NUCLEAR DOCTRINES AND STRATEGIES
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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 44
ISSN 1874-6276
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies National Policies and International Security
Edited by
Mark Fitzpatrick Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK
Alexander Nikitin Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Russia
and
Sergey Oznobishchev Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments, Moscow, Russia
Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division
Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines – National Policies and International Security Moscow, Russia 15–16 October 2007
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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
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Preface This book presents the results of the NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop “Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines: National policies and International Security,” held in Moscow on October 15–16, 2007. Co-directed by Dr. Sergey Oznobishchev, Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments (Moscow) and Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and hosted by the International Federation for Peace and Conciliation, the workshop was sponsored by the NATO Science Programme. The workshop brought together policy experts and government officials from eleven nations and NATO for two days of exchanges on some of the most serious issues affecting national and global security. The topic of the workshop was chosen in view of the overarching importance that nuclear strategies and doctrines continued to play in the modern world and in relations among the leading states. This introduction provides a summary of the workshop and the main issues that were discussed throughout the two-day event. The nuclear doctrines of the recognized nuclear weapons states and the activities these policies entail – beginning with the acquisition and modernization of nuclear forces – inevitably influence the defense and foreign policies of those nations which are without nuclear weapons capabilities as well as the policies of those nations that are considered to be de facto nuclear weapons states. The present unstable balance between the “haves” and the “have-nots” is becoming increasingly shaky. Many representatives of the latter countries consider this division to be illegal, immoral and unresponsive to the demands of their national security. The declaratory aspects of nuclear doctrines and their provisions, which now even more than in the past do not exclude the use of nuclear weapons when the national security is considered to be in jeopardy, look extremely outdated in today’s globalized world, when most countries are pursuing close cooperative and partnership-like relations. The nuclear doctrines still support the notion that only nuclear weapons may serve as a “supreme guarantor” of military security, despite the situation in which nuclear deterrence cannot fulfill its role effectively, especially against rogue states, and in view of new threats and dangerous regimes. The non-declared “operational” aspect of nuclear doctrines, which, as a remnant of the old times of nuclear confrontation, still presupposes the presence of hundreds of nuclear targets on the territory of the opponent (primarily between Russian and American forces) serves as an additional destabilizing factor in relations between countries. Throughout the conference it was emphasized that the existing policies of national security and military doctrines do not reflect modern realities and that nuclear deterrence, which still comprises the essence of nuclear doctrines of the nuclear-weapons states, cannot effectively fulfill its assigned role, especially in view of the new common threats posed by non-state actors and dangerous regimes. As outlined in an introductory presentation by Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the acute problems to be discussed at the conference included the correlation between the declaratory and the “operational” aspects of the nuclear doctrines, the
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“first use” or “no first use” concepts in the nuclear policies of the nuclear weapons states, the launch on warning issue, the contemporary “crisis” concerning US plans for ballistic missile defense in Europe, and the present status of the nuclear arms control. The discussion of the first topic – on the new threats and challenges to international and national security and on the role of nuclear weapons under present conditions – focused on the situation of the nations that have nuclear weapons at their disposal. In addition to the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are considered to be de facto nuclear power. Beyond these states, about 20 other countries have the technological potential to develop nuclear weapons. Analyzing these issues, Dr. Alexander Khryapin, Senior Research Fellow from the Center for Military Strategic Studies, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, acknowledged that whether or not these countries would use their potential is dependent not only on the political will of their leaders, but on the security environment in the world and in their regions and on the degree to which the nuclear powers exercise self-restraint. Participants agreed that in contrast to the times of the Cold War, nuclear weapons are increasingly presented in official policy documents not as instruments of political containment but as combat weapons which may be physically used to deter the escalation of aggression executed even by conventional means. This situation was considered to be extremely dangerous. Many experts expressed their concern that the most mighty nuclear arsenals (of Russia and the USA) are still, as in times of the Cold War, aimed at each other. This factor, as well as the left-over disposition inherited from the Cold War period of regarding the partner as a potential “nuclear opponent” strongly impedes prospects for achieving true and effective partnership. An interesting and timely analysis was given by Dr. Harold Smith, Distinguished Professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy of the University of California, who presented a comparison of the Republican and Democratic Party policies towards nuclear weapons. His principal assessment was that differences between the parties are diminishing, as evidenced by the 4 January 2007 op-ed by Messrs. Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, which advocated steps toward “A world free of nuclear weapons.” Smith predicted that in matters nuclear, candidates from both sides will move toward multilateralism, legally binding treaties and international verification and enforcement; e.g. sanctions. Professor Vladimir Baranovsky emphasized the new factors connected with nuclear weapons: the appearance of highly accurate weapons, the lowered possibility of regional conflict being escalated to the global level, and the crisis of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. A number of experts commented that in fact non-proliferation policies are subordinate to the status of political relations, the level of confidence between states and their ability to work cooperatively to achieve common goals. The deficit of partnership in many aspects of interactions between countries was acknowledged. Dr. Edward Ifft, Adjunct Professor of Georgetown University, in analyzing several aspects of nuclear deterrence, acknowledged that this phenomenon still exists. Several participants emphasized that nuclear deterrence is no longer suitable in the situation of a declared partnership between the former adversaries (Russia and the USA, first of all), is not able to deter rogue states, poses a threat to international security, and is impotent to counter the most acute modern threats and challenges, particularly proliferation and terrorism.
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Discussing the issue of Russia and US military strategies Major General (ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin, the former director of the principal institute of the rocket forces, also paid attention to the contradictory character of the present nuclear doctrines. He also emphasized the issue of transparency of the nuclear programs which are not open to the public in only two of the Permanent Five: Russia and China. His assessment was that Russia in the coming future will support the level of 2000 nuclear warheads, taking the course of MIRVing the Topol-M warheads. The experts discussing this issue expressed their opinion that Russia and US are interested in a new arms control treaty which should be more transparent. At the same time the opinion was expressed that the proposed enlargement of the INF Treaty to the “global” level does not seem to be possible in the near future. In suggesting a cooperative approach to managing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship, Dr. Lewis Dunn, Senior Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation, recommended that the USA should address Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic intentions; that Russia should address U.S. uncertainties about Russia’s commitment to preventing proliferation; and that both should find ways to build habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack. A vision of an alternative future US nuclear policy was presented by Joseph Cirincione, Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy of the Center for American Progress. In a document signed by several authoritative US experts on the Democratic Party side, a vision of such policy was presented. In their view, deep reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals are achievable. This would pave the way for the other nuclear states to join such reductions. Dr. Victor Mizin, Counselor, Analytical Division of the Russian Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly, reinforced many of these suggestions in his analysis of how to cure the inherent defects of the NPT. At the same time the discussion of British and French nuclear doctrines indicated that joining in nuclear arms reductions is not necessarily on the agenda of both countries, particularly France. As was confirmed during the discussion of these issues, both countries go along the way of their own national oriented understanding of minimum deterrence. The discussion segued to a presentation by Michael Rühle, Head, Speechwriting and Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Planning Unit of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, who gave his prognoses of the new NATO strategic concept which would appear rather soon. He paid attention to the fact that the situation in Europe concerning the providing of nuclear security is steadily improving and expressed the opinion that the nuclear doctrines of France, Great Britain and USA are developing in one direction towards the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in the whole defense doctrine. Dr. Jeremy Stocker, Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (London), assessed that the UK-USA relationship was of key importance in determining the UK’s nuclear stance and that while the Soviet threat has been replaced by a less threatening but more uncertain strategic environment, nuclear ties with the US remain as important as ever for the UK. Dr. Petr Romashkin, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, expressed his point of view that the nuclear doctrines of the UK and France, like that of the US, reveal a break from the doctrine and rhetoric of the defensive nuclear deterrence of the Cold War period and a shift to preemptive and coercive use of nuclear weapons.
