Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan
Studies of the East Asian Institute Columbia University
Palace and Politics •
Ill
Prewar Japan David Anson Titus
1974 Columbia University Press
New York and London
This study, prepared under the Graduate Fac u l t ies of ( :ol ulllhia University , was selected by a committee of those fa(' u l t ies 1 o l'l'l'l'ivt· one of the Clarke F. Ansley awards given ann ua l l y hy ( :ol ulllhia University Press .
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Titus, David Anson, 1934Palace and politics in prewar Japan. Bibliography: p. I. Japan-Emperors. 2. japan. Kunaisho-History. 3. Japan-Constitutional history. 4. Japan-Politics. and government-1868- I . Title. JQ1641.T55 74-6109 354'.52'0312 ISBN 0-231-03622-1
Copyright © 1974 Columbia University Press Printed in the United States of America
For Anne B. and jesse E. Titus
THE
EAST
ASIAN
INSTITUTE
OF
COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY
The East Asia n I nstitute of Columbia University was establ ished i n 1 949 t o prepare graduate students for careers deal ing with East Asia, and to aid research and publication on East Asia duri ng the modern period . The faculty of the I nstitute are grateful to the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation for their fi nancial assista nee . The Stud ies of the East Asian I nstitute were i naugurated i n 1 962 to bring to a wider public the results of significant new research on modern a nd contemporary East Asia .
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
1.
Introduction
2. 3.
Political Legitimacy and Palace Autonomy The Palace Bureaucracy: Gatekeepers of the
4.
The Offices and Officers of Palace Leadership
5.
Kido Koichi and the Matrix o f Palace Politics . Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan: An
lmperial Will
6.
Interpretation Bibliography Index Studies of the East Asian Institute
IX
13 51 97 1 93 31 1 335 343 359
VII
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
RESEARCH FOR THIS STUDY was initiated in japan from
1 965
1 963
to
under the generous support of the Foreign Area Fellowship
Program.
Through the kind introduction of the late
Professor
Koizumi Shinzo, former President of Keio University and at that time tutor to the crown prince, I was given access to palace records and
an
opportunity
to
interview
palace
officials.
Without
his
cooperation, and that of many officials of the Imperial Household Agency, this study would not have been possible. I am also grateful to Professor Wada Hideo, Professor Yoshida Yoshiaki, and their colleagues in
the
Department
of
Law at
Meiji
University,
to
Professor Maruyama Masao, and to Professor Sato lsao for their im measurable assistance during my stay in .Japan. Portions of this study, fortunately, received the more than helpful criticisms of the University Seminar on Modern Japan at Columbia University and the Japan seminar at Harvard University. I am also indebted to Professor Fred
I.
Greenstein and my colleagues at
Wesleyan University, to Professor Shumpei Okamoto of Temple University, and to Professor James L. Payne of Texas A & M for their comments and encouragement during the last eight years of re search, writing and revising. The final revision of this manuscript, completed in Japan during
197 1 -72,
was made possible by a grant from the American Council
of Learned Societies and by Wesleyan University's generous leave and sabbatical arrangements. Professors Oka Yoshitake, lwanaga
X
,\t K:\ti\\'II·IH;MF:\TS
Kenkichiro, Sato Seizaburo, and Ito Takashi of Tokyo ll nivnsit y were most helpful not only in suggesting r evi sio n s l111t .dso i n Ktlid i n g m y research for a projected study o f politi c a l lc ad l 'r s h ip and po lit i('a l change in modern Japanese politics. Amy Heinrich, Cynthia Brodhead, and .Joa n l\ lr(�11a1·y provid l'd invaluable editorial suggestions during the l a st st ;tgl's of [ll"c·parottion for press.
I
am also grateful to Michael Harwood a nd Mary I )11r;1nt for
their encouragement and for their a s s i stanct' in styl<' and clarity. Mrs. Cheryl Cuyler, Mrs. Lee Messina, Mrs. M i l d n· d ( :;trlcT, a n d Mrs. Janice Brown typed the many revisions that thi s n1a n11scTipt has seen. Finally,
Professors James
Morley
and
H t ' r s l ' h l' l
Wc·hh
of
Columbia University have seen this study t hrough fro111 start to finish. Intellectual guidance was but part of t h e i r co n t rih11t i o n . Er rors of omission and commission, interpretation, and t'va lllat ion un fortunately remain-and remain, unfortunately, solely min<'.
l>.A.T.
Cromwell, Connecticut October 1973
Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan
Studies of the East Asian Institute Columbia University
CHAPTER ON E
INTRODUCTION
ORIGINALLY THIS WAS INTENDED to be a study of the imperial insti tution i n Japan after World War I I . For three reasons it became a study of the prewar imperial i nstitution, going back to the theory of imperial prerogative evolved duri ng the Restoration settlement of 1 868-8 9 . First , the internal structure of the palace today is very close to what it had been from 1 885 to 1 945 , although the emperor's constitutional role has been drastically altered . Second , there is very little information in Japanese or English about the prewar palace , its leaders , and its concrete rel ation to politics , despite t he theoretical centrality of the imperial institution in politics . Third , the moderni zation of japan between 1 868 a nd 1 945 was centrally ma naged ; the articulated referent for modernization-political as well as economic and social-was the imperial i nstitution. The 1 947 Constitution of Japan produced profound changes i n the formal relationship between emperor and government . Accordi ng to the prewar constitution of 1 88 9 , the emperor had " combi ned i n his being the supreme rights of rule" and was conseq uently endowed with an immense range of constitutional prerogatives in military comma nd , civil admi nistration, and legislation. In the 1 947 consti tution, however, the people were made sovereign a nd the emperor was divested of all prerogatives . His constitutional position is now defined as "symbol of the State and of the unity of the people . " The Prime M i nister is no longer appoi nted by the emperor; he is "designated from among the members of the Diet by a resol ution of
2
I N T R O D U CT I O N
Diet ." Cabi net ministers are no longer appoi nted by the emperor but by the Pri me M i nister. The Office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal , an adj u nct palace office that had l i nked the emperor and the civil side of the prewar government , was abolished in 1 94 5 , as was the Office of Chief Aide-de-Camp, an adj unct palace office that had li nked the emperor to the military command . Palace personnel were reduced in number from approximately six thousand to one thou sand . I mperial lands , stocks a nd bonds , a nd other sources of fi nancial autonomy were elimi nated . I n 1 947 the imperial house be came dependent on funds provided in an annual budget passed by the legislature . The prewar aristocracy , including most bra nch houses of the imperial family, was abolished . M a naged by the Im perial Household Ministry , the prewar aristocracy had been the " bulwark" of t he throne . The I mperial H ousehold M i nistry , which had enj oyed a n autonomous position i n relation to the prewar government , w a s repl aced by the present I mperial H ousehold Agency under t he direction of the Prime M i nister. The i nternal organization of the palace , however, has remai ned all but uncha nged . There is still a palace office charged with the conduct of Shi nto rites , despite t he legal "denationalization" of Shinto as a state religion . There are i nformal offices i n the Imperial Household Agency which link the palace of today with the prewar aristocracy . There are a Poetry B ureau, a B oard of Chamberlai ns , a B oard of the Ceremonies-j ust as in prewar times . Although the formal relationship between emperor and government has been revised , therefore , many of the symbolic and actual roles played by t he emperor may have survived , overtly or covertly. Without an under standing of the prewar palace those roles could not be identified , much less eval uated . Second is the problem of information . The most I have found in a single work , for example, are lists of and partial descriptions for the men who held the four lead ing palace offices from 1 88 5 to 1 945 : the I mperial Household Minister, the Grand Chamberlain, the Chief Aide-de-Camp , and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Sea l . There is no systematic analysis of their roles, or of the institutional structure created to manage the emperor's relationship to politics and society : the I mperial Household Ministry . The lack of such information and the
I N T R O D U CT I O N
3
analysis is not without reason , however. Only recently has it been possible to·subj ect the prewar imperial institution to scholarly inquiry and objective analysis. The sanctity surround ing the prewar palace vanished in 1 94 5 ; since that time documents and private papers have become increasingly available, making it feasible to analyze the role of the palace in prewar pol itics . Postwar Japanese scholarship on the role of the imperial i nsti tution i n prewar politics has tended , however, to divide i nto two categories : the macrosocietal and t he micropolitical . In the macro societal category fall such scholars and writers as Maruyama Masao, I s hida Takes h i , I noue Kiyoshi , Yokota Kisaburo , M i yazawa Toshiyoshi , Kamiyama Shigeo, Yamazaki Tansho, a nd Yamakawa Hitoshi . Although there are vast differences in both approach and in terpretation among them, they all attempt to relate the imperial in stitution to one or more aspects of the total Japanese environment : to values and ideals in Japanese society, to the social structure, to the total legal order, or to norms a nd patterns of Japanese behavior. Marxist historians, for example , q uarrel over the class structure of the prewar "emperor system" (tennosei) . The debate centers on the nature of the class base of " absolutism" (zettai shugi) and "absolute monarchy" (zettai osei); the effort is to develop a model of prewar Japanese society. The founder of the absolutism school i n Japan, ac cording to Professor Toyama Shigeki , is Hattori Shiso: It was M r . Hattori Shiso's achievement (i n 1 928] to define the political regime produced by t he Meij i Restoration as "absolutism" and thus to locate it i n the developmental stages of w orld history . . . . Absolutism, or rule by an absolute monarch , is that state power w hich, resti ng on an equi librium of two contendi ng class forces (the feudal nobility-landlord class and the bourgeoisie) , carries out its policies by utilizing the opposition between the two while at the same time representing the i nterests of both. Absolutism is produced i n the course of the transformation from a feudal to a c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m . . . . C o n s t r u c t i n g a state cons o l i d ated u nd e r centralized authority b y means o f a monarch's despotic and autocratic power, power t hat is protected both by an enormous sta nd i ng army and by an entrenched bureaucracy, absolutism simultaneously undertakes the ac celeration by force of primary accumulation, using its immense state power as a spur. 1 I. Toyama Shigeki , Meiji /shin Shi, "lwanami Zensho," vol . 1 28 , 1 7th ed . (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1 962) , p. 23 .
4
I NTRODUCTION
While they quite rightly poi nt to the bureaucracy as the engine of prewar Japanese politics , scholars and writers who adopt the absol u tism model go very little fart her i n their analysis of political i nstitu tions and behavior . They are content to argue whet her Japanese absolutism was more "feudal " than " bourgeois , " or the reverse . For example, Kamiyama S higeo, perhaps the leadi ng postwar exponent of the Hattori position and the feudal basis of Japanese absolutism , asserts the primacy of the bureaucracy i n the pol itical process . B ut the most one can fi nd about the operations of the bureaucracy in his writi ngs i s : The exercise o f the nation's powers coveri ng a l l domestic and foreign policy was formally united u nder t he i mperial prerogative; i n actuality , however, a flock of leaders i n the bureaucratic structures and the factions at court which enveloped t he emperor exercised [the emperor's preroga tives ] . 2
W h o were the bureaucratic leaders ? What were the court factions that " enveloped the emperor" ? How were bureaucrat ic leaders and court factions related ? The second category of J apa nese scholarship, not near as voluminous as the macrosocietal , I have termed the micropolitical . Scholars and writers i n this category focus on the emperor's indi vidual role in politics , viewi ngs events i n relation to his " personal " actions . This approach poi nts up contrad ictions i n the emperor's be havior, shows his i neffectiveness, or asserts his individual responsi bility for pol icy fail ures . Nez u Masashi , for example, argues that the emperor's actions during the Manchurian I ncident and its aftermat h in late 1 93 1 and early 1 932 were contradictory : the emperor condemned the Army's i ndependent acts of aggression in Manchuria and at the same time sent formal " i mperial words" of praise to that Army on October 1 8 , 1 93 1 and agai n at New Years in 1 932.3 Such apparent contradicti ons ca nnot be understood , however, wit hout consideri ng the emperor's opinions on pol icy , which he expressed to those "close to the throne , " in relation to his institutional role, 2 . Kamiyama Shigeo, Tenno Sei ni kansuru Riron-leki Sho Mandai (Tokyo: Ashi Shup panShinSha, !956),pp. l12-13. 3. Nezu Masashi, Ten no Sho wa Ki, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1961) , vol. I, "Dai Nippon Teikoku no Hokai," pp. 110-14.
INTRO DUCTION
5
which was to legiti mate policies and decisions produced by ot hers for his ratification. The micropolitical approach tends to view the em peror as an autonomous individual i n an i nstitutional vacuum. The macrosocietal approach, in contrast , tends to see him in a social system without i nstitutional content or empirically verified patterns of political behavior. Third , the imperial i nstitution was central to Japa nese moderniza tion . A n effective national government was produced duri ng the Res toration settlement of 1 868-89. After the Restoration settlement the vast array of imperial prerogatives set down i n the 1 8 8 9 Constitution of the Great Empire of Japan gradually became i nstitutionalized , so that by the 1 920s Japanese politics was characterized by a high degree of confused competition among the i nstitutions of imperial prerogative to monopol ize t he Imperial Will in politics-that is, to make or control national policy making. The Diet , for example, insisted on its supremacy in politics by asserting the supremacy of the emperor's prerogative of legislation. The Army, on the other hand , i nsisted on its right to make policy on the basis of the em peror's prerogative of supreme command . All other i nstitutions of government were equally derived from imperial prerogative-and t herefore eq u a l l y j u s t i fi e d i n t h e i r p o l i c y - m a k i ng d e m a nd s . Pa ra l l e l i ng t he i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of i m p e r i a l p r e r og a t i ves , moreover, political leadership passed from an oligarchy of autono mous Restoration leaders to coalitions of institutional el ites who were creatures , not creators , of Japan's modern political institutions . Rapid and intense socioeconomic cha nge accompanied the i nstitu ti onalization of imperial prerogatives a nd political elites; by the 1930s, Japan was a formidable industrial and military power, her highly literate population enj oying universal adult male suffrage ( 192 5) and bei ng served by modern mass media . All these changes-political, economic, and social-took place a round a si ngle, fixed referent : the imperial i nstitution. As the pole st a r around which politics a nd society revolved , the imperial insti l ut ion w as looked to by most as the one fixed poi nt i n a vortex of ('hange. How did it mai ntai n its position i n the face of such drastic l'hanges? How could it survive the profound challenges of national d efeat in 1 945 and subseq uent occupation by a foreign power ? Only
6
I N T R O Dt: C T I O N
an exami nation of the theory and practice of palace politics and of the structure and leadership of the palace bureaucracy in prewar Japan could begi n to answer the first question and to suggest answers to the second . My concerns here are first with the theoretical position of the im perial institution i n the governi ng process, second with the evol ution of the palace as a formal structure and as personnel between 1 88 5 and 1 94 5 , and third with the relation o f the palace to the political process , primarily during the 1 930s . The theory of political legitimacy produced duri ng the Restoration settlement of 1 868-89 was based on the concept of imperial pre rogative to be discussed in chapter 2 . I n that concept were fused modified religious myths and court practices from Japan's ancient past , shogunal powers from Japan's i mmed iate past , and selected adaptations from Western constitutional monarchies . In theory , all political power derived from a " sacred and i nviolable"4 emperor who had " i n herited from Our A ncestors " "the rights of sovereignty of the State . " 5 If the imperial i nstitution was to be the eternal fount of political authority , however, measures had to be taken to ensure that political failures would not reach the emperor and that the em peror's human frailties would not enda nger the transcendental role of the throne in the Japanese polity . Duri ng the Restoration set tlement , therefore , court and government were separated i nstitu t i o n a l l y a nd e a c h w a s g i v e n i t s ow n w r i t t e n c o n s t i t ut i o n . Government officials were made responsible to the emperor for bot h policy maki ng and policy implementation. The emperor was to ratify policies resolved upon by the officials who "ad vised and assisted " him . The emperor did not ratify policies as an i ndividual monarch but as the representative of the I mperial Will-the beq ueathed i nstructions of his ancestors " of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal . "6 " I mperial Will" was thus to serve as a maj or political fic tion for legitimizing decisions of state while protecting the emperor from individual responsibility for the decisions he ratified . I n response to the theory of i mperial prerogative a nd the i nstitu4 . Constitution of the Great Empire of japan, Article 3. 5. Ibid . , Preamble.
6 . Ibid.
I N T R O DC C T I O N
7
tiona! separation of court and government , a palace bureaucracy developed between 1 868 and 1 889 w hich was designed not only to preserve the imperial institution's transcendental authority in politics but also to ma nage that institution's role as symbol of all t hat was true, good , and beautiful in the Japanese polity. The creation and evolution of the palace bureaucracy are the subjects of chapter 3 . Manipulating the transcendental I mperial Will i n politics and managing the symbolic centrality of the imperial i nstitution i n Japanese society had origi nally been seen a s complementary func tions . As will be seen in chapter 4, however, this was so only when the court was under strong cohesive leadership and coordi nated with equal ly strong and cohesive government leadership. S uch leadership existed in both court and government from 1 885 to 1 9 1 2 . But by the 1 930s the court had become a mosaic of bureaucratic representatives who responded in a variety of ways to contradictory external and i nternal pressures . These pressures came mainly from t he entrenched political i nstitutions that had grown to maturity under the 1 88 9 constitution. Pluralism and competition in the i nstitutions of government were reflected not only in the middle level of the palace bureaucracy but also in the palace leadership, the focus of discussion in chapter 4 . Between 1 885 and 1 9 1 0 the four leading palace officers were either dutiful Court Nobles or Restoration leaders who belonged to the charmed circle of statesmen directi ng the course of Japan's moderni zation. B ut by the 1 930s each of the four palace leaders was a distin guished burea ucrat drawn from a different component of the government bureaucracy-primarily the Foreign M i nistry , Home Mi nistry , Navy , and Army . As both palace persons and careerist representatives of bureaucratic i nterests, these palace leaders were to see to it that what the emperor ratified was the correct , appropriate , or desirable " national consensus , " despite competing demands from the multiple i nstituti ons of government . They were to protect the transcendence of the emperor as well as cope with the interests of their respective i nstitutional constituencies . Under such counter vailing pressures in the 1 930s , negotiating the national consensus taxed to the utmost the political capabil ities of the palace . No longer were palace leaders drawn from an i ngroup of men w ho were crea-
INTRODUCTION
tors , not creatures, of government institutions . No longer did they negot iate the imperial ratification of policies which were produced among themsel ves as Restoration comrades in arms and subj ect to personal , not i nstitutional , grievances , competitions , and policy preferences . Negotiati ng the national consensus for i mperial ratification was not , however, the responsibility of the four leadi ng palace officials alone . All or some of those who constitutionally or traditionally " advised and assisted " the emperor were i nvolved : t he four palace leaders , the Privy Councillors , the M i nisters of State , the C hiefs of the High Command, the Elder and Senior Statesmen . Between 1 88 5 and 1 9 1 2 the advisers to the throne were a small group o f like minded men who shifted offices freely among themselves , most notably during the period from 1 88 5 to 1 90 1 . Later, the number ad vising and assisti ng the emperor i ncreased , as did the institutions they represented . In the 1 93 0s the negotiation process leading to im perial ratification was complicated by the fact that partisan leaders i nitiated and implemented the policies which they themselves ne gotiated as national consensus . The outcome of the negotiation process was based on a balance of issue considerations, i nstitutional loyalties , a nd personal ambitions-all i nvolvi ng i nstitutionalized role perceptions on the part of the participants . By all criteria, however, the four palace leaders were to be the least involved i n policy i nitia tion a nd implementat i o n , the most conscious of t he national consensus , and the most experienced i n the arts of Japa nese domestic diplomacy . They and the reti red statesmen were to be the negotiators par excellence ; they were expected to discern the national consensus, regardless of their i nstitutional experiences , and to be able to ne gotiate that consensus i nto effect . Role behavior and the communication network l i nking court and government duri ng the 1 930s are the subj ects of chapter 5 . The focus of analysis is Marquis Kido Koichi , whose patterns of association re veal the nature of prewar Japa n's closed , or privatized , political process as well as the political roles req uired to sustai n that process . Between 1 930 and 1 945 Kido held three different palace offices : Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Sea l , Director of Peerage Affairs , and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal . Kido's behavior
I NTRODUCTION
9
i n each of these offices illustrates three roles that were basic to palace politics : the secretary , the bureaucrat , and the negotiator. The secretary was the functional eq uivalent of the feudal retai ner; it was via the loyal secretary that a political decision maker received in formation that was both reliable and indispensable in j udging the "trends of the times" on which he acted . The bureaucrat was an administrator w hose role i nvolved neutral or impartial adminis tration. The negotiator was responsible for eval uati ng the "trends of the times" and forging the consensus on which policy and personnel decisions were based . Kido's associates in his three pal ace offices also illustrate other political roles essential to privatized decision maki ng : the ratifier, who put the fi nal seal of approval on political decisions ; the policy advocate, who headed a faction within the government and whose partisan views and follower strength were key components of the "trends of the times " ; and the i nstrument of pressure-a person or group who attempted to i nfluence the political system "from below " or " from t he outs i d e " - i ncl ud i ng agitat ors , assassins , newsmen, i nterest groups , and political societies . C hapter 6 concludes with a discussion of privatized decision maki ng i n prewar Japan that attempts ( 1 ) to contrast the Japanese bureaucratic policy process and its privatization of conflict with the democratic policy process a nd its socialization of conflict , (2) to illustrate t he persistence of traditional patterns of decision making from Japan's i mmediate feudal past , and (3) to i ncorporate the role typology developed in chapter 5 i n an i ntelligible model of political decision making. Political controversy i n prewar Japan was not au thoritatively resolved in an open public forum but i n t he corridors of bureaucratic i nstitutions leadi ng into t he walled and moated imperial palace . Since decisions were to be presented to the public, not pub licly resolved , basic political communication was mai ntai ned by secretaries to leadi ng government and palace officials , negotiation took place verbally or "privately" among the principals involved , and the entire process was wrapped i n secrecy-as best it could be . Such privatization of conflict i n prewar Japan, which stands i n contrast to the socialization of conflict characteristic o f democracy i n the United States , was made both possible and desirable given the theoretical and actual role of the palace i n prewar Japanese politics .
10
INTRODUCTION
This study is bound exclusively to the structure and operations of palace politics in Japan between 1 868 a nd 1 945 . Si nce there have been no analytic descriptions of the worki ngs of the palace, much less the relation between the palace and the political process, I consider such a focus j ustified . Alt hough the concludi ng chapter suggests a model of prewar Japanese decision making that may ultimately prove useful for comparison with other political systems, the model is far from complete. The emphasis of this study is palace rather tha n government , a nd the model i s distorted b y the perspective taken. A great deal more needs to be done on faction building, factional coalitions, and political roles i n prewar Japanese politics before com parisons with other political systems and their development can be meani ngfully made. M ost critically needed in this respect is a study of the Japanese bureaucracy as it evolved under the theory and practice of imperial prerogative . Until very recently, Western and Japanese students of prewar Japanese politics have tended to ask w hy Japan was undemocratic a nd then to focus on the constitution, the legislature, pol itical parties , voting, and democratic values as we know them . Although the q uestion is certainly a proper one, the a nswers have been sought in the wrong sumo ring. It was the bu reaucracy , i nitiating and i mplementing policy , that shaped the course of successful political modernization in Japan, however undemocratic. If B ritish political development is any model of demo cratic development from a "traditional " society , moreover, one of the precond itions of democratic development i n national politics is the creation of a strong central bureaucracy . 7 Of course , the creation of an effective national bureaucracy is no guarantee that democracy will follow , but without it "the people" have nothing to fight agai nst a nd nothing to control . O nly in that society where the government did not govern and the land was " free" was there a different pattern of democratic development .8 7 . This is certainly the import of G. R. Elton's a nalysis of Tudor bureaucracy under Thomas C romwell i n t he 1 530s in his The Tudor Revolution in Government: Administrative Changes in the Reign of Hen ry VI/I (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1 95 3 ) . 8 . James Young h a s analyzed with great perception a n d humor t he absence o f national government i n the United States during its foundling period i n The Washington Community, 1800-1828 (New York : Columbia University Press , 1 966) . Of course, the absence of government is no guarantee of democracy ; nor is a frontier.
INTRODUCTION
11
This is not , therefore , a comparative study . Nor is it a study of the decision-maki ng process in terms of substantive issues, alternative courses of action, or reasons for ultimate policy decisions . These aspects of the political process are referred to only as illustrations of the i nstitutional role of the palace , the structure and style of palace politics , and the political roles and behavior that li nked palace and politics in prewar Japan. Finally, I am not much concerned here either with the per sonalities of the Japanese emperors or with the prewar social forces , unleashed by J apan's modernization, which pressured the political system " from below "-mass movements , political parties , societies , pressure groups. Unlike the B ritish monarch, or his portrait by B ritish historians , "personality" had very little to do with the political functioning of the Japanese emperor. Those responsible for advisi ng and assisting the emperor were responsible for making policies . This they did in view of the "trends of the times" outside the palace gates . As supreme ratifier in the Japanese state , the em peror was to put the seal of the I mperial Will on those policies . I n doing so, he was t o ensure as best he could that a national policy de cision presented to him for ratification was truly a consensus among all concerned leaders on the best way to cope with the trends of the times . Whatever policy preferences the emperor might have had were know n only to those close to the throne and of very limited ef fect . I n the prewar decision-making process, therefore , the emperor was an i nstitution, not an autonomous personality exercising an ar bitrary i ndividual will in politics. If the personality and the policy preferences of the Japanese em peror were not very relevant to prewar politics, social forces cer tainly were. There are two reasons for givi ng them only the most tangential treatment here . First , this study simply had to be con trolled in scope . Obviously not everything relevant to Japanese political development could be encompassed . Second , I do not think we have fully understood what these new social forces were pitted agai nst politicall y . I hope that by analyzi ng the core i nstitution i n the prewar political process " from above , " this study will aid our understanding of the forces " from below . "
CHAPTER TWO
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND PALACE AUTONOMY
IN 1 9 1 7 THE B I O G R A PH E R of Tanaka M itsuaki , Imperial Household Minister from 1 898 to 1 909, described the imperial palace as " a region of supreme scenic beauty, distant , far from the smoke of human habitations , in the verdant hills, above the blue expanse of sea . . . beyond the government , transcending, no one ever to i nvade its sanctity . " 1 B ut it was only after twenty years of gropi ng experi mentat ion, from the restoration of t he emperor in 1 8 68 to the pro mulgation of the Constitution of the Great Empire of Japan in 1 88 9 , that such a transcendental position for the throne was agreed upon . The new imperial i nstitution was a creative fusion of t hree elements : ( 1 ) practices , rituals, a nd an organization unique to t he traditional imperial i nstitution on which nativist ideas about an idealized a ncient polity were based ; (2) formal powers of rule previously held by the shogun a nd " returned " to the emperor in 1 867 ; and , fi nally, (3) selected legal theories of constitutional monarchy prevalent in co nti nental Europe during the second half of the ni neteenth century . Alt hough the pressures of Western thought and power made the instituti onal and theoretical position of the restored emperor by no means certai n, historical precedents weighted the direction that the 1 . Tomita Ki">jiri">,
Tanaka Sezsan-haku
(Tokyo: Seisan Shoi n , 1 917), p . 2 9 3 .
13
14
POLI TI C A L
L E G I TIMA C Y
AND
PALACE
Al'TO N O M Y
new government was to take . This was especially true of the political transcendence of the emperor . The position of the imperial i nsti tution during the precedi ng Tokugawa period ( 1 603- 1 867) a nd earl ier had been tra nscendental as wel l . From the twelfth century , political power had been exercised by a shogun, and only in times of political turmoil and warfare had the emperor and his court enj oyed any latitude of political maneuverability . The shogun had i nitially acquired his position by mil itary power, and his de facto power was legitimized by the important fiction of imperial appoi ntment . Suc cessive shogu ns of a ruling house , whether they ruled or were manipulated by persons in the shogunal house or government, were all appointed by the emperor. Each appoi ntment , like that of the founding shogun , was a ritualistic ratification of a fait accompli. During the Tokugawa period the emperor and his court resided i n the imperial palace i n Kyoto, under the cl ose control of the shogunal government headquartered i n Edo-present-day Tokyo. The em peror was virtually a transcendental prisoner. He and his court , however, had performed unique religious rites in the Japanese pol ity from prehistoric times . These rites and the sociocultural status of the i mperial i nstitution had p roved useful to all de facto rulers throughout the course of J apanese history . As a transcendental prisoner, therefore , the emperor lent legiti macy to the Tokugawa shogunate , and for all shoguns this was a valuable mea ns toward stable government . After a series of political failures , foreign and domestic, the shogun returned his ma ndate of rule to the emperor . The stage was thus set for the leaders of the Restoration to unite the traditional religious aut hority of the imperial inst itution with the powers previously held by the shogun. Those powers had largely involved mil itary and pol ice functions , as attested by the shogu n's full title of " barbaria n subduing generalissimo. " Such a unification was concretely sym bolized when the emperor and court moved from Kyoto to Tokyo and took up residence in Edo castle, the fortress of the defu nct sho gunal government . By 1 889 the emperor's aut hority had been further enhanced . The Meij i Constitution, formally know n as the Constitution of the Great
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Empire of Japan, made Japan a constitutional monarchy in which the emperor was to exercise far-reachi ng prerogatives . Traditional religious rites were implicit in this constitution, which termed the emperor " sacred and i nviolable . " Shogunal powers recast as im perial prerogatives , as well as constitutional powers modeled most notably after the Prussian constitution, were explicit . In direct com mand of the armed forces both in peacetime admi nistration and i n wartime operations, the emperor appoi nted a l l generals o f t h e Army and admirals of the Navy. He also appoi nted all Mi nisters of State , i ncludi ng the Prime M i nister. He exercised the legislative power with the consent of the I mperial Diet , declared war, made peace , and concl uded treaties . He had discreti onary powers to issue ordi nances in times of emergency . Paradoxically , however, the court and the government were separated structurally and legally during the Restoration settlement . The court acq uired its ow n autonomous bureaucracy , the I mperial Household M i nistry . The imperial i nstitution was also granted its own constitution, the I mperial House Law , concurrently with the enactment of the Meij i Constitution. Court affairs , furthermore , i ncreasi ngly involved ritual practices or rites , and t he public ap pearr.p ces of the emperor increasi ngly tended to be rigid , formalized affinnations of an imperial presence unique to Japan's sociopol itical order. Palace autonomy and the union of court and rites were paralleled by the union of government a nd rule . The emperor and court ritualized , the government decided and executed . This division of functions was also complementary : the emperor and court le gitimized government decisions. Far from bei ng his personal decision-maki ng powers , therefore , the emperor's prerogatives were the source of authority for rule by ot hers-at first , by the statesmen who had engi neered the Res toration and created the i nstitutions of prewar Japanese government ; later, by the leaders produced by the new i nstitutions that grew to maturity under the const itution of 1 88 9 . In short , the imperial prerogatives laid dow n in the constitution became institutionalized in a government structure over which the emperor reigned but did not rule : the civil and military bureaucracies , the imperial legislature ,
16
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and the courts . The emperor was once again a transcendental prisoner, but i n a new and different political system: a constitutional monarchy based on imperial prerogative . The separation o f court a nd government , t h e union o f court and rites , and the theory of imperial prerogative are the subjects of this chapter. These three elements constituted the theory of legitimacy on which Japanese government was based from 1 889 to 1 94 5 , despite changes in Japanese society and shifting power configurations among the leaders and component structures of government .
THE SEPA RATION OF COURT AND GOVERNM ENT : PALAC E AUTONOM Y
The " return to the kingly government of ancient times" (osei fukko), on the basis of which the emperor was restored physically to the center of the Japanese political order in 1 868 , had very little concrete content . "Direct imperial rule" (shinsei), a corollary slogan, was equally devoid of practical expression. It was the work of experi mental nation-building efforts and political compromises during the Restoration settlement of 1 868-89 that produced i nstitutional and legal arrangements relating the emperor to the new pol itical order. Between 1 868 and the creation of the cabi net system i n 1 88 5 , Res toration governments were based on a union of court and palace af fairs with government and state affairs under a literal i nterpretation of direct imperial rule . The first Restoration government of 1 86 8 m a d e n o d i s t i nct i o n b e twee n c o u r t a n d gove r n m e n t . 2 T h e g o ve r n m e nt orga n i z a t i o n e s t a b l i s hed b y t he I n s t r u m e n t o f Government (Seitaisho) o f 2 1 April 1 868 provided for an officer t o manage court affairs . He was an official withi n a unified government and had concurrent governmental functions as wel l . 3 2 . Nezu Masashi, p. 38 3 . Sorifu , Kancho Benra n , 20 vols. (Tokyo: Okura Sho l nsatsu, Kyoku, 1 958), vol . 2, " Sorifu I I , " pp. 3, 2 9 . The Gregorian calendar was not officially adopted in Japan until January I, 1 87 3 . Dates prior to this a re listed according to t he Japa nese calendar without conversion and in the Japa nese order: day, month, year.
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B ut in early 1 869 a "court affairs admi nistrator" (naibenji), 4 later called a "court governor" (naitei chiji), 5 was created , only to be superseded by an " i mperial household secretary" (kunai kyo ) when the I mperial Household Mi nistry came i nto being on 8 July 1 869.6 All three of these 1 869 functionaries were to devote themselves exclu sively to court affairs . Although court affairs were no l onger handled by an official who had other concurrent admi nistrative duties , court admi nistration remai ned an i ntegral part of government . The Im perial Household M i nistry , l ike other mi nistries created by the 1 86 9 decree, was an administrative division of the Civil Government (Dajo kan). 7 The heads of the ministries created in 1 869 were not directly re sponsible for "advising and assisting" (hohitsu) the emperor, though they were to become so in 1 88 9 .8 Accordi ng to the 1 87 1 reorganiza tion of the ministries , for example , the privilege of assisting the throne directly was in theory limited to the Chancellor (Dajo Daijin), M i nister of the Left (Sa Daijin), M i nister of the Right (U Daijin), a nd the Councillors (Sangi). 9 The mi nistries , i ncluding the I mperial Household M inistry , were separate offices (bunkan) headed by secretaries . 10 The I mperial Household Secretary , however, was not i ncluded among those Secretaries of M inistries , Councillors , and M i nisters const i t u t i ng t he i n ner circle of eightee n , called t he "cabinet " (naikaku), w ho decided government policies . 1 1 By 1 87 1 evidence t hus emerges t hat court and government would eventually be i nstitutionally separated . In 1 869 the affairs of court had become the excl usive duty of one offica l ; two years later that official, t he l m4. Horei Zensho (Tokyo: Okura Shii I nsatsu Kyoku, 1 869-), p. 1 43 . Hereafter l isted by title, year, and volume number when appropriate. 5. Siirifu, Kancho Benran, 2 : 2 6. 6 . " Daj iikan Tasshi , " no . 622 , 8 July 1 869, in Horei Zensho, 1 869, pp. 249-64 . This di rect ive created the "eight ministry system" under a Chancellor, M i nister of the Left , M inister of t he Right , and Councillors . For t he officers in this system, see Toyama Shigeki and Adachi Yoshiko, Kindai Nihon Seiji Shi Hikkei (Tokyo: lwanami Shoten, 1 96 1 ) , pp. 26-27 . 7. Horei Zensho, 1 869, pp. 249-64 ; Kyutei Kishadan, Kunai Cho (Tokyo: Hiibun Sha , 1 957), p . 8 . 8 . " Dai Nippon Teikoku Kempii, " Article 5 5 , i n Horei Zensho, 1 889, vol . 2 , p . 6 . 9. " Daj iikan Tasshi , " n o . 400, 1 0 August 1 87 1 , in Horei Zensho, 1 87 1 , p. 3 1 7 . 1 0. Ibid. 1 1 . Tanaka Siigorii, Kindai Nihon Kanryo Shi (Tokyo: Tiiyii Keizai Shimpii Sha Shuppan Bu, 1 94 1 ) , p. 99.
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perial Household Secretary, was not asked to sit on the highest governing body, the informal cabinet of leading government of ficials. 12 Paralleli ng the trend toward the structural separation of court and government between 1 868 and 1 87 1 was the displacement from central government offices of Court Nobles , the aristocrats who had accompanied the teenaged emperor from Kyoto to Tokyo. Between January and June 1 868 , forty-three of the 1 02 Conferees (Sanyo) ap poi nted were Court Nobles , i ndicati ng that the i nitial Restoration government was i n fact a fusion of court and government . Between June 1 868 and August 1 86 9 , however, only three of t he twenty-two appoi ntments were Court Nobles , and none of the twenty-six Councillors appointed between August 1 869 and December 1 88 5 was a Court Noble.13 Court Nobles d i d have a tenuous hold until 1 88 5 , however. The Chancellor, when that office was filled , was Court Noble Sanj o Sanetomi ( 1 837- 9 1 ) and the Mi nisters of the Right and Left were , with one exception, imperial pri nces or Court Nobles .14 B ut the union of court and government was becomi ng a fic tion, structurally and i n terms of personnel , between 1 868 and 1 87 1 . The crumbli ng union between court a nd government did not go unchallenged , however. The theory and practice of direct imperial rule found a staunch proponent within the court in the person of M otoda Eifu ( 1 8 1 8- 9 1 ) . At the recommendation of O kubo Toshi michi ( 1 8 3 1 -7 8) , one of the leading oligarchs of the day, Motoda had entered the I mperial Household M i nistry i n 1 87 1 as I mperial Reader to the emperor.15 In September 1 873 M otoda petitioned M i nister of the Right lwakura Tomomi to enlist the support of the government's ablest leaders for direct imperial rule . M otoda argued 1 2 . The inrormal cabi net or 1 87 1 is not to be conrused with t he rormal cabinet s ystem enacted in 1 885 . The "cabi nets" or 1 8 7 1 -8 5 , being coll ections or lead i ng government officials, were or cou rse the p recursors or this system. 1 3 . W. G. Beasley , " Councillors or Samurai O rigin i n the Early Meiji Government , 1 86 8 - 1 86 9 , " Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 20 (1 957) : 94 . 1 4 . Toyama and Adachi , p . 26. 1 5 . Kaigo Tokiomi, " M otoda Eiru , " Nippon Kyo iku Sentetsu Sos ho (Tokyo: Bukyo Shoi n, 1 942), 1 9 : 2 . Until his death i n 1 89 1 Motoda was a curtained i nflue nce at court . A ded icated Conrucian, he exercised considerable i nfl uence over the political development or t he Emperor Meij i as well as t he con tent or public education i n the new Japan's rormative years .
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that "at present the sovereign's wisdom is not yet extensive and his benevolence is not yet comprehensive. " 16 Cultivating the emperor's virtue must be the responsibility of the ablest men i n the country , and not left to second- and third-rate teachers as at present . The ablest men of the day have become Prime M i nister [ Chancellor] , M inisters of the Left and Right , and Councillors, but these men rarely consult the Emperor on political matters . 1 7
To this end , M otoda desired a union of court and government . M otoda's ultimate test came with the creation of a group of court advisers , the jiho (Advisers-in-Attendance) , on August 2 9 , 1 877 . Ac cording to Tsuda Shigemaro, biographer of jiho Sasaki Takayuki , the office of jiho " origi nated i n a si ncere i ntent to concentrate on cultivati ng the emperor's virtue . " When Sasaki Takayuki j oined the group in 1 878 there were ten jiho. 18 B oth educators of the emperor and potential implementers of direct imperial rule, the jiho, as court officers , came i nto competition with the M inisters and Councillors , collectively the government oligarchy . Like M otoda, Sasaki Takayuki wished to have a powerful and ca pable political leader head the jiho, given their "weighty office" of educati ng the emperor in political affairs . 19 He and the other jiho agreed that they were simply not prepared for the task of remedying the emperor's deficiencies as Japan's central political figure. Sasaki also complai ned of the personnel surrounding the emperor at court : they had left everythi ng as it was i n Meij i 's childhood . If the em peror refused advice on the most trifl i ng of matters the palace people let him have his way . As far as politics was concerned , the emperor left everything to the "two Mi nisters" (presumably , t he C hancel lor a nd t he M i nister of t he Left ) . Sasaki accused t he I mperial Household Secretary, Tokudaij i Sanenori , of weakness-allowing too much power to the two Ministers and fearing the emperor's temper. Head C hamberlain Higashikuze Michitomi , Sasaki com1 6. Quoted by Donald H. Shively, " M otoda Eifu : Confucian L ecturer to the Meij i Em peror," in Confucianism in Action, ed . David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (Sta nford : Stanford University Press , 1 959), p. 3 1 5 . 1 7 . I bid ; Shively paraphrases M otoda's argument . 1 8 . Tsuda Shigemaro, Meiji Seijo to Shin Takayuki (Tokyo : Jishiikai, 1 928), pp. 401 , 403 . 1 9. Ibid . , " Preface" p. 3, and text p. 403 .
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plai ned , lacked drive and could do nothi ng to assist the emperor's virtue. Conseq uently, Sasaki and the other jiho agreed to ask O kubo Toshimichi, possibly the most powerful member of the government at the time, to head the " B ureau of jiho. " O kubo agreed to turn over the Home M i nistry to Ito Hirobumi , with Ito's consent , and then to take over the post of I mperial H ousehold Secretary . B ut on the way to the palace on May 14, 1 87 8 , apparently to accept his new office, O kubo was struck down by assassins.20 The jiho once again found themselves powerless . The aftermath of Okubo's assassi nation reveals the difficulty the jiho faced i n "advising" a politically apathetic emperor as well as the power struggle implicit in their role of "cultivati ng the emperor's virtue . " The jiho agreed among themselves that the leadi ng assassin, Shimada lchiro, spoke no smal l measure of truth when he argued that Japanese politics origi nated neither in the will of the emperor nor in the discussions of the people but in the autocratic decision maki ng of a few officials. To meet such criticism from " public opinion , " Sasaki urged that the emperor be made a more active political figure; it was their duty as jiho to reproach the emperor soundly, without regard to their personal fortunes . When they ap peared before the emperor, Senior jiho Sasaki led the remonstration : if the emperor did not familiarize himself with foreign and domestic trends , t he whole work of the Restoration would collapse . All of t he jiho spoke to the same effect .21 Komeda Torao, jiho of the third rank, was the most blunt : " I f in the past [ Your Majesty] had show n as much care for politics as he had passion for horsema nship , no such criticism from the public as 'politics by two or three Mi nisters' would have occurred . " 22 If "cultivating the emperor's virtue" meant making the emperor a direct participant in politics, it would also make the jiho a for midable group should the emperor rule i n fact . The implications of such an interpretation of di rect imperial rule were not lost on the government . When the jiho reported to the Councillors following 20. Ibid . , 2 1 . Ibid . , 2 2 . Ibid . ,
403-07 . 408 - 1 0 . 410.
pp.
pp. p.
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O kubo's assassi nation, they urged that the emperor be present at meeti ngs of the Councillors and M i nisters as well as attend cabinet meeti ngs daily, and that the jiho themselves take part in such sessions .23 Chancel lor Sanj o Sanetomi replied that arrangements for the emperor's presence at such sessions would be made . The jiho, however, would not be permitted to participate, si nce this would confuse the distinction between " i nternal " (court ?) a nd "external" (government ?) . Councillor and Home Secretary Ito H i robumi was much more explicit . It was the consensus of the cabi net , he said , that it would be improper for the jiho to have knowledge of the confi dential plans of the admi nistration; in present-day administrative systems , imperial house (teishitsu) and cabi net (naikaku) ought to be separate . Si nce the Restoration, Ito conti nued , it had not been the practice for the I mperial Household Secretary to serve concurrently as Councillor in the government . Ito concluded that the jiho were to concern themselves strictly with the emperor's ed ucation .24 By dearly acknowledging the separation of court and government , Ito fended off an attempt by court officers to assume pol itical power and 1 hereby break the monopoly of power held by the government ol igarchs in the cabi net . The jiho conti nued to be disgruntled after their bid for participa t ory power was denied . They complai ned that after their office was created in 1 877 the Chamberlains had remai ned i n charge of court ceremony and the Ministers and Councillors had retai ned control of political policy . As a result the jiho were neither fish nor fowl , having al most no power to carry out their functions . M otoda and Sasaki fi nally presented the government with an ultimatum : either increase the powers of the jiho or abolish the office . The government l'hose abolition .25 Although Sasaki 's biographer weakly claims that "t hey had absol utely no desire to violate the j urisdiction of the 21 . Professor Shively is much more direct on the i ntentions of the jiho. "Only four days [ t he jiho ] formally demanded that the Emperor be given the right to m;okc political decisions and that thejih u as his advisers, be permitted to participate in cabi net dc·l i herations. The oligarchs-lwakura and Ito, in particular-were indignant" (Shively, p . IU). 24 . Tsuda Shigemaro, pp. 411-12 . 2S. Ibid . , pp. 439-4 9.
.oft<·r Okubo's death they
,
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M i nisters and Councillors , to obstruct politics , or to confuse the dis tinction between court and government , " the maj ority of government oligarchs clearly believed otherwise. 26 The abolition of the jiho as a court office on October 1 3 , 1 87 9 marked the end of direct imperial rule on the basis o f a union between court and government . A thinly veiled power confrontation of unequal odds led ulti mately to the enunciation of the converse pri nciple: separation of court a nd government . The remaining question between 1 879 and 1 889 was what structural and legal form this separation should take . Although Motoda, Sasaki , and the ot her jiho failed i n their efforts to i ntegrate court and government under a politically active emperor , the separation of court and government did embody elements of com promise that benefited Confucian moralists such as Motoda. The concept of direct imperial rule was ambiguous in its impl ications , si nce the model Confucian emperor was more a paragon of virtues than a power wielder. By placing the palace-t he imperial court and attendant i mperial house hold bureaucracy-beyond t he formal government , the oligarchs allowed M otoda and ot her court i n fl uences considerable freedom to make the emperor a supreme exem plar of political rectitude in the Confucian and Japanese image . B ut by restricting these court advocates of direct imperial rule to that function, the government oligarchs freed themselves from i nstitu tional ized court i nterference in the process of policy making and enforcement . 27 Only the cabi net remai ned as the emperor's direct ad visory group in politics-and only the cabi net would rule directly . Between the demise of the jiho i n 1 87 9 and the enactment of the constitution in 1 88 9 , accusations of violati ng the disti nction between court and government were l eveled not at the court but at the government . Most freq uently at the center of such controversy was government oligarch Ito H i robumi, who had returned from his study of European constitutional systems on August 4, 1 883 . While there were those who feared that Ito, having studied in Germany , might 2 6. Ibid . , p . 439. 27. Th e ambi guity o f M otoda's power-moral ity theory of d irect imperia l rule resolved itself i nto both power and moral force: power to the jiho on the ba sis of the emperor's moral force. Motoda " repeatedly urged the Emperor to exercise his I mperial right of personal decision, overriding the cabi net w hen necessary" (Shively, p . 304 ) .
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work for an autocratic monarchy on the Prussian model , many im perial household officials were apprehensive that he would so revise t he i nstitutions and practices of court that the emperor's "preroga tives" would be jeopardized . On March 1 7 , 1 884 Ito became di rector of the newly created I nstitutions I nvestigation B ureau (Seido Torishira be Ky oku), at t he same t i me ret a i n i ng his post as Councillor in the government .28 The I nstitutions I nvestigation B u reau was charged with an inquiry i nto the i nstitutions of bot h court and government and the drafting of an imperial house law and a na tional constitution . Four days later Ito became I mperial Household Secretary as well . Holding three maj or posts-i n government , court , and I nvestigation B ureau, Ito fell under charges of " using the em peror . " Opposition on this occasion origi nated not so much from the court as from out-of-power political leaders and from Ito's opponents within the government oligarchy .29 Chancellor Sanj o Sanetomi 's cabi net , however, came to Ito's defense . To ensure that the palace structure would coi ncide with the new constitutional structure under consideration and at the same time preserve the disti nction between court and government , Sanj o argued that a capable Councillor must serve concurrently in all three posts. Moreover, for constitutional government to be i naugurated successfully in Japan, the closest cooperation between court and government was required . B ut when Sanj o sent his endorsement of Ito's appointment as I mperial Household Secretary to the throne , t he emperor withheld his approval. M otoda , who had remained at court as Grand Steward to the empress , was called in for advice. He replied in favor of Ito's appoi ntment . Still the emperor hesitated . It appeared that infl uential leaders were supporting Ito's colleague and rival , Yamagata Aritomo, for the post . Only after Sanj o and the M i nister of the Left , Pri nce Arisugawa, had formally petitioned the emperor on March 20 did the empe � or sa nction Ito's appointment .30 28 . Shumpo Kotsui S hokai , Ito Hirobumi Den, 3 vols. (Tokyo : Shumpo Kotsui Shokai ,
I 940) , 2 : 360-65, 371; Kyiitei Kishadan, p. 12 . The I nstitutions I nvestigation Bureau suc
t eed ed the Rules and Regulations I nvestigation Bureau (Naiki Torishirabe Kyoku) created in l lccember 1882 under l wakura Tomomi. W hile Ito was abroad lwakura died and the Rules a nd Regulations I nvest igation Bureau lapsed . 2 9 . Shumpo Kotsui Shokai , 2 : 372-77 ; Sorifu, Kancho Benran, 2 : 27 ; Kyiitei Kishadan, p. 12. 3 0 . Shumpo Kotsui Shokai , 2 : 374-7 7 .
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The emperor is reported to have questioned the wisdom of the ap pointment : "When one views [ our] long history one sees that it is a mistake for those next to the throne to conduct politics . " 31 Op position to Ito's domination over court and government had reached such dimensions that the emperor was required to mediate the ap pointment of his ow n household manager. It may even have bee n that Ito's appointment went agai nst the emperor's better j udgment . From his ascendant position i n court and government, Ito i nsti tuted the cabi net system as a prior step to the enactment of a consti tution. When the new system was i naugurated on December 22 , 1 88 5 , the court was fi nally made explicitly autonomous . The Im perial H ousehold Secretary was rest y l ed I mperial H ousehold Mi nister, and the I mperial Household M i nistry was placed outside t he formal gover nment st ructure . 32 The I mperial H ousehold M i nister was now responsible directly a nd exclusively to the em peror for the management of court affairs . When the Imperial H ousehold M i nistry was reorganized in early 1 886 it was done on the sole authority of i ncumbent I mperial Household Mi nister Ito, who exercised autonomous control over its organization,33 directed the affairs of the imperial house , managed the aristocracy , and superintended the staff of the mi nistry . The period of Ito's tenure from March 1 884 to September 1 887 has been called the golden age of the I mperial H ousehold Mi nistry . The mi nistry's j urisdiction expanded greatly under a mi nister " high in the emperor's confi dence . " 34 W hile remaining as I mperial Household Mi nister, however, Ito became Japan's first Prime M i nister, honoring the separation of court and government in the breach . As i n 1 884 , Ito was once agai n attacked severely by government opponents . Publicly charging him 3 1 . Kyiitei Kishada n, p . 1 2 . M y guess is that the quote is apocrypha l , b u t given t h e em peror's political apathy , already noted , there may be considerable truth in his alleged desire to keep the court , and himself, out of politics . 3 2 . "Daj okan Tassh i , " no. 69, December 22 , 1 885 , in Horei Zensho, 1 88 5 , vol . 2, p. 1 , 044 ; Sorifu, Kancho Benra n, 2 : 3 ; Kyiitei Kishadan, p . 1 3 . For an account of Ito's ma neuvering to have the cabi net system adopted , especia lly his handling of former Councillor Kuroda Kiyotaka, see S humpo Kotsui Shokai, 2 : 445 -84 . 3 3 . " Kunai Shii Tasshi," no. 1 , February 4, 1 886, in Kampa (Tokyo: Naikaku I nsatsu Kyoku), No. 776 (Friday, February 5, 1 886) . 34. Kyiitei Kishadan, p. 1 5 .
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with violati ng the distinction between court and government , the op position made this issue part of a general attack on Ito and his policies . Ito modestly retorted that he had assumed bot h posts as the only qualified persons able to arrange palace affairs to accord with the constitutional form of government soon to be i nstituted . Without complete responsibility, Ito conti nued , he could not possibly carry out a comprehensive renovation. The current arrangement , further more , was only temporary . Ito accused the opposition of ignorance , deliberate scheming, or both. The opposition grew to such a crescendo, however, that he was forced to resign as I mperial Household M i nister in September 1 887 , almost one year before the constitution and I mperial House Law were placed before the Privy Council for ratification .35 Ito found himself hoisted with his own pe tard . The argument he had used agai nst the jiho in 1 87 8 had been effectively turned agai nst him. After 1 887 no Prime M i nister was again to hold the post of I mperial Household M inister concurrently . I n fact , no ex-Prime M i nister or future Prime M i nister became Im perial Household M i nister from 1 887 to 1 945 . Ito's resignation as I mperial Household M i nister once again in volved M otoda Eifu. When Ito submitted his resignation for the second time in July 1 887 , the emperor questioned M otoda on the propriety of Ito's concurrent posts. 36 Still clingi ng to his concept of direct imperial rule, Motoda answered that for one person to be bot h Prime Mi nister and I mperial Household M inister i ndicated that court and government were united . He knew of no reason why this was i nadmissible from the standpoi nt of Japan's " national polity , " the unalterable essence of Japan's governmental system . If, however, a person did hold both posts, M otoda conti nued , he must be a statesman of exceptional character, reputation, and discernment . Ito, t hough of ability and character, was not yet able to control " public sentiment" and , if left i n charge of the court for any length of time , might cause difficulties for the imperial house . M otoda therefore 3 5 . Shumpo Kotsui Shokai , 2 : 523-24, 547 . 36. Ibid . , pp. 524-2 5 , 548- 5 3 . Ito first submitted his resignation in May 1 887 ; the third submission was accepted . The emperor's refusal to accept the first two requests was in line with Confucian pol itical etiquette: two refusals followed by reluctant accepta nce of the third . This i s a general rule of propriety often followed b y bi ographers o f political figures, if not by I he figures themselves .
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recommended that the emperor accept Ito's resignation without delay .37 Although M otoda 's advice was not followed , his response to the throne i ndicates that a union between court and government might be achieved not on court but on government i nitiative. Separation of court and government for M otoda was merely an expedient should there be no sage-statesman to administer both concurrently. Such a position was entirely consonant with Motoda's concept of direct im perial rule . According to Confucian catechism, a true emperor ruled through exceptional mi nisters whom he guided by moral force . The presence of public opposition to a mi nister meant ipso facto that the minister was not a true statesman. Such public clamor might reach the emperor himself, embroiling him i n political battle and thereby tarnishi ng the I mperial Virtue. Expediency , therefore, dictated eve n to M otoda that without statesmen to carry out the I mperial Will directly, separati ng court a nd government was the lesser of two evils.38
THE UNION OF COURT AND RITES
For M otoda , direct imperial rule meant both political power and moral transcendence for the imperial i nstitution. If, however, the emperor were to have actual power-to be the central decision maker in the turbulent politics of modernization, how was his transcendental position to be maintained ? Accordi ng to M otoda , J a pan 's greatness was attributable to its imperial house , "tran scending the entire world, being immutable, one line of all ages descendant of the gods. " 39 It was the ethic of loyalty to this 3 7 . Ibid . , pp. 549-50. 3 8 . I n addition to assassinations and verbal assaults against government leaders for the evils attri buted to t he time, t here were also direct accusations agai nst the emperor himself. I n 187 7 , for example, Kataoka Kenkichi blamed t h e empe ror directly for the poverty o f t h e people, for i nequities in governme nt, a nd for t he lack of popular participation in politics. Kataoka was called dow n for insolence by a cabi net secretary w ho argued t hat the cabi net and the emperor were one (I noue Kiyoshi, Termo Sei [ Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai , 1953 ] , pp. 76-77 ) . Direct exposure of t he emperor i n the l ight of political battle might have i ncreased such attacks and deOated the moral authority of the throne, as M otoda feared . 39. Kaigo Tokiomi, p. 2 9 .
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t ranscendent imperial house , i n M otoda's view , that constituted the basis of Japan's superior national polity . 40 B ut how could political involvement and transcendence coexist ? H ow could loyalty be sus t ained to an i nstitution that made political decisions , i nevitably dep rivi ng some and benefiting others ? As M otoda half-heartedly agreed , one solution was that arrived at by 1 8 5 5 : palace autonomy , the legal a nd structural separation of the court from the political process . Ac !'epting the separation, the problems of givi ng meaning to the em peror's transcendence and then of transforming that meaning i nto political authority, i nto a theory of political legitimacy , remai ned . The " return to the kingly government of ancient times" was sup ported and extended by a further restorationist sloga n : " rites and rule are one" (saisei itchi) . 4 1 A 1 933 interpretation of this "ancient practice" posited that "to celebrate the gods is to rule t he people . " 42 Historically, ritual practices exclusive to the court had been central t o the imperial i nstitution's social and political role. The rites of !'ourt had formed the basis for the emperor's legitimiz i ng function i n politics throughout most o f Japanese history . I n the fol k beliefs o f the . J apanese, blood descent from a god confers the uniq ue power to communicate with the god . The Sun Goddess , Amaterasu Omikami, chief divinity of the Shinto pantheon, was t he progenitrix of the imperial l i ne . . . . Primitive Japanese as well as great numbers of their more recent descendants believed that ministrations to that most awesome personage were of potent efficacy in orderi ng the affairs of agriculture, warfare, and the governance of societ y . 43
its official structure, moreover, the court historically "symbolized more than the way it worked ; it symbolized an elaborate concep t ualization of timeless ethical precepts for ordering human so !'icty . " 44 On the one hand , blood descent from the gods gave the C'mperor an exclusive power to communicate with those gods, and In
4 0 . I bid . , p. 35 . 4 1 . lenaga Saburii et a/., Kindai Nihon Shiso Shi Koza, 8 vols. (Tokyo : Chikuma Shobii, I '11 9), 1 : 43 . 4 2 . Goseitoku Fukyii K a i , Meiji- Taisho -Kinjo Santei Seito ku Roku, ed . Watanabe lkuj irii ( To k yo: Handoku Kai, 1933) , p. 9. 4 3 . Herschel Webb, The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period (New Y ork : Col umbia University Press, 1968) , p . 13 . 4 4 . Ibid . , p. 32 .
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such rites of communication were i nterpreted as effective means of ruling the country . On the other hand , the organization of the court for the performance of rites gave concrete expression to the ideal ethical polity. Placi ng the emperor newly at the structural center of government i n 1 868 need not , of course , have changed the traditional relation ship between dignified rites and efficient rule . Speaki ng of the thirteenth-century aristocrat-priest Jien, Herschel Webb notes that in Jien's theory , as well as in the traditional Chi nese i nterpretation , "the sovereign's first function was something other than the adminis tration of government " 45 : it was to legitimize rule through rites . And this function remai ned i ntact after the political revol ution of 1 86 8 . 46 The institutional form as well as the content that rites were to ac quire in the new political order after 1 868 were, however, determi ned in the same pragmat ic fashion that led to the establ ishment of palace autonomy . The i nstitutional experime ntat i o n t hat led to the separation of court and government also led to the union of court and rites . Being based on the pri nciple that rites and rule are one , the first Restoration government fused rites and rule as well as court and government .47 B oth a Civil Government and a Government of Rites (jingikan) were revived on 1 7 November 1 867 .48 With the creation of the Meij i government on 9 December 1 867 (January 3 , 1 868) , in ac cordance with the "great command to return to the ki ngly government of ancient times" (osei jukko no daigo rei) , a Division of Rites (jingi jimuka) replaced the Government of Rites and became one of seve n 4 5 . Ibid . , p. 165 . 46. "One may point out that all new nations and post-revolutionary societies face the cru cial problem of legitimacy . The old order has bee n abolished and wi th it the set of beliefs that j ust ified its system of authorit y . Me ij i Japan did not face this erisis; at the moment of change the imperial system had remai ned i ntact to give sanction to the new admi nistration . During the Tokugawa period and even before . . . , actual political power had not resided with the emperor. Th e legit imizing authority was always, however, implicitly or expl icitly recognized as belonging to the imperial court " O osep h Pittau, Political Thought in Early Meiji japan: 1868-1889 [Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard University Press, 1967 ] , p. 10) . 4 7 . Kyutei Kishadan, p. 9; Umed a Toshihiko, Nihon Shu kyo Seido Shz (Kyoto: Hyakkaen, 196 2 ) , p . 5 8 6 . 4 8 . "No. 7 o f 17 November 1867 , i n Ho rez Zensho, 1 867 , pp . 3-4. T h e ideograph for " rites" in the slogan "rites a nd rule are on e" and the ideographs for " rites" in " government of rites" are different. The former denotes rites in general, the latter denotes speeifically Shinto rites. Both mean formal , ceremonial rituals . "
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divisions o f the new Civil Government . 49 The i nitial dualism o f Civil Government and G overnment of Rites was apparently elimi nated by maki ng t he G overnme nt of R i tes a d i vi s i o n under the C i v i l Government . The leadi ng persons i n the Division o f Rites d i d not , however, hold concurrent posts as Councillors or Junior Councillors i n the deliberative chambers of the Civil Government . 5° After several admi nistrative reorga nizations in 1 868 and 1 86 9 , the G overnment of Rites was once again restored and made separate from the Civil Government on 8 July 1 869.5 1 The duties of the G overnment of Rites i n 1 8 6 9 i ncl uded the cond uct of S h i nto ceremonies a nd the preparation of ritual texts, the supervision of religion and prayers , a nd t he ma nagement of shri nes and t ombs . I n this year the ( ; overnment of Rites was also given short-lived preeminence over the Civil Government . In theory both governments were under the direct rule of the emperor. 52 That the performance of rites would eventually fall in large measure to the court is i ndicated by the fate of the Government of Rites after 1 869. I n 1 87 1 it was demoted to M i nistry of Rites Uingi ."iho ) and placed under the Civil G overnment . On 1 4 M arch 1 872 the Ministry of Rites was abolished53 and reconstituted as the M i nistry of Teachi ngs (Kyo bu Sho ) . In that same year the Secretary of Ed ucation was also made Secretary of Teachings, concurrently managi ng the Ministry of Education ( newly created in 1 87 1 ) and the M i nistry of Teachi ngs . Fi nally, in 1 877 the M i nistry of Teachi ngs was abol ished in the aftermat h of quarrels over the issue of separati ng church and st ate .54 Parallel i ng t he demot i o n , t ra nsformat i o n , and demise of the ( ; overnment of Rites , the court acquired increased duties in the pt'rformance of rites . By imperial comma nd on 1 4 September 1 87 1 , for example, it was ordered that rites to the imperial ancestors , to the 49.
Toyama and Adachi , p p . 1 , 22 . SO. Ibid . , p. 1 'i 1 . " Daj oka n Tassh i , " no . 622 , 8 J uly 1 869, in Ho rei Zensho, 1 869, pp. 249-64; Umeda l 'oshihiko, p. 586. S 2 . Horei Zensho, 1 869, p . 250; Umed a Toshihiko, p . 4 1 7 . I noue Kiyoshi, p . 63; Paul M .\ Li nebarger, Ardath W. Burks, and Djang Chu, Far Eastern Governments and Politics: I .'IIITw and japan, 2d ed . , rev. ( Princeton : D. Van Nostrand Compa ny, 1 95 6 ) , p. 369. S 1 . "Dajokan Tasshi , " no. 398, 8 August 1 87 1 , in Ho rei Zensho, 1 87 1 , " I ndex," p . 24 . S 4 . Toyama a nd Adachi, pp. 2, 3 . .
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spirits of past emperors , be transferred from the j urisdiction of the M inistry of Rites to that of the " i n ner shrine" (kashikodokoro) of the palace .55 When the M i nistry of Rites was abolished in 1 87 2 , matters pertaining to Shi nto rites and scriptures came under an Office of the Ceremonies (Shikibu Ryo ) , which had been created withi n the Civil Government on 1 0 August 1 87 1 .56 The Office of the Ceremonies was transferred to the I mperial Household M i nistry in 1 87 5 , then back to the Civil Government at the end of that year, and fi nally returned permanently to the I mperial Household M i nistry in 1 877 .57 The Office of the Ceremonies was originally created to cond uct Shi nto ceremonies in the palace and to superi ntend rites conducted at the national shri nes , such as the Grand Shrine at Ise. 58 Its transfer to the Imperial Household M i nistry meant that the court gai ned i nstitu tional control over rites at the palace as well as rites at the maj or na tional shrines . Management of local shri nes and the priest hood , like other functions not transferred to the court , was turned over to the Bu reau of S hrines and Temples i n the Home Mi nistry . 59 The evol ution of the B oard of the Ceremonies, as it was renamed after 1 87 7 , i ndicates that Shi nto rites played an i ncreasingly im portant role in the affairs of court . The 1 886 reorganization of the Im perial Household M i nistry made the B oard one of seventeen divisions of the palace bureaucracy . Given charge of rites (saiten) , ceremonies (gishik i) , and court music, the board was headed by an official of im perial appoi ntee (chokunin) rank, the second highest civil service cate gory .60 B y the 1 930s , however, the Chief of the B oard of the Cere monies had risen in rank to become one of t he six court officials regularly given direct i mperial appointment (shinnin ) , the highest civil service rating . His salary had also risen from 3 , 500-4 ,000 yen i n 1 886 to 5 ,800-6 ,200 y e n in 1 93 1 . 61 By the 1 930s the C hief o f the 5 5 . Umeda Toshihiko, p. 5 8 8 . 56. Ibid . , pp. 4 1 7 , 5 8 8 . 5 7 . Ho rei Zensho, 1 87 5 , pp. 8 1 , 439; ib id . , 1 87 7 , pp . 208-09 . 5 8 . Umeda Toshihiko, p. 41 6. 5 9 . Ibid . , p . 4 1 5 . 60. " Kunai Sho Tasshi," no. I , February 4 , 1 886 (Kampa, February 5 , 1 886), i n Horei Zensho, 1 886, pp. 38-48 . 6 1 . "Kunai Sho Gogai" of February 1 5 , 1 88 6 , in Horei Zensho, 1 88 6 , p. 1 4 1 ; Shokuin Roku (Tokyo: Naikaku I nsatsu Kyoku, 1 93 1 ) , pt . 2, p . 3. Hereafter refe rred to by title and date.
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Board of the Ceremonies was equal i n rank and salary to the Grand Chamberlain.62 The i ncreased importance of the B oard of the Ceremonies , as measured by the i ncreased rank and salary of its chief relative to other leading court officials, was paralleled by the growth of the Division of Rituals . O ne of the chief sections of the B oard of the Ceremonies by 1 930, the Division of Rituals conducted " sacred rites " (saiji) .63 Whereas the Masters of the Ceremonies were responsible for such functions as court diplomacy involving both foreign and Japanese notables , the Masters of Ritual managed Shinto ceremonies . Of ap proximately 2 1 0 persons servi ng on the Board of the Ceremonies i n 1 93 1 , 3 3 were employed in the Division o f Rituals. Eight o f those 3 3 held concurrent posts elsew here in the I mperial Household M inistry , such as i n the I mperial Poetry Bureau.64 Like the Chief of the Board of Ceremonies , moreover, the Chief of Rituals i ncreased in relative i mporta nce , as measured by rank and salary . His salary had more than doubled between 1 886 (2 ,000-2 ,400 yen per annum) and 1 93 1 (4,650-5 , 1 00 yen per annum) .65 B y 1 940 his rank was either imperial appoi ntee or direct imperial appoi ntee . Fi nally, the Division of Rituals was made i ndependent of the B oard of the Ceremonies i n December 1 93 9 , when i t became a full-fledged board and one o f five basic divisions of the I mperial Household M i nistry .66 By 1 943 the personnel i nvolved i n " S hi nto ceremonies" (saishi) performed by the Board of Rituals had also i ncreased to seventy-one, thirty-six of whom held concurrent posts in the palace bureaucracy .67 The i nstitutional growth of the B oard of Rituals, the i ncreased salary and ra nk of its chief, and the doubl i ng of its personnel between 1 930 and 1 943 signify 1 hat the union of court and rites was fu ndamental to the role of the im perial institution i n prewar Japan and even i ncreased i n importance ; � fter 1 87 7 . 62 . The Gra nd C hamberlain was one of four palace leaders responsible for relating the cm p.-rc>r to politics and society from 1 885 to 1 945 (see chap. 4). 63. Shokuin Roku, 1 93 1 , pt. 1 . p . 3 ; " Koshitsu Rei," no. 7 , October 7 , 1 92 1 , in Naikaku K i roku Ka, Genko Horei Shu ran, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Teikoku Chiho Gyosei Gakkai, 1 923 ) , vol . I , pt . 3, p . 6 . 64. Sho kuin Roku, 1 93 1 , p t . 3 , pp. 1 0- 1 1 . 6 5 . Ho rei Zensho, 1 886, p . 1 42 ; Shoku in Roku, 1 93 1 , pt. 2, p . 4 . 6 6 . Naikaku Kiroku K a , 1 942, vol . 1 , p t . 3 , chap. 1, sec . 3 , pp. 20-2 1 . 67 . I bid . ; Kunaz Sh
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Shi nto rites had always been a maj or function of the emperor and his court ; but to argue that rites had been a fundamental function of the imperial i nstitution historically is not to explain the particular place of rites in modern Japan. The experimentation with Shinto in stitutions between 1 868 and 1 87 7 suggests that the Restoration leaders were as eclectic a nd pragmatic i n adapting japan's heritage as they were in adopti ng Western forms and ideas to buttress the new na tional government . After 1 868 Shinto rites became an i nstrument for national izi ng public consciousness . No longer were the rites of court conducted in a secluded imperial palace for the knowledgeable members of a literate ruling elite. The Shinto reforms of the early Res toration years made court rites the property of the entire nation , linking those rites with local Shinto organizations i n an attempt to mobilize national sentiment around the emperor. The new organization and management of Shinto rites were i ntended to give the emperor a popular visibility that had never before existed . I noue Kiyoshi , a Marxist historian markedly unsympat hetic to the imperial i nstitution, has described the i ntent and actions of Res toration leaders as follows: None other t h a n the gods were to b e t h e fi nal base o f the emperor's , and his government 's, authority . W hen people have bee n submerged too long and too continuously in lives of poverty t hey somehow come to yearn for somet h i ng absolute to rel y o n . The Emperor System u t i l i zed t h i s sentiment . And , while severely suppressi ng t h e Christian faith, which argued that all men are equal before God , the Emperor System enj oi ned the people to believe in gods who were the retai ners of the Sun Goddess . To t hat end the emperor above all had to revere the gods himself. " Rites a nd rule are one" has its origi ns here . In terms of governmental organiza tion as wel l , a Division of Rites was created i n the first government system of J a nuary 1 868; then, in J uly of 1 869 , the Government of Rites was placed above t he Civil Government . Further, a shrine to the Eight Gods the G od of Creation a nd the others-was established in the Government of Rites and then transferred i nto the palace . (These gods were not derived from the ancient people's faith in nature but were conceived for the pur pose of apotheosiz i ng the a ncestors of the imperial clan around the sixth and seventh centuries , w hen the imperial clan at last became chief of the clans . "God of Creation" means no more than somethi ng miraculous that gives birth to things . ) On 3 January 1 870 the Rite of the Begi nning ( Gens hi Sai] was begu n i n order to celebrate the Gods of Heaven and
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Earth, the Eight Gods, and t h e I mperial Spirit o f emperors gone before . Precedi ng the Commencement of Government Affairs [Se�.fi Hajime] on 4 January [every year] , this Rite was a nati onal holiday until the end of the War .68
I noue also states that fourteen shrines for imperial rites were es tablished i n 1 868 . Local shrines , hierarchically arranged and staffed by priest-officials , were created throughout Japan. Certain Shinto rites centering on the i mperial l i ne were also proclaimed national fes tivals. I n 1 87 1 , for example, the Rite of Emperor Jimmu was made a state holiday , as was the legendary Jimmu's legendary enthronement , later to be called Empire Day (Kigensetsu) , in 1 872 . As early as 1 874 the practice of prostration before the emperor's photograph was begu n .69 One need not accept I noue's value j udgments or his implications as to the effectiveness of such efforts to mobilize national consciousness in order to agree that the nationalization of Shinto was i ntended to secure popular loyalty to a transcendental emperor. The emperor and people were to be l i nked by national Shinto rites and a national orga nization for managi ng those rites that extended from the emperor and rourt i nto every village and hamlet . Of course, not all those who advocated a transcendental emperor a rgued that Shinto rites be made the sole basis of the emperor's exem plary role in society. We have seen, for example, that M otoda Eifu's concept of direct imperial rule i nvolved maki ng the emperor a paragon of Confucian virtues . This also meant linki ng sovereign and subject in terms of filial piety , the absolute loyalty due a father from his sons . Maki ng Shinto rites one function of an autonomous court in t erfered little with such Confucian concepts, however. Ethnocentric Shinto rites and universalist C onfucian moral force would merely n·i nforce one another in sustai ni ng the transcendental position of the i mperial house . The compromise that separated court and government u l timately proved acceptable to both Confucianists and Shi ntoists . ( :onfronting a rising storm of political ideas blow i ng i n from the West , 1 hey recei ved a sanctuary for t he i r conservat ism w hen ritual observances were delegated to an autonomous court . 6 R . Inoue Kiyoshi , pp. 63-64 . 69. Ibid . , pp. 64 , 66 , 67 .
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POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND I M PERIAL PREROGATIVE
By the 1 930s Shinto rites conducted by the emperor and court were thought by some to be the very core of Japan's national polity . The political implications of the union of court and rites , so strongly sug gested by Professor I noue , were confirmed by Sakamaki Y oshio, an of ficial in the I mperial Household M i nistry from 1 9 1 8 to 1 93 6 , when he li nked Shinto rites, popular loyalty, imperial authority, and state power with fearsome logic : 1 . Man has a religious nature, w hich is to perceive the existence of gods above men and to resolve that all affairs should accord with the will of the gods. 2 . The power of the gods is operative in the common existence of a people or nation. 3. Therefore , t hat which governs a people or nation is the will of the gods. 4 . The i ncarnation of the will of the gods is the monarch. 5. The gods are eterna l , therefore the monarch-not one generation but the imperial l i ne-is also eterna l . 6 . Therefore , nation and imperial house are one a nd inseparable. 7. When strife occurs among groups or i ndividuals, all search for the j udgment of the gods. 8 . Therefore , the j udgment of the emperor, being the will of the gods, is obeyed .70
Elaborating, Sakamaki noted that " our nation has from ancient times believed i n the Way of the Gods, been proud of ours being the land of the gods, duly respected rites to the nation's ancestral gods, and revered the Shi nto shri nes . " 71 It is unquestionably the duty of all sub j ects to revere t he ancestral gods. The Shinto shri nes serve these deities ; they are public places and those who serve there are public of ficials. Supreme management of Shinto rites is vested i n the emperor , and his performance of rites is an example to all .72 I n taking the 70. Sakamaki Yoshio, Koshitsu Seido Gairon ( n . p . , n . d . ) . A copy of this work was kindly lent me by a former I mperial H ousehold M inist ry official w ho said it was one of t he few per sonal treasures he sal vaged from the fires during the war. The Gairon was evidently the basis for Sakamaki's Koshits u Seido Ko wa (To kyo: lwanami Shoten, 1 934), which is very s imilar in content . 7 1 . Ibid . , "Appendix , " p. 2 . 7 2 . Ibid .
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welfare of the nation as its primary principle , Shinto differs from other religions , which seek the salvation of all manki nd . To pray to the gods is to pray for the welfare of the nation. Therefore , "these Shinto services have a deep and special quality, in fact and ideally, i n that they are the divinely appoi nted work in the lifetime o f the em peror himself. " 73 Given the relation between rites and national welfare , " for our people to abandon reverence for the Gods of Heaven and Earth is completely impermissible. " 74 The ultimate result of uniti ng Shinto rites with the court was to make the emperor a transcendental figure embodying the will of the gods in the Japanese polity-at least for those who accepted and bel ieved in those rites . Assumi ng a more practical and less muddled pattern of thinking on the part of those who engi neered the Restoration settlement of 1 868-8 9 , how did the architects of the emperor's new role i n the Japanese polity relate rites and rule , the imperial institution and political power? Upon returning from Europe after his i nvestigation of Western constitutional monarchies in 1 883 , Ito Hirobumi i ndicated that the focus of popular loyalty would also be made the focus of state power : the imperial i nstitution. Havi ng discussed his views on a constitution for Japan with M otoda Eifu , Ito reported to the throne on September 2 3 , 1 883 in order to allay the many fears about his i ntentions re garding such a constitution. I n his discourse to the emperor, Ito declared that in Japan the emperor " of one line unbroken for ages eternal" exercised general control over all matters of state : "This is the national polity unparalleled throughout all nations . " 75 As the person primarily responsible for crea t i ng t he const itut i o n , I t o therefore i ntended to legitimize government power b y placi ng the em peror at the center of political authority . Si nce political power at this time had i n fact gravitated to the government oligarchs , court rites would thus be made to serve government rule. The relation of rites to rule eventually settled on was reveali ngly put by Ito in his explanation of the extensive imperial prerogatives granted by the draft Constitu tion of the Great Empire of Japan, 7 3 . Ibid . , p . 3 . 74. I bid . 7 5 . Shumpo Kiitsui Shiikai , 2 : 3 65 .
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popularly known as the Meij i Constitution .76 The draft was placed before the Privy Counci l , chaired not unnaturally by Ito hi mself, m June 1 88 8 . Ito argued : When we turn now to enacti ng a Constitution we must fi rst seek the pi votal axis of the nation, fi rmly establ ishing what that axis shall be . Without such an axis the Government will lose its discipl ine and the State will eventually col lapse when pol itics are entrusted to the reckless dis cussion of t he people . . . . In Europe , not only have the people become proficient in constitutional government si nce it first took seed ; there was also religion, and t his constituted the axis , deeply i nfusing t he popular mind . In this t he people 's hearts found unity . In our country , however, the power of t he religions is feeble ; not one can be deemed an axis of State . . . . I n our country there is only the I mperial House that can become such an axis. With this point in mi nd I placed great value on the Throne's prerogatives and endeavored as far as possible not to restrict t hem i n this draft Constitution .77
Ito thus saw i n the imperial house a native Japanese emotional equivalent to Western religion. With Shinto rites firmly lodged i n the court by 1 87 7 , the Meij i Constitution in effect grafted Western forms of monarchical prerogative onto the trunk of nationalized Shinto. I m plicit in Ito's reasoning was the proposition that rite makes might : rites antecedent to prerogative would unify Japanese loyalty around a Western form of state power. The Meij i Constitution was ratified by the Privy Council and pro claimed on February 1 1 , 1 88 9 , the anniversary of the day when the Emperor Jimmu was alleged to have taken the throne al most 2 , 5 5 0 years before . I n t hat document the emperor's moral authority was fused with pol itical authority in the form of vast imperial preroga76. Our concern here is with the implications or the Restoration settlement [or the imperial i nstitution's role in politics a nd the e mperor's personal relation to the political process, not the evolution or the Meij i Constitution . The theories and countertheories proposed up to 1 889 have been admirably covered elsewhere : see Pittau, Political Thought in Early Meiji Japan; and George Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern japan, 7868- 7 900 (Cambridge, M ass . : Harvard University Press, 1 967) . It is sufficient to note here that the Meij i Constituti on, like palace autonomy and the nationalization or Shinto, was produced by experimentation a nd compromise-theoretical , institutiona l , and politica l . I have dwelt at length on the separation or court a nd government and t he union or court and rites simply be cause these critical aspects or the imperial institution's modern political development have not bee n adequately dealt with. 7 7 . Shimizu Noboru , Teikoku Kempa Seitei Kaigz, pp. 88-89, quoted in Maruyama M asao, Nihon no Shiso , 8th ed . (Tokyo: l wanami Shinsho, 1 964), pp. 29-30.
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tives . The emperor was declared "sacred and inviolable" (Article 3 ) , thereby maki ng explicit his transcendent position based on rites . He "combi ned in his being the supreme rights of rule" (Article 4) and " exercised supreme command over the Army and Navy" (Article 1 1 ) . From these two basic prerogatives flowed the many prerogatives of admi nistration , welfare , legislation, and emergency that were reserved to him by the constitution.78 This immense range of imperial prerogatives was new to the role of the emperor. With one exception in the fourteenth century , not si nce the ninth century had the emperor claimed or been argued to possess even closely equivalent powers . In 1 86 8 , however, the em peror had inherited the shogun's traditi onal political powers , most notably those involvi ng military command . These powers were recast as prerogatives similar to those held by authoritarian monarchs in the West . Other prerogatives , such as that of legislation, were derived solely from Western models. The emperor thus became the source of execut ive, legislative , and j udicial powers , a nd all government acts were issued i n his name . To argue that this fusion of rite and prerogative was a violation of the separation of church and state, as several scholars i n prewar Japan did , is somewhat misleading.79 Historically, there was no si ngle institution of church in pre- Restoration Japan to come in con flict with a si ngle i nstitution of state , in any way comparable to the struggles i n Europe . Nor was there any phil osophical issue of rendering unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and unto G od that which is God's. Lacki ng both institutional and philosophical bases for a church-state controversy , there was consequently no basis for the principle of separation of church and state . The emperor's cele bration of Shinto rites , moreover, resembled i n many respects the performance of high rituals of state by Western monarchs . M uch of the ceremony of the Western monarchies is of religious origi n, and some of the rituals of state still carry religious significa nce . The Queen of England remains the formal head of the C hurch of Eng7 8 . "Dai Nippon Tei koku Kemp o " , in Naikaku Kiroku Ka, 1942 , vol . 1 , pt . I, chap . 1 , sec . pp. 7 - 1 8 . 79. This argument w a s often adva nced b y t h e prewar Const itutional School o f Japanese legal scholars led by Mi nobe Tats ukichi . See Miyazawa Tos hiyoshi's review of M inobe's Chikuj1! Kemp!! Sezj.;z in Kokka Gakkai Zasshz 42 , no. 9 (September 1 92 8 ) , pp. 1 6 S -7 2 . 1,
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land . The i nvolvement of Western monarchs in such ceremonies and official positions has not generally been held to violate the distinction between church and state . Shinto was something less than a religion, something more than formal ceremony . As it was devel oped and applied to Japan's na tional life after 1 868, Shinto symbolized that the Japanese were Japanese , united in a national community that was peculiarly their own and somehow disti nct from and superior to other national entities . The weakness of the Japa nese religions , noted by Ito, meant that there was no i nstitutional chal lenge of any maj or import to the nationalization of Shinto. A nd the absence of a religious challenge to Shinto may have produced a more i ntense sentimental adherence to national ized Shi nto than might otherwise have occurred . Si nce the maj or figure in Shinto rites was the emperor, quasi religious aut hority was given to state power by Ito and the framers of the constituti on. In this respect , Sakuma Shozan's apt slogan for Japan's moderniz i ng aspirations, " Eastern ethics , Western tech niques , " may be applied with equal aptness to the government produced by the Restoration settlement . The basis of Japan's " im mutable and peerless " national polity (kokutai) was the imperial i n stitution, w hose spiritual and ethical authority ultimately derived from Shinto rites impl icit i n the constitution's provision that the em peror was " sacred and i nviolable . " 80 The constitution was explicit in stipulating a Western form of mutable state structure (seitai) : the 80. "National polity" (kokutaz) was the subject of academic and political controversy i n prewar J apan a s well as i n t h e immediate postwar period . There were at least three meanings, all of w hich were pred icated on the existence of the imperial i nstitution: ( 1 ) sovereignty residing in the imperia l institution, (2) the existence of an imperial l ine from w hich authority flowed , and (3) the presence of an imperial i n st itution symbolizing the spiritual unity of the Japa nese state and people. None of these definitions was clearly disti nct from the others and one or more co uld be combi ned or emp hasized depe nd i ng on w hat one wished to argue. M iyazawa Toshiyoshi, w ho inherited the mantle of l eadership of the Constitutional School from M i nobe Tatsukichi , has argued that imperial sovereignty, in the Western sense of being the fi nal l ocus of decision-making power, was the most widely accepted defi nition i n prewar Japa n . But because the emperor's spiritual role, based on Shi nto rites. was central to both sovereignty and ancestral authority, and because that role was the only consistent role played by the imperial i nstitution h istorically, I have taken a position that tends to support definitions (2) and (3). This ambiguous position is consonant with the fi nal and hopelessly am biguous discussion of t he national polity produced by t he Japanese government i n the 1 930s. "National polity " was literally the national system, "state structure" (seitai) was literally the government system. I n prewar Japan t he imperia l i nstitution was central to bot h .
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Japanese monarchy . T o exaggerate , the existence of the imperial in stitution was to be eternal , the operation of the monarchy temporal . It is i n this context that Ito's i nsistence on the centrality of the im perial i nstitution to state power should be eval uated , not in the context of the separation of church and state . Ito and the Meij i oligarchs thus hoped to make the imperial i nsti tution an i mpregnable stronghold of political legitimacy, t he centripetal poi nt around which statesmen would gat her to govern. The theory of i mperial prerogative was the basis for political leadership that looked to the imperial i nstitution and not elsewhere for its j ustification . Religious and natural law , the " people," a social "class" -none had theoretical i ndependence from the emperor and none became sources of dist i nctive doctri nes that seriously challenged t he t heory of prerogati ve . 8 1 For example , M i nobe Tats ukichi , perhaps prewar Japan's leading constitutional theorist , argued that Japan was an organic state under law . His rationalization of consti tutional monarchy , widely accepted between 1 9 1 3 and 1 93 5 , did not , however, attack t he sovereign position of the emperor. He made the emperor the highest organ of state and attempted at most to make the Cabinet, appointed by the emperor, ultimately responsible to the lower house of the I mperial Diet-but on the basis of the emperor's legislative prerogative. M inobe i n effect made the elected house of the I mperial Diet the central of several governmental i nstitutions competing to declare the I mperial Will i n politics during the 1 920s and 1 930s.82 8 1 . See , for example, Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First A ttempt (Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1962 ) ; a nd M aruyama M asao, Thought and Behaviour in Modem Japanese Politics, ed . Ivan Morris ( London : Oxford U niversity Press, 196 3 ) . 8 2 . M inobe i s the subject o f an outstanding st udy by Frank 0 . M iller, Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 196 5 ) . Although M i nobe was forced to resign from t he House of Peers in 1935 for allegedly transgressing t he sacred national polity , it is difficult to conceive of a J apanese more loyal to the imperial i nstitution (ibid . , pp. 165-2 53). At the end of the war M i nobe resisted all revisions of the constitution that would demote the imperial institution or suggest popular sovereignty. He argued that t he Japanese have unbounded fai th in t he imperial house, a faith unparal leled in a ny other nation. The war was the wi llful doing of the military, which was completely oblivious to the general will of the people. Only from loyalty to the emperor d id the Japanese devote themselves t o the war effort. Should Japan lose the imperial house as its eentral i nstitution, there would be a ceaseless train of disturba nces ( M i nobe Tatsukichi , " M i nshu Shugi to Waga Gikai Seido," Sekai Uanuary 1 946] : 21-24 ) .
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I f, however, the emperor's prerogatives were attributed to hi m personally or wielded by him i n fact , how could he avoid censure when the government failed to solve a maj or political crisis ? How could he wield prerogatives and yet be " i nviolable" ? In addition to palace autonomy and the union of court and rites , two measures were taken by the oligarchs . First the Ministers of State were to be i ndividually responsible to the emperor for the government and its policies . Article 55 of t he constitution made each M inister of State responsible for " advising and assisti ng" the emperor in the exercise of his prerogatives , and therefore the Mi nisters of State, not the em peror, were to be held accountable for governmental actions based on the emperor's prerogatives .83 Second , sovereignty i n the constitution was placed i n the imperial line, not in the emperor as an i ndividual ruler. As Ito explai ned i n his commentaries on the constitution: The sovereign power o f reigning over a n d o f governi ng the State , i s inherited by the Emperor from His A ncestors , and b y Him bequeathed t o His posterity . A l l the different legislative a s well a s executive powers o f the State, by means of which He reigns over the country and governs t he people, are united in this M ost Exalted Personage, who thus holds in His hands, as it were, all the ramifying threads of the political life of the country , . . 84 .
M iyazawa Toshiyoshi , a leading constitutional theorist i n postwar Japan, has termed the type of sovereignty that existed under the Meij i Constitution " oracle sovereignty . " 85 The emperor was the transmitter, not the i ndependent j udge, of the I mperial Will . The traditional role of the emperor for " ages eternal " as medium between the Japanese people and the gods was therefore adopted as the basis of sovereignty i n the Meij i Constitution. N oting t he vast difference that separated the Japanese emperor from Western divine-right monarchs , Maruyama Masao has argued that 83. " Dai Nippon Teikoku Kempo", in Naikaku Kiroku Ka, 1 942, vol . I , pt. I, chap. I, sec .
I, pp. 7 - 1 8.
84 . Ito H i robumi, Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, trans. Ito M iyoj i , 3d ed. (Chil-o Daigaku, 1 93 1 ) , p. 7 . 8 5 . M iyazawa Toshiyoshi, Kemp o, 4th ed . , re v . (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1 95 3 ) , pp. 2 5 , 1 57-58.
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The amalgamat i o n of spiritual aut hority w i t h political power was regarded not as any new departure i n the concept of sovereignty , but simply as a return to 'the ancient days of the J i mmu Foundation. ' Though the Emperor was regarded as the embodiment of ultimate val ue, he was in fi nitely removed from t he possibility of creating val ues out of nothing. His M aj esty was heir to the I mperial l i ne unbroken for ages eternal and he ruled by virtue of the fi nal inj u nctions of his ancestors . The Imperial Constitution, granted to the people in 1 88 9 , was not regarded as having been created by t he Emperor himself; rather it was a document that 'transmitted t he i mmutable law accordi ng to which the land has been governed . ' Thus the Emperor too was saddled with a burden-i n his case a tradition that derived from the i nfinitely remote past . It was only because his existence was i nextricably i nvolved with t he ancestral tradition, in such a way that he and his I mperial Ancestors formed a single unit , that he was regarded as being the ultimate embodiment of i nternal values . 86
The emperor's prerogatives were prerogatives of the imperial l i ne , and the Meij i Constitution embodied the beq ueat hed i nstructions of the emperor's ancestors . His role as medium, through rites , between subj ects and ancestors placed political aut hority beyond his immediate person and fused the past , present , and future in an unbroken con ti nuum of eternal Right . This displacement i nto antiquity of political authority for present political rule was a del iberate and creative act of statesmanship by the drafters of the constitution. The M i nisters of State were responsible to an emperor who in turn was responsible to his ancestors . Si nce the emperor was not even in theory a free agent i n the process o f ruli ng but acted only in accorda nce with beq ueat hed i nstructions , the M i nisters of State were left potentially the sole free agents in governi ng the nation. The enactment of the I mperial House Law (Koshitsu Tempan) concurrently with the Meij i Constitution was the fi nal stone in the foundation of the Meij i state . Explicitly recognizing the pri nciple of palace autonomy , the Meij i Constitution reserved to the imperial house its self-governance . Ito's i ntent in the I mperial H ouse Law , as i ndeed in the constitution, was to preserve the dignity of the throne " coeval with heaven and earth. " 87 The I mperial House Law was not 86. Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour, p . 20. 87 . Shumpo Kotsui Shokai , 2 : 57 4 ; Constitution of the Great Emp ire of Japan, A rticl e 74.
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even to be discussed , much less altered , b y the national legislature . I n his commentaries Ito states that the I mperial H ouse Law "will be regarded as the family law of the I mperial House . That these provi sions are not expressed i n the Constitution shows that no in terference of the subj ect shall ever be tolerated regardi ng them . " 88 Agai nst allowing the Diet a participatory role in determi ning when a regency should be i nstituted , for example, Ito argued that if "the de cision of a matter of great importance to the I mperial family is thus delegated to the will of the maj ority of the people there would be a tendency to bring about the degradation of the I mperial dignity . " 89 To make the Imperial House Law as sacred a nd i nviolable as the imperial i nstitution itself, therefore, Ito first placed it beyond the reach of "the people" and their representatives i n the Diet . At the same time, Ito attempted to buttress the immutability of the I mperial H ouse Law by the fiction that it merely set forth practices which had existed from time immemorial . The I mperial House Law was the ancestral law of the imperial li ne-provisions governing the imperial family t hat were a "clarification of bequeathed i nstruc tions" from the imperial forebears . 90 The I mperial House Law was not "enacted " but "clarified , " not created but already extant . It was not to be amended even at t he emperor ' s sole discret i o n ; 9 1 amendment , i f req uired , was to b e made by the I mperial Family Council and the Privy Council.92 The emperor was thus freed of per sonal responsibility even for his ow n house law . As with the consti tution, Ito and the government oligarchs made every attempt to remove from the emperor any personal initiative for which he might subsequently be held accountable. The I mperial House Law gave concrete expression to palace au88. Ito Hirobumi, p. 6. 89. Ibid . , pp. 33-34 . 90. Koshitsu Tempan, in Naikaku Kiroku Ka, 1 942, vol . 1 , pt. I , chap. 1 . , sec . 2, p. 2 1 . 91 . Shumpo Kiitsui Shiikai , 2 : 57 1 -7 5 . 9 2 . Naikaku Kiroku K a , 1 94 2 , vol . 1 , p t . I , chap. 1 , sec. 2 , p. 2 8 . Created b y the I mperial House Law of 1 889, t he I mperial Family Council as modified in 1 907 was composed of all male members of the imperial family of maj ority age w ho were eligible to become Regent . The Lord Keeper of t he Privy Seal , President of the Privy Council , I mperial Household M inister, M i nister of Justice, and President of the Supreme Court participated without vote. In addition to amending powers , th e I mperial Family Council and the Privy Council decided on modifica tions in the order of succession to the throne a nd on the creation of a regency . The I mperial Family Council also dealt with discipli nary matters involving members of the imperial family.
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tonomy .93 Its sixty-two articles dealt with succession, accession, and enthronement ceremonies , titles , regency , tutors and education, im perial family members , imperial house expenses , property litigation, the I mperial Family Counci l , amendment , and coming of age . As head of the imperial family, the emperor exercised supervision over that family (Article 3 5 ) . He sanctioned the marriages of the family members (Article 4 1 ) , appointed or approved tutors to their children (Article 37), approved travel abroad for family members (Article 43) , sanctioned the summons or arrest of a family member (Article 5 1 ) , and suspended or divested of rights a family member who humiliated or degraded the imperial house or was disobedient (Article 5 2 ) . I n the execution of all maj or duties the emperor was advised b y the I m perial Family Council and the Privy Council .94 Strangely enough, however, the I mperial House Law was not pro mulgated with the Meij i Constitution on February 1 1 , 1 88 9 . It is to be found neither in the Kampa (Official Gazette) for February 1 88 9 , in which t h e constitution appears , nor i n the Ho rei Zensho (Com plete Laws) for 1 889 or 1 890. When it was promulgated in later edi tions of the Ho rei Zensho, it was not countersigned by the M inisters of State, as was the usual practice with laws. Mi nobe Tatsukichi has surmised that the I mperial House Law was not promulgated in 1 889 because its framers considered it as applying only to the i nternal af fairs of the imperial house . M inobe claims that the drafters believed the I mperial House Law had no beari ng on the political life of the people and did not concern regulations of the state. I n support of his opinion, he cites Ito Hirobumi 's commentaries on the I mperial House Law , in w hich Ito declares that "the I mperial House Law is somethi ng the Imperial House has itself enacted as its house law; it is not something, therefore , to be promulgated to Uapanese] subjects by public ceremony . " 95 It would appear that Ito and those responsible for the I mperial House Law did not regard affairs of court as mat ters for either the government or t he public : the affairs of court should remain a mystery to ensure greater transcendence for the im perial i nstitution . 93. 94 . 95.
Siirifu, Kancho Ben ran, 2 : 3. Naikaku Kiroku Ka, 7942, vol. 7, pt. 7, chap. 7, sec. 2, pp. 2 7-28. M inobe Tatsukichi , Kempa Ko wa, 1 st ed . , rev . (Tokyo : Yuhikaku, 1 9 1 8) ,
p. 4 6 6 .
