The Patterns of Religious Conflict in Indonesia (1990-2008)
Research Report
Ihsan Ali-Fauzi Rudy Harisyah Alam Samsu R...
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The Patterns of Religious Conflict in Indonesia (1990-2008)
Research Report
Ihsan Ali-Fauzi Rudy Harisyah Alam Samsu Rizal Panggabean
Jakarta, February 2009
Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (YWP) Magister Perdamaian dan Resolusi Konflik, Universitas Gadjah Mada (MPRK-UGM), The Asia Foundation (TAF)
Preface One of the flagship programs undertaken by Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (YWP) since 2008 has been the “Religious Freedom Mainstreaming”. Through this program, we seek to continue to work on and to keep strengthening what has been the chief mission of the YWP all this time, i.e. to create the foundation for and to develop further the pluralism discourse in Indonesia. As is publicly known, since its founding – among others by the late Nurcholis Madjid – more than two decades ago (1986), YWP has been actively conducting studies, discussions and seminars, and issuing publications on the issue. Under this framework, one of the major constraints that have continued to haunt us has been the still rampant acts of violence committed in the name of religion. These acts of violence take the form of both sectarian and communal violence as well as thuggery and terrorism. This is highly regretful especially in light of the fact that we are now living in an era of democracy which is growing stronger and stable, and conflicts should be solved through peaceful means. Together with other component in Indonesia, YWP hopes to foster a joint effort to eliminate the use of violence in solving religious conflict. This way we can hope that the rights of religious freedom of every citizen can be fully enjoyed. Up to this date, however, it has been an unfortunate affair that we still have not yet had reliable basis of data for charting out the patterns of religious conflict in our country, which can help us to understand the issue better and thereby enable us to consider more things when designing and planning for follow-up activities. By “reliable” we mean that the database should be built on strong theoretical and conceptual basis, up to date and accurate, using a fully accountable methodology, and executed in an honest and careful manner. Based on the above arguments we conducted this study and publicized the result. The study, using Kompas and Antara, two of the most reliable national publications, as the source of information, hoped to provide a glimpse into the patterns of religious conflict in Indonesia between January 1990 and August 2008. The period allows us to analyze various religious conflicts that occurred during the New Order regime (1990-1998), the period of transition towards early democracy (1998-2004), and the new democratic regime (2004-2008). The study mostly tried to determine whether religious conflict was solved through peaceful means or by means of violence, the underlying issues, their geographic spread, players and victims, and the manner with which the security forces responded to the incidence. It is our hope that this study is useful for the strengthening of the discourse of pluralism in Indonesia. We also hope this study is useful for further studies on similar issue.
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Like any other activities, this study had its own drawbacks and limitations. Some of them were already explained in this report. Therefore, we would be grateful for any inputs from our readers to help improve our performance in the future. This study was possible through the cooperation between YWP and Program Magister Perdamaian dan Resolusi Konflik, Universitas Gadjah Mada (Postgraduate Program for Peace and Conflict Resolution-Gadjah Mada University/MPRK-UGM), and The Asia Foundation (TAF). In addition to this joint effort, we are also collaborating to run the Police, Civil Society and Religious Conflict in Indonesia program to contribute to the protection of religious freedom in the country by ensuring that religious conflict is solved through peaceful means. Last, we would like to thank everybody who has helped make the study possible. It is our hope that this effort will be useful. ***
Jakarta, February 2009 Ihsan Ali-Fauzi Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, Program Director
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Executive Summary The goal of this study is to reveal the patterns of religious conflict in Indonesia between the period of January 1990 and August 2008. We chose this period in order to analyze in depth the various incidence of religious conflict that happened over three periods of regimes: the authoritarian New Order (1990-1998), the early transition to democracy period (1998-2004), and the more recent democratic period (2004-2008). The data sources for this study were drawn from reports in Kompas daily and Antara news agency, two of the most reliable national media sources in Indonesia. In this study, we examined the religious conflicts in terms of whether they were solved in peaceful or violent manners. The study also examined the underlying issues causing the religious conflicts (communal, sectarian, terrorism, moral, or others), their geographic spread, actors and victims, and how the security institutions responded to them. The following are the key findings: First, in terms of intensity of the incidence, two thirds of the religious conflicts in Indonesia took form as peaceful actions, and only one third were as actions of violence. This shows that the Indonesian people are capable of resorting to peaceful means when responding to religious conflicts. Second, in terms of timing, most actions of violence, after the three regimes were compared, happened during the transitional democratic regime. This shows that the opportunity for public participation ushered in by the new democratic era, after lengthy repression during the authoritarian New Order regime, had not yet been accompanied fully by a well-functioning security apparatus. This finding was supported by the fact that peaceful actions in the wake of religious conflict were dominant under the later more established democratic regime. Third, whether in the form of peaceful or violent actions, most of the incidences of religious conflict were caused by or related to disputes stemming from communal issues like conflicts between Muslim and Christian communities and blasphemy against religions. However, there were geographic variations as to what triggered conflicts. In Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, the conflict triggers were predominantly communal issues were. Meanwhile, in areas like West Java and Banten moral and sectarian issues caused most of the conflicts. In Jakarta religious violence was linked more to terrorism and moral issues. Fourth, in terms of actors, most actions of violence were committed by community groups while religious groups that were often perceived as the major players only ranked third (after terrorist groups) in terms of their involvement in violent actions. The perception of the involvement of religious groups was only confirmed insofar as their involvement in peaceful actions. iv
Fifth, violence related to communal issues had resulted in the highest number of human casualties and property damage. Meanwhile, violence related to moral issues ranked second in terms of the losses inflicted. Sixth, the information obtained from Kompas and Antara on the role of security forces in the incidence of religious conflict had been inadequate. However, despite the limited information, the study was able to show that in general the security forces had performed their tasks well. In addition, Kompas’ descriptive reports of incidences of religious conflict, except for cases that resulted in a large number of casualties and/or property damage, tended to be limited. Similarly, Kompas had given only limited accounts of the role of security forces during the incidences. In this regard Antara provided a more detailed description of the role of security forces. Seventh, there was a possibility that the data obtained were biased since both Kompas and Antara are media with a national news scope. The number of incidences could have been higher had this study obtained its data from the local, either provincial- or regency/citylevel media sources. That said, however, the data obtained from the two national media sources could still serve as valuable initial database that provide a general description of religious conflict in Indonesia between 1990 and 2008. Based on the above key findings we propose four recommendations. 1. The study shows that the Indonesian people are capable of responding to issues triggering religious conflict through peaceful means. In the future the challenge will be to encourage people to resort to peaceful means as their first act of choice when responding to issues triggering religious conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to design a program that can help to improve the public’s understanding and capability of how to promote strategies for peaceful actions as a means of responding to issues triggering religious conflict. In light of the fact that the actors committing the various acts of violence with religious undertones were communal groups rather than certain religious groups, such programs should be designed to reach sections of the society as wide as possible. 2. The key issues that triggered the religious conflicts varied from one region to another. Therefore, efforts dealing with religious violence should be designed to address the key trigger issues in each region. Programs promoting harmony between followers of different religions (inter-religious) should be a priority in eastern Indonesian regions like Central Sulawesi and Maluku, while programs to promote harmony among members of a religion (intra-religious) are more important in western Indonesian regions like Banten and West Java. Likewise, in western Indonesian regions, serious attention should be given to helping people develop their capacity to resort to peaceful means when responding to moral issues that often triggered incidences of religious violence. This is of course related to the readiness and firmness of security forces to uphold the law and to protect citizens in accordance with the law in the
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places that had often become targets of destruction when moral issues were made excuses for committing violence. 3. The study shows that each regime faced different issues of religious conflict. If a study is to be made again to look for how to best respond to the contemporary incidences of religious conflicts, the use of the national media like Kompas and Antara as the main data sources will be inadequate. This report thus recommends a follow-up study using provincial- and regency/city-level media as data sources in order to understand the patterns of religious conflict in Indonesia that happened in a more recent period. 4. Reports by non-media sources like the police and nongovernmental organizations data that might have escaped media attention, even by the local media, should be used. It is hoped that through the use of more varied data sources a more comprehensive and detailed picture of the patterns of religious conflict in Indonesia and the efforts that the Indonesian security institutions had made in dealing with those conflicts can be produced. *** Jakarta, February 2009
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Contents Preface Executive Summary
ii iv
Part I Introduction, Methodology and Concept 1. Introduction 1.1 Background 1.2 Objectives and Benefit
2 2
2. Methodology 2.1 Mass Media as a Data Sources for Studying Protest and Violence 2.2 Converage of Study 2.3 Sources and Data Gathering Method 2.4 Incidence Tally
3 4 5 6
3. Religious Conflict 3.1 Religious Conflict: Definition 3.2 Issues of Religious Conflict in Indonesia 3.3 Pattern of Religious Conflict 3.4 The Role of Security Forces in Religious Conflict
6 7 9 10
Part II The Findings 1. Inscidences of Religious Conflict: Type, Level and Development 2. Subtype and Form of Incidences of Religious Conflict 3. Pattern of the Spread of Religious Conflict 4. Players in Religious Conflict 5. Issues of Religious Conflict 6. The Impacts of Incidence of Religious Violence 7. The Role of Security Forces in Incidences of Religious Conflict 8. The Possibility of Data Bias
13 14 19 21 24 36 38 43
Part III Consclusions and Recommendation 1. Consclusions 2. Recommendation
46 48
Appendix 1. Notes on Coding and Template to Record Incidences of Religious Conflict 2. Coding and Template to Record Incidences of Religious Conflict