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Special interest was devoted to the issues of Chinese nuclear preparations. Speaking on this topic, Dr. Jianqun Teng, Deputy Secretary General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, emphasized that the term deterrence in connection with the national arsenal is not applicable to the understanding adopted among Chinese experts and politicians. He noted that China is not supposed to enlarge the number of warheads but would potentially go along the way of qualitative modernization. At present China consider the security situation around its borders to be the best in the last 50 years. Major General (ret) Pavel Zolotarev, Deputy Director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies, agreed that Chinese nuclear strategy does not consider nuclear weapons to be battlefield armaments. China’s commitment not to use nuclear weapons first and its proposal to the other nuclear powers to undertake similar obligations deserve support. In analyzing Iran’s nuclear program, Fitzpatrick described the factors that lead to a conclusion that Iran’s nuclear program has a military dimension. Dr. Alexander Pikaev, Department Head of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, presented the view that neither the sanctions nor the incentives employed by the international community to date have had any impact on Iran’s stance, primarily because Washington has undercut the value of the incentives offered. Representative of the Iranian Embassy in Moscow expressed confidence that Iran has neither the intention nor the capability to construct nuclear weapons and that “minor disputes” should not impede Iranian-IAEA cooperation. The example of North Korea was mostly treated as the successful case of cooperative efforts of the leading states. Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack, Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the US Naval War College assess the various strategies pursued to date to forestall North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons, and noted that none of them have yet achieved definitive results. Discussion focused on the loopholes in the nonproliferation regime when a country can benefit from all the privileges of being within the NPT regime and then withdraw without punishment. The existence of the suspected nuclear arsenal in Israel, and the creation of arsenals by India and Pakistan outside the limitations of the NPT at present pose even more challenges to the NPT regime. Dr. Yair Evron, Professor of International Relations at Tel Aviv University, assessed that while Israel’s ambiguous nuclear posture signals self restraint and caution, the policy has not in fact deterred armed violence against the state, and it was only a secondary factor in inducing Arab regimes to seek peace. Dr. Rajesh M. Basrur, associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University Singapore, explained that while India’s rapidly growing international profile has raised concerns about the potential expansion of its nuclear capabilities. Indian strategic culture is minimalistic, the product of decades of slow growth and a firmly grounded policy of non-deployment. Pakistan’s ambassador to Russia also stressed the minimum deterrence underpinning of his country’s nuclear forces. Some experts lamented that “third states” are being presented with new incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. For instance, for many countries the US military campaign in Iraq served as an additional proof that only nuclear weapons may provide real security. The comment was made, for example, that “if Saddam Hussein really had nuclear weapons at his disposal Washington would not dare to intervene.” Hence the acute need for creating “security conditions” and collective security systems, including nuclear-weapon-free zones, if possible, in the most uneasy regions of the world. In this respect, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Vadim Grechaninov, President of the Atlantic Rada of
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Ukraine, argued that Ukraine’s disarmament experience can serve as a positive example for the world today.
Acknowledgments The workshop directors appreciate the contributions to the discussion of all the participants, including those not named above. Credit is due the NATO officials and staff who lent support, particularly Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues, Programme Director for Human and Societal Dynamics of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, and Elizabeth Cowan, program assistant. Special gratitude is extended to Adelina Akhmentzyanova, Eugenia Andryushina, Eva Kharitonova, Oksana Novikova, Varvara Sinitsina, Yulia Starilova, and Bejanishvili Zurab for their contributions in Moscow toward the organization of the conference, and for their translation and editing of chapters of this book. We also wish to thank Erin Blankenship and Rachel Yemini in London for their skillful copy-editing and lay-out assistance in the preparation of this book. Above all, Alexander Nikitin deserves acknowledgment for inspiring the workshop and for providing strategic direction and organizational advice before, during and after the proceedings. Sergey Oznobishchev and Mark Fitzpatrick Workshop Co-Directors
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Contents Preface Sergey Oznobishchev and Mark Fitzpatrick
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The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World Alexander Khyrapin
1
A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation Harold Smith Understanding Deterrence Edward Ifft Cooperative Security Management: Toward a New Approach for Managing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship Lewis A. Dunn Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy Joseph Cirincione The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” of the Nonproliferation Regime Victor Mizin
7 16
25 30
39
NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision Michael Rűhle
58
British Nuclear Strategy Jeremy Stocker
64
Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective Petr Romashkin
70
A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy Jianqun Teng
79
Modern Nuclear Strategy of China Pavel Zolotarev
87
Iranian Nuclear Program – Peaceful or Military Goals? Mark Fitzpatrick
92
Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution Alexander Pikaev
99
Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program Jonathan D. Pollack
113
Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons Yair Evron
121
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India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement Rajesh M. Basrur
129
Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear Security Vadim Grechaninov
138
The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines Alexander Nikitin and Sergey Oznobishchev
144
Author Index
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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-1
1
The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World Alexander KHYRAPIN1
Abstract. Deterrence policy was officially acknowledged as a constituent part of national policy after the advent of nuclear weapons and therein became a main instrument of military confrontation. The role of nuclear weapons as a means of deterring aggression will be preserved for the foreseeable future. Deterrence as the basis for strategic stability, however, may be endangered by various military developments, including by: the creation of the global anti ballistic missile system; attempts to reach strategic military dominance by re-equipping ballistic missiles with conventional warheads and retaining a nuclear potential; the possible lifting of restrictions on the deployment of weapons in outer space and the creation of military bases in zones of so-FDOOHG³YLWDOLQWHUHVWV´
The strategy of deterrence Throughout the centuries-old existence of the intergovernmental relations, the deterrence of aggression has been one of the key elements of DVWDWH¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\ SROLF\ $W WKH VDPH WLPH ³GHWHUUHQFH SROLF\´ ZDV RIILFLDOO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG DV D FRQVWLWXHQWSDUWRIWKHVWDWH¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\SROLF\RQO\ZKHQQXFOHDUZHDSRQVKDG been created and thus became a main instrument of military confrontation. The term ³GHWHUUHQFH´LWVHOIWRRNRQVSHFLDOVLJQLILFDQFHDVZHOODVLWZDVQRZQHZO\DWWDFKHGWR nuclear scenarios. In time nuclear deterrence became the basis for strategic deterrence of a potential aggressor from unleashing war. When understood as force containment, nuclear deterrence aims to convince the enemy that aggression lacks any prospects in view of the consequences that such military actions may entail. Hence the first key determinant of deterrence is the FDWHJRU\ RI ³LQWLPLGDWLRQ´ ZKLFK SUHVXSSRVHV WR IULJKWHQ WKH PLOLWDU\-political leadership of the potential aggressor state with the consequences of the retaliation. In WKLVOLJKWVRPHDQDO\VWVLQWHUSUHWWKHWHUP³GHWHUUHQFH´DV³GLVVXDVLRQWKURXJKIHDU´ The intimidation is based on the threat of retaliation, i.e. the guaranteed punishment of a certain scale. The implementation of the retaliation threat suggests that certain consequences for the aggressor state will follow. As the numerous examples of armed conflicts including both world wars show, consequences in a broad sense may be of various character and scale ± from moral-political deprecation and economic sanctions imposed by the international community, up to heavy territorial, economic and demographic losses including the disintegration of the state or significant limitation of its sovereignty. 1
Leading Research Fellow, Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces.
