Stockton, The Gracchi (Oxford, 1979), pp. 119 - 20. For the popular support Popillius may have enjoyed, see Volkman, PW, s.v. 'Popillius (28)', eol. 63. 194. Cie. Brut. 113: 'Erat uterque [Scaurus et Rutiliusl natura vehemens et acer; itaque cum una eonsulatum petivissent, non ille solum, qui repulsam tulerat, accusavit ambitus designatum competitorem, sed Scaurus etiam ahsolutus Rutilium in iudieium voeavit.' 195. The sources on the exchange of prosecutions in addition to Cie. Brut. 113 are Cie. De Or. 2.280 and Tac. Ann. 3.66. 196. Roman Politje;, pp. 120-3. For a contrasting interpretation ofthe

160

161

Notes

Notes

exchange, see E. Badian, Studies in Greek and Roman History (Oxford, 1964), p. 107: 'though Cicero mentions the case [i.e., the exchange of prosecu­ tionsl in his rhetorical works, it was clearly of no importance either in legal or political history - being only a private quarrel between two bad tempered men.' 197. Roman Politics, p. 121. 198. For Rutilius' supposed connections with the Scipionic Circ1e, see Gruen, Roman Politics, p. 120. H. Strasburger, 'Der "Scipionenkreis" " Hermes, val. 94 (1966), pp. 66-9, believes that Rutilius' connections with Scipio Aemilianus were a figment of Cicero's imagination. 199. The sources are collected in MRR, val. 1, p. 547. 200. Roman Politics, pp. 120 - 2. 201. This point is admitted by Gruen, Roman Politics, p. 120. 202. On the legal point, see Caelius apo Cic. Fam. 8.8.1. 203. Ibid.: 'Nemini hoc deferre munusculum maluit quam suo accusa­ tori. ' On the prosecutions exchanged by Tuccius and Sempronius, cf. Münzer, PW, S.V. 'Sempronius (79)', col. 1436 and Gruen, Last Genera­ tion, p. 351. 204. Gruen, Last Generation, pp. 305-8; cf. T. A. Dorey, 'Cicero, Clodia, and the Pro Gaelio', Greece and Rome, val. 27 (1958), p. 176; F. Lovera, 'Questioni riguardanti il processo "de vi" di Marco Celio Rufo e l'orazione di Ciceroni', Il Mondo Glassico, vol. 6 (1936), p. 167; R. Heinze, 'Cicero Rede Pro Gaelio', Hermes, vol. 60 (1925), p. 195. 205. Cic. Gael. 50. 206. Cic. QFr. 2.12.2. Cf. Gruen, Last Generation, p. 331. On Servius, see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature (American Philological Association, 1976) p. 66. 207. Cie. Gael. 75. Cf. Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Caelius (35)', col. 1268. 208. For Lucceius' involvement, see Cic. Gael. 51. 209. Gruen, Last Generation, p. 308. 210. Cie. Gael. 51. 211. Ibid., 52. 212. Ibid., 56. 213. The source for the whole story is Caelius apo Cic. Fam. 8.8.2-3. For discussions of the details, see R. Y. Tyrell and L. C. Purser, The Gorrespondence 0/ M. Tullius Gicero, 6 vols. (Dublin, 1904-33), vol. 1, pp. 109-10; W. W. How, Gicero, Seleet LeUen, 2 vols. (Oxfard, 1925-6), vol. 2, pp. 260- 3; D. R. Shackleton Bailey, 'On Cicero, Ad Familiares', Philol., vol. 105 (1961), p. 86; Shackleton Bailey, Gicero: Epistulae ad Farniliares, 2 vols. (Carnbridge, 1977), vol. 1, pp. 398 - 400; and Gruen, Last Generation, pp. 351-2. 214. Caelius apo Cie. Fam. 8.8.2: 'praevaricationis ... causa.' 215. Ibid., 8.8.3. 216. The sources on the prosecution are collected in MRR, val. 1, p.524. 217. For the charges, see E. Badian, 'Po Decius P.f. Subulo', jRS, vol. 46 (1956), p. 92 and n. 15. 218. See ibid., p. 91 and Gruen, Roman Politics, p. 103 and n. 123, which bath depend an F. Münzer, 'Anmerkungen zur neuen Livius­ Epitome', Klio, vol. 5 (1905), pp. 135-9.

219. Cic. De Or. 2.277. 220. Gruen, Roman Politics, p. 103 agrees that the prosecution originated in a private quarrel. 221. See Erich Gruen's discussions of this trial in 'Some Criminal Trials of the Late Republic: Political and Prosopographical Problems', Ath., vol. 49 (1971), pp. 59-62 and Last Genera/ion, p. 271. See especially Gruen' s conclusion , Last Generation, p. 271: 'Inimieitia between Clodius and Catiline endured. The accusatio de repetundis takes its place in the register of private feuds and enmities.' 222. See Epstein, 'Cicero's Testimony', pp. 232- 3. 223. Ase. p. 50 (Clark). 224. Gic. 29.1. 225. Dom. 72; Har. Resp. 5; Sest. 42; Pis. 11, 15 ­ 16; Plane. 86; Mil. 37. For Gruen, 'Same Criminal Trials of the Late Republic', p. 61, n. 29, such references are 'pure rhetoric'. 226. Last Generation, p. 283. 227. Ibid. The marriage can be inferred from Cic. QFr. 3.3.2. 228. Plut. Sero 21; Oros. 5.23.12. 229. Cic. Fam. 5.11.2. Cf. Miltner, PW, S.V. 'Pompeia (53 and 56)', col. 2264 and Gundei, PW, S.V. 'Vatinius (3)', col. 496. 230. Last Generation, p. 282. 231. The sources on the elections for the consulships of 65 are set out in MRR, val. 2, p. 157. 232. For the role played by the younger Manlius in the prosecutions of 66, see Münzer, PW, S.V. 'Manlius(79)', col. 1201, and 'Manlius(80)', col. 1203. 233. Cic. Au. 4.18.3; QFr. 3.3.2. Cf. Gruen, Last Generation, p. 285 and n.98. 234. Sull. 50: 'Tu [Manliusl ornatus exuviis huius venis ad eum lacerandum quem interemisti, ego iacentem et spoliatum defendo et protego. ' 235. Cass. Dio 38.10.4. 236. Cic. Vat. 27 ­ 28. Cf. Schol. Bob. p. 149 (Stangl). 237. Erich Gruen, 'The Trial ofC. Antonius', Latomus, vol. 32 (1973), p.306. 238. The sources on the early trial are Plut. Gaes. 4.1- 2; Cicero Gomrnent. Pet. 8; and Ase. p. 84 (Clark), with Marshall's commentary, Asconius, p. 293. For the pardon extended to Antonius, see Cic. Phil. 2.99 and Klebs, PW, S.V. 'Antonius (19)', col. 2582. 239. Cie. Phil. 2.56; Cass. Dio 46.15.2-3. 240. Gruen. Last Generation, p. 288. Gruen discusses this interpretation of the trial at greater length in 'The Trial of C. Antonius', pp. 301-10. His thesis has been followed by Robin Seager, Pompey, A Political Biography (Berkeley, 1979), p. 91. But Gruen's interpretation rests on some extremely tenuous links between the triumvirs and the three proseeutors of Antanius - Caelius, Fabius Maximus and L. Caninius Gallus. See 'The Trial of C. Antonius', pp. 304- 5. There is strong evidence for an early association between Caelius and Crassus. But the evidence Gruen addures für linking Q. Fabius Maximus to Caesar and Caninius Gallus (if this Caninius Gallus reaJly is the tribune of 56) to Pompey postdates