50 56
Bibliography vii
Part I Introduction, Methodology and Concept
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1. Introduction 1.1. Background For more than a decade, conflicts and violence carrying religious nuances have rocked Indonesia. They ranged from conflicts in provincial cities between 1995-1997, the purging of black magic practitioners (dukun santet) in Java and conflicts between religious groups in Central Sulawesi and Maluku from 1998-2001, to the mobilization of religious paramilitary units (laskar) and the jihad bombing attacks by terrorist groups from 2000-2005. Conflicts triggered by sectarian issues against Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and other religious groups have also added to the list of incidences of the religious conflict. Attempts have been made to solve the religious conflict and violence. One such attempt is the program now being run by Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina (YWP), in partnership with Magister Perdamaian dan Resolusi Konflik, Universitas Gadjah Mada (Postgraduate Program for Peace and Conflict Resolution-Gadjah Mada University/MPRK-UGM), and The Asia Foundation (TAF). The program seeks to strengthen the role of the police in dealing with religious conflict and violence by involving members of the civil society, while remaining the main institution in charge of upholding security in Indonesia. Despite the various efforts, there has been one key problem that has remained unaddressed: the inexistence of reliable data showing the patterns of religious conflict and violence in Indonesia. This state of affairs is very unfortunate because a full understanding of the patterns of religious conflict and violence is crucial to help provide the basis for the right program and strategy to be developed and to help determine the scale of the problem-solving priorities. To tackle the problem, YWP, MPRK-UGM, and TAF thus embarked on a project to produce such data. We started out by systematically researching and analyzing incidences of religious conflict that happened in Indonesia between January 1990 and August 2008 as reported by Kompas daily and Antara news sgency. 1.2. Objectives and Benefit The objectives of this study are to: (1) identify the patterns of religious conflict in Indonesia; and (2) identify the patterns of measures taken by the security forces, the police in particular. By patterns of religious conflict we mean the type, level, development, spread, actors, trigger issues involved and impacts. By the patterns of measures we mean the presence of security forces at the time of incidence, elements of security forces involved in the operations and the security measures taken. The resulting database from the study is valuable in terms of: (1) the availability of reliable information on the patterns of religious conflict in Indonesia that can be used to determine the priority scale and to help design various preventive programs for religious conflicts and violence; and (2) the availability of reliable information that can be used to evaluate the security measures taken by the police, which can subsequently be used as an input for improving the security measures taken by the police in dealing with religious conflict and violence in Indonesia. 2
2. Methodology 2.1. Mass Media as a Data Source for Studying Protest and Violence All this time researchers have used the disciplines of social sciences like history, anthropology, sociology and psychology in their attempts to explain the phenomena of conflict and violence. They have also paid more attention to the use of mass media in their studies of conflict. There are two main models of how to use mass media in conflict studies that are generally used. The first one is where the mass media serve as the main source of data on protest and violence (e.g. Merrill & Lowenstein 1971; Danzger 1975; Franzosi 1987; Olzak 1989, 1992; Tadjoeddin 2002; Varshney, Panggabean & Tadjoeddin 2004; Barron, Kaiser & Pradhan 2004; and Barron & Sharpe 2005). The second one is where the mass media itself become the objects of the study (i.e. Blank 1977; Cho & Lacy 2000; Clarke & Blankenburg 1972; Gerbner 1969; and Littleton 1995). The latter is known as the ‘media effects research.’ This study follows the first model, which uses mass media reports as the source of data on religious conflict in Indonesia. The use of mass media reports, particularly newspapers, has fast become a trend over the past several decades, especially in the study of collective action and social movements. The fast development in this area is possible simply due to the fact that newspaper-based data of events or occurences provide numerous theoretical and methodological opportunities for researchers to draw from (Earl et al 2004). Newspaper-based data allows researchers the opportunity to study various types of collective action, from religious conflict and violence in Indonesia (Tadjoeddin 2002; Varshney, Panggabean & Tadjoeddin 2004; Barron, Kaiser & Pradhan 2004; and Barron & Sharpe 2005), to racial violence (Olzak 1989b, 1992; Bergesen & Herman 1998), ethnic conflicts in India (Varshney 2002; Wilkinson, 2004), farmers’ protest and revolt (Paige 1975), and various social protests, both conventional and nonconventional (Earl et al. 2003, Kriesi et al. 1995). The use of newspapers as a source of data on conflict, protest and violence is growing in importance, especially in situations when alternative sources such as the government or police statistics are considered inadequate or unreliable. This is mainly due to a lack of standardization among the different agencies, which has resulted in the low level of comparability of interagency data sets. However, the use of mass media as a source of data is not without its drawbacks. The reliability of the media depends on the situation and characteristics of the regime in power. Under the authoritarian New Order regime that prohibited any discourses on issues of SARA (the Indonesian acronym for ethnicity, religion, race and intergroup) national newspapers were not a reliable data source for researching violent incidences, particularly incidences related to ethnocommunal violence. This explains why researchers turned to regional newspapers (in provinces in the case of Varshney, Panggabean & Tadjoeddin, 2004, and in cities/regencies in the case of Barron & Sharpe, 2005) when they tried to build a database on collective violence in Indonesia. 3
The use of regional newspapers was also based on the consideration of the characteristics of the violence that generally took on local undertones and was more likely to be covered by local newspapers than national newspapers. Although local media offers a better chance of obtaining useful information, the choice of a media source, whether national or local, actually depends on the need for and design of the research at hand. It also depends on the research period. In the case of Indonesia, for example, the post-New Order period witnessed the proliferation of local media. This creates problems when a comparative research study is designed to include the New Order period and to rely on local media. Moreover, the method and the archiving quality of the local media could be well below that of established national media. Two other methodological issues worth noting in the use of newspapers as a source of data concerns what are called selection bias and description bias (Earl et al 2004). Selection bias is the possibility of a newspaper’s failure to report on an actual occurrence or event. This can be due to the different standards newspapers use to decide which occurrence or event is “worth” covering. Another cause may be the technical constraints that prevent them from providing comprehensive coverage of an event. With regard to coverage of protest and violence, for example, the media decide whether or not to cover an event based on several considerations such as the number of victims or the amount of losses inflicted, the number of actors (players) involved and the level of public attention to or scrutiny of the event. Description bias is the newspaper bias in describing an event. In other words, media description of an event might not be as accurate as the actual event. In a study on print and electronic media coverage of the 1982 and 1991 protest events in Washington, D.C., for example, McCarthy et al (1999) identifies three dimensions of description bias, namely: (a) omission of information; (b) misrepresentaton of information; and (c) framing of event by the media. Description bias can be the result of technical factors such as the coverage skills of the reporters and the deadline, as well as the media’s “ideology” with regard to the issues covered. The problems of description bias and selection bias in a media study can be solved by resorting to multiple sources instead of relying on just a single media source. To deal exclusively with description bias, content analysis and framing analysis may be used to identify the possibility of bias (Kripendorf 1980, Neuendorf 2002). 2.2. Coverage of Study As mentioned earlier, this study aimed to build a database of religious conflict, both in the form of peaceful actions (including protests) and violent actions. The study covers the period of January 1990 and August 2008. Overall, the study covered a period of nearly 19 years; 18 years and 8 months, to be exact. Studying the period allows us to examine the religious conflict that occurred over three different regime periods. First, the end of the authoritarian New Order regime period, from January 1990 to 20 May 1998. Second, the period of transition towards democracy under the governments of B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri, from 20 May 1998 to 20 4
October 2004. Third, the period of the new democratic regime under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, which also marked the start of a direct presidential election, from 20 October 2004 to 31 August 2008. This variation of government types also allows us to learn about whether the religious conflicts that had happened in Indonesia involved similar types of conflict and issues or whether each government had faced specific type of conflict and issues. 2.3. Sources and Data Gathering Method This study used Kompas daily and the Antara news agency as the data sources. Despite a number of methodological issues mentioned previously, for an initial attempt at building a database on religious conflict incidences in Indonesia, Kompas and Antara made relatively good —if not the best—sources compared to other available alternative sources. Kompas is the most widely-read national newspaper, equipped probably with the best news-gathering infrastructure compared to other national newspapers. Meanwhile, Antara is the only news agency in Indonesia that existed during all the periods under study. The Kompas data was collected by reading all the editions or archives during the periods studied, from January 1990 to August 2008. The newspaper archives were obtained from the National Library in Jakarta. The search for Antara data involved a different approach. Since Antara does not apply news indexing, the search for news archives was done by using several combinations of key words. The most widely used key words were “religion”, “conflict”, “violence”, protest/demonstration”, “SARA”, “clash”, “bombing”, “indecent places”, “dim-lighted stalls”, and “pornography” or “pornoaction”. Several other key words obtained from other studies on the same subject were also used, such as “black magician”, “HKBP”, “Ahmadiyah” and “heretical sect”. The data gathering process lasted from September through December 2008. There were eight data collectors who were specially trained for this study’s purpose. They read all the archives to identify relevant articles. By relevant we mean news articles on religious conflict, that took the form of either peaceful actions or violent actions. In addition to the articles on conflict incidences, the field officers also identified articles related to the incidence, both prior to and after they had occurred, to find background information that might help explain how and why religious conflict occured. The search result was compiled in a data search journal. Next, the articles identified as “relevant articles” were copied, manually or in digital format. Copied articles and the data search journal were then submitted to the staff in charge of coding according to the coding template prepared earlier. Prior to the coding, a re-identification of the news articles collected by the field officers was conducted. This was to ensure that all the news articles that were gathered fit the study’s criteria.
