THE EARLY SOCIOLOGY OF MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS
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THE EARLY SOCIOLOGY OF MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS
THE EARLY SOCIOLOGY OF MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS VOLUME I Scientific Management Frederick Winslow Taylor Comprising: Shop Management The Principles of Scientific Management Testimony Before the Special House Committee VOLUME II The Philosophy of Management Oliver Sheldon VOLUME III Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett Edited by Henry C.Metcalf and L.Urwick VOLUME IV Papers on the Science of Administration Edited by Luther Gulick and L.Urwick VOLUME V Management and the Worker F.J.Roethlisberger and William J.Dickson VOLUME VI The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization Elton Mayo VOLUME VII Organization and Management: Selected Papers Chester I.Barnard VOLUME VIII On the Shop Floor: Two Studies of Workshop Organization and Output T.Lupton
THE EARLY SOCIOLOGY OF MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS Edited by Kenneth Thompson VOLUME VIII On the Shop Floor Two Studies of Workshop Organization and Output T.Lupton
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published 1963 by Pergamon Press, Oxford This edition published 2003 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Copyright © 1963 T.Lupton Editorial matter and selection © 2003 Kenneth Thompson All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested. ISBN 0-203-50909-9 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-57080-4 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-27982-8 (set) ISBN 0-415-27990-9 (volume VIII) Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original book may be apparent.
ON THE SHOP FLOOR Two Studies of Workshop Organization and Output by
T.LUPTON Head of Department of Industrial Administration, College of Advanced Technology, Birmingham. Sometime Senior Lecturer, Department of Social Anthropology and Sociology, University of Manchester.
PERGAMON PRESS OXFORD · LONDON · NEW YORK · PARIS 1963
CONTENTS
Page List of Figures
vii
List of Tables
viii
Preface
ix
Chapter 1
The Problem
1
2
The Workshop at the Wye Garment Company
12
3
Norms, Expectations, Output and Earnings
39
4
“Sociable” Groupings in Workroom X
64
5
Conflict and Co-operation
75
6
Conclusion (Wye Garments Case Study)
86
7
Jay’s Electrical Components. The Industry and the Firm
92
8
People and Production in the Small Transformer Section
108
9
The Method of Wage Payment at Jay’s
125
10
Norms, Expectations and Performance
135
11
Output and Earnings
166
12
Conclusion (Jay’s Case Study)
180
13
General Conclusion
183
Appendix 1
199
References
201
Subject Index
203
LIST OF FIGURES Page FIG. 1 Diagrammatic layout of Workroom and No. 3 Unit FIG. 2 Daily output of units FIG. 3 Fluctuations around average weekly earnings. Full weeks FIG. 4 Average Weekly earnings. No. 3 Unit Full weeks only FIG. 5 Average Hourly earnings FIG. 6 Working positions FIG. 7 Tea Break Groupings FIG. 8 Diagram of Work Flow FIG. 9 Sketch of Management Structure FIG. 10 Flow of Work and Typical Positions of Workers FIG. 11 Tea Break and Lunch Groups FIG. 12 Comparison of “Job Spoiler” and “Conformer” FIG. 13 Bonus per cent., Daywork Hours, and Average hourly earnings: 4 workers
22 51 53 54 57 65 69 97 100 104 123 170 174
LIST OF TABLES Page TABLE 1 Workers of No. 3 Unit TABLE 2 Average (weekly) hourly earnings and range of variation (No. 3 Unit) TABLE 3 Tea Break groupings TABLE 4 Workers in the Small Transformer Section TABLE 5 Wage Rates TABLE 6 Average (Weekly) hourly earnings and range of variation TABLE 7 “External” and “Internal” factors
35 54 70 124 132 176 195
PREFACE
THIS study is based upon research carried out from the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Manchester during 1955 and 1956. The work was sponsored by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research/Medical Research Council Joint Committee on Human Relations in Industry, and financed from Counterpart Aid funds derived from United States Economic Aid. The idea of a study of the social factors influencing output in factories originated from Max Gluckman, Professor of Social Anthropology at Manchester, and arose from discussions with Professor Homans of Harvard about American work in this field. I was engaged to carry out the study and was given complete freedom to develop the idea, and the investigation, in my own way. However, Professor Gluckman gave liberally of his knowledge and experience at every stage. His advice was invaluable. The atmosphere in the Manchester Department of Social Anthropology is always stimulating, and I count it a great privilege to have worked there. If this study has any value, it derives in great measure from the helpful but pointed criticism it had at every stage, from individual colleagues and from the Manchester seminar. I was particularly helped by Sheila Cunnison, Shirley Wilson, and John Bescoby, who were engaged on similar work, Dr. Victor Turner, although his fieldwork interest lay in Africa, took a lively interest in the work and placed his great understanding of sociological theory at my disposal. Neither they nor my other colleagues are in any way responsible for shortcomings in the work. In preparing for, and in carrying out my investigations on the shop floor, I relied heavily on the help and advice of officials of the Waterproof Garment Workers Trade Union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, and the Electrical Trade Union, and of managers of the factories where I worked. Without their counsel, and without the friendliness and co-operation of the workers, my task would have been impossible. I cannot name them without breaking my promise to preserve anonymity of people and firms. I can only hope that my work will add to greater understanding of the problems which they, and others like them, face. This was its only object.
CHAPTER 1 THE PROBLEM
THE material for this study was gathered while the investigator was playing the role of industrial worker. Those with whom he worked knew him as a University investigator and were told of his purpose in coming amongst them. This method, which may be described as “open participant observation” is not widely used by sociologists. It has been criticized because it is open to the possibility of bias and personal idiosyncrasy in the selection of data, because only a small area can be investigated, and because comparison between the work of different investigators is difficult. The method was adopted for this study simply because it seemed most appropriate for the problem to be studied.* The danger of personal bias is a real one and the reader is therefore entitled to know not only what was observed but also how far the efforts-of the investigator to maintain a posture of detachment and impartiality were successful. It is therefore necessary for the investigator to describe his own activities and states of mind. For this reason, and also to avoid the awkward use of “the investigator” and “the present writer” the book has been written as an account of a personal experience as well as an essay in sociological analysis. From here on, the first person singular will be used. I recall first the way my mind was working when, in the Autumn of 1954, I began to think how the research problem which had been set for me might best be tackled. The title of the project for which funds had been granted was “Production Norms in Factories, with reference to the social factors determining their establishment.” I was free to decide, within this very wide frame of reference, which research field I should choose to investigate and what research methods I would use. My first task was to work out a set of hypotheses which could be submitted to the test of empirical observation, and which were *A fuller discussion of the merits of “open participant observation” as a research technique may be found in Appendix 1.
2 ON THE SHOP FLOOR
based upon previous work in the field, upon my own personal experience and perception of the problem. In the 1930’s, during my apprenticeship as a marine engineer, I spent some years in an engineering workshop. This experience brought home clearly to me the influence of customary workshop standards of conduct upon individual behaviour, and the subtlety of the sanctions employed to enforce conformity. It was the custom of the workshop in which I served my apprenticeship for the workers to cease work some 15 minutes before the official finishing time. During the second day in the shop I was given a job by the foreman which completely absorbed my interest. I became oblivious to my surroundings and to the passage of time. I was disturbed by the sounding of the “buzzer” which announced the official finishing time, and when I looked up I found myself surrounded by a group of men who had obviously been watching me for some time. They were all ready to go home. Nothing was said, but their looks made it clear that I would soon become unpopular if I persisted in observing official times. The lesson was quickly learned, and not unwillingly. In time I learned other lessons about the customs and usages of the shop. To work too quickly was to be labelled a “teararse” and to be at least partly shut out from the friendly give and take of the shop and from the spontaneously formed “scrounging groups” which, in defiance of management rulings, assembled in secluded corners of the shop for unofficial tea breaks and discussions. Here, the latest sporting and political news was argued about and highly coloured accounts of sexual adventures were retailed. If to be a “teararse” was to court exclusion from the social life of the workshop, it was also regarded as a breach of workshop custom to be too much of a “scrounger”. The man who persistently dodged work and whose output fell below what was generally considered “decent” became an object of ridicule. Equally, in this workshop of skilled craftsmen, the man who produced shoddy work lost status in the shop and was pointed out to apprentices as a bad example. As it so often turned out, the “teararsers” and the “scroungers” produced the shoddy work. So workshop custom was reinforced by the value placed on a high standard of workmanship, a value held by management and workmen alike, and by the apprentices even before they entered the shop. Many of the customs of the workshop effectively regulated the output of the shop in respect both to quality and quantity, and it was known to be management’s opinion that the output of the shop could easily be increased. From time to time a determined effort was made by management to enforce official starting and finishing times, to break up the scrounging groups, to end unofficial tea breaks, and generally to tighten management control. The threat to use the sanction of dismissal, or suspension of apprenticeship, might for a time be effective, but gradually shop
THE PROBLEM 3
custom would reassert itself. The running battle between management and the workers in this shop was sometimes brought out into the open but for the most part it was guerrilla warfare. Woe betide the worker who betrayed the strategic aims and the tactics of the workshop to the other side. He would be labelled a bosses’ man; and to be a bosses’ man was the greatest of workshop misdemeanours. I spent the greater part of my youth amongst industrial workers. My father was a skilled craftsman, his kin and his friends were skilled craftsmen. I became one myself. Listening to their conversations led me to believe that my own experiences were not unique and that workshops everywhere were much the same. It was no surprise, therefore, later to learn that industrial psychologists and sociologists had observed the same kind of behaviour in workshops. I was enthusiastic to discover how they interpreted behaviour of a kind which I personally had observed and experienced. As an adolescent I had accepted such behaviour as being in the nature of things, although I remember being troubled at times that what I was doing offended against the virtues of hard work and conscientiousness which I had been taught at school and in the home, and which was at the core of the religious teaching I had received. I quickly learned to overcome what scruples I had. In industrial sociology behaviour such as I had seen and experienced is widely described as “restriction of output”. It seemed from the literature as if managements estimated what output could reasonably be expected from a workshop on technical grounds and giving due weight to the skill, experience and organization of the working force. Outputs below this were regarded as “restrictive”, and as the outcome of the kind of behaviour I have just been describing. The puzzling question arises: why do the workers behave in this way ? It is especially difficult to explain why restriction is encountered in workshops where money incentives are offered to call forth the best efforts of the workers. In a time-rate workshop, restriction could be quite plausibly explained on the ground that it is a human failing (either innate or culturally formed) to grab money for nothing. If the wage is guaranteed each week provided a certain period of time is spent within the factory, it would follow from this premise that men would be inclined to do as little as possible in the time, and instead to use time in the factory to pursue activities less unpleasant than hard work. But in a shop where cash incentives were offered one would expect that up to a point at least the offer of extra cash would overcome inertia and idleness. The most thorough study of the phenomenon of “restriction of output” is the Bank Wiring Observation Room study.* It was from my reading of this study that I learned of explanations which
4 ON THE SHOP FLOOR
were based on thorough investigation and which appeared to be plausible. My own work, most of which is reported in the pages which follow, has led me to question these explanations. But I am now trying to recall my state of mind before I began my own research in this field, and my reading of the Bank Wiring Observation Room study was a powerful formative influence. While investigating management-worker relationships, the motives of workers, and other problems, the observers in the Hawthorne plant noted a widespread tendency for output to fall below what could reasonably be expected.* It was therefore decided to undertake serious and intensive investigation of this problem. Before summarizing the results and conclusions of the Bank Wiring Observation Room researches it is necessary to point out that the investigators were University men working in active collaboration with the management of the firm. Research activities were accordingly directed to problems defined by management—or jointly by managers and research workers. There is no evidence that workers were consulted before investigations were planned to discover what they considered to be problems worth investigating, although at every stage afterwards the workers were kept fully informed and their co-operation sought. It would be fair to say that the investigation into restriction of output was undertaken in the hope that out of it would emerge conclusions which would enable management to devise policies to help close the gap between expected and actual output. After becoming actively interested in the problem of restriction of output, the Hawthorne researchers decided to set up a small workroom in which the workers could be observed over a long period and records of output kept.† An observer remained in the workroom throughout the day and recorded behaviour and conversation. From time to time the workers were taken from the room and interviewed by another member of the research team. It soon became clear that the group was imposing upon the individual workers a standard of output. This group standard was below the limit set by normal fatigue.* The workers were paid according to a group piecework scheme. Like most piecework incentive schemes, this scheme rested on the assumption that the workers would attempt to maximize their earnings up to the limit imposed by skill and physical fatigue. But, as Professor Homans has pointed out in his excellent re-analysis of the Bank Wiring Room data:
*One of the many studies carried out in the Hawthorne Plant of the Western Electric Company in Chicago in the 1920’s and 1930’s. See Ref. 1 for report of Bank Wiring Room study.
THE PROBLEM 5
“Whether the men were expected to behave as described, the fact is that they did not…. They had a clear idea of a proper day’s work…output was clearly not as great as it would have been if fatigue had been the only limiting factor.” and: “Together with the belief that a man’s output ought not to go above [a certain limit] went the belief that a man’s output record, that is, his average hourly output, ought to show little change from week to week”.(4) The output graphs of individual workers in the Bank Wiring Observation Room approximated to straight lines. The output of individual workers was held to the group norm by a complicated and subtle process of social control operating within the work group. There were many differences between the Bank Wiring Room and the workshop in which I served my apprenticeship. The work in the Bank Wiring Room was simple and repetitive. In my workshop it was skilled and varied. The Bank Wiring Room was a piecework shop, mine was a timework shop. One could point to many other differences. There was one important point of similarity, namely the existence of a customary code of behaviour which affected the output performance of individuals and of groups. I was therefore interested in the interpretation of the events observed in the Bank Wiring Room. A number of possible explanatory hypotheses were advanced and examined in the light of the data from the Bank Wiring Room. Was it possible, for example, that the workers were consciously and deliberately exercising control over output in the belief that they were protecting themselves against rate-cutting and other actions by management which would make them financially worse off in the long run ? This hypothesis was rejected. The investigators argued that the actions of the workers were not based upon a logical appraisal of their situation. According to the evidence of the interviews with the workers it was clear that the method of wage payment was imperfectly understood. Without full knowledge, it was argued, it would clearly have been difficult for the men to act deliberately to serve what they considered to be their long-run interest.
*“Reasonable expectations” being defined with reference to obligations implied in the contract of employment, and taking account of the technical equipment and materials provided and the skill and training of the workers. The concept of “reasonable output” also includes judgments about what constitutes “normal fatigue” and a “fair effort”. †The Hawthorne investigators were not the first to pay serious attention to this problem, see for example Ref. 2; also F.W. Taylor discusses the problem at length, see Ref. 3.
6 ON THE SHOP FLOOR
The “quiet life” hypothesis was then examined. This states that workers restrict and stabilize output at a certain level so as to ensure that the attention of management will not constantly be directed to their activities; in order, for example, to see whether the layout of the shop ought to be improved, or the system of wage payment altered. As against this the Bank Wiring Room investigators argued that restriction of output may well lead to an increase in the unit cost of the product and bring about the very interference that workers are assumed to fear. On these grounds the argument that restriction was the outcome of a shrewd calculation of certain crucial aspects of their situation on the part of the workers was rejected as inadequate. Yet when the workers were interviewed, and asked why they held output at a given level, these were the very reasons they gave. The investigators resolved this apparent paradox by calling the “reasons” rationalizations. The notion that the workers were malicious, ungrateful, or just plain lazy was summarily rejected on the evidence from the Bank Wiring Room, as was the suggestion that the workers’ behaviour was a manifestation of suspicion of, and hostility towards, the management. Such evidence of hostile attitudes towards management as was adduced, was explained as emerging from the efforts of the workers to maintain the internal organization of their group. Briefly, the conclusion of the Bank Wiring Room investigators was that what had become known as restriction of output was the outcome of a discrepancy between two logics. Management logic is a logic of efficiency. Workers are “groupish”, they adhere much more to custom and tradition, and their logic is a logic of sentiment. This is why their reactions so often seem to be irrational and so exasperating to management.* A similar conclusion is reached by Collins, Dalton, and Roy, after reporting several studies of working groups. They write: “Analysis has indicated that restriction of output is an expression of group solidarity, arising from causes other than economic fear, laziness or dishonesty”, although it “at the *There are many difficulties about the concept of “normal fatigue”. Friedmann has drawn attention to the lack of knowledge of human physiology which is implied in the everyday use of the concept by managers. See Industrial Society, Glencoe, 111., The Free Press (1955) especially Chapter 3. *Since, according to the Bank Wiring Room investigators, levels of output were not the outcome of deliberation and planning, they suggested that it is misleading to describe behaviour such as they observed as “restriction of output”.
THE PROBLEM 7
same time expresses a feeling that workers are different from management, that their motivations and goals are quite apart from those of management employees”.(5) Collins, Dalton and Roy thus place more stress than did the Bank Wiring Room investigators on the social position of the workers in relation to management, Donald Roy(6), reporting a participant observer study of a machine shop, explains the workers’ manipulation of the piecework incentive system not so much in terms of adherence to traditionalistic values, in as terms of a shrewd appreciation of their economic position and of an effort to protect and improve it, Roy is acutely aware that explanations of restriction given by workers may appear to management irrational, and that behaviour is affected by sentiment as well as hard-headed pursuit of self-interest, but his argument shows up a flaw in the reasoning of the Hawthorne investigators. It is surely possible to argue rationally to a policy of self-interest from a position of incomplete knowledge. Such a policy may have consequences which are unanticipated. In this case the unanticipated consequences themselves are another item of knowledge which may modify policy. Roy describes, for example, how the workers’ behaviour in the machine shop led management to institute controls designed to prevent the manipulation of the incentive system by the workers. These controls were immediately countered by more ingenious methods of manipulation. Both sets of manipulations were designed by the working group to serve the same end, namely, to retain control over the working situation and over earnings. Comparing my own experience with the findings and conclusions of other investigators, and comparing their interpretations, I conclude that although there is much agreement about the existence of differences between expected and actual output in modern industrial workshops, there could hardly be more disagreement why this should be so. I think this disagreement can be explained as follows. In the first place it is clear that the values of the investigator influence the method of approach and conclusions. The term “restriction of output” itself has always seemed to me to carry an odour of disapproval, as if to fall short of expectations based upon a logic of efficiency indicated industrial malaise. Many social investigators have attempted to postulate the conditions under which working groups and individual workers can achieve satisfaction in work and managers can at the same time achieve satisfactory outputs. Coch and French, reporting a study of resistance to change, observe that “a strong psychological sub-group with negative attitudes towards management will display the strongest resistance to
8 ON THE SHOP FLOOR
change. On the other hand groups with high ‘we-feeling’ and positive attitudes are the best re-learners”.(7) The implication is that management should encourage “wefeeling” as a matter of enlightened self-interest, Another study of managementinitiated changes concludes that people “do not change under threat; their attitudes and behaviour are modified most rapidly and most effectively in an atmosphere of acceptance. (8) Seashorereports similarly upon a study of industrial working groups: “The direction of deviation of group productivity (i.e. towards a higher or lower productivity) is a function of the degree to which the larger organization (the company) is perceived by group members to provide a supportive setting for the group”(9) thus echoing the conclusions of the monumental study of the American Army in wartime.(10) These writers, though not always explicitly, confirm that the planning of production is a process of social control in which workers are expected to modify their behaviour to meet the requirements of the production plan. In addition it is thought to be desirable for them to accept the norms and values of the planners and the pattern of sanctions associated with the enforcement of these norms. All these writers echo the difficulties of practising managers who see the administrative problem of control as involving the acceptance by workers of the norms and values of the planners, at least to some extent. A recent textbook on management may be quoted to illustrate the point. “Unfortunately, the attitude of willing, informed, intelligent obedience is not inherent or automatic—it must be engendered and developed, and this is only possible in an atmosphere of mutual trust and belief in a worthwhile purpose and of enthusiasm for attaining that purpose”.(11) From the standpoint of management, the problem is seen as one of devising methods and incentives which will ensure optimum use of mechanical and human effort. In order to ensure that production plans are fulfilled, the behaviour of workers must be subjected to control. The controls which are used by management seem to be of two kinds. First, there are those controls which inhere in the production plan itself, which may be called the technological controls. The extreme examples of this kind of control are, of course, the moving assembly line and the automatic continuous process where the behaviour of the individual workers is controlled throughout the working day by the speed of the belt or by the demands of the continuous process. But even in the highly mechanized workshop other controls operate to regulate behaviour. The worker submits to the dictates of the machine in
THE PROBLEM 9
return for cash reward, and to the orders of management because of the moral obligation implied in the contract of employment and the specific sanction of dismissal and hence loss of earnings. Within this framework of obligations and sanctions the extent to which the expectations of the management about output are fulfilled in practice, will depend upon the interpretation of these obligations in day-to-day relationships within the workshops between management, supervisors and workers. It is to be expected then that managers, and those who have accepted management’s definition of the problem of restriction of output, should be preoccupied with the development of “human relations” techniques to win over the workers to an acceptance of management norms and expectations, especially since it is clear that workers do not always accept the moral obligation to submit completely to technological and administrative controls. This approach rests upon the belief that there is something sacrosanct about management goals and norms. It also tends to assume that the interests and goals of managers and workers coincide, if only workers could be persuaded to shed irrational fears and accept this. But this approach “robs workers’ claims of their legitimacy”(12) as Cozer puts it, and begs the question. It was partly because of my own background as an industrial worker that I suspected the management-oriented approach to the problem of differences between actual and expected output, but a training in sociological analysis increased my suspicions. It is naïve to believe, for example, that managers are always competent enough in all circumstances to create the conditions for optimal social co-operation. It is also naïve to believe that there are no fundamental differences of interest between managers and workers and to accept the view that irrational fears, plus the insecurity which promotes workshop solidarity, alone prevent workers from coming to a full realisation of the extent of their identity of interest and aim with management. Most of all, as a sociologist I suspected the simplicity of some of the interpretations.* For all these reasons I have decided to dispense with the concept of restriction of output; but my reasons differ from those which influenced the Bank Wiring Room investigators. They rejected the concept because it implied deliberate policy. I think standards may be set deliberately but are not therefore reprehensible, and I shall not use the term again. My analysis will therefore proceed by way of an examination of controls over behaviour. These controls may be technological, or administrative, *I have elaborated these points in my article “Industrial Conflict and Cooperation”, Industrial Newsletter, 5.C.M., December, 1955.
10 ON THE SHOP FLOOR
or quasi-legal, or they may be customary. Since the kind of controls which operate to regulate behaviour help to define the roles which individuals are expected to play, the existence of discrepant or conflicting modes of control may well produce conflicting role expectations. Generally, one would say that the kind of controls which management exercises over the behaviour of workers are dictated by the need to meet market demand and (with due consideration for the health and welfare of workers) to make profits—or at least to avoid losses. It is by no means clear that the behaviour of workers as individuals is determined by these considerations, nor is it at all clear whether one can speak about workers’ motives in general terms. Since management behaviour in any particular factory is likely to be affected by the situation which confronts it in the market for labour and for the product, and in its relationships with other firms, it is likely that workers’ behaviour will be affected by the behaviour of particular managements and the kind of controls which each exercises. That is to say, the pattern of role expectations will differ according to the economic, technological, and administrative context in which the unit of production operates. This means, of course, that the controls which workers either individually or collectively attempt to exercise over output and earnings may well differ from unit to unit. It seems to me, therefore, that the most interesting task for the field investigator which emerges when the problem is posed in this way, is to map out what may be described as the field of social forces which operate to produce certain kinds of behaviour. Since the chief concern of this report is “behaviour of workers in relation to output”, this behaviour will be considered as a kind of moving resultant of the interplay of social forces in a field of economic, technical and administrative, and customary controls. Of course output behaviour is itself a factor affecting the field, and not just the end result of the interplay of other factors. I am studying a dynamic process, and from it I select one factor for special emphasis. I must discuss one further general consideration before analysing the field data. If, as I have postulated, there are discrepant systems of control, and discrepant role expectations associated with these, and if, moreover, the pattern of social relationships persists and exhibits regularity, then there must exist some mechanism for resolving or handling the discrepancies. I shall attempt in the analysis to show how these mechanisms operate and how behaviour is affected by them. It is in the working of equilibrating mechanisms that customary controls appear to be most relevant and effective. For convenience of exposition the two workshops are considered separately. In each case I shall begin with an analysis of the technological and administrative controls. Since the effectiveness of these controls is relevant to an explanation of the reaction of
THE PROBLEM 11
the workers, I shall not only consider the controls planned by management and the interests and values associated with them, but I shall also describe them in their detailed operation in the workshop. I then go on to introduce an analysis of the social structure of the workshop. Then I consider the output performance of individual workers and attempt an explanation of output and earnings levels. This will involve a number of detailed case studies of factors influencing performance. The process whereby conflicts are handled within the workshop will be analysed using detailed descriptions of the resolution of conflict situations. Each case study concludes with a more general interpretation of observed behaviour by reference to expectations and to various types of controls and sanctions. I shall be arguing throughout that levels of output and earnings are the outcome of the interplay of a complex of factors, some of which lie outside the workshop itself and therefore outside the power of management or workers to control. In general conclusion I suggest hypotheses to explain differences in behaviour between the two workshops. This will involve the assessment of factors usually considered to be the concern of economic analysis. But since there are marked differences between the two workshops both in response to cash incentives and in pace of work, and since these cannot be completely explained by reference to factors operating within the workshops, I have thought myself justified in trying to explain the differences by reference to external factors.