162

iI I

163

Notes

Notes

Antonius' trial. Even if firm associations between the prosecutors and the triumvirs could be established for 59, this would still not prove that the pro­ seeutors were acting on behalf of the triumvirs. 241. Gruen concedes this point, 'The Trial of C. Antonius', pp. 309 - 10. 242. We cannot be absolutely sure that Calvus was the prosecutor of Vatinius in 54, but Erich Gruen, 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', Harll. Stud., vol. 71 (1966), p. 220, makes a very strong case. 243. For this interpretation and the sources on the trial, see Gruen, Last Generation, p. 317. 244. The sources on the campaign are collected in MRR, vol. 2, p. 216. 245. Gl'uen, Last Generation, p. 317 and n. 28. 246. The sources on Calvus' lampoons are collected in Gruen, 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', p. 224 and nn. 74-5. 247. Last Generation, pp. 317-18; 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', pp. 221 - 2. For Calvus' role al the trial, see Tac. Dial. 21.2. For the date, see Cic. QFr. 2.16.3. 248. Last Generation, pp. 317 -18; 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', pp. 221 - 2. Münzer, PW, s. v. 'Livius (19)', cols. 882 - 3, is more cautious. 249. Au. 2.7.3. 250. This conclusion is drawn by Gruen, Last Generation, p. 318; 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', p. 221. For Drusus' prosecutor, see Cie. Au. 4.16.5 and Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Lucretius (12)', cols. 1657-8. 251. See Gruen, Last Generation, p. 317 and n. 30. 252. QFr. 2.16.1: 'Sie enim habeto, numquam me a causis el iudiciis dislrictiorem fuisse, atque id anni tempore gravissimo el caloribus maximis.' Gruen (Last Generation, p. 318; 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', p. 221) relies even more heavily on Au. 4.15.9: 'Deinde me expedio ad Drusum, inde ad Scaurum; parantur orationibus indices gloriosi.' This crack certainly does not suggest that Cicero was coerced into undertaking lhe defence of either Drusus 01' Scaurus. Rather, Cicero, well aware of bloodlines, may simply be calling Atticus' attention to the farne of his clienls' fathers, with a hint that the blood had run out. CL Shackleton Bailey, Cicero 's Leuers to Auicus, vol. 2, p. 212. 253. On Cato's political rnetamorphosis, see Gruen, Last Generation, pp. 314- 15, based on his discussion in 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', p. 223. Cf. Miltner, PW, s.v. 'Porcius (6)', col. 106. 254. Livy Per. 105; Cass. Dio 39.27.3. CL Gruen, 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', p. 223. 255. For the charges against Cato, see Gruen, 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', p. 223 and n. 64. 256. Tac. Dial. 34.7; Quint. Inst. 12.6.1. 257. Sen. Controv. 7.4.7. See Gruen's careful and convincing exegesis of this passage, 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', pp. 223 - 4. 258. Gruen, Last Generation, p. 315, suggests that Calvus' task was 'burdensome and unwelcome'. Cf. 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', p. 224. 259. See p. 58 supra. 260. Cic. Au. 4.15.9. For the dose polilical and personal associalions between Cato and Servilius, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Servilius (67)', col. 1799.

164

261. Sen. Control!. 7.4.8. It may not have been this trial at wh ich Calvus spoke for Messius for we know that Messius had appeared as a defendant before. But see Gruen' s cogent case, 'Cicero and Lieinius Calvus' , p. 231, n. 53.

262. Tac. Dial. 21 indicates that Calvus accused Vatinius at least once in the past. CL Münzer, PHI, S.v. 'Licinius (113)', col. 430. 263. On the premature death of Calvus, see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Licinius (113)', col. 433. Both Münzer, ibid., col. 430 and Gruen,

'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', p. 217 admit that attempts to reconstruct

Calvus' judicial activity against Vatinius with precision are incondusive.

264. Sec Cic. QFr. 2.4.1 together with D. R. Shackleto n Bailey, Cicero: Epistulae ad Quinlum Fratrem et M. Brutum (Cambridge, 1980), p. 180. Cf.

Gruen, 'Cicero and Licinius Calvus', p. 218.

265. On the indictment of Memmius in 54, see Cic. QFr. 3.2.3. For the postponement of his trial until 52, see Erich Gruen, 'The Consular Elections 01' 53 He', in Jacqueline Bibau w (ed.), Hommages CL Marcel Renard, 3 vols. (Brussds, 1969), vol. 2, pp. 318-20. The sources on the trial in 52 are Cic. Fam. 13.1.1; App. BCil!. 2.24'; Cass. Dio 40.52.4. 266. For Gruen's suggestion that Pompey did not come to Memmius' aid in 52, see Last Generation, p. 348. For Pompey's support of Memmius' carnpaig in 54, see Gruen, 'The Consular Elections of 53 He.', p. 313. n 267. For the date of the marriage, see Plut. Pomp. 55.1. CL Cass. Dio I

40.51.3. 268. The sources are collecled in MRR, vol. 2, pp. 233-4. 269. On the age discrepancy and the impression it made on Rome, see Plut. Pomp. 55.4. 270. Suet. Gram. 14. 271. App. BCil!. 2.24. 272. On the prosecution of Metellus Scipio, see ibid.; Cass. Dio

40.53.2. 273. Cass. Dio 40.51.2-3,40.53.1-2. The other sources (Plut. Pomp. 55.7; Val. Max. 9.5.3; App. BCiv. 2.24) add various embellishments. See Gruen, Last Generation, p. 345, n. 166.

