Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology)

OUTLINE OF A TFIEOFY OF PRACTICE Pierre Bourdieu

Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology ED ITO RS:

ER N EST

ST E PH E N

G U D EM A N .

G EL LN ER ,

JACK

M IC H A E L

JO N A T H A N

GOODY,

HERZFEI.D,

PARRY

16 O U T L I N E OF A T H E O R Y OF P R A C T I C E

r

O U T L I N E OF A T H E O R Y OF P R A C T I C E P IE R R E

B O U R D IE U

T r a n s la t e d b y

RICHARD NICE

ffiS C a m b r i d g e U N IV E R S IT Y P R E S S

P u b lis h e d b y th e P r e s s S y n d ic a t e o f th e U n iv e r s it y o f C a m b r id g e T h e P it t B u ild in g , T r u m p in g t o n S tr e e t, C a m b r id g e C B 2 1R P 4 0 W e s t 2 0 th S tr e e t, N e w Y o r k , N Y 1 0 0 1 1 - 4 2 1 1 , U S A 1 0 S ta m fo r d R o a d , O a k le ig h , M e lb o u r n e 3 1 6 6 , A u str a lia © In t h e E n g lis h la n g u a g e e d it io n C a m b r id g e U n iv e r s it y P r e s s 1 9 7 7 T h e o r ig in a l e d it io n , e n t it le d E sq u isse d 'u n e th e o rie d e la p r a ti q u e , p r e c e d e d e tr o is e tu d e s d ’e th n o lo g ie k a b y le , w a s p u b lis h e d b y L ib r a ir ie D r o z S .A . in S w itz e r la n d © L ib r a ir ie D r o z , 1 9 7 2 F ir s t p u b lis h e d in E n g lis h tr a n sla tio n 1 9 7 7 R e p r in te d 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1991 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1995 P r in t e d in G r e a t B r ita in at th e U n iv e r s it y P r e s s , C a m b r id g e L ib r a r y o f C o n g re ss C a ta lo g u in g in P u b lic a tio n D a t a B o u r d ie u , P ie r r e . O u tlin e o f a th e o r y o f p r a c tic e . (C a m b r id g e s t u d ie s in so c ia l a n th ro p o lo g y '; 16) T r a n s la tio n w ith r e v is io n s o f E s q u is s e d ’u n e th e o r ie d e la p r a tiq u e . I n c lu d e s b ib lio g r a p h ic a l r e fe r e n c e s a n d in d e x . 1. K a b y le s - A d d r e s s e s , e s sa y s, le c tu r e s. 2. E t h n o lo g y . I. T i t le . D T 2 9 8 .K 2 B 6 9 1 3

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Contents

T ran slato r's forew ord 1

2

3

T H E O B JEC TIV E L IM IT S OF O B JEC TIV ISM

I

Section i: A n alyses

i

From the mechanics o f the model to the dialectic o f strategies From the "rules ” o f honour to the sense o f honour Practice and discourse about practice The fallacies of the rule

3 10 16 22

Section 1 1 : Case stu d y: parallel-cousin m arriage

30

The state o f the question The functions o f kinship: official kin and practical kin Officializing strategies Collective beliefs and white lies The ordinary and the extra-ordinary M atrimonial strategies and social reproduction

32 33 38 52 58

STRUCTURES AND THE HABITUS

72

A false dilem m a: mechanism and finalism Structures, habitus and practices The dialectic o f objectification and embodiment

72 78 &7

43

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G E N E R A T IV E SCHEM ES AND PRACTICAL LOGIC: IN V EN TIO N W ITH IN LIM ITS

The calendar and the synoptic illusion Economy o f logic The body as geometer: cosmogonic practice Union and separation Thresholds and rites o f passage Reunion o f contraries and denial M aking use of indeterminacy The habitus and homologies

4

page vii

ST R U C T U R E S, H A B IT U S, POWER: BASIS

96 97 ^ 109 114 124 130 132 140 143 FOR A

T H E O R Y OF S Y M B O L I C PO W E R

159

D oxa, orthodoxy, heterodoxy Symbolic capital Modes of domination

159

N otes In d ex

171 183 198 240

" T h e principal defect of all m aterialism up to now - including that of Feuerbach - is that the external object, reality, the sensible w orld, is grasped in the form of an object or an intuition; but not as concrete human activity, as practice, in a subjective way. T h is is why the active aspect was developed by idealism , in opposition to materialism - but only in an abstract w ay, since idealism naturally does not know real concrete activity as su ch .” K . M arx, Theses on Feuerbach

T ranslator’s foreword

Outline o f a Theory o f Practice was first published in Fren ch in 1972 (Esquisse d ’une theorie de la pratique ). H ow ever, this E nglish text incorporates most of the changes which Pierre Bourdieu has made since then. T h e argum ent is carried further, particularly as regards the concepts of practical logic and sym bolic capital, the order of exposition is recast, and, partly for reasons of space, the ethnographic chapters with w hich the Fren ch edition opens have been curtailed. T h is text is the cornerstone of an oeuvre w hich encom passes num erous m ajor works in both anthropology and sociology - which crosses and chal­ lenges the boundary dividin g their objects, tasks, and theories, and forces attention to the social conditions in which such sciences are possible. T h e fieldwork in K ab y lia w hich provided the ethnographic basis for this text and the starting-point for its reflections w as carried out am id the tragic circum stances of the Algerian w ar, w hich brought to a head the contradictions inherent in the ethnologist’s position. T h is was one factor in Bourdieu’s subsequent move into the field of sociology, where the separation w hich is the hidden condition o f all academ ic activity - most insidiously so in the behavioural sciences - could itself be grasped scientifically in the course of inquiry into the social functions of scholarship and the m echanism s of cultural and social reproduction. T h e Outliney a " reflection on scientific practice w hich will disconcert both those who reflect on the social sciences without practising them and those who practise them w ithout reflecting on th em ” , seeks to define the prerequisites for a truly scientific discourse about human behaviour, that is, an adequate theory o f practice which must include a theory of scientific practice. T h e stages through w hich Bourdieu’s work has passed, the problem s he has set him self, are of course partly determ ined by the accidents of a b iography; but also by the configurations of the intellectual field in France over a certain period. T h e com m onplaces a translator m ight feel required to adduce in order to extenuate the visible loss entailed in extracting a text from its context touch only the surface of processes which the explicit thrust of Bourdieu’s argum ent, here and elsew here, enables us to grasp m ore pro­ foundly as involving more than questions of " translatability Bourdieu would [ v i i ]

Vl l l

Translator's fo rew o rd

be the last to regret the shedding of all that the text was immediately and tacitly granted, inasmuch as it bore the social marks which signal a product conforming to the local standards: the signs of recognition eliciting the recognition of already converted readers, the dignifyingreferences, theoretical allusions, stylistic effects, have indeed every likelihood of remaining dead letters once outside the magic circle of belief. But much more besides the value set on the text is at stake when it circulates beyond its field of production. The most autonomous work contains implicit reference to an intellectual universe whose cardinal points are scientific (and political) positions symbolized, in a given state of the field, by the names of authors or schools of thought or by " is m s ” which may cover totally different realities in different national traditions. These are the structures of the field of production, its divisions into antagonistic groups and rival schools, which, internalized, function as unexamined principles of perception and appreciation. When these bearings are removed the text becomes open to misreading. T h u s nothing guarantees that, for some readers, this work, written against the currents at present dominant in France, "structuralism ” or "structuralM arxism ” , will not be merged with the very tendencies it combats. Less pessimistically, there is still reason to fear that the frequent references made to the Anglo-American philosophical tradition - a heaven-sent weapon against the theoreticism which so strongly characterizes French social science, from Durkheim to Levi-Strauss - may, when returned to their original universe, take on a significance very different from the one they were given in a context in which that tradition is disdained or unknown, and be seen as a sign of allegiance to positivism (if not as an ingratiating gesture towards the intellec­ tual establishment). The fact remains that a text which seeks to break out of a scheme of thought as deeply embedded as the opposition between subjectivism and objectivism is fated to be perceived through the categories which it seeks to transcend, and to appear contradictory or eclectic (except when forcibly reduced to one or the other alternative). T he provisional eclecticism which can juxtapose Wittgenstein with the young M arx finds its justification in the fact that all the resources of a tradition which from the beginning has made practice the negative obverse of theory are needed in order to think the unthinkable. R. N.

I The objective limits of objectivism

SECTION

I:

ANALYSES

T h e practical privilege in which all scientific activity arises never more subtly governs that activity (insofar as science presupposes not only an epistemological break but also a social separation) than when, unrecognised as privilege, it leads to an implicit theory of practice which is the corollary of neglect of the social conditions in which science is possible. T h e anthropologist’s particular relation to the object o f his study contains the makings of a theoretical distortion inasmuch as his situation as an observer, excluded from the real play of social activities by the fact that he has no place (except by choice or by way of a game) in the system observed and has no need to make a place for him self there, inclines him to a hermeneutic representation of practices, leading him to reduce all social relations to communicative relations and, more precisely, to decoding operations. Charles Bally remarked that linguistic research takes different directions according to whether it deals with the researcher’s mother tongue or with a foreign language, emphasizing in particular the tendency to intellectualism implied in observing language from the standpoint of the listening subject rather than that of the speaking subject, that is, as a "m ean s of action and expression” : "th e listener is on the side of the language, it is with the language that he interprets sp eech ” .1 And exaltation of the virtues of the distance secured by externality sim ply transmutes into an epistemological choice the anthropologist’s objective situation, that of the "im partial spectator” , as Husserl puts it, condemned to see all practice as a spectacle. It is instructive to glance at the case of art history, which, never having really broken with the tradition of the amateur, gives free rein to celebratory contemplation and finds in the sacred character of its object every pretext for a hagiographic hermeneutics superbly indifferent to the question of the social conditions in which works are produced and circulate. Panofsky, for example, w T i t i n g on Abbot Suger and the invention” of Gothic architecture, only exceptionally and almost accidentally aban­ dons the point of view o f the interpreter who, more concerned with the opus operatum than the modus operandi, represses the question of artistic production under the concept of the "objective intention” o f the work and reduces immediate com pre­ hension to a decoding that is unaware that it ii a d e c o d i n g . T o treat a work of plastic art as a discourse intended to be interpreted, decoded, by reference to a transcendent code analogous to the Saussurian " langue” is to forget that artistic production is always also - to different degrees d e p e n d i n g on the art a n d on t h e historically variable styles [ i]

2

T he objective lim its of objectivism

of practising it - the product of an " art ”," pure practice without theory ”, as Durkheim says,2 or to put it another way, a mimesis, a sort of sym bolic gym nastics, like the rite or the d ance; and it is also to forget that the work of art always contains som ething ineffable, not by excess, as hagiography would have it, but by default, som ething which com m unicates, so to speak, from body to body, i.e. on the hither side of words or concepts, and w hich pleases (or displeases) without concepts.

S o lon g as h e rem ains unaware of the lim its inherent in his point of view on the object, the anthropologist is con d em ned to adopt unw ittingly for his ow n u se the representation of action w hich is forced on agents or groups w hen th ey lack practical m astery of a h ighly valued com p eten ce and have to provide th em selves w ith an exp licit and at least sem i-form alized su bstitute for it in the form of a repertoire of rules, or of what sociologists con sid er, at best, as a " r o le ”, i.e. a predeterm ined set of discourses and actions appropriate to a particular Mstage-part ” .3 It is significant t h a t" culture ” is som etim es described as a m a p ; it is the analogy w h ich occurs to an outsider w ho has to find his w ay around in a foreign landscape and w ho com p en sates for his lack of practical m astery, the prerogative o f the native, by the use o f a m odel of all p ossible routes. T h e gulf b etw een this potential, abstract space, devoid of landm arks or any privileged centre - like gen ealogies, in w h ich the ego is as unreal as th e starting-point in a Cartesian sp ace - and the practical space of journeys actually m ade, or rather of journeys actually b ein g m ade, can be seen from the difficulty w e have in recogn izin g fam iliar routes on a m ap or tow n-plan u ntil w e are able to bring together the axes of th e field of potentialities and the "system o f axes linked unalterably to our b odies, and carried about w ith u s w herever w e g o ”, as Poincare puts it, w hich structures practical space into right and left, up and d ow n , in front and b eh in d . H ence it is not sufficient for anth rop ology to break w ith native experience and the native representation of that ex p er ie n c e: it has to m ake a second break and question the p resup position s inherent in the p osition of an outside observer, w ho, in his preoccupation w ith interpreting practices, is inclined to introduce in to th e object th e p rinciples o f h is relation to the object, as is attested by the special im portance he assigns to com m un icative functions (w hether in language, m yth, or m arriage). K n o w led g e does not m erely d ep en d, as an elem entary relativism teaches, on th e particular standpoint an observer "situated in space and tim e ” takes u p on the object. T h e "know ing su b jec t”, as the idealist tradition rightly calls h im , inflicts on practice a m uch m ore fundam ental and p ernicious alteration w h ich , b ein g a constituent con d ition of th e cognitive operation, is b oun d to pass u n n oticed : in taking up a point of view on the action, w ithdraw ing from it in order to observe it from above and from a d istance, he con stitu tes practical activity as an object o f observation an d analysis, a representation.

T he objective lim its o f objectivism

3

From the mechanics o f the model to the dialectic o f strategies T h e social w orld may be the object o f three m odes of theoretical k now ledge, each o f w hich im plies a set of (usually tacit) anthropological theses. A lthough these m odes of know ledge are strictly speaking in no way exclu sive, and may be described as m om ents in a dialectical advance tow ards adequate k now ledge, they have on ly one th in g in com m on , the fact that they are op posed to practical k now ledge. T h e know ledge w e shall call phenomenological (or, to speak in term s of currently active sch ools, " eth nom ethod ological ”) sets out to m ake exp licit the truth of prim ary exp erience of th e social w orld , i.e . all that is inscribed in th e relationship of fa m ilia rity w ith the familiar environ­ m en t, the u n q u estion in g apprehension o f th e social w orld w hich , by defini­ tion, d oes not reflect on itself and exclu d es the question of the co n d itio n s of its ow n possibility. T h e k now ledge w e shall term objectivist (of w hich structuralist herm eneutics is a particular case) con stru cts the objective rela­ tion s (e .g . econ om ic or lin gu istic) w h ich structure practice and representa­ tion s of practice, i.e ., in particular, prim ary k now ledge, practical and tacit, o f th e fam iliar w orld. T h is con stru ction presup poses a break w ith prim ary k now ledge, w h ose tacitly assum ed p resup position s give the social w orld its self-ev id en t, natural character .4 It is only on condition that it poses the q u estion w hich th e doxic exp erience of th e social w orld excludes by definition - th e q u estion of the (particular) con d ition s m aking that experience p ossible - that ob jectivist k now ledge can establish b oth th e structures of the social w orld and the objective truth of prim ary experience as experience denied explicit k now ledge of those structures. F in ally, it is only by m eans of a secon d break, w h ich is needed in order to grasp the lim its of ob jectivist k now ledge - an inevitable m om ent in scientific k now ledge - and to brin g to light the theory of theory and the theory of practice inscribed (in its practical state) in th is m ode of know ledge, that w e can integrate th e gains from it into an adequate scien ce of practices. T h e critical break w ith ob jectivist abstraction en su in g from inquiry in to the con d ition s o f p ossib ility, and thereby, into th e lim its o f th e objective and ob jectifying standpoint w hich grasps practices from ou tside, as a fa it accomp li, instead o f constructing th eir generative principle by situating itself w ithin the very m ovem ent of their accom p lish m en t, has no other aim than to make p ossib le a scien ce of th e dialectical relations b etw een th e objective structures to w h ich th e ob jectivist m od e of k now ledge gives access and the structured d ispositions w ith in w h ich those structures are actualized and w hich tend to reproduce them . T h is q u estion in g of ob jectivism is liable to be understood at first as a rehabilitation of subjectivism and to be m erged w ith the critique that naive

4

T he objective lim its o f objectivism

hum anism levels at scientific objectification in the nam e o f " lived exp erience ” and the rights o f " su b je ctiv ity ” . In reality, the theory of practice and o f the practical m ode of know ledge inherent in all practice w hich is the precondition for a rigorous scien ce o f p ractices carries out a new reversal o f the p roblem atic w hich objectivism has to con stru ct in order to con stitu te the social w orld as a system of objective relations in depend en t o f individual con sciousnesses and w ills. Just as ob jectivist k n ow led ge p oses the question of the con d ition s of the p ossib ility of prim ary exp erience, thereby revealing that th is experience (or the phenom enological analysis of it) is fundam entally defined as not posing this q uestion, so the theory of practice puts objectivist know ledge back on its feet by p osin g the q u estion of the (theoretical and also social) conditions w hich m ake su ch know ledge p o ssib le. Because it produces its scien ce o f the social w orld against the im p licit presup position s o f practical know ledge of the social w orld, objectivist k now ledge is diverted from construction o f the theory o f practical know ledge of the social w orld, of w hich it at least produces the lack. O bjective analysis of practical apprehension of the fam iliar w orld is not a n ew form of sacrificial offering to the m ysteries o f su bjectivity, but a m eans o f exploring the lim its of all ob jective exploration. It teaches us that we shall escape from the ritual eith er/or ch oice b etw een objectivism and su bjectivism in w hich the social scien ces have so far allow ed them selves to be trapped only if w e are prepared to inquire into the m ode o f production and fu n ction in g of the practical m astery w h ich m akes possib le both an objectively intelligible practice and also an ob jectively enchanted experience o f that practice; m ore precisely, that w e shall do so o n ly if we subordinate all operations of scientific practice to a theory of practice and of practical know ledge (w hich has n oth ing to do w ith p henom en ological reconstitution of lived exp erience), and inseparably from this, to a theory o f the theoretical and social con d ition s of the possibility o f objective apprehension - and thereby to a theory o f the lim its o f this m ode of know ledge. A sin gle exam ple w ill suffice to sh ow how this sort o f third-order know ledge d oes not cancel out the gains from objectivist know ledge but conserves and transcends them by integrating the truth of practical experience and o f the practical m ode of k now ledge w hich this learned know ledge had to be constructed against, that is to say, inseparably, the truth o f all learned know ledge. It will b e rem em bered that L evi-S trau ss, criticizing M au ss’s " p h en om en ological” approach to gift exchange, makes a com p lete break w ith native experience and the native theory of that experience, p ositing that it is the exchange as a con stru cted object w hich " constitu tes the primary p henom en on, and not the in dividu al operations into w hich social life breaks it d o w n ”,5 or, in other w ords, that the "m echanical la w s ” o f the cycle of

From the mechanics o f the model to the dialectic o f strategies

5

reciprocity are the u nconscious principle of the obligation to g iv e, the ob liga­ tion to give in return, and the obligation to receive .6 " P h en o m en o lo g ica l” analysis and objectivist analysis b rin g to light tw o antagonistic principles of gift exchange: the gift as exp erienced , or, at least, m eant to be experienced, and the gift as seen from ou tside. T o stop short at the " o b jectiv e” truth of the gift, i.e . the m od el, is to set aside the q u estion of the relationship b etw een so-called objective truth, i.e . that of the observer, and the truth that can scarcely be called subjective, sin ce it represents the official definition o f the subjective experience of the exchan ge; it is to ignore the fact that the agents practise as irreversible a seq u en ce of actions that the observer con stitu tes as reversible. T h e ob server’s totalizin g apprehension su b stitu tes an objective structure fundam entally defined b y its reversibility for an equally objectively irreversible su ccession of gifts w h ich are not m echanically linked to the gifts they respond to or in sisten tly call for: any really objective analysis of the exchange of g ifts, w ords, ch allen ges, or even w om en m ust allow for the fact that each of these inaugural acts m ay m isfire, and that it receives its m eaning, in any case, from the response it triggers off, even if the response is a failure to reply that retrospectively rem oves its intended m eaning. T o say that the m eaning the gift has for the d onor is recognized and consecrated only w hen the counter-gift has b een m ade d o es not am ount to restoring the structure of the cycle of reciprocity in different w ords. It m eans that even if reversibility is the objective truth of the discrete acts w hich ordinary experience know s in discrete form and calls gift exchan ges, it is not the w hole truth o f a practice w hich could not exist if it w ere co n sciou sly perceived in accordance w ith the m odel. T h e tem poral structure o f gift exchan ge, w hich objectivism ignores, is what makes possible the coexisten ce of tw o o p p osin g truths, w hich defines the full truth of the gift. In every society it m ay be observed that, if it is not to con stitute an insult, the counter-gift m ust be deferred and different, because the im m ediate return o f an exactly identical object clearly am ounts to a refusal (i.e . the return of the sam e ob ject). T h u s gift exchan ge is op posed on the one hand to swapping, w hich, like the theoretical m odel of the cycle of reciprocity, telescop es gift and cou n ter-gift into the sam e instant, and on the other hand, to lending, in w hich the return of the loan is ex p licitly guaranteed by a juridical act and is thus already accomplished at th e very m om ent of the draw ing up of a contract capable of ensuring that the acts it prescribes are predictable and calculable. T h e difference and delay w hich the m onothetic m odel obliterates m ust be brought into the m odel n ot, as L evi-Strauss su ggests, out of a " phenom enological ” desire to restore the subjective experience o f the practice of the exchange, but because th e operation o f gift exchange p resupposes (individual and collecti%'e) m isrecognition ( meconnaissance) of the reality of

6

T he objective lim its o f objectivism

the objective " m ec h a n ism ” of th e exchan ge, a reality w hich an im m ediate response brutally exp oses: the in terval b etw een gift and cou n ter-gift is w hat allow s a pattern of exchange that is alw ays liab le to strike the observer and also the participants as reversible, i.e . both forced and interested, to be exp erienced as irreversible. " O verm u ch eagerness to d ischarge o n e’s obliga­ tions is a form o f in gratitu d e”, said La R och efoucauld. T o betray on e's h aste to be free o f an ob ligation on e has incurred, and thu s to reveal too overtly o n e ’s desire to pay off services rendered or gifts received, so as to b e quits, is to d en ou n ce the initial gift retrosp ectively as m otivated b y th e in tention of ob ligin g one. It is all a question of style, w hich m eans in this case tim in g and ch oice of occasion , for the sam e a c t - g i v i n g , g iv in g in return, offering o n e ’s services, p aying a visit, etc. - can have com p letely different m eanings at different tim es, com in g as it m ay at the right or the w rong m o m en t, w hile alm ost all im portant exchan ges - g ifts to the m other of a new -born ch ild , or on th e occasion o f a w ed d in g, etc. - have their ow n particular m o m en ts; the reason is that the lapse o f tim e separating th e gift from the cou n ter-gift is w hat authorizes the d eliberate oversigh t, the collectively m aintained and approved self-d ecep tion w ithou t w h ich sym b olic exch an ge, a fake circulation o f fake coin, cou ld not operate. If th e system is to work, the agents m ust not be entirely unaware of th e truth of th eir exch an ges, w hich is m ade exp licit in the anth rop ologist’s m od el, w hile at the sam e tim e th ey m ust refuse to know and above all to recognize it .7 In sh ort, everyth ing takes place as if a g en ts’ practice, and in particular their m anip ulation o f time, w ere organized exclu ­ sively w ith a view to con cealin g from th em selves and from others th e truth o f their practice, w hich the anth rop ologist and his m odels b rin g to light sim p ly by su b stitu tin g the tim eless m odel for a schem e w h ich w orks itself ou t on ly in and through tim e. T o abolish the interval is also to abolish strategy. T h e period in terp osed , w hich m ust be neither too short (as is clearly seen in gift exchan ge) nor too lon g (especially in the exchange o f reven ge-m urders), is q u ite the op posite of the inert gap o f tim e, the tim e-lag w hich the objectivist m od el m akes of it. U n til he has given in return, the receiver is " obliged”, exp ected to sh ow his gratitude tow ards his benefactor, or, at least, to have regard for h im , to refrain from u sing against h im all the w eap on s he otherw ise m ig h t, to pull h is p un ch es, lest he be accused of ingratitude and stand co n d em n ed b y "w hat people sa y ”, w h ich is w hat gives his actions their social m ean ing. T h e man w h o has not avenged a m urder, not b ou gh t back his land from a rival fam ily, not married off his daughters in tim e, sees his capital d im in ish ed from day to day by passing tim e - unless he is capable o f transform ing forced delay into strategic deferm ent, th e sp ace of tim e in to deliberate sp acin g o u t: p utting off revenge or the return o f a gift can b e a w ay o f keeping o n e’s partner-opponent

From the mechanics o f the model to the dialectic o f strategies

7

in th e dark about o n e ’s in tention s; the m om ent for th e com eback becom es im possible to p in p oin t, like the really evil m om en t in the ill-o m en ed periods of the ritual calendar, just b efore the upturn. A fter a certain p oint lack of response ceases to be an oversigh t and b ecom es disdainful refusal. D elay is also a w ay o f exacting from h im the deferential con d u ct that is required as long as relations are not broken off. It is understandable w ith in th is logic that a m an w hose daughter is asked for in m arriage sh ou ld feel he has to reply as soon as p ossible if the answ er is no, lest he seem to be taking advantage of th e situ ation , and offend the suitor, w hereas if he in tend s to say yes, he m ay put off th e reply for as lon g as h e likes, so as to m ake the m ost of the tem porary advantage of his p osition, w h ich he w ill lose as soon as he gives his con sent. E veryth in g takes place as if the ritualization o f interactions had the paradoxical effect of g iv in g tim e its full social efficacy, never m ore potent than w h en n oth in g but tim e is goin g o n . " T im e ”, w e say, " is on h is s id e ” ; tim e can also w ork against on e. In other w ords, tim e derives its efficacy from the state o f th e structure of relations w ith in w h ich it com es into p la y ; w hich does not im ply that the m odel of that structure can leave it ou t of account. W hen the u n fo ld in g o f the action is heavily ritualized, as in the dialectic of offence and ven gean ce, there is still room for strategies w h ich consist of playing on the tim e, or rather th e tempo, o f the action, by d elayin g revenge so as to prolong the threat of revenge. A nd th is is true, a fo rtio ri, of all the less strictly regulated occasion s w hich offer u n lim ited sco p e for strategies ex p lo itin g th e p ossib ilities offered by m anipulation of the tem p o of the action - h old in g back or p u ttin g off, m aintaining su sp en se or exp ectation , or on the other hand, h urrying, h ustlin g, surprising, and stealing a m arch, not to m en tion the art of osten tatiou sly givin g tim e (" d ev o tin g o n e’s tim e to som e­ o n e ”) or w ith h o ld in g it ("n o tim e to sp a re”). W e know , for exam p le, how m uch advantage the holder o f a transm issible pow er can derive from the art o f d elayin g transm ission and keeping others in the dark as to his ultim ate in ten tio n s. T h en there are all th e strategies in tend ed sim p ly to neutralize the action o f tim e and ensure th e continuity of interpersonal relations, drawing the co n tin u ou s ou t of the d iscon tin u ou s, as m athem aticians d o , through infinite m ultip lication of th e infinitely sm all, in th e form , for exam ple, of the "little presen ts ” said to " keep friendship g o in g ” (" O present - thunticht you w o n ’t make m e rich b ut you are the bond of frie n d sh ip ”). Little presents, which are halfway between "gratuitous” gifts ( elma'tar, unreturned gift, "like a m other’s m ilk ”, or thikchi, a thing given w ithout recom pense) and the most rigorously " forced” gifts, must be of m odest value and hence easy to give and easy to match; but they must be frequent, and in a sense continuous, w hich implies that they must function within the logic of "surprises” or "kind th ou gh ts” rather than according to the m echanism s of ritual. T h ese presents intended to maintain the everyday order of social intercourse almost always consist of a dish of cooked food,

8

The- objective limits o f objectivism

couscous (with a piece of cheese, when they mark a cow ’s first milk) and follow the course of minor family celebrations - the third or seventh day after a birth, a baby’s first tooth or first steps, a b oy’s first haircut, first visit to the market, or first fast; linked to events in the life-cycle of men or the earth, they involve those wishing to impart their joy, and those invited to take part in that joy, in what is nothing less than a fertility rite: when the dish which contained the present is taken back, it always contains, "for good lu ck ” ( el fa l), what is som etim es called thiririth (from er, to give back), that is to say, a little corn, a little sem olina (never barley, a female plant and symbol of fragility), or, preferably, som e dried vegetables, chick peas, lentils, etc., called ajedjig "flower”, given "so that the boy [the reason for the exchange] will flourish ”, so that he will grow tall and be fruitful. T hese ordinary gifts (which include som e of those they call tharzefth, which are visiting-presents) are sharply opposed to extraordinary gifts, Ikhir or lehna, given for the major festivals called thimeghrivnn (sing, thameghra) - w eddings, births, and circum cisions - and a fortiori to Iw'ada, the obligatory gift to a saint. A nd indeed, the little gifts between relatives and friends are opposed to the present of m oney and eggs which is given by affines remote both in space and in the genealogy, and also in time - since they are seen only intermittently, on the "great occasions” - and whose importance and solem nity make them a sort of controlled challenge in the same way that marriages within the lineage or neighbour­ hood, so frequent and so closely w oven into the fabric of ordinary exchanges that they pass unnoticed, are opposed to the more prestigious but infinitely more hazardous extraordinary marriages between different villages or tribes, som etim es intended to set the seal on alliances or reconciliations and always marked by solemn ceremonies.

T h is takes u s a lon g w ay from the objectivist m odel o f the m echanical interlocking of preregulated actions that is com m only associated w ith the notion of ritu al: on ly a virtuoso w ith a perfect com m and o f his "art of liv in g ” can play on all the resources inherent in the am biguities and uncertainties of behaviour and situ ation in order to produce the actions appropriate to each case, to do that of w hich p eop le w ill say " T h ere w as n oth ing else to be d o n e ” , and do it the right w ay. W e are a lon g w ay, too, from norm s and rules: doubtless there are slips, m istakes, and m om ents of clum sin ess to be observed here as elsew h ere; and also gram m arians of decorum able to state (and elegantly, too) w hat it is right to do and say, but never presum ing to encom pass in a catalogue o f recurrent situations and appropriate con d uct, still less in a fatalistic m odel, th e " art ” of the necessary improvisation w hich defines excellen ce. T o restore to practice its practical truth, w e m ust therefore reintroduce tim e into the theoretical representation of a practice w h ich , b ein g tem porally structured, is intrinsically defined by its tempo. T h e generative, organizing schem e w hich gives a d iscu ssion its unity or an im provised speech its "argu­ m e n t”, and attains con sciou s expression in order to work itself o u t, is an o ften im precise b u t system atic principle of selection and realization, ten d in g, through steadily directed adjustm ents and corrections, to elim inate accidents w hen they can be put to u se, and to conserve even fortuitous su ccesses. It is therefore practice, in its m ost specific asp ect, w hich is annihilated w hen

From the mechanics o f the model to the dialectic o f strategies

9

the schem e is identified with the m odel: retrospective necessity becom es prospective n ecessity, the product a p roject; and things w hich have h ap p en ed , and can no longer not happen, becom e th e irresistible future of the acts w hich made th em happen. T h is am ounts to p ositing, with D iod oru s, that if it is true to say of a thin g that it w ill be, then it m ust one day be true to say that it is, or, in the w ords of another paradox, that " T o d a y is tom orrow , because yesterday tomorrow' w'as to d a y .”8 All exp erience of practice contradicts these paradoxes, and affirms that cycles o f reciprocity are not the irresistible gearing o f obligatory practices found on ly in ancient tra g ed y : a gift may remain unrequited, if it m eets w'ith ingratitude; it m ay be spurned as an in su lt .9 O nce the p ossib ility is adm itted that th e "m echanical law'” o f the "cycle of reciprocity” m ay not apply, the w'hole logic of practice is transform ed. Even in cases in w hich the agen ts’ h abitus are perfectly harm onized and the interlocking of actions and reactions is totally predictable from outside, uncer­ tainty rem ains as to the ou tcom e of th e interaction as long as the sequence has not been c o m p le te d : the passage from the highest probability to absolute certainty is a qualitative leap w hich is n ot proportionate to the num erical gap. T h is uncertainty, w h ich finds its objective basis in the probabilist logic of social law s, is sufficient to m odify not on ly the experience of practice (w hich phenom enological analysis describes, b ein g m ore attentive than objectivism to the tem porality of action) but practice itself, in givin g an objective founda­ tion to strategies aim ed at avoiding th e m ost probable ou tcom e. T o su bstitute strategy for the rule is to reintroduce tim e, w ith its rhythm , its orientation, its irreversibility. S cien ce has a tim e w hich is not that of practice. For the analyst, tim e no lon ger cou n ts: not only b e c a u s e - a s has often been repeated sin ce M ax W eber - arriving post festum, he cannot be in any uncertainty as to w hat m ay h app en , b u t also because he has the tim e to totalize, i.e . to overcom e the effects o f tim e. Scientific practice is so "detem poralized ” that it ten ds to exclu d e even the idea of what it e x c lu d e s: because scien ce is p ossib le only in a relation to tim e w hich is op posed to that of practice, it ten d s to ignore tim e and, in d oin g so, to reify practices. (W hich is to say, once again, that epistem ological reflection is con stitu tive of scientific practice its e lf: in order to understand w hat practice is - and in particular the properties it ow es to the fact that it u nfolds in tim e - it is therefore necessarv to know' what scien ce is - and in particular w hat is im plied in the specific tem porality of scientific practice.) T h e detem poralizing effect (visib le in the syn optic apprehension that diagram s m ake p ossib le) that scien ce produces w hen it forgets the transform ation it im poses on practices inscribed in the current of tim e, i.e. detotalized, sim p ly by totalizing th em , is never m ore pernicious than w'hen exerted on practices defined by the fact that their tem poral structure, direction, and rhythm are constitutive o f their m eaning.

10

T he objective limits o f objectivism

From the "ru les” o f honour to the sense o f honour T h ere are w ays of avoiding ethnocentrism w hich are perhaps no m ore than so m any d ev ices for keep in g one s distance and, at all ev en ts, for m aking a virtue ou t of n ecessity by con verting a de facto exclu sion into a ch oice of m eth od . T h u s, there w ould be less danger of locking the exchan ge of honour or the seem in gly m ost ritualized g ift exchange in reified, reifying m odels, if one were able to procure a theoretical m astery of social practices of the sam e class as those o f w hich one may have a practical m astery. T h ere is n oth ing, for exam ple, m ore likely to inspire in an outside observer the illusion of m echan ­ ical necessity than “fo rc e d ” conversation, w hich , to perpetuate itself, m ust en d lessly create and recreate, often ex nihilo, the relationship b etw een the interlocutors, m oving them apart and bringing them together, constraining them to seek out points of agreem ent and disagreem ent, w ith the sam e earnestness at once sincere and feign ed , m aking them by turns trium ph and retreat, arousing m ock quarrels that are always on the verge of b eco m in g real on es, but q uickly settled by a com prom ise or a return to the safe ground of shared con victions. B ut, by a radical change in p oint of view , o n e can equally apprehend th is m echanical sequ en ce o f gestures and w ords "from a subjective point o f v ie w ” , as th e M arx of the Theses on Feuerbach som ew hat rashly puts it, or, preferably, from the stand point of an adequate theory of practice: the u nceasing v igilance one n eed s to exert so as to be " carried along ” by th e gam e, w ithou t b ein g " carried away ” beyond the gam e, as happens w hen a m ock fight gets the better of the fighters, is evidence that practices as visibly constrained as these rest on the sam e principle as conduct m ore likely to g iv e an equally m isleadin g im pression o f free im provisation, such as bluff or seduction, w hich play on th e eq u ivocation s, in n u en d os, and unspoken im plication s o f verbal or gestural sym bolism to produce am biguous con d uct that can be d isow ned at th e slightest sign o f w ithdraw al or refusal, and to m aintain uncertainty about in ten tion s that alw ays hesitate b etw een playfulness and seriou sn ess, abandon and reserve, eagerness and indifference. T h e language of rules and m od els, w hich seem s tolerable w hen applied to " a lie n ” practices, ceases to con vin ce as soon as one considers th e practical m astery of th e sym b olism of social interaction - tact, d exterity, or savoir-faire - p resupposed by th e m ost everyday gam es o f sociability and accom panied by the application of a sp ontaneous sem iology, i.e . a m ass o f precepts, form ulae, and codified cu es. T h is practical know ledge, based on the con ­ tin u ou s d eco d in g o f the perceived - b u t not con sciously noticed - in dices of th e w elcom e given to actions already accom plished, co n tin u o u sly carries out the checks and corrections intended to ensure the adjustm ent o f practices and exp ression s to the reactions and expectations of the other agents. It fu n ction s

From the "rules ” o f honour to the sense o f honour

ii

like a se lf-r e g u la tin g d evice program m ed to redefine courses of action in

accordance w ith inform ation received on the reception o f inform ation trans­ m itted and on th e effects produced by that inform ation. It can be seen that the tvpical herm eneutic paradigm of the exchan ge o f w ords is perhaps less appropriate than the paradigm of the exchan ge of b low s used by G eorge H . M ead .10 In d og-fights, as in the fighting o f children or boxers, each m ove triggers off a cou n ter-m ove, every stance o f the body becom es a sign pregnant with a m eaning that the op p on en t has to grasp w hile it is still in cip ient, reading in th e b egin nings of a stroke or a sid estep the im m inent future, i.e. the blow or the d u m m y. A nd the d u m m y itself, in b oxin g as in conversa­ tion, in exchanges of honour as in m atrim onial transactions, presupposes an opponent capable of preparing a riposte to a m ovem en t that has barely b eg u n and w ho can th u s be tricked in to faulty anticipation. It is sufficient to carry out a sim ilar reversal of perspective in order to see that one can, for exam ple, produce practically or reproduce theoretically all the honour con d ucts actually observed (or p otentially ob servab le), remarkable at once for their inexhaustible diversity and their quasi-m echanical n ecessity, w ithout p ossessing the "filing-cabinet of prefabricated represen tation s”, as Jakobson puts it ,11 that w ou ld enable the agent to " se le c t” the conduct appropriate to each situ ation , and w ith ou t having to construct at great expense of effort a " m ech a n ica l” m odel w hich w ould at best be to the man of honou r’s regulated im provisation w hat an etiq u ette handbook is to the art of living or a harm ony treatise to m usical com p osition . T h e scien ce of practice has to construct the principle w hich m akes it possible to account for all the cases observed, and on ly those, w ith ou t forgettin g that th is con stru c­ tion, and the generative operation of w hich it is the basis, are on ly the theoretical equivalent of the practical sch em e w hich enables every correctly trained agent to produce all the practices and jud gm ents of honour called for by the ch allenges of existence. T o make som eon e a challenge is to cred it him w ith the dignity o f a man of honour, sin ce th e challenge, as su ch , requires a riposte and therefore is addressed to a man d eem ed capable of playing the gam e of honour, and of playing it w ell. From the principle of m utual recognition of equality in h onour there follow s a first corollary: the challenge confers h onour. " T h e m an w ho has no e n em ie s”, say th e K ab yles, "is a d o n k ey” (th e sym bol of passivity). T h ere is n oth in g w orse than to pass u n n oticed : thu s, not to salute som eon e is to treat him like a th in g, an anim al, or a w om an. T h e challenge, conversely, is ' a high point in the life o f the man w ho receives i t ”. It is the chance to prove o n e ’s m anliness (thirugza) to others and to on eself. A second corollary is this: he w ho ch allenges a man incapable of taking up the ch allenge, that is, incapable of pursuing the exch an ge, d ishon ou rs h im self. T h u s elbahadla,

12

T he objective limits o f objectivism

extrem e hum iliation p ub licly in flicted , recoils on the man w h o provokes it ( am ahbul): even the man w h o m erits elbahadla p ossesses an honour; that is w hy elbahadla boom erangs. H cncc the m an w ho finds h im self in a strong p osition m ust refrain from p u sh in g his advantage too far, and sh ou ld tem per his accusation with a certain m oderation, so as to let his adversary p ut him self to sham e. " Better that he sh ou ld strip h im s e lf” , says the proverb, "than that I sh ould unclothe h im .” H is op p on en t, for his part, can alw ays try to turn the tables by leading him on to overstep the perm itted lim its. T h is is d one in the hope of rallying p u b lic op in ion , w hich cannot but disapprove of the accuser’s lack of m oderation. T h e third corollary is that only a ch allenge (or o ffence) com in g from an equal in honour deserves to be taken u p; in other w ords, for there to be a ch allen ge, the m an w ho receives it m ust consider the m an w ho makes it w orthy of m aking it. An affront from a p resum ptuous inferior rebounds on its author. " T h e prudent, circum spect m an [amahdhuq] d oes not get involved w ith an amahbul." E lbahadla w ould fall on the w ise man w h o ventured to take up the am ah bufs senseless ch allenge; w hereas in abstaining from all reply, he leaves him to bear the w eig h t o f his arbitrary acts. L ik ew ise, dishonour w ould fall on the m an w ho dirtied his hands in an unw orthy revenge (h en ce, in certain cases, recourse to the hired killer, am ekri). It is therefore th e nature of the riposte w hich m akes the challenge a ch allen ge, as opposed to m ere aggression .12 In gam e theory, the good player is the on e w ho alw ays su p p o ses his op p on en t w ill discern the b est strategy and w h o directs his ow n play accord ­ ingly; sim ilarly, in the gam e of honour, ch allenge and riposte alike im p ly that each player ch ooses to play the gam e as w ell as he can w hile assu m ing that his adversary is capable of m aking the sam e choice. T h e gift is a challenge w hich honou rs the man to w hom it is addressed, at the sam e tim e p utting his p oint of honour (nif) to the test; con seq u en tly, just as to in sult a man incapable of riposting d ishon ou rs on eself, so to make a present so great that it cannot be m atched m erely d ishon ou rs th e giver. A gift or ch allenge is a provocation, a provocation to reply. " H e has sham ed h im ” , the M oroccan Berbers used to say, accord in g to M arcv, apropos of the ch allen ge-gift ( taw sa) w hich m arked the great cerem o n ies .13 T h e receiver of a gift is caught in the toils of exchan ge and has to ch oose a line of conduct w h ich , w hatever he d oes, w ill be a response (even if o n ly by d efault) to the provocation of the initial act. H e can choose to prolon g the exchan ge or to break it off. If, ob ed ien t to th e p oint o f honour, he op ts for exch an ge, his choice is identical w ith his o p p o n en t’s initial ch oice: h e agrees to play th e gam e, w'hich can go on for ever, for the riposte is in itself a new ch allen ge. Form erly, it is said , as soon as ven gean ce had been taken, the w h ole fam ily rejoiced at the en d in g of dish on ou r: th e m en let off rifle sh o ts and the w om en uttered cries of* y o u -y o u \

From the "rules ” o f honour to the sense o f honour

13

oclaim ing that revenge was accom plished, so that all m ig h t see h ow a fam ily of honour prom ptly restores its prestige and so that the o p p o sin g fam ily sh ould be left in no d ou b t as to th e source o f its m isfortune. C hoosing th e other alternative m ay take on different and even op posed m eanings. T h e offender m ay, in term s o f h is p hysical stren g th , h is prestige, or the im portance and authority of the group to w h ich he b elo n g s, be superior, equal,

or

inferior to the person offend ed . W hile the logic o f honour presupposes

the recognition of an ideal equality in h onou r, the popular con sciou sn ess is nonetheless aware o f actual in eq ualities. T h e m an w h o declares " I ’ve got a m oustache, t o o ” is answ ered w ith the proverb " T h e m oustache o f the hare is not that o f the l i o n . . . ” T h is is the basis o f a w h ole sp ontaneous casuistry. Let us take the case w here the offended party has, at least ideally, the m eans to riposte; if h e proves incapable of taking u p the challenge (w hether a gift or an offence), if from pusillanim ity or w eakness he sid estep s it and renounces the chance o f ripostin g, he is in a sen se ch oosin g to be the author o f h is ow n dishonour, w hich is then irrem ediable. H e con fesses h im self d efeated in the gam e that he ou gh t to have played d esp ite everyth ing. But n on-reply can also express the refusal to reply: the m an w h o has suffered an offence refuses to regard it as su ch , and through his d isd ain , w hich he m ay m anifest by calling in a hired killer, he cau ses the offence to recoil on its perpetrator, w h o is thereby d ishon ou red . Sim ilarly in the case of the gift, th e recipient may indicate that he ch ooses to refuse the exch an ge, either by rejecting the gift or by p resen tin g an im m ediate or su b seq u en t cou n ter-gift identical to the original g ift. H ere, to o , the exchange sto p s. In sh ort, w ithin th is logic, only escalation, ch allenge an sw ering challenge, can sign ify the op tion o f playing the gam e. In th e case w here the offender is clearly superior to the offend ed , only the fact o f avoiding the ch allenge is held to be blam ew orthy, and the offended party is not required to trium ph over th e offender in order to be rehabilitated in the eyes of p ub lic op in ion : the d efeated m an w h o has d o n e his duty incurs no blam e. T h e offend ed party is even able to throw back elbahadla on his offender w ithou t resorting to a riposte. H e on ly has to adopt an attitude of h um ility w h ich , by em p h asizin g his w eakness, h igh lig h ts the arbitrary and im m oderate character of the offence. T h is strategy is, o f cou rse, only ad m is­ sib le so lon g as, in the eyes of the grou p , th e disparity b etw een th e tw o antagonists is u nequ ivocal; it is a natural course for those individuals socially recognized as weak, clien ts (ya d h itsumuthen, those w h o lean o n ), or m em bers o f a sm all fam ily. F in ally, in the case w here the offender is inferior to the offend ed , the latter m ay riposte (th u s transgressing the third corollary) b u t if he unfairly exp loits his advantage, he exp oses him self to th e d ishon ou r w hich w ould otherw ise

14

T h e objective lim its o f objectivism

have rebounded on to the p resum ptuou s offend er. W isdom advises him rather to abstain from any reply and to play the " c o n te m p t” gam bit: sin ce failure to riposte cannot be im pu ted to cow ardice or w eakness, th e d ishon ou r recoils on to the attacker. A lth ou gh each of th ese " th eo retica l” cases cou ld be illustrated w ith a host of observations and stories, th e fact rem ains that the differences b etw een the tw o parties are never clear-cut, so that each can play on the am bigu ities and eq u ivocation s w hich this indeterm inacy len d s to the co n d u ct. T h e distance b etw een failure to riposte o w in g to fear and non-reply b espeaking con tem p t is often infinitesim al, w ith the resu lt that d isdain can alw ays serve as a mask for pusillanim ity. Every exchange con tains a m ore or less dissim ulated ch allenge, and th e logic o f ch allenge and riposte is b ut the lim it tow ards w h ich every act of com m un ication ten d s. G en erou s exchan ge tends tow ards overw h elm in g g en er o sity ; the greatest gift is at the sam e tim e the gift m ost likely to throw its recipient into d ishon ou r b y p roh ibitin g any cou n ter-gift. T o redu ce to the fun ction o f com m un ication - albeit by th e transfer of borrow ed co n cep ts p henom en a such as the d ialectic o f ch allenge and riposte and, m ore generally, th e exchange of gifts, w ord s, or w o m en , is to ignore th e structural am bivalen ce w hich predisposes them to fulfil a political function of d om in ation in and through perform ance o f th e com m u n ication fun ction . If th e offence d oes not necessarily bear w ith in it d ishon ou r, the reason is that it allow s the p ossib ility of riposte, w h ich is recognized b y the very act o f g iv in g offen ce .14 But p otential d ishon ou r becom es m ore and m ore real the longer vengeance is d elayed. T h erefore th e tim e-lag b etw een the offence and the reparation m ust be as sh ort as p ossib le; a large fam ily has in deed sufficient fightin g m en not to have to w ait lon g. T h e reputation o f its nif, its sen sitivity and d eterm in ation, lead it to appear as capable of rip ostin g the very instant an offence is com m itted . T h e respect inspired b y a good fam ily is exp ressed in the saying that it can "sleep and leave th e door o p e n ”. T h e m an o f honour, o f w h om p eop le say that he fulfils " h is role as a m a n ” ( thirugza), is alw ays on his g u a rd ; h en ce h e is im m u n e from even th e m ost reckless attack, and "even w hen he is aw ay, there is som eon e in his h o u s e ”. But th in g s are n ot so sim p le. It is said that D jeh a, a legendary figure, asked w h en h e had aven ged his father, replied , "A fter a hundred years had g o n e b y .” T h e story is also told o f th e lion w ho alw ays walks w ith m easured p a ces: " I d o n ’t know w here m y prey i s ”, he said. " I f it’s in fron t o f m e, on e day I ’ll reach it; if it’s b eh ind m e, it’ll catch up w ith m e .” H ow ever close it m ay com e to the logic o f practices (and to the extent that it d o es), the abstract diagram w h ich has to be constructed in order to account for that logic is liable to ob scu re the fact that the drivin g force of the w hole m echanism is not som e abstract principle (th e principle of iso tim y , eq u ality