CHAPTER 2 THE WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT COMPANY
THE Wye Garment Company was formed in 1868 as a small workshop making waterproof garments. It has since embraced other manufacturing activities, chiefly by way of backward integration towards the sources of raw materials. More recently, the firm has moved into other branches of manufacture, but waterproof garments still form a significant part of the total output of its workshops. The history of the industry, and the structure of the industry and the firm, have helped to shape the present-day behaviour of managers and workers, so it is necessary to sketch briefly some of the chief historical and structural details. The history of the industry is one of alternating prosperity and depression. This may, of course, be said of many other industries. In this case even the periods of relative prosperity have been interspersed with short term and seasonal fluctuations. The market situation is marked by chronic uncertainty. During the first World War and immediately after, the industry rode on the crest of a boom. When Government contracts were reduced and pent-up civilian demand was satisfied, a fierce price war ensued, accompanied by a descending spiral of low wages, cheaper and faster production, and debasement of quality. Agreements on wages and conditions of employment which had been drawn up by the organized sections of the industry were ignored. Even the best firms were forced into the undignified scramble for orders, for only in this way could they remain in business. During this period the downward pressure on wage rates was powerful and much hardship was suffered by the workers. There were prolonged and bitter industrial disputes. During and since the second World War demand has become more stable and seasonal and short term fluctuations, while still occurring, have been less severe, especially in the larger firms. Competition is still keen, but since demand has been brisk, prices fairly high, and labour in short supply, the downward pressure on wage rates has been somewhat relaxed. Throughout its history, the structure of the industry has changed little. Noting this, a Commission of Enquiry, set up to
ON THE SHOP FLOOR 13
consider an application to establish a Wages Council for the industry, was of the opinion that the present relatively high wages were due primarily to labour shortage. The Commission thought that existing negotiating machinery would be inadequate to maintain standards in the face of contracting demand. If demand became less, another price war would develop and the downward pressure upon wage rates would be irresistible. For these reasons they recommended the inclusion of the industry in one of the existing Wages Councils for the clothing industry. In an industry such as this, the development of Trade Unionism and the establishment of stable relationships between Unions and Employers is beset with difficulties. That collective bargaining has been established at all is a tribute to both the tenacity and ability of the Trade Union officials and to the far-sightedness of a group of employers. Although the industry and the Trade Union were well established before 1919, it was not until then that a comprehensive piecework price list covering most firms was agreed upon by the Union and the Manufacturers’ Association. But in the difficult inter-war years many firms not covered by the agreement enforced wage reductions. The others were compelled to follow suit and soon the agreement fell into disuse. The Employers’ Association was also weakened by resignations and it disbanded in 1936. Trade improved during the late 1930’s and fresh efforts were made once again to introduce stability into the Union-Employer relationship. One result of these efforts was the formation of a new association of Employers. During World War II this Association and the Union opened discussions on a new price list. These dragged on into the postwar period and in 1946 Union officials, impatient at the delay, called an industry-wide strike to bring matters to a head. Agreement was finally reached. One of the conditions attaching to the new agreement was the provision that the Union and the Employers jointly would apply for the establishment of a Wages Council for the Industry. The Union is more confident than the Employers that the existing machinery of negotiation would stand the strain of another severe depression in trade, and it is the latter who have pressed most strongly for the establishment of a Wages Council as a safeguard against unfair wage competition in conditions of general decline in the market. The Wye Garment Company is one of the most progressive firms in the industry. For its 3,000 odd employees it provides a wide range of services. Canteen, club, sports, and welfare facilities are better than most in the industry. There is a superannuation scheme for the workers, and a profit-sharing scheme administered by a committee on which employees are represented. In recent years a Personnel Department has been formed, Joint Consultation has been introduced, and a start has been made to
14 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
apply modern methods for the selection and training of workers. The firm of Wye Garments has also pioneered the introduction of modern production engineering methods in the industry. The extent of its advance in this field will be the more easily appreciated if the present structure of the industry is outlined and some of the production methods in use are briefly described. The Working Party on Rubber-Proofed Clothing, which reported in 1947, estimated that there were between 200 and 300 firms in the industry. Between them these firms employed some 6,000 workers. Most of the firms were very small. Of the 115 firms concentrated in the same area as the Wye Garment Co., 51 had fewer than 20 workers. Only 24 had more than 100 workers. There has been some expansion and concentration since 1947 but the industry is still for the most part made up of very small firms. Many of the larger firms manufacture plastic and chemically proofed garments. The figures quoted above apply only to the manufacture of rubber-proofed garments. It is the firms, or departments of firms, which produce rubber-proofed garments, which constitute the Waterproof Garment Industry. Although the Wye Garment Company employs over 3,000 people, only about 400 of these are engaged on the actual assembly of rubber-proofed garments. Even so the firm remains one of the largest and best known in the industry. The industry is still intensely competitive. This is due, of course, to the large number of small producers in relation to the size of the market. It is also due to the organization of the market itself and to the nature of the product. Most firms are too small and unstable to afford the risk of keeping stocks, and wholesalers find it unprofitable to do so. In these circumstances even short-term prediction of demand is difficult and the growth in size of firms is inhibited. Demand for the product is also related to weather conditions, or so it is believed, and upon changing fashions. It is therefore risky to expand productive capacity in anticipation of a steady flow of orders. It is also risky to instal expensive plant, and for the same reasons. It should now be clear why, in times of brisk demand, the small producer can survive. Since methods of production remain primitive the only equipment required to start production is a set of cheap hand tools and sewing machines. In buoyant market conditions almost any skilled worker can set up on his own with a small capital outlay (£20 is a current estimate) and either produce for the market direct or as sub-contractor for a larger firm. In this industry, any contraction of demand tends sharply to intensify price competition. This in its turn leads to downward pressure on wage rates, since few economies can be made elsewhere. The industry is not to any significant degree mechanized, nor is it possible in such an industry easily to finance research into mechanization, or to make it worth while for
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manufacturers of machinery to devote serious attention to the design of special machines. Thus when the market is depressed the chief way for manufacturers to gain competitive advantage is wage reduction, or its equivalents, speed-up and reduction of quality. All these things have, as we have seen, happened in the past. Small firms have been driven out of business, collective bargaining procedures have been ignored, and much unemployment has resulted. These things remain very much in the minds of employers, workers and Trade Union officials, and, as we shall see, affect their attitudes to output and earnings. Although the manufacture of a Waterproof Garment is still, in most firms, primarily a manual task, methods of production differ from firm to firm, and even from workroom to workroom within a firm. Four methods of production may be distinguished: the “make-through” method, the “set” method, the “conveyor” method, and the “unit” or “section” method. Whichever method is used, the process of assembly of the garment begins when a set of cuttings from the rubberproofed material is delivered to the worker or workers responsible for assembly. (i) In the “make through” method a skilled maker, working with one or more machinists, assembles the whole garment. (ii) In the “set” method a skilled worker supervises the work of a number of semi-skilled workers who prepare the parts for assembly, and then he (or she) does the final and difficult assembly operations. This method lends itself to abuse, and the Trade Union has attempted with some success to limit the numbers of semi-skilled workers who may work with any one skilled maker. (iii) Where the “conveyor” method is employed, semi-skilled workers work on either side of a moving belt or a stationary table. The work moves, or is passed, from worker to worker through the various stages of assembly, (iv) The “unit” method entrusts the assembly of the garment to a team of workers of differing degrees of skill who co-operate. In some ways this resembles the conveyor method, but in the “unit” method there is no machine-pacing, the team is usually smaller, the sub-division of tasks differs, and the layout of tables and machines is different. The “make-through” method is traditional and is used typically in the smaller firms. However, some of the larger firms still employ skilled makers-through in some of their workshops. Wye Garment Company still has one workroom employing make-through methods on high class and expensive garments. The “set” method is not used at Wye. Some of the large firms employ variants of it but its use is mainly confined to the very small firms on the margin of the industry. The “conveyor” method was used extensively in the workrooms of Wye Garments until a few years ago. Recently it has been replaced by the “unit” method. The new
16 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
method has been planned in accordance with modern principles of work flow and motion economy. At the same time as the units were being introduced, the firm undertook the replanning of the flow of work through the plant as a whole, and introduced modern techniques of production and cost control. The calculation of piecework prices by time-study and job-evaluation has been established for the past few years. This is a new departure in the industry. By agreement with the Union, the firm no longer fixes prices according to the industry Price List for the majority of its workers. The new method of job pricing will be discussed in detail presently. All these changes at Wye have embraced the Waterproof Garment Department. The present study was carried out in one of the workrooms of this department. I shall refer to this workroom as Workroom X. I worked as an operative in this Workroom and in the training school for nearly six months. In the section which follows I shall describe the system of production in Workroom X. I shall also consider how it operates as a mechanism of social control. THE PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM IN WORKROOM X I now examine what may be called the human ecology of Workroom X. This is an essential first step in the analysis of the factors affecting output, to show how the system of production operates as a means of management control over the behaviour of the workers. In any workshop the layout of machines and other equipment will set limits to the social relationships which can be entered into by workers.* The extent of this limitation will depend upon the operation of other factors. The effectiveness of the control exercised by supervisors and managers in ensuring that workers fulfil the roles assigned to them in the productive system, the force of the sanctions they are empowered to apply to this end, the degree of response by the workers to cash and other incentives offered as an inducement to maximize effort—all these factors operate in addition to the controls implicit in the productive arrangements themselves. Then there are the normative controls over behaviour, the standards of right behaviour, which, in their *William Foote Whyte observes: “We have ample data to show that the formal structure (i.e. the official allocation of positions) does not determine the pattern of human relations in an organization. Nevertheless, it does set certain limits upon the shape of that pattern” ‘The Social Structure of the Restaurant’, Amer. J. Soc. Vol. LIV, No. 4, Jan., 1949.
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turn, influence management’s definition of the worker’s roles and the worker’s definition of his own role in the productive system. In the literature, it is the discrepancy between two role definitions which has been seen as the main clue to the problem of differing standards of output as between managers and workers, although it is not always explicitly stated as such. The hypothesis which has been advanced by the Bank Wiring Room investigators and others is that the worker’s role in the informal group of workmates is in conflict with his role as defined by management in the productive system. In this chapter I shall be concerned only to show how management’s definition of the worker’s role is expressed in the productive arrangements in Wye Garments. There is a distinction to be made between the system as planned, and as it actually operates. To say this is not to imply criticism of management. It is merely to recognize that to fulfil a plan in a situation where so many factors have to be taken into account is a difficult task. Attempts to run according to plan are often defeated by happenings which are outside the control of management, and some of which are non-recurring and unpredictable. Since the difference between the planned and the actual affects the expectations of workers, and the expectations of those responsible for management and supervision, it is germane to our problem. The system of production in the Wye Garment workshop appears to have been designed according to the principle of the divorce of planning from doing; or what some writers have described as the “transfer of intelligence from the shop floor”.(13) Theapplication of this principle relieves the worker of the responsibility for planning the supply of materials to his workplace and of deciding on the method he will use to perform the task. Production flow and methods are seen as being management’s responsibility. To show the extent to which management in Wye Garments considered this to be so, I refer to a lecture by a member of the production engineering staff which I attended while I was learning my job in the firm’s training school. The content of this lecture also contains management’s definition of the worker’s role, and its expectations about worker behaviour. The object of the lecture was to familiarize the trainees with the design of the productive system, and to show them the part they would be expected to play in it when they had completed their training. The lecturer’s approach was fairly representative of that of the management as a whole. Evidence which will be examined at a later stage in the analysis will, I think, confirm this. The lecturer began by describing, with the aid of a blackboard diagram, the layout of the workrooms in which the trainees would eventually work. He explained that a lot of thought had gone into the layout and that its object was to reduce to a minimum the movement of people and materials, thus enabling more to be
18 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
produced. He said that the system was better than the one it had displaced, i.e., the conveyor system, because it made the work less monotonous. The new system was also designed to raise output, and since operatives were paid according to what they produced, this meant that higher earnings were possible for them. He went on to say that when a trainee was transferred to a workroom at the end of the training period she would be shown the best way to do the job to which she was assigned. It would then be up to her to develop speed and to avoid unnecessary movements. “All the seconds add up”, he concluded, “and that means that you earn less and fall behind the rest of the team.” These remarks suggest that the principle of the divorce of planning from doing was also seen as involving here the separation of the planner from the doer. Thus, in terms of the production plan, operative control over output was limited to control over the speed at which the work was performed. The operative could, according to management’s definition, and within limits imposed by skill and fatigue, vary the speed at which operations were performed and hence her daily output and earnings. But the incentive scheme was designed to control this factor. Given the supply of materials and tools— controlled by management—the operative’s earnings would depend upon the effort expended by her. Management expected that the operatives would attempt to maximize earnings and this expectation was tied in to the production plan itself. It is only possible to plan production on a flow principle if it is possible to estimate reasonably accurately the daily output of the operatives. And it is only possible to make such an estimate in terms of an adequate response to the monetary incentives offered. Differential responses would interrupt the flow and upset the planned operation of the system. Common failure to respond would result in outputs below those planned for by management. In Workroom X there were three production units. Each unit normally comprised sixteen workers, although the units were sometimes supplemented to facilitate work flow or to meet special circumstances. Figure 1 shows the layout of the workroom. The work did not pass from unit to unit. Each unit was separately responsible for the production of a number of complete garments each day. The component parts of the coat were received into the workroom from the cutting room. They were marked, and sorted and after a preliminary operation known as “stripping” they passed into the units. In the units the various parts were prepared for assembly and they were passed from worker to worker through the various stages of sub-assembly and assembly until a garment emerged, complete save for buttoning and final inspection. After inspection the finished garments were taken from the room and despatched down a shute into the warehouse.
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A more detailed description of the operations which were performed upon the material as it moved through the workroom is necessary for an understanding of the degree of co-ordination which was called for by the system. It also serves to emphasize the dependence of the workers upon management planning for that smooth flow of work through the room upon which their earnings so largely depended. The chief product of Workroom X was the double texture rubberproofed garment, although occasionally single texture garments were made. The manufacture of a double texture garment of good quality called for the operation of stripping, as a preliminary to the assembly of the garment. The Stripper removed a narrow layer of cloth from the edges of the cuttings, leaving a strip of rubber exposed. The operation was wholly manual. A cutting was laid on a table and the cloth loosened from the rubber with a pad soaked in naphtha solvent. Then, with a bradawl-like tool, the cloth was ripped away from the rubber on one side of the double-texture “sandwich”. The operation was complete when the loosened cloth was cut away with shears leaving a strip of the proofing exposed. There were three strippers in the workroom and each was responsible for keeping one of the units supplied. The strippers worked in a group close by the shute where the cuttings were delivered to the room, and near to the marker, who stamped the job and batch numbers on the cuttings prior to stripping and assembly. After the work of the strippers was completed, the cuttings were ready to enter the teams. In each team there were sixteen workers: 11 makers, 4 machinists, and one maker-machinist if such an operative was available. If not, the machining work involved in the operation was taken over by another machinist. But the production plan called for a maker-machinist and it is with the plan that we are now concerned. The cuttings passed from operative to operative to be smeared, hemmed, joined, and machined, emerging complete save for buttonholing, buttoning and inspection. Although there were some limits imposed upon the machinists by the speed of the machines, the work of the teams was not machine-paced. The work of the maker was wholly manual, and the quality and quantity of finished garments depended upon the skill and dexterity of the makers and upon the degree of coordination achieved between the workers, both makers and machinists, in the unit. This co-ordination was provided for in the production plan. It was the concern not of the operatives but of management and of supervision. In terms of the plan, so long as the operative carried out the job by the method prescribed by management, co-ordination was thereby secured. The inflow of work into the room was part of the factory-wide flow plan, and in
20 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
this, of course, the productive capacity of the operatives in Workroom X had to be taken into account. In the team the maker worked at a smooth-topped table, the size and surface of which were designed to facilitate the handling of the work. The tools the maker used were few and of simple design. They consisted of a roller, a cleaner, and a piece of “weeding”. The materials with which the maker worked were varnish (a solution of rubber and naphtha) and a supply of tape if the operation called for this. To give an impression of the work of the maker I describe the operation of smearing backs, a simple initial operation on which I myself was engaged for most of my stay in the workroom. According to the production plan this operation was combined with certain machining operations on the back of the garment and was carried out by a maker-machinist. Maker-machinists were not easy to find and often, as in my case, the smearing operation was done separately and the machine work was passed to an adjacent machinist. I collected from the stripper a “turn” or batch of back cuttings already stripped. The cutting was then laid on the table with the stripped seam along the edge. I then dipped my forefinger into the can of varnish and drew it quickly along the seam, depositing a thin smear. When I had finished smearing all the seams which required it I then laid the cuttings over a trestle to lie there until the varnish became tacky. Before taking up the next cutting I cleaned the table of surplus varnish with the “weeding”—a piece of semi-hard rubber varnish. After I had smeared a few cuttings the varnish had become tacky on the first one and it was ready for hemming or capping. Capping consisted of turning over the cloth along the seam and sticking it down, usually to a width of about l/8th of an inch, although the width varied with the operation and the part of the coat being worked on. I would turn the hem down with my right hand and stick it down with my left hand. Then I would roll it down firmly with the roller. More experienced makers cap and roll in one swift movement and save time by doing so but this requires much skill and practice. It was only towards the end of my stay that I began to acquire proficiency at this. During the smearing operation a careful watch had to be kept to see that varnish was not deposited on the cuttings where it was not required. This surplus varnish was removed with the cleaner before it became hard. There were other parts of the “smearing back” operation but enough has been said to give a general impression of the maker’s work. On completion, the smeared back was picked up from the trestle by the machinist who sewed on the vent pieces. It was then passed to another maker who affixed linings and prepared the seams for joining to the front parts of the coat, which were undergoing similar making and machining operations in another
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part of the unit. Other components, such as collars and sleeves, were meanwhile passing through the appropriate operations. All the components came eventually to be joined by a worker at a specially designed machine which sewed and stuck the seams together, in one operation. It now remained for the seams to be taped over on the inside to make them completely waterproof. This operation, which followed immediately upon the combined sticking and sewing operation, was regarded as being the most skilled of all the operations carried out in the team. Particularly difficult was the operation of taping the joint where the sleeve joined the body of the garment. Usually there were two operatives engaged upon taping the joinedup garment. They were known by the other operatives as “armholers”. From the “armholers” the garment was passed along a rail to a machinist who performed final sewing operations. When these were complete the coat left the team. The place in the sequence of the operations of marking off buttonholes, making buttonholes, and sewing on buttons was not always the same. Sometimes these operations were performed before the coat was completed, sometimes afterwards. In any case, these operations did not take place in the units. The making of buttonholes was done on special machines, and these machines served all three units. There were three operatives engaged in the hand-sewing of buttons and one whose task was to mark off the coat for buttons and buttonholes. None of these operatives was attached to a unit. The completed garments were examined in the room by two passers. They returned faulty work to the workers responsible to ensure that the coat measured up to the standards of workmanship required by management, before it left the workroom. All the operations in the room were supervised by a chargehand. The chargehand stood at a table where she could see most of the operatives in the room. She acted both as a general supervisor and as a progress chaser. That is to say that she tried to ensure as far as possible that the work flow envisaged in the production plan was maintained. The flow of production is shown diagrammatically in Fig. 1. For its efficient operation this system called for planning of a high order. The strippers relied upon the cutters and upon the marker for a steady flow of cuttings to their tables. Similarly, the makers and machinists who performed the initial operations upon the stripped cuttings relied upon the strippers to supply them evenly and steadily with work. And each operative in the various production routes within the team depended upon the operative who preceded her in the workflow. The finished output of garments was determined by the joiner. the armholers, and the final machinists. They in their turn relied not only on the smooth
22 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
FIG. 1. Diagrammatic layout of Workroom and No. 3 Unit
and uninterrupted flow of work down the back, front, and sleeve lines, but on their co-ordination, so that all the component parts reached the place where they were to be joined as and when they were required. On the principle of separating planning from doing, with its corollary, the separation of the planner from the doer, coordination to ensure a smooth flow of work was accepted as the sole responsibility of management. It was a task which bristled with difficulties. Each worker was expected to keep the next supplied with work to keep the flow steady. The breakdown of the manufacture of the garment into its constituent operations and the system of wage payment had to be so arranged that at no point in the system were more or less parts being produced than were required to maintain an even flow. For if more were being produced there would be a glut in the supply of one component and also pressure by the operative back down the line for more
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parts. If less were being produced than the plan called for, the worker would be under pressure from further up the line. To meet this problem the management attempted, when calculating the rates for each operation, to pay each worker according to skill, experience, and ability, and to offer each one sufficient incentive to produce the number of parts necessary to an even flow. Since the tasks within the teams required different degrees of skill—armholers for example were much more highly skilled than back smearers—and since individuals differed in their speed and dexterity and to a lesser extent in their response to monetary incentives, this was a difficult task. Job pricing was apparently planned in conjunction with the breakdown of the operations,* so that, given the rates for the particular operations and an adequate response to the financial incentive, there would be no more over- and under-loading of the system than could be avoided in any system planned and operated by human beings. That is to say, management would expect that a constant eye would be kept on the flow of work so that such adjustments as were required would be made. The responsibility for making these adjustments rested chiefly with the supervisor who was responsible for several workrooms, and with the chargehand in the room. The chargehand was in fact the only person who could really make the adjustments as difficulties arose, for she alone could observe the work passing through the room from hour to hour. The chargehand and the chief supervisor were also consulted when job rates were being fixed. The calculation of the rates was based on time study, the time studies being carried out by the production engineering staff. The supervisor and the chargehands were called in when assessments of skill and experience were being rated for inclusion in the job prices. The reader will have gathered that the workers were paid on the basis of straight piecework. It might seem as if for team work such as this, group payment would be more suitable. But both the management and the workers had experience in the past of group payment. Managers argued that group piecework slows a team down to the speed of the slowest member. They also said that the workers preferred individual piecework, and my own enquiries on this point amongst the operatives showed that most of them did, This was especially true of the speedier workers, some of whom complained to me that in the days of group piecework the fast workers would help the slow ones so as to keep up the output of the team: “We earned their wages for them, now everyone makes their own wages”. Some of the slower workers were less keen on *I had assumed that this must be a corollary of the system as planned, but I have since been told by managers that it was not.
24 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
the new arrangement but generally all agreed on the desirability and equity of individual piecework. But individual piecework made the system more inflexible, and threw a heavy responsibility for coordination on to management. The responsibility might have been lighter with group payment, since the group itself would have had an incentive to make any adjustments required to expedite the flow of work. For the purposes of planning the production system workers must be regarded as units in the work flow. As one manager put it when describing the system to me: “We have to regard the workers as machines”. He insisted that he did not mean to imply by this that this was how he regarded particular operatives, but that it would be impossible to plan if every individual difference and idiosyncrasy were taken into account. It had to be assumed that each worker would do the job assigned and taught to her, and that all workers would work according to the prescribed methods and would respond similarly to the monetary incentives offered. Thus in terms of the technological system operatives were considered as individual work units and not as a social group. As planned, the productive system set a premium on human cooperation. But co-operation was planned as a “built-in” factor; the workers were not expected spontaneously to devise means to maximal cooperation. According to the sub-division of operations, each worker, in performing the role assigned to her in the system, at the same time provided work for the next workers in the designed line of work flow. The design of the layout was such that to achieve co-operation the worker need not move from her place; she was in fact anchored to her bench or machine throughout the working day.* This meant that, theoretically at least, co-operation could be achieved without verbal communication between workers and without any formal hierarchy of authority being required within the production units. So far as the productive system was concerned all workers were of equal status, although there were, as we have seen, quite marked differences in skill. Thus the system was designed to be quasi-mechanical in its operation. There was no machine-pacing of the work, the level of output depending upon the efforts of the workers and upon the effectiveness of the provision for built-in co-operation. The incentive which was offered to the workers was a straight piecework incentive. That is to say, the individual worker was paid a cash price for each operation performed. This system set a premium on individual striving for cash reward and at first sight it seems to militate against the planned goal of the system, which *Except at “break” times, and at odd times when varnish tins had to be re-plenished or personal needs satisfied.