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A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World
The consequences of deterring the aggressor are usually associated with the FRQFHSWRI³GDPDJH´PDLQO\XQGHUVWRRGDVSK\VLFDOORVVHVRILQGXVWULDOGHPRJUDSKLF and military capacities that the aggressor would suffer as a result of the retaliatory actions of the opposite party. Since the very moment of its formulation the category of ³GDPDJH´ KDV EHHQ RYHUWO\ RU GLVFUHHWO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG E\ DOO H[SHUWV DV WKH EDVLV RI deterrence. At WKH VDPH WLPH RQO\ WKH GDPDJH ZKLFK LQ YLHZ RI WKH DJJUHVVRU¶V political-military leadership, implies losses incommensurable with the benefits can keep the adversary from direct military aggression. The level of inflicted damage which exceeds the level RI ³DFFHSWDELOLW\´ GHILQHG E\ WKH HQHP\ KLPVHOI LV FDOOHG ³GHWHUUHQWGDPDJH´LQWKHGHWHUUHQFHWKHRU\7KHXSSHUOLPLWRIWKHGHWHUUHQWGDPDJHLV ³XQDFFHSWDEOHGDPDJH´LQLWVFODVVLFDOPHDQLQJ 7KHUHIRUH WKH KLHUDUFKLFDO FKDLQ RI ³LQWLPLGDWLRQ ± retaliation threat ± FRQVHTXHQFHVGHWHUUHQWGDPDJH ´SURYLGHVWKHJURXQGIRUQXFOHDUGHWHUUHQFH
Nuclear deterrence in the world It should be emphasized that for over 60 years of its existence nuclear weaponry has played an important role in preventing regional and large-sale wars in the first place, as well as local conflicts between the nuclear powers and the coalitions they formed ± the resolution of such conflict situations as the Taiwan (1954 and 1958), Berlin (1961), and Cuban (1962) crises at the climax of the military-political and ideological confrontation between the two world systems being glaring examples. Fortunately, each of these crises ended peacefully and at the same time helped to create the mutual deterrence system and the conceptual framework of nuclear security. However, at that time more than 200 local wars and armed conflicts which included the direct participation of nuclear states were unleashed: for example, the USA and their NATO allies took part in the conflicts in Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq and the Soviet Union took part in the war in Afghanistan. This shows that the existence of nuclear weapons cannot deter all armed conflicts, let alone terrorist attacks. Therefore the main purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the escalation of conventional wars, meaning the development of local conflicts into regional, regional into large-scale, and large-scale into nuclear wars. Today there are five states which officially possess nuclear weapons de jure: Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France and China. India and Pakistan have acknowledged military nuclear programs. Israel neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons and North Korea has claimed to have obtained such weapons. According to the IAEA another 20 states possess the potential to create nuclear weapons but owing to different reasons have refrained from it so far. For some of them making the nuclear choice is only a question of political will, not of technological impediments. Countries have varying perspectives regarding their nuclear deterrent. The USA, Great Britain and France, as both nuclear powers and NATO member states, follow the coalition military strategy including nuclear strategy, though their national nuclear strategies diverge on certain positions. For example, NATO coalition strategy views QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DV WKH ³H[WUHPH LQVWUXPHQW´ ODVW UHVHUYH ZKHUHDV $PHULFD¶V RZQ QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ GRHV QRW UHJDUG QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DV WKH ³H[WUHPH LQVWUXPHQW´ DV LW DLPVWR³FUHDWHWKHKLJKHVWSRVVLEOH XQFHUWDLQW\´DERXWWKHSRWHQWLDOSHULRGDQGVFDOHRI nuclear weapons use against the enemy.
A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World
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Interestingly, in contrast to the Cold War period, based on its economic and military capacities the United States today has rather shifted its emphasis from nuclear ZHDSRQVDQGEURDGHQHGWKHQRWLRQRI³WULDG´7KLVLQFOXGHVFRQYHQWLRQDOVWULNHIRUFHV (high-precision weapons), the ABM system, and flexible infrastructure which guarantee a possible quick build-up of operatively deployed nuclear forces. That being said, the United States does not rule out the possibility of delivering pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the adversary states possessing weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological or nuclear). It should be noted that in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (2002), both Russia and the United States are to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 2012 to 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads. With regard to these reductions, however, the American side has implied that the agreemHQW SHUWDLQV RQO\ ³RSHUDWLYHO\ GHSOR\HG´ QXFOHDU ZDUKHDGV WKXV reserving the opportunity to build up its nuclear forces at any time. Other nuclear states have their own views of nuclear weapons and deterrence. The Chinese military-political leadership sees its nuclear weapons as the basic instrument to deter any attempts of military force pressure upon the state. India and Pakistan regard their nuclear weapons not only as the means of defense policy in contemporary conditions, but also as an indicator of high-tech development and status in the international relations system. The history of the nuclear deterrence in intergovernmental relations supports the viewpoint of many states (primarily the developing countries) that nuclear weaponry is one of the most effective instruments to protect oneself from the aggression of a more developed adversary. It seems that this view on the role of nuclear weapons in the overall system of international relations and national security will last for a long time. Besides, GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ LQWHUHVW LQ DFTXLULQJ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DQG PHDQV RI delivery has been heated by the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, cases which clearly showed them that no state outside of NATO can feel safe if in confrontation with the western powers. As a result there are a number of states which strive to possess nuclear weapons production technology as an effective instrument to deter a more powerful adversary even when the opposing parties have significantly asymmetric capacities. It should be stressed once again that there are approximately 20 states today which have the potential to develop nuclear weapons and this number will only grow. There are several reasons underlying the desire to possess nuclear weapons: Strengthening national (military) security; Enhancing national status and prestige; Protecting national freedom of action.
5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQ The position of the Russian Federation concerning the role of nuclear weapons in the international relations system is close to the viewpoints of other nuclear powers. In accordance with its military doctrine Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation against nuclear or any other WMD attack as well as in response to largescale conventional aggression if the situation is critical for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies. The nuclear de-escalation of unleashed aggression is an extreme and forced measure and may be executed through nuclear strikes
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A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World
appropriate to the existing situation. The main aim of such strikes is to coerce the enemy to stop the war at the earliest possible stage. It should be stressed that Russia had further restrained its actions with the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT except for the cases when Russia, its allies or states with shared security responsibilities are attacked or if the aggression is launched in alliance with a nuclearweapon state. Russia steadily adheres to the principles set in the international agreements in the sphere of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. In particular Russia has completely fulfilled its commitments within the INF Treaty as well as the SORT Treaty. It is certain that by 2012 Russia will reach the quantitative level of nuclear warheads defined by the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty. However the treaty, which expires on December 5, 2009, does not provide any verificatioQPHFKDQLVPVDVLWLVDQ³DJUHHPHQWRILQWHQWLRQV´SHUVH:LWKWKLVLQPLQG it is necessary to carry on negotiations with the USA on a new agreement in the sphere of strategic weapons reduction that is supported by an effective verification mechanism. Such a new treaty should be legally binding and rest upon the basic principles of the SORT Treaty. It is necessary to stress once again that nuclear deterrence is based on the ides of assured possibility and capability to cause unacceptable (deterrent) damage to an aggressor through retaliation strikes of Russian forces, i.e. the threat of punishment which in fact keeps the potential enemy from attacking Russia and its allies for any rational political, military and economic reasons. The understanding of the disastrous consequences of the use of nuclear weaponry strengthens its role as a political instrument of prevention regional (large-scale) wars in the first place. However, nuclear weapons should be also viewed as the military means to destroy an enemy if the measures of deterrence turn out to be insufficient. Thus it seems that the main functions of nuclear weapons which determine its role and place in the strategic deterrence system are the following: Political function ± deterring the aggressor (state or coalition of states) from attempting to solve emerging differences by military means through the threat of inevitable punishment; Military function ± disruption or de-escalation of the unleashed aggression and decisive defeat of the enemy through the use of nuclear weapons. $IHZZRUGVDERXWWKHDWWHPSWVXQGHUWKHVORJDQRIµQXFOHDUULVNUHGXFWLRQ¶ZKLFK certain experts have been undertaking recently in order to revise the role of nuclear weapons in the Russian military security system, and hence change the essence of nuclear deterrence based on the threat of mutually assured destruction in the Russian$PHULFDQ³FHQWUDOQXFOHDUFRQIURQWDWLRQ´WKH PDLQGUDZEDFNRIVXFKDWWHPSWVLVWKDW they perceive nuclear deterrence as separate from strategic deterrence as it is. Suggested measures such as reducing the forces on duty, slowing down the build-up of high-alert elements of nuclear forces, and transparency about regions of SSBN patrolling can significantly increase the vulnerability of Russian nuclear forces against a sudden conventional, high-precision attack, especially considering the creation of the American global ABM system. After such a strike has been delivered, Russian nuclear forces may become incapable of fulfilling their tasks and thus fail to ensure 5XVVLD¶V nuclear deterrence capability. Therefore before the specific measures of nuclear risk reduction can be discussed it is necessary to address the whole spectrum of issues regarding the strategic deterrence maintenance, not only in the nuclear sphere but also
A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World
5