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M i nobe took issue with Ito's interpretation of the "private" nature of the Imperial House Law while agreei ng with him on the spiritual centrality of the imperial house . He argued that the Imperial H ouse Law was in fact a fundamental law of the land because it establis hed two rules of basic constitutional importance : provisions for succession to the throne and regulations for the creation of a regency . Far from concerning merely the private affairs of the imperial family, the I m perial House Law bore a critical relation to the state . As evidence , Minobe cited the 1 907 decree that made revisions and supplements to the Imperial House Law subj ect to countersignature by the Min isters of State and also to promulgation .96 The supplement to the I mperial House Law of February 2 1 , 1 907 was conseq uently coun tersigned by the Prime Minister and all Ministers of State. The only other prewar supplement or revision of the Imperial House Law-that of February 2 8 , 1 9 1 8-was similarly countersigned and promulgated . 97 At the same time, M i nobe argued that the I mperial House Law was of all state provisions the one " most based on national condi tions peculiar to Japa n . " From the standpoint of Japan's " u nique national polity , " matters pertai ni ng to the imperial house dare not be subject to participation by the people, and conseq uently the Diet 's power to consent to laws did not reach imperial house affairs i n any way whatever.98 Even as outspoken a constitutionalist as Mi nobe Tatsukichi willingly acknowledged the pri nciple of palace autonomy and its corollary : Japan's unique national polity centered on its im perial institution. Although Mi nobe may have disagreed with Ito on a host of issues regarding constitutional interpretat ion , the tran scendental position of the throne as the center of Japa nese life was not one of them . By the 1 930s the theoretical relationships between rites and rule and between the I mperial House Law a nd the Meij i Constitution had become blurred to a considerable extent . Some constitutional theorists , such as Uesugi Shi nkichi , argued that the "emperor is i n 96. Ibid . ; Koshiki Rei, "C hokurei" no . 6 , J anuary 3 1 , 1 907, Articles 4 and 5 , in Horei Zensho, I 907 , vol . I . 97 . Naikaku Kiroku Ka, 1 94 2 , vol . I , pt. I , chap. I , sec. 2 , pp. 31 -33, 37-3 8 . 98. M inobe Tatsukichi , Kempa Kowa, p . 468 .
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fact the state"-stressi ng the pri nciples of absol ute Western monar c hies adapted to J a p a n ' s unique national polit y . Ot hers , l i ke M i nobe , made the emperor the highest organ of a state under law stressi ng the constitutional aspects of Western monarchy . Yet others , notably Kakehi Katsuhiko, posited the centrality of Shinto and Shi nto rites in Japa n's prewar constitutional order. At the root of the confusion was the issue of sovereignty-its location and the con sequent distribution of powers among political entities such as the Diet . The Ort hodox School of Uesugi and others clearly mai ntai ned that the emperor was sovereign. The Constitutional School , led by Mi nobe , argued that the emperor was sovereign " u nder law" and that the "supreme rights of rule" were invested i n the state as a legal person. The Shi nto School dissolved the issue of sovereignty in a murky fusion of rite and rule i n the imperial l i ne , placi ng it in the eternal " becomi ng" of the imperial line in history , a Japanese version of the Hegelian unfolding of cultural progress concretely expressed by Japan's imperial i nstitution.99 Sakamaki Yoshio, the imperial household official whose tortured logic on the role of rites has already been noted , attempted to resolve the ambiguities that had arisen by integrating many aspects from many schools of i nterpretation. Following M i nobe's argument that the imperial house was a publ ic, not a private entity, Sakamaki asserted that since the imperial house had at its center the wielder of the supreme rights of rule in the state, "the state and the I mperial H ouse are one and i nseparable . " 1 00 "The vitality of the I mperial House is nothing less than the prosperity of the State . " 1 0 1 The 99. M iller, Mi nobe Tatsukichi , Kemp a Ka wa, Suzuki Yasuzo, Meiji Kempa to Shin Kempa (Tokyo: Sekai Shoi n , 1 94 7 ) , pp. 71 ff. ; Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan, Kempa Shirya Tenji Kai Mokuroku (Tokyo : 1 957 ) ; Uesugi Shi nkichi , Koku tai Kempa oyobi Kensei, 2d ed . (Tokyo: Yiihikaku, 1 91 7) . Kakehi Katsuhiko, Dai Nippon Teikoku Kempa no Kompon Gi (Tokyo: l wanami Shoten, 1 936). Among the plethora of sc hools of interpretation, the two most important were t he Ort hodox School (Uesugi Shi nkichi) and t he Const itutional School ( M i nobe Tatsuk irhi ) . The word in t he M eij i Const itution that has freq uently been translated as "sovereignty" is tachiken, which literally means "supreme rights of rule" or "prerogatives of government , " j ust as tasuiken means "prerogatives of supreme command . " The word used by M i nobe for sovereignty, or sovereign power, is shuken, the word used for sovereignty in the present Constitution of Japan. It is likely that a termi nological problem complicated the con t roversy over sovereignty and its relation to the " national polity" bot h in prewar Japan and i n t hr immed iate postwar period. 1 00 . Sakamaki Yoshio, Koshitsu Seido Ko wa, p. 1 0 . 1 0 1 . Ibid . , p . 9 .
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constituents of a monarchy , states Sakamaki , are a ruling monarch, a royal family from whom successors will come , and a general populace . It is the state's function , in accordance with these three constituents, to make the position of the monarch secure and tran quil , to make the monarch and the royal house "shine forth with increasing splendor," and to advance the people's welfare, tran q uil ity , and national consciousness . In a constitutional monarchy like Japan, argued Sakamaki , the people assist the monarch in ruling, the monarch seeks the advice of public leaders and the M i nisters of State, and the people participate in mai ntaini ng the public welfare . One aspect of the separation of court and government can be found i n the division of functions among those who advise the emperor . On court affairs the I mperial Household Mi nister, the Imperial Family Counci l , and the Privy Council advise . The separation of court and government , however, is merely a division of functions : the em peror's court and government prerogatives both derive from his position as Chief of State . Conseq uently, the Imperial House Law is as much a constitution as the constitution itself. Although the dis tinction between court and government embodied in these two basic laws makes Japan's a dual legal system, Sakamaki argued , both are eq ually state laws deriving from the emperor's i ndivisible supreme right of rule . 102 Separate but equal , the I mperial House Law and the constitution achieved reverential status by the 1 930s as the oracular pronounce ments of the apotheosized Meij i Emperor. As already noted , the I m perial House Law w a s suppleme nted only twice between 1 889 and 1 94 5 ; the effect was to make the imperial house a more public entity and to elevate the I mperial House Law to equal status with the constitution. The Meij i Constitution remai ned unchanged to the let ter. Made structurally and legally independent by 1 88 9 , the imperial house was placed in a transcendental but symbiotic relation to political power. The pri nciple of palace autonomy was firmly united with the emperor's moral authority implied by the union of court and rites . The resultant moral transcendence was then made the 1 02 . Ibid . ,
pp.
1 3 -22 .
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basis of political authority . These li nkages evolved as the result of ( 1 ) compromises between the theories and aspirations of traditionalists, such as M otoda Eifu , and those of the modernizing oligarchs, such as Ito Hirobumi ; (2) political conflict between the " i n " oligarchs a nd t he " ou t " leaders of " p ublic opi nion , " confl icts which threatened to embroil the emperor as well as u nseat the oligarchs ; and (3) creative nation-building efforts by the Meij i oligarchs , who eclectically applied both native Japanese and imported Western theories of state power in seeki ng to place their political power on an unassailable foundation of legitimacy . The implications of the theoretical and i nstitutional arrangements arrived at by 1 889 were twofold . First , the imperial institution was hopefully placed beyond the criticism of the "Japanese subject " . As high priest , shogun , and constitutional monarch, the emperor was to be the transcendental i nstitution of state power, " far from the smoke of human habitations , no one ever to invade its sa nctity . " This awesome dista nce was t o provide the basis of popular loyalty and obedience to the state . Second , the emperor was not to be a free agent in an open political process . His personal will , which was fallible, was not identical with the Imperial Will , which was by defi nition the eternal will of the imperial ancestors . This in turn meant restricting the emperor's public role to formal rituals, such as Shinto rites and the formal sanctioning of government decisions . By removi ng the emperor from open and direct participation i n the de cision-maki ng process , while issuing all government acts in the em peror's name , the oligarchs apparently hoped to ensure their ow n power to develop Japanese political i nstitutions around a core of bu reaucratic i nitiative supported by prerogative above and loyalty below . Surrounded by walls and moats i n the 2 7 5 -acre castle that had for merly been the fortress of shogunal power, the emperor found his per sonal freedom of movement , as well as his personal will i n politics , forfeited for shogunal powers recast i n Western monarchical form. An indication of the price the emperor paid by becomi ng the sacrosanct center of Japanese politics is the decreased number of imperial outi ngs from his Tokyo residence after 1 890. Table 1 lists the number of im perial tours from 1 868 to 1 9 1 0 , with a partial listing of the purposes
48 TABLE 1 .
POLITI C A L
L E G I TI M A C Y
AND
PALACE
A U TO N O M Y
IMPERIAL TOURS, 1 868-1 9 1 0 Purpose"'
rear
Total
1 868 1 869 1 870 1 87 1 1 872 1 873 1 874 1 875 1 876 1 877 1 878 1 879 1 880 1 88 1 1 882 1 883 1 884 1 885 1 886 1 887 1 888 1 889 1 890 1 89 1 1 892 1 893 1 894 1 895 1 896 1 897 1 898 1 899 1 900 1 90 1 1 902 1 903 1 904 1 905 1 906 1 907 1 908 1 909 1910
17 37 87 1 12 42 1 05 80 1 00 55 58 89 98 1 63 127 96 95 81 57 36 44
62 47 47 21 21 20 18 9 21 4 10 25 25 8 16 14 12 12 18 17 13 18 18
Within Tokyo
Outside Tokyo
9 36 86 111 38 101 77 97 51 56 86 96 161 1 18 91 91 75 55 33 42 60 46 44 17 19 18 14 8 18 3 9 23 21 7 15 II 12 10 17 15 12 17 16
8
4 4 3 3 4 2 3 2 2 9 5 4 6 2 3 2 2 1 3 4 2 2 4 1 3 1 1 2 4
3 0 2 1 2 1 2
M
R
s
I
p
0
4
3
0
0
80
50
9
0
39
1 35
13
0
8
0
7
29
9
0
9
24
9
0
7
0
2
0
G
4
9
11
11
0
2
4
3
2
2
0
5
9
0
2
0
7
0
2
P O LI T I C A L
LEGITIMA C Y
A !\ D
P A LA C E
49
A C TONOM Y
for which they were made . It is abundantly clear that the period of the Restoration settlement , from 1 868 to 1 88 9 , was also the period of the emperor's greatest mobility. From 1 87 1 to 1 880 there were an average of 90.2 imperial tours a year; from 1 88 1 to 1 890 the average was 6 9 . 2 per year. O nce the new state was formed , however, the emperor was increasi ngly restricted to his palace . Between 1 89 1 and 1 900 there were but 1 7 .4 imperial outi ngs a year; from 1 90 1 to 1 9 1 0 , only 1 4 . 6 . And , a s table 1 clearly shows, the emperor did not g o t o the government very often after 1 890; the government came to hi m. The decrease in imperial visits to the government does not necessarily mean, of course , that the emperor's political influence , if there was any , decreased . It does mean that whatever infl uence he had over government leaders was exercised withi n the palace sanctuary . His personal will was restricted to those close to the throne : leaders of the palace bureaucracy and those of the government , civil and mili tary , who were allowed access to his castled prerogatives . To exag gerate, the emperor's personal will ended at the palace gates where public scrutiny began. The keepers of the gates were the officials of the palace bureaucracy .
sou R C E FOR TABLE
I : Kunai Daijin Kambii Siimuka , Gyoko Hyo (Tokyo: 1 933). The code u nder Purpose , based on places visited by the emperor, is as follows : G government ; M military, including maneuvers and academies ; R religious institutions, such as shrines ; S social, including prefectural tours, attendance at cultural events, and visits to factories ; I international, such as banquets with royal visitors held outside the palace ; P personal, such as summer visits to the imperial villas. •
=
=
=
=
=
=
CHAPTER THREE
THE PALACE B UREAUCRACY : GATEKEEPERS OF THE IM PERIAL WILL
THE OLD SHOGU NAL FORTR ESS was ideally suited to be the new im perial palace . With its spacious grounds , securely walled and moated , it gave physical meani ng to palace autonomy and imperial transcendence . It also provided ample space to house the palace bu reaucracy which managed the affairs of the imperial i nstitution and isolated the emperor as a person from the public I mperial Will ; by 1 900 t he number of palace officials had grow n to approximately four thousand . What was the structure and composition of the palace bureau cracy ? What specifically did it manage and how ? We may begi n by attempti ng a schematization of the roles created for the emperor as a l ogical result of the theory of legitimacy and the i nstitutional ar rangements evolved by the Restoration settlement of 1 868-89 (fig . 1 ) . Although the imperial i nstitution tended to be undifferentiated to its more dedicated adherents , the analysis of the separation of court and government in chapter 2 suggests that there were two funda mental imperial roles : Emperor-in-Court and Emperor-i n-State . B oth roles had two aspects : Emperor-i n-Public and Emperor-in Chambers . The Emperor-i n-Public represented the Imperial Will in politics and society; the Emperor-in-C hambers was the emperor as a person who expressed his ow n views and ideas to those "close to the throne . " 51
52
TH E
P A LA C E
BUREAVCRACY
Ideal Polity (I nstitutions of Court) ( Rites) EMPEROR-I N-COURT
I
visible
I
\
invisible
\
E M P E R O R -I N - PU B LI C
EM PER OR - I N - C H A M B E R S
( I mperial Will)
(Personal Will)
\
visible
\
I
invisible
I
EM P E R O R -I N - STATE
( Rule) ( I nstitutions of Government) Real Polity FIGURE
1.
IMPERIA L ROLES I N PREWAR
J A PA N
The Emperor-in- Court. B agehot i nforms u s that the B ritish monarch i n the late nineteenth century performed the "dignified " function i n government and that the monarchy 's dignity derived from its " mystery . " The dignified mystery of the monarchy , however, was directed not so much toward the "efficient " political leaders as toward the general public. Its mystery served to make the monarchy the focus of popular loyalty and identification, deflecting public at tention away from the tough busi ness of actually ruling the nation and how that was accomplished . To exaggerate , the dignified mystery of the monarchy served the purposes of efficient rule by eliciting popular obedience to political decisions produced by an al most i nvisible political process . 1 Mystery , by definition, meant that the act ual worki ngs of the monarchy would be screened from popular scrutiny so that the monarch would appear to be above the ordi nary lot of men. In Japan the need for such transcendence was apparently i ntensified by the vast changes in Japanese society that were planned or a nticipated by the moderniz i ng oligarchs after 1 86 8 . Fosteri ng an almost rel igi ous at1 . Walter B agehot , The English Constitution ( London: Kega n Paul , Trench, Triibner, 1 904) .
TH E
P A LA C E
BUREAUCRACY
53
tachment to the imperial institution, Restoration leaders and their heirs attempted to make the Imperial Will a diffuse mystery around which all ki nds of i ndividuals and social groups could be mobilized . The mystery of the Japanese imperial institution was, of course , al ready there to be adapted by the Restoration leaders . Throughout Japan's recorded history the emperor had been the most exalted figure in Japa nese society. By virtue of his hereditary position, he had exercised an excl usive monopoly over certain religious rites that many considered basic to the well-being of the entire society . The court had also been the repository of ancient Japanese culture and its accretions from C hina. I ndeed , from the twelfth century onward , rites and cultural practices were the only consistently autonomous functions performed by the imperial institution. Finally, the emperor and his court had been isolated from society at large and from the seat of de facto government for over 2 5 0 years when the Restoration occurred i n 1 86 8 . The restored emperor was very much a transcendental mystery to the vast maj orty of J apanese . Given this backgrou nd and the fact that the emperor had not ruled for centuries , the Japanese imperial i nstitution had perhaps more potential than any other modern monarchy to become the symbol of the nation as a people, as disti nct from the nation as a state . This di stinction may very well have been the true basis for the separation of court and government and for the functional union of court and rites on the one hand and of government and rule on the other, as discussed in chapter 2 . The new imperial i nstitution, bri nging its distinctive character to bear in the building of a new Japan, could be made to symbolize the unity and continuity of Japanese society as it underwent the disruptive effects of extensive modernization. Thus , when the emperor made a tour of the provi nces , presided over an im perial poetry contest , or performed rites at one of the national Shinto shri nes , he symbolized the unity of the Japanese people, their shared cult ural heritage and skills, and their unique rel igious communality , of which he was chief priest . He was Emperor-i n-Court acting as Emperor-i n-Publ ic, presumably reminding all .Japanese that , by virtue of his maj esty and mystery , they were a unique and un ited people. The Emperor-in-Court also symbol ized somethi ng new i n his
54
TH E
PALACE
BUREAUCRACY
public functions : the desirable course of Japan's modernization. The emperor and imperial family were among the first to don Western dress and to use the latest modes of transportation. The imperial house was fi rst i n line to invest in new manufacturi ng enterprises . Modern educational facil ities received imperial support and the em peror distributed rewards t o those who successfu l l y i nt roduced "Western techniques" i nto Japa nese society. The emperor and his court were thus made to stand for the moderniz i ng aspirations of the Japanese people as wel l . The first duty o f the palace bureaucracy was the ma nagement o f the Emperor-i n-Court as Emperor-in-Publ ic. I n this function the palace bureaucrats were gatekeepers of the I mperial Will in Japa nese so ciety, seali ng off the emperor's personal will so that the Imperial Will might be made the focal point of unquest ioning popular esteem and reverence . To do so, the palace bureaucracy was divided i nto two components : an outer side and an inner side. The outer side contai ned t he bureaucratic machi nery for mai nt a i n i ng t he t ra nsce ndental dignity of the emperor i n society. It arra nged formal appearances of the emperor and imperial family members , wrote and regulated publicity , managed the imperial estate and fi nances of the imperial house , and watched over its ow n bureaucratic concerns . The i nner side ma naged the Emperor-in-Court as Emperor-in-C hambers . The officials of the i nner side were chamberlains, valets , aides , tutors , ladies-i n-waiting. They provided for the personal well-bei ng and private education of the emperor and imperial family. As immediate compa nions and servants to the emperor, they were the innermost guardians of his privacy . They were conseq uently responsible for keepi ng the emperor's personal will and his human i ndiscretions from escapi ng i nto the public arena . The palace bureaucracy , both its outer and inner sides , was to see that the emperor as a person was made in visible . Only the emperor as a social paragon , as an ideal , was to be visible . Fi nally, the imperial i nstitution was to be the expression of all that was true, good , and beautiful in the Japanese polity. In its structure , therefore , the court was .to b e a model o f the ideal polity, o f the ideal social arrangements that ought to prevail i n Japan. The second basic duty of the palace bureaucracy was to maintai n itself as social paragon .
TH E
PALACE
BUREAUCRACY
55
The Emperor-in-Sta te . The emperor was also t o be the transcendental source of state power. For centuries , of course, the emperor had been the source of political legitimacy . It was his theoretical and physical proximity to politics that was new . As Em peror-i n-State the emperor was to express the I mperial Will i n politics , and the I mperial Will was to be the referent for a l l acts of government . J ust as the court was responsible to the Emperor-in Court for mai ntaining the " ideal polity , " the government was responsible to the Emperor-i n-State for actuating the " real polity . " Agai n , the emperor was not t o be i nvolved as a person but as a n in stitution. The Emperor-i n-State , as Emperor-i n-Public , was to ratify decisions reached by responsible government leaders . As the fi nal act in the prewar decision-maki ng process, imperial ratification meant that a given policy was a legitimate decision of state , having been sanctioned by the I mperial Will . The Imperial Will i n politics was not t he emperor's personal will but the will of the " imperial line unbroken for ages eternal . " Far more than was the case with the emperor's personal will as Emperor-in-Court , it was imperative that the emperor's personal will as Emperor-i n-State be hidden from public view . If the personal preferences of the emperor were publicly known on a sharply disputed issue prior to its resolution by the government , the emperor might well be charged with political partisanship and his i ndividual role challenged . And if those preferences were widely credited as the source of a disastrous political policy , the imperial i nstitution itself might be q uestioned , undermining the foundation of the state. Because the mysterious dignity of the imperial institution was the basis of state power, however, the gatekeepers of the I mperial Will in politics were not only palace bureaucrats but virtually all political leaders of account : M inisters of State, generals and admirals of the Supreme Command , Privy Councillors , Elder Statesmen, and all others who by law or custom " advised a nd assisted" the emperor . Hut it was primarily the responsibility of four palace officials to ma nage the Emperor-i n-State so that the palace remai ned the in vi olable sanctuary of the emperor's personal will i n politics . These four were the I mperial Household M i nister, the Grand Cham berlain, the Chief Aide-de-Camp , and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal . To ensure the transcendental position of the throne in politics
56
TH E
PALACE
BUR EAUCRACY
as well as i n society, they were primarily concerned that the Em peror-i n-State as Emperor-i n-Public appear as the representative of the I mperial Will i n politics , and therefore that the emperor's per sonal will be made invisible. The emperor was to be neither a political partisan nor a policy maker. He was to ratify decisions produced by government leaders with the I mperial Seal . With these considerations in mind , the four palace leaders cooperated with the government leaders of the day in arranging the public display and i nvolvement of the Emperor-i n-State. In practice , of course, the distinction between Emperor-i n-Court and E mperor-i n-State , as well as t hat between Emperor- i n Chambers and Emperor-i n-Public, proved ambiguous and very flexible, depending on the discretion of court and government leaders of the day , the nature of political pressures , and the state of public opi nion. The Emperor-i n-State and the Emperor-i n-C ourt were one and the same person. A nd the gatekeepers between Emperor-in Chambers and Emperor-i n-Public for both these roles were the same palace officials. Ultimately it proved as difficult to preserve a fixed distinction between Emperor-in-Public and Emperor-i n-C hambers as it was to maintai n the distinction between Emperor-i n-State and Emperor-in-Court . During the 1 930s, for example, the emperor pursued his i nterest in marine biology within the pal ace sanctuary and collected specimens near the imperial villa at Hayama . Many found this activity beneath the sublime Japanese emperor. Was this avocation public or private ? Public criticism of the emperor's pas time in the 1 930s illustrates the prevailing state of public opi nion as well as a maj or breach in the human fortifications around the Em peror-i n-Chambers . At this time i n Japan's modern history not even the emperor's private life was free from public scrutiny. By way of contrast , there was l ittle danger prior to 1 9 1 0 that w hat the emperor said or did in chambers as Emperor-in-State or Em peror-i n-Court would leak out i ndiscreetly to the public. Those who surrounded the emperor in the early half of Japan's modern history formed a tight knot of political leaders , the oligarchs , w ho may have disagreed among themselves over policies but not on the privileged status of remarks made by t he Emperor-i n-C hambers . There is no i ndication, for example, that t he criticism of the emperor's passion for horsemanship made by the jiho i n 1 87 8 reached the public or be-
THE
PALACE
BUREAUCRACY
57
came a source of public criticism of the emperor at that time (see above , p. 20) . Differences among the Mei j i oligarchs, however great , were fought out person-to-person without visibly i nvolving the Em peror-in-Chambers . The dearth of information about the M eij i em pero r ' s p e r s o n a l v i e w s on p o l i t i c s a nd his p e r s o n a l p o l i c y preferences , i f h e had any, is a tribute to t he cohesiveness o f those close to the throne in preservi ng the privileged status of the Em peror-in-C hambers in both his roles as Emperor-in-State and Em peror-i n-Court . By t he 1 930s this knot of political leaders had been untied . Those close to the throne i ncluded institutional spokesmen, whose primary loyalties were to their respective i nstitutions of imperial prerogative Army , Navy , Home M i nistry , Foreign M i nistry . If the Emperor-in Chambers favored one policy over another (personally or at the prompting of advisers), one of these i nstitutional representatives would invariably be slighted . When the slighted representative conferred with his i nstitutional cohorts, leaks to the outside often followed . Omi nous remarks about " evil advisers" close to the throne might also filter through the inj ured institution and seep out to the press as wel l . The privileged nature of the emperor's remarks i n chambers was thus destroyed b y the encroachment o f institutional pluralism i nto the very heart of the palace . Our concern i n this chapter is the i nstitutional setti ng of palace politics : the structure and functions of the I mperial H ousehold Ministry , which managed the day-to-day activities of the Emperor in-Court and coordi nated the routine affairs of the Emperor-in-State . We are concerned , therefore , with the palace bureaucracy , as struc t ure a nd personnel , between 1 885 and 1 945 . C hapter 4 describes the nature and function of palace leadership, w hich set t he policies for ma nagi ng the public Emperor-i n-Court and coordinated the process of imperial ratification by the Emperor-i n-State . THE OFFICES AND PE RSONN EL OF THE PALAC E BU R EAUC RACY
M any theorists and commentators have argued that the prewar . J a panese state was a family writ large . Japanese subj ects were not
58
TH E
P A LA C E
B U R EA U C R A C Y
i ndividual citizens but members of families which i n turn were units of the national family headed by the imperial house . The emperor was the fat her of his people and all his subj ects were bound to him by the absolute loyalty owed a father by his children.2 If the prewar Japanese state was a family writ large , however, the imperial insti tution was a state writ smal l . The imperial institution had its ow n constitution, t he I mperial H ouse Law , and its own counci l , the Im perial Family Council, w hich j oi ntly with the Privy Council advised the throne on t hat constitution. The I mperial Household M inister was responsible for advising and assisting the emperor i n all matters of court , much as the Prime M i nister and other Ministers of State were responsible in all matters of government . The I mperial Household M inistry housed i n miniature all that in the large was encompassed by the government 's bureaucracy : fiscal and property management , capital i nvestment , foreign affairs , police functions , m i l i t a ry o p e r a t i o n s , e d u c a t i o n , a nd w e l fa r e . T h e I m p e r i a l H ousehold M i nistry was t hus a concrete symbol o f modern bureau cratic government . Not only did the Restoration .settlement produce a separation of court and government and a unification of court and rites ; it also resulted i n a new administration for court affairs . The creation of modern bureaucratic structures i n government was paralleled i n court , especially duri ng I t o H i robu m i ' s t e nure as I mperia l Household Secretary and I mperial Household M inister from 1 884 to 1 887 . When he left the I mperial Household M i nistry the bureau cratic structure for managi ng court affairs had been largely consoli dated . From the end of the Restoration settlement in 1 889 to the end of 1 945 , w hen the prewar government ceased to operate as it had , only minor revisions were made i n the functional domai n and structure of t he mi nistry . A list of its offices i n 1 945 i ndicates the wide range of functions under its j urisdiction (see table 2). The earliest date for each office , or its cognate predecessor, also indicates that the struc2 . For example, see Maruyama M asao, Thought and Behaviour, pp. 36-37 and passim, for a critique, a nd H ibino Yukata, Nippon Shindo Ron, or the National /deals of the Japanese People (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1 928}, for a glorification of family-state ideals.
TH E
PALACE
TABLE 2.
59
BUREAUCRACY
OFFICES OF THE IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD MINISTRY, 1 945
Title of Office
Minister's Secretariat Board of Chamberlains Board of the Ceremonies Office of Peerage Affairs Office of Imperial M ausolea Office of Archives Office of Court Physicians Office of Imperial Cuisine Office of the Privy Purse Office of Imperial Works Office of Imperial Stables General Affairs Bureau Bureau of Imperial Guards Board of Rituals Board of the Empress's Affairs Board of the Crown Prince's Affairs Board of the Empress Dowager's Affairs Imperial House Audit Bureau Imperial Poetry Bureau Imperial House Museum Sh6s6in Curator's Office Bureau of Imperial Lands and Forests Peers School Peers School for Women Board of Prince Ri's Affairs Kyoto Office Office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Office of Aides-de-Camp
Date Created 1 908 1 884 1 877 1877 1 878 1 883 1 886 1 886 1 885 1 885 1 886 1 94 1 1 886 1 939 1 869 1 889 1 869 1 889 1 888 1 886 1 884 1 885 1 877 1 885 191 1 1 883 1 885 1 896
souRCEs : " Sho Sanko Hy6," handwritten document provided by the Imperia l l lousehold Agency ; Sorifu, Kancho Benran , 2 : 26-32 ; Matsushita Yoshio, Meiji Gunsei S/li Ron , 2 vols, (Tokyo : Yiihikaku, 1 956) , 2 : 206. N OTE : The English names of the offices have been taken mostly from prewar Japanese yearbooks and biographical dictionaries in English. Where I considered the name clumsy or ambiguous I took the liberty of changing it. The dates listed are as accurate as possible, given the frequent changes in office names from 1 869 through 1 945.
l ure of the palace bureaucracy remained almost unchanged after I H 8 9 . Of t he twenty-eight offices in 1 945 , only one was entirely new l o the twentieth century : the Board of Prince Ri's Affairs created after the annexation of Korea in 1 9 1 0 . The M i nister's Secretariat a nd the General Affairs B ureau, created in 1 908 and 1 94 1 respec-
60
THE
PALACE
BUREAUCRACY
tively, were organizational refi nements of two or three secretarial di visions of 1 886-8 9 . As noted i n chapter 2, the Board of Rituals origi nated as a subdivision of the Board of the Ceremonies around 1 880. Other offices , such as the B oard of the Empress Dowager's Af fairs, were created and abolished according to the composition of the imperial family at any given time . In addition, ad hoc offices were established and then termi nated when their work was completed : palace construction bureaus, i nvestigatory bodies, and t he like . One o f t he offices listed i n table 2 w a s not formally i ncl uded i n the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry's organization chart : the Office of A i d e s - d e - C a m p . O rg a n i z at i o n a l l y , t he A i d e s - d e - C a m p w e r e considered members o f the General Staff Office , a n d i t w a s the military , not the palace bureaucracy , that i nitiated t heir appoint ments . But because the Aides were i n fact regular attendants on the emperor and members of t he imperial family, they were opera tionally very much a part of t he palace bureaucracy , if not the I m perial Household M i nistry strictly speaki ng. It also appears that a n office for the Ladies-i n-Wait i ng was never created a s a formal part of the I mperial H ousehold Mi nistry . Whether or not they were ac knowledged as " officials" of t he ministry , however, there were al ways Ladies-i n-Waiting in the inner circle surrounding the Em peror-i n-C hambers . Finally, there were a number of Court Advisers (Kyuchu Kom an) and I mperial Household M i nistry Consultants (Kunai Sho Goyogakari) w ho advised the court on such matters as fi nances , dipl omatic etiq uette, Shinto ceremonies , and t he dis tribution of honors . Some of them were extra court appoi ntees while others served concurrently i n formal court offices . As t he formal and i nformal offices of the I mperial H ousehold M inistry reveal , management of the court was an extensive and many-faceted operation. A considerable bureaucracy was req uired to mai ntain the imperial i nstitution as a state within a state . Table 3 lists at three-year intervals the total number of I mperial Household M i nistry officials from 1 924 to 1 942 , the numbers of persons in the two highest civil service categories of direct imperial appoi ntee (shin nin) and i mperial appoi ntee (chokunin) for those years , and the number of officials in the Tokyo palace and in t he provi ncial offices
TH E
PALACE
TABLE 3 .
61
BUREAUCRACY
IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD MINISTRY OFFICIALS, 1 92 4-1 942
rear•
Total
Direct Imperial Appointeesb
Imperial Appointeesb
Other
Tokyo
Provinces
1 924 1 927 1 930 1 933 1 936 1 939 1 942
4 , 749 4 , 58 1 4 , 922 4 , 899 5 , 1 45 5 , 342 5 , 677
8 7 8 8 6 6 8
101 1 09 Ill 1 15 1 34 1 40 1 33
4 , 640 4 , 465 4 , 803 4 , 776 5 , 005 5 , 1 96 5 , 536
3 ' 161 3 , 209
2 , 181 2 , 468
SOURCE : Kunai Sho Shokuin Roku, 1 924-42 . Although this source goes back to 1 92 1 , figures o n total personnel and civil service allotments by rank are not listed until 1 924. Three-year intervals have been selected because two of the annual Kunai Sho Shokuin Roku, those for 1 926 and 1 932, are missing from the Imperial Household Agency files and because there was neither a very great increase in officials over the twenty year period nor much variation on a yearly basis. b The number of direct imperial appointees from 1 935 on includes both those offi cially of that rank and those treated as such. In 1 942, for example, 6 of the 8 direct imperial appointees were officially of that rank. The same applies to those of imperial appointee rank : of the 1 33 imperial appointees in 1 942, 75 were imperial appointees strictly speaking. •
for years in which these figures were available. The personnel break down of the mi nistry's officials in 1 943 was as follows : 3 Di rect imperial appointee or treated a s such I mperial appoi ntee or treated as such Executive appoi ntee or treated as such Official or treated as such Attached staff Staff Employees Total
9 1 32 356 2,631 203 I, 1 6 1 1 ,325 5 ,8 1 7
With ni ne officials o f direct imperial appointee rank i n 1 94 3 , and from six to nine of that rank from the 1 920s on, the I mperial l l ousehold M i nistry ranked among the top bureaucratic structures i n prewar Japan. Only the Foreign M i nistry , whose mi nister and 3. Kunai Sho Shokuin Roku, 1 94 3 , p . 1 9 .
62
THE
P A LA C E
BUREAUCRACY
ambassadors plenipotentiary were direct imperial appoi ntees , and the armed forces , whose generals and admirals were also of that rank, outranked the Imperial H ousehold M i nistry i n this respect . And only the Foreign M i nistry outranked the I mperial Household M i nistry in its ratio of direct imperial appoi ntees to total personnel . Only the Prime Minister and the Speakers of the two houses of the I mperial Diet , moreover, received higher official salaries than the I mperial Household Mi nister. In 1 93 9 , for example, the maximum official salaries (yen per annum) of the leading officials of the government and the court were : 4 Government Prime M inister Speaker of t he House of Peers Speaker of the House of Representatives M inisters of State President of the Privy Cou nci l Ambassadors Plenipotentiary Admirals and generals Vice M i nisters of State
9,600 ¥ 7 , 500 7 ,500 6,800 6,600 6,600 6,600 5 , 800
Court I mperial Household M inister Lord Keeper of t he Privy Seal Chief Aide-de-Camp Grand C hamberlain
6,800 ¥ 6,800 6,600 6,200
Finally, in the years from 1 924 to 1 943 there were approximately fifty officials at court w ho held concurrent posts i n the government but were not carried on the I mperial Household M i nistry's official roster. Of t hese, about twelve were direct imperial appoi ntees i n rank. As measured by the ranks and salaries of its official s , therefore , the I mperial H ousehold M inistry was a very powerful and pres tigious bureaucratic organization . The transcendental dignity of the imperial i nstitution, of course , made it necessary for the I mperial Household M i nistry to be prestigious and dignified as wel l . Why the mi nistry should have been led by such high-ranking bureaucrats, however, is a q uestion that cannot be answered merely i n terms of status, as we shall see in the following chapters . Here we turn to the 4 . Shokuin Roku, I 939, pt. 2, pp. 1 - 1 57 .
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63
institutional and personnel structure around the emperor for the routi ne management of the imperial dignity .
TH E OUTER SIDE : BUREAUC RATIC OPERATIVES OF THE EM PEROR-IN-COURT AS EM PEROR-IN-PUBLIC
Functionally, the I mperial Household M i nistry had two sides : an " outer" side and an " i nner" side .5 The outer side comprised the modern bureaucratic aspects of court admi nistration-arrangement of imperial tours, management of imperial lands and forests , ac counting, records , public relations-and was located in provincial of fices or in office buildings outside and around the inner palace , the Fukiage park, where the emperor resided . The inner side comprised those in regular attendance on the emperor and his immediate family : Chamberlains , Ladies-i n-Waiting, Aides-de-Camp , tutors to the im perial family and so on. As "family" members of the court , these persons had access to the emperor and imperial family in the inner palace . As will become apparent , the line separating the outer and inner sides was not clear-cut or absolute ; there was a constant flow of communication between the two. As a rule, however, the work of the outer side was office work, that of the inner side, attendance . The former were bureaucrats, the latter, imperial emissaries and ele gant valets. A glance at the 1 945 offices listed in table 2 will reveal generally which of the offices were outer offices : the M i nister's Secretariat , Of fice of Imperial Mausolea, Office of Archives , Office of the Privy Purse , Office of I mperial Works , General Affairs B ureau, etc . Ap proximately eighteen of the twenty-eight offices were clearly involved with court administration and estate management . The Minister's Secretariat , for example, was responsible for " secret " matters , the promotion, status, and retirement of mi nistry officials, pensions , cor respondence , statistics, and reports for the Official Gazette, coordi nation of mi nistry offices and bureaus , investigations , t he drafting of S. Kyiitei Kishadan, pp. 3-4 . Although this source applies the " outer" (ornate) and " i n owr" (oku) distinction to the postwar court bureaucracy , it is equally valid, if not more so, for 1 he prewar court admi nistration.
64
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papers , and matters not assigned to other offices . The General Af fairs B ureau handled arrangements for imperial tours , public an nouncements and photographs , and miscellaneous work for other ministry offices . The I mperial Guards Bureau was responsible for palace security, escorting imperial processions and other police func tions , sanitation, air defense , and fire-fighting. Reception of foreign dignitaries and protocol matters fell u nder the Foreign Affairs Section of the B oard of the Ceremonies .6 The outer side was thus responsible for the Emperor-i n-Court acting as Emperor-i n-Public, a charge they guarded j ealously. I f the living emperor's public i mage, as well as that of the im mediate imperial family, was the first duty of the outer side , the dignity of t he imperial li ne-the imperial presence in the land from antiquity-was also in its charge . I t was the responsibility of the Of fice of I mperial Mausolea to maintain the 734 tombs and shrines of past emperors and imperial family members that were located i n twenty-seven o f t h e forty-seven l ocal divisions o f Japan.7 These were physical reminders to the people that theirs was a divine land which had existed from " time i mmemorial . " Supporting the physical presence of the imperial l i ne among the populace were the rites conducted by the B oard of Rituals on national festival days . To em phasize the cultural centrality of the imperial l i ne, the I mperial Household M i nistry also managed the Shosoi n , repository of Japan's cultural treasures and court relics dating from the eighth century on . A ncient court music was preserved by the music division of the B oard of the Ceremonies .8 The management of court fina nces. Nothing better illustrates the essentially administrative nature of the outer side, and , incidentally , the separation of court and government , than the management of court fi nances . M anaging the fi nancial operations of t he palace was a maj or function of the outer side, and approximately half of the M i nistry's total personnel were engaged in imperial estate and fi nance management . 6. " Kunai Shii Kansei , " Article 1 0, Koshitsu Rei, no. 7 , October 7 , 1 92 1 , as amended t hrough 1 94 1 ; in Naikaku Kiroku Ka, 1 942, vol . I, pt. 3, chap. I. sec. 3, pp. 1 6, 1 7 . 7 . " Ryiibo S u Ichiran Hyii," handwritten document provided b y the I mperial Household Agency . In the 1 930s Japan comprised forty-three prefectures, three municipalities, and one circuit . 8. Siirifu, Kancho Benran, 2 : 20-2 1 ; Kyutei Kishadan, p. 50.
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As part of their preparations to create a transcendental emperor during the Restoration settlement , the Meij i oligarchs strengthened the i ndependent base of court organization by transferring vast amounts of state land to the imperial house and by placing the court 's finances under sole j urisdiction of the palace bureaucracy . I n 1 882 lwakura Tomomi pressed upon the cabi net a strongly worded argument in favor of imperial house properties which would serve as the " material foundation" of the constitution soon to be d rafted and implemented . He argued that all state lands as well as railways and a number of industrial plants should be placed under autonomous control of the imperial house .9 I mperial house property would give the i mperial i nstitution fi nancial autonomy commensurate with its all-embracing political authority . The oligarchs were agreed that the creation of an autonomous source of income for the imperial house was an essential step to be taken before the constitution came into ef fect . 1 0 The legal a nd admi nist rat ive separat i o n of court and government was therefore to be bolstered by granti ng financial i nde pendence to the court . The court 's financial autonomy was consolidated during Ito Hirobumi 's tenure as I mperial Household M inister from 1 885 to 1 887 . First , lands and capital i nvestments were turned over to the Imperial Household M i nistry i n such amounts that by 1 9 1 5 the court was able to defray the maj or part of its expenses from income derived from its own i ndependent sources . Second , budgets and ac counts, not only for its ow n revenues from capital and lands but also for its allotment from the national treasury to meet court expenses , were completely under court (I mperial H ousehold M inistry) control . The government had no formal j urisdiction over court fi na nces ex cept over i ncreases in the national treasury allotment . I n 1 885 a B ureau of I mperial Lands was created to admi nister the vast public lands transferred or to be transferred to the management of the Imperial Household Ministry . Between 1 885 and 1 890 the imperial estate increased from 54,7 1 7 acres to some 8 . 7 million acres . Article 45 of the I mperial House Law of 1 889 also provided for hereditary imperial property; approximately 2 . 5 million of the 8 . 7 9 . Kuroda Hisata, Tenno Ke n o Zaisan (Tokyo: Sanichi Shinsho, 1 966), pp. 22-24 ; I noue Kiyoshi, pp. 88-89. 1 0. Kuroda Hisata, pp . 24 , 26; I noue Kiyoshi, p . 89.
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acres were consequently designated as hereditary , "forever" bel ong to the imperial family.U Between 1 890 a nd 1 945 , however, 1 l w imperial estate decreased considerably. Disparities between rq�istered area and actual surveys, the sale of unnecessary lands and la nds difficult to administer, and t he return of lands , origi nally ac quired for development purposes , to prefectural authorities largely accounted for the decrease . In 1 895 , for example, 3 . 3 million acres of imperial land in H okkaido were returned to local admi nistration . L a n d s i n Y a m a n a s h i p r e fect u re , a p p a re n t l y acq u i re d fo r development , were largely returned to local prefectural adminis tration by 1 9 1 6 . Surveys of i mperial lands proved the registered area of imperial land to be as much as 1 8 percent greater than the actual area . 12 Even the hereditary lands were greatly reduced . Consequently, the imperial estate in 1 940 totaled 3 ,226,388 acres , not i ncludi ng " unnecessary lands" yet to be disposed of, of which 5 1 2 ,204 acres were hereditary imperial property. Forest lands constituted approximately 97 percent of the imperial estate , while palaces , villas, and imperial tombs accounted for 0.5 percent . The remai nder was agricultural land . I mperial lands were held i n forty of the forty-seven l ocal divisions of Japan. 13 At least 1 ,300 of the Im perial Household M inistry 's 5 ,400 registered officials were engaged in the management of the imperial lands a nd forests in 1 940. 14 In ad dition to maintai ning an imperial presence throughout the land , the B ureau of I mperial Lands and Forests also provided a substantial in come to the court from 1 897 on. In 1 9 1 5 it is estimated that three million of the imperial house's total income of sixteen million yen derived from the B ureau of I mperial Lands. 15 The period from 1 885 to 1 890, years of enormous expansion of the imperial estate , were also years of great i ncrease in imperial capital investments, most notably i n the field of banking. I n 1 884 Matsukata Masayoshi, leadi ng government oligarch i n the world of finance, urged that government stocks i n the Bank of Japan and the Yokohama Specie B ank be turned over to the i mperial house. The 1 1 1 illion
lo
11. 12. 13. 14. 1 5.
Kuroda Hisata, pp. 2 6 , 3 1 -32 , 3 7 . I bid . , pp. 1 08-09 passim, 46-48, 5 1 - 5 2 . Ibid . , pp. 1 08-09, 1 1 1 . Kunai Sho Shokuin Roku, 1 940. Kuroda Hisata, pp. 1 32 , 248-4 9 , 1 00 .
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government subsequently transferred shares valued at five million yen in the former and one million yen in the latter to the Chief of the Privy Purse, Imperial Household M i nistry , in February 1 885 . These stocks were to remain the nucleus of imperial house i nvestments until 1 947 , when all imperial house properties were dissolved . Addi tional stocks were acquired between 1 88 5 and 1 890 i n the N ippon Yusen Kaisha (a shippi ng company), Japan Railways , Sapporo Sugar, Tokyo H otel , and industrial railways in H okkaido. 16 And al t hough the imperial estate dwindled after 1 890, imperial house in vestments in banking and industry conti nued to grow until 1 945 . Each venture in foreign expansion netted monies for the Privy Purse . I n 1 898 part of the i ndemnity garnered from the Sino-Japanese War, in the amount of twenty million yen , was granted to the im perial house by resolution of both houses of the I mperial Diet . This money was then invested by the court i n government securities . The imperial house also invested i n the B ank of Taiwan ( 1 899), Taiwan Sugar ( 1 90 1 ) , the Bank of Korea ( 1 909) , the Chosen I ndustrial Bank ( 1 9 1 8) , t he Manchurian Railway ( 1 924-2 5 ) , and banks belonging to private combines , such as the Sumitomo Bank. 17 M oreover, imperial house capital i nvestments grew steadily i n each of these enterprises as the result of stock i ncreases and divisions . For example , the modest holding of 4 , 000 M a nchurian Railway stocks i n 1 92 5 grew to 84 , 3 7 5 stocks b y 1 945 . 18 Profits from lands, forests, and capital i nvestments were supple mented by sums allotted from the national treasury to meet the " im perial house expenditure" (koshitsu hi) . As early as 1 869 the Civil Government had allotted a regular sum for court expenses , but the expenses of t he i mperi al family a nd t he sal aries of I mperia l Household M i nistry personnel were paid b y the M inistry o f Fi nance . From 1 886 onward , however, a l ump sum to cover all court expe nses was gra nted to the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry . Moreover, the I mperial H ousehold M inistry was i n no way ac countable to the government for the use of the government allotment ; the court was to have fi nancial autonomy even with respect to 1 6. Ibid . , pp. 27-29, 63-64 . 1 7 . Ibid . , pp. 6 1 -62 , 66, 92-93 . 1 8 . Ibid . , p. 93 .
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monies granted from the national treasury . From 1 88 9 to 1 909 the sum disbursed from the national treasury was fixed at 3 million yen . I n 1 909 the sum was increased t o 4 . 5 million, where i t remai ned until the end of World War II. 19 The only accurate figures on imperial house fi nances from 1 897 are this disbursement from the national treasury and the fi nancial records of the B ureau of I mperial Lands and Forests. I mperial in vestments in public bonds and in both public and private enterprises were cloaked in secrecy, with only occasional figures available on certain investments.2° Kuroda Hisata, however, estimates the annual income of the imperial house in 1 9 1 6 as fol lows : 21 National treasury Bureau of I mperial La nds and Forests Stocks Public and other securities Total
4 , 5 00,000 ¥ 3,000,000 4 , 5 00,000 4 ,000,000 1 6 ,000,000 ¥
By 1 9 1 6 at the latest it is clear that the imperial house fi nanced the maj or portion of its operations from its own resources . From 1 9 1 4 it even had its own bank, the J ugo Cinko. At the end of the war im perial capital (stocks , public securities , cash on hand) was valued by the Occupation authorities at 3 3 6 , 1 5 8 ,890 yen, yielding annual in come of possibly as much as 2 0 million yen . I ncome derived from lands and forests plus sales of land in 1 937 was approximately 8. 7 million yen .22 A very rough estimate of annual imperial house in come around 1 940 would thus be : 23 National t reasury Bureau of I mperia l La nds and Forests Capital investments Total
4,500,000 ¥ 9,000,000 1 5 ,000,000 28,500,000 ¥
1 9 . I bid . , pp. 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 4 , 36, 7 8 . 20. I bid . , p . 7 2 . 2 1 . I bid . , p. 1 00 . Accord ing to Japanese yearbooks, t he average exchange rate of U . S . dollars to y e n i n 1 9 1 6 w a s 5 50.50 to 1 00 ¥ . The i ncome o f t h e imperial house w a s t herefore over 58,000,000 per a nnum in 1 9 1 6 U . S . d ollars. 22. I bid . , pp. 1 20, 1 22 , 249. 23. The biographers of lshiwatari Sotaro, the last I mperial Household M i nister, claim that t here had never been a complete estimate of imperial house properties until the Occupation au t horities dema nded such a valuation after the war. The value fi nally arrived at by I shiwatari was 1 . 6 billion yen (lshiwatari So taro, [Tokyo: lshiwatari Sotaro Denki Hensan Kai, 1 954] ,
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69
All but autonomous in its fi nancial resources , the imperial house was accountable only to itself for both revenues and expenditures . Only increases in the national treasury allotment req uired Diet ap proval , and by 1 940 the national treasury allotment was a mere fift h of the total court i ncome . The court audit, as well as its budget , was completely disti nct from the government's audit and budget and ex clusively under the control of the Imperial Household Ministry . Even the court 's fiscal year (January-December) after 1 89 1 was dif ferent from that of the government (April-March) .24 The chief advisory body on court fi nancial operations was the Im perial House Economic Counci l , created in 1 89 1 . According to the 1 89 1 regulations governing the council , it was to be composed of spe cially appoi nted imperial house economic advisers , the I mperial H ousehold Mi nister, the Vice M i nister, the Chief of the Privy Purse , and the Chief of the Bureau of I mperial Lands. The emperor was to be present at council meeti ngs , which decided o n regul ations governing the management of the hereditary estate, designation of hereditary properties , general provisions concerning the imperial estate, capital i nvestments, the amount and use of the current ac count , budget increases and decreases in the imperial estate and in capital investments, and regulations governing the court audit . Three accounts were created for auditing purposes by the I mperial H ouse Finance Law of March 1 89 1 : the imperial estate account , the capital account , and the current account . The C hief of the B ureau of I mperial Lands was responsible for the estate accou nt , the Chief of the Privy Purse for the capital account , and division and bureau chiefs of the mi nistry for the current account .25 Three accounts were retai ned after the revision of imperial house auditing procedures i n 1 9 1 2 a s well : current , special , and capital . The special account after p . 478). It is also claimed that t he imperial house had origi nally acqui red stocks to give the public confidence in this new form of economic activity : if the emperor invested , others would follow suit (ibid . , p . 47 9). However accurate these claims-and bot h are subject to serious doubts-it remains t hat imperial property a nd i nvestment contributed greatly to the political pur poses of palace autonomy. The excha nge rate at the Yokohama Specie Bank i n 1 940 was U . S . $23 .40 to 1 00 ¥ . The annual i ncome of t he imperial house in 1 940 was therefore around $6.7 million in 1 940 U . S . dollars. 24. Kuroda Hisata, pp. 36, 37-38, 44 . 2 5 . Ibid . , pp. 39-44 .
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1 92 1 applied exclusively to the imperial estate and was the responsi bility of the C hief of the B ureau of I mperial Lands and Forests. The Chief of the Privy Purse looked after both current and capital ac counts and was responsible to the I mperial Household Mi nister for drafting the court budget . These accounts were i nvestigated by the Imperial H ouse Audit Bureau, which did not , however, examine the inner court and " secret " expenditures . Apparently, the budgeting and accounti ng practices of t he court were considerably more flexible than those of the government .26 I mperial lands and forests, imperial house capital, and an all but u nt o u c h a b l e g o v e r n m e n t d i s b u rs e m e n t gave t h e c o u r t t h e wherewithal for legal and administrative autonomy . How these resources were employed , however, depended on w ho controlled the I mperial H ousehold M inistry . With great wealth at its disposal , the palace bureaucracy could conceivably use court funds for political purposes . This would appear to be all the more likely if the Imperial Household M i nister had pol itical aspirations or owed obl igations to gover nment leaders , or if his tenure i n office depe nded o n cooperation w i t h the government leadership of the day . Contribu tions to individual government leaders and politicians , and even to polit ical parties , l i kewise depended on t he nat ure of palace leadership . The secrecy that enshrouded the fi nancial operations of the court is circumstantial evidence that court funds were not used strictly for court purposes . The very autonomy of the court , para doxically, constituted a potential for political abuse . As will be show n in chapter 4, there is some evidence that this potential was indeed exploited , bl urring in operation the distinction between court and government . Managing the aristocracy. If in fact the imperial institution were to be an operati ng symbol of all that was true, good and beautiful i n the Japanese polity, the I mperial Household M i nistry logically would also manage the affairs of social status . This was concretel y implemented by giving the M inistry control over the aristocracy . After several unsuccessful attempts to settle on a system of ranks following the Restoration, a modern aristocracy fi nally came into being in 1 884. The new aristocracy was to be open to ex-samurai 2 6 . Ibid . ,
pp.
80-83 .
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71
and commoners who had made outstandi ng contributions t o the new Japanese polity as well as to ex-feudal lords and ex-Court Nobles . By 1 87 8 the C ouncillors had agreed to create five ranks , and these were formalized in 1 884 as follows : prince , marquis, count , viscount , and baron . Centering on the imperial house , the new aristocracy was to be the statused bulwark of the throne . On the day following the establishment of the aristocracy the emperor reported the i nvestment of titles to the i nner shri ne (kashik odokoro ) , to the shri ne of the im perial spirits (koreiden) , and to the shri ne of the gods (shinden) . The newly invested aristocrats then paid their respects to the inner shrine, dedicati ng themselves to t he service of the imperial house .27 As early as 1 877 a bureau withi n the I mperial Household M i nistry had been establis hed to ma nage t he affairs of the aristocracy . 28 I n 1 884 the Mi nistry was given custody of the family registers of the aristocracy . Marriages and adoptions req uired its approval; 29 in 1 886 the Mi nistry was charged with managing the hereditary property of the aristocracy as well . 30 After several changes in name and clarifications of j urisdiction, the I mperial Household M inistry office in charge of the aristocracy was finally styled the Of fice of Peerage Affairs (Sochitsu Ryo ) . As such, it handled ( 1 ) matters regarding the aristocracy , the imperial family, pri ncely families, and such families as the Korean royal house, i ncluding conferences of princes-of-the-blood and of princes as well as meetings of the I mperial Family Counci l ; (2) supervision of personnel assigned to the imperial family, pri nces-of-the-blood , and princes ; (3) announcements of con ferrals of court rank and peerage titles ; ( 4) regulations governi ng the Peers School and the Peers School for Women; and ( 5 ) preparation of the electoral list of counts, viscounts, and barons for the H ouse of Peers . 31 The director of the Office of Peerage Affairs was either a direct i mperial appoi ntee or an imperial appointee . 32 Ito H irobumi , architect of the new peerage system of 1 884, not 27. Shumpo Kotsui Shokai , 2 : 384-88; I noue Kiyoshi, pp. 94-95 . 2 8 . "Kunai Sho Tasshi Koka, " no. ! , January 1 0, 1 87 7 ; in Horei Zensho, 1 87 7 , p. 950; Kyiitei Kishadan, p . I I . 29. Shumpo Kotsui Shokai , 2 : 386. 30. Ho rei Zensho, 1 886, vol . 1 , pp. 1 78-8 1 . 3 1 . Naikaku Kiroku Ka, 1 942, pt. 3, chap. I, sec. 3, p. 1 6 ; Shokuin Roku, 1 943, pt. I , p . 60 . 3 2 . Naikaku Kiroku K a , 1 94 2 , pt . 3, chap. I , sec. 3, p. 1 9 .
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only managed the affairs of this new class as I mperial Household M inister but was i nstrumental in clarifying the relationship of the new aristocracy to the social order. First , the Peers School was to train the sons of the aristocracy in service to the nation. Second , Ito i nsisted that the new aristocracy reward achievement as well as family heritage i n its composition. 33 One of Ito's first acts after becoming Imperial Household Secre tary in March 1 884 was to resolve the long-standing issue of j uris diction over the Peers School . Created in 1 887 , the Peers School was i nitially supported by contributions from the court and the " peers club , " the latter i ncluding the entire aristocracy at t he time. After considerable difficulty , Ito had the Peers School made a government school under the management of t he I mperial Household Ministry on April 1 7 , 1 884. In so doing, Ito argued that the aristocracy existed to support the social order and to preserve the prosperity of the imperial house . For the aristocracy to operate merely for its ow n group i nterest was " d isl oyal . " 34 Refl ect i ng t he public service orientation of the aristocracy as i ntended by Ito, the curriculum of the Peers School emphasized military subjects and ethics as well as the natural sciences and literature .35 The new aristocrats were to embody the cultural values of the new Japanese nation, combi ning in their education both Eastern ethics and Western techniques . An em phasis on military subj ects reinforced the role of the aristocracy as bulwark of the throne and hence , of national defense . Almost in variably the headmaster was a promi nent military figure; among them were such famous war horses as General Nogi Kiten and General Tani Kanj o . Except those given special exemption, princes of-the-blood all became military officers . 36 Moreover, the Peers School gave concrete express i o n to t he identificati o n of t he aristocracy with imperial rites . Peers School holidays, for example , included the anniversary of t he death of Emperor Komei ( 1 866) , the Rite of Emperor J immu , Empire Day, the emperor's birthday , and Shi nto festivals of the autumnal and vernal equinoxes , new rice , and 33. 34. 35. 36.
S humpo Kotsui Shokai , 2 : 384 . Shumpo Kotsui Shokai , 2 : 378-80. Horei Zensho, 1 884 , p. 1 2 . Goseitoku Fukyii Kai , p . 1 03 .
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harvest .37 The desti ny of the aristocracy as a public class was thus made i nstitutionally coeval with the fortu nes of the state and the im perial house . I n the formative years of the new aristocracy ( 1 884-87) , the aristocracy of merit i ncreased from 33 to 80 families38 B y 1 92 8 the total number of aristocratic families was 956, excl udi ng pri nces-of the-blood . As i ndicated in table 4 , a bare maj ority of aristocratic families ( 487 of 956, or 50.8 percent) were of " miscellaneous" family origi ns . This category was mixed in composition and i ncluded highly stat used hered itary priest s , high-ranki ng feudal branch families , leading retainers of the greater feudal l ords (including the shogun) , and families of high status i n pre-Restoration japan-some of the old Osaka business families, for example-as well as those families whose titles were acquired solely as reward for service to the state and society.39 In this latter category-the merit aristocracyTABLE 4. COMPOSITION OF THE JAPANESE ARISTOCRACY IN 1 928, EXCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE IMPERIAL FAMILIES (PRINCES-OF-THE-BLOOD) Family Origins
Title
Prince M arquis Count Viscount Baron Total souRCE :
Imperial House
Court Noble
Feudal Lord
Miscellaneous
Total
0 5 4 0 0
9 10 29 85 43
3 16 33 220 12
6 9 42 74 356
18 40 1 08 379 41 1
9
1 76
284
487
956
Gendai Ka;:;oku Fuyo (Tokyo : Nihon Shiseki Ky6kai, 1 929), p. 720.
3 7 . Horei Zensho, 1 884, p. I , 298. 38. I noue Kiyoshi, p. 96. 39. I am i ndebted to Herschel Webb for call i ng my attention to t he diversity i n the back grounds of those aristocrats in t he miscellaneous category . In overall composition, therefore, t he pre-Restoration ascribed aristocracy outnumbered the post-Restoration merit aristocracy , even though the merit aristocracy domi nated in the miscellaneous category .
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were Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, both of whom were eventually created princes . Of low rank within the warrior class , both acquired their titles on the basis of merit alone. A nd like the titles of all prewar aristocrats, those granted to Ito a nd Yamagata were made hereditary . The conferral of titles on " servants of the throne" conveyed fiscal reward as well as status . Around 1 884 , for example, those granted the title of count , such as Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, were each given lump sums of 3 5 ,000 yen. In 1 887 each count was given 3 5 0 shares of stock, valued at 1 7 ,500 yen, i n the Nippon Yusen Kaisha . 40 B oth the 1 884 and the 1 887 awards were disbursed from the emperor's Privy Purse . S i nce the I mperial H ousehold M i ni nstry managed both t he affairs of t he aristocracy and an autonomous im perial estate, the financial resources of the imperial house were used to sustain not only the dignity of the imperial house but also that of its bulwark . The Imperial H ousehold M i nistry , therefore, was the bureaucratic means of fusing the hierarchy of social status with that of wealth, or at least of ensuri ng that social status and wealth were commensurate. The aristocracy discharged its public service function in several ways . One of the maj or areas of service was the I mperial Household M i nistry itself. Of the fifty-two men serving in the six leading palace offices between 1 885 and 1 945 , forty-five were or became titled . There were nine princes ( i ncluding one pri nce-of-the-blood), six marquis, ten counts, seven viscounts, and thirteen barons . All twelve men who served as Directors of Peerage Affairs were titled : two pri nces, five marquis, three viscounts , and only two barons , i ndi cating that the aristocracy played a considerable role i n defining its bulwark functions as well as i n managing the affairs of the I mperial Household M i nistry . THE INNER S I D E : SANCTUA RY OF THE EM PEROR-IN-CHA M B E R S
While some aristocrats held leadi ng palace posts, others served in lesser roles , primarily on the inner side of the I mperial H ousehold 40. I noue Kiyoshi, p . 96.
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M inistry as C hamberlains and Stewards. The inner side of the palace bureaucracy and certain positions, such as Master of the Ceremonies , on the outer side , constituted refuges for aristocrats con sonant with their inherited dignity and status while not demanding from them the tough-mi nded abil ities required outside the palace to achieve social and political success-abilities that i n many cases had been possessed by t hose who first acquired titles . Among those who served a lifetime in the palace , for example, was no less a figure t h a n t he adopted son of I t o H i robumi , Pri nce I t o H i rokuni ( 1 870- 1 93 1 ) . After graduati ng from the Peers School and studying briefly in Germany , Hirokuni entered the I mperial Household M inistry , where he remai ned for thirty-nine years . Eventually achievi ng the post of Grand Master of the Ceremonies ( 1 926-29) , he became know n as the "lord of the great i nner mountain."41 If Ito H irokuni is a classic instance of an aristocratic scion taking refuge in the I mperial Household M i nistry , he was by no means the only one . I n 1 93 1 , for example, we find the grandson of oligarch Yamagata Aritomo, Prince Yamagata Arimichi , among the C hamberlains and concurrently among the Masters of the Ceremonies .42 The Cham berlains. It was among the C hamberlains i n particular that many an aristocrat found sanctuary . In 1 942 t he Imperial Household M i nistry's regulations provided for a Grand Cham berlain, two Deputy Grand C hamberlains, and ten C hamberlains.43 I n 1 94 3 , however, there were twelve C hamberlains in addition to the Grand and Deputy Grand C hamberlains . 44 Of the fifteen, eight were titled or in line to succeed and at least three were younger brothers of titled aristocrats. In addition to their predominantly aristocratic background , the C hamberlains also found a measure of group co hesion in educational experience . Twelve of the fifteen C hamberlains in 1 943 had graduated from prewar Japan's foremost university, Tokyo Imperial University .45 Forming the inner ring around the em4 1 . Daz Jimmei jiten, ed . Shimonaka Yusaburo, 10 vols. (Tokyo: Heibon Sha, 1 937-4 1 ) , 1 : 26 1 . 42. Shokuin Roku, 1 93 1 , pt. 3 , p . 1 0. 4 3 . Naikaku Kiroku Ka, 1 942, vol . 1 , pt. 3, chap. 1 , sec. 3, p. 1 . 44. Kunai Sho Shokuin Roku, 1 94 3 . 4 5 . Data on t he personal backgrounds a n d careers o f t he Chamberlains, as w e l l a s all other officials discussed hereafter, have been obtained from published rosters of officials, biographical dict i onaries, biographies , diaries, interviews, and the I mperial Household Agency's personnel files.
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peror and his immediate family, the Chamberlains , usually of high educational attainment and impeccable li neage , were elegant men servants a nd i mperial messengers-paragons of the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry's i nner side . I n contrast to the bureaucrats of the outer side, whose duties were clearly outli ned in the organic law of the I mperial Household M inistry, the Chamberlains had no prescribed duties other than to serve at the emperor's side. Even after the palace admi nistration had become highly bureaucratized , the basic regulation governing the I mperial H ousehold M inistry merely stated that the Board of Cham berlains "takes charge of matters at the side of the emperor. "46 A characteristic of the ministry's inner side , as demonstrated by the Chamberlains, was its lack of formal structure a nd officially stipu lated duties . This was , of course , natural to offices that called for constant companionship with the emperor and imperial family. I rie Sukemasa , Chamberlai n to the emperor since 1 934 and formerly a viscount , has articulated by hyperbole what that companionship en tailed : Outside t here may be persons whom the emperor trusts deeply. Outside there may be persons w hom the emperor respects. But those he considers j ust like t he atmosphere, like t he breezes, paying no heed that they are there-being j ust the same w hether there or not-those are Cham berlains . 47
I rie notes that the role of companion and messenger played by the Chamberlains might invol ve helping the emperor collect mari ne life specimens or goi ng to Taiwan to express the emperor's condolences on such occasions as the great earthquake of 1 93 4 .48 l rie also recalls that considerable freedom prevailed at the side of the Emperor-i n-C hambers . I n 1 93 5 , for example, the Chamberlains kept a book of fines for improprieties i n speech and the sums collected were used for a year-end party. Outside the palace such improprieties , claims I rie, would have been dealt with as disrespect , causing offenders to lose their positions or suffer other serious penalties . Even during the Pacific War, conti nues lrie, such freedom 46. Naikaku Kiroku Ka, 1 942 , vol . 1 , pt. 3 , chap. 1 , sec. 3. 4 7 . I rie Sukemasa , Tenno-sama no Kanreki (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1 962), p . 242 . 48. Ibid . , pp. 232-3 3 , 238-39.
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was protected in the palace . Yoshida Shigeru ( 1 878-1 967 ) , a prewar Foreign M i nistry bureaucrat a nd one of J a p a n ' s outst a ndi n g postwar leaders , w as arrested during the w a r for mentioning the possibility of Japanese defeat. Yet "we" at the palace talked openly about the i nevitability of defeat . 49 "At the emperor's side freedom of speech has been guarded at every turn; there is absol utely no more democratic a place than this . "50 Such "freedom" at the emperor's side also meant the pranksteri ng freedom that prevails among those of an intimate ingroup . Count Kanroj i Osanaga , classmate of the Taisho Emperor (r. 1 9 1 2-26) at the Peers School and a lifetime official of the I mperial Household M i nistry's inner side , states that both the Meij i and Taisho Em perors were surrounded by a band of stalwarts fond of practical j okes . Kanroj i 's uncle, Kadenokoj i Sugekoto ( 1 860- 1 92 5 ) , was one of them, claims Kanroj i . When " Kade" was a page to the Meij i Em peror he , like the other pages , slept in the young emperor's room . On one occasion Kade, unable to sleep , decided to kick the bed i n w hich the emperor was sleeping soundly. The emperor bolted out of bed-it was a time of earthquakes-and looked around hi m. Kade was of course very fast asleep by then. This same Kade , according to Kanroj i again, was know n to yank the sleepi ng Taisho Emperor's blankets off when his ow n had fallen off in the dead of the night . Kanroj i also relates that when he himself and the Taisho Emperor were schoolboys together, they were taught to swim by being throw n willy-nilly into the water by a Colonel Tachibana .5 1 Such pranks , according to I rie, continued as a regular part of inner court life i n the Show a period ( 1 926-) a s wel l . 52 Even acknowledgi ng the at49. I rie Sukemasa , jiju to Paipu (Tokyo: Mai nichi Shimbun Sha, 1 957), pp. 97-98 . 50. l rie Sukemasa , "Okajiki," Matsudaira Tsuneo Tsuiso Roku, ed . Tokyo PR Tsiishin Sha (Tokyo: M atsudai ra Tsuneo-shi Tsuioku Kai, 1 96 1 ) , p . 83. l rie's essays on court life have all been written in the postwar period . Given the t heoretical role played by the emperor in prewar Japan and the protective shell imposed by the palace bureaucracy , such anecdotes could not have been publ ished then. With t he postwar "democratization" of the imperial insti tution, however, l rie and other court persons have published essays, anecdotes, and memoirs about the inner court during the prewar period . I rie in particular has gained a reputation for bei ng the emperor's foremost public relations man. Although his views may be exaggerated and one-sided in an effort to create a more humanistic image for the emperor and court , his essays capture at least some of the atmosphere and activity of court life in prewar Japan. 5 1 . Kanroj i Osanaga, Sebiro no Tenno (Tokyo : Tozai Bummei Sha, 1 957), pp. 42-43 , 4 5 . 5 2 . l rie Sukemasa, "Okajiki . "
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tempts to " humanize" and " democratize" the emperor and court that are so read ily apparent in these postwar accounts of prewar in ner court life , there was clearly a very great gap between the rigid formality and cold sanctity surrounding the Emperor-in-Public and the freewheeling i nformality and intimate fraternity surrounding the Emperor-in-Chambers. Also characteristic of the C hamberlains was the practice of holding concurrent posts in both the inner and outer sides of the Im perial Household M i nistry . Of the fifteen Chamberlains in 1 94 3 , for example, one was concurrently Grand Steward to the Empress , one headed a section of the Office of Court Physicians , and three were on the tutorial board for the children of the imperial family . Not un naturally, a Chamberlain headed each of the three sections of the B oard of Chamberlains, the outer office through which communi cation between the inner court and outer mi nistry offices was chan nelled .53 Since audiences granted to foreign dignitaries as well as visits of worship to the inner shri ne were scheduled by the Board of the Ceremonies ,54 it is not surprisi ng that three C hamberlains served concurrently as Masters of the Ceremonies . One Chamberlain also served concurrently as a secretary i n the General Affairs B ureau,55 an outer office concerned with imperial tours and public relations . The holding of concurrent posts was evidently deemed necessary be cause it was the C hamberlains who had primary responsibility for managing access to the Emperor-in-Chambers , as well as providing companionship to the emperor and members of the imperial family. The primacy of the Chamberlai ns in mai ntaining the privacy of the imperial family by controll i ng access to the i nner court , at least during the 1 930s and 1 940s , is also clear from the official duties of the B oard of Chamberlains. Although the I mperial Household M inistry 's organic law did not specify the functions of the board , the ministry's regulations governing divisions and sections did . The fi rst section of the Board of Chamberlains, the Miscellaneous Section, handled ( 1 ) imperial lectures , (2 ) audiences at court , (3) court allowances and imperial gifts, (4) imperial family records, (5) cus53. Kunai Sho Shokuin Roku, 1 94 3 . 54. " Kunai S h o Bunka Kitei , " in Shokuin Roku, 1 943, pt . 1 , p . 60. 5 5 . Kunai Sho Shokuin Roku, 1 943.
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tody of the board 's seal , and (6) matters not assigned to the other two sections. In coordination with the Office of Aides-de-Camp, that section also scheduled audiences for military personnel . The I nner Court Section of the board managed such matters as butleri ng. The t hird and last section, the Management Section, was in charge of ac counts and possessions of the imperial family .56 Thus the Board of C hamberlains managed the i nner court a nd liaison between the Em peror-in-Chambers and t he Emperor-in-Public. The term of service for a Chamberlain was generally his lifetime . The fifteen Chamberlains i n 1 943 averaged nine years i n office , rangi ng from three to twenty-nine years service . Six of the fifteen were still C hamberlains in 1 962 .57 Obviously, the post of C hamberlain was not a rung on the ladder of advancement to higher office; it was a termi nal appoi ntment . It may be surmised that their seniority , as well as their aristocratic station and educational background , gave the C hamberlains considerable authority in deali ng with the outer side bureaucrats , enhanci ng their ability to preserve t he privacy of imperial family life from outside scrutiny. The Ladies-in- Waiting and A ides-de- Camp . The C hamberlains did not , however, have a complete monopoly over the i nner court cir cuit . There were two other groups w ho shared i n t he function of regular attendance : the Ladies-i n-Waiti ng and the Aides-de-Camp . Until the early twentieth century t he Ladies-in-Waiting had had quite a different function from others in regular attendance : to ensure that there would be an heir to the t hrone. In fact , a court lady of the second rank (gon-tenji) , Yanagihara Naruko ( 1 855-1 943) , was the mother o f the Taisho Emperor. Meij i 's empress had no offspring .58 The Ladies-in-Waiting had been members of the inner court t hroughout t he recorded hist ory of J a p a n , a nd Kanroj i Osanaga estimates that some three hundred of them accompanied the young emperor to Tokyo w hen he was restored as the center of the Japanese polity in 1 86 8 . 59 Only w hen the present emperor became regent i n November 1 92 1 , 5 6 . " Kunai Sho Bunka Kitei , " in Shokuin Roku, 1 94 3 , pt . 1 , pp. 59-60. 57. Kunai Sho Shokuin Roku, 1 943; Kunai Cho C hokan Kambo Hisho Ka , Kunai Cho Shokuin Roku (Tokyo: 1 962) . 5 8 . Kyiitei Kishada n, pp. 1 7 , 1 5 1 . 5 9 . Kanroj i Osanaga, p. 1 42 .
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however, was a successful reform of the Ladies' court life begun, and it was not until 1 92 6 , when the present emperor began his reign , that monogamy was established .60 Until 1 92 1 , and especially in the early Meij i period , the Ladies-i n-Waiti ng were a power to be reckoned with. Like the C hamberlains, they acted as i ntermediaries between the emperor and the outside world . It is even rumored that some leading Restoration figures were turned away by the Ladies when they appeared for audience at the emperor's inner residence . Such Restoration leaders as Sanj o Sanetomi, Iwakura Tomomi, and Saigo Takamori were victims of their perversity .61 In 1 87 1 an at tempt was evidently made to put a stop to the political maneuveri ngs of the Ladies by havi ng prominent civilian and military officials ap pointed to court posts . Among the appoi ntees were the future jiho Yoshii Tomozane and Komeda Torao, two " modernizers" devoted to the reform of t he imperial institution.62 B ut even with maj or ef forts at housecleaning, the traditions of life in the " back i nterior" of the emperor's residence continued up to the end of the Taisho pe riod .63 Until the Showa period , the lives of the one hundred Ladies and their attendants , isolated from the outside world , were replete with jealousies, viciousness , and feuds .64 Even such a life-long member of t he court's inner side as Kanroj i Osanaga states that their existence was " i nhuman, i nappropriate to the new times . "65 When the present emperor married i n 1 92 4 , the old system a nd practices of court Ladies-in-Waiting were fi nally abolished . The " machi nes for produci ng t he emperor's heirs" were replaced by salaried women at tendants . 66 The attempted reform of such a ncient court practices and i nstitu tions indicates the i ntent of the Meij i oligarchs to make the imperial i nstitution a modern structure around w hich popular l oyalty could 60. Nezu M asashi , p. 3 9 ; Kyiitei Kishadan , p. 1 56. 6 1 . Kyiitei Kishada n, pp. 1 52-53 ; Kanroj i Osanaga , p. 1 43 . 62 . Tokutomi l ichiro, Koshaku Yamagata A ritomo Den, 3 vols. (Tokyo: Yamagata Ari tomo-ko Kinen Jigyo Kai, I 933), 2 : 288-89 . 63. Kyiitei Kishadan , p. 1 49; Watanabe lkuj i ro, Meiji Tenno, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Meij i Tenno Shotoku Kai , I 958), I : 1 2 5 -3 1 . 64 . Yanagihara Byakure n , " Y a nagihara l c h i i Tsubone no Kai n i n , " Bu ngei Shu njii (Tokushii) , no. 10 ( 1 956) : 44; Kyiitei Kishadan, pp. 1 50-5 3 . 6 5 . Kanroji Osanaga, p . 1 4 2 . 6 6 . Nezu Masashi , p . 3 9 ; Kyiitei Kishadan, p . 1 45 .
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b e mobil ized i n support of the " new Japa n . " The emperor was not to be the captive of i n ner court anachronisms but a modern symbol of old virtues , and the difficulties posed by as seemi ngly innocuous an institution as the Ladies-i n-Waiti ng were typical of the whole range of problems confronti ng the politicia ns of modernization. Quite a different component of the court 's i n ner circle was the Of fice of Aides-de-Camp . Like the Chamberlains , the Aides-de-Camp served as imperial messengers and regular attendants . Whereas the C hamberlai ns in t heir capacity as messengers linked emperor and government , however, the Aides as messengers li nked emperor and military . The Office of Aides was i nstitutionally unique in the Im perial Household Ministry : provisions governing the organization and duties of the Aides were established by I mperial Ordi nance, not by I mperial H ousehold M inistry decree . Personnel assigned to the palace as Aides were listed i n the Army and Navy rosters as well as in the official roster of the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry , i ndicating that the Aides were less court officials than representatives of the military at court .67 The organization of the Office of Aides-de-Camp i n 1 943 was es tablished by I mperial Ordinance Number 3 1 9 of December 2 8 , 1 908 , as ame nded i n 1 9 1 9 a nd 1 92 0 . That ord i na nce was countersigned by the Prime M i nister, M i nister of the Army , and M inister of the Navy-but not by the I mperial Household M inister.68 Its provisions reveal that control over the Aides rested only minimally with the Imperial Household M i nistry : 1 . The C hief Aide shall be a General or Lieutenant General of the Army or an Admiral or Vice Admiral of t he Navy , by direct i mperial ap pointment [shimp o ] . 2 . Aides shall be officers ranking from Army Captain or Navy Lieutenant 67 . There had been Aides to the emperor from at l east 1 87 5 . In 1 873 a dispute occurred over whether Aides should be officers of the Imperial Guard or of the armed forces. Yamagata Aritomo's argument for Aides appoi nted from the military services won the day . As early as 1 87 9 a Chief Aide-de-Camp was named directly. In 1 885 General Katsura Taro proposed the creation of an Office of Aides-de-Camp after i nvestigati ng European military organizations; his proposals apparently were the basis for the establishment of the Office of Aides-de-Camp which finally occurred in 1 896 (Matsushita Yoshio, 2: 205-06; Tokutomi I ichiro, Koshaku Yamagata, 2: 2 88-92 ; Nezu Masashi , p . 1 1 5) . 6 8 . "J ij ii Bukan Sei" , i n Kunai Sho, ed . , Genko Kunai Sho Hoki Shu, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Horei Shuppa n Kabushiki Kaisha , 1 92 7 ) , with changes entered through 1 938.
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to Army Lieutenant General or Navy Vice Admiral; there shall be five from the Army and three from t he Navy . The functions of t he Chief Aide and Aides are : a . ordinary services t o the emperor b. reporting a nd replying to the throne on military matters c. conveying military orders and commands d. accompanying the emperor at mil itary parades , maneuvers , tours, festivals, rites, banquets, audiences . The Chief Aide and Aides shall be dispatched to mil itary exercises and mil itary in spections . The Chief Aide supervises the work of the Aides . The C hief Aide and Aides are to be treated as members of the General Staff [ Samba ] . When t he C hief Aide a nd Aides are at court they shall observe the regu lations of the I mperial H ousehold M inistry .69
Only the last provision gave the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry any measure of control over the actions of the Aides . The Office of Aides-de-Camp was thus an extra-court institution imposed on the very center of court life . In addition to the eight Aides there was also a staff of seven military officials attached to the office .7° Furthermore, military Aides from the Army and the Navy were attached to every male of maj ority age in the imperial families . The regulations governi ng the duties of Aides to imperial family members were almost identical to those governing the Aides to the emperor. Like the ordinance creati ng the Office of Aides-de-Camp , these regulations were countersigned only by the Prime Minister, Army Minister, and Navy M inister.71 As table 5 indicates , the total number of mil itary appoi ntees at court varied from twenty-eight to thirty-eight during the period from 1 92 1 to 1 943 . Si nce there were only eight Aides to the emperor , they and their staff were only one of the military's wi ndows into court life. Moreover, the maj ority of Aides to the emperor as well as Aides to imperial family members were Army officers . After 1 93 1 the predominance of Army over 69. Ibid, paraphrased . 70. I bid . 7 1 . " Kozoku-tsuki Rikugun B ukan Ka nsei , " I mperial Ordinance no. 2 8 1 , August 1 0 , 1 896, as amended in 1 900, 1 91 5 , and 1 93 2 ; " Kozoku-tsuki Kaigun B ukan Kansei ," I mperial Ord i nance no. 3, October 1 4 , 1 897 , as amended in 1 899 and 1 9 1 6 (ibid . ) . I nterestingly, the rules for Aides to imperial family members were made by each of the two services separately and not by cosponsored I mperial Ordinance.
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TABLE 5. AIDES TO THE EMPEROR AND IMPERIAL FAMILIES : ALTERNATE YEARS, 1 92 1 -1 943 Office of Aides (Aides and Staff) rear 1 92 1 1 923 1 925 1 927 1 929 1931 1 933 1 935 1 937 1 939 1 94 1 • 1 943•
Army
Total 38 35 33 30 28 28 30 31 31 29 29 29
24 21 20 19 17 17 20 21 21 20 20 22
(63 % ) (60% ) (6 1 % ) (63 % ) (6 1 % ) (6 1 % ) ( 67 % ) (68 % ) (68 % ) (69 % ) (69% ) ( 76 % )
Navy 14 14 13 II II II 10 10 10 9 9 7
( 37 % ) (40% ) ( 39 % ) (37 % ) ( 39 % ) ( 39 % ) (33 % ) (32 % ) (32 % ) (31 %) (3 1 % ) ( 24 % )
Total Army 15 19 18 15 14 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
10 12 II 10 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Navy 5 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Imperial Family Aides Total Army 23 16 15 15 14 15 17 18 18 16 16 16
14 9 9 9 8 9 12 13 13 12 12 14
Navy 9 7 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 2
SOURCE : Kunai Sho Shokuin Roku, 1 92 1-43. Aides attached to the Korean royal house have been excluded. It is interesting to note that the roster of officials for the govern ment in toto (Shokuin Roku) does not list the Aides under the Imperial Household Ministry but under the Army and Navy. The Imperial Household Ministry's official roster (Kunai Sho Shokuin Roku) lists the Aides under " attached office" and under each of the imperial princes. • In 1 94 1 and 1 943 one civilian was attached to the Office of Aides ; he is excluded from the tabulation.
Navy at court was even more marked , especially among Aides to im perial family members. That the i nitiative in appointi ng Aides to the emperor lay with the armed forces is strongly suggested by the fact that t he Aides were members of their respective General Staffs . General Honj o Shigeru , Chief Aide-de-Camp from 1 933 to 1 93 6 , has verified that during the 1 930s the military proposed and the emperor a nd court disposed on appointments to the Office of Aides . I n his diary entry of May 25 , 1 93 5 H onj o states that after considerable difficulty in arrivi ng at its selection of t he candidate to be its ranking Aide-de-Camp , the Navy finally proposed two candidates to the throne with clear preference indicated for the first nominee . The emperor, however, selected the
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second candidate, Rear Admiral Hirata N oboru . Honj o immediately notified the Navy of the emperor's decision. The Navy M i nister told Honj o that it was almost without precedent for the emperor to select the second nominee . Admiral Fushimi H iroyasu , Chief of the Navy General Staff, bel ieved that the emperor had q uestioned the " i n tegrity" of the Navy M i nister, or that someone in the palace was en gaging in disruptive activities . The Navy M i nister, however, told Honj o that the matter was closed because the emperor had acted .72 If i n fact this was an unprecedented case , it reveals that the military had more than the power to initiate the appoi ntments of Aides-de-Camp : a recommendation by the mil itary was cl oser to an order that , if not followed by the emperor and court , could create a difficult situation. The emperor did review cand idates for the post of Aide and had some voice in the matter, as the above case indicates . General Yoshihashi Kaiz o, Aide-de-Camp from December 1 944 to November 1 945 , has stated that the emperor checked the q ual ifica tions of each Aide prior to his appointment . In addition to " ability , " qualifications such a s " honesty" and the capacity t o perform liaison work reliably were required .73 Although the appointment of Aides was subject to a measure of negotiation between the military and the court , however, the military had the upper hand . Strengtheni ng the independence of the Aides as palace personnel was the transient nature of their service at court . The Aides were not " permanent " servants of the palace , as were the Chamberlains , but served a tour of duty at the side of the emperor. Chief Aide Honj o Shigeru , for example, obtai ned permission from t h e emperor in 1 934 to have Aides serve three-year tours to duty .74 I n 1 943 the eight Aides , including the Chief Aide , had been in office an average of sl ightly over two years , ranging from nine months to three years eleven months (the Chief Aide, General Hasunuma Shigeru) . Only the Chief Aide resembled anythi ng like a permanent official close to the throne . By contrast , we have seen that the fifteen Chamberlains had been i n office an average of nine years as of August 1 943 . 7 2 . Honjo Shigeru , Honjo Nikki (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1 967), p. 2 1 2 . 7 3 . I nterview with General Yoshihashi Kaizo, March 24 , 1 96 5 . A t the time of the in terview , General Yoshihashi was President of the Self-Defense Force Staff College. 74. Honjo Shigeru , p. 1 99 .
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M oreover, a tour of duty as Aide-de-Camp was usually followed by promotion in rank and advancement in the military hierarchy .75 Of the forty-three Aides w ho served from December 1 92 6 , when the era name changed to Showa , to November 1 94 5 , when the Office of Aides-de-Camp was abolished , seven were i n office w hen the office was abolished and ten were listed as havi ng been transferred without any further notation. Of the remaining twenty-six, twelve were transferred to commands.76 A tour of duty as Aide-de-Camp , therefore , was a stepping-stone to higher office within the military bureaucracy . To take an extreme example, General Anami Kore chika became Army M i nister under Prime M i nister Suzuki Kantaro in April 1 945 ; Anami had been an Aide-de-Camp from August 1 92 9 t o August 1 93 3 during Suzuki's tenure a s Grand C hamberlai n . Appointment to the post of Aide-de-Camp sometimes involved status as well as strictly military q ualifications . I n 1 943 , for example, at least one of the Aides was an aristocrat : Baron Lieutenant Colonel Yamagata Ariakira , a grandson of Pri nce Yama gata Aritomo. A glance at the roster of forty-three Aides between 1 92 6 and 1 943 reveals a few more aristocrats. Viscount Machij i ri Kazumoto, who eventually became a genera l , was an Aide from May 1 930 to March 1 93 5 and agai n from March 1 93 7 to October 1 93 7 . A career Army officer, Machij iri was married to the eldest sister of Prince-of-the-B lood Kaya Tsunenori and was considered i nfl uential because of his marriage . Marquis Rear Admiral Daigo Tadashige , Aide from December 1 93 8 to October 1 94 1 , was of Court Noble origi n : his wife was the eldest daughter of Pri nce Mori M otoaki . I n addition t o those of aristocratic background , there were also Aides related to officials who had been close to the throne . Hirata Noboru , a naval officer who served as Aide from 1 93 5 to 1 93 9 , for example , was the son of former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Hirata Tosuke.77 Given the emphasis on military careers for aristocrats , however, the number of aristocratic Aides was not extraord i nary . It is quite possible that more military officers of aristocratic origi n 7 5 . Yoshihashi i nterview ; i nterview with Chamberlain Irie Sukemasa , 1 964 . 7 6 . Photocopy of a document written by General Yoshihashi Kaizo on I mperial Household Agency stationery [ 1 965 J . 7 7 . I bid . ; Yoshihashi interview .
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served tours of duty as Aides-de-Camp than did those of common origin . As I rie Sukemasa remarked , only "the best" were allowed to become Aides .78 I n general, however, the Aides-de-Camp, who managed the i nner court 's liaison with the military commands , were very different from t he C hamberl a i n s , w ho ma naged access t o t he Emperor- i n C hambers and were primarily responsible for liaison between the in ner court and civilian personnel , both court and government . The Aides were career military officers whose service at court was tempo rary . The C hamberlai ns were overwhelmingly civilian and their positions were all but permanent . A tour of duty as an Aide was in most cases a step up in the mil itary , not the palace bureaucracy . There was virtually no upward mobility among the Chamberlains , at court or elsewhere . Although some Aides were of aristocratic origi n, they were far less aristocratic than the Chamberlains . Fi nally, all the Aides were graduates of t he service academies. Only two of the fifteen C hamberlai ns in 1 943 were products of the aca demies . INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AT COURT
The Office of Aides-de-Camp exemplifies the presence at court of institutional representatives from the " outside" -personnel from the numerous i nstitutions of imperial prerogative beyond the palace gates . Since the emperor was the supreme commander of the armed forces , the General Staff officers of the Office Aides, w ho linked the emperor to the operational commands of the military establishment , could be fully j ustified on constitutional grounds . B ut the emperor also possessed extensive prerogatives in government admi nistration , foreign affairs, and legislation. By the same logic that led to the presence of the military at court , one would expect that the other basic i nstitutions of imperial prerogative-the government mi nistries and the I mperial Diet-would also be represented there . By the 1 930s the court was in fact a mosaic of such institutional representatives . This was especially true of palace bureaucrats i n 7 8 . I rie i nterview .
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positions of responsibility. M oreover, the higher the position of a palace official , the more likely it was that he had had extensive bu reaucratic experience outside the palace . As we shall see in the follow i ng chapter, for example, the four top palace officers after 1 927 were invariably brought into the palace directly from high positions in the government and military bureaucracies . B ut the " outside" i nstitutional representation at court was se lective. Not all institutions of imperial prerogative were represented , nor were they represented equally. Table 6 illustrates the nature of institutional representation at court by giving a statistical summary of the careers and backgrounds of eighty-three palace officials i n responsible positions a t court during 1 943 , from the top four palace officers down to and including the officials who managed the various sect ions of w hich the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry ' s boards , bureaus , and offices were composed . Ladies-in-Waiti ng and some thirty palace advisers have been excluded from the tabulation. Of the eighty-three persons i ncluded , fifty-seven were section chiefs or above , fifteen were Chamberlains , eight were Aides-de-Camp, and three were court physicians . Thirty-six of the eighty-three ( 43 .4 percent) had had at least one year's experience i n the civil bureau cracy prior to entering the I mperial Household M inistry . Twelve ( 1 4 . 5 percent) had come from the military establishment , and ni ne (1 0 . 8 percent) had some degree of other professional experience, such as teaching in private universities . Thus , 6 8 . 7 percent of the Im perial Household M i nistry's leading officials in 1 943 came from the "outside . " Those whose careers were apparently confi ned exclusively to the palace numbered only twenty-six (3 1 .3 percent) . The personnel mosaic at court was essentially made up of the civi l , court , and military bureaucracies , these three clusters ac counting for 89.2 percent of the leading palace officers in 1 943 . Most numerous were representatives from the civil bureaucracy (43 . 4 percent) , w h o outnumbered their " outside" colleagues from the military bureaucracy by three to one. At least seven of the eleven ministries of t he central civi l i a n bureaucracy in 1 940 were represented . One of those ministries , the Home Mi nistry , was the most strongly represented of all the outside institutions of imperial prerogative, civilian or mil itary : 1 8 . 1 percent of the leading palace
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TABLE 6. CAREERS, EDUCATION, AND STATUS OF LEADING IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD MINISTRY OFFICIALS, 1 943 (83 PERSONS) Number of persons
Percentage
CAREER BACKGROUN D :
Civil Bureaucracy Home Ministry Ministry of Agriculture and Commercea Finance Ministry Foreign Ministry Ministry of Justice Ministry of Communications Ministry of Education Court Bureaucracy Military Bureaucracy Army Navy Otherb Business and banking Medical Education Mass media
Total
36
43 . 4 15 6 4 3 3 3 2
26 12
18. 1 7 .2 4.8 3 .6 3.6 3.6 2 .4 31 .3 14 . 5
7 5 9
8 .4 6.0 10.8
3 3 3 0 83
3 .6 3 .6 3.6 0 1 00 . 0%
LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE :
House of Peers House of Representatives None Total
5 0 78 83
6.0 0 94 . 0 1 00 . 0%
COLLEGE EDUCATION :
Tokyo Imperial University Other state universities Military academies Private universities None Total
49 15 12 4 3 83
59 . 0 18 . 1 14 . 5 4.8 3 .6 1 00 . 0%
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TABLE 6.-Continued Number of persons
Percentage
STATUS:
Titled or in line to succeed but not taxpayers Titled taxpayers Titled subtotal Nontitled taxpayers Taxpayer subtotal Neither titled nor taxpayer Total
12
14 . 5 15 . 7
13 25
25
30 . 1 30 . 1
38
33 83
45 . 8 39 . 8 1 00 . 1 %
souRCE : Kunai ShO Shokuin Roku, 1 943, and terse data available in Japanese bio graphical dictionaries and palace files . Given the limited information available, the information presented in table 6 may not be very complete. It is highly likely, for ex ample, that many more than 13 of the 25 aristocrats had tax obligations. N OTE : 1 943 has been chosen because one might expect that in the midst of Japan's greatest war military representation at the side of the emperor would be greater than at any other time. This was obviously not the case. From my perusal of personnel lists and official rosters after 1 920, it would appear that 1 943 was not unrepresentative of the personnel complexion of the Imperial Household Ministry after 1 920, when the institutionalization of imperial prerogatives was largely completed. • I ncludes the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which were created from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1 925. b Other is not quite synonymous with " private sector," since private educational institutions were not entirely free from regulation by the Ministry of Education and certain business and banking activities were closely involved with the state bureaucracy.
officials in 1 94 3 had served i n the H ome M inistry prior to entering the I mperial Household M i nistry . Notably underrepresented was the Imperial Diet . None of the eighty-three officials had ever been elected to t he House of Representatives . O nly five were from the House of Peers, and those five, two princes a nd three marquis, served exclusively by right of hereditary title. None of the eighty three ranki ng officials of the palace in 1 943 had ever been elected by any kind of electorate to any kind of political office. Finally, representatives from the " private sector" of Japanese so ciety-mass media (0 percent ) , private education ( 3 . 6 percent) ,
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a nd banki ng (3 . 6 percent) , and other professions (3 . 6 -were also underrepresented . The palace bureaucracy was I " · , t . 1 1td foremost a mosaic of representatives of the bureaucratic in ·.t tl 1 1 1 i o ns of imperial prerogative . Underlini ng the bureaucratic ' l t. t ral'lcr of these palace officials was the fact that in 1 94 3 , 5 9 . 0 p•·rn·nt had graduated from prewar Japan's most prestigious state u n iversity, Tokyo I mperial University , w hile only 4 . 8 percent were grad uates of private universities . Si nce the imperial i nstitution was the state writ small , it is not un natural that offices resembli ng those of the state existed at court . B ut it does not necessarily follow that officials from the state bureaucracy should serve in the Imperial Household M inistry , however closely state and court offices resembled each other. In other words, an explanation is required for the relatively low percentage (3 1 . 3 percent) of purely court bureaucrats in the mi nistry and for the se lective representation of outside i nstitutions . I n the first place, the palace was the hub of the negotiation process in prewar Japanese politics . The theory of legitimacy set forth in the Meij i Constitution, if practiced , would make the imperial i nstitution the ultimate locus of political resolution because it was at court that policies were to receive fi nal ratification. To have representatives at court from the maj or political components i nvolved in policy maki ng might conceivably facilitate t hat process . The existence of the Office of Aides·de-Camp a nd the B oard of C hamberlains attests to the i nteraction of the military and civil bureaucracies with the court . All of the Aides were career officers i n the Army or Navy and four of the fifteen Chamberlains in 1 943 had prior careers i n the civil bureau cracy . It was the emperor's role as Emperor-i n-State that made such offices and outside representation necessary . The absence of officials with any experience in the elected H ouse of Representatives and the small number and hereditary nature of those from the H ouse of Peers suggests that at least by 1 943 the legislature simply was not important to the process of political ne gotiation a nd ratification that centered on the Emperor-i n-State. And the 1 943 composition of the palace bureaucracy was not , i n fact , atypical of the I mperial Household Mi llistry throughout the prewar period , especially after imperial prerogatives had become thoroughly l o l l 'o l nt·ss I " ' ' ,. , , , )
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i nstitutionalized in the 1 920s. As we shall see in the following chapter, for example, none of the four top palace officers from 1 885 to 1 945 had ever been elected to the H ouse of Representatives . Even though the H ouse of Representatives had acquired considerable power by 1 92 0 , it never ma naged to p lace its i nstitutional representatives i n positions of power at the side of t he emperor. The selectivity of i nstitutional representation at court substantiates the profoundly bureaucratic nature of the political process in prewar Japan . Although a law , to be a law , required passage by the Im perial Diet , the role of law per se was very limited , and all laws re quired imperial sanction as well . Such vital decisions as declarations of war and appointments of Prime M i nisters were always made by the responsible M inisters of State, military chiefs , and imperial advisers and then ratified at the palace , not i n the I mperial Diet . To exaggerate , it was t he i mperial seal t hat u l t i mately made a government policy t he legitimate policy of t he state , not its passage by t he I mperial Diet . The imperial i nstitution was intricately i nterwoven not only with the government but also with society at large . The arrangements for imperial tours by the Emperor-in-Court , for example, c � uld" best be made by officials familiar with l ocal operations; hence the impressive number of ex-Home M inistry officials among the leading court of fici a l s . T he same applies to ma nagement of imperial house properties scattered throughout Japan and the number of officials at court from t he M inistry of Agriculture a nd Commerce. Finally, the imperial i nstitution was the ideal polity writ smal l . In addition to the bureaucracy , representatives of status a nd wealth were prominent at court . At least 30. 1 percent of the leadi ng palace of ficials in 1 943 were titled or in l i ne to succeed, and at least 4 5 . 8 percent were wealthy enough to pay taxes . The I mperial H ousehold M i nistry was t herefore an i nt ricate mosaic of burea ucracy , aristocracy , and pi utocracy-the elements i n prewar Japanese so ciety most highly valued as components of t he " ideal . " B ut i f t hese court officials symbolized t he " ideal" structure of the prewar Japanese polity , they also operationalized that symbol both in government and i n society. Guardians of the emperor's personal will , they were also responsible for translating the imperial symbol
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into the I mperial Will. By the 1 930s the human mosaic at court no longer reflected a unified and stabilized agreement concerning the privileged status of the Emperor-i n-Chambers . With the gradual disappearance of a unified elite in government after t he turn of the century , the imperial i nstitution itself lost its internal unity. By the 1 930s struggles for supremacy among t he institutions of imperial prerogative outside the palace had i nfected even the lower levels of the palace bureaucracy. The following incident reveals the extent to which the walls around the Emperor-in-Chambers had been breached . In October 1 93 1 a Maj or Endo Saburo called on his section chief in the General Staff Of fice, Colonel Imamura Hitoshi . 79 Had Col onel I mamura ever met Sekiya Teisaburo, the Vice Mi nister of the I mperial Household M inistry , Maj or Endo asked . I mamura repl ied that he had met Sekiya but once , and only formal ly. Endo then told Imamura that after he had returned from Europe with Sekiya 's son he had been a regular visitor to the Sekiya house . Suddenly, conti nued Endo, Sekiya had cal led him to his official residence and asked him about the October I ncident , a plot by young Army officers to overthrow the government in October 1 93 1 . Sekiya inquired if it were true that one objective of the plot was to " rectify" the I mperial Household M inistry . Si nce Sekiya had heard from the police that Endo's supe rior, Colonel Imamura , was investigating the matter, he asked Endo to make an appointment for him to see I mamura . Commenting, Sekiya said that he was not worried about the fate of the I mperial Household M i nistry but was concerned over "causing a dist urba nce at the emperor's side . " After delayi ng two or three days because Ima mura was so " busy , " Endo had fi nally come to Imamura wit h Sekiya 's req uest . I n response , I mamura told E ndo that he had heard that Sekiya was a practici ng Christian, but that he would meet him after checking with the Military Affairs Bureau in the Army M inistry . This precaution was necessary , claimed I mamura , because to discuss 7 9 . The following account is from I mamura Hitoshi, Kozoku to Kashikan (Tokyo: Jiyii Ajia Sha, 1 960), pp. 234-44 . Although M aj or Endii is listed in the 1 93 1 and 1 932 Shokuin Roku as a member of t he General Staff Office, Colonel I mamura is not . Accordi ng to I ma mura's account, he became Chief of the Strategy Section, General Staff Office, on August 1 , 1 93 1 but was transferred to t he Shanghai front in February 1 932 . This would explain his absence from both official rosters, w hich are dated July ( I mamura H itoshi, pp. 1 92 , 2 5 8 ) .