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2.4. Incidence Tally The analysis section of this study focuses on religious conflicts and it is possible that one news item covered or reported on one or more than a single religious conflict incidence. An event is classified as an incidence of religious conflict if it involved issues of religious conflict as sources of dispute or conflict. (On “Issues of Religious Conflict” see the explanation below.) A religious conflict event is tallied as one incidence if it involved the same actors and religious issues and occured on the same day and place. In that regard, two protest rallies that occured at the same time in two different locations are considered as two incidences. Similarly, a violent action that occured two days in a row is considered as two incidences. An incidence may involve a group or several groups. In short, an incidence that occured on the same day, at the same location, involving the same actors and religious issues counts as a single incidence. As mentioned earlier, the incidences covered in the study occurred between January 1990 and August 2008, but this period refers to the period of occurrence and coverage. Therefore, when a 30 December 1989 incidence was reported on 2 January 1990, it was not included in this study. Similarly, an incident that occurred at the end of August 2008 but reported in September 2008 was not included in the study. The study was limited to religious conflict that occurred in Indonesia. Since East Timor is no longer part of Indonesia by 1999, the religious conflict that occurred there, including incidences that occurred prior to its secession from Indonesia, was not included in the study. Provinces were categorized based on the name used in the news articles. Thus, prior to the establishment of Banten as a province in 2000, all the incidents in Tangerang city/regency were categorized as incidences that occurred in West Java province. This study used two sources of data: Kompas and Antara. This means it is possible that an incident was covered by both media. In cases like this, only the data from Kompas was used while the Antara data was used as footnotes to serve as comparison. In case an incident was not covered by Kompas but appeared in Antara, then the event counts as an incidence, with all the information provided by Antara serving as reference. In other words, no double count occurred. Once all the incidences were identified they were coded using the coding template designed on the Filemaker Pro software (see “Notes on Coding” at the end of this report). Once they were coded they were double-checked to validate the data. Only after this validation was the data processed and analyzed using SPSS software. 3. Religious Conflict 3.1. Religious Conflict: Definition The classic definition of religious conflict as proposed by Louis Coser is “a struggle over values and claims to secure status, power, and resources, a struggle in which the main aims of opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals” (Coser 1956). For the purpose of this study, the definition is considered too broad and seems to be based more on the rationalization of 6
acts with political-economic undertones. This did not quite suit the purpose of this study because, as shown by several studies, 1 religious acts—including those within the context of conflict and violence—are impossible to understand simply as economic, political or power rationalizations. Numerous protests and violent actions related to religious conflict were rooted in cultural and ideological origins of religion, and the rationalization of the conflict is expressive or symbolic in nature; for example, as an expression of what is understood by a religious community as “obedience” to religious teachings or a symbol of solidarity of the community. This may indicate a weakness in the numerous explanations about the conflict phenomenon, including of the ethno-religious conflict that is the area of this study. As explained by Jacques Bertrand, “In general, theories of ethnic conflict have been poor at differentiating between forms of conflict and better at developing theoretical propositions about the causes of all forms of ethnic conflict” (2004: 14). In a more general context, Bertrand’s statement can be understood to indicate that the numerous explanations of conflict, including ethno-religious conflict, fail to address the variety or characteristics of the forms of conflict. Focusing on the characteristics of various religious conflicts enables us to explain why a form of conflict occured at a certain time and place while other forms of conflict occured at other times and places. This study was based on the assumption that religious conflict must be defined based on the religious issues that became its trigger. Therefore, this study defined “religious conflict” as a dispute over values, claims and identities regarding religious isues packaged as religious slogans or expressions. Religious conflict can take the shape of two kinds of action, namely (1) peaceful action and (2) violent action. In this study, peaceful action is defined as every nonviolent action committed to deal with religious issues that trigger dispute in a community. This category includes protest rally (an action to reject a point of view or policy regarding the issue in dispute), support rally (an action to support a point of view or a policy on the issues in dispute), and mediation action (an action to support efforts to settle an ongoing conflict). Meanwhile, a violent action is defined as every physical action committed to deal with religious issues that trigger conflict that leaves violent impacts on both people (deaths, injuries, disppearance or displacement of people) and property (material losses, damages or lost properties)—although the impact of the violence may not be tangible. For example, although a violent action does not necessarily cause injuries on both sides or property damages, a clash between two groups is still considered an incidence of violent action. 3.2. Issues of Religious Conflict in Indonesia Breaking down religious issues into categories is not an easy task. This is due in part to the nature of religion as perceived by its followers to be all-encompassing and comprehensive, like Islam. It is quite imposible to categorize issues that involve religious conflict as “purely” religious because in reality we often discover that those issues are always linked to other issues such as politics, economics and culture. 1
Take the case of Juergensmeyer (2003), Sofyan (2006), Mujani (2007) and Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta (2007).
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Therefore, this study used the terms “religious issues” and “issues packaged in religious slogans or expressions” as the basis to determine whether or not an event is an incidence of religious conflict. Religious issues are issues that can be clearly identified as having links with the teachings or doctrines of a religion, such as the issues of prostitution, adultery, gambling or alcoholic beverages. Meanwhile, issues packaged as religious slogans or expressions are more general, although they are considered by a religious community as having links with the teachings or doctrine of their religion, such as the issue of corruption. If a protest or rally is held by taking up the issue of corruption and at the same time the rejection is put together in religious slogan or expression—for example, “Only the Islamic sharia and khilafah can eliminate corruption from Indonesia!”—the protest is classified as an incidence of religious conflict. This study broke religious issues that trigger religious conflict into six categories: First, moral issues, covering issues of gambling, alcoholic beverages, narcotics, immoral action, prostitution, pornography/pornoaction. Other moral issues such as anti-corruption also fall into the category of religious issues as long as they involve religious groups and are packaged into religious slogan or expression by the actors involved. Second, sectarian issues, pertaining to disputes over the religious interpretation or understanding in a religious community as well as the leadership status of a religious community. In Islam, the Ahmadiyah 2 , Lia-Eden and Al Qiyadah Al Islamiyah are religious groups that often trigger protests or violent actions, both by religious groups and the general public. Meanwhile, in the Christian community, the leadership conflict in the HKBP Church (Huria Kristen Batak Protestan) is an example of a sectarian issue. Third, communal issues, those involving disputes between religious groups such as the MuslimChristian conflict as well as hostility between religious groups and communal groups that cannot always be identified as belonging to a certain religious group. Issues like blasphemy, as in the case of the cartoon of the Prophet Mohamad, fall in this category. It must be noted here that hostility or clashes involving a religious issue—as long as the parties involved cannot be identified as belonging to or representing the same religious communities—also fall in this category. If both hostile groups can be identified as belonging to the same religious community, then the conflict falls into the cagegory of sectarian issues. Fourth, terrorism issues, those relating to terror acts that target religious groups or the property of certain religious groups, as well as terror attacks against foreign citizens and the property of foreign governments. These acts of violence are often classified as religious terrorism, which according to Juergensmeyer are “symbolic acts” of performance violence, rather than a tactical
2
The attacks on the Ahmadiyah community prior to this study occurred in, among others, eastern Sumatra (1935); Medan (1964); Cianjur (1964, 1984), Kuningan (1969); West Nusa Tenggara (1976); Central Kalimantan (1981), South Sulawesi (1981); West Kalimantan (1981); Surabaya (1981), Parung Bogor (1981); and Garut (1988). The ban on Ahmadiyah teachings and books in Sungai Penuh, Kerinci, Jambi Province, by the local prosecutor’s office on 4 April 1989. See Darul Aqsha, Dick van der Meij, and Johan Hendrik Meuleman, Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events and Developments from 1988 to March 1993 (Jakarta: INIS, 1995), p. 447.
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or strategic action. 3 In the case of Indonesia, the Bali bombing by Imam Samudra et. al. and the numerous bomb attacks in Jakarta are the cases in point. Meanwhile, terror acts in areas where communal conflicts and incidences related to the efforts to settle the conflict in certain communities are pervasive like in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and Ambon, Maluku, all fall into the third category. Fifth, religious-political issues, those involving rejection of the policy of Western goverments or other foreign governments and opposition against Western or other foreign ideology/culture. Included in this category are the implementtion of the Islamic sharia principles or Islamism and the pros and cons regarding the policies of the Indonesian government affecting certain religious communities. Finally, other issues, including mystical religious subcultural issues like black magic as well as issues outside the five categories mentioned above. 3.3. Patterns of Religious Conflicts As mentioned earlier, this study aimed to identify the patterns of religious conflict in Indonesia from the period of January 1990 to August 2008. The patterns consisted of the type of conflict, level or frequency of conflict, development and spread of conflict, issues that trigger conflict, actors involved and the impact of the conflict. In this study, conflicts with religious undertones are divided into two main types of incidencces: peaceful action, either in the form of protest or action to find solution to a religious conflict, and violent action, namely an action that results in human casualties and/or property damages 4 . Protest in general is understood as an action to express rejection or acceptance of a position, point of view or policy (Oliver 2000). In this study, included in the category of protest are acts to support a position, point of view or policy on certain religious issues. In terms of their types, this study classified peaceful action into actions that involve the masses (mass actions) and actions that do not involve the masses (non-mass actions). Mass actions can take the form of demonstration/protest rally, long march, parade, mass prayer, delegation/ filing a complaint, mass prayer/reflection or strike/boycott. Meanwhile, non-mass actions can be in the form of petition, press conference/press statement, or legal action (warning/class action/judicial review). In terms of their types, violent actions related to religious conflict are classified into: 3
Juergensmeyer argues that: “By calling acts of religious terrorism ‘symbolic’, I mean that they are intended to illustrate or refer to something beyond their immediate target” (2003: 125). For example, the attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York was not solely aimed at destroying the buildings but to show that despite its superpower status, the US is not completely safe from attack. In addition, the attacks can also be seen as the superiority of the attackers, as well as to motivate others following the same ideology to launch similar attacks. 4 James B. Rule defines violence as “deliberate destruction of persons or property by people acting together” (1988: 11). Meanwhile, John T. Sidel defines religious violence as “collective physical attacks on persons or property launched in avowed defense or promotion of religious beliefs, boundaries, institutions, traditions, or values, and behind religious symbols and slogans” (2007: 7).
