Operational Research in War and Peace : The British Experience from the 1930s to 1970

M a u r i c e

W

K i r b y

O P E R A T I O N A L R E S E A R C H IN WAR A N D PEACE THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE FROM THE 1930s TO 1970 Imperial College Press

O P ERAT I O N AL R ESEARC H I N WAR A N D P E A C E THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE FROM THE 1930s TO 1970

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Maurice W Kirby Lancaster University, UK

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Imperial College Press

Published by Imperial College Press 57 Shelton Street Covent Garden London WC2H 9HE and The Operational Research Society Seymour House 12 Edward Street Birmingham, Bl 2RX Distributed by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: Suite 202, 1060 Main Street, River Edge, NJ 07661 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH IN WAR AND PEACE The British Experience from the 1930s to 1970 Copyright © 2003 by Imperial College Press and the Operational Research Society All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.

ISBN ISBN

1-86094-297-0 1-86094-366-7 (pbk)

Printed in Singapore.

Contents

List of Figures

vii

List of Tables

ix

List of Illustrations

xi

Acknowledgements

xiii

1. Introduction

1

2. The Origins of Operational Research: Military and Other Antecedents to 1937

30

3. The Beginnings of Operational Research: British Air Strategy, 1920-1940

58

4. The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research, 1940-1945

86

5. Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945

132

6. The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research, 1945-1951

185

7. Operational Research in Iron and Steel

209

8. Operational Research in Coalmining

253

9. The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960: The Corporate Sector

293

10. Operational Research in the Public Sector

334

11. The Institutional Development of Operational Research

365

Bibliography

413

Index

437 v

Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett (Baron Blackett of Chelsea), the 'Father' of Operational Research in 1964

List of Figures

1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 8.1 8.2 8.3 10.1

Science Schema Appleyard's Diagrams Flash Spotting Layout of a Sound-Ranging Section Tizard ('Tizzy') Angle The Structure of Coastal Command Headquarters Frequency Plotted Against Time Interval: Data up to May 1941 The First Sixteen Attacks to be Analysed Mean Centre Points for Attacks Shipping Losses as a Result of U-boat Action, 1941-3 Accuracy of Night Bombing of German Cities Monthly Totals of Tons Dropped Per Sorties Despatched by Bomber Command The Growth of BISRA The Organisation of BISRA Total Importing Cost Repair Queueing Model Typical Availability Chart (12-furnace shop) Growth of Operational Research Staff in FIG, 1947-65 Organisation of the Operational Research Branch Results of Monte Carlo Computations of Warning Time O.R. Groups in Civil Departments of British Civil Service

Vll

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List of Tables

3.1 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 7.1 8.1 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4

Summary of Pre-War Expansion Schemes — 1934-1939 U-boat Effectiveness During the Second World War Progress of Lethality of Attacks Percentage of Attacking Sorties Within Three Miles of Aiming Point Density at the Aiming Point — German Cities Bomber Command Targets in the European Theatre, October-December 1944 Bomber Command Targets in the European Theatre, January-April 1945 German War Production, 1942-1944 Actual and Potential Armaments Production, 1943-4 Absence Episodes per 1000 Working Shifts Information Used in Selection Procedure Attendance at the First IFORS Conference The National Societies in IFORS, with their Year of Joining Area of Employment in Operational Research Respondents' First Degree Subject

IX

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List of Illustrations

Frontispiece: Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, the 'Father' of Operational Research in 1964. Patrick Blackett, the young physicist. Sir Henry Tizard. Sir Robert Watson-Watt. F. A. Lindemann. Sir Arthur T. Harris. Dr B. G. Dickens. Solly Zuckerman. Sir Charles Goodeve. Stafford Beer Roger Eddison. B. H. P. ('Pat') Rivett. Philip M. Morse. Sir Owen Wansbrough-Jones. Sir William K. Slater. The Earl of Halsbury.

XI

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Acknowledgements

I have incurred many debts in writing this book, the first of two projected volumes on the history of operational research in Britain. I am grateful to Robert Fildes for stimulating my early interest in the subject and to Rebecca Capey for research assistance. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to the Operational Research Society for funding the costs of the project. I must also acknowledge the invaluable support that I have received from members of the Society's Archives Committee — John Friend, J. D. Griffiths, Brian Haley, Norman Lawrie, Bob Miles, George Mitchell, Maurice Shutler, Richard Storey, Rolfe Tomlinson and Christine Woodland. All of them have given liberally of their advice and without their assistance this first stage of the project could not have been brought to fruition. Special thanks are due to Norman Lawrie in his capacity as a stern but sympathetic critic: his unerring eye for inconsistencies and infelicities in exposition has resulted in a much improved manuscript. Beyond the Archives Committee, I wish to acknowledge the help received from the following individuals: Jim Bamberg, Ray Beatty, Stafford Beer, Ken Bowen, Christopher Chapman, Peter Checkland, Roger Collcutt, David Comins, Sebastian Cox, Nigel Cummings, Peter Davies, Ian Disley, R. T Eddison, Samuel Eilon, Caroline Elliott, Ernest Field, Alec Glaskin, Carl Harris, J. Harrington, E. K. James, H. G. Jones, Ernest Koenigsberg, John Lawrence, Fred Lloyd, Robert Locke, John Macfarlane, Mike Makower, Alan Mercer, Hugh Miser, Jim Morrison, John Mowat, David Owen, Janet Parker, Peter Pengilly, R. W. Pipe, Graham Rand, John Ranyard, Pat Rivett, Shirley Rodden, Jonathan Rosenhead, Ronnie Shephard, Brian Shorrock, David Steer, John Stringer, Ian Taylor, Derek Trigg, Stephen Watson, Doug White and Brian Whitworth. Needless to say, they bear no responsibility for the opinions expressed or for any errors of fact or interpretation. Maurice W. Kirby xiii

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Patrick Blackett, the young physicist

Sir Henry Tizard, Chairman of the CSSAD

Sir Robert Watson-Watt, Superintendent of the Radio Department, National Physical Laboratory

F. A. Lindemann, Lord Cherwell, one time member of the CSS AD and Paymaster-General in the wartime Coalition Government

Sir Arthur T. Harris, Bomber Command's outstanding Commander-in-Chief, 1942-5

Dr. B. G. Dickens, Officer-in-Charge, Bomber Command's Operational Research Section

Professor Solly (later Lord) Zuckerman in 1945

Sir Charles Goodeve, Director of BISRA

Stafford Beer, pioneer of Operational Research and Cybernetics in the iron and steel industry

Roger Eddison, Founding Editor of the Operational Research Quarterly

Professor B. H. P. ('Pat') Rivett, pioneer of Operational Research in the coalmining industry and first Professor of Operational Research in a British university

Professor P. M. Morse, Operational Research practitioner and the outstanding advocate of Operational Research in American universities

Sir Owen Wansbrough-Jones, President of the Operational Research Society, 1954-5

Sir William Slater, President of the Operational Research Society, 1956-7

The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Halsbury, President of the Operational Research Society, 1960-1

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1

Introduction

This book provides an account of the history of operational research in Britain, the country of its inception, from the late 1930s to 1970. Originating in the prewar plans for the air defence of Great Britain against the Luftwaffe, by the end of the 1960s operational research had achieved substantial, if uneven diffusion throughout the civilian sector, both public and private. In the decade after the war operational research became well-established at the industry-specific level with a significant presence in the nationalised coal industry, the British Iron and Steel Research Association (BISRA), and the larger iron and steel companies. During the 1960s, coincident with the diffusion of corporate forms of enterprise into the manufacturing sector, the discipline was incorporated in the managerial structures of a wide variety of firms, from petroleum products and man-made fibres to confectionery and printing and publishing. By that time too, operational research had made its presence felt in the transport sector, including civil aviation, British Railways and London Transport, as well as in such public utilities as electricity generation, gas and atomic energy. Diffusion in the 1960s was also reflected in the emergence of operational research as a subject worthy of advanced study in universities. Initially confined to postgraduate courses, by the mid1970s several i n s t i t u t i o n s of h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n w e r e offering undergraduate degree programmes in operational research, either singly or jointly with other 'management' oriented subjects. Finally, from the mid-1960s onwards, operational research found increasing acceptance in civil g o v e r n m e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , both central a n d local. This development, precipitated in part by the modernising ethos of the then Labour Government, continued after 1970, by which time operational research had come to be a valued activity in Whitehall, not least in the Treasury and the Civil Service Department.

1

2 Operational Research in War and Peace A combination of acknowledged utilitarian value and formal academic recognition within thirty years of its foundation is consistent with an impressive trajectory of achievement for any human endeavour and it gives rise to a number of explanatory hypotheses. At one extreme, it might be argued that in the light of its wartime contribution to military effectiveness, the postwar diffusion of operational research was virtually guaranteed by a wave of enthusiasm propelled, wholly or in part, by wartime practitioners who, in returning to their civilian occupations, proved to be able and effective advocates of the application of 'science' to the process of management, broadly defined. Alternatively, it is possible that operational research, even at its inception, was sufficiently grounded in pre-existing developments, such as 'scientific management' and the 'rationalisation' of industry, that there could be no significant obstacles to its adoption thereby giving rise to a smooth and linear diffusion process. Thus, to the extent that the advocates of operational research were able to capitalise on some well-established trends in managerial organisation, they could lay little claim to originality. Before these and other hypotheses can be evaluated it is necessary to define the methodology and subject matter of operational research, always bearing in mind that formal definitions did not begin to appear until the later 1940s. That was the period when several of the leading wartime practitioners of the discipline described, as far as the Official Secrets Act would allow, its military origins and uses, as well as its potential civilian applications. At a conference held in Dundee under the auspices of the British Association in 1947, the innovator of radar, Sir Robert Watson-Watt, stated that although he had been directly involved in the inauguration of operational research in the period to 1940, he had no recollection of any generally accepted definition emerging then or subsequently. The exception was his own 'negative thesis,' maintained with 'damned iteration,' that 'Operational Research is not doing arithmetic for Air Staff.'1 For the Dundee audience, therefore, Watson-Watt presented his own definition of operational research — 'for industry as well as in war': To examine quantitatively whether the user organisation is getting from the operation of its equipment the best attainable contribution to its overall objective, what are the predominant factors governing the results at a minimal cost in effort and time, and the degree to which variations in the tactical objectives are likely to contribute to a more economical and timely attainment of the overall strategic objective.2

Introduction 3 Despite the claim that he had encompassed the non-military applications of operational research, the overall consensus was that Watson-Watt's definition was unduly limited: it may have described accurately the modus operandi of the scientists and engineers engaged in the radar-based system of aircraft interception in advance of the Battle of Britain, but it failed to convey the wider relevance of the discipline. This point was addressed explicitly in 1948 by Sir Charles Goodeve, the former Deputy Controller of Research and Development at the Admiralty. After stating his own 'shorthand' definition of operational research as 'quantitative common sense,' G o o d e v e t h e n cited w i t h a p p r o v a l (and w i t h m i n i m a l embellishment) Charles Kittel's 1947 definition of operational research as 'a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control.' 3 It was this sparse formulation which provided the basis for most of the subsequent definitions of operational research, at least until the 1970s. Its full flowering was reflected in the definition adopted by the UK Operational Research Society and prominently displayed on the first page of its house journal, the Operational Research Quarterly, from 1967 onwards: Operational Research is the application of the methods of science to complex problems arising in the direction and management of large systems of men, machines, materials, and money in industry, business and defence. The distinctive approach is to develop a scientific model of the system, incorporating measurements of factors such as chance and risk, with which to predict and compare the outcome of alternative decisions, strategies or controls. The purpose is to help management determine its policy and actions scientifically. The immediately striking aspect of this definition is its assertion that operational research was rooted in the methodology of 'science.' 4 In this respect, it is clear that one of the immediate concerns of the postwar pioneers of the discipline was to establish their credentials by reference not only to the mathematical basis of operational research, but also by rooting it in the established traditions of scientific enquiry with a particular emphasis on the objective appraisal of evidence. For the eminent scientist and philosopher, Karl Popper, 'every statement must be testable' in the sense that A scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward statements, or systems of statements and tests them step by step.

4 Operational Research in War and Peace In the field of empirical sciences, more particularly, he constructs hypotheses or systems of theories and tests them against experience of observation and measurement.5 In the context of operational research, Popper's definition of the scientific method had already been anticipated by another scientist of distinction who had himself fulfilled a decisive role in the diffusion of operational research after 1940. Indeed, no account of the history of operational research would be complete without generous acknowledgement of the pioneering endeavours of Professor Patrick Blackett (later Lord Blackett). As a young physicist of outstanding ability, responsible for important advances in knowledge and u n d e r s t a n d i n g of cosmic rays, rock magnetism and atomic physics, Blackett had been a key member of the official committee convened by Sir Henry Tizard in 1934 to advise the government on the effective air defence of Great Britain. After 1940, Blackett was primarily responsible for the diffusion of operational research from RAF Fighter Command throughout the greater part of the military command structure. He played the leading role in the creation of operational research sections in Ack-Ack and Coastal Commands before his appointment as Director of Naval Operational Research at the Admiralty in January 1942, a position which he held until the end of the war.6 Combining the role of scientist with the practice of operational research, Blackett has long been regarded as the 'father' of the discipline and as a Nobel Prize winner (1948) he was certainly well qualified to comment on the nature of operational research in its scientific context. His thoughts are conveniently summarised in the first issue of the Operational Research Quarterly, published in March 1950. Quoting with approval Kittel's definition, Blackett was mainly concerned to define the remit of operational research in relation to 'the application of the scientific method.' This could be defined as a systematic method of learning by experience. In more detail, scientific method may be defined as that combination of observations, experiment and reasoning (both deductive and inductive) which scientists are in the habit of using in their scientific investigations.8 Whilst conceding that this was a very general formulation, Blackett concluded that it conveyed accurately the two essential elements of any scientific investigation, namely

Introduction 5 (a) Observation which may in itself be something quite simple or a very complicated survey and may or may not be supported by special experiment, but which must be so carried out that it provides reliable information on the material observed; and (b) Reasoning which may often take one of the forms of numerical deduction and induction covered by the term statistical analysis. It may be noted that it is the use of appropriate and precise methods of observation and reasoning that make an investigation scientific. The fact that the initial material is scanty, as sometimes may be the case in operational research, does not of itself render an investigation unscientific, although no amount of scientific method can get more out of data than there is in them and one of the initial approaches to any problem must be to examine the material, consider what conclusions can be drawn from it and decide what further information is required and how it can be obtained.9 Defined in this way, Blackett was prepared to admit that the scientific method had often been applied to 'the analysis of human life and organisation,' a judgement validated by reference to the literature of applied economics and the statistical analyses carried out by a variety of research bodies such as Political and Economic Planning (P.E.P.), the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and individual industry research associations. Thus, to the extent that operational research is 'merely the scientific method applied to the complex data of human society, however useful it might be, it certainly is not new.' It is in this context, therefore, that a full account of the history of operational research must place it in its correct historical setting. Whilst the following chapter establishes the origins of operational research by reference to its specific antecedents in the period to 1937, it is appropriate to examine the wider societal background to its pre-history in this introductory chapter in the general context of the scientific method as defined by Blackett. In this respect, it is possible to draw on the insights provided by Robert Locke in his study of management and higher education in advanced industrial countries after 1940.10 The explanatory tool deployed by Locke to analyse 'the application of science to the solution of managerial problems' in the modern era is the emergence of the ' n e w p a r a d i g m ' in business studies. This can be illustrated diagrammatically as follows:

6 Operational Research in War and Peace ^.Science ^

Philosophy, logic, mathematics, neo­ classical economics

natural sciences (physics, chemistry, etc.)

engineering sciences

social sciences including management studies

Figure 1.1 Science Schema Source: Robert Locke, Management and Higher Education since 1940: The Influence of America and ]apan on West Germany, Britain and France (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1989), Fig. 1.1, p. 3.

The figure distinguishes between the formal and empirical sciences and divides the latter into theoretical (pure) and practical (applied) branches. The practical sciences are themselves divided into technical and human relations sub-groups. The direction of the arrows, from left to right, is indicative of the evolution of the sub-groups and is thus illustrative of the emergence of the 'new paradigm.' In moving from left to right, the main precipitating factor in relation to the formal sciences was mathematics — 'the most significant and pervasive scientific tool of modern times.' 11 During the nineteenth century mathematics was transformed from a subject concerned mainly with numbers and shapes into a discipline with a wide variety of applications, both theoretical and practical. Critical in this respect were the insights provided by George Boole who applied arithmetic and a 'new' algebra to Aristotelian logic, thereby demonstrating that the existing laws of reasoning could be expressed in symbolic form: logical processes could thus be clarified by the precision of mathematical reasoning. Boolean algebra was entirely consistent with the emergent view among mathematicians that algebraic formulae and manipulations could be used to denote entities other than

Introduction 7 numbers, and that the methods of algebra could be applied to classes or collections of phenomena beyond ordinary arithmetic. As such, Boole's approach appealed both to pure and applied mathematicians, in the latter case primarily because of the insights it provided into the laws of probability. 12 A further significant development germane to the emergence of the 'soft' sciences was the growth of knowledge and understanding in the area of mathematical statistics. Since it was only the 'hard' sciences which could engage in laboratory experiment (in the sense that all variables could be held constant except two that could be varied in order to produce precise results), statistical inference rooted in the mathematics of probabilities could replicate for the 'soft' sciences some of the rigour of the scientific method insofar as it was a credible substitute for laboratory experiment. This view that the methodology of operational research was rooted in prevailing techniques of statistical analysis was also shared by Charles Goodeve, himself a university-trained scientist, and the outstanding postwar advocate of the new discipline. As he commented in 1948, In most problems there are a number of variables to be considered. Our first objective is to find the correlation between these variables, our second to test the stability of this correlation by finding the causal link lying behind it, and our final objective is to estimate the likely consequences of any particular change that may be imposed upon the system. We thus provide ourselves with a quantitative basis for any decision to be made regarding the change.13 It was this basic methodology which had been applied to the solution of a wide range of tactical problems during the Second World War. Nowhere was this more evident than in the anti-U-boat campaign and the justification for a convoy system in the North Atlantic. Chapter 4 deals with this issue in detail but some aspects of the approach adopted by operational researchers can be legitimately raised in this introductory chapter since they provide critical insights into their emergent methodology. Convoying of merchant vessels across the Atlantic was a vital factor in sustaining Britain's military capability in the First World War and so it proved again in the later conflict. In revalidating the convoy system after 1940, the key issues for analysis in relation to the optimal speed of a convoy were as follows:

8

Operational Research in War and Peace How does the number of ships in the convoy depend u p o n the speed of the convoy? Is the speed the direct cause or the effect? How many ships are likely to be saved if the speed is increased? What will be the cost resulting from the elimination of re-routing of slow ships etc.?14

Clearly, the s p e e d of t h e c o n v o y w a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e in conformity w i t h G o o d e v e ' s methodological generalisation, b u t It may be that the correlated rate of sinkings really depends on some other variable itself accidentally inversely correlated to the speed. For example, the ships may make smoke when steaming at lower speeds and thus be detected by a U-boat at a longer range. However, a study of the performance of the enemy's submarines and of his tactics showed clearly a direct causal link. It was possible to go and predict approximately the relation between sinkings and speed, and the relation was found to agree satisfactorily with the operational data. It could, therefore, be predicted that if it was decided to make a certain increase in speed of convoys a certain increased safety was to be expected. The loss due to various dislocations of convoy routine was separately calculated and set against the gain, and the net result formed the basis for decisions to increase speed in many important convoys. 15 A f u r t h e r e x a m p l e of m e t h o d o l o g i e s i n f o r m e d b y e l e m e n t a r y s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s is p r o v i d e d b y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of p r o b a b i l i t y calculations to tactical p r o b l e m s . A g a i n this w a s illustrated b y G o o d e v e , given his considerable appreciation of m a n y of the w a r t i m e applications of operational research. In the case of G e r m a n E-boats o p e r a t i n g in the English Channel, for e x a m p l e , it w a s found that t w o s e p a r a t e counter­ a t t a c k i n g flotillas h a d w i d e l y differing p e r c e n t a g e s of s i g h t i n g s . O n investigation it w a s discovered that there w a s n o statistical difference b e t w e e n the flotillas w i t h r e g a r d to the time taken to identify the e n e m y position. H o w e v e r , The average taken was a linear average, whereas the probability of interception is a function of the inverse third or fourth power of the time. Therefore, the average taken should have been of the times raised to the third or fourth power rather than to the first. When this was done, there was a marked difference found in the averages of the two flotillas, quite sufficient to account for the difference in success. 16

Introduction 9 It was evident, therefore, that there were considerable fluctuations in transmission times, with the successful intercepting flotilla in receipt of far more short transmission times, notwithstanding the fact that the overall average was the same for the other flotilla. For Goodeve, therefore, the application of the scientific method in this way was entirely consistent with 'quantitative common sense.' In 1950, Blackett advanced the claim for the 'newness' of operational research not by reference to its use of the scientific method but to 'the level at which the work is done, in the comparative freedom of the investigators to seek out their own problems and in the direct relation of the work to the possibilities of executive action.' 17 Whilst this was an accurate indication of a great deal of the operational research carried out in wartime, the postwar history of the discipline shows clearly that Blackett failed to anticipate the difficulties encountered by operational researchers in securing an equivalent remit in civil affairs. Although operational research was readily adopted by the coal, iron and steel, civil aviation and petroleum industries in the period to 1960, its penetration into the manufacturing sector was initially slow. Moreover, when the pace of diffusion accelerated after 1960 the coverage was notably uneven so that as late as 1970 operational researchers could not take their status for granted in corporate managerial hierarchies. In Whitehall too, significant diffusion beyond military affairs was delayed until the later 1960s after a brief flirtation of interest in the immediate postwar years. At one level, the peacetime trajectory of operational research is readily explicable by the very fact of the termination of the national emergency which had given birth to it and guaranteed its rapid diffusion throughout the military command structure. The fact remains that during the war operational research had a clearly defined purpose and a limited time scale: its achievements were intermittently dramatic in increasing military effectiveness and the credibility of the discipline was enhanced all the more for having been sponsored by civilian scientists of considerable talent and distinction. The postwar diffusion of operational research is analysed in detail in chapters 6-11, but in the present context it is necessary to highlight one aspect of the history of the discipline which is of direct relevance to its evolving status and standing. Whilst distinguished practitioners of operational research of the calibre of Patrick Blackett and Charles Goodeve could invoke wartime experience and the scientific method as positive justifications of the discipline's relevance to civil affairs, it is significant that the postwar pioneers of operational research continued

10 Operational Research in War and Peace to debate its 'scientific' status and possession of a unique and dedicated repertoire of analytical techniques at least until the early 1960s. In the former context, W. N. Jessop, an early practitioner of operational research in the manufacturing sector, commented in 1956 that Operational Research is still young and self-conscious. It is therefore very much concerned about what it is, how it came to be what it is, and what its standing is in comparison with other sciences — indeed whether it is a science at all. This latter question has probably been settled, at last, to the, satisfaction of most of its adherents. It is agreed that it is a science.18

Only two years later, however, the then President of the Operational Research Society, Professor M. G. Kendall, rejected the notion that operational research could be 'defined by definitions' in a scientific setting. In his view, Operational Research may be regarded as a branch of philosophy; as an attitude of mind towards the relationship between man and environment; as a body of methods for the solution of problems that arise in that relationship.19 Others, such as A. W. Swan, head of the operational research group within Courtaulds Ltd, expressed similar sentiments in the sense that operational research was no more, and no less than a 'point of view.' 20 These views were expressed in the form of brief articles in the Operational Research Quarterly, the recently established house-journal of the nascent operational research community. Their vagueness and contradictory nature might be forgiven in the light of the immaturity of the discipline, but they could only have mystified the readers of the Quarterly, the vast majority of whom were practitioners of operational research seeking to establish its relevance and credibility in a variety of industrial settings. In any event, they clearly represented a considerable dilution of the views of Blackett and Goodeve and it remained to Stafford Beer to provide a more thoughtful contribution to the debate. As a distinguished pioneer of cybernetics and head of the operational research group in one of the larger iron and steel companies, Beer was well qualified to participate in the discussion. In his opinion, operational research 'is not a science, for it is not about anything; it is science.' This was not to suggest that the discipline was devoid of specific subject matter. As Beer continued, I contend that operational research emerges as a [subset] of scientific methods appropriate to the analysis of activity....And

Introduction 11 these sets of methods do not form a science - nor does operational research. And so I am saying let us do away with the idea of 'the science of operational research'; and let us do away with the idea 'but we do not know what it is'. There is a wonderful ambiguity about these two statements, is there not? Beer then proffered his own definition of the content of operational research: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)

Operational research is the attack of modern science on problems of likelihood (accepting mischance) which arise in the management and control of men and machines, materials and money in their natural environment Its special technique is to invent a strategy of control by measuring, comparing and predicting probable behaviour through a scientific model of the situation. 21

In reflecting on these definitional issues, the eminent American operational researcher, Russell Ackoff, concluded that although Beer's definition was broadly acceptable, it failed to answer the key question as to whether operational research was 'a unique and unitary discipline.' In addressing the 'uniqueness' of operational research, Ackoff chose to adopt a literal approach by focussing on 'the special class of phenomena we study,' namely, 'operations.' Thus, an operation may be defined as A set of acts required for the accomplishment of some desired outcome; that is, it is not a single act but a complex of interrelated acts, performed simultaneously or in sequence, which lead to the accomplishment of some desired outcome (i.e., set of objectives). It seems clear to me that in OR we have been studying just such sets of interrelated acts. This concept of an operation, of course, is equally attributable to industrial, military, governmental, and other types of organisations.22 In this setting, operational research could never be concerned with the 'operations' of individuals, but only with certain kinds of purposeful system in which 'choices are made and objectives pursued.' For Beer, such systems were coincidental with organisations composed of 'men and equipment' where responsibility for choices (decision-making) 'is divided among two or more individuals and/or groups of individuals' who are aware of each others' choices 'either through communication or observations.' 24 Looked at in this way, therefore, the specific remit of

12 Operational Research in War and Peace operational research was to study 'the operations of organisations.' As for the unitary nature of the discipline, in the sense of its possession of a dedicated methodology, the implication of Beer's conclusion that operational research was not a science was that it could never possess a unique body of knowledge as in the case of, say, physics or chemistry. This point had been anticipated by Jessop in his assertion that operational research in practice is concerned with particular cases or situations, or in other words, its job is to solve problems that are specific or local. It is, therefore, a natural consequence that what constitutes operational research is not knowledge but know-how. Problem solving technique is the bond that links operational research workers in diverse fields. Operational research considered as a subject rather than an activity is knowledge of particular situations and classes of situations and their associated methods. In natural science the unifying and synthesising process takes the form of recognising analogous situations and developing techniques to meet them.25 In agreeing with these sentiments, Ackoff concluded that operational research appeared 'to consist essentially of the ability both to construct suitable mathematical models of operational problems and to derive 'solutions' from them. 26 By the beginning of the 1960s, debate on the 'philosophy' of operational research h a d all hut ceased, not least because the methodological repertoire was expanding rapidly. For British operational researchers a defining moment in the postwar history of the discipline was the first international conference on operational research held at Oxford in 1957. Whilst British participants chose to address specific case studies, their North American counterparts demonstrated a high degree of technical and methodological virtuosity in papers ranging across linear programming, queuing theory, inventory control and search theory — aspects of operational research either unknown or hardly recognised in Britain.27 Thereafter, the methodological gap was closed rapidly as the American-derived techniques were disseminated both formally and informally. The techniques themselves were grouped as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Allocation Inventory Replacement Queuing

5. 6. 7. 8.

Sequencing and Coordination Routing Competition Search 28

Introduction 13 Inventories concern the holding or storing of resources, in particular the rate and timing of their acquisition. With multi-item inventories there may be delays in the allocation process if there are inadequate production facilities, the result, perhaps, of mechanical breakdown or power failure. To resolve this problem queuing theory could be deployed, entailing the application of a mathematically-based model to determine the optimal sequencing and coordination of the production process. If workers and equipment are to be prepared adequately for their tasks, consideration of time and set-up costs need to be taken into account. This may give rise to a routing problem, ie, the identification of a minimum-cost path through a network in order to contain set-up costs. If such a problem is considered over an extended period, the application of stochastic processes may be necessary in order to determine the appropriate rate of replacement of equipment that is either wearing out or is worn out. If account is also taken of factors external to the system being analysed, for example, the buying in of materials and pricing of final products, competitive problems entailing considerations of choice may arise. In this setting, zero and non-zero sum mathematical games may serve as a guide to cost-minimising or profit-maximising choices. Finally, effective responses to the above problems may be dependent on the acquisition of information. This is problematic in the sense that the search for information can give rise to costs — the cost of obtaining information and the losses arising from its use. In this respect, statistical decision theory could be used to minimise such risks. To the current generation of operational researchers these techniques will appear dated and in some cases distinctly unhelpful, insofar as there is an unrelenting focus on production-related issues. The key point to note, however, is that by the end of the 1960s, they had aspired to the status of a methodological orthodoxy, especially in the academic context of operational research. Underlying the developing methodology of operational research was the concept of the model as a means of analysing system-based problems by an experimental process in which physical manipulation of variables is not possible. In formal mathematical terms, models in operational research can be defined simply, but quite abstractly, in the form

w h e r e U denotes the utility of value of the modelled system's performance, x, denotes the variables that can be controlled, y, denotes the variables (and constants) that are not controlled but do affect U, and / i s the relationship between U, x,- and yy.

14 Operational Research in War and Peace In conformity with the scientific method, solutions could be derived from models either by experimentation in the form of simulation (manipulation of a model to produce a motion picture of reality) or by mathematical analysis. In the latter case variables could be derived by abstraction or symbol, or via known values (ie, concretely or numerically). The function, /, can be defined as a set of rules in the form of an algorithm that facilitates the calculation of utility (U). An algorithm, simply defined, is a logical or s e q u e n t i a l p r o c e d u r e w h i c h can solve a problem mathematically. In the post-war period, a critical development in opening up new possibilities in mathematical modelling was the innovation of linear programming. Emanating from the logistic needs of the United States Airforce at the time of the Berlin airlift in 1947, linear programming represented a significant advance in the analysis of problems involving an array of interacting variables subject to a variety of restraining conditions. To the extent that these restraints could be defined in such terms as 'not more than,' 'not less than,' 'at least/ and 'at most/ linear programming in the form of the original simplex method developed by George B. Dantzig provided a superior methodology to existing problemsolving techniques based upon systems of equations. The use of linear programming to produce optimal solutions to problems could be justified where all the functions in the relevant model were linear functions. Thus, in relation to the Berlin airlift, where the objective was to carry as much freight as possible within a specified time period, the constraints included the supply of suitable aircraft, efficient flying and maintenance schedules, the availability of aircrew, prevailing weather conditions and likely Soviet reactions. Linear programming as a means of finding optimal solutions to complex problems was clearly of direct relevance to the practice of operational research. In this respect, there was an interface with the discipline of economics where it was viewed as a powerful supplement to marginal analysis in calculating least-cost combinations of productive factors. The importance of Dantzig's simplex method was enhanced when J. von Neumann, the father of game theory, developed the concept of duality in the later 1940s. This facilitated a considerable extension to the applicability of linear programming to problem solving. Indeed, the 1950s witnessed a flood of new algorithms and theoretical developments in the subject which paved the way for the introduction of new algorithms for other mathematical programming problems, including integer, stochastic and nonlinear programming. 29

Introduction 15 In the non-military sphere, the first linear programming exercises relevant to executive decision-making were pioneered in the United States by the Gulf Oil and Standard Oil Corporations where they were applied to the optimisation of refinery processes. In the period to 1952, most of the relevant computations were carried out on punched card calculators, but by the end of the decade the first generation digital computers were being deployed to the benefit of data input and the resulting quantitative analysis. In Britain, comparable developments followed both in military and civil applications. In the former, the lead was taken by the Admiralty Research Laboratory, whilst in the civilian sector the main focus of interest was to be found in the coal, iron and steel and petroleum industries where linear programming had a valuable role to play in the selection of minimum-cost transport routes both for raw materials and finished products. Complementing linear programming was the technique of simulation as an aid to rational decision making. For modelling complex systems, simulation entailed the creation of a physical or mathematically-based analogue. The analogue could be a scale model, fully reflective of reality, for example, a model aircraft or railway, or in a different physical system as represented by the flow of coloured water in tubes. 30 In addition, an abstract approach could be adopted utilising mathematical equations and logical relationships. However, such calculations were time consuming and repetitive and were thus ideally suited to digital computerisation, a procedure which became increasingly common in the coal and steel industries during the 1960s. Computerisation itself fulfilled an invaluable role in the diffusion of operational research and in extending its practical scope. After 1960, the quantum leap in computer power through the innovation of the transistor and the associated 'hype and mystique' attached to computers, helped to ensure their commercial proliferation. Although this was a doubleedged development, in the sense that the specialised needs of operational researchers were rendered increasingly subordinate to overall company computing needs, the fact remains that by the end of the 1960s computers were an essential tool in operational research, encouraging more powerful linear programming codes and new high-level simulation languages. 31 At the end of the 1960s — a decade when 'management had become the focus of science and science the focus of management as they had never been before' 32 — operational researchers could congratulate themselves on their achievements. Diffusion of the discipline had accelerated markedly after 1960 and the decade was ending on a high note with its increasing penetration into Whitehall departments and

16

Operational Research in War and Peace

university-level curricula. The growing confidence of the operational research community was well reflected in the expanding membership of the Operational Research Society from less than 600 in 1960 to 2,565 in 1970 — equivalent to an annual growth rate of 15 per cent. In this light it is inevitable that the following account of the development of operational research should be generally positive in tone, notwithstanding the unevenness of the diffusion process. Yet such a history would be incomplete without reference to the doubts and uncertainties which began to afflict the operational research community after 1970. Writing in the context of the 'new paradigm' in management studies, Locke has observed that 'there were critics right from the beginning,' notably from those who were concerned to challenge the relevance of mathematics. 33 During the 1970s, moreover, challenges began to emerge from within the new paradigm itself. Whilst 'It is easy to find maverick critics cavorting inside the citadel of a new discipline while the victory bells are still ringing inside,' it is evident that the decade as a whole was marked by a growing reaction against the established paradigm. Nowhere was this more true than in the case of operational research, at least as reflected in the pronouncements of leading academic members of the discipline. The most extreme view was expressed by Russell Ackoff of the Case Institute of Technology, one time operational research pioneer turned critic, when he roundly condemned operational researchers for engaging in 'mathematic masturbation without substantive knowledge of organisations, institutions or their management.' 34 Coincidentally, M. G. Simpson, the then President of the Operational Research Society, similarly commented that in the world of operational research practice (as opposed to academia) 'Standard mathematical techniques are rarely applicable' although 'they can often be used in the initial stages of a study to give valuable "back of envelope" estimates of system change.' 35 Whilst Simpson possessed greater sympathy for mathematics than Ackoff, his reference to 'back of envelope' calculations may be viewed as revealing, in terms of the relationship between theory and practice. This theme was given full rein in Dando and Eden's report on the 1976 Euro II Conference on operational research when they concluded that the operational research community in general paid only lip service to 'the elegant models and mathematics' expounded in professional journals and academic conferences. Practitioners of the discipline, moreover, habitually referred to 'the normal inadequacy of data, the irrelevance of sophisticated mathematics and the transcendent importance of style and communication.' 36 It remained to Dando and Sharp to offer insights into

Introduction 17 the 'Kuhnian Crisis' afflicting operational research which were to achieve near-consensual status, at least among their fellow academics. 37 There were three distinctive themes in their analysis, all of them rooted firmly in the historical development of operational research. In the first instance, the 1950s and 1960s, up to and beyond the general election of 1964, were 'golden years for the concept of rational scientific progress,' a period when 'Belief in the power of physical science (as popularly conceived) was at its height and the world's problems were thought to be disappearing.' 3 8 It was entirely natural, therefore, that operational researchers, anxious to establish and confirm their credibility in peacetime, should have sought to present themselves as 'hard physicalmathematical scientists' in order to capitalise on popular feeling. The 'hard science' ideal was consolidated in the 1960s as operational research was taken up in higher education institutions. In that context the search for 'respectable' teaching material resulted in the proliferation of courses based on sophisticated models and complex mathematics. Evidence of the academic 'takeover' of operational research was well reflected in the contents of the discipline's house journal. In the five-year period from 1971 to 1975, 69 per cent of all papers published in the Operational Research Quarterly were bound up with mathematical theory and technical notes. Case studies of operational research in practice accounted for 22 per cent of the total, but even here, genuine 'management-oriented' papers were in a minority. Needless to say, these trends were also reflected in the tone and content of conference papers. 40 In retrospect, it is evident that the operational research community was undergoing a new phase of its evolution after 1970. In the early postwar years Patrick Blackett and Charles Goodeve had proclaimed the relevance of operational research as a general problem-solving approach utilising the 'scientific method.' Twenty years later, it aspired to the status of a distinctive 'hard science' which purported to analyse 'hard objective phenomena' on the basis of 'complex mathematical models.' 41 By the early 1970s, however, the point had been reached when the discipline's ability to generate precise mathematical answers to managerial problems was subject to mounting scepticism. The mood in this third phase was captured effectively by Pat Rivett, one of the pioneers of operational research at the National Coal Board and the first professor of operational research in a British university. In a 1974 paper, replete with references to his own experience, Rivett referred to the 'rather easy and exciting life' that he and his colleagues had enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the ongoing process of economic growth. 42 It was hardly

18 Operational Research in War and Peace surprising, therefore, that early industrial operational research should have concentrated on the production process. As Rivett pointed out, Of all the tasks of industry, production is the most well defined. One knows the capacities of the machinery, one knows and can state the input to the machinery, one knows and can state the output, one is dealing with quantitative measures about which there need be little discussion, one has objective functions which tend to be well defined, such as cost minimisation, maximisation of contribution to profit and so on.43 Thus, in conditions of sustained economic growth and in a relatively uncomplicated business environment, the pay-off from first acts of measurement and analysis was potentially large, a fact amply confirmed by wartime experience. After 1970, however, the 'golden age' of western economic growth was swiftly terminated by a combination of cyclical recession and macroeconomic shocks. 44 The business environment became increasingly 'messy' at the same time as the realisation dawned on operational researchers that their activities were constrained by a complex of social and political factors operative both within and without the organisations in which they worked. Thus, in a world where there were 'no clear objectives, little opportunity for quantification, and many stakeholders with different perspectives,' the hard mathematical paradigm was subject to mounting challenge. 45 Rivett himself had become an ardent advocate of linear programming techniques after working with Russell Ackoff at the Case Institute of Technology in the mid-1950s. By 1974, however, he had become disillusioned to the extent that he agreed with Patrick Blackett's judgement that the 'hard science' paradigm had reduced operational research to 'little more than a scientific closed shop.' 47 The post-1970 watershed in the history of operational research raises a set of historical concerns and issues of interpretation which merit a further book-length study of the evolving relationship between operational research and management science in general. In addition to the mounting disillusion with extreme mathematisation, for example, it is significant that in the UK corporate sector the economic recession of the early 1970s provoked an unprecedented bout of managerial 'downsizing' which in some cases resulted either in the closure of operational research groups or the dispersal of their functions elsewhere in the managerial hierarchy. 48 In examining the period to 1970, therefore, the following account is concerned with the 'golden age' of operational research as reflected in its diffusion beyond the military sector and

Introduction 19 ongoing methodological advances. Whilst it will be of primary relevance to those concerned with the history of management science, it is the author's hope that the book will be of interest to other historical specialists as well as to a lay-audience. The overriding aim has been to produce a history of operational research which sets the subject within the broad context of Britain's political, social and economic development in the twentieth century. It will be evident, for example, that no account of Britain's military effort, from the later 1930s to 1945, can be complete without reference to operational research. In their capacity as 'boffins' civilian operational research scientists were an integral part of the 'Secret War' so graphically portrayed by Professor R. V. Jones. 49 Their incorporation into high-level military c o m m a n d structures was unprecedented and was certainly indicative of a degree of flexibility in the British military hierarchy which was notably absent in its Axis counterparts. In describing the early antecedents of operational research, including the application of quantitative analysis to naval and military affairs during the First World War, the following chapter serves as a prelude to the formal inception of operational research. This is identified clearly in chapter 3 as an integral part of the emergent air defence of Great Britain in the later 1930s, culminating in the successful outcome of the Battle of Britain. The acknowledged enhancement of RAF Fighter Command's defensive capabilities in 1940 as a result of the application of operational research to the innovation and deployment of radar fulfilled a critical role in encouraging the adoption of the discipline by other commands. 50 In view of its origins in relation to air defence needs, the trajectory of diffusion after 1940 was predictable. After gaining a significant foothold in Ack-Ack Command (an army responsibility), operational research was then taken up in Coastal Command and the Royal Navy. The common denominator in the latter context was the urgent need to defend the Anglo-American convoy system in the North Atlantic against the depredations of the U-boat. 51 Chapter 4 confirms that, as in the case of the Battle of Britain, the favourable outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic was facilitated considerably by operational research. The chapter also highlights the diffusion of operational research in the army where the discipline was applied to the analysis of weapons lethality and manpower requirements in a variety of theatres. Chapter 5 is concerned exclusively with RAF Bomber Command with a particular focus on the campaign of area attack launched against Germany from the spring of 1942 onwards. At this distance in time the area bombing of

20 Operational Research in War and Peace Germany by the RAF in conjunction with the US Eighth Air Force is still the subject of controversy both in terms of its questionable morality and alleged ineffectiveness.52 Whilst the chapter lends further support to the critics of area bombing as a presumed war-winning strategy, it confirms the vital importance of operational research in informing Bomber Command tactics, not least in relation to target routing and bombing accuracy. The chapter also comments on the role of operational research in support of the allied invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy and N o r t h e r n France w h e r e , in all of the relevant theatres, aerial bombardment of precision targets was viewed as an essential precondition for successful seaborne invasions. In the case of the civilian diffusion of operational research after 1945, it is a notable fact that some, at least, of the early pioneers were to the left of centre politically and viewed operational research as a means of advancing the cause of socialism. Of the founders of operational research, Professors Blackett and J. D. Bernal, as well as Sir Robert Watson-Watt, were active members of the Association of Scientific Workers — the leftleaning union for scientists and laboratory technicians. There was a strong communist presence in the 1940s and it is significant that all three were to serve terms as president. In the radical science movement of the later 1930s, embracing such organisations as the Cambridge Scientists Against War Group and the Division for the Social and Industrial Relations of Science of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, were to be found scientists of the calibre of Professors Solly Zuckerman (later Lord Zuckerman) and C. H. Waddington. Both of them were prominent in operational research during the war and determined to capitalise on the discipline's wartime achievements. 53 With the election of the first majority Labour Government in 1945, with a commitment to effective economic and social planning, the latter part of the decade appeared to offer an ideal environment for the application of operational research to the rational distribution of resources in an impoverished economy with substantial infrastructure needs. Yet it is instructive to note that beyond the nationalised coal industry and BISRA, operational research made little headway in either central or local government in these years. In analysing the reasons for this, chapter 6 focuses on the postwar Board of Trade and the Committee on Industrial Productivity chaired by Sir Henry Tizard. Whilst it will be evident that the latter body devoted considerable attention to the relevance of operational research to enhanced productive efficiency in the manufacturing industry, the chapter highlights some of the early difficulties encountered by the advocates of operational research

Introduction 21 in the new peacetime setting. Hostile reactions encompassed outright scepticism to their claims in the utilitarian sense and also the incompatibility of operational research with established civil service structures insofar as they were relevant to the needs of the manufacturing sector.54 Chapters 7, 8 and 9 are concerned with the application of operational research in the coal and iron and steel industries, and also in the corporate sector, the latter embracing manufacturing and services. Whilst operational research was viewed with considerable disdain within the Board of Trade, it is a notable fact that the discipline achieved an early presence in coal and steel after 1946. In focusing on these key industrial sectors, chapters 7 and 8 assess the specific factors conducive to the diffusion of operational research and also the principal operational research programmes instituted within each industry after 1950. The chapters demonstrate that in these sectors the adoption of operational research was wholly dependent on personal advocacy on the part of individuals with direct knowledge and appreciation of the wartime achievements of operational research. Thus, in relation to the coal industry, the foundation of an operational research facility in 1947 was due to the intervention of Sir Charles Ellis, the designated 'scientific member' of the newly-created National Coal Board and former Scientific Adviser to the Army. Similarly, the incorporation of operational research within BISRA was the product of the personal drive and enthusiasm of Charles Goodeve. Goodeve, more than Ellis, had direct experience of operational research during the war, having worked with Patrick Blackett at the Admiralty. Indeed, Goodeve was to play the leading role in disseminating operational research into the corporate sector. He achieved a modicum of success in the 1950s as a result of personal advocacy, but the fruits of his endeavours were not realised in any significant way until the 1960s. That decade was notable for an upsurge in merger activity in the manufacturing sector which entailed considerable changes in managerial styles and structures. 55 Hitherto, the managerial organisation of UK industry had reflected a continuing commitment to 'personal' or family influence and control. This fact in itself had served to limit the extent of professionalism in British management, especially in an AngloAmerican context.56 The merger movement of the 1960s, however, in giving birth to a US-style 'corporate economy' precipitated the recruitment of professional managerial hierarchies based on the US model, often on the advice of North American management consultants. In these circumstances, the Anglo-American corporate gap was closed,

22 Operational Research in War and Peace but in such a way as to encourage the adoption of operational research as a management tool.57 The diffusion of operational research into the corporate sector is analysed in chapter 9 where the main focus is on the relevance of the discipline to the management of increasingly complex organisations. In identifying the role of operational researchers as early 'gatekeepers' to new computer-based technologies, the chapter concludes that the corporate managers of the 1960s could envisage a growth in firm size with a degree of confidence denied to their pre-1950 counterparts Chapter 9 also highlights the role of Patrick Blackett in his capacity as an industrial 'moderniser.' Marginalised politically after 1945 on account of his principled opposition to the use and spread of nuclear weapons, Blackett was readmitted to public life in the context of the post-1964 Labour Government's commitment to economic and industrial rejuvenation.58 He shared fully Harold Wilson's belief in the virtues of the 'white heat of the technological revolution' and concurred in the new Prime Minister's view that the competitive advantage of UK manufacturing industry, at least since 1950, had been adversely affected by a rising tide of defence expenditure. This had led to a damaging transfer of scarce resources, including scientific expertise, from civil to military-oriented R and D. Since the relevant outlays on nuclear weaponry and aerospace had brought few countervailing advantages to Britain, either politically or economically, the time had come to reconstruct the country's scientific and technological effort away from defence procurement in favour of civilian manufacturing industry.59 It is in this context that the creation of new ministries by the Wilson government in 1964 can be readily understood. Blackett himself was appointed Chief Scientific Adviser to the newly-created Ministry of Technology (Mintech) and was also instrumental in establishing the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation in 1966 as an official 'merger broker' to encourage the formation of large scale firms in civilian manufacturing in the belief that the exploitation of scale economies provided a direct route to enhanced competitiveness. In all these respects, Blackett advanced the cause of operational research in the context both of 'big government' and a belief in the virtues of large scale business. In doing so he received powerful support from his wartime colleague, Solly Zuckerman, who had been Chief Scientific Adviser to the outgoing Conservative Government before his reappointment by Harold Wilson in 1964.60

Introduction 23 History and practice have not proved kind to Blackett's views: even before the end of the 1960s the reduction in defence R and D initiated after 1964 had been reversed whilst 'big government' was manifestly in retreat. In the 1970s and 1980s, moreover, there was increasing disillusion with the performance of large scale corporate enterprise on the part of economists and politicians alike.61 But if the attempt to boost industrial competitiveness by means of interventionist industrial policy proved to be largely ineffectual, chapter 10 shows that the Labour Government succeeded admirably in one aspect of 'modernisation' which was to cast a long shadow forward to the benefit of operational research. This concerns its efforts to reform the Civil Service in the light of the recommendations of the Fulton Committee, published in 1968.62 This committee was the first major enquiry into the Home Civil Service since the Harcourt-Trevelyan reforms of the early 1850s, and its terms of reference, embracing structure and recruitment, elicited a robust intervention by the Operational Research Society to the effect that its members had a significant contribution to make to the resolution of 'major policy problems.' As chapter 10 reveals, the representations of the Society fell on fertile ground, not least in the Treasury where the Permanent Secretary, Sir William Armstrong, took the lead in establishing a separate Civil Service Department with a strong operational research section. Chapter 10 also comments on the adoption of operational research in local government in the 1960s, as well as on its diffusion into the Home Office and the nationalised railway and electricity sectors. The chapter concludes by highlighting the continuation into peacetime of defencerelated operational research by reference to its role in informing naval tactics and strategy in the era of the Cold War. Chapter 11 examines the institutional development of operational research with particular reference to the foundation of the Operational Research Society and the diffusion of the discipline across international frontiers. Contrasts and comparisons are drawn with the experience in the United States, not least in relation to the differing trajectories of the discipline's penetration into higher education. The chapter points out that in the same way that the Anglo-American corporate lag was closed in the 1960s in terms of the adoption of advanced forms of corporate enterprise, so too was the academic deficit in operational research. Higher education expanded considerably in Britain following the publication of the Robbins Report in 1963, and although the first dedicated chair in operational research was established in 1964 in the new University of

24 Operational Research in War and Peace Lancaster, the representative experience was for the discipline to be introduced into established institutions. This was in conformity with pioneering efforts in educational provision for operational research at the University of Birmingham in the 1950s. The chapter concludes with a commentary on the increasing introspection of the operational research community in the 1970s as the future of the discipline was debated in reaction to the limited practical relevance of complex mathematical modelling and the growing divide between the practitioner and academic communities. Again, contrasts and comparisons are drawn with North American experience in the context of Andrew Abbott's concept of the 'Division of Expert Labour' whereby professional status is related directly to the application of 'pure' knowledge in the form of mathematical dexterity. 63 In acknowledging the increasing mathematisation of operational research after 1960, the following account is consistent with the view that the 'hard paradigm' was a by-product of the discipline's aspirations to high academic status. For operational researchers in general, and especially for those intent upon inserting the discipline into universitylevel curricula, their professional standing was the subject of acute concern. To those members of the operational research community who were anxious to achieve a distinctive professional status, the increasingly mathematical orientation of the discipline was a positive development. This fact in itself was to play a key role in precipitating the debates and controversies of the 1970s and 1980s. But whilst it is possible to agree with Dando and Sharp that the academically-driven hard paradigm created a 'myth' — in the sense that the elegant mathematical models enshrined in 'classical' operational research would be wholly incapable of dealing with a post-1970 world afflicted by mounting economic, social and behavioural problems — this should not be allowed to detract from the achievements of the postwar community of operational research practitioners. At the most general level, the application of the 'scientific method,' in the sense defined by Patrick Blackett, injected a degree of objectivity into decision-making processes which had hitherto been lacking. In this respect, operational research contributed as much in peacetime as it had in war. It may well be argued that an overwhelming proportion of the discipline's peacetime endeavours was bound up with the tactical rather than strategic application of operational research (thereby providing invidious contrasts with its presumed wartime role), but that would be to downgrade the cumulative contribution to economic and social well-being of a myriad of efficiency-enhancing and cost-saving

Introduction 25 projects in a wide variety of industrial and commercial settings. In any event, it is a valid argument that the vital contribution of operational research lay in improving confidence in the decision-making process. As a notable practitioner of operational research once observed, A decision reached by OR methods is not necessarily different from the decision that would be reached by other methods; a right decision is a right decision, irrespective of whether it is obtained by sticking a pin into a list of all the alternatives, or by a piece of OR work. The basic difference is in the degree of confidence that can be placed in the correctness of the result.64 Operational research, as with other branches of management science, necessarily deals with systems which may be simple or complex, but in general they all contain human beings. The latter, in conjunction with the limitations of quantitative data, have necessarily compromised the discipline's predictive abilities. But even allowing for these deficiencies, the diffusion of operational research from the later 1930s onwards, in encouraging a trend towards precise measurement, was consistent with greater self-confidence, and hence professionalism, on the part of executive decision makers. In the context of the definitional issues alluded to earlier in this chapter, the following account is most in sympathy with the view that operational research, although not a science in the 'hard' sense, utilised the scientific method as the unifying factor in the application of 'know-how' or 'problem-solving technique.' In its methodology it was quantitatively driven, but the relevant techniques need not entail the application of sophisticated mathematics. Operational researchers may have tried to express problems in quantitative terms, as well as applying empirical checks to provisional conclusions, but their decisive contribution to decision-making processes was to inject a degree of objectivity into the appraisal of alternative courses of action which would otherwise have been lacking. Both in war and peace, therefore, the effect of operational research was to reduce the scope for 'gusts of emotion' in determining tactics and strategy.

NOTES 1. Maurice Goldsmith and Roy Innes, 'Operational Research,' Pilot Papers (1947). 2. 'Operational Research in War and Peace,' Nature, 15 November, 1947, p. 660. 3. Sir Charles Goodeve, 'Operational Research,' Nature, 13 March, 1948, p. 377.

26 Operational Research in War and Peace 4. Samuel Eilon, 'How Scientific is OR?,' Omega, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1995), p. 1. 5. K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Hutchinson, London, 1959), p. 27. 6. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett: Baron Blackett of Chelsea,' Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1975), pp. 1-115; M. W. Kirby, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett (1897-1974),' in Malcolm Warner (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Business and Management (Thomson, London, 1996), pp. 386-9. 7. P. M. S. Blackett, 'Operational Research,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1950), pp. 3-6. 8. Ibid., p. 3. 9. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 10. Robert Locke, Management and Higher Education since 1940 The Influence of America and Japan on West Germany, Britain and France (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989). 11. Ibid., p. 5. 12. Keith Devlin, Mathematics: The Science of Patterns: The Search for Order in Life, Mind and the Universe (Scientific American Library, New York, 1994), pp. 43-9; Carl B. Boyer, A History of Mathematics (John Wiley, New York, 1968), pp. 632-8; Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971), pp. 89-91; Donald Gilkes, 'The Fregean Revolution in Logic,' in Idem, Revolutions in Mathematics (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 265-305. 13. Goodeve (1948), p. 379. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., p. 381. 17. Blackett (1950), p. 4. 18. W. N. Jessop, 'Operational Research Methods: What Are They?/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1958), p. 49. Emphasis added. 19. M. G. Kendall, 'The Teaching of Operational Research,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1958), p. 267. 20. A. W. Swan, 'The Name and Nature of Operational Research,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 8 (1957), pp. 1-5. 21. Stafford Beer, 'What has Cybernetics to do with Operational Research?,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 10 (1959), p. 12. 22. Russell L. Ackoff, 'The Meaning Scope and Methods of Operational Research,' in R. L. Ackoff (ed.), Progress in Operational Research, Vol. 1 (John Wiley, New York, 1961), p. 6. 23. Ibid., p. 8. 24. Ibid., p. 11, citing Beer. 25. Jessop (1956), p. 50. 26. Ackoff (1961), p. 20.

Introduction

27

27. M. Davies, R. T. Eddison and T. Page (eds.), Proceedings of the First International Conference on Operational Research (Oxford, 1957), (ORSA, Baltimore, 1957). 28. R. L. Ackoff and M. W. Sasieni, Fundamentals of Operational Research (John Wiley, New York, 1968), pp. 13-16. 29. On the development of linear programming see George B. Dantzig, Linear Programming and Extensions (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1963); Robert Dorfman, Paul A. Samuelson and Robert M. Solow, Linear Programming and Economic Analysis (McGraw Hill, New York, 1958); George B. Dantzig, 'Reminiscences About the Origins of Linear Programming,' Operations Research Letters, Vol. 1 (1982), pp. 43-8. 30. G. H. Mitchell, Operational Research: Techniques and Examples (English Universities Press, NCB, 1972), pp. 202-71. 31. J. C. Ranyard, 'A History of OR and Computing,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 39 (1988), pp. 1073-86. 32. Locke (1989), p. 26. 33. Ibid., p. 30. 34. R. L. Ackoff, 'The Future of Operational Research is Past,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 30 (1979), p. 97. See also Idem, 'President's Symposium: OR, A Post Mortem,' Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987, pp. 471-4. 35. M. G. Simpson, 'Those Who Can't,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 24 (1978), p. 518. 36. M. R. Dando and C. Eden, 'Reflections on Operational Research: A Report from the Euro II Congress,' Omega, Vol. 5 (1977), pp. 255-70. 37. M. R. Dando and R. G. Sharp, 'A Kuhnian Crisis in Management Science,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 32 (1981), pp. 91-103. 38. M. R. Dando and R. G. Sharp, 'Operational Research in the UK in 1977: The Causes and Consequences of a Myth?,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 29 (1978), pp. 939-49. 39. Ibid., p. 943. 40. Ibid., p. 942. 41. Ibid., p. 943. 42. Patrick Rivett, 'Perspective for Operational Research,' Omega, Vol. 2 (1974), p. 225. 43. Ibid., p. 228. 44. Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo (eds.), Economic Growth in Europe since 1945 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), pp. 1-37. 45. John C. Ranyard, 'Supporting Real Decisions: A Review of OR Practice in the UK,' European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 87 (1995), p. 475. See also R. L. Ackoff, 'Resurrecting the Future of Operational Research,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 30 (1979), pp. 189-99 and J. V. Rosenhead, 'Old and New Paradigms of Analysis,' in J. V. Rosenhead (ed.),

28 Operational Research in War and Peace Rational Analysis for a Problematic World (John Wiley, New York, 1989), pp. 65-89. 46. Rivett (1974), p. 229. 47. 'Editorial: Appreciation Lord Blackett,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 25, (1974), pp. i-viii. 48. R. Fildes and J. C. Ranyard, 'Success and Survival of Operational Research Groups — A Review/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 336-60. 49. R. V. Jones, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945 (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1978). 50. M. W. Kirby and R Capey, 'The Air Defence of Great Britain, 1920-1940: An Operational Research Perspective,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 555-68. 51. C. H. Waddington, O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the U-Boat (Elek Science, London, 1973). 52. M. W. Kirby and R. Capey, 'The Area Bombing of Germany in World War II: An Operational Research Perspective,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 661-77; Richard Overy, Bomber Command 1939-45: Reaping the Whirlwind (Harper and Collins, London, 1997); M. W. Kirby, 'Operations Research and the Defeat of Nazi Germany,' Military Operations Research, Vol. 5 (2000), pp. 57-70; Mark Connelly, Reaching for tlie Stars: A New History of Bomber Command in World War II (I. B. Tauris, London, 2001); Robin Neillands, The Bomber War (Murray, London, 2001). 53. Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and Socialists of the 1930s (Allen Lane, London, 1978). 54. M. W.Kirby and R. Capey, 'The Origins and Diffusion of Operational Research in the UK,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 49 (1998), pp. 307-26. 55. Derek F. Channon, The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise (Macmillan, London, 1973). 56. Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990), pp. 235-392. 57. Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (Methuen, London, second edition, 1983). 58. Lord Zuckerman, Six Men Out of the Ordinary (Peter Owen, London, 1992), pp. 13-38. 59. M. W. Kirby, 'Britain's "Manifest Industrial Destiny": The Culture of High Technology and Industrial Performance in the Twentieth Century,' Business and Economic History, Vol. 26 (1997), pp. 1-19. 60. M. W. Kirby, 'Blackett in the "White Heat" of the Scientific Revolution: Industrial Modernisation under the Labour Governments, 1964-1970/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 50 (1999), pp. 985-93.

Introduction 29 61. M.W. Kirby, 'The Corporate Economy in Britain: Its Rise and Achievements since 1900/ in M. W. Kirby and M. B. Rose (eds.), Business Enterprise in Modern Britain: from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century (Routledge, London, 1994), pp. 139-71. 62. Fulton Committee, The Civil Service, Cmnd. 3638 (1968). 63. Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labour (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1988), pp. 237-8. 64. R. W. Shephard, 'Some Aspects of Measurement in Operational Research' (Stephen Cook Papers, MSS 335/GKN/71, 1961, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick — hereafter, MRC).

2

The Origins of Operational Research: Military and Other Antecedents to 1937 Whilst the discipline and practice of operational research originated in the later 1930s and came to fruition during the Second World War, the history of warfare is punctuated by attempts to apply some element of quantitative analysis to understanding the causes of victory and defeat. If it is reasonable to presume that even in pre-historic times questions arose as to whether 'an enemy would be discomfited by a rapid barrage of small stones or by a less speedy process of throwing big ones.' 1 The first overt attempts to apply 'algebra and numbers' to the battlefield occurred in the later sixteenth century. 2 During the Middle Ages, the outcome of battles had been determined by 'the collision of aristocrats on horseback/ From 1500 onwards, however, changes in military technology in favour of 'stand-off weapons such as harquebuses, muskets and artillery, went hand in hand with the evolution of new battle tactics whereby hundreds and even thousands of troops were arranged in precise squares and triangles. According to one interpretation, the development of new weapons and military formations can only be understood in the context of the perceptual revolution in thinking in terms of quantified time and space evident in the Renaissance West after 1400.3 The development of mathematical techniques facilitated precise measurement in cartography and astronomy leading ultimately to quantum leaps in navigational skills, whilst the innovation of doubleentry bookkeeping enabled the new merchant class to manage effectively ever-expanding trading links. In a long term perspective the movement from qualitative to quantitative perception was consistent with the triumph of a civilisation which was to achieve unprecedented control over its environment. Certainly, contemporary advances in science and technology after 1500 were to provide the 'edged weapons' of European imperial expansion during the succeeding four centuries. In the specifically military sphere the decisive moment towards the systematic 30

The Origins of Operational Research 31 control of force was undertaken by Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange and Captain-General of Holland and Zeeland in the period 1585-1625. Equipped with a university training in mathematics and classics, Maurice sought to confront the Spanish armies in the Low Countries by capitalising on precedents established in the legionary forces of the Roman Empire. In addition to siege-related earthworks, he introduced critically important innovations in the areas of drill and marching. In the former, he systematised the loading and firing of matchlock guns into forty-two sequential moves, from powder loading to discharge. Every move was named so that on command every soldier could act in unison thereby imparting a considerable 'shock' effect to opposing forces. Systematic drill enabled soldiers to load and fire their weapons more rapidly and accurately, resulting in a dramatic leap forward in the efficiency of hand-guns defined in terms of 'the amount of lead projected against an enemy per minute of battle.' So too in relation to marching, Maurice moved far beyond Roman practice by introducing the concept of the counter march. This provided for successive bursts of fire as ranks of arquebusiers or musketeers, after discharging their weapons, marched to the rear to reload, having been replaced in the front line by the next rank. Timed to perfection a n d operated with d u e discipline, countermarching was tantamount to 'a well-choreographed military ballet' which could produce spectacular results on the battlefield, as demonstrated in innumerable armed conflicts up to and beyond the Napoleonic era.4 Insofar as Maurice's innovations were based upon observation and measurement in relation to the development of advanced weaponry, it is legitimate to view him as an unconscious practitioner of operational research. His status in this respect is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that 300 years were to elapse before a comparable programme of military innovation was to take place. During that time technological change in land-based armaments remained modest, mainly because the weight of field weapons was limited to the extent that they could be pulled by horses. From the 1880s onwards, however, the world's navies were subject to a profound scientific and technological revolution. A multiplicity of causal factors were at work, ranging from national and imperial rivalries, to the evolution of domestic politics and the rise of private sector armaments contractors endowed with substantial research and development capabilities. As the world's greatest naval and imperial power it was entirely appropriate that the revolution should have been inaugurated in Britain. Whilst the whole of the period from the 1880s to

32 Operational Research in War and Peace the outbreak of the First World War witnessed a sequence of spectacular innovations conducive to enhanced speed, firepower and armour, there were equally important changes to the process of naval procurement. The latter were consistent with the concept of 'command technology' whereby Admiralty technicians provided naval constructors with precise specifications for a range of performance characteristics whether for guns, engines or ships. Up to 1880 the pace of technological advance had been slow, mainly because development costs had to be borne by the contracting entrepreneur. In reducing the risks of innovation 'command technology' encouraged deliberate invention, all the more so since the Admiralty proved willing to contribute towards the costs of the relevant research and technical programs. Whilst 'command technology' was not entirely new in the 1880s in the sense that the Admiralty had been in the habit of issuing performance specifications since at least the 1860s, it was the sheer range, breadth and rapidity of technological change which demarcated the three decades before 1914 as inaugurating a new era in weapons procurement which was to establish precedents reaching far into the twentieth century. Drawing on contributions from 'metallurgists, ballisticians, chemists and engineers' paying 'sophisticated attention to accurate steel analysis, precise heat control and very small dimensional tolerances,' Britain's armaments firms were the leading innovators in the use of alloy steels and nickel alloys. Their research and development commitments were correspondingly large. In the early 1900s, Vickers, the predominant British armaments manufacturer, employed a design staff of 300-400 individuals. By that time the leading gun makers were habitually allocating 6-12 per cent of net annual profits to their scientific departments, whilst 'research appropriations of £80-100,000 per annum were not unheard of in the busiest years of the 1900s.'5 The new 'command technology' resembled operational research in one sense only, namely the close cooperation in developing new weapons systems between technically proficient naval officers and civilian scientists and engineers. The remit of the latter was still confined to the material of war with little or no input into tactical or strategic analysis. In these respects, the First World War may be viewed as a staging post in the application of scientific techniques to problems of warfare insofar as it inaugurated a trend towards official military and governmental recruitment of scientists. This was in recognition of the unprecedented logistical needs of a country fighting for survival in the first mechanised war. Whilst collective memories of the conflict are rooted in the tragic extent of infantry casualties on the Western Front in consequence of

The Origins of Operational Research 33 trench warfare, the First World War was to cast a long shadow forwards in that it heralded a new era of warfare as a result of the innovation of the military aeroplane and the submarine. In both respects, the period after 1914 was one of rapid technological development in armaments with considerably greater implications for the formulation of military tactics and strategy than the revolution in surface ship design manifest after 1880. In the light of these developments, governments and military commanders alike acquired a new awareness of the potential contribution of scientists to the strategy and tactics of warfare, an awareness, moreover, which was to remain alive throughout the interwar years in view of the evolution of international political relations following the German capitulation in 1918. A portent of things to come was provided by the insights of F. W. Lanchester into the deployment of air power. Better known publicly for his pioneering work on automobile engineering, Lanchester also made seminal contributions to the science of aeronautics and aerodynamics. 6 As early as 1894 he had formed an accurate, if undeveloped view of the theory of flight, concentrating on calculations of lift force as a vital precursor to the design of an aircraft worthy of the name. Although Lanchester's ideas were published in Aerial Flight,7 a two-volume work appearing in 1907-8, the long delay between conception and publication meant that the lion's share of the credit for defining and establishing the principles of wing design went to others, in particular the German scientist, Ludwig Prandtl. More germane to the history of operational research was Lanchester's original work on military aeronautics. In the latter part of 1914 (by which time he was a member of the official Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) he published a sequence of articles in the periodical Engineering which, with appropriate embellishment, appeared in book form in 1916. Although it remains unclear whether the ideas set out in Aircraft in Warfare informed either contemporary aircraft design or aerial tactics and strategy it is, perhaps, significant that a fulsome preface to the work was contributed by Major General Sir David Henderson, Director General of Military Aeronautics. 8 The core of Lanchester's analysis was a sequence of equations consistent with the 'N 2 law' which quantified the relationship between victory and defeat by reference to the 'concentration of effort,' the relative strengths of opposing forces, the nature of weapons and their impact both on casualties and the outcome of the battle. The techniques deployed by Lanchester were eventually incorporated into the repertoire of operational research techniques in that he formulated clear assumptions, derived

34 Operational Research in War and Peace their mathematical consequences and identified the manner in which variation in the assumptions affected the results. A validation of Lanchester's equations in the context of modern warfare was published in 1954 utilising data derived from the Battle of Iwo Jima in 1945 with particular reference to combat casualties. 9 Whilst the modern field of 'combat simulation' can be regarded as a direct descendant of Lanchester's pioneering work, it is interesting to note that an early antecedent of his approach was provided in 1902 by Rear Admiral J. V. Chase of the United States Navy who applied calculus to illustrate the square law effect of the concentration of effort.10 This work was acknowledged subsequently by Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske who published an equivalent battle model in the form of an essay which won the Navy Institute Prize for 1905.11 Coincidentally, the Russian military theoretician, M. Osipov, produced equations similar to those of Lanchester, but his work remained unknown to the western world until it too was published in 1915.12 These rival studies, however, do not detract from Lanchester's wholly independent achievement, a fact recognised by the Operations Research Society of America which, from 1955, has awarded the annual Lanchester Prize 'to the author or authors of the best paper on operations research or reporting on an operations research study, identified as such.' 13 In methodological terms, the relevant chapters in Aircraft in Warfare (v, vi and viii) provide a unique and outstanding example of operational research at the tactical level. Indeed, writing forty years after the formulation of the 'N 2 law,' Joseph F. McCloskey commented that if there had been journals in the discipline of operational research at the time when Lanchester was writing, his work would have merited prize-winning status, a judgement which McCloskey also applied to Lanchester's calculated dismissal of the dirigible in favour of the aeroplane. In this latter case, 'a few more graphs and a few more equations' would have produced 'the best article of the year reporting an operations-research study on weapons systems.' 14 If Lanchester's work lay principally in the realm of mathematical theory, it was the German Zeppelin raids of 1916-17 — in effect the first strategic air offensive — which encouraged the Experimental Section of the army's Munitions Invention Department to investigate the problem of anti-aircraft gunnery. Led by a young physiologist, Captain A. V. Hill, a small group of applied mathematicians embarked on a statistical study of tactics and procedures which produced greater accuracy of fire. At the same time, the group — referred to colloquially as 'Hill's Brigands' — formed the prototype of what came to be known in the

The Origins of Operational Research 35 Second World War as the Operational Research Section attached to the principal military commands. 15 In 1917, when Britain was planning its own aerial bombardment of Germany, Viscount Tiverton (later the Earl of Halsbury), at that time serving with the British Aviation Commission in Paris, submitted a report to the Air Board setting out the factors which in his view would determine the outcome of a bombing campaign. 16 The report was based on a study of aerial bombardment begun by Tiverton in 1915 which had sought to discover the knowledge and skills necessary for success and to determine the requirements of a bomber force in terms of aircraft characteristics, organisation and maintenance and the training of aircrew. Tiverton's work was remarkable for its application of scientific research methods to the analysis of factory types and the bomb loads required for their destruction. Tiverton also assessed the merits of day and night operations (favouring the former in the light of available aircraft types), highlighted the need for reliable meteorological services and urged the development of improved aids to navigation. Tiverton, like Lanchester, favoured the concentration of effort so that all available aircraft would attack a single target in any one raid, thereby anticipating the RAF's 1,000 bomber raids in the Second World War.17 Quantitative analysis of military operations was also applied to naval affairs after 1914 with favourable consequences for Britain's war effort. The immediate context was provided by the decision of the German Naval Staff to embark upon unrestricted submarine warfare from 1 February 1917. As a war-winning strategy, sinking without warning by U-boats was designed to force a British capitulation in response to the disruption of vital supply lines from the United States. Judged by its results in the summer of 1917, the German plan held out every prospect of success in view of the U-boats' record in sinking an average of 10 per cent of Britain's Atlantic shipping per month. The initial response of the Admiralty was to seek technological solutions in the form of depth charges, hydroplanes, deep mines and air patrols. But although U-boats began to be sunk in consequence, the average loss of three per month was amply offset by replacements at the same time as the rate of British and neutral shipping losses continued to rise. The ultimate solution was found in a more effective deployment of existing naval forces in accordance with a precedent first established during the Napoleonic Wars. This was the convoy system whereby merchant ships were required to sail in large groups escorted by warships. The credibility of convoying, however, could be called into question by reference to several objections

36 Operational Research in War and Peace which appeared to be soundly based. In the first instance, it could be argued that the process of assembling large numbers of merchant ships would reduce the total tonnage transported per month, whilst inadequate port facilities would lead to severe bottlenecks in loading and unloading. More obviously, convoys could travel only at the speed of the slowest vessel, thus placing a further constraint on the tonnage transported, a problem compounded by the fact that faster ships would be prevented from extricating themselves from the area of torpedo attack. Further reservations were expressed in relation to the difficulties in maintaining coherent formations of merchant and naval vessels and the fact that massed shipping would provide an easier target for U-boats. Even if convoys could be proved to be practicable, where were the requisite n u m b e r s of naval escorts to come from, bearing in mind that contemporary customs returns indicated that more than 5,000 ships were entering and leaving British ports each week? On the other side of the account, the proponents of convoys could point to a number of countervailing factors based upon contemporary operational experience. At the end of 1916, for example, in the face of severe disruptions to the cross-channel supply of British coal to French industry as a result of U-boat activity, a convoy system was introduced resulting in an immediate reduction in sinkings. More impressive confirmation of the benefits of convoys over a longer sea passage was provided by the reorganisation of the North Sea trade in iron ore imports from Narvik. In the first month of convoy operations the loss rate fell more than one hundredfold to 0.24 per cent, and in the light of experience the initial sailings of six ore carriers was boosted to a 5-day cycle of convoys consisting of 20-30 ships with no increase in escort strength or sinkings. These events provided the advocates of convoys with some effective arguments, but they still had to confront the Admiralty's proclaimed inability to organise sufficient escorts in relation to the 5,000 weekly arrivals and departures at British ports. In the event, the conundrum was resolved by two Royal Navy Commanders — R. G. H. Henderson and Rollo Appleyard. The former was responsible for organising the cross-channel coal convoys and in that capacity had access to Ministry of Shipping figures on arrivals and departures of all ocean-going merchant vessels. Henderson calculated that the figure of 5,000 referred to the average number of ships of all nationalities of over 100 tons entering or leaving British ports each week. Thus, 'If a dredger sailed from Yarmouth to Felixstowe, it was counted once. If it then went to Harwich it was counted a third time. If it made the return journey inside

The Origins of Operational Research 37 the same week, it would be counted six times.' 18 The implications of these observations were profound: they revealed in stark terms that if arrivals and departures were restricted to ocean-going vessels of 1,000 tons and above, the figure of 5,000 was reduced to 300 — in effect little more than 20 arrivals and departures per day in British ports. Convoying across the Atlantic with effective escort provision was thus practicable. Given that Henderson's calculations were prompted in part by his knowledge of a rapidly developing shipping crisis, he took the unorthodox step of contacting the Prime Minister, Lloyd George directly, recommending the adoption of convoys as soon as possible. His intervention was immediately effective, although it remains to be said that the Admiralty's face was saved to some extent by the formal entry of the United States into the war, an event which heralded the arrival of more merchant and escort vessels. Convoying was introduced officially in May 1917 and in November the Admiralty, citing statistics for September, announced that 90 per cent of all ships crossing the Atlantic had been in convoy with a loss rate '0.5 per cent or 1 in 200.' Taking the period from February 1917 to the end of the war, there were 83,958 sailings in convoy in Atlantic and home waters resulting in 260 sinkings. This compared highly favourably with the 1,497 ships sunk out of 48,861 individual sailings in the year from November 1917. Why did convoying work? The reasons ranged from organisational factors (convoying to schedule alleviated port congestion) to tactical considerations. In particular, convoys did not offer rich pickings for U-boats on account of their size and mass. Convoys in the Atlantic were almost as difficult to find as isolated ships ('If a single ship is visible to a submarine at 10 kilometres and a convoy at 12 kilometres, the chance of a submarine finding the convoy is only 20 per cent higher than that of finding the single ship' 19 ), and the presence of escorting destroyers placed the U-boat itself in danger whilst reducing the possibility of torpedo hits. During the course of 1917, Commander Appleyard produced a mathematically-based justification for the convoy system making use of 'ships' logs, eye witness accounts, diagrams of U-boat attacks, diagrams of convoy formation, columns, and escort dispositions and with an accurate knowledge of the capabilities of merchant ships, escorts, U-boats and their torpedoes.' 20 Replete with algebraic equations and diagrammatic representations, Appleyard's calculations were 'as good a piece of "operational research" as anything in the Second World War.' 21 His analysis of convoy attack and defence was based on two assumptions — that U-boats had innumerable options

38 Operational Research in War and Peace for attack and these were paralleled by the infinite variations in convoy formation. Nevertheless, it was possible to apply quantitative methods to the mode of U-boat attack in relation to the course steered, the angle of attack measured against the target, and the areas of sea to be navigated. The resulting calculations could then be used to determine the optimal response of the convoy in terms of formation and speed. Equipped with 'cardinal' angles and areas, calculations could then be made of the ideal positions of escort vessels. Appleyard also investigated the 'danger angle' for U-boat attack in order to determine the shape of the convoy and paid particular attention to the merits of zigzagging as a defensive tactic (see Fig. 2.1 below). The resulting report on 'Elements of Convoy Defence' formed part of a highly classified Technical History series which were 'kept locked up in a safe when not actually in use.' 22 Incredibly, these so-called 'Confidential Books' were declared obsolete in 1939 and subsequently destroyed so that the lessons of the First World War had to be relearned at considerable cost in lives and material. Two further examples of studies in the First World War, which would later have been designated as operational research can be cited, one complementary to the work of Henderson and Appleyard in relation to the U-boat weapon, and the other concerning the counter-battery intelligence exercise carried out for the Canadian Corps at Vimy Ridge in 1917. In the former case, Thomas Edison, head of the US Naval Consulting Board, utilised statistical methods to devise a 'Tactical Game Board' as an aid to the evasion and destruction of U-boats. Like Appleyard, he also analysed zigzagging as an evasion tactic for merchant ships in the light of his discovery that most ships were following known prewar routes and it was here that the majority of sinkings were taking place. 23 The importance of the Canadian Corps' experience at Vimy Ridge lies in the fact that it provides real insights into the methodology of operational research as a means of enhancing military effectiveness. The strategically important high ground of Vimy Ridge had been captured by the Germans at an early stage in the war and in three attempts to retake it between 1914 and 1916, the French Army had lost 200,000 men. The problem for those attacking a strong defensive position was defined by the nature of trench warfare: on leaving their trenches attacking infantry had three obstacles to overcome — barbed wire, machine gun fire and artillery shelling. By 1917, a combination of technology and tactics had limited the effects of the first two — barbed wire by the innovation of a new fuse causing shells to explode on impact, and machine guns in

The Origins of Operational Research 39

Scale of Sea Miles 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I—I- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

A Convoy at A is proceeding in the direction of the arrow. Visibility 5% sea miles. A Submarine, approaching from about astern, tries to take up a position somewhere near the beam at Torpedo-range of 1 Mile. The Submarine cannot proceed for more than 1 Hour. The Diagram shows the Danger Angles and the Widths of Screen corresponding to various speeds of Convoy. Figure 2.1 Appleyard's Diagrams Source: Rollo Appleyard, 'Elements of Convoy Defence/ reproduced in John Winton, Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade, 1890-1970 (Michael Joseph, London, 1983), p. 117.

40 Operational Research in War and Peace the form of a 'rolling barrage' to confine enemy machine gunners to the bottom of their trenches whilst the attacking forces advanced 200 yards behind the barrage of shellfire. The problem remained, however, of how to neutralise the enemy's own artillery. By the spring of 1917, the Canadian Corps were in position in front of Vimy Ridge, determined to dislodge the Germans where the French Army had manifestly failed. Whilst the Corps devoted meticulous attention to the mode of attack (even to the extent of constructing full scale replicas of the terrain for training purposes), considerable thought was also given to the problem of the German artillery. In this respect, a classic operational research study was undertaken by the Corps' counter-battery organisation led by Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. L. McNaughton who in civilian life had been an electrical engineer at McGill University with an interest in the oscillograph. 24 Building on pioneering work carried out in the British A r m y ' s V Corps, M c N a u g h t o n recruited the services of three distinguished scientists — Lawrence Bragg, a physicist and Nobel Prize winner in 1915, Charles Darwin, another physicist, and Lucien Bell, who shared MacNaughton's interest in the oscillograph. Collectively, they perfected two techniques which severely reduced the effectiveness of the German artillery. The first was flash spotting, entailing close cooperation between observation posts in order to determine the location of field guns literally by the flash of the shell on exit from the barrel. Figure 2.2 is illustrative of the technique. Three points are identified as typical of a World War One front — point G for a German gun and points 01 and 02 for observation posts: an arbitrary direction is indicated by 'd 0 .' If the German gun is fired then the observers at 01 and 02 will be able to use the reference direction, 'do,' to measure angles giving straight lines to the flash, as indicated in Panel B of the figure. Inevitably, however, such a procedure would encounter problems if more than one gun was being fired from the same direction: coordination would be impossible and any calculations would produce incorrect target locations. McNaughton's solution to the problem, which could be applied to enemy guns at a distance of 10,000 yards, was as follows: Survey sections have two or more 'posts' situated on commanding ground, equipped with the finest type of surveying instruments and interconnected by telephone with a station. When one post locates a hostile battery firing, the bearing is reported to central station and the other posts put on approximately. Then telephone communication is cut off, and each post as it sees the flash corrects

The Origins of Operational Research

41

German Line

01

"o f

01

Figure 2.2 Flash Spotting Source: J. S. Finan and W. J. Hurley, 'McNaughton and Canadian Operational Research at Vimy/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), p. 12.

its bearing and presses a key which lights a corresponding light at central station. When all lamps there light u p together the operator may be fairly certain that all posts are on the same flash. Bearings are phoned in and plotted and the position determined with great precision (under favourable conditions to within

5 yards).25 The second technique devised by McNaughton and his colleagues was sound-ranging. As with flash spotting, it can be illustrated diagrammatically: Figure 2.3 presents a number of landmarks, with G denoting the position of a German gun. There are three microphone posts (Ml, M2 and M3), a forward listening post (L) and a headquarters (H). On hearing the gun firing, the operator at the listening post would press a key to activate a recording apparatus at headquarters, and with each microphone post hard-wired to the recorder, the latter would record the arrival time of the sound from each microphone. Combining the known location of the microphone post with the calculated speed of sound, an estimate of the enemy gun position could be made. A further refinement,

42 Operational Research in War and Peace •

G

German Line Allied Line L

M3

Figure 2.3 Layout of a Sound-Ranging Section Source: Finan and Hurley (1997), p. 12.

based upon the reports of exploding shells, was that the resulting calculations of flight time and range would enable headquarters to determine the type of gun and its calibre. Sound ranging was of no use during an enemy artillery barrage, but when combined with flashspotting it could provide a vital scientific contribution to counter-battery intelligence, complementing conventional techniques based upon visual observation from the ground and air, wireless intercepts, captured documents and prisoners' statements. In judging the effectiveness of McNaughton's work the Canadian Corps was, of course, successful at Vimy Ridge, not least because counter-battery intelligence facilitated the destruction of 83 per cent of the German artillery. Following the First World War much of the work carried out by pioneers of the calibre of Tiverton and McNaughton was forgotten. Whilst their studies may be viewed in retrospect as employing analytical skills akin to operational research, they did not result in the sustained and conscious use of scientific techniques in the planning and execution of military operations. There were ongoing developments in the technology

The Origins of Operational Research 43 of warfare, especially in relation to aircraft, submarines and tanks, as well as in radio and telephone communication, yet until the mid-1930s, 'The designers led, the tactics lagged, and effective countermeasures were virtually nonexistent.' 26 It is significant, for example, that the officiallysponsored history of operational research in the RAF makes no reference to the studies of Lanchester or Tiverton.27 One obvious reason for the failure to sustain such work after 1918 was the policy of military disarmament enshrined in the 'Ten Year Rule' of 1919 which resulted in severe financial stringencies in the allocation of defence funding for the greater part of the interwar period. Under the rule, the armed services were required to prepare their annual estimates 'on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war in the next ten years.' This was subsequently refined by the Treasury to require service chiefs to justify expenditures on a daily shifting basis. In the relatively placid international environment of the 1920s it is hardly surprising that defence expenditure fell dramatically from £766 million in 1919-20 to £189 million in 1921-2 and to £102 million in 1932. But a powerful adjunct to objective financial constraints was the lingering cultural division between military personnel and scientists. A notable attempt to bridge the divide was provided by the government's decision in 1915 to establish the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) with a view to organising civilian research in the national interest, both in war and peace. Four research boards, embracing physics, chemistry, engineering and radio research were created under the leadership of the distinguished chemist, Henry Tizard, with a remit to coordinate civilian efforts with the corresponding service establishments. The project was, however, unsuccessful due to the inability of the civilian boards to understand military requirements, together with a chronic lack of research funding in the aftermath of the war. 28 In a long term perspective, the rise of scientific influence in military affairs in the formal sense began with the establishment of the post of Director of Scientific Research at the Admiralty in 1920, a precedent followed four years later by the creation of the Air Ministry's Directorate of Scientific Research.29 Whilst these offices gave every appearance of forward-looking developments, their effectiveness was limited by the fact that their remit was confined to weapons development. In the case of the Air Ministry's Directorate, there can be no doubting the technical abilities of its head, H. E. Wimperis, inventor of the Wimperis accelerometer and of the course-setting bombsight developed for the Royal Flying Corps in 1917 which remained in service until 1939. But in

44 Operational Research in War and Peace addition to funding limits, Wimperis's efforts were frustrated by an ongoing reluctance on the part of the Air Staff to relinquish significant control over weapons research. In fact, his role consisted mainly of directing routine tasks which had been instituted before the establishment of the Directorate and would have continued in its absence. In commenting on the resulting frustrations, A. P. Rowe, principal assistant to Wimperis, noted the difficulty in attracting scientists into armaments research in the 1920s and early 1930s. Quite apart from the lack of perception of a national emergency at this time, such work as was available was controlled by RAF officers who were invariably interested only in the improvement of weapons familiar to them, thereby leaving little scope for civilian scientists. In Rowe's view, however, the most significant constraint was the 'curse of secrecy' which stifled legitimate scientific discourse to the point at which it stunted the progress of research. As Rowe observed, Although security in defence science is often essential and although no man of goodwill would break a pledge of secrecy, it must be admitted that the more secret a project the less efficient it is likely to be. The science of aeronautics, for instance, progressed rapidly under a system of healthy competition between the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough and the National Physical Laboratory at Teddington, whereas knowledge of armament work was known only to the few engaged upon it and workers in this field rarely, if ever, had to encounter the criticism of greater or even other minds.30 Until the mid-1930s, therefore, little attempt was made to encourage civilian scientists to engage in military research. In the case of the Air Ministry, it was ironic, to say the least, that whilst it was accepted that flight was based on scientific principles, the belief was pervasive that science had little relevance to the conduct of war. Revealing insights into contemporary RAF thinking in this respect are provided by the following quotation from a contemporary issue of The Hawk, the official journal of the RAF Staff College, purporting to explain the reluctance of the military profession to take advantage of the scientist's knowledge: The first reason is the natural resentment felt by any highly developed guild towards intruders from another equally powerful guild. It is permissible to make use of traders, yes; but permitting them to have a voice in policy making is another matter. It has also happened in the past that science has been pressed into war

The Origins of Operational Research 45 by radicals within the military group or by outside pressure of civilian governments. This tended to cause a hardening of feeling against scientists among the military hierarchy. Secondly, the basic education and aims of the two professions differ widely in purpose. The scientist deals primarily with inanimate objects and natural laws; the soldier with men, their handling and discipline. The scientist reaches his decision by laborious experiment, by exploring every avenue, deliberately seeking the unusual and unexpected. Time is seldom of great importance to him. The soldier must make his decision quickly, since the lives of his men and his whole force may be in jeopardy. His decisions thus tend to the orthodox, time worn decisions he has been taught to make; there is little room for experiment with so much at stake. The scientist is brought up in an atmosphere where complete independence of thought and action is a cardinal tenet. He regards with suspicion any organisation which demands rigid obedience to authority. Finally, although war has spurred science and technology on to greater efforts, and has even served to spread their benefits more widely, the scientist is aware that war, in the end, drains away the resources of mankind, and that future wars may wipe out civilisation itself. Even when recognising that another war would only be in defence of his way of life, the scientist is reluctant to give his talents to the arts of destruction. He is above all a builder, not a destroyer.31 It remains to be said that the prejudicial judgements on the leisurely time horizon of scientists and their reluctance to engage in 'destructive' research were to prove to be wholly wrong. Nevertheless, the statement remains significant for its scepticism on the worth of scientific endeavour from within the one branch of the armed services which might be expected to have been in the vanguard of the scientific evaluation of military tactics and strategy. In reflecting on the origins of operational research, Patrick Blackett paid tribute to the work of Lanchester in an article published in the journal, Advancement of Science, in 1948.32 In this light, it is reasonable to assume that he would also have acknowledged McNaughton, Tiverton and Appleyard as practitioners of operational research in the classical sense. Each of these pioneers of operational research was concerned exclusively with the military application of the scientific method. It would therefore be instructive to conclude the chapter by considering the extent

46 Operational Research in War and Peace to which attitudes, or modes of thought akin to operational research were foreshadowed in the non-military sphere. In this respect, the historical lineage is confined to the onset of the modern industrial era, coinciding with the movement from the workshop to the mechanised factory in the period from the late eighteenth century onwards. Evidence of sophisticated thinking grounded, albeit implicitly, in quantification can be traced back to the first great work of classical economics, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, published in 1776.33 As a tract for the times, this book laid the foundations of all subsequent justifications for a liberal socio-economic order by reference to the 'invisible hand' whereby the pursuit of individual self-interest within a framework of law and custom maximises social welfare. In the present context, the critical point to note is that Smith was determined not only to justify individual freedom on the basis of a fundamental mutuality of individual interests, he was also concerned, more prosaically, to identify the sources of economic growth. In his view, the 'wealth of the nation,' literally, was dependent upon the specialisation or division of labour, which in practical terms was the principal cause of enhanced productivity. Smith's well known example of a pin manufactory provided an eloquent illustration of the point. In the absence of functional specialisation, an individual worker, even 'with his utmost ability,' could scarcely make 'one pin in a day, but certainly could not make twenty.' On the basis of his own observation, however, Smith described the division of labour applied to pin-making in the following terms: One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three distinctive operations; to put it on is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is another; it is a new trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, though in others the same can well sometimes perform two or three of them.34 Citing the case of a 'manufactory' employing ten workers, Smith then calculated that, collectively, they could p r o d u c e u p w a r d s of 12 pounds of pins per day, approximately 48,000 in total. Thus, the average daily production of each worker was 4,800 pins. The quantum increase in productivity was dependent upon three specific attributes of the division of labour, first the increased dexterity of each worker,

The Origins of Operational Research 47 secondly the saving in time of not having to switch from one task to another, and finally the encouragement to the use of machinery, facilitating the automatic repetition of identical movements. Smith's references to the opportunities for mechanisation are insightful to the extent that they foreshadowed the 'machinery question' which was at the forefront of debate among political economists during the first half of the nineteenth century.35 At one end of the spectrum, the diffusion of machine processes in the context of the factory system was consistent with the appearance, over time, of a reserve army of the unemployed in response to deskilling arising from the substitution of capital for labour. According to Karl Marx, mounting technological unemployment would be one critical factor in undermining the structure of competitive capitalism. The overwhelming majority of political economists, however, adopted a more optimistic view of technological change as holding out the prospect of ongoing economic advance in the face of population growth and the inherent tendency towards diminishing returns. This is encapsulated in the work of David Ricardo, the doyen of early nineteenth century classical economists. 36 But whilst Ricardo appeared to take Smith's conception of the division of labour for granted, others placed it at the forefront of their analysis. Nowhere was this more true than in the case of Charles Babbage, the inventor of the first calculating, or 'difference' engine incorporating many of the facets of automation and anticipating the development of computer-based technology. In c o m m e n t i n g on The Economy of Machinery and Manufactures^ Babbage was concerned to establish 'the domestic economy of the factory' with a view to production and sales at the lowest possible point via the achievement of scale economies. In this connection he reiterated the elements of Smith's division of labour, but proceeded further than Smith in attempting a more accurate calculation of the skills and force necessary at each stage of production. In facilitating precise measurement, mechanisation would enable manufacturers to more accurately determine their costs of production and, more specifically, the economic life of individual machines. Insofar as his views on the division of labour were validated by reference to his own empirical observations, the value of Babbage's work was acknowledged by his fellow political economists, from J. S. Mill to Marx. Its impact on contemporary industrial practice, however, is far less certain, if only because examples of his philosophy of industrial management can be cited on the part of entrepreneurs unfamiliar with his work. For example, in establishing the Soho Factory at Birmingham in 1795, Boulton and

48 Operational Research in War and Peace Watt adopted as rigorous approach to the division of labour as that advocated by Babbage. The delivery of steam power was analysed to a degree and individual job specifications were identified for each class of worker employed in the factory.38 Similar approaches were adopted in the period before 1830 by Benjamin Gott in his Leeds woollen mill and by William Brown, flax spinner of Dundee, the latter notable for offering a consultancy service to other mill owners on the efficiency of work processes. 39 It is only in retrospect, therefore, that the claim can be made that Babbage's commitment to the 'empirical methods of science' ranks him as a 'proto' operational researcher. Indeed, it is arguable that Babbage was less interested in producing practically useful insights into managerial problems than in addressing his fellow political economists struggling to understand the manifold repercussions of industrialisation for the wider society. In any event, his work failed to lay the foundations for a nascent management science rooted in the achievement of scale economies, not least because of its limited relevance to the needs of British industry both in its contemporary setting and for decades to come. Even as late as the Second World War the single unit family-owned firm or partnership was the norm in British manufacturing industry. Where large scale firms existed they invariably took the form either of integrated 'entrepreneurial' companies (i.e., manager manned but owner controlled) or holding companies encompassing decentralised federations of family or entrepreneurial firms.40 In the very few instances where professional managers were employed their small numbers and restricted functions 'helped to perpetuate a commitment to personal ways of management' which effectively precluded access both to significant scale economies and the adoption of a scientific approach to the resolution of managerial problems. 41 The pre-1914 dominance of 'personal' or 'family' capitalism in Britain's industrial structure has been explained by reference to a number of interrelated factors which derive their validity from explicit contrasts with the United States. In that country, the foundations of a modern corporate economy were laid in the period after 1890 as the business structure came to be dominated by firms possessing professional hierarchies in which managerial tasks were differentiated by function. By this means American enterprise was able to respond to buoyant demand conditions by the exploitation of managerial economies of scale. In Britain, however, domestic markets were relatively slow growing and disintegrated: real incomes were lower and income distribution more highly skewed. For many firms, moreover, export markets both in

The Origins of Operational Research 49 composition and geographical extent, were extremely fragmented, thus compounding the limitations of the home market as a source of scale economies. The incentives, therefore, to create integrated firms with managerial hierarchies were far less compelling than in the continental United States, all the more so because of the existence in Britain of a sophisticated and entrenched system of marketing middlemen, operating both nationally and internationally, which placed a substantial institutional brake on integration. 42 It is therefore unsurprising that the first practical attempts to enhance managerial processes on the basis of rational observation and measurement, consistent with the application of scientific principles, were made in the United States following the publication of Frederick Winslow Taylor's Principles of Scientific Management.® Scientific management, or 'Taylorism/ was grounded in Taylor's experience first as a labourer and then as chief engineer for the Midvale Steel Company. He subsequently worked for the Bethlehem Steel Company, but from 1901 onwards devoted himself to writing and industrial consultancy. Even before the publication of his seminal work in 1911, he had been invited to serve as a visiting lecturer at the recentlyformed Harvard Business School where his ideas were debated in an atmosphere of controversy. Taylor's first paper was delivered to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers in 1895 in which he argued that the allocation of labour on the shopfloor should be determined 'scientifically' through detailed job analysis and time and motion studies. In this way 'standard time and output' could be identified which would determine differential piece rates according to the individual worker's productivity. 44 The achievement of 'standard time' was dependent on the establishment of a planning department to administer the factory as a whole, supported by a number of highly specialised 'functional foremen.' Thus, instead of reporting to one general foreman, workers would report to eight. These included '1) route clerks, 2) instruction card clerks, 3) cost and time clerks, who plan and give directions from the planning room, and 4) gang bosses' for coordination and control. Others ('the speed boss, the repair boss, and the inspector') assessed work performance and quality, whilst the 'shop disciplinarian' reviewed workers' 'virtues and defects' in order to enhance their productivity. 45 Although every factory would possess an administrative hierarchy, the planning department occupied the pivotal position, insofar as it presided over job evaluations and time and motion studies, as well as establishing daily work plans for units and individual workers. In this way, Taylor

50 Operational Research in War and Peace hoped to move away from the prevailing intuitive approach to managerial control to one based on scientific principles. Taylor's advocacy of extreme specialisation was in a direct line of descent from Adam Smith and Charles Babbage. Like the latter, he took the view that the division of labour was conducive to the welfare of the workforce as a whole as a result of enhanced monetary rewards. It is well known, however, that the introduction of scientific management into American industry provoked labour unrest to the extent that it was perceived as a threat to the strength of trade unionism in consequence of its focus on individual rather than collective incentives.46 But although it is true that a majority of American employers rejected the full application of Taylor's ideas, a number of principles associated with scientific management were incorporated into managerial practice, albeit with adjustments to meet local circumstances. After 1900, more overt line and staff organisations appeared and the essential functions of Taylor's planning department were taken on by a plant manager's specialist staff.47 As for the linkages between scientific management and operational research, it is clear that Taylor's work was to have long-term influence insofar as he was the founding father of managerial consultancy in the United States, an activity which was to come to fruition in the interwar years and which played a notable role in the diffusion of operational research into the American corporate sector after 1950. Taylor's approach to managerial organisation can be regarded as a direct precursor of operational research because it was concerned to optimise the use of existing resources by reference to procedures akin to the 'scientific method,' based upon observation and measurement. On this level, scientific management had practical impact, although it is important to note that its techniques of analysis were far removed from the relative technical rigour of operational research as it was to develop after 1950. The fact remains that scientific management originated in practical experience on the shopfloor where 'intuitive feel' had an important role to play in achieving greater operational efficiency. This was, of course, far removed from the modus operandi of the academically trained scientists who were to lay the real foundations of operational research after 1937.48 In the period to 1914 there was no movement in Britain corresponding to scientific management. In the interwar years, however, a number of factors encouraged prominent sections of the business community to accept that 'a more rational control....of economic life through the application of scientific method is possible and desirable.'49

The Origins of Operational Research 51 The war itself was one causal element, insofar as its unprecedented logistic needs had encouraged product standardisation, mass production and company mergers, as well as the growth of capital intensive industries such as advanced chemicals and electrical engineering hitherto underrepresented in Britain's business structure compared with Germany and the United States. In the decade after the war the fulcrum of debate was provided by the 'rationalisation' movement which offered a congenial home for the British advocates of scientific management. Whilst The Economist claimed that rationalisation was no more than 'a cloak for confused ideas, and....a badge of respectability for processes of doubtful value,' 50 it is clear in retrospect that it was consistent with the movement towards a larger scale of business organisation as a result of company mergers. In the depressed commercial climate of the 1920s this was viewed as desirable on several counts. Surplus productive capacity, for example, entailed a loss of competitive efficiency. In that context, horizontal integration (mergers of firms at the same stage of production) was viewed as a direct means of overcoming the slowness of market forces in eliminating loss-making firms, whilst vertical integration (the merger of firms at different stages of production) was advocated as a means of achieving economies of scale in industries such as iron and steel and cotton textiles. Rationalisation owed its popularity in part, therefore, to increasing dissatisfaction with market mechanisms. As Harold Macmillan, MP was to state in 1934, There is abundant evidence to prove that some form of conscious social direction will have to supplement the old system under which the regulation of our economy was entrusted to the method of trial and error in response to the price indicator.51 As a progressive Conservative and advocate of planning, Macmillan, like the business community in general, was concerned to revalidate the capitalist system in the face of depression and mass unemployment, and at a time w h e n the Labour P a r t y w a s a d v o c a t i n g wholesale nationalisation as one solution to the extreme forces of competition. In these respects, it is significant that in the later 1920s government and the leading supporters of rationalisation regarded it as a structuralist solution to the problem of unemployment. Whilst it was conceded that mergers would have the immediate effect of raising unemployment, in the longer term, as industrial efficiency improved in response to scale economies, lost export markets would be regained and rationalised industries would be able to recruit more workers. 52

52 Operational Research in War and Peace The belief that rationalisation would lead to industrial rejuvenation was also grounded in contemporary conceptions of the virtues of German, and more especially American business organisation. This is confirmed by the flood of literature pointing to foreign competitive strengths based upon large scale organisation. Official publications were no exception to this trend, as evidenced by the reports of the Balfour Committee on Industry and Trade and the Samuel and Lewis reports on the coal industry, all of which proclaimed the virtues of 'scientific' marketing and management as the paramount sources of commercial success in German and American business. 53 The issue of foreign emulation as a force for rationalisation can be taken further by reference to the direct intrusion into the British business scene of industrialists or firms with American and German origins. 54 Excellent examples are provided by Sir Hugo Hirst of the General Electrical Company (GEC), the Renolds of the Renold and Coventry Chain Company and, for his role in founding ICI in 1926, Sir Alfred Mond (later Lord Melchett). Mond claimed to have inaugurated the rationalisation movement in Britain, and it is significant that his enthusiasm for a large scale merger in the British chemical industry was prompted by his desire to emulate the competitive power of the recently-founded German chemical combine, I. G. Farben. At the level of the firm it was American companies which spurred on the rationalisation movement by acquiring and then merging British firms in sectors such as electrical products and vehicles. GEC, for example, was responsible for the merger of four electrical manufacturers to form Associated Electrical Industries, whilst General Motors, in taking over Vauxhall Motors, complemented Ford's presence as a large scale producer in the British domestic market. 55 Taking all of the above factors into account, the business historian, Leslie Hannah, has argued that the interwar period in general, and the 1920s in particular, marked the rise of a corporate economy in Britain whereby the structure of business and the practice of management began to move towards prevailing standards in the United States. 56 During the 1920s, an average of 188 firms disappeared each year as a result of mergers. This was three times the average for the forty years to 1920, and its effects were fully reflected in the g r o w t h of industrial concentration. In 1910, the share of the largest 100 firms in manufacturing net output stood at 16 per cent: by 1920 it had risen to 18 per cent before advancing to 26 per cent in 1930. The growth in firm size, moreover, was facilitated by managerial innovations on an unprecedented scale. The diffusion of the telephone, for example, greatly facilitated

The Origins of Operational Research 53 managerial control and coordination, as did the introduction of office machinery such as the Hollerith 'which could process accounting data with great speed, and which were recognised to have caused important developments in the collection and diffusion of information, notably in large companies.' 57 Equally significant as a response to the growth in firm size was the rise of the functional managerial specialist with a particular focus on new methods of accounting. In this respect, the spread of cost accounting was complemented by innovations in internal audit and forecasting procedures. Yet although the 1920s witnessed a move away from the small scale 'family capitalism' of the nineteenth century in favour of the corporate business form and professional salaried managers, great care should be taken not to exaggerate their impact in terms of the introduction of 'scientific methods of management' on the American model. The consensus among business historians is that as late as 1939 Britain's' business structure could still be described as being based upon family, or personal capitalism. As Chandler has emphasised, As late as the 1930s the great majority of the leading firms making packaged branded goods continued to be run by one or two families. The Cadburys, Frys, Rowntrees, Colmans, Recketts, Ranks, Lyles, Barratts, Beechams, Sangers, Courtaulds, Albright and Wilsons, and the families who owned Cross and Blackwell, Peek Frean, Huntly and Palmers, Gilbeys Gin, Cerebos, Liebig, Bovril, Carreras, Yardley, Pinchin Johnson and Goodlass, Wall and Borax Consolidated continued to manage their firms into the third and even fourth generations.58 The mergers of the 1920s, moreover, were also consistent with the perpetuation of family influence and control. Although the contemporary merger wave gave birth to such corporate giants as ICI and Unilever, the practice of constructing federations of autonomous family enterprises in the form of holding companies was the norm. In this context, it is significant that Hannah has conceded that, Companies like AEI, Hawker Siddeley, Liebigs, Cadbury-Fry, Stewarts and Lloyds, Tube Investments and Reckitt and Coleman appear to have been little more than loose confederations of subsidiaries, and it may reasonably be doubted whether such a structure can have achieved many of the potential economies of large scale. Suspicion is inevitably aroused that they were a form of cartel — albeit a strong and permanent cartel — which could achieve many of the private benefits of monopoly power whilst

54 Operational Research in War and Peace foregoing the social benefits which strategic and organisational innovation were likely to bring.59 When it is borne in mind that the rate of merger activity tailed off dramatically in the 1930s to be replaced by overt cartelisation as the dominant trend in business organisation, it can be readily appreciated that the movement towards managerial innovation was blunted further. The rise of the functional managerial specialist should also be placed in its correct historical context in that the emphasis on the recruitment of accountants is indicative of a notable weakness in educational provision for management. In the United States, the modern business school had made its debut in the decade after 1899 culminating in the foundation of the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard in 1908. At the same time, organisations for professional managers and specialist journals proliferated, as did m a n a g e m e n t consultancy. 6 0 Such developments were notable for their absence in Britain where the 'cult of the amateur' prevailed until well after 1945. In the context of a business structure where family ownership and management continued to be writ large, this was hardly surprising. In these circumstances, large swathes of British industry were unaffected either by scientific management or the rhetoric of the rationalisation movement. There were British variants of 'Taylorism' in the interwar period, notably the Bedaux system of work simplification and standardisation introduced by 225 firms by 1937, but which encountered substantial worker and trade union resistance for simply trying to 'speed u p work.' 6 1 Much closer to the spirit of operational research was the work carried out at the Shirley Institute for the cotton textile industry from the 1920s onwards. This focussed on time and motion studies of loom operations entailing the assembly of large quantities of statistical data. 62 Such activities, however, were the exceptions to the general rule of a widespread and fundamental indifference to the 'scientific' organisation of business.