in the field of general-purpose forces where the USA, let alone NATO, has certain predominance. It seems that before the revision of the essence of nuclear deterrence and nuclear risk reductions can be discussed it is necessary to eliminate a whole complex of differences and problems in the system of international and bilateral security. In order to reduce nuclear risks several urgent measures should be taken, in particular the commitment to: Solve emerging international problems only through political-diplomatic measures on the basis of the corresponding UN Security Council resolutions. The use of military force should be regarded as an extreme measure which can only be sanctioned by the UN Security Council and include a peacekeeping part; Ban the deployment of nuclear weapons and its carriers on the territory of new NATO-members as well as the use of the nuclear infrastructure created in the former Soviet republics and the former members of the Warsaw Treaty; Prevent (prohibit) the deployment of strategic ABM attack systems outside the national territories of the states building them; Take measures aimed at the practical reduction of strategic offensive arms and OLTXLGDWLRQRIWKH³UHWXUQSRWHQWLDO´RQWhe common basis with the USA; Involve other nuclear powers into the common process of fulfillment Article 6 of the NPT through nuclear weapons reduction and comprehensive disarmament; Sign new interrelated international agreements in the sphere of strategic offensive (both nuclear and non-nuclear) and defensive systems, including the ABM systems; Prohibit any opportunity of arms deployment in outer space, to fix permanently the weapons-free status of outer space; and Restrict the creation and deployment of high-precision long-range conventional systems as well as weapons based on newly developed technology. 5XVVLDLVDOVRFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQ³PLQLDWXUH´ nuclear warheads and re-equipment of strategic nuclear carriers with conventional warheads. The claims that such means increase the effectiveness of the war against terrorism are based on one-sided evaluations and do not stand up to critical analysis. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the appearance of such weapons would lower the nuclear threshold and provoke the use of nuclear weapons. It should be also stressed that the role of nuclear weapons as the ultimate means of deterring aggression will hold out for a foreseeable perspective. However any steps attempting to restrict the potential capabilities oI RWKHU VWDWHV¶ VWUDWHJLF GHWHUUHQW systems would immediately lead to the collapse of the guaranteed security principles not only of the individual states but also of the whole world. In the first place such steps are as follows:
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A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World
Creation of the global ABM system which infringes upon the military security of other countries; Attempts to achieve military dominance in the sphere of strategic weapons by reequipping some of the ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads and building up capabilities for nuclear reconstitution; Attempts to lift any restrictions on the deployment of weapons in outer space; and &UHDWLRQRIPLOLWDU\EDVHVLQWKH]RQHVRIWKHVRFDOOHG³YLWDOLQWHUHVWV´ Hopefully this approach to solving global problems will exhaust itself in the near future as no global challenge can be solved outside a multilateral framework and without considering the interests of all parties. In conclusion ,as long as nuclear weaponry exists and the possibility of using it in order to achieve military-political aims persists, and in the absence of a collective security system with an effective verification mechanism, Russia will continue to regard its nuclear weapons as the chief factor of deterrence and essential to maintaining stability in the world.
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-7
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A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-proliferation Harold Smith
1
Abstract. The use of nuclear weapons by terrorists against urban targets is generally agreed to be the most formidable threat faced by the United States today. Yet, there is remarkably little discussion of the threat in the presidential campaigns, and for good reason: one doesn’t win elections by frightening the voters – better to concentrate on domestic issues such as the economy or medical insurance or ethanol. Nonetheless, the populace is entitled to know what the candidates intend to do to protect the country from so formidable a threat. Insight can be found by studying the writings of key advisors on the general issue and applying their thoughts to programs that must be considered by the next administration, whether Republican or Democrat. In this case, modernization of the nuclear arsenal and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty provide touchstones that separate the philosophical differences on these issues.
A Moving Target is Hard to Hit There is nothing like a long American presidential campaign, particularly as a divisive eight-year administration comes to an end, to show that Woody Allen was right: the future ain’t what it used to be.2 Following 9/11, the Bush Administration adapted a muscular, tightly controlled, unilateral approach to many areas, certainly to the area of non-proliferation. Over the years, however, the strong-man approach has steadily morphed into a more diplomatic, multi-lateral willingness to negotiate key areas of concern. For example, a few years ago North Korea was part of the “axis of evil” whose leader was a “tyrant”. This past year, however, Shapton in the New York Times, which has been no admirer of the Bush policy, summarized the approach to North Korea with a headline on October 8, “NK test – from regime collapse to multi-lateral negotiation”, and Steven Lee Myers, also of the Times, began an article on October 7, “Mr. Bush, who spent most of his presidency with a swaggering, go-it-alone style, has increasingly turned to China…”. Even more recently, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that Iran, also a member of the “axis of evil”, discontinued its nuclear weapon program in 2003. Evidently, Iran is no longer a proliferator of nuclear weapons, which is truly a major change in American policy on non-
1 Distinguished Visiting Scholar and Professor, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA; formerly Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programs, 1993-1998 2 Attributed
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H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation
proliferation. One concludes that it is no easy matter to define a constant policy regarding non-proliferation in “[T]these most brisk and giddy-paced times”.3 If it is difficult to ascertain the changing positions of an incumbent administration, how much more so is the prediction of a policy of a dozen or so presidential candidates, all of whom are trying to avoid taking any position on any matter so far in advance of the actual election? Despite the cacophony, the answer is not as difficult as the question implies. First of all, the candidates are focused on domestic issues of interest to the primary election in the particular state at hand - Iowa at the time of this writing. Debate of foreign policy, including non-proliferation, is limited to the war in Iraq, a solution to the Palestinian problem, or the (now allegedly defunct) Iranian nuclear weapon program. All of these pale when compared to health care, immigration, trade balances, or farm policy, particularly in Iowa where ethanol – not a nuclear weapon – is the issue of choice. It is a near certainty that the candidates themselves, whether Republican or Democrat, will shed little light on their particular approach to nonproliferation.4
The Role of Advisors in Determining Non-Proliferation Policy The candidates may be evasive on such issues, but the advisors are certainly not, and it would not be unusual for a newly elected president to turn to respected and experienced (and published) advisors during the transition to and beginning of a new administration, much as President Bush supposedly relied on (now) Secretary Rice in forming his own foreign policy. The same could be said for most, perhaps all, of the recent presidents. If one wishes to gauge the policy of either party regarding a subject as arcane as nonproliferation, one should look to the published statements of presumably trusted advisors rather than statements of candidates themselves during an election campaign. One does not have to look far. Just as the candidates were beginning their campaigns at the beginning of 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an Op-ed with the strongest and most bipartisan statement on nuclear weapons that one can imagine. George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, experienced, respected, and trusted advisors, published an article entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”.5 It would be difficult to find four more qualified individuals to speak on the subject. Collectively, they represent both parties and have experience dating at least to the Reagan Administration as heads of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. While one could question whether their position is a policy or a hope – as John Deutch6 and Harold Brown7 have 3
William Shakespeare, “Twelfth-Night” II, iv, 6. John Steinbruner and Nancy Gallagher provide an interesting twist to this conclusion. As a result of their polling of Russian and American citizens, they conclude “that if future U.S. and Russian leaders wanted to adopt cooperative nuclear risk reduction measures that match the changed circumstances of global security, their citizens would be favorably disposed.” Arms Control Today, January/February 2008. 5 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007. 6 Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, 10 November 2007. Both are respected senior advisors although their impressive credentials are based primarily on Democratic administrations. 7 Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2007-08. (Former Secretary of Defense) Brown takes a particularly strong position against Shultz, et. al, by noting that they have the proposition backwards. “[A] peaceful and orderly world is a prerequisite for the abolition of nuclear weapons”; not the other way around. 4
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done, their recommendations on how to proceed to a world without nuclear weapons represent a forthright statement of non-proliferation policy as it might apply to the next administration, whether Republican or Democrat. Furthermore, many of their recommendations, but not all, have been espoused by the Bush Administration, the notable exceptions being ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and elimination of “short-ranged nuclear weapons designed to be forward deployed”.8 There are, however, notable absences in their recommendations; namely, whether to proceed with deployment of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and the possible need to modify the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the face of new weapon states beyond the P-5 as well as an American willingness to provide nuclear technology to India.9 In short, to the extent that the elected candidate is willing to follow the recommendations of such senior advisors, there will be considerable unanimity between the parties, but it will not be total. Partisan politics, despite the old adage, will not end at the water’s edge.10 In this regard, the Reliable Replacement Warhead and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty offer interesting contrasts between the parties.