9
o o o o o o o
Assault on people/group of people Attack on property of other people/group Attack on government apparatus/property Attack on foreigners/property of foreign governments Clash between citizens/religious groups and security forces Clash between communal groups, and Riot that claims lives/cause damage to property of religious groups.
Violent actions/attacks can take the form of: o Sweeping/expulsion o Hostage taking/kidnapping/imprisonment o Torture o Death by torture o Shooting/murder o Confiscation/sealing off of property o Destruction o Destruction and looting/arson o Bombing o Torture/murder and destruction/arson People involved in incidences of religious conflict are classified into: religious groups, communal groups, university student/youth groups, juvenile groups, unidentified people/group, security forces and civic groups. In addition, the number of people involved is also noted to determine the size of the incidence, whether the number is in the dozens, hundreds or thousands. Meanwhile, in terms of impact, particularly in connection to acts of violence, the study recorded impact in terms of human casualties (deaths, injuries, disappearance and displacement of people) as well as lost properties (houses, places of worship and other buildings). 3.4. The Role of Security Forces in Religious Conflict As previously mentioned, this study also aimed to portray the patterns of the involvement of security forces in incidences of religious conflict. The patterns are: the presence of security forces, the timing of their presence, the elements of security forces involved, and the types of action taken. The presence of security forces can be divided into two categories: there is information about the presence of security forces and there is no information on their presence. The elements of security forces are troops, police and other security apparatus, as well as a combination of those elements. The actions taken by security forces include: o Acts of ommission o Guarding the masses o Pacifying the masses o Dispersing the masses 10
o Making arrests o Other The next part of the report reveals the key findings of the study.***
11
Part II The Findings
12
1. Incidences of Religious Conflict: Type, Level and Development This study found 832 incidences of religious conflict in Indonesia over the period of January 1990 and August 2008. Of this number, as presented in Chart 1, two thirds are in the form of peaceful actions and one third in form of violent actions. Chart 1 Type of Incidences of Religious Conflict in Indonesia, 1990-2008
The lower level of violent actions compared to peaceful actions in incidence of religious conflict was in fact a common phenomenon that also occurs in other places or countries. However, this does not mean that violent actions carried less significance because regardless of how low the level is we must bear in mind the impact, in terms of the destruction they wrought both over human lives and property. Social scientists often use the term the “significant small” to describe this phenomenon. The above data should be seen from a wider perspective: that the Indonesian people in fact have the capacity to apply peaceful means to respond to issues that trigger religious conflict, in the form of protests and efforts to contribute to finding a solution to the conflict. The problem is how to encourage people to resort to peaceful actions as the key alternative to responding to issues of religious conflict. The study also produced an interesting finding regarding the development of religious conflict. As shown in Chart 2 below, the fluctuating incidences of peaceful actions follow the fluctuating incidences of violent actions, except for the period during the transition from the New Order regime under Soeharto to the mid-term period of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government. As will be discussed later, this was related to the new opportunity of public political participation following the downfall of the New Order regime in 1998.
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Chart 2 Development of Incidence Incidences of Religious Conflict in Indonesia, 1990-2008
2. Subtype and Form of Incidences Incidence of Religious Conflict This study divided peaceful actions act into twoo subtypes: mass action and non-mass non action. Meanwhile, violent actionss were divided into the following subtypes: attacks, attack clashes and riots. Of the 547 peaceful actions, s, 79% (433) took the form of mass actions while another 21% (144) were in the form of non mass actions. As shown in Chart 3 below, most of the mass actions (85%) of took the form of demonstrations, long marches, human processions or mass prayers, followed by delegations/complaints (13%). Meanwhile, 3% of the actions took the form of strikes/boycotts s/boycotts and art/cultural performances.
14
Chart 3 Forms of Mass Actions
Meanwhile, most non-mass actions (96%) mainly took the form of petitions, press statements or press conferences, and the remaining actions in the form of the distribution or installment of leaflets/banners and lawsuits/class action lawsuits/legal reviews (see Chart 4). Chart 4 Forms of Non Mass Actions
This data shows that mass actions were considered the most effective way of responding to issues of religious conflict. Although it is obvious that when compared to the period under the New Order regime mass actions tended to escalate as a result of the freedom of expression that 15
was achieved during the transition to democracy ((see Chart 5), ), it is still not clear whether in tthe future mass actions will remain the action of choice compared to non mass actions as regards issues of religious conflict.
Chart 5 Development of Peaceful Actions by Type of Action, 1990-2008
Based on their subtypes, violent acts in the form of attacks attacks ranked highest, followed by clashes and riots. Of the 285 violent incidents related to religious issues reported by Kompas and Antara during the period of January 1990 1990-August August 2008, 77% were in the form of attacks, 18% clashes and 5% riots. Chart 6 Types of Violent Incidents
This study divided violent incidents inciden s according to the targets and/players involved, namely: attacks on individuals/groups; attacks on the property of individuals/groups; attacks on government personnel/property; attacks on forei foreigners/property gners/property of foreign governments; clashes 16
between communal/religious groups and security forces; clashes between communal groups; and riots that led to the destruction of human lives/property of religious groups. Chart 7 below shows that based on their their subtypes violence in the form of attacks against the property of individuals/groups related to religious issues ranked highest with 111 cases of the total 285 violent incidents with religious undertones. They were followed by attacks against individuals/groups groups related to religious issues (82 cases) and clashes between communal groups (41 cases). Other subtypes of violence were fewer than 15 cases.
Chart 7 Subtypes of Religious Violence by Target/Actor Involved
Based on the period of occurrence riots that claimed human lives and caused damage to the property of religious groups only occurred in two periods during the last 19 years. The first period lasted between 1995 and 1998, from the final years of the New Order regime to the beginning of the era off transition towards democracy during which 10 incidents of riot occurred. Second was the period between 2005 and 2006 under the democratic government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that witnessed four incidents of riot (see ( Chart 8 below). below
17
Chart 8 Development pment of Types of Religious Violence, 1990-2008 2008
Meanwhile, incidence of violence in the form of clashes was also limited to certain periods, albeit at higher intensities. The clashes peaked in 1999 with 21 incidents and dropped to 17 in the following year. ear. There were only 2 (two) clashes at the end of the New Order regime compared to 6 (six) under the democratic government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono from 2005-2007. 2005 Does it mean that the current government has a poorer record compared to the New Order government overnment in terms of the prevention of acts of violence, especially with regards issues of religious conflict? The question led to a positive answer that is supported by data on the development of violent incidents in the form of attacks. Chart 8 shows that at the pattern of violent incidents inciden s in the form of attacks during the transition period was quite similar to the pattern during the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, despite the lower level of incidence under the latter. Violent incidents inciden s in the form of attacks peaked in 2000 at 38 and 2006 at 27. The number of attacks dropped to 12 in 2007, only to escalate in the following year. Until the end of August 2008 there had been 13 attacks related to issues of religious conflict. Most of the attacks took the the form of bombing, followed by acts of destruction and acts of destruction accompanied by looting/arson (see Chart 9). 9
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Chart 9 Forms of Attack
Sweeping/expulsion Hostage taking/Kidnapping ping /detention
Torture
Death by torture
Shooting/Killing
Confiscation/Sealing
Act of destruction Act of destruction struction on accompanied by looting/arson ing/arson
Bombing Torture/ Killing accompanied by act of destruction/arson
3. Pattern of the Spread of Religious Conflict What pattern does the spread of religious conflict in Indonesia Indonesia follow? Kompas and Antara reports show that between January 1990 and August 2008 peaceful acts related to religious conflict in Indonesia spread across wider areas compared to violent acts. Meanwhile, violent incidents related to religious conflict occur occurred red in 20 provinces and peaceful acts in 28 of the total 33 provinces in Indonesia.