From the "rules ” o f honour to the sense o f honour

*5

in h onou r), still less the set o f rules w hich can be d erived from it, but the sense o f h onou r, a d isp osition inculcated in the earliest years of life and constantly reinforced b y calls to order from th e grou p , that is to say, from the aggregate of the in dividu als en d ow ed w ith the sam e d isp o sitio n s, to w hom each is linked b y h is d isp osition s and in terests. N if, literally the n o se, is very closely associated w ith virility and with all the d isp ositio n s, incorporated in the form o f bodily sch em es, w hich are held to m anifest v ir ility ; th e verb qabel, com m only used to design ate the fundam ental virtu es of the m an o f honour, the m an w h o faces, ou tfaces, stand s up to others, looks th em in the ey es, knows how to receive as a host and to d o his gu est h on ou r, also m eans to face the east (elqibla) and the future (qabel), th e m ale orientation par ex cellen ce. T h is is sufficient to rem ind us that the point o f honour is a perm anent d isp osition , em bedded in the agen ts’ very bodies in the form o f m ental d ispositions, schem es of p ercep tion and th ou gh t, extrem ely general in their application, such as those w h ich d ivid e up th e w orld in accordance w ith th e op position s betw een the m ale and th e fem ale, east and w est, future and past, top and bottom , right and left, e tc ., and also, at a d eep er level, in th e form o f bodily postures and stances, w ays o f standing, sittin g , look in g, sp eak ing, or w alking. What is called the sense o f honour is n oth in g other than the cultivated disposition, inscribed in the b ody schem a and in th e sch em es of thou ght, w hich enables each agent to en gen d er all the practices co n sisten t w ith the logic o f ch allenge and riposte, and on ly su ch p ractices, by m eans o f cou n t­ less in ven tion s, w h ich th e stereotyped u n fold in g o f a ritual w ould in no w ay dem and. T h e fact that there is n o " c h o ic e ” that cannot be accounted for, retrospectively at least, d oes not im ply that su ch practice is perfectly predic­ table, like the acts inserted in the rigorously stereotyped seq u en ces of a rite; and this is true not on ly for the observer b ut also for the agen ts, w ho find in the relative predictability and u np redictab ility o f the p ossib le ripostes the op portu nity to put their strategies to work. But even the m ost strictly ritualized exchan ges, in w h ich all th e m om ents o f th e action , and their u n fold in g, are rigorously foreseen, have room for strategies: th e agents rem ain in com m and of the interval b etw een th e ob ligatory m om ents and can therefore act on their o p p on en ts b y p layin g w ith th e tempo o f the exch an ge. W e know that returning a gift at o n ce, i.e . d oing away w ith the interval, am ounts to breaking off the exch an ge. L ikew ise th e lesson con tained in the parables of D jeha and the lion m ust be taken seriou sly; the m astery w h ich defines ex cellen ce finds exp ression in th e play m ade w ith tim e w h ich transform s ritual­ ized exchan ge in to a confrontation of strategies. T h e skilled strategist can turn a capital of provocations received or con flicts su sp en d ed , w ith the potential ripostes, ven gean ces, or con flicts it con tains, into an in stru m ent o f power, b y reserving the capacity to reopen or cease h ostilities in his ow n good tim e.

i6

T h e objective limits o f objectivism

Practice an d discourse about practice It w ould th u s be p ossib le to m ove on to th e grou n d w here talk of rules seem s least m isp laced , that of cu sto m or " p re -la w ”, and sh o w that the "custom ary r u le s” preserved by the grou p m em ory are th em selv es the p rod uct of a small batch o f sch em es en ab lin g agen ts to generate an in finity of p ractices adapted to en d lessly ch an gin g situ ation s, w ith ou t th ose sch em es ever b ein g constituted as exp licit p rin cip les. T h is is w h y, like W eb er’s K ad i-ju stice, cu stom ary law alw ays seem s to pass from particular case to particular case, from th e specific m isd eed to th e specific san ction , n ever exp ressly form u latin g th e fundam ental p rin cip les w h ich " ration al” law sp ells out exp licitly (e .g . all m en are equal in h on ou r ).15 T h e appropriate acts o f jurisp ru dence co n cern in g a particular offence, for exam p le, th ose m aking it p ossib le to assess the gravity of a theft accord in g to the circu m stan ces in w h ich it w as com m itted , can all be produced from a sm all n um ber of sc h e m e s that are con tin u o u sly ap plied in all dom ains o f practice, su ch as the op p o sitio n s b etw een the h o u se (or m o sq u e) and other places, b etw een night and d ay, b etw een feast d ays and ordinary d ays, the first m em ber of each pair alw ays corresp ond ing to the severer p en alty. It is clear that it is sufficient to co m b in e th e corresp on d in g p rin cip les to p rod uce the sanction appropriate to each case, real or im aginary - from , for exam p le, theft com m itted b y n ight from a d w ellin g h ou se, the m ost h ein o u s, to th eft by day in a d istan t field, the least h ein o u s, other th in gs b ein g eq u al, of co u rse .16 T h e g en erative sch em es are so gen erally and au tom atically a p plicab le that th ey are con verted in to exp licit p rin cip les, form ally stated, only in the very case in w hich th e value o f the object stolen is su ch as to sw eep aside all extenu atin g or aggravating circu m stan ces. T h u s the qanun of Ighil Im oula, for exam p le, reported by H anoteau and L eto u rn eu x , p rovid es that "he w h o steals a m u le, ox or cow , b y force or trickery shall pay

50 reals to th e djem aa and pay the

ow ner the value o f the stolen anim al, w h eth er the theft w as by night or by d a y , from inside a house o r outside, and w hether the anim als belong to the householder o r to someone else ” .17 T h e sam e b asic sch em es, alw ays fu n ctio n in g in the im p licit state, ap ply in th e case of braw ls, w h ich togeth er w ith th efts norm ally occu p y a con sid erab le place in cu sto m ; there are th e sam e o p p osition s, b u t som etim es w ith n ew im p licatio n s, b etw een the h ouse and other p laces (th e m urder of a person cau gh t in o n e’s h o m e , for exam p le, en tailin g no sa n ctio n ), n igh t-tim e and d aytim e, feast days and ordinary days; and there are also variations accord in g to th e social status of th e aggressor and the victim (m an /w om an , ad u lt/ch ild ) and th e w eap on s or m eth od s used (w h eth er it w as b y treachery - if, for exam p le, the victim w as asleep - or in m an-to-m an com b at) and the extent to w h ich the deed w as carried o u t (m ere threats or actual v io le n c e). T h er e is every reason to think that if the basic

Practice and discourse about practice

17

tions o f th is im plicit axiom atics w ere sp elled out m ore co m p letely than Pr

here (e .g . a crim e is alw ays m ore seriou s com m itted by n ig h t than

1S A hv co^ m m itted „ d av). together w ith the law s by - w h ich th ev are com b ined ding on the case, tw o p rop osition s m ay either be added togeth er or ncel each other ou t, w h ich , w ith in the logic of th e rule, can o n ly be d e scrib ed as an ex c ep tio n ), it w ould be p ossib le to reproduce all th e provisions of all the custom ary law s w h ich have b een collected and even to produce the co m p lete universe of all the acts of jurisprudence con form in g to th e "sen se of ju stice ” in its K ab yle form .

T h u s the p recepts o f cu sto m , very close in this resp ect to sayin gs and proverbs (such as th ose w h ich govern th e tem poral d istrib u tion of activ ities), have noth ing in com m on w ith the tran scend en t rules of a juridical code: everyone is able, not so m uch to cite and recite them from m em o ry , as to repro­ duce them (fairly accurately). It is because each agent has the m eans of acting as a judge of others and of h im self that cu stom has a hold on h im : in d eed , in social form ations w here, as in K abvlia, there exists no judicial apparatus endow ed w ith a m on op oly of physical or even sy m b o lic v io len ce and w here clan assem b lies fu n ction as sim p le arbitration tribunals, that is, as m ore or less expanded fam ily cou n cils, the ru les of cu stom ary law have so m e practical efficacy on ly to the ex te n t that, sk ilfully m anip ulated b y the h olders of authority w ithin the clan (th e " gu aran tors”), th ey "aw a k en ” , so to speak, the schem es of perception and appreciation d ep osited , in their incorporated state, in every m em ber of the grou p , i.e . the d isp o sitio n s o f the h abitus. T h e y are therefore separated on ly b y d ifferen ces o f degree from th e partial and often fictitious exp licit statem en ts of the g ro u p ’s im p licit axiom atics through w hich individual m ore-or-less " a u th o r ize d ” agen ts seek to cou n ter the failures or hesitations of th e h abitus by stating th e so lu tio n s appropriate to difficult cases. Talk of rules, a eu p h em ized form of legalism , is n ever m ore fallacious than w hen applied to the m ost h om o g en eo u s societies (or the least codified areas of differentiated so cieties) w here m ost p ractices, in clu d in g th o se seem in g ly m ost ritualized, can b e abandoned to the orchestrated im provisation of com m on d isp osition s: the rule is never, in th is case, m ore than a secon d -b est in tend ed to m ake g ood the occasional m isfirings o f the co llectiv e enterprise of in cu lcation ten d in g to p rod uce h abitus that are capable o f gen erating practices regulated w ith ou t exp ress regulation or any in stitu tion alized call to ord er .18 It go es w ith o u t sayin g that th e im p licit p h ilo so p h y o f practice w hich pervades the anthropological tradition w ould n ot have su rvived all th e d en u n ­ ciations of legalist form alism if it had not had an affinity w ith the p resu p p o si­ tions in scrib ed in th e relation ship b etw een the ob server and th e o b ject of his stu d y, w h ich im p ose th em selv es in the very con stru ction o f his ob ject so lon g

T h e objective limits o f objectivism

i8

as they are not exp licitly taken as an ob ject. N ative exp erience o f the social w orld never ap preh en ds th e system o f ob jective relations other than in profiles, i.e . in th e form o f relations w h ich present th em selv es o n ly on e by on e, and h en ce su cc essiv ely , in the em ergen cy situ ation s of everyday life. If agents are p ossessed by th eir h abitus m ore than th ey p ossess it, this is because it acts w ith in th em as the organ izing p rin cip le of their action s, and because th is modus operan di in form in g all th ou g h t and action (including th o u gh t o f action ) reveals itself only in th e opus operatum . In v ited b y the a n th rop ologist’s q u e stio n in g to effect a reflexive and quasi-theoretical return on to h is ow n practice, th e b est-in form ed in form an t p rod uces a discourse which compounds tw o opposing system s o f lacunae. Insofar as it is a discourse of fa m ilia rity , it leaves u n said all that g o es w ith o u t sayin g: the inform ant’s remarks - like the narratives or com m en taries o f those w h o m H eg el calls ‘'original h isto ria n s” (H ero d o tu s, T h u c y d id e s, X en o p h o n , or Caesar) who, liv in g "in the sp irit o f the e v e n t ” ,19 take for granted the p resu p p o sitio n s taken for granted b y the historical agen ts - are in evitab ly subject to the censorship inherent in their h abitus, a sy ste m o f sch em es of p erception and th o u g h t w hich cannot g iv e w hat it d oes g iv e to b e th o u g h t and perceived w ith ou t ipso facto p rod ucing an unthin k able and an u nn am eable. Insofar as it is an outsideroriented discourse it ten ds to ex c lu d e all direct reference to particular cases (that is, virtually all in form ation d irectly attached to p ro p er names ev o k in g and su m m arizin g a w h ole sy stem of previous in form ation ). B ecau se th e native is that m uch less in clin ed to slip in to the language o f fam iliarity to th e extent that his q u estion er strikes him as unfam iliar w ith th e u n iverse of reference im plied b y his discou rse (a fact apparent in the form of the q u estio n s asked, particular or general, ign oran t or in fo rm ed ), it is u nderstandable that an th rop ologists sh ould so o fte n forget the distance b etw een learned recon ­ stru ction of the native w orld and the native exp erience of that w orld, an exp erience w hich finds ex p ressio n on ly in the silen ce s, ellip ses, and lacunae of the language o f fam iliarity. F in ally, th e in form an t’s discou rse ow es its b est-h id d en properties to the fact that it is the p rod uct o f a sem i-theoretical d isp o sitio n , inevitab ly induced b y any learned q u estio n in g . T h e rationalizations prod uced from this sta n d ­ p oin t, w h ich is no longer that of action, w ith ou t b ein g that of scien ce, m eet and confirm

the ex p ecta tio n s of th e juridical, ethical, or gram m atical

form alism to w hich his o w n situ ation in clin es the observer. T h e relationship b etw een inform ant and an th rop ologist is som ew h at an alogous to a p edagogical relation ship , in w hich the m aster m u st b rin g to th e state of ex p licitn ess, for the p urposes of tran sm ission , the u n con sciou s sch em es o f h is practice. Just as the tea ch in g o f ten n is, th e vio lin , ch ess, d an cin g , or b o x in g breaks dow n into in dividu al p osition s, ste p s, or m oves, p ractices w h ich in tegrate all these

Practice an d discourse about practice

artificia „ activity,

19

isolated elem en tary u nits of beh aviour in to the u n ity of an organized in form an t’s d isco u rse, in w h ich h e strives to give h im self the sym b olic m astery o f his p ractice, ten d s to draw attention to

a^ r n o s t rem arkable " m o v e s ”, i.e . th ose m ost esteem ed or rep reh en d ed , in thC different social gam es (su ch as elbahadla in the h on ou r gam e or m arriage

1 th the parallel cousin a m o n g th e m atrim onial strategies), rather than to the ole from w h ich th e se m oves and all eq u ally p ossib le m o v es can be erated and w h ich , b elo n g in g to th e u n iverse of the u n d isp u ted , m ost often remain in their im p licit state. B ut th e su b tlest pitfall d o u b tless lies in the fact that such d escrip tion s freely draw on the h igh ly a m b ig u o u s vocabulary of rules, the language of gram m ar, m orality, and law , to exp ress a social practice that in fact o b ey s q u ite different prin cip les. T h e exp lan ation agents may provide o f their ow n practice, thanks to a quasi theoretical reflection on their practice, con ceals, ev en from their ow n eyes, the true nature o f their practical m astery, i.e . that it is learned ignorance (docta ignorantia), a m ode of practical k n ow led ge not com p risin g k n ow led ge o f its ow n p rin cip les. It follow s that th is learned ign oran ce can on ly giv e rise to the m islead in g discourse of a speaker h im self m isled , ignorant b oth o f th e o b jectiv e truth about his practical m astery (w h ic h is that it is ignorant of its o w n tru th ) and o f the true prin cip le of the k n ow led ge h is practical m astery co n ta in s. N ative theories are d a n gerou s not so m uch b ecause th ey lead research towards illusory exp lan ation s as b ecau se they b rin g q u ite su perflu ous rein­ forcem ent to the in tellectu alist ten d e n c y in h eren t in th e ob jectivist approach to practices. T h is acad em icism of th e social " a r t” o f living w h ich , having extracted from the opus operatum the su p p o sed principles of its p rod u ction , sets them up as norm s ex p lic itly g overn in g practices (w ith phrases like "good form req u ires. .

" c u sto m d e m a n d s . .

et c. ) , takes away u n d erstan d in g

of the logic of practice in th e very m ovem en t in w h ich it tries to offer it. For exam ple, th e id eological u se m any so cieties m ake o f th e lineage m o d el and, m ore gen erally, of gen ealogical represen tation s, in order to justify and le g iti­ m ate the estab lish ed order (e .g . b y ch o o sin g the m ore orthodox of tw o p ossible w ays o f classifyin g a m arriage), w ou ld d o u b tless have b eco m e appar­ en t to an th rop ologists at an earlier date if the theoretical u se th ey th em selv es make of this theoretical co n stru ct had not p revented th em from in q u irin g in to the fu n ction s o f g en ea lo g ies and genealogists, and thereby from se ein g the gen ealogy as th e theoretical cen su s of th e u niverse o f theoretical relationships w ithin w hich in d ivid u als or grou p s d efine the real space o f (in b oth sen ses) practical relation ship s in term s of their conjunctural in terests. T h e im p osition and in cu lcation o f the stru ctures is n ever so p erfect that all ex p licitn ess can b e d isp e n sed w ith . A nd in cu lcation is itself, togeth er w ith in stitu tio n alizin g, w h ich is alw ays accom pan ied by a certain am oun t of

T h e objective lim its o f objectivism

20

ob jectification in d iscou rse (oral or w ritten ) or so m e other sy m b o lic support (em b lem s, rites, e tc .), on e of th e privileged m o m en ts for fo rm u la tin g the practical sc h e m e s and co n stitu tin g th em as p rin cip les. It is d o u b tless no a ccid en t that th e q u estion o f the relations b etw een the h ab itu s and th e " r u le ” sh o u ld be b rou ght to ligh t w ith th e h istorical em ergen ce o f an exp ress and e x p lic it action of in c u lc a tio n :20 th e p ed agogy of th e S o p h ists, forced , in order to realize its aim , to p rod uce sy stem s of ru les, su ch as gram m ars or rhetorics, cam e u p against the p rob lem o f the rules d efin in g th e right w ay and right m o m en t - kairos - to apply th e rules, or, as th e phrase so aptly g o es, to pu t into practice a repertoire of d ev ices or tech n iq u es, in sh o rt, th e w h o le art of p erform an ce, in w h ich th e h abitus in evitab ly reappears. A n d , n o doubt b ecau se it still partakes o f th e am b igu ou s statu s of all gram m ars, w h ich never m ake it clear w h eth er th e y recon stitu te th e real m ech an ics o f th e sch em es im m an en t in practice or th e theoretical logic of the m o d els co n stru cted in order to account for p ractices, C hom skian gen erative gram m ar n ow ad ays en tails (o b jective) rediscovery that w hat creates th e p rob lem is not the p o ssib ility o f p rod u cin g coh eren t sen ten ces in in finite n u m b er but th e fact o f coh eren tly and appropriately u sin g an in finite n u m b er of sen ten ces in an in finite n um ber o f situ ation s. It is n ot easy to d efine rigorou sly th e statu s o f th e sem i-learn ed gram m ars o f practice —sayin gs, p roverbs, g n o m ic p o em s, sp o n ta n eo u s " th e o r ie s” w hich alw ays accom pan y even th e m o st " a u to m a tic ’* p ractices, ch eck in g th e fu n c ­ tio n in g o f th e au tom atism s or, m ore or less su cc essfu lly , m aking g o o d their m isfirin gs - and of all th e knowledges p rod uced by an "op eration o f th e secon d p o w e r ” w h ic h , as M erleau -P on ty ob serv es, " p resu p p o ses the stru ctu res it a n a ly ses ”21 and m ore or less rigorou sly a ccou n ts for. B ein g th e p rod u ct of the sam e gen erative sc h e m e s as th e practices they claim to a ccou n t for, even the m ost false and superficial o f th ese " secon d ary exp la n a tio n s ” on ly reinforce the stru ctures by p rovid in g th e m w ith a particular form o f " r a tio n a liza tio n ”. E ven if th e y affect practice o n ly w ith in narrow lim its ,22 the fact rem ains that w h en ever th e ad ju stm ent b etw een stru ctu res and d isp o sitio n s is b rok en , the transform ation

of th e gen erative sc h e m e s is d o u b tless reinforced and

accelerated by th e d ialectic b etw een th e sc h e m e s im m a n en t in practice and th e n orm s p rod uced b y reflection on practices, w hich im p o se n ew m ean in gs on th em b y reference to alien stru ctures. R eaction against legalist form alism in its o vert or m asked form m ust not lead u s to m ake the h ab itu s th e ex clu siv e p rin cip le o f all p ractice. In reality, even in social form ation s w h ere, as in K ab ylia, th e m akin g ex p lic it and ob jec­ tify in g of th e gen erative sc h e m e s in a gram m ar o f practices, a w ritten cod e o f co n d u c t, is m in im al, it is n o n eth eless p ossib le to ob serve th e first sig n s o f a d ifferen tiation of th e d om ain s of practice accord in g to th e d egree of

Practice an d discourse about practice

21

t on of the p rin cip les g o v er n in g th em . B etw een the areas that are C° rently " fr e e st” b ecau se g iv e n over in reality to th e regulated im provisaa.PPa ^ {he h abitus (such as th e d istrib u tion of a ctivities and ob jects w ith in the^internal space of th e h o u se) and th e areas m ost strictly regulated by ustom ary norm s and u p h eld b y social san ction s (su ch as the great agrarian rites) there lies the w h ole field of practices su b jected to traditional p recep ts, custom ary recom m en dation s, ritual p rescrip tion s, fu n ctio n in g as a regulatory device w hich orien ts practice w ith o u t p rod u cin g it. T h e ab sen ce o f a g en u in e law - the product of th e w ork of a b od y of sp ecialists exp ressly m andated to produce a coh eren t corp u s of juridical norm s and ensure resp ect for its application, and fu rn ish ed to th is en d w ith a co ercive p ow er - m ust not lead us to forget that any socially recogn ized form ulation con tain s w ith in it an intrinsic pow er to rein force d isp o sitio n s sym b olically. Our approach is th u s radically o p p o sed , on tw o essen tial p oin ts, to th e interactionism w h ich redu ces th e con stru ctio n s of social sc ien ce to " c o n s­ tructs of the secon d d egree, that is, con stru cts o f th e co n stru cts m ade by th e actors on the social s c e n e ”, as S ch u tz d o e s ,23 or, like G arfinkel, to accoun ts of the accounts w hich agen ts p rod uce and through w hich they p rod uce the m eaning of th eir w o rld .24 O ne is en titled to undertake to g iv e an "accou n t of accounts ”, so lo n g as on e d o es not p ut forw ard o n e ’s co n trib u tio n to th e scien ce of pre-scien tific representation o f the social w orld as if it w ere a science o f the social w orld . But th is is still too gen ero u s, b ecau se th e pre­ requisite for a scien ce o f co m m o n se n se represen tation s w h ich seek s to b e m ore than a co m p licito u s d escrip tion is a sc ien ce o f th e stru ctu res w h ich govern both practices and th e con co m ita n t rep resen tation s, th e latter b ein g the principal obstacle to th e con stru ction o f su ch a sc ie n c e .25 O n ly by co n stru ctin g the objective stru ctu res (price cu rves, ch an ces o f access to h igh er ed u ca tio n , law s of th e m atrim onial m arket, e tc .) is on e able to p ose the q u estion of the m echanism s through w hich th e relation ship is esta b lish ed b etw een the structures and th e practices or th e rep resen tation s w h ich accom pan y th em , instead of treating th ese " th o u g h t o b je c ts” as " r e a so n s” or " m o tiv e s ” and m aking them th e d eterm in in g cau se o f the practices. M oreover, th e co n stitu ­ tive pow er w hich is granted to ordinary lan guage lies not in th e lan guage itself but in the grou p w h ich au th orizes it and in vests it w ith au th ority. Official language, particularly th e sy stem of co n cep ts b y m ean s o f w hich th e m em bers of a given group p rovid e th e m se lv e s w ith a representation o f th eir social relations (e.g . th e lin eage m odel or the vocabulary of h o n o u r), sa n ctio n s and im p oses what it states, tacitly layin g d ow n th e d iv id in g lin e b etw een the thinkable and th e u n th in k ab le, th ereb y con trib u tin g tow ard s the m ainten an ce of the sy m b olic order from w h ich it draw s its au th ority. T h u s officialization is on ly one asp ect of th e ob jectify in g p rocess through w h ich th e group

22

T h e objective limits o f objectivism

teaches itself and con ceals from itself its ow n tru th , in scrib ing in o b jectivity its representation o f w hat it is and thu s b in d in g itself b y th is p u b lic d eclaration .26 T h e agent w h o " reg u la rizes” his situ ation or puts h im self in the right is sim p ly b eating the group at its ow n gam e; in abiding by th e ru les, fallin g in to line w ith good form , he w in s the group over to h is sid e b y o sten tatiou sly h onou rin g the values the grou p h on ou rs. In social form ations in w h ich the exp ression o f m aterial in terests is heavily censored and political au th ority relatively u n in stitu tion alized , political strategies for m obilization can be effec­ tive only if the values they pursue or propose are presented in the m isrecognizable gu ise o f th e valu es in w hich the grou p recogn izes itself. It is therefore not sufficient to say that th e rule d eterm in es practice w h en there is m ore to -b e gained b y ob ey in g it than b y d isob eyin g it. T h e ru le’s last trick is to cause it to be forgotten that agents have an interest in o b ey in g th e rule, or m ore precisely, in being in a regular situation. Brutally m aterialist redu ction enables on e to break w ith th e n aiveties o f th e sp on tan eou s theory of p ra ctice; b u t it is liable to m ake on e forget the advantage that lies in ab iding b y the ru les, w h ich is the principle of the secon d-ord er strategies through w hich the agent seeks to p u t him self in the right.27 T h u s, q u ite apart from the d irect profit derived from d o in g w hat the rule prescribes, perfect con form ity to the rule can bring secondary benefits su ch as the prestige and respect w hich alm ost invariably reward an action apparently m otivated b y n o th in g other than p u re, disinterested resp ect for the rule. It follo w s that strategies d irectly o rien ted tow ards th e prim ary profit o f practice (e .g . th e prestige accruing from a m arriage) are alm ost alw ays accom pan ied b y secon d-ord er strategies w h o se purpose is to give apparent satisfaction to th e d em an d s of the official ru le, and th u s to com p oun d th e satisfaction s o f en ligh ten ed self-in terest w ith the advantage of ethical im peccability.

T he fallacies o f the rule T h e place w h ich a notion as visibly am b igu ou s as that o f the rule o ccu p ies in anthropological or lin gu istic theory cannot be fully u n d erstood u n less it is seen that th is notion p rovid es a solu tion to the con trad iction s and d ifficulties to w hich the researcher is con d em n ed b y an inadequate or - w hich am oun ts to th e sam e th in g - an im p licit theory o f practice. E veryth in g takes place as if, fulfillin g the role o f a refuge for ignorance, th is hospitab le n otion , w h ich can su ggest at on ce the law con stru cted b y scien ce, th e tran scend en t social norm and th e im m anent regularity of p ractices, enabled its user to escape from the d ilem m a of m echanism or finalism w ithou t falling in to th e m ost flagrant naiveties o f the legalism w hich m akes o b ed ien ce to the rule the d eterm in in g

T he fallacies o f the rule *

23

cip le o f all p ractices. O n e cou ld g o back to D u rk h eim and exam in e the

lace at on ce central and em p ty, occu p ied in h is system b y th e notion o f social c o n s tr a in t.

But it is sufficient to con sid er th e q uite exem plary theoretical

operations w hereby Saussure con stitu tes lin gu istics as a scien ce b y con stru ct­ ing language as an au ton om ou s ob ject, d istin ct from its actu alization s in sp eech , in order to bring to ligh t the im p licit p resu p p o sitio n s o f any m ode

of know ledge w h ich treats practices or w orks as sy m b o lic facts, finished p ro d u cts, to b e deciphered by reference to a cod e (w h ich m ay be called

culture). Finding them selves in a position of theoretical dependence on linguistics, structural­ ist anthropologists have often involved in their practice the epistemological unconscious engendered by unm indfulness of the acts through w hich linguistics constructed its own object. Heirs to an intellectual heritage which they did not make for them selves, they have too often been satisfied with literal translations of a term inology dissociated from the operations of which it is the product, sparing them selves the effort of an epistemological critique of the conditions and limits of validity of transposing the Saussurian construction. It is notew orthy, for exam ple, that w ith the exception of Sapir, who was predisposed by his dual training as linguist and anthropologist to raise the problem of the relations between culture and language, no anthropologist has tried to bring out all the im plications of the hom ology (w hich Leslie W hite is virtually alone in formulating explicitly) between the two oppositions, that betw een language and speech on the one hand, and on the other hand that betw een culture and conduct or works. When Saussure constitutes language as an autonom ous object, irreducible to its concrete realizations, that is, to the utterances it makes possible, or w hen, by a procedure similar in every respect, Panofsky establishes that what he calls, follow ing Alois Riegl, Kunstuollen - that is to say, roughly,- the objective sense of the work is no more reducible to the " w ill” of the artist than it is to the "w ill of the a g e ” or to the experiences the work arouses in the spectator, they are perform ing an operation with regard to these particular cases w hich can be generalized to all practice. Just as Saussure show s that the true m edium of com m unication betw een two subjects is not discourse, the im mediate datum considered in its observable materiality, but the language, the structure of objective relations making possible both the production and the deciphering of discourse, so Panofsky show s that iconological interpretation treats the sensible properties of the work of art, together with the affective experiences it arouses, as mere *'cultural sy m p to m s”, which yield their full m eaning only to a reading armed w ith the cultural cipher the artist has engaged in his work.

Saussure first m akes the p oin t that sp eech appears as th e precondition for language, as m uch from the in dividu al as from the co llectiv e p oin t o f v iew , because language cannot be ap prehended ou tsid e o f sp eech , because language is learnt through sp eech , and because sp eech is the so u rce of in novation s in and transform ations o f language. T h is is so even th o u g h on e m ight invoke the ex isten ce o f dead languages or d u m b n ess in old age as provin g the p ossib ility o f losin g sp eech w h ile con servin g language, and even thou gh language m istakes reveal the language as the ob jective norm o f sp eech (w ere !t otherw ise, every language m istake w ould m od ify th e language and there

24

T he objective lim its o f objectivism

w ould be no m istakes any m ore). But h e then ob serves that the priority of sp eech over language is p urely ch ron ological and that the relationship is inverted as soon as on e leaves the d om ain o f individual or co llective history in order to in qu ire into the logical conditions for d ecip h erin g. F rom this p oin t o f view , w hich is that of ob jectivism , language is the precond ition for th e in telligibility o f sp eech , b ein g th e m ed iation w h ich en su res the id en tity o f the so u n d -con cep t associations m ade b y th e speakers and so guarantees m utual com p reh en sion . T h u s, in th e logical order o f in telligibility, sp eech is th e p rod u ct o f lan gu age .28 It follo w s that, because it is con stru cted from th e strictly intellectualist stan d p oin t of d ecip h erin g , Saussurian lin g u istics privi­ leges the structure of sign s, that is, th e relation s b etw een th em , at the ex p en se of th eir practical functions, w hich are never redu cible, as structuralism tacitly assu m es, to fu n ction s of com m u n ication or k now ledge. T h e lim its o f Saussurian ob jectivism are never m ore clearly v isib le than in its in ability to con ceive o f sp eech and m ore generally o f practice other than as execution ,29 w ith in a logic w h ich , th o u g h it d oes not use th e w ord , is that of th e rule to b e ap plied . O b jectivism con stru cts a theory of practice (as execu tio n ) b ut on ly as a negative b y-p rod u ct or, on e m ig h t say, w aste p rod u ct, im m ediately discarded, o f the con stru ction o f the sy stem s of o b je c­ tive relations. T h u s, w ith th e aim of d elim itin g , w ithin th e b ody o f lin g u istic data, the "terrain o f th e la n g u a g e” and o f extracting a " w ell-d efin ed o b je c t” , "an ob ject that can be stu d ied se p a r a te ly ”, " o f h om o g en eo u s n a tu re” , Saussu re sets aside " th e physical part of co m m u n ica tio n ”, that is, sp eech as a preconstructed ob ject, liable to stan d in the w ay o f con stru ctin g th e lan guage; he then isolates w ithin the " sp eech c ir c u it” w hat he calls th e "ex ecu tiv e s id e ”, that is, sp eech as a con stru cted ob ject defined by th e actualization of a certain sen se in a particular com b ination of so u n d s, w hich he finally elim inates on the grou n ds that " execu tion is never the w ork of th e m a ss”, b ut "alw ays in d iv id u a l” . T h u s the sam e co n cep t, sp eech , is d iv id ed by theoretical con stru ction into an im m ed iately observable preconstructed datu m , p recisely that against w hich th e operation of theoretical con stru ction is carried ou t, and a constructed object, the negative p rod uct o f the operation w h ich con stitu tes the language as su c h , or rather, wrhich produces b oth ob jects by p rod ucing th e relation o f o p p o sitio n w ith in w h ich and b y wrh ich th ey are d efined. It w ou ld not be difficult to sh ow that th e con stru ction o f th e con cep t of culture (in the cultural an th rop ology sense) or social structure (in RadclifTe-Brown’s sen se and that o f social anthropology) sim ilarly im p lies th e con stru ction of a n otion o f co n d u ct as execu tion w'hich coexists w ith th e prim ary notion of con d u ct as sim p le behaviour taken at face value. T h e extrem e con fu sion of debates on the relation ship b etw een " cu ltu re” (or " social stru ctu r es”) and con d u ct generally arises from the fact that the con stru cted

T h e fallacies o f the rule

25

m eaning of con d u ct and the theory of practice it im plies lead a sort 0f underground existen ce in the discou rse o f both th e d efen d ers and the opponents of cultural a n th rop ology .30 O bjectivism is th u s protected by the im plicit state in w h ich its theory of practice rem ains against the only decisive ch allen ge, the o n e w hich w ou ld attack p recisely that th eory, the source of all th e m etaph ysical aberrations on "the locus of c u ltu r e ” , the m ode of existen ce o f the " str u c tu re”, or the u n con sciou s finality of the history of system s, not to m en tion the all-too-fam ous " co llectiv e con sciousness . It is indeed " on th e ex ecu tiv e s id e ”, as Saussure puts it, that on e finds the essen tial w eakness of the Saussurian m odel and o f all the th eories w h ich ,

som etim es under new n am es, accept the fundam ental p resu p p o sitio n s o f its theoretical con stru ction . C red itin g the sp eak ing subject w ith a potentially in finite generative cap acity m erely p ostp on es the Saussurian d ifficulty: the

power of innovation requ ired in order to generate an in finite n um ber of sentences in no w ay im p lies th e pow er o f adaptation that is required in order to make relevant use of th o se sen ten ces in con stantly ch an gin g situ ation s. H ence the lin g u ists’ lon gstan d in g stru ggle to overcom e the d ifficulties to w hich th e Saussurian con stru ction w as con d em n ed from the very b eg in n in g , inasm uch as th e o n ly w ay it co u ld con stitu te the structural properties of the m essage w as (sim p ly b y p ositin g an indifferent sender and receiver) to neglect th e functional properties the m essage derives from its use in a determ inate situ ation and, m ore p recisely, in a socially structured interaction. As soon as one m oves from the structure of language to the functions it fulfils, that is, to the uses agents actually make of it, one sees that mere know ledge of the code gives only very im perfect m astery of the linguistic interactions really taking place. As Luis Prieto observes, the m eaning of a linguistic elem ent depends at least as much on extra-linguistic as on linguistic factors, that is to say, on the context and situation in which it is used. E verything takes place as if, from am ong the class of "sign ified s” abstractly corresponding to a speech sound, the receiver " selected ” the one which seems to him to be com patible with the circum stances as he perceives th em .31 T h u s reception depends to a large degree on the objective structure of the relations betw een the interacting agents’ objective positions in the social structure (e .g . relations of com petition or objective antagonism , or relations of power and authority, e tc .), which governs the form and content of the interactions observed in a particular conjuncture. Bally show s how the very content of the com m unication, the nature of the language and all the forms of expression used (posture, gesture, mimickrv, e tc .) and above all, perhaps, their style, are affected by the structure of the social relation betw een the agents involved and, m ore precisely, by the structure of their relative positions *n the hierarchies of age, pow er, prestige, and culture: "W hen I talk to som eone, or talk about him , I cannot help visualizing the particular type of relationship (casual, formal, obligatory, official) betw een that person and m yself ; involuntarily 1 think not °nly of his possible action towards m yself, but also of his age, sex, rank, and social 2

BOT

26

T h e objective lim its o f objectivism

background; all these considerations may affect my choice of expressions and lead me to avoid what might discourage, offend, or hurt. If need be, my language becomes reserved an d prudent; it becom es indirect and euphem istic, it slides over the surface instead of in sistin g.’*32 Hence com m unication is possible in practice only when accom ­ panied by a practical spotting of cues w hich, in enabling speakers to situate others in the hierarchies of age, wealth, power, or culture, guides them unw ittingly towards the type of exchange best suited in form and content to the objective situation between the interacting individuals. T h is is seen clearly in bilingual situations, in w hich the speakers adopt cne or the other of the two available languages according to the circum stances, the subject of conversation, the social status of their interlocuter (and thus his degree of culture and bilingualism ), etc. T h e whole content of the com m unication (and not just the language used) is unconsciously modified by the structure of the relationship between the speakers. T he pressure of the socially qualified objective situation is such that, through the mediation of bodily mim esis, a whole way of speaking, a type of joke, a particular tone, som etim es even an accent, seem to be objectively called for by certain situations, and, conversely, quite excluded from others, whatever efforts are made to introduce them . But the linguists and anthropologists w ho appeal to " co n tex t” n r " situ ation ” in order, as it were, to "correct” what strikes them as unreal and abstract in the structuralist model are in fact still trapped in the logic of the theoretical model which they are rightly trying to supersede. T he m ethod known as “situational analysis”,33 which consists of "observing people in a variety of social situ ation s” in order to determ ine "the way in which individuals are able to exercise choices within the lim its of a specified social structure”,34 remains locked within the framework of the rule and the exception, which Leach (often invoked by the exponents of "situational analysis”) spells out clearly: "I postulate that structural system s in which all avenues of social action are narrowly institutionalized are im possible. In all viable system s, there must be an area where the individual is free to make choices so as to manipulate the system to his advantage.”35 In accepting as obligatory alternatives the m odel and the situation, the structure and the individual variations, one condem ns oneself simply to take the diametrically opposite course to the structuralist abstraction which subsum es variations - regarded as sim ple variants - into the structure. T h e desire to "integrate variations, exceptions and accidents into descriptions of regularities ” and to show " how individuals in a particular structure handle the choices with which they are faced as individuals are in all so cieties”36 - leads one to regress to the pre-structuralist stage of the individual and his choices, and to miss the very principle of the structuralist error.37

N o t the least of C hom sky's m erits is to have reopened d iscu ssion on the d istinction betw een syntax and sem an tics (and secondarily, b etw een syntax and pragm atics) and, m ore p recisely, on the dep en dence or in d ep en d en ce of th ese different levels o f discou rse relative to the situ ation , by affirm ing the in d ep en d en ce of th e structural properties o f linguistic exp ression s relative to their uses and fu n ction s and the im p ossib ility of m aking any inference from analysis of their form al structure - a p osition w hich has sim p ly adopted exp licitly the p ostu lates im plied in th e Saussurian lan guage/sp eech distinction. In short, failing to con stru ct practice other than n egatively, ob jectivism is con d em ned either to ignore the w h ole question o f th e principle u nd erlyin g

T h e fallacies o f the rule

27

the p ro d u ctio n o f the r e g u la r itie s w hich it then con ten ts itself w ith recording; to reify abstractions, by th e fallacy of treating the ob jects constructed by s c i e n c e , w hether " c u ltu r e ”, " structures ” , or "m od es of production ”, as realities en d ow ed w ith a social efficacy, capable o f actin g as agents responsible for historical actions or as a power capable of con strain in g p ra ctices; or to save appearances by m eans of con cep ts as am bigu ous as the notions of the ruie or the u n con sciou s, w h ich make it p ossib le to avoid ch oosin g betw een incom patible theories o f practice. T h u s L evi-S trau ss s use o f the notion of the unconscious m asks th e contradictions generated b y the im plicit theory o f practice w hich "structural a n th rop ology” accep ts at least by d efau lt, restoring the old en telech ies of the m etaphysics o f nature in th e apparently secularized form of a structure structured in the absence of any stru cturin g p rin cip le .38

When one is reluctant to follow D urkh eim in p ositin g that none of the rules constraining su bjects "can b e found en tirely reproduced in the applications made o f them b y in dividu als, since they can exist even w ithou t b ein g actually a p p lied ” ,39 and u n w illin g to ascribe to th ese rules th e tran scend en t, perm anent existen ce h e ascribes (as S aussu re d oes to language) to all collective " realities”, the only w ay to escape the crudest naivities o f the legalism w hich sees practices as the p rod uct of o b ed ien ce to the rules is to play on the p olysem ous nature of the w ord rule: m ost often u sed in th e sen se of a social norm expressly stated and explicitly recogn ized , like m oral or juridical law , som etim es in the sen se o f a theoretical model, a con stru ct d ev ised b y scien ce in order to accoun t for practices, the w ord is also, m ore rarely, used in the sense o f a scheme (or p rin cip le) im m anent in practice, w h ich sh ou ld be called im plicit rather than u n con sciou s, sim p ly to indicate that it exists in a practical state in agents' practice and not in their con sciou sn ess, or rather, their discou rse .40 Clearly a case in point is C hom sky, w h o h old s, sim u ltan eou sly, that the rules of gram m ar are in scrib ed in n euro-physiological m ech a n ism s ,41 that they are system s o f norm s of w hich agents have a certain aw areness, and lastly that they are in stru m en ts for description o f language. But it is also instructive to reread a paragraph from L evi-Strau ss’s preface to th e secon d edition of L es structures elementaires de la parente (E lem entary Structures o f K in sh ip) , in w h ich one m ay assu m e that particular care has b een taken w ith the vocabulary of norm s, m od els, or rules, sin ce th e passage deals w ith the d istin ction b etw een preferential sy s te m s ” and "prescriptive sy s te m s ” : " C on versely, a system which recommends m arriage w ith the m oth er’s brother’s daughter m ay be called p rescriptive even if the rule is seld om ob served , sin ce w hat it says m ust be d one. T h e q u estion of h ow far and in w hat proportion the m em bers of a given so ciety respect the norm is very interesting, but a d ifferen t q u estion to that of w here th is society sh ou ld properly be placed in a typ o lo g y . It is sufficient

28

T h e objective lim its o f objectivism

to ack n ow led ge the lik elih ood that awareness of the rule in flects choices ever so little in the prescribed d irection , and that the percentage of conventional m arriages is higher than w ou ld be the case if m arriages w ere m ade at random, to be able to recogn ize w hat m igh t be called a m atrilateral *operator’ at work in th is so c iety and actin g as a p ilot: certain alliances at least fo llo w th e path w h ich it charts out for th e m , and th is suffices to im print a sp ecific curve in the gen ealogical space. N o d ou b t there w ill be not just on e cu rve but a great n um ber o f local cu rves, m erely in cip ien t for th e m ost part, h ow ever, and form in g closed cycles o n ly in rare and excep tion al cases. But the structural ou tlin es w h ich em erge h ere and there w ill be en ou gh for the sy stem to b t used in m aking a p rob abilistic version o f m ore rigid sy stem s the notion o f w hich is com p letely theoretical and in w hich m arriage w ou ld con form rigorously to a n y rule the social group pleases to enunciate ”42 T h e d om in an t ton ality in th is passage, as in the w h ole p reface, is that of th e norm, w hereas S tructu ral A nthropology is w ritten in the language of the model or, if you like, th e structure; n ot that su ch term s are en tirely ab sen t here, sin ce th e m ath em atical-p hysical m etaph ors organ izin g th e central passage (" o p erator” , " c u r v e ” in "genealogical s p a c e ” , " str u c tu re s”) evok e the logic o f th e th eoretical m od el and of the eq u ivalen ce, at on ce declared and repudia­ ted , o f th e model and the norm : " A preferential sy stem is p rescriptive w hen en visaged at th e m odel lev el, a p rescriptive system m ust b e preferential w hen en visaged on th e level of reality .”43 B ut for the reader w h o rem em bers the passages in S tructu ral A n thropology on th e relation ship b etw een language and kinship (e .g . '" K in sh ip sy s te m s ’, like 'p h o n em ic sy s te m s ’, are b uilt up by the m ind on the level o f u n c o n scio u s th o u g h t ”)44 and th e im perious way in w hich "cultural n o rm s” and all the " ration aliza tio n s” or "secon d ary argu­ m e n ts ” p roduced b y the n atives w ere rejected in favour of th e " u n co n scio u s stru ctu r es” , not to m en tion passages assertin g th e u niversality o f th e fun da­ m ental rule of exo gam y, th e co n cession s m ade here to "aw areness o f the r u le ” and the d issociation from rigid system s " th e n otion of w hich is entirely th e o re tic a l’' m ay com e as a surprise, as m ay th is further passage from the sam e preface: " I t is n on eth eless true that th e em pirical reality o f so-called p rescriptive system s o n ly takes on its full m ean in g w hen related to a theoretical m odel w orked out b y the natives themselves prior to e th n o lo g ists ” ,45 or again: " T h o se w h o practise th em know fu lly that th e spirit of su ch system s cannot be redu ced to the tautological prop osition that each grou p ob tain s its w om en from 'g iv e r s ’ and gives its daughters to 'ta k e rs’. T h ey are also a w a re that m arriage w ith th e m atrilateral cross co u sin (m o th er’s b roth er’s daughter) p rovid es th e sim p lest illustration of th e rate, th e form m o st likely to guarantee its su rv iv a l. O n the other h and , m arriage w ith the patrilateral cross cou sin (father’s sister’s daughter) w ould violate it irrevocab ly .”46

T h e fallacies o f the rule

29

• tem ptin g to q uote in reply a passage in w h ich W ittgenstein effortlessly 1S together all the q u estio n s evad ed by structural an th rop ology and no k ^ v T m o r e generally b y all in tellectu alism , w h ich transfers the ob jective truth blished by scien ce in to a practice w h ich b y its very essen ce ru les o u t the CS

tical stance w h ich m akes it p ossib le to estab lish that tr u th :47 " W'hat do

I call ‘the rule by w hich he p r o c e e d s’? - T h e h yp o th esis that satisfactorily describes his use of w ords, w h ich w e ob serve: or th e rule w h ich h e looks up vhen he uses sign s; or the on e w h ich he g ives u s in reply w hen w e ask w hat his rule is? - But w hat if ob servation d oes not enable us to see any clear rule, and the question brings n on e to l i g h t ? - F o r he d id in deed g ive m e a definition w hen I asked h im w hat he u n d erstood b y ' N*, but he w as prepared to withdraw and alter it. S o h ow am I to d eterm in e the rule accord in g to w h ich he is playing? H e d oes not know it h im self. - O r, to ask a b etter q u estion : What m eaning is th e exp ression 'th e rule b y wrh ich he p ro ce ed s’ su p p o sed to have left to it h e r e ?”48 T o consider regularity, that is, w hat recurs w ith a certain statistically m easurable frequency, as th e p rod u ct of a con scio u sly laid -dow n and co n s­ ciously respected ruling (w h ich im p lies exp lain in g its g en esis and efficacy), or as the product of an u n co n scio u s regulating by a m ysteriou s cerebral and/or social m echan ism , is to slip from th e m od el of reality to the reality of the m odel .49 "C on sid er the d ifferen ce b etw een sayin g 'T h e train is regularly tw o m inutes la te ’ and 'A s a rule, the train is tw o m in u tes la te ’ . . .th er e is the suggestion in th e latter case that that th e train be tw o m in u tes late is as it were in accordance w ith som e p olicy or p l a n . . . R ules co n n ect w ith plans or policies in a w ay that regularities d o n o t . . .T o argue t h a t . . .th er e m ust be rules in the natural language is like argu in g that roads m ust be red if th ey correspond to red lin es on a m a p .”50 In on e case - to take up Q u in e’s distinction b etw een fittin g and guiding - o n e form ulates a rule w h ich fits the observed regularity in a purely d escrip tive w ay; in the other case on e states a rule w hich g u id es th e behaviour and w h ich can d o so o n ly to the extent that it is know n and recogn ized (and h en ce cou ld b e sta ted ).51 O n e is en titled to p osit an " im p licit g u id a n c e ” , as, accord in g to Q u in e, C hom sk y d o es, in order to accoun t for a practice ob jectively govern ed b y rules u n k now n to the agents; but on ly o n con d ition that on e d oes not m ask the q u estio n o f the m echanism s p rod u cin g th is con form ity in the ab sen ce of the in ten tio n to conform , by resortin g to the fallacy o f th e rule w h ich im p licitly p laces in the con sciousness o f the in dividu al agen ts a k n ow led ge b u ilt u p against that experience, i.e . con fers th e value o f an an th rop ological d escrip tion on the theoretical m od el con stru cted in order to accou n t for practices. T h e theory of action as m ere execution o f th e m o d el (in the tw ofold sen se o f norm and scientific con stru ct) is just on e exam p le am ong oth ers o f th e im aginary

T he objective lim its o f objectivism

3 °

an th rop ology w h ich o b jectivism en gen d ers w h en , w ith the aid of w ords that obscure the d istin ction b etw een " th e th in g s of lo g ic and the logic o f th in g s!) it p resen ts th e ob jective m ean in g o f p ractices or w orks as the subjective p urpose o f th e action of the producers o f th ose practices or w orks, w ith \\^ im p ossib le

homo economicus su b jectin g

h is d ecisio n -m a k in g to ration*;

calcu lation, its actors p erform in g roles or actin g in co n fo rm ity w ith m odels or its sp eak ers " s e le c tin g ” from a m on g p h on em es.