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was co-operation between 16 workers to produce a finished garment. As I have already noted, it would appear more logical in a system such as this to arrange for cooperative, rather than individual, effort to be rewarded. But there was no such obvious conflict of principles at the planning level, since co-operation was “built-in” to the plan. In actual operation, as we shall presently see, this conflict of principle did emerge. There is one other point to be made before this analysis of the planned productive system is concluded. Since the rewards offered to workers were graded according to the skills they were called upon to exercise, as well as according to the time taken to perform operations, it follows that, since there was wide differentiation of skill within the teams, there was also wide differentiation of earnings. This being the case, the emergence of a “norm” of output was inhibited. For output is expressed in cash terms in a straight piecework system. Thus, had there been a norm of output it would have been expressed in terms of the expected earnings of sixteen people, most of whom were engaged on different tasks and whose earnings were arranged on a scale according to the skill required for their job. This was an almost impossible task when it is remembered that the system tended to inhibit communication between all the members of the team. The emergence of a “norm” was further inhibited by the emphasis which the system placed on individual striving for cash reward. To conclude the description of the formal system, it is necessary for me to say something about the arrangements for “booking” work done by the operatives. These arrangements provided a means by which the workers could regularly observe the relationship between the effort they were expending, and the cash reward for that effort. They also enabled management to check upon the performance of the operatives, and of course they provided the wages department with the information needed to calculate earnings each week. Affixed to each bundle of cuttings (the material for a complete garment) which came into the workroom was a sheet of dockets, each one of which represented an operation to be performed on the material. The worker performing a given operation detached the appropriate docket from the sheet, and attached it to her own individual work sheet. Thus at the end of each day the work sheet showed the number of operations which the worker had performed. The sheets were handed each evening to the chargehand and were delivered by her to the wages department. The dockets did not show the price to be paid to the operative (I was told that this used to be so but that the practice had been discontinued) but most of the workers knew what the price for their operation was. So at the end of each day the worker knew what she had earned.
26 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
For the most part the workers followed the formal procedure for booking. But there were some minor exceptions. These, and their causes and consequences, will be discussed in a later chapter. THE WORKERS The productive roles of the workers as defined by management have now been discussed. Now the persons occuping these roles are described. I shall not only describe them as people but I shall describe the relationships between them which were prescribed in the planned productive system. I shall say little about the members of Units 1 and 2 as individuals since I can only describe those I knew well and was in a position to observe, i.e. the members of No. 3 Unit and a few others. It could be argued, I suppose, that the discussion of individuals is out of place in a sociological analysis, on the ground that sociology is the analysis of role relations.(14) To push this kind of argument further one could say that the sociological analysis of relationships other than those prescribed by the formal system ought to be handled in terms of roles in an informal system. I cannot take this view, since so much of what I observed is difficult to fit in to the categories of formal and informal organization. I cannot see why it is necessary to block the way to understanding by using these categories in analysis. I therefore devote this section to describing the people who worked in the work-room, the work they did, and the way they were linked together by the requirements of the system of production. This will help the reader to follow the subsequent analysis and will provide the material on which alternative interpretations to my own may be based. With two exceptions, the workers in Workroom X were women. The exceptions during my stay in the workroom were Joe the stripper, and myself. During my period in the training school, when it was already known that I would soon be moving into Workshop X, it was assumed by the women instructors that I would wish to join another man during the morning tea break and at lunch, and I was introduced to Joe, who made the arrangements for a supply of tea and eatables and accompanied me each day to the canteen for the midday meal. This arrangement, once made, persisted and during the whole of my stay in the factory I joined Joe each day at break time and dinner time. We became good friends and he proved to be an intelligent and knowledgeable informant. “My background”, wrote Joe, in response to my general request for written life histories from the workers, “is such that I was born in the vicinity of the factory in what was a slum area. Later we moved to , rather a bit more refined. My father was a lorry driver,
ON THE SHOP FLOOR 27
also secretary of the Labour Party until he died at the age of 45. My mother then went out as a cleaner to rear a family of six, five boys and a girl the girl being the oldest, at the time 19 and employed here at the factory.” “After being invalided out of the services I was reluctant to go back to the factory owing to my position but being informed that they were doing a rehabilitation scheme sponsored by the Government I went as a garment maker”. Joe is now married and has two children. Until very recently he lived, as most of the workers do, in the congested working-class area close to the factory. Recently he moved to an “overspill” estate about 6 miles from the factory. Joe often expressed to me his disapproval of the behaviour of the women in the factory. He maintained that they were “mugs”, who allowed themselves to be hoodwinked and pushed around by managers, supervisors and chargehands. He said that they did not know how to look after themselves. In this situation he felt that it was best for him “to look after No. 1”. He had no intention of “sticking his neck out for the women” who would not appreciate his efforts anyway. Unduly influenced perhaps by Joe’s views and those of other male workers I came to know, I came to think that, although management did not deliberately set out to intimidate the workers, women workers were more reluctant openly to express the criticisms of management which they voiced to me and amongst themselves. Individual complaints and grievances were voiced but usually only when matters had reached a critical stage. I worked with the women in No. 3 Unit when I was in the workroom, and it is to these I shall mostly refer in my analysis. But I gathered a good deal of information about other workers in the room so I can give an overall picture of the composition of the working force. Of the 48 workers on whom I was able to collect fairly complete information, 47 were women, ranging in age from 16 to 60 plus. Nine of the 47 were girls in their teens, 2 were in their twenties, 8 in their thirties, 12 in their forties, and 14 in their fifties. One woman was over 60. I have information about the marital status of 47 of the workers; 18 of them were married. Of these 11 were young married women with children of school age, 4 were older women whose children were grown up and financially independent. I did not find out whether the remaining 3 had children, but I knew their ages and from these I infer that if they had children these would be wageearning adults. Twenty-three of the 47 were single persons, and 13 of these were over 30 years of age; 9 of the remaining underthirties were still in their teens. The remaining 5 of the 47 were widows. Thus the working force was composed for the most part of women in, or approaching, middle age. Most of them had long
28 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
service with the firm, and few had experience of industrial employment outside the industry. A few had worked for other firms in the same industry, and a few had transferred to garment making from other jobs with the firm. All the workers in Workroom X came from working-class families. All save one—a grammar school girl—had attended public elementary or secondary modern schools. Some of the women were reluctant to disclose to me the occupations of their husbands and fathers. My enquiries why this should be so amongst people who were free with other kinds of information elicited the response by some informants that some of the women were ashamed because their husbands had jobs carrying low pay and status. These informants remarked that people would rather talk about the achievements of their children of which they were proud. I found this to be so. From those who did volunteer information about occupations of husbands and fathers I learned that for the most part they were workers of unskilled or semiskilled status, for example, rubber worker, lorry driver, policeman, and labourer. I did not come to know all the workers well enough to obtain detailed life histories, but some whom I did know well wrote life histories for me. I include extracts here since I have reason to believe that the life histories I have are fairly typical and they help to explain some of the behaviour I shall describe later. They are also of interest in themselves. Nancy, a garment maker in her middle thirties, wrote this for me: “My father never had a proper full week’s wages, for 16 years he worked at…and they had to do four half-days so that it made them as they could not draw any dole. It should have been three days in work and three days on the dole which would have been better, but the firm would not let them do that so that my mother had to take in washing to make ends meet. Which I personally think is three parts of her ailments today”. Nancy’s father is dead now and her brothers and sisters are married. She lives in a street in a slum area not far from the factory with her mother who is a chronic invalid. She finds little time for leisure. Most of her time away from the factory is spent cleaning, shopping, and preparing meals. She stays at home most evenings and her greatest pleasure and relaxation is the “telly”. Since Nancy is her mother’s chief support she must earn as much as she can. I worked near her for many months and I found her pace of work fast and her skill and dexterity remarkable. Yet for
ON THE SHOP FLOOR 29
all her pressing need for cash she always was generous, and willing to leave her own work to help me out of my difficulties. The chargehand told this story: “When mother was left a widow, father having passed away at the early age of 36 I was called upon to help to “mother” the younger members of the family of whom I was the eldest aged 11. I had two sisters and one brother, and mother had a rough time earning a living for all of us. This she did by cleaning offices, doing day cleaning, and in the early hours of the morning “knocking up”. Life was indeed very hard for her. “Often after putting the youngsters to bed I would give mother a hand with the cleaning. This I did even after I had started work and as the others grew older they took their turn. However, those days are over and the other three are married with a family. My young sister and husband and girl are living at home with mother and I”. She then tells of a life active in the voluntary service of youth and states that her philosophy of life is “service is the rent we pay for our room on this earth”. She concludes: “My hobbies these days don’t take me much beyond the garden or out for walks with the dog. I haven’t much energy left after working all day”. The cases of Nancy, and of Maisie the chargehand, are not exceptional stories of hardship. Many of the older women in the room have had just as hard lives. Kitty, a skilled garment maker wrote for me: “I was left with seven children to bring up at the age of 34. The eldest is now married and the youngest twenty, now doing his National Service. Three of my girls were shorthand typists but now married. The other one is a Sister at a hospital. I have a sister who is a B.A. having got it at Manchester University and is now a teacher. I still live in the same house as when I got married which is now 33 years. I enjoy being at work as I get very lonely at home now that my family have left me.” The general statistical picture of the working force in Workroom X and the extracts from the life histories of some of the operatives suffice to show that the persons who operated the production system, and who in their interrelationships made up the social system of the workroom, were in the main women who had had
30 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
hard lives. The area of the town from which they came was one of the most badly stricken in the depression of the ’thirties. At the time of my investigation its residents were much more prosperous than they had ever been. I distinguished three categories of women workers at Wye. First, the older single women and the widows, who worked to support themselves or dependent relatives. Second, the married women who worked to supplement the family income. Third, the teenagers, who came to work to make a contribution to the family income, but also to buy clothes and cosmetics, and to pay for entertainment. I mention this fact of differential economic position in passing. I shall raise it again when I consider the extent of workers’ response to financial incentives. Throughout the subsequent analysis, the workers of No. 3 team will be my chief concern and I now describe them briefly. The order of description follows the positions of the workers in the work flow, so that the descriptions may be read in conjunction with the chart showing work flow in Fig. 1. Some of the details of social background and circumstances, and of personal characteristics, which I describe, will not be referred to again in analysis so I must therefore explain why I have included them. I did so mainly in order that those who wish to make an attempt to relate differences in performance to individual differences may have all the material available to refer to. But I also believe that the reader will be interested to discover what kind of people worked in the workshop at Wye. Sally, who performed the initial operation of machining front parts, was a married woman with a grown-up family. She and her husband lived by themselves in a house a few minutes’ walk from the factory. Sally was workers’ representative on factory committees. She represented the unit at the meeting I held to explain my research purposes, and subsequently gave me an “official” welcome to No. 3 Unit. Sally had worked at Wye since 1939, and had no other industrial experience. Helen, a 17-year-old maker, took the fronts from Sally, and after she had finished her work on them she passed them to Wendy, another 17-year-old. Both these girls had been trained in Wye training room and had worked in the workroom for about a year. Helen sought the company of both sexes actively, but Wendy was a quiet, thoughtful girl. Wendy passed the fronts on to three older and more experienced makers, Mary, Annie, and Jean, who all worked at the same table. Mary, a long-service employee, was a married woman with two young children, Annie, who worked opposite, was married but childless. These two were good friends, even though Mary was a much older woman. There was more horseplay and noise from these two than from any other workers in the room. They were
ON THE SHOP FLOOR 31
also friends outside the factory, which was unusual for this workshop. Jean, the third front part maker, had worked at Wye continuously since 1930, which was 10 years longer than Annie. Jean, who, like Mary, had once worked as a skilled maker, was a much less forceful personality. She was single, in her forties, and she lived within walking distance of the factory. I gathered nothing from her of her home circumstances. Although not unfriendly to me, she was reticent about her private affairs. For most of the time I was in the workroom I myself performed the first operation on backs. For some of the time I was working on belts and sleeves, and during this time backs were smeared by Joan, who was subsequently transferred to another team. But as she will be mentioned again later I note here that she was a widow with a son aged 22 who lived at home near the factory, and two married daughters. Joan always looked ill and was said by the other operatives to be “chesty”. Certainly she lost a lot of time through illness and this is one reason why she was changed around from job to job and from team to team much more than others. The other reason was that she was a slow worker. More than most people, Joan found difficulty in making enough parts to cover the guaranteed minimum rate. The operative usually engaged on the second set of operations on the backs was Pam. Pam was a single person in her thirties. She had worked at Wye since before the war, but it was only in the last few years that she had joined a garment-making team. She had previously worked in the department which prepared the tapes for the garment makers, and she was reputed to be one of the fastest smearers in the room. She was the wit of the team—“a scream”, as she was described by the others. Pam was easily upset, and when she was upset she did not work so hard; she would talk of going back “across the road” or would go around voicing her grievances, to the great amusement of the others. Pam’s emotional instability goes far to explain why her earnings fluctuated much more than those of her workmates. But they do not by themselves constitute a sufficient explanation, as I shall show when I analyse the output figures. The sleeve girls, Pat and Thelma collected the sleeves cuttings from the strippers and they performed the same operations upon them. Thelma however did the machining on the sleeves. I did not see Pat doing machining operations. Pat was a single woman in her twenties. She had lived in the area around the factory all her life until she moved quite recently with her parents to a new council house in an overspill housing estate some ten miles away. She was quiet and uncommunicative. She was not unfriendly to me but difficult to draw out. I know little about her except what I have already stated.
32 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
Thelma was a much more lively person than Pat. She was in her late teens. She planned to marry at the end of the year during which I was in the factory. After leaving school at the age of 15, Thelma took a job as a machinist in a garment factory, but stayed there for only a few months. She applied for a post as a trainee maker with Wye in 1951, and was taken on. There was no break in her service with Wye. Her experience as a machinist was useful to her and to the firm, as we have seen. She worked on the next table to Pam and talked to her much more than she did to her fellow sleeve girl, Pat. Some of the sleeve machining, as well as the front part machining, was done by Millie, a teenager. Millie, as the layout plan shows, worked with her back to the front part makers in the corner and partly faced the two girls in the team who were about her age, that is Wendy and Helen. But her view of them was obscured by a shelf arrangement and she could not converse with them while work was in progress. Millie was more isolated from human contact by her position in the team than anyone else. She did not seem to mind this much for she seemed to be a quiet, hard-working girl, although there were occasions when she turned from her work to converse with those behind her. Millie came to No. 3 Unit from another workroom in the factory, where she had worked since leaving school. Parts from the back and front lines, and from the sleeve girls, all found their way to Dora, who operated the joining-up machine. Dora, a single woman in her fifties, had worked for Wye continuously since 1916. She left grammar school at the age of 16, and she was trained by Wye as a skilled waterproof garment maker. After working for many years as a maker she developed ankle trouble, the result, so she said, of working in a standing position for long periods. She was transferred to machining so that she could work seated, and was assigned to the joining-up machine when No. 3 team was formed. Dora lived with her unmarried sister in a terrace house in a working-class area of the city, but some miles from the congested area where most of her colleagues lived. A kindly and helpful person, Dora proved to be a useful informant. She knew well many of the older workers in the firm, and she had worked at the bench with the present chargehand, with whom she was on very friendly terms. Dora’s skill as a maker was useful to her, and to the chargehand, when other members of the team were away. Eileen and Jenny were the armhole makers. They took the joined-up garments from the hangers where Dora had placed them and taped them ready for final machining by Alice. Both Eileen and Jenny were skilled garment makers. They could make a whole garment if they wished to do so but they seemed to
ON THE SHOP FLOOR 33
prefer to be in a team and be responsible for only one—the most skilled—operation on the garment. Eileen was a widow in her fifties. She had one grown-up son. She lived alone but said she saw a lot of her son and daughter-inlaw. With the exception of a period of three years during the war when she was engaged upon war work in an engineering factory, she had made waterproof garments all her life, but only came to Wye 6 years ago. She had experience of several firms in the trade. Her father and mother before her were waterproof garment makers. They met and married while they were working at Wye Garments. Eileen was a speedy and highly skilled maker and a woman of independent character. Her colleague Jenny was the oldest and longest served operative in the team, and, with one exception, in the whole room. Jenny started at Wye Garments in 1910. She was a widow. She left Wye for some years after she was married to bring up her family of 5. When they were older she returned and she had worked at Wye ever since. Jenny found it difficult to keep up speed and her output and earnings were much less than Eileen’s. She was absent often and it was said that she suffered from rheumatism. Alice, the final machinist, was about 50. She was a married woman with four children. These were now in their teens and twenties. Alice had been with Wye Garments for 13 years. She had never worked anywhere else. A very competent machinist, she had no difficulty in handling the output of the armholers and was often looking out for extra work to keep her occupied. Alice was a rather quiet person who concentrated on the work in hand. She conversed with Sally sometimes while she worked. But more often than not it was Sally who started the conversations. Standing with her back to Alice and opposite to me across the table worked Nancy, the collar girl. Nancy was a single woman in her thirties. I have mentioned the life story she wrote for me already. Nancy started work at Wye in 1943 after having worked for some three years with a firm in another industry on semiskilled work. Only during the last few years had she taken up garment making. The war contracts on which she had been engaged came to an end and Nancy was transferred by the firm to the work she was now doing. Nancy was a capable maker now and one of the highest earners in the team. She led a difficult life. She was the sole support of her invalid mother and also kept house for her when she was not working in the factory. I owe much to Nancy for making me welcome and accepting me as a colleague. We worked opposite one another for a long time and became good friends. Nancy said that she was glad to see me and sorry to see me go. Usually, she worked alone at the table and lacked company. Despite the racket of the sewing machines and particularly of the buttonhole machine just by, she was able to converse with Sally on her right while working. Nancy completed
34 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
the whole collar and from her it passed either to Alice or to the armholers for assembly. It only remains now to mention Vera, who had worked at Wye since 1941. Vera was not, while I was there, a regular member of No. 3 team. She was however, quite often drafted in by the chargehand to help out with armholes and other jobs in the team when people were absent or when there were gluts and shortages in the flow. A married woman in her thirties, Vera had one small child. Like so many others, Vera kept her husband’s job secret. And like so many of her colleagues she lived quite near to the factory. Vera seemed to be regarded by the chargehands as a utility worker. She moved around from unit to unit whilst I was in the room and also from job to job. She did not seem to resent this and seemed capable of doing most of the operations in the teams. She preferred, as she told me, to work in No. 3 Unit. She said she found the atmosphere friendlier. This was to be expected since her close friend Pam was in No. 3 Unit. Wherever she happened to be working Vera would come to join Pam at lunch and at break time. Table 1 summarizes the information I have about the operatives in No. 3 Unit, so far as their individual characteristics are concerned. It will be noted that, like the workroom as a whole, No. 3 Unit was composed mostly of older persons, almost all of them with long service with the firm. But there were, as in the other units, a group of teenagers, who had been recently recruited and trained as semi-skilled workers for the unit system. I gathered that these young people had been recruited partly to replace older women who had left rather than work on the unit system, partly as part of a management policy of expansion, and partly as an insurance against the future when many of the older workers would retire. Although there appeared less reason for the younger people to try to maximize earnings—none had dependants and since they had the same job prices as the older women they were able to earn high wages—they usually adopted the pattern set by the older women and worked very hard. Therefore I shall not refer to them as a separate group when considering how the workers reacted to management’s expectations, which I shall analyse in the chapter which follows. Later, when I consider friendly groupings, and their effect on production relationships in the workroom, the age factor will be taken into account. So far, my description of the productive system has been confined to the work done and the persons doing it. I conclude this section by trying to convey my own subjective impression of what it was like to work in the workroom. I do not claim, of course, that my own impressions corresponded with those of the other workers. But the reader will perhaps be better able to assess these
ON THE SHOP FLOOR 35
TABLE 1 WORKERS OF No. 3 UNIT
from my description and from the remarks made by other workers, which I shall quote. I found the work itself tedious and boring. Sometimes I would work for weeks smearing backs, the same thing all day and every day. It occurred to me that I might be exceptional and that those who had been there for many years might be accustomed to the routine. Certainly, some of them were, but I also heard many complaints, such as the following: “You hear a lot of people complain about the youngsters nowadays having no interest in their work. It’s not surprising when you look at it, the same thing day after day”.*
36 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
I found the work hard and exhausting. Makers had to stand all day. I found it difficult to adjust myself to a job which required me to stand in the same place for long hours. On this score I heard no complaints from the other workers, although Dora, who suffered with her ankles, was of the opinion that it was bad for a person’s health. I was laughed at as being a “cissie” when I mentioned how tired standing made me. I did hear many complaints about the pace of the work, which I myself found it difficult to maintain. “They don’t want workers around here, it’s machines they want”; “They want men from Mars with more than two hands, that’s what they want round here”; “They must think we are all octopuses”; “I think I’ll try a spell in Holloway, they reckon it’s cushy there”, were some remarks I heard. The working conditions were the best possible in the circumstances, but the building was old and the workroom not very well ventilated, so that the room became stuffy in hot weather. It was rather more pleasant to work in in winter since the central heating was quite adequate. But there was always a smell of naphtha in the room. This smell was overpowering to the newcomer, but one quickly became used to it. I do not wish to convey the impression that everyday life in the workshop was all tedium, or that the workers grumbled all day long. The tedium was broken by the usual joking and leg-pulling and the workers appreciated the wireless programmes, and sometimes joined in singing. I was sometimes the butt of the jokes; as when some of the workers made a coffin from cardboard, containing eleven candy figures, to symbolize the expected coming defeat of Newcastle United, whom I was supporting in the Cup Final against Manchester City. Jenny, the buttonhole marker, was decked out with decayed watercress—in lieu of shamrock—on St. Patrick’s Day to the great amusement of everyone. On warm summer days workers would create, in animated conversation, a fantasy world in which everyone was bound for Blackpool on pleasure bent instead of being tied to the work bench. Among some workers, representatives of management, particularly the time-study men, became the butt of mimicry and ridicule in their absence. But for the most part these activities did not interfere with the rhythm of work. If they threatened to do so the chargehand would intervene. Talking and horseplay, if these interfered with output, were definitely frowned upon. The distinction between “them” and “us”, which has been noted by Hoggart(15) and other observers of working-class life, was marked in the workshop. The managers (and this included the time *I was unable to judge whether the work was less monotonous than it had been on the conveyor system, as management claimed. And no worker made this comparison.
ON THE SHOP FLOOR 37
study men and all representatives of management other than the female chargehands) were called the “higher ups”. The places where the higher-ups worked when they were not in the workroom were covered by the one term “the office”. To make the distinction between “them” and “us” was not to express resentment against managers as a class, nor envy. The workers I knew never hoped to become one of “them”. They seemed to be well adjusted to what some would consider the rather narrow range of their lives, and they never grumbled about their position as workers. They grumbled about the behaviour of particular managers, and particular landlords, but then to be plagued by landlords and managers was part of normal working-class life, and something to be “put up with”. Although the workers appeared to have adjusted well, I do not imply by this that their attitude was one of resignation or indifference. On the contrary, behaviour not in conformity with their rather strict ethical code was harshly condemned, and as I shall presently show, there were occasionally active individual protests against what was believed to be “unfair” treatment. I have already indicated what hard lives some of the workers had experienced, and I have described how some of those with dependents still have great financial handicaps to overcome in living what they regard as a “decent life”. Yet they were extraordinarily generous, both with their money and in their impulses. A “whip-round” or “gathering” for a person getting married, a regular collection for a charity, or for a friend in personal difficulties, or for a present for someone leaving the factory, found workers donating sums quite large in relation to their income. The manager of the department once remarked to me that to keep his subscriptions to “gatherings” on a level with those of the workers made a considerable hole in his income. When I left the workshop after my fieldwork, I was presented by the members of “No. 3 Unit” with an expensive cigarette lighter and case. For me, the monotony of the job and the working conditions were tempered by the friendship and generosity of the workers, and I think the same considerations would apply for the other workers, although this was never stated explicitly. Perhaps managers, albeit not consciously, rely a good deal upon the capacity of workers to adjust without undue complaint to conditions of monotony and boredom, a capacity which is a result of the tough social training of a class of “we’s”. “You have to take the rough with the smooth in this life” or “I can’t grumble really, there’s many a one worse off than me”—such phrases as these illustrate the ideology which underlies the enormous capacity for “making the best of a bad job” which I encountered amongst these workers, But again I would emphasize that although there was a feeling that everyone shared a common lot, to make the best of it
38 WORKSHOP AT THE WYE GARMENT CO.
was largely an indidivual matter, as far as relationships with management were concerned. Such social solidarity as existed— and the productive system sets limits to this—was a generalized friendliness and generosity rather than organization in terms of specific ends, either for or against something or somebody. In my second study I shall draw attention to the difference between the solidarity of the men in their workshop and of the women in Wye. I can only say here that although I myself, like the other workers, grumbled about the pace of work, the irregularities in the flow of work, the system of production, in fact almost everything, I found the shop a fairly friendly place in which to be and so, I am sure, did many of the other workers.