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Table 1 The Spread of Incidences of Religious Conflict by Province, 1990-2008 Provinces NAD North Sumatera West Sumatera Riau Riau Archipelago South Sumatera Bangka Belitung Bengkulu Jambi Lampung Banten Jakarta West Java Central Java Yogyakarta East Java Bali West Nusa Tenggara East Nusa Tenggara South Kalimantan Central Kalimantan East Kalimantan South Sulawesi Central Sulawesi North Sulawesi South-East Sulawesi North Maluku Maluku Papua Total
Peaceful Actions 3 9 4 2 2 3 1 1 1 7 5 267 57 37 18 33 14 5 2 5 5 2 19 28 2 5 0 7 3 547
Violent Actions 1 8 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 41 45 12 4 32 9 9 5 1 0 3 6 48 2 1 12 36 0 285
Total of Incidents 4 17 4 7 2 3 1 1 1 7 10 308 102 49 22 65 23 14 7 6 5 5 25 76 4 6 12 43 3 832
When the regions were classified based on the intensity of incidence, namely low (1-4 incidents), medium (5-24 incidents) and high (≥ 25) the results would appear in Table 2 and Table 3: Table 2 Number of Province by Intensity of Peaceful Actions
Provinces
Low 1-4 12 43%
Peaceful Actions Medium 5-24 11 39%
20
High ≥ 25 5 18%
Total of Provinces 28 100%
Table 3 Number of Province by Intensity of Violent Actions Violent Actions Low 1-4 Provinces
Medium 5-24
6 30%
9 45%
Total of High ≥ 25
Provinces
5 25%
20 100%
Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java and Central Sulawesi recorded the highest number of peaceful acts (≥ 25). Meanwhile, the highest level of violent incidence (≥ 25) was recorded in Central Sulawesi, West Java, Jakarta, Maluku and East Java. 4. Players in Religious Conflict In terms of players, 50% of the people involved in peaceful acts related to religious conflict in Indonesia during the period of 1990-2008 were members of religious groups (see Chart 10). Chart 10 Peaceful Actions by Group of Actors
Religious groups
Communal groups
Cadres or supporters of political parties Student/youth groups
Unidentified Civilian
Communal groups
21
In terms of players, communal groups and student/youth groups were the dominant players in incidence of peaceful acts, accounting for 21% of incidence each. They were followed by unidentified civilian (5%), cadres or supporters of political parties and school student/youth groups (1%). In terms of the number of people involved, around 35% of peaceful incidents in the form of mass actions involved hundreds of supporters. Another 22% involved tens of people and 17% thousands. Only 6% of peaceful incidents involved dozens of people. However, the number of people involved in 20% of the total number of peaceful incidents was not reported by the media that provided the data for this study (see Chart 11).
Chart 11 Number of People Involved in Peaceful Actions
thousands
Unlike their involvement in only 5% of peaceful acts, communal groups dominated nearly half or 47.8% of violent incidents related to religious conflict in Indonesia (see Chart 12).
22
Chart 12 Violent Incidence by Group of Actors
Religious groups
Community groups
Cadres or supporters of political parties Common Citizens
Communal groups
Security Personnel
Unidentified group of people
Second to that is the number of violent incidents (35.4%) involving unidentified groups of people. Religious groups were involved in 10.6% of incidence of religious violence. The rest involved university students/youths (2.6%), community groups (2.2%), security personnel (1.1%) and political party cadres (0.4%). With regards to incidence of violence, this study shows that media sources (in this case Kompas and Antara) had little information about the number of people involved. Around 64% of incident reports did not have information on the number of people involved. Only 20% of incidents were reported to have involved hundreds of people. Around 6% of incidents involved tens of people while other incidents involved dozens (5%) and thousands (5%) of people.
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Chart 13 Number of People Involved in Violent Actions
thousands
5. Issues of Religious Conflict This study shows that most religious conflicts in Indonesia involved communal issues (39%), followed by moral issues (19%), political-religious issues (17%), sectarian issues (12%), terrorism issues (8%), and others (6%). This is shown in Chart 14 below. Chart 14 Issues of Religious Conflict
Did the intensity of religious issues vary in terms of responses to issues that triggered the conflicts? This study shows they did. 24
Chart 15 Issues of Religious Conflict by Type of Incidences
Moral
Moral
Sectarian
Sectarian
Communal
Communal
Terrorism
Terrorism
Political-religious
Political-religious
Others
Others
Chart 15 shows that although communal issues were the main trigger of incidence of religious conflict, both in the form of peaceful and violent actions, they ranked differently in both. In term of the ranking, the top trigger issues in peaceful actions were communal issues, followed by political-religious issues, moral issues, sectarian issues, others, and terrorism issues. were the number two trigger of peaceful acts by order of their importance after communal issues. Meanwhile, in the violent actions, the trigger issues were respectively moral, terrorism, others, sectarian and political-religious issues. This is clear in Table 4:
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Table 4 Issues of Religious Conflict by Type of Incidences Number of
Peaceful
Violent
Issues 1 2 3 4 5 6
Actions Communal Political-Religious Moral Sectarian Others Terrorism
Actions Communal Moral Terrorism Others Sectarian Political-Religious
Peaceful actions and violent actions Communal Moral Political-Religious Sectarian Terrorism Others
So far we have learned the different issues that triggered religious conflict by type of incidences. The next question is: did issues of religious conflict vary by the period of their occurrence? This question is important to determine whether each government faced similar or different issues of religious conflict. This study shows that the intensity of each issue of religious conflict varied according to the period of occurrence. The study period allows us to compare the three government regimes, namely the authoritarian New Order regime, the transitional governments of B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarno Putri, and the new democratic regime under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The study shows that communal issues were the main issues behind religious conflict faced by the transitional and new democratic governments (see Chart 16). Religious conflict in the form of peaceful and violent acts during the transition period peaked in 1999, particularly in the form of conflicts between Muslim-Christian communities in Maluku (and North Maluku) and in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Meanwhile, during the new democratic government violent acts related to communal issues peaked in 1999. However, unlike in 1999 when communal violence mostly took the form of open clashes among communal groups, in 2006 the acts of violence mostly took the form of terror attacks, both in shooting and bombing incidents, in areas where communal conflicts were common like Poso and Palu, Central Sulawsi, and Maluku (and North Maluku). Another dominant phenomenon was the high level of incidence of peaceful acts in 2006 that was triggered by the publication of a caricature of the Prophet Muhammad in the daily JyllandPosten in Denmark at the end of 2005 as well as the settlement of the communal conflict in Poso, including protest rallies against and supporting the execution of the key players in the Poso violence, Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwu.
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Chart 16 Development of Religious Conflict Related to Communal Issues, 1990-2008 1990
The development of religious issues related relat to moral issues during 1990-2008 2008 shows that moral issues played a part in the incidence of religious conflict in each regime, although their intensity varied (see Chart 17). ). Violent acts related to these issues remained high under the transitional regimes es but declined under the new democratic regime, although they remained high when compared to the final years of the New Order regime. Violent acts related to these issues mainly took the form of attacks against places considered indecent such an night entertainment ent places, stalls offering food and sex workers (warung ( remang-remang), ), places that sold alcoholic drinks as well as gambling dens. As in the case of communal issues, incidence of peaceful acts related to these issues peaked in 2006 under the new democratic emocratic government. The high level of incidence that year was mostly related to the pros and cons about the bill on pornography.
27
Chart 17 Development of Religious Conflict Related to Moral Issues, 1990-2008
With regard to political-religious religious issues, issues, violent incidents triggered by these issues were relatively few under all government regimes (see Chart 18). ). Unlike this phenomenon, the number of peaceful acts organized to respond to political political-religious religious issues was high, both in the transitional and new democratic regimes. Unlike the other two issues that related more to domestic issues, political-religious religious issues were mainly related to international issues such as Western/foreign government policies, particularly the policies of the U.S. and Israeli governments. ernments. Issues related to anti Western/foreign government policies accounted for around 71% of the 139 incidents related to conflicts linked to political-religious political religious issues.
28
Chart 18 Development of Religious Conflict Related to Political Political-Religious Issues, 1999-2008 2008
Peaceful actions in the form of protests and rallies related to political-religious political religious issues peaked in 2001 and 2006. Specifically, the U.S. attack on Afghanistan within the framework of its war against terrorism in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center in the U.S. on 11 September 2001 triggered a wave of protests in 2001. Meanwhile, the war between Israel and the Hizbullah in South Lebanon in mid 2006 and the planned visit of U.S. President George Bush to Indonesia on 20 November 2006 006 were the key triggers of the protests and peaceful rallies related to political-religious religious issues in Indonesia in 2006. With regard to incidences of religious conflict related to sectarian issues, it seemed that all regimes faced this problem, albeit at different levels. This study shows that violence related to sectarian issues was a major problem faced by the new democratic regime and the level of incidence followed an uphill trend since 2005 (see Chart 19 below). The Ahmadiyah group was not the religious ous group that became the main target of violence related to these issues. Incidence of protests and rallies related to these issues also escalated under the new democratic regime. The number surged in 2008 due in most part to public demands, particularly Muslims, that the government ban the Ahmadiyah group in Indonesia. Meanwhile, in the final years of the New Order regime, sectarian issues were mostly related to the conflict within the leadership of the Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) church.
29
Chart 19 Development of Religious Conflict Related to Sectarian Issues, 1990-2008
The study shows that issues of religious terrorism were a problem faced by the transitional and new democratic regimes. The problem did not occur during the New Order regime (see ( Chart 20). ). However, the type of terrorism in the transition period was different from the one under the new democratic regime. Religious terrorism that occurred in the transition period, particularly in 2000 when acts of religious terrorism peaked, mai mainly nly took the form of terror attacks against the property of Christian followers, namely in the bombing of churches in a number of cities in Indonesia. Meanwhile, in the period that lasted from the end of the transition period to the new democratic regime, religious terrorism mainly took the form of attacks/bombing targeting foreigners and facilities associated with foreign governments or interests.