S E C T I O N I I : CASE S T U D Y : P A R A L L E L - C O U S I N MARRI AGE " P h ilosop h y aim s at the logical clarification o f t h o u g h t s . . . W ithou t philo­ sop h y th o u g h ts are, as it w ere, clou d y and in d istin ct: its task is to m ake them clear and g ive th em sharp b o u n d aries .”52 In th is sen se, the fo reg o in g analyses m ay be said to b elon g to p h ilosop h y. B ut u nlike p h ilo so p h ica l activity as W ittgen stein con ceiv es it, they do not ach ieve their en d in "th e clarification o f p r o p o sitio n s”. A rising in resp onse to scien tific d ifficu lties and not to the reading o f tex ts, th ey are in ten d ed to h elp su rm oun t d ifficu lties, b y providing not on ly p rocedu res for research b u t also p roced u res for valid ation , means of d ecid in g b etw e en com p etin g accoun ts o f the sam e practices. T h e case of m arriage - stru cturalist grou n d par ex cellen ce - and o f p arallel-cou sin mar­ riage - a sort of q u asi-in cest ch allen gin g b oth the u n ilin ea l-d escen t theories and th e m arriage-alliance th eory - co n stitu tes an ideal terrain for such a tru th -test .53 M arriage w ith a patrilateral parallel cou sin (bent'am m , fath er’s b rother’s d augh ter )54 appears as a sort of scandal, in C laude L e v i-S tra u ss’s ter m s ,55 only to those w h o have internalized th e categories o f th o u g h t w h ich it disturbs. In ch a llen g in g th e idea of exogam y, th e p recon d ition for th e co n tin u a tio n of separate lin eages and for the perm an en ce and easy id en tifica tio n o f con secu tive u n its, it ch allen ges the w h ole n otion of u nilineal d escen t as w ell as the theory of m arriage as an exch an ge o f on e w om an against an oth er, w h ich assu m es an in cest taboo, i.e . the ab solu te n ecessity o f ex ch a n g e. A n ex o gam ic system clearly d iv id es alliance grou p s and d escen t g ro u p s, w h ich by definition cannot c o in c id e , gen ealogical lin eages b ein g b y the sam e token clearly defined, sin ce p o w ers, privileges, and d u ties are tran sm itted eith er m atrilineally or patrilineally. E n d ogam y, by contrast, resu lts in a b lu rrin g of the d istinction b etw een lin eages. T h u s , in the extrem e case of a sy stem actually fou n d ed on p arallel-cou sin m arriage, a particular in dividu al co u ld be related to his paternal grandfather eq u ally through his father or h is m o th er. But on th e other hand, b y ch o o sin g to keep the parallel co u sin , a q u a si-sister, w ith in the lineage, the grou p w o u ld d ep rive itself o f an o p p o r tu n ity to receive a w om an from ou tsid e and o f th u s con tractin g n ew alliances. Is it sufficient to regard

T he objective lim its o f objectivism

3i

of m arriage as th e excep tion (or the " a b erra tio n ”) w h ich proves |ile or to rearrange th e categories o f th ou gh t w h ich m ake it p o ssib le in ^ °h

" t o ’ find a place ( i.e . a nam e) for it? Or sh o u ld w e radically q u estio n c a te g o r ie s

of

th ou gh t

w h ich

have

p rod u ced

this

" u n th in k a b le”

^ T h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n p osed b y Arab and Berber trad ition s to cu rren tly avail­ able th eo ries has at least th e m erit of rem in d in g us th a t, as L o u is D u m o n t says th e th e o r y of u nilineal d escen t g rou p s and th e allian ce theory o f m arriage rem ain " reg io n a l th e o r ie s” in the geographical and a lso the ep istem o lo g ica l sen se, e v en th o u g h they wear the cloak o f u n iv e rsa lity .56 N eith er can th e critical e x a m in a tio n of certain of the bases o f th ese th eo ries, w h ich is e n ­ cou raged or e v e n im p osed b y the particular ch aracteristics of a cultural trad ition , c la im to be universal. But su ch a critical exam in ation m ay con trib ute to progress tow ards a theory free from all geograph ical or ep istem ological regionalism by p o sin g u niversal q u estio n s w h ich are raised w ith particular in sisten ce b y the pecu liarities o f certain ob jects. F o r exam p le, it is not su fficient to con clu d e that, w h ile valid in the case o f an ex ogam ic tradition w h ich str ic tly d istin gu ish es b etw een parallel and cro ss k in, the idea o f a p referential m arriage is not justified in the case of a so c iety w ith ou t exogam ou s g ro u p s. W e m ust find in this ex cep tion a reason for q u e stio n in g not o n ly th e very n o tio n of p rescription or p referen ce, b u t also on th e on e h and, the notion o f the g e n e a lo g ic a lly defined grou p , an en tity w h o se social id en tity is as in variab le a n d u niform as the criteria for its d elim itatio n and w h ich con fers

on each o f its m em bers a social id en tity eq u ally d istin ct and p erm an en tly fix e d : and o n the other hand, the n otion o f rules and rule-governed behaviour in the tw o fo ld s e n s e of b eh aviour con form in g ob jectively to rules and d eterm in ed bv o b e d ie n c e to rules.

T h e inadequacy o f th e language of p rescription an d rules is so clear in the case of patrilateral m arriage that w e cannot fail to be rem in d ed of R odn ey N eedham 's in qu iries in to the co n d itio n s o f v a lid ity, perhaps n ever fu lfilled , of such a lan guage, w h ich is in fact n oth in g other than legal la n g u a g e .57 But this q u estio n in g of the ep istem ological status of co n ce p ts as co m m o n ly and as w id ely u sed as th ose o f rule, p rescription , and p referen ce, in evitab ly challenges the theory o f practice w h ich th ey p resu p p ose: can w e , even im plicitly, treat th e "algebra o f k in sh ip ”, as M alinow sk i called it, as a theory ° f the practical u ses o f kinship and of " p ra ctica l” k in sh ip w ith o u t tacitly

postulating a d ed u ctive relationship b etw een k in sh ip term in o lo g y and " kin­ ship a ttitu d e s” ? A nd can w e g ive an an th rop ological m ean in g to th is relation­ ship w ith o u t p ostu latin g that regulated and regular relatio n sh ip s b etw een kin are the resu lts of o b ed ien ce to a set of rules w h ich , althou gh a residual D urkh eim ian scru p le m akes R adcliffe-B row n call th e m " ju ra l” rather than

32

T h e objective limits o f objectivism

legal are assu m ed to con trol b eh aviour in the sam e w ay as legal ru les?** F in a lly , can w e m ake th e gen ealogical d efin ition of gro u p s th e o n ly means o f d ifferen tiatin g b etw een social u n its and of a ssign in g agen ts to th e se group 8 w ith o u t im p licitly p ostu la tin g that th e agen ts are d efined in every respect and for all tim e by their b elo n g in g to the g rou p , and th a t, in sh o rt, die group d efin es th e agen ts and th eir in terests m ore th an th e agen ts d efine groups in term s of their interests?

T h e state o f the question T h e m ost recent theories of parallel-cousin marriage, those of Fredrik Barth59 and of Robert M urphy and Leonard K asdan,60 though diam etrically opposed, do have in com m on the fact that they appeal to those functions w hich structuralism either ignores or brackets off, w hether econom ic functions, such as the retention of the patrimony w ithin the lineage, or political functions, such as the reinforcem ent of lineage inte­ gration. It is difficult to see how they could do otherw ise w ithout making absurd a marriage w hich obviously does not fulfil the function of exchange and alliance com m only attributed to cross-cousin marriage.61 Barth em phasizes that endogamous marriage " plays a prom inent role in solidifying the minim al lineage as a corporate group in factional stru g g le”. By contrast, M urphy and Kasdan criticize Barth for explaining the institution "through reference to the consciously felt goals o f the individual role p layers’*, or more precisely by reference to the lineage h e a d s interest in keeping a close control over his nephew s, who represent points of potential segm entation. Thus M urphy and Kasdan relate this type o f marriage to its "structural fu n ctio n ”, that is, to the fact that it "contributes to the extrem e fission of agnatic lin es. . .a n d , through in-marriage, encysts the patrilineal seg m en ts”. L evi-Strauss is perfectly justified in stating that the twTo op p osin g positions amount to exactly the sam e thing: in fact Barth’s theory makes o f th is type o f marriage a means o f reinforcing lineage unity and of lim iting the tendency to fission; M urphy’s theory sees in it the principle of a quest for integration into larger units, founded on the appeal to a common origin, and ultim ately encom passing all Arabs. So both adm it that parallel-cousin marriage cannot be explained w ithin the pure logic of the matrimonial exchange system and that any explanation must refer to external econom ic or political fu n ction s.62 C uisenier sim ply draws o u t the consequences o f this observation, in a construction w hich attem pts to account for the inconsistencies noted by all observers betw een the “ m o d el” and actual practice, together with at least the econom ic external functions of matrimonial exchanges. " It is native thinking itself w hich gives us a clue to an explanatory m odel. T h is m odel represents in effect alliances knit together in one group based on the fundam ental opposition o f tw o brothers, of w hom one m ust marry endogam ously in order to m aintain the coherence of the group, and the other must marry exogam ously in order to gain alliances for the group. T h is opposition between the tw o brothers is found at all levels of the agnatic group; it expresses in the usual genealogical term inology of Arab thought a choice betw een alternatives w hich may be represented as a 'partial ord er’ diagram in w hich the num erical values of a and 6 are and % respectively. If a represents the choice of endogam y and b the choice of exogam y, and if one follow s the branchings of the two-part fam ily tree from the roots upwards, the choice of a at the m ost superficial genealogical levels is the choice of the parallel cousin (Vs of the c a ses).”63 One m ight be tem pted to see it as a virtue

The functions o f kinship: official kin and p ra ctica l kin ,

33

that it seeks to account for the statistical data in contrast to traditional £ercntjaj marriage w hich w ent no further than to state the divergence t h e o r ie s "norm ” (or the " r u le ”) and actual practice.64 But one only has to adopt b e tw e e n restrictive definition of the marriages assim ilable to parallel-cousin a m° re to move away, to a greater or lesser extent, from the magical percentage V£?) w hich, w hen com bined with a native m axim , generates a "theoretical ^ a V'- and then there is no need to appeal to an epistem ological critique to show 010 t h e model fits the facts so perfectly only because it has been made to measure to fM he facts, i.e. invented ad hoc to account for a statistical artefact, and not built up from a theory of the principles of the production of practices. T h ere is an equation for the c u r v e of each face, said L eibniz. A nd nowadays there w ill always be a m athe­ m a tic ia n to prove that tw o cousins parallel to a third are parallel to each o t h e r .. . But the intention of subm itting genealogies to statistical analysis has at least the virtue of revealing the m ost fundam ental properties of the genealogy, an analytical tool which is never itself analysed. W e can im m ediately see what is strange about the idea of calculating rates of endogam y wrhen, as here, it is the very notion of the endogamous group, and therefore the basis o f calculation, which is in q uestion.65 Are w e to be satisfied with abstractly dissecting genealogies wrhich have the sam e extent as the group memory, whose structure and extent depend on the functions actually given by the group to those whom it rem em bers or forgets ? R ecognizing in a lineage diagram an ideological representation resorted to by the Bedouin in order to achieve a "primary comprehension” of their present relationships, E. L . Peters66 points out that the genealogy ignores the real power relations between genealogical segm ents, that it forgets about the w om en, and that it treats as "contingent a ccid en ts” the most basic ecclogical, dem ographic, and political factors.67 M ust w e then resort to the units which the agents them selves recognize, using criteria w hich are not necessarily genealogical ? We discover, however, that an individual’s chances of making a marriage w hich can be treated as a marriage w ith the daughter of his ramm are greater to the extent that his practical, effectively m obilizable lineage (as well as the num ber of potential partners) is larger, and the pressures on him to marry inside the lineage are stronger. Once the family property is divided and there is nothing to recall and maintain the genealogical relationship, the father’s brother’s daughter may be considered no closer in degree of kinship than any other patrilateral (or even matrilateral) cousin. On the other hand, a genealogically more distant cousin m ay be the practical equivalent of the bent'amm w hen the tw o cousins are part of a strongly united '*h o u se” living under one elder and ow n ing all its property in com m on. And perhaps inform ants are simply victim s of an illusion created by the decline of the great undivided fam ilies, when they repeat with insistence that people now marry less w ithin the lineage than they did formerly. 1

0f this mo

T h e functions o f kinship: official kin and practical kin It is not su fficien t to fo llo w the exam p le o f the m ore circu m sp ect fieldw orkers, p ru dently slip from the n otion of preferential m arriage w ith a parallel cousin to the n otion o f " lin eage en d ogam y ”, tru stin g that th is va g u e, h igh sounding lan guage w ill offer a w ay ou t o f th e problem s raised b y th e n otion ° f en d ogam y and con cealed b y the all-too-fam iliar con cep t o f th e group. It first n ecessary to ask w hat is im plied in d efining a grou p by th e genealogical relationship lin k in g its m em b ers, and in thereby im p licitly treatin g kinship

34

T h e objective lim its o f objectivism

as th e necessary and su fficien t con d ition of grou p u n ity . A s soon as we ex p licitly about th e functions of kin relation ship s, or m ore b lu n tly , about t}* u sefu ln ess of k in sm en , a q u estio n w hich k insh ip th eo rists prefer to treat ^ resolved , w e cannot fail to n otice that th o se u ses o f k in sh ip w h ich may ^ called genealogical are reserved for official situ a tio n s in w h ich they ^ th e fu n ctio n of ord erin g th e social w orld and o f leg itim a tin g that order .68jn th is resp ect th ey differ from th e other kinds o f practical use m ade of kirj relation sh ip s, w hich are a particular case o f the u tilization o f connections. The g en ealogical diagram o f kin relation ship s w hich th e an th rop ologist constructs m erely reprodu ces th e official representation o f th e social stru ctures, a repre. sentation p rod uced b y ap p lication of the stru cturin g prin cip le that is dominant in a certain respect; i.e . in certain situ ation s and w ith a v iew to certain fu n ction s. Marriage provides a good opportunity for observing what in practice separates official kinship, single and im m utable, defined once and for all by the norm s o f genealogical protocol, from practical kinship, w hose boundaries and definitions are as many and as varied as its users and the occasions on w hich it is used. It is practical kin who make marriages; it is official kin w ho celebrate them . In ordinary marriages the contacts preceding the official proposal (akhiab) and the least avowable negotiations relating to areas w hich the official ideology tends to ignore, such as the economic conditions of the marriage, the status offered to the wife in her husband’s home, relations with the husband’s m other, and similar m atters, are left to the persons least qualified to represent the group and to speak for it (w ho can therefore be disowned if need b e), such as an old w om an, usually a sort of professional in these secret m eetings, a m idw ife, or som e other woman used to m oving from village to village. In the difficult negotiations betw een distant groups a w ell-know n, prestigious man from a group sufficiently distant and distinct from the "w ife-takers’ to appear neutral and to be in a position to act in com plicity with another man occupying approximately the sam e position in relation to the w ife-givers (a friend or ally rather than a kinsman) w ill be entrusted w ith the delivery of the declaration of intent (assiw at w a w a l). He will avoid com ing straight to the point, but w ill try to find an opportunity to meet som eone from "the girl’s s id e ” and to disclose to him the " in ten tio n s” of the interested fam ily. T h e official marriage proposal (akhtab) is presented by the least responsible of those responsible, i.e. the elder brother and not the father, the paternal uncle and not the grandfather, etc., accom panied, especially if he is young, by a kinsman from another line. T h e m en w h o present the request may be, for example, on the first occasion, an elder brother and a maternal uncle, then on the second occasion a paternal uncle and one of the notables o f the group, then the third time the sam e people accom panied by several group and village notables such as the taleb, to be joined later by the village marabouts, and the fourth tim e the father together with notables from the neighbouring village and even the next tribe, etc. So progressi­ vely closer and more distinguished relatives of the bridegroom com e to present their request ( ahallal) to m en in the bride’s family w h o genealogically and spatially are increasingly distant. In the end it is the most im portant and m ost distant of the girl's kin w ho com e to intercede w ith the girl’s father and mother on behalf of the closest and m ost prestigious of the young m an’s kin, having been asked to do so by this latter group. Finally, acceptance (aqbal) is proclaimed before the largest possible number

T h e functions o f k in sh ip : official km and practical kin

35

ved to the most em inent kinsman of the young man by the most 0f men and conv ^ kinsm en, w ho has been asked to support the proposal. As eminent of t ^ an(j begin to look successful, official kin may w ell take the place negotiations pr ^ hierarchy with respect to utility being alm ost the exact opposite 0f practica * reSpect to genealogical legitim acy. T here are various reasons of the hierarL ^ ^ ^ advisable to " c o m m it” in the early stages kin w h o because of for this, r i » social position m ight com prom ise their principals too dpeplv the^ gene2 ^ sjtuation of conjunctural inferiority, w hich is often associated w ith particu^j s^perjorjty (because the man is marrying beneath h im ). Secondly, not structur ^ asked to put him self in the position of a supplicant liable to receive eVe?usa^ and a fortiori to take part in negotiations w hich w ill bring no glory, w hich 3 ^often*painful, and som etim es bring dishonour on the tw o parties (like the practice thaj'alts which consists of paying m oney to secure the intervention of som e o f the ° *soective bride’s kin). Finally, the search for maximum efficiency in the practical hase of negotiations directs the choice towards persons know n to com m and great skill, to enjoy particular authority over the fam ily in question, or to be on good term s with someone in a position to influence the d ecision . And it is natural that, in the official phase, those who have actually " m a d e” the marriage should have to make do with the place assigned to them not by their usefulness but by their position in the genealogy; having played their parts as "utility m e n ”, they m ust make way for the "leading actors”.

T h u s, to schem atize, official kinship is op p osed to practical k insh ip in term s of the official as op p osed to th e non-official (w h ich in clu d es the unofficial and the scand alous); the co llectiv e as o p p o sed to th e in d ivid u al; th e p u b lic, explicitly codified in a m agical or quasi-juridical form alism , as o p p o sed to the private, kept in an im p licit, ev en h id d en state; co llectiv e ritual, su b jectless practice, am enable to perform an ce b y agen ts interchangeable b ecau se co llec­ tively m andated, as op p osed to strategy, directed tow ards the sa tisfa ctio n o f the practical in terests of an in d ivid u al or grou p of in d ivid u a ls. A bstract u nits produced by sim p le theoretical d iv isio n , su ch as, here, th e u nilineal d escen t group (or elsew h ere, age-group s) are available for all fu n ctio n s, that is, for no sin gle on e in particular, and have practical ex isten ce o n ly for th e m ost official uses of k in sh ip ; representational kinship is n o th in g other than the group s self-rep resen tation and th e alm ost theatrical p resen tation it g iv e s of itself w h en actin g in accord ance w ith that self-im age. B y con trast, practical groups exist o n ly through and for th e particular fu n ctio n s in p ursuan ce of v^hich they have b een effectively m ob ilized ; and th e y co n tin u e to exist only because th ey have b een kept in w ork in g order b y th eir very u se an d by M aintenance w ork (in c lu d in g th e m atrim onial exch an ges th ey m ake p o ssib le) and b ecause they rest on a co m m u n ity o f d isp o sitio n s (h a b itu s) and interests u-hich is also th e b asis o f u n d ivid ed o w n ersh ip o f th e m aterial and sy m b o lic patrim ony. T o treat kin relation sh ip s as so m eth in g people make, and w ith w h ich they do so m eth in g, is not m erely to su b stitu te a " fu n ction alist ” for a " stru cturalist ” interpretation, as current ta xon om ies m ig h t lead on e to b eliev e; it is radically

3^

T h e objective lim its o f objectivism

to question the im p licit th eory of practice w hich causes the anthropological tradition to see kin relation ship s " in the form of an object or an intuition as Marx p u ts it, rather than in the form o f the practices w h ich produce, reproduce, and use them b y reference to necessarily practical fu n ctio n s. The sam e is tru e, a fo rtio ri, o f affinal relation sh ip s: it is o n ly w hen on e records th ese relation ship s as a fa it accom pli, po st festum , as th e anthropologist does w h en he draw s u p a gen ealogy, that on e can forget that they are the product of strategies (con sciou s or u n con sciou s) oriented tow ards the satisfaction of m aterial and sy m b o lic in terests and organized by reference to a determ inate set of eco n o m ic and social con d itio n s. O n ce on e forgets all that is im plied in extracting from the product the p rin cip les of its p rod uction , from th e opus operatum the modus operandi, on e con d em n s o n eself to proceed as if the regular p rod u ct had b een p rod uced in accordance w ith the ru le s .69 T h e com petition and conflicts provoked by the transmission of first names provide an opportunity to observe the practical and political functions of these genealogical markers: to appropriate these indices of genealogical position (so-and-so, son of so-and-so, son of so-and-so etc.) w hich are also emblems, sym bolizing the whole sym bolic capital accum ulated by a lineage, is in a sense to take possession o f a title giving special rights over the group’s patrimony. T h e state of the relations of force and authority between contem porary kin determ ines what the collective history will be; but this sym bolic projection of the power relations between com peting individuals and groups also plays a part in reinforcing the initial state of affairs by giving those w ho are in a dom inant position the right to profess the veneration of the past which is best suited to legitim ate their present interests. T o give a new-born child the name o f a great forefather is not sim ply to perform an act o f filial piety, but also in a sense to predestine the child thus named to bring the eponym ous ancestor "back to life ” ( isakrad djedi-s "he has brought his grandfather 'back to life ’”), i.e. to succeed him in his responsibilities and p ow ers.70 Prestigious first nam es, like the noblest lands, are the object of regulated com peti­ tion, and the " righ t” to appropriate the first name which is most coveted, because it continuously proclaims the genealogical connection w ith the ancestor w hose name is preserved by the group and outside the group, is distributed in accordance with a hierarchy analogous to that governing the obligations of honour in the case of revenge, or of the rights to land belonging to the patrimony in the case of sale. T h u s, since first names are transmitted in direct patrilineal line, the father cannot give a child the name of his own 'amm or his own brother (the ch ild ’s 'amm) if either of the latter has left any sons w ho are already married and hence in a position to reuse their father’s name for one of their son s or grandsons. Here as elsew here, the convenient language of norms and obligations (m u st. . . c a n n o t. . .e tc .) m ust not be allowed to m islead us: thus, a younger brother has been known to take advantage of a favourable balance of power in order to give his children the first name of a prestigious brother who had died leaving only very young children; the children subsequently set their point of honour on retaking possession of the first name of which they considered them selves the legitimate bearers - even at risk of confusion. T h e com petition is particularly evident w hen several brothers wish to give their children their father’s first name: whereas the need to rescue it from neglect and fill up the gap that has appeared requires that the name should be given to the first boy born after the death of its bearer, the

T he functions o f kinship: official kin an d practical kin

37

may Put t^ie attribution of the name in order to give it to one of his eldest |nSteacj 0f leaving it for the son of one of his younger brothers, thus Sran - a genealogical level. But it may also happen, on the other hand, that for lack ^ male descendants, a name threatens to escheat, at which point the responsibility ° reviving” it falls first on the collaterals, and then on the group as a w hole, which bv demonstrates that its integration and its wealth o f men enable it to reuse the a m e s of all direct ancestors and, m oreover, to make good any gaps that may appear elsewhere (one of the functions of marriage with the daughter of the 'amm w hen the latter dies w ithout male heirs, being to allow the daughter to see to it that her father's name does not disappear).

T h e eth n ologist is in a particularly bad p osition to d etect th e d istin ctio n between official and practical kinship: as his d ealin gs w ith kinship (at least, the kinship of others) are restricted to cogn itive u ses, he is d isp osed to take for gospel truth the official d iscou rses wrhich in form an ts are in clin ed to present to him as lo n g as they see th em selves as sp okesm en m andated to present the grou p 's official account o f itself. H e has no reason to p erceive that he is allow in g the official definition o f social reality to b e im p o sed on him a version w h ich d om in ates or represses other d efin ition s. W itness to th is are the desperate efforts by generations o f an th rop ologists to confirm or d en y the existence o f " p referen tial” cross-cou sin m arriage. A s soon as o n e poses the problem of m arriage in strictly gen ealogical term s, as inform an ts alw ays w ill, by referring to m arriage writh th e bent'am m , all further d iscu ssion w ill take place w ithin certain lim its; all so lu tio n s are acceptable so lo n g as they are expressed in gen ealogical l a ng ua ge . . . T h e eth n ologist can n ot break the c o m p ­ licity w hich b in d s him to the official id eology o f his inform ants and reject the presuppositions im p lied in the m ere fact o f se ein g ex clu siv ely genealogical relationships o f filiation or alliance in relation ship s w h ich can be read in other w ays (e .g . in term s o f sib lin gsh ip ) and are alw ays also based on other principles (e .g . eco n o m ic or p o litica l), u nless he situ ates th is sp ecial kind of use of kinship w ith resp ect to the various kinds of u ses the agen ts m ay make of it. W hen the anthropologist treats n ative k insh ip term in o lo g y as a clo sed , coherent sy stem of p urely logical relation sh ip s, defined o n ce and for all b y the im plicit axiom atics of a cultural trad ition,

he p roh ib its h im self from

apprehending the different practical fu n ctio n s of th e k inship term s and relations w hich he u n w ittin gly brackets; and by th e sam e token he p roh ibits him self from grasping the ep istem ological status of a practice w h ich , like his °w n , p resup poses and consecrates n eutralization of the practical fu n ctio n s of those term s and relationships. T h e logical relation ship s con stru cted by the an th rop ologist are op posed to

practical ” relation ship s - practical b ecau se co n tin u o u sly practised, kept

UP, and cu ltivated - in the sam e w ay as the geom etrical sp ace of a m ap , an im aginary representation of all theoretically p ossib le roads and rou tes, is

3«

T h e objective limits o f objectivism

op posed to the network of b eaten tracks, of paths m ade ever m ore practicable by con stant u se. T h e gen ealogical tree con stru cted b y th e an th rop ologist, a spatial diagram that can be taken in at a gla n ce, uno intuitu, and scanned indifferently from any p oint in any d irection , causes the co m p lete network of kinship relations over several gen erations to exist as on ly theoretical objects exist, that is, tota sim ul, as a totality p resen t in sim u lta n eity .71 Official relationships w h ich d o not receive con tin u ou s m aintenance ten d to becom e w hat th ey are for the gen ealogist: theoretical relationships, like abandoned roads on an old m ap. In sh ort, the logical relations of kinship to w hich the structuralist tradition ascribes a m ore or less com p lete au ton om y w ith respect to econ om ic d eterm in ants, and correlatively a near-perfect internal co ­ herence, exist in practice on ly through and for the official and unofficial uses m ade o f th em b y agents w hose attachm ent to keeping them in w orking order and to m aking th em work in ten sively - h en ce, through constant u se, ever m ore easily - rises w ith the degree to w h ich they actually or p otentially fulfil fu n ction s in dispensab le to th em or, to put it less a m b ig u o u sly , the exten t to w hich th ey do or can satisfy vital m aterial and sym bolic interests.72

O fficializing strategies By th e m ere fact o f talking o f en d ogam y and o f tryin g, ou t o f a laudable desire for rigour, to m easure its d egrees, on e assu m es the ex isten ce o f a purely gen ealogical definition of th e lin eage. In fact, every adult m ale, at w hatever level on th e genealogical tree, represents a p oint of potential segm entation w h ich m ay b ecom e effective for a particular social purpose. T h e further back in tim e and genealogical space w e place th e p oint o f origin - and n othing forb ids a regression to in finity in th is abstract space - the m ore w e push back the boundaries o f the lineage and th e m ore th e assim ilative pow er of genealogical ideology grow s, but on ly at the exp en se o f its distinctive pow er, w hich increases as w e draw nearer th e p oint o f com m on origin . T h u s the kind of use w h ich can be m ade o f the exp ression ath (" th e d escen d an ts o f, th e people o f . . . ”) o b eys a positional logic altogether sim ilar to that w h ich accord in g to Evans-Pritchard characterizes th e u ses o f the w ord ciengy th e sam e person b ein g able, d ep en d in g on circum stance, situ ation , and interlocutor, to call h im self a m em ber o f the A th A bba (th e h ou se, akham ), of the A th Isa'd ( takharrubth), of the A th O usseb'a (adh ru m )t or of the A th Y ahia ('arch). T h e absolute relativism w hich b esto w s upon the agents th e pow er to m anipulate w ith ou t lim it their ow n social id en tity (or that o f th e adversaries or partners w h om they assim ilate or exclu d e b y m anip ulating the lim its o f the classes they each b elo n g to ), w ould at least have the m erit of repu d iating the naive realism o f those w h o cannot characterize a grou p other than as a popu lation defined

O fficializing strategies

3 9

directly visible boundaries. H ow ever, the structure o f a group (and h en ce the social id en tity of th e in dividu als w h o m ake it u p) d ep en d s on the fu n ction which is fundam ental to its con stru ction and organization. T h is is also forgotten by those w h o try to escape from genealogical abstraction by con ­ trasting the d escen t line w ith the local line or the local d escen t grou p , that portion of a unilineal d escen t group w h ich , b y the m ere fact of com m on residence, can act collectively as a g ro u p .73 O n e again su ccu m b s to realism if one forgets that the effects of spatial d istance are d ep en d en t on the fun ction which the social relation ship aim s to ach ieve. W e m ay adm it, for exam p le, that the potential u sefu ln ess of a partner ten d s to decrease w ith distance (except in the case o f p restige m arriages, w here the m ore distant the people between w hom the relationship is estab lish ed , th e greater th e sym b olic profit). If u nity of resid en ce con trib u tes to the integration of the grou p , the unity given to the grou p b y its m obilization for a com m on fun ction con trib utes towards m in im izin g the effect o f d istance. In sh ort, althou gh w e cou ld in theory m aintain that there are as m any p ossib le groups as there are fu n ctio n s, the fact rem ains that, as w e saw in the case o f m arriage, on e cannot call on absolutely anyone for a n y occasion , any m ore than on e can offer o n e’s services to anyone for a n y en d . T h u s , to escape from relativism w ithou t falling into realism , w e m ay posit that th e con stants of the field o f potentially useful relationships (i.e . th ose that are actually u sable, because spatially close, and useful, because socially influential) cause each grou p of agents to ten d to keep up b y con tin u ou s m aintenance-w ork a privileged netw ork o f practical relationships w hich com p rises not only th e su m total of the genealogical relationships kept in w orking order (here called practical kinsh ip ) b ut also the sum total o f the non-gen ealogical relation ship s w hich can be m obilized for the ordinary n eed s of existen ce (practical relation ship s). T h e official set o f th ose in dividuals am enable to definition b y the sam e relationship to the sam e ancestor at th e sam e level on the genealogical tree may con stitu te a practical grou p : th is is the case w h en the genealogical divisions cover (in both sen ses) u nits foun ded on other p rin cip les, w hether ecological (n eigh b ou rh ood ), econ om ic (un d ivid ed p atrim on y), or political. T he fact that the d escrip tive value o f the genealogical criterion is greater w hen the com m on origin is nearer and the social u nit is m ore lim ited d oes not m ean that its unificatory efficacy rises in the sam e w ay. In fact, as w e shall see, the closest genealogical relationship, that b etw een brothers, is also th e p oin t of greatest ten sion , and o n ly in cessan t work can m aintain the co m m u n ity of interests. In sh ort, th e genealogical relation ship is never stron g en ou gh on its ow n to provide a com p lete d eterm ination o f th e relationship b etw een the individuals w hich it u n ites, and it has su ch p redictive value on ly w h en it g oes with the shared interests, produced by th e com m on possession of a m aterial

4o

T h e objective lim its o f objectivism

an d sy m b o lic p atrim on y, w h ich en ta ils co llec tiv e v u ln era b ility as w ell as co llectiv e p rop erty. T h e e x te n t o f practical k insh ip d ep en d s on th e capacity o f th e official grou p m em b ers to o v erco m e th e ten sio n s en g en d ered b y the co n flict o f in terests w ith in th e u n d iv id ed p rod u ction and co n su m p tio n grou p , and to k eep u p the kind o f p ractical relation sh ip s w h ich co n fo rm to th e official v iew h eld b y every grou p wrh ich th in k s o f itself as a corporate u n it. O n that co n d itio n , th e y m ay en joy b o th th e ad van tages a ccru in g fro m ev ery practical relation sh ip and th e sy m b o lic p rofits secu red b y th e approval so cia lly con ­ ferred o n practices c o n fo rm in g to th e official represen tation of practices. S tra teg ies aim ed at p ro d u c in g "regular ” p ractices are o n e categ o ry , am ong oth ers, o f officializing strategies, th e o b ject o f w h ich is to tr a n s m u te " e g o is tic ”, private, particular in terests (n o tio n s d efin ab le only w ith in th e relation ship b etw een a social u n it and th e en co m p a ssin g social u n it at a h ig h er le v el) in to d isin te re ste d , co llec tiv e, p u b lic ly avow ab le, leg itim a te in terests.

In the

ab sen ce o f p olitical in stitu tio n s en d o w e d w ith an effectiv e m o n o p o ly of leg itim a te v io len ce, p olitical action p rop er can b e ex ercised o n ly b y th e effect o f officialization and th u s p resu p p o ses th e competence (in th e se n se o f a ca pacity socially recogn ized in a pu blic au th ority) required in ord er to m anip ulate th e co llec tiv e d efinition o f th e situ a tio n in su ch a w ay as to b rin g it closer to th e official d efin ition o f th e situ ation and th ereb y to w in th e m ea n s of m o b ilizin g th e largest p o ssib le grou p , th e op p o site strategy te n d in g to reduce th e sam e situ ation to a m erely private affair .74 T o p o ssess th e cap ital of a u th ority necessary to im p o se a d efin ition o f the situ a tio n , esp ecia lly in the m o m e n ts o f crisis w h e n th e co llec tiv e ju d g m en t falters, is to be able to m o b ilize th e grou p b y so le m n iz in g , officializin g, an d th u s u n iv e rsa lizin g a p rivate in cid en t (e .g . b y p resen tin g an in su lt to a particular w om an as an affront to th e hurma o f th e w h o le g r o u p ). It is also to b e ab le to d em o b ilize it, b y d iso w n in g th e p erson d irectly co n ce rn ed , w h o , fa ilin g to id en tify his particular in terest w ith th e " gen eral in te r e s t”, is red u ced to th e sta tu s o f a m ere in d ivid u al, co n d em n e d to appear u nreason able in seek in g to im p o se his private reason - idiotes in G reek and am ah bul in K a b y le. In fa ct, grou p s d em an d in fin itely less than legalist form alism w o u ld have u s b e lie v e , but m u ch m ore than th o se w h o " w o n ’t p lay th e g am e ” are w illin g to gran t th em . B etw een th e responsible m an, w h o m th e ex c e lle n c e o f a p ractice im m ed iately in lin e w ith th e official rule, b eca u se p ro d u ced b y a regu lated h abitus, p red isp o ses to fulfil th e fu n ctio n s o f d eleg a te and sp o k e s­ m an, and th e irresponsible m an w h o , n ot c o n ten t w ith break in g th e ru les, d oes n o th in g to ex ten u a te h is in fraction s, g r o u p s m ake room for th e w ell-m eaning rule-breaker w h o b y c o n c e d in g th e ap pearan ces or in ten t o f co n fo rm ity , that is, recognition, to rules he can n eith er resp ect nor d en y , co n trib u tes to the - en tirely official - su rvival of th e ru le. It is natural that p o litics sh o u ld b e th e

O fficializing strategies

4i

ivjjeged arena for th e d ia lec tic of th e official and th e u sefu l: in their efforts ^ draw th e g ro u p ’s d eleg a tio n upon th e m se lv e s and w ith d ra w it from their rivals, the agen ts in co m p etitio n for p olitical p ow er are lim ited to ritual s tr a te g ie s in te r e sts

and strategic ritu als, p rod u cts o f th e c o lle c tiv iz in g of private and th e sy m b o lic ap propriation o f official in terests.

But th e stru ggle to m o n o p o liz e th e leg itim a te exercise o f v io le n c e - that is to say,

^ e ab sen ce o f ec o n o m ic a cc u m u la tio n , th e stru g g le to a ccu m u late

sym bolic capital in th e form of c o llec tiv ely reco g n ized credit - m u st n ot lead us to forget th e n ecessarily h id d en o p p o sitio n b etw een th e official and th e unofficial. C o m p etitio n for official p ow er can be se t up o n ly b etw een m en , while the w o m e n m ay en ter in to com p etitio n for a p ow er wrh ich is b y d efin itio n condem ned to rem ain unofficial or ev en cla n d estin e and o cc u lt. W e find in fact in the p olitical sp h ere th e sam e d iv isio n o f lab ou r w h ich en tru sts relig io n - p u b lic , official, so le m n , and co llec tiv e - to th e m en , and m agic - secret, clandestine, and private - to th e w o m e n . In th is co m p e titio n th e m en have the w hole official in stitu tio n o n their sid e , startin g w ith th e m vth ico-ritu al representations and th e rep resen tation s o f k in sh ip w h ic h , b y red u cin g the opposition b etw e en th e official and th e private to the o p p o sitio n b etw een the outside and th e in sid e, h en ce th e m ale and th e fem a le, esta b lish a sy stem a tic hierarchization c o n d e m n in g w o m e n ’s in te rv e n tio n s to a sh a m e fu l, secret, or, at b est, unofficial ex iste n c e . Even w h en w o m e n d o w ield th e real p ow er, as is often th e case in m atrim onial m atters, th e y can ex ercise it fu lly o n ly on condition that th e y leave th e appearance o f powrer, that is, its official m anifestation, to th e m e n ; to have any p ow er at all, w o m e n m ust m ake do with th e unofficial p ow er o f th e eminence grise, a dom in ated p o w e r w h ich is opposed to official p ow er in that it can op erate o n ly b y p ro x y , u n d er th e cover of an official au th o rity , as w ell as to th e su b v ersiv e refusal o f th e rule-breaker, in that it still serves th e au th ority it u ses. T h e true statu s o f kin relatio n sh ip s, p rin cip les of stru ctu ration of th e social world w h ich , as su c h , alw ays fulfil a p olitical fu n ctio n , is m o st clearly seen in the d ifferen t u ses wrh ich m en and w o m e n can m ake o f th e sam e field of genealogical rela tio n sh ip s, and in particular in th eir d ifferen t " r ea d in g s” and u s e s ” o f gen ea lo g ica lly am b ig u o u s k in sh ip ties (w h ich are relatively freq u en t on accou n t of the narrow area of m atrim onial c h o ic e ). In all cases o f genealogically am biguous relationship, one can always bring closer the most distant relative, or m ove closer to him , by em phasizing what unites, w hile one can hold the closest relative at a distance by em phasizing wrhat separates. What ls at stake in these m anipulations, w hich it w ould be naive to consider fictitious on the grounds that no one is taken in, is in all cases nothing other than the definition of the practical lim its of the group, w hich can be redrawn by this m eans so as to go beyond or fall short of an individual one w ants to annex or ex clu d e. An idea of these subtleties m ay be got from considering the uses of the term khal (strictly, m other’s

T h e objective limits o f objectivism

42

Moussa

A

A,«aA

Koula (

±

Ahmed

Ahccne

Ardjab

i k.- Mohand

I

A thm an

/ K hedoudja

“ Ahmed Case i

Case 2

F ig . i.

b roth er): used by a m arabout to a com m on, lay peasant, it expresses the desire to distinguish oneself, w ithin the lim its of courtesy, by indicating the absence of any legitim ate kin relationship; whereas between peasants, it m anifests the intention of setting up a minimal relationship of familiarity by invoking a distant, hypothetical affinal relationship.

It is the official reading that the an th rop ologist is accep tin g w h en , w ith his in form an ts’ b lessin g , he assim ilates to parallel-cousin m arriage the relation ­ sh ip w h ich u nites, for exam p le, secon d -d egree patrilateral parallel cou sin s w hen on e o f them is h im self th e ch ild o f a parallel-cousin m arriage, and a fo rtio ri w h en b oth are ch ild ren of su ch m arriages (as in th e case o f an exchan ge o f w om en b etw een the son s of tw o b rothers). T h e m ale, that is to say, the d om in an t reading, w h ich im p oses itself w ith particular in sisten ce in all p u b lic, official situ a tio n s - in sh ort, in all honou r relation ship s in w hich one m an of h onou r is sp eak in g to another - p rivileges th e n oblest asp ect, the aspect m ost w o rth y o f p u b lic p roclam ation, of a m ulti-faceted relation ship , lin k ing each of th e in d ivid u als w h o are to be situated to his patrilineal forebears and, th rou gh th e latter, to the patrilineal forebears th ey have in co m m o n . It represses the other p ossib le pathw ay, alb eit so m etim es m ore direct and often m ore co n v en ien t p ractically, w h ich w ou ld reckon through the w om en . T h u s , gen ealogical prop riety requires on e to con sid er Z oubir as having m arried in A ldja his fath er’s fath er’s b rother’s so n ’s d augh ter, or his fath er’s b roth er’s d a u gh ter’s daughter, rather than h is m o th er’s b roth er’s daughter, even if, as h app en s to be the case, th is latter relation ship lies at the origin o f the m arriage (see fig. i, case i) ; or again, to cite another case from the sam e gen ea lo g y , that K h ed oud ja sh ould b e seen as her husband

C ollective beliefs an d w hite lies

43

d ’s father's father’s b rother's son 's daughter, instead o f b ein g treated cross cou sin (father’s siste r’s d au gh ter), w h ich sh e equally w ell is (case ^

T h e h eretical reading, w'hich p rivileges the relation s through w o m en that exclu d ed from the official a ccou n t, is reserved for private situ a tio n s, if

^ot for m a g ic, w h ich , like in su lts, d esign ates its victim as " his m o th er’s son ” and not “ h is fath er's son

A part from the cases in w hich w om en are sp eak ing

to oth er w om en about a w om an ’s kin relation sh ip s, w hen use of the language of kin sh ip through w om en is taken for granted, th is language m ay also be current in the m ost in tim ate sp h ere of fam ily life,

i.e . in a w o m a n ’s

con versatio n s w ith her father and his brothers or her h u sb an d , her so n s, or even p erh ap s her h u sb an d ’s b rother, taking on th en the value of an affirm ation of th e in tim a c y o f the grou p of in terlocu tors as w ell as at least the sy m b o lic participation in that in tim acy of th e person th u s d esign a ted . T h e an th rop olo­ gist is in d eed the on ly person to undertake pure, d isin terested research into all p o ssib le routes b etw een tw o p o in ts in gen ealogical s p a c e : in p ractice, the ch oice o f one route rather than an oth er, the m ale or the fem ale, w h ich orients the m arriage tow ards on e or the oth er lin eage, d ep en d s on the pow er relations w ith in the d om estic u n it and ten ds to rein force, b y leg itim a tin g it, the balance o f pow er w h ich m akes th e ch oice p ossib le.