NOTES 1. A. P. Rowe, One Story of Radar (Cambridge University Press, London, 1948), p. 51. 2. Thomas Digges, An Arithmetical Militaires Treatise Named Stratioticos (London, 1571: Da Capo Press, Amsterdam, 1968). 3. Alfred W. Crosby, The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society 1250-1600 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997).

The Origins of Operational Research 55 4. William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since AD 1000 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982), pp. 126-30. 5. Ibid., pp. 262-306; M. W. Kirby, 'British Culture and the Development of High Technology Sectors,' in Andrew Godley and O. M. Westall (eds.), Business History and Business Culture (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996), pp. 190-221. 6. H. R. Ricardo, 'F.W. Lanchester/ Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 5 (1948), pp. 757-65. 7. F. W. Lanchester, Aerial Flight, Vol. 1 Aerodynamics, Vol. 2 Aerodonetics (Constable, London, 1907, 1908). 8. F. W. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare (Constable, London, 1916). 9. J. H. Engels, 'A Verification of Lanchester's Law,' Journal of the Operations Research Society of America , Vol. 2 (1954), pp. 163-71. 10. Lt. J. V. Chase, 'Force on Force Effectiveness: Model for Battle Lines' (1902). Reprinted and discussed in B. A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine (Navy Institute Press, Annapolis, MD.). 11. B. A. Fiske, 'American Naval Policy,' US Naval Institute, vol. 130 (1905), pp. See also, K. Weiss, 'The Fiske Model of Warfare,' Operations Research, Vol. 10 (1962), pp. 569-71. 12. M. Osipov, 'The Influence of Numerical Strength of Engaged forces on their Casualties'. English translation in Robert L. Helmbold and Alan S. Rehn, Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 46 (1995), pp. 435-90. See also, R. L. Helmbold, 'Osipov: the "Russian Lanchester",' European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 65 (1993), pp. 278-88. 13. J. Reed Lowell to President Rinehart, in Operations Research, Vol. 2 (1954), p. 363. 14. Joseph F. McCloskey, 'The Beginning of Operations Research: 1934-1941/ Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), p. 146. 15. B. D. Powers, Strategy without Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914-1939 (Croom Helm, London, 1976), p. 18. 16. N. Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing (William Kimber, London, 1973), p. 142. 17. Tiverton Papers, RAF Museum, Colindale, Boxes 1-4. 18. V. Van der Vat, Tire Atlantic Campaign (Hodder and Stoughton, London 1988). 19. T. W. Korner, The Pleasures of Counting (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 28. 20. J. Winton, Convoy (Michael Joseph, London, 1983), p. 115. 21. Korner (1996), pp. 32-3. 22. Winton (1983), p. 122. 23. Lloyd N. Scott, Naval Consulting Board of the United States (US Printing Office, 1926). I am grateful to Ernest Koenigsberg for this reference. 24. J. Finan and W. J. Hurley, 'McNaughton and Canadian Operational Research at Vimy,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 10-14.

56 Operational Research in War and Peace 25. A. G. L. McNaughton, 'The Development of Artillery in the Great War,' Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1929), pp. 160-71. Cited in Finan and Hurley (1997), p. 12. 26. McCloskey (1987), p. 144. 27. Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force (HMSO, London, 1963). 28. Sir Harry Melville, The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (Macmillan, London, 1962). 29. R. W. Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (Phoenix House, London ,1962), pp. 10-11. 30. Rowe (1948), p. 2. 31. Cited in Clark (1962), pp. 16-17. 32. P.M.S. Blackett, 'Operational Research,' Advancement of Science, Vol. 45 (1948), p. 30 and appendix 1, p. 38. Reprinted in Idem, Studies of War (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 1962), Part 2, ch. 1, pp. 169-98. 33. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1, 9 th edition (London, 1799). 34. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 35. Maxine Berg, The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy 1815-1848 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980). 36. Ibid., pp. 43-74. 37. Charles Babbage, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures (London, first, second and third editions, 1832, fourth edition, 1835). 38. Eric Roll, An Early Experiment in Industrial Organisation (Longmans, London, 1930). 39. Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management: A Study of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968), pp. 115-6; Dennis Chapman, 'William Brown of Dundee, 1791-1864: Management in a Scottish Flax Mill,' Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, Vol. 4 (1952), p. 124. 40. Alfred D. Chandler, 'The Development of Modern Management Structure in the US and UK,' in L. Hannah (ed.), Management Strategy and Business Development: An Historical and Comparative Study (Macmillan, London, 1976), p. 40. 41. Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990), p. 242. 42. Alfred D. Chandler, 'The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis,' Economic History Review, Vol. 33 (1980), p. 402. 43. Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (W. W. Norton, New York, 1911. 44. Frederick Winslow Taylor, 'A Piece-Rate System Being a Step towards Partial Solution of the Labour Problem,' Transactions of the American Society of

The Origins of Operational Research

57

Mechanical Engineers, Vol. 16 (1895), pp. 856-83. See also Daniel Wilson, 'Scientific Management, Systematic Management and Labour, 1880-1915/ Business History Review, Vol. 49 (1974), pp. 479-500. 45. Taylor (1911), p. 104. 46. D. Nelson, Frederick Taylor and the Rise of Scientific Management (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WL 1980). 47. Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 276-7. 48. Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (Methuen, London, second edition, 1983), pp. 31-3. 49. Lyndall F. Urwick, The Meaning of Rationalisation (Macmillan, London, 1930), p. 27. 50. The Economist, 7 December, 1929, p. 1073. 51. Cited in Hannah (1983), p. 31. 52. M. W. Kirby, 'Industrial Policy/ in Sean Glyrm and Alan Booth (eds.), The Road to Full Employment (Allen and Unwin, London, 1987), pp. 131-5. 53. Final Report of the Committee on Industry and Trade (Balfour Committee), Cmd. 3282 (1929); Report of the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry (Samuel Commission, 1925), Cmd. 2600 (1926); Report of the Departmental Committee on Cooperative Selling (Lewis Committee), Cmd. 2770 (1926). 54. Hannah (1983), p. 38. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid., pp. 90-122. 57. Leslie Hannah, 'Managerial Innovation and the Rise of the Large Scale Company in Interwar Britain,' Economic History Review, Vol. 27 (1974), p. 257. 58. Alfred D. Chandler, 'The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United States and the United Kingdom,' Economic History Review, Vol. 33 (1980), p. 402. 59. Leslie Hannah, 'Strategy and Structure in the Manufacturing Sector/ in Idem, Management Strategy and Business Development: An Historical and Comparative Study (Macmillan, London, 1976), p. 199. 60. Chandler (1977), pp. 464-8. 61. C. Littler, The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies: A Comparative Study Heinemann, London, 1982), pp. 99-116. 62. John Singleton, Lancashire on the Scrapheap: The Cotton Industry, 1945-1970 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991), p. 69; Board of Trade, Working Party Reports: Cotton (HMSO, London, 1946), pp. 129-31.

3

The Beginnings of Operational Research: British Air Strategy, 1920-1940 Political and diplomatic historians are agreed that the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 was followed by a peace settlement which sowed the seeds of future conflict. The economist, J. M. Keynes may have lamented the imposition of a 'Carthaginian' peace settlement on Germany, 1 but the Treaty of Versailles left the sinews of German military power intact. 2 Reparations were dominated by financial transfers, whilst the Allied military occupation of the Rhineland was subject to a time limit at the same time as it preserved the greater part of the prewar German state. In these circumstances, there were no effective restraints on German revanchism, a fact confirmed by the covert military rearmament undertaken by the Weimar government in the 1920s, together with the rapid revival of German industry following the hyper-inflation of 1922-3. Default on reparations payments, moreover, did not lead to effective sanctions, especially in the light of the willingness of the United States to guarantee Germany's financial security in the form of short term loans after 1924. Even these were repudiated after 1930 when, in the midst of renewed financial crisis and mass unemployment, the stage was set for the takeover of the German state by the National Socialist Party committed to the reassertion of German political and military power in Europe and hence the overthrow of the Treaty of Versailles. Following the inauguration of Adolf Hitler's Chancellorship in 1933, Germany's territorial ambitions were rekindled in such a way as to offer a renewed threat to that long standing British foreign policy objective of maintaining a balance of power in Europe. But in exactly the same way that the construction by Imperial Germany of a naval battle fleet in home waters had undermined the military integrity of the British Isles after 1900, Hitler's elevation to power was followed by an overt drive for rearmament which was to incorporate a substantial aircraft building programme. In this context, interwar observers of military and diplomatic 58

The Beginnings of Operational Research 59 affairs adopted a view of future warfare reminiscent of the 'mutually assured destruction' of the nuclear age: quite apart from its implications for naval and land forces, aerial bombardment held out the prospect of mass slaughter of civilians concentrated in urban areas. 'Terror bombing,' therefore, was viewed as a potent new weapon in the military arsenal, a fact which received some confirmation from the Japanese bombing campaign in Manchuria in the early 1930s and the deployment of air power during the Spanish Civil War after 1936.3 As indicated already, British defence policy after the First World War was based upon the 'Ten Year Rule' which placed severe constraints on military expenditure (see above, p. 43). From the early 1930s onwards, however, the changing international situation forced a fundamental reappraisal of military strategy. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in defiance of the League of Nations in 1931 coincided with the rise of the Nazis in Germany and the progressive breakdown of the Disarmament Conference convened at Geneva in 1932. Faced with the prospect of having to deal with 'two great states at opposite ends of the world, with unfulfilled ambitions and bitter memories,' the Cabinet was obliged to consider the defence requirements of 'the largest conglomeration of political and economic interests and commitments in the world.' 4 The Ten Year Rule was therefore partially abrogated in 1932 and laid aside completely following Hitler's accession to power. Thereafter, the Treasury began to relax the reins on military expenditure, marginally at first, but culminating in the Defence White Paper of 1936.5 In recognition of the prevailing public hostility to the expansion of the army for a military campaign on the Continent, the White Paper envisaged a 'two power naval standard' whereby the Royal Navy would maintain an effective presence both in Far Eastern and Home waters. Equally significant was its endorsement of the Air Ministry's 'Scheme F' which allowed for the construction by 1939 of a force of 1,736 first-line aircraft, including nearly 1,000 bombers with adequate reserves. In relation to the foundation of operational research it was the strategic role allotted to the RAF which was to prove to be of decisive importance, albeit in circumstances which had little, or nothing to do with the initial bias of the relevant rearmament programme in favour of a bomber force. In order to explain why this was so it is necessary to trace the evolution of British air strategy after the First World War. During the 1920s the Air Staff became committed to the view that the ongoing development of military technology ensured that any future conflict on land or sea would result in a lengthy battle of attrition.

60 Operational Research in War and Peace Evidence from the First World War was cited to demonstrate that nations did not surrender because their armed forces had been defeated in the field but because their internal economic and socio-political cohesion had been undermined. 6 In this latter context, it was argued that aircraft could be used to accelerate the process of internal collapse by means of aerial bombardment of an enemy's war-making capacity. This would entail attacks on centres of industry and urban areas w i t h a view to undermining civilian morale. Aircraft, moreover, had the potential to fulfil a major strategic role in warfare insofar as it was widely assumed that no effective defence against air attack could be organised. The first strategic air offensive in history was launched by Germany against Britain in the form of the Zeppelin raids of 1915 and 1916 (see above, p. 34). These were directed against military targets, although in reality bombs were dropped largely at random. Whilst they caused few casualties and little material damage, the raids had a significant public impact in Britain, not least because the Zeppelins were able to strike deep into the English mainland, carrying out attacks with apparent impunity, against towns and cities as far to the north west of England as Cheshire and Lancashire. In June, 1917, German Gotha bombers caused considerably more damage, both moral and material, when they attacked central London in broad daylight, killing 162 people and injuring 432. All but 11 of the casualties were civilians and numbering amongst them were 46 school children. 7 The Zeppelin and Gotha raids did much to determine the future of air force organisation and strategy in Britain. Two reports prepared for the Imperial War Cabinet by the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, and General Smuts, pointed to future needs in the form of anti-aircraft gunnery and other defensive measures, but also favoured an offensive capability.8 The latter was highlighted in the second report which adopted the doctrine already established in the Royal Flying Corps by its Commander-in-Chief, Major General Hugh Trenchard, that counter-attack was the best form of defence: a strategic air offensive, in crippling the enemy air force over its own territory would reduce the potential scale of attack, deny air superiority, and in destroying the enemy's war-winning potential would reduce morale. To the extent that 'The day may not be far off when aerial operations...on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war to which the older forms of military and naval operations become secondary and subordinate', Smuts recommended that the air arm should be separated from the existing controls exercised over it by the army and the navy. 9

The Beginnings of Operational Research 61 In fulfilment of Smuts' recommendation, the RAF came into existence on 1 April, 1918 with its separate identity linked clearly to the concept of a strategic bombing offensive. It was the latter which provided the justification for the continued existence of an independent air arm in the face of opposition from the established services and cost-conscious politicians after the war. In this respect, the role of Trenchard as Chief of Staff (1919-29) was decisive so that by the end of his period of office the accepted RAF doctrine was that the bomber was a weapon of warwinning capability via its impact on enemy morale. As Trenchard argued before the Cabinet Standing Sub-Committee on Defence in May 1921, 'it is only by way of the air that one country can reach the heart of another in the earliest days of war and drive home the fear of personal injury and loss to every individual.' 10 In the early years of the interwar period the RAF was not alone in its acceptance of the Trenchard doctrine. In the United States, General Billy Mitchell expounded the strategic role of the bomber, whilst Guilio Douhet, an Italian general, formulated it at length in a treatise published in 1921. In The Command of the Air, Douhet argued that in the event of war the devastation threatened by aerial bombardment was so great that a nation's only hope of survival was to destroy the enemy air force before it had a chance to strike. Douhet suggested, therefore, that the bulk of military resources should be devoted to producing fleets of heavy bombers designed to deliver, without warning, a 'knock-out blow' resulting in immediate capitulation. 11 Fear of the so-called 'knock-out blow' dominated Air Staff thinking for the greater part of the interwar period. In March 1922, a report in The Times disclosed that the French L'Armee de L'Air had a considerable force of 300 bombers and fighters to match. 12 Published at a time of increasingly frigid diplomatic relations between France and Britain, the public stir created by this pronouncement was fully reflected in official deliberations on military strategy. Only one month after The Times article was published, a sub-committee of the Committee on Imperial Defence (CID), in extrapolating from the German Gotha Attacks on London, concluded that a French bomber force would be able to drop 75 tons per day on civilian centres in England after an initial attack amounting to 150 tons. In these circumstances, 'Railway traffic would be disorganised, food supplies would be interrupted, and it is probable that that after being subject for several weeks to the strain of such an attack the population would be so demoralised that they would insist upon an armistice.' 13 In retrospect, the possibility of an Anglo-French military conflict in the early 1920s w a s virtually

62 Operational Research in War and Peace unthinkable, but the strategic aspects of air power continued to be debated for the remainder of the 1920s. In 1923, for example, a further sub-committee of the CID with a remit to consider 'National and Imperial Defence,' r e c o m m e n d e d the establishment of a H o m e Defence ('Metropolitan') Air Force of 52 squadrons dominated by bombers in a ratio of two to one over other aircraft types. In this respect, Trenchard's views had been decisive on two counts. First, 'Air power holds within itself the possibility of bringing about an early termination of a European war' thereby eliminating the prospect of infantry casualties on the scale of the First World War. Secondly, to the extent that there could be no effective defence against aerial bombardment of the English mainland, the only credible response to an enemy bombing campaign was deterrence: the RAF should therefore be equipped with a bomber force large enough to provide a credible threat against a potential aggressor by virtue of its ability to deliver its own variant of the 'knock-out blow.' 14 Although the RAF's expansion plans of the early 1920s were stunted by the financial constraints imposed by the Ten-Year Rule, Trenchard's focus on the strategic bombing offensive and the knock-out blow continued. In 1925, for example, the official Air Raid Precautions Committee reconfirmed the probable effects of an attack on Great Britain by the L'Armee de L'Air as resulting in 'a loss of more than twice the whole First World War total of [civilian] casualties in only three days.'15 The Air Staff, moreover, reconfirmed its belief that the effect on morale of a bombing offensive would be far greater than the material damage, since no defence was possible against such an attack. By the early 1930s fear of aerial bombardment was being articulated in public. This was well illustrated by Stanley Baldwin's doom-laden statement to the House of Commons that 'the bomber will always get through,' made in the aftermath of the 'terror' bombing of Shanghai by the Japanese airforce in 1931.16 Following Hitler's accession to power both political and military minds were concentrated by the fact that in relation to Germany, Britain was at a serious disadvantage in the conduct of aerial warfare. Although Germany possessed no official air force in the early 1930s, evidence soon began to accumulate that preparations were underway for the formation of the Luftwaffe.17 Confronted by this development, British military planners were conscious of the fact that no part of the British Isles lay further than seventy miles from the coast, a meagre seventeen minutes' flying time for enemy aircraft in the event of a German occupation of Belgium and the French north-east coast. British targets, moreover, were relatively concentrated, whereas their German equivalents were spread

The Beginnings of Operational Research 63 over a wide geographical area, the implication being that 'The same weight of bombs, ferried over the same distance, would do far more effective damage to the British economy than it would to the German.' 18 Already, in 1934 the Air Staff had concluded that with a first-line strength of 1,230 aircraft, Germany could drop 75 tons of bombs per day on England, a figure that would be doubled if the Luftwaffe had access to airfields in the Low Countries. Casualties were estimated at 50 per ton. 19 As estimates of Luftwaffe strength were raised after 1935 (when Hitler claimed, falsely, to have achieved parity with the RAF), so too were the calculations of the possible Luftwaffe bomb load. In 1936 the Air Staff estimate stood at 600 tons per day with 150,000 casualties during the first week of war. By 1939 it had been raised to 700 tons, a figure that was viewed as consistent with an attempted 'knock-out blow' of 3,500 tons delivered within the first 24 hours. 20 As the international situation deteriorated from the mid-1930s onwards, Britain's defence requirements were subject to continuing review. For the RAF this entailed the formulation of successive construction programmes as set out in Table 3.1. The later schemes after 1937 were consistent with the perceived need to construct a strike force of at least equal strength to the Luftwaffe. In that context there were three primary considerations, first the need to sustain a bomber force of sufficient capability to deter aggression, second to possess sufficient strength in depth to defeat a knock-out blow, and third to develop a strike force with the ability to engage, if necessary, in a counteroffensive against the German homeland. These objectives were enshrined in Scheme J and reached maturity in Scheme M, the latter being devised in the aftermath of the German takeover of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. The evolving schemes up to and including 'K' were biased in favour of the bomber strike force and were thus in conformity with the Trenchard doctrine. The 'L' and 'M' schemes of 1938, however, provided for an increasing proportion of interceptor fighters which at first sight was indicative of an increasing concern with the air defence of Great Britain itself. This was, however, more apparent than real insofar as the final prewar expansion Scheme M fully reflected the Air Ministry's decision, taken in 1936, to re-equip the RAF with four-engined heavy bombers with a flight range of 2,000 miles and therefore capable of reaching targets in eastern Germany. Thus, although the strike force in Scheme M was numerically smaller than in Scheme H twenty months earlier, the estimated bomb lift was 5,000 tons compared with less than the 1,000 tons carried by the twin-engined 'light' bombers envisaged in the

Table 3.1. Summary of pre-war expansion schemes — 1934 to 1939.

s

GERMAN AIR FORCE

R.A.F

(estimated) Scheme

A

Date Submitted

July

Total Striking Force

Total Fighter Command

Total R.A.F Incl. Overseas

Due for Completion

500

336

1252

March 1939

1934

Striking Force

Total G.A.F

Due for Completion

Remark

I

The first pre-war expansion.

C

March 1935

840

420

1804

March 1937

800/950

1512

March 1937

The result of Sir John Simon's and Mr. Eden's visit to Hitler in Berlin

F

November 1935

1022

420

2204

March 1939

840/972

1572

March 1937

Further German expansion and the Abyssinian war.

H

January 1937

1631

476

2770

March 1939

1700

2500

March 1939

Withdrawn after consideration by cabinet.

J

October 1937

1442

532

3031

June 1941

1458

3240

December 1939

The first scheme based on estimated of minimum overall strategic requirements.

K

January 1938

1360

532

2795

March 1941

1350

2700

Summer 1938

The 'emasculated J'

L

April 1938

1352

608

2863

March 1940

1950

4400

April 1940

After Austria

M

October 1938

1360

800

3185

March 1942

After Munich. The first 'all-heavy' programme.

n

The Beginnings of Operational Research 65 earlier scheme. 21 The decision to bolster fighter production was based upon two interrelated factors which were bound up with the quality of the available bomber strike force and contemporary developments in fighter design and construction. In relation to the former, it is important to note that the later RAF expansion schemes were to be completed in 1940 or beyond. Under the final Scheme M, for example, the proposed heavy bomber strike force would not materialise until March 1942. The implication of this was that at the point of the scheme's inception in October 1938, and for a considerable period thereafter, Bomber Command would be reliant on obsolete or interim aircraft types which were wholly incapable of launching either a knock-out blow against Germany or undermining German civilian morale in conformity with the Trenchard doctrine. Thus, in November 1938, only one month after the inception of Scheme M, Bomber Command's Commander-in-Chief, Sir Edgar LudlowHewitt, informed the Air Staff that to dispatch the existing strike force deep into Germany could well result in a major catastrophe. 22 It was this scenario which would ensure that when war broke out in September 1939, 'conservation' of the bomber strike force was the primary concern in Bomber Command (see below, p. 135). In the light of the RAF's limited deterrent and offensive capability it was inevitable, perhaps, that in the circumstances of the later 1930s the Air Staff should focus increasing attention on the possibilities of defending Britain against the Luftwaffe with a view to negating a bombing strike, whether in the form of an attempted knock-out blow or a concerted campaign to undermine civilian morale. Defence, as opposed to offence in the deployment of air power was a radical challenge to the received wisdom of the Trenchard doctrine. It was, moreover, an increasingly realistic possibility in the later 1930s as a result of contemporary improvements in fighter design and techniques of interception. In the former case, the initial development was the transformation of the RAF's fighter population from the wooden biplanes of the mid-1930s to a force of cantilever monoplanes by 1939 with vastly superior armament and performance. Epitomised in the form of the Hurricane and Spitfire, the revolution in fighter design after 1935 was a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for the successful interception of enemy aircraft. As indicated already, the geographical configuration of Great Britain meant that the country was highly vulnerable to aerial attack. There was no way of intercepting bombers by night and the only means of interception by day was to maintain

66 Operational Research in War and Peace

standing patrols, a system which could not be sustained indefinitely — unless the RAF possessed a mass fighter force capable of defending the greater part of the English eastern and southern coastline. Since logistic and financial considerations ruled out the construction of such a force, the effective air defence of Great Britain was entirely dependent upon a radical improvement in techniques of interception. In the late 1920s the CID had established an anti-aircraft research sub-committee to investigate 'the present position in regard to research for anti-aircraft purposes.' Its report, submitted in 1928, concluded that the 'only system which can be applied at present with any hope of success' was the detection of aircraft by acoustic methods. By 1934, a prototype acoustic device was in place, situated on Romney Marsh. Measuring 25 feet high and 200 feet long, it was directed towards the French capital. Sensitive to ground noises and with a circumscribed range of only eight miles, it could provide no information on the altitude or bearing of incoming aircraft. In these respects, it was already obsolete, not least because of increasing air speeds and the changed international situation whereby France was replaced by Germany as the most likely source of aerial attack. 23 The practical limitations of the acoustic system were highlighted dramatically during the RAF's summer exercise of 1934 consisting mainly of night attacks on London, but with Coventry singled out as the main provincial target. In the first raid the Air Ministry was effectively 'destroyed' without interception by defending fighters, and in subsequent raids the Houses of Parliament were picked out without difficulty. The lessons of the exercise were not lost within the Air Ministry where A. P. Rowe, principal assistant to the Director of Scientific Research, H. E. Wimperis, undertook an informal investigation into Britain's air defence capabilities. 24 After studying the fifty three files on 'air defence' in the Ministry's archives, Rowe reported that unless 'science' could develop some new method of enhancing Britain's defences against aerial bombardment, any war beginning in the next ten years would be lost. 25 It was this bleak conclusion which prompted Wimperis to recommend to the Air Ministry that a Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence (CSSAD) should be established under the chairmanship of Henry Tizard, assisted by himself and Rowe, and also Professors A. V. Hill and P. M. S. Blackett. The remit would be 'to consider how far recent advances in scientific and technical knowledge can be used to strengthen the present methods of defence against hostile aircraft'. The Tizard Committee, as it came to be called, was well suited to its task.

The Beginnings of Operational Research 67 Tizard himself, after gaming a doctorate in chemistry, had moved into administrative work at the DSIR and in 1934 was Rector of the Imperial College of Science and Technology as well as chairman of the Aeronautical Research Committee. He had already collaborated with Wimperis by permitting the Air Ministry to establish a research laboratory at Imperial College. By the early 1930s, seven scientific officers were employed to undertake experiments on engine fuels and navigation instruments. 26 Of even greater relevance to the work of the CSSAD, Tizard possessed directly relevant military experience having served in the Royal Flying Corps during the First World War. In this capacity he had undertaken experimental flying at Martlesham Heath, and on one occasion, whilst testing a new Sopwith Camel fighter, had obtained vital information on the performance of Gotha bombers by joining a formation on their return from a raid on London. 27 The other members of the CSSAD also possessed experience of scientific and military affairs. Hill, holding a chair in physiology at University College, London, was a Nobel Laureate in Physiology and Medicine and offered a long record of pure research. Reference has already been made to his work as Director of the Anti-Aircraft Experimental Section during the First World War (see above, pp. 34-5). Blackett also possessed military experience having served as a junior naval officer before and during the war. He had been present at the Battle of the Falkland Islands in 1914 and had served as a gunnery officer on HMS Barham, flagship of the Fifth Battle Squadron, at Jutland in 1917. During the course of the 1920s, after embarking upon an academic career under Sir Ernest Rutherford at the Cavendish Laboratory, he had proved himself as one of the most brilliant scientists of the day. Elected a fellow of the Royal Society in 1933, he was to earn a Nobel Prize in 1948 for his work on theoretical and applied physics. 28 With these backgrounds, the distinguished members of the Tizard Committee were well qualified to ponder the scientific principles which might be utilised for the effective air defence of Great Britain. In advance of the first meeting of the CSSAD in January 1935, and at A. V. Hill's suggestion, Wimperis approached Robert Watson-Watt, Superintendent of the Radio Department at the National Physical Laboratory, to examine the feasibility of a 'death-ray' which 'would either claw an aircraft out of the sky or burn up the occupants at the turn of the switch.' 29 Deeply sceptical at the possibility of 'radio destruction,' Watson-Watt nevertheless asked his assistant, A. F. Wilkins, to calculate the radio power necessary to raise the temperature of a man standing at 600 metres away from the transmitter by two degrees centigrade within

68 Operational Research in War and Peace ten minutes. Whilst Wilkins confirmed the practical impossibility of the death-ray concept (the power requirement would amount to many thousands of kilowatts), he concluded that it might be possible to locate aircraft by using reflected electromagnetic or radio waves. Watson-Watt agreed, and with the encouragement of Wimperis prepared a paper for the CSSAD offering to undertake 'numerical calculations on the method of detection by reflected radio waves.' It was this offer which inaugurated a research programme which would give birth both to radar and operational research. One month after the first meeting of the CSSAD and with the encouragement of Air Marshall Hugh Dowding, the Air Council's member for Research and Development, Watson-Watt presided over an experiment which confirmed the practicality of radio direction finding. Using a BBC transmitter near Daventry for the beam and an RAF Heyford bomber as the enemy aircraft, the crude receiving apparatus produced an identifiable response on a cathode ray tube. Within weeks of this first experiment the Air Ministry, at Dowding's instigation, had awarded research funds amounting to £10,000 and by the end of 1935 the Treasury had approved the remarkably generous budget of £10 million to provide for the construction of an air defence system based upon radio direction finding. The early experiments were carried out at an 'Ionospheric' Research Station at Orfordness by a team of civilian scientists recruited under the auspices of the CSSAD. By September 1935, the problem of altitude identification had been solved when an aircraft was located fifteen miles away, flying at 7,000 feet. An accurate method of determining compass bearing, however, had to wait until January 1936. By that time a new experimental site was under construction at Bawdsey Manor on the Suffolk coast, ten miles south of Orfordness. The Bawdsey Research Station was to become the nerve centre for research and experimental work, and also the administrative headquarters for planning a chain of twenty radar stations to be built around the English coast, from Southampton to the Tyne. Bawdsey became operational early in 1936 and in March a newly-constructed 240 feet steel mast enabled the bearing and altitude of an aircraft to be calculated at a record range of seventy-five miles. During the period of experiment at Bawdsey, members of the CSSAD began to consult RAF officers concerned with the operational needs of early aircraft warning. Collectively, they considered the difficulties of dealing with individual aircraft and also of anti-aircraft gunners confronted with the problem of targeting aircraft flying at high speeds.

The Beginnings of Operational Research 69 From these deliberations there emerged two problems requiring solution. The first was the need to intercept raiders in time, bearing in mind that a more accurate positioning was required by night than would suffice by day. Secondly, once located enemy aircraft had to be destroyed. Again, this required very different solutions by day and night. The sheer rapidity at which decisions were made and actions carried out in this early phase of radar research reflected the outstanding ability of Tizard and his colleagues and the high esteem in which they were held by those charged with the formulation of air defence policy both within and without the Air Ministry and the Cabinet itself. The decision to back radar within a fortnight of the first meeting of the CSSAD, and for the necessary approvals to pass smoothly through official administrative channels 'was almost miraculous.' In this setting, C. P. Snow observed, appositely, that If the Establishment had not trusted Tizard as one of their own, there might have been a waste of months or years. In fact, everything went through with the smoothness, lack of friction, and the effortless speed which can only happen in England when the Establishment is behind one. Within a very short time the Tizard Committee were asking for millions of pounds and getting it without blinking an eye.30 Within the CSSAD, Wimperis and Rowe formed the main commu­ nications link to Air Ministry officials. Blackett and Hill added scientific weight combined with a knowledge of service procedures. As Chairman, Tizard contributed critical insights gained from his own military experience. In retrospect, he always remembered how Things that seemed easy for other people to do or use in the air, when one is sitting safely on the ground, assumed quite a different aspect when one was in the cramped and cold cockpit of an aeroplane, cumbered with heavy clothing — quite apart from the fact that other misguided people might be trying to shoot one down.31 It was his instinctive ability to understand the problems of military flying that contributed significantly to Tizard's personal standing and the credibility of the CSSAD with serving officers. So too, in relation to the work carried out at Bawdsey, Tizard presided over a highly informal research establishment, notably devoid of red tape. The academic scientists recruited by Watson-Watt arid others were in the habit of working into the early hours, often as not in collaboration with visitors

70 Operational Research in War and Peace from the Cavendish Laboratory. Informal discussions grew into what Bawdsey staff called 'soviets,' involving not only visiting scientists, but also civil servants, high-ranking RAF officers and, ultimately, operational aircrew. At a very early stage in its deliberations, the CSSAD recognised the need for research into the operational aspects of radar in view of the fact that its innovation rendered obsolete existing techniques of fighter interception. But in laying down the practice of standing patrols, it was essential to prove that fighters were capable of meeting approaching raiders in suitable conditions of height, position and readiness. Thus, in the summer of 1936, a team of RAF officers, accompanied by Dr B. G. Dickens, an engineer from the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, was established at Biggin Hill to investigate techniques of controlled interception in advance of the construction of the first radar station. The CSSAD authorised this investigation in order to determine the percentage of occasions on which effective fighter interception could be undertaken under normal daylight conditions, on the assumption that enemy aircraft could be identified at specified intervals as they approached the coast. In particular, the Biggin Hill experiments attempted to analyse how close to a bomber it was possible to direct a fighter by radio instruction from the ground. In this respect, a major issue was to determine the range required for a radar set for installation in fighter aircraft for use at night or in poor visibility.32 The initial procedure adopted under the 'Biggin Hill experiments' was to provide pilots with a fifteen minute warning of the approach of an attacking force emitting constant radio signals. The latter were, in turn, picked up by a directionfinding station which telephoned the results through to Biggin Hill in order to facilitate radio direction of the fighters. The early interception results were an outstanding success, but only as long as the attackers flew in a straight line. When they altered course or altitude the success rate trailed off markedly, mainly because the vastly increased length of time necessary to plot interception courses led to inaccurate fighter responses. Tizard himself was responsible for solving this problem with the aid of simple geometry. Noting that fighters flew at higher speeds than bombers, assuming that the course of a bomber was on the line AD, and the fighter was at position B, ground control should direct the latter to C as the interception point. In simple mathematical terms, an isosceles triangle, ABC, was drawn with the two marked angles equal. As the interception experiments continued, an observant ground controller noted that the so-called Tizard ('Tizzy') angle could be

The Beginnings of Operational Research 71 Bomber — ►

7

D

Fighter

B Figure 3.1 The 'Tizzy' Angle estimated visually thereby giving rise to the well known jargon of interception — 'scramble, angels and vectors' — familiar to postwar cinema audiences viewing films of the Battle of Britain.33 From its inception in 1936 to the outbreak of war the Bawdsey Research Station participated in the annual air exercises held by RAF Fighter Command with its headquarters at Bentley Priory, Stanmore. The completion of five radar stations in the south-east of England by July 1938 facilitated exercises based upon controlled interception. In September, these 'Chain Home Stations' engaged in continuous operation, coincidental with the Munich crisis.34 Radar research was developing so rapidly at this time that significant organisational changes had to be implemented. With Watson-Watt absent from Bawdsey for prolonged periods, A. P. Rowe was transferred from his post as Coordinator of Air Defence at the Air Ministry to become Deputy Superintendent at Bawdsey. Shortly afterwards, in June 1938, he was elevated to the position of Superintendent following Watson-Watt's appointment as Director of Communications Development responsible for all radio equipment research and with overall responsibility for the activities at Bawdsey. In identifying the origins of the term 'operational research,' it is evident that it originated at Bawdsey in the summer of 1938 following the arrival of Rowe and his instruction to E. C. Williams and G. A. Roberts to undertake 'operational researches.' Williams, a university scientist, took responsibility for control room procedures, whilst the telephone engineer, Roberts, examined the communications system. This work was commissioned by Rowe in the light of experience gained in the 1938 air exercise. Whilst this had reconfirmed the technical feasibility

72 Operational Research in War and Peace of radar, it had also pointed to the need for the coordination and correlation of the often conflicting information received from the five Chain Home radar stations which were operational at that time. 35 In describing the operational research undertaken by Williams and Roberts, the account contained in the official RAF history is exceptionally clear. In the case of Williams, his team had to judge the skill of the observers operating the radar equipment and, to take an example, they discovered that the R.A.F. personnel who had been observing for some two or three hours daily for a period of six months were more competent operators than scientists who, by comparison, lacked experience on the observer side of radar operations.36 Williams' investigations were to lead to the 'Filter Room' system of fighter interception which was to play a critical role in determining Fighter Command's tactics and strategy during the Battle of Britain (see below, pp. 80-1). No less important, however, was the work carried out by Roberts, who studied the procedures, relationships and working of the various stages of the reporting and aircraft control systems of Fighter Command as carried out in the chain of operations rooms, in the course of which he moved away from the boundaries of communications, engineering, equipment, electrical circuits, and all the physical paraphernalia, and ....entered into the wider field of the executive officer responsible for the control of the system as a whole,37 D u r i n g the a u t u m n of 1938, scientists from the Cavendish Laboratory, led by Professor John Cockroft, were sent to Bawdsey to be instructed in radar procedures, whilst in the first half of 1939, scientists were recruited from the universities of Oxford, Manchester, Birmingham and London so that by the end of August some 80 scientists had been familiarised with the principles and practice of controlled interception. On 1 September 1939, two days before Britain declared war on Germany, groups of up to ten scientists were sent to radar stations around the coast, by that time more than twenty in number. In this context, Rowe took a further decisive step in the inauguration of operational research by arranging with Squadron Leader R. G. Hunt — the RAF officer responsible for the administration and operation of all radar stations — that some of the Bawdsey scientists should be sent directly to Fighter Command headquarters at Stanmore on the outbreak of war. In

The Beginnings of Operational Research 73 September 1939, Williams and Roberts were already there, having played key roles in the 1939 air defence exercise. Deploying 1,300 aircraft and 33,000 men, this final exercise before the outbreak of war demonstrated that by the standards of the time Fighter Command possessed a highly sophisticated air defence and warning system. It had also highlighted the importance of close liaison and cooperation between civilian scientists and RAF operational personnel. In this respect, Rowe was under no illusions that his agreement with Hart represented a milestone in the early history of operational research. As he commented in retrospect, By this agreement I hoped to give and get. I hoped to give Fighter Command the services of men who had an intimate knowledge of the performance of the radar chain and who had, as scientists been trained to use their analytical faculties; and I hoped to get....from my detailed members of staff the true facts concerning the operations against the enemy, and so enable the Bawdsey staff to be permeated with an intimate knowledge of the needs of Fighter Command.38 After the declaration of war, Harold Larnder was sent to Stanmore to head the group of civilian scientists, including Williams and Roberts. They acted as the 'Stanmore Research Section' until June 1941 when, under the continuing leadership of Larnder, its designation was changed to the Operational Research Section, Fighter Command. 39 In the autumn and winter of 1939-40 Larnder and his colleagues concentrated their efforts on the development of 'filter room techniques.' This entailed the plotting and dissemination of information emanating from the cathode ray screens at the Chain Home Stations. They also analysed the relative performance of station personnel and after highlighting significant differences in the skill of radar operators, recommended improvements in training procedures. 40 In practical terms, therefore, the early wartime work of operational research scientists was devoted to the progressive refinement of the aircraft reporting system whereby observations from the Chain Home Stations were plotted on a single diagram in a filter room. This process was known as 'Plan Position Filtering,' and the derived locations were then passed on to the relevant operations rooms at command, group and sector levels where appropriate responses by interceptor fighters, ack-ack units and civil defence were planned. Information on aircraft sightings was also reported from Observer Corps posts and used to confirm radar-based locations and the plotting of previously unreported aircraft. Operational researchers were involved

74 Operational Research in War and Peace in the continuous observation of the Stanmore filter room, where improvements in Plan Position Filtering were made by analysing virtually every failure to intercept daylight raids by German aircraft.41 In view of the historic relationship between scientists and military personnel, it was a remarkable step for civilians to be attached to the operational headquarters of a command. But, as Rowe indicated, there were important reasons for the decision. First, detailed knowledge of radar was confined largely to the Bawdsey scientists. Secondly, it was realised that the scientific analysis of military operations under the new guise of operational research was best conducted by civilians with formal scientific training, if only because RAF technical officers were more interested in the equipment per se than in the wider implications of its employment. Above all, however, it was the product of an established equality of collaboration between scientists and serving officers. The inception of radar marked the first occasion on which problems were presented from a military perspective and scientists were asked for solutions. In this way, staff officers became accustomed to bringing difficult problems to scientists, thereby breaking down institutional barriers to fruitful working relationships and creating a climate conducive to the development of operational research. Before appraising the contribution of operational research to the outcome of the Battle of Britain, there are two issues relating to the work of the Tizard Committee which require elaboration, first the political background to its deliberations, and secondly, the precise role of WatsonWatt in the inauguration of operational research. That the air defence of Great Britain was a matter of acute public concern was heralded even before the establishment of the CSSAD by Winston Churchill's much publicised campaign, launched in 1934, for enhanced measures of air defence. Ably assisted by his friend and advisor, F. A. Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell), Professor of Experimental Philosophy at the University of Oxford, Churchill succeeded in persuading the Cabinet to establish not only an air defence sub-committee of the CID, but also in securing Lindemann's membership of the CSSAD. Lindemann, however, proved to be a reluctant recruit, viewing the CSSAD as an ineffectual body, susceptible to interference by Air Ministry officials with a 'defeatist mentaility' in the face of 'terror bombing.' He was, moreover, doubtful about the merits of radio direction finding and proved highly critical of the amount of effort and resources devoted to it. For this reason alone, quite apart from any personal antipathies, the meetings of the CSSAD became heated. The situation was exacerbated by Lindemann's forceful

The Beginnings of Operational Research 75 advocacy of his own research agenda focusing on alternative methods of aircraft interception. In particular, he argued for the development of aerial mines supported by parachutes that could be dropped in front of enemy aircraft, and infra-red detection as a substitute for airborne radar equipment. A further source of tension lay in Lindemann's wholly unfounded criticisms of the tempo of the committee's work and its failure, in his view, to initiate effective research programmes, not least in relation to his own concerns. 4 2 The committee, in turn, came to resent Lindemann's open association with politicians and there was general unease that whatever took place in the CSSAD was retold in private to Churchill. The internal battles came to a head in the summer of 1936 when Lindemann announced his intention to stand for Parliament in a by-election at Oxford, the focus of his campaign being the lamentable state of the country's air defences. This provoked the resignations of Hill and Blackett from the CSSAD, followed by its dissolution in July 1936 by Lord Swinton, the Secretary of State for Air. When it was reconstituted in October, Hill and Blackett were reappointed but without Lindemann. In a postwar account of the Work of the CSSAD, C. P. Snow questioned whether radar would have been in place by September 1939 if Lindemann had remained as a member. 43 More sympathetic writers, however, have argued that Lindemann did not attempt to retard the development of radar in favour of his own projects, a fact confirmed by Watson-Watt himself who subsequently proved unable to recall 'even the merest shadow of evidence that the Prof [Lindemann] ever did anything to obstruct the development of radar.' 44 There remained, however, the continual arguments at meetings that could only have hampered the work of the committee. In retrospect, it seems clear that had Lindemann succeeded in gaining greater influence in the CSSAD the purely technical development of radar would have continued, with Watson-Watt's assistance. However, something would have been lacking. As Tizard's biographer commented, he was concerned from the outset to bring about a unity of purpose between scientists and service personnel, based upon mutual respect. 45 In this he succeeded admirably. Whilst it is true that the concept of radio direction finding was essentially handed to Tizard on a plate, it was largely due to his efforts that the developing radar system was integrated into the operational procedures of Fighter Command. Lindemann, prompted by Churchill, may have fretted at bureaucratic and administrative delays, but the fact remains that by September 1939 Britain possessed a technically efficient and fully

76 Operational Research in War and Peace operational early warning system of aircraft interception all along the greater part of its vulnerable south and east coast. As for Watson-Watt, there can be no doubting his critical role in the development of radar. His scientific abilities were of a very high order as was his capacity to make sound guesses as to the most fruitful lines of research. Acting with a sense of urgency and prompted by the motto, 'second best tomorrow,' he set time limits to individual research programmes, after which equipment went into production irrespective of its state of development. But although his status as the leading innovator in the inception of radar is incontrovertible — notwithstanding a notable tendency on his part to downgrade the contribution of colleagues — this does not apply to his role in the inauguration of operational research. In his memoirs, Watson-Watt included the statement that 'If I was not the first and true inventor of Operational Research....I was at the very least a first and true inventor with one or two of my early staff at Bawdsey.' 46 He also claimed to have coined the specific name 'operational research' in 1940.47 Whilst it is true that Watson-Watt had overall responsibility for the 'operational researches' carried out by E. C. Williams and G. A. Roberts at Bawdsey, a survey of other personal memoirs, autobiographies and biographies reveals little, if any support for his claims. 48 Williams, for example, identified A. P. Rowe as the first to use the term 'operational research' as a description of the work carried out with Roberts in the period 1937-9, 49 whilst E. G. Bowen, scientific officer at Bawdsey, concluded that 'the real origins are hard to pinpoint given the general commitment to the application of a quantitative and scientific approach to Britain's air defences evident both within and without the Tizard Committee.' 50 At this distance in time it is reasonable to assume that Rowe was the original instigator of operational research, although Bowen's point is well taken that the quantitative evaluation of radar in the context of the Bawdsey experiments was an integrated team effort. As radar became more sophisticated technically and operationally the Stanmore Research Section began to examine the efficiency of 'Identification: Friend or Foe' (IFF) and night interception through the use of 'Air Intercept' (AI) sets installed in aircraft.51 The CSSAD had recognised as early as 1936 that once radar had solved the problem of daylight interception, the enemy would turn to night raids. Inevitably, this would render the task of air interception extremely difficult, insofar as it would be necessary to guide fighters in the black of night to within a few hundred yards of hostile bombers. By the end of 1940 RAF night

The Beginnings of Operational Research 77 fighters were being equipped with airborne radar which enabled them to engage in combat once they had been brought to within AI range by ground control. Operational researchers played a key role in improving AI techniques, presenting Fighter Command staff with detailed evaluations of different techniques of night interception, including the coordination of fighters with searchlights, proportions of interceptions resulting in combats, and combats resulting in kills. Operational researchers also considered the problems of routing friendly aircraft in ways that would ease night interception, as well as the effectiveness of weapons systems and the optimal distribution of personnel to ensure the most rapid repairs. 52 A final refinement to the early warning radar system based upon the Chain Home Stations was the innovation of the 1.5 metre wavelength. The Chain Home Stations operated on a much higher 10 metre wavelength, but from 1938 onwards they were complemented by a second radar system — Chain Home Low — operating on the shorter wavelength geared to altitudes up to 500 feet and thus able to locate low-flying aircraft. Operational researchers were again instrumental in devising procedures for the incorporation of the Chain Home Low Stations within the reporting network. In terms of the development of operational research, the events of May-September, 1940, encompassing the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain are conventionally viewed as marking a turning point, leading ultimately to the diffusion of operational research throughout the greater part of the military command structure. In relation to the German military offensive in north-west Europe, the role of Fighter C o m m a n d ' s operational researchers has been highlighted in the context of the aircover needs of the British Expeditionary Force as measured against the minimum requirements for the air defence of the British home islands. It is well known that in the early phases of the offensive, French requests for additional RAF fighters were viewed by Fighter Command and its Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Dowding, as damaging to its defensive capability. In this setting, considerable attention has been focussed on a meeting of the War Cabinet on 15 May 1940, attended by Dowding and called to consider a range of possible options, including the Prime Minister's evident desire to send additional fighter squadrons to northern France. 53 In preparation for the meeting Dowding, at short notice, had requested that his operational research staff should study the record of aircraft losses on a daily basis in order to calculate the desired replacement rate. In this respect, the objective was to 'show how rapidly the Command's strength was being sapped and how much more rapid

78 Operational Research in War and Peace this would become if its losses were to be doubled while the replacement rates remained constant.' 54 For the purpose of the meeting, Harold Lardner, as section head, had converted the numerical findings of E. C. Williams into a graph. This indicated, in stark terms, that in relation to the minimum home defence requirement of 52 squadrons, Fighter Command had already been reduced to 36, and at the existing rate of attrition in France, the entire force of Hurricane fighters would be dissipated within two weeks. According to some accounts, Dowding used the graph to great effect during the War Cabinet meeting. Finding that he was making little headway in persuading the Prime Minister of the vital necessity to preserve the home defence force, he rose from his chair in order to place Williams' analysis in front of Churchill. In Dowding's recollection 'That did the trick' in persuading the Prime Minister of the futility of his preferred course of action.55 In reality, however, it would appear that Dowding did not address the full War Cabinet. According to A. J. P. Taylor, he made use of the graph in a restricted meeting in advance of the assembly of the full Cabinet.56 Attending the former were the Prime Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair (Secretary of State for Air), Lord Beaverbrook (Minister of Aircraft Production), and Sir Cyril Newall (Chief of the Air Staff). Although he was permitted to remain for the subsequent Cabinet meeting, Dowding did not speak and his views went by default such that orders were given for four more fighter squadrons to be sent to France. On the following day, the Prime Minister flew to Paris and after listening to French pleas for even more RAF fighters, he telephoned London to ask the Cabinet to agree to send six further squadrons. At an evening meeting to consider Churchill's request, the Secretary of State for Air drew attention for the first time to Dowding's quantitative exposition to the restricted meeting on the previous day. The Chief of the Air Staff, moreover, described in graphic detail the complex logistics of sustaining an RAF presence in an increasingly chaotic battle zone. In the Prime Minister's absence, the Cabinet reached a consensus: six further Hurricane squadrons would be deployed in France, but on condition that they returned to English airfields at night. This decision was arrived at in spite of a letter written by Dowding to the Air Ministry as soon as he had been informed of the previous day's Cabinet decision to send four Hurricane squadrons to France. Dowding's view was unequivocal: if the Home Defence Force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the situation in France, defeat in France will involve the final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country.57

The Beginnings of Operational Research 79 In this light the Cabinet compromise is readily understandable: Churchill may have been absent from the meeting on 16 May, but the Cabinet was hardly in a position to deny his request for the six squadrons given that he was in Paris and in direct liaison with senior members of the French government and armed forces. On the other hand, Dowding's bleak warning could not be ignored. In the event, the drain on Fighter Command ended on 19 May, by which time the War Cabinet had come to accept the inevitability of French defeat and hence the pointlessness of offering further air support. 58 In recounting the story of Fighter Command's role in May 1940, the official narrative confirms that the conditional agreement of 17 May was based not on Dowding's 'quantitative' analysis submitted two days earlier, but on his letter directed at the Air Ministry on 16 May. 59 This raises the intriguing question as to the precise role of operational research in informing the deployment of Fighter Command squadrons in the third week of May. It is the gestation and utilisation of Williams' graph which have excited the attention of those who have sought to emphasis the role of operational research in the relevant deliberations. The fact that its impact was less decisive than originally thought can be ascribed to the pressure of immediate events and the manner in which they resonated within the War Cabinet in the absence of a forceful Prime Minister. Whilst the graphical analysis presented by Dowding underlined Fighter Command's primary duty as the air defence of Great Britain, the War Cabinet members would have been less than human if they had failed to be moved by the urgent pleas for help from Paris and the desperate plight of the allied armies in the field. Above all, there was the fact of Churchill's ascendancy as leader of the War Cabinet: he may have been absent at a critical juncture but his political command was firm and sure. In this setting, ministerial subordinates were bound to respond to the Prime Minister's wish to bolster the French war effort. If the precise contribution of operational research to the War Cabinet deliberations of May 1940 is less clear cut than has been supposed, the events recounted above were of great significance for its subsequent development. As the official history of operational research in the RAF concluded in relation to the calculations of Larnder and Williams, Though the mathematics were of the simplest nature and the figures in loss and replacement very crude, this use of the [Operational Research Section] by the Air Officer Commandingin-Chief when considering a point of high-level staff policy forms

80 Operational Research in War and Peace a notable milestone in the progress of the idea of operational research.60 Although the work of Larnder and Williams was vastly less sophisticated than the quantitative analysis applied by Rollo Appleyard to justify the convoy system in the First World War (see above, pp. 36-8), it was the first real hint, in the later conflict, of the wider scope of operational research in informing high-level military tactics and strategy on the part of civilian scientists attached to a military command. It remains to be said that the outcome of the Battle of Britain provided the first practical demonstration of the relevance of operational research to military effectiveness. Before assessing the contribution of operational research to the events of August-September, 1940 it would be instructive to provide a brief description of the radar-based air defence system in operation. Essentially, it was a reporting organisation triggered off by visual representations of attacking formations on cathode-ray tubes located at the Chain Home Stations. At this point, the estimated strength of a formation and its altitude and position were telephoned through to Fighter Command's filter room at Stanmore headquarters. Within the filter room WAAF personnel utilised a 'plotting table' with markers to indicate the changing trajectory of the formation. The key requirement, entailing much skill, was to identify the incoming aircraft as 'friendly,' 'hostile,' or 'doubtful.' This was the nub of the filtering process, whereby the 'filtered' information was passed, simultaneously, to the Command operations room and its Group and Sector counterparts. All operations rooms possessed identical plotting tables and the hoped for result of filtering was the elimination of doubtful locations. The functions of the Duty Group Controller in charge of the group operation room were to identify, with the aid of the plotting table, the Fighter Command sector responsible for interception and to coordinate anti-aircraft fire so that friendly aircraft would not be hit. The final task was to ensure that actual fighter interception took place. Len Deighton's authoritative study of the Battle of Britain provides a succinct description of the relevant procedures: The Sector Controller ordered the squadrons under his command to various states of readiness or 'scrambled' them into the air. As with all the Operations rooms, girl plotters received the plots over their headsets and used croupiers' rakes to move coloured counters on the plotting table. The Controller — or his deputies, often NCOs — spoke with the leader of each of the fighter

The Beginnings of Operational Research 81 formations while they were flying and directed them towards the enemy. They exchanged simple code words intended for brevity and clarity rather than security — 'Angels' meant height, so that 'angels ten' meant ten thousand feet, 'Vector' meant steer, so 'Vector 180' meant head due south. 'Pancake' meant come home and land. A 'bogey' was an unidentified aircraft and a 'bandit' an enemy one. From the fighter pilots, 'Tally-Ho' meant enemy sighted, 'liner' was cruising speed, and a 'buster' meant full throttle.61 It was this system, aided and abetted substantially by Observer Corps posts, which was the ultimate product of the work of the CSSAD. Its crucial importance rested on two factors: first it rendered obsolete the pre-radar interception system based on standing patrols, and even more importantly, it negated the Luftwaffe's superiority in numbers. The official narrative of Fighter Command's operations pointed out that on the basis of the required size of the prewar fighter force, the deteriorating military situation in the summer of 1940 necessitated a minimum defensive force of 120 squadrons. 62 At that time, Dowding possessed half that number, representing a force far smaller than a reasonable security demanded, even allowing for contemporary overestimates of Luftwaffe strength. In this light, the contribution of operational research in designing, testing and refining the radar-based system of air interception cannot be overestimated. The techniques applied throughout the Battle of Britain had been conceived as early as 1936 in the initial Biggin Hill experiments and improved upon in the intervening years by civilian scientists, first at the Bawdsey Research Station and then in the Stanmore Research Section, Fighter Command. The result was that by the opening stages of the Battle of Britain in July 1940, Fighter Command's defensive capabilities were enhanced by 'the most efficient scheme of air defence in the world at the time.' 63 This is not to suggest that the technical quality of the relevant equipment was unduly sophisticated. In the case of Germany, its 'Freya' early warning radar was considerably more advanced than anything in Britain, whilst the 'Wurzburg' was an excellent fire control radar. On the eve of the war, however, the German air defence system was notable for its weak integration, leading to low operational efficiency. Even then, the 'system' was confined largely to the Berlin area where the few available 'Freya' radar sets were concentrated. 64 As Winston Churchill commented retrospectively, in the Anglo-German context the decisive contribution of the Chain Home Stations to the outcome of the Battle of Britain rested on 'the extent to which we had

82 Operational Research in War and Peace turned our discoveries to practical effect, and, woven all into our general air defence system....it was the operational efficiency rather than the novelty of the equipment that was the British achievement.'65 It was left to Sir Charles Goodeve to offer a quantitative assessment of the contribution of radar and operational research to the events of 1940. According to his postwar estimate, radar had been responsible for increasing the probability of fighter interception by a factor of ten: the work of operational researchers had increased the probability by a factor of two. The combined effect, therefore, had been to render Fighter Command twenty times more powerful. In this light Goodeve's conclusion that the contribution of operational research to the air defence of Great Britain 'was out of all proportion to the amount of effort spent on research' seems entirely appropriate. 66

NOTES 1. J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (Harcourt Brace, New York 1920). 2. J. R. P. McKenzie, Weimar Germany, 1918-1933 (Blandford Press, London, 1971), pp. 95-6; Gaines Post, Jr., The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1973), pp. 159-202. 3. B. Collier, A History of Air Power (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1974). See also H. Schliephke, The Birth of the Luftwaffe (Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1971). 4. Paul Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980 (Fontana, London, 1981), p. 279. 5. H. M. Government, Statement on Defence, Cmnd. 5107 (1936). 6. Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy between the Wars (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), pp. 13-43. 7. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1939-1945, Volume 1: Preparation (HMSO, London, 1961), p. 35. 8. Barry D. Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914-1939 (Croom Helm, London, 1976), p. 69. 9. Cited in Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974), p. 81. 10. Cited in Ibid., p. 81. 11. Guilio Douhet, Command of the Air, Translated from the Italian by Dino Ferrari (Faber and Faber, London, 1943); Martin Edmonds and Robert C. Gray (Eds.), Landmarks in Defence Literature (CDISS, Lancaster, 2001), pp. 62-9. 12. R. E. Groves, 'Our Future in the Air: the New Warfare: No First Line Defence,' The Times, 22 March, 1922, pp. 13-14.

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13. Cited in Howard (1974), p. 82. 14. Cited in Ibid., pp. 84-5. 15. John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Air Force in the European War, 193445 (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985), p. 11. 16. Cited in A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965), p. 364. 17. R. Suchenwirth, The Development of the German Air Force 1919-1939 (Arno Press, New York, 1986). See also, R. J. Overy, 'The German Pre-War Aircraft Production Plans/ English Historical Review, Vol. 30 (1975), pp. 778-97. 18. Howard (1974), pp. 112. 19. PRO, CAB 53/24, 'The Potential Air Menace to this Country from Germany: Memorandum for Chiefs of Staff by the Air Staff,' 12 June 1934. 20. Webster and Frankland (1961), pp. 89-91. 21. Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (Cassell, London, 1956), pp. 145-85. See also, Sebastian Ritchie, Industry and Air Power: The Expansion of British Aircraft Production, 1935-41 (Frank Cass, London, 1997), pp. 41-74. 22. Howard (1974), p. 114. 23. Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force (HMSO, London, 1963), p. 3; R. W. Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (Phoenix House, London, 1962), pp. 26-7. 24. W. Peyton Cunningham, Denys Freeman and J. F. McCloskey, 'Of Radar and Operational Research: An Appreciation of A. P. Rowe (1898-1976),' Operations Research, Vol. 32 (1984), pp. 958-67. 25. A. P. Rowe, One Story of Radar (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1948), pp. 4-5. 26. Air Ministry (1963), p. 2. 27. P. M. S. Blackett, Studies of War (Oliver and Boyd, London, 1962), pp. 116-17. 28. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, Baron Blackett of Chelsea, 18 November 1897-13 July 1974/ Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1974), pp. 1-117. 29. E. G. Bowen, Radar Days (Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1987), p. 4. 30. C. P. Snow, Science and Government (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961), p. 28. For a review of alternative air defence proposals considered by the Tizard Committee see David Zimmerman, 'Preparations for War', in Peter Hore (ed.). Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist and Socialist (Frank Cass, London, 2003), pp. 112-25. 31. R. W. Clark, Tizard (Methuen, London, 1965), p. 116. 32. PRO AIR 16/45, 'Note of Conclusions Reached at an Informal Meeting held at the Air Ministry to Discuss Certain Experiments Suggested by Mr Tizard, Chairman for the Scientific Study of Air Defence/ 13 July, 1936.

84 Operational Research in War and Peace 33. T. W. Korner, The Pleasures of Counting (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), pp. 47-9; David Zimmerman, Britain's Shield: Radar and the Defeat of the Luftwaffe (Sutton, Stroud, 2001), pp. 110-17. 34. Air Ministry (1963), p. 6. 35. Harold Lardner, 'The Origins of Operational Research/ in K. B. Haley (ed.), OR '78 (North Holland Publishing Co., 1979), p. 8; Air Ministry (1963), pp. 6-7. 36. Air Ministry (1963), p. 7. 37. J. G. Crowther and R. Whiddington, Science at War (HMSO, London, 1947), p. 92. 38. Rowe (1948), p. 52. 39. Air Ministry (1963), pp. 7-8. 40. H. M. Barkla, Historical Monograph for the Director of Scientific Research, Ministry of Supply: The War Lessons of the Operational Research Section, Fighter Command (IIH/240/14/7, Air Historical Branch, December, 1947). 41. F. L. Sawyer, A. Charlesby, T. E. Easterfield and F. E. Treadwell, 'Reminiscences of Operational Research in World War II by Some of its Practitioners/ journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 40 (1989), p. 117. 42. Earl of Birkenhead, The Prof in Two Worlds (Collier, London, 1968), pp. 84-7. 43. Snow (1961), p. 28. 44. Birkenhead (1968), p. 200. 45. Clark (1965), pp. 129-30. 46. Sir Robert Watson-Watt, Three Steps to Victory (Odhams, London, 1957), p. 200. 47. Ibid., p.203. 48. Joseph F. McCloskey, ' The Beginnings of Operations Research: 1934-1941/ Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), p. 150. 49. E. C. Williams, 'Reflections on Operational Research/ Operations Research, Vol. 2 (1954), pp. 441. 50. Cited in McCloskey (1987), p 150. 51. Air Ministry (1963), p. 10; Zimmerman (2001), pp. 169-70, 180-1, 186-7. 52. PRO AIR 14/1763, 'Summary of the Present Programmes of Operational Research Sections at Bomber, Coastal and Fighter Commands (1941): Note on Current Investigations of Operational Research Section, Fighter Command (1942)'. 53. Taylor (1965), p. 405; R. Wright, Denuding and the Battle of Britain (MacDonald, London, 1969), p. 103; Len Deighton, Tighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain (Triad, Grafton Books, London, 1979), pp. 61-5. 54. Harold Lardner, 'The Origins of Operational Research/ Operations Research, Vol. 32 (1984), pp. 45-75.

The Beginnings of Operational Research

85

55. Cited in Ibid., p. 51. 56. Cited in Deighton (1979), p. 62. 57. PRO AIR 41/14, Letter from Sir Hugh Dowding to Under-Secretary of State, 16 May 1940. 58. Terraine (1985), p. 158. 59. PRO AIR 41/14, Tlie Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume 1: The Growth of Fighter Command, July 1936-June 1940 (1944), pp. 143-4. 60. Air Ministry (1963), p. 24. 61. Deighton, (1979), p. 125. See also R. W. Burns (ed.), Radar Development to 1945 (Macmillan, London, 1988); G. Hartley, The Challenge of War: Scientific and Engineering Contributions to World War Two (David and Charles, Newton Abbot, 1970); O. Blumstritt, H. Petzold and W. Aspray (eds.), Tracking the History of Radar (Piscataway, New Jersey, 1994; and Guy Hartcup, The Effect of Science on the Second World War (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 18-38. 62. PRO AIR 41/15, The Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume 1, The Battle of Britain (1944), pp. 564-5. 63. Ibid., p. 569. 64. Walter Kaiser, 'A Case Study in the Relationship of History and Technology and of General History: British Radar Technology and Neville Chamberlain's Appeasement Policy,' Journal of the International Committee for the History of Technology, Vol. 2 (1996), p. 38. 65. Cited in A. Beyerchen, 'On Strategic Goals as Perceptual Filters: Internal Responses to the Potential of Radar in Germany, the UK and the US,' in Blumstrittt et al (1994), p. 271. Emphasis added. 66. Sir Charles Goodeve, 'Operational Research/ Nature, 164 (1948), pp. 377-84. See also Zimmerman (2001), pp. 226-8.

4

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research, 1940-1945

The role of civilian scientists in informing military tactics and strategy is exemplified in the work of the Tizard Committee on air defence. It was, perhaps, the very secrecy of the Committee's deliberations, together with an increased appreciation of the mounting technological complexity of warfare, which helps to explain why the British scientific community in the later 1930s began to assert the need for the direct involvement of scientists and professional engineers in military defence planning in general. One of the earliest promptings came from Captain Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, military correspondent of The Times and an ardent advocate of mechanised warfare. In 1937 he approached the Secretary of State for War in order to press the case for the creation of 'a [military] staff organisation devoted to research' in which 'the best intellects in the army' would be supplemented by 'first-rate university men who have been trained in the process of scientific enquiry.' 1 There is no evidence to suggest that Liddell-Hart's proposal was taken forward, but a further initiative launched by a young and ambitious university chemist at University College London (UCL) fell on more fertile ground. The contribution of Charles F. Goodeve to the diffusion and practice of operational research after 1945 is highlighted in chapters 6-8. In 1938, Goodeve was 34 years old, Reader in Chemistry at UCL, and within two years of his election as a Fellow of the Royal Society. An expert on the physical chemistry of vision, he was especially interested in the industrial applications of his research. 2 Equally significant was Goodeve's experience as a volunteer reserve naval officer: as a Canadian national he had attended the University of Manitoba and in his final year had joined the Royal Canadian NVR. After his arrival in London in 1927 to join UCL's chemistry department, Goodeve had entered the RNVR and thereafter 'went to sea in submarines and minesweepers, and served in

86

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 87 four battleships and three destroyers.' 3 By 1938, he held the rank of Lieutenant Commander, RNVR, and was already combining his academic and service roles in the form of research projects funded by the Admiralty. Although he failed to convince the Admiralty of the need to enlist specialist scientists and engineers in the RNVR, Goodeve did achieve a modicum of success in encouraging the Royal Society to take up the issue of official recruitment of scientists for any putative war effort. In 1938 he wrote jointly with an academic colleague, G. T. R. Hill, to Professors A. V. Hill and A. C. Egerton, Biological and Physical Secretaries of the Royal Society respectively, suggesting the creation of a 'Peacetime Organisation for Voluntary Training of Scientific Workers in the Event of a National Emergency.' The immediate result of this initiative was the establishment, with government backing, of a Central Registry of civilians with administrative, scientific and engineering qualifications. After coping with 'a surge of amiable muddlers who believed themselves equipped to deal with great enterprises,' the compilers of the register soon focussed their attention on the universities. 4 By October 1939 the register contained 7,000 names, including up to 90 per cent of all qualified scientists and engineers, the majority of whom were already employed on radar, or radar-related projects.5 Thus, in July 1940, in view of an emergent shortage of personnel in the general area of telecommunications, all qualified engineers, physicists, chemists and quantity surveyors were required to put their names on the register.6 It was the apparent success of this exercise which helps to explain why the efforts of the Royal Society to ensure the provision of scientific advice on military affairs at the highest levels of government were initially frustrated. In July 1939 the then President of the Royal Society, Sir William Bragg, proposed to Lord Chatfield, Minister for the Coordination of Defence, that senior members of the Society should be empowered to advise the CID on 'any opinion, suggestion or scientific result which might appear to be important to the purpose of the Committee.' This approach was followed in September 1939 by Bragg's suggestion that the two secretaries of the Society (Professors Hill and Egerton) should be attached to the War Cabinet to advise on 'the best distribution of national scientific effort.'7 Bragg's efforts eventually bore fruit in September 1940, albeit in emasculated form, when the government agreed that a member of the War Cabinet should preside over a committee representative of the leading scientific societies. This was approved by the Prime Minister on the understanding that the committee would not be informed of the existence, let alone the

88 Operational Research in War and Peace progress of highly sensitive scientific research projects. In the meantime, the scientific advice available to the government was delivered on an adhoc basis with minimal coordination and assessment. Even in the case of the Central Register, it would appear that 'cut-throat competition' for the available personnel was the order of the day in Whitehall. 8 An early and public outburst against the government's apparent inability to ensure the effective deployment of civilian scientists and engineers took the form of a 'Penguin Special' entitled Science in War, published in the summer of 1940 after the fall of France, but in advance of the Battle of Britain.9 The significance of this book in the present context is that among its 25 anonymous authors were individuals such as Professors Solly Zuckerman, J. D. Bernal, C. H. Waddington and Patrick Blackett who were to fulfil critical roles in the development of operational research in wartime. Emanating from the deliberations of the 'Tots and Quots' (quot homines, tot sententiae — literally, 'as many opinions as people'), a small dining club formed by Zuckerman as early as 1930 to discuss the 'social responsibility' of science, Science in War was written and delivered to the publisher, Allen Lane, within eleven days. 10 The book's mission statement proclaimed that 'A large proportion of the scientific brains in this country are not being used at all and, due to defects of organisation, most of those that are being used are not working at anything like their possible efficiency.' Thereafter, the authors lamented the domination of British public life by graduates with academic backgrounds confined to the classics and humanities, and pleaded for the rapid diffusion of 'scientific management' in industry. More to the point, Science in War stated that the effective mobilisation of scientists entailed far more than the consultancy role currently assigned to them: the scientific method shpuld be applied to the analysis of military tactics and strategy as well as to the administration of the war economy. More specifically, The use of weapons and the organisation of men who handle them are at least as much scientific problems as is their production. The waging of warfare represents a series of human operations carried out for more or less definite ends. Seeing whether these operations naturally yield the results expected from them should be a matter of direct scientific analysis. The ultimate answer is provided by victory or defeat, but failure to understand the factors contributing to that victory or defeat and the degree to which each contributes, removes any secure ground for organising further success.11

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 89 What this meant in practice, therefore, was that scientists should participate directly in the formulation and implementation of policy.12 Science in War sold 20,000 copies before the end of 1940, but there is an excellent case for claiming that it was 'pushing at a door which was already half open' in relation to the central direction of the war effort.13 The fact remains that the Tizard Committee had already provided a striking demonstration of the direct contribution of civilian scientists to military effectiveness. In the guise of operational research, the application of the 'scientific method' to the innovation and development of radar had reached a high degree of sophistication in this particular sphere, and even as Science in War was receiving favourable notices in the national press, its recommendations were being validated by the conduct and outcome of the Battle of Britain. It was entirely appropriate, therefore, that the concerns expressed in Science in War should be addressed most explicitly by the early advocates of operational research. In this respect, the contribution of Patrick Blackett was uniquely outstanding in that it is legitimate to view him as the catalyst for the diffusion of operational research beyond Fighter Command to embrace virtually all of the major military commands by 1945. A further indication of the desire to bring a scientific perspective to bear on the conduct of the war was reflected in Winston Churchill's appointment of his friend, F. A. Lindemann, as his personal scientific and statistical adviser when he joined the government as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1939. After assuming the premiership in 1940, it was natural that Churchill should bring Lindemann with him, although the influence exerted by the latter, for good or ill, was and remains the subject of controversy, especially in the light of ongoing rivalries and antagonisms emanating from Lindemann's temporary involvement in the work of the Tizard Committee (see above, pp. 74-6). In 1941, Lindemann was raised to the peerage as Lord Cherwell and in the following year he entered the War Cabinet as Paymaster-General thereby enabling him to enjoy 'power greater than that exercised by any scientist in history.' 14 Even before embarking on his ministerial career, Lindemann's close relationship with Churchill had resulted in the marginalisation of Tizard and A. V. Hill, the very individuals who, in the light of their role in the development of radar, might have been expected to wield considerable influence in the delivery of high-level scientific advice. Tizard was undoubtedly the chief sufferer: shortly before the outbreak of war his air defence committee was amalgamated with the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Offence which had been formed under his

90 Operational Research in War and Peace chairmanship in 1936. However, the new Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Warfare (CSSAW) did not survive beyond the summer of 1940. Although Blackett subsequently claimed that it 'died a natural death, since an advisory committee of part-time members was not useful under fully mobilised war conditions,' 15 other commentators have argued that the hand of Lindemann could be detected in the winding down of the CSSAW's business. 16 But given the scientific eminence of Tizard and Hill, they could hardly be declared totally redundant in the context of wartime scientific policy. Thus, in May 1940, Hill was despatched to the British Embassy in Washington as scientific adviser to the Air Attache, whilst Tizard was appointed head of a scientific delegation to the USA in September 1940. The resulting 'Tizard Mission' was Tizard's own brainchild, the product of his desire to bring American scientists into the war 'before their government.' Facilitated by Hill and the British ambassador, Lord Lothian, the purpose of the mission was to engage in an interchange of highly sensitive scientific information, some of which in the British case was the product of operational research. Thus, the mission's famous 'Black Box' contained design blueprints and reports on asdic (sonar), atomic energy, the variable time fuse, the sonabuoy and anti-aircraft gunlaying. The most important item by far was the 9.1 cm resonant cavity magnetron which vastly improved the power and range of radar. The product of a research programme at the University of Birmingham, the magnetron precipitated the formation of the Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology which, in turn, produced outstanding innovations in centimetric radar. According to Vannevar Bush, Director of the US Office of Scientific Research and Development, the contents of the Black Box' represented 'the most valuable cargo ever brought to our shores' rendering it 'the single most important element in reverse lease lend.' 17 It has also been suggested that the composition of the mission — the combination of civilian scientists with serving military officers — was noted by the hosts and was one factor in persuading the US armed forces to form operational research sections within weeks of the bombing of Pearl Harbour. 18 On his return to England, Tizard worked for the Ministry of Aircraft Production and subsequently joined the Air Council in the middle of 1941. His role at this time became increasingly ambiguous in view of Lindemann's ascendancy in Whitehall. In a retrospective comment on this period Patrick Blackett highlighted Tizard's frustrations: In spite of his [Tizard's] wide knowledge of the government machine, he seems to have been genuinely disappointed that the

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 91 Air Council rarely discussed strategy or tactics, but often minor administrative matters: he related that at one meeting of the Air Council the main business was the inspection of an exhibition of different designs of WAAF underwear! A deeper difficulty underlay the frustrations of this period. For it was not at all easy for a Service Ministry to incorporate a man as senior as Tizard in its taut, war-time machine. On one hand he was too senior to do his own devilling among the files at the lower levels of the machine, where much of the real work of a department is done — to be sure he was too important to have been very good at this — and on the other hand, he had too much self respect to acquire influence by becoming a courtier. Tizard evidently felt that he was not wanted in Whitehall and so he accepted the presidency of Magdalen College, Oxford, where he remained, apart from some Government advisory work and several important visits abroad, until after the end of the war.19 To his sympathetic biographer, Tizard's treatment as Britain's 'most competent defence scientist' was 'shabby' and was accepted as such by his protagonists in the House of Commons. 20 Moreover, it is to Blackett's credit that in his postwar recollections he made no reference to Lindemann's machinations against Tizard. Before his return to academia in the summer of 1943, Tizard was to have one last confrontation with Lindemann on the strategic merits of area bombing (see below, pp. 139-40). In the meantime, the career of Patrick Blackett was in the ascendant, the result, in part, of his original membership of the Tizard Committee and a demonstrated ability to apply the scientific method to a wide range of military problems. Like Tizard, Blackett was also destined to clash with Lindemann on bombing policy, but not before he had established a formidable reputation as the foremost practitioner of operational research in the British military command structure. In 1939 Blackett was appointed Principal Scientific Officer at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) with a remit to investigate the activities of all departments. On his own initiative he embarked upon a study of bomb-sights, motivated, perhaps, by his early experiences as a gunnery officer a '.d engagement with RAF personnel in the development of radar. 21 It is generally agreed that Blackett was the catalyst for the Mk-14 bomb-sight which remained in service with the RAF until 1965. He also designed the low-level Mk II bomb-sight around existing components and worked with E. C. Williams on the magnetic field detection of submarines. The defining moment in Blackett's wartime career, however, took place on 9 August 1940 when A. V. Hill introduced

92 Operational Research in War and Peace him to General Sir Frederick Pile, Commander-in-Chief of Ack-Ack Command. As noted already, Hill had investigated anti-aircraft gunnery problems during the First World War (see above, pp. 34-5), and given Pile's sensitivity to his Command's limitations in terms of military effectiveness, it was natural for the latter to take note of Hill's warm endorsement of Blackett's capabilities, all the more so since Ack-Ack Command was under the operational control of Fighter Command. Recognising that Blackett possessed 'the quick intuition of a freshman.' 22 Pile appointed him as his Scientific Adviser at Ack-Ack Command Headquarters, Stanmore. Blackett remained with Pile for only seven months, until March 1941. During that time, however, he made an enduring impression on the Command as a result of his expertise in operational research and an outstanding ability to achieve practical results. At the time of the Battle of Britain, Ack-Ack Command was equipped with G. L. Mk I gun-laying radar sets. These were capable of determining the bearing and slant range of attacking aircraft but could not give their elevation. The latter was provided by sound-locating apparatus with the result that the aiming of guns was cumbersome and ineffectual to the extent that ack-ack crews could engage in Tittle more than a gesture of fist-shaking.' 23 Even when the Ground Controlled Interception apparatus was modified to provide the elevation of aircraft, the results were less than satisfactory in terms of accuracy of fire: the equipment was complicated to use and the radar gun-layers in particular were proving highly sensitive to their local environment. As Blackett commented, Immense scientific and technical brilliance had gone into the rapid design and manufacture of the [gun-laying radar] sets; likewise at a more leisurely pace into the construction of the guns and predictors. Understandably, but unfortunately, partly through shortage of scientific and technical personnel but also through a certain lack of imaginative insight into operational realities, hardly any detailed attention had been paid to how actually to use the [radar] data to direct the guns until the Battle of Britain was in progress. Thus the first months of the AA battle against the night bomber were fought with highly developed radar sets and guns, but with the crudest and most improvised links between them.24 A further cause for concern was that ack-ack gunners were encountering insurmountable difficulties in predicting the trajectory of enemy aircraft given that shells had to explode at a point determined by the estimated speed of the aircraft at the time of their exit from the gun

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 93 barrel. However, the mechanical predictors in use had been designed to use accurate visual observations rather than the imperfect data generated by the crude early metric wavelength radar sets. The problem was eventually overcome in 1944 by combining the more sophisticated 10 cm radar with an electronic predictor. In the pressing circumstances of 1940, however, Blackett could only devote his efforts to improving the operation of the existing equipment. His first step was borrowed directly from his experience on the Tizard Committee in that he assembled a team of scientists with specialist radar knowledge to study the performance of the gun-laying equipment in the field. It was an eclectic group composed of physiologists, mathematical, astro and general physicists, two pure mathematicians, a surveyor, and an army officer. Collectively known as 'Blackett's Circus' they began by working out the best method of plotting the [radar] data and of predicting the future enemy position for the use of the guns on the basis only of pencil and paper, range and fuse tables. The second task was to assist in the design of simple forms of plotting machines which would be manufactured in a few weeks. The third stage was to find means of bringing the existing predictors into use in connection with radar sets. This was found to be possible if, by intensive training of predictor crews, the inaccurate radar data could be smoothed manually. A special school was set up by AA Command to work out the methods of doing this and to give the necessary training. The fourth stage was to attempt to modify the predictors to make them handle the rough [radar] data more effectively. This proved possible with the Sperry predictor leading to what was known as the amputated Sperry which played a useful though limited role as an alternative to the use of plotting methods.25 Whilst the efficient deployment of batteries equipped with radar presented significant problems in defending London against the night bomber, the operational effectiveness of Ack-Ack Command was further compromised by the remaining 50 per cent of batteries devoid of radar assistance. In this respect the 'Circus' considered whether the 120 guns in question would be better organised in conformity with existing practice in 30 four-gun batteries or in 5 eight-gun batteries, bearing in mind that the latter would facilitate radar cover for all metropolitan ack-ack units. The resulting calculations demonstrated clearly the advantages of radar assistance, leading to the formation of more eight-gun batteries. In the

94 Operational Research in War and Peace event, however, the increasing availability of radar sets pre-empted the need for full redeployment. 26 The critical indicator of Blackett's effectiveness at Ack-Ack Command was the declining number of shells required to destroy enemy aircraft as the efforts of the 'Circus' gradually bore fruit. At the outset of the London Blitz the 'rounds per bird' amounted to 20,000 shells expended for each aircraft shot down. By the summer of 1941 the number had fallen progressively to 4,000 as a result of the operational researches of the 'Circus' in improving the accuracy of radar-based gun-laying. Coincidentally, the ' C i r c u s ' succeeded in resolving a p u z z l i n g phenomenon revealed by statistical investigation. This concerned the considerable disparity in the rounds per bird achieved by coastal and inland ack-ack batteries, with the former appearing to be twice as accurate as the latter. In Blackett's own words, All sorts of....hypotheses were considered as explanations of this strange result. Were the coastal batteries better sited, or did radar work better over the sea? Perhaps the enemy aircraft flew lower and straighter than over the land. Then suddenly the true explanation flashed to mind. Over the land a battery, say, in the Birmingham area, which claimed an enemy aircraft destroyed, would have this claim checked by the search for and identification of the crashed machine. If no machine was found, the claim was disallowed. But, in general, no such check could be made of the claims of the coastal batteries, since an aircraft coming down at sea would not be traceable. The explanation of the apparent better shooting of the coastal batteries turned out to be due, therefore, to an overestimate of the coastal batteries (as by almost all other batteries!) of their claims of enemy aircraft destroyed by a factor of two.27 On Blackett's departure from Ack-Ack Command in March 1941 to join Coastal Command, Pile complained to A. V. Hill that 'They have stolen my magician,' a comment indicative of Pile's heartfelt admiration for Blackett's achievements. 28 The 'Circus,' led by C. E. Bayliss, remained intact for a short period before being absorbed into an Air Defence Research Group under the direction of J. A. Ratcliffe, an expert in the training of radar technicians. On his transfer to the Telecommunications Research Establishment, Ratcliffe was replaced by the South African physicist, Colonel (later Brigadier) B. F. J. Schonland, who was principally responsible for expanding the organisation into an operational research facility for the army in general. The work of the Army Operational

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 95 Research Group is analysed in the latter part of this chapter (see below, pp. 117-24). The occasion for Blackett's transfer to Coastal Command as Scientific Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, and as head of the Command's operational research group, was the mounting threat to Britain's merchant shipping supply lines across the North Atlantic as a result of enemy U-boat action. As Table 4.1 reveals, until the dramatic change in their fortunes during 1943, the growing U-boat fleet experienced substantial success in terms of ship sinking rates and the loss rate for the U-boats themselves. All of this was reminiscent of experience during the First World War: as in the earlier conflict, the U-boat menace held out the prospect of a British capitulation as a result of the disruption of vitally important military and civilian supply lines. The problem was compounded by wholly inadequate anti-submarine warfare (ASW) defences on the part of the Royal Navy and RAF Coastal Command, and also by the boost to the U-boat's fortunes from January 1942 as a result of minimal protection for merchant vessels on the eastern seaboard of the USA. For the first few months of 1942 American inshore merchant ships continued to sail independently against the backdrop of a brightly-lit shoreline and at a time when the US Army Air Force possessed only nine short-range bombers for ASW work. 29 In these circumstances, the ship sinking rate soared whilst the U-boat loss rate reached an all-time low. Taking the whole of the North Atlantic theatre into account, A. P. Rowe commented of this period we did not know what was happening in the battle against the submarines largely because there was nothing at Coastal Command corresponding to the operational research section at Fighter Command. We wanted to know the hours flown per submarine sighting by day and by night, the average range of radar locations and the results of attacks on submarines. I therefore went to Air Marshall Sir William Freeman, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, who was ever ready to listen, and argued that P. M. S. Blackett should be asked to form an Operational Research Section at Coastal Command. This was arranged within a few days.30 The group of scientists assembled by Blackett was as eclectic as his ack-ack 'Circus.' Among the initial recruits were three physicists, three c o m m u n i c a t i o n s experts, four m a t h e m a t i c i a n s , t w o C a n a d i a n astronomers, and several physiologists and biologists. 31 Until the end of the war the maximum size of the group was no more than 25 with an average membership of 16. These were modest numbers for the task in

96

Operational Research in War and Peace T a b l e 4.1.

Sep-Dec 1939 Jan-Dec 1940 Jan-Jun 1941 Jul-Dec 1941 Jan-Jun 1942 Jul-Dec 1942 Jan-Jun 1943 Jul-Dec 1943 Jan-Jun 1944 Jul-Dec 1944 Jan-Apr 1945

U-boat effectiveness during the S e c o n d W o r l d War. Ship Sinking Rate (grt* per U-Boat day at sea)

U-Boat Loss Rate (% of U-Boats at sea per month)

Approximate Exchange Rate (ships per U-Boat)

276 550 484 119 284 170 78 39 27 34 41

16 13 11 8 4 9 15 25 24 19 33

10 23 24 8 40 11 3 0.9 0.6 1 0.7

Source: P. M. Sutcliffe, 'The End of the Battle of the Atlantic (German U-Operations, 1943-1944)/ Journal of Naval Studies, Vol. 18 (1996), p. 118. *gross tonnage

h a n d , b u t shortage of staff w a s m o r e t h a n c o m p e n s a t e d for b y the high calibre of the scientists in question. T a k i n g the w h o l e of the w a r t i m e p e r i o d from its inception, Coastal C o m m a n d ' s O p e r a t i o n a l Research Section (ORS) included t w o N o b e l Prize w i n n e r s , five Fellows of the Royal Society a n d a Fellow of the N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y of Sciences of Australia. O t h e r s w e r e to achieve professorial rank in British universities a n d their average age w a s well u n d e r 40. By this time, Blackett himself h a d ' a fairly clear idea' as to h o w a n ORS s h o u l d be organised. His major requirement, fully reflecting his experiences at Ack-Ack C o m m a n d , was that The operational research group must be an integral part of the Commander-in-Chief's staff and all the reports or recom­ mendations must be to the Commander-in-Chief and not to the Air Ministry direct. The importance of this lies in the fact that a considerable part of the work of an operational research group at a command must inevitably involve criticisms of the work of the Command coupled with suggestions for improvement. For any part of the Command's work in which no improvement seems possible, it is not likely to be the subject of a report by the group.

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING IN CHIEF

Scientific Adviser to C-in-C

Air Staff

Administrative Staff

Senior Air Staff Officer S.A.S.O.

Air Officer Administration A.O.A.

D.S.A.S.O.

D.A.O.A »-*

Intelligence

Operations Anti-U-Boat

Operational General

Training

Operational Requirements

Organisation

1

I

Personnel

a 5' 3 o

-O.R.S.—1

O •a Specialist Branches -l

Signals and Radar

Navigation

1—

Armament

Photo

-1

etc.

Engineering

Equipment

s» 5' a SL. CO

Figure 4.1

The Structure of Coastal Command Headquarters showing the Administrative Position of the Operational Research

Section Source: C. H. Waddington, O. R. in World War 2 (Elek Science, London, 1973), Table 1.1, p. 13.

n> ^ n =r \o

98 Operational Research in War and Peace When, however, the group find, say, that some tactics in use are faulty and could be improved, their report would necessarily have a critical character. If these reports were sent (as at one time was the suggestion) direct to the Air Ministry, then the Staffs at C o m m a n d w o u l d rightly feel aggrieved and the intimate collaboration between operational service staffs and operational research workers, would become impossible. If, however, the report went to the Commander-in-Chief, and if the recom mendations were adopted successfully, the Air Ministry would hear of it as a successful achievement of the Command itself.32 M u t u a l t r u s t a n d confidence b e t w e e n civilian scientists a n d service personnel h a d b e e n the hallmark of the operational researches c o n d u c t e d o n behalf of F i g h t e r C o m m a n d after 1936. I n c o n t r a s t to F i g h t e r C o m m a n d ' s reactive a n d defensive role, h o w e v e r , the offensive r e m i t of Coastal C o m m a n d offered far g r e a t e r s c o p e for t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of o p e r a t i o n a l research. 3 3 The anti-U-boat w a r , c o n v o y p r o t e c t i o n , a n d attacks o n e n e m y s h i p p i n g lasted for t h e w h o l e w a r w i t h v a r y i n g levels of intensity. Coastal C o m m a n d ' s activities, moreover, w e r e vastly m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n those of Fighter C o m m a n d . A s M c C l o s k e y h a s pointed out, Each [Coastal C o m m a n d ] operation involved problems in navigation, search, identification, bombing accuracy, verification of results and, not least, given Britain's weather, return to base. Whether flights were search patterns over the Bay of Biscay, or convoy missions over the North Atlantic, Coastal Command planes had to know position in a way not applicable to Fighter Command; for the task they were fitted with airborne radar aids as soon as these could be made available — and the Operational Research Section, Coastal Command, was charged with making these aids fully operational. The fulcrum of Coastal C o m m a n d ' s efforts — a n d hence that of the ORS — w a s , of course, the anti-U-boat w a r in the N o r t h Atlantic. T h e ' f u n d a m e n t a l scientific b a c k g r o u n d to the w h o l e c a m p a i g n ' w a s b a s e d o n the U-boats' r e q u i r e m e n t to surface, bearing in m i n d that [the standard] 550 ton U-boat had an overall endurance on the surface ranging from 14,000 miles at 6 knots to 2,800 miles at 17 knots; but the underwater endurance on one charge of the batteries was only about 14 miles at 8 knots, 28 miles at 6 knots, 65 miles at 4 knots. It was, therefore, essential for the batteries to be charged

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 99 at frequent intervals and until 1944 [when the Schnorkel tube was introduced] this implied repeated surfacing at short intervals.35 In practical terms, therefore, surface recharging rendered the U-boats vulnerable to aerial detection and attack. The construction of U-boat pens on the French Atlantic coast opened up new possibilities for Coastal Command insofar as U-boats traversing the Bay of Biscay en route for the open Atlantic were obliged to spend part of their voyage on the surface. In attacking merchant shipping, moreover, even the lowest convoy speed of 7 knots was sufficiently fast to oblige U-boats intent on shadowing a convoy to spend a considerable portion of time on the surface. Thus, Coastal Command had two critical opportunities to engage with the U-boats, in the first instance via their traffic routes, and secondly, in and around the convoys themselves. In appraising the effectiveness of Coastal Command's ORS, the historian is confronted by proliferating research programmes as the antiU-boat war ebbed and flowed in terms of tactical responses on both sides. In overall terms, however, there were a number of common themes which can be grouped under the following headings: (a) enhanced search capability of individual aircraft and/or reduced U-boat visual observation. (b) enhanced bombing accuracy (including optimal depth charge settings). (c) improved aircraft range and availability. As far as search capability is concerned, Blackett recalled a night in April 1941 spent in the operations room of the Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches, in Liverpool. A large wall map was displayed indicating the predicted positions of U-boats in the Atlantic: From the recorded number of hours flown by Coastal Command aircraft over the relevant area, I calculated in a few lines of arithmetic on the back of an envelope the number of U-boats which should have been sighted by the aircraft. The number came to about four times the actual sightings. This discrepancy could be explained either by assuming the U-boats cruised submerged or by assuming that they cruised on the surface and in about four cases out of five saw the aircraft and dived before being seen by the aircraft.36 A further insight into the problem was gained from an analysis of the reported sightings of U-boats up to May 1941. This indicated that in

100 Operational Research in War and Peace nearly 40 per cent of sightings the U-boat was diving at the time of sighting, whilst in a further 20 per cent the U-boat was submerged at periscope depth. 37 The clear implication was that 60 per cent of all U-boats sighted had spotted the aircraft in advance of its attack. What about unsighted U-boats? The analysis of this problem is illustrated in Fig. 4.2 which shows frequencies for various states of submergence plotted as a histogram on the right and continued (for lack of observations) as a smooth normal (or bell shaped) curve to the left. This really assumes that the aircraft is as likely to see the U-boat a few minutes before the U-boat sees the aircraft as the other way round. The times along the horizontal axis are gaps between the moment when the aircraft sights the U-boat and the moment when the U-boat sights the aircraft. The limits are set at six minutes, for this is the time corresponding to the maximum distance at which U-boats can be spotted from aircraft. On the extreme right of the figure, the aircraft sees the U-boat well before the U-boat sees the aircraft and an attack takes place with the U-boat on the surface. Near the centre of the figure the two protagonists see each other at much the same time and the attack takes place with the U-boat submerged for some minutes. On the left and the extreme left of the figure, the U-boat sees the aircraft first, begins to submerge and wholly escapes detection. The hatched area represents the fraction of U-boats in

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

1

2

3

*

5

6

minutes

ALL VISIBILITIES. DATA UP TO MAY 1941. PER CENT U-BOATS LOST BY DIVING 67%

Figure 4.2 Frequency Plotted against Time Interval: Data up to May 1941. Source: C. H. Waddington, O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the U-Boat (Elek Science, London, 1973), Fig. 6.1, p. 152.

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 101 the observation path of the aircraft but not observed and demonstrates that u p to two-thirds of all U-boats escaped detection. The key problem for resolution, therefore, was how to raise the number of U-boat sightings. As Blackett recalled, All the obvious courses of action were considered and recommended where necessary [by the ORS] — better lookout drill for the aircrews, better binoculars etc. Then the best direction of aircraft course in relation to the sun was considered. If the aircraft flew down the sun, the U-boat crew might have more difficulty in seeing it. Discussing these questions one day in Coastal Command, a Wing Commander said casually: 'What colour are Coastal Command aircraft?' Of course I knew that they were mainly black as they were mainly night bombers such as Whitleys. But before the question was asked me, I had missed the significance of the fact. Night bombers are painted black so as to reflect as little light as possible from enemy searchlights. When there is no artificial illumination by searchlights an aircraft of any colour flying at moderate or low height, both by day and by night, is normally seen at a great distance as a dark object against a lighter sky and only seldom as a light object against a darker sky.38 In the generally overcast weather conditions of the North Atlantic, therefore, the ideal colour for Coastal Command aircraft was white, a fact confirmed by model and full-scale tests. These demonstrated that white aircraft were, on average, sighted at 20 per cent less distance than black aircraft indicating that the former were likely to engage with surfaced U-boats on 30 per cent more occasions than the latter, thereby facilitating 30 per cent more U-boat sinkings for the same number of sightings. 39 Following the repainting of all Coastal Command aircraft white the sinking rate began to climb significantly. It was not possible, however, to calculate statistically the direct contribution of the new marking since other work being conducted by the ORS was simultaneously producing improvements in the rate of sightings. These included the analysis of optimal flying heights and the most effective use of binoculars. In overall terms, by the middle of 1943 The number of escaping U-boats had fallen from some 66% to a figure that rose from 10% at low visibilities to 35% at high visibilities. This very satisfactory result was probably due to

102 Operational Research in War and Peace improvements in aircraft look-outs and to the effectiveness of [repainting], though a deterioration in the standard of U-boat watch may also have played a part.40 As sighting efficiency improved, so too did the lethality of attacks. In this respect, the ORS could lay claim to significant achievements, some of which rested on investigations which have been widely acknowledged as classic operational research studies. Nowhere was this more true than in the study of depth charge settings carried out by Professor E. J. Williams, FRS, a scientist well known for his work on the quantum theory of atomic collisions. In the spring of 1941 Williams had been attached to the Instrument Department of the Royal Aircraft Establishment in order to investigate the possibility of equipping depth charges with proximity fuses so that explosions would take place adjacent to a U-boat at any depth. This was presumed to hold out the prospect of a higher kill rate than could be obtained from the conventional depth charge calculated to explode at a pre-determined depth. Later in 1941, whilst still pondering the merits of the proximity fuse, Williams joined Coastal Command's ORS and immediately began to analyse all aspects of air attacks on U-boats with a view to estimating their depth at the moment of attack. The existing practice in Coastal Command was to assume that a U-boat would spot an incoming aircraft at approximately two minutes before the attack commenced and that within this time it would dive to 100 feet. Thus, depth charges were set to explode accordingly. Blackett provides an excellent summary of Williams' reaction, based on his air attack analysis: [He] spotted a fallacy in the argument leading to the 100-foot depth setting. It might be true that on the average a U-boat might sight the aircraft a long way off and so manage to get to the 100 feet before the attack. However, just in those cases the U-boat had disappeared out of sight of the aircraft for so long that the air crew could not know when to drop the depth charges, so that the effective accuracy in plan of the attack was low. Williams drew attention to the few cases when the U-boat failed to see the aircraft in time and so was on the surface when attacked. In these cases the bombing accuracy in plan was high, as the U-boat was visible at the time of attack. However, Williams pointed out that in just those cases the explosion of the depth charges at 100 feet would fail to damage seriously the U-boat as the radius of lethal damage was only about 20 feet. Thus the existing method of attack failed to sink deep U-boats owing to low bombing accuracy and failed to sink shallow boats due to the depth setting.41

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 103

The official history of the application of operational research to the anti-U-boat war records that the transition to a shallower depth setting took place in stages so that the 25 feet setting was not in general service until the summer of 1942. In the meantime, as Table 4.2 reveals, the lethality of attack mounted steadily. Whilst the rise in lethality can be attributed in part to the introduction of torpex as a more effective explosive material, and an increase in bomb loads as heavier aircraft became available, it is evident that the shallower depth setting made a substantial contribution to the observed improvements. In the words of the official history, Thus far in the period July 1941 to December 1942 there were 209 attacks against visible and partly visible U-boats which scored 11% sunk and 15% damaged, while the 309 attacks against definitely submerged U-boats scored only 2% sunk and about 9% damaged. Again, when the attacks were classified as 'shallow setting' (about 30 feet) and 'not shallow setting' (about 60-100 feet), the former scored 7% sunk and 11% damaged, the latter less than 1% sunk and about 14% damaged.42 As Blackett observed, 'There can be few cases where such a great operational gain had been obtained by such a small and simple change of tactics.' 43 Certainly, captured U-boat crews assumed that Coastal Command had begun to make use of depth charges containing a vastly more effective explosive.