30
Chart 20 Development of Religious Conflict Related to Issues of Terrorism, 1990-2008 1990
Lastly, other issuess in this study were mostly (around 56% of the 53 incidence of conflict) were mainly related to violence related to religious subculture of mysticism, namely issues of black magic practitioners. Violence against people accused of practicing black magic peaked pea in 1998 in East Java. Although in 1998 these were special cases that observers linked to the political issues of the time, the issues appeared in every government regime (see Chart 21). 21 This means that regardless of the presence or absence of underlyin underlyingg political issues, these issues played an important part in incidence of religious conflict in Indonesia.
Chart 21 Development of Religious Conflict Related to Other Issues, 1990-2008
31
Another important finding of the study is the fact that each issue of religious conflict was concentrated in certain regions. In other words, each region faced different issues of religious conflict. As seen in Chart 22, of the total 48 violent incidents related to moral issues, around 41.7% occurred in West Java and 22.9% in Jakarta. Similar incidents occurred in Central and East Java (both 8.3%) and the remaining 18.8% in other provinces. Chart 22 Distribution of Violent Actions Related to Moral Issues
Like moral issues, of the total 32 violent incidents related to sectarian issues mostly occurred in West Java and Jakarta (37.5% and 15.6% respectively). Banten and West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) recorded 9.4% of violent acts. Another 28.1% of the incidents occurred in various provinces (see Chart 23).
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Chart 23 Distribution of Violent Actions Related to Sectarian Issues
Unlike the other two issues, violent incidents related to communal issues seemed to be concentrated in Central Sulawesi (35.8%) and Maluku (29.3% in Maluku and 9.8% in North Maluku). West Java and East Nusa Tenggara both recorded 4.1% of incidents while the remaining 17.1% of occurred in other provinces. There were a total of 123 violent incidents related to communal issues (see Chart 24).
33
Chart 24 Distribution of Violent Actions Related to Communal Issues
Meanwhile, Chart 25 shows that more than half of the violent incidents related to terrorism issues occurred in Jakarta, East Java and Bali. Of the total 46 violent incidents, the highest number of 37% occurred in Jakarta. East Java and Bali accounted for 8.7% of incidents each. The other 45.7% of incidents occurred in other provinces.
Chart 25 Distribution of Violent Actions Related to Terrorism Issues
34
Only three incidents related to political-religious issues were recorded. The three incidents occurred in three provinces: East Java, Central Java and Jakarta. Meanwhile, of the total of 33 cases of violence related to other issues, notably of black magicians, 57.6% seemed to be concentrated in East Java (see Charts 26 and 27).
Chart 26 Distribution of Violent Incidents Related to Political-Religious Issues
Chart 27 Distribution of Violent Incidents Related to Other Issues
35
It can be concluded from this part that incidence of religious violence was concentrated by the type of issues that triggered the conflict. This underlines the urgency of diversified strategies to deal with conflict, particularly religious violence by the type of issues in different regions. 6. The Impacts of Incidence of Religious Violence Over a period of 19 years, violent incidents related to religious conflict in Indonesia claimed more than 55,000 victims. Of the total, 761 were killed, 1,873 injured and 52,446 went missing or were displaced. In terms of property, violence related to religious issues in Indonesia caused damages to 1,330 houses, 70 places of worship and 593 other buildings, bringing the total to 1,993. The amount of material losses did not include damages to vehicles and other properties that were not reported by the media used in this study (see Table 5 below).
Table 5 Impact of Religious Violence, 1990-2008 Category of Issues Moral Sectarian Communal Terrorism Political-Religious Others
Victims (People) 212 500 53096 1193 4 75
Material losses (Unit) 422 63 1472 32 0 4
55080
1993
Total
Table 6 shows the number of human casualties and property damages inflicted by violent acts related to religious issues.
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Table 6 Number of Casualties and Losses Inflicted by Incidences of Religious Violence, 1990-2008
Category of Issues Moral
Description Victims/Material Losses
Communal
Killed Victims
2
2 people
5
10 people
Missing Victims/displaced
1
200 people
Houses
2
53 unit
Places of Worship
0
0 unit
24
369 unit 10 people
Killed Victims
4
Injured Victims
9
45 people
Missing Victims/displaced
4
445 people
Houses
9
54 unit
Places of Worship
6
6 unit
School/Government Offices/Communal Building/Commercial
3
3 unit
Killed Victims
52
460 people
Injured Victims
50
835 people
5
51801 people 1218 unit
Missing Victims/displaced
Terrorism
Political-Religious
Others
Number of Victims/ Material Losses
Injured Victims
School/Government Offices/Communal Building/Commercial Sectarian
Number of Cases
Houses
14
Places of Worship
19
55 unit
School/Government Offices/Communal Building/Commercial
10
199 unit
Killed Victims
14
249 people
Injured Victims
24
944 people
Missing Victims/displaced
0
0 people
Houses
1
3 unit
Places of Worship
8
8 unit
School/Government Offices/Communal Building/Commercial
4
21 unit
Killed Victims
0
0 people
Injured Victims
1
4 people
Missing Victims/displaced
0
0 people
Houses
0
0 unit
Places of Worship
0
0 unit
School/Government Offices/Communal Building/Commercial
0
0 unit
Killed Victims
23
40 people
Injured Victims
4
35 people
Missing Victims/displaced
0
0 people
Houses
2
2 unit
Places of Worship
1
1 unit
School/Government Offices/Communal Building/Commercial
1
1 unit
37
The above data shows that violence related to communal issues claimed the highest number of human victims and property damage. Specifically, in terms of the number of deaths, religious conflict related to communal issues left the biggest impact, followed by violence related to issues of terrorism, as seen in Chart 28 below.
Chart 28 Number of Deaths in Incidences of Religious Violence
Other issues in religious conflict, particularly related to issues of black magicians, peaked in intensity in 1998 in East Java. Meanwhile, in terms of property losses, violent incidents related to moral issues ranked second after communal issues. The amount of property losses related to moral issues nearly accounted for one third of the total losses inflicted in violent incidents related to communal issues. The losses were mostly due to damages to places (houses, stalls or places of business) considered as indecent places such as night entertainment places, brothels, gambling dens and places that sold alcoholic drinks. 7. The Role of Security Forces in Incidences of Religious Conflict Other than to obtain a complete picture of the patterns of religious conflict, the study also aimed to obtain a clear picture of the role of security forces in various incidents of religious conflict. Kompas and Antara reported 832 cases of religious conflict incidence between January 1990 and August 2008. Of the number, 285 took the form of violent actions and 547 in the form of peaceful actions (433 mass actions and 114 non mass actions). Security forces were only present 38
in violent incidents and peaceful actions involving the masses. Therefore, 718 incidences (433 peaceful mass actions and 285 violent actions) offered information on the presence of security forces during the incidences. Kompas and Antara only reported the presence of security forces in 172 of 718 incidences. In other words, only 24% of the reports on the incidences had information about the presence of security forces while 76% did not (see Chart 29).
Chart 29 Presence of Security Forces in Incidences of Religious Conflict
Information Available No Information Available
The information on the presence of security forces reveals that around 53.5% of security presence was related to violent incidents and 46.5% to peaceful incidents (see Table 7 below). Table 7 Presence of Security Forces by Type of Incidences
Types of Incident
Presence of Security Forces
Count of Incident % within Presence of Security Forces
39
Peaceful Actions
Violent Actions
80 46.5%
92 53.5%
Total 172 100.0%
Table 8 below shows that security forces were almost always present at peaceful incidents. Meanwhile, with regard to violent incidents, nearly 61% of security presence was reported during the incidents and 39% after the occurrence. Table 8 Presence of Security Forces According to Time and Type of Incidences
Types of Incident
Presence of Security Forces
During the incident
After the occurrence
Total
Count of Incident % within Presence of Security Forces % within Types of Incidents Count of Incident % within Presence of Security Forces % within Types of Incidents Count of Incident % within Presence of Security Forces % within Types of Incidents
Peaceful
Violent
Actions
Actions
79 58.5% 98.8% 1 2.7% 1.3% 80 46.5% 100.0%
56 41.5% 60.9% 36 97.3% 39.1% 92 53.5% 100.0%
Total
135 100.0% 78.5% 37 100.0% 21.5% 172 100.0% 100.0%
This is understandable considering the low level of predictability of violent incidents compared to peaceful incidents, resulting in the lack of anticipation by security forces. Often, violent incidents, unlike peaceful actions, happened in a flash. This fact contributed to the late arrival of security forces in violent incidents. The study also shows that policemen were the security personnel most often deployed to deal with various incidents of religious conflict (see Chart 30). Of the 172 cases of religious conflicts that offered information on the presence of security forces, 76.7% revealed the presence of policemen. In addition, 11.6% of incidence of religious conflict showed the presence of joint security forces of the police and army.
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Chart 30 Elements of Security Forces Deployed
The last aspect examined by this study is the type of actions taken by the security forces in various €incidencess of religious conflict. Data collected through this study as shown in Chart 31 below reveals that around 41.4% of the measures taken by security forces involved the guarding of the masses.. Of the total, 19.2% of incidents revealed the measures taken by security forces in dispersing the crowd and 7.6% in calming the masses. Only 4.7% of incidents revealed that security forces committed acts of omission.