C ollective beliefs an d w h ite lies T he am biguity o f the strategies in to w h ich it enters is su ch as to lead us to ask w hether parallel-cousin m arriage sh ou ld be seen as th e ideal, hardly ever achieved in practice, o f accom p lish ed m arriage; or as an ethical norm (a duty of honour) w hich

bears on every m arriageable person b u t w h ich can

conceivably be broken (w h en circu m stan ces m ake it im p o ssib le); or sim p ly as a " m o v e ” recom m en d ed in certain situ ation s. It is because it is all these things at once that it is a favoured ob ject of m anip ulation. In this case, the second-order strategies aim ed at d isg u isin g the first-order strategies and th e interests th ey p u rsu e, u nd er the appearances of o b ed ien ce to the rule, arise from the a m b igu ity of a practice that is ob jectively am en able to a tw ofold reading, th e gen ealogical reading, w h ich everyth in g en cou rages, and the econom ic and p olitical reading, w h ich w ould p resup pose access to com p lete inform ation on the exchan ges b etw een the groups in q u estio n . B ut the ideological trap w orks both w ays: too m uch faith in native a ccou n ts can lead °n e to present a m ere id eological screen as the norm o f practice; too m uch distrust of them m ay cause on e to n eglect the social fu n ction of a lie socially devised and en cou raged , on e o f th e m ean s agen ts have of correcting the sym bolic effects o f strategies im p o sed b y other n ece ssitie s .75 T h ere is n o d ou b t that th e p re-em in en t p osition en joyed by parallel-cousin

44

T h e objective lim its o f objectivism

m arriage in native accoun ts and, co n seq u en tly , in eth nograph ic accoun ts, is d u e to the fact that it is the m arriage m ost p erfectly co n sisten t w ith the m yth ico-ritu al representation of th e sexual d iv isio n of labour, and m ore parti* cularly o f th e fu n ction s assigned to the m en and the w o m en in inter-group relations. F irst, it con stitu tes the m ost ab solute affirm ation of the refusal to recogn ize the relation ship of affinity for w hat it is, i.e. w hen it does not appear as a sim p le duplication of the relationship o f filiation: there is praise for the result peculiar to a m arriage b etw een parallel co u sin s, the fact that the resu lting ch ild ren (" th ose w h ose extraction is u n m ix ed , w h o se b lood is p u r e ”) can be attached to th e sam e lineage through their father or their m oth er ("he took his m aternal u n cles from the place w here he has his r o o ts’*- ichathel, ikh aw el, or in A rabic, " h is m aternal u n cle is h is paternal u n c le ” - khalu ram m u). O n the other hand w e know that the husband is free (in theory) to repudiate his w ife, and that a w ife co m in g from ou tsid e is a virtual stranger until sh e has p roduced a m ale d escen dan t and so m etim es even b eyon d that tim e. W e know too the am bivalen ce of the relationship b etw een n ep h ew and m aternal uncle ( khal): " h e w h o has no en em ies need o n ly await his sister's s o n ” (that is, the person w h o , in con tem p t o f h onou r, can alw ays claim his m oth er’s in heritan ce p ortion ). But the refusal to recogn ize the affinity relationship (" th e w om an neither u n ites or se p a r a te s”, tham attuth u r th a zed d i ur theferreq) finds reinforcem ent, if not a basis, in the m yth ical representation of w om an as the sou rce from w hich im pu rity and d ishon ou r threaten to en ter the lin eage. N o th in g entirely g ood can com e fom a w om an : sh e can bring n o th in g but evil or, at b est, the lesser of tw o ev ils, her w ick ed n ess on ly b ein g com p en sated for by her weakness (" G od knew what he w as creating in the d o n k ey ; he d id n ’t g iv e him any h o rn s”) . T h is lesser ev il, th is g ood in evil, alw ays arises in w om en through the corrective and p rotective action o f a m an. "S h am e is th e m a id e n ” - aVar thaqchichth - the proverb says, and th e son -in -law is so m etim es called setter la y u b " th e veil cast over sh a m e ” .76 It fo llo w s that a w om an is n ever w orth m ore than the w orth o f the m en of her lin eage. It fo llo w s to o that the best, or least bad, of w om en is the on e w h o is sp ru n g from the m en o f th e lineage, the patrilateral parallel cou sin , the m ost m ascu lin e of w om en - th e extrem e in stance o f w h ich , the im p ossib le figm en t of a patriarchal im agin ation , is A th en e, born o f Z e u s’ head. "M arry the daughter o f you r 'amm; even if she ch ew s yo u , sh e w o n ’t sw allow y o u .” T h e patrilateral parallel co u sin , a cu l­ tivated, straightened w om an , is op posed to th e m atrilateral parallel cou sin , a natural, tw isted , m aleficen t, im pu re w om an , as the m ale-fem ale is op posed to the fem ale-fem ale, i.e . in accordance w ith the stru cture (o f the ty p e a :b : : b j : b 2) w h ich also organ izes the m yth ic space o f the h ouse and o f the agrarian calen dar .77 M arriage to the father’s brother’s daughter is the m ost

C ollective beliefs an d w h ite lies

45

j 0 f ail m arriages, and the on e m ost likely to call d ow n b lessin gs on roup- I 1 usec*t0 r^ e ° f the o p en in g rite of the m arriage season , nded, like the h o m o lo g o u s rite in the case of p lou g h in g , to exorcize the threat contained in the co m in g togeth er of m ale and fem ale, fire and w ater, kv and earth, plough sh are and furrow , in acts o f in evitab le sa crileg e .78 T h e projection of the categories of m yth ic th o u g h t on to kin relation ship s duces op p osition s w h ich w ould rem ain relatively unreal if th e d ivision s thev engender d id not corresp ond to a fun dam en tal d ivision in d om estic politics: the interests of the m other, seek in g to reinforce her p o sitio n in her adoptive hom e by b rin gin g into the fam ily a w om an sp ru n g from her ow n lineage, are ob jectively op p osed to the in terests of the father, wrh o, in arranging his son ’s m arriage, as befits a m an, by an agreem en t w ith h is ow n kin, his own brother, or som e other patrilineal kinsm an, rein forces the agnatic unit and, thereby, his ow n p osition in the d om estic u n it. The in-marrying woman ( thislith), depending on whether she is linked to her husband’s father (and in that case, whether she is so by her father, or more generally bv a man, or by her m other) or to her husband’s m other (and there again, whether it is by her father or her m oth er), carries very different w eight in the power relationship with her husband’s m other ( thamgharth); this relationship clearly also varies depending on the thamgharth’s genealogical relationship to the men of the lineage (i.e . to her husband s father). T h u s the patrilateral parallel cousin finds herself from the outset in a position of strength w hen she has to deal w ith an "old w o m a n ” from outside the lineage, whereas the "old w om an’s ” position may be strengthened in her relations with thislith, and also, indirectly, in her relations w ith her ow n husband, w hen thislith is her own sister’s daughter, and, a fortiori, her brother s daughter. Since the mother and the father have (in a certain respect) structurally opposed interests, the so n ’s marriage provokes a confrontation - albeit undeclared, because the wom en can have no official strategy - betw een the parents, the father tending to favour marriage within the lineage, i.e. the one w hich mythical representation, the ideological legitim ation of male dom ination, presents as the best, while the mother directs her secret approaches towards her own lineage, and at the opportune m om ent will invite her husband to give his official sanction to the results. T h e wom en w ould not deploy in matrimonial exploration all the ingenuity and effort that is generally conceded to them by the sexual division of labour, at least up to the m om ent w hen official dialogue can be established between the m en, if it were not the case that their so n ’s marriage contains the potentiality of the subversion of their ow n pow er, and thus of a crisis in the dom estic economy which w ould lead consum ption ( lakhla ukham, the em ptiness of the house) to overtake the accum ulation of stocks (la'mara ukham, the fullness of the house), resulting eventually in the break up of joint ow nership. T h is m eans, incidentally, that the interests of "the old m an ” (amghar) and "the old w o m a n ” ( thamgharth) are not necessarily antagonistic: conscious of the advantage to him self of the choice of a young Wlfe (thislith) fully devoted to a thamgharth herself devoted to the lineage, am gharw ill authorize thamgharth to seek out a docile girl from her lineage: moreover, since the w ole structure of practical relationships betw een kinsm en is present in each particular je ationship, he may deliberately choose to take for his son his own sister’s daughter \patrilateral cross cousin) or even, w ithout being seen to do so , encourage his wife t° marry him to her broth ers daughter (matrilateral cross cousin) rather than

46

T he objective limits o f objectivism

strengthen the hold of a brother already dom inant (by age or prestige), by agreeing to take his daughter (patrilateral parallel cousin).

Parallel-cousin m arriage m ay in certain cases im p ose itself as a necessity w h ich is, howrever, not that of a gen ealogical rule. In practice th is ideal marriage is often a forced ch o ic e, w'hich p eop le so m etim es try to pass off as a p ositive ch oice of the id eal, th u s m aking a virtue of n ecessity . T h e native " theory ”, taken up w ith en th u siasm b y legalist form alism , accord in g to which everyon e has a sort o f " righ t o f p re-e m p tio n ” over h is parallel cou sin , is d o u b tless sim p ly another exp ression o f the id eo lo g y o f m a scu lin ity w hich gives the m an su periority, and therefore the in itiative, in all relations b etw een the sexes and especially in m arriage. It is im possible to find an informant or anthropologist who will not declare that in Arab and Berber countries every boy has a ''rig h t” to his parallel cousin: " If the boy wants his father’s brother’s daughter, he has a right to her. But if he d o esn ’t, he isn ’t consulted. It’s the same as with land.” A lthough infinitely closer to the reality of practice than anthropological legalism , which does not even suspect the homology betw een a m an’s relation to the w om en of the lineage and his relation to the land, this remark by an inform ant, w hich adopts the official language of law, masks the real and infinitely more com plex relation linking an individual with his parallel cousin. A m an’s supposed right to the bent'amm, the father’s brother’s daughter, may in fact be a duty which obeys the same principles as the obligation to avenge a kinsman or to buy up a piece of family land coveted by strangers, and is therefore totally binding only in very special and even som ewhat exceptional circum stances.79 T h e fact that, in the case of land, the right of pre-em ption (achfa') is formulated and codified by the learned legal tradition (furnished with an institutionalized authority and guaranteed by the courts) as w ell as by " cu sto m ” ( qanun) in no way im plies that the juridical or customary rule can be m ade the principle of the practices actually observed when land changes hands. Because the sale of a piece of land belonging to the patrimony is first and forem ost an internal matter for the lineage, it is entirely exceptional for the group to have recourse to the authorities (the clan or village assem bly) which transmute the obligation of honour into a right, and if they do invoke the right or custom of chafa‘ (or achfa'), they are alm ost always m otivated by principles which have nothing to do w ith those of legal rights (e.g . the intention to challenge the purchaser of the lands by dem anding the annulm ent of an allegedly illegal sale) and which govern m ost of the practices of buying or selling land. T h e obligation to marry a woman who is in a situation similar to that of fallow land, neglected by its masters ( athbur, unmarried girl; el bur, fallow land) sim ply im poses itself w ith less urgency than the obligation to buy land put up for sale by a group m em ber, or to buy back land fallen into the hands of outsiders, land ill defended and ill possessed ; and it is infinitely less binding than the im perative of avenging the murder of a group mem ber. In all these cases, the force o f the duty depends on the agent’s positions in the genealogy and also, of course, on their dispositions. T h u s, in the case of revenge, the obligation of honour may becom e a right to honour in the eyes of som e (the same murder is som etim es avenged tw ice), while others w ill back out or bring them selves to do it only under pressure. In the case of land, the material advantage o f purchase is clear, and the hierarchy of rights to honour and obligations to buy is both more apparent and more often transgressed, with conflicts and com plex transactions betw een

C ollective beliefs an d w h ite lies

47

of the family who feel obliged to purchase but cannot afford to, and t^l°Se xrhn have lesser duty-rights to purchase but could afford to. m e m b e rs

those

In practice, parallel-cousin m arriage d oes not take on the ideal sign ifican ce

and function w hich th e official accou n ts attribute it, excep t in th o se fam ilies which are sufficiently stron gly integrated to wrant th is rein forcem en t o f their integration. It on ly im p oses itself, at least in an ab solu te wray, in extrem e circum stances, su ch as the case of the daughter of the am engur, the m an w ho has " fa iled ”, w h o has n ot had a m ale heir. In this case in terest and d uty com cide to require the m arriage of the parallel cou sin s, sin ce the amengur's brother and his ch ild ren w ill in any case inherit not on ly the land an d the house of the " fa ile d ” m an but also his ob ligation s w ith regard to his daughters (particularly in the case o f w id ow h ood or rep u d iation ), and sin ce this marriage is, m oreover, the on ly wray o f avoid in g the threat w'hich m arriage to a stranger (aw rith ) w ou ld pose to the h onou r of th e grou p and perhaps to its patrim ony. T h e obligation to m arry the parallel cou sin also im p o ses itself w h en a daughter has not fou n d a h usb and , or at least not fou n d on e w orth y o f her family: " H e wrh o has a daughter and d oes not marry her off m u st bear her sh am e” ; " T h e m an w h ose daughter grow s up w ith ou t m arrying w ould be better off dead than a liv e .” T h e relation ship b etw een brothers is su ch that a man cannot w ith h old his daughter w h en his b rother, esp ecially an elder brother, asks for her for his son . In th is lim itin g case, in w hich the taker is also the giver, in asm uch as he is the eq u ivalen t of and su b stitu te for the father, shirking the obligation is scarcely thinkable, as w h en an u n cle asks for his niece on behalf of so m eon e to wrh om he has prom ised her; it w ould m oreover, be a serious sligh t to a m an ’s b rothers to marry off his daughter w ithou t inform ing and co n su ltin g th e m , and a b roth er’s disapproval, o ften g iven as a reason for refusin g, is not ahvays a ritual p retext. T h e d em an d s o f solidarity are even m ore b in d in g , and refusal is unthin k able wrh en , g o in g against all propriety (it is alw ays the m an w ho " a sk s” for the w om an in m arriage), the girl’s father offers her for h is n ep h ew , h in tin g at it as d iscreetly as possible, thou gh to con travene cu stom in th is w ay on e has to be able to co u n t °n a relationship as stron g as that b etw een twro closely u n ited brothers. T h e fact rem ains that, sin ce honou r and d ishon ou r are held in co m m o n , th e tw o brothers have the sam e in terest in "coverin g u p the sham e before it is un v eile d ”, or, in the language of sy m b o lic in terest, before the fam ily finds that its sy m b olic capital has been d evalu ed b y the lack o f takers for its aughters on the m atrim onial m arket .80 S o , even in th ese lim itin g situ ation s where the ch oice of th e parallel co u sin im p oses itself writh extrem e rigour, ere is no need to appeal to ethical or juridical rules in order to a cco u n t for Practices w hich are th e result of strategies co n sciou sly or u n co n scio u sly

48

T he objective lim its o f objectivism

directed tow ards th e satisfaction o f a d eterm in ate type of m aterial and sy m ­ bolic in terests. T h e eth ic o f honou r is the self-in terest eth ic of social for­ m ations. grou p s, or classes in w hose patrim on y sy m b o lic capital figures p rom in en tly. O n ly total unaw areness o f the terrible and perm anent loss w h ich a slur on th e honour of the w o m en o f the lin eage can represent could lead on e to see o b ed ien ce to an ethical or juridical rule as the principle of the action s in ten d ed to p revent, con ceal, or make g ood the outrage. M arriages w h ich are id en tical as regards gen ea lo g y alone m ay th u s have differen t, even o p p o site , m ean in gs and fu n ctio n s, d ep en d in g on the strategies in w h ich th ey are in v o lv ed . T h e s e can on ly be grasped b y m eans o f a re­ con stru ction of th e entire system of relation ship s b etw een the twro associated grou p s and o f th e state of th ese relation ship s at a g iven p oint in tim e. A s soon as one con sid ers not sim p ly the m arriages already co n clu d ed , those counted and classified by the g en ealogist, b u t also the co n scio u s and u n con sciou s strategies and th e ob jective co n d ition s w h ich m ade them p o ssib le and n eces­ sary, i.e . the in d ivid u al and collectiv e fu n ction s w h ich they have fulfilled , one cannot fail to n o tice that any tw o m arriages b etw een parallel co u sin s m ay have n oth in g in co m m o n , d ep en d in g on w heth er th ey w ere co n clu d ed d uring the lifetim e of the co m m o n paternal grandfather, and even perhaps by him (w ith the agreem en t of th e tw o fathers, or "over their h e a d s”), or on th e contrary by direct agreem en t b etw een the tw o b rothers ; w hether in th is latter case they w ere arranged w h ile the future sp ou ses w ere still ch ild ren , or on ce th ey were o f m arriageable age (not to m en tion the case o f the daughter w h o has already passed that a g e); w h eth er th e tw o brothers live and work separately or have kept u n d ivid ed th eir farm ing activity (land, herds, and other g o o d s) and their d om estic e c o n o m y ("a sin gle cook in g p o t ”), not to m en tion th e case in w hich on ly the appearance of u n d ivid ed property is m aintain ed ; w h eth er it is the elder brother ( d a d d a ) w h o g ives his daughter to his junior, or on th e contrary w h o takes a d augh ter from h im , a d ifferen ce in age and esp ecially in sib lin g order so m etim es b ein g associated w ith d ifferen ces in social rank and prestige; w h eth er the brother g iv in g h is daughter has a m ale heir or is an am engur; w h eth er the tw o brothers are alive at the m om en t w hen the m arriage is settled , or on ly one of th em is, and m ore p recisely w h eth er th e surviving brother is the b o y s father, the d esign ated protector of th e girl he is taking for h is son (esp ecially if sh e has n o adult b rother), or on the contrary, the girl’s father, wrh o m ay u se his d om in ant p osition in order to secure the allegiance of th e son -in -law . A nd as if to add to the a m b igu ity of this type of m arriage, it is not u nu sual, as w e have seen , that th e d uty to sacrifice o n eself, so as to be the " veil cast over s h a m e ”, and to p rotect a su sp ect or ill-favoured g irl, sh ould fall to a m an from the poorest branch o f th e lineage, w h ose act it is easy, u seful and p raisew orthy to praise as if it sprang from

Collective beliefs a n d w h ite lies h is e a g e r n e s s

49

to fulfil a d uty of h on ou r tow ards the d augh ter of h is 'amm or

even to exercise his right as a m ale m em b er o f the lin ea g e .81 I n f o r m a n t s con stantly rem ind u s by th eir very in coh eren ces and con trad ic­ tions that m arriage can n ever be fu lly defined in gen ealogical term s, and that it may take on different, even o p p o site m ean in gs and fu n ctio n s, accord in g to its d eterm in in g con d itio n s. T h e y also rem ind u s that parallel-cousin marriage can be th e w orst or the b est o f m arriages d ep en d in g on w h eth er it is seen as voluntary or forced , i.e . d ep en d in g prim arily on th e relative p o sitio n s 0f

the fam ilies in the social stru ctu re. It m ay be the best kind o f m arriage

("to marry the daughter of your 'amm is to have h on ey in your m o u th ”), not simply from the m yth ic p oin t o f v ie w , but also in term s o f practical satisfactions, sin ce it is the least on erou s econ om ically and socially - the transactions and m aterial and sy m b o lic costs b ein g reduced to a m in im u m - and at the sam e tim e th e safest: th e sam e term s are u sed to contrast a close marriage w ith a d istant on e as are u sed to contrast direct exch a n g es b etw een peasants w ith m arket tran saction s .82 It m ay also be th e w orst kind of u nion ("Marriage b etw een *paternal u n c le s ' - a z w a j el la 'm u m - is bitter in m y heart; I pray you , oh m y G od , p reserve m e from that m isfo r tu n e ”),83 and also the least prestigious (" F rien d s have com e w h o oversh adow y o u ; you re­ main, you w h o are b la c k ”) w h en ever it is forced on th e grou p as a last resort. In short, the apparent in coh eren ce o f in form an ts’ accou n ts in fact draw s our attention to th e fun ction al am b ig u ity o f a genealogically (i.e . id eo lo g ica lly ) unequivocal m arriage, an d th ereb y to the m an ip u lation s of the ob jective m eaning o f practice and its p ro d u ct w h ich th is com b in a tio n of am bigu ity and clarity allow s and en cou rages Perhaps the only victim of these m anipulations is the anthropologist: by putting into the same class all patrilateral parallel-cousin marriages (and assim ilated cases) whatever their functions for the individuals and groups involved, he assimilates practices which may differ in all the respects left out of account by the genealogical model. One example will suffice to give an idea of the econom ic and sym bolic inequalities w hich may be disguised beneath the mask of the genealogical relationship between classificatory parallel cou sin s and to bring to light the specifically political strategies cloaked under the legitim acy of th is relationship. T h e spouses belong to the house of Belaid ”, a big fam ily in term s both of its num bers (perhaps ten m en of fork in g age and about forty people in all) and of its econom ic capital. Because undivided property is never anything other than a refusal to divide, the inequalities " nich separate the potential "shares ” and the respective contributions of different lines strongly felt. T h u s the line of the descendants of A hm ed, from which the , egroom com es> *s m uch richer in men than the line of Y oucef, from which the e com es, and which is correspondingly richer in land. Wealth in m en, considered 2s reproductive strength and therefore as the prom ise of still greater wealth in m en, 18 related, provided one knows how to make the capital work, to a great num ber of ? Vantages the most im portant of w hich is authority in the conduct o f the house’s internal and external affairs: " T h e house of men is greater than the house of ca ttle”

5°

T h e objective limits o f objectivism

( akham irgazen if akham izgaren). T h e pre-em inent position of this line is shown by the fact that it has been able to take over the first nam es of the rem ote ancestors of the family and that it includes A hcene, who represents the group in all major external encounters, w hether conflict or cerem onies, and A hm ed, the "wise m a n ” who by his mediation and counsel ensures the unity of the group. T h e girl’s father (Y oucef) js totally excluded from power, not so m uch on account of the difference in age separating him from his uncles (A hcene and A hm ed), since A h m ed ’s sons, although much younger than he, are associated w ith the decisions, but above all because he has cut him self off from com petition betw een m en, from all exceptional contributions, and even to a certain extent from work on the land. (A n only son, and, moreover, "son of the w id o w ”, coddled by a w hole set o f w om en (m other, aunts, etc.) as the only hope of the lineage, kept away from the gam es and work of the other children in order to go to school, he has kept in a marginal position all his life. After a period of army service and then agricultural labour abroad, he takes advantage, now that he is back in the village, of his favourable position as possessor of a large share of the patrimony with only a few m ouths to feed, restricting him self to the work of overseeing, gardening, and tending (m ills, gardens, and fig-driers) - those tasks w hich require the least initiative and entail the few est responsibilities, in short, the least male of male jobs.) T h ese are som e of the elem ents which m ust be taken into account in order to understand the internal and external political function of the marriage betw een Belaid - t h e last son of Amar, him self the son of A hm ed, the uncle of Y oucef - and Y ou cefs daughter Yasmina, his classificatorv parallel cousin (father’s father’s brother’s son’s daughter). T h is marriage, arranged by A hm ed and A hcene, the holders of p o w e r as usual w ithout consulting Y oucef, and leaving his w ife to protest in vain against a union bringing little profit - reinforces the position of the dom inant line, strengthening its links w ith the line rich in land, w ithout in any way com prom ising its external prestige, since the structure of dom estic power is never declared outwardly, and because even its m ost im poverished mem ber nevertheless shares in the brilliance of the lineage. T h u s the com plete truth about this marriage resides in its tw ofold truth. T he official im age, that of a marriage betw een parallel cousins in a large family anxious to demonstrate its unity by a marriage able to reinforce it at the sam e time as displaying its adherence to the m ost sacred of the ancestral traditions, coexists without contradiction, even am ong strangers to the group, w ho are always sufficiently well inform ed never to be taken in by the representations they are given, with knowledge of the objective truth about a union w hich sanctions the forced alliance between tw o social units sufficiently attached to one another negatively, for better or for w orse, i.e. genealogically, to be forced to unite their com plem entary riches. Endless exam ples could be given of this sort of collective bad faith.

It is u nd erstan dab le that, faced w ith su ch accom plished p rod ucts o f the art of m asking con strain ts and in terests u nd er exp ressio n s capable o f sidetrack­ ing sp on tan eou s h erm en eu tics tow ards the less real but m ore presentable m otives o f m orality and d u ty , the collectiv e ju d gem en t should h esitate. But there is n o case in w hich th e ob jective m ean in g o f a m arriage is so strongly marked as to leave n o room for sy m b o lic transfiguration. T h u s th e marriage of the so-called mechrut, by w h ich a m an w h o has no male d escen d an ts gives his d augh ter in m arriage to an " h e ir ” (aw rith ) on con d ition that he com es to live in his fath er-in -law ’s h ou se, is en cou n tered on ly in tales or anthropology' books in the form o f th e sort of purchase of a son -in -law , recruited for his

Collective beliefs an d w h ite lies er§ 0f p rod uction and reprodu ction , that m echan ical application o f the Official p r in c ip le K abyle w orld -view w ould lead u s to see in i t .84 T h e w ho m en tion it, in w hatever region , are right in saying that this

°n fo r m a n ts

form of marriage is u n k n ow n am ong th em and on ly to be foun d in other areas. T h e m ost careful scru tin y of gen ealogies and fam ily h istories w ill not reveal a single case w hich p erfectly m atches the d efin ition (" I g iv e y o u m y d aughter, but vou w ill com e to m y h o m e ”). Rut on e is eq u ally en titled to claim that there is no fam ily w h ich d oes not in clu d e at least on e a w rith y but an aw rith disguised u nd er the official im age of the " a sso cia te” or th e "adopted s o n ”. The word aw rith , the " h eir ”, is an official eu p h em ism a llo w in g p eop le to nam e the unnam eable, i.e . a m an w ho cou ld o n ly be d efin ed , in the h o u se w hich w elcom es him , as th e h usband of h is w ife. It is clear that th e m an of honour who plays the gam e fairly can cou n t on th e b en evolen t co m p licity o f his ow n group w hen he attem p ts to d isguise as an ad option a u n io n w h ich , v iew ed cvnically, represents an inversion o f all th e honourable form s of m arriage and which, as su ch , is no less dishon ou rab le for the aw rith (" h e is the on e w h o is playing the b r id e ”, th ey say) than for kinsm en su fficien tly self-in terested to give their daughter to th is kind of u np aid d om estic servan t. A nd th e grou p is quick to join in the circle of the calculated lies w h ich ten d to con ceal its failure to find an h onou rab le way of savin g th e am engur from resortin g to such extrem ities in order to prevent the " b a n k ru p tcy” ( lakh la) o f h is fam ily. But the genealogies also contain cases about w hich it is hard to understand how they can benefit from similar com plicity. For exam ple, in the history of one prestigious lineage one finds a series of acquisitions of sons-in-law who are neither seen as nor declared mechrut, although their annexation was im posed not by necessity, but as part of a quasi-systematic effort to increase the capital o f m en, a fact w hich one m ight expect to double the sense of scandal. In one such case, the fact that the " ill-gotten ” son-in-law was a marabout no doubt lent credibility to the status of "adopted son ” which he was supposed to have received, although he had put him self in the position of an awrith by coming to live with his w ife’s family (a sign that the latter were in a stronger position) after spending a few m onths with his own fam ily (w hich he was made to do for the sake of appearances). N evertheless, various subterfuges were resorted to in order to get over the problem of his presence in the h o u se : he was given the job of miller, which made it possible to keep him at a distance; as is customary in such c^ses, his food was brought to him at the m ill. T h en the heads o f the lineage discreetly suggested that he should take outside work, an ingenious solution w hich kept the profits of his labour w hile rem oving the em barrassing situation created by his presence in ls l i f e ’s fam ily. After the death of her husband, the woman remarried and had a son, whom she took back into her ow n lineage w hen her second husband died; this son was not regarded as an aw ritn, either, w hen his maternal uncles married him to j*n orphan under their protection, so as to bind him to her. T h e reason was that in nnging up their quasi-son as "their ow n s o n ” (though he still calls them khal and not dadda, and is called A hm ed u A gouni, after his father’s village) and marrying him o one of their quasi-daughters, they had given sufficient proof of their adherence to e official image of the aw rith as " h eir ” and "adopted s o n ” to im pose a collective

52

T h e objective lim its o f objectivism

recognition of it. T h is is how the second-order strategies - w hich all tend to transform useful relationships into official ones and hence to ensure that practices which in fact obey altogether different principles appear to be deduced fom the genealogical definition - achieve in addition an unexpected result, in giving a representation of practice seem ingly designed to confirm the representation the structuralist anthro­ pologist has of practice.

T he ordin ary and the extra-ordinary T h u s , far from o b eyin g a norm w hich w ou ld design ate an ob ligatory spouse from am on g the wTh ole set o f official k in, the arrangem ent o f m arriages d epends d irectly on the state o f the practical k insh ip relation s, relation ship s through th e m en usable by th e m en and relation ship s through the w o m en usable bv th e w om en , and on the state of the p ow er relations w ith in th e " h o u s e ”, that is, b etw een the lineages u n ited b y m arriage in th e p reviou s gen eration, w hich allowr and favour the cu ltivation of o n e or th e other field o f relationships. If on e accep ts that on e of the principal fu n ctio n s o f m arriage is to reproduce th e social relations of w h ich it is th e p rod u ct, then it is im m ed iately u nd er­ stand able w h y the different types of m arriage w h ich can b e d istin gu ish ed as m u ch b y the criterion o f th e ob jective ch aracteristics o f the groups brought togeth er (th eir p osition in th e social hierarchy, their rem oteness in sp ace, etc.) as by the characteristics of the cerem on y itself, in particular its solem n ity, sh o u ld correspond very closely to th e characteristics o f th e social relations w h ich have m ade th em p ossib le and w h ich they ten d to reprodu ce. T h e official kin grou p , p ub licly nam ed and socially recogn ized , is w hat m akes possible and necessary the official m arriages w hich provide its on ly o p p ortu n ity to m o b ilize practically and thereby to reaffirm its u n ity , a u n ity at on ce as solem n and as artificial as th e occasion s on w h ich it is celebrated. It is w ith in practical k insh ip , that is, in the field o f relation ship s constantly reused and thus reactivated for future u se, that ordinary m arriages are con tracted, w ith a freq u en cy w hich itself con d em n s th em to the in sign ifican ce o f th e unm arked and the banality of the everyday. It is logical that the h igher a group is placed in the social hierarchy and h en ce th e richer it is in official relation ship s, the greater the proportion o f its work o f reprodu ction that is d ev o ted to reprodu c­ ing su ch relation ship s, w hereas the poor relations, w h o have little to spend on so lem n ities, can m ake d o w ith th e ordinary m arriages that practical k inship en su res for them . T h e m ost in sid ious of the d istortion s in herent in inform ants' exp lan ations is d ou b tless the fact that they give a disproportionate im portance to extra­ ordinary m arriages, w h ich d istin g u ish th em selv es from ordinary m arriages by a p ositive or a negative m ark. A s wrell as the various curios wrhich the an th ro­ p ologist often finds h im self b ein g offered by w’ell-in ten tio n ed inform ants, such as m arriage by exchan ge (a b d a l, tw o m en " e x c h a n g e ” their sisters),

T he ord in a ry and the extra-ordinary

53

gjfiage b y " a d d itio n ” (th im i, tw o b rothers marry tw o sisters, the second sister being " a d d e d ” to th e first; the son marries th e sister or even the daughter of th e secon d w ife o f h is fath er), or again, the levirate, a particular case of marriage as " rep aration ” ( thiririth, from err, to g iv e or take back), native discourse also d efines th e extrem e cases: parallel-cousin m arriage, the

niost perfect m yth ically, and m arriage u n itin g the h ead m en o f tw o trib es or two different clans, the m o st perfect p olitically. Thus, the tale, a sem i-ritualized didactic narrative, a sim ple paraphrase in parabolic form of the proverb or saying w hich serves as its moral, only ever relates marked, marking marriages. First, there are the different types of parallel-cousin marriage, whether intended to preserve a political heritage or to prevent the extinction of a lineage (in the case of an only daughter). T h en there are the most flagrant misalliances, like the marriage of the tawny ow l and the eagle’s daughter - a pure m odel of upward marriage (upward socially, but also m ythically, up being opposed to dow n as day, light, happiness, purity, honour are opposed to night, darkness, m isfortune, im purity, and dishonour) between a man at the bottom of the social ladder, an aw rith and a woman of a fam ily of higher rank, in w hich the traditional relationship o f assistance is inverted by the discrepancy betw een the partner’s positions in the social and sexual hierarchies. It is the one w ho g iv es, in this case the higher, w ho must g o to the aid of the one who has taken his son-in-law, the tawny ow l, on his back, to spare him a humiliating defeat in com petition with the young eagles - a scandalous situation denounced in the proverb " giving him your daughter and corn to o ’*.

Contrary to th ese official represen tation s, observation and sta tistics estab ­ lish that, in all the groups ob served , the m ajority of the m arriages b elo n g to the class of ordinary m arriages, generally arranged by th e w o m e n , w ithin the area of the practical k insh ip or practical relation ship s w hich m ake them possible and w hich they help to stren g th en .85 T h e m arriages contracted w ithin this area, b etw een fam ilies u n ited by frequ en t and ancient ex ch an ges along age-old b eaten paths con tin u ou sly kept op en for gen eration after gen era tio n , are those about w hich n o th in g is said, as w ith everyth in g wfhich can be taken for granted because it has ahvays been as it is - th ose w hich have no other function, apart from b iological rep rod u ction , than the reprodu ction of those social relationships w hich m ake them p o ssib le .86 T h e se m arriages, w hich are generally celebrated w ith o u t cerem on y, stand in the sam e relation ship to extra-ordinary m arriages, wTh ich are con clu d ed b y the m en b etw een different villages or tribes, or m ore sim p ly , ou tsid e practical k insh ip , and for th is reason alw ays sealed by solem n cerem on ies, as th e exchan ges o f everyday life, th e little presen ts (thuntichin) exchan ged by w om en to " b in d them in friendship ”, stand to th e extra-ordinary exchan ges on special o cca sio n s, the solemn gifts solem n ly p roclaim ed (Ikhir) w h ich are exp ected b etw een official kin .87 Extra-ordinary m arriages ex clu d e the w om en , as d o es parallel-cousin marnag e, wrhich differs in th is respect - alone 88 - from ordinary m arriages, w hich

54

T he objective lim its o f objectivism

w ould be u nthin k able w ith o u t their in terven tio n . B u t, in contrast to marriage arranged b etw een brothers, o r at any rate a m on g the m en of the lin eage, with the b lessin g o f th e patriarch, a distant m arriage is officially p resen ted as p olitical. C ontracted o u tsid e th e zon e of everyday relation ship s, celebrated w ith cerem on ies w h ich m o b ilize exten sive gro u p s, its sole justification is p olitical, as in the lim itin g case o f th e m arriages in ten d ed to set the seal on peace or on an alliance b etw een th e " h e a d s” o f tw o trib es .89 M ore o fte n , it is m arriage of the m arketplace, a neutral grou n d from w h ich w o m en are exclu d ed and w here lin eages, clans, and tribes w arily m eet. It is " p u b lish e d ” in the m arket by th e crier (b erra k ), u nlike other m arriages w h ich , sin ce they on ly bring togeth er k in sm en , d o not in volve so lem n in vitation s. It treats the w om an as a political in stru m en t, a sort of p led g e or liquid asset, capable of earning sym b olic profits. B ein g an op p ortu n ity to ex h ib it p u b licly and officially, and hence p erfectly legitim ately, the fam ily's sy m b o lic capital, to m ake a show of k insh ip ties, and thereby to increase th is capital, at the cost o f con sid erable eco n o m ic ex p en d itu re, it is faithful at all tim es to the logic of the accum u lation of sy m b o lic capital. T h u s m arriage to a stranger w h o has been cut off from his grou p and has fled to o n e s village is sh u n n e d , w hile marriage to a stranger liv in g at a d istance is p restigiou s becau se it bears w itn ess to the extent o f th e lin eage’s p restige. Sim ilarly, political m arriages, as op posed to ordinary m arriages w hich follow w ell-w orn tracks, are not and cannot be repeated , sin ce th e alliance w ould be d evalued b y b ecom in g co m m on . F urth erm ore, th is typ e o f m arriage is fun d am en tally m ascu lin e and often causes conflict b etw een the father o f th e bride and her m other, w ho is less appreciative of the sy m b o lic profit w h ich the m arriage m ay b rin g and m ore con cern ed about th e draw backs it m ay entail for her daughter, co n d em n ed to a life of ex ile ( thaghribth, the ex ile, sh e w h o has g o n e off to the w est ).90 Insofar as it b rin gs large grou p s in to in terrelation sh ip through the fam ilies and lineages d irectly in volved , it is totally official and every aspect of the celebration is strictly ritualized and m agically stereo ty p ed : th is is d ou b tless b ecau se the stakes are so h igh and the ch an ces of a rift so great that the agen ts dare not tru st to the regulated im provisation of orchestrated habitus. T h e marriages arranged in the sort o f privileged sub-market (that o f the akham) which the authority of the elder and agnate solidarity set up as a free zone from which all outbidding and all com petition are absolutely excluded, unquestionably distinguish them selves from extra-ordinary marriages by their incomparably lower material and sym bolic cost. T h e union is generally regarded as a self-evident necessity, and when this is not the case, the discreet m ediation of the w om en of the fam ily is sufficient to bring it about. T h e celebration of the marriage is reduced to a strict m inim um . First, the expenses ( thaqufats) incurred in the reception of the marriage procession by the girl’s fam ily are very m odest; the imensi cerem ony, at w hich the bride-

T he ord in a ry an d the extra-ordin ary

55

alth is presented, brings together only the m ost im portant representatives o f the * * fafnilies being allied (perhaps tw enty m en) ; the bride’s trousseau ( la d ja z) is limit** to three dresses, tw o scarves, and som e other item s (a pair o f shoes, a haik) ; the sum agreed upon as the bridew ealth, negotiated in advance in relation to what the girl’s parents have to buy in the market to dower their daughter (a m attress, a illow, a trunk, as well as the blankets which are the fam ily’s own work and are handed down from m other to daughter), is presented w ithout m uch cerem ony, and w ithout bluff or pretence; as for the w edding-feast expenses, they are m inim ized by arranging for the feast to coincide w ith the A id: the sheep traditionally sacrificed on that o c c a s io n is sufficient for the requirem ents of the w edding, and the guests are more likely to be kept at hom e at that time and present their excuses. Compared with these ordinary marriages, w hich the old peasant morality eulogizes (in contrast to marriages w h ich , like ’’w id ow s’ daughters’ m arriages”, go beyond the socially recognized lim its of each fam ily), extra-ordinary marriages differ in every wav. T o conceive the am bition of seeking a wife at a distance, one has to be predisposed to do so by the habit of keeping up relationships that are out of the ordinary, w hich im plies possession of the skills, especially the linguistic ones, indis­ pensable in such circum stances; one also needs a large capital of very costly distant relationships, w hich are the only source of reliable information and of m ediators necessary to the success of the project. In short, to be able to m obilize this capital at the right m om ent, it is necessary to have invested a lot and for a long tim e. For example, to take only one case, the heads of marabout fam ilies who have been asked to act as mediators are paid back in countless ways: the taleb of the village, or a fortiori the religious figure of higher rank who takes part in the procession of iqafafen, is given new clothes and shoes by the "m aster of the w ed d in g ”, and the gifts he traditionally receives, in cash at the tim e of religious feasts and in provisions at harvest time, are in a sense proportionate to the services rendered ; the A id sheep he is given that year is sim ply com pensation for the " sh a m e” ( ihachem udhmis, he has covered his face with sham e) he has incurred in going to solicit a layman (w ho, whatever his power, does not "hold in h is heart” Koranic know ledge) and consecrating the marriage writh his faith and know ledge. O nce the agreem ent is reached (possibly involving the paym ent of thaj'alts to one or another of the girl’s close relatives), the ceremony of " p led gin g” ( asarus, the laying dowrn of the pledge, thimristh)y which functions as an appropriation rite (a'ayam , nam ing, or a'allam , marking, comparable to that of the first plot of land ploughed; or m ore exactly am lak, appropriation on the same term s as land) is in itself alm ost a w'edding. Presents are brought not only for the bride (w ho receives her " pledge ”, a jew'el of value, and m oney from all the men who see her on that day - tiz r i) , but also for all the other w om en o f the house; the visitors also bring provisions (sem olina, honey, butter) and som e cattle, to be slaughtered and eaten by the gu ests or added to the bride’s capital. T h e men of the amily demonstrate how num erous they are w ith the noise of their rifle volleys, as on the wedding day. A ll the feasts w hich take place betw een this feast and the w edding are opportunities to bring thislith her " sh are” (el haq): great fam ilies at a great istance from each other cannot be content w’ith exchanging a few dishes of couscous; Presents appropriate to the persons they unite are added. T hough granted, that is to g iv e n ”, "appropriated”, and "recalled to m in d ” by the m any " sh ares” she has received, the girl is not yet a cq u ired : a point o f honour is set on allowing her fam ily e time it w ishes to wait and to keep one waiting. T he celebration of the marriage is obviously the high point of the sym bolic confrontation of the two grou p s, and also the m om ent of the greatest expense, T h e glrl s fam ily is sent thaqufats, at least tw o hundred kilos of sem olina, fifty kilos of flour,

56

T h e objective limits o f objectivism

abundant meat (on the hoof) - w hich the senders know will not all be eaten - honev (twenty litres) and butter (tw enty litres). T h e case was mentioned of a marriage in which the girl’s family was taken a calf and five live and one slaughtered sheep. The delegation of iqafafen consisted, it is true, of forty rifle-bearing m en, together with all the kinsmen and notables exem pted by their age from shooting - fifty men in all. T h e bride’s trousseau w hich may in such cases consist of up to thirty item s, is matched by a similar number of item s given to the various other w om en of the family. And if one often hears it said that betw een great fam ilies there are no chrut (conditions laid dow n by the father for his daughter before he grants her hand), it is because the status of the fam ilies is in itself a guarantee that the "con d ition s” explicitly stated elsewhere will here be surpassed. Although the value of the bridewealth is always subject to strict social supervision, exceptional marriages may ignore the lim its tacitly set by the group. T h e proof may be seen in phrases nowadays used as challenges: " Who do you think you are? T h e woman of fourteen [am arba'tach] ? ” - an allusion to the fourteen reals paid for the most expensively bought w ife w ho became the mistress of the house of the family which was richest and the most endow ed with men. For w om en married around 1900-1910, the same expression speaks of a payment of forty duros, w hich, according to the popular notion of equivalence ("W e got her for ’the equivalent of two pairs of oxen*”, elhaq nasnath natsazwijin) , must have corresponded to the price paid for two pairs of oxen; just before the Second World War, a typical bridewealth was worth around tw o thousand old francs (£20). A prestigious marriage celebrated with great cerem ony in 1936, to w hich virtually all the m en of the tribe were invited (together with a troupe of tbal who performed for three days and nights) cost the organizer in addition to all his liquid assets, the value of one of his best pieces of land (four days’ ploughing for one m an). T o feed his guests he had to slaughter tw o oxen, a calf, and six sheep. In fact the econom ic cost is probably insignificant in comparison with the symbolic cost of imensi. T h e ritual of the cerem ony of presenting the bridewealth is the occasion for a total confrontation betw een the tw o groups, in w hich the econom ic stakes are no more than an index and pretext. T o dem and a large paym ent for one’s daughter, or to pay a large sum to marry off one’s son, is in either case to assert one’s prestige, and thereby to acquire prestige: each side intends to prove its own "worth ”, either by show ing what price men of honour, w ho know how to appreciate it, set on alliance w ith them , or by making a brilliant dem onstration of their estim ation of their ow n value through the price they are prepared to pay in order to have partners worthy of them . By a sort of inverted haggling, disguised under the appearance of ordinary bargaining, the two groups tacitly agree to step up the amount of the payment by successive bids, because they have a com m on interest in raising this indisputable index of the sym bolic value of their products on the matrimonial exchange market. And no feat is more highly praised than the prowess of the bride’s father w ho, after vigorous bargaining has been concluded, solem nly returns a large share of the sum received. T he greater the proportion returned, the greater the honour accruing from it, as itin crow ning the transaction w ith an act of generosity, the intention was to make an exchange of honour out of bargaining which could be so overtly keen only because the pursuit of maximum material profit was masked under the contests of honour and the pursuit of maxim um sym bolic profit.91

T h e m ost distant m arriages are p erfectly u nequ ivocal sin ce, at least until recent tim es, it w as im possible to marry at a d istance for negative reasons, for lack of anyone to marry near at hand. L ik e all close m arriages, p a rallel-co u sin m arriage, the on ly type o f ordinary m arriage to b e p ositively and officially

T h e ordin ary and the extra-ordin ary

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marked, often occurs in the poorest lin eages or the poorest lin es o f the dominant lineages (th e clien ts), w h o , in resorting to th is, th e m ost econom ical type of u nion, release the group in the m ost satisfactory wray (if only by avoiding m isalliances) from the obligation to marry off tw o of its particularly disadvantaged m em bers. B ut at the sam e tim e, because it alw ays has the objective effect of rein forcin g the integration of th e m inim al unit and, consequently, its d istin ctiven ess vis-a-vis other u n its, it is likely to b e th e tactic of groups characterized by a strong desire to assert their distinction. T h u s its am biguity p redisposes it to play the role of th e poor m an ’s p restige m arriage: it offers an elegant w ay ou t for all those w h o, like the ruined n oblem an unable to indicate other than sym b olically his refusal to derogate, seek in the affectation o f rigour the m eans o f affirm ing their d istin ctio n , su ch as a lineage cut off from its original group and an xious to m aintain its originality, a fam ily aiming to affirm th e d istin ctive features of its lineage b y g o in g on e better in purism (alm ost alw ays the case w ith on e fam ily in a m arabout co m m u n ity ), a clan seeking to mark its d istin ction from the o p p o sin g clan b y stricter observance of the traditions (like th e A it \la d h i at Ait H ich em ), and so on. Because it can appear as the m ost sacred and, under certain co n d ition s, the most " d istingu ish ed ” m arriage, it is the ch eap est form of extra-ordinary marriage, obviating exp en d itu re on the cerem on y, hazardous negotiations, and a costly b ridew ealth. A nd thu s there is no m ore accom plished w ay of making a virtue of n ecessity and of p u ttin g o n eself in lin e w ith the rule. H ow ever, any particular marriage is m ean ingfu l o n ly in relation to the totality of sim u ltan eou sly p ossib le m arriages (or, m ore con cretely, in relation to the range o f potential p artners); in other w ords, it is situated som ew h ere on a con tinu um ru n nin g from parallel-cousin m arriage to m arriage b etw een members of different trib es, the m ost risky b ut m ost p restigious ty p e, and is therefore necessarily characterized from both stan d p oin ts, by the extent to which it rein forces integration and by th e exten t to w h ich it exp an ds alliances. T h ese tw o typ es o f m arriage represent the p oints of m axim um intensity of the tw o valu es w hich all m arriages seek to m axim ize: on the one hand the integration of the m inim al unit and its secu rity, on th e other hand alliance and prestige, that is, op en in g up to th e ou tsid e w orld, tow ards strangers. T h e ch oice b etw een fission and fusion, the in sid e and the ou tside, security and adventure, is posed anew w ith each m arriage. If it en su res the Maximum of integration for the m inim al group, parallel-cousin m arriage duplicates the relation ship o f filiation w ith a relationship of alliance, sq uan ­ dering by th is redundancy the op p ortu n ity of creating new alliances w hich n^arriage represents. D istant m arriage, on the other hand, sccu res p restigious aHiances at the cost of lineage integration and the bond b etw een brothers, * e foun dation of the agnatic u n it. N ative discou rse repeats th is o b sessively. 3

BOT

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T he objective lim its o f objectivism

T h e centripetal thrust - exaltation of the in tern al, of secu rity , autarky, the ex cellen ce o f th e b lo o d , agnate solidarity - alw ays calls forth, if o n ly to oppose it, the centrifugal thrust, exaltation of th e p restigiou s alliance. T h e categorical im perative alw ays m asks calcu lation of the m axim u m and the m in im u m , the search for th e m axim u m of alliance com p atib le w ith the m ainten an ce or rein forcem ent o f in tegration b etw een brothers. T h is can be seen from the in form an ts’ syn tax, w h ich is alw ays that of preference: " I t is b etter to protect your p oint o f honou r [nif\ than reveal it to o th e r s.” " I d o n ’t sacrifice adhrum [th e lineage] to aghrum [ w h e a t c a k e ] " T h e in sid e is b etter than the o u tsid e .’1 "F irst m ad n ess [daring, risky ste p ]: to g ive the daughter of 'amm to other m en . S econ d m adness to g o p en n iless to m arket. T h ird m ad n ess: to vie with the lions on th e m oun tain to p s .” T h is last sayin g is the m ost significant, because u n d er the gu ise o f ab solute con d em n a tio n of d istant m arriage, it expressly recogn izes the logic in w h ich it b elon gs, that o f th e ex p lo it, prow ess, prestige. It takes great p restige and w ild audacity to go to m arket w ithout any m oney in ten d in g to b u y th in g s, just as it takes en orm ou s cou rage to take on lion s, th e cou rageous strangers from w h om the foun ders of the villages had to w in back their w iv es, accord in g to m any leg en d s o f origin.

M atrim on ial strategies an d social reproduction T h e characteristics o f a m arriage, and in particular the p o sitio n it occupies at a determ in ate point on the co n tin u u m ru n n in g from p olitical m arriage to parallel-cousin m arriage, d ep en d on th e aim s o f th e co llectiv e strategies o f the grou p s in v o lv ed . M ore p recisely, given that the ob jectives th e m selv es depend very closely on the m eans available, analysis o f the op eration s w'hich have led u p to different typ es of m arriage sen d s u s back to analysis o f the conditions w h ich had to be fulfilled for th em to be p o ssib le, i.e . con ceivab le and realizable. T h e m atrim onial gam e is sim ilar to a card gam e, in w h ich the o u tco m e d ep en d s partly on the deal, the cards held (th eir value itself being defined by th e rules of the gam e, characteristic of the social form ation in q u e stio n ), and partly on the players’ s k ill: that is to say, firstly on the material and sy m b o lic capital p ossessed b y the fam ilies con cern ed , th eir w ealth in in stru m en ts o f production and in m en , con sid ered both as p rod u ctive and reproductive p ow er and also, in a p revious state of play, as figh tin g strength and h en ce sy m b o lic stren gth ; and secon d ly on the co m p eten ce wrhich en ­ ables the strategists to m ake the best u se o f this capital, practical m astery of the

(in the w id est sen se) econ om ic axiom atics b ein g th e precondition

for p rod u ction o f the p ractices regarded as " rea so n a b le” w ith in th e group and p ositively san ction ed b y the laws o f th e m arket in m aterial and sym bolic g ood s.