Table 4.2.

Progress of lethality of attacks.

Period

Total No. of attacks on U-boats

Sunk (%)

Seriously damaged (%)

Sept. 1939-June 1941 July 1941-Dec. 1941 Jan. 1942-June 1942 July 1942-Dec. 1942

215 127 79 346

1 2 4 7

4 13 19 9

Source: Waddington (1973), Table 7.2, p. 177.

104 Operational Research in War and Peace The essential complement to the heightened lethality of depth charges was the drive to increase bombing accuracy. Paradoxically, in trial conditions accuracy was achieved far more often than in operational conditions. In taking the investigation further, Coastal Command's operational researchers embarked on a study of aerial photography of bombing runs informed by aircraft type and trajectories of attack. The results of the first sixteen attacks to be analysed are indicated in Fig. 4.3. The arrows give the direction of attack with the centre points indicating the concentration of depth charges dropped. Since the outer ring has a radius of 300 feet, the diagram confirms the general problem of inaccuracy. However, when the ORS calculated that the distribution of the mid-points of the depth charge sticks was 60 yards ahead of the Uboat's conning tower, the realisation dawned that there was a 'systematic error' in aiming. As the official history records: At that time [early in 1942] the tactical instructions and the training in low level bombing, both laid considerable stress on the need to aim off ahead so as to allow for the forward trend of the U-boat

300°

SCALE: 1 inch 100 feet ® MEAN POINT OF EXPLOSION

Figure 4.3 The First Sixteen attacks to be Analysed. Source: Waddington (1973), Fig. 4.4, p. 184.

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 105 during the time of the fall of the depth charges. It was clear that this aim-off was being overdone. It is notoriously difficult to establish distances at sea by eye when travelling at the speed of an aircraft (a difficulty which also accounts for the optimistic assessments by pilots of their bombing accuracy). It could be shown that in this case the cure was worse than the disease: a greater percentage of hits would be obtained if pilots forgot all about the forward travel of the U-boat and aimed boldly at the conning tower.44 Once the 'systematic error' had been removed it seems likely that the n u m b e r of kills increased by 50 per cent, a result indicated by Fig. 4.4. The focal point of Coastal Command's operational research effort was the 'Bay of Biscay Campaign' waged against the U-boats over an eighteen-month period in 1941-3. At the outset of the campaign, Coastal Command aircrews were dependent upon visual sightings only. In the

VISIBLE U-BOATS

Figure 4.4 Mean Centre Points for Attacks (after aim-off countermanded). Source: Waddington (1973), Fig. 4.5, p. 185.

106 Operational Research in War and Peace latter half of 1941, however, aircraft began to be fitted with ASV radar. This led to a vast improvement in sighting efficiency with the result that U-boats were obliged to cross the Bay at night. ASV radar was obviously capable of operating in darkness but its low operational efficiency on the IV2 metre wavelength, meant that it could not guide aircraft sufficiently close to the target to engage in an effective night attack. Indeed, in the final stage of approaches, aircrews were dependent upon eye contact with minimal assistance from flares.45 The problem was partially resolved by equipping aircraft with powerful searchlights (Leigh Lights) located in a retractable turret under the fuselage. After several highly effective attacks by modified aircraft, the U-boats began to submerge at night. They were then forced to cross the Bay in daylight, but this, in turn, rendered them even more vulnerable to surface attack. In this war of response and counter-response the next move was initiated by the Germans in the form of 'Metox' radio receivers which could give warning of the approach of aircraft equipped with radar. During the course of 1942, however, Coastal Command was supplied with new radar sets operating on the 10 centimetre wavelength. Facilitated by the innovation of the cavity magnetron (see above, p. 90), and already applied to Bomber Command aircraft as a navigation and bombing aid, centimetric radar had greatly enhanced range and proved extremely difficult to counter. In fact, its diffusion throughout Coastal Command led to the successful conclusion of the Bay campaign in the summer of 1943, a result confirmed by Fig. 4.5 which charts the ebb and flow of the battle from its inception in 1941. Throughout the campaign, the ORS

1941

1942

1943

Figure 4.5 Shipping Losses as a Result of U-boat Action, 1941-1945. Source: Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Blackett in War and Peace/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 39 (1988), Fig.l, p. 226.

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 107 engaged in a sequence of statistical studies of detection rates of U-boats by radar and visual means. Operational hours flown by Coastal Command aircraft were carefully recorded and predictions were made of the number of U-boats at sea and the likelihood of sightings. As a result 'All the tactical resorts to which the enemy were driven could be followed and the best tactics could be devised to meet them.' 47 Indeed, as Blackett confirmed, operational research reports on hours flown, U-boat densities, search rates, and other statistical indicators were tabled regularly at the fortnightly meetings of the Anti-U-Boat Committee chaired by the Prime Minister.48 One remaining Coastal Command operational research study which deserves to be highlighted concerns the problem of aircraft availability. This was a critical issue for the Command in terms of the number of sorties that could be flown by existing squadrons, especially those equipped with long-range aircraft. The desirability of such aircraft for the anti-U-boat war was defined by the ORS in terms of 'ships not sunk.' At first sight, it is reasonable to assume that ship sinkings would be proportional to the product of U-boat and convoy density. In practice, this was not the case. On the basis of sinkings in 1941 the ORS calculated that Inside 300 miles from shore, where there was regular air cover, the density product (of U-boats x convoys) was 6.4 and the number of ships sunk for that product was seventeen. For 300-500 miles from shore, where there was occasional air cover, the density product fell to 3.2, but the number of ships sunk rose to forty six. Finally, outside 500 miles, where air cover was very scarce, density product was 3.3 and the number of ships sunk was fifty-five.49 With a density product for U-boats and convoys almost twice as high for inside 300 miles from shore compared to 500, it might be expected that the number of ships sunk would increase in the same ratio with 106 ships sunk within 300 miles of the coast compared to the actual figure of 17. The much lower figure was the result of air cover, thereby u n d e r l i n i n g Coastal C o m m a n d ' s need for l o n g - r a n g e aircraft. Unfortunately, the necessity for such aircraft with a heavy bomb load placed the Command in direct competition with Bomber Command's requirements for the area bombing of Germany. In the spring of 1942, therefore, stimulated by an urgent instruction from the Prime Minister to increase patrols over the Biscay ports within existing resource limits, the ORS decided to investigate the possibility of increasing the

108 Operational Research in War and Peace 'effectiveness rating' of individual squadrons defined in terms of the proportion of serviceable aircraft. The task was entrusted to Dr Cecil Gordon and it led to one of the classic operational research studies of the Second World War. Gordon was a biologist 'who combined a brilliant mind' with 'an abrasive personality.' As one of his wartime colleagues recalled, His mind was temporarily one-track; and whatever obsessed him obsessed him to the exclusion of all else for the time being. If it was his problems at work, at times it could get monotonous; and if it was his grievances it became a bore. Indeed, I suspect that he was only acceptable to Coastal Command because, like a lot of other odd types employed there, it was acknowledged that they might be mad, but they got results.50 Gordon's work bore fruit in the concept of 'Planned Flying, Planned Maintenance' whereby aircraft maintenance schedules were related directly to the number of sorties to be flown. According to Crowther and Whiddington, Gordon approached the problem from a biological 'life cycle' perspective. 51 Thus, he began by defining the 'availability' of aircraft in terms of the cycle of activities between one service inspection and the next. The activities themselves included flying days, days spent on the ground awaiting maintenance, and days when the aircraft is available for sorties but does not fly. The key variables in determining the time spent in each of these states were the number of permitted flying hours before the need for a major inspection and the length of individual sorties on a daily basis. After three weeks of study, Gordon identified the supply of skilled maintenance labour as the critical determinant of aircraft availability. According to existing RAF practice, the ideal availability or 'serviceability' percentage was in the range 70-75 per cent. But Gordon's analysis of the interaction between flying and maintenance demonstrated clearly 'the illogicality of this requirement for the more an aircraft is flown, the sooner it will need repair or maintenance.' 52 Since he calculated that if every serviceable aircraft flew daily whenever weather conditions permitted, the serviceability percentage would fall to approximately 1 in 3, it appeared that the 70-75 per cent range could only be achieved by reducing flying hours. No. 502 squadron of Coastal Command was the first to be subject to 'Planned Flying, Planned Maintenance' with the requirement to ignore the serviceability percentage so that all available aircraft were flown, weather permitting. The ORS recorded the results which revealed that

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 109 The availability percentage shrank as predicted, the maintenance system continued to function satisfactorily, and the flying output was approximately doubled. There were, of course, consequential adjustments to be made, especially in the organisation of maintenance — for example, to the balance between different trades within the maintenance workshops, and in the design of maintenance returns so that performance and manning levels could be monitored on a daily basis. Other work was carried out on the grouping of tests into minor or major inspections.53 'Planned Flying, Planned Maintenance' was subsequently adopted by all Coastal Command squadrons under the guidance of Gordon and his colleagues. As a result, flying hours per month were virtually doubled thereby enabling Coastal Command to sustain the Bay of Biscay campaign at a higher level of intensity. After completing the work, Gordon then joined the Scientific Directorate of the Air Ministry in order to secure the adoption of 'Planned Flying, Planned Maintenance' throughout the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm. 54 His labours were recognised officially in 1946 with the award of an OBE in the New Year's honours list. The ultimate tribute to Coastal Command and its ORS is provided by the increasing proportion of U-boats sunk by land-based aircraft after 1941. Up to the end of that year, land-based aircraft had sunk only 4 U-boats compared with 46 sunk by naval vessels. In 1942, however, virtual parity was achieved with 36 and 35 sinkings respectively. In 1943, Coastal Command achieved a decisive lead, destroying 84 U-boats compared with 64 sunk by naval action. From the beginning of 1944 to the end of the war more U-boats were sunk by naval vessels (124 compared with 91 by air attack), 55 but there can be no doubting the fact that during the course of 1943, the role of Coastal Command aircraft was transformed from 'submarine scarecrow to submarine killer.' 56 When Patrick Blackett moved from Coastal Command to the Admiralty in January 1942 (see below), he was succeeded as head of the ORS by his colleague, Professor E. J. Williams. The latter also joined the Admiralty in January 1943, ultimately to be appointed Blackett's deputy as Assistant Director of Operational Research. 57 As Blackett generously acknowledged, it was his partnership with Williams which drove forward 'the technical battle of wits' which resulted in the successful conclusion of the 'Bay Offensive' during the course of 1943. In his obituary notice of Williams, Blackett stated that the successes achieved by Coastal Command's ORS put operational research 'on the map' to the extent that the anti-U-boat campaign of 1943 'was waged

110 Operational Research in War and Peace under closer scientific control than any other campaign in the history of the British Armed Forces/ save for the final stages of the Anglo-US bombing offensive against the German communications system in 1944. As for Williams himself, it is revealing that following his retirement from the Admiralty due to ill health, he confessed that he found 'the subtle intricacies of the U-boat war of comparable intellectual interest' to his academic research as Professor of Physics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. Blackett's transfer to the Admiralty was orchestrated in large measure by Sir Charles Wright, the Admiralty's Director of Scientific Research. Having been informed of 'the new techniques Blackett had used for the Air Forces,' Wright and his advisory committee agreed that Blackett should be invited to meet them with a view to persuading the Admiralty to establish an operational research facility. In preparation for the meeting, Blackett circulated a paper — 'Scientists at the Operational Level' — containing the fruits of his experiences in operational research from the Tizard Committee onwards. 5 9 One memorable phrase stands out as proclaiming Blackett's philosophy at this time, namely that the application of numerical analysis could 'help to avoid running the war by gusts of emotion.' Thus, Operational staffs provide the scientists with the operational outlook and data. The scientists apply scientific methods of analysis to these data, and are thus able to give useful advice. The main field of this activity is clearly the analysis of actual operations, using as data the material to be found in an operations room, e.g. all signals, track charts, combat reports, meteorological information, etc. It will be noted that these data are not, and on secrecy grounds cannot, in general, be made available to the technical establishments. Thus such scientific analysis, if done at all, must be done in or near operations rooms.60 If operational researchers were of the highest standing in science 'with direct experience of Service Technical Establishments,' then there was no reason why they should not 'grasp the service problems of operational research as surely did the service officers themselves.' Indeed, an operational research section should operate in conformity with 'a firstclass pure scientific research institution,' but with the proviso that its members should work in close cooperation with service personnel. More

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 111 specifically, Blackett expressed concern about the 'natural inclination' of the Services 'to acquire new weapons instead of expending effort upon using existing ones properly.' 61 This was quantified in terms of three factors: the first N(f) is the number [of weapons] in use; the second P is the scheduled performance of the weapon; and the third S(t) is the average state of service ability and training, i.e. the actual performance expressed as a function of the schedule. The probable form of N(t) could be obtained from the production statistics of existing weapons. Relatively little is known of the form S(t), but probably a good first approximation would be to take S(t) = a(l - e~'/r) where T is of the order of the order of 2 months to 1 year according to the type of gadget. Some operational research might usefully be directed towards elucidating this function. One could then attempt a numerical estimate of the gain or loss involved in the changeover from one device to another, and so attempt to avoid the unduly heavy overhead costs of too rapid change-over.62 According to Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Scientists at the Operational Level' w a s a hurriedly and s o m e w h a t flippantly written document.' 6 3 Nevertheless, it impressed Wright's committee, all the more so in the light of Blackett's personal exposition in which he set out his ideas on the relationship between operational research scientists and the Royal Navy's command structure. In January 1942, therefore, after spending only nine months at Coastal Command, Blackett was appointed Chief Adviser on Operational Research in charge of an ORS reporting directly to the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff. In 1944, Blackett's title was changed to Director of Naval Operational Research, a post which he held until the end of the war. In his biographical memoir of Blackett, Lovell cited the view of the then Chief Scientist (Royal Navy) that operational research was given the widest remit by the Admiralty following Blackett's arrival. His searching mind ranged over the relevance of battleships or carriers as 'core of the fleet,' priorities in postwar budgeting between production and operating costs, and proposals to establish a Joint Warfare Committee to consider the theory and practice of Combined Warfare. He also pontificated on the nature of military operations in more general terms, suggesting that in any one weapons epoch 'there are relatively few things which a commander of major operations must know and remember if he is consistently to be more successful than chance.' 64 Inevitably,

112 Operational Research in War and Peace however, the initial thrust of Blackett's work was directed to the antiU-boat war. In this respect, there can be no doubt that he would have continued to work closely with his former colleagues in Coastal Command even if the latter had not come under the operational control of the Admiralty. In the. period 1942-3, Blackett and his colleagues presented 89 operational research reports, of which over 60 per cent concerned anti-U-boat tactics. In 1944, however, following the successful outcome of the 'Bay of Biscay Campaign,' of 105 reports published, only 35 per cent were concerned with U-boats, a figure which fell to 15 per cent in 1945. It was during his period of office at the Admiralty that Blackett became involved in a vociferous and personally bruising dispute with Sir Arthur Harris, Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, and other high-level advocates of the area bombing of German towns and cities. The issue in contention — Harris's overriding need for long-range heavy bombers as against that of Coastal Command, is considered more appropriately in the next chapter which deals with the role of operational research in informing the theory and practice of strategic bombing. In the present context, the value of Blackett's work for the Admiralty can be illustrated to no better effect than in his analysis of the organisation of convoys in terms of desirable escort provision in relation to the number of merchant ships and optimal convoy speeds. Blackett's work on these issues constituted outstanding examples of wartime operational research. In examining the number of escort vessels deployed in 1941-2, he calculated that convoys with nine escorts had experienced 25 per cent less sinkings than those with six. This led him to the conclusion that for each extra escort vessel, between two and three merchant ships could be saved annually. In reality, however, the resulting conclusion in favour of building proportionately more escorts could not be realised, at least in the short term as a result of the practical difficulty of changing the shipyards rapidly over from the building of merchant vessels to the building of escort vessels. As so often happens with the predictions of economic theorising the theoretically optimum production programmes cannot be realised quickly in practice.65 For Blackett, however, the matter did not end there since statistical analysis of convoy losses for 1941-2 revealed that 'smaller convoys with an average size of 32 ships had suffered a loss of 2.5 per cent, whereas the large convoys with an average size of 54 ships, had suffered a loss

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 113 of 1.1 per cent. Large convoys appeared to be in fact more than twice as safe as small convoys.' 66 Existing Admiralty rules, derived from collective memories of the First World War, were based on the assumption that small convoys numbering no more than 40 vessels were relatively safe. Convoys in excess of 60 ships were therefore prohibited. Yet although the operational research results in favour of the latter were 'quite reliable/ Blackett and his colleagues were determined to provide the Admiralty with a 'rational' justification for larger convoys. As Blackett recalled: an intensive study of all available facts about the U-boat campaign against the convoys was undertaken. Of great use were the accounts of prisoners of war from sunken U-boats of the detailed tactics pursued by the U-boats in their 'wolf-pack' attacks on the convoys. After several weeks of intensive research analysis and discussion, the following facts emerged. The chance that a given merchant ship would be sunk in any voyage depended on three factors: a) the chance that the convoy in which it sailed would be sighted; b) the chance that having sighted the convoy the U-boat would penetrate the screen of escort vessels round it; and c) the chance that when a U-boat had penetrated the screen the merchant ship would be sunk. It was found a) that the chance of a convoy being sighted was nearly the same for large and small convoys; b) that the chance that a U-boat would penetrate the screen depended only on the linear density of the escorts, that is, on the number of escort vessels for each mile of perimeter to be defended; and c) that when a U-boat did penetrate the screen the number of merchant ships sunk was the same for both large and small convoys — simply because there were always more than enough targets.67 Blackett's reasoning replicated, in large measure, Rollo Appleyard's work during the First World War, namely that the percentage of U-boats sunk was inversely proportional to convoy size. Admiralty policy should therefore be directed to reducing the number of convoys in order to limit the possibility of U-boat sightings with the proviso that the size of convoys should be increased to maintain the total number of ships sailing. After weeks of 'earnest argument' Blackett's recommendations were accepted so that from the spring of 1943 onwards average convoy size was gradually increased. Although the first 'large' convoy suffered severe losses, the ultimate accolade for the results of operational research was provided by the Admiralty in the summer of 1944 when it proclaimed the successful crossing of the Atlantic by a record 187 ships in convoy.68

114 Operational Research in War and Peace Blackett was the first to admit that the pay-off to his work could not be tested directly since the move to larger convoys (more than 150 ships) took place after the Battle of the Atlantic had been won. He did, however, regret deeply that the relevant statistical analysis had not been undertaken earlier by 'a strong operational research group with access to the relevant facts.' 69 If large convoys had been introduced earlier than 1943 the bottleneck in the supply of escort vessels would have been alleviated, and u p to 200 merchant vessels and countless lives saved. As it was, the n e w rules were introduced in sufficient time to permit the transfer of naval vessels from the Atlantic to support the Normandy landings in 1944, thereby diminishing the threat of U-boat attacks against the invasion forces whilst in cross-Channel transit. Further valuable work undertaken by Blackett and his colleagues was directed at improving the lethality of attacks by naval vessels on U-boats. This was an essential complement to the air attack analyses of Coastal Command's ORS. As in the latter context, naval operational researchers calculated that a substantial proportion of depth charges — u p to 40 per cent — were set too deep, although very few were set too shallow. The problem was more difficult to resolve than in Coastal Command due to the absence of an accurate method for determining the depth of the target. Some improvement followed from the suggestion that 'ahead-thrown weapons with contact fuses' should be deployed, but work in this area remained a matter of concern until the end of the war. In 1945, following the introduction of 'Hedgehog' and 'Squid' as new anti-submarine weapons, Admiralty operational researchers investigated their effectiveness relative to depth charges. The resulting study demonstrated that the probability of destroying a U-boat was 27 per cent, 53 per cent and 8 per cent respectively, a result in conformity with theoretical predictions. The study also revealed that the lethality of escort attacks had mounted significantly after 1943 in response to improved tactics, training and experience. In the case of 'Hedgehog' attacks (forward-throwing bombs), for example, their effectiveness had increased by a factor of three between late 1943 and the early months of 1945. For the same period, moreover, the study confirmed that independent attacks on U-boats were considerably less effective than when two or three escort vessels coordinated their manoeuvres, if only because of the greater number of attacks being carried out.70 In founding and leading the operational research groups at AckAck and Coastal Commands and the Admiralty, Blackett was assisted by civilian scientists of outstanding ability. At first sight it appears

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 115 paradoxical, therefore, that whilst some complex investigations were conducted, the application of advanced mathematical theory was generally absent. In a document released to operational research sections in May 1943, Blackett set out his thoughts on the relevant applications and methodology of operational research. 71 On the former he stated that The main fields of operational research can be classified under the following headings, the study of weapons, the study of tactics, and the study of strategy. The first consists mainly in analysing how and why existing weapons perform as they do, with the object of finding out how they can be improved. The second consists in analysing the various tactical methods in use, with the same object of finding methods of improving them. The third consists in studying the results achieved by various types of operation and the cost in the resources of war in achieving them. The actual form of the method of variational analysis lends itself immediately to the calculation of 'marginal' profits and costs — which is in general what is required.72 'Variational' analysis was presented as 'a commonsense procedure' to establish 'both by experiment and analytical methods how a real operation [of war] would be altered if certain of the variables, e.g. the tactics employed or properties of the weapons used, were varied.' 73 If an operation of war results in the yields Yy Y2 etc. on the basis of a number of operational variables, xy X2,...,x„, then the form of the resulting function y =/(*!,...,x„) cannot be deduced from first principles due to the complexity of the problem and the non-quantitative basis of many of the variables. But for predicted small changes in the variables 'a fairly accurate answer' might be achieved by determining the partial differential coefficients dY/dXn. In this case, the operational effect of changes in weapons, tactics or training can be estimated quantitatively giving the predicted yield dY dY Y' = Y+ — d X a + — d X 2 + efc dXl dX2 In an appendix, Blackett illustrated the application of what was no more than elementary regression analysis to the air war against the U-boats, the analysis of convoys, and the area bombing offensive then

116 Operational Research in War and Peace underway against Germany. Two questions arise in this context: first, to the extent that Blackett and his colleagues had the wherewithal to engage in sophisticated mathematical analysis, why did they not do so, and secondly, if the results of operational research were derived from relatively simple procedures, why was it necessary to employ highlyqualified academic scientists? On the first issue, it is important to remember that in the rapidly changing circumstances of war, operational researchers were invariably confronted with imperfect data which rendered 'delicate mathematical techniques' redundant. 74 In the context of the unfolding U-boat war, when relatively large data sets were simply unavailable, Watson-Watt's philosophy as applied to the development of radar (second best today is better than tomorrow's optimal solution) was the most appropriate basis for the evaluation of tactics. It is a point well taken, therefore, that In operational research, as in much human endeavour, the first 10% of the effort produces 90% of the result. In practice, under stable conditions it may be very much worthwhile or even essential to use sophisticated tools to produce the full 100% but not in war.75 On the second question, concerning the employment of 'high-powered' scientists, one useful insight is the need to differentiate between 'knowledge' and 'competence.' Thus, To an 8 year old, multiplication may appear a difficult operation. To a 16 year old, algebraic manipulation may seem hard but multiplication is trivial. At 18 calculus is hard but algebraic manipulation presents few problems. After a year or so of university mathematics, multi-dimensional calculus is hard but the one dimensional calculus of school is reassuringly familiar; and so on. We lack the confidence and competence to make use of our highest levels of knowledge but the possession of the highest levels gives us the confidence required to make use of the lower levels.76 To labour the point, When we can speak a language well, we can concentrate our thoughts and not worry about the language in which we express them.77 In relating this to the operational research sections formed by Blackett after 1940, the scientists involved spoke a common and well known language of mathematics so that they were free to concentrate on

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 117 operational problems. A further, and even more obvious factor, well appreciated by Blackett, was that operational research 'has, or should have, a strictly practical character' in that 'Its object is to assist the finding of means to improve the efficiency of war operations in progress or planned for the future.' 78 This was exemplified in Williams' work on depth charge settings. In this case, past operations [were] studied to determine the facts: theories were calculated to explain the facts; and finally the facts and theories [were] used to make predictions about future operations.79 The credibility of these procedures in terms of their influence on military operations rested in part upon the confidence placed by serving officers in academic scientists. It is, of course, possible that Blackett's standing as a scientist of distinction was of lesser importance than his status as a former officer in the Royal Navy, albeit of junior rank. But this is to devalue the point that from 1940 onwards, operational research scientists could lay claim to demonstrable achievements in enhancing military effectiveness. Their credibility therefore rested on dual foundations: respect for them in their capacity as 'boffins/ but a respect bolstered by impressive results. In his historical review of British operational research during the Second World War, McCloskey estimated that upwards of 1,000 men and women made their contribution to the war effort in this particular setting. Of the total, approximately 200 were associated with operational research for the British Army both at home and abroad. 80 It has already been noted that Blackett's Circus was the starting point for army operational research in advance of B. F. J. Schonland's appointment as superintendent of the newly-designated Air Defence Research and Development Establishment (ADRDE) Operational Research Group. The group was initially under the joint direction of the Ministry of Supply and the War Office, but in February 1943 it severed its connection with the ADRDE to become the Army Operational Research Group (AORG) under the sole control of the Ministry of Supply. Coincidentally, a policy was inaugurated of establishing operational research sub-groups so that by the end of 1943 AORG had under its wing eight sections with a further two being formed before the end of the war. The breakdown of responsibilities was as follows: AORS 1(a) AORS 1(b) AORS 2(a)

Ack-Ack and Field Army Radar Ack-Ack Operations and Searchlights Coast Defence and Coast Artillery Radar

118 Operational Research in War and Peace AORS 2(b) AORS 3 AORS 4(a) AORS 4(b) AORS 5 AORS 6 AORS 7(a) AORS 7(b) AORS 8(a) AORS 8(b) AORS 8(c) AORS 9 AORS 10

Analysis of Coast Artillery Shoots and Trials Signals Armour and Mobility of Tanks, and Tank Gunnery Anti-Tank and Field Gunnery Airborne Forces Operations and Equipment Infantry Weapons and Tactics General Mathematical Problems, Fragmentation Fuzes Accuracy and Lethality of Artillery Fire, Field Trials Mines and Obstacles Special Optical Aids and Visual Problems Flame Throwers and Smoke Time and Motion Studies of Drill and Uses of Equipment Analysis of Battle Records.81

AORS 1(a) and (b) were the linear descendants of Blackett's Circus and, as such, had pride of place in AORG. Whilst sub-section 1(a) continued to refine the radar basis of ack-ack fire with a particular focus on centimetric fire control, 1(b) developed special expertise in analysing the performance of VI flying bombs and V2 long range rockets. By the spring of 1945, procedures had been devised for predicting the point of fall of flying bombs and of engaging them with ack-ack batteries. Happily, the allied advance into Germany, in ending the V2 attacks, rendered this aspect of the section's work redundant. AORS 2 was formed in June 1941 in order to enhance the effectiveness of the newly-introduced chain of 'coast-watching radar stations': it also determined the siting of the first centimetric stations. In its early incarnation, the section's main function was to provide advance warning of any seaborne invasion, but after 1942 it concentrated on the defence of coastal convoys and on the improvement of coastal artillery fire-control sets as well as accuracy of fire. AORS 3 was formed in the autumn of 1942 at a time when 'many units... knew little of communication by sky waves over distances of 100 miles or less.'82 The work of the section therefore concentrated on improving long distance communications as well as investigating the possibility of VHF transmissions to forward troops. AORS 4, 5, 6 and T33 were established in sequence in 1942-3 with wide-ranging remits to investigate the effectiveness of equipment, from tanks and field artillery to the destructive power of projectiles. The work of AORS 4 was especially effective under the direction of the distinguished Canadian physiologist, Omand Solandt. Before joining the section in July 1942, Solandt had been the director of the Physiological Research Laboratory

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 119 attached to the Gunnery Wing of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Training School at Lulworth in Dorset. The main thrust of his research was to improve the physical capabilities of tank crews in the context of 'fume hazards, environmental problems, vision, tank driving and gun laying.* 4 Before joining AORS 4 Solandt had become convinced that tank crews, 'although a very important component in determining the tank's overall effectiveness, should, in operational terms, be regarded as only a sub­ system of the whole. Work needed to be done in other sub-systems too, if a complete approach was to be taken to tank and [armoured fighting vehicle] performance.' 85 AORS 4 provided Solandt with the opportunity to address these issues. Initially frustrated by a lack of engineering facilities to conduct trials, Solandt was instrumental in the creation of the Tank Armament Research Establishment (TAR) in October 1943 at Porton. Equipped appropriately, TAR worked in close cooperation with AORS 4 until the end of the war when it was redesignated as the Research Wing of the Fighting Vehicle Design Department at Chobham. In a postwar review of the AORS 4's work, Solandt highlighted the following projects as worthy of note: Tank Gunnery (a) The value of zeroing, and devising zeroing drills when shooting is not possible, which led to a study of the variation in jump of tank guns. (b) An investigation of the errors of visual estimation of opening range — leading to work on the value of range-finders in tank gunnery. (c) The accuracy of central laying with different types of aiming at moving targets. (d) Methods of correcting fire — In A.P. Shooting the Tine of sight' method of correction and direct correction. In H. E. Shooting, the general theory of bracketing has been developed, tested and applied to the production of bracketing drills. (e) The experimental work on the drills to be employed with ricochet airburst fire. Tank Armour Theoretical studies have been made of the best armour distribution on tank hulls and turrets, together with work on the vulnerability of tanks, both allied and enemy, to A. P. fire.

120 Operational Research in War and Peace Tank Mobility (a) The production of Tank Going Maps in conjunction with the Met. Office, reliable data on the performance of tanks under given soil conditions have been obtained in various trials. Instruments and methods of measuring the conditions existing in tank mobility trial have been developed. (b) Methods of reconnoitering (sic) ground to estimate the going condition for tanks. (c) The general theory of the relation between the factors which influence the going, including the design of suspension and tracks, is being developed.86 Across the spectrum of AORG activities, much of the work could not be dignified with the term operational research. Solandt himself was fond of recounting the results of studies of manpower deployment which could be more appropriately be regarded as 'work study.' For example, one investigation revealed that anti-tank gun drills could be carried out as effectively by three men as by the six originally assigned to this duty. However, the resulting report was not implemented after 'Those responsible for this "waste" of manpower pointed out...that it had taken 20 years to get enough men assigned to their units to do the cooking, bring up ammunition, and handle other chores.'87 In a similar vein, it was discovered that during artillery drills one member of the crew remained motionless in his capacity as the horse holder, bearing in mind, of course, that the unit in question had dispensed with horses twenty years previously. Studies of this kind were clearly useful and it was eventually decided that their specialist nature required the formation of a dedicated operational research section.88 Thus, in 1944, AORS 9 (Time and Motion Studies) was formed in order to investigate 'fatigue problems' and 'work simplification.'89 One of the most effective studies concerned the efficiency of the 25-pounder field gun. The key issue, on which opinion was divided, was whether the gun's function was primarily antimateriel or anti personnel. If it was the latter, a further consideration was whether it should have a lethal or morale effect. In recommending that the function should be anti-personnel, covering both effects, AORS 9 presented tabulated results of the measurement of effectiveness embracing the operation of the gun, the quality of the ammunition and irregularities in terrain. In defining effectiveness in terms of functions, the implementation of the relevant findings led to a substantial improvement in the gun's effectiveness.90

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 121 AORS 10 was the final operational research section to be formed under AORG auspices in the summer of 1944. In formal terms, its remit was to analyse battle records but in such a way as to provide future military commanders with a compendium of knowledge rooted in practical experience. The early work of the section concentrated on the effects of artillery shelling and bombing in advance of the Allied invasion of Italy. These were timely studies in the lead up to the D-Day landings in Normandy when the section investigated the comparative effects of fire support on the British and American invasion beaches. Solandt's immediate postwar commentary is instructive: The British beaches in Normandy all [presented] similar problems to the attackers. It is first shown that the casualties on those beaches which were defended by machine guns and not by mortars were closely proportional to the number of machine guns in the defences. It is then shown that if the machine guns on the other British beaches were as effective as those on the British beaches where there were no mortars, then each mortar caused about three times as many casualties to the assault troops as each machine gun. The third stage introduces the American areas and shows that the very heavy casualties on Omaha area (which revealed much the same density of bombardment as the British areas) were not much more proportional to the weight of the defences, while the light casualties on Utah area may be related to the heavy bombardment to which it was subjected. The final stage is an attempt to express this reduction of casualties by weight of bombardment in numerical terms, and to relate these numerical expressions to the corresponding expressions for land operations and for American assaults on Pacific atolls held by the Japanese.91 ORS 10 was unique in AORG in engaging directly with the needs of the Army in overseas theatres. As such, it fulfilled a valuable linking role between the Ministry of Supply and the War Office. It has already been noted that from February 1943, AORG operated under the aegis of the Ministry of Supply in order to provide an operational research facility for army commands located in the UK. For the War Office, the relinquishing of interest in AORG was part of an overall strategy for operational research whereby its Scientific Adviser would be responsible for the formation of operational research sections attached to overseas commands in the Middle East, Italy, India, South East Asia and Australia. Up to March 1943, the post of Scientific Adviser was held by Sir Charles Darwin, but on his transfer to the National Physical Laboratory, he was

122 Operational Research in War and Peace replaced by his deputy, Professor Charles Ellis. The latter was to prove to be an able advocate for the civilian diffusion of operational research after 1945, principally in the nationalised coal industry (see below, pp. 255-6). It was Ellis who was primarily responsible for the formation of overseas operational research sections from the spring of 1943 onwards. However, in marked contrast to the acceptance of operational research within the UK-based command structure, there is good evidence to suggest that the diffusion of the discipline'in overseas theatres was patchy and unsatisfactory. In a frank and revealing postwar report to the Army Council the then Scientific Adviser, Sir Owen Wansbrough-Jones, referred to numerous problems encountered by overseas operational researchers, even though the scientists involved possessed military rank. In the Middle East, for example, the operational research section (S.O.6) produced 'many valuable reports' on radar research in collaboration with RAF researchers, but had to contend with indifference from GHQ resulting in 'a very hand to mouth existence' where they sought their own work 'as and when they could.' 92 Ellis's efforts to place the section on a sounder footing in July 1943, met with little enthusiasm with the result that S.O.6 'gradually disintegrated and its members were absorbed into other appointments within the scientific framework.' 93 Similarly, the operational research section in Italy (No. 1 ORS), despite being able to learn from the experiences of S.O.6, was also confronted with a lack of commitment on the part of headquarters staff. As the postwar report commented, There was by no means complete understanding between the Staff of [HQ] and the O. R. S.; as so often happens, a new type of unit has great difficulty in making good headway unless it is lucky enough to have a powerful sponsor. In No. 1 ORS's case there was no such sponsor and work was undertaken in a somewhat haphazard fashion instead of being undertaken under the definite direction of a Staff branch which was fully alive to the potentialities of such a unit.9* The situation was little better in India and the Far East. In India, O.R.S.10 failed to surmount the problem of 'top heaviness' in its organisation at the same time as it w a s subject to 'considerable dilution w i t h comparatively inexperienced personnel.' 95 Operational researchers in the Far Eastern (Pacific) theatre, experienced similar problems which were compounded substantially by the sheer vastness of the operational area. In this respect, the postwar report was direct and to the point:

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 123 Battles were few and far between, thus providing little opportunity for detailed battle studies. Distances were great and travel by Jeep track was slow, and it could conceivably mean a two weeks absence from the unit for a member of the section to visit a battle area for only one day's observation. The impossibility that they were constantly up against was in carrying out orders that they received. On many occasions the sections were ordered to observe a specific type of warfare or action and to report on detailed aspects thereof: but unless that type of warfare or action was in existence to be observed the work obviously could not be carried out. A truism which was all too frequently overlooked by those who demanded the information.96 The exception to this general picture of indifference was provided by O.R.S.2, formed in August 1943 to provide an operational research facility for the 21 st Army Group, then in the process of formation as the British Army Command responsible for the planning and execution of the invasion of north west Europe as part of the allied war effort. O.R.S.2 had the inestimable advantage of being formed within the UK under the leadership of B. F. J. Schonland. Schonland's work for the AORG has already been noted and he brought to O.R.S.2 a degree of credibility denied to the overseas sections. In his postwar report, Wansbrough-Jones highlighted several further advantages enjoyed by the section: No. 2 O.R.S. was a fortunate section in one important respect: they had no need to indulge in any advertising campaign for their wares. The reasons for this were that by the time they were formed, operational research already had an established reputation in the Army: an O.R.S. had already been accepted by the C. in C. before the Army Group was formed: there was plenty of time to 'show the flag' before the start of full scale operations: and useful work was undertaken during the planning period; many of the appointments in the section were made by the staff of 21 Army Group which, perhaps, occasioned slightly more parental affection than might otherwise have been the case. One other important factor in their favour was the presence of the Scientific Advisor on the Staff of the Army Group, who was in a position to ensure that operational research was never overlooked.97 With a remit to engage in investigations on its own initiative, O.R.S.2 provided its members with unparalleled opportunities to engage in operational research studies in battlefield conditions from June 1944 to the German surrender in May 1945. The work of the section was viewed

124 Operational Research in War and Peace as of sufficient importance to future military operations that WansbroughJones authorised the compilation of a detailed account of its activities.98 This was divided into four main sections covering air support, artillery, tanks and infantry operations. The investigation which established the ground rules for the section's work was an appraisal of the impact of heavy bombing on Caen undertaken by the RAF in the second week of July 1944. Although the resulting report was 'little better than a study of the plain physical effects of the bombing/ its very limitations served to identify the essential ingredients of an operational research analysis of an active war zone, namely the advantages of studying the operational orders in advance of the attack, and observation of the actual course of the battle. The latter were exemplified in the section's report on the impact of bombing on the Ardennes offensive, launched by the Wehrmacht in December 1944. The report, prepared in consultation with operational researchers attached to the 2 nd Tactical Air Force, concentrated on the effects of allied bombing of enemy tanks. The RAF's anti-tank operations were limited in scale compared to American fighter-bombers, so that the report concentrated on the latter. The overall conclusion was that American aircraft were 'indifferent' at tank destruction: For every hundred claims, we could find only one tank indubitably destroyed by air. Though a few cases turned up where perhaps tanks had been abandoned because of air attack, they were doubtful and went only a little way to making good the discrepancy. Almost the only claim we did substantiate was that of a Royal Tiger well and truly demolished by a hit from a 500 lb bomb." Although the report was not widely circulated, insofar as it was concerned with American operations, it was undoubtedly a classic operational research study: By analysing a large number of small tank/anti-tank actions from the Ardennes salient, in terms of the number of anti-tank guns defending, the number of tanks attacking, and the losses on both sides, it was possible to establish a clear numerical superiority for self-propelled over towed guns and for anti-tank layouts with infantry over those without. The report is a good example of a how commonsense numerical approach to warfare can sometimes settle points that have always been regarded as the preserve of experience and intuition.100

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 125 O.R.S.2 may have been far more effective than any other overseas operational research section, but it was entirely dependent for its credibility within the command structure on the patronage of a senior field commander. Its wide-ranging remit notwithstanding, the section found that its influence was limited to the extent that it had such support. Its frustrations in this respect show through in the postwar report: Time and again we came up against the inescapable fact that the introduction of new ideas rested solely with a commander, or at least with his immediate deputy. We thus found ourselves trafficking in ideas far above our rank, with report-writing as the only ready means at our disposal of conveying them, and it must be stated once and for all that report-writing is a very poor substitute for a senior officer who can discuss the idea with his equals in Armies, Corps and Divisions. Many of the ideas that emerged from our reports were never adopted, often never even considered because they were only ideas buried in reports that were never read. The conclusion that must follow from this is that the investigating body, the O.R.S., can be lowly ranked, but that it needs a highly-ranked officer, a Scientific Adviser to see that its ideas are tried out.101 The above paragraph provides excellent confirmation of the fact that even a well-founded operational research section, if deployed in an active military theatre was dependent for its ability to influence events upon high-level sponsorship. Schonland's departure at a critical moment, early in 1945, was felt keenly by the section, although by that time the mould had been cast. The fact remains that taking the period of the war as a whole, operational researchers were most influential in the context of home-based military commands and when investigating immediate operational problems. In this respect, Patrick Blackett's record was unique. Operational researchers overseas, however, could never replicate Blackett's role: obliged to accept honorary military rank due to service exigencies, they were bound to be constrained by their position in the military hierarchy, quite apart from their subservience to immediate events in active military theatres. Even in Blackett's case, his scientific reputation and formidable record in tactical operational research could not prevent his marginalisation in relation to the higher strategic conduct of the war. Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of Bomber Command's campaign of area attack against Germany. Before examining the role of operational research in informing the tactics and strategy of

126 Operational Research in War and Peace aerial bombardment, it is appropriate to conclude this chapter with a brief account of the work of operational researchers in the area of home defence, bearing in mind that their overriding concern was to evaluate the impact of German bombing on British towns and cities. On the outbreak of war the Ministry of Home Security was established as a new Whitehall department with general responsibility for civil defence. It was the immediate product of the generally accepted view that the primary military assault on Britain would be undertaken by the Luftwaffe in the form of attacks on towns and cities. In that setting, the Ministry undertook a series of investigations focussing on the nature and scale of anticipated air attacks, the likely number of civilian casualties in the first three months of the war, and the extent to which casualties could be reduced by the construction of air-raid shelters. The work was carried out by the Ministry's Research and Experiments Division at Princes Risborough under the leadership of Sir Reginald Stradling, the prewar Director of the Building Research Station. The engineering section, led by Professor John Baker, concentrated on air-raid shelter design whilst the 'operational' side was headed by Professor J. D. Bernal. Baker's work was to result in the innovative Anderson and Morrison shelters which saved innumerable lives during the Blitz and the VI attacks of 1944.102 No less important were Bernal's studies of the effects of bombing. In these he was assisted by Professor Solly Zuckerman, the distinguished South African anatomist and authority on primates. Indeed, it was Zuckerman who succeeded in devising standardised casualty rates for differing weights of bombs dropped. Preliminary investigations, based upon the personal experiences of 10,000 people who had been involved in 380 bomb explosions, together with experiments on animals, produced the surprising result that humans had a 50-50 chance of surviving blast pressures up to 500 pounds per square inch — vastly in excess of the 5 pounds per square inch dictated by conventional wisdom. This result was confirmed by a full-scale air-raid casualty survey undertaken by Zuckerman in 1940-1. The survey also revealed that smaller bombs were more destructive in terms of casualties. In the range 50 kg-1000 kg, the smaller weapon was the greatest producer of casualties and was 'every bit as dangerous as the V2 rocket bomb.' 103 The key factor was the larger number of strikes for the same weight of aircraft bomb load. The concept of a standardised casualty rate also made it possible to compare the relative risk of different sized bombs in different situations; for example, being out of doors or

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 127 on the ground floor, as opposed to being in the cellar of a terrace house or in a small outside shelter. We were also able to find out whether there were differences in the spectrum of injuries associated with characteristic conditions of exposure in, say, daytime as opposed to night raids, or high-level as opposed to low-level attacks. Very soon, too, I had all the evidence which was necessary to reinforce the extrapolations that I had made from any experimental studies about the levels of blast pressure that would prove directly fatal to men.104 Lethal blast pressures above 500 lbs per square inch were only likely to be experienced in the immediate vicinity of an explosion, and even then most air raid casualties were caused not by the primary effects of the explosion but by the secondary and tertiary consequences of 'violent displacement/ the product of 'flying and falling debris and other secondary missiles/ given that most air-raid casualties were to be found in their homes where the severity of their injuries was 'proportional to the amount of structural damage that their dwellings suffered.'105 Zuckerman's work revolutionised understanding of the effects of bombing and it led to significant improvements in hospital facilities for air-raid casualties as well as air raid protection and fire services.106 Before transferring to the staff of Combined Operations under Lord Louis Mountbatten, Zuckerman and Bernal were attached to a sub-section of the Research and Experiments Division, R.E. 8, responsible for providing the Air Ministry with assessments of the effectiveness of Bomber Command's operations against Germany. Using aerial photographs of enemy targets, estimates were made of optimal bomb loads in relation to damage, as well as likely production losses. These activities were fully reflective of a new stage in the war as the Western allies turned to the offensive. Indeed, by the time R. E. 8 was transferred to Air Ministry control early in 1944, it was effectually an Anglo-US organisation incorporating such distinguished American scientists as Charles Hitch, L. M. Denbitz, I. N. Pincus, LeRoy A. Brothers and Jacob Bronowski.107 It was in their capacity as members of R. E. 8 that Zuckerman and Bernal also became embroiled in the bitter and heated debate on the merits of area bombing which once again placed Patrick Blackett and Henry Tizard in contention with F. A. Lindemann (Lord Cherwell). The subject of ongoing controversy, more than fifty years after the event, the role of operational research as a critical aspect of the debate is the subject of the following chapter.

128 Operational Research in War and Peace NOTES 1. Basil Liddell-Hart, The Defence of Britain (Random House, New York, 1939), pp. 346-7. 2. 'Obituary: Sir Charles Frederick Goodeve, OBE, FRS,' journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 31 (1980), p. 961. 3. R D. Richardson, 'Charles Frederick Goodeve, 21 February 1904-7 April 1980/ Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 27 (1981), p. 312. 4. Angus Calder, The People's War: Britain 1939-1945 (Panther, London, 1971), p. 253. 5. Ronald Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (Phoenix House, London, 1962), p. 156. 6. Ibid., pp. 56-8; H. M. D. Parker, Manpower (HMSO, London, 1957), pp. 319-22, 331-3. 7. Clark (1962), p. 156. 8. Ibid., p. 157. 9. Anon, Science in War (Penguin Special S74, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1940). 10. Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords, 1904-46: An Autobiography (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978), pp. 110-12, 398-9; Idem, Scientists and War (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1966), pp. 148-9. 11. Ibid., p. 38. 12. Ibid., pp. 8, 35, 44-5, 138. 13. Calder (1971), p. 534. 14. Earl of Birkenhead, The Prof in Two Worlds (Collier, London, 1968), p. 73. 15. P. M. S. Blackett, 'Tizard and the Science of War/ Nature, Vol. 185 (1960), p. 647. Reprinted in Idem, Studies of War (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962), Part 1 , Chapter 8, p. 101. 16. Clark (1962), pp. 157-8; C.P Snow, Science and Government (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961); R. V. Jones, 'Scientists at War/ The Times, 6, 7, 8 April 1961. 17. James Phinney Baxter, Scientists Against Time (Little Brown, Boston, Mass., 1946). 18. Joseph F. McCloskey, 'U.S. Operations Research in World War 11/ Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), pp. 910-25; Erik P. Rau, 'The Adoption of Operations Research in the United States During World War 11/ in Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes (eds.), Systems, Experts and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000), pp. 57-92. 19. Blackett (1962), p. 109. 20. R. W. Clark, Tizard (Methuen, London, 1965). 21. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, Baron Blackett of Chelsea, 18 November, 1897-13 July 1974/ Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1975), p. 54.

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22. A. V. Hill, cited in Lovell (1975), p. 56. 23. J. G. Crowther and R. Whiddington, Science at War (HMSO, London, 1949), p. 95. 24. Blackett (1962), p. 208. 25. Ibid. 26. Lovell (1975), p. 57. 27. Blackett (1962), p. 211. 28. Cited in Lovell (1975), p. 58. 29. P. M. Sutcliffe, 'The End of the Battle of the Atlantic (German U-Boat Operations, 1943-1944),' Journal of Naval Studies Vol. 18 (1996), p. 119. 30. A. P. Rowe, One Story of Radar (Cambridge University Press, London, 1948), p. 105. 31. Derman Christopherson, and E. C. Baughan, 'Reminiscences of Operational Research in World War II by Some of its Practitioners,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 43 (1992), p. 574. 32. Blackett (1962), pp. 213-14. 33. Joseph F. McCloskey, 'British Operational Research in World War II,' Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), p. 455. 34. Ibid. 35. C. H. Waddington, O. R. in World War II: Operational Research against the U-boat (Elek Science, London, 1973), pp. 31-2. 36. Blackett (1962), p. 216. 37. Waddington (1973), p. 151. 38. Blackett, (1962), pp. 216-17. 39. Waddington (1973), pp. 151-67. 40. Ibid., p. 151. 41. Blackett (1962), p. 215. 42. Waddington, (1973), p. 177. 43. Blackett (1962), p. 215. 44. Waddington (1973), p. 186. 45. Christopherson and Baughan (1992), p. 576. 46. Waddington (1973), pp. 246-7; Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force (HMSO, London, 1963), pp. 41-6. 47. Blackett (1962), p. 223. 48. Ibid. 49. John Winton, Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade (Michael Joseph, London, 1983), p. 224. 50. F. L. Sawyer, A. Charlesby, T. E. Easterfield and F. E. Treadwell, 'Reminiscences of Operational Research in World War II by Some of its Practitioners,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 40 (1989), p. 127. 51. Crowther and Whiddington (1949), p. 98. 52. Jonathan Rosenhead, 'Operational Research at the Crossroads: Cecil Gordon and the Development of Post-War Operational Research,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 40 (1989), p. 127.

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53. Ibid. 54. Waddington (1973), pp. 40-8; Air Ministry (1963), pp. 102-3. 55. German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties during the War: Particulars of Destruction, Cmd. 6843 (HMSO, London, 1946). 56. T. W. Korner, The Pleasures of Counting (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 68. 57. P. M. S. Blackett, 'Evan James Williams, 1903-1945/ Obituary Notices of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 45 (March 1947). 58. Blackett (1962), p. 238. 59. 'Scientists at the Operational Level/ reprinted in Blackett (1962, Part II, Chapter 1, pp. 171-6. 60. Ibid., p. 171. 61. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Blackett in War and Peace/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 39 (1988), p. 224. 62. Blackett (1962), p. 176. 63. Lovell (1975), p. 60. 64. Ibid., p. 68. 65. Blackett (1962), p. 229. See also M. Llewellyn-Jones, 'A Clash of Cultures: The Case for Large Convoys, in Peter Hore (ed.), Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist and Socialist (Frank Cass, London, 2003), pp. 142-3. 66. Ibid., pp. 230-2. 67. Ibid., p. 232. See also M. Llewellyn-Jones (2003), pp. 148-9. 68. Noel Falconer, 'On the Size of Convoys: An Example of the Methodology of Wartime OR Scientists/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 23 (1976), p p . 315-27. 69. Blackett (1962), p. 233. 70. Paul M. Sutcliffe, 'Operational Research and the Battle of the Atlantic/ in Stephen Howarth and Derek Law (eds,), The Battle of the Atlantic 19391945: The 50th Anniversary International Naval Conference (Naval Institute Press, Annaplois, MD. 1994). p. 422. 71. ' A Note on Certain Aspects of the Methodology of Operational Research/ reprinted in Blackett (1962), Part II, Chapter 1, pp. 176-98. 72. Ibid., pp. 177-8. 73. Ibid., p. 180. 74. Korner (1996), pp. 92-3. 75. Ibid., p. 93. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid. 78. Blackett (1962), p. 177. 79. Ibid. 80. McCloskey (1987), pp. 462-5. 81. 'Reconstruction of Operational Research Group Ministry of Supply' (War Office and Ministry of Supply Joint Paper 287/GEN/752). Reprinted in R. W. Shephard (ed.), Readings on Early Military Operational Research (with

The Wartime Diffusion of Operational Research 131 Particular Reference to Army OR (Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, March 1984), Reading J, p. 97. 82. Ibid. 83. Brief histories of AORS 5, 6 and 8 are contained in Shephard (1984), pp. 195-228. 84. Ronald W. Shephard, 'The Influence of Solandt on the Development of Early Operational Research in Britain,' in C. E. Law, G. R. Lindsay and D. M. Grenville (eds.), Perspectives in Science and Technology: The Legacy of Omand Solandt (Queen's Quarterly, Kingston, Ontario, 1994), p. 32. 85. Ibid., pp. 37-9. 86. Omand Solandt (ed.), Army Operational Research Group: Conversazione (26-27 July 1945), p. 9. 87. McCloskey (1987), p. 463. 88. Omand Solandt, 'Observations, Experiment and Measurement in Operations Research/ in Joseph F. McCloskey and John M. Coppinger (eds.), Operations Research for Management (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1956), pp. 267-84. 89. Solandt (1945), pp. 13-14. 90. McCloskey (1987), p. 464. 91. Solandt (1945), p. 464. 92. Department of the Scientific Advisor to the Army Council, Operational Research in the British Army 1939-45 (October 1947). Reprinted in Shephard (1984), pp. 229-76. 93. Ibid., p. 243. 94. Ibid., p. 244. 95. Ibid., p. 248. 96. Ibid., p. 251. 97. Ibid., p. 246. 98. Operational Research in NW Europe: The War of No 2 Operational Research Section, With 21 Army Group, June 1944-July 1945 (Defence Operational Analysis Centre: Library Accession No. 35965). Reprinted in Shephard (1984), pp. 277-310. 99. Ibid., p xiii. 100. Ibid., p. xiv. 101. Ibid., p. xv. 102. Christopherson and Baughan (1992), pp. 570-3. 103. Zuckerman (1978), p. 137. 104. Ibid., pp. 137-8. 105. Ibid. 106. Crowther and Whiddington (1949), pp. 98-9. 107. Air Ministry (1963), p. 42.

5

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945

From its inception in 1940 the strategy and tactics of Bomber Command's campaign against Germany were the subject of continuing debate both within and without the Air Staff. Issues such as the relative merits of precision versus area bombing, the relationship between offensive and defensive tactics, and the Command's capabilities as a war-winning weapon in its own right were the meat of wartime deliberations at the highest level. In these respects, the historiography of Bomber Command is extensive, ranging from popular accounts, television documentaries and personal memoirs to informed analyses based upon full access to official records. 1 In general terms, the literature has described the trials and tribulations of the Command from three interrelated perspectives. In the first instance, the so-called campaign of area attack, launched in 1942 and culminating in the 'terror bombing' of Dresden in February 1945, has been viewed by some as morally reprehensible, sufficient by itself to justify the absence of a campaign medal for Bomber Command operational personnel and the establishment's failure to elevate its outstanding Commander-in-Chief, Sir Arthur Harris, to the peerage. Secondly, of all British service branches, Bomber Command suffered by far the greatest rate of attrition, all the more poignant in view of the youthfulness of the casualties. To the extent that the personnel in question were endowed with exceptional leadership qualities and courage to match, the high casualty rate has been viewed as reminiscent of the decimation of the British officer corps during the First World War. Thirdly, the entire strategic contribution of the Command to the defeat of Germany has been brought into question. The focus here has been on Sir Arthur Harris's unwavering commitment to the area bombing of the German civilian population in the country's principal industrial towns and cities. This was sustained even after his Command had the wherewithal to engage in the allegedly more profitable strategic option

132

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 133 of attacking precise targets of direct military importance. The account offered in this chapter offers a new interpretation of the area bombing campaign from an operational research perspective. It does not seek to refute existing interpretations, all of which contain an element of validity. The aim, rather, is to enhance understanding of the most controversial element in the British war effort against Germany in the knowledge that the strategy and tactics of area attack were informed by the use and abuse of operational research. Chapters 3 and 4 have highlighted the vital role of operational research in enhancing the military effectiveness of Fighter and Coastal Commands, as well as the Army and the Royal Navy. In the case of Bomber Command, however, the role of operational research is deeply contentious both in its contemporary setting and in historical retrospect. The enduring source of controversy is provided by the validation of area bombing by reference to its presumed impact on the morale of the German civilian population — a strategy endorsed, in part, on operational research grounds which signally failed to convince either Henry Tizard or Patrick Blackett that 'morale' bombing by itself could induce a German capitulation. A separate but related source of disquiet was Sir Arthur Harris's deep opposition to his Command's involvement in Operation Overlord on the grounds of its strategic irrelevance to the outcome of a war which could be ended by bombing German towns and cities if only sufficient resources were made available for the task. That Harris's commitment to uninterrupted area bombing was overruled in favour of attacks on precise targets relevant to the military invasion of the Continent can be ascribed in large measure to the quantitative analysis of bombing in the Mediterranean theatre undertaken by Solly Zuckerman in 1943. As an advocate of aerial attack on precise targets, Zuckerman was intrinsically o p p o s e d to ' m o r a l e ' bombing. This view was propounded vigorously in his memoirs, in which he also condemned Bomber Command's Operational Research Section (ORS) for its failure to challenge Harris's wholly mistaken strategic vision. 2 In order to illuminate these controversies the chapter begins with an assessment of the RAF's experience of bombing in the period to 1942 in order to explain the transition from precision to area bombing. It then analyses the work of Bomber Command's ORS in enhancing the effectiveness of the striking force before examining the wartime debate on the relationship between Bomber Command and Operation Overlord. It concludes with an assessment of the impact of area bombing, particularly in relation to Harris's view that an effective campaign of

134 A History of Operational Research area attack, supplemented by the efforts of the US Eighth Air Force, obviated the necessity of a seaborne invasion of north-west Europe. Up to the mid-1930s, the Air Staff remained committed to the view that the primary responsibility of the RAF in any future war would be to attack an enemy's war-making industrial capacity and to undermine civilian morale in accordance with the Trenchard doctrine. In 1937, however, the Air Ministry clarified the RAF's role in the context of German rearmament and the need to identify suitable targets. The resulting 'Western Air Plans' were prepared in October 1937 in which the most important objectives were grouped as follows: (a) Plans for attack on the German Air Striking Force, and its maintenance organisation. (b) Plans for reconnaissance in co-operation with the Navy in Home Waters and the Eastern Atlantic. (c) Plans for close co-operation with the Navy in convoy protection in Home Waters and the Eastern Atlantic. (d) Plans for attacking the concentration areas of the German Army and the interruption of its communications in an advance into Belgium, Holland and France. (e)PIans for attacking the enemy's manufacturing resources in the Ruhr, Rhineland and Saar.3 The first, fourth and fifth objectives were directly relevant to the newly-established Bomber Command, with the attack on German industry in closest conformity with the Trenchard doctrine. In December 1937, therefore, the Command formalised a list of industrial targets in collaboration with the Air Targets Sub-Committee of the Industrial Intelligence Centre. With the focus on the Ruhr, the identified priorities covered electricity supply, canal and rail transport, and the Ruhr dams. In responding to these recommendations, the Air Staff were primarily concerned to avoid any semblance of an attack on civilians in order to reduce the risk of provoking Germany into launching a 'knock-out blow' against British towns and cities. Thus, when war broke out in September 1939, Bomber Command was ordered to confine its activities to the support of the allied armies in the field and to attacks on German naval units in the North Sea. Penetration into German air space was permitted only for the dropping of propaganda leaflets. During the first two years of the war Bomber Command was to learn some painful lessons. Offensive activities were minuscule in comparison with the succeeding period but they were on a sufficient

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 135 scale to underline the limited capabilities of the Command. Daylight raids against German naval ports produced catastrophic losses, whilst night­ time propaganda raids revealed gross deficiencies in navigation skills and wholly inadequate flying conditions for operational personnel in relation to aircraft icing and frostbite. These deficiencies were highlighted in acute form following the German attack on France and the Low Countries. In the aftermath of the Luftwaffe 'blitzkrieg' in Poland, the Air Staff had modified its stance on civilian attacks to the extent that 'expediency' should henceforth be the 'sole consideration' in determining bombing targets. 4 Following the bombing of Rotterdam in May 1940, however, the new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in authorising Bomber Command attacks east of the Rhine, effectively laid aside the Air Staff's ruling against attacks on civilians. The resulting attacks on the Ruhr, however, were little more than pinpricks in the German war effort. Indeed, this initial phase of operations was entirely consistent with 'the conservation of the bomber force' on the grounds of its ineffectiveness in penetrating 'into enemy territory by day or to find its target areas, by night.' 5 By the summer of 1941, the offensive limitations of Bomber Command were painfully evident from photographic intelligence. In August of that year the Prime Minister's confidant and personal scientific adviser, F. A. Lindemann, initiated a statistical investigation of Bomber Command operations prompted by the accumulating photographic record of bombing sorties and air crew debriefings. The resulting report, prepared by Lindemann's personal secretary, David Benusson-Butt, was based upon 100 separate raids on Germany encompassing 28 different targets. In stark terms the 'Butt' report revealed that, on average, less than one third of the striking force was navigating to within five miles of the designated target, a fraction reduced to one tenth in raids on the heavily defended towns and cities of the Ruhr. What was even more depressing, however, was the fact that the figure of one-third related to the average number of aircraft which had contrived to reach the actual target, and not to the total dispatched. Thus, as Benusson-Butt concluded, In the raids considered in the analysis, 6103 aircraft were dispatched but 4065 attacked (66%). Thus of the total dispatched not one-third but one-fifth reached the target area.6 This observation was complemented by the calculation that of the bombs dropped on Germany by night, only five per cent had hit genuine objectives. For Bomber Command these were sobering conclusions which

136 A History of Operational Research were fully reflective of prewar bombing trials. In the tactical sense they pointed in two directions: first and foremost the need to develop reliable navigation aids, and second the abandonment of attacks on predesignated targets in favour of an 'area' approach. On the basis of existing navigation techniques it was practically impossible for Bomber Command to achieve the accuracy in timing and routing necessary for the concentration of large numbers of aircraft in time and space. Insofar as the striking force had operated as 'a collection of individual aircraft/ it had been unduly vulnerable to the enemy defence system, all the more so because it was dominated by increasingly obsolescent aircraft with limited bomb loads and performance characteristics. Concentration, however, held out the prospect of saturating enemy air raid and anti­ aircraft units as well as enhancing defensive capabilities against fighter interception on a collective basis. As for area bombing, it could be justified as a short-term measure until such time as the striking force was equipped with the means to resume precision attacks. 7 It might be thought that the truly rational response to Bomber Command's predicament in 1941 would have been to suspend offensive operations over Germany, at least until navigational improvements had been effected. Alternatively, in the quest for accuracy, daylight bombing could have been resumed but with severe cost in terms of aircraft losses and the supply of experienced aircrew. At this stage in the war, however, the Command was in desperate need of operational experience and it was this fact, in combination with wider political and military exigencies, which dictated the continuation of night bombing. In political terms, there were two paramount considerations. The first was to lend support to a hard-pressed Soviet Union following the German invasion in June 1941. At that time Bomber Command was the only British force capable of offering even a modicum of assistance. Secondly, in relation to Britain's own war effort, fortunes were at a low ebb in 1941 with the Royal Navy fully strained by the Battle of the Atlantic and the Army in retreat in North Africa. From this perspective alone the constellation of forces in favour of a continuing bombing offensive was unrelenting. It was thus a combination of operational and political considerations, in conjunction with the limited capabilities of the Army and Royal Navy, that provided the immediate background to the devising and launching of 'an ever increasing air bombardment of Germany.' 8 The wartime origins of Bomber Command's strategic air offensive can be traced back ultimately to Churchill's stated view to Lord Beaverbrook, following the defeat of France, that there was 'only one

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 137 sure path' to winning the war 'and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack of heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland. We must be able to overwhelm by this means, without which I do not see a way through.' 9 Although the subsequent poor results achieved by Bomber Command, confirmed by the Butt report, caused the Prime Minister to doubt 'whether bombing by itself would be a decisive factor/ rather than 'a seriously increasing annoyance,' 10 it was in July 1941 that the Chiefs of Staff committed themselves to an area bombing offensive to be launched as soon as practicably possible. In the history of aerial warfare this was a momentous decision, insofar as the primary target for attack was to be the morale of the German civilian population. 11 In subsequent discussion within the Chiefs of Staff and Air Staff organisations, it is apparent that there was 'a certain looseness' in the interpretation of the term morale: On the one hand it denoted the attack on a wide and heavy scale on the civilian population of Germany regardless of, or at least, with secondary consideration to, the intrinsic economic value of objectives; on the other hand the more limited but economically effective attack on the heavily built-up areas of major industrial towns with the aim of dislocating the lives of the industrial workers and thereby reducing their output to a level which would seriously affect and ultimately bring about the collapse of the German war economy as a whole.12 Divorced from economic objectives of a more or less precise nature, the area bombing of 'heavily built-up areas' conjures up certain unpleasant images. These have been conveyed well enough by John Terraine as being consistent with 'putting the fear of death into individuals. On a collective basis it means threatening a massacre.' 13 In 1941 it is fair to say that, notwithstanding the London blitz, such thoughts were confined to a small minority of military planners. For example, as an advocate of the destruction of German towns and cities, Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff and former Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, was of the opinion that the object of area bombing was 'to demolish factories, communications, the homes of the workers, the apparatus and amenities of major urban life.' Civilian deaths would undoubtedly occur but they would be minimised because industrial workers and their families 'would retreat from the urban areas to the countryside with consequent loss of production, or, if they remained, suffer loss of morale from hours spent in shelters and from the reduced amenities of life.'14

138 A History of Operational Research In reviewing the evolution of British bombing strategy against Germany in 1941-2 it is apparent that the official record of deliberations conveys considerable ambiguity. As noted already, the Chiefs of Staff took the view that as soon as the necessary four-engined aircraft were available, Bomber Command should embark upon an area offensive: more specifically, this would take the form of 'a planned attack on civilian morale' on such a scale as to bring about a complete collapse of the German war economy. 15 The Air Staff, however, envisaged a war on two fronts, with attacks on morale and the economy of equal importance. These objectives, moreover, were interdependent to the extent that 'economic distress would produce lowered morale while loss of spirit would increase economic strain.' 16 Semantics apart, it would appear that the latter view was capable of reconciliation with the former insofar as considerations of civilian morale were focussed clearly on the industrial workforce where it was assumed that nervous strain and fatigue would have an adverse effect on productive performance. The real ambiguity in bombing policy relates to the interpretation of its origins in the account of RAF operations prepared by the Air Historical Branch (AHB) of the Air Ministry in the later 1940s. In this it is stated clearly that 'as originally envisaged, the bombing offensive was to be directed against the most heavily built-up area of a town rather than the docks or factories unless the two points coincided.' In other words, 'the domestic lives' of the workers themselves should be the primary focus of attack.17 In this form the offensive was 'conceived by the Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Prime Minister.' More significantly, however, it was never intended to be more than 'a temporary measure, born of bitter experience' until such time as navigational techniques had improved to the point where Bomber Command could 'return to the precision attack of specific industrial objectives.' Stated in these terms, area bombing was 'a policy of despair,' driven forward by the ineffectiveness of early bombing operations and the political and military exigencies already noted. 18 The bombing offensive, launched in the spring of 1942, continued until the end of the war. Despite considerable improvement in Bomber Command's precision capabilities, its overall thrust remained as an area offensive directed principally at civilian targets. Whilst it is true that in the final eighteen months of the war the Command began to adopt a more flexible approach in relation to particular target systems (see below, pp. 165-6), Sir Arthur Harris remained committed to the view that the deployment of the heavy bomber force in favour of attacks on 'fleeting' or 'panacea' targets was an unwarranted diversion from the strategic

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 139 task allotted to his Command, namely to force a German capitulation in the wake of the mass destruction of towns and cities. Whilst Harris himself regarded civilian demoralisation as a useful by-product of the area attack strategy, 19 an early and possibly decisive endorsement of morale bombing emanated from F. A. Lindemann (now Lord Cherwell) in the form of a memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister at the end of 1942. Assessing what could be achieved in an eighteen-month period with a given weight of effort against the built-up areas of 58 German towns and cities with populations in excess of 100,000, Cherwell wrote: Investigation seems to show that having one's house demolished is most dangerous to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relations killed. At Hull signs of strain were evident even though only one-tenth of the homes were demolished. On the above figures we could do as much harm to each of the 58 principal German towns. There seems little doubt this would break the spirit of the people.20 Apart from the unconscious irony, it is significant that the Cherwell memorandum focussed entirely on civilian morale, making no reference to the effects of bombing on industrial output. Passed by the Prime Minister to the Secretary of State for Air (Sir Archibald Sinclair) and the Chief of the Air Staff for comment, it received their approval, prompted in part by the fact that Cherwell's calculations relating to the German bombing of Hull and Birmingham conformed broadly to the findings of a more detailed analysis of Luftwaffe attacks on Coventry carried out on behalf of the Air Staff in October 1941 by the Director of Bombing Operations. 21 In the historiography of the Second World War the Cherwell memorandum has become a cause celebre on account of its apparently decisive endorsement of area bombing on the part of a close friend and confidant of the Prime Minister, recently ennobled and appointed to Cabinet office as Paymaster-General. Public controversy erupted in 1961 with the delivery of C. P. Snow's Godkin lectures in which he portrayed Cherwell as an area bombing fanatic to the detriment of other legitimate calls on the striking force.22 Further critical comment stemmed from the pen of Patrick Blackett who in his Studies of War, published in 1962, claimed that he could 'vouch for the fundamental truth of Snow's account.' 23 In Blackett's case added credence was given to his remarks by virtue of the fact that he had been involved directly in the wartime debate on bombing policy in his capacity as Director of Naval Operational

140 A History of Operational Research Research and, together with Henry lizard, had sought to challenge the quantitative assumptions underlying the Cherwell memorandum. As he stated in retrospect: My [view] was that [Cherwell's] method of calculation was correct in principle, but that the actual numerical answer, that of the number of houses which could be destroyed within 18 months, was six times too high. The main mistake in the calculation was the assumption that all bombers which would be delivered from the factories in the next 18 months would in the same period have dropped all their bombs on Germany....24 Tizard, using the same basis of calculation as Blackett, independently assessed Cherwell's estimate as five times too high. According to Tizard's biographer, Cherwell responded to these criticisms by pointing out 'that all his calculations were intended to show was that a great deal of damage could be done by bombing in built-up areas,' a view with which Tizard, at least, did not disagree. 25 The fundamental division of opinion, however, related to the use of Bomber Command as a cohesive striking force at a particular stage in the war. For Tizard and Blackett in particular, the overwhelming strategic issue confronting Britain in 1942 was the anti-U-boat war in the Atlantic. An effective campaign required the deployment of long-range, heavy aircraft by Coastal Command in direct competition with the needs of Bomber Command. To the extent that an area bombing offensive against the German homeland could not produce decisive results in 1942 or 1943, neglect of the defence of convoys entailed the unacceptable risk of British defeat as a result of the rupture of the all-important Anglo-American supply line. The critical issue raised by the Cherwell memorandum was whether offence or defence should be the predominant factor in air strategy. In 1942 the argument went in favour of Cherwell by virtue of the Prime Minister's commitment to a bombing offensive in support of a Soviet Union in desperate straits in advance of the defeat of the German army at Stalingrad. In this respect, area bombing was Britain's response to Stalin's repeated calls for immediate assistance in advance of any military invasion of north-west Europe by the western allies. It was, in effect, a 'Second Front' in its own right which confirmed Britain's commitment to an offensive war. 27 A final insight into the Cherwell controversy was provided by Solly Zuckerman in his memoirs published in 1978.28 Described by Sir Maurice Dean as 'one of the best minds in operational research,' 29 Zuckerman had secured a reputation in 1940-1 as Britain's leading expert on the

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 141 human effects of blast damage. His work in this respect has been noted in the last chapter with particular reference to the analysis of air raid casualties (see above, pp. 125-6). An important aspect of Zuckerman's work was a survey of the effects of German bombing on Hull and Birmingham in 1940-1 on behalf of the Ministry of Home Security in collaboration with J. D. Bernal. The relevant survey had been carried out with Cherwell's knowledge and it was a most impressive and comprehensive piece of operational analysis, not least because the researchers had a tally of virtually all bombs dropped. After an exhaustive investigation, entailing extensive quantitative evaluation, the ZuckermanBernal report concluded that In neither town was there any evidence of panic resulting either from a series of raids or a single raid. The situation in Hull has been somewhat obscured from this point of view by the occurrence of trekking [people leaving the town at night], which was made possible by the availability of road transport and which was much publicised as a sign of breaking morale, but which in fact can be fairly regarded as a considered response to the situation. In both towns, actual raids were, of course, associated with a degree of alarm and anxiety which cannot in the circumstances be regarded as abnormal, and in which in no instance was sufficient to provoke mass anti-social behaviour. There was no massive effect on the health of either town.30 As Zuckerman revealed, Cherwell used the report as the empirical basis for his own calculations to justify an area bombing offensive on the grounds of its impact on civilian morale. But as the above quotation indicates, the Zuckerman-Bernal report stated 'the very reverse' of what Cherwell claimed. 31 In short, the Cherwell memorandum was seriously misleading and certainly provided no objective justification for an area bombing offensive. Commenting in retrospect on these wartime iterations, Blackett confessed to 'a haunting sense of personal failure/ feeling sure that Tizard had been of the same opinion. 32 Both men, Blackett in particular, may have had an emotional antipathy to the 'terror bombing' of civilians, but that was not the issue in 1942. They simply did not believe that area bombing could produce decisive results in an eighteen-month period in view of likely trends in aircraft production, the availability of trained aircrew and other valid demands on the supply of long-range bombers. To that extent, Zuckerman was correct in his assertion that the difference of opinion between Cherwell, Tizard and Blackett was 'a technical one.'

142 A History of Operational Research Blackett's controversial claim that the issue could have been resolved effectively if only Bomber Command had possessed 'a strong and trusted operational research section' which had subjected Cherwell's calculations to rigorous analysis is considered later in the chapter. In summarising the evidence thus far, it is apparent that the evolution of wartime bombing policy was subject to a complex of influences. At the most subjective level there was the understandable desire to deliver retaliatory blows against Germany in the wake of military reverses in North Africa and the Atlantic, and when a seaborne invasion of the Continent seemed an uncertain prospect. There was also the perceived need to lend support to the Soviet Union: at the very least, a bombing offensive, in drawing Luftwaffe fighter strength from the eastern front and in necessitating the formation of ack-ack divisions and extensive air-raid precautions within Germany itself, would reduce the pressures on Soviet forces. On less certain ground was the argument advanced by the Inter-Services Research Bureau in April 1942 that the German civilian population was, at that stage in the war, peculiarly susceptible to 'morale bombing.' In the light of adverse developments on the eastern front, the experience of a massive bombing offensive would bring home to German civilians 'the intense horrors of war' and also 'the horrors which would follow defeat and accompanying vengeance.' 33 If this smacked of wishful thinking, the Cherwell m e m o r a n d u m purported to stand on firmer ground. Although it took its stand on considerations of civilian morale, it was supported by an appeal to quantitative evidence. The 'evidence,' however, was used in a highly selective way to support a preconceived conclusion. Whilst Webster and Frankland's official history of the RAF in the Second World War concluded that Cherwell's intervention was 'not decisive,' 34 it is possible to agree with Zuckerman that without it the impetus to sustained area bombing would have been less urgent and certainly less compelling. During the winter of 1941-2 Bomber Command's operations against Germany had been limited by the previous commitment to conservation of aircraft and by the need to direct a considerable proportion of the available effort to attack two German battleships in harbour at Brest. By February 1942, however, circumstances were moving strongly in favour of the launching of the area offensive. The military situation in Russia was at crisis point, whilst morale in Britain was at a low ebb following the surrender of Singapore to the Japanese. More specifically in the context of Bomber Command, new airfields were becoming available at the same time as the supply of trained aircrew and the production

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 143 of heavy bombers were increasing markedly. Above all, the tactical abilities of the striking force were about to be revolutionised by the inception of new techniques of routing and concentration, together with improved navigational facilities. In these respects, Bomber Command's Operational Research Section (ORS), formed in September 1941, was to fulfil a vital role in enhancing the capabilities and effectiveness of the striking force. Prior to the formation of the ORS, scientific analysis of bombing operations had been carried out by A. E. Woodward-Nutt and Dr B. G. Dickens of the Department of the Director of Scientific Research at the Ministry of Aircraft Production. Their researches concentrated on the causes of aircraft losses, the efficiency of aircraft armament and a variety of signal problems. The formation of a dedicated ORS was prompted by the precedents already set in other military commands and also by the acute awareness, generated by the Butt report, of the need to increase the efficiency of operations in terms of 'bombs on the target per aircraft lost.' 35 In view of his long-standing involvement in operational research on behalf of the RAF, Dr Dickens was appointed Officer-in-Chief of the section. The first distribution of staff duties was issued in September 1941 and covered the following areas: Dr B. G. Dickens Dr R. J. Smeed Miss K. M. M. Goggin Mr G. W. H. Stevens Mr E. A. Lovell Mr L. A. Roberts Mr J. A. Jukes

Officer-in-Charge Study of bomber losses Study of bomber losses Study of success of bombing operations Study of vulnerability of bombers Study of radar and radio problems Study of radar and radio problems

From these modest beginnings the number of staff grew steadily as the area offensive increased in intensity. By the autumn of 1942 the establishment had reached 41. A further expansion to 51 officers was approved in April 1943 and the maximum wartime establishment of 55 was reached in August of that year.36 Shortly after the formation of the ORS, day operations were identified as a further area of study. Coincidentally, it was realised that 'the study of radar problems was too closely linked to both the study of the success of bomber operations and that of bomber losses for it to be pursued in a separate section.' 37 Thus, the ORS began to be reorganised from early 1942 onwards on the basis of specialist sub-sections. At the end of the war the organisation was as follows:

144

A History of Operational Research

Officer-in Charge ORS Administrative Officer ORS 1 Research into Success of Operations

ORS 1(a) General tactical success of operations ORS 1(b) Bombing accuracy and weapon effectiveness ORS 1(c) Bombing training

ORS 2 Research into Bomber Losses

ORS ORS ORS ORS

2(a) 2(b) 2(c) 2(d)

Bomber tactics Radio counter-measures Aircraft vulnerability Causes of bomber losses

ORS 4 General Problems

ORS ORS ORS ORS

4(a) 4(b) 4(c) 4(d)

Use of night photography Airfield control Bomber Command Review Night and day raid reports

ORS 5 Research into Radar Aids

ORS 5(a) Use and accuracy of blind bombing aids ORS 5(b) Use and accuracy of navigational aids

ORS 3 Statistical Section

ORS 6 Research into Manpower and Economy Detachments

(a) Group Representatives Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 100 and Pathfinder Force (b) Bombing Development Unit Representatives (c) Bomber C o m m a n d Bombing Research Unit (Investigations) (d) Group Damage Inspectors Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 Group

ORS 3 was initially responsible for the analysis of day operations, but when daylight bombing was suspended early in 1943 it was reconstituted as the Statistical Section responsible for the collation of data emanating from each Bomber Command sortie. As for the position of the ORS in the Command organisation, it differed to experience elsewhere in that it was placed under the Senior Air Staff Officer rather

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 145 than the Commander-in-Chief. The ORS was therefore a branch of the Air Staff, although Dickens, as officer-in-charge, had open access to the Commander-in-Chief.38 At the inception of the ORS the then Commander-in-Chief, Sir Richard Peirse, formulated a broad programme of research with the precise content left to Dickens in consultation with senior members of his staff. The overall objective at this early stage 'was to study the success of operations, in terms of the percentage of aircraft dispatched which bombed the target, and make recommendations whereby the percentage could be improved.' 39 Central to this task was the need to engage in 'raid analysis': Considered as an entity the individual raid has a more or less complex structure, and if consideration is restricted to its active phase in the target area, a relatively short life. The ultimate units of which the raid is composed are individual aircraft moving through space at considerable speeds, but along various contorted tracks. At a critical point in each track the bomb-load is dropped. The raid as a whole is then the aggregate of these tracks considered in their mutual inter-relationships; it is a warp, the strands of which are the individual aircraft tracks. If the actual raid-as-awhole can be reconstructed and studied it will be found to differ more or less from the raid as planned; such differences either may be of the order expected (from past experience) by the planners, or they may be critically large so as to be significantly discrepant from the planners' intentions. The problem is to reconstruct the raid, compare it with the plan, and (if possible) to account for major discrepancies between them.40 Raid analyses were based upon three sources of information. In the first instance, a detailed report was prepared in the aftermath of every operational sortie in order to collate information on bombs carried and dropped, method of bomb release, and general conditions in the target area. Supplementary information was obtained from operational photographs and daylight photographic reconnaissance. The former were a vital adjunct to sortie raid reports because they enabled the position of the aircraft when bombing to be fixed in space and time with considerable accuracy. In the latter case, the aftermath of most major raids was surveyed by aircraft of the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit. The resulting images were then analysed with a view to identifying the number of bomb craters and their distribution. The most elaborate analyses were undertaken on behalf of the ORS by the Research and Experiments Department (RE8) of the Ministry of Home Security.

146 A History of Operational Research The analytical methods deployed by the ORS in evaluating the effects of individual raids were both qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative analysis was based upon individual sortie raid reports and photographic intelligence. Together, they facilitated the construction of a 'time histogram' of bombing and its unique distribution in each raid. In this context, operational research scientists acted in a manner akin to 'the detective' of fiction insofar as 'a great number of strands of evidence [were] mentally assessed for reliability (mainly for their coherence and mutual consistency) and then woven together to form what is, in effect, a reconstruction of the raid' in the form of its 'life history.' 41 Thus, In the case of a raid which has fallen below expectation (and these are the raids mainly selected for study), the time when and reasons why it failed will usually emerge as analysis proceeds. For example, it might be that a small group of aircraft claim to have bombed a cluster of red target indicators at a time when it is known that more were burning; one of these aircraft may have been plotted away from the main concentration and their descriptions of the target area may make it probable that the others were part of the same division. The evidence points to the use of decoy target indicators by the enemy. Moreover, this might be an isolated incident limited in time to about ten minutes, or it might have the effect of attracting most of the rest of the raid.42 As for methods of quantitative analysis, the main requirement was to characterise any given raid by some numerical measure of success, or by a set of such measurements, so that a whole series of raids carried out by one bombing technique can be compared with other series carried out by other techniques; also, so that seasonable and longer-term changes in accuracy and the varying effects of weather can be assessed.43 The relevant 'measure of success' was defined in terms of the 'bombfall distribution' as indicated by the results of photographic intelligence. The sources of data and methods of analysis employed by the ORS proved to be critical ingredients in enhancing the effectiveness of the striking force. The object of qualitative analysis was to provide a rapid estimation of tactical success and the reasons for relative failure of operations. Distributed to Bomber Command headquarters and the Air Officers commanding Groups participating in the operation concerned, qualitative analyses 'were of obvious practical importance, and made concrete suggestions for improving future operations.' 44 In contrast, the

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 147 results of quantitative analysis appeared to be 'somewhat academic and unpractical,' at least in the short term. However, raid parameters which are the end-product of the process of quantitative analysis, became in turn the new data for further researches. By collecting the parameters for whole groups of comparable raids, it became possible to characterise the groups as a whole in a reasonably exact way, and thence to compare one group with another. Thus, the way was open to assessing and comparing different bombing techniques, to furnish precise information on the accuracy of Bomber Command attacks under given conditions, and to estimate the weight of attack required in future operations.45 The ORS engaged in quantitative analysis throughout the campaign of area attack. The parameters had to be re-calculated continually as the striking force improved in effectiveness in terms of aircraft bombing the aiming point of the operation. The derived data was used in the estimation of force requirements when the bombing effort was turned on to the attack of multiple targets preceding the Normandy landings and thereafter in the campaign against communication centres and in attacks in support of the ground battle. Up to August 1941, in advance of the introduction of radar aids to navigation and highly developed marking techniques, the only available means of navigation and bomb aiming were 'compass, loop and sextant, combined with such visual identification of ground detail' that could be made 'by starlight, moonlight, or in the light of an occasional unshaded flare.'46 In these circumstances, difficulties in navigating to the target area were compounded by the need to obtain a visual fix of the target itself or of a clearly identifiable landmark in order to make a dead reckoning run. Since the process of searching for the target could occupy the better part of an hour in the face of intense anti-aircraft fire, the reasons for the lack of success of Bomber Command's early night raids can be well appreciated. ORS studies of these raids, based upon photographic analysis, demonstrated the need for crews, whenever possible, to use more than one feature to identify the target. Indeed, of crews claiming to have identified a single ground feature, the ORS calculated that only 33 per cent located the target successfully compared with 47 per cent for those who used two features, and 82 per cent for those who used more than two. In addition, the ORS identified significant differences in the reliability of various ground features for visual fixing.

148 A History of Operational Research The most popular features — lakes and rivers — proved the least reliable, whilst coastal features, docks in particular, were the most trustworthy. All of these observations were passed on to Bomber Command stations together with exhortations for a general improvement in standards of map-reading to be obtained from training flights at operational heights in British airspace. One critical recommendation for an improvement in target identification was that consideration should be given 'to the formation of specialist squadrons to initiate raids and to raise fires.' The same report, submitted to Bomber Command headquarters in December 1941, also stressed the need for 'the use of reconnaissance flares by a number of aircraft in co-operation.' 47 Together, these recommendations led to the formation of the much-famed Pathfinder Squadrons which commenced operations in August 1942 with a view to improving the accuracy and visual impact of target marking. At the end of 1941, the ORS concluded that in the absence of clear moonlight conditions, the ability of the striking force to inflict substantial physical damage on Germany's urban centres was dependent upon the introduction of radio aids which would make successful night attacks less dependent on the visual identification of ground features. The first radio aid, known as Gee (Ground Electronics Engineering), was developed by the Telecommunication Research Establishment, and was first used operationally in a raid on Essen in March 1942. The Gee system was based on the measurement in the aircraft of the phase difference between signals transmitted from three ground stations. As such, it was designed to enable large numbers of aircraft to navigate 'with certainty' to specific targets in Germany, with a particular focus on the Ruhr industrial towns. Before Gee was brought into use, the ORS, conscious that the device was susceptible to enemy jamming, engaged in a research programme designed to derive maximum short term benefit from its deployment. The overall conclusion from the analysis of early Gee raids, was that its beneficial effects were confined to raids undertaken in specific weather conditions and on certain classes of target. Given Gee's limited range, its positive impact on navigation and routing was most marked against short-range targets in the northern Ruhr area, and under meteorological conditions which were unfavourable for visual identification. In conditions of light moonlight and good visibility, Gee's contribution to routing accuracy was negligible, but in cloudy, hazy or moonless conditions it produced measurable results to the extent that from April 1942 onwards the striking force was deployed principally in moonless conditions.

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 149 German jamming of Gee was confirmed early in August 1942 and it was this factor that persuaded Bomber Command's Commander-in-Chief, Sir Arthur Harris, to authorise the formation of the Pathfinder Force despite his concern that the 'creaming off of squadrons' in terms of 'elite' aircrew would have an adverse effect on morale. Jamming of Gee reduced its range from 400 miles to 250-300 miles from Daventry thereby eliminating all worthwhile German targets. But although Gee could no longer be used as an aid to target identification, it was still of value as a navigational aid over the greater part of the route to the Ruhr. 49 From the inception of the Pathfinder Force, Bomber Command's ORS was committed to enhancing its organisation and effectiveness. In the former category, ORS reports led to improved methods of crew selection and training, optimal numbers of Pathfinder aircraft in the main striking force, and the compilation of a manual describing the role and functions of Pathfinder crews on behalf of the Main Force. 50 In March 1943, the ORS compiled a major report on the accuracy of bombing operations based upon 316 raids and 38,000 sorties. The main parameter — the percentage of sorties bombing within three miles of the aiming point — was applied to three distinct sub-periods, and produced the following results:

Table 5.1.

Percentage of attacking sorties within three miles of aiming point.

Pre-Gee Period to March 1942 Coastal Towns 33% Ruhr Towns 14% Other Inland Towns 23% Gee Period: March 1942 to August 1942 Coastal Towns 44% Ruhr Towns 11% Other Inland Towns 29% Early Pathfinder Force Period: August 1942 to February 1943 Coastal Towns 27% Ruhr Towns 34% Other Inland Towns 18% Source: Air Ministry (Air Historical Branch), Operational Research in Bomber Command (1949), pp. 106-7.

150 A History of Operational Research Whilst the introduction of Gee was consistent with a positive effect on most raids, the results in the heavily-defended Ruhr were disappointing. With the introduction of the Pathfinder Force, however, target finding improved significantly over the Ruhr. This was where the striking force was concentrated, although even here, the improvement in the proportion of bombs hitting the target area was not accompanied by improvement in the accuracy of attack. The real breakthrough in the latter respect was achieved during the course of 1943 as a result of the innovation of considerably more sophisticated radio aids to navigation. The first, known as ' O b o e ' was developed by the Telecommunications Research Establishment as a 'blind' bombing device as aircraft were directed to the target along a fixed radio beam emanating from a tracking station. At the designated aiming point, two ground stations signalled the aircraft to release its bombs. The accuracy of Oboe was initially estimated at a remarkable twenty yards, although the chief limitation of the system was that the single pair of ground stations could only deal with one aircraft every ten to 15 minutes. 51 ORS studies of bombing operations had demonstrated clearly that if the aiming point could be identified visually, or on the basis of target marking flares, successful attacks could be achieved. The fundamental problem, however, was to identify the aiming point at the inception of the attack. Prior to the operational use of Oboe, the ORS conceived the idea that if Oboe aircraft could drop a distinctive mark on the aiming point at zero hour and replenish it, say, every three minutes, an accurate and easily seen aiming point would be provided for the whole bomber force. This would require, say, four pairs of ground stations and one squadron of high flying aircraft such as Wellington Vis or Mosquitoes [sic].52 The Air Staff at Bomber Command accepted this suggestion for attacks on the Ruhr which were to be supplemented by a new system of target indicators as recommended by the ORS. Thus, Aircraft flying at 28,000 to 30,000 feet marked the Oboe with red target indicators (T.I.) approximately one every five minutes (there were two Oboe channels — two pairs of stations working on different frequencies — each channel being able to deal with one aircraft every ten minutes). To provide continuity (as The T.I.s only burnt for a few minutes) and to guard against failure of Oboe aircraft, 'Backers-up' were provided. These Backers-up, which were normal heavy bombers, dropped green T.I. visually on the Red

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 151 T.I. (or on previous greens if no reds were visible). The main force bombed the red T.I. if visible, otherwise they bombed the Green T.I.53 Taken together, these developments were probably the greatest contribution to the increase in the effectiveness of bombing operations.' 54 The first Oboe attacks inaugurated the 'Battle of the Ruhr' and lasted for the greater part of 1943. They resulted in a quantum leap in Bomber Command's effectiveness. Indeed, the first significant Oboe ground marking operation, launched against Essen in March 1943 by a force of 400 aircraft, resulted in severe damage to a target which had been attacked on numerous occasions previously with little effect: the greater part of the residential area was burnt out and the Krupps armaments works were damaged severely for the first time. At the same time as Oboe was being developed, the Telecom­ munications Research Establishment was also investigating the possibility of airborne radar. The ultimate objective was to provide all aircraft in the striking force w i t h the capability to b o m b b u i l t - u p areas independently. The relevant equipment, known as H2S, was derived from A.S.V. radar. Operating on the more accurate centimetric band, it held out the prospect of releasing Bomber Command from the limitations imposed by range from ground stations as in the case of Gee and Oboe. Given the limited supply of H2S radar sets at the beginning of the Battle of the Ruhr, it was decided as an interim measure to deploy H2S as an aid to Pathfinding. By January 1943, two flights of the Pathfinder force had been equipped. At the end of September, the whole of the force had H2S, and by February 1944 its deployment in the main striking force was well underway. 55 During February and March 1943 the ORS examined the results of ten raids in which H2S had been used for target marking. In accounting for the limited degree of success, the ORS analysis pointed to a number of problems. In the first instance, the early H2S raids were characterised by the very small number of primary target indicators (i.e. those dropped blindly via H2S) which were burning at any one time. The practical effect was to limit the effectiveness of target marking on the part of back-up Pathfinder aircraft which were not equipped with H2S. Thus, many raids were poorly centred on the target. A further difficulty, beyond the control of aircrew, was the low serviceability of the early H2S equipment. Indeed, the ORS calculated that only 55 per cent of sorties arrived in the target area with serviceable radar sets. Moreover, fewer than half of the crews with working sets used it for blind marking, the rest releasing their target

152 A History of Operational Research markers visually. Blind marking itself was subject to large errors and the situation was further aggravated by the poor timing of arrival of the marker aircraft, especially in relation to longer range targets. After reviewing all of these problems the ORS secured the adoption of the following recommendations: (a) That Pathfinder crews whose H2S was working satisfactorily must use it for marking, and must not be tempted to release on visual identification. (b) That the blind markers, instead of being spread throughout the attack, should all be detailed to attack at the beginning of the raid (at zero minus one), or if considered necessary, in two waves, one at the beginning and one in the middle of the raid. (c) In view of the fact that raids on which visual marking in the light of flares laid by H2S aircraft had been used as the primary marking method had proved much more successful than those on which purely blind marking was employed, it was recommended that this technique be used whenever weather conditions would permit.56 The problems encountered in primary marking were compounded by the fact that even when the target was marked satisfactorily, the raid as a whole tended to move backwards along the line of attack. ORS time analyses revealed that the resulting shift in the centre of the attack was due primarily to back-up aircraft which displayed 'a strong tendency to undershoot the main concentration/ Since back-up aircraft dropped their target indicators at intervals during the attack, each aiming at target indicators already dropped, undershooting was invariably cumulative so that in an attack, say of 25 minutes, the drift from the centre could amount to several miles. In making suggestions to correct the shift in the centre of the attack, the ORS focussed on the need for frequent 'recentering' via H2S as the raid proceeded. Whilst this led to improved results, the problem was not resolved finally until 1944 when back-up aircraft were eliminated as a result of the employment of smaller forces which, in shortening the duration of the attack, required only primary marking. In the meantime, the Pathfinder Force was able to avail itself of the so-called 'Newhaven technique' of target marking which emanated from the ORS analyses of the early H2S raids. The Air Historical Branch account provides a succinct summary of its development: In the original form of the Newhaven method the attack was opened by a wave of H2S aircraft, all detailed to attack at the same time, who would blindmark the target with target indicators

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 and at the same time illuminate it with sticks of flares. These blindmarker illuminators, as they were called, were followed after an interval of about two minutes by a smaller number of visual markers, whose function was to identify the aiming point visually in the light of the flares and to mark it accurately with target indicators of a distinctive colour. If they were unable to do this on account of weather or any other reason, they would refrain from dropping their markers. Finally came the backers-up, attacking at the rate of one or two per minute throughout the duration of the attack, who would either back-up the visual marker's target indicators or, if these had not been dropped, would centre the attack on the... the blind marker's target indicators. The later backers-up, arriving after the primary markers had died out, would continue to back-up the target indicators of previous backers-up. On the early Newhaven attacks both the visual markers and the backers-up both used the same colour target indicators. This was a highly dangerous procedure since the backers-up had no means of telling whether they were in fact backing up the primary marking or were simply aiming at target indicators dropped by previous backers-up which might or might not be accurate. It was also unsatisfactory from the point of view of the main force who had no method of distinguishing the more accurate visual target indicators from the less accurate secondary target indicators. This plan of attack was partly responsible for the poor results of the attack on the Skoda Works at Pilsen on 13/14 May 1943 which led the ORS to put forward a suggestion for a modified form of Newhaven attack employing target indicators of three different colours. It was suggested that the blind markers should use yellow target indicators, the visual markers red, and the backers-up green. The three colour Newhaven was first tried out on the Pathfinder Force experimental raid on Munster on 11/12 June 1943, and remained in general use throughout 1943. The use of the yellow target indicators by the blind markers was eventually abandoned when, early in 1944, the hooded flare came into general use, since it was found that these flares when viewed through haze were liable to be mistaken for yellow target indicators. This was thought to have led to some confusion on the raid on Frankfurt on 20/21 December 1943 and on subsequent attacks the colour scheme was changed to green for blind marking, red or large salvoes of mixed red and green for visual marking, and green for backing-up. The first raid on which this modified colour scheme was tried (Stettin 5/6 January 1944) was not an outstanding success but on subsequent operations the scheme proved reasonably satisfactory.57

153

154 A History of Operational Research A major advantage of the Newhaven method was that when weather conditions pre-empted visual marking of the aiming point, 'the attack would automatically develop as a blind H2S groundmarking raid/ More than half of the Newhaven raids in 1943 developed in this manner, but during 1944 and 1945, as visual marking skills and the quality of illumination improved, a rising proportion of attacks developed as 'Visual Newhavens.' According to the Air Historical Branch account, 'This was one of the many factors contributing to the steady improvement in the efficiency of [the Pathfinder Force] and consequently the Command as the war progressed.' 58 From 1943 until the end of the war in Europe, Bomber Command's ORS monitored the bombing accuracy of the striking force against a range of German towns and cities in terms of aiming point densities. The results are presented in Table 5.2. The density is defined in two ways: the absolute density in tons per square mile at the aiming point is a measure of the scale of attack, whilst the relative density at the aiming point is the absolute density per 1000 tons dropped and is independent of the scale of attack and provides a measure of accuracy, including both centering and scatter. The table indicates an average absolute density of 57 tons per square mile at the aiming point in 1943, with a range of 3.2 to 216 tons per square mile. The equivalent figures for 1944-5 were an average absolute density of nearly four times as great as in 1943, with a range from 23.7 to 658 tons per square mile. The 1943 average for relative density was 33 tons per square mile per 1000 tons dropped, with a five­ fold increase to 174 in 1944-5. Even allowing for two daylight raids in the later period, there was an increase in the accuracy of night bombing to 122.4 tons per square mile per 1000 tons dropped — 3.7 times the accuracy achieved in 1943.59 A further indication of Bomber Command's mounting accuracy was that at the inception of the area campaign the ORS calculated the results of raids in terms of the percentage of aircraft bombing within five miles of the target. During 1943 the distance was reduced to three miles, falling to one mile during the course of 1945. These results, the fruits of new equipment and operational research, receive some confirmation from Fig. 5.1, prepared by the ORS at the end of the war. The figure is also consistent with the Air Historical Branch account which claimed that 1942 was essentially a year of experiment in which 'new ideas, new methods [and] new scientific devices' played critical roles in facilitating concentration of the striking force. This was exemplified in the thousand bomber raids of May and June 1942, exceptional efforts in themselves but marking a watershed in

Table 5.2.

Density at the aiming point — German towns and cities (calculated from raid parameters).

Target

Date

Absolute Density (tons/sq. mile)

Relative Density (per 1000 tons dropped)

Target

Duisburg Duisburg Bochum Dortmund Barmen Dusseldorf Drefeld Cologne Mannheim Hamburg Hamburg Nurnberg Manheim Hannover Kassel Hannover Kassel

26/27-4-43 12/13-5-43 13-14-5-43 23/24-5-43 29/30-5-43 11/12-6-43 21/22-6-43 3/4-7-43 16/17-4-43 24/25-7-43 27/28-7-43 27/28-8-43 23/24-9-43 27/28-9-43 3/4-10-43 8/9-10-43 22/23-10-43 Average

8.5 53.4 21.0 35.2 84.3 145.5 86.8 72.5 7.5 47.8 7.7 3.8 28.6 3.2 39.0 108.9 216.1 57.1

5.9 36.6 21.1 16.3 46.6 72.0 44.6 40.5 22.6 20.2 3.3 2.2 15.4 1.4 25.1 64.8 128.8

Stuttgart Hamburg Russelsheim Bremen Russelsheim Frankfurt Saarbrucken Dortmund Bochum Wilhelmshaven Bochum Freiburg Ludwigshaven Magdeburg Nurnberg Emden Munster

3M

Date

25/26-7-44 28/29-7-44 12/13-8-44 18/19-8-44 25/26-8-44 12/13-9-44 5/6-10-44 6/7-10-44 9/10-10-44 15/16-10-44 4/5-10-44 27/28-11-44 2/3-1-45 16/17-1-45 2/3-1-45 6/9-44 )* 12/9/44 )* Average Increase over 1943:

Absolute Density (tons/sq. mile)

Relative Density (per 1000 tons)

159.1 48.9 23.7 108.1 139.0 328.2 89.8 305.7 46.1 349.8 658.4 287.2 182.6 238.3 182.7 463.6 110.5 218.9 3.8 fold

110.2 42.4 24.5 95.6 89.4 212.0 54.0 184.3 31.7 163.8 198.3 169.3 149.5 223.5 87.7 797.5 315.7 173.5 5.2 fold

* = Day raids Source: Air Ministry (Air Historical Branch), Operational Research in Bomber Command (1949), Table 1, p. 110.