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the October I ncident with " outsiders" required permission from the bureau, which had general j urisdiction over such i ncidents . The bu reau consented to I mamura's meeti ng with Sekiya. I mamura then had E ndo arrange a meeti ng with Sekiya for 8 : 30 p . m . at Sekiya's official residence, t he time and place havi ng been selected so that few would see them meeting. W hen they met , Vice M i nister Sekiya told I mamura that persons in t he Metropolitan Police Office had told him that Colonel I ma mura had tracked down the plan of the October I ncident written by its organizers , and that , after divulging its contents only to the top Army leaders , the C hief of the Military Affairs Bureau, General Koiso Kuniaki, had burned the document . Sekiya said it had bee n discovered that the radicals had i ntended to discipline the I mperial H ousehold M inistry thoroughly. Colonel I mamura was dismayed that there might be persons withi n the Army who had set such ru mors flying and that t he Metropol itan Police Office should have spied out the plan of the radicals . He then denied that the organizers were in any way disloyal , asserting to Sekiya that those of the twelve arrested whom he knew were loyal and far above the ordi nary in i n tegrity , however improper their met hods. B ut it was true, I mamura conti nued , that the plotters had intended to rectify the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry . He guessed that t he I ncident 's organizers harked back to the early Meij i period , when the emperor was surrounded by talented men " of the people" ; at present those at court were mostly aristocrats , and " persons truly able to render assistance to His M ajesty are not to be found . " Praising their " l oyal hearts , " I mamura then warned Sekiya that many officers of the I mperial Guards had been involved in the blood sealed pact among the organizers . Knowing full well w hat transpired at the palace , Imamura stated , the officers of the Imperial Guards detested the officials of the I mperial Household M i nistry . Asked to give the reasons for this hatred , I mamura replied that ac cording to what he had heard , the officers of the I mperial Guards felt that I mperial H ousehold M inistry officials treated the emperor as "their emperor, " separati ng him from the eyes and hearts of the people . With police and officials surrounding him every mi nute , the <'mperor was kept away from the people w hen outside the palace, as if he were "touri ng an enemy country or battleground . " The officials
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of the ministry , m other words, were impairi ng the closeness between sovereign and subj ect that had prevailed in the Meij i pe riod . Moreover, the members of the Imperial Guards were not the sons of aristocrats as they had been in the Meij i period but came from middle and lower class homes . Si nce the soldiers came largely from farm villages, and the officers bore heartfelt affection for thei r men, it was only natural that t he officers should be sympathetic to the banners of village relief being waved by Lieutenant Colonel Ha shimoto Ki ngoro.80 Specifying some of the concrete complaints he had heard , and commenting on them, I mamura stated : When Their M aj esties walk in the palace garden the Chamberlains al ways go first along the itinerary . To the sentries of the I mperial Guards , w ho act as imperial escorts, they announce : "You' re an eyesore . Go to the very back, move to a place w here they won't catch sight of you . " Even the more polite C hamberlains say : "Soon Their Maj esties will be in sight . Please wait over there until they have passed . " From w hat I hear the C hamberlains behave as if it were t he era of the tsars of Russia , even i n the palace . I have a req uest to make of those cl ose to the throne . I nstead of this, I would like them to say : "Soon the emperor will pass here . Possibly he may have q uestions. Be close at hand along the route. " As it is now , I am com pelled to say that the C hamberlains are forcibly trying to separate His M ajesty , who is the father, from the soldiers , w ho are the children. The soldiers are i ndignant . I f the I mperial H ousehold officials think the soldiers are such eyesores , why shouldn't every i mperial escort be made up from only palace police ? Why shouldn't the I mperial Guards be dropped ?81
To w hich Sekiya replied : "That 's probably because the sentiments of the B oard of C hamberlains are not clearly transmitted to the Im perial Guards u nits . " Earlier in their conversation he had confessed great concern and promised to look into the officers ' complaints . He caut i o ned C ol onel I mamura, howeve r , t hat " eve n w i t h i n the ministry my authority is weak; I j ust don't have the power to reform this fundamentall y . " After talking with Sekiya for three hours , Colonel Imamura left , much impressed with the sincerity of the Im perial H ousehold Ministry 's vice minister. 8 0 . Hashimoto Ki ngoro ( 1 890- 1 957), an active leader o f t he radical C herry B l ossom Association composed largely of young Army officers, was i nvolved in many of the coup at tempts of the 1 930s as well as military adventurism in C hi na . 8 1 . I mamura H itoshi , p p . 242-43 .
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The above i ncident reveals the extent to w hich inner palace events had become sources of outer institutional complai nts , however fatuous . Complaints of this sort , however, were verbalizations of the deeper i nstitutional st ruggle to declare t he I mperial W i l l i n politics-that is, to determi ne state policy . I n t his i nstance, mal treatment of soldiers by imperial household officials while the em peror and empress were walking within the palace grounds became a rat ionalization for m i l itary p l ot t i ng t o " rect ify " t he I mperia l Household M i nistry . Such rectification usually meant assassination or attempted assassi nation of officials close to the throne, as events soon proved . The leadership of the Army not only declared its sym pathy with the October plotters' motives but also screened the entire plot from public scrutiny, as well as the plotters from public prosecution, on the re.m arkable ground that the I ncident was a strictly " military" matter to be disposed of by strictly " military" personnel . Events of the inner court , no matter how trifl i ng, thus be came rationalizations for action on the part of i nstitutionalized political leaders-i n this case the Army's-in their struggle for su premacy in the state. Despite the institutionalization of palace autonomy , so carefully engineered duri ng the Restoration settlement , and the sophisticated structure of the court for managing the Emperor-in-Public and Em peror-i n-Chambers in both his state and court roles , the palace bu reaucracy was obviously not very successful in preserving the em peror's privacy during the early 1 930s . The imperial institution , howeve r , remai ned a l l but unchalle nged duri ng the extensive changes in Japanese society and the pluralization of political power among the i nstitutions of imperial prerogative, both of which forced the palace gates open to an extent that threatened the security of the Emperor-in-Chambers a nd the lives of " those close to the throne . " The emperor's transcendental position was maintai ned in large measure by the tradition that supported the imperial i nstitution as symbol of the nation as a people, not as a state, and the ability of palace leaders to cope with the trends of the times outside the palace gates .82 H2. Negat ively, thorough police and thought controls made the transcendental imperial in 'l i l ution virtually a taboo by t he 1 930s , at least as far as the general public was concerned .
CHAPTER FOUR
THE OFFICES AND OFFICERS OF PALACE LEADERSHIP
of the emperor's palace sanctuary was the result of institutional competition to declare the I mperial Will in politics and the palace leadership's response to that competition. To place palace leadership in its proper context , therefore , it is first necessary to describe two developments affecting political leadership outside the palace : the institutionalization of imperial prerogatives and the i nstitutionalization of political el ites . B oth affected the nature of political leadership directly, while the politicization of society in fluenced the environment in which that leadership operated . 1 The institutionalization of imperial prerogatives. By the 1 930s the emperor's prerogatives had been completely i nstitutional ized . The I mperial Diet exercised the emperor's legislative prerogative, i n cooperation with o r in opposition to the government leaders o f t he day . From 1 890, when the first Diet was convoked , to 1 900 , when oligarch Ito H irobumi attempted to fuse oligarchic and political party power, t he elected H ouse of Representatives was the i nstitutional base for antioligarch forces : a composite of antimodernizers , political leaders excluded from the Cabi net by the oligarchs, landow ning mal l"ontents, and " liberals" espousing various forms of party government . THE INCREASING INVASION
1 The general izations t hat follow about the nature of prewar political leadership are t•· ntative observations based on preliminary research for a projected study of Japanese political lr·aclcrship and political cha nge after 1 868. .
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Between 1 900 and 1 9 1 8 , however , the House o f Representatives was led by strengthened political parties whose leaders for the most part had had bot h bureaucratic and electoral experience . During this period the House became strong enough to mount an effective chal lenge to "transcendental Cabinets " -Cabi nets composed exclusivel y of civil and mil itary bureaucrats and the bureaucratic proteges of the oligarchs . The House of Representatives' bid for i nstitutional supremacy after 1 9 1 3 , rationalized by Professor M i nobe Tatsukichi 's theory of the supremacy of the emperor's legislative prerogative, was a consequence of the i nstitutionalization of but one of the emperor's pre rogatives . The H ome M i nistry exercised the emperor's prerogatives in mai ntaining peace and order. The emperor's treaty-maki ng pre rogative was exercised by the Foreign M i nistry . The military com mands of the Army and Navy wielded the emperor's prerogative of supreme command , and the military mi nistries his prerogative of military admi nistration. Because all institutions were equally derived from imperial pre rogatives , however, serious j urisdictional disputes developed among them . From at least 1 9 1 4 the " prerogative of supreme command" was used by the military services to defend their i nstitutional i nterests agai nst the I mperial Diet . When the Diet refused to i ncrease military appropriations, for example, the military accused the Diet of violating the prerogative of supreme comma nd . But did a legislative proposal concerni ng the size of t he military establ ishment i nvolve the emperor's legislative prerogative or his military prerogative? The London Naval Treaty of 1 930, as we shall see in this chapter, produced a "sharp conflict between the Navy General Staff a nd the Cabi net . Did a treaty i nvolvi ng combatant ships fall under the emperor's preroga tive of treaty making, exercised by the Foreign M inistry , or the prerogative of supreme command , exercised by the naval comma nd ? A nd who was to decide w hich i nstitution of prerogative had j uris diction? The Privy Council , which advised the emperor on constitu tional issues ? The Supreme War Council , which advised the em peror on basic military policies ? Or the Cabi net , w hich was respon sible for producing and ma nagi ng unified national policies ? The i nstitutions of prerogative were also fragmented i nto subinsti-
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tutions and factional groupings . For example, the legislative pre rogative was exercised by the I mperial Diet , but the Diet was com posed of two feudi ng houses : the appoi ntive and aristocratic upper H ouse of Peers and the elected lower H ouse of Representatives. A fter 1 903 the prerogative of supreme command was i nstitutional ized in two separate and equal command structures : the Army General Staff and Navy General Staff. These subi nstitutions were further frag mented into smaller structures , personal cliques , and opi nion groups . The consequences of i nstitutionalization, fragmentation, and fac tionalism were twofold . First , political leaders were able to maneuver and manipulate by playing one i nstitution or component of imperial prerogative off agai nst another: the Army command against the Navy command , the H ouse of Peers agai nst the House of Representatives , the Navy M i n i stry agai nst the Navy General Staff, the Foreign M inistry agai nst t he Army M i nistry. Second , if one i nstitution of pre rogative or any of its subi nstitutions or groups wished to make or dominate policy , it had to form cross-i nstitutional coalitions . The height of the H ouse of Representatives' i nfl uence, for example, was reached between 1 9 1 8 and 1 93 1 , w hen its leaders united with civilian bureaucrats-most notably those i n the H ome a nd Finance Minis tries . Th"e Control Faction of the Army was able tQ gain predominance in the government only after 1 -93 2 , w hen it formed a coalition with segments of the Navy , renovationist bur�auqats in the civil mi nistries , and a number of sympathetic leaders i n the I mperial Diet . The institutionalization of political elites. Disputes among the plural i nstitutions of prerogative, complicated by i ntrainstitutional competition, might not have endangered the palace sanctuary had it not been for a parallel trend in Japanese politics : the institutionaliza tion of political elites . By the 1 930s the institutions of imperial prero gative tended to be led by men who were products of those i nstitutions . Leadership i n the House of Representatives was frequently held by those with party seniority and the longest record of electoral success . The Army and Navy were led by generals and admirals who had risen to positions of leadership via standardized achievement routes exclu sively within their respective services . If the Foreign Minister was not a career diplomat , w hich he often was, those in positions of leadership _ under him almost i nvariably were . The i nstitutions of imperial pr"ero-
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gative were for t he most part c l osed systems u nder parochial leadership . Under such conditions, political leaders more often than not eq uated the demands of their institution or subinstitution with the national i nterest , translati ng a parochial concern into the I mperial Wil l . Even w hen a mi nister was a " generalist" of lengthy and diverse political experience , he still had to cope with the careerist leaders of his mi nistry and their often narrow policy references . Thus , after the assassination of Prime Mi nister H ara Kei in 1 92 1 and the death of oligarch Yamagata Aritomo i n 1 922 , each of the governmental organs began to insist on its own power-the foreign ministry on its control over diplomacy , the ministry of j ustice on its control over the legal system , the army on its prerogative of supreme com mand , and the Privy Council and House of Peers on their uniq ue posi tions-so much that political agreement became extremely difficult to maintain . 2
Such j urisdictional disputes , especially between the military and civil i nstitutions , i nfused the entire polity . Occasi onally they bordered on the inane. The q osutoppu i ncident of 1 93 3 is an extreme example of rivalry between the Army and the Home M i nistry-and of the con sequences of i nstitutionalized elites operating the plural institutions of imperial prerogative. In June 1 93 3 a traffic policeman in Osaka tried to arrest a private first class who had twice crashed a traffic signal (go stop) . The private i nsisted that as a soldier he was not subject to orders from a policema n. A fight broke out and a crowd gathered . The military police (kempeitai) immediately took custody of the private . The i ncident then went from the local chief of pol ice to the Governor of Osaka , then via the Home M i nistry's C hief of the Police B ureau to the H ome M i nister himself. It went right to the top of the Army Ministry , via the C hief of Staff and Commander of the Army 's Fourt h Division, to which the private was attached . Home M i nister Yama moto Tatsuo argued firmly that Army vehicles must obey the law . Army Mi nister Araki Sadao and other Army leaders i nsisted that soldiers were the "emperor's soldiers . " The Home M i nistry's police 2. Ito Takashi, "Conflicts and Coalitions i n Japan, 1 930: Political Groups [and] the London Naval Disarmament Conference, " in The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives a nd Cases from Four Continents, ed . Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley, a nd M ichael Leiserson (New York : Holt , Rinehart & Winston, 1 970), p. 1 62 . Ito's list could be longer and should i nclude the House of Representatives as wel l .
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authorities retorted that policemen, too, were the "emperor's po licemen. " The C hief of Staff of the Army's Fourth Division declared publicly that the i ncident i nvolved acts that were " violent , i nj urious , a nd insulting to soldiers on active duty , " " a grave incident involving the dignity of the imperial army . " Even the emperor fi nally heard about the dispute . Duri ng Army exercises in October, the emperor asked Army M inister Araki what was going on. M ortified , Araki ordered the affair settled immediately . The Governor of Hyogo Prefecture , who was not involved in the incident , was asked to mediate. In November he produced a compromise to which both sides subsequently agreed . Harmony was fi nal ly restored after some five months of feuding.3 I n this example , the i ntensity of i nstitutional loyalties caused a maj or dispute over the most mi nor of incidents , embroiling Japanese political leaders in a five-month conflict . The time involved i n reachi ng compromises is but one measure o f the intensity o f i nstitu tional loyalties i n prewar Japanese politics . Another is the viability of the compromises reached-whether in fact they settled the disputes . A third measure is the extent to w hich i nstitutionalized elites were willing, or unwilling to condone and manipulate assassination to satisfy their demands. The i ntensity of such loyalties not only affected the efficiency and viability of Japa nese decision maki ng; it also made politics a very dangerous undertaking. During the 1 930s , for example, the Army made dema nds , backed by threat and i nti midation, that the entire population be mobilized for " nati onal defense , " and assassi nation became a means to that end.4 Si nce all policies required im perial sanction, threat and intimidation reached into the palace itself, as we saw in the concl usion to chapter 3 . And si nce the imperial insti tution was the sole referent for each political institution and its policy maki ng claims , it was not uncommon for political elites like those i n the Army to grasp for any imperial token that would make their insti tution's claims to declare the I mperial Will more forceful or those of other i nstitutions less so, again as ill ustrated i n chapter 3 . 3 . Nezu Masashi, pp. 1 28-2 9 . 4 . F o r an analysis o r the Army's invasion i nto all areas o r politics in the name o r national defense and the prerogative or supreme command , see James B. C rowley , Japan 's Quest for A utonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930- 1 938 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 966) .
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Institutionalization, Cabinet coalitions, a nd the palace. The i nstitu tionalization of imperial prerogatives and the i nstitutionalization of elites profoundly affected the operations of the Japanese Cabi net , which was the central institution for translating political demands from the components of the " real polity" i nto national policies , and the operations of the palace , which was the central institution of political ratification for both policy decisions and personnel appoi nt ments at the apex of the Japanese political system . The first effect was an increase i n Cabi net i nstability . Prewar Japanese Cabi nets were not noted for their stability , averagi ng only 1 .4 years in length. B ut Cabi nets between 1 885 and 1 92 1 lasted an average of 1 . 9 years , while the life of those between 1 92 1 and 1 94 5 averaged a mere 1 .0 years . I nstability was also reflected in the number of new M i nisters of State produced annuall y . Between 1 88 5 and 1 92 1 there were 3 . 1 new mi nisters per year; from 1 92 1 to 1 94 5 , 6 . 9 . Si nce some twenty men in both periods served a s Minister of State four times or more , Japanese politics remained ol igarchic as far as the Cabi net was concerned . B ut the nature of that oligarchy changed drastically. The second effect of plural institutionalization was to make the Cabi net a coalition of elites representi ng the competi ng insti tutions of prerogative rather than a coalition of autonomous indi viduals as it had been from 1 88 5 to 1 90 1 , when the ol igarchs held the maj or Cabi net posts.5 By the 1 930s, therefore , Cabinet coalitions reflected the mix of in stitutional strengths at any given time . The Hamaguchi Cabinet of 1 92 9 , for example, emphasized that the House of Representatives was 5 . M uch has been made o f t h e fact that t h e ol igarchs w h o held most Cabinet posts most of the time between 1 885 and 1 90 1 , and even after, were from the two domains of Satsuma and Chiishii . Cabinets between 1 885 and 1 90 1 were assailed as being monopolized by these two "domain cliques . " But the oligarchs were leaders of the nation, not local clans. Although they may have favored as their political proteges those from their own domains, this was by no means always the case. Second , it would be more than difficult to demonstrate that their policies were directed only to the benefit of their local domains. They ruled as national figures, whose loyalties to their domains and to the specific institutions of government they had created were subsidiary to their abid i ng concern with Japan's national development. In this respect they were far more autonomous than t heir successors , w hose institutional origi ns and loyalties often caused them to equate their institution's i nterests with the national i nterest, rather than vice versa . To exaggerate, a political leader in t he 1 930s tended to see his i nstitution as t he nation, not the nation as a w hole composed of many legitimate parts of which his institution was but one.
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the " most equal" of the institutions or subi nstitutions of imperial pre rogative at that time. Seven of the fourteen Cabi net mi nisters , including Prime M i nister Hamaguchi , held seats in the House of Representatives , a nd one more had served i n the House for four years prior to 1 92 9 . These eight ministers had been in t he House an average of fourteen years . At the same time, however, the Army M i nister was a career Army officer, the Navy M inister a career Navy officer, and the Foreign Mi nister a career diplomat . None of the three had had significant , if any, experience outside his ow n institution of prero gative . In addition, the Fi nance Mi nister had moved directly into Cabinet politics from a career in state banking. Both he and the Foreign M inister held seats in the House of Peers by imperial ap pointment . An ex-bureaucrat who had served in the House of Peers si nce 1 9 1 6 and a career Army officer completed the institutional coalition on which the Hamaguchi Cabi net was based . B y way of contrast , General Tojo's Cabinet , created less than two months before the outbreak of war with the United States , represented the triumph of the military . Seven of the fifteen Cabinet posts were held by career Army and Navy officers , and an eighth was held by a doctor whose career had been exclusively i n Army medical schools and hospitals. None of Tojo's Cabi net M inisters had even served i n the House of Representatives and only one , a career Finance M i nistry bu reaucrat , held a seat in the House of Peers when the Cabi net was formed . Again, however, the Cabinet was a coalition of institu tionalized elites . The Foreign M i nister was a career diplomat . The M i nister of Justice had spent his entire career in the Justice Ministry . The M i nister of Commerce and I ndustry and the M i nister of Agricul ture and Forestry were exclusive products of those mi nistries and their predecessor, the M i nistry of Agriculture and Commerce . Toj o's Cabinet was thus a coalition of the bureaucratic institutions of prerogative with the mil itary bureaucracy bei ng the " most equal . " B ut even under total mobilization for war Toj o had t o cope with the I mperial Diet . Thus in the "Toj o election" of 1 942 two of his ministers were elected to the House of Representatives . Later, three were appoi nted to the House of Peers . Throughout his tenure as Prime M inister, from 1 94 1 to mid- 1 944 , Toj o was obliged to appear before the House of Representatives and defend his policies . One
1 04
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Diet member even suggested publicly that Toj o was becomi ng a "dictator. "6 H owever weakly, the I mperial Diet continued to function as the institution of the imperial prerogative of legislation. Because Cabi nets were unstable coalitions of i nstitutionalized elites reflecting the mix of i nstitutional strengths at a ny given moment , policy making a t the national level was a tortured and time consumi ng process that more often than not produced incoherent and inconsistent policies , or policies that simply could not be implemented . The elites could and did break apart the delicate coalitions on which Cabinets were based by insisting on their respective institutional de mands. As early as 1 9 1 2 , for example, the Army brought dow n Saionj i Kimmochi's second Cabi net when Saionj i refused t o accom modate the Army's demand for two new divisions .7 Although the Army may well have been the greatest offender, given the increasi ng i ntensity with w hich it i nsisted on its parochial demands , other i nsti tutions of imperial prerogative were guilty of similar behavior at various times and with varying degrees of success : the House of Representatives , t he Privy Counci l , House of Peers , Navy General Staff, and coalitions of civil bureaucrats . For example, Kiyoura Keigo's " bureaucratic" Cabinet of 1 924 collapsed very shortly after its i nauguration w hen t he House of Representatives " flatly refused to cooperate with the Cabinet . "8 The problem was not only to find a coalition appropriate to the times i n terms of institutional mix . It was also one of finding Prime Ministers and M inisters of State , each of whom commanded the respect of more than one i nstitution of imperial prerogative and would be willing to cooperate i n forgi ng a united policy w hich the i nstitu tions of prerogative would implement , willingly or unwillingly . This meant findi ng leaders with cross-i nstitutional connections, political views that were representative of more than one i nstitution's parochial demands, sophisticated abilities i n the arts of compromise and coalition building, and , given the frequent assassi nations of Prime M inisters and other leadi ng officials after 1 930, a great deal of courage. The i nstitutionalization of elites made such statesmen scarce . 6. Maruyama M asao, Thought and Behaviour, p. 1 7 . 7 . Hugh B orton, japan 's Modern Century (New York : Ronald Press, 1 95 5 ) , p. 250. 8 . Ibid . , p. 307 .
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The institutionalization of prerogatives made it difficult for such statesmen to forge a coherent policy , or to carry out a policy once it was agreed upon . Si nce the emperor appoi nted the Prime M i nister and Mi nisters of State, the palace was deeply involved in the process of formi ng Cabi net coalitions . All Cabinets after 1 92 1 reflected a balance of the i nstitutions of prerogative and their representatives i n accordance with the estimated strengths of those institutions and their leaders . Estimating the strengt hs of institutions and leaders and discoveri ng appropriate coalitions was the responsibility of those who advised the t hrone on political appointments : the Elder Statesmen (the remai ning oligarchs after 1 90 1 ), the Senior Retai ners (ex-Prime M i nisters) , and palace officers , most notably the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal . These advisers , w ho in effect exercised the emperor's prerogative of Cabi net appoi ntments , were the " generalists" in Japa nese politics . For the most part they had had extensive political experience in more than one i nstitution of imperial prerogative and were the most skilled among Japanese political leaders in the arts of coalition building and the politics of consensus . Cabi nets therefore reflected coalitions of institu tionalized elites according to what palace advisers bel ieved desirable for " coping with t he trends of the time" -which may have meant their own policy and personnel preferences rather than a dis passionate and obj ective evaluation of institutional and leadership strengths. Whether palace advisers were partisan consensus makers or obj ective consensus takers, they held primary responsibility for ne gotiating Cabinet coalitions into existence . More than any other si ngle prerogative , therefore , it was the emperor's prerogative of ap pointment that brought the palace i nto the political process . The palace officers responsible for coordinating and facilitating the palace advisory machi nery , as well as for gatekeepi ng policies in the face of institutional pressures to declare t he Imperial Will , were the I mperial Household M i nister, the Grand Chamberlai n , the C hief Aide-de-Camp, and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal . The I mperial H ousehold M i nister, as head manager of the palace bureaucracy , was primarily responsible for mai ntaining palace autonomy a nd the transcendental position of the Emperor-i n-Court . The Grand Cham berlain was the emperor's chief messenger in attenda nce ; his role was
1 06
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far more ambiguous than that of the other three palace leaders , a s we shall see in this chapter. The Chief Aide-de-Camp was the emperor's key military adviser in the palace a nd his chief liaison with the opera tional commands of the Army and Navy . The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was the emperor's pri ncipal palace adviser on political af fairs , excludi ng matters clearly under the j urisdiction of the military commands. Unlike the Imperial H ousehold Mi nister and the Grand C hamberlain, who were strictly court officers and responsible pri marily for t he Emperor-i n-Court , t he Chief Aide and the Privy Seal were adj u nct palace officers primarily responsible for the Emperor-in State i n his military and governmental capacities respectively. Behi nd all four palace leaders were the curtai ned advisers to the throne-the Elder Statesmen and Senior Retai ners w ho held primary responsi bility for advisi ng the Emperor-i n-State , via the Privy Seal , on who should be appoi nted to make and manage national pol icies . These four palace officers also managed the process of imperial ra tification of political policies in cooperation with the government leaders of the day , both civil and mil itary . I mperial ratification, as the fi nal act in an essentially closed a nd bureaucratic political proce�s , was to endow decisions of state with dignified mystery . Conducted within the walled a nd moated imperial palace , imperial ratification was an " i nvisible" process designed to keep the entire prewar system of decision making i nvisible . Only the decision was to be public, not the process itself. The assertions that have j ust been made about the political process outside the palace and the relation of the palace to that process are substantiated at least in part by the following discussion of the I m perial Household Mi nister, Grand Chamberlai n , Chief Aide-de Camp, and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal as officers and offices of palace leadership from 1 885 to 1 94 5 . All four officers were members or part ners of the oligarchy as it evolved from a group of autonomous political leaders to an unstable collection of i nstitutionalized elites . Begi nni ng with a description of t he evolution of palace leadership from 1 885 to 1 94 5 , this chapter deals in considerable detail with the duties , personal ities , and behavior of each of the four palace officers . It concludes with a comparative portrait of these leaders and an analysis of the role of the palace as it evolved over time, with an emphasis on the 1 930s.
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1 07
TH E EVOLUTION OF PALACE LEADERSH I P : A PRELIMINARY PERIODI ZATION AND ANALYSIS
We may begin our discussion of the four most important palace of ficers by dividing the evolution of palace leadership into a seq uence of stages . The starting poi nt is 1 885 , the year in which the cabi net system was adopted and the first Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal ap pointed . By 1 885 oligarchic power had been consolidated both i n government and i n court . The structure a nd offices of the palace bu reaucracy had also been largely consolidated . The only office of court leadership not in existence by 1 885 was that of Chief Aide-de-Camp ; although there had been Aides-de-Camp at court from at least 1 87 5 , the formal creation of the Office of Aides-de-Camp did not occur unti l 1 896. The evolution of palace leadership after 1 885 may be divided into five stages : ( 1 ) oligarchic control ( 1 8 8 5 - 1 9 1 2 ) ; (2) transition to leadership by career bureaucrats from the i nstitutions of imperial pre rogative outside the palace ( 1 9 1 2-2 1 ); (3) bureaucratic leadership at the emperor's side by the constitutional monarchists ( 1 92 1 -3 6) ; (4) replacement · of the constitutional monarchists by the traditionalists ( 1 93 6-40) ; and (5) bureaucratic leadership by the traditionalists ( 1 940-4 5 ) . These periods may also be viewed as subdivisions of im perial reigns . The last two-thirds of the Meij i period ( 1 885-1 9 1 2 ) was a time o f oligarchic unity a t the palace . The Taisho peri od ( 1 9 1 2-26) was a one of transition, and the prewar and wartime part of the current Showa period ( 1 926-45) a period of balanced i nstitu tional representation at court led first by the constitutional monar chists and then by the traditionalists. B oth peri odizations , however rough, reveal a conti nuous response on the part of palace leadership to the changi ng circumstances of politics outside the palace gates . Table 7 lists the names and years of appointment of all persons holding the four leadi ng palace offices between 1 885 and 1 94 5 . I n contrast t o the Taisho and Showa periods, the Meij i period witnessed a high degree of tranquility at the emperor's side . From the end of 1 88 5 through 1 9 1 2 there were only nine changes in the personnel of the four offices . If we calculate changes in office against cumulative years , the average tenure for each palace officer was 1 0 .7 years . Until late 1 9 1 2 , when Pri nce Katsura Taro became Privy Seal and concur-
1 885 1 886 1 887 1 888 1 889 1 890 1 89 1 1 892 1 893 1 894 1 895 1 896 1 897 1 898 1 899 1 900 1 90 1 1 902 1 903 1 904 1 905 1 906 1 907 1 908
Tanaka Mitsuaki
Hijikata Hisamoto
Ito Hirobumi
rear Appointed Household Minister
Tokudaiji Sanenori
Grand Chamberlain
Nakamura Satoru
Okazawa Kuwashi
Chief Aide
Position
Tokudaiji Sanenori
Sanjo S anetomi
Privy Seal
TABLE 7 . PERSONS HOLDING THE FOUR LEADING PALACE OFFICES AND THEIR YEARS OF APPOINTMENT, 1 885-1 945
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1 926 1 927 1 928 1 929 1 930 1 93 1 1 932 1 933 1 934 1 935 1 936
1913 1914 1915 1916 1�17 1918 1919 1 920 1 92 1 1 922 1 923 1 924 1 925
1 909 1910 191 1 1912
Usami Okiie
Hyakutake S aburo
Matsudaira Tsuneo
Nara Takeji
Uchiyama Kojiro
Honjo Shigeru
Suzuki Kantaro
Chinda Sutemi
Tokugawa S adataka
O gimachi S anemasa
Hatano Takanao K atsura Taro Takatsukasa Hiromichi
Yuasa Kurahei
lchiki Kitokuro
Nakamura Yiijiro Makino Nobuaki
Hatano Takanao
Iwakura Tomosada Watanabe Chiaki
Saito Makoto lchiki Kitokuro
Hamao Arata Makino Nobuaki
Hirata Tasuke
M atsukata Masayoshi
O yama Iwao
Katsura Taro Fushimi S ad anaru
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Fujita Hisanori
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Yuasa Kurahei
IHMD ; Shokuin Roku ; Ijiri Tsunekichi, Rekidai Kenkan Roku (Tokyo : Choyokai, 1 925) ; and Toyama and Adachi. N OTE : Ito Hirobumi had headed the Imperial Household Ministry since 1 884 and Tokudaiji had been Grand Chamberlain since 1 87 I . In 1 936 Ichiki Kitokuro was appointed Privy Seal for one day as a procedural step to have the murdered Saito replaced. The list of Chief Aides is as accurate as possible, given the lack of information on this office available from the Imperial Household Agency before 1 926.
souRCE :
1 940 1 94 1 1 942 1 943 1 944 1 945
1 937 1 938 1 939
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TABLE 7.-Continued
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111
rently Grand C hamberlain, leadership at the palace like that in the government was firmly in the hands of the oligarchs , who either held Cabi net offices ( 1 8 8 5 - 1 901 ) or exercised control i ndirectly as Elder Statesmen and via proteges in the Cabi net ( 1 90 1 - 1 2 ) . Palace leaders were securely under the oligarchs in terms of both status and alle giance throughout the Meij i period , despite the fact that , with the one exception of Ito Hirobumi from Choshu , they were either Court No bles or restorationist samurai from other than Choshu or Satsuma , the two domai ns that had spearheaded the Restoration. That a Court Noble, Prince Tokudaij i Sanenori , was able to serve concurrently as both Grand Chamberlain and Privy Seal for over twenty years , from 1 89 1 to 1 9 1 2 , attests to the solidity of the Restoration settlement as far as palace leadership was concerned . The first ten years of the Taisho period , from 1 9 1 2 to 1 92 1 , were , however, years of transition and confusion in the nature of palace leadership . This is indicated by the high rate of turnover in the leading palace offices (a change in one of the four officers every 3 . 4 years) and the diversity i n origi ns and status of t hose holdi ng leading palace posts during that period . A political protege of oligarch Yama gata Aritomo (Katsura Taro) , oligarchs as Elder Statesmen ( O yama lwao and Matsukata Masayoshi) , a pri nce-of-the-blood (Fushimi Sa danaru) , former Court Nobles ( O gimachi Sanemasa and Takatsukasa Hiromichi ) , successful civil bureaucrats (Watanabe Chiaki and Ha tano Takanao) , and creatures of the military bureaucracy (Uchiyama Koj iro and Nakamura Yujiro) all found their way into the four leading palace offices . There seems to be no pattern in their appoi nt ments-no effort , for example, to balance institutional forces at the side of the emperor-although Yamagata and his allies apparently domi nated at court . Judged by the marked increase i n personnel changes and the diversity of palace leadership between 1 9 1 2 and 1 92 1 , the oligarchic unity surroundi ng the throne up to 1 9 1 2 was clearly lost . Those close to the throne were no l onger exclusively the band of Restoration " stalwarts" praised by Kanroj i Osanaga .9 With the appoi ntment of Count Maki no N obuaki as I mperial Household M i nister in February 1 92 1 , palace leadership entered a new era . The leaders who domi nated the palace from Makino's ap9 . See above,
p. 7 7 .
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pointment until 1 936 were constitutional monarchists-proponents of M inobe Tatsukichi 's theory of constitutional monarchy or a more conservative variant-led outside the palace by Pri nce Saionj i Kim mochi and i nside the palace by , most notably, Count Maki no, B aron lchiki Kitokuro, and Admiral Suz uki Kantaro . After the death of Prince Matsukata Masayoshi in 1 924, moreover, the powers pre viously held collectively by the Elder Statesmen devolved solely on Prince Saionj i as the " last of the Elder Statesmen . " From 1 92 1 to 1 93 6 , therefore, palace leadership was primarily i n the hands of a small group of partisan bureaucrats under Pri nce Saionj i ' s tutelage who were the products of Japan's new bureaucratic and educational system. With one exception they were political leaders brought i nto the palace from successful careers " on the outside . " A measure of stability at the side of the emperor was also restored by this like minded group of palace officers . Between 1 92 1 a nd 1 936 a change i n one o f the four palace officers occurred o n an average o f once every five years . The young officers' unsuccessful but bloody coup of February 2 6 , 1 93 6 , followed b y t he only complete shift i n palace leaders during the entire period from 1 885 to 1 945 , marks the start of the last phase i n the evolution o f palace leadership. The new palace group emerging duri ng the 1 930s, the traditionalists, achieved preemi nence i n court councils with the appoi ntment of M arquis Kido Koichi as Privy Seal in 1 940 and the death of Prince Saionj i that same year. Led by Pri nce Konoe Fumimaro outside the palace and by Marquis Kido inside, the traditionalists disavowed the partisan stance of the constitutional monarchists . In effect , they restored the " neutrality" of the throne in politics by recommendi ng personnel and policies " appropriate to the new times . " As such, the traditional ists were concerned more with na tional unity than with substantive policies , more with discovering and havi ng the emperor ratify a true " national consensus" than with pursuing a specific set of domestic or foreign policies . The constitutional monarchists persisted in their policy and person nel preferences until the assassinations a nd threats of assassi nation from 1 930 to 1 93 6 forced them to desist . One reason why the tradi tionalists , Kido Koichi in particular, took a " neutral" stance was precisely to preserve t he transcendental position of the emperor : to
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113
persist i n recommendi ng to the throne "liberal " domestic policies and " pro-Anglo-American" foreign policies was to invite assassi nation not only of government leaders but also of the leading palace officers , thereby jeopardizing the emperor and the imperial institution . The traditionalists , like the constituti onal monarchists at court , were all creatures of Japa n's modern bureaucracy . They also main tained the same balance of institutional forces at the emperor's side that had been established by the constitutional monarchists. Whereas the constitutional monarchists had manipulated this institutional balance as best they could to realize their partisan purposes , however, t he traditionalists used it to ensure the accuracy of the " national consensus" on which they based their recommendations to the throne . Since the traditionalists were " neutral , " moreover, they could allow new policies and men to lead the nation i n accordance with the "trends of the times" revealed by the national consensus , regardless of the direction of those trends. Thus Privy Seal Kido, as the emperor's chief adviser from 1 940 to 1 945 , could preside over both the com mencement of war agai nst the United States in 1 94 1 and the sur render of Japan in August 1 945 . In short , he was able to recommend the appointment of a Prime Mi nister who would be able to lead the nation i nto war " i n accord with the times" in 1 94 1 and one who would be able to surrender the nation " i n accord with the times" in 1 945 , before the nation was obliterated . That meant General Toj o in 1 94 1 and retired Admiral Suzuki Kantaro i n 1 94 5 . Finally, a s i n 1 9 1 2 -2 1 , the rise of the traditionalists was marked by great i nstability in the four palace offices , chiefly as a result of the Feb ruary 2 6 I ncident of 1 93 6 . Between 1 93 6 and 1 940 a change in one of the four officers occurred every 2 . 3 years . With Kido's appoi ntment as Privy Seal i n 1 940 and the Japanese government under the near hege mony of the military , stability was once again restored at the side of the emperor. Accepti ng this summary statement about the evol ution of palace leadership from 1 88 5 to 1 945 for the moment , what general charac teristics did all four palace leaders have in common throughout that period ? First , to poi nt out what palace leaders were not , it is most conspicuous that none had ever held elective public office (excluding those elected to the House of Peers from among their aristocratic peer
1 14
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group) . Second , only five of the thirty-seven men ( 1 3 . 5 percent) who held the top four positions at court from 1 88 5 to 1 945 could possibly be identified as career court figures : Tokudaij i Sanenori , Iwakura To m os a d a , T a k at s u k a s a H i r o m i c h i , T o k u g a w a S ad a t a k a , a n d O gimachi Sanemasa. All o f the others were brought into positions of leadership at the emperor's side from successful careers outside the imperial household. After 1 927 not a si ngle appointment was made from among career court bureaucrats, although some of those ap pointed served for a time in the palace prior to assuming one of the four top positions . Table 8 presents career data on the thirty-seven men who held one or more of the top four offices at court from 1 88 5 to 1 945 . Quite ob viously, palace leadership was composed predominantly of members of the House of Peers with considerable bureaucratic experience and achievement : 5 9 . 5 percent were at one time or other members of the House of Peers , 4 5 . 9 perce nt Privy Counci l l ors , 3 7 . 8 percent Ministers of State , and 2 7 . 0 percent Supreme War Councillors. Si nce the number of times a person held high official position is also in dicative of his political success or importance , column 5 has been in cluded in table 8 . Most revealing i n this respect is the fact that the fourteen who had served as M i nisters of State served thirty-seven times in that capacity, suggesting a high degree of political success and competence prior to enteri ng the palace . That the thirty-seven palace leaders should have among them six Prime Ministers , servi ng in that capacity twelve t i mes , is also a measure of t he high political achievement of the group i n general . Table 8 (columns 3 and 4) also reveals that appoi ntment to one of the four leading palace offices generally termi nated the given person's official public career. Of the 1 2 6 times the thirty-seven palace leaders served in high government office, 1 04 times (82 .5 percent) occurred prior to or concurrent with holding top palace office; only 22 times ( 1 7 .5 percent) occurred after leavi ng palace office . Si nce the average age of the palace leaders upon assumi ng office was 6 1 .7 years , there was , of course, not much time left for future political aspirations . I n fact , thirteen o f the thirty-seven (35 . 1 percent) died within two years of leavi ng office . The career backgrounds of the palace leaders also suggest that the
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TABLE 8 . HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICES OF THE FOUR LEADING PALACE OFFICIALS, 1 885-1 945
(37 PERSONS) Number of Times in Position
Number• of Persons (2)
Before or Concurrent with Palace Office (3)
6 ( 16 . 2%) 1 4 (37 . 8 % )
7 36
5
12 (9 . 5 % ) 3 7 ( 29 . 4 % )
( 10 . 8% ) (45 . 9 % ) (27 . 0 % ) (2 1 . 6 % ) (59 . 5 % ) (8 . 1 % ) (0 % )
2 14 8 ll 22 4 0
5 6 3
0 0
7 20 ll 12 23 4 0
1 04
22
Position (l)
Prime Minister Minister of State President of the Privy Council Privy Councillor Supreme War Councillor Top military postsh House of Peers• Ambassadors House of Representatives Total
4 17 lO 8 22 3 0
After Palace Office (4)
Total Number of Times (5)
(5 . 6% ) ( 1 5 . 9% ) (8 . 7 % ) (9 . 5 % ) ( 18 . 3% ) (3 . 2% ) (0 % )
1 26 ( 1 00 % )
soURCEs : Miwa Kai and Philip B. Yampolsky, Political Chronology of Japan, 1885-1957 (New York : East Asian Institute of Columbia University, 1 957) ; Toyama and Adachi ; Gikai Seido Shichijii Nen Shi (Ki:r.okuin-Sangiin Giin Meikan) , ed. Shiigiin-Sangiin (Tokyo : Okura Sho Insatsu Kyoku, 1 960) ; biographical dictionaries in Japanese and English. • Since almost all of the 37 palace officers served in more than one important govern ment position, the totals for column 2 add up to more than 37 and 100 percent. b For the purposes of tabulation, "top military posts" were limited to the following : Chief of the Army General Staff, Chief of the Navy General Staff, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau (Army Ministry) , Inspector General of Military Education, and Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau (Navy Ministry). • Only one person, Baron General Nakamura Yiijiro, was elected or appointed to the House of Peers twice. Of the 23 times the 37 leading palace officers served in the House of Peers, 9 were by imperial appointment, 10 by right of title, and 4 by election (among counts, viscounts, and barons).
palace leadership was even more a mosaic of the valued i nstitutional forces in prewar Japanese political society than was t he second echelon of palace officialdom described in chapter 3 . In terms of achievement , it was a far more prestigious group of military and ci vilian leaders ; fully twenty-eight of the thirty-seven (75 .7 percent)
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held a t one time o r another one o r more of the highest military o r ci vilian offices , excl uding ambassadorships and memberships i n the H ouse of Peers . Palace leaders were also of high status . Of the thirty-seven, at least thirty ( 8 1 . 1 percent) achieved or inherited titles . Of these thirty , one was a prince-of-the-blood , eight were pri nces , one a marquis, eight counts , four viscounts , and eight barons . I n proportion to the total aristocracy (table 4) , palace leaders were drawn more often from the upper than from the lower artistocracy in terms of titles ulti mately achieved . Palace leaders were also draw n more from the merit than the hereditary aristocracy : twenty-six of the thirty acquired their titles as rewards for service to the state . Top palace office was not generally a refuge for the scions of aristocrats . Palace leaders were , however, linked by family ties not only among themsel ves but also with political and social leaders outside the palace . I n the Meij i period , Pri nce Tokudaij i Sa nenori epitomized the i ntri cate web of family that connected Japan's sociopolitical elites by mar riage and adoption. One of Tokudaij i 's younger brothers was Pri nce Saionj i Kimmochi ( 1 849- 1 940) , who was closely aligned with Ito Hirobumi 's side of the oligarchy . 10 The political opponent of Yama gata Aritomo's willful protege , Katsura Taro, Saionj i alternated as Prime M inister with Katsura between 1 90 1 and 1 9 1 2 . As mentioned previously, Saionj i became the leading spirit of the constitutional monarchists at court and leading adviser to the throne after the last of the oligarchs, M atsukata M asayoshi , died i n 1 92 4 . Another of T o k ud a ij i ' s b r ot hers was B a r o n S u m i t o m o K i c h i z a e m o n ( 1 864- 1 92 6), a leadi ng figure i n one of prewar Japan's four leading i ndustrial and fi nancial combi nes . Tokudaij i 's eldest daughter mar ried Pri nce Takatsukasa Hiromichi ( 1 8 5 5 - 1 9 1 8 ) , Grand Chamber lain from 1 9 1 2 to 1 9 1 8 . Tokudaij i 's second daughter married a mar quis sci on of the feudal domain of Akita ; his third , a M itsui of the M itsui combine; his fourt h, a viscount scion of a nother feudal do main; and his fifth, a prince of the Satsuma domai n . One of Tokudaij i 's sons became a consultant (goyogakari) to the Household 1 0. Saionj i served in three of Ito's four Cabinets and Matsukata Masayoshi's second Cabi net ; he never served under Yamagata or other u ncomprom i s i ng ad vocates of "transcendental Cabi nets . "
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Ministry , another a Chamberlain, and the third a director of Mit subishi Heavy I ndustries . Tokudaij i was thus related directly to top court and government leaders , scions of the old feudal domai ns, and leaders in three of the four maj or industrial-fi nancial complexes in prewar Japan . Japan's last Privy Seal ( 1 940-4 5 ) , Marquis Kido Koichi (b. 1 889) , was almost equally well connected . His wife was the fifth daughter of General Count Kodama Gentaro ( 1 852- 1 9 1 6) , Army M i nister from 1 900 to 1 902 . Kido's sister, Yaeko, married Kodama 's fourth son, Kodama Tsuneo, an Army officer and one-time director of Manchuria A i rl i nes . A mong Kido's brot hers-i n-law were Kodama Hideo ( 1 876-1 947) , Mi nister of Overseas Affairs from 1 934 to 1 93 6 and subseq uently three ti mes M i nister of State ; Kodama Kyiiichi , a Home M inistry bureaucrat ; Kodama Kunia and Kodama Sadao, both busi ness executives , and Kodama Tomoo, one time commander of the Japa nese Army i n Taiwan, who was married to the third daughter of B aron General Nakamura Yiij iro, Household Mi nister from 1 920 to 1 92 1 and a protege of Yamagata Aritomo. Kido's younger brother, Wada Koroku , was a famous aeronautical engi neer. Kido's eldest daughter, Takiko, married the eldest son of General Abe Nobuyuki , Prime Mi nister i n 1 93 9-40 . The family relationships of Pri nce Tokudaij i and Marq uis Kido illustrate the iron law of family that li nked Japa n's sociopolitical elites throughout the prewar period . Family connections served to unite merit and ascribed status as well as to link the components of Japanese society laterally across the top. But much too much behavioral cau sality has been attributed to family connections in Japan. Family only opened up opportunities ; it did not ensure success . On the contrary , the great use of marriage and adoption may have even assured the in fusion of talent and ability into lead ing social and political roles . The four leadi ng officials at court , in summary , had generally achieved high bureaucratic positions outside the palace prior to be comi ng palace leaders , were representatives of the military and government bureaucracy as well as the interlocki ng merit and ascribed aristocracy , and termi nated successful public careers " at the side of the emperor. " Why the palace req uired such capable public leaders from the outside is answered in part by the theory of legitimacy , which
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made the imperial institution the center of political authority. I f in fact that theory were operative , all acts of government would req uire ra tification by the I mperial Will . And if the Imperial Will were to have authoritative meaning, ratification would req uire a high degree of political skill at court-to ensure that the emperor ratified a generally agreed upon policy (a consensus) or that he ratified a partisa n policy promoted by palace leaders in alliance with policy advocates in the government proper. That bureaucrats from the top strata of Japanese political society held or controlled the four leading palace offices from 1 885 to 1 945 is prima facie evidence that such a theory was indeed operative and that government leaders held to the theory of imperial prerogative with tenacity. THE I M PERIAL HOUSEHOLD M I N I STER : C H I E F M ANAG ER OF T H E EM PEROR-IN-COURT If you were to ask me I 'd say that it 's by havi ng the M i nister and Vice M i nister brought i n from the outside that the I mperial Household M i nistry gets its raison d 'etre as a n " I mperial Household M i nistry i n l i ne with the times" in the fi rst place . To cover its tracks , as it were, with persons from within the mi nistry-si nce neither a Kido nor a Hirohata are in fact outside people-a nd not to bri ng i n people from the outside would be tantamount to letti ng the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry dig its ow n grave . If that know-nothing bunch [ i n the mi nistry ] alone had their ow n way, wouldn't they ultimately deprive themsel ves of their ow n raison d 'etre ? Pri nce Saionj i Ki mmochi 1 1
The pol icy o f selecting the Imperial Household Mi nister from out side the " know-nothing" career officials at court was consistently pursued from 1 885 to 1 94 5 . All twelve of the Household M i nisters between 1 88 5 and 1 945 , a nd indeed many of the Vice Mi nisters , achieved some measure of success in the government bureaucracy prior to enteri ng the palace . Although only one Prime M i nister was among their number, six (50 percent) had been Mi nisters of State , seven ( 5 8 . 3 percent) had been or became Privy C ouncillors (i nclud i ng 1 1 . As quoted by Baron Harada Kumao, Pri nce Saionji's political secretary, in 1 932 (Harada Kumao, Saior!]i-ko to Seikyoku, 9 vols. [Tokyo: lwanami Shoten, 1 950-56] , 2 : 397).
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two Presidents) , one ( 8 . 3 percent) had served i n one of the leading military positions , and six (50 percent) received imperial appoint ments to the House of Peers at one time or another. Only two ( 1 6 . 7 percent)-the last two Household Ministers-were not titled ; only one ( 8 . 3 percent), Iwakura Tomosada, was anything approachi ng a court figure , and he had served for nine years as Privy Councillor before his appoi ntment as Household Mi nister in 1 909. If approximately twenty years i n a given institution is arbitrarily selected as sufficient for defining " career, " the number of I mperial Household Mi nisters whose careers were in the Home M i nistry num bered three (25 percent), in the Foreign Mi nistry two ( 1 6 . 7 percent) , and in the Army , the Finance Mi nistry , the Justice Mi nistry , and the court bureaucracy one each ( 8 . 3 percent) . I have classified the remaining three Household M inisters (25 percent) as Restoration bu reaucrats, si nce these Household M i nisters had served in a variety of positions in a bureaucracy and political system t hat was of their ow n creation prior to becomi ng Household Mi nisters ; they do not fit any fixed career category . More revealing, however, is the correlation between career back ground and length of tenure in office as Household Mi nister: Restoration bureaucrats Home M i nistry bureaucrats Foreign M i nistry bureaucrats J ustice M i nistry bureaucrats Army officers Fina nce M i nistry bureaucrats Court bureaucrats Total
23 years I 5 years 1 3 years 6 years 1 year 1 year 1 year 60 years
Throughout the sixty-year period between 1 885 and 1 945 career Army officers held the mi nistership but one year, i ndicating that the normal practice was for civilian bureaucrats to occupy that post, espe cially those from the Home and Foreign M inistries after 1 92 1 . I n general , an I mperial Household Minister termi nated a suc cessful public career in that office . There were notable exceptions , however. Ito Hirobumi became Prime Mi nister three ti mes and President of the Privy Council twice after he resigned as Household Mi nister in 1 887 . lchiki Kitokuro became President of the Privy
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Council in 1 934 after having served a s Household M i nister for eight years . Makino Nobuaki became Privy Seal i n 1 92 5 after four years as Household M i nister; Yuasa Kurahei also became Privy Seal after serving as Household M i nister. Averagi ng five years in office , however, t he Household M i nisters held office independent of Cabi net changes , except in 1 93 6 when assassinations caused changes in bot h court and Cabinet , and were thus "above politics" throughout the prewar period . The average age on assuming office, moreover, was 5 8 . 3 years; ranging in ages from 44 to 67 , the Household M inisters were quite young. As a group they were not venerables given their of fice as reward for services rendered but competent bureaucrats ex pected to end their public careers "at the side of the emperor. " Perhaps an exami nation of the prescribed duties of the I mperial Household M i nister's office will reveal, at least in part , why Pri nce Saionj i would i nsist on extra-court bureaucrats to admi nister the court bureaucracy . The 1 886 reorganization of the I mperial Household M i nistry merely stated that the H ousehold M i nister was to decide upon all matters regarding the affairs of the imperial house, to supervise the palace staff and staffs to the imperial family and family members, and to manage the aristocracy . The 1 886 act was signed by the Household M inister alone . 12 As early as 1 88 9 , however, the or ganic law of the I mperial Household Mi nistry was revised to specify the j urisdiction of the Household M i nister in greater detail . I n ad dition to the duties set forth in 1 88 6 , the Household M i nister was em powered to issue directives to subjects of the realm regardi ng imperial house matters such as palace ceremonies , festivals, and imperial tours . He was also empowered i n this respect to issue directives to the S uperi ntendent Ge neral of Met ropol i t a n Police (Tokyo) , t he Governors of the Prefectures , and other government officials. 1 3 As chief manager of the public role of the Emperor-i n-Court , therefore , the Household M i nister was directly involved with the government , especially the H ome M inistry , which had j urisdiction over prefectural Governors as well as over the ordi nary police establ ishment . Palace autonomy did not mean the isolation of the court from the government but rather a symbiotic relation between the two i n w hich i nitiative in 1 2 . "Kunaisho Tasshi , " no. I , February 4 , 1 886. 1 3 . Shokuin Roku, 1 894, vol . I , pt . 2 , p. 1 3 .
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arranging the public d isplay of the Emperor-in-Court rested with the H ousehold M i nistry , w hile t he act ual arra ngeme nts req u i red government cooperation . The H ousehold M inistry's reorganization of 1 907 further ac knowledged the entanglement of court and government that actually occurred i n the exercise of t he mi nistry 's duties . 14 Significa ntly, t he 1 907 act was countersigned by the Prime M i nister and Home M inister as well as by the Household M i nister. 1 5 A paraphrase of t he fifteen articles concerning t he Household M i nister reveals the prob lems of relati ng court a nd government that had emerged between 1 886 and 1 907 : 1 . The I mperial H ousehold Minister shall be a direct imperial appointee [shinnin I and shall be responsible for "advising and assisting" ( hohitsu I the throne on all matters regarding the imperial house. 2 . He supervises the personnel of the ministry and concurrently has ju risdiction over the aristocracy . 3 . When it is necessary to abolish, revise or enact I mperial House Ordi nances [Koshitsu Rei] , the H ousehold Minister prepares appropriate drafts for presentation to t he throne. If the draft concerns the work of other Ministers of State, the H ousehold Minister shall report the draft j ointly with t he Prime Minister or with the Prime Minister and concerned Ministers vf State . 4 . The Household Minister may prescribe regulations necessary to enforce Imperial H ouse Ordina nces and carry out his other duties. If such regulations concern the fu nctions or responsibilities of ot her Ministers of State they shall be passed upon by the Prime Minister and concerned Ministers of State. 5. The Household Minister may promulgate ordinances on matters under his jurisdiction. 6 . He may issue orders and directives to the Superintendent General of Metropolitan Police and to l ocal officials regarding matters under his j urisdiction. 7. I n accordance wit h imperial comma nd , he may dispense relief, awards, and grants. 8 . He reports to t he t hrone promotions and retirements of Household M inistry executive appointees (so nin l , as well as officials treated as imperial appointees (chokuninl and executive appointees . He decides 1 4 . Although t here was one more ministry reorganization prior to the end of the Pacific War, the 1 907 reorga nization was in fact the last major revision regarding the duties of the Household Mi nister. The last prewar reorganization took place in 1 92 1 . 1 5 . Naikaku Kiroku Ka, 1 920, vol . I , pt. 3 , pp. 6-8.
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o n promotions and retirements of official appointees [ hannin] , those treated as official appointees, and other lower ra nking officials. He reports to the throne investitures in rank of Household Ministry personnel and members of the aristocracy . He reports conferrals of decorations to the throne through the Prime Minister. With imperial sanction the Household Minister may create advisers and special officers to the ministry regarding matters under his j uris diction . When in il l health or otherwise indisposed the Household Minister may appoint t he Vice Minister to perform the duties of Minister tem porarily . B ut in this capacity t he Vice Minister shall not go beyond public promulgations in accordance wit h the I mperial House Law and countersigning in accordance with the Public Forms Ordinance [Koshiki Rei] . The Household Minister may delegate part of his duties to the Vice M i nister and the bureau and section chiefs . He may not obstruct the proceedings of the audit . He may establish, regulate, and abolish divisions or sections within the secretariat and other bureaus and divisions under his j urisdiction. He may establish posts of imperial appointee , executive appointee , and official appointee and stipulate their d uties ; posts of executive ap pointee and above require imperial sanction. 16
No later than 1 907 , therefore , the fact of interaction between court and government was officially acknowledged regarding ( 1 ) drafts of Imperial H ouse Ordi nances , (2) regulations established to carry out those ordi nances , (3) police and local officials, predominantly those under the Home Mi nistry , and ( 4) conferrals of decorations , w hich were handled through the Bureau of Decorations in the Prime M inister's Office . The I mperial H ousehold M i nister in 1 907 was Count Tanaka Mit suaki ( 1 843- 1 939) , the second of two loyalists from the domain of Tosa to head the household bureaucracy between 1 887 and 1 909 . Tosa had been one of the four maj or domai ns i n the politics of Res toration, but its role had been one primarily of negotiation and media tion between the two most active restorationist domai ns of C hoshii and Satsuma. B oth Ta naka and his predecessor as Household M inister, Count H ijikata Hisamoto ( 1 833-1 9 1 8 ) , had played nego tiator roles in forging the C hoshii-Satsuma alliance on which the 1 868 1 6 . Shokuin Roku, 1 9 1 0, p t . 2 ,
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Restoration was engi nee red . 17 After the Restorat i o n , more Im port a ntl y , Tanaka conti nued his role as negotiator within t he oligarchy , the oligarchy bei ng pri marily from C hoshu and Satsuma . He has been credited , for example, with acting as midwife for Ito Hirobumi 's third Cabi net in January 1 898. 18 After Tanaka became Household M i nister in February of that same year, he remained a middleman to the oligarchy ; that Tanaka " acted as a safety valve i n the political world while in office a s I mperial Household Mi nister i s a n absolutely inescapable fact . " 19 Tanaka was the last true Restoration loyalist , or participant i n the politics of Restoration, to head the household bureaucracy . But he was a loyalist of a particular stamp .20 He did not seek to challenge the C hoshu-Satsuma oligarchs from within by building a court consti tuency , as his fellow clansman, Sasaki Takayuki , apparently did as a jiho i n 1 877-7 9 . Nor did he attempt to challenge them from without by building an antioligarch political party, as did another Tosa clansman, ltagaki Taisuke . Tanaka appeared content to be a member of the charmed Restoration ingroup surrounding the throne and to ne gotiate among and on behalf of the oligarchs . Si nce the government was i n fact domi nated by leaders from C hoshu and Satsuma well into the twentieth century , it was also logical to have the Household M i nister appointed from a domai n other than those two: such a selection would give the I mperial Household Mi nistry at least the semblance of detachment from alleged factional strife in the government while allowing the oligarchs influence at court as wel l , dependi ng on the person selected as Household M i nister. As late as 1 92 1 Count Makino Nobuaki told 1 7 . Tomita Koj i ro, p. 292; Sawamoto Kenzo, ed . , Hakushaku Tanaka Seisan (Tokyo: Ta naka-haku Denki Kanko Kai, 1 929), pp. 1 6 1 -8 3 ; Hijikata-haku, 2d .ed. (Tokyo: Toyo I nsatsu Kyoku, 1 9 1 4) , pp. 240-49. On Tosa 's role i n t he Restoration see M arius B. Jansen, Sakamoto Ryo ma and the Meiji Restoration (Princeton : Pri nceton University Press, 1 96 1 ) . 1 8 . Tomita Koj iro, p p . 298-30 1 ; Sawamoto Kenzo, p p . 426-2 8 . 1 9. Sawamoto Kenzo, p. 430. 20. The variety of Army, police, and court offices held by Tanaka between 1 868 and 1 909 reveals the difficulty i n categorizing the "career background" of all the Restoration leaders. Tanaka achieved the rank of major general in t he Army a nd was at one time t he Superintendent General of Metropolitan Police. He also served as Chief Cabinet Secretary, a post t hat t his predecessor, H ijikata Hisamoto, had also held . Tanaka entered t he palace as a court adviser in 1 89 1 a nd served as Vice M inister of the Household M inistry from 1 895 to 1 897 .
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Privy Seal Pri nce Matsukata M asayoshi t hat in selecting a successor to Household M inister General Nakamura Yuj iro: We should select as successor to the I mperial Household Minister someone suitable from among persons other than those of Satsuma or Choshu origins. The times have changed . To give the people the im pression t hat Satsuma and C hoshu have always monopolized power even in the palace is simply wrong. 2 1
As second-ranki ng members of t he Restoration ingroup, bot h Tanaka and his predecessor were ideal candidates for leadi ng t he court bu reaucracy : they possessed Restoration status and were committed as negotiator-mediators to the new government evolved by the oligarchs . Tanaka 's actions as Household M i nister ( 1 898- 1 909) i ndicate t hat the Household M i nister's i nteraction with the government , as sug gested by the 1 907 description of t he Household M i nister's duties , oc curred largely i n his capacity as chief manager of t he Emperor-in Court . I n that capacity Ta naka defended the formal autonomy of t he court with ferocious tenacity, dow n t o the most trifling matters of cere mony . He had resigned as Vice M i nister of t he Household Mi nistry i n 1 897 over a dispute with the government concerning who was to an nounce t he death of t he empress dowager, t he I mperial Household M inister or the Prime Mi nister. The emperor's view was solicited a nd the Privy Council 's advice asked . Tanaka 's i nsistence that the an nouncement be made i n the name of the I mperial Household Mi nister was upheld but at the expense of Prime M i nister M atsukata's friend ship, and Ta naka resigned over t he difficulties caused .22 After becomi ng H ousehold Mi nister in 1 898 Tanaka conti nued t o defend t he formal parity o f court and government w i t h equal stub bornness. O n one occasion Prime M i nister Katsura Taro asked Ta naka to come t o the Prime M i nister's residence for a discussion. Ta naka refused : I ' m not under the Pri me M i nister; the Imperial Household M i nister is i n an independent position outside the Cabinet . Other than H i s Majesty I a m t o b e under n o one's orders . Of course , I have the greatest respect for 2 1 . Shimozono Sakichi , Makino Nobuaki-haku (Tokyo: Jimbunkaku, 1 940) , I ronically, Nakamura's successor w a s Makino, w h o was himself from Satsuma . 2 2 . Sawamoto Kenzo, pp. 422-2 4 .
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Prince Katsura as an individual . . I refused because if Prince Katsura had some matter to take up with me he should come here . For me to go on summons would be unacceptable in view of my office . 23 .
.
Katsura then called back and said he would come see Tanaka if Ta naka were inconvenienced . Once he received this ritualistic ac knowledgment of his " office" from the Prime Mi nister, Tanaka re plied that he would go see the Prime M i nister and immediately ordered a carriage .24 How Tanaka served as political mediator among government leaders and participated in policy at this time is not the issue here; his behavior in both i nstances cited above showed extraor dinary sensitivity to the symbolic separation of court and government and to the formalistic role of office in palace politics . Preservation of parity also i nvolved the preservation of the court 's fi nancial autonomy from government encroachment . I n 1 902 , for example, Tanaka refused to give imperial lumber to the Home M i nistry free of charge for the reconstruction of the Grand Shrine at Ise. Tanaka argued that si nce the court and the government had separate budgets, and si nce the government already had a budget allocation for rebuilding the shri ne, the Home M i nistry should pay the I mperial Household M i nistry a suitable price . To keep the dis t i nction between court a nd government free of confus i o n , he continued , there must be no government inroads on imperial house property . The Cabinet reconsidered the matter and the Home M i nistry subseq uently bought the lumber.25 Household M i nister Ta naka was in no sense the servant of the government , and he perceived his office as granti ng hi m great freedom of action agai nst the government and its leaders on court matters , as he defi ned them. If Tanaka kept the government at bay , he also acted firmly with both the court a nd the emperor . J ust after Tanaka had become H ousehold M i nister in February 1 898, Prince-of-the-Blood Komatsu req uested a B udd hist fu neral for t he late Pri nce-of-t he- B l ood Yamashina, as Pri nce Yamashi na had req uested in his wil l . With the support of the Privy Council Tanaka refused the request on the grounds that a member of the imperial house held a position above 2 3 . Tomita Koj i ro, p. 477 . 2 4 . I bid . , pp. 477-7 8 . 2 5 . Ibid . , pp. 3 1 0- 1 1 .
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all religions; the funeral service had t o b e one appropriate t o the status and position of the imperial family.26 Tanaka also had a considerable reputation for goi ng agai nst the emperor's wishes and for doing precisely what he believed his office demanded . Tanaka's biographer, Tomita Koj iro, states that hardly anyone dared counter the emperor to his face , not even the Elder Statesmen, Grand Chamberlain , or Privy Seal . Tanaka , however, would argue with the emperor " as a comrade. " 27 On one occasion the emperor is reported to have flared out at Tanaka's stubborn resista nce : "Aren't you a Maj or General ? You 're breaking mil itary discipline if you don't listen to the order of your supreme com mander. " Tanaka retorted : " I ' m sorry , I wasn't speaking in my ca pacity as Maj or General . I must beg your indulgence on this matter from my position as Imperial Household Mi nister . " 28 I n 1 904 General Yamagata Aritomo was dispatched to the front to review the Russo-Japanese War situation. For this purpose he requested t hat Tanaka obtai n two of the emperor's horses . The em peror, claims Tomita, had very little he could truly call his ow n other than his beloved horses . When Tanaka approached the em peror with Yamagata's request , the emperor flatly refused . After unsuccessful attempts to obtain the emperor's permission, Tanaka fi nally handed over two of the emperor's horses to Yamagata without a word to the emperor. Overj oyed , Yamagata immediately audienced with the emperor and t hanked him for his generosity .29 Tanaka viewed his relationship with the emperor as one of sole responsibility for advisi ng and assisting the throne on court and household affairs , but " t o obey imperial directives to the letter, without offeri ng the slightest admonition, cannot be called fulfilling the responsibility of advice and assistance , to my way of thinking. " 30 In this i nsta nce " admonition" took the form of disobedience. C ommenti ng o n Tanaka ' s position as I mperial H ousehold M i nister, Tomita argues that a courageous person of Tanaka's in tegrity was needed to maintai n t he sepa rat i o n of court and 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.
Ibid . , Ibid . , Ibid . , Ibid . , Ibid . ,
308-09 . 484-8 5 . p . 483. pp. 484-8 7 . p . 47 9 . pp. pp.
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government in t he face of clique politicians anxious to achieve their ambitions Y Tanaka evidently demonstrated such courage not only toward the government but also toward the court and t he emperor as wel l . It would appear that for Tanaka the emperor was a fellow Restoration " stalwart , " a comrade i n arms who could be rebuked both from the standpoi nt of Tanaka 's perception of " office" and from the spirit of competitive comradeship that prevailed among the oligarchy . As recognized in the 1 907 orga nic law of the Imperial H ouse hold Ministry , palace autonomy obviously did not mean isolation for the emperor as Emperor-in-Court . I mperial house funds were used to emphasize the role of the emperor as social paragon, as symbol of socially desirable styles , activties , a nd goals. To encourage education , for example, an imperial gift of 50,000 yen was granted to Fukuzawa Yukichi in 1 900. In 1 908 Waseda University received 30 ,000 yen from the I mperial Household M i nistry .32 Since the emperor was "the father and mother of his people , " the " standard of public morals , " and the " fundamental basis of institutions and culture , " such uses of privy monies were amply rationalized .33 B ut the emperor was also the " fount of politics . " 34 The vast sums available to the H ousehold M i nister had political uses as well . I n 1 8 9 2 , for e x a m p l e , t h e I m p e r i a l D i et refused t o p a s s t h e government 's naval shipbuilding budget . A t the request o f the Cabinet , which sought to overcome Diet opposition by imperial rescript , the emperor called a meeti ng of the Prime M inister , Privy Councillors , and the Speakers of both houses of the Diet . An im perial rescript was subsequently issued to the effect that for the next six years 300 ,000 yen per year would be allocated from the court fund for naval shipbuilding.35 This sum was one tenth the annual allotment to the court from the national treasury . Quite clearly, the oligarchs in government and the leaders at court cooperated in a political maneuver to maintain the supremacy of oligarchic decision making . 31 . 32. 33. 34 . 35.
Ibid . , pp. 306-07 . Ibid . , pp. 329-30. Sawamoto Kenzii, p. 441 . Ibid . Kuroda Hisata , pp. 75-7 7 .
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This action also demonstrated the " sacrifices" that the emperor was willing to make for " patriotic" goals. But privy monies were also used for political manipulation that had no such patriotic ra tionalization. Hara Kei , for example, recorded a conversation with oligarch I noue Kaoru on December 4, 1 90 1 , i n which I noue stated that the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry had on at least one occasion given oligarch Yamagata Aritomo court funds . W hen Hara spoke with Pri nce Saionj i two days later, Saionj i told him that Yamagata had at one time received the enormous sum of 980 ,000 yen from the Household M i nistry . Hara confessed amazement : it was difficult to believe that such a sum was needed merely to establish a Cabinet , as Yamagata's request to the throne had stipulated . Despite Yama gata's reputation for i ntegrity , Hara was firmly convi nced that Yamagata had used this and other sums from the court to bribe members of the H ouse of Representatives . In 1 90 1 Prime Minister Katsura Taro asked H ousehold M i nister Tanaka for a similar "contribution . " Although he had given funds from the privy purse to a number of oligarchs up to that poi nt , Tanaka refused Katsura's request , evidently because Katsura was not an oligarch. Hara specu lated that Katsura , like Yamagata, intended to use such court funds , had they been made available, to entice members of the House of Representatives to go along with Cabi net policies .36 Apparently Yamagata conti nued to tap court funds later as well by having his proteges appoi nted Household M i nister from 1 909 to 1 92 1 .37 There exists , t herefore , some evidence to support I noue Kiyoshi's claim that "this extensive imperial house property did play the political and military role that Iwakura [Tomomi] had hoped . " 38 H ousehold M i nister Tanaka was i n fact an agent of the oligarchs brought into the palace from the " outside" to enhance cooperation between court and government i n managi ng the Emperor-i n-State . As i ndicated by Tanaka's refusal to give Katsura court monies and other uncooperative acts already noted , Tanaka cooperated only with the oligarchs (Elder Statesmen) , not with their proteges or other 36. Hara Kei Nikki, 9 vols. (Tokyo: Tokyo Kengen Sha, 1 950), 2 : 454-56. 3 7 . Fukumoto Kunio, Kanryo (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1 959), p. 66. 3 8 . I noue Kiyoshi , p. 94 . Unfortunately , I have been unable to fi nd any further evidence of such political uses and abuses of court funds . It is difficult to believe that t hey were not greater than I have found and t hat t hey did not continue.
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lesser political leaders .39 The available evidence suggests that Ta naka willingly coordinated the I mperial Will in politics with the policies of the oligarchs , while mai ntai ning the formal separation of court and government . Tanaka's actions as H ousehold M i nister re veal the significance of Saionj i ' s caveat that H ousehold Mi nisters be " brought i n from the outside" : a H ousehold M inistry " i n l i ne wit h the times" was one that cooperated with the domi nant political forces at any given moment i n managi ng the Emperor-i n-State , w hile maintai ni ng the autonomy of the Emperor-i n-Court . The "dominant political forces" -in Tanaka's time a handful of Cabi net oligarchs or oligarchs acting as Elder Statesmen-had chief responsi bility for political decision making, for defining the official I mperial Will in politics . The H ousehold M i nistry cooperated with the government i n this process . With regard to the Emperor-i n-Court , howeve r , t he palace bureaucracy held t he i nitiative, a nd the government cooperated with t he Household M i nister i n maintaining the autonomous image of the public Emperor-i n-Court . Between 1 909, w hen Tanaka resigned , and 1 92 1 , when Count Makino Nobuaki became H ousehold M i nister, there were four H ousehold M inisters . One was predominantly a palace official (lwakura Tomosada) , one a Home M i nistry bureaucrat (Watanabe C hiaki), one a J ustice M i nistry official (Hatano Taka nao) , and one a career Army officer (Nakamura Yiij iro) . The average term of office between 1 885 a nd 1 945 was five years . The average between 1 885 and 1 909, however, was eight years , while that between 1 909 and 1 92 1 was but three years . B oth the freq uency of changes and the va riety of career backgrounds brought to the office of Household M i nister between 1 909 and 1 92 1 suggest that this was a period of transition for the court bureaucracy as it adj usted to t he loss of Res toration leaders . I n contrast to the tranq uility that had prevailed at t he side of the emperor during the period 1 885 to 1 909, the period 1 909 to 1 92 1 was one of confusion as the leadership at court strug gled to get in line with the new times . From 1 92 1 to 1 945 , however, the I mperial Household Mi nisters , with the possible exception of Ishiwatari Sotaro, were drawn from a 39. Katsura was Yamagata's leading protege (Tetsuo Najita, Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise, 7905- 7 9 75 !Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard University Press, 1 96 7 ] , p . 8 1 ) .
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group of civilian bureaucrats whom I have called the constitutional monarchists . M ost important , perhaps , was Ichiki Kitokuro , Household M i nister from 1 92 5 to 1 93 3 . Although lchiki had been a career bureaucrat i n the Home M inistry and served as Education Mi nister i n 1 9 1 4- 1 5 , H ome M inister i n 1 9 1 5 - 1 6 , and Privy Councillor from 1 9 1 7 , his importance did not derive from such na tional visibility . In 1 894 lchiki had become professor of law at Tokyo I mperial University while remaining an official in the H ome M inistry . In that same year Ichiki 's most celebrated pupil , M i nobe Tatsukichi, entered the university. It was from Ichiki that M inobe was to acquire the basic ideas of his " organ theory " (kikan setsu) of constitutional monarchy , a theory that gained primacy in Japanese constitutional thought duri ng the 1 920s and which was also accepted by a number of Japan's leading bureaucrats.40 lchiki 's very presence in the palace as chief manager of the Emperor-in-Court suggests the acceptance of his theory , or of M i nobe's more liberal variant , by the court leadership during the 1 920s and early 1 930s. lchiki argued that the "supreme right of rule" over w hich the em peror exercised general supervision was lodged i n the state as a legal person. The state exercised its supreme right of rule through " organs" (kika n ) , the highest of which exercised general control . When a monarch was the highest organ of state but governed with the cooperation of other organs, such as a legislature, he was a constitutional monarch. For these reasons , Ichiki concluded , Japan under the Meij i Constitution was a constitutional monarchy . The emperor as highest organ of state was, however, under very little restriction : he could at any time divest another orga n of state of its power. The Imperial Diet , according to lchiki, could not assert its powers over M inisters of State, si nce ministers were responsible in dividually to the emperor. W hile placi ng the emperor under law , as embodied i n the constitution, lchiki allowed no government organ to check the emperor.41 I n M i nobe's hands, however, lchiki's organ theory was greatly liberalized . W hile mai ntaining t hat the emperor was the highest organ of state, M inobe i nsisted that the emperor was bound by the 40. Nihon fimbutsu. Shi Taikei, 7 vols. , 3d ed . (Tokyo: Asakura Shoten, 1 963 ) , 7 : 270. 4 1 . Ibid . , pp. 2 7 1 -73.
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constitution; were he t o act arbitrarily, the emperor would be vio lating Japan's long history as well as the constitution. Moreover, M inobe made the I mperial Diet i n effect the highest organ of state under the emperor . Minobe's theory was ultimately an attack on the independence of the bureaucratic institutions of prerogative and on "transcendental Cabinets . " If pushed to its logical conclusion, his theory j ustified the creation of Cabinets responsible to the elected House of Representatives , w hile still preserving the sanctity of the emperor as sovereign u nder law . Mi nobe never asserted the demo cratic pri nciple of popular sovereignty , but his theory might have led to democratic government . The orthodoxy of M inobe's theory , as far as the palace leaders and t heir allies were concerned , is i ndicated by the fact that he received an imperial appointment to the H ouse of Peers in June 1 932 . B y this time, however, the worldwide depression and right wing movements in Japan had brought on a reaction that ultimate! y forced M inobe to resign that post . His theory was condemned i n 1 93 5 a s contrary to the ideals o f Japan's national polity-ironically, with t he support of rightists and ultraconservatives i n the very insti tution he had so strongly supported : the I mperial Diet . More signifi cantly , lchiki was dislodged less than a year later from the presidency of the Privy Counci l , an office he had taken in May 1 934 . The attack on M i nobe became the vehicle for bringing about lchiki 's downfal l , si nce lchiki was allegedly responsible for " the importation of the hateful doctri nes . " 42 B y extension, it also became an attack on court leaders and the emperor's close advisers , ultimately en couragi ng the outbreak of assassinations and attempted assassina tions that peaked on February 2 6 , 1 93 6 . M iller's a nalysis of the M inobe i ncident of 1 93 5 shows most dramatically that the condem nation of M i nobe's theory was the catalyst for a massive attack on the constitutional monarchists in government and court by renova tionist a nd militarist bureaucrats in t he government .43 Despite the eclipse of t he constititional monarchists following M inobe's ouster and the assassi nation and attempted assassi nation of 42 . M iller, p. 2 1 8 . 4 3 . Ibid . , pp. 1 96-2 5 3 .
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the emperor's close advisers i n February 1 93 6 , the constitutional monarchists never lost control of the H ousehold M i nister's office . The Household Minister from 1 93 6 to 1 945 was Matsudaira Tsuneo, a career diplomat w ho had been ambassador to the United States ( 1 925-28) and England ( 1 929-3 5 ) . He was, like most palace leaders of the 1 920s and early 1 930s, pro-Anglo-American and a cir cumspect moderate in domestic politics . The forces of extremism never quite managed to capture the Emperor-i n-Court " from the in side , " however much they manipulated the imperial symbol outside the palace gates . The court remai ned , in I rie Sukemasa 's exag gerated terms , a place "where freedom of speech has been guarded at every turn " : I rie could still claim that there was " no more demo cratic a place than this" .
TH E GRAND C HAM B E RLA I N : C H I E F M ESSENG E R IN ATTENDANCE Wel l , I became G rand C hamberlain. How best go about the job? Even on that score I had no idea , but I did hear various thi ngs from the B oard of C hamberlains , learned about His Majesty's daily routine, was helped out by Kawai Yahachi , the Deputy G rand Chamberlain, . . . Suzuki Kantaro44
Even more than the duties of the Chamberlains, those of the Grand C hamberlain were ill-defi ned . After the I mperial Household M i nistry was reorganized in 1 88 6 , the 1 87 1 office of Grand C hamberlai n45 was given two vague and flexible functi ons : ( 1 ) to render assistance at the emperor's side, and (2) to supervise the Chamberlains and Stewards.46 Between 1 886 a nd 1 945 there was no further specification of the Grand C hamberlain's duties , in marked contrast to the considerably detailed regulations to which the I mperial Household Mi nister was subjected after 1 886. When an outsider took up that post , as Admiral Suzuki Kantaro did in 1 92 9 , he could either unearth the precedents 44. Suzuki Kantaro, Suzuki Kantaro Jiden, ed . Suzuki Haj i me (Tokyo: O gikukai , 1 949),
p. 270.
45. " Daj okan Tasshi , " no. 400, 10 August 1 87 1 , in Ho rei Zensho, 1 87 1 . 46. "Kunai Sho Tasshi , " no. 1 , February 5 , 1 886, in Ho rei Zensho, 1 886.
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applyi ng to his new office-or make them himself. Such vagueness was disconcerting to a career mil itary officer like Admi ral Suz uki , but it allowed an incumbent considerable latitude to i nterpret the meaning of rendering " attenda nce at the emperor's side . " For example, Cham berlain Irie Sukemasa writes of Admiral Suzuki 's tenure as Grand C hamberlain from 1 92 9 to 1 93 6 , " Since Makino and Saito as Privy Seals did not come to their offices but once a week or once a month, it was natural that the Grand Cham berlain should come to ha ndle part of the Privy Seal 's work. " 47 I n terms of j urisdiction and behavior the Grand Chamberlain, at least by 1 92 9 , played a highly flexible role in the politics of relating emperor and government , despite the fact that he was in charge of the " i nner side" of t he court and presumably a purely court figure . The career backgrounds of the personnel appoi nted Grand Cham berlain between 1 885 and 1 945 were q uite different from those of t he H ousehold M i nisters . There were ten G rand Chamberlai ns during the sixty-year period : only two (20 percent) had been Mi nisters of State and only one ( 1 0 percent) had been Prime M i nister. The two M i nisters of State (Hatano Takanao and Katsura Taro) and the Prime M i nister (Katsura Taro) , moreover, held the post of Grand C hamberlain a total of less t han six months, indicati ng the irregu larity of such appoi ntments. Two (Katsura Taro and Suzuki Kan taro) did become Prime M i nister after serving as Grand C ham berlai n, but once agai n this was not the norm . I n contrast to the H ousehold Mi nisters , the Grand C hamberlains were frequently drawn from the court and the military . Whereas t he Household M inisters numbered only one mil itary ( 8 . 3 percent) and one court figure ( 8 . 3 percent) , the Grand C hamberlains numbered four (40 percent) w ho had served in high mil itary posts, five (50 percent) whose careers had been largely military , and three (30 percent) career court figures . O nly three Grand Chamberlains (30 percent) had served at one time or another on the Privy Council ; seve n H ousehold M i nisters ( 5 8 . 3 percent) had done so. A striki ng pattern emerges over time i n the career backgrounds of the Grand Chamberlains between 1 885 and 1 945 , a pattern that reflects the bureaucratization of palace leadership from the outside. 47 . l rie Sukemasa, jiju to Paipu,
p.
9 9 . M y emphasis.
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I n the years 1 885 t o 1 929 the Grand Chamberlains were draw n al most exclusively from the court ; from 1 92 9 to 1 945 they were exclu sively retired admirals of the Navy . Calculating career background (twenty years or more) agai nst length of service as Grand C ham berlai n, the following institutional emphases emerge : Court Navy Army•• Foreign M inistry Total
36 years 1 7 years 5 years 2 years 60 years
Additionally, it was a rare coi ncidence for the Grand Chamberlai n and the Household Minister to be drawn from the same institutional constituency between 1 885 and 1 94 5 . Only in 1 909 did this occur, when both were drawn from the court bureaucracy . This fact sug gests that there was a carefully contrived balance of i nstitutional representatives at the side of the emperor, not merely a mosaic of status, especially after 1 92 9 . Like the Household M i nisters , however, the Grand Chamberlains after 1 927 generally termi nated successful public careers on the " outside" by serving at court . The average age of the Grand Cham berlains on assumi ng office was 6 1 . 1 years , rangi ng from 46 to 7 1 . The average term of office was six years . It is important to note , however, that the Grand Chamberlain throughout the Meij i period was one person, Pri nce Tokudaij i Sanenori .49 The very length of his service , from 1 87 1 to 1 9 1 2 , suggests the high degree of tranq uility at the emperor's side if not in the outside political arena . Tokudaij i was the only palace official , moreover, to have held three of the four leading palace offices : he was concurrently I mperial Household 4 8 . The Army official was Takatsukasa H i romichi ( 1 855- 1 9 1 8) , Grand Chamberlai n from 1 9 1 2 to 1 9 1 8 . Alt hough Takatsukasa achieved the rank of major general he was basically a court person of Court Noble li neage . In 1 896 he was Aide-de-Camp to t he crow n pri nce (Shokuin Roku, 1 896, p. 1 38). In such cases it is obviously difficult to separate court from extra-court careers. 4 9 . Ij iri Tsunekichi lists four persons as G rand Chamberlain during the period 1 87 1 -84 , with Tokudaij i becoming Grand C hamberlain in 1 884 (lj i ri Tsunekichi, Rekidai Kenkan Roku [Tokyo : Choyo Kai , 1 925 1 ) . The Imperial Household Agency , however, has Tokudaij i listed a s Grand Chamberlain from 1 87 1 to 1 9 1 2 and lists h i m as serving concurrently as Im perial H ousehold Secretary from 1 87 1 to 1 884. Without being able to account for the dise repa ncy between t he lj iri and Agency records, I have accepted the Agency roster as official.
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Secretary from 1 87 1 to 1 884 and concurrently Privy Seal from 1 89 1 to 1 9 1 2 . Despite his length of service at court , Prince Tokudaij i has enj oyed singular obscurity . There is no biography of t his venerable figure; 50 most biographical dictionaries refer to him si mply as " Em peror Meij i ' s Grand Chamberlai n . " He has also been referred to as "a classic court official " who, in constantly attending the Emperor Meij i , " was so humble and diligent that no one ever saw him stand in a fully upright position. " 5 1 Apparently Tokudaij i was a perfectly resistance-free conduit between t he emperor and the oligarchs . He was the emperor's messenger on all important matters of state, such as Cabi net formations and questions of foreign policy , but was never credited with offeri ng his own views, advisi ng the throne or the ol igarchs , or blocking access to the throne .52 In 1 87 8 , he was accused by jiho Sasaki , as we saw in chapter 2 , of catering to the emperor's every whim and of being weak. The meager references to him that ap pear in the biographies of the Meij i oligarchs credit him with no other function than a punctilious execution of liaison between the emperor and the oligarchs . Even as hostile a critic of Meij i "absolutism" as I noue Kiyoshi in dicates that Tokudaij i was merely a faithful servant to the emperor . I n 1 88 1 Prince Saionj i Kimmochi , one of Tokudaij i ' s younger brothers , became president of the Toyo jiyu Shim bun, a liberal newspaper which numbered Nakae C homin among its outspoken critics of the oligarchs . Sanj o Sanetomi , Iwakura Tomomi , and Tokudaij i -all t h ree C ourt N oble restorati o nists-attempted to dissuade Saionj i from the venture, but to no avail . Finally the oligarchs took the problem to the emperor. "The emperor, too, was greatly alarmed a nd ordered Tokudaij i to have his younger brother quit the newspaper . " B ut Saionj i held fi rm until a "clear" imperial command was issued agai nst his participation.53 In the absence of 50. There is no list i ng, for example, i n Takanishi Koshi's bibliography of Meij i biogra phies, Shiseki Kaidai (Denki Hen) (Tokyo: Meij i Shoin , 1 935) . 5 1 . Watanabe lkuj i ro, Meiji Tenno t o Hohitsu no Hitobito (Tokyo: Chigura Shobo, 1 938), p. 1 2 5 . 5 2 . l nada Masatsugu, "Taiheiyo Sensa Boppatsu to Tenno Genro oyobi Jiishin n o Chii," Nihon Gaiko Gakka i , ed . , Taiheiyo Sensa Genin Ron (Tokyo: Shimbun Gekkan Sha, 1 953), p. 3 1 . I noue Kiyoshi, p. 1 1 6 . 5 3 . I noue Kiyoshi , p p. 79-80, 1 1 6 .
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evidence to the contrary , Tokudaij i appears t o have been merely a liaison between emperor and oligarchs and a faithful executor of oligarchic wills, and not extremely effective at the latter. He was evi dently an opi nionless member of the Restoration ingroup, which fought over policies on a person-to-person, face-to-face basis but stood united on the privileged position of the Emperor-i n-C hambers . O nce Tokudaij i left his posts as Grand Chamberlain and Privy Seal in 1 9 1 2 , however, there was i nstability at t he side of the em peror. Between 1 9 1 2 and 1 92 1 there were no less than four Grand C hamberlains, or one every 2 . 3 years . The average term of office being six years between 1 88 5 and 1 945 , the period 1 9 1 2 to 1 92 1 , as for the Household Ministers , was the most unstable in the history of the Grand C hamberlain's office. It was in these years that court leadership was in effect transferred from men of the court to bu reaucrats from the outside in all four leading palace offices . The confusion i nvolved i n the transition is well illustrated by General Prince Katsura Taro's brief tenure as Grand C hamberlai n and Privy Seal from August 1 3 to December 2 1 , 1 9 1 2 . The precedent for holding both posts concurrently had , of course , been set by Katsura's predecessor, Tokudaij i Sanenori . B ut there was a vast difference between a life-long civil-military official a nd protege of oligarch Yamagata Aritomo, w ho was twice Prime M i nister before entering the court , and a life-long court personage, w ho knew no other than palace life. Public response to Katsura's appointment as Privy Seal and Grand C hamberlain was immediate and sharply critical : the previous Privy Seals had been the " flower of the court aristocracy , " while Katsura was of " rustic" origi ns a nd thereby an affront to court office . A "tidal wave" of rumor and gossip engulfed Katsura and he became t he focal point of public censure, controversy and slander : 54 The public believed that Katsura's entrance i nto the Imperial Household , as chamberlain and keeper of the imperial sea l , was a plot of the Yamagata faction to dominate the Imperial Household and establish control over the new Emperor. 55 54. Tokutomi I ichiro, Koshaku Katsura Taro Den, 2 vols. (Tokyo : Ko-Katsura Koshaku Kinen J igyo Kai, 1 9 1 7) , 2 : 5 96-97 . 5 5 . Tetsuo Najita, p. 93.
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Even as astute a political leader as Hara Kei , Home M i nister at the time of Katsura's appointment , concurred i n this widely held view . H ara wrote i n his diary on the day of Katsura's appoi ntment : Katsura Taro was appointed Grand Chamberlain and concurrently Lord Keeper of the Privy Sea l . I had been unclear about the meaning of what he had said yesterday regarding court and government , but his conversation became understandable as the result of this appoi ntment : it was evident that he had taken part in a scheme , a plot of the Yamagata faction to garner the Privy Council along with the court wholly i nto its hands. 56
Despite these perceptions , quite the opposite reason appears to have motivated Yamagata to engi neer Katsura 's entra nce into an of fice of court leadership. Yamagata and other members of his group were fearful that Katsura , though Yamagata's leadi ng protege , would take an i ndependent course from the Yamagata main line and found a political party to counter the predominant influence of the Seiyukai i n the Diet . The Seiyukai president was Saionj i Kimmochi and Hara Kei was Saionj i ' s chief lieutena nt . Between 1 90 1 and 1 9 1 2 Saionj i had alternated with Katsura as Prime Mi nister. B oth Saionj i and Yamagata agreed , for different reasons , t o " retire" Katsura into the palace, thus bri ngi ng Katsura's active political career to an end . Y a m ag a t a hoped by t h i s m e a s u re t o o bt a i n h i s g o a l of "transcendental Cabinets " composed of officials above party and not responsible to the Diet ; Saionj i , who was Prime M inister at the time, hoped to rid himself of his and Hara Kei 's political rival . Katsura , the victim of collaboration between patron and rival , was evidently quite unhappy about his " i mprisonment " in the palace .57 B ut Katsura did not stay imprisoned for long. After some four months as Privy Seal-G rand Chamberlain, he emerged to become Prime Mi nister for the third time on the very day , December 2 1 , 1 9 1 2 , that he resigned his palace offices . His exit from the palace was accompa nied by a public outcry of equal vehemence to that when he was appoi nted :
( I t ] was being said generally of Katsura : He had entered the I mperial Household i n August 1 9 1 2 to establish the control of Yamagata's faction 5 6 . Hara Kei Nikki, ed . Hara Keiichiro, (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha , 1 96 5 ) , 3 : 24 5 . 5 7 . Tetsuo Najita, p p . 92-95 . Tokutomi l ichiro, Koshaku Katsura Taro Den, p p . 593-96. Hara Kei Nikki ( 1 965), 3 : 24 5 .