The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) as a Touchstone The Bush Administration has made a strong case, using a clear-eyed analysis of the current American arsenal, for the design, development, and deployment of a new nuclear weapon, the RRW. Democratic members of Congress and their advisors are not against clear-eyed analysis, nor do they dispute the technical basis for the RRW concept, but they are strongly against proceeding to deployment at this time. The arguments for and against this program could well be a harbinger of the differences that will separate the parties regarding non-proliferation after the next president is inaugurated in January of 2009. Its omission in the bi-partisan opinion piece by Shultz, et al., underscores a possible significant difference regarding non-proliferation between the parties.11 The technical arguments; i.e., the facts The technical arguments in favor of deployment of the RRW, which are not in dispute, are similar to those associated with the common household decision to buy a new car even though the old car is operating satisfactorily. Significant improvements are possible, many of which will enhance non-proliferation (or operation, in the case of the current automobile): •
Reliability can be improved and, therefore, the size of the arsenal can be reduced.
8 Shultz et al. ,ibid. If the quoted statement were implemented, American nuclear weapons, under the control of NATO and based in Europe, would be eliminated, which has been an untouchable subject in American foreign policy for decades, despite Russian objections since the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and its weapons returned to Russia. 9 James E. Goodby, “Nuclear Nonproliferation’s Missing Link,” The Brookings Institution, Global Politics, 1 December 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/goodby/20061201.htm. 10 According to David Halberstam, the adage is nothing more than a myth: The Coldest Winter, America and the Korean War, page 171, Hyperion, 2007. 11 Shultz et. al. ,ibid.
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• •
•
•
Security of the new weapon can be enhanced; thereby further decreasing the likelihood that a stolen weapon could be detonated should it fall into the hands of terrorists. The new weapon will be certifiable without testing, an assertion that will surely be debated sometime in the future but not for the moment. It is presumed, although it is by no means certain, that the old weapons, the socalled legacy arsenal, will eventually require testing. Performance will not be enhanced. The Administration has gone to considerable effort to make this point. The RRW is a strict replacement; it does not add nuclear capability and, therefore, in the opinion of the administration should not be viewed as proliferation. Although not related to non-proliferation, it should be noted for completeness that the safety and manufacturability will be increased and, in the long run, costs will be reduced.
Although there is room for disagreement on these issues, they will not determine the outcome of the debate on deployment; they merely set the stage for the debate, much as a legal brief tries to establish the “facts of the matter” with a series of sentences beginning with “whereas”. The Bush position and, presumably, that of a succeeding Republican president The present Republican administration does not rest its case simply on the technical arguments; it goes further by noting that deployment of the RRW will have no effect with regard to proliferation on the players of interest: •
• • •
The established nuclear powers, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China, the so-called P-5, see their reliance on nuclear deterrence as unaffected by the modernity or lack thereof of the American stockpile. The same could be said for the more recent nuclear powers, who entered the scene following the 1967 signing of the NPT; viz., Israel, India, and Pakistan. Even those nations that may be on the threshold of recognition as nuclear powers, North Korea and Iran, will not based their decision to cross the threshold on whether the US modernizes its arsenal. Most importantly, the non-state players, the terrorists, who seemingly would not hesitate to explode a nuclear weapon to further their cause, do not have a nation to lose, and will not be deterred by the nuclear weapons of the nuclear powers – whether modernized or not.
In short, the current Republican position is that no one who counts in the nuclear world cares whether the US modernizes or not and, therefore, the decision should be limited to the technical and economic advantages to the US. Simply put, the international community is not a factor, and the country should get on with it.
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The presumed position of a Democratic president regarding RRW Except for the conclusion, most Democratic advisors agree with the administration’s arguments. Where they part company is the size and importance of the international audience watching to see if the new weapon is to be deployed. Rather than just the nuclear powers and non-state terrorists, the Democrats see a much larger audience composed of the vast majority of non-nuclear states that have conformed to the conditions of the NPT.12 These nations have decided against the development of nuclear weapons – indeed, some have cancelled such programs or, in the case of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have returned their nuclear weapons to the country of origin. The Democrats argue that the broader audience did so for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the assumption that the United States and the other members of the P-5 would act in accordance with Article Six of the NPT; that they would, over time, reduce and, eventually, eliminate nuclear weapons. Deployment of RRW would, in the eyes of these conforming nations, suggest otherwise. They will conclude, according to the Democratic advisors, that the United States, contrary to the NPT, intends to have a nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future; i.e., that the vision of a road to eventual world-wide nuclear disarmament is a mirage and that, therefore, they should reconsider their obligations under the treaty. Proliferation would, presumably, follow. There are also practical matters, such as time and money, which should be considered in addition to the softer issue of international psychology. The question of money, that most practical of matters, is of course, always with us, but especially so at a time, or so the Democrats will argue, when federal deficits are both large and fastrising and when the (Democratically controlled) Congress cannot find a way to increase taxes – as witnessed by its inability to fund the changes in the Alternative Minimum Tax. As a result many programs will be postponed or curtailed by the next administration. RRW will be a prime target for such postponement, thereby avoiding the more contentious questions associated with proliferation of nuclear weapons. Fiscal conservativeness will be abetted, in this case, by the simple question: why now? By all accounts, the Stockpile Sustainment Program (SSP), while expensive but probably less so than the early years of RRW, is proceeding satisfactorily. The directors of the weapons laboratories (Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia) continue to certify that the present arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable. Furthermore, they see no need for nuclear testing at the present time and are sustained in this judgment by reviews by multi-disciplined, prestigious advisory boards such as the Defense Science Board and the JASONS. Even nature seems to be in agreement: the aging of plutonium, the central ingredient of American weapons, has been studied intensively and found to be surprisingly resilient.13 In short, there is no need for a deployment decision at this time; hence, the Democratic advisors are clear: postpone the deployment.
