On the Problem of Empathy

The CollectedWorks of EDITH STEIN Sister Teresa Benedicta of the Cross DiscalcedCarmelite Volume Three

ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Third Revised Edition

Translated by Waltraut Stein,Ph.D.

ICS Publications Washington, D.C. I 989

O W a s h i n g t o n P r o v i n c e o f D i s c a l c e dC a r m c l i t e s , l n c . 1 9 8 9

ICS Publicatiorrs 2 l 3 l L i n c o l n R o a d ,N . E . WashingtonD , .C.20002 'lypeset

CONTENTS Forsu,ord to the Third Edition

a n d P r o d u c e c li n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e so f A m c r i t a

Prefaceto the Third Edition Prefaceto the First and SecondEditions

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xii xul

Translator'sIntroduction l,{oteson the Translation . . . Couerphoto: Edith Stein at home in Breslau, 1921. Courtesl of CologneCarmel.

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ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Forruord Chapter11.The Essence of Acts of Empathy l. l'he Method of the Investigarion 2. Description of Empathy in Comparison with Other Acts .

Library

of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Data

S t e i n .E d i t h . l 8 9 l - 1 9 4 2 . On the Problem of Empathv. (The collected s'orks of Edith Stein : v. 3) 'l'ranslation of: Zum Problem der Einliihlung. Includes index. l Enrpathl'. 2. Phenomenologicalpsvchokrgl'. -Iitle. I I . S e r i e s :S t e i n .E d i t h , l 8 9 l - 1 9 4 2 . W o r k s . E n g l i s h .1 9 8 6 r v . 3 . I, 8 3 3 3 2 . 5 6 7 2 8 5 . { l g 8 6 r o l . 3 1 9 3s [ 1 2 8 ' . 3 ] 8 9 - 1 9 4 9 l s B N 0 - 9 3 5 2 1 6 - ll - l

(a) Outer Perceptionand Empathy (b) Primordiali\ and l,lon-primordialitl . . (c) Memory, Expectation, Fantasy, and Empathy . . . . 3. Discussionin Terms of Other I)escriptior.rsof Empathy-Especially f'hat of Lipps-and Continuation of the Anall'sis (a) Points of Agreement (b) The Tendenclto Full Experiencing (c) Empathl and Fellow Feeling (d) l,tregatiueEnpathy (e) Empathy and a Feelingof Oneness (f1 Reiterationof Empathy-Refexiue Sypathy . . . . .

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Contents

-I'he 4. Controversy Between the View of Idea and 'I'hat of Actuality

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5. Discussionin Terms of Genetic Theories of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness. . . . . . (a) On theRelationshipof Phenornenology to Psycholog (b) The Theory of Imitation (c) The Theory of Association (d) The Theory of Inference by Analogl

2l 2l 22 24 26

6. Discussionin Terms of Scheler'sTheory of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness . ' ' 7. Mtinsterberg's Theory of the Experience of Foreign Consciousrress

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ChapterIII. The Constitution of the Psycho-Physical Individual I

The Pure "1" . .

2 . The Stream of Consciousness .). The Soul 4 . "1" and Living Bodr, . (a) The Giuennessof the Living Body . (b) The Liaing Body and Feelings Causality . . (c) Soul and Liuing Body,Psycho-Physical (d) The Phenomenonof Expression (e) Will and Liaing Body . . 5. Transition to the Foreign Individual (a) The Fields of Sensationof the Foreign Liaing Bodl (b) The Conditionsof the Possibilityof SensualEmpathv (c) The Consequence of SensualEmpathyand itsAbsence in the Literature on Empat@ [Jnder Discussion. . . (d) The Foreign Liuing Bodl as the Center of Orientation of the Spatial \\'orld @ fhe Foreign World Image as the Modifcation of Our Oun World Image . (f) Empathy as the Condition of the PossibilityoJ Constituting Our Own Indiaidual (g) The Constitutionof the Real Outer W'orld in I ntersubjectiae Experience

(h) The Foreign Lizting Body as the Bearer of Voluntarl Mouement (i) The Phenomenaof Lxfe (h) Causality in the Structure of the Ind.iaidual (l) The Foreign Living Bodl ai the Bearer of P henomenaof Expre ssion (m) The Correction of Empathic Acts (n) The Constitution of the psychicIndiaidual and Its Signifcance for the Correction of Empathy . .. (o) Deceptionsof Empathy (p) The Signifcance of the Foreign Indiuidual's Constitutionfor the Constitutionof Our Own PsychicIndiaidual

38 38 39 40 4l 48 49 5l

54 56 DI

58 60 6l 62

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66 68 ll

ID

84 86 86

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Chapter114Empathy as the Understanding of Spiritual persons -Ihe l. Concept of the Spirit and of the Cultural Sciences[Geisteswissenschaften] 9l 2. The Spiritual Subject 96 3. The Constitution of the person in Emotional Experiences 9g 4. The Givennessof the Foreign person l0g 5. Soul and Person l0g -Ihe 6. Exisrenceof the Spirit . ll2 7. Discussionin Terms of Dilthey I 13 (a) The Being and Value of the person I 13 (b) Personal Typesand the Conditions of the Possibilityof Empathy With persons. . . . . tt4 8. T'he Significanceof Empathy for the Constitution of Our Owr.rperson I 16 9. The Question of the Spirit Being Based on thePhysicalBody. ......

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PersonalBiography

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l{otes Index

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ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Foreu)ord to the Third Edition ranslatiorris alwaysa difficult task. It calls for a high order of intellectual virtue, demanding expertise in languages and in the art of interpretation. Dr. Waltraut Stein gives evidence in this n'ork of these competenciesand especiallyof the ability to penetrate and transmit empathically the text of her great-aunt's rvork OrztheProblemof Empathy(Zum Problemder Einfuhlurzg).This statementis no mere play on words but is meant rather to express the translator's human understanding and rapport u'ith Edith Stein'sthought. This is the first reason why I was huppy to learn that a third edition of the translation lvas projected and u'hv I readily agreed to write a brief preface. In my research and writing on E. Stein'sphilosophy, I have used the secondedition extensivelv and regretted that the book r.r'asnot available to many others becauseit rvasout of print. Another reason u'hy I welcome the new edition is the important place that this work occupiesin E. Stein's philosophy and in the development of phenomenology. Anyone who r,r,'ishes to penett'ateher thought should begin with this early $'ork. It skerches tl.tebroad outlines of her philosophy of the human person, details rit rvhich she frlls in in subsequent investigations. For her, the a\\'arenessthat empathy is and of what it is are linked essentially IX

Foreuord to the Third Edition

l,,,n.n. undersrandi ,r,rlno.u.!r,:t;:;..,"",anda wayor understanding person is through descriptive analysesof empathy. By means of the latter, she gives what may be called a first draft of the psycho-physical-spiritualnature of person, one which is not superficialbut n'hich raisesmany quesrionsto be addressedin her future n'orks. It was E. Stein's conviction that phenomenology was the most appropriate approach to the investigation of the structure of the human person, and she gave it her best efforts t h r o u g h o u t h e r s c h o l a r l yc a r e e r . This work, which was her Ph.D. dissertation, reveals both in method and content the breadth, depth, and precision of her philosophizing even at the beginning of her career. It revealsalso something of the enthusiasm and excitement which she, one of Edmund Husserl's most brilliant pupils, experienced in the la_ borious researchand writing that was required. Even at this time, in preparing a dissertation which had to win the ,.Master's', ap_ proval, Edith displaysan originality and independenceof thought that anticipated later existential developments in pheno-meqo.logy.Not only does she differ from Husserl-albeit diplomatically-in some respects,birt she also takes issuewith some theo_ ries of Scheler, T. Lipps, Miinsterberg, and others of her contemporaries, in the processof formulating her own theory. I n a d d i t i o n r o t h e r r a n s l a t i o no f t h e r e x t a n d t h e v a l u a b l ef o o t notes, the translator has supplied an introduction which gives r e a d e r sa n e x c e l l e n l e n t r 6 e i n t o r h e t h o u g h t r t o r l d o f t h e p h e _ n o m e n o l o g i s t so f t h e t i m e . W i t h i n r h e s p a i e o f a f e u . p a g e s .s h e gives a helpful introduction into the Husserlian viewpoini which i n f l u e n c e dE . S r e i n a n d i n t t . rt h e o r g a n i z a t i o na n d s i g n i f i c a n c eo f t h e v a r i o u s s e c t i o n so f t h e t e x t . I n t h e f i n a l s e c t i o no f h e r i n t r o duction, she raisesa question regarding whether E. Stein holds an unjustifiable assumprionconcerning the type of rationality which values and feelings have. This is an example of an issue which seems to me to be elucidated later in the Beitriige zur philosophischenBegrilndung der Psychologieund d,er Geisduissenschaften fContributions to the Philosophical Grounding of pslchotogy and the cultural scienceslpublished in 1922. It is a questi"" tt-rii may be legitimately raised on rhe basisof this first work. Finally, it should be noted rhat rhe book has the porential to be

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useful to scholarsin psychology.E. Stein's own srudiesin psychology befbre concentrating on phenomenology appear to have been of'great value to her in this and later works, in which the analysesof'human experiences are a springboard to an underof'the nature of the human person. statrdir.rg Mary Catharine Baseheart,S.C.N. M.A., Ph.D. Spalding University Louisville, Kentucky S e p t e m b e r ,1 9 8 8

Prtfoce to the Third Edition hen the Institute of Carmelite Studies asked me to pre/ Y Y pare a new edition of my translation of Edith Stein's doctoral dissertation for their series of her collected works in English, I was delighted to do so, becausea wider audience will now have the opportunity to examine a young scholar'srigorous and technical work in the light of her later reputation as a powerful and revered spiritual giant. At this time, about thirty years afrer presenting this translation as my thesisfor the degree of Masrer of Philosophy,I find myself again drawn to my great-aunt'swork, this time as a guide to living the Christian life fully and deepll'. I am srruck by the fact that she returned to scholarly work in a new way after her conversion to Christianity and continued in this work for the remainder of her lif'e.This teachesme thar God expectsme to use all of my gifts in His service and challengesme to find a way ro do so rather than withdrawing from the exigenciesof this earthli life. I rvant to thank Sr. Mary Catharine Baseheartfor her encouragement and her thoughtful foreword and Reverend John Sullivan for his generous help in preparing this neu,edition. \

Waltraut Stein,Ph.D. Atlanta, Georgia October, 1988

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Prtfoce to the Firs t and SecondEditiofls he translation of Zurn Problem d,er Einfi,-hlung presented here is a translation of the doctoral diss.z:rtation of'Edith Stein, done under Edmund Husserl. -I'he degre 4 \\'as awarded tn l9l6 at the University of Freiburg in Breisgiu, and the disserta-I-he title of the tion in this form n'aspublished in ig t 7 at U'alte. t treatise originalll' rvasDas Einfi)htungsproblemin seiner historischen Entuichlung und in phiinomenologisiei Betrachtu.ag [The Empathy Problemas It Dneloped Historicail and.ConsideyTd Phlttomenologicallyl.'I'he first historical chapter u'asomitred i1 . publication and seemsno longer to be extant. This work is a description of the narure of errr pathy within the f r a n t e r + ' o r ko f H u s s e r l ' sp h e n o m e n o l o g l a s p r e . e n t e d n r a i r t l yi n Volume I of ldeas' As Husserl's assistanl,Edith Frad the opportunity to become intimately acquainted with his 1 rinking. In fact, she edited Volume ll of ldeas (cf. Husserliar La IY, Martinus N1ihotr, 1952) which deals to a large exrenr u,it]-, the same problems as her own work on empathy. -lhough she c aims not to have seen Volume II before completing herlwn wr:rk (see Au.thor's Foreword),she had evidently been iollowing Hu...serl very closely as he was at that time r.r,orkingout his ideas.-Thu: her dissertation clearly shorvshow she has develol>eclher inter'i)retation rlf the " - \ . p r p e rl r r r k r t . p r i r r l , r f t h r I l : r l l c r , < l i ro l r u . : r ,r r u b l i . h r t l \ r ' r l : r g , r l N l i i n t h e ni r r l 9 X 0 i l r l i r h _ S r c i r r _ K a r n rI ri .i h l irrgt I' roblemder Linfihlung).

1'1 ( icrharrl.KrffLr r ' I - ?l l l h \ t r t r t ' Z u m

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later presented in problem of empathy in terms of u'hat Husserl ihis '^'ih.*ork left unpublished bv him' presented n::t ^I: ,lg.tifi.ar,.. of the work by E' Stein in relation to Maurice becomes evident when considered de la perceptiozi'rSince influen tial Ph'enom'enologie U".f.^"-p"nty's unpublished manuscript of Merlear'r-Pontvhad accessto the same important and irltere.stVolume Il of ideas,a number of his most t o t h o s eo t L ' s t e l r l ' i n g f o r m u l a t i o n st a k e o n a s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y 'Ihis lived or living body is particularly true of the coricept of the (Le '" CorPs a1cu or Leib)' completiono{ E' Stein'swork on empathy' t;; i."rs after the (1931)' hts Caitesian Med'i'tationsin French H;;;'p..r.,',t.d In 1960)' Nijhoff' (Martinus which is now also availablein English different a somewhat this work, however, Husserl is eirphasizing possibili'tvof the problem of t*pati'y t the !h" lltt ;;p:;t;i of this other' Thus rather than the phenomenolo[ical description with his earlier concepCartesian Meditattons is more in contrast meansthat E' Stein'su'ork on tiotrs tharl similar to them' This also Meditations' However' both empathy is in contrast with Cartesian works to the necessityfor n. 3t.irl'u.ta Husserl adhere in all these Therefore' a ohenomenological reduction to Pure consciousness' in the strict rvorks oi phenomenology ;; ioiria.,ta ;ti.;.;; Husserlian sense. -fhe "The Essenceof Acts of last third of E. Stein's chapter on Scheler'sconceptron oI of Empathy" consistsof a careful critique (1913)' Sympathiegefuhle of presented in his first edition .*i".ni referred he that pertinent so Scheler considered Steirr'sar-ralysis this work (1923)'2 to it three times in the second edition of fits. into the EinJi)hlun-g der This, then, is how Zum Problem other hand' the On history of the phenomenological movement' has made E' Stein that fact the reader must not out'loik that some original contributions to the phenomenological.description contributions' as the o{' the nature of empathy' Some tf th"tt in the following considered tle translator understands them, will introduction to the work' Dr' At this time I want to acknowledge my indebtlqlttt- 1o. UntverOhto at thesis of my master'-s James Shericlan' director was made' It is he sitt', in connection with rvhich ihis translution

Pr{ace to the First and SecondEditions

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,vho first led me ro an understanding of the phenomenological and the contents of E. Stein's rvork. Also Alfred Schuetz, ,rosirion 'H".b.tt Spiegelberg,William Earle' as well as my fellow graduate most helpful by ,tud.r.,tt ai Northwestern University, have been However,.,I encouragement' corrections, and their suggestiot.ts, may still errors that any for mvself u.tu-" full responsibility r " i r r a i ni n t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n . Waltraut Stein, Ph.D. l 964

Translator's I ntroduction

Translator' s I ntro duction he radical viewpoint of phenomenology is presented by .I'his viewpoint seemsquite Edmund Husserl inhis ldeas.:' simple at first, but becomes exceedingly complex and involves intricate distinctions when attempts are made to apply it to actual problems. Therefbre, it may be well to attempt a short statement of this position in order to note the general problems with which it is dealing as well as the method of solution which it proposes.I shall emphasize the elements of phenomenology which seem most relevant to E. Stein's work. Husserl deals with two traditional philosophical questions,and in answerin€ithem, develops the method of phenomenological -fhese reduction which he maintains is the basis of all science. questionsare, "What is it that can be known without doubt?" and "How is this knowledge possiblein the most general sense?" as the area to In the tradition of idealism he takesconsciousness be investigated. He posits nothing about the natural world. He puts it in "brackets," as a portion of an algebraic formula is put in brackets,and makes no use of the material within these brackets. 'I'his does not mean that the "real" world does not exist, he says emphatically; it only means that this existenceis a presupposition which must be suspendedto achieve pure description. It should be noted that the existenceof most essencesas well as that of things or facts is suspended in this bracketing. Clear knowledge of'the existenceof the idea of a thing transcendent to consciousnessisjust as impossibleas clear knowledge of the existence of natural objects, Husserl maintains.'' But what can pclssiblyremain when things and essenceshave been suspended?Husserl saysthat a realm of'transcendentalconxvl

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remains, a consciousness which is in contrast with indisciousness in the natural consciousness world. This transcendentalor vidual includes a subject, an consciousness act, and an object. Huspure that consciousness is emphasizes always active and always ierl d i r e c r e d t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g .T h i s a c t i v e d i r e c t e d n e s sh e c a l l s j n tentionality.The subject of consciousnessis what wills, perceives, 'fhe act is the willing, remembers, knows, evaluates,fantasizes. p e r c e i v i n g .e t c . T h e o b j e c t , c a l l e d " i n t e n r i o n a l o b j e c t " o r ' . p h i n ( ) m e n o n , i s w h a t i s w i l l e d , p e r c e i v e d .l n o r d e r t o t a l k i n t h i s r n a y ,i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r yt o s t a t e t h a t t h e p h e n o m e n o ne x i s t sa n y _ where but in consciousness.Furthermore, Husserl intends the designation"transcendental" to indicate that this consciousness is fundamental to any natural scientific effort because it prescribes what knowledge of the narural world must include. It is intersub_ jective in the same sensethat natural scienceis. In other words, the phenomenologist's description of consciousnessis verifiable by other people who are employing his method. Husserl clearly is referring to Descartes'"Cogito, ergo sum,' in stating that pure consciousness is what is known indubitably. -I.he area of'certain knowledge is that of consciousness. It now becomesimportant not to confuse Husserl's,,phenomenon" with the usual designation of phenomena as appearancesor rellections from objects. Husserl has no such intentions. pure consciousness is concerned with a realm of objects which are the sameobjects existing in the natural world. It only hasa different "standpoint" in regard ro them. Answering the question of frow knon,ledge is possiblein the most general sense,Husserl maintains that a reduction to phe_ nomena in an orderly manner is necessary.phenomenologists must intuit the field of investigation so that the exact nature of the radical change from the nitural standpoint and of the limits of'the descriptive undertaking may become perf'ectly clear. Husserl callsthis a methodological necessityand ihus thereduction is called the phenomenological reduction. When this reduction has Decn made, the phenomenologist is in a position to intuit the esse_lce or eidos of phenomena. Husserl calls this specialkind of act Wesenschauung (intuition of essence). E. Stein in the dissertation here presented takes the phenom_

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enological standpoint. She claims that the description o{'emPathy of the existenceof emafier the suspensior.r withiri cor-rsciousness with the problem pathy must be the basis{or any other dealings 'I'he description she ty psy.hologists, sociologists,or biologists' as phenomenou n-rakesis a description of the pure transcel)dental It is above' described it is observed from the special standpoint esserlce filr the imp-physicai 'fhe indiof psvcho-physical the descriptions the sp.iritualperson. to show in order necessary are vidual and of'the spiritual Pers()n of the doctrine of empathy' the f ull implicatiorrsand applicatior-rs 'fhis follows. as takes place development ln Chapter II E. Stein explairls what it mealls to say that.er,r,lpathy is the givenness offoreign subjects and their erperietrqes' She does this in terms of'the pure "I," the sub-iectof'experience living in experierrce.Her c
amortg description makes it possibleclearly to distingtrisl.r empathy, syntpathy,and a I'eelingo1'oneness' C h a p t e r I l l d e s c r i b e sh o w t h e p s v c h < > p h y s i c ai nl d i v i d u a l i s

Translator's Introduction

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constituted within consciousnessas sensed, living body and as 'fhis constitutior) is unified by orrtu'ardlyperceived physicalbody. 'fhe soul, an experience which is the rhe phenomenon of fusion. basicbearer of'all experiences,is founded on the body, and soul and body together form the psycho-physicalindividual. Irr developing this conception of the psycho-physicalindividual, the author notes that sensationsare among the real constitu-I'hese are absoents of consciousnessand cannot be bracketed.s lLrtelygiven just asjudging, willing, and perceiving. But there is a difl-erencebetween sensationsand these other acts.Sensationsdo llot issue from the pure "l" and never take on the form of the cogitotn which the "1" turns toward an object,{}i.e.,they are never -fhey are spatially localizedsomewhere at a au'areof themselves. from the "I" and these locationsare alwayssomeplacein clistarrce the living body. On the contrary, the pure "I" cannot be localized. Nevertheless,my living body surrounds a "zero point of orientation" to u'hich I relate my body and everything outside of it. Whatever ref'ersto the "I" is given as at no distance from the zero point and everything given at a distancefrom the zero point is also given at a distance fiom the "L" Arr external thing can contact not me, btrt my physical body. Then its distance from my physical body 'fhus but not from me becomeszero. the living body as a whole is at the zer() point while all physical bodies are outside of it. 'l'his indicates that bodily' space(of which the zero point is the "1") and ()uter space (of which the zero point is the living body) are very different. For instance, it cannot be said that the stone t h a t I h o l d i n m y h a n d i s t h e s a m e d i s t a n c eo r o n l y a t i n y b i t tarthcr fl'r>mthe zero poinr of orientation (i.e., from me) than the hand itself. In this case, the living body itself is rhe cenrer of orientation and the stone is at a distance from it. T'his means that the distance of the parts of my living body from me is completely trtcomparablewith the distance of'foreign physical bodies from me.lo

Let us consider for a moment the lrroblem that this notion of a zero point of'
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living body.rr Why?'fhe reason seemsto be that she recognizes "I" is related that ihe has the pr,blem of showing how the pure ;'I" i.t a living body' This, it seemsto me' is very to the empirical close to the problem which Descartes also faced in trying to explain how an extended substance(matter) can be related to a non-extended substance (mind). Thus it aPpears that even though phenomenologistsvery p
Translator's Introduction

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is at no particular place.r2For purposes of outer perception, the living body itself servesas the zero point of orientation, and I see no reason to dispute this last observation. However, it seemsto me that further clarity must be gained on .n'hatit means to say that the "I" is at the zero point of orientation of the living body. Since this zero point is at no particular place, what does it mean to say that it is a point of orientation? What she wants to say, of course, is that the "I" is non-spatially localized, but what this means requires further elaboration. Until this has been clarified, it cannot be understood how the literally spatially localizedsensationsare at a distance from the non-sDatiallvlocalized "I," and the problem of the relation of the extended ro the r)on-extended cannot be considered as entirely resolved. However, this does not mean that this problem cannot be resolved by acknowledging sensationsas real constituents of consciousness and given at placesin the living body. E. Stein continues her analysisby noting that the living body is constituted in a two-fold manner: (l) as sensed or bodily perceived living body fLeib] and (2) as outwardly perceived physical body lKorper] of the outer world.r3 It is experienced as the same in this double givenness. By bodily perception she means rhe perception of my body from the inside as distinguished from outer perception or sensationsof objects. But she does not fail to note that sensationsof objects are given at the living body to the living body as senser,raand so they are intimately connected with bodily perception. She calls this double mode of experiencing objects the phenomenon of "fusion": I see the hand and what it sensesor touches and also bodily perceive this hand touching this object. Furthermore, this psycho-physical individual only becomes aware of its living body as a physical body like others n'hen it empathically realizes that its own zero point of orientation is a spatialpoint among many.'I'hus, it is firsi given to itself in the full sensein reiterated empathy.r5 In her description of the spiritual person in Chapter IV, E. Stein shows how the spirit differs from the soul. The soul, as a part of'nature, is sub.jectto natural causality.The spirit, which laces the natural n'orld, is subject to a meaning context based on