CHAPTER 3 NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS
IN an earlier chapter I described, by quoting from a lecture given to new workers, how management expected the workers to behave. It will be recalled that this lecture did not include any notion of a “proper” level of output expressed in units to be produced in a given time, or as a sum of money to be earned. Rather, it emphasized the kind of behaviour likely to maximize earnings, and contained the assumption that the workers would wish to earn as much as they could. The content of the lecture is summarized in the statement: “This is the work, these are the job prices; the more work you do, the more you earn”. As I have already noted, some investigators of workshop life have drawn attention to differences between the expectations of managers, and the behavioural norms of work groups. It has been argued that the systems of rewards and punishments instituted by management to ensure that workers conform to its expectations, often come into conflict with a system of informal social controls spontaneously developed by working groups. The adjustment between the conflicting systems of control, both of which operate within a wider system of technological and administrative controls, produces productive performance by workers below management expectations. An example of a possible mode of adjustment is described by Gouldner; he terms it the “Indulgency Pattern”.* Other writers have referred to a conflict between two logics, “the logic of efficiency” of management, and the “logic of sentiment of the work group”. But there are, logically speaking, other possible modes of adjustment of the relationship between management and the workers in a firm. Workers may accept management definition of their role, and conform to management expectations, and the workshop group may use informal sanctions to ensure conformity to shared norms, supplementing formal management sanctions. Another possible alternative is one where workers conform to management expectations as individuals and where the only controls which operate to regulate behaviour are the formal management controls. I now examine the situation in the Wye garment workshop, to discover the extent to which management expectations were
40 ON THE SHOP FLOOR
accepted by the workers. Before I do this, it is necessary to state that, though workers may accept management’s definition of their role and fulfil management expectations, this does not necessarily mean that they are satisfied with their situation. Other factors may intervene to create dissatisfaction. I shall therefore describe situations in the workshop in some detail so that as many as possible of the factors which seemed to be affecting the relationship between management and the workers are brought into the analysis. I shall also attempt to trace the factors which influence the capacity of the workers to earn. Earnings would seem prima facie to be an important element in a worker’s satisfaction with the job and in relationships with management. The analysis of the earnings figures will also help to determine whether a norm of output and earnings existed which differed from the management norm. The examination of workers’ social relationships will indicate the extent to which such controls over output and earnings as existed were collectively sanctioned. During my stay in the workroom I kept a daily record of events observed and remarks and conversations overheard. Management gave me access to records of the earnings of the workers. It was my intention to treat output and earnings as the resultant of the interplay of a number of factors in the work situation, and to try to relate my observations to the output and earnings figures in the hope that this would illustrate the factors which affected earnings and output. I shall attempt this now. I shall try also to recreate the “atmosphere” of the workshop rather than merely to assemble a number of facts into categories. I shall therefore present extracts from my field-notes as I wrote them and try to extract from them a picture of the operation of the various factors affecting the output of the workers. “This was the first really sunny and warm day since I started. The workroom was hot and stuffy. By the middle of the afternoon I felt sleepy, thirsty, and fed up. I went out about 3 p.m. for a smoke and lingered in the yard for a breath of fresh air. When I returned I worked slowly on the batch of sleeves on which I was engaged so that it would last until finishing time. But I could not manage it. About twenty minutes before finishing time I went to the chargehand for more work. I was given a batch of sleeves. I carried them back to my table feeling very reluctant to make a start so near to finishing time. I persuaded myself that a spell would be in order, and *The “indulgency pattern” is characterized by friendly easy-going relationships between management and workers and tolerance of behaviour not in strict conformity with formal management rules. See Ref. 16.
NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 41
that this would give me an opportunity for a leisurely observation of the rest of the unit at work. I had hardly started to idle when Mary bawled out from the other end of the unit, ‘Have you nothing to do?’ It was obvious that I had for my table was piled high with sleeves. Now the eyes of the whole team were upon me. I tried to appear unconcerned but I felt so uncomfortable that I was compelled to reach for a sleeve and to begin smearing the hems. When finishing time came I went over to the table where Mary and Annie worked and said jokingly, ‘lt’s a bit thick when a man can’t have a few minutes spell without being bawled out’. The reply to this was a reminder that I ought to remember what time the shop started work in the morning. [I had been a few minutes late on a few mornings.] After a bout of good-natured banter sweets were handed round and we all went home”. This extract from my notes illustrates a dominant group norm which can be summed up in the phrase: “You work hard when you have work on the table.” This corresponds to management expectations. The workers, for the most part, did attempt to maximize earnings and when work was available they worked at what seemed to me to be a high speed. The workers themselves distinguished two paces of work, “steaming” and “sweating”. Steaming described the behaviour of a worker who knew that the price of the job made it possible for her to “make her wages”, and who worked at the normal pace of work. “Sweating” described the behaviour of a worker whose job was tightly priced and who was working at a “killing” pace, and probably making some sacrifice of quality to prevent a slump in earnings. Each operative had a notion of what her “wages” were; that is she had formed an expectation of a “proper” level of daily earnings for herself against which she judged whether the price of the job was “tight” or “loose”. A common form of greeting in the shop was the call, “Are you making your wages?”; or, if it was quite obvious that you were, “You’re doing alright today”. Sometimes the greeting “You’re doing alright” had a sour sound, for, as I shall show later, there were times when some workers in the workshop were “doing alright” while others were finding it difficult to “make their wages” even by sweating. And others might be short of work. In the next two extracts the concept “making your wages” is illustrated. But it is necessary first to say something more about the incentive scheme than I have so far done. The incentive scheme which operated in the workshop was designed to maximize output by offering to the workers an opportunity to increase earnings by increasing effort. As in all cash incentive schemes management must base its calculations of job prices upon the concept of the average worker, and of the
42 ON THE SHOP FLOOR
effort such a worker can maintain from day to day without undue fatigue. It would be pointless to fix prices in such a way that workers must wear themselves out to earn what they consider to be a reasonable wage. This would be to store up trouble for the future, or to encourage workers to leave. Or workers might just become disillusioned, and cease attempting the impossible. Starting then with some idea of the appropriate level of earnings for workers of given skill, management will seek to fix job prices in such a way as to enable a better than average worker to earn more than this working at normal pace, and the average worker to earn more by increased effort, or the less than average worker to bring his or her earnings up to the average by greater effort. In the Wye scheme, the attempt was made, when fixing prices, to make it possible for the least capable worker to earn the negotiated minimum wage for the industry—£4 18s. 0d. per week.* The average worker, doing a job requiring average skill, would be enabled to earn £5 15s. 0d. per week. And the better than average, more highly skilled worker, would find it possible to earn much more than this. Any person entering the workshop who was unable, after a trial period of a few weeks after training, to earn, at current piecework prices, the minimum rate for the industry, would not be accepted as suitable by management. From management’s point of view, this was a reasonable policy, since they were bound by their agreement with the union to make up the workers’ earnings to the minimum rate. Only one worker was dismissed during my stay in the shop, and she was dismissed for consistent failure to earn the minimum rate on piecework. Shirley, the dismissed worker, was a teenage girl fresh from the training school. I relate the circumstances which led to her dismissal both to illustrate the extent to which the workers accepted the principles of the scheme, and to throw light on the concept “making your wages”. I knew Shirley as a fellow trainee in the training school. She liked “a bit of fun” and was regarded by her colleagues and by the trainers as a “bit of a character”. She showed less interest than the other girls in the job, and found it much more difficult to learn than they did. But she was friendly and sociable. She enjoyed the company of the other girls and seemed to get a great deal of satisfaction and enjoyment out of life. But she lacked concentration and a serious interest in output and earnings. Her reputation followed her into the workshop and she was placed in a position in the workroom where the chargehand could keep a constant eye on her. The chargehand gave Shirley a good deal of help, showing her the best methods to use, and keeping her supplied with work, and generally doing her best to make it possible for Shirley to “make her wages”. She also did her best to make Shirley apply steady and concentrated attention to her
NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 43
work. But she failed. It soon became obvious that Shirley would never “make her wages”. She continued to “dodge the column”. Many of the workers told me that Shirley would not have been given an extended trial period if it had not been for the chargehand. It was said that the chargehand had asked the management to give Shirley every possible chance to improve. There was little sympathy for Shirley amongst those with whom I discussed her case. They did not approve of her “playing about”. “You can’t expect to get your money for nothing” expressed the general attitude. I heard no expressions of regret when Shirley was finally dismissed. That she “couldn’t make her money” was taken as a good and sufficient reason for her dismissal since she had been given a fair chance. It seemed to me that every worker in Workroom X had a clear idea of what her “wages” ought to be each day or week. The expectations of the workers corresponded closely to those of management. The management had decided on the £5 15s. 0d. datum as a reasonable level of earnings for an adult semi-skilled worker, on the grounds that it offered a good deal more than the minimum time rate to the average worker, and more still to the worker with greater skill. It also compared favourably with the rates in comparable jobs in other industries. The workers were quite prepared to accept this figure as a datum. The other element in the concept of “my wages” was derived by reference to past earnings. But if the workers were prepared to accept management’s view of what constituted “a fair day’s pay”, and were prepared to work hard on piecework to “make it”, they also expected management to create the conditions which made it possible for hard work to produce the “wages”. Their lack of sympathy for Shirley was produced by the knowledge that she had been given every chance. Work had been provided for her and she had been told how to do the work. But she refused to work hard for her wages so she was undeserving of sympathy. It was when, in spite of hard work and of willingness to work hard, the worker found herself not able to make her money that she expressed dissatisfaction. Although there was no fundamental disagreement between management and the workers about the principle of the scheme, the workers judged it unfair if for any reason other than a refusal to work hard throughout the day, they failed to make their wages. The most serious obstacle to “making your wages”, provided that work was available, was the “tight” price. Since workers often complained about tight prices I asked them to explain the reason why tight prices existed. The most common *For persons under 21 the minimum rate was lower, but the same job prices applied.
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explanation was that the whole business stemmed from the fact that most prices were based upon the prices fixed on one common style of garment during the period when the unit system was being introduced. It was said that the original unit, whose operatives’ work was timed, was composed of fast workers. Some said that the supervisors had attempted to supply slow workers for the first unit but had been frustrated by the Work Study Consultants, who had insisted on having the best workers. I quote some of the accounts of what was alleged to have happened at the time when the prices were being calculated for the staple garment on which, it was said, most other prices were based. I do not, of course, assert that these accounts are accurate history, but they were accepted as such by the workers, whose behaviour may be influenced accordingly. “The girls were kidded into working hard when the jobs were timed. The Union man said that we mustn’t stand in the way of science in industry, but they blinded the girls with it”. “When time and motion came in the workers were put out of their stride. They were put off by people standing behind them with stop-watches”. “The new system benefits the experienced workers and doesn’t give the less experienced much chance. Everything is rush nowadays”. “The girls worked very hard for when they were putting the system in. One girl set out to prove that she could make 64 a day. She worked herself to a standstill.…told her she was very clever, but she had spoiled the job for everyone else”. A slow worker: “We are not overloaded with money. We were all right on the conveyors but this time and motion has finished it”. Most workers with whom I discussed the matter said that the slower workers had suffered relatively from the changeover. But in their minds this was not an argument for a general loosening of the rates. It merely showed that on the group piecework system on the conveyors the fast workers had been earning money for the slow ones. Now “everyone earns their own money”. In my experience there existed in the workshop a shared belief in what constituted a reasonable effort or pace of work which corresponded to management expectations. I have already shown how I was myself subject to banter and ridicule for taking it easy or leaving my bench, and how Shirley was regarded for her refusal to work for her money. But this shared belief did not issue in action to remedy the whole system of job pricing. Individuals
NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 45
complained about particular prices. “A fair day’s work” enabled some workers to “make their wages”, others on the same task failed to do so. Since there were also considerable skill differences and since all the workers in the units were for the most part engaged upon different work at any one time, it would have been surprising if any ground for common complaint had arisen. I think I have been able to show that while the workers attempted to conform to management’s expectations in attempting to maximize their earnings, they considered that management ought to create the conditions in which it was possible to “make their wages”. They were aggrieved if management failed to keep its side of the bargain, and, as I have said, they complained about tight prices as a failure of management in this respect. But the workers also criticized other kinds of failure on the part of management to keep its side of the bargain. One common complaint was of waiting for work. To “make your wages”, even when prices were such as to make this possible without sweating, meant that a worker had to have work on her table or machine throughout the day. The chargehand did everything possible to ensure that the workers were kept supplied with work but she was often defeated by factors beyond her control, and her efforts often raised a fresh crop of difficulties. The difficulties of the chargehand were well summed up for me by one of the workers who said, “the system runs the chargehand, the chargehand doesn’t run the system”. The following extracts from my field notes illustrate this point, and also introduce the discussion of the efforts of the workers to control some of the factors which affected their output and earnings: “The unit is changing over from the production of a garment known as ‘the black shiny’, a single texture garment, to a blue double texture garment. The workers at the beginning of the process of production are already working on parts for this new coat. The final assemblers are still working on the ‘black shiny’. In a day or two all will be working on the new coat. “Pam complained to me again about earning little bonus on the blue coats. She yearns for the ‘black shinies’. She has wasted a lot of time since she finished working on black shiny parts and seems disinclined to work hard on the blue coat”. A change to a new style of coat had led Pam to believe that she would now be unable to “make her wages”, even by sweating. She was therefore disinclined even to make the attempt. The work was available and in this sense management had fulfilled her demands
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but she felt cheated because the price did not enable her to “make her wages” by working at normal speed. “Jenny and Mary were absent this morning. Joan has been transferred tempor-arily to another workroom, so the team was short. A slow start was made. I was drinking tea with Dora at eight, ten minutes after official starting time. But people soon settled down to a high speed. I finished an odd batch of work which had been brought in from another workroom, and was then introduced to the method of making backs, on which I was to help Pam. This again showed me how difficult it is for the inexperienced to keep up the pace expected. I had noticed the same with sleeves last week. It would be impossible for me to earn a decent wage for the work I am doing at present. “When I was collecting my dockets this afternoon, I took the opportunity of asking Pam why she liked Black Shinies best. She said that she didn’t really know why but she was emphatic that she did like them very much. “I mentioned the question of absentees to Joe. He suggested that the absenteeism was deliberate. It was to avoid badly paying work. I questioned Eileen about the absentees as we walked to the canteen together. “T.L.: I see your friend [Jenny] hasn’t turned in today. “EILEEN. Yes, it’s Monday morning, she probably slept late. She will be in after dinner. I wouldn’t be though. If I sleep late I have the day off. It’s not worth coming in for. She [the chargehand] asked me once why I had been off for a day. I said I had slept late. She said ‘what, all day?’ The next day: “More absentees today. Mary and Jenny still absent. Wendy is also absent. Jean is sent by the chargehand to take Jenny’s place on armholes but goes absent herself in the afternoon. By three o’clock the flow of coats to Alice, the final machinist, had dried up. I was pressed, by the use of chaff and banter, to work harder to produce more backs so that Alice could sew in the vents. For the first time since I joined the team I saw Alice leave her machine during working time. “It is not easy to find what has caused the absenteeism. But the coincidence with the introduction of the blue coat seems more than an accident. Pam was greatly pleased that she had been transferred to Jenny’s job. During the afternoon she announced that she had got her money in for the day and didn’t care”.
NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 47
The next day Jean came back to work but the chargehand did not put her to work on her own job. Instead, Jean was sent to take Jenny’s place on armholes, In the afternoon she was absent again. “In response to my enquiries why there were so many people absent, Nancy told me that one of Mary’s boys had tonsillitis, Jenny was ill, and Jean had gone absent because she had been put on armholes, while her own work was being done by someone else. Dora hinted that Mary had really gone absent because there was no money to be made on the new blue coat”. The above extracts illustrate the resentment which is generated when: 1. The introduction of a new style of garment reduces the capacity of a worker to “make her wages”. On her own job (backs) Pam was unable to make her wages. Yet when she was transferred to Jean’s job she was able to do so. But Jean, on her return after a short absence, was resentful at not being given her own job back. This may have been because she found it difficult to make her wages, and/or because she felt the regular work she did (front parts) was by right “her job”. There are involved here two principles, both of which are valued, yet which are to some extent in conflict. Workers felt they had a right to the job they customarily performed and at which they had acquired skill and speed. But they also felt that management should create the conditions—work on the table at a reasonable price—which would make it possible to make their wages. The chargehand, faced with the problem of keeping work flowing through the units when the units were depleted, was obliged to move workers, and work, around. If resentment at being moved from one’s own job was adequately compensated by good earnings then protest was unlikely to be made and the move might be welcomed (Pam’s case). But if the move reduced earnings then the principle of “right to the job” was asserted. In Jean’s case, and possibly in Mary’s, protest took the form of absence. But this only increased the chargehand’s difficulties and made more transfers necessary. 2. The chargehand’s efforts to keep work flowing generated pressure by one worker on another worker to keep her supplied with parts so that she could make her wages. Sometimes workers were on jobs which were unfamiliar and they found it difficult to work up speed, thus causing the flow of parts to the worker next in the flow to be inadequate (my own case). Since management’s formal expectation was that workers as individuals would attempt to maximize earnings, the workers made little attempt to organize co-operation amongst themselves to maximize the output of the
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whole team. The attempt to do this would not necessarily have increased the earning capacity of all the team since some jobs might pay better than others. It was therefore seen as the chargehand’s responsibility to arrange the work in such a way that a worker could make her wages on her own job. But when the team was depleted by absenteeism this was clearly impossible. A worker faced with a shortage of “work on the table” would feel resentful, and would attempt to bring pressure to bear upon those supplying her with parts to produce enough to enable her to make her wages. The application of such pressure led usually to irritation on the part of the recipient though it did not often lead to open quarrelling, since the workers were aware that somehow the problem was insoluble. But sometimes open quarrelling did occur, and anger issued in threats to leave the workroom altogether, and sometimes workers actually left for this reason.* The chargehand was seldom blamed for creating situations such as I have been discussing. The workers saw that she had a difficult task, and they were aware that she did not play favourites. Further, they appreciated that she made the attempt, within the strict limits imposed upon her since she could not directly alter the job prices, nor decide which work would be done by which unit, nor control absenteeism, to give everyone work on which they could “make their wages”. I think I have now made it sufficiently clear that the workers, as individuals, accepted the definition of their role as stated by management. But the workers defined management’s role as being to provide them with the means to “make their wages”, i.e. to rate the jobs “properly” and to keep work on the table. This was impossible for management to achieve the whole time. With a working force which contained many married women, some absenteeism was unavoidable, and its incidence was difficult to predict. Since management’s chief interest was to maximize the output of the depleted units, they were obliged to deploy the working force and the work to gain the best possible output. This was seen as the chargehand’s responsibility since she alone was able to assess the best mode of deployment in the work-shop. She alone knew intimately the skills and capacities, and the temperament, of individual workers. But any deployment of the working force was likely to offend against the principles valued by the workers, i.e. the proprietary right to the job, and the capacity to make one’s wages. Since management itself had helped create these expectations workers were the more aggrieved. But their anger was tempered by the knowledge that the chargehand was faced with a tremendous problem in trying to reconcile these two *In a subsequent chapter I shall analyse the social mechanism which operated to control quarrels of this kind.
NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 49
conflicting principles. This attitude of sympathy was fostered by the workers’ experience of the behaviour of the chargehand. They knew that while she was strict in her insistence on hard work, she would try to create the conditions which made it possible for them to make their wages. And they knew that she worked tremendously hard to this end. They also liked her as a person. Absenteeism made for difficulties in reconciling conflicting principles, and absenteeism lay outside the control of management. And so it was with changes in style of garment coming into the units. These were decided by market conditions. Management obtained what orders it could, and these were allocated to the units. Some orders gave short runs, some long runs, and always the operatives could anticipate that there would be changes from time to time in the style of garment on which they would be working. And changes in style often affected their capacity to earn. The ability of management to loosen the rate at the request of an operative was limited by the necessity to keep costs low. They operated in highly competitive markets and since labour costs obviously formed a large part of the total cost of the product, large concessions were impossible. Further, management were often reluctant to alter job prices when individuals complained since the complaint sometimes arose from a temporary difficulty due to having to master a new sequence of movements. It must also be mentioned that management was confident that its system of determining job prices on the basis of careful time study gave fair prices. They were sometimes willing to undertake re-timing at the request of a worker but were unwilling to alter prices if it appeared to them that the worker was naturally a slow worker and her slowness was reflected in her pay packet, or if the worker was using a method other than that prescribed by management and wasteful of movement and time. But errors in calculation would, of course, be corrected. Absenteeism, and market factors, were largely outside management control. The workshop system had therefore to be manipulated by management in such a way as to maximize output within the limits imposed by these external (uncontrollable) factors. The manipulations, in their consequences, were interpreted by some of the workers, on some occasions, as a failure of management to keep its promise to create conditions favourable to them. In my analysis of the productive system I argued that the system itself, with its minute sub-division of tasks, and with wide differences in skill and earning capacity, obstructed possible attempts by workers to control the effects of imbalance in the work flow, tight prices, and the like. My analysis in this chapter has shown how the individualism of the workers, which was encouraged by management, and which was intensified when the capacity to earn was affected by temporary difficulties, militated
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against the development of collective control to mitigate the effects of these factors on output, and hence on earnings. The only controls which I observed were the practice of “sweating”, i.e. sacrificing quality for speed when the rate was tight, and “dead horse”, i.e. the practice of booking in dockets for work which had not yet been completed. But these were individual practices not sanctioned by the work group (“dead horse” was condemned by some workers as immoral), and in any case management made them difficult to operate. Since dockets did not begin to circulate until work was delivered to the units, the scope for “dead horse” was limited. The system of inspection and the responsibility of each worker for the quality of her own work, made “sweating” a risky business. Shoddy work, if discovered, might involve the worker in a great deal more work without extra pay. This being so, it was to be expected that some of the processes which I have been analysing would find fairly accurate reflection in the earnings of the workers. I shall now examine the earnings of the workers and trace the effect of a number of factors which I have already mentioned, in causing fluctuations in earnings. The incentive scheme at Wye was a straight piecework scheme. Earnings were therefore a direct measure of output. I found it easier to gain access to figures of earnings than to measures of the output of various components. For this reason, and also because the workers made their own calculations in terms of earnings and not of output, I conduct my analysis of the output of individuals mainly in terms of their earnings. But I collected figures showing the output of completed garments by each of the units in the workroom each day during the period when I was in the workroom. These figures were obtained from the chargehand’s report book, which was submitted to the manager each day, and they are shown in Fig. 2. To enter into detailed comparisons of the productivity of the three units in Workroom X on the basis of Fig. 2 would be unrewarding, because there were no long periods when each unit was producing the same style of garment. Since different styles raised different problems of assembly, accurate comparison of the productivity of the units was not possible. Length of run was alsoa quite important consideration. This was indicated when the day-to-day fluctuations in the output of the three units were compared. In each case there were marked fluctuations in output, but the output of No. 1 Unit was seen to be much steadier than the output of the other two units. This was partly due to the fact that No. 1 Unit had the benefit of longer runs on the same style of garment than had the other two units. During the period of my research No. 1 Unit experienced only one change of style; No. 3 Unit experienced 9 changes; and No. 2 Unit 5 changes. No. 2 Unit also experienced a long period when extra work on leggings and aprons was being carried on in addition to garment production.
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FIG. 2. Daily output of Units
The difference in treatment of No. 1 Unit, as compared with the other units, in the matter of work allocation, is to be explained by the fact that the workers in the unit were considered to be the most skilled and experienced in the workroom. They were usually given high quality work. They also had the lion’s share of the longterm contract work which was the firm’s staple product. Short orders of odd garments were usually allocated to the other two units. Thus the workers in No. 1 Unit were favoured in that they had less frequently to make adjustments to take account of new styles and new job prices. And this helped to account for the often expressed sentiment that No. 3 Unit, with which I worked, was underprivileged. I was told, and my experience confirmed this, that the prices on the staple contract work were much fairer, i.e. one could make one’s wages more easily, and tighter prices were fewer.