12
Raymond Jeanloz, “Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation,” Science 316, 1541 (2007) with supporting material, including an extensive bibliography, at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full316/5831/1541/DCI 13 NNSA NEWS, “Studies Show Plutonium Degradation in U. S. Nuclear Weapons Will Not Effect Reliability Soon,” National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, Press Release on 29 November 2006
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The CTBT Adds a New Wrinkle; Viz., “Advise and Consent” of the Senate Whereas the RRW was conspicuous by its absence in the recommendations by Shultz, et al.,14 discussion of the CTBT merited one of the longest and most substantive paragraphs in the article, which suggests that there was little disagreement between the prestigious advisors who were drawn from both parties.15 The candidates, themselves, as is to be expected, have been relatively silent on ratification of the CTBT, or so the absence of reporting on the issue would have us believe.16 The conservative Republican senators are, however, another and important matter. They have resisted ratification since the Clinton Administration and have remained unmoved by either the report by General Shalikashvili in 200117 or that of the National Academy of Science in 2002.18 Because of its unique constitutional powers, the Senate, thereby, becomes a useful metric in seeking differences between the parties in foreign policy as it pertains to non-proliferation. Because one-third of the US Senate can reject ratification of a treaty, it really does not matter what the candidates think, let alone say, or what their advisors advise. Every candidate from both parties realizes that the conservative arm of the Senate will probably be able to block ratification, and therefore, there is little practical value in expending election potential or political capital on this issue. The CTBT will, as a result, probably remain in the Senate where there are stark differences among the members. These will have little impact on the presidential campaigns but are worth exploring for the insight they give into the philosophical differences between the parties regarding non-proliferation. In general, the differences can be characterized by the old metaphor of a glass half full or half empty. The Republican senators ask what’s to be gained by ratifying the treaty, and the Democrats ask what’s to be lost. Philosophically, the differences are similar to those that divided the house with respect to the RRW; i.e., the Republicans want to see tangible benefits and measure those benefits against risks and without regard to the opinions of the international community. The Democrats are not against risk/benefit analysis but want to consider less tangible benefits such as those sometimes captured by the (forever undefined) expression of “world opinion”. Some differences, such as the conservative fear that any treaty is an unacceptable invasion of national sovereignty or the liberal desire for international control or outright elimination of nuclear weapons can be set aside as debatable visions of the future, but other differences are more immediate, deserve scrutiny, and hopefully will be debated even though minority blockage seems the most likely outcome. These fall into the categories of [1] whether nuclear tests can be reliably detected, [2] if detected what can 14
Shultz et. al. ,ibid. The basis for the wide agreement is summarized in the comprehensive paper prepared by Professor Jeanloz for the second conference on "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons" held at Stanford University in October 2007, a meeting that resulted in a second Op-ed by the same authors in the WSJ on 15 January 2008, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World" 16 The strongest reporting on the matter has been by Zachary Hosford in Arms Control Today (December 2007) “The CTBT …has drawn little attention from the Republicans but widespread support from the Democratic candidates.” 17 J. M. Shalikashvili (2001) Letter to the President and Report on the Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/ctbt_report.html 18 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) (2002) Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 84 pp 15
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be done about the violation, and [3] what impact the absence of nuclear testing may have on the reliability of the future arsenals. Is the technology up to the task? Most Democratic senators were convinced in 1999 that the available systems were adequate to detect and verify underground nuclear explosions of any useful magnitude anywhere in the world, and the capability has improved markedly since that time. As Professor Jeanloz points out, seismic networks to be available by 2009 can detect accurately the time of release of energy as low as 0.1 – 0.5 KT with good geographical accuracy and can distinguish between explosions, earthquakes, and implosions such as collapse of a mine or the sinking of the Kursk. Furthermore, what seismic networks cannot do, namely distinguish between a nuclear explosion and a large conventional one, can be done through radiochemical means, which have been vastly improved since the first Soviet test was detected by analysis of airborne debris off the coast of China in 1949. In fact, the two approaches are nicely complementary: radiochemistry provides the requisite information about the type of explosion,19 nuclear or non-nuclear, but with poor resolution of time and place; seismic nets provide the opposite. To this must be added the enormous expansion and availability of satellite photography, both classified and unclassified, which makes any activity on the ground related to nuclear testing difficult to hide – especially if seismology provides the archival clue of when and where to look. In short, technology is up to the task; detection of a test of a nuclear weapon should be viewed by one and all as highly likely. So what? The problem, as seen from the Republican side of the aisle, is not whether a nuclear test can be detected. That’s granted, as is the intrinsic value of the intelligence gained from measuring various aspects of a nuclear test. The problem, rather, is what to do about the detected test, aside from the intelligence gained there from. The Republicans will cite the successful international detection of tests by India, Pakistan, and North Korea and will ask, rhetorically, what was the effect of the treaty, did the known ability to detect deter, or even impede, these nuclear programs; what actions were taken as a result of the detection; and given these most recent tests, what would deter future tests by the three countries or by other currently non-nuclear countries. In short, what benefits accrue to the United States or any established nation, for that matter, from a treaty that bans testing, when those who want to test, announce that they intend to test, test, and nothing happens? There are no consequences. The Republicans will call this “realism” and the Democrats will call it “cynicism”. They will counter that an international treaty, where verification is essentially guaranteed, provides a clear statement that the total number of nuclear weapons and the number of nations possessing weapons and that there should be no major improvements to weapons that exist. The argument will be the classic debate between school children where every “why” is answered with a “why not”? The question of “so what” will add rhetoric to the debate, but it will not add substance.
19
For example, a xenon-isotope anomaly, related to the North Korean test, was detected in Canada fifteen days after the event; see Jeanloz.
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Impact on established nuclear arsenals Of far more substance would be a debate on whether testing is essential to maintaining the reliability and safety of the American arsenal, which was designed for high performance (high yield to weight ratio) at a time when it was assumed that testing would continue indefinitely.20 The positions of the two parties, in this case, will show a difference in degree – not in kind. There is no serious doubt within the parties that, for the time being, the United States must maintain a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear arsenal, and any development that compromises its retaliatory nuclear threat must be addressed, and addressed urgently and with highest priority. Furthermore, both parties will agree that if testing is required to ensure the nuclear deterrent, so be it; the US will test. The difference will be in the desired sequencing of events leading the test. The Democrats will argue that the treaty specifically allows a states-party to withdraw from the (ratified) treaty if it judges that testing is necessary to its national interest. Hence, the Democratic call will be: ratify now and withdraw later, if necessary. The conservative Republican senators will not accept this. They will note that international political forces will be so strong and so varied and that the scientific need to test will be so arcane that no president will have the political courage or capital to withdraw from the treaty. Hence, the Republican call will be: do not ratify in order to preserve a real option to test – not a paper option that realistically cannot be exercised. Given the willingness of the present Bush Administration to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM treaty, the Democrats will have the better of the argument – but the Republicans will have the votes; i.e., the required number of votes to block ratification.
Conclusions The quiet debate on non-proliferation among the advisors of both parties, which is taking place far from the hustings and the candidates, and the recent willingness of the Bush Administration to seek international agreement through negotiation, including multi-lateral negotiation, suggests that the degree of difference regarding nonproliferation between the parties will be not be a major factor in the forthcoming presidential race. In forming policy, the Democrats will consider the broader international community, while the Republicans will rely more on maintaining a stronger, unilateral position, but the differences will be small, especially when compared to the early years of the present administration. Deployment of the Reliable Replacement Warhead serves as a touchstone for this prediction. As far as non-proliferation is concerned, the (presumably Democratically controlled) Congress and a Democratic president will consider the effect of deployment on the large majority of signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty rather than just the present nuclear powers or terrorists. They will opt for postponement. A Republican president may take the narrower view and be in favor of deployment, but it is difficult 20 The automotive metaphor which was applied above to the case of the RRW will be extended during the debates to the arguments over the CTBT in the sense that high performance automobiles (and warheads) need more maintenance and testing than more ordinary cars (and warheads). The comparison is a useful pedagogical tool but its usefulness stops there. Cars that are used continually and nuclear warheads that (so far) have seen no use have very little in common.
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to see how the new president could convince the congress to provide the funds. In either case, however, consideration of non-proliferation will be secondary: the normal bureaucratic processes will prevail; i.e., the absence of urgency and fiscal reality will lead to the easy road of postponement. Debate regarding ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will bring out the same points as those made with regard to the RRW. Neither will spark debate among the candidates but each will receive significant attention from presidential advisors where the Democratic advisors will insist on the importance of international standing and the Republican advisors will look for (and fail to find) more tangible reasons. Both programs will languish in the coming administration, but for different reasons: RRW deployment is easily postponed and CTBT ratification will be blocked by a minority of the Senate. Should there be a nuclear 9/11, or if the public suddenly becomes convinced that there is a clear and present danger of nuclear terrorism, all bets are off. At that point, all aspects of proliferation of nuclear weapons will be center-stage, and the absence of presidential statements during the campaign, including the long range aspects of nonproliferation such as RRW and CTBT, will be overlooked. The world will have entered a new era.