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motivation. She describes motivation as the symbolic' experienced proceeding of one experience from another without a detour over the ohject sphere.rriShe develops this conception clf' the spiritual person in terms of feelings which are the necessary basisfbr volition and ground valuing. The description of f'eelings revealsan "I" with various depths or levels.This is, of course, not t h e p u r e " I " o f ' C h a p t e r I I . W i t h t h e a d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o no f intensity and spread, a hierarchy of value feelings can be established and a doctrine of types of persons developed. On the basis of these complex relati
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the thult 'f the types and the depth hierarchy we have described? I1 this approach to understanding spiritual personsis to be useful, \\'e must continually revise our classificationsas new phenomena present themselves,rather than dismiss some fbrms of behavior a s " i r r a t i o n a l . " T . d i s m i s sb e h a v i o r i n t h i s w a y i s a c t u a l l y t o abdicate a readinessto understand. 8,. Stein is certai'ly to be credited here with seeing that mecharical causationas an explanation of physicalphenomena is not r r p p r o p r i a r el o r e x p l a i n i n gs p i r i r u a lp h e n o m e n a ,a n d r h e i n t e r _ pretative scheme she proposes is very interesting. But it seems that such a scheme must be left open and distinguished from logical rationality rarher than identified with it. I n t h i s w o r k E . S t e i n h a st h u s s h o w n w h a t e m p a t h y i s a n d h o w i t is important in understanding our own nature as well as that of others. She has done an admirablejob of analyzing and describ_ ing the various aspectsand presentationsof'the phenomenon of empathy within the framework of the phenomenological meth'd. Her approach is clear and direct und h". e*amples'are apt. She also makes distinctions with a finenessof percepti,-,nthat is truly remarkable. A final possiblevalue of this work may lie in an insight which E. Stein has in common with Sigmund Freud but has apparently arrived at independently. she shows that an experience u'hich took place in the past can exist in the background of present experience and still have an effect.18she calls this mode of existerce the mode of non-actuality.Freud in his analysisof personali t r s a y st h a t a n e x p e r i e n c em a y b e r e p r e s s e db y t h e s u p e r e g ob u t continue to exist in the id. At a later time, if the superigo is rveakened,the repressedexperience may break out of the id and affect the behavior of the ego. T'he mode of existenceof material rn the id Freud calls unconscious.A synthesisof the views of nonactuality and unconscious, one of which was arrived at by the nrethod of phenomenology and the other by an architectonic of the person in a naturalistic context, might be both profitable and i rr re r e s it n g . Waltraut Stein,Ph.D. l 962

I{otes on the Translatiort

Noteson the Translation he pagination of the original has been retained in the lefthand margin and all footnotes and cross references refer to these pages. In general, W.R.B. Gibson's translation of the Ideenlehas been followed for the translation of technical phenomenological terminology. An exceptionis AusschaLtung, which has been rendered "exclusion" rather than "disconnection." In Chapter III the distinction benveenKdrper and Leib becomes very important. While this distinction is quire clear in German, the usual translation in English is "body" for both rvords.K'drper signifies the material or physical aspectsof one's body, i.e., that which can be sensually perceived as matter. By contrast, Leib emphasizesthe animation of the body, the perception of it as alive instead of simply as a thing. In accordance with this distinction the word Kdrper has usually been rendered as "physical body" and Leib as "living body." The distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung becomes important in several places. E. Stein used,Erlebni.sin the mosr general sense of experience, i.e., as anything which happens to a subject. In the feu'places lvhere she usesErfohrung, she is emphasizing senseexperience, such as the experience or perception of foreign experience. To make this distinction clear, Erfahrunghas been rendered as "perception" or "perceiving," with the Germarr in brackets to distinguish it from Wahrnehmung.Erlebnishas consistentlybeen translated as "experience." -l'he word hineinuersetzen alsohas no simple English equivalent. Literally it ref-ersto the acr of transl-erringor putting oneself into another's place. "Projection into" seemedto be the most satisf-actorY tra115l21iqn. xxiv

xxv

A frrrther problem arose with the translation of Seeleand seelemost clearly means "soul" in the senseof psyche and seelisch. has bee' rendered as such. Howe'er, "soulful" o. ,,rpi.it.,ol" i' English does not render rhe senseof seelisch. As far as the transla_ tor ccruldsee,E. Stein is not making a distinction between seerisch anclpsychisch and so both words havb been rendered as ,.psychic.,, 'rhe translation of ceis,tin chapter IV presented a sp.iiar p.oblem, since neither of the two usual renderings inio English, "-i"{' or "spirit," is reaily satisfactory.The connorarions of "rnind" are too narror{,',while those of "spirit" are too broad. "spirit" has been selecredfor this third ed'ition with the cavear rhat the reader keep in mind that the author is nor referring to a moral or religious entity in this context. Rather, the sense i, Jf tne creative human spirit that is the subjecrmatrer of what we call the humanities, the social sciences,andlaw and that the Germans call G e i s t e s u . i s s e n s c h a f tlei tne,r a l l y , , i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o spirit.,, Geisteswissenschaften has bee. transrated as""curtural r.i..,...,,, a c()mmon rendering of this term.

ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY

Foreword he complete work, fiom which the following expositions are taken, began with a purely historical treatment of'the problems emerging one by one in the literature on empathy belore me: aestheticempathy, empathy as the cognitive source of fbrergn [fremdes)experience, ethical empathy, etc. Though I firund these problems mingled together, I separatedthem in my presentation. Moreover, the epistemological,purely descriptive, anclgenetic-psychologicalaspectsof this identified problem were undistinguished fiom one another. This mingling showed me rvhv no one has fbund a satisfactorysolution so far. Above all, it seemed that I should extract the basic problem so that all the others would become intelligible from its viewpoint. And I wanted to submit this problem to a basic investigation. At the same tinre, it seemed to me that this positir,'ework was a requisite foundation for criticizing the prevailing conclusions. I recognized this basic problem to be the question ofempathy as the perceiving lErfahrungl of {breign subjects and their experience lErLeben]. The fcrllowingexpositior.rs will deal with this ques-



tr()l).

I am very well aware that my positive results represent only a v e t y s r l a l l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o w h a t i s t o b e r e a l i z e d .I r r a d d i t i o r r , specialcircumstanceshave prevented me from once more thor- oughly revising the work before publication. Since I submitted it t o t h e f a c u l t y , I h a v e , i n m y c a p a c i t ya s p r i r . a t e a s s i s t a n t o m y

2

Edith Stein

respectedProf'essorHusserl, had a look at the manuscript of Part II of his "Ideen," dealing in part with the same question' Thus, naturally, should I take up my theme again, I would not be able to refrain from using the new suggestionsreceived. Of course, the statement of the problem and my method of work have grown entirely out of intellectual stimuli received from Professor Husserl so that in any case what I may claim as my "spiritual property" in the following expositions is most questionable.Nevertheless,I can say that the results I now submit have been obtained by my own efforts. This I could no longer maintain if I nou' undertook changes.

Chapter II

The Essenceof Acts of Empathy l. The Method of the Investigation ll controversy over empathy is based on the implied as- < I > ^ta. sumption that foreign subjects and their experience are -fhit-rk..s given to ,rr. deal with the circumstances of'the occuri",,.., the effects, and the legitimacy of this givenness' But the m o s t i m m e d i a t eu n d e r t a k i n gi s t 0 c o n s i d e r t h e p h e n o m e n o nr l f in and by itself and tt h e e x c l u s i o no r r e d u c t i o n .

4

Edith Stein

W h a t t a n b e l e l i i f t h e w h o l e w o r l d a n d e v e r tt h e s u b j e c te x p e r i eDcing ir are cancelled?In fact, there remains an infinite Iield o1' pure i.vestigation. For let us consider what this exclusiot'tmeatts. i can doubr whether what I see befbre me exjsts' Deception is p o s s i b l e .J ' h e r e f b r e , I m u s t e x c l u d e a n d m a k e n o u s e o f t h e p . , s i t i n g o l e x i s t e n c e .B u t r ' r ' h a tI c a n n o t e x c l u d e . w h a t i s n o t iubject to doubt, is my experience of the th"!pg (the perception' *"-,r.y, or other kind sitirrgof existcnce and still retain the i.,ll .hn.u.t.r of'perception. The caseof hallucination illustrates this possibility.Let us suppose that someone suffers {iom halluc i n a i i o n s a n d h a s i n s i g h t i n t o h i s c o n d i t i < l n .I n a r o o m w i t h a healthy person, he may supPosethat he seesa door in the wall and \\'ant ti) go through it. Whell his attentiorl is called to this, he r e a l i z e sr h a t h c i s h a l l u c i n a t i n ga g a i n . N o w h e n o l o n g e r b e l i e v e s that the door is present, even being able to transf'er himself into 'I'his offers him an excellent opporthe "cancelled" perception. o f p e r c e p t i o n i, n c l u d i n gt h e p o s i t n a t u r e t h e s t u < l y i n g l o r tunity no longer participates in this) he though evelt o{'existence, ing tl-hus there remains the whole "pheIlf phenomenology' However, it is not sufficient merely to comprehend thern individually and to explain what is i m p l i e d i n t h e m , i n q u i r i n g i n t o t h e t e n d e n c i e se n c l o s e di n t h e simple havilrg of'rhe phen<-rmenon.Rather, $'e must press iorn,ard to their essence.Each phenrn the single casein icleationalabstract i<)r-l.:" We must sljl-L"shoLrC[gtit means to sa)'that my experier4e is ,r,irf.;6E6ie-Med. It is lot-lirdu6itable that i exist, tl"risempirical " 1 " o l t h i s n a m e a n d s t a t i o n ,g i v e n s u c h a n d s u c h a t t r i b u t e s .M y

The Essence

of Acts of Empathy

5

u,hole past could be dreanr ed or be a deceptive recollection. 'l'herefbre, it is subjectto thc- exclusion, only remaining an object "I," the experiencing 1 ; { c' o r r s i d e r a t i o na s a p h e n . - m e n o t l . B u t rld and my own person as phenomew(? the considers who subiect i n n d o n l y i t , a m .justas indubitable " 1 " a e x p e r i e n c e i n a m ,,,r,',, xperience itself. as ecancel to and impossible Norv let us apply this way ,-, f thinking to our case.lhe lvorld.in --vorld of physical bodies but also..of r.vlrichwe live is not orrll'a tls, of whose experiences we erxperiencing s.ubjectsext€F-;lel'to -fhis : indubitable. Precisely here we are nc, is knowledge know. that occasionally we are indec.=ptions diverse such to subject -v of knowledge in this domain at all. possibilit the doubt to clined life is i'duhitehlv tbels' But the-phenomeron ef foreig*Jxyehk er. -want.to-exas+ir+--++his-a-lirde-furrh r!-g-D.ovc and Horvever,.the-dlrectiA! cr:.,the investig-ationis not yet clearly prescribed. \\'c could.procef'apsvcho-physical 'fhis indir r dual is not givett as a physical body, a phy,sicalthing. but as a sensitive,living bo.r,ly belonging to an "I," an "I" that s e r ) s e st h, i n k s ,f ' e e l sa, n d w i l l - . ' l ' h e l i v i n g b o d y o f t h i s " I " n o t o n l y

eqgmenal .n:a;lcif lur"u-Lielfuhc.cenrerrrf-orieiuafi ts i nto my p_!-r

tion of'sr',cha phenomenal r.. orld. It facesthis rvorld and commun l c a t e sw l t n m e . And we could investigate how whatever appears to us beyond t h e m e r e p h y s i i a lb o d y g i r . - : n i n o u t e r p e r c e p t i o n i s c o n s t i t u t e d u'ithin consciousness. Moreover, we could cons-, der the single, concrete experiences < r f t h e s e i n d i y i d u a l s .D i f f e r . = n t r v a y so f b e i n g g i v e n w o u l d t h e n appear, and we could f-urt -rer pursue these. It would become apparent that there are oth- er ways of being given "in the svmb o l i c r e l a t i o n " t h a n t h e g i v e r l l l e s sw o r k e d o u t b y L i p p s . I n o t o n l y know what is expressedin fie cial expressionsand gestures,but also Perhaps I seethat someone makes a rvhat is hidden behind thent sad {irce but is not really sa 'd. I may als
<4>

Edith Stein

6

judgment about having made it. Neither this motivation nor the his reirark is expressedby any "sensory appearance'.' w3y's9f This investigutionwill be concerned rvith these various "and pgssibly- witb the qnderlying .reiatio,nslrips being given All these pr.r! ttl But a still more radical examination is possible' of actsin nature bata oifbr.ign experience point back to the basic Iv!'e now \^'ant to which fgl"jgl :;5pg1l,encgganmpreh,.g.+-ded' " r ad i d esi g n if e i hti" i. t t- i t A - pa t h y, r ega r d-l"s s o f aI I h i st o r i caI t in the acts these tioniattached to the *.'ia: 1." grasp and describe greatest essentialgenerality will be our first undertaking' Acts l. Description of Empathy in Comparison With Other

5>

we shall be able ro see empharic acts best in their individuality if u,e confront rhem u'ith othenect! olprc-eqlllllglsl9s'(our field of considerarion afrer making the describedreduction)..I e*t us take an example to illustrate the nature of the act qf gmpalhy' A friend?ell, -J that hi hai lbst his brcithei and I become aware of his pain. What kind of an arvarenessis this?I anr not concerned here with going into the basison which I infer the pain' Perhaps his face is"pale and disturbed, his voice toneless and strained' Perhaps he also expresseshis pain in words' Naturally, these things can all be investigatecl,but they are not mv concern here'.I *ot,id like to kr-row,not horv I arrive at this awareness'but rvhat it itself is. (a) Outer PercePtionand EmPathl Needlessto sav,I have no outer perception of the pain' Outer perception is a term for acts in u'hich spatio-temporal conctete t.ir-tg'and occurring come to me in embodied givenness'This beini has the quality of being there itself righl now; it turns this to-nib ii embodied in a or tliat ffied with sidescocomparison in It is specific sense. liri6-oi-cli{$xhere averted. perceived but -I'he pain is not a thing ar.rdis not given to me-4sa thigg' even ';in" the pained countenance'I perceive u,hen I am alvare of it this countenanceout$'ardl1'and the pain is given "at one".rvith it' There is a close,yet very loose,parallel between empathlc acts and the averted sides of rvhat is seen, because ln Progresslve

The Essenceof Actsof Empathy

7

perception !.a14-Uaysnrors-ne.wsidesofrheLhhg-to-,nri-u.ordial givenness. Each side can, in principle, assume this primordial giviiiness I select. I can consider the expression of pain, more a c c u r a t e l y t. h e c h a n g eo f f a c e I e m p a t h i c a l l yg r a s p a s a n e x p r e s sion of pain, from as many sides as I desire. yet, in p.rincipl", i .ur., never get an "orientation" where the pain irself is primordiall.y glven. Thgs empathy doesnot have the character of outer perceptign, though it does have something in common with outer perception: In both casesthe objeq_q itself is present here and now. We have c o m e t o r e c o g n i z eo u t e r p e r c e p t i o na s a n a c r g i v e n p r i m o r d i a l l y . B u t . t h o u g h e m p a t h ) i s n o t o u r e r p e r c e p t i o n .t h i s i s n o t r o i u y that it does not have this "primordialitv."

(b) Primordialitl and \Von-primordiality Tl:r: are things other than rhe ourer world given to us pri_ rnordially; for insrance,there is ideation rvhich ls the intuiiive c
fti@ffi?r What could be more primordial rhan

experience itseiprt Btlt not all experiencesare primordiaill, given nor primordial . i' their colttent. Menrorl', expectati.n, ur-rdfu,-rturydo not have, their.objec_t.lodilypresenrbefore therrr. Thev only represent it, and this character of representation is an immanent, essential lr moment ol'these acts,not a sign fiom their objects. Finally, there is the question of the givenness of our own gx_ periences themselv-es.It is p
<6>

8

Edith Stem

for the reflecting glance of primordially given, i'e'' it is.possible ,.t,, in the experiencero be there bodily itself. Furthermore, it in. non-primordially is possible fbr our olvn exPerlences to b-egiven f a n t a s ; ' o r inhmory' expectation' whether empathy is Now we ugii,-t tuk" up the questi;n of sense' what Primordial and in (c) Memorl, Expectation,Fantasl' and Empathy

<7 >

of empathy and There is a well-known analogy between acts qon-primordially' expfrlglrces 4Ie€!v9! acts in which our own representallonal act now The memory of a joy is primordial as a joy is non-primordial' of co^ntent its being carried out, tiro"gn I could study' but the which ofjoy character fhis act has the iotal rather there' bodily and joy is not primordially ""t' ":-liil:g "been expe.ence' can aliueland this "once," the time of the past points b e d e f i n i t e o r i n d e f i n i t e ) ' l T h ep r e s e n t n o n - p r i m o r d i a l i t y c h a r a c t e ro [ a ' t h . e h a s h t l i t p a s t back to the past primordii[iiy' rerlgmwhat'is and posits' memory forrner ".to*." Accordingly' bered has being' "1" as the subject of Further, theie are two possibilities:The can look the act of'remembering, in this act of representation, intentional object of back at the pastjoy'-fhen the pastjoy is th.e .,1,,,its sublelt being with and in the "I" of the past. fLr.ustle the subject and objegt' present.:'I" -l'd the puti"t" face.eachother as of sameThey do not coinciie, though there is a consciousness ness.Butthisisnotapositiveidentificationand'moreover'the "I" and the distinction between th-eprimordially remembering also be "I" non-primordiall,vremembered persists'Memory can representationin accomplishedin other modes' The same act of asa whole implies which what is remembered emergesbefore me expose "traits" in certain tendencies.When these unfold, they experience their temporal course, how the whole remembered was once prlmordially constituted'22 .l.hisprocesscanoccurpassively..inme''orlcandoitactively well asthe active' step by itep. I can evencarry out the passive'as the present course o{'memory rt'ithout reflecting' without having way' Or I in.any "1," the sub-iectof th. utt of memory, before me stream .url .*pr"rriy set mvselfback to that time in a continuous

The Essenceof Acts of Empathy

I

of'experiences, allowing the past experiential sequence to re<8> awaken, living in the ryrqgrnLelgd glpg{ence instead of turning t o i t a s a n o b j e c t . H o n e v e r , t h e . m e m o r y a l w a y sr e m a i n s a r e p r e which is in contrast with sentation ylllqq-prlinordralsubject 'I'he reproduction of the the subject dqing -the,remqpqbering. lormer experience is the clarification of what was vaguely intended at first. At the end of the process theqis a new_gpjgqqlicatign. I now unite the past eap6iience, which first arose before me as a whole and which { tbS. fpt'apj=rr-t while projec'tjng myself into it, in an \trnelle-for-miof "appercepti\grfp memory can have a variety '['hus of'gaps. tt is poisible for me to represent a past s-ituation to myself and be unable t9 repember rny iqner behavilr in this tl situation. As I transfer myself back into this situa,tiop;f,'surrogata ; 'I'his image of the past frrr the missing memory comes into focus. behavior is not, however,a representation of what is past. Rather, of'the memory image to get the it is the "€-qursltejg-lrpletion n i'rg,,1'i he * ht lE-ii canTave t he cha;;aFioad;ubt,cbnjec", ture, or possibility,but never the character of being. It is hirdly necessaryt6 go into the caseof expectatron.since it is so parallel. But something can still be said about free fhntasy. Fantasy,too, can be accomplishedin various ways: An experience of'fantasy can arise as a whole and the tendencies implied in it fulfilled step by step. In faplasy there is no temporal distance, filled by continuous experiences,between the fantasizingand the fantasized"l," provided I do notjust happen to be dealing with a l a r r t a s i z e dm e m o r y o r e x p e c t a t i o n . 'l'he "I" But there is also a distinction here. producing lhe lantasizedworld is primogdial: the "I" living in it is non-primo,rdial. The fhntasized experiences are in contrast with memory h e c a u s et h e y a r e r r o t g i v e n a s a r e p r e s e n t a l i o no f a c t u a l e x p e r i ettces but as the non-primordial form of present experiences. -l'his "present" does not indicate a present of'objective time but an experienced present which in this casecan only be objectified 'I-he ttt a "neutral"::r present of fantasized time. neutralized or <9> tton-positedfirrm of'the present memory (the representation of'a sivennessnow real but not possessinga body) is in contrast with a tteutralized pre- and post-memory. That is to say,it is in contrast

t0

with a fantasy of the past and of the future, with the representation of unreal past and future experiences.It is also possiblefor me to meet myself in the realm of fantasy(asrvell as in memory or expectation), i..., to meet an "I" which I recognize as m-f1.elf though there is no linking continuity of experience to establish the unity, so to speak,to meet my mirror image. (This reminds us, for example, of the experience Goethe relates in Dichtung und W'ahrheit.One evening he was coming from Sesenheim after saying good-bye to Friederike, and he met himself on the way in his fui..re form.) But this does not seem to be the genuine fantasy of our own experiences.Rather, it seemsto be an analogue to empathy which can be understood only from the viewpoint of empa-

l <10>

The Essenceof Acts oJ'Empathl

Edith Stein

thy. So now to empathy itself. Here, too, we are dealing with an act which is primordial as present experience though non-primordial in content. And this content is an experience which, again, can be had in diFerent ways such as in memory, expectation, or in fantasy.When it arisesbefore me all at once, it facesme as an object (such as the sadness I "read in another's face"). But u'hen I inqqlre into its implied tendencies (try to bring another's mood to clqar givennessto mysel|, the content, having pulled me into it' is no longer really an object. I am now no longer turned to the content but to the object of it, am at the sub.jectof the content in the original subject'splace. And only after successfullvexecuted clarification, does the content again face me as an object.2a Thus in all the casesof the representation of experiencesconsidered, there are three levels or modalities of accomplishment even if in a concrete case people do not always go through all Ievelsbut are often satisfied lvith one of the lower ones. These are (1) tne emergence of the experience,(2) the fulfilling explication, ind (3) the comprehensive ob.iectificationof the explained experience. On the first and third levels,the representationexhibits the non-primordial parallel to perception, and on the second lervelit exhibits the non-primordial parallel to the having of the experietrce.The subject of the empathized experience, howet'er, is not the subject empathizing, but another. And this is what is fundamentally new in contrast with the memory' exPectation,or the fantasy of our own experiences. These two subjects are sepa-

i j t i r i

II

ra[e and notjoined tggether, as previclusly,by a consciousnessof sameness.ora coruinuity of experience. And $'hile I am living in the other's joy, I do not feel primordial .joy. It does not issuelive fiom my "L" Neither does it have the character of once having lived like rementberedjoy. But still much less is it merely f'anta'fhis sized rvithout actual life. sther subject is primordial all clo not experignce-ifas.primordial. In nry non-primorthough dial experience I feel,(as-il-were, led by a primordial one not experienced by me but still there, manifesting itself in my nonprimordial experience. Tbrrs errrpat-hyis a.kindof act of perceiuiag{eine ,|rt erfahrender Aktu) suigeneris.We have set ourselves the task of expounding it in its peculihrity befbre tackling any other question (of whether such experience is valid or how it occurs).And we have conducted this investigation in purest generality. Empathy) which rve examined and sought to describe,.is th9 g1pe1!gnggof.ful'eign colsciousrress in general. irrespective ofthe kind ofthe experiencing subject or o l t h e ' s u b i e c t w h o s e c o n s c i o u s n e siss e x p e r i e n c e d .W e o n l r d i s cussedthe pure "I," the subject ofexperience, on the subject'sas u,ell as on the object's side. Nothing else n'as drawn into the investigation. 'l'he experience which an "I" as such has of another "I" as such < I I > l o o k s l i k e t h i s . T h i s i s h o w h u m a n b e i n g sc o m p r e h e n dt h e p s y c h i c lif'e of'their fellows. Also as believers they comprehend the love, the anger, and the precepts of their God in this way; and God can comprehend people's lives in no other way. As the possessorof complete knowledge, God is not mistaken about people's experiences,as people are mistaken about each others' experiences.But people's experiences do not become God's own, either; nor do they have the same kind of givennessfor Him. 3. Discussion in Terms of Other Descriptions of EmpathyEspecially That of [T.] Lipps-and Continuation of the Analysis Naturally, this general presentation of the nature of "ernpathy on the u'hole" does not accomplish much. \{e must now investigate how empathl is differentiated as the perceptiop of psy'cho-