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the conception of the bomber force not, as in the past a collection of individual aircraft but as a single, cohesive and decisive weapon capable of being used with deadly effect against any target or on any task required by the strategic situation.60 But if 1942 was a watershed in Bomber Command's offensive capability, 1943 was to be the year when the strategy of area bombing would reach sufficient momentum to encourage Sir Arthur Harris in the belief that he had at his disposal the means to secure a German capitulation. Figure 5.2 lends support to this insofar as it depicts 1943 as the decisive year in relation to the increased tonnage of bombs dropped per sortie at a time when aiming point accuracy was improving significantly. Harris's confidence could only have been increased by the arrival in Britain of substantial numbers of American heavy bombers committed to daylight precision bombing as a complement to night-time area bombing on the part of his own command. In reviewing the progress of the area offensive in a memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister on 3 November 1943, Harris assessed 19 German towns as 'virtually destroyed' and a further 19 as 'seriously damaged/ all of them centres of substantial importance to the enemy war effort.61 A more detailed progress report was submitted

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 157

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to the Air Ministry in December, in which Harris forecast that by 1 April 1944, 37,750 acres of built-up area would have been destroyed out of a total target area of 89,000 acres. Moreover, the population of the towns attacked would be over 75 per cent of the total population of towns in Germany with more than 50,000 inhabitants. Thus, by the end of 1943, Harris 'felt certain that Germany must collapse before his programme, which was more than half completed already, should have proceeded much further.' 62 In the context of the original objective laid down in 1942 at the inception of area bombing — the breaking of the morale of the German civilian population — the Chief of the Air Staff informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff in November 1943 that the effects of the air offensive on German morale were of 'tremendous importance' in view of the fact that up to six million people had been rendered homeless 'and were spreading alarm and despondency in the areas into which they had gone.' 6 3 This view was reinforced by a contemporary appreciation by Air Intelligence and the Political Warfare Executive of the effects of area bombing during 1943: (a) Fear of air attack has been the dominant preoccupation of a large part of the German civilian population, and has contributed to produce a situation in which fear of the consequences of continuing the war is becoming greater than fear of the consequences of defeat.

158 A History of Operational Research (b) Air attacks on Germany have resulted in social disruption on a scale which has greatly impaired the German ability to prosecute the war. (c) Though the forces of repression, the hopes of compromise with one or other of the belligerents, and the favourable climatic conditions of the past three months have so far prevented any general break in morale, it is not unreasonable to infer that... such [a] break in morale can occur.64 A further optimistic report on the progress of the area offensive was presented to the Air Ministry at the beginning of March 1944. This was based on an analysis carried out by Department RE 8 of the Ministry of Home Security. Staffed by operational researchers, the department calculated that Bomber Command's attacks during March-December 1943 had cost Germany one million man-years, or 36 per cent of the potential industrial effort of the 29 towns attacked in this period. Since the relevant towns contained a high proportion of war-related industries it was thus reasonable to assume that the figures of man-hours lost contained a high proportion of skilled workers' time. As the report concluded, This being so, a Lancaster [bomber] has only to go to a German city once to wipe off its own capital cost, and the result of all subsequent sorties will be clear profit.66 The message conveyed in these reports and assessments is clear: area bombing, via its effects on civilian morale, held out the prospect of a German capitulation without the need for a military invasion of the Continent. Indeed, as far as Bomber Command was concerned, an allied victory could have been achieved before the end of 1943 if only the striking force could have delivered the necessary weight of attack. This view was stated explicitly in the Command's Quarterly Review for December 1943: Had resources been available for the execution of the Combined Bomber Offensive on the scale as planned it would also have been the year of victory over Germany. As it is, although we have gone a long way and the end is now in sight, the decisive blows have yet to be delivered.67 The reference to the availability of resources is apposite, especially in relation to the delivery of so-called 'decisive blows.' In this context, Sir Arthur Harris took the view that in terms of the supply of warrelated resources, his Command should have first priority. Not only that, he felt entitled to resist vigorously any calls on the use of the striking

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 159 force which he regarded as serious diversions from the primary offensive against Germany. Unsurprisingly, in the light of changing military perspectives on the part of a War Cabinet increasingly obliged to collaborate in the formulation of 'Grand Strategy' in partnership with the Soviet Union and the USA, Harris was to find himself periodically engaged in bitter dispute concerning the diversion of his command to 'secondary fronts' and 'panacea targets.' This occurred, for example, at the very outset of the area offensive in 1942 when Harris succeeded in retrieving 60 bomber crews from Middle East Command after accusations that the latter had creamed off 'the best part of a thousand crews/ few of whom returned to Britain.68 Of even greater consequence for Bomber Command was the 'Pointblank' directive in June 1943 which launched a Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany in cooperation with the US Eighth Air Force. The first draft of the directive stated that the immediate and primary focus of attack for the combined striking forces should be 'enemy fighters in the air and on the ground.' This was the direct product of devastating losses on the American side during the first half of the year and concern that the effective bombing of Germany, whether on a precision or area basis, necessitated the destruction not only of the Luftwaffe but also its supplying industries. As the Official History notes, 'There was not a single mention of the general area attack on German morale.' Yet the final draft, whilst stating that the 'first priority' was the attack on the German air force, reinforced the 'primary object' as being 'the undermining of the morale of the German people,' as stated by the British Chiefs of Staff in October 1942. In effect, therefore, the object of defeating German fighter strength was 'specifically allotted to the [US]...Air Force and to the Eighth Air Force alone,' thereby enabling Bomber Command to continue with the campaign of area attack. 69 These episodes are illustrative of Sir Arthur Harris's overwhelming commitment to a particular military objective and his ability to carry the day against political doubters, sceptics within the Air Staff, and rival commands. In relation to the theme of this chapter, therefore, it is significant that his principal reverses were at the hands of civilian operational researchers. Two issues of crucial military importance stand out in this respect, first, the Bay offensive against the U-boats in 1943 (see above, pp. 104-6) and secondly, the allied preparations for the invasion of the Continent under the cover of 'Operation Overlord in 1944. In the former case, the immediate cause of dispute was the submission in March 1943 of an Admiralty paper to the Anti-U-boat

160 A History of Operational Research Committee chaired by the Prime Minister. The paper, prepared by Patrick Blackett in his capacity as Director of Naval Operational Research, noted the rapidly mounting shipping losses in the North Atlantic and ascribed them to the U-boats' successful countermeasures against radar detection. Blackett called, therefore, for the diversion of 90 heavy bombers from Bomber to Coastal Command, a reinforcement which in his view would effectively contain the renewed U-boat challenge. 70 As noted already, the Admiralty exercised operational control over Coastal Command and it seems perverse at first sight that Blackett's request should have elicited a vitriolic response from the Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshall Sir John Slessor. In denying the need for additional aircraft Slessor referred, in a well-quoted passage, to 'slide-rule strategy of the worst kind,' before concluding that the anti-U-boat offensive should be tackled from 'a less scientific, namely, less quantitative, but more practical angle.' 71 What Coastal Command required was not additional aircraft, but 'aircraft of the right type with the right sort of radar and with crews trained in the right sort of way'. In appraising this episode, Sir Bernard Lovell commented that there were strengths and weaknesses on both sides of the argument. 72 Blackett's numerical calculations, for example were more relevant for 1942 than 1943, and in Slessor's case there was an apparent complacency in the face of steeply rising shipping losses after the sustained fall observable in the last three months of 1942. What is really significant about the Blackett-Slessor exchange, however, is that it was more a reflection of the latter's commitment to the area offensive as the primary claimant on resources in contrast to his own needs. In Slessor's view, Coastal Command was essentially a defensive organisation which should draw 'as little as possible on limited resources.' More to the point, Bomber Command's area offensive under Harris's direction represented 'true air warfare' and Slessor shared fully Harris's belief that area bombing could win the war outright without the need for 'great land battles on the scale of the First World War.'73 In his memoirs, Slessor sought to explain Blackett's stance by reference to his intellectual and temperamental opposition to area bombing, a view which receives some credence from Blackett's public opposition to the use and spread of nuclear weapons. 74 Whatever the truth in this there can be little doubt that it was official perceptions of Blackett's scepticism on the merits ofarea bombing which encouraged his marginalisation in strategic debate to the point where he was excluded from any role in the preparation of Operation Overlord. Nevertheless, the impact of his intervention in 1943 can be gauged from the fact that during the course of the year Coastal

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 161 Command was reinforced by a further 72 heavy aircraft in the face of determined opposition from Bomber Command. For Sir Arthur Harris the activities of Coastal Command represented an unacceptable diversion of effort from the area offensive and hence 'an obstacle to victory.' 75 It remains to be said that the ultimate diversion was represented by Operation Overlord which called for an intensive programme of precision bombing both before and after the allied landings in Normandy. In short, the invasion of the Continent necessitated Bomber Command's deployment in tactical support of the allied armies to the detriment of the strategic air offensive. Harris's deeply hostile reaction to Overlord had been foreshadowed in a personal minute addressed to the Prime Minister immediately after the first 'Thousand Bomber Raid' on Cologne in May 1942: It is imperative, if we hope to win the war, to abandon the disastrous policy of military intervention in the land campaigns of Europe, and to concentrate our air power against the enemy's weakest spots. The success of the 1000 plan [has] proved beyond doubt in the minds of all but wilful men that we can even today dispose of a weight of air attack which no country on which it can be brought to bear could survive. We can bring it to bear on the vital part of Germany. It requires only the decision to concentrate it for its proper use.76 A land campaign, moreover, 'would play right into Germany's hand,' leading to mass slaughter 'in the mud of Flanders and France.' 77 This view that Bomber Command could deliver the British Army from a fate pre-ordained by experience in the First World War was widely held in the upper echelons of the RAF, even beyond the spring of 1944 when detailed planning for Overlord was in its final stages. Indeed, as late as December 1943, in the midst of sustained attacks by Bomber Command on Berlin, Harris claimed that the Lancaster force [by then in excess of 40 squadrons] alone should be sufficient to produce in Germany by April 1st 1944 a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable.78 It is not surprising, therefore, that the prospect of Bomber Command's subordination to the needs of Overlord in general and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) in particular, should have elicited from him a robust but dogmatic plea for the uninterrupted continuation of the area offensive. In a memorandum addressed to the Air Ministry in January 1944 entitled 'The Employment of the Night Bomber Force in

162 A History of Operational Research Connection with the Invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom' Harris reminded his superiors that the primary objective of his command was the destruction of 'the enemy's industrial centres.' 7 9 In that connection, specialised aircraft and operational tactics had been developed, chiefly for use at night. The striking force, moreover, was 'quite incapable of being brought into action against "fleeting targets".' It followed, therefore, that 'A planned schedule of heavy bomber operations to give assistance to ground forces would be extremely unreliable and almost wholly futile.' These judgements and presumptions did not go unchallenged since both the AEAF and the Air Ministry itself qualified virtually every statement in the Harris memorandum. The decisive factor, however, in securing Harris's subordination to the needs of Overlord was the decision of Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder, the designated Deputy Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, to request that Solly Zuckerman should leave Combined Operations to join the AEAF Bombing Committee in the role of Scientific Advisor on Planning. On completing his work on air raid casualties, (see above, pp. 125-6), Zuckerman had been appointed to the staff of Combined Operations, spending the greater part of 1943 in the Mediterranean theatre of war. During this time he worked in an advisory capacity to Tedder, the then overall Air Commander, in preparing highly detailed bombing plans and then analysing the results in support of land forces in North Africa, Sicily and Southern Italy. Zuckerman's quantitative assessments pointed to the fact that the swiftness of the allied advances in these areas had been heavily dependent on the precision bombing of communications networks in general and enemy-held railheads in particular. In the case of Sicily and Southern Italy the rail systems had been 'practically paralysed' by the end of July 1943 as a result of bombing attacks on only six rail centres — Naples, Foggia, San Giovanni, Reggio, Messina and Palermo. The enemy was thus forced to rely heavily on motor transport to the detriment of oil and petrol supplies to the field forces.80 Tedder's response was to relate these findings directly to the needs of Overlord, insofar as they supported the conclusion that concentrated, precise attacks upon railway targets scientifically selected could probably produce a degree of disruption and immobility which might make all the difference to the success or failure of the long-awaited invasion of France. The clear and detailed reports submitted by Professor Zuckerman convinced me that this was the right method of attack.81

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 163 Enjoying 'complete confidence in Zuckerman's knowledge and judgement/ Tedder pressed the case with extreme determination for the adoption of a 'Transportation Plan' with the object of destroying the rail network of northern France. His efforts are recounted in Zuckerman's memoirs which highlight the full extent of Bomber Command's rigid opposition to any departure from area bombing in direct support of Overlord. In particular, Sir Arthur Harris focussed on the issue of bombing accuracy and enlisted the support of his ORS to dispute Zuckerman's claim that the specified railway targets could be obliterated. In reflecting on a sharp exchange on this issue with Dr Dickens in his capacity as head of Bomber Command's ORS, Zuckerman commented revealingly, This was not the first, but unfortunately not the last time that it became apparent to me that not all scientists who during the war had been drawn into service posts were as questioning and independent in their judgements as they could have been. On occasion they were constrained by assumptions which increasingly fitted their masters' preconceived ideas. There was also a tendency to defer to the rank than the intellectual competence of the officers they served82 This judgement is undoubtedly unfair to Dickens. It can only be assumed that his position in relation to Harris was one of extreme delicacy, given his Commander-in-Chief's singular tendency to reject valid advice and criticism. As section head, moreover, he interpreted his brief correctly as being to enhance the tactical capabilities of the striking force, given the overall strategic objective of the area offensive. Dickens was no Blackett and even if he had sought to query Harris's intransigence it may safely be assumed that his advice would have been ignored. As it was, Dickens conceded that precision bombing was possible — he could hardly do otherwise given the success of his ORS in informing the tactics of the striking force. Harris himself was eventually forced to accept this fact and it is to his credit that even before the Transportation Plan was formally adopted, he had already authorised attacks on rail centres. They began on the night of 6/7 March at Trappes when twelve hundred tons of bombs were dropped on the marshalling yards. The devastating results were a testament to the high standards of bombing accuracy that Bomber Command was capable of achieving in night attacks at that stage in the war. The overriding objectives of the Transportation Plan were '(a) to strain to the utmost the enemy's capacity for carrying out railway

164

A History of Operational Research

m o v e m e n t , b y the destruction of p e r m a n e n t installations, rolling stock a n d repair facilities, a n d (b) to disorganise, a n d if possible stop military t h r o u g h traffic/ 8 3 Including the raid o n Trappes, 79 designated rail centres h a d b e e n attacked in n o r t h e r n France a n d the L o w Countries by D-Day on 6 J u n e , 1944. A s u b s e q u e n t r e p o r t by Z u c k e r m a n , c o m m e n t i n g o n the effects of Bomber C o m m a n d ' s precision attacks, concluded as follows: Due to attacks on rail centres the capacity of the railways of the northern half of France, which previously exceeded by far the enemy's military and economic needs, had by D-Day fallen below the level with which he had sustained his garrison troops in the preceding period. During the Normandy Battle he consequently had to try to maintain, and actively employ more numerous forces than he had previously kept in Northern France, on a traffic level lower in capacity than that which he had used for his holding troops. One immediate result was that he was increasingly forced to the roads — in spite of a very precarious [motor transport] and fuel situation, and in spite, after D-Day, of the large scale of our armed air reconnaissance of roads. Another was that the residue of rail traffic which continued, after D-Day, to trickle at a slow rate through the battered railway regions became, in general, easy prey for fighter-bombers which, in a short time before our landings occurred, started to operate in increasing strength against arriving rail traffic. Attacks on bridges and open lines added to the chaos that had resulted from the rail centre attacks, and before June had passed, organised rail movement in Northern France had, by all accounts, practically ceased.84 F r o m M a r c h until M a y 1944, Bomber C o m m a n d ' s ORS e n g a g e d in an intensive research p r o g r a m m e d e s i g n e d to e n h a n c e still further t h e precision capabilities of the striking force. This entailed careful evaluation of the merits of different bomb-sights, the further refinement of g r o u n d m a r k i n g techniques, and the design of i m p r o v e d training m e t h o d s a n d practice in b o m b aiming. According to the Air Historical Branch Account, It was the general drive on bombing accuracy which was without doubt the most fruitful of the various measures taken at this stage. More frequent practices, better maintenance [of equipment] and, above all, the engendering in the aircrews of enthusiasm to attain the maximum possible accuracy on operations, produced great and rapid improvement which was stimulated by a healthy amount of rivalry. Knowledge of the difference between what was being achieved and what might be was the basis of this propaganda

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 165 and since that knowledge was provided by the analysis carried out by the ORS they can claim a considerable share of the credit for the improvement which took place.85 The overall historical consensus is that the tactical support offered by Bomber Command to the invasion forces both before and after D-Day was an outstanding success in preventing German troop and logistic reinforcements until well after the Normandy beach-head had been consolidated. 86 Zuckerman's contemporary reaction is recorded in his wartime diary: The amazing thing is that Harris, who was even more resistant than the Americans to the idea of AEAF domination, has in fact thrown himself wholeheartedly into the battle, has improved his bombing performance enormously, and has contributed more to the dislocation of enemy communications, etc. than any of the rest.87 In one sense, the fact that Harris subordinated himself to Overlord should occasion no surprise. Committed to absolute and unquestioning confidence in his own judgement he may have been, but he was, above all, a military man. Having been given orders with no scope for interpretation, as in the Transportation Plan, he was bound to obey them. But when a directive conveyed a degree of ambiguity, as in the case of the Combined Offensive, he proved capable of exploiting this to the full. So too, in the aftermath of his formal release from AEAF control, Harris was concerned to return Bomber Command 'to its proper strategic role,' namely the area offensive in the belief that the war could still be won by this means. 88 In this respect, however, Harris came into prolonged conflict with Sir Charles Portal in view of the latter's insistence that Bomber Command should engage in precision attacks on the German oil industry and the country's internal transport system. Thus, in the final phases of the war, from the autumn of 1944 onwards, Harris was obliged to trim his overriding strategic objective to include a range of secondary targets. The target percentages, set out in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, provide prima facie evidence that in the face of Portal's strictures as Chief of the Air Staff, Harris proved remarkably successful in sustaining the area offensive as the single most important element in Bomber Command's operations. Although the bomb tonnage directed at urban areas fell below 30 per cent in the period January-April 1945, it is salutary to remember that in addition to Dresden, 29 other towns were subject to 'major area attack' in this period.

166 A History of Operational Research Table 5.3. Bomber Command targets in the European theatre, October-December, 1944. Attacks Attacks Attacks Attacks Attacks

on on on on on

cities railways and canals oil targets enemy troops and fortifications naval and other objectives

53% 15% 14% 13% 5%

Source: John Terraine, The Right of the Line (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985), p. 675.

Table 5.4. Bomber Command targets in the European theatre, January-April 1945. Attacks on cities Attacks on troops and defences Attacks on transportation Attacks on naval targets Attacks on oil Attacks on the German Air Force Attacks on specific industries Miscellaneous

36.6% 14.4% 15.4% 6.1% 26.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2%

Source: Terraine (1985), p. 679.

Assessments of the effectiveness of area bombing and its contribution to the defeat of Germany began even before the war in Europe ended in May 1945. Both Britain and the United States had established bombing survey units by the autumn of 1944, and after defining criteria for analysis they began to make on-the-spot visits to the most heavily bombed towns and cities, complementing their visual inspections of damage with interviews with German military and civilian personnel. Like the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, the British Bombing Analysis Unit (subsequently the British Bombing Survey Unit), under Zuckerman's leadership as scientific director, adopted a mixture of qualitative and quantitative techniques in assessing the effects of bombing both on the German industrial economy and the impact of the area offensive on civilian morale. 89 In reviewing the British and American reports it is

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945

167

a p p a r e n t that there w a s a striking m e a s u r e of agreement: area attacks h a d a considerable effect on the G e r m a n w a r economy, b u t t h e effect w a s n e v e r critical. As the British r e p o r t concluded: The lack of decisive effect was due primarily to the fact that the direct loss imposed could be absorbed by non-essential German productive resources. The indirect effects fell on industries able to bear the burden. An area raid drove down production by as much as 55% in the month immediately following an attack, but recovery was rapid. 90 The resilience of the G e r m a n w a r e c o n o m y in the face of B o m b e r C o m m a n d ' s area offensive is indicated in Table 5.5, taking the i n d e x for 1940 a s 100:

Table 5.5.

German war production, 1942-44.

Monthly Average Production Year Group Panzer Motor vehicles Tractors Aircraft Warships Ammunition Weapons

1942

1943

1944

130 120 124 133 142 167 137

330 138 210 216 181 247 74

512 130 238 264 162 297 313

Source: PRO AIR 41/43, AHB, Chap. 18 (1949), p. 168.

The figures point to the fact that the b o m b i n g offensive forced G e r m a n y to call o n its e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s to create a m o r e fully m o b i l i s e d w a r e c o n o m y b e y o n d the n e e d s of the short term 'blitzkrieg' tactics of 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 . Indeed, the p r o p o r t i o n of a r m a m e n t s p r o d u c t i o n to civilian p r o d u c t i o n rose from 25 per cent in m i d - 1 9 4 2 to 42 p e r cent in mid1944. 9 1 F u r t h e r evidence of the a p p a r e n t l y limited industrial i m p a c t of the offensive is p r o v i d e d by Table 5.6 w h i c h c o m p a r e s the actual a n d p o t e n t i a l o u t p u t of a n u m b e r of g r o u p s of a r m a m e n t s . T h u s , according

ON

> 3" O Ml

O Table 5.6.

Actual and potential armaments production, 1943-4. o'

Tanks

Aircraft

Motor Vehicles

Naval Construction

3

TO

Year and Quarter

Actual

Potential

Actual

Potential

Actual

Potential

Actual

Potential

en

1943 3rd 4th 1944 1st 2nd

367 411 465 558

390 485 565 631

166 159 173 163

175 170 185 195

229 213 227 300

233 255 280 320

171 156 154 129

186 176 177 141

13-

Source: PRO AIR 41/43, Chap. 18 (1949), p. 168.

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 169 to the British Bombing Survey Unit, in 1943 air attacks only delayed the armaments programme in four categories of production — 'some 5% of potential.' 92 Direct evidence of the recuperative power of the German economy is provided by the aftermath of the much-celebrated 'Dambusters Raid' in May 1943. Although the 'vast disruption of the Ruhr water supply caused a serious loss of production in the first few days — within 8-14 days this had been overcome.' Repairs to the Moehne Dam, moreover, 'were rushed through in order to catch the autumn rains/ 9 3 Finally, there was the startling discovery by the American Strategic Bombing Survey that the height of the productive power of the German war economy coincided with the period of greatest bombing intensity. It was this fact which caused one outspoken member of the American team — the youthful economist J. K. Galbraith — to conclude that the combined bombing offensive had been a strategic failure. As he stated in memoirs notable also for their commentary on the ineffectiveness of American bombing in Korea and Vietnam: Our first indication that something was wrong came in London before the fighting stopped. It was a superb statistical find, the Statische Schnell bericht zur Kriegs produktion or the German statistical overview of war production. The factories producing the guns, tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns were not a primary target. But they drew on labour, coal, steel, ferrous-alloys, machine tools, transportation and all the lesser resources and fabrics of industrial life. In 1940, the first full year of the war, the average monthly production of Panzer vehicles was 136; in 1941 it was 316; in 1942, 516. In 1943, after the bombing began in earnest, average monthly production was 1004, and in 1944, it was 1538. Peak monthly production was not reached until December 1944...We were beginning to see that we were encountering one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest miscalculations of the war...94 As for the impact of the area offensive on civilian morale, the official British records, together with contemporary German assessments, also lend support to a common conclusion, namely that the adverse effects of bombing were surprisingly short term so that the indirect impact on industrial production was limited. Bomber Command's attack on the Baltic port of Rostock in 1942, for example, caused Goebbels to comment that

170 A History of Operational Research Community life there is practically at an end...The situation in the city is in some sections catastrophic...seven tenths of the city have been wiped out. More than 100,000 people had to be evacuated...There was, in fact, panic...95 Similarly, in the aftermath of the 'fire bombing' of Hamburg in JulyAugust 1943, resulting in the destruction of 61 per cent of the city's residential accommodation, Adolf Galland, then serving as Inspector of Fighters in the German Air Ministry, stated: A wave of terror radiated from the suffering city and spread through Germany. Appalling details of the great fire were recounted...A stream of haggard, terrified refugees flowed into the neighbouring provinces. In every large town people said: 'What happened to Hamburg yesterday can happen to us tomorrow'...After Hamburg in the wide circle of the political and military command could be heard the words: 'The war is lost.'96 This view was shared by Albert Speer, the Reich Minister for Armaments, who in his postwar interrogation admitted that 'Hamburg put the fear of God in me' to the extent that he informed Hitler that 'a series of attacks of this sort, extended to six more cities, would bring Germany's armaments production to a total halt.' 97 Yet for each of these apparently devastating attacks such judgements were subsequently viewed as premature. As the Official History records in the case of Rostock: The panic was soon over as the people hastened back to work, took energetic measures themselves to put the streets back in order, much helped by the Mecklenburg Gauleiter Hildebrandt. He could report on 29th April that the principal war factories were nearly back to hundred per cent production.98 Hamburg enjoyed the same experience with the speed of its industrial recovery causing Speer to revise his initially gloomy view of the survivability of the German war economy in the face of area attack. This was well reflected in his postwar recollections, as recorded in the Air Historical Branch account: The purpose of the night attacks directed exclusively at city centres had been incomprehensible to Speer: their effects on industry were very slight. He considers that area bombing alone would never have been a serious threat. He emphasises that civilian morale

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 171 was excellent throughout and resulted in rapid resumption of work after attacks." Further reservations concerning the effectiveness of area bombing relate to the outcome of 'Operation Pointblank' in view of the coincidence of its termination date, 1st April 1944, with Sir Arthur Harris's forecast that by that date Germany would be in 'a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable.' Although twenty towns and cities were attacked during the relevant period (November 1943-March 1944), the main target for Bomber Command was Berlin, accounting for 9,111 sorties out of a total of 11,117 and 492 of the 555 aircraft failing to return. 100 A frank verdict on the 'Battle of Berlin' is provided by the Official History: for all practical purposes it 'was more than a failure. It was a defeat' for Bomber Command. 101 The validity of this conclusion is underlined by the strongly rising trend of German armaments production throughout the period of the Pointblank Offensive, together with the insupportable losses sustained both by Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air Force, mainly at the hands of the German Fighter Force.102 The question remains as to why Bomber Command persisted with the campaign of area attack over an extended period in the face of appalling losses in terms of aircraft and aircrew, and with results both in relation to the check to physical production and the impact on civilian morale which were, at the very least, questionable. Whilst the effects of faulty intelligence should not be discounted, the following factors should be taken into account. In the first instance, intelligence did improve during the course of 1943 and the cumulative message was consistent: German morale was resilient in the face of aerial attack and the impact on armaments production was uncertain. The evidence, however, was poorly corroborated and this fact in itself, independent of Sir Arthur Harris's personal commitment to the area offensive, effectively insulated Bomber Command from the constraints of critical evidence. 103 It has been argued that it was the lack of such evidence which enabled Harris consistently to exaggerate the effects of the offensive and, more to the point, to resist the periodic pressure from within the Air Staff and Chiefs of Staff organisation for the resumption of precision bombing. Thus, Once adopted, and with elaborate target plans laid for area bombing, it became all the more difficult to change to alternative tactics and alternative targets. Even when Portal presented Harris with the means to adopt more economical precision bombing later in the war, the commitment of Bomber Command and its

172 A History of Operational Research commander to the original decision was almost impossible to reverse.104 On this interpretation, therefore, area bombing was the line of least resistance: minimal intelligence was required and for all practical purposes Harris 'simply needed a long list of German cities and the industries located in them.' 105 In its political and strategic context, moreover, area bombing was always vulnerable to criticism from the military and naval establishment. It is instructive to note that at the Casablanca conference in 1942, called to discuss future Anglo-American military objectives, area bombing was viewed as only one of five forms of offensive action, and the key emphasis was placed on the invasion of enemy-held territory by surface forces. Thus, confronted at an early stage by the realities of 'Grand Strategy' the subsequent survival of the area offensive depended on 'political protection and vigorous advocacy on the part of the air forces.'106 For the greater part of the period after 1942, it is evident that both were supplied in full measure. In fairness to Harris, however, his rejection of precision targets was not without foundation. For example, there is the telling comment by Noble Frankland in the context of Harris's reluctance to augment the US Eighth Air Force's attacks on Schweinfurt as a centre for ball bearing production, a target identified by the Ministry of Economic Warfare as vital to the German war effort: Previous experience of what he called the 'panacea mongers' had made the C-in-C cynical. The breaching of the Moehne and Eider dams [by the Dambusters], the destruction of the molybdenum mine at Knoben, the destruction of the marshalling yard at Modane, had all been urged upon him as measures likely to produce vital consequences. All these tasks had been achieved but no serious consequences had followed. It would be the same, the C-in-C thought, for Schweinfurt. There was always an alternative factory, marshalling yard or [metal] factory to keep things going.107 It was this perspective that Harris brought to bear on Sir Charles Portal's advocacy of an oil campaign following Bomber Command's release from AEAF control in the autumn of 1944. Although the justification for such a campaign was based on ULTRA decrypts of German Enigma signals, to Harris oil was yet another panacea target. 108 As he stated in his memoirs, T still do not think that it was reasonable at that time to expect that the [oil] campaign would succeed; all that the Allied strategists did was to bet on an outsider and it happened to win

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 173 the race.' 109 Even then, scrutiny of oil targets from October 1944 to the end of the war in Europe (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4) indicates that Bomber Command's efforts in this area were hardly negligible, especially in the light of prevailing weather conditions and other legitimate calls on the striking force, a point conceded by the Chiefs of Staff Committee in a postwar appraisal of the German oil industry as a precision target.110 Similar considerations apply to the transportation campaign, all the more so when it is borne in mind that the area offensive was devised, in part, with transportation targets in mind. It is in this connection that the destruction of Dresden by Bomber Command on the night of 13-14 February 1945 — an attack which has come to be regarded as the incarnation of the moral reprehensibility of the area offensive — can be defended. It is true that the Dresden attack had been envisaged by Harris as part of the area offensive directed against civilian populations in eastern Germany (including Berlin, Chemnitz and Leipzig), but the precipitating factor was the Air Staff's desire to lend support to the westwards advance of Soviet forces. Thus, the attacks on eastern towns and cities were designed not only to further undermine German morale, but also for the purpose of disrupting enemy road and rail traffic in close proximity to the fighting front. The bombing of Dresden, therefore, cannot be viewed as an act of wanton destruction, needlessly perpetrated by Harris when the war was all but over. On the contrary, it was entirely consistent with the transportation campaign and for that reason alone it had the backing both of Harris's superior officers and the Prime Minister. Further support for Harris emanated from the postwar 'Thunderbolt' exercise which concluded in respect of the Normandy landings that Above all [the area offensive] resulted in a state of favourable [air] superiority in the European theatre generally, without which Overlord could not have succeeded. It had thrown Germany completely on the defensive in the air. She had heavily reduced her bomber production in order that maximum resources could be devoted to fighters and defensive equipment. Her fighters and flak were deployed not on the critical battle fronts, or to oppose a possible landing, but they were spreadeagled throughout Germany in a vain attempt to defend vital targets at home. Nearly three quarters of a million men were tied down to these defences and probably a greater number were engaged in ARP and repair work.111 But the nub of the issue is provided by alternative uses of the striking force based on the analysis of value set against cost. The counterfactual

174 A History of Operational Research scenario was highlighted, although not quantified, in a memorandum prepared by the Air Staff in 1948 in response to Sir Arthur Harris's personal assessment of the area offensive submitted to the Air Ministry in October 1945.112 Predictably, Harris had sought to justify the offensive on the grounds that 'the enemy's sinews of war were to be found in his industrial cities.' The Air Staff paper began, however, by reiterating the point that area bombing had been envisaged originally as a temporary measure until the striking force could resume the attack on precision targets of direct military value (see above, p. 138). As the memorandum concluded, It is probably true that the great bulk of the enemy's armaments production came from the industrial cities (though this was not demonstrated by the experience of the war), but his most valuable sinews of war (oil and communications) were generally outside them. They were the ones which were severed and most potently brought about his collapse.113 This was, in effect, a ringing endorsement of Zuckerman's approach to bombing policy: far from the bomber being a war-winning weapon in its own right in conformity with the Trenchard doctrine, its main utility lay in tactical support for land forces via the interdiction of the enemy transport and communications system. The implications of this view for wartime bombing policy were profound: area bombing may have contributed indirectly to the success of Overlord, but the striking force could have been deployed with greater effect elsewhere, first in precision attacks on the Luftwaffe and its supplying industries (including oil) in collaboration with the US Eighth Air Force, and then in a relatively short campaign against the communications network of north-west Europe in support of a land invasion. Aircraft and aircrew losses would, in all likelihood, have been minimal compared with the cost of the area offensive, a consideration which would also have applied to German civilian deaths and injuries as well as the physical fabric of the country's principal towns and cities. It is this alternative scenario which underpinned the stance of Zuckerman as well as that of Blackett, Tizard and Galbraith. In several respects, however, their advocacy of precision bombing may be viewed as naive both in its contemporary setting and in historical retrospect. In his most recent study of the role of air power in the Second World War, the distinguished military historian, Richard Overy, has provided an important re-evaluation of Bomber Command's contribution to the defeat of Germany.114 In justifying the conclusion that

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 175 'the 125,000 men and women of Bomber Command made a larger contribution to victory in Europe than any other element of Britain's armed services,' Overy has emphasised the fact that the sustained AngloAmerican bombing offensive cannot be divorced from the sheer magnitude of the infantry casualties of the First World War. It has already been noted that the unwavering commitment of Harris and his colleagues to the area offensive was rooted in the belief that in the broadest possible context, aerial bombardment was the most cost-effective use of Britain's limited military capacity. The attrition rate of operational personnel was high, but the 55,000 deaths over six years of war should be set against the 200,000 casualties experienced by the allied invasion forces within three months of the D-Day landings. Thus, For Britain, with its small population and the lack of a large standing army, a small force of specialised volunteers was arguably a more effective way of mobilising British manpower than the development of a large and inexperienced ground army.116 A second justification for the area offensive which, by definition, was wholly inconsistent with the Zuckerman-Blackett-Galbraith critique, is rooted in a complex of political and psychological factors. Churchill himself remained sceptical of the military effectiveness of bombing, but he supported the area offensive as evidence to world opinion in general and potential allies in particular that Britain remained committed to the defeat of Germany. In its domestic setting, moreover, the area campaign was viewed by the War Cabinet as an important propaganda tool in sustaining civilian morale because it gave the British public the sense that their country was still actively fighting an enemy whose geographical immunity might otherwise have reduced Britain's role to that of a distant spectator.116 If Patrick Blackett was unmoved by such considerations there was yet a further justification for the area campaign on the grounds of its indispensability to allied grand strategy following Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. In that context, the bombing of Germany could be, and was, presented to Stalin as direct evidence of the determination of the western allies to prepare the ground for a land invasion of Germany from the west. To the extent that the area offensive absorbed German manpower and other physical resources, and drew Luftwaffe strength away from the eastern front, it also made an indirect but powerful contribution to the ultimate success of the Red Army. In so

176 A History of Operational Research doing it helped to pre-empt the ultimate Anglo-American nightmare of a Russian capitulation. Inevitably, this would have transformed the strategic and tactical situation in Western Europe in favour of Germany thereby reducing the prospects for a successful invasion, perhaps for years to come. In all of these respects, Churchill was surely correct to argue that the area offensive constituted a 'second front' in its own right (see above, p. 142). There remains the issue of the relatively limited impact of bombing on the German war economy in general and the armaments industry in particular. In these respects Overy's conclusions, reflecting the current historical consensus, are based upon a more sophisticated appreciation of the effect of bombing than the official American and British surveys. Quite apart from the fact that the sheer scale of the offensive had direct and measurable effects on public utilities such as gas and electricity, the bombing of towns and cities also had adverse consequences for the performance of the German armaments industry, notwithstanding the statistics cited in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The key issues here relate to the policy of dispersal and diversions of effort. Dispersal, or decentralisation of German industry began in 1942 and was a major factor in facilitating the rapid rise in armaments production as the bombing offensive intensified during 1943 and 1944. But this is to miss the point that Dispersal meant larger hauls between the different premises making an aeroplane and a tank, and area bombing interrupted this delicate net of distribution and supply. Dispersal also meant greater reliance on skilled labour in smaller, less rationalised workshops. Where skilled labour was lacking, new labour was drafted in that was less well-equipped to cope with complex engineering and the quality of German weapons also declined.117 The building of new factories in 'bomb-safe' locations made further inroads into the supply of increasingly scarce labour and materials. In overall terms, the dispersal programme led to 'a constant attrition of managerial energy' and placed insuperable obstacles in the way of rational planning in an industrial structure which had hitherto been geared to centralised control.118 The adverse effects of dispersal were complemented powerfully by the effects of bombing in encouraging wasteful diversions of effort in the German war economy. As it became evident during 1943 that 'bombsafe' locations were disappearing rapidly in the face of the increasing accuracy and penetration of the American and British striking forces,

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 177 Speer, with Hitler's personal backing, began to plan a vast programme of underground armaments production encompassing 93 million square feet of floorspace. Work began during 1944, but by the end of the war only 13 million square feet had been completed. Even that limited achievement had required half a million construction workers with quantities of building materials and machinery to match. Further diversionary effects emanated from the V-weapons p r o g r a m m e inaugurated in 1943 as a deterrent to the area offensive. The resulting VI and V2 were to cast a long shadow forwards into the nuclear age, but they had little effect before the end of the war. Their explosive capacity was minuscule compared to the tonnage of bombs dropped on Germany in 1944-5, whilst most of the Vis fired exploded prematurely, fell outside urban areas, or were destroyed by the British defences. More to the point, the production of V weapons distorted the German technical effort away from strategically more profitable investments in ground-toair missiles and jet-propelled aircraft. In the light of these factors, Overy has focussed critical attention on the key counterf actual question — what would the German war economy have been able to achieve in the absence of bombing? Whilst conceding that the answer must be hypothetical in the current state of historical knowledge, Overy's conclusions raise some important issues for critics of the area offensive, namely that ...it would not be bending historical probability too much to argue that if Germany had been free to mobilise its economy, science, manpower, and that of occupied Europe, entirely free from the bombing threat, the German war effort would have been potentially too formidable to contemplate a western invasion of Europe. The war would then have unfolded in a very different way.119 Counterfactual scenarios are of direct relevance in evaluating the contribution of Bomber Command's ORS to the outcome of the war in Europe. In this setting, there is an obvious and direct analogy with the role of operational research in enhancing the combat effectiveness of Fighter Command in 1940. In his postwar memoirs Sir Arthur Harris paid generous tribute to his ORS, claiming that it had saved the lives of 'thousands' of aircrew and 'hundreds' of aircraft, as well as being an 'indispensable' aid to military effectiveness.120 On the basis of proven results and the Air Historical Branch account, there can be no doubting the validity of Harris's judgement. Although there is some evidence to

178 A History of Operational Research suggest that younger members of Bomber Command's ORS were frustrated by an apparent lack of interest on the part of Dickens and other senior colleagues in unorthodox ideas and approaches, notably in relation to the weight of aircraft defensive armament as a drag on airspeed, 121 there can be little doubt that the section engaged in highly effective programmes of research and statistical evaluation conducive to the accurate routing and concentration of the striking force. In so doing the ORS helped to transform Bomber Command into a cohesive weapon of strategic value. Attrition rates were high, but Dickens and his colleagues fulfilled vital functions in assessing the causes of aircraft losses and making well-founded recommendations for their reduction. 122 Reference has already been made to Charles Goodeve' quantitative estimate of the contribution of Fighter Command's operational researchers to the outcome of the Battle of Britain (see above, p. 82). In the case of Bomber Command's ORS, its impact on the area offensive may be gauged by the dramatic enhancement of navigational capabilities after 1942 and the Command's heightened ability to hit precise targets. Even allowing for the greatly increased bomb-loads which followed on from the introduction of four-engined heavy aircraft after 1942, it is an undisputed fact that operational research rendered the striking force of 1944 vastly more effective than its counterpart in 1942. In this setting W. Barton Leach, in his introduction to the official wartime history of operational research in the US Army Air Forces, concluded that In the books of some god of battles [operational research] has its exact proportion of credit. Improvement by a factor of 1? A factor of 3? The equivalent of 1500 bombers? Futile to ask, and besides, who cares? The [researchers] were members of the team, knew that they were carrying out their assignment, and were mightily gratified at the ultimate result.123 Such judgements are of direct relevance to Bomber Command's ORS, and also have bearing on the strictures of Blackett, Zuckerman and Galbraith. Zuckerman's condemnation of the ORS for its failure to challenge the military rationale of the area offensive has been noted (see above, p. 163), but a balanced view must exonerate Dickens and his colleagues from the extreme, if implicit, charge of dereliction of duty. Even if area bombing was of limited strategic relevance, it was not within Dickens' remit to challenge this fact because his activities were confined strictly to the analysis of tactical issues. In this context, he succeeded admirably. In any event, it is reasonable to presume that in the political

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 179 and military circumstances of 1942-4, a pro-active Bomber Command ORS headed by a Blackett or a Zuckerman which attempted to query the rationale of the area offensive, even on the basis of the most sophisticated of quantitative evaluation, would have received short shrift. Sir John Slessor's 'put down' of Blackett in the matter of 'slide-rule strategy' was vitriolic enough but it was mild in the face of the likely reaction from Sir Arthur Harris. It is interesting to note that of all wartime ORS chiefs, Dickens was the longest serving. It seems likely that he retained the confidence of his single-minded Commander-in-Chief precisely because he refrained from strategic calculation. In concluding this final chapter on the military origins of operational research, it is incumbent on the historian to place the discipline in an international perspective, given the scientific and technological basis of the Second World War. In their postwar memoirs other senior British commanders joined Harris in proclaiming the value of operational research so that there is a considerable degree of consensus on the fact that it fulfilled a vital military role. 124 In the USA, similar perspectives apply, especially in relation to the application of operational research to the Army Air Forces and the Navy. 125 In this respect, McCloskey has pointed to the influence of Robert Watson-Watt and Patrick Blackett in stimulating interest in the attachment of civilian scientists to American military commands. 126 That the Americans learned quickly is confirmed by the fact that shortly after the US entered the war both the Navy and the Army Air Forces had established operational research organisations, all of which fulfilled functions virtually identical to their British counterparts. For the Axis powers, however, operational research was notable for its absence, not least in relation to their air forces. In the German case, in particular, this is surprising in view of that country's notable achievements in scientific and technical education in the period to 1939. But there was nothing in Germany in the 1930s which bore any resemblance to the Tizard Committee on air defence. After 1939 the contribution of civilian scientists to military decision making was limited by the emigration of key personnel prior to the outbreak of war and the subjection of those that remained to political tests of loyalty to the Nazi Party. As Overy has observed, 'If the Luftwaffe willingly exploited science, it did so only to the extent that the Luftwaffe staff believed desirable,' thereby stifling the possibility of objective appraisal of military policy. It is significant in the wider context that whilst Churchill 'chose as his principal confidant a scientist [Cherwell], Hitler chose to surround himself with astrologers,' at least until 1944 when he began to take an

180 A History of Operational Research interest in fundamental science in the quest for new 'terror' weapons. 127 In Britain and the USA, however, the contribution of civilian scientists was always valued, a fact confirmed by the rapid diffusion of operational research throughout their respective military command structures after 1941. Care should be taken, however, not to overemphasise the independent influence of the British scientific establishment. Taking the wartime period as a whole, operational researchers were at the peak of their influence during the first year when they held the key to the successful deployment of radar in the 'Air Defence of Great Britain.' Thereafter, however, following the Battle of Britain, and coinciding with the onset of strategic deliberations on the future course and conduct of the war, operational researchers lost influence to military commanders and their staffs. Indeed, the overall record shows that when operational researchers attempted to move into the area of strategic debate, they were likely to receive short shrift, no matter how prestigious their scientific reputations and contributions to military effectiveness. In this respect, Tizard and Blackett provide the outstanding examples. There remains, however, the case of Zuckerman who certainly did prove capable of high-level influence, most notably in the context of Overlord. But even here, it is evident that the advice tendered in favour of precise transportation targets was entirely in conformity with a pre-determined strategic objective of long-standing, an objective, moreover, which was predicated on political as well as military assumptions.

NOTES 1. See, for example, Sir Arthur T. Harris, Bomber Offensive (Collins, London, 1947); C. Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1943-45, 4 Vols. (HMSO, London, 1961); A. Revie, The Lost Command (Bruce and Watson, London, 1971); Max Hastings, Bomber Command (Macmillan, London, 1985); D. Saward, Victory Denied: The Rise of Air Power and the Defeat of Germany, 1920-1945 (Buchan and Enright, London, 1985); John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1985); K. Delve and P. Jacobs, The Six-Year Offensive: Bomber Command in World War 2 (Arms and Armour, London, 1992); Richard Overy, Bomber Command 1939-1945 (Harper Collins, London, 1997); Mark Connelly, Reaching for the Stars: A New History of Bomber Command in World War II (I. B. Tauris, London, 2001); Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: Arthur Harris and the Allied Bomber Offensive, 1939-45 (John Murray, London, 2001); Henry Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and Times (Greenhill, London, 2001).

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945 181 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978). PRO, AIR 14/225, Air Staff, 9 December 1937. Cited in Overy (1997), p. 26. PRO, AIR 41/42, S. 463, Vol. 1, End. 14A (1949). Webster and Frankland (1961), Vol. 1, p. 125. Ibid., pp. 178-9. PRO, AIR 41/42, XC 23126, Air Historical Branch (AHB), The Bomber Offensive, March 1942-January 1943 (1943), pp. 109-311. Ibid., p.39. W. S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Cassell, London, 1948), p. 567. PRO, AIR 41/42, PM.M., 970/1, 7 October, 1941. PRO, AIR 41/42, WC 23126, AHB, Vol. Ill, Part II, Chaps. 1-4. PRO, AIR 41/42, AHB, 11/70/149 (E). Terraine (1985), p. 261. D. Richards, Portal of Hungerford (Heinemann, London, 1977), p. 166. PRO, COS 155 (0), 31 July, 1941. PRO, JP (41) 444, Para. 7, 14 June 1941. PRO, AHB/II/70/149(E), 1949. PRO, AIR 41/42, XC 23126, AHB, Vol. IV, Chap. 23 (1943), p. 316. Overy (1997), p. 80. PRO, AIR 41/42, XC 23126, AHB, Vol. II, 30/168, 30 March 1942. Ibid., 3 October 1941. C. P. Snow, Science and Government (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962), pp. 47-53. P.M.S. Blackett, Studies of War (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962), p. 120. Ibid., p. 205. Lord Birkenhead, The Prof in Two Worlds (Collins, London, 1961), pp. 248-9. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, Baron Blackett of Chelsea,' Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1975), pp. 64-5. Overy (1997), p. 185. Zuckerman (1978). Terraine (1985), p. 621. J. D. Bernal and S. Zuckerman, Quantitative Study of Total Effects of Air Raids [Hull and Birmingham Survey] Ministry of Home Security: Research and Experiments Department, 2770, 8 April 1942. Zuckerman (1978), p. 146. For further analysis of these wartime iterations see Paul Crook, 'Science and War: Radical Scientists and the Tizard-Cherwell Bombing Debate,' War and Society, Vol. 12 (1994), pp. 69-101. Blackett, (1962), p. 126. PRO, ARB/RET/906, 2 April 1942. Webster and Frankland, Vol IV (1961), p. 337. Air Ministry (AHB), Operational Research in Bomber Command (1949), p. 3. Ibid., p. 4.

182 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

A History of Operational Research Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., Chap. 2, p. 1. Ibid., pp. 1-2. Ibid., p. 38. Ib/d., pp. 38-9. Ibid., p. 41. Ibid., p. 65. JWd., pp. 65-6. Ibid., Chap. 3, p. 1. Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. 58. For a full appraisal of Gee see Ibid., Chap. 11, pp. 224-47. Ibid., Chap. 3, pp. 62-3. Ibid., Chap. 14, p. 290. Ibid., p. 292. Ibid., p. 294. Ibid., p. 293. Ibid., Chap. 3, pp. 17-18. Ibid., pp. 18-19. Ibid., pp. 19-20. Ibid., p. 23. For a detailed review of H2S see Ibid., Chap. 12. Ibid., Chap. 5, p. 109. PRO, AIR 41/42, XC 23126, AHB, I7ie Bomber Offensive, March 1942-January 1943 (1943), p. 317. PRO, ID/4/23A, Flag 25, 3 November 1943. PRO, BC/M.S., 29961, End. 15A, 7 December 1943. PRO, CM5 268, End. 9L. 11/70/174, 14 November 1943. Ibid., ID/4/355, Combined Bombing Offensive Report. PRO, BC/S, 29961, End. 41B, 2 March 1948. Ibid. PRO, AIR 41/42, XC 23126, AHB, 154 (1949). Terraine (1985), p. 269. Webster and Frankland, Vol. 2 (1961), p. 29. Lovell (1975), pp. 61-3. Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (Cassell, London, 1956), pp. 524-5. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Blackett in War and Peace,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 39 (1987), pp. 226-7. Terraine (1985), p. 452. Slessor (1956), pp. 524-5. Terraine, (1985), p. 426. Ibid., pp. 425-6.

Operational Research in Bomber Command, 1941-1945

183

77. Webster and Frankland, Vol. 1 (1961), p. 340. 78. Ibid., Vol. 2 (1961), pp. 54-7. 79. PRO, BC/MS, 311156/C, T h e Employment of the Night Bomber Force in Connection with the Invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom,' 13 January 1944. 80. Zuckerman Papers, Bombing Analysis Unit, 'Air Attacks on Rail and Road Communications: An Analysis of Operations carried out in Sicily and S. Italy,' c. December 1943. 81. Lord Tedder, With Prejudice (Cassell, London, 1966), p. 489. 82. Zuckerman (1978), p. 234. 83. Zuckerman Papers, Bombing Analysis Unit, 'The Effects of the "Overlord" Air Plan to Disrupt the Enemy's Rail Communications,' 4 November, 1944, p. 1. 84. Ibid., pp. 33-4. 85. Air Ministry, Operational Research in Bomber Command, Chap. 5, pp. 114-18. 86. PRO, AIR 8/1109, XC 22465, War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 'Effects of the Allied Bombing Offensive on the German War Effort with Particular Reference to "Overlord",' 3 June 1944; D. Richards and H. Saunders, The Royal Air Force, 1939-1945, Vol. 3 (HMSO, London 1974), pp. 88-9; C. D'este, Decision in Normandy (Collins, London 1974), pp. 88-9; Zuckerman (1978), pp. 259-85; John Peyton, Solly Zuckerman: a Scientist Out of the Ordinary (John Murray, London, 2001), pp. 51-63. 87. D'este (1974), quoting Zuckerman's diary, 9 July 1944. 88. Terraine, (1985), pp. 672-3. 89. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (1946); PRO, Air 14/1910, SC 2209, British Bombing Research Mission: The Analysis of Area Attacks (September 1945; PRO, AIR 41/43, SC 23126, British Bombing Survey Unit: Overall Report (1949). 90. Ibid. 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid., citing Speer Papers, no. 35. 94. J. K. Galbraith, A Life in Our Times: Memoirs (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA, 1981). 95. Cited in Richards and Saunders, Vol. II (1974), p. 129. 96. Adolf Galland, The First and the Last (Fontana, London, 1970), pp. 166-7. 97. PRO, AIR 41/43, SC 23126 (1949), citing Speer papers, No. 2. 98. Webster and Frankland, Vol. 1 (1961), p. 485. 99. PRO, AIR 41/43, XC 23126, AHB, Chap. 18, p. 171. 100. Terraine, (1985), p. 557. 101. Webster and Frankland, Vol. 2 (1961), p. 193. 102. Terraine (1985), p. 557. 103. R. J. Overy, The Air War, 1939-1945 (Europa, London 1980), p. 112.

184

A History of Operational Research

104. 105. 106. 107.

Ibid., p. 109. Ibid., p. 110. Ibid., p. 108. Cited in Sebastian Cox, Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur T. Harris, Despatch on War Operations, 23rd Feb, 1942 to 8th May, 1945 (Frank Cass, London, 1995), p. xix. Ibid., p. xxii. Harris (1947), p. 201. AHB, OS Committee, Technical Sub-Committee on Axis Oil, 'Oil as a Factor in the German War Effort, 1933-1945/ Cited in Cox (1995), p. xxii. PRO, AIR 41/43, XC 21236, AHB, Chap. 18, p. 171. PRO, AIR 41/43, SC 22928, Sir Arthur T. Harris, 'Despatch on War Operations, 23rd February 1942 to 8th May 1945: Air Staff Memorandum on the Despatch by Sir A. Harris (March 1948). Ibid. Richard Overy, Bomber Command 1939-45: Reaping the Whirlwind (Harper Collins, London, 1997). Ibid., p. 185. Ibid. Ibid., p. 92. Ibid., p. 197. Ibid., pp. 199-200. Harris (1947), p. 201. Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (Harper and Rowe, New York, 1979). PRO, AIR 41/43, SC 21236 (1949), Chaps. 16, 17 and 19. United States Army Air Forces, Operations Analysis in World War II (Stephenson Brothers, Philadelphia, 1948), pp. 1-2. See for example, Slessor (1956); Sir Frederick Pile, Ack-Ack: Britain's Defence against Air Attack during the Second World War (Harrop, London, 1948); C.H. Waddington, O.R. in World War 2 (Elek, London, 1973). United States Army Air Forces (1948); Ellis Johnson and David A. Katcher, Mines Against Japan (Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak Maryland , 1973); Philip M. Morse, In at the Beginning: A Physicist's Life (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1977); Charles W. McArthur, Operations Analysis in the US Army Eighth Air Force in World War II (American Mathematical Society, Providence, Rhode Island, 1990); Erik P. Rau, 'The Adoption of Operations Research in the United States during World War II,' in Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes (Eds.), Systems, Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 2000), pp. 57-92. Joseph F. McCloskey, 'U.S. Operations Research in World War II,' Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), pp. 910-25. Overy (1980), p. 189.

108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124.

125.

126. 127.

6

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research, 1945-51

An interesting perspective on the postwar diffusion of operational research in Britain beyond the military sector is provided by early American commentaries. In 1954, for example, Florence Trefethen wrote that The general postwar diffusion of OR in Britain proceeded directly from wartime experience and did not pick up a thread of related business activity from prewar years. In one sense this was an advantage. The American industrial manager, having previous experience with management consultants and differing experts of all types, could and did say to the OR man, 'what's new about this?' Unconvincing replies, in many instances deterred management from encouraging the activity: American non-military OR, consequently, got off to a slow start after the war. The British industrialist, on the other hand, immediately recognised OR as a new and valuable instrument.1 This interpretation was subsequently reinforced by the distinguished operational research pioneer, Russell Ackoff, when he pointed to the invasion of American industry by 'specialised scientists' well before 1940. Thus, in contrast to British experience, by the early 1950s substantial progress had already been made in resolving 'managerial problems arising from the interaction of functional departments.' 2 These North American views, therefore, pointed to the enthusiastic welcome given to operational research in the UK industrial sector after 1945. They also highlighted the American lag in its civilian diffusion in the light of earlier developments in scientific management and educational provision geared to the needs of the corporate sector. Superficially, the Trefethen-Ackoff interpretation is attractive. In accordance with Trefethen's account, for example, it might be argued that the very absence of a scientific approach to business management 185

186 Operational Research in War and Peace provided the postwar British advocates of civilian operational research with an original and attractive agenda. It is also the case that the political and economic circumstances of Britain in the later 1940s gave every appearance of providing an ideal environment for the diffusion of operational research beyond the military sector in view of the election of a Labour Government in 1945 committed to the retention of wartime control systems. Insofar as the principal justification for the continuation of controls was the need to allocate scarce resources, this may be viewed as conducive to rational decision-making according to 'fair' and objective criteria. The contemporary vogue for ' p l a n n i n g ' reinforced this perspective to the extent that it hinted at the need for a 'scientific' approach to the resolution of economic and social problems in a resource constrained world. In this setting, the creation of a large, nationalised public utility sector operating at the limits of capacity in view of historic underinvestment and wartime dilapidation helped to focus attention on 'efficiency' criteria in the planning and execution of investment programmes. This applied also to the wider macroeconomic environment in which the weakness of sterling and the balance of payments dictated the need for a postwar export drive on the part of a manufacturing sector with its own considerable resource demands. 3 Finally, it is conventional in this setting to refer to the 'left of centre' political allegiance of some of the leading wartime practitioners of operational research. Patrick Blackett stood out in this respect, but so too did Professors J. D. Bernal, Solly Zuckerman, C. H. Waddington, Dr Cecil Gordon and Robert Watson-Watt. Much has been written of the 'left-intellectual and left-scientific ambience' which proved attractive to the British scientific establishment in the 1930s and 1940s.4 In the former decade admiration for the Soviet Union was rooted, in part, in that country's relatively liberal funding of science together with the high status and prestige enjoyed by the Soviet scientific elite. The arrival of Jewish scientists in Britain in the wake of Nazi persecution was an additional factor, as was the apparent inability of capitalism to deploy the nation's scientific effort in order to secure the full employment of labour and capital. The view that science could, and should be used to advance the cause of socialism was associated most strongly with J. D. Bernal. Indeed, in his 1939 publication, The Social Function of Science, Bernal went as far as to argue, in classic Marxist fashion, that the use of science for the common good would expose the limitations on productive potential set by the profit motive thereby hastening the downfall of capitalist economic organisation. 5 In that

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 187 setting, Bernal emerged after 1945 as an articulate advocate of the economic and social benefits of operational research as conducive to the inauguration of a scientific and socialist millennium. 6 Collectivist discourse among scientists was also organised both informally and formally. Reference has already been made to Solly Zuckerman's 'Tots and Quots' dining club, formed in 1931 to discuss the social and economic responsibility of science (see above, p. 88). The group, which included such distinguished academics as Hyman Levy, Jack Haldane and Lancelot Hogben, was certainly 'left of centre/ although as Zuckerman later recorded, 'most of us were politically naive and one or two were certainly right wing.' 7 At the institutional level, the Association of Scientific Workers, encompassing both scientists and laboratory technicians, was well known for its left-wing stance and also as an organisation subject to communist influence. Significantly, Blackett, Bernal and Watson-Watt served terms as President. After 1939, the Association, growing rapidly in numbers, interested itself in the recruitment of scientists and technicians to the war effort and organised several conferences focusing on scientific issues relevant to the postwar world. In this respect, one notable gathering took place in January 1943 at Caxton Hall where the theme of the conference was the 'Planning of Science.' The keynote address, delivered by Sir Stafford Cripps in his capacity as Minister of Aircraft Production, touched on the military applications of operational research, a theme also highlighted by Air Chief Marshall Sir Philip Joubert, the current Commander-in-Chief of Coastal Command. More germane to civilian affairs was the speech by F. Morgan, a member of the command's operational research section, which drew positive lessons for consumers in general from the use of operational research in informing the equipment needs of the armed forces.8 This theme was carried forward by the Association with some vigour. In 1944, for example, the Association was openly advocating 'the very fullest application of science to the personal needs of the British people.' This would entail government sponsorship of 'consumer research' and the use of operational research by manufacturing industry to facilitate closer relationships between company managers and consumers. As Bernal stated at a conference convened by the Association in February 1945 to discuss 'Science in Peace/ once a new product was 'in the hands of the ultimate user, the methods of operational research indicate its shortcomings and the new needs which its user discloses.' The Association's thinking was elaborated further in the same year in a report on 'Research into Consumer Needs.' Ranging over consumer research

188 Operational Research in War and Peace experience in the USA and the USSR, the report called for the establishment of a 'Consumer Research Council' reporting to the Lord President of the Council as the minister responsible for 'science.' In the British context, relevant examples of consumer research included the Therapeutic Trials Committee of the Medical Research Council and the Government Social Survey, the latter established in 1940 to monitor public opinion on a wide range of issues, including the impact of shortages and rationing. Operational research was also cited and once again reference was made to the wartime operational research sections insofar as The [Armed] Services may be considered as consumers of the technical material supplied to them by industry...In peace time we shall require the same techniques to study the most efficient ways of utilising the country's resources for the satisfaction of the consumer's needs and desires.9 As Rosenhead has observed, the 'parallelism' with wartime operational research might be viewed as misplaced in that 'the influence of a powerful wartime monopoly "consumer," the Armed Services, over industrial suppliers somewhat exceeds that of a mass of dispersed, individual, peace-time purchasers.' But in its contemporary setting, concerns over consumer needs in peacetime were validated by the fact that 'in 1945 the post-war balance of power between labour and capital, between consumer and manufacturer, were still unclear.' In advocating the establishment of a 'Council for Consumer Research' the Association was, in effect, attempting to shift the balance of power away from sectional, profit-oriented interests in favour of the wider community. 10 The Association of Scientific Workers was certainly at the forefront of public debate on the peacetime applications of operational research as the war drew to a close. After 1945, however, the lead was taken by a single individual — Charles Goodeve — the former Deputy Controller of Research and Development at the Admiralty and recently knighted in recognition of his wartime service. Goodeve's role in advocating the recruitment of scientists to the war effort has already been noted (see above, pp. 86-7), and insofar as he was aware of the quality of Blackett's work for the Admiralty and Coastal Command, he emerged from the war with a considerable determination to secure the application of operational research to civilian affairs. Appointed as Director of the newly-established British Iron and Steel Research Association in 1945, Goodeve had ample opportunity to give full vent to his enthusiasm for

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 189 operational research in that particular setting (see chapter 7). His position also provided him with a useful platform to proclaim the virtues of operational research to a wider audience. During the decade after the war, therefore, Goodeve mounted what was tantamount to a one-man campaign in favour of operational research via speeches and articles in which he underlined its wartime successes and pointed to a variety of peacetime uses. His early thinking is set out admirably in a 1948 survey paper published in Nature.11 In terms of definitions, Goodeve endorsed the brief formulation set out by the American operational researcher, Charles Kittel (see above, p. 3) and proclaimed the 'scientific method' for its use of 'the rigorous logic of mathematics and statistics' in order to analyse the data emanating from 'controlled experiments...or experiences.' 12 Goodeve further commented that the application of operational research was wholly dependent on the meaning attached to the word 'operations' in Kittel's definition. Thus, In war, operational research was applied to the use of weapons, to tactics, and to strategy. In the peace-time application of operational research studies are directed, for example, to the use of equipment and man-power, to operating procedures, and to the solution of those many problems faced by management in operating or controlling factories or public utilities, or by Government authorities in planning. The field of operational research is very wide; but it will be seen that it is quite distinct from the field of most applied scientific research, the latter being concerned with new or improved processes, equipment, materials, etc.13 The use of the present tense in relation to peacetime applications was validated by the claim that operational research was 'already in full swing.' The examples cited by Goodeve were in the fields of railway and road traffic management, both of which gave 'a promise of useful results on the application of the scientific method.' In the former, Goodeve noted that the L.M.S. company had established a special research unit to investigate the communications system. Recommendations concerning improvements to organisation and equipment were being implemented on the basis of quantitative predictions. In road transport, the Road Research Department of the DSIR was using 'a wide range of the tools of modern science' to investigate improvements in traffic flow and the reduction of accidents. The remaining sections of Goodeve's survey were commendably vague, ranging over the application of operational research to 'Inspection and Maintenance,' and 'Technical Progress.' In a later

190 Operational Research in War and Peace article, however, he reported on the proceedings of a DSIR-sponsored conference which had discussed the relevance of operational research to individual industry research associations.14 These included cotton textiles, ceramics, the electrical and allied industries, the boot and shoe trades and Goodeve's own research association in the iron and steel industry. The account was instilled with enthusiasm, with the reader's attention being drawn to the fact that There never has been a more favourable opportunity for an extension of operational research. With the present 'sellers' market/ competition is at a minimum and and co-operation at a maximum. Organised labour, which has always had to look first for security of employment, is able now to take a broader view and consider efficiency of employment.15 Goodeve concluded with a resume of the objects of operational research 'which have been or could be carried out by the research associations:' 1) to increase production per man hour; per unit of equipment, or per unit of of fuel; 2) to improve quality and suitability of products; 3) to improve the basis for decisions regarding the application of science; 4) to make studies of consumer or market problems, that is scientific studies in market research; 5) to aid in finding the optimum degree of standardisation for any particular field of production; 6) to aid in the planning of research programmes.16 It is thus clear that Goodeve's agenda touched, in part, on the concerns of the Association of Scientific Workers, and although he was politically to the right of Bernal and Blackett, it is evident that he shared their vision of operational research as a means of alleviating or resolving a wide range of social and economic problems. 17 As for contemporary reactions to Goodeve's advocacy, there can be no better indication than that provided by the work of the official Committee on Industrial Productivity (CIP) of which Goodeve was a member. This body was to prepare a substantial report on the 'Principles and Practice of Operational Research' and in view of the importance of this document in the early postwar history of operational research it is worthwhile analysing its contents and ultimate fate in some detail. The origins of the CIP itself have been attributed to the Labour Government's interest in long-term economic planning and the relevance of a 'scientific approach' to the improvement of productive efficiency.18 Whilst this is broadly correct, it is important to note that government

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 191 industrial policy was also influenced heavily by short term economic circumstances, especially in relation to the external accounts. The postwar balance of payments crisis was the immediate product of a war in which exports had been curtailed severely in order to expand production of war materials. Masked during the war by a combination of Lend-Lease, the sale of overseas assets and the accumulation of sterling balances, the payments gap dictated the need for a postwar export drive on the part of manufacturing industry. Whilst 'output now' was the favoured rallying cry, the emphasis on enhanced productivity was indicative of the government's concern with long-term efficiency. In this context, the CIP was only one of a myriad of government sponsored bodies which were appointed to discuss the means of raising industrial output. 19 The CIP was established in December 1947 under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Tizard. Its remit was to identify efficiency-enhancing measures which were likely to raise industrial productivity significantly within a five-year time horizon. 20 In that connection, four separate panels were assembled — on Technology and Operational Research, Import Substitution, Technical Information Services, and Human Factors. In reviewing the work of the CIP it is clear that the panels on Technology and Operational Research and Human Factors were regarded as most critical to the task in hand to the extent that these areas held out the greatest prospects for alleviating resource constraints in particular industrial sectors. In the present context, it is only necessary to refer to the work of the Technology and Operational Research Panel which had the following membership: Sir William Stanier (Chairman), Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Supply and former Chief Mechanical Engineer to the L.M.S. Railway Mr S. A. Dakin, Board of Trade Dr P. Dunsheath. Association of British Chemical Manufacturers Dr C. Gordon, Board of Trade Dr H. Hollings, Gas, Light and Coke Co. Mr L. H. C Tippett, Shirley Institute Professor Willis Jackson, London University Lt. General F. G. Wrisberg, Ministry of Supply Dr W. L. Francis, DSIR Mr E. D. T. Jourdain, Lord President's Office The original terms of reference of the panel were 'to consider the part which the results of technical research can play in increasing industrial productivity and in particular to examine the means whereby

192 Operational Research in War and Peace technological improvements and the methods of operational research can best be applied.' 21 At the instigation of Cecil Gordon, representing the Board of Trade, the proposed evaluation of operational research was sharpened so that the panel would also 'review the principles and methods of operational research as applied to Industrial Productivity, in consultation with other Panels [and] recommend how to encourage the spread of such techniques, and to advise on the initiating of special projects.' 22 The reference to Gordon is apposite because he was to play a central role in determining the CIP's recommendations on operational research. His distinguished record in wartime operational research on behalf of Coastal Command has been described in chapter 4 (see above, pp. 107-8). At the end of the war, Gordon moved from his post at the Air Ministry to the Board of Trade as Director of the newly-formed Special Research Unit (SRU) in order to investigate the application of operational research to civilian industry. It is reasonable to assume that Gordon's uniquely valuable work for Coastal Command was known to the then President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, formerly Minister of Aircraft Production. Like Gordon, Cripps was concerned to raise industrial efficiency by a combination of exhortation and selective measures of intervention, albeit on a consensual basis with managers and unions. He certainly had the ambition to transform the Board of Trade into a 'Ministry of Industry' to form the focal point of the government's productivity drive. 23 Thus, under Gordon, SRU's early work concentrated on studies of product variety and standardisation in a range of industrial sectors, but with a particular focus on cotton textiles where Gordon calculated that increased productivity was directly dependent on high-throughput mass production. 2 4 It was his commitment to quantitative analysis of industrial problems, together with his left-wing political sympathies which coloured Gordon's work for the CIP. In this respect, it was significant that he was not only a member of the Technology and Operational Research Panel, but also of the CIP's official Working Party responsible for ranging across all areas of the committee's work from the standpoint of 'a scientific approach' to running industry. Indeed, it was the Working Party rather than the Panel which took the lead in proclaiming the virtues of operational research beyond the industrial sector to embrace 'the machinery of government' where it 'may serve in such fields as the work of O and M Divisions, the framework of capital investment policy, questions affecting the redeployment of labour and the provision of a factual basis for an export policy.' These themes

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 193 were incorporated in a draft report on 'The Principles and Practices of Operational Research' which was available for comment both within and without the CIP in May 1948.25 By January 1949, after the draft had been scrutinised by a number of Whitehall departments, Research Associations and the DSIR, the secretary of the Working Party reported that although it had been well received in the Ministry of Supply, substantial criticisms had been directed against its excessive length and overemphasis on the achievements of wartime operational research at the expense of relevant peacetime applications. 26 Nevertheless, even a superficial reading of the draft report confirms that its 60 single-space typed pages offered a hymn of praise to the potential contribution of operational research to human progress in a wide range of peacetime settings, from industry research associations, civil government departments (including the newly-formed National Health Service) and the nationalised industries, to private sector firms and agriculture. In offering a definition of operational research, the Working Party report endorsed Kittel's emphasis on the use of the scientific method as the basis for executive decisions. The name itself was viewed as having a 'double significance' in that operational research is 'research into the operations of a unit, and it is carried out at the operational — i.e. executive level.' Thus, an operational research team 'exists primarily to aid (and even to stimulate) the executive.' In elaborating on the functions of the operational research team, the report commented as follows: (a) Its function is to examine the methods of operation of the unit under consideration, using all appropriate scientific techniques and disciplines. (b) The team should in general consist of workers with a wide variety of scientific and technological backgrounds, the scientific approach being common to all. (c) Operational Research is undertaken by a separate and trained section which, while it works at the executive level and in intimate and constant contact with executives, has no executive responsibilities. 27 This was followed by a commentary on the 'characteristics' of operational research. These included the need for interdisciplinarity within the research team, the desirability of contact 'at all executive levels' and the absolute requirement for mutual trust between executives and researchers. All of this was validated by the role and status of the wartime operational research sections, especially in Fighter Command where the report presented a clear account of the fruitful working relationships between

194 Operational Research in War and Peace scientists and serving officers which had been so vital in the development of radar. As for civilian illustrations of operational research, the report began by focusing on 'the social field' where it was claimed that there was a long history of pioneering work reaching back into the nineteenth century. According to the report, the social investigations carried out by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and Charles Booth were forerunners of operational research insofar as they had led to 'executive action' in the form of social insurance legislation. This applied also to the work of Sir Cyril Burt in the field of educational psychology carried out on behalf of the London County Council. More recent examples of such work included the wartime Government Social Survey which was alleged to have helped the process of policy formulation in the Ministries of Food and Health. In a similar vein, the report claimed that wartime economic policy also represented an example of 'operational research or near operational research' in that When the war broke out the best theoretical brains utilised their knowledge to solve the economic problems of the war. Surveying the currently available resources of the country, Lord Keynes advocated from the beginning of the war a type of war finance which would include an element of forced savings. When he became one of the main advisers of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, this idea was incorporated in the budget in the form of post-war credits. The quantitative aspects and the shaping of this measure, as well as many other measures of war finance, got their foundation from the official estimates of national income and expenditure carried out in the Central Statistical Office. The necessity for formulating measures of war finance gave a strong impetus to proceed with this research work, and in determining actual financial measures, they led to immediate administrative application.28 It would be interesting to conjecture on Keynes's likely reaction to his designation as an operational research pioneer, especially since the reference to his contribution to war finance was followed by sections on the application of operational research to Royal Ordnance Filling Factories and brick making. The key point to note is that in presenting the case for operational research in peacetime, the authors of the report chose to draw on historic and contemporary precedents far removed from the kind of work carried out in wartime. Ultimately, of course, their ability to convince a sceptical audience was dependent on the credibility of their case for the application of operational research to relevant and

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 195 pressing peacetime problems in the civilian sector, broadly defined. In this respect, the report concluded with a resume of the possible applications of operational research, embracing general and sector-specific issues. They may be summarised as follows: (a) Operational Research as a Means of Reducing the Gap between Scientific Discovery and Practical Application. This would entail collaboration between economists and technical specialists with an input from operational researchers to effect the necessary synthesis. (b) Some Opportunities for Operational Research in Central Government i) The Administrative Machine. Operational researchers would engage in the systematic collection of quantitative data on behalf the Machinery of Government Branch of the Treasury O and M Division. ii) Re-equipment of Industry. Operational researchers could assist in the framing of 'an optimal policy of capital investment' by identifying the relative values of investment projects in both the public and private sectors of industry. iii) Criteria of Efficiency in Nationalised Industries. Given their status as natural monopolies they should be efficient 'in the sense of fulfilling [their] whole set of aims laid down at a minimum cost of man-power, plant and materials. Operational researchers would have a valid role in defining relevant criteria of efficiency. iv) Factors Affecting the Availability of Labour. Operational researchers could assist the productivity drive by calculating the optimal size of labour force at the industry-specific level. v) Some Problems in Foreign Trade. Operational researchers could assist in the framing of export policy by advising on an appropriate product mix in the light of domestic capacity constraints and foreign exchange requirements. (c) Operational Research in Non-Nationalised Industries. The Board of Trade Working Party Reports on individual industries had pointed to a number of subjects suitable for operational research. These included; i) The quantitative assessment of the relative importance of factors affecting productivity in particular industries. ii) Effects of mechanisation. (a) The national cost of raising productivity by new machinery. (b) The productivity of machine-makers.

196 Operational Research in War and Peace (c) Conflict between quality and mechanisation in particular industries. (d) The social and human consequences of technical advance and increased mechanisation. iii) Standardisation. (a) The length of run necessary to get maximum economy in production. (b) The scope for standardisation of products. (c) The efficiency of the distributive system in interpreting and educating public demand and in feeding bulk orders to producers in a form making economic production possible. (d) The cost of changes in fashion, seasonal demand, etc. iv) The application of the principles of layout and flow to individual factories; the balance of cost against advantage in applying these principles. v) The breakdown of operations according to their skill and the effect on productivity of re-deploying labour among these operations. vi) Better labour utilisation. (a) Time and motion study of the efficiency of labour. (b) The development of scientific piece-work systems. vii) Correlation between size and efficiency of the unit (firm or plant). viii) The development of a uniform and rational costing system. ix) The effect of Government controls on efficiency. (d) Operational Research and the Human Factor. Wartime. operational research had pointed to the divergence between the actual achievement and the initial theoretical expectation. This divergence was usually attributed to the human factor. Limited progress was made in this area but the postwar period held out the prospect of more scientific work in this field. In terms of specific applications in the civilian field, the report concentrated on 'Problems for Immediate Study' In order of priority, the nationalised industries were ranked first insofar as any efficiency improvements there would be to the advantage of the economy as a whole. Agriculture was accorded second priority because of its vital role in sustaining the balance of payments in terms of import substitution. Moreover,

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 197 In this industry, the current device for obtaining the correct balance of production and for promoting efficiency is a system of guaranteed prices. By reason of the interaction of the technical, social and economic factors, the problem of developing price or other policies to [promote] efficiency seems one to which the operational research approach can usefully contribute, especially since the term 'efficiency' covers the problems of balance between the efficient use of men, of land and of other factors.29 A third group of industries was identified as being vital to the export drive but limited in its contribution as a result of a shortage of labour. Cotton textiles featured prominently as a potential earner of hard currency, but so too did the tinplate, pottery and foundry trades. In all cases, operational research was viewed as a possible means of raising output in the short term without major capital investment or labour recruitment. The remaining groups embraced those industries such as cutlery, glassware, and the engineering trades — all of them with good export prospects — but constrained by their lack of access to scale economies and capital resources. The application of operational research was again viewed as relevant to raising efficiency in the short term. 30 A final notable theme of the report was its concern with methodology. The section on 'Techniques used in Operational Research' began by noting that It has been emphasized that Operational Research is quantitative, as far as possible, in its methods, and experiment may also play an important part. Much use is made of arithmetical and graphical techniques, and of a good deal of simple mathematics, though genuine mathematical problems occurred (at least in wartime experience) only rarely. The circumstances of the case determine the particular method to be used.31 This was followed by specific reference to the wartime operational research sections: In the use of statistics, there was at times a good deal of confusion among operational research workers, particularly those who were statistical novices, concerning the applicability of tests of significance. Whilst the best modern statistical practice undoubtedly takes into account not only the ill effects of accepting a hypothesis as proved when the evidence is insufficient, but those of rejecting one that is in fact true, and also the cost of reducing

198 Operational Research in War and Peace the risk of either or both of these errors to assigned limits, the fact remains that certain kinds of academic experience led to an inordinately serious rating of the danger of accepting an insufficiently proved hypothesis. Such an approach led to a policy of extreme conservatism, since no new trend would be acted on till its existence was proved beyond doubt, however serious the consequences might be.32 In that light, the report called for the early preparation of a textbook on operational research methods, drawing on wartime experience where necessary. In addition, 'some sort of facility should be provided to ensure that operational research papers, particularly those of methodological interest, are published and read by other operational research workers...Either a special journal for the purpose is needed, or a central abstracting service, to keep operational research workers informed.' 33 Discussion of the merits of a textbook was, in fact, already underway, having been considered by the official Advisory Council on Scientific Policy. This body, formed in 1947 to advise the Lord President of the Council 'in the exercise of his responsibility for the formulation and execution of Government scientific policy,' was chaired by Sir Henry Tizard and included Solly Zuckerman as a member. 34 With their backing, the Council established an Operational Research Editorial Committee with Sir Charles Goodeve in the chair, assisted by Cecil Gordon. In view of the fact that Gordon had collaborated with his colleague, Tom Easterfield, in writing the Working Party report, it is strange, at first sight, that they were not invited to expand the report in a suitable form for a wider audience. But to the extent that a textbook should be 'readily intelligible' and 'technically sound,' it was desirable that the task should be 'most suitably...undertaken by scientific journalists.' 35 The task was therefore allotted to Ritchie Calder and Maurice Goldsmith, the former a personal friend of Gordon. By March, 1948, they had prepared a synopsis. 36 To be written for 'the ordinary reader,' the prospective authors envisaged a preface containing 'a direct approach to the industrialist' supplemented by 'a working definition and...signed by names which carry authority a n d respect in industry.' Significantly, in view of s u b s e q u e n t developments, the synopsis stated that the general approach of the book must take account of possible attitudes, misconceptions and resistance to the use of Operational Research. Some may resent it as 'new tangled nonsense;' others may say that there is nothing new in it, that it is merely process research, time-and-rnotion study, business efficiency,etc, in a new wrapper; others may feel

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 199 that the scientists are looking for a pretext to interfere with industrial practices. In this light, the interest of industrialists had to be engaged as a prelude to relating it to their own problems. Thus, 'Operational Research must be discreetly dramatised. And the exciting aspect of Operational Research is to be found in its war-time applications.' In the context of the times — the vital need to release scarce resources for an export drive to aid the balance of payments — the sectoral coverage of the original Working Party report was admirable. As Maurice Shutler has argued, the agenda for operational research bore favourable comparison with the remit of the Sector Working Parties formed as part of the Labour Government's 'Industrial Strategy' after 1975. Indeed, it is difficult to think of much that was left out, a judgement which led Shutler to the legitimate conclusion that the proposed proliferation of operational research recommended in the report would have effectively mortgaged a considerable proportion of the scientific effort of British universities for years ahead. 37 Perhaps anticipating that result, the report concluded that 'Although Operational Research should not be used as a dump for elderly workers whose powers are failing, it should be realised that some useful workers for the field may be obtained from older scientists whose increasing breadth of interest makes them impatient of concentrating on one narrow speciality.' 38 Supply of scientists could also be facilitated by interchange or secondment from universities to industry and government departments. In the event, the ultimate fate of 'The Principles and Practice of Operational Research' was determined by the Working Party's decision that a substantially shorter version should be produced with more emphasis on the practical application of operational research in peacetime. The task was entrusted to the Treasury's Economic Information Unit (EIU) — 'with an economist's rather than a scientist's hand on the pen, supposedly to improve intelligibility.' 39 This was accomplished by the end of May, 1949. When the Working Party reassembled on 9 June it had before it the new draft and a covering note from the EIU. It was the latter which set the tone for the discussion. After referring to the simplification of the language compared to the original, it commented that the redraft Brings out very well...the weaknesses of the original Report, and therein lies its value...it is hard to be sure that this paper is saying anything at all. I hope that you will not think that this is intended

200 Operational Research in War and Peace to be entirely destructive. On the contrary our purpose is to try to show what the reaction of ordinary people is likely to be to the CIP paper as it stands...the more we read the literature which has circulated about,it, the closer we come to the conclusion that operational research is merely a term covering a whole range of sensible activity (already known, studied and applied under other names), arbitrarily, and to no purpose, differentiated from other sensible activity.40 As if this was not damaging enough, the redraft itself incorporated a sequence of annotations by Cabinet Office and Treasury officials. Their consistent theme was that the report failed signally to make a convincing case for operational research as a distinctive activity. More pointedly, the redraft was 'an announcement of some very large territorial ambitions...and the resulting impression Hitlerism/ an extreme view, perhaps, but one which was complemented by the more reasoned judgement that the actual instances of civil operational research cited — good examples being 'the development of costing systems/ Lord Keynes's studies of 'postwar credits' and 'the boot and shoe industry's reduction of 130 American shoe fittings to 30 British ones' — were no more or less than 'commonsense and ordinary good management practice.' In that light, therefore, 'Any field investigation undertaken with a view to improving the effectiveness of results could be OR on this basis. If this is what is meant would it not be better to say so?' 41 Shutler's conclusion that the use of non-technical language was itself a fatal flaw in the redraft is apposite in that the net effect was that operational research appeared to be applied commonsense and the scientific aspects did not shine through even though it was stated that OR workers should have had a scientific training in some discipline — but their sets of such disciplines included Economics, Statistics, Work Study, O and M and Social Science. This is possibly to miss the lesson of the wartime OR Groups, that they were led by people steeped in the scientific method from long practice of a basic science.42 The redraft was considered by the Working Party in June 1949 in the presence of Gordon and Easterfield, the authors of the original report. The inevitable conclusion was that circulation of the report in Whitehall and beyond would be seriously damaging to operational research. The only optimistic comment was offered by the chairman; Dr Alexander King representing the Lord President of the Council, to the effect that

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 201 the report and redraft had at least stimulated discussion on a variety of issues relevant to the raising of productivity. 43 In the immediate postwar years civil operational research in government departments was confined to the Ministry of Works, the Home Office and SRU at the Board of Trade. SRU had a remit 'to apply to some of the broader problems of peacetime industry and trade, statistics and scientific methods which...have proved so valuable to the Services in war.' Under Gordon's leadership, the unit was highly active, with five reports to its credit by August 1948 (44). These were as follows: (1) Concepts and methods of product standardisation and case studies on variety reduction. (2) Analysis of value added per man hour for cotton goods showing that only low value added goods were exported. (3) Estimate of the level of clothing production at which rationing can be abandoned. (4) Forecasting labour supply in cotton areas. (5) Collation of the findings of various [Board of Trade] working parties on productivity. The focus on cotton textiles is understandable, given the industry's critical role in the postwar export drive, but the relevant activities appear to have generated few worthwhile results. In this respect, Shutler cites an internal Board of Trade evaluation which concluded that in addition to difficulties encountered in extracting statistical data from industry, it had proved impossible to provide well-founded conclusions on the best uses for operational research. The effect, therefore, was to 'draw a line' under the subject which 'may well bear prime responsibility' for the slow growth of operational research in civil government. 45 Taking the whole of the period of office of the postwar Labour Government, this is undoubtedly an unduly narrow judgement. Reference was made earlier to the economic and political factors which appeared to be conducive to the diffusion of civil operational research in the immediate postwar years, in particular, the vogue for centralised planning in a resource constrained economy. The Labour Government was certainly committed to industrial modernisation in both the public and private sectors, as evidenced by its interest in standardisation and economies of scale. But despite the dirigiste rhetoric of Sir Stafford Cripps, it never at any time engaged in purposeful strategic planning, let alone a consistent industrial policy which could be applied to the private sector.46 After 1947, the idea of economic planning became increasingly divorced from the allocation of

202 Operational Research in War and Peace resources at the sectoral level as the management of supply gave way to discretionary demand management. Indeed, by the end of its period of office, full employment, the control of inflation, maintenance of the exchange rate and equilibrium in the balance of payments were the principal policy objectives of the Labour Government. 47 In this setting, the necessity of increasing output in the short term reduced the relevance of operational research as a means to enhancing future competitiveness. Overt political considerations also help to explain the government's and Whitehall's resistance to the diffusion of operational research. As Rosenhead has observed, the onset of the Cold War after 1947 induced a change in the intellectual climate in which certain ideas and policies, including that of centralised state planning, became tarred with the brush of totalitarianism. Operational Research, because of the socialist perspective of many of its originators, and more generally through the left-wing image that science and scientists had acquired since the 1930s, was exposed to this chill wind.48 It is significant that Blackett and Bernal, for all their scientific eminence, were progressively marginalised in British science politics after 1947. In Blackett's case, this was registered in his failure to be appointed to the Central Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, although he did become one of the 'science' members of the newly-formed National Research and Development Corporation in June, 1949. Blackett's 'almost total exclusion from the inner advisory circles of the Government' until 1964 was the direct result of his principled opposition 'to almost every aspect of Anglo-American atomic policy' as stated publicly in his Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy, published in 1948.49 As well as advocating a neutralist stance for Britain in the emergent phase of the Cold War, the book contained vitriolic criticisms of American bombing policy, both conventional and nuclear, during the Second World War. It also registered his deep concern that Britain's limited supply of scientists would be better employed in the business of pure research in university laboratories or in applied work on behalf of civilian manufacturing industry. 50 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in Whitehall Blackett should have been exposed personally to the 'chill winds' identified by Rosenhead in view of his 'unreliability' and as the purveyor of 'dangerous nonsense' in the matter of postwar defence policy.51 As for Cecil Gordon and SRU, their fate was sealed on several counts. In the first instance, SRU sat uneasily within the Board of Trade. As Gordon's colleague, Tom Easterfield, recalled,

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203

Our remit was somewhat vague, somewhat like that of the wartime O. R. sections, of investigating anything we were asked to and at the same time anything else we thought might be useful, as far as time permitted. In the armed forces, this worked well, since the usefulness of O. R. sections was established early, spreading out from obviously 'scientific' (i.e. technological) studies to associated studies of organisation, congestion, information flow, efficiency and so on; moreover, in the armed forces the intimate contact between the O. R. staff and and the officers, not only in the offices and Nissen huts but also in the bar and the mess, meant that personal confidence was established..., and that there was the possibility of hearing the gossip that reveals what will be an important problem. In the B.o.T., the administrators with whom we had to work had no conviction that we could be useful (the more so as the place had a large number of units and advisers who seemed depressed because their advice was seldom asked for, a n d m o r e s e l d o m taken); they w e r e less tolerant of unconventional language; and there was very little opportunity for any sort of informal contact.52 F u r t h e r difficulties s t e m m e d from G o r d o n ' s o w n p e r s o n a l i t y w h i c h w a s calculated to m a k e influential enemies both within a n d without SRU. In a n i n f o r m e d essay in biography, R o s e n h e a d h a s described a m a n 'careless of his a p p e a r a n c e ' w i t h a l o u d voice w h i c h grated 'like a s a w t h r o u g h h a r d b o a r d . ' Possessing a brilliant m i n d in combination w i t h a rebarbative personality, G o r d o n w a s n o t inclined to suffer fools gladly. After i n t e r v i e w i n g s o m e of his former colleagues, R o s e n h e a d concluded that No one remembers Cecil Gordon as tactful. On one occasion the young children of a friend and colleague were reduced to tears by his ceaseless flow of talk at the dinner table. Civil servants overwhelmed by the 1947 fuel crisis received the same insensitive treatment. Those who failed to warm to him found Gordon inconsiderate, brash, intemperate. But this was the obverse of his whole-heartedness. He was impatient, persistent, not willing to be put off. If obstructed, he dug his toes in. Or he went straight to the top. It worked under wartime conditions.53 For G o r d o n , the final point w a s the n u b of the matter. A willingness to cut red t a p e a n d to b y p a s s conventional p r o c e d u r e s w a s all very well in circumstances of total war, b u t this could n o t be replicated in peacetime, not least in a Whitehall d e p a r t m e n t devoted exclusively to civilian affairs.

204 Operational Research in War and Peace Matters were not helped by the fact that the Permanent Secretary at the Board of Trade — Sir John Henry Woods — possessed laissez-faire s y m p a t h i e s which were completely at variance w i t h G o r d o n ' s interventionist agenda. SRU's continuing difficulties in extracting statistical data, accurate or otherwise, from industry was also a major problem: it has already been noted that it rendered it virtually impossible to formulate well-founded recommendations on the best uses of operational research. In this context, it is instructive to note that SRU's work on added value per man-hour and variety reduction in the cotton industry was possible only because of the cooperation received from the Shirley Institute in gathering statistics on behalf of the Cotton Industry Research Association. 54 Finally, it should be noted that Gordon himself was a former member of the Communist Party and remained a lifelong Marxist. It is reasonable to presume, therefore, that he was regarded in a similar light to Blackett and Bernal. SRU itself did not survive the end of the 1940s, by which time Gordon had accepted the position of Senior Lecturer in Social Biology, working under Professor C. H. Waddington at the University of Edinburgh. 55 Two issues remain to be considered, first the fate of the proposed 'textbook' on operational research, and secondly, that of the Committee on Industrial Productivity itself. Although Calder and Goldsmith as authors of the prospective text agreed on a division of labour (Calder covering the wartime record of operational research and Goldsmith examining civilian applications), it would appear that all did not go well. In June 1949 it was reported to the Working Party that the project, as originally envisaged by the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, would not be completed due to Goldsmith's appointment to a UNESCO post. It was therefore decided that Sir Charles Goodeve should be approached as a possible author in his capacity as chairman of the editorial committee. 56 Although nothing came of this initiative, the name of Roy Innes was mooted as a former operational researcher in the Air Ministry and Fighter Command specialising in radar operations and bombing analysis. Innes was, however, the current General Secretary of the Association of Scientific Workers and a known Communist. Both affiliations were no doubt sufficient to secure his rejection.57 As for the CIP, it is evident that Tizard's personal enthusiasm for its productivityenhancing role began to wane during the autumn of 1948. In October, the Technology and Operational Research Panel was laid down, although the Human Factors Panel and the Working Party survived. In the following year Tizard's conviction that a combination of continuing

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 205 capital shortage and long lead times in R and D was hardly calculated to enhance productivity in the short term came to be widely accepted within the CIP. 58 This served as a precursor to the CIP's formal dissolution in July 1950. Whilst it is now accepted that the postwar Labour Government was the first peacetime administration 'to put raising industrial efficiency close to the centre of its economic policy agenda' there is no consensus as to the real impact of its productivity drive on industrial performance. It is true that manufacturing productivity rose strongly between 1946 and 1950 — possibly by as much as 6 per cent per annum — but even the most revisionist economic historian of the period has accepted that the contribution of industrial policy is 'unclear.' 59 Still less is it possible to claim any role for operational research. Its public visibility was confined largely to the few articles published by Goodeve, and even then the relevant journals were hardly likely to have enjoyed a wide readership at the level of industrial managers. The articles themselves were worthy efforts, but it is clear, with the benefit of hindsight, that Goodeve's examples of the civilian applications of operational research were less than convincing in terms of their direct relevance to the raising of industrial efficiency. This certainly applied to the CIP's Working Party Report, and it was a critical factor in encouraging the hostile response from within the Treasury and other Whitehall departments. The application of operational research to 'the machinery of government,' moreover, was always likely to be in conflict with a conservative civil service with an ethic of administration rooted firmly in the nineteenth century. Modernising impulses in this sphere would have to await the election of another Labour administration committed to far-reaching institutional reform (see chapter 10 below). These factors were sufficient in themselves to ensure a lukewarm reaction to operational research and the optimistic claims of its principal supporters. It can only be said that their advocacy was damaged further by overt political considerations at the inception of the Cold War. The chapter began with reference to American perceptions of the postwar diffusion of operational research in Britain. On the basis of the evidence presented, it is clear that their optimistic tone must be severely qualified, at least in relation to contemporary reactions to operational research as a means of achieving early and measurable increases in industrial productivity. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the civilian diffusion of operational research after 1945 was entirely dependent on committed individuals wielding high executive authority

206

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a n d t h e r e b y in a p o s i t i o n to c i r c u m v e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s i s t a n c e to m a n a g e r i a l innovation. Even t h e n , the sectoral coverage w a s limited to the recently nationalised coal i n d u s t r y a n d the iron a n d steel i n d u s t r y . As in the case of administrative reforms in Whitehall, the diffusion of o p e r a t i o n a l research into the civilian m a n u f a c t u r i n g sector w a s n o t to m a k e s i g n i f i c a n t h e a d w a y u n t i l t h e 1960s i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s of u n p r e c e d e n t e d m a n a g e r i a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g w h i c h followed in the w a k e of a notable u p s u r g e in m e r g e r activity.

NOTES 1. Florence N. Trefethen, 'A History of Operations Research/ in J. F. McCloskey and F. N. Trefethen (Eds.), Operations Research for Management (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1954), pp. 30-1. 2. R. L. Ackoff, 'A Comparison of Operational Research in the USA and Great Britain,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 8 (1957), pp. 88-100. 3. Jim Tomlinson, 'Mr Attlee's Supply-Side Socialism,' Economic History Review, Vol. 46 (1993), pp. 1-22; Jim Tomlinson, Government and the Enterprise since 1900: The Changing Problem of Efficiency (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), pp. 161-85. 4. Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and Socialists of the 1930s (Allen Lane, London, 1978); P. G. Werskey, 'British Scientists and Outsider Politics, 1931-1945/ in B. Barnes (Ed.), Sociology of Science (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972), pp. 231-50; Jonathan Rosenhead, Operational Research at the Crossroads: Cecil Gordon and the Development of Post-war OR/ Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 40 (1989), pp. 3-28. 5. J. D. Bernal, The Social Function of Science (1939); Idem, 'Lessons of the War for Science,' Proceedings of the Royal Society, A 342 (1945), pp. 555-74; Idem, Science in History (Watts, London, 1954), pp. 580-607. 6. D. M. C. Hodgkin, 'John Desmond Bernal, 10 May 1901-15 September 1971/ Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 26 (1980), pp. 17-84; M. Goldsmith, Sage: A Life of]. D. Bernal (Hutchinson, London, 1980). 7. Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords 1904-46: An Autobiography (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978), pp. 393-4. 8. Rosenhead (1989), p. 6. 9. Cited in Ibid, p. 12. 10. Ibid. 11. Sir Charles Goodeve, 'Operational Research/ Nature, Vol. 161 (13 March, 1948), pp. 377-84. 12. Cited in Ibid., p. 377. 13. Ibid.

The Postwar Labour Government and Operational Research 207 14. Sir Charles Goodeve, 'Operational Research in the Research Associations,' Nature, Vol. 161 (17 April, 1948), pp. 584-5. 15. Ibid., p. 585. 16. Ibid. 17. Ackoff (1957), pp. 88-100. 18. Rosenhead (1989), p. 16. 19. Tomlinson (1994), pp. 161-85. 20. PRO CAB 124/1094, 34095, 18 December, 1947. Provisional Committee on Industrial Productivity. 21. PRO CAB 132/28, 34013. CIP (48) (1), 2 February, 1948. Committee on Industrial Productivity, first meeting. 22. PRO CAB 132/47, 34013. CIP (TR) (48), 20 January, 1948. Committee on Industrial Productivity: Panel on Technology and Operational Research: Terms of Reference. 23. D. E. H. Edgerton, 'Whatever Happened to the Warfare State? The Ministry of Supply, 1945-51/ in Helen Mercer, Neil Rollings and Jim Tomlinson (Eds.), Labour and Private Industry: The Experience of 1945-51 (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1992), pp. 95-6. 24. Rosenhead (1989), pp. 11-13. 25. PRO CAB 132/28, 34013 (CIP) (48) (25), 21 July, 1948. The Principles and Practices of Operational Research; Report by the Working Party of the Committee on Industrial Productivity (Final Draft). 26. PRO CAB 132/50, 34095 (CIP) (WP) (49), 17 January, 1949. Committee on Industrial Productivity: Working Party. Minutes of Second Meeting. 27. Ibid., p. 2. 28. Ibid., p. 11. 29. Ibid., pp. 32. 30. Ibid., pp. 37-9. 31. Ibid., p. 17. 32. Ibid., p. 20. 33. Ibid., p. 22. 34. PRO CAB 132/64, 34013, S. P. (47) 1, 18 February, 1947. Advisory Council on Scientific Policy: Terms of Reference and Composition. 35. PRO CAB 132/81, 34095. Advisory Council on Scientific Policy: Operational Research Editorial Committee. Minutes of a Meeting held on 27 January, 1948. 36. PRO CAB 132/81, 34095, S. P. (O.R.E.) (48) 1, 4 March, 1948. Advisory Council on Scientific Policy: Operational Research Editorial Committee: Argument and Synopsis. 37. Maurice Shutler, 'Operational Research and the Creation of Wealth,' International Working Seminar, University of York (1978), pp. 1-5. 38. PRO CAB 132/28, The Principles and Practices of Operational Research. 39. Rosenhead (1989), p. 19.

208 Operational Research in War and Peace 40. PRO CAB 132/50, 34095, 9 June, 1949. Working Party of the Committee on Industrial Productivity: Minutes of Meeting. 41. PRO CAB 132/50, 34095. A Short Account of Operational Research Describing its History and Techniques and Its Bearing on Productivity. 42. Shutler (1978), p. 4. 43. PRO CAB 132/50, 34095, 9 June 1949. Working Party of the Committee on Industrial Productivity: Minutes of Meeting. 44. Rosenhead (1989), p. 13. 45. Shutler (1978), p. 5. 46. Tomlinson (1993). 47. M. W. Kirby, 'Supply-Side Management,' in N. F. R. Crafts and N. Woodward (Eds.), The British Economy since 1945 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991), p. 239. 48. Rosenhead (1989), p. 24. 49. Sir Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, Baron Blackett of Chelsea,' Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1975), pp. 70-1. 50. P. M. S. Blackett, Political and Military Consequences of Atomic Energy (Turnstile Press, London, 1948). 51. Solly Zuckerman, Six Men Out of the Ordinary (Peter Owen, London, 1990), pp. 27-8. 52. T. E. Easterfield, 'The Special Research Unit at the Board of Trade, 19461949/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 34 (1983), p. 565. 53. Rosenhead (1989), p. 23. 54. Easterfield (1983), pp. 566-7. 55. Rosenhead (1989), pp. 21-2. 56. PRO CAB 132/50, 34095. Committee on Industrial Productivity: Minutes of a meeting held on 9 June, 1949. 57. Rosenhead (1989), pp. 20-1. 58. A. King, cited in Ibid., p. 20. 59. Tomlinson (1994), pp. 184-5.

7

Operational Research in Iron and Steel

After its formation in 1916, the DSIR developed a dual strategy for the sponsorship of industrial research in the UK, in the first instance by the creation of research establishments under its own auspices, and secondly by encouraging specific industries and trades to form their own cooperative research associations. For the latter, financial subsidies were available and within five years of its formation, the DSIR had presided over the creation of 20 such associations. Thirty years later, the number had doubled so that they encompassed approximately one half of manufacturing industry 1 It has been suggested that these associations provided 'a natural home' for operational research 2 and it is certainly true that some interest was displayed in the later 1940s. In 1948, for example, the periodical Nature contained a report on a conference on operational research convened by the Committee of Directors of Research Associations in cooperation with the DSIR.3 The overall consensus was that operational research was a worthwhile activity to the extent that its purpose was to raise productivity and product quality via optimum standardisation, and to apply scientific studies to management problems.4 If these praiseworthy objectives resonated with the recommendations of 'The Principles and Practices of Operational Research' then it should occasion no surprise for the conference rapporteur was none other than Charles Goodeve, currently serving as a member of the Committee on Industrial Productivity. In 1948, Goodeve was Director of the British Iron and Steel Research Association (BISRA), a body formed in 1945 which he had been invited to join directly after his departure from the Admiralty. BISRA was the product of an initiative from within the British Iron and Steel Federation (BISF) to form an industry-wide research facility in order to resolve common problems on the basis of pooled expertise. In this setting, BISRA was designed to complement the research efforts of individual firms within the industry.