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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-16
Understanding Deterrence Edward IFFT1 Abstract. Nuclear deterrence continues to be an important concept in international relations, despite the dramatic changes since the Cold War. As efforts are made to reduce the number of nuclear weapons to very low levels, with the ultimate goal of elimination, it is important to consider issues such as who is entitled to have nuclear deterrence, how nuclear deterrence operates at very low levels, the proper role of ABM defenses and how to strengthen nonproliferation norms by assuring the security of states without nuclear weapons. One path to resolving these difficult issues may be a greater reliance upon collective defenses by groups of states, using conventional arms.
Introduction Deterrence is a word used frequently in international relations. Even a casual consideration of its usage shows that there is no common understanding of what it means or how the concept operates. All the Nuclear Weapon States say that the primary purpose, perhaps the sole purpose, of their nuclear weapons is for deterrence. India and Pakistan say that deterrence is the goal of their programs. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry declared that “nuclear weapons will serve as a reliable war deterrent for protecting the supreme interests of the state and the security of the Korean nation from the U.S. threat of aggression.”2 If Iran decides to seek nuclear weapons, one can be sure that they will justify it on the basis of deterrence. They would also tell us that a major cause of their disastrous war with Iraq was the lack of a credible deterrent. Nor is the concept of deterrence static even within one country. In the U.S., we have gone from massive retaliation to assured destruction to flexible response to tailored deterrence, with other variations along the way. Similar evolutions have taken place in other countries. Almost any proposed major new strategic weapon system will be both supported and opposed on the basis of its supposed effect upon deterrence. A prominent recent example is the ABM system proposed for Poland and the Czech Republic. The U.S. believes it would strengthen deterrence, while the Russian Federation believes it would weaken it. Evidently, someone is confused! Perhaps the most straightforward explanation for the confusion is the failure to ask “deter whom from doing what?” In view of the fact that this is a large and complicated subject, and in view of the limited time available and the sophistication of the audience, I would like to use the format of posing eight fundamental questions about deterrence and attempting to sketch out what will be rather simplistic answers. My hope is that this may shed some light on 1 Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The views expressed are those of the author alone.
E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence
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this important subject, or at least stimulate some useful discussion. Perhaps we can be guided by James Thurber’s observation that it is better to know some of the questions than to know all of the answers.
1. What is Deterrence? At the most basic level, deterrence, which comes from the Latin verb deterrere—to frighten—is convincing a person, group or state that the reaction to a contemplated course of action would result in a degree of pain or punishment that would exceed the expected benefit of such action. Seen in its most general terms, deterrence is clearly basic to law enforcement or the rearing of children. Deterrence could also be used, not to prevent an action, but to encourage one or to force the cessation of something. This could also be called “compellance” or even “coercion,” although the latter carries an emotional burden that makes rational discussion difficult. We are, of course, talking here about nuclear deterrence, although the concept is certainly relevant to discussions of other weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. As an aside it might be noted that the word frequently used for deterrence in Russian, sderzhivaniye, carries a slightly different meaning than the English word.
2. Has Nuclear Deterrence Been Effective? Yes and no. Most scholars believe that nuclear deterrence kept the major powers from going to war against each other for 60 years. There is no reason to dispute this proposition, though it cannot be proven and history does not reveal its alternatives. On the other hand, numerous actions almost universally condemned by the international community have not been prevented. In some cases, this was almost certainly because the international community did not really attempt to apply credible and effective deterrence. In other cases, deterrence may have simply failed. An interesting example is found in the first Gulf War. It is believed by many that Saddam Hussein did not use chemical weapons because he was deterred by strong warnings from the U.S. However, it is frequently overlooked that he was also strongly warned not to set fire to the Kuwaiti oil fields, but did so anyway. In addition, he attacked Israel with ballistic missiles, in spite of Israel’s nuclear potential. In any case, without going into specific cases, one might observe that there have been instances in which luck, or good decisions by a handful of individuals, saved us from disaster, more than the operation of an abstract theory. The Cuban Missile Crisis might be one such example.
3. What is the Relationship between Deterrence and Assured Destruction? It is relevant here to recall Churchill’s memorable phrase, “Safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation.” He correctly foresaw the implications of mutual deterrence between powerful and hostile powers armed with nuclear weapons. Elaborate theories of nuclear deterrence, which we need not explore here, were developed in an effort to impose some intellectual rigor on a confused and difficult situation. These efforts tended to be strong on mathematics, which we knew
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how to do well, but weak on psychology and politics. Elaborate computer simulations were carried out to attempt to predict how a nuclear war would develop, and how intrawar deterrence could be established. However, these almost always broke down after the initial nuclear exchange. In the real world, what resulted, in the name of deterrence, were grotesque levels of nuclear weapons in both the U.S. and Soviet Union. In an effort to answer the question, “How much is enough?” and to gain some control over the “mad momentum of the arms race,” Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tried to quantify what levels of destruction would be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from actions that would threaten the vital interests of the U.S. and its Allies. Various considerations led to the conclusion that the destruction of 30% of the population and three-fourths of the industry of the Soviet Union would be sufficient. The spirit of those times is further illustrated by the fact that, in the late 1960s, as we were preparing for the beginning of the SALT negotiations, we were told that, since the Soviet Union had “accepted” 20,000,000 deaths in World War II, much greater levels of destruction would be necessary for deterrence to be effective. That seemed absurd to me then and is, of course, even more so today. Similar calculations were presumably made by other Nuclear Weapon States. In the West, we referred approvingly to the policies of states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as Britain and France, as “deterrence of the strong by the weak.” That phrase now has a much more negative connotation in connection with asymmetric warfare. In the U.S., an effort was eventually made to make deterrence less horrific by emphasizing the targeting of military and economic assets, rather than population per se. However, calculations of what would be the actual effects of a nuclear exchange indicated that any feelings of moral superiority from the change were hard to justify. All along, the concept should have been called Mutual Assured Deterrence, but the unfortunate acronym MAD would have been the same. Certainly there were, and are, differences in how individual states view the roles of nuclear weapons and deterrence. There are experts at this Workshop from all the Nuclear Weapon States who can address the views and policies of their countries authoritatively.2 As far as NATO are concerned, previously it described nuclear weapons as “weapons of last resort” and the possibility of their use as “extremely remote.” The current NATO Strategic Concept, which dates from 1999, proclaims that nuclear weapons make a “unique contribution” and describes them as “essential to preserve peace.”3
4. Do We Still Have Assured Destruction Today? The answer must be a qualified “yes.” Of course, we have the benefits of de-targeting and far better relations, including greater openness and cooperation, among the states of NATO, the former Warsaw Pact and China. One could claim that there is no longer a “policy” of assured destruction. However, to claim, as some have done, that assured destruction no longer exists, is a dangerous illusion. A more realistic view is to consider assured destruction as an existential fact, rather than a policy. The only prudent assumption is that, if the survival of a state possessing nuclear weapons were at stake, and especially if it were attacked with nuclear weapons, it would respond with nuclear weapons, probably on a large scale. The simple fact is that, as long as large numbers of nuclear weapons exist, the threat of assured destruction hangs over us. As
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former Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to Congress, “You can’t entirely do away with what has been known as mutual assured destruction.”4 There are clearly moral objections to be made to the policy, and perhaps legal ones as well, flowing from the 1986 Advisory Opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice. However, it is difficult to say that mounting a credible threat to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor was or is wrong. What was wrong, in my view, was the failure to recognize that the levels of nuclear weapons created by the two superpowers were grossly in excess of what was necessary to do this. This was caused by lack of trust, lack of communication, the extreme use of worst-case assumptions and the lack of arms control agreements to regulate the competition. The unhealthy competition has finally been brought under control by the SALT, INF, START and Moscow (SORT) Treaties, but thousands of nuclear weapons remain, both deployed and non-deployed. Another result of the arms control process of the 1980s and 1990s was the realization that not only the size, but also the structure of strategic forces, has important effects upon stability and deterrence. While “freedom-to-mix” was recognized as important to allow for differences in the geo-political situation, along with historical factors, more sophisticated analysis showed that certain kinds of nuclear deterrent forces would be more stabilizing, or at least less destabilizing, than others. Thus, the U.S. concluded that placing relatively greater reliance upon more survivable systems, such as SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), mobile ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and bombers would be better for stability than relying upon fixed ICBMs, especially those with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles). Similarly, systems which were slow-flying, and hence provided more warning time, such as bombers and cruise missiles, are less destabilizing than ballistic missiles, with their very short warning times. The U.S. devoted considerable effort in the START negotiations to trying to convince its Soviet partner of the wisdom of this view of deterrence, with some, though not complete, success. Perhaps the greatest achievement of this philosophy of deterrence was the agreement to a complete ban on ICBMs with MIRVs in the START II Treaty. Unfortunately, this Treaty never entered into force. Nevertheless, the trends in both U.S. and Russian force structures over the past 15 years do reflect this view of deterrence and stability.