12

Edith Stein

physical individuals and thcir experierce of personality, erc. yet fror, the c.nclusi.ns already reached, it is possibreto criticize s , m e h i s r o r i c a lt h e o r i e s o f h o r . rf o r e i g n c o n s c i o u s n e siss e x p e r i e n c e d .B y m e a n so f t h i s c r i t i c i s m ,w e c a n a l s oc o m p l e t eo u r a n a l v _ s i sa l o n g s o m e l i r r e s . Lipps' description of' the experience of-entpathy agrees with ours ln many respects.(we shall not deal with his causal-genetic h1,p'thesis tc o n d u c h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o ni n p u i e generality, sticking ro the caseof the psycho-physicatindi'idual a.nd to "symbolic givenness," but we can still generalize in part the conclLrsionshe reaches. (a) Points of Agreement

I2>

, L.ipps depicts emparhy as an fljnnef parricipation" in foreign Drubrless, this is eq,ivalent to our highest le'el"ol' yre.xperiences. / the consurnrnationof empathy-where we are ..at" the foreign s u b j e c ta n d t u r n e d w i t h i t t o i t s o b j e c t . H e s t r e s s e tsh e o b i e c t i v i t v .r the "demanding" characrer of'empathy ar.rdthus .ip..rr", w h a t w e . n r e a n b y d e s i g n a t i n gi t a s a k i n d o f a c t u n d e r g o n e . Further, he indicateshow errrpathy,is akin to memor),.and e-xpec_ tation. But this brings us directly to a point where.r.r, *uy, pu.,. (b) The Tendencyto Full Experiencing Lipps speak.sof the f-actrhat .ever) experience about which I kn'u', including those remembered and expected as well as those e m p a t h i z e d ," r e n d s " t o b e f ' u l l v e x p e r i e n c e d .A ' d i t i s f u l l y e x p e r i e n c e di f n o t h i n g i r . rm e o p p o s e si t . A t r h e s a m e t i m e t h e , , I , , , a n o b j e c t u n t i l n o w , i s e x p e r i e n c e d '.f h i s i s s o w h e t h e r t h e , . I , , i s p a s t c i r f u t u r e , m y ( ) w n o r r h e f o r e i g . " I . " H e a l s o c a l l st h i s f u l l e x p e r i e n . i . g . f f r r r e i g ne x p c r i e r r c e m p a t h y .I n d e e d ,h e f i r s r s e e s f u l l e m p a t h l h e r e , t h e o t h e r b e i n g a n i n c o n r p l e t e ,p r e l i m i n a r y levelol empathv. -I'hat t h e s ' b j e c t o f ' t h e r e m e r n b e r e d e, x p e c t e d ,r > re n r p a t h i z e d e x p e r i e n c ei n t h i s s e c o n df < r r m . o f ' m e m o r ye,x p e c t a t i o r ro, r e m p a _ t h y 'i s n o t p r o p e r l v a n o b j e c ri s i n a g r e e m e n tw i t h o u r c o n c e p r i ; n . But we dr .'t agree that there is a c.mplete c.'i.cidence *iih tne

The Essenceof Actsof Empathy

l3 ,.1,', renrembered, expected, empathized that they become -or o n e . L i p p s c o n f u s e st h e f o l l o w i n g t w o a c t s :( l ) b e i n g drawn into r h e e x p e r i c n c ea r f i r s r g i ' e n o b j e c r i v e r ya n d f r r t f i i l i n gi i s i m p r i e d tendencieswith (2) the transition from non-primoraiil to p.i-,rrdial experience. A memory .is entirely lulfilred and identified when o.e has lirllowed out all its terrdenciesto exprication anrr estabrished the experie'tial continuity to the prese.ri. But this does no, -ut .-,rr. remembered experience primorQia-|.The present viewpoint of rlre remembere. stare.f affairs is comptetely independen, of rn. remembered viewpoint. I can remember a perception and now be ct>n'inced that I u'as formerry under a derusion. I .emember my discomfort in an embarrassirrgsituation and now think it *u, u..y f u n n y . I n t h i s c a s et h e m e m ( ) r y i s ' o m o r e i n c o m p r e t e ttun if t again take the former viewpoint. We agree that a shift from remembered, expected or empa_ <13> thized to primordial experience is possible.But we ao r that, when this tendency has been Iulfilled, memory, "", "gi." expectation, or empathy is still present. Let us consider the case further. I actively bring to mind a j f t r r m e r j o y , f o r e x a m p l e , o [ a p a s s e de x a m i n a i i o n . I r r a n s f e rm v _ self into it, i.e., I rurn,ro the joyful evenr and depict i, ,; ;yr.iiT, a l l i t s j o y f u l n e s sS . u d d e n l yI n r i t i c et h a t I , t h i s p r i m o r d i u l , ,'._.__ bering "1," am full ofjoy. I rqmembql the joyful ar.d.tuk. primordial .foy in the rernemtrer,edevent. rio*"u.., "uent ,r," -.-".i . l f ) ' a n d t h e m e m o r y " I " h a v e v a n i s h e do r , a r m o s t , p e r s i s tb e s i d e t n e . p r r m o r d r a l . . ; oayn d t h e p r i m o r d i a l . , I . " N a t u r a l l y , t h i sp r i m o r _ dialjoy over past events can also occur directly. .Ihis *ould b" mere representation of the event without my remembering " the former joy or making a transition from the remembered to the primordial evenr. Fin?!y, I may be primordially;"yfuf ou., rh. past.foy,making the difference r r r r c r c I r L cbetween u c t w e e n lth n e s e t w o a c t se s p e c i a l l y pr
14>

The Essenceof Actsof Empathy

hending the.joy of the other. Should the examination candidate step into the tense,impatient family circle and impart the.ioyful news, in the first place, they will be primordially.joy{ul over this ' nervs. Only when they have been joyful long enough" themselves,will they be joyful over their.joy or, perhaps as the third possibility,be joyful over his joy.2r'Rut his joy is neither given to us as primordialjoy over the evelrt nor as pri,mordialjoy over his .joy. Rather it is given as this non-primordial act of empathy that we have already described more precisely. On the other hand, if, as in mem6ry, we put ourselvesir-rthe place of'the fbreign "I" and sgpprgssit while we surround ourselveswith its situation, we hav'eone of these situationsof "appropriate" experience. If we then again concede to the foreign "I" its place and ascribethis experiemceto him, we gain a knort ledge of his experience.(According to Adam Smith, this is how foreign experience is given.) Should empatht trail, this procedure can make up the deficiency, but it is not itself an experience. We could call this surrogate for empathy an "assumption" but not strictly empathy itsetf, ai-ifl-nleirrong'doei."' empatfiiirur defined sens*e as thg experience of foreign consciousnesscan only , be the non-primordial experience which announcesa primordial one. It is neither the primordial experience nor the "assumed" one.

may be naturally capable of more intense I'eelingsthan he; they may be "altruistic" and "values for t>thers"zo ipso mean moreJ() them than "values fbr themsely.es":finally, this event may have lost s()me of its value through circumstances unkn
(c) Empathy and Fellou Feeling

I 5>

l5

Edith Stein

14

Should empathy persist beside primordial .joy over the joyful event (beside the comprehension of' the joy of the other), and, moreover, should the other really be conscious of the event as joyful (possiblyit is alsojoyful for me, for example, if this passed examination is the condition for a trip together so that I am huppy fbr him as the means to it), we can designatethis primordial act asjoy-with-him or, more generally, as f'ellow feeling,(syrzpathy).21 Sympathizedand empathizedjo1, need rrot necessarilybe the same in content at all. (They are certainly not the same in respect to quality, since one is a primordial and the other a nonprimordial experience.)The joy ofuhe most intimate participant will generally be more intense and enduring than the others' joy. But it is also possiblefor the others' joy to be more intense. i'hey

(d) lttegatiueLtnpathl Lipps hascalled the primordial experiencethat can be added to the experience of empathy full, positive empath\'. With this he has contrasted a negative empathy: the case in which the tenclencyof'the empathic experience to become a Prim'rdial experi- I ence'of ml mena.Let r-rs take the {bllowing case. I am completely filled u'ith grief'over a bereavement,at the moment nry friend tells me the joyful ndws. -I'his grief does not permit the predominance of sympathy with the .joy. T'here is a .nnf irt (again, not real but phenomenal) 'I'he "I" living entirely in the grief perhaps involving-ii')levels. -I'his at first experiencesempathy as a "background experience." is comparable to geripheral areasof the visual held that are seen the full sense,are r.rotob.1'ects and yet u.. n@Ir of actual attentiorr.And now the "I" f'eelspulled toward two sides at once, both experiencesclaimirrg to be a "cogito" in a specific sense(i.e.,actsin which the "1" lives and turns torvard its object). Both seek to pull the "cogito" into themselves.l-his is preciselv the experienceof being split. Thus on the Iirst level there is a split betlveenour own actual experience and the empathic experience. I t i s f u t t h e r p o s s i b l e f < r rt h e " l " t o b e p u l l e d i l r t o t h e e m p a t h i c < 1 6 > experience,to turn to the other's.joyful object. At the same tinre, t h i s o t h e r p u l l m a y n o t c e a s es ( )t h a t a n a c t u a l - j o yc a n p r e v a i l .

16

Edith Stein

Br.rt it seenls to me that in neither case is it a ouestion of a specific trait of in- or rvith-feeli ng (empathlor sympatiy),but of one of the typical forms of transition from one "cogito" to another in general. There are numerous such transitions: A cogito can be completely lived out so that I can then "entirely spontaneously" flow over inro another one. Further, while I am living in one cogito, another can appear and pull me into it rvithout causing conflict. Finally, the rendenciesimplied in the cogito and not yet entirely consummated can obstruct the transition to a new cogito. And all this is just as possiblein perception, memory, in theoretical contemplation, etc. as in empathy.

l7>

Q) Empathy and a Feeling of Oneness I would also like to examine a little more closely this unity of ' i o.,. owq.and the fqf-e_jgl l.l-I"in gmpaphy.ghatwas earlier rejecr,ed. Lipps saysthat as long as empathy is complete (exactly what we no longer recognize as empathy) there is no distinction between our own and the foreign "I," that they are one. For example, I am one with the acrobat and go through his motions inwardly. A distinction only ariseswhen I step out of complete empathy and reflect on my "real 'I'." Then the experiencesnot coming from me appear to belong to "the other" ar.rdto lie in his movements. Were this description correct, the distinction between foreign and our own experiences,as well as that between the foreign and olrr own "I," would actualll'be suspended.This distinction rvould first occur in associationwith various "real 'I's' " or psycho-physical ir-rdividuals.What my body is doing to my body and what the foreign body is doing to the foreign body would rhen remain completely obscure, since I am living "in" the one in the same \4'ayas in the other, experience the movements of the one in the same lvay as those of the other. This assertion is nor only refuted by its consequences,but is also an evidently false description. I am not one with the acrobat but only "at" him. I do not actualll' go rhrough his molions but quasi. Lipps also stresses,to be sure, that I do not outwardly go throuS;h his motions. But r.reitheris what "inwardly" corresponds to the movements of the body, the experience that ,,I move," primordial; it is non-primordial for me. A4d in rhesenon-primor-

The Essenceof Actsof ErnPathy

17

dial movements I {'eelled, accompanied,by his movements.'l'he-ir primordiality is declared in my non-primordial movements which are only thgre for me in him (again understood as experienced, since the pure bodily movement is also perceived outwardly). Every movement the spectator makes is primordial. For example, he may pick up his dropped program attd not "know" it because he is living entirely in empathy. But should he reflect in the one instance as in the other (for which it is necessaryfor his "1" t monadic character? Not entirely. .! feel my joy while I empathically comprchend the orhers' and see it as the same. And, seeing this, it seems that the non-primordial character of the 1 l'oreign joy has vanished. Irrdeed, this phantom joy coincides in every respectu'ith my real livejoy, and theirs isjust as live to them a s m i n e i s t < >m e . N o w I i n t u i t i v e l y h a v e b e f o r e m e w h a t t h e y f e e l . It comes to life in my feeling, and from the "I" and "you" arisqs the "ryel' as a subrjectof'a higher level.?E And it is also possible fbr us to bejoyful over the same event, though not filled with exactly the same joy. Joyfulness may be more richly accessibleto the others, which difference I compre-

lg

hend empathically.I empathicalryarrive at the "sides" of'joyfurnessobstructed in my own joy. 'fhis ignites my.ioy, ar,d oniv now is there complete coincidence with what is empathized. If the same thing happens to the others, we empathiially enrich our {eelingso that "we" now f'eela different joy from ..I,i' ..you,', and " h e " i n i s o l a t i o n .B u t " I , " , . y o u , " a . d . , h e ; ' are retainei in .,we.,, A "we," nor an "I," is the subject of the empathizin€i. Ne_t through the feeling of'oneness,but through empathizing, dot; experienceothers. 'I'he fbeling of orrenessind the enrichment of our own experience become possiblethrough empathy.



The Essenceof Acts of EmPathY

Edith Stein

(fl Reiterationof Empathy-Refexiue Sympathy I would like t' call attentic-rnto.iust one more concept from Lipps'description: that which he designatesas .,reflexive sympa_ thl'" and which I wourcr rike ro calr tte ireiterarion of empathyf m o r e e x a c t l y ,a p a r t i c u l a r c a s eO f ' r e i t e r a t i < t n . has this attribute ir.rcommr>nwirh many kinds of'acts. _.Empathy fhcre is not only reflection, but also reflecrion on reflection, etr.. as.anideal possibility ad infnitum. simirarry, there is a wiiling of willing, a liking of liking, itc. ln fact, all represenrarions can be rerterated. [ can remember a memory, expect an expectation, ranrasya fanrasy' And ro I can arso emparhize rhe enipathized, u-ong the acts of anorher that I comprehend empathically l:.., lhere can be empathic acts i. *,hich the oth., .o-pr.h..d, or,_ 'rther's acts.This "other" can be a third person o. -. myself. In the second casewe have "reflexive mpathJ " where my originar . . x p e r i e n c e r e t u r l ) s . . , ' . , . , . 7 , u , . ' @s) ,n..:rn..i/.ln.in.. this pheromenon in the give ur-rdtok. be*veen i.diviitrars does '"fr o t . e e d t o c o n c e r n u s h e r e b e c a u s ew e a r e o n r l ' d e a l i n gw i t h t h e {eneral essenceof'empathy and not u,ith its effect. 4. The Controversy Between the View of Idea and That of Actuality from the viewpoint of our description of empathic ,,_._t..nupr 'r'rts' we ca' find access to the much-cliscussedquestir>n 'f \''herher empathy has the character of an ipea lvorsteirungl
19

. , , . r r r e l i t l\ M . . l G e i g e r h a s a l r e a d l s l r e s s e dt h a t t h i s q u e s t i o r r i s (I 1 . , , , r 1 , , . , .a. n, t< lt h a t v a r i < l u sp o i n t s n t u s t b t ' d i s t i n g u i s h e d : 2 " ) A r c ( ) r ( 2 ) f o r e ign 6';1A r e n o t ? p r i m o r d i a l ),l",r,hized experiettt'es g i v en exm e o r f a c i n g a s s o m e t h i n H g i v e r t ,.,]i.',t.'., obje<:tively g i v e n 1a'd o r n ' n i ' t u i t i v e l y i r t u i t i v e l y A r e t h e y [criertially? (3) or of representatiolr)? of perception in the character li:i,rtr-ri,iu.iy' the-srst After the preceding discussion, rve.carl.{latly answer answer easily the so cannot we But ,[e€iativr. question in the is a ttr-oThere .ur presentation. of in terms .'..,r,-raquestio. experience of 6v1 ,ia.an.ti to thq essence.olempathic acts: an various levels of are And there one. an in objectivity of speak cannot one case, t5e second "is there" fbr certainly experience firreign the thor-rgh even sense, nle.

-I.he

third quesrion likewise requires further investigation. \ve .seenwhat.distinguishes emPathll liom perccp-tlon already have ancl u,hat they have itr common.iP-g;ce-ptiq1!3: it: object bqfcrr-eit ; mpathy does not.,Bttt both h3ve.-their i n e m b o d i e d g i v e n n e s se object iisel{'th?re ar-rdmeer ir directly where it is anchored in the conrinRiry,g.fbeing. They need not represent it in order to dr:trtit cl,rseiN'lereknowiedge lWissenlis also characterized by this "encountering" by the subject, but is created in this encounter. It is "hlrve" nn the. bas.is.t'a 'l'hen the grief is not Fiivcll t() rne irltuitively, c,r--.,,ii.ution. though surely to rhe communicator. (should this be the grie\er hirrself , it is primorclially given to hirn in reflectiotr' Shoulclit bt' a third persorr, he crtnrprehendsit non-primordially in empathy.)

20

<21>

Edith Stein

And from his experience I once more have an experience, i.e., I comprehend the grief empathically. A further analysis of the relationship of'"ernpathy" to "know'ledge of foreign experience" is not required at this point. It is enough that we have reciprocally limited them. The crlnclusionfrom t>ur discussionis that the original controversial question was badly put. Thus no answer to it could be correct. For example, Witasek, a particularly energetic defender of the viervof idea.:'0does not take our distinctions into consideration at all. He takes the objective character of empathy to be proved along with its representational character. By a further ecluivocationof idea (which is an intellectual experience in contrast with an em()tional one), he arriv'es at the absurd consequence of denying that empathized feelings involve em()tion. He even baseshis conclusion on a specialargument: Empathy cannot involve feelings because the "assumption of f-eeling" is missing (the "something" to which feeling could be related). The empathizing subject would only assumefeeling in the subject having the feelings if he were dealing with a projection fHineinuersetzenl. Witasek lrroves that the subject cannot be dealing with a projection, not by analysisof the experience of empathy, but by a logical cliscussionof'possible meanings of pro-jection.It could be a judgment, an assumpti()n,or even a fiction that the empathizing sub-ject is identical with the subject under consideration. Aesthetic empathy does not demonstrate all this and so it is not projection. Unfortunately, the dis.junctionis not complete, exactly the possibility applying to the present case being missing. To pro.ject oneself into another means to carry out his experience with him as we have described it. Witasek's contention that empathy is an i n t u i t i v e i d e a o f a n o t h e r ' s e x p e r i e n c eo n l y a p p l i e s t o t h e s t a g e where empathized experiencesare made into objects, not to the stage of fulfilling explication. And fbr this last case we cannot a n s w e rt h e q u e s t i o nO f w h e t h e r i t i s " i n t u i t i v e i n t e r m s o f p e r c e p tion or in terms of idea (i.e., non-primrirdially)" because,as rve h a v e s h o w n , e m p a t h y i s n e i t h e r o n e i n t h e u s u a l s e n s e .I n f a c t , i t refusesto be classifiedin one of the current pigeonholes of psyc h o l o g v b u t u ' i l l b e s t u d i e c li n i t s o w n e s s e n c e .

The Essenceof Acts of Empathy

2l

5. Discussion in Terms of Genetic Theories of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness As we have seen,philosophicaI investigation has already often come to grips with the problem of foreign consciousness.But its question of'hqw we perceive fbreign consciousnesshas usually taken the turn of how in one psycho-physicalindividual the per'I-his has led to'the ception of another such individual occurs. origination of theories of imitation, of inference by analogy, and ,rf cnrpathl by association.

<22>

(a) On the Relationship of Phenomenologyto Ps2chology It may not be superfluousto elucidate the relationship of psychological investigationsto what we are doing. Our position,is that there is the phenomenon o{'"foreign experience" and correlatively the "perception of foreign experience." For the p r e s e n t w e m a y l e a v e u n d e c i d e dw h e t h e r t h e r e r e a l l y i s s u c h a fbreign experience or rvhether this perception is authentic. "I'he phenomenon in which all knowledge and certainty must finally be anchored is indubitable. It is the genuine object of nqdq 'fhus q'Aoooqia. the first task in this domain, as in all domains, is to comprehend the phenomenon in its pure essence,freed frorn all the accidentsof appearance.What is foreign experience in its gi'l'enness? How does the perception of foreign experience look? We must know this before we can ask how this perception occurs. It is self-evident rhat this first question cannot in principle be ansn'ered by a genetic-psychologicalinvestigation of cause,3rfor such an investigationactuallypresupposesthe being whose development it is seeking to ground-its essenceas well as the exist e n c e ,i t s " w h a t " a s w e l la si t s " t h a t . " N o t o n l y t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o no f the nature of the perceprionof foreign experiencing but also the .justificationof this perceptionmust thus precede genetic psychology. And if this psychologyalleges ro accomplish both of these <23> thirrgs itself, its claim must be re-jectedas rhoroughly unjustilied. -I-his is not to dispute its title tcl existence in any way. On the contrary, it has its task already very definitely and unequivocally f o r m u l a t e d . I t i s t o i n v e s t i g a t et h e o r i p ; i n a t i o no f ' t h e k n o w l e d g e

22

Edith Stein

that a real psycho-physicalindividual has of other such individuals. Thus a rigorous delineation of u'hat phenomenology and ps1'chology are to accomplish for the problem of empathy by no meansproclaims their complete independencefrom one another. Indeed, examination of the phenomenological method has shown us that it does not presuppose science in general and especially not a factual science. Thus pheaomenology is not tied to. the results of genetic psychology,either. On the other hand, psychology pretends to no assertions about the circumstances ol- the process it is investigating, and it does not occur to phenomenology to encroach upon its privileges. Nevertheless,psychology is enrirely bound to the results of phenomenology. Rhefrq.rag{rpl"ogy investigates..theessetrceof empathy, and'*'herever.empathpis realized this general essencemust be retained. Genetic psychology, presupposing the phenomenon of empathy, investigates the processof this realization and must be led back to the phenomenon when its task is completed. lf, at the end of the process of origination it delineates,a genetic theory finds something other than that r.r'hoseorigin it r+'antedto discover, it is condemned. Thus in the results of phenomenological investigation we find a criterion for the utility of genetic theories. (b) The Theory of Intitation Now we want to test present genetic theories in terms of our conclusions.Lipps endeavorsto explain the experience of foreign psvchic life by the doctrine of imitation already familiar to us. (-Io be sure, it appearsin his writings as an element of description.) A n'itnessedgesture arousesin me the impulse to imitate it. I do this to express all my experiences. Experience 4nd expression a-reso closely associatedthat when one occurs it pulls the other after it. 'fhus we participate in the experience of the gesture together with this gesture. But, since the experience is experienced "irr" the foreigrr gesture, it does not seem to me to be mine, but another's. We do not want to go into the objections that can be raised againstthis theory nor those which have already been raised,with

The Essenceof Actsof Empathy

Zz

rtr without justification.32trVeonly want to employ, for criticism rvhat lve have already worked out for ourselves.We must therefore say that this theory only distinguishesour own from fbreign experience through affiliation with different bodies, n,hile both experiences are actually different in themselves.By the means indicated, I do not arrive at the phenomenon of foreign experience, but at an experience of my own that arouses ir.r me the fbreign gestures witnessed. This discrepancy between the phenomenon to be explained and that actually explained sufficesas a refutation of this "exolanation." I n o r d e r t o c l a r i f y i h i t d i r . . " p u n c y . l e t u s a n a l y z ea c a s eo f r h e second kind. \de are familiar with rhe facr thar feelings arre aroused.in us bv witnessed "phenomena of expressi,on." A child seei4g.another g.rying cries, foo. When I see a member of my family going around with a long face, I too become upset. When l want to stop worrying, I seek out happy company. We speak of the contagion or transference of feeling in such cases.It is very <2b> plain that the actual feelingsaroused in us do nor servea cognitive I u n c t i o n . t h a t t h e l d o n o t a n n o u n c ea f o r e i g n e x p e r i e n c et o u s a s empathy does. So we need not consider whether such a transference of feeling presupposesthe comprehension of the foreign feeling concerned, since only phenomena of expressionaffect us Iike this. On the contrary, the same change of face interpreted as a grimace certainly can arouse imiration in us, but not a f-eeling.It is certain that as we are saturated b), rrch "transferred" feelings, r v el i v e i n r h e m a n d t h u s i n o u r s e l v c s . ' f h i s p r e v e n t s o u trr r r n i i g ;, toward or submerging ourselvesin the foreign experience, wh'ich I is the attitude characterisricof emparhy.33 l If we had not first comprehended the foreign experience in some other way, we could not have brought it to givenness to ourselvesat all. At most we could have concluded the presenceof the foreign experience from a feeling in ourselveswhich required the foreign experience to explain its lack of motivation. But thus we would only have gotten a knowledge of, not a "givenness" of, the Foreign experience, as in empathy. It is also possible for this transf'erenceitself to be experienced so that I f'eel the feeling, rvhich was at first a foreign feeling, overffor.r,ingme. (For instance, this would be the case if I seek out cheerful companv to

24

Edith Stein

cheer me up.) Here, too, the difference between comprehendirrg and taking on a feeling is clearly apparent. Finally, in all casesthere is a distinction between the transference of feeling and ngl only empathl', but also $yrnpathy and a feeling of oneuess, these latter being based on an empathic subnersion i-nthe fbreign gxpgrielrc.e.3a From rvhat u'e have said, it should be sufficiently clear that the theory of imitation cannor serve as agenetic explanation of'empathy.