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Chart 31 Measures Taken by Security Forces
The measures taken by security forces in safeguarding the masses were mostly related to peaceful incidents while efforts to calm and disperse the crowds crowds were mostly related to peaceful incidents. With a few cases of peaceful incidents, the acts of omission by security forces were mostly related to violent acts. Included in this category were acts of omission committed by security forces on the ground of their inability to deal with the masses because they were outnumbered (see Table 9 below). Therefore, from the limited information available on the presence of security forces, it can be concluded that in general the security forces performed their tasks tasks well according to prevailing procedure in dealing with various incidents of religious conflict, both in the form of peaceful and violent acts. Despite cases where security forces committed acts of omission, what available information showed that they had taken the necessary measures required. However, it should be noted that the information on the presence of security forces in various incidents of religious conflict available in Kompas and Antara only represented a quarter of the total of 718 incidents that hat indicated the presence of security forces. Therefore, the portrayal of the role security forces in various religious conflicts in Indonesia could have changed if only there had been more data available on the subject.
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Table 9 Measures Taken by Security Forces by Type of Incidences
Measure taken by security forces
In action of the masses
Guarding of the masses
calming masses
dispersing the crowded
arresting
Others
No information
Total
Count of Incident % within measure taken by security forces % within types of incident Count of Incident % within measure taken by security forces % within types of incident Count of Incident % within measure taken by security forces % within types of incident Count of Incident % within measure taken by security forces % within types of incident Count of Incident % within measure taken by security forces % within types of incident Count of Incident % within measure taken by security forces % within types of incident Count of Incident % within measure taken by security forces % within types of incident Count of Incident % within measure taken by security forces % within types of incident
Types of Incident Peaceful Violent Actions Actions 2 6 25.0% 75.0% 2.5% 6.5% 68 3 95.8% 4.2% 85.0% 3.3% 2 11 15.4% 84.6% 2.5% 12.0% 2 31 6.1% 93.9% 2.5% 33.7% 1 3 25.0% 75.0% 1.3% 3.3% 3 16 15.8% 84.2% 3.8% 17.4% 2 22 8.3% 91.7% 2.5% 23.9% 80 92 46.5% 53.5% 100.0% 100.0%
Total 8 100.0% 4.7% 71 100.0% 41.3% 13 100.0% 7.6% 33 100.0% 19.2% 4 100.0% 2.3% 19 100.0% 11.0% 24 100.0% 14.0% 172 100.0% 100.0%
8. The Possibility of Data Bias This final part of this report discusses in brief the reliability of the data obtained from Kompas and Antara for portraying the incidence of religious conflict in Indonesia from 1990-2008. As mentioned earlier in the previous part of this report, the attempt to get a portrait of the religious conflict incidence could be well influenced by the choice of data used, or what is known as selection bias and description bias. It was explained earlier that Kompas and Antara were chosen as data sources based on the consideration that both were the most representative national media for the period under study. Another consideration was that the two media had better infrastructure compared to other media, both in terms of the scope of national coverage and archiving. In other words, as a preliminary study to obtain a national picture of religious conflict in Indonesia the two media were unrivaled by other national media. However, a national description of religious conflict in Indonesia could also be made by integrating various local news sources. In a number of cases, the use of local media could produce more incidences, affecting the portrait of the level of incidences. In addition, compared to national media like Kompas, local media often provide more in-depth description in their 43
coverage of an incident, including of the role of security forces in various religious conflict incidences. Selection bias by national media, in this case Kompas and Antara, is shown in a similar study by Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta (Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta 2008), although it spanned a shorter period from 2004-2007. By using Radar Banten daily as its source of data, Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta recorded 112 peaceful incidents related to religious conflict in Banten during the period (compared to 2 incidents reported by Kompas and Antara in the same period). In other words, in a shorter period, Radar Banten reported 50 as many reports of peaceful incidents compared to Kompas and Antara. Meanwhile, from 2004-2007 Radar Banten reported 28 incidents in Banten compared to 5 incidents reported by Kompas and Antara from 1990-2008. In other words, local sources (Radar Banten) reported 6 times more violent incidents in its area of coverage compared to national media (Kompas and Antara).
Table 10 Kompas-Antara Coverage as Compared to Radar Banten Coverage of Incidences of Religious Conflict in Banten Province
Sources
Period
Kompas and Antara Radar Banten
2004-2007 2004-2007
Peaceful Violent Actions Actions Total 2 4 6 112 48 140
This indicates that the use of local media results in more information on religious conflict incidences. However, the use of local media was limited to the period of occurrence. Radar Banten, which was used in the study by Balai Litbang Agama Jakarta, for example, first hit the newsstands in 2000. Therefore, the daily did not cover incidences that occurred prior to its establishment. In other words, the use of local media is probably more suitable for studies designed to examine the phenomenon of religious conflict in Indonesia in a more contemporary period; for example, to portray incidence of religious conflict that occurred from the transition period following the New Order regime to the new democratic regime under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, from 1998-2008.***
44
Part III Conclusions and Recommendations
45
1. Conclusions This goal of this study was to obtain a full picture of the patterns of religious conflict in Indonesia from January 1990 to August 2008. The study was based on the reports in Kompas daily and Antara news agency. This part is a summary of the key findings of this study. First, in terms of the level of incidences, the study found that two-thirds of the religious conflicts in Indonesia were in the form of peaceful actions, and only one-third of them took the form of violent actions. This finding should not be interpreted to mean that the level of violence is low, because violence, regardless of its intensity, must be eliminated one way or the other. Instead, the finding should be interpreted from the point of view that the Indonesian people are actually capable of responding to religious conflicts through peaceful means. What needs to be done now is how to encourage people to resort to peaceful actions as the first means of choice for responding to various religious issues that cause or trigger conflicts. Second, from the timing, by comparing the three governments, most violent actions occurred under the transitional regime than the other two regimes. This should not lead to the conclusion that there was no act of violence in the New Order regime, because the authoritarian government run by the regime itself was already a form of violence, a form of repression of the rights and freedom of people. This finding shows to a greater extent that the new opportunity for civic participation ushered by the era of democracy after a lengthy repression by the authoritarian New Order regime had not yet been accompanied by a fully functioning security forces, which could help ensure that conflicts be channeled through peaceful means. This was supported by the fact that peaceful actions following religious conflicts were dominant under the following democratic regime. Third, most peaceful and violent actions were linked to communal issues such as conflicts between Christian-Muslim communities and cases of blasphemy against a religion. However, although communal issues seemed to dominate various incidences of religious conflict, if seen from their spread, there were geographic variants of the issues that triggered religious conflict. Communal issues dominated religious conflicts in regions where communal conflicts are pervasive such as in Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi. In West Java and Banten, religious conflict was mostly triggered by moral and sectarian issues, while in Jakarta acts of violence with religious undertones mostly carried the nuances of terrorism and moralism issues. Fourth, this study shows that each government regime faced different sets of religious conflict issues. Communal issues dominated religious conflict under the transitional government and the new democratic government. However, unlike the transition regime when communal violence occurred in the form of open clashes between communal groups, under the new democratic regime acts of violence in regions rocked by communal conflicts in Poso and Palu, Central Sulawesi and Maluku (North Maluku) were mostly in the form of terror attacks, either shooting or bombing. In addition, issues of communal conflict resolution and issues of blasphemy were also faced by the new democratic regime. 46
The new democratic regime also faced a higher number of religious conflicts related to sectarian issues. Although sectarian issues also emerged under each regime there was a growing intensity in the conflicts. With regard to moral issues, although the number of violent incidents in the new democratic regime was lower than during the transitional regime and during the final years of the New Order regime, the occurrences of peaceful actions peaked during the new democratic regime. In short, each government regime faced different dominant issues of religious conflicts. Fifth, in terms of actors, this study shows that communal groups dominated acts of violence related to religious conflicts. Meanwhile, religious groups, which are often perceived as the dominant players in violence related to religious issues, actually only ranked third. The perception of the dominant involvement of religious groups was confirmed by this study only in terms of involvement in peaceful actions. Sixth, the study shows that violence related to communal issues was the incidence of religious violence that claimed the highest number of human casualties and property losses. Meanwhile, in terms of property losses, violence related to moral issues ranked second after violence related to communal issues. Most damages occurred in places (houses and stall or places of business) considered by the public as indecent places such as night entertainment places, brothels, gambling dens and places that sold alcoholic drinks. Seventh, the study shows that the information obtained from Kompas and Antara on the role of the security forces during religious conflict incidences was inadequate. Both media only reported one-quarter of the total of 718 conflict incidences that assumes the presence of security forces. The information did not confirm whether security forces were not present in the other threequarters of incidences or whether this was due to underreporting by the media. What the limited information shows is that in general security forces had performed their tasks well. Guarding peaceful rallies, dispersing masses related to acts of violence, were indications that the security forces had taken the necessary steps. The information available showed that only around 4% of the security forces were engaged in “acts of omission”. Included in these acts of omission was the inability to deal with the masses on the argument that they were outnumbered by the masses. Eighth, Kompas’ description of religious conflict incidences, with the exception of cases involving huge number of victims/damages, tended to be limited, as was its description of the role of security forces in various incidences. In this regard Antara provided a more comprehensive description of the role of security forces in various incidences of religious conflict. In addition, the study shows that there was a possibility of bias in the data produced by Kompas and Antara as national media, resulting in underreporting of incidences and the impact of the resulting violence compared to what could have been obtained if the study used local media in provinces and cities/regencies as a source of information. However, this study could still provide useful preliminary data to get a general picture of the patterns of conflict with religious undertones that occurred in Indonesia between 1990 and 2008. In addition, the study also provides a basis for assessing the reliability of follow-up studies conducted based on local media and non-media sources. 47