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Whatever the explanation for the difference in fluctuation of unit output, it is clear from the figures that in none of the units was there an effective norm of daily or weekly output for each unit. None of the units regulated the behaviour of its members according to some notion of what ought to be produced on each style of garment each day. I have already indicated some of the reasons why this was so, and indeed, since the incentive scheme rewarded them as individuals, there seems no obvious reason to expect the workers to be concerned about the output of the unit as a unit. The only workers one would expect to be concerned about unit output would be those enaged on final assembly, since their output was the output of the unit (the team output figures in Fig. 2 are in effect the output figures for the final assemblers). Yet within the workroom it was regarded as right and proper that the team ought to work in such a way as to keep the final assemblers continually occupied. This I interpreted as in some measure a carry over from the old system of conveyor production when the earnings of all individuals depended each week on the output of the final assemblers. But the principle that the final assemblers should always be kept occupied conflicted with the principle that management should provide the individual with the opportunity to “make her wages” each week. This was inevitable since, due to absenteeism, to imbalance in the work flow, and so on, to keep the work flowing to the final assemblers often meant that individuals had to be transferred from job to job within the units. Since the output of the units was the output of the final assemblers the policy of the chargehand was to keep work flowing to them. She pursued this policy intelligently. This being so, it was to be expected that the fluctuations in the earnings and output of the final assemblers would fluctuate less than those of the other members of the unit. Figure 3, which shows the fluctuations in the earnings of the workersin No. 3 Unit around their own average earnings, indicates that the final assemblers were amongst those with less violent fluctuations in earnings, but it also shows that, like the other workers, they were subject to marked fluctuations in their earnings. From my own observations I can say that the final assemblers, that is Eileen and Jenny, the “armhole girls”, were seldom short of work. It would seem therefore that the fluctuations in their earnings have to be explained by reference to other factors, for example, style changes or anomalies in job prices. I defer detailed analysis of the factors affecting the earnings of the final assemblers until I can deal with the earnings of all the workers in No. 3 Unit in detail. I have already argued that the productive system itself militated against the emergence of collective control over output and earnings. Most of the workers were working on different operations within the units, and since the allowance for skill in the prices differed from operation to operation, there were wide
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FIG. 3. Fluctuations around average weekly earnings. Full weeks
differentials in earnings within the unit. I argued that these differentials were a factor dividing the units internally, helping to prevent co-operation either to further management objectives or to control the level of earnings. I now illustrate the extent of these differentials. Figure 4 shows that only three workers in No. 3 team earned on average more than the piecework average for the workshop. Two of these,Nancy and Eileen, averaged just over £7 per week. Eileen was an “armholer” whose high average earnings reflected her special skill as a maker. She was also a speedy worker. Her colleague Jenny was also skilled but she was old and slow, and her earnings are thus well below the earnings for the hypothetical average worker. Nancy was a speedy worker, engaged on the tricky job of collar assembly. Sally, the other high earner, was a machinist who was especially quick at the relatively straightforward sewing operations she was expected to perform. The average earnings of the rest of the team fell below the level of the hypothetical average worker. This one would expect in the case of the inexperienced teen-agers. They were not expected to make the adult minimum wage—it will be recalled that Shirley was fired for failing to make the juvenile minimum, about £3 10s. 0d.—but many of the adult workers in No. 3 Unit made, on average, somewhat less than the average worker was expected to make, given the job prices. Possibly these workers were below average with respect to skill and speed according to the management. The evidence suggests,
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FIG. 4. Average weekly earnings. No. 3 Unit. Full weeks only
however, that most of the workers were average or above average in potential performance, but were prevented from realizing their full potential by anomalies in job prices, stoppages in work flow, and the like. There are one or two workers to whom this explanation does not fully apply. I refer particularly to Joan and Pam. The reasons for Joan’s poor performance lay in her poor health and in her inability to adapt herself to new methods of work. Although Pam’s earnings were affected by imbalance of work flow, transfers, and the like, her personal attitude to the job accounts to some extent for her low figure of average earnings. I shall discuss her case in more detail presently; I merely mention here that she was easily discouraged and was inclined to slack off when it appeared to her difficult to make her wages, and her earnings slumped. Taken by itself, the fact that so many workers in No. 3 Unit failed on average to reach the £5 15s. 0d. level was not for them a serious cause for complaint. It could hardly have been so since, in my experience, none of them was aware that management considered £5 15s. 0d. to be a fair weekly reward for a worker of average skill working at a reasonable pace. Nor were they aware that management took this into account when calculating job prices, Each worker’s concept of a reasonable level of earnings was based upon her own past experience and on comparison with other workers doing roughly the same work, insofar as it was possible for her to make this comparison, Thus “to make one’s wages” was to reach one’s accustomed level each week. To fall
TABLE 2. AVERAGE (WEEKLY) HOURLY EARNINGS, AND RANGE OF VARIATION. No. 3 UNIT.
NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 55
short of this gave rise to discontent, which was probably emphasized by the fact that the individual was powerless to do much to alter the circumstances which caused her to fall short. More accurately, most individuals showed no wish to control these circumstances, but felt aggrieved that management had somehow let them down. The figures of output and earnings that I have given so far serve to back up the argument I have already advanced, namely, that there were in this shop no effective group norms of output, either about the output of completed garments by the group, or about the output of completed parts by individuals. By this I do not mean that there were no shared ideas about right and proper behaviour, I have already shown that there were such shared ideas. And I have also shown that each individual operated with an idea of what her “wages” ought to be, an idea which was related to her own subjective estimate of the relation between the effort she was expending as against the reward accruing. Measured by this yardstick, any one day or week could be adjudged “good” or “bad”. Thus the situation in this shop was that the behaviour of the members of the group and of management is judged according to standards which are widely accepted within the group even though effective techniques for the control of the working environment in terms of these standards are absent. I now go on to elaborate this general point by examining in detail the earnings of No. 3 Unit. I shall attempt to show, by an examination of the causes of fluctuations in earnings, that individual control over levels of individual output was very limited, and that collective control over output did not occur. Table 2 is an analysis of earnings fluctuations. It gives figures of the average hourly earnings of each worker in No. 3 Unit for nineteen weeks, together with two measures of earnings variation—the range over which individual earnings fluctuated, and the mean deviation. Both these measures show a considerable variation in most cases, as did the graph in Fig. 3 showing the range of fluctuations of gross weekly wages. I have already said that I had observed that most of the workers worked at a fast even pace when they had work “on the table”, except in periods of “sweating” when quality was sacrificed for speed to offset the effects of a tight price; and I argued that the variations in pace of work which I did observe were far from sufficient to account for the fluctuations in the earnings of individual workers, or to explain why the earnings of some workers varied more than others. I think I can now demonstrate this convincingly from my field notes on the fluctuations in the earnings of some of the workers. Referring to Table 2, it will be seen that the average hourly earnings of Pat and Thelma, the sleeve girls, are remarkably steady in comparison with those of, say, Nancy, the collar girl, or Pam, the back maker. This was due primarily to the fact that the
56 ON THE SHOP FLOOR
sleeve girls were to some extent shielded, by their position in the unit, from the effects of imbalance in work flow. They collected cuttings direct from the stripper, completed the making of the sleeves, and delivered them direct to Dora, the “joiner-up”. Only shortage of sleeve cuttings could keep them short of work. It seemed that in their case the stripper could usually keep them supplied. I rarely saw them short of work, nor were they frequently transferred to other work. They were also little affected by changes in style, for sleeve making was a relatively straightforward operation, and changed little with change in style. Such fluctuations as these two workers experienced were due to occasional shortage of work. It may be that these two workers used “dead horse”* to even out fluctuations but I have no evidence of this. Such indirect evidence as I have, for example, in statements by Nancy, Dora, the chargehand and other informants, suggests that few workers used “dead horse”. The considerable difference in the range of fluctuation between Pat and Thelma on the one hand, and Nancy on the other, is correspondingly explained by the fact that collars do vary considerably from style to style, and involve a good deal of adjustment of work routine when the style changes. Making collars is a tricky operation, and difficult to price. Since Nancy was a speedy worker, she was often ahead of the stripper, and this meant that she was more subject to waiting time and to transfers to other work than were Pat and Thelma. There are so many factors involved that it is impossible to do more than to indicate the probable reasons for differences in the range ofvariation in the earnings of the workers. I have suggested, in comparing the earnings of Pat and Thelma on the one hand and Nancy on the other, that position in the work sequence and the degree of complexity of the operation are two factors affecting stability of earnings. But there are many others. To illustrate the effect of these I now examine in a little more detail the earnings of six workers, and attempt to explain, by reference to my field notes, the reasons for particular fluctuations. Graphs of earnings for these workers are shown in Fig. 5. The asterisks along the time co-ordinate indicate those periods when the unit was changing over to a new style. Pam
Pam’s earnings fluctuated widely and showed a lack of systematic variation. They did not seem to be particularly prone to change only with style changes. Her earnings moved sharply up and down in a period (weeks 3 to 6)when styles were unchanged. Yet in a
*i.e. booking, and being paid for, work not yet completed.
NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 57
FIG. 5. Average hourly earnings
similar period, from week 11 to 15, her earnings are very steady. They seem to have been affected greatly by a number of style changes in the last four weeks of the period. The drastic slump in week 5 illustrates the effect of absenteeism in the unit on the allocation of work within the unit and hence on earnings. Mary was absent for a few days on week 5. The chargehand transferred Pam to Mary’s job. Pam found that she could do quite well on this new job. Meanwhile, Joan was moved into the unit to take over Pam’s job. When Mary returned Pam was not moved back to her own job at once but was found a few odd batches of varied work to keep her occupied. Pam was upset about this, and, as I have mentioned she was prone to stop trying to “make her wages” when this objective appeared difficult to reach. In this instance she was also accumulating waiting time while the chargehand found work for her. All these experiences are reflected in her pay packet for the week. Pam also suffered from her reliance on my efforts to keep her supplied with parts for the back making operation. My inexperience often caused me to fall behind and Pam had to wait for me. She never failed to draw my attention to this, for if she accumulated waiting time as a consequence, her earnings were adversely affected. But sometimes I was myself held up by drying
58 ON THE SHOP FLOOR
up of supplies from the stripper. My output dropped in consequence and Pam was affected. The examination of fluctuations in earnings in Pam’s case illustrates the effect of absenteeism, transfers, personal response to frustration, and imbalance in the work flow. It also shows how the flow of work may be affected in a system such as this by the presence of workers of inferior skill in the units. Nancy
Nancy, whom I closely observed during the whole of my stay in No. 3 Unit, did not, as did Pam, vary her pace of work when she felt aggrieved or frustrated. She had an invalid mother to support, and it was perhaps for this reason that she always strove hard to reach maximum output. In temperament she was much less volatile than Pam, who was regarded as “a bit of a character”. Nancy was described as a “good hardworking girl”. For these reasons it is in an examination of Nancy’s earnings that the effect of style changes and anomalies in the job prices can be most clearly seen. For the first few weeks of the period Nancy’s earnings were well below her own average. Then, with the full introduction of a new style which paid well, her earnings climbed to well above her average. After a few weeks of high earnings, another change in style brought a slump in earnings. Then towards the end of the period she became accustomed to the new style and her average hourly earnings increased markedly. Nancy’s experience indicates not only that earnings were affected by the difficulties of working up a new routine of work on a new style, but also that there were sufficient anomalies in the job prices for the same effort on different styles to yield a smaller or larger cash reward. It is not possible to account for the difference in the level of Nancy’s earnings in weeks 4 and 5 on the one hand and weeks 17 and 18 on the other by reference to difference in effort expended. It is true, of course, that I did not possess an accurate measure of effort. I am comparing my own observation that Nancy worked at a fast and even pace with the objec-tive figures of earnings. But then there are no such accurate measures of effort—at least there are none which do not require expensive equipment, and which are suitable for use in a workshop. The most up-to-date techniques for measuring and evaluating work involve subjective estimates of effort expended.* The sudden slump in Nancy’s earnings which occurred in week 15 was due mainly to work starting on a new style of garment which presented difficulties in assembly. There was a good deal of uncertainty at the time when this garment was introduced. Work on the garment, which was made of cloth which was difficult to handle, was under way before the workers knew what prices were to be paid. There were rumours that all operations were to be
NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 59
timed. Others said that average rates were to be paid because the run was to be a short one. There was also uncertainty about how the work was to be allocated amongst the members of the unit. It is difficult to say whether work slowed down only because the cloth was difficult to work, or because of a combination of the factors I have cited. After a few days, during which a number of jobs were time-studied, job prices for the garment were made known. By this time many of the initial difficulties attending the changeover had been overcome. Most of the workers were also satisfied that they could “make their wages”. From then on earnings rose for Nancy, as for many of the other workers in the unit. Alice
Like Nancy, Alice’s earnings were affected by style changes. They also varied a good deal in periods when the same style was being assembled. This was mainly because Alice, a machinist, undertook a variety of operations. Her regular task, that of completing the sewing of the garment at the final assembly point, did not occupy her whole time. Alice’s position illustrates once again the general difficulty of organizing work on flow principles in a unit system of this kind. There are two chief sources of difficulty. The first is that of deciding the number of workers required in the unit and the sub-division of operations required to ensure that each worker will be fully occupied, and not under or over-loaded. Obviously if a worker cannot deal with the output of the worker who is supplying her with parts, then she herself will probably find it difficult to keep the worker next to her fully occupied, and thus the flow will be disturbed. The second difficulty is that of staffing the units with workers of sufficient skill and speed to fit into the system. Marked individual differences will be likely to disturb the flow. Thus it was that I was often unable to keep Pam fully occupied. In Alice’s case, the “armholers” did not always produce sufficient garments to give her enough final sewing operations to keep her occupied. Threequarters of an Alice would probably have been sufficient for a smooth flow; or a worker three-quarters as fast as Alice. As it was the chargehand had to find Alice other work to keep her fully occupied. Sometimes Alice helped out machinists like Sally, if they happened to have too much work. Sometimes extra “bits and pieces” were not available and in this event waiting time reduced earnings. And, of course, frequent changes of operation tended to break the rhythm and slow down her pace. In weeks when there was a good run of her regular work, her earnings were better. It
*For discussion on this point see Refs. 17 and 18.
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could be argued that this worker could have planned her work better so as to iron out fluctuations, but since the supply of work to her depended on the activities of other people, who had similar problems, this would have been difficult. Alice, like many other members of the unit, was affected by the general uncertainty which surrounded the introduction of the new style in weeks 14 and 15. Eileen
Like Nancy, Eileen’s earnings seemed to have been affected mostly by style changes. There was about a shilling an hour difference between her average hourly earnings in weeks 3, 4 and 5, and in weeks 13, 14 and 15. Eileen, an armholer, was never, as far as I know, transferred to other work. The output of the unit was usually sufficient to keep her and her colleague, Jenny, fully occupied. But a change in style often radically changed the nature and sequence of the operations they performed, and this, together with pricing anomalies, often radically changed their opportunities to “make their wages”. The slight slump in Eileen’s earnings in week 8 is probably explained by the effect of her own absence at the beginning of the week. She remarked to me that she wished she had taken the whole week off since her work had been done for her by two other people, and she came back only to be plagued by waiting time. The drop in earnings in week 6 is mainly the result of an error in assembly. Several coats had been completed before the error was noticed and all the work had to be undone and made again. Dora
Dora’s earnings were affected only slightly by most changes in style. The variations in her earnings are largely due to the fact that she worked on an important sub-assembly operation, “joining-up”. Her capacity to earn was affected by the efforts of about half the workers in the unit. Backs, fronts, and sleeves, were supplied to her, and she joined these together ready for taping by Eileen and Jenny. Any hold-up in the supply of any of these prevented her from going ahead. But Dora was able to avoid the worst consequences of imbalance in work flow. Besides being a skilled machinist, Dora was also a skilled maker. Often, when she had no machining work, she could find some making to do in the unit. Dora explained to me some of her difficulties in trying to make her wages. At the beginning of week 6 she told me that to make her wages (i.e. about £1 0s. 0d. a day) she had to complete about 60 joining-up operations. She found that it was difficult, on this particular style, for other workers to keep her supplied at this rate. She remarked that she could do 60 easily enough if she got the
NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 61
parts, but if she did 60 this would be too many for Eileen and Jenny to cope with. To meet her difficulty, she worked at the rate of 60 a day until supplies ran out, and then left her machine to help Eileen and Jenny to clear away the work she had accumulated for them. But, as she explained, her assembly work was, for lack of practice, slower than her machining, and she lost money. Thelma
I have already discussed some of the reasons why the earnings of Pat and Thelma, the sleeve girls, were less subject to fluctuations than those of other workers. Such fluctuations as they experienced were probably due to waiting time, caused by shortage of supply of stripped sleeve cuttings, and to slight price anomalies. It is impossible, of course, to rule out the effect on the earnings of these two workers of changes from day to day and week to week in their own attitude to the job. From my own experience of this work I can say that there were days when one felt disinclined to start work, and eager to finish. At other times one was prone to make errors. This must have applied to all the workers in some measure but is obviously not to be held responsible for major differences in earnings. It is impossible to trace clearly the effect of “sweating” on earnings, for any of the workers. But the measures taken by the inspector to prevent deterioration of quality, and the effect of these on earnings, can be illustrated. I refer to the graph of Pam’s average hourly earnings, particularly to weeks 5 and 6. Pam had told me that she was pleased that a new style was coming into production. She had made this style before, she said, and she knew she could make her wages on it. When the new style was introduced she started “sweating” to make up for her poor earnings on the previous style. But the inspectors returned a large batch of work to her, claiming that it was below the quality required. She had to do the work again. Pam, and many of the other workers, stated that the inspectors always found some minor fault on a new style and returned work to the workers. It was believed that they did this so as to impress upon the workers that they were on their toes and would not allow a new style to be the occasion for a drop in quality. It was also believed that the inspectors “picked on” certain workers whom they believed were prone to “sweat”. Certainly, if work was returned, earnings suffered. From the foregoing it is clear that there were many factors influencing the capacity of the workers to make their wages. Some of these could not possibly have been controlled directly by the workers either as individuals, or collectively. The proliferation of styles, and the length of run on any style, was dictated by the market. I was told by managers that they would have preferred to
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have long runs on the same small range of styles, but that to keep the units fully employed they had to get the orders which were available, and this often meant short runs on odd styles. All this created problems. Changes of style often meant changes in the kind of cloth to be handled, and on the sub-division of tasks within the unit. Some kinds of cloth were easy to handle, others induced eye strain, and so on. When fixing prices, the attempt was made to compensate for such factors as these. The workers often considered the allowances inadequate, and it will be easily appreciated that managers found it extremely difficult accurately to calculate allowances which reflected the effect of changes in materials on the output of workers. It is possible that difficulties were in some cases overestimated, in others underestimated. Thus, in various ways the earnings of workers were affected. Although the workers could do nothing to influence the market they could possibly have controlled some of the effects of market factors on their capacity to earn their wages. For example, they might have refused to accept prices which did not compensate them for working with difficult materials. They might have used the ultimate threat of withdrawal of labour to back their demands. This they did not do. There were individual complaints about job prices, and sometimes changes were made as a result. But mostly the prices as fixed by management were accepted. If they were tight, workers grumbled about them but they took no action to get them altered, except “sweating”, and the effect of this was defeated in most cases by the efficient inspection system. Absenteeism was another unpredictable factor. And absenteeism led to transfers, and these, in their turn, affected the workers’ capacity to earn. But I never once heard a demand made for “transfer allowances”, or for compensation for “re-learning”. Similarly, when shortages of work accrued due to imbalance in the work flow, allowances could have been claimed for waiting time. This was never done. It is true that an allowance for average waiting time was incorporated in the job prices, but in any one period waiting time might be much greater than the management estimate of an average, and earnings would be adversely affected. No attempt was made by the workers to alter this situation. It is clear that although the workers could not directly control the market situation, they could possibly have taken steps collectively to offset the effect of market factors on their capacity to make their wages. They took such action extremely rarely as individuals, and never collectively. Certainly they never attempted to use the strength of the Union to enforce claims of any kind. I was told by informants that women workers in Wye had been known to make collective protest against what they considered to be injustice. There have been walk-outs from particular workrooms. There have also been cases of individual protest but this has usually taken the form of permanent withdrawal. I myself
NORMS, EXPECTATIONS, OUTPUT AND EARNINGS 63
observed that some women left the factory when they were personally dissatisfied with conditions. But I saw no efforts by the workers collectively to control either the level of their earnings or their stability of earnings from week to week. “Dead horse”, which is extensively used in other sections of the waterproof garment industry, was not as far as I know extensively used at Wye. At a later stage, when I compare the behaviour of the women workers at Wye with the behaviour of the workers at Jay’s factory, I offer an explanation of the absence of any norm of output or earnings at the Wye factory. This explanation will be made largely in terms of the influence of the structure of the industry, of the markets for labour and for the product, and of the traditions of the industry. But the reader will have noticed already that there were some features of the organization of production and wage payment which militated against the developments of collective controls over output and earnings. The unit system, operating as it did in conjunction with individual financial incentive, did not encourage co-operation and workers’ solidarity, and acted against any tendency to combine. The tendency to “look after No. 1” already there, was encouraged. Since the system did not encourage social co-operation except in the sense that it was designed to make co-operation automatic with a minimum of inter-action between the individuals operating it, one could expect that to work in such a system would be unsatisfying, especially since there was little in the work itself to give satisfaction. It is true that absenteeism was high, and was management’s greatest worry. But neither absenteeism nor labour turnover was excessive when one considers the composition of the working force. I now attempt to explain why this was so.