(c) The Theory of Association <26>

The theory of associationis a rival of the lheory of imiration. The optical irnage of foreign gestures reproduces the optical image of our o\\,'ngestures.This reproduces the kinesthesisand this, in turn, the feeling with u'hich the kinesthesiswas linked 'Ihis earlier. feeling is norv experienced not as our own, but as foreign, because(l) ir facesus as an objecr, (2) it is nor motivared by our own previous experiences,and (3) it is not expressedby a gesture. Here, again, we want to raise the question of whether the phenomenon of empathy stands at the end of this process of development. And again the answer is no. By the proposed course we arrive at a feeling of our own and we have grounds for viewing it not as one of our o\\'n feelings, but as a foreign one. (At this point we can waive the refutation of these claims.)Now, on these grounds we could conclude that this is another's experierrce.But in empathy we draw no conclusions because the experience is given as foreign in the character of perceprion. Let us illustrate this opposition in a typical caseof comprehending foreign psychic life in terms of the theory of associatior-r. I see someone stamp his feet. I remember how I myself once stamped my fe.etat the same time as my previous fury is presented to me. Then I say to myself, "This is how furious he is now." Here the other's fury itself is not given but its exisrenceis inferred. By an intuitive representation,my own fury, I seek to draw it near.3:,By contrast, emparhy posits being immediately as a perceived act, and it reachesits object directly withor,rtrepresentarion.'I'hus the theory of associationalsp fails to reveal the genesisof empathy.

The Essenceof Acts of Empathy

25

I realize that this type of associativeexplanation (prandtl,s) probably does not include all associationalpsychologists.Accordirrg to Paul Stern, for example, association is not merely the <27> linking of single ideas,one reproducing anorher, but is the unity t r f a p e r c e p t u a lc o n r e x t l E r f a h r u n g s z u s a m m e n h a ni nr j w h i c h t h i s context is alwaysbefore us as a whole. Such a perceptual context is both outside of and within an individual. But this raises more questions. Certainly association should mean more than the descriptive unity of a perceptual context. It should certainly explain how it arrives at this unity. Thus perhaps all that is given to consciousnessat the same time is linked to a u'hole reproduced as such. But then what distinguishesthe unity of the objects of my visual field (that can again arise before me as a whole), from the unity of one object?We cannot do everything in this casewith the one word "association." Further, for such a perceptual context to originate, certainly at some time its parts must be given together. But when do I have a person's inner and outer sidesgiven together? Actually, such casesdo occur. Someone has an expression at first unintelligible to me, for instance,he may put his hand over his eyes. On inquiry, I learn that he is meditating deeply on something just now. Now this meditation that I empathize bec()mes"connected by association"with the perceived pose. When I seethis pose again, I see it as a "meditative" pose. Then in this repeatedcaseempathy is, as a matter of fact, basedon association. But this associationitself requires an empathic act, thus does not suffice as a principle to explain empathy.36Furthermore, association only mediatesknowledge, for we say to ourselvesthat this is how he looks when he is meditating. Associationdoes not mediate our understanding of this pose as the expression of an inner condition. This I gain in empathic projection as follows: He is <29> meditating: he has his mind on a problem and wanrs to shield his train of thought from disturbing distractions; therefore he is covering his eyesand cutting himself off from the outer world,32 We must distinguish Volkelt's theory of fusion from this theory , r f a s s o c i a t i o nV. o l k e l t s a y sl h a r r h e f e i t c o n r e n t i s n r > tl i n k e d w i r h tntuition but fused u'ith it. Of course, this is r-rota genetic explanation but only a description of the empathic experience. Later we

The Essenceof Ats of Empathy

Edith Stein

26

this viewpoint clarishall return to this phenomenotl and see that This clarificafies the origin of certain empathic experiences':r8 the explanation" "e*utt oi tion is certainly far tiom the t
The rheoryof inferenceby analogyto.explain:l: :lO^r:,.:lll: getlerally,acKnowl-

experience of foreign psychic life was alrnost oFthis theory (tor edged before r-ippsopp"ted it. The standpoint is evidence of outer eximple,J. S. lr'l'iil'suiJ*)it as follows' There atlhe facti t:h:i and of inner perception and wg-can orlly Let

29>

fr.r-tirhuy-.u"-. "ri@1 thesepercepti,r,t,

t11',lp^E]::j:

phytl:il the present caseas fbllowsi-I-kf,'5$'Th€T6'ffgt, 1Y::: and,lts modlncabody physical own my I know its modifications;

of the latter are tions. Further, I know thai the modifications likewise given' conditions and implications of my experiences' physical appearal:-es Now, becausein this casethe succession
ffi;#';i3il;;;;;"on

mainThis'thet>rr is simplvignored' ^--^.---r..-

r - , , r r- h . , s i c a l

soulless alld

is required to After our earlier expositions, nothing further theory'ar genetic a as refute the cloctrine of iirference by analogy order to in longer iittle Nevertheless,I would tik. io tingti httt a we when theory the take this odium of complete abiurdity fr.m

27

onlv consider it from the one side Even so, we cannot deny that inl-erencesby analogy do occur tr knowledge of foreign experience. It is easilypossiblefor another'sexpressionto remind me of meaning 1lneof mv own sothat I ascribeto hisexpressionits r-rsual ftrr me. Only then can we assumethe comprehension of atrother 'I'he infer"1" u'ith a bodilv expression as a psvchicexpression. enceby analogy replacesthe empathyperhaps denied. It does not vield perception but a more or leisprobable knorvledge of the fbreign experience.a2Further, thistheory does not really intend to give a genetic explanation,thouqhit also occurs as such, and so <30> \\'e must present it here with the others. Rather, it intends to usneis. lt specifiesthe fbrm in u'hichknowledge of loreign conis "possible." But the valueof such an empty form, not sciousness oriented toward the nature of krowledge itself, is more t.han doubtful. Exactlr how appropriate the inference by analogy rvould be for such a demonstrationcannot be treated here. 'l'hus we conclude from our critrcalexcursions that nr-rneof the cul'rent genetic theories can accountfor empat\y. Of course, we carr guess rvhy this is so. Before ooecan delineate the genesis of s o m e t h i n g ,o n e m u s l k n o n $ ' h a t r ti s . ' 6. Discussion in Terms of Scheler'sTheory of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness We have still to measure empathl against one more theory of fbreign consciousnessthat deviate' considerably from all those discussedso far. According Lo'ScheLer,{'' lve perceive the foreign "1" n'ith its expertenceinwardly jutt as we perceive our own "1." (We need not go into his polemic againstempathy, since it is not directed against rihat we call empathy.)lnitially there is "a neutral stream of experience" and out 'own" and "foreign" experi'Ib encesare first gradually crystallizeoout of it. illustrate this, he cites the fact that we can experiercea thought as our olvn, as foreign, or even as neither of there.Further, initially we do not c()me upon ourselves as isolated.but as placed in a n'orld of ps1'chicexperience.At first we experienceour o\\'11experiences mr,rchlessthan thoseof our environment.Finally, out of our ou'n

28

<31>

<32>

Edith Stein

experiences we only perceive rvhat moves along prescribed courses, especially those objecrs for which we already have a previous term.{{ -I'his bold rheory, starrdir-rgin opposition to all theories up to now, has something extremelv seductive about it. Nevertheless, to get some clarity, we must examine precisely all the concepts used here. f'hus we first ask l'hat inner perception is. scheler answersthat inner perception is not the perception of self, for ye can perceive ourselves as our bodies outwardly, too. Rather, inner perceprion is distinguished from outer perception by beirft directed roward acrs. It is the type of act giving us rhe psychic. These nvo modes of perception are not to be disti'guished on the basis of a difference of objects. Conversely,the physical is ro be distinguished from the psychic because,in principle, it is differently given.a5Nevertheless,Scheler's critique does not seem to corroborare earlier attempts r() reciprocally timit psychic and physicala6by distinguishing criteria. It deals solely with an essen_ tial difference of givennessand not rvirh the distinction between objects having different modes of being. To such objects a different mode .f givenness would essentially fwesensgezetslichl correspond. \4'e could accept "inner perception" in this sense of a definitely constituted act without creating a conflict r.r,ith our doctrine of empathy. (A more precise explication follows immediately.) It is possible to differentiate within this speciesof "inner perception" acts in which our own and foreign experience are given. But this is still not sufficiently clear. What do ..on,n" and ,.for_ eign" mean in the context in rvhich Scheler usesthem? If we take his discussion of a neutral stream of experience seriously, we cannot conceive of how a differentiation in this stream can occur. But such a stream of experience is an absolutelyimpossiblenotion because every experience is by nature an ,.I's" experience that cannot be separated phenomenally from the .,I" itself. It is only becausescheler fails to recognize a pure "I," alwavsraking "I'l as "psychic individual," that he speaks of an experience presenr before "I's" are constituted. Naturally, he cannot exhibit such an "I-less" experience. Every casehe brings up presupposesour own as well as the foreign "I" and does not verify his theory at all.

The Essenceof Acts of Empathy

29

Onll if we leave the phenomenological sphere do these terms nrake good sense."Own" and "foreign" then mean: belonging to different individuals, i.e., different substantial,qualitatively elaborated, psychic subjects.Both these individuals and their experienceswould be similarly accessibleto inner perception. Suppose that I do not feel mine, but foreign feelings. Accordingly, this means that feelings have penetrated my individual from the foreign individual. I am initially surrounded by a world of psychic ()ccurrences,that is to say,at the same time as I discover that my body is in the world of my outer experience against the background of the spatial 'world spread out boundlesslyon all sides,I also discover that my psychic individual is in the rvorld of inner experience, a boundlessworld of psychic individuals and psychic lif'e. All this is certainly incontestable. But the basis here is altogether different from ours. We have excluded from t}le field of our investigation this whole world of inner perception",our own -fhey are individual and all others, together with the outer world. not within, but t.ranscend,the sphere of absolute givenness,of pure consciousness.Tha "I" has another meaning in this sphere of absolute consciousness,being nothing but the subject of experience living in experience. In these terms, the question_of whether an experience is "mine" or another's becomessenseless. What I primordially feel is preciselyrvhat I feel irrespectiveof this f'eeling'srole in the sum total of my individual experiencesor of lrorvit originates (perhapsby contagion of feeling or not).17These experiencesof my on,n, the pure experiencesof the pure "I," are given to me in re flection. This means that the "I" turns back and arvayfrom its object and looks at the experience of this object. moren <33> Now wf at distinguishesreflectionlp:"InrugMp,'9n.

exacr|y.t;@,T;il1.r

(

actual turning toriErclan'---actual experien-ce,while inner perception itself can be non-actual. In principle, it can also encompass the fringe of non-actualities that form m)' present experietrce together rvith perception. Further, I may vien'my experiencesin such a lvay that I no longer consider them as such, but as evidence of the transcendenceof my individual and its attributes. My recttllectionsannounce my memory to me; my acts of outer percep-

30

<34>

Edith Stein

tion announce the acutenessof my senses(not to be taken as sense organs, of course);my volition and conduct announce my energy' etc. And these attributes declare the nature of my individual to me. We can designate this viewing 25 inner perception of self. We have reliable evidence for the contention that Scheler's of "self in the senseof "inner perception" is the ap-perc_eption rhe indiirdUalTndtrlFerperiences r+'ithin the conrext o{' individual experience. He ascribescomplexes of experience to the objects of inner perception which come to givennessin a uniform intuitive act, for example, my childhoo6'+s (Of course, I would not call this perception, but one of those "abridgments of memalluded to earlier' We must reserve an ory" fErinnerungsabrAg'es] analysisof this for the phenomenoiogy of represetltatiotralcolrsciousness.) F u r t h e r , h e m e a n st h a t t h e " t o t a l i t y o f o u r ' I " ' i s g i v e n i n i n n e r perceptionjust as in the act of outer perception; not single sgns-ual qualities, but the totality of nature is given.aeScheler could not characterizethis totality more clearly than as an apperception of a transcendence even if he stressed the difference betn'een the unity in variety characteristicof inner and of outer perception (or "separateness"and "togetherness")."0This "I" is fundamentally different from the pure "1," the subject of'actual experience' The unities constituted in inner perception are different frt>m the unity of having an experience. And the inner perception giving us these complexes of experience is different from the reflection in which we comprehelrd the absolute being of an actnal experience. Scheler himself distinguishesbetween reflection and innerperception,5rwhich he denies is a compreheusion of acts in cQntrast with reflection. Thus it is still more striking that he did not seethe his owt.tand Husserl'sconcept of "inner perdistinctior-r'between ceptiol't," and that he even carries on a pcllemicagainst Husserl's preference for inner perception over outer.:'2Precisely because the term "inner perception" could have a number of meanings, Husserl substituted "reflection" for it to designate the absolute givennessof experience.f':]Nor lvould he sa)' that inner percept i o r r i r r S c h e l e r ' ss e r l s e\ \ a s n r o r e c o t l c l u s i r et h a n o u t e r p e r c e P tion.

The Essenceof Actsof Empatht

3l

The difference between reflection and inner perception also becomes very clear in a cor.rsiderationof the dtceptionsof inner perception presented in Scheler's ldolenlehre.Should I be deceived in my feelings for another person, this,lsgspliqn cannot mean that I comprehend an act of love by refiectionthat is r-rot present in fact. There is no such "reflective dec,:ption."Should I comprehend an actual erotic emotion in reflrction, I have an absolute not to be interpreted away in any ::ranner.I can be deceived in the object of my love, i.e., the prrson I thought I comprehended in this act may in fact be drferent, so that I mplghglggd a phantom. But the love was ::ill genuine. perc-o. ha@ndure as one exiectid, but ceases rery shortly. This is not a reason, either, fbr ,aying it was not genuine as long as it lasted. But Scheler is no: thinking of such deceptions. 'fhe first kind of "idol" he presents is a decellivedirecting. As u'e live in the feelings of our environment, $'e 4ke them for our own, though they do not clarify our own feelirSsat all. We take <35> I-eelings"acquired by reading" to be our ort'n fe1 instance, the young girl thinks she feelsJuliet's love.sa I think we still need distinctions and thorouih analyseshere. Suppose that I have taken over from my envi rnment a hatred and contempt for the members of a particular :aceor party. For example, as the child of conservativeparents, I ::ayhateJews and social democratsr gr raised with more liberal e1vs,I mav hate 'Junkers" [aristocratic landowners]. Then thi rvould be an entirely genuine and pincerehatred savefor the i,:t that it is based on an empathic valuing, rather than on a prirjp4l21 one. l-his hatred may also be increased by contagion ol'eeling ro such a d e g r e e t h a t i t i s n o t l e g i t i m a t e l yr e l a t e d t o t h e : - 1 d i s v a l u e .T h u s I am not under a deception rvher-rI comprehen, my hatred. T1a,o deceptions can be present here: ( I ) a deception -: value (as I think I comprehend a disvaluethat does not exist at a r;(2) a deception about my.person, if I were to imagine, on thr Sasisof my ciwn insight, that these feelings are exalted and r,'ic my prejudice as "loyalty." In the second casethere is really a c-reprionof inrrer Perception but certainly not a deception of rer'g1isp.5"I canpot be clear in reflection abor-rtthe failure of tht tasic primordial

32

< \ J1U6l>

<27

Edith Stein

valuing becauseI cannot reflect on an act that is not present. But should I carry out such an act and bring it to givennessto myself, I gain clarity and thus also the possibilityof unmasking the earlier deception by comparing it with this case. Feelings "acquired by reading" are no differqnt. Should the enanrored schoolboy think he feels Romeo's passion, this does not mean he believes he has a stronger feeling than is actually present. He actually feels passionbecausehe has blown his spark into a flame bv borrowed embers. This flame will go out of its own accord as soon as the embers die out. Becausea primordial valuing is lacking as a foundation, we also have :'norr-genuinen.rrt here. Th-is rcsults in a false relarionstip betueen the febling, on the one hand, and its subject and object, on the other. And the youth's deception is that he atrributes Romeo's passion to himself, not that he thinks he has a strong feeling. Now let us look at the other deceptivedirecting where experiencesactuallv present do not come to givenness.I do not seehow we can call a feeling actually present a deception if, becauseit is -fhe beyond traditional lines, it is not perceived. turning to$'ard our o\\rnexperience naturally means the cessationof the foreign attitude. It requires special circumstancesto direct attention to our orvn experiencing. Thus, if I do rlot notice a feeLng becaus.e norhing has made me aware thar there is "such a thing," this is e n t i l e l y n a t u r a l a n d i s d e c e p t i v ea s l i t t l e a s m v n o l f , e a r i n " ga sclundin my environment or overlooking an object in my visual field.56Scheler is certainly not discussingdeceptivereflection, for "reHection" is the comprehension of an experience, and it is trivial to saythat an experienceI comprehend does not elude me. It is a different story if the experiencedoes not elude me but I take it, rather, to be imagined becauseit does not fit in with mv ertlirclearlt consciousmotive for our conduct or there

The Essenceof Ach of Empathy

3Z

are other motives operating besides the moti'e before us. \te calrn()tbring these other motives clearly to gi'enness ro ourselves becausethey are not actual, but "background," experiences.For r h e r e f l e c t i r r gg l a n c e t o b e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a n e x p e r i e n c e ,t h r s experience must assume the form of a specific ..cogito." For example, supposethat I go into the military serviceas a"volunteer under the impression that I am doing so out of pure patriodsm ard do not notice that a longing for adventure, vanity, or a dissatisfactionwith my present situation also play a parr: The;r these secondary motives withdrarr; from rly ..fl..iing'glrn...Juit as if they were not yet, or no longer,3.t"'i1. I am th-us-u'deia,r inner perceptual and value -deception if I take this action as it appears to me and interpret it as evidence of a noble character.. People are generally inclined to ascribe to rhemselvesbetter motives than they actually have and are not consciousof manv of their emotional impulses at all5' because these feelings arready seem to have a disvalue i. the mode of non-actuality,and people do not allow them to become actual at alr. But this does noi .u.,r. the feelings ro cease enduring or functioning. The fact that we ca' feel past or future events to be valuable or rvorthlessrvherr thev themselves are no longer, or not yet, ..conceived" is also based on this difference betrveeu u.trurity and non-actuaritv.5s Tl.rus,an actual valuing can be basedon a non-actual memory or expectation. We can hardly hold that this would be a pure valuing without a basic, theoretical act. There are no such^experience's c that an experience is differintlv .,presented', in the contexts of the perceptions into u'hich it enteri. No matter how figurativerv n'e take it, a' experie.ce comprehended in reflecti
conclusion, by this contrast rr,ecan 'nclerstand why Scheler ,.lt distinguishes betwee. "peripheral" experiences that sever o.e

Edith Stein

The Essenceof .\cts of Enpathl

an()ther in sequenceand "cetrtral" experierlcesthat are giverl as a u n i t y r e v e a l i n gt h e u n i t y o f ' t h e " 1 . " W e h a v e a s e q u e n c ea t a l l artother. But levels in the sensethat one actual experience ser,'ers s()me experiences disappear as soon as they have faded out (a sensorypain, a serrsorydelight, an act of perception), while others c()lttinue to endure in the mode of non-actrrality.The latter lirrm those unities that enable us to glance perceptually back into the past (at a love, a hatred, a friendship), and they constitute the c o m p l e xs t r u c t u r ct h a t c a nc o m c l o g i v e t t n e s1so u s i n a n i n t u i t i v e act, sr.lchas my childhood, my student days, etc.(ir I hope this exhibits the difference betweenreflection in which actual experience is given t r e i g ne x p e r i e n c ef a c i n g m e . -I'he level where I am at the fi;reign "1" and explain its cxperience bv living it a{ter the other seemsto be much rrore parallel to t h e p r i m o r c l i a l e x p e r i e n c e i t s e l f t h a n t o i t s g i v e n n e s si n i n n e r perception.