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there; o n the basis o f his influence in the I mperial Household, h e had destroyed the Second Saionj i Cabi net and t hen had issued an imperial rescript to himself to become prime mi nister for the third time. 58
Katsura's reemergence into active politics , from palace leader to Prime Minister, was "deeply resented by the public. " 59 If the dis tinction between court and government was violated by Katsura 's en trance into court office it was more than equally violated by his exit. Not since Ito Hirobumi 's first Cabi net in 1 885 had there been such a public clamor over manipulati ng the throne for political purposes . Although a court personage was eventually selected to replace Katsura as Grand Chamberlain and an imperial pri nce appoi nted as Privy Seal , there was some q uestion as to when the successors would be selected . H a ra Kei was deeply suspici ous of Katsura : on December 1 8 , 1 9 1 2 Saionj i told Hara that Katsura had said he i ntended to appoint no successor as Privy Seal for the moment . In his diary Hara comments , " . . . maybe there was no person for this [ post] , and maybe he [ Katsura] would keep it open as a place for him to take refuge in again later. " 60 Here, at least in Hara 's mind , was direct manipulation of palace office by political partisans for political purposes . More important , however, is the institutionalized nature of the conflict over Katsura's appoi ntment and subseq uent actions . On the theoretical level , it was a conflict between the concepts of " party" versus " transcendental" cabi nets . On the i nstitutional level it was a conflict over the composition of the Japa nese executive between the I mperial Diet , specifically the H ouse of Representatives , and the bu reaucracy, specifically the ministries , operati ng on the pri nciple of executive imperial prerogatives . On the personal level it was a con flict between oligarch Yamagata and his proteges on the one side and Saionj i and his proteges on t he other, specifically protege Katsura versus protege Hara . B oth the theoretical and the personal aspects masked the profoundly i nstitutional nature of t he conflict . It is i n this context that Dietman Ozaki Yukio's famous denunciation of 5 8 . Tetsuo Najita, p. 1 1 6 . 5 9 . Ibid . , p. 1 1 7 . 60. Hara Kei Nikki ( 1 965 ) , 3 : p. 274.
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Katsura's use of the emperor in politics on February 5 , 1 9 1 3 ought to be evaluated : They [ Katsura and the oligarchs] always mouth "loyalty" and "patrio tism" but w hat t hey are actually doing is to hide themselves behind the Throne, and shoot at their political enemies from their secure ambush. (Applause . ] The Throne is their rampart . Rescripts are their missiles.61
Ozaki pitted Diet against bureaucracy and attacked the assumption of t he bureaucracy that it rightfully monopolized the I mperial Will . The uncertai nties i ntroduced i nto Japanese politics as a result of the emergi ng i nstitutional competition underlying Katsura's ap pointment are obtusely suggested by Hara on August 1 4 , 1 9 1 2 : " Katsura's appoi ntment had been proposed by Yamagata; they might have satisfied t heir ambitions by this , but the future of bureau cratic politics when it comes to this cannot possibly be long. " 62 If a leading practitioner of " bureaucratic politics" had to assume court office in order to protect his and his faction's power from the institu tional challenge of Diet politicians , then he and his faction, ac cording to Hara, revealed their actual weakness . They had to take " refuge" in the palace. Conversely, palace leadership ought not to be i n the hands of active political partisans but i n the hands of neu tral negotiators who were able to keep faction out of the palace : I heard from Saionj i the truth about Grand Chamberlain Tokudaiji' s resignation . Although t h e domain cliques had coveted that office, trying any number of schemes up to that time, Tokudaij i had dedicated himself and been sincere in his service to the throne . 63
According to Hara , therefore , Tokudaij i as Privy Seal and Grand C hamberlain was the ideal type for the post : neutral , above faction, and "sincere . " As we have seen, Tokudaij i was a master of liaison to the poi nt of obscurity . Hara's actions while Katsura was Privy Seal and Grand Cham berlain, however, reveal that Hara expected Katsura to act as a non partisan negotiator, despite t he longstanding competition between the two over political power. Throughout Katsura's brief tenure in 6 1 . Speech b y Ozaki Yukio, H ouse o f Representatives, a s published i n The Japan Mail, February 1 5 , 1 9 1 3 , pp. 1 97 -98; cited in Scalapino, p. 1 94 . 62. Hara Kei Nikki ( 1 965 ) , 3 : 24 5 . M y emphasis. 6 3 . Ibid.
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high palace office Hara attempted t o enlist his efforts a s mediator between the Saionj i Cabi net and the Army to prevent a direct confrontation between the two which might bri ng about Saionj i 's resignation. On August 1 8 , 1 9 1 2 " Katsura made it clear that from now on he would not participate in politics " 64 but it was Hara himself w ho attempted to reinvolve him . On November 1 6 , for example, Hara met with Katsura to discuss the Army 's demand for two new divisions and to enlist Katsura's efforts as a negotiator. At first Katsura declined , argui ng that in his present office he could not speak on such issues . B ut Hara pressed him, and he fi nally agreed to arbitrate on the Cabinet's behalf. Although Hara doubted that Katsura would be si ncere in his efforts,65 he clearly bel ieved that the office of Privy Seal-Grand C hamberlain was no bar to participation as a negotiator in the political process . On the contrary , Hara ex pected the Privy Seal-Grand C hamberlain to act as an arbitrator , especially when it came to the survival of a Cabi net , regardless of the political preferences of the individual holdi ng the offices . Within the court Katsura also " tutored " the new Taisho Emperor and coordi nated court and government functions . His biographer im plies that one of Katsura's main functions, like that of the jiho i n the 1 870s, was to cultivate the imperial virtue : Although the office of Privy Seal , a completely noble and pure office admi nistering the i mperial seal in service to the t hrone, was no more than a court office servi ng t he throne i n attendance , there was, i n regard to the present E mperor [Taisho] , a certain necessity for someone with qualifica tions as a master teacher in politics to be Privy Seal .66
Like the young Meij i Emperor i n the 1 870s, the new Taisho Em peror i n 1 9 1 2 had to be brought i n line with the times-his " virtue" made responsive to the dominant political forces of the day . Katsura was particularly concerned with devising a regular series of lectures to the emperor on basic political information and current events : essentials of the constitution , "the reason why Japan's national polity was unsurpassed in the world , " other political systems of the world , ideal emperors of antiq uity , .Japanese military preparedness 64 . Ibid . , p. 247 . 6 5 . Ibid . , p. 2 62 . 6 6 . Tokutomi Iichiro, Koshaku Katsura Taro Den, 2 : 5 9 5 .
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a nd that of the Western nations . Military lectures were t o be given by the chiefs and deputy chiefs of the armed services ' General Staffs .67 In his coordinati ng duties Katsura had considerable contact with the H ome Mi nister, Hara Kei , in regard to imperial outi ngs and im perial amnesties for political prisoners .68 The Privy Seal-Grand C hamberlain was therefore a key figure in controlling the political i nformation reachi ng the emperor as well as a liaison-coordi nator of court functions that i nvolved government cooperation. After Katsura's brief and stormy period in high court offices , no one was ever again to be Grand C hamberlain and Privy Seal concur rently. Nor was a ny ex-Prime M i nister ever to be appoi nted Grand C hamberlai n . Between 1 9 1 2 and 1 927 there were but three Grand C hamberlains : two were of Court Noble origin and one was related to the shogunal house of Tokugawa . All three were predominantly court figures, alt hough one achieved the ra nk of maj or general (Takatsukasa H i romichi) a nd a not her served as G overnor of Saitama Prefecture ( O gimachi Sanemasa) . The period between 1 9 1 2 a nd 1 927 thus represents a return to the tradition that the Grand C hamberlain was to be a neutral figure from the flower of the as cribed aristocracy . Si nce the Privy Seals from 1 9 1 4 a nd 1 92 2 were aged but powerful Elder Statesmen and the H ousehold Mi nisters from 1 9 1 0 on were competent bureaucrats from the outside , it would appear that there was no need for powerful men i n the office of Grand Chamberlai n . I n 1 92 7 , however, Chinda Sutemi , an aged career diplomat who had been educated in the United States, was made Grand Cham berlain in a fi nal break with the precedent of neutral and aristocratic Grand Chamberlains . His successor as Grand Chamberlain in 1 92 9 , Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, was appoi nted directly from the post of C hief of the Navy General Staff. From 1 92 9 to 1 945 the post of Grand Chamberlain was occupied exclusively by Navy admirals . Not only does t he appoi ntment of Suzuki reveal the bureaucratiza tion of the Grand Chamberlain's office from the outside; it also reveals the efforts of partisan palace advisers , the constitutional monarchists, to balance the instituti onal i nfluence of the Army at the 67 . Ibid . , pp. 602-03 . 68. Hara Kei Nikki ( 1 965) , 3 : 2 5 9 .
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emperor's side . The Chief Aide and a maj ority o f Aides had always been ra nki ng Army officers whom the Army had nomi nated . By 1 92 9 , moreover, the Army had mou nted its claim to be the leading institution of prerogative and thereby entitled to declare the Imperial Will in both domestic and i nternational affairs . With a Navy ad miral at the emperor's side, the palace leaders could pit the i nstitu tional interests of the Navy agai nst those of the Army without frontally violati ng the prerogative of supreme command . And si nce the palace leaders had sole responsibility for appoi nting the Grand Chamberlai n , as they did not i n the case of the C hief Aide and Aides , they could choose a Navy officer " i n line with the times" and their partisan purposes-who would be useful i n controlling the military, i ncluding the Navy itself. Finally, because the office of Grand Chamberlain was q uite possibly the most ambiguous and flexible of the four palace offices , its i ncumbent had considerable dis cretion i n the performance of his vague duties-on his ow n initiative or at the behest of partisan colleagues . The appoi ntment of Admiral Suz uki and his subsequent actions as Grand Chamberlain from 1 92 9 to 1 93 6 ill ustrate these assertions. Al though Suz uki's successors were also admirals, there is no i ndication that they became involved i n politics as palace partisans , as did Suzuki . Si nce the palace partisanship of the constitutional monar chists was drastically curtailed after the assassi nations of February 2 6 , 1 93 6 , the Grand Chamberlains who succeeded Suzuki were far more neutral figures . Unity in government was also restored in some measure after 1 936 by the Army and its all ies in the bureau cracy and I mperial Diet . It might be wel l , then, to concl ude our dis cussion of the Grand C hamberlain with Admiral Suzuki and his relation to palace involvement in politics . When Grand C hamberlain Chi nda Sutemi died in office , the I m peri al H ousehold M i nister, lchiki K i t okuro , persona l l y pressed Suzuki into the post of Grand C hamberlai n , despite the Navy's reluctance to part with Suzuki and Suzuki 's ow n hesitations. lchiki had consulted with his palace colleague and fellow constitutional monarchist , Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki , and the emperor himself prior to pressuri ng Suzuki to accept . The reasons why the palace selected Suzuki , as given in Suzuki's biography , were : ( 1 ) the Chief
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Aides had always been Army generals, (2) there were no "suitable" candidates in the civil bureaucracy , and (3) the only other Navy pros pect was from Satsuma and would not be acceptable because Privy Seal Makino was also from Satsuma .69 M ore important , however, was the congeniality of Suzuki 's views with those of the two constitu ti onal monarchi sts , H ousehold M i nister lchiki a nd Privy Seal Makino, who managed the palace under Pri nce Saionj i 's direction.70 It is claimed , for example, that Suzuki "detested " politics and that he believed military men should stand completely clear of political activity . He is also alleged to have believed that by the late 1 920s military officers were clearly violati ng the Emperor Meij i 's " I nstruc tions to Soldiers and Sailors , " which forbade military i ntervention in politics .71 Despite bei ng a career Navy officer, Suzuki apparently sup ported Mi nobe's theory of constitutional monarchy .72 In terms of his institutional constituency and political views , therefore , Suzuki was ideally suited to the partisan purposes of the constitutional monar chists in their struggle against the militarists and renovationists . That Suzuki served the interests of the constitutional monarchists is well illustrated by his alleged i nvolvement in the fall of the Ta naka Cabinet in 1 92 9 and his clear i nvolvement in the London Naval Treaty controversy of 1 930. 6 9 . Suzuki Kantaro Den (Tokyo: Suzuki Kantaro Denki Hensan l i nkai, 1 960), pp. 1 01 -02 . It is i nteresti ng to note that Suzuki's wife had served as a companion to the emperor when he was age three to fourteen ( 1 904- 1 5 ) . Suzuki was therefore l inked to the palace long before he became a candidate for G rand C hamberlain (Kanroj i Osanaga, p. 28). 70. A career bureaucrat i n the H ome M inistry, lchiki was regarded as a protege of Yama gata Aritomo (Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata A ritomo in the Rise of Modern japan, 1838-1922 !Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard University Press, 1 97 1 ] , p. 268) . As we have seen, however, lchiki was the originator of the M inobe theory of constitutional monarchy . He was also ac cused by conservative household officials of "disrespectful acts" toward the imperial house and the late Taisho Emperor a nd was i ntensely disliked by court conservatives, t he Army, and right-wing groups who considered his views on const itutional monarchy to be the source of his disrespect . Public rumor had it t hat lchiki did not even k now the Japanese national anthem (Nezu Masashi , p . 1 36). Makino was a cosmopolitan bureaucrat whose career had been largely diplomatic. Foreign M inister in Admiral Yamamoto Gombei's first Cabinet ( 1 9 1 3-1 4), Makino had served in both Saionj i Cabi nets, first as M inister of Education ( I 906-08) and then as M inister of Agriculture and Commerce (I 9 1 1 - 1 2 ) . As Privy Seal, M.� kino was also the subject of wild rumors, such as having fl i rted with the empress in t he palace forests, which were evidently believed by right wing societies (ibid . , p. 1 37 ) . Makino was sixty-three when he became Privy Seal in 1 92 5 . 7 1 . Suzuki Takeshi, Shusenji Saisho Suzuki Kantaro-o: fusan Kaiki ni Omou (Tokyo: Jimbutsu J idai Sha, 1 960) , pp. 20-2 2 . 7 2 . Nakase juichi , Kindai ni okeru Tenno Kan (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1 963), p . 2 7 .
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Tanaka G iichi 's Cabi net resigned in J uly 1 92 9 . The cause o f his fall was his disposition of the C ha ng Tso-lin affair. C hang Tso-li n , Warlord o f Manchuria, had been killed b y Japanese Army officers and their conspirators in J u ne 1 92 8 . The Army , in which Prime M i nister Tanaka had spent his entire career before t u r n i ng politician, and t he political party of which he was president , the Seiyiikai , wished to hide the facts by passing off the murder as the work of Nationalist Chinese soldiers . Pri nce Saionj i , his colleagues in the palace , and the leaders of t he other mai n political party, the M i nseito, were aware that the facts were widely know n abroad and could not , nor should not , be so clumsily buried . They therefore argued for full disclosure of the truth and for strict action agai nst the Japanese officers i nvolved-courts-martial . While the Army and its allies i nsisted that admission of the facts and strict punishment would tarnish the Army a nd the emperor, Saionj i and his com patriots argued that international trust in Japan would be seriously undermi ned if Japan were unwilling or unable to mai ntain her ow n house in order, and that t his would be an even more serious affront to the emperor. Shortly after Chang's murder, Prime Minister Tanaka reported to the emperor that the plotters were evidently Japanese officers sta tioned in M anchuria. I f that were the case , Tanaka continued , strict measures would be taken. Tanaka also told the Privy Seal and Pri nce Saionj i the same thing i n the strictest confidence .73 Sub sequent i nvestigation by the Army itself verified beyond a doubt that Japanese Army officers were responsible.74 In the face of Army and Seiyiikai pressure to hide the affair as much as possible and to deal lightly with the officers i nvolved , Tanaka fi nally reported to the throne i n M ay 1 92 9-almost a year after Chang's murder and five months after Suzuki's appoi ntment as Grand Chamberlai n-that the plotters were not Japanese but that because the murder took place i n an area u nder Japanese guard the responsible officers would b e dis cipli ned " admi nistratively" -transferred to different posts. The em7 3 . Suzuki Haj i me, ed . , Suzuki Kantaro jiden (Tokyo : Jij i Tsiishin Sha, 1 968), p. 254. Okada Keisuke, Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 1 950) , p . 37 . Harada Kumao, I : I . 74. Okada Keisuke, p. 3 7 .
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peror poi ntedly remarked that this report was i n flat contradiction to w hat Tanaka had originally reported . According to the recollections of Admiral Okada Keisuke , Navy M i nister in Tanaka 's Cabi net , the emperor told Tanaka when he at tempted to explain the contradiction: " There is no need for an explanation . " Tanaka then returned to meet his Cabi net Mi nisters . They urged that Tanaka attempt to arra nge another audience and explain w hy the government had made its fi nal disposition of the Chang Tso-lin affair in the way it did . B ut when Tanaka went to see Grand Chamberlain Suzuki to arrange the audience , claims Okada , Suzuki said : " I shall pass your req uest on, but I fear that it might be to no avail . " Having lost the emperor's confidence , Tanaka decided to resign.75 Pri nce Saionj i 's secretary , Harada Kumao, gives a slightly different account . After the emperor had scolded Tanaka for contradicting hi mself, Harada relates , the emperor retired i nto the inner palace and told Grand Chamberlain Suz uki , "I simply don't u nderstand what Prime M i nister Tanaka says . I don't want to hear him out agai n . " Harada then claims that " since the Grand Cham berlain was new to his post and not yet used to it , " Suzuki told Ta naka exactly what the emperor had said .76 Neither Okada nor Harada were present when the alleged con versations took place and their records are obviously hearsay . Suzuki's biographers claim that he played no part i n Tanaka 's resignation: [Tanaka's resignation) . . . had no relation whatever to the work of the G ra nd C hamberl a i n . The matter was between t he Army and the government . Matters i nvolving the mil itary fell under the j u risdiction of the Chief Aide-de-Camp; if it were a matter i nvolving politics , the Lord Keeper of t he Privy Seal would have been responsible for renderi ng advice a nd assista nce in attendance. However, it was publicly bruited about that Grand C hamberlain Suz uki had gotten i nvolved and that for this reason the Cabi net may have fallen.77
I n his autobiography Suzuki also claims that he was i n no way i n volved : Then, si nce the Army M i nister made a report to the throne that was 75. I bid . , pp. 40, 4 1 . 7 6 . Harada Kumao, I : I I . 7 7 . Suzuki Ka ntaro Den, p. 1 07 .
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completely different from w hat t he Prime M i nister had previously reported to the throne , the Emperor poi ntedly i nquired about the disc repancy between t he two reports w hen Prime M i nister Tanaka audienced . That is w hat M r . Tanaka told me U ust ] after he withdrew in humble respect from the presence of t he E mperor . Although [ M r . Tanaka ] also said he was goi ng to resign, I, as Grand Chamberlain, could make no reply w hatever to this. As far as the Prime M i nister's report to the Throne is concerned , t he Grand Chamberlain [ Suzuki himself, that is] was not , of course , in attenda nce . I haven't t he slightest notion about the nature of the conversation between His M ajesty a nd the Prime M i nister. The Prime M i nister merely told me i n confidence of his resolve [to resign] . This is t he cause for t he resignation of the Tanaka Cabi net . Later I heard the fol low ing about the state of affairs at t he time: Various contentions seethed in the Cabi net . There were even some who held that it would not do for the Pri me M i nister to decide at his own dis cretion that the Cabi net should resign : they wanted to report on the situation to the Throne once again and dispose of the matter without re signing. Mr. Tanaka refused , sayi ng that his will had been broken and t hat he simply couldn't do it . That was probably w hat did it. Two or t hree Cabi net ministers came to see the Grand C ha mberlain [ Suzuki] and I think said somethi ng to the ef fect that it would be a good thing if I were to be a go-between-t hat is, use my good offices between His Maj esty and the Prime M i nister. I remember havi ng refused , tel l i ng them : For me t hat would be improper . The [ office of] Grand C hamberlain is not t hat kind of position. The Grand Chamberlain [ Suzuki ] merely heard w hat the Prime M i nister vol unteered to let out and left it at that ; [the Grand Chamberlain] is unable to do anything more than that .78
B ut if Suzuki was not actively involved in bri ngi ng the Tanaka Cabi net dow n , he did very little to help the Prime Mi nister stay in of fice . Although it was quite proper for him to refuse to mediate on be half of the Cabi net , si nce that was the role of the Privy Seal , the net result was to assist Pri nce Saionj i , his palace partisans , and opposition leaders in the House of Representatives i n ousting Tanaka . One of Saionj i ' s pri ncipal allies was Privy Seal Makino, who was allegedly maneuvering " behind the scenes " against Tanaka because he, like Saionj i , was opposed to " military diplomacy" in China .79 It would 7 8 . Suzuki Hajime, pp. 254�5 5 . Note that Suzuki's account states t hat t he Army M inister, not Tanaka, made the contradictory report . 7 9 . Nezu Masashi, p. 99.
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also appear that the emperor himself, who had been sharply critical of Tanaka 's "contradictory" actions , was one of Saionj i ' s maj or allies . As a result , Grand Chamberlain Suzuki was accused of partisan activities at the emperor's side. Suz uki 's biographers claim that they have no idea w here t he " fact s " " got twisted , " givi ng rise t o "groundless misunderstandings . " 80 B ut there are a t least three basic factors that combi ned to create such " misunderstandi ngs" : ( 1 ) the ambiguity of the Grand Chamberlain's role in law and practice, (2) the " privatized " nature of Japanese decision making, and (3) the i ntensity of competition among t he institutions of imperial pre rogative and their coalitions of i nstitutionalized elites to declare the I mperial Will in politics . I noted at the outset of this discussion of the Grand C hamberlai n that his office, as defined by I mperial H ousehold M i nistry regula tions, was perhaps the most ambiguous of the four leading palace of fices . I n practice, moreover, that office between 1 89 1 a nd 1 9 1 2 was held concurrently by the Privy Seal . Si nce the Privy Seal was the emperor ' s chief political adviser in t he palace , t hi s role was i nevitably merged with that of the Grand C hamberlai n duri ng those years . We have also seen that C hamberlain I rie considered it " natural" that the Grand Chamberlain in the 1 930s s hould have acted as Privy Seal when the Privy Seal was not at the palace . Moreover, if the Grand C hamberlai n was a powerful representative from one of the governmental i nstitutions of prerogative, rather tha n a neutral and discreet court bureaucrat from the high aristocracy , he w ould very probably be viewed as a " polit ical part i s a n " by government leaders and the public at large . This was certainly true of Katsura Taro in 1 91 2 , and it was equally true of Suzuki Kantaro from 1 929 to 1 93 6 . It is highly revealing , for example, t hat Grand C hamberlain Suzuki was asked by some of Tanaka's Cabinet Ministers to act as "go-between" for t he emperor a nd the Prime M i nister in order to save the Cabi net ; in the eyes of political actors outside the palace, the Grand C hamberlain was a potential political negotiator, despite Suzuki 's proper disclaimer that the office of Grand Chamberlain was " not that kind of position . " Finally, the 80. Suzuki Kantaro Den, p. 1 08 .
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Grand Chamberlain scheduled audiences for the Prime M i nister and M i nisters of State . If, for whatever reason, a Prime M i nister or M i nister of State was unable to report to the throne, or his report was delayed , the Grand C hamberlain could be, and occasionally was, accused of " blocking access to the throne . " Si nce there was n o record of w hat the Grand Chamberlain actually said or what he thought and did i n the course of arranging audiences , such accusations could not be refuted or substantiated . Even if Suzuki disclaimed , as he certai nly did , any partisanship i n scheduling audiences , he could be accused of disi ngenuousness by those who considered themselves i nj ured . Given the verbal and closed nature of the prewar decision-maki ng process, as the disposition of the Chang Tso-lin affair ill ustrates , it is no wonder that the " facts" " got twisted " and that leadi ng court and government officials were subject to " misunderstandings . " M ore important than the ambiguity of the Grand Chamberlain's office , therefore , was the nature of the decision maki ng process itself. Privatized decision making on issues of the gravest national import-such as C a b i net format ions, Cabi net resignations , and basic foreign and domestic policy directions characterized the Japanese pol itical process throughout the prewar period . Since there were no public transcripts of these exchanges and since the entire process was kept from public scrutiny, there was no way to verify the actions of the men i nvolved . Only the decisions were know n ; how , why, and even by whom decisions were made were therefore matters of endless speculation. As a result , charges and cou ntercharge s , rumor mongeri ng, u ncert a i nty , a nd " m i s u nder standings" i nfused the entire political process . The confusion was exacerbated i n the 1 920s and 1 930s by the dedicated efforts of Japan's extensive and energetic mass media industry in unearthing and pub licizing any and all political rumors . Had there been records , had those records been public, had voting for public officials been a critical part of the political process, had open discussions and voting in the legislature been a decisive factor i n shaping political decisions , rumor might have played only a Drew Pearson role in politics . But such a public or " socialized " process of decision making was neither prac ticed nor considered desirable in prewar Japan. Ultimately all deci sions, both ideally and in practice , were to be made by the "emperor's
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advisers" communicating verbally among themselves and issui ng thei r decisions in the name of the emperor from the presumably secure sanctuary of the imperial palace . Privatized decision making and the flexibility of lead ing palace of fices were consistent features of Japanese politics throughout the entire prewar period . Conseq uently, Japanese politics had always been marked by rumor, uncertainty, and " misunderstandi ngs . " Along with the politicization of society, 8 1 however, the i nstitu tionalization of imperial prerogatives and political elites added new dimensions to these traditi onal by-products of Japanese politics during the late 1 920s and early 1 930s , produci ng an i ntensity and extensiveness of rumor mongeri ng and a degree of u ncertainty i n basic policy directions that challenged the effectiveness of Japan's traditional system of privatized decision maki ng. The Chang Tso-lin affair, for example, profoundly affected the disposition of institutions competi ng to declare the Imperial Wil l . If the Japanese officers who had plotted and executed C hang's murder were court-martialed and severely punished , both the Army 's China ambitions and its i nstitutional right to declare the Imperial Will i n an i ncreasingly wide arena would have been seriously j eopardized . The institutional strength of the Army in politics was ultimatel y demonstrated by the fact that Pri nce Saionj i ' s views did not prevail , but it took the Army a year of pressure and behi nd-t he-scenes ma neuveri ng to achieve its purposes . And Tanaka's Cabi net collapsed as a result . Grand Chamberlain Suzuki was i nevitably i nvolved i n the rumor mongering and back-stage maneuverings because he scheduled audiences for the Prime M i nister. Regardless of the " facts , " Suzuki was held at least partially responsible for Tanaka 's fall by Tanaka 's political party, the Seiyuka i . One of t he i nstitutions of prerogative, or its components , had been adversely affected by a decision reached verbally i n the closed corridors of the i mperial palace . During and after the 1 920s the i nstituti ons of prerogative and thei r K 1 . The expansion of mass media after the 1 870s, the emergence of mass demonstrations . o nd popular movements after 1 905 , the proliferation of right-wing societies after 1 9 1 8 , and the enfranchisement of all adult males in 1 92 5 are some of the promi nent i ndications of such politicization .
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el ites i ncreasingly " twisted " the " facts " t o serve their partisan and parochial interests . As the i nstitutional competition for political power widened and i ntensified , so did the rumor mongering. Allega tions of violati ng one or another prerogative, of interferi ng in a given i nstitution's alleged decision-maki ng domai n, of schemi ng behi nd the scenes , of engaging i n political activities improper to one's office, were used to vault one i nstitution and its allies i nto political power agai nst a multipl icity of competi ng institutions and their allies . Goverment by rumor occurred precisely because of the intensely privatized nature of decision making; such rumor mongeri ng and its attenda nt un certai nties i n policy directions were vastly i ntensified when the paroc hial elites of the plural i nstitutions of prerogat ive replaced the autono mous i ndividuals of Restoration leadership at the top of Japanese political society. I nstitutional rat her than " personal" resources were brought to bear in the struggle for political power, yet the system for resolving conflicts remai ned based on verbal decisions and face-to-face relations centered on the imperial palace. I f G rand C hamberl a i n S uz u k i ' s a l l eged i nvolvement in t he collapse of Tanaka Giichi 's Cabi net illustrates palace partisanship i n politics o n the one hand , therefore, i t also illustrates the nature and effect of privatized decision maki ng in an environment of institu t i onalized prerogati ves a nd parochial e l i tes . B ut t he partisa n activities of Prince Saionj i and his constitutional monarchist allies i n the palace-the " palace group" as they have been called b y one Japanese political scientist82-and the problems of privatized de cision making in this period are much more clearly illustrated by the London Naval Treaty controversy of 1 930. Whereas the C hang Tso-lin affair basically i nvolved only the Army , the Prime M i nister and his Cabi net , and Pri nce Saionj i and his allies , the London Naval Treaty brought to bear a complicated set of i nstitutional forces : the Navy M i nistry, which admi nistered the naval establishment ; the Navy General Staff, w hich commanded the Navy 's operati ng forces ; the Foreign Mi nistry , w hich managed the prerogative of treaty maki ng; the Prime M i nister and his Cabi net , who were responsible for setti ng overall national policies ; the Sup.
82 . M atsushita Keiichi , Sengo Minshushugi no Tenbo (Tokyo: N i hon Hyoron Sha, 1 965 } , 2 1 9.
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preme War Council , which advised the emperor on basic military policies; and the Privy Council , which advised the emperor on treaty ratification. Behi nd each stage in policy formation, negotiation, and ratification in w hich these institutions were i nvolved was the firm hand of Pri nce Saionj i who, at eighty years of age, was determi ned to see the London Naval Treaty through to a successful concl usion . As in the C ha ng Tso-lin affair, the necessity for Japan to act responsibly in international affairs was uppermost in Prince Saionj i ' s mind . A t t h e outset o f t h e negotiations in London, which began for mally in January 1 930, the Navy hard-liners had publicly taken a "70 percent or bust " stand : Japan had to have a minimum tonnage ratio of 70 percent with the American fleet in all categories of auxiliary combatant ships , from heavy cruisers to submarines . Saionj i was severely critical of this position. If Japan were completely unwilling to compromise, the London Conference would fail and the responsibility for its failure would rest securely with Japan. Saionj i therefore argued that Japan should lead the conference to a successful conclusion, increasing Japan's international stature and impressing the Great Powers that Japan intended peace . In alliance with Great B ritain and the United States , continued Saionj i , Japan could share in wielding "the baton of command . " By insisting on a 70 percent ratio Japan would " throw away its grip on the handle" and "j oin the ranks of France and Italy . " Saionj i concluded that there was nothing to .Japan's interest in parting company with Great Britain and the United States : in fact , closer ties between Japan and these two Great Powers were desirable . 83 Given Saionj i ' s pro-Anglo-American stance , what resources did he have to implement his views? First , Prime M i nister Hamaguchi and his Cabinet were overwhelmingly of Saionj i 's opi nion. As president of the Minseito in the House of Representatives , the Prime M inister had a strong base of support . Second , Japan's chief delegate to the conference was ex-Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reij iro, a pro-Saionj i bureaucrat with w hom the Prime M i nister had been very closely a ssociated . Wakatsuki was responsible for signing t he America n ! D . Harada Kumao, 1 : 1 7- 1 8 . It should be noted t hat Saionj i , like all Japanese leaders of l i lt" modern peri od , was deeply concerned with Japan's international prestige and national
'"·•·ngt h. He differed drastically from the militarists and other right-wing leaders on how that pn·sr igc and strengt h were to be established , maintained , and used .
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compromise proposal of March 1 930, w hich ultimately led t o the successful conclusion of the London Naval Treaty .84 Third , Saionj i had powerful support withi n the Navy itself, most notably from Ad mirals Okada Keisuke and Saito Makoto. As a Supreme War Councillor, Okada was i n a position to check those "Navy Elders" w ho opposed any compromise on t he 70 percent ratio. Pri nce Saionj i had urged Okada t o act a s t he treaty's " matchmaker. " Okada pursued that role by helping to control his hard-li ne colleagues i n the Navy General Staff a nd t he Supreme War Council from March to October, w hen Japan finally ratified the compromise treaty .85 Ad miral Saito, at that time Governor General of Korea, was strongly in favor of the treaty and in complete accord with Pri nce Saionj i . Al though he was unable to stay i n Tokyo to keep pressure on his hot headed colleagues in the Navy , Saito lent public support to the treaty by, for example , issui ng a statement to the newspapers praising the results of the conference and criticizi ng the actions of the Navy General Staff as " most disagreeable. " 86 Fourth, the Foreign Min istry was led by Baron Shidehara Kij uro, a long-ti me opponent of " military diplomacy " in China and a strong pro-treaty partisan . Shidehara met w i t h Admiral Okada a t least once and urged Okada to help bring the treaty to a successful conclusion. Fifth, Pri nce Saionj i had Prince Konoe Fumimaro in t he House of Peers to do his biddi ng in that component of imperial prerogative. 57 Finally, Saionj i had his supporters at the side of the emperor : Privy Seal Makino, Household M i nister lchiki , a nd Grand Cham berlain Suzuki . Throughout the treaty controversy Saionj i was i n constant touch with all three, usually through his tireless secretary , Harada Kumao. I n March 1 930, for example, Saionj i told Harad a : " It is extremely important a t this j uncture t hat the I mperial H ousehold M i nister and Grand C hamberlain, along with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, give us their complete understanding on this matter. " 88 After the American proposal had been approved by the Japanese government in Apri l , the problem of Privy Council ra84. 85. 86. 87. 88.
Ibid . , p. 1 9 . Suzuki Kantaro Den, p . 1 1 0 . Okada Keisuke, pp. 44-5 5 . Harada Kumao, 1 : 67 . Harada Kumao, 1 : 49-50. I bid . , pp. 2 6 , 2 1 -2 2 . Ibid . , p . 2 8 .
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tification arose . At that time Saionj i told his secretary : "The Privy C ou ncil problem will ultimately come out all right if those at the side of the Emperor, like the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain, hold fast . " 89 A nd hold fast they did . Grand C hamberlai n Suzuki was very much i nvolved in keeping Admiral Kato Kanj i , Suzuki 's successor as C hief of the Navy General Staff, in l i ne, although the exact nature of Suzuki's i nvolvement is a matter of controversy and speculation. Suzuki heard from the C hief Aide-de-Camp, for example, that Kato had requested an audience for April 1 . Prime M i nister Hamaguchi had also req uested an audience , via Grand Chamberlain Suzuki , for that same day to obtain imperial sanction for the government 's ap proval of the American compromise . Suzuki suspected trouble: Kato probably wished an audience in order to denounce the government 's position on the treaty. Suzuki therefore called Kato to his official residence. Did Kato intend a contrary report to the throne ? When Kato replied that he did , Suzuki told him that this would cause His Majesty great difficulty : Kato should give careful consideration to the consequences of putti ng the emperor in a strait between the Prime M inister, w ho was responsible for politics , and the Chief of Staff, who was responsible for supreme command . As a result of his talk with Suzuki, Kato agreed to withdraw his April 1 report to the throne : The matter was most simple. As a friend , and as a senior in the Navy , Suzuki employed honest counsel so that no fault would lie with Kato and so that no trouble would be caused His M aj esty . Kato, too, understood the good will of his senior and withdrew his report to the throne of April 1 . Therefore, there should have been nothing that would become an issue , but . . go .
.
According to his ow n recollection, Suzuki called Kato dow n sharply , telling h i m in effect that the size o f the naval establishment w a s no busi ness of the Navy General Staff, which was in charge of opera tions, not admi nistration. As Chief of the Navy General Staff, Kato must go along with the Prime M i nister and the Cabi net on w hich the Navy Mi nister sat .91 89. Ibid . , p. 5 2 . 9 0 . Suzuki Kantaro Den, p p . 1 1 2 1 3 9 1 . Suzuki Haj i me, pp. 256-57. -
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This account b y Suzuki and his biographers , however, i s but one of at least three differi ng accounts of the same event . Admiral Okada states in his memoirs that Kato came to see him on April 1 . Saying that his request for an audience on that day had apparently been blocked by someone close to the throne, Kato told Okada to find out from Grand Chamberlain Suzuki what had happened . Okada saw Suzuki immediately and was greatly relieved to hear that Suzuki had not blocked Kato's report . Since the emperor's schedule had already been filled for that day , Suzuki i nformed Okada, it would have been very difficult to arrange an audience for Kato.92 Suzuki also told Harada Kumao that he had not blocked Kato's report . Poi nting out that reports by the Chiefs of Staff had no relation to the Grand Chamberlain, Suzuki argued that such reports fell under the j uris diction of the C hief Aide-de-Camp. Since the emperor simply had no time that day , said Suzuki , Kato's report had to follow that by the Prime Mi nister.93 Suzuki's action on April 2 , the day after he had allegedly coun seled Kato to withdraw his report to the throne, is also the subj ect of conflicting accounts. On April 2 Kato made a grudgi ngly con ciliatory report to the t hrone , telling the emperor that the Navy would make do with the treaty, though this would be difficult.94 A newspaper later alleged that Grand Chamberlain Suzuki was i n at tendance duri ng Kato's report , in place of the C hief Aide whose duty it was to attend such reports by officers of the Supreme Com mand . Harada categorically denies this , but Suzuki 's biographers are equally categorical in claiming, on the contrary , that Suzuki was in attendance , taking the "completely unprecedented " action of re placi ng the Chief Aide.95 Whatever the facts , Suz uki 's behavior was subject to the same ki nd of " misunderstandi ngs" that arose regardi ng his alleged in volvement i n Tanaka Giichi's resignation less than a year earlier. He became the target of censure by antitreaty forces i n the govern ment and the public at large as they mobilized to defeat the treaty's 92 . 93 . 94 . 95 .
Okada Keisuke, p p . 55-56. Harada Kumao, I : 48 . Suzuki Kantaro Den, p. 1 1 4 . Harada Kumao, I : 1 05 ; Suzuki Kantaro Den, p. 1 1 4 .
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ratification i n the Privy Council .96 I n J une , for example, a reporter came to see Harada with the following story . The C hief Secretary to the Privy Cou ncil had said that the C hief Aide had told him that the Grand C hamberlain and Privy Seal had prevented the C hief of t he Navy General Staff from reporti ng his criticisms of the treaty to t he throne. In so doing, they had bypassed the C hief Aide, and therefore the C hief Aide had submitted his resignation. The re porter then told Harada that the C hief Secretary to the Privy Coun cil had concluded that the Privy Seal , Grand C hamberlai n , and H ousehold M i nister should " accept responsibility" for this state of affairs by resigning their offices .97 Thus a n alleged event on April 1 was relayed to Harada in J u ne by a newspaper reporter who heard about it from a treaty opponent who in turn heard about it from the C hief Aide w ho, as the responsible official at t he emperor's side regardi ng military reports , was allegedly abused by his fellow palace officers . A n inevitable product of prewar Japan's privatized decision making process , hearsay issui ng from the palace inundated the public with uncertai nties as i nstitutionalized actors and their allies manipulated unverifiable rumors to serve their preferences on issues of basic importance to t he direction of Japan's foreign a nd domestic policies . And given the oligarchic disunity i n government , the palace officers were bound to be partisan, w hether they were active or in active , si nce they managed the i mperial sanction of policies on which there was no effective consensus in the government . Though distorted and contradictory , the evidence does sustain the conclusion t hat Grand C hamberlain Suzuki was actively in volved as a palace partisan in seeing the treaty through to a success ful conclusion: I n this situation i t w a s inevitable that Grand Chamberlain Suzuki, too, having been the previous Chief of the Navy General Staff and being one of the leading officials at the emperor's side in the palace, would not be allowed to stand aloof, l ooking on indifferently . 98
The inherent flexibility of the Grand C hamberlain's role allowed '!6 . Suzuki Kantaro Den, p. 1 1 3 . Harada Kumao, I : 4 8 . 97 . Harada Kumao, 1 : 1 04-05 . 98. Suzuki Kantaro Den, p. 1 1 1 .
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Suzuki considerable latitude t o use his office a s h e saw fit . And be cause he was Kato's predecessor as Chief of the Navy General Staff he could talk with Kato "as a friend , and as a senior in the Navy " possibly without violati ng his official role a s Gra nd Chamberlain i n his o w n mind but certainly not serving a s a neutral liaison betwee n government and court i n the minds of those adversely affected . More remarkable is the argument that , as one of the " lead ing officials at the emperor's side in the palace , " Suzuki could not remain aloof. As we have seen, the traditional role of the Grand C hamberlain was precisely such al oofness . The conseq uence of i nsti tutional fragmentation i n the government and of bringing a powerful bureaucrat from that i nstitutional world i nto the palace as Grand Chamberlain, however, was that the office of Grand Chamberlain became something quite different from the courtly office it had been in Tokudaij i Sanenori 's day . The Grand Chamberlain was no longer a frictionless conduit between a transcendental court and a united oligarchy i n government . He was one of three leadi ng palace officers serving the partisan purposes of the constitutional monarchists as they attempted to achieve their policy preferences by controll i ng the palace and manipulati ng it agai nst t he forces of extremism in a n en vironment of unstable government coalitions of institutionalized elites . The fourth palace leader was not a constitutional monarchist . B ut the actions of the C hief Aide-de-Camp i n the 1 930s i nvolved par tisanship nonetheless-a partisanship that more often than not contradicted the efforts of the constitutional monarchists who were his palace colleagues .
T H E C H I E F A I DE-DE-CA M P : C H I EF M I L ITARY ADVISER IN ATTENDANCE One other personal adviser, if he can be called so, on the Emperor's staff was the chief aide-de-camp ( jiju bukanch o ) . Certainly he was the least helpful member, for he seems to have functioned as the eyes and ears of the General Staff rather than as the Emperor's trusted aide . . . . The chief aide-de-camp was at this time [ 1 93 1 ] functioning as a General Staff infor-
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mant in the Palace rather than as a discreet and devoted assistant to the Emperor i n his difficult task of coordination . Yale Candee Maxon99
The unique position of the Office of Aides-de-Camp among the of fices of court has been described i n chapter 3 . The post of Chief Aide-de-Camp was explicitly recognized in a revision of Army regu lations on October 1 0 , 1 87 9 , although a set of regulations applying exclusively to the Office of Aides did not materialize until April 1 , 1 89 6 . Aides had acted as messengers between the emperor and the organs of military command as early as 1 87 5 , 100 however, and prior to the formal creation of the Office of Aides in 1 896, Aides had been acknowledged members of the General Staff. I n 1 893 , for example , the wartime Imperial Headquarters incl uded six Imperial Aides as well as both service ministers and the Chief of the High Command . 101 The Aides were the military equivalent of the C hamberlains, and the C hief Aide functioned as the liaison between the emperor and the military leadership, much as the Grand C hamberlain did between the emperor and the civilian leadership . More importantly, the C hief Aide was the military equivalent of the Privy Seal . He advised and assisted the emperor on mil itary affairs in regular attendance , much as the Privy Seal did on civil affairs . B oth emissary and adviser func tions were implicit in the 1 896 regulati ons discussed in chapter 3 : the Chief Aide-and even the Aides-reported and replied to the throne . Between April 1 896 and November 1 945 , when the Office of Aides was abolished , there were but eight Chief Aides , or one every 6 . 3 years . Measured by personnel changes , therefore , the office of C hief Aide was the most stable of the four leadi ng court offices : there was a new Household M i nister every 5 years , a new Grand Cham berlain every 6 years a nd a new Privy Seal every 4 . 6 years . For three of the four court offices , the Meij i period wit nessed the highest degree of personnel stability, but for the Chief Aide, the greatest stability occurred between 1 9 1 3 a nd 1 93 3 . There were two C hief 99. Yale Candee Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Uwalry, 1930- 1 945 (Berkeley and Los A ngeles : University of California Press, 1 95 7 ) , p. 54. 1 00 . Matsushita Yoshio, pp. 205-06. 1 0 1 . l naba Masao, "N ihon no Sensii Shidii: Sono Kikii to J issai ( 1 ) , " Kokubo 10 no. 7 ( M a rrh 1 962 ) : 7 9 .
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Aides from April 1 896 t o November 1 9 1 3 (9 years average) , two from November 1 9 1 3 to April 1 933 ( 9 . 5 years average), and four between April 1 93 3 and November 1 94 5 ( 3 . 3 years average) . The greatest instability at the emperor's side i n military affairs thus came i n t he period when the mil itary , particularly the Army , made its bid for i nstitutional hegemony over government decision making. As the Army's demand s on the government i ncreased in scope and intensity , it became i ncreasi ngly difficult to find a Chief Aide satisfactory to both the Army a nd the court , and this evidently produced frequent changes . Only w hen Japan settled down to mobilizing for total war under military leadership after 1 93 9 did the office of C hief Aide re stabilize. Until the 1 930s the Chief Aide, i nvariably an Army general , was notable mostly for his lack of visibility in the politics and operations of the military bureaucracy . The first Chief Aide, General Viscount Okazawa Kiyoshi ( 1 834-1 908) , was from the restorationist domain of Choshu . Prior to his appoi ntment he had served as Vice Minister of the Army and concurrently C hief of the Mil itary Affairs B ureau ( 1 8 9 1 -92 ) . He had also been a member of the staff at I mperial H e a d q u a r t e r s d u r i ng t he S i n o -J a p a nese W a r of 1 8 9 4 - 9 5 . Okazawa's successor, however, was General B aron Nakamura Sa toru ( 1 854- 1 92 5 ) , a famed swordsman of very little importance in the military bureaucracy . Havi ng served as Aide to the crow n pri nce in 1 895 and as Aide to the emperor in 1 896, Nakamura was ap pointed C hief Aide in 1 908 without any experience in maj or Army positions . When he resigned as C hief Aide in 1 9 1 3 , Nakamura was appoi nted to the Supreme War Council . Composed of mil itary venerables , the Supreme War Cou ncil was the military's eq uivalent of the largely civilian Privy Council . Nakamura's successor, General Uchiyama Koj iro ( 1 859-?), also held no Army posts of significance ; like Nakamura he had served previously as an Aide-de-Camp . With the appoi ntment of Nara Takej i as Chief Aide in 1 922 , the first of the Army 's " C hi na hands" came to the palace . In add ition to havi ng served as Director of the M ilitary Affairs B ureau , the first to have held one of the maj or Army offices si nce Okazawa, Nara had commanded the Japanese garrison in China. I ncluding Nara, four of the five C hief Aides from 1 922 to 1 945 had seen service in China :
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H onj o Shigeru , C hief Aide from 1 933 to 1 93 6 , had been commander of t he Kwantung Army w hen the Manchurian I ncident broke out i n 1 93 1 ; Hata Shunroku, Chief Aide briefly in 1 93 9 , had been com mander of the Shanghai forces in 1 93 8 , and Hasunuma Shigeru , C hief Aide from 1 93 9 to 1 9 t-.::i , had at least some experience i n C hi na . O nly Usami Okiie, C hief Aide from 1 936 to 1 93 9 , ap parently had no experience in the China theater. Since the Army's dema nds for policy control were i nextricably i nterwove n w i t h military actions on the C hinese mai nland , it is notewort hy that Army officers with Chi na experience served as C hief Aides for twenty of the twenty-three years from 1 922 to 1 94 5 . Like other palace leaders , the Chief Aides, with one exception, were all ending their active bureaucratic careers . The average age upon appointment was 5 6 , ranging from 5 1 to 62 , and the average age on leaving office was 62 . 1 , rangi ng from 54 to 7 4 . O nly one achieved high military office after serving as C hief Aide : Hata Shunroku became Army M inister in 1 93 9 directly after a brief tour of duty as C hief Aide. Until the 1 930s, therefore, the C hief Aides were largely drawn from the second level of the Army bureaucracy ; almost all terminated their active military careers as Chief Aides to the emperor . I n contrast to the position of Aide-de-Camp , the office of Chief Aide was not a steppi ng-stone to higher military office, with the one exception of Hata Shunroku. Two Chief Aides in the 1 930s did , however, become Privy Councillors . That Nara Takej i in 1 937 and Honj o Shigeru in 1 940 should have received such appoi ntments is evi dence of the weight that the Army as an institution carried in the councils of state i n the late 1 930s. Although the Army held the i nitiative in appoi nti ng the Chief Aide , it would be misleadi ng to label the C hief Aide as the " spy" of the General Staff in the palace throughout the prewar period . In the first place, the Chief Aides from 1 896 to 1 922 were neither maj or figures nor focal poi nts of conflict resolution. When Hara Kei , as Saionj i ' s H ome M inister in 1 9 1 2 , attempted to negotiate the Army's demand for two new divisions , for example, he went to Privy Seal Katsura Taro, not to Chief Aide Nakamura Satoru . Hara's diary records no contact with the Chief Aide nor does it mention any ac t i ons taken by the Chief Aide in connection with the dispute . It
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would appear that the C hief Aide was a loyal servant of the Meij i oligarchy u ntil 1 9 1 3 and a neutral figure until approximately 1 92 8 . Second , leadership over the military was not yet in the hands of generals and admirals w ho were entirely the products of the m i l i t a r y ' s r i g i d l y i ns t i t u t i o n a l i z e d c ha n ne l s of recrui t m e n t , education, and career advancement-channels that were so all-en compassing and exclusive that a general or admiral tended to equate his i nstitution's particular interests with the general national i nterest (Imperial Will ) . 102 The first C hief Aide to have graduated from the M ilitary Academy , for example , was Uchiyama Koj iro, Chief Aide from 1 9 1 3 to 1 92 2 . Thereafter every C hief Aide was a Military Academy graduate, and most were graduates of the Military Staff Col lege as wel l . Finally, the Army's involvement in C hi na did not reach the poi nt of no return until 1 928-3 1 , begi nning with the murder of Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin in June 1 92 8 and made irrevocable by the Manchurian I ncident i n September 1 93 1 . 103 O nly when the i nstitutionalization of military leadership combined with an irrevocable commitment in C hi na did the office of Chief Aide become a vehicle for Army activism in the palace . The tenure of General Honj o S higeru as C hief Aide from 1 93 3 to 1 93 6 is t he most extreme example of i nstitutional ized Army representation at the side of the emperor. 104 Honj o was one of five generals produced by the ni nth class of the Military Academy , which was graduated in 1 897 . His fellow generals were Araki Sadao, a leading spirit in the Army's Imperial Way Faction ; Mazaki Jinzaburo , also a leader of the Imperial Way Faction and deeply im plicated in the coup of February 26, 1 93 6 ; Matsui lwane, com mander i n C hina during the rape of Nanking in 1 937 and ha nged as a war criminal after the war; a nd Abe Nobuyuki . 105 Two of t he five 1 02 . On t he exclusiveness of Army education and its effects on Army leadership see Alvin D . Coox, " Year o f t h e Tiger," Orient/ West 9, n o . 4 Ouly-August 1 964) : 34-7 1 ; and Maruyama Masao, Thought a nd Behaviour, pp. 1 3- 1 5 . 1 03 . On t he Army's role in Manchuria see Sadako N . Ogata , Defiance i n Manchuria: The Making of japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1 964) . 1 04 . Honjo's diary, cited earlier, is t o m y knowledge the only primary source t o have been published on the activities of any C hief Aide-de-Camp. N or have I d iscovered biographies or autobiographies of any of the C hief Aides. My discussion of t hat office and its personnel is t herefore at best fragmentary . 1 05 . Honj o Shigeru , p. i .
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were prominent Army politicians . Araki and Abe both served as Cabinet M i nisters and Abe became Prime M i nister in 1 93 9 for a brief period . Three of the five-Honj o , Mazaki, and Matsui-had seen extensive service in China. As noted above , General Honj o had been commander of the Kwantung Army w hen the M a nchurian In cident broke i n September 1 93 1 . Honj o's appointment as Chief Aide in 1 93 3 , t herefore , brought into t hat pal ace office mil itary prominence , i nstitutionalized career, and China experience . To this was added his association with the allegedly extremist Army group , the Imperial Way Faction . As Chief Aide, Honj o played four i nterrelated roles : ( 1 ) adviser to the emperor; (2) defender of the i nstitutional i ntegrity of the military, primarily t hat of the Army , at the emperor's side; (3) liaison between the emperor and the military ; and (4 ) consultant and confidant to the other t hree palace leaders . 106 The vagueness of " reporting and replyi ng to the throne on military matters" allowed the C hief Aide considerable discretion in the performance of these functions . The role of adviser to the emperor in Honj o's case in volved replying to rhetorical q uestions by the emperor as much as it did the renderi ng of advice . On April 1 8 , 1 93 3 , twelve days after he had been appointed C hief Aide, Honj o was summoned by the em peror and asked w hether a direct imperial command should not be issued to the Kwantung Army to halt its advance in the Jehol area of Manchuria. Honj o guessed t hat the emperor was pointing out by such a question that it would be a breach of faith for Japan to continue advancing while declaring to t he foreign powers that Japan would not advance into China's interior. Fearing that this kind of im perial command would lead to u ndesirable consequences , he advised the emperor to wait . Honj o then retired from the emperor's presence 1 06 . Unfort unately, the particulars of Honj o's appointment are not known . Nezu M asashi argues that his appointment was a personal reward by t he emperor for service i n Manchuria (Nezu Masashi, p. 1 1 6) . There is as little evidence to support this view as there is for the ("()ntrary proposition that by being i n the palace Honj o would be " neutralized" as a politically artive military leader. The biographers of Suzuki Kantarii argue that Honjo became Chief Aide at the recommendation of General Araki Sadao, who was Army M inister when Ho�ii was appoi nted ; subsequently, Honj o allegedly reported everything t hat went on in t he palace lo Araki (Suzuki Ka ntaro Den, p. 1 20) . Nezu supports t he " reward" t heory of appoi ntment , Suzuki 's biographers the "spy" i nterpretation. Both require modification, although the latter i s apparently more accurate. Honjo was forced to resign i n 1 936 because of complications •·a used by his son-in-law's participation in the February 26 coup.
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and went to see the Deputy Chief o f the Army General Staff, General Mazaki J i nzaburo. Honj o told Mazaki that what Mazaki and others had reported to t he throne conflicted with the actual situation in China. As a result , the General Staff issued an order to t he army in the field to pull back. 107 In t his i nstance the Chief Aide advised the emperor to wait , which the emperor did, and then saw to it t hat the conditions provoking t he emperor's rhetorical q uestion were relieved . O n January 2 6 , 1 934 the emperor told Honj o that accordi ng to the newspapers t he Army and Navy Mi nisters had stated to t he Diet t hat t here was nothi ng wrong in military men discussi ng and studying politics . Commenting, the emperor stated that even re search might lead to evil i nfluences if it went too far. That afternoon, i n response to i mperial summons , Honj o apprised the emperor of the meaning of the ministers' remarks . First , he argued , officers must know about politics at t he national and l ocal levels i n order for t hem to command reservists and veterans as well as their own troops effec tively . Without such knowledge, officers would be unable to possess t he deep sympathy for their men that is required for leadership : communication problems would develop between officers and men . Second , under present conditions, when the strength o f the nation must be i ncreased and concentrated on prepared ness for war, domestic politics must be shaped toward t his end . Those loyal to na tional defense s hould petition t hrough proper channels, such as the Army Mi nistry , for the remedy of political defects i n this regard . Senior officers must know about politics for morale purposes and for unity i n t heir views on national defense. Finally, although officers ought not to be diffident about politics , t hey must not participate i n politics directly; direct political action was prohibited b y military regulations . In response to Honj o's rationalization of the military's political attitudes , the emperor remarked that such an i nterpretation lay on the side of moderation and was acceptable. 108 Honjo's " ad vice" to the throne i n t his instance reveals an attempt by the C hief Aide to mollify t he emperor w hile defending the i ntegrity of the 1 07 . Honj o Shigeru, p . 1 59 . 1 08 . Ibid . , p p . 1 82-83 .
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military's political views. His remarks also show the degree of politicization that had taken place withi n the Army and his sym pathy with it. Honj o again defended the Army's political i nterests to t he em peror on February 8, but with less success. The emperor told Honj o t hat the military's i nterest in agrarian problems and sympat hy with rural distress should go only so far; t he farmers also had their pleasures and the aristocracy their pains. The emperor pointedly re marked that the Taisho Emperor's illness was provoked by t he cares a nd restraints of being emperor. At this veiled rebuke, Honj o was apparently contrite, " u nable to restrai n his emotion and awe . " 109 On occasion the C hief Aide and t he emperor collided directly. At one point the emperor told Honj o poi nt blank of the Army's obstruc tion between emperor and Cabinet duri ng t he Manchurian I ncident . H onj o felt compelled to remonstrate with the emperor and replied i n effect that n o such thing could ever happen . 1 10 M ore importa nt , however, was t he emperor's constant conflict with his C hief Aide over M inobe's theory of constitutional monarchy . As often as the emperor explai ned the theory and castigated the Army's opposition to it, H onj o j ustified t he Army's stance : the Army believed the em peror to be god manifest ; to make t he emperor a person would be troublesome for "troop education and supreme command . " 1 1 1 When t he emperor told the ranki ng naval Aide-de-C a m p, ldemitsu Mambei , that t he military was contradicti ng imperial wishes re garding M i nobe's theory , ldemitsu replied that the emperor should " tra nscend " such debates . 1 12 Throughout t he controversy over M inobe's t heory , which raged in t he Diet and elsewhere from March i nto October 1 93 5 , "advice" to the emperor from the C hief Aide as well as t he ranki ng naval Aide amounted to staunch defense of t he military's position and outright contradiction of the emperor's views. 1 13 Honj o's actions during the M i nobe affair illustrate how much the office of Chief Aide-de-Camp had been transformed i nto a 1 09 . I 1 0. 111. 1 12. 1 1 3.
Ibid . , Ibid . , I bid . , Ibid . , Ibid . ,
p. 1 85 . p . 207 . p. 204 . p. 2 1 1 . pp. 203-3 1 .
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channel for institutional representation a t the emperor's side and a vehicle for countering opinions at the palace contrary to those of the military , including those of the emperor hi mself. Honj o also used his office as military adviser to the throne to protect as best he could the interests and i ntegrity of the Army in the aftermath of the February 26 I ncident of 1 93 6 , a coup attempt by young officers w hich brought i nt o q uest i o n t he capacity or willi ngness of the senior Army officers to control their younger colleagues . On March 6, 1 93 6 , shortly after t he coup had been brought under control , the emperor asked Honj o whether he should not dissolve the regiments that had spaw ned the " i nsurgent officers and men . " Honj o replied that the matter was now under investi gation by those i n positions of responsibility and poi nted out to the emperor that to dissolve the "dishonorable" regiments would be a great rep r i m a nd t o t he e nt i re m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t . N ot surprisingly, "those in responsible positions" subsequently decided not to abolish the concerned regiments . Because the regimental colors had been bestowed by the emperor, however, the Office of Aides-de-Camp thought it improper merely to present such a de cision to him without first aski ng his view . Consequently, the Army M inistry , the I nspectorate of Mil itary Education, and the Army General Staff reconsidered and decided to ascertain the emperor's views on the issue of dissolution. The burden of negotiating a solution satisfactory to both Army and emperor now lay sq uarely on C hief Aide Honj o . On March 1 4 the Section Chief for Mil itary Affairs went back and forth between the Aides' Office and the Army M i nistry ; he emphasized that if by any chance the emperor should press for dissol ution of the tai nted regiments the Army authorities would be in serious straits. Havi ng reported this to the emperor and heard his views, Honj o asked the Director of the Mil itary Affairs B ureau, General l mai Kiyoshi , to come to Honj o's office : it was the emperor's wish to permit the retention of the tai nted regiments . On March 1 7 the Army M i nister and Army C hief of Staff met with the emperor at the palace . They reported , over their j oi nt signatures , that : ( 1 ) t he coup was an un precedented disgrace and a blot on the bright record of the I mperial Army , in particular of the regi ments concerned ; (2) although
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dissolving the four regiments i nvolved was deemed unavoidable i n view of regimental and officers' rules o f conduct , those who planned a nd participated in the i nsurgency were but a small fraction of these regi ments ; a nd ( 3 ) t he tai nted regiments w i s hed to redeem themselves . The emperor replied : "Then all is wel l . Guard agi nst t he future . " After severely reprimanding their regiments, two of the four commanders came to visit the C hief Aide on March 2 0 , expressi ng their gratitude and asking that their appreciation be reported to the throne . 1 14 W hile the dissolution issue was pending, Honj o was also set to work on what the emperor was to say formally to the Army M i nister w hen he proffered his apologies for the i nsurrection. The i nteraction among palace officials i n arrivi ng at the public I mperial Will in politics as well as the C hief Aide's efforts on behalf of his i nstitu tional constituency are both illustrated by the reprimand process. I n late February the Office of Aides began t o i nvestigate the substance of a suitable reprimand , the procedures i nvol ved , and the locus of responsibility for the i ncident . Honj o asked the Privy Council President and former I mperial Household M i nister, Ichiki Kitokuro, about procedures for the reprimand . Ichiki replied that on relatively routine matters it had been customary si nce the time of Meij i to relay the emperor's words precisely as he had stated them ; on mat ters of grave import , however, the emperor's statement was to be " advised and assisted " on by the Privy Seal . Honj o agreed that consultation with the Privy Seal was req uired and the Office of Aides proceeded accordi ngly . 1 15 The Army M i nister apologized i nformally on February 2 9 and formally on March 3. B ut because a new Privy Seal had not yet been appoi nted to replace Privy Seal Saito Makoto, one of the key senior leaders assassi nated in the February 26 coup , the emperor did not reply to the Army Mi nister. Honj o urged the necessity of a prompt imperial response . W hen he was summoned by the emperor on March 4, Honj o was told that if the reprimand were too strong the Privy Seal would once again be menaced by radical rightists . Yet some discipli nary action had to be taken, the emperor implied , be1 1 4 . Ibid . , 1 1 5 . Ibid . ,
pp. pp.
290-9 1 . 2 9 1 -92 .
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cause for h i m personally the murder o f his most trusted senior statesmen and military officers caused the greatest anguish . Moreover, such behavior went against the constitution, violated the Emperor Meij i ' s I nstructions (to soldiers and sailors) , and stai ned the national polity . On March 5 Honj o was again summoned by the emperor, who was concerned whether his words, given through the ordi nary channels, would have any effect at all on officers who seemed so willing to defy the constitution . The Office of Aides fi nally prepared a suitable reprimand and on March 8, after the New Privy Seal, Yuasa Kurahei, had agreed to and signed it, Honj o obtai ned the emperor's sanction. The repri mand was severe : the Army had frequently and repeatedly staged ominous i ncidents, finally giving rise to the recent disaster which ut terly contradicted the I nstructions to Soldiers and Sailors , tarnished the history of Japan, and caused i nsufferable anxiety. The military was ordered to clean house thoroughly and to guard against such a disgrace occurring again . 1 1 6 B ut Honj o's labors were not at an end. One hour after the em peror had apparently sanctioned the text he summoned Honj o once agai n : the text did not i nclude t he phrase " stained the national polity . " W hat was the Army's i nterpretation of t he national polity , given its i nsistence on "clarification of the nati onal polity " ? Honj o replied that Japan's national polity " lay i n an emperor of one l i ne unbroken for ages eternal who ruled the state i n obedience to the be queathed i nstructions of the imperial ancestors and the imperial founder . " B ut , Honj o conti nued , t he fearsome i ncident of late " can not . . . in any way be said to have stained the national polity . " 1 1 7 Despite the emperor's poi nted questions, the phrase "stai ned the na tional polity " was left out of the official reprimand . Honj o had once again succeeded in compromisi ng t he severity of action contemplated agai nst his i nstitutional constituency . O n March 1 0 t he new Army M i nister, G e neral Terauchi Hisaichi , was summoned to the palace specifically to receive the formal imperial reprimand . Terauchi was ordered by the emperor to make the i ntent of the reprimand thoroughly know n to subordi nate 1 1 6 . Ibid . , p . 292 . 1 1 7 . lbid . , pp. 2 92-93 .
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personnel i n the Army . To avoid future misunderstanding, Honj o gave the Army M inister a copy of the emperor's words. At four o'clock that afternoon the emperor summoned Honj o and asked him how the Army M i nister planned to transmit t he reprimand to the Army . Honj o relayed the emperor's q uestion to the Army M inister, w ho took it u nder consideration immediately _ u s The responsible au thorities of the Army , with the participation of Aide-de-Camp Sakai , met on March 1 9 and decided that ( 1 ) for the emperor to issue such an imperial rescript of reprimand to the entire Army was without precedent ; (2) a rescript with such words as " tarnished the history of our country , " w hen the conduct in question was that of a small segment of the Army , would leave a stain on the Army that would be difficult to remove ; (3) a rescript of reprimand should only be given after all other efforts had failed , and the Army's leaders had not yet taken all alternative measures ; therefore, (4) there should be no im perial rescript at this time. Havi ng received this decision from his responsible subordi nates , the Army M i nister asked Honj o the following day about distributing the emperor's reprimand to Army personnel . The Office of Aides consulted the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry secretaries and the Privy Seal 's Office on t he nature of imperial rescripts and declarations; the Army Minister was then advised that the intent of t he imperial reprimand should be written into the Army M i nister's instructions to t he Army but that it would be advisable to avoid distributing copies of the reprimand to the Army . Copies could , however, be given to high-ranki ng officers , includi ng division commanders . 1 19 The emperor's reprimand to the Army M inister i n chambers was therefore not transformed into a public imperial declaration to the entire Army . Throughout his tenure as Chief Aide Honj o reconciled the con flicti ng demands of Army and emperor, includ i ng those of the em peror's "advisers , " as much in favor of t he Army as possible. W hat was "possible" depended on ( 1 ) the emperor's stance a nd to whom that stance was known, (2) the i ntransigence of the Army , (3) the precedents and procedures available to rationalize given courses of Ibid . , 1 1 9 . I bid . ,
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293. 293-94 .
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action, and (4) the views of other palace leaders w ho shared in the process of conflict reconciliation. The emperor's stance in politics was conditioned by his civilian advisers , especial ly palace leaders and others , such as Prince Saionj i , who held to M i nobe's theory of constitutional monarchy or sympathized with i t . The sharpness of the conflict between Chief Aide Honj o and the emperor over the M inobe theory i ndicates how partisan t he emperor's stance was . Honj o was therefore restrai ned by t he emperor to the extent that the emperor's actions a nd views had to be taken i nto account by the C hief Aide i n dischargi ng his function of advice a nd assistance . The i ntransigence of Honj o's i nstitutional constituency was ap parently t he most important factor i n Honj o's actions; he felt constrai ned to " remonstrate" with the emperor w hen basic Army i nterests were threatened . W hile " remonstration" for Household M inister Tanaka M itsuaki in t he early twentieth century was largely based on his personal role conception and his person-to person relations with the oligarchs and their proteges , Chief Aide Honj o's remonstration in the 1 930s was based primarily on institu tional considerations . It is important to repeat t hat the C hief Aide was an Army officer on active duty ; both Ho�o and his predecessor, Nara Takej i , for example, went i nto the Reserves after they resigned as C hief Aides . The fact t hat the C hief Aides were active-duty of ficers appoi nted on Army initiative rei nforced t heir loyalty to the Army . Also quite obvious in Honj o's behavior was a great concern for procedure and precedent . Honj o was meticulous i n consulting the Privy Seal , the President of the Privy Council , a nd household of ficials w henever formal action was to be taken by the emperor, as i n dicated by his actions i n the aftermath of the February 2 6 I ncident . Precedent was useful i n mitigating the emperor's actions against the Army i n t hat critical period ; a formal reprimand to the Army, for example, would have been "without precedent . " B ut procedures and precedents worked two ways. Precedent had to be sought for actions on the part of the C hief Aide, as well as the emperor, and the observance of procedures quite obviously allowed palace leaders some i nfluence over the behavior of the C hief Aide . Once he became one of the four leading palace officers , Honj o was surrounded by
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a different set of procedures and precedents from those in the Army , and a different set of colleagues . Among his palace colleagues , the one with the greatest influence on Honj o appears to have been Grand Chamberlai n Suzuki Kan taro. I t was Suzuki who initially i nformed Honj o of the norms of conduct regardi ng the throne for both civilian and military leaders . This he did by discussi ng improprieties i n the behavior of Prime M inister Tanaka Giichi in 1 92 9 and , on instructions from the em peror, the contradictory actions of the Chief of the Navy General Staff duri ng the London Naval Treaty controversy of 1 930. 120 Al though Chief Aide Honj o and those i n the Office of Aides were the sole formal liaisons between the palace a nd the military commands, H onj o was careful to keep himself i nformed of the Privy Seal 's views . On one occasion, for example, he ascertai ned the Privy Seal 's opinion, via Grand Chamberlain Suzuki , on the revision of reporting procedures for the Navy General Staff. 121 The Household M i nister was also i nvolved on occasion. When i n J anuary 1 934 a request came from Pri nce-of-the-Blood Asaka for an imperial review of the Palace Guards (Konoe Shidan) , Honj o busied himself with precedents for such a review and obtai ned the " under standi ng" of the H ousehold M inistry as well as t he B oard of C ham berlains . 122 The H ousehold M i nister and Chief Aide also worked together when t he Army obj ected to the emperor's reviewi ng J apanese troops with the emperor of M a nchuria during the latter's visit to Japan. The Household M i nister i nsisted that courtesies to a visiting head of state fel l under his j urisdiction, not t he Army's. Through Honj o , however, a compromise was reached w hereby spe cial courtesies were to be rendered by the Army to the Japanese em peror. The issue took two weeks to settle. 123 Honj o also kept palace leaders i nformed , at least sporadically, of Army criticisms of those " at the emperor's side" or "close to the t hrone . " Around September 1 93 5 , for example, H o nj o told 1 20. Ibid . , pp. 1 60-62 . Suzuki t hus conti nued his partisan activities o n behalf o f the consti tutional monarchists. I n the instances cited above he was used i n an attempt to bri ng the Chief Aide i nto l i ne with palace policy duri ng 1 93 3 . 1 2 1 . Ibid . , p p . 1 63-67 . 1 2 2 . Ibid . , pp. 1 79-80. 1 23 . Ibid . , pp. 201 -03 .
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Household M i nister Yuasa Kurahei that a segment of the Army was angry over the " weak" advice given the emperor by the Senior Retainers, i ncluding the emperor's palace advisers . Yuasa told Honj o that he, as Household M i nister, was never asked political questions by the emperor, although some felt that the Household Minister should speak his mind on political issues . Grand C ham berlain Suzuki added that the emperor never asks the Privy Seal questions about military affairs . Honj o believed , however, t hat the Privy Seal might properly be consulted on the d isti nctions between civil and military matters . 124 Honj o did, it appears , act as a colleague among fellow palace leaders in coordi nating the emperor's role as E mperor-i n-State . It is much too simple to classify even as extreme an example as C hief Aide Honj o as a military " spy" at the emperor's side . Although he tenaciously defended the policies a nd interests of t he military, espe cially the Army , Honj o was meticulous in observing palace customs , procedures , and precedents. He kept the emperor and palace leaders i nformed of opi nion within the Army . If he behaved as the representative of his i nstitutional constituency at t he emperor's side , he also demonstrated an awareness of his role as a palace person, as one of those i nvolved in the coordination of t he I mperial Will i n politics . H i s actions reveal the complexity of pressures o n him as military adviser a nd liaison to the throne, pressures that derived from his dual capacity as institutional representative and palace ne gotiator. As such, he was both the voice of military demands at the side of the emperor and t he instrument of palace communication and negotiation with the military . Havi ng an active-duty status . within t he Army, having served a lifetime in that constituency , and having i n fact been given his palace office by that constituency , the C hief Aide was, however, a v ery dif ferent palace officer from his palace colleagues . He was espec· lly set on apart from his civilian counterpart who advised the emper " politics" : the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal .
5
1 24 . Ibid . , pp. 224-2 5 .
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171
THE LORD KEEPER OF THE PRIVY SEA L : C H I EF POLITICAL ADVISER IN ATTENDANCE Because Count Makino also felt deep concern over his i ncapacity i n of fice, [ his i nfirmities] bei ng such that it was completely impossible for him to take part even i n court events at the year's end and the year's begi n ning, Pri nce Saionj i , Prime M i nister Okada, H ousehold M inister Yuasa , Grand C hamberlain Suzuki , and others came to an agreement among themselves and fi nally brought about [ M akino's resignation as Privy Seal ] . Former Prime M i nister Viscount Saito was made his successor by direct imperial appointment because his character and career were considered most fit for dischargi ng the heavy responsibilities of rendering advice and assistance in regular attendance on the Emperor, given that the viscount was already one of t he Senior Retainers . Although some gave heed to his connections with t he present Cabi net , si nce the viscount had been involved as midwife of the Okada Cabinet , in fact there was absolutely no political significa nce in this. To kyo Asahi Shim bun125
However accurate as a picture of political reality, these comments on the appointment of the new Privy Seal in 1 935 reflect idealized perceptions about the right man to be Privy Seal and the proper nature of his role. A Senior Retai ner (ex-Prime Minister) , Viscount Saito was most " fit" to render advice and assistance to the throne , which he would have done i ndirectly in any case as one of those consulted by Pri nce Saionj i w hen a Cabinet collapsed during the 1 930s. There was " no political significance" -undue political par tisanship or unhealthy political connections-in the fact that he had been " midwife" to the Okada Cabi net in J uly 1 934, despite Vis count Saito's pro-Saionj i stance in politics and his long association with Okada in the Navy . As we shall see , the Privy Seal had always acted as liaison a nd negotiator between the throne and the political world outside the palace gates . That Saito had midwifed the Okada Cabi net prior to his appointment as Privy Seal was evidence that he 1 2 5 . December 27, 1 93 5 , as qu oted in Shishaku Saito Makoto Den, 3 vols. (Tokyo: Zaidan l l oj i n Saito S hishaku Kinen Kai , 1 94 1 ) 3 : 646. ,
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was i n fact able t o perform one of the Privy Seal 's most important functions : political broker to the throne on Cabi net formations . As indicated by the appoi ntment of Senior Retai ner Saito i n 1 93 5 , t he Privy Seals genera l l y were expected t o be accomplished statesmen , and i n fact they were the most prestigious of the palace leaders in career and status. Of the thirteen Privy Seals between 1 885 and 1 945 , four (30 . 8 percent) had been Prime M i nisters ; nine (69.2 percent) had served as M i nisters of State; seven ( 5 3 . 8 percent ) , i ncludi ng t w o presidents , had been Privy Councillors ; a nd a l l but one (92 . 3 percent) were at one time members of the House of Peers . Two ( 1 5 .4 percent) were Elder Statesmen . The only imperial pri nce among all four lead ing palace officers from 1 885 to 1 94 5 , Fushimi Sadanaru , served as Privy Seal . All the Privy Seals were titled ; among them they i ncluded one pri nce-of-t he-blood (7 .7 percent ) , five pri nces (38 . 5 percent) , one marq uis (7 .7 percent) , two counts ( 1 5 . 4 perce nt ) , two viscounts ( 1 5 . 4 percent ) , and two barons ( 1 5 . 4 percent) . Averaging sixty-five years of age upon assuming office , ranging from forty-eight to eighty-two, the Privy Seals were also on the average the most senior members of the palace leadership. The average term of office was 4.6 years , although two Privy Seals served but one day in office , thus distorting the average dow nward . The Privy Seal , like all palace leaders , was expected to " serve a lifetime at the side of the emperor" once appoi nted to leading court office . And most of them did ; eight of the thirteen died within two years of retirement . Althouth many Privy Seals did not serve twenty years in any one given i nstitutional constituency prior to appoi ntment , their maj or career backgrounds were : restorati onist , three (23 . 1 percent); H ome M inistry , three (23 . 1 percent) ; Army , two ( 1 5 .4 percent) ;{and court , Education M i nistry , Foreign M i nistry , Navy , and Agric�ure and Commerce Mi nistry , one each ( 7 . 7 percent) . Calculati ng career backgro\lnd agai nst length of service, however, it is apparent that court , restoration, and Foreign Mi nistry officials held the post of Privy Seal 7 5 percent of the time between 1 885 and 1 945 : 126 1 26 . Four of the thirteen Privy Seals served less than six mont hs : Hamao Arata ( Education M i nistry), Katsura Taro (Army), Saito Makoto (Navy), and lchiki Kitokuro (Home M i nistry).
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years years years years
6 years 2 years 60 years
That only three military officers should have received appointments , excludi ng Elder Statesman General O yama lwao, and that they served a total of but two years i ndicates that the office of Privy Seal was very much a civilian post . The military officers who did hold the post, moreover, were senior officers who had either served as Prime M inister (two) or were members of the imperial house (one) . The only time a court person served as Privy Seal was from 1 89 1 t o 1 9 1 2 , when Pri nce Tokudaij i Sanenori served concurrently as Grand Chamberlain and Privy Seal . Like the other offices of court leadership, therefore , the office of Privy Seal also underwent bureau cratization from the outside once the oligarchic solidarity of the Meij i period ended . The official duties of the Privy Sea l , the initial conception of his role i n 1 885-as revealed by the appoi ntment and actions of the first Privy Seal, Pri nce Sanj o Sanetomi-and the ac tions of subsequent Privy Seals reveal the flexibility of that most im portant of court offices as it responded to changing times throughout the period 1 885- 1 94 5 . A s was the case with the Grand C hamberlai n, the duties o f the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal were briefly defi ned and the j urisdic tion of his office diffuse . The office of Privy Seal was created withi n the palace in December 1 88 5 . The Privy Seal was to ( 1 ) take custody of the I mperial Seal and the Great Seal of State, (2) render advice and assistance in attendance on the emperor, and (3) preside over the proceedings of the Court Advisers (Kyuchu Kom onkan) . 1 21 The ef.
1 2 7 . " Daj okan Tasshi , " no. 68, December 2 2 , 1 88 5 , in Hii rei Zensho, 1 885, 2 : 1 ,043 . Palace advisers, origi nally fifteen i n number, were appoi nted for meritorius service and were to advise the throne on ceremonies stipulated in household regulations (ibid . ) . B y 1 907 the fifteen Court Advisers·, as well as the I mperial H ousehold Mi nistry Consultants (Kunai Shii Goyogakari) , fell under t he Imperial Household M i nister's office . In 1 94 3 , however, there were three special "consultants" (goyiigakari) to the Privy Seal : one a Privy Councillor, one a n I mperial Household M i nistry Councillor (Sanjikan) and the third a Bureau of Legislation ( :ouncillor ( Prime Minister's Office) (Shokuin Roku, July 1 943, pt . 2, pp. 1 4- 1 5 ) .
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fective regulation governi ng the Privy Seal 's office from 1 907 until 1 942 added that the Privy Seal was to take charge of imperial edicts , imperial rescripts , and matters regarding palace documents, while deleting the provision on presidi ng over the meetings of Court Advisers . In addition to two secretaries of executive appointee rank , the Privy Seal was assigned a C hief Secretary of imperial appoi ntee rank to assist him in his duties . 128 Of the four leading palace officers only the Household M i nister and the Privy Seal were empowered to "advise and assist " (hohitsu) the emperor, as were the Mi nisters of State ; the C hief Aide , however, was permitted to " report and reply to" the throne, which allowed him similar i nfl uence, and the gene rality of " renderi ng attendance at the emperor's side" allowed the Grand Chamberlain influence as wel l . B ut except for precedents and the "trends of the time , " the Privy Seal , unlike the Household Minister, was under no restriction regarding advice and assistance . If the Privy Seal 's was a disti nctive office for assisting the emperor by renderi ng advice on both national affairs and imperial household matters , the manner in which the function of advice and assistance was fulfilled varied considerably throughout the period from 1 88 5 to 1 94 5 . We have seen, for example , that from 1 89 1 to 1 9 1 2 Privy Seal-Grand C hamberl a i n Tokudaij i was a frictionless conduit between emperor and ol igarchs . The first Privy Seal , Pri nce Sanj o Sanetomi ( 1 8 3 7 -9 1 ) , was , however, a n act i ve member o f the oligarchy . His role as Japan's first Privy Seal has been the subj ect of considerable speculation and controversy. One opinion is that the of fice of Privy Seal was created especially for Sanj o as a place for him to retire in dignity . According to this i nterpretation, Ito Hirobumi wished to fi nd a place for Sanj o commensurate with the post of Chancellor, a post from which Sanj o would be forced to resign when the cabi net system was i naugurated in 1 88 5 . 129 Sanj o has also been characterized as a weak member of the oligarchy . 130 Even w hile Sanj o was Privy Seal , moreover, he was attacked for faw ning ser1 28 . "Kiishitsu Rei ," no. 4 , November I , 1 907, as amended in 1 9 1 0, 1 9 1 4 , and 1 9 1 7 , in Naikaku Kiroku Ka , 1 94 2 , vol . I, pt. 3, chap. I , sec. 3 , p . 20. 1 29. l nada Masatsugu, p . 35; I noue Kiyoshi, p. 1 03 . 1 30. Tsuji Kiyoaki, Nihon Kanryo Sei no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Kiibundii, 1 952), p . 70.
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vilely on the Ito Cabinet . 131 Thus the office of Privy Seal may have been created as a device for kicking the ineffectual Sanj o upstairs . I noue Kiyoshi disagrees with such a n ad hoc interpretation of oligarchic i ntent behind the creation of the Privy Seal 's office . He argues that the office of Privy Seal , which he believes should have been a government rather than a court office, was deliberately placed under the emperor and outside the government to ensure that the emperor could be used to rescue the government oligarchs in time of need , as in confrontations with the I mperial Diet . As such, the office of Privy Seal was intended to be the ultimate stronghold of the "em peror system's bureaucratic-military despotism . " 132 It is not necessary to subscribe to I noue's theory of despotism to agree with him that the office of Privy Seal was intended to be pi votal in t he politics of oligarchic decision maki ng. Sanj o ' s experiences a s a Restoration leader made him a valuable member of the oligarchy and ideally suited to serve oligarchic unity as Privy Seal . Prior to the creation of the cabi net system and the office of Privy Seal in 1 885 , Sanj o had been instrumental in coordinating personnel a nd policy . Throughout the process leadi ng to t he i nauguration of t he cabi net system, for example, he had worked closely with Ito in reachi ng and re-reaching compromises . At no point , according to Ito's biographer, was Sanj o anythi ng but fair and impartial i n his attitudes toward this maj or revision of government structure, a revision that would deprive him of his office as Chancellor. If oligarch Ito was the leader and initiator of policy , oligarch Sanj o was the key policy negotiator. As harmonizer of ol igarchic wills, moreover, Sanj o did not hesitate to offer suggestions to Ito that did not always conform with I to's views . 133 A high Court Noble outside the Satsuma-Choshu group of leaders , Sanj o was also the chief link between Ito and the emperor. As an oligarch, Sanj o was a member of the government elite; a s a Court Noble he had ac cess to the ernperor and was familiar with the ways and customs of court . Sanj o was t herefore ideally suited to render " advice and 1 3 1 . Shumpo Kotsui Shoka i , 2 : 5 1 9 . 1 32 . I noue Kiyoshi, pp. 1 02 -03 . 1 33 . Shumpo Kiitsui Shokai, 2 : 44 1 -84 .
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assistance" a t the emperor's side a s negotiator, not initiator, withi n the oligarchy . After he became Privy Sea l , Sanj o conti nued to be an invaluable member of the oligarchy as it weathered the drafting of the Meij i Constitution between 1 88 5 and 1 889 and the opening of the first I m perial Diet in 1 890. When in 1 88 9 , for example, no agreement could be reached among the oligarchs on a successor to Kuroda Kiyotaka as Prime M i nister, Sanj o became Pri me M inister pro tempore . For two months , from October 2 5 to December 24, 1 88 9 , Sanj o served as both Prime M inister and Privy Seal while engaged in negotiations that ultimately led to t he formation of a Cabi net under Yamagata Aritomo. 134 Rather than "weakness " Sanj o demonstrated great skills as a negotiator, making his office of Privy Seal that of " Prime M inister in reserve. " Sanj o also stood staunchly behi nd the Prime M i nister, believing it to be his duty as Privy Seal to do so until the Pri me Mi nister himself had decided to resign. In the spri ng of 1 887 Prime Mi nister Ito Hirobumi was attacked for blurri ng the disti nction between court and government as well as for failing to revise the unequal treaties between Japan and the Western powers . Despite the possible tarnish on his career that his support of Ito might have caused , Sanj o refused to give in to " public opinion . " Sanj o stood aloof, insisting that any q uestion of resignation had to be delayed until Kuroda Kiyotaka had returned from abroad and all the oligarchs could assemble to reach agreement on a course of action. 135 Given Sanj o's career both before and during his tenure of office as Privy Seal , it might even be argued that he was one of the crucial figures in negotiating the Restoration settlement to a successful conclusion. It is tempting to speculate that the i nnocuous Tokudaij i was able to serve as both Privy Seal and Grand Chamberlai n from 1 89 1 to 1 9 1 2 because Sanj o, as Privy Seal , had been so successful i n consolidati ng oligarchic unity around the Meij i Emperor : a skilled negotiator was no longer required as Privy Seal after Sanj o's death in 1 89 1 . There were but two Privy Seals from December 1 885 to July 1 34 . Ibid . , p p . 698-705 , 1 ,007 . 1 35 . Ibid . , pp. 5 1 9-20.
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1 9 1 2 , the terms of Sanj o and Tokudaij i averaging 1 3 . 3 years . As in the case of the Household M i nister and the Grand Chamberlain, however, the end of the Meij i era was also the end of personnel stability in the Privy Seal's office . From August 1 9 1 2 , when ex Prime Mi nister Katsura became both Privy Seal and Grand Cham berlai n , to March 1 92 5 , when Makino Nobuaki was appoi nted Privy Seal , there were six Privy Seals, or one every 2 . 1 years . An ex Prime Mi nister, a prince-of-the-blood , two Elder Statesmen, and two ex-Ministers of State , in that order, held the post of Privy Seal , i l l ustrat i ng the transit i o n from restorat ionist to bureaucrat ic leadership at the palace . The transition was one of trial a nd error, posing considerable dif ficulties both i n government and i n court . The difficulties involved in Katsura Taro's entrance i nto and exit from the office of Privy Seal in 1 9 1 2 have already been described . Katsura's successor, Pri nce-of the-Blood Fushimi Sadanaru , caused problems of the reverse order . Rather than an active faction politician like Katsura , Fushimi was an imperial prince . His appoi ntment was i nterpreted as renderi ng the office of Privy Seal impotent precisely because of his status . W hen t he issue of Household M i nister Watanabe C hiaki ' s resignation arose in early 1 9 1 4 , for example, the Privy Council had to affirm Privy Seal Fushimi 's powers , as an imperial pri nce, to countersign the resignation, givi ng rise to fears at the time that the office of Privy Seal might "stagnate . " Consequently, the Elder Statesmen, affirming the need for a " full-time" Privy Seal , decided that one of their number, General O yama Iwao, should replace Fus himi . 136 I mplicit in their action was the proposition that an imperial prince had to be " above politics , " yet the Privy Seal's office i nvolved political action-includi ng even such details as the countersigni ng of ministerial appointments and resignations. And these acts, however formal , were potentially partisan. If an imperial pri nce were Privy Seal , his acts would ipso facto affect the impartiality of the imperial family-and the emperor. A Privy Seal had to act discreetly. By virtue of his station, Prince Fushimi could not act discreetly, a nd it is 1 36 . Gensui Koshaku Oyama lwao (Tokyo: O yama Gensui Den Kanko Kai , 1 93 5 ) , pp. H23-24 .
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significant that h e was the only imperial pri nce t o serve m any leading court office from 1 885 to 1 945 . 137 From 1 9 1 5 to 1 922 the office of Privy Seal was occupied by two aged Elder Statesmen, O yama lwao a nd Matsukata Masayoshi . Their appoi ntments suggest that the office of Privy Seal , i n the tradition of Sanj o Sanetomi , belonged to experienced and infl uential statesmen who had no further ambitions in government and were thus ideally suited to act as impartial but effective negotiators i n the political process . Si nce the Elder Statesmen advised the throne on maj or national policies as well as on the appoi ntment of the Prime M i nister, moreover, having one of their number as Privy Seal made this process of advice simpler and solidified the concept that such basic advice to t he t hrone was t he prerogative of t he Elder Statesmen . Count Hirata Tosuke was appoi nted to succeed Pri nce Matsukata Masayoshi in 1 92 2 . Hirata was a protege of Yamagata Aritomo. Next to Yamagat a , appare nt l y , H i rata was best know n t o Matsukata, and it was a t Matsukata's recommendation that Hirata , at the age of seventy-three , was made Privy Seal . 138 Hirata was not a complete stranger to the ways of court . I n 1 9 1 9 he had been appointed I mperial Household M i nistry Consultant to assist the I mperial House Economic Council in the adj ustment of im perial house properties . That council had traditionally i ncluded many of Japan's leading statesmen ; Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Ari tomo, and Matsukata M asayoshi , for example , had at one time or another advised on court fi nances as members of the counci l . W hen the Elder Statesmen became few i n number and aged , younger scholars and officials were appoi nted Consultants to assist in the council's work. As Consultant , Hirata i nvestigated the fi nances of foreign royal houses , heard the views of men in the world of finance , and consulted with court officials . 139 1 37 . We have seen t hat one of t he objections to Katsura was his " rustic" origi ns, and this may have been important i n t he selection of Prince Fushimi to replace Katsura . After Fushimi, however, no person of even Court N oble origi n was to be Privy Sea l . If "status" was one of the criteria i n selecti ng t he Privy Sea l , it q uickly gave way to "ability, " as proven by t he successful bureaucratic careers of all those who served as Privy Seals from 1 9 1 5 on . 1 38 . Hakushaku Hirata Tosuke Den (Tokyo: Hirata-haku Denki Hensan Jimusho, 1 927 ) , p. 1 67 . 1 39. Ibid . , pp. 1 64-6 5 .
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The various posts for advising the court on one matter or another were devices for recruiti ng government leaders into the court , on the one hand , a nd for keeping leaders available to reenter t he government after they had resigned or been forced to resign from their government posts, on the other. Under pressure over the treaty revision issue, for example, I noue Kaoru had resigned as Foreign Minister i n 1 887 only to be appoi nted Court Adviser; he emerged from the palace less than a year later as M inister of Agriculture and Commerce . 140 Leading court officials also retired i nto palace advisory posts. Tanaka M itsuaki , for example, became an I mperial House Economic Adviser after he retired as Household Minister in 1 909, as did ex-Household M i nister lchiki Kitokuro when he was forced to resign as President of the Privy Council in 1 93 6 . The palace, with its multiplicity of advisory posts, thus served as a sanctuary for Japan's leading statesmen and bureaucrats . For Hirata, however, advisi ng at court was evidently a device for acquainting the protege of an Elder Statesman with the ways of court in preparation for high court office . The fundamental role of the Privy Seal as political negotiator was continued by Hirata . Shortly after he had become Privy Seal in Sep tember 1 922 , dissension between the government and the Privy Council arose over the Si no-Japanese postal treaty. The issue was basically a procedural one, involving t he timing of the Privy Council's advice on treaty ratification. The task of mediation fell to Hirata as Privy Seal . The I mperial Diet took up the issue i n December 1 92 2 , causi ng further complications b y subjecti ng the treaty to public criticism, and the issue required five months to settle. Throughout those five months Hirata was guided i n his task of me diation by two negative pri nciples : ( 1 ) not to leave future complica t i ons after the treaty had been ratified , and (2) not to "wound the face" (i� ure the pride) of either the government or the Privy Council . 141 I f in Sanj o's case the role of Privy Seal was to negotiate among the powerful men of the oligarchy , Hirata's role was to mediate among institutions , in this i nstance the Cabinet and the 1 40. S humpo Kiitsui Shiikai, 2 : 5 5 3 . 1 4 1 . Hakushaku Hirata Tosuke Den, p p . 1 68-69.
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Privy Council . Hirata was less concerned with personal reputations than with the prestige and status of institutions i n conflict . Duri ng Hirata 's tenure as Privy Seal there were no less than three Cabi net changes . When Prime M i nister Kato Tomosaburo died i n office o n August 2 5 , 1 92 3 , the Regent " put the q uestion" concerning a successor to the Elder Statesmen . 142 Saionj i went to the imperial villa at Hayama to respond to the throne . There he met Privy Seal H i rata a nd told him t hat he had consulted w i t h Matsukata Masayoshi , the only other remai ning Elder Statesman, and that they wished to recommend Yamamoto Gombei as Kato's successor . Asked his opinion , Hirata replied that w homever the Elder Statesmen recommended , he deemed appropriate. The imperial command to form a Cabi net fell to Yamamoto on August 28, 1 92 3 . 143 I n contrast to his role as institutional mediator in the postal treaty controversy , Privy Seal Hirata's role in Cabi net formations was evidently one of liaison between the throne and the elder Statesmen, although they solicited his view . 144 From 1 885 to 1 945 the selection of the Prime Mi nister was a care fully preserved imperial prerogative . Because it was an imperial pre rogative , however, the appointment of the Prime Mi nister was to be advised upon by various political leaders via the Privy Seal . During their active political leadership in the Cabinet from 1 885 to 1 90 1 , the oligarchs usually agreed to have one of their number serve as Prime M i nister. In 1 892 , for example, four oligarchs-Kuroda Kiyotaka , Yamagata Aritomo, I noue Kaoru , a nd Ito Hirobumi gat hered t o select a s uccessor to Prime M i nister M atsukata Masayoshi . 145 As a result , Ito succeeded Matsukata and I noue be came Ito's Home Mi nister. After 1 90 1 , however, the ol igarchs retired from positions of direct leadership in the Cabi net , preferri ng to work behind the imperial screen. As the Council of Elder Statesmen ( Genro Kaigi) , they " occupied a supreme position in Japanese politics up to the 1 920's . " 146 Under these circumsta nces the 1 42 . The present emperor became Regent for his father in 1 92 1 . 1 43 . Hakushaku Hirata Tosuke Den, pp. 1 69-70. 1 44 . U nfortunately , H i rata's biographer does not t reat H i rata's role in the succeedi ng cabi net changes . 1 45 . Chitoshi Ya naga , Japan since Perry (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Compa ny, 1 949) , p. 2 1 9. 1 46 . Scalapino, p. 1 50.
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imperial prerogative of appointment was in fact exercised by the Elder Statesmen; the Privy Seal was primarily a liaison betwee n them and the throne i n this function. In 1 924 Pri nce Matsukata Masayoshi died , leavi ng Pri nce Saionj i a s the last Elder Statesma n. Si nce palace leadership was al most ex clusively in the hands of Pri nce Saionj i 's partisans , a measure of stability was restored in the Privy Seal 's office . Between 1 92 5 and 1 93 6 there were but two Privy Seals, or one every 5 . 5 years , and both were constitutional monarchists . I n 1 93 2 , however, Pri nce Saionj i , who was over eighty, bega n to make provisions for an advi sory system after his deat h. He therefore asked Kido Koichi , the Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal, to examine and revise proced ures for replying to the throne on appoi nting Prime M i nisters . Kido sub sequently drafted a plan w hereby the Senior Retai ners would meet to advise the t hrone w hen a Prime M i nister res igned . The conference was to be composed of ex-Prime M i nisters (Senior Retai ners) , the President of the Privy Counci l , the Privy Seal , and the Speakers of bot h houses of the I mperial Diet . Household Minister lchiki Kitokuro, however, deleted the two Speakers from the proposed conference. 147 This conference , as modified by lchiki , met with Saionj i in the palace in J uly 1 934 to assist him in selecting a successor to Prime M i nister Saito Makoto. 148 As a consultant in this process , the Privy Seal gai ned an increased voice in exercising the imperial prerogative of appoi ntment . From 1 93 6 , when Privy Seal Saito Makoto was assassi nated , to November 1 94 5 , w hen the office of Privy Seal was abolished , there were two Privy Seals, averagi ng five years in office . Neither were of Senior Retainer status , yet it was during this time that the Privy Seal acq uired primary responsibility for recommending new Prime M inisters to the throne . 1 49 Yuasa Kurahei, Privy Seal from 1 93 6 to 1 940, had been a career Home Mi nistry official whose highest posts before becomi ng Privy Seal were Civil Governor of Korea ( 1 925-27) a nd I mperial Household Mi nister ( 1 933-36) . His successor, Mar-
�
ezu 1 47 . f?kada Keisuke (Tokyo: Okada Taisho Kiroku Hensan Kai , 1 956), pp. 233-M asash1 , p. 13 I . 1 4 8 . Harada Kumao, 3 : 347-48 . 1 4 9 . l nada Masatsugu, p. 93 . I nada places the date of the Privy Seal's primacy in recom n w nd i ng Prime M i nisters precisely at May 1 93 7 .
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quis Kido Koichi , had served in two Cabi nets between 1 937 and 1 93 9 prior to his appoi ntment as Privy Seal in 1 940. With Pri nce Saionj i 's death in 1 940, Privy Seal Kido became solely responsible for replying to the throne on basic policy directions and Cabi net changes . The importance of the Privy Seal's office thus varied according to the composition of the forces competing to declare the I mperial Will and the nature of the emperor's senior advisers . The flexibility of the office , al ong with that of the other leading palace offices , allowed the Privy Seal and his palace colleagues considerable ma neuverability to cope with any political situation. The Pri vy Seal, however, was the most i mportant palace officer in rel a t i ng emperor to politics throughout the period 1 885 to 1 945 . As i nitially conceived by the oligarchs and as developed by the first Privy Seal from 1 885 to 1 89 1 , the office of Privy Seal was to be the chief link between court and government . It is not surprising, therefore , that throughout the entire prewar period the Privy Seals as a group were the most highly statused in terms of titles , the most accomplished in terms of prior government careers , and on average the most senior of the four leading palace officers .