CHAPTER 4 “SOCIABLE” GROUPINGS IN WORKROOM X
IN Workroom X, the productive system set fairly rigid limits upon social interaction during working time. Any worker, while working, was able to converse only with those within a few feet of her. To communicate with others called for shouting above the noise of the machines, and this could not be sustained for more than a minute or two. The requirements of the productive process, and the need to maintain a rapid and continuous pace to “make a wage”, kept workers anchored to their positions in the room, so conversation groupings on the process were limited to a very few persons. But the layout of the benches and machines offered greater opportunities for conversation for some workers than for others. The front-part makers faced one another around a table and formed a convenient grouping for conversation. The two armhole tapers also faced one another and could converse easily while working. But some workers worked alone, facing a wall or a window, and for them conversation was difficult. Figure 6, which shows the working positions of the workers in the room, shows clearly the kind of groupings where continuous conversation was possible, and those where workers worked back to back, or in an isolated position, so as to make conversation difficult. The diagram also shows that, within the room during working time, there was little possibility of cross-unit grouping, and that within each unit the layout, while facilitating work flow, broke up the teams into small sub-groupings and isolated individuals. Overmuch conversation, and especially horseplay, was regarded by management as an interference with output and was discouraged. Young Irene, for example, whose position (11c in the figure) made it impossible for her to converse with anyone without either shouting or stopping to turn around, was sometimes severely chided by the chargehand for leaving her machine to talk to the front-part makers behind her. But a worker did not often leave her work to talk to others. Most of the workers were anxious to “make their wages”, and this, as I have said, required them to stay at their tables or machines continuously. So few workers left their work just to make conversation. During many months’ observation of No, 3 Unit, I saw no one leave work for more than a few minutes
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FIG. 6. Working positions
just to talk. The workers left their places only to visit the toilet, or to replenish their cans of varnish, or perhaps to collect work from the strippers or to see the chargehand. I was myself chaffed by the members of No. 3 Unit when I left the job for more than a few minutes. The circumstances therefore ensured that the productive units and sub-units were the conversation units, But as I have already shown, workers were sometimes moved around within the units; despite the separation entailed by the productive process, workers came to know each other quite well. My own experience is a good guide here. When I started work in No. 3 Unit I quickly came to know Nancy, who worked opposite me, very well. During the months we worked together we managed to find topics of conversation for most of each day and got to know a lot about one another. My work was sewn by Sally, but she was too far away to make continuous conversation possible, unless one shouted above the noise of the machines. I would pass a word with her when I took work to her to be sewn, but I was never able to know her as well as I came to know Nancy. But I came to know the other members of the unit reasonably well. Sometimes little groups
66 SOCIABLE GROUPINGS IN WORKROOM X
would assemble and laugh and talk in the few minutes before starting work each morning and afternoon, Some of the workers passed me en route to replenish their varnish cans and would exchange a few words. But of course I was able to leave my work more often than others to ask questions and to converse. Yet, if I did too much of this, I was quickly reminded that this was “not done”. “Have you got nothing to do?”; “You must be on a good thing this week”; “We always thought women were the great gossipers, but you can beat us”, were typical of the remarks which were shouted if I left my work for more than a few minutes. So, although there were some workers with whom I did not exchange more than a few words during the whole of my stay, I soon came to feel that No. 3 Unit was a recognizable social unit and that I was an accepted member of it. But I found it difficult to establish contact with members of the other two units, and so far as I could see it was almost as difficult for the other members of No. 3 team. I had to ask specific questions to find out the names of some of them; and my workmate, Nancy, who had many years service with the firm, did not know some of the members of the other units by name. Certainly she spoke to few of them during my stay there. The social frontiers around the units were therefore strictly marked during working time. Workers were not often moved from unit to unit. I was convinced, and so were the other members of No. 3 Unit, that it was the most friendly and cohesive of the three units. I may have been wrong in this, but two instances will serve to show how members of No. 3 Unit identified themselves with their unit. On one occasion the colour of the garment being made by No. 3 Unit was changed. This necessitated, for the machinists, a change in the colour of the cotton in their machines. One of the machinists neglected to change her cotton, and had sewn parts of several garments before she noticed her error. To have unpicked all these parts herself would have meant a substantial drop in earnings. The rest of the team sacrificed their tea break and combined to unpick the parts so that after the break the machinist could carry straight on. The second occasion was when a machinist from another team was introduced into No. 3 team to take the place of an absentee. Although this worker was keeping the flow of parts moving and thus making work for the team, she was given a hostile reception, and was glad to return to her own team, as soon as she could. It would be unwise to over-emphasize the solidarity of No. 3 Unit, since this solidarity did not extend so far as to touch significantly the value placed on individual striving to maximize earnings. People were prepared in this case to sacrifice their free time, but they were seldom prepared to help others out in working time—although this was not unknown—since this would have severely affected their own capacity to earn. On another occasion,
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when, owing to a change in style of garment, a large number of collars were wrongly assembled, the worker who was responsible was sympathized with, but was left to fend for herself. Spontaneous co-operation was rare. The workers accepted the situation which management had created, in which co-operation was expected to follow from the pursuit of her own interests by each individual. Resentment was expressed by individuals when this “built-in”co-operation broke down for any reason and adversely affected their capacity to earn; “They told us that time and motion meant that I would always have work on my table, and it is up to them to see that it is there” was one common expression of this attitude to management and supervision. It seemed to me that such solidarity as there was, was the expression of the sharing of a common situation vis-à-vis management and other groupings, a negative thing, rather than something with positive content or purpose. This would explain why No. 3 Unit seemed to be the most cohesive of the three. No. 3 Unit had a grievance as a unit, in addition to the grievance of its members as individuals about work shortages, tight rates and the like. The grievance was that No. 3 Unit was treated badly in the matter of work allocation. It was said that they were given the awkward, badly paying work, and that the other units received more favoured treatment. There was some justification for the complaint. No. 1 Unit was the first to be formed under the new system, and was made up of those whom the management considered were the most skilled and experienced workers. This group was drawn from workers from the same workroom who knew each other well, and was given high quality work, which was also said to pay better. No. 2 team was also formed from workers from the same workroom and was considered to be next in the status hierarchy to No. 1 Unit. No. 3 Unit was made up of persons, many of whom were initially unknown to each other, who were drawn from different parts of the factory, from outside the firm, and from the training school. There was a significant difference in the number of trainees in the units, No. 3 team having by far the largest number. It was also significant, perhaps, that I myself, a stranger and a trainee, should be assigned to No. 3 Unit. The management regarded No. 3 Unit as less reliable than the other two, and said so. Certainly there was a good deal more singing, conversation, and horseplay in No. 3 Unit than in the other two units. In deciding on the allocation of work to the units, in the light of the quality required by the customer, and the date of delivery, the management took account of the differences, real or imagined, between the three units, thereby perpetuating the differences. The productive system—in which I include the system of wage payment—encouraged individualism. The layout, and the attitudes and expectations of the workers, discouraged
68 SOCIABLE GROUPINGS IN WORKROOM X
spontaneous cooperation either to help or to hinder management’s plans. When, due to the breakdown of the planned system of cooperation—either because of defects in the system itself or because of the intrusion of haphazard factors such as absenteeism —the workers’ expectations of a “fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work” or “a steady supply of work on the table” were frustrated, they reacted as individuals. Their common grouse did not result in a common protest or a common effort to control the system in their own common interests. I shall return to this topic later. I mention it here as a possible explanation of the fact that as soon as the workers were free, as at tea breaks, to decide with whom they would associate, they tended to leave those with whom they worked, and sit with others in another part of the room. This tendency was less marked in No. 3 Unit than in the others, and this was to be expected in view of the position of the unit as an underprivileged group of newcomers. Figure 6 should be compared with Fig. 7 and the tendency will be clearly seen. Figure 7 shows the position in the room, and the composition of the tea-break groupings. Table 3 analyses the composition of the groupings. It is clear that spatial propinquity on the process is not the sole, or even the chief, basis for “free” group formation, although some of the groupings, for example group (g), are based on this principle. Age and length of service with the company seem to be the principles on which some of the groups are formed. This seems to be the case with groups (d) and (e) which were composed of teenagers, all fairly new to the firm. And of course, in this case, common interests outside the factory, dancing, boys and the like, drew these youngsters together and marked them off from the others. Members of No. 3 Unit tended to stay within the territory of the unit (the exceptions being Helen, Wendy, Jenny, and myself) *, but they chose for the most part to group differently from the way they were required to do by the process. Even the three front-part makers split up at break times, although they were regarded by the others as being “very thick”—a term used to describe close exclusive friendship groups. The pattern of tea-break groupings represented in Fig. 7 was persistent. There were no changes in the pattern during my stay in the shop. My own experience shows the difficulty of changing one’s group, although mine was a special case since I was one of the two men in the room. All the same, I found that once I had become attached to one group, I was regarded with suspicion if I attempted to enter another group during break time.
*Helen and Wendy joined the teenagers, Jenny a group of older women, while I joined Joe the stripper, the only other man in the workroom.
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FIG. 7. Tea-break groupings
It would appear that for the most part the tea-break groupings weregroupings of old friends who had struck up friendships long ago, when methods of production had been different. It may have been that on the old processes they had worked alongside one another, but I cannot comment on this since there is no clear evidence. However these friendships started, it is clear that some of them have persisted through many changes in the production arrangements and layout of workrooms. A good example of this is group 1. This group contained members of all three units. All the members of the group were middleaged or elderly women, all of whom had long service with the firm and had worked in the same workroom for many years. The reader will have noticed that some of the persons who worked in Workroom X did not belong to the tea-break groupings, Some of them went during their break to other workrooms in the factory, where they had their special friends. And in group (b) one of the worker-trainers from the training school came into Workroom X to drink tea with her old friends. Although the tea break lasted only a few minutes, and convenience might have dictated that the workers stayed at their work stations with their workmates, they looked forward to the breaks in order to join what I like to call the “friendship” or “sociable” groupings.
70 SOCIABLE GROUPINGS IN WORKROOM X
TABLE 3 TEA-BREAK GROUPINGS WORKROOM X
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I myself believe, and I later produce more evidence in support of this, that these “sociable groupings” were the means by which life in the workshop was made reasonably pleasant. Belonging to them developed some sense of identification with the firm. The “sociable groupings” also served as a refuge from the individualism and competition engendered by the productive system and they cut across inter-unit rivalry. Several of the male operatives whom I met in the factory were of the opinion that the women workers were “mugs” who would put up with any kind of treatment. When
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I asked them to explain why the women remained with the firm year after year and still grumbled and fought individually against the management, they said that “all the women have Wye stamped on their backs”, i.e, that they had a strong sense of identification with the firm. It would be cynical to suggest that there were no good reasons besides membership of “sociable-groupings” to explain the strong sense of identification with the company which the women, especially the older ones, undoubtedly felt. There were financial and welfare benefits to be gained from remaining with the firm, and it is highly probable that employment was more stable than in other firms in the industry. I would suggest, however, that the workers’ attachment to the company sprang very largely from the emotional attachment to the small group of friends. Certainly, as I shall show later, the reluctance of workers to leave the workshop and the firm, even when they were convinced that they had been badly treated, and the ability of the management to persuade them to stay by an appeal, inter alia, to loyalty to the firm, stemmed largely from their reluctance to leave their friends. Further support to this interpretation of the role of the small sociable groupings in offsetting some of the disintegrative tendencies inherent in the process of production itself, is given by the persistence of the friendship groupings when necessity had demanded the withdrawal of a worker from the productive process. People who left the firm years ago to marry, or for other reasons, would often visit the factory to see their friends. Shirley, who was sacked, hung about the factory at lunchtime to meet her friends— until she found another job. I shall give other examples of the power of the “sociable group” to cement an attachment to the wider unit later on. Much of my analysis of them is summed up in the phrase which many of the women used: “We come to work for the company”—(that is, of other women). This is not to say that they had no other motive for coming to work. For most, work was a compelling economic necessity. Nancy was the sole support of her widowed mother. There were widows with families to support and single women who lived alone and supported themselves. But much of the emotional satisfaction they derived at work was gained from the close friendships they formed with other workers. There was little satisfaction to be gained from the job itself. Thus although the work itself offered little intrinsic satisfaction, and it was hard and often unpleasant, and the system of production often engendered jealousies and antagonism between individuals and groups and threatened the peace of the shop, the existence of the sociable groupings, which cut across the groupings on the process in many cases, had an integrative effect. The analysis of the sociable groupings helps to explain why, in a situation where so many tensions were present, labour turnover remained fairly low. As I shall show in the next chapter, people did
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withdraw either temporarily or permanently to escape these tensions. But most of them stayed. What still remains to be explained fully is why workers who combined freely in friendly groupings showed no tendency to combine together to control output and earnings, or at least to offset some of the effects on their earnings of such factors as imbalance in the productive system, transfers, changes in style and the like. There was no lack of individual grumbling about these things, and sometimes individuals attempted to seek a remedy, but no attempt was made either to exert joint pressure on management and supervision, or at collective control over output. I am tempted to argue that the system of production itself destroyed the basis for the emergence of a common interest in controlling output and earnings. Since few people in the room were doing the same job, and since the system called for fairly wide skill and earnings differentials, we might expect that it was not only difficult for workers to appreciate the special problems of others, but it was also difficult for them to have knowledge of the level of earnings of other workers and to compare these according to some common yardstick. Thus the workers did not perform the same task, nor were they in the position of knowing what the earnings and output situation of the units were as a whole. In this rather confusing situation, so the argument would go, it was to be expected that each worker would look after her own interests. To further strengthen this argument, it could be pointed out that since the layout of the units was such as to inhibit the development of groups based on spatial propinquity on the process, communication on common problems was thereby stifled. The cross-unit nature of the tea-break groupings also inhibited communication on matters of ouput and earnings in particular units. Thus the social mechanism which was most effective as a cushion against individualism enabled individualism to persist. This is an attractive argument and it accounts for most of the facts. But there are some facts for which it fails to account. The little evidence I have suggests that when the same workers were working on the old process, on a system of group piecework which encouraged co-operation, individualism showed itself in arguments about the share-out of the group bonus, and, I was told, these arguments were often quite bitter. Indeed, one of the chief attractions of the unit scheme to the workers when it was first suggested to them, was that piecework would be on an individual basis. As one of the workers put it: “On the conveyors the slow workers held up the fast ones and because the fast ones helped the slow ones to keep the speed up, it meant that they were earning their wages for them. Now we earn our own money, and the slow ones are feeling the draught”. It would seem that an individualistic attitude existed long before the unit system, and
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there was a corresponding reluctance to develop collective controls. It seems to me that despite the considerable difficulties in the way, collective action could have been taken, and the grumbles about tight rates, transfers, etc., translated into collective action to control output and earnings, or at least to mitigate the effect of uncertainties upon them, if the desire to do so had been there. I was often tempted to say, when workers complained to me about tight rates, or what they considered to be unfair allocation of work, “Why don’t you get together and do something about it”. In my own experience as an industrial worker, a threat to one was considered as a threat to all, and I found it difficult to understand why the workers in Workroom X did not seem to see it this way. As I have shown already, I was not unaware of the difficulties in the way, but it is not as if the attempt had been made and failed, because of the difficulties. As far as I could see, it had never been made. The absence of a “will to control” has to be explained and this cannot be done entirely, or even partly, by an examination of the workshop alone. It would seem as if individualism is a traditional feature in this industry as a whole. The emergence of the tradition can possibly be explained by reference to the seasonal nature of the industry, and the uncertainty about the prospects of continuous employment which has been a feature of its history. Perhaps the tradition also stems from the time when the industry of small units was first established: “to setup on one’s own” was a quite legitimate ambition and moreover it was an ambition which could be realized by some. It is true, of course, that few of the workers in Workroom X had any desire to set up on their own. But it is quite possible that they have inherited the tradition of individualism. And few of them have had any experience of work in other industries as a basis for comparison with their situation in the waterproof garment industry. They have erected the tradition of individualism into a living principle of hard work, and “looking after No. 1”. I found this a bit disconcerting since the principle seemed in the circumstances of Workroom X to rob the workers of the possibility of exerting any control over their situation. As one of the male maintenance workers put it to me: “They let the management get away with anything”. I shall be returning to a further discussion of this point in a later chapter. I go on now to discuss in greater detail how the jealousies and quarrels which emerged in this situation were dealt with.
CHAPTER 5 CONFLICT AND CO-OPERATION
MY analysis of relationships in the workroom has shown how the expectations of the workers that management will provide them with the means to “make their wages”, were on occasion frustrated. The failure of management to make this provision was, as I have repeatedly pointed out, largely, but not entirely, due to factors outside its control. For example, if absenteeism depleted the units, replacements were difficult to find at short notice in a situation where demand for labour was keen. And the incidence of absenteeism was difficult to predict. Similarly, market conditions determined the length of run and style of garment and management could do little to control the market. Again, in calculating rates for the job, inevitably errors were made, so that “making one’s wages” was difficult in some situations for some workers. Since all these contingencies affected the flow of work through the units, the supply of work to individuals was affected, and at times this affected the relationships between individual operatives. Redeployment to maintain the flow of work, as I have shown, sometimes generated resentment if earnings were affected. The situation I have described and analysed was paradoxical, for it would seem that the value which both management and the workers shared, to maximize output, was itself both the source of conflict between workers and management, and also between worker and worker. Management, in trying to maximize output, had to deploy the labour force in such a way as to create occasional resentment, and was forced into this position by the pressure of factors which lay outside the workshop and over which it had little control. In attempting to maximize output, management sometimes adversely affected the capacity of individual workers to maximize output and earnings. And this effect was emphasized by anomalies in the job prices. Conflict between worker and worker was sometimes generated by a failure of one worker to keep another supplied with enough work to enable her to maximize output and earnings; and a worker’s failure to produce her allotted output often arose from management’s organization for maximum output.
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Up to a point, of course, workers tend to regard minor fluctuations in earnings, and minor frustration in expectations, as part of a process of “taking the rough with the smooth”. But at times there occurred serious breaches in the relationship between management and worker, and between worker and worker, which generated heated argument and complaint. Sometimes, as we have seen, workers would temporarily leave the situation. But some threatened to leave altogether and a few actually did so. I now analyse a number of cases of conflict to show the process by which such conflicts were usually handled. Dr. V.W.Turner, in an illuminating analysis of conflict within an African society,(19) has suggested the concept of social drama to describe the process whereby serious disturbances in social life are handled. Turner noticed “a pattern in these eruptions of conflict—…phases in their development seemed to follow one another in more or less regular sequence”, and “divided the social process which constituted the social drama into four major phases”. These phases are: 1. Breach of regular, norm-governed relations; 2. Period of mounting crisis; 3. Redressive mechanisms; and 4. Re-integration or irreparable breach. The episodes in the life of the workshop which I now analyse follow a similar sequence. However, I must emphasize that the workshop society is not a closed system, nor is it as bound by custom as the society which Turner analyses. Relationships are bound by rule as well as by custom. The relationship between worker and management is a contractual relationship, and relationships between worker and worker, so far as the productive arrangements at any rate are concerned is, to use Durkheim’s terminology, an organic rather than a mechanical one. But relationships are governed to some extent by custom. As I shall show, there are some resemblances between the mechanisms which are brought into play to handle conflict in the African society which Turner studied, and in the workshop at Wye Garments but there are, of course, significant differences. I cite first the case of Jean. It will be recalled that during a period when No. 3 Unit was changing over to a new style, Pam, in Jean’s absence, was transferred to Jean’s job by the chargehand. On her return to work Jean was not assigned to her own job but was told to assist Eileen on armholes in Jenny’s absence. Jean accepted the charge-hand’s direction with some reluctance and after the midday break she was absent. It was clear that she had absented herself as a protest against her transfer to armholes. She was absent for four and a half days.
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On her return to work Jean immediately gave notice to the charge-hand that she was leaving the firm at the end of the week. This move generated much discussion, indeed excitement, in the workshop and in No. 3 Unit in particular. I discussed the situation with Nancy, who declared that this sort of thing had happened often in the past. “At times”, she said, “a rash of notice-giving breaks out”. She advised me not to take it too seriously, implying that Jean’s threat to leave would not, in the end, be carried out. Around 11 a.m. on the same morning, my attention was drawn to the fact that Jean had been called to “the office”. The chargehand came down the room to Jean’s workplace and escorted her the whole length of the room towards the office, under the curious eyes of everyone in the room. “They’ll talk her out of it up there,” remarked one operative near me. Jean was away for about half an hour. While she was away there was a good deal of gossip about what would be happening to her, and when Jean returned she was questioned about it. I was unable to talk with Jean at this time, but I learned that she had told those who worked with her that she was still determined to leave but that she had promised to reconsider the matter and to give management her final decision the following morning. At lunch time I left the factory in company with Jean. I did not wish to embarrass her with direct questions about what had happened in the office so I made some remark about the weather. But Jean was anxious to tell me about her experience. “It was just like a court”, she said. “Smithers [the departmental manager] was sitting there with Hetty Jones [the chief supervisor] on one side of him and Maisie Callaghan [the chargehand] on the other side. It’s enough to frighten anyone, but I have been here for 26 years and I was not frightened”. The day after Jean had been “before the higher ups”, as one worker described it, she was silent and subdued. I asked a worker who passed me on her way to replenish her varnish can, what Jean had decided to do. This worker said that several people had asked Jean about it but she had told them to mind their own business. At break time I discussed the case with one of my most reliable informants. I was told that it was extremely unlikely that Jean would leave. “They never leave, for all their threats; even though they can earn better money elsewhere in the trade, they stay because Wye is their religion”. The high priest of the order, it turned out, was Hetty Jones, the chief supervisor. It was said of her that once when her home was partly under water during heavy floods, she insisted on being carried shoulder high from the house so that she could get to work. As the week passed it became obvious that Jean would not be leaving. No one was very surprised and gradually interest
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subsided. But several people said that she had been justified in making her protest because she had been treated unfairly. By now Jean was back on her “own” job and the situation which led to her protest no longer existed. Jean’s protest arose out of the breach, by the chargehand, of a norm that a worker had the right to remain on her “own” job, unless she was adequately compensated for transferring. But, of course, the charge-hand’s duties required her to deploy the labour force at her disposal so as to maximize total output, and when workers were absent those who remained were often transferred. And it was usually the older, more experienced workers who were so transferred since they often had experience of jobs other than their “own”. But the crisis which developed in the relationship between Jean and the management, which led her to threaten resignation, was not taken up by the rest of the workers as an issue of principle. Since, at various times, most of the workers were placed in a similar position to Jean, it might have been expected that they would use a particular case such as Jean’s as the occasion for a collective protest. But, as we have seen, the reaction was a lively interest in Jean’s fate, and a scepticism about the seriousness of her threat to leave. One factor inhibiting joint action was, as I have already indicated, the differential impact of redeployment on the various members of the unit. During the week in which Jean handed in her notice to leave, her earnings had dropped, due to transfer, from £6 0s. 0d. to £5 10s. 0d. In the following week she suffered a further drop to just over £5 0s. 0d. But Eileen’s earnings over the same period, on her “own” job were £7 0s. 0d., £8 3s. 0d., £8 3s. 0d., well above her own average. And the earnings of some other members of the team were little affected. Therefore there was no immediate pressure upon other members of the unit to support Jean on principle. The evidence seems to indicate that there was no underlying desire for collective action to remedy common grievances, which might find expression in a critical instance such as Jean’s protest. The emphasis seems rather to be on the value of individual service to the firm—again an acceptance of management expectations. To further illustrate this point I examine the influences which were brought to bear upon Jean to withdraw her resignation. The workers, and particularly the longer-service workers, accept that the most important thing is to “get the work out”. Many workers told me that they thought it a good thing to learn to take the rough with the smooth, indicating that individuals sometimes lost through attempting to get the work out but on other occasions they gained. They should, it was felt, balance one thing against another and not complain. This was why some of them deplored Jean’s threat to resign. Yet there was also sympathy in their
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attitude since a large slump in earnings was regarded as unfair. So the norm “get the work out” came into conflict with the value placed on “making one’s wages”. The subtle pressures exerted on Jean by her fellow workers, as, for example, the open scepticism about her threat to leave, only strengthened her obvious reluctance to leave her friends and the firm she had worked in for so long. And, as reported to me, the management “Court” placed emphasis upon the value of co-operation as against temporary individual gain or loss, thus attempting to reconcile the two conflicting principles. But, of course, there were other pressures restraining the disgruntled worker from leaving. It was said by some that it was the service pay (i.e. the employee’s share of the dividends of the firm’s profit-sharing scheme, which increased with length of service) which led Jean to withdraw her threat. And Jean had been with the firm for 26 years. Many of her close friends worked for the firm. She had no experience of other workshops against which to measure and interpret conditions at Wye. That these were perhaps the crucial considerations in Jean’s case may be seen by reference to the case of Diane, who gave in her notice and actually did leave, as she had threatened to do. Diane, an attractive teenage girl, worked in No. 1 Unit. She had worked for Wye since she left school two years before. No. 1 Unit comprised, for the most part, the most skilled and speedy of the workers in the workroom. Diane worked on front parts. Her task was to prepare the front parts for operations to be performed by two older and more experienced workers. Because of her inexperience, and perhaps lack of desire to maintain the pace expected of her, she found it difficult on occasion to keep her older colleagues supplied with a constant flow of parts. They relied upon a constant flow of parts to “make their wages”, so they exerted pressure upon Diane to increase her pace of work. One morning, about a month after the settlement of Jean’s case, I was told that there had been a “rumpus” in No. 1 Unit. I had noticed that the chargehand had been spending a lot of time with the unit but I was too far away to follow closely what was happening. But, from all accounts, it seemed that the older women had been increasing the pressure on Diane. I also learned that Diane was the last in a long line of teenagers who had worked on the job. The others had left. Diane had survived longer than all the rest. This morning she had burst into tears. One or two workers in the immediate vicinity had sympathized with Diane, and what was described to me as “a first-class row” had developed. The chargehand then intervened to restore order and helped Diane to catch up with her work. But Diane said that she had had enough and intended to leave.
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Two days later I learned that the “row” had died down. Diane had been to the office accompanied by her mother and now she was telling the other workers that she “had no intention of throwing up a good job because of those two women”. Two weeks later, to the surprise of all except the few who were “in the know”, it was announced that Diane had given final notice to leave. She had found another job in another industry. She left to take up this job. There was a good deal of gossip about Diane’s behaviour. Opinion was divided. There were some who said that “the trouble with her was that she wanted her money easy”, others said that she was wise to get out, saying “for the young girls here the money is good, but they will never earn much more than they earn now, there’s no prospects”. As in Jean’s case, there were social and material pressures to remain. Diane was a member of a close-knit, cheerful, group of peers. They shared breaks, and were often seen at lunch time, partnering off to “jive” to the music of a record-player in the canteen. All these girls had a healthy respect for the authority of the chargehand, a mixture of awe and personal liking. This all lends support to the widespread view that Diane’s mother made the decision for her, advising her to keep her counsel while looking around for a new job. Diane’s case illustrates the point that the controls imposed upon workers by the productive system, operating through relationships between persons, tended to generate conflict between workers, should someone’s opportunities to “make her wages” be adversely affected. Workers were subject to conflicting pressures. In Diane’s case, it is possible that parental influence overcame the influences pulling her towards the workshop and the firm. It is also possible that the younger workers had not fully accepted the value of hard work and conformity to management expectations. It was the older women who commented that she “did not want to work hard for her money”. There is some further evidence to support this interpretation. In the training school the instructors were constantly complaining that the girls these days were not like they were when they (the instructors) were girls. Both instructors had spent their whole working lives in the industry and, like the shop steward, they agreed that “girls nowadays do not have their minds on their work”. My query as to what they did have their minds on, was usually answered with a knowing look, and a remark such as, “they can teach us a thing or two”. The instructors, the supervisors, and the shop steward were at one with management in believing in the virtues of hard work for the workers. The teenagers were subject to a process of indoctrination in the training school and in the workshop. I observed and experienced this process, and I noticed that the pressures to conform took the
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form of an appeal by managers and trainers to economic selfinterest, the use of official sanctions—the threat of dismissal etc.— and the subtle and effective pressures applied in social relationships with other workers. I am convinced that a powerful influence upon persons to remain in the workroom was the pull of emotional attachment to other persons. For some people it seemed to outweigh economic considerations, for some could have earned more elsewhere in the trade.* Since the solidarity of the groupings in the workshop was not directed towards the exercise of control over output and earnings, the only sanction open to the individual worker for the redress of grievance was the threat to leave. This, in a situation of keen demand for labour, was a fairly powerful sanction. However, it was usually used only in the heat of a “row”. When the heat was dissipated, the pull of personal attachment would prevail. Mary and Annie, who worked together on front parts in No. 3 Unit, were very close friends. During one of Mary’s absences, the team was reshuffled and Pam took Mary’s place. Another worker was drafted in to the team to take Pam’s place, so that when Mary returned the team was overmanned. It suddenly became known that Mary had handed in her notice to leave. It was said that management intended to transfer her to another workroom. She had objected to this and threatened to leave. There were rumours that she had already secured another job in the industry, makingthrough with another firm. Rumour also had it that if Mary left Annie would also leave. It seemed clear that Mary was using the threat to leave to influence management against a transfer. Workers to whom I spoke about Mary’s intentions said she would never leave the workshop: “She’s done this before and she’ll do it again, but she will never leave”, expressed the general sentiment. And so it proved. Mary went to the office. When she came back she said she had promised to reconsider her decision. She remained on her job and as time passed the incident was forgotten. She was not transferred. It is possible that Mary, a skilled maker, would have gained financially from a move to another firm but she obviously preferred to stay, at that time. I have since learned that she did not return from her summer holiday, having taken the opportunity during the holiday to find work elsewhere.† I do not know whether Annie also left. The threat to leave, made individually, seemed to be the only sanction which the workers were prepared to use to control their conditions of work. In the absence of collective controls and an effective procedure for collective presentation, by a representative *Eileen, Dora, and Mary, for example.