165

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168

169

Index

Index

Aburius, M. (pr. 176) 15 Achilies 65, 88 Acilius Glabrio, M. (cos. 191) 91,94,157nl05 admiration for pursuit of inimicitiae 20 - 5 Aegistheus 34 Aegritomarus 62 Aelius Tubero, L. (pr. ca. 49) 112 Aelius Tubero, Q. 112 Aemilia Lepida 114 Aemilius Lepidus, M. (cos. 187, 175); and with M. Fulvius Nobilior 13, 15, 18, 25, 59, 73, 150n81 Aemilius Lepidus, M. (cos. 78) 13, 18 Aemilius Lepidus, M. (cos. 46) 16-17, 69 Aemilius Lepidus Paullus, L. (cos. 50) 87, 141n90 Aemilius Paullus, L. (cos. 182, 168) 150n84 Aemilius Scaurus, M. (cos. 115) advice to Cicero 55; and Cn. CorneJius Dolabella 107 - 8; and P. Rutilius Rufus 117; factional associations of 117; prosecuted by Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus 26, 59, 104; prosecuted by M. J unius Brutus 106-7; subordinates inimicitiae to Republic 15; testimony at trials of C. Memmius and C. Flavius Flaccus 107 Acmilius Scaurus, M. (pr. 56) 7-8,36,53,107 Agonis 38 Albius Oppianicus 93, 154n21 Albit:s Oppianicus, Statius 93 Albucius, T. (pr. ca. 105) 106 Alexander the Greal 65

ambition 12, 21 amicitia amicitiam renuntiare 4, 125; basis for factions 82, 128; basis for retaliatory prosecu­ tions 118-19; connotations of 1- 2, 95 - 6; focus of earlier stu'dies 127; justification for taking up inimicitiae 24; obligations of 95; precedence over inimicitiae 8 - 9, 27; precedence over patriotism 17 - 18; source of inimicitiae 40-1,46-8,92,94; virtues of 14; with foreign states 130n 11 Annaeus Seneca, L. 124 Annius Milo, T. (pr. 55) and Cicero 24, 36, 43, 47, 96; and Clodius 47, 67, 73, 102; conspiracy 67 Antioch 66 Antiochus 72, 81 Antonia 34 Antonius, C. (pr. 44) 45, 73 Antonius, L. (cos. 41) 45,59,73 Antonius, M. (cos. 99) 113 Antonius, M. (cos. 44, 34) 45, 73 alliance with M. Aemilius Lepidus 69; and Cicero 43, 74, 95; and P. Cornelius Dolabella 33, 34 - 5, 46, 147n14; and Q. Fufius Calenus 92; asks Cicero's consent before recalling P. Clodius 21, 23, 26-7; banned from the hause of the eider Curio 131n14; ddeats L. Domitius Ahenobarbus for the augurate 114; fails to recall C. Antonius Hybrida 122; Lupercalia 57; reconciliation with Augustus at Brundisium 131n17 170

Antonius Hybrida, C. (cos. 63) 122 Antony, see Antonius, M. (cos. 44, 34) Appian 44, 66, 74 Appuleius Decianus, C. (tr. 99) 79, 93, 110 Appuleius Decianus, C. 76, 93, 110 Appuleius Saturninus, L. (tr. 103, 100) 20,60,67,78-9 Arausio 16, 71 Ariovistus 68 Arpinum 55 Asconius Pedianus, Q. 40, 55, 67, 71, 93, 96, 99, 104, 120 Asinius Pollio, C. (cos. 40) 123 -4 Atilius Regulus, M. (cos. 227) 103 Atinius Labeo Macerio, C. (tr. 131) 60,70, 137n92 Atticus, see Pomponius Alticus, T. Attius Varus, P. (pr. ca. 53) 112 auctoritas 13, 76, 77, 91 Augustus (emperot) 22, 56, 131n17 Aurelius Augustinus (St. Augustine) 19 Aurelius, C. 14 Aurelius Colta 154n21 Aurelius Cotta, C. (cos. 200) 51 Aurelius Cotta, C. (cos. 75) 23 Aurelius Cotta, L. (cos. 65) 57, 121 Aurelius Cotta, M. (cos. 74) 28 Autronius Paetus, P. (pr. ca. 68) 114,121, 143n131

i !

Brunt, P. A. 1,94,95 Brutus, see Junius Brutus burial, refusal of, as consequence of inimicitiae 25 Caecilius, Q. 80 Caecilius Metellus, L. (tr. 213) 60, 103 Caecilius Metellus, Q. (cos. 206) 13 Caecilius Metellus Calvus, L. (cos. 142) 99 Caecilius Metellus Celer, Q. (cos. 60) 11,35-6,83 Caecilius Metellus Creticus, Q. (cos. 69) 65, 84,110-11, 150n84 Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Q. (ws. 143) 15-16, 70,99, 105, 137n92 Caecilius Metellus Nepos, Q. (cos. 98) 93 Caecilius Metellus Nepos, Q. (cos. 57) and Cicero 39, 44, 131n22; and M. Porcius Cato 26, 39; and Pompey 35-6,83,114; subordinates inimicitiae to Republic 15; swears to accuse C. Scribonius Curio 93, 154n21 Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Q. (cos. 109)

and Marius 19, 36-7, 41, 55,

61,67, 75,78-9, 138n20;

and P. Furius 60,78-9; and

T. Manlius Mancinus 21;

attempts to expel Saturninus

and Glaucia from Senate 60,

78; commander of P. Rutilius

Rufus 117; exile 78

Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica, Q. (cos. 52) 54, 58, 114, 125 Caecilius Niger, Q. (quaest. 72) 28, 38, 97, 156n50 Caelius Rufus (pr 48) and Ap. Claudius Pulcher 4-5,47, 74,88, 103, 118; and Cicero 47 -8; and Clodia

Badian, E. 50, 107 Baebius Tamphilus, Cn. (cos. 182) 17 banquets marking the end of inimieitiae 3, 131 n20 Bidis 38 Bocchus 50 Bona Dea trial 34, 95, 100, 102, 108-9 boni 9 171

Index 21,118; and C. Trebonius 67; and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus 59, 114; attacked by Servius Polo. 118; convinced that Curio would support Pompey 87 - 8; passed over for urban praetarship 56, 67; prosecutes M. Antonius 163n240; prosecutes L. Calpurnius Bestia 118; trial of 27,93,118-19 Caesar, see ]ulius Caesar, C. Caesarian conspiracy 69 Caesetius Flavus, L. (tr. 44) 57, 58, 130n14 Caetra 110 Calidius, M. (pr. 57) 154n21 Calpurnius Bestia, L. (cos. 111) 107 Calpurnius Bestia, L. (aed. ca. 59)93,118 Calpurniu, Bibulus, M. (cos. 59) 66, 72, 81, 85 Calpurnius Pisa, C. (ros. 67) 52,77, 103, 109 Calpurnius Piso, Cn. (quaest. 65)80-1,87 Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, L. (cos. 58) and Ap. Claudius Pulcher 5; and Caelius 47, 103; and Caesar 111; and Cicero 22, 28,44,47,111; and Valerius Flaccus 111 Calpurnius Piso Frugi, C. (quaest. 58) 44 Caninius Gallus, L. (tr. 56) 163n240 Caninius Rebilus C. (cos. 45) 57 Caninius Satyrus, A. 80 Cannae 103 Calluleius, C. (tr. 98) 79 Carthage 19 Cassius Dio Cocccianus 24, 36, 52,53,67,73,77,82, 100, 108, 131n23 on factions 82; on Pompey's rcluctance to accept honours 58; on proposal to remove Lutatius' name from