209

210 Operational Research in War and Peace At its inception, BISRA was financed jointly by the DSIR and the BISF. It contained a membership of 298 firms and was subject to the oversight of a council composed of representatives of the BISF, the Iron and Steel Institute, and the DSIR.5 If its ultimate purpose was to enhance the industry's performance in terms of overall competitiveness, then it can only be said that Goodeve's task as director of BISRA was truly formidable, given the industry's unfortunate historical legacy. As the oldest established national producer, the British industry had begun to encounter severe problems of modernisation well before the end of the nineteenth century. Small and widely scattered production units, dispersed control and lack of vertical integration may have been appropriate in the age of wrought iron, but these entrenched structures placed major obstacles in the way of any decisive movement towards bulk production on the basis of advanced processes. Alternate periods of boom and slump in a situation where plant was very durable exacerbated the problem of structural rigidity and encouraged the movement towards price-fixing agreements, the latter helping to sustain high-cost and relatively inefficient producers. 6 The interwar period gave rise to new difficulties in the form of depressed demand at the same time as the industry's financial burdens increased dramatically. It is true that over the divide of the First World War, and continuing into the 1920s, the pace of amalgamation accelerated, but by the end of the interwar period the structure of the industry lagged far behind the achievements of its American and German counterparts in terms of integration and high-throughput production. The BISF itself had been established in 1935 as a direct response to the award of enhanced measures of protection following the enactment of a general tariff in 1932. There can be no doubt that the Conservative-dominated government of the day and the industry's critics intended that the BISF should preside over a programme of rationalisation in the form of regional mergers. To their mutual disappointment, however, the Federation's organisational reforms focused on the restriction of competition in response to further moves towards price controls. As the industry's most recent historian has concluded, a government which was opposed to direct measures of intervention was obliged to sponsor 'a cartel over which it had little control.' 7 In the light of the industry's recent history, BISRA's future was clearly uncertain. It is true that the creation of a fully mobilised war economy after 1940 had helped to strengthen the industry's central organisation, not least as a result of coordinated investment strategies. In addition, there was a growing appreciation of the Anglo-American

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 211 productivity gap in the context of an acute scarcity of resources for capital investment. 8 Inter-firm jealousies, however, persisted so that influential elements within the industry remained suspicious of the possibility that the very creation of BISRA might compromise inter-firm competitiveness, especially in the context of firm-specific product and process innovations. It is also the case that Goodeve himself viewed the £190,000 annual budget awarded by the industry to BISRA (inclusive of a DSIR subsidy of £60,000) as failing to 'encompass the large and aggressive organisation' that he envisaged. 9 His one advantage, in addition to his singular energy and powers of persuasion, was that he simultaneously held the title of Director of Research not only for BISRA, but also for the BISF itself. The latter position was to prove essential in giving Goodeve direct access to the highest levels of influence within the Federation.

1

1946

|

,

1950

1

1

,

1954

p

1958

1962

Years ended 31 December

Figure 7.1 The Growth of BISRA Source: R D. Richardson, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 27 (1981), Fig. 7, p. 340.

212 Operational Research in War and Peace

PLANT ENGINEERIKO AND ENERGY (A)

Mechanical engineering Control engineering Civil engineering Energy

CHEMISTRY (A) Process chemistry Refractories and slags Corrosion

PHYSICS (A) Instruments Fluid dynamics Metal physics Automation OPERATIONAL RESEARCH (A) Operational investigation Systems evaluation Human factors

STEEL MAKING (Q

(A ind B)

Raw materials Iron ore preparation Blast furnaces Technology and practice

S P e c i a 1 i s t d e P a r m/ n t s

Converters Electric furnaces Process Chemistry Ingots and continuous casting

MECHANICAL (C) WORKING (D)

Rolling Forging Wire drawing Tinpiate Coatings Steel snip processing

METALLURGY
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

Field of work North East Coast

Patents (A) Information (A and C) Public Relations (A) Steel user service (A and C) Corrosion advise bureau (A)

North East Coast

DEVELOPMENT AND INFORMATION SERVICES

A London B N E Coasi

C Sheffield D Swansea

Figure 7.2 The Organisation of BISRA Source: Richardson (1981), Fig. 6, p. 338.

Goodeve served as Director of BISRA until his retirement in 1969. Beginning with a small staff of 11, by 1963, the association had well over 500 employees and a multi-million pound annual income. BISRA's growth is set out in Fig. 7.1, whilst Fig. 7.2 describes the organisational structure which had evolved by the early 1960s. Five divisions, corresponding to the structure of the industry, were complemented by three specialist departments, the heads of each reporting directly to Goodeve. 10 During the 1950s, research laboratories were established in the general areas of physics, chemistry and plant engineering with their locations being determined by the needs of local producers. Almost from the start, the volume of research projects tended to outstrip the available staff resources. In 1962, 200 projects were underway, reflecting the disparate interests of BISRA's 500 committee members. By that time, however, the association had substantial achievements to its credit, particularly in relation to the improvement of open-hearth, arc and electric furnaces. Other noteworthy results had been achieved in the production of strip and in methods of coating steel. All of this work had

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 213 been carried out in collaboration with individual company research laboratories. In addition, BISRA had negotiated licensing agreements with individual companies for the use of innovations patented by its own staff. In this respect, the system of automatic gauge control for rolling mills was an excellent example of the association's independent contribution to technical advance in partnership with university scientists. Non-patentable studies of high quality were also carried out, an excellent example being the work undertaken during the 1950s on the chemistry of sintering. This was a joint programme with the Research and Development Department of the United Steel Companies resulting in 'a complete and firm scientific model' which was rapidly diffused throughout the industry as a whole. 11 In the context of the industry's disintegrated structure, there can be no doubt that BISRA made a positive contribution to technical advance in the steel industry. As Goodeve's obituarist stated, in glowing terms: It (BISRA) naturally prosecuted important programmes of research but it also provided a vital forum for technical discussion and collaboration between specialists in the separate companies of which the industry consisted. The overall level of technical expertise was greatly improved by this sharing of knowledge and by the movement of engineers from B.I.S.R.A. into the industry as the years went by. Typically B.I.S.R.A. would pioneer a project, do the preliminary work in its own laboratories and then complete the work on a plant in collaboration with one of the major steel companies. Getting effective collaboration was sometimes difficult, so the diplomatic skill and ability to reconcile conflicting views, which Charles had displayed during his naval years, again proved invaluable.12 It is instructive to note, however, that BISRA's activities notwithstanding, the postwar economic performance of the iron and steel industry was disappointing both in the Anglo-American and European contexts. Effective rationalisation consistent with the closure of the overseas productivity gap had to await the 1980s when a combination of product innovation and fundamental shop-floor reorganisation — the latter entailing substantial redundancies — transformed the industry's market and financial position. 13 In the meantime, the industry was a veritable political football with a brief phase of nationalisation being followed by a return to private ownership in 1953 before renationalisation in 1967. The resulting British Steel Corporation was, in turn, transferred back to the private sector as British Steel in 1988. Throughout the period of

214 Operational Research in War and Peace private ownership in the 1950s and 1960s, the industry was subject to official surveillance by the supervisory Iron and Steel Board which presided over a sequence of 'development' plans, all of them subject to overt political considerations. In general terms, the aim was to 'patch up' existing capacity and when new investments were made, sub-optimal locations were chosen in response to the politically sensitive problem of localised unemployment. 14 The return to private ownership was also accompanied by a resumption of the protectionist policies of the 1930s insofar as the industry remained outside the newly-formed European Coal and Steel Community, whilst the operation of a system of uniform delivered prices helped to sustain a 'quiet life' for high cost and inefficient producers. 15 Indeed, a scenario of 'low effort and low productivity' had been foreshadowed in a report on the industry published by the AngloAmerican Council on Productivity, published in 1949.16 This had drawn invidious contrasts between the British and American industries in terms of poor factory layout, limited mechanisation and standardisation of output, as well as entrenched restrictive practices on the part of employers and trade unions alike. In this light, it is evident that BISRA faced an up-hill task in contributing to technical progress and enhanced efficiency in the steel industry. In the absence of a fundamental reorganisation in favour of low-cost production as determined by plant size and location, its role was bound to be circumscribed as an agent of positive change. In terms of specialist departments, the outstanding innovation for BISRA as a research association was the creation of an operational research section to accompany those devoted to physics and chemistry. Originally established in 1946 as a joint section of BISRA and the BISF, by 1950 the new department was under BISRA's exclusive control. There can be no doubt that the decision to proceed in this direction was taken by Goodeve personally in the light of his well articulated commitment to the civilian diffusion of operational research. 17 The remit of the department was defined as follows: (a) To apply the methods of mathematical statistics and allied techniques to the solution of operational problems arising in the industry. (b) To provide, by studies of costs, a detailed picture of the economics of the essential processes of the iron and steel industry. The purpose of this part of the work is twofold. First, in order that research projects may be concentrated on problems whose successful solution will lead to the greatest economic advantages. Second, to enable

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 215 estimates to be made of the savings to be expected from any proposed changes in technical procedure. (c) To form a liaison between the activities of the Research Association and those of the Federation. This function consists in providing a channel for the two-way interchange of information and in carrying out analyses in regard to matters which form common ground between the Research Association and the Federation. 18 Beginning with a staff of two in 1947, by the mid-1960s the Operational Research Department had expanded to more than fifty in number, approximately 40 of whom were science graduates. 19 In addition to external recruitment, the original numbers had been augmented gradually by staff transfers from BISRA's Plant Engineering Division and from the Mathematics Section of the Physics Department. 20 This was in response to the growing volume of work being undertaken after 1950. The largest project by far encompassed a sequence of studies on the importing of iron ore, continuing well into the 1960s. Other significant projects in the 1950s included the analysis of stock control and accident statistics and more importantly, consideration of the contribution of digital electronic computers to problems of managerial control. Although the larger iron and steel firms such as the United Steel Companies, the Steel Company of Wales, Richard, Thomas and Baldwins and GKN were establishing their own operational research groups after 1950, BISRA began to offer a consultancy service to small and medium size firms in 1953 with financial support from the US-sponsored Conditional Aid Fund. 21 By 1965, consultancy work on a confidential basis accounted for one half of BISRA's work in operational research, although by that time firms using the service were being charged full cost fees. The very fact of consultancy was itself a stimulus to operational research and contributed to the further diffusion of the discipline in the steel industry.22 In view of the growth of operational research in the steel industry both within and without BISRA, there were signs by the mid-1950s of a shortage of suitably qualified personnel. Of the original members of the Operational Research Department, David Owen owed his recruitment to his wartime experience in working for Dr Dickens at Bomber Command, 23 whilst Roger Eddison had undertaken statistical work on behalf of the office of the Chief Inspector of Fuses. When Eddison left BISRA in 1955 he was replaced as head of the Operational Research Department by Roger Collcutt who possessed long experience of operational research in the military context. Like Owen, he too had served

216 Operational Research in War and Peace u n d e r Dickens at Bomber C o m m a n d a n d before taking u p an appointment in Flying Training Command, had accompanied Solly Zuckerman to France and Germany to survey the effects of area bombing. 23 On Collcutt's arrival, he took the view that his department had 'too many chiefs and too few indians' and too many of the latter were leaving to join company-based operational research groups after very short periods of service with BISRA. In his estimate, BISRA needed '6 to 8 new graduates a year/ an observation which anticipated the inauguration in 1960 of a two-year graduate apprenticeship scheme in operational research leading to the award of a postgraduate diploma at the London School of Economics (LSE). In conformity with contemporary gender preferences, candidates were required to be male and in possession of 'a good final degree in pure or applied science, mathematics or statistics.' The first year was spent on practical projects as an 'operational research apprentice/ whilst the second was devoted to full time study at the LSE. On receipt of the diploma, there was the prospect of employment in BISRA in the civil service grade of senior scientific officer.24 The BISRA annual report for 1961 noted that the scheme had begun with ten graduates, seven of whom had been recruited by BISRA directly with the remaining three on secondment from Richard Thomas and Baldwins and Stewarts and Lloyds. The report also noted that the first month of training at BISRA had been devoted to the use of computers as an essential aid to operational research studies, especially when they entailed the amassing of considerable amounts of statistical data. 25 In view of the fact that the steel industry fulfilled a pioneering role in the use of first generation computers it is worthwhile investigating their introduction and diffusion in this particular setting. Within BISRA, the case for acquiring a computer was developed with logic and eloquence by David Owen. By the mid-1950s, Owen was involved in the manipulation of large data sets in relation to blast furnace operations and crane movements on behalf of BISRA's Ironmaking and Plant Engineering Divisions. In that connection he was making use of the digital electronic computer owned by the University of Manchester. As Owen recalled, this was probably the first machine in the UK to be used for industrial applications and in order to gain access to it he had 'to go up to Manchester by train and arrive in the evening, go to the university and use the machine until 6 o'clock in the morning.' 26 It would be understandable if inconvenience on this scale was a precipitating factor in Owen's advocacy, but his case for the purchase of a computer,

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 217 addressed to BISRA's Operational Research Advisory Committee, was grounded in objective reality: There are two separate reasons for recommending this purchase by BISRA. Firstly, in many research projects problems are met which can be investigated effectively only by methods involving a great deal of computation, often far too much to be attempted by manual methods; only a computer can do this work sufficiently quickly for the answers to be useful, and it can speed up and improve in many respects a considerable volume of the conventional research work formerly done by hand. Secondly, there is urgent need (and an increasing demand) for a computer to serve as a pilot installation: to be a centre for training personnel of member firms, and to be used for experimenting with and developing the application of computers to the day-to-day activities of offices and works throughout the steel industry. It is generally agreed that computers are of great value in research work because of their high speed and capacity for mathematical and logical analysis. What is less widely appreciated is their potential value to management. Efficiency of communication of selected facts and figures about production is vital both to management and to research; to that extent, both business and scientific procedures may be said to depend on generating, moving, and analysing information, much of which is (or can be made) numerical.27 Thus, BISRA's acquisition of a computer could be justified not only in relation to the association's own activities, but also as a means to the diffusion of computer techniques to member firms in the industry. Perhaps the decisive argument advanced by Owen was the fact that BISRA was already spending £3,000 per annum for the use of the Manchester computer. In this context, the purchase of a machine with ancillary data processing equipment at a cost of £50,000 (with capital charges amortised over ten years at £5,000 per annum) was an attractive proposition, all the more so in relation to the enhanced effectiveness of BISRA's research capability.28 These arguments were accepted by BISRA's Budget Committee and an order was placed with the Ferranti company for the delivery of a Pegasus digital computer. This was installed at BISRA's London headquarters in the summer of 1957, by which time Owen had prepared an explanatory booklet on its potential uses on behalf of BISRA's newly-formed Computer Applications Section located in the

218 Operational Research in War and Peace Operational Research Department. 2 9 Introduced in 1954, the P e g a s u s was a 'state of the art' c o m p u t e r consisting of Paper-tape input (at 200 characters per second): a computing store of seven accumulators and 56 ordinary registers, all based on nickel delay lines and giving 'immediate' access to the 39 bit words (addition took 0.3 msec, multiplication 2 msec and division 5.5 msec): a main store of 4096 words later extended to 7168 words on a revolving magnetic drum (maximum access time 16 msec): and paper-tape and teleprinter output. Magnetic-tape spools were used for backing store. Operators punched paper tape from coding documents, and to guard against error two operators would punch the same program separately. Both would be fed simultaneously to the computer, which would stop when there was a discrepancy, allowing the error to be investigated! 30 'State of the art' the P e g a s u s m a y h a v e been, b u t it w a s already s h o w i n g its age b y the early 1960s. It w a s , of course, m u c h less p o w e r f u l t h a n even the first generation m i c r o c o m p u t e r s , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g its physical bulk a n d high initial cost. 31 Nevertheless, the primitive P e g a s u s w a s to p r o v e its w o r t h on a n u m b e r of BISRA research p r o g r a m m e s , especially in t h e context of o p e r a t i o n a l research b a s e d u p o n t h e t e c h n i q u e of simulation. In describing the k i n d of w o r k u n d e r t a k e n b y BISRA's O p e r a t i o n a l Research D e p a r t m e n t there is a convenient chronological divide, before a n d after the acquisition of t h e Pegasus. In the p e r i o d to 1957 t h e w o r k could b e divided into three g r o u p s w i t h one third b e i n g a c c o u n t e d for by contracts received from the BISRA divisions. The r e m a i n d e r w a s d i v i d e d in r o u g h l y e q u a l p r o p o r t i o n s b e t w e e n s t u d i e s o n behalf of i n d i v i d u a l c o m p a n i e s a n d projects a r i s i n g w i t h i n t h e O p e r a t i o n a l Research D e p a r t m e n t itself. 32 At the divisional level m u c h of t h e w o r k consisted of statistical advice in relation to works operations. For example, electrical crane failures w e r e studied on behalf of the Plant Engineering Division: crane failure records w e r e e x a m i n e d a n d the failures t a b u l a t e d according to the t y p e of fault a n d the conditions of operation. For the S t e e l m a k i n g D i v i s i o n , s t u d i e s of the c a u s e s of p l a t e d e f e c t s w e r e u n d e r t a k e n as well as the analysis of the use of refractories. O t h e r w o r k dealt w i t h major organisational p r o b l e m s such as the s u p p l y of s c r a p to o p e n h e a r t h furnaces a n d c h a r g i n g delays d u e to the ' b u n c h i n g ' of furnaces. Work o n behalf of i n d i v i d u a l firms w a s facilitated i n 1952 after the formation of a n A d v i s o r y Service Team. This w a s f u n d e d b y the M u t u a l Security Agency, a n organisation established by t h e U S C o n g r e s s

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 219 to support industrial reconstruction relevant to the military capability of NATO countries in Western Europe. 33 Although advice was normally delivered on a confidential basis, BISRA soon obtained the agreement of companies to the wider dissemination of information obtained at individual works. This was the case in relation to the Advisory Team's analysis of scrap supplies and furnace charging, as well as open hearth rebuilding. 34 The overwhelming majority of individual reports were accepted by company managements, apparently with positive results. Early studies concentrated on works layout and handling problems, together with traffic studies. Thus, detailed studies were carried out at several steelworks to solve specific problems in the rate of furnace charging: each investigation resulted in the removal of superfluous operations with consequent increases in the rate of output. At one steelworks, the management required a forecast of the facilities which would be needed to ensure the delivery of sufficient supplies of scrap as a sequence of new furnaces came on stream. The Advisory Team's recommendations were accepted as the basis for improvements in the handling, preparation and movement of scrap from stock to both old and new furnaces. At two other works, existing transport and handling facilities were a major constraint on the expansion of furnace capacity and delays to furnace-charging were being experienced. Changes in consumption from week to week were being met from works stock, but in order to avoid delays, the immediate supply system was being used to meet hourly fluctuations in relation to the varying number of furnaces w h i c h required charging. In this case, the A d v i s o r y Team's recommendations for radical changes in storage policy were implemented with considerable benefit to the internal transport system and hence works productivity. 35 Within the Operational Research Department itself, two long lasting projects were inaugurated after 1950, the first devoted to the import of iron ore and the second to the statistical analysis of accidents. Since the former continued into the era of computerisation, it is appropriate to highlight it in the context of the post-1957 programme of work. BISRA's interest in accident prevention dated back to the early years of its existence when it collaborated with the BISF Accident Prevention Committee in a number of ad hoc studies. These included the design of safety boots and reasons for their non-use, the establishment of reliable testing procedures for flame-resistant fabrics, and the effectiveness of safety posters. The specific remit of the Operational Research Department was to construct an injury frequency rate index

220 Operational Research in War and Peace for individual steelworks 'as a guide to management action.' 37 The purpose of the exercise was to shed light on labour turnover and absentee rates due to injury and illness. The first study entailed the collection of relevant data from three widely dispersed steelworks covering different periods of time from the later 1940s. Subsequent analysis revealed a remarkable degree of consistency between the three works. As the relevant report commented: Following each new recruit through the first four years of his works service, or until he left if this happened within the period, it was apparent that the injury frequency rates for the new recruits fell off steeply during the early part of their service towards the overall works rate; this fall was much greater than any decrease in the overall works rate in the same period. Plotting absence behaviour in terms of the number of shifts lost, a further outstanding point of similarity between the three works was the spectacular rise in sickness absence with increasing length of service. In all cases sickness absence for the first six months of service was well below the overall works level. On the same basis, a comparison of changes in the level of sickness absence at each works with changes in all other kinds of absence (default, injuries, leave, uncertificated sickness) showed a general pattern of progressive 'conversion of absence under other headings into sickness absence.37 On the reasonable assumption that the general level of health of steelworkers was no worse than for the rest of the population in heavy industrial areas, the results of the study indicated that the rise in sickness reported after the first months of employment reflected 'not so much a genuine increase as a rise in the proportion of absence reported as sickness absence.' This implied that individual workers had a degree of choice as to whether or not to absent themselves and also in the type of absence selected. In this setting, the BISRA study pointed to the fact that in some cases 'injuries sustained outside the works and aggravated at work, recurrences of old injuries and injuries resulting from a permanent or temporary weakness on the part of the individual concerned (e.g., strained backs) are reported as works accidents.' It was thus clear that in the case of injuries resulting from a works accident, it was a matter of individual choice whether the worker stayed at work or reported it. Even then, if accidents were reported, it was the personal decision of the worker whether to return to work after treatment in the sick-bay or to go absent. Naturally, in the latter case, the worker had some measure of

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 221 control over the duration of the absence. Further work focussed on the reasons for absence on the part of new recruits to the industry, paying particular attention to those who left within four years of joining ('leavers') and those who stayed longer ('stayers'). In these respects, the BISRA investigation revealed a substantially higher injury frequency rate for leavers than stayers, with the former twice as likely as stayers to report a 'lost-time' injury. As Table 7.1 shows, leavers also had higher absence rates in terms of absence episodes.

Table 7.1. Absence rates of long and short service personnel. Absence Episodes per 1000 Working Shifts Works C

Works B Leavers

Stayers

Leavers

Stayers

4.6

3.7

8.5

4.3

19.0

14.9

5.0

2.4

3.0

4.6

1.8

1.3

Source: R. H. Collcutt, The First Twenty Years of Operational Research (BISRA, London, 1965), Fig 2.12, p. 21.

These results underlined the fact that Under broadly similar circumstances new intakes into steelworks respond in similar ways to the demands made on them by the unfamiliar environment. A policy of consistent and thorough screening could reduce the high initial loss rates from intakes; as the leavers are more prone than the stayers to go absent and report lost-time injuries, their non-existence is also likely to improve the overall absence figures and injury frequency rates.38 BISRA's analysis of accidents pointed to three conclusions. In the first instance, increased labour turnover resulting in a reduction in average length of service could lead to a rise in the injury frequency rate without any change in works safety. Secondly, there was an increasing tendency for minor injuries to be ascribed to sickness absence

222 Operational Research in War and Peace rather than reported injury. Most importantly, 'Those who stay a short time contribute little to the works and also have the highest rate of injury and other absence; more efficient selection procedures to reject such men could lead to improved safety records.' 39 Whether or not the industry revised its recruitment procedures is unknown. However, the conclusion that reported injuries were an unsatisfactory indicator of works safety and accident prevention bore fruit in a further study of the effect of safety posters on the level of works accidents. Until the Operational Research Department began to investigate the merits of safety posters, views of their impact on works safety were entirely subjective. In order to provide a more robust indicator of effectiveness the department chose to examine a particular steelworks operation which was potentially dangerous and therefore subject to a well-defined safety practice. A further requirement was that the operation should occur on a sufficient number of occasions to generate a large number of observations. These conditions were met by the hooking back of crane slings. The subsequent analysis, based upon a sequence of posters designed by advertising consultants, was carried out in seven steelworks over a period of weeks. It revealed that dedicated safety posters led to substantial improvements in works safety. Across all seven works the average proportion of slings correctly hooked back was 38 per cent, rising to 50 per cent after posters had been displayed for two months. In shops with low roofs where the danger of unhooked slings was especially acute, the equivalent proportions were 42 per cent and 62 per cent.40 It would be fair to say that none of the above investigations — least of all research into accidents — entailed the use of advanced mathematical or statistical techniques. This did not apply, however, to the second extended project launched by the Operational Research Department. Inaugurated in 1950, it was directed at the study of port operations with particular reference to the import of iron ore.41 Carrying on well into the 1960s, the project evolved to embrace three themes — the transport of ore at sea, the discharge of ore in port, and its transport by rail to the blast furnace stockyard. When it is borne in mind that ore imports rose from 6 million tons in 1946 to a peak of 16 million tons in 1964 (total ore consumption in 1964 was 30 million tons), that the average distance of sources increased from 1,700 to 2,500 nautical miles, and that delivered ore costs accounted for approximately one quarter of the price of finished steel, any savings in the transport of ore were potentially of considerable value to the industry as a whole. The first study focussed on the actual ships used for the transport of ore. In 1950 these were

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 223 exclusively general purpose cargo vessels of approximately 6,000 tons displacement. Investigation by the Operational Research Department indicated that a majority of ore-receiving ports had sufficient depth to cater for dedicated ore carriers of at least 14,000 tons. These would be cheaper to operate because larger cargoes would reduce the capital costs per ton imported. Purpose-built holds, moreover, would facilitate faster turnaround of ships in response to more rapid unloading. When the Department further demonstrated that these benefits would more than offset the extra cost of outward journeys in ballast, BISRA's Management Committee recommended that a fleet of ore carriers should be built for long term charter to BISC(ORE), the industry's importing agency.42 The next area of study for BISRA was the unloading of iron ore at the port with the aim of reducing the total unloading cost per ton, the latter consisting of the costs of operating the ship while in berth together with the unloading facilities. The starting point of the analysis was the scheduling of ship arrivals in UK ports by BISC(ORE). Long experience, however, indicated that ship arrivals in general were 'almost random' due to prevailing weather conditions, tidal movements and delayed starts to voyages. This meant that 'over a long time, say a year, the number of ship arrivals is accurately known, but during a particular day in that year there may be no ship arrivals, or there may be two or even three.' 43 Thus, unloading facilities would be periodically idle whilst at other times there could be a queue of ships. Since fluctuations in the demand for port facilities could not be eliminated, it might seem logical to aim for a faster turnround of individual ships in order to reduce the average waiting time for a berth. But faster turnround would entail additional costs in the form of more efficient unloading equipment. Even then, clearing the berth more rapidly would lead to more occasions when no ships were queuing resulting in the under-utilisation of equipment and labour. The cost of installing improved unloading machinery, moreover, might exceed any savings arising from shortened queue times. To the extent that there would always be some queuing, the ultimate objective was to reduce unloading costs to a minimum in relation to queuing and unloading. To predict this position it was necessary to examine the effects of unloading speeds on the average time a ship spent in the queue. In this respect, the Operational Research Department collated the records of numerous ports and ship arrivals from the later 1940s onwards in order to calculate the time elapsing between successive arrivals of ships in the unloading queue. Statistics were also obtained on average unloading times according to ship size and type and the nature of the

224 Operational Research in War and Peace unloading facilities. Across the array of ports studied, the investigation revealed that there were considerable differences in average unloading times. These were the product of variations in the standard of equipment, machinery failures and the type and condition of ore. The one consistent result across all of the ports studied was that the variation about the mean, expressed by the coefficient of variation, was practically the same in each case. The next stage of the investigation was to establish the relationship between the time spent unloading and the average waiting time for a berth. It was at this point that queuing theory was applied as a recognised technique of analysis in operational research.44 Queuing theory owed its origins to a seminal paper published in 1909 by A. K. Erlang, an employee of the Copenhagen Telephone Company. With its origins rooted in practical problems, Erlang's methodology was to prove influential in the development of the Danish and other national telephone systems. 4 5 In the context of tele­ communications systems the main problem to be resolved was the relationship between the length of time a caller had to wait for a response from the telephone exchange and the facilities available at the latter. In mathematical terms, the key assumption was that the length of time between any two calls is random and that the mean and the coefficient of variation of the distribution of response times by an exchange operator is known. In the period after 1945 queuing theory was taken up with enthusiasm by transportation analysts and also by students of other service systems. 46 In the context of the steel industry the theory was directly applicable to the unloading of iron ore ships: For the intervals between phone calls substitute the intervals between ship arrivals; for the time the operator takes to deal with individual calls, substitute the turn-round time of the ship at a berth. The data, too, are in the right form to fit the theory.47 As noted already, the distribution of port arrivals was very close to a random distribution, whilst the mean time of unloading a ship was directly dependent on the state of the equipment and ship characteristics. When the mean and coefficient of variation of unloading time were known, the average delay per ship (assuming one unloading berth per port) could be calculated from the following equation:

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 225 where: X is the mean rate of vessel arrivals, tu is the average unloading time of vessels in berth, and v is the coefficient of variation of unloading time for vessels in berth. E q u i p p e d with the a p p r o p r i a t e theory, BISRA's operational researchers were able to forecast with reasonable accuracy the average queuing time for ore carriers. The relevant calculations led to the following conclusions: (a) Existing port facilities were being operated at too low an unloading rate with too high a utilisation (50% or less was found to be the optimum). (b) In situations where there was a choice of using the same unloading facilities on one ship, or on two or more at once, lower total unloading costs would be obtained by concentrating all the facilities on one ship at a time. (c) In spite of increased labour charges and lower utilisation, unloading facilities manned 24 hours a day 7 days a week would give the lowest total unloading cost.48 The critical problem arising from this analysis was how to persuade ship owners and port managements to collaborate in arrangements which were of optimal benefit to the whole system but where the advantages were less than clear cut for themselves. In the event, the conundrum was resolved when the steel companies agreed with BISC(ORE) that a bonus, graduated according to ship size, should be paid to port unloaders for more rapid turnround of ships. Over time, the effectiveness of bonus payments was demonstrated in a gradual upgrading of port facilities consistent with a movement towards an optimal unloading system. Writing in 1965, Roger Collcutt commented that 'the first queuing calculations were not adequate to describe all aspects of the systems accurately' in view of the widely differing conditions to be found at the ports. These ranged from berthing delays at locks because of tidal effects, differences in shift work, and considerable variation in ship sizes and unloading facilities.49 Following the acquisition of the Pegasus computer, however, it was possible for BISRA's operational researchers to analyse the behaviour of such a complicated system by using the technique of simulation. The circumstances in which simulation could be useful were well summarised by the American operational researcher, G. W. Morgenthaler, in 1961:

226 Operational Research in War and Peace It may not be possible to observe the phenomenon in its desired environment. This is true of studies of the thrust of rocket motors for use in interplanetary space. The phenomenon or system may be too complex to summarize in a compressed mathematical formulation. It has not been possible thus far, for example, to reduce the operation of a large business activity to a few simple equations. Analytical techniques may not exist for solving the mathematical formulation once it has been achieved...Even when analysts have the confidence and ability to arrive at a theoretical prediction of the behavior of a large system, it may not be possible to perform validating experiments. You cannot, for example, test conclusions about global strategic war by trying them even once. When any of these difficulties occur, as they do daily in the attempts., .to tackle previously untouched, unmanageable problems, some form of simulation is the obvious tool to be tried.50

The hallmark of simulation, therefore, was the creation of an analogue to represent the system under study. This entailed the identification of all the relevant components, the manner in which they changed over time, and specification of all interactions. After the construction of the analogue it would be set in motion to simulate the actual operation of the system over time. Variables in the analogue would then be compared with equivalent variables in the real system. The desired result was close correspondence of variables in order to provide a fair representation of reality. Once this condition had been satisfied, it was then possible to modify the analogue to incorporate differing design configurations in the system so that parallel effects on the real system could be predicted. The analogue, therefore, was the subject of experiment in order to identify the most promising configurations. Analogues could take differing forms, both physical and abstract. In the former case, a scale model might be constructed, such as a model aircraft in a wind tunnel or a model railway. Alternatively, a different physical system, such as coloured water in tubes, could replicate reality. In the abstract setting, the system to be investigated might be represented in the form of mathematical equations and logical relationships. In this case, changes in each part of the system would be calculated separately and sequentially. Inevitably, this would result in 'repetitive, tedious and time consuming' calculations so that simulations of this kind were 'prime candidates for computerization.' 51 In the popular imagination, simulation is, perhaps, associated most closely with the training of civil and military aircrew as well as astronauts. Since the Second World War, however, it

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 227 has fulfilled a key role in a variety of terrestrial settings, from the location of warehouses and factories to the planning of transportation systems and the scheduling of industrial operations. In the steel industry, digital simulation with computer assistance was developed by BISRA in order to refine further the analysis of port operations. The aim was to model more accurately the import of iron ore taking account of the differing shipping and unloading scenarios noted above. As Collcutt commented, Such a simulation consists of supplying the computer information about how often ships arrive and how irregular their arrivals are, when the tides are high and low, when the shift system operates, etc., so that there is available to the computer program a typical pattern of the timing and duration of all important activities which any ship could on a particular occasion undergo at the port; the program then obeys a set of rules that, by random and appropriate selection of values from this pattern of information, calculates the step-by-step consequences of a ship arriving, being unloaded, and departing from the port; repeating this operation many times, but in each case with a separate selection of values, and by keeping a tally of the cumulative effects, typical average values of such factors as unloading times and queuing time can be calculated. The method takes account of the random arrival of ships by assigning certain probabilities to a ship arriving within a certain interval of time; these probabilities are usually based on actual observations of ships arrivals at a real port.52 As a new technique in operational research, simulation carried with it a number of advantages in the context of managerial decision making. Most importantly, it could be 'easily understood by management' insofar as 'They can see, in the computer print-out, an analogue of the real system progressing in a manner very similar to the systems with which they are familiar.' 53 Managerial involvement in simulation, therefore, held out the prospect of improved decision making, all the more so if it aspired to the status of a 'management game' where two or more individuals competed or collaborated in identifying the most promising configuration. This is not to say that simulation was without its disadvantages. For example, construction of a model of the system to be analysed could be extremely expensive in time and effort, not least in relation to the writing of a large and complex computer program. This, in turn, could generate substantial financial costs in marked contrast to queuing theory where the answer may be forthcoming as a result of a 'single calculation.' It

228 Operational Research in War and Peace was in this context that BISRA's operational researchers developed Montecode as the world's first computer simulation language. This was based on Pegasus Autocode, and although the running times could be long, the programming of routine tasks reduced the possibility of errors. 54 The focal point of BISRA's pioneering exercise in simulation was to capitalise on previous work in order to calculate the total importing cost per ton of ore, defined as 'the sum of a ship's cost per ton at sea and the total unloading cost per ton for the same ship.' Simulation was designed to identify the variations in this cost in relation to differences in ship size, length of voyage and annual quantities of ore carried. This was on the assumption that unloading was optimal in the sense of minimumcost operations. This is illustrated in Fig. 7.3. In overall terms, simulation indicated that larger ore carriers would always produce lower importing costs unless the following conditions applied: (a) The journey distance is very small. The total cost increased in this case because, even under optimal conditions, the larger ship spent so much of its working time in port that it was very under-utilised. A smaller ship with a high utilisation gave a lower total importing cost. (b) The annual tonnage imported is very small. Under these conditions the optimum unloading rate is lower, for all ship sizes. The ship therefore spends longer in port and becomes under-utilised exactly as before.55 Simulation, therefore, was to prove critical in justifying the movement to larger ore carriers as importing distances began to increase significantly after 1960. Further work in this area was devoted to the analysis of future ore importing patterns and the consequences for the shape and form of the ore carrying fleet. By the mid-1960s the investigation had evolved to include the use of programming theory in order to identify the optimal choice of ore in relation to price, origins, chemical and physical composition, and type of blast furnace. As Collcutt noted, however, this was a formidable task in view of the immense computational problems which would arise if the exercise was applied to all foreign ores imported. In this case, the analysis would need to encompass every blast furnace practice in the industry which utilised foreign ore.56 In some respects, the study of ore importing was an ideal operational research activity. As Collcutt commented:

\S

%

I

\ s

\

K

3000

\

v

s

Port-to-port distance in nautical miles

N 2000

0 0

fc

**

\s *8

x$

IS

^

K

1000

"""*---..-

\

2 million t o n s o f o r e / y r _ _

N

4 milltor tons of ore/yr

■""

\

4 million tons of ore/yr

"*x

O

N

*cs CO

2000

10 20 30 40 50 SHI P SIZE, thousand of tons capacity

>-t 01

^ *■* -«.

\x N

— oooo 500

** — —

0 3 0"

?3 ro w m 01 o

200

3 >-t

o 3 0

10 20 30 40 50 SHIP SIZE, thousand of tons capacity

01

3 p-

cn

Figure 7.3 Total Importing Cost Source: Collcutt (1965), Fig. 2.5, p. 15.

fB ft)

ro

rO VO

230 Operational Research in War and Peace It looks at the whole system to discover the interdependencies, attempts to design a description of the system (in this case a mathematical model), tests its adequacy with actual operating figures, and uses it to forecast the effects of any changes in facilities and operating procedures.57 Indeed, the analysis of queuing problems was to become a standard component of BISRA's methodological repertoire with studies of the reception sidings at steelworks, the handling of raw material stocks, and the size of the engineering maintenance force.58 One of the largest projects, carried forward into the 1960s on behalf of the industry as a whole, was designed to produce optimal repair programmes for open-hearth furnaces. Such furnaces were generally capable of refining up to 220 tons of steel every 6-8 hours, and their average life — dictated by the durability of the brickwork — was approximately 13 weeks. A general repair to a furnace required up to 50 workers and might take two weeks to complete. Since the total cost of the repair, inclusive of lost production, could amount to £150,000, it was imperative that furnaces should not be taken out of commission until it was absolutely necessary. If two repairs were simultaneously necessary in a steelmaking shop equipped with, say, eight furnaces, either one furnace would have to wait, with considerable loss in productive capacity, or labour and materials would have to be found for both repairs at the same time. It might seem that in order to avoid more than one repair, the 'life' of furnaces should be shortened so that reconstruction would take place whether or not it was needed imminently. But although this would reduce the chances of multiple furnace shutdowns, it would inevitably lead to more frequent, and therefore more costly repairs in any given time period. The resolution of the problem was clearly dependent on the production policy of steelplant managers. In a sellers' market, for example, the aim would be to maximise production, albeit at minimum cost. Alternatively, in a situation (as in the mid-1960s) when agreed maximum prices were being charged for steel products, the goal of maximum production was likely to lead to reduced profit margins per ton. In a situation where plant capacity was greater than the available market, actual production would need to be set at the point of minimum cost. These options were not exhaustive, but they covered most eventualities so that they could serve as the basis for devising an optimal repair policy. On the assumption that managerial objectives had been clarified, the next stage was to form an embryo model of the furnace system. This can be illustrated simply as a queuing model as set out in Fig. 7.4:

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 231

ACTIVE FURNACES

FURNACES AWAITING REPAIR

FURNACE UNDER REPAIR

REPAIRED FURNACE

Figure 7.4 Repair Queuing Model Source: Collcutt (1965), Fig. 3.2, p. 29.

The rate of repairs to furnaces was clearly related to numbers, design configuration in relation to the melting shop, and tempo of production. It was also dependent upon managerial practice in identifying the need to terminate production in advance of total furnace collapse. All of these factors helped to determine the 'arrival rate' of furnaces for repair. The corresponding 'service' or repair times were dependent on such variables as furnace size and the availability of repair gangs. The ensuing analysis was based upon data obtained from 11 steelworks and was directed at identifying the relationship between the rate of production (the 'driving' rate) and furnace life. The relevant data were then subject to regression analysis in order to facilitate computer simulation of the operations of a melting shop. The computer program permitted variations to (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)

The The The The The The The The

rate of working number of furnaces size of furnaces types of bricks in the furnace structure size of the repair gang method of repair plant used to carry out the repair policy for deciding when to repair.59

The program results were then used to construct a set of availability charts of the kind set out in Fig. 7.5. The charts could then be used to estimate the effects of differing operating practices. An increase in the driving rate, for example, would reduce furnace life and availability according to prevailing production needs. The cost of improved repair techniques could also be calculated as well as the optimum policy in order to deliver specific outputs. In the mid-1960s, by which time a number of companies had adopted the BISRA

232 Operational Research in War and Peace LENGTH OF CAMPAIGN LIFE (days) LENGTH OF FURNACE REPAIRS (days) HO

70

12 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 9 0 92 94 96 98 100 PERCENTAGE AVAILABILITY

Figure 7.5 Typical Availability Chart (12-furnace shop) Source: Colkutt (1965), Fig. 3.4, p. 31.

repair model, Collcutt estimated that industry-wide diffusion could produce savings of u p to £10 million per annum. Reference was made earlier to the foundation of company-specific operational research groups during the 1950s. Relevant archival sources for this period are grossly uneven so that it is not possible to present an over-arching view of the development of operational research in this particular setting. Nevertheless, such records as survive, together with personal reminiscences, offer some consistent and revealing insights into the reactions of senior and middle level managers to the new discipline. In these respects, the development of operational research in three of the largest iron and steel manufacturers may be highlighted — Richard Thomas and Baldwins (RTB), the United Steel Companies (USC) and the Steel Company of Wales (SCOW). In the case of RTB, the decision to establish an Operational Research Department was taken in the autumn of 1955. The first appointments were made in the following spring, and by November 1956, the initial planned staff of 12 had been recruited. The manager was Stephen Cook who had been employed as Deputy

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 233 Head of the NCB's Field Investigation Group since 1951 (see Chapter 8 below). An electrical engineer by training, Cook was one of only two members of the new department with any experience of operational research. As in the case of the wartime operational research sections, his colleagues were an eclectic group with backgrounds ranging across physics, metallurgy and mathematics. 60 In structural terms, RTB was representative of the greater part of the British iron and steel industry, with a head office in London presiding over widely scattered plant in South Wales, the Midlands and Lincolnshire. Within this disintegrated structure, Cook could only have been reassured that the status of his Ebbw Vale-based department was underwritten by the requirement that he should report directly to the managing director, subject to his day to day accountability to a 'Management Advisory Committee on Operational Research' consisting of senior managers within the company. From the outset, matters appeared to run smoothly, with the advisory committee identifying the following principles for the selection of suitable operational research studies: (a) Each job for a different 'customer' and of a different nature. A great asset of the O.R Department is its reputation for independence which is safe-guarded by having several different customers most of the time. It is also useful to establish the broad scope of O.R. early on. (b) Select enough work for 6 to 12 months. This gives security of work for the 'probation' period but leaves flexibility to change direction if necessary after that. (c) Choose projects, worthwhile but not too difficult, which may lead on to really important projects later on, but which can give useful results as soon as possible. (d) Don't try to tackle the major problems of the industry right away. If they are recognised, yet unsolved, they are probably too difficult to start on and would take too long to complete. Also they are probably already being tackled by other people in the organisation who may wonder what credentials the newcomers have to enter their field.61 Armed with this eminently sensible brief, Cook chose four modest projects from an original list of 20 in order to inaugurate his department. The main focus was on South Wales and the Ebbw Vale plant in particular, where studies were undertaken of mould conditioning capacity and open hearth scrap metal supplies. 62 In 1957 and 1958 the programme of work expanded steadily to include the analysis of sheet sales policy, the optimum number of soaking pits and statistical investigation of weld

234 Operational Research in War and Peace breaks. 63 Unsurprisingly, Cook soon began to press the case for extra resources in order to recruit more staff and also to reduce RTB's continuing dependence on outside consultants. His success can be gauged from the fact that by January 1959 the number of full time staff had expanded to 15 with the prospect of an additional six recruits during the course of the year. By May 1960, Cook was envisaging a projected strength of 24 operational researchers with a further expansion in the number of computing and clerical staff.64 Writing in 1961, Cook offered a retrospective view of his department's achievements in the light of the original strategy of concentrating on short-term projects:65 After the first year or two of operation of our Department, we were the envy of most industrial O.R. groups in the country because of the support we had established with works management in direct operational research studies of a short-term nature. It was widely thought that, building on this support, we might quickly become the most effective O.R. group in the industry and that R.T.B. could be well ahead of its competitors in applying scientific methods throughout its operations.66 The tone and content of this commentary is revealing. According to Cook, short term studies, as pioneered by BISRA, were the 'bread and butter' of operational research in the steel industry primarily because they 'can generally show a good financial return, unlike longer term work on planning and control systems.' More to the point, such work was needed to train the staff, to enable the Department as a whole to 'keep its feet on the ground/ and to demonstrate to production managers the practical effectiveness of O.R. methods so that they will have confidence in our conclusions in long-term studies where the results cannot so readily be tested. These studies also reveal new problems needing long-term study, and prevent the thinking of the Department from becoming limited to certain problem areas.67 The problem confronting Cook, therefore, was that whereas half of the Department's early work was taken up by short term projects, during the first six months of 1961, only three per cent of the work had fallen into this category thereby raising some critical questions about staffing levels and the Department's financial viability. Cook's comments on longterm work were equally revealing:

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 235 It can be argued that the longer term work should be supported by management as an act of faith and not be required to show a financial return. In practice, however, such faith tends to waver with the financial situation, and a Department depending only on long-term work is liable to lose support from time to time. This creates an impossible situation, because continuous steady support is one of the essentials if long-term work is to be effective. The most certain way to overcome this difficulty is for the Department to pay its way all the time on shorter term problems, so that in times of difficulty the Department Manager can be allowed to continue the long-term work on his on responsibility.68 Cook concluded by registering his concern about the future of operational research in RTB, not least with reference to an imposed standstill on all recruitment to his Department. The fact remains that by 1961, RTB was experiencing acute financial problems which were largely the result of substantial cost overruns on the construction of the Spencer Works as a large integrated steelworks near Newport in South Wales. It was the acute pressure for economy in expenditure, therefore, which provided the immediate background to Cook's commentary and the principal explanation for the doubts and uncertainties which coloured the tone of the entire document. Those 'doubts and uncertainties' had longer term origins. In 1958, for example, Cook noted the 'complicated relations' between his own Department and RTB's Works Study Unit, the product mainly of the company's continuing use of external consultants on projects which came 'very close to Operational Research.' The effect of this was to inhibit the development of good relations between the two departments. As Cook commented, It has become clear that there are some genuine differences of view between the consultant and Operational Research on the way [the latter] should be used, and on the nature of most steel works problems. In problems involving Operational Research and Work Study the consultants have emphasised the controlling role of Works Study which calls in Operational Research when it believes that its specialist techniques are needed. We, on the other hand, believe that for most major steel works problems a broad Operational Research study is needed first to define the area in which Work Study can be most beneficial, and to specify which kinds of improvement are most desirable from the point of view of the overall operation of the plant. We believe that the latter

236 Operational Research in War and Peace emphasis is particularly important in the early stages of Work Study in the Company and that the passing back of problems from Work Study to Operational Research will only become effective after Work Study has been working alongside Operational Research for long enough to appreciate what Operational Research can do.69 Subsequent reports, going forward into the 1960s, referred to Cook's continuing difficulties with the Work Study Unit and the effects of this on the credibility and independence of the Operational Research Department. 70 In 1963, after spending two years on secondment from RTB at BISRA, Cook accepted the offer of a visiting professorship at the Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, Ohio. On his return at the end of 1964, he resigned from RTB in order to take up the position of Chief Management Consultant to CEIR Ltd, a London-based company specialising in mathematical and computer consultancy. He was then appointed as the foundation Professor of Operational Research at Aston University, a post which he held from 1966 until 1973. Thereafter, he served as head of the University's Operational Research and Systems Analysis Subject Group until his death in 1979.71 In the light of Cook's experience of operational research at RTB, it would be tempting to interpret these career moves as prima facie evidence of his disillusion with the company. Although his private papers provide few, if any, insights into his post-RTB career choices, it is significant that they contain the results of a survey of the 'effectiveness' of operational research at RTB, as perceived by members of the Operational Research Department in 1966, two years after Cook's departure from the company. 72 The results were depressing, to say the least. In terms of relations with company managers, the survey pointed to a Tack of interest, almost complete lack of confidence [and] bad liaison.' To make matters worse, Few people were able to claim that their work was of any real value to the Company, and while trying hard to justify themselves had to fall back on such phrases as 'spreading the gospel of management science,' 'contributing to decisions etc' The relevance of these feelings may be questioned by some, but the fact that they exist is a poor reflection on the morale of the department.73 The conclusions were bleak to the point of despair. After referring to the lack of knowledge of the Department's activities on the part of 'certain line managers/ the summary judgement expressed regret that

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 237 It is most disappointing that after eight (sic) years of O.R. in the company senior company management, works and departmental management, are not queuing up with their problems. Some of them are unaware of our existence.74 Finally, as if to confirm the moribund state of operational research at RTB after Cook's departure, the authors lamented that One needs only to examine the present make-up of the department to see how desperately we need to recruit and keep mature, experienced project staff. It should not be thought that higher salaries alone can achieve this. We are fast becoming the [Field Investigation Group] of the fifties — a good department to have been in.75 In this light, it is apparent that the department had been subject to the loss of experienced staff at the same time as recruitment was limited, or non-existent. Clearly, whatever enthusiasm had been displayed in favour of operational research at the inception of the Department, it is reasonable to conclude that it had been substantially dissipated by the mid-1960s. In order to place the experience of operational research at RTB in a wider perspective, it is instructive to describe the development of the discipline in another comparable iron and steel manufacturer. Like RTB, the United Steel Companies (USC), with its head office in Sheffield, presided over a diverse structure of subsidiary companies in south Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and Cumbria. The development of operational research can be traced through the recollections of its outstanding pioneer in USC, Stafford Beer. His first unknowing acquaintance with operational research was in 1946 when he was a very young staff captain in the Ghurkas, responsible for army intelligence in the Punjab. In Beer's own words, This was a very complex job. I couldn't think of any way in because I had British troops, I had Indian army troops and I had state troops. In those days the Maharajas had their own armies and so on. And a very volatile situation as we came up to the takeover. So, I used the only technique I could think of which was...a symbolic logic model...because that was what I had been doing at university...And when I got back to England, various people said, 'but that's interesting, what you've been doing — that's operational research. And that's the first time I had heard of it.76

238 Operational Research in War and Peace Further experience of what his contemporaries identified as operational research was gained by Beer whilst serving as an army psychologist dealing with problems of illiteracy and mental instability. His marriage in 1947, however, precipitated the movement from psychiatric screening for the army into the steel industry. In that year he joined USC as a Management Apprentice and was soon appointed personal assistant to H. P. Forder, the commercial director of Samuel Fox and Co., one of the largest constituent firms within USC. Beer's early interests were in the area of production control for high-value alloy stainless steel, and it is in this context that he became 'an operational research man.' The defining study, which took two years to complete, concerned a steelworks which was 'two miles long' with 'over 100 different machines, and as many as 2,000 works orders in progress (from the progressing of raw materials to final dispatch) at any one time.' 77 The issue at stake was the need to improve on the 27 per cent of orders that were delivered within the promised period of four weeks even though this was in conformity with industry norms. Beer's response was to devise a regime of 'tenacious management invigilation' of the production process. When the new system was implemented, 'clear cut and realistic planning' soon led to reduced stock levels which, in turn, facilitated 'better forecasting, planning and progressing methods.' The results were impressive: within six months 90 per cent of all orders were being delivered on time, and the remaining 10 per cent within six weeks compared with 12 months for delayed deliveries under the previous control system. 78 That said, Beer's enthusiasm for production control — which was wholly in accord with his emergent interest in cybernetics — did not meet with universal acclaim. As he recalled, ...I didn't know in those days that people didn't take any notice of ideas. I was very naive about all this. I thought people would be glad to have all these proposals. And they weren't. And what is worse, the General Works Manager proposed that anybody who came up with such absurd thinking should be discharged.79 In the event, Beer's production control system was implemented only after he had won the support of Sidney Ralph Howes, the General Manager of Samuel Fox and Co., who overrode the objections of the Works Manager. Armed with this success, Beer's career within USC began to develop rapidly. By 1950, his position as head of operational research in Samuel Fox and Co. had been confirmed, and this was soon followed by his

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 239 appointment as Production Controller. From 1950 onwards, Beer began to recruit an operational research team which, in terms ,of academic allegiance, was every bit as diverse as the wartime operational research sections. His own degree was in politics, philosophy and economics, but his choice of colleagues ranged across the spectrum of subject specialisms: mathematicians and physicists were complemented by engineers and economists. He even a p p o i n t e d 'a Doctor of Divinity' and an anthropologist. However, when he advertised for two biologists, he was called to account by the puzzled Chairman of USC, Sir Walter Benton Jones. It was a testament to Beer's persuasive skills that his recruitment strategy remained unchallenged until the end of his service with USC. That strategy was set out very clearly in Beer's major work, Decision and Control, published in 1966.80 His retrospective view provides a succinct summary: Problems [in operational research] are not respecters of areas, either departments or professions. These things pop up like secondary cancers all over the place. So you get as many lines on this as you can. And my model of this was a trigonometric point. You get three lines and you've got a triangle now. You get some more and you get it narrower and narrower, and that was the model. So with seventy of them, there wasn't a subject which I couldn't [cover].81 The reference to the figure 'seventy' underlines the fact that by the end of the 1950s Beer was presiding over the largest civilian group of operational researchers in the UK. In itself, this is prima facie evidence of the high status which he enjoyed. Further evidence of this is provided by his appointment in 1955 as head of operational research for all of the USC companies. The move was orchestrated by Sidney Howes, who claimed that his retirement from 'Foxes' in order to join the USC board was 'with the whole object of being your [Beer's] boss.' 82 Howes' long­ standing admiration for Beer could only have been enhanced by his pioneering work in simulation which was carried out in the mid-1950s with the aid of stochastic theory. This arose in the context of the 'highly probabilistic goings on' in a 'two mile long steelworks' subject to random variables. In this setting, the mathematics of simulation were extremely complex so that Beer developed his own methodology: I made a map of the hot end flow [of the steel works]...with all the statistical functions marked on it. And then I used symbolic logic...to get the parameters, the qualitative parameters, and

240 Operational Research in War and Peace mathematical statistics to get the quantitative ones. Then I played this with tiddly winks and I...discovered all sorts of things about the way ingots moved. You see the ingots belonged to whichever department they were in and nobody had any conspectus of the whole thing.83 It was this work which led to the construction of Beer's celebrated Stochastic Analogue Machine (SAM). Equipped with Synthetic Data Generators (SDGs), SAM could provide a mechanical simulation of any desired probability distribution by utilising 'ball bearings representing ingots flung all over the place according to the laws of probability.' A two-stage SAM was developed and it was the machine in this form which was the subject of Beer's paper delivered to the first international conference on operational research held at Oxford in 1957 (see below).84 In replicating steelworks processes, SAM had two great advantages — its operation could be watched and studied by managers and it could 'demonstrably produce solutions' to a range of stochastic queuing problems. It has been claimed that Beer envisaged a 10-stage SAM, but it is unclear whether such a machine was constructed. 85 In any event, he soon became converted to the need for an electronic computer following his appointment as USC's head of operational research. In this respect, Beer had come to enjoy increasingly close relations with BISRA as Charles Goodeve became acquainted with the quality of his work. After BISRA acquired its Pegasus computer, David Owen visited Sheffield regularly to keep Beer informed of its potential uses. With Sidney Howes' support Beer achieved a dual success — a Pegasus machine for USC and the services of Owen as his computer manager.86 This, in turn, led to the development of a general simulation language (GSL) which resulted in considerable savings of time in the writing and testing of computer simulations in comparison with Pegasus Autocode. 87 With his new Department of Operational Research and Cybernetics located in Sheffield at the appropriately named Cybor House, Beer was concerned to sustain an operational research presence at individual steelworks within USC. Innovative as ever, he purchased a number of caravans which were towed to the site of the job. The guys were put in the nearest hotel. There was no roughing it...I wanted to get some importance associated with [operational research] and it was because I'd found that people expected me to work in the back of some accounting

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 241 office, that I came up with this plan. So they didn't use them for sleeping in, they were equipped as offices. They became astonishing features of the steel scene.88 These were exhilarating times for Beer. In his own words, he was having 'a whale of a time...it was just incredible fun and games.' 89 His supreme confidence in the future of his department was reinforced considerably by his absorption of USC's Works Study Office and by the recruitment of K. D. Tocher, formerly Reader in Statistics at Imperial College. Tocher was destined to become one of the foremost experts on the technique of simulation as an aid to the calculation of optimum production flows and for this reason alone operational research at USC attracted international attention. 90 In 1961, Beer left USC to establish SIGMA as a managerial consultancy linked to the French-based Societe de Economie et Mathematique Applique. In accounting for this abrupt career change, it is possible to identify a number of interrelated factors, some of which bear resemblance to Cook's experiences at RTB. In the first instance — and in Beer's own words — he encountered 'a very sticky patch' in 1958. This was the result of adverse comments from USC middle managers about the burgeoning size of his Department and its increasing overheads. Criticism was stifled temporarily, however, when he became a celebrity within USC as a result of the award of the Silver Medal of the Swedish Royal Academy of Engineering and Sciences. This was on account of his outstanding contribution to the theory and practice of cybernetics. Two years later, however, his resignation from USC was precipitated by the retirement of Sidney Howes. Deprived of his principal sponsor, Beer in his guise as 'a sort of mad scientist figure' was subject to a less sympathetic managerial regime up to, and including, the company chairman. It was in this context that he decided to leave USC.91 There can be no doubt that under Beer's leadership operational research proved to be of considerable value to USC in terms of cost and efficiency gains. Indeed, in a long life devoted to management science, he recalled that a project carried out on behalf of one of USC's constituent companies 'was probably the most successful...that I was ever involved with.' 92 This arose from a chance meeting with the General Manager of the Workington Iron and Steel Co. who described to Beer the problem of maximum demand (MD) confronting a large industrial concern located in an urban area. Beer subsequently described the situation in Decision and Control:

242 Operational Research in War and Peace The company was a heavy user of electricity. As is well known, there arises in the winter a particularly heavy demand for this source of energy, especially at peak periods of the day. In consequence, an industrial concern has to agree with the electricity undertaking on a maximum demand (MD). That is to say, the company undertakes not to exceed this agreed call for electric power during periods of peak demand, and in return a pricing system is agreed under which the electricity authority can be assured of a proper return on the proportion of its total load committed to this company. More significantly, the authority is assured that no load greater than that agreed as a maximum demand will be exerted on its supply system. But the company, which is fully connected to the grid, can fail to observe the agreed limit: what happens then?93 The company had, indeed, exceeded its maximum demand level more than once, and in consequence had incurred extra costs of £20,000 for each breach of the agreement. In order to investigate the problem, Beer established a small operational research team. The initial findings revealed a situation of great complexity because of the variety of fuel policies available to the company. As well as electricity supply from the national grid, it had its own electrical generators which could be primed either by oil or gas derived from internal company sources. From this it was deduced that the company should establish 'a genuinely integrated energy control system.' For Beer, therefore, the investigation needed to change tack away from the issue of MD alone. In the face of considerable managerial scepticism, his team then embarked on a 'scientific' survey of the company's energy requirements. This took nine months to complete. The analysis — 'expressed in a symbolism that many who have studied mathematics at degree level would find hard to understand' — resulted in a recommendation that the MD figure 'could be reduced to less than half its previous level.' 94 According to Beer, this produced 'an absolute sensation.' As he subsequently recounted, The arguments which followed showed clearly how important it is that management should really understand the nature of operational research. If the basic features of OR work...had been comprehended all might have been well. As it was, some of the people concerned had this familiar view of OR: that it is an impractical attempt to beat the manager at his own game by theoretical mathematics. Apart from the total misconception of the subject thus indicated, this is a way of expressing things which,

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 243 by its pejorative tone, is clearly intended to mean that such an approach cannot possibly succeed.95 It is possible to deduce from this some of the difficulties confronting operational researchers in the early years of its industrial diffusion. If computers were a mysterious and threatening 'black box' to industrial managers in the 1950s, this applied with no less force to the resolution of practical problems with the aid of sophisticated mathematical and statistical techniques. As Beer discovered, a major barrier in the way of formulating an overall energy strategy for the Workington plant was the existence of entrenched vested interests in the form of 'the controllers of the electrical generating station, the gas controller [and] the man in charge of the steam boiler.' 96 None of these people had any interest in surrendering their autonomy, least of all on the pretext of mathematical calculation on the part of those who were perceived to be lacking in direct experience of the business of steelmaking. Even when the new energy control system was implemented successfully, the respect accorded to Beer and his team was begrudging. So too in the case of RTB, the efforts of Cook and his associates were given minimal recognition, at least at the level of middle management. In this setting, operational researchers were viewed as 'ivory tower' dwellers at best and at worst as disturbers of the status quo in an industry well shielded from the forces of domestic and international competition. An essential counterpoint to the trajectory of operational research within RTB and USC is the development of the discipline within SCOW. In structural terms, this company differed markedly from RTB and USC in that its operations were highly integrated and geographically concentrated in South Wales. There were three operating divisions — ingot and sheet steel (Port Talbot), tinplate (Swansea and Llanelly), and sheet steel (Newport). Of these, by far the largest was the Steel Division at Port Talbot. In the 1950s, this plant was the subject of a major programme of reconstruction rendering it the most up to date steelmaking works in Europe. Operational research was introduced to the company in the autumn of 1952 when H. G. Jones was recruited from Pilkington Brothers as manager of the new department attached to the Steel Division. From the outset there were several direct parallels with experience at RTB and USC. In the first instance, Jones was concerned to recruit an eclectic team based upon internal transfers from the company's Metallurgical and Steelworks Departments, supplemented by external appointments at graduate level — 'mainly science but some

244 Operational Research in War and Peace arts/ 9 7 From an initial complement of ten staff, by the spring of 1963 the authorised establishment (including office staff) numbered 63 with a preponderance of graduates in mathematics, statistics and physics. At its inception Jones's department reported directly to the Director and General Manager of the Steel Division. In 1962, however, operational research became an overall company function under the direction of SCOW's Research Controller with the aim of providing a service to all three operating divisions. G. W. Thomas, as successor to H. G. Jones, took comfort in the fact that the widening remit for operational research within SCOW, together with the ongoing recruitment of staff, provided important 'qualitative indications' of the value that the company placed on the discipline. 98 This view was expressed in the early 1960s at the very time w h e n operational researchers at RTB and USC were experiencing a crisis of confidence in response to their perceptions of increasing marginalisation. This is not to say that the trajectory of operational research within SCOW was uniformly positive. As Jones recalled in relation to his earliest experiences, we had an early identity problem. I still remember one manager asking if I worked as a vet or as a doctor. When I understood his question I realised, in those days anyway, it was preferable to be a vet — for example one manager asked for help with a problem and then proceeded to tell us in detail what was wrong — he did not appreciate our ultimate report indicating quite different 'wrongs/ but to be fair he did act on our prescription." Thomas also referred to 'misunderstood' or 'ignored' reports, the product, in his view, of SCOW's initial failure to 'integrate operational research more closely with management.' 1 0 0 The inauguration of projects, moreover, had tended to be 'haphazard' at the same time as operational researchers had failed to participate fully in their implementation. 101 That said, the overall record of operational research within SCOW provides some marked contrasts with experience in RTB and USC in that it is difficult to discern any evidence of the outright scepticism directed at Cook and Beer. One major reason for this was that SCOW's operational researchers were working within an environment conducive to managerial cooperation. As Jones has observed of the Steelmaking Division in the 1950s, At that time, the plant was the most modern in Europe and our first job was on the capacity of the slabbing mill which was one of the showpieces of the plant. The mill was breaking output

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 245 records almost every week (partly as a result of ancillary plant becoming fully operational) and the management were prepared to accept any help that would enable them to perform even better. Just as important, the operators in the 'pulpit' were rightly intensely proud of their skills and moreover were on output bonus.102 In this context, Jones and his colleagues were soon perceived as indispensable to the success of the works in the wake of a series of highly successful studies of slabbing mill and hot strip mill operations, traffic in steel ingots, the supply of tonnage oxygen and the simulation of iron ore imports. All of the recommendations arising from these projects were implemented on a consensual basis 'with line management through the committee system.' The direct involvement of departmental managers was a vital factor in the resolution of differences in advance of public discussion: only rarely were the Director and General Manager involved as arbiters, if only because Jones and his colleagues were fully aware of the need to 'sell' their results on the basis of their 'personal integrity and attention to detail.' 103 From its inception, and throughout the 1950s, Jones's department had an endless queue of projects 'embracing long-term and short-term and top and middle management problems.' Not only was this good for morale, it also meant that operational research penetrated far and wide into the problems of steelmaking. 104 By the early 1960s, SCOW's Port Talbot plant was fully operational, but a new agenda for operational research was bequeathed by the end of the postwar sellers' market. In these circumstances, there was a particular emphasis on internal efficiency and economy with the aim of containing or reducing costs. At the same time, the remit of operational research was expanded to encompass SCOW's Tinplate Division where several projects were inaugurated with the same cost-reducing agenda. 105 Thus, at the very time when the value of operational research was being questioned in RTB and USC, it was being given a new lease of life in SCOW with favourable consequences for staff morale.106 This was, indeed, the defining characteristic of operational research at SCOW — that it was a valued activity which had more than proved its worth at a time when managers and shopfloor workers alike were committed to the company's success. The main contrast with RTB and USC was that operational research was introduced to SCOW at a time of major physical reconstruction which served to marginalise vested interests. By 1960, it was well integrated with management following a sequence of well founded projects where the implementation of the recommendations had

246 Operational Research in War and Peace made a substantial contribution to SCOW's output targets. This is, indeed, one of the main lessons to be derived from the civilian diffusion of operational research — that its success was dependent not only upon high-level advocacy, but also on its perceived relevance to the resolution of problems beyond the capabilities of existing managerial establishments. As Director of BISRA, Charles Goodeve was indefatigable in his advocacy of the application of operational research to civil affairs. Over a long career at BISRA his reported speeches and articles were numerous, with most of them providing details of the more notable operational research programmes carried out on behalf of the iron and steel industry. 107 Yet in no case did Goodeve point to a successful outcome emanating from a BISRA programme. To the extent that research projects were ongoing this is, perhaps, understandable, but it is clear that Goodeve was content to let his audience draw their own conclusions on the merits of operational research as a facilitator of rational decision making. Goodeve's approach to selling operational research was only partially reflected in Collcutt's celebratory volume on The First Twenty Years Operational Research at BISRA, published in 1965.108 By that time, the Operational Research Department had considerable expertise in computer applications. The most important current projects concerned the d e v e l o p m e n t of m a t h e m a t i c a l models for d e t e r m i n i n g optimal ironmaking processes and the devising of criteria to be adopted in the selection and evaluation of research projects.109 Both projects were the subject of academic papers, those on ironmaking being delivered to international conferences, where the paper givers drew attention to BISRA's imminent acquisition of an ICT 1905 computer. This would, in effect, replace the ageing Pegasus machine with beneficial effects on the work of the Department in view of its multiprogramming and language facilities.110 In order to measure the effectiveness of BISRA's operational research provision, Collcutt cited a sample of 100 projects 'completed in the recent past.' Of these, he judged that 70 had been successful insofar as the recommendations had either been implemented in full or above the level of 50 per cent. Rather than ignore the remaining 31 projects, Collcutt offered a frank commentary on the reasons for his Department's 'failure' in these instances. 111 The primary cause was 'inadequate co­ operation' between managers and the operational research team, leading to the following consequences: On the one hand there are those problems which then suffer from inadequate definition and/ or inadequate analysis, and on the other, those where results get insufficiently explained and/or no attempt is made to assist in the implementation of solutions.112

Operational Research in Iron and Steel 247 In a significant number of cases, 'inadequate co-operation' was the result of internal company politics, compounded by deficient analysis and poor explanation of the results of a project. In this light, therefore, it was hardly surprising that after nearly two decades of operational research in the iron and steel industry, there remained 'a hard core of disillusioned rather than enthusiastic management.' Even where operational researchers were fortunate enough to report to the highest managerial echelons on the basis of mutual understanding, the problem remained that The implementation of some solutions, although ordered by the chief executive, requires the compliance and co-operation of often much less exalted beings. For example, a production planning and stock control scheme may depend for its success upon the operations of a number of clerks. If the clerks cannot be persuaded to believe in and understand the reasons for the procedures they are asked to adopt, then even if they do not resort to active sabotage, they are unlikely to operate efficiently. Similar comments apply as well to action required at all subordinate levels, whether management or operatives.113 In all of these respects, Collcutt's experience of operational research at BISRA conformed closely to that of Cook and Beer at RTB and USC respectively. Despite his clearly expressed reservations, historical retrospect would suggest that Collcutt was being unduly pessimistic about the iron and steel industry's commitment to operational research. The fact remains that by the mid-1960s, all of the larger companies in the industry possessed dedicated operational research groups offering a wide range of services to managerial and technical departments. Moreover, Collcutt was able to point to the cost effectiveness of more than one hundred BISRA projects which had been sponsored as part of his Department's consultancy service for smaller companies. These ranged from the appraisal of capital investment programmes to sales forecasting and production planning. 114 It is also clear that the BISRA Department had played a vital role in the dissemination of computer techniques in the iron and steel industry by organising periodic conferences and demonstrations of their relevance to a variety of technical and organisational problems, including simulations of the working of mould preparation shops and the efficient administration of customer contracts. Whilst it is impossible to quantify the overall contribution of operational research to the economic development of the iron and steel industry as

248 Operational Research in War and Peace a whole, it is reasonable to presume that both BISRA and the dedicati company departments not only improved the quality of decision-makii at the level of the individual firm, but also contributed to the econon well-being of the industry as a whole. The chapter began by noting the comparatively poor performan of the industry in the three postwar decades when a substanti productivity lag opened up with the leading European, Far Eastern ar North American producers. In the absence of operational research tl lag would have been greater. At the very least, the efforts of BISRA helpi to offset some of the long-standing institutional rigidities which afflicti the British industry. Nowhere was this more evident than in the extend* studies of the importation and transport of iron ore, issues of vit significance to an industry which operated under the handicap of su optimal locations inherited from the nineteenth and early twentie centuries.

NOTES 1. J. W. Grove, Government and Industry in Britain (Longmans, London, 196i pp. 275-6. 2. Paul Keys, Operational Research and Systems: The Systemic Nature ofOperatiot Research (Plenum Press, New York, 1991), p. 48. 3. 'Operational Research in the Research Associations,' Nature, Vol. 1< (17 April, 1948), pp. 584-5. 4. Ibid., p. 585. 5. BISRA Records, Annual Report of Council (1947). 6. Bernard Elbaum, 'The Steel Industry before World War One/ in Berna: Elbaum and William Lazonick ((Eds.), The Decline of the British Econon (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), pp. 51-81. 7. Steven Tolliday, 'Steel and Rationalization Policies, 1918-1950/ in Elbau and Lazonick (1986), pp. 82-108. 8. Duncan Burn, 'Steel/ in Duncan Burn (Ed.), The Structure of British Indush A Symposium, Vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 195! pp. 297-8. 9. F. D. Richardson, 'Charles Frederick Goodeve, 21 February 1904-7 Ap 1980/ Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 27, (1981 p. 337. 10. The following account is based on BISRA Records, Annual Reports to Count (1950-66). 11. Richardson (1981), pp. 341-2. 12. Ibid., p. 139.

Operational Research in Iron and Steel

249

13. A. Cockerill, 'Steel/ in P. Johnson (Ed.), The Structure of British Industry (Unwin Hyman, London, 2nd Edn., 1994), pp. 52-74.; J. Aylen, 'Privatisation of the British Steel Corporation/ Fiscal Studies, Vol. 9 (1988), pp. 1-25. 14. John Vaizey, The History of British Steel (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1960), pp. 169-76. 15. C. K. Rowley, Steel and Public Policy (McGraw-Hill, London, 1971). 16. Anglo-American Council on Productivity, Steel Founding (London, 1949). 17. Goodeve Papers, 'The Place of Operational Research in the Iron and Steel Industry' (June, 1946). 18. BISRA Records, Annual Report of Council (1947). 19. Roger Collcutt interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 20. Charles F. Goodeve, 'The Growth of Operational Research, 1939-64' (Goodeve Papers). 21. BISRA Records, The BISRA Operational Research Advisory Service: Report of the work carried out during the last three years (1956). 22. Richardson (1981), p. 350. 23. Roger Collcutt interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 24. BISRA Records, 'Industrial Training in Operational Research: Graduate Apprenticeship'; BISRA, Annual Report (1961); R. H. Collcutt, 'OR Changes/ journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 32 (1981) pp. 361-9. 25. BISRA, Annual Report (1961). 26. David Owen interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 27. BISRA Records, D. G. Owen, 'The Case for Purchase by BISRA of an Electronic Computer with special reference to furthering the application of Computers to work in the steel industry/ OR/15 (1955). 28. BISRA Records, Roger Collcutt 'Introductory Remarks to Paper/ OR/15 (1955). 29. D. G. Owen, Computers and Steel (BISRA, 1957). 30. J. C. Ranyard, 'A History of OR and Computing/ journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 39 (1988), p. 1075. 31. Ibid. 32. BISRA Records, 'Special Reports from the Operational Research, Steel User and Information Sections/ Part II, C (1955), 6. 33. Matthias Kipping and Ove Bjamer (Eds.), The Americanisation of European Business: The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models (Routledge, London, 1998), pp. 28-30. 34. Ibid., p. 32. 35. BISRA Records, Director's Report to Council (January 1954), c (54) 1, Part 1. 36. Roger Collcutt, The First Twenty Years of Operational Research (BISRA: London, 1965), p. 19. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid., p. 21. 39. Ibid.

250

Operational Research in War and Peace

40. Ibid. 41. BISRA, Annual Report of Council (1950), pp. 54-5. 42. R. T. Eddison and D. G. Owen, Imported Ore Handling: A Review of the Economics of Shipping and Discharging of Iron Ore (BISRA, August, 1953); C. F. Goodeve and J. S. Terrington, 'Iron Ore Carriers for Britain,' The Shipping World, 30 January, 1955. 43. Collcutt (1965), p. 14. 44. R. H. Collcutt, 'Operational Research in the Steel Industry,' Iron and Coal Trades Review, 22 January,1960; R. T. Eddison and D. G. Owen, 'Discharging Iron Ore/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 4 (1953), pp. 39-50. 45. A. K. Erlang, 'The Theory of Probabilities and Telephone Conversations,' Nyt Tidskriftfor Matematik, B. 20 (1909), p. 33. 46. P. M. Morse, 'The Application of Queuing Theory in Operations Research,' In P. M. Morse (Ed.), Queuing Theory: Recent Developments and Applications (American Elsevier, New York, 1967). 47. Collcutt (1960), p. 191. 48. Collcutt (1965), p. 14. 49. Ibid. 50. G. W. Morgenthaler, 'The Theory on Application of Simulation in Operations Research,' in R. L. Ackoff (Ed.), Progress in Operations Research, Vol. 1 (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1961), pp. 366-7. 51. G. H. Mitchell, Operational Research: techniques and examples (English Universities Press, London, 1972), p. 203. 52. Collcutt (1965), p. 14. 53. Mitchell (1972), p. 205. 54. Ranyard (1988), p. 1078. 55. Collcutt (1965), p. 15; BISRA Records, R. Chapman and R. R. P. Jackson, 'Operational Research Studies of Port Operations,' OR/20/1963. 56. Collcutt (1965), p. 17. 57. Collcutt (196). 58. BISRA Records, Review of Operational Research Studies with reference to Queuing Theory (1963). 59. Collcutt (1965), p. 31. 60. Cook Papers, MSS 335/CK/CA/B/10. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid., MSS 3 3 5 / C K / C A / B / l . 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid., MSS 3 3 5 / C K / B / l l , 'Note on Operational Research in the Company' 65. Ibid., Richard Thomas and Baldwins: Operational Research Department: Confidential Report on the Work and Staffing of the Department (May, 1961). 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid.

Operational Research in Iron and Steel

251

69. Ibid., MSS 3 3 5 / C K / C A / B / l , Operational Research Department: Progress Report for the twelve months ending June 30, 1958 (9 July 1958). 70. Ibid., MSS 335/CK/CA/B/1-10. 71. Ibid., MSS 335/CK/CA/F/1-24. 72. Ibid., MSS 335/CK/CA/B/lO, 'The Effectiveness of the Operational Research Department in Richard Thomas and Baldwins (1966). 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Stafford Beer interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 77. Stafford Beer, Decision and Control: The Meaning of Operational Research and Management Cybernetics (John Wiley, London,1966), p. 388. 78. Ibid., p . 389. 79. Stafford Beer interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 80. Stafford Beer (1966), pp. 1-93. 81. Stafford Beer interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. Stafford Beer, 'The Mechanical Simulation of Stochastic Flow,' in Max Davies, R. T. Eddison and Thornton Page (Eds.), Proceedings of the First International Conference on Operations Research (ORSA, Baltimore,1959), pp.166-75. 85. Ranyard (1988), p. 1078. 86. David Owen interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 87. K. D. Tocher and D. G. Owen, 'The Automatic Programming of Simulations,' in J. Banbury and J. Maitland (Eds.), Proceedings of the Second IFORS Conference (English Universities Press, London, 1960), pp. 58-60. 88. Stafford Beer interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 89. Ibid. 90. K. D. Tocher, The Art of Simulation (English Universities Press, London, 1963). 91. Stafford Beer interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 92. Ibid. 93. Stafford Beer (1966), p. 74. 94. Ibid., p. 81. Italics in original. 95. Ibid., pp. 81-2. 96. Ibid., p. 78. 97. G. W. Thomas, 'Operational Research in the Steel Company of Wales Limited,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1963), p. 247. 98. Ibid., p. 254. 99. H. G. Jones, 'Early OR in the Steel Company of Wales/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 43 (1992), p. 564. 100. Thomas (1963), p. 255. 101. Ibid.

252 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

108. 109. 110.

111. 112. 113. 114.

Operational Research in War and Peace Jones (1992), p. 564. Thomas (1963), p. 253. Ibid., p. 251. Ibid. pp. 258-9 David Steer to M. W. Kirby, 26 January 1998; H. G. Jones to M. W. Kirby, 4 September, 2000. See, for example, Charles F. Goodeve, 'Operational Research: The Front Line Scientist in the Management Team,' The Manager (December,1955), pp. 995-8; 'Man Must Measure/ journal of the Institute of Transport (March, 1957), pp.75-82; 'Operational Research: The Common Factor,' The Engineer (6 September, 1957), pp. 345-6. Collcutt (1965). BISRA Records, Operational Research Department, Report (1966). Collcutt (1965), p. 90; BISRA Records, 'Applying Bender's Partitioning Method to a Non-Convex Programming Problem,' OR/15(66); R. H. Collcutt and R. D. Reader, 'Choosing the Operational Research Programme for B.I.S.R.A.' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1967), pp. 219-42. Collcutt (1965)., pp. 92-3. Ibid. Ibid., p. 94. Ibid., p. 92.

8

Operational Research in Coalmining

Of all British industries in the last one hundred years, none has had a more traumatic history than coalmining. At the beginning of the last century, the industry was the primary source of energy for the economy at the same time as it contributed substantially to the external accounts as a result of a thriving export trade. Production peaked in 1913 with a total output of 287 million tons, one quarter of which was exported. Employment reached its maximum in 1920 at 1.25 million, at which time approximately 10 per cent of the population was dependent directly, or indirectly on the industry for the means of subsistence. By 2000, total employment had shrunk to less than 7,000, whilst annual production had fallen to little more than 40 million tons. In the intervening period, the industry had enjoyed a turbulent history in response to profound changes in the energy market, an unenviable record of labour unrest and changing perceptions of fuel needs at the level of national policy. In structural terms, the industry entered the twentieth century with a population of firms dominated by family ownership and control. As in iron and steel, corporate capitalism was notable for its absence. Mining operations, moreover, were labour intensive and a technological gap with the American and German industries was already evident. Labour productivity had declined persistently from the mid-1880s at the same time as labour relations had begun to deteriorate in the face of the miners' campaign for a national m i n i m u m wage. 1 The First World War exacerbated tensions within the industry insofar as the imposition of state controls resulted in renewed vigour for the miners' campaign for public ownership. In the interwar years, coalmining was the 'cockpit' of labour unrest in British industry: precipitate market collapse after 1920 led to downwards pressure on wages, resulting in the General Strike and miners' lock-out in 1926. Wage reductions, however, failed to redeem the industry's market position and it was for this reason that the later

253

254 Operational Research in War and Peace 1920s witnessed a movement towards cartelisation on a coalfield basis. This was followed in 1930 by the imposition of statutory price and output controls so that by the end of the decade coalmining was the most closely regulated of all private sector industries. 2 Economic historians are divided in their opinions as to the economic impact of cartelisation on the industry. For some, the adverse impact on efficiency — the consequence of sustaining high-cost marginal producers — was notable, 3 whilst for others comfort is drawn from the fact that minimum prices helped to raise profitability thereby providing the resources for limited programmes of mechanisation. 4 In any event, the industry entered the Second World War with levels of productivity far below the achievements of the German and American industries. The impact of the war on the coalmining industry was profound. By the end of 1940, an industry which had laboured for almost twenty years under conditions of sustained market contraction, with large-scale unemployment in the mining districts, was experiencing considerable difficulties in fulfilling the demands of a booming war economy and in recruiting and retaining an adequate supply of labour. Indeed, the need to ensure that the war effort would not be impeded for lack of coal was to provide the wartime Coalition Government with its most serious problem on the home front. By 1943, both Conservative and Labour ministers had come to accept that its successful resolution was dependent on a fundamental transformation in the industry's structure and technology. In this setting, there was tacit agreement that whether this was to be accomplished under private or public ownership would be dependent on the outcome of a postwar General Election. In pointing to the future, the seminal wartime document was the report of the Technical Advisory Committee, published in March 1945.5 The Reid Committee, as it came to be known, had been appointed by the Minister of Fuel and Power 'to examine the present technique of coal production from coal face to wagon, and to advise what technical changes are necessary in order to bring the industry to a state of full technical efficiency.' In the light of the industry's troubled history, the report may be viewed as a damning indictment of entrepreneurial standards under private ownership in that it pointed to: (a) the lack of investment in locomotive haulage underground; (b) the absence of adequate training schemes for new entrants to the industry; (c) the lack of standardisation of coal in respect of size and quality;

Operational Research in Coalmining 255 (d) the adoption by colliery owners of a short term view in relation to exploitation of the coal measures; (e) the lack of cooperation between owners and miners as evidenced by the reluctance of the latter to accept mechanisation as 'a necessity' The situation was further exacerbated by the survival of 'small or awkwardly shaped [mineral] leaseholds,' the wide dispersion of ownership in the industry which had inhibited 'the closing down or merging of uneconomic mines,' and finally, the reluctance of colliery owners to invest in long-term technical improvements 'because of the long-standing uncertainty surrounding the future Ownership of the Industry.' Coming from a committee composed of high-ranking executives and engineers in the industry, readers of the report could be forgiven for assuming that the conclusions were tantamount to confirmation of the case for nationalisation. For the Conservative Party, the report was a key factor in its resolve to legislate for a fundamental reorganisation of the industry under private ownership. It also ensured that the Party's o p p o s i t i o n in Parliament to the p o s t w a r Labour G o v e r n m e n t ' s nationalisation Bill was muted, although debate on the detailed legislative provisions was intermittently acrimonious. 6 The Labour Government's chosen vehicle for nationalisation was the public corporation accountable to a minister in parliament but in principle enjoying substantial managerial autonomy in the day-to-day running of the industry in question. 7 As in the case of other nationalised industries, executive members of the National Coal Board (NCB) were appointed on the basis of specialist expertise in order to fulfil managerial functions at the strategic level. Thus, members for production and finance were complemented by those for marketing and industrial relations. Reflecting the strictures of the Reid Committee on the industry's lack of interest in scientific research, provision was also made for a member for 'science.' The individual appointed was Sir Charles Ellis, Wheatstone Professor of Physics at King's College, London and a long-serving member of the official Advisory Council on Scientific Research and Technical Development, latterly reporting to the Ministry of Supply. During the war he had served as Scientific Adviser to the Army Council and it was in this context that he was responsible for the development of operational research on behalf of the army (see Chapter 4 above). 8 In several respects, therefore, Ellis had enjoyed a similar career trajectory to Charles Goodeve and it was by no means coincidental that he too was determined to establish operational research as an essential component of the NCB's

256 Operational Research in War and Peace Scientific Department. His intentions were confirmed in 1946, even before nationalisation took formal effect, when he prepared a draft set of proposals on 'the Principles of Organisation of the [proposed] Scientific Control Directorate.' The remit of the Directorate would embrace 'fundamental laboratory work,' 'research into matters involving human aspects (including the health of the workforce)' and 'operational research on coal-getting and coal preparation.' 9 Ellis initially envisaged that operational research would be carried out 'under the control of the responsible official on the spot, eg. a mine manager, agent or an official above that rank in the case of research on coal-getting.' 10 At this stage, therefore, it was unclear whether an operational research facility would occupy a position in the NCB structure akin to the relevant department within BISRA. At the end of 1947, however, Ellis secured the provisional agreement of his Board colleagues to the establishment of 'a small mobile staff to do operational research' on behalf of the scientific directorate. 11 In the following February formal agreement was reached on the establishment of an operational research group charged with the task of testing the applicability of operational research techniques to the coalmining industry. 12 Ellis set out the case for such a group in the following way: There is a large field of practical investigation which belongs neither to Research in the ordinary sense nor to the more limited sphere of quality control. Sir Charles Reid tells me, for example, that there is an urgent need for an objective analysis of the chain of operations from the face to the surface, to establish the cost of each link in terms of money, power, manpower and effort generally, if only to find out what constitutes a fair day's work at each stage. There is a fund of practical experience and instinctive knowledge but little in the way of factual data. More specifically, matters of the following kinds call for investigations: (a) haulage and transportation; (b) relative costs of driving and maintenance needs; (c) the effects of lighting on output, loss of materials, loss of coal etc.; (d) power generators — the efficiency and cost of them and com­ pressed air generators; (e) the distribution of manpower in various jobs; the percentage of time usefully employed and the reasons for non-productivity time etc.

Operational Research in Coalmining 257 The answers to nearly all questions of this kind are in the patient methodical assembly and analysis of information which is there to be collected, but which no one else has the time to collect. We came to the conclusion that it was for my Department to do this, and that I should set up a small section which, for want of a better title, I propose to call it the Field Investigation Group. The choice of title for the group was intriguing. According to Donald Hicks, the NCB's first Director of Scientific Control and the individual responsible for inaugurating operational research in the industry, Ellis was 'loathe to define O.R.'13 At a time when formal definitions of the discipline had yet to appear, it was eminently sensible to avoid any title which might restrict the scope of the group's activities. As for the use of the word 'Field,' Hicks claimed that Ellis chose it because he knew that the best way of getting a better understanding of the Board's many problems was by investigating them where the operations were carried out and doing so in collaboration with the people involved. If, as a result of the investigations, changes in practices were proposed, these would have to take place in the field, and members of the Group would participate in the necessary experiments. It was the field investigation aspect of the activity which appealed to me and which enlisted my enthusiasm.14 It was the expectation of both Ellis and Hicks, therefore, that the Field Investigation Group (FIG) would find its own way, thereby permitting 'the distinctive features of operational research to emerge over time.' It was for this reason that Ellis delayed issuing a directive setting out FIG's objectives until early in 1953. By that time the Group had succeeded in consolidating its position within the industry, not least because of Hicks' outstanding ability as an effective sponsor of operational research, reinforced by his skills in communication at all levels within the Board. FIG's 'three broad objectives' were defined as follows: (a) to study existing practices and assess their efficiency and indicate where and how improvements can be obtained without any major change in equipment; (b) following from (a) to indicate the fields of experimental research and development that are likely to be profitable; (c) to act as an independent body to assess the efficiency of the results of research and development in actual practice. 15

258 Operational Research in War and Peace These loosely defined objectives remained intact until 1962, immediately before Hicks' departure from the NCB, when FIG's functions were reconsidered in the light of its existing programme of work and the likely demand for its services in the future (see below, p. 264).16 By that time, the number of staff was in excess of 50 and included more than thirty graduate operational researchers embracing a predictable range of academic disciplines. Mathematics and statistics were particularly well represented, and they were complemented by engineering, physics, economics and social science. In terms of growth, FIG's staff complement had expanded most rapidly in the 1950s, as indicated in Fig. 8.1 below. As originally conceived, FIG's establishment of operational researchers was fixed at ten. 17 The first head of the Group, with the status of Principal Scientific Officer, was Alan Evans who joined FIG in 1948 from the Army operational research section at West Byfleet. A mathematician by training, Evans remained with the Group until 1950

/

60

5U

in

">0

10

1947

M9

•51

•53

'55

"57

•59

•61

'63

•65

Figure 8.1 Growth of Operational Research Staff in FIG, 1947-65. Source: B. T. Houlden, 'Operational Research in the National Coal Board,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 15 (1964), Fig. 2, p. 174.

Operational Research in Coalmining 259 when he returned to his original vocation as a schoolmaster. By that time, the establishment had increased to twelve scientists, but it was under the leadership of Evans' successor, B. H. P. ('Pat') Rivett, that FIG was to enjoy its most rapid expansion until the latter half of the 1960s.18 Under Rivett's leadership, which lasted until 1960, the Group quadrupled in size, fully reflecting a continuing expansion in the demand for FIG's services, the result, in part, of Rivett's infectious enthusiasm for operational research which was complemented powerfully by his considerable skills in exposition. The contribution of Hicks was also notable. Not only did he organise appreciation courses in operational research for senior NCB managers, he also used his influence as Director of Scientific Control to ensure that FIG's services were marketed widely. As Rivett recalled, Donald had scientific representatives on the major committees of the Board. There was an electrical engineers committee; a safely committee; a mechanical engineers committee: full of engineers but always Donald or myself with a watching brief.19 Each of these committees had their own problems to surmount and with limited resources they were only too happy to engage the services of FIG in order to undertake a variety of investigations, whether in the field of underground transport or communications, all the more so since the budgetary implications were small. It is also the case that FIG's reputation was enhanced at an early stage by the pay-off from first acts of measurement which, in Rivett's words produced 'some startling results.' 20 This was exemplified in FIG's investigation into the Creswell Colliery disaster of 1950 when 80 miners were killed by fire and fumes arising from the frictional heating of torn rubber belting. An additional reason for the high death toll was the slowness in evacuating the pit as a result of inadequate u n d e r g r o u n d communications. On FIG's recommendation, the position of three existing telephones was changed and a further three installed resulting in a halving of the time taken for evacuation. This result, extensively reported in the industry, led to the introduction of standardised communication systems for all pits (see below, pp. 268-70).21 A further contributory factor in the growth of FIG after 1950 was the acute pressure of demand on an industry which was operating in an expanding economy in advance of the rise of competing sources of energy. In the early years of nationalisation, home demand was complemented by the resumption of export sales. In the words of the

260 Operational Research in War and Peace nationalised industry's historian, 'the urge all the time was to try to produce more coal, so long as this could be done without a large real increase in average costs.' 22 More to the point, Recruit more miners. Get a greater quantity of work, and more effective work, by winning such co-operation from the miners that it shows in industrial peace, reduced absence, and lower labour turnover. Reap the benefits of having both unified and public ownership by more rational deployment of productive resources, by standardization, and by the wider spread of best practices; and then enlarge those benefits by increased investment wherever good returns can be expected. Find and work the coal which can most readily and economically add to output. These were the kinds of proposition that seemed appropriate for the making of policy and for speeding its application.23 It was in this urgent context that FIG operated, with a continuing 'queue of jobs coming in originally from [the] Production Department.' 24 Indeed, in Rivett's recollection, FIG's activities for the greater part of the 1950s related solely to 'production, production, production. Marketing no, costing no, ...labour turnover no, ...production.' 25 Although the NCB enjoyed the position of a monopsonist — to the extent that coal was allocated rather than marketed until the end of rationing in 1958 — the unrelenting pressure of demand, especially from industrial consumers, ensured that the industry could not subscribe to the 'low effort and low productivity' stance of the iron and steel industry (see above, p. 214). This fact alone helped to sustain FIG's status within the NCB's managerial structure, both centrally and within the coal-producing Divisions and Areas. In the history of FIG, the year 1957 proved to be a major watershed in two ways. In the first instance, the pattern of work began to change as the Group took on a remit beyond the Production Department (see below, pp. 263-4). This was signalled by the inauguration of a study into the wastage of men from the industry. The resulting investigation set out to determine the leaving patterns for different categories of employee and then to establish how wastage varied in relation to the distance that men worked from their homes, whether housing was easily available, and other associated factors. The second development was even more significant. As indicated below, the first international conference of operational researchers was held in 1957 at Oxford (see below, pp. 375-7) and there can be little doubt that it had a traumatic effect on the whole British operational research community. The conference itself

Operational Research in Coalmining 261 was the result of the initiative of the distinguished American operational researcher, Russell Ackoff of the Case Institute of Technology and the lead on the British side was taken by Charles Goodeve. Significantly, the conference secretary was Pat Rivett who at that time was also serving as secretary of the Operational Research Society 26 In terms of the impact on FIG, it is worth emphasising that the Group's early work had not been based on any sophisticated statistical or mathematical techniques. As a later head of operational research in the NCB commented, the group had been established at a time when there was no shame to be found in solving a problem by simple common sense, if that would suffice.27 After the conference, however, the realisation dawned that there was a significant methodological gap between operational research as practised in Britain compared with the USA. Within FIG itself, Rivett was, perhaps, the least surprised in view of the fact that he had visited the USA and Canada as early as 1954 to investigate the techniques and organisation of North American operational research in the military and civilian sectors. 28 Whilst there, he 'discovered [things] called inventory control, linear programming and the transportation algorithm' and after returning to FIG 'bounded around like a retriever dog telling the lads all about this.' 29 Rivett's report to Donald Hicks suggested that the American technical lead was the product of university-level interest in operational research at a time when UK universities in general were uninterested in the subject and, indeed, in the whole area of study which came under the generic term, 'management education.' Rivett therefore advocated the establishment of study groups within FIG 'to consider how the intellectual content of the Group's work should be improved' and also 'to undertake research in the techniques of the subject.' Similar reactions to those of Rivett were registered by his deputy, Steve Cook, who after visiting the USA in 1955, concluded that American practitioners of operational research were armed with a battery of techniques unknown, or underutilised, by their British counterparts. The former were therefore capable of producing timely recommendations for managerial action — a sensitive issue for FIG members in view of the typical 3-4 year length of their investigations. 30 That said, Cook was concerned to emphasise that his visit pointed to the fact that American operational research was structured differently to that in Britain insofar as most of the effort was concentrated in universities and military groups (the latter usually in association with a particular institution of higher education), and in 'two or three of the large management consulting firms.' Internal operational research groups comparable to FIG and BISRA, and those attached to

262 Operational Research in War and Peace individual companies, as in the case of RTB and United Steel, were few and far between. Indeed, Cook's report cited a survey of internal groups in the USA carried out by the Case Institute in 1954 which had concluded that there were 'only 157 OR employees in 85 companies known to be using OR.' The majority was employed in the aircraft and electrical industries, and in the former case most of the work was related to military problems. Even allowing for difficulties in identifying operational researchers — given that unknown numbers were employed under the categories of 'systems' or 'industrial' engineers — it was entirely reasonable for Cook to draw attention to the preponderance of practitioner-led operational research in Britain as compared with the USA. Whilst the 1957 conference provoked a searching appraisal of techniques and methodologies within the wider community of British operational researchers- 31 nowhere was this more evident than in FIG. After the conference, Rivett made a further visit to the USA in order to work with Russell Ackoff at the Case Institute. On his return, he was determined to establish a training course in the leading-edge American techniques, in particular linear programming, queuing theory and inventory control. As Rivett recalled, What we did was, for each topic there was a small group set up to learn that subject and teach it so everybody, including the junior staff, were part of the teaching side and part of the learning so there were no teachers and taught, and they produced their own lecture notes...and examples, and on Saturday mornings we used to work and it was the course morning. Looking back, I think that really was one of the wisest things I did because...the best way to learn a subject is to teach it...[We} got our own training course book out...and that meant we did have people leaving...frequently because they were in great demand at that time. It was before the university expansion and...the subject was expanding everywhere [with] advertisements every day almost in the newspapers for operational research scientists.32 Whilst it is true that the American-derived techniques expanded the range of problems that were amenable to operational research, Rivett's reminiscences of the later 1950s must be tempered by the alternative interpretation of the period presented by Rolfe Tomlinson in his celebratory history of the first twenty-one years of operational research in the coal industry. Writing in 1971, by which time he was head of operational research at the NCB, Tomlinson confirmed the intellectual ferment in FIG in the later 1950s, but suggested also that the Group was

Operational Research in Coalmining 263 overly concerned with techniques. This was underlined by the fact that 'Work was undertaken because it looked like a good application of linear programming rather than because of its intrinsic importance.' 3 3 As Tomlinson further commented, This widespread assimilation of new techniques led to other problems. Hitherto most of the work undertaken by the [Group] had been readily comprehensible to the management of the industry. On the whole, it had been fact-finding and comparatively straightforward analysis of those facts. On the other hand, the new techniques were by no means easily understood. Consequently it was realized that the OR man's task now included persuading management that these new techniques were useful and that because of their existence, OR had much wider potential than had hitherto been realized. Recognition of this task led to the first formal training in such matters as report-writing and effective speaking.34 Coincidentally, the later 1950s inaugurated a sustained contraction of the industry which was to persist into the early 1970s. In 1959, inland coal consumption was 28.1 million tons less than in the peak year of 1956, whilst total production had fallen by 33.5 million tons at the same time as undistributed stocks of coal rose more than twelve-fold. For an industry which had been striving since nationalisation to increase production at the urgings of government, the sudden contraction was as 'appalling' as it was 'cruel,' given the expansion of output envisaged in the NCB's 1957 Plan for Coal35 The fact remains that the later 1950s witnessed the onset of a permanent loss of markets in response to the development of oil burning, the improved technology of gas production and the curtailment of exports. FIG's formal response to this changing environment is not recorded in the NCB's historical records, but it is highly significant that after 1958 'the whole pattern of work' within the Group began to change. As noted already, FIG's remit up to that time had been bound up, almost exclusively, with operational research on behalf of the Production Department. Thereafter, however, FIG began to spread its wings within the NCB managerial structure. In this respect, 1961 w a s a milestone for the Group in that the Annual Report for that year stated that projects had been undertaken for the first time on behalf of every NCB department, with several cutting across departmental boundaries. 36 Thus, the Group had combined studies under the headings of production planning and operations with investigations into labour issues, coal treatment, distribution and sales. Even the Legal Department

264 Operational Research in War and Peace had called on the Group's services in order to provide evidence on behalf of the NCB to an official enquiry into the construction of workers' housing on Greenbelt Land. 37 Writing in 1964, Brian Houlden, Rivett's successor as head of FIG, commented that by the beginning of 1962 requests for the Group's services 'were considerably more than could be handled with the staff available.' 38 By that time the Group was undertaking work for the NCB's Divisions and Areas, in addition to national headquarters, and it was in this context of expanding demand for operational research studies that a fundamental review of FIG's future was inaugurated by Donald Hicks and Houlden. Their remit was to 'consider what further guidance should be given to FIG about the concentration of their resources on the most important projects and what arrangements might be made to assess the results of completed FIG investigations.' In May 1962, their conclusions were presented to the NCB's General Purposes Committee. The objective recommended by Hicks and Houlden in the short term was 'to double the strength of the Group in the next two to three years.' This would entail the recruitment of more than 40 graduates in the period to the end of 1964 resulting in a doubling of the Group's salary costs.39 It would appear that the NCB's approval of this major expansion was controversial to the extent that there was 'some feeling that [FIG] had pulled "a fast one".' 40 If that is so, animosities must have been short-lived in that during the course of 1964 Board approval was obtained for further recruitment to produce a total graduate complement of 80 by the end of the decade. One possible explanation for any resentment at the diversion of resources into operational research was the difficulty of justifying an accelerating programme of recruitment in a contracting industry. 41 In this situation, Houlden and his colleagues were acutely aware that the virtues of operational research needed the widest possible publicity within the NCB's managerial structure. It was for this reason, therefore, that appreciation courses in operational research were mounted in each of the Board's 40 Areas attended by all senior staff. The impact of the courses may have been of limited value, but at least 'No one could now claim ignorance of OR.' 42 In order to clarify further the status of operational research, the Group's designation as 'FIG' was dropped in favour of the Operational Research Branch with the head enjoying the unambiguous title of Director of Operational Research. As one senior operational researcher commented, 'We were honest men at last.'43 A change of title and expansion plans were not the only products of the 1962 review. Expansion in itself necessitated organisational reforms.

Operational Research in Coalmining 265 In the early days of FIG the Head and his Deputy were able to monitor every project personally. By the early 1960s, this was no longer possible in view of the increasing volume of work: the situation would clearly deteriorate further in the light of the forecast expansion in the number of employees. It was for these reasons, therefore, that the Operational Research Branch was divided into four sub-groups, each with its own head reporting to the Director. The sub-groups in turn contained up to six section leaders, the precise number being dependent on the competencies of the relevant staff and the nature of the projects in progress. This is illustrated in Fig. 8.2 which also highlights the position of the single operational research scientist responsible for recruitment and training, as well as liaising with the Director in the selection of projects. After 1962, project selection within the Branch became more robust in terms of assessment of the potential pay-off. It was the function of the Director to sift project proposals before submitting them to selected Group Heads for their appraisal.in consultation with project sponsors. Once terms of reference were agreed in principle, estimates were made of the duration of a project, the likely scale of effort, and 'the real saving to the Board which is likely to result.' 45 It was this information which provided the basis for project selection and rejection. For selected projects, formal terms of reference were then drawn up by the Branch before circulation to the Deputy Chairman of the relevant division and the sponsoring department. Whilst this smacked of 'red tape,' liaison on this

Director

Group Head !