5. Who is Entitled to Have Nuclear Deterrence? This awkward question is almost never asked, but is at the heart of the nuclear proliferation issue. One obvious answer could be the five Nuclear Weapon States, as defined by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, there would not be consensus on this point. Although each of the five would certainly assert its right to have nuclear deterrence, it is far from clear that each of the five would agree that the others have the right to deter it with nuclear weapons. The problem is that discussions of nuclear deterrence in any country will invariably deal with how deterrence works for that country, not how it might work to deter it. During the START negotiations, I sometimes heard from my colleagues on the U.S. Delegation the statement, “We are not trying to deter ourselves!” It is clear that both publics and policy makers are ambivalent about the subject. It would be quite easy to gain assent to the proposition that deterrence should be
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preserved. It would be quite another matter to gain acceptance of the idea that other countries should be allowed to maintain the capability to destroy us. The paradox is that these are simply two ways of stating the same question. If deterrence is legitimate and stabilizing, it would follow that countries should refrain from attempting to take away the deterrence of other Nuclear Weapon States. This is obviously a difficult proposition. It was the basic premise of the ABM Treaty, which is no longer with us. However, even in the ABM Treaty, there was always the feeling that the Treaty was simply recognizing a basic fact of the military situation between the US and USSR and the impossibility of an effective nationwide ABM defense. There was always the view, in some quarters, that this balance could and should be overturned as soon as technological developments permitted. This latter view was certainly at least part of the vision behind President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). What we have is a collision between the need to maintain deterrence and the fundamental right and basic instinct for self defense. We have never really solved this problem. The situation becomes even more delicate when considering the situation regarding India, Pakistan and Israel. Of course, the fact that India, Pakistan and Israel never joined the NPT puts them into a different category than North Korea and Iran, but the fundamental question of who has the right to deterrence against whom remains. This leads us to the next question.
6. What is the Difference between Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Blackmail? Much of the discussion around the dangers of nuclear proliferation seems to be crystallizing around the term “nuclear blackmail.” The best way to understand nuclear blackmail is to recognize that it is simply nuclear deterrence in the wrong hands. The term has become suddenly popular in recent years, especially in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. In an important speech at the National Defense University in Washington in 2001, President Bush declared, “The international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able to blackmail with nuclear weapons.”5 President Putin, former President Chirac and former Prime Minister Blair have all used the term. In the context in which it is being used, it basically expresses the concern that the freedom of action of the Nuclear Weapon States would be curtailed if other states acquired nuclear weapons, or perhaps other weapons of mass destruction. The scenario frequently cited is that a Nuclear Weapon State will be unable to intervene in a regional conflict if one of the hostile parties to that conflict has nuclear weapons. While this is certainly a legitimate concern, it does not take much thought to conclude that an argument that proliferation is bad because it would limit the ability of Nuclear Weapon States to attack other states is not likely to be at all convincing to Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Framing the proliferation debate so that it focuses on whether individual states can intervene without risk in distant regional conflicts will clearly not turn out well. If anything, such arguments merely confirm the utility of nuclear weapons and raise the incentives for rogue states to acquire them. Such arguments also tend to undermine the credibility of the security guarantees and extended deterrence that are so important to nonproliferation.6 Furthermore, they imply that we would not defend our vital interests, thus weakening deterrence itself. We would be better served to stop talking about nuclear blackmail and return to the
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traditional arguments used in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for why it is in the best interests of all states to hold the line firmly on nuclear proliferation.
7. Can Terrorists be Deterred? The question of whether or not terrorists can be deterred has been discussed so extensively recently that there is little new to say. It has become commonplace to assert that terrorists cannot be deterred and therefore must be hunted down and eliminated at the source. There is, unfortunately, much truth to this. The concept of punishment as deterrence is difficult to apply to those who seek martyrdom or deranged fanatics who believe that terrorist acts can hasten the end of the world. At the same time, terrorists have to come from somewhere and states, and especially their leaders, can be held accountable for training camps and other preparations for terrorism which take place on their territory. The same is true for those who knowingly assist terrorist activities. After the experience of Afghanistan, regardless of how Iraq turns out, it is hard to believe that states would lightly welcome and shelter terrorists. Of course, in the case of failed states, or states unable to control their own territory, some action by the international community may be necessary. One should also recognize that denial can also be an effective counter, if not necessarily a deterrent, to terrorists. This could be brought about through cooperation in intelligence, missile defense, better regulation of the transfer of the tools of terrorism, effective management of the consequences of terrorist acts, and so on. More research on nuclear forensics, so that the source of nuclear materials used in an attack could be reliably determined would be very useful. As far as international law is concerned, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the International Convention against WMD Terrorism provide a good foundation upon which additional measures might be formulated.7
8. Can We Escape from Nuclear Deterrence and Assured Destruction? This is one of the crucial questions of our time. Real escape from under the sword of Damocles does not appear to be a realistic possibility as long as large numbers of nuclear weapons exist in the world. However, it should be possible to push the threat far into the background through deeper reductions and more enlightened policies. Over 20 years ago, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev put forward competing visions of a world free of nuclear weapons. Many people at the time, including myself, considered these proposals rather unrealistic, and perhaps even an impediment to more practical measures that were desperately needed. However, the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons entirely has reemerged in quite responsible circles. In an article in the Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn—certainly not inexperienced or impractical men—advocated precisely this course.8 In an important speech in Washington in June, 2007, Margaret Beckett, then UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, declared that almost no one believes that the current numbers of nuclear warheads are necessary and called for further work to determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.9 Hans Blix has recently written that “There is no conceivable use for nuclear weapons and their deterrent effect is becoming increasingly ineffective. In
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regions where nuclear weapons might be a real basis for security, other measures, such as integration into the fabric of the international community, are likely to be more effective.”10 In the near term, a crucial question concerns what sort of a regime will replace the START Treaty, which is scheduled to expire in December, 2009. The Moscow Treaty of 2002, while usefully driving the START levels significantly lower, is clearly not the answer in the longer term, for reasons that are well known. A practical path toward very low levels of nuclear weapons may be through the gradual transformation of deployed nuclear forces into “virtual” nuclear forces. Under this concept, nuclear warheads would be separated from delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers), along with other measures to reduce the imminent threat and reduce the possibility of accident or miscalculation. On-site inspections and other transparency measures would assure that these measures were being carried out as agreed. Reconstitution would be possible as a safety net in the unlikely event that this became necessary. This concept has recently been given expression by respected scholars in both the U.S. and the Russian Federation.11 One could perhaps envision a sequential process involving five “D’s”: • • • • •
Declarations/Data Exchange De-targeting De-alerting Deactivation Disassembling/Dismantling
One would, of course, all the while be careful to preserve the most important “D”-deterrence. Our goal is certainly not to make the world safe for conventional war. Although we really do not know yet how to safely eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, we do need to think in greater detail about how deterrence could work as the levels approach zero. At some point, we would enter the realm of “minimum deterrence.” This undefined term has been in use for many years and generally refers to the minimum level of nuclear weapons that could still deter. Clearly what that level might be is dependent upon specific scenarios and the psychology and goals of those being deterred, but it is obviously far below current levels, or even those established by the Moscow Treaty. Anyone who has