7. Miinsterberg's Theory of the Experience of Foreign Consciousness

34

<39>

35

It is still n.rorediffictrlt fbr me to sift the phettomenal contetrt ( ) r r to f ' M i i n s t e r b e r g ' st h e o r y t h a n i t w a s i n S t h e l e r . O u r e x p e r . i ence of lirreign subjects is t() cortsistof the underscanding of tbreign acts of rvill. He agreeswith our analysisbl characteriz.ing t h i s a c t o { ' t r t r d e r s t a n d i n ga s a l l a c t i n r v h i c h t h e " f i l r e i g n r v i l l e l t t e r s i n t o m i n e " a n d s t i l l r e m a i t r st h a t < l f t h c o t h e r . B r t t u ' e c a n n ( ) ts e e u ' h y t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n gs h t t u l d b e c o t l f i r t e dt o a c t s ( ) f r ^ ' i l l .A s r v e s a \ \ ' ,i t a p p l i e s t o a l l k i n d s o f ' e m p a t h i c a q t s . N ( ) w N'[iinsterbergtakes "act of will" in a broader sense.\fle incltrdgs u n d e r i t a l l " a t t i t u d e s " t h a t " a n t i c i p a t e , "t h i s a n t i c i p a t i n sc l i n s irrg to attitudes filr the one u'ho comprehendsthem. But rve cann()t accePt his thesiseven il-tthis broader sense.An in the empathized mc-rodis an experienceof foreign crlnsciousness include compreattitude Both is. same senseas an empathizecl h e n d i n g t h e f o r e i g n s u b j e c t .W h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e sa t t i t u d e si s t h a t the anticipatiotr inherer.rtin tl-remcontainsa contrast betu'eell the
<'10>

Chapter III

The Constitution of the Psycho-Physical Indiaidual e have now achieved an essentialdescription of the empathic act and a critique of historical theories of foreign from the point of vielv of our description. We still consciousness have a far greater undertaking before us. We must treat empathy as a problem of constitution and answer the question of how the objects in the usual theories, such as the psycho-physicalindividual, personality,etc., arise within consciousness. Within the framework of a short investigation we cannot hope even to approach the ansn'er to this question. We shall have fulfilled our purpose if u'e succeed in showing the paths to this goal and that the investigationsof empathy so far could not be satisfactorybecause,except for a very few attempts, these thinkers have overlooked these basic questions. This is very clear in Lipps, who has certainly achieved the most progress toward our goal. He seemsto be bound by the phenomenon of the expression of experiencesand repeatedly comes back to that from which he also wants to begin. With a few words he lays aside the profusion of questions present in the treatment of this problem. For instance, he saysabout the bearer of these phenomena of expression, "lVe believe a consciouslife to be bound to certain bodies by virtue of an 'inexplicable adjustment of our spirit' or a 'natural instinct."' 'f his is nothing more than the proclamation of wonder, declar- <41 > it

38

Edith Stein

i n g t h e b a n k r u p t c yo { ' s c i e n t i f i ci n v e s t i g a t i o n A . n d i f s c i e n c ei s n o t p e r m i t t e d t o d o t h i s , t h e n e s p e c i a l l yn o t p h i l o s o p h y . F o r h e r e there is no longer any domain into which it can push unsolved 'fhis q u e s t i o n sa s a l l o t h e r c l i s c i p l i n ecsa n . m e a n st h a t p h i l o s o p h y must give the final answer,gain final clarity. rv!'ehave final clarity and no questions remain open rvhen we have achieved what we call progres5-1|rs constitution of'transcendental objects in imm a n e n t l yg i v e n . p u r e c o n s c i o u s n e s T s .h i s i s t h e g o a l o f ' p h e n o m enology. Now let us lurn to the c()nstitution of'the indiviclual and make c l e a r , i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e ,w h a t a n i n d i v i d u a l i s . l. The Pure "f" So far rve have alrvaysspoken of the pure "1" as the

\{'e ca'r take the "1" in a seconclsenseas the Lrnity.f'a stream of c o n s c i o u s n e s sw.e b e g i n w i t h t h e " l " a s t h e s u b j e c t ' I a n a c t u a l experience. However, when we reflect on this experience, we find that it is not is.lated, but ser against the backgr.und of a stre:rm of such experiences more ()r less clearly' and distinctll'

Indiuidual Constitutionof the Psycho-Physical

39

-l'he "I" of this experience was not alwaysin it but shifted siven. irr,.r o. was drau'n into it from another experience, and so on. Going over these experiences,we continually come upon experiencesin w'hich the present "I" had orrce lived. This is even true rvhen u'e can no longer directly grasp the experience, finding it ltecessaryto view it through rememberilrg represetrtation' Preciselythis affiliation o1-all the stream's experienceswith the present, living, pure "I" constitutes its inviolable ur-rity.Norv "other" streams of consciousnessface this "same" stream: the srream of the "I" faces those of'the "you" and the "he." Their selfnessand clthernessare based on those of their subject. Hort'ever, they are not only "others," but also "varied" becauseeach one has its peculiar experiential coutent. Sir.rceevery single experience of a stream is particularly characterizedbv its position in the total experiential context, it is also characterizedapart from belonging to an "I." Thus it is also qualitative as the experience are qualitaof this and no other "l," and streamsof consciousness tively distinguished b1' virtue of-their experiential content. But even this qualitative distinction does not yet take us to what is usually understood by an individual "1" or an individual. characterized as "it itself and no The stream of conscior-rsness, other" u'ith a nature peculiar to it, results in a good sense of precisely liniited individuality. Qr"ralitativepeculiarity u'ithout selfnesswould be insufficient for individualization becausewe can also arrive at oualitative variation of the stream ot'consciousness by thinking of'the one grven stream as qualitativelv modified in -I'his does not mean that its affiliation the course of experience. "I" only becomes another by <43> ceases; stream n,ith the same the "I." and qualitative variation toSelfness belonging to another senses-constitute a further in two individuality gether-thus 'I' " of common parlance, i.e,, step in progress to the "individual a characteristicallystructured psycho-physicalunity.

3. The Soul N e x t u ' e c a n e x a m i n e t h e i n d i v i d u a l u n i t y o f ' t h e p s y c h ea s s u c h u ' h i l e n e g l e c t i n g t h e l i v i n g b o d y a n d p s y c h o - p h y s i c arle l a t i o n ships. Our urriform, isolated stream of consciousrress is lr()t our

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soul. But, as we already saw in examining inner perception. am()ng our experiencesthere is orre basic experience given to us which, together u'ith its persistent attributes, becomes apparenr 'I'his i n o u r e x p e r i e n c e sa s t h e i d e n t i c a l " b e a r e r " o f ' t h e m . is the substantialsoul. We have already become acquainted with single -fhe such psvchicattributes, too. acLlteness of our sensesapparent in our outer perceptions is such an at.tribute. Another is the -fhe energ! apparent in our conduct. tension or laxity' of our volitions manif'eststhe vivacity and strength or the weaknessof o u r w i l l . I t s p e r s i s t e n c ti's f o u n d i n i t s d u r a t i o n . T h e i n t e n s i t yo f o u r f e e l i n g s ,t h e e a s ew i t h u ' h i c h t h e y a p p e a r ,t h e e x c i t a b i l i t yo f our sentimentse , t c . d i s c l o s eo u r d i s p o s i t i o n . It is hardly necessaryto follow out these relationships further. W e t a k e t h e s o u l t o b e a s u b s t a n t i a lu n i t y w h i c h , e n t i r e l y a n a l o l l e n t e n t sa n d f l ( ) u st o t h e p h y s i c a lt h i n g , i s m a d e u p o f c a t e g o r i c a e the sequenceof'catep;ories.Its elements appear as individual instancesr>f these categt>ries,and the soul firrms a parallel to the sequenceof experiential categories.Among these categoricalelements there are s()methat point beyond the isolated soul to col)rrecti()nw s i t h o t h e r p s y c h i ca s w e l l a s p h y s i c a lu n i t i e s ,t o i m p r e s si
Constitutionof the Psycho-PhlsicalIndiuidual

4l

I-)roposed division between soul and body was an artificial one, for t i-re roul is always necessarilya soul in a body. What is the body? F{or, .' and as what is it given to us? (a) The Giuennessof the Liuing Body \.\ e again proceed from the sphere forming the basisof all our i r -rve ;tigations: that of pure consciousness.How is my body lLeibl c ( )ns tituted vvithin consciousness?I have my physical body I NAr Oerl given once in acts of outer perception. But if we suPpose it to be given to us in this manner alone, we have the strangest r > l l e - c t . ' l h i s w o u l d b e a r e a l t h i n g , a p h y s t c a lb o d y , w h o s e m o t i \ *1re. I successiveappearancesexhibit striking gaps. It would withl-r, lld its rear side with more stubbornness thart the moon and ir-. vit e me continually to consider it from new sides.Yet as soon as I -rm about to carry out its invitation, it hides these sidesfrom me. 'l-.r b ,e sure, things that withdrar.r'from the glance are accessibleto t t ' u g h . B u t p r e c i s e l l ' t h e r e l a t i o n s h i pb e t u ' e e ns e e i n ga n d t o u c h ir -. q i s different here than anywhere else.Everything else I seesays tt ' n: e, "'fouch me. I am really what I seem to be, am tangible, <45> arrd n o t a p h a n t o m . " A n d w h a t I t o u c h c a l l st o m e , " O p e n y o u r c\ es and 1ou will seeme ." The tactile and visual senses(asone can sl-.,ea < of sense in the pure sphere) call each other as witnesses, tl- ou gh they clo not shift the responsibility on olle another. I'hris unique defect <>fthe outu'ardly perceived physical b<>dyis in co ntrast with another peculiarity. I can appr t h e r tl-r ..ngj,s and the movement of my' physical body, is inconceivable. N , rr ,s it possibleto seehow we comprehend the movement of our ()\-- n physicai bodies at all as long as we maintain the fiction that or- 1 in outer percepti()n and not 1-rhysical body is only c()nstituted 'I'hus 2l\ a :haracteristically living body. we must say, more pret ' i - - € , 1 r , t h a t e v e r y o t h e r t > b - i e cits g i v e n t o m e i n a n i n f i n i t e l y v r t - i a b l e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f a p p e a r a n c e sa n d o f c h a n g i n g p o s i t i o n s , ;ttr I u here are alsotimesu'hen it is not given to me. But this one

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ob.ject(my physicalbody) is giverrto me ir.rsuccessiveappearances only variable within very narrow limits. As long as I have my eyes o p e n a t a l l , i t i s c o n t i n u a l l yt h e r e w i t h a s t e a d f a so t btrusiveness, alwayshaving the same tangible nearnessas no other object has. It is always "here" while other objects are always "there." B u t t h i s b r i n g s u s t o t h e l i m i t o f o u r s u p p o s i t i o na n d w c m u s t suspendit. For even if'we shut our eyesrightly and stretch out our arms, in fact allowing no limb to contact another so that we can neither touch nor seeour physicalbody, even then we are not rid of it. Even then it stands there inescapablyin full embodiment (hence the name), and we lind ourselvesbound to it perpetually. Precisely this a{Iiliati
Constitutionof the Psycho-PhlsicalIndiuidual

43

of'my living body, together u,ith everything spatial outside of it, to a "zero point of orientation" which my living body surrounds. 'I'his zero point is not to be geometrically localizedat one point in my physical body; nor is it the same for all data. lt is localized in the head for visual data and in mid-body for tactile data. Thus, rvhatever ref'ers to the "l" has no distance from the zero point. arrd all that is given at a distance from the zero point is also given a t a d i s t a n c ef r o m t h e " I . " However, this distance of bodily parts lrom me is fundamentally different from the distance of other things from each otlrer and f rom me. Two things in spaceare at a specificdistance <47 > Il-om each other. Thel' can approach each other and even come into contact, whereupon their distance disappears.It is also possible (if the objects are not materiall,v impenetrable, but, for instance,are hallucinatory objects of different visual hallucinators) fbr them to occllpy the same portion of space.Similarly, a thing can approach n.re,its distance from me can decrease,and it can contact not me, but my physicalbody. Then the distancefrom my physical body, but not from me, becomes zero. Nor does the distanceof the thing f rom the zero point become the same as the distanceofthe contacted part ofthe physical body from rhe zero p<>int.I could never say that the stone I hold in my hand is the same distance or "only a tiny bit farther" from the zero point than the hand itself. The distance ofthe parts ()f my living body from me is completely ir-rcomparablewith the distanceof foreign physical bodies fiom me. The living body as a rvhole is at the z-ero point of orientation with all physical bodies outside of it. "Body space" fLeibraum]and "outer space" are completely different from each other. 1\Ierely perceiving outwardly, I would not arrive at the living body, nor merely "perceiving bodily" fLeibuahrnehmendl, at the outer world. But the living bod1,is constituted in a two-folcl nlanner as a sensed(bodily perceived) living body and as an outwardly pcrceived physical body of the outer lr'orld. And in this 'I'herefore, cloubledgivennessit is experienced as the sante. ir has a location in outer spaceand fills up a portion of this space. -I'here is still something to sav aboLrtthe relati
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usually comes up in other contexts. we usually look at sensations ,.give" us the outer n'orld, and in this sensewe separate as whar .,sensatioi" from "what is sensed" or "content of sensation" ..sensatlonas function" in stumpfs sense.we separate,for fiom example, the seen red and the possessingof this red.65I cannot distinagree with him.'fhe object'sredis "perceived" and I must of The analysis is perceived. what and gi,irh b.t*.en perception at the I can look "sensory that so dara" to p.r..pti.rn leais me p..."ptio,-'ofqualitiesas-an..objectificatiorrofsensorydata,''But thisdoesnotmakequalitiesintoperceptionsnorperceptionsinto qualities or giving aits. As constitu.entsof outer perception, both are elements not further anall'zable' Non,if we considersensationin terms of the side turned torvard the living body, we find an entirely analogous phenomenal state of a of affairs. I can speakof a "sensed" living body as little as ,.sensed"object in the outer world. However, this also requires an objectifyingapprehension.Ifmyfingertipscontactthetable,I ha"veto clisiing.rirh,first, the sensationof touch' the tactile datum nor further divisible.secondly, there is the hardnessof the table and, thirdly, the touchwith its correlativeact of outer perception ..bodlly percePtion.,'What act of correlative the and ing fingertip mikes'the connectionbetrveen sensationand bodilv Perceptioll particularly intimate is the fact that sensationsare given at the iiving body to the living body as senser' An investigationof all kinds of sensationsin their meaning for b o d i l v p e r c e p t i o n w o u l d b e b e y o r r d t h e s c o p e o f t h i s..outer', work.Butwe and must discussone more point. We said that the ,.bodily perceived" living body is given as the same.This requires still further elucidation.I not only see my hand and bodily perceive it as sensing,but I also "see" its {ields of sensationcorlstitured for me in bodily perception. on the other hand, if I conbody, I have an sciousll emphasizecertain parts of mv living ,,image" of itris part of the physical body. 'fhe one is give' rvith the oiher, thougir rheyare not perceived together. This is exactly to the province of outer percePtion. we n9t only see analr_rgous feel its hardness,but n'e also "see" its hardness.The and taLle the robes in Van DVck'spaintingsal.enot only as shiny as silk but also as smooth and as sofi as silk. Psychologistscall this phenomenon

Constitutionof the Psycho-PhlsicalIndiuidual

45

fusion and usually reduce it to "mere association."This "mere" indicates psychology'stendency to look at explanation as an explaining away, so that the explained phenomenon becomes a <49> "subjective creation" without "objective meaning'" We cannot accept this interpretation. Phenomenon remains phenomenon' An explanation is very desirable,but this explanation adds nothing to or subtracts nothing from it. Thus the certainty of tactile qualities would continue to exist and lose none of its merit whether or not associationcan explain it. 'fo be sure, we do not think such an explanation possible because it contradicts the "phenomenon" of association.Associat i o n i s t l p i c a l l v e x p e r i e n c e da s " s o m e t h i n g r e m i n d i r r g m e o l something." For example, the sight of the table corller reminds me I once bumped myself on it. However, this corner's sharpness is not remembered, but seen. Here is another instructive example: I seea rough lump clf'sugarand know or rememtrer that it is sweet. I do not remember it is rough (or only incidentally), nor see its sweetness.By contrast, the flower's fragrance is really sweet and does not remind me ol'a s\^/eettaste. This begins to ()pen up perspectivesfor a phenomenology of the sensesand of senseperceptions that, of course, we cannot go into here. At this point we are only interested in applving these insights to our case' -I'he seen living body does not remind us it can be the scene of manifold sensations.Neither is it merely a physical thing taking up the same spaceas the living body given as sensitivein bodily perception. It is given as a sensing,living body. So far we have only considered the living body at rest. Now we can go a step farther. Let us supposethat I (i.e., my living body as a rvhole) nrove through the ro()m. As long as we disregarded the constitution of the living body, this was not a peculiarly characterized phenomenon. It was no different than the kaleidoscopic shifting ol-the surrounding outer world. Nou' the experience that "I mr>ve" becomesentirely new. It becomes the apperceptior.rof our own movement based on manifold sensationsand is entirely different from the outwardly perceived movement of physicaL b < l d i e sN . o w t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o no f ' o u r o w n m o v e m e n t a n d t h e alteration of'the outer world are combined in the fbrm of "if <50> . . . t h e n . " " l f ' I m o v e , t h e n t h e p i c t u r e o f m y e n v i r o n m e n ts h i f t s . "

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Individual Constitutionof the Psycho-Physical

This isjust as true for the perception ofthe single spatial thing as for the cohesivespatial world, and, similarly, for movements of parts of the living body as fbr its movement as a whole. If I rest my hand on a rotating ball, this ball and its movement are given ro me as a successionof changing tactile data merging into an intention permeating the whole. These dara can be comprehended together in an "apperceptive grasp," a unified act ofouter perception. Data have the same sequenceif my hand glides over the still ball, but the experiencethat "I move" supervenesanew and, with t h e a p p e r c e p t i o no f t h e b a l l , g o e s i n r o t h e f b r m o f " i f . . . r h e n . " Visual dara are analogous.While being still, I can see the changing appearancesof'a rolling ball; and the "shadesof' the ball" can look the same if the ball is still and I move my head or only my e y e s .1 ' h i s m o v e m e n l , a g a i n , i s g i v e n t ( ) m e i n " b o d i l v p e r c e p tion." 'I'his is how parts of the living body are consrituted as moving organs and the perceprion of the sparial world as dependent on the behavior of these ()rgans.But this does not yet show us how we comprehend the movements of living bodies as movements of physicalbodies.When I move one of my limbs, besidesbecoming bodily aware of my own movement, I have an ()uter visual or tacrile perception of physicalbody movemenrsto which the limb's changed appearancestestify. As the bodily perceived and outwardly perceived limb are interpreted as the same, so there also arisesan identical coincidence of the living and physical body's 'I'he movemenr. moving living body becomesthe moved physical body. And the fact that "I move" is "seen with" the movement of a part of my physicalbody. The unseenmovement of the physical body in the experience of "I move" is comprehended jointly. The afliliation of the "I" with the perceiving body requires some further elucidation. The impossibility of being rid of the b o d y i n d i c a t e si t s s p e c i a g l i v e n n e s sT. h i s u n i o n c a n n o t b e s h a k e n ; the b
myself can undertake a regrouping by moving things farther or nearer or exchanging their places. Or else I can take another "standpoint" so that I change my "here" insteadof their "there." Every step I take disclosesa new bit of the world to me or I seethe old one from a new side. In so doing I alwaystake my living body along. Not only I am always "here" but also it is; the various "distances" of its parts from me are only variations within this "here." Nou', instead of in reality, I can also "regroup" my environment "in thought alone." I can fantasize. For example, I can fantasize my room empty of furniture and "imagine" how it l'ould look then. I can also take an excursion through the n'orld of fantasy. "In thought" I can get up from my desk, go into a corner of the room, and regard it from there. Here I do not take my living body along. Perhaps the "I" standing there in the corner has a fantasizedliving body, i.e., one seen in "bodily fantasy,"if I may say so. Moreover, this body can look at the living body fLeibkorperl at the desk it has left .just as well as ar other things in the room. Of course, this living body then also is a representedobject, i.e.,one given in representing outer intuition. Finally, the real living body fLeib] has not disappeared, but I actuallycontinue to sit at my desk unseveredfrom my living body. 'fhus my "I" has been doubled,66and, even though the real "I" cannotbe releasedfrom its body, there is at leastthe possibilityof "slipping out of one's skin" in fantasy. An "I" u'ithout a body is a possibility.6iBut a body without an "1" is utterly impossible.To fantasize my body fbrsaken by my "1" means to fantasizemy living body no longer, but a completely parallelphysical body, to fantasizemy corpse.(If I leave my living body, it becornes for me a physical body like others. And, instead of my leaving it, should I think of it away from me, this removal is not "one's o\ /n movement" but a pure movement of the physical 'fhere body. is still another way of showing this. A "wiihered" limb without sensationsis not part of my living body. A fbot ''gone to sleep" is an appendagelike a foreign physicalbody that I cannotshake off lt liesbeyond the spatial zone of my living body rntowhich it is once more drawn when it "awakens." Every movenent I make of it in this condition is like "moving an object," i.e.,

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Edith Stein

m y a l i v e m o v e m e n t e v o k e s a m e c h a n i c a lm o v e m e n t . A n d t h i s moving itself is not given as the living moving of a living body. For the living body is essentiallyconstituted through sensations:sens a t i o n sa r e r e a l c o n s t i t u e n t so f c o n s c i o u s n e sasn d , a s s u c h ,b e l o n g 'I'hus hou'could there be a living body not the body of to the "I." ,tr " I "l.'' W h e t h e r a s e n s i n g" l " i s c o n c e i v a b l ew i t h t > u ta l i v i n g b r d y i s another question. This is the questi<>n of rr'hether there could be -f sensationsin rvhich n
Constitutionof the Pslcho-PhlsicalIndiaiduaL

49

they issue fiom my "I." General et the same time als<1in me; similar to_sensualfeelings. Not position hybrid a have Ieelings ,.I" feels vigorous or sluggish,but I "notice this in all my ,,nty tt" every paln' every acttvlty ot linrbs." Every mental act, everyJoy' every movement I bodily every with to€iether thought, "-::i?"' "I" feel sluggish' My living when colorless and sluggish it ,.I.,"k", with me' Thus our familiar <54> lreclv and ^ii itt pu.tt are sluggish Not only do I seemy hand's appears' again fusitln of ,rhe,r,rmett,rrt sametime, but I also see at the sluggishness its feel and ir.,.ru.*.n, sluggishness' hand's We alu'ays the and movement the sluggish general feelingsas coming from the living body with "*rr..i.n.e ,,r'acceleraiing or hindering influence on the course of experie'ce. This is ti.,e even *'hen these general feelings arise in conr)ection with a "spiritual feeling,'' Moods are "general feelings" of a non-somaticnature, and so \\,eseparate them from strictly Fieneralf'eelingas a speciesof their ou,D.Cheerfulnessand melancholy do not fill the living body. It is rrOtcheerful or melancholyas it is vigorousor sluggish,nor could a purely spiritual being be sub.iect to moods. But this does not imply t'hai psychic and bodily general l-eelingsrun beside one ouoti,.. undisturbed. Rather, one seemsto have a reciprocal "influence" ()n the other. For instance,supPoseI take a trip t<-r recuDerateand arrive at a sulrny, pleasantsPot.While lookirrg at the view, I f-eelthat a cheerful mood wantsto take possessionof me, but cannot prevail because I f'eel sluggishand tired' "I shall be cheerful here as s()onas I have rested up," I say to myself' I nray know this fiom "previous experience,"yet its foundatit>n is al$rys in the phenomenon of the reciprocalaction of psychic aI-rd somatic exPeriences. Causality (Q Soul and Lit'ing Body, Psycho-Physical o{ The psychic is in essencecharacterizedby this deper-rdence Everything bodyis psychic experiences ()n somatic influences' psychic experiand in this area essentially bound c
i|l