M atrim on ial strategies an d social reproduction

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T h e collective strategy w h ich leads up to a particular " m o v e ” (in the case 0f marriage or in any oth er area of practice) is b u t th e p roduct o f a com b ination 0f the strategies of the in terested parties w h ich ten d s to g iv e their resp ec­ tive interests the w eigh t corresp on d in g to their p ositio n , at the m o m en t in question, w ith in the stru cture of p ow er relations w ith in th e d o m estic u n it. It is a striking fact that m atrim onial n egotiation s are really th e b u sin ess of the whole group, everyon e p layin g h is part at th e appropriate m o m en t, and thu s being able to con trib u te to the su ccess or failure o f the project. First o f all, the women w ith their unofficial and recoverable con tacts m ake it p o ssib le to start semi-official n egotiation s w ith ou t th e risk of a h u m iliatin g rebuff. T h e n the most em in en t m en , th ose m ost representative o f official kinsh ip , a ctin g as guarantors exp ressly m andated by the w ill of their grou p and as ex p licitly authorized sp ok esm en , m ed iate and in terced e, p resen tin g at the sa m e tim e a striking testim on y of th e sym b olic capital p ossessed b y a fam ily capable of m obilizing such p restigiou s m en . F in ally, each grou p in its en tirety enters into the d ecision , passion ately d iscu ssin g th e m atrim onial projects, evaluatin g the reception g iv en to th e d elegates’ p rop osals, and d irectin g th e cou rse w h ich future n egotiations sh ou ld take. T h is m ean s, in cid en tally - for th e benefit of those eth n ologists w h o cou n t th em selves satisfied w'hen th ey have charac­ terized a m arriage in exclu sively gen ealogical term s - that b eh in d th e q u asi­ theatrical im age p u t forw ard b y the official kin at the tim e of the m arriage, the tw o grou p s carry ou t a system atic in vestigation to estab lish co m p lete information on th e variables ch aracterizing not on ly th e co u p le (age, and especially age differen ce, p revious m atrim onial h istory, sib lin g order, th eo re­ tical and practical kin relation to th e fam ily au th ority h old er, e tc .) but also their grou p s. Inform ation is ob tain ed on th e eco n o m ic and social history of the fam ilies about to be allied and o f the larger grou p s to w h ich they b elo n g ; the sym bolic p atrim on y, esp ecially th e capital o f h onou r and m en o f honour which they c o m m a n d ; th e q uality o f th e netw ork o f alliances on w h ich they count, and o f the grou p s to w hich th ey are traditionally o p p o sed ; each fam ily’s p osition in its grou p - a particularly im portant factor b ecau se a display o f p restigiou s k in sm en m ay d isg u ise a d om in ated p osition w ith in an em inent grou p - and th e state o f its relations w ith th e other m em b ers of its group, i.e . the fam ily’s d egree o f integration (u n d ivid ed o w n ersh ip , e t c .) ; the structure o f th e pow er an d authority relations w ith in the d o m estic u n it (and, f° r a fam ily m arrying off a d augh ter, esp ecially th ose am ong th e w o m e n ), etc. In a social form ation oriented tow ards sim p le reprodu ction , i.e . tow ards the biological reprodu ction of the grou p and the p rod uction of su fficien t g o o d s 0r its su b sisten ce and b iological reprodu ction , and, inseparably from this, wards reprodu cing th e structure o f social and id eological relations w ith in which and through w h ich th e a ctivity o f p rod uction is carried on and le g iti­

6o

T h e objective lim its o f objectivism

m ated, th e strategies o f th e different categories of agen ts, w h o se interests w ithin the d om estic u n it m ay be con trad ictory (am on g other o ccasion s, at the tim e o f a m arriage), arise from th e system s of interests ob jectiv ely assigned to them b y the system o f p rin cip les w h ich m ake u p a particular mode 0f reproduction: th ese p rin cip les g overn fertility, filiation , resid en ce, inheritance, and m arriage, and, in c o m b in in g to fulfil th e sam e fu n ctio n - the biological and social reprodu ction o f th e grou p - are ob jectively co n ce rted .92 In an eco n o m y characterized by the relatively equal d istrib u tion of th e m eans of p rod uction (gen erally o w n e d in com m on b y the lineage) and by th e weakness and stability o f th e p rod u ctive forces, w h ich rule out th e p rod uction and accum u lation of su bstan tial su rp lu ses and h en ce the d ev elo p m en t of clearly m arked eco n o m ic d ifferen tiation (alth ou gh it is p ossib le to see in th e levying o f labour in th e " m u tu a l-h elp /c o rv e es” - th iw iz i - a disguised form of the sale of lab ou r-p ow er), th e fa m ily ’s efforts are d irected tow ards th e maintenance and reprodu ction o f th e fam ily, not the p rod u ction of assets. If one insists on seein g thinnzi as a corvee (the better, for exam ple, to force reality into the framework of a realist, reified definition o f m odes of production) one must at least take into account the fact that this corvee is disguised under the appearance of mutual aid. In fact th iw izi mainly profits the richer farmers and also the taleb (whose land is ploughed and sow n co llectiv ely ): the poor have no need o f assistance with the harvest; but th iw izi may also benefit the poor man in the case of the building of a house (the transporting o f stones and beam s). Ostracism is a terrible sanction which is not only sym bolic: ow in g to the lim ited technical resources, m any activities would be im possible w ithout the help of the group (e .g . the building of a house, with the transporting of stones, or the transporting of m ill-w heels, which used to m obilize forty men in non-stop shifts for several days). M oreover, in this econom y of insecurity, a capital of services rendered and gifts bestowed is the best and indeed the only safeguard against the "thousand con tin gen cies’*on w hich, as Marx observes, depends the maintenance or loss of working conditions, from the accident which causes the loss of an animal to the bad weather w hich destroys the crops.

In su ch co n d itio n s an ab un dan ce o f m en w ou ld n o d o u b t be a liab ility if, taking a strictly eco n o m ic view , on e saw in it on ly " a r m s” and therefore " sto m a ch s”. In fact th e political in secu rity w h ich perp etu ates itself b y gen­ erating th e d isp o sitio n s required in order to respond to w ar, brawling, robbery, or ven gean ce ( reqba) w as d ou b tless the basic reason w h y m en were valued as " r ifles” , i.e . not o n ly as a labour force but also as fig h tin g power: the value of the land lies on ly in th e m en w h o cu ltivate and also d efen d itT h e patrim on y of th e lin eage, sym b o lized by its nam e, is d efined not simply by th e p ossession o f th e land and the h ou se, g o o d s w h ich are p reciou s and therefore vu lnerab le, but also by the p ossessio n of th e m ean s of protecting it, i.e . m en ; th is is s o b ecau se the land and th e w o m en are n ever r e d u c e d to th e statu s of sim p le in stru m en ts o f p rod uction or reprodu ction , and stih less to the statu s of co m m o d ities or even " p ro p er ty ”. A ttack s on the lan d ,

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61

house, or th e w om en are attacks on their m aster, on h is nif, his very ^ defined by th e g ro u p - h is " p o te n c y ”. A lienated land, u navenged or m urder, are different form s of the sam e offence, w h ich alw ays elicits the same response from the grou p 's p oin t of honour: just as a m urder is " paid back’ i but at a h igher rate, b y striking if p ossib le at the person closest to the murderer or the m ost p rom in en t m em ber in his g ro u p , so a piece of ancestral land, even a not very fertile on e, is " b ou gh t b a ck ” a t a n y price in

order to w ipe ou t the sta n d in g insult to the group's h o n o u r .93 Just as, in the logic of challenge and riposte, th e best land b oth techn ically and sy m b olically is that m ost closely tied to the p atrim ony, so the m an through w hom on e can

most cruelly strike at the grou p is its m ost representative m em ber. The ethos of honour is but the transfigured expression of these econom ic and political facts. A sharp distinction is drawn betw een n if the point of honour, and hurma, the sum total of that w hich is haram, i.e . forbidden, all that goes to make up the vulnerability of the group, its m ost sacred possession (from w hich there follows a distinction betw een the challenge, w hich touches only the point of honour, and sacrilegious outrage).94 Only the punctilious, active vigilance of the point o f honour (n if) can guarantee the integrity of honour (hurma) - w hich, being sacred, is inherently exposed to sacrilegious outrage - and win the consideration and respectability accorded to the man who has sufficient poin t of honour to keep his honour safe from offence.95 Hurma in the sense of the sacred (haram ), nif, and hurma in the sense of respectability, are inseparable. T h e more vulnerable a fam ily, the more n if it m ust possess to defend its sacred values, and the greater the m erit and esteem opinion accords i t ; thus poverty, far from contradicting or prohibiting respectability, makes doubly meritorious the man who, though particularly exposed to outrage, nonetheless manages to w in respect. Conversely, the point of honour has a m eaning and a function only in a man for whom there exist things worthy of b ein g defended. A being devoid of the sacred could dispense with the point of honour because he w ould in a sense be invulnerable. What is haram (i.e. literally, taboo) is essentially the sacred of the left hand, hurma, that ,s* ^ e inside and more precisely the fem ale universe, the world of the secret, the enclosed space of the house, as opposed to the outside, the open world of the public square (thajm afth)f reserved for the m en. T h e sacred of the right hand is essentially the rifles”, that is, the group o f the agnates, the "sons of the paternal u n cle”, all those whose death m ust be avenged by blood and all those who are bound to carry °ut blood vengeance. T h e rifle is the sym bolic em bodim ent o f the nif of the agnatic group, nif defined as that which can be challenged and w hich enables one to take up the challenge. T h u s to the passivity of hurma, fem ale in nature, there is opposed the ^ctive susceptibility of nif, the m ale virtue par excellence. It is ultim ately on nif, its 'physical or sym bolic) fighting capacity, that the defence of the group’s material and symbolic patrimony - the source both o f its potency and of its vulnerability depends.

M en con stitu te a political and sy m b o lic force on w h ich d ep en d the p rotec*,Qn and exp an sion of th e p atrim on y, the d efen ce o f the grou p and its good s against the en croach m en ts of violen ce, and at the sam e tim e the im p osition its dom in ance and th e satisfaction of its in terests. C o n seq u en tly , th e o n ly reat to the pow er of th e grou p , apart from th e sterility of its w o m e n , is the

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fragm en tation of the m aterial and sy m b o lic p atrim on y w h ic h w ould result from quarrels b etw een th e m en . H e n c e th e fertility strategies w h ich aim to p rod u ce as m an y m en as p ossib le as q u ick ly as p o ssib le (th rou gh early m arriage), and th e ed u cative strategies w h ich , in in cu lca tin g an exalted a d h eren ce to th e lineage and to th e v alu es o f h on ou r (th e transfigured exp ression o f the ob jective relation b etw e en th e agen ts an d an extremely vu lnerab le and p erp etu ally threaten ed m aterial and sy m b o lic patrim ony) collaborate to su pp ort th e in tegration of th e lin eage and to divert aggressive ten d e n c ies ou tw ard s: " T h e land is cop p er ( nehas), m e n ’s arm s are silver." T h e very am b ig u ity of th is say in g - nehas also m ean s jealou sy - p o in ts to the p rin cip le of th e con trad iction w h ich th e su ccessio n a l cu sto m en gen d ers in attaching m en to the land. T h e su ccessio n a l stra teg ies, w h ich ob jectively tend to attach as m an y m en as p o ssib le to th e p atrim on y by en su rin g eq u ality of in h eritan ce and b y gu aran teein g the u n ity o f th e patrim ony through the d isin h eritin g o f th e w o m e n , in trod u ce an u n a v o id a b le co n tra d ictio n : n ot only d o th ey threaten to fragm en t th e ancestral lands by p arcelling th em out eq u ally am on g very n u m erou s h eirs, b u t ab o v e all th ey set at the very heart of th e sy stem the p rin cip le of co m p etitio n for p ow er over th e domestic ec o n o m y and p olitics - co m p etitio n an d con flict b etw een father and sons, wrh o m th is m o d e o f pow er tran sm ission c o n d em n s to su b ord in ation so long as the patriarch lives (m an y p arallel-cou sin m arriages are arranged by th e "old m an ” w ith o u t th e fathers b ein g c o n s u lte d ); co m p etitio n and conflict between b rothers or co u sin s w h o , at least w h en th e y in their turn b eco m e fath ers, are d estin ed to find that th eir in terests c o n flic t .96 T h e strategies of agnates are d om in ated b y the an tagon ism b etw een th e sy m b o lic p rofits of p olitical and ec o n o m ic n on -d ivision and th e m aterial profits o f a breakup w h ich are con tin u a lly recalled to m in d b y th e sp irit o f ec o n o m ic ca lcu la tio n . T h e urge to calcu late, repressed in m en , find s m ore overt ex p ressio n in w o m e n , who are stru ctu rally pred isp osed to be less con cern ed w ith the sy m b o lic profits accru in g from political u n ity , and to d ev o te th e m se lv e s m ore readily to strictly ec o n o m ic practices. T h e ideology which makes wom an a principle of division and discord th u s finds an apparent basis in the effects of the division of labour betw een the sexes, w h ic h , as we have seen, predisposes the w om en to be less sensitive to sym bolic profits and freer to pursue material profits.97 L en d in g b etw een w om en is regarded as the antithesis of the exchange of honour; and it is indeed closer to the econom ic :ruth of exchange than the m en ’s dealings. O f th e man w ho, unlike the man of honour anxious not squander his capital of "c r e d it”, too readily seeks loans, especially of m on ey, the matf w ho has so often blanched w ith sham e on asking for a loan that he has a "yellow face . it is said that " his borrowing ( arrtal) is like that of w o m e n ’*. T h e opposition between the two " econom ies is so marked that th e expression err arrtal, also used to e x p r e s s the taking of revenge, means the returning o f a g ift, an exchange, in the m en ’s s p e e c h whereas it m eans "giving back a lo a n ” w hen used by the w om en. Loan c o n d u c t

I

M atrim on ial strategies an d social reproduction

63

• 1 * more frequent and more natural am ong the w om en, w ho w ill borrow and certai . . jor any pUrpose; it follow s that the econom ic truth, held back in lend c joser t0 t he surface in fem ale exchanges in w hich there may be specific svvaP £o r r e p a y m e n t (" when m y daughter gives birth ”) and precise calculation of the quantities lent.

In sh o r t, the sym bolic an d politica l in terests attached to th e unity o f land ow n ersh ip , to the exten t of allian ces, to th e m aterial and sy m b o lic p ow er o f the agnatic g r o u p , and to th e valu es o f h on ou r and p restig e w h ich m ake a ^reat h o u se ( akham am oqrane), m ilitate in favour of th e stren g th en in g of corporate b o n d s . C on versely, as is sh o w n b y th e fact that th e breaking u p of joint o w n e r sh ip h as b eco m e m ore and m ore freq u en t w ith the g en eralizin g of m on etary exch an ges and th e spread o f the (corresp o n d in g ) calcu lative spirit, economic in terests (in th e narrow s e n s e ), th o se relatin g to co n su m p tio n , are c o n d u c iv e to the breakup of u n d iv id ed o w n e rsh ip .98 E ven in cases in w h ich a h older of d o m e stic p ow er has lo n g prepared for his su c c e ssio n by th e m anip ulation of in d ivid u al asp iration s, d irectin g each of the b ro th ers tow ards th e " s p e c ia lity ” w h ich su ited h im in the d iv isio n of d om estic labour, com p etition for internal p ow er is alm ost in evitab le, and can be su b lim a ted in to a co m p etitio n of h on ou r on ly at th e co st o f co n tin u o u s control b y th e m en over th e m se lv e s and b y th e g rou p ov er all of th e m . B ut the forces o f coh esion represen ted b y th e n o n -d iv isio n o f th e land and the in tegration of th e fam ily - in stitu tio n s w h ich rein force each other - clash con stantly w ith forces of fission su ch as th e " je a lo u sy ” arou sed by an u nequ al d istrib u tion of powrers or resp o n sib ilities, or th e im b alan ce b etw een resp ective co n trib u tio n s to p rod u ction and co n su m p tio n (" T h e hard -w ork in g m a n s labour has b een eaten u p b y th e m an w h o lean s against th e w a ll ”).99 In general, au th ority over th e d eleg a tio n of w ork, th e con tro l o f exp en d itu re and the m anagem ent of the p atrim on y, or over the fam ily's external relation s (alliances, e tc .) resid es in fact in a sin gle p erso n , w h o th u s appropriates the sy m b o lic

profits wrh ich

accrue from g o in g to m arket, p resen ce at

°lan assem b lies or th e m ore excep tion al g a th erin gs o f tribal n otab les, etc . — n°t to m en tion th e fact that th ese d u ties have the effect of e x e m p tin g tta person w h o assu m es th em from th e ex ig en cie s o f th e daily w ork rou tine.

O bjectively u n ited , for th e w orse if n o t for th e b etter, th e b rothers are o b je c tiv e ly d iv id ed , even in their solid arity. " M y b r o th e r ”, said an informant,

is th e m an wTh o w o u ld d efen d m y h on ou r if m y p o in t o f h onour failed ,

Wh° w ° u ld save m e from d ish o n o u r but p u t m e to sh a m e .” A n oth er in form an t reported an acq u aintance as sa y in g : " M y brother is h e w h o , if I d ie d , cou ld I^arry m y w ife and w ou ld b e praised for i t .” T h e h o m o g e n e ity o f th e m ode

0 Production o f h abitus ( i.e . of th e m aterial co n d itio n s of life , and o f

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The objective lim its o f objectivism

ped agogic action) p rod uces a h om ogen ization of d isp o sitio n s and in terests w h ich , far from exclu d in g com p etition , m ay in so m e cases en g en d er it by in clin in g th ose w h o are the product of th e sam e co n d itio n s of production to recogn ize and pursue the sam e g o o d s, w h ose rarity m ay arise en tirely from this com p etitio n . T h e d om estic u n it, a m o n o p o listic grou p ing defined, as W eber said, b y the exclu sive appropriation o f a determ in ate type o f goods (land , nam es, e tc .) is the locus o f a co m p etitio n for th is capital, or rather, for con trol over th is capital, w hich co n tin u o u sly threatens to d estroy the capital b y d estroyin g th e fundam ental con d itio n of its p erp etu ation . T h e relationship b etw een brothers, k eystone o f the fam ily structure, is also its w eakest p oint, w hich a w h ole series o f m echan ism s are d esign ed to su pp ort and stren gth en ,100 startin g w ith parallel-cousin m arriage, the ideolo­ gical resolu tion, som etim es realized in practice, o f the specific contradiction o f this mode o f reproduction. If p arallel-cou sin marriage is a m atter for m e n ,101 con sisten t w ith the m en ’s in terests, that is, the h igher interests of th e lineage, o ften arranged w ith o u t the w om en b ein g in form ed , and against their w ill (w hen th e tw o b rothers’ w iv es are on bad term s, on e not w anting to a d m it the other’s d augh ter to her h ou se and th e other n o t w ish in g to place her daughter under her sister-in -law ’s au th ority), the reason is that it is in tend ed to counteract, p ractically, d ivision b etw een the m en . T h is is taken so m uch for granted that th e father’s ritual advice to h is son (" D o n ’t listen to your w iv es, stay united am ongst y o u r se lv e s!”) is naturally taken to m ean "M arry you r ch ild ren to o n e a n oth er.” E verything takes places as if th is social form ation had had to grant itself officially a p ossib ility rejected as in cestu o u s by m ost so cieties, in order to resolve id eologically the ten sion w h ich is at its very centre. P erhaps the exaltation of m arriage w ith the ben'amm (parallel cou sin ) w ould have been better u nd erstood if it had been realized that ben amm has co m e to designate th e en em y , or at least, the in tim ate en em y , and that en m ity is called thaben'ammts "that of th e ch ildren of the paternal u n c le ”. In fact, the forces o f ideological coh esion are em b od ied in the elder, djedd, w h ose authority based o n the pow er to d isin h erit, on the threat of m aled iction , and above all on adherence to the values sym b olized b y th adjadith, can secu re equilibrium b etw een th e b rothers o n ly by m aintain in g th e strictest eq u ality b etw een them (and their w iv es) both in w ork (th e w o m e n , for exam p le, taking turns to do th e h ousew ork, prepare the m eals, carry w ater, etc .) and in co n su m p tio n . It is no accid en t that crisis so often coin cid es w ith the disappearance of this p ositive coh esive factor, arising w h e n the father d ies leaving adult so n s n on e o f w h om w ield s a clear estab lish ed au th ority (b y virtue o f th e age gap or

any

other p rin c ip le ). But the extrem ely variable relative strength of the te n d e n c ie s to fu sion or fission d ep en d s fu n d am en tally, at th e level o f the d o m estic u n it

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m uch as at th e level o f larger u n its like the clan or th e trib e, on the elationship b etw een the grou p and the external u n its: in secu rity provides a negative principle of coh esion capable of m aking up for the d eficien cy of o sitive p rin cip les.102" I hate m y brother, but I hate the m an w h o hates h im .” T h e n eg a tiv e, fo rced solid arity created by a shared vu ln era b ility , w hich is reinforced every tim e th ere is a threat to the jointly ow ned m aterial and svm bolic p atrim ony, rests o n the sam e prin cip le as the d iv isiv e ten d e n c y w hich

it tem p ora rily thw arts, that o f th e rivalry b etw een agnates. S o , from the u n d ivid ed fam ily up to th e largest political units., the co h esio n en d lessly exalted b y the m yth ological and genealogical ideology lasts no lon ger than the pow er r ela tio n s capable o f h o ld in g in dividu al in terests togeth er. H avin g restated the p rin cip les w hich define the system s of in terests of the different ca te g o r ie s of a gen ts in the d om estic pow er relations w h ich result in the d efin itio n o f a co llectiv e m atrim onial strategy, if w e now p o sit that the more th e w orking o f th e sy stem serves the agen ts’ in terests, the m ore they are inclined to serve the w orking of the system , w e are able to u nd erstan d the fundam ental p rin cip les o f th e strategies w h ich are con fron ted o n the occasion of a m a rria g e.103 T h o u g h it is true that marriage is on e of th e principal o p p ortu n ities to con serve, in crease, or (b y m isalliance) d im in ish the capital of au th ority conferred b y stron g integration and th e cap ital of p restige stem m in g from an ex ten siv e netw ork o f affines ( nesba), the fact rem ains that the m em b ers of the d om estic u nit w h o take part in arranging th e marriage do not all id e n tify their o w n interests to the sam e degree w ith th e collective interest o f the lineage. As the products of elaborate strategies, of which more is expected than sim ple biological reproduction, i.e. external or internal alliances intended to reproduce the domestic and political power relations, marriages are a sort of short-term and long-term investment in, am ong other th in gs, the quality of the "maternal u n cles” they procure. It is understandable that they cannot be lightly dissolved, the most long-standing and prestigious relationships naturally being best protected against an ill-considered break. If repudiation becom es inevitable, then all sorts of subterfuges are resorted to so as to prevent the total loss of the capital of alliances. T h e husband’s relatives may go and heg the w ife’s relatives to give her back, attributing the divorce to the youth, recklessness, thoughtless ch oice of w ords, and irresponsibility of a husband too young to appreciate the value of alliances; it is pointed out that he did not pronounce the ormula three tim es, but only once, im petuously, and without w itnesses. T h e divorce ecomes a case of thutchha (the wife w ho lost her temper and w ent home to her relatives); there may even be th e offer of a new w edding (w ith imensiand a trousseau). the repudiation proves to be final, there are several ways of "separating” : the greater the importance and solem nity of the marriage, the more one has " in v ested ” *n, *he more one has therefore an interest in preserving relations w ith those from Whorn one is separating (either out of kinship or neighbourhood solidarity, or out tK Se^ ‘*nterested calculation), and the greater the discretion of the break; return of e bridewealth is not dem anded im m ediately, nor is the return refused (" free”

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repudiation - battal - being a grave in su lt); it m ay not even be expected until the woman remarries; not too m uch attention is paid to the precise am ount, and witnesses especially outsiders, are kept away from the divorce settlem ent.

T h e in h eritan ce tradition w h ich exclu d es w om an from th e h eritage, the m yth ic w orld -v iew w h ich accord s her o n ly a lim ited ex iste n c e and never grants her full participation in th e sy m b o lic capital o f her ad o p tiv e lineage, th e sexual d iv isio n of labour w h ich restricts her to d o m estic tasks leaving the representational fu n ctio n s to th e m an - ev ery th in g co m b in es to id en tify the in terests o f th e m en w ith the m aterial and particularly the sy m b o lic interests o f the lin eage ; all th e m ore so , th e greater th e m e n ’s au th ority in th e agnatic grou p . A nd th e typ ically m ascu lin e m arriages - parallel-cou sin and political m arriages - testify u n am b ig u o u sly to the fact that m en s’ in terests are more d irectly id en tified w ith th e official in terests o f th e lin eage, and that their strategies are m ore d irectly d esig n ed to rein force th e d o m estic u n it’s integra­ tion or th e fa m ily ’s n etw ork of alliances, con trib u tin g in b oth cases to the g row th o f the lin ea g e’s sy m b o lic capital. A s for th e w o m e n , it is n o accid en t that th e m arriages for w h ich they are resp on sib le fall in to th e class of ordinary m arriages, or m ore p recisely , that th ey are left resp on sib ility on ly for unrem arkable, u ncerem onial m arriages .104 B ein g exclu d ed from representational k in sh ip , th e y are th row n back on to practical k insh ip and practical u ses of k in sh ip , in v estin g m ore econom ic realism (in th e narrow se n se ) than th e m en in th e search for a partner for their so n s or d a u g h ters .105 M ale and fem ale in terests are m o st likely to d iverge w hen a daughter is to be m arried. N o t only is th e m oth er less sen sitive to th e " fam ily in te r e st” w h ich ten d s to see the d augh ter as an instrument for stren g th en in g th e in tegration o f th e agnatic g ro u p , or as a sort o f sy m b o lic m on ey a llo w in g p restigiou s alliances to be set up w ith other g ro u p s; b ut also, in m arrying her daughter in to her ow n lin eage and in ten sify ­ ing th e ex ch an ges b etw een th e grou p s, sh e ten d s to stren g th en her own p osition in th e d om estic u n it. T h e m arriage o f a son raises for th e m istress o f th e h ou se first and forem ost th e q u estion o f her d om in an ce over the d o m estic eco n o m y . H er in terest is o n ly n egatively adjusted to that o f the lin eage: in taking a d au gh ter from th e fam ily sh e herself cam e from , sh e is fo llo w in g th e path traced b y th e lin eage, and a con flict a m o n g th e w om en resu ltin g from a bad ch o ice w ou ld u ltim ately threaten th e u n ity o f th e agnatic g rou p . T h e in terest o f th e m en , alw ays d o m in an t officially and te n d in g alw ays to b e so in reality, im p oses itself all the m ore fu lly th e stron ger th e integration of th e agn atic grou p and th e m ore nearly equal (at least) th e fa th er’s lineage is to th e m o th er’s in th e social hierarchy. It is n o exaggeration to claim that th e g ro u p ’s w h ole m atrim onial h istory is p resen t in the internal transactions

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0ver each in ten d ed m arriage. T h e lin ea g e’s in terest, i.e . the m ale in terest, requires that a m an sh o u ld n ot b e placed in a su b ord in ate p o sitio n in th e fam ily bv b e in g m arried to a girl of m arkedly h igh er statu s (a m an, they say, can raise a w om an , b u t n ot th e o p p o site; y o u give - a d augh ter - to a su perior or an e q u a l, yo u take - a d au gh ter - from an in ferior). It has m ore chance of assertin g itself if th e m an w h o has th e resp on sib ility (at least th e official

responsibility) for th e m arriage has not h im self b een m arried ab ove h is sta tu s. In fact, a w h ole set of m ech an ism s, in clu d in g th e b rid ew ealth and th e w ed d in g exp en ses, w h ich rise in p rop ortion to the p restige o f th e m arriage, tend to ex clu d e alliances b etw een grou p s too u nequ ally m atched in term s of econ om ic and sy m b o lic capital (th e freq u en t cases in w h ich the fam ily o f on e sp ouse is rich in on e form o f capital - e .g . in m en - w hereas th e other p o ssesses rather th e other form of w ealth - e .g . land - are n o ex c ep tio n s to

this): " M en ally w ith their e q u a ls” , th e sa y in g g o es medden

( " tsnassaben (naseb)

widh m'adhalen”).

In short, th e stru cture of ob jective relation s b etw een th e kin w h o m ake th e matrimonial d ecisio n , as m an or w om an or as m em ber o f th is or that lin eage, helps to d efine th e stru ctu re of relation sh ip s b etw een th e lin eages u n ited by the proposed m arriage .106 In fact it w ou ld be m ore accurate to say that the determ inant relation ship , b etw een th e lin eage o f th e person to b e m arried and the lineage offerin g a p ossib le partner, is alw ays m ed iated by th e d o m estic power structure. In d eed , in o rd er to d e scr ib e co m p letely th e m u lti-d im en sio n a l and m u lti-fu n ction al relation ship (irred u cib le to k insh ip ties) b etw een th e tw o groups, it is n ot sufficient to take in to accou n t o n ly th e spatial, eco n o m ic, and social d istan ce b etw een th em at th e m om en t of m arriage in term s of econom ic and sy m b o lic capital (m easured b y th e n u m b er of m en and o f m en of honour, b y th e d egree of in tegration of th e fam ily , e t c .) . W e m u st also take into con sid eration th e state, at that particular tim e, o f th e b alan ce-sh eet of their m aterial and sy m b o lic ex ch an ges, i.e . th e w h o le h istory o f th e official, extra-ordinary ex ch an ges su ch as m arriages b rou ght ab out or at least co n se­ crated b y the m en , and also th e u nofficial, ordinary ex ch a n g es co n tin u o u sly carried o n b y th e w o m en w ith th e co m p lic ity o f th e m en and so m etim es w ithout th eir k n ow led ge, a m ed iation through w h ich th e o b jectiv e relations predisposing tw o grou p s to com e tog eth er are prepared for and realized. Whereas econom ic capital is relatively stable, sym bolic capital is relatively pre­ v i o u s : the death of a prestigious head of the fam ily is som etim es enough to dim inish severely. Fluctuations in the group’s sym bolic fortunes are follow ed by corresponding changes in the w hole im age of itself w hich the group aim s to present, afld in the objectives - alliance or integration - w hich it sets for its marriages. T h u s the space of tw o generations, a great fam ily, w hose econom ic situation was in fact ^•proving, declined from male marriages - marriages w ithin the close kin or extraurt»nary marriages (arranged by m en, outside the usual area, for purposes of alliance)

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- to ordinary marriages, generally set up by the w om en, w ithin their own network of relationships. T h is change in m atrimonial policy coincided w ith the deaths of the two eldest brothers (H ocin e and L aid ), the long absence of the oldest men (w ho had gone to France), and the weakening of the authority o f thamgarth, who had become blind, with real power passing into the hands of Boudjemaa and, intermittently, A thm an. Because it is not clear w ho is to succeed thamgarth, the wom an who imposes order and silence ( ta'a n thamgarth, da susm i"obedience to the old wom an is silen ce’ ) the structure of relations betw een the wives reflects the structure of relations between the husbands, leaving vacant the position o f m istress of the house; in such c ir c u it stances, marriages tend to go tow ards the w om en’s respective lin eages.107

T h e structural ch aracteristics gen ericallv d efin in g the value of a lineage’s prod ucts on th e m atrim onial m arket are ob v io u sly sp ecified by secondary ch aracteristics su ch as the m atrim onial statu s of th e person to be married, h is or her age, se x , etc. T h u s th e gro u p ’s m atrim onial strategies and the type of m arriage w hich m ay result from th em are q uite different d ep en d in g on w heth er the m an to be m arried is a b ach elor " o f th e m arrying a g e ” or has already "p assed the a g e ” , or w h eth er he is an already m arried m an looking for a co-w ife, or a w id ow er or d ivorcee w antin g to rem arry (w ith th e situation ch an gin g further d ep en d in g on w heth er or not he has ch ild ren from his first m arriage). F or a girl the p rin cip les o f variation are th e sam e, w ith the d ifferen ce that the depreciation en tailed by p reviou s m arriages is infinitely greater (becau se of the price p u t on virginity and in sp ite of the fact that a reputation as a " m an w h o repu d iates ” is just as dam agin g as that o f a " woman to be r e p u d ia te d ”). T h is is only one aspect of the dyssvm m etry betw een the situation of the man and the woman before marriage: " T h e m an ”, runs the saying, "is always a man, whatever his state [unlike the wom an, w ho can disqualify herself, and cast herself into shame,
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seS to arrange hasty marriages (such marriages are unlikely to remain stable, which plains why som e men seem " con d em n ed ” to marry many tim es). But there is great avssymmetry on this point too: a man, divorced or w idow ed, is expected to remarry, 'hereas a divorced wom an is devalued by the failure of her marriage, and a w idow , even a very young on e, is excluded from the m atrimonial market by her status as a pother expected to bring up her husband’s ch ild , especially if it is a boy ("a woman c a n n o t remain - a w idow - for the sake of another woman ” is the saying applied to a w id o w w ho, only having daughters, is encouraged to remarry, whereas a mother 0f 50ns is praised for her sacrifice, which is all the more meritorious if she is young a n d thus liable to have to live as an outsider am ong her husband’s sisters and her h u s b a n d ’s brothers’ w ives). But her situation varies further depending on whether she h a s "left” her children with her deceased husband’s fam ily or gone back to her own family with her children (in which case she is less free and hence harder to marry o f f ) - A n interesting option arises: she may either be taken to w ife by som eone in her h u s b a n d ’s fam ily (the official practice, particularly recom m ended if she has sons) or be found a new husband by her father’s fam ily (w hich happens more often w hen she is childless) or by her husband's fam ily. It is difficult to establish the universe of v a r ia b le s (doubtless including local traditions) determ ining the " ch o ice” of one or the other of these strategies.

But it m u st also be borne in m ind , contrary to the tradition w h ich treats each marriage as an isolated u n it, that th e m arrying of each o f the ch ildren of the sam e fam ily u n it ( i.e . the children o f the sam e father, or in som e cases the grandchildren o f the sam e grandfather) d ep en d s on the m arrying of all the others and th u s varies as a fu n ction o f each c h ild ’s position (defin ed m ainly by sib lin g order, sex , and relationship to th e head o f the fa m ily ), w ith in the particular configuration of the w hole set of ch ild ren to be m arried, itself characterized b y their n um ber and se x . T h u s , for a m an th e situ ation is m ore favourable the closer his kin relation ship to the statutory holder o f authority over the m arriage (w h ich m ay range from so n -fa th e r to you nger b ro th e relder brother, or even the relation ship b etw e en distant co u sin s). M oreover, although there is no official recogn ition o f an y p rivilege for the eldest (o f the boys, o f co u rse), everyth in g con sp ires to favou r him to th e d etrim en t o f his younger brothers, to marry him first and as w ell as p ossib le, that is, o u tsid e rather than inside th e lin eage, the yo u n g er b rothers b ein g d estin ed for Production rather than th e exchanges o f th e m arket or assem b ly, for work on the land rather than the h o u se’s external p o litics. H is p o sitio n is, how ever, ver)r different d ep en d in g on w h eth er he is the eld est o f several so n s, or the bearer of all h is fa m ily ’s h opes as an on ly so n or on e follow ed b y several daughters .108 T h e fam ily w ith m any d au gh ters, especially if th ey are poorly Protected ” (by son s) and hence little valu ed b ecau se vu lnerab le and prom islr*g few allies, is in an u nfavourable p o sitio n and finds itself forced to incur debts tow ards the fam ilies w h ich receive its w o m en . In con trast, a fam ily rich ln m en has considerable room for m a n o e u v r e : it can ch o o se to in vest each ° f its son s differently accord in g to circu m stan ces, to increase its alliances w ith

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o n e o f th e m , to stre n g th e n its in tegration w ith an oth er, to p u t a co u sin ^

■

o n ly has d au g h ters u n d er an o b ligation b y tak in g o n e of h is g irls for a third ^ In th is case, th e stra teg ist’s sk ill can h ave free rein and can effortlessly re co n cile th e irrecon cilab le, b oth rein fo rcin g in teg ra tio n an d expanding a llia n ces. T h e m an w h o o n ly has d a u gh ters, or has to o m a n y o f them ,

js

restricted to n egative strategies, and h is sk ill has to b e lim ited to th e manip, u lation o f th e rela tio n sh ip b etw e en th e field o f p oten tial p artners and th e field o f p o ten tia l co m p etito rs, p la y in g off th e " n e a r ” against th e " d ista n t” , the req u est o f a clo se k in sm an again st that o f a stranger (in o rd er to refuse w ith o u t o ffen ce or m ake h im w ait) in su ch a w ay as to reserve th e pow er to op t for th e m o st p restigiou s alternative. It w ill d o u b tle ss h ave b eco m e clear h o w artificial it is to distinguish b e tw e e n th e en d s and th e m ean s of c o llec tiv e m atrim on ial stra teg ies. Ever}', th in g takes place as if, o b je ctiv ely o rien ted tow ard s th e rein fo rcin g or in crea sin g o f in tegration w ith in th e lim its o f th e m a in ten a n ce of allian ces (or th e reverse) th e se strategies d ep en d e d for th eir lo g ic and th eir efficacy o n the m aterial and sy m b o lic cap ital o f th e social u n it in q u e stio n , i.e . n o t o n ly on th e v a lu e o f its m aterial h eritage b u t also on its sy m b o lic h erita g e, w h ic h itself d e p e n d s first on th e size and in tegration o f th e agnatic g ro u p (m arked b y the jo in t p rod u ction and co n su m p tio n o f m aterial g o o d s) an d se co n d ly on its cap ital o f allian ces, b o th th e se form s o f sy m b o lic capital o b v io u sly depending on th e w h o le m atrim on ial h isto ry . It fo llo w s th a t every m arriage tends to rep rod u ce th e co n d itio n s w h ic h have m ad e it p o ssib le .110 M atrim on ial strate­ g ie s, o b jectiv ely d irected tow ard s the con serv a tio n or ex p a n sio n of th e material and sy m b o lic capital jo in tly p o ssessed b y a m ore or less ex te n d ed group, b e lo n g to th e sy stem o f rep rod u ction stra teg ies, d efin ed as th e su m total of th e stra teg ies th rou gh w h ic h in d iv id u a ls or g ro u p s o b jectiv ely ten d to repro­ d u c e th e relation s of p ro d u c tio n associated w ith a d eterm in a te m o d e of p ro d u c tio n b y striv in g to rep rod u ce or im p ro v e their p o sitio n in th e social str u c tu r e .111 T h is takes us a lo n g w ay from th e p ure - b eca u se in fin itely i m p o v e r i s h e d - realm o f the " ru les of m a rria g e” and th e " elem en ta ry stru ctu res of k in s h ip ’ • H a v in g d efin ed th e sy ste m o f p rin cip les from w h ich th e a g en ts are a b le to p ro d u c e regu lated and regular m atrim on ial p ractices and to understand p ractically th e m atrim on ial p ractices of oth er a g en ts, w e co u ld u se statistical a n alysis o f th e relevant in form ation to estab lish th e w eig h t o f th e corresp ond ' in g stru ctural or in d ivid u al variables. In fact, th e im p o rta n t th in g is th a t the a g e n ts’ p ractice b e c o m e s in te llig ib le as so o n as o n e can co n stru ct th e systerfl of th e p rin cip les and o f th e law s of co m b in a tio n of th o se p rin cip les (or, to p u t it an oth er w ay, th e sy stem of variab les and op erators) w h ich th e y put in to p ractice w h en th e y id en tify im m ed ia tely th e in d iv id u a ls so cio -lo g ica lly

M a trim o n ia l strategies a n d social reproduction

inatc *n f wlt ^

7 i

hable in a g iven state of th e m atrim on ial m ark et, or m o r e p rec ise ly , w h e n , n t0 a particular m a n , th ey d esig n a te, for ex a m p le, th e few w o m en oractical k in sh ip w h o are in so m e se n se prom ised to h im an d th o se w h o m u |cj at a stretch b e p erm itted to m arry - and d o s o in su ch a clear and

I wav that any d ev ia tio n from th e m o st lik ely c o u rse, m arriage in to

anotnei

tribe for ex a m p le, is felt as a ch a lle n g e to th e fa m ily co n cern ed , and

also to the w h ole grou p .

2 S tru c tu re s and the h ab itu s

M eth od ological o b jectivism , a necessary m om en t in all research, by the break w ith prim ary exp erien ce and th e con stru ction of ob jective relations w hich it accom p lish es, d em and s its ow n su p ersession . In ord er to escap e the realism o f the structure, w h ich h ypostatizes system s of ob jective relations b y converting them in to totalities already con stitu ted ou tsid e o f in d iv id u a l h istory and group h istory, it is necessary to pass from th e opus operatum to the modus operandi, from statistical regularity or algebraic structure to the p rin cip le o f the produc­ tion of th is ob served order, and to con stru ct the theory of p ractice, or, more p recisely, th e theory of the m od e of gen eration of practices, w hich is the p recon d ition for estab lish in g an exp erim en tal scien ce o f the dialectic o f the internalization o f extern ality and the extem a liza tio n o f \n tem a lity, or, more sim p ly, o f in corporation an d ob jectification .

A false dilem m a: mechanism an d finalism T h e stru ctu res con stitu tiv e o f a particular typ e o f en v iro n m en t (e.g . the m aterial co n d itio n s of existen ce characteristic of a class co n d itio n ) produce habitus, sy stem s o f d urable, transposable dispositions/ stru ctured structures p red isp osed to fu n ctio n as stru cturin g stru ctu res, that is, as p rin cip les o f the generation an d stru ctu rin g o f practices and represen tation s w h ich can be ob jectively " re g u la ted ” &nd " regu lar” w ith ou t in any w ay b ein g th e product o f o b ed ien ce to ru les, ob jectively adapted to th eir g o a ls w ith o u t presupposing a co n scio u s aim in g at en d s or an exp ress m astery of th e op eration s necessary to attain th e m and, b ein g all th is, co llectiv ely orchestrated w ith o u t being the product of th e orchestratin g action o f a con d u ctor. E ven w h e n th ey appear as the realization of the ex p lic it, an d explicitly stated, p u rp oses of a project or p lan, th e p ractices p ro d u ced b y the habitus, as the strategy-gen eratin g p rin cip le en ab lin g agen ts to cop e w ith unforeseen and ev er-ch an gin g situ ation s, are on ly apparently d eterm in ed b y th e future.