2. Recommendations First, the study shows that the Indonesian people are capable of resorting to peaceful means to respond to issues that cause religious conflict. The challenge is how to encourage people to resort to peaceful means as their first choice of means when responding to various religious issues that cause or trigger conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to design a program that can help to improve the public’s understanding and capability of how to promote strategies for peaceful actions as a means of responding to issues triggering religious conflict. In light of the fact that the actors committing the various acts of violence with religious undertones were communal groups rather than certain religious groups, such programs should be designed to reach sections of the society as wide as possible. Second, the key issues that led to religious conflict differed from one region to another. Therefore, efforts to deal with the violence with religious undertones should be designed to address the various issues of religious conflict that dominate each region. Programs to promote harmony among communities of different religious beliefs should be made a priority in eastern Indonesian regions such as Central Sulawesi and Maluku, while programs to promote harmony among members of the same religion will be needed more in western Indonesian regions like Banten and West Java. In addition, attention should be paid to efforts to develop the public’s capacity to respond peacefully to moral issues that often trigger incidence of violence in the western parts of Indonesia. This is related to the preparedness and firmness of the security forces in upholding the law and providing protection for places that become the target of destructive acts related to moral issues according to prevailing law. Acts of omission by security forces, although the study only managed to identify a few cases, require an improvement in the capacity and professionalism of security forces in dealing with conflict incidences, particularly incidences of violence, related to religious issues. Third, this study shows that each regime faced different issues of religious conflict. To respond to incidences of contemporary religious conflict, the use of national media like Kompas and Antara as the source of information was inadequate. This report recommends a follow-up study to understand the patterns of religious conflict in Indonesia to cover a more contemporary period using local mass media in provinces and cities/regencies as the source of information. In addition, the reports from non-media sources such as the police and reports from nongovernmental organizations that might escape media coverage, including local media, should be utilized. The more varied sources are expected to provide more adequate information for a more comprehensive and detailed picture of the patterns of religious conflict and the efforts to deal with them by the security institutions in Indonesia. ***
48
Appendix
49
Appendix 1 Notes on Coding and Template to Record Incidences of Religious Conflict
Table 1: Source & Location 001 No. Entry Number of entry will be automatically added with new data entry 002 Coder Filled in with the three initials of coding officer using capital letters 003 Source Source of news; 1= kompas and 2=antara 004 Date Edition : [day] Day and date of news publication
[date]
005 Date of incidence : [day] [date] Day and date of incidence. Usually a day or two after day and date of publication. 006 Location Filled in with the smallest location where the incident occurred such as in front of the state palace, at the campus of University A or at Jl. B. 007 Province No explanation required
: [text]
008 City/Regency No explanation required
: [text]
009 District No explanation required
: [text]
010 Sub district/Village No explanation required
: [text]
Name of location follows name of origin entered in the news archive, although several locations may have changed names following the establishment of new provinces. For example, news reports on incidents in Tangerang Regency prior to 2000 were entered under West Java Province, not Banten. Table 2: Description of Incidence 011
Types of incidence 50
Types of incidence can be classified into: 1= peaceful acts and 2=violent acts “Peaceful acts” are acts performed by two or more people in response to religious conflict, whether in the form of protests to express dissatisfaction over/objection to religious issues, acts to support certain position, point of view or policy, and acts to contribute to efforts to find a settlement to a conflict. “Acts of violence“ are intentional physical assaults by two or more people against individuals or property, or physical clashes between two communal groups that claim human lives, cause injuries, the disappearance or displacement of people, as well as damage to houses, places of worship or other buildings. 012
Subtypes of incidence
Peaceful acts fall into two subtypes: 1=mass actions and 2=non mass actions. Mass actions are actions involving the deployment of the masses, regardless of their number. Non mass actions are actions that do not involve the deployment of the masses. Violent acts are classified into the following three subtypes: 1=assaults 2=clashes 3=riots An “assault” is an arbitrary act of violence committed by a group of people against another in the form of assault, attack, ambush, etc. An assault can be launched by both communal groups and security forces. A “clash” is a two-way act of violence, usually described as a brawl, assault and counter assault, fight, etc. A clash can break up between communal groups and between communal groups and security forces. A “riot” is a large-scale attack involving a larger target. However, the study only examined riots that involved or victimized certain religious groups and/or caused damage to the property of certain religious groups. By their types, acts of violence are divided into the following categories: 1=attacks on individuals/group of individuals 2=attacks on property of individuals/group of individuals 3=attacks on government officials/property 4=attacks on foreigners/property of foreign governments 5=clashes between communal/religious groups and security forces 6=clashes between communal groups, and 7=riots that lead to the destruction of human lives/property of religious groups 013 Forms of peaceful acts 1=demonstration/long march/procession/mass prayer 51
2=Act of silence/reflection/mass prayer 3=delegation/complaint filing e report 4=strike/boycott 5=art performance/music concert 6=petition/press conference/press release 7=distribution/installment of leaflets/banners 8=lawsuit/warning/class action lawsuit/judicial review The first five acts fall into the category of mass action while the last three acts are non mass actions. A “demonstration/protest rally” occurs when a group of people gathers to voice objection to or support a position, point of view and policy. “Long march/procession” is a form of expression to reject or support a certain position, point of view and policy by moving from one location to another that is the target of the protest. “Mass prayer” is a form of expression to reject or support a certain position, point of view and policy by taking advantage of a certain moment or religious occasion. “Delegation/complaint” is a form of protest by submitting reports to concerned institutions such as the police, government commissions, higher state institutions, etc. “Petition” is a form of protest by submitting a letter signed by the protesters. “Press conference/press release” is a form o protest by inviting journalists to a press conference or by sending a press release to media offices. “Lawsuit” is a form of protest by filing a lawsuit against a certain group (in the form of warning or complaint) or a lawsuit against a legislation or government policy with the State Administrative Court (PTUN), in the form of class action or judicial review. 014 Forms of assault 1=Sweeping/expulsion 2=Hostage taking/kidnapping/detention 3=Torture 4=Death by torture 5=Shooting/killing 6=Confiscation/sealing 7=Act of destruction 8=Act of destruction accompanied by looting/arson 9=Bombing 10-Torture/killing accompanied by act of destruction/arson 015
Issues of incidence
: [text] 52
Issues of incidence are issues or the main themes that trigger a protest incident or incidence of religious violence. 016
Category of issues 1=moral 11=gambling/alcoholic drinks/narcotics 12=immoral act/prostitution/places that offer sex workers 13=pornography/pornoaction 14=other; [explain] 2=sectarian 21=between Muslims 22=between Christians 23=between other religious groups 24=other; [explain] 3=communal 31=Muslim-Christian 32=Muslim-group of other religion 33=blasphemy 34=terror/violence in areas hit by communal conflict 35=settlement of communal conflict 36=execution of Tibo et al 37=other; [explain] 4=terrorism 41=terror attack 42=terror attack against foreigners/property of foreign governments 43=arrest of terrorists 44=other; [explain] 5=political-religious 51=anti Western/foreign government policy 52=anti Western/foreign ideology 53=Islamism/implementation of the Islamic sharia 54=other; [explain] 6=other 61=black magicians 62=other
017 018
Players 1: [text] Category of Players 1 1=religious groups 53
2=community groups 3=university students/youths 4=student/youth groups 5=cadres/supporters of political parties 6=security forces 7=common citizens 8=unidentified individuals/group of individuals 019
Target/Players 2: [text]
020 Category of Target/Players 2: 1=religious groups 2=community groups 3=university students/youth groups 4=student/youth groups 5=political party cadres/supporters 6=security forces 7=common citizens 8=unidentified individuals/group of individuals 021 Number of Target/Players 2: 0=no information available 1=several/dozens 2=tens 3=hundreds 4=thousands Table 3: Measures taken by security forces 022 Presence of security forces 1=information available 2=no information available 023 Time of arrival of security forces 0=no information available 1=when an incident is underway 2=when an incident is over 024 Security forces deployed [more than one option possible] 0=no information available 1=military; unit: [explain] 2=police; unit: [explain] 3=other security forces: [explain] 025 Measures taken by security forces [more than one option possible] 0=no information available 54
1=act of omission 2=guarding the masses 3=calming the masses 4=dispersing the crowd 5=making arrests 6=other; [explain] Table 4: Impacts of Incidents Human casualties: 026 Killed: 027 Injuries: 028 Missing: 029 Displaced:
people people people people
Material losses 030 Houses: units 031 Places of worship: units 032 Other buildings: units 033 Other casualties reported: [text] These items are used to list other casualties reported that cannot be coded based on the categories in the templates, including reports on the impact of incidents that do not use discreet figures such as in “several people were injured”, “a number of houses were damaged”, etc. Notes 034
Notes : [text]
These items are used to take notes of important issues that can help analysts understand this information. This is written in the form of a brief narration of no more than five lines.
55
Appendix 2 Coding and Template to Record Incidences of Religious Conflict Tab 1
Sources and Location
No. Entry Coder Sources Date Edition Date Incidence Headline News
day
date
day
date
Location Provinces City/Regency District Sub districts/Village
Tab 2 Descriptions of incidences Types of Incidences Subtypes of Incidences Subtypes of Peaceful Actions Subtypes of Violent Actions Form of Peaceful Acts Form of Assaults Players 1 Category of players 1 Number of Players
Targets/ Players 2 Category of Target/Players 2 Number of Players 2
Issues Category of Issues Subcategory of Issues Tab 3 Security Forces Presence of Security Forces Elements of Security Forces Measure taken by Security Forces Tab 4 Human casualties
Impacts of Incidents Killed Injuries Missing Displaced
Material Losses Houses Place of worship others buildings other casualties reported Tab 5
Notes
56
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