THE NATUR E AND ROLE OF PALAC E LEADERS H I P IN PREWAR J A PANESE POLITICS
Table 9 summarizes data on each of the four leadi ng palace officers from 1 885 to 1 945 and demonstrates once again the primacy of the Privy Seals in palace politics . In contrast to the diversity and stature of the Privy Seals, and indeed the Household M i nisters and Grand Chamberlains, the Chief Aides were representatives of only one in stitutional constituency , the Army, achieved no titles higher than vis count , and on the average were the most j unior of the four palace leaders . As table 9 also reveals , the Chief Aide's was the only office that remai ned strictly autonomous ; no Chief Aide ever held any other position of palace leadership. There was considerable interchange among all the other offices : some officials held two posts concurrently; others transferred from one palace office to another. And Chief Aides
1 83
OFFICES AND OFFICERS OF PALACE LEADERSH IP
TABLE 9. A COMPARATIVE PORTRAIT OF THE FOUR LEADING PALACE OFFICIALS BY OFFICES, 1 885-1 945 Privy Chief Grand Household Seals A ides Chamberlains Ministers 1 00 % ) 1 00 %) ( 1 3 1 00 %) (8 1 00 % ) ( 1 0 (12 =
=
=
=
Average age on taking office
58 . 3
61 . 1
56
65
Range of ages
44--6 7
46-7 1
5 1-62
48-82
6.3
4.6
Average years in office High offices held: Prime Minister Minister of State Privy Council President Privy Councillor Top military office Supreme War Councillor Ambassador House of Peers One o r more of the other top four palace offices Prior career against years in court office: Restorationist Army Navy Foreign Ministry Home Ministry Justice Ministry Finance Ministry Agriculture and Commerce Ministry Court Titles eventually achieved: Prince Marquis Count Viscount Baron None
6
5 I (8 . 3 % ) 6 (50% )
2 ( 20 % ) 2 (20 % )
0 ( 12 . 5%)
4 (30 . 8 % ) 9 ( 69 . 2 % )
2 ( 1 6 . 7%) 7 (58 . 3 % ) (8 . 3 % )
( 1 0% ) 3 (30 % ) 2 (20% )
0 2 (25 % ) 3 (37 . 5 % )
2 ( 15 . 4% ) 7 (53 . 8 % ) 3 (23 . I % )
0 2 ( 1 6 . 7%) 1 0 ( 83 . 3 % )
4 ( 40 % ) ( 1 0% ) 6 ( 60 % )
4 (50 % ) 0 0
4 ( 33 . 3 % )
3 (30 % )
0
23 0 13 15 6
0 I
2 0 4 I 3 2
( 16. 7%) ( 33 . 3 % ) (8 . 3 % ) (25 % ) ( 16. 7%)
2 ( 1 5 . 4% ) I (7 . 7 % ) 1 2 (92 . 3 % )
5 (38 . 5 % )
0 5 17 2 0 0 0
0 49 0 0 0 0 0
14 2 0 II 7 0 0
0 36
0 0
6 20
0 0 0
6 I 2 2 2 0
3 ( 30 % ) 0 3 ( 30 % ) ( 1 0% ) I ( 10% ) 2 (20% )
( 12 . 5%) 4 ( 50% ) 3 ( 37 . 5 % )
( 46 . 2 % ) (7 . 7%) ( 15 . 4% ) ( 1 5 . 4% ) ( 1 5 . 4% )
1 84
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simply did not move in the same circles a s did other palace leaders , even if those others had also been career military officers . General Nakamura Yuj i ro received two imperial appointments to the House of Peers prior to becoming I mperial Household Minister in 1 920. No Chief Aides were appointed to the House of Peers . General Katsura Taro had been Prime M i nister tw ice before he became Privy Seal Grand Chamberlain in 1 9 1 2 . Admiral Saito Makoto had also been Prime M inister before his appointment as Privy Seal ( 1 93 5 ) . Admiral Suzuki Kantaro became President of the Privy Council ( 1 944) and Prime M inister ( 1 945 ) after having served as Grand Chamberlai n . N o Chief Aide, however, served a t any time a s Prime M inister o r as President of the Privy Counci l . Unlike the Chief Aides , therefore , those military officers who held other leading palace offices were " ge n e ra l i s t s " a n d " n e g o t i a t o r s , " n o t d e d i c a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l spokesmen. Like their civilian colleagues , they were part o f the elabo rate network that linked Japan's political leaders laterally across the top of the plural institutions of government after imperial prerogatives had been i nstitutionalized . The Chief Aides , however, conceived of themselves as career Army officers who had no relation to politics ex cept when the Army's interests were involved or when their role as court officials compelled collaboration with the other palace leaders . The bureaucratization of the four leading palace offices over time and t he nature of the evolved i nstitutional balances at the emperor's side are illustrated i n table 1 0 . The periodization is by reigns , w hich, as I poi nted out earlier, corresponds roughly with the maj or stages i n the evolution of palace leadership. During the Meij i period court persons were the maj or component of palace leadership for the only time in the history of palace pol itics from 1 885 to 1 945 . That Restoration leaders were the second component is evidence that court leadership was under the control of the oligarchs, bringing tran quility at the side of the emperor throughout the Meij i period . From 1 9 1 2 to 1 92 6 , however, tranquil ity at the side of the emperor was l ost . The diversity of career backgrounds brought to high palace of fice during that period i ndicates no firm pattern of oligarchic control or of balanced i nstitutional representation at court . After 1 92 6 , however, a fairly definite pattern of bureaucratic representation at the emperor's side emerged . Four bureaucratic in-
OFFICES AND OFFICERS OF PALACE LEADERSH I P
1 85
TABLE 1 0 . BUREAUCRATIZATION AT THE SIDE OF THE EMPEROR : CAREERS PRIOR TO COURT OFFICE AGAINST YEARS IN COURT OFFICE Household Minister Meiji Period (1885-1912} : Restorationist Army Navy Foreign Ministry Home Ministry Justice Ministry Finance Ministry Agriculture and Commerce Ministry Court Taisho Period (1912-1926} : Restorationist Army Navy Foreign Ministry Home Ministry Justice Ministry Finance Ministry Agriculture and Commerce Ministry Court Showa Period (1926-1945} : Restorationist Army Navy Foreign Ministry Home Ministry Justice Ministry Finance Ministry Agriculture and Commerce Ministry Court N OTE :
Grand Chamberlain
Chief A ide
Privy Seal
Total
23 0 0 0 3 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 16 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 16 0 0 3 0 0
0
0 27
0 0
0 20
0 48
0 I 0 4 3 6 0
0 5 0 0 0 0 0
0 14 0 0 0 0 0
8 2 0 2 3 0 0
8 22 0 6 6 6 0
0 0
0 9
0 0
0 0
0 9
0 0 0 9 9 0
0 0 17 2 0 0 0
0 19 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 9 4 0 0
0 19 17 20 13 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
6 0
6 0
Because only those who served in office six months or more are listed, 5 of the
: 1 7 persons who held one or more of the four top palace offices are excluded from the
l abulation : Privy Seal-Grand Chamberlain Katsura Taro (Army}, Privy Seal Hamao Arata (Education Ministry}, Privy Seal Saito Makoto (Navy}, Privy Seal lchiki K itokuro (Home Ministry}, and Chief Aide Hata Shunroku (Army ) .
1 86
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stitutions o f imperial prerogative were represented , and i n fairly close balance : the Army , Navy , Home Mi nistry , and Foreign Ministry . These four, plus the Fi nance Mi nistry , were the major components of the prewar policy-maki ng process . Why the Finance M inistry had only one of its representatives at the emperor's side , and for only one year in the entire period 1 885 to 1 945 , is a matter for speculation. As noted in chapter 3, the court was fi nancially au tonomous and had no relation to the Ministry of Finance . More im portantly, perhaps, the maj or issues facing Japan in terms of na tional defense, domestic controls, and foreign policy were managed primarily by t he Army , N a vy , Home M i nistry , a nd Foreign Ministry . The Army and Navy exercised the emperor's prerogatives of supreme command and military administration. By the 1 930s they received the lion's share of the national budget in order to carry out a rather extensive conception of " national defense . " The H ome M inistry controlled local government , shrines a nd temples , and the regular police force . With the M inistry of Education, the Home M inistry was involved in maintai ni ng orthodox t hought in Japanese society-but the Home M inistry had the instruments of force to mai ntai n that orthodoxy . The Foreign M inistry exercised the em peror's prerogatives in diplomacy and was the primary source of in formation about the "trends of the times" internationally. These four bureaucratic structures dealt with the mai n substantive issues of domestic and foreign policy and were therefore of key importance to the palace in its negotiation and ratification roles . Duri ng the 1 930s the inner Cabinet was composed of the Prime Minister, Army M i nister, Navy Minister, Foreign M inister, H ome Minister, and Finance M i nister, on whom all had budgetary de mands. The inner Cabi net was most important in maki ng and maintai ni ng national policies until the Liaison Conference system was adopted in 1 937 . 150 When Prime M inister Saito Makoto resigned in July 1 934, for example , he attempted to ensure the con tinuity of his policies in t he succeeding Cabinet by having his Army , ISO. Liaison Conferences combined part of the inner Cabinet with t he leaders of t he General Staffs in an effort to produce unity between High Command a nd Cabinet policies . For a description of the Liaison Conference, see Ike Nobutaka, Japan 's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford : Stanford University Press, ! 967), pp. xv-xvi .
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Navy , and Foreign M inisters carried over and his Minister of Agri culture and Forestry made Home M i nister. 151 It appears to be no ac cident , therefore, that the mai n components of bureaucratic politics in government were represented at court on an almost one to one basis. And this balance of key institutional forces at the emperor's side remained intact from the late 1 920s u ntil the end of 1 945 . Despite t he i nstitutionalizat i o n of i mperia l prerogatives and political elites outside the palace gates and the accompanyi ng institu tional balances at the emperor's side that had occurred by 1 92 9 , the palace remai ned the sole referent for all government decisions and the central institution through which the I mperial Will was declared in politics . Selection of the Prime M inister from 1 885 to 1 945 , for example , was up to "the palace . " This meant those who advised the throne at any given time : the oligarchs , Elder Statesmen, Senior Retainers, Privy Seal . These advisers reached their decisions on the basis of their personnel and policy preferences and the "trends of the times , " as they evaluated them in consultation with other political leaders . B y the late 1 920s Pri nce Saionj i was t he emperor's key adviser as to w ho was best able to form a Cabinet t hat could and would "con trol t he situation" outside the palace gates . Pri nce Saionj i ' s nomi nation was based on his policy preferences , whom he deemed most able to realize those preferences , a nd w hat was possible, both i n terms of policies and personnel , given the state o f i nstitutional com petition to declare the I mperial Will at a ny given moment . As we saw i n the resignation of Tanaka Giichi in 1 92 9 and the 1 930 London Naval Treaty controversy, Saionj i had strong preferences i n domestic and international politics . He favored " party" Cabinets when possible-which meant appoi nti ng as Prime M inister the leader of a maj or political party i n t he House of Representatives , not Cabinets composed entirely of party men or Cabinets elected by the House of Representatives . More importantly, he was guided in his nomi nation by his strong views on foreign policy : the necessity of controll i ng the Japanese Army in China, and the desirability of maintaining A nglo-American amity. Tanaka Giichi , as a retired 1 5 1 . Okada Keisuke, p . 2 3 1 .
1 88
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Army general respected b y that i nstitution o f imperial prerogative and as president of the leading political party in the House of Representatives , appeared to be an ideal nomi nation as Prime M inister in 1 92 7 . Saionj i evidently believed that Tanaka , having support i n two maj or i nstitutions of imperial prerogative, would be able to deal effectively with Army adventurism in Manchuria and northern China . The Chang Tso-lin affair proved that Tanaka was unable to do so, and Saionj i and his allies in the government and i n the palace forced Tanaka to resign . Saionj i nomi nated as Tanaka 's successor Hamaguchi Osachi , president of the ot her leading political party i n the House of Representatives . As we saw earlier, Hamaguchi proved willing and able to do Saionj i 's bidding during the London Naval Treaty con troversy of 1 930. Although Saionj i was successful i n obtai ning his treaty , however, he lost his Prime Mi nister: withi n a mont h after imperial sanction of the treaty, Hamaguchi was critically wounded by an assassin. After a brief caretaker government in 1 93 1 under Wakatsuki Reij i ro, Saionj i nomi nated l nukai Tsuyoshi to form a Cabi net . An aged party politician who had served i n the House of Representatives conti nuously si nce 1 890, I nukai had succeeded Ta naka Giichi as president of the Seiyiikai in 1 92 9 . But withi n six months of taking office , l nukai was assassi nated . Unable to persist in his party Cabinet policy , Saionj i turned to the Navy . Between the assassi nation of I nukai in 1 932 and the coup at tempt of February 26, 1 93 6 , Saionj i selected two senior naval officers as Prime M i nisters : Admiral Saito Makoto a nd Admiral Okada Keisuke . As al ready d i scussed , both were open supporters of Saionj i ' s position on the London Naval Treaty and involved in con trolling antitreaty forces within the Navy . As moderates, however , both were out of line with the trends of the times as far as mil itarists and right-wing leaders were concerned . Okada narrowly escaped assassination on February 2 6 , 1 93 6 ; Saito, who had become Privy Seal in late 1 93 5 , did not . With this attack on moderate government leaders and the em peror's palace officials , Saionj i 's partisan activities became all but fu tile. I n early 1 937 , for example , he recommended as Prime M i nister a retired general of the Army , Ugaki Kazunari , si nce he was aware
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1 89
of t he " unlikelihood of the Army being satisfied with anythi ng less than a cabi net headed by a general . " 152 Ugaki had cooperated i n reducing the size of the standing army during the 1 920s . The Army t herefore deemed him i nappropriate a nd p revented him from formi ng a Cabi net by the simple device of refusi ng to nomi nate an Army M i nister. 153 Through his power to advise the throne on the appointment of the Prime M inister and on basic political issues , Saionj i had managed to brake the forces of extremism from 1 92 1 to 1 93 6 , but with decreasing effectiveness after 1 93 0 . He had also managed to keep constitutional monarchists domi nant among the emperor's advisers during that period . The only leading palace office that el uded Saionj i , as we have seen, was the office of C hief Aide-de-Camp . Ironically, it was duri ng the domination of the constitutional monar chists at court that Japanese fascism became the domi na nt force in government . Professor Maruyama Masao divides the evolution of Japanese fascism i nto three period s : preparation ( 1 9 1 9-3 1 ), matu ration ( 1 93 1 -36), and consummation ( 1 936-4 5 ) . The union of militarist and renovationist political leaders with rightist societies , which occurred during the preparation period , produced the rash of assassi nat i o ns , attem pted coups , terrorist act i vities , and public agitation during the maturation period that ultimately vaulted the military into the center of political power. 154 While the palace be came t he main i nstitution of political moderat i o n , t herefore , Japanese society and the government proper moved in the opposite direction-toward militarism, virulent ethnocentrism, and bureau cratic fascism. U nd e r s u c h p r e s s u r e s fr om the " o u t s i d e , " an " I m p e r i a l Household M i nistry i n line with the times " , which Pri nce Saionj i s o strongly insisted upon, could n o longer b e one led b y himself and his " pro-A nglo-A merican , " " l iberal , " " pro-party" partisa ns. To be " in l i ne with the times" after 1 930 mea nt foll owing the lead of the reno vationists and mil itarists in the instituti ons of imperial prerogative . 1 52 . Robert J . C . Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton: Pri nceton University 1 96 1 ) , p. 8 8 . 1 5 3 . I bid . , pp. 88-90. 1 54 . Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour, pp. 26-34.
Press,
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The constitutional monarchists in court fi nally gave way t o the tradi tionalists , j ust as the moderates in government were forced i nto the background by the renovationists and mil itarists . The traditionalists were concerned above all w i t h t he preservat ion of i mperial transcendence , so seriously threatened by the terrorist activities of 1 930-3 6 . This meant havi ng the Emperor-i n-State ratify as accurate a consensus of national opinion as possible, regardless of where that consensus led the nation. It also meant that the emperor would not be permitted to persist in open support of constitutional monarchist policies , at least to the extent that his palace advisers would once again be threatened by assassins . 155 As managers of the Emperor-in Court and coordinators of the public Emperor-i n-State, therefore , the traditionalists in the palace presided over the consummation of Japanese fascism by movi ng away from the constitutional monarchist position toward a " neutral" eval uation of the "trends of the times" as the basis for advisi ng the throne. O ne of the most promi nent handmaidens of bureaucratic fascism i n government was Pri nce Konoe Fumimaro. Viewed as "a renova tionist [ kakushin-teki] politician bringing harmony to the opposi tions among the military factions , bureaucrats , and political parties after the Manchurian I ncident [ 1 93 1 ] , " Konoe was a hereditary member of the H ouse of Peers , becoming its Vice President in 1 93 1 and its President i n 1 93 3 . 156 He held no other posts i n government prior to becomi ng Prime M i nister in 1 937 . Duri ng his three Cabi nets between 1 937 and 1 94 1 , Konoe presided over events and decisions of such magnitude as the commencement of the war i n China ( 1 937 ) , the National General M obilization B i l l ( 1 93 8 ) , the Axis alliance ( 1 940) , and the inauguration of the I mperial Rule 1 5 5 . Assassination plots continued to be di rected against certain palace leaders and advisers after 1 936, but t hey were quickly discovered and suppressed . That t hey were quickly put down, in contrast to the 1 930-36 period, suggests that assassination of t he emperor's palace advisers was no longer needed in order for the mil itarists and renovationists in government to have their way (see Butow, Tojo, pp. 1 28-29). 1 56 . Dai jimmei jiten, 2 : 587 . It is claimed that from the time w hen he went to the 1 9 1 9 Paris Peace Conference , Konoe was held i n great "affection" by Prince Saionji (ibid) . During the 1 930 London Naval Treaty controversy, Konoe was able to do Saionji's biddi ng by stifling antitreaty movements i n the H ouse of Peers (Harada Kumao, I : 2 1 -22). But Konoe's chief political role was not so much that of policy advocate, either pro-Saionj i or promilitarist, as it was that of political matchmaker or negotiator. Apparently he moved with the " trends of the times" rather than attempting to control those trends.
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191
Assistance Association ( 1 940) , of which he became president . 157 I n October 1 94 1 General Toj o Hideki replaced Konoe as Prime Minister. Toj o was prepared to lead the nation in the event of war with the United States . Despite his role in preparing the road for such a war, Konoe, apparently, was not . 158 The leadi ng traditionalist at court was Marq uis Kido Koichi , one of Konoe's closest associates . With Kido's appoi ntment as Privy Seal in J u ne 1 940 the traditionalists replaced t he constitutional monar chists as the emperor's chief palace advisers . Since some constitu tional monarchists , most notably Household M i nister Matsudaira Tsuneo, remained at the emperor's side , Kido's appoi ntment was neither a sudden transition nor a decisive break with the past . Nor, as we shall see in the next chapter, was Kido an advocate of renova tionist or militarist policies . Rather, as chief manager of the Em peror-i n-State from 1 940 to 1 94 5 , Kido restored the emperor's "traditional " role as ratifier of personnel and policies "in line with the times . " Kido was able to perform this role because , as the em peror's chief adviser after Prince Saionj i ' s death in 1 940, he took the consensus that led to his recommending candidates for Prime Minister to the emperor; he also took the consensus regarding national and international trends at any given moment , on the basis of which he rendered advice to the throne on political policies. Despite the vast social , economic , and political changes that occur red d u r i ng t he course of Japa nese modernization, t he palace remai ned the key mechanism through which the I mperial Will was declared in politics from 1 88 5 through 1 94 5 . It was able to remain so because Saionj i 's caveat that the Imperial Household Mi nister must come from "the outside" to keep the mi nistry " i n l i ne with the times" was applied with equal rigor to all four palace leaders . The high bureaucratic achievement of those serving in the four key palace offices , the reflection in their career backgrounds of the changi ng political forces outside the palace gates , and the flexibility inherent in those four offices attest to the critical role played by palace I S7 . Konoe's three cabinets were J une 1 937-January 1 939, J uly 1 940-July 1 94 1 , and j u ly -October 1 94 1 . For discussions or Konoe's role in t he 1 930s and early 1 940s, see Borton , pp. 347-69, and Butow , Tojo, pp. 77-3 1 5 . I SH . Butow , Tojo, p. 3 1 4 .
1 92
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leadership in managing the Emperor-i n-State s o that the I mperial Will would be responsive to the "trends of the times" -not only duri ng the "enl ightened " modernization of the Meij i period but also duri ng the periods of institutional pluralism and of bureaucratic fas cism that followed . The key palace officer in mai ntai ning the cen trality of the palace in politics during the period of bureaucratic fas cism was Japan's last Privy Seal , Marquis Kido Koichi .
CHAPTER FIVE
KIDO KOIC HI AND THE MATRIX OF PALACE POLITICS
has dealt with the theory of legitimacy on w hich the prewar Japanese state rested , the court structure for managi ng palace autonomy, and the nature of palace leadership from 1 885 to 1 94 5 . The purpose of this chapter is to exami ne the network of association and communication that li nked court and government duri ng the 1 930s and early 1 940s . It was during this pe riod that Cabi nets led by moderate bureaucrats and party leaders gave way to Cabi nets led by renovationists in the civil and military bureaucracies and in the Imperial Diet , especially the House of Peers . And it was during this period that court leadership passed from the hands of the constitutional monarchists i nto the hands of t he traditional ists . The subject of our analysis is Kido Koichi . Kido is especially suitable for study because he has left an extensive diary of his political associations and activities duri ng the two periods he was i n t he palace : 1 930 t o 1 937 and 1 940 t o 1 945 . 1 More a n appoi ntment hook than a political commentary or record of substantive decisions , Kido's diary allows a comprehensive statistical reconstruction of the OuR
D I SCU S SI O N T H U S
FAR
1 . Kido Kiiichi , Kido Koichi Nikki, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Tiikyii Daigaku Shuppan Kai , 1 966) . This record of 1 ,257 pages is supplemented by a volume of related documents and Kido's
postwar comments on the diary : Kido Nikki Kenyu Kai , Kido Ko ichi Kankei Monjo (Tokyo: J ',-,kyi> Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1 966) .
1 93
1 94
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patterns of association that linked court and government in t he case of one of the court's most important political personages . Kido's associations and behavior will be exami ned i n 1 932 , 1 93 6 , and 1 94 1 . These three years have been chosen for two reasons . First , all three were years of crisis as bureaucratic fascism matured and consolidated i n government . On M ay 1 5 , 1 932 the last prewar party Prime M inister was assassinated . The Shanghai crisis and the formation of the puppet state of Manchukuo contributed to making 1 932 an important year in Japanese foreign policy . In 1 936 the most extensive coup attempt si nce Saigo Takamori 's 1 877 revolt was mounted agai nst "evil advisers" close to the throne . As i n 1 932 , a new Cabi net came into bei ng as the result of violence . Also i n 1 93 6 the Anti-Comi ntern Pact was concluded with Nazi Germany. I n 1 94 1 two Cabi nets were formed and war was declared agai nst the United States . I n all three years the palace was deeply involved i n Cabinet formations and foreign policy decisions . Second , Kido held different palace posts i n each of these three years . His associations and behavior in each office reveal three dif ferent roles he played i n the operation of palace politics : the " secretary , " the " bureaucrat , " and the " negotiator . " As Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal in 1 932 , Kido acted as a political liaison and i nformation broker. His chief associate was another "secretary , " Baron Harada Kumao. Harada was Pri nce Saionj i ' s " public" secretary and was also a member of Kido's i ngroup-a small knot of aristocrats who collectively facilitated Kido's i nformation-gathering role. B oth his role as liaison and his efforts to gather information as a "secretary " were primarily for the benefit of his superior , Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki . As Privy Seal , Makino was one of the key " negotiators" in the prewar political process : he was one of those experienced statesmen responsible for maki ng recommendations to the throne on political appointments and basic national policies . As Director of Peerage Affairs i n 1 93 6 , Kido was a " bu reaucrat " -a p u b l i c offi c i a l resp o n s i b l e for t he d a y - t o- d a y management of a specific official j urisd iction. Although Kido was concurrently Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal until J une 1 3 , 1 93 6 ,
KIDO
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his associations and behavior throughout that year illustrate with sufficient clarity the role of the bureaucrat in palace politics . A bu reaucrat might use his office to build a political faction and advocate policies , since policy i nitiatives emerged from within the bureau cracy . M ost prewar bureaucrats , however, were ci rcumspect administrators content to play a neutral role i n politics . This was ap parently the case with Kido. His chief associates in 1 936 were fellow bureaucrats i n the palace w ho had official duties that i nvolved Kido's official duties . His diary gives no evidence that he used his office to build a political constituency at court to press his palace colleagues on policy matters , or that he used his office to consolidate a policy advocating coalition of government and court leaders . I n 1 94 1 Kido was a " negotiator. " As Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal he was responsible to the emperor for negotiating Cabi net formations as well as advising on policies emanating from the i nsti tutions of imperial prerogative. Like Sanj o Sanetomi , Japan's first Privy Seal , Kido was the key negotiator in presenti ng unified government policy to the emperor for ratification. In that capacity, Kido's primary associates were the emperor, the M inisters of State , and the other three leadi ng palace officers . Kido's behavior changed markedly i n terms of his patterns of association in each of the three years , showing a remarkable sensitivity to the political roles he was called upon to play . A n exami nation o f h i s associates reveals not only that others performed similar roles in both court and government but that there were other roles essential to the successful operation of Japan's privatized political system : the " ratifier, " the " policy advocate , " and the " instrument of pressure . " The behavior of Kido and his associates was understandable , if not predictable or productive of "good " policies , given the i nstitutional role of the palace as the center of the ratification process i n prewar Japanese politics . Our discussion will conclude with a critique of Maruyama M asao's typology of political personality in prewar Japan in order to demonstrate the primacy of the bureaucracy in the political process and the effectiveness in that process of the political roles revealed by Kido and his associates .
1 96
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K ID O 'S A P POINTM ENT AS C H I EF SECRETARY TO THE PRIVY SEAL
Kido Koichi was appoi nted Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on June 1 , 1 940. Not only was he the last Privy Seal (the office was abolished on November 2 4 , 1 94 5 ) ; he was also the only Privy Seal to have served previously as Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal . Kido became C hief Secretary on October 2 8 , 1 930, after some fifteen years in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and the M i nistry of Com merce and I ndustry . Like other prominent leaders in the palace bu reaucracy , he was brought in from "the outside . " For the C hief Secretary previous governmental experience and wide associations were apparently desirable, j ust as they were for the Privy Seal himself. The manner in which Kido was brought i nto the palace ill ustrates the high degree of informality that prevailed in the top echelons of Japan's prewar polity . On Sunday , August 1 7 , 1 930, Kido found himself at the golf course with Prince Konoe Fumimaro and Nagaike Choj i , a director of the Bank of Japan . While resting during the match, Konoe mentioned casually that he would like Kido to become Chief Secretary . 2 Kido replied that he had no positive desire to be Chief Secretary but would not decl ine if the circumstances were fa vorable . He would leave everything to Konoe . 3 Kido had begun to wonder what Konoe had in mind when he did not hear from him for well over a month . Then, on the evening of September 2 9 , Konoe called : Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki wished to see Kido at nine o'clock the following morning. 4 Accordingly, Kido visited Makino at the Privy Seal's official residence on September 30. Since Kido had tenta tively agreed with Konoe to become Chief Secretary , he assented when Makino asked him. Following his interview with Privy Seal Makino, Kido went to meet I mperial Household Minister Ichiki Kitokuro . Ichiki expressed his hope that Kido would accept the post of Chief Secretary and also asked him to serve concurrently as Counselor 2 . The i ncumbent Chid Secretary , Viscount Okabe Nagakage, had met Kido on July 23 and talked about accepti ng elect ion to the House of Peers ; he subseq uently resigned as C hief Secretary (Kido Nikki Kenyii Kai, p. 98). 3 . Kido Koichi , I : 3 3 ; Kido Nikki Kenyii Kai, p. 98. 4. Kido Koichi, I : 3 8 .
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1 97
(Sanjikan) to the I mperial Household M i nistry . Kido replied that he had no objection . 5 Commenting many years later on his appoi ntment , the "turni ng point in my destiny , " Kido said that at the time he was somewhat worried about working on a person-to-person basis with Makino, since Makino was over seventy years old . 6 When he met Makino for the first time on September 30, however, he was greatly impressed and instantly made up his mind to accept . There was no " old man's stubbornness" in Makino ; on the contrary , he was a man of " l ibera l " views, and Kido thought h e would b e a b l e to learn from h i m . Kido was not , howeve r , as e nthusiastic ab out I mperial H ousehold Minister Ichiki , who seemed more withdrawn than Makino. Sum ming up his impressions of the two men who were to be his supe riors , Kido observed : "The Imperial Household Mi nister was, from a look at him , a person of the wise bureaucrat type, but I felt that the Privy Seal had more charm as a person. " 7 Neither in this later commentary nor in the diary at the time of his appoi ntment are there any q ueries or statements about the nature of the office Kido was to assume . He was concerned solely with the personalities he would be working with, not the official duties of the Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal . His i nterviews with both Makino and lchiki were not "j ob interviews" as commonly understood in the West . Obviously, no examination was required . On October 27 Kido had lunch at the Tokyo Club with Konoe , as he had done freq uently i n the past , and learned that his transfer to the I mperial Household M i nistry would be approved by the Cabi net meeti ng of October 2 8 . Kido arra nged his affairs at the M i nistry of Commerce and I ndustry accordingl y : was this to be the fi nal day i n a fifteen-year period o f his life ? Around noon o n October 2 8 Ki no shita M ichio of the I mperial Household M i nistry telephoned . Kido's presence at the mi nistry was desired at 1 : 30 p . m . When Kido ar rived at the mi nistry he received his appoi ntment from the Imperial H ousehold M i nister : "Appoi nted Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and concurrently Counselor to the I mperial 5 . Ibid. 6. Kido Nikki Kenyii Kai, 7 . Ibid . , p . 99.
p.
98.
1 98
KIDO
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MATRIX
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Household M i nistry . " 8 Accompanied by a mi nistry officia l , Kido then made his round of greeti ngs to the Privy Seal's Office, the B oard of C hamberlains, and the admi nistrative bureaus and divi sions of the mi nistry . That afternoon and duri ng the next few days he paid his respects to Pri nce C hichibu , one of t he emperor's three brothers , and to other royal houses . He then made his farewells to officials in the M i nistry of Commerce and I ndustry .9 I n addition to the i nformality with which Kido was i nitially proposed as Chief Secretary , several other aspects of his appoi ntment are worthy of note. Kido had been recommended to the post by bot h Prince Konoe and Viscount Okabe. 10 B oth were aristocrats and friends of long standing. Okabe was not only Kido's predecessor i n office; h e was also a graduate o f the Peers School , a s was Kido. Al though five years Kido's senior at the Peers School , Okabe had worked with Kido since graduation to form the Cherry Blossom Fraternity (Sakura Yu kai) , a golfing clubY Okabe was also a charter member of the Eleven Club (ju ichikai) , formed the eleventh day of the eleventh month in the eleventh year of the reign of Em peror Taisho ( 1 922) . Composed of a number of aristocrats, it was intended to be something approaching a literary society. As the years passed , most of the club members became members of the House of Peers . Some became Vice M i nisters of State; some , like Kido and Okabe , even became M i nisters . Accordingly , the Eleven Club be came a forum for the discussion of current political issues , meeting regularly at Kido's home . 12 Konoe Fumimaro was evidently a member of the club but attended only infreq uently. Thus the spring board for Kido's appoi ntment was an aristocratic ingroup cl osely i n volved i n clubs , golfing, and the House of Peers . Another aspect of Kido's appoi ntment is the official ritual of ap proval by persons in official positions whom Kido did not know socially or officially. Kido looked over and was looked over by bot h the Privy Seal and the Imperial Household M i nister . His ap pointment was passed upon by the Cabinet . Formal appoi ntment 8. 9. 1 0. II. 12.
Kido Kiiichi , I : 42. Ibid . , pp. 42-43 . Kido Nikki Kenkyii Kai, Ibid . , p. 98. Ibid . , p . 97 .
p.
96.
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1 99
was made by the I mperial Household M i nister. Thus , constituted of ficials disposed formally of an appointment proposed informally by a casual social grouping. Such recruit ment procedures were ap parently standard for the leading palace offices , with the possible ex ception of the C hief Aide-de-Camp . Also noteworthy is the fact that the Privy Seal's office was , at least in this instance, under the j oi nt j urisdiction of the Privy Seal and the I mperial Household M inister. The I mperial H ousehold M inister i nterviewed the candidate for C hief Secretary to the Privy Seal and made the formal appoi ntment . Though the Privy Seal's Office was an adj u nct palace office , its af fairs were apparently as much under the I mperial Household Minister as under the direct supervision of the Privy Seal . The procedures involved i n Kido's appoi ntment indicate that a person neither sought directly nor campaigned for a leading palace position . In Kido's case , everything was " left to Konoe , " who i nitiated Kido's candidacy and arranged his official interviews. This pattern of non-office-seeki ng was standard for palace personnel . I nitiative, advocation, and approval all lay beyond the candidate's direct control , although he could presumably veto his ow n nomi nation. Fi nally, Kido's appointment illustrates an emphasis on personal as opposed to official concerns by the candidate. As already men tioned , Kido was far more concerned about his personal relations with his future official superiors than about the duties of his future office . Possibly Kido knew what the j ob entailed as the result of close association with his predecessor in office , Viscount Okabe . The fact remains, however, that Kido agreed informally to accept the office and " kept his promise" to Konoe after j udgi ng the Privy Seal 's per sonality, not the duties of the office or his technical qualifications for it . 13 THE SECRETARY
When Kido became Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal i n 1 930, he brought to that position a network of sociopolitical associations , such 13. Kido did, however, express some reservations about his previous status : he had not hcen an important official in the Mi nistry of Commerce and I ndustry (Kido Nikki Kenkyii Kai, pp. 98-99) .
200
KIDO AND MATRIX
OF
PALACE POLITI CS
as t he Eleven Club, that would prove useful i n dischargi ng his secre tarial duties . It was these associations , plus new official connections , that made Kido one of the liaisons between court and government and one of the information sources for palace leaders . Table 1 1 classifies Kido's associations throughout 1 932 according TABLE 1 1 . KIDO KOICHI ' S ASSOCIATIONS IN 1 932 : FREQUENCY AND MODE OF COMMUNICATION Total• (I) Mode of Communicationd
No.
Ten or Moreb (2)
Nine or Less• (3)
%
No.
%
No.
7.6 2.6 1.1 1 .4 0.8 1 .6
31 15 5 0 7 II
6.2 3 .0 1 .0 0 1 .4 2.2
47 12 6 14 I 5
%
OFFICIAL
Office Official residence Official conference Imperial lecture Kido's reports Reports to Kido
78 27 II 14 8 16
Official subtotal
! 54
1 5 . 0%
1 44 75 314 55 71 12 2
14.0 7.3 30 . 6 5 .4 6.9 1 .2 0.2
79 40 1 85 9 51 0 0
15.8 8.0 37 . 0 1 .8 10.2 0 0
65 35 129 46 20 12 2
12 . 3 6.6 24 . 5 8.7 3.8 2.3 0.4
4 1 40
0.4 13 .6
46
0.2 9.2
3 94
0.6 17.8
56
5.5
20
4.0
36
6.8
873
85 . 0 %
69
13 .8%
85
8.9 2.3 1.1 2.7 0.2 0.9 16. 1%
INFORMAL
Home Informal meeting Meals Banquets Eleven Club Sixth Day Club Mist Club Tuesday Luncheon Club Golf Social and miscellaneous Informal subtotal Total
I , 027
1 00 %
43 1 500
86 . 2 % 1 00 %
442 527
83 . 9 % 1 00 %
Kido Koichi, I : 1 26-2 1 0. • Based on a total of I ,027 meetings with 297 persons Kido records having met in 1 932. Average : 3.5 meetings per person. b Based on 500 meetings (48. 7 % of the total) with the 18 persons Kido met 10 times or more. Average : 2 7 . 8 meetings per person. souRcE :
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
P O L I TI C S
201
Based o n 5 2 7 meetings (5 1 . 3 % o f the total) with the 2 7 9 persons Kido met 9 times or less . Average : 1 . 9 meetings per person. d The categories devised under Mode of Communication are mutually exclusive. For example, meetings tabulated under Official conference are not listed under Office, even though such meetings took place in official places. Official conference designates meetings with two or more people at an office to discuss official matters. If such a meeting took place at X's office, X would be tabulated under Office and all others present would be tabulated under Official conference. The same applies to Informal meeting and Home. If Kido met Okabe and Konoe at Harada's home, for example, Okabe and Konoe would be tabulated under Informal meeting and H arada under Home. Social and mis cellaneous refers to weddings, trips, funerals, parties, social calls. Kido' s reports and Reports to Kido refer almost exclusively to telephone conversations. Imperial lecture refers to Kido's contact with persons giving formal presentations to the throne. Although the emperor was obviously present, I have not included him in the statistics as having met with Kido because the emperor and Kido merely listened to the presentation, apparently without exchanging words. Golf has been listed separately because of the importance of this pastime to Kido. An avid golfer, Kido often recorded his matches and scores more meticulously than the subject, much less the content, of his political meetings. Banquets refers to formal social and state dinners attended by Kido. They have been listed under the informal category because most were social affairs and Kido recorded nothing of official importance at any of these ceremonial functions. Obviously, the basic division of "official" and " informal" that I have employed is somewhat arbitrary. The subdivisions within the categories do reveal, however, the specific kinds of sociopolitical activities in which Kido was absorbed. N OTE : There are several opportunities for error and distortion in compiling such statistics. First, there are several persons with the same surnames whom Kido records only by surname and with no other identification, such as title or official position. There are several Kodamas, for example, some of whom were Kido's relatives and some not. It was not always clear, even using the index of persons at the end of vol. 2, which one was being referred to. Second, Kido does not mention all the people he met. For example, he frequently mentions attending a "Tuesday Luncheon Club," but without naming those whom he met there. This applies to official meetings of Imperial Household Counselors as well. Despite technical problems in using Kido's diary in this manner, the diary provides thorough data amenable to statistical reconstruction of Kido's network of association. Since it is more an appointment book than a record of policy making or ex post facto reflections on events, Kido's diary can be used to demonstrate the nature of palace office and the matrix of communication and association supporting palace politics without relying on the author's value judgments about events, policies, and decisions. Harada Kumao's dictated record and Honjo Shigeru's diary, covering all or part of the period recorded by Kido, are selective accounts in which the authors exercised their judgments and prejudices regarding issues and personnel ; both are to some extent revised accounts, not on-the-spot records. Although both are extremely valuable, they do not lend themselves to the same kind of objective analysis possible with the Kido diary. Kido's wife and daughters, doctors and dentists, and various tutors-calligraphers, etc.-who came to Kido's home for various lessons are excluded from the tabulations in table I I . Such associations were neither numerous nor relevant to Kido's role. •
202
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OF
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to frequency and mode of communication. Kido recorded having met a total of 2 97 persons (column 1 ). Of these 2 97 , he met 1 8 ten times or more (column 2 ) and 279 ni ne times or less (column 3 ) . Meeti ngs in all three frequency groups are divided into two basic categories , "official" and " informal , " each of which is subdivided according to w here or how the meeti ngs took place . Mode of communication is thus defined by place or circumstances of meeting. The purposes of classifying Kido's association i n this fashion are to analyze his political role as a secretary in terms of frequency of association and mode of communication i n 1 932 and to make comparisons later on with his role as a bureaucrat in 1 93 6 and as a negotiator i n 1 94 1 . The most conspicious aspect of Kido's associations i n 1 932 , im mediately apparent in table 1 1 , is the great predominance of i nformal over official modes of communication, regardless of frequency of association : 85 percent of Kido's meetings were i nformal , only 1 5 percent official . Variation according to frequency (columns 2 and 3 ) was a mere 2 . 3 percent , although t here was a tendency for frequency of association to be related positively to i nformal modes of communi cation. This is especially true for Kido's meetings at meals : 3 7 . 0 percent o f Kido's meetings with those h e met ten times o r more occur red at meals, while only 24 . 5 percent with those he met nine times or less took place in that setti ng. When Privy Seal Maki no i nterviewed Kido in 1 930 he told him that as Chief Secretary he would have a great deal of free time. Did this mean that Kido was able to transform this legally undefined and apparently undemanding office i nto a vehicle for socializing with his aristocratic cronies on government pay and "company time" ? Or does the role of the secretary i n Japanese politics reveal why in formal should domi nate official modes of communication ? Why does Kido note t hat 1 930 was a turning poi nt in his career, that after 1 930 he was swamped in political activity ? A second aspect of Kido's associations i n 1 932 is the presence of a key group of persons freq uently met . Eighteen persons met Kido ten times or more during that year. Those eighteen met him an average of 2 7 . 8 times each, whereas those who met him nine times or less averaged a mere 1 . 9 meetings (table 1 1 ) . M oreover, there was considerable variation between the two frequency groups in modes of
KIDO
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203
communication . Kido's meetings at meals, homes , and the Eleven Club account for 63 .0 percent (3 1 5 meetings) of all his associations with the eighteen persons in the ten or more group but only 40 . 6 percent (2 1 4 meeti ngs) of his associations with those h e met ni ne times or less . Conversely, those meeti ngs involving almost purely social and recreational activities-golf, banquets, social a nd miscella neous-account for 33 .4 percent ( 1 7 6 meetings) of Kido's total meeti ngs with those in the nine or less group but only 1 5 .0 percent (75 meetings) of those in the ten or more group. It might be wel l , therefore , to begin our analysis o f Kido's activities and role i n 1 932 by determini ng w ho the eighteen persons were , w hat their social and political positions were, and what their domi nant modes of com munication with Kido were (table 1 2) . These eighteen may be grouped i nt o dist i nct type cl usters : t i tled aristocrats (eleven) , political contacts i n the i nstitutions of imperial prerogative (four) , members of Kido's family (two) , a nd golfi ng cronies (one ) . The two members of Kido's family , his brother Wada Koroku and eldest son Takazumi , held no political positions and were outside the network of Kido's aristocratic associations . Their meeti ngs with Kido in volved social and family activities of no significance to Kido's political office or role . Kato Kyohei was a promi nent busi ness leader whose meeti ngs with Kido all i nvolved golfi ng. Like Kido's brother and son, Kato had no demonstrable relation to Kido's political activities . The remai ning fifteen persons , however, formed the core of Kido's secretarial network-one of the associational matrices that li nked court and government , the emperor and his palace officials with the leaders of political power and status outside the palace gates . As revealed i n table 1 2 , eleven titled aristocrats were the center of Kido's associations in 1 932 , accounti ng for 82 percent of Kido's five hundred meeti ngs with the eighteen persons he met ten times or more . Who were these aristocrats a nd what roles did they play in the accomplishment of Kido's secretarial functions ? Ten of the eleven aristocrats were currently in the House of Peers , as was Kido himself. All ten, again like Kido, had inherited their titles; they were all members of the new hereditary aristocracy that had matured under the Meij i constitutional order. None had been
204
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TABLE 1 2 . PERSONS IN CONTACT WITH KIDO KOICHI TEN OR MORE TIMES, 1 932 ( 1 8 PERSONS )
Person
Harada Kumao
BARON
Okabe Nagakage
VISCOUNT
Konoe Fumimaro COUNT Makino Nobuaki couNT Sakai Tadamasa COUNT Kuroki Sanji Wada Koroku K ato Kyohei PRINCE
Takagi Yoshihiro MARQUIS Inoue S aburo Suzuki Teiichi BARON
Oda Nobutsune Inukai Takeru
VISCOUNT
Sasaki Yukitada
MARQUIS
Position
Sec'y to Prince Saionji Kimmochi ; Member, House of Peers Member, House of Peers ; Kido's predecessor as Chief Sec'y to Privy Seal Member, House of Peers Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Member, House of Peers Member, House of Peers Kido's brother Director, Mitsubishi Trading Co., Ltd. , etc. Member, House of Peers Member, House of Peers Lt. Col. , Military Affairs Bureau Member, House of Peers Member, House of Representatives ; son of incumbent Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and a secretary to him Member, House of Peers
Number of Meetings
Dominant Mode of Communication Number
Mode
1 35
Meals
53
( 39 . 3 % )
67
Meals
28
(4 1 . 8 % )
57
Meals
29
( 50 . 9 % )
41
Official residence Meals
15
( 36 . 6 % )
15
(62 . 5 % )
24
18 16
Eleven Club Each (Each 33 . 3 % ) 8 or Golf 6 ( 33 . 3 % ) Social 1 2 ( 75 . 0% ) Golf
15
Meals
13
( 86 . 7 % )
13
Meals
6
(46 . 2 % )
13
Meals
9
( 69 . 2 % )
13
Eleven Club
8
(6 1 . 5 % )
12
Informal meetings
4
( 33 . 3 % )
II
Eleven Club
8
( 72 . 7 % )
24
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
205
P O LI T I C S
TABLE 1 2-Continued
PI!Tsons
Tani Masayuki
Fujinuma Shohei VISCOUNT
Uramatsu Tomoaki (Tomomitsu) Kido Takazumi
Total
Position
Chief, Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry Chief, Metropolitan Police Member, House of Peers
Kido's eldest son
Numbi!T of Meetings
Dominant Mode of Communication Numbi!T
Mode
II
Meals
9
(81 . 8 % )
10
Meals
6
(60 . 0% )
10
Eleven Club
9
( 90 . 0 % )
10
Golf or Social
Each (Each 5 50 . 0 % )
500
imperially appoi nted to the House and none had earned h i s title a s the result o f i ndividual contributions to state and society. The spri ngboard of Kido's political activity in t 932 , therefore , was a group of hereditary aristocrats in the House of Peers . 14 Eight of the ten Peers were also members of the Eleven Club, Kido's i ngroup within the aristocracy . These eight accounted for 68.2 percent of all Kido's meeti ngs with those he met ten ti mes or more , thus forming the core of Kido's associates in t 932 . I ncluding Kido, there were fourteen members of the club in 1 932 _ 15 Rangi ng i n 1 4 . M arquis Kido served in t he H ouse of Peers from 1 9 1 7 t o 1 94 5 b y right of hereditary Iitle. The political i mporta nce of the House of Peers and its hereditary aristocrats i n the matu ration and consummation of Japan's bureaucratic fascism is suggested by Kido's political career and by that of one of his closest political associates , Pri nce Konoe Fumimaro. Having held no positions of leadership outside the House of Peers, Konoe was the first aristocrat of Court Noble origins to serve as Prime M i nister since Pri nce Saionj i in 1 9 1 1 - 1 2 . Konoe served as Prime M inister three times between 1 937 a nd 1 94 1 . M arquis Kido was t he first purely hereditary Peer to serve as Privy Seal si nce Pri nce-of-the- B l ood Fushimi Sadanaru in 1 9 1 3- 1 4 . 1 5 . The fourteen members were: M arquis Kido Koichi, Baron Harada Kumao, V iscount Okabe Nagakage , Prince Konoe Fumimaro, Count Sakai Tadamasa , Count Kuroki Sanj i , Vis munt Oda Nobutsune, Marquis Sasaki Yukitada, V iscount Uramatsu Tomoaki (Tomomitsu), V iscount Soma Taketane, Ma rq uis Matsudaira Yasumasa , Marquis Hirohata Tadataka, ( :ount Arima Yoriyasu, and Count Ya nagisawa Yasutsugu.
206
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age from thirty-nine to forty-eight , all fourteen had inherited their titles . Most had graduated from Kyoto I mperial University; the re mai nder were graduates of Tokyo I mperial University. These two universities were the elite institutions of higher education in prewar Japan. In short , the Eleven Club was a group of approximately the same age , social station, educational background , and base of political operations. It was the inner ri ng of Kido's concentric rings of aristocratic association that reached ultimately into the palace , to Kido's direct superior, Privy Seal Count Makino Nobuaki . Count Makino was the only aristocrat Kido met ten times or more who was not a member of the House of Peers at that time . And he was the only aristocrat i n the ten-or-more frequency group who achieved his highest title as the result of merit . B ut si nce only eight of the thirteen Eleven Club members met Kido ten times or more in 1 932 and the frequency of Kido's associa tion with these eight varied from 1 0 to 1 3 5 meetings , something other than mere ingroup fraterniz ing would appear to be involved . The central person in Kido's 1 932 network of associations was Baron Harada Kumao, a member of the Eleven Club who was also Prince Saionj i ' s political secretary .16 Kido's meeti ngs with Harada were twice as numerous as those with any other person Kido met during 1 932 and comprised 1 3 percent of his total meeti ngs in that year. Harada's association with Kido, as with the other members of the Eleven Club, was of long standing. For example, when Harada was appoi nted Secretary to the Prime Mi nister in J une 1 924 (a post he held for two years) , Kido, Viscount Okabe , and Pri nce Konoe 1 6 . Saionj i's private or personal secretary was Nakagawa Koj lirii. Consequently, Harada had been referred to as Saionji's " public" secretary (Harada Kumao, 1 : i i ) . Born in 1 88 5 , Harada w a s o f Kido's age group a n d , like Kido, a descendant o f t he merit aristocracy created during the Meij i peri od . A graduate of Kyoto I mperial University, as was Kido, Harada served with the Bank of Japan ( 1 9 1 6-22) a nd traveled in Europe and America under the aus pices of the I mperial H ousehold M inistry ( 1 922-24). In 1 92 6 he became a member of the Sumitomo Company, one of the four great fi nancial and i ndustrial combines in prewar Japan. That same year he became Pri nce Saionj i 's public secretary . I n 1 93 1 he was elected by his fellow aristocrats to serve i n the H ouse of Peers. Like Kido, t herefore, Harada is an example of the aggl utination of status, political position, and busi ness connection that characterized the prewar aristocracy . Harada died on February 26, 1 946, ten years to the day, ironically, after the coup w hich did so much to destroy Saionj i 's influence in politics (Ibid . , " Bekkan," p. 389; Shiigiin-Sangii n , Gikai Seido Shichiju Nen Shi [Kizokuin-Sangiin Giin Meikan] , " Da nshoku Giin" section, p. 78).
KIDO
AND
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207
were all i nvolved . 17 I n addition to bei ng aristocratic associates , however, Kido and Harada were more importantly connected by virtue of their secretarial roles . Because Saionj i was the highest political adviser in the Japanese state from 1 924 to 1 940, Harada, as his political secretary , had almost carte blanche access to all civil and military leaders . His position was one of an unofficial post to a semiofficial person, the last Elder Statesman. 18 Kido's position as Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal was that of an official post to an of ficial person. The two secretaries were the key liaisons i n the official process that commenced when the " imperial q uestion" (gokamon) was put. When a Cabi net resigned , the emperor would ask the Privy Seal about appoi nting a new Prime M i nister. The Privy Seal would then reply that the Elder Statesman-Pri nce Saionji-should receive the " imperial question, " meaning that the Privy Seal would as certain Saionj i 's views as to a suitable successor. In this fashion, the process of consultation, negotiation, resolution, and reply to the throne would be set i n motion . Kido and Harada, in their secretarial roles , were brought toget her as liaisons i n this critical process of responding to the throne when a " political change" (seihen) occur red-that is, when a Cabi net resigned . O ne simple i ndicator t hat H arada a nd Kido were brought together primarily by virtue of their pol itical roles is the very fre quency with which the two met : 1 3 5 ti mes throughout 1 93 2 . That the frequency of association was not merely i ngroup socializing is further substantiated by contrasting the number of meetings between the two before and after Kido became C hief Secretary . During the first six months of 1 930 Kido and Harada met only four times-at t he " usual " Monday lunches at the Tokyo Club with fellow aristocrats such as Konoe and Okabe . 19 After Kido was appointed Chief Secretary on October 2 8 , 1 930, he saw Harada 1 0 times in the 1 7 . Harada Kumao, I : vi ; " Bekka n , " p. 390. 1 8 . Harada was not officially appoi nted by the government or court to be Saionj i ' s «'
208
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITI C S
remaining two months of 1 930, or 7 . 5 times more freq uently than in the first six months of 1 930.20 Despite possible errors of omission in Kido's diary , the frequency gap is sufficiently great to i ndicate that communication between the two was a function of their respective political roles and not of their long-standi ng social acq uai nta nce . I n performing their duties , the two secretaries communicated with one another on an almost exclusively i nformal basis . Although Harada was the most frequent visitor to Kido's office (a meager nine times) , at least 8 6 percent of their meeti ngs were i nformal. They met fifty-three times at meals (39.3 percent) , forty-seven times at each other's homes (34 . 8 percent), nine times at i nformal meetings ( 6 . 7 percent) , a n d seven times a t Eleven C l u b sessions ( 5 . 2 percent) . I f their first role was t o act a s liaison between the Elder Statesman and the Privy Seal, bearing messages back and forth during political crises , they were also sources of i nformation and advice to their respective su periors . Both were i n constant and regular communication during 1 932 as they kept track of the "trends of the times" i n the i nstitutions of imperial prerogative . The information gathered by the two was placed at the disposal of their superiors , both of whom were key advisers to the emperor : the Elder Statesma n in times of political crisis and the Privy Seal both i n times of crisis and on a regular basis. Harada was therefore the pivot of Kido's i nformation-gatheri ng efforts as well as his key liaison counterpart outside the palace gates . The way i n w hich i nformation was gathered explains i n large measure w hy t he mode of communicat i o n between t he two secretaries was so overwhelmingly i nformal . Harada regularly held breakfast meeti ngs at his home w hich brought toget her members of the aristocratic i ngroup and leadi ng government officials . He also ar ranged informal meals to which were invited members of the aristocratic ingroup a nd select public officials, dependi ng on the in formation desired . I n fact , one of the key roles played by most of Kido's aristocratic friends , i ncluding Harada , was to provide the set ting for Kido's i nformation-gatheri ng efforts, most notably with the four persons in government w hom Kido met ten times or more : 20. Ibid . , pp. 43-54.
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITI C S
209
S uzuki Teiichi , l nukai Takeru , Ta ni M asayuki , a nd Fuj i numa Shohei . These four were bureau-chief level officers in four different i nstituti ons of i mperial prerogative : t he Army, t he H ouse of Representatives , the Foreign M i nistry , and the Home M i nistry respectively. O n January 25, for example, Kido had breakfast at Harada's home . Present were the Mi nister to China , Shigemitsu M amoru ; the Chief of the Asia B ureau in the Foreign Mi nistry , Tani Masayuki ; the Director of t he Naval Affairs Bureau i n t he Navy M i nistry , Toyoda Teij i ro; O ya Atsushi of Sumitomo Chemical; Marquis I noue Saburo; Viscount Okabe ; and Baron Takagi Yoshihiro. They "exchanged views on the China problem. " 21 There were t hus five aristocrats , three of whom were Eleven Club members , and four " outside" persons present . Si nce the issue under discussion was Chi na , the M i nister to China and the Chief of t he Asia B ureau were present . The gatheri ng of i nformation took place i n the i nformal set ting of aristocratic association. Again, on M arch 2 9 , Kido had breakfast at Harada's. Lieutenant Colonel Suzuki Teiichi of the Military Affairs Bureau and two others from the " outside" were brought in to have breakfast with Pri nce Konoe , Baron Kuroda Nagatoshi , and Baron I wakura M ichitomo. They discussed " prob lems of the times . " 22 Others of Kido's aristocratic colleagues also held such meeti ngs at t heir homes . Marq uis I noue Saburo23 gave a dinner at his home for Lieutenant Colonel Suzuki (again) and Colonel Obata Toshiro, al ong with Kido and Okabe, on February 1 9 . Colonel Obata gave his views on trends within the military si nce the October I ncident 2 1 . Ibid . , p . 1 3 1 . 2 2 . Ibid . , p . 1 52 . 2 3 . M arq uis I noue Saburii ( 1 887 - 1 959) served in t he House o f Peers from 1 929 t o 1 946. Alt hough a member of Prince Konoe's Tuesday Society (Kayo kai) in the House of Peers, I noue was not a member of Kido's Eleven Club. Unlike Konoe, Kido, and t he other members of the Eleven Club, I noue was a graduate of the Army Academy and a career Army officer. I noue founded a "breakfast club" in the early 1 930s w hich "brought together t he leading members of the bureaucracy and t he army, and . . . paved the way for close collaboration hctween them. It was in this organization that the members of the Nagata faction of the army , I he newly risen bureaucrats, and the H ouse of Peers politicians established inti mate contacts Mld started planning toget her to put their ideas i nto effect " (Yanaga , p . 520) . Like Pri nce Konoe, Marquis I noue apparently acted as an aristocratic pol itical broker to the renovationist a nd militarist bureaucrats i n their drive for political domination.
210
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
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( 1 93 1 ) , and this was followed b y an " open exchange of views . " From this discussion Kido ascertai ned in great detail the three mai n currents of thought in the military , the li nks between military cliques and right-wing civilians , and the measures desired by military leaders to placate extremists . They also discussed who would or would not be supported by the Army as Prime M i nister in the event of a Cabinet resignation.24 This meeting was followed up by a lunch on March 1 at Pri nce Konoe's home, attended by Marquis I noue , Lieutenant Colonel Suzuki , and Kido. Suzuki commented critically on Colonel Obata's previous remarks and described the situation in the military si nce they last met at Marquis l noue's.25 I n these two i nstances , the " state of affairs" withi n the military was discussed . Kido's contact with the " outside" military world was primarily Lieutenant Colonel Suzuki , the only military official outside his aristocratic set whom Kido met ten or more times in 1 932 . The Eleven Club was the central group around which Kido constructed an information-gathering and -sharing network that embraced leading figures from the outside worlds of government , the military , finance, and busi ness . Of the eighteen persons Kido met ten or more times , five were from these outside worlds. Kato Kyohei, di rector of the M itsubishi Trading Company a nd other M itsubishi concerns , was one of Kido's golf cronies and , as already noted , was not a key outside contact . As we have j ust seen , however, Lieutenant Colonel Suzuki was Kido's primary contact with the military world . l nukai Takeru , secretary to his father the Prime M i nister until mid May and a member of the House of Representatives , was Kido's main contact with the Prime M inister's office and the political parties . Tani Masayuki , Chief of the Asia B ureau, was Kido's leading contact with the diplomatic world. The fifth outside person was Fuj i numa Shohei , Chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police ; it was through him that Kido kept informed about right-wi ng activities and other matters under the j urisdiction of the Home Mi nistry that af fected palace security . Kido met these last four persons a total of forty-six times , 1 0 . 1 percent of the meetings he had with the politically relevant persons he met ten times or more in 1 932 . Only 2 4 . Kido Koichi , I : 1 40-4 1 . 2 5 . Ibid . , p . 1 44 .
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
P O L I TI C S
21 1
three of the forty-six meeti ngs , however, took place at offices ; most were at meals . The style of association common to Kido's aristocratic i ngroup was therefore extended to embrace public officials outside the palace bureaucracy , the i nstitution of imperial prerogative to which Kido belonged . These contacts were acq uired " i n the line of duty" -as part of Kido's j ob as Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal . I n formal association was an efficient and effective means for Secretary Kido to acquire i nformation from the outside world. Suzuki , l nukai, Ta ni , and Fuj i numa were t he outside contacts most often consulted by Kido in his secretarial role between court and government , but they were by no means the only ones . Kido's i nformal techniq ues of i nformat i o n gatheri ng embraced many persons at the minister and bureau-chief levels of the government and mil itary bureaucracies , director-level leaders i n i ndustry and fi nance , scholars, elected Representatives , reporters , and members of various social and political societies . He also met members of the im perial family , i ncluding the emperor. There can be no question that Kido had a wealth of varying i nformation at his disposal, that this information was quite accurate, and that it covered every important sector of the Japanese polity. The leaders and representatives from all walks of Japanese life who clustered around Kido and his aristocratic group were absorbed into an i ntricate web that could be and was used to fulfill meaningful and purposeful political functions . Kido's group of aristocrats also kept each other constantly in formed of one another's activities . Each member of the group had ac cess to persons and sources of i nformation that overlapped and others that were exclusive. Konoe, for example, apparently had more contacts in the military than did Kido or Harada. Harada defi nitely had more contact with top civilian leaders than did Kido. From such differentiated sources they were able to pool and share i nformation . This is especially true of Harada , who kept Kido conti nuously in formed of his meeti ngs with Prince Saionj i and with M i nisters of State . Dependi ng on the problem under consideration and the per sonal relationships i nvolved , these outside contacts could be brought l ogether at homes , restaurants , and clubs . Although Kido's chief aristocratic associates were members of the Eleven Club, the Eleven Club was but one of many organizations
212
KIDO
A ND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITI CS
allowing Kido to gather and share i nformation a nd to discuss public policies . For example, the Sixth Day Club (Muikakai) , a more ex tensive organization than the Eleven Club, evidently centered on a group of business and finance leaders . On its executive committee were Baron Ito B unkichi and Miyagawa Hyakutaro, both prominent businessmen. 26 Members of the Sixth Day Club gathered together with government and military persons to discuss political matters af fecting the economy . General M uto Nobuyoshi and Prince Konoe were both members . 27 In its membership, therefore, it was an over lapping group , including both aristocratic ingroup and public of ficials . Other clubs , such as the C herry Blossom Fraternity, were de voted exclusively to social activities . These are but three of the more freq uently mentioned clubs of which Kido was a member. His cl ubs ra nged from informal eating clubs to formal current events associations , from the strictly social to the political . These clubs had varying memberships but always in cluded one or more from Kido's aristocratic i ngroup . The com bination of differentiated and overlappi ng memberships in the ag gregate encompassed representatives of every maj or opinion- and de cision-maki ng institution in Japa nese society. Kido's clubs and orga nizations were valuable forums for regularized i nformation gathering and shari ng , supplementing ad hoc contacts with his aristocratic i ngroup and public officials. How did this lateral liaison and information-gat hering process reach vertically i nto the top palace echel ons ? As poi nted out earl ier, Kido's position as Chief Secretary i nvolved him i n the Privy Seal-Kido-Harada-Pri nce Saionj i relay, a relay that sometimes saw d i rect communication between Privy Seal M a k i no a nd Pri nce Saionj i , bypassi ng bot h secretaries , or that involved but one of the secretaries , Kido or Harada. Significa ntly, only one of the eighteen persons Kido met ten times or more in 1 932 was a palace official : Kido's direct superior, Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki . Makino's mode of communication with Kido was al most exclusively " official , " in marked contrast to Kido's mode of communication with the others i n the ten o r more freq uency group . O f the forty-one times Kido met 26. Ibid . , 2 7 . Ibid . ,
pp. pp.
1 38 , 1 46-47 . 1 79, 205 .
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PA LA C E
P O L I TI C S
213
with Makino, one was at a n official banquet i n the presence of the emperor and one was on a tour. Even these two meeti ngs may be classified as " official , " The remai ning thirty-ni ne meeti ngs betwee n them took place at Makino's official residence , the Privy Seal 's of fice , official conferences , or they i nvol ved reports. As with Kido's ot her associations , the communication between the two was almost exclusively verbal . Kido records hardly any documentary transac t i ons between t hem . Vertical a nd lateral communicat i o n was therefore similar; both relied on di rect verbal contact . The communication between Kido and Maki no is well ill ustrated duri ng the Shanghai crisis of early 1 932 . Hostilities begun i n Manchuria duri ng 1 93 1 eventually spread t o the Sha nghai area i n January 1 932 . 28 The issue facing the government was whether, in view of the tense i nternational situation there , to send rei nforcements to Shanghai . The issue faci ng the Privy Seal a nd palace leadership was whether to i nvol ve the emperor or to activate extraordinary councils, such as a conference of the Elder Statesman and Senior Retai ners , in order to bring the military under control . On February 4 Kido went to his office at 1 0 : 30 a . m . , his usual time for appearing at the palace . At noon he had lunch with Harada and Konoe at the Tokyo Club and they discussed the Shanghai in cident . Harada told them that he had met with Finance M i nister Takahashi Korekiyo. According to Harada, the Finance Mi nister was gravely concerned that positive military action in S hanghai would j eopardize international confidence i n Japan and suggested that the emperor " speak to the military" -that is, caution the mil itary to desist . Harada then related that he had asked Pri nce Saionj i 's views on this : Saionj i had told Harada to consult the Privy Seal and dispose of the matter accordingly . Kido and Harada then returned to the palace and met with Privy Seal Makino.29 The Privy Seal said that this sort of thing had come up in the past : whether it should be taken to the emperor was up to the Prime M i nister . S hortly after 4 p . m . Kido returned home .30 On February 5 the Privy Seal audienced with the emperor from 2 H . Sadako N . Ogata, pp. 1 42-45 . 29. Konoe probably accompanied them. lO. Kido Kiiichi, I : 1 3 5 .
214
K I DO
AND
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9 : 30 to 9 : 45 a.m. Fol lowing this the C hief of the Navy General Staff, Prince-of-the-Bl ood Fushimi, and Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, General Mazaki , audienced with the emperor .3 1 Makino then sent Kido to ask Harada if Harada had ascertai ned the Prime Mi nister's views on the emperor's " speaking to the military . " Kido went t o see Harada a t 1 1 a . m . According t o Harada, the Pri me Mi nister was concerned about the international repercussions that positive military measures in Shanghai would have . The Prime Mi nister's plan was fi rst to caution the Army Deputy C hief of Staff and in particular the Mi nisters of the Army and the Navy . The Prime Mi nister, Harada conti nued , would then speak with bot h Chiefs of Staff and , following that , report to the emperor on the measures taken . In a note to this conversation with Harada, Kido re marked that Finance Mi nister Takahashi was strongly opposed to sending rei nforcements to Shangha i . Repercussi ons in New York fi nancial circles were serious and it was al most i mpossible to obtai n foreign credit . 32 From February 5 to February 2 1 Kido was i nvol ved in frantic rounds of i nformal d i scussions with lead i ng members of the government and the military , leaders in fi nance and i ndustry , and scholars , as well as in club meeti ngs and meals with his aristocratic i ngroup . He was in constant contact with the Privy Seal not only as his official liaison but also as i nformant a nd confidant . On February 1 7 , for example, Kido had a long conversation with Privy Seal Makino duri ng w hich Makino i nformed Kido of the contents of the Foreign M i nister's and the Deputy Army C hief's reports to the throne . M akino also told Kido that the emperor was very concerned about the attitude of the League of Nations .33 Makino, therefore , kept Kido i nformed of what transpired i n the emperor's audience chamber w hile Kido kept Makino informed of what Kido had heard on the outside. I nformation shari ng as well as i nformation gat hering and reporting was thus part of Kido's relationship with his superior. Kido and Makino also discussed what measures should be taken to 3 1 . Kido merely notes these audiences by military leaders. Evidently these were reports to the emperor requiring no comments on the emperor's part . Passive acceptance of reports from the mil itary chiefs was apparently a routine matter at the palace. 32. Kido Kiiichi , I : 1 35-36. 3 3 . Ibid . , p . 1 39 .
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
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POLITICS
215
bring the Shanghai I ncident under control . I n the same conversation on the seventeenth, Maki no told Kido that there were opi nions to the effect that a conference of the Elder Statesma n and Senior Retai ners would be necessary should the i ncident become a maj or crisis . There were also views to the contrary , said Makino: given the nature of the times such a conference would be anachronistic and not in accord with popular sentiment . Makino then asked Kido his opi nion on holdi ng such a conference . Kido believed that j ust to call a group of elderly men together without any concrete idea in mi nd-to hold a mere " festivity"-would give rise to popular ill wil l . He did bel ieve , however, that such a conference would be meani ngful if it were called to discuss plans for national unity after the Cabinet had , on its own responsibility , decided on a policy that would truly " revolution ize the times . " Kido doubted that the Cabi net had reached this stage and thus questioned the wisdom of holding a conference of the Elder Statesman and Senior Retainers .34 The relationship between the Chief Secretary and his Privy Seal went beyond one of liaison and mutual reporting. It was also one of mutual consultation, at the initiative of the Privy Seal , on issues of great national import that might ultimately i nvolve the emperor and palace actively i n the process of decision making. Hostilities i n the S hanghai area ceased on March 3 .35 Until that time Kido and leading palace figures were constantly concerned with the course of events and with possible courses of action, including palace i nvolvement . Ultimately, and fortunately, the Prime Minister was able to settle the issue without call i ng on the emperor. The degree of activity at the palace , however, indicated that active involvement was a distinct possibility if the Prime M inister were not able to bri ng hostilities to an end on the basis of his own political resources . Just how close the palace came to involvement is i ndicated by the following events . On Sunday , February 2 1 , Kido was at the golf !'nurse when a caddie ran up to him with a message from the Privy Seal : Makino wanted Kido back in Tokyo immediately . When Kido a rrived at Makino's official residence at 4 : 30 p . m . , Makino informed him that there was fear of war should rei nforcements be sent to the J4.
Ibid .
V i . Sadako N. Ogata, p.
1 43 .
216
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITI C S
Shanghai area . Si nce " advisory" procedures might be necessary , such as holding a conference of the Elder Statesman and Senior Retai ners , Makino had decided to consult with Pri nce Saionj i at t he latter's villa in Okitsu. I n preparation for his visit Makino had met with the emperor for i nstructions : the emperor had told him to ob tain Saionj i ' s views on troop reinforcements and other related issues . 36 But, Makino continued , the Prime M inister had audienced with the emperor on the twentieth and assured him twice that rei nforce ments would not be sent to Shanghai for the time being. Makino therefore had decided to cancel his trip to see Saionj i . Then, on the morning of the twenty-first , the I mperial Household M inister and the Grand Chamberlain visited Makino and told him that it might i ndeed be necessary to send rei nforcements , depending on the course of the hostilities. Si nce the need would arise suddenly there would be no time to consult Saionj i . Therefore, they argued , it would be de sirable to know beforehand what Saionj i ' s views were . As a result of his conversation with the I mperial Household M i nister a nd the Grand C hamberlain, Makino had once again changed his mi nd and decided to see Saionj i the followi ng day , February 22 . Kido therefore called Harada to make the necessary arrangements. Makino evi dently visited Saionj i on the twenty-second , but Kido makes no mention of what happened .37 Unfortunately, Kido does not note how the Shanghai crisis was ul timately resolved as far as the palace was concerned . He merel y states that he met with the Privy Seal several times between Feb ruary 22 and M arch 2 , that he reported on the Shanghai I ncident to Finance M i nister Takahashi on February 2 7 , a nd that the Prime M i nister audienced with the emperor on March 2 about the resignation of the Governor General of Korea .38 Si nce the Prime M inister proved capable of resolving the Shanghai crisis , however, no extraordinary involvement by t he emperor a nd the palace occur red . B ut such involvement could have occurred at the Prime 36. Kido Koichi, 1 : 1 4 1 . 3 7 . I bid . , pp. 1 4 1 -42 . 38. Ibid . , pp. 1 42-46.
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
P O LI T I C S
217
Minister's i nitiative and with the acquiescence of leading palace of ficials, most notably the Privy Seal . Palace leadership was highly flexible and responsive to political events largely because of its efficient and wide-rangi ng network of contacts with the outside political , fi nancial , and military worlds. As one of the li nks in this commu nication system, Kido acquired , through his secretarial associati ons , information that was pl aced at the disposal of one of these key palace official s : the Privy Seal . H owever informal the matrix of communication appeared , it effi ciently embraced every sector bearing on the determination of public policy and extended in Kido's case via the Privy Seal to the emperor himself. As the Shanghai crisis illustrates , it was because of this net work that the key palace officials were able to determine whether or not the emperor and extraordinary political advisory bodies should be activated to cope with a political emergency . Kido's associations with palace officials other than the Privy Seal were of a more limited nature. Of the fifty-three persons whom Kido met four times or more, for example, only six were palace officials . Kido met with the Privy Seal forty-one times , the I mperial Household M i nister eight times , the Vice M i nister eight times , the Grand Chamberlain five times , the Deputy Grand Chamberlain six times , a nd the Deputy Gra nd Master of the Ceremonies five times . 39 Si nce t he Deputy Grand Chamberlain, Marq uis Hirohata Tadataka , had been in office only from September and his contacts with Kido were l'xclusively at Eleven Club meeti ngs , he may be discounted as a " palace official , " at least in 1 932 . Hirohata's predecessor as Deputy C rand Chamberlai n , Kawai Yahachi , met Kido only twice during 1 932 . Excludi ng the Deputy Grand Chamberlain, then, Kido met with only five palace officials four or more times each. The number of meetings with these five totaled sixty-seven, of which twenty-six t ook place at offices , ni neteen at official residences , and six at official conferences . Seven were i nvolved with reports . "Official " contacts w ith the five palace officials therefore totaled fifty-eight of the sixty s!'ven (86 . 6 percent ) . Kido's mode of communication with palace of1 9 . Kido also mentions, wit hout comment or naming those present, ten meeti ngs with the I mperial Household Mi nistry Counselors throughout 1 93 2 .
218
KIDO
A ND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
P O LI T I C S
ficials was the precise reverse of that with the four outside public of ficials whom he met ten times or more : 93 . 5 percent of his meeti ngs with these outside officials were informal . It is clear from Kido's pattern of association that aristocratic i ngroup , government officials (the outside) , and palace officials (the inside) were disti nct groups performing distinct functions in the ma trix of palace politics . Social relations among members of the aristocratic ingroup facilitated information gatheri ng and sharing when one or more of the ingroup held public office-in government or court . W hen Kido became Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal , a social network that belonged to him by virtue of birth and schooling a l l owed h i m t o perform a n i mport a nt l i a i s o n fu nct i o n . The aristocratic i ngroup became a vehicle for polit ical i ntegrat i o n between court and government . Kido's official role as Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal was that of liaison between the Privy Seal and the outside world . Although a large part of the i nformation gathered by Kido from outside officials via the aristocratic ingroup may have short-ci rcuited at the Privy Seal's office , the Privy Seal was able to pass on to other leading palace officials and the emperor such i nformation as he saw fit . Kido's role as C hief Secretary was fulfilled by i nformal contact with government officials and official contact with palace officials . The former i nvolved obtaining information, the latter i nvolved reporting and usi ng it. Japan's prewar aristocracy has frequently been called the bulwark of the throne . As Kido's associations indicate , his ingroup of the aristocracy was deeply i nvolved i n the politics of palace participation i n the affairs of state . The informal contact Kido, Konoe, Harada, Okabe , and other members of Kido's i ngroup maintai ned with a great number of public officials and social l eaders i l l ustrates concretely how this " bulwark" function was fulfilled in the 1 930s . A quasi-public class , the aristocracy comprised over 950 families by 1 930. As we saw in chapter 3 , some aristocrats and scions of aristocrats found haven in court offices . B ut some of t hose offices , like Kido's, were pol itically significant and not mere refuges from political i nvolvement . The degree of political interaction among aristocrats and between aristocrats and nontitled government and
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
P O L I TI C S
219
court officials depended , moreover, on the offices they held i n court and government as well as on their political aspirations . To normal social interactions within the aristocracy were added political rela tions that varied in intensity (freq uency) and that were official , in formal , or various combinations of both depending on the political roles its members played at any given time . Although Harada, for example , was a member of Kido's aristocratic i ngroup , his associa tion with Kido, in both its frequency and its informal modes of com munication, was a direct reflection of the role of secretary that both Harada and Kido played in 1 932 . The second person Kido met most frequently, Viscount Okabe Nagakage , was also a member of Kido's Eleven Club ingroup . A politically ambitious member of the House of Peers, Okabe eventually became M i nister of Education under Toj o in 1 943 . Okabe was also Kido's predecessor as Chief Secretary to t he Privy Seal . Konoe , like Okabe, was also a member of Kido's i ngroup , political l y ambitious , a nd deeply i nvol ved in Kido's political career and activities . Konoe was the third most promi nent person in Kido's 1 932 pattern of association. In contrast with the in formal modes of communication between Kido and these three ingroup aristocrats , Kido's association with Privy Seal Makino, the fourth person he met most frequently in 1 932 , was almost completely official . A much older man, and completely outside Kido's normal set of aristocratic associations , Count Makino might never have met Kido except under the most fortuitous and casual circumstances had not Kido been his Chief Secretary or held another post that figured i n the Privy Seal's role a s a negotiator. B oth the frequency o f association and the mode of communication between Marq uis Kido and Count Makino were completely dependent on the offices the two held ; neither was dependent on the fact that Kido and Makino were members of the aristocracy . Since membership in the aristocracy was given, and public office as well as political aspirations were variable, it follows logically that Kido's association with members of even his own ingroup , while mai ntained at a basic level of social i nteraction , would vary according to the offices and ambitions they held . Frequency of association and mode of communication between Kido and public officials, whether aristocrats or not , would also vary accordi ng to offices held . In other
220
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITI CS
words, Kido's associations with political persons-however closely tied together by "class , " "group , " "age , " " education , " or even " policy preferences" -were almost entirely situational . They de pended on offices mutually held and the roles those offices demanded . This was certainly true of Kido's associations as a secretary in 1 932 . I t w a s also true o f Kido a s a bureaucrat in 1 93 6 .
T H E B U R EAUC RAT
From August 1 93 3 to October 1 937 Kido was Director of Peerage Affairs in the I mperial Household M inistry , a position that made him one of t he six palace officers of direct imperial appoi ntee rank.40 As discussed i n chapters 3 and 4 , t he I mperial H ousehold M i nistry was the primary bureaucratic structure for ma nagi ng the Emperor in-Court . The mi nistry exercised the emperor's prerogatives over his own affairs and the affairs of court , including management of the aristocracy . During 1 93 6 Kido remai ned a Counselor to the Household M i nistry as wel l . He was also concurrently C hief Secretary to the Privy Seal until J u ne 1 3 , 1 93 6 . Despite his overlap ping functions , his role as a bureaucrat in one of the i nstitutions of imperial prerogative is clear from his pattern of association for the year as a whole . I n 1 936 Kido recorded meetings with 3 9 1 persons , 94 more than in 1 932 (an increase of 3 1 . 6 percent) . He met those 391 persons a total of 1 ,444 times, 4 1 7 more meeti ngs than he had had in 1 932 (an increase of 40.6 percent) . His concurrent offices and the diversity of functions entailed by those offices i ncreased his associates and associati ons markedly. As table 13 reveals, the increases i n Kido's associations were in cu rred almost exclusively i n t he " officia l " category . I n 1 932 Kido's informal meeti ngs out numbered his official by 873 to 1 5 4 (85 perce nt to 1 5 percent) . In 1 93 6 , however, informal domi nated official by 877 to 567 ( 6 1 percent to 3 9 percent) . W hile Kido's informal meeti ngs 40. The other regular direct imperial appoi ntees at this time were : Privy Seal, Household Mi nister, G rand C hamberlain, Chief Aide, and Grand Master of the Ceremonies (Shokuin Roku, 1 93 1 , pp. 1 -4 , 92-93 ) . For a descri ption of the Office of Peerage Affairs, see above , p. 7 1 .
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
221
POLITICS
TABLE 1 3. KIDO KOICHI ' S ASSOCIATIONS IN 1 936 : FREQUENCY AND MODE OF COMMUNICATION Ten or Moreb (2)
Total• (I) Mode of Communication
No.
Nine or Less• ( 3)
%
No.
%
No.
%
OFFICIAL
Office Official residence Official conference Imperial lecture Kido's reports Reports to Kido
365 71 69 2 20 40
25 . 3 4.9 4.8 0.1 1 .4 2 .8
1 56 54 38 0 17 33
20 . 4 7 .0 5 .0 0 2 .2 4.3
209 17 31 2 3 7
30 . 8 2.5 4.6 0.3 0.4 1 .0
Official subtotal
567
39 . 3 %
298
38 . 9 %
269
39 . 7 %
147 35 205 60 55 220
10.2 2 .4 14 . 2 4.2 3.8 15.2
57 14 1 14 24 43 155
7 .4 1 .8 14 . 9 3.1 5.6 20 . 2
1 55
10 . 7
61
8.0
877
60 . 7 %
468
61 . 1 %
INFORMAL
Home Informal meeting Meals Banquets Eleven Club Golf Social and miscellaneous I nformal subtotal Total
1 , 444
1 00 %
766
1 00%
90
65
13 . 3 3.I 13.4 5.3 1 .8 9.6
94
13 .9
21 91 36 12
409 678
60 . 3 % 1 00 %
Kido Koichi, I : 454-532. • Based on a total of 1 ,444 meetings with 3 9 1 persons Kido records having met in 1 936. Average : 3.7 meetings per person. b Based on 766 meetings (53.0% of the total ) with the 3 7 persons Kido met 1 0 times or more. Average : 20. 7 meetings per person. • Based on 678 meetings (47.0% of the total ) with the 354 persons Kido met 9 times or less. Average : 1 . 9 meetings per person. NOTE : The notes to table I I apply equally to table 1 3 . souRcE :
222
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PA LA C E
P O L I TI C S
remai ned constant i n number between 1 932 and 1 93 6 , his official meetings j umped from 1 54 to 5 67 , an i ncrease of 2 6 8 . 2 percent over 1 932 . That Kido's role as a bureaucrat in 1 936 entailed a marked increase in official modes of communication is also clear from the re placement of " meals" as the si ngle most important mode of com munication in 1 932 (30 . 6 perce nt) by " office" i n 1 936 (2 5 . 3 percent) . As a bureaucrat-an official responsible for managing a specific j urisdiction within a component of imperial prerogative-Kido would be expected to have more contact with col leagues i n that j uris diction. M oreover, such associati ons would normally be official , si nce the work of admi nistration was office work and policy coordi nation involving fellow administrators-that is, bureaucrats . If the role of secretary i nvolved liaison and information gathering i n an i n formal setti ng, that of bureaucrat i nvol ved admi nistration i n an of ficial setti ng . The fact that Kido's secretary and bureaucrat roles overlapped for half of 1 93 6 , and the fact that his specific duties as a bureaucrat involved the aristocracy and consequent socializ i ng at various functions, help explain w hy informal modes of communi cation continued to be dominant i n 1 936. An exami nation of the thirty-seven persons Kido met ten times or more in 1 93 6 (table 1 4) substantiates these expectations . Si nce Kido met twice as many persons ten or more times in 1 936 as compared to 1 932 , his overlapping functions produced a wider set of frequent associates and decreased the average number of times he met them from 2 7 . 8 times per person i n 1 932 to 2 0 . 7 in 1 93 6 . Kido's bureau cratic role in 1 936 also produced a new group of associates frequently met . As table 1 4 reveals, ten of the thirty-seven persons Kido met ten times or more in 1 93 6 had not met Kido even once i n 1 932 ; five o f the thirty-seven met Kido only once i n 1 932 . Kido met but ten of the thirty-seven ten times or more in both 1 932 and 1 93 6 . S i x o f those ten persons were members of the Eleven Club, t w o were members of Kido's immediate family, one was an aristocratic i nti mate outside the Eleven Club, and the last was the retired Privy Seal , Count Maki no Nobuaki . Kido met these ten persons 375 times in 1 932 , accounti ng for 75 percent of his meeti ngs with persons he met ten times or more that year. I n 1 936 he met these ten 244.ti mes ,
KIDO AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
223
P O L I TI C S
TABLE 1 4. PERSONS IN CONTACT WITH KIDO KOICHI TEN OR MORE TIMES, 1 936 (37 PERSONS) Dominant Mode of Communication, 1936
Number of Meetings Persons
Harada Kumao Yuasa Kurahei Matsudaira Tsuneo VISCOUNT Saito Makoto Yuasa Kurahei BARON
Position
Sec'y to Prince Saionji Imperial Household Minister• Privy Seal•
1932
73 1 35
15 39 11
Section Chief, Bureau of Peerage Affairs, Household Ministry
Meals
26
(35 . 6 % )
Office
28
(5 1 . 9 % )
Office
28
( 60 . 9% )
Meals
23
(53 . 5 % )
0 I 46
Member, House of Matsudaira Peers ; Sec'y to Yasumasa the Privy Seal MARQUIS Inoue Member, House of Saburo Peers COUNT Mizoguchi Member, House of Naosuke Peers ; retired Lt. Gen . ; businessman PRINCE Konoe Pres. , House of Fumimaro Peers BARON Ito Pres. , Nippon Bunkichi Mining Co. , etc . ; Member, House of Peers MARQUIS Hirohata Deputy Grand Tad ataka Chamberlain; Member, House of Peers BARON Shirane Vice Minister, Matsusuke Household Ministry (May 1 936) Member, House of VISCOUNT Okabe Nagakage Peers
Number
Mode
0 54
35
MARQUIS
Iwanami Takenobu
1936
43
0 6
41
13
Golf
31
( 75 . 6 % )
36
3
Golf
34
(94 . 4 % )
34
57
Meals
II
( 32 . 4 % )
34
8
Golf
33
( 97 . 1 % )
31
6
Office
15
( 48 . 4 % )
Office
13
(46 . 4 % )
28
26
24
67
Meals or Eleven Club Office
Each (Each 8 30 . 8 % ) 9
(37 . 5 %)
224
KIDO
A ND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITI CS
TABLE 1 4.-Continued Number of Meetings Persons PRINCE
Kitashirakawa and Family Wada Koroku VISCOUNT
Matsudaira Keimin EMPEROR
Hirohito COUNT Kodama Hid eo PRINCE
Takamatsu Nobuhito Matsumoto Kannosuke Inoue Katsuzumi
VISCOUNT
Asaka and Family PRINCE Chichibu Yasuhito PRINCE
Takahashi Toshio
Naito Saburo Sasaki Yukitada Kido Takazumi VISCOUNT Oda Nobutsune PRINCE Saionji Kimmochi
MARQUIS
Position
1936
1932
Imperial family
17
Kido's brother Grand Master of the Ceremonies, Household Ministry Emperor
17 16
18 5
16
2
15
4
14
14
Kido's brother-inlaw ; bureaucrat Imperial family (emperor's brother) Official attached to Prince Higashikuni Member, House of Peers ; Naval officer Imperial family Imperial family (emperor's brother) Section Chief, Bureau of Peerage Affairs, Household Ministry Police official, Home Ministry Member, House of Peers Kido's son Member, House of Peers Last of the Elder Statesmen
Dominant Mode of Communication, 1936 Mode
Number
Social
9
(52 . 9% )
Golf Office
II
4
( 64 . 7 % ) ( 25 . 0 % )
Official residence Home
10
( 62 . 5 % )
7
( 46 . 7 % )
2
Official residence
7
(5 0 . 0 % )
0
Office
11
( 78 . 6 % )
Golf
11
( 84 . 6 % )
Official residence Official residence
5
(38 . 5 % )
8
( 66 . 7 % )
13
13
4
12
5
12
0
Office
5
(4 1 . 7 % )
12
0
Office
8
( 66 . 7 % )
11
11
8
( 72 . 7 % )
11 11
10 13
7 7
( 63 . 6 % ) ( 63 . 6 % )
11
3
Eleven Club Social Eleven Club Office
7
( 63 . 6 % )
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
225
P O L I TI C S
TABLE 1 4.-Continued Number of Meetings Persons Otani Son'yu Tokinori Hisashi COUNT Makino Nobuaki Arita Hachiro couNT
VISCOUNT
Uramatsu Tomoaki Oguma Shin'ichiro and family Naruse (Tatsu?)
PRINCE
Position Member, House of Peers Brother-in-law ; Army officer Former Privy Seal
1936
1932
Mode
11
0
Golf
10
0
10
41
Foreign Minister (April 1 936) Member, House of Peers
10
6
10
10
Son of wealthy businessman Oguma Koichiro (?) Kido's son-in-law (?) ; Managing Director, Nippon Life Assurance Co. (?) Imperial family
10
Number 10
( 90 . 9% )
Social
5
( 50 . 0% )
Home
4
(40 . 0% )
Official residence Eleven Club
4
( 40 . 0% )
8
(80 . 0% )
0
Home
6
( 60 . 0 % )
10
0
Golf
10
3
Official residence
Higashikuni and family Total
Dominant Mode of Communication, 1936
10 ( 1 00 . 0 % )
4
( 40 . 0 % )
766 437
• Kido met Privy Seal Saito and his family I I times. He met Yuasa Kurahei a total of 50 times : 15 times when Yuasa was Household Minister, 35 times after Yuasa had succeeded Saito as Privy Seal. He met Matsudaira Tsuneo, who succeeded Yuasa as Household Minister, 39 times. Three persons, therefore, held two leading palace posts as a result of personnel shifts following the assassination of Privy Seal Saito on February 26, 1 936. By persons the count is Yuasa 50, Matsudaira 39, Saito I I . By office the count is Household Minister 54, Privy Seal 46 . Because of the importance of office, both person and office tabulations are included in table 14 for these three persons .
226
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
POLITICS
3 1 .9 percent of his meetings with those i n the ten or more frequency group . As measured by frequency of association, these ten persons were collectively more important to Kido in 1 932 than they were i n 1 93 6 . Kido met only one palace offical (his direct superior, the Privy Seal) ten times or more in 1 932 , accounting for a mere 8 . 2 percent of Kido's meetings in that freq uency group. In 1 93 6 , however, he met ten palace officials ten times or more, and these accounted for 3 5 . 0 percent of his meetings with those in the ten o r more frequency group . As measured by frequency of association, palace officials , whose domi nant modes of communication with Kido were official , were collectively the most important group in Kido's 1 936 pattern of association. By way of contrast , Kido's aristocratic ingroup i n the Eleven Club, whose domi nant modes of communication with Kido were almost completely i nformal, had accounted for 68.2 percent of his meetings with those he met ten times or more in 1 932 and were the core of his associations during that year. In 1 93 6 , however, the eight members of the Eleven Club who met Kido ten times or more accounted for only 3 1 .2 percent of Kido's meeti ngs in that frequency group . Kido's meetings with two key palace officials, the Privy Seal and the Household M i nister, numbered one hundred during 1 936-1 3 . 1 percent of Kido's meeti ngs with those he met ten times or more and 6 . 9 percent of his total meeti ngs that year. Kido met with the Privy Seal and I mperial Household Mi nister less than half that number of times in 1 932 , and forty-one of the forty-nine times he met with bot h i n 1 932 were meetings with the Privy Seal, his official superior. I n 1 93 6 , however, Kido met with the Privy Seal forty-six times and the I mperial H ousehold M i nister fifty-four times . Before his resignation as C hief Secretary to the Privy Seal on J une 1 3 Kido met with the Privy Seal thirty-seven times , after his resignation only ni ne times . Kido's association with the Privy Seal was thus a function of office and not a social or status relationship. Si nce Kido was Director of Peerage Affairs throughout 1 93 6 , contact with his direct superior in t his capacit y , the I mperial H ousehold M i nister, s hould have remai ned const a nt , regardl ess of Kido's resignation as C hief Secretary . This was indeed the case. From Ja nuary 1 to June 1 3
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Kido met with t he Imperial Household Minister thirty times ; from June 1 4 to December 3 1 he met with him twenty-four times . The higher number of meeti ngs in the January 1 -June 1 3 period was caused by palace activity during the aftermath of the February 2 6 coup, when the I mperial Household Mi nister and Kido, along with the other leading palace personages, were closeted in t he palace for over ten consecutive days . M eeti ngs with both these palace officials were primarily " of ficial . " Fifty-six of the one hundred meetings took place at offices , six at official residences , nine at official meetings , and seven i nvolved reports, for a total of 78 (78 percent) . Three persons held t he two posts of Privy Seal and I mperial Household M i nister duri ng 1 936 as the result of Privy Seal Saito's assassination on February 26. Of the one hundred meeti ngs, six were social calls of condolence and other calls on Saito's family after February 2 6 , inflating the " i nformal " figure . Such calls were of course expected of Kido under the circum stances but would not have occurred had Kido not been Saito's Chief Secretary . Further substantiating the official nature of Kido's rela tionship with all t hree is t he fact that duri ng 1 932 he met only one of t hem, the then Prime M i nister Saito, and him only once, at an of ficial imperial banquet for Ministers of State. The same pattern of official contact dependent upon official palace positions holds true for the remaining seven palace officials Kido met ten times or more during 1 93 6 , but with variation in the case of three . Four of the seven were strictly palace officials. lwanami Take nobu and Takahashi Toshio were section chiefs directly under Kido i n the B ureau of Peerage Aff�irs . Of t he thirty-six times Kido met with both, thirty (83 .3 percent) were official . Matsumoto Kanno suke , an official attached (bett o ) to Pri nce Higashikuni , was also connected to Kido by virtue of office. Kido, as Director of Peerage Affairs, was i nvolved in t he appointment of persons to t he entourage of members of the imperial family a nd other official duties regarding imperial family members . All of the fourteen times he met with Mat sumoto were official . Vice Minister of the I mperial Household Ministry B aron Shirane Matsusuke met Kido a total of twenty-eight times , of which twenty-one (75 percent) were official. B oth he and Kido were equally i nvolved in matters of ministry administration.