55>

56>

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Edith Stein

Constitutionof the Psycho-PhlsicalIndiuiduaL

enon of "psycho-physicalcausality" we have delineatedand in the nature of sensations.And the soul together with the living body forms the "psycho-physical" individual. Now we must consider the character of so-called "spiritual 'fhe feelings." term already indicates to us that spiritual feelings are accidentally psychic and not body-bound (even if psychologists would not like to ackno$'ledge this consequence.)Anyone who brings the pure essenceof a bodiless subject to givenness would contend that such a subject experiencesno pleasure,grief, or aesthetic values. By contrast, many noted psychologistssee "complexes of organic sensations"in feelings. As absurd as rhis de{inition may seem as long as we consider feelings in their pure essence,in concrete psychiccontexts we actually do find phenomena which do not ground feelings, to be sure, though they can make them intelligible. "Our heart stops beating" for joy; u'e "wince" in pain; our pulse races in alarm; and we are breathless. Examples which all deal with psycho-physical causality, with effects of psychic experience on body functions, can be multiplied at will. When we think the living body away, these phenomena disappear,though the spiritual act remains. It must be conceded that God rejoices over the repentance of a sinner u'ithout feeling His heart pound or other "organic sensations,"an observation that is possiblewhether one believesin God or not. People can be convinced that in reality feelings are impossible rn,ithout such sensationsand that no existing being experiencesthem in their purity. However, feelings can be comprehended in their purity. and this appearanceof accompaniment is experienced exactly as such, as neither a feeling nor a component of one. The same thing can also be shown in casesof purely psychiccausality."I lose my wits" for fright, i.e., I notice my thoughts are paralyzed. Or "my head spins" for joy so that I do not know what I am doing and do pointlessthings. A pure spirit can also become frightened but it does not loseits wits. IIts understanding does not stand still.] It feels pleasureand pain in all their depth u'ithout these feelings exerting any effect. I can expand theseconsiderations.As I "observe" myself, I also discover causalrelationships betu'een my experiencesu'ith their announced capacitiesand the attributes of my soul. Capacitiescan

()ut and ber developed and sharpened by use as well as \vorn 'fhus my "power of observatil'the exact causal-geneticpsychology to n'hich psychologistsaspire in conjunction n"ith the example set by the modern scienceof physical nature. We must content ourselveshere with pointing out these problems u'ithout going into their solution.T0

50

(d) The Phenomenonof ExPression 'f

he considerationof the causaloperation of'feelings has led us f urther than u'e anticipated. Nevertheless,we have not exhausted r r h a t f e e l i n g sc a t t t e a c h u s . l ' h e r e a r i s e sa n e n p h c n o m e n o n r l { . the expression o{' feeling beside this appearance of accompaniment. I blush fbr shame, I irately clench my list, I angrily furrow 'l'he relation- <57> rny brow, I groan with pain, am.iubilant with.joy. ship of'feeling to expressionis completely different from that of f'eeling to the appearance of' physical accompatriment. In the lormei case I do not notice physical experier.rcesissuing out ol psychic ones, much lesstheir mere simultaneity. Rather, as I live through the f'eeling,I feel it terminate in an expressionclr release t'xpression o u l o f i t s e l f . ; rF e e l i r r gi l r i t s p u r e e s s e l l ( ei s n o l s o m e thing complete in itself'.As it were, it is loaded rvith an energ) u'hich must be unloaded. 'I'his unloading is possiblein different ways. We know one kind

2

Edith Stein

f unloading very well. Feelings releaseor motivate volitions and ions, so to speak. Feeling is related to the appearance of exion in exactly the same rvay.The samefeeling that motivates volition can also motivate an appearanceof expression. And ing by its nature prescribeswhat expressionand what volitiorr can motivat..tt By nature it must alwaysmotivate something, alwal'sbe "expressed." Only different forms of expression re possible. It could be objected here that in life feelingsoften arise without ivating a volition or bodily expression.As is u'ell-known, we ivilized people must "control" ourseh'esand hold back the ily expression of our feelings. We are similarly restricted in activities and thus in our volitions. 'Ihere is, of course. still e loophole of "airing" one's wishes.The employee who is alwed neither to tell his superior by contemptuouslook s he thinks im a scoundrel or a fool nor to decide ro remove hirn, can still ish secretly that he n'ould go to the devil. Or one can carry out in fantasy that are blocked in realitl'.One who is borrr into tricted circumstancesand cannot fulfill himself in reality caries out his desire for grear things by winning battles and pertrming wonders of valor in imagination. The creation of anher world where I can do what is forbidden to me here is itself a trm of- expression. Thus the man dying of thirst sees in the istance before him oasesn'ith bubbling springs or seas that ree him, as Gebsattel reDorts.T3 The jov filling us is not a meditative devotion to rhe pleasing ject. Rather, it is externalized in other situationsas \'e entirel; rround ourselveswith what is enioyable.We seek it in or-rrreal rrounding world or induce ir by"mem.rryor freely fantasizing epresentation. We neglect everything that does not fir in rvith it Lntil our frame of mind is in complete harmony with our surnding world. l'his peculiarity of expression requiresa comprehensive clariation. It is not enough to state that f-eelings influence the,,rerduction of ideas" and how frequenth this occurs, as psycholv usually does. But expression or its surrogate is possiblein still another way, nd to this the ..controlled" person who fbr social,aesthetic. or

Constitution of the psyho_physicat Indiaid.ual

Sz

ethical reasonsputs on a uniform count

rerreats. Feering canrerease ana*

f'eelingitself objective. The "i;.',iil[;i#TiliJ:l? i'r..-i,rat.r,,in this act o' reflection just as in a volition"*p..i.r.. or bodily expression. we usua,y say that reflection weakens.feelirrg ur,d'thut the 1sfls61ing man is incapabte of intense feelings.

<5g>

rnt i"ra.l";;.;:::::,ii9.

:i" ; r;J:,:,:::JJ::r., l. g:'tn:.f..l; ; ;..minates,,i. ;ts"; J""fif ::

J;#;t,s il:,',T.,;:ff :l;:;;:'r.,J,ff _'#:,:..::"".;;;ffi so rar, we can .:l:I"j. rhai

expression. The var

feeling by its narure demands

jlt'j,,.if pc,isib'ities.,Feerin'Jsujr H:::"l.ffi ;Hn*i:{ meaning, nor causally. Thebodily.*p..rrion,ii;;i#

forms issuing from feeling u"d'i;;;;

il:il,.

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thisexpression given. in.b"dilyp";;;;,i"r,. rr,. ,.ii. time I have ;,-,,"i;.n _y preasure rsexperientially externalized isu, ,n" ,un-'.-r,;" me as a stretching of my lips. ;*" i: As I live in th

irsexpression inihemode oractu"r,ii

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:t i. :.oi i.-,..d,;t; ;';;:;J;.::'Jj:l H i:'I Ji1J:' "; X,lI:

rsrakenapartin bodilyperception, a'd &p.es.lon is separated as independeniph..,on'"no". ir.rn. sametime it itself 1-1;lativelr Decomes productive.I-can stretch my mouth ,. il;;;,.;,fi,j "taken foi" a smile but actuallynor be a smile. perceptualpt .no-.'nu a[il', __ -Similar

i,,a.p"r, J.n;t"; ;.:;il Trllff:;TJ#: <60> ".:nuoi"*p.!r,ro.,' I., r"

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,,orastheansameoccurrf-l1t"tttt"n ",p.;;;;';i f, nf":ff;'#".:,ltT:;ill;**;

54

Edith Stetn

have said that it requires an observant glance to make the bodily perceived expressiotrinto an intentional object in the pregnant sense.Yet the felt expression, even though experienced in the mode o{'actuality,also requires a particular turrring of the glance to become a comprehended object. This turnilrg of'the glance is n()t the transition from non-actuality to actuality that is characteristic of all l'ron-theoreticalacts and their correlates.t" -I'he fact that I can ffeelings, they are simultaneously the expression of the psychic characteristicsthey anllouttce. For exanrple, the furious glance reveals a vehement state of mind. \,!'e shall conclude this investigation by a consideration of experiencesof will. (e) WilL and Liaing Body

6l>

Experiences o[ will also have an important meaning for the constitution of psycho-physicalunity. For one thing, they are important becauseof accompanying physical manif-estations(sensati()nsof tension, etc.), though we shall not consider these further becausewe are already farniliar with them from our discussion of f'eelings. Other phenomena of blated as feeling releasesor motivates v
Constitutionof the Pslcho-PhlsicalInditidual

55

possible"expression" in a wider sense),so will externalizesitself irr actior-r.To act is always to produce what is not present. The "freri" of *'hat is willed conforms to the "fiat!" of the volitional clecisionand to the "facere" of the subject of the rvill in action. 'l'his action can be physical. I can decide to climb a mountain and carry olrt my decision. It seems that the action is called forth errtirely by the will and is fulfilling the r,r'ill.But the action as a rlhole is willed, not each step. I rvill to climb the mountain. What is "necessary,"for this takes care "of itself." The will employs a psvcho-physicalmechanism to fulfill itself, to realize n'hat is willed,just as feeling usessuch a mechanism to realize its expression. At the sane time the control of the mechanism or at least the "srvitching on of the machine" is experienced. It may be experienced step by step if it means overcoming a resistanceat the same time. If I become tired halfway up, this causesa resistanceto the movement to seizemy f-eetand they stop serving my will. Willing and striving oppose each other and fight for control of the organisrn. Should the will become master, then every step may now be lvilled singly and the effective movement experienced by overcoming the countereffect. 'fhe same thing applies in purely psychic domains. I decide to take an examination and almost automatically do the required preparation. Or m1'strength may give out before I reach my goal, and I must call to life each requisite mental act by a volition to overcome a strong resistance.The n'ill is thus master of the soul as of the living body, even though not experienced absolutelynor u'ithout the soul refusing obedience. The world of objects disclosed in experience sets a limit to the u'ill. The will can turn toward an object that is perceived, felt, or otherwise given as being present, but it cannot comprehend an object not present. This does not mean that the world of objects itself is beyond the range of my rvill. I can bring about a change in the world of' objects but I cannot deliberately bring about its perception if it itself is not present. The will is further limited by countereffective tendencieswhich are themselvesin part body-bound (when they are causedby sensory f'eelings)and in part not. Is this effect of r,r,illingand tending on the soul ar-rdon the living

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Constitutionof the P sycho-P hysical Indiuidual

body psycho-physicalcausality or is it that much-talked-about causality in freedom, the severing of the "continuous" chain of causality?Action is always the creation of what is not. This processcan be carried out irt causalsuccession,but the initiation of the process,the true intervention of the will is not experienced as -I'his does not mean that the will has causalbut as a specialeffect. nothing to do with causality.We find it causallyconditioned when w.efeel how a tirednessof body prevents a volition from prevail'I'he will is causally effective when we feel a victorious will ing. overcome the tiredness, even making it disappear. The will's fulfillment is also linked to causalconditions, since it carries out all its effectsthrough a causallyregulated instrument. But what is truly creative about volitiorr is not a causaleffect. All these causal relationships are external to the essenceof the will. The will disregards them as soon as it is no longer the will of a psychophysical individual and yet will. Tending also has a similar structure, and action progressing from a tendency does not appear as a causalsuccession,either. The difference is that in tending the "I" is drawn into the action, does not step into it freely, and no creative strength is lived out in it. Every creative act in the true sense is a volitional action. Willing and tending both have the capacity to make use of psycho-physicalcausality,but it can only be said that the willing "I" is the master of the living bocly.

rial as a n'hole belongs to the order of nature. The living body in contrast with the physicalbody is characterizedby having fields of sensation,being located at the zero point of orientation of the spatial world, moving voluntarily and being constructed of moving organs, being the field of expressionof the experiencesof its " I " a n d t h e i r r s t r u m e n to f t h e " I ' s " w i l l . 7 6W e h a v e g o t t e n a l l rhese characteristicsfrom considering our own individual. Now rve must shorv how the foreign one is structured for us.

5. Transition to the Foreign Individual We have at least outlined an account of what is meant by at.t individual "1" or by individuals. It is a unified object inseparably .joining together the consciousunity of an "l" and a physicalbody in such a way that each of them takes on a nerr character. The occurs as the physical bocly occurs as a living body; consciousness is This unity documented by the individual. soul of'the unified living body as belonging to the that specific events are given fact The general feelings. soul at the same time: sensations, and to the resulting events and the between and psychic causal tie physical mediated causalrelationship between the soul and the real outer -I'he individworld further document this unity. psycho-ph1'sical

57

(a) The Fields of Sensationof the Foreign Liaing Body Let us begin by considering what permits the foreign living bodv to be comprehended as a living body, what distinguishesit from other physical bodies. First we ask how fields of sensation are given to us. As we saw, we have a primordial givennessin "bodily perception" of our own fields of sensation.?7 Moreover, they are "co-given" in the outer perception of our physicalbody in that very peculiar way where what is not perceivedcan be there itself together with what is perceived. The other's fieldsof sensation are there for me in the same way. Thus the foreign living body is "seen" as a living body. This kind of givenness,that u'e want to call "con-primordiality," confronts us in the perception of'the thing.is The averted and interior sidesof a spatialthing are co-given with its seen sides.In short, the whole thing is "seen." But, as we have already said,this givennessof the one sideimplies tendenciesto advance to ne$' givennesses.If we do this, then in a pregnant sense we primordially perceive the formerly averted sidesthat were given con-primordially. Such fulfillment of what is intended or anticipated is alsopossible in the "co-seeing" of our owrr fields of sensation,only not in progressiveouter perception, but in the transition from outer to bodily perception. The co-seeing of foreign fields of sensatiorr also implies tendencies,but their printordial fulfillment is in principle excluded here. I can neither bring them to primordial givennessto myself in progressive outer perception nor in the transition to bodily perception. Empathic representation is the ,rrlv f'lfillment possiblehere.

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Constitution of the Pslcho-Physical I ndiuidual

5/ I

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body psycho-physicalcausality or is it that much-talked-about causality in freedom, the severing of the "continuous" chain of causality?Action is always the creation of u'hat is not. This processcan be carried out in causal succession,but the initiation of the process,the true intervention of the will is not experienced as 'fhis does not mean that the will has causalbut as a specialeffect. nothing to do with causality.We find it causallyconditioned when u'e feel how a tirednessof body prevents a volition from prevail-I'he ing. will is causally effective when we feel a victorious u'ill -l-he will's overcome the tiredness, even making it disappear. fulfillment is also linked to causalcor-rditions,since it carries out all its effectsthrough a causallyregulated instrument. But what is truly creative about volition is not a causaleffect. All these causal 'fhe will relationships are external to the essenceof the will. disregards them as soon as it is no longer the will of a psychophysical individual and yet nill.'fending also has a similar structure, and action progressing fiom a tendency does not appear as a causalsuccession,either. The difference is that in tending the "I" is drarvn into the action, does not step into it freely, and no creative strength is lived out in it. Every creative act in the true sense is a volitional action. Willing and tending both have the capacity to make use of psycho-physicalcausality,but it can only be said that the u'illing "1" is the master of the living body. 5. Transition to the Foreign Individual We have at least outlined an account of what is meant by an individual "I" or by individuals. lt is a unified object inseparably joining together tl-reconsciousunity of an "I" and a physicalbody in such a way that each of them takes on a new character. The physical body occurs as a living body; consciousness occurs as the soul of'the unified individual. This unity is documented by the fact that specificeverts are given as belonging to the living body and to the soul at the same time: sensations,general feelings.The causal tie between physical and psychic events and the resulting mediated causalrelationship betlveen the soul and the real outer world further document this unity. T'he psycho-physicalindivid-

ual as a whole belongs to the order of nature. The living body in contrast with the physicalbody is characterizedby having fields of sensation,being located at the zero point of orientation of the spatial world, moving voluntarily and being constructed of movirrg organs, being the field of expressionof the experiencesof its "I" and the instrument of the "I's" will.76 We have gotten all these characteristicsfrom considering our own individual. Now rve must show how the foreigr-t one is structured for us. (a) The Fields of Sensation of the Foreign Living Body Let us begin by considering what permits the foreign living body to be comprehended as a living body, what distinguishesit fiom other physical bodies. First we ask how fields of sensation are given to ns. As we saw, we have a primordial givenness in "bodily perception" of our own fields of sensation.TT Moreover, they are "co-given" in the outer perception ofour physical body ir.rthat very peculiar r.r'aywhere what is not perceived can be there itself together with what is perceived. The other's fields of sensation are there for me in the same way. Thus the foreign living body is "seen" as a living body. This kind of givenness,rhat we want to call "con-primordiality," confronts us in the perception of the thing.78The averted and interior sidesof a spatialthing are co-given u,ith its seen sides.In short, the whole thing is "seen." But, as we have already said, this givennessof the one side implies tendenciesto advance to ne\l' givennesses.If we do this, then in a pregnant sense we primordially perceive the formerly averted sidesthat were given con-primordially. Such fulfillment of rvhar is intended or anticipared is also possible in the "co-seeing" of our own fields of sensation,only not in progressiveouter perception, but in the transition from outer to bodily perception. The co-seeing of foreign fields of sensarion also implies tendencies,but their primordial fulfillment is in principle excluded here. I can neither bring them to primordial glvenness to myself in progressive outer perception nor in the transition to bodily perception. Empathic representation is the
<64> l'l

I

rl {

I ll

Edith Stein by empathic presentation or con-primordiality, I can ing these fields of sensationto givennessby making them for me, not in the character of perception, but only ntationally. This was delineated in the description of emacts. Fields of sensationowe the character of being "there lves" to the animatedly given physical body with which e given. This becomesstill clearer in the consideration of sensationsthemselvesinstead of fields of sensation.The ing on the table does not lie there like the book beside it. s" against the table more or less strongly; it lies there or stretched; and I "see" these sensationsof pressure and in a con-primordial way. If I follow out the tendenciesto nt in this "co-comprehension," my hand is moved (not in ') but "as if to the place of the foreign one. It is moved into pies its position and attitude, now feeling its sensations, not primordially and not as being its own. Rather, my feels the foreign hand's sensation "with," precisely the empathy whose nature we earlier differentiated r own experience and every other kind of representation. this projection, the foreign hand is continually perceived ing to the foreign physicalbody so that the empathized are continually brought into relief as foreign in conith our orvn sensations.This is so even when I am not toward this contrast in the manner of au'areness. ) The Conditionsof the Possibilityof SensualEmpathy possibility of sensualempathy ("a sensing-in," we should be exact) is warranted by the interpretation of'our own rdy as a physical body and our own physical body as a rdy because of the fusion o{' outer and bodily percepIt is also u'arranted by the possibility of spatially altering ysical body, and finally by the possibility of modifying its ties in {hntasywhile retaining its type. Were the sizeof Ird, such as its length, width, span, etc. gtven to me as ably fixed, the attempt at empathy with any hand having llt Properties would have to fhil becauseof the contrast n them. But actually empathy is also quite successfulwith and children's hands which are very different fiom mine,

Constitutionof the Psycho-PhlsicalIndiuidual

59

lor my physicalbody and its members are not given as a fixed type but as an accidental realization of a type that is variable u'ithin definite limits. On the other hand, I musr retain this type. I can only empathize with physical bodies of this type; only them can I interpret as living bodies. 'l'his 'I-here is not yet an unequivocal limitation. are types of various levels of generality to which correspond various possible lcvels of empathy. The type "human physical body" does not clefine the limits of the range of my empathic ob.jects,more exactly, of lvhat can be given t() me as a livir"rgbody. However, it r:ertainlymarks off a range withrn which a very definite degree o{ cmpathic fulfillment is possible.In the caseof empathy u'ith the firreign hand, fulfillment, though perhaps nor "adequate," is yet ltossibleand very extensive. What I sensenon-primordially can coincide exactly u'ith the other's primordial sensati()n.Shr uld I perhaps consider a dog's paw in comparison with my hand, I d
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Constitution of the Psycho-PhlsicalIndiuidual

(c) The Consequence of SensualEmpathy and lts Absencein the Literature on Empathy (Jnder Discussion

that this discomfort arisesfrom sensations.\,Vecan easilysee how [,ipps arrives at this contention. It is implied by his one-sided focusing on the "symbol," the phenomenon of "expression." Only those experiences expressed by a countenance, a gesture, erc. are given to him as "visible" or intuitive. And sensationsare certainly nol expressedactually. However, it is certainly a strong contention that they are thus not given to us directly at all, but gnlv as the basic support of statesof feeling. He who does nor see rhat another is cold by his "goose flesh" or his blue nose, having first to consider that this discomflort he feels is indeed a "chillilless," must be suffering from striking anomalies of interpretation. Furthermore, this chilly discomfort need not be based on sensationsof coldnessat all. For example, it can also occur as the psychic accompanying appearance of a state of excitement. On the other hand, I can very well "be cold without being cold," i.e., can have selrsationsof coldnesswithout feeling the least bit uncomfbrtable. Thus we would have a badly-appointed acquaintance rvith foreign sensatioltsif we could only reach them by the cletour over states of f'eeling based on such sensarions.

A t t h e e n d o f t h e e m p a t h i c p r o c e s s ,i . , u r c a s e a s w e l l a s usually',there is a nel' objectification where *,e firrd the "perceivi ' r g h a n d " f a c i ' g u s a s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g .( 1 b b e s u r e , i t i s p r e s e n t the whole rime-in contrast with progressiclnin ()uter perceplien-1ynly not in the mode of attention.) Norv, however, it has a neu' dignity becausewhat was presented as empty has found its 'fha'ks f ulfillment. rr>the fact that sensarionsessentiallybelong r < >a n " l , " t h e r e i s a l r e a d y a f o r e i g n , . I " g i v e n r o g e t h e r w i t h t h i co.sriruti()n rf' the sensual level of the frrreign physical body ( u ' h i c h ,s t r i c t l y s p e a k i ' g , w e m a y n o w n o l o n g e r c i l l a , , p h y s i c a l -lhis "I" c'^ become cr>nsci'usof itseif, even thougir it is b<,dy"). n o t n e c e s s a r i l y" a w a k e . ' As we already nored, this basic revel of consriturio. has always bee. ign.red so f'ar. Volkelt goes i.to "sensing-in" i. various ways, but he briefly characterizesit as the reproductio. of sensati.n and does not explore its own essence.Neither does he cons i d e r i t s m e a n i n g f t r r t h e c o n s r i r u r i o no f t h e i n d i v i d u a r ,o n l v c o n sidering it as an aid to the occurre.ce of what he alone designates as empathy. I'his is the empathizing of feelings and especiallvof moods. He d,es not want to call se.satior empathy because,if empathy stopped at sensatirns, it wruld be "s'methirrg franklv p i t i { i r l a . d l a n r e n r a b l e . "w e d o . o t w a n r r o i m p u t e t h i s i o . n r p u ' t h y b y a n y m e a n s .o n t h e o t h e r h a n c r ,o u r p r e c e d i n gd e m o n s t r a tions show that sensati<)ns cannot be assessedquite so narrowlv. F i n a l l y ,e m ( ) t i o n a lr e a s o n ss h o u l d n o l c a u s eL r st o s e p a r a t ew h a t essentiallybelongs together. 'rhe comprehension of fcrreign experiences-be they sensations,feelings, or what p1;1_is i unified, typical, even rhough diversely differentiated mocrificationof consciousness and requires a uniform name. -I'herefore, we have selectedthe already cust()maryterm "empathy" fbr some of these phenomena. Should one desire to retaii"rthis fcrr the narrrlver d.main, the' lre must coilr a new expressionfbr the broader one. In .ne place Lipps contrasts sensatiorrswith f'eeli'5;s.He says t h a t I k r o k a r r h e m a n w h o i s c o l d , n o t a t t h e s e n s a r i o no f c . l d n e i s , but at the disc
6l

(d) The Foreign Liuing Body as the Center of Orientation of the Spatial World \{'e come to the second constituent of the living body: its position at the zero point of orientation. The living body cannot be separated from the givenness of the sparial outer world. The ot.her'sphysical body as a mere physical body is spatial like other things and is given at a certain location, at a certain distancefrom me as lhe center of spatial orientation, and in certain spatial relationships to the rest of the spatial rvorid. When I now interpret it as a sensing living body and empathically project myself tnto it, I obtain a new imageszof the spatial world and a new zero point of orientation. It is not that I shift my zero point to this place, for I retain my "primordial" zero point and my "primordial" orientation u'hile I am empathicallv, non-primordially obtaining the other one. On the other hand, neither do I obtain a fantasizedorientation nor a fantasizedimage of the spatialworld. But this orientation, as well as the empathized sensations,is conprimordial, becausethe living body to which it refers is perceived

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Indiuidual Constitutionof the Psycho-Physical

as a physical bocly at the same time and becauseit is given primordially to the other "I," even though non-primordially to rns. J'his orientatir>ntakes us a long way in constituting the foreign i n d i v i d u a l ,f o r b y m e a n so f i t t h e " l " o f t h e s e n s i n g ,l i v i n g b o l y empathizes the whole fullness of ourer perception in which the spatial world is essenriallyconstituted. A sensing subject has be_ c o m e o n e w h i c h c a r r i e so u t a c t s . A n d s o a l l d e s i g n a t i o n sr e s u l t i n g from the immanent essential examination of perceptual con-sci<>usness apply to it.83 This also makes statements about the essentiallypossible various modalities of the accomplishment of a c t s a n d a b o u t t h e a c t u a l i t y a n d n o n - a c t u a l i t yo f p e r c e p t u a la c t s and <-rf'wharis perceived applicable to rhis subject. In principle, the outwardly perceiving "I" can perceive in the manner of the "cogito," i.e., in the mode of specific "being directed" toward an o b j e c t ; a n d , s i m u l t a n e o u s l yg i v e n , i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t yo f ' r e f l e c t i o n on the accomplished act. Naturally, empathy with a perceiving consciousnessin general does not prescribe the f
significanceof empathy for exp.eriencingthe real ()uter cr's, the'I'his significanceis evident in still another resPect' ,r'.,rlcl.