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from the workshop, it was the only sanction which promised to be effective. During my stay in the shop, almost all the “rows” which blew up involved workers on front parts. I suspected that this was more than just coincidence and I asked Maisie, the chargehand, about it. I could see that those front-part makers who were involved in rows were in the middle of the flow from the preparation stage to the final assembly stages, and were probably more prone to suffer from the effect of gluts and shortages of material than many of the other workers. The charge-hand took the view that it was an accident that what she called the “malcontents” were to be found on front parts. This, she said, applied to all the units. I remain unconvinced. I would say that the position of these workers in the system, subjected them to acute conflicting pressures, although I am prepared to admit that some of the more lively aggressive personalities in the room were working on front parts. Of course, rows such as those I have been describing occurred infrequently, and, as I have shown, they rarely led to permanent withdrawal from the workroom. Only three persons actually left during the six months that I was in the shop, and one left shortly after I left. Three of these were front-part makers and one was Shirley, the trainee, who was sacked. Thus it would seem that the tensions generated between management and worker, and between worker and worker in the productive system were usually eased without permanent breach in relationships. I attribute this to the workers’ acceptance of the management expectation of hard work,* and to the pressure from the sociable grouping in the workroom. Membership of these groupings strengthened the more general tendency of workers to identify with the company, which was still further strengthened by the “fringe” benefits, profitsharing and the like, which the firm offered. The episodes in the life of the workshop which I have described have the processional form described by Turner. “Rows” are generated when individuals feel that they have been unfairly treated, i.e. there has been a breach of norm-governed relationships. Then follows the development of a crisis which usually issues in a threat to leave the workshop. The third stage begins when the attempt is made to bring into operation mechanisms to redress the breach in relationships. In the society Turner was describing, there existed no great power disparities between the persons or groups in dispute and it was therefore possible, even necessary, to find some way to stress values held in common as against those in dispute. But in the workshop at Wye there were such power disparities. In all industries the immediate †It may be that she postponed her decision to leave until she had drawn her profit-sharing bonus.
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balance of power rests in favour of management at workshop level. But in some industries disputes are channelled out of the workshop if there is no possibility of settlement at that level. They are then handled by institutions where power is more equally balanced. Thus, in the steel industry, for example,(20) and in heavy engineering, procedures for handling disputes are arranged so that workshop disputes can be taken as far as national level for settlement if this is necessary. But in the workshop at Wye the machinery for handling grievances was not well developed. Trade Union power was never, in my experience, invoked as a sanction when workers were aggrieved. This is not to say that the Union was powerless. In its dealings with the employers at district level it was successful in safeguarding minimum rates and general conditions of employment. I can only say that I did not observe one occasion when the power of the Union was used by workers as a lever to counteract the power of management at workshop level. Instead, the aggrieved worker seemed to be reminded, in the office, of the power of management as against the individual worker. I may be wrong in supposing that the shop stewards were never involved in discussions about workers’ grievances, but this was my strong impression. I was not able to check this by direct observation and my impression is based partly upon workers’ descriptions about what happened “in the office”,and upon the general attitudes to the Union which I heard expressed. The workers regarded the Union officials, if indeed they knew about them, as members of the “they” class—as persons in authority. So when a worker was aggrieved and threatened to leave, management, anxious to keep labour, tried to persuade her to stay. The pressures upon management from the market made it impossible for them to offer large cash concessions as an inducement, or even to recognize the right of a worker to a particular job (since absenteeism, for example, made constant redeployment of the labour force necessary). In an important sense, therefore, a settlement to remedy breach permanently was impossible. Given the situation which confronted management inevitably, they had to fail from time to time to create the conditions which enabled workers to fulfil management expectations, and at the same time “make their wages” and safeguard the right to “their” particular job. Management’s scope for manœuvre was therefore strictly limited. And the absence of, or the refusal to use, Trade Union power, robbed the workers of every sanction save the individual threat to leave the situation. A collective threat was not to be expected since, as I have shown, it
*The only two exceptions I have noted were Shirley and Diane, and both left the workshop.
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was unlikely, given the system of production, that workers would have common grievances at the same point in time. In situations of crisis the chargehands and female supervisors usually played three roles at the same time. They were anxious, as members of the workshop society, and often as personal friends of the aggrieved worker, to make sure that the worker remained. And they would sometimes persuade management to make minor concessions to this end, thus acting as surrogates for a shop steward. But they were also representatives of management and under pressure to act as such. It was remarkable that they were so often successful. But in evaluating their success it must be remembered that the workers knew what they were talking about when they dismissed threats to leave as idle. They saw that the threats were often made in the heat of the moment and were likely to be withdrawn upon reflection, when the balance of advantages had been weighed. Turner, in his analysis of social dramas in Ndembu villages, shows how ritual emphasizes the values which unite members of a group, as against those influences which cause them to quarrel. There were no such rituals in the Wye workshop to emphasize values which united manager and worker. Such ritual-like behaviour as was observed—the walk down the shop, the summons to the office, the sudden social isolation of the aggrieved individual—seemed only to demonstrate to all the power of management to control the workers’ behaviour. Thus reconciliation was possible only if the worker agreed to conform to management’s definition of the worker role. There could never be integration in the sense in which Turner uses the term, i.e. a reaffirmation of higher social values transcending those conflicting ones which precipitated the quarrel. If a worker refused to accept management’s definition of her role she could, of course, leave. But, as I have shown, there were many inducements to remain. In the workshop at Wye, the adjustment of relationships between managers and workers did not take the form reported in many workshop studies. There was no norm of output or earnings associated with spontaneously developed informal relationships and at variance with the formal expectations of management. Nor did workers accept the formal expectations of management as a norm sanctioned by group pressure, at least not to any significant extent. The situation was rather that the workers, as individuals, accepted the formal expectations of management that they should work hard and attempt to maximize their earnings. But again as individuals, they expected that management would create the conditions which would enable them to do this. Management’s failure to do this was not on every occasion objectively a moral
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shortcoming, and was often due to factors beyond its control: but the failure was evaluated morally and workers felt aggrieved. Yet they did not attempt to exert control over the situation to any significant extent. This absence of the “will to control” has not been adequately explained so far. I shall examine this problem in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION (WYE GARMENTS CASE STUDY)
THE concepts I have used in the analysis of the workers’ behaviour at Wye have been those of social role, expectations, and social control. I now summarize the analysis before turning to discuss the absence of collectively sanctioned norms of output and earnings in the workshop. I began by showing how the productive system acted as a mechanism of social control by limiting social interaction during working time. But the productive system could only act as a control if the workers accepted management’s definition of their role in it. I showed that in fact they did so. They behaved, on the whole, as management expected them to behave. There were, of course, individual differences, some due to personality differences, some to differing economic pressures upon persons. These differences do not significantly affect the general conclusion that the management’s expectation that persons would work hard and attempt to maximize their earnings was largely fulfilled. But the workers believed that hard work should be adequately rewarded. They also believed that management had a moral obligation to create the conditions in which, by hard work, the worker could make her wages. It was when management failed to do this that workers, as individuals, protested. I have shown that the protests were made by individuals, never by groups, and seldom by individuals representing groups, except perhaps in the sense that an individual protest might indicate to management a general source of grievance. Protests almost invariably took the form of individual attempts to control the relationship between effort and reward, such as “sweating” and “dead horse”, and, in extreme cases of violation of expectation, temporary withdrawal from the system or the threat of complete withdrawal. Since the working force was composed of women, many of whom had heavy domestic responsibilities, and a few of whom were family breadwinners, it was inevitable that there would be a good deal of involuntary absenteeism. Absenteeism dislocated the tightly-geared productive system. Management’s scope for replacing absent workers was limited by the general shortage of trained female semi-skilled labour and their difficulties were
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magnified by the fact that their productive system was unique in the industry: they could not easily replace workers who left since they had to train newcomers. It seemed to me that workers trained in other firms to make-through would not be attracted to the unit system, so the management had to rely on its own supply of trainees. So, when the units were depleted through absenteeism, a good deal of day-to-day redeployment of labour within the units was necessary if work were to be kept flowing smoothly through the units. This redeployment had to be ad hoc, since it was extremely difficult to predict the incidence of absenteeism from day to day. But redeployment was always likely to affect the capacity of some workers to make their wages, and hence gave rise to complaint. It was interesting that there were few who questioned the right of the management to shift workers and work around within the units. To “get the work out” was regarded by the majority as the greatest good. All the evidence I have analysed confirms this. Yet redeployment violated the belief that management should create the conditions in which workers could make their wages, and so generated, in many cases, individual protests of the kind I have described. A further source of individual complaint arose from anomalies in the piecework prices, and here again, it seemed to me that the complaint arose from the belief that tight prices amounted to a failure of management to fulfil its side of the bargain. One could sum up most of what I have been saying if one said that in many respects the situation in the Wye workshop represents the classic picture of the contract of employment as a matter of agreement between the individual worker and the employer except, of course, that the minimum conditions of employment were laid down in a collective agreement and in legislation. But against that background, relationships within the shop had this characteristic. And in any such contract the balance of advantages lies with the employer, even in a situation of labour shortage where the sanction of withdrawal by the individual worker is a serious matter for management. In general, relationships between workers which were generated on the productive process, were not elaborated into close personal friendships to produce an informal group structure, closely related to the groupings of workers on the processes, although there were isolated examples of this. Rather, the system tended to create competition and jealousies between the workers, in many instances. This effect was, of course, emphasized by the system of wage payment. The system of wage payment called for individualism, the productive system called for cooperation, although, as I have shown, co-operation was expected to follow from the efforts of each individual to maximize earnings. That this expectation was not fulfilled was partly due to shortcomings in planning and rate-fixing, and partly due to factors beyond the
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control of the management. My own personal conviction, which was also expressed by some of the workers, was that the system was too inflexible to be adapted easily to the strains which were placed upon it. Yet, as I have shown, there was no collective attempt on the part of the workers so to control the situation that the effects, upon their earnings and output, of factors external to the workshop—market changes and the like—could be minimized, if these operated against what they considered to be their own best interests. One such mode of control would have been a collectively sanctioned norm of output or earnings. Or, perhaps, the establishment of some procedure, via a representative, for mobilizing the workshop personnel as a whole, to slacken a tight rate or to claim a special allowance upon transfer to another task. I have shown how the productive system itself effectively inhibited the emergence of a norm of output and earnings, at variance with management expectations. But, in a situation of labour shortage, and with a Trade Union as a power reservoir, there seemed little to prevent collective action for, say, transfer and relearning allowances, or for participation in the process of rate-fixing. These would not have amounted to direct controls over the level of output and earnings of individuals, but would have given the workers a greater control over the wage-effort relationship. Job prices and work allocation would have been subjects for negotiation and not for unilateral decision by management. There is no doubt that the workers held strong views about the correct and fair relationship between wage and effort, and it is therefore a little puzzling, on the face of it, that their efforts to control this relationship and to impose their (shared) views upon the management were so feeble. I discussed this aspect of the workshop situation with managers. I argued that in view of the severe fluctuations in earnings which some workers suffered due to such factors as anomalies in the job rates, and job changes due to changes in style and absenteeism, some provision should be made for bargaining on the spot for allowances.(21) These managers claimed that because many factors intervened to distort the relationship between wage and effort expended, there would be so much bargaining for allowances that output would go down and costs up. This would place the firm at a competitive disadvantage and the workers would suffer in the long run. On the whole, they argued, the existing system, in which the chargehands and supervisors were consulted when job rates were being fixed and were made responsible for the deployment of the working force, guaranteed that the workers were treated fairly, and their grievances brought to the notice of management. The fluctuations in earnings which workers experienced were the result of the inevitable process of “taking the rough with the smooth”. That the workers were reasonably satisfied with things
CONCLUSION (WYE GARMENTS CASE STUDY) 89
was shown, the argument went on, by the fact that labour turnover was not unduly high. This argument has some plausibility. Any introduction of bargaining would have meant that time spent on direct production would probably have been reduced, especially if many rates and transfers were contested. But whether management thought that to allow worker control over rates and allowances was desirable or not is beside the point I am now discussing. I wish to explain, if I can, why such controls were not spontaneously developed by the workers. I would, however, suggest that the argument that low labour turnover is a sufficient proof that the workers are satisfied with the system, is fallacious. The evidence I had adduced shows that there was, in the workshop at Wye, a good deal of voluntary absenteeism, some of which took the form of temporary escape from the system. I have also shown that strong ties of friendship with other workers which were of long duration held many workers to the firm despite pressures for them to leave. The women in the shop were “groupish” but the groups were based largely on sociable associations, or so it seemed to me. It was membership of these groupings which made the “rough” passages tolerable. And if the groups exercised control over the members to behave towards management in one way or another, it was to emphasize the norm of hard work and to underline management’s expectations. It was long membership of groups like this which strengthened the tie with the company, the tie which led some to aver that “the girls have Wye stamped on their backs”. Thus, as I interpret it, the workers had taken the course of accepting management’s definition of their role. Failure by management to create a situation in which workers could act out the role correctly did not call forth efforts to work out a new definition of role in terms of specifically workers’ interest, nor did it lead to collective action to control job prices and conditions of work, e.g. work allocation when teams were depleted. This may be referred to as the absence of a “desire to control” and it has to be explained, especially since in so many workshops which have been observed the “will to control” is present and finds expression in many ways. In my second case study I shall analyse behaviour in such a workshop. The first and most obvious factor to be considered in an explanation of the absence of the will to control is, of course, the sex of the majority of the operatives in the workshop. In contemporary British society, it is considered that the major role of women is that of housewife and mother and this would seem to be especially so in the working class.(22, 23) Men are considered to be the breadwinners and providers. Industrial employment for women is seen, therefore, as a means to provide marginal income and not as the sole source of income for the family. Young women, on leaving school, enter industrial employment not as a lifelong
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career, but as a temporary phase between school and marriage. This applies especially, of course, to working class women who leave school at the age of 15 or 16 qualified for little but semiskilled industrial work. Earnings from industrial employment enable these women to make a contribution to the family income for a while, and to buy the clothes and cosmetics which will make them more attractive to men, and to attend places of entertainment where they will meet men. Earnings also make it possible for young women to save towards a contribution to the setting up of a home, and many continue to work for a while after marriage, and before they start to bear children, to contribute towards the furnishing of a home. But they expect that the husband will be the main breadwinner. This expectation is, of course, recognized in the wage and salary structure. In most industries and professions women earn less than men, although they are often performing similar tasks. Married women with children who go out to work in industry do so for a variety of motives. I can say little here about these since they differ from individual to individual. It is fairly clear that a predominant motive will be to supplement the family income, but this may be mixed with a need for the company of other women, and a desire to escape from the loneliness and boredom of domestic routine. In only a minority of cases women are to be found working in industry as the sole economic support for themselves and dependants. It would seem therefore that, in general, women may be regarded as “birds of passage” in industry, and their apparent lack of interest in combining to control their conditions of employment might be explained in this way. I consider that although this is a necessary part of the explanation of the lack of “desire to control”, it is not, in itself, a complete explanation. I think it possible, for example, that women workers, like their male counterparts, will accept the customs and conventions of the industry in which they enter employment. If it has been the custom for groups of workers to control levels of output and earnings, or if there is already a well-developed system of workshop bargaining about job rates, work allocation and the like, it is possible that women workers will conform to this pattern. Equally, if there has already developed a tradition of individualism, women workers will tend to conform to this pattern. And in this case, if the previous argument about the role of women in industrial employment holds, they will find the adjustment easier. In the garment industry, the tradition of individualism is strong. There are many male workers in the industry, and the information I have about these—in other workshops in the Wye factory, and in other factories*—suggests that they, too, lack interest in collective controls over output and earnings. In its infancy, the waterproof garment industry was predominantly a male industry. If my information about this
CONCLUSION (WYE GARMENTS CASE STUDY) 91
period, which has been gained largely from conversations with persons who knew it, is correct, many workers entered the trade hoping to become employers themselves. As I have already indicated this was quite possible for them since little capital outlay was required. Even today, it is possible for the skilled worker with a little capital to set up a workshop of his own. There has always been, therefore, a tendency towards individual striving in the industry. And this has been further emphasized by the insecurity engendered by long-term and seasonal booms and slumps in trade, encouraging persons to accumulate as much cash as they could while trade was good to tide them over the slack periods. Thus the women who began to enter the industry in large numbers in the ‘twenties and ’thirties have adopted the tradition of individualism. “You have to look after No. 1” is the way they put it. And the general attitude of women to industrial employment has, as I see it, strengthened this tendency. I would not say, therefore, that because the role of women in our society is what it is, that in all cases women will lack the “desire to control”. It would be necessary, in each case, to examine the structure and traditions of the industry in which they are working. It may be that in an industry which has been marked by great security of employment over long periods, where low labour costs have relaxed downward pressure by management on wage rates, and where procedures for workshop bargaining and control have emerged, that women coming in to the industry will adopt the prevailing pattern. There is so little evidence on which to base such a conclusion that one must admit the possibility that in all cases women will behave as individuals, and will also fear management and conform to management expectations. But it has seemed to me reasonable to suppose that in the Wye workshop the economics of the industry and its traditions are important to the explanation of the behaviour observed. I now go on to describe and analyse behaviour in an engineering workshop employing a majority of males and a minority of females. I shall return to the discussion of the importance for workshop behaviour of influences from outside the workshop at Wye when I have presented the second study.
*My colleagues, Sheila Cunnison and Shirley Wilson, who have carried out studies in workshops employing women.
CHAPTER 7 JAY’S ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS. THE INDUSTRY AND THE FIRM
LIKE Wye Garments, Jay’s was a family firm. At the time when the study was made, control of the firm was in the hands of the son of the founder, whose own two sons held important executive positions within the organization. The firm was founded in 1882 in the London area, to manufacture equipment for the generation and transmission of electricity. The founder was a pioneer in the design and manufacture of generators, cables, and other equipment. As the demand for electrical equipment increased, the firm expanded. In 1896 headquarters and plant were moved to the Manchester area. Since that date expansion has continued steadily and the firm has increased both the number and diversity of its products. The manufacture of large generating equipment has long since been discontinued, and the expansion has taken place largely in the manufacture of domestic appliances and supply and distribution transformers. The manufacture of transformers is now mainly carried on in the Manchester factory to which the firm moved in 1896, and which has since then been greatly enlarged and brought up to date. There are other factories in the Manchester area and in Scotland, and the firm also has a factory in Canada. Expansion still goes on. There is no reason to suppose that the expansion of the firm’s activities will be slowed down within the foreseeable future, since there seems to be a well-assured market for its products. The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, whose report on the industry was published in 1957, estimated that “The consumption of electricity has grown on average by about 12 per cent a year from 125 kWh sold in 1901 to some 68,000,000 kWh sold in 1955”. The Commission estimates that the “world consumption of electricity doubles approximately every 10 years” and that “since 1948 generating capacity has been increasing at 8 per cent per year”.(24) In striking contrast to the situation in the market for the product of the Wye Garment company, the market for heavy electrical equipment is not marked by keen price competition. There is much combination amongst manufacturers to regulate
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prices. As early as 1902 a Trade Association was established with the object of eliminating excess capacity and protecting the industry from foreign competition. In 1911 this became the British Electrical and Allied Manufacturing Association. At the same time a number of Trade Groups of manufacturers were set up whose main object was price regulation. In the post-1918 period there were several re-groupings and amalgamations which resulted in the emergence of a small number of large firms. This process has continued and at the present time the industry is dominated by giants like Metropolitan Vickers, B.T.H., and English Electric. Since the Second World War, the industry has had full order books and it is not likely that demand will slacken. Jay’s is a member of the British Electrical & Allied Manufacturing Association and also a member of the Transformer Makers’ Group. Transformers remain Jay’s main interest in what might be called the heavy side of the industry. When I was at Jay’s, I worked in the Transformer factory and it is with this part of the company’s activities that I am mainly concerned here. A transformer is a device for raising or lowering voltage in an electricity supply system. Whilst it is economical to transmit electrical power over long distances at high voltages, it is not practicable to generate at such voltages in the power stations, or to supply high voltage electricity to consumers. It is therefore necessary to raise voltages at the power stations before transmission into the grid, and then to lower them from the grid voltage to a voltage suitable for the consumer. The transformers at the power station—supply transformers—are usually quite large. The largest may be much larger than a double-decker bus, and will take many months to manufacture. The transformers which are found in sub-stations, and those which are seen attached to poles in rural areas—distribution transformers—are much smaller. The largest of these are about eight feet high, the smallest about the size of a domestic electric fire. Distribution transformers take from about one hour to one hundred hours to complete, after the component parts have been delivered to the assembly point. A transformer has two main parts, the core and the windings. The core is composed of soft steel or iron sheets clamped together. The coils of insulated copper wire encircle the core and these are wired together. The whole electrical assembly, i.e. cores, coils, and ancillary components, is contained in a tank, which is usually filled with oil. The oil acts both as a cooling and as an insulating agent.
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PRICE REGULATION IN THE TRANSFORMER MARKET The Transformer Makers’ Group includes Jay’s and most of the other large manufacturers of supply and distribution transformers. There are many manufacturers of transformers who are outside the group and who are in price competition with it, but there are few firms outside the ring which manufacture the whole range of supply and distribution transformers. The group has three kinds of agreement about prices. The first of these relates to the home market. The second deals with exports, which are considerable. These two agreements cover the whole range of supply and distribution transformers. The third agreement provides for notification of orders, and applies only to very large transformers. In the price agreement there is a minimum price provision, minima being based upon a schedule which lists the factors to be taken into account in price calculation. In practice this means that there is much “level tendering” by members of the group. It is probable that the manufacturers have found it necessary to combine to regulate prices so as to offset downward pressure on prices which might result from the existence of a small number of large buyers in the market. While it is true that the Group members are faced with price competition from outside, they are the largest manufacturers and thus have the advantage of economies of scale. Since they can also afford to finance research, they are able to lead in design. They are therefore unlikely to be priced out of the market. It appears from evidence given by the Monopolies Commission that another factor militating against the non-group manufacturer is the conservatism of consumers. In comparison with the Waterproof Garment Industry, the number of firms in the Transformer industry is small and the firms themselves are larger. Some idea of the difference may be gained when it is stated that the number of persons employed in the Transformer factory at Jay’s, which is far from being the largest producer, is about a third of the total employed in the whole Waterproof Garment industry. Unlike the demand for garments, the demand for transformers is relatively stable. There are no sharp seasonal slumps in demand and for the worker it would seem that employment has been, and still is, more secure, than it is for his counterpart in the Waterproof Garment industry. The wages of workers in the Electrical Engineering Industry are determined in the first place by negotiation at National Level between the Employers and the Trade Unions representing those employed. Within the structure thus created, there are variations to take account of special factors operating at district and at plant level.