228
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Kido's assoCJatwns with these four arose exclusively from thei r palace offices . Kido met them a total of seventy-eight times; sixty-five (83 .3 percent) took place i n an official setti ng. In 1 932 Kido met only two of the four and those two but once each, emphasiz i ng once again the direct correlation between offices held and frequency of association . The last three palace officials Kido met ten times or more were Marquis Matsudaira Yasumasa , Marquis Hirohata Tadataka , and Viscount Matsudaira Keimin. Their patterns of association with Kido varied considerably from those of the ot her seven palace of ficials . Two, M arquis Matsudaira and Marq uis Hirohata, were members of the Eleven Club ; Viscount Matsudaira was Marquis Matsudaira 's uncle. Kido met these three only seventeen times in 1 932 ; i n 1 93 6 , however, he met them a total of ni nety times . Mar quis Matsudaira first entered the palace bureaucracy i n 1 93 6 as Kido's successor as Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal . Marquis Hiro hata first entered the palace in late 1 932 as Deputy Grand C ham berlai n . Viscount Matsudaira had held a court office in 1 932 that was of no relevance to Kido's secretarial role. Although all three were i ngroup aristocrats, therefore , the relation between the 1 93 6 palace offices o f a l l three and Kido's palace offices in 1 936 provides the most reasonable explanation for the cha nges in frequency of association between 1 932 and 1 93 6 and for the modes of communi cation with Kido duri ng 1 93 6 . Matsudaira Yasumasa was the only pal ace official whose modes of communication with Kido in 1 936 were overw hel mi ngly informal : 8 8 . 5 percent of their meeti ngs took place i n an i nformal setti ng and the dominant mode of communication between them was meals (53 . 5 percent) . During the five and a half months of 1 936 before he suc ceeded Kido as C hief Secretary to the Privy Seal , Matsudaira met Kido seventeen times, or 3 . 1 times a mont h . During the remai nder of 1 936 he a nd Kido met twenty-six times , or 4 . 0 times per month. The nature of Matsudaira's new office and the fact that Kido was his predecessor i n that office largely explain the mode of commu nication between them as well as the i ncreased frequency of association. The role of secretary , as we have j ust seen, called for the gatheri ng of political i nformation at meals and in other i nformal settings con-
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ducive to an " open exchange of views" -a relaxed environment i n which the participants could talk together a s " persons , " not formal officeholders . If Matsudaira pursued the same secretarial role as had Kido, which he apparently did , the only person with w hom he would meet on an overwhelmingly official basis would be his official supe rior, the Privy Seal . Second , Kido's and Matsudaira's palace offices in 1 936 had very little to do with one another, even though they were in the same component of imperial prerogative . There was no reason for them to meet officially, a nd given their i ngroup associa tion i n the Eleven Club it is not surprisi ng that informal modes of communication prevailed between them . M ore importantly, however, Kido was M atsudaira's predecessor in office and probably recommended Matsudaira to succeed him . Predecessor and successor were bound b y ties of courtesy, obligation , and self-interest-ties w hich were i nformal, not official . Kido, for example, maintai ned regular contact with his own predecessor as C hief Secretary to the Privy Seal, Viscount Okabe Nagakage, who was also a member of the Eleven Club ingroup. In 1 932 , wel l over a year after Kido had succeeded Okabe , Kido met Okabe sixty-seven t i mes : 97 . 0 percent of t heir meet i ngs were i nformal a nd t he domi nant mode of communication was meals (4 1 . 8 percent) . The pattern of association between Kido and his predecessor was thus repeated between Kido a nd his s uccessor . I ngroup associ ation between Kido and Matsudaira was therefore expanded because of two fact ors : ( 1 ) M atsudaira ' s new secretarial rol e , a nd ( 2 ) predecessor-successor relations . Kido's mode of communication with Hirohata Tadataka, also a member of the Eleven Club, was the complete reverse of that with Matsudaira Yasumasa : 87 . 1 percent of Kido's meetings with Hiro hata in 1 936 occurred at official places . Hirohata had become Deputy Grand C hamberlain in September 1 932 after twenty years in the M i nistry of Communications. From February 2 6 , 1 936 until November of that year Hirohata was virtually Grand C hamberlain while Grand Chamberlain Suzuki was recoveri ng from wounds in fl icted by the February 2 6 i nsurgents . Throughout most of 1 93 6 , therefore , H irohata performed the role o f one o f the s i x direct im perial appoi ntees at court . Had Kido not been one of those six of-
230
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ficials and had Hirohata not been Grand Chamberlain pro tempore it is quite likely that a very different pattern of association would have prevailed . As it was , Kido's role as a leading palace bureaucrat and Hirohata's role as chief attendant to the emperor in 1 93 6 transformed an i nformal and i nfrequent i ngroup association i nto an official and frequent palace association. The last of the ten palace officals was Viscount Matsudaira Keimin, w ho had been Grand Master of the Ceremonies si nce August 1 93 4 . Like Kido, he was one of the six palace officials of direct imperial appointee rank . Palace ceremonies , whether Shinto rites or diplomatic functions i nvolvi ng foreign notables , obviously concerned members of the imperial families and the aristocracy w hose affairs were managed by Kido. This may account for the increase i n association between the two, from five meeti ngs i n 1 932 to sixteen i n 1 93 6 . O nly seven of their meetings i n 1 936 were of ficial , however. A relative of one of Kido's aristocratic i ntimates and a palace official of equal rank whose duties i nvolved Kido's official functions , Matsudaira Keimin bel ongs in the ambiguous category of social-official associate . B oth office and social station serve to explain his place i n Kido's 1 936 pattern of association. Kido's meeti ngs with these ten palace officials may thus be classified as official-superior (three) , official-i nferior (four) , and of ficial-i ngroup (three) . The freq uency of association with all ten de pended primarily on palace offices held , not social relationships . These ten accounted for 1 80 of the 298 official meeti ngs with persons Kido saw ten or more times in 1 93 6 . J udgi ng by Kido's experience as a palace official , therefore , communication between a bureaucrat and those in the same bureaucratic organization was predomi nantly official rather than i nformal . Rei nforcing this conclusion is the fact that the domi nant mode of communication with these ten palace of ficials was office in all cases but one, Marq uis Matsudaira Yasu masa . His exception to the rule of bureaucratic association may be explai ned simply by the mode of operation called for by the role of Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal : i nformal contact between the Chief Secretary and his predecessor, as well as with government officials and officials at court not related to him by official duties . This was well docume nted by Kido's i nformal communication w i t h his
KIDO
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23 1
predecessor, Viscount Okabe Nagakage , and Kido's overw helmingly informal contact with government officials i n 1 93 2 . I f palace officials were a new type cluster in Kido's 1 936 pattern of association, so also were members of the imperial family. I n 1 932 Kido met with the emperor and members of the imperial families a total of 2 1 times ; i n 1 93 6 his association with them increased to 1 1 4 . Kido had met n o member of the imperial family ten times o r more i n 1 932 ; in 1 936 h e met s i x ten times o r more . Because Kido's office i n 1 93 6 gave h i m duties with regard to the imperial families a s well as the aristocracy, such associations followed as a matter of office . Sixteen of the thirty-seven persons Kido met ten times or more i n 1 936 were palace officials o r imperial family members . They ac counted for 4 5 . 7 percent of his associations in that frequency cate gory . Since he had met none of t hese sixteen persons ten times or more in 1 932 , Kido's role as a palace bureaucrat clearly brought him a new set of associates based on his new office . Of these sixteen persons eleven were titled aristocrats. As i n 1 932 , aristocratic associations dominated Kido's political network . B ut as these eleven aristocrats illustrate, Kido's aristocratic colleagues i n 1 93 6 were a diverse group and largely new faces . Twenty-five o f the thirty-seven Kido met ten times or more i n 1 936 were titled, and these twenty-five accounted for 7 1 .4 percent of Kido's meetings with those in the ten or more frequency category . I n addition to the eleven who were palace officials and members of the imperial family , five , accounting for 1 7 . 6 percent of Kido's meeti ngs with those he met ten times or more, were golfing cronies . With the possible exception of Marq uis I noue Saburo, none of these five appears to have figured i n Kido' political role during 1 93 6 . One of the remaini ng ni ne aristocrats was Kido's brother-in-law , Count Kodama Hideo. Kido gives no i ndication that Kodama , a promi nent bureaucrat of minis terial rank, was i nfl uential either i n Kido's career or in the perfor mance of Kido's political functions . The eighteenth aristocrat was Count Makino N obuaki , Kido's former superior. Despite Makino's retirement from the office of Privy Seal and from public life i n 1 935 , Kido kept i n touch with him apparently as a matter of courtesy . Be l'ause Makino was no longer Privy Seal , however, the number of meetings between the two decreased from forty-one in 1 932 to ten i n
232
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1 93 6 . Moreover, only two of the ten meetings in 1 936 took place under official circumstances . Since their official relationship no longer prevailed , therefore , frequency of association decreased markedly and the mode of communication was reversed from official to informal . Prince Saionj i , t he ni neteenth aristocrat , met Kido ten times during 1 93 6 , most meeti ngs taking place i n the aftermath of the February 26 coup attempt . After his resignation as Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal i n J u ne 1 93 6 , however, Kido met Pri nce Saionj i only once duri ng the remai nder of 1 93 6 , and that was a courtesy call concerned with his resignation. Kido's meetings with Saionj i , few though they were during his career as C hief Secretary , were therefore a function of Kido's secretarial role i n the process of advising the throne . The remai ni ng six aristocrats were members of the Eleven Club . These six, plus t he two Eleven Club members who were palace of ficers , accounted for 3 1 .2 percent of Kido's associations with t hose he met ten times or more. In 1 932 the correspond i ng percentage (68 . 2 percent) w a s more t h a n double. Meeti ngs w i t h a l l Eleven Club members cited by Kido decreased from 367 in 1 932 (3 5 . 7 percent of Kido's total meetings in 1 932) to 2 6 1 in 1 936 ( 1 8 . 1 percent of Kido's total meeti ngs i n 1 936). Meetings at Eleven C l ub sessions also de clined , from 71 in 1 932 to 5 5 i n 1 93 6 . The role of Kido's aristocratic i ngroup dimi nished markedly , therefore, when Kido's role changed from secretary to bureaucrat . After J une 1 93 6 Kido was no longer required to use his aristocratic circuit for gathering political in formation, si nce he was no longer Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal . Most affected was Kido's association with Prince Saionj i 's political secretary , B aron Harada Kumao . Although Harada was still the central figure in Kido's network of association in 1 93 6 , their meeti ngs decreased from 1 3 5 i n 1 932 to 73 in 1 93 6 . After June 1 93 6 Kido's role a s bureaucrat did not require the secretary-to-secretary liaison that was so important in 1 932 . Harada met Kido an average of 7 . 3 times a month prior to Kido's resignation in 1 93 6 ; during the remai nder of 1 936 they met 5 . 1 times a month. Because Harada was still a secretary , as well as a member of Kido's aristocratic i ngroup , a nd because Kido was an important palace bureaucrat , however, meeti ngs between the two remai ned at a high level . Although Kido mai ntained his center of gravity i n i ngroup
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aristocratic associations , therefore, ( 1 ) these decreased or changed in frequency of association according to offices held , (2) Kido's role as a bureaucrat brought him new and wider aristocratic associations than i n 1 93 2 , and (3) palace officials became Kido's most important set of associates , replaci ng the aristocratic i ngroup . Paralleling these changes , there was a decrease i n Kido's contact with " outside" government officials . Kido's four main li nks to the outside political world i n 1 932 are not found among the thirty-seve n persons Kido met ten times or more i n 1 93 6 . I n 1 932 Kido met Colonel Suzuki thirteen times , party politican I nukai twelve times , Foreign M i nistry bureaucrat Tani eleven times , and police chief Fuj inuma ten times . The displacement of t hese four persons may be explained rather easily. First , Kido was no longer a secretary after June 1 936 and did not need the same types of political contacts thereafter. Second , these four persons no longer held the offices they had had in 1 932 , offices which had made them politically relevant to Kido in performing his secretarial role. Fuj i numa , for example, was not Chief of Metropolitan Police in 1 93 6 . His successor was Ishida Kaoru, w hom Kido met six times duri ng 1 93 6 . Kido was also in frequent contact with police chief Naito Saburo (twelve times).41 Kido's contact with the Foreign Ministry was maintained via Arita Hachiro, Vice M inister of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign M i nister (April 1 93 6 ) , whom he met ten times duri ng 1 93 6 . Given the concern of the I mperial Household M inistry with palace security and the palace's deep concern with foreign policy directions , Kido's associations with the police and the Foreign M i nistry , though not i ntense, were not out of the ord inary . Most notable , however, is Kido's lack of sustained contact with autonomous representatives of the military . The two military officers Kido met ten times or more were Tokinori Hisashi , Kido's brother-in-law , and I noue Katsuz umi , a golfing crony . Their 4 1 . Meetings with these two police officials thus totaled eighteen. I nterestingl y , fourteen of t hese meeti ngs took place after Kido had resigned as C hief Secretary to the Privy Sea l . Since t he security of the imperial family and the aristocracy was one of t he prime concerns of all l•·ading palace bureaucrats, it is not extraordinary t hat Kido should have maintai ned frequent rontact with the Home M i nistry police, especially the Tokyo Metropol itan Police. The Feb ruary 26 coup might also have made palace officials far more security-conscious t han they had I we n.
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TABLE 1 5. TYPES OF PERSONS KIDO MET TEN TIMES OR MORE, 1 936 AND 1 932 1936
Persons
Titled aristocrats (including imperial personages ) Palace officials Eleven Club members Imperial family Business leaders Kido's family and in-laws Government officials Military officials Party officials Total•
No . of Meetings
/932 % of Tota[b
Persons
No. of Meetings
% of Total•
25
547
71 .4
11
410
82 . 0
10 8 6 3 5
268 239 82 80 63
35 . 0 31 .2 10 . 7 10 .4 8.2
8 0 1 2
41 34 1 0 16 28
8.2 68 . 2 0 3 .2 5.6
3 2 0
37 23 0
4.8 3.0 0
2
22 13 12
4.4 2.6 2 .4
62
1 , 339
27
883
• The persons add up to more than 3 7 in 1 936 and 18 in 1 932, and the number of meetings to more than 766 in 1 936 and 500 in 1 932, because the categories used are not mutually exclusive. For example, all Eleven Club members were titled aristocrats and some were palace officials. Kodama Hideo was a titled aristocrat, a government official, and a member of Kido's family. b Based on a total of 766 meetings. Based on a total of 500 meetings. •
association with Kido was based on family and aristocratic ties and i nvolved nonpolitical activities . The absence of someone like Colonel Suzuki from Kido's group of frequent associates is therefore symbolic of the drop in Kido's contact with the military during 1 93 6 . Table 1 5 l ists t he types of persons Kido met t e n times o r more in 1 932 and 1 936 and their frequency of association with Kido in each year. In 1 932 Kido's associations with four autonomous representa tives from the " outside" (government , military , and party) totaled 9 . 4 percent of his meeti ngs with those i n the ten or more frequency category . In 1 93 6 , however, only two such autonomous representa tives are to be found in this freq uency category , accounting for a mere 2 . 9 percent of Kido's associations with those he met ten times
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P O L I TI C S
o r more . As Kido's role changed from secretary to bureaucrat , therefore, the role of autonomous contacts with the outside world of politics decreased . Table 1 5 also summarizes the maj or shifts in all categories of persons Kido met , emphasizing once again t he primacy of official associations with palace colleagues in 1 93 6 , when Kido was primarily a bureaucrat , and the parallel decrease in association with i ngroup aristocrats of the Eleven Club. These changes i n Kido's pattern of association were paralleled by a marked change in dominant modes of communication, as table 1 6 reveal s . I n dischargi ng his role as secretary i n 1 93 2 , Kido's domi nant mode of communication with t hose he met ten times or more was overwhel mi ngly i nformal : 94 .4 percent of those he met ten times or more were linked to Kido primarily by i nformal modes of communication . The only exception was his association with his palace superior, Privy Seal Makino. In 1 93 6 , however, only 54 . 1 percent of those he met ten times or more were l inked primarily by i nfo r m a l modes of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . M oreove r , t he i nfor m a l TABLE 1 6. DOMINANT MODES O F COMMUNICATION MET TEN TIMES OR MORE, 1 936 AND 1 932
Dominant Mode Office Official residence "Official" subtotal
Number of Persons in 1936 11 6 17
PERSONS
Number of Persons in 1932 0
(45 . 9 % )
Meals Informal meetings Golf Home Eleven Club Social and miscellaneous
4 0 7 3 3 3
" Informal" subtotal
20
Total
37 ( 1 00% )
a
WITH
(5 . 6 % ) 9 1 2 0 4 1
( 54 . 1 % )
17
(94 . 4 % )
1 8 ( 1 00% )
N OTE : In cases where a tie occurred in the dominant modes of communication for given person, the first figure in tables 1 2 and 1 4 is used for that person, arbitrarily.
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percentage for 1 936 is greatly inflated because of the inclusion of some eleven persons whose domi nant mode of communication was informal but who had little or nothi ng to do with Kido's 1 93 6 political roles : family members and golfing cronies . The number of politically relevant types in 1 93 6 was twenty-six of the thirty-seve n persons Kido met ten times or more; i n 1 932 , fifteen of eighteen persons . I n both years the dominant mode of communication with politically irrel � vant persons was i nformal . Official modes of com munication domi nated in the case of seventeen of the twenty-six ( 6 5 . 4 percent) politically relevant persons in 1 93 6 ; in 1 932 , however, official modes of communication domi nated i n the case of only one of fifteen (6.7 percent) . I n 1 936 Kido's secretarial role was supplemented and then re placed by a bureaucratic role. The change in political roles altered his pattern of association significantly, primarily from i nformal meeti ngs with members of his aristocratic i ngroup and outside political persons to official meetings with fellow officials i n the palace. Kido's aristocratic ingroup remai ned the fixed base of his political operations from 1 932 through 1 936 but decreased in im portance . The Eleven Club, the Sixth Day Club, and other regular meetings such as the Tuesday Luncheon Club continued to function as before and Kido's attendance remai ned fairly constant . During 1 93 6 the Eleven Club met eight times, there was at least one meeting of the Sixth Day Club that Kido attended , and he was present at six Tuesday Luncheon Club sessions . On the other hand , his association with public officials in the government and the military decreased in 1 93 6 , and those officials he did see in 1 93 6 varied greatly from those he met in 1 932 . All these variations can be accounted for by changes in offices between 1 932 and 1 93 6 : the changes in Kido's associates , frequencies of association, and modes of communication between 1 932 and 1 93 6 were largely dependent on changes in Kido's palace role and the offices held by the persons Kido met . Finally, the total number of Kido's associations and associates i ncreased greatly between 1 932 and 1 93 6 . These i ncreases ca n be ac counted for by ( 1 ) new associates acquired by new offices , as j ust in dicated , (2) Kido's overlapping roles in 1 93 6 , and (3) associationa l accretions normal to any politically active person as he moves up t he
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political ladder. We have noted , for example, that Kido mai ntai ned frequent contact with Count Makino Nobuaki during 1 93 6 , wel l after Makino had retired as Privy Seal . Kido also kept in regular contact with his predecessor as C hief Secretary to the Privy Seal during 1 93 6 , almost six years after Kido had replaced him. Kido eve n mai ntai ned contact , t hough i nfreq uent , w i t h his former colleagues i n the M i nistry of Commerce and I ndustry . Throughout his political career, therefore, Kido acqui red a constantly expanding range and number of associations as the result of changes i n his public offices and his attendant pol itical advancement . With his ap pointment as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in 1 940, Kido's pace of associational activity became breathtaki ng .
KIDO ' S A PPOINTM ENT AS LORD KEEPER OF THE PRIVY SEAL
Kido resigned from his post as Director of Peerage Affairs to become Minister of Education in Pri nce Konoe's first Cabi net on October 22 , 1 93 7 . For the next two years he tasted the flavor of Cabi net politics, first as Education Mi nister and Welfare M i nster under Konoe and then as H ome Mi nister under Prime M i nister Hiranuma Kiichiro. Given his long-standi ng association with Pri nce Konoe, his entry i nto Konoe's Cabinet was " i n the nature of thi ngs . " Si nce Konoe remained as M inister without Portfolio in the Hiranuma Cabinet , which succeeded his , it is not at all surprising that Kido remai ned in the Hiranuma Cabi net as wel l . When Kido was ap pointed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on June 1 , 1 940, therefore , he brought to t hat office mi nisteri al experie nce , as had all his predecessors with the exception of Tokudaij i Sanenori and Fushimi Sadanaru . Kido's appoi ntment as Privy Seal was, of course , far more im portant than his appoi ntment as Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal t t' n years earl ier. I n 1 940 he was to become the emperor's chief ;ulviser on Cabi net changes-and remain i n that capacity for over fi ve years . Conseq uently , his appoi ntment brought to bear imperial
238
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advisers , leading political figures , palace officers , and their respective secretaries . I nvolved i n Kido's selection were ( 1 ) Baron Harada Kumao, Prince Saionj i 's political secretary , who claims to have suggested Kido to (2) Pri nce Saionj i , last of the Elder Statesmen, who at ni nety years of age strained to keep from advisi ng the throne on any issue ; (3) Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal Matsudaira Yasumasa , playing a liaison-catalyst role for (4) Privy Seal Yuasa Kurahei , dying of emphysema , who in cooperation with (5) the I mperial Household M inister, Matsudaira Tsuneo, and with the approval of (6) the Prime M inister, Yonai Mitsumasa, formally recommended Kido as Privy Seal . Leadi ng imperial advisers , such as (7) Senior Retainer Wakatsuki Reij i ro, (8) Senior Retai ner Okada Keisuke, and (9) Senior Retainer and President of the Privy Council , Pri nce Konoe Fumimaro were involved, as were advocates of sp eci fi c candidates , such as ( 1 0) lzawa Takio. Even ( 1 1 ) Kido was consulted as to a proper successor to Yuasa , not imagi ning that he himself would be chosen. Last , ( 1 2) the emperor sanctioned Kido's appoi ntment , having queried his principal palace officers as to the most suitable person to be his chief adviser-i n-attendance. The caution and secrecy with which all these participants went about selecting the new Privy Seal , so characteristic of prewar Japan's privatized decision making in general , are illustrated in the course of i nitiation, consultation, ne gotiation , and recommendation that led to Kido's appoi ntment . On the evening of May 3 , 1 940 Harada Kumao visited Kido : Privy Seal Yuasa Kurahei was ill a nd , since there was no immediate prospect of his recovery, the problem of replaci ng him would arise sooner or later. 42 Commenting after the war on this meeti ng with Harada, Kido notes : " At this time I didn't even dream that I would be nomi nated as his successor, and it appears that this was not at all i n H arada's mind either. " 43 Then, on M ay 8, the Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal , Matsudaira Yasumasa , visited Kido and Harada . When Matsudaira stated that the Privy Seal 's ill ness would probably make it necessary to replace him, Harada said t hat Pri nce Saionj i wished t o have Kido succeed Yuasa . Dumbfounded , Kido bluntly 42 . Kido Koichi, 2 : 783; K i d o Nikki Kenkyii Kai , 4 3 . K i d o N i kki Kenkyii Kai , p . 1 20.
p.
1 20 .
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asked Harada if this were in fact Prince Saionj i 's idea or his own . Harada replied that he had merely i nformed Saionj i that Privy Seal Yuasa would soon have to be replaced : Saionj i had then suggested Kido.44 I was completely stunned . I had noticed before that Saionj i was gracious enough to bestow his t rust a nd his affection on me; I could not but be moved t hat he would bestow such faith as this, however. But havi ng served the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal as his C hief Secretary , and knowi ng i ntimately how try i ng the Privy Seal's work is, I stated my view that Prince Konoe should be Privy Seal , a nd for President of the Privy Council Baron H i ranuma would be appropriate .45
On May 2 9 , Chief Secretary Matsudaira visited Kido again and asked Kido what his thoughts were on a successor to Yuasa. Kido once agai n recommended Konoe; if Konoe would not accept then Baron Hiranuma was the only alternative .46 When Harada visited Kido on May 3 1 , however, he intimated that Kido would be recom mended to succeed Yuasa . Kido resisted strongly : Not only do I have n o confidence i n deali ng with this i mportant position; I also feel an obligation regardi ng the establishment of the new party , w hich I discussed with Prince Konoe a n d Count Arima this past twenty sixt h, to help Pri nce Konoe a nd make t he new party a great success . On that I am in real difficulty !7
Finally, on June 1 , I mperial Household M inister Matsudaira Tsuneo called Kido: he wanted Kido to meet him at his official residence . W hen Kido appeared at 1 0 : 30 a . m . , Matsudaira men tioned having Kido appointed Privy Seal . Once again Kido declined : he was too j u nior and simply not suitable for such a position. The Imperial Household M inister replied that Prince Konoe, Privy Seal Yuasa , Prime M i nister Yonai, and other " top leaders" were united in recommending him. For Kido to refuse, thinking only of his per sonal convenience , would not do. Kido was unable, however, to understand why Konoe of all people had recommended him, given 44. Ibid . ; Kido Koichi , 2 : 783 . 4 5 . Kido Nikki Kenkyii Kai, p. 1 20. A terse verification of Kido's disclaimer is also found in the diary (Kido Koichi, 2 : 783). 46. Kido Koichi, 2 : 7 87-88; Kido Nikki Kenkyii Kai, p . 1 22 . 47 . Kido Nikki Kenkyii Kai , p . 1 22 . The party referred t o i s the I mperial Rule Assistance Assodation designed by Konoe and others to replace the political parties.
240
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their conversation of the twenty-sixth. Kido therefore asked Matsu daira to wait until he had asked Konoe w hat Konoe really had i n mind for him . 48 Kido called on Konoe immediately . Konoe explai ned his position as follows: W hat I had most hoped for w a s for you to work w i t h m e i n establishing the new party , and I feel the same way now as wel l . Si nce the view sup porting you for Privy Seal was the united view of the top leaders , starting with the Elder Statesman [ Pri nce Saionj i ] , it would not do for me alone to oppose . And t he position of Privy Seal is also extremely important ; i n pavi ng the way for t he new party I shall organize presently , your being i n the position of Privy Seal will be helpful i n many ways . Therefore , I also came around to endorsi ng [ your appointment ) . Since that's the way it is, I would like very much for you to accept , though it be a burden to you .49
When Konoe put it this way , Kido felt he could not decline simply on the basis of his personal desires . He made up his mi nd to accept and telephoned the Imperial Household M i nister to that effect . At the time Kido did not think to ask w ho the other " top leaders" were . While he was i n Sugamo Prison at t he end of the war , however, he had occasion to read t he biography of lzawa Takio and found that at lzawa's behest both Privy Seal Yuasa and Senior Retainer Wakatsuki Reij iro had come to Kido's support .50 H owever , Prince Konoe, at that time President of the Privy Council , was once agai n the most i nstrumental person in Kido's appointment to high office . Konoe shifted to Kido's support w hen the weight of pro-Kido views among other top leaders became unanimous . And it was only after Kido had cleared his nomination with Konoe that Kido consented to become Privy Seal . Si nce Kido was one of Konoe's con fidants and deeply i nvolved in Konoe's political aspirations and plans , Kido as Privy Seal would conti nue to be " helpful i n many ways . " Although Kido claims that Harada was not thi nki ng of Kido to succeed Privy Seal Yuasa when they met on M ay 3, Harada had 48. Ibid . ; Kido Koichi , 2 : 788. 49. Kido Nikki Kenkyii Kai, p . 1 22 . 5 0 . I bid . , p . 1 23 .
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241
brought up the issue of Yuasa's ill health wit h Pri nce Sai onj i as early as April 1 7 . Harada told Pri nce Saionj i : I thi nk Kido would b e all right a s the Privy Seal 's successor, but sud denly to put Kido in office now would have too strong an impact . So for now how about maki ng Kido I mperial H ousehold M i nister and , should the case arise, t ra nsfer him from I mperial H ousehold Mi nister to Privy Seal ?
To w hich Saionj i replied : " I think that 's a fi ne idea , really good , but I don't want you to say a word that I was strongly in favor, or that I broached t he subj ect . " 5 1 Apparently, Kido was under consideration three weeks before he himself knew about it . 52 Si nce it was his role to report a feasible consensus in the form of a reply to the throne , Pri nce Saionj i remai ned aloof until all the barometers of opi nion had been read . As late as May 27 , for instance , Saionj i told Harada to tell people that he was merely "listeni ng . " 53 B ut it seemed that he was beyond even reporting a consensus . On May 2 9 , the emperor evidently told the I mperial Household Mi nister to have Harada ask Saionj i 's opi nion on Yuasa's successor. The I mperial H ousehold Mi nister spoke with Harada on the thirtieth and told him to see Saionj i at Okitsu im mediately . When Harada saw Saionj i on the thirty-first , Saionj i refused t o respond to the emperor's questions o n grounds of old age and distance from recent political developments . Saionj i fi nally sug gested "someone like Ichiki [ Kitokuro] or Okada [ Keisuke ] , " his fellow constitutional monarchists, but he remai ned silent when Harada asked him for permission to relay this to the emperor .54 Harada reported to Saionj i that eveni ng that Kido had ultimately 5 1 . Harada Kumao, 8 : 224-2 5 . The precedent for such an appointment procedure had been
set by Makino N obuaki , Household M i nister from 1 92 1 to 1 92 5 a nd then Privy Seal from 1 925 to 1 93 5 . The practice was continued by Yuasa Kurahei , Household M inister from 1 933
l o 1 936 and Privy Seal from 1 936 to 1 940.
52 . Althouth Harada records a conversation with Kido after his April 17 meeting with Pri nce Saionj i , Kido notes no meeti ngs with Harada between April I I and May 2 . Since l l arada's record is an oral statement recorded by another person at ten-day i ntervals, Kido's daily diary, written by himself, would appear more reliable on specific details such as dates a nd meeti ngs. Harada also dictated long passages that were mere hearsay , frequently •·rnbel lishing his accounts with his own commentary . 5 3 . Harada Kumao, 8 : 250. 5 4 . Ibid . , pp. 2 5 1 - 5 3 .
242
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been recomme nded to t he t hrone by t he I mperial H ousehold Minister. Saionj i was very pleased : I n fact , as you have j ust sai d , if t he predecessor first recommends a suc cessor, then the State M inister who is to countersign-that is, the Im perial Household M i nister-agrees to this and His Maj esty gives his sanction, nothing could be better. I am completely satisfied .55
Saionj i 's attempt to keep out may be explai ned in two mutually supporting ways . First , as Elder Statesman he was to express a consensus , not dictate a choice . This involved selecting a "suitable" person, one who would satisfy various representatives of opinion and policy-making groups and meet certain criteria of political style and viewpoi nt . Second , Prince Saionj i was genui nely disenchanted with his role as Elder Statesman and for the past several years had tried in vain to " retire" from this advisory position to the throne . When Saionj i approved the selection of Kido he was i n effect rati fying an official process for selecting top political leaders : the predecessor recommends, those M i nisters of State who countersign the appointment agree, and the emperor sanctions . This leaves Saionj i out completely, as well as others not directly involved by law in the appoi nting process , and makes appointment to office largely an intramural process within the given bureaucratic structure . By 1 940 Harada's role as secretary to the last of the Elder Statesmen appears to have been more that of advocate and initiator than pure liaison. It seems in fact that Kido was put into Saionj i ' s head b y Harada, a n d not suggested b y Saionj i himself, a s Kido suspected on May 8. Saionji's refusal even at the twelfth hour to recommend a successor to the Privy Seal allowed Harada-and the other concerned public officials-to go ahead with Kido's ap pointment . After his conversation with the I mperial Household Minister on May 30, Harada commented : For some time before I had had various t houghts concerni ng a successor , a nd , si nce I had had to listen to various views, I had spoken to Konoe a nd also heard the views of Matsudaira [ I mperial H ousehold M i nister] , Admiral Okada, and others . W hen it came to a decision, the n , it amounted to saying: " Kido is the safest . With Kido, si nce he knows q uite 5 5 . Ibid . , p. 2 5 4 .
KIDO
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243
a bit about palace matters and is also conversant with recent political conditions, wel l , Kido will be fine . " When at that point I checked with the Prime M inister a nd heard his t houghts, he said : "I have no objection to Kido. " 56
As Pri nce Saionj i ' s secretary , Harada appears to have done Saionj i ' s j ob o f negotiating a consensus in 1 940. Since the ritual o f " aski ng the Elder Statesman at Okitsu" was preserved to the very last , Harada was permitted to perform Saionj i 's role. The ultimate de cision was made and reported by t he Imperial H ousehold M inister, in consultation with Privy Seal Yuasa , and evidently midwifed by Harada. As Saionj i ' s better half in 1 940, Harada was very concerned that the process of consensus taking and consensus resolution be thorough but highly contained . On May 1 7 Harada claims to have met the Prime M i nister a nd told him to give careful consideration to a possible successor to Privy Seal Yuasa : Si nce ultimately both t he I mperial Household Mi nister and you are to make direct decisions on this upcoming problem, the I mperial Household M i nister might possibly make some recommendations directly to His M ajesty . A nd if t hat happens the case will be closed-so watch that side of thi ngs carefully . 57
One of the imperatives to secrecy in Harada's mind was a premature recommendation to the emperor of Yuasa's successor, closi ng the se lection process . I mperial sanction was the fi nal act of the consensus resolution process , and a clear recommendation to the throne in variably elicited imperial sanction . 58 Harada wanted the process of consensus taking to run its full course to avoid a rash decision on the new Privy Seal . The Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal, M atsudaira Yasumasa, ap pears to have acted as an impartial i nformant and liaison in Kido's appoi ntment . Neither Kido nor Harada records any preferences given by the Chief Secretary as to Yuasa's successor. The Chief 56. Ibid . , p . 2 5 2 . 5 7 . Ibid . , p p . 245-46. 58. Under certain circumsta nces, however, leaders declined or were prevented from taking office even after i mperial appointment . Konoe decli ned the imperial command to form a Cabinet in 1 936. As we saw in the concl usion to chap. 4, General Ugaki was prevented from forming his Cabi net in 1 937 w hen the Army refused to appoi nt an Army M inister.
244
KIDO
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Secretary did, however, press for a decision by i nformi ng the prin c i p a l s re g u l a r l y of Y u a s a ' s he a l t h a nd u r g i n g i m me d i a t e consideration o f a successor. The C hief Secretary was also concerned that the issue be kept contai ned and secret, even among the prin cipals . On May 4 , for example, he talked with Harada : This is top secret , but the Privy Seal 's condition is really not very good . He himself finally said : " I cannot possibly go on . " A nd he tal ked to the I mperial Household M i nister about this as wel l . Wel l , he is thinking of some way to regai n his health and i ntends to resign soon. Don't talk about this with Konoe or Kido j ust now .59
On May 6 or 7 , the Chief Secretary again spoke with Harada and told him that Privy Seal Yuasa had suggested as his successor Wakatsuki Reij iro, Ugaki Kazunari , 60 or Kido . He then asked Harada to speak to no one until he had heard from the Imperial H ousehold M i nister and not to speak with the Imperial Household M i nister himself.61 The Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal was therefore instrumental i n keeping the decison-maki ng circuit closed , a t t h e same time that he kept Harada i nformed . He also attempted to preserve the decision making primacy of the two chief palace figures concerned : the Privy Seal and the Imperial Household Mi nister. Despite Harada 's liaison ambulations and his recommendations , the fi nal decision was ap parently made by these two palace officials . The emperor appears to have pl ayed an active role i n Kido's ap pointment . On hearsay , Harada q uoted the emperor as saying to the I mperial H ousehold Mi nister on M ay 2 9 : Wakatsuki , for example, i s also a candidate [ for Privy Seal ] , but there is the fact of the London Treaty problem, and the fact that he was president of the M inseito for many years ; the mood of the opposition party will never relent . Won 't that prove a bar ? And Konoe is good , but flocks of various kinds of people are a bit too close [ to him] , and further, in the future, it will be necessary in fact for him to be in charge of the party; I 5 9 . Harada Kumao, 8 : 237. 60. Ugaki Kazunari was at this time a retired general turned bureaucrat-pol itician . Born i n 1 868, Ugaki w a s M inister o f t h e A r m y under three Prime M i nisters, i nclud i ng Wakatsuki Reij irii, between 1 924 and 1 92 7 , a nd again from 1 929 to 1 93 1 . During his career he had managed to alienate himself from a number of military leaders and consequently lost his cha nce to become Prime M inister in t he 1 930s. 6 1 . Harada Kumao, 8 : 239.
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would like, therefore , to avoid making him Privy Seal now . Hiranuma seems to keep secrets, but Okitsu [ i . e . Prince Saionj i ] j ust simply will not support h im . Kido I think is good , but he is a bit young and to extinguish his future political career would be sad-but who ?62
The emperor added , " Among these , who does Saionji think is good ? Are there others besides these ?"63 Evidently the emperor did express opinions about the selection of the official who would serve as his closest and most important link with the government . Fi rst , he couched suggestions as questions . Second , the criteria he applied were ( 1 ) lack of opposition from i nfl uential q uarters of Japanese political society, (2) seniority and experience , and (3) low in volvement in a given political policy or political stance . Wakatsuki and Hiranuma had opposition, Kido was too young, and Konoe too involved . The emperor did not mention a desirable political policy as a criterion for any candidate. In fact , there is no discussion by either Harada or Kido of any policy criteria in the selection of the Privy Seal-pro Anglo-American, pro civilian, for example-or of concrete programs a candidate would advise the throne to adopt . The im plication i n the entire nominating and appoi nti ng process was that the Privy Seal was to be an impartial adviser, untai nted by in volvement in any specific policy or program. Third , the emperor's participation left wide latitude to t hose responsible for advising the throne on a new Privy Seal; he did not really declare for a specific person. The most that can be said is that the emperor very mildly intimated that Kido was the least objectionable . Kido's appoi ntment as Privy Seal , in contrast to his appoi ntment to the post of C hief Secretary to the Privy Seal ten years earlier, thus brought to bear the top echelon of consensus takers and consensus makers : Senior Retai ners , Pri nce Saionj i , palace officials, the Prime Minister, the emperor. And Kido was not the only candidate proposed for that importa nt office . The resol ution process was one of elimination, and Kido was the "safest , " as Harada suggested . Kido's own behavior during the appointment process was similar to that ten 62 . Ibid . , pp. 2 5 1 -52 . Si nce appointment to the office o f Privy Sea l , with the o n e exception of Katsura in 1 9 1 2 , always terminated a successful career on the " outside", Kido's ap poi ntment would in effect "exti nguish his future political caree r . " 63 . Ibid . , p. 2 5 2 .
246
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PA LA C E
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years earlier, when he was appoi nted as Chief Secretary . First , as in 1 930, Kido was not a candidate by his ow n req uest : he was placed i n office b y others . Whereas h e w a s neit her excited nor displeased about his 1 930 appoi ntment, he appears to have been genui nely op posed to becoming Privy Seal in 1 940. His refusal to accept the post in 1 940 went far beyond the self-effacing courtesies of Japanese pro priety : he had other plans, he was too young, and he did not want an office that was both a demandi ng pressure point i n the political process and da ngerous to life and limb. He was literally pressed i nto service. According to Harada, Kido was recommended to the throne (May 3 1 ) even before he had accepted Q u ne 1 ) .64 Second , there were no formal j ob interviews . Not even the em peror interviewed Kido prior to his appoi ntme nt . And when Kido met the I mperial Household M i nister on J u ne 1 it was to be pressed i nto service , not to be i nterviewed on policies a nd programs . Kido was never asked what he "stood for. " Finally, only a very small number of persons had a say i n Kido's appoi ntment as Privy Seal . He was reported to the throne by the Imperial H ousehold Mi nister and sanctioned by the emperor, after consultations with a small group of "top leaders" from the government . No formal body passed on Kido's appointment , which was a matter for the emperor and his indi vidual advisers excl usively .
T H E NEGOTIATOR
J ust how demandi ng the office of Privy Seal was for Kido may be readily appreciated from table 1 7 . Although Kido recorded having met 3 84 persons in 1 94 1 , 7 less than i n 1 93 6 , he saw those 384 persons 1 , 920 times, a 3 3 . 0 percent i ncrease i n meetings over 1 93 6 and an 87 . 0 percent i ncrease over 1 932 . Moreover, those Kido met ten times or more in 1 94 1 averaged 32 . 5 meeti ngs per person. I n 1 932 the comparable figure was 2 7 . 8 (table 1 1 ) ; in 1 93 6 , 2 0 . 7 (table 1 3) . As Privy Seal , Kido was a far busier person than he had ever been before i n his palace career. 64 . Ibid . , pp. 253-54 .
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P O LI T I C S
TABLE 1 7. KIDO KOICHI ' S ASSOCIATIONS IN 1 94 1 : FREQUENCY AND MODE OF COMMUNICATION To tala (I) Mode of Communicationd
No.
Ten or Moreb (2) %
No.
%
Nine or Less• (3) No.
%
OFFICIAL
Office Official residence Official conference Imperial lecture Kido's reports Reports to Kido Imperial report•
79 1 439 31 5 14 60 7
Official subtotal
1 , 347
41 . 2 22 . 9 1 .6 0.3 0.7 3.I 0.4
625 1 82 10 0 12 51 2
56 . 6 16.5 0.9 0 1.1 4.6 0.2
1 66 257 21 5 2 9 5
20 . 4 31 .5 2.6 0.6 0.2 1.1 0.6
70 . 2 %
882
79 . 8 %
465
57 . 1 %
263 14 1 02 34 46 5 12
13.7 0.7 5.3 1 .8 2 .4 0.3 0.6
101 4 45 17 4 3 12
9.1 0.4 4.1 1 .5 0.4 0.3 1.1
1 62 10 57 17 42 2 0
19 . 9 1 .2 7 .0 2.I 5.2 0.2 0
97
5.1
37
3.3
60
7 .4
223
20 . 2 %
350
42 . 9 %
INFORMAL
Home Informal meetings Meals Banquets Eleven Club Golf Tour1 Social and miscellaneous Informal subtotal Total
573
I , 920
29 . 8 % 1 00 %
I , 1 05
1 00%
815
1 00%
souRcE : Kido Koichi, 2 : 847-937. • Based on a total of I, 920 meetings with 384 persons Kido records having met in 1 941 . Average : 5.0 meetings per person. b Based on I , 1 05 meetings (57.6 % of the total ) with the 34 persons Kido met 10 times or more. Average : 32.5 meetings per person. • Based on 8 1 5 meetings (42.4% of the total ) with the 350 persons Kido met 9 times or less. Average : 2.3 meetings per person. d In 1 94 1 Kido was not as careful to distinguish place of meeting as he had been in 1 932 and 1 936. When he reports visitors to his residence it is almost always impossible to tell whether he means his official residence or his home. This was not a problem in 1 932 and 1 936 because in those years Kido was not an official of high enough rank to warrant an official residence. I have therefore tabulated as Official residence meetings
248
KIDO
AND
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P A LA C E
P O LI TI C S
The i ncrease i n Kido's activity was directly related to official duties . For the first time in the three years exami ned , official modes of communicat i o n pred omi nated over i nformal . I n 1 94 1 , 7 0 . 2 percent of Kido's meeti ngs took place i n an official setti ng. A s a secretary i n 1 93 2 , official modes of communication accounted for only 1 5 . 0 percent of Kido's meeti ngs (table 1 1 ) ; as a bureaucrat i n 1 93 6 , 3 9 . 3 percent (table 1 3) . I n 1 932 " office" accounted for a mere 7 . 6 percent of Kido's total meeti ngs (table 1 1 ) . Office became im portant to Kido i n discharging his administrative duties as Director of Peerage Affairs in 1 93 6 , accounting for 2 5 . 3 percent of his meeti ngs that year (table 1 3) . Office became even more important when Kido took his post "at• the emperor's side" as chief political adviser; 4 1 .2 percent of Kido's total meetings i n 1 94 1 occurred at offices , primarily his own office in the palace . The next most important mode of com munication was official residence, accounting for 22 . 9 percent . These two modes of communication , therefore, accounted for almost two thirds of Kido's total meeti ngs i n 1 94 1 . In short , the palace was the primary place where Kido performed his negotiator role as the em peror's chief consensus taker and consensus maker i n politics . Despite the great i ncrease i n his total associations in 1 94 1 , moreove r , Kido's i nformal modes of communication decl i ned absolutely i n comparison to 1 932 and 1 93 6-from 873 meeti ngs in 1 932 (table 1 1 ) and 877 i n 1 93 6 (table 1 3) to 573 meeti ngs i n 1 94 1 . Certain i nformal modes of communication declined drastically. Meals, so important to Kido's secretarial role in 1 93 2 , accounted for only 1 02 meetings and a mere 5 . 3 percent of Kido's total meetings i n 1 94 1 . I n 1 932 , 3 1 4 o f Kido's meeti ngs occurred a t meals, accounting for 3 0 . 6 percent of his total meeti ngs that year (table 1 1 ) . The press and nature of Kido's official duties during 1 94 1 also decreased on weekdays and as Home meetings on weekends, as far as visitors coming to Kido's residence were concerned. The Official residence figure may be inflated by as much as 1 0 percent. • The category Imperial report indicates reports to the throne that Kido attended . These were substantially different from the more general imperial lectures, in that they were policy position reports. 1 Tour refers to imperial outings, mainly to the imperial villa at Hayama, on which Kido accompanied the emperor or empress. NOTE : The notes to table I I apply equally to table 1 7 .
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PA LA C E
P O LI TI C S
249
activities that were purely social or recreational . "Golf" and "social and miscellaneous" accounted for 1 02 meeti ngs and 5 . 3 percent of Kido's total meeti ngs in 1 94 1 . In 1 932 the comparable figures were 1 96 and 1 9 . 1 percent (table 1 1 ) ; in 1 93 6 , 375 and 2 6 . 0 percent (table 1 3) . Finally, each of the modes of i nformal communication that was significant in terms of freq uency duri ng 1 94 1 -home , meals, social and miscellaneous , Eleven Club, and banquets-was more important in the nine or less frequency group than in the ten or more group. In other words, the less a person met Kido duri ng 1 94 1 the more likely their meeting would take place u nder i nformal cir cumstances . Conversely , frequency of association i n 1 94 1 , i n contrast to 1 932 and 1 93 6 , was directly correlated with official modes of communi cation. The more a person met Kido the more likely their meetings were to occur at official places to accomplish official functions . Over 79 percent of Kido's meetings with those he met ten times or more i n 1 94 1 were official i n mode of communication, but only 5 7 percent of his meeti ngs with those i n the nine times or less group took place i n an official setti ng. Variation between the two freq uency groups was 22 .7 percent . In 1 932 official modes of communication with those i n the two frequency groups varied b y only 2 . 3 percent , and i n the op posite direction. In 1 93 6 the variation was an i nsignificant 0 . 8 percent . A s a secretary in 1 932 and a bureaucrat i n 1 93 6 , moveover, office meeti ngs took place more often with those i n the nine or less frequency group than with those in the ten or more group : 8. 9 percent in the nine or less group as compared to 6 . 2 percent in the ten or more group during 1 932 (table 1 1 ) and 30.8 percent as com pared to 20.4 percent during 1 93 6 (table 1 3) . In 1 94 1 , however, 5 6 . 6 percent of Kido's meetings with those he met ten times or more occurred at offices , w hile only 2 0 . 4 percent of his meeti ngs with those i n the nine or less group took place i n that setting. Thus , as Kido's official position and role in the palace bureaucracy cha nged i n nature and i ncreased i n political weight , ( 1 ) associations i ncreased i n frequency , ( 2 ) those associations i ncreasi ngly took place under of ficial circumstances , and (3) frequency of association ultimately be came positively correlated with official modes of communication , especially " office . "
250
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
P O LI T I C S
"Official residence" as an official mode of communication does , however, pose difficulties . I n 1 94 1 Kido had an official residence , as he had not had in 1 932 and 1 93 6 . Access by visitors to Kido's official residence was very much like access to his home and involved com munication that was both social and official . Second , as poi nted out in note d to table 1 7 , it was frequently impossible to distinguish visits to Kido's official residence from those to his home . Under such circumstances , were visits to Kido's official residence " informal " or " official " ? Did they involve political duties or nonpolitical activities ? Perhaps it would have been more logical to combine the " official residence" and " home" categories and classify both as informal modes of communication, since both " offical residence" and " home" meetings increased markedly over 1 932 and 1 93 6 , combi ning to ac count for 3 6 . 6 percent (702 meeti ngs) of Kido's total meeti ngs i n 1 94 1 . I n 1 932 " official residence" accounted for only 27 meetings and " home" for 1 44 , combining for 1 7 1 meetings and only 1 6 . 7 percent o f Kido's total meetings that year (table 1 1 ) . I n 1 936 " official residence" and " home" numbered 7 1 and 1 4 7 respectively, combining for 2 1 8 meetings and only 1 5 . 1 percent of Kido's total meeti ngs that year (table 1 3) . There are, however, several reasons for attempti ng t o distinguish the two and for maki ng " official residence" an official mode of com munication . First , not all official residence visits were visits to Kido. At least 77 of the 439 official residence meetings , for example, were visits by Kido to the palaces of the emperor and members of the im perial families . Second , many of the visits to Kido's residence were , in fact , official visits while others were made in the performance of political d uties-especially those by the Chief Cabi net Secretary , police officials, and Kido's own C hief Secretary . Third , even if " of ficial residence" i nvolved a mix of official and i nformal modes of communicat i o n , it is useful to attempt to separate " official residence" from " home" for purposes of comparing Kido's modes of communication as negotiatior with those as secretary in 1 932 and as bureaucrat in 1 93 6 . Fourth, the great i ncrease in visits to both Kido's official residence and his home suggests that Kido was a focal point around which political forces congregated , officially and infor mally. With the exception of the emperor and members of the im-
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
P O LI T I C S
251
perial families, political leaders al most invariably went t o see Privy Seal Kido, not vice versa. It is important to discover as accurately as possible what kinds of access various sorts of people had to the em peror's chief negotiator in politics . W ho, then, were the persons who congregated most frequently around Kido during 1 94 1 ? Table 1 8 lists the thirty-four persons Kido met ten times or more in 1 94 1 , their positions , frequency of association with Kido for 1 932 and 1 93 6 as well as 1 94 1 , and the domi nant mode of communication with each duri ng 1 94 1 . As i n 1 932 and 1 93 6 , Kido's new political role i nvolved him with new sets of people politically significant to that role. Of the thirty-four persons , Kido reports having had no contact with thirteen in either 1 932 or 1 93 6 . He met but twelve in all three years , and only four persons ten times or more i n all three years . Two of these four were members of Kido's family and politically irrelevant . Quite clearl y , therefore , Kido acquired a new set o f associations in h i s office a s Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal . Second , only nine of the thirty-four i n t he ten or more frequency group , or 2 6 . 5 percent , were titled aristocrats, i ncluding the emperor and members of the imperial families. These nine aristocrats ac counted for 4 7 . 9 percent of Kido's meeti ngs in that frequency group . I n 1 932 , however, 6 1 . 1 percent of those w hom Kido met ten times or more were titled , accounting for 82 .0 percent of Kido's meeti ngs i n that frequency group . I n 1 93 6 the percentages were 67 . 6 percent and 7 1 .4 percent respectively. Aristocrats were no longer the core of Kido's associations as t hey had been when he was a secretary and a bureaucrat . I n 1 94 1 , moreover, the role of Kido's Eleven Club ingroup decli ned drastically. As table 1 9 i ndicates , only three of the thirteen Eleven Club aristocrats met Kido ten times or more i n 1 94 1 ; eight had done so i n 1 932 and 1 93 6 . These three accounted for a mere 1 2 .3 percent of Kido's meeti ngs with those i n the ten or more frequency group during 1 94 1 . In 1 932 Eleven Club members had ac counted for 68.2 percent of his meeti ngs in that frequency group ; i n 1 93 6 , 3 1 .2 percent . With the exception of Prince Konoe , Prime Minister throughout most of 1 94 1 , and Marq uis Matsudaira Yasu masa , Kido's Chief Secretary , members of the Eleven Club were al most i nvisible in Kido's 1 94 1 pattern of association.
252
KIDO
A ND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
P O L I TI C S
TABLE 1 8. PERSONS IN CONTACT WITH KIDO KOICHI TEN OR MORE TIMES, 1 94 1 (34 PERSONS)
Position
Person EMPEROR
Emperor
Hirohito PRINCE Konoe Fumimaro GENERAL
Hasunuma Shigeru Matsuoka Yosuke Matsudaira Tsuneo GENERAL
T6j6
Hideki MARQ.UIS
Matsudaira Yasumasa ADMIRAL
Hyakutake S abur6 Yamazaki lwao
MARQ.UIS
Komatsu and family Wada Koroku Hirose Hisatada
ADMIRAL
Toyoda Teijir6
Total Number of Meetings
Dominant Mode of Communication , 1941
1941
Mode
1936 1932
Number
313
16
2
Office
272 ( 86 . 9 % )
Prime Minister
93
34
57
Office
52 ( 55 . 9 % )
Chief Aide-de-Camp
82
0
0
Office
73 ( 89 . 0 % )
Foreign Minister
55
0
Office
34 ( 6 1 . 8 % )
Imperial Household Minister Army Minister, Prime Minister Chief Sec'y to the Privy Seal
45
39
0
Office
29 ( 64 . 4 % )
44
0
0
Office
38 ( 86 . 4 % )
33
43
6
Official residence
Grand Chamberlain
32
0
Office
27 (84 . 4 % )
Superintendent General of Metropolitan Police Future in-laws
27
0
Office
1 2 (44 . 4 % )
0
Official residence
8 ( 34 . 8 % )
Brother Director of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau ; House of Peers Minister of Commerce and Industry ; Foreign Minister
21 21
17 0
18 0
Home Official residence
1 1 ( 52 . 4 % ) 1 3 (6 1 . 9% )
20
0
Office
1 2 (60 . 0 % )
0
23
7 (2 1 . 2 % )
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
253
P O LI T I C S
TABLE 1 8-Continued Total Number of Meetings Person GENERAL
Suzuki Teiichi COUNT Kanroji Osanaga Korematsu Jun'ichi Hashimoto Seikichi Hara Yoshimichi Yamashita Kamesaburo Matsui Seikun (Kiika) BARON Ito Bunkichi Higuchi Chikao Kido Takahiko Kido Takazumi Okada Fumihide
Abe Nobuyuki Watanabe Yoshio GENERAL
Togo Shigenori PRINCE
Takamatsu Tomita Kenji
Position
1941
Director of the Cabinet Planning Board Deputy Grand Chamberlain Businessman ; bureaucratic "sec'y" Director of the Police Bureau, Home Ministry Pres. of the Privy Council Shipping magnate Right-wing ideologist Businessman ; Member, House of Peers Son-in-law Son Son Ex-Home Ministry, Welfare Ministry bureaucrat Senior Retainer
20
Newspaperman ; consultant to the Cabinet's Information Bureau Foreign Minister Emperor's brother Chief Cabinet Sec'y
1936 1932
Mode
Number
Office or Each ( Each Official 7 35 . 0% ) residence 1 4 ( 73 . 7 % ) Office
3
13
0
0
Official residence
10 ( 55 . 6 % )
0
Official residence
9 ( 52 . 9 % )
19 18
Dominant Mode of Communication, 1941
17
16
0
0
Office
16
0
0
Official residence Official residence Home
15
0
10 (62 . 5 % ) 9 ( 56 . 3 % ) 1 2 ( 80 . 0% ) 1 0 (66 . 7 % )
15
34
8
15 15 14 13
0 7 II 0
0 0 10 0
13
0
0
Home
4 ( 30 . 8 % )
12
0
0
Official residence
9 ( 7 5 . 0% )
12 12
0 14
0 2
9 ( 75 . 0% ) 10 (83 . 3 % )
12
0
0
Office Official residence Official residence
5 (33 . 3 % ) Home 10 (66 . 7 % ) Social 5 (35 . 7 % ) Social Each ( Each Official residence 5 38 . 5 % ) or Home
6 ( 50 . 0 % )
254
KIDO
TABLE
AND
MATRIX
PALACE
P O LI T I C S
1 8-Continued Total Number of Meetings Position
Person Shimozono Sakichi
EMPRESS
OF
Newspaperman ; M akino Nobuaki's "confidant" Nagako Empress
Harada Kumao
BARON
Ogura Masatsune
Total
Ex-sec'y to the late Prince Saionji Minister of State ; Finance Minister
1941
1936 1932
11
4
11
6
10
73
10
0
1 35
2
--
--
--
1 ' 1 05
307
257
Dominant Mode of Communication, 1941 Mode
Number
Office
6 ( 54 . 5 % )
Official residence Official residence
9 (8 1 . 8 % )
Office
5 ( 50 . 0 % )
4 ( 40 . 0% )
The remarkable drop i n Kido's aristocratic associations i n 1 94 1 , both i n terms of persons and freq uency of association, was largely the result of his negotiator role as Privy Seal, an office that made him the emperor's chief link with the government . The leading government officials-as indeed the leadi ng court officers-during the 1 930s were not for the most part titled aristocrats but persons of achievement in the real polity who might eventually achieve titles for their contributions to the state and society .65 It was these government and court officers who were Kido's key associates in his role as adviser to the throne . This is clearly demonstrated by a situational categorization of the thirty-four persons Kido met ten times or more and the frequency with w hich Kido met persons i n each category . Three of the thirty four were members of the imperial family, i ncluding the emperor . 65 . This was the case, for example, with lchiki Kitokuro and Suzuki Kantaro, who wert• created barons after long careers in government and service at the side of the emperor in one ol t he four leadi ng palace offices.
KI
DO
AN
D
TABLE 1 9.
MATRIX
PALACE
255
P O LI T I C S
KIDO ' S ASSOCIATION WITH ELEVEN CLUB MEMBERS
Person Harada Kumao Okabe Nagakage Konoe Fumimaro Sakai Tadamasa Kuroki Sanji Oda Nobutsune Sasaki Yukitada Uramatsu Tomoaki Soma Taketani Matsudaira Y asumasa Hirohata Tadataka Arima Yoriyasu Y anagisawa Y asutsugu Total
OF
1932
1936
1941
Total Eleven Meetings Club
Total Eleven Meetings Club
Total Eleven Meetings Club
1 35 67 57 24 24 13 11 10 8 6 6 4 2
7 8 0 3 8 8 8 9 6 4 6 2 2
73 26 34 6 8 11 11 10 4 43 31 4 0
4 8 1 3 7 7 8 8 0 6 1 2 0
10 8 93 4 7 6 4 7
1 7 2 4 6 6 4 7
33 7 2 5
1 2 1 5
367
71
26 1
55
1 86
46
Nine were government officials of Cabi net rank (direct imperial ap pointee) ,66 and five were government officials below that rank . Court officers who were direct imperial appoi ntees numbered three, those below that rank, two. Five were in-laws or members of Kido's family who were irrelevant to Kido politically. Three were businessmen and three ideologists a nd/ or mass media representatives .67 Only one was l inked to Kido primarily as a member of t he Eleven Club i n 1 94 1 ; Harada Kumao held n o office that would explain his place i n Kido's associations that year other than his membership in Kido's ingroup. Pri nce Saionj i had died in late 1 940 and with his death had gone Harada's importance as a secretary in the political system. The 66. These nine i nclude General Abe Nobuyuki , who was a Senior Retainer and " officially" involved with Kido in t he selection of new Prime M inisters. Abe's eldest son was married to Kido's eldest daughter. 67 . One of the three, Watanabe Yoshio, was a newspaperma n who had become a consultant to the government's I nformation B ureau of the Cabinet Secretariat. He later became secretary to Kido's brot her-i n-law, M inister of State Kodama Hideo.
256
KIDO
A ND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
P O LI T I C S
number of Kido's meeti ngs with persons i n each category and the percentage of meeti ngs according to each category are as follows : Emperor and imperial family (3 persons) Government officials of Cabinet rank (9 persons) Government officials below Cabinet rank (5 persons) Court officials of direct imperial appoi ntee rank (3 persons) Court officials below direct imperial appointee rank (2 persons) I n-laws and family members (5 persons) B usinessmen (3 persons) Ideologists a nd mass media representatives (3 persons) Eleven Club members { I person) Total
336
(30.4%)
283
(25.6%)
90
(8 . 1 %)
1 59
( 1 4 .4%)
52 88 49
(4.7%) (8 .0%) (4.4%)
38 10 1 , 1 05
(3.4%) (0.9%) ( 1 00%)
The emperor and imperial family, government officials of Cabi net rank, and court officials of direct imperial appointee rank impressively domi nated Kido's associations in 1 94 1 , accounti ng for 70.4 percent of his associations with those he met ten times or more and 4 0 . 5 percent o f h i s total associations that year. M odes of communication between Kido and persons in these various situational categories also varied significantly . Table 1 8 i ndi cates that " office" was the domi nant mode of communication with one of the three imperial family members (the emperor) , with eight of t he ni ne government officials of Cabi net rank, with only one of the five government officials below Cabinet rank, with all three court of ficials of direct imperial appoi ntee rank, with one of the two court officials below that rank, a nd with only one of t he twelve persons in t he re ma i n i ng fo u r c a t e g or i e s . O ffi c e , t he refore , w a s the overwhelmingly domi nant mode of communication with the em peror, government officials of Cabinet rank, a nd court officials of direct i mperial appoi ntee rank-political persons with whom Privy Seal Kido would normally be expected to associate , frequently and officially , i n the performance of his political duties . Table 20 gives a detailed presentation of modes of communication according to situational categories . From these figures it is read i l y apparent t hat the higher the person's office in government o r court
257
KIDO AND MATRIX OF PALACE POLITICS
TABLE 20. KIDO KOICHI ' S MODES OF COMMUNICATION WITH THOSE HE MET TEN TIMES OR MORE IN 1 94 1 , BY SITUATIONAL CATEGORY Situatzonal Category
Mode of Communication
Emperor and Imperial Family
Government Officials ..>1 c:: til
�til �
�
...
...
«.> c::
�
�
�
u
(I) OFFICIAL
Office Official residence Official conference Imperial lecture Kido's reports Reports to Kido Imperial report Official subtotal
No. 273 33 0 I
0 0 308
% 81 . 3 9.8 0.3 0 0.3 0 0
(2)
No. 1 66 24 8 0 10 36 2
9 1 . 7 % 246
% 58 . 7 8.5 2.8 0 3 .5 12 . 7 0.7
«.> c::
ca 0
:s til u
!-< (4)
(3)
No. % 26 28 . 9 4 1 45 . 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2.2 0 0
86 . 9 % 69
No. 1 92 65 8 0 10 38 2
76 . 7 % 3 1 5
% 51 .5 17.4 2.I 0 2.7 10.2 0.5 84 . 5 %
INFORMAL
Home Informal meetings Meals Banquets Eleven Club Golf Tour Social and miscellaneous Informal subtotal Total
0 0 8 8 0 0 12 0
0 0 2 .4 2 .4 0 0 3 .6 0
15 3 2 0 0 2
28
8 . 3%
37
336 1 00%
14
4.9 0.4 5.3 1.1 0.7 0 0 0.7
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 . 1 % 21
283 1 00 %
23 . 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35
23 . 3 %
58
90 1 00%
I
15 3 2 0 0 2
9 .4 0.3 4.0 0.8 0.5 0 0 0.5 1 5 . 5 '/o
373 1 00%
258
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
P O LI T I C S
TABLE 20.-Continued Situational
Court Officials
-;;;
�
(7) OFFICIAL
Office Official residence Official conference Imperial lecture Kido's reports Reports to Kido Imperial report Official subtotal
No. 1 29 9 I 0 6 0 1 46
% 81 . 1 5.7 0.6 0 0.6 3 .8 0 91 . 8%
No. 18 8 0 0 0 7 0 33
% 34 . 6 15 .4 0 0 0 13 .5 0
No. 147 17 I 0
63 . 5 %
1 79
13 0
% 69 . 7 8. 1 0.5 0 0.5 6.2 0 84 . 8 %
IN FORMAL
Home Informal meetings Meals Banquets Eleven Club Golf Tour Social and miscellaneous Informal subtotal Total
3 I 4 I 0 0 3 13 1 59
1 .9 0.6 2 .5 0.6 0 0.6 0 I .9 8 . 2% 1 00 %
6 2 4
0 0 5 19 52
11 .5 3.8 7.7 1 .9 1 .9 0 0 9.6 36 . 5 % 1 00 %
9 3 8 2 I 0 8 32 21 1
4.3 1 .4 3 .8 0.9 0.5 0.5 0 3 .8 15 . 2% 1 00 %
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
259
POLITI C S
Category
Others
c::
I
j
�
( 1 2)
(9)
No. 2 15 0 0 0 0 0
% 2.3 17.0 0 0 0 0 0
No. 3 21 0 0 0 0 0
% 6.1 42 . 9 0 0 0 0 0
17
19 . 3%
24
49 . 0%
29 0 II 3 0
21 0 2
0 27
33 . 0 0 12.5 3 .4 0 1.1 0 30 . 7
42 . 9 0 4. 1 2 .0 0 2 .0 0 0
71
80 . 7 %
25
5 1 . 0%
88
1 00%
I
0 0 0
49
1 00%
No. 8 26 0 0 0 0 0
% 21 . 1 68 . 4 0 0 0 0 0
No. 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
% 0 50 . 0 0 0 0 0 0
No. 13 67 0 0 0 0 0
% 7.0 36 . 2 0 0 0 0 0
89 . 5 %
5
50 . 0%
80
43 . 2 %
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0
57 0 14 4
0 0 0
30 . 0 0 10.0 0 10.0 0 0 0
30 . 8 0 7.6 2 .2 0.5 1.1 0 14 . 6
4
10 . 5%
5
50 . 0%
34
38
1 00%
I
0 I
10
1 00%
I
2 0 27 1 05 1 85
56 . 8 % 1 00 %
260
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PA LA C E
P O L I TI C S
the more likely it was that his meetings with Kido would occur at an office . For example, 58.7 percent of Kido's meetings with Cabi net ranking government officials (col umn 2) took place at offices , almost invariably Kido's palace office. On the other ha nd , Kido's office meetings with government officials below Cabi net rank (col umn 3 ) accounted for only 2 8 . 9 percent o f his meetings with those officials. For persons in the second echelon of government and below , Kido was most accessible at his official residence ( 4 5 . 6 percent) and his home (23 . 3 percent) . The same applies to court official s : 8 1 . 1 percent of Kido's meeti ngs with court officials of direct imperial ap pointee rank (column 5 ) took place at offices ; only 3 4 . 6 percent of his meetings with the two court officials below that rank (col umn 6) occurred at offices . Kido's meetings at his official residence and home with these two (col umn 6) accounted for 1 5 . 4 percent and 1 1 . 5 percent respectively. Si nce both worked with Kido at the palace , their meeti ngs with him at palace offices were naturally higher in percentage than those of governme nt officials of comparable rank . In short , government officers of Cabi net rank had direct access to the throne . They could see Kido at his palace office with great ease . Those of lesser rank and without such access saw him when and as they could- normally before Kido went to his palace office or after he had returned . Second , Kido did very little socializing with either government or court officials. " Social and miscella neous" meeti ngs with government officials Kido met ten times or more (column 4) amounted to a mere 0 . 5 percent of their meetings ; with court officials (col umn 7 ) , only 3 . 8 percent . Kido had no golfing engagements with government of ficials and only one with court officials . Even home meeti ngs ac counted for but 9 . 4 percent of his meeti ngs with government officials (column 4) and only 4 . 3 percent of his meeti ngs with court officials (column 7). There was almost no correlation between Kido's official and i nformal associations as measured by modes of communication. By way of contrast , Kido's meeti ngs with persons in the remai nin!!: four categories (col umn 1 2 ) were more i nformal ( 5 6 . 8 percent) tha n official (43 .2 percent) . O nly 7 . 0 percent were office meetings , whi l e 1 4 . 6 percent were social and miscellaneous . Si nce official residence
KIDO
A ND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
P O LI T I C S
261
accounted for 3 6 . 2 percent and home for 3 0 . 8 percent of Kido's meeti ngs with these persons (column 1 2 ) , however, access to his of ficial residence and to his home was relatively open to all his associates-government and court officials, busi nessmen, ideologists, and mass media representatives . Even Kido's family members and i n-laws met Kido at his official residence 1 7 .0 percent of the times they met (column 8 ) . W h y did these associates , freq uencies o f association, and modes of communication prevail during 1 94 1 ? The politics of place and station i n prewar Japan made the palace the centripetal poi nt around which political leaders gathered to seek imperial sanction for their policies; the emperor was the final ratifier of all national policies . It was the Privy Seal's official duty to render " advice and assistance" i n regular attenda nce on the emperor as Emperor-in State, as ultimate ratifier of political decisions . If the Privy Seal were fulfilling his negotiator role in politics , therefore , the top government leaders would be i n constant communication with Kido and Kido would be i n constant communication with the emperor. Duri ng 1 94 1 Kido met with the emperor a total of 3 1 3 times ; 272 were audiences at palace offices or the emperor's villa (" office" ) , 1 4 were meetings at t he emperor's palace residence (" official residence " ) , 1 was an " official conference , " 8 were " meal s , " 8 " banquets , " and 1 0 were " tours " -accompa nying the emperor to and from a place , such as the i mperial villa at H ayama . 68 If H a rada Kumao was the cornerstone of secretary Kido's associations in 1 932 , the emperor was t he key person in negotiator Kido's pattern of association i n 1 94 1 . Fully 1 6 . 3 percent of Kido's total meeti ngs i n 1 94 1 were with the emperor . It is also evident that Kido's association with the em peror was overw hel mi ngly a n official rel at i o nship : 272 ( 8 6 . 9 percent) of Kido's 3 1 3 meeti ngs were audiences on matters of na68. The fourteen meetings tabulated as "official residence" were social cal ls on the em peror-New Year's G reetings, Birthday Felicitations, and I mperial Gifts. I have not tabulated Kido's presence at " imperial reports" or "imperial lectures" as meeti ngs between Kido and the emperor: both totaled twelve. Nor have formal banquets at the palace been counted w hen persons attending were not listed by Kido: there were at least nine such occasions. Kido also took part i n eighteen other untabulated palace ceremonies . Association with the emperor was if anything greater i n 1 94 1 than shown in table 1 8 .
2 62
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
P O LI TI C S
tiona! policy and personnel . The official description of the Privy Seal's office and Kido's pattern of association with the emperor were therefore in close agreement during 1 94 1 . Kido records more meticulously the time of each audience than the content or subject of his discussion with the emperor. Most of his audiences , w hich lasted from approximately ten mi nutes to one hour and fifteen mi nutes , were merely recorded as " audienced from such and such a time to such and such a time . " Occasionally the subject was noted . Those audiences noted in detail , however, illustrate the nature of the emperor's ratifier role and reveal the communication routes between the emperor and the government . Kido's audiences also reveal how important the Privy Seal was as the emperor's confi dant on all policy matters , military as well as civil-if the two ca n be disti nguished during 1 94 1 . I n audience between 2 : 45 and 3 : 1 5 on January 2 3 , for example, the emperor told Kido that he had delayed replying to both Chiefs of Staff until he had spoken with the Foreign M i nister about plans for Southeast Asia . Kido replied that he would speak with the Foreign Minister. The C hief Aide-de-Camp came to Kido's office to discuss the matter at 3 : 20 . At 5 : 00 Kido talked with Foreign M i nister Mat suoka , before Matsuoka audienced . Kido then audienced again from 6 : 30 to 6 : 40 . The emperor told Kido that both Chiefs of Staff would be summoned the following morni ng and ordered to reach agreement with the government before establishing what would amount to an ultimatum for Thailand . After Kido returned home he i nformed thr Chief Aide of the emperor's desires .69 The emperor, in consultation with the Privy Seal , had decided on a course of action that would unite government and mil itary , but without dictating the content of the policy concerned . On November 30 the emperor told Kido that , according to what Pri nce Takamatsu had reported to him that morning, the Navy ap peared to have its hands full and to want to avoid war with the· United States . When he asked Kido what he thought about the situa tion, Kido replied that the emperor must be fully convi nced before· assenting to such a momentous decision as war with the Unitc·cl 69.
Kido Koichi , 2 : !!5 1 .
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
P O LI T I C S
263
States . The emperor should summon the Navy Mi nister and the Chief of the Navy General Staff immediately , as well as speak with the Prime M i nister. After the Prime M inister audienced at 3 : 30 p . m . , the Navy Minister and the C hief of the Navy General Staff were duly summoned . At 6 : 3 5 p . m . Kido audienced once again : the emperor told him that both Navy leaders had appeared fully con fident in their replies to his questions . Kido was consequently ordered to tell the Prime M inister to proceed as planned , w hich he did immediately .7° Kido therefore advised the emperor on courses of action to bri ng unity to national policy . Rather than dictating a policy or program, however, both the emperor and his Privy Seal sought assurance that the appropriate government and military leaders were fully confident and united in their national policy . The emperor's role was to keep the consensus-making process honest. By q uestioni ng leaders in audience a nd by exerting pressure via his palace advisers he assured himself that any policy he ratified had been thoroughly discussed and represented a genui ne consensus among the policy makers . B ut he was kept from active and direct participation in the consensus-maki ng process by formalities and precedents governi ng his relations with government leaders , indi vidually and collectivel y . For example, it was not the practice for military and government leaders to appear before the emperor until policies had been carefully worked out and agreed to among them . Kido notes that a " new precedent" was set w hen the Chief of the Navy General Staff, the C hief of the Army General Staff, and Prime Minister Konoe audienced together on February 1 . Previously, Kido continues , important decisions of the Liaison Conference (the top government-military policy council at that time) were reported i n I mperi a l C onfere nce , a nd l e s s importa nt ones were reported separately by members of the government or the military .71 Prior to Prime M i nister Konoe's unusual February 1 audience , the only group presentation to the throne was the rather inflexible I mperial Conference , which made no provision for free exchanges of opi nion : an I mperial Conference was the final formality i n ratifying a top-level consensus on crucial national policies . On August 1 1 , for example, 7 0 . Ibid . , 7 1 . Ibid . ,
p. p.
928 . 8 53.
264
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
PO L I T I C S
the emperor i nformed Kido that " however formal previous I mperial Conferences had been," he desired to question the participants of the next Imperial Conference (September 6) until he was sufficiently satisfied that a united policy had been achieved . 72 Kido, however, would not allow the emperor such a participant role .73 The emperor could thus bring pressure to bear only in i ndividual audience and mediate between the military and government only via the Privy Seal and other palace leaders , such as the Chief Aide-de-Camp . Since the Privy Seal assisted the emperor i n this critical , if i n direct , unifying function, it is not surprisi ng that the emperor kept Kido informed on military policies and plans . Freq uently the emperor confided w hat had been told him in audience by the Chiefs of Staff as well as by the military M i nisters of State and exchanged views with Kido on military plans and activities . On January 1 8 , for example, the emperor told Kido i n detail what Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama had told him about the Army's plans to bri ng t he " C hi na I ncident " under control . Again, on January 20, the emperor talked about the military's " l ong-term guidel i ne for m i l itary operations agai nst China , " this time as reported by the Army Mi nister . The emperor's sentiments on military trends were also shared with Kido. On March 1 3 the emperor expressed to Kido his worries about the " sub jective tendencies of the Army . " When the empero5:- objected to the Prime M i nister's plans to set a n age limit on Supreme War Councillors he asked Kido about transmitti ng his obj ections to the Army Mi nister via the Chief Aide ; Kido approved .74 Although Kido advised the emperor on courses of action and received i nformation from the emperor with regard to military activities and plans , he was never the emperor's direct l i nk with the High Command . Privy Seal Kido had only five meeti ngs with the two Chiefs of Staff in 1 94 1 . Those five meetings took place at the palace and at the initiative of the C hiefs of Staff. The only significant contact between Kido and extra-palace military leaders was with the Army and Navy Mi nisters. Duri ng 1 94 1 Kido met the Army Minister twenty times, the Navy M i nister seven. Because the Army 7 2 . Ibid . , 7 3 . Ibid . , 7 4 . Ibid . ,
901 . 905 . pp. 849, 850, 862 , 9 1 9.
p. p.
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265
and Navy M i nisters were members of the Cabi net-and legally concerned with military admi nistration as opposed to military opera tions-t hey were i nvolved in the government as well as the military side of Japanese politics . Consequently, Kido had access to them and they to him by virtue of their offficial roles . The High Command audienced directly with the emperor, almost never stoppi ng to talk with the Privy Seal. When the Army or Navy M i nister audienced , however, he would frequently speak with Kido. With the exception of the Prime M inister and the Foreign M inister, Kido's contact with the Army and Navy M i nisters was as frequent as that with other Cabinet ministers , or more so. The emperor's direct liaison with the High Command was his Chief Aide-de-Camp , Hasunuma Shigeru . It was the Chief Aide's liaison on behalf of the emperor that brought him and Privy Seal Kido together. As one of the palace 's four leading officials, the Chief Aide performed for the military the same role that the Privy Seal performed for the government . Since the emperor capped the military and the government , both the C hief Aide and the Privy Seal were key offices in the i nstitutional arrangement for the fi nal recon ciliation and ratification of military-government demands. A nd si nce the emperor was not a free participant in the negotiati ng process , coordi nation fell largely to the Chief Aide and the Privy Seal . Only w hen Kido became Privy Seal , therefore , did he have signifi cant communication with the Chief Aide . As table 1 8 i ndicates , the Chief Aide was the third person most freq uently met by Kido during 1 94 1 and the most freq uently met court official . Kido met the Chief Aide eighty-two times that year. In 1 932 , however, Kido met with the C hief Aide but twice; i n 1 93 6 , only eight times . Privy Seal Kido's relation with the Chief Aide was first one of in formation sharing and second one of relay. The Chief Aide was Kido's most important military source of i nformation on Army policies and reports to the throne by the H igh Command . On January 2 5 , for example , the C hief Aide came to Kido's office to in form him of what the C hief of Staff had reported to the throne con cerni ng the I ndochina q uestion. On February 1 the C hief Aide once again came to Kido's office , this time to report in detail on the " out line of policy measures for I ndochina and Thailand" should Thai-
266
KIDO
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land accept Japanese intervention. The C hief Aide also passed on to Kido reports from other Aides-de-Camp as well as from military at taches stationed abroad . On June 1 1 Kido received via the C hief Aide a report on Russo-German relations prepared by a military at tache in the Soviet Union . The Chief Aide also functioned as a barometer of military opi nion and future plans. He came to Kido's office on J u ne 3 to tell him that it might soon be necessary to hold a Liaison Conference " i n order to clarify attitudes on the policy of pushing south. " 75 Through the C hief Aide, therefore , Kido was kept regularly i nformed on military plans, policies , and prospects. Si nce 89 percent of Kido's meetings with the Chief Aide took place at palace offices (table 1 8) , information sharing between them was perceived by both to be an official duty . Although Kido maintai ned a mutual consultation relationship with the C hief Aide, Kido was the main beneficiary of the i n formation shari ng aspect of their association. Almost i nvariably the C hief Aide came to Kido's office, i ndicating further that both perceived the Privy Seal to be entitled to military information af fecti ng national policies . Kido did discuss the emperor's thoughts on the military and on military policies , however. When the emperor told Kido in March about the "subjective tendencies of the Army" Kido prompt l y relayed this to t he C hief Aide . Agai n , after audiencing on March 4 Kido told the C hief Aide what the emperor thought of General Hata Shunroku's plans for the South Seas area.76 Kido does not state that he reported i nformation received from the C hief Aide to the emperor. Evidently, he used such i nformation as a basis for advisi ng the emperor on large national issues i nvolvi ng both the mil itary and the government . Finally, Kido was occasionally used by the emperor to transmit his wishes to the High Command via the Chief Aide. As already noted , Kido transmitted the emperor's wishes to the Chief Aide after Kido had audienced late on January 2 3 . The emperor also had the C hief Aide keep i n touch with the Privy Seal on mil itary reports. On J uly 30 the Chief Aide came to see Kido, on orders from the em peror, to talk about that evening's report by the Chief of the Navy 75. I bid . , 7 6 . I bid . ,
pp. pp.
852 , 8 53 , 881 , 878-79. 862 , 860.
KIDO
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2 67
General Staff.77 Given the information shari ng, mutual discussion, and liaison among the emperor, Privy Seal , and Chief Aide, the palace appears to have been a maj or bridge between top military and government leaders . The emperor was the keystone in the arch. O n either side o f him were the Privy Seal and Chief Aide, spans to the government and the military respectivel y . These two negotiatiors kept each other constantly i nformed of policies advocated and actions taken by leaders of the i nstitutions of imperial prerogative, most of whom had direct access to the throne : Cabinet members on one side and the High Command on the other. If Privy Seal Kido's relation to the military side of Japanese politics was primarily intra-palace and i ndirect , his relation to the civil side was also intra-palace but direct and considerably more i ntense . I ncluding the Army and Navy M i nisters , Kido met wit h Cabinet ministers 304 times . His associations with Cabinet ministers also surpassed his meetings with the other three palace officials of direct imperial appointee rank, 304 to 1 5 9 . From these statistics it is clear that the Privy Seal 's official duties on behalf of the emperor were primarily channeled toward the government . After the emperor, Kido was most frequently in communication with Prince Konoe Fumimaro. Prime M i nister until October 1 8 , Konoe met with Kido a total of ni nety-three times i n 1 94 1 . While Konoe was Prime M i nister he met with Kido eighty-four times ; after his resignation the two met only nine times . As Prime M i nister , Konoe saw Kido an average of 8 . 8 times a month; after he resigned , he saw him only 3 . 6 times a month duri ng the remai nder of 1 94 1 . As Army M i nister, Toj o Hideki met Kido twenty times from J anuary 1 to October 1 8 , or 1 . 9 times a month. After he be came Prime Mi nister, however, Toj o met Kido twenty-four times , or 9 . 6 times a month, duri ng the remainder of 1 94 1 . Kido thus met with the Prime M i nister 1 08 times duri ng 1 94 1 , making the Prime Minister the most • important political person, after the emperor, to Kido's role as Privy Seal . The domi nant mode of communication with both Konoe and Toj o throughout 1 94 1 , moreover, was office : 5 5 . 9 percent of Kido's meetings with Konoe a nd 86.4 percent of his 77. Ibid . , p. 895 .
2 68
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meeti ngs with Toj o were held i n offices (table 1 8) , almost always Kido's palace office . Association between the Privy Seal and the Prime M inister was therefore an official relation dependent on of fices held, not the persons as persons . The key palace adviser was constantly i n touch with the key government leader. The second most frequently contacted member of the government i n 1 94 1 was the Foreign M inister, seventy-eight meetings .78 Like Kido's mode of communication with the Prime M inister, his associa tion with t he Foreign M i nister was overwhelmi ngly official . Kido met the Foreign M i nister at the Privy Seal's office or at the palace fifty-three times ( 67 . 9 percent) and received seventeen (2 1 . 8 percent) reports from him. Kido reported only twice to the Foreign M inister, i ndicati ng t hat the Privy Seal was officially entitled to receive government i nformation. Duri ng 1 94 1 the Prime M i nister also reported more often to Kido than the reverse , sixteen reports to eight . The common practice for both the Pri me Mi nister and the Foreign M inister was to visit Kido at the palace before or after t heir audiences with the emperor. It was a rare occasion for Kido to visit a government officia l ; government official s , i nc l ud i ng t he Prime M inister, came to the Privy Seal-not the reverse . Kido's frequency of communication with the Foreign M i nister in dicates the emperor's-and palace leadership 's-abiding concern with problems of foreign policy , not unnatural in t he year that Japan began the greatest war i n her history . The following example illustrates both the emperor's concern and the Privy Seal 's role as the emperor's direct liaison with the government . On Saturday , June 2 1 , Kido had a lengthy dinner meeti ng with Prime M i nister Konoe and Home M inister Hiranuma about t he q uestion of " Cabi net responsibility" should war break out between the Soviet Union and Germany : Kido strongly urged Konoe not to resign because there was no issue of Cabi net responsibility i nvolved on this occasion.79 7 8 . There were three Foreign M inisters i n 1 94 1 : M atsuoka Yosuke (to July 1 8), Toyoda Teij iro (July 1 8-0ctober 1 8) , and Togo Shigenori (October 1 8 on). Kido met these t hree a total of eighty-seven times in 1 94 1 ; seventy-eight of these meeti ngs occurred with the t hree a s Foreign M i nisters . 7 9 . When the issue of "Cabi net responsibility" arose t he portent was omi nous-a Cabinrl resignation was impend i ng. In this i nstance a war between Germany a nd the USSR would bring up Japan's obligations under t he Tripartite Pact . Si nce Japan also had , as of April 1 1 , 1 94 1 , a neutrality pact with the USSR, Konoe felt he had t o take the responsibility for such a n impasse-that is, to resign (Kido Koichi, 2 : 883; Yanaga, p . 592 ) .
KIDO
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269
The followi ng day at 2 p.m. General Suzuki Teiichi , President of the Cabi net Planning B oard , telephoned Kido to i nform him that war had indeed broken out . Then, at shortly after 4 p . m . , Foreign M inister Matsuoka called Kido for an audience with the emperor to report on the outbreak of the Russo-German war. Kido had Cham berlain Tokugawa check with the emperor for a convenient time and Matsuoka ' s audie nce was arra nged for 5 : 3 0 p . m . Kido t he n requested an audience for himself, before Foreign Mi nister Mat suoka audienced , to report on his talk with Konoe and Hiranuma the previous evening.80 Kido gives the gist of his report to the emperor as follows: It appears that t he views o f t he Foreign M i nister are not entirely a t one with those of the Prime M i nister regardi ng the attitude and pol icy our country should take in t he event of war between Germany and the Soviet Union. A nd t he disposition our country makes on this issue will im portantly affect the course of the nation's destiny. Therefore , when the Foreign M i nister audiences today I would hope that you would in effect tel l him, regardless of what i nterpretations on this policy he might give you , that he should discuss the matter t horoughly with the Prime M i nister, given the extreme gravity of this event , aski ng him if he had completed his discussions with the Prime M i nister on this. I would ask that you indicate your i nner thoughts on t he primacy of the Prime M i nister, if you will forgive my presumption.81
Matsuoka then audienced , after which the emperor summoned Kido. The emperor was extremely anxious about Japan's strength and about the unity of the High Command and the government , given that Matsuoka 's policy would result in simultaneous military ad vances in both the south ( I ndochina) and the north (Soviet Union) . Kido therefore telephoned Konoe and Hiranuma . Having spoken with Hiranuma, Kido fi nally reached Konoe at 9 p . m . and told him about Matsuoka 's audience . At 1 2 : 30 a . m . Konoe called Kido back to report that he had spoken with Matsuoka and that what Mat suoka had said i n audience was not a plan for immediate action but a long-range estimate of alternatives . Kido later reported this to the emperor . The Chief Aide came to Kido's office shortly after Kido 80. Kido Koichi, 2 883-84 . 8 1 . Ibid . , p. 884.
270
KIDO
AND
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OF
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POLIT I C S
had audienced to talk about the outbreak of the Russo-German war and its implications .82 Matsuoka's differences with the Prime M inister over foreign policy cost him the Foreign M inister's portfolio and nearly brought dow n the Cabi net in July. In June he disagreed with the Prime Minister on Japan's obligations to assist Germany; in J uly he argued a get-tough policy toward the United States , a stance at great variance with the Prime Minister's emphasis on negotiation.83 The above example does , however, illustrate the Privy Seal 's advisory function, both to the throne and to the Prime Mi nister. I n t h is instance , Privy Seal Kido advised the emperor to uphold the Prime Minister's position as primus inter pares i n the Cabi net . Whereas Kido records no i ntervention on behalf of or agai nst the High Com mand , he felt perfectly free to act as the Prime M i nister's spokesman to stifle disunity within the government. The Privy Seal also advised the Prime M i nister on the problem of Cabi net responsibility-the issue or issues involvi ng resignation-as well as general policies . Alt hough the Prime Mi nister had direct ac cess to the throne , he consulted the Privy Seal before reporting such drastic action as a Cabi net resignation. In the above i nstance Kido claimed cred it for forestalling a Cabinet resignation on the outbreak of the Russo-German war. As Privy Seal Kido's close friend si nce childhood , Prime M i nister Konoe quite possibly relied on Kido as a consulta nt more readily than he would have another Privy Seal . For whatever reason, Konoe frequently unburdened himself to Kido. After Konoe had audienced on October 9 , for example, he talked at length with Kido about the prospects for a n agreement with the United States . Kido spelled out in great detail why the September 6 I mperial Conference decision setting a n October deadline on negotia tions with the United States could and should be reexami ned .84 Kido's freq uency of communication with Konoe's successor as Prime Minister, General Toj o Hideki , however, i ndicates that such a consultative relationship was built into the office of Privy Seal. The Privy Seal was one of the key consultants for the Prime Mi nister, as 82 . Ibid. 83. Ibid . , 84. Ibid . ,
890-92 . 912.
pp. p.
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
P O LI T I C S
27 1
well as a key adviser to the emperor, j udgi ng from frequency of com munication and official behavior. W hereas Kido did not report a si ngle i nstance of his relaying im perial summons to members of the High Command in 1 94 1 , he did perform such a liaison function with government leaders . For example, on January 22 Kido telephoned Foreign Minister Matsu oka and told him to report to the emperor immediately should it be decided to place a time limit for I ndochina to respond to Japan's demands . On February 2 8 Kido called Matsuoka after the emperor had q uest i o ned h i m on foreign policy toward Tha i l a nd and I ndochi na . Kido also relayed between emperor and Prime M i nister . On April 2 1 and June 4 Kido relayed i nformation from the Prime Minister to the emperor. After the emperor had checked with the Navy Mi nister and the Chief of the Navy General Staff on November 30 he ordered Kido to tell the Prime M i nister to proceed according to plan.85 Kido's direct relations with members of the government allowed him to give the throne authoritative advice on matters i nitiated and developed by the government . On February 1 8 , as well as t he June 22 i nstance cited above, the Privy Seal cautioned the emperor on a substantive policy issue. When Kido audienced on February 1 8 he suggested that the emperor have the government examine carefully the impact Foreign M i nister Matsuoka's trip to Europe would have on Japan's relations with England and the United States .86 The Privy Seal and the emperor were deeply involved in evaluati ng policy trends and alternatives to war. On November 1 9 Kido spelled out the possible alternatives to war and agreed with the emperor that the Senior Retainers should be consulted if a decision for war ap peared likely .87 As i n the case of military reports to the throne, the emperor kept his Privy Seal informed and consulted with him about the reports of ranking government officials . On February 5 , for example, the em peror discussed Ambassador Honda's report to the throne .88 It 85. 86. 87 . 88. 1 942 .
Ibid . , Ibid . , Ibid . , Ibid . ,
pp. 85 1 , 858, 870, 879, 928 . p . 857 . pp. 923-24 . p. 854. Honda Kumataro was ambassador to t he Republic of China from 1 940 to
272
KIDO
AND
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OF
P A LA C E
P O LI T I C S
should be noted that Kido was almost never present at the audiences of either High Command or government personnel . Kido attended only seven reports to the throne : six by ambassadors and the Foreign Minister and one by the Prime M inister. Kido did not nor was he apparently entitled to attend reports to the throne by the military ; he was seldom present when government officials reported . Kido operated between the emperor a nd the government and the military , directly or i ndirectly, on an almost exclusively verbal basis-a nd quite frequently on hearsay . Very few documents passed through Kido's hands. The verbal tra nsactions among emperor , Prime M i nister, C hief Aide, and others were recorded privately i n Kido's diary and possibly in diaries kept b y other members o f the network . The only formal written record Kido mentions is that of the Senior Retainers' conference on October 1 7 , w hen Kido's recom mendation that Toj o succeed Konoe as Prime M i nister was agreed to.89 If such verbal transactions all owed flexibility , they also permit ted each i ndividual in the communication network to i nterpret mo mentous policy issues as he saw fit , with no appeal to the written record . Such a practice could , and did , give rise to many " misunder standings" among government and military leaders , as we have seen i n previous episodes i nvolvi ng palace l eaders (see above , p p . 1 45-50, 1 5 4-5 5 ) . From Kido's pattern o f associations a s Privy Seal in 1 94 1 i t i s abundantly clear that the palace was extremely important a s a ne gotiati ng i nstitution in the formation of prewar national policies . Privy Seal Kido was the emperor's direct adviser on government af fairs and indirect adviser on military affairs, as the emperor at tempted to bridge the gap between government and military de mands, to assure some semblance of unity in government and military policies . Palace activity in this respect was i ntense , with Kido in al most daily contact with the emperor Saturdays and Sun days as well as weekdays , and regardless of the hour of day-espe cially during such crises as the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, Konoe's resignation, and t he decision for war agai nst the United States . 89. Ibid . , p. 9 1 9.
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITICS
273
Given the high degree of palace activity i n politics , it is not surprisi ng that leading palace officials were in freq uent contact with Kido. The key court officer for Privy Seal Kido, as we have seen, was the Chief Aide-de-Camp . As discussed i n detail above, the only sustained " official " way for Kido to communicate with the High Command and to obtain information about the "trends of the times" within the military components of imperial prerogative was in directly via the C hief Aide. I ncluding the Chief Aide, five of the thirty-four persons Kido met ten times or more i n 1 94 1 were high court officials . These five accounted for 1 9 . 1 percent of Kido's meeti ngs with those in the ten or more frequency group . Although neither the Grand Chamberlain nor the H ousehold M i nister was deeply i nvolved in the negotiation process , t hey met Kido thirty-two and forty-five times respectively during 1 94 1 . B oth were kept in formed and were consulted by Kido on general policy trends . The fact t hat Privy Seal Kido had frequent meeti ngs with the Grand Chamberlai n , in marked contrast to 1 932 and 1 93 6 , suggests that the Grand C hamberlain was of some significance in palace politics . On February 2 8 , for example , Kido visited the Grand C hamberlai n's office to speak with him about the emperor's " mental state" and other matters . On October 4 the Grand C hamberlain came to Kido's office to talk about Japan's relations with the United States . Occa sionally Kido discussed political matters with the Imperial Household Minister as wel l . On November 4, for example, the Household Minister came to Kido's office to discuss prospects for the success of Japan's policy toward the United States . 90 The last two court officers Kido met ten times or more duri ng 1 94 1 were his Chief Secretary , M atsudaira Y asumasa , and one of the two Deputy Grand C hamberlains, Kanroj i Osanaga . The fre quency and mode of communication between Privy Seal Kido and his Chief Secretary require no elaboration, given our discussion of Kido's role as C hief Secretary in 1 932 and 1 93 6 . Kanroj i , a life-long member of the I mperial Household's inner side , apparently took it upon himself to keep i n touch with the Privy Seal . Si nce the Grand Chamberlain had been a career Navy officer it is q uite possible that 90. Ibid . ,
pp.
859, 9 1 1 , 92 1 .
274
KIDO
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Kanroj i felt himself best qualified to look after matters affecti ng the Emperor-in-C hambers . Kido's associations with his palace colleagues suggest that all four of the top palace officers were mutually responsible for coordinati ng the imperial i nstitution's role in the prewar J apanese polity. The Privy Seal was t he emperor's chief negotiator with the government , the Chief Aide his chief negotiator with the military-particularly the military's operational command . Although t he Privy Seal was the more important of the two, given his duty of advising the throne on Cabi net formations , both he and the C hief Aide advised the em peror on how best to coordi nate state policies . The frequency of com munication between the two, the nature of that communication, the frequency and nature of Kido's association with Cabinet mi nisters , and Kido's behavior toward the emperor support the conclusion that the palace was in fact fulfilling its central role in the process of top level policy negotiation and imperial ratification in prewar Japanese politics . The prominence of the C hief Aide in Kido's 1 94 1 network of association also suggests that the Privy Seal a nd the Chief Aide were the key palace officers for managing t he Emperor-i n-State . The Household M inister and the Grand C hamberlain, on the other hand , were the two key palace officers for managi ng the Emperor-in Court . M ost of Privy Seal Kido's meeti ngs with the Household M i nister a nd G r a nd C hamberl a i n were concerned w i t h court administration, imperial family matters , palace personnel , imperial outings , banquets, and arrangements for audiences . The two palace officers responsible for the Emperor-in-Court coordi nated their ac tions with the two palace officers primarily responsible for the Em peror-i n-State. Given the ambiguous disti nction between the Em peror-i n-Court a nd the Emperor-i n-State that emerged in actual practice and the role flexibility of palace offices , all four palace leaders were i nvolved , in varying degrees of i ntensity, with the central process of political negotiation that led to imperial ratifi cation.
KIDO
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275
KIDO K O I C H I AS AN "OFFICIAL" IN PREWA R JAPANESE POLITICS
Kido's behavior i n three different offices within one i nstitution of im perial p r e r og a t i v e , t he I m peri a l H o u s e h o l d M i n i s t r y , h a s demonstrated t hree situational roles withi n the prewar Japanese political system. Because all three roles were the result of Kido's of fices within a bureaucratic structure , they may be subsumed under the " Officia l " category of political personal ity devel oped by Maruyama Masao. Maruyama describes three types of political per sonality that " serve to formulate not only the fascist period but the entire political world of I mperial J apan" : " the Portable Shrine, the Official , and the Outlaw (or ro nin) . " 91 The Shri ne represents authority; the Official , power; the Outlaw , vio lence . From the point of view of their position in the national hierarchy and of their legal power, the Shri ne ranks highest and the Outlaw lowest . The system, however, is so constituted t hat movement starts from the Outlaw and gradually works upwards. The Shrine is often a mere robot who affects other people by 'doi ng nothing' (wu wei) . The force that ' holds aloft' the Shri ne a nd t hat wields the real power is the Official (civilian or military) . His rule over the powerless people is based on t he legitimacy that descends from the Shrine. He in his turn is bei ng prodded from behi nd by the Outlaw .92
These three personality types are to be found not only in the nation at large but also within the specific organizations that constitute the national polity : If we examine t he i nternal structure of t he established political parties , for example, we find t hat t he president of t he party is the Shrine, the chairman and the secretary-general hold actual power as Officials , and the pressure groups contain t he Outlaws . In the total political structure 9 1 . M a ruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour, pp. 1 30, 1 28 . 92 . Ibid . , p p . 1 28-2 9 .
276
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members of the rightist orga nizations occupy the position of Outlaws; but within each organization we again fi nd the tripartite hierarchy , 93 .
.
.
Each of Maruyama's three personality types is based on the behavior of politically active persons within the national polity and politically relevant organizations . Excluded are the " powerless people" at the base of society who did w hat they were told by the political system but were otherwise politically i nert . I n table 2 1 I have attempted to summarize t he positions , per sonalities a nd kinds of i nfl uence that pertain to each of Maruyama's political types . Ultimately , the Official was the most powerful be cause he was in a legal position to manipulate t he Shrine in the na t i onal pol i t y , his spec i fic political orga nizat i o n , or bot h . The Outlaw , the political activist at the base of society or any given political organization w ho is " content if he can storm about ir responsibly at the bottom of the hierarchy , uttering great yells of de light and dumbfoundi ng the rest of the community , " 94 could only in fl uence political outcomes by pressuri ng the Official , the sole political type able to manipulate the Shri ne and thereby produce au thoritative decisions . TABLE 2 1 .