Group Head

Group Head

Group Head

1

1

i

3 to 6 Section Leaders

3 to 6 Section Leaders

3 to 6 Section Leaders

3 to 6 Section Leaders

Scientist with special responsibility (Recruitment, Training, Project Selection and Assessment)

Figure 8.2 Organisation of the Operational Research Branch. Source: Houlden (1964), Fig. 3, p. 175.

Admin. Section

266 Operational Research in War and Peace basis was introduced in order to enhance the chances of a successful outcome to the project. As Houlden commented, [In advance of the reorganisation] when a project was started [FIG] informed those who were obviously concerned and kept them in the picture. Almost invariably there were other people with direct interests but on a smaller scale. Ignoring some of these, due to not being aware of them, led to the study getting off on the wrong foot and the tentative recommendations being heavily criticized. With the present system the official contacts in each of the departments are responsible for informing those people in their departments who have an interest and for telling the Branch of this. This enables the Branch to start with a considerably better overall appreciation of problems and this is reflected in the increased success of projects.45 Paradoxically, the expansion of operational research within the NCB after 1962 was followed by a deterioration of morale within the Branch. This was particularly evident in 1966, the year in which physical relocation took place from south of the Thames to Harrow. Rather than move house, several staff chose to resign, and over the divide of 1965 and 1966, 24 experienced operational researchers left for employment elsewhere. Amongst them was Houlden who resigned from the NCB in order to take up a chair in Business Studies at the new University of Warwick. The long delay in appointing his successor was hardly conducive to the Branch's cohesion and direction of purpose. Matters improved eventually, but not before 'much damage had been done.' It certainly meant that when Houlden's deputy, Rolfe Tomlinson, was appointed as Director, the latter was confronted by a major task in re­ building morale. In this, Tomlinson was helped considerably by the appointment of a new Board Member for Science who was directly responsible for the oversight of the Branch. With sponsorship at this level, the Branch was reassured of its status following the inevitable uncertainties which had accompanied reorganisation following Donald Hicks' departure in 1963 to become Director of the British Coal Utilisation Research Association. 46 A further morale booster was the coming to fruition during 1966 of several important studies in the areas of marketing and the simulation of underground operations. In the latter context, computer simulations resulted in the introduction in 1968 of the 'Simbelt' system for evaluating belt-operated clearing schemes and the 'Simloc' programme for locomotive-operated systems. 47 Advanced simulations of this kind were to cast a long shadow forwards and were reflected after

Operational Research in Coalmining 267 1970 in the development of 'Geosimplan' for the evaluation of geological and other risks in colliery planning and 'Simprep' for the design of coal preparation plants. 48 Further indications of the NCB's continuing commitment to operational research were provided by the inauguration in 1966 of a two-year part-time postgraduate course leading to the degree of Master of Technology (M.Tech.) at Brunei University and the establishment of an Area Systems Group in the following year. Designed for new entrants to the Operational Research Branch, the introduction of the M.Tech degree was a response to the excessive teaching loads falling on senior members of the Branch in delivering the in-house training programme. It was also the product of the buoyancy of demand for operational research scientists in the public and private sectors and the specific recruitment needs of the Branch. At a time when British universities were beginning to embrace the concept of 'management education/ the link with the newlyestablished Brunei University was designed to encourage high quality graduate recruitment to the Branch by combining in-house training with day release from paid employment. 49 The Area Systems Group was the natural corollary to the decision taken by the Branch in the mid-1960s to regard the NCB Areas as businesses in their own right. The Group's objectives were twofold, first to inform Areas about operational research techniques relevant to their specific needs, and secondly to offer an ad hoc advisory service. Within a year, work on behalf of Areas was accounting for one quarter of the Branch's total effort. Although the relevant activities were controlled from Harrow, the foundation of the Area Systems Group paved the way for the establishment of large devolved operational research units in South Yorkshire and Leicestershire, and smaller ones in Scotland, North-East England and South Wales. 50 As in the case of BISRA, the defining characteristics of operational research in coalmining can be analysed on a chronological basis with a considerable divide evident from the later 1950s onwards. As noted already, the NCB's overwhelming priority in the period to 1957 was to raise production, and it is hardly surprising that much of the work undertaken by FIG was coloured by this objective. From the later 1950s, however, the slowdown in production caused the Group to move beyond the immediate needs of the Production Department. Coincidentally, the Group began to a d o p t a wider range of techniques so that in methodological terms, the 1960s marked a decisive break with the past, especially in the context of computerisation and simulation. In order to illustrate the nature of operational research in the earlier period, it is

268 Operational Research in War and Peace appropriate to highlight the four dominant projects of that time. Two of them — the study of underground communications and an examination of the wearing properties of conveyor belting — were commissioned in response to the Creswell Colliery disaster already alluded to. The third study, inaugurated in 1951, was concerned with underground haulage and was a logical extension of an original investigation into the respective merits of diesel and battery locomotives. The fourth study was devoted to the high-speed drivage of tunnels as an essential component of the NCB's determination to boost production. In the aftermath of the Creswell disaster the NCB established a Fire Hazards Working Party to 'appraise the current position regarding fire hazards, to draw up and implement a programme of research and investigation and disseminate information to the Divisions.' The key objectives were to improve underground communications and personnel warning systems. 51 Following a pilot survey of the relevant provision at the Creswell Colliery itself, the project was extended to other collieries in the autumn of 1952 when the sponsorship of the project was transferred from the Fire Hazards Working Party to a further Working Party on Underground Communications. It was at this stage that FIG took on responsibility for the research programme. A key preliminary finding was that an emergency warning would have to be transmitted via the normal underground telephone system. This meant that in order to evaluate the use of the system in an emergency, the day-to-day operation of underground telecommunications required investigation. In the latter context, the Group began by analysing the warning procedures in place at a number of collieries and relating them to the answering delay times inherent in each system. The latter were directly related to the four components of a completed call — the time taken for the exchange to answer an incoming call, the time for an extension to respond, the time for the exchange to connect from one line to another and to start ringing the extension required, and finally, the talking time. Once this information had been obtained, the Group proceeded to investigate the rate at which underground workers could be warned of an emergency. For all the collieries investigated, illustrative 'manpower m a p s ' were constructed in order to identify the location of all underground workers during the course of each shift. On the assumption that 'everything in an emergency would happen in the most logical fashion' it was then possible to identify the number of men who would be warned in any given time period and also to examine the effect on the warning rate of marginal alterations to the telephone system. A key

Operational Research in Coalmining 269 component of the investigation was to consider the effects of the introduction of a dedicated underground alarm system working in tandem with the telephone system. A critical difficulty in this respect was the impact of unanswered calls appearing at random. Since it was not possible to construct an algebraic formulation of the relationship between the number of men warned and the time since the onset of the warning, the investigators made use of the Monte Carlo technique of analysis. This was a specific method of simulation where the principles of random sampling were applied to the evaluation of deterministic and probabilistic variables. Equipped with the manpower plan of the relevant pit, the distribution of delay times, and proportion of unanswered calls at each point of the telephone system, the investigators used an appropriate set of random numbers to examine the operation of a warning system. The random numbers at each point indicated whether or not the telephone was answered and also when alternative action was required. After allowing for time lags, a sequence of warning system trials was carried out with the results plotted as in Fig. 8.3.

100% Alarm System

._J Rearranged System

Per cent of men worried

___J

Existing System

Time units

Figure 8.3 Results of Monte Carlo Computations of Warning Time. Source: B. H. P. Rivett, 'Operational Research in the British Coal Industry/ in J. F. M. McCloskey and J. M. Coppinger (Eds.), Operational Research for Management (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1956), Fig. 6, p. 208.

270 Operational Research in War and Peace In commenting on this particular study, Rivett recalled that it was initially a laborious and time-consuming 'paper and pencil' exercise based upon tables of random numbers. 52 It was for this reason, therefore, that FIG had resort to the electronic computer at the National Physical Laboratory in order to construct a decision model by simulation. This was a pioneering exercise which confirmed that the installation of an alarm system did not produce a significant improvement in the time taken to warn all underground workers, although it did improve by some margin the average time taken to warn all of the men — 'In other words the introduction of an alarm system might only slightly reduce the expected time to warn all the men but would markedly reduce the time to warn all the men in the extreme case when a number of telephones might not answer.' 53 FIG's analysis of underground communications took four years to complete, notwithstanding the resort to computer assistance. In that period, underground communications and warning systems at 28 pits were examined. In view of wide differences in underground conditions, each investigation proved to be 'a dog's breakfast' in terms of the physical effort expended. 54 Nevertheless, the results were impressive. On FIG's recommendation the industry adopted a sequence of measures which were designed to improve pit safety in terms of warning and evacuation procedures. At the simplest level, underground telephones were relocated, louder bells introduced, and operators equipped with telephone headsets. In the longer term, the NCB undertook to phase out all underground exchanges at the same time as the industry moved to a fully automated telephone system. 55 As noted already, FIG's investigation of conveyor belting was also prompted by the Creswell disaster. The main point of the project was to test a range of belting materials for their non-inflammable qualities with wearing properties as a related, but subsidiary concern. At first sight, the investigation appeared to be straightforward insofar as it entailed a sequence of field trials. However, matters did not run smoothly. In the first instance, an original list of 208 conveyors to be tested proved to be too ambitious. Some conveyors were unsuitable for trials either because their expected life was too short or because the running conditions were liable to change from time to time. After an amended list was devised, it was found that very few conformed with the original project specifications, a problem compounded by the difficulty in assessing 'less tangible factors' such as quality of alignment, hardness of coal, and maintenance standards. 56 In the event, 101 conveyors were selected for

Operational Research in Coalmining 271 trial, but at the end of 1952, after 12 months of study, it was calculated that only one third had been in operation. Staff shortages, moreover, meant that FIG was unable to spend sufficient time in seeking out new conveyors to replace those already lost to the investigation. Matters improved during 1953 as extra staff became available, but even then it was found that 'the smooth functioning of an adequate records system was found to involve most of the office time of the field team in addition to those looking after the records.' 57 The trials themselves proved difficult to organise in view of the large number of collieries to be visited and the fact that they were scattered widely throughout the NCB Divisions. Nevertheless, by the end of 1953 worthwhile results were beginning to appear both in relation to durability and fire resistance. In this respect, FIG had engaged in two sets of trials with both of them producing mutually supporting results. The principal trial material was PVC, although several kinds of rubber belting were included. FIG's main achievement was to establish a rank order of belting materials based upon 'simple statistical techniques.' 58 The results were communicated not only to NCB production engineers but also to the manufacturers, a number of whom were stimulated to develop their own research and development programmes. FIG was also instrumental in encouraging the NCB's own area and divisional laboratory scientists to devise testing procedures for new types of belting and also for checking the consistency of all deliveries. In this way 'the work of the operational research group...led to a combined scientific effort on conveyor-belting problems many times larger than the group's own contribution.' 59 If the work on underground communications and belting was prompted by the immediate effects of a mining disaster, the third major project undertaken by FIG after 1950 was the product of one of the principal recommendations of the Reid Committee that the industry should, as a matter of urgency, secure the widest possible diffusion of locomotives as an integral part of any underground haulage system (see above, p. 254). This was one of the first investigations to be undertaken by FIG and in its original form it focussed exclusively on the respective merits of diesel and battery locomotives. Inaugurated in 1948, the investigation was to cast a long shadow forward into the 1950s insofar as it formed the basis of most of the comparative cost studies carried out by the Group. In methodological terms the key features were as follows: (a) Collection and tabulation of cost data; (b) Grouping of cost items according to the factors determining the cost;

272 Operational Research in War and Peace (c) Development of formulae for predicting costs in these groups, based on a combination of traction theory and the results obtained in the survey; (d) Application of these formulae to installations studied in order to check the validity of this empirical method; (e) Selection of hypothetical examples of 'typical installations'; (f) Application of prediction formulae to the above examples, giving comparative costs for different types of locomotive under identical conditions. 60 The main conclusion of the investigation was that diesel locomotives were considerably cheaper to operate than their battery equivalents for coal haulage. This information, conveyed to the NCB's Underground Transport Sub-Committee, resulted in a request that FIG should extend its work in this area to embrace rope and conveyor haulages. In the early 1950s little information existed on the relative merits of such systems, not least in relation to locomotive haulage. FIG's early conclusions pointed to the fact that rope haulage as one of the oldest methods of underground transport was often cheaper to operate than ostensibly more modern systems. Belt conveyors, which were also being investigated as part of FIG's safety remit, were subject to limitations on their length because of their inability to operate round bends. Thus, any extensive system of belt haulage necessitated numerous transfer points giving rise to spillage and hence coal degradation. In fact, FIG's examination of rope haulage helped to prolong the life of this system into the 1970s, by which time substantial improvements in efficiency had been achieved. As for belt haulage, the main requirement in securing its more general diffusion was increased length and capacity. By 1953, FIG was evaluating the performance of a conveyor which had been designed originally for a maximum length of 1,500 yards, but which had been made one third longer. But greater lengths than this were desirable if belts were to be adopted for trunk haulage. One main difficulty was that the belt which carried the load also had to transmit the power and from 1956 onwards FIG fulfilled a major role in evaluating belt designs which could fulfil both purposes. 61 FIG's overall contribution to the improvement of underground haulage in an industry in which the cost of transport both above and below the ground loomed large was invaluable. By the end of the 1950s, the NCB was operating a flexible underground haulage system tailored to the needs of individual collieries according to criteria derived from

Operational Research in Coalmining 273 FIG investigations and the monitoring of field trials. Writing in 1956, Steve Cook classified the Group's work in relation to underground transport under three main headings, each of them borrowed from the American operational researcher, Ellis A. Johnson. 62 At the level of 'technology' FIG had delivered to individual colliery managers the means to compare performance with other collieries. In terms of tactics, the planning organisation, whether at colliery, area or divisional level, had been enabled to predict the overall costs of differing methods of transport thereby facilitating ' o p t i m u m planning.' Finally, the 'strategic' contribution of the Group was consistent with the delivery to 'top executives at national level' of a 'better quantitative knowledge' for deciding on the respective merits of different mining techniques where alternative transport systems could be deployed. In the light of the above description of the relevant project, Cook's classification was both accurate and sensible. The final significant project of the 1950s was inaugurated in 1951 and was directed first at the costing of underground tunnel construction and second at the problem of the high speed drivage of tunnels on behalf of the NCB's Production Department. The Board's problem in the former area was encapsulated by the situation in mid-1952 when 240 major tunnels were under construction. Assuming an average length of 1,000 yards and an average cost per yard of £55, the total cost to the industry represented by this effort was £13 million at current prices. FIG undertook a pilot survey of costing procedures at an individual colliery subject to an unusually large tunnel-drivage programme. Experience gained there led to the drawing up of the following remit for the project as a whole: (a) To examine the costs of tunnel construction collected by Production Department...and assess their accuracy and comparability; (b) To examine the machinery for the collection of these costs and determine the requirements of a standard method of collection; (c) To make proposals for a standard method of collecting costs of tunnel construction which will give accurate costs for each tunnel costed and will ensure that these costs will be comparable in content to those for any other tunnel; (d) To ascertain how far the methods of Area Finance Departments then in use fulfilled this purpose, and, if necessary to show where changes were required or practicable to enable the Area Finance Costs to be used for this purpose; (e) Using the system devised under (c): to cost the construction of a sample group of tunnels, and from these data derive the 'indicator'

274 Operational Research in War and Peace costs which can be used by Planning Officers for reference when estimating costs of future tunnel drivage or revising existing estimates. 63 One main result of the investigation was to highlight the deficiencies in the Production Department's costing procedures. At the point of FIG's intervention, costs were categorised under five main headings — labour, materials, maintenance, plant charges and power. But these were not defined in any way, a fact which applied also to the physical limits of tunnels under construction. The consequence of this was that standardised costing was notable for its absence across the different NCB Areas. The problem was compounded by the fact that little or no guidance was given on the method of calculation of costing information with the result that 'the costs returned...depended generally on the opinions of the colliery officials.'64 Costing calculations themselves were inaccurate to the extent of 5 per cent of the total cost per yard, mainly because of the diversion of materials underground from one tunnel to another. Although the sums were small, during the course of 1953 FIG succeeded in devising a standard costing system which covered the entire range of sizes of tunnels being driven and the range of equipment used across the spectrum of collieries.65 It was a testament to the value placed on this work that FIG's remit was extended to include the analysis of high-speed drivage of tunnels. This was a direct result of the production drive then underway, bearing in mind that in the early 1950s the average advance per week in major tunnels was approximately 27 feet. The aim of the FIG investigation was to examine the possibility of raising the driving rate to more than 100 feet per week and it was this fact which caused the investigators to concentrate on the evaluation of machine performance in relation to drilling, charging, loading, and the setting of tunnel supports. As well as visiting NCB collieries which at the time of the investigation were achieving above average driving rates of 60-80 feet per week, FIG members also spent some time in examining the operation of fully mechanised tunnels in the German coalmining industry where driving rates of 180 feet per week were being achieved in the early 1950s. FIG's recommendations arising from this visit were to prove critical in moving the average driving rate in the NCB's most productive collieries within striking distance of the desired 100 feet per week by the end of the 1950s. The principal result of FIG's work was to improve drilling and detonation techniques and to secure the removal of material blasted down mechanically rather than by hand. Thus, by the end of the 1950s,

Operational Research in Coalmining 275 mechanical loading was being applied to virtually all drivages with beneficial effects on productivity. Indeed, in the period 1953-60 the average volume of blasted material extracted per manshift increased by an impressive 76 per cent and the average weekly rate of advance of tunnels by 66 per cent, even though the average cross sectional area was 30 per cent greater.66 Reference was made earlier to the fact that the major focus of FIG's work until the later 1950s was bound up with the NCB's commitment to increased production, but that from that point onwards the Group began to expand its remit in order to cope with the problems of a contracting industry (see above, pp. 263-4). Production studies continued to fulfil an important 'bread-winning' function, but these began to be complemented by investigations into planning policies and mechanisms, the treatment and marketing of coal, and m a n p o w e r problems. Coincidentally, the work of the Group moved beyond the application of 'common sense' and simple mathematics to embrace an increasingly wide range of operational research techniques. It is significant that in 1962 Brian Houlden published a short volume on operational research techniques as practised within the NCB. The chapters, ranging across the theory of games, queuing theory, stock control, dynamic programming and the theory of search, were the result of the collective efforts of 23 operational researchers. 67 In that respect, the message was clear — operational research within the NCB was at the methodological forefront in Britain. FIG's first exercise in linear programming was conducted in 1959 and the results were published in the Operational Research Quarterly,68 and as if to confirm the continuing fallout from the first IFORS Conference (see below, pp. 375-7), further articles appeared on stock control and production planning. 69 It is by no means coincidental, therefore, that when operational research began to be incorporated in university-level curricula, following the expansion in higher education which followed in the wake of the Robbins Report, NCB operational researchers were prominent amongst the first recruits to academia. Potential illustrations of operational research within the NCB after 1960 are numerous. When Brian Houlden published his 1962 survey article on the work of the Operational Research Branch, he reported that 40 projects were in progress. 70 At the end of the decade, 121 projects were underway on behalf of the NCB Areas alone, always bearing in mind that by that time approximately 75 per cent of the work of the Branch was being accounted for by 'ad hoc' Area problems. 71 In view of the importance attached by the NCB to the resolution of stock control

276 Operational Research in War and Peace problems, this aspect of the work of the Branch will be described first before highlighting operational research studies in the areas of production planning and marketing. For the NCB, purchasing and stores was an immense commercial activity. In the early 1960s purchases of capital and consumable stock items were running at £185 million per annum. When it is realised that the Board routinely held stocks of several hundred thousand items 'ranging in price from less than a penny to many tens of thousands of pounds, ranging in usage from many per day to once in perhaps 50 years,' it will be readily appreciated that effective stock control was an essential component of any strategy directed at reducing, or containing costs. 72 In the 1950s, stock control theory — or inventory control theory — was a rapidly developing technique in operational research. Earlier work had focussed on economic lot-size formulae and probabilistic studies of stock control with shortages, but following the publication of a seminal paper by Dvoretzky, Kiefer and Wolfowitz in 1951/ 3 this particular field of 'classical' operational research began to address the issue of optimum stock control policy albeit with specific reference to finished goods in the manufacturing sector.74 In the case of the NCB, stock control was of direct relevance in relation to mundane production materials such as pit props and steel arches and, more especially, spares for production and other coalface machinery. 75 It was the latter which attracted the attention of the Board's operational researchers and which resulted in some important contributions to the developing literature of practitioner-based studies. 76 The availability of spares for coalface machinery became a pressing issue for the NCB in the later 1950s when power-loading machines were achieving widespread usage in the wake of the earlier commitment to increased production. Reliability problems, however, were acute and delays to production were a regular occurrence as a result of coalface repairs. As a consequence, each colliery tended to build up its own stock of spares, regardless of whether they might be available nearby. As a result, there was considerable overstocking of spares nationally, particularly the most expensive ones. The Purchasing and Stores Department at national headquarters was determined to introduce an overarching system of control and a major step in this direction was the establishment of a central store in each Area. By 1960, stocks of engineering spares were organised at two levels — at 35 central stores which were in receipt of direct deliveries from manufacturers and at 700 individual colliery stores. To keep production flowing with minimal overall costs, all of these stores required an appropriate system for the

Operational Research in Coalmining 277 reordering of spares. It was for this reason that the advice of operational researchers was sought, leading to a sequence of studies that would continue for many years to come. The initial parameters were laid down as follows: First, it was decided the aim of the system would be to minimize the total of the costs of holding stocks, or losing production if spares were not immediately available, and of administering the stores system. This was felt to be less arbitrary than the alternative, that of giving a particular level of service. Second, since most breakdowns could be repaired by replacing one part, and since there was no gain in considering parts jointly from the ordering and purchasing points of view, it was decided that items could be treated independently. The effect of this was that the policy which minimized the total cost for each spare individually also minimized the total cost for the whole inventory of items, and was therefore the optimum policy. Third, the cost of shortages was taken to be proportional to the number of items short, rather than the duration of the shortage, since action either had to be taken immediately or could wait until the normal delivery was made. Fourthly, a re-order level and re-order quantity system was preferred to the cyclic review system most used at that time in the NCB...Finally, forecasting; this would remain the responsibility of the stores clerks.77 One of the most critical things to estimate was the cost of not having a spare in the store when it was needed. Bulky 'not portable' spares could not be delivered to the coalface during the working shift, and there was nothing to be gained by holding such spares at the colliery rather than centrally. In general they could be despatched to the colliery for the maintenance shift in good time, partly because the central store had superior handling facilities. Another important distinction could be made between priority spares, where production was lost until they were replaced, and non-priority spares. Estimates were then made of the run­ out costs for portable/not portable, priority/non priority spares at colliery and central stores. Taking these and other costs into account, it was possible to set up calculations for the appropriate re-order level and quantity for each class of spare according to rate of usage. This work was done well before computers were easily available, and an outside research computer had to be used. The first set of tables produced in this way were tried out in an Area highly regarded for its standard of stock control. The trial showed that the system should reduce stocks by

278 Operational Research in War and Peace one eighth, administrative costs by one quarter, and shortages by one half. In this light, the Purchasing and Stores Department recommended that the system should be adopted by all Areas. 78 The new system, described in OR Branch Technical Note No. 75 (TN 75), was adopted widely after 1961, although there were many attempts at local variations. Undoubtedly the system could have been fine tuned for individual situations but the Branch believed that much of its virtue lay in providing a uniform, rational approach to the problem throughout the country. Inevitably, there were some problems of implementation. Some Areas, for example, had difficulty in categorising spares satisfactorily and there was some resistance to such a radical alteration to the control of stocks. Nevertheless, the new system, modified from time to time, remained in use until the end of the 1960s. The changes that had to be made were driven mainly by the economics of the industry. As contraction began, there was increasing emphasis on the need for the Purchasing and Stores Department to meet target figures for the total value of stock held, irrespective of less visible factors such as shortage costs. Many such problems were handled in the short term by 'adjustments' to the parameters built into the system, for example by increasing the notional costs of holding stock. Other factors were pointing to the need for a different system: coalface machinery was becoming much more reliable during the 1960s and repairs to machines were often undertaken by replacing whole sections rather than individual parts. Then a decision was taken that central workshops should specialise in particular machines, with each workshop serving several Areas. In describing this sequence of events, Tomlinson observed that by 1967 TN 75 was 'living on borrowed time.' Its estimated life, after all, had been projected at only five years, but it remained in use 'mainly because no better system is at present available.' 79 What was needed was a computerised system that gave the stores staff much more direct control in an 'adaptive system.' Even then, not everything could be predicted in detail. Tomlinson concluded, perhaps with tongue in cheek after the vicissitudes of the 1960s, 'The computerized system will include a forecasting sub-system using such techniques as exponential smoothing and tracking signals, but the key problem in forecasting is how to incorporate the clerk's local knowledge, which may have been informally picked up in the Miners' Welfare Club.' 80 It is a truism that all organisations engage in forward planning, either implicitly or explicitly. For commercial undertakings, planning may be

Operational Research in Coalmining 279 defined simply as a process whereby the goals of the firm are identified in the short and long terms as a preliminary to identifying the means of achievement. Economic theorists have focussed on the need for profit maximisation in conditions of uncertainty as the ultimate justification for corporate planning. In the case of the nationalised industries, however, the original parliamentary statutes laid down the somewhat vague requirements that they should 'break even, taking one year with another' and that the 'public interest' should be furthered 'in all respects.' The implications of this for the coalmining industry were twofold: there was clearly an absolute requirement that production should be sustained at a level consistent with the nation's energy requirements , but this was to be tempered by the need to earn 'operating surpluses' in order to fund capital investment without battening unduly on the public purse. Until the later 1950s, national planning in the NCB was conducted within this broad framework. From that point onwards, however, the situation changed rapidly as the industry began to contract. Up to that time, national fuel policy had been consistent with the maximisation of coal output, and capital investment programmes had been formulated with this object in mind. Rapid market contraction, however, propelled the industry into a sustained period of uncertainty which could only have adverse consequences for the planning function at the national level. For the greater part of the 1950s relations between the NCB and governments were generally easy and changes of policy desired by ministers were achieved by informal discussion and persuasion. Such occasions, however, were few and it was only in the matter of pricing policy that the NCB was conscious of the political limitations on its freedom of action. During the 1960s political pressures began to mount. The industry's weakening market position was one factor in encouraging a more d e p e n d e n t financial relationship between the NCB and governments, and the formulation of a national fuel policy in the latter part of the decade without reference to the Board helped to precipitate a financial crisis which could only be resolved by further contraction. At the same time, new institutional arrangements, whereby the responsibility for energy policy passed from one Whitehall department to another, compounded by the rapid turnover of sponsoring ministers, served to further undermine the Board's position in dealing with government. A third and final phase was ushered in after 1973. This coincided with an apparent improvement in the industry's market prospects following the OPEC-administered oil price rise. The NCB's position was thereby strengthened, but there were powerful countervailing factors. These

280 Operational Research in War and Peace included statutory prices and incomes policies, continued dependence on Treasury subventions and, in particular, the damaging legacy of two national strikes in encouraging direct ministerial intervention in labour disputes. This theme continued into the 1980s at a time when government economic objectives were intensifying the pressure for cost reductions. The NCB's comment in 1982 that the industry needed 'continuity in political attitudes...,balance, orderliness a n d consistency; and encouragement of a reasonable rate of change' was heartfelt if wholly unrealistic politically. The sentiments expressed could, of course, have been uttered at any time in the 1960s and 1970s.81 If national planning was fraught with difficulty, it can only be said that the situation was replicated at the level of the individual colliery. It is a central fact of the economics of coalmining that the product in question is not homogeneous. There is a huge variety of sizes and quality which need to be directed at specific categories of customer. Individual coalfaces may contain several types of coal and a decision to expand the output of one at the expense of another cannot be taken in isolation from production as a whole. Above all, the combination of a moving frontier of output in an extractive industry subject to geological uncertainty helps to differentiate coalmining from the generality of manufacturing industry. During the 1960s, the Operational Research Branch concentrated its attention on the optimal choice of coalfaces to be worked as its principal contribution to short-term colliery planning. Two techniques were devised — Selection Procedure 'by hand' and Computerised Action Programme Selection (CAPS). The former consisted of three stages which were defined as (a) Definition of alternative faces and methods...An example would be: Face A; Shearer (a coal-getting machine); Powered supports (that are moved forward by hydraulic power); Two shifts (meaning that coal is produced on two shifts per day although other activities may be continuing on other shifts). (b) The collection of data on use of resources and determination of the contribution for each face/method. (c) The selection of the plan for the colliery from the set of face/ methods that will give maximum colliery contribution. 82 The information derived from stages one and two was tabulated in the form set out in Table 8.1 giving the contributions per ton and per man in the context of different face and method combinations.

Table 8.1. Face Method 1 Shearer 1 1 Shift2

Cont. Men Tons

£1,700 36 953

Difference Between Face Methods 1 and 2 Cont. Men Tons

£1,400 20 547

Information u s e d i n selection procedure.

Face Method 2 Shearer 2 Shifts

Cont. Men Tons

£3,100 56 1,500

Difference Between Face Methods 1 and 3 Cont. Men Tons

£2,500 48 1,107

Difference Between Face Methods 2 and 3 Cont. Men Tons

£1,100 28 560

Face Method 3 Shearer 3 Shifts

Cont. Men Tons

£4,200 84 2,060

o ro >-i

B>

cont. per ton £1.8

cont. per man £47.2

cont. per ton £2.6

cont. per man £70.0

cont. per ton £2.1

cont. per man £55.4

cont. per ton £2.3

cont. per man £52.1

cont. per ton £2.0

cont. per man £39.3

cont. per ton £2.0

cont. per man £50.0

5' a £i Ul

n s»

*-t

:

Type of coal-getting machine. 2 No. of working shifts per day. Source: Rolfe C. Tomlinson, OR Comes of Age (Tavistock Publications, London, 1971), p. 158.

n y

5' n o 8)

B

3' 5'

CJO (O 00 f-1

282

Operational Research in War and Peace

The ultimate object w a s to identify a list of faces a n d m e t h o d s w h i c h w o u l d p r o d u c e ' t h e highest possible total contribution of the colliery.' 83 A l t h o u g h Selection P r o c e d u r e w a s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d to t h e p o i n t of s i m p l i c i t y , it failed to a c h i e v e w i d e s p r e a d a d o p t i o n . In a f r a n k commentary, Tomlinson pointed to a major flaw: One mistake was made early on in the work and that was to claim that large profit increases were possible as a result of using the procedure. Thus it was claimed that one Area had increased its profit by £D-1 million p.a. as a result of applying the procedure to all its collieries. This may or may not have been true (in fact the Area later confirmed the figure as being the improvement over what would have been obtained by extrapolating from the previous plans) and, in any case, this sort of thing is very difficult, if not impossible to measure. But it looked like a claim by OR staff, when the Area staff themselves had been intimately involved. Whatever the reason, many people subsequently looked askance at suggestions that the Branch might help — they did not want Headquarters breathing down their necks asking where £□ million had gone. 84 It w a s this factor, together w i t h the l a b o u r intensity a n d time specificity of Selection Procedure, which p e r s u a d e d the Operational Research Branch to a t t e m p t to d e v e l o p CAPS. 8 5 In this respect, the m a i n r e q u i r e m e n t w a s to identify likely 'events' in the p r o d u c t i v e life of a colliery over an e i g h t e e n - m o n t h period. These m i g h t include the o p e n i n g a n d closure of faces a n d changes in the available m a n p o w e r . From a n identified list of f a c e / m e t h o d s , the next stage w a s to select combinations w h i c h w e r e most likely to p r o d u c e optimal faceworking. Action P r o g r a m m e s w e r e then d r a w n u p on t h e basis of integer p r o g r a m m i n g u s i n g variables w i t h the values of 1 or 0 to indicate w h e t h e r a f a c e / m e t h o d w a s being u s e d or not. The p r o g r a m m e s w e r e t h e n considered sequentially a c c o r d i n g to the following procedure: Every time that an Action Programme reaches the end of the period, its contribution is 'tested' by comparing it with the contribution of the best Action Programmes so far obtained that achieve similar levels of output and make similar demands on limited resources. If the contribution is lower the Action Programme is rejected, otherwise it replaces the one previously stored as best. In practice the six best are stored so that management can make a choice between them. 86

Operational Research in Coalmining 283 Taken together, Selection Procedure and CAPS brought about a radical transformation in colliery planning. Appreciation courses in their use were provided both for senior and local staff across the NCB Areas. Indeed, the effort expended by the Operational Research Branch could be viewed as a further watershed in the development of operational research in coalmining insofar as it represented 'the first attempt to get large-scale usage by local staffs of systems developed by the OR Branch.'87 The application of operational research to Area Planning began in the early 1960s. It was assumed at that time that Selection Procedure was a convenient route to short-term planning and considerable effort was expended in developing the technique in this particular context in the first half of the decade. In the event, the results were disappointing to the extent that the selection of plans utilising Selection Procedure was achieved by only two Areas. The main lesson derived from this experience was that Area Planning was meaningful only in a longer timescale, preferably within the limits of 3-5 years. It was for this reason, therefore, that the Operational Research Branch began to investigate the application of mathematical, or linear programming to planning at the level of an entire NCB Division with the aim of identifying the most profitable combinations of productive resources. In the development of the methodological repertoire, the innovation of linear programming was an event of decisive importance in the history of operational research. The outstanding innovator was George B. Dantzig of the Rand Corporation who devised the simplex method on behalf of the United States Air Force in 1947 (see above, p. 14). Enhanced by the insights provided by John von Neumann, the father of game theory, the diffusion of linear programming beyond the US military sector after 1950 was as rapid as it was extraordinary. 88 As a formal subject of operational research, linear programming was devised as a means to optimisation in that it deals with the problem of allocating scarce resources among competing uses in the 'best' possible way. The adjective 'linear' merely implies that all the mathematical functions in the relevant model are required to be linear functions. Dantzig himself attended the first IFORS Conference and delivered a brief, but informative paper on the subject, although to be fair to the British operational research community it was followed by a highly instructive case study on the application of linear programming to the supply of coal to the Central Electricity Authority. 89 In applying the technique to the planning needs of the NCB, the Operational Research Branch chose the Northumberland and Durham Division for its first major foray into the field. The Division

284 Operational Research in War and Peace was a large one, containing 60 collieries and in this respect the Branch was confronted with a Herculean task. In methodological terms, the initial requirement was to identify all of the available resources of capital and labour, as well as individual production units down to the level of individual coal seams. This information formed the basis for a sequence of linear algebraic equations which were then subject to computer analysis in order to calculate 'the amount of production from each unit which will give the greatest overall contribution.' According to Tomlinson, 'Progress was slow at first, largely because of data-collection.' 90 By 1967, however, worthwhile results had been obtained which were consistent with improved profitability at the Divisional level. It was at this point that the NCB decided to eliminate the Division as a unit of management in favour of larger scale Areas, each equipped with its own Business Planning Team. Thus, work in the later 1960s was concentrated at this level.91 Although the Board's Staff College mounted lecture programmes in linear programming techniques, the rate of adoption was initially disappointing. Data collection problems were partly responsible, but so too was the manipulation of the results in order to produce the required coefficients and the assembly of the initial matrix. Matters were eased considerably by the development of a specific matrix generator computer programme which had the immediate effect of a major reduction in the volume of preliminary calculation. The breakthrough to the diffusion of linear programming came in an 'unexpected fashion.' As Tomlinson recalled, When Area Systems staff began their discussions as to the kind of work that operational research could most usefully do in their Areas, it was found that there were short-term problems of allocating existing production to markets that could best be solved by the application of these mathematical programming techniques, and moreover the programs developed for the longer-term planning problems were primarily concerned with evaluating production alternatives, could equally be used for this purpose. Some half-dozen Areas, therefore, began to apply linear programming to this problem and found it useful...Thus a tool developed essentially for long-term production was proved and sold by applying it to short-term market planning.92 The reasons for this were rooted in the fact that the analysis of distribution was inherently less complex than for production: data collection was relatively limited in scope and the timescale of implementation was therefore much shorter than for full-scale Area

Operational Research in Coalmining 285 Planning. Nevertheless, the Operational Research Branch persisted with its efforts to secure the implementation of the latter. As noted already, the original investigation had been applied to the Northumberland and Durham Division, but following the 1967 reorganisation in favour of Areas, concentration was focussed on the Midlands Area. 93 The aim of the Branch was to produce alternative plans in order to equip Area managers and planners with a number of possible ways of meeting variations in future demand. Operational research, therefore, was to be viewed as an 'investigating tool' rather than a means to prescriptive p l a n n i n g . Long-run objectives w o u l d be influenced by linear programming, 'but they [would] in no sense automatically flow from them.' 94 As a subject for operational research studies, the marketing of coal assumed increasing importance after 1960 as the long-term contraction of the industry was confirmed. It was, however, a difficult field for the Operational Research Branch to make its mark in view of the complexity of the product in relation to size and quality, the different markets to be served (industrial, carbonisation and domestic), and the consequences for pricing policy. The problem was compounded by the structure of the NCB's marketing organisation whereby 'a customer in London.. .could have found himself receiving coal from several Coal Board Areas and having to negotiate with each separately.' 95 During the 1960s, therefore, the NCB established Regional a n d Area Marketing Services as complements to the Headquarters Marketing Department in order to improve distribution and the quality of customer service. Whilst this had the effect of increasing the potential remit for operational research, marketing staff remained unconvinced as to the relevance of the discipline to an area of the NCB's activities which was subject to rapid change and where a very high premium was placed on 'experience' in the field. On the other hand, they were conscious of the need for assistance. In the event, agreement was reached to form a small study team to investigate the application of operational research to marketing problems. This was to bear fruit in the establishment in 1967 of the Domestic Market Study Team led by 'a senior marketing man' and including members drawn from the NCB's Computer Service and the Operational Research Branch. The work of the Team was concentrated heavily on the development of two models for distribution and planning. In the former case, the relevant model offered a range of solutions to transportation problems according to the priority attached to savings in transport costs and the maximisation of consumer satisfaction.96 At the time when Tomlinson published his

286 Operational Research in War and Peace celebratory history, the 'distribution model' had been adopted in one Sales Region as the basis for negotiations with merchants. In addition to savings in transport costs, implementation of the model had also resulted in significant reductions in the clerical and managerial effort.97 It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the model was rapidly diffused throughout the industry after 1970. Market planning was devoted exclusively to the issue of balancing supply and demand in relation to the rapidly changing domestic fuel market. In drawing up forecasts of changing demand, the Study Team engaged in extensive market research in order to distinguish between 'planned' and 'voluntary' market changes, the former determined by housing construction and demolition and the latter by the choices of individual householders. By the early 1970s, the Team was producing national forecasts for five years ahead, all of which pointed to the increasing demand for smokeless fuels and hence the need for the NCB to commit more resources to the construction of smokeless fuel plant. 98 By the end of the 1970s, the NCB was employing more than 100 graduate operational researchers. If titles are indicative of status, then the post-1970 re-designation of the Operational Research Branch as the Operational Research Executive reporting to its own Board may be taken as further confirmation of the NCB's continuing commitment to the discipline. 99 Computerisation had proceeded apace and with it an everexpanding remit for operational research. Nowhere was this more evident than at the level of national planning where Executive members collaborated with the NCB's Central Planning Unit in developing sophisticated models of the national fuel economy. Work on behalf of Areas continued to diversify and the decision taken in 1967 to establish the Area Systems Group was validated in practice by the delivery of an operational research service, decentralised where necessary, and geared increasingly to local needs. In all of these respects, the development of operational research in coalmining presents some striking contrasts with experience in iron and steel. The major difference between the two industries lay in the degree of commitment to operational research as a guide to objective decision-making. The last chapter described in some detail the contribution of BISRA and three of the largest company-based operational research groups in a variety of settings. The work was clearly of value and was recognised as such in its contemporary setting. But it is also the case that the diffusion and practice of operational research was not necessarily welcomed by managers. In two of the steel companies resentment of operational researchers as 'ivory tower dwellers' was

Operational Research in Coalmining 287 evident, and resistance to well-founded r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s was encountered in the face of vested interests determined to preserve the status quo. In coalmining, however, operational research and its practitioners were generally well regarded and nurtured throughout the long p e r i o d of public o w n e r s h i p . At one level, there w a s a straightforward explanation for this. Nationalisation of the industry undercut the ground from vested interests, and in creating a unified managerial structure with the status of operational research recognised at the highest executive echelons, it sent out powerful signals to managers that this was a valued activity. It is significant that on every occasion when the future contribution of operational research was under discussion, the outcome was registered in the allocation of extra resources, and invariably on a substantial scale. It may well be that operational research in coalmining was unusually well served by individuals endowed with a judicious combination of enthusiasm, commitment and charisma, but this would be unfair to men of the calibre of Charles Goodeve and Roger Collcutt. What is clear in the case of coalmining is that the early advocates of operational research, such as Donald Hicks, Pat Rivett and Brian Houlden, were considerably advantaged by the highly pressurised — and politicised — environment in which the industry operated in the 1950s. At that time, the industry was the primary source of energy for the economy: the winter fuel crisis of 1947 had revealed, in the starkest possible terms, the dire consequences which would follow from an acute shortage of coal. From that point onwards, therefore, the accent was on the need to achieve maximum output consistent with advances in productivity and cost effectiveness, bearing in mind also that the industry's performance was the subject of sustained public and parliamentary scrutiny. In marked contrast to their counterparts in the protected and disintegrated iron and steel industry, therefore, NCB managers were more than usually receptive to wellarticulated proposals which might ease their supremely difficult task. Whilst FIG's independent status was underwritten by its reporting line to the NCB's Scientific Member, the group was able to establish its credibility with local managers as a result of its detailed and often painstaking fieldwork. This, in itself, helped to generate confidence in FIG's ability to produce worthwhile recommendations which could be disseminated throughout the industry as a whole. Colliery managers, moreover, were professional engineers and could therefore be expected to be sympathetic to a quantitative approach to the resolution of their problems. In this context, it is significant that FIGs operational researchers

288 Operational Research in War and Peace were never tainted with the accusation that they were little more than 'distant research boffins' and therefore out of touch with the realities of underground mining operations. The production drive of the 1950s was, of course, followed by the contraction of the 1960s and 1970s and it may appear paradoxical, at first sight, that the NCB's commitment to operational research was progressively enhanced. But as this chapter has demonstrated, operational researchers proved adept in identifying new areas for study in accordance with the changing needs of the Board. Thus, the overwhelming emphasis on production was followed by increased concerns with planning and marketing as well as manpower issues, all of them of direct relevance to an industry subject to mounting competitive and cost pressures. Methodological developments and computerisation were critical in underpinning this expanding remit and there can be no doubt that the NCB's operational researchers proved extremely able in demonstrating their relevance to a wide spectrum of managers in the Board's hierarchy. On numerous occasions they displayed an extreme sensitivity to the managerial culture of the NCB which laid considerable stress on consensual and rational decision making: there was no arbitrary restriction on the scope of operational research and the prevailing ethos was one of partnership in the resolution of difficulties.100 FIG and its successors, therefore, served the coalmining industry well for more than four decades. Their success was the product of high-level sponsorship, a distinctive mixture of demand and supply conditions and ease of access to management. The record of achievement was so impressive that operational research in coalmining provides the outstanding example of the relevance of the discipline at the level of practice in the postwar period.

NOTES 1. Roy Church, The History of the British Coal Industry, Volume 3, 1830-1913 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991); M. W. Kirby, The British Coalmining Industry 1870-1945: A Political and Economic History (Macmillan, London, 1977). 2. Barry Supple, The History of the British Coal Industry, Volume 4, 1913-1946: The Political Economy of Decline (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987). 3. Ibid. 4. N. K Buxton, The Economic Development of the British Coal Industry: From Industrial Revolution to the Present Day (Batsford, London, 1978); Ben Fine, The Coal Question: Political Economy and Industrial Change from the Nineteenth Century to the Present Day (Routledge, London, 1990).

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289

5. Ministry of Fuel and Power, Coal Mining: Report of the Technical Advisory Committee, Cmd 6610 (1945). 6. W. W. Haynes, Nationalisation in Practice: The British Coal Industry (Bailey and Swinfen, London,1953). 7. Jim Tomlinson, The Unequal Struggle? British Socialism and the Capitalist Enterprise (Methuen, London, 1982); William Ashworth, The State in Business 1945 to the mid 1980s (Macmillan, London, 1991). 8. K. Hutchinson, J. A. Gray and H. Massey, 'Charles Drummond Ellis 18951980/ Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol.27 (1981), pp.287-323. 9. PRO, COAL 33/21 'The Organisation of the Scientific Department of the National Coal Board: Memorandum by the Scientific Member,' Organisation and Complement, NCB. Sc. (46)2. 10. Ibid., NCB: 4th Meeting, Minute 44 (26 July 1946). 11. Ibid., COAL 22/2, Note 342, p.88 (1948). 12. Ibid. COAL 33/17, Extract from the Staffing and Organisation Committee: Reorganisation of the Scientific Department (February, 1948). 13. Donald Hicks, 'The Origins of Operational Research in the Coal Industry: A Tribute to Sir Charles Drummond Ellis, F.R.S., 1895-1980/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 34 (1983), p. 847. 14. Ibid. 15. R. C. Tomlinson, OR Comes of Age: A Review of the Work of the Operational Research Branch of the National Coal Board (Tavistock Publications, London, 1971), pp. 6-7. 16. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 17. NCB, Expenditure Committee: First Interim Report (NCB/P/48) 427. 18. PRO COAL 33/17, Directorate of Scientific Control: Confidential Report: Staff for The D.S.C. (Feb 1948) (NCB/P(48)427; NCB, HQ Expenditure Committee, First Interim Report (NCB/P(48)427. 19. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 20. Ibid. 21. Tomlinson, (1982), p. 6. 22. William Ashworth, Tlie History of the British Coal Industry, Volume 5, 19451982: The Nationalized Industry (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986), p. 22. 23. Ibid., p. 155. 24. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Tomlinson, (1982), p. 24. 28. 'Report by B. H. P. Rivett to the Director of Scientific Control on a Visit to the United States and Canada, May and June 1954/Cook Papers, MSS. 3 3 5 / C K / C A / A/119.

290

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29. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 30. Cook Papers, MSS 225/CK/CA/A/20. 31. Paul Keys, Operational Research and Systems: The Systemic Nature of Operational Research (Plenum Press, New York, 1991), pp. 60-1. 32. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 33. Tomlinson (1971), pp. 54-5. 34. Ibid., p. 55. 35. Ashworth (1986), p. 235. 36. FIG, Annual Report for 1961. 37. Tomlinson (1971), pp. 12-13. 38. B. T. Houlden, 'Operational Research in the National Coal Board,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 15 (1964), p. 174. 39. 'The Future of Operational Research in the Board,' cited in Tomlinson (1971), pp. 15-16. 40. Ibid., p. 17. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Houlden (1964), p. 176. 45. Ibid., p. 177. 46. Tomlinson (1971), p. 21. 47. British Coal Archive, Records Management Centre, G P / P (68) 65, NCB General Purposes Committee: Work of the Operational Research Branch, October 1967 to September 1968; NCB, Annual Report (1968-1969). 48. NCB, Annual Report (1970-71); British Coal Archive, NCB General Purposes Committee: Operational Research Executive — Annual Report for the Year April 1973 to March 1974. 49. Ibid., NCB General Purposes Committee, Research and Development: Work of the Operational Research Branch, October 1966 to September 1967; British Coal Archive, R.C. Tomlinson and G. H. Mitchell, 'Training OR Practitioners,' Deposit No. 2644/1. 50. British Coal Archive, 'A Review of Operational Research Work for the Areas, Report No 2778 (June 1974. 51. NCB, FIG, Annual Report for 1953. 52. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 53. B. H. P. Rivett, 'Operational Research in the British Coal Industry,' in Joseph F. McCloskey and John M. Coppinger (Eds.), Operations Research for Management, Volume 2: Case Histories, Methods (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1956), p. 210. 54. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 55. PRO COAL 33/17, 'A Review of the Scientific Control Department by Donald Hicks' (July 1955), pp. 2-5; NCB, Annual Report (1953); Ashworth, (1986), p. 100.

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291

56. FIG, Annual Report for 1953. 57. Ibid. 58. S. L. Cook, 'Operational Research in Underground Mining/ in McCloskey and Coppinger (1956), p. 216. 59. Ibid., pp. 216-7. 60. FIG, Annual Report for 1953. 61. FIG, Annual Reports, 1957-9. 62. Cook (1956), p. 219. 63. FIG, Annual Report for 1953. 64. Ibid. 65. FIG, Annual Report for 1954. 66. NCB, Annual Report (1959-60). 67. Brian Houlden (Ed.), Some Techniques of Operational Research (English Universities Press, London, 1962). 68. K. B. Williams and K. B. Haley, 'A Practical Application of Linear Programming in the Mining Industry,' Operational Research Quarterly Vol. 10 (1959), pp. 131-5. 69. J. R. Lawrence, G. G. Stephenson and W. Lampkin, 'A Stock Control Policy for Important Spares in a Two-Level Stores System/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 12 (1961), pp. 261-71; G. H. Mitchell, 'Problems of Controlling Slow-Moving Engineering Spares/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 13 (1963), pp. 23-9; H. Boothroyd and R. C. Tomlinson, 'The Stock Control of Engineering Spares/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 13 (1963), pp. 31732; W. Lampkin and A. D. J. Flowerdew, 'Computation of Optimum Re-order Levels and Quantities for a Re-order Level Stock Control System/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1964), pp. 263-78; J. E. Wood and J. G. Fergusson, 'Economic Planning of Production in an Area,' Steel and Coal (October, 1962). 70. Houlden (1964), p. 176. 71. NCB, General Purposes Committee: Work of the Operational Research Branch, October 1968 to September 1969. 72. Houlden (1964), p. 180. 73. A. Dvoretzky, J. Kiefer and J. Wolfowitz, 'The Inventory Problem,' Economica, Vol. 20.3 (1952), pp. 187-222 and 450-66. 74. L. Bovaird, A. S. Goldman and T. B. Slattery, 'Concepts in Operational Support Research/ Management Science, Vol. 8.2 (1962), pp. 113-37. 75. Tomlinson (1971), pp. 91-2. 76. See note 69 above. 77. Tomlinson (1971), pp. 108-9. 78. Ibid., p. 111. 79. Ibid., p.112 80. Ibid., p. 113. 81. M. W. Kirby, 'Verdict on Coal: The Nationalised Industry/ Bulletin of the Labour History Society (1987), pp. 112-19.

292 Operational Research in War and Peace 82. 83. 84. 85.

86. 87. 88. 89.

90. 91.

92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

99. 100.

Tomlinson (1971), pp. 155-6. Ibid., p. 159. Ibid., p. 163. P. N. Thompson, K. Knowles and R. M. Tagg, 'A Heuristic Tree Method of Selecting Face Schedules at a Colliery/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1967), pp. 139-48. Tomlinson (1971), p. 163. Ibid., p. 164. G. B. Dantzig, Linear Programming and Extensions (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963). George B. Dantzig, 'Concepts, Origins and Use of Linear Programming/ in Max Davies, R. T. Eddison and Thornton Page (Eds.), Proceedings of The First International Conference on Operational Research (Operations Research Society of America, Baltimore, 1957), pp. 100-8: J. Stringer and K. B. Haley, 'Application of Linear Programming to a Large-Scale Transportation Problem/ Idem, pp. 109-22. Tomlinson (1971), p. 171. NCB General Purpose Committee, Work of the Operational Research Branch, October 1967 to September 1968; Work of the Operational Research Branch, October 1968 to September 1969. Tomlinson (1971), pp. 171-2. NCB General Purposes Committee, Annual Report of the Operational Research Branch, 1969-1971. Tomlinson (1971), p. 173. Ibid., p. 122. NCB General Purposes Committee, Work of the Operational Research Branch, October 1968 to September 1969. Tomlinson (1971), p. 141. Operational Research Executive in the Seventies: Review of the Work of the National Coal Board's Operational Research Executive, 1970-78 (NCB, Hobart House, c. 1979). Ibid. G. H. Mitchell and R. C. Tomlinson, 'Six Principles for Effective OR their basis in practice,' in K. B. Haley (ed.), OR'78 (North Holland, Amsterdam, 1979), pp. 32-52.

9

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960: The Corporate Sector

Chapter 6 began with a critical commentary on the Trefethen-Ackoff interpretation of the positive reaction to operational research by the British industrial sector in general after 1945 (see above, pp. 185-6). The historical record, however, points to the fact that if non-military operational research got off to a flying start after 1945 it was confined to the iron and steel and coal industries, and even here the diffusion process was heavily dependent on the individual advocacy of Sir Charles Goodeve and Sir Charles Ellis. It is true that by the end of the 1950s, operational research had penetrated more widely into the iron and steel industry and also into the manufacturing sector generally. Such evidence as exists, however, suggests that in manufacturing, operational research was confined to very small numbers down to single individuals (see below, pp. 300-1). In a comparative setting, therefore, there is every reason to believe that industrial operational research was valued no more in Britain than in the US up to the end of the 1950s.1 Ackoff can also be taken to task for his claim that the 1950s witnessed little interest in the advancement of management science in the US in view of the earlier 'professionalisation' of American industrial managers. In this respect, Robert Locke has drawn attention to the 'paradigm shift' in the study of management which took place in the US after 1945.2 Hitherto, business education had been based upon ideas invented by working engineers infused with practical experience or 'praxis.' In the leading business schools this was supplemented by instructional techniques based upon problem-centred case studies derived from actual business practice. In the aftermath of a war which had entailed decision making on an unprecedented scale in conditions of complexity, variability and uncertainty, three categories of management science models were developed under the umbrella of 'operations research' or 'decision analysis:' deterministic models were applied to many repetitive 293

294 Operational Research in War and Peace procedures and planning problems, stochastic models in situations of uncertainty (using probability calculations), whilst heuristic models, perhaps using game theory or general systems theory, were also used. During the 1950s and 1960s the development and application of these models transformed the American management education system, initially in the departments of industrial administration of engineering schools where mathematical and statistical techniques had already penetrated, and then from the later 1950s in the business schools. By 1970, the paradigm shift had been completed, as reflected in the triumph of 'classical [American} management' utilising 'the new science-based managerial instruments, from linear programming and statistical analysis, to cyclometric feedback systems and electronic data processing.' 3 In accounting for these developments, Locke has placed special emphasis on the diffusion of operational research into the US corporate manufacturing sector from the late 1950s onwards. In this context, there were parallels in Britain, although considerable care must be taken in defining the rate and extent of diffusion in this particular setting. At first sight, the prospects for the widespread diffusion of operational research in British industry after 1960 were at least as propitious as in North America as a result of dramatic changes in the structure of business which were to take place during the course of the decade. The critical development was the adoption, on an increasing scale, of American-style multidivisional structures (the M-form), characterised by a headquarters general office presiding over semiautonomous product divisions staffed by professional managers differentiated by specialist function. The chief merit of the M-form was that it offered the prospect of overcoming managerial diseconomies of scale in the face of the growth of the firm. Pioneered in the US after the First World War by Du Pont, General Motors and Standard Oil, the M-form initially made little progress in British industry before 1939, with the notable exceptions of ICI, Unilever, Spillers, Dunlop, and Turner and Newall. American historians, building on the pioneering work of the doyen of modern business historians, Alfred D. Chandler, 4 have identified Britain's 'corporate lag' behind the United States (in terms of the delayed adoption of the M-form) as the primary cause of the declining competitive advantage of British industry at home and abroad from the later nineteenth century at least until the early 1960s. Indeed, the most extreme 'Chandlerians' have described the phenomenon of corporate lag and the entrenched British preference for family influence and control in the management of the firm as prima facie evidence of long standing

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 295 deficiencies in entrepreneurial quality.5 The fundamental difficulty with this interpretation of British economic decline is that it attempts to explain a multicausal phenomenon by reference to factors on the side of supply alone. Yet the most elementary analysis of the evolution of Britain's business structure would point to a complex and interrelated set of influences on the demand side of the equation. In this respect, the limited adoption of the M-form before 1939 can be explained readily by the market situation confronting many British firms — a combination of d e p r e s s i o n and deflation at h o m e c o m p o u n d e d by the rise of protectionism and import substitution abroad. As the first mergerintensive decade of the twentieth century, the 1920s may have been the occasion for the formation of ICI, but the most common form of postmerger organisation was the holding company, invariably based upon horizontal integration, but giving limited access to economies of scale by v i r t u e of the continuation of significant elements of family management and control. In the depressed British economy of that time, vertical integration, viewed by Chandlerians as marking the decisive breakthrough to high throughput mass production - and hence paving the way for the adoption of the M-form — was notable for its absence. But capital intensive mass production on the American model was entirely dependent on the existence of mass markets with a broad range of consumers enjoying access to rising real incomes. These conditions were manifestly not present in the interwar period. 6 Further retarding factors in encouraging corporate lag were imperfections in the British capital market, the absence of dedicated provision for the education of professional salaried managers, and the limited numbers of university graduates who were prepared to contemplate a career in mainstream manufacturing industry. From the later 1940s, however, economic and related circumstances were increasingly conducive to the closure of the Anglo-American corporate gap. In terms of the capital market, for example, the disclosure requirements of the 1948 Companies Act, in encouraging the removal from holding company boards of family nominees, was consistent with increasing managerial professionalism. Far more significant in this respect was the foundation, from the mid-1960s onwards, of Britain's first dedicated business schools. This movement was in direct recognition of competitive deficiencies in British industry as indicated by the Robbins Committee on higher education, the newly-founded National Economic Development Council, and the recommendations of Lord Franks on behalf of the British Institute of Management. In the event, Franks'

296 Operational Research in War and Peace recommendation for the establishment of two business schools at London and Manchester University respectively was adopted. The full flowering of management education in Britain had to await the 1970s and 1980s, but at least the foundation of the London and Manchester Schools held out the prospect of eliminating a historic constraint on the development of large-scale business on the American corporate model. 7 On the demand side, there were profound differences between the 1950s and 1960s compared with the interwar period. The former were decades of unprecedented demand for labour in the context of the 'golden age' of western economic growth. 'Full employment,' therefore, paved the way for 'the affluent society' characterised by increasing living standards and the purchase of a growing range of consumer durable goods. By the 1960s, it was possible to refer to a British-style mass market which acted in concert with mounting foreign competition — the latter following in the wake of the reconstruction of a viable, functioning international economy — to force a fundamental reappraisal of the managerial organisation of British business. It is this broad context of supply and d e m a n d influences which provides the essential b a c k g r o u n d to understanding the dramatic changes in Britain's business structure which characterised the 1960s. Of 100 large British companies in existence in 1950, 13 per cent possessed recognisable M-form structures; by 1960, the proportion had risen to 30 per cent with a surge forward to 72 per cent by 1970.8 The growth in the number of multidivisional firms in Britain cannot be divorced from the great merger wave of the later 1950s and 1960s. Mergers at that time were propelled by a constellation of factors, some specific to the postwar period, but others repetitious of interwar circumstances (see above, pp. 52-4). Among factors relevant to the later period, the revival of competitive forces was critical. In this respect, international treaty obligations and domestic l e g i s l a t i o n were complemented by the influx of foreign direct investment from the US in intensifying competition. The net result of these trends 'was a widespread desire to reduce such competitive pressures within the British market,' manifesting itself in the form of 'compensating mergers.' 9 Whilst mergers may be viewed as defeating the ends of a procompetition policy, government itself was directly responsible for their encouragement. This was especially the case in the defence-related industries where the state as a monopsonist was in a powerful position to promote mergers in pursuit of more efficient procurement policies, notably in the aircraft industry. 10 In the later 1960s, moreover, the then

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 297 Labour Government adopted policies of direct intervention in the industrial sector in the hope of boosting competitive performance. In the present context, the establishment of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation in 1966 'to promote or assist the reorganisation or development of any industry' in pursuit of scale economies was critical. In this setting, the role of Patrick Blackett was notable. Marginalised politically after 1945 as a result of his principled objections to the military applications of nuclear energy, Blackett re-emerged in the later 1950s as an adviser to the Labour Party on science and technology policy. His contribution to industrial policy is analysed in detail later in the chapter, but it is important to note that his advocacy of large-scale industrial organisation was predicated, in part, on his assumption that a sustained movement in this direction could be justified by reference to the wartime record of operational research. The spread of multidivisional structures was also the product of a widespread desire to emulate American managerial styles. Indeed, in many instances the adoption of the M-form followed closely the recommendations of US managerial consultants such as McKinsey and Company who were recruited in the later 1950s and 1960s to advise on post-merger managerial hierarchies. Adoption of the M-form was regarded as a necessary prerequisite for the effective control and direction of large-scale firms. It was also regarded as a vital component of any strategies for growth through product diversification or the acquisition of overseas subsidiaries. Of the aforementioned 100 large-scale companies, 25 per cent were diversified in 1950, 45 per cent in 1960, and 60 per cent in 1970. In 1950, 29 per cent possessed overseas manufacturing interests, but by 1970 the proportion had risen to 58 per cent. 11 In this context of increasing managerial complexity in British business, it has been suggested that the diffusion of operational research and computer technology together 'made the administration of larger scale enterprises more tractable.' 12 With new instruments of control and decision making at their disposal, the corporate managers of the 1960s could envisage growth in firm size with a degree of confidence denied to their pre-1950 counterparts employed, for the most part, in holding companies enjoying limited access to scale economies. In the light of the above developments, there is a strong prima facie case for the growing receptivity of British business to operational research. According to a survey of 160 organisations carried out by Goodeve and Ridley in 1953, 45 claimed to possess either an 'operational research section,' or 'at least one section or individual doing this sort of

298 Operational Research in War and Peace work.' 13 Within this group, 23 were industrial firms with a considerable size variation according to the number of employees. As for the sectoral coverage, in addition to iron and steel and coal, operational research had a presence in the boot and shoe, building, chemical, confectionery, engineering and machinery, pharmaceutical, textile and transport industries. Further indications of the diffusion of operational research into the corporate sector were provided by Rivett and Ackoff in their Managers' Guide to Operational Research, published in 1963.14 According to the authors' personal knowledge and the records of the Operational Research Society, the following sectors and companies had used, or were making use of operational research: Aircraft and Missiles Boulton Paul Aircraft; Hawker Siddeley; Royal Aircraft Establishment. Banking and Investment Phillips and Drew. Brewing and Distilling Distillers Co.; Guinness. Chemicals Albright and Wilson; British Oxygen; British Resin Products; W. J. Bush; J. Crosfield; Distillers Co.; Fisons; Imperial Chemical Industries; Laporte Industries; Shell Chemical; Unilever. Construction Cementation Co. Electrical, Electronic and Computer Associated Electrical Industries; Cossors; Decca; EMI; English Electric; General Electric Company; International Computers and Tabulators; Mullard; Phillips. Glass British Ropes; Hepworth and Grandage; R. H. Neal; Pilkingtons; Sigmund Pump. Merchandising John Lewis; Littlewoods; Saxone; Lilley and Skinner.

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 299 Metals British Aluminium; BISRA; Colvilles; Gillette; GKN; Steel Company of Wales; RTB; Tube Investments; USC. Mining British Coal Utilisation Research Association; NCB; Rio Tinto. Packaged Goods Batchelors Foods; Cadbury; Petfoods; Unilever. Paper A.E Read; Wiggins Teape. Petroleum British Petroleum; Esso; Shell International; Shell Mex-BP. Photography Ilford; Kodak. Printing and Publishing Macmillan; Odhams Press; Whitefriars Press. Public Surveys Gallup Polls; Television Audience Management. Restaurants J. Lyons. Shoe Manufacture British Boot, Shoe and Allied Trades Research Association. Textiles British Celanese; British Nylon Spinners; Courtaulds; Shirley Institute. Tobacco Tobacco Manufacturers' Standing Committee. Transport British European Airways; British Overseas Airways Corporation; British Transport Commission; London Transport Executive.

300 Operational Research in War and Peace Utilities Central Electricity Generating Board; United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. Wood Products Timber Development Company. This coverage builds u p o n Goodeve and Ridley's earlier survey, although there is no reference to the building and pharmaceutical industries. In a further survey carried out by Mercer, utilising the membership of the Operational Research Society at the end of 1967, 766 operational research groups were identified. 15 Of these, 553 were in the industrial sector and financial services (banking, insurance and finance). The most outstanding industries were metal manufacture, and chemicals (including oil refining), although operational research had also made an impact in mining and quarrying, food, drink and tobacco, paper, printing and publishing, and transport and communications. Within this broad spectrum, the largest groups, employing more than 30 operational research scientists (defined in terms of their membership of the Operational Research Society), were to be found in ICI, the NCB, USC, English Electric, BISRA, the Central Electricity Generating Board, Metra, and Imbucon. In interpreting these survey results, however, it is important to note that they fail to provide firm evidence of the extent to which operational research was taken up by corporate enterprise. As a recent survey of operational research g r o u p s has e m p h a s i s e d , classification problems were writ large from the outset, whilst sampling techniques were notably deficient. 16 Moreover, Mercer's relatively comprehensive analysis pointed to the fact that of the 1,724 members of the Operational Research Society surveyed, half of them worked in operational research groups numbering three or less and the latter comprised 87 per cent of the total. Indeed, of 164 organisations employing full members of the Society surveyed, namely those with at least four years' experience of operational research, 57 per cent employed only one operational research scientist. As Mercer concluded, whilst there were some notably large groups — as in coal and steel — 'the most striking feature of the statistics is the large number of one-member teams.' 17 Even allowing for the fact that such groups may have represented the tip of the iceberg — in the sense that the single Society member was complemented by a greater or lesser number of non-Society members — there can be no easy presumption that the managerial and organisational

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 301 changes alluded to above had resulted in a greatly enhanced role for operational research in the corporate sector. Nevertheless, it remains true that by the end of the 1960s, corporate operational research was an established fact. Whilst its depth and penetration at the industry-specific level may have been superficial, its sectoral coverage was impressive. In order to illustrate this point, the work of operational research scientists in widely differing branches of the corporate economy can be highlighted. Whilst the focus of the following brief case studies is on the manufacturing sector, the diffusion of operational research into financial services is also noted.

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AT COURTAULDS By the early 1950s, Courtaulds was Britain's largest producer of viscose yarn, with a distinguished record of innovation in artificial fibres. During the course of the decade, in conscious recognition of the need to boost its R and D capabilities, the company engaged in a substantial recruitment programme of graduate scientists.18 In 1941, only 125 qualified personnel were employed in the research department: by 1954 the figure had risen to 753 with a further increase to 1,050 by 1964-5. At the same time, Courtaulds developed a diversification strategy, acquiring overseas interests in pulp production and paint manufacturing capacity, as well as growing horizontally via mergers with other textile firms. In these respects, the company was entirely representative of the trend towards increasing managerial complexity in British business noted above. Within this structure, the decision to form an operational research group was taken in 1951 at a relatively early stage in the company's postwar history, and resulting, in all likelihood from the personal advocacy of Sir Charles Goodeve in conversation with Sir Arthur Knight, Courtaulds' Economics and Accountancy Director, and Alan Wilson, the Director of Research.19 The first leader of the group was Albert Swan who was recruited from the United Steel Companies. By the beginning of 1952, Swan had recruited four colleagues and had also defined a programme of work focusing on a range of economic and technical problems. The latter included studies of the optimal use of bobbins in section warping, optimal lengths of spinning runs, and the avoidance of double-handling of bales in the despatch department. 20 As for methods of analysis, the group deployed standard statistical approaches — 'analysis of variance, regression, probability theory, e t c ' as well as the Monte Carlo technique for assessing the most economic length of production runs. By the early

302 Operational Research in War and Peace 1960s, the group was using critical path analysis (CPA) to help improve the physical characteristics of the products emanating from the viscose division. The purpose of CPA was to determine the time-cost trade-offs in relation to discrete activities in order to meet scheduled completion times at minimum cost, i.e. to identify 'zero slack,' or the 'critical path.' In this context, the group began to employ linear programming techniques, aided and abetted by access to a computer. By the end of the decade, computer simulations were a standard component of the group's methodological repertoire. In other respects, the Courtaulds group replicated experience in BISRA and FIG. By the early 1960s, the original staff of four had grown to ten, and thereafter, until the termination of operational research as an identifiable activity in 1979, numbers fluctuated between 10 and 15 in accordance with the turnover of staff. In the latter respect, the group benefited from Courtaulds' policy of offering scholarships under the guise of mathematical apprenticeships to operational research recruits whilst studying for first degrees at university.

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AT CADBURY BROTHERS LTD In the food and drink industry, broadly defined, one of the outstanding names in British industry is Cadbury. In its original nineteenth century incarnation the firm was Quaker-owned and managed, and notable for its commitment to the welfare of employees at its celebrated Bournville plant. As late as the 1950s, the Cadbury Company was still over­ whelmingly committed to its original product base in chocolate confectionery, although by that time it had a significant market presence in the Commonwealth. Diversification began in the 1960s as a considered response to increased competition, commodity price fluctuations and low growth. Interests were acquired in sugar confectionery and the manufacture of cakes and convenience foods utilising American technology. Coincidentally, the family leaders of the firm began to consider a radical transformation in its managerial organisation from a 'functional holding company form' to a multidivisional structure. This had been accomplished by the end of the 1960s (when the company merged with Schweppes) on the basis of advice from McKinsey and Company. 21 In this context of increasing managerial complexity, fully reflective of contemporary trends in British business organisation, it is significant that in 1965 the decision was taken to establish an operational research group as a central function within the company. In this respect,

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 303 the ground had been well prepared by Paul Cadbury from the later 1950s onwards as a result of his personal commitment to rational scientific analysis in industry and government. 22 The initial work, carried out by Denis Reid, attached to the firm's inspection department, concentrated on quality control in relation to minimum weight legislation. In September 1960, however, following David Beattie's recruitment, a broader range of managerial issues began to be studied. One project of note at this time was an investigation into the optimal location of a new processing plant away from the predominantly residential area of Bournville. A critical requirement was the minimising of transport costs. In this connection, a regional contour map of such costs was devised leading to the decision to locate the new plant at Chirk in North Wales. In 1964, Beattie left Cadburys to set up an operational research department at Johnson & Johnson. Two years later, however, following the death of Denis Reid, he returned to Cadburys with a remit to establish an equivalent department. Significantly, this was located in the Cost Office 'at the centre of the decision-making processes in a centrally controlled organisation.' 23 It was the Cost Office which commissioned operational research projects on behalf of other central departments, but always with the requirement that the relevant investigations should produce 'visible savings of three times the budget of the [Operational Research] Department.' 24 Early projects concentrated on the design and implementation of quality control tests. These included investigations into variations in the taste quality of chocolate products, studies of the impact of environmental conditions on their shelf life, and improvements in the quality and design of packaging. 25 Associated and ongoing studies were also undertaken of the mean weight of representative Cadbury products in relation to their nearest equivalents marketed by RowntreeMackintosh, Nestle and Mars. Further studies of a long-term nature dealt with distribution arrangements. Beginning in 1967, the relevant projects focused on optimal routing networks and resulted in the closure of 7 out of 13 distribution depots nationwide. Work of this kind continued into the 1970s following the merger with Schweppes. At the point of the merger, Cadburys' Operational Research Department contained 16 members, most of them graduates who had been recruited by Beattie via the university 'milkround' in the previous three years. Training was both 'on the job' and academic, with the least experienced members being required to attend courses in operational research, such as those offered by the new Universities of Warwick and Lancaster (see below, pp. 383-88). As with other operational research

304 Operational Research in War and Peace groups at this time, staff turnover was high with an average length of employment of younger members of less than two years. In 1968 and 1969 the Department lost two experienced staff and although their departure was more than compensated by the recruitment of five graduates following the 'milkround' in the latter year, this influx of youthful talent threatened to upset the programme of work. It was at this point, therefore, that Ian Taylor was recruited from RTB to serve as a Senior Team Leader, and when Beattie left Cadburys in 1972 it was Taylor who succeeded him as head of the Operational Research Department. There can be little doubt that the initial location of the department in the Cost Office was a critical factor in establishing operational research on a firm footing in Cadburys, not least because the service provided was effectively free. Later on the OR Department, as an input to the budget process, actually did the cost analysis across operating companies and spread their own budget accordingly. This ensured [the Department's] continuing employment since the companies wished to receive value for the money they had spent.26 If this was the position in 1969, it changed rapidly thereafter as the company's post — merger divisional structure evolved to allow more managerial autonomy. This created problems of communication for the Operational Research Department which were well reflected in a significant decline in demand for its services. The situation was compounded by the creation of the Management Services Division in 1976. Three departments were absorbed — Operational Research, Organisation and Methods and Computing. The first two, employing twelve people each, were dwarfed by the 70 members of the computing section. The significance of the latter was recognised in 1981 when it was 'hived off as 'a separate and secure installation,' leaving the remaining departments to operate on a consultancy basis. 27 In the case of operational research, this was reflected in the formation of a subsidiary company — ITnet Ltd. This, in turn, was absorbed by Consultancy Services in 1992. Three years later, ITnet was totally free standing from Cadbury Schweppes. 28

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AT KODAK As a subsidiary of the American parent company, British Kodak dominated the postwar market for camera film and was also a major

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 305 producer of cinematic film for amateur and professional use. The development of operational research at Kodak provides an interesting case study insofar as the complement of staff was always very small, numbering no more than three at any one time. Yet despite the paucity of staff, some extremely useful work was undertaken which resulted in substantial cost reductions in manufacturing and distribution. This was particularly the case in relation to the forecasting of demand where the results of the relevant studies were disseminated both in conference papers and journal articles. The pioneer of operational research at Kodak was Derek Trigg, a physics graduate who joined the company in 1950 after a short period of service with the Bristol Aircraft Company. Initially employed as a product technician responsible for quality control, Trigg soon became interested in the statistical aspects of his work. 29 An early problem that he addressed was the phenomenon of 'coloured spots' where the emulsion coating was contaminated by grease and it was the statistical analysis of the number of defects that awakened his interest in operational research. One of Trigg's first encounters with the discipline related to the 'travelling salesman problem' (TSP) — in literal terms, the planning of an optimal route for a salesman who has to visit a number of cities in sequence and return home. The 'problem' was to calculate the lowest possible mileage encompassing one visit to each city.30 For Trigg, this was a mathematically similar situation to the optimal production of multiple products: In film track, for example, the transition time from product A to product B varies according to what A and B are. You may wish to wash all the equipment out if you go from A to B, but if you go from B to C, you may not have to do so, taking less time. So, given that there are 50 different [kinds of film] to produce, what is the correct production sequence in order to minimise down time?31 A more complex problem which Trigg attempted to address concerned the forecasting of customer demand in a situation where Kodak 'sold about 6,000 different items out of its branches.' As Trigg recalled, The production line started with the purchase of raw materials to produce the emulsion. This emulsion then passed to the coating department where it was coated onto big rolls of support. The film is transferred to finishing, where the film is cut according to requirements and packed. Then onto a distribution centre, where it feeds various branches to supply the customer. In the 1960s

306 Operational Research in War and Peace there was no overall planning, [so] that if the customer suddenly ordered twice as much, branch stocks were rapidly reduced. As light dawned two weeks later, the branch manager approached the distribution centre requesting greater stocks. Again two weeks passed before this increase in demand was communicated to finishing....32 The fundamental problem, therefore, was to forecast demand through time in conditions of uncertainty. In this respect, Trigg was inspired by the work of R. G. Brown in the area of inventory control.33 The key concept was 'exponential smoothing' where the new forecast of demand for a period is defined as the previous or old forecast plus a modifying term. This term is a constant factor, usually denoted by alpha, multiplied by the discrepancy or difference between the latest observation of demand and the previous forecast. The elementary algebra is as follows: New forecast = old forecast + oc x (error) = old forecast + a x (latest observation - old forecast) = (1 - a) x old forecast + a x (latest observation) where a is the smoothing constant of the old forecast and represents the degree to which the latest demand figure is believed. For example, if a = 0.1, then the new forecast is 0.9 times the previous forecast + 0.1 times the current demand, i.e., the latest demand figure is 1/10 believed. Trigg was responsible for numerous projects utilising this basic methodology and he himself contributed to a rapidly developing literature, becoming well known for the innovation of the 'Trigg tracking signal' as a method of identifying bias in the forecasting system.34 After 1960, Trigg's office, which had hitherto reported to the manager of the finishing department in the Manufacturing Division, was absorbed within a newly-created Administrative Services Division (subsequently called Information Systems). In 1977, Trigg was appointed head of the latter and retired from Kodak in 1987. Two years earlier, the operational research section had been closed down as a cost reduction exercise. After that date, 'OR became just one of the tools used by the Systems Analysts.'35

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 307 OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AT SHELL-MEX AND BRITISH PETROLEUM In terms of its receptivity to operational research in the later 1950s and 1960s the petroleum industry was outstanding. Transportation and distribution problems loomed large, in addition to optimum production runs for particular refinery products. The planning of single or multirefinery operations was also susceptible to modelling on the basis of mathematical programming. In the US oil industry, interest in operational research was first registered in the early 1950s, with the British industry following suit before the end of the decade. In the latter setting, operational research at the Shell-Mex-BP (SMBP) group of companies was inaugurated in 1957 after a successful approach from Sir Charles Goodeve to the then marketing director, Christopher Brunner. 36 The founder of the group, H. R. W. Watkins, was recruited from Courtaulds' operational research department after being alerted to SMBP's intentions by Pat Rivett, then serving as head of the NCB's Field Investigation Group. The new group was located in the Organisation and Methods Department, one of three company divisions, and reported to the Board through the General Manager, Administration. The early work of the group was carried out on behalf of the Operations Division and ranged across optimum run calculations for the production of lubricants and simulations of installation facilities. The latter were conducted by hand until the acquisition of a computer. Overall distribution patterns were modelled as a transportation problem with the acronym MERCATOR (Method for the Evaluation, Review and Control of a Transport network using OR). 37 In the later 1950s, linear programming made its debut in the UK oil industry. At that time, the technique was well established in the American industry as 'a routine operational planning tool.' 38 The pioneering role in the UK was fulfilled by BP where it was developed in response to the increasing complexity of the company's operations in terms of oilfields, refineries and markets. 39 During the 1950s the company's forward supply planning was the responsibility of the Supply and Development Department (S and D) which enjoyed 'elite status' in BP as a result of its success in dealing with the supply disruptions emanating from the Iranian nationalisation crisis in the early part of the decade and the Suez crisis in 1956-7. That success, however, had been achieved on the basis of 'rule of thumb, intuition and experience' so that S and D had no method

308 Operational Research in War and Peace of assessing the optimality of its proffered solutions. Two developments helped to propel BP down the road of deterministic modelling — first, the ordering of an electronic computer in 1956 and secondly, the arrival in BP's head office of R. J. (Bob) Deam in the following year. Although the two events were unconnected (purchase of the computer had been suggested by the Refineries and Technical Department), there was to be a fusion which cast a long shadow forward in determining BP's strategic direction. Deam himself was Australian and had studied chemistry and mathematics at the University of Adelaide. He came to the notice of BP's head office whilst working as a production estimator at the company's Kwinana refinery where he had applied linear programming techniques to the production of gas oil which was in short supply in Australia in the mid-1950s. Devoid of computer assistance and proceeding by a good deal of trial and error, he succeeded in producing a surplus for export. Recruited to the UK head office, Deam was appointed head of a computer group in the Research and Development Division of the Refineries and Technical Department. Although the company's computer had yet to be delivered, Deam looked forward to its arrival since 'we shall be able to select the optimum feasible programme under given conditions and hence overcome the inadequacies of the older methods.' Within three years Deam and his computer group had succeeded in applying linear programming to short and medium-term operations at five BP refineries where, for a given pattern of output, costs were minimised. The early exercises were 'single refinery models,' but in the summer of 1960, with the aid of hired computer power, Deam succeeded in devising an integrated refinery model (subsequently known as the Balancing Refineries Model) which paved the way for the programming of refinery and supply operations. As Bamberg has observed, The integrated Five Refinery model was indeed a quantum leap from the earlier single refinery models. Solutions of the new model provided an optimal plan for supplies of crude oils to the five refineries, the individual refinery programmes and the allocation of products to marketing areas. For these purposes, the optimal plan was defined as that which met a given pattern of demand at minimum variable cost. In the computation of the model this was achieved by requiring the refineries to engage in marginal cost competition for the available crude oils and product markets. The point of optimisation was that at which marginal costs were the same at all refineries and no product was manufactured at a marginal cost greater than the cost of procuring it from outside.40

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 309 The resulting economies were impressive — from reductions in freight costs and the greater use of low-cost crudes to the elimination of tanker back-hauls and reductions in inventories. With the acquisition of further computer power after I960, notably in collaboration with the University of London, four more refineries were added to the model. In 1962, Deam devised a second refinery/supply model — the Central European Refineries Supply Programme (CESP) — covering operations in Central and Western Europe and ultimately embracing 11 BP refineries. Thus, by 1966 the Balanced Refinery Model and CESP were being applied to nearly 90 per cent of BP's crude oil throughput and for a similar proportion of the company's sales of refined products. Following the destabilising effects of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 and the onset of the Nigerian civil war, a major effort was made to integrate the two models to form the Simplified Linear Integrated Model (SLIM). This was first used in 1967, but in view of the need for extensive remodelling in the face of imbalances between BP's international operations, it was soon replaced by a new Group Resource Allocation Model (GRAM). The latter was designed to economise on unnecessary detail to facilitate rapid computing, but in order to capture the effects of local markets it was supplemented by local area models (LAMs) which were already in use by BP's main overseas associates. GRAM itself was used for the first time for the computation of the short term estimates in March 1969 and for the medium term estimates in March 1969. By the end of the 1960s a substantial proportion of BP's operations both at home and abroad were being run on the basis of computergenerated deterministic models. The status of operational research within the company was reflected in its position within the managerial hierarchy. In 1960, Deam had been appointed technical manager of the Operational Research Branch in the newly-created Research and Technical Development Department. Two years later, the branch was given divisional status at the same time as an Operational Research Directing Group was established, consisting of senior BP managers, and with a remit to 'direct OR activities to the overall advantage of BP.' In August 1966 the operational research and computer divisions were amalgamated to form a single Computer Department and it was in this environment that Deam moved to consummate the hold of his operational research empire on BP. Already, considerable work had been done on applying linear programming to long-term planning, but success was elusive in the face of limited computer power. A single model, embracing the total planning horizon, was introduced in 1967, but in view of its inability to

310 Operational Research in War and Peace integrate marketing with refining and supply, Deam devised a 'revolutionary method' in the form of Integrated Marketing and Refining (IMR). Its distinguishing feature was that it aimed for profit maximisation rather than the cost minimisation which was the hallmark of earlier models. At first, micro-IMRs were devised for BP's associate companies, but the ultimate aim was to link a macro-IMR model to the company's 1971-6 Group long-term plan. Unhappily for Deam the latter was never implemented. The reasons for this range from personality factors and perceptions of empire building to increasing scepticism of the validity of linear programming models as the primary determinant of BP's strategic direction. As an Australian, Deam himself was not averse to 'pommy-bashing,' but he combined this characteristic with an abrasive and intolerant manner. More specifically, 'He was extremely hard to manage, especially as it could be virtually impossible for general managers with little understanding of [operational research] to separate the real worth of Deam's ideas from the bombast that surrounded them.' 41 By the end of the 1960s — when 'it looked as though Deam would not stop short of controlling BP's entire operations' by linear programming — opposition to his empire building tendencies was widespread in the company. The coup de grace was administered in two stages - first by a single individual and secondly by the newlyformed Management Study Group (MSG). In the former case, Deam's reputation was severely damaged by the extreme scepticism as to the worth of his activities by Peter Walters who returned to the Supply and Development Division in 1967 after a period of service in BP's New York office. In joint charge of operations and unimpressed by Deam's mathematical abilities, Walters used the Arab-Israeli war to question the validity of Deam's entire approach: That experience [the war] convinced him [Walters] that the LP models were incapable of speedy, flexible response to rapidly changing external conditions. He was also concerned about the lack of management information on the profitability of individual parts of BP's integrated business. How, he wondered, could he decide on the allocation of scarce supplies to marketing associates when he had no idea what margins they were making? He was, moreover, convinced that the centralised control of integrated operations diminished the responsibility and motivation of operational executives.42 Walters then proceeded to block further initiatives from Deam. In this, he received powerful support from the MSG in the form of a highly

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 311 critical report on the Operational Research Division. Prepared in 1968, the report referred to Deam's 'overbearing attitude' to his customers and the 'appalling state of relations' between his division and user departments. Indeed, 'attitudes on both sides have frequently deteriorated to a point where co-operation has been minimal.' Projects, moreover, had been over-sold resulting in premature implementation whilst Deam himself had 'attempted to take operational and executive responsibilities for activities which more rationally lie with other departments.' 43 Whilst acknowledging Deam's pioneering role in linear programming, the MSG was highly critical of his methodological approach insofar as his obsession with deterministic modelling had pre-empted the use of other operational research techniques, notably simulation. Faced by a growing volume of criticism, Deam's superior as head of the Computer Department, W. J. (Bill) Newby, decided to retire from BP in 1971, an event which precipitated the hiving off of Deam's division to the newly-formed Central Developmental Planning Department. Successively downgraded and marginalised, Deam was eventually sent into 'dignified exile' as a BP-sponsored professor at Queen Mary College in the University of London where he devoted his time to the preparation of a world energy model.

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AT THE NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK Operational research in the financial services sector was pioneered in the USA following the establishment of a dedicated facility at the Bankers Trust Company of New York in 1962. The precipitating factors were the onset of a harsher economic climate for banks and growing awareness of the potential contribution of computers to the process of managerial decision making. Diffusion was rapid: by the mid-1960s the First National Bank of Minneapolis was utilising operational research techniques to calculate the optimum number of cashiers and customer queuing times, whilst the Bank of America was engaged in studies of future staffing levels and the optimum period for the pursuit of loan defaulters. Elsewhere, operational research was deployed with effect in asset management, notably by the Bankers Trust. By the early 1960s, numerous New York and California banks possessed operational research groups with up to 30 employees. 44 In Britain, the arrival of operational research in banking was signalled in 1965 by an invitation from the National Provincial Bank to Samuel Eilon, Professor of Management Science at

312 Operational Research in War and Peace Imperial College, to advise on the establishment of an operational research group. As Eilon recalled, Computerization was beginning to expand rapidly and its effect on working practices was expected to be profound. The bank appointed Mr R. Hopps, a seasoned senior manager with many years of banking experience, but with no special knowledge of computing and no acquaintance with [operational research], to be 'Head of Automation.' It was he who initiated our first meeting, which was followed by another meeting with the Chief Executive, when I explained how an [operational research] group could be organized within the bank, how it would work and what contribution it could make. In in April 1965 I was given the task of setting up an [operational research] group and it started functioning in earnest later that year.45 After the merger b e t w e e n the N a t i o n a l Provincial a n d the Westminster and District Banks to form the National Westminster Bank (subsequently NatWest) in 1970 the scope of operational research expanded significantly 'and an ambitious range of projects was undertaken.' According to Eilon, Some of the very early work included: location of branches, development of credit scoring procedures for bank loans, use of risk simulation in evaluating the launch of a credit card system (leading to the Access card), development of an asset management model for the bank, planning the introduction of cash dispensers (including number and location), and many others.46 One important study, which was placed in the public domain, concerned the planning of future manpower resources with particular reference to management succession and recruitment policy.47 Five key factors were identified as follows: Demand Each year the Bank requires a particular total number of employees. This total number can be subdivided according to levels of seniority. Retirement Each year a number of staff reach retiring age and leave the Bank. The number of people reaching retirement age each year is determined by past patterns of recruitment and wastage and the Bank's policy on retirement age.

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 313 Wastage Each year a number of staff leave the bank for reasons other than retirement (i.e. dismissal, resignation, death, etc.). Wastage rates are different for different groups of people (e.g. wastage rates for women are higher than for men). Promotion Each year it is necessary to promote staff to fill the vacancies created at higher levels by retirement, wastage and expansion. Recruitment Each year it is necessary to recruit staff to replenish the numbers who have retired or wasted. Recruitment is normally only to the most junior levels. Recruits will inevitably have a mixture of abilities and ages and it is important to ensure that this mixture is appropriate for the bank's staffing and promotion requirements. 48 Relations between these factors were analysed using a computer program with the aim of simulating expected manpower requirements. The following five variables were defined in order to 'measure the health of the manpower situation' at any point in time: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

Number of promotions Number of retirements Ages of promotions to particular levels of responsibility Level of seniority reached before retirement Number of years spent in a particular job

The resulting calculations were then subject to sensitivity analysis which entailed numerous simulations based on 'optimistic/ 'most likely' and 'pessimistic' scenarios. The relevant model required large amounts of computer time and storage, but the benefits were significant in that 'the model...makes it possible to experiment with different assumptions and policies' at the same time as it 'encourages managers to think directly, and in numerate terms, about the consequences of their [manpower) policies.' 49 By 1972, NatWest was employing 24 operational researchers. Barclays Bank had also followed suit in establishing an operational research group and this paved the way for diffusion beyond banking into other parts of the financial services sector.50 In summarising the diffusion and experience of corporate operational research a number of common themes can be identified. In the first

314 Operational Research in War and Peace instance, it is evident that the introduction of operational research into the corporate sector was not so much in conscious recognition of the discipline's wartime achievements, but in response to personal advocacy at a level high enough in the managerial structure to ensure serious consideration. Charles Goodeve was ideally placed to fulfil this role. Passionately committed to the diffusion of operational research, and enjoying a wide circle of contacts, both metropolitan and provincial, he was more than capable of engaging the real interest of high ranking executives, all the more so in the context of increasing managerial complexity and heightened competition both at home and abroad. It was also the case that once introduced, the credibility of operational research as a management tool was dependent on its success in dealing with a sequence of tactical problems in the sense of their clear definition and suitability for quantitative modelling. This was exemplified in the application of operational research at Courtaulds, Cadbury Brothers, Kodak and NatWest. The case of Kodak, moreover, demonstrates that successful operational research did not necessarily require substantial resources in terms of qualified staff. The ultimate incarnation of 'classical'operational research was linear programming which achieved growing popularity in the later 1950s and 1960s. As the relevant case study has indicated, BP was won over to operational research in this aspect of its claim to be a 'hard' science with the capability to inform strategic decision-making. After 1960, linear programming was used increasingly to model the complex operations of a global oil corporation, a development which was facilitated by the diffusion of computers in British industry. BP's experience, however, provides major insights into the difficulties of using operational research as a management tool at the strategic level. Whilst the case studies as a whole, confirm the value of the discipline as an aid to tactical decision making, its trajectory in BP reveals that once the remit of operational research was extended to long term business strategy it was highly vulnerable to political and macroeconomic instability and the destabilising effects of local and regional military conflict. Whilst the mounting resistance to linear programming cannot be divorced from considerations of personality and the jealousies unleashed by overt attempts at 'empire building,' the growing lack of confidence in operational research both in terms of its objectively determined results and its relevance to BP's strategic direction was unmistakable. In these respects, BP's experience foreshadowed the crisis of confidence which was to afflict the operational research community in the 1970s and 1980s (see below, pp. 390-404).