62

(e) The Foreign l|orld Image as the Modification of Our Oun World. Image The world image I empathize in the other is not only a modification of my own image on the basis of the otl.rer orientation, it also varieswith the way I interpret his living body. A person without eyes fails to have the entire optical givenness o{' the world. Doubtlessa , w o r l d i m a g e s u i t i n g h i s o r i e n t a t i o n e x i s t s .B u t i f I ascribe it t<; him, I am under a gross empathic deceptiorr. The u'orld is constituted firr him only through the remaining senses, and ir.rreality it may be impossible lbr me empathically to fulfill h i s w t > r l dg i v e n i n e m p t y p r e s e n r a r i o n s .T h i s i s s o b e c a u s eo f m y a c t l r a l ,I i f b - l o n gh a b i t so f i n t u i t i n g a n d t h i n k i n g . B u r t h e s ee m p r y presentationsancl the lack of intuitive fulfillment are given to me. 'fo a still greater extent this applies to a pers()n lacking a sense w h o e n . r p a t h i z ewsi t h a p e r s ( ) nh a v i n g a l l h i s s e n s e sH . ere emerges the possibilityof enriching ()ur ow,n world in.ragethror-rghanorh-

Our () l:nPathy as the Condition of the Possibilitlof Constituting Oun Indiuidual ir-t lrom the viewpoint of the zero point of orientation p;ained 7.ero as the poitlt zero owll my consider no lt>llger I cllpathy, must clnly u.,i,,t,b|-,tas a spatial pdint arnong many. By this rneans,ar.rd like body a physical as body my living see I learlt t() irv thi, means, i s i t g i ven e x p e r i e n c e i n p r i m o r d i a l o n l y s a m e t i m e , A t the ,,ih"... l n c ( )mm e a s a n t o i t i s g i v e n M o r e o v e r , b o d y . a l i v i n g to llrc as all from as different and in perception outer Uoay plctc physical p h y s i cal t h i s i n t e r p r e t " r e i t e r a t e d I a g a i n e m p a t h y " ' l ' l I t otheri.'i a as myself to first given is I am so it that living body, and a as boclv b e i t t g o f l ' h e t h c t s e n s e ' f u l l i n i n c l i v i d u a l t h e psrcl.r<>phl'sical fbr psvchothis is now col'rstitutive body on a physical ii,uncled -fhis reiteratedempathy is at the sametime p h l ' s i c a li n d i v i d u a l . t h e c o n d i t i r > nm a k i n g p o s s i b l et h a t m i r r o r - i m a g e - l i k e g i v e n n e s s o{ myself in mernory artd f'antasyon rvhich u'e have touched Probably it als r ' i n gt h i s n o n - e x i s t e n c et o Fiivennesa s s I live in fantasy.'I'he r t o r l c lI g l i m p s ee m p a t h i c a l l yi s a n e x i s t i n g w o r l d , p o s i t e da s h a r " -

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ing being like the world primordially perceived. The perceived world and the world given empathically are rhe same world differently seen. But it is not onlv the same one seen from different sidesas rvhen I perceive primordially and, traversing continuous varieties of appearances,go from one standpoint to another. Here each earlier standpoint motivates the later one, each followinp;one seversthe preceding one. Of course, I also accomplishthe transition from my standpoint to the other's in the same manner, but the ne$' standpoint does not step into the old one's place. I retain them both at the same time. The same world is not merely presented no.u'in one way and then in another, but in both lvays at the same time. And not only is it differently presented depending on the momenary standpoint, but also depending on the nature of the observer. This makes the appearanceof the rvorld dependent on individual consciousness, but the appearing u'orld-which is the same, however and to whomever it appears-is made independent of consciousness.Were I imprisoned within the boundaries of my individuality, I could nor go beyond "the world as it appears to me." At least it u'ould be conceivablethat the possibility of its independent existence,that could still be given as a possibility,would alwaysbe undemonsrrable. But this possibility is demonstrated as soon as I cross these boundaries by the help of empathy ar-rdobtain the same world's second and third appearancewhich are independent of my perception. Thus empathy as the basisof intersubjective experience becomes the condition of possible knowledge of the existing outer world, as Husserl8Tand also Roycesspresent it. Non'we can also take a position on other attempts at collstituti n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e o n e m p a t h y .W e s e et h a t L i p p s is completely justified in maintaining thar our own individual, as rn'ellas the multiplicity of "I's", occurs on rhe basisof the perceptior-rof'fbreign physicalbodies in which we come upon a consclous lil-eby the mediation of emparhy. \4/efirst actr-rallyconsider ourselvesas an individual, as "one 'I' among manv," when rve have learned to consider ourselves by "analogy" wrth another. This theory is inadequate becausehe is content with such a brief indication. He held the foreign indrvidual's physical body in rhe one

hysicalIndiuidual Constitution of the P sycho-P

65

hand and his single experiences in the other. In addition, he lirnited them to what is given in "symbolic relation," and then he stopped. He neither showed how these two get together nor demonstrated en-rpathy'spart in constituting the individual. We can also discussour theory in terms of Miinsterberg's interpretationseto which we really did not find an approach earlier. If \\'e understand him correctly, he concludes that r+'ehave side by side and separate,on the one hand, the other subject'sacts given in co-experiencingand on the other hand foreign physicalbodies and the spatial world given to them in a specific constellation. liVlrinsterbergcalls this rvorld "idea" lVorstellungl,a view we cannot take time to refute here). When other subjects approach me with the content of statements and this content appears to be dependent on the position of their physical bodies in the spatioremporal world, then they and their acts are first bound to their physical bodies. On the basisof our modest demonstrations, we must reject this ingenious theory as an untenable construction. Nlerely considered as such, a physical body could never be interpreted as the "principle of the organization" of other subjects. On the other hand, if there were no possibility of empathy, of transferring the self into the other's orientation, their statements about their phenomenal u'orld woulcl always have to remain unintelligible, at least in the senseof a complete fulfilling understanding in contrast with the mere empty understanding of u'ords. Statementscan fill the breach and supplement where empathy fails. Possibly they may even serve as points of departure for further empathy. But ir-rprinciple they cannot substitute for empathy. Rather, their production assumesthat of empathy. Finally,even if arriving at the idea of a grouping of the spatialu'orld around a particular physical body on the basisof mere statements and the undertaking of a coordination of the subject of these statementsn'ith this physical body were conceivable,it would not be clear at all how one gets from this to a phenomenon of the unified psycho-physicalindividual. And this we now certainly incontestably have. Naturally, this theory appliesjust as little to interpreting our o\\'n living body as a physical body otr rvhose "situation" depends the "content of our ideas."

I

<7 4>

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Edith Stein

(h) The Foreign Liuing Bodl as the Bearer of Voluntary l\'Iouement

<75>

\4'e have become acquainted with the foreign living body as the bearer offields of sensationand as the center of orientation of the spatial rvorld. Non' u'e find that voluntary movement is another c o n s t i t u e n to { ' i t . A n i n d i v i c l u a l ' sm o v e m e n t sa r e l r ( ) tg i v e n t o u s a s merely mechanical movements. Of course, there are also casesof' t h i s k i n d . i u s ta s i n o u r ( ) w n m o v e m e n t s .l I I g r a s pa n d r a i s eo n e hand rvith the other, the former's movement is given to me as 'I'he m e c h a n i c a il n t h e s a m es e n s ea sa p h y s i c a lb o d i ' I l i l i . simultaneous sensations constitute the consciousnessof a positiclnal change of my living body, but not of'the experience of "I move." On the contrary, I experierrce this in the other hand, and, furm()\'ement, but also how it thermore, not r>nly its sptrs and associatedmovement. N ra s 'l'hus, m ( ) \ , e m c n to f m y p h y s i c a l b o d y . there are the familiar " o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n s " :t r e e sa r r dt e l e g r a p hp o l e sf l y i n g p a s t ,t h e s t a g e

Constitutionof the Pslcho-PhlsicalIndiuidual

67

trick in n'hich goir-rgalong a road is simulated by moving the scenerv,etc. Associatedmovement can thus only be interpreted as mechanicaland never as alive. Consequently,every alive movement seemsto be a spontaneousmovement. However, we must still distinguish "imparted" movement from associatedmovement. \4'e have the phenomenon of an imparted mechanicalmovement when a rolling ball does not "take along" a resting one, but "imparts" to it a movement of its ou'n by its impulse (possiblystopping itself). Now, we can perceive such an imparted movement r-rotonly as mechanical,but also experience i t a s a l i v e .T h i s , h c l r v e v e ri ,s n o t a n e x p e r i e n c eo f " I m o v e , " b u t o f "being moved." If someone shoves me and I fall or am hurled dorvn an embankment, I experience the lnovement as alive, but n o t a s " a c t i v e . " I t i s s u e sf r o m a n " i m p u l s e , " t h o u g h i t i s " p a s s i v e " or imparted. Movements analogous to our o\{n are found in foreign m()vements. If I see someone ride past in a car, in principle his movement appears no differently to me than the "static" parts of the car. It is mechanical associatedmovement and is not empathized, but outwardly perceived. Of'course, I must keep his interpretation of this movement completely separate. I represent this to myself empathically when I ransfer myself into his orientation. 'I'he caseis entirelt, different if, for example, he raiseshimself up in the car. I "see" a movement of the tVpe of my sp()ntaneolrs m()vement. I interpret it as his spontaneous movement. As I participate in the movement empathically in the n'ay already suffrcientll' familiar, I fbllon' out the "co-perceived" spontaneous <76> movement's tendency to ful{illment. Finally, I objectify it so that the movement faces me as the other individual's movement. This is h<>'w' the foreign living body u'ith its organs is given to m e a s a b l e t o m o v e . A n d v o l u n t a r y m o b i l i t r . i s c l o s e l yl i n k e d u . i t h t h e o t h e r c o n s t i t L r e n t os f t h e i n d i v i d r . r a lI.n o r d e r t o e m D a t h i z e alive ntovement in this physical body, we rnust alreadv have interpreted it as a living body. We lr'ould never interpret the spontaneous mo\.ement of'a physicalbodv as alive, even should rve perhaps illtrstrate its difference from irnoarted or associatedn)o\,ement t() ourselves by a quasi-empathy'.For exanrple, we rnay "inwardlt'

rliil

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Edith Stein

IndiaiduaL Constitutionof the Psycho-Physical -fhe

participate in" the movement of knocked and knockinq ball. character of the ball otherwise prohibits the attribution of represented alive movement to it.eo On the other hand, rigid immobility conflicts with the phenom_ e n o n o f t h e s e n s i t i v el i v i n g b o d y a n d t h e l i v i n g o r g a r r i s mi n g e n eral.er We cannor imagine a completely immobtle living being. That which is bound ro one place completely motionless ls "turned to stone." So far, spatial orientation cannot be com_ pletely separated from voluntary mobility. First of all, the varie_ t i e s o f p e r c e p t i o nw o u l d b e c o m e s o l i m i t e d i f s p o n t a n e o u sm o v e ment ceasedthat the constitution of a spatial world (so far, the individual one) u'ould become dubious. This abolishes rhe pos_ of transference into the foreign living body and so of a libility fulfilling emparhy and the gaining of his orieniation. Thus voluntary movement is a part of the strucrure of the individual and is entirely nonsuspendable.

77>

(i) The Phenomenaof LW Now let us consider a group of phenornena that participate in the structure of the i'dividual i. a specialway: the y appeai i. the living body and also as psychic experiences. I u,ould iike to calthem the specificphenomena of life. They include gro\r,rh,devel_ opment and aging, health and sickness,vigor and sluggishness (general feelings, in our terms, or, as Scheler would say,;feeling ourselvesto be in our living body"). As he has protesred againsi empathy in general, Scheler has very parricularly protested against "explaining" phenomena of life by empathy.ezHe wor.rld be e.tirely justified if empathy were a genetic processso rhat the elucidation of this tendency explained away what it was ro eluci_ date, as we mentioned earlier. Otherwise, I see no possibilitv of detaching the phenomena of life from the individuai's other ions t i t u e n t so r o f e x h i b i t i n g a n y t h i n g b u t a n e m p a t h i c c o m p r e h e n sion of them. In considering general feelingsas our own experience,we have seen horv they "fiIl" the living body and rhe soul, horv they defi_ nitely color every spiritual act and every bodily evenr. horv they are then "co-seen" at the living bodyjust as fields of sensationare. 'I'hus, bl his walk, posture, and his every ntovement, \{e also

69

"see" "how he feels," his vigor, sluggishness,etc. We bring this c.o-intendedforeign experieuce to fulfillment by carrying it out nith him empathically. Furthermore, we not only see such vigor and sluggishnessin people and animals, but also in plants. Empathic fulfillment is also possiblehere. Of course, what I comprehend in this caseis a considerablemodification of my own life. A plant's general feeling does not appear as the coloring of its acts, lirr there is no basisat all to believe such acts are present. Neither do I have any right to ascribe an "awake" "I" to the plant, nor a reflective consciousnessof its feelings of life. Even the otherwise larniliar constituentsof animals are absent. lt is at least doubtful and so our empathy is unjustirvhether the plant has sensations,e3 inflicting believe we are pain on a tree by cutting it if we {red is center of orientation of the with ax. A not the an plant don'n mobile, even though it is nor voluntarily world either, spatial capable of alive movement in contrast with the inorganic. On the other hand, the absence of this constitution does not justify us in interpreting what is present in a new way and distinguishing the phenomena of life in plants from our own. I would not like to offer an opinion on whether we should look at the phenomena of life as essentiallypsychic or only as an essentialbasisfor psychic That phenomena of life have an experienexistence fDaseins).sa tial character in psychic contexts is hardly contestable. No*' perhaps someone will think that I have selectedgeneral feeling as a very convenient example of the psychic nature of phenomena of life. Horvever, this psychic nature must also be demonstrable in other phenomena of life. Scheler has himself directed us to the "experience of life."e5 First calling "lived," isolated, finished experiences "psychic," as he does, seemsto me like a definition not derived from the essenceof the psychic. The psychic entity present (the primordial one, according to us) is rvhat is becoming, is experience. What became, rvaslived, and is {rnished sinksback into the stream of the past. We leave it behind us when we step into new experience; it losesits prirnordiality but remains the "same experience." First it is alive and then dead, but not first non-psychicand then psychic. (There is no positive ternr fbr "non-psychic.")Just as solidifying u'ax is first liquid and then hard but still wax, so the same material body remains. There is no

<78>

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7'dith

non-psychic individuaI .. p:1:' I:;.gi:i:: <79>

Constitutionof the Psycho-Physical Indiuidual

Stein

"-Til : 1?:'.:i n:

*h'.r,.Jf.om life. reductionis.non-psych,. t:q';,;;l;t'e came')soul is ':]l:?i is a^ experienceof'life asschelern"t-tTPll?:i"d,tl,'.1.'0,,'ihis experience and not an is an censionand one gf litl of discerniblestagesof ":t"';'..'o.arion objective po-ttTtJ:1^"-t.'n" - .;t itfe itself is gi'en to us as such t' development: connectin; h igh points' Fur]l^t^::l ot lul','.,.,r., tl,',...'ooints, and not ^ u t"Tl:tit^t the developmentand not thermore,t1.1u:..1r11nro rl''*rurse,in order to perceivethe only its results.isgrvc:,,o ,, "t.,:",;scious of rhis development, result.we must hrsl "becorr'rau,a, o[our we becomeconscious i'e" make are weak' correspondinslv, :!:::'J::'o' :",;;,:-;. " strengthwaning yh::,Yt tt'i'.).,-. conscious of an inclination "higher in etc.)Nor is it a presenr, TI:"T: :1.--""-Y;';:;rong.. disappearing,:_lt^T:l"d *iih that of a plant; ll*',,.".f"pn\.r,, mere metap"1"l_':,:::,fff.",li., io,rtly aefinedsenseof compreit is a genuine"Tl:fl1_'.1,:n:,i,;.;; the sametype. hendingthat somethingbel,"'5'..."feelingsick" haslittle to do Bodily ""uit'" u" tio aiit''ts1rt:

trusted, is no different from the gardener's relationship to his plants, whose thriving he oversees.He sees them full of fresh strength or ailing, recovering or dying. He elucidatestheir condition for himself empathically.ln terms of cause,he looks for the causeof the condition and finds ways to influence it. (h) Cousaliry"iin the Structure of the Indixidual Again, the possibilitvof suchcausalreflecti We then interpret tirednessand the bad mood as the effects of' movement. We have already seen how movements come to givennessfor us as alive movementsand how tiredness comcs to givenness.As rve shall soon see,we alsr>comprehelrd the "bad mood" empathically.Now, lve may not infer the causalsequence from the data obtained, but also exoerience it emnathicallv. For e x a r n p l e ,w e c o m p r e h e r r di n t e r p s y i h i cc a u s a l i t ys i m i l a r l y ' l r , h e n we observethe processo{'contagionof f'eelingsin others while we ourselvesare immune trsays,"You cal) hear nothing but sobbing and women u'eeping," rve perceive a suppressedsob in all parts of'the atrdi-

;l:;,T wirh"p;in,';;rl":::.f j'iT[':t"ffi|,'.11,[:i:,:1STJ o',n. bodily injyrl sucha,su brok,"

ar rhis ,,srare,,in the

t toot canalso*"],l:',1 .,',fu,r'i.projection. :l :lll:l:l.i.''-y'"rii" otherando::"9-T^:^glltli""",

'.rl of singletraitsin the whole The attentiv-e t"tt "?::il:t ' '.'."'l from the fleeringglance. picture which reml l,"i,,ta.n disease This is *h";;:lr.n""'.1'r,-.*"

hasover the lay of the physician

pe rson, ^ ::ffi :lll,illHlJ'.'"",I H$::l;':;: lonser-"d::'*iqi Thus in question' the cause

tTI^::l-p'1,''::;;f this "clinical picture" ir an ,1'".' r;': 5v yellow' sunken cheeks' or he .ur.ln,',,'u he thinks h; -",. unnatural gleamof the eyes. 1 ,, , ^,-,.rts.rnd ,.., t,.,b...,

Bu,,his.,'i.Tlriftffi H#;i:h:31:?,f :*;*::'1f, s n w h i c h3 ] ' " o ' " t y p e so I i l l n e s s e o

<80>

;;1'13 niil :; p;;;;'., uyr,i,tur" il:Sf 3l;3:l;:'ru:.:*ff phenomena::i

level, ?I]::1ni.",)r,. "t thehrstintroductory course'thtt:111'-1]i":ll' the phvsiAnd .,1orhe illco.dition, notproceeclrng'toProJecttorr :;;. with nhose welfare he is enc i a n ' sr e l a t i o n s h i pt o h i s p ; t : " ' '

71

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Edith Stein

ence. And, projecting ourselves into this soul-stirring spirit, lr'ebecome seized by the mood portrayed. In this wa1' we get an inrage of the causalpr()cessbeing ertacted. Finally, we als fe x p e r i e n c e ,i t d e p e n d so t r t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' se n t i r e l i f e . I t l

Constitution of the P sycho-P hlsicaI I ndiuidual

73

the first place, if we rvere to stick to the last formulation, we rvould have to completely accept the fact that every experience is conditior-redby the entire series of previor-rsexperielrces: B"t Y." also have to accept that every physical occurrence is condirr'c>ulcl tioned by the entire chain of causality.'1|-refundamental difference here is that "the same causeshave the same effects" in the physicaldomain while in the psychicdomain it can be shown that of the "same causes" i5 s55entiallyexcluded' But ih. "pp.u.unce he w'ho strictly supports the relationship of causing to caused experiencecould hardly demonstrate a new kind of efficacy' L.t .rt try to make this clear by examples of what we have in mind.r00A deliberate decision on a problern put to me contlnues to direct the course of my action long afi er th.e actual decision n'ithout my being "cot-tscious"of this as Pr(:sent rn current actlon' Does this mean that an isolated past experience determines my present experience from that time on? Not at all. This volition <83> that remained unfulfilled for a long timc has not fallen "into the into sunk back forgottenness" during this time, his not ttr"um of the past, beiome "lived lif-e" in Scheler's terms' It has t>nly gone ouf of the mode of actuality cr!'er into that of^nonactuality,out of activity into passivity.Part of the nature of consciousnessis that the cogito, the act ;n p'hich the "I" lir-es, .is surrounded by a marginal zone of background experiences ln each moment of experience. These are non-actualities no longer or not vet cogito and therefore not accessibleto reflection, either' ln order to 6. .o-prehended, they must first pass through the firrm of the cogito, which they can do at arrl time. They are still primordially pi.r.nt, even if not actually, and therefore have efficac\'.The unfulfilled volition is not dead, but continues to live in the background of consciousnessLrntilits time comes and it can be realized.Then its effect begins. T'hus, is is not something past which affects the present, bui something that reaches into the Present.l'herefore, we quite agree thaia reproduction of..the volition does not set the aition in motion. 4 nd' indeed, rve rn'ill go even further and say that volition would not. be in a positi<x todo this at all. A forgotten volition cannot have an effect' and a "reproduced" volition is ttot an aliye one. either, but a represelltedone. As such it is urlable to affect anv behavi
1

Edith Stein

Constitution of the P sycho-P hysicalI ndittidual

in a dark room we can Produce the fantasy of a burning lamp to provide the necessarylight for reading)' It must first be relived, lived through again, in order to be able to have an ellect' Future events which "throw their shadows in advance" are no different. Scheler givesan example fromJamesr0rwho, under the influence of an unpleasant logic course he had to teach afternoons, undertook many unnecessary activities the entire day before simply so that he would find no time for the burdensome preparation. Yet he did not "think about it." Every expectation of a threatening event is of this type. We turn our attetrtion to another object to escapethe fear, but it does not vanish. Rather, it remains "in the background" and influences our entire conduct. As a non-actual experience not specifically directed, this fear has its object in the expected event. This is not completely present, but constantly tends toward going over into actual experience, toward pulling the "I" into itself. The fear constantly resists giving itself to this cogito. lts rescueis in other actual experiences that are still blocked in their pure course by that background experience. And of what linally concerns the efficacy of the whole life on every moment of its existence lDaseinsl we must say: Everything living into the present can have an effect, irrespective of how far the initiation of the affecting experience is from "now." Experiences of early childhood can also endure into my present, even though pushed into the background by the profusion of later events. This can be clearly seen in dispositionstoward other persons. I do not "forget" my friends when I am not thinking of them. They then belong to the unnoticed present horizon of my world. My love for them is living even when I am not living in it. It influences my actual feeling and conduct. Out of love for someone, I can abstain from activities which would causedispleasure without "being conscious" of this. Likewise, animosity agairrsta person, inculcated into me in my childhood, catr make au impression on my later life. This is true even though this animosity is pushed entirely into the background and I do not think of this person at all any more. Then, when I meet the animosity again' it can go over into actuality and be dischargedin an action or elsebe brought to reflective clarity and so be made ineffectual. On the

contrary, what belongs to my past, what is temporarily or permanently fbrgotten and can only come to givenness to me in the character of representation by reminiscence or by another's account, has no effect on me. A remembered love is not a primordial feeling and cannot influence me. If I do someone a favor becauseof a past preference, this inclination is basedon a positive opinion of this past preference, not on the represented feeling. All that has been said showsthat the casesScheler brings up do not prove that there is a difference in the phenomenal structure of efficacy in the physical and in the psychic domains. We have not found a "long-range effect" in the psychic domain. And in the domain of mechanical causality,we also have a parallel accumulation of latent strength and an effectiveness of hidden strength such as we have found here. For example, accumulated electrical energy first "affects" at the momenr of discharge. Finally, we also have analogous circumstances in bodily processes.The appearanceof illness is preceded by an "incubation period" in which the causegives no indication of its presence by any effect. On the other hand, one can ascertain numerous changes in an organism long before one can find their cause. In spite of the similarity of the causalphenomenon, we cannot here deny profound differences between physical and psychic causality. Yet, to demonstrate this we need an exact study of the dissimilar structure of psychic and physical reality.