MARUYAMA ' S TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL PERSONALITY
sOURCE :
Bottom
Top
Activist member
Officer
President
Abnormal Pressure
Normal Power
Normal Authority
VIOLENT
Position (National Polity) Position (Organization} Personality Nature of Influence
CIRCUMSPECT
Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour, pp. 84- 1 34.
93 . I bid . , p . 1 30. 94 . Ibid . , p. 1 29 .
in word and deed ; sanetions whatever is submitted by Officials
in word and deed ; evades responsibility, submits to actions taken by others as faits accomplis Middle or upper
in word and deed ; sensationalist, adventurist, and irresponsible
Behavior
Shrine
Official
Outlaw
ROBOT
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PA LA C E
P O LI T I C S
277
Maruyama 's typology is widely used to explain the alleged derangement in J apa nese government during the decade prior to Pearl Harbor. There are, however, serious logical and empirical dif ficulties with his typology-difficulties characteristic of the macro societal analyses offered by many Japanese scholars to explai n political behavior in this period . Maruyama's typology, moreover, is so highly generalized that it obscures the political roles and behavior that made the Japa nese government effective . By examini ng the political behavior of Kido Koichi , his associates , and other political actors i n relation to Maruyama 's typology we may perhaps show what those roles and patterns of behavior were . The first problem is to correlate position (office , rank, status) and personal ity-the age-old problem of the degree to which the office determi nes the man or vice versa . Maruyama argues strongly for a positional explanation of behavior. A political actor could not be at the base of society and be a Shri ne or Official in the national polity , nor could he be an Outlaw at the top of the national polity . Simi larly, a lowly member of a political orga nization could not be a Shrine or Official within that organization, nor could its president be an Outlaw in the orga nization. Not only does position correlate with behavior, but a person will and must change his behavior when he changes position. "If an Outlaw gets ahead in the world, he may develop into a petty bureaucrat and become more ' moderate' ; if he advances still further, he may even in the end fi nd himself bei ng car ried on people's shoulders as a Shrine . . . : unless the Outlaw can transform himself so that he becomes like an Official or a Shrine, he has no hope of attai ning high rank . " 95 H owever, The same man may behave as an Outlaw to those above him, but regard those below with the eyes of an Official . Another man may be held al oft as a Shrine by the l ower elements, while he serves those above as a loyal , circumspect Official . 96
If this is the case , position does not explain behavior or typologize political personality in any meani ngful sense . One Official might 95 . Ibid. 96. Ibid.
278
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manipulate his superior as a Shrine, another Official of exactly the same rank and position might serve "those above as a loyal , cir cumspect Official , " while yet anot her Official of the same ra nk and position " may behave as an Outlaw to those above him . " Under such circumstances , three exactly equal positions produced three dif ferent types of behavior toward the same persons . These same three Officials might also be Officials or Shri nes toward the same persons below them . It might appear that Maruyama 's typol ogy at least rules out Outlaw behavior by a superior toward an inferior or Shri ne behavior by an inferior toward a superior. But he also argues that "these three types do not , of course , represent fixed categories . Frequently two or three of them will be blended i n a si ngle i ndi vidual . " 97 If this is so the behavior and personality of a political actor cannot be explai ned or typed by reference to any position he might hold. The difficulties i n Maruyama 's positional explanation of political behavior are further illustrated by the following hypothetical case , which a pproximates the situation and behavior of the young officer insurgents involved in the February 26 I ncident of 1 93 6 . Army Lieutenant A was an Official toward his troops and a circumspect Official toward his superior, Maj or B . He was a dedicated young of ficer who had no deali ngs with Outlaw societies or any other political organizations outside the Army ; he obeyed orders to the let ter and without q uestion. Army Lieutenant C, of the same ra nk and position , was an Outlaw toward his superior, the same Maj or B . Like Lieutenant A , Lieutenant C was an Official toward his men . Unlike Lieutenant A, however, Lieutenant C w a s an Official i n Outlaw society Y and an Outlaw i n Outlaw society Z . The behavior of Lieutenant A was consistently Official to bot h i nferiors and supe riors ; the behavior of Lieutena nt C was a blend of types but , given his constant i nvolvement i n rightist activities a nd assassi nation plots , al most completely Outlaw i n t he national polity . Yet bot h L ieutenant A a nd L ieutenant C were of precisely the same " position" i n the national hierarchy of Officials . Suppose , then, that Maj or B ordered Lieutena nt A to station troops around the Pri m(' 97 . Ibid . , my emphasis.
KIDO
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279
M inister's residence and to distribute rightist propaganda pro claiming the " restoration of the emperor to di rect imperial rule. " Maj or B , an Outlaw Official in collusion with (or "prodded from behind " by ?) Outlaw Official Lieutenant C, then planned to have Lieutenant C and other collabt>rators assassi nate the Prime M inister and other " evil advisers close to the throne . " Lieutenant A dutifully stationed his troops and passed around handbills. Lieutenant C and his friends "dutifully" assassi nated the Prime M inister. Lieutenant A's behavior became Outlaw because he was an obedient Official : he was an Outlaw in spite of himself. M ore important is the fact that Maj or B and Lieutenant C were effective Outlaws precisely because they were Officials. They had of ficers and men to command as well as weapons available for use i n carrying out their Outlaw projects . An official could not only b e an Outlaw in the national polity but also be , in fact , a " better" Outlaw because he was an Official . This was evidently true of some Officials much higher than our hypothetical Maj or B and Lieutenants A and C . Maruyama points out , for example, that as the secretary-general of the Seiyukai, M ori Kaku's " role in the party was that of supreme Official ; but as fa r as political fu nct i o n a nd behaviour were concerned he was closer to an Outlaw . " 98 Having been secretary general of one of Japan's greatest political parties from 1 92 9 to 1 93 1 , Mori then served as Chief Cabi net Secretary from 1 93 1 to 1 93 2 , certainly a high Official position in Maruyama 's national hierarchy . It is reasonable to surmise that only his deat h i n 1 932 prevented Mori from becoming a higher Official-and quite possibly even more of an Outlaw . It is therefore conceivable that when a n Outlaw got ahead in the world and attai ned i ncreasi ngly higher Official positions he became more Outlaw , not " more ' moderate . ' " Matsuoka Yosuke , Foreign Minister from July 1 940 to July 1 94 1 , is a reveali ng example . Maruyama notes that Matsuoka was one of the " borderli ne cases" among "some of the genuine psychopat hs" who appeared in the Tokyo war crimes trials after World War I J .99 Although Matsuoka 98. Ibid . , p . 1 30. 99. Ibid . , p. 9 1 . At the war's end Matsuoka became completely demented and died before his trial was completed .
280
KIDO
A ND
MATRIX
OF
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P O L I TI C S
served briefly in the lower house of the Imperial Diet , he was a career d i p l omat who had recei ved his secondary a nd college education in the United States . In career and position he should have epitomized the Official ideal . On the contrary , however, Matsuoka epitomized Outlaw mental ity and behavior. Matsuoka 's rashness , profuse and contradictory pronouncements, and irresponsible policy proposals left his Official colleagues astonished , even those in the military . At a Liaison Conference meeting i n May 1 94 1 , for example , M atsuoka spoke of the possibil ities of going to war with Germany , Great B ritain, the United States , and the Soviet Union at the same time or one after the other-and of the necessity i n this regard to " make up our minds now " on Japan's pol icy i n Southeast Asia . "With a bluntness unusual in J apan even in jest , Navy M i nister Oikawa turned to his colleagues and observed , 'The foreign minister is crazy , isn't he ?' " 1 00 Matsuoka's Outlaw personality found its fullest expression when he reached one of the highest posi tions in the national hierarchy , that of Foreign M i nister. The cases of both M ori and M atsuoka suggest that rather than progressing in timidity and circumspection as they rose in Official positions , Outlaws gai ned increasing opportu nity to give vent to their Outlaw personalities and to have greater Outlaw impact on political outcomes . M ori and Matsuoka did not evolve from Outlaws to petty Officials and then Shri nes in the national polity , but from Outlaws to bigger Outlaws as they ascended the ladders of Official success . In the case of Mastuoka it is even conceivable that he evolved from a discreet lower ranking Official in the Foreign M i nistry i nto an Outlaw Foreign M i nister . A second difficulty w i t h Maruyama 's typol ogy i s the relation between positions in one or more concrete political organizations and national polity position. I have attempted to diagram Maruyama's national polity and three of its component orga nizations in figure 2 . The national polity was a hierarchy of political types , with Shrines at the top and Outlaws at the bottom . B ut the national polity was 1 00 . Butow , Tojo, p . 208. We have seen that M atsuoka's willful recklessness i n 1 94 1 was of constant concern not only to the Prime M i nister but also to Privy Seal Kido and the emperor . B utow's study of Toj o is punctuated with examples of M atsuoka's Outlaw behavior in high Official places, i ncluding his whirlwind replacement of " weak-kneed" Foreign Mi nistry dip lomats.
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
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281
POLITI CS
National Polity Shrine
National Polity Official
Outlaw 3
National Polity Outlaw Outlaw I
The People FIGU R E
2.
O U T LA W S I N
P O S I T I O N A L A R R A NG E M E N T O F S H R I N E S , O F F I C I A L S , A N D ' M A R U Y A M A S T Y P O LO G Y
also made up of concrete orga nizational hierarchies-rightist societies, political parties , the bureaucratic components of i mperial prerogative. W hat , then, is the relation between one's intraorganiza tional position and his national polity position? Maruyama is clear that all members of a rightist society were Outlaws in the national polity , regardless of w hether they were S hri nes or Officials withi n the society . As figure 2 illustrates , a rightist society might be de picted as a pyramid composed of Shrine 1 , Official 1 , and Outlaw 1 in the Outlaw category of t he national polity. It was not the position or behavior of an i ndividual withi n the society that positioned him in the national polity , but the behavior of his organization. O n the other hand , a bureaucratic component of imperial prerog ative might be depicted as a pyramid in the national polity composed of Shri ne 2 , Official 2 , and Outlaw 2 . Although Maruyama does not
282
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITI C S
pos1t10n bureaucracies in the national polity , all members of a government bureaucracy must necessarily fall in the Official category if legal-hierarchical " power" in the national polity has any meaning . B ut because a given Official might b e more Outlaw than Official i n his national polity behavior, regardless of his bureaucratic position, there is once again no meaningful correlation between intraorganiza tional position and national polity position. An Official might be a S hrine, Official , or Outlaw in his bureaucratic organization and a n Outlaw , Official, o r even Shrine i n his national polity behavior . I n contrast to Outlaw organizations , moreover, it w a s not the behavior of the organization that typed or explai ned the behavior of persons belonging to an Official organization but the behavior of those persons despite the position of their organization in the national polity and regardless of their intraorganizational positions . The Army's behavior in C hina; the rationalization of that behavior by many senior officers ; the Outlaw activities of radical young officers in the assassi nations and assassi nation plots that culmi nated in the February 26 I ncident ; and the rationalization of some or most of such activities by certain senior officers , as in the case of Colonel I mamura's defense of the October plotters (see chapter 3 ) , all suggest , that the behavior of Army officers at certain times and in certain situations made that Official organization i n national polity position an Outlaw organization in national polity behavior. The problems posed by an Official organiz ation are somewhat similar to those that apply to the " established " political parties . Maruyama does not position political parties i n the national polity , although he asserts that any given political party was composed of his tripartite hierarchy . B ecause its l eaders were frequently government officials , a political party could not be placed exclusively at the bottom of Japanese society and therefore was not completel y Outlaw i n posit i o n . Neither was it a formal i nstitution o f government and therefore completely Official in position . Depending on the behavior of its members at any given time, a political part y might be positioned in various places in the national politica l hierarchy . A political party might be more Outlaw in behavior when out of power, more Official or even Shrine when in power. For example, members of a party out of power did on occasion engage in
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
POLITI C S
283
violence , i nflammatory propaganda and irresponsible attacks agai nst Cabinets formed by a nother political party , by bureaucrats , or by a combination of bot h . The pyramid in figure 2 composed of Shrine 3 , Official 3 , and Outlaw 3 i s a n attempt t o position a party of mixed behavior: one that was out of power, w hose president had at least once been a high Official in the government , some of whose officers had at one time served as government Officials , and whose "pressure group" members were Outlaws both within the party and within the national polity. B ut once agai n, the organizational positions of party members within the party do not correlate with national polity posi tions i n any consistent manner. And the behavior of party members in the national polity varied sometimes with the political situation of the party as an organization, sometimes with the " personality" com position of the party regardless of the party's political situation. Organizational membership poses further problems for national polity position and behavior . A political actor in prewar Japan was not generally a member of only one political organization but held multiple memberships and positions . Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro provides an example. A career official in the J ustice Ministry , he be came a Privy Councillor in 1 924 after havi ng served as M i nister of Justice . In 1 924 he organized the National Foundation Society (Kokuhon Sha) of w hich he became president . "Although by and large the society was a stronghold of traditional conservatism , it also had an extremist element . " 1 0 1 Hiranuma was also an " adviser" to the National Founding Association (Kenkoku Kai) , a rightist society organized in 1 926 by one of the more violent Outlaw types , Akao Bin. Here we have a very high government Official who was logi cally prodding himself from behind in the national polity as the Shri ne (or Official) of Outlaw political organizations . The behavioral relation between orga nizational offices and na tional polity types becomes enormously entangled when a given political actor holds different offices or memberships in three or more political organizations . For example, take the not implausible case of a ( 1 ) party secretary-general who was an i nexperienced bureaucrat but served as (2) Home M inister in a Cabi net of which his party 1 0 1 . M aruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour, p. 3 1 6 .
284
K I DO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITI CS
president was Prime Mi nister. He was also (3) honorary chairma n of a rightist society as well as ( 4 ) director of a busi ness firm . As party secretary-general and Home Mi nister he was an Official with at least two potential Shri nes to manipulate: t he Prime M inister party president and the emperor. As an inexperienced Home Minister, however, he was most likely a Shrine to the Officials who ran the ministry . As the honorary chairman of a rightist society he was organizationally a Shrine but nationally an Outlaw . As the di rector of a busi ness he was an Official within the company but as a "pressure group " member of his political party he was an Outlaw within the party, and possibly the national polity. Not only did he serve as two types i n the national polity simulta neously ; he was also two types , Outlaw and Official , simultaneously within the party and toward the same persons-i ncluding himself. A third difficulty i nvolves relations among the three political types : i nitiative, l i nes of i nfl ue nce , manipulation. Accepting Professor Maruyama's description of type behavior for the moment , let u s fi rst examine the i nternal cohesion of each type a s a class of political actors . All members of rightist societies, for example, were Outlaws . Maruyama points out , however, that . . . , a united front never emerged from the right-wing movement in spite of fairly advantageous conditions . Unity was constantly i ntoned , but as soon as t hey had j oi ned together, they split apart and exchanged abuse . Since they were associations centered on a paternal boss, t hey could only be small-scale; each struggled to elevate its own deity. 102
The Outlaw class of political types was therefore i nternally frag mented . Fragmentation was even more characteristic of Officials. As we saw in chapter 4, competition to declare the I mperial Will among Officials in the plural ized institutions of imperial prerogative was intense by 1 930. Professor Maruyama notes that one result of the political structure created under the Meij i Constitution was that "modern Japan was . . . burdened with its ' origi nal sin' : the plu ralism of political power. " There were " confrontations within the 1 02 . Ibid . ,
p.
79.
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITIC S
285
military bureaucracy " and "the horizontal splits among Japan's wartime leaders " "were for ever being atomized . " 10 3 Thus we fi nd a series of confrontations on progressively lower levels: among the leaders , civil ian versus military officials ; among the military , Army versus Navy ; within the Army, W a r M i nistry versus General Staff; within t he War M inistry , Military Affairs B ureau versus Military Service B ureau ; and so fort h. I n the same category is the notorious h o s t i l i t y bet w e e n offi c i a l s in t he C a b i net P l a n n i ng B oa rd , t he Manchoukuo Government, a nd the H ome M i nistry . 104
The competition among Officials and among Outlaws suggests the possibility that one set of Outlaws might have been used by one or more sets of Officials to pressure another set or sets of Officials, that the relation between Outlaws and Officials was not pressure by the former as a group on the latter as a group but manipulation-overt or covert , explicit or tacit-of certai n Outlaws by certain Officials agai nst other Officials . Maruyama argues that "suppressing fascism from below , . . . fas cism from above made rapid progress . " Seventeen leaders of the 1 93 6 coup attempt were executed : " The fate of Kita, Nishida , and the young officers of the February I ncident is j ustly expressed i n the Chinese proverb , 'when the cunning hares have been killed , the hunting dogs go into the cooking pot . ' " 1 05 Who were the cunning hares ? Surely, the " moderate" Officials currently or formerly i n the bureaucratic institutions of imperial prerogative who were the targets of the February I ncident : Prime M i nister Okada Keisuke , Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantaro, Privy Seal Saito Makoto, former Prime . M i nister Takahashi Korekiyo, former Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki . Who were the hunting dogs ? The Outlaws who led the coup attempt or were related to it by behavior and ideological persuasion . B ut most important , w ho put the hunting dogs i nto the cooking pot ? And who brought on fascism from above ? The only real possibility is a set or sets of Officials-a group or groups of the " new bureaucrats" and mil itary renovationists-who demanded the right 1 03 . I bid . , pp. 1 27 , 1 23-24. 1 04 . Ibid . , p . 1 24 . 1 0 5 . lbid . , p . 67 .
286
K I DO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITICS
to declare the I mperial Will i n politics and to restore " national unity" in the place of pluralist warfare among the institutions of imperial prerogative . General Mazaki J i nzaburo's behavior a t the time o f the February 26 I ncident in 1 93 6 suggests such collusion among Outlaws and Of ficials agai nst other Officials-or at least an attempt to capitalize on extremist Outlaw action i n order to control the government . A leader of the Army's I mperial Way Faction, General Mazaki had been forced to resign as I nspector General of Military Education i n 1 93 5 b y Control Faction officers of the Army . The February 2 6 insurgents were proponents of the Imperial Way Faction who looked to Mazaki and other generals of that faction for leadership . Mazaki was i n ful l dress uniform a t 8 a . m . on February 2 6 , only a few hours after the coup had broken out . Decked out i n his formal fi nery , he met the i nsurgent officers at the Army M i nistry and was greeted like a " vic torious general come back from the war. " He then went to see Prince-of-t he-Blood Fushimi, Chief of the Navy General Staff, and told him that there was no other recourse but to look to an imperial rescript for a " Showa Restoration" and to anticipate its bei ng car ried out by the formation of a " strong Cabi net . " After his talk with Fushimi , he went to the palace , still in formal u niform; it is not un likely that he expected to be called upon to form such a Cabi net then and there . I nvestigation by the military police (kempeitai) revealed that he had been deeply i nvolved with the young officers who plotted and executed the coup attempt . 106 Mazaki was not appoi nted Prime M i nister but placed in the Reserves , and the I mperial Way Faction lost much of its previous power in both the Army and the government . The Officials who manipulated or hoped to use Outlaw pressures lost . The most severe losses were suffered by the "moderate" Officials-the targets of the coup : their power was severely curtailed from 1 93 6 until 1 945 . The winners were the Army's Control Faction Officials and their colleagues i n the Navy and the civil bureaucracy : they capital ized on 1 06 . Nezu M asashi, pp. 1 56-5 7 . " S hiiwa Restoration" (Showa /shin) was a term in vogut· among rightists during the 1 930s . In direct imitation of " Meij i Restoration," it meant that tht· emperor must be " restored " to his rightful place at the center of politics-usually by the elimi nation of "evil advisers next to the t hrone" and the " reconstruction" of the state under "diret'l imperial rule. " It is my guess, not Nezu's, that Mazaki expected to be made Prime Mi nister.
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
POLITI C S
2 87
the successful use of Outlaw violence by the I mperial Way Faction agai nst moderate Officials , and on the mistakes of the I mperial Way Faction's Officials i n the way they did so, to consolidate bureaucratic " fascism from above . " O f course, the very presence of Outlaws and Outlaw terrorism critically affected the outcome of political struggles withi n the Of ficial class . Assassi nation and the threat of assassination became im portant political means, utilized with or without skill and with or without success , of exerting pressure " from below . " In terms of men tality and behavior, the Outlaws of the 1 930s were very little dif ferent from the loyalist assassins and protagonists of the Meij i Res toration. Both were zealous nationalists ; both demonstrated their " pure hearts" by wielding the "shining sword" agai nst those i n high places . Several Outlaws of the 1 850s and 1 860s , however, rose to the peak of the Meij i polity to become "statesmen of origi nal merit " ; the Outlaws of 1 93 6 were put " i nto the cooki ng pot . " The Outlaws of the 1 8 50s and 1 860s were i nstruments of pressure that contributed to the Meij i Restoration; several of them then contributed to Japan's remarkable and successful emergence as a great power. The Outlaws of the unsuccessful Showa Restoration were instruments of pressure used to consolidate a bureaucratic monol ith in government and then discarded . 107 Despite Outlaw violence during the 1 930s there was no " res toration . " Outlaw violence actually strengt he ned Official control over the state . A nd even the unprecedented defeat of 1 945 and the unprecedented stationing of occupation forces on Japa nese soil did not break the control of the Officials. O ne is led to suspect that Of ficials were powerful rather than timid , that it was they who made the Japanese government a Government . One is also led to the con clusion that meani ngful functional roles withi n the Official class prevented the Japa nese polity from disi ntegrat ing under the most severe domestic and i nternational pressures . Our exami nation of 1 07 . On violent loyalist activity preceding the Restoration see Marius B. Jansen, Sakamoto Ryo ma and the Meiji Restoration (Pri nceton: Princeton University Press, 1 96 1 ) . It is un fortunate t hat Maruyama does not compare the behavior of his Outlaw with that of the Res torat ion loyalist . Although the Outlaws of the 1 930s might well be called " pseudo-loyalists," given the changed nature of Japanese society and politics, their behavior was very similar to the violent , emotiona l , and " i rrational" behavior of many of their " l oyalist" precursors .
288
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MATRIX
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Kido Koichi 's behavior i n three different palace offices has revealed at least three such roles : the secretary , the bureaucrat , and the nego tiator. Kido's behavior revealed that these roles were not unique to him, either as a distinctive personality type or as a highly statused member of the aristocracy , but were inherent in the offices he held . Moreover, Kido's associations i n each role demonstrated not only that other political actors performed similar roles but also that still others performed different roles : those of ratifier (the emperor) , policy advocate (officials such as Hiranuma Kiichiro and Matsuoka Yosuke, w ho headed various factions and coalitions) , and instrument of pressure (right - w i ng radicals) . These roles , w hich i nvolved various patterns of behavior within the Official class of political ac tors , made Japan a powerful polity in both its policy successes and policy failures . Maruyama, however, cites Kido only to ill ustrate the weak and evasive Official in "the massive ' system of irresponsibilities' that constituted J apan's fascist rule . " 108 B oth Kido and Konoe are si ngled out to exemplify the relationship between Outlaws and Officials : Note , for i nstance , t he peculiar relations between Pri nce Konoe and M r . I noue Nissho, o r again those that connected Marq uis K i d o to m e n like M r . Hashi moto Tetsuma of t he Purple Cloud Pavilion and M r . Matsui Kuka . W hen Mr. Takuya Dempu of the Pol itics and Learning Society, who went i n for blackmailing Senior Retainers , was arrested in conne xion with a certain maj or incident in the Palace, Marquis Kido wrote i n h i s diary t hat h e felt a s if ' a grain o f rice sticking to the sole o f m y foot ' had been removed (3 March 1 93 3 ) . This neatly illustrates what members of the ruling class felt about the lower-ranking Outlaws and suggests the relationship between them. 109
How salient in fact were Outlaws in Kido's life as an Official ? What i nfluence did they have ? I have compiled a list of forty-nine Outlaws or possible Outlaws i ncludi ng ( 1 ) those cited specifically by Maruyama as Outlaws , and (2) those w ho were or might have been Outlaws, given the manner in which they appear in Kido's diary . In this latter category are those w ho i nvited themselves to Kido's home or official residence at strange hours to " talk" (for example, O kawabara Nitto)-usually 1 08 . M aruyama M asao, Thought and Behaviour, p . 1 28 . 1 09 . Ibid . , pp. 1 29-30. The date o r Kido's diary entry is M arch 2 , not March 3 .
K I DO
AND
TABLE 22.
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
289
PO LI T I C S
KIDO KCHCHI ' S OUTLAW ASSOCIATES Number of Meetings
Name Hasama Shigeru H ashimoto Tetsuma Inoue Nissho Kiriyama Masashi M atsui Kiika (Seikun) Okawabara Nitto "Shigeki" Suridate Kazuo Y asuoka Masaatsu Yoshida Masuzo Total
1932
1936
1941
0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 I 0
0 0 0 0 I 0 6 0 0
2 I 3 0 15 0 5 9 0 9
5
8
44
about imminent crises and the need for drastic political solutions , those who held no positions of note and therefore do not appear i n Japanese biographical dictionaries and were not otherwise identi fiable (for example Suridate Kazuo) , and those who were prominent right-wing propagandists but not listed as Outlaws by Maruyama (for example, Yoshida Masuzo) . Some of the persons whom I have listed as Outlaws , therefore , may or may not have been Outlaws . Of the forty-nine Outlaws or possible Outlaws, only ten met Kido in one or more of the three years in which his associations have been analyzed . These ten and t he number of times they met Kido i n each year are listed in table 22 . It should be readily apparent that i n terms o f frequency o f association Outlaws were o f singular obscurity , accounting for 0 . 5 percent of Kido's associations in 1 932 , 0 . 6 percent in 1 93 6 , and 2 . 3 percent in 1 941 . If freq uency of association is any measure of i nfluence , Outlaw i nfluence on Kido was infinitesimal . I n only one of the three years exami ned did an Outlaw appear with any degree of promi nence. In 1 94 1 Matsui Kuka met Kido fifteen times . Matsui, w hom Harada Kumao called a " political parasite" (seijigoro) , u o emerges in Kido's diary for the first time in 1 1 0. Harada Kumao, 3 : 229, 244.
2 90
KIDO
AND
MATRIX
OF
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PO LI T I C S
March 1 93 5 , when he came to Kido's office to " talk about the political situation" and " urge the necessity for the establishment of a Konoe Cabi net . " 1 1 1 Kido met Matsui a total o f t e n times i n 1 93 5 . Most of these meetings i nvolved " reports" by Matsui on trends within the military and "exchanges of views" on t he political situa tion, during which Matsui often talked about " political crises . " I n July, for example, he came t o Kido's office t o report o n the "critical nature of the present situation " ; he also said that he " hoped for the resignation of the Privy Seal . " 1 12 Along with maki ng such recom mendations Matsui reported on his own activities and those of others . On August 1 2 , 1 93 5 he called Kido to tell him that the Chief of the Military Affairs B ureau, Nagata Tetsuzan, had been critically wounded by a disgruntled Army officer-forty-five minutes after the attack on Nagata had occurred . Kido called t he Privy Seal im mediately and reported the assassi nation. 1 13 In this i nstance Kido received accurate and useful i nformation from Outlaw Matsui that was of importance in discharging his role as C hief Secretary to the Privy Seal . Other Outlaws performed a similar function . I noue Nissho, for example, visited Kido at his official residence in 1 94 1 to report on his meeti ng with Konoe and to tell Kido about his ow n future plans. 1 14 Matsui and other Outlaws like I noue evidently de lighted in acting as i nformation brokers to Kido and other high political leaders . Although Kido records only one meeting with Matsui in 1 93 6 , the two were i n frequent communication from 1 937 on. In his relation to Kido, Matsui was a self-appoi nted secretary who kept Kido informed , willy-nilly, and at the same time attempted to prod Kido and other Officials " from behi nd " with extremist and irresponsible proposals. Given the i nfrequency with which Kido met Outlaws and the q uasi-secretarial role that they often played in their meetings with him, how is their infl uence to be determi ned ? There are two possi bilities . First , the concrete demands of the Outlaws were translated i nto some form of positive accommodating action by Official Kid o . 1 1 1. 1 12. 1 1 3. 1 1 4.
Kido Koichi , 1 : 393. Ibid . , p . 42 1 . Ibid . , pp. 423-2 4 . Ibid . , 2 : 86 1 .
K I DO
AND
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Kido i ndicates n o i nstance of respondi ng t o Outlaw pressure i n this manner during the three years I have exami ned . O n the contrary , he even opposed Outlaw suggestions directly . When Matsui urged the resignation of the Privy Seal in J uly 1 93 5 , for example, Kido told him to "rethink" the matter si nce his opinion " rested on facts that were all but entirely mistaken . " 1 15 I noue Nissho came to see Kido i n January 1 94 1 and i nformed him that the political situation was tense and that there was danger of a terrorist i ncident . If such an in cident were to occur, continued I noue , there was no one but the venerable Toyama M itsuru to bri ng the situation under control . 1 16 Although Kido did not counter I noue's recommendation, the possi bility of a Cabi net under Toyama , the octogenarian doyen of Out laws, was patently absurd even in the frenzied nationalism of the months preceding war with the United States . There was no need for Kido to respond to such a recommendation; on the other hand , he was alerted to the possibility of a terrorist i ncident . The second possible form of infl uence over Kido is a negative one . Kido might have refrained from a course of action under Outlaw pressure . Agai n, he gives no instance i n his diary during the three years examined of alteri ng his course of action as the result of his Outlaw associations . Takuya Dempu provides us with a better example of Outlaw "pressure" not only on Official Kido but also on the political system in general . Takuya was one of the classic Outlaws-the Lum penpolitiker who stormed about irresponsibly at the base of society threatening those in high places by word and deed . Kido reports no meeti ngs with Takuya, who appears in Kido's diary only as the sub ject of police reports and the cause of anxiety to palace officials . Takuya makes his debut in Kido's diary i n September 1 93 1 . He had published a newspaper article " as usual attacking the Privy Seal " but which on this occasion was " particularly fierce, " "tending to i ncite assassination . " Kido spoke with two Household Ministry secretaries about the Takuya attack and they agreed that since the situation was such that " it was less and less possible to rely on those i n the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Office , " measures had to be taken to deal with 1 1 5 . lbid . , 1 : 42 1 . 1 1 6. lbid . , 2 : 849.
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this problem first . Kido discussed the matter with the Vice Mi nister of the I mperial Household M inistry , who concurred . 1 17 Takuya kept up his attacks until March 1 93 3 , when he was fi nally arrested . I nformed of Takuya 's arrest by the police, Kido made the diary entry cited by Maruyama above . A full quotation of t hat entry reveals why Takuya was an irritant to Kido: " [ His] was an existence like a grain of rice sticki ng to the sole of [ my] foot ; but I feel much better now that ugly rumors have come to an end because he has been taken into custody . " 118 As the Privy Seal 's Chief Secretary, Kido was naturally and rightly concerned with actions , like Takuya's, that threatened the life of his official superi or. The only " i nfluence" Outlaw Takuya had , therefore , was to prod Kido and other palace Officials to have the police arrest him. That an atmosphere of intimidation and viole nce surrounded those "close to the throne" during the 1 930s is indisputable. What to do about such Outlaw activity, however, was squarely in the hands of the Officials. If a set of threatened Officials lacked the means to con trol Outlaw activities , they would be forced to rely on those Officials who did . This was precisely the case with Outlaw Takuya's threats and the difficulties encountered by palace Officials in having police Officials arrest him. The instruments of coercion were in the hands of the military services and the H ome Mi nistry . During the 1 930s one or the other had to be persuaded to control Outlaw activity . 1 19 For Kido, therefore , Outlaws were ( 1 ) self-appoi nted " secretaries" who were useful to him, however irresponsible their policy views (Matsui Kuka) ; (2) tangential nuisances who treated Kido to mystical political talk ( Q kawabara Nitto) ; or (3) threats to the lives 1 1 7 . lbid . , 1 : 1 02 . 1 1 8 . Ibid . , p . 2 2 3 . Takuya was again o n t he loose short ly after his arrest and publishing the same kind of attacks. In March 1 93 6 , in t he aftermath of the February 26 I ncident, he was once again arrested ; thereafter he ceased to threaten Kido and other palace officials. 1 1 9 . It is Professor Oka Yoshitake's opi nion t hat the "go-stop" i ncident of 1 93 3 , w hich has been discussed in t he introduction to chap. 4 , ended any possibility t hat the H ome M inistry's police could be used to check t he Army, at least directly (i nterview , April 20, 1 972). By ex tension, it might be argued that the pol ice were i neffective against t hose Outlaws who enjoyed Army protection. Although the I mperial Household M inistry had a Bureau of I mperial Guards, its units were i nfected by Outlaw thought and behavior, as we saw i n t he conclusion to chap. 3 . As challenges to peace and security in the nation at large, moreover, Outlaw activit ies were not under the Guards' jurisdiction but that of the police.
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of palace Officials and to palace security who prompted palace Of ficials to take action agai nst them (Takuya Dempu) . The Outlaws j ust mentioned were all classic Outlaw types-irresponsible zealots outside Kido's organization, the I mperial H ousehold M i nistry , who attempted to pressure him from " outside" and " below . " Si nce Maruyama's Outlaw could also exist within a given Official 's organ ization , Kido may have been subj ect to pressure by the lowest members of the H ousehold Ministry as wel l . B ut in no i nstance during the three years analyzed did Kido report any such pressure . He simply did not meet with the l owest ranki ng personnel of the palace . Neither from within the I mperial Household M inistry nor from the outside did Outlaw pressure figure prominently in Kido's behavior. In fact , the more Outlaw their behavior, the less likely Outlaws were to meet Kido and the more likely the were to be the subj ects of efforts by Kido and other Officials to have them arrested . Kido never met Takuya Dempu, for example, nor did he record having met two of the most radical Outlaws, Kita I kki and Nishida Zei , during the period covered by his diary . That Kido should have had forty-four meetings with Outlaw types in 1 94 1 , however, demonstrates that his Outlaw associations did i ncrease when he became Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal . B athing in imperial light , he attracted moths . Maruyama has suggested that gaini ng proximity to the emperor was a motivational factor i n the behavior of political actors i n prewar Japa n . For Outlaws, associa tion with someone close to the emperor may have given them a vi carious sense of proximity , and therefore of importance . Whatever their motivation, Outlaws were known for their bravado. Bargi ng i n o n Privy Seal Kido was a s much an act of swagger a s i t was purposeful action to persuade. When Outlaws met Kido i n 1 94 1 , i n contrast t o the period prior to Kido's becomi ng Privy Seal , they did so exclusively at his official residence or home , where they could catch him at odd hours . Thirty-one of Kido's forty-four meetings with Outlaws in 1 94 1 , for example, took place at his official residence and the remai nder at his home . The Privy Seal 's office was apparently off limits to Outlaws . That Kido should have had any deali ngs with Outlaws may speak more for the resourceful effrontery of the Outlaw than the timidity of the Official .
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Finally, many Officials were i n essential agreement with military expansion abroad , Japanism, and statism, as advocated by Outlaws. Although contemptuous of the Outlaw life style and opposed to their methods of political pressure, Officials like Kido may have been in sympathy with some or all of their views. If such were the case , it is not logical to assert that such Officials yielded to Outlaw pressure out of timidity : yielding to someone with whom one is already i n agreement i s a dubious measure o f i nfluence. It has been shown, both here a nd i n the previous chapter, that those Officials w ho were policy advocates , as opposed to those who were neutral bureaucrats , either manipulated or condoned Outlaws i n order to domi nate the Japanese polity , or that they struggled at the risk of life and limb to control Outlaw activity and to counter the political demands made by Outlaws and sympathetic Official s . I n neither case can such Official behavior be called "timid , " " power dwarfed ," or "weak . " Kido's most important associates in 1 93 2 , 1 93 6 , and 1 94 1 were not Outlaws . As Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal in 1 932 , his primary Official associates were four officers of bureau-chief level in four distinct i nstitutions of imperial prerogative outside the palace and one official in the palace. These five , however, accounted for only 1 7 .4 percent of Kido's meeti ngs with those he met ten times or more that year. Kido's relations with the four government Officials, moreover, involved information gatheri ng and sharing, not " i n fluence . " Nor did Kido manipulate his palace superior, the Privy Seal, as a Shri ne . Kido's relation to the Privy Seal , as we have seen, involved liaison, reporting, and consultative functions . Kido's be havior was "loyal" and "circumspect " but not timid , weak, or faw ning. Kido and the Privy Seal freq uently consulted and shared i nformation as equals on matters of grave importance , but it was al ways at the initiative of the Privy Seal that Kido's advice was used in rendering advice to the throne. Kido's chief associates in 1 932 were eight hereditary aristocrats i n the H ouse of Peers who were also members of Kido's Eleve n Club . These eight accounted for 68.2 percent of his meeti ngs with those i n the ten o r more frequency group . None held office in Kid o ' s component o f i mperial prerogative, t he I mperi al H o u s e h o l d
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M i nistry , during 1 932 . Only one of the eight-Kido's predecessor as C hief Secretary to the Privy Seal-had been a palace Official . Four of the eight held or had held government offices ; four apparently had no government experience outside the H ouse of Peers . These eight associates were a diverse group of persons whose base of operations was the House of Peers . B ut what position did the House of Peers occupy in the national polit y ? In what category or categories did its members belong ? Was it an organization composed of the tripartite hierarchy ? The position of the House of Peers , given the status and achievements of its members , was unquestionably high . B ut some of its members , such as the princes-of-the-blood , could be nothing but Shri nes in the national polity, regardless of their membership i n the House . Others , like some of the schola rs , busi nessmen , and aristocrats , had never held government office but were neither Outlaw nor Shrine i n behavior. Yet others had had long and disti nguished careers in the bureaucratic components of imperial prerogative. In its membership, therefore , the House of Peers was a mixture of persons of high status or high achievement in practically every val ued activity in the japanese polity . Finally, these men of diverse backgrounds and social status were or ganized into loosely knit clubs , subsets, and even political parties . The House of Peers was an association of associations and individuals, not an organizational hierarchy. In short , the House of Peers did not fit the tripartite organizational model , and its members , by station and behavior, did not fit any consistent personality typology . Although association among members of the House of Peers was not of any particularly consistent pattern, Kido's association with his eight aristocratic associates in the House of Peers during 1 932 illustrates one pattern of association perti nent to a significant group of Peers . None of the eight was related to Kido as a Shri ne, Official , Outlaw , or combi nation of such behavi oral characteristics . Their associati ons with Kido and with each other were based on the egali tarian comfort of mutual membership in an elite status group and enha nced by mutual i nvol vement in one another's political aspira tions and careers (for example, Konoe and Kido) and by the ki nds of roles they played in the political system at any given time (for example, Secretary Harada and Secretary Kido, Prime M i nister
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Konoe and Privy Seal Kido) . I nfl uence among all these aristocrats was mutual . We saw , for example, that Konoe was of key im portance in i nfluenci ng Kido to become Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal in 1 930 and Privy Seal in 1 940. On the other hand , Konoe frequently consulted Kido and relied on Kido's j udgment , as on the issue of Konoe's resigning when Germany and the Soviet Union went to war i n June 1 94 1 . Although there may have been mutual in fluence between Secretary Harada and Secretary Kido in 1 93 2 , their association was not one of " influence" but of l iaison , i nformation gatheri ng, a nd information shari ng i n fulfillment of their secretarial roles . In fact , i nformation gatheri ng and sharing were the key political functions performed by Kido and all members of the Eleven Club during 1 932 . Such functions were extremely importa nt i n building cross-i nstitu tional coalitions of policy advocates in t he i nstitutions of imperial prerogative . We saw , for example , that Kido's aristocratic associates in the House of Peers , both Eleven Club members and nonmembers , brought together " new bureaucrats" i n the civil mi nistries, such as Tani Masayuki of the Foreign M i nistry , and those i n the military services, such as Suzuki Teiichi , during 1 932 . 120 B oth Tani and Suzuki became Ministers of State, in 1 942 and 1 94 1 respectively. I n 1 93 6 , when Kido was Director of Peerage Affairs , a notable shift in his Official associations occurred . His chief associates that year were ten Officials in the palace, who accounted for 3 5 . 0 percen t o f his meeti ngs w i t h those in t h e t e n o r more freq uency category . Meeti ngs with two purely Official representatives from other institu tional components of imperial prerogative raised his meetings with Officials to 3 7 . 8 percent of his meeti ngs with those he met ten times 1 20 . For a penetrating a nd enlightening discussion of t he " new bureaucrats , " see Robert M Spaulding, Jr. , "The Bureaucracy as a Political Force, 1 920-4 5 , " i n Dilemmas of Growth 1 11 Prewar japan, ed . James W. M orley (Princeton: Pri nceton University Press, 1 97 1 ) , pp 33-80, and his "Japan's ' New Bureaucrats,' 1 932-4 5 , " in Crisis Politics in Prewar Japan: [,. stitutional and Ideological Problems of the 1 930s, ed . George M. Wilson (Tokyo: Sophi;l University , 1 970) , pp. 5 1 -78. I n t he latter essay (page 52), Spaulding gives the follow i n !( characteristics of the new bureaucrats : "a pragmatic nationalism emphasizi ng t he eronom i• role of the state, a willingness to collaborate with like-minded men i n other mi nistries and i 11 t he military services, a nd a desire to change the existing order from within by non-r�vol 1 1 tionary means. " Obviously, Kido a nd his aristocratic associates were involved in farilit a t i n� the process of collaboration among such like-minded policy advocates.
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or more . An Eleven Club aristocrat , secretary Harada, accounted for 9 . 5 percent and six Shri nes-t he emperor and five members of the imperial fam i l ies-accou nted for 1 0 . 7 perce nt . The remai n i ng persons in the ten or more frequency group were other aristocratic associates (including Pri nce Saionj i ) , golfing partners , and members of Kido's family. If freq uency and nature of association are any measures of i nfl uence , Official types a nd cert a i n aristocrat ic associates , such as Secretary Harada, were most i nfl uential in Kido's behavior as a bureaucrat in 1 93 6 , j ust as Eleven Club aristocrats were most important in Kido's behavior as a secretary in 1 932 . W hen Kido became Privy Seal another marked transformation i n his patterns o f association occurred . Associations with the supreme Shri nes in the Japanese polity , primarily the emperor, increased to 30.4 percent of Kido's meetings with those he met ten times or more . Kido's meeti ngs with government Officials whom he met ten times or more i n 1 94 1 i ncreased to 3 3 . 8 percent , his meeti ngs with palace of ficials decreasing to 1 9 . 1 percent . I n 1 94 1 , therefore , Kido's associa tions with both Officials and Shri nes increased markedly over 1 93 6 , a s they had in 1 93 6 i n comparison to 1 932 . The Officials Kido met in t he ten or more frequency category also changed markedly in com parison to 1 93 6 . I t i s d i ffi c u l t t o a s c e rt a i n w hi c h O ffi c i a l s , q ua s i - Offi c i a l aristocrats , and Shrines were foremost i n influencing Kido's be havior, given the marked shifts in associates and frequencies of association both withi n and among types in 1 93 2 , 1 93 6 , and 1 94 1 . Prince Konoe is the only person Kido met thirty times or more in all three years examined . However, not only did frequency of associa tion between them vary in accordance with the offices they held, but it is extremely difficult to determine who i nfluenced whom in terms of policy preferences . Kido and Konoe were deeply involved in each other's political careers , and they exercised mutual influence on each other i n maki ng up their minds about policy objectives , political strategies , and political tactics . It is unquestionable t hat as Kido grew i n bureaucratic stature he gained greater access to the highest Shri nes in the Japanese polity : the emperor, imperial pri nces , and other members of the imperial families . As a secretary in 1 932 , Kido met no one in the imperial
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family category ten times or more . As a court bureaucrat in 1 93 6 , 1 0 .7 percent of Kido's meetings with those he met ten times o r more were with the emperor and imperial families ; as negotiator to the throne in 1 94 1 , 30.4 percent . According to Maruyama's typology , therefore , it became i ncreasingly possible for Official Kido to " hold aloft " the supreme Shrines in Japanese politics , manipulating them agai nst the "powerless people" or those below Kido in his organiza tional hierarchy . Let us examine the relation between Officials and Shrines , focusing on Kido's behavior during 1 94 1 , when he was i n the best position to " hold aloft " the emperor . A s Privy Seal , Kido was the Official closest to the throne, the emperor's most frequently consulted adviser, and he controlled the imperial seal and the seal of state which stamped all decisions as authoritative . The emperor's position at the pinnacle of the national hierarchy made him the ultimate Shrine in the Japanese polity , and the su preme ratifier of all decisions . No government proposal to the em peror was an authoritative decision of state without the emperor's approval . Did such approval automatically make the ratifier a Shri ne ? M aruyama's discussion of the Shri ne personality is very am biguous , suggesti ng both that ratification itself makes the ratifier a Shri ne and t hat manipulation by others in the course of the ratifi cation process makes the ratifier a Shrine-or both do. B ut there is a very important distinction between ratification as authority and ra tification as manipulation. Whether the ratifier was the rubber stamp for proposals made by others , whether he modified such pro posals, or whether he initiated the proposals that he himself ratified are questions of great significance in analyzing t he decision-making process . B ut these questions do not touch on the legal fact that the fi nal decision was authoritative-assuming, of course , that the ratifier was the established and accepted i nstitution for ratification i n the political system for such decisions and that " manipulation" of the ratifier, when and if it occurred , was not illegal . Because all pro posals stamped with the imperial seal and seal of state were authori tative decisions of state, that fact alone does not make the emperor a Shri ne . I n order to show Shrine behavior on the part of the emperor it must be demonstrated that the emperor "automatically" sane-
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tioned proposals placed before him-regardless of his agreement or disagreement . Kido's relationship with the emperor throughout 1 94 1 indicates a meticulous observance of the Privy Seal 's role as negotiator to the throne . At no time i n 1 94 1 did Kido use imperial rescripts to bom bard i nstituti onal opponent s , as Ozaki Yukio accused Prime Minister Katsura of doing in 1 9 1 3 . The very fact that Kido met with the emperor at least 3 1 3 times duri ng 1 94 1 suggests , moreover, that the emperor was no mere robot , dumbly manipulated by Kido or even by other high Officials such as the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff. Were the emperor merely a rubber stamp Kido could have affixed the imperial seal and seal of state to decisions he and his colleagues had agreed to without bothering to engage in constant communication and consultation with the emperor. Privy Seal Kido was not , however, a policy advocate but a compromise negotiator, and the emperor played an important part in that negotiator role. Privy Seal Kido's duty , as he evidently perceived it , was to see that the emperor was presented consistent and unified policies a nd deci sions for ratification. When such consistency and unity were lacking, however, the emperor a nd his palace advisers had considerable room for i nitiative and maneuvering. We have seen, for example, that both Kido and the emperor were active i n bringing unity to the Cabinet when Foreign M inister Matsuoka's proposals and actions in 1 94 1 went counter t o Prime M i nister Konoe's policy of negotiation with the United States . We also saw that the emperor exercised i nitiative that same year i n seeing that the Navy was " fully confident" of its position toward the United States . The first of the emperor's i nitiatives was exercised i n keepi ng himself informed at all stages of the policy-making process , particu larly in regard to foreign policy . On April 2 8 , 1 94 1 , for example , Kido was a t home with a cold when his C hief Secretary came to see him. The emperor had asked the Deputy Grand C hamberlain two questions : how was he to ask questions about foreign policy issues and so forth , w hen, as today , t he Prime M inister, the Foreign Minister, and the Privy Seal were all confined at home by illness , and w hat had happened recently i n Japan's relations with the
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United States . Kido repl ied on both of these points and had the Chief Secretary report to the throne on his behalf. 121 The emperor exercised considerable i nitiative in pressuring his leadi ng Officials for i nformation, and, as in the example j ust cited , was successful i n doing s o even under unfavorable circumstances . Obviously, the em peror's ability to acq uire information not only from his Privy Seal but also from his other leading Officials was a necessary precon dition for exercising w hatever i nfluence he might have had over policy directions prior to his ratification of any given policy . B ut the emperor did not simply keep himself i nformed ; he also pressured his Officials in regard to the correctness and consistency of their policies . O n the evening of July 30, 1 94 1 , for example, the C hief of the Navy General Staff reported to the throne on Navy policies . The followi ng morning the emperor i nformed Kido in detail about the report and the replies given by the Chief of Staff i n response to t h e emperor's questions . The C hief o f Staff, Admiral Na gano Osami , wished to avoid war if it were at all possible, as had the precedi ng C hief of the Navy General Staff, Pri nce-of-the-Blood Fu shimi . According to Admiral Nagano, it appeared that a negotiated settlement with the United States would be impossible unless Japan withdrew from the Tripartite Pact . If, however, there were no set tlement with the United States and Japan should thereby l ose her source of oil , her oil reserves would last only two years . If war did break out , the reserves would be consumed i n a year and a half and there would be no alternative but to find new supplies . In response , the emperor told Admiral Nagano that if Admiral Nagano believed that Japan could win in the event of war, then he himself believed Japan could win : but would it not be difficult to achieve as great a victory agai nst the United States fleet as J apan's victory i n the Battle of the Japan Sea against the I mperial Russian fleet in 1 905 ? Ad miral Nagano replied that such a victory was well nigh impossible. 122 The emperor, after telling Kido of Admiral Nagano's report and replies, said that such a war of desperation would be truly perilous . Respondi ng to t he emperor's concern, Kido replied that Admiral Na gano's views were too simplistic. The Tripartite Pact was not a ba r 1 2 1 . Kido Koichi, 2 : 87 1 . 1 2 2 . Ibid . , p. 895 .
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in reachi ng a negotiated settlement with the United States . I n fact , because the United States respected i nternational treaties so highly, he thought it very doubtful that U.S. confidence i n Japan would be deepened if Japan abrogated the pact ; on the contrary , Japan might incur the contempt of the United States by doi ng so. There were still various other avenues open to Japan in negotiating with the United States and these had to be exploited constructively and with tenacity . Kido told the emperor that he would press Prime M i nister Konoe i n particular o n this . 123 After his audience , Kido's diary records the foll owing events for the remainder of July 3 1 : Noon. talked with Navy M i nister Oikawa; chatted about the views C hief of Staff Nagano had reported to the throne . 1.· 00. the Chief Aide came to the office; chatted about the same matter. 7:30. Count Kanroj i came to the office ; I was relieved to hear that a reply arrived from Marquis Komatsu w hich stated his desire that the marriage arrangements between Takazumi and Miss Nobuko go for ward . 2:20. Pri nce Konoe came to the office ; conversed after [ his] audience with the emperor . From 3:40 to 4:05 . audienced with the emperor. 7: 00. Terasaki , Chief of the America B ureau, came to my residence; received a telegram. 124
Thereafter Kido was in constant contact with Prime Minister Konoe about the posibilities of negotiation with the United States , occa sionally noting in great detail his recommendations to Konoe (August 2, 1 94 1 ) and Konoe's proposals and recommendations , which on one occasion (August 5) i nvolved a lengthy written memo randum delivered to Kido by messenger. 125 It is clear, therefore, that ( 1 ) the emperor was actively concerned about the possibility of war with the United States and expressed his doubts about the Navy's ca pabilities, should war break out , to bot h the Navy and the Privy Seal , (2) Privy Seal Kido and the emperor consulted each other about what should be done , and (3) the Privy Seal acted on problems 1 23 . Ibid . , p . 896. 1 24 . I bid . 1 2 5 . Ibid . , pp. 896-98.
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raised by the emperor, usually exercising his ow n j udgment as to the best or most feasible way of dealing with them . Even w hen presented with a unified policy , moreover, the emperor occasionally pressed his views if he disagreed . Duri ng the I mperial Conference of September 6, 1 94 1 , for example, the emperor offered an unprecedented criticism of his highest Officials in their assembled presence by reading one of the Emperor Meij i 's poems . The poem , which questioned the violence i n t he world when all desired peace , was recited at the end of the conference which formalized a unani mous decision, reached by the government at that time, to go to war with the United States if negotiations had not succeeded by late October. 126 The emperor's recitation was unq uestionably counter to the I mperial Conference's decision and a rebuke specifically to the Navy General Staff. I n short , the Emperor-i n-Chambers was by no means a robot manipulated dumbly by his Officials-an i nactive Shri ne who " af fects people by 'doi ng nothi ng . ' " The emperor expressed his preferences and concerns to those Officials who appeared before him i n his palace sanctuary . Although the actions taken by the Officials did not always support the emperor's views, those views did provoke responses by the relevant Officials-especially the Privy Seal . As Emperor-in-Public, however, the emperor was used as a S hrine to keep the "powerless people" in l i ne ; however active the emperor was with his Officials " privately" as Emperor-in-Chambers , he was displayed in public in such a manner as to elicit obedience to state policies . The emperor's appeara nces as public Emperor-i n-State were high ceremony , rigidly formal . His name was used to j ustify all laws and ordinances ; he was theoretically the fount of government authority and therefore of popular obedience . I n this he was i ndeed the "property" of the Officials. B ut the manipulative relat ionship between Shri ne and Official is simply not borne out by Kido's be havior . Kido and the emperor infl uenced each other mutually in ar rivi ng at w hat the emperor should or should not ratify and should or should not do even as Emperor-i n-C hambers . And Kido did not record any attempts to use the emperor's name to pressure his Official 1 26 . I bid . , pp. 907-08 .
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colleagues without the emperor's knowledge and consent . Finally, the Privy Seal was by no means the only Official who audienced with the emperor . The emperor was in constant communication with all four palace leaders , the Prime Minister, the M inisters of State, the Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of the General Staffs . If these Officials disagreed among themselves in the presence of the emperor, as they oc casionally did by giving contradictory reports and replies to the throne , the emperor might have been in a position of maki ng choices , not i n one of being manipulated . When a policy was ratified by the emperor it was invariably the I mperial Will , and therefore authori tative . But whose policy was it? That exclusively of the Official s ? That o f Officials prodded from behi nd b y Outlaws ? That o f Officials with the agreement of the Shrine? That of the Shrine with the agreement of the Official s ? Which Officials and why ? Although the emperor was the highest Shrine, moreover, he was not t he sole Shrine at the top of t he national polity . His three brothers and the male members of the imperial families were also Shrines . Prince-of-the-Blood Admiral Fushimi was C hief of the Navy General Staff from February 1 932 to April 1 94 1 . Pri nce-of the-Blood General Kanin was Chief of the Army General Staff from December 1 93 1 to October 1 940. 127 J ust as was the case with Maruyama's Outlaws and Officials , therefore, the S hrines may have been a fragmented class of political actors . Manipulation , w hen and if it occurred , might have been manipulation of one Shri ne by the Officials in his organization agai nst other S hri nes and their organi zations . Pri nce Fushimi, for example, took a hard-line stance agai nst the London Naval Treaty in 1 930; as an admiral on the Supreme War C ouncil he ca used considerable trouble to protreaty partisans throughout the negotiation and ratification process . It is even alleged that he was called down for his actions by Grand Chamberlai n Suzuki . 128 Fushimi's appoi ntment as C hief of the Navy General Staff in 1 932 was questioned by Prince Saionj i and other " moderate" leaders because of Fushimi's behavior duri ng 1 93 0 . When Pri nce Kanin had been proposed as Chief of the Army General Staff in 1 27 . Toyama and Adachi, pp. 95-96, 92-93 . 1 2 8 . Okada Keisuke, pp. 48-49; Harada Kumao, I : 32-3 5 , 1 1 8-20.
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1 93 1 , moreover, Saionj i had argued that it was unwise for an i nsti tution of government to "shoulder" an imperial prince . No imperial prince should be in such a "position of responsibil ity . " The same was applied to Pri nce Fushimi 's appointment as Chief of the Navy General Staff i n 1 932 . 129 Prince Fushimi conti nued to cause trouble as C hief of the Navy General Staff. In 1 934 he supported a "lecture" to the throne by the former Deputy C hief of the Navy General Staff, despite t he em peror's clear disapproval . Although such a lecture was a matter of courtesy to the recently resigned Deputy Chief, the emperor feared that he would use the opportunity not to lecture but to voice the Navy's opposition to the status quo establ ished by the London Naval Treaty. O nce the emperor " heard " such a policy , then antitreaty partisans would argue that it was " national policy" to abrogate the treaty. 130 On July 1 2 , 1 934 Pri nce Fushimi audienced with the em peror i n his capacity as a member of t he imperial family . After expressi ng the Navy's views on arms reduction, he handed the em peror a letter which demanded parity i n naval armaments and added that if parity were not achieved " t he Navy could not be controlled . " The emperor had the letter returned t o Fushimi without comment . Even C hief Aide Honj o thought it highly improper for a prince-of the-blood , audienci ng as a member of the imperial family, to use that means of access to proffer his partisan views on military and foreign policies . After Fushimi's audience , moreover, the Navy M inister evi dently pressed the Prime M inister to accept the parity proposal be cause it had already been reported to the throne . 131 Here was a clear case of " usi ng" an imperial family member, with his . obvious consent , to counter an established policy supported by the emperor . The Navy Officials who wrote the parity letter " used " Fushimi's imperial status to gai n access to the emperor, a nd then used the audience to argue that their policy was national policy because it had been " reported to the throne . " Shri ne was " used " against Shri ne . The emperor's brothers were also of constant concern, especially 1 29 . Harada Kumao, 2 : 1 97-99. Harada's account leads one to believe t hat Pri nce Fushimi's appoint ment was initiated and pushed through by antitreaty forces i n the Navy. 1 30. Honj o Shigeru, pp. 1 80-8 1 . 1 3 1 . Ibid . , pp. 1 9 1 -92 .
K I DO
AND
MATRIX
OF
PALACE
POLITI C S
305
his first brother, Pri nce Chichibu , w ho was deeply involved with rightist fanatics , both military and civilian. A friend of N ishida Zei (one of the purer Outlaw types) , Chichibu began associating with radical officers as early as 1 927 . Chichibu was also actively involved with renovationist bureaucrats and their sympathizers in other insti tutions of imperial prerogative, including Prince Konoe : I n September 1 932 Pri nce Konoe recommended Pri nce C hichibu for the post of lord keeper of the privy seal , a position which would have given him great power over the emperor. B ut this was vetoed by Pri nce Saionj i . I nstead the pri nce was assigned to t he General Staff. . . . Pri nce Chichibu was not only a n i mperial pri nce . Until Pri nce Aki hito's birth in December 1 93 3 , he was also the apparent heir to the throne and would have become emperor had H i rohito died or abdicated for reasons of health . . . . It is significant t hat , in the early 1 930s, critical remarks began to be made against the emperor by such army men as General Mazaki, court princes such as H igashikuni a nd other dignitaries such as Pri nce Konoe . The rebels [ of 1 93 6 ] t hemselves , i n spite of their reverance for the im perial i nstitution, would have shed few tears if Hirohito had abdicated in favor of his brother or his mi nor son with his brother as regent . 132
C hief Aide Honj o Shigeru records in his diary on September 7 , 1 93 3 that on one day i n late 1 93 1 or early 1 932 Pri nce C hichibu had a fierce argument with the emperor . Chichibu told the emperor that d i rect rule by t he emperor was necessary a nd in t hat event suspension of the constitution would be u navoidable. Later the em1 32 . Ben-Ami Shillony, "The February 26 Affair: Politics o f a M i litary I nsurrection" i n Crisis Politics i n Prewar Japan, p p . 36-3 7 . Shillony's essay, the most i ncisive dissection o f t he February 26 I ncident to appear in English, shows not only t hat Prince Chichibu supported the rebels but also that other members of the imperial family, such as Prince H igashikuni and Prince Asaka , were in sympathy with the plot . Support by General Mazaki , who was in formed by the rebels of their plans one month before t he i nsurrection occurred , and other Army leaders is also abundantly clear: "The extensive political connections of t he February 1 93 6 rebels i ndicate that t he Affair was of a much more serious character than is usually assumed . It was serious not because extremist junior officers i mposed t heir views on a spineless establishment , but because powerful elements of t he establishment had decided to extend their support to a group of fanatic idealists i n the lower echelons of the military. The February 1 936 rebellion was not a mere mutiny, although it was later so described by those w hose i nterest was in depicting it as such . . . . If it was an insurrection, then it was the i nsurrection of a whole segment of the Japanese military, from top to bottom, agai nst another segment wieldi ng power through t he General Staff ' (Ibid . , p . 49). In short , t he February 26 coup attempt was an extensive plot that came very close to success. The emperor's clear and steady opposition to the rebellion was one of the major causes for its suppression (Ibid . , pp. 39, 42-4 3 ) .
306
K I DO
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peror told the Grand Chamberlain that he could not possibly agree to anything that would tarnish the virtue of his a ncestors : he ruled i n accordance with the constitution and i t was impossible for h i m to destroy something created by the Emperor Meij i , which suspension of the constitution would surely amount to. 133 Pri nce C hichibu continued to be a problem even during 1 94 1 , when renovationists controlled the government and traditionalist Kido was at the emperor's side as Privy Seal . The problem was how to keep C hichibu from meddl i ng in politics , and those who had to solve it were the emperor and the leading palace officials. On Sep tember 16 Privy Seal Kido audienced with Pri nce Takamatsu, the emperor's second brother, to talk about a diplomatic settlement wit h the United States . I n the course of their discussion, Prince Ta kamatsu suggested that Prince C hichibu be kept informed of I m perial Conference decisions and other matters of national policy and that Kido arrange reports for that purpose . Kido replied that if Prince Chichibu were in good health, such reporti ng would occur as a matter of course; he also promised that he would seek advice on Prince Takamatsu's suggestion. 134 The next day Kido audienced with the emperor and they talked about Takamatsu's proposal . The emperor argued that it would be premature to discuss national policies with C hichibu; Chichibu's recovery might be impaired . On September 1 9 Kido tal ked w i t h Deputy G ra nd C hamberl a i ns Kanroj i and Hirohata about Takamatsu's stance, and on September 20 he discussed the same matter with the I mperial Household M inister and the Director of Peerage Affairs . Then, on September 22 , Kido talked about C hichibu's recent state of health with Pri nce C hichibu's aide (bello ) and audienced again with the emperor. 135 Fi nally, on September 26, Kido called on Takamatsu to report on the proposal . Kido told Takamatsu that in the j udgment of the emperor , t he I mperial H ousehold M inister, and the attending physician, it was not yet time for C hichibu to be brought i nto consultations on important state policies. 136 Kido a nd his palace colleagues had suC'1 33 . 1 34 . 1 35 . 1 3 6.
Honj o Shigeru, p . 1 63 . Kido Koichi , 2 : 907 . Ibid . , p. 908 . Ibid . , p. 909.
K I DO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
PO LI T I C S
3 07
ceeded i n isolating Pri nce C hichibu from the political process i n 1 94 1 . As this and the previous examples have illustrated , imperial princes were highly statused personages on the periphery of the palace negotiation process who constantly threatened the palace's delicate machi nery for resolving political conflict . If such persons were Shrines , dumbly manipulated as robots in the political system , they were manipulated against one another, and especially against the emperor. I n other words, they were Shrines in multiple i nstitu tions of imperial prerogative who i ntensified , rather than mitigated , the competition among institutions , factions, and coalitions to de clare the Imperial Will in politics . It was the divisiveness amon g Shrines , dumbly manipulated or not , rather than their type of be havior in the national polity as a w hole, t hat was important in the political process . I mperial pri nces posed serious problems to the unity of state policies and were a constant challenge to the ne gotiating skil l of the palace leaders , who had either to unite them around the emperor and his Officials or to negotiate them out of the political process altogether. Kido was largely successful in such ne gotiation , and primarily at the second strategy , not only i n 1 94 1 but throughout his tenure as Privy Seal from 1 940 to 1 94 5 . I n none o f the years w e have a nalyzed , however, were Shrines , much less Outlaws, the most importa nt group of political per sonalities in Kido's pattern of associations . As table 23 reveals, Of ficials and q uasi-Officials (aristocrats with limited or no experience in court and government who were members of the House of Peers) were of key importance in all three years . Table 23 attempts to classify Kido's Official associates as officeholders , former of ficeholders , and other ki nds of Officials, such as members of the H ouse of Peers , in order to illustrate the diversity of Officials Kido met ten times or more and the changes in Kido's associations withi n the Official class as his palace role changed from secretary to bu reaucrat to negotiator . I t is readily apparent that as Kido rose in the Official hierarchy his associations with officeholders of higher, equal , and lower rank i ncreased : from 2 7 . 4 percent i n 1 932 to 4 1 . 2 percent in 1 936 to 5 0 . 5 percent in 1 94 1 . Association with former officials who were members of the House of Peers and with members of the
308
KIDO
AND
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OF
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PO L I T I C S
TABLE 23. KIDO KOICHI ' S ASSOCIATES IN 1 932, 1 936, AND 1 94 1 : TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF ASSOCIATION FOR THOSE MET TEN TIMES OR MORE 1932 No. of Meetings
Type Shrines Emperor Other imperial family Officials Officials of equal or higher rank who held office in court or government during all or part of the year Officials of lower rank who held office in court or government during all or part of the year Former officials who were members of the House of Peers Other former officials Members of the House of Peers with no court or government experience Outlaws Others (family, etc.) Total
1941
1936
%
No. of Meetings
%
0
0%
82
10 . 7%
0 0
0 0
16 66
No. of Meetings
%
336
30 . 4%
2.1 8.6
313 23
28 . 3 2.1
456
91 . 2 %
636
83 . 0%
650
58 . 8 %
1 37
27 . 4
141
18 .4
429
38 . 8
0
1 75
22 . 8
1 29
11 .7
202
40 . 4
200
26 . 1
10
0.9
0 1 17
0 23 . 4
20 1 00
2 .6 13 . 1
44
38
4.0 3 .4
0
0%
0
0%
15
1 . 4%
1 04
9 . 4%
0
44
500
8 . 8% 1 00%
48 766
6 . 3% 1 00%
1 ' 1 05
1 00%
H ouse of Peers with no court or government experience decreased accordingl y : from 63 . 8 percent in 1 932 to 3 9 . 2 percent in 1 93 6 to a mere 4 . 3 percent i n 1 94 1 . As Kido became a higher Official , therefore , his associations with Officials i ncreased and those with quasi -Officials decreased .
K I DO
AND
MATRIX
OF
P A LA C E
POLITI C S
309
The predominance of Officials i n Kido's patterns of association, the i ncrease in contact with officeholding Officials as Kido advanced in Official rank, and the diversity of contact within the Official cate gory can be explai ned by the nature of Kido's offices and official duties . As a palace Official , Kido associated with persons with whom he was supposed to associate by virtue of his and their offices . Such associations are simply not explai ned by reference to Maruyama 's typol ogy of political personality . Si nce Official associations were primary to Kido's political life , moreover, it is a misrepresentation to suggest that his i nteractions with Outlaws and Shri nes were of primary importance in his political behavior. Even when Kido was closest to the throne and i n constant communication with the em peror-Shrine, associations with Officials domi nated his behavior with those political personalities outside that category . Kido brought to each of his three offices and the roles they entailed his ow n political style, skills, ingroup associations , personal aspira tions , and policy preferences . These elements , interacting with Kido's offices and official duties , generated patterns of behavior that were far more complex and functi onal to the political process than M a ruyama ' s typol ogy of political pers onality-behavior reveals . Kido's behavior ill ustrated three roles that were critical to the prewar governi ng process : secretary , bureaucrat , and negotiator. His associations reveal that others performed similar roles , w hile yet other political actors functi oned as policy advocates , instruments of pressure, and ratifiers . It is time to concl ude by incorporating these roles , and the matrix of association that li nked them together, i nto a working model of decision making i n prewar Japan.
CHAPTER SIX
PALACE AND POLITIC S IN PREWAR JAPAN : AN INTERPRETATION
THE LATE
E . E . S cHATTSCHNEIDER has written :
Democratic government is the greatest single instrument for the socializa tion of conflict in the A merican c om m u n ity . . . Government in a democracy is a great engine for expanding t he scale of conflict . 1 .
A democratic society is a free society, and " a free society maximizes the contagion of conflict ; it i nvites i ntervention and gives a high priority to the participation of the public i n conflict . " 2 U nderlying the democratic socialization of conflict are a host of critically suppor tive values : the desirability of open competition, free i nvolvement , and free inquiry i n politics; the right of all citizens to vote for the candidates of their choice; a belief in the election of public officials, i n legislative enactment of laws by accountable representatives, in in dividual equality before the laws . Democratic society thrives on indi vidual initiative, open competition among individuals a nd groups , and publicity. B ut democratic government also seeks to rule effec tively by bringing t he maximum number of citizens into t he market place of politics . Since all i n theory have the right to participate, for example, all i n theory are bound by the decisions of "their" demo1 . E . E. Schattschn eider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist 's View of Democracy in A merica (New York : Holt, R inehart and Winston, 1 967 ) , p . 13. His emphasis. 2. Ibid . , p . 5 .
31 1
312
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cratic government . By " socializ i ng conflict , " it might be argued , a democratic government hopes to resolve conflict a nd thereby govern effectively . One is therefore tempted to modify Schattschneider's maxim to read : Because democratic government is t he greatest single i nstrument for the socialization of conflict i n the A merican community , it governs effectivel y .
Ideally, democracy embraces values and procedures t hat make de sirable and possible the orderly expansion of orderly conflict ; ideally, socialization of conflict i n a democracy is a means of resolvi ng con flict peaceably and therefore an effective strategy of governing. Socialization of conflict , however, is but one strategy of governi ng . At t he other pole of strategy is the privatization of conflict . "A look at political literature shows that there has i ndeed been a long standing struggle between the conflicting tendencies toward the pri vatization a nd socialization of conflict. "3 Being the opposite of so cialization, privatization of conflict limits the number of participants in a given conflict , discourages " outsiders " from entering the con flict , keeps issues from public scrutiny, and utilizes the "principle of unanimity of decision" among t hose few resolving the conflict . 4 I f democracy i n the United States has relied primarily on strategies of socializat i o n , prewar Japa nese government rel ied eq ually on strategies of privatization. Prewar Japanese politics i nvolved t he in verse of Schattschneider's maxim on democratic government in America and might be phrased as follows: The imperial government was t h e greatest single i nstrument for the priva tization of conflict in the prewar J apanese community . Government in prewar Japan was a great structure for contracting the scale of open con flict .
Prewar Japanese society attempted to minimize the contagion of con flict ; it discouraged i ntervention and gave a low priority to the partici pation of the public i n conflict . Underlyi ng the privatization of conflict in prewar Japanese politics were a host of critically supportive values : the undesirability of open competition, free i nvolvement , a nd free i n quiry i n politics ; the duty of all enfranchised subjects to vote for those 3. Ibid . , p . 7. His emphasis. 4. Ibid . , pp. 8-9.
AN
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313
who would loyally serve the Imperial Will; a belief i n the imperial ap pointment of public officials, in the imperial sanction of all laws consented to by a dutiful assembly of elected subjects of the empire, i n individual obedience to acts of government . I mperial Japanese society thrived on disguised i nitiative, hidden competition among i ndividuals and groups, and rumor. The imperial government hoped to rule effec tively by bri nging a mi nimum number of subjects into the imperial corridors of politics . B y privatizing conflict the imperial government hoped to resolve conflict and thereby govern effectively. J ust as socialization of conflict is both a strategy and an ideal i n American democracy , so privatization o f conflict i n prewar Japanese politics was both a strategy and an ideal . I n chapter 2 we saw that the ideal underlying the Meij i Constitution was that of imperial prerog ative. The strategy was to bring the decision-making process into the corridors of the 2 7 5 -acre palace in which the emperor's prerogatives were castled , sealed off by walls and moats and guarded by the gate keepers of t he I mperial W i l l . The separat ion of court and government , palace autonomy , and the fusion of rites and court were devices to enhance the transcendental immutability of imperial prero gative , to make the palace an i nviolable sanctuary for the resol ution of political conflict , and thus to make conflict among political leaders in visible. Decisions were to appear " i nevitable , " "in the nature of things ," "a matter of course . " Public harmony was the mark of good government and good governors . We have seen, for example, that M otoda Eifu criticized Ito Hirobumi in the 1 880s for bei ng unable to control "public sentiment " ; the presence of public conflict and criticism meant that Ito had fallen short of ideal statesmanship. Public harmony was to be attai ned , i n part , by the q uietude and unity of governmental leaders as they carried t he I mperial W i l l fort h una nimously from the palace for public display . It was also to be at tained in the I mperial Diet by the public expression of unity between emperor and subjects, government and people . Ideally, the I mperial Diet was not to be a forum for open competition among the people over political office and publ ic policy . The I mperial Diet was to be a harmonious assembly of imperial subj ects to assist the emperor and the government i n achievi ng unanimity and harmony . To state that harmony and unanimity were the ideals of Japanese
314
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politics does not , of course, mean that conflict was in fact lacki ng . Prewar Japanese politics, from the Restoration of 1 868 to 1 945 , was rife with personal and factional strife. Assassi nation and assassi nation plots were common occurrences , not j ust aberrations of the 1 930s : oligarch O kubo Toshimichi was assassi nated in 1 87 8 , Ito Hirobumi in 1 909 (in Harbin by a Korean) , Prime M i nister Hara Kei i n 1 92 1 , Prime M inister l nukai Tsuyoshi i n 1 93 2 , Privy Seal Saito Makoto in 1 93 6 . By the late 1 920s, moreover, rivalry among and within the in stitutions of imperial prerogative was the hallmark of Japanese politics . Nor did prewar Japan lack public disturbances and political movements . It was to create harmony and consensus that ideals and strategies of privatization were employed : techniques of privatization were adopted to cope with conflict , however successfully, because con flict was endemic to Japanese politics, however disguised . What were the issues that agitated Japanese politics and how did the palace relate to political conflict ? Speaki ng of B ritish politics duri ng the reign of George I I I , Richard Pares states that political issues were necessarily a nd even rightly concerned with the composition and the behaviour of the executive . The Government existed , in t hose days, not in order to legislate but in order to govern : to maintain order, to wage war and , above all, to conduct foreign affairs . These things made up, in t hose times, nine tenths of government ; and most of the controversies w hich divided politicians and parties concerned foreign affairs , or those q uestions about t he distribution of t he national effort in war-time , which were connected with foreign af fairs. The most prominent single issue was what one might call the 'German q uestion . '- . . . W hen this controversy slept-as it often did-there was nothing to think about , in t he middle eighteenth century , but the control and com position of t he executive government itself. I ndeed , when there is nothing to do but to govern, no other subj ect is worth thinking about . 5
Whether Pares is accurate regarding B ritish politics i n the late eighteenth century I am simply not q ualified to j udge ; but his statement applies neatly to Japanese politics throughout the period 1 868 to 1 945 if one modifies the specifics of the issues and takes ac5. Richard Pares, King George Ill and the Politicians (London: Oxford U niversity Press , 1 96 7 ) , pp. 4-5 .
AN
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315
count of differences m political styles . The issues facing Japa n throughout that period primarily i nvolved foreign policy and the composition of the Cabi net , i nclud i ng who was to be Prime M i niste r . Of course , plans for i ndustrialization a nd economic development , concerns not salient i n late eighteenth-century English politics , greatly affected Japan's choices a nd alternatives on both sets of issues . Issues of diplomacy , of war and peace, were ever present as Japan struggled to gain a nd maintain Great Power status, to " stand tall i n t he world " : the unequal treaties ( 1 85 5-94), Japanese domination first in Korea ( 1 873- 1 9 1 0) and t hen i n East Asia ( 1 9 1 0-45 ) , alliances with t he Great Powers t o preserve Japan's primacy in East Asia-first with E ngland in 1 902 and t hen with the Axis in 1 940 , war with China i n 1 894 and agai n in 1 93 7 , war with I mperial Russia in 1 904 , war against Germany in 1 9 1 4 , war against the U nited States a nd the Allies i n 1 94 1 . The composition of the Japanese executive was of equal importance i n national politics . At first , leading government positions were subj ect to competition among a small number of oligarchs . After 1 900, however, the battle over cabinet posts and the Prime M inistership was i ncreasi ngly waged among the plural i nstitutions of imperial prerogative-the I mperial Diet , the military , the civil bureaucracies . Each of these in stitutions , creatures of Japanese political modernization, sought to maximize its voice and ultimately to declare , alone or in concert wit h allies, the I mperial Will i n politics. Between 1 885 and 1 945 t here were no less than forty-three Cabinets , or one every 1 .4 years . However privatized , the competition over "the composition and the behaviour of the executive" was fierce . Prewar Japanese government did, i n fact , exist " not i n order to legislate but in order to gover n . " A nd the power to govern was l odged firmly in the Japanese executive. The power to appoint the Prime M inister and Cabinet ministers was an imperial prerogative ( Co nstitution of the Great Empire of Japan, Article 1 0) , as was the power to declare war, make peace , a nd conclude treaties (Article 1 3) . As such, both the composition of the prewar Japanese executive and the conduct of foreign affairs were subject to privatized conflict reso lution ultimately ratified by t he emperor . The Prime M i nister and
316
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M inisters of State were not officially appointed until they had been formally invested by the ceremony of direct imperial appointment at the palace; the formation of a new Cabi net always dated from the day of that ceremony . A declaration of war could only be legitimate if it emanated from the palace and carried the imperial seal and great seal of state, both in the custody of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal . The decisions leading to war agai nst I mperial Russia i n 1 904 and agai nst the U nited States i n 1 94 1 were ultimately made by no more than fifteen persons convened in I mperial Conference at the palace. B oth appointments of the Prime M i nister and declarations of war were expressed as the unanimous consensus of the emperor's close advisors , i ncluding the top executive leaders . Neither was sub ject to a vote i n the I mperial Diet . At no time during the prewar period did the Japanese executive the officials and advisers to the throne entitled to " render advice and assistance" to the emperor-surrender t he right to i nitiate the ap pointment of the leading officials of state , both military and civilian, or the right to conduct foreign policy . Those forces and i nfluences in Japanese society w ho wished to make policy had no other recourse but to capture positions in t he Japanese executive that would allow them to render advice and assistance to t he throne and t hereby take part i n the declaration of the I mperial Wil l . At no time during the prewar period did the palace surrender the right to ratify the consensus reached by the Japanese executive. Responsibility for rati fyi ng the national consensus in prewar Japanese politics was lodged in the palace , not in an open legislative forum or in socialized election procedures . The palace was the apex of the privatized de cision-making structure in Japanese politics , ideally and strategi cally. This somewhat exaggerated statement of the privatization of con flict i n prewar Japa nese politics and the relation of the palace to the privatization process is not i ntended by any means to obscure the im mense changes i n Japanese society and i n the composition of i t s political forces t hat occurred during the prewar period . It docs , however, poi nt to t he centrality of norms and strategies of privatiza tion and the centrality of the palace throughout the prewar period , regardless of the emergence of new political forces, changes i n
AN
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317
policies , and the pluralization of government institutions . I n other words, those forces wishing to gai n a voice in or to dominate Japanese politics , whatever their organization and policies , had to consider the imperial referent in decision maki ng. The radical left , notably the Communist Party of Japan, was forced to deny the im perial referent and consequently the entire structure and operation of prewar Japanese government . The radical right , most notably the fascists led by Kita l kki and others , felt obliged , on the contrary , to claim a monopoly over the I mperial Will and to declare itself sole in terpreter. M ore important , however, were the i nstitutions and persons actually responsible for conducting the affairs of government . In the late Meij i period , 1 885 to 1 9 1 2 , an oligarchy of some ten men com prised the inner circle for advisi ng the emperor on the composition of the government a nd on foreign policy . These men were the creators of modern political institutions, not their creatures . The spirit of per sonal competition that prevailed among them was not paralyzed or aggravated by i nstitutional competition. Although Yamagata Ari tomo had been the guidi ng force behind the creation of a modern army , his dedication to that enterprise did not prevent him from cooperating with Ito Hirobumi , the oligarch primarily responsible for creating the constitution and nurturi ng the civil i nstitutions of government . The appointment of Matsukata Masayoshi as Prime M inister in 1 892 was made, as we have seen, at the recommendation of four oligarchs , i ncluding both Yamagata and Ito. Ito and Yama gata were also in complete accord on goi ng to war with Russia i n 1 904 .6 W hen w a r broke out between J apan and Russia, therefore , the government was unified : " neither the problem of State Affairs and Supreme Command nor opposition between the Cabinet and 6 . On the events leading to the decision for war against I mperial Russia, see Gaimu Sho, ed . , Nihon Gaiko Monjo (Tokyo: Gaimusho Zohan, 1 95 8 ) , ser. 4 7 , vol . 37, no. I , pp. 92-93 ; Gensui Koshaku O yama lwao, pp . 629-634; and Yamamoto Eisuke, Yamamoto Gombei (Tokyo: J ij i Tsiishin Sha, 1 95 8) , pp . 1 34-4 1 . Although I cannot locate the source for the anec dote, Yamagata is alleged to have thrown his arms around Ito at the end of the I mperial Conference of February 4 , 1 904 , when the derision for war was fi nalized, and said to Ito that he sympathized profoundly with Ito's plight : if Japan lost Yamagata would die a glorious death in battle; Ito, however, would have to reconstruct Japan from the wreckage and humiliation of defeat .
318
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Senior Retainers over j urisdiction existed . "7 The government and the military , the Cabinet a nd the Elder Statesmen, were united under the leadership of a truly i ndependent coterie of oligarchs . As " politicians of origi nal merit" (genkun seijika) , Ito, Yamagata and the other few members of the Restoration leadership believed it their privilege to answer the emperor's i nquiries concerning the selection of the Prime M i nister and t he determi nation of basic state policies , especially i n matters of war a nd peace.8 After 1 9 1 2 , however, the oligarchic unity surroundi ng the throne gradually gave way to i nstitutional competition to declare the Im perial Will i n Japanese politics . The i nstitutions created by t he oligarchs between 1 868 and 1 890 gradually produced their ow n leaders . The feedback of i nstitutional elites created the politics of special pleading by leaders who were products of exclusive stan dardized achievement routes m a i ntai ned by each bureaucrati c component o f government . Such leaders competed among themselves for the right to declare the I mperial Will, frequently on behalf of their i nstitutional constituencies . All i nstitutions of government , moreover, had their j ustificat i o n i n i mperial prerogati ve . The military claimed its right to declare the I mperial Will on the basis of the emperor's prerogative of supreme command over the armed forces . By the 1 930s, the concept of " national defense, " based on the prerogative of supreme command , became the rationalization for the military's massive i ntervention i n politics. Quarrels between the military and the Foreign M inistry frequently degenerated i nto j uris dictional disputes over the imperial prerogative of supreme command and the imperial prerogative to conduct foreign policy , especially i n regard to Japan's C hina policy . . There were j urisdictional disputes between the "emperor's police" of the Home M i nistry and the " em peror's soldiers" of the Army. Although not a bureaucratic i nstitution, the I mperial Diet also claimed its primacy in the i nstitutional foray over the I mperial Will on the basis of imperial prerogative-the emperor's legislative prerog ative . During the 1 920s, for example, the slogan " normal course of 7. lwabuchi Tatsuo, " Kido Naifu no Sekinin," Shinsei (Nova Vita) , October I , 1 94 5 , p. II. 8 . I nada Masatsugu,
p.
25.
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constitutional government " was a n assertion by the I mperial Diet of its primacy in declari ng the I mperial Wil l . This did not necessarily mean that either or both the House of Peers and House of Representa tives should elect the Prime Minister and his Cabi net ; it did mean that the palace should appoint as Prime Mi nister the leader of the maj ority or maj or political party, preferably in t he lower house-the House of Representatives . Whether or not the palace appointed such a Prime M inister, however, was up to the j udgment of those "close to the throne , " most notably, in the 1 920s and 1 930s, Pri nce Saionj i , the ex Prime M i nisters , and the Privy Seal . The appoi ntment of the Prime M inister was simply a prerogative of t he throne . Like the appointment of the Prime M inister, all i nsti tutional claims on the I mperial Will had to be ratified in the palace; it was there that political decisions ultimately became the I mperial Will . The components of imperial prerogative-the I mperial Diet , the Army and Navy, the Foreign M i nistry , the Home M i nistry exerted policy and personnel pressures , but t he palace took the barometer readings and measured the vectors of pressure. During the 1 930s the pressure of t he military component of the imperial pre rogative could not be ignored . The barometer readi ngs taken by the palace after 1 932 increasi ngly pointed to a high pressure area moving toward national mobilization for war , national defense predicated on military domination of Asia, and Cabi nets amenable to the military's policies . Those close to the throne , however, never permitted the military complete dominion. I nstitutional balances were still maintai ned i n the composition o f the Cabinet , though the military representatives carried the most weight . Even at the height of t he Pacific War, the military failed to capture dominion at t he side of the emperor : at least two of the four leadi ng palace officers were moderate or "cir cumspect " representatives from the " outside" bureaucracy . I t was precisely because of the palace's barometer reading and ratification functions that all channels to all components of imperial prerogative had to be kept open. If the Cabinet was to reflect the "trends of the times" i n its composition and policies , the palace, because of its ra tification function, had to have the means and skills required to measure those trends. Thus , as Prince Saionj i argued , the I mperial
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Household M inistry itself had to be kept "in line with the times" by appropriate leaders from the " outside" ; otherwise, it would lose its " raison d 'etre . " We may, then, conclude with Maruyama t hat governmental operations in prewar Japan did not embody " ' political process , ' namely, public competition among diverse social groups for the con trol of a State apparatus t hat in itself is regarded as neutral . " 9 Japan's process of privatized decision making fell far short of any Western model of democracy , as Maruyama rightly claims . B ut if politics i n prewar Japan was not a public process , are we then j us tified i n arguing, as Maruyama does, that "a more irrational ar rangement prevailed i n w hich decisions depended on fortuitous human relations, psychological coercion by the Elder Statesmen a nd other ' officials close to the Throne , ' shifts i n the relative strength of cliques , deals among wire-pullers and bosses , assignation-house politics , and so forth" ? 10 Speaking of C hoshu domai n between 1 840 and 1 868, Albert Craig has elaborated t he mechanism of policy change and power transfer in a feudal government : A change from one clique to the other could be effected by switching about a small number of men. M embers of the opposing bureaucratic clique might still be i n the government , but , once removed from the key positions, their function would be purely administrative. Also, . . . not all of the of ficials in the han [domain ] government belonged to the two cliq ues . There remained a strong uncommitted center of gravity made up of neutralist of ficials . Because o f this neutral middle group and the small number o f key posi tions , a small change was at times sufficient to transfer power from one clique to the other. The daimyo ( l ord of the domain] and the Elders [ advi sory council of leading retainers] were in the position to make this change . Yet , throughout the Bakumatsu period [ca . 1 840-67 ) , the daimyo and Elders of Choshii were incompetent. . . . However, i n spite of their ineptitude, the daimyo and the Elders remai ned the ultimate source of power within the han; rule by either clique was rule i n the name of th<' daimyo and with the approval of most of the Elders . This combination of weakness and authority accounts for the freq ue n t change from o n e clique to the other. Since the daimyo a n d the Elders w e r l ' 9 . M a ruyama M a s a o , Thought and Behavzour, 1 0. Ibid . , p . 232 .
pp.
229-30.
H i s emphasi s .
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weak they were easily swayed by " public opinion . " When . . . the dominant feeling i n the han was one of the need for reform, they would put t h e refo r m i s t s in powe r . W h e n a react i o n a r o s e aga i n s t t h e reform, . . . they reverted to the moderate . . . . But i n spite of their personal shortcomings , the daimyo and Elders could not be completely domi nated by either clique i n power, because socially and politically their positions were so far above those of the bureaucratic cliques . . . . The power to appoint officials, . . . remained i n the hands of the daimyo who, it seems, was i nfluenced mainly by the " public opi nion " of the collectivity of Elders and some of his highest-ranking retainers . These i n turn were sensitive to a much wider compass of opinion that probably i ncluded their own retainers , merchants , samurai bureaucrats, and others . 1 1
Although the C hoshii model cannot b e applied i n its feudal purity to t he entirety of the prewar Japanese political process , it is remarkably relevant to the role of the palace from 1 868 to 1 945 . The emperor, of course, held a far more prominent position as head of the entire Japanese nation than did the daimyo of C hoshii , one of over two hundred domai ns that made up the feudal polity of Tokugawa Japan. The emperor's position was also far more com plex in its composition than that of a feudal lord , however powerful . I n his transcendental role as emperor were fused his traditional role as high priest to the Japanese people, t he role of feudal l ord acquired w hen the shogun returned his powers to the emperor in 1 867 , and the role of constitutional monarch acquired in 1 889 w hen the em peror obtained monarchical prerogatives in a constitutional legal order. Yet t he emperor did perform the same ratification function i n Japanese politics from 1 868 to 1 945 that the daimyo o f C hoshii performed from 1 840 to 1 867 . I n performing his role the emperor was assisted by advisers , " those close to t he throne , " much as t he daimyo of C hoshii was assisted by the Elders . Again , w hile there are differences in the nature of t hose advisers , their function was remarkably similar. The Elders of C hoshii were the highest feudal retainers i n the entourage of t he daimyo, holding t heir positions by right of birt h . Almost all those close to the throne between 1 868 and 1 94 5 , however, held their 1 1 . Albert M . Craig, Choshu in the Meiji Restoration (Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard University Press, 1 96 1 ) , pp. 1 1 4- 1 5 .
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positiOns as a result of " achievement" -success in bureaucratic leadership outside the palace . This was true, as we have noted , of the four leadi ng palace officials w hose primary role, as a collectivity , was to guard the emperor's ratification function a nd to act as catalysts i n t he process of reachi ng the consensus on which the Im perial Will i n japanese politics was based . Like the daimyo of Choshu , the emperor was also " influenced mainly by t he ' public opi nion' of the collectivity" of his advisers , who, like the Elders of C hoshu, approved of t heir l ord 's actions before those actions were taken. By the 1 930s t he function of ad vising the throne on political appointments as basic as the ap pointment of the Prime M inister a nd on policy decisions as basic as i nternational treaties was performed by the Elder Statesman (Pri nce Saionj i ) , the Senior Retai ners (ex-Prime M inisters) , the President of the Privy Council , and the Privy Seal . These were t he primary nego tiators in the process of imperial ratification. Although they may have had policy preferences in their roles as negotiators , they were not primarily political activists or policy advocates : they did not lead active political groups , public or private, once they attained the role of adviser to the throne . Their primary responsibility was to assist the emperor in reachi ng the I mperial Will in politics . If they held policy preferences , as most of them apparently did , they at tempted to have those preferences realized as the I mperial Will if it were possible to do so. During 1 93 0 , for example , Pri nce Saionj i was firmly convinced t hat Japan must conti nue to court the United States and Great B ritain by ratifying the London Naval Treaty ; he allied with Prime M inister Hamaguchi Osachi and other leaders agai nst the Navy General Staff. B ut Saionj i and the rest of those close to the throne (including the four leadi ng palace officials) would not persist in policies that i n their j udgment would endanger the transcendental role of the emperor . 12 This meant essentially that the negotiators would advise the em peror to appoint as Prime M inister that person most able to "cope with the situation" or to ratify that policy most " i n l i ne with the times" at any given moment . In so doi ng they were i nfluenced by 1 2 . Harada Kumao, vol . I , passim.
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their estimate of " public opi nion" as well as by their personnel and policy prefere nces . The emperor's advisers , l i ke t he Elders of Choshu, were " sensitive to a much wider compass of opinion . " Such " public opi nion" was not public i n the commonly understood sense of that term . It was not measured by public opinion polls, elections , or other public testi ng devices. Nor was it made public i n the press , radio, or other means of public communication. By p ublic opi nion was meant the views of persons who counted , not the public at large . B y the 1 930s those who counted were the bureaucratic policy advo cates who directed the plural i nstitutions of government . What counted was the weight assigned by the negotiators to any one or combination of such policy advocates a nd the importance attached , once again by the negotiators , to any one or combi nation of the components of imperial prerogative-I mperial Diet , Foreign M i n istry, Army , Navy . The i nformation gathered about the policy advocates and their components of imperial prerogative was acquired through an elabo rate network of privatized communication and was destined not for the public but for the negotiators, to assist them in producing the unanimous I mperial Will for public display . The hub of the com munication process among the negotiators was the sanctuary of the palace itself, at least when they or their representatives met to reach a consensus . We have seen, for example, that Privy Seal Kido's central base of operations as a negotiator i n 1 94 1 was unques tionably the palace . For Saionj i , as Elder Statesman, the palace served only as the formal place to report t he consensus. Other nego tiators , i ncluding the palace leaders , went to see Saionj i at his villa at Okitsu if the need arose . More often they relied on Saionj i ' s secretary , B aron Harada Kumao. The breathtaking pace o f activity maintained by Harada and Kido, when Kido served as C hief Secretary to the Privy Seal , illustrates t he key role played in the communication process by t he secretary , who gathered i nformation on policy preferences and opi nion trends within the components of imperial prerogative at i nformal meetings, homes , restaurants , and clubs . The i nformation so gathered was destined primarily for the negotiators i n their capacities as advisers to the throne, not for the public . Both Harada and Kido, for example, were annoyed when
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newspaper reporters asked questions , as they frequently did , about such rumors as the immi nence of a Cabinet resignation. According to their own records, Kido and Harada held the press i n contempt and counted it a matter of pride to remain tight-lipped with reporters or better yet , to put off their questions skillfully. Newspaper reporters were " outsiders . " Policy i nitiatives , however, did not reside primarily with the nego tiator or t he secretary , but with the policy advocate . " Policy , " as used here , does not refer to those decisions that could be made and implemented by one component of government essentially without reference to the others. Ordinarily, for example, the emperor's trips to the imperial villa at Hayama were decided upon and arranged by the I mperial H ousehold M i nister and court officials, without much more than formal not i ficat i o n t o t he government . Rather, by "policy" is meant decisions that req uired negotiation among the components of imperial prerogative and subseq uent imperial ratifi cation: the appoi ntment of the Prime M i nister and his Cabi net , foreign policy , the national budget , economic planning. The imperial government of Japan i n the 1 93 0s was far greater in scope of operations and far more complex than the administration of Choshu in the 1 840s . For example, clique rivalries i n Choshu ap parently did not have t he added complexity of i nstitutional rivalry that characterized Japanese government in the 1 920s and 1 930s . Yet policy was i nitiated , as i n C hoshu, by " bureaucratic cliques" of policy advocates and their followi ngs i n the imperial government . Though not as unified as the C hoshu bureaucratic cliques , bureau cratic opi nion centers during the 1 920s and 1 930s held the i nitiative i n advocati ng the policies with w hich the negotiators a nd secretaries deal t . And like t he policy process in Choshu, policy changes could be realized by "switchi ng about a small number of men , " however dif ficult the process of switchi ng might have been. Finally, there ap pears to have been a vast neutral center of bureaucrats i n the im perial government , much as there had been i n the ad mi nistration i n C hoshu : persons w h o merely administered the affairs o f court and government . One side of the competition to declare the I mperial Will in politics during the 1 920s and 1 930s was strictly i nstitutional : the Foreign
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M inistry versus the Army on jurisdiction over China policy , the Army versus the Navy over budget allocations for national defense and strategic priorities , the H ome M i nistry versus t he Army over police j urisdiction. A second side was i ntrainstitutional , involving factionalism over personnel promotions and i nstitutional priorities , such as that fou nd i n the Army between the I mperial Way Faction and the Control Faction, among others . 13 Factionalism at the micro i nstitutional level , paradoxically, allowed macro-opi nion centers to form on the i nterinstitutional level . A pol icy group within one insti tutional component of imperial prerogative sought allies withi n others . The pro-German faction within t he Foreign M i nistry , for example, fou nd support in the J ustice M i nistry and the Army . The pro-Anglo-American side of the Foreign M inistry found allies in the Navy and Finance Ministry . The primary role of the negotiators and the secretaries was to discover and sustain suitable interi nstitutional opi nion groupings that would declare the Imperial Will i n politics effectively. During the 1 920s and 1 930s, two basic bureaucratic opi nion centers might be identified : the constitutionalists and the renova tionists . The former group of policy advocates favored ( 1 ) noni nter vention by the military in " politics " ; (2 ) if not party Cabinets , at least party Prime Ministers ; (3) i nternational alliance with the United States and Great B ritai n ; and (4) preservation of the em peror as a constitutional monarch. The renovationists favored ( 1 ) na tional mobilization and mil itary preparedness , largely at military i nitiative; (2) "transcendental" Cabi nets free from pol itical party i n fl uence and representation; (3) i nternational alliance with the Axis powers ; and ( 4) an absolutist or mystical theory of "direct imperial rule" with the emperor as "god manifest . " B oth groups were essentially bureaucratic. Several constitutionalist leaders , such as Hamaguchi Osachi , had also, however, served in the House of Representatives for many years . Even some of the renovationists , such as Matsuoka Yosuke , had served i n that H ouse . A nd both the const i t utionalists a nd t he renovat ionists were concer ned w i t h increasi ng Japan's i nternational reputation and prestige . The dif1 3 . On the complexity of Army factionalism, see James B . Crowley, "Japanese Army Fac tionalism in the 1 930's," Journal of Asian Studies 3 1 , no. 3. (May 1 962): 309-2 6 .