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I have considered it necessary to give this short outline of the economic structure of the industry at the beginning of this case study of the workshop which assembles small distribution transformers at Jay’s factory. I shall refer to it, where it is appropriate, in my analysis of workshop behaviour, and stress its implications in my concluding chapter, where I compare the two workshops. THE PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM AT JAY’S The problems which managers in industry face when they are planning and controlling the productive process, are largely set for them by the situation in the market for the product. To produce at an economic price, the costs incurred in production must be controlled; and if the tools and equipment used are expensive the problem of using them to capacity will arise sharply. Thus production planning involves decisions about the appropriate work load, and the economical use of equipment, materials and labour. When the customer is considering placing an order with a firm, he will be concerned about the date of delivery. Thus, in addition to his problems of work loads and cost, the production planner must consider the speed at which materials can be obtained and worked up into a finished product. This question obviously cannot be considered in isolation. It is closely related to questions of work load and cost. Then the planner must take into account future relationships with consumers, and here the maintenance of standards of quality and durability is important. Thus decisions about the timing and flow of work in the factory must be taken in the light of decisions about the standards to be maintained, and planning must include provision for the inspection and testing of the product. So far this discussion of the problems set for managers by the relation of the firm to the market is such as may be found in any textbook on management. But managers also work with conceptions of appropriate work load on the factory, which are social rather than technical. The limits to planning are set not only by the complexity of the technical problem, and by the lack of adequate instruments of measurement and control; they are also set by prevailing beliefs about what are desirable relationships between persons and groups of persons within the organization.(25) It may be that too detailed planning and control of the behaviour of persons, which can easily be justified as a rational means to the end of cheap and efficient production, will be inconsistent with these beliefs. So, like their counterparts in Wye Garments, or indeed in any firm, the activities of the managers in Jay’s were subject to the influence of the market, and from other external
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factors, and also to the influence of individuals and groups to conform to expected standards of behaviour. I have to repeat here what I said when I began to discuss the management of Wye Garments. I am not measuring the behaviour of Jay’s management against any stereotype of perfect management. But it is necessary to describe the way production was planned and controlled within the firm, since I want to place my observations of the behaviour I observed in one small section of the plant within the wider system of production planning and control. For those within the smaller section this system set the conditions in which production was carried on. THE SMALL ERECTION SECTION IN THE PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM The Small Erection Section in which I worked was one link in a long chain of assembly operations transforming the raw material into the finished product. I shall presently describe how difficulties of co ordinating the work of the various sections helped to shape the behaviour that I observed in the Small and Medium Erection Sections. The planning of the flow of work through the Transformer factory began with the receipt of an order from a consumer by the Sales Department. The order, together with an estimated delivery date, was passed from the Sales Department to the Schedule Control Department, whose tasks were to prepare a route through the factory for the various components; to fix scheduled dates at which parts should reach various subassembly and assembly points; and, having determined the route and the schedule, to keep a constant check on the progress of the work. The check upon progress was effected by reports from the floor controllers attached to each production section. These controllers, or “chasers” as they were known in the shops, were expected to work closely with store-keepers and section foremen. The reports which the controller submitted each day were translated into positions on peg-and-string charts in the Control Room. The position of the pegs on the charts which lined the walls of the control room indicated whether the various sections were keeping to schedule. From the Schedule Control Department the order was passed to the Design and Drawing offices and also to the Planning and Ratefixing Departments. Each section of the plant was served by a separate section of the Planning and Ratefixing Department. Thus, the Tank Shop, the Machine Shop, the Coil Shop, and the Insulating Shop, to name the largest, each had a section within the Planning Office. The task of these office sections was to translate the overall schedule for its works section into specific instructions to foremen, floor
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FIG. 8. Diagram of work flow
controllers, and operatives. The Planner-Ratefixers also made out forms authorizing the requisition of small components from stores, and routing these materials to the appropriate section. When preparing instructions for individual operatives on instruction cards, the Planner-Ratefixers also entered the time to be allowed to complete the tasks which were written on the cards. The Planner-Ratefixers were also responsible for seeing that the necessary drawings were made available to the operatives. Since they themselves also worked from drawings and lists of materials supplied by the drawing office, they worked closely with the draughtsmen. The outcome of the work of the Planner-Ratefixer on that part of the schedule passed to him by the Schedule Control Department, was a number of cardboard folders each containing drawings, materials lists, and instruction cards for the order. Folders were sent to the foreman of the section, and to the floor controller. The stores requisition sheets were also included in the folders and extra copies of these were sent to the storekeepers responsible, in order that necessary the small components could be moved from the various feeder stores to stores attached to the sections, where these components were made ready for collection by the operative to whom the job was subsequently allocated. According to the plan, therefore, all raw materials, semi-finished parts, and small components, were scheduled to reach each section as they were required. I have prepared a sketch plan, Fig. 8, which shows in outline the flow of components and
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materials. This plan shows how complicated the work flow was as several orders were passing through the factory at the same time. This flow plan is not intended to represent the actual flow of components. To include all components would be confusing. Neither does the diagram show the actual layout of the plant. It is a diagrammatic layout. The large rectangles on the plan represent the feeder stores for both large and small components. Included in these are such components as wire, porcelain insulators, nuts, bolts, screws, and connections of various kinds. Some of these components were made by Jay’s, some were bought from other manufacturers. The feeder stores supplied the section stores [shown as small rectangles], and these in turn supplied the various manufacturing sections. The main components of a transformer are the Tank, the Coils, the Cores, and the Insulating materials. These components were assembled in the separate sections indicated on the diagram. All these sections served the three erection sections and the three tanking sections. The tanking and erection sections had their own stores which were also kept supplied by the various feeder stores. The task of the section stores was to store together groups of small components as they were required for each order. After each job had been erected and tanked, it was painted and packed, and then despatched either to the warehouse or direct to consumer. It should now be clear that the efficiency of the plan depended on the effective co-ordination of the flow of components into the erection and tanking section via the feeder and section stores and the sections assembling main components. And, to look further back, the main component sections, viz. the Tank, Coil, Core, and Insulation sections, could keep to schedule only if they too could rely upon the flow of smaller compo nents from the stores and from outside manufacturers. Finally, of course, the work of operatives within the various manufacturing sections had to be effectively co-ordinated so as to meet scheduled deliveries to sections further ahead in the system. To ensure co-ordination requires a plan such as I have described and also controls to ensure that the plan is fulfilled. I have already touched upon the formal arrangements providing for a flow of information about the progress of work. I said that the control room charts, which were kept up to date by information from the floor controllers, indicated the progress of the various components through the sections at any time. Thus information, on which action could be taken, was available. But information, while necessary for effective control, is not in itself control. So before I go on to describe in detail the planned and actual flow of work through the small erection section, I have to describe the planned arrangements for the communication of information and the control of productive activities.
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Information flowed to the chief “line” executive via the various specialist “functional” departments. For example, the Schedule Control Department supplied him with information about the existence of hold-ups in the work flow at various points and the Personnel Department supplied information about the deployment of the labour force. This information enabled a check to be kept upon performance. The existence of a chain of command which ran down via the Section superintendents, the foreman, and the chargehand, made it possible for action to be taken to make the work flow smoothly and according to schedule. The functional departments themselves had quasi-executive responsibilities. In this factory, the foreman and the shop superintendents were not responsible for co-ordinating the work of the shop floor representatives of the functional departments. Thus the test men, the inspectors, the floor controllers, and the storekeepers, according to the formal allocation of roles, were responsible not to the shop foremen or superintendents, but to the chief tester, the chief inspector, and the chief controller respectively. But, of course, the inspectors and testers were expected to work in close liaison with the foremen and superintendents. In the “line” the section superintendents and their assistants (“shop managers” would describe them better) were responsible for the work of the foremen, chargehands and operatives in the shop. They also reported to the works manager and it was through them that the works manager was able to take action to improve coordination of the work of the sections. The shop superintendents received information from the “planning agencies”, as did the foremen, which gave them a picture of the flow of work in the plant well before their own department was involved. For example, the shop superintendent of the Erection Shop would know the scheduled dates for the delivery of tanks from the Tank Shop to his own department and also the estimated dates for completion of transformer erection. In addition he would have been told when the Tank Shop superintendent expected to be able to deliver the Tanks. Detailed “paper” planning and control ended at foreman level. The work of the sections was supervised personally by the foreman. Within the framework of his instructions from the planning agencies he allocated the work in his department as he pleased. For example, the allocation of work to operatives was entirely at his discretion. The planning department framed instructions to be followed by operatives when doing the job, but it did not specify which operatives should do the job. The foreman and the chargehand were responsible for this aspect of planning. Their incentive to efficiency in their sections was a bonus paid upon the output of the section each month. And, of course, every
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FIG. 9. Sketch of management structure
foreman was responsible to the shop superintendent for the performance of his section. This brief discussion of the main elements in the formal system of planning, communication, management, and supervision, suffices to show that, with the exception of some lines of lateral communication between superintendents and foremen, most of the information on which control was initiated originated at the shop floor level. Figure 9 shows the formal organization of management in diagrammatic form. The level of output of finished transformers was therefore determined by the success of the controls which were designed to ensure the fulfilment of the schedule, and upon the flow of information about the actual position of components in the flow of production which indicated the specific points at which detailed control must be exercised to ensure effective co-ordination. Whether the schedule was fulfilled or not depended upon how efficient was the paperwork of ordering and requisitioning, so that materials required for any operation came together at the scheduled time for beginning the operation. If this happened, then the success of the incentives for the foreman, chargehand, and the operatives to complete the operations in any one section to schedule would determine the smoothness or otherwise of the flow of work from section to section. Of course there might arise in the assembly of components difficulties which could not be foreseen at the planning and design stage, and which would hold up the work. But such hold-ups were to some extent allowed for in the plan. The time allowed for the progress of orders through the various sections by the Schedule Control Department, when it drew up the schedules, was based upon the experience of section foremen of the progress of similar orders in the past, and this time was modified periodically in the light of experience. These allowed times were thus based upon actual experience of building
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Transformers, including experience of snags. So the plan was designed to be fairly flexible at section level, In this case it is impossible to speak of a planned expected level of output based upon a logic of efficiency against which actual output could be measured. This is because the plan itself was based upon the actual past performance of the sections. In other words, the firm was prepared to accept the situation in the sections as a basis for planning, and to leave them fairly autonomous in their inner organization, unless for one reason or another the section fell below previous performance or unless higher management thought that more ought to be done. Therefore it is not possible to measure actual output in any one section against expected output. The question then arises whether there was anything in the observed behaviour of the persons in the section which could obviously be construed as a holding back of effort. I therefore turn to a description of relationships within one of the sections in order to describe and analyse the organization of work. I discuss the workers’ response to the incentives offered them to ensure that the schedule be fulfilled, and the factors which influenced the use of time in the section. The section in which I worked was the Small Transformer erection section. This section operated at a quite advanced stage in the produc-tion flow. It was therefore dependent upon the coordination of the flow of work in sections nearer to the raw materials. Thus coils, cores, insulation and small components for one order had to arrive at the same time at the section to enable the operatives to commence assembly. Before the transformer could be completed the tank had to be delivered on time. Thus the work load in the section at any time was largely beyond the direct control of the foreman of the section. It was almost completely outside the control of the operatives. This is obvious from the description of the production flow which I have already given, for knowledge about the total flow was available only in the control room. This information was available to foremen and floor controllers; by communicating with other foremen and floor controllers they could influence the sequence of work in another section to some extent, though not very much in the case of large assemblies which were already in the course of erection. Even the operatives could have small components speeded up by making personal contact with other sections. But, by and large, the flow of work was beyond the control of the foreman, of the operatives, and, to a lesser extent, of the floor controller. As in Wye Garments, the productive system at Jay’s was based upon the “transfer of intelligence”. The planning of production, the arrangements for the supply of materials to the shops, and so on, were the responsibility of the specialist departments of management, and not of the operatives and lower levels of supervisory staff. But there are certain significant differences
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between the two systems. In Wye Garments management planning operated at two levels. The first set of plans was concerned with the delivery of materials to the workrooms assembling garments. The second set of plans covered the arrangements for production within the workshops themselves. In each case a high degree of planning was involved, so that in the workrooms the flow of work from individual to individual was the subject of management planning. As I have shown, in this plant the role of the chargehand became one of corrector of faults in the plan. In Wye, the units in the plan were individual workers. In Jay’s the units in management planning were departments or sections of departments. Within the departments and sections the initiative lay with the foreman to plan the work in the light of the overall production schedule and the flow of materials into his department. The relationships between people in the productive process were not, as they were in Wye, specified in the production plan, so there was a good deal more room for adjustment in these relationships at shop floor level. In subsequent sections I shall argue that this situation encouraged the congruence of productive and friendship groupings, and that this in its turn contributed to the greater degree of control which the workers at Jay’s exercised over output and earnings. But I would emphasize that this was by no means the only factor. The interdependence of this and other factors will emerge in the course of the analysis of relationships in the shop. ALLOCATION AND SEQUENCE OF WORK IN SMALL TRANSFORMER DEPARTMENT The work of assembly was carried out in the workshop by erectors and tankers. The tasks of the erectors were to take the coils and the cores which were delivered to the shop from other departments; to draw from the feeder stores the wire, terminals, insulating material, etc.; and with these materials to complete the erection of the electrical components of the transformer. The smallest of the distribution transformers were usually erected on roller conveyors, a pair of which ran the whole length of the section. This eased the work of moving the electrical assemblies along the shop and into the test enclosure and the stoves. There was no mass production sequence: each electrical assembly was completed by an erector, or by two—occasionally three—erector “working mates”. When an assembly had been completed, it was visually examined by an inspector attached to the section. The assembly was then rolled along into the test enclosure for a preliminary electrical test. It was then rolled further, into a stove, where it remained for up to 24 hours to be completely dehydrated. It was then ready for the operation of tanking. The larger
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assemblies were erected on the floor of the shop and then lifted into the test enclosure and the stoves by an overhead crane. An area of floor space was set aside at one end of the shop for tanking. Here tanks were delivered from the tank shop by truck. The task of the tankers who worked in this part of the section was to take the completed assemblies from the stoves, place them and secure them in the tank, wire-up and attach terminals, and in general complete the job ready for removal to the paint shop. In the tanking area the oil was pumped into the tanks from a storage tank. This work was done by a labourer. Some of the tankers’ work on larger jobs required the use of the overhead cranes, but sometimes the assemblies could be lifted by hand into the tanks. After tanking, the job was again visually and electrically tested before removal to the paint shop. Figure 10 shows the layout of the shop and the flow of components. Work was allocated to the erectors and tankers by the foreman. The sequence was determined, as I have shown, by the Schedule Control Department, and the foreman was responsible for seeing that the planned sequence was followed, and for informing the planning departments when completed transformers left his department. But subject to the overall requirements of the schedule the foreman had complete discretion in work allocation. He could bring a job forward out of turn, if he wished to keep workers busy and if parts for that job became available ahead of schedule. He was also able to decide for himself which workers were particularly capable of performing certain types of job, and to allocate these jobs to them. An operative who had no work would ask the foreman for a job and would be told to make a start on this or that job, or the foreman would warn a worker in advance of the job he was to start next. Thus every time a job was allocated the foreman, or the chargehand deputizing for him, came into personal contact with the worker. And since small transformers usually took only between one and twenty hours to erect, there was much interaction between the foreman, the chargehand and the workers in the shop. In addition, the foreman and the chargehand frequently were approached for help to sort out difficulties, such as, for example, to authorize the despatch of an ill-fitting component back to the manufacturing department, or to make out a chit for issue of special tools, In comparison with the workroom at Wye, at Jay’s the role of the chargehand and foreman involved a positive control of the activities of the persons in the shop, within the broad framework laid down in the schedule. When a worker, or a pair or trio of mates, received orders to make a start on a job, there were certain formalities to be carried out. Thefolder for the job had to be collected from the foreman’s desk. This folder contained a check list of the material which had been requisitioned for the job by the Planning Department and
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FIG. 10. Flow of work and typical positions of workers
which, if everything had gone according to plan, would be already assembled in a bin in the feeder stores. The folder also contained a list of any unusual features specified by the customer, about method of erection, type of wiring, delivery date, and so on. There would also be in the folder a wiring diagram and a drawing showing the general arrangement of the complete job. This folder was made up in the Planning Department, which sent copies of the various lists and instructions to the floor controller and the various stores so that material could be made ready for issue as required. The worker was also required to collect from the desk his job instruction card. This was an important document, for in addition
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to giving detailed instructions about the method to be employed in performing the task, it specified the time allowed for completing the job. The allowed time was the basis of the incentive scheme, for bonus was calculated on the time saved on allowed times. I shall discuss the details of the incentive scheme later. For the moment I am concerned with the production sequence, in which the job instruction sheet was an important item. It was closely examined before a worker proceeded with the actual task of assembly. On some jobs the workers found it unnecessary to draw the folder and job instruction sheet, so familiar were they with these. This, of course, applied to the standard designs of transformer. But unusual work of special design often came into the section, and for these the instructions were carefully followed and the allowed times carefully examined. Whatever the type of job, the first stage in assembly was the collection of components. Coils and cores were stored on the floor in the section, and these were brought by hand truck or crane to the assembly point. The rest of the materials had to be collected from the feeder stores. This was usually done by a labourer while the erectors and tankers were preparing the larger components for assembly. But sometimes, perhaps when there was no crane available to lift coils or cores in position, the erector or tanker would fill in time by collecting his own materials from the stores. I do not intend to describe in detail the task of transformer assembly and tanking, but I must mention that it was carried out entirely with hand tools, such as soldering irons, wire clippers, and spanners. Each worker was equipped with a set of these tools, and provided the components for assembly were ready, he could go straight ahead and complete his work. For the most part, the workers worked in pairs. Some workers preferred to work alone, and sometimes three of them worked together. The choice depended, for the most part, on what particular workers preferred, although the foreman sometimes exercised his prerogative to split up pairs. One of the advantages of working in a pair was that a number of jobs could be taken on concurrently. In this way time spent waiting for components or for the crane could be reduced to a minimum. But the workers told me that on a single job it was not possible for two men to do the job twice as fast as one, so that each suffered losses of time which reduced earnings. Yet work was usually done in pairs, and workers seemed to prefer this arrangement despite its reputed disadvantages. It will already be obvious that at Jay’s the work of an erector or tanker brought him into constant personal contact with many people, and he was not confined so closely by the requirements of the produc-tive process as were his counterparts in Wye. In the process of collecting together the materials for his job, he moved around the shop and dealt with several people—probably the
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foreman and the chargehand, the time clerk at the desk, the labourer, the crane slinger, and his own mate. And when wheeling his truck, say from the coil storage space to the conveyor, he would probably take the opportunity for a word or two with other workers. The work of assembly was not broken down into a large number of component operations each performed by different persons in accordance with a pre-conceived plan. Hence, during the course of assembly the worker was not required to co-operate with anyone else except his mate, and the division of labour between them was entirely their own affair. The system did not call therefore for a high degree of continuous co-operation between all the persons in the section. Co-operation rested in the relationship between each worker or pair on the one hand and the foreman on the other. If the worker’s job was made difficult by failure to deliver components or the delivery of faulty components, his relationships with the foreman were not much affected since the responsibility for the supply and quality of these components was not the foreman’s. For the most part then the productive arrangements did not call for the high degree of co-operation they required at Wye, and there was in consequence less strain in the relationships between the workers, since the plan did not place any one worker or pair of workers in a relationship of dependence upon another worker for output and earnings. The tankers as a group were a minor exception to this, since they relied upon the erectors to keep them supplied with assemblies. But in fact if they were held up it was usually for tanks and not assemblies. The source of their difficulties was some half-a-mile away, not in the section. Much more than in Wye, the productive system allowed the worker a wide range of social contacts on the job. Even if all the components arrived in sequence for the job and there were no snags during erection or tanking, the operatives’ range of contacts was fairly wide. But if there were errors in design, or in workmanship, or in planning, which caused delays, then the range of social interaction widened. And delays such as these were fairly frequent. I saw examples of bad design which caused difficulties for workers in assembly. Other workers were asked for help, the foreman or the chargehand was called upon. Sometimes the inspector would be asked for an opinion, and often the draughtsman responsible would be asked to come down to the shop. Then there would be a “huddle” around the job until some way had been found to get out of the difficulty. In cases of special difficulty the shop manager or his deputy would intervene. If the difficulty was due to faulty assembly of a component in another department, a labourer would usually be sent by the foreman with the component, and an explanatory note, to the other foreman. Thus the labourers had a wide range of contacts in
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other departments and conveyed news and views to and fro, forming a link between department and department. Sometimes workers from other departments would arrive to make amendments in situ. I consider that the productive system, and the difficulties associated with attempts to make it work efficiently—difficulties which seem to me to be inevitable under batch production— created the conditions for fairly intense social interaction, both on and off the job. Time spent waiting for delivery of components, or for the crane, could, for example, be spent in talk on all sorts of subjects of common interest, and again, some waiting time was almost bound to occur when batch production was, as in this case, planned on flow principles. To sum up, the unit of planning in Jay’s factory was the section and not the individual worker. Within the section the allocation of work was the responsibility of the foreman. Since the work was arranged so that a complete and fairly lengthy task was performed by one or two workers, there were few difficulties in the way of cooperation between workers. The requirements of the process of assembling transformers, together with the inevitable breaks in work flow, stimulated a good deal of social interaction. And there was also a good deal of personal freedom for the workers to choose with whom they would work or whether they would work alone. In addition to this, the work was quite varied and did not call for the repetitive production of small parts. All this was conducive to the spontaneous development of friendly groupings on and off the job, and to the spread and exchange of knowledge amongst the whole group of workers in the section. This contributed to the solidarity of the group in its relationships with management, but at the same time permitted the development of smaller groups with different interests within the larger group. For myself, I was struck by the difference of atmosphere between Jay’s workshop and the workshop at Wye. The pace of work at Jay’s seemed to be much more leisurely. This was partly because the materials being worked with were much more heavy and cumbersome, and partly because the operations extended over a longer time span. It was also partly due to the fact that much care had to be taken during assembly. A semi-mechanical set of movements could not be learned and repeated until it became habit, as was the case on many of the operations at Wye. Each assembly set the operative different problems, and care and attention were required for their solution.
CHAPTER 8 PEOPLE AND PRODUCTION IN THE SMALL TRANSFORMER SECTION
IN my analysis of the workshop at Wye Garments I described in some detail the social background and circumstances of those workers whom I had observed. I also described, in an impressionistic way, the personal characteristics of these workers. I thought it necessary to do this so that I could myself adequately explain those aspects of personal behaviour which seemed to spring from personal idiosyncrasy or social background, and so that the reader who wished to look more closely at the relationship between personal characteristics and behaviour in the workshop than I felt necessary for my argument, might do so. I also thought that it would add interest to the text if my worker colleagues appeared as real persons, and not merely as occupants of workshop roles. For all these reasons, I shall give the same detailed description of the workers in the transformer shop at Jay’s. The small erection section was not walled off from the rest of the transformer department. Many of the workers in the section had good friends across the passageway on the medium section. Often erectors from the “medium side” worked in the space between the conveyors in the “small section”. The two sections were served by one Shop Steward of the Electrical Trades Union, George Brewer. Each section had its own foreman, Jack Cornwall on the small side, and Ken Thompson on the medium side. And each of these was assisted by a chargehand, Peter Brown and Tom Irvine respectively. Towards the end of my stay in the section Jack Cornwall was transferred to another factory owned by the company, and pending the appointment of a new foreman, Ken Thompson took over both sections. When Cornwall left, a number of “medium” men were permanently transferred to the small section. These men had much experience of small transformers, had often worked alongside the men in the small section, and were well known to them. I have included this group in my analysis, for reasons which will appear.
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Figure 10 shows the layout of the shop and a fairly typical spatial disposition of the workers during productive operations. Several groupings may be distinguished. Bill, Lionel, and Fatty, Nos. 6, 7 and 8 on the diagram, worked as a team. They were not required to do so by management but they preferred this arrangement, which had persisted for a long period and which did not change during my stay in the shop. Bill and Lionel had come into the shop when the small erection section was moved from another of the company’s plants to its present site. Fatty was a newcomer who had been seconded to Bill and Lionel for training, and who had remained with them. These three men were usually entrusted with the assembly of prototypes, and with the preparation of exhibition work, although they also worked on production jobs. Many of the men in the section, particularly the younger ones, considered that Bill, Lionel and Fatty were given special favours in work allocation, and they said this was because they were regarded by the foreman as his personal friends. This group was given special nicknames by the other workers. Sometimes they were referred to as the “Benton Blue Eyes”, sometimes as the “scientific boys” (their work brought them into contact with designers and research engineers). Bill, who was regarded as the leader of the group, was sometimes referred to as “the professor”. Bill was 37 years old, a married man with two children, who had worked at Jay’s for 6 years. Most of his previous industrial experience had been in semi-skilled engineering work, but he also had experience of routine clerical work. All his working life had been spent in factories within easy travelling distance from his home in a suburb of Manchester. Bill was educated at a public elementary school and left at the age of fourteen. I found him to be a very capable person, and also an ambitious one. His colleague Lionel was 35 years of age and had also worked for Jay’s for 6 years. His industrial experience was similar to that of Bill. Unlike Bill, he had a spare time occupation. In evenings and at weekends he assisted the projectionist at the local cinema. Lionel was not considered by the workers in the shop to be as skilful as Bill, nor as intelligent. Like Bill, he had lived his whole life in the locality. Fatty, the third member of the trio, was born locally but had worked for many years in the Midlands. He returned to his home town on his demobilization after the war, and after having several shortlived jobs in factories in the area, had taken up employment at Jay’s. Fatty, like his two mates, was a married man with dependent children. He was a pleasant fellow, a conscientious worker, and well liked. I next consider th