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 315 In accounting for the increasing penetration of operational research into the corporate sector it is incumbent on the historian to draw attention to developments in the wider society which facilitated the diffusion process. Reference was made earlier to the professionalisation of British management which gathered significant momentum after 1960 in response to the growth in firm size. The associated diminution of family control and influence in British business was certainly conducive to the spread of operational research, but so too was the prevailing belief in rational scientific progress. For the 1950s it is only necessary to point to the enthusiastic reception accorded to the introduction of civil nuclear power and the public adulation of British achievements in aerospace. In the 1960s, moreover, the seizing of political initiative by a Labour Party a p p a r e n t l y committed to the organisational and technological rejuvenation of British industry helped to perpetuate the general approbation of 'science' and also to focus attention on the apparent benefits of operational research as an aid to managerial decision making. In terms of the relevant historiography, the economic history of the Labour Governments in office from 1964 to 1970 is dominated by the failure to break out of the stop-go cycle in response to continuing and debilitating balance of payments and exchange rate crises. These had fatal consequences both for 'The National Plan,' published in 1965, and ultimately the Department of Economic Affairs as the sponsoring ministry. It is salutary to remember, however, that although the attempt to inject 'long-termism' into the economic policy machine was an unmitigated failure, the same cannot be said of the government's industrial policies per se. Responsibility in this area was vested in another new Whitehall department inaugurated in 1964 — the Ministry of Technology (Mintech). It was in this context that Patrick Blackett was readmitted to the inner circle of policy advice. In view of the fact that Blackett possessed firm beliefs as to the means of regenerating British industry, his role in the gestation and work of Mintech requires evaluation. Whilst it is well known that Blackett lost his place as a scientific adviser to the postwar Labour Government on account of his opposition to the military use of nuclear energy, 51 it is instructive to note that from 1956 to the 1964 general election he fulfilled a critical role in determining the science and technology policy of a future Labour administration. The precipitating factor was the Labour Party's defeat in the 1955 general election and its impact on the new leader, Hugh Gaitskell. In 'Blairite' terms Gaitskell was a moderniser, or 'revisionist' in contemporary

316 Operational Research in War and Peace parlance. This related not only to his views on public ownership and unilateral nuclear disarmament, but also to his concerns with industrial efficiency a n d the relevance to that of scientific research and development. 52 In 1956, therefore, the 'Gaitskell Group' of scientists was formed as one of several study groups on future party policy. 53 The chief orchestrator was Marcus Brumwell, an original member of the proLabour Association of Businessmen founded in 1944. In July 1956, Brumwell hosted a dinner for selected senior Labour Party members and leading left-wing scientists. Although J. D. Bernal was unable to attend, Brumwell set the tone for discussion by expounding Bernal's views on science policy for a future Labour government. Central to Bernal's concerns was the belief that there was a gross imbalance between the national resources devoted to civil science and research and those available for military purposes at the behest of central government. 54 This message fell on the receptive ears of Blackett and Solly Zuckerman, and also struck a responsive chord in Gaitskell himself. The reasons for this are easily explained. For Blackett and Zuckerman it is only necessary to refer to their membership of the left-leaning Association of Scientific Workers in the 1940s and the fact that Blackett was the serving director of the National Research Development Corporation (NRDC), formed in 1948 by the then President of the Board of Trade, Harold Wilson, to exploit patent rights in inventions derived from publicly-supported research. In Gaitskell's case, he was, of course an original member of Zuckerman's 'Tots and Quots' club, an informal dining group which had met throughout the 1930s to discuss 'the social responsibility' of science.55 In addition, he had joined the Association of Scientific Workers in the 1940s, and as Minister of Fuel and Power in the Attlee administration was more knowledgeable than most about the political implications of scientific and technolological advance. 56 The foundation of the Gaitskell Group was to lead to a continuing dialogue between Labour politicians and sympathetic scientists which carried on well into the 1960s.57 In the period to 1960, it is evident that Blackett fulfilled the key role in formulating a science policy for the Labour Party, focusing on the needs of civil research and development. Convinced that too many British firms were technologically backward, Blackett's diagnosis highlighted a lack of qualified personnel, financial constraints, poor management and failure to achieve economies of scale as a result of inadequate firm size. In terms of policy responses, Blackett argued that

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 317 Excluding nationalisation on a big scale, the Government has two possibilities open to it; to leave things as they are or to buy itself a position of influence in industry by offering financial help for research and development projects.58 In ruling out further nationalisation Blackett recommended, therefore, that a Labour Government should aim to invest £10 million per annum in private sector firms to fund R and D programmes conducive to the national interest. This would be accomplished by expanding the NRDC and utilising the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) for the allocation of R and D contracts. Although Gaitskell accepted Blackett's proposals as the basis for party policy, science and technology did not feature prominently in the 1959 general election campaign. For Labour the reasons were rooted in the left-right split within the party. In relation to science policy, this was well reflected in the growing tensions between Bernal and Blackett, the former advocating substantial measures of direct state intervention in the private sector as well as wholesale nationalisation, and Blackett increasingly committed to Giatskell's own brand of social democratic revisionism. In this setting, Gaitskell was not prepared to endow science and technology policy with major campaign status out of fear of exposing further the fundamental divide in the party. Following Labour's electoral defeat, however, Gaitskell's explicit commitment to revisionism came to the fore in three main ways: first in his rejection of unilateral nuclear disarmament, second in his wish to revoke Labour's constitutional commitment to public ownership, and thirdly in his desire to present Labour as a modernising party with a distinctive policy for science and technology. In this present context, it is important to note that although the first two issues were fundamentally divisive, the desire to project a 'scientific image' could be, and was, presented as a unifying factor in that it embraced the interventionist aspirations of the left and the desire for electoral success on the part of the revisionists. 59 It was the 1960 conference of the Labour Party, therefore, which witnessed the arrival of science and technology as key issues of policy. Significantly, the lead was taken not by Gaitskell, but by Harold Wilson. As Wilson stated in his conference speech, This is our message for the 60s — a Socialist inspired scientific and technological revolution releasing energy on an enormous scale and deployed not for the destruction of mankind but for enriching mankind beyond our wildest dreams.60

318 Operational Research in War and Peace That this was not mere political rhetoric was confirmed during the next three years by a sequence of initiatives which were to give shape and form to Labour's science policy agenda. The pace began to accelerate following Wilson's assumption of the party leadership early in 1963 and his decision to appoint Richard Crossman as Shadow Minister for Science and Higher Education with Patrick Blackett as his adviser on scientific matters. By the time of the 1963 party conference a policy statement — Labour and the Scientific Revolution61 — had been prepared, the significance of which was underwritten by Wilson's extensive reference to it in his first conference speech as party leader. As Wilson stated in ringing tones, ...in all our plans for the future, we are redefining and we are restating our Socialism in terms of the scientific revolution. But that revolution cannot become a reality unless we are prepared to make far-reaching changes in economic and social attitudes which permeate our whole system of society. The Britain that is about to be forged in the white heat of the revolution will be no place for restrictive practices or for outdated methods on either side of industry.62 Sitting beside Wilson on the conference platform, and nodding sagely at this point in the speech, was Patrick Blackett. And when Wilson moved to clothe his rhetoric in practical policy proposals, he reiterated the details of a four-point programme which Blackett had devised earlier for Richard Crossman. In the first instance, a new ministry was to be created to preside over a sustained expansion of higher education in order to produce the science and technology graduates who would carry the scientific revolution to fruition. Secondly, priorities in terms of the allocation of resources would be determined by a 'a full Ministry of Science' which would ensure that 'prestige' defence projects and 'consumer gimmicks' would be downgraded in favour of the civilian manufacturing sector. Thirdly, economic growth and productive efficiency were to be enhanced by the centralised allocation of civil R and D contracts, the creation of new state industries based on governmentsponsored research and their location in areas of high unemployment. Finally, Wilson referred to the scientific 'brain drain' and hence the need to provide the status and facilities which would discourage the increasing tendency for scientists to seek employment abroad. 63 In defining the overall context for Wilson's speech and the Blackettderived proposals, the distinguished historian of science and technology policy, David Edgerton, has highlighted the warlike nature of Britain's scientific effort in the twentieth century with particular reference to

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 319 military aviation and and the development of atomic energy for destructive purposes. In this setting postwar Britain may be viewed as a 'warfare state' in contradistinction to the 'welfare state.' In his conference speech Wilson was contrasting 'an aristocratic imperial England' (sic) with 'a civil, industrial and commonwealth England.' 64 If the first had too much science, the latter had not nearly enough. More to the point, Harold Macmillan's Conservative Government had presided over a sequence of embarrassing defence project failures, major cost overruns, and bloated estimates on the part of defence contractors. Wilson's deep conviction that R and D contracts in the field of defence represented a damaging misallocation of scarce resources — and hence the need to bolster civil R and D — was therefore complemented by the knowledge that the 'white heat of the scientific revolution' was a valuable stick with which to beat the Conservatives. 65 After the 1963 party conference Wilson began to plan his election strategy, calling when necessary on Blackett's expertise. Indeed, it was Blackett who took the lead in devising the administrative machinery which would facilitate the scientific revolution. His key proposal was for a new Ministry of Industry and Technology which would pursue an interventionist role in industrial research and the modernisation of manufacturing industry. As Blackett commented to Richard Crossman: It is obvious, even if paradoxical, that if the Labour Party is to be able to carry out a substantial part of its social programme, it must ensure that private industry functions better than it has done under recent Tory governments. I remember Stafford Cripps in 1943 emphasising that any Labour Government which leaves, as it must, most of manufacturing in private hands must provide the conditions under which it can be efficient. This may be emotionally distasteful at times but the challenge must be faced.66 As originally envisaged, Blackett's ministry would use a variety of mechanisms, from R and D contracts to tax incentives, to achieve its objectives. Blackett's enthusiasm was writ large in a communication to Crossman in 1964: On the scale envisaged...such a programme of government investment in Industry tied to research and development and new science-based products would be something quite new in Britain. It could quickly bring about an important change of opinion in industry and in the world of technology generally and within some years it should begin to make an impact on the commercial success of industry.67

320 Operational Research in War and Peace In the event, the need for a Labour government to achieve practical results within a reasonable time period led to significant refinements to Blackett's original arguments for a Ministry of Industry and Technology. In a key paper prepared on the eve of the general election in September, 1964, Blackett set out the case for a leaner version in the form of 'The Case for a Ministry of Technology:' The best hope for the Labour Party to quickly make a definite impact on the technological level of manufacturing industry would be to create immediately on taking office, a new and small Ministry of Technology.68 The core of the organisation would be an enlarged NRDC supported by a technological and commercial intelligence division. It was this variant which was incorporated in Labour's election manifesto promising a 'Ministry of Technology to guide and stimulate a major national effort to bring advanced technology and new processes into industry' The new Ministry of Technology (Mintech) was established in October 1964, headed by the former trade union leader, Frank Cousins. At that time it controlled most of the research activities of the DSIR and was responsible for the NRDC and the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA). It was also given a 'sponsorship' role for four 'key' industrial sectors — computers, electronics, telecommunications and machine tools. After the arrival of Tony Benn in 1966 Mintech grew substantially in size, absorbing the Ministry of Aviation in 1967 and taking over the procurement functions of the Royal Radar Establishment (RRE) and the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE), as well as civil projects, notably Concorde. The final phase of expansion came in 1969 when Mintech took over the Ministry of Power and greatly extended its sponsorship functions in the manufacturing sector. The administration of investment projects and regional policy was taken from the Board of Trade at the same time as Mintech took control of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (see below, p. 326) and the Central Investment Group of the Department of Economic Affairs. By 1969, therefore, Mintech was a veritable 'superministry' — in the words of Tony Benn 'the biggest state-directed complex of scientific and industrial power in Europe' with a total staff in excess of 40,000.69 One of Frank Cousins' first acts as minister was to implement Blackett's suggestion that an Advisory Council on Technology should be established with himself as chairman. Blackett's role was to serve as deputy chairman and Scientific Adviser to Mintech, positions which he

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 321 held until the general election of 1970.70 According to Sir Bernard Lovell, it was in these capacities that, for a time, Blackett wielded immense power in Whitehall, a judgement validated by Sir Iuean Maddock's statement that 'initially, Blackett was virtually the "Deputy Minister." His views were accepted as absolute and his priorities determined the activities of the day.' 71 What then, were Blackett's priorities and how were they to be achieved? Firstly, in accordance with the content of discussions on science and technology policy going back to the later 1950s, there was a vital need to boost significantly the R and D effort of civilian manufacturing industry, mainly at the expense of the defence sector. Secondly, an effective R and D effort, even with direct government subsidies, was entirely dependent on the restructuring of industry in favour of larger scale firms in order to generate the necessary scale economies in research. 72 As to the means of achievement, it is evident that Blackett was influenced strongly by his wartime experience of operational research. The scientific management of warfare, rooted in 'the scientific method,' had outstanding achievements to its credit after 1939 and Blackett assumed that the transfer of the relevant principles to the peacetime economy was unproblematic. As he commented later, 'There is not all that real difference between trying to cope in 1942-3 with submarine losses of 700,000 tons a month and trying to cope with an adverse balance of payments deficit of 700 million a year.' 73 Indeed, if carried to their logical conclusion, Blackett's proposals were consistent with the compulsory recruitment of scientists and technologists to company boardrooms as a necessary condition for the receipt of government R and D subventions, a scenario reminiscent of wartime conditions. According to Sir Alan Cottrell, a colleague of Blackett on Mintech's Advisory Council for Technology, Blackett brought his techniques of operational analysis to bear in the same direct down-to-earth and forceful way that he had done during the war. His main approach here was to work out, first, the minimum scale of effort needed to sustain a commercially adequate R and D activity on various industrial projects; and then, from this, to work out the minimum size of capital investment, of market, and hence of industrial firm, necessary to realise the full productive and sales benefits from the R and D. He very nearly turned this into an exact science that led to policies and actions in the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, the National Research ■ Development Corporation, and in Government itself. The amalgamation of several high-technology firms and the

322 Operational Research in War and Peace Government's financial support, for example for the computer industry, were among the fruits of this.74 In terms of the optimal size of firm, there can be little doubt that the desire to emulate the technological achievements of American corporate capitalism was a major influence on Blackett. To the extent that the merger movement of the 1960s propelled British industry down the corporate path, Blackett approved of it and demonstrated his enthusiasm in his strong backing for the establishment, in 1966, of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation as an official merger broker with government funding at its disposal. 75 Blackett was most influential in science and technology policy in the period to 1967, the year in which Mintech absorbed the Ministry of Aviation. This had been envisaged by Harold Wilson as early as 1963. Although Blackett was aware that 'the renaissance of many branches of industry' would necessitate 'a big migration of personnel' from the defence sector, he was concerned that direct use of the Ministry of Aviation for the purpose would be 'overlordism gone mad.' Quite apart from the Ministry's 'cost-plus tradition/ absorption would lead inevitably to a severe dilution of Mintech's civil work. 76 In the event, Blackett's worst fears proved unfounded, if only because the takeover enhanced Mintech's ability to intervene directly in the defence-related industries. In addition, responsibility for the RRE and RAE placed Mintech in a position to influence the direction of research projects towards civil applications, a policy which had already met with some success in relation to the AEA. Therefore, the RRE created an Industrial Applications Unit for research into computer languages, computer-aided design, air traffic control systems and thermal imaging. Similarly, the RAE engaged in work on the commercial application of carbon fibre and established an Advisory and Demonstration Unit to run courses on the use of numerically controlled machine tools. Coincidentally, Mintech cancelled most of the Ministry of Aviation's large defence projects from the previous Conservative Government — the P-1154, the HS-681 and, most controversially, the TSR-2.77 Blackett presumably approved of these initiatives and also the results in that they contributed to that general shift in the balance of government funding of R and D that he had consistently advocated. In absolute terms, expenditure in industry for military aircraft R and D fell from £202 million in 1964-5 to £120 million in 1970-1. In the same period, and in percentage terms, total defence R and D fell by 10 per cent whilst civil R and D rose by 20 per cent. By

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 323 the end of the 1960s the government was spending proportionately more on civil than defence R and D for the first time since 1945. There were, however, significant offsets which contributed substantially to Blackett's increasing disillusion with Mintech after 1966. Whilst Mintech cancelled some high-profile projects, the fact remains that others survived, for example the Spey-engined Phantom, the conversion of Comets to maritime reconnaissance Nimrods, the Buccaneer Mk 2, the Harrier and the Jaguar, to name but a few. One factor limiting Mintech's freedom of manoeuvre was that it had no statutory power to reallocate displaced scientists and engineers released by defence project cuts. Redeployment within government institutions also led to difficulties with the Institute of Professional Civil Servants at the same time as many employees were reluctant to leave the security of government service and surrender valuable pension rights. 7 8 A l t h o u g h some useful commercially oriented w o r k w a s carried o u t in the research establishments, difficulties were encountered in securing market-based costings due to the long-standing emphasis on performance rather than finance in defence projects. In many cases, moreover, the response of private sector firms to Mintech initiatives was decidedly muted. At the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE), for example, a project for the Application of Computers to Engineering (APACE) was frustrated by the reluctance of firms to place research contracts outside their own laboratories, the result, in part, of a lack of trust in the level of security at government defence establishments. In other respects, Blackett's reservations concerning an expanded Mintech were validated by the autonomy of organisations nominally under its control. The AEA, for example, continued to enjoy a significant elenaent of independence from Whitehall, and the retention by the absorbed Ministry of Aviation of the same staff working in the same offices cannot have helped the process of integration. 79 In January 1969, Richard Crossman commented in his diary that All our election commitments were to re-orientate the whole balance of our R and D away from defence to civil affairs. We haven't done it. Instead, Denis (Healey, Minister of Defence) has managed to say that if we are to make major cuts in overseas military commitments we must maintain a prominent position for [military] R and D, and have the best even for our limited, new European — based defences. If our equipment is reduced it must, he maintains, be of the best and if we are to buy British it means that the R and D can't be cut back in proportion to the cut in our foreign commitments-80

324 Operational Research in War and Peace As noted already, Crossman was wrong in his judgement that nothing had been achieved: cuts in defence R and D under Mintech were large and proportionally larger than cuts in overall defence spending. To Blackett's dismay, however, the late 1960s witnessed the birth of two immense projects: the MRCA (Tornado) and the upgrading of Polaris via the Chevaline project. The latter emanated for the AWRE at Aldermaston and was predicated on the assumption that Moscow was a legitimate Polaris target, whilst the MRCA was viewed as an essential component of the RAF's front line commitment to NATO. The result was that by the mid-1970s defence R and D spending had grown considerably, and in real terms was higher than in the early 1960s. By then, Blackett was dead, but even before 1970 one of the central tenets of his analysis of Britain's industrial malaise — that military R and D was excessive — was being questioned both within and without Whitehall. As Blackett himself stated to the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology: Britain has the highest research and development expenditure of any country in Europe...she also has had for at least a decade or more, one of the lowest economic growth rates. This unpalatable fact is clearly one of the main reasons for the intense national self-questioning now going on about the organisation of the national deployment of R and D, both that paid for by the Government and that paid for by industry.81 Blackett's interpretation focused, of course, on the 'crowding out' effects of military R and D. Yet in 1968, the Central Advisory Council for Science and Technology, chaired by Solly Zuckerman, concluded that Britain's total R and D effort at the hands of government and industry was excessive. As the Council noted, 'a high level of R and D is far from being the main key to successful innovation...high research intensiveness is not in itself a good thing. It may represent an uneconomic input of scarce and expensive resources to yield only a small commercial output. As a general goal, we should aim at a lower research intensiveness than at present'. 82 This view had been foreshadowed in the mid-1960s by Mintech's economic adviser, Professor B. R. Williams, in his conclusion that there was no correlation between rates of economic growth and the absolute and relative level of R and D as a whole. Williams' findings were confirmed by other economists and accepted by Tony Benn. As Benn stated in 1969:

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 325 more scientists and engineers should be encouraged to go into production, and management in industry, rather than research and development — to ensure a balanced use of scientific and technological resources over all the the stages of the innovation chain. This should produce a better ratio between research and development and capital investment.83 Relative to Japan and West Germany, Britain did not underspend on non-military R and D in the manufacturing sector during the 1960s. The fact remains that military R and D took place on top of a substantial civil effort and raising the latter by reducing the former would not necessarily have produced faster economic growth. Blackett's analysis of Britain's R and D malaise, therefore, was naive: defence R and D was damaging not because it circumscribed civil R and D 'but because it reduced the number of scientists and engineers working in non-R and D functions in industry.84 In historical retrospect it is apparent that time has not proved kind to Blackett in his 1960s reincarnation as an official adviser on science and technology policy. Reference was made earlier to Sir Alan Cottrell's admiration for Blackett's 'down to earth' approach to R and D policy based u p o n his experience of operational research in wartime. As a counter to this it is instructive to note the view of Sir George Macfarlane who became Controller of Research at Mintech in 1967: Blackett's general technique in argument was to attack by stating a series of conclusions and demanding actions to follow them. His conclusions were not always justified and often based on a simplified analysis of a very complex situation [in which] opinions and philosophies were more numerous than facts. He was a man who liked action and could not tolerate slipshod or inefficient administration.85 This view dovetails very well with the judgement of J. B. Adams, Mintech's Technical Head, when he expressed the opinion that operational research may have proved decisive in informing effective tactics and strategy during the Second World War, but to apply that approach as a means of determining government-industry relations in peacetime was of limited value. As Adams commented, Industry in Britain is a vast collection of independent firms whose sizes range from very large to very small with little coherence or common purpose. It is supposed to be shaped by market forces, and government action in those days [the 1940s] was largely

326 Operational Research in War and Peace concentrated on modifying the market forces through government purchasing power and on financial investment through government. Certainly, industry cannot be commanded like an army...nor is it the enemy of government, so the analysis and strategies of war situations are hardly applicable.86 An attempt to determine science and technology policy by reference to wartime operational research, therefore, pointed to the fact that Blackett possessed 'very little first hand knowledge of industry.' This applied not only to his failure to appreciate the difficulties in transferring redundant scientists and technologists from military to civil applications, but also to his lack of empathy with the depressing minutiae of labour relations issues which were bound to come to the surface in any discussion of industrial modernisation. Blackett can also be held to account for his unquestioning adherence to the 'inexorable logic' of economies of scale. As noted already, his operational research perspective pointed to a minimum-efficient size of firm in terms of effective R and D. But to the extent that firms below a certain size could not engage in adequate R and D, this implied that large R and D resources located within, for example, the AEA and the Ministry of Aviation, needed to be kept intact to act as 'surrogate centres for smaller scale industry.' 87 Blackett was, of course, motivated by the desire to gain access to the kind of scale economies in R and D which were the norm in the American corporate sector. This explains his role in the formation of the IRC. During the 1970s, however, industrial economists began to adopt an increasingly critical view of the large scale corporate firm in manufacturing on account of its risk averseness and market inflexibility. Their concerns have been well expressed by J. G. Walshe as follows: if mergers created technical opportunities to expand plant or firm size and obtain scale economies, then, ceteris paribus, costs should have declined and profits increased. A larger market share will also have ensured that more of the gains from innovation accrued to the firm and, therefore, there will have been greater incentives to invest in research. In general, the greater the market share and larger the absolute size of the firm the smaller the risk which would arise from the actions of competitors; hence, firms would be more willing to take on the risks inherent in new products and processes. Thus a range of static and dynamic efficiency benefits should have showed up either in profit margins or the revenues generated from the firm's risk capital — both of which changes should be reflected in the rate of profit on net assets employed.88

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 327

Walshe then cited the findings of eight aggregate studies of postmerger performance. Seven of them pointed either to declining profitability following mergers and/or no efficiency gains. The remaining study produced results which were not statistically significant.89 Whilst it is true that some mergers were instigated in anticipation of poor profitability and that the gains of 'a very few large "winners"' may have offset 'the very many small "losers",' 90 the overwhelming consensus pointed to poor post — merger performance in terms of profits and productivity. Efficiency gains, moreover, tended to be modest. Indeed, one study of the mergers of the 1960s took the view that efficiency losses from mergers could be ascribed to 'managerial chaos' arising from inherited unitary-form managerial structures. Such chaos could be expected to disappear following the adoption of improved multidivisional structures. 91 It is significant, therefore, that in those cases where the M-form was introduced the results in terms of enhanced productivity performance were disappointing. In 1970 the 72 per cent of the top hundred British companies to adopt the Chandlerian M-form was far ahead of the 40 per cent in Germany 92 Yet by that date German labour productivity in manufacturing exceeded the UK level by 30 per cent having been 30 per cent below it in 1950.93 Econometric testing has shown that multidivisional structures did have a positive effect on industrial productivity, but with increases confined to the range between 15 and 20 per cent.94 What seems incontrovertible is that British firms proceeding towards 'multidivisionalisation' failed to adopt the full range of managerial practices which had come to be the norm in American enterprise. Critical deficiencies were the failure to plan mergers in order to achieve 'synergy/ lack of uniform and effective accounting procedures both within and between divisions, weaknesses in marketing and technological innovation and, in the case of the numerous holding companies adopting multidivisional structures, a tendency to insert a cosmetic layer of management falling far short of fundamental reform.95 Finally, British industry in general was notable for its underinvestment in human capital. The creation of the first business schools in the 1960s may have presaged the professionalisation of management, but this is to ignore the continuing failure to invest in skill enhancement at the level of technician and foreman. Low skill levels on the shopfloor, therefore, made their own contribution to the slow growth of productivity by limiting flexibility in the face of technical change and by retarding the diffusion of new technology. 96

328 Operational Research in War and Peace The theme of this chapter has been the diffusion of operational research into the corporate industrial sector. A facile conclusion might be that in the light of the manifest competitive failings of British industry in the 1970s — the decade par excellence of deindustrialisation — operational research had proved to be of limited use as an aid to improved managerial decision making. Such a verdict depends, of course, on the assumptions that operational research was diffused widely both within and between industrial sectors, that its penetration was impressive, and that operational researchers achieved high and influential status in post-merger managerial hierarchies. These assumptions are heroic. As indicated earlier, operational research may have attained impressive sectoral coverage after 1960 but its penetration into the generality of manufacturing industry was superficial compared, say, with the iron and steel and petroleum industries. Such evidence as exists points also to the fact that most operational research groups were very small: numbers less than 5 appear to have been the norm and it is by no means clear that groups of this size — or even larger groups enjoying the personal backing of senior executives — were in a position to inform strategic decision-making on a scale large enough to have influenced overall company productivity and profitablility. In any event, the available evidence points to the fact that most operational research projects were carried out at the tactical level, falling far short of the wartime model propounded by Blackett whereby operational researchers had a roving brief to range across tactical and strategic issues in a mutually reinforcing way. 97 What does seem certain, in the light of subsequent developments, is that Blackett's attempts to justify a general movement towards largescale enterprise on the basis of operational research criteria was fundamentally misplaced. It is ironic that at the very time that Alfred D. Chandler was proclaiming the virtues of the 'visible hand' of market coordination and professional managerial hierarchies, an alternative literature was in preparation based on the presumption that corporate industrial society was moving towards 'multi-structured dualism' with 'core' and 'peripheral' firms coexisting.98 This trend, foreshadowed in the structural changes consequent upon deindustrialisation and shifts in international competitive advantage after 1970, gave every sign of coming to fruition in the 1980s. Notable developments in this decade were the rationalisation of activities by large multinational firms, the information technology revolution giving rise to externalisation of functions and the birth of new small firms in the burgeoning service sector, and the creation of 'niche' products and markets by small-scale manufacturers. Above all

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 329 in the British context, the period witnessed a profound change in public policy in favour of 'disaggregated' capitalist structures. There was a renewed emphasis on competition policy and this went hand in hand with the reduction of the monopoly powers of public corporations as a prelude to privatisation. In- manufacturing, considerable attention was devoted to encouraging the formation of small owner-managed firms in the belief that they had a valuable role to play in stimulating structural diversity and in offsetting the aversion to risk of large scale firms. It hardly needs to be said that these developments were far removed from the assumptions and beliefs underlying Blackett's industrial policy prescriptions of the 1960s. There remains the case of financial services, broadly defined. In this setting, relative decline is a contradiction in terms given the sector's increasing weight within the economy as a whole, a phenomenon which has persisted from the 1960s to the present day. Insofar as the expansion of the sector was a reflection of developing comparative and competitive advantage, it seems reasonable to conclude that the diffusion of operational research was entirely consistent with these trends.

NOTES 1. M. W. Kirby and R. Capey, 'The Origins and Diffusion of Operational Research in the UK,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 49 (1998), pp. 307-26. 2. Robert Locke, Management and Higher Education since 1940: The Influence of America and Japan on West Germany, Great Britain and France (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981), pp. 1-29. 3. Ibid., p. 27. 4. Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1977); Idem, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990). 5. Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick (Eds.), The Decline of the British Economy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986). 6. M. W. Kirby, 'Institutional Rigidities and Economic Decline: Reflections on the British Experience/ Economic History Review, Vol. 45 (1992), pp. 637-60. 7. David J. Jeremy, A Business History of Britain, 1900-1990s (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), pp.407-8. 8. Derek F. Channon, The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise (Macmillan, London, 1973), p. 73. 9. Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (Methuen, London, 1983), pp.148-9.

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10. Keith Hayward, Tlie British Aircraft Industry (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989). 11. Channon (1973), p. 78. 12. Hannah (1983), p. 173. 13. C. F. Goodeve and G. R. Ridley, 'A Survey of OR in Great Britain,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 4 (1953), pp. 21-4. 14. B. H. P. Rivett and R. L. Ackoff, A Manager's Guide to Operational Research (John Wiley and Sons, London, 1963), pp. 87-93. 15. Alan Mercer, 'The Membership of the Operational Research Society,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 19 (1968), pp. 371-6. 16. R. Fildes and J. C. Ranyard, 'Success and Survival of Operational Research Groups,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 336-60. 17. Mercer (1968), p. 373. 18. D. C. Coleman, Courtaulds: An Economic and Social History, Volume III: Crisis and Change, 1940-1965 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980). 19. H. R. H. Watkins interviewed by George Mitchell; information supplied to the author by David Comins and Dr Shirley Rodden. 20. Operational Research Department Reports, 1952-6 (Courtauld's Archive). 21. Channon (1973), p. 170. 22. Information supplied to the author by Ian Taylor and John Mowat. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. 'Variation in Weight Control of Covered Units,' Bournville Operational Research Report, 5.9 (March, 1965); 'The Effect of Temperature and Humidity on Milk Tray Assortment,' ibid, 13 (July, 1965); 'Long Storage of Milk Tray: Design Keeping Test,' ibid., 30 (March, 1964). 26. Ian Taylor and John Mowat interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 27. Ibid. 28. Itnet Ltd. (1996). 29. Derek Trigg interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 30. J. D. C. Little, K. G. Murty, D. W. Sweeny and C. Karel, 'An Algorithm for the Travelling Salesman Problem' Operations Research, Vol. 11 (1963), pp. 979-89. 31. Derek Trigg interviewd by Rebecca Capey. 32. Ibid. 33. R. G. Brown, Statistical Forecasting for Inventory Control (McGraw Hill, New York, 1959); Idem, Smooth Forecasting and Prediction (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliifs, NJ, 1963). 34. D. W. Trigg, 'Monitoring a Forecasting System,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 15 (1964), p p . 271-4; D. W. Trigg and A. G. Leach, 'Exponential Smoothing with an Adaptive Response Rate,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1967), pp. 53-9.

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 331 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

Derek Trigg interviewed by Rebecca Capey H. R. H. Watkins interviewed by George Mitchell. Ernest Field interviewed by Rebecca Capey. H. R. H. Watkins interviewed by George Mitchell. The following account is derived from James Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil: The Challenge of Nationalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000). 40. Ibid., p. 404. 41. Ibid., p. 399. 42. Ibid., p. 418. 43. Ibid., p. 419. 44. Samuel Eilon and Terence R. Fowkes (Eds.), Applications of Management Science in Banking (Gower Press, Epping, 1972), pp. 5-6. 45. Samuel Eilon to George Mitchell, 3 September, 1998. 46. Ibid. 47. R. C. Jones, S. R. Morrison and R. P. Whiteman, 'Helping to Plan a Bank's Manpower Resources,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 24 (1973), pp. 365-74. 48. Ibid., p. 366. 49. Ibid., pp. 373-4. 50. Eilon and Fowkes (1972). 51. Solly Zuckerman, Six Men Out of the Ordinary (Peter Owen, London, 1992). 52. S. Haseler, The Gaitskellites: Revisionism in the British Labour Party (Macmillan, London, 1969). 53. Blackett Papers, Minutes of a Meeting at the Reform Club, 17 July, 1956. The Royal Society Library, Folder E 24. 54. Bernal Papers, Marcus Brumwell: the Labour Party and Science, 17 July, 1956, F.2. 55. Zuckerman (1992). 56. Anon, 'Scientists in the Government,' Scientific Worker, Vol. 2, (1947), p. 2. 57. D. Horner, 'The Road to Scarborough: Wilson, Labour and the Scientific Revolution,' in R. Coopey, S. Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (Eds.), The Wilson Governments 1964-70 (Pinter, London, 1993), pp. 48-71. 58. Blackett Papers, 'Civil Research and Development in a Labour Government' 31 July, 1956. 59. Horner (1993), pp. 36-7. 60. Haseler (1969), quoting Harold Wilson. 61. Labour and the Scientific Revolution: A Statement of Policy Approved by the Annual Conference of the Labour Party (Scarborough, 1963). 62. Harold Wilson, Purpose in Politics: Selected Speeches (Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1964), p. 27. 63. Horner (1993), pp. 65-6. 64. David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation (Macmillan, London, 1991).

332 Operational Research in War and Peace 65. David Edgerton, 'The "White Heat" Revisited: the British Government and Technology in the 1960s,' Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 8 (1996), pp.37-61. 66. Blackett Papers, Patrick Blackett to Richard Crossman , E 49 (23 Fecbruary, 1964). 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid., 'The Case for a Ministry of Technology' (September, 1964). 69. Tony Benn, Office Without Power: Diaries 1968-72 (Hutchinson: London, 1988). 70. Richard Coopey, 'Industrial Policy in the White Heat of the Scientific Revolution,' in R. Coopey, S. Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (Eds.), The Wilson Governments: 1964-1970 (Pinter: London, 1993), pp. 102-22. 71. Bernard Lovell, 'Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett, Baron Blackett of Chelsea,' Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 21 (1975), pp. 80-1. 72. Ibid., pp. 83-6. 73. Blackett Papers, 'Comments on Estimates Committee Report (22 July, 1965). 74. Lovell (1975), pp. 84-5. 75. Tony Benn, Out of the Wilderness: Diaries 1963-67 (Hutchinson, London, 1987), p. 479. 76. Blackett Papers, 'Government Participation in Industrial Research' (1959); 'The Case for a Ministry of Technology.' 77. Edgerton (1996). 78. Coopey (1993), pp. 116-17. 79. Richard Coopey, 'Restructuring Civil and Military Science and Technology,' in R. Coopey, G. Spinardi and M. Uttley (Eds.), Defence Science and Technology: Adjusting to Change (Harwood, London, 1992), pp. 130-45. 80. Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3 (Hamilton, London, 1977), p. 309. 81. P. M. S. Blackett, 'Understanding Technological Innovation,' Science of Science Foundation Newsletter (March, 1968). 82. Central Advisory Council for Science and Technology, Technological Innovation in Britain (HMSO. London, 1968), p. 9. 83. Tony Benn, 'The Minister of Technology Speaks to Design Engineering,' Design Engineering (30 May, 1969). 84. David Edgerton, Science, Technology and the British Industrial 'Decline' (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), pp. 62-3. 85. Lovell (1975), p. 83. 86. Ibid., p. 85. 87. Coopey (1993), pp. 119-20. 88. J. G. Walshe, 'Industrial Organisation and Competition Policy/ in N. F. R. Crafts and N. Woodward (Eds.), The British Economy since 1945 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1991), pp. 351-2. 89. Ibid., pp. 352-4. 90. S. J. Prais, The Evolution of Giant Firms in Britain (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980), p. xvii.

The Diffusion of Operational Research After 1960 333 91. Keith Cowling, Monopoly Capitalism (Macmillan, London, 1982). 92. G. P. Dyas and H. T. Thanheiser, The Emerging European Enterprise (Macmillan, London, 1976). 93. B. Van Ark, 'Comparative Levels of Labour Productivity in Postwar Europe: Some Evidence from Manufacturing,' Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 52 (1990), pp. 343-74. 94. P. Steer and J. R. Cable, 'Internal Organisation and Profit: An Empirical Analysis of Large UK Companies,' Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 27 (1978), pp. 13-30. 95. P. Pagnamenta and R. Overy, All Our Working Lives (British Broadcasting Corporation: London, 1984); P. Clark and J. Tann, 'Cultures and Corporations: the M-form in the USA and Britain,' Paper presented to the International Academy of Business (1986); B. W. E. Alford, British Economic Performance 1945-1975 (Macmillan, London, 1988), p. 64; P. L. Payne, 'Entrepreneurship and British Economic Decline,' in B. Collins and K. Robbins (Eds.), British Culture and Economic Decline (Weidenfeld and Nicholson London, 1990), pp. 25-58. 96. Geoffrey Jones, 'Great Britain: Big Business, management and competitiveness in twentieth century Britain,' in Alfred D. Chandler, Franco Amatori and Takashu Hikino (Eds.), Big Business and the Wealth of Nations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), pp. 130-1. 97. P. M. S. Blackett, 'Operational Research,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1950), pp. 3-6. 98. R. L. Kaufman, 'Economic Dualism: A Critical Review,' American Sociological Review, Vol. 47 (1982), pp. 727-39; M. J. Piore and C. F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (Basic Books: New York, 1984); C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, 'Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets, and Technology in Nineteenth Century Industrialisation,' Past and Present, Vol. 108 (1985), pp. 133-76.

10

Operational Research in the Public Sector

Reference was made in Chapter 6 to the failure of operational research to make any significant headway in civil government after 1945. This was epitomised in the fate of the Special Research Unit at the Board of Trade. Elsewhere, a small operational research group was established in 1946 at the Ministry of Works to examine postwar housing problems. However, it was disbanded in 1949 when its founder members — Jacob Bronowski and Sir Reginald Stradling — left to join the NCB and the Home Office respectively. Other members were relocated to the Building Research Station. On his arrival at the Home Office, Stradling established the Scientific Advisory Branch to undertake operational research studies. This group, together with colleagues at the Building Research Station, proved to be one of the longest lasting operational research units in civil government with a continuing presence well into the 1990s.1 Other long lasting groups were located in the DSIR and the Ministry of Supply. In the former, an operational research facility was established by Tom Easterfield following his departure from the Board of Trade's Special Research Unit. This group remained in that location until 1964 when its staff were transferred to the Industrial Operations Unit of the newlyformed Ministry of Technology. As for the Ministry of Supply group, it remained intact until 1964. Much of its work was in the field of civil aviation and when the functions of the Ministry were divided in 1964 between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Aviation, the group was transferred to the latter. A further transfer took place in 1967 to the Civil Aviation Authority. 2 Beyond these specific areas, however, the period from the 1940s to the late 1950s was marked by limited interest in operational research on the part of civil government whether in Whitehall or at the level of local authorities. If operational research had a public sector profile, it was confined to the armed services and the nationalised industries. From the later 1950s onwards, however, the

334

Operational Research in the Public Sector

335

discipline began to be diffused into an increasing range of civil government activities with a notable acceleration after 1966. In describing the extent of diffusion the body of this chapter is concerned with local and central government, concentrating in the latter context on the Home Office and the Treasury, ft then examines the contribution of operational research in two of the nationalised public utilities before concluding with a commentary on the work of operational researchers in the military sector. In accounting for the upsurge of public sector interest in operational research at the level of civil government, it is interesting to note that there were parallels with the post-1960 diffusion of the discipline into the corporate sector. The previous chapter has drawn attention to the heightened competitive environment confronting British business in the 1960s and the associated merger wave resulting in a sustained movement towards the adoption of US — style managerial structures. In terms of the evolution of British business, therefore, the 1960s may be viewed as a major discontinuity insofar as the historic 'corporate lag' behind the USA was closed. The notion of discontinuity can also be applied to the role and functions of government. It is salutary to remember that the 1960s began with what the distinguished financial journalist, Samuel Brittan, has termed 'the Great Reappraisal' in British foreign and economic policy.3 In foreign affairs there was Harold Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' speech to the South African Parliament in 1960 and the race to decolonise in the aftermath of the Suez debacle. The first application to join the Common Market came in 1961, and the decision was taken to terminate the pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent in favour of reliance on American Polaris technology. As for economic policy, the early 1960s witnessed a growing revulsion at the record of economic management on the part of the Treasury. By that time, the phrase 'stopgo' had been incorporated into economic and financial journalism as a convenient and critical shorthand for a policy-enhanced pattern of economic activity which was markedly cyclical in the short run. This was viewed as detrimental to the efficiency and prospects of the industrial sector to the extent that it reduced the stimulus to invest. In responding to the mood of the times, the then Conservative Government established the National Economic Development Council ('Neddy') as a quasiindependent body composed of government, business and trade union representatives with a remit to examine the growth prospects for the economy, identify supply constraints and to secure agreement for their removal. 4 In providing open and clear links between government and

336 Operational Research in War and Peace industry, Neddy was expected to create an atmosphere of confidence in the context of a governmental commitment to sustained growth — all the more so if businessmen, taking their cue from government, began to plan ahead in a more systematic way. The decision taken at the end of 1963 to establish separate Economic Development Committees ('little Neddies') was a further step along the road of government-industry collaboration in devising long-term policies.5 The trend towards 'long-termism' in the formulation of economic policy in the interest of more effective supply side management was enhanced by the incoming Labour Government in 1964 with its commitment to 'purposive' and 'effective' planning. In that connection, the new administration was concerned not only to sustain Neddy but also to establish a new ministry — the Department of Economic Affairs — unencumbered by detailed executive functions and principally concerned with planning and the efficient use of physical resources in the long term. 6 All of this was reminiscent of the later 1940s, but insofar as it was a calculated reaction to well-founded criticisms of short-termism in policy formulation, the creation of a new ministry committed to 'longtermism' held out the prospect of a more robust engagement with planning than the postwar Attlee government. In this setting, the formation of the Ministry of Technology (Mintech), highlighted in the last chapter, may be viewed as a further essential ingredient of supply side policy given its primary aim of rejuvenating and sustaining manufacturing industry. That Labour Party economic policy in the mid-1960s struck a resonant chord in the operational research community is indicated in the following letter addressed to The Times by Stafford Beer in September 1964: Firstly, a policy research orientation and facility is vital. We need operational research teams of outstanding ability working on problems of decision and control at the national level. Because these problems are usually discussed in economic terms, they are currently assumed to be purely economic problems: but they are not. Interdisciplinary scientific teams are needed to evaluate issues, subject to conflicting criteria. Secondly, a new kind of administration is required that can encompass these advanced methods of management. The tradition of cultivated minds is inadequate to cope with the needed quantification of value judgements and with large-scale computer operations. Thirdly, we need ministers who can demand and use these facilities in

Operational Research in the Public Sector 337 resolving problems. Surely we have had enough ministerial sermons? Ministers should be acting, not preaching: explaining to us the point of their actions in a way that shows that hard work has been done. The answer to complex modern problems will not strike a minister as he sits in his bath, just because he is holding the Queen's Seal. Nor can those ideas be picked up as bright ideas on American tours.7 In calling for the active involvement of operational researchers in resolving 'problems of decision and control' Beer was concerned to advance the cause of operational research in civil government at a time when there was a new awareness of the economic constraints on social and political action. In retrospect, Beer was knocking at an opening door which was to become wide ajar in the later 1960s as the pace of diffusion of operational research into civil government accelerated. The critical development was the Labour Government's commitment to the reform of the Home Civil Service as recommended in the report of the Fulton Committee, published at the beginning of 1968.8 Whilst it is true that the government's planning endeavours proved to be largely ineffectual in the face of ongoing balance of payments and exchange rate problems and that Mintech and the IRC were abolished by the incoming Conservative administration in 1970, it is important to note that in its attempts to modernise the Whitehall administrative machinery the Labour Government succeeded admirably, and in a way which was to cast a long shadow forward to the benefit of operational research. In civil government, the first significant development in the application of operational research originated not in Whitehall but in local government. This occurred in 1959 when the Royal Institute of Public Administration (RIPA) inaugurated a study of the potential application of operational research to housing maintenance. Funding was provided by the Human Sciences Committee of the DSIR and the Metropolitan Boroughs' O and M Committee. 9 The prime mover for this initiative was Raymond Nottage, the Director of the RIPA and his colleague, John Sargeant. During the 1950s, Nottage had mounted a sequence of seminar programmes for local government and health service officials on relevant managerial techniques. One of the most successful programmes was on the theme of 'New Ways to Higher Output' and it was in this context that operational research as an aid to management was raised. 10 In enlisting expert advice, Sargeant's point of contact was Stephen Vajda, a senior operational researcher in the Admiralty, and currently serving as an Honorary Lecturer in the Department of

338 Operational Research in War and Peace Engineering Production at the University of Birmingham (see below, pp. 370-1). It was Vajda who persuaded Sargeant and Nottage of the value of operational research, but the catalyst for a research programme was W. J. Reiner, Principal Scientific Officer in the Building Research Station. It was his advice a n d guidance which resulted in the incorporation of an operational research component within the 'New Ways to Higher O u t p u t ' seminar p r o g r a m m e . Reiner w a s also instrumental in convincing Nottage that the application of operational research held out the prospect of substantial savings in building maintenance on behalf of local authorities. In order to identify an appropriate field of work Ray Ward was recruited to the RIPA from BISRA's operational research section. His first project — the control of depot operations on behalf of Slough Borough Council — produced disappointing results, but Ward proved adept in persuading a succession of local authorities to finance operational research studies in a variety of settings. Excellent examples were the work carried out on behalf of the City of Coventry on refuse collection and disposal and for Kent County Council on the organisation of contracting for school buses. In the former case, Ward was fortunate that the City Treasurer was a former member of the RIPA, whilst the city engineer responsible for refuse collection and disposal — Nathaniel Raymon — possessed a doctorate and was wholly sympathetic to the proposed programme of work. 11 The actual study was carried out by Brian Whitworth, recently recruited by Ward from the operational research group at BOAC. The focal point of Whitworth's analysis was the problem of 'slack' in the collection system as a result of a combination of factors, the most important of which were as follows: There are holiday periods to allow for, sickness occurs, breakdowns put vehicles out of service, and occasionally tip fires break out. Unfortunately, when such misfortunes happen their effects not only become cumulative, but it is progressively more difficult to overtake the arrears of work which they create. Bins become heavier, collection vehicles fill more quickly, and calls are made on householders at unexpected times, possibly with abortive results.12 The normal solution to these problems was to introduce a degree of slack into the system in terms of extra labour and equipment. By definition, this would result in periodic underemployment and hence higher costs. Whilst an element of slack was inevitable and indeed desirable, cost effective operations required minimum slack, as long as

Operational Research in the Public Sector 339 this was consistent with a satisfactory standard of service. Whitworth's approach to the problem was to use computer simulation, the object being 'to reproduce the conditions which are likely to arise not on one particular day but over a long enough period to give a reasonable chance of reflecting the effects of seasonal changes and the upsets that are bound to occur from time to time.' 13 Thus, Whitworth's model allowed for five hundred working days representing a period of two working years. An early simulation language, 'Control and Simulation Language' (CSL) was applied. This needed 1,200 instructions to deal with the events of one day. The results permitted the City Engineer to undertake a fundamental review of the refuse collection and disposal system and also to assess the merits of paper sack collection as well as the use of smaller depots rather than centralised provision. Whitworth's next study, undertaken on behalf of Kent County Council in 1963, was in response to the statutory requirement that local education authorities should provide transport for all children under the age of eight who lived more than two miles from their school and for older children who lived more than three miles away. In Kent, the numbers involved were 36,000 children out of a total school population of 245,000 with a direct cost to the authority of nearly £500,000 per annum. In order to identify possible economies, Whitworth, assisted by his colleague, C. L. Myers, analysed the transport provision in three adjacent educational divisions embracing 28 per cent of the children eligible for school transport. Much of the work entailed the application of multiple regression analysis in the context of public transport and hired buses and coaches. The results pointed to under-capacity in the use of hired vehicles as well as the advantages of purchasing season tickets for public transport. The study also suggested that it would be worthwhile investigating the possibility of the Council running its own vehicles, bearing in mind that they could also be used for other purposes beyond the needs of school transport. 14 Further studies were carried out on behalf of a number of local authorities on buying policy and stock control as well as the checking of invoices. The latter, carried out on behalf of the London County Council, was particularly successful, generating savings of over £60,000 per annum. 15 By 1964, with a record of successful work in operational research, Ward was able to achieve his ambition of persuading the RIPA to establish a specialist operational research facility — the Local Government Operational Research Unit. This was inaugurated in 1964 with the aid of grants from central and local government.

340 Operational Research in War and Peace A further indication of the increasing interest in the application of operational research to civil government was provided by the formation in 1963 of the Police Research and Planning Branch attached to the Home Office. In the period to 1970, the Branch was to revolutionise policing methods, most notably in the public eye by devising the concept of Unit Beat Policing which was to lead to the introduction of the ubiquitous 'Panda' car. The inspiration for the Branch was the Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Police, published in May, 1962. As the report stated, ...there is a major requirement...for the provision of a central Government unit, charged with the planning of police methods, the development of new equipment (such as communications facilities, and the design and standardisation of vehicles), and the study of new techniques, so as to enable the police service to deal promptly and effectively with changes in the pattern of crime and the behaviour of criminals. We recommend the establishment of such a unit, adequately staffed and with provision for expert scientific advice. The unit should work under the general direction of the chief inspector of constabulary.16 By the end of 1962 considerable progress had been made in identifying a suitable remit for the Branch, together with proposed staffing levels and relevant expertise. Within the Home Office the lead was taken by the Chief Scientific Adviser, H A. Sargeaunt, the former head of Scientific and Operational research at the War Office. It was entirely natural for Sargeaunt to seek the advice of his successor, Dr E. E. R. Holmberg. The latter took the view that 'the field of operations of the War Office [operational research] unit is probably more closely related to that of the unit contemplated by the Home Office than those of the other service departments' insofar as 'a study to ascertain the correct deployment of a battalion was not fundamentally different from a study designed to establish the correct disposition of police manpower for the better prevention of crime/ 17 In a spirit of cooperation, Holmberg offered to second one of his Principal Scientific Officers to the Home Office 'for a year or two' in order to establish the new Branch on a firm footing. In the event, Holmberg's offer was not taken up. When the Research and Planning Branch was established formally on 1 st August, 1963, its staffing consisted of a Scientific Director, two Principal Scientific Officers, two Assistant Scientific Officers and a Chief Executive Officer trained in organisation and methods. All of the Scientific Officers were familiar with operational research techniques. In the light of Sargeaunt's concern

Operational Research in the Public Sector 341 that the Branch should possess credibility with serving police officers, provision w a s m a d e for five senior officers above the rank of Superintendent to be seconded for a period of up to two years. 18 During the first two years of its existence, the Branch engaged in numerous studies of police force organisation and effectiveness. Relevant projects included an examination of the extension of regional crime squads and the use of multi-channel radio, the application of computer technology to fingerprints and other police records, the security of cash in transit and the operational lessons to be learned from the 'Great Train Robbery' of August 1963.19 Three projects can be singled out as being of particular significance both in their contemporary context and also in terms of the longer term development of policing methods. The first, concerning the assessment of staffing requirements, was a continuation of a study inaugurated by the Association of Chief Police Officers. The objective was to produce a formula for the accurate assessment of police establishments. Following the analysis of 'measurable factors' in the policing of six boroughs, a 'paper' establishment for each borough force was calculated on the basis of the manning requirements for specialised posts and the appropriate number of 'standard' beats. A similar study was applied to six county forces in order 'to provide a yardstick for a standard beat in rural areas based on population, acreage and road mileage.'20 In retrospect, this work marked the first tentative step towards the adoption of unit beat policing (see below, pp. 342-4). The second project of note was conducted in the spring and summer of 1964 and was directed towards the analysis of motorway traffic patrol organisation. The recently completed M6 motorway was the chosen route and in that setting experiments were conducted on the basis of combined policing under one command and single force policing for the Lancashire, Cheshire and Staffordshire sections. The main objects of the project were to establish (a) the value of helicopters to both the separate and combined force method of policing; (b) the effect of various levels of policing upon traffic accident, offence and incident rates; (c) the administrative and technical problems which might result from combining forces, e.g. communications, housing, vehicle maintenance; (d) the most suitable types of patrol vehicle and scale of equipment; (e) the value of mechanical and electronic aids for surveillance and control; (f) the police system best suited to the problems encountered. 21

342 Operational Research in War and Peace In order to carry the project to fruition a number of specific experiments were carried out. The starting point for analysis was the realisation that 'The number of incidents actually occurring on a motorway in a given time is not known.' The Branch therefore decided to simulate 'a known number of false incidents and to use [this] as a measure for comparing incident detection rates.' As a result of this comparison, it was shown that a helicopter was equivalent to two road patrol vehicles in the detection of incidents. Relative maintenance and total operating costs, however, meant that helicopters were grossly uneconomical when used in this role. The 'false' incidents varied in duration from 1 minute to 40 minutes and the resulting statistical analysis indicated that the chance of a road patrol detecting incidents of given duration was as follows: Length of Incident 1 minute 5 10 20 30 " 40

Chance of Detection 2 per cent 15 33 70 93 100

It followed, therefore, that rigorous prosecution of dangerous driving offences, many of which lasted for only a few seconds, would require a massive and costly police patrol effort. The logical conclusion was to place increased emphasis on deterrent measures as opposed to enforcement. Further experiments were carried out on the provision of emergency accident services, the effect of traffic flow on emergency telephone calls and on the optimal equipment requirements of road patrols. 22 With the expansion of the motorway network, rapidly increasing traffic volumes and improved vehicle performance the work of the Research and Planning Branch in this area was of vital importance in enhancing police effectiveness both in terms of organisational capability and cost effectiveness.23 The third project carried out by the Branch was a direct response to the mounting difficulties confronting uniform ground patrol officers in a general context of rising urban and rural crime rates and the changing pattern of policing in the face of the explosion in motor traffic. Specialist departments were proliferating in the 1960s and since ground patrols accounted for 60 per cent of total staffing requirements whilst recruitment budgets were limited, the necessary personnel were invariably drawn

Operational Research in the Public Sector 343 from the pool of uniform ground patrol officers. The inevitable result was a gradual reduction in police visibility 'on the beat.' An important preliminary study carried out by the Branch was an investigation of the effect of different levels of ground patrol on the incidence of crime. The major conclusion was that effectiveness in terms of crimes prevented was not significantly improved by quite large increases — three or fourfold — in patrol densities. 24 It was this finding which led to the inauguration of motorised patrols, or unit beat policing. 25 The first experiment took place at Kirkby in Lancashire. Although it coincided with a substantial reduction both in the crime rate and in malicious damage, detection rates did not improve. Thus, on the advice of the Branch, 'a supporting level of policing by the oldest method of all — the resident constable' was adopted. 26 The rationale was that Since the car beats are effective preventers of crime and are covered twenty-four hours per day, the resident constables need only work for eight hours per day and can be encouraged to adapt their times and methods to the needs of their particular area, varying from uniformed patrol, when needed to demonstrate their presence, to plain clothes work when this is thought advantageous. To enable the resident constable to communicate regularly with their colleagues in cars, they are provided with personal radios.27 In order to capitalise on the resulting improvement in communications, the Branch proposed the establishment of the new post of collator responsible for collecting, recording and disseminating information. In this role, therefore, the collator 'is acting as a local-level intelligence bureau.' 28 By the end of 1966, unit beat policing on this model had been adopted elsewhere in Lancashire and this served as a precursor to its diffusion more widely in Great Britain. In commenting on this major change in policing methods A. G. McDonald, the Deputy Director of the Branch, observed that In urban areas it is now possible to use a yardstick to give an estimate of the number of uniform patrol officers and of their support and supervision, and to monitor the performance of these units in terms of response time to calls for police assistance and information gained about the local state of crime, both of which are measurable objectives. A standard of uniform police patrolling can thus be examined in terms of response time to incidents and the data rate associated with the information gathering service.29

344 Operational Research in War and Peace Unit beat policing had important consequences for other police functions. For example, the distinctive marking on patrol vehicles was perceived to have a favourable impact on driver behaviour, thereby helping to reduce the workload of traffic patrol officers. At the same time, the modifications to the communications system consequent on the introduction of unit beat policing led to a substantial reduction in the workload of traffic patrols in answering calls for police assistance. Increased mobility and better communications, moreover, permitted officers 'to be tactically deployed from fewer police stations thereby leading to savings in buildings and administration.' In the spring of 1969, when McDonald was writing, the Branch had begun to study the logistical requirements for the effective policing of central urban areas where unit beat policing was inappropriate. In the light of subsequent developments, it is interesting to note that preliminary results pointed to the fact that closed circuit television surveillance could not be justified either on grounds of improved coverage or cost effectiveness.30 There can be little doubt that the Research and Planning Branch contributed significantly to the operational effectiveness of the police service. By the end of the 1960s a considerable range of organisational problems had been analysed with apparently beneficial results. Significant projects, in addition to those indicated above, included the evaluation of helicopters, the optimal size of vehicle fleets and replacement policy, the application of unit beat policing to rural areas and the analysis of wastage rates. The technique of manual simulation had been used to model an organisational unit consisting of a team of detectives, a fingerprints department, scenes of crime officers and a local criminal records office. 'Simpol' was thereafter used in three settings —for training and assessment, for system evaluation and for studies of decision-making behaviour. 31 This aspect of the work of the Branch was to expand considerably in the 1970s following the acquisition of a computer. The point is well taken that the alacrity with which operational research was embraced within the police service can be explained in large measure by the military- style aspects of its structure and organisation. 32 It has already been noted that the War Office was initially approached for its advice in establishing the Branch. But developments in the wider society were pointing strongly towards the need for a 'scientific' approach to policing. In this respect, the rapid increase in the crime rate and in motor traffic after 1960 loomed large. The last chapter pointed to the fact that if the post-1964 Labour Government was a reforming administration, its attempts to enhance

Operational Research in the Public Sector 345 industrial competitiveness by means of central planning and other measures of state intervention proved to be largely ineffectual. This should not be allowed, however, to detract from the government's achievements elsewhere. As indicated already, in one aspect of modernisation the government's efforts cast a long shadow forward to the benefit of operational research. This concerned its reforms of the Home Civil Service in the light of the recommendations contained in the report of the Fulton Committee published at the beginning of 1968.33 This committee was the first major inquiry into the Home Civil Service since the Harcourt-Trevelyan reforms of the early 1850s. Its terms of reference, embracing structure and recruitment, as well as management, provided the Operational Research Society with an ideal opportunity to advance the cause of operational research as a solution to 'major policy problems.' The vehicle for this took the form of a memorandum submitted in evidence to the Fulton Committee by Roger Eddison, the then President of the Operational Research Society.34 Drafted by Rolfe Tomlinson and A. J. D. Flowerdew, the memorandum called for the creation of a central operational research group to deal with national and regional planning problems, as well as contributing to problem solving at the departmental and interdepartmental levels. The group would also undertake research into operational research techniques in collaboration with devolved units in departments and prepare an appropriate form of training in the subject for new recruits. As for the group's position within the Civil Service hierarchy, the memorandum envisaged two possibilities of more or less equal merit. In relation to existing structures there were three departments taking 'co-ordinated policy decisions of the type that the [operational research] research team would be studying — the Treasury, the Department of Economic Affairs and the Cabinet Office. Alternatively, if only to resolve any problems of seniority within established hierarchies, a special agency similar to the RAND Corporation in the USA could be created, although in this instance 'the level of contact within various ministries would have to be carefully established' in order to sustain a high enough profile for operational research. In accounting for the very positive reception accorded to the memorandum by the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Sir William (later Lord) Armstrong, it is necessary to refer to an entirely fortuitous sequence of events beginning in 1961 with the publication of the Plowden Report on public expenditure. 35 The Plowden Committee was appointed in response to criticism of the Treasury's control over the spending of

346 Operational Research in War and Peace other government departments by the House of Commons Select Committee on Estimates. In view of the fact that decisions were taken on an ad hoc basis and that there was no adequate machinery to ensure that competing demands for expenditure were brought together in a coherent way, the Committee recommended the adoption of a functional administrative structure which was 'much more in line with modern concepts of management.' 36 One by-product of this was the recruitment of the Treasury's first operational research scientist — T. S. Billinger — to the O and M division in 1965. This was followed in 1967 by a visit to West Byfleet by senior officials within the Treasury's Management Services Division 'to find out what this new-fangled Defence Operations Analysis was all about.' 37 The Defence Operations Analysis Establishment (DOAE) had been created in 1965 following the merger, under Ministry of Defence auspices, of the separate Service operational research sections. As a result of the Treasury visit, Ken James, Deputy Director (Scientific) of the Establishment, was invited to join the Treasury's O and M Division 'to put [operational research] on a better footing.' 38 James initially declined to leave West Byfleet but subsequently agreed to join the Treasury, attracted by the prospect of creating an independent operational research group. There could be few operational researchers in government service who were better qualified in the discipline than Ken James. In 1964, he had been appointed Director of the Army Operational Research Establishment at West Byfleet, immediately in advance of the creation of DOAE. Before that, he had specialised in the application of operational research to chemical and biological warfare. As well as serving as head of the US Army Chemical Corp's operational group, he h a d also established his reputation as an able advocate of military operational research within the NATO alliance.39 Arriving at the Treasury in January 1968, James was just in time to accompany the Permanent Secretary in meeting with Roger Eddison, Rolfe Tomlinson and Pat Rivett following the submission of the Operational Research Society's memorandum. In the light of Sir William Armstrong's commitment to a n enhanced operational research effort in Whitehall, the meeting was entirely successful. Armstrong had already expressed his desire to establish a central operational research group within the Treasury, attracted to the idea, perhaps, by his dislike of 'strongly defined ideological attitudes' and preference for 'facts and logic' as a guide to policy-making. 40 Following the publication of the Fulton Report, the Treasury was divided in June 1968 with the Treasury itself retaining responsibility for

Operational Research in the Public Sector 347 economic policy and the management of the Civil Service being taken over by a new Civil Service Department (CSD), headed by Armstrong. It was the CSD which provided a home for the operational research group being formed by James. On joining the Treasury, James was reassured by the evident degree of respect accorded to his remit. As he stated in retrospect, What was immediately impressive was that even on my first day I was included in the circulation of papers for comment on the problem of financing the Health Service — thought likely to be in a critical state by the end of the century. There was another on the possible catastrophic flooding of London by the River Thames and the need for a Thames Barrier; one on the means of crossing the Channel with a tunnel, a tube or a bridge; and another on the feasibility of change-over to Decimal Currency. Here were problems above the tactical level and it looked as though all I had to do was to reach out and grab worthwhile projects as they went by — if I had something to offer.41 In order to inaugurate the group with limited staff availability, James employed outside consultants. In this context, 'The trick was to produce results that saved money and then point out that we could have done the job cheaper with internal staff.'42 Thus, projects were undertaken to rationalise the checking of invoices in HMSO (saving £30,000 per annum), to provide a model for the Customs and Excise VAT computer (saving £70,000 per a n n u m ) and to optimise the g o v e r n m e n t ' s vehicle replacement policy (saving £100,000 per annum. Numerous projects of this kind were undertaken in the first year, a majority of them with the assistance of outside consultants such as the Institute for Operational Research (see below, p. 394-5). With the new group amply paying its way, the next step was to encourage other Whitehall departments to establish their own groups. The catalyst for this was the formal establishment of the CSD and the absorption of James' group within it. In an early interview with Armstrong, James argued the case for 'an integrated [operational research] service across Government.' The immediate and positive impact of James' advocacy was reflected in the fact that 'There and then, we plotted to set up under his [Armstrong's] chairmanship a seminar at Nuffield College, Oxford, to which he would invite Lord Shackleton, our Minister, to consider the future of [operational research] in the Civil Service.' 43 The Nuffield seminar was held early in January, 1969. It proved to be a decisive event in the history of operational research. Practitioners

348 Operational Research in War and Peace were well represented, as well as senior operational researchers from the university sector. Thus, operational researchers from the coal and steel industries mingled with 'a galaxy of Ministers' and 'high-level government administrators, believers and unbelievers.' 4 4 In James' recollection, the most impressive papers were presented by members of DOAE and the Ministry of Transport, the latter containing the largest operational research group in civil government. The paper from DOAE underlined the fact that most of the work of the group was commissioned on an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless, the strong impression was created that every project undertaken 'added to the sum total of [the group's] detailed and structured understanding of defence, so that as time went on problems would be solved less in isolation and more and more in perspective with the total aims of defence.' 45 More to the point, if the work of defence operational researchers looked different — sometimes less elegant perhaps — than what the giants of the Second World War had done, it was probably because the problems they were tackling were harder. No longer had they the clear-cut objectives of the war years to work to — sink more submarines, save more merchant ships, shoot down more aircraft, kill more tanks. If there were objectives to be found they were many-fold, interacting and imprecise. But what perhaps was most important of all was that despite the difficulties — and being at the nodal point of three Services vying for limited resources was not the least of these — they were producing some answers to difficult problems of use to hard-pressed administrators.46 The contribution from the Ministry of Transport also referred to the ad hoc nature of operational research but again created the strong impression that this was entirely consistent with a 'total systems' view of the Ministry's needs. After considering issues such as the ideal size of operational research groups and the desirability of forming a composite of separate groups to form a 'centre of excellence,' a general consensus emerged that operational research had much to offer civil government departments as an aid to decision making. In December 1970, therefore, — by which time he had perused every volume of the Operational Research Quarterly — Sir William Armstrong made the following recommendations to the Permanent Secretaries of all Home Civil Service Departments: (a) Departments which already have small study groups should consider whether these should be integrated to provide a larger, more viable

Operational Research in the Public Sector 349 unit. Such a group should have close ties with the Management Services organisation which should otherwise have an [operational research] group of its own. It might also provide the essential research basis for planning in departments. (b) Departments which have no study group of mixed disciplines should review their organisations to see whether one should be formed. (c) Those smaller departments which consider after review that it is not practicable to form a group of their own should be able to continue to draw upon the CSD's [operational research] group to help with their problems. (d) Departments should form joint study groups ad hoc when problems arise which cross departmental boundaries. The CSD group would advise and help in setting up such studies, which should be led by the department with the major interest in the problem. 47 Armstrong concluded with a personal commitment to establish the CSD group as a central source of advice: the notion of a 'centre of excellence' would be considered after the Civil Service College had been established for the training of civil servants. During the 1970s, Armstrong's determination to diffuse operational research more widely in Whitehall was brought to fruition. After the demise of the National Board for Prices and Incomes in 1971, Maurice Shutler, the Board's adviser on operational research, joined Ken James at the CSD 'with the specific task of selling [operational research] to more departments.' 48 Figure 10.1 indicates the degree of penetration into Whitehall which had been achieved by 1974. By that date, more than 600 operational research staff were employed in central government departments, although the great majority (up to 400) were working in the military field. Even then, a substantial amount of project work was being 'farmed out' to universities and consultancies.49 Writing in 1970, James was concerned to draw attention to 'the advent of a new dimension to the work of operational research.' Ad hoc projects were certainly numerous. Thus, The Home Office looked for the optimal distribution of police stations, the Ministry of Transport was looking at the parking problems in cities, an independent inquiry team was concerned with the vexed problem of the siting of a third London airport; there were problems of patient care in hospitals, the likely size and nature of VTOL air traffic, treatment levels for sewage, and many more.50

350 Operational Research in War and Peace At the same time, however, a number of recent projects suggested that operational research was capable of producing 'general solutions which could be used to answer questions of tomorrow not yet posed.' In this respect, James pointed to the fact that The Department of Education and Science had embarked upon a [computer] model of the education system itself. The Forestry Commission was attempting a financial control model. The Ministry of Technology was building a computerised model of the energy sector of the economy. The Ministry of Defence had produced a very large inter-service model to determine the leastcost mix, under variously constrained circumstances, of forces, transport, weapons and so on, which could be consulted again and again as circumstances or policies changed.51 As for the CSD, work had begun on a number of planning models which were to set important precedents for the programme of work well into the 1970s. These included the formulation of a planning model for the Ordnance Survey, a planning and control model for a small department and a sequence of models for forecasting and planning expenditure on highways construction on behalf of the Department of the Environment. The broadest study by far was an attempt to build a model linking the control of public expenditure to the management of resources in departments. Work in this area continued into the 1970s and was to lead to a project of considerable strategic significance in the management of the economy as whole. This was inaugurated late in 1974 at a time of mounting Treasury concern at the growth of public expenditure as a proportion of the gross domestic product. The relevant work, carried out by the Treasury's own operational research unit, was devoted to the study of Financial Information Systems (FIS). It bore fruit in the first fully comprehensive analysis of the Public Expenditure Survey (PES), Treasury Estimates and the Cash Monitoring Systems in all government departments. In the context of cash limits on public expenditure, FIS held out the prospect of a substantial improvement in the flow of information to central policymakers. The requirement for departments to calculate monthly rather than quarterly figures of spending within ten working days of the end of each month facilitated a considerable improvement in the profile of public expenditure during the course of the financial year. As the Financial Times commented, The resulting information should provide both spending Departments and the Treasury with the earliest possible indication

Operational Research in the Public Sector 351

H.M. Customs and Excise

Department of the Environment

Operational Research Division

Transport and Road Research Laboratory

Department of Health and Social Security

National Health Service O.R. Unit

1

Economics of Transport and Highways Divisions

Systems Analysis Research Unit

Building Research Station

Local

Man. Services Civil Sen/ice Department

Civil Service College

Government O.R. Unit

■ ! ■ •

Home Office

Departments of Energy Industry Trade Prices and Consumer Protection

Scientific Advisory Branch

Police Scientific Development Branch

Department Of Industry O.R. Unit

7H. Metropolitan Police Office

Legend Named Operational Research Unit

1 Training Services Agency

Joint Treasury ICSD Or Unit

_ Substantial O.R. Work Carried Out =

Non-Civil Service but Supported by Government Money

Figure 10.1 O.R. Groups in Civil Departments of British Civil Service 1974. Source: Maurice Shutter's aide memoir for a conference paper on the diffusion of operational research in civil government, 1974.

in a fast changing position of possible difficulties in meeting spending targets, as well as an earlier input for economic forecasts. This still leaves the policy problem of what happens if the general rate of inflation is far higher or lower than when the cash limit was fixed. But at least there will now be a forewarning of the effects in time to make at least some adjustment.52 Following the completion of this work, a joint Treasury/CSD operational research unit was formed to provide general assistance to the Treasury but with a particular focus on public expenditure issues. Commenting in retrospect, James claimed that the diffusion of operational research in Whitehall after 1970 was aided considerably by the confidence engendered by early successes. This was exemplified in the work carried out by his CSD group on decimalisation. This was 'a one-off tactical exercise/ and 'The evidence for the introduction of the new currency which resulted was there for all to see, and in addition around .a million pounds was saved... on metal and minting.' 53 Evidence of strategic input was registered in the group's work on the location of government offices and the dispersal of civil servants from London.

352 Operational Research in War and Peace Completed in February, 1973 the resulting Hardman Report, based in part on a n interactive computer model, recommended that 31,000 civil servants should move from London mainly to the north of England, Wales and Scotland with projected annual savings of £3 million by 1980, rising to £24 million in 1984.54 In the event, none of the moves had been completed by the 1979 General Election. Uninterested in regional policy measures, the succeeding Conservative Government chose to concentrate on the reduction in size of the Civil Service as part of its commitment to restraining the growth of public expenditure. Thus, between 1979 and 1988 only 5,000 relocations from London actually took place, falling far short of the numbers envisaged in the Hardman Report. 55 Operational research in the nationalised public utilities may have been pioneered in the coalmining industry, but by the end of the 1950s it had achieved substantial diffusion throughout the sector as a whole. Beyond coalmining, the first initiative was launched by the British Transport Commission (BTC), the body created by the Transport Act of 1947 to establish overall control of nationalised goods and passenger transport by rail, road and inland waterways. Within this structure, the 'Railway Executive' loomed large and it was in this organisation that operational research was inaugurated. The catalyst was provided by a commissioned report on the organisation of research on public transport undertaken by Sir William Stanier, currently serving as Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Supply and formerly Chief Mechanical Engineer to the L.M.S. Railway. It has already been noted that Stanier was deeply involved in the work of the Committee on Industrial Productivity in his capacity as chairman of the Technology and Operational Research Panel (see above, p. 191). It is hardly s u r p r i s i n g , therefore, that his recommendation for the creation of a consultative research council under BTC auspices was accompanied by the proposal that the Director of Research employed by the Railway Executive should be assisted by 'a Section staffed by people having a knowledge of Operational Research methods.' Its primary task would be to undertake 'statistical and other scientific studies of operating problems and, where necessary, [make] their own observations.' 56 Stanier's report was accepted and in 1950 a small Operational Research Unit was formed under the leadership of M. G. ('Bluey') Bennett. A physicist by training, Bennett was on terms with Patrick Blackett and was one of the co-founders of the Operational Research Club in 1948 (see below, pp. 367-8). In 1955, Bennett possessed a staff of four operational researchers and three technical assistants. 57

Operational Research in the Public Sector 353 Growth, thereafter, was rapid and by the early 1960s the Unit was employing more than 20 scientists.58 The Unit's early work was concerned mainly with ticket issuing technology and studies of locomotive firing techniques with a view to economising on coal consumption. 59 None of this work involved the application of sophisticated techniques of analysis, although the situation in this respect was to change dramatically after 1960 with the inauguration of a sequence of studies on the optimal distribution of empty wagons according to classes of use. By that time, the Unit was fully informed of 'All the main Operational Research techniques,' as evidenced by the publication of a confidential booklet by Bernard Bishop on behalf of the Research Co-ordination Committee of British Railways. 60 Prepared under BTC auspices, Bishop's compendium began with elementary statistics and sampling before ranging across probability and queuing theory, inventory control, linear programming and simulation. Pre-dating Brian Houlden's NCB-inspired volume by three years (see above, p. 275), Bishop's short text was prima facie evidence of the positive response of British operational researchers to the North American methodological repertoire as revealed at the 1957 Oxford conference (see below, pp. 375-7). Linear programming, as applied to the distribution of wagons, produced cost effective results in calculating 'the engine power needed to move empty coal wagons from the yards to the collieries' and this served as a precursor to more ambitious surveys entailing the simulation of empty wagon movement across the entire railway system. 61 Inventory control was also applied to good effect in the ordering of stores. 62 In terms of its contribution to operating efficiency — and hence the financial performance of the railway system as a whole — it is fair to assume that the contribution of operational research was positive but marginal. The fact remains that of all the publicly-owned utilities, the commercial performance of British Railways was the weakest from the inception of the nationalisation era. For the 6 years after 1948 cumulative losses amounted to £115.1 million (at 1948 prices). Thereafter, the situation worsened as competition from road transport intensified. Deficit financing by the Government was necessary after 1957 and whilst the Transport Acts of 1962 and 1968 wrote off most of British Railway's debts, the period was notable for a rising trend of government subsidies to permit the retention of uneconomical urban and rural services. 63 It was in this context that Dr Richard (later Lord) Beeching was recruited from ICI as chairman of the newly-created British Railways Board. His principal task, as set out in the controversial report which came to be associated

354 Operational Research in War and Peace irrevocably with his n a m e , w a s to u n d e r t a k e a f u n d a m e n t a l reorganisation of the railway system in order to eliminate financial deficits.64 The Beeching Report recommended extensive closures and rapid modernisation of the remaining core of the system. Between 1962 and 1966 the former were implemented with favourable consequences for productivity, although the impact on financial performance was limited by continuing overestimation of demand. 65 The archives of the Operational Research Unit are notable for the lack of any reference to the Beeching Report and its implementation. This stands in marked contrast to the Unit's direct involvement in the successful attempt by the British Railways Board to discredit the draconian recommendations of the 1982 Serpell Report which, if implemented, would have resulted in the decimation of the remaining peripheral railway services.66 A senior member of the Unit, Norman Shelley, did, in fact, prepare a position paper on the future size of the railway system in 1961 by reference to a theory of 'peripheral decay.' As Shelley observed, Since 1927, peripheral decay has been taking place. Each wave of retreat has resulted in temporary improvement being pursued by further retreat. The enemy, to use a battlefield simile, has been allowed to advance in order to minimise local losses, but having advanced, finds himself able to deal further lethal blows. It was in the real battlefield that Operational Research found its early uses so the simile is, perhaps a good one. If the enemy had been allowed to advance in a different place he could have been trapped and annihilated. This would not have saved the original losses but the security of the defenders as a whole might have been enhanced.67 The theory itself was simply stated — perhaps too simply — as follows: If the activities of an organisation are arranged in ascending order of profitability, then the position of each activity is a function of the influence exerted over the other parts. It follows that the correct [optimal] size of any organisation can be calculated by a mathematical interpretation of its activities in terms of peripheral decay theory.68 Insofar as 'the unscientific reduction in the scope and quality of service offered by the railways of Britain to their customers is the direct cause of the present predicament,' the arrival of Dr Beeching presented the ideal opportunity to proclaim the virtues and relevance of operational research. 69 Shelley's plea that the modernisation of the railway system

Operational Research in the Public Sector 355 should be informed by operational research was ignored. By the 1990s, his successors in the Operational Research Unit possessed considerable understanding of the manner in which branch lines contributed feeder traffic to main line services. To the extent that the Beeching Plan's analysis in this respect was 'superficial' and 'incomplete/ it resulted in 'overhasty' rationalisation thereby contributing to the further peripheral decay of the system. 70 Operational research in the electricity generating industry was introduced in 1954 when the Central Electricity Authority, the forerunner of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), established a central group of 'five or six' researchers to preside over smaller devolved units attached to the Authority's twelve operating divisions. In 1958, following the creation of the CEGB, the latter were grouped into five 'regions' and by the mid-1960s the total operational research staff was about fifty. In view of the strong emphasis on 'informal interchange of information and co-operation between the separate teams on individual studies,' control from the centre was light in terms of functional direction . In a frank survey of the contribution of operational research to the system of electricity supply published in the mid-1960s, the CEGB's Operational Efficiency Engineer and Operational Research Officer admitted that in the early years the divisional teams 'found it difficult...to establish the necessary working relationships with managers...at the same time as demonstrating, by successful studies, the usefulness of the service they could offer.'71 In the latter context, the Board's operational research teams tried to establish their credibility in a manner akin to Steve Cook at RTB (see above, pp. 232-3). Thus, the earliest projects were concerned with small-scale problems such as the preparation of stores layouts and comparisons of different kinds of shunting locomotives. By the end of the 1950s the remit of work had expanded considerably in the general area of the planning and control of power stations. With the demand for electricity doubling every ten years, the industry was obliged to engage in complex forward planning in view of the long gestation period of power station design and construction. Delays in commissioning would require the operation of older and less efficient plant giving rise to substantial 'replacement generating costs.' Operational research proved its w o r t h in forward p l a n n i n g by the application of dynamic programming and critical path analysis to project control. It also contributed to the siting of new generating plant. This was a particularly difficult problem for the CEGB in view of the inauguration of nuclear stations as a complement to existing coal and oil-fired capacity. The

356 Operational Research in War and Peace factors to be taken into account in resolving the 'siting problem' were as follows: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Amounts of conventional and nuclear plant to be installed. The potential capacity of generating plant that could be built. The distribution of demand for electricity over the country. The distribution of demand for electricity over the year. The fuel costs and efficiencies of plant (both existing and new) on the system. (6) The cost of building transmission lines. (7) The cost of transferring energy along transmission lines. In devising an optimal siting pattern operational researchers identified twelve transportation problems based upon existing and potential sources of supply both conventional and nuclear. Each 'problem' was then solved independently to give an equivalent number of siting patterns. These were then costed against each other with the lowest cost pattern taken to be the optimum. Other operational research studies were devoted to the most economical transport of coal between collieries and power stations and the planning of plant overhauls. In the former, linear programming was applied with computer assistance in order to identify optimal coal allocations on a weekly basis. For plant overhauls, the CEGB's main priority was to minimise repair times in order to contain replacement generation costs. This was especially the case for pressure vessels and steam plant. In an eight year period after 1957, operational research studies resulted in a major reduction in overhaul schedules as applied to power stations of varying levels of efficiency. Reference was made earlier in the chapter to the merger of the armed forces' operational research sections to form the DOAE in 1965 (see above, p. 346). This was the logical consequence of the considerable and long­ standing cooperation between the separate sections after 1945 and, in its more immediate setting, the creation of the over-arching Ministry of Defence in 1963. The history of military operational research after 1945 justifies a book-length study of its own, especially in the Anglo-American and NATO contexts, but it is entirely appropriate that this chapter should conclude by offering some insights into the subject, bearing in mind that a full account will have to await the declassification of official papers. The key source in the public domain is a sequence of articles published in the Journal of Naval Studies in 1981 by T. H. Pratt, Director of Naval Operational Studies (DNOS) from 1974 until his retirement in 1979.72

Operational Research in the Public Sector 357 Pratt h a d served in the Naval Directorate since 1956 and before that had held the positions of Scientific Adviser to the Home and Mediterranean Fleets. H e was therefore well qualified to comment on the application of operational research in this particular setting. From the 1940s to the 1960s, the pattern of work in naval operational research shifted from studies of tactics and force deployment based upon actual operational data, to studies of strategic choice and equipment based upon assumptions rather than operational experience. The principal factors which determined the content of the work included changing military priorities within NATO, the emergence of the UK nuclear deterrent and the introduction of nuclear submarines, the phasing out of aircraft carriers and defence cutbacks in the 1960s, and finally, the introduction of computers. Early tactical studies concerned the efficiency of anti-submarine (AS) searches by aircraft and surface units and the relationship between convoy spacing and torpedo hits. In the former case, a study carried out in 1950 compared the ability of two air escort patrols to detect a diesel electric submarine in closing with 6 knot and 12 knot convoys. The analysis was subsequently expanded to include the efficiency of surface vessel AS searches. In 1952-3 operational research was applied to the 'standard' doctrine of convoy spacing — 800 yards between columns and 1,000 yards between rows. Simulation revealed that 'for a non-homing torpedo this spacing optimised the chance of a torpedo hit and spacings which were either smaller (because the torpedo might miss the convoy altogether with the sensor and fire-control errors of the day) or larger (because a torpedo could pass through the convoy without intercepting a target) were to be preferred.' Further tactical studies at this time were devoted to 'pro-submarine' operations. Thus a 1951 study analysed guidance paths for torpedoes in submarine/ submarine engagements and optimum salvo patterns against surface targets. The use of radar by submarines was also investigated in order to assess the risk of transmission detection. This was followed by a 1954 study of the use of radar and search receivers in convoy defence. The conclusion in this respect was that radar should be used only in the closing interception stages, placing reliance on search receivers for the first detection of airborne radar. Many of the early tactical studies were informed by data derived from operational experience in the Second World War. Notable amongst these was a detailed investigation of 'fruitful' U-boat patrols where merchant shipping was the primary target. This revealed that sinkings were only 0.08 of what they would have been if all torpedoes were reliable, had been expended and had hit

358 Operational Research in War and Peace targets. The same study indicated that the performance of individual Uboat commanders varied considerably and that whilst a small percentage achieved results close to the theoretical maximum, most sinkings were achieved by a relatively large number with low overall performance. Further studies based upon wartime data included analyses of aircraft flying intensity in the Pacific, the vulnerability of British warships to submarine attack, the relative losses of merchant ships to day and night torpedo attacks, and the time taken to repair war-damaged merchant vessels. The Korean War and the Suez crisis of 1956 provided much needed additional data for naval operational researchers. In the former, the effects of shore bombardment and air operations were analysed whilst in the latter attention was concentrated on the calculation of an 'operational degradation factor' whereby the points of impact of virtually all rockets and bombs were identified in relation to their intended target. The degradation factor was then calculated as a comparison to practice firings. Suez delivery accuracies were also used in the theoretical assessment of the number of naval air sorties needed to destroy a tank. On the basis of this analysis it was concluded that in a situation of 'limited war' naval air strikes should concentrate on the enemy air force on the ground in offering more profitable targets than tanks for rocket-based attacks. Tactical studies in the context of limited war continued well into the 1960s. By that time they had been complemented by an ambitious programme of work devoted to 'global war studies.' The key assumption was that a strategic nuclear exchange would be followed by a period of conventional 'broken back' war in which maritime forces would fulfil a major strategic role in determining the ultimate outcome of the conflict. Operational research was therefore applied to the calculation of naval losses in the nuclear phase and the minimum force requirements in the succeeding conventional stage. Pratt's account provides a succinct summary of the programme of work. Thus, The starting point of the work was the general economic background, population, GNP, industrial capacity in key areas and so on. Soviet strategies for winning control of Western Europe while maintaining wider interests were considered and NATO's reactions. Likely defence expenditures were derived and these were broken down between Civil Defence, Navy, Army and Air Force. What this would buy in terms of military capability was calculated for the first time on a full 'slice cost' basis in which it was argued that the war would be fought with what it proved possible to

Operational Research in the Public Sector 359 keep in service in peacetime and that this could be calculated by assigning the whole of the Defence Vote to front-line units. The outcome of the strategic nuclear exchange was calculated in terms of losses to population, industry and so on. A range of offence/defence postures was considered relevant to the exchange. From the outcome of the nuclear battle it was possible to calculate the demands of rehabilitation of the civil population and industry, as well as a continuing conventional land battle, and what this would mean in terms of imports to Western Europe and the maritime task involved. A series of war games was played. The will to conduct conventional operations was assessed by comparison with the effects of wartime bomber raids on centres of population. The general conclusion was that a military will and capability could survive the nuclear exchange given correct decisions on Defence policy. It was therefore argued that division of the Defence Vote should make provision for the later war at A further important conclusion was that current expenditures on Civil Defence capability were inadequate to ensure survival during the nuclear phase. Following the presentation of the results to the Chiefs of Staff at the end of 1955, a Joint Global War Working Party was established as a planning body 'for studying the likely nature, course and duration of global war.' Its report, issued in 1957, confirmed many of the earlier findings, but went further in rejecting bomber aircraft 'as a basis for delivery of strategic weapons between equal opponents.' The naval contribution emphasised the importance of shelter provision for the civilian population. Insofar as shelters could be located and inspected 'with comparative ease,' DNOS recommended that Attempts should...be made to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on a 'no shelter' policy, as an aggressive nuclear weapon policy would be inconsistent with this. It was felt that shelter policy might be a topic on which the Russians would find it difficult politically to refuse discussion, and it might be the one area where some form of treaty, which could be backed up by realistic inspection, could be achieved.74 The historical record suggests that this proposal was never advanced. Global war studies led to further related projects, the most important of which was the analysis of essential civilian and military imports in the post-nuclear conventional war. It was in this context that in 1956

360 Operational Research in War and Peace DNOS established an Atlantic War Working Party to establish naval requirements for a north Atlantic convoy system. Calculations were carried out for the years 1965 and 1970 on the basis of a flow of 2,000 ships per month sailing to the UK and Western Europe. The primary assumption was that a defence capability 'which held losses from all causes to 1, 500 ships in the first year of war, with 500 in the second year and still less in the third' should be aimed for. In Pratt's recollection the principal conclusions were as follows: That a large number of convoys at sea at any one time would be unacceptable even if the threat was from submarines alone; the initial threat was not reduced significantly by the nuclear exchange; an AS [anti-submarine] transit offensive was worthwhile using submarines and possibly aircraft; an air defence transit offensive using SAM [surface-to-air-missile] ships was impracticable because of the submarine threat; close defences were needed which made convoy essential; basic policy should be for a small number of large convoys (e.g. 600 ships...); no serious loss of imports would arise from this policy. The requirements of anti-submarine and air defence were calculated — 40 escorts were allowed for the 600 ship convoy.75 Following the completion of these studies, naval operational research priorities returned to limited war and 'intervention operations' outside Europe. Projects were undertaken in collaboration with Army and RAF operational researchers. The starting point was to identify 'likely situations in which UK maritime forces might be required to intervene in support of national interests or treaty obligations. An initial survey produced 200 potential geo-political confrontations and of these, three were chosen for intensive analysis — Indonesia/ Malaysia, Iraq/Kuwait and Guatemala/British Honduras. By luck or good judgement all three were the subject of subsequent military interventions in which operational research studies fulfilled a valuable role in planning and logistics. In the naval context, the major assumption was the need to provide a carrier task force in support of the invading force. In order to assess the size and composition of the force, the relevant operations were analysed stage by stage utilising a combination of 'simple arithmetical techniques,' generalised Lanchester equations, computer simulation and gaming. In the context of a programme of work spanning more than two decades, it is possible only to identify the more significant programmes and to provide some indication of changing priorities. According to Pratt, 'the work reported did in some cases have immediate effect on maritime

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policy, p r o c u r e m e n t or tactics. P e r h a p s m o r e often results w e r e achieved by a process of attrition.' 7 6 This is a revealing c o m m e n t , b u t a predictable one. T h e Cold W a r n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , successive h o l d e r s of the position of D N O S could n o t expect to wield the kind of influence enjoyed by Patrick Blackett in the circumstances of total w a r .

NOTES 1. Ross Tristram, 'The Development of Operational Research Groups in Civil Government, 1946-1979' (quoting Maurice Shutler), Operational Research Society Symposium on the Foundation, Development and Current Practice of OR (Bowness, 1996). 2. Ibid. 3. Samuel Brittan, Steering the Economy: the Role of the Treasury (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1971). 4. Richard Bailey, Managing the British Economy: A Guide to Economic Planning in Britain since 1962 (Hutchinson, London, 1968), pp. 37-48; Keith Middlemas, Industry, Unions and Government: 21 Years of NEDC (Macmillan, London, 1983). 5. Alan Budd, The Politics of Economic Planning (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1978); T. J. Hatton and K. A. Chrystal, 'The Budget and Fiscal Policy,' in N. F. R. Crafts and N. Woodward (Eds.), The British Economy since 1945 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991), pp. 68-90. 6. M. W. Kirby, 'Supply Side Management/ in Crafts and Woodward (Eds.), pp. 236-60. 7. Stafford Beer, Letter to The Times, 15 September, 1964. 8. The Civil Service (Report of the Fulton Committee), Cmnd 3638 (1968). 9. R. A. Ward, Operational Research in Local Government (RIPA and George Allen and Unwin, London, 1964), p. vii. 10. Brian Whitworth interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 11. Ibid. 12. Ward (1964), p. 67. 13. Ibid., p. 69. 14. Ibid., pp. 73-9. 15. Brian Whitworth interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 16. Royal Commission on the Police, Final Report, Cmnd 1728 (May, 1962). 17. PRO, HO 287/651, 38672, Development and Planning Branch (August, 1962). 18. PRO, HO 287/652, 38672, Home Office Police Research and Planning Branch: Formation and Progress: Note by Head of Branch (November, 1964). 19. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 20. Ibid., p. 6. 21. Ibid., p. 7.

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22. PRO, HO 368/38, 38672, Home Office Police Report: Progress of Scientific Research on Police Problems: A Progress Report (31 March, 1965). 23. 'The Police Research and Planning Branch and Its Work,' Police Research Bulletin, no. 1 (January, 1967); P. M. Hills, 'Traffic Patrol Tactics/ Police Research Bulletin, No. 6 (April, 1968). 24. PRO, HO 377/4, 38778, 'A Series of Experiments to Measure the Effectiveness of Foot Patrols' (October, 1964). 25. A. G. McDonald, 'Assessment of Police Establishments,' Police Research Bulletin, No. 10 (April, 1969). 26. E. Gregory and T. P. Turner, 'Unit Police Beating: A New System of Patrol,' Police Research Bulletin, No. 1 (January, 1967). 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. McDonald (1969), p. 3. 30. Ibid., p. 4. 31. 'SIMPOL: The Development of Simulation Models of a Police (C.I.D.) Team,' Police Research Bulletin, No. 11 (July, 1969). 32. PRO, HO 287/651, 38672, Development and Planning Branch (August, 1962). 33. The Civil Service (Report of the Fulton Committee), Cmnd 3638 (1968). 34. R. T. Eddison, 'Committee on the Civil Service: Memorandum submitted by the Operational Research Society.' 35. Control of Public Expenditure (Report of the Plowden Committee), Cmnd 1432 (1961). 36. Bailey (1962), p. 51. 37. E. K. James to Rebecca Capey, 28 August, 1997. 38. Ibid. 39. E. K. James, 'A Long Crude Draft': Statement on Behalf of the Operational Research Society. 40. Brittan (1971), p. 272. 41. E. K. James to Rebecca Capey, 28 August, 1997. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. E. K. James, 'Operational Research in Government,' p. 81. 46. Ibid., p. 82. 47. Ibid., p. 84. 48. Maurice Shutler, 'The Development of Operational Research in Civil Government, 1946-1979/ Operational Research Society Symposium on the Foundation, Development and Current Practice of OR (Bowness, 1996). 49. E. K. James, 'Operational Research in Government/ p. 85. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Peter Riddell, 'The Treasury Learns How Much It Spends/ Financial Times, 30 November, 1976, p. 17.

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53. E. K. James, 'A Long Crude Draft.' 54. The Dispersal of Government Work From London (Report of the Hardman Committee), Cmnd 5322 (1973). 55. C. W. Jefferson and M. Trainor, 'Public Sector Relocation and Regional Development,' Urban Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1996), pp. 37-48. 56. PRO, AN 8/11, 38744, 'The British Transport Commission: Report on the Organisation of Research' (1 November, 1948), p. 5. 57. Anon, 'Research and the Railways,' Research, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1955), pp. 106-12. 58. Operational Research Unit, Business Plan, 1995, 'History of the Organisation,' p. 16. 59. PRO, AN 1, 'Platform Ticket Issuing Machines' (May, 1951); AN 11, 'Rapid Ticket Printing and Issuing Machines' (November, 1952); AN 5, 'Locomotive Coal Consumption' (June, 1951); AN 12, 'A Study of Coal Consumption' (April, 1953); AN 20, 'Coal Consumption and Locomotive Firing' (March, 1954); R. J. Eaton, 'Mechanizing Ticket Printing and Issue,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1955), pp. 65-73. 60. Operational Research Techniques (Research Co-ordination Committee Publications, No. 14, British Transport Commission, 1959). 61. ORU 39, 'Linear Programming in Wagon Distribution: Its Scope and Achievements' (April, 1961); ORU 40, 'Report on the Activities of the Operational research Unit' (April, 1961); ORU 46, 'Linear Programming of Empty Wagon Distribution' (March, 1962). 62. ORU 56, 'Scientific Techniques of Inventory Control' (April, 1963). 63. T. R. Gourvish, British Railways 1948-73: A Business History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986). 64. British Railways Board: the Reshaping of British Railways (The Beeching Report) (HMSO: London, 1963). 65. J. Dunkerley and P. Hare, 'Nationalised Industries,' in Crafts and Woodward (1990), p. 391. 66. ORU, Business Plan, 1995, p. 17. 67. ORU, 'The Size of British Railways: An Introduction to the Theory of Peripheral Decay' (26 March, 1961). 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. Italics in original. 70. ORU, Business Plan, 1995, p. 16. 71. W. N. Parkinson and David Taylor, 'Operational Research in the Central Electricity Generating Board,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 14, (1965), p. 136. See also I. J. Whitting, 'Planning for an Expanding Electricity Supply,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 14, (1965), pp. 107-17; M. D. Bates, 'Solution of Special Linear Programming Problems with Additional Constraints,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1966), pp. 42545; J. P. Kidd and J. R. Morgan, 'A Predictive Information System

364 Operational Research in War and Peace for Management,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1969), pp. 149-70. 72. T. H. Pratt, 'A Rose by Any Other Name: An Outline of Operational Analysis in Admiralty HQ 1947-1970/ Journal of Naval Studies, Vol 7, No. 1, pp. 1-9; No. 2, pp. 104-13; No. 3, pp. 161-9; No. 4, pp. 218-27 (1981). The following account is based upon this sequence of articles. 73. Ibid., p. 106. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid., p. 107. 76. Ibid., p. 227.

11

The Institutional Development of Operational Research

In his survey of the rise of professional society in England, the social historian, Harold Perkin, has highlighted 'the increasingly complex society of twentieth-century England in which a vast and increasing range of expert services are necessary to social survival and well-being.' 1 More specifically, twentieth-century society moved progressively towards an occupational structure based on hierarchy and specialism where professional advancement was dependent on merit and formally acknowledged expertise. Thus, Where pre-industrial society was based on passive property in land and industrial society on actively managed capital, professional society is based on human capital created by education and enhanced by strategies of closure, that is, the exclusion of the unqualified.2 Exclusion is a necessary condition for the achievement of professional status and recognition because 'specialised training of itself yields only earned income, payment for immediate services rendered, which may even fall below the cost of production if the service is oversupplied or undervalued.' 3 The critical requirement, therefore, is to gain control of the market for a particular service in order to produce an artificial scarcity. In these circumstances, members of the profession will be able to augment their income 'by an amount proportional to the scarcity of the service or skill.' In the language of the economist this enhancement is equivalent to a rent in the Ricardian sense of the term. For the professional, therefore, the element of rent delivers a number of benefits: independence, security, the right to criticise without fear of the consequences, and so a secure position from which to defend one's place in society or, if he so wishes, a position of leverage from

365

366 Operational Research in War and Peace which to change society or one's own corner of it. Above all, it gives him the psychic security and self-confidence to press his own social ideal, his own vision of society and how it should be organised, upon the other classes.4 The main d r i v i n g force in favour of professionalism has been the specialisation, or division of labour. For the classical economist, Adam Smith, it was this development which propelled the 'wealth of the nation' in favour of a n increasing scale of organisation consistent with the emergence of a n industrialising society in which the mass production economy was eventually to be complemented by a burgeoning service sector. In a study of immense range, Perkin's focus is on the development of 'career hierarchies of specialised occupations, selected by merit and based on t r a i n e d expertise.' 5 It is in this context that he devotes considerable attention to the rise of 'corporate society' and the associated professionalisation of management. It is true that the managerial revolution m a y have been a reluctant one in British experince, but the point is well taken that For good or ill, the controllers of twentieth-century business...ceased for the most part to be individual ownermanaging entrepreneurs in the Victorian mould and...[became] professional managers owning little capital other than the human capital derived from their abilities.6 Although P e r k i n makes no explicit reference to the development of management science in general, let alone operational research, his thesis is certainly applicable to the latter in relation to its institutional trajectory. In this respect, there was a sequence of notable developments after 1945, all of them consistent with 'the rise of professional society' in the sense of its definition by Perkin. The most critical developments were the transformation of an informal 'OR Club,' founded in 1948, into the Operational Research Society in 1953 and the establishment of that ultimate h a l l m a r k of professional status — a specialist journal. The Operational Research Quarterly {ORQ) first appeared in 1950, and continued in that form until 1978 when it was renamed as the Journal of the Operational Research Society {JORS) with twelve issues per annum. These d e v e l o p m e n t s may be viewed as a t e s t a m e n t to the g r o w i n g professionalisation of the discipline and subscription to common methodologies rooted in the 'scientific method' as defined by Patrick Blackett. They may also be viewed as consistent with a growing self-

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 367 confidence on the part of the emergent community of operational researchers in their potential contribution to economic and social utility. Operational research had improved the quality of decision-making in circumstances of total war and, for the early pioneers at least, there was little reason to believe tha.t its application to civil affairs would not result in rising real living standards in response to enhanced efficiency and cost effectiveness. It is also significant that as operational research was being recognised as a practically useful guide to rational decision making, its public profile was enhanced further by formal academic recognition. By the early 1960s, several institutions of higher education were making provision for postgraduate courses in operational research and this served as a precursor to the expansion of the subject at undergraduate level following the foundation of the first dedicated chair in operational research at the new University of Lancaster in 1964. In the light of these factors, the purpose of this chapter is to chart the institutional development of operational research from the later 1940s to 1970. It is concerned mainly with the evolution of the community of operational researchers both in terms of practitioners and academics. The framework for analysis is 'the rise of professional society' as described by Per kin. Where appropriate, comparisons and contrasts with experience in the United States are cited. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the post-1970 debate on the achievements and limitations of operational research in its postwar 'golden age.' In the institutional development of operational research, the guiding hand of Sir Charles Goodeve was evident from the beginning. As Pat Rivett has commented, if Patrick Blackett was the wartime 'father of operational research,' Goodeve, ably assisted by Donald Hicks, was the 'foster parent' and 'wet nurse' of 'the baby which was more or less left on the doorstep in 1946.'7 It was Goodeve who took the initiative in founding the Operational Research Club in April 1948 as a small informal group of people who are working in or are concerned with problems associated with Operational Research. The club has been organised so that its members may meet together to discuss problems connected with their work and to assist in the development of the methods of Operational Research.8 The accent was on informality because 'it was felt that free discussion and interchange of ideas were the first essentials, and the fewer the rules the freer the Club's development would be.' 9 The natural concomitant was a limitation on numbers in order to avoid the inconvenience of 'rules

368 Operational Research in War and Peace of procedure.' The original members of the Club's steering committee were Goodeve, Dr W. K. (later Sir William) Slater, destined to become chairman of the Agricultural Research Council, A. W. Swan, a pioneer of operational research at USC and subsequently Courtaulds, and Dr Cecil Gordon of the Special Research Unit at the Board of Trade. In 1950, Gordon resigned and was replaced by Dr Owen (later Sir Owen) Wansbrough-Jones, the Scientific Adviser to the Army Council and soon to be appointed Principal Director of Scientific Research (Defence) at the Ministry of Supply. 10 Club membership was at the discretion of the committee a n d was limited to one member per industry or organisation. By the end of 1952, the agreed limit was 78 members. 11 The intention was to hold at least four meetings a year when papers would be read and discussed. Early participants included Goodeve himself who spoke on the theme of the 'Laws and Methods of Physics Applied to Social Problems,' Dr C. H. Waddington on operational research in livestock breeding, Roger Eddison on operational research problems in the steel industry, and Dr Norman Wright on the National Food Survey. Meetings of the Club were held in the rooms of the Royal Society at Burlington House, whilst meetings of the steering, or executive committee were held in Wansbrough-Jones' flat in Pall Mall. 12 Oral dissemination of the applicability and benefits of operational research was soon complemented by hard copy in the form of the world's first journal of operational research. The ORQ, which made its debut in March 1950, was the brainchild of Goodeve and was inspired by the popularity of a sequence of lectures on operational research organised by Professor E. S. Pearson at University College, London during 1949.13 The joint editorship was, in effect, imposed by Goodeve on two of his BISRA colleagues: Max Davies, the Chief Public Relations Officer was appointed as business editor and Roger Eddison as technical editor. Both were reluctant recruits, but in Eddison's recollection they anticipated that 'it [wouldn't] last more than a couple of years.' In the meantime, they would have 'a bit of fun.'14 Their first editorial gave a hint of this when they justified 'burdening the scientific world with yet another journal' by committing themselves to two essential conditions — 'undoubted utility and utmost brevity.' 15 Thus, The main purpose of the Operational Research Quarterly is to assemble in one place as much as possible of the information that operational research workers now find (or fail to find) scattered widely over the very large body of scientific and technical

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 369 literature. The method is to provide a quarterly collection of abstracts of relevant papers and articles, taken from as wide a field as possible.16 The first issue, therefore, contained abstracts of papers on the role of statistical methods in industrial production and research, the study of road traffic and on the definitional aspects of operational research. It also abstracted Patrick Blackett's seminal wartime paper on the subject, and it was Blackett who contributed a commissioned paper in fulfilment of the editor's secondary objective of publishing in each issue 'an original and authoritative article on some aspect of operational research.' This paper, highlighted in Chapter 1 (see above, pp. 4-5), set out Blackett's thoughts on the application of operational research both in relation to the scientific method and his own wartime experience. In the latter context, the paper was notable for its advocacy of an ambitious remit for civilian operational researchers in their role as 'autonomous, scientific investigators akin to the Texas Rangers or the FBI' (see below, p. 389).17 At the 1953 Annual General Meeting of the Operational Research Club a motion was carried that the jClub should cease to exist and that 'the Operational Research Society [ORS] should simultaneously come into existence with the new Constitution.' 18 A press statement provided the following illumination: The increasing interest in operational research in this country has caused the Operational Research Club, hitherto a deliberately restricted group of scientists meeting more or less informally, to reconstitute itself formally as the Operational Research Society with no numerical limit on membership. Members must still, however, be engaged in some form of operational research 'whether or not it is so called.'19 The official announcement of the conversion was reported in a subsequent issue of the ORQ. In a lead article the editors stated that the principal justification for the move to formal status was the Club's evident success in proclaiming the virtues of operational research to an increasingly wide audience. 20 The growth in interest in operational research was illustrated by reference to a survey article published by Goodeve in an earlier issue of the ORQ.21 Based on a questionnaire sent out to 210 organisations ranging across the private and public sectors, the survey concluded that 45 of them had sections carrying out operational research as their major activity. In addition, a further 41

370 Operational Research in War and Peace organisations carried out operational research 'in one or other parts of their organisation at some time or other.' For Goodeve, these results were 'satisfactory' in view of the 'extremely vague' borders of operational research and the fact that the survey itself had not encompassed private sector services such as the commercial banks and insurance companies. As for the Society's aims and objectives, these were defined in the constitution as 'the advancement of education through the provision of training in and the promotion and adoption of operational research.' The means of achievement were described as '(a) lectures, classes, discussions and publications; (b) the promotion and organisation of research projects; and (c) the encouragement of contact between workers in all relevant fields of enquiry.' For the editors of the ORQ, the presumption was that in addition to the efforts of the Society itself, the continuing diffusion of operational research was d e p e n d e n t on 'educational ventures such as those of Professor [T. U.] Matthew, and Sir Charles Goodeve's recent papers in America and to the British Institute of Management.' 22 The reference to Goodeve highlights his tireless commitment to the cause of operational research as indicated by numerous speaking engagements and the publication of a never-ending sequence of articles on the subject in the 'management' and engineering periodicals of the day.23 Matthew, on the other hand, was notable for inaugurating the first ventures in higher education on the subject of operational research. Beginning with summer schools on operational research and work-study at the University of Birmingham in the later 1940s, he moved to establish a regular sequence of short residential courses at the University's Institute for Engineering Production. 24 The first course, held in November and December 1953, had as its chosen theme the role of operational research in 'increasing productivity in industry.' Speakers included Goodeve, T. E. Easterfield of the DSIR, L. H. C. Tippett of the Shirley Institute, A. W. Swan of Courtaulds and E. C. Williams, head of operational research at the Admiralty. Attended by 26 individuals from a wide variety of industrial backgrounds, the course was repeated in succeeding years until 1958 when a one-year taught masters' course in operational research was established with Frank Benson, lecturer in statistics and an expert in queuing theory, as the coordinator. Simultaneously, Brian Haley, one of Benson's former doctoral students, was appointed as the first lecturer in operational research at a British university. In succeeding years, Haley was assisted by a trio of distinguished honorary lecturers — Charles Goodeve, Pat Rivett and Steven Vajda, Assistant Director of Operational Research at the

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 371 Admiralty. In 1965, Vajda was appointed professor of operational research at Birmingham and was succeeded by Haley himself in 1968.25 Surprisingly, in view of the declared aims and objectives of the ORS, the executive committee expressed reservations as to the value of the new degree, although it had earlier noted with approval the introduction of short courses on operational research on the Birmingham model at the Borough and Northampton Polytechnics, the Glasgow School of Industrial Administration and the Bristol School of Management. 26 Conjecture suggests that the committee's concerns related to the employability of postgraduate operational researchers in what was still a limited market for such expertise and perhaps even more importantly, the lack of suitable teaching materials in the purely British context. In this respect, there are substantial contrasts with experience in North American universities where the diffusion of operational research into postgraduate curricula was a notable feature of the 1950s. By the end of the decade there were at least ten American university-level institutions with postgraduate teaching programmes in operational research and it was American operational researchers who produced the first genuine textbook on the subject.27 This differing Anglo-American experience can be explained in two main ways. First, it is instructive to compare the postwar careers of Patrick Blackett and Philip Morse, the acknowledged British and American pioneers of operational research. Whilst it is true that Blackett contributed articles on the subject to some of the leading scientific periodicals in the immediate postwar period, after 1950 he virtually disappeared from the world of operational research until the mid-1960s when he was readmitted to political life as an adviser on industrial policy (see above, pp. 315-28). The same can be said of the other great names of British wartime operational research — individuals of the calibre of Tizard, Zuckerman and Bernal — all of them returned after the war to their original academic disciplines in physics, chemistry, anatomy and biology and did not seek to build an academic community of operational researchers. In contrast, although the physicist Morse returned to MIT after his wartime service on behalf of the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group (ASWORG) attached to the US Navy, he subsequently played a pivotal role in the institutional development of operational research.28 In 1952 he became the first president of the newlyformed Operations Research Society of America (ORSA) and used his position as a means to penetrate high-level science and social science organisations. Thus,

372 Operational Research in War and Peace The Social Science Research Council gave me [Morse] a rough time when I told them I believed that operations research differed both in techniques and in subject matter from the social sciences on the one hand and economics on the other and thus had standing as a separate subject. I seemed to convince a few of them. Other O/R veterans also were working for the same ends. We managed to penetrate the sanctum of the National Academy of Sciences, or rather, of its operating subsidiary, the National Research Council (NRC).29 Armed with this success, Morse sought to penetrate academia, focussing initially on engineering schools and their associated departments of industrial engineering. This was exemplified in the case of Johns Hopkins University where the Department of Industrial Engineering collaborated with the US Army Operations Research Office (AORO) in the teaching of operational research. As head of the department, Professor Robert Roy was successful in obtaining AORO funding to expand his faculty and also in persuading Bell Laboratories to fund tuition fees for junior managers participating in postgraduate operational research programmes. By 1960, the department (renamed as the Department of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering) was offering consultancy services to industry and government and had developed particular expertise in the application of operational research to medical care. 30 The Johns Hopkins experience was replicated elsewhere. In addition to Morse's MIT, the Universities of Pennsylvania, California (Los Angeles), Columbia and Cornell, as well as the Case Institute of Technology and Northwestern University, began to offer postgraduate courses in operational research from the mid-1950s onwards. 31 The receptivity of American universities to operational research thus stood in marked contrast to the vast majority of their British counterparts in the 1950s. The suspicion remains, however, that even if Blackett had followed Morse in collaborating with his wartime colleagues to promote operational research as an academic subject, his efforts would have been frustrated by the conservatism of British universities in relation to management and business studies. The fact remains that Morse was able to promote operational research as a legitimate academic pursuit within a university structure which had been at the forefront of management science education since the beginning of the twentieth century. American universities, therefore, could provide the kind of congenial home for operational research which was notable for its absence in Britain in the

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 373 early postwar years. It is significant that the Birmingham initiative was launched from within the University's Institute of Engineering Production, one of the very few British organisations which was in a position to emulate American experience. The flowering of academic operational research in British universities, therefore, had to await the changed climate of the 1960s when academic education for management began to receive serious consideration at a time of rapid corporate change and intensifying competitive pressures on British business. The decade also witnessed the founding of new universities committed to curricula innovations in general and with a greater willingness to engage with management science as the term had come to be understood in North America. 32 Further distinguishing features of operational research in the AngloAmerican context were the differing profiles of the relevant journals and institutional trajectories. ORSA's equivalent of the ORQ was The Journal of the Operations Research Society of America (after 1955, Operations Research) which made its debut in the year of the association's foundation. The initial emphasis was on mathematical and statistical methods but within two years of its inception there was an observable trend in favour of theoretical methods. In this respect, Operations Research made a distinguished contribution to the methodology of operational research with an important sequence of articles on dynamic programming, stock control and production planning, as well as the travelling salesman problem and queuing theory. 33 In 1953, within a year of ORSA's foundation, the Institute of Management Sciences (TIMS) was founded. Management science was defined as a multidisciplinary product requiring mathematics, economics, psychology, sociology, engineering, and other disciplines. However, we believe that management science can also be defined as a separate science within the broad science of sociology. It is related to economics and to political science but different from them. It is the science of the conduct of group enterprise directed in purpose. Like all sciences, management science will employ the scientific method, involving mathematics, model building, and investigative research in seeking understanding of the subject.34 Management science and operational research were therefore 'different but complementary in their purposes.' If the latter represented 'the problem — solving objective,' management science was directed at the accumulation of 'general scientific knowledge.' Whilst it had little in

374 Operational Research in War and Peace the way of 'general laws and general truths/ management science did encompass 'the great body of general management knowledge and experience and...specific operations research applications.' It would therefore help to define 'the fundamental relationships of predictive theory which will distinguish management science as a true science.'35 As in the case of ORSA, TIMS was concerned to demonstrate the multidisciplinary nature of management science by the publication of a journal of that name. From the outset, the pages of Management Science, as well as Operations Research, were sharply differentiated from the ORQ. Early issues, for example, included articles on systems theory and behavioural science and these ranked alongside a sequence of pioneering papers on the mathematics of operational research.36 The ORQ, however, remained committed to the publication of case studies and practiceoriented papers at least until the early 1960s and to that extent it reflected the interests of the practitioner-dominated ORS in contradistinction to the academic and research bias of the ORSA membership. Described by Pat Rivett as an 'intimate little magazine,' 37 the early issues of the ORQ were dominated by papers presented at the meetings of the Operational Research Club and subsequently the Society. It was, in effect, 'the parish magazine' of operational research. It was in this context that in September, 1954 Roger Eddison drew the attention of the ORS executive committee to the generally poor quality and quantity of papers submitted to the ORQ. It was agreed, therefore, that all members of the Society should receive a letter from the President appealing for the submission of more papers. 38 This was followed by the publication in the ORQ of a survey article on operational research methods prepared by W. N. Jessop of Courtaulds. 39 After referring to the 'unhealthy bias towards abstract topics' in the American journals, Jessop warmed to Eddison's concerns: If we are to develop operational research techniques which are of general use in situations recurring in different fields, much more work should be published particularly of the practical example or case history sort. By pooling information on (say) stock control, in the course of time general features should be recognised and methods of approach of wide application developed What practical steps can be taken in this direction? Obviously we in Britain must publish more papers. We are living at a time of expansion in operational research and there must be much work of interest not finding its way into publication. It may well be

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 375 that industrial secrecy accounts for part of this reticence, but surely not enough to account for the pathetic trickle of published work from this country. One is tempted to suppose that some practitioners are so unduly impressed by the ill-gotten reputation of certain techniques and the aura of intense intellectuality surrounding the subject, that they feel diffident about the work they are doing and may even doubt whether they are doing operational research at all. Such inhibitions need to be overcome. Why should not the Operational Research Quarterly have a good half dozen practical examples of operational research per issue instead of two or three.40 The concerns expressed by Eddison and Jessop bore fruit in several ways. Beginning with the volume for 1958, individual issues of the ORQ moved away from their 'parish magazine' format to incorporate a more professional layout, and following the negotiation of a publishing contract with Robert Maxwell's Pergamon Press in 1958, issues began to appear in accordance with the stipulated date of publication. Coincidentally, the number of articles in each volume began to increase significantly so that by the end of the 1960s the typical volume contained more than 40 contributions compared with the norm of less than 12 in the mid-1950s. In terms of content, two trends were observable over the divide of the 1960s. In the first instance, Jessop's appeal for more case study-based papers was amply met insofar as every volume from the later 1950s through to 1970 incorporated articles from practitioners of operational research in an increasingly wide range of industrial settings, reflecting the accelerating diffusion of the discipline. Good examples include John Friend's work on stock control on behalf of the Distillers Company, Whitting's analysis of electricity supply for the Central Electricity Board and Sussam's study of consumer product distribution in relation to the International Publishing Corporation. 41 In addition, there was a steady flow of papers from the industrial pioneers of operational research in coal and steel, together with intermittent contributions on defence-related operational research. The second trend was of long term significance insofar as the publication of increasing numbers of technical and theoretical papers reflected the dissemination of American-derived methods and techniques. In the latter context it is conventional to refer to the first international conference on operational research held at Oxford in 1957.42 Its immediately 'traumatic effect' on the members of FIG has already been noted (see above, p. 260) and its longer term impact was certainly registered in the subsequent tone and content of the ORQ. The

376 Operational Research in War and Peace conference itself was an American initiative with Russell Ackoff of the Case Institute of Technology, and currently serving as vice-president of ORSA, acting as the intermediary. In January 1955 he wrote to Pat Rivett on behalf of ORSA and TIMS setting out a proposal for an 'International Operational Research Meeting' to be held in the summer of 1957.43 In deference to the origins and gestation of operational research, Ackoff suggested that the conference should be held in Britain. The reaction of the ORS executive committee was enthusiastic, with Charles Goodeve and Rivett taking the lead in liaising with their American counterparts — Thornton Page of the Operations Research Office at Johns H o p k i n s University and David Hertz of A r t h u r Andersen and Company. 44 In reflecting on the conference preparations, Page commented that 'there were several major differences in concept to be ironed out: ORS wanted to maintain a scholarly atmosphere, ORSA emphasised the international aspects, and TIMS the organisational aspects of OR.' 45 In the event, a consensus was reached: the number of delegates was to be limited to 250, papers accepted were to be circulated in advance, and the French society of operational research, SOFRO, was invited to join ORSA and the ORS as one of the sponsoring organisations. The conference was held in the first week of September, 1957 and was attended by 242 delegates from 20 countries, as indicated in Table 11. 1.