74

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(l) The Foreign Liaing Body as the Bearer of Phenomena of Expression We have become acquainted with the foreign living body as the bearer of a psychic life that we "look ar" in a cerrain way. Now there is still a group of phenomena that disclosea further domain of the psyche to us in a peculiarly characterized way. When I "see" shame "in" blushing, irritation in the furrowed brow, anger in the clenched fist, this is a still different phenomenon than when I look at the foreign living body's level of sensation or perceive the other individual's sensarionsand feelings of life with him. ln the latter case I comprehend the one with the other. In the former case I see the one through the other. In the new phenomenon what is psychic is not only co-perceivedwith what is

<85>

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b < d i l y b u t e x p r e s s e c l t h r o t r g h i t . ' I ' h e e x p e r i e n'I'h' ceanditsexpresVischer and ,i,r,t are ,.lat"d itl a rtay we fir-rdportrayed b1' Fr' e s p e c i a l l vb i L i p p s a s t h e s y r n b o l i cr e l a t i o n s h i p ' r ' ) 2 L e r u s m a k e ' i l e a r t h e d i f f e r e n t v i e w p o i n t so n r h i s p r o b l e m of $,.hich Lipps took at different times. In the first editit>n of I)thischenGrundfragen(1899) he saysthat the ext,ernalizatitlrrs lif.earesig,'swhichbecn c hc a n n ( ) tb e a n d m e a n i r r g t, h i t t h e r e a r e p h e n < l m e n aul n i t i e sr v h i'fhese expoassociation. made at all intelligible by alltrsionslo at) then Frrlm views. his revise sitions could have stimulated Lipps tct "svm()r "expression" "sign" and on he distinguishesbetween -ro srimething per,^y-ihrt something is a sign nleans-that bol.,, fhus smokeis a sign e x i s t s . e l s e c e i v e ds a y st o m e t h a t s o m e t h i l ) g



rreis, then 'l-he r e r n i t t d sm c o f s n t o k e a s s o t ' i a t i o r r . D r e s e n th e r e l h a n n r e r e a s s o c iation'S ) adness t o u s l e a d m a v a l s o h.., .r'.,, 1[ough this 'fhe else' s
Constitutionof the Psycho-PhlsicalIndiaidual

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sad countenanceis actually not a theme that leadsover to another one at all, but it is at one with sadness.This occurs in such a way that the countenance itself can step entirely into the background, 'f he countenance is the outside of sadness.Together they form a l)atural unity. The difference also becomes clear in single casesrvhere there are actually experiences of the indicator type given. I notice a familiar facial expression in a close acquaintanceand determine that, when he looks like that, he is in a bad mood. But such cases are deviations from the normal case,that of symbolic givenness. Moreover, they already presume a certain symbolic givenness.l05 'I'he indication and the symbol both point beyond themselves n'ithout wanting to or having to. (As we shall see, this distinguishes them both from the genuine sign,) -I'here are differences, however. If I remain turned to$'ard the smoke and observe how it rises and disperses,this is no less"natural" than if I go over to the fire. Should I think of the tendencies leading me in this direction as gone, then I certainly no longer have the full perceptual object, but still the same object, an object of the same kind. On the contrary, should I consider the sad countenance as a mere distortion of face, I do not have the same <88> object at all anv more nor even an object of the same kind. This is related to the difference of the possibilitiesof empathy in both 'rases.In one case what is presented as empty is fulfilled in progressiveouter perception and in the other through a here necessary pudBaorg eig lill,o yilog, the transition to empathic pro-I'he relationship between what is perceived and what is .jection. presented as empty proves to be an experienceable, intelligible one. It can also be that the symbol does not yet point in a specific direction. Then it is still a pointer into emptinessso that what I seeis incomplete. There is more to it, but I just do not know what ! et. l-hese expositions should make clear what Lipps means by svmbol. But this still does not mean that whatever he irrterprets as a svmbol is really a symbol, and that we alreadl' have a sufficient clistinctionbetween "indication" and "symbol." Symbols for him :rre gestures, movements, resting forms, natural sounds, ano rr'ords.Since he openly uses "gestures" here for involuntary ex-

j,

Edith stein

Constitutionof the Pslcho-PhlsicalIndiuid,uaL

description ternalizations, his designation pr()ves c()rrect. The 'I'his gets us certainly cloesnot cover purPoseful externalizations. into the sPhere of sigrrs. For the present I would like tcl neglcct "resting filrms" such as fhcial f'eatlrres,the shape of the hand, c1L^.-1hs "expressionsof personality"-artd corlfine mysell tcl the expressionnalit.v. l-his would be dealt with in "resting forms" atrd can te omitted here. Further, Lipps thinks that a movement can a p p e a r a s l i g h t , f r e e , a n d e l a s t i co r a s c l u m s ya' n d r e s t r i c t e d . f h i s among the pher.romenaof life u'hose givennessrve have bekrr.rgs already cor)sidered.Filrally, other feelingscart also be co-comprehended together with movements. For example, I can see a person's sadnessby his gait and POSture.Horvever, a s)'mbolic rela-l'he movement is not tif . i u d g m e n t ,a s s a d t l e s si s i n h i s c o u n t e n a r l c e t, ( ) c o l l t e n d t h a t t h e s b a s e d( ) n t h i s . r 0 { ' < > f ' s p e e ci h comprehetrsion In order to sh
rn'hichrve have already spoken frequently. For example, signsare the signalsof ships or the flag announcing that the king is in the castle.Like signals,verbal expressionsare not themes themselves, but only the intermediate points to the theme, namely, to rhat rvhich they designate.They arouse a tendency to transition that is restricted if they themselvesare made into themes. In the normal caseof comprehension (especiallyof the word), the transition is so nlomelltary that one can hardly speak of a tendency. Hou'ever, the tendency becomes visible when one is stopped by a foreign \r'ord not understood at first but only containing a hint of its rrreanirrg. What is "sensually perceived" completely recedes in the sign. T'his distinguishesit from the indication that becomesa "theme" irr its full f'actualcontent. On the other hand, the sign is not to be put on the sameplane as the svmbol, for that signified is certainly 'Ihere not co-perceivedlike that comprehended in the symbol. is something more. The signal has a moment of ought, a demand in itself, finally fulfilled in the idea of him who has determined it as a sign. Every signal is stipulated as coltvenrion ar.rddetermined by s()meone for someone. This is lost in the pure symbol. The sad countenance "ought" not to mean sadness,nor blushing shame. Symbolic and signal character are combined in a cerrain way in the purposeful externalization using the syrnbol as a sign. I now n()t only comprehend disapproval in the furrowed brow but it -I'he intends to and ought to announce it. comprehended intention gives the whole phenomenon a new character. Nevertheless, the intention itself can still be given in a symbolic relation, perl.rapsin a glance,or it can be the result of the situation as a whole. Nou' what about the u'ord? Does this also have a moment of ought as the signal does?Apparently the word can be there as communicated and, even further, as communicated to me or to arlother, or as merely "thought aloud." For the present t{e can rgnore how the word has these characteristics.At any,rate, they -I'he rureirrelevant to the intelligibility of the rvord. u'ords "Something is burning" mean the same thing to mc n'hen they are merelv called out as rvherrthev are directed to nte or to another. Indeed, nothing of these differences needs to be co-given at all. P a r t o f t h e i r g i v e n n e s si s c e r t a i n l y , r h a sr o m e o n ei s s p e a k i n gr h e m ,

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Edith Stein the speaker is not comprehended in the u'ords. Rather, he is prehended at the same time as they. Nor does this at first play ry role in the words' meaning, but only when it points toward eir intuitive fulfillment. For example, in order to fulfill the eaning of a perceptual statement, I must put myself into the 'Ihus the words can be considered entirely ker's orientation. rhemselveswithout regarding the speaker and all that is going in him. Now what distinguishesthe word from the signal?On the one nd, rve have the signaling thing, the circumstancesof the pro, the bridge that convention has thron'n betn'een them and t is perceivable as this "ought to indicate." The circumstances mselvesremain entirely undisturbed by the fact that the signal esignatesthem. On the other hand, there is first of all no verbal hysical body fWortkiirperf corresponding to the signaling physirl body lSignalhArperl,only a verbal living body fWortleibl. The I expression could not exist by itself, and neither has it eived the function of a sign from the outside in addition to it is. Rather, it is ahvaysthe bearer of meaning in entirely the me manner n'hether the meaning is really there or whether it is vented. On the contrary, the signal is real. lf it is invented, its nction as a sign is merely invented, too, whereasthere is no such ing as an invented meaning of u'ords. The living body and the I of a word form a living unity, but one permitting to both a latively independent development.l0TA signal cannot develop. nce it has received its designation it continues to convey it nchanged: and the function an act ofchoice has assignedto it, an t of choice can take au'ayagain. Further, it only existsby reason f a creative act completed in it. But as soon as it exists it is vered and independent from this act like any product of human rtistry. lt can be destroyed and cease functioning u'ithout its creator" knou'ing anything about it. If a storm u'ashesau'ay all rail markers in the Riesengebirge,hikers will get lost. This can appen without the RiesengebirgeAssociation,the creator of this 1'stemof signs, being responsible for this, since it believes they re still in the best condition. This cannot happen rr.ith a word, or it is alrvavsborne by a consciousness(which is naturally not hat of'him *,h,, i. speakinghere and nou,).It lives "by the grace"

Indiuidual Constitution of the P sycho-Physical

8l

of a spirit (i.e., not by reason of the spirit's creative act, but in living dependence on it). The n'ord's bearer can be an individual subject but also a group of possibly changing subjects bound into one by a continuity of experience. Finally, we have the main difference: Words point to the object through the medium of meaning, while the signal has no meaning at all but only the function of being significant. And u'ords do not simply point to the circumstancesas the signal does. What goes into them is not the circumstance, but its logico-categorical formation. Words do not signify, but express,and $'hat is expressedis no longer what it u'asbefore.l08 Naturally, this also applies when something psychic is expressed.Should someone say to me that he is sad, I understand ihe meaning of the words. The sadnessI now knolv of is not an "alive one" before me as a perceptual givenness.It is probably as little like the sadnesscomprehended in the symbol as the table of u'hich I hear spoken is like the other side of the table which I see' ln one caseI am in the apophantic sphere, the realm of propositions and meanings, in the other casein immediate intuitive contact with the objective sphere. Meaning is always a general one. In order to comprehend the object intinded right no'w, we always need a givenness of the intuitive basisof the meaning experiences.There is no such intermediate level between the expressedexperience and the expressing bodily change. But meaning and symbol have something in common which forces them both to be called "expression" repeatedly.This is the fact that together they constitute the unity of an object, that the expressionreleasedfrom the connection $'ith r"hat ls expressed is no longer the same object (in contrast with the signaling physical body), that the expressionproceeds out of the experiencer0eand adapts itself to the expressedmaterial. These relationships are present in simple form in bodily expression;they are doubled in a certain sensein verbal expression: rvord, meaning, ob.ject;and, correlatively, having of the object, logical intention or meaning, and linguistic designation. The function of expressing, through u'hich I comprehend the expressed experience as the expression, is always fulfilled in the experiencein which expressionproceeds from what is expressed'

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Edith Stent

Wehavealreadyportrayedthisearlierandalsoused..expression" in a broadened sense. <93>lnthecaseofunderstarrdingthisexperierrcirrgisnotprimordial, but empathized. Of course, we must distinguish^bt'*:-t: verbal and bodily expression here' Understanding of a bodily e x p r e s s i o n i s b a s e d o n c o m p r e h e n d i n g t h..1.,' efore-ignlil'ingbody project myself already interpreted as a |iving body of an .l intotheforeignlivirrgbody,carryouttheexperiencealreadycogiven to me as empty with its countenance, and experlence tne experience ending irl this expression' As we saw,ou..ir-r neglect the speakingindividual i. ttre word. I myself primordially comprehend the meaning of this ideal object in the understanding transition from word to meaning' And as long as I remain in this sphere, I do not need the foreign individualind do not have to empathically carry out his experienceswith him. An rrrtuitive fulfillment of u'hat is intended is also possible through primordial experience' I can bring the circumstancesof u,hich the statement speaks to givenness to myself. I hear the rvords, "It is raining," I understand them without considering that someone is saying them to me' And I bring this comprehension ro intuitive fllfifment wher-rI look out the wiI-rdou,'myself' only if I rvant to have the intuitioD on rvhich the speakerbaseshis statement and his full experience of expression,do I need empathy' Therefore, it should be clear that one does lrot arrive at experlence bv the path leading imnrediately fiom rerbal expression to thit the word, insofar as it has an ideal meaning. is not a ,.,"'.ar.ririg, symbol. But supPosethat there are still other rvaysto get to the rvord. The walto get to meaning is through the pure t1'peof rhe rvord. Except perh"apsin solitary psr,chiclife, we alwaysfind this

<94>

rvordinsomekindofearthlycloak,inspeech,handwriting'or prirrt. The form can be unnoticed; but it can also push itself ibrward (for example, if it does not clearly reproduce the c<.rnt.ur Of the wnrds). Then it draws interest to itself'arldat the same time to the speakingperson.rr0He appearsto be externalizing or communic:rting *,.rrdr, possibly communic:rting to me. In the latter .,ought" to point out somethillg to me. Now they casethe words are no longer -.r.iy the expressionof somerhing objective, but

tl t't ConstitutiLnr

lndiuidual Pstrho'Physical

I3

rerimeare,tt,,:.)l',il' arrhesan illlil: ffi:::"T.X?,:'*TT1I':'i '

t l t e p e r s ot t ' t t t a t n i ' , , ' l , t '" ' i r . s r r c ha \ a p e r c e p t i r ) l r .' . e i \ i o n t. h e t r a n s i t i t . rtno t h e s p c a k i l r g t h e $ ' o r c l s ., 1 l n s t e a d o f i n v e r b : r .l l l , l , . n i n i r rt h c m e a n i n g o f person and his actscutr'l],,,rr.,i are aln,aysdirected t()1vardsorll('q u e s t i o n , a r e q u e s r , 0 , , ' n l i , , - l " l ^ t i o n s h i po f t h e s p e a k e rt o . t l ' r e o t r e a n d t h u s r e f e r , . ' i l l : , . ' ; ; . H e r e r h e s p e a k e r ' si n t e n t i t > t - , 5 h e a r e r ,j t r s t a s a l l g r t ' t ' t t t ' r ' o t h e * o r d s i n t e l l i g i b l e . F r o n l ] 1 , t substanti:rlly assistitr u,ords mean in gener.r'1, "t"i',,irt n,hatthe r i c r np o i n t r r ' ec t - r n r p r , ' l r . ' t t t ' . , , j , . , o * . b u t ' r v h a tt h e r . m e i n h ' ' t : ' . l l : ; ; ; s s v m b o l si n t h e i r i n f o r m : r t i r q \ \ ' o r d s c a n . o t b e d r ' : l F r ' ' * , = ,, t u t t , b e c a u s et h e y d o n , t . f i r t - r 1 1 l u n c t i o r t s .e i t h e r .T h i s t s ' ' , . f , , c ( ) m p r e h e n d i n tgh i s € X p c r l e l l tq . l '.e' esarerrot l h e o n l v r r o r t h r f i a i 1 1l r ' t " c o m p r e h e n d e d l rt l \ e s e c o n d l l .b e c a u s et h e s r' . l , ; o r . o , i ' t , a r r da r e a l s oe n r i r e l id i f f t ' r s'ords, but only frur ,1.'t," ."l.ijn i, sl,mbolically giren. At nr.r51 steps i nt o enrll' pres ented frorn, ;lr; .*t Jrnulirution oJ self , , t t e c o u l ds a 1t h a t i l l s l ) "'l',,]; ( ' l l h " . ' nals a n a f f e c l d 1 1 e isn a n e x p r e s s i \ ' e "" v i e w w i t h t h e s a m ea t t i t t t : t t . ^ " ' n . " . t h . - r . l v e s t o w h i c h 1 6 . '.,iif l u r ( ) \ e n ) e n t b. u t n o t t l l : t h a t i r r f l e t t i ? t t, t , d l 5 " o . , f - . , .aost ianng e x p r e s s i o i l( t h e e n r \l)ee(h restifies.\et il . . i :, r . ' . r r o r d i n t o n a t i c l r ra r e a l s oa l ) : r r l , ( " 1, " r o , -ot .f t n . , p . . a h , t h e r i s i n g o f t l r e p h a s i sp l a c e d o n r h e . t ' l ' l ' 1 , , ] a ' t h a t r h e s ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c sc a t r < ; 1 1 1 u r o i t e i n a q u e s t i o n ,. . 1 ,. l . ' , , , f t e : t i f 1i r r g . s c c o n d a r i l v h a v e a r u r r r . t t l l l ; ; ; , c o u l c ls t l l l b e i r r v e s t i g a r eidn n r r > 1 - s Natural iy, rheserelar:."1;;I;;;rntio,,, let .rs onie rlore Ir11[. t . ' J . , t mere "bec l e t a i l . r rlrt r t e r m s o f r h t s o l i . g i ' e r r n e s sf r o m t h e ').,,iri.'..irsiderecl t clear what distinguishr so far..\\re seethat rve ' l l , , L " r . l u r otl i r t g - c o - g i v r . n "o f r r h a t i t . l isoursardly perceir'ed tlte " ( ( ) p e r c e i r e c l " . 1. ,1 1 t ' x p e r i e r t c ct h i s p r o c e t ' ( , " ] : ; ; fr.m rrhar \\as e lcvel ol' ernpathic pr(),('( c r > n s i c l e r e da r l i t . r . ( 1 ) l ' r > l],,rri,r* in the cases tht' first lt'vel. This r",,t tl." f.ront^sc|1.rn r " a d o e sn o l p r , r c e e d I l r c a p p e . r r a r r c eo l l : ( ' l l \ r " r p r t l c e e d sl r o n r h a p p i r l s s s(. ) t t 1 1 1 1 ' a tiotrs in the u'a1 11'tu1 l;tttf',,, irr..if'.all1 different fiotr1 a t:attsal i. ,,thcr hanrl. rlre yrroct-.r'(ill:i;;. 1 1 . , . , . .i , a d i f f e r e r r t r e l a t i o r r : h i 1 r seqtlence' As wt' sairl t'Jt,,.,r'tf-r^" bet.rveenexerti()ll and-bltrs[betueettshame ,rd lrl,'tt' a n n o u n c e di n t h e l i l r n r 1 ; 1 u,l r l r g .\ \ ' l r i l t ' r ' a u s arle l a ri . r l r ' " ' r " " r " " r .

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Edith Stein

if . . . then, so that the givennessof one occurrence (be it psychic o r p h y s i c a l )m o t i v a t e sa p r o g r e s s i < . tron t h e g i v e n n e s so f ' t h e o t h e r one, here the proceeding clf one experience fiom another is ( ' x p e r i e n c e di n p u r e s t i m m a l t e r r c ew i t h o u t t h e d e t o u r o v e r t h e object sphere. We want to call this experienced proceeding "motivation." All t h a t i s u s u a l l yd e s i g n a t e da s " m o t i v a t i o n " i s a s p e c i a lc a s eo f t h i s m o t i v a t i o n : m o t i v a t i o n < > fc o n d u c t b y t h e w i l l , o f t h e w i l l b y a l'eelirrg.But the proceeding of expression {iom experience is a specialcaseol'this motivati()n, too. Artd we also understand motiv a t i o r ri n p e r c e p t i o n ( t h e g o i n g o v e r l r o m o n e g i v e n n e s so f t h e o b j e c t t ( ) a n o t h e r ) , o f ' w h i c h H u s s e r ls p e a k s , r r i2n t h i s w a y . V a r i ous attempts have been made to set forth motivation as the cause -I'his interpretation is untenable fbr, as we sa\{', of r.r'hatis psvchic. there is also psychic causality that is clearly distinp;trishedfiom motivatioll. On the contrary, motivation belongs essentiallyto 'I-here i s n o o t h e r s u c h c o n n e c t i o n .W e t h e e x p e r i e n t i a ls p h e r e . *'ould like to designate the motivational relationship as intelligible or meaningful in contrast with the causalone. Tb be intelligib l e n r e a n sn o t h i n s m ( ) r e t h a n t o e x p e r i e n c et h e t r a n s i t i o n f i o m ()ne part to another within an experiential rvhole (n()t, to have objectively), and every objective, all ob.jectivemeaning, resides o n l v i n e x p e r i e n c e so { ' t h i sk i n d . A n a c t i o n i s a u n i t y o f i n t e l l i g i b i l ity or of meaning because its component experiences have an c x p e r i e n te a b l e r ' < l n n t ' ri 'ot n . And experience and expression {irrm an intelligible rvhole in the same sense.I understand an expression, n'hile I can merely bring a sensationto givenness.This leads me through the phen ( ) m e n ( ) no f ' e x p r e s s i o n i n t o t h e m e a n i n p ic o l r t e x t s o f w h a t i s psychic and at the same time gives Ine an imp()rtant means clf ( ( ) r r ( . c itl r g e m P a lh i ( a c ts . (m) The Correctionof Empathic Acts 'fhe

basisfbr what would suspendthe unity of a meaning must b e a c l e c e p t i o n .W