If th ey se e m d eterm in ed b y an ticip ation of their o w n co n seq u en ces, thereby en cou raging the finalist illu sio n , th e fact is that, alw ays ten d in g to reproduce th e ob jective structures of w h ich th ey are th e p ro d u ct, they are determined b y the past co n d itio n s w h ich have p rod uced the p rin cip le of th eir prod uction ,

[ 72 1

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is by th e actual ou tcom e o f id en tical or in terchan geab le past p ractices, hich coin cid es w ith their ow n ou tco m e to th e exten t ( and on ly to the extent) that the ob jective stru ctu res of w h ich th ey are the p rod uct are p rolon ged in the structures w ith in w h ich th ey fu n ctio n . T h u s, for exam p le, in the interaction b etw een tw o agen ts or grou p s of agents en d o w ed w ith the sam e habitus (say A and B ), everyth in g takes p lace as if the a ctio n s of each of them (say ai f ° r w ere organ ized in relation to the reaction s th ey call forth from any agent p o ssessin g the sam e h abitus (say, b i, B ’s reaction to ai) so that they objectively im p ly an ticip ation of th e reaction w h ich th e se reactions in turn call forth (say a2, the reaction to b i). But th e teleological d escrip tion accord in g to which each action has the purpose o f m aking p ossib le th e reaction to the reaction it arou ses (ind ivid ual A p erform in g action ai, e .g . a g ift or ch allen ge, in order to m ake in dividu al B p rod uce action b it a co u n ter-g ift or riposte, so as to be able to p erform action a2, a step p ed -u p g ift or ch allenge) is q u ite as naive as th e m ech an istic d escrip tion w hich p resen ts the action and the riposte as m o m en ts in a se q u en ce o f program m ed actio n s prod uced by a mechanical apparatus. T h e h abitus is the sou rce of th ese series o f m o v es w hich are objectively organized as strategies w ith ou t b ein g th e p rod uct of a g en u in e strategic in ten tio n - w h ich w ould p resup pose at least that th ey are p erceived as one strategy am ong other p ossib le stra teg ies .2 It is necessary to ab and on all theories w h ich ex p lic itly or im p licitly treat practice as a m echanical reaction , d irectly d eterm in ed by the a n tecedent conditions and en tirely redu cible to th e m echan ical fu n ctio n in g of preestablished a ssem b lies, " m o d e ls” or " r o l e s w h i c h o n e w o u ld , m oreover, have to p ostu late in in finite n um ber, like th e chance con figu ration s o f stim uli capable o f triggerin g th em from o u tsid e, th ereb y c o n d em n in g o n eself to the grandiose an d d esperate und ertak ing of th e an th rop olo g ist, arm ed w ith fine positivist cou rage, w h o recorded

480 elem en tary u n its of b eh aviour in tw en ty

m inutes' ob servation of his w ife in th e k itch en .3 B ut rejection o f m echan istic theories in n o w ay im p lies that, in accordance w ith an oth er ob ligatory op tio n , we sh ould b esto w on som e creative free w ill th e free and w ilfu l p o w er to constitute, o n the in stant, th e m ean in g o f the situ a tio n by p rojectin g the en d s aiming at its tran sform ation , and that w e sh ou ld redu ce the objective intentions an d con stitu ted sign ification s o f action s an d w orks to the co n scio u s and deliberate in ten tion s o f their authors. Jean-Paul Sartre deserves credit for having given an ultra-consistent form ulation 0 ^ e philosophy of action accepted, usually im plicitly, by all those who describe Practices as strategies explicitly oriented by reference to purposes explicitly defined >’ a free project4 or even, with som e interactionists, by reference to the anticipated cues as to the reaction to practices. T h u s, refusing to recognize anything resem bling urable dispositions, Sartre makes each action a sort of unprecedented confrontation etween the subject and the w orld. T h is is clearly seen in the passages in Being and

7 4

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Nothingness where he confers on the awakening of revolutionary consciousness - a sort o f " conversion ” of consciousness produced by a sort of imaginary variation - the power to create the m eaning o f the present by creating the revolutionary future which negates it: "For it is necessary to reverse the com m on opinion and acknow ledge that it is not the harshness of a situation or the sufferings it im poses that lead people to conceive of another state of affairs in w hich things would be better for everybody. It is on the day that we are able to conceive of another state of affairs, that a new light is cast on our trouble and our suffering and we decide that they are unbearable.”5 If the world of action is nothing other than this universe of interchangeable possibles, entirely dependent on the decrees of the consciousness w hich creates it and hence totally devoid of objectivity, if it is m oving because the subject chooses to be moved, revolting because he chooses to be revolted, then em otions, passions, and actions are merely gam es of bad faith, sad farces in which one is both bad actor and good audience: " It is not by chance that materialism is serious; it is not by chance that it is found at all tim es and places as the favourite doctrine of the revolutionary. This is because revolutionaries are serious. T h ey com e to know them selves first in terms of the world which oppresses t h e m .. .T h e serious man is 'o f the w o rld ’ and has no resource in him self. He does not even im agine any longer the possibility of getting o u to i the w o rld . . . he is in bad fa ith .”* T h e same incapacity to encounter "seriousness” other than in the disapproved form of the "spirit o f seriou sn ess” can be seen in an analysis of em otion w hich, significantly, is separated by L ’imaginaire ( Psychology of the Imagination) from the less radically subjectivist descriptions in Sketch f o r a Theory o f the Emotions: "W hat will make me decide to choose the magical aspect or the technical aspect of the world ? It cannot be the world itself, .or th is in order to be manifested waits to be discovered. T herefore it is necessary that the for-itself in its project m ust choose being the one by w hom the world is revealed as magical or rational; that is, the for-itself m ust as a free project of itself give to itself rational or magical existence. It is responsible for either one, for the for-itself can be only if it has chosen itself. T herefore the for-itself appears as the free foundation of its emotions as of its volitions. M y fear is free and m anifests my freedom . >rT Such a theory of action was inevitably to lead to the desperate project of a transcendental genesis of society and history (the Critique de la raison dialectique) to which D urkheim seem ed to be pointing w hen he w rote in The Rules o f Sociological Method: " It is because the imaginary offers the mind no resistance that the m ind, conscious of no restraint, gives itself up to boundless am bitions and believes it possible to construct, or rather reconstruct, the world by virtue of its own strength and at the w him of its desires. ”8 N o doubt one could counterpose to this analysis of Sartrian anthropology the num erous texts (found especially in the earliest and the latest works) in which Sartre recognizes, for exam ple, the “ passive syntheses* of a universe of already constituted significations or expressly challenges the very principles of his philosophy, such as the passage in Being and Nothingness in which he seeks to distinguish his position from the instantaneiste philosophy of D escartes9 or a sentence from the Critique de la raison dialectique in w hich he announces the study of "agentless actions, totalizer-less productions, counter-finalities, infernal circularities”.10 T h e fact remains that Sartre rejects with visceral repugnance "those gelatinous realities, m ore or less vaguely haunted by a supra-individual consciousness, which a sham efaced organicism still seeks to retrieve, against all likelihood, in the rough, com plex but clear-cut field o f passive activity in w hich there are individual organisms and inorganic material realities”, and that he leaves no room for everything that, as m uch on the side of the things of the world as on the side of the agents, m ight seem to blur the sharp line his rigorous dualism seeks to maintain betw een the pure transparency of the subject and the

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• ral opacity of the thing. W ithin this logic, "objective ” sociology can grasp only X ? s o c ia lit y of inertia”, that is, for exam ple, the class reduced to inertia, hence to tence, class as a thing, an essence, " co n g ea led ” in its being, i.e . in its "having 1 ' »>. « Class seriality makes the individual (w hoever he is and whatever the class) being who defines him self as a hum anized t h i n g .. .T h e other form of class, that * the group totalizing in a praxis, is born at the heart of the passive form and as Its negation.”12 T h e social w orld, the site of these com prom ises betw een thing and meaning which define "objective m ean in g” as m eaning-m ade-thing and dispositions as meaning-made-body, is a positive challenge to som eone who can only live in the mire transparent universe of consciousness or individual ” praxis”. T h e only lim it this artificialism recognizes to the freedom of the ego is that which freedom sets itself by the free abdication of a pledge or the surrender of bad faith, the Sartrian name for alienation, or the subm ission im posed on it by the alienating freedom of the alter ego in the Hegelian struggles betw een master and slave. S eeing "in social arrangments onlv artificial and more or less arbitrary com b in ation s”, as Durkheim puts it ,13 without a second thought he subordinates the transcendence of the social - reduced to "the reciprocity of constraints and autonom ies ” - to the " transcendence of the ego ”, as the early Sartre used to put i t : " In the course of this action, the individual discovers the dialectic as rational transparency, inasm uch as he produces it, and as absolute necessity inasmuch as it escapes h im , in other w ords, quite sim ply, inasm uch as others produce it; finally, precisely insofar as he recognizes him self in overcom ing his needs, he recognizes the law which others im pose on him in overcom ing their own (recognizes it: this does not mean that he subm its to it), he recognizes his ow n autonom y (inasmuch as it can be used by another and daily is, bluffs, m anoeuvres, e tc .) as a foreign power and the autonom y of others as the inexorable law which allows him to coerce th em .”1,1 T h e transcendence of the social can only be the effect of recurrence, that is to say, in the last analysis, o f number (hence the importance accorded to the " series”), or of the "m aterialization of recurrence” in cultural objects;15 alienation consists in the free abdication of freedom in favour of the demands of "worked upon m atter” : "the 19th century worker makes himself w hat he is, that is, he practically and rationally determ ines the order o f his expenditure hence he decides in his free praxis - and by his freedom he makes him self what he was, what he is, what he m ust be: a m achine w hose wages represent no more than its running c o s t s .. . C lass-being as practico-inert being com es to men by m en through the passive syntheses of worked upon m atter.”16 Elsewhere, affirmation o f the " logical ” primacy of "individual praxis”, constituent R eason, over history, constituted Reason, leads Sartre to pose the problem of the genesis of society in the same terms as those employed by the theoreticians of the social contract: "H istory determ ines the content ° f human relationships in its totality and these relationships. . .relate back to every­ thing. But it is not H istory w hich causes there to be human relationships in general, t is not the problem s of organization and division of labour that have caused relations to be set up betw een those initially separate objects, m en .”17 Just as for D escartes creation is con tin u ou s”, as Jean Wahl puts it, "because tim e is n o t” and because extended substance does not contain w ithin itself the power to subsist - God being ^vested w ith the ever-renewed task of recreating the world ex nihilo by a free decree 0 his w i l l - s o the typically Cartesian refusal of the viscous opacity of "objective potentialities” and objective m eaning leads Sartre to entrust to the absolute initiative c mdividual or collective "historical a g en ts”, such as the Party, the hypostasis of the subiect’ t^Le indefinite task of tearing the social w hole, or the class, out of e inertia of the " practico-inert ”. At the end o f his im m ense imaginary novel of the eath and resurrection of freedom , with its tw ofold m ovem ent, the "externalization

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of internality”, w hich leads from freedom to alienation, from consciousness to the materialization of consciousness, or, as the title puts it, "from praxis to the practicoin ert”, and the “ internalization of externality” w hich, by the abrupt shortcuts of the awakening of consciousness and the " fusion of consciousnesses ”, leads "from the group to h istory”, from th e reified state of the alienated group to the authentic existence of the historical agent, consciousness and thing are as irremediably separate as they were at the outset, w ithout anything resem bling an institution or a socially constituted agent ever having been observed or constructed. T h e appearances of a dialectical discourse (or the dialectical appearances of the discourse) cannot mask the endless oscillation betw een the in-itself and the for-itself, or in the new language, between materiality and praxis, betw een the inertia of the group reduced to its " essen ce”, i.e. to its outlived past and its necessity (abandoned to sociologists) and the continuous creation of the free collective project, seen as a series of acts of com m itm ent indispen­ sable for saving the group from annihilation in pure m ateriality.18

It is, o f cou rse, never ruled ou t that the resp onses o f the h abitus m ay be accom pan ied b y a strategic calculation ten d in g to carry on quasi-consciously th e operation th e habitus carries on in a q u ite d ifferen t w ay, nam ely an estim ation o f ch an ces w h ich assu m es the transform ation o f the past effect into the exp ected o b jectiv e. But the fact rem ains that these resp on ses are defined first in relation to a system o f ob jective p oten tialities, im m ed ia tely inscribed in the presen t, th in g s to d o or not to d o , to say or not to say, in relation to a forthcom ing reality w hich - in contrast to th e future co n ceiv ed as " absolute p o ssib ility ” ( absolute M oglich keit), in H e g e l’s sen se, projected by the pure project o f a " n egative fr e e d o m ” - p u ts itself forw ard w ith an u rg en cy and a claim to existen ce exclu d in g all d elib eration . T o elim in a te the n eed to resort to ‘'r u le s” , it w o u ld b e necessary to estab lish in each case a com plete d escrip tion (w h ich invocation o f rules allow s one to d isp en se w ith ) of the relation b etw een th e h abitus, as a socially con stitu ted sy stem of co g n itiv e and m otivatin g stru ctu res, and th e socially stru ctured situ a tio n in w h ich the a g en ts’ interests are d efin ed , and w ith th em the o b jectiv e fu n ctio n s and su bjective m otivation s o f their p ractices. It w ould th en b ecom e clear that, as W eber in d ica ted , the juridical or custom ary rule is never m ore than a secondary p rin ciple o f the d eterm in ation of p ractices, in terv en in g w hen the prim ary p rin cip le, in terest, fa ils .19 S ym b o lic - that is, conventional and conditional - stim u la tio n s, w h ich act on ly on co n d itio n th ey en cou n ter agen ts co n d itio n ed to perceive th em , tend to im pose th e m se lv e s u n con d ition ally and n ecessarily w h en in cu lcation of the arbitrary ab olish es the arbitrariness of b oth the in cu lca tio n and th e sign ifica­ tio n s in cu lcated . T h e w orld of u rgen cies and of goals already ach ieved , of u ses to b e m ade and path s to be taken, o f ob jects en d o w e d w ith a "permanent teleological ch a ra cter”, in H u sse rl’s phrase, tools, in stru m en ts and institu* tion s, the w orld o f practicality, can grant on ly a co n d itio n a l freedom - liberet si liceret - rather like that of the m agnetic n eed le w h ich L eib n iz im agined

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tid ily en joyed tu rn in g northw ards. If one regularly o b serves a very close

rrelation betw een the scien tifically co n stru cted objective probabilities (e .g . the chances of access to a particular g o o d ) and subjective aspirations (" m o tiv a ­ tions” or " n e e d s”) or, in other term s, b etw een the a posteriori or ex post

probability know n from past exp erien ce and the a p rio ri ox ex ante probability attributed to it, this is not becau se agen ts co n sc io u sly adjust their aspirations t0 an exact evaluation o f their ch an ces o f su c c e ss, like a player regulating his bets as a function of perfect inform ation as to h is ch an ces o f w in n in g, as one im plicitly p resup poses w h en ever, forgettin g th e "every th in g takes place as if”, one proceeds as if gam e theory or the calcu lation of p rob abilities, each

constructed against sp on tan eou s d isp o sitio n s, am ou n ted to anthropological descriptions of practice. C om pletely reversin g the ten d en cy of ob jectiv ism , w'e can, on th e contrary,

seek in th e scien tific theory of p rob abilities (or strategies) not an an th rop olo­ gical m odel of practice, but the elem en ts o f a negative description o f the im p licit logic of th e spontaneous interpretation o f statistics (e .g . the p rosp en sity to p rivilege early exp erien ces) w h ich th e scien tific theory necessarily con tain s becau se it is explicitly con stru cted against that log ic. U n lik e th e estim a tio n o f p rob abili­ ties w hich scien ce con stru cts m eth od ically on th e basis of con trolled ex p eri­ ments from data estab lish ed according to precise rules, practical evaluation of the lik elihood o f the su ccess o f a given action in a g iv en situ ation brings into play a w'hole b ody of w isd om , sayin g s, com m o n p la ces, ethical p recepts ("that’s not for th e likes of u s ”) and, at a d eep er lev el, the u n co n scio u s principles of the ethos w h ich , b ein g the p rod u ct of a learn ing p rocess d o m i­ nated by a d eterm inate typ e of ob jective regularities, d eterm in es" rea so n a b le ” and ''u n reason ab le” con d u ct for every agen t su b jected to th o se regu larities .20 "We are n o soon er acquainted w ith the im p o ssib ility o f sa tisfy in g any d esire ”, says H u m e in A T reatise o f H um an N a tu re, " th an the d esire itself v a n ish e s.” And Marx in the Economic and Philosophical M anuscripts: " If I have n o m oney for travel, I have no need, i.e . no real and self-realizin g n eed , to travel. If I have a vocation to stu d y , b u t n o m on ey for it, I have no vocation to study, i.e . no real, true v o ca tio n .” Because th e d isp o sitio n s durably in cu lcated b y ob jective co n d itio n s (w h ich science ap preh en ds through statistical regularities as the p rob abilities ob jec­

tively attached to a grou p or class) en gen d er asp iration s and practices ob jec­ tively com p atib le w ith th ose ob jective req u irem en ts, the m ost im probable practices are ex clu d ed , eith er totally w ith o u t exam in a tio n , as unthinkable, or at the co st o f the double negation w hich in clin e s agen ts to m ake a virtu e of necessity, that is, to refuse wrhat is an yw ay refu sed and to love th e in evitab le. T h e very co n d ition s of p rod uction o f the e th o s, necessity m ade into a virtu e, ^ e su ch that the ex p ectation s to w hich it g ives rise ten d to ignore the

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restriction to w h ich the valid ity of any calcu lu s o f p ro b a b ilities is sub­ ordinated, n am ely that the co n d ition s o f th e ex p erim en ts sh o u ld not have b een m od ified . U n lik e scien tific estim ation s, w h ich are corrected after each exp erim en t in accordance w ith rigorous rules o f ca lcu lation , practical esti­ m ates g iv e d isp rop ortion ate w eigh t to early e x p e r ie n c e s: th e stru ctu res charac­ teristic of a d eterm in ate ty p e of co n d ition s o f ex iste n c e, through the eco n o m ic and social n ecessity w h ich th ey b rin g to bear on th e relatively a u to n om ou s u n iverse o f fam ily relation ship s, or m ore p recisely , through the m ediation of th e specifically fam ilial m an ifestation s of th is external necessity (sexual d iv isio n of labour, d om estic m orality, cares, strife, ta stes, etc.), p rod uce the stru ctu res of the h abitus w h ich b ecom e in turn th e basis of p erception and ap preciation of all su b seq u en t ex p erien ce. T h u s , as a result o f th e hysteresis effect necessarily im plied in the logic o f th e co n stitu tio n of habitus, p ractices are alw ays liable to incur n egative san ction s w h en the en viron m en t w ith w h ich th e y are actually con fron ted is to o distant from that to w hich they are ob jectively fitted . T h is is w h y g en eration con flicts oppose not age-classes separated by natural p rop erties, but h ab itu s w h ich have been p roduced by d ifferen t modes o f generation, that is, b y co n d itio n s of existence w h ich , in im p o sin g different d efin ition s of th e im p o ssib le, the p o ssib le, and the probable, cau se on e grou p to exp erien ce as natural or reasonable practices or aspirations w h ich another grou p finds unthin k able or scand alous, and vice versa. Structures, habitus an d practices T h e habitus, th e durably installed gen erative p rin cip le o f regulated im provi­ sation s, p rod u ces practices w h ich ten d to reproduce th e regularities im m anent in the ob jective co n d ition s of the p rod u ction o f their gen era tiv e principle, w h ile ad justing to the d em and s inscribed as ob jectiv e p oten tialities in the situ ation , as d efined b y the cogn itive and m otivatin g stru ctu res m aking up the h ab itu s. It fo llo w s that these practices can n ot b e d irectly d ed u ced either from the ob jective con d itio n s, defined as the in stan tan eou s su m o f th e stim uli w h ich m ay appear to have d irectly triggered th em , or from th e con d itions w h ich p rod u ced the durable p rin cip le of their p ro d u ctio n . T h e se practices can b e accou n ted for on ly b y relatin g the ob jective structure d efin in g the social co n d ition s of th e p rod u ction of the h abitus w h ich en g en d ered th e m to the co n d ition s in w h ich th is h ab itu s is op eratin g, that is, to th e conjuncture w hich, short o f a radical transform ation, represents a particular sta te o f th is structure. In practice, it is th e habitus, h istory turned into n atu re, i.e . d en ied as such, w hich acco m p lish es practically th e relating o f th ese tw o sy stem s o f relations, in and th rou gh th e p rod u ction o f practice. T h e " u n c o n s c io u s ” is never an yth ing other than the forgettin g of h istory w h ich h isto ry itself p rod uces by

Structures , habitus an d practices

jg

. corporating th e ob jective stru ctures it p rod u ces in the seco n d natures of habitus: " . • • in each o f u s, in varying prop ortions, there is part of y esterd a y ’s man; it IS yesterd ay’s m an w h o in evitab ly p red om in ates in u s, sin ce the resent a m ou n ts to little com pared w ith th e lo n g past in the course o f w hich we were form ed and from w hich w e resu lt. Y et w e d o n ot sen se this m an of the p ast, b ecause he is inveterate in u s; he m akes u p th e u n c o n scio u s part 0f ourselves. C on seq u en tly w e are led to take no accou n t of h im , any m ore than w e take accou n t o f his legitim ate d em an d s. C on versely , w e are very m uch aware of th e m ost recent attain m en ts of civilization , b ecau se, b ein g recent, they have n ot yet had tim e to settle in to our u n c o n sc io u s .”21 G enesis am nesia is also en cou raged (if n ot en tailed ) b y th e ob jectivist apprehension w h ich , graspin g the p rod uct of h istory as an opus operatum , a fa it accom pli, can on ly invoke the m ysteries of p re-esta b lish ed harm ony or the prodigies of co n scio u s orchestration to acco u n t for w h at, apprehended in pure sy n ch ron y, appears as ob jective m ean in g, w h eth er it be the internal coherence o f w orks or in stitu tion s su ch as m yth s, rites, or b o d ies of law , or the objective co-ordin ation w h ich th e con cordan t or co n flictin g p ractices of the m em bers o f the sam e grou p or class at on ce m anifest and p resup pose (inasmuch as they im p ly a com m u n ity o f d isp o sitio n s). Each agen t, w ittin g ly or u n w ittin gly, w illy n illy , is a p roducer and repro­ ducer of ob jective m ean in g. Because h is action s and w orks are the p rod uct of a modus operandi of w h ich he is not th e p rod ucer an d has n o co n scio u s mastery, th ey contain an " ob jective in ten tion ”, as th e S ch o la stics put it, w h ich always o u tru n s his co n scio u s in ten tio n s. T h e sch em es o f th o u g h t and expression he has acquired are the basis for th e intentionless invention of regulated im p rovisation . E n d lessly overtaken by h is o w n w ord s, w ith w h ich he m aintains a relation of "carry and b e ca r ried ”, as N ico la i H artm ann put it, the v irtu oso finds in the opus operatum n ew triggers and new su p p orts for the modus operandi from w h ich th ey arise, so that h is d iscou rse co n tin u o u sly feeds off itse lf like a train b rin gin g alon g its ow n ra ils .22 If w itticism s surprise their author no less than their au d ien ce, and im p ress as m uch b y their retrospective n ecessity as b y their n ov elty , the reason is that the trouvaille appears as the sim p le u nearthin g, at o n ce accid en tal and irresistib le, of a buried p o ssib ility . It is b ecau se su bjects d o not, strictly sp eak ing, know w hat they are d o in g that w hat th ey d o has m ore m ean in g than th ey know . T h e habitus is th e u n iversalizin g m ediation w h ich cau ses an in dividu al a g en t’s practices, w ith ou t eith er ex p licit reason or sig n ify in g in ten t, to be none the less " s e n s ib le ” and " r ea so n a b le”. T h a t part o f practices w h ich rem ains °bscure in th e ey es of their ow n producers is th e aspect b y w h ich th ey are objectively adjusted to other p ractices and to th e stru ctures o f w h ich the Principle o f their p rod u ction is itself th e p rod u ct .23

8o

Structures and the habitus O n e of th e fun dam en tal effects of the orchestration o f h abitus is the

p ro d u ction o f a com m o n sen se w orld en d ow ed w ith th e o bjectivity secu red by co n se n su s on th e m ean in g (sens) of practices and th e w o rld , in other words th e h arm onization o f ag en ts’ exp erien ces and th e co n tin u o u s reinforcem ent that each o f th em receives from th e exp ression , in dividu al or co llectiv e (in festivals, for exa m p le), im p rovised or program m ed (co m m o n p la ces, sayings), of sim ilar or id en tical ex p erien ces. T h e h o m o g e n e ity o f h ab itu s is w hat w ith in th e lim its of th e grou p of agen ts p ossessin g th e sch em es (o f production and in terp retation ) im p lied in their p rod uction - cau ses practices and works to b e im m ed iately in telligib le and foreseeable, and h en ce taken for granted. T h is practical com p reh en sion ob viates th e " in te n tio n ” and "intentional transfer in to th e O th e r ” dear to th e p h en om en o lo g ists, b y d isp en sin g , for th e ordinary occasion s of life, w ith close an alysis o f th e n uan ces o f another’s practice and tacit or ex p licit in q u iry (" W hat d o you mean ? ”) in to h is inten­ tio n s. A u tom atic and im person al, significant w ith o u t in ten d in g to signify, ordinary practices lend th em selv es to an u n d ersta n d in g no less au tom atic and im p e rso n a l: th e p ick in g u p of th e ob jective in ten tio n th e y exp ress in no way im plies " r ea ctiv a tio n ” of th e " liv e d ” in ten tion of th e agent w h o performs th e m .24 " C om m u n ica tio n of c o n sc io u sn e sse s” p resu p p o ses co m m u n ity of " u n c o n sc io u se s” (i.e . o f lin gu istic and cultural co m p eten ce s). T h e d eciph er­ in g of th e ob jective in ten tion of practices and w orks has n o th in g to d o with th e " r ep ro d u c tio n ” ( N achbildung, as th e early D iith e y p u ts it) o f lived ex p erien ces and the reco n stitu tio n , unnecessary'and u ncertain , o f th e personal sin gu larities of an " in te n tio n ” w h ich is not their true origin. T h e ob jective h o m o g en izin g of group or class h abitus w h ich resu lts from th e h o m o g en eity of th e co n d itio n s o f existen ce is w hat en ab les practices to be o b jectively h arm onized w ith o u t any in ten tion al calcu lation or conscious reference to a norm and m utually adjusted in the absence o f a n y d irect interaction or, a fortiori, ex p lic it c o -o r d in a tio n ." Im agine ”, L e ib n iz su g g ests, " tw o clocks or w atches in p erfect agreem en t as to the tim e. T h is m ay occur in o n e of three w ays. T h e first co n sists in m utual in flu e n c e; th e seco n d is to a p p o in t a skilful w orkm an to correct th em and syn ch ron ize th e m at all tim es; th e third is to con stru ct th ese clock s w ith su ch art and p recision that on e can b e assured o f their su b se q u en t a g reem en t .”25 S o lon g as, retaining o n ly th e first or at a p in ch the seco n d h y p o th esis, on e ignores th e tru e p rin cip le o f th e conductorless orchestration w h ich g iv e s regularity, u n ity , and sy stem a ticity to the p ractices of a grou p or class, and th is even in th e ab sen ce o f any sp on tan eou s or extern ally im p osed organ ization of in dividual projects, on e is con d em ned to th e naive artificialism w h ich recogn izes no other p rin cip le u n ify in g a group s or class’s ordinary or extraordinary action than th e co n scio u s co-ordination of a co n sp ira c y .26 If th e p ractices o f the m em b ers o f th e sam e grou p or class

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are m ore and b etter h arm onized than th e agen ts know or w ish , it is becau se,

Leibniz puts it, " fo llo w in g on ly [his] ow n la w s”, each " n o n e th e less agrees % vith the o th e r ”.27 T h e h ab itu s is p recisely th is im m an en t law , lex in sita, laid j 0wn in each agent by h is earliest u p b rin gin g, w hich is th e p recon d ition not onlv for the co-ord in ation of p ractices b u t also for practices o f co-ord in ation , «ince th e correction s and ad ju stm en ts the agen ts th em selv es co n scio u sly carry out presuppose their m astery o f a co m m o n code and sin ce u nd ertak ings o f collective m ob ilization cannot su cceed w ith o u t a m in im u m o f con cordan ce between the h ab itu s o f th e m o b ilizin g agen ts (e .g . p rop h et, party leader, e tc .) and the d isp o sitio n s o f th o se w h o se aspirations and w o rld -v iew th ey exp ress. So it is becau se th ey are th e p rod u ct o f d isp o sitio n s w h ich , b ein g th e internalization o f th e sam e ob jective stru ctu res, are ob jectiv ely con certed that (he practices of the m em b ers o f th e sam e grou p or, in a differen tiated so c iety , the sam e class are en d ow ed w ith an ob jective m ean in g that is at on ce unitary

and system atic, tran scen d in g su b jective in ten tion s and co n sc io u s projects whether in d ivid u al or c o lle c tiv e .28 T o d escrib e th e p rocess o f ob jectification

and orchestration in th e lan guage o f interaction and m utual a d ju stm ent is to forget that the in teraction itself ow es its form to th e o b jectiv e stru ctures which have p rod uced th e d isp o sitio n s of th e in teracting agen ts and w h ich allot them their relative p o sitio n s in the in teraction and elsew h ere. E very co n fro n ­ tation b etw een agen ts in fact b rin gs togeth er, in an interaction d efined by the objective structure of th e relation b etw een th e groups th e y b elo n g to ( e .g . a boss g iv in g orders to a su b ord in ate, colleagu es d iscu ssin g th eir p u p ils, academics taking part in a sy m p o siu m ), system s of d isp o sitio n s (carried by 'natural p e r so n s”) su ch as a lin g u istic com p eten ce and a cultural co m p eten ce and, through th ese h ab itu s, all th e ob jective stru ctures o f w h ich they are the product, stru ctures w h ich are active on ly w hen em bodied in a co m p eten ce acquired in th e cou rse of a particular h istory (w ith th e d ifferen t ty p es of

bilingualism or p ron u n ciation , for exam p le, stem m in g from d ifferen t m o d es of a cq u isition ).29 T h u s, w h en w e speak o f class h abitus, w e are in sistin g , against all form s of the occasion alist illu sion w h ich co n sists in d irectly relating p ractices to properties in scrib ed in th e situ ation , that " in terp erso n a l” relations are never, except in appearance, in d ividu al-to-in dividu al relation ship s and that th e truth °f the in teraction is never en tirely con tain ed in the in teraction . T h is is w hat social p sy ch o lo g y and in teraction ism or eth n o m eth o d o lo g y forget w h en , reducing the ob jective stru cture of th e relation ship b etw een th e assem b led tfidividuals to the con jun ctural stru cture of their in teraction in a particular situation and grou p , they seek to explain everyth in g that occu rs in an ex p eri­ m ental or ob served in teraction in term s of the exp erim en tally con trolled characteristics o f the situ ation , su ch as the relative spatial p o sitio n s o f the

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participants or th e nature o f th e ch an n els u sed . In fact it is th eir p resen t and past p ositio n s in th e social stru ctu re that b iological in d ivid u als carry with th em , at all tim es and in all p laces, in th e form o f d isp o sitio n s w h ich are so m any m arks o f social position and h en ce o f th e social d istance b etw een objective p o sitio n s, that is, b etw een social p erson s con jun cturally b rou ght together (in p hysical sp ace, w h ich is not th e sam e th in g as social sp a ce) and correlativelv, so m any rem in d ers o f th is d istan ce and of th e co n d u ct required in order to " k eep o n e ’s d ista n c e ” or to m an ip u late it strategically, w h eth er sym bolically or actually, to reduce it (easier for th e d om in a n t than for th e d om in ated ), increase it, or sim p ly m aintain if (b y n ot " lettin g o n ese lf g o ”, n ot "becom ing fa m ilia r”, in sh ort, " stan d in g on o n e ’s d ig n ity ”, or on th e other hand, refusin g to " take lib erties ” and " p u t o n ese lf forw ard ”, in s h o r t" k n o w in g o n es p la c e ” and stayin g th ere). E ven th o se form s o f in teraction seem in g ly m o st am en able to description in term s of " in ten tion al transfer in to th e O th e r ”, su ch as sy m p a th y , friend­ sh ip , or lo v e , are d om in ated (as class h om ogam y a tte s ts ), through th e harm ony o f h abitus, that is to say, m ore p recisely, th e h arm on y o f eth o s and tastes - d ou b tless sen sed in th e im p ercep tib le cu es of b o d y hexis - b y th e objective stru cture of th e relation s b etw e en social co n d itio n s. T h e illu sio n o f mutual election or p red estin ation arises from ignorance o f th e social co n d itio n s for th e h arm ony of aesth etic tastes or eth ical lean in g s, w hich is th ereb y perceived as ev id en ce o f th e ineffable affinities w h ich sp rin g from it. In sh ort, th e h abitus, th e p rod u ct of h istory, p rod u ces in d ivid u al and co llectiv e practices, and h en ce h istory, in accord ance w ith th e schem es en gen d ered b y h istory. T h e sy stem o f d isp o sitio n s - a past w h ich survives in th e p resen t and ten d s to p erp etu ate itself in to th e future b y m akin g itself p resen t in p ractices stru ctured accord in g to its p rin cip les, an internal law relayin g th e co n tin u o u s exercise of th e law of external n ecessities (irreducible to im m ed iate con jun ctural con strain ts) - is th e p rin cip le o f th e co n tin u ity and regularity w h ich o b jectivism d iscern s in th e social w orld w ith o u t b ein g able to g iv e th em a rational b asis. A n d it is at th e sam e tim e the p rin cip le o f the tran sform ation s and regulated revolu tion s w h ich n either th e extrin sic and in stan tan eou s d eterm in ism s o f a m ech an istic so cio lo g ism nor th e purely internal b u t eq u ally p u n ctu al d eterm in ation o f volu ntarist or spontaneist su b jectiv ism are cap ab le of a ccou n tin g for. It is just as true and just as u n tru e to say that co llectiv e actio n s produce th e even t or that th ey are its p rod u ct. T h e con ju n ctu re cap ab le o f transform ­ in g practices ob jectively co-ordin ated b ecau se su b ord in ated to partially or w h olly id en tical ob jective n ecessities, in to collective action ( e .g . revolutionary action ) is co n stitu ted in th e d ialectical relation ship b etw een , on the on e hand, a habitus, u n d erstood as a sy stem of lastin g, transposable d isp o sitio n s w h ich .

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tegrating past ex p erien ces, fu n ctio n s at every m o m en t as a m atrix o f percep*n its ap p rec^ ons* an(* a c*i°ns an^ rnakes p ossib le th e a ch iev em en t o f infini11 diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers o f sc h e m e s p erm ittin g the olution of sim ilarly sh aped p ro b lem s, and thanks to the u n cea sin g correction s of the results ob tain ed , d ialectically p rod u ced by th ose resu lts, and on th e other hand, an objective even t w h ich exerts its action of co n d itio n a l stim u lation calling for or d em a n d in g a d eterm in ate resp on se, on ly on th o se w h o are disposed to con stitu te it as su ch b ecau se th e y are en d ow ed w ith a d eterm in ate type o f d isp osition s (w h ich are am en able to red u p lication and rein forcem en t by the ’'aw akening of class c o n sc io u sn e ss” , that is, b y th e d irect or in direct possession of a d iscou rse cap ab le o f secu rin g sy m b o lic m astery o f th e practi­ cally m astered p rin cip les o f th e class h a b itu s). W ith ou t ever b ein g totally co-ordinated, since they are th e p rod uct o f "causal s e r ie s ” characterized by different structural d uration s, th e d isp o sitio n s and th e situ a tio n s w h ich com bine syn ch ron ically to co n stitu te a d eterm in ate co n ju n ctu re are n ever whollv in d ep en d en t, sin ce th ey are en gen d ered by th e o b jectiv e stru ctures, that is, in th e last an alysis, b y th e eco n o m ic bases o f th e social form ation in question. T h e h ysteresis o f h ab itu s, w h ich is in h eren t in th e social co n d itio n s of the reproduction of th e stru ctures in h ab itu s, is d o u b tless on e of the foundations of th e structural lag b etw een op p ortu n ities and th e d isp o sitio n s to grasp them w h ich is th e cau se of m issed op p ortu n ities and, in particular, of the frequ en tly ob served in cap acity to thin k historical crises in categories of perception and th o u g h t oth er than th o se o f th e p ast, a lb eit a revolu tionary past. If one ignores th e dialectical relation ship b etw een the o b jectiv e stru ctures and the cogn itive and m otivatin g stru ctu res w h ich th ey p rod u ce and w h ich tend to reproduce th em , if o n e forgets that th ese ob jectiv e stru ctures are them selves products o f historical practices and are co n sta n tly reprodu ced and transformed by h istorical practices w h o se p rod u ctive p rin cip le is itself the product o f the stru ctures w h ich it co n seq u en tly ten d s to rep rod u ce, then on e is condem ned to redu ce th e relation sh ip b etw een th e d ifferen t social agen cies ( instances), treated as " d ifferen t tran slation s o f th e sam e s e n te n c e ” - i n a Spinozist m etaphor w h ich con tain s th e truth of th e o b jectiv ist lan guage of articulation ” - to th e logical form ula en a b lin g any on e o f th e m to b e derived from any other. T h e u n ify in g p rin cip le o f practices in d ifferen t d o m a in s w h ich objectivist

analysis

w ou ld

assign

to

separate " s u b -s y s te m s ”, su ch

at,

P atrim onial strategies, fertility strategies, or eco n o m ic ch o ic es, is n o th in g other than the h ab itu s, th e lo cu s o f practical realization o f th e " a r ticu la tio n ” ° f fields w hich ob jectivism (from Parsons to th e stru cturalist readers of M arx) lavs out side b y sid e w ith o u t secu rin g th e m ean s o f d isco v erin g the real Principle o f the structural h om o lo g ies or relations of transform ation o b ject­

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iv ely estab lish ed b etw een th e m (w h ich is n ot to d en y that th e structures are o b jectiv ities irred u cib le to th eir m an ifestation in th e h a b itu s w h ich they p rod u ce and w h ich ten d to rep rod u ce th e m ). S o lo n g as o n e accepts the ca n on ic o p p o sitio n w h ich , en d lessly reappearing in n ew form s through out the h istory o f social th o u g h t, n ow ad ays p its "h u m a n is t” a g a in st" str u c tu r a list readings o f M arx, to declare diam etrical o p p o sitio n to su b jectivism is n ot g en u in e ly to break w ith it, b u t to fall in to th e fetish ism of social laws t0 w h ich ob jectivism co n sig n s itself w h e n in esta b lish in g b etw e en structure and p ractice th e relation o f th e virtual to the actual, of th e sco re to th e performance of essen ce to ex iste n c e, it m erely su b stitu tes for th e creative m an of subjects vism a m an su bjugated to th e dead law s of a natural h istory. A n d h ow could o n e u n d erestim a te th e stren gth o f th e id eological cou p le su bjectivism /objec­ tiv ism w h en o n e sees that th e critiq ue of th e in d ivid u a l co n sid ered as ens realissimum on ly leads to h is b ein g m ade an ep ip h e n o m en o n of hypostatized stru ctu re, and that the w ell-fo u n d ed assertion o f th e p rim acy of objective relation s resu lts in p ro d u cts o f h um an action , th e stru ctu res, b ein g credited w ith th e p ow er to d ev elo p in accord ance w ith their o w n law s and to determine an d o v erd eterm in e other stru ctu res?

,

Ju st as th e o p p o sitio n o f lan gu age to sp eech as m ere ex e cu tio n or even as a p recon stru cted o b ject m asks th e op p osition b etw een th e o b jectiv e relations o f th e lan guage and th e d isp o sitio n s m aking up lin g u istic co m p eten ce , so th e o p p o sitio n b etw e en th e stru ctu re and the in d iv id u a l again st w h om the stru ctu re has to be w o n and en d lessly rew’on stand s in th e w ay o f construction of th e dialectical relation sh ip b etw een the stru cture and th e dispositions m aking u p th e h abitus. If the debate on the relationship between " cu ltu re” and " p erson ality” which dom inated a w hole era of Am erican anthropology now seem s so artificial and sterile, it is because, am idst a host o f logical and epistem ological fallacies, it was organized around the relation betw een tw o com plem entary products of the sam e realist, substantialist representation of the scientific object. In its m ost exaggerated form s, the theory of "basic personality” ten d s to define personality as a miniature replica (obtained by " m o u ld in g ”) of the " cu ltu re”, to be found in all m em bers of the sam e society, except deviants. Cora D u B ois’s celebrated analyses on the Alor Island natives provide a very typical exam ple of th e con fu sion s and contradictions resulting from the theory that " cu ltu re” and personality can each be deduced from the other: determ ined to reconcile the anthropologist’s con clu sion s, based on the postulate that the same influences produce the sam e basic personality, with her ow n clinical observations of four subjects w ho seem to her to be "highly individual characters”, each "moulded by the specific factors in his individual fa te ”, the psychoanalyst w ho struggles to find individual incarnations of the basic personality is condem ned to recantations and contradictions.30 T h u s, she can see M angm a as "the m ost ty p ica l” of the four ("his personality corresponds to the basic personality stru ctu re”) after having written: " ll is difficult to decide how typical M angm a is. I w ould venture to say that if he were typical, the society could not con tin u e to ex ist.” Ripalda, w ho is passive and has

I

S tructu res , habitus an d practices

S 5

super-ego, is " atyp ical’*, S o is Fantan, w h o has "the strongest character a StfCfion devoid of inhibitions toward w o m e n ” (extrem e heterosexual inhibition *°fnl the rule), and "differs from the other m en as m uch as a citv-slicker differs from kc!°£ner ,\ T h e fourth, M alekala, w hose biography is typical at every point, is a 3 known prophet w ho tried to start a revivalist m ovem ent, and his personality seem s ^ resem b le that of Ripalda, another sorcerer w ho, as we have seen, is described as t0 ical. All this is capped by the analyst’s observation that "characters such as ngflia, Ripalda and Fantan can be found in any society ”. A nthony F . W allace, from Vhom this critique is taken,31 is no doubt right in p ointing out that the notion o f modal ' -onality has the advantage of avoiding the illogicalities resulting from indifference ^differences (and thus to statistics) usually im plicit in recourse to the notion of basic r s o n a l i t v . But what m ight pass for a m ere refinem ent of the m easuring and checking techniques used to test the validity o f a theoretical construct am ounts in fact to the - u b s t i t u t i o n of one object for another: a system o f h ypotheses as to the structure of personality, conceived as a hom eostatic system w hich changes by reinterpreting external pressures in accordance with its ow n logic, is replaced by a sim ple description of the central tendency in the distribution of the values of a variable, or rather a c o m b i n a t i o n of variables. Wallace thus com es to the tautological conclusion that in a population of Tuscarora Indians, the m odal personality type defined by reference to twenty-seven variables is to be found in only 37 per cen t of the subjects stu d ied . The construction of a class ethos m ay, for exam ple, make use of a reading of statistical regularities treated as indices, w ithout the principle w hich unifies and explains these regularities being reducible to the regularities in w hich it m anifests itself. In short, failing to see in the notion of "basic p erson ality’* anything other than a way of pointing to a directly observable " d a tu m ”, i.e . the "personality type*’ shared by the greatest number o f m em bers of a given society, the advocates o f th is notion cannot, in all logic, take issue w ith those w ho subm it th is theory to the test of statistical critique, in the name of the sam e realist representation of the scientific object.

The h abitus is the p rod uct o f the w ork of in cu lca tio n and appropriation necessary in order for th o se p rod u cts of co llec tiv e h istory, th e ob jective structures (e .g . o f lan gu age, e c o n o m y , e tc .) to su cceed in rep ro d u cin g th e m ­ selves m ore or less co m p letely , in th e form o f d urable d isp o sitio n s, in the organisms (w h ich on e can, if o n e w ish es, call in d ivid u a ls) lastingly su b jected to the sam e co n d itio n in g s, and h en ce placed in th e sam e m aterial co n d itio n s ° f existence. T h er efo re so c io lo g y treats as id en tical all th e b io lo g ica l in d iv i­ duals w h o, b ein g the p rod uct o f th e sam e o b jectiv e co n d itio n s, are the supports o f th e sam e h ab itu s: social class, u n d erstood as a sy stem o f o b jective determ inations, m u st be b rou gh t in to relation not w ith th e in d iv id u a l or w ith " c la ss” as a popu lation , i.e . as an aggregate of en u m erab le, m easurable

biological in d ivid u als, b u t w ith th e class h ab itu s, th e sy stem of d isp o sitio n s ^partially) co m m o n to all p ro d u cts o f th e sam e stru ctu res. T h o u g h it is ^ p o s s ib le for a ll m em b ers o f th e sam e class (or even tw o o f th em ) to have h&d the sam e ex p erien ces, in th e sam e ord er, it is certain that each m em b er the sam e class is m ore likely than any m em b er o f another class to have een con fron ted w ith th e situ ation s m ost freq u en t for the m em b ers o f that C,ass- T h e ob jectiv e stru ctu res w h ich sc ien ce ap p reh en d s in the form of

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statistical regu larities (e .g . e m p lo y m e n t rates, in co m e cu rv es, p rob abilities 0f a ccess to secon d ary ed u ca tio n , freq u en cy of h olid a y s, e tc .) in cu lca te , through th e direct or in d irect b u t alw ays co n vergen t ex p erien ces w h ich g iv e a social e n v iro n m en t its ph ysiogn om y, w ith its " clo sed d o o r s ”, " d ead e n d s ”, and lim ited " p r o s p e c ts ”, that "art of a ssessin g lik e lih o o d s”, as L e ib n iz put it, 0f a n ticip atin g th e ob jective fu tu re, in sh ort, th e sen se o f reality or realities which is perh ap s th e b est-co n cea led p rin cip le o f th eir efficacy. In order to d efin e the relation s b etw e en class, h ab itu s and th e organic in d iv id u a lity w h ich can never en tirely b e rem oved from so cio lo g ica l discourse, in a sm u ch as, b ein g giv en im m ed ia tely to im m ed ia te p ercep tio n (intuitus personae), it is also socially d esig n a ted and reco g n ized (n am e, legal identity, e tc .) and is d efin ed b y a social trajectory strictly sp eak ing irred u cib le to any o th er, th e h ab itu s cou ld b e con sid ered as a su b jectiv e b u t not in d iv id u a l system of in tern alized stru ctu res, sc h e m e s of p ercep tio n , co n ce p tio n , and action co m m o n to all m em b ers of th e sam e grou p or class and co n stitu tin g the p reco n d ition for all ob jectification and a p p ercep tio n : and th e o b jectiv e co­ ord in ation o f p ractices and the sh arin g o f a w orld -v iew cou ld be fou n d ed on the p erfect im p erson ality and in terch an geab ility o f sin gular practices and v iew s. B ut th is w ou ld am ou n t to regarding all the practices or representations prod uced in accord ance w ith id en tical sc h e m e s as im person al and su b stitu ­ table, like sin gular in tu itio n s of sp a ce w h ich , acco rd in g to K a n t, reflect none o f th e p ecu liarities o f th e in d ivid u al ego. In fact, it is in a relation of h o m o lo g y , of d iversity w ith in h o m o g en eity reflectin g th e d iv er sity within h o m o g e n e ity ch aracteristic of their social c o n d itio n s o f p ro d u ctio n , that the sin gular h a b itu s of th e d ifferen t m em b ers o f th e sam e class are u n ite d ; the h o m o lo g y of w orld -v iew s im p lies th e sy stem a tic d ifferen ces w h ich separate sin gular w o rld -v iew s, ad op ted from sin gular b u t con certed stand points. S in ce the h istory o f th e in d ivid u al is never a n y th in g other th an a certain sp ecification o f th e co llec tiv e h istory o f h is grou p or class, each individual system o f dispositions m ay b e seen as a structural v a r ia n t o f all th e o th er group or class h ab itu s, ex p ressin g th e d ifferen ce b etw e en trajectories and positions in sid e or o u tsid e th e cla ss. " P e r so n a l” sty le, th e particular stam p m arking all th e p ro d u cts of th e sam e h ab itu s, w h eth er p ractices or w orks, is n ev er more than a deviation in relation to th e style of a p eriod or class so that it relates back to th e co m m o n sty le n ot o n ly b y its co n fo rm ity - like P h id ias, who, accord in g to H e g el, had no " m ann er ” - b u t also b y th e d ifferen ce w h ich makes th e w h ole " m a n n e r ” . T h e p rin cip le o f th ese in d ivid u al d ifferen ces lies in th e fact that, b ein g the p rod u ct o f a ch ron o lo g ica lly ordered series of stru ctu rin g d eterm in a tio n s, the h a b itu s, w h ich at every m o m e n t stru ctu res in term s o f th e structuring ex p erien ces w h ich p rod u ced it th e stru ctu rin g ex p erien ces w h ich affect its

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*7

tructure, b rin gs ab ou t a u n iq u e in tegration , d om in a ted b y th e earliest S neriences, o f th e ex p erien ces statistically co m m o n to th e m em b e rs o f the same class. T h u s , for ex a m p le, th e h ab itu s acq u ired in th e fa m ily u n d erlies the structuring of sch o o l ex p erien ces (in particular th e recep tio n and a ssim i­ lation of the sp ecifically p ed agogic m essa g e ), and th e h a b itu s tran sform ed b y schooling, itself d iversified , in tu rn u n d erlies th e stru ctu rin g o f all su b seq u en t experiences (e .g . th e recep tio n and assim ilation o f th e m essa g es o f th e cu ltu re industry or w ork ex p er ie n c es), and so o n , from restru ctu rin g to restru cturin g. Springing from th e en co u n te r in an in tegrative organ ism o f relatively independent causal series, su ch as b iological an d social d eter m in ism s, th e habitus m akes co h eren ce and n ecessity o u t o f accid en t and co n tin g e n c y : for

example, th e eq u iv a len ces it esta b lish es b etw e en p o sitio n s in th e d iv isio n o f labour and p o sitio n s in th e d iv isio n b etw e en th e se x es are d o u b tle ss not peculiar to so c ietie s in w h ich th e d iv isio n o f labour and th e d iv isio n b etw een the sexes co in c id e alm ost p erfectly. In a class so c iety , all th e p ro d u cts o f a given agen t, b y an essen tial overdeterm ination , speak in sep arab ly an d sim u l­ taneously o f h is class - or, m ore, p recisely, h is p ositio n in th e social stru cture and his risin g or fallin g trajectory - and of h is (or h er) b o d y - or, m ore precisely, all th e p rop erties, alw ays socia lly qualified, o f w h ich he or sh e is the bearer - sexu al p rop erties o f cou rse, b u t also p hysical p rop erties, p raised, like strength or b eau ty, or stig m a tized .