Table 11.1. Attendance at the first IFORS Conference. Austria Australia Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany India Israel Italy

1 7 5 5 3 25 4 27 17 8

Japan The Netherlands Norway Poland South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States

2 14 5 2 1 2 17 2 80 56

Source: G. K. Rand, 'IFORS: the formative years,' International Transactions in Operations Research, Vol. 7 (2000), Table 1, p. 103.

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 377 In Pat Rivett's recollection, the conference 'went tremendously well.' 46 The 'scholarly atmosphere' was virtually guaranteed by the location at two of Oxford's most prestigious colleges — Balliol and Magdalen, whilst any tendency towards verbosity in the delivery of papers was pre-empted by a seven-minute time limit determined by flashing green and red lights. Of the twenty eight papers incorporated in the published proceedings, 47 it is possible to identify five categories: definitional; programmatic; expository; technical; and case studies. British operational researchers contributed ten of the papers with half of them devoted to case studies. In this respect, there was a significant contrast with the North American contributions. As The Economist noted, in commenting on the conference programme, The American approach to operational research differs significantly from the British; the experts from the United States were concerned more with the elaboration of its techniques and with the study of large working systems in all their ramifications than with the practical case studies and applications British speakers described,48 As Keys has observed, the conference marked a decisive step towards the ending of the 'independent development' of operational research in Britain and the USA.49 Henceforth, the British community of operational researchers was to be exposed to an increasing range of American-derived models, techniques and applications which were to become embedded in the discipline. An important facilitating factor in the diffusion of advanced operational research techniques was the publication in the same year of the conference of the first text in operational research to present a unified view of the discipline. Derived from courses delivered at the Case Institute, Introduction to Operations Research encompassed the available models in operational research, describing them in detail and identifying their relevance to a variety of industrial processes. 5 0 A further contribution to Anglo-American convergence in the content of operational research was the decision taken at the Oxford conference to accept Thornton Page's proposal that a second meeting should be held at another European venue. His suggestion that an international federation of national operational research societies should be formed was also approved. Both of these decisions bore fruit in the form of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS) and in the 1960 IFORS conference held at Aix-en-Provence, France. IFORS itself was launched formally in January 1959. It consisted of the three

378 Operational Research in War and Peace recognised national societies at that time — the ORS, ORSA and SOFRO. The ORS was invited to provide the first secretary and treasurer of the new organisation and the honours were bestowed appropriately on Charles Goodeve and Donald Hicks respectively. The aims of IFORS, as set out in the original statutes, were to secure 'the development of operational research as a unified science and its advancement in all nations of the world.' This was to be achieved by (1) Sponsoring of international conferences and meetings. (2) Providing other means for the exchange of information on operational research between nations. (3) Encouraging the establishment of national operational research societies. (4) Maintaining standards of competence in operational research. (5) Encouraging the teaching of operational research. (6) Promoting the development of specific parts of operational research, for example, to ensure a balance within that science or to open up new fields.51 By the time of the Aix-en-Provence conference, IFORS had ten affiliated societies with a total membership of 4000. In the years down to 1970, the recruitment of further national societies reflected the gradual diffusion of operational research across national frontiers (see Table 11.2 below). In terms of networking and formal information flows, IFORS presided over a sequence of triennial conferences, all of which resulted

Table 11.2.

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1966 1969 1970

The National Societies in IFORS, with their year of joining.

France, UK, USA Australia, Belgium, Canada, India, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden Japan Argentina, West Germany, Italy Denmark, Spain, Switzerland Greece, Ireland, Mexico Brazil, Israel New Zealand

Source: G. K. Rand, 'Forty Years of IFORS/ Table 1, p. 2.

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 379 in the publication of conference proceedings, 52 and also established International Abstracts of Operational Research as a means of disseminating knowledge of the development of operational research in differing national settings. 53 Within the ORS, one consequence of the Oxford conference was the stimulation of interest in an annual British-based meeting. Following a suggestion from Dr K. Pennycuik of ICI, the executive committee agreed to sponsor a two-day conference to be held at Harrogate in May 1958. Unlike the Oxford conference, it would be open to members and nonmembers. The decision to proceed was taken in spite of Charles Goodeve's strong opinion that two days 'is too long by a factor of two/ and all the more so since the conference was being held so soon after the international meeting. 54 No doubt Goodeve would have been surprised to learn that the Harrogate initiative was to cast a long shadow forwards in the form of an ongoing programme of such conferences to the point where they expanded to incorporate an ever-increasing range of parallel sessions. As Pat Rivett recalled, 'we went round all the watering holes to begin with... — Harrogate, Leamington, Cheltenham,' suggesting that some, at least, of those attending possessed 'the best set of kidneys in the whole of British industry!' 55 According to Rivett, attendance at the early conferences was in the range of '50 or 80 people' of whom the overwhelming majority were practitioners of operational research. Certainly, by the late 1950s the membership of the ORS had risen to the point where an annual conference was a realistic proposition in terms of a potential attendance. At the end of 1955, the total membership stood at 220. This included 47 associate members, a category introduced at the beginning of the year in order to encompass 'those who did not have the necessary experience in operational research, but were interested in the subject.'56 By the end of 1959, the total membership exceeded 500 (including more than 200 associates). Thereafter, recruitment accelerated markedly so that during the 1960s the average annual rate of increase was in excess of 15 per cent. By 1970, the total membership, augmented by students, had reached 2,565. A profile of the ORS membership, published in the ORQ in 1969, p r o v i d e d revealing insights into the composition of the Society's membership in the context of the accelerating diffusion of operational research after I960. 57 Based upon 1,355 questionnaire responses, the median age of the respondents was approximately 30 years with one-third in the 25-30 range and 70 per cent 35 or younger. The average length of career in operational research was 4.7 years,

380 Operational Research in War and Peace and only 14 per cent had more than 10 years' of experience. In terms of their sectoral allegiance, the respondents classified themselves as follows:

Table 11.3. Area of employment in operational research. /o

Industrial/commercial Military Consultancy Academic Others

65.1 2.2 15.0 11.1 6.6

Source: S. Eilon, J. Hough and R. J. Betts, 'Profile of Current Members of the Operational Research Society/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 20 (1969), Table 5, p. 251.

Within the d o m i n a n t industrial a n d commercial g r o u p i n g , the metallurgical and chemical and allied industries loomed large, whilst the 'others' category was virtually coterminous with the oil industry. The median salary for all respondents was £2,150 per annum, whilst ten per cent received more than £3,500, albeit with a very long tail of this distribution. To place the former salary in perspective, at a time when salaries in British universities were relatively competitive, annual remuneration in excess of £2,000 was consistent with a senior lecturer-level appointment. This is all the more i m p r e s s i v e in view of the youthful profile of the ORS membership, and bearing in mind that most aspirants to senior university positions were above 40 years of age. Thus, in terms of Perkin's analysis of the rise of professional society, operational researchers may be viewed as strikingly successful in establishing their claims to preferment, at least if monetary reward is viewed as a critical indicator of professional status. Whilst the operational research c o m m u n i t y h a d e x p a n d e d considerably d u r i n g the 1960s, the 'Ricardian rent' element in the level of remuneration was guaranteed by the excess of demand in relation to supply. As for academic allegiance, the first degrees held by respondents were distributed as follows:

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 381 Table 11.4. Respondents' first degree subject.

Arts Mathematics/ statistics Pure sciences Mechanical engineering Electrical engineering Other engineering Economics/P.P.E Sociology/ psychology Others

% 2.1 36.3 23.6 9.3 4.8 9.5 7.5 1.4 5.2

Source: Eilon, Hough and Betts, op. cit, Table 12, p. 253.

Thus, mathematics and statistics and the pure sciences together accounted for nearly 60 per cent of the total, although it is significant that the behavioural sciences which had been well represented in the wartime operational research groups were notable for their absence. As the authors of the survey concluded, Emerging from this study, it seems that the operational research worker is typically young, has impressive academic qualifications and is highly mobile. There is evidence that he is becoming increasingly more professional by training, and an undergraduate background in mathematics and statistics appears to be predominant.58 The references to academic achievement and professionalism in the context of training point to a further significant aspect of the survey, namely the discovery that nearly 40 per cent of the respondents possessed a postgraduate qualification. Of these, 20.5 per cent possessed a doctorate, 45.9 per cent a masters degree, and 27.5 per cent a diploma. Significantly, nearly 60 per cent of the respondents stated that their qualification was within the field of operational research, a proportion consistent with the introduction, from the late 1950s onwards, of formal taught programmes in the discipline. 59 It has already been noted that the Institute for Engineering Production at the University of Birmingham was responsible for the first taught masters degree in operational research (see above, p. 370), although the subject had earlier been incorporated in a postgraduate

382 Operational Research in War and Peace course in production management at Imperial College.60 In the late 1950s, these were pioneering developments of considerable significance at a time when university and tertiary college-level courses in the subject were confined to short lecture and seminar programmes catering for the needs of industrial and commercial managers. 61 Thereafter, however, operational research began to gain momentum as an academic subject worthy of university-level discourse. In this respect, a crucial role was fulfilled by Pat Rivett during his period of office as President of the Operational Research Society in 1962-3. By then, Rivett had resigned from FIG to take up a London-based appointment as head of operational research on behalf of Arthur Andersen, the well-known Chicago firm of management consultants. In the 1950s, the elected presidents of the national society had been established public figures in the worlds of science and Whitehall and all of them had been persuaded to stand for office in the hope and expectation that they would prove to be active ambassadors on behalf of the operational research community. Thus, the first two presidents — Sir Owen Wansbrough-Jones and Sir William Slater — were senior civil servants in the Whitehall scientific establishment, whilst the third, Professor M. G. Kendall, was an eminent statistician at the London School of Economics. Kendall was then followed by the Earl of Halsbury, recently retired as managing director of the National Research Development Corporation. The role of Halsbury's father (then Lord Tiverton) during the First World War as an operational research pioneer was highlighted in Chapter 2 (see above, p. 35) and it was certainly a coup for the society to engage the interest of his son in view of his status as a Fellow of the Royal Society and long experience of public affairs. Rivett's election was, in part, the product of Halsbury's advocacy on his behalf in the belief that 'the old men' should 'clear out' 62 and that 'a horny-handed son of toil' should alternate with the 'great men.' 6 3 Rivett's personal mission as president was 'to get universities interested' in operational research and to engage the interest of the wider community. He was certainly active in the latter respect during his period of office, addressing numerous local chambers of commerce, and even appearing on BBC television as the presenter of four programmes on operational research in 'prime time' slots.64 As for the university community, Rivett recalls visits to Reading, Exeter and Manchester. Of these the most fruitful was the journey to the north west, although the outcome was hardly what Rivett could have expected insofar as it led to his own transfer to academia. His point of contact at Manchester was the distinguished industrial economist, Charles (later

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 383 Sir Charles) Carter. Interestingly, Carter already had some acquaintance with operational research as a result of a fortuitous meeting with Russell Ackoff. This had taken place in advance of his meeting with Rivett when they both addressed the board of directors of Unilever on the relevance of their respective disciplines to business management. 65 Following Carter's appointment as Vice-Chancellor of the new University of Lancaster in 1963, it is by no means coincidental that the creation of a department of operational research was one of his early academic priorities. 66 With the Earl of Halsbury acting as 'go-between,' Rivett met Carter and Sir Noel Hall, the chairman of the University's planning board, at the Athenaeum Club in order to discuss the possibility of moving from his consultancy position at Arthur Andersen to take up the first established chair in operational research at a British university. As Rivett recalls, I talked about what I wanted to do, which was very much in the image of the Case Institute because I had been [there] and I knew Russ [Ackoff] well and I always thought that this was the way we should do it — project based, earning the money, demon­ strating that you could do it in anger...and creating posts and having studentships — this sort of thing appealed to them both so they offered me the job and I took it.67 Rivett's first problem was to recruit staff for his new department and in this respect he had recourse to the only pool of talent available — the existing community of operational research practitioners. In his later years at FIG, Rivett had sought to create an 'academic' environment in order to persuade his colleagues of the relevance of the American techniques of analysis that had he had encountered at the Case Institute and which featured prominently at the Oxford conference in 1957 (see above, pp. 375-7). It was understandable, therefore, that the initial core of his department should consist of former colleagues within FIG, notably Mike Simpson and Alan Mercer, reinforced subsequently by colleagues from the operational research group at RTB. In the autumn of 1964, the department inaugurated an MSc programme in operational research with an intake of 10 students. They were taught on the basis of Ackoff's Case Institute model with instruction in the techniques of operational research accompanied by supervised projects of a practical nature in collaboration with approved firms. Interestingly, this model had formed the basis of the pioneering Birmingham MSc degree, where two terms of teaching were followed by an industrially-based project.

384 Operational Research in War and Peace In the Lancaster case, the subscribing firms were charged consultancy fees and with a stream of income coming in from a sequence of short courses directed at practitioners, the department was able to offer studentships in advance of such provision by the Science Research Council. In its original incarnation the Lancaster department was committed exclusively to postgraduate education, but in the early 1970s courses in operational research began to be offered to undergraduate students, initially in the context of a 'triple major' degree where the subject was combined with mathematics and economics. By then, Rivett h a d departed for the new University of Sussex as the foundation professor of operational research, whilst Simpson and Mercer had been promoted to professorial rank. 68 If Lancaster University p r o v i d e s the prime example of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of operational research into a new university, the representative experience in the 1960s was for the discipline to be launched within existing academic frameworks, replicating in some respects the experience at Birmingham in the 1950s. This was exemplified in the case of Imperial College, and the University of Strathclyde. At Imperial College, the gestation of operational research can be traced through the career of Samuel Eilon, destined to become one of the most influential members of the academic community of operational researchers. 69 In 1955, the year in which Eilon completed his Ph.D. thesis in the Department of Mechanical Engineering, he was informed by his head of department, Owen (later Sir Owen) Saunders, that the College had decided 'to launch production engineering and management studies as a part of the big expansion of postgraduate education.' Following the appointment of Dr Nicol Gross as the first Reader in Production Engineering, Eilon accepted Saunders' offer of a temporary lectureship in his department with a view to assisting Gross in devising a one-year postgraduate course in production engineering. This would lead to the Diploma of Membership of Imperial College (DIC), at that time the highest postgraduate qualification that the College could award for a taught course at this level. In terms of a division of labour, Gross took responsibility for teaching production technology whilst Eilon agreed to develop the production management element of the course. The latter would embrace operational research in accordance with Eilon's developing interest in the subject. In the event, responsibility for launching the course fell entirely on Eilon's shoulders following Gross's resignation to take up a senior managerial position at British Oxygen. After the first cohort of five students had completed the course in 1956

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 385 Eilon was appointed head of the newly-formed Production Engineering Section. Following a period of secondment as Associate Professor at the Technion, Israel Institute of Technology where he was responsible for a new MSc course in operational research, Eilon returned to Imperial College in 1959 as Reader in Production Engineering. In the succeeding years, he presided over the expansion and consolidation of operational research as a subject of advanced postgraduate study. A major development took place in 1961 when a new one-year course in Operational Research and Management Studies (ORMS) was launched to complement the existing programme in engineering production. At the same time, the Production Engineering Section was renamed as the Production Engineering and Management Studies Section and it was under the auspices of the new organisation that successful completion of the ORMS and production engineering courses resulted in the award of an MSc. In 1966, responsibility for production technology was passed to the Department of Mechanical Engineering and five years later the new Department of Management Science was founded with Eilon as head of department and with the title of Professor of Management Science. By that time, the work of Eilon and his colleagues had won international recognition both foi| the quality of their teaching and publications in the field of operational research. In this respect, it is interesting to note Eilon's reasons fgr the choice of 'management science' for the department's title. In his historical account of the development of operational research at Imperial College, Eilon comments as follows: Management is concerned with the analysis of alternative courses of action, with efficient and effective deployment of resources, with planning, and with execution. It is the art of the possible and the attainable. It should not be concerned just with what managers actually do in the course of their work, but in the main with what managers can and should do. The ability to pose penetrating questions about industrial and business operations, the ability to solve problems and create new opportunities, the ability to project forward and implement plans — these are the major attributes that are vital for management to operate effectively. The aim of management education is to help students acquire a state of mind and such knowledge that would expedite the process of developing these attributes.70 As for the quantitative basis of operational research Eilon accepted that

386 Operational Research in War and Peace For most people, the term Management Science is synonymous with that of Operational Research, but my preference for the former was to emphasise our concern with real managerial problems, rather than with mathematical models per se.71 It was, in fact, one of the defining characteristics of Eilon's approach to the teaching of operational research that students should engage directly with case-study material. In 1966, for example, he introduced 'business policy' as an elective subject in the management science programme. This w a s organised in two parts, the first elaborating on basic concepts in operational research and the second consisting of case studies 'researched and written by the students themselves' rather than being drawn from textbooks. Operating on a 'team' basis, the case studies entailed active engagement with leading companies such as ICI, Ford, British Oxygen and Boots. The end-report was then presented at a seminar attended by a senior manager from the company concerned. The University of Strathclyde was founded in 1964 as the successor institution to the Royal College of Science and Technology. In this particular setting, it seems likely that the introduction of operational research w a s e n c o u r a g e d by i n d i v i d u a l s w h o possessed s o m e acquaintance with the discipline's wartime achievements. For example, Joan Curran, wife of the first Principal of the new university, Samuel C u r r a n , h a d w o r k e d w i t h A. P. Rowe, S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of the Telecommunications Research Establishment, to produce 'Window' as a counter-measure against the German radar system in the context of Bomber Command's campaign of area attack. 72 Professor T. T. Paterson, head of the Department of Industrial Administration, also had experience of military operational research and it was under his auspices that the discipline was introduced to Strathclyde. W. A. (Bill) Donaldson took up the first appointment in operational research as a senior lecturer in Paterson's department in December, 1962 whilst Norman Lawrie was appointed to a lectureship in the following summer. Further staff were recruited in succeeding years — D. J. (Doug) White as Reader in 1964 and A. K. S Jardine and John Macfarlane as lecturers in 1964 and 1967 respectively. In 1968 a separate Department of Operational Research was founded with White as the first professor. 73 Among the early recruits, only White possessed an academic background in operational research having recently completed his doctorate following the award of an MSc in operational research from the University of Birmingham. Lawrie came to Strathclyde after service with IBM in London and Glasgow and as the former head of the computer section at Bruce Peebles and Co., heavy

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 387 electrical engineers of Edinburgh. Whilst in London he had worked on a 'transportation problem' package for the CEGB and therefore possessed some knowledge of linear programming. 74 The teaching of operational research was inaugurated in the academic year 1963-4 in the form of two courses delivered to final year honours mechanical engineering students reading for the Associateship of the Royal College of Science and Technology and degrees of the University of Glasgow. Initially restricted to 'The Application of Techniques of Measurement to Management Decision Making and Planning' and 'An Appreciation of Operational Research, Systems Analysis, Data Processing and the Use of Computers,' by the mid-1960s the syllabus had evolved to encompass such core techniques as 'Inventory Control, Queuing Theory, Critical Path Analysis, Quality Control, Linear Programming, [and] Dynamic Programming.' In succeeding years, operational research was taught to naval architects and production engineers, and to postgraduate engineering students in Manufacturing Sciences. At the same time, the discipline was introduced into the undergraduate School of Business and Administration. In the academic year, 1964-5, 'operational analysis' was incorporated as a unit within the Industrial Administration (Techniques) specialist subject taught to second and third year students. As well as providing an introduction to 'the techniques of operational research,' the unit embraced 'data-processing, including an introduction to computational methods.' Strathclyde was unusual to the extent that courses in operational research were first offered at undergraduate level. In 1965, however, an 'MSc in Operational Analysis' was introduced. In Norman Lawrie's recollection, the degree title was chosen with care insofar as Bill Donaldson argued persuasively that analysis was a better description of what 'OR' people did in applied fields in industry and elsewhere than research; and that the MSc's title should reflect that reality. The term 'operational analysis' was current in the USA at the time and was used by the military in Britain.75 In 1967 the title was changed in favour of operational research. The reasoning here was primarily financial because funding for postgraduate studentships from the Science Research Council was more readily available for courses identifiable by the dominant nomenclature. As in the case of Imperial College, the Strathclyde degree was, in part, projectbased and this was a component of the course which was of special appeal to students.

388 Operational Research in War and Peace Other universities where operational research had been introduced as an academic subject by the early 1970s include Aston, Brunei (see above, p. 267), Edinburgh, Hull, the LSE, Sussex and Warwick. In 1961, the subject had been introduced at postgraduate level at the Cranfield College of Aeronautics following the creation of an O.R. and Statistics Section within the Production Department. The resulting Diploma course replicated experience elsewhere with the teaching of mathematical and statistical techniques complemented by team and individual projects. A similar programme had been inaugurated at the LSE in 1960 on the recommendation of Professor M. G. Kendall. Introduced initially for BISRA apprentices, the course was designed to capitalise on existing expertise in the delivery of short, intensive courses in operational research for BP and other corporate employees which had been introduced in 1958 with the support of the Operational Research Society.76 In the later 1960s operational research began to penetrate into the new polytechnic sector, albeit in the form of evening courses. George Mitchell, then employed in FIG, was particularly active at this level among the London-based institutions, organising and, in part or whole, delivering regular evening lectures at the City and Borough Road Polytechnics. 77 In this light, it is fair to say that if the Anglo-American 'corporate gap' had been closed substantially by 1970, this applies also to the academic deficit in operational research. Even allowing for the expository gifts of individuals of the calibre of Goodeve and Rivett, this was a major achievement in view of the innate conservatism of the academic community in general. Whilst it is true that operational research had its high-level academic 'champions,' such as Charles Carter and Samuel Curran, who replicated in higher education the advocacy roles fulfilled by Goodeve, Sir Charles Ellis, and Sir William Armstrong, there could be no guarantee that the subject would receive formal academic recognition. The 1960s may have been a notable decade for university expansion in the light of the recommendations of the Robbins Report (see above, p. 23), but the existing profile of operational research as a subject for postgraduate study could only be viewed as marginal to the more central task of expanding the number of undergraduate students across the range of academic specialisms. By the early 1970s, there were more than ten professors of operational research or management science in British universities, and in fulfilment of the Robbins vision, undergraduate provision was expanding rapidly.78 In retrospect, however, the expansion of academic operational research was to prove controversial

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 389 in relation to the aims and objectives of the wider community of operational researchers. In particular, the charge was to be levelled that the n a s c e n t academic s u b - c o m m u n i t y w a s responsible for the dissemination of a dangerous 'myth' in proclaiming that operational research was a 'hard' science akin to, say, physics or chemistry, with a repertoire of 'elegant models and mathematics' which were of practical and direct relevance to practitioners. 79 One of the more remarkable aspects of the history of operational research is the rapid onset after 1970 of a sustained period of doubt and uncertainty concerning the future of the discipline following on from the expansionary and optimistic experience of the later 1950s and 1960s. The growing lack of confidence in the historic achievements of operational research and its practical relevance affected practitioners and academics alike and the remainder of the chapter is devoted to explaining this phenomenon. It is a point well taken that the key institution in securing the postwar diffusion of operational research was the company-based group in the guise of internal consultancy.80 Chapters 7 and 8 have highlighted the critical roles fulfilled by operational research groups in the iron and steel and coal industries. The relevant groups determined not only the content and direction of practitioner-based operational research, they also provided many of the original officers of the Operational Research Society. In addition, they were the recruiting ground for the first generation of university appointments in the subject. Chapter 9, moreover, has drawn attention to the fact that by the end of the 1960s, operational research had achieved substantial penetration into the wider corporate sector even though its depth and penetration at the industry-specific level may have been superficial. In 1950, Patrick Blackett had drawn an analogy between the operational research group on the one hand and the Texas Rangers and the FBI in their capacity as 'autonomous scientific investigators.' In referring to the experience of the wartime operational research sections, Blackett claimed that 'the most fertile tasks were often found by the groups themselves rather than given to them.' Hence, 'the scope of [operational research] activities was seen as unconstrained, at least by the managerial culture in which it developed.' 81 The wartime model of operational research was also applied to the composition of operational research groups. Thus, in 1957, McCloskey and Swan agreed that groups should be organised on a multidisciplinary basis, supplemented by corporate managers in search of solutions to problems. 82 In 1958, Brough argued that there was a need for

390 Operational Research in War and Peace a comprehensive management staff service capable of providing executives at all levels with competent advice and accurate evidence concerning the problems involved in the conduct and organization of both the operations and administration of the business. This should include within the one unit not only people trained in pure scientific principles but also people trained in the more intuitive disciplines such as engineering and accountancyP As Fildes and Ranyard have pointed out, however, survey evidence of postwar recruitment patterns points to the fact that a majority of 'civil' operational researchers possessed academic allegiances rooted in mathematics, engineering and the hard sciences, whereas many of their wartime predecessors had embraced the behavioural sciences. 84 The consequences of this narrowing of recruitment can be illustrated by reference to the soul-searching and agonising which was to afflict the operational research community in the 1970s. The presidential address to the Operational Research Society in 1974 was delivered by Rolfe Tomlinson, the then head of the NCB's operational research group. As a direct participant in the expansion of the discipline in the 1960s, Tomlinson took pride in reminding his audience of the diffusion of operational research into manufacturing, the state-owned public utilities, an increasing range of government departments, and the discipline's incorporation into university-level curricula. Other developments of note included the penetration of operational research into the financial services sector and its increasing application to social issues following the foundation of the Institute for Operational Research and the Local Government Operational Research Unit. In the light of these developments, Tomlinson entitled his address 'OR Is,' signifying that the operational research community, embracing both practitioners and academics, had achieved impressive credibility in the private and public sectors entirely in conformity with Perkin's concept of the 'rise of professional society.'85 Tomlinson's message would have been even more impressive if he had highlighted the continuation of military operational research and the development after 1960 of external consultancy organisations offering expertise in the resolution of managerial problems on the basis of operational research. 86 But having drawn the attention of his audience to the rationale for the title of his address, Tomlinson then asked why the current mood of the Society signally failed to reflect these substantial achievements. It is clear, in retrospect, therefore, that Tomlinson was attempting to stem a crisis of self-confidence which had begun to afflict the operational research community. His message was

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all the m o r e compelling in the light of its close proximity to a n earlier presidential a d d r e s s delivered to the Operational Research Society in 1970 b y Stafford Beer. Reference h a s a l r e a d y b e e n m a d e to Beer's ambitions for operational research in the context of the election of the Labour G o v e r n m e n t in 1964 (see above, p p . 336-7). His 1970 a d d r e s s registered his extreme disillusionment in this respect: For a quarter of a century leading members of this society have tried to gain an acceptance for operational research in the scientific management of civil affairs commensurate with its war-time contribution in the military field. A certain amount has been done, which I earnestly wish to acknowledge. There have been valuable if isolated results in a few departments of state. The same can be said about a very few local and regional authorities, the Greater London Council at their head. But anybody soaked in the early history of OR and its immediate postwar promise undoubtedly feels let down. This is the cause for anger with which I began. And yet the feeling of anger almost dissolves into feelings of bewilderment and regret... By the end of the 'forties it might have seemed that the days of positive anti-science in government were past. It was said at that time, with amused disgust, that we had seen the last of them. A m e m o r a n d u m issued within the Civil Service in 1934 had supposedly recommended that senior officers should not sit in conference with scientists. Ridiculous, everyone was saying by 1949. But less than two years ago a distinguished civil servant — our own then president — was on this very occasion concerned lest a myth arise that operational research were [sic] less than an 'integral and essential part' of management. The fact is that we had not after all gained the point. We have not gained it to this day. 87 The i m m e d i a t e c o n s e q u e n c e of B e e r ' s p u b l i c l y - s t a t e d c o n c e r n s w a s ' M a r l o w Seventy' — a specially c o n v e n e d m e e t i n g of the council of the ORS w i t h the express a i m of reforming its structure in order ' t o build our Society into a p r o p e r vehicle for the aspirations of its m e m b e r s . ' 8 8 In a s u m m a r y s t a t e m e n t of the conference deliberations, Beer identified the key issues for debate as follows:

392 Operational Research in War and Peace It is part of the resolution of the long-standing argument about professional status that we should aim to say this: 'Yes of course an OR man you can trust holds the Society's top professional rank — not because he would not be allowed to operate without it..., but because he inevitably plays a major role in the affairs of his profession.' That is where we want to be. We could not say this today. At a guess, there are as many OR men — good ones — outside the society as are in it. They read our journal on a circulation list basis, and are therefore subsidized by the membership. Let them now come forward and take up the cause in person.89 The result of the Marlow conference was a plan of reform which was designed to overcome the existing ambivalence in 'The conduct of the Society's affairs' as reflected in its national meetings, its publications and educational efforts. As Beer's report stated, We begin with the question of national meetings, held in London, which well exemplify the problem and are not well attended. They are mostly interesting: but the programme as a whole is inevitably designed to be all things to all men. This is not a criticism of the programme but an acceptance of the inappropriateness in the 'seventies of traditions inherited from and suitable for the 'forties. The national Society will not continue to hold these meetings after the current session. Instead, it will convene a few national meetings, each designed with a specific and attainable purpose, and armed with a proper organization to ensure its success.90 The main thrust of the reforms, therefore, was towards a substantial decentralisation of the Society's structure and business with the aim of engaging the interest both of operational research practitioners and managers. In one sense this was mere recognition of one of the principal developments of the 1960s, namely the creation of regional societies complemented by specialist discussion groups, many of which lay outside the national Society and levied their own subscriptions. In this light, the Marlow Plan proposed that the national Society should adopt a federal organisation with a substantial rationalisation of the committee structure. It was also recommended that there should be only one class of membership together with the formation of a 'professional register.' Controversial in its contemporary context and only partially endorsed at a general meeting of the Society (the proposals relating to 'professionalism' did not achieve the necessary 75 per cent majority at the subsequent annual general meeting of the Society), the Marlow Plan

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 393 singularly failed to resolve the 'crisis of confidence' within the operational research community which was the subject of Tomlinson's later presidential address. 91 In explaining this situation, it is evident that longer term concerns were beginning to interact with more recent developments. In the former category, there was the growing perception — highlighted by Beer — that operational research had failed to capitalise on it strategic relevance as defined by Patrick Blackett — notwithstanding the fact that the overwhelming contribution of the discipline to military effectiveness during the war had been at the tactical level. To the extent that the vast majority of peacetime work had also been 'tactical,' it had been consistent with a gradual slippage of status of operational research groups in relation to senior management. 92 Chapter 7 has drawn attention to this phenomenon in the context of the iron and steel industry, both in terms of BISRA and some of the leading iron and steel companies. In this setting, it was somewhat ironic that Tomlinson's presidential address noted the recent demise of BISRA's operational research division. In a much broader context, applicable also to American experience, it is evident that the post-1950 diffusion of operational research into the industrial sector had been facilitated by the ongoing process of economic growth in conditions of relative international economic stability. The discipline had therefore been production-oriented in the postwar sellers' market. As Pat Rivett commented with respect to his own experience as a practitioner of the discipline, For many years those of us in Operational Research had a rather easy and exciting life. Our life was easy because the national economies in which we worked were expanding, new job opportunities were constantly being created and the growth of the organizations which we served, which is one of the fundamental objectives of all organizations, was more or less assured by the continuing growth of the economies in which we worked.93 But even as operational research groups were proliferating in Britain in the 1960s, macroeconomic instability was increasingly evident in the face of exchange rate and balance of payments crises. A rising trend of imports accompanied the end of the postwar sellers' market leading to concerns over de-industrialisation in the 1970s.94 Externally, the end of the 'golden age' of western economic growth was signalled by the devaluation of the US dollar in 1972 and the first oil crisis in 1973-4. It is a facile point, but in an increasingly 'messy' international environment following the relative stability of the 1950s and 1960s, a discipline with

394 Operational Research in War and Peace its roots embedded firmly in the 'hard science' or 'classical' methodology forged in the later 1940s and 1950s was bound to encounter a crisis of confidence. 95 The very fact that classical operational research was being questioned after 1970 provoked further anxieties concerning the discipline's claim to scientific status. The most eloquent, if extreme, denunciation of the scientific pretensions of operational research was provided by Dando and Sharp's paper published in 1978. % In this, they argued that the emergence of the 'hard' science ideal had been fostered by the belief, extant in the 1950s, that rational, physical science would provide the solution to the world's problems. Anticipating Andrew Abbott (see below, p. 401), they claimed that the 'myth' of the scientific status of operational research had been perpetuated in the 1960s by its emergence as an academic discipline validated by the application of increasingly complex mathematics. Moreover, the early 'tactical' production-led successes of industry-based operational research groups had reinforced these trends because it had been possible to use 'simple models and elegant mathematics, and easily to implement some "solutions" as the environment was uncomplicated.' 97 In a 1974 article, Rivett expressed the view that linear p r o g r a m m i n g a n d other methodological developments had taken the operational research community 'at high speed down a very attractive algebraic blind alley.' In a more complex world there was a need for a new 'social dimension' to the discipline: simplification of complex problems could be modelled but courses of action should be formulated which did not depend solely upon mathematical modelling. 98 It is significant that attempts to move beyond the straitjacket imposed by mathematical modelling had begun as early as 1962 when the ORS executive committee decided to support 'a proposal that an "Institute for Operational Research" (IOR) [should] be formed within the matrix of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations.' The relevant minute called for operational researchers to engage in 'an active partnership with social scientists, since their discipline was concerned with 'whole organisations, and seeks policies which are best for the whole rather than for the individual parts of an organisation.' 99 The IOR was formed in 1963 under the direction of Neil Jessop, who had succeeded A. W. Swan as head of the operational research group at Courtaulds, and this was followed in 1964 by a joint ORS/Tavistock Institute conference on the interface between operational research and the social sciences.100 Inspired in part by the advocacy of Russell Ackoff, the IOR developed a distinctive

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 395 'school' of operational research based upon the concept and practice of 'action research' as pioneered by the social scientists employed in the Tavistock Institute since its inception in 1947. In the latter half of the 1960s, therefore, A recognizable IOR style of working began to emerge through undertaking projects at the frontiers — and through a gradual transfer, almost by osmosis, of social science practices in the negotiation and management of change processes, and in the recording and use of data. To generalize, this style of work emphasised interaction with groups of people from client organizations in order to create a shared, often diagrammatic, view of the situation. Flip-chart paper and felt-tip pens were often the only technological element, and where computers were used, the emphasis was on presenting outputs that could be discussed by groups.101 Early work focussed on operational problems in 'multi-organizations,' such as communication channels in the building industry, policy making and planning in local government, and management and adaptation to change in hospitals. 102 The second arid third of these projects resulted in book-length studies which helped to'define the 'IOR School' in terms of its methodology. 103 In the early 1970s, the IOR developed close relations with operational researchers in the Civil Service Department, working on problems of manpower planning in the context of Civil Service dispersal (see above, pp. 351-2). This was followed by a sequence of projects on health planning, regional policy and urban deprivation, culminating in the application of 'strategic choice' to problems of urban and transport planning. 104 The IOR produced some excellent work in the area of public sector policy, with much of it achieving international recognition in Europe and beyond. Ultimately, however, it was to be viewed as the exception to the general rule of the limited engagement of the operational research community with problems in the general area of applied social scinece, a point made repeatedly at the anniversary conference held in 1979. If the 1970s were marked by a growing sense of crisis within the operational research community, it can only be said that the temperature of debate was raised to new heights by the intervention of the American operational researcher, Russell Ackoff. In a 1961 publication charting the progress of the discipline, Ackoff had cited, with approval, Bevan's opinion that

396 Operational Research in War and Peace OR should be applied example, to an industry system as opposed to a reason why OR should concerned with national

effectively to broad problems, as for as opposed to the bench, to a transport railway track. Incidentally, I can see no not be applied in the future to studies planning and policy.105

This view resonates with the optimism expressed in the 1948 Industrial Productivity Report on operational research and also with the wider remit for the discipline espoused by Stafford Beer in 1964 (see above, pp. 336-7). By the late 1970s, however, Ackoff, distinguished pioneer and enthusiast for operational research, was deeply disillusioned with the course and conduct of the discipline on both sides of the Atlantic. Reflecting the global political and economic uncertainties of the 1970s, he too underlined the notion of messes — in his terms 'dynamic situations that consist of complex systems of changing problems that interact with each other,' thereby rendering optimal solutions meaningless. In papers read to the 1978 conference of the Operational Research Society, Ackoff called for a 'new paradigm' in which operational research should replace its problem-solving orientation by one that focussed on the planning and design of systems. 106 In elaborating on the reasons for his disillusion, Ackoff reserved particular opprobrium for the community of academic operational researchers. It is well known that Patrick Blackett, noting the development of the discipline after 1950, periodically inveighed against 'the evils of increasingly complex mathematics which served only to obscure 'real issues.' 107 In a memorable phrase Ackoff himself referred to i n d u s t r i a l m a n a g e r s ' e q u a t i o n of operational research w i t h 'mathematical masturbation,' denoting the takeover of the subject by second-generation academics devoid of 'knowledge of organisations, institutions or their management.' 108 Indeed, the mounting obsession with mathematical models and algorithms had been instrumental in eroding one of the vital strengths of wartime operational research — its interdisciplinarity. Ackoff's concerns were expressed by others. In a 1974 article, the former retail executive turned academic operational researcher, W. G. McClelland, observed that OR can rarely represent the full range of alternatives open to management. The mere construction of a model (explicitly or implicitly, and sometimes usefully) shuts out some alternatives. What one would like to see, therefore, is an alternation between mathematical techniques and creativity. Before model construction

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 397 begins to shut out alternatives, let there be a good look around all conceivable possibilities. After a model has produced the optimum within its own terms of reference, let this optimum be compared with what other approaches might conceivably have to offer.109 A further issue concerned the ability of managers to implement solutions based on the application of mathematics: Granted that the model's prescription would be better than the existing situation, granted that the value of the improvement would exceed the costs of transition from the present to the preferred state, are those who will have to implement the change going to be prepared to do so?110 In McClelland's view, line managers were bound to see operational research as a threat because it held out the prospect of unwelcome change in terms of personal adaptation. In any event, the lead times before any benefit accrued could be considerable whereas the managerial time horizon was often necessarily short. Further insights into the limitations of mathematical modelling were provided by Roger Collcutt and M j G. Simpson. Collcutt was engaged as a consultant in the later 1970s for the planning of a third London airport. Following this experience, which entailed the construction of an overall optimising model, he confessed that 'alternative sites for [the airport] cannot be reliably distinguished by [operational research] or any other method other than political.' The only function of operational research was to 'suggest the feasibility of various futures which in certain circumstances may look desirable.' 111 As Robert Locke has commented in the light of this admission, 'With all these "mays" and "mights" such a defense of O.R. obviously conceded much to the opposition.' 112 Simpson has already been identified as one of the founder members of the Department of Operational Research at the University of Lancaster, having been recruited by Pat Rivett from FIG (see above, p. 383). As practitioner turned academic, the following remarks, contained in his presidential address to the ORS in 1978, may be viewed as significant, all the more so since they coincided with Ackoff's recantation: Standard mathematical techniques or their immediate extension are rarely applicable...This is borne out by surveys among past students, the majority of whom, even several years after graduation, have never used queuing theory, linear programming or the rest...The techniques themselves reflect and embody the

398 Operational Research in War and Peace underlying structures of commonly occurring processes. Thus, in queuing situations while the arrival and service distributions, the queue discipline and of course the context may vary very substantially from one situation to another, they all have a basic form which is reflected in the mathematical methods used and in the resultant models emerging. The ability to draw and to exploit such analogies is clearly one of our strengths, though I fear there are still too many instances of Operational Researchers striving to re-invent the wheel. Quite apart from being aware both of the potential and the limitations of formal mathematical ways of handling problems of a given structure, I believe that a thorough appreciation of the techniques enables one much better to understand (or even to recognize) the existence of the underlying form...[W]hile the techniques as such may never really be applicable, they can often be used in the initial stages of a study to give 'back of envelope' estimates of the likely effects of system change.113 Whilst Simpson possessed a clear appreciation of the educational and intellectual virtues of mathematical modelling, his limited confidence in the value of operational research techniques was indicated by the revealing reference to 'back of envelope' calculations. 114 The ultimate commentary on the state of operational research after 1970 was contained in the Report of the Commission on the Future Practice of Operational Research, published in 1986 under the auspices of the Operational Research Society. 115 The Commission itself had been appointed in response to continuing uncertainties about the future of operational research in the wake of the economic recession of the early 1980s which had resulted in the closure of several industrial operational research groups in the general context of managerial 'downsizing.' A strong feature of the report was its concerns with the views of the practitioner community. For example, in the section dealing with methodology, the Commission commented that practitioners, in contrast to their academic counterparts, evidently made little use of the mathematical techniques (linear programming and queuing theory) most commonly associated with operational research. This observation was followed by some caustic remarks on the contents of the Journal of the Operational Research Society (JORS) as the direct successor to the ORQ: The journal is felt by some to be unhelpful in fostering OR in practice by virtually all practitioners, and is considered a positive hindrance by many. This practitioner concern about the Journal is

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 399 one aspect of a more general criticism, namely that the Society does not do enough to present the true nature and achievements of OR to the world, and might in some of its activities be misrepresenting these things, conceivably harmfully.116 That 'misrepresentation/ according to the report, was that operational research was a 'mathematical, or at least abstract and nonpragmatic subject,' a remark followed by the observation that some practitioner members of the ORS held such a negative view of JORS that they 'took positive steps to prevent potential clients' from seeing it. Over the divide of the 1970s, there was a significant decline in the number of case study articles appearing in the ORQ in comparison with papers devoted to theory and technical notes. According to Dando and Sharp's calculations, in the period 1971-5, the former accounted for 22 per cent of the published papers and the latter for 69 per cent. This stands in marked contrast to experience in the 1950s and 1960s when at least half of all published articles addressed operational research applications even when they were mathematically based. A second study conducted by Dando and Bennett in the early 1980s sampled the content of ORQ and JORS volumes for 1963, 1968, 1973 and 1978.117 Whilst the pre-1970 volumes were suffused with optimism about the future of operational research, those after 1970 were characterised by deepening gloom and pessimism to the point where one third of the major papers published in 1978 questioned the practical relevance of the discipline. Further insights into the 'Kuhnian crisis' afflicting the operational research community are provided by the recollections of John Lawrence, editor of the ORQ from 1964 to 1968. Lawrence was the archetypal practitioner, having served in FIG and RTB before taking up a senior appointment in operational research in the Paints Division of ICI. As editor, he prided himself on increasing the submission rate of articles which, in turn, allowed for a greater degree of selectivity. His thoughts on his period of office are revealing: There seemed to be in India an organisation that was allocating queuing disciplines...and giving them out as PhDs. They would all send their papers to the [ORQ] and I would write back and say 'Well this doesn't seem to have been applied anywhere.' They would re-write, saying 'If this were done...This is what we do...' Anyway, I would say send it to a maths journal. It's not for me. It wasn't just from India. I sent lots of papers back. They were just mathematics.118

400 Operational Research in War and Peace In due course, Lawrence resigned from the Operational Research Society. Whilst he was in fundamental sympathy with Ackoff's critique, the immediate cause was more picturesque: The thing that finally caused me to resign from the Society was I picked up the journal one day which had just come through the door. The leading article was a statistical [analysis] on how to win at darts. Interesting technically, but nothing to do with management.119 A s t r i k i n g feature of the post-1970 debate on the limited achievements and future of operational research is that the concerns expressed in Britain from the early 1970s onwards were paralleled fully in the United States well into the 1990s. In 1978, Hall and Hess voiced the very concerns then being articulated by Ackoff in front of a British audience. In asking the question, 'is operational research/ management science "Dead or Dying"?,' they referred to contemporary North American perceptions of the excessive specialisation and limited applicability of operational research in view of its unrelenting technique orientation. They also claimed that the relevant American journals were generally of poor quality and noted the post-1970 demise of a number of corporate operational research groups. 120 Earlier in the decade, Bonder, in distinguishing between operational research analysts and scientists, concluded that formal education for analysts (i.e., operational researchers 'whose formal role is to assist management in identifying meaningful operational and planning problems and in inventing and analysing alternative feasible solutions to them') was grossly deficient in that 'new analysts are unable to solve problems.' 121 He returned to this theme with increased vehemence in 1979, by which time he was fully in accord with the doom-laden views of Ackoff, then being debated in Britain. Bonder noted , in particular, that The relevance of current mathematical developments in OR is continually questioned and, perhaps more significant, the techniques and methods are being developed by individuals who have more of a disciplinary allegiance to mathematics and economics than to operations research.122 In the meantime, Philip Morse, in reflecting on the evolution of ORSA, agreed retrospectively with Patrick Blackett that in the aftermath of the Second World War there had been 'a narrowing in outlook of many operations research workers.' Like Blackett, Morse regretted the increasing

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 401 mathematisation of the discipline to the extent that 'The pages of Operations Research had come to resemble advanced mathematic texts, than like those of journals of physical science.123 In the ensuing decade, articles in Operations Research returned repeatedly to the increasing divorce between the theory and practice of operational research and the baleful consequences for educational provision.124 In terms of the growing divide between the American academic and practitioner communities, a particularly insightful commentary was provided by Corbett and Van Wassenhove in the context of their 'natural drift' hypothesis, focussing on the increasing gap between operational research theory (management science) and operational research practice (management consulting). This was reflected, in part, in the declining interest devoted to the subject in established management journals such as the Harvard Business Review and the Sloan Management Review.125 In explaining the natural drift, they made excellent use of Abbott's work on the 'Division of Expert Labour,' paying particular attention to his concept of 'professional regression.' It has been noted already that this had been anticipated in the critical British literature of the 1970s commenting on the 'academisation' of operational research. As Abbott stated, Once a field [such as operational research] becomes self conscious and professional, practitioners draw their self-respect from other colleagues' admiration. Since the professions are founded on knowledge, admiration peaks when knowledge is most pure, that is, when it is least deformed by actual application. Hence, mathematical pre-eminence.126 For Abbott, such regression was both inevitable and irreversible, although Corbett and Van Wassenhove drew some comfort from his judgement that compared to other areas of human endeavour, operational research 'is a profession which has managed to organise itself relatively flexibly and successfully.' In a 1992 paper, Geoffrion repeated earlier British concerns about the academic structure of operational research whereby professional advancement was wholly dependent on theoretical work at the expense of integrative or applied studies 127 — hence the growing divide between the practitioner and academic communities and the increasing disillusion of the former with the contents of the mainstream academic journals. 128 Anticipating the work of Fildes and Ranyard on the fate of British industrial operational research groups from the 1970s onwards, 129 Geoffrion also highlighted the 'dispersion' of operational research in US industry:

402 Operational Research in War and Peace There is only one term to fairly describe the conduct of MS/ OR in industry today: dispersed. The idea that MS/OR is conducted mainly by organised groups of MS/OR professionals is a myth. MS/OR is practised mainly by individuals in myriad types of staff groups and functional areas.130 In accounting for this phenomenon, Geoffrion referred, inter alia, to the ongoing demise of operational research groups as a result of managerial downsizing and decentralisation, and the diffusion of operational research techniques into other disciplines and professions that competed for managers' attention all the more effectively in view of the end of the 'bandwagon effect' of operational research which had rested primarily on its claim to novelty as a managerial tool. Finally, although the discipline could lay claim to strategic impact in the historical past, the limited tactical orientation of the majority of industrial applications had resulted in slippage of status in managerial hierarchies. To a historian of operational research in its specifically British context, the tone and content of the American debate on the future of the discipline can only induce a profound sense of deja vu. It is salutary to note that virtually all of the concerns expressed by Geoffrion and his colleagues in the 1990s had been set out eloquently and in some detail by Samuel Eilon in a summary paper published in 1980. Reflecting the recent 'soul-searching' of British operational researchers, aided and abetted by Russell Ackoff, Eilon drew sharp contrasts between aspiration and reality. In the former case, The high hopes for O.R./M.S. stem from the conviction that it can and should make a contribution at the top decision-making stratum of the organisation, that its approach to problem solving is inter­ disciplinary and based on scientific modelling, that hence its methodology is unique and complements rather than attempts to supplant the work of conventional functions of management. It has further been argued that the dispassionate analysis of data, which is the trade mark of the true scientist, must elevate O.R./ M.S. above the politics of power and make it acceptable to — nay sought after by — the senior executives in the organisation, and it was therefore expected that O.R./M.S. would not be identified or become an integral part of one particular function. Furthermore, O.R./M.S. was seen not only as the means for evaluating crucial problems facing the organisation, but as the natural mechanism for originating new ideas and promoting innovation.131

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The reality, however, h a d p r o v e d to be far r e m o v e d from this ideal state insofar as The O.R./M. S. group reports at a level well below the board, its work concentrates on tactical problems, often with limited terms of reference, its contribution to the evaluation of strategy is minimal, its approach is technique-orientated and the competition from other functions is real and sometimes threatening: the uniqueness of the O.R. approach is not seen as indispensable, its methodology is challenged, it is regarded as a narrow, specialist discipline, a suitable sanctuary for mathematicians, its involvement in implementation is tenuous and its general impact somewhat limited. 132 But t h e n , in referring to the dispersion of operational research, Eilon r e m i n d e d his readers of a prescient question that h a d first b e e n p o s e d by Rivett a n d Ackoff in their ' m a n a g e r s ' g u i d e ' to the subject, p u b l i s h e d in 1963: Will [operational research] take over management? This is a blunt question and it demands a blunt answer. The answer is quite simple — No. Management, in fact will take over [operational research]. 133 In this context, Eilon w a s p r e p a r e d to d o w n g r a d e the seriousness of the 'crisis' i n operational research to the extent that O.R. has been so successful in its application that it has now been warmly embraced by all functions of management to become an integral part of their planning and evaluation procedures and, viewed in this light, we should congratulate ourselves on a remarkable achievement. 134 It is instructive to n o t e t h a t Eilon's v i e w s , i n f o r m e d b y British e x p e r i e n c e in t h e 1960s a n d 1970s, w e r e b e i n g fully a r t i c u l a t e d by Geoffrion in 1992. Despite his concerns a b o u t the integrity of operational research as a result of o n g o i n g dispersion, Geoffrion also conceded that operational research w a s being u s e d ever m o r e w i d e l y in response to its increasingly rapid diffusion in the w a k e of the c o m p u t e r / c o m m u n i c a t i o n s r e v o l u t i o n i n a u g u r a t e d in the 1980s. T h u s , by the early 1990s, linear a n d n o n l i n e a r optimisation codes in combination w i t h s p r e a d s h e e t packages, w e r e w i d e l y available to m a n a g e r s at m o d e s t cost. In conformity w i t h Eilon's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , this ' d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n ' of o p e r a t i o n a l research,

404 Operational Research in War and Peace however vulgar (and therefore to be regretted by 'professionals'), presented new challenges and opportunities. Applicable to both academics and practitioners alike, these included an absolute requirement for up-to-date knowledge of the moving frontier of information technology, a determined effort to diffuse operational research into the low-productivity service sector and, for academics in particular, the need to moderate their enthusiasm for theoretical and technical discourse in favour of the practical relevance of operational research. The chapter began by highlighting Perkin's concept of 'professional society' and its relevance to the diffusion of operational research in its institutional setting. There can be no doubt that in its role as a specialised, 'expert service' the discipline conferred upon its members a number of the attributes identified by Perkin as germane to professional recognition. Operational research in its original military incarnation was 'invented' by academic scientists and its claims to professional status 'based on human capital created by education' were effectively confirmed by its adoption as a legitimate university-level academic discipline. The effects of 'academisation,' however, were to prove extremely controversial after 1970 in circumstances of mounting economic and political turbulence. 'Messy' problems required far more sophisticated solutions than could be derived from classical operational research. The suspicion remains, however, that the notion of 'O.R. in crisis' was overdone. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the British operational research community gives every appearance of vibrancy and generational progression. The Operational Research Society is in a thriving state: its conferences are well attended by practitioners and academics alike and its journal is held in high esteem. All of this stands in marked contrast to Ackoff's predictions of imminent death. One of the most effective ripostes to Ackoff, which complemented Eilon's thoughtful commentary, came not from academic operational researchers but from senior members of the British Airways Operational Research Branch. In a 1980 JORS article they acknowledged the increasing complexity of the real world — and hence the limitations of 'classical models' — especially as applied to the solution of 'whole problems.' But they also pointed out that in many operational research groups, 'people [had] found satisfaction in throwing light by O.R. methods on at least some aspects of a problem and hence helping managers towards more rational solutions, even if they were not in a position to dictate to their clients with the force of irrefutable logic what decisions should be taken.' 1 3 5 In the practitioner-based world of operational research, therefore, the role of the operational researcher had

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 405 been transformed from that of 'expert' to 'change-agent' whereby 'the O.R. man [sic] is asked to help in changing the decision-making process through better tools, information or organisation without becoming a surrogate decision maker.' 136 Although this might be viewed as a downgrading of 'real O.R.,' the essential point to note was that operational research in practice had come to be deeply enmeshed in planning processes that are 'interdepartmental and multi-disciplinary.' Within British Airways, therefore, cost-effective operational research was directed towards the solution of 'a whole series or class of problems' rather than single decisions. During the 1980s, the British Airways approach was to gain the status of a 'new orthodoxy' for operational research as both practitioners and academics sought to move beyond the extreme introspection of the 1970s in order to widen the scope of their remit.

NOTES 1. Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880 (Routledge, London, 1990), pp. 2ff and 16. 2. Ibid., p. 2. 3. Ibid., p. 7. 4. Ibid., p. 8. 5. Ibid., p. 2. 6. Ibid., p. 302. 7. B. H. P. Rivett, 'Sir Charles Goodeve O.B.E., F.R.S.,' OR Newsletter, (May, 1980). 8. 'Operational Research Club,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 2 (1951), p. 36. 9. Ibid. 10. Donald Hicks and David Smith, 'Sir Owen Haddon Wansbrough-Jones,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 34 (1983), p. 107. 11. B. H. P. Rivett (1980). 12. Hicks and Smith, (1983), p. 107; information from John Stringer. 13. 'Club into Society,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 4 (1953), p. 58. 14. Roger Eddison interviewed by Rebecca Capey. 15. 'Editorial Notes,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1950), p. 1. 16. Ibid. 17. P. M. S. Blackett, 'Operational Research,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1950), pp. 3-6. 18. Operational Research Club, Annual General Meeting (10 November, 1953), Minutes (MRC, MSS. 3 3 5 / S O / l / l / l . 19. Cited in 'Club into Society'(1953), p. 57.

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20. Ibid., pp. 57-60. 21. Charles F. Goodeve and G. R. Ridley, 'A Survey of O.R. in Great Britain,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 4 (1953), pp. 21-4. 22. 'Club into Society' (1953), p. 60. 23. C. F. Goodeve, 'Operational Research' Nature, Vol. 161 (1948), pp. 377-84; Idem, ' O p e r a t i o n a l Research: The C o m m o n Factor,' The Engineer, 6 September, 1957, pp. 345-6; Idem, 'Man Must Measure,' Journal of the Institute of Transport, (March, 1957), pp. 75-82; Idem, 'Operational Research: The Front Line Scientist in the Management Team,' Tlie Manager, (December, 1955), pp. 995-8. 24. 'Operational Research Course at Birmingham University,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 4 (1953), pp. 77-83. 25. Information from Doug White; Steven Vajda interviewed by John Bather; Brian Haley interviewed by Bob Miles. 26. Operational Research Society, Minutes of Meetings, 29 November, 1955, 20 March 1956, 29 November, 1956, 5 March, 1958. 27. C. W. Churchman, R. L. Ackoff, and E. L. Arnoff, Introduction to Operations Research (Wiley, New York, 1957). 28. Philip M. Morse, In at the Beginning: A Scientist's Life (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1977). 29. Ibid., p. 290. 30. Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (Pantheon Books, New York, 1998), p. 153. 31. J. F. McCloskey and F. N. Trefethen (eds.), Operations Research for Management (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1954). 32. M. W. Kirby, 'Operations Research Trajectories: The Anglo-American Experience from the 1940s to the 1990s,' Operations Research, Vol. 48 (2000), pp. 1-10. 33. R. Bellman, 'Some Applications of the Theory of Dynamic Programming - A Survey,' Operations Research, Vol. 2 (1954), pp. 275-88; H. A. Simon and C. C. Holt, 'The Control of Inventory and Production Rates — A Survey,' Operations Research, Vol. 2 (1954), pp. 289-301; G. Dantzig, R. Fulkerson and S. Johnson, 'Solution of a Large-Scale Travelling Salesman Problem,' Operations Research, Vol. 2 (1954), pp. 393-410; T. L. Saaty, 'Resume of Useful Formulas in Queuing Theory,' Operations Research, Vol. 5 (1957), pp. 161-200. 34. G. Giffard and H. Symonds, 'The Institute of Management Sciences,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 8 (1957), p. 61. 35. Ibid., p. 62. 36. A. Charnes and W. Cooper, 'The Stepping Stone Method of Explaining Linear Programming Calculations in Transportation Problems,' Management Science, Vol. 1 (1954), pp. 46-69; G. B. Dantzig, 'Linear Programming under Uncertainty,' Management Science, Vol. 1 (1955), pp. 197-206.

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37. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 38. Operational Research Society, Minutes of Committee Meeting, 16 September, 1954. 39. W. N. Jessop, 'Operational Research Methods: What Are They?,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 7 (1956), pp. 49-58. 40. Ibid., p. 58. 41. J. K. Friend, 'Stock Control with Random Opportunities for Replenishment,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 11 (I960), pp. 130-6; I. J. Whitting, 'Planning for an Expanding Electricity Supply System/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1963), pp. 107-17; J. E. Sussams, 'Some Problems Associated with the Distribution of Consumer Products/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 19 (1968), pp. 161-74. 42. Paul Keys, Operational Research and Systems: Tlie Systemic Nature of Operational Research (Plenum Press: New York, 1991), pp. 60-1. 43. Operational Research Society, Second Committee Meeting of the Session 1955-6, 21 March, 1956. 44. G. K. Rand, 'IFORS: the Formative Years/ International Transactions in Operational Research, Vol. 7 (2000), p. 102. 45. Thornton Page, 'First International Conference on Operational Research/ Operations Research, Vol. 5 (1957), 863-71. 46. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 47. M. Davies, R. T. Eddison and T. Page (Eds.), Proceedings of the First International Conference on Operational Research (English Universities Press: London, 1959). 48. The Economist, 7 September, 1957. 49. Keys (1991), p. 60. 50. Churchman, Ackoff and Arnoff (1957). 51. Cited in Rand (2000), p. 105. 52. Davies, Eddison and Page (1959); J. Banbury and J. Maitland (Eds.), Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Operational Research (English Universities Press, London, 1961); M. Kreweras and G. Morlat (Eds.), Actes de la 3eme Conference Internationale de Reserche Operationelle (Dunod, Paris, 1964); D. B. Hertz and J. Melese (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Operational Research (Wiley Interscience, New York, 1966); J. Lawrence (Ed.), OR 69: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Operational Research (Tavistock, London, 1970). 53. G. K. Rand, 'IAOR Comes of Age/ in J.P. Brans (Ed.), Operational Research '81 (North Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1981), pp. 23-38. 54. Operational Research Society, Minutes of Committee Meeting, 18 June 1957. 55. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 56. Operational Research Society, Minutes of Committee Meeting, 29 March, 1954.

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57. S. Eilon, J. Hough and R. J. Betts, 'Profile of Current Members of the Operational Research Society,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 20 (1969), pp. 247-73. 58. Ibid., p. 272. 59. Ibid., p. 255. 60. Samuel Eilon, 'A History of Operational Research at Imperial College (19551989): A Personal Note' (manuscript). 61. M. G. Kendall, 'The Teaching of Operational Research,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1958), pp. 268-9. 62. Earl of Halsbury interviewed by Jonathan Rosenhead. 63. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 64. Ibid. 65. Alan Mercer interviewed by Maurice Kirby. 66. Marion E. McClintock, Quest for Innovation (University of Lancaster, Lancaster, 1974), pp. 135ff. 67. Pat Rivett interviewed by Graham Rand. 68. Alan Mercer interviewed by Maurice Kirby. 69. The following account is based on Eilon, 'A History of Operational Research.' 70. Ibid., p. 14. 71. Ibid., p. 15. Italics in original. 72. R. V. Jones, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945 (Hamish Hamilton ,London, 1978), pp. 373-4. 73. John Butt, John Anderson's Legacy: The University of Strathclyde and its Antecedents, 1796-1996 (Tuckwell Press in association with the University of Strathclyde, 1996); information from Norman Lawrie. 74. Information from Norman Lawrie. 75. Ibid. 76. Information from Maurice Shutler. 77. Information from George Mitchell. 78. R. C. Tomlinson, 'OR Is,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 25 (1974), p. 348. 79. M. R. Dando and R. G. Sharp, 'Operational Research in the UK in 1977: The Causes and Consequences of a Myth?,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 29 (1978), pp. 939-49. 80. R. Fildes and J. Ranyard, 'Success and Survival of Operational Research Groups — A Review,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 48 (1997), pp. 336-7. 81. P. M. S. Blackett, 'Operational Research,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1950), p. 3. 82. J. F. McCloskey and A. W. Swan, 'The Name and Nature of Operational Research: a correspondence,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 8 (1957), pp. 1-5.

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83. B. M. Brough, 'Operational Research as a Staff Service/ Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1958), p. 141. Italics added. 84. Fildes and Ranyard (1997), p. 343. 85. Tomlinson (1974). 86. C. S. Chedzey, 'Management Sciences Limited,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 16 (1965), pp. 265-74; Stafford Beer, 'Sigma,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 16 (1965), pp. 275-85. 87. Stafford Beer, 'Operational Research as Revelation,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 21 (1970), pp. 9-21. 88. 'Marlow Seventy': Statement by Stafford Beer on behalf of Council (10 April, 1970), p. 3 (OR Society Archive, MSS.335/SO/4/3/6). 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid., p. 4. 91. The requisite 75% majority 'to enable [the OR Society] to provide members with recognition of their achievements in OR' was achieved at the Society's Annual General Meeting in October, 2001. Henceforth, the existing membership categories (A: individual ; B: student and C: retired) would be complemented by three new categories — 1: Associate; 2: Associate Fellow; 3: Fellow. Thus, an individual member who was also a Fellow would be in category A3. (OR Newsletter, No. 372, December, 2001) p. 3. 92. Samuel Eilon, 'Technician or Adviser,' OMEGA, Vol. 5 (1977), pp. 1-6. 93. B. H. P. Rivett, 'Perspective for Operational Research,' OMEGA, Vol. 2 (1974), pp. 225-33. Italics in original. 94. F. T. Blackaby, De-industrialisation (Heinemann: London, 1979). 95. Samuel Eilon, 'How Scientific is Operational Research?,' OMEGA, Vol. 3 (1975), pp. 1-8; M. Sadler, 'Operational Research and the Transition to a Post-Industrial Society,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 29 (1978), p p . 1-7; K. J. Radford, 'Decision m a k i n g in a Turbulent Environment,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 29 (1978), pp. 677-82; D. J. Harris, 'Corporate Planning and Operational Research,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 29 (1978), p p . 9-17; J. Rosenhead, 'An Education in Robustness,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 29 (1978), pp. 105-11; M. R. Dando and P. G. Bennett, 'A Kuhnian Crisis in Management Science?,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 32 (1981), pp. 939-42; R. H. Collcutt, 'OR Changes,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 32 (1981), pp. 361-9. 96. Dando and Sharp (1978). 97. Ibid. 98. Rivett (1974). 99. Cook Papers, MSS 3 3 5 / C K / C A / B / l O l , 'A Proposal for an Institute of Operational Research' (November, 1962). 100. John Stringer, 'William Neil Jessop,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 20 (1969), pp. 291-2; J. R. Lawrence (Ed.), Operational Research and the Social Sciences (Tavistock Publications, London, 1967).

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101. J. K. Friend, M. E. Norris and J. Stringer, 'The Institute for Operational Research: An Initiative to Extend the Scope of Operational Research/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 39 (1988), p. 70. 102. J. Stringer, 'Operational Research for "Multi-organizations'", Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1967), pp. 105-20; John Friend, Don Bryant, Bart Cunningham and John Luckman, 'Negotiated Project Engagements: Learning from Experience,' Human Relations, Vol. 51 (1998), pp. 1509-42. 103. J. K. Friend and Neil Jessop, Local Government and Strategic Choice: An Operational Research Approach to the Problem of Strategic Planning (Pergamon, Oxford, 1969, second edition, 1977); G. M. Luck, J. Luckman, B. W. Smith and J. Stringer, Patients, Hospitals and Operational Research (Tavistock, London, 1971); J. K. Friend, J. M. Power and C. J. L. Yewlett (Eds. ), Public Planning: The Inter-Corporate Dimensions (Tavistock, London, 1974). 104. Andreas Faludi, A Decision-centered View of Environmental Planning (Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1987), pp. 88-101; John Friend, 'Supporting Developmental Decision Processes: the Evolution of an OR Approach,' International Transactions in Operational Research Vol. 2 (1995), pp. 225-32; John K. Friend, 'Planning in the Presence of Uncertainty: Principles and Practice,' Journal of Infrastructure Planning and Management, No. 476 (1993), pp. 1-9; Idem, 'Engaging with Transient Complexity in Development Projects,' in Gillian Ragsdell and Jennifer Wilby (Eds.), Understanding Complexity (Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 2001), pp. 91-102. 105. R. Ackoff, 'The Meaning, Scope and Methods of OR,' in Idem (Ed.), Progress in OR, Vol. 1 (John Wiley, New York, 1961), pp. 3-34. 106. R. Ackoff, 'The Future of Operational Research is Past,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 30 (1979), pp. 93-103; Idem, 'Resurrecting the Future of Operational Research,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 30 (1979), pp. 189-99. 107. Cited in Dando and Sharp (1978), pp. 943-4. 108. Ackoff, 'The Future of Operational Research is Past,' p. 97. 109. W. G. McClelland, 'Mathematics: How it Looks to the Manager/ OMEGA, Vol. 3 (1975), pp. 151-2. 110. Ibid. 111. Collcutt (1981), p. 368. 112. Robert Locke, Management and Higher Education since 1940: The Influence of America, and Japan on West Germany, Britain, and France (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981), pp. 31-2. 113. M. G. Simpson, 'Those Who Can't/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 29 (1978), p. 518. 114. Locke (1981), p. 401. 115. Operational Research Society, 'Report of the Commission on the Future Practice of Operational Research/ Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 37 (1986), pp. 829-66.

The Institutional Development of Operational Research 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124.

125. 126. 127. 128.

129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136.

411

Ibid. Dando and Bennett (1981), p. 940. John Lawrence interviewed by Rebecca Capey. Ibid. J. R. Hall and S. W. Hess, 'OR/MS: Dead or Dying?' Interfaces, Vol. 8 (1978), pp. 42-4. S. Bonder, 'Operations Research Education; Some Requirements and Deficiencies/ Operations Research, Vol. 21 (1973), pp. 796-809. S. Bonder, 'Changing the Future of Operations Research,' Operations Research, Vol. 27 (1979), pp. 209-24. P. M. Morse, 'ORSA Twenty Five Years Later,' Operations Research, Vol. 25 (1977), pp. 186-8. S. J. Balut and R. L. Armacost, 'ORSA as Viewed by its Members,' Operations Research, Vol. 34 (1986), pp. 945-53; J. R. Borsting, 'President's Symposium: Reflections on OR/MS Education,' Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), pp. 387-91; H. J. Miser, 'President's Symposium: Science and Profes­ sionalism in Operations Research,' Operations Research, Vol. 35 (1987), pp. 314-19; W. P. Pierskalla, 'President's Symposium: Creating Growth in OR/MS,' Operations research, Vol. 35 (1987), pp. 153-6. C. J. Corbett and L. N. Van Wassenhove, 'The Natural Drift: What happened to Operations Research?,' Operations Research, Vol. 41 (1993), pp. 625-40. Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988), pp.237-8. A. M. Geoffrion, 'Forces, Trends and Opportunities in OR/MS,' Operations Research, Vol. 40 (1992), pp. 423-45. A. F. Reisman and F. Kirschnick, 'The Devolution of OR/MS: Implications from a Statistical Content Analysis of Papers in Flagship Journals,' Operations Research, Vol. 42 (1994), pp. 577-88. Fildes and Ranyard (1997). Geoffrion (1992). Samuel Eilon, 'The Role of Management Science,' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 31 (1980), p. 18. Ibid. B. H. P. Rivett and R. L. Ackoff, A Manager's Guide to Operational Research (John Wiley: New York, 1963), p. 23. Eilon (1980). N. R. Tobin, K. Rapley and W. Teather, 'The Changing Role of O.R.?' Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 31 (1980), p. 280. Ibid.

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Archival Sources Air Historical Branch Papers Beer Papers Bernal Papers BISRA Records Blackett Papers British Coal Archive Cadbury Brothers Archive Cook Papers Courtaulds Archive Goodeve Papers Operational Research Society Archive Tiverton Papers Zuckerman Papers

Papers in the Public Record Office AIR 8/1105; 14/225; 14/1763; 14/1910; 16/45; 41/14; 41/15; 41/42; 41/43 AN 1; 5; 8/11; 11/20 CAB 53/24; 124/1094; 132/28; 132/47; 132/50; 132/64; 132/81 COAL 33/17 HO 287/651; 287/652; 368/38; 377/

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414 Bibliography Lewis Committee, Report of the Departmental Committee on Co-operative Selling, Cmd 2700 (1926). Balfour Committee, Final Report of the Committee on Trade and Industry, Cmd 3282 (1929). HM Government, Statement on Defence, Cmd 5107 (1936). Reid Report, Coal Mining: Report of the Technical Advisory Committee, Cmd 6610 (1945). HM Government, German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties: Particulars of Destruction, Cmd 6843 (1946). Plowden Committee, Control of Public Expenditure, Cmnd 1432 1961). Royal Commission on the Police, Final Report, Cmnd 1728 (1962). Fulton Committee, The Civil Service, Cmnd 3638 (1968). Hardman Committee, The Dispersal of Government Work from London, Cmnd 5322 (1973).

Oral Interviews Stafford Beer Sir Hermann Bondi Roger Collcutt Ernest Field Brian Haley Lord Halsbury Margaret Kinnaird Alan Mercer John Lawrence John Mowat David Owen Pat Rivett Ian Taylor Derek Trigg Steven Vajda H. R. H. Watkins Brian Whitworth

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436 Bibliography Werskey, Gary, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and Socialists of the 1930s (Allen Lane, London, 1978). Whitting, R. J., 'Planning for an Expanding Electricity Supply,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1965), pp. 107-17. Williams, K. B. and K. B. Haley, 'A Practical Application of Linear Programming in the Mining Industry,' Operational Research Quarterly, Vol. 19 (1959), pp. 131-5. Wilson, Daniel, 'Scientific Management, Systematic Management and Labour, 1880-1915/ Business History Review, Vol. 49 (1974), pp. 479-500. Wilson, Harold, Purpose in Politics: Selected Speeches (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1964). Winton, J, Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade, (Michael Joseph, London, 1983). Wood, J. E. and J. G. Fergusson, 'Economic Planning of Production in an Area/ Steel and Coal (October 1962). Wright, R., Dowding and the Battle of Britain (MacDonald, London, 1969). Zimmerman, David, Britain's Shield: Radar and the Defeat of the Luftwaffe (Sutton, Stroud, 2001). Zimmerman, David, 'Preparations for War', in Peter Hore (Ed.), Patrick Blackett: Sailor, Scientist and Socialist (Frank Cass, London, 2003), pp. 97-109. Zuckerman, Solly, Scientists and War (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1966). Zuckerman, Solly, From Apes to Warlords, 1904-46: An Autobiography (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978). Zuckerman, Solly, Six Men Out of the Ordinary (Peter Owen, London, 1990).

INDEX

Abbott, Andrew, 24, 394, 401. Ack-Ack Command, 91-4. Ackoff Russell, defines OR, 11, 12; view of early British OR, 185; role in first international OR conference, 376; condemns 'classical' OR, 395, 396; mentioned, 16, 18, 261, 293, 298, 383, 394, 402-4. Adams, J.B., 325. Admiralty Research Laboratory, 15. Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, 198, 204. Air Historical Branch (AHB), 138, 164, 165, 177. Air Raid Precautions Committee, 62. Anglo-American Council on Productivity, 214. Anti-Submarine Operations Research Group, 371. Anti-U-Boat Committee, 107. Application of Computers to Engineering, 323. Appleyard, Commander R.G.H., 36-8, 80, 113. Armoured Fighting Vehicle Training School, 119. Armstrong, Sir William, 23, 345-7, 348, 349. Army Operational Research Group, 117-25, 255.

Association of Scientific Workers, 187, 188, 190, 204. Aston University, 388. Atomic Energy Authority, 320, 323. Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE), 323, 324. Babbage, Charles, 47. Baker, Professor John, 126. Baldwin, Stanley, 62. Bamberg, James, 308. Battle of Britain, 77-82, passim, 92. Bawdsey Research Station, 68, 71, 72, 81. Bayliss, C.E., 94. Beattie, David, 303, 304. Beaverbrook, Lord, 136. Bedaux System, 54. Beeching, Dr Richard, 353, 354. Beeching Report, 354. Beer, Stafford, defines OR, 10, 11; early career 237, 238; joins USC, 238; develops OR for USC, 238-43; relations with BISRA, 240; advocates OR in civil government, 336, 337; President of the OR Society, 391; convenes 'Marlow Seventy', 391-3; mentioned, 396. Bell Laboratories, 372. Bell, Lucien, 40.

437

438

Index

Benn, Tony, 320, 324, 325. Bennett, M.G., 352, 353. Bennett, P.G., 399. Benson, Frank, 370. Benton-Jones, Sir Walter, 239. Benusson-Butt, David, 135. See also Butt Report. Berlin Airlift, 14. Bernal, Professor, J.D., 20, 88, 126, 127, 141, 186, 187, 190, 202, 316. Biggin Hill experiments, 70, 76, 81. Billinger, T.S., 346. BISC (ORE), 223. Bishop, Bernard, 353. Blackett, Professor P.M.S., defines OR, 4, 5, 9; joins CSSAD, 66, 67; view of Tizard, 90, 91; wartime career in OR, 91-117; in Ack-Ack Command, 91-4; in Coastal Command, 95-110; view on ORS organisation, 96-8; at the Admiralty, 110-14; wartime OR methodology, 110, 111, 115-17; opposition to area bombing, 139-42, 160, 161; marginalized after 1945, 202; adviser on scientific and industrial policy to Labour Party, 315-20; role in Mintech and Advisory Council on Technology, 320-5; views on military R and D, 324, 325; role in IRC, 326, 327; contributes to ORQ, 369; invokes Texas Rangers and FBI analogy, 389; condemns complex mathematics, 396; mentioned, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 45, 69, 88, 89, 125, 127, 175, 179, 186, 187, 190, 297, 328, 329, 361, 366, 367, 371, 372. BOAC, 338. Board of Trade Special Research Unit (SRU), 192, 201, 202-4, 334. Bomber Command, 132-80, passim. Bonder, S., 400.

Boole, George, 6, 7. Booth, Charles, 194. Boulton and Watt, 47, 48. Borough Polytechnic, 371, 378. Bowen, E.G. 76, Bragg, Lawrence, 40. Bragg, Sir William, 87. Bristol School of Management, 371. British Airways, 404, 405. British Bombing Survey Unit, 166. British Institute of Management, 295. British Iron and Steel Federation, 209, 210, 214. British Iron and Steel Research Association (BISRA), 1, 21, 188, 209-32 passim, 246-8, 302, 388, 393. British Petroleum, 307-11, 314. British Railways, 1, 353, 354. British Steel Corporation, 213. British Transport Commission, 352, 353. Bronowski, Jacob, 127, 334. Brothers, LeRoy A. 127. Brown, William, 48. Brumwell, Marcus, 316. Brunner, Christopher, 307. Butt Report, 135, 137. Burt, Cyril, 194. Cadbury Brothers, 302-4, 314. Calder, Ritchie, 198, 204. Canadian Corps, 38, 40-2. Carter, Sir Charles, 382, 383, 388. Case Institute of Technology, 16, 18, 236, 262, 372, 377, 383. Cavendish Laboratory, 67, 70, 72. Central Advisory Council for Science and Technology, 324. Central Electricity Authority, 355. Central Electricity Generating Board, 300, 355, 356, 375. Chandler, Alfred D., 294, 295, 328. Chatfield, Lord, 87.

Index 439 Cherwell, Lord, 74, 127, 139-42, 179. See also F.A. Lindemann. Churchill, Winston, 74, 78, 79, 135-7, 175, 179. City Polytechnic, 388. Civil Aviation Authority, 334. Civil Service College, 349. Civil Service Department (CSD), 1, 23, 347, 349, 350, 395. Coalmining industry, 253-88 passim. See also National Coal Board (NCB), Field Investigation Group. Coastal Command, 95-110, passim. Cockcroft, Professor John, 73. Collcutt, Roger, 215, 216, 225, 227, 228, 246, 247, 287, 397. Command Technology, 32. Columbia University, 372. Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), 61, 62, 66. Committee on Industrial Productivity (CIP), 190-205, passim. Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Defence (CSSAD), 66-76, passim. Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Warfare (CSSAW), 89, 90. Concorde, 320. Convoying, in World War 1, 36-8; in World War 2, 112-14. Copenhagen Telephone Company, 224. Cook Stephen, 232-7, 241, 261, 262, 273, 355. Corbett, C.J., 401. Cottrell, Sir Alan, 321, 322, 325. Courtaulds, 301, 302, 314. Cousins, Frank, 320. Cranfield College, 388. Creswell Colliery, 268, 270. Cripps, Sir Stafford, 187, 192, 201. Curran, Joan, 386. Curran, Samuel, 386, 388.

Dakin, S.A., 191. 'Dambusters' Raid, 169. Dando, M.R., 24, 394, 399. Dantzig, George B., 14, 283. Darwin, Charles, 40, 121, 122. Davies, Max, 368. Deam, R.J., 304-8. Defence Operations Analysis Establishment (DOAE), 346, 348, 356. Defence White Paper (1936), 59. Deighton, Len, 80, 81. Denbitz, L.M., 127. Department of Economic Affairs, 315, 336. Department of the Environment, 350. Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), 43, 189, 190, 209-11, 334, 337. Dickens, Dr B.G., 70, 143, 145, 163, 178, 179, 215, 216. Distillers Company, 375. District Bank, 312. Donaldson, W.A., 386. Douhet, Guilio, 61. Dowding, Air Marshal Hugh, 68, 77-9, 81. Dresden, 165, 173. Du Pont, 294. Dunsheath, P., 191. Easterfield, Tom, 202, 203, 334, 370. Economic Information Unit (Treasury), 199, 200. Eddison, Roger, 215, 345, 346, 368, 369, 374, 375. Eddison, Thomas, 38. Edgerton, David, 318, 319. Egerton, A.C., 87. Eilon, Professor Samuel, 311, 312, 384-6, 402-4. Ellis, Sir Charles, 21, 255-7, 293, 388. Erlang, A.K., 224.

440

Index

European Coal and Steel Community, 214. Evans, Alan, 258, 259. Ferranti, 217. Field Investigation Group (FIG), 233, 257-76 passim, 302, 375, 383. Fighter Command, 71-3, 76-82 passim, 98. Fildes, Robert, 390. Flash Spotting, 40, 41. Flowerdew, A.J.D., 345. Frankland, Noble, 172. Franks, Lord, 295. Fulton Committee, 23, 337, 345, 346. Gaitskell, Hugh, 315-7. Galbraith, J.K., 169. Galland, Adolf, 170. Game theory, 14. GEC, 52. 'GEE', 148-50. General Motors, 294. Geoffrion, A.M., 401-3. GKN, 215. Glasgow School of Industrial Administration, 371. Goebbels, Josef, 169, 170. Goldsmith, Maurice, 198, 204. Goodeve, Sir Charles, defines OR, 3, 7-9, 189; on OR and the Battle of Britain, 82; early career, 86, 87; appointed as Director of BISRA, 188; postwar agenda for OR, 189, 190; role in BISRA, 209-32 passim; retirement, 212; as a facilitator of OR, 246; founder of 'OR Club', 367, 368; disseminates OR, 370; mentioned, 17, 21, 190, 198, 204, 205, 240, 255, 287, 293, 297, 300, 301, 307, 369, 370, 376, 378, 379, 388. Gordon, Dr Cecil, 108, 109, 186, 191, 198, 201-4, 268. Gott, Benjamin, 48.

Gross, Dr Nicol, 384. Gulf Oil Corporation, 15. Haldane, Jack, 187. Hall, J.R., 400. Halsbury, Earl of, 382, 383. Hannah, Leslie, 52-4. Harcourt-Trevelyan reforms, 23. Hardman Report, 352. Harris, Sir Arthur T., on 'fleeting' targets, 138, 139; formation of Pathfinder Force, 149; advocates bombing to win the war, 156-9, 171, 174; opposition to 'Operation Overlord', 161, 162; post- D-Day bombing policy, 165-6; acknowledges role of OR, 177, 178; mentioned, 112, 132, 133. Hayley, Brian, 370, 371. Henderson, Commander R.G.H., 36, 37. Henderson, Major General Sir David, 33. Hertz, David, 376. Hess, S.W., 400. Hicks, Donald, 257, 258, 261, 266, 287, 367, 378. Hill, A.V, 34, 35, 66, 67, 69, 87, 89, 91, 92, 94. Hill, G.T.R., 87. Hill's Brigands, 34, 35. Hirst, Sir Hugo, 52. Hitch, Charles, 127. Hitler, Adolf, 179, 180. Hogben, Lancelot, 187. Hollings, H , 191. Holmberg, Dr E.R., 340. Home Civil Service, 337, 345. Home Office, 201, 334, 340. Houlden, Brian, 264, 266, 275, 287, 353. Howe, Sidney Ralph, 238-41. 'H2S', 151-4. Hunt, Squadron Leader R.G., 72.

Index ICI, 295, 300. IFORS, 275, 283, 377-89. Imbucon, 300. Imperial College, 382, 384-6, 387. Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, 22, 297, 320, 322. Innes, Roy, 204. Institute for Operational Research, 347, 390, 394, 395. Inter-Services Research Bureau, 142. International Publishing Corporation, 375. Iron and Steel Board, 214. Iron and steel industry, 209-48 passim. Itnet Ltd., 304. Jackson, Professor Willis, 191. James, Ken, 346, 347, 349, 350. Jardine, A.K.S., 386. Jessop, W.N., 10, 12, 374, 375, 394. Johns Hopkins University, 372. Johnson and Johnson, 303. Johnson, Ellis A., 273. Jones, H.G., 243-6. Jones, Professor R.V., 19. Joubert de la Ferte, Air Chief Marshall Sir Philip, 95, 187. Jourdain, E.D.T., 191. Journal of the Operational Research Society (JORS), 366, 398-400, 404. Kendall, Professor M.G., 10, 382, 388. Kent County Council, 338. Keynes, J.M., 58, 194, 200. Keys, Paul, 377. King, Dr Alexander, 200, 201. Kittel, Charles, 3, 189, 193. Knight, Sir Arthur, 301. Kodak, 304-6, 314. Lanchester, F.W., 33-5, 45. Lanchester Prize, 34.

441

L'Armee de L'Air, 61, 62. Larnder, Harold, 73, 79, 80. Lawrence, John, 399, 400. Lawrie, Norman, 386, 387. Levy, Hyman, 187. Liddell-Hart, Captain Sir Basil, 86. Linear programming, 307-111, 353. Lindemann, F.A., 74, 75, 89. See also Lord Cherwell. Lloyd George, David, 60. LMS Railway, 189, 352. Local Government Operational Research Unit, 339, 390. Locke, Robert, 5, 6, 16, 293, 294, 397. London Business School, 296. London County Council, 339. London School of Economics, 388. London Transport, 1. Lovell, Sir Bernard, 111, 112, 160. Ludlow-Hewitt, Sir Edgar, 65. McClelland, W.G., 396, 397. McCloskey, Joseph F, 34, 98, 117, 179, 389. MacDonald, A.G., 343, 344. Macfarlane, Sir George, 325. Macfarlane, John, 386. McKinsey and Co., 297, 302. Macmillan, Harold, 51, 319, 335. McNaughton, Lt. Col. A.G.L., 40-2. Management Science, 374. Manchester Business School, 296. Matthew, Professor T.U., 370. Marx, Karl, 47. Maurice of Nassau, 30, 31. Mercer, Alan, 30, 383. Metra, 300. Mill, J.S., 47. Ministry of Aviation, 320, 322, 323. Ministry of Defence, 356. Ministry of Home Security, 126, 145, 158. Ministry of Supply, 334.

442

Index

Ministry of Technology (Mintech), 22, 315, 336. Ministry of Transport, 348. Ministry of Works, 201, 334. MIT, 372. Mitchell General Billy, 61. Mitchell, George, 388. Mond, Sir Alfred, 52. Monte Carlo technique, 269, 70, 301, 302. Morganthaler, G.W., 225, 226. Morse, Philip, 371, 372, 400, 401. Mountbatten Lord Louis, 127. Mutual Security Agency, 218, 219. Myers, C.L., 339. National Board for Prices and Incomes, 349. National Coal Board (NCB), 255-88 passim. See also Field Investigation Group. National Economic Development Coucil ('Neddy'), 295, 335, 336. National Health Service, 193. National Physical Laboratory, 67, 121, 270. National Plan, 315. National Provincial Bank, 311. National Research and Development Corporation (NRDC), 202, 316, 320. National Westminster Bank (NatWest), 311-14. NATO, 356, 357. Newall, Sir Cyril, 78. Newby, W.J., 311. Neumann, J.Von, 14, 283. Northampton Polytechnic, 372. Northwestern University, 372. Nottage, Raymond, 337. Nuffield College seminar, 347, 348.

Operational Research Branch (NCB), 264, 265. See also Field Investigation Group. Operational Research Quarterly (ORQ), 3, 4, 10, 17, 275, 366, 368, 369, 373, 379, 398. Operational Research Society, 16, 23, 300, 345, 366, 368-71, 374-76, 378-81. Operations Research, 373, 401. Operations Research Society of America (ORSA), 34, 371, 373-76, 378. OR Club, 366, 368, 369. Orfordness, 68. Osipov, M. 34. Owen, David, 215-17. Page, Thornton, 376, 377. Paterson, Professor T.T., 386. Pathfinder Force, 150, 152, 153. Pearson, Professor E.S., 368. Pegasus computer, 217, 218, 225, 240, 246. Pennycuik, Dr K., 379. Pergamon Press, 375. Perkin, Harold, 365-7, 380, 404. Pile, General Sir Frederick, 92, 94. Pincus, I.N., 127. Planned Flying, Planned Maintenance, 108, 109. Plowden Report, 345, 346. 'Pointblank' directive, 159, 171. Police Planning and Research Branch, 340-44. Political Warfare Executive, 157, 158. Popper, Karl, 3, 4. Portal, Sir Charles, 137, 165, 172. Prandtl, Ludwig, 33. Pratt, T.H., 356-61. Queuing theory, 224, 225.

'OBOE', 150, 151 Operation Overlord, 161-5, 174.

Radar, 68-82, passim.

Index Rand Corporation, 283, 345. Ranyard, John, 390. Ratcliffe, J.A., 94. Rationalisation, 51, 52. Raymon, Nathaniel, 338. Reid Committee, see Technical Advisory Committee. Reid, Denis, 303. Reiner, W.J., 338 Ricardo, David, 47. Richard Thomas and Baldwins (RTB), 215, 232-9. Rivett, B.H.P., recruited to FIG, 259; characterises FIG's work, 260; visits USA, 261, 262; disseminates OR techniques, 262; view of ORQ, 374; and first international OR conference, 376, 377; views of early OR conferences, 379; President of ORS, 382; appointed to University of Lancaster, 382-4; view on OR practice, 393; view on OR theory, 394; mentioned, 17, 18, 270, 287, 298, 346, 367, 370, 388, 397, 403. Robbins Committee, 295. Roberts, G.A., 71-3, 76. Rosenhead, Jonathan, 188, 202, 203. Rowe, A.P, 44, 66, 69, 71, 76, 95, 386. Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE), 91, 320, 322. Royal Institute of Public Administration, (RIPA), 337-9. Royal Radar Establishment (RRE), 320, 322. Rutherford, Sir Ernest, 67. Samuel Fox and Co., 238. Sargeant, John, 337. Sargeaunt, H.A., 340, 341. Saunders, Sir Owen, 384. Schweppes, 302, 303. Schonland, B.F.J., 94, 117, 123, 125.

443

Science in War, 88, 89. Science Research Council, 387. Scientific management, 49, 50. Shackleton, Lord, 347. Sharp, R.G., 24, 394, 399. Shell-Mex, 307-11. Shelley, Norman, 354, 355. Shirley Institute, 54, 370. Shutler, Maurice, 199, 349. 'Simbelf, 266. 'Simloc', 266. 'Simpol', 344. Simpson, M.G., 16, 383, 397, 398. Simulation, 15, 255-8, 339, 344, 353. Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 78, 139. Slater, Sir William, 368, 382. Slessor, Air Marshall Sir John, 160. Smith, Adam, 46, 47. Smuts, J.C., 60, 61. Snow, C.P., 69, 75, 139. Societe, de Economie, et Mathematique Applique, 24. SOFRO, 376, 378. Solandt, Omand, 118, 119. Sound ranging, 41, 42. Speer, Albert, 170, 171, 176, 177. Stainier, Sir William, 191, 352. Standard Oil, 294. Steel Company of Wales (SCOW), 215, 232, 243-6. Swan, A.W., 10, 368, 370, 389, 394. Tank Armament Research Establishment, 119. Taylor, A.J.P., 78. Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 49, 50. Taylor, Ian, 304. Tavistock Institute, 394, 395. Technical Advisory Committee (Reid Committee), 254-5, 271. Tedder, Air Marshall, Sir Arthur, 162. Telecommunications Research Establishment, 150, 151.

444

Index

Ten Year Rule, 59. Thunderbolt Exercise, 173. TIMS, 373-5. Tippett, L.H.C., 191, 370. Tiverton, Viscount, 35, 382. Tizard, Sir Henry, forms CSSAD, 66, 67; quality of leadership, 75, 76; marginalisation after 1940, 89-91; opposition to area bombing, 140, 141; chairs CIP, 191; mentioned, 4, 20, 43, 69, 127, 180, 198, 204. 'Tizzy angle', 70, 71. Tocher, K.D., 241. Tomlinson, Rolfe, 262, 263, 266, 284, 345, 346, 390, 391, 393. 'Tots and Quots', 88, 187, 316. Travelling Salesman problem, 305. Treasury, 1, 346, 347, 350, 351. Treaty of Versailles, 58. Trefethen, Florence, 185, 293. Trenchard, Major General Hugh, 60-2, 65, 134. Trigg, Derek, 305, 306. Unit Beat Policing, 343, 344. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 166, 167. United Steel Companies (USC), 213, 215, 232, 237-43, 300. University of Birmingham, 24, 338, 370, 371, 373, 381-3. University of California, 372. University of Hull, 388. University of Lancaster, 23, 24, 303, 367, 383, 384, 397. University of Pennsylvania, 372. University of Strathclyde, 384, 386, 387. University of Sussex. University of Warwick, 303. Vajda, Stephen, 337, 338, 370. Van Wassenhove, L.N., 401. Vickers, 32.

Vimy Ridge, 38. Waddington, Professor C.H., 20, 186, 204, 368. Walshe, J.G., 326, 327. Walters, Peter, 310, 311. Wansbrough-Jones, Sir Owen, 122-4, 368, 382. Ward, Ray, 338. Watkins, H.R.W., 307. Watson-Watt, Sir Robert, defines OR, 2; begins radar work, 67, 68, views on F.A. Lindemann, 75; role in CSSAD, 76; role in origins of OR, 76; mentioned, 20, 69, 71, 116, 179, 186. Webb, Beatrice, 194. Webb, Sidney, 194. White, D.J., 386. Whitworth, Brian, 338, 339. Wilkins, A.R, 67, 68. Williams, Professor B.R., 324. Williams, E.C., 71-3, 76, 78-80, 91. Williams, Professor, E.J., 102, 103. Wilson, Alan, 301. Wilson, Harold, 22, 317-9. Wimperis, H.E., 43, 44, 66-69. Woods, Sir John Henry, 204. Woodward-Nutt, A.E., 143. Workington Iron and Steel Co., 241, 242. Zeppelin raids, 60 Zuckerman, Professor Solly, role in 'Tots and Quots', 88, 187; role in Science and War, 88; work on bomb blast pressures, 126, 127; views on area bombing, 140, 141; role in Combined Operations, 162; role in Operation Overlord, 162-4; leads British Bombing Survey Unit, 166, 167; mentioned, 20, 22, 133, 180, 186, 187, 216, 324.

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE FROM THE 1930s TO 1970

O P E R A T I O N A L This is the first of two projected volumes on the history off operational research (OR) in Britain commissioned by the IK Operational Research Society. Based upon a vast array of published and unpublished sources, the book provides an original account of the discipline's pre-war and wartime origins.

R E S E A R C H

I

N

Thias a prelude to a wide-ranging analysis of the diffusion of OB into the public and private sectors after 1945. The chapters on the role of OB in iron and steel and coalmining, and its rapid adoption in the I K corporate sector after 1960, will be of particular interest to practitioix

W A R

A N D

P E A C E

This book also analyses and explains the diffusion of OB into local and central gdVernment and provides an informed commentary on the origins and subsequent history of the OB Society. The author has related the development of OB in the UK to contemporary developments in the USA. The book concludes with a resume of the post-1970 debates concerning the future trajectory of OB.

P247hc ISBN 1-86094-297-0

Imperial College Press www.icpress.co.uk

I I nun II II II m i 9 l 781860 il 942976 11