Index Capitoline 113-14; on reconciliations 5, 6, 9; on relations between lawyers 96 Cassius Longinus, C. (cos. 73) 100 Cassius Longinus, C. (pr. 44) 3, 52, 56 Cassius Longinus, L. (tr. 104) 16, 71 Cassius Longinus, L. (pr. 66) 143n131 Catilinarian conspiracy 10, 52, 66, 103, 109, 120-1 Caesar's complicity in first Catilinarian conspiracy 87 Catiline see Sergius Catilina, L. (pr. 68) Cato see Porcius censarship 60, 72 Chalinus 24 Cicero see Tullius Cicero, M. (cos. 63) civil war 17,19,31,43,45,54, 62,67,75,83,85,86,87,88, 112, 123 Claudius, C. (pr. 56) 8, 43, 91, 119 Claudius Asellus, Ti. (tr. 140) 60,103-4,113 Claudius Caecus, Ap. (cos. 307, 296) 21 Claudius Marcellus, C. (cos. 50) 85-6 Claudius Marcellus, C. (cos. 49) 86-7 Claudius Marcellus, M. (cos. 222,215,214,210,208) 77, 150n81 Claudius Marcellus, M. (pr. ca. 73) 107 Claudius Marcellus, M. (cos. 51) 62,85 Claudius Nero, C. (cos. 217) and M. Livius Salinator 6, 13,17, 18,70,94 Claudius Pulcher, Ap. (cos. 143) 53 Claudius Pulcher, Ap. (cos. 54) acquittal in 50: 19 - 20; and Caelius 4-5,47,74,88, 103

172

118; and Cicero 3-4,7,11, 14,44,53-4,92,132n32, 142n99, 149n76; and C. Scribonius Curio 74; and M. Aemilius Scaurus 7 - 8, 53; prosecuted by P. Cornelius Dolabella 7,32,74,92 Claudius Pulcher, Ap. 43 Claudius PluIcher, Ap. (cos 38) 43, 119 Claudius Pulcher, C. (cos. 177) 51,61,105 clemency, Caesar's 27,57,86 clients 10, 24, 32, 42, 56, 60-2, 85, 128 Clodia 21,59,98, 108, 118 Clodius Pulcher, P. (aed. 56) and Caecilius Metellus Nepos 36; and Caesar 34; and Catiline 109, 120-1; and Cicero 6-7,9,20,21,22,23, 25-6,27,32,39,42,44,45, 68,70,72,73,94-5,98, 102, 112, 120-1, 142n99; and Hartensius 102, 109; and Lucullus 59, 108-9; and Milo 47,67,73, 102; and Terentia 109; avenged by nephews 43; death 22,25-6,42,47; dedicates property of Cicero and Gabinius 70; see also Bona Dea trial Clodius PuIcher, P. 21, 23, 27 Cluentius Habitus, A. 93, 154n21 Coelius Caldus, C. (ws. 94) 55 Coelius Caldus, C. (quaest. 50) 59 Commentariolum Petitionis 10, 37, 96 wmpetition benefits of 12 - 13; increase of 19; source of inimicitiae 41, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 63, 117 confiscation 38 consecration 70 consensus 79 consilium 75 - 6 consulate campaigning für 13; dignity of 12; duality of 13 conviction (far crime)

damage of 90 - 1; revenge far 92-3 Copillus 50 Cornelia (mother of Gracchi) 20,116, 135n56 Cornelia (wife of Pompey) 125 Cornelius, C. (tr. 67) 99 Cornelius Balbus, L. (cos. 40) 57, 103 Cornelius Cinna, L. (cos. 87, 86,85,84) 24-5 Cornelius Dolabella, Cn. (pr. 81) 107-8 Cornelius Dolabella, P. (cos. 44) 7,32-3,34-5,44,92, 147n14 Cornelius Lentulus Crus, L. (cos. 49) 86, 108 Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, Cn. (ws. 56) 108 Cornelius Lentulus Niger, L. (pr. ca. 61) 108 Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, P. (ws. 57) 9, 54, 80, 100, 108 Cornelius Lentulus Sura, P. (cos. 71) 43, 143n131 Cornelius Nepos 46 Cornelius Scipio, Cn. (cos. 222) 51 Cornelius Scipio, P. (ws. 218) 51 Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P. (cos. 205, 194) and Cato 17, 72,99, 104-5; and Fabius Maximus 143n136, 149n77, 150n78, 150n80; and Marcius Septimius 51- 2; and Sempronius Gracchus 8, 13, 15, 19,39-40,99, 134n22; and Terentius Culleo 81; attracts invidia 128; triumph opposed by inimici 78; see also invidia Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus, P. (ws. 147, 134) and Ap. Claudius Pulcher 53; and Q. Pompeius 41, 105; and Ti. Claudius Asellus 60, 103 - 4, 113; attracts invidia 66, 128; wit 140n50 173

Index

Index Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, L. (cos. 190) andCato 17, 72,99,104-5; and Q. Terentius Culleo 81; and Sempronius Gracchus 15, 19 Cornelius Scipio Nasica, P. (cos. 162, 155) 19 Cornelius Sulla, P. (pr. ca. 68) 49,78,96,114,121-2 Cornelius Sulla Felix, L. (cos. 88, 80) and Caesar 45; and Marius 25, 42, 45, 50", 67; attracts invidia 128; dream 8, 75; epitaph 22; Memoires 50; proscriptions 74, 148n58; reforms 53, 69; resigns dictatorship 44, 56; victims of 45 Cornelius Tacitus 21 Crassus, see Licinius Crassus Crete 65, 84 cruelty as characteristic of inimieitiae 75 Curius, Q. (quaest. ca. 71) 143n131 Curtius Nicias 125, 130n14 cursus honorum 48, 54, 63, 91, 128 curule office focus of ambition 48, 52; nobles' monopoly of 55, 105; subverted by inimieitiae 128

Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn. (cos. 32) 114 Domitius Ahenobarbus, L. (cos. 54) and Caelius 103, 114; and Cicero 80; bickering at Pharsalus 54; defeated by Antony for augurate 59, 114, 136n68; republicanism 86 Domitius Calvinus, Cn. (cos. 53) 111 Duronius, M. (tr. ca. 97) 113

edicta 73 e1ections 10, 31, 55-6, 114 emotionalism as characteristic of inimieitiae 2, 64, 65, 78, 83 envy see invidia Epicrates 38 Epidius Marullus, C. (tr. 44) 57,58, 131n15 equestrians 105 evidence 91, 97, 154n9 exile 78-9, 91,116,122 see also Tullius Cicero, M., exile Fabia 109, 120 Fabius GaIIus, M. 28 Fabius Maximus, Q. (cos. 45) 45, 163n240 Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, Q. (cos. 233, 228, 215, 214, 209) and Minucius Rufus 66, 71; and Scipio Africanus 143n136, 149n77, 150n78, 150n80; attracts invidia 56; insists that Senate reconcile Livius and Claudius 13 factions 10, 44, 80-8, 100-2, 128-9, 132n52, 151n98 Falcidius 110 familiaI inimieitiae Appuleius Decianus' with Flaccus 110; Caelius' with Claudii 5, 118; Cn. Domitius' with Antony 114; Luculli's with Servilii 115; paterna irlimieitia 43; Cn. Pompeius