T h e dialectic o f objectification a n d em bodiment So long as th e w ork o f ed u cation is n ot clearly in stitu tio n a lized as a sp ecific, autonom ous p ractice, and it is a w h o le g rou p and a w h o le sy m b o lica lly stru c­ tured en v iro n m en t, w ith o u t sp ecialized agen ts or sp ecific m o m e n ts, w h ich exerts an an o n y m o u s, p ervasive p ed agogic actio n , th e essen tia l part o f the modus operandi w h ich d efin es practical m astery is tra n sm itted in practice, in its practical state, w ith o u t attain in g th e le v el of d iscou rse. T h e ch ild im itates not ,fm o d e ls ” b u t other p eop le's a ctio n s. B od y hexis sp eak s d irectly to the niotor fu n ctio n , in th e form o f a pattern of p ostu res that is b o th in d ivid u al and sy stem atic, b ecau se linked to a w h o le sy stem of tec h n iq u es in v o lv in g th e body and to o ls, and ch arged w ith a h ost of social m ea n in g s and va lu es: *n all so c ietie s, ch ild ren are particularly atten tive to th e g estu res an d p ostu res w hich, in their ey es, exp ress ev e ry th in g that goes to m ake an a cco m p lish ed adult - a w ay o f w alk in g, a tilt of the h ead , facial ex p ressio n s, w ays of sittin g and of u sin g im p lem en ts, alw ays associated w ith a to n e o f v o ic e , a sty le of sp eech , and (h o w cou ld it be o th erw ise? ) a certain su b jectiv e ex p erien ce. B ut the fact that sc h e m e s are able to pass from practice to p ractice w ith o u t g o in g through d isco u rse or co n sc io u sn e ss d o e s n ot m ean that acq u isitio n o f the

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habitus co m es d ow n to a q u estion of m echanical learn ing by trial and error U nlike an in coh eren t series o f figures, w h ich can be learnt o n ly gradually through repeated attem p ts and w ith con tin u o u s p redictable p rogress, a num e­ rical series is m astered m ore easily b ecause it con tain s a structure w h ich makes it unnecessary to m em orize all the n um bers on e by o n e : in verbal products such as proverbs, sayin gs, m axim s, so n g s, ridd les, or gam es; in ob jects, such as tools, th e h ou se, or the village; or again, in p racticcs such as con tests of honour, gift exch an ges, rites, e tc ., the m aterial w h ich the K a b y le ch ild has to assim ilate is the p rod u ct of th e system atic application of principles coherent in practice ,32 wrh ich m ean s, that in all th is en d lessly redundant m aterial, he has no difficulty in graspin g th e rationale o f w hat are clearly series and in m aking it h is ow n in the form of a p rin cip le gen erating con d uct organized in accordance w ith the sam e rationale. Experimental analyses of learning w hich establish that " neither the form ation nor the application of a concept requires conscious recognition of the com m on elements or relationship involved in the specific i n s t a n c e s e n a b l e us to understand the dialectic of objectification and incorporation w hereby the systematic objectifications of system atic dispositions tend in their turn to give rise to systematic dispositions: when faced w ith series of sym bols - C hinese characters (H u ll) or pictures varying sim ultaneously the colour, nature, and num ber of the objects represented (Heidbreder) - distributed into classes w ith arbitrary but objectively based names, subjects who are unable to state the principle of classification nonetheless attain higher scores than they w ould if they were guessing a t random, thereby dem onstrating that they achieve a practical mastery of the classificatory schem es which in no way implies sym bolic mastery - i.e . conscious recognition and verbal expression - of the processes practically applied. Albert B. Lord's analysis o f the acquiring of structured material in a natural environm ent, based on his study of the training of the guslar, the Y u g o s l a v bard, entirely confirm s the experim ental findings: the practical mastery of what Lord calls "the form ula”, that is, the capacity to im provise by com bining "form ulae”, sequences of words "regularly em ployed under the sam e metrical conditions to express a given id ea”,34 is acquired through sheer familiarization, "by hearing the poem s”,35 w ithout the learner’s having any sense o f learning and subsequently mani­ pulating this or that form ula or any set of form ulae:36 the constraints of rhythm are internalized at the same tim e as m elody and m eaning, w ithout being attended to for their own sake.

B etw een ap p ren ticesh ip through sim p le fam iliarization, in w h ich th e ap­ prentice in sen sib ly and u n con scio u sly acquires th e p rin cip les of th e "art and the art of living - in clu d in g th ose w h ich are not know n to th e producer of the p ractices or w orks im itated , and, at the other extrem e, exp licit and express tran sm ission by precept and p rescription , every society provides for structural exercises ten d in g to transm it th is or that form o f practical m astery. S uch are the riddles and ritual con tests w h ich test the " sen se o f ritual language ” and all th e gam es, often structured accord in g to th e logic of the wager, the ch allenge or th e com bat (d u els, grou p battles, target-shootin g.

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etc ) which require the b oys to set to w ork, in th e m ode o f " le t’s p retend ”, the chetfies gen erating the strategies of h on ou r .37 T h e n there is daily participation in gift exchan ges and all their su b tleties, w h ich the b o y s derive from their role as m essengers an d, m ore especially, as interm ediaries b etw een th e fem ale

xvofld and the m ale w orld . T h ere is silen t ob servation o f th e d iscu ssio n s in the men’s assem b ly, w ith their effects o f elo q u en ce, their rituals, their s t r a t e g ie s ,

their ritual strategies and strategic u ses o f ritual. T h ere are the

interactions w ith their relatives, w h ich lead them to ex p lo re th e structured space of ob jective kin relationships in all d irection s b y m ean s o f reversals requiring the person w h o saw him self and b ehaved as a n ep h ew o f his fath er’s brother to see h im self and behave as a paternal uncle tow ards h is b rother’s son, and th u s to acquire m astery o f the transform ational sch em es w h ich p erm it the passage from th e sy stem of d isp o sitio n s attached to on e p o sitio n to the

system appropriate to the sym m etrically op p o site p o sitio n . T h ere are the lexical and gram m atical com m u tation s ( " I ” and " y o u ” d esig n a tin g the sam e person accord in g to the relation to the speaker) w h ich in stil the sen se o f the interchangeability o f p osition s and of reciprocity as w ell as a sen se of the lim its

of each. A n d , at a d eep er level, there are th e relation ship s w ith the m oth er and the father, w h ich , b y their d yssym m etry in an tagon istic co m p lem en tarity, constitute one of th e op p ortu n ities to in tern alize, inseparably, the sch em es

of the sexual division o f labour and of the division o f sexual labour. But it is in th e dialectical relation ship b etw een the b o d y and a space structured accord in g to the m yth ico-ritu al o p p osition s that on e finds the form par ex cellen ce o f the structural ap pren ticesh ip w hich leads to the em -b o d y in g of the structures of th e w orld, that is, the appropriating b y the w orld o f a body th u s enabled to appropriate the w orld. In a social form ation in w h ich the absence o f th e svm b olic-p rod u ct-con servin g tech n iq u es associated w ith literacy retards the ob jectification o f sy m b o lic and particularly cultural capital, inhabited space - and above all the h ou se - is the principal lo cu s for the objectification o f the gen erative sc h e m e s; and, through th e interm ediary of the divisions and hierarchies it sets up b etw een th in gs, p ersons, and practices, this tangible classifyin g system con tin u o u sly in cu lcates and reinforces the taxonom ic p rin cip les u nd erlyin g all th e arbitrary p rovision s of this cu ltu re .38 T h us, as we have seen , the op position b etw een the sacred o f the right hand and th e sacred of th e left hand, b etw een n if and h aram , b etw een m an, ^ v ested w ith p rotective, fecun datin g virtu es, and w om an , at on ce sacred and charged w ith m aleficen t forces, and, correlatively, b etw een religion (m ale) and m agic (fem a le), is reproduced in the spatial d ivision b etw een m ale space, Wlth the place of assem b ly, the m arket, or th e fields, and fem ale sp ace, the house and its gard en , the retreats of haram . T o d iscover h ow this spatial organization (m atch ed b y a tem poral organization o b ey in g the sam e logic)

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gov ern s practices and represen tation s - far b eyon d the frequ en tly described rough d ivision s b etw een the m ale w orld and the fem ale w orld , th e assembly and the fou n tain , p ub lic life and in tim acy - and thereby con trib utes to the durable im p osition of th e sc h e m e s o f p ercep tion , th o u g h t, and action, it j8 necessary to grasp the dialectic o f objectification and em b o d im en t in the p rivileged locu s o f th e sp ace of th e h ouse and the earliest learn ing processes. T h is analysis of the relation sh ip b etw een the ob jectified sch em es and the sch em es incorporated or b ein g incorporated p resu p p o ses a structural analysis of the social organization of th e in tern al sp ace of the h ouse and th e relation of th is internal space to external sp ace, an analysis w h ich is not an end in itself but w h ich , p recisely on accou n t of the (dan gerous) affinity betw een ob jectivism and all that is already objectified, is the on ly m eans o f fully grasping the stru cturin g stru ctu res w h ich , rem aining ob scu re to them selves, are revealed on ly in the ob jects th e y stru cture. T h e house, an opus operatum, len d s itself as su ch to a d ecip h erin g , b u t on ly to a d eciph ering w h ich does not forget that the " b o o k ” from w h ich th e ch ild ren learn their v isio n of the w orld is read w ith the b o d y , in and through the m o v em en ts and displacem ents w h ich make the space w ith in wrh ich th ey are enacted as m uch as they are m ade by it. T h e interior of the Kabyle house, rectangular in shape, is divided into two parts by a low w all: the larger of these tw o parts, slightly higher than the other, is reserved for human use; the other side, occupied by the anim als, has a loft above it. A door w ith tw o w ings gives access to both room s. In the upper part is the hearth and, facing the door, the w eaving loom . T h e low er, dark, nocturnal part of the house, the place of damp, green, or raw objects - water jars set on the benches on either side of the entrance to the stable or against the "wall of darkness ”, w ood, green fodder - the place too of natural beings - oxen and co w s, donkeys and m ules - and natural activities sleep, sex, birth - and also of death, is opposed to the high, light-filled, noble place of humans and in particular of the guest, fire and fire-made objects, the lam p, kitchen utensils, the rifle - the attribute of the manly point of honour ( tiif) w hich protects fem ale honour ( hurma) - the loom , th e sym bol of all protection, the place also of the tw o specifically cultural activities performed w ithin the house, cooking and weaving. T he m eaning objectified in things or places is fully revealed only in the practices structured according to the sam e schem es which are organized in relation to them (and vice versa). T h e guest to be honoured (qabel, a verb also m eaning "to stand up t o ”, and "to face the east ”) is invited to sit in front of the loom . T h e opposite wall is called the wall of darkness, or the wall of the invalid: a sick person’s bed is placed next to it. T h e washing o f the dead takes place at the entrance to the stable. T h e low dark part is opposed to the upper part as the fem ale to the m ale: it is the m ost intim ate place w ithin the world o f intim acy (sexuality, fertility). T h e opposition betw een the male and the female also reappears in the opposition betw een the " master beam and the main pillar, a fork op en skywards. T h u s, the house is organized according to a set of hom ologous oppositions fire: water :: cook ed : raw :: h ig h : low :: lig h t: shade :: d a y : night :: m a le: fem ale ♦« nif: hurma:: fertilizing: able to be fertilized. But in fact the same oppositions are established between the house as a w hole and the rest of the universe, that is, the

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w o r l d , the place of assem bly, the fields, and the market. It follow s that each ^ th e s e two parts of the house (and, by the sam e token, each of the objects placed it a n d each of the activities carried out in it) is in a sense qualified at two degrees, If t as female (nocturnal, dark, etc.) insofar as it partakes of the universe of the U Se an
woman.

All the actions p erform ed in a space con stru cted in this way are im m ediately qualified sym b olically and fu n ctio n as so m a n y structural ex ercises through which is b u ilt up practical m astery of th e fun dam en tal sch e m e s, w h ich organize m agical practices and rep resen tation s: g o in g in and co m in g ou t, filling and em p ty in g , o p en in g and sh u ttin g , g o in g leftw ards and g o in g righ t­ wards, g oin g w estw ard s and g o in g eastw ard s, etc. T h ro u g h the m agic of a world of ob jects w hich is th e p rod u ct o f th e ap plication o f th e sam e sch em es to the m ost d iverse d om ain s, a w orld in w h ich each th in g speaks m etaph ori­ cally of all th e others, each practice co m e s to be in vested w ith an ob jective m eaning, a m ean in g w ith w h ich practices - and particularly rites - have to reckon at all tim es, w h eth er to evoke or revoke it. T h e con stru ction of the world of ob jects is clearly not the so vereign operation o f c o n scio u sn ess w h ich the n eo-K antian tradition co n ce iv e s of; the m ental stru ctures w h ich con stru ct the world o f ob jects are con stru cted in th e practice of a w orld o f ob jects constructed accord in g to th e sam e stru ctu r es .40 T h e m ind born o f th e w orld of objects d oes not rise as a su b jectiv ity con fron tin g an o b jectiv ity : the objective u niverse is m ade u p of ob jects w h ich are the p rod u ct o f ob jectifyin g operations structured according to th e very stru ctures w h ich th e m in d applies

t0 it. T h e m ind is a m etaphor of the w orld of ob jects w h ich is itself b u t an endless circle of m utually reflecting m etap h ors. All the sym b olic m anip ulations o f b od y exp erien ce, starting w ith d isp lace­ m ents w ith in a m yth ically structured sp a ce , e .g . the m o v em en ts of g o in g in and com in g o u t, ten d to im p ose th e integration o f the b od y sp ace w ith co sm ic space by graspin g in term s of th e sam e c o n c e p ts (and naturally at the price great laxity in logic) th e relation ship b etw e en m an and th e natural w orld and the com p lem en tarity and op p osed sta tes and action s o f th e tw o sex es in the d iv ision of sexual w ork and sexual d iv isio n o f w ork, and h en ce in th e work ° f biological and social rep rod u ction . F or exam p le, the o p p o sitio n b etw een

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m o v em en t ou tw ard s tow ards th e fie ld s or th e m arket, tow ards th e production and circulation of g o o d s, and m o v em en t in w ard s, tow ards th e accum ulati0ri and con su m p tio n of th e p ro d u cts of w ork , corresp on d s sy m b o lica lly to the o p p o sitio n b etw een th e m ale b o d y , self-en clo sed and d irected towards the o u tsid e w orld , and the fem ale b o d y , resem b lin g th e dark, d am p house fu ll of fo o d , u te n sils, and ch ild ren , wrh ich is en tered and left b y th e same in evitab ly so iled o p e n in g .41 T h e op p o sitio n b etw een th e centrifugal, m ale orien tation and th e centripetal fem ale orien tation , w h ich , as w e have seen , is th e true p rin cip le of the organization of d om estic sp ace, is d o u b tless also th e b asis o f th e relationship o f each o f th e se x es to their " p s y c h e ”, that is, to their b o d ies and more precisely to their sexu ality. A s in every so ciety d o m in ated b y m ale values - and E u rop ean so c ietie s, w h ich assign m en to p o litics, history, or war and w o m en to th e hearth, th e n ovel, and p sy ch o lo g y , are n o ex cep tio n - the sp ecifically m ale relation to se x u a lity is that of sublim ation, th e sy m b olism of h onou r ten d in g at on ce to refuse any d irect ex p ressio n o f sex u a lity and to en cou rage its transfigured m an ifestation in th e form o f m an ly p row ess: the m en , w h o are n either co n scio u s of nor con cern ed w ith th e fem ale orgasm but seek the affirm ation o f their p oten cy in repetition rather than prolongation o f th e sexual act, are not unawrare th at, through th e interm ediary o f th e female g o ssip that th ey b oth fear and d esp ise, th e ey e s o f th e group alw ays threaten their in tim acy. A s for the w o m e n , it is true to say, w ith E rikson, that male d om in ation ten d s to "restrict their verbal c o n sc io u s n e s s ”42 so lo n g as this is taken to m ean n ot that th ey are forb id d en all talk o f se x , b u t that their d iscou rse is d om in ated by th e m ale v alu es of v irility , so that all reference to specifically fem ale sexu al " in te r e sts” is exclu d ed from th is aggressive and sh am e-filled cu lt o f m ale p o ten cy . P sych oan alysis, the d isen ch a n tin g p rod uct o f th e d isen ch a n tm en t of the w o rld , w h ich lead s to a d o m a in of sign ification that ism y th ica lly overdetermined to b e co n stitu ted as suchy forgets and cau ses it to b e forgotten that on e's own body and o th er p e o p le ’s b o d ies are o n ly ever p erceiv ed through categories of p ercep tion w h ich it w o u ld be naive to treat as sex u a l, even if, as is attested b y the wTo m e n ’s lau ghter d u r in g con versation s, and the in terp retation s they g iv e of grap h ic sy m b o ls - m ural p ain tin gs, p ottery or carpet d esig n s, etc. th e se categories alw ays relate back, so m etim es very co n cretely , to the o p p osition b etw een the b iologically defined p rop erties of th e tw o se x es. As naive as it w ou ld b e to reduce to th eir strictly sexu al d im en sio n th e countless acts of d iffu se in cu lcation th rou gh w h ich th e b o d y and the w orld ten d to be set in order, b y m ean s of a sy m b o lic m an ip u lation of the relation to th e body and to th e w orld aim in g to im p ose w hat has to be called , in M elan ie Klein s term , a " b o d y g e o g r a p h y ” , a particular case of geo g ra p h y , or better.

T h e dialectic o f objectification an d em bodim ent

9 3

sinology -43 T h e ch ild ’s in itial relation to its father or m o th er, or in other

00

t0 the paternal b o d y and m aternal b o d y , w h ich offers th e m ost

!f matic op portu nity to exp erien ce all th e fu n d am en tal o p p o sitio n s o f m yth olC practice, can n ot be fou n d as the b asis of the acq u isitio n o f the P nCiples of th e stru ctu rin g of th e ego and th e w orld, and in particular o f very hom osexual and h eterosexu al relation sh ip , excep t insofar as that initial relation is set u p w ith ob jects w h o se sex is d efin ed sy m b o lica lly and not biologically. T h e ch ild co n stru cts its sexual identity, th e m ajor elem en t in its social id en tity, at the sam e tim e as it con stru cts its im age of th e d iv isio n of orfc betw een th e se x es, o u t o f th e sam e socially d efined set o f inseparably biological and social in d ices. In other w ord s, the aw akening o f co n scio u sn ess of sexual id en tity and th e in corporation of th e d isp o sitio n s associated w ith

a determinate social d efin ition o f th e social fu n ctio n s in cu m b en t on m en and women com e hand in hand w ith th e ad op tion of a socially d efined v isio n of the sexual d ivision of labour. Psychologists’ work on the perception of sexual differences makes it clear that children establish clear-cut distin ction s very early (about age five) betw een male and female functions, assigning dom estic tasks to w om en and m others and econom ic activities to m en and fathers. Everything suggests that the awareness of sexual differences and the distinction betw een paternal and m aternal functions are constituted simultaneously. From the num erous analyses of the differential perception of mother and father it may be gathered that the father is generally seen as more com petent and more severe than the mother, w ho is regarded as " kinder ” and more affectionate than the father and is the object of a m ore em otional and more agreeable relationship. In fact, as Emmerich very rightly points out, underlying all these differences is the fact that children attribute more pow er to the father than to the m other.

It is not hard to im agin e th e w eigh t that m u st b e b ro u g h t to bear o n the construction o f self-im age and w orld -im age b y the o p p o sitio n b etw een masculinity and fem in in ity w h e n it co n stitu tes th e fu n d a m en ta l p rin cip le o f division o f th e social and sy m b o lic w orld . A s is em p h a sized b y th e tw ofold meaning o f th e w ord nif, sexual p o te n c y inseparable from so cia l p o ten cy , w hat is im posed th rou gh a certain social d efin ition of m alen ess (and , by d erivation , of fem alen ess), is a p olitical m y th o lo g y w h ich g overn s all b o d ily ex p erien ces, not least sexual ex p erien ces th e m selv es. T h u s , th e op p o sitio n b etw een m ale sexuality, pub lic and su b lim ated , and fem ale sex u a lity , secret an d, so to speak, alienated ” (w ith resp ect to E r ik so n s " u top ia of u niversal g e n ita lity ”, i.e . the "u topia of fu ll orgasm ic re cip r o city ”) is o n ly a sp ecifica tio n o f th e opposition b etw een the extraversion o f p o litics or p u b lic religion and th e x tro v ersio n of p sy ch o lo g y or private m agic, m ad e up for th e m o st part of n tes aim ed at d o m estica tin g th e m ale p artners. Bodily /texts is political m ythology realized, em-bodied, turned into a permanent lsposition, a durable m anner of standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling and

9 4

Structures an d the habitus

thinking. T h e oppositions w hich m ythico-ritual logic makes betw een the male ancj the fem ale and w hich organize the w hole system o f values reappear, for exam p le ^ the gestures and m ovem ents of the b od y, in the form of the opposition between the straight and the bent, or betw een assurance and restraint. " T h e Kabyle is like th heather, he w ould rather break than b e n d .” T h e man of honour’s pace is steady and determ ined. H is way of walking, that of a man w h o know s w here he is goin g and knovv8 he will arrive in tim e, w hatever the obstacles, expresses strength and resolution, 35 opposed to the hesitant gait (th ikli thamahmahth) announcing indecision, half-hearted prom ises ( a v a l amahmah), the fear of com m itm ents and the incapacity to fulfil them At the sam e tim e it is a measured p a ce: it contrasts as m uch with the haste of the man w ho "throw s his feet up as high as his h ea d ”, "walks along w ith great strides” " dances ” - running being weak and frivolous conduct - as it does w ith the sluggishness of the man w ho "trails a lo n g ”. T h e m anly man stands up straight and honours the person he approaches or w ishes to w elcom e by looking him right in the eves; ever on the alert, because ever threatened, he lets nothing that happens around him escape him , whereas a gaze that is up in the clouds or fixed on the ground is the mark of an irresponsible m an, w ho has nothing to fear because he has no responsibilities in his group. C onversely, a w om an is expected to walk with a slight stoop, looking down, keeping her eyes on the spot where she w ill next put her foot, especially if she happens to have to walk past the thajma'th; her gait m ust avoid the excessive sw in g of the hips which com es from a heavy stride; she m ust always be girdled with the thimehremth, a rectangular piece of cloth w ith yellow , red, and black stripes worn over her dress, and take care that her headscarf does not com e unknotted, revealing her hair. In short, the specifically fem inine virtue, lahia, m odesty, restraint, reserve, orients the w hole fem ale b ody dow nwards, tow ards the ground, the inside, the house, w’hereas male excellence, nif, is asserted in m ovem ent upwards, outw’ards, towards other m en.

If all so c ietie s and, sign ifican tly, all the "totalitarian in stitu tio n s ”, in G off m an ’s p hrase, that seek to produce a n ew m an through a process of " d ec u ltu ra tio n ” and " r ec u ltu ra tio n ” set su ch store on the se em in g ly most in sign ifican t d etails of dress, bearing, p hysical and verbal manners, th e reason is th at, treatin g th e b ody as a m em ory, they en tru st to it in ab breviated and practical, i.e . m n em o n ic, form th e fu n d am en ta l p rin cip les o f th e arbitrary co n ten t of th e cu ltu re. T h e p rin cip les em -b o d ied in th is w ay are p laced beyond th e grasp of co n sc io u sn e ss, and h en ce cannot b e to u ch ed b y voluntary, d elib erate tran sform ation , can n ot even be m ade ex p licit; n o th in g se em s more in effab le, m ore in co m m u n ica b le, m ore in im ita b le, and, th erefo re, more p reciou s, than th e v alu es g iv en b o d y , m ade b o d y b y th e transubstantiation ach ieved b y th e h id d en p ersuasion of an im p licit p ed a g o g y , capable of in stillin g a w h o le co sm o lo g y , an eth ic, a m etap h y sic, a p olitical p h ilosop h y, through in ju n ction s as in sign ifican t as " stand u p straigh t ” or " d o n ’t hold your knife in you r left h a n d ”.44 T h e lo g ic of sc h e m e transfer w h ich m akes each tech n iq u e o f th e b ody a sort o f pa rs totalis, p red isp osed to fu n ctio n in accordance w ith th e fallacy p a rs p ro totot and h en ce to evok e th e w h o le system o f w h ich it is a part, gives a very general sco p e to the se em in g ly m ost circu m scrib ed and circu m stan tial ob servan ces. T h e w h o le trick o f p edagogic

The dialectic o f objectification and em bodiment

95

reason I*68 precisely in the w ay it extorts th e essen tial w h ile se em in g to dem and the in sign ifican t: in o b tain in g th e respect for form and form s o f resp ect w h ich constitute th e m ost v isib le and at th e sam e tim e th e b est-h id d en (b ecau se most * n a tu ra l”) m an ifestation o f su b m issio n to th e esta b lish ed order, th e in c o r p o r a t io n

o f th e arbitrary ab olish es w hat R aym on d R uyer calls " lateral

possibilities” , that is, all th e eccen tricities and d evia tio n s w h ich are th e sm all change o f m ad n ess. T h e co n cessio n s o f politeness alw ays con tain p o litica l c o n c e s s io n s .

T h e term obsequium u sed by S p in o za to d en o te th e " con stan t

*iH" produced by th e co n d itio n in g through w h ich " th e S ta te fash ion s u s for

its own use and w hich en ab les it to s u r v iv e ”45 co u ld be reserved to d esign ate the public testim o n ies of recogn ition w h ich every grou p ex p ec ts o f its members (especially at m om en ts of co -o p tio n ), that is, th e sy m b o lic taxes d ue from individuals in the ex ch an ges w h ich are set up in every grou p b etw een th e individuals and th e grou p . B ecau se, as in g ift ex ch a n g e, th e ex ch a n g e is an end in itself, the trib u te d em an d ed b y th e grou p gen erally co m es d o w n to a matter o f trifles, that is, to sy m b o lic rituals (rites of passage, th e cerem on ials o f etiquette,

e t c .) , form alities and form alism s w h ich " cost n o th in g ” to perform

and seem su ch

n atu ra l” th in g s to d em and (" It's th e least on e can d o . . . ” :

“ It w ou ld n ’t cost h im an yth in g t o . . . ”) that ab sten tio n a m o u n ts to a refusal or a ch a llen g e.4* T hrou gh th e habitus, th e stru ctu re w h ich has p rod uced it g o v ern s practice, not by th e p rocesses of a m ech an ical d eterm in ism , b ut th ro u g h th e m ed iation

of the orien tation s and lim its it assign s to th e habitus's op eration s of invention.47 A s an acquired system o f gen erative sch em es o b jectiv ely adjusted to the particular co n d itio n s in w h ich it is co n stitu ted , th e h ab itu s en gen d ers all the th ou gh ts, all th e p ercep tio n s, and all th e action s co n siste n t w ith th ose conditions, and no oth ers. T h is paradoxical product is difficult to co n ceiv e, even in con ceivab le, o n ly so lo n g as on e rem ains locked in th e d ilem m a o f determinism and freed om , co n d itio n in g and creativity (lik e C h om sk y, for example, w h o th ou gh t th e on ly escap e from B loom fieldian b eh aviou rism lay in seek ing " fre ed o m ” and '‘ cr ea tiv ity ” in th e " str u c tu re” - i.e . th e " n a tu r e” “ of th e hum an m in d ). B ecause the h abitus is an en d less cap acity to en gen d er

products - th ou gh ts, p ercep tio n s, exp ressio n s, action s - w h o se lim its are set bV the h istorically and socially situated co n d itio n s o f its p ro d u ctio n , the

conditioned and con d ition al freed om it secu res is as rem ote from a creation u npredictable n ovelty as it is from a sim p le m ech an ical reprodu ction of the initial c o n d itio n in g s .48

3 G e n e ra tiv e sch em es an d p ractical lo g ic : in ve n tio n w ith in lim its

T h e opposite gesture, that o f inverting a sp oon , sh ou ld autom atically, as it w ere, provoke a contrary action. T h is is what the w ife of a fqih does, among the M tougga, to ward off im m inent rainfall. E . L aoust, M ots et choses berberes " I think I ’ve made a new theological d isc o v e ry . . . ” " What is it ? ” " If you hold your hands upside dow n, you get the opposite of what you pray fo r !” Charles M . S ch u lz, There's N o One L ike You, Snoopy M an differs from other anim als in that he is the one m ost given to mim icry ( mimetikotaton) and learns his first lessons through m im esis (d ia mimeseos). Aristotle, Poetics, 1448b

O b jectivism co n stitu tes the social w orld as a sp ecta cle p resen ted to an observer w h o takes up a " p o in t of v ie w ” on th e action , w h o sta n d s back so as to ob serve it an d, tran sferrin g in to th e ob ject th e p rin cip les o f h is relation to th e o b ject, c o n ce iv e s of it as a to ta lity in te n d ed for co g n itio n alo n e, in which a ll

in teraction s are red u ced to sy m b o lic ex ch a n g es. T h is p o in t o f v iew is the

on e afforded b y h ig h p o sitio n s in th e social stru ctu re, from w h ich the social w orld appears as a rep resen tation (in the sen se of idealist p h ilo so p h y b u t also as u sed in p ain tin g or the th eatre) and p ractices are n o m ore than " e x e c u tio n s’ , stage parts, perform an ces of scores, or the im p lem en tin g o f p lans. W ith the M arx o f the Theses on Feuerbach, th e th eory of practice as p ractice insists, against p o sitiv ist m aterialism , that th e ob jects of k n o w led g e are constructed, and against idealist in tellectu a lism , that th e p rin cip le o f th is co n stru ctio n is practical a ctiv ity orien ted tow ards practical fu n ctio n s. It is p o ssib le to a b a n d o n th e sovereign p oin t o f view from w h ich o b jectiv ist id ealism ord ers th e w orld, w ith o u t b ein g forced to relin q u ish th e "active asp ect ” o f ap p reh en sio n o f the w orld by red u cin g co g n itio n to a m ere record in g: it suffices to situ ate on eself w ithin "real activity as s u c h ”, i.e . in th e practical relation to th e w o rld , the q u a si-b o d ilv " a im in g ” w h ich en tails no rep resen ta tio n o f eith er th e b o d y or th e w orld , still less o f their relation sh ip , that a ctiv e p resen ce in th e w orld th ro u gh w h ich th e w orld im p o ses its p resen ce, w ith its u rg en cies, its th in gs to b e d o n e or said , th in g s " m a d e ” to be said and said "to be d o n e ”, w hich

[ 961

T h e calen dar an d the synoptic illusion

97

directly com m an d w ord s and d eed s w ith o u t ever d ep lo y in g th e m se lv e s as a

spectacle. The a rgu m en ts that have d ev elo p ed as m u ch am on g a n th ro p o lo g ists (eth n o science) as am on g so c io lo g ists (eth n o m e th o d o lo g y ) around classification s and classificatory sy stem s have on e th in g in co m m o n : th ey forget that th ese

instruments of cogn itio n fulfil as su ch fu n ctio n s other than th o se o f pure cognition. Practice alw ays im p lies a co g n itiv e op eration , a practical operation 0f construction w h ich se ts to w ork, b y reference to practical fu n ctio n s, systems of classification (ta x o n o m ies) w h ich organ ize p ercep tio n and structure practice. P rod u ced b y th e p ractice of su cc essiv e gen era tio n s, in co n d itio n s of existence o f a d eterm in ate ty p e , th ese sc h e m e s o f p ercep tio n , ap p reciation , and action, w h ich are acq u ired th rou gh practice and ap plied in their practical state w ith ou t a cced in g to ex p lic it rep resen tation , fu n ctio n as practical op era­ tors through w h ich th e ob jective stru ctu res of w h ich th e y are the p ro d u ct ten d to reproduce th em selv es in practices. Practical taxon o m ies, in stru m en ts o f cognition and com m u n ica tio n w h ich are th e p reco n d itio n for th e esta b lish ­ ment of m ea n in g and the co n se n su s on m ean in g, exert th eir structuring efficacy only to th e ex ten t that th ey are th em selv es structured. T h is d o es not m ean that they can b e ad eq u ately treated by "structu ral ”, " co m p o n en tia l ”, or any other form of strictly internal an alysis w h ich , in artificially w ren ch in g th em from their co n d itio n s o f p rod u ction and u se, in ev ita b ly fails to und erstan d their social fu n c tio n s .1 T h e co h eren ce to be ob served in all p ro d u cts of the ap p lication o f the sam e habitus has n o other basis than th e co h eren ce w h ich th e gen erative p rin cip les con stitutin g th at h ab itu s ow e to th e social stru ctu res (stru ctu res o f relation s between grou p s - th e se x es or age-classes - or b etw een social cla sses) of w h ich they are th e p rod u ct and w h ich , as D u rk h eim and M au ss saw , th ey ten d to reproduce .2 T h e practical op erators w h ich co n stitu te th e h ab itu s and w h ich function in th eir practical state in gestu re or u tterance rep rod u ce in a trans­ form ed fo rm , in sertin g th e m in to th e stru ctu re o f a sy stem o f sy m b o lic relations, the o p p o sitio n s and h ierarchies w h ich actu ally organ ize social groups, and w h ich th ey h elp to leg itim ate by p resen tin g th em in a m isrecognizable form .

T h e calen dar an d the synoptic illusion A nalysis o f th e agrarian calendar w ill en ab le u s to d em o n stra te, b y a sort of proof p e r absurdum , th e error w h ich resu lts from th e in tellectu a list theory ° f social sy stem s o f classification . O w in g to th e extrem ely im p ortan t social fu n ction w h ich it fu lfils in orchestratin g th e g rou p 's a ctiv ity , th e calendar is indeed o n e o f th e m ost cod ified asp ects o f social e x iste n c e .3 T h e organ ization

98

G en erative schemes an d practical logic

of practices is n ot entrusted in th is case ex clu siv ely to th e practical schem es of th e habitus: it is the object of exp licit in ju n ction s and express recom m en ­ d ation s, sayin gs, p roverbs, and taboos, servin g a fu n ction analogous to that perform ed in a different order b y custom ary rules or gen ea lo g ies. A lthough th ey are never m ore than rationalization s d evised for sem i-scholarly purposes, th ese m ore or less cod ified ob jectification s are, o f all the products of habitus structured in accordancc w ith the prevailing sy stem of classification, those w h ich are socially recogn ized as the m ost representative and su ccessfu l, those w orthiest of b ein g preserved b y the collectiv e m em ory; and so they are them selves organized in accordance w ith th e stru ctures co n stitu tin g that sy stem of classification . T h e y thereby com e to be en d ow ed w ith a com m on " p h y sio g n o m y ” rend erin g them im m ed iately " in te llig ib le ” for any agent eq u ipp ed w ith the " s e n s e ” o f lin gu istic an d /or m y th ic roots, and are thus pred isp osed to m ake u p for th e lap ses or u ncertain ties o f the habitus by settin g out cod ified references and strict g u id e lin e s .4 W hat on e derives from q u estio n in g in form an ts, thereby in vitin g th em to adopt a q uasi-scien tific attitu de, is a m ixtu re, in variable p rop ortions, of know ledges draw n from on e or th e other o f th e available traditions w hich, ex cep t w hen m echan ically reprodu ced, is selected and o ften reinterpreted in term s o f the sch em es o f the h abitus and of representations produced a d hoc from the sam e sch em es. A s soon as on e undertakes to draw u p a synoptic calendar w h ich co m b in es th e features m ost freq u en tly attested and indicates the m ost im portant variants (instead o f p resen tin g a sin g le calendar chosen for the sake o f its particular " q u a lity ”, or a set o f particular calendars) one com es up against a prim ary d iffic u lty : id en tical p eriods are g iv en different nam es, and still m ore often , id en tical nam es cover periods varying con si­ derably in length and situ ated at different tim es in the year, d ep en d in g on the region, th e trib e, th e village, and even the inform ant. M oreover, at two different p oin ts in the sam e con versation, an inform ant m ay offer tw o different nam es (e.g . on e B erber, on e draw n from th e Islam ic tradition) for the same m o m en t of th e year. T h ere is a great tem p tation to am ass and collate th ese different productions in order to con stru ct a lacuna-free, con trad iction -free wTh o le, a sort o f unwritten score of w hich all th e calendars d erived from in form an ts are then regarded as im perfect, im p overish ed perform ances .5 T h e p rob lem is that th e calendar cannot be u nd erstood u nless it is set d ow n on paper, and that it is im possible to understand h ow it w orks u n less on e fully realizes that it exists o n ly on paper (see fig. 2).8 M oreover, wrhen it is a m atter o f transm itting all the useful inform ation as q u ick ly as p ossib le, there is no m ore efficient and c o n v e n i e n t w ay than a linear narrative, w h ich perm its the rapid u n fo ld in g o f th e su cces­ sion of " p erio d s” and " m o m e n ts” (treatin g rival accoun ts as " v a ria n ts”).

io o

G en erative schemes an d practical logic

M ost in form an ts sp o n ta n eo u sly make th e year start w ith autum n ( lakhrif) F or som e of th em , the season starts around the ist o f S ep tem b er in the Julian calendar; for others, it starts on about the

15th of A u g u st, on the day called

"th e door of the y ea r” ( thabburth usugas), w h ich marks th e entry in to the wet p eriod, after the d o gd ays o f sm aim and at the b eg in n in g of la k h rif: on that day, each fam ily sacrifices a cock, and associations and con tracts are renewed. But for other in form an ts, th e " d oor of the y e a r ” is th e first day o f ploughing ( lahlal natsharats or lah lal n thagersa), the m ost d ecisiv e tu rn in g -p o in t of the transitional period. T h e tillage period (u su ally called lah lal, but so m etim es hartadem ) begins w ith the first d ay’s p lo u g h in g (azvdjeb), after an ox b o u g h t co llectiv ely has been sacrificed ( thimechret) and the m eat shared out am ongst all the m em bers of the co m m u n ity (adhrum or villa g e). P lou gh in g and so w in g , w h ich begin im m ediately after the inaugural cerem on y (w h ich is also a rain-m aking rite), as soon as the land is su fficien tly m o ist, m ay go on u n til m id -D ecem b er or even lon ger, d ep en d in g on th e region and the year. It is doubtless incorrect to speak of lahlal as a “ p erio d ”: this term , and the corresponding tem poral unit, are defined practically, within the universe of the wet season, in opposition to lakhrif (ploughing and sow ing being opposed to the picking and drying of the figs, gardening work in thabhirth, the sum m er garden, and w ith la la f, the special attention given to th e oxen weakened by treading ou t, so as to prepare them for ploughing) ; but w ithin th e same universe it may also be defined in opposition to lyali, the slack m om ent in w inter. W ithin a quite different logic it can also be contrasted w ith all the other periods held to be licit for a particular type of work which w ould be haram (the illicit) if done outside those periods: for exam ple, lahlal lafth, the licit period for sow ing turnips (from the seventeenth day of autum n, the 3rd of Septem ber in the Julian calendar), lahlal yifer, the licit period for stripping the fig-trees (the end of Septem ber), etc.

F or so m e in form an ts, w in ter b egin s on the

15th o f N o v em b er, for others

on th e ist of D ec em b e r, w ith o u t any sp ecial rite (w h ich ten ds to sh o w that the o p p o sitio n b etw een a u tu m n and w in ter is not stro n g ly m arked) .7 T h e heart o f w inter is called ly a li} th e n igh ts, "a period of forty d a y s ” , w ith in w hich a d istin ction is alm ost alw ays draw n b etw een tw o equal parts, ly a li thimellalinef the w h ite n igh ts, and ly a li thiberkanine, the black n ig h ts (a d istinction w h ich , as is su gg ested b y its range of ap plications, is the p rod u ct o f an en tirely abstract, form al p rin cip le of d ivision , althou gh inform ants find jus­ tification s for it in clim atic ch an ges). O n ce the autum n w ork is over, the peasants keep th e m selv es b u sy , repairing their tools w hen th ey cannot leave th e h ou se, gath erin g grass and leaves for the cattle, and clearing the paths after heavy sn ow falls. T h is is the slack season o f the year, contrasted, as su ch , w ith sm aim , the slack p eriod of th e dry season , or, as w e have seen , w ith lahlaU a tim e of in ten se a ctivity; but it is con trasted in another resp ect w ith the

T he calen dar and the synoptic illusion

10 1

ransition from w in ter to sp rin g (essba't or essubu', the " s e v e n s ”); and from et a n o t h e r point of v iew , th e se are th e "great n ig h ts ” (ly a li kbira) as op posed ^ t h e l e s s er n ig h ts ” (ly a li esghira) o f February and M arch, to th e " sh ep h erd ’s nights” a n d to the " n igh ts o f H a y a n ” . T h e first day of ennayer (January), in the depth o f w in ter, is m arked by a w h ole set o f renew al rites and taboos (in particular on sw eep in g an d w ea v in g ), w h ich som e inform an ts extend to the w hole period of issemaden (th e cold d ays) ru n n in g from late D ecem b er to early January. T h e end of ly a li is m arked by the ritual celebration of el'a zla gennayer, s e p a r a t io n

from ennayer: life has em erged on the face of the earth, th e first

shoots are appearing on th e trees, it is "th e o p e n in g ” (el ftuh ). T h e farm er goes out into th e fields and se ts up oleander b ranches, w h ich have th e pow er to drive away m aras, the cockchafer g r u b ; as h e d oes so , he savs, " C om e o u t, maras! T h e khammes is g o in g to kill y o u ! ” O n the sam e day, it is said, the peasants g o to their stables b efore sunrise and sh ou t in th e ears of the oxen : "G ood new s! E n n ayer is over! ” S om e in form an ts say 'a zri} the bachelor, for 'azla ("because from that day on , sp rin g is co m in g , and m arriages start to be celebrated ”), w ith a sort o f play on w ords w hich is no d ou b t also a play on m ythic roots. T h is is b eg in n in g of a lo n g transitional p eriod, a tim e of waiting, covered by a term in o lo g y as rich as it is con fu sed : w hereas autu m n is "a w h o le ”, as on e in form an t p u t it, th e passage from w inter to spring is a patchwork of m o m en ts w h ich are ill d efin ed , alm ost all m a lig n , and variously named. Thus, the term thimgharine, the old w om en, or thamgharth, the old w om an,8 also known as amerdil (the loan) in Great Kabvlia, denotes either the m om ent of transition from one m onth to another (from D ecem ber to January, or January to February, or February to March, and even, at Ain A ghbel, from March to A pril), or the m om ent of transition from winter to spring. Husum, a learned term of Arabic origin, referring to a sura of the Koran, coexists w ith hayan (or ahgan) to denote the passage from furar to maghres. 9 But the logic o f m agic insists that it is never possible to know exactly which is the most unpropitious m om ent in a period which is uncertain as a w h o le,10 so that the terms thimgharine or husum, relating to highly unpropitious periods, are som etim es used to denote the w hole transitional period from late January to m id-M arch: *n this case, they are made to include the four " w eek s” which divide up the m onth of February, known collectively as essba't ("the se v e n s”) , i.e. el mivalah (som etim es called \mirghane), the salt days; el quarah, the pungent days; elsw a la h , the benign days; €l fyjatah, the open d ays.11 As the nam es of this series them selves testify, we find here, as in the case of the nights of January, one o f the sem i-explicit dichotom ies which always involve an attempt at rationalization: the first two periods are m align and come the end of winter; the last tw o are benign and com e at the beginning of spring, n the sam e way, inform ants w ho identify husum w ith the fortnight straddling the end °f January and the beginning o f February, concentrating within it all the features characteristic of the period as a w h ole, distinguish a first, dangerous week and a second, j^ore favourable week. And sim ilarly, num erous inform ants (especially in the jurdjura region) distinguish tw o ahgans (or hayans) - ahgan bu akii, the hayan of

10 2

G en era tive schemes a n d p ra ctica l logic

the N egro, seven intensely cold days d uring w hich work is su sp en d ed , and ahgQtl hari, the hayan of the freem an, seven days in w hich “ everything on earth comesK u to life ”. D u rin g " hayan w eek ” (th e first w eek of M arch), life com p letes its work. Man m not disturb it by goin g into the fields or orch ard s.12 T h e anim als too seem to ^ com pleted their grow th: w eaning (el h iya z) is carried out at the end of hayan weej.' on the day of the spring eq u in ox (a d h w a l gitij, the len gth en in g o f the su n ). A tin ca^ is struck to make a noise w hich w ill prevent the oxen - w ho can understand human speech on that day - from hearing what is said about " th e len gth en in g of t h e davg” for if they heard it, they w ould take fright at having to work harder. By virtue o f position, husum (or hayan) is endow ed w ith an inaugural - and augural - character very sim ilar to that conferred on the m orning, in th e cycle of the day (for e x a m p l e , if does not rain, the wells w ill not be full all year; if it rains, that is a sign o f p le n ty if there is snow at the b egin n in g, there will be m any partridge e g g s ); it is th e r e f o r e an occasion for acts of propitiation (alm sgivin g) and divination.