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ferences between the two opi nion centers i nvolved the means to reach that end : the constitutionalists sought to win power and prestige i nternationally by cooperati ng with the United States and Great Britain; the renovationists looked to Germany and its allies as the wave of t he future. Finally, both groups were "anti-Communist , " but again they differed o n how best t o deal with the Soviet Union while agreei ng generally on the suppression of Communists at home . 14 The constitutionalists, whose policies gai ned preemi nence i n government with the appointment of Hara Kei a s Prime Mi nister i n 1 9 1 8 , had their counterpart negotiator group i n the palace : the constitutional monarchists . As discussed in chapter 4, t he constitu tional monarchists were led by Prince Saionj i Kimmochi as Elder Statesman and by Count M akino Nobuaki , Baron lchiki Kitokuro , Baron Suz. uki Kantaro, and Viscount Saito Makoto as leading palace officials from 1 92 1 to 1 93 6 . After 1 93 6 , w hen a conservative bureaucrat , Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro, replaced negotiator and constitutional monarchist Ichiki as President of the Privy Council , the renovationists gained preeminence i n national policy maki ng . The negotiators w ho responded favorably to renovationist i nitiatives were the traditionalists , led outside the palace by Prince Konoe Fumimaro and i nside the palace after 1 940 by M arquis Kido Koichi . W hatever their policy preferences and associations, however, bot h t he constitutional monarchists and t he traditionalists were primari ly responsible for maintaining the transcendence of the throne . The role of negotiator did not permit t he latitude of policy i nitiative and 1 4 . The const itutionalist and renovationist groups have been discussed briefly i n chaps . 4 and 5 . M y discussion of these policy-advocati ng coalitions and of factional operations within t he institutions of imperial prerogative has dealt i n generalizations t hat help to illuminate t hr role of the palace in t he prewar political process; in fact , of course, policy-advocati ng coalition• and factional operations were far more complex than I have i ndicated . Ito Takashi's analysis of factions, groups a nd coalitions during t he I 930 London Naval Treaty controversy , fm example, shows t hat opi nion groups were both fragmented and complex. He places groups a nd leaders on a graph having Progressive-Restorationist and Gradualist-Renovationist axes t h.1t gives a far more accurate representation of opinion configurations t han my constituti ona list renovationalist dichotomy (Ito Takas h i , "Conflicts and Coalitions , " esp . pp. 1 74 - 7 5 ) . :\ I 1 dichotomy, however, is useful in analyzing the role of the palace in politics, as opposed to t i ll' total political process, because it points to the basic confl ict over the specific role of the i m pc r i . . J institution that characterized Japan's political leadership not only i n the I 930s but also rl u r i n v, the entire period from I 889 to I 945 .
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policy advocation allowed to the bureaucrat as an i nstitutional spokesman. Although Prince Saionj i , for example, favored the constitutionalist position against the military , he would not allow the emperor to take any action that would visibly i nvolve t he throne in decision making. In 1 934, Privy Seal Makino and Grand Cham berlain Suzuki urged that the emperor call an I mperial Conference in order to restrai n the military . Saionj i vetoed the proposal : if events developed contrary to the I mperial Conference decision, the imperial virtue would be tarnished by a " wrong" decision that for mally involved the emperor . When even the emperor hoped that an Imperial Conference in 1 937 might be useful in checki ng extremism , thereby helping to restore peace with China, Saionj i agai n vetoed the proposal : a decision reached in the presence of the emperor in formal conference might miscarry . 15 Saionj i applied the same policy of imperial transcendence in se lecti ng those w ho were to serve in positions of palace leadership . Kido Koichi , for example, relates that Saionj i opposed Konoe Fumimaro's appoi ntment as I mperial H ousehold M i nister in 1 932 : Konoe had too many friends i n too many quarters and would, given his weaknesses , fi nd it difficult to resist their solicitations and " admonitions . " 16 W hatever his policy and personnel preferences , therefore , Saionj i attempted to keep the emperor from direct and visible involvement in political decision making and to prevent those who would so i nvolve him from acquiring positions of palace leadership. Saionj i constantly warned even against t he emperor's being too greatly concerned with politics during the 1 930s : if the em peror became identified as the direct proponent of a given policy he might eventually suffer the same fate that befell the German Kaiser and the monarchy in Germany following World War I . 17 Although they placed a different emphasis on different opinion ag gregates , the traditionalists were equally concerned with the em peror's transcendence . Konoe Fumimaro and Kido Koichi , as we have seen, had greater rapport with the renovationists than did Saionj i and the constitutional monarchists . Kido, however, was ful ly 1 5 . I nada Masatsugu , pp. 38-4 1 . 1 6 . Kido Kiiichi, 1 : 208 . 1 7 . Kimura Ki, Saionji Kimmochi (Tokyo: J ij i Tsushin Sha, 1 958),
p.
iii.
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aware that utmost discretion was required in regard to the emperor's political i nvolvement . In 1 93 9 , w hen he was Home M i nister in Konoe's first Cabinet , Kido is reported to have said : B asically, His M ajesty is a scientist; he is a pacifist as well as extremely liberal . Consequently, if we do not get some change in His Majesty's way of thinking in the future, a n extraordinary gulf is possible between His M aj esty and the right-wing. I f this comes about , what happened to the Emperor Komei , whose close advisers were completely changed by the shogunate , might happen here. In order to entice the Army along while appearing to be dragged along by the Army , therefore, the emperor must take a posture that shows a little more understanding of the Army . 18
Whether Kido believed that the military should make policy and w hether he sympathized with right-wing opi nion are not the issues here . Strategically, Kido was concerned that t he emperor's anti military views would endanger the transcendence of the throne if widely known to the public . He was less concerned that the emperor was , as Emperor-in-Chambers , antimilitary than that the emperor , as Emperor-i n-Public, might appear to be antimilitary . Given the " nature of the times , " the Emperor-in-Public simply could not af ford to appear, i n Kido's j udgment , antimilitary . Like Saio� i , Privy Seal Kido also attempted to keep the throne from direct i nvolvement in the decision-making process . Kido was opposed , for example, to the appointment of an imperial pri nce as Prime M inister in October 1 94 1 . If peace were likely, w hich it was not , an imperial pri nce would be acceptable . It was another thing for an imperial prince, as Prime M i nister, to lead Japan into war wit h t he U nited States . If the war ended i n disaster, the i mperial i nsti tution would be j eopardized . The reasoning behind Kido's obj ection to an imperial prince beinK nominated premier [ Prime M inister] was unquestionably sound . As lord privy seal, he bore a heavy responsibility for overseeing the continurd maintenance of an imperial i nstitution unblemished i n any way . It w a s against t hat duty that every proposal affecting the t hrone was weighed . 19
When t he emperor told Kido i n August 1 94 1 that he wished 1 8 . l nada M asatsugu , p. t he Emperor Me ij i . 1 9 . B ut o w , Tojo, p . 288.
6 5 . Emperor Komei ( 1 82 1 -6 7 , reigned 1 84 6 - 6 7 ) was the
fa t hn
Io o ol
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conduct the q uestioning directly at the scheduled September 6 Im perial Conference , Kido restrained him : the President of the Privy C ounci l , Hara Yoshimichi , would do the questioning for the em peror; it would be suitable for the emperor only to issue a warning at the end of the discussion, given the gravity of the decision to be reached . 20 The position of both these groups of negotiators from 1 92 1 to 1 945 was far more complicated and unstable than that enj oyed by the Elders of C hoshu in 1 840. Neither the constitutional monarchists nor the traditionalists held their positions by right of birth. The em peror's advisers , the functional equivalent of the Elders of Choshu , were more vul nerable to attack by " public opi nion" because they were appointed rather than hereditary officials. They were not much higher in social and political status than those who challenged them on defining the I mperial Wil l . Those policy advocates w ho wished to declare the I mperial Will , in other words , could and did challenge the negotiators , w ho were responsible for defining the I mperial Will for ratification by t he emperor. Second , the negotiators of the I mperial Will had not only to cope with greater i nstitutional complexity than prevailed in C hoshu; they also had to deal with a much wider scope of public opi nion. The Im perial Diet , however i nadequate as a democratic forum for the so cialization of conflict , was nonetheless a public place for the public expression of criticism, t hus serving to expand the scope of conflict . M ore importantly, public opi nion had become increasi ngly socialized by a n active press , by social groups w hose views were largely de pendent on w hat was reported in the press, and by a voracious news consuming public. Even though " privatized public opi nion" -the views of policy advocates and bureaucrats in the i nstitutions of im perial prerogative-remai ned t he basic sources for negotiator deci sions , by 1 930 the negotiators and their secretaries were forced to consider socialized public opinion i n reaching their decisions-publ ic attitudes and group demands reported by the press and other mass 20. l nada M asatsugu, pp. 74-75; Kido Kiiichi, 2 : 90 1 -0 5 ; Taiheiyo Sensa e no Michi, ed. N i hon Kokusai Seij i Gakka i , Tai heiyii Sensii Genin Kenkyii B u , 7 vols. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1 963 ) , 7 : 254- 5 5 . A deadl i ne on t he negotiations with the United States was under consideration at this conference. If negotiations were not successfully concluded by that date, war with the United States would be " i nevitable."
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media. H owever much Kido and Harada disliked dealing with the press, for example, they were visited by reporters whenever a crisis or rumor of crisis arose . Moreover, socialized public opi nion was manipulated by the policy advocates to exert pressure on the negotiators ; Army and Navy leaders did not hesitate to feed rumors to the press or to spread propaganda leaflets during the London Naval Treaty discussions and during the campaign against M inobe's organ theory . We have seen, for example, that the attack on M i nobe's doctrines was a public at tack in the Diet and in the press , as well as an attack by the renova tionists in the privatized corridors of conflict resolution, agai nst the constitutionalists and constitutional monarchists. O ne purpose of the attack on M i nobe was to dislodge negotiator Ichiki Kitokuro from the Presidency of the Privy Council . A constitutional monarchist , Ichiki had been given his post by Saionj i and the constitutional monarchists in an unprecedented move to block renovationist Hi ranuma's elevation from the Vice-Presidency to the Presidency i n 1 93 4 . I n 1 93 6 t he renovationists, aided b y socialized public opinion, were successful i n removi ng lchiki from the Presidency of the Privy Council , as they had been in 1 933 in removing him as I mperial H ousehold M inister. In order to dampen the extremism of renovationist policies and to preserve t he transcendence of the imperial i nstitution, the constitu tional monarchists were forced to bring the traditionalists into the palace and i nto positions of primacy in the negotiation process . The transition had begun as early as 1 930, w hen Kido Koichi was made Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal . It was completed in 1 940 when Kido was appointed Privy Seal , by that time the most important ne gotiator role in t he process of defining the I mperial Wil l . The consti tutional monarchists were forced to acknowledge t he fact , after assassi nations and assassination plots from 1 930 to 1 93 6 , that they were simply not able to " cope with the situation" any longer. They were no longer able to negotiate a united national policy . M ore seriously, they would be unable to maintain the transcendence of the throne if t hey persisted in their policies . The point of no return was reached on February 2 6 , 1 93 6 , when a bloody coup was directed against them . The Privy Seal was murdered . The Grand Cham-
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berlain was seriously wounded . Though former Privy Seal Makino escaped the assassins , as did Pri nce Saionj i , the coup was clearly a frontal attack on the constitutional monarchists as negotiators of the I mperial Will . For the first time i n Japan's modern history , a leading palace official had been assassinated and another seriously wounded . Had t he constitutional monarchists not retreated t he em peror himself might have been placed in jeopardy . By retreati ng into the background , the constitutional monarchists also preserved a political system based on values and strategies of privatized conflict resolution, a system rooted in the concrete practices of Japanese feudal decision making but operating in the context of laws and structures adapted from Western systems of constitutional monarchy . I n t hat system policy decisions were ratified by the emperor; they were not reached by an open col lision of views in public forums . The highest political leaders were appointed by the emperor, a nd such appointments were not subject to public elections or r e v i e w b y p u b l i c l y e l ected b od i e s . W he n e l ec t i o n s a n d representative forums played a role i n policy a nd personnel decisions they did so only as one of the variables-and usually a n unimportant one-taken i nto consideration by those responsible to t he throne for negotiating the consensus on w hich imperial ratification was based . The system fell far short of any Western model of democracy , as Maruyama claims . Values and strategies of socialized conflict reso l ution were all but absent in the political process . H owever u ndemocratic i n terms of social ized processes for resolving conflict , the prewar Japanese government was nonetheless a very effective government . Capping Japan's system of privatized confl ict resol ution, the palace was a delicate a nd responsive mechanism for negotiating the I mperial Will i n politics-for fi nalizing authoritative decisions of state. My examination of Kido Koichi 's palace career has i ndicated t hat three political roles were essential to the operation of that mechanism: the negotiator, t he bu reaucrat , t he secretary . All three roles were to be found not only i n actual political operations but also i n the official descriptions of government and court offices . Two of the roles , those of negotiator and secretary , were to be found in the extra-constitutional system for advising the throne on Cabi net appoi ntments and basic foreign
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policy decisions . Kido's associations also i ndicated that i n addition to neutral admi nistrative bureaucrats there were bureaucratic policy advocates w ho headed opinion coalitions and factions within the in stitutions of imperial prerogative. Negotiators , i n evaluati ng the "trends of the times " and advisi ng on w ho would be able to "cope with the situation , " concerned themselves with the merits and strengths of these policy advocates and their coalitions. The " u nani mous" consensus resulting from negotiator efforts was ratified by the emperor, the supreme ratifier i n the Japanese polity. I nstruments of pressure-the "traditional" privatized means of pressure, such as assassi nation and the threat of assassi nation, clique building and positioning " behi nd the scenes , " and face-to-face persuasion hidden from public view , as well as " modern" socialized means of pressure , such as the mass media, elections, mass protests, and appeals to the public-were utilized by policy advocates in convi nci ng negotiators of the validity a nd power of their positions . Secretaries were vital communication l inks among political leaders, especially among nego tiators and policy advocates , a nd they provided much of the critical i nformation on w hich negotiators based their j udgments. Kido Koichi 's behavior and associations in the 1 930s suggest that Japanese officials performed their roles with remarkable sensitivity to the differentiations i nvolved and to t he rules of the game of pri vatized decision making. There was nothing fortuitous about the political behavior of persons filling such roles ; but there was considerable difficulty , given t he nature of the system, i n fi ndi ng out j ust w hat persons were doing w hen they were doi ng it. The nego tiator withdrew political conflict from public scrutiny, hoping to contract the scope of conflict and thereby resolve the issues involved . The seeds of political conflict origi nated primarily within the closed components of imperial prerogative . These components were either bureaucratic or were run largely by bureaucratic pol icy advocates , w ho aggregated policy demands within the corridors of power and formed cross-i nstitutional coalitions " behind the scenes . " Policy ad vocates pressured negotiators a nd opposing policy advocates by manipulating various i nstruments of pressure . Pol icy initiative, policy advocating, and conflict resolution were basically privatized processes, despite the growth of modern i nstitutions , such as the Diet
AN
INTERPR ETATION
333
a nd the mass media, for socializ i ng conflict . The most important political information on which political figures acted was acquired by private means . The secretaries to political leaders operated on an al most exclusively verbal basis . Their function in the political system was much like the " vassal telegraph" w hich was so critical to de cision maki ng in the Tokugawa Shogunate. 21 Secretaries , like loyal vassals, literally informed the entire structure of prewar Japanese politics . The highly flexible nature of such roles , the sensitivity and skill of the actors performi ng them , and the commitment of those actors to norms and styles of privatized decision maki ng produced a highly in tegrated and responsive governi ng process. H owever distasteful the resulti ng decisions might appear to present-day Japanese critics of the prewar political system, all decisions of national importance had to be reached by negotiation and compromise . However wrong the decisions might ultimately have been, the privatized process of con fl ict resolution ensured that time would be taken in arrivi ng at the I mperial Wil l . As a result , the palace acted as a brake on extremism throughout its prewar existence . J ust as that i nstitution prevented Japan from becomi ng a purely fascist state in the 1 930s , so it allowed Japan in 1 945 to reach its decision to surrender before the nation was annihilated . The premise of prewar government in Japan was imperial prerogative . And it was the palace that provided the all-important negotiation and ratification mechanism at the apex of the political process w hich allowed the government to govern , however changed the complexion of political forces, however varied the policy demands made on the political system in the course of Japan's political modernization.
2 1 . T h e t e rm " vassal telegraph" is Conrad Totman's (Politics in the Tokugawa Bakuju:
1600- 1843 [ Cambridge , Mass . : Harvard University Press, 1 967 ] , p. 202 ) . For an analysis of the role of l i ege vassa l s
and
cl i q u e pol i t i !'s in the Tokugawa pol i t y , see espe!' i a l l y !'h a p . 9 .
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INDEX
Abe Nobuyuki, 1 60; as Army politician, 1 6 1 ; as Prime Minister, 1 1 7 , 1 6 1 Absolutism, 3-4 Access to t he t h r o n e : Pri nce F u s h i m i Hiroyasu's abuse of, 304 ; role o f t h e Grand Chamberlain, 1 47-48, 1 49, 1 54-55 Aides-de-Camp: and the aristocracy , 85-86; autonomy of, 8 1 -8 6 ; and the Cham berlains, 8 1 , 84, 86, 1 57 ; composition of, 82-83 ; creation of Office of, B i n , 1 57 ; duties and functions of, 8 1 -82, 1 57 ; and the Imperial Household M inistry , 60; and institutional pluralism at court , 86; as members of the inner side of the Imperial Household Ministry , 63 ; see also Chief Aide-de-Camp Anami Korechika, 85 Araki Sadao : as Army politician, 1 6 1 ; and the Army's I mperial Way Faction, 1 6 1 ; and Chief Aide Honjii Shigeru, 1 6 1 n ; and the gosutoppu incident ( 1 933 ) , I 00- 1 Aristocracy : abolished , 2 ; and the A ides-de Camp, 85-86; as bulwark of the throne, 2 , 74, 2 1 8- 1 9 ; and the Chamberlains, 74-7 5 ; composition of, 7 1 , 7 3 - 7 4 , 2 1 8 ; fi scal rewards to, 74; ident ification with im perial Shinto rites, 72-7 3 ; and the Im perial Household Ministry, 24, 70-7 5 , 9 1 ; i m p o r t a n c e to K i d o K ii i c h i as C h i e f Secretary to the Privy Sea l , 203- 1 2 , 2 1 8- 1 9 ; importance to Kido Ki"> ichi a s Di-
rector of Peerage Affairs, 220, 2 3 1 -33; im portance to Kido Kiiichi as Privy Seal , 2 5 1 , 254; and palace leadership, 1 1 6 Arita Hachirii, 233 Army : balance w i t h the Navy at court , 1 4 1 -4 2 ; and the Chang Tso-lin affair, 1 44 , 1 49, 1 50, 1 60; and the Chief Aide-de C a m p , 1 42 -4 3 , 1 5 8 - 6 8 , 1 7 0 , 1 82 - 8 4 ; Control Faction o f (q . v . ) ; a n d t h e Feb ruary 26 Incident , 1 64-67 , 282; and the Hamaguchi Cabinet , 1 03 ; I mperial Way Fact ion of (q . v . ) ; and the I mperial Will, 95 , 1 0 1 , 1 42 ; and military representation at the emperor's side, 60, 8 1 - 8 4 , 90, 1 4 1 -42, 1 60-6 1 , 1 82-84 , 1 85-86; and the October I ncident, 92-95 ; as an "Outlaw" organization, 282; participation in pol itics, 1 62-63; rivalry with the Home M inistry, I 00- 1 , 292n, 3 1 8 ; and Saionj i's second Cabinet , 1 04, 1 40; "subjective tendencies" of, 264, 266; and Tanaka Giichi , 1 44 , 1 87-88; a n d t h e Tiij ii Cabinet , 1 03 ; and Ugaki Kazunari , 1 88-89 ; see also Aides de-Camp; I mperial prerogative (of su preme command) Board of Chamberlains, see Chamberlains (Board of) B r i t i s h pol it ics u n d e r G eorge I l l : a n d prewar Japa nese pol itics, 3 1 4 - 1 6 B u reaucrac y : a n d .J apa nese pol it ical
343
344
I NDEX
B ureaucracy ( Cont. ) modernization , 1 0; as an organization in the national polity, 2 8 1 -82 ; primacy in politics of, 3-4 , 1 0, 9 1 , 1 06, 1 95 ; see also "Bureaucrat " ; Japanese (bureaucratic) fas cism; " Policy advocate " ; Renovationists " B ureaucra t " : Kido Kiiichi as, 1 94-9 5 , 220-37, 275-309; a s a political role, 9 , 1 94-95 , 222, 288, 324 Cabinet (informal) , 1 7- 1 8 , I Bn ; as the direct advisory group to the emperor, 22 Cabinet : as a coalition of institutional elites, 1 02-5 ; composition of, 3 1 5- 1 6 ; creation of the Cabinet system, 2 4 , 1 7 5 ; inner Cabinet , 1 86-87 ; a n d the palace, 1 05 ; "responsibility, " 268, 268n ; role of, 1 02 ; and S a nj ii 1 75-76; Sanetom i , " t ra nscenden t a l " C a b i n e t s , 9 8 , 1 3 1 , 1 37-38, 325 ; see also Hamaguchi Osachi ; House o f Representatives; Okada Keisuke; Political parties; Saionj i Kimmochi ; Tiijii Hideki Ceremonies, Board of the : and the Cham berl ains, 7 8 ; evolution of, 30-3 1 ; and foreign dignitaries, 64 Ceremonies, Office of the, 30 Chamberl a i n s , 7 4 - 7 9 ; and the A i d es-de Camp, 8 1 , 84, 86; and the aristocracy , 74-7 5 ; Board of, 76, 78-79, 1 69 ; and the I mperial Guards, 94 ; and the inner side of the Imperial Household M inistry, 63; see also Grand Chamberlain Chang Tso-li n : murder of, 1 44 , 1 60 Chang Tso-lin affair, 1 44-4 5 , 1 48-5 1 ; and the Army (q . v . ) ; and the emperor, 1 44-4 5 , 1 46-47 ; and Tanaka Giichi, 1 44 , 1 88 Chichibu Yasuhito ( Pri nce-of-t he- B l o od ) : political involvement of, 304-7 Chief Aide-de-Camp, S i n ; abolition of the office of, 2; autonomy of, 1 42 , 1 82 ; career backgro u n d s of, 1 4 2 , 1 5 8 - 5 9 ; C h i n a experience of, 1 58-59, 1 6 1 ; duties and role of, 8 1 -82 , 1 05 - 6 , 1 5 7 , 2 6 5 , 2 6 7 ; as General Staff informant (spy), 1 56-5 7 , 1 59 , 1 6 1 n , 1 70; a n d the Gran!! Cham berlain, 1 42-43 , 1 53 , I S S, 1 57 , 1 69, 1 70; and Hara Kei, ! 59 ; Hasunuma Shigeru
•
a s , 1 59, 262 , 265-67 , 269-70; Honjii Shi geru as, 1 60-70, 304 , 305 ; and the Im perial Household Minister, 1 69-70; and the London Naval Treaty, 1 53-5 5 ; as a " n egot i a t o r , " 1 7 0 , 2 7 4 ; as P r i v y Counc i l l ors, 1 5 9 ; and the P r i v y Sea l , 1 65-70; and Privy Seal Kido Kiiichi , 262, 265-67 , 269-70 ; Saionj i Kimmochi's lack of control over, 1 89 Chinda Sutemi (Grand Chamberlain), 1 4 1 Chiishii (doma i n ) : a s a decision-making model for the prewar Japanese political process, 320-23 , 324, 329; and the Im perial Household Minister, 1 23-24 ; and the Meij i ol igarchs, 1 02 n , 1 23 ; and the Meij i Restoration, 1 22-23 Civil Government (Dajo kan ) , 1 7 ; and the Government of Rites (jingikan ) , 28-30, 32 Clique, see Faction Club(s), see Eleven Club; Sixth Day Club; Tuesday Luncheon Club Confucianism : and the role of the emperor, 26, 33; and Shinto rites, 33 Consensus , see Emperor; " Negot iator " ; Palace; Palace leadership; Trad itional ists Const itutional ists : as " policy advocates , " 325-26, 326n Constitutional monarchists: control of the palace, 1 07 , 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 8 1 , 1 89 ; and the February 26 I ncident , 330-3 1 ; and the Grand Chamberlain, 1 4 1 -4 3 ; and the Im perial Household M inister, 1 29-32 ; and imperial transcendence, 326-27 ; influence on the emperor, 1 68 ; and the London Naval Treaty, 1 50, 1 56; and Minobe's t h e o r y of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m o n a rc h y , 1 1 1 - 1 2 ; a s " negotiator(s)" (q . v . ) ; political partisanship of, 1 1 1 - 1 3 , 1 4 1 -42, 1 50, ! 56 ; a n d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s , 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 90 , 326-29 , 330; see also Ichiki Kitokuril ; M a k i n o N o b u a k i ; S a i o nj i K i m m o c h i ; Suzuki Kantarii Constitutional monarchy, see Constitutional monarchists; Emperor; Minobe Tatsuk ichi Control Fact ion (Army), 99; and the Fch ruary 26 Incident , 286-87 ; and intrainsl i tutional factionalism, 325 C o u rt , see E m p e r o r - i n - C o u rt ; l m p <' r i a l
INDEX
Household Minister; I mperial Household M inistry ; Palace; Palace leadership Court finances, 64-70; and the aristocracy , 7 4 ; and palace autonomy , 65 , 67-68, 69; political uses of, 70, 1 27-28, 1 28n; and the role of the emperor as social paragon, 1 27 ; see also I mperial House Economic Council Court Nobles: importance of Sanjii Sanetomi as, 1 75 ; and the Restoration Government, 18 Decision making, see Privat ized decision making; Social ized decision making Diet , see I mperial Diet " E a s t e r n e t h i c s , W e s t e r n t e c h n i q ues " , 38-39, 72 Elder Statesmen ( Genro ) , 55, 3 1 8 , 320; conference of, 2 1 5- 1 6 ; Council of, 1 80; a n d t h e i m p e r i a l p reroga t i v e of ap pointment , 1 06, 1 80-8 1 ; and the Imperial W i l l , 1 29 , 1 87 ; and Kido Kiiichi's ap pointment as Privy Sea l , 238-39, 241 -43, 245; last of the, 1 1 2 , 1 8 1 ; as " nego tiator(s)" , 8, 1 05 , 1 78 , 322; and the Privy Seal , 1 72 , 1 73 , 1 77-78, 1 79 , 1 80 ; see also Saionji Kimmochi Eleven Club Uu ichikai), 209; centrality to Kido Kiiichi's role as a " secretary , " 2 0 5 - 6 , 2 1 0- 1 2 , 2 9 6 ; fo r m a t i o n a n d function of, 1 98 ; and Kido Kiiichi a s a "bureaucrat" , 222, 226, 228, 229, 232-33 , 235 , 236; and Konoe Fumimaro, 1 98 ; members of, 205-6, 205 n ; a n d Privy Seal Kido Kiiichi , 2 5 1 , 255 Emperor: antimilitary views of, 328 ; and the appointment of Kido Kiiichi as Privy Seal, 2 3 8 , 244-4 5 , 246; and the appointment of Suzuki Kantarii as G rand Chamberlain, 1 42 , 1 43 n ; change in constitutional role ( 1 947), 1 -2 ; and the Chang Tso-lin affair (q . v . ) ; and Chichibu Yasuhito ( Prince-of the-Blood), 305-7 ; and the Chief Aide-de Camp, 265 , 267 ; and Chief Aide Honjii Shigeru, 1 6 1 -68, 1 70; and the consensus making process, 263-64 ; and const itu tional monarchy, 1 4 -1 5 , 38-39, 47 , 32 1 ;
345 "cultivating t h e virtue" of, 1 9-2 1 , 1 40; and the February 26 Incident , 1 64-67 , 305 n ; and Fushimi Hiroyasu ( Prince-of I mperial and 304 ; t h e- B l ood ) , Conferences, 263-64, 302 , 3 2 7 , 328-29; and the imperial line (ancestors), 6, 40-4 1 , 42 ; and the I mperial Will, 6 , 47 , 52, 5 4 - 5 6 , 303; a n d t h e L o n d o n Naval Treaty, 1 53-54; and Minobe's theory of constitutional monarchy , 1 63-64 , 1 68 ; and negot i a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , 299-301 ; personal role in politics, 4-5 , 6, 1 5 , 4 7 - 4 9 , 5 4 - 5 6 , 2 62 - 6 4 , 2 6 6 - 6 7 , 268-69, 299-303 ; personality of, 1 1 ; and Privy Seal Kido Kiiich i , 2 6 1 -64 , 266-67 , 269-70, 27 1 -7 2 , 298-303 ; public criticism of, 26n, 56-5 7 ; as a " ratifier," 4-5 , 6, 8 , 1 1 , 47, 5 5 , 5 6 , 1 95 , 2 6 1 -63 , 298-303 , 3 1 5 , 32 1 , 33 1 ; and the role o f the feudal lord (daimyo), 32 1 -23; and the Shanghai crisis ( 1 93 2 ) , 2 1 3- 1 4 , 2 1 6- 1 7 ; and Shinto deities (rites), 27-28, 3 2 , 47 , 5 3 ; and sho gunal powers, 6, 1 3- 1 5 , 37, 47, 32 1 ; as a "Shrine," 298-99, 302 ; as social paragon, 53-54, 64 , 70, 1 27 ; and the Sun Goddess, 2 7 ; and Tanaka Giichi , 1 44-47 ; in the Tokugawa period , 1 4 ; and war with the United States, 262-63 , 27 1 , 300; see also Emperor-in E m peror- i n - C h a m b e r s ; Court ; Emperor-in-Public; Emperor-in State; I mperial prerogative; I mperial Will ; Meij i Emperor; Taishii Emperor Emperor system ( tennosei) , 3, 3 2 , 1 7 5 Emperor-in-Chambers, 5 1 -5 7 ; actions o f em peror as, 302-3 ; and the Chamberlains, 75-79; and the Emperor-in-Public, 5 6 , 3 2 8 ; a n d t h e October I ncident ( 1 93 1 ) , 93-95 Emperor-in-Court , 5 1 -54; and the Emperor in-State, 5 6 , 274 ; and the I mperial Household Minister, 1 05 , 1 24 , 1 27 , 1 29; a n d t h e o u t e r s i d e of t h e I m pe r i a l Household Ministry , 64 Emperor-in-Public, 5 1 -5 7 , 302 , 328 Emperor-i n-State, 5 1 , 5 5 - 5 7 ; and the Em peror-in-Court, 56, 2 7 4 ; and Japa nese (bureaucratic) fascism, 1 90; and pal ace leadership, I 06, 1 90
346 Faction (clique}, 99, 1 39, 320-2 1 , 324; see also C o n t r o l Fact i o n ; I m p e r i a l W a y Faction Fascism, see Japanese (bureaucratic} fascism Family state: Japan as, 57-58 February 26 I ncident ( 1 936), 1 88 , 1 94 ; and the Army, 1 64-67 , 282 ; causes change in palace leadership, I 1 2 ; and Chichibu Ya suhito ( Pri nce-of-t he- B l ood } , 305 n ; and Chief Aide Honjo Shigeru , 1 6 1 n , 1 64-68 , I 6 9 ; and collusion of " Offici a l s " and " Outlaws , " 2 8 5 -87 ; and the emperor, I 64-67 , 305 n ; and Fushimi H i royasu ( Prince-of-the-Blood}, 286; impact on the constitutional monarchists, I 42, 330-3 I ; and Mazaki jinzaburo (General, 1 60, 286; and the military establishment , 305 n ; and young insurgents, 278-79, 282, 285 Feudal government : and the prewar political process, 9, 320-23 , 324, 333 Foreign M i n i s t r y : b u r e a u c r a t i c representation at court , 1 84-87 ; a n d the Imperial Household M inister, I I 9 ; and the imperial prerogative (of treaty making) (q . v . ) ; and the Privy Seal, 1 72-7 3 ; see also Arita Hachiro; Matsuoka Yosuke; Shide hara Kij iiro; Tani Masayuki Fuj inuma Shohei , 209, 2 1 0, 2 1 I , 233 Fushimi H i royasu ( Prince-of-the- B l ood } : abuse o f access t o the throne, 304 ; a s Chief of the Navy General Staff, 84, 2 1 4 , 286, 300, 303-4 ; and the February 26 I ncident, 286; and the London Naval Treaty, 303 , 304 ; as a "Shrine," 303-4 Fushimi Sadanaru ( Prince-of-the-B lood ) : as Privy Sea l , I 77-78
Genro, see Elder Statesmen gosutoppu incident ( 1 933 }, I 00- I , 292n Grand Chamberlain: appointment of Suzuki Kantaro as, I 4 I -43 ; career backgrounds of, 1 33-34; and the constitutional monar chists, 1 4 1 -5 6 , 1 69n; duties and role of, 1 05-6, 1 32-33 , 1 47-48 , ! 5 6 ; and the Feb ruary 26 Incident, 330-3 1 ; and the Navy, 1 3 4 , 1 42 ; Katsura Taro as, 1 3 6-4 1 ; Suzuki Kantaro as, 1 43 - 5 6 , 1 69-70; Tokudaij i Sanenori as, 1 34-36, 1 39 ; tran sition to bureaucratic leadership, 1 4 1
I NDEX
Hamaguchi Osachi : assassination of, 1 88 ; Cabinet of, 1 02-3; and the London Naval Treaty (q . v . ) Hara Kei : assassination of, 3 1 4 ; a n d Grand Chamberlain/ Privy Seal Katsura Taro, 1 37-40; on the political use of court fi nances, 1 28 ; and the preeminence of the constitutionalists, 326; views on palace leadership, 1 39-40 Hara Yoshimichi , 329 Harada Kumao: account of Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi's resignation, 1 45 ; career of, 206n ; centrality to Kido Koichi's role as a " secret a ry " , 1 9 4 , 2 0 6- 9 , 2 6 1 , 323-24; and Kido Koichi's appointment as Privy Sea l , 2 3 8 - 3 9 , 240-44 ; and Kido Koichi as a " bureaucrat , " 232, 297 ; and the London Naval Treaty, 1 54-5 5 ; and Privy Seal Kido Koic h i , 2 5 5 ; role i n Cabinet changes, 207 ; see also Saionji Kimmochi Hasunuma Shigeru, 84, 1 59; and Privy Seal Kido Koichi, 262, 265-67 , 269-70, 273, 274, 301 Hata Shunroku, I 5 9 Hij i kata H isamoto, 1 22 , 1 23n Hiranuma Kiichiro : Cabinet of, 237 ; and " C a b i net respons i b i l i t y " , 2 6 8 ; a s a government "Official , " 283; and Foreign M inister Matsuoka Yosuke, 269 ; as a "policy advocate , " 288 ; as a possible Privy Seal, 239, 245 ; as President of the Privy Counci l , 239, 326, 330 Hirata Tosuke: appointment as Privy Seal, I 7 8 ; and Cabinet changes, I 80; as Im perial Household M i n istry Consul t a n t , 1 78-79; a n d t h e Privy Council , 1 7 9-80; a s Privy Seal, 1 79-80; s o n of, 85 Hirohata Tadataka, 205 n , 2 1 7 , 228, 229-30 Home M inistry : bureaucratic representation at court , 87-89, 9 1 , 1 84-86; and the Im perial Household Minister, 1 20-2 1 , 1 22 , 1 2 5 ; a n d t h e I mperial Household Ministry (q . v . ) ; and i m p e r i a l preroga t i v e , 9 H ; rivalry with the Army, 1 00- 1 , 292n , 3 1 H Honjo Sh igeru : appointed to the Privy Council, I 5 9 ; appointment as Chief A icl<' de-Camp, 1 6 1 n ; and Chichibu Yasu h i l u ( Pri nce-of-the- B l ood } , 305 - 6 ; a s C h i d
INDEX
Aide-de-Camp, 83-84 , 1 60-70, 304 , 305 ; China experience, 1 59 ; conflicts with the emperor, 1 63-64 ; defends Army interests, 1 6 1 , 1 62-68; and the February 26 In c i d e n t , 1 6 1 n , 1 64 - 6 7 ; a n d F u s h i m i Hiroyasu ( Prince-of-the-Blood), 304 ; and G r a n d C h a mber l a i n S u z u k i K a n t a ro , 1 69-70; and lchiki Kitokuro, 1 65 ; and I mperial Household M i nister Yuasa Kurahei , 1 69-70, interpretation o f t h e na tional polity, 1 66 ; as a military "spy" at the palace, 1 56-5 7 , 1 6 1 n , 1 70 H o u s e of Peers : a n d t h e E l ev e n C l u b Uii ichikai) , 1 98 , 205 , 294 ; and the Hama guchi Cabinet , I 03 ; and the House of Representatives, 9 9 ; and the I m perial Household M inistry , 89, 90-9 1 , 1 1 9, 1 72 , 1 84 ; and J apanese (bureaucratic) fascism, 205 n ; and Kido Koichi (q . v . ) ; and Konoe Fumimaro, 1 5 2 , 1 90 , 1 90n , 20 5 n and M i nobe T a t s u k i c h i , 1 3 1 ; a n d p a l ace leadership, 1 1 4- 1 6 ; and to Tojo Cabinet , I 03 ; see also I mperial Diet ; I mperial pre rogative (of legislation) House of Representatives : and the Hama guchi Cabinet , I 02- 3 , 1 5 1 ; and the Im perial Household Ministry, 89, 90-9 1 ; and the institutionalization of i m perial prerogatives, 97-99; and the Kiyoura Cabinet , 1 04 ; Minobe Tatsukichi's theory o n , 3 9 , 1 3 1 ; a n d p a l ace l e a d e rs h i p , 1 1 3- 1 5 ; and "party" Cabinets, 1 37-39, 1 87-88 ; and the Tojo Cabinet , 1 03-4; and " t ranscenden t a l " Cabinets, 1 37 - 3 9 ; see also I mperial Diet ; I mperial prerogative (of legislation) lchiki Kitokuro: antipathy of court conserva tives and rightists, 1 43 n ; career of, 1 30, 1 4 3 n ; a n d t h e c o n ference o f S e n i o r Retainers, 1 8 1 ; a s a constitutional monar chist , 1 1 2 , 1 2 9-3 1 , 3 2 6 ; as I m perial House Economic Adviser, 1 79 ; as I mperial Household M i n ister, 1 2 9-30, 1 42-43 , 1 52 , 1 8 1 , 1 96-97 , 1 99 , 2 1 7 ; interviews Kido Koichi , 1 96-97 , 1 99; and Minobe Tatsukichi , 1 30-3 1 ; as possihle Privy Sea l , 2 4 1 ; a s President o f t h e Privy Council , 1 1 9-20, 1 3 1 , 1 6S , 326, 330; and Saion j i
347 Kimmochi , 1 1 2 , 1 43 , 326; and Suzuki Kantaro's appointment as Grand Cham berlain, 1 42-4 3 ; theory of constitutional monarchy, 1 30 ldemitsu Mambei , 1 63 I mamura Hitoshi, 92-94, 282 Imperial Conference ( Gozen Kaigi) : and the emperor, 263-64, 302 , 327 , 328-29; of F e b r u a r y 4, 1 904 , 3 1 7 n ; and P r i m e M inister Konoe Fumimaro, 2 7 0 ; role of, 263; of September 6, 1 94 1 , 264, 302 , 328-29; and the wars with Russia ( 1 904) and the United States ( 1 94 1 ) , 3 1 6, 3 1 7n I mperial Diet : and the I mperial Household M inistry , 89, 90-9 1 , 1 1 9 , 1 72 , 1 84 ; and the I mperial House Law, 42; and the Im perial W i l l , 3 1 8- 1 9 ; and the institu tionalization of imperial prerogatives, 5, 97-99; and the legitimacy of state policies, 9 1 , 3 1 6; Minobe Tatsukichi's theory on, 3 9 , 9 8 , 1 3 1 ; and " pa rt y " C a b i n e t s , 1 38-39; a n d public harmony , 3 1 3 ; see also House of Peers; House of Representatives; I mperial prerogative (of legislation) I mperial estate (property), 65-66, 70, 1 25 , 1 2 8 ; see also I m pe r i a l L a n d s ( a n d Forests), Bureau of I mperial Family Council , 4 2 , 42n, 4 3 , 46, 58 I mperial Guards: and the Chamberlains, 94; complaints against the I mperial Household M i n i s t r y , 9 3 - 9 4 ; d u t ies of, 6 4 ; a n d " loyalty," 93; a n d "Outlaws, " 292n I mperial House Audit Bureau, 70 I mperial House Economic Counci l , 6 9 , 1 78-79 I mperial Household M inister: career back grounds of, 1 1 8-20; and the constitutional monarchists, 1 29-32 ; and court finances, 70, 1 25 , 1 27-28; duties of, 1 20-2 2 ; Ichiki Kitokuro as, 1 29-30, 1 42-43 , 1 52 , 1 8 1 , 1 96-97 , 1 99, 2 1 7 ; interaction with the government , 1 20-2 2 , 1 24-2 5 , 1 28-29 ; Ito H i ro b u m i a s , 2 4 - 2 5 , 1 1 9 ; M a k i no Nobuaki as, I l l , 1 20, 1 24 n , 1 29 ; Makino Nobuaki's views on, 1 2 3 - 2 4 ; and the Meij i Emperor, 1 26-27 ; role of, 1 05-6; Tanaka Mitsuaki as, 1 22-29; transition to bureaucratic leadership, 1 29 ; see also Kido Koirhi ; Saion j i Kimmochi
348 I m pe r i a l H o u s e h o l d M i n i s t r y : a n d t h e A i d es - d e -C a m p , 8 1 - 8 6 , 9 0 ; a n d t h e aristocracy, 70-75 , 85-86, 9 1 ; a n d the C hamberlains, 75-79, 80; consol idation of, 58-60; creation of, 1 7 ; and the Home M inistry , 87-89, 9 1 ; and the I mperial Diet (q . v . ) ; I mperial Guards' complaints against , 93-94; and institutional plu ralism, 86-95 ; and the Ladies-in-Waiting, 79-8 1 ; and the management of the Em peror-in-Court as Emperor-in-Public, 5 4 , 63-74 ; number o f officials in, 6 1 ; " rectifi cation" of, 92-9 5 ; and Shinto rites, 30-3 1 ; a s s y m bo l o f m o d e r n b u r e a u c r a t i c government , 5 8 ; as a top-level bureau cratic structure, 60-63 I m p e r i a l H o u s e h o l d Secret a r y : and t h e " c a b i n e t , " 1 7 - 1 8 ; I t o H i ro b u m i a s , 23-24 ; Tokudaij i Sanenori a s , 1 9 Imperial House Law (Koshitsu Tempan ) : contents, 4 3 ; draft i n g o f , 2 3 , 2 5 ; in terpretations of, 4 1 -46 ; and the Privy Counci l , 42, 43, 46, 58 Imperial institution : dignified mystery of, 52-53; and modernization, 5-6, 53-54; and the modernizing ol igarchs, 52-5 3 , 80; and the national polity, 38-39, 38n; and the plural institutions of government , 9 5 ; popular loyalty t o , 26-27 , 32-33 , 3 5 , 39n , 47 ; and Shinto rites, 1 5 , 27-28 , 3 2 , 5 3 ; and shogunal powers, 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 3 7 , 47 ; as state within a state, 5 8 , 60; as a state writ small , 90; as symbol of the nation as people, 5 3 , 95 ; in the Tokugawa period , 1 4 ; transcendence of, 6-7 , 1 3- 1 4 , 26-27 , 43, 4 7 , 95n , 1 1 2- 1 3 , 1 90 , 326-2 8 , 330; see also Emperor; Emperor-in-Chambers; E m peror- i n - C o u rt , E m peror-in-Public; Emperor-in-State; Meij i Emperor; Palace; Palace leadership; Taisho Emperor I mperial invest ments, 66-67 ; see also Court finances I mperial Lands (and Forests) , Bureau of, 65-66, 68, 70 I mperial line: and the Imperial House Law, 42 ; and sovereignty, 6 , 40-4 1 I mperial prerogative, I ; of appointment, 1 5 , 1 05 , 1 1 3 , 1 80-82 , ! B i n , 1 87-89, 1 9 1 ,
INDEX
207 , 3 1 5- 1 6 , 3 1 9 , 322-2 3 ; and Cabinet coalitions, 1 02-5 ; and the imperial line, 4 1 ; institutionalization of, 5, 5 7 , 8 6 , 97- 1 05 , 1 49-50, 1 84-87 , 3 1 5 , 3 2 3 ; of legislation, 5, 1 5 , 39, 97-99, 1 00, 1 04 , 3 1 8- 1 9 ; and political leadership, 99- 1 0 1 ; and political legitimacy, 6, 35-37 , 39, 3 1 3 , 333; and the role o f the palace, I 05 , 1 87 ; and Shinto rites, 35-38; o f supreme com mand , 5, 1 5 , 3 7 , 98-99, l O i n , 1 42 , 1 53 , 1 86 , 3 1 8 ; o f treaty making (war, peace, di plomacy) , 98, 1 50 , 1 86 , 3 1 5 , 3 1 6 , 3 1 8 I mperial princes : a s "Shrines," 303-07 ; see also C h i c h i b u Y a s u h i t o ; F u s h i m i Hiroyasu ; Fushimi Sadanaru; Takamatsu Nobuhito I m p e r i a l R u l e A s s i s t a nce Assoc i a t i o n , ! 90-9 1 , 239n I mperial tombs, 64 I mperial Way Faction (Army), 1 60-6 1 ; and the February 2 6 I ncident , 286-87 ; and in trainstitutional fact ional ism, 325 I mperial Will: coordination of, 1 70; and de cision making, 6; and the emperor's per sonal will, 6, 40-4 1 , 47, 54-56; and the imperial ancestors, 6 , 40-4 1 , 4 7; institu tional competition over, 5, 95, 1 00, 1 01 , 1 05 , 1 87 , 284 , 3 1 5 , 3 1 8 , 3 1 9 ; as the na tional interest , 1 60; and the " negotiator ," 322 , 329, 3 3 1 ; and popular mobilization, 52-53; and the privatization of confl iet , 3 1 3 , 3 1 6 , 3 1 7 ; and the radical left , 3 1 7 ; and the radical right , 3 1 7 ; and the ratifi cation process, 6, 5 5 , 1 1 8 , 303 , 3 1 9 , 329; and the role of the palace, 1 87 , 1 9 1 -92 , 3 1 9 , 3 3 1 , 333 Inner Cabinet , 1 86-87 I nner shrine (kashikodokoro), 30, 7 1 I noue Kaoru, 1 7 9, 1 !!0 I noue Nissho: and Konoe Fumimaro, 288 ; as an "Outlaw , " 290-9 1 I noue Saburo , 2 3 1 ; and Kido Koich i ' s aristocratic network, 209- 1 0; and t h•· renovationist bureaurrats, 209n I nstitutional plura l i s m , 284-86 ; and t lw court bureaurrae y , 7 , 8 6 - 9 2 , 9 5 ; a n d palace leadership, 7 - 8 , 5 7 , l OS , 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 , 1 84-87 ; see also Cahinct ; Imperial inst i -
INDEX
t u t i o n ; I mperial prerogative; I mperial Wil l ; Palace I nstrument of Government (Seitaishii ) , 1 6 " I nstrument of pressure, " 9 5 , 288; and the " negotiator," 330, 332 ; "Outlaws" as, 285-87 , 288-94; and the "pol icy advo cate," 330, 332 ; as a political role, 9 lnukai Takeru, 209, 2 1 0 , 2 1 1 , 233 l nukai Tsuyoshi ; assassination of, 1 88 , 3 1 4 ; a s Prime Minister, 1 88 , 2 1 0 , 2 1 3- 1 7 lrie Sukemasa, 76-77 , 77n, 1 32 ltagaki Taisuke, 1 23 Ito Hirobumi : accused of violating the dis tinction between court and government , 22-2 5 , 1 38 ; and the aristocracy , 7 1 -7 2 , 7 3 - 7 4 ; assassination of, 3 1 4 ; a n d court fi na nces, 6 5 , 1 7 8 ; crit icized by Motoda Eifu, 2 5 , 3 1 3 ; as Elder Statesman (ol igarch ) , 3 1 7 - 1 8 ; and the I mperial House Economic Council, 1 78 ; as Im perial Household Minister, 24-26; 5 8 , 6 5 , 1 1 9 ; as I m perial Household Secret a r y , 2 3 - 2 4 , 5 8 ; a n d t h e I mperial House Law, 4 1 -4 2 , 43-4 4 ; and the i m perial insti tution, 38-39; and the jiho, 2 1 , 2 1 n ; and the Meij i Constitution, 35-36, 38-39; and the national polity, 3 5 ; as a "policy advo cate , " 1 7 5 ; as President of the Privy Counci l , 36, 1 1 9 ; as Prime M i nister, 24-2 5 , 1 1 9, 1 80; resignation as I mperial Household Minister , 25-26; and Sanjo Sanetomi, 23, 1 74-7 6 ; and Yamagata Ari tomo, 2 3 , 3 1 7 , 3 1 7n Ito Hirokuni, 7 5 lwakura Tomom i : a n d court fi nances, 6 ; , 1 28 ; and t h e jih o , 2 1 n ; a n d t h e Ladies-in Waiting, 80; and Motoda Eifu, 1 8 ; and the Rules and Regulations Bureau, 23n; and Saionj i Kimmochi , 1 35 lzawa Takio: and Kido Koichi's ap pointment a s Privy Seal , 2 3 8 , 240 Japanese (bureaucratic) fascism, 275 ; evo lution of, 1 89 ; and the February 26 In cident , 285-87 ; and the House of Peers, 205 n ; and the I mperial Wil l , 3 1 7 ; and Konoe Fumimaro, 1 90-9 1 ; and the pal ace, 1 92 , 333; and t h e traditiona lists, 1 !!9 - 9 1
349 Japanese pol itics : a n d British politics under George I I I , 3 1 4- 1 6 jiho (Advisers-in-Attendance): abolition of, 2 2 ; and the assassination of O kubo Toshi michi, 20; competition with the "cabinet ," 2 1 -22; creation and duties of, 1 9 ; criticism of the Meij i Emperor, 20, 56-5 7 ; and Ito Hirobumi, 2 1 ; and the Ladies-in-Waiting, 80; Sasaki Takayuki as, 1 9-20, 2 1 -22, 1 35 ; and Tokudaij i Sanenori , 19, 1 35 Kakehi Katsuhiko, 45 Kanroj i Osanaga, 7 7 , 79, 80, 1 1 1 , 273-74, 301 Kato Kanj i : as Chief of the Navy General Staff, 1 53-56, 1 69 Katsura Taro: as Grand Chamberlain and Privy Seal , 1 1 1 , 1 36-4 1 , 1 84 ; and I m perial Household M i nister Tanaka Mit suaki, 1 24-2 5 ; Ozaki Yukio denounces, 1 38-39, 299; and Yamagata Aritomo, 1 1 1 , 1 1 6 , 1 30n , 1 36-37 , 1 38-39 Kido Koich i : and the Army and Navy Ministers , 264-65 , 267 , 301 ; associations as a " bureaucra t " compared with h i s associ ations as a " secretary , " 2 2 0-2 6 , 2 3 1 -3 7 ; associations as a " negot iator" compared with his associations as a "bu reaucrat " and as a "secretary , " 246-5 4 ; as a "bureaucrat , " 1 94-95 , 220-37; as a " bureaucrat" with the emperor and im perial family, 23 1 , 297 , 298; as a "bu r e a u c ra t " w i t h g o v e r n m e n t offi c i a l s , 2 3 3 - 3 4 , 2 9 6 ; as a " bureaucra t " with palace officials, 1 95 , 226-3 1 , 296; cate gories of associates as Privy Sea l , 254-59; and Chief Aide Hasunuma Shigeru, 262 , 265-67 , 269-70, 273, 274, 301 ; and Chief Secretary Matsudaira Yasumasa , 238-39, 243-44 , 273, 299-300; as Chief Secretary to the Privy Sea l , 8 , 1 94 , 1 99-220, 294-96, 330; and the Chiefs of Staff (High Command ) , 263-65 , 27 1 , 2 7 2 , 300- 1 ; diary of, 1 93-94 , 1 93n, 201 n; as Director of Peerage Affairs, 8, 1 94-95 , 220-37 , 296-97 ; and the E l even C l u b (q . v . ) ; family connect ions, 1 1 7 ; and the Foreign Mi nister, 268-70, 27 1 ; and the Grand
350 Kido Ki'lichi (Cont. ) Chamberlain, 2 1 7 , 229-30, 273, 274; and Harada Kumao (q . v . ) ; and the House of Peers, 203-S , 20Sn, 294-96, 307 -8; and Konoe Fumimaro (q . v . ) ; as Minister in the Konoe and Hiranuma Cabinets, 237 , 328; and the Ministers of State, 1 9S , 2 S 6 , 267 ; and negotiations with the United States, 300- 1 ; as a " negotiator" with the emperor and imperial family, 1 9S , 261 -64 , 266-67 , 268-70, 27 1 -7 2 , 274, 299-303 , 306-7. , 309; as a " negot iator" with government o ffi c i a l s , 1 9 S , 2 S 6 - 6 0 , 2 6 1 , 2 6 4 - 6 S , 2 6 7 - 7 2 , 297 ; a s a " negot iator" with palace officials, 1 9S , 26S-67 , 273-74, 297 ; and "Officia l s , " 2 9 4 -97 , 307 - 9 ; and Okabe Nagakage (q . v . ) ; and " Outlaw" I noue Nissho, 290-9 1 ; and "Outlaw" Matsui Kuka, 289-90, 2 9 2 ; and "Outlaw" O kawabara Nitto, 288, 2 9 1 ; and "Outlaws, " 288-94 ; and "Outlaw" Takuya Dempu, 288, 2 9 1 -93 ; and prewar p o l i t ical r o l e s , 8 - 9 ; and t h e P r i m e Minister, 267-68, 270-7 1 , 272, 301 ; and Prince Chichibu Yasuhito, 1 98 , 306-7 ; and Prince Takamatsu Nobuhito, 306; as Privy Sea l , 8, 1 1 2- 1 3 , 1 8 1 -82, 1 9 1 , 1 9S , 246-7 4 , 293, 297 , 2 98-303 , 306-7 , 326, 3 2 8 -2 9 , 3 3 0 ; and Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki, 1 94 , 1 96 , 1 97 , 1 98-99, 202 , 207 , 208 , 2 1 2 - 1 7 , 2 1 9 , 2 2 6 ; a n d Privy Seal Saito Makoto, 226-27 ; and the reno vationists (new bureaucrats), 1 9 1 , 296, 296n, 326, 327 ; roles in palace pol itics, 8-9, 1 94-9 S , 287-88 , 309, 3 3 1 -33; and Saionji Kimmoch i , 207 , 2 1 2 , 232, 239, 2 4 1 , 2 4 2 ; a s a " secret a r y " w i t h government officials, 208- 1 1 , 2 9 4 , 2 9 6 ; as a " secret a r y " w i t h p a l a ce o ffi c i a l s , 2 1 2 - 1 8 , 2 9 4 ; a n d the S h a nghai crisis ( 1 932 ) , 2 1 3- 1 7 ; and "Shrines," 297-307 ; and the Sixth Day Club, 2 1 2 , 236; and Suzuki Kantaro, 1 1 3 ; and the system for advising the throne, 1 8 1 ; and Tojo Hideki, I 1 3 , 267-68 , 270, 272 ; as a traditionalist, 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 9 1 , 3 2 7 - 2 9 , 3 3 0 ; and t h e t r a n scend e n t a l role of t h e e m p e r o r , 3 2 7- 2 9 ; see also Aristocracy ; Emperor; Matsudaira Tsuneo
I N DE X
Kiyoura Keigo: Cabinet of, I 04 Kodama Hideo, 1 1 7 , 2 3 1 Komeda Torao: criticizes the Meij i Emperor, 20 Konoe Fumima ro : and Cabi net responsi bility, 268, 268n , 270; and the House of Peers, I S2 , 1 90, 1 90n , 20S n ; and the Im p e r i a l R u l e A s s i s t a nce A s s oc i a t i o n , 1 90-9 1 , 2 3 9 , 240, 244 ; involvement with Kido Koichi's pol itical career, 2 1 9, 297 ; a n d J a pa nese ( bu r e a u c r a t i c ) fa s c i s m , 1 90-9 1 ; and Kido Koichi's appointment as Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal, 1 96-97 , 1 98 , 1 99 , 296; and Kido Koichi's ap pointment as Privy Seal , 238-40; and Kido Koichi's aristocratic network, 1 98 , 2 1 0, 2 1 1 ; a n d t h e London Naval Treaty (q . v . ) ; as a " negot iator," 1 90n ; and "Out laws, " 288; as a possible Privy Seal , 2 3 9 , 244, 24S ; a s Prime Minister, 1 90-9 1 , 1 9 1 n , 2 0S n , 2 3 7 , 2 6 3 , 267-7 1 , 2 7 2 , 29S-96, 301 , 3 2 8 ; and Privy Seal Kido Koichi, 267-7 1 , 272, 29S-96, 301 ; and the renovationists (new bureaucrats), 326-2 7 ; a n d the t rad itionalists, 1 1 2 , 3 2 6 , 3 2 7 , vetoed a s I mperial Household Minister by Saionj i Kimmochi , 327 Kuroda Kiyotaka, 24n, 1 76 , 1 80 Kwantung Army, I S9 , 1 6 1 Ladies-in-Waiting, 60, 63; duties of, 79-80; and the jiho, 80; and the Restoration leaders, 80-8 1 Liaison Conference, 1 86 , 1 86n, 263 London Naval Treaty : and the Chief Aide de-Camp, I S3-S S ; and Chief of the Navy General Staff Kato Kanj i , I S 3-S4, I S S , I S6 , 1 69 ; and the constitutional monar chists, I SO, I S6 ; and the emperor , 1 53-54 ; and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantari"1 , 1 4 3 , I S 3 - S 6 , 1 6 9 ; a n d I m pe r i a l Household Minister Ichiki Kitokuro, I 5 2 ; i n s t i t u t i o n a l fo rces i n v o l v e d i n , 'J H , 1 50-5 1 ; issues a t stake, l S I ; and Konc w F u m i m a r o , I S 2 , 1 9 0n ; a n d O ka cL 1 Keisuke, 1 5 2 , 1 5 4 , 1 8 8 ; a n d P r i m e· Minister Hamaguchi Osachi, 1 5 1 , l. 'i .\ 1 88 , 322 ; and the Privy Counci l ( q . v . ) , and Privy Seal M a kino Nohua k i , l .'i 2 'i l ;
INDEX
a n d Saionj i Kimmoch i , 1 5 1 -5 3 , 1 87 , 1 88 , 3 2 2 ; and Saito Makoto, 1 52 , 1 88 ; and Shidehara Kij iiro, 1 52 ; and Wakatsuki Reij iro, 1 5 1 -52 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal , see Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki : attacks against , 1 43n, 290, 2 9 1 -92 , 3 3 1 ; and " b u r e a u c r a t " K i d o Koichi, 222, 2 3 1 -32 ; career background of, 1 43n; and constitutional monarchist control of the palace, 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 326; as Im perial Household M i nister, 1 1 1 , 1 20, 1 2 4 n , 1 2 9 ; interviews Kido K o i c h i , 1 96-97 , 202 ; a n d t h e London Naval Treaty , 1 52-53; as a " negotiator," 1 94; as Privy Sea l , 1 20, 1 42 -4 3 , 1 43 n , 1 46 , 1 52-53, 1 7 1 , 1 77 , 1 94 , 206, 2 1 2- 1 8 , 2 1 9 , 290, 2 9 1 -92 , 294, 327; resignation as Privy Seal, 1 7 1 ; and Saionj i Kimmochi , 1 43 , 1 4 3 n , 1 52-53; and t h e Shanghai crisis ( 1 93 2 ) , 2 1 3- 1 7 ; and Suzuki Kan t a r o ' s a p p o i n t m e n t a s Grand C h a m berla i n , 1 4 2-43 ; a n d Tanaka G i ichi's " military diplomacy , " 1 46 ; views on a successor to I mperial Household Minister Nakamura Yiij iro, 1 23-24 Matsudaira Keimin, 228, 230 Matsudaira Tsuneo: and " bureaucrat" Kido K o i c h i , 2 2 5 n , 2 2 6 -2 7 ; a s I m p e r i a l Household M i mst cr, 1 32 , 225n, 226-27 , 238, 239-40, 24 1 -42 , 243, 246, 273, 274, 306; and Kido Koichi's appointment as Privy Seal, 238, 239-40, 24 1 -42, 243, 246 Matsudaira Yasumasa : and " b u reaucra t " Kido Koich i , 228-29; as Chief Secretary t o t h e Privy Seal , 238-39, 243-44, 2 5 1 , 273, 299-300; and the Eleven Club, 205 n , 228, 229; and Kido Koichi's appoint ment as Privy Seal , 238-39, 243-44 Matsui !wane, 1 60-6 1 Matsui Kiika: as an "Outlaw , " 289-90, 292 Matsukata Masayoshi : death of, 1 1 2 , 1 1 6, 1 8 1 ; as Elder Statesman, 1 1 1 , 1 78 , 1 80; a n d the I m p e r i a l House E c o n o m i c Council , 1 78; a n d imperial investments, 66-67 ; as Prime Min ister, 1 24 , 1 80, 3 1 7 ; a s Privy Seal, 1 1 1 , 1 24 , 1 78 ; rcmmmcnds Hirata Tosukr as Pr i vy Sea l , 1 7 H Matsuoka YiJ S u ke : as Fon· i !l; n M i n is t t•r,
35 1 262, 268n, 268-70, 27 1 , 279-80, 299; as an "Outlaw" and "Official" , 279-80; as a " policy advocate , " 288; as a renovationist, 325 Mazaki Jinzaburo: and Chief Aide Honjo S h igeru , 1 6 1 -6 2 ; C h i na experience of, 1 6 1 ; and the February 26 I ncident , 1 60, 286; and the I mperial Way Faction, 1 60 Meij i Constitution (Constitution of the Great Empire of J a pa n ) , 1 , 5 , 1 3 , 1 4 - 1 5 ; drafting and ratification of, 2 3 , 24, 2 5 , 35-37 , 36n ; a n d t h e I mperial House Law, 1 5 , 4 1 -42, 43-46; and the Meij i Emperor, 46; and the M inisters of State, 40; and the pluralism of political power, 5, 284 ; and the Privy Council , 36, 5 8 ; schools of in terpretation, 44-46, 45n; and Shinto rites, 1 5 , 35-37, 38; and sovereignty of the im perial line (imperial ancestors), 40-4 1 ; see also Imperial prerogative Meij i Emperor: and the aristocracy , 7 1 ; criticism of, 20, 26n, 56-57 ; freedom of movement, 4 7 - 4 9 ; and G rand Cham berlain Tokudaij i Sanenori , 1 35 ; and the I mperial House Law, 46; and I mperial Household Minister Tanaka M itsuaki, 1 26-27 ; and inner court life, 77 ; and Ito H i ro b u m i ' s a p p o i n t m e n t a s I m p e r i a l Household Secretary , 2 3 - 2 4 ; and I t o H i ro b u m i ' s res i g n a t i o n a s I m p e r i a l Household Minister, 2 5 - 2 6 ; a n d t h e jiho, 20-2 1 ; and the Meij i Constitution, 46; and the Meiji ol igarchs 56-5 7 , 1 7 6 ; per sonal views on pol itics, 24, 24n, 49, 57 Meij i oligarchs, 1 02 ; cohesiveness of, 56-5 7 , 7 6 , 3 1 7- 1 8 ; contrast w i t h leaders o f the 1 930s , 1 02 , 1 02 n ; control over the palace, 1 07 - 1 1 1 , 1 23-24, 1 84 ; and court finances, 6 5 , 1 2 8 - 2 9 ; domain origins of, 1 02 n , 1 2 3 - 2 4 ; a n d G rand C h a m berl a i n Tokudaij i Sanenori, 1 35-36, 1 56 , 1 74 ; a n d I mperial Household M inister Tanaka M itsuaki, 1 22-24, 1 28-29 ; and the im perial institution, 80-8 1 ; and institutional pluralism, 3 1 7 - 1 8 ; and the jiho, 2 1 -22 ; and nation building, 4 7 ; and political le gitimary, 39; and Privy Seal Sanjo S a n c t o m i , 1 7 4 - 7 6 ; and the R u s s o J a p a nese War ( 1 '104 ) , 3 1 7 , 3 1 7 n
352 M inisters o f State : a n d palace leadership, 1 1 4- 1 5 , 1 1 8 , 1 33 , 1 72 ; responsibility to the emperor, 40; see also Cabinet ; Kido Koichi M i nobe Tatsukich i : attacks against, 39n , 1 3 1 , 1 63 , 3 3 0 ; and the constitutional monarchists, 1 1 2 ; emperor supports his constitutional theory, 1 63-64, 1 68 ; and the House of Peers, 39n , 1 3 1 ; and lchiki Kitokuro, 1 30-3 1 ; interpretation of the I m pe r i a l H o u s e L a w , 4 3 - 4 4 ; i n terpretation o f sovereignty, 39n , 4 5 , 45n, 1 3 1 ; loyalty to the i mperial institution, 39n; on the role of the emperor, 39, 39n , 4 5 , 1 30-3 1 ; and the supremacy of the em peror's legislative prerogative, 3 9 , 9 8 ; Suzuki Kantaro supports h i s constitutional t h e o r y , 1 4 3 ; t h eo r y o f const i t u t i o n a l monarchy, 3 9 , 1 30-3 1 Mori Kaku : as an "Outlaw" and " Official , " 279, 280 Motoda Eifu : criticizes Ito Hirobumi, 2 5 , 3 1 3 ; and direct imperial rule, 1 8- 1 9 , 22n, 25-26; and the emperor as Confucian p a r a go n , 22, 33; and i m pe r i a l tra nscendence, 26n , 26-27 ; and Ito H i ro b u m i ' s a p p o i n t m e n t a s I m p e r i a l H o u s e h o l d S e c re t a r y , 2 3 ; a n d I t o H i robu m i ' s res i g n a t i o n a s I m pe r i a l Household M inister, 25-26; a n d O kubo Tos h i m i ch i , 1 8 ; p e t i t i o n s l w a k ura Tomomi , 18 N a g a n o Osa m i : a s C h ief o f t h e Navy General Staff, 263, 267 , 300 Nagata Tetsuzan, 209n , 290 Nakamura Satoru : as Chief Aide-de-Camp, 1 58 , 1 59 Nakamura Yiij iro : appointment to House of Pee r s , 1 8 4 ; as I m p e r i a l H o u s e h o l d Minister, I l l , 1 1 7 , 1 24 , 1 2 ? , 1 84 ; as protege of Yamagata Aritomo, 1 1 7 , 1 29 Nara Takej i : as Chief Aide-de-Camp, 1 53 , 1 55 , 1 58 , 1 59, 1 68 National polity ( k o k u tai) : defined, 3 8 n ; Chief Aide Honjo Shigeru's statement on, 1 66 ; and the February 26 I ncident, 1 66; and the imperial institution, 38, 38n; Ito
INDEX
H i ro bu m i ' s s t a t e m e n t o n , 3 5 ; a n d Maruyama Masao's typology o f political personality (roles), 275-84 , 295 , 297 -98 ; Minobe Tatsukichi's "transgression" of, 3 9 n , 1 3 1 ; Motoda Eifu ' s concept of, 26-2 7 ; and Shinto rites, 34 Navy : bureaucratic representation at court, 1 34 , 1 4 1 -4 2 , 1 8 5 - 8 6 ; and the Grand Chamberlain, 1 34 , 1 4 1 -4 2 ; see also Im perial prerogative (of supreme command); Navy General Staff Navy General Staff: emperor rebukes, 302 ; and the London Naval Treaty, 1 50, 1 52 , 1 53 ; see also Fushimi Hiroyasu; I mperial prerogative (of supreme ' 1mmand); Kato Kanj i ; Kido Koich i ; Nagano Osamu; Suzuki Kantaro "Negotiator " : the Chief Aide-de-Camp as, 274; Chief Aide Honjo Shigeru as, 1 70; the const i t u t i o n a l m o n a r c h i s t s a s , 326-33 1 ; the Elder Statesmen a s (q . v . ) ; t h e emperor's advisers a s , I 05; t h e feudal Elders as, 3 2 2 -2 3 ; the Grand Cham berl a i n a s , 1 47 ; Grand Cham berl a i n/ P r i v y S e a l K a t s u r a T a r o a s , 1 39-40; I mperial Household Minister Ta n a k a M it s u a k i a s , 1 2 2 - 2 3 ; Konoe Fumimaro as, 1 90n ; military officers as, 1 84 ; and the national consensus, 7-8, 9, 1 05 ; and the palace, 7-8, 1 05 , 323; and the " policy advocate" (q . v . ) ; as a political role, 9, 3 2 5 ; the Privy Seal as, 1 05-6, 1 7 1 , 1 7 5 , 1 76, 1 7 8 , 1 79-80, 1 95 , 274, 299; Privy Seal Hirata Tosuke as, 1 7 9-80; Privy Seal Kido Koichi as, 1 95 , 246-74, 288, 299, 307 , 309; Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki as, 1 94 ; and public opinion, 3 2 3 , 329-30; Sanjo Sanetomi a s , 1 74-7 6 ; and the "secretary, " 323, 325 , 332 ; the tradi tionalists as, 326-29; see also I mperial W i l l ; Kido Koichi; Palace (and the ne got iating process) ; Saionj i Kimmo!'h i ; "Trends o f the times" New bureaucrats , see Renovationists October I ncident ( 1 93 1 ) , 92-93, '14 "Official " : defined , 2 7 5 ; disunity of, 2H4 H .'> ; H i ranuma Kiich i rii as, 2 8 3 ; a n d K i d o
INDEX
Kiiichi, 294-97 , 307 - 9 ; manipulation of " O u t l a w s , " 2 8 5 - 8 7 , 2 9 4 ; M at s u o k a Yiisuke a s , 279-80; Mori Kaku a s , 2 7 9 , 2 8 0 ; power of, 275-76, 287 ; position of, 275-76, 277-84 ; roles within the " Of ficial" class, 287-88 Okabe Nagakage: and the Eleven Club, 1 98 , 205 n , 2 1 9 ; a n d Kido Kiiichi, 1 98 , 2 1 9 ; as K i d o K ii i c h i ' s p redecessor a s C h i e f Secretary t o t h e Privy Seal, 1 96n, 1 98 , 229, 230-3 1 Okada Keisuke : Cabinet of, 1 7 1 ; and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantarii, 1 45 , 1 54 ; a n d t h e February 26 I ncident , 1 88 ; and Kido Kiiichi's appointment as Privy Seal, 2 3 8 ; and the London Naval Treaty (q . v . ) ; nominated as Prime M inister, 1 88 ; as a possible Privy Sea l , 24 1 ; and Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, 1 45 O kawabara Nittii : as an "Outlaw ," 288, 2 9 1 Okazawa Kiyosh i : as Chief Aide-de-Camp, 1 58 O kubo Toshimich i : assassination of, 20, 3 1 4 ; and the ]iho, 20-2 1 ; and Motoda Eifu , 1 8 Oracle sovereignty, 40 "Outlaw " : defined , 275-76; disunity of, 284; and the February 26 I ncident , 285-86, 2 8 7 ; as an "instrument of pressure," 287 ; and Kido Kiiichi , 2 88-94 ; and Konoe Fumimaro, 288; manipulation by " Of ficials" , 285-87 , 294; Matsuoka Yiisuke as, 279-80; and the Meij i loyalists, 2 8 7 , 287n; M o r i Kaku as, 279, 280; position of, 275-76, 277-84 ; and terrorism , 287 Oyama Iwao: as Privy Seal , 1 73 , 1 77-78 Ozaki Yukio, 1 38-39, 299 Palace: and Cabinet coal itions, 1 05 , 3 1 5- 1 6 ; and foreign policy , 3 1 5 - 1 6 ; and the Im perial Will, 1 87 , 1 9 1 -92, 3 1 9 , 33 1 , 333; and institutional pluralism, 92 , 9 5 , 97 , 3 1 9-20; and the national consensus, 7 -8; and the negotiating process, 7-8, 90, 273, 323, 33 1 , 333; and the privatization of conflict , 9, 3 1 5 - 1 7 ; and the ratification process, 90, 9 1 , 1 02 , 1 06 , 333; as a refuge for aristocrats, 7 5 ; as sanctuary of thr em peror's personal wil l , 49, 5 5 �� 5 7 ; .1w al.1 o
353 Constitutional monarchists; I mperial pre rogative (and the role of the palace); Meij i ol igarchs; " N egotiator " ; Privatized de cision making; Traditionalists; "Trends of the times" " Palace group," 1 50 Palace leadership: and the aristocracy , 1 1 6 ; bureaucratization of, 1 84-87 ; career back ground of, 1 1 3- 1 6 ; changes in, 7-8, 1 07 , I l l , 1 1 2 - 1 3 ; a n d t h e const i t u t i o n a l monarchists (q . v . ) ; a n d t h e coordination of the role of the imperial institution , 274; Hara Kei's views on, 1 39-40; and the House of Peers, 1 1 4- 1 6 ; and the London Naval Trea t y , 1 52 - 5 3 ; and the M eij i oligarchs (q . v . ) ; and the Ministers of State (q . v . ) ; and M i nobe's theory of constitu tional monarchy, 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 3 1 ; and the na tional consensus, 7-8, I 05 ; and the Privy Council (q . v . ) ; and Saionj i K i m mochi (q . v . ) ; and the Shanghai crisis ( 1 932 ) , 2 1 3- 1 7 ; a n d t h e S u p re m e W a r Councillors, 1 1 4- 1 5 ; a n d t h e theory o f le gitimacy, 1 1 7 - 1 8 ; and the traditionalists ( q . v . ) ; see also Chief A ide-de-Camp; Em peror-in-State; Grand Chamberlain; I m perial Household M inister; "Negotiator"; Privy Sea l ; "Trends of the times" Parties, see Political parties " Party" Cabinets, see House of Representa tives; Political parties Peerage Affairs, Office of, 7 1 ; see also Kido Kiiichi (as Director of Peerage Affairs) Peers, House of, see House of Peers Peers School, 72-73 Pluralism,2:,ee I nstitutional pluralism " Policy advocate " : and the " bureaucrat , " 1 9 5 ; the constitutionalists as, 3 2 5 - 2 6 ; 3 2 6 n ; Ito H i robumi a s , 1 7 5 ; and Kido Kiiich i , 9 , 1 9 5 , 288; manipulation of " Outlaws , " 294 ; manipulation of so cialized publ ic opi nion, 330; and the " ne gotiator," 323, 324, 326-27 , 329, 332 ; as a political role, 9; and "privatized public o p i n i o n , " 3 2 9 ; the renovat i o n i s t s a s , 325-26, 326n ; and the "secretary ," 323, 332 Po l i t i r a l t• l i t t•s , 99- 1 0 1
354 Political parties: a s organizations in t h e na t i o n a l pol i t y , 2 8 2 - 8 3 ; and " pa r t y " Cabinets, 1 87-88, 3 2 5 ; a n d the Privy Seal, 244-4 5 ; and "transcendental" Cabinets, 1 37-39, 1 87-88 Pol it icization : of society, 1 49, 1 49n Prerogative, see Imperial prerogative Privatization of confl ict : and bureaucratic decision making, 9; defined , 3 1 2 ; and the im perial government , 3 1 2 ; and the palace, 9, 3 1 5- 1 7 ; and the socialization of confl ict , 9, 3 1 2 ; as a strategy of governing, 3 1 2 , 3 1 4 ; a s a value system, 3 1 2- 1 3 ; see also Pri vatized decision making; Socialization of conflict ; Socialized decision making Privatized decision making: effects on the political process, 1 48-50, 1 55 ; and the palace, 1 50, 1 5 5 , 3 1 6 , 33 1 ; political roles in, 8-9, 3 3 1 -33; and social ized decision making, 1 48 , 3 3 1 P r i v y Counci l : and the C hief A ides-de Camp, 1 59 ; and the Imperial House Law, 42, 43, 46, 58; and the London Naval Treaty, 98, 1 5 1 , 1 52-5 3 , 1 54-5 5 ; and the Meij i Constitution, 36, 58; and palace leaders h i p , 1 1 4- 1 5 , I 1 8- 1 9 , 1 3 3 , 1 5 9 , 1 72 , 1 84 ; and Privy Seal Fushimi Sa d a n a r u , 1 7 7 ; and P r i v y S e a l H i ra t a Tosuke, 1 79-80; a n d t h e Supreme War Council, 1 58 Privy Sea l : abolition of the office of, 2 ; at tacked by "Outlaw" Takuya Dempu, 2 9 1 -92 ; career backgrounds of, 1 72-73; creation of the office of, 1 7 4-7 5; duties of, 1 7 3-74 ; Fushimi Sadanaru as (q . v . ) ; H irata Tosuke a s (q . v . ) ; Katsura Taro as ( q . v . ) ; Kido Koichi as (q . v . ) ; M a k i n o Nobuaki as (q . v . ) ; murder of, 330-3 1 ; as a "negotiator" (q . v . ) ; O yama Iwao as (q . v . ) ; S a nj ii S a n e t o m i a s ( q . v . ) ; T o k u d a ij i Sanenori a s (q . v . ) ; transition t o bureau cratic leadership, 1 7 7 ; Yuasa Kurahei as (q . v . ) " Public opinion " : antioligarch leaders of, 47 ; defined as t h e v i e w s of b u r e a u c r a t i c " policy advocates , " 323, 329; a n d t h e Elders of Chiishii domain, 32 1 ; a n d the emperor, 20, 26, 26n, 56-57 ; and the em peror's advisers, 3 2 2 -2 3 ; and Grand Cha mberl a i n/ Privy S e a l Katsura Taro ,
INDEX
1 36, 1 38 ; and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki K a n t a r ii , 1 4 7 , 1 5 4 ; ltii H i ro b u m i ' s inability t o control , 25-26, 3 1 3 ; and the jiho, 20; and the " negotiator," 322-2 3 , 329-30; "privatized , " 3 2 9 ; a n d Privy Seal Sanjo Sanetomi , 1 7 6 ; "socialized , " 330, 332 " Ratifier" : defined as a political role, 9 , 288; see also Emperor; Palace Renovationists, 209n, 296; attack on the cons t i t u t i o n a l i s t s a n d const i t u t i o n a l monarchists, 3 3 0 ; defined , 296n, 325-26; and the February 26 I ncident, 285-86; and Kido Koichi , 1 9 1 , 327 ; and Konoe Fumimaro, 1 90, 327 ; and the moderates, 1 90; as "policy advocates," 325-27 , 326n; union with rightist societies, 1 89 Representatives, House of, see House of Representatives Restoration settlement ( 1 868-1 889 ) , 5, 1 5 , 1 6, 49, 5 1 , 95 Rightist societies, 284; disunity of, 284; and Hiranuma Kiichiro, 283; as "Outlaw" groups, 28 1 ; union with the renovationists, 1 89 Right-wing radical s : attack on moderate leaders, 1 88 ; and the I mperial Will, 3 1 7 ; a s " instruments o f pressure," 288 ; see also "Outlaw" Rites, see Shinto rites " Rites and rule are one" (saisei itchi), 27 ; and the Restoration government , 28-30 Rites, Government of (jingikan), 28-30 Rites, Ministry of (jingi Sho), 29-30 Rituals, Board of, 3 1 Saigo Takamori, 8 0 , 1 94 Saionji Kimmochi ( Prince) : blocks H iranuma Kiichiro's appointment as President of thr Privy Council , 3 3 0 ; blocks H i ranuma Kiichiro's appointment as Privy Seal, 24S; and the Chang Tso-l in affair (fall of thl' Tanaka Cabinet in 1 929 ) , 1 44 , 1 46, 1 4 9 , 1 88 ; a n d t h e Chief Aide-de-Camp, 1 89 ; a s a constitutional monarchist , 1 1 2 , 1 1 6 , 1 1! ? , 326-2 7 ; death of, 1 82 , 1 9 1 , 2 5 S ; as Eld«·r Statesman ( Ge n rii ) , 1 1 2 , 1 8 1 , 242 4 � . ' 322-2 3 ; as th e emperor s highl'st a d v i s «• r ,
INDEX
1 1 6, 1 87-90, 207 ; foreign policy views, 1 87 ; and Hara Kei , 1 28 , 1 37 , 1 38 , 1 39 ; and Harada Kumao, 1 94 , 206, 206n , 207 , 208 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 , 2 1 3 , 232, 238-39, 240-43, 2 5 5 ; on I mperial Household M i n isters from the "outside", 1 1 8 , 1 20, 1 29, 1 9 1 ; and the I mperial Household M inistry , 1 1 8 , 1 89 , 3 1 9-20; on imperial princes in "positions of responsibility," 303-4; and Ito Hirobumi, 1 1 6, 1 1 6n and lwakura Tomomi, 1 35 ; and Katsura Taro, 1 1 6 , 1 37 , 1 38 ; a n d Kido Koichi, 207 , 2 1 2 , 232 ; and Kido Koichi's appointment as Privy Seal, 238-39, 240-43 , 245 ; and Konoe Fumimaro, 1 5 2 , 1 90n , 3 2 7 ; and t h e London Naval Treaty (q . v . ) ; a n d Makino Nobuaki, 1 43 n , 1 46, 2 1 6; as a " nego tiator," 322-2 3 ; and the palace leadership of the constitutional monarchists, 1 1 2 , 1 43 , 1 8 1 ; and "party" Cabinets, 1 87 , 1 88 ; political partisanship of, 1 5 0 , 1 87 - 8 9 , 322; a s president of t h e Seiyiikai, 1 37 ; a s Prime M inister, 1 1 6 ; a n d t h e renova tionists (new bureaucrats), 327 ; and Sanjo Sanetomi, 1 35 ; second Cabinet of, 1 04 , 1 38 ; and t h e Senior Retainers, 1 7 1 , 1 8 1 ; and the system for advising the throne, 1 8 1 ; and Tokudaij i Sanenori , 1 1 6, 1 35 ; and the "trends of the times," 3 1 9-20; and the transcendental role of the emperor, 322, 326-2 7 ; and Yamagata Aritomo, 1 28 , 1 37 , 1 38 Saito Makoto: assassination of, 1 65 , 1 8 1 , 1 88 , 227 , 3 1 4 , 330; and the constitutional monarchists, 326; and the February 26 In cident , 1 65 , 1 88 , 330; and the London Naval Treaty (q . v . ) ; and the Okada Cabinet , 1 7 1 -7 2 ; as Prime Minister, 1 8 1 , 1 84 , 1 86-87 ; as Privy Seal, 1 7 1 -7 2 , 1 8 1 , 1 84 , 1 88 , 227 , 330; Saionj i Kimmochi nominates as Prime Minister, 1 88 Sanjo Sanetomi : as Chancellor, 1 8 , 2 1 , 2 3 , 1 74, 1 7 5 ; defense o f I t o H irobumi, 2 3 ; and Ito Hirobumi, 1 74-76 ; and the jiho, 2 1 ; and the Ladies-in-Waiting, 80; as a " ne gotiator," 1 7 5-76, 1 95 ; as Privy Sea l , 1 73-76, 1 95 ; a n d Saionj i Ki mmochi, 1 3 5 Sasaki Yukitada: as jiho, 1 9-22, 1 3 5 S a t s u m a ( d o m a i n ) : a n d tfw l nl Jl l' r i a l
355 Household M inister, 1 23-24, 1 24n; and the Meij i oligarchs, 1 02n , 1 23 ; and the Meij i Restoration, 1 22-23 " Secretary, " 288; as a political role, 9 , 1 94 , 3 2 3 , 3 3 2 , 3 3 3 ; see also Harada Kumao; Kido Koichi Sekiya Teisaburo : as Vice M inister of the I mperial Household Ministry , 92-94 Senior Retainers : as advisers to the emperor, 1 05 , 1 06 , 1 87 , 27 1 , 322; Army criticizes as "weak, " 1 70; conference of, 2 1 5- 1 6 , 2 7 2 ; and Kido Koichi's appointment as Privy Seal, 238, 240, 245 ; as " negotia tors , " 8 , 1 05 ; and Saionj i Kimmochi , 1 7 1 , 1 8 1 ; Saito Makoto as, 1 7 1 ; and the system for advising the throne, 1 8 1 Shanghai crisis ( 1 932 ) , 2 1 3- 1 7 Shidehara Kijiiro, 1 52 Shinto rites : adapted to serve the new na t i o n a l govern m e n t , 27 - 2 8 ; and t h e aristocracy , 72-7 3 ; a n d Confucian moral force, 33; and the emperor, 27-28, 34-3 5 , 3 7 ; I t o H irobumi's use of, 35-36; a n d the Meij i Constitution , 35-37, 45; and the na tional polity, 34; and the separation of church and state, 37-39; and Western reli gion, 36; see also Ceremonies, Board of the; I mp e r i a l p r e roga t i v e ; R i t e s , Government of; Rituals, Board of "Showa Restoration, " 286, 286n, 287 "Shrine" ( Portable) : defined , 275-76; em peror as, 298-99, 302 ; imperial princes as, 303-7 ; position and role of, 2 7 5 - 7 6 , 277-84 Sixth Day Club, 2 1 2 , 236 Socialization of confl ict : and democracy, 9, 3 1 1 - 1 2 ; as a strategy of governing, 3 1 2 ; as a value system, 3 1 1 - 1 2 , 3 1 3 ; see also Pri vatization of confl ict ; Socialized decision making Socialized decision making, 1 48 , 3 3 1 ; see also Privatized decision making Supreme War Council (Councillors), 1 58 ; a n d t h e London Naval Treaty , 98 , 1 50-5 1 , 1 52 ; and palace leadership, 1 1 4-1 5 Suzuki Kantaro : appointment as G rand Chamherlain, 1 4 1 -43, 1 4 3n ; and Chief A i d r H o n j i"1 Shif.�rru, 1 69 ; and C h i<-f o f S t a ff K a t <• Ka n j i , I 1 3 1 1• ; a nrl t lu· m l l a pS!"
356 Suzuki Kantaro ( Co nt. ) of the Tanaka Cabinet ( 1 929), 1 43-50; and the constitutional monarchists, 1 1 2 , 1 4 1 -43; and the February 26 I ncident , 2 2 9 , 330-3 1 ; as G rand Chamberl a i n , 1 32-33, 1 43-56, 1 69, 330-3 1 ; a n d the London Naval Treaty (q . v . ) ; and Okada Keisuke, 1 54 ; percept ion of the Grand C h a mber l a i n ' s ro l e , 1 4 6 - 4 7 ; p o l i t ic a l views of, 1 43 ; a s President of t h e Privy Council, 1 84 ; as Prime Minister, 8 5 , 1 1 3 ; a n d Privy Seal Kido Koichi , 1 1 3 , 229 S u z u k i Tei ic h i : a n d " b ureaucra t " K i d o Koichi , 2 3 3 , 2 3 4 ; and Privy S e a l Kido Koichi , 269; as a renovationist (new bu reaucrat), 296 ; and Secretary Kido Koichi, 209- 1 0, 2 1 1 Taisho Emperor: Ichiki Kitokuro 's "dis respectful acts" toward , 1 43 n ; illness of, 1 63 ; and Kanroj i Osanaga, 7 7 ; Katsura Taro's tutoring of, 1 40-4 1 ; mother of, 79 Takamatsu Nobuhito (Pri nce-of-the-Blood), 262, 306 Takuya Dempu : as a n "Outl a w " , 2 8 8 , 2 9 1 -93 Tanaka Giichi, 1 44-47 , 1 49-50, 1 87-88 Tanaka M itsuaki : career of, 1 22-23, 1 23 n ; as Imperial House Economic Adviser, 1 79 ; a s Imperial Household Minister, 1 22-27 , 1 28-29, 1 68 ; and the Meij i Emperor, 1 2 6 -2 7 ; and P r i m e M i n i s t e r K a t s u r a Taro, 1 24-2 5 ; as a Tosa loyalist, 1 23 T a n i M a s a y u k i : a n d " b ureaucra t " K i d o Koichi, 2 3 3 ; a s a renovationist (new bu reaucrat), 296; and Secretary Kido Koichi , 209, 2 1 0, 2 1 1 Toj ii H i d e k i : as A r m y M i n i s t e r , 2 6 7 ; Cabinet of, 1 03-4 ; as Prime M inister, 1 1 3 , 1 9 1 , 267-68 , 270, 272; and Privy Seal Kido Koichi, 1 1 3 , 267-68, 270, 272 Tokudaij i Sanenori : crit icized by the jiho, 1 9, 1 35 ; family connections of, 1 1 6- 1 7 ; as Grand Chamberlain/ Privy Seal, 1 34-36, 1 39 , 1 56 , 1 73 , 1 74 , 1 7 6; and the Meiji oligarchs, 1 35-36; and Saionj i Ki mmochi, 1 1 6, 1 35 Tosa (domain) : and the Meij i Restoration, 1 22-23
INDEX
Toyama M itsuru : as an "Outlaw , " 2 9 1 Traditionalists : control o f t h e palace, I 07 , 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 326, 330; and imperial transcendence, 3 2 6 , 3 2 7 ; a n d Japanese fas cism, 1 90-9 1 ; and the national consensus, 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 9 1 ; and the " t rends of t h e times", 1 1 2- 1 3 , 1 90-92 ; see also Constitu tional monarchists; Kido Koichi; Konoe Fumimaro; � 'Negotiator'' "Transcendental" Cabinets, see Cabinet "Trends of the times " : and advising the throne, I I , 1 87 ; and decision making, 9; and the Foreign Ministry , 1 86 ; and the Im perial Household Ministry, 1 1 8 , 1 29, 1 89, 1 9 1 ; and the military, 2 7 3 ; and the " nego tiator , " 9, 3 3 2 ; and the palace, 1 05 , 1 9 1 -92 , 3 1 9-20; and palace leadership, 9, 1 05 ; and the " policy advocate," 9; and the Privy Seal , 1 74 ; and Secretaries Harada and Kido, 208 ; see also Traditionalists , Tuesday Luncheon Club, 236 Uchiyama Koj iro: as Chief Aide-de-Camp, 1 58 , 1 60 Uesugi Shinkich i : constitutional theory of, 44-4 5 , 45n Ugaki Kazunari : career of, 244n ; as possible Privy Seal, 244; recommended as Prime Minister, 1 88-89 Union of court and government , 1 6-26 Usami Okiie: as Chief Aide-de-Cam p , 1 59 Wakatsuki Reijiro: caretaker government of, 1 88 ; and Kido Koichi's appoint ment as Privy Sea l , 2 3 8 , 240; and the London Naval Treaty (q . v . ) ; as possible Privy Sea l , 244, 245 Yamagata Aritomo : and the Aides-de-Camp, B i n ; Cabinet of, 1 7 6 ; and the creat ion of " modern army, 3 1 7 ; domination over tht' court , I l l ; grandsons of, 7 5 , 8 5 ; and Hirata Tosuke, 1 78 ; and Ichiki Kitokun\ 1 43 n ; and the I mperial House Economio Council , 1 7 8 ; and Imperial Househol d Minister Tanaka Mitsuaki, 1 26; a n d 1 1 1-, Hirobumi (q . v . ) ; and Katsura Ta r (> , I l l , 1 1 6, 1 30n , 1 36-37 , 1 38-39; and thr nwril aristocracy, 73-74; as an oligarfh , 1 80 ,
I NDEX
3 1 7 ; as a possible I mperial Household Secretary , 23; receives funds from the Im perial Household M i nistry, 1 2 8 ; and "transcendental" Cabin� ts, 1 37 Yamamoto Tatsuo : and Home M i n istry rivalry with the Army, 1 00 Yonai M itsumasa : and Kido Kiiichi's ap pointment as Privy Sea l , 238, 239 Yoshida Shigeru, 77
357 Yuasa Kurahei : and Chief Aide Honjii Shi geru , 1 69-70; as I m perial Household Minister then Privy Sea l , 1 20; as Imperial Household M inister, 1 8 1 , 225n, 226-2 7 ; a n d K i d o Kiiichi's appointment as Privy Seal, 238, 239, 240, 243, 244 ; as Privy Seal, 1 69-70, 1 8 1 , 225n, 226-27 , 238, 239, 240, 243, 244
STUDIES OF THE EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE
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A SI A N
IN STITUTE
japanese Education: A Bibliograp hy of Materials in the English Language, by Herbert Passin. New York : Teachers College Press , Columbia U niversity, 1 970. Economic Development and the Labor Market in Japan, by Koj i Taira. New York : Columbia University Press , 1 970. The Japa nese Oligarchy and the Russo-japanese War, by Shumpei Okamoto. NewYork : Columbia University Press, 1 970. Imperial Restoration in Medieval Japan, by H. Paul Varley . New York : Col umbia University Press, 1 97 1 . Japan 's Postwar Defense Policy, 7 94 7- 7 968, by Martin E . Weinstein. New York : Columbia University Press , 1 97 1 . Election Campaigning Japanese Style, by Gerald L . Curtis. New York : Columbia University Press , 1 97 1 . China and Russia: The "Great Game, " by 0 . Edmund Clubb. New York : C olumbia University Press , 1 97 1 . Money and Monetary Policy in Communist China, by Kathari ne Huang Hsiao. New York : Columbia University Press, 1 97 1 . The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China, by John R . Watt . New York : Columbia University Press, 1 97 2 . L a w and Policy in China 's Foreign Relations: A Study of A ttitudes and Practice, by James C . Hsiung. New York : Columbia University Press , 1 972 . Pearl Habor as History: japanese-A merican Relations, 7 93 7- 7 94 7, edited by Dorothy B org and Shumpei Okamoto, with the assista nce of Dale K . A . Fi nlayson . New York : Columbia University Press , 1 97 3 . japanese Culture: A Short History, b y H . Paul Varley . New York : Praeger, 1 97 3 . Doctors i n Politics: The Political L ife of the japan Medical Association, by William E . Steslicke . New York : Praeger, 1 97 3 . japan 's Foreign Policy, 7868- 7 94 7: A Research Gu ide, edited b y James William M orley . New York : Columbia Uni versity Press , 1 97 4 . The japan Teachers Union: A Radical Interest Group in Japanese Politic.1 , by Donald Ray Thurston . Princeton : Pri nceton U niversity Press, 1 97 3 . Palace and Politics i n Prewar Japan, b y David A nson Titus . New York : Columbia University Press , 1 97 4 . The Idea of China: Essays i n Geographic Myth a n d Theory, b y Andr!'w March. Devon, England : David a nd Charles , 1 97 4 . Origins of the Cultural Revolu tion, b y Roderick MacFarquhar. New Y o r k : Columbia University Press , Vol . 1 , 1 97 4 . Shiba Kokan, by Calvi n L . French. Tokyo: J ohn Weatherhi l l , I nc . , fort h coming.