Decius, P. (pr. 115) 119-20 declarations of inimieitiae 4, 11 definition of inimieitiae 1 - 3 Dido 24 dignitas 5, 18, 21, 28, 32, 60, 69,85 Dio 118; see alm Cassius Dio Cocceianus Diodorus Siculus 19, 103, 116 divinatio 98, 129 dolor 20 Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn. (cos. 122) 59 Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn. (cos. 96) 26,59,96, 104 174

Hannibal71 Hannibalic War 51,94 Hasdrubal 18, 70 Herrenius Balbus, L. 96, 119 Hinard, Fran<;ois 45 Homer 20-1 honour 76, 113 Pompey' s reluctance to accept honours 58 Hortensius Hortalus, Q. (cos. 69) 96, 97 -8, 102, 109 humiliation as source of inimieitiae 37 - 8

Magnus' (Pompey's son) with Cicero 37; Roman expectations about 23 - 4; Sempronius Atratinus' with Caelius 118; transmission of 43 - 6; trials originating in 92 -4,97, 115, 154n21 family ties focus of earlier studies 127; inhibited inimieitiae 27; role in building power 128; strength of 35, 44, 45, 92 - 3 Favonius, M. (pr. 49) 36, 114 jides 40 - 2, 128 Flavius, L. (pr. ca. 58) 3, 36 Flavius Fimbria, C. (cos. 104) 55, 107 Flavius Fimbria, C. (leg. 86) 25 Fonteius, M. (pr. ca. 75) 27 friendship, see amieitia Fufius Calenus, Q. (cos. 47) 6, 39,92, 122, 131n23 Fulvia 74 Fulvius Nobilior, M. (cos. 189) and M. Aemilius Lepidus 13, 15, 18,25,59,73, 150n81 Fundanius, C. 3 Furius, P. (tr. 100) 60,78-9 Furius Crassipes (quaest. 51) 5 Furius Philus, P. (cos. 223) 103 Furius Purpurio, L. (cos. 196) 51, 72

ideology 30, 40, 64-5, 80, 83, 127, 128 imperium 16, 78 increase of inimieitiae 19 indignatio 25 infidelity 32, 34 - 6 in tensity of inimieitiae 11 lnvectiva in Cieeronem 20, 76 invidia 23 as source of inimieitiae 48 - 54, 56, 63, 128 Jugurtha 50,61,78,107 Jugurthine War 61,107 Julia 85, 87 Julius Caesar, C. (cos. 59, 48, 46, 45, 44) and Aemilius Lepidus Paullus 87; and Brutus 34, 43; and Caelius 56, 67; and Caesetius Flavus 57,58, 131n15; and Calpurnius Bibulus 72, 81, 85; and Calpurnius Piso 102-3, 109; and Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus 111; and C. Antonius 122; and Cato 25, 64-5,81; and Cicero 9, 15, 47, 103, 109; and Claudius Marcellus (cos. 51) 62,85; and Claudius MarceIIus (cos. 50) 85; and Claudius Marcellus (cos. 49) 86-7; and Clodius 34; and Cornelius Dolabella 33; and Cornelius Lentulus Crus 86; and Epidius Marullus 57,58,

Gabinius. A. (cos. 58) 23,46, 68,70,94,111

Gabinius, P. (pr. 89) 156n50 Galatia 83 Gallius, M. (pr. ca. 44) 154n21 Gallius, Q. (pr. 65) 154n21 Gallius, Q. (pr. ca. 43) 154n21 Gellius, Aulus 39-40, 103-4, 113 gloria 21 - 3, 41, 50, 51, 81, 90, 128 Pompey's pursuit of 65 gratia 42 Gruen, Erich 16, Chapter 5 passim 175

Index 131n15; and Labienus 42; and Livius Drusus Claudianus 123; and Lutatius Catulus 52-3,102-3,109, 113-14; and M. Antony 35; and Matius 18; and Messius 124; and Munatius Plancus 17; and Pompey 25, 34, 36, 53,54,113-14,123; and Scribonius Curio 87 - 8; and Sulla 45; affair with Servilia 34; assassination of 69; attracts inuidia 56-8, 128; attributes opposition to inimieitiae 82 - 3; De Bello Givili 67; De Bello Callieo 68; delights in besting adversaries 22; interview with Ariovistus 68; lampooned by Calvus 123; litigation subsides during dictatorship of 112; loyalty inspired in Gallic army für 69; reconciles Pompey and Crassus 10, 46, 82; requested to disband arrny 74, 86; resisted by inimiei 84 - 8, 128 - 9; resolves rivalry between Brutus and Cassius 52; subordinates state's interests to inimieitiae 128; see also Caesarian conspiracy; civil war; demency J unius Brutus, D. (pr. ca. 45) 47, 70 Junius Brutus, M. (cos. 178) 51 Junius Brutus, M. 106-7 Junius Brutus, M. (tr. 83) 43 Junius Brutus, M. (pr. 44) and Antony 3, 46; and Caesar 34, 43; and Cassins 52; and Pompey 43, 75 J unius Brutus Callaicus, D. (cos. 138) 106 Junius Silanus, M. (cos. 109) 62 jury 19-20, 95, 97-9,100, 102, 107 justification for inimicitiae 4 just war as prerequisite für triumph 78

Index J uventius Laterensis, M. (pr. 51) 114-15 Labienus, Q. 141n94, 155n25 Labienus, T. (pr. ca. 59) 42, 53, 141n94, 155n25 Laelius, C. (cos. 140) 8, 41,66, 105 Laelius, D. (tr. 54) 109-10 lawyers 95 - 7 lex Gorne/ia de iuridictione 73 lex Gorne/ia de proseriptione 45 lex Cabinia de imperio Gn. Pompeio 114 lex Manilia de imperio Gn. Pompeio 65,77,83-4 lex Seantinia 103, 118 lex Vatinia de alternis eonsiliis reieiendis 122 Licinius Calvus, C. 122-4 Licinius Crassus Dives, M. (cos. 70, 55) and Cicero 5, 7, 9, 10-11, 46-7; andC. PorciusCato 123; and Pompey 10, 14,46, 66,71,80-1,82,84,136n68; reputation für becoming reconciled 132n39 Licinius Crassus, L. (cos. 95) 15,26,93, 107 Licinius Crassus, P. (leg. 54) 10-11 Licinius Lucullus, L. (pr. 104) 65, 115 Licinius Lucullus, L. (cos. 74) and Clodius 59, 108-9; and Memmius 60; and Pompey 36, 77, 83 - 4; and Quinctius 150n 77; and Servilius the Augur 115, 154n21; and Vatinius 49; subordinates inimieitiae to Republic 15 Licinius Lucullus, M. (cos. 73) 15,60, 115, 154n21 Licinius Macer, C. (pr. 68) 69, 108 Licinius Macer, L. (pr. 112) 68 Licinius Murena, L. (cos. 62) 91 - 2, 102, 114 Ligarius, Q. (leg. 51) 112

176

Marcius Septimius, L. (leg. 206) 51-2 Marians 54, 108 Marius, C. (cos. 107, 104, 103, J02, 101, 100, 86) and Caecilius Metellus Numidicus 19, 36-7, 41, 55, 61,67, 75, 137n120; and Lutatius Catulus 53; and Sulla 25,42,45,50,67; alliance with Saturninus and Glaucia 67; attracts inuidia 55, 128; behaviour towards inimiei contrasts with Cicero's 136n79; sec also Marians; proscriptions Marius, C. (cos 82) 45 Marius Gratidianus, M. (pr. 85) 45,93-4 marnage alliances 85,86, 121, 125; Cicero's marriage connection with Cornelius Dolabella 7, 32-3,44; role in reconciliations 5, 13 Matius, C. 17 -18 mediation between inimiei 5 - 6 Memmius, C. (pr. ca. 104) 107 Memmius, C. (quaest. 76) 121 Memmius, C. (pr. 58) 60, 125 Messius, C. (aed. 55) 58, 124 Metaurus 18 military bonds inhibited inimieitiae 27 - 8; obligations between subordinates and commanders 28,38,41-2, 111, 159n149 military terminology used to declare inimieitiae 4 Milvian Bridge 18 Minucius Rufus, M. (cos. 221) 66, 71 Minucius Thermus, Q. (pr. ca. 58) 45, 59, 73 Mithridates 54, 65 Mithridatic War 83 moderation towards inimiei 26-7 mos maiorum 27 Mucia 34, 35, 36, 8:), 87

litigation 27 - 8, Chapter 5 passim Livius Drusus, M. (tr. 91) 40, 92, 139n43 Livius Drusus Claudianus, M. 123 Livius Salinator, M. (cos. 219, 207) and C. Claudius Nero 6, 13, 17,18,70,94 Livius, T. 15,67,73,75,81, 99, 103, 104 - 5, 150n83 Livy, see Livius, T. Luca 122, 123 Lucceius, L. (pr. 67) 6, 81, 118 Lucilius, C. 106 Lucilius Hirrus, C. (tr. 53) 54 Lucretius, Q. (cos. 19) 123 Lucro, M. 110 Lupercalia 57 Lutatius Catulus, Q. (cos. 102) 50, 53, 94 Lutatius Catulus, Q. (cos. 78) and Aemilius Scaurus 13; and Caesar 52-3, 102-3, 109, 113-14; and Verres 75; co­ operates in prosecutiol1 of Clodius 109; engineers execution 01' Marius Gratidianus 93 - 4 Maccius Plautus, T. 24 Macedonia 68 Mallius Maximus, Cn. (cos. 105) 16 Mamilian Commission 107 Mancinus treaty 20 Manlius Mancinus, T. (tl'. 107) 21 Manlius Torquatus, L. (pr. 49) 78,95-6,121-2 Manlius Torquatus, L. (cos. 65) 121 Manlius Vulso, A. (lOS. 178) 51 Manlius Vulso, Cn. (cos. 189) 72, 150n83 Marcius Philippus, L. (cos. 91) 15, 40 Marcius Rex, Q. (ws. 68) 150n84 177

Index Mucius Scaevola, Q. (cos. 117) 106

Mummius, L. (cos. 146) 60

Münzer, Friedrich 78, 82,

110-11

Munatius Plancus, L. (cos. 42)

16-17,47,70

Munatius Plancus Bursa, T.

(tr. 52) 42,94, 111-12

murder

of C. Gracchus and followers

119; ofDio 118; ofLivius

Drusus 40; of relatives as

source of inimicitiae 43 - 4; of

T. Gracchus 2-3, 115-16; see also proscri ptiuns

Index Opimius, Q. (cos. 154) 120 Oppius, P. (quaest. 74) 28 opportunism 9-10 optimates 31,46-7,53,81,84, 112, 114

otium 46, 48

Papirius Carbo, C. (cos. 120) 26,93, 120 Papirius Carbo, C. (pr. 62) 154n21 Papirius Carbo Arvina, C. (pr. ca. 83) 93 Papirius Paetus, L. 28 Parthian campaign 35, 57 patriotism 8,12,15,17-18,20, 23, 98, 127, see also national security patronage 24, 60 - 2 Perpenna, M. (pr. ca. 82) 54-5 Perseus 68 personal grievances, as source of inimicitiae 34 - 8 Petillius, Q. (tl'. 187) 72, 104-5 Phamea 42 Pharsal us 37, 54 Philiscus 9, 24 pietas 43, ++, 93, 97,108,118 Pilius Celer, Q. 119 Plancius, Cn. (aed. 54) 114-15 Plautus, see Maccius Plautus, T. Pleminius, Q. (leg. 205) 34, 75, 103 Plutarch 32, 37, 50, 61,77,83, 91,96, 115-16, 120 describes lives guided by inimicitiae 66 - 7 political disagreement as source of inimicitiae 39 - 40; between Cato and Caesar 64 political ideals 17, 18 political parties 30 - 1 Polybius 12, 19 Pompeia 121 Pompeius, Q. (cos. 141) 15-16, 41,99, 105 Pompeius Magnus, Cn. (cos. 70, 55, 52) and Aemilius Lepidus Paullus 141n90; and Acmilius Seaurus

national secu rity endangered by inimicitiae 12 -13; Senate defies 68; Senate's power to protect 18; subordinating inimicitiae to 15, 70-1; supremacy of 12, 19, 20; taking up inimicitiae for 22-3,28,32 new men Atticus 48; Cato 104; Cicero 49, 96; inimicitiae of nobiles for 4,55-6, 105-6, 115, 128; Marius 37; Pompeius 99, 105-6 NicomceJes 87 Ninnius Quadratus, L. (tr. 58) 70 nobility 28, 82, 127 ambitions of 18; domination 31; provoked by Caesar 57; see also new men Novum Comum 62 objectivity, appearance of, by prosecu tors 98 Octavia 85 Octavius, L. (leg. 67) 65 Octavius, M. (tr. 133) 2-3, 115-16 Octavius, M. (aed. 50) 54 Octavius, Naso, L. 3 Opirnius, L. (cos. 121) 106, 119- 20, 149n60 178

46, 48; prevcnts de1,'1 j." _.i 1"11 of Cicero's relationshil' wll i> Hortenius 96; simultanl'olls friendship with Cicero, Brutus, and Antony 46; urges Cicero to collect loan from Dolabella 33 Popillius Laenas, C. (cos. 172) 68 Popillius Laenas, M. (cos. 173) 68 Popillius Laenas, P. (cos. 132) 2-3,78,115-16 populares 20, 24, 31, 53 Porcia 81 Porcius Cato, C. (tr. 56) 123-4 Poricus Cato, M. (cos. 195) and with Acilius Glabrio 91, 94; and Scipios 17, 72,99, 104-5; and T. and L. Quictius Flamininus 66-7; and 1'. Sernpronius Gracchus 40,99-100; censorship 72-3; new man 55; praises prosecutor of father's inimici 24 Porcius Cato, M. (pr. 54) African campaign against Caesar 54; and Caecilius Metellus Nepos 26, 37, 39; and Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica 114; and Caesar 25,36,64-5,80-8; and Cicero 39; and Licinius Murena 91-2, 102; and Pompey 36, 82-4,112; and Servilius Isauricus 124; defeated for praetorship in 55 by Vatinius 122 praetorship, abused by inimzci 73 pretexts for taking up inimicitiae 4-5,131n15 priuilegia 71 - 2 proscriptions 17, ++, 45,74,93 prosecution, Chapter 5 passim Cicero's reluctance to under­ take 42; destroys candidacy 91; filial 24, 92-3; justifieations f
36; and Brutus 43, 75; and Caecilius Metellus Celer 35-6,83; and Caecilius Metellus Creticus 65, 84, 111; and Caecilius Metellus Nepos 26,35-6,39,83, 114; and Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasiea 125; and Caesar 25, 34,36,53,54,113-14,123; and Calpurnius Piso 77; and Cicero 9, 23, 27, 37, 44, 46, 47,80; and Clodius 6-7, 118-19; and C. Porcius Cato 123; and Crassus 10, 14,46, 66, 71, 80-1, 82, 84; and Lucullus 77, 83 - 4; and Memmius 60, 125; and M. Porcius Cato 82 - 4, 112; and Munatius Planeus Bursa 111-12; and P. Cornelius Sulla (pr. ca. 68) 121; and Valerius Flaceus 109-10; attraets inuidia 58, 128; bans Curtius Nicias from his house 125, 130n14; criticized by Curiones for marrying Julia 87; divorce of Mucia 34, 35 - 6, 83; lampooned by Calvus 123; reconciles Claudius and Cicero 7; reeonciles Crassus and Cicero 7; reeonciles Gabinius and Cicero 6, 8; requested to disband army in 50: 74, 86; resisted by inirmci 82 - 4, 128-9; supported by C. Messius 54, 124; see also glory; honour; lex Gabinia de imperio Cn. Pompeio; lex Maniha de imperio Cn. Pompeio; Pharsalus Pompeius Magnus, Cn. (prefect 49) 37 Pompeius Rufus, Q. (cos. 88) 55 Pompeius Rufus, Q. (tr. 52) 42 Pompeius Strabo, Q. (eos. 89) 14 Pompey, see Pompeius Magnus, Cn. (cos. 70, 55, 52) Pomponius Atticus, T. and Lucceius 6; prefers otium 179

Index

Index Sabinus 42, 94, 112

Sallust, see Sallustius Crispus,

C. (pr. 46) Sallustius Crispus, C. (pr. 46) 5, 19,23,49,66,69,76,81, 102 - 3 and Cicero 42; retirement from public life 48 Saturninus, Cn. 114 Scipionic Circle 117 Scribonius Curio, C. (cos. 76) 34,87,93, 130n14, 154n21 Scribonius Curio, C. (tr. 50) and Ap. Claudius Pulcher 74; and Caesar 34,87-8; corrupted by Antony 130n14; example of pretext for inimieitiae 131 n 15; persuades Senate to vote to disarm Pompey and Caesar 74, 86 secrecy of ballot box 20; of inimieiliae 3 - 4, 19 Sempronius Atratinus, L. (cos. 34) 93, 118 Sempronius Gracchus, C. (tr. 123-22) anti-Gracchans 106, 120; desire to avenge Tiberius 2-3,20,23-4,67, 115-16; goals as popularis 31; head brought to Opimius 149n60; legislation against Octavius and Popillius 2 - 3, 78, 115- 16; murder of 119 Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (cos. 117, 163) and Cato 40, 99-100; and L. Cornelius Scipio 14-15, 19, 99; and P. Cornelius Scipio 13, 15, 19,39-40,99, 134n22; and Rutilius 61, 70, 105 Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (tr. 133) object of revenge for Gaius 2-3,23-4, 115-16; supporters executed without trial 78; tribunate inlluenced by dolor 20, 67

oath to undertake in good faith 98; of senior officials by subordinates 28; rewards of 90 provincial settlements 76 - 7 Ptolemy Auletes 118 public image 17 Publicius Bibulus, C. (tr. 209) 77 public opinion, Chapter 2 passim about reconciliates 6 - 9 punishment of inimiei who overlooked their duty 15 -17 quaestio auri Tolojani 16 Quinctius, L. (pr. 68) 149n77 Quinctius Flaminius, L. (cos. 192) 66-7 Quinctius Flaminius, T. (cos. 198) 66- 7 Quintillian 25 Rabirius, C. 53, 108, 141n94, 155n25 reconciliations 5-11,13,15,18, 86, 131 n23, 132n32 see also public opinion; reputation regnum 56 religious institutions 14, 52 - 3, 59, 70 reputation for becoming reconciled 8; für destroying inimiei 8 retaliatory trials 43, 103, f16-19 revenge acceptability 9,20,23-4; Achilles 65; against prosecu tors 92 - 4, 97, 108; Caecilius Metellus Celer's 36; C. Gracchus' 2-3, 20, 23-4, 115 - 16; counter-prosecutions as 116-19; Saturninus' 20; Ti. Gracchus' 20; Lucullus' 84; see also retaliatory trials revolution 12,17-20,54,74, 127 - 8 Rutilius, P. (tr. 167) 61, 67,70, 105 Rutilius Rufus, P. (cos. 105) 117 180

Sempronius Rufus, C. (pr. ca. 44) 117 - 18 Sempronius Rutilius, C. (tr. 189) 157nl05 Senatt' collectively yields to inimieiliae 67-8; power 18 Seneca, see Annaeus Seneca, L. Sergius Catilina, L. (pr. 68) accused of seducing Fabia 109; and Cicero 136n62; and Clodius 109,120-1; attribu tes troubles to inimieiliae 68; executes Marius Gratidianus 45; Jee also Catilinarian conspiracy Sertorius, Q. (pr. 83) 54 - 5, 121 Servaeus 88 Servile War in Sicily 65; Spartacus 14, 71 Servilia (mother of Brutus) 34 Servilia (wife of M. Livius Drusus) 139n43 Servilius, C. (pr. 102),65, 115 Servilius, M. 119 Servilius Caepio, Cn. (cos. 141) 99 Servilius Caepio, Q. (cos. 140) 99 Servilius Caepio, Q. (cos. 106) 16, 71 Sen'ilius Caepio, Q. (pr. ca. 92) 40, 107, 139n43 Servilius Glaucia, C. (pr. 100) 60, 67, 78 Servilius Globulus, P. (pr. 64) 99 Servilius Isauricus, P. (cos. 48) 110-11,124 Servilius the Augur 15, 115, 154n21 Servius Pola 118 Sestius, L. (cos. 23) 92 - 3 Sestius, P. (pr. ca. 54) 92 snub of Marius 36, 55, 61 Social War 50 Spartacus 71 state horse, inimieitiae as reason for depriving another of 6, 17, 60, 103, 104

Statelliates 68 Sthenius 61 successors as inimiei 53 - 4 Suetonius Tranquillus, C. 72, 81, 114 Sulpicius Galba, Ser. (cos. 144) 150n84 Sulpicius Galba, Ser. (pr. 54) 86 Sulpicius Rufus, Ser. (cas. 51) 85, 95 Tarquins 16 Taylor, Lil)' Ross 94 Terentia 109 Terentius Culleo, Q. (pr. 187) 81 testimony against Pompeius 99, 105-6; Cicero's at Bona Dea trial 109; generator of mimieiliae 94 - 5; of Aemilius Scaurus' slave 26; prejudiced by inimiciliae 21, 98-9 Tiberius (emperor) 4 Tigellius Hermogenes, M. 42 Tiro 134nl8 Trebellius, L. (tr. 47) 34 Trebonitis, C. (pr. 48) 67 tribunate abused by inimici 67, 73 triumph Curio plans to resist Caesar's 88; offered to Caesar 73; opposed by inimiei 21, 25, 56, 59-60,72,77-8,84; universal desire for 59 triumvirate first 9,36,46-7,83,129 (formation 10, 46, 82, role in trials 109-11, 122-4); second 74 trust see jides Tuccius, M. 117 - 18 Tullia 32 - 3 Tullius Cicero, M. (cos. 63) accaunt of Popillius' departure from Rome 116; admiration for Domitius 62; advice from Aemilius Scaurus 55; and Annius Milo 24, 47; 181

Index

Index behaviour towards inimiei with Marius' 136n79; conversation with Philiscus 24; De Amieilia 14, 41; defends Caecilius Metellus 114; defends Cornelius Sulla 78, 121; defends Ligarius 112; defends Livius Drusus 123; defends Murena 95; De Fonleio 27; De Haruspicum Responso 14; denies that prosecutors 01' Autronius, Cornelius Sulla, and Licinius Murena were motivated by inimieiliae 114; De Officiis 26; De Provineiis Cansularibus 15; dialogues 66; distinguishes between inimiei and campelilares 49; Divinalia in Caeeilium 97; encouraged by good relations between D. Brutus and Munatius Plancus 70; endures inimieiliae 1'01' state 23; exile 9, 15,22,24,39,44,45,46,47, 49, 68, 72, 73, 78, 111 (attributes Caecilius Metellus Numidieus' exile to inimieiliae 78 - 9); hopes to be put out 01' misery by inimiei 25; ideal 01' moderation towards inimiei 27; inhibi ted by inimieiliae 80; mediates between Atticus and Lucceius 6; opposes restoring rights to Sulla's victims 45; Phitippies 23,27,76; Pro Caelio 21,27,93,96,98; Pro Cluenlia 95; Pro Flaeca 75; Pro A1areella 62; Pro Milane 24; proper relations between legal opponents 95; Pro Scaura 43; Pro Seslia 24, 92 - 3; reaction to designation 01' Caninius Rebilius as consul 57; rebukes brother over threat to Appollonis 3; recognizes strategie possibilities 01' prosecution 91; rejoices in misfortunes 01' inimiei 22; reputation as provincial governor 59; status as new man 49, 55, 96 (hostility Q.

and Antony 23, 43, 74, 95, 122; and Ap. Claudius Pulcher 3-4,7,11,32,44, 53-4,74,92, 132n32, 136n68, 142n99; and Atticus 46; and Caecilius Metellus Nepos 39, 44, 131n22; and Caelius 47 -8 (see also Tullius Cicero, M., Pro Caetia); and Caesar 15, 52, 56, 62, 73, 103, 109, 122; and Calpumius Bibulus 66; and Calpurnius Piso 22, 47; and Catiline 136n62; and Cato 39, 102; and Clodius 6-7,21, 22,23,25-6,42,44,45,68, 70,73,94-5,98, 102, 109, 120 - 1, 112, 142n99; and Cornelius Dolabella 32 - 3, 92; and Crassus 5,7,10-11, 46 - 7; and D. J unius Brutus 47; and Dornitius Ahenobarbus 136n68; and Fufius Calenus 6, 131n23; and Gabinius 6, 8, 18, 23, 94; and Herrenius Balbus 96; and Hortensius 96, 97-8; and L. Munatius Planeus 47; and Manlius Torquatus 95 - 6; ami Phamea 42; and Pompeius Rufus 42; and Pompey 9, 36, 46, 58, 73,80, 94; and Q. Caeeilius 80; ami Sallust 42; and Sthenius 61; and Sulpicius Rufus 95; and T. Munatius Plancus 42, 94, 111-12; ami triumvirs 9, 10, 20-1,46, 123; and Vatinus 49,80, 123, 131n20; associates invidia with a political career 48; associates prosecution with inimieiliae 92: atlacked by hostile prosecutors 96; a!tacks judicial opponents 96; attributes inimieiliae to competi[ion for office 19; attributes trials to inimieiliae 99, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110; belittled for not resisting inimiei 8, 22; contrasts his 182

Pompeius faced as new man 99, 105 - 6); tribunates 01' Gracchus and Saturninus motivated by inimieiliae 67; urged not to deny services to anybody 37; urged to become reconciled to win elections 10; Verrines 4,38,55,75,76-7, 92,96, 100, 102; warns Minucius Thermus not to disgrace his quaestor 59; wi t 37; see also Bana Dea trial; Catilinarian conspiracy Tullius Cicero, Q. (pr. (2) mentioned as correspondent 01' M. Cicero 8, 9, 12, 22, 80; service under M. Cicero 59; suffered because 01' M. Cicero's exile 24, 45; threat to Apollonis 3 Turpilius Silanus, T. 19,61

Valerius Flaccus, L. (cos. 86) 93,110 Valerius Flaccus, L. (pr. 63) 93, 98-9,103,109-11 Valerius Maximus 16, 40, 93, 99, 103, 105, 107, 108, 109 Vargunteius, L. 143n131 Vatinius, P. (cos. 47) 49, 80, 121, 122-4 Velleius Paterculus 24, 87 Verres, C. (pr. 74) and Caecilis Niger 28, 38, 97; and Cicero 41,61,92,75, 102; assessment 01' Sicily 76 - 7; offends Cassius Longinus 100 Vettius, L. 43 violence 17 virlus 25 - 7, 28 Volcatius 38 witnesses attract inimieiliae 94 - 5; at Valerius Flaccus' trial 110 -11; dangers faced by 95; hostile 98-9, 105; Lucullus at Bana Dea trial 108

Vaga 61 Valerius Antias 72, 81, 104 Valerius Flaccus, L. (cos. 100) 113

111'1