O n ce th e d ays of th e old w om an and husum are ov er, th e flock is reckoned to be sa v ed : it is now el fw a ta h , th e tim e for c o m in g o u t, th e tim e o f births, b o th on th e cu ltivated land an d a m o n g th e flock , an d th e y o u n g lin g s are no lo n g er th reaten ed b y th e rigou rs o f w in ter. T h e first day o f sp rin g ( thafsuth), th e feast o f g reen n ess and in fa n c y ,13 has already b een celeb ra ted . A ll the ritual o f th is inaugural day of an augural p eriod is p laced u n d er th e sig n of jo y and o f o b jects that b rin g g o o d fo rtu n e and p rosp erity . T h e ch ild ren g o ou t into th e field s to m ee t sp rin g . In th e o p en air th ey w ill eat a se m o lin a o f grilled cereals an d b utter. T h e c o u sc o u s served on that d ay is co ok ed in th e steam o f a broth co n ta in in g a dh ris (seksu w a d h ris) , th ap sia, a p lant w h ich causes sw e llin g . T h e w om en ab an d on th e tab oos o f th e p lo u g h in g p erio d and dye th eir h an d s w ith hen na. T h e y g o off in g ro u p s o f fifteen or tw e n ty and bring back heath sh ru b s to m ake b ro o m s, th e eu p h e m is tic n am e for w hich is th a farah th , from f a r ah , joy, and w h ich , m ade in joy, w ill b rin g joy. T h e d a y s grow lon ger. T h e r e is n ot m u ch w ork to b e d o n e (apart from tillage in the fig o rc h a r d s); m an has to w ait for life to d o its w ork . " I n M arch ”, th ey say in G reat K ab ylia, " g o an d look at yo u r cro p s, and take a g o o d lo o k ” ; and e ls e w h e r e :" the su n o f th e flow erin g [of th e lo n g -a w a ited p eas an d beans] em p tie s th e d o u a r ” T h e fo o d sto ck s are ex h a u sted , and th e le n g th e n in g of th e d ays is accen tuated b y th e ban on g o in g ou t in to th e field s (natah is not over) and o n eatin g b ean s or oth er green v eg eta b les. H e n c e th e proverbs: "M arch ( maghres) clim b s like a h ills id e ” ; an d " T h e d a y s o f M arch are sev en -sn ack d a y s.” W ith natah or thiftirine, th e tran sition al p eriod co m e s to an e n d . T h ese term s, w h ich d en ote th e sam e p eriod to w ith in a few d ays, are b o th o f Arabic origin and are rarely k n ow n to th e p easan ts o f th e D jurdjura reg io n (w here h a ya n , or rather ahgan, as it is k now n lo cally, has sh ifte d to th is tim e o f the yea r). D u r in g natch " th e trees are sh aken and knock to g e th e r ” ; excessive

T h e calen dar a n d the syn optic illusion

10 3

is likely, and th e w eath er is so cold th at " th e boar sh iv er s in its la ir 5*.

husum , there is a ban o n en terin g th e cu ltiv a ted field s and th e orchards fear o f ca u sin g th e d eath o f a p erson or an a n im a l). F or natah is also the on of n atu re’s a w ak en in g, o f th e b lo sso m in g o f cro p s, life , and m arriages. It is the m om en t for w e d d in g s an d village fe a sts .14A n d s o , b y a fam iliar d ev ice, gome in form an ts d iv id e thiftirin e or natah in to an u n fa v o u ra b le p erio d , in March (“ th e d ifficu lt d a y s ”) and a favourable p eriod (" th e easy d a y s ”) in April-

The passage from th e w et season to th e dry season is effected ritually and collectively, d u rin g n atah, o n th e day o f tharurith v ia z a l (th e return o f a z a l ),15 on a date wTh ich varies from region to region b ecau se o f clim a tic differen ces, coming eith er in M arch, after w ea n in g , el h iy a z , or in A p ril, at sh ea rin g tim e or just after, or, at th e v ery latest, at th e b e g in n in g of M ay: fro m th at day on, the flock, w h ich up to th en w en t o u t late in th e m o rn in g and cam e back relatively early, leaves early in th e m o rn in g , co m e s back and g o es o u t again in the early a ftern o o n , and retu rn s at su n se t. T he bad w eath er is o ver for g o o d ; th e green fields an d th e g a rd en s are now ready to receive th e rays o f th e su n . T h is is th e start o f th e cy c le of d ryn ess

and ripenin g; w ith ibril, a p articu larly b en eficen t m on th (" A p ril is a dow'nw'ard slope”), a trou b le-free p eriod o f relative p len ty b eg in s. W ork o f all sorts starts up again: in th e field s, wThere th e critical p eriod o f g ro w th is ov er, th e m en can start th e h o ein g , the o n ly im p ortan t activ ity (w h ich u sed to b e in augu rated by the a b d u ction of M ata, th e " brid e ” o f th e field , a rite in te n d ed to call dow n the rain n eed ed for th e ears of th e corn to d e v e lo p ) ; in th e gard en s, th e first beans are p ick ed . D u r in g th e p eriod o f nisany w h o se b en eficen t rain, b rin gin g fertility and p rosp erity to every liv in g th in g , is in vok ed writh all so rts o f rites, the sh eep are sh orn and th e n ew lam b s are b ran d ed . T h e fact that nisan, like all transitional p erio d s (n atah , for e x a m p le ), is an a m b ig u o u s p erio d , ill defined in relation to th e o p p o sitio n b etw e en th e dry and th e w e t, is here expressed not in a d iv isio n in to tw o p eriod s, o n e a u sp icio u s an d the other inauspicious, b u t b y th e ex iste n c e o f in a u sp icio u s m o m e n ts ( eddbagh , th e 1 st of M ay, at a m ysterio u s h our k n ow n to n o n e ), m arked b y various taboos (pruning or graftin g, celeb ra tin g w e d d in g s, w h ite w a sh in g h o u se s, settin g up *he lo o m , se ttin g eg g s to b e h atch ed , e t c .) . A s th e p eriod k n ow n as ize g za w e n " th e green d a y s ” co m e s to an en d , th e last traces o f g reen ery fade from th e la n d sc a p e ; th e cerea ls, wrh ich had b een as 'te n d e r ” ( th aleqaqth ) as a n ew -b o rn b a b y , n ow b eg in to tu rn y e llo w . T h e changing ap pearan ce o f th e corn field s is in d icated b y th e n a m es of th e ten ­ or seven -d ay p erio d s in to wTh ich th e m o n th o f magu (or m ayu) is d iv id e d . A fter l*egzaw en co m e iw ragh en , th e yellow* d a y s, im ellalen, th e w h ite d a y s, and tquranen, th e dry d ays. S u m m e r (anebdhu) has b eg u n . T h e ch aracteristic tasks

104

G en erative schemes an d practica l logic

o f the w et sea so n , tillage (in th e fig orchards) and so w in g , w h ich is p erm itted in the "green d a y s ”, are ab so lu tely b ann ed from the p eriod known as th e " y ello w d a y s”. T h e o n ly con cern is to p rotect th e rip en in g crops against th e dangers w h ich threaten th em (hail, b ird s, lo cu sts, e tc .). T h e means u sed again st predators - sh o w ers o f sto n e s, sh o u ts (ah ah i), scarecrow s th e co llec tiv e ex p u lsion rites (asifedh) that are in ten d ed to transfer the m align an t forces from th e territory to b e p rotected in to a cave, b u sh , or heap o f sto n e s, after " fixing ” th em on o b jects (d o lls) or an im als (e.g . a pair o f birds) w h ich

are th e n

sacrificed,

are sim p ly

ap p lica tio n s o f the sch em e of

" tran sferen ce o f e v il” w h ich is se t to w ork in th e treatm en t o f a large number of d iseases - fever, m ad n ess (p o ssessio n b y a d jin ), sterility - and also in rites p erform ed on fixed dates in certain villages. A cco rd in g to m o st in form an ts, su m m er b eg in s on th e sev en teen th day of the m o n th of m agu, also called mut el ardh " th e d ea th o f th e la n d ”.16 By the last day o f iquraranen, k n ow n as "a fiery em b er has fallen into th e w ater” (thagli thirgith egw am an ), an exp ression w h ich allu d es to th e tem p erin g o f iron, th e action p rop er to th e sm ith , ev eryon e sh o u ld have started harvesting ( essaif) , w h ich is com p leted around in sla, the day o f th e su m m er solstice

(24 J u n e ), w h en purificatory fires are lit ev e ry w h er e .17 W hen treading-out and w in n o w in g are co m p leted , th e forty d ogd ays o f smaim b egin and w ork is su sp en d ed (just as it is in ly a li, a p eriod to w h ich smaim is always o p p o se d ).18 In o p p o sitio n to the h arvestin g and tread in g-o u t, la k h rif is seen as a slack p eriod in th e agrarian year, or rather in th e grain cy cle. I t is also a period d ev o ted to rest an d to th e celeb ration s of a p len tifu l h a rv est ;19 as w ell as the n ew ly h arvested grain th ere are figs, grap es, and various fresh vegetables, to m a toes, sw eet p ep p ers, g o u rd s, m elo n s, etc . L a k h r if is so m etim es said to b egin in m id -A u g u st, at thissemtith (from sem ti, to start rip en in g ), th e m om ent w hen th e first ripe figs appear, and el haq " th e la w ” is im p osed - a ban on fig-p ick in g, ev e n from o n e ’s o w n trees, w ith fines for d iso b ed ien ce. W hen ichakhen co m es round (ichakh lakh rif, it is la k h rif ev ery w h ere), th e fig -h arv est is at its peak, an d th e m e n , th e w o m e n , and th e ch ild ren are all kep t busy; th e is t o f O ctob er is lah al y ife r (o f th e le a v es), and n ow th e leaves m ay be strip p ed from th e fig-trees (ach raw , from chrew, to strip ) to feed th e oxen. T h is d ate is the signal for th e "w ith d raw al of lif e ”, the work o f iqachachen (" th e last d a y s ”), w h ich are d ev o ted to a th orou gh clea n in g o f th e kitchen g ard en s, orchards, and fields, w ith thaqachachth la k h rif (th e last fruit is shaken from th e trees and the rem ain in g leaves are strip p ed off) and " th e rooting u p of th e g a r d e n ”. W hen all traces o f life p ersistin g in th e fields after the harvest have th u s been rem oved , th e land is ready for p lo u g h in g . T h is lin ear diagram o f th e agrarian year (lik e all d isco u rse) at o n ce m asks

T h e calen dar an d the synoptic illusion d reveals th e d ifficulties that are en cou n tered as soo n as o n e ceases to take actical relations o f an alogy or h o m o lo g y sin g ly (or in pairs) and su cc essiv ely , and e n d e a v o u r s in stead to fix th em sim u lta n eo u sly so as to cu m u la te th em s y s te m a tic a lly .

T h e se d ifficu lties w o u ld , n o d o u b t, not m erit our atten tion

(in sp ite o f th e trou b le and tim e th ey have co st) w ere it not that, as w ith , jn an oth er order, the statistical an alysis o f g en ea lo g ies, th ey have the effect 0 f fo rcin g

u s to call in to q u estio n the very op eration w h ich g ave rise to th em .

Rigour d em ands n ot that o n e sh o u ld o cc lu d e th ese co n tra d ictio n s b y m ean s of som e rhetorical or m ath em atical d ev ic e, so as to fall into lin e w ith the rules of the p rofession , but rather that on e sh o u ld m ake th em th e object of a reflection capable of d isco v e rin g in th em b oth th e logic o f the practical use of tem poral o p p o sitio n s (from w h ich the con tra d ictio n s arise) a n d , inseparably from th is, th e p rin cip le of th e tran sm u tation to w h ich scholarly ob jectifica­

tion su b jects this logic. Just as gen ealogy su b stitu tes a sp ace of u n eq u ivoca l, h o m o g en eo u s rela­ tionships, estab lish ed o n ce and for all, for a sp atially and tem p orally d isc o n ­ tinuous set of island s of k in sh ip , ranked and organized to su it the n eed s of the m om ent and b rou gh t in to practical e x iste n c e gradually and in term itten tly , and just as a m ap replaces th e d isco n tin u o u s, p atchy space o f practical p ath s by the h o m o g e n e o u s, co n tin u o u s sp ace o f g eo m etry , so a calen dar su b stitu tes a linear, h om o g en eo u s, c o n tin u o u s tim e for practical tim e, w h ich is m ade up of in com m en su rab le islan d s o f d u ration , each w ith its ow n rh y th m , th e tim e that flies b y or drags, d e p e n d in g on w hat o n e is doing, i.e . o n th e fu n c­ tions con ferred on it b y th e activ ity in p rogress. By d istrib u tin g gu ide-m arks (cerem onies and tasks) alon g a co n tin u o u s lin e, o n e turns th em in to d ivid in g marks u n ited in a relation o f sim p le su cc essio n , thereby creatin g ex nihilo the question o f the in tervals and corresp o n d en ces b etw een p o in ts w h ich are no longer to p ologically b u t m etrically eq u iv a len t. Proof that lyali, which every inform ant m entions, is not "a period of forty d a y s” (all that is said is "W e are entering ly a li”) but a sim ple scansion of passing tim e, is found in the fact that different inform ants ascribe to it different durations and different d a te s: one of them even situates the first day of ennayer both in the m iddle of w inter and in the m iddle o f ly a li, although he d oes not set ly a li in the (geom etric) middle of winter, thereby dem onstrating that the practical grasp of the structure w hich leads him to think of lyali as the winter of winter overrides calculative reason. A num ber °f ill-defined guide-m arks (e .g . the "old w o m e n ”) shift according to the region and the inform ant, but never beyond the bounds o f w inter. T h e sam e logic is found in *he belief that it is im possible to know exactly w hen a certain action should be avoided, the " p eriod ” b ein g nothing other than the field of uncertainty betw een two guide-marks. A question as innocuous in appearance as "And what com es n ex t? ”, ^ v itin g an inform ant to situate tw o " periods ” in relation to one another in a continuous time (w hich does no more than state what the genealogical or chronological diagram does im plicitly), has the effect of im posing an attitude to tem porality w hich is the exact

io 6

G en erative schemes an d practica l logic

opposite of the attitude involved practically in the ordinary use of tem poral terms Q uite apart from the form w hich the questioning m ust take so as to elicit an ordered sequ en ce of answ ers, everything about the inquiry relationship itself betrays the interrogator's "theoretical ” (i.e . "non-practical ”) disposition and invites th e interrogatee to adopt a quasi-theoretical attitude: the situation in w hich the interrogation is carried on rules out any reference to the use and conditions of use of th e temporal guide-m arks; the interrogation itself tacitly substitutes for d iscontinuous marks intended to be used for practical ends, the calendar as an object o f thought, predisposed to becom e an object o f discourse and to be unfolded as a totality ex istin g beyond its "applications” and independently of the needs and interests o f its u sers. This explains w hy inform ants w ho are invited to give the calendar often start by setting out the scholarly series of successive units, such as mtvalah, rw alah, and fw atah , or izegzazven, iwraghen, imellalen, and iquranen. A nd also w hy, w hen they do not send the anthropologist (w hom they always see as a scholar) to other scholars w ith his scholar’s questions, they endeavour to produce the form s o f learning w hich seem to them w orthiest of being offered in reply to scholarly interrogation, su b stitu tin g for the guides w hich really organize their practice as m uch as they can m obilize of the series of the constructed calendar, the m onths of the M oslem calendar or the " h o u ses”.20 In short, by tacitly excluding all reference to the practical interest which a socially characterized agent - a man or a w om an, an adult or a shepherd, a farmer or a sm ith, etc. - may have in dividing up the year in such-and-such a w ay, and in using such-and-such a tem poral gu id e, one unw ittingly constructs an object which exists only by virtue of this unconscious construction of both it and its operations.

T h e can cellin g ou t o f th e practical fu n ctio n s o f tem poral gu id e-m a rk s that resu lts from th e co n tex t of in terrogation and from scien tific reco rd in g is the h id d en co n d ition o f cu m u la tin g and seriatin g the aggregate o f th e o p p o si­ tio n s w h ich can be p rod u ced in relation to d ifferen t u n iv erses of discou rse, that is, w ith d ifferen t fu n ctio n s. B y cu m u latin g in form ation wTh ich is n ot and can n ot alw ays b e m astered b y any sin g le in form an t - at any rate, never on th e in stan t - th e analyst w in s th e privileg e o f totalization (th ank s to th e pow er to perpetuate that w ritin g and all the various tec h n iq u es for reco rd in g give h im , and also to th e abundant tim e h e has for an a ly sis). H e th u s se cu re s the m ean s o f a p p reh en d in g th e lo g ic of th e system wrh ich a partial or d iscrete view w ould m iss; b ut b y the sam e tok en , there is every lik elih ood th a t he w ill overlook th e ch an ge in statu s to w hich he is su b jectin g practice and its p rod u cts, and co n seq u en tly that h e w ill in sist on tryin g to an sw er q u estio n s w h ich are n ot and can n ot b e q u estio n s for practice, instead o f ask in g h im self w h eth er th e essen tial ch aracteristic o f practice is n ot p recisely th e fact that it ex clu d es su ch q u e stio n s. T h e totalization wrh ich th e diagram effects by ju xta p o sin g in th e sim u lta n eity of a sin gle sp ace th e com p lete series of th e tem poral o p p o sitio n s applied su ccessiv ely b y d ifferen t agen ts at d ifferen t tim es, w h ich can n ev er all be m ob ilized togeth er in p ractice (b ecau se th e n ece ssitie s o f e x iste n c e never require th is sort of sy n o p tic ap p reh en sion , ten d in g rather to d isco u ra g e it by their u rgen cy) g iv es full rein to the theoretical n eu tralization w h ich th e inquiry

T he calen dar an d the syn optic illusion r e la tio n s h ip

itself p rod u ces. T h e esta b lish m en t of a sin g le series th u s creates

ex nihilo a w h o le host of relation s (o f sim u lta n eity , su cc essio n , or sy m m etry , {or example) b etw een term s and gu ide-m ark s of d ifferen t levels, w h ich , b ein g o d u ced and u sed in d ifferen t situ a tio n s, are never b rou ght face to face in practice a n d are th u s com p atib le practically even w h en logically con trad ictory. T h e s y n o p tic diagram takes all th e tem poral op p o sitio n s w h ich can be collected and a sse m b le d and d istrib u tes th em in accordance w ith th e law s o f su ccessio n (i.e. ( i ) " y fo llo w s x ” ex c lu d e s " x follo w s y ” ; ( 2) if y fo llo w s x and z fo llo w s y , th en z fo llo w s x \ ( 3) eith er y fo llo w s x or x fo llo w s >•). T h is m akes it p ossib le to ap preh en d at a glan ce, uno intuitu et tota sim ul, as D esca rtes said, m onothetically, as H u sserl put it ,21 m ean in gs w h ich are p rod u ced and u sed p o ly th e tic a lly , that is to say, not o n ly on e after an oth er, b u t on e by o n e, step

by step .22 D epending on the precision w ith w hich the event considered has to be localized, on the nature of the event, and on the social status of the agent concerned, different svstems o f oppositions are seen to em erge: for exam ple, the period known as ly a li, far from being defined - as in a perfectly ordinate series - in relation to the period which preceded it and the period w hich follow s it, and only in relation to them , can be opposed to smaim as well as to el husum or thimgharine\ as we have seen , it can also be opposed, as " lya li o f D ece m b e r”, to " lyali of January”, or, by a different logic, be opposed as the "great n ig h ts” to the "lesser nights of fu ra r” and the "lesser nights of maghres (the sam e com binative logic w hich leads to the oppositions betw een " essba't of w inter” and "essba't of sp rin g ” ; betw een " es-ba't of late sp rin g ”, w ith the Mgreen days” and the "yellow d a y s”, and " essba't of su m m er”, w ith the "w hite d a y s” and the "dry d ays” ; and betw een smaim of sum m er and smaim of autum n). T h e same informant may at one m om ent, thinking in term s of ritual practices, oppose lakhrif taken as a w hole ("autum n is w ithout d iv isio n s”) to lahlal, the licit period for ploughing; and the very next m om en t, thinking in term s of the cycle of the fig harvest, oppose lahlal to achraw , w hich is the end of lakhrif and one o f the activities of thaqachachth, through w hich it is im plicitly opposed to thissemtith (the first figs), or achakh (the ripeness of the figs). When one knows that m any other oppositions could be produced, one sees the artificiality and indeed unreality of a calendar w hich assim ilates and aligns u nits of different levels and of very unequal im portance. G iven that all the d ivisions and sub-divisions w hich the observer may record and cum ulate are produced and used ln different situations and on different occasions, the question of h ow each of them relates to the unit at a higher level, or, a fortiori, to the divisions or sub-divisions of the " p eriods” to w hich they are op p osed , never arises in practice. If another seem ingly ethnocentric analogy' be perm itted, one m ight suggest that the relation betw een the constructed series obeying the laws of succession, and the tem poral oppositions put mto practice successively so that they cannot be telescoped into the sam e spot, is hom ologous with the relation betw een the continuous, hom ogeneous, political space of graduated scales of op in ion , and practical political positions, w hich are always taken UP in response to a particular situation and particular interlocutors or opponents and make d istinctions and divisions of greater or lesser refinem ent depending on the Political distance betw een the interlocutors (le ft:r ig h t::left o f the left:righ t o f the left:: left of the left of the le f t: right of the left o f the le ft: :e tc.) so that the sam e agent

io 8

G en erative schemes an d practica l logic

may find him self successively on his own right and on his ow n left in the " absolute ” space of geom etry, contradicting the third law o f succession. T h e same analysis applies to the term inologies serving to designate social units: ignorance of the uncertainties and am biguities w hich these products of a practical lo g ic ow e to their functions and to the conditions in w hich they are used leads to the production of artefacts as im peccable as they are unreal. Perhaps no anthropologist has been more sensitive than Edm und Leach to "the essential difference betw een the ritual description of structural relations and the anthropologist’s scientific description ”, or, in particular, to the opposition betw een the "com pletely unam biguous” terminology of *he anthropologist, with his arbitrarily devised concepts, and the concepts which agents use in ritual actions to express structural relations. Indeed, nothing is more suspect than the ostentatious rigour o f the diagram s of the social organization o f Berber societies offered by anthropologists. Jeanne Favret provides an exam ple in a recent article in w hich she follow s Hanoteau on to a " field ” on which her general ideas are most redolent of generals’ ideas, as Virginia W oolf would have put it. If her taste for provocative paradox had not led her to rehabilitate the worthy brigadier-general’s "wild [sauvage] ethnography” against professional ethnology (which happens to be somewhat under-professionalized in this area), M s Favret w ould not have gone to the "innocent and m eticulous ethnography of Hanoteau and L etourneux” for the basis of the pure, perfect taxonom y of political organization which she opposes to the anthropological tradition, accusing the latter both of being "m erely more sophisticated and more ignorant of its lim its” than the general’s military anthropology and of failing to observe the distinctions which his work makes it possible to draw.23 A more penetrating reading of the texts in question, produced in the main by administrators and soldiers (or law professors), w ould show that the vagueness of the social term inolo­ gies they offer could only result from a certain familiarity with K abyle reality com bined w ith ignorance of the theoretical traditions and of the corresponding pre­ tensions to theoretical system aticitv. W ithout entering into detailed discussion of M s Favret’s schem atic presentation o f the term inology collected by Hanoteau, one can only restate certain basic points of the description of the structure of the village of A lt H ichem 24 which perhaps erred only by excessive "rationalization” of native categories. T hough the vocabulary of social divisions varies from place to place, the fact remains that the hierarchy o f the basic social units, those designated by the words thakharubth and adhrum, is alm ost always the opposite of what M s Favret, following Hanoteau, says it is. A few cases can be found in w hich, as Hanoteau maintains, thakharubth includes adhrum, probably because term inologies collected at particular times and places designate the results of different histories, marked by the splitting up, the (no doubt frequent) disappearance, and the annexation of lineages. It also often happens that the words are used indifferently to refer to social divisions at the same level; this is the case in the Sidi Alch region, in w hich the terms used, starting with the m ost restricted and hence most real unit, are (a) el hara, the undivided family (called akham, the house, akham n A it A li, at Ait H ichem ), (b) akham, the extended fam ily, covering all the people bearing the name of the same ancestor (as far as the third or fourth generation) - A li ou X , som etim es also designated by a terra probably suggested by the topography, since the path bends as one passes from one akham to another: thaghamurth, the elbow , (c) adhrum, akharub (or thakharubth), or aharumy bringing together the people w hose com m on origin goes back beyond the fourth generation, (d) the suff, or sim ply "those a b ove” or "those b elow ”, (e) the village, a purely local unit, in this case including the tw o leagues. T h e synonym s, to which must be added tha'rifth (from 'arf, to know one another), a group of acquaintances, equivalent to akham or adhrum (elsew here, thakharubth) may not have been used

Econom y o f logic since they emphasize either integration and internal cohesion ( akham or adhrum) or the contrast with other groups ( taghamurth, aharum). Su/f, used to suggest a n " a r b i t r a r y ” unit, a conventional alliance as opposed to the other term s which denote n d i v i d u a l s bearing a com m on name (A it. . . ) , is often distinguished from adhrum, with which it coincides at A il H ichem . Everything takes place as if one passed by in s e n s i b l e gradations from the patriarchal fam ily to the clan {adhrum or thakharubth), th e f u n d a m e n t a l social unit, with the intermediate units corresponding to m ore-or-less a r b i t r a r y points of segm entation (w hich would explain the inform ants’ uncertainty with v o c a b u l a r y they often indequatelv m aster). T h ese points becom e especially apparent w h e n conflict arises ( b y virtue of the fact that the units are separated only by d i f f e r e n c e s of degree, as can be seen, for exam ple, in the different shades of obligation in t h e c a s e of m ourning, with the closest relatives offering the meal, and the others m a k in g their own small contribution, by helping w ith the cooking, bringing jars of w a t e r o r som e vegetables, and the m ost distant relatives - or friends from another clan - g i v i n g a m e a l for the fam ily of the deceased after the m ourning is over); and they a r e s u b j e c t to constant change: the virtual lim its may becom e real ones w hen the group e x t e n d s itself (thus at A it H ichem , the Ait M endil, who were originally united, c o n s t i t u t e tw o thakharubth) and the real lim its may disappear (the Ait Isaad group t o g e t h e r several reduced thakharubth in a single thakharubth). In short, the system atic p i c t u r e of interlocking units, presented by " w ild ” or civilized anthropologists from H a n o t e a u through Durkheim to Jeanne Favret, ignores the unceasing dynam ism of u n i t s which are constantly form ing and reform ing, and the fuzziness which is an i n t e g r a l part of native notions inasmuch as it is at once the precondition and the p r o d u c t of their functioning. What is true of genealogical and political taxonom ies is equally true of the tem poral taxonom ies of the agrarian calendar: the level at which t h e oppositions actually m obilized are situated depends fundam entally on the situation -th a t is to say, on the relationship betw een the groups or individuals who are to be demarcated by m eans of taxonom ies. ^ g p h a z a rd ly ,

Econom y o f logic Sym bolic sy stem s ow e their practical coherence, that is, their regularities, and also their irregularities and even in coh eren ces (b oth eq u ally necessary b ecause inscribed in the logic of their gen esis and fu n ctio n in g ) to the fact that they are the p rod uct o f practices w hich can n ot perform their practical fu n ctio n s except insofar as th ey brin g into play, in th eir practical state, p rin cip les w hich are not on ly coh eren t - i.e . capable of en gen d erin g in trin sically coh eren t practices com p atib le w ith the ob jective co n d itio n s - b u t also practical, in the sense o f con v en ien t, i.e . im m ediately m astered and m anageable because obeying a " p o o r ” and econom ical logic. O ne th u s has to acknow ledge that practice has a logic w h ich is not that of logic, if on e is to avoid asking of it m ore lo g ic than it can g iv e, thereby con d em n in g o n ese lf either to w rin g in coh eren ces out of it or to thrust upon *t a forced c o h er en ce .25 A nalysis of the various b u t clo sely interrelated asp ects ° f the theorization effect (forced sy n ch ron ization of the su cc essiv e, fictitious totalization , n eutralization o f fu n ction s, su b stitu tio n o f th e sy stem of products

1 10

G en erative schemes and practical logic

for the system of p rin cip les o f p rod u ction , e tc .) brings o u t, in negative form ( certain properties of th e logic o f practice w h ich by definition escape theoretical ap p reh en sion , sin ce they are con stitu tive of that ap preh en sion. Practical logic - practical in both sen ses o f the w ord - is ab le to organize the totality of an agent's th ou gh ts, p ercep tions, and action s by m eans of a few generative p rin cip les, th em selves redu cible in the last analysis to a fundam ental dicho­ to m y , on ly because its w hole econ om y, w h ich is based on th e principle of the econ om y of logic, p resu p p oses a loss of rigour for th e sake o f greater sim p licity and generality and because it finds in " p oly th esis ” the conditions required for the correct use of p olysem y. T h an k s to " p o ly th e sis”, the " con fu sion of sp h e r e s”, as the logician s call it, resu lting from the highly econ om ical, b ut necessarily approxim ate, application of the sam e sch em es to different logical u niverses, can pass u nn o ticed because it entails no practical co n seq u en ces. N o one takes the trouble to system atically record and com pare th e su ccessiv e products o f the application of the generative sch em es: th ese discrete, self-su fficien t u n its owe their im m ed iate transparency not on ly to th e sch em es w hich are realized in them , b u t also to the situation ap p reh en d ed through th ese schem es and to the a gen t’s practical relation to that situ ation . T h e p rin cip le of the ec o n o m y of lo g ic, w hereby no m ore logic is m ob ilized than is required by the n eed s of p ractice, m eans that th e universe of d iscou rse in relation to w hich this or that class (an d therefore the com p lem en tary class) is co n stitu ted , can rem ain im p licit, because it is im plicitly defined in each case in and b y the practical relation to th e situ ation . G iven that it is unlikely that tw o contradictory ap p lication s of the sam e sch em es w ill be b rou ght face to face in w hat w e m ust call a universe o f practice (rather than a universe of d isco u rse), the sam e thing m ay, in different u niverses of practice, h ave d ifferent th in gs as its com p lem en t and m ay, therefore, receive differen t, even o p p o sed , properties, according to the u n iv e rse .26 T h e h ou se, for exam p le, is glob ally defined as fem ale, dam p, e tc ., w h en con sid ered from o u tsid e , from th e m ale p oin t of v iew , i.e . in o p p o sitio n to the external w orld , b ut it can be d ivid ed in to a m ale-fem ale part and a fem ale-fem ale part w hen it ceases to be seen by reference to a universe o f practice co exten sive w ith the u niverse, an d is treated instead as a universe (of practice and d iscou rse) in its ow n righ t, w hich for the w o m en it indeed is, especially in w in te r .27 T h e fact that sym b olic ob jects and practices can enter w ith ou t contradiction in to su ccessiv e relation ship s set up from different p oin ts of v iew m eans that they are subject to overdeterm ination through indetermination: the application to the sam e ob jects or practices of different sch em es (such as o p en in g /clo sin g , g o in g in /co m in g ou t, g o in g u p /g o in g d o w n , e tc .) w h ich , at the d egree of p recision (i.e . o f im precision ) w ith w hich th e y are d efined, are all practically

Econom y o f logic e q u iv a le n t, is r e la tio n s h ip s in

iii

the sou rce of the polysem y characterizing th e fundam ental the sym b olic system , w hich are alw ays d eterm in ed in several

respects at o n ce. T h u s a relation sh ip su ch as that b etw een th e h ou se and the ihajm ath (for w h ich one cou ld su b stitu te th e m arket, or the field s) con d en ses

a good n um ber of th e system 's fundam ental op p o sitio n s - th e full and the empty, the fem ale and th e m ale, n ight and day, etc. - w hich are also fo u n d , with only sligh t d ifferen ces, in relation ship s as accessary in appearance as those between the cook in g-p ot and the w heatcake griddle or the stable and the kanun. T he m ost sp ecific properties o f a ritual corpu s, th ose w h ich define it as a system coh eren t in practice, cannot be perceived or ad eq uately understood unless the corpu s is seen as th e product (opus operatum ) of a practical m astery (modus operandi) ow in g its practical efficacy to the fact that it m akes connections based on w hat Jean N ico d calls overall resemblance. 28 T h is m ode of apprehension never ex p licitly or system atically lim its itself to any on e aspect of the term s it links, b ut takes each on e, each tim e, as a w h o le, exp lo itin g to the full the fact that tw o " d a ta ” are never entirely alike in a ll respects but are always alike in som e resp ect, at least in directly (i.e . through the m ediation of som e com m on term ). T h is exp lain s, first, wrhy am ong the d ifferen t aspects of the at on ce u n d eterm in ed and overdeterm in ed sy m b o ls it m anipulates, ritual practice never clearly op p oses asp ects sym b olizin g so m eth in g to aspects sym bolizing n o th in g and h en ce disregarded (such as, in the case o f the letters of the alphabet, the colou r or size of the strokes, or, in a page of w riting, the vertical wro rd -ord er). For exam p le, although on e of the d ifferen t aspects through w h ich a " d a tu m ” like gall can be con n ected w ith other (equally equivocal) data - viz. b ittern ess (it is eq u ivalen t to oleander, wormwrood, or tar, and op posed to h o n e y ), green ness (it is associated w ith lizards and the colour green ), and h o stility (inherent in the p revious tw o q ualities) necessarily com es to th e forefront, the other aspects do not th ereb y cease to be perceived sim u ltan eou sly; the sym b olic chord m ay be so u n d ed eith er in its fundam ental form , w h e n th e fun dam en tal quality is em p h a sized , or in its inverted form . W ithou t w ish in g to p ush the m usical m etaph or too far, one m ight n on eth eless su g g est that a n um ber of ritual seq u en ces can b e seen as Modulations: occurring w ith particular frequ en cy because the sp ecific principle ° f ritual action , th e desire to stack all the od ds on one's ow n s id e , is con d u cive to the

logic o f developm ent, w ith variations against a background o f

redundancy, these m od u lation s play on the harm onic p rop erties o f ritual sym bols, w h eth er d u p licatin g on e of th e th em es w ith a strict eq u ivalen t in all respects (gall evok in g wrorm w ood, w h ich , like gall, u n ites b itterness and greenness) or m od u latin g in to rem oter tonalities by playing on th e associations °f the secondary h arm onics ( l i z a r d t o a d ).29

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Ritual practice effects a fluid, "f u z z y ” abstraction, b rin gin g th e sam e sym bol in to different relations through different aspects or b rin gin g d ifferen t aspects o f the sam e referent in to th e sam e relation o f o p p o sitio n ; in other w ords, it ex clu d es th e S ocratic q u estion o f the respect in which th e referent is appreh en ded (shap e, colour, fu n ctio n , e t c .) , thereby ob v ia tin g the need to define in each case th e prin cip le g overn in g the ch oice o f the aspect se lec te d , and, a fo rtiori, the n eed to stick to that p rin cip le at all tim es. B ut in relating objects and selectin g asp ects, this practical taxon om y ap plies, su ccessiv ely or sim u ltan eou sly, prin cip les w h ich are all in directly redu cible to on e another, and this en ab les it to classify the sam e " d a ta ” from several different stand­ p o in ts w ith ou t classifyin g them in different w ays (w h ereas a m ore rigorous sy stem w o u ld m ake as m any classification s as it fou n d p rop erties). The u n iv erse th u s u n d ergoes a d ivision w h ich can be said to be logical, though it seem s to break all the rules of logical d ivision (for ex a m p le, by making d ivision s w hich are n eith er exclu sive nor ex h a u stiv e), for all its dichotom ies are in d efin itely redu n dan t, b ein g in th e last analysis the product of a single principium division is. B ecause the p rin cip le o p p o sin g the term s w h ich have b een related (e .g . the su n and th e m oon ) is n ot d efined and u sually com es d o w n to a sim p le contrariety (w hereas con trad iction im p lies a prelim inary analysis) analogy (w h ic h , w h en it d oes not fu n ction purely in its practical state, is alw ays exp ressed ellip tically - "w om an is the m o o n ”) estab lish es a h o m ology b etw een o p p o sitio n s (m a n :w o m a n ::su n :m o o n ) set up in accor­ dance w4th tw o in d eterm in ate, overd eterm in ed p rin cip les ( h o t : c o ld : : m ale: fe m a le ::d a y :n ig h t::e tc .) w h ich differ from the p rin cip les gen eratin g other h o m ologies in to wTh ich either o f the tw o term s in q u estio n m ig h t enter (m a n :w o m a n ::e a st:w e st or s u n : m o o n : : d r y : w e t). In other w ords, fluid abstraction is also false abstraction. B ecau se the properties d istin g u ish in g one " d a tu m ” from another rem ain attached to n on -p ertin en t p rop erties, the assim ilation is com p reh en sive and com p lete even w hen fun dam en tally m oti­ vated in on ly on e resp ect. T h e aspect o f each o f the term s w h ich is (im p licitly) selected from a sin gle stan d p oin t in any particular con n ectio n m ade betw een them rem ains attached to th e other asp ects through w h ich it can su b seq u en tly be o p p osed to oth er asp ects of an oth er referent in other co n n ectio n s. T h e same term cou ld th u s en ter in to an infinite n um ber o f co n n ectio n s if the num ber of w ays of relating to wrhat is not itself w ere not lim ited to a few fundamental o p p o sitio n s. Ritual practice p roceed s n o differen tly from th e ch ild who drove A ndre G id e to despair b y in sistin g that th e o p p o site o f "blanc w as " b la n c h e ” and the

fem in in e o f " g r a n d ” , " p e t it ”. In sh ort, the

"analogical s e n s e ” in cu lcated in th e earliest years o f life is, as W allon says of th in k in g in cou p les, a sort o f " sen se o f th e con tra ry ” , w h ich g iv e s rise to the co u n tless ap p lication s of a few basic contrasts capable o f p rovid in g a m in im u m

Econom y o f logic

"3

0f determ ination (a m an is not a w om an - > a toad is not a frog) and cannot ive anv inform ation about the relations it relates, b ecause it is p recisely their indeterm inacy and fu zzin ess that perm it it to op erate. T h e u ncertain ties and m isunderstandings in herent in th is logic of su g g estio n and a m b igu ity are thu s the price that has to be paid for the economy w h ich resu lts from redu cing the universe o f the relations b etw een o p p osites and o f the relation s b etw een these relations to a few basic relations from w hich all the o th ers can be generated. Sym patheia ton holon, as th e S to ics called it, the affinity b etw een all the objects of a universe in w h ich m ean in g is everyw h ere, and everyw here superabundant, is ach ieved at the cost of the fu zzin ess and vagu en ess of each of the elem en ts and each of the relation ship s b etw een th em : lo g ic can be everyw here on ly b ecause it is really n ow h ere. If ritual p ractices and represen ­ tations are ob jectively en d ow ed w ith partial, approxim ate sy stem a ticity , this is because they are th e p rod uct o f a sm all n um ber of g en erative sch em es that are pra ctically interchangeable, i.e . capable o f p rod u cin g eq u ivalen t resu lts from the p oint of view o f the " lo g ic a l” d em an d s of practice. If th ey never have more than partial and ap proxim ate sy stem aticity , th is is b ecause the schem es o f wrh ich they are the product can be q uasi-u n iversally applied on ly because th ey fu n ction in their practical state, i.e . on the h ith er side of exp licit statem ent and co n seq u en tly ou tsid e o f all logical con trol, and by reference to practical en d s w h ich are su ch as to im p ose on them a necessity w h ich is not that of logic. It is by "practical sense ” that an agent know s, for exam ple, that a given act or object requires a particular place inside the house; that a given task or rite corresponds to a particular period of the year or is excluded from another. H e only needs to possess, in their practical state, a set of schem es functioning in their im plicit state and in the absence of any precise delim itation of the universe of discourse, to be able to produce or understand a sym bolic series such as the follow ing: w hen a cat enters the house with a feather or a wisp of w hite wool in its fur, if it heads for the hearth, this presages the arrival of guests, w ho w ill be given a meal with m eat; if it goes towards the stable, this m eans that a cow w ill be bought if the season is spring, an ox if it autumn. T h e question-begging and the approxim ations in this series are obvious: the cat, an intruder w hich enters by chance and is driven out again, is only there as a bearer of sym bols, which realizes practically the m ovem ent of entering; the feather is im plicitly treated as the equivalent of the w ool, no doubt because both substances are called upon to function as the mere supports of a beneficent quality, "the w h ite” ; the opposition betw een the hearth and the stable, the centre of the rite, is engendered by the schem e w hich structures the internal space of the house, opposing the top and the bottom , the dry and the w et, the male and the fem ale, the noble part where guests are received and where meat is roasted (the dish served to guests par excellen ce), and the lower part, the place reserved for the anim als. T h is schem e only has to be com bined with the schem e generating the opposition betw een two seasons - autum n, the tim e of the collective sacrifice of an ox follow ed by the ploughing, and spring, the season of milk - to give the ox and the co w .30

ii4

G en erative schemes and p ra ctica l logic

A nother exam ple occurs in a w ell-known tale, the story of Heb-H eb-er-Rem m an. A girl who has seven brothers falls foul of the jealousy of her sisters-in-law. T h ey make her eat seven snake’s eggs, concealed in dum plings: her belly sw ells and people think she is pregnant; she is driven from the house. A w ise man discovers the cause of h e r ailm ent: to cure her, a sheep must be slaughtered and its meat roasted, with a lot of salt. T h e girl m ust eat it and then be suspended by her feet with her m outh open over a pan o f water. When this is done, the snakes com e out and they are killed. T h e girl marries; she has a child whom she calls H eb-H eb-er-R em m an "pomegranate se e d s”. She goes back to her brothers, who recognize her when she tells them h e r story, show ing them the seven snakes which she has dried and salted. It can im m ediately be seen that to produce this narrative, or to decode (at least in an approxim ate form) its significance, it is sufficient to possess the set of schem es which are at wrork in the production of any fertility rite. T o fecundate is to penetrate, to introduce som ething which sw ells and/or causes sw elling: the ingestion of food, and of food w hich sw ells ( ufthyen) is hom ologous with sexual intercourse and ploughing.31 But here there is a false fecundation: the snakes, a sym bol of the male life-principle, of sem en, o f the ancestor w ho must die in order to be reborn, and thus of the dry, are ingested in the form of eggs, i.e. in their fem ale state, and return to maleness inopportunely, in the girl’s stom ach (in a fertility rite reported by Westermarck, it is the heart - a male part of the snake - that is eaten ). T h e sw elling which results from this inverted procreation is sterile and pernicious. T h e cure is logically self-evident. T he dry m ust be made to move in the opposite direction, from the high to the low - the girl sim ply has to be turned upside dow n - and from the inside to the outside - which cannot be done by a sim ple mechanical operation: the dry must be further dried, parched, by adding to it what is pre-em inently dry, salt, and reinforcing its propensity tow ards the moist, which in normal fecundation - procreation or sowing - carries it towards the inside, towards the damp w om b of woman or of the earth opened by the ploughshare. At the end of the story, the w om an’s fecundity is proved by the birth of H eb-H eb-er-R em m an ‘'pom egranate se e d s ” (the sym bol par excellence of female fecundity, identified with the w om b ), i.e. the many sons born (or to be born) from the fertile wom b of a woman herself sprung from a wom b prolific of m en (her seven brothers). And the seven snakes end up dried and salted, i.e . in the state to w hich they are structurally assigned as sym bols o f male seed, capable of grow ing and m ultiplying through the cycle of im m ersion in the wet follow ed by em ergence towards the dry.

T he body as geom eter: cosmogonic practice U n d erstan d in g ritual practice is not a q u estion of d eco d in g the internal logic o f a sym b o lism but of restoring its practical n ecessity b y relating it to the real co n d ition s of its g en esis, that is, to the co n d itio n s in w hich its fu n ctio n s, and the m ean s it u ses to attain th em , are d efin ed . It m eans, for exam ple, reco n stitu tin g - b y an operation of logical recon stru ction w h ich has n oth ing to d o w ith an act of em p ath ic projection - th e significance and fu n ctio n s that agents in a d eterm in ate social form ation can (and m ust) con fer on a d eter­ m inate practice or exp erien ce, given the practical tax o n o m ies w hich organize their p ercep tion . W hen con fron ted w ith m yth and ritual, social theory has alwrays h esitated b etw een the lofty d istan ce w h ich the m ost com p rehensive scien ce seek s to keep b etw een itself and th e elem en tary form s o f reason and

T h e bo d y as geom eter: cosmogonic practice

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the m ystical participation of the great initiates of the g n o stic trad ition. T h e objectivist reduction w h ich b rings to ligh t the so-called ob jective fu n ction s 0f m yth s and rites (for D u rk h eim , fu n ction s of m oral in tegration ; for L eviStrauss, fu n ction s o f logical integration) m akes it im p o ssib le to understand bow these fu n ction s are fu lfilled , b ecau se it brackets th e agents' ow n repre­ sentation o f th e w orld and o f their practice. " P a rticip a n t” anth rop ology, on the other hand - w h en it is not m erely inspired b y nostalgia for the agrarian paradises, th e prin cip le of all con servative id eo lo g ies - regards the human invariants and the u niversality o f th e m ost basic exp eriences as sufficient justification for seek in g eternal answ ers to the eternal q u estio n s of the cosm ogon ies and co sm o lo g ies in the practical answ ers w h ich the peasants of K abylia or elsew h ere have given to th e practical, h istorically situated problem s w h ich w ere forced on th em in a determ in ate state o f th eir in stru ­ m ents o f m aterial and sy m b o lic appropriation of th e w o rld . Even w hen they are asym ptotic w ith scien tific tru th , the inspired in terp retation s fostered by such a d isp osition are never m ore than the in version o f th e false objectification performed b y colonial an th rop ology. By cu ttin g practices off from their real conditions o f ex iste n c e, in order to credit them w ith alien in ten tio n s, by a false g en erosity con d u civ e to stylistic effects, the exaltation o f lost wrisd om dispossesses th em , as su rely as its o p p osite, o f everyth in g that co n stitu tes their reason and their raison d'etre, and locks th em in the etern al essen ce of a " m en ta lity”. T h e K ab yle w om an settin g up her loom is not perform ing an act o f cosm ogon y; sh e is sim p ly settin g up her loom to w eave clo th in tend ed to serve a techn ical fu n ctio n . It so happ en s that, given the sy m b o lic eq u ip m en t available to her for th in k in g her ow n activity - and in particular her language, which con stantly refers her back to the logic of p lou g h in g - sh e can on ly think what sh e is d oin g in th e en ch an ted, that is to say, m y stified , form w hich spiritualism , thirsty for eternal m ysteries, finds so en ch a n tin g . R ites take place b ecau se and o n ly b ecau se they find th eir raison d'etre in the co n d ition s of ex isten ce and the d isp o sitio n s o f a gen ts w h o cannot afford the luxury of logical sp ecu la tio n , m ystical effu sion s, or m etaph ysical anxiety. It is not sufficient to rid icu le the m ore naive form s of fu n ctio n a lism in order to have d one w ith th e q u estion o f the practical fu n ctio n s o f p ractice. It is clear that a universal d efinition of the fu n ction s of m arriage as an operation intended to en su re th e b iological reproduction of the g ro u p , in accordance with form s approved b y the grou p , in n o w ay exp lain s K ab yle marriage ritual. But, contrary to appearances, scarcely m ore u n d erstan d in g is d erived from a structural analysis w h ich ign ores the sp ecific fu n ctio n s of ritual practices and fails to inquire in to the eco n o m ic and social co n d itio n s o f the p roduction ° f the d isp o sitio n s gen eratin g both these practices and also th e co llective definition of th e practical fu n ction s in w h ose service th e y fu n ctio n . T h e

G en erative schemes an d practical logic

n6

K abyle peasan t d oes not react to " ob jective c o n d itio n s” but to th e practical in terp retation w hich he prod uces of th o se con d itio n s, and the principle of wfh ich is the socially con stitu ted sc h e m e s of his h abitus. It is th is inter­ pretation w h ich has to be con stru cted in each case, if w e w ant to give an account of ritual p ractices w h ich w ill d o justice b oth to their reason and to their raison d'etre, that is, to their inseparably logical and practical n ecessity . T h u s , tech n ical or ritual practices are d eterm in ed b y the m aterial conditions of ex isten ce (that is, in this particular case, by a certain relation ship between the clim atic and ecological con d ition s and th e available tech n iq u es) as treated in p ractice b y agents endowred w ith sc h e m e s of p ercep tion of a determ inate sort, wrh ich are th em selv es d eterm in ed , n egatively at least, b y th e material co n d itio n s of existen ce (th e relative au to n o m y o f ritual b ein g a ttested by the invariant features fou n d th rou gh ou t the M agh reb, d esp ite the variations in th e clim a tic and econ om ic co n d itio n s). It is in a particular relationship b etw een a m ode of p rod uction and a m o d e of p ercep tion that th e specific contradiction of agrarian a ctivity is defined as the hazardous or even sacrilegious con fron tation of antagonistic p rin cip les, togeth er w ith th e ritual apparatus w h ose fu n ctio n it is to resolve that con trad iction . It is through th e m ediation o f th e fu n ctio n thereby assigned to tech n ical or ritual p ractice that the relation sh ip observed b etw een the eco n o m ic system and the m ythico-ritual sy stem is estab lish ed p ractically .32 R ites, m ore than any other typ e of practice, serve to u n d erlin e the mistake of en clo sin g in con cep ts a logic m ade to d isp en se w ith co n cep ts; of treating m o v em en ts o f the body and practical m an ip u lation s as purely logical opera­ tio n s; o f speaking of an alogies and h om o lo g ies (as on e so m etim es has to, in order to understand and to con vey that u nd erstan ding) w h en all that is in v o lved

is

th e

practical transference

of

incorporated,

quasi-postural

sc h e m e s .33 R ite is in d eed in som e cases n o m ore than a practical mimesis of the natural p rocess w h ich n eed s to b e facilitated : u nlike m etaphor and ex p licit analogy, mimetic representation (apom im em a) estab lish es a relationship b etw een the sw ellin g of grain in th e cook in g-p ot, the sw ellin g o f a pregnant w om an ’s belly, and th e germ ination of w h eat in the grou n d, w h ich entails no ex p licit statem en t of th e properties of th e term s related or th e principles of th eir relationship; the m ost characteristic operations of its " lo g ic ” in v ertin g, transferring, u n itin g, separatin g, etc. - take th e form of m o v e m e n t s of the b o d y , turnin g to th e right or le ft, p u ttin g th in g s u p sid e d o w n , going in, co m in g ou t, ty in g , cu ttin g, etc. T o sp eak , as w e have h ere, of overall resem b lance and u ncertain abstraction, is still to u se th e intellectualist language o f represen tation - the language w h i c h an an alyst’s relation to a corpus spread ou t before him in th e form of

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docum ents q u ite n aturally forces on him - to express a lo g ic w h ich is acted

oUt directly in th e form of b odily gym n astics w ith ou t p a ssin g through the express ap preh en sion of the " a s p e c ts” selected or rejected , of the sim ilar or dissimilar " p r o f i l e s T h e lo gicism inherent in th e ob jectivist stand point leads those w h o adopt it to forget that scien tific con stru ction cannot grasp the principles o f practical lo g ic w ith ou t ch an gin g th e nature o f th ose p r in c ip le s: when m ade exp licit for objective stu d y, a practical su ccessio n b eco m es a

represented su c c e ssio n ; an action oriented in relation to a sp ace objectively constituted as a stru cture o f d em and s (th in gs " to be d o n e ” and " n ot to be d on e”) b ecom es a reversib le operation carried ou t in co n tin u o u s, h o m o ­ geneous space. F or exam p le, as lon g as m vthico-ritual sp a ce is seen as an opus operatum , that is, as a tim eless order of th in gs co e x istin g , it is never more than a theoretical sp ace, in w hich th e on ly landm arks are provided by the term s of relations o f op p osition (u p /d o w n , e a st/w e st), and w here on ly theoretical op eration s can b e effected, i.e . logical d isp la cem en ts and transfor­ mations w hich differ toto coelo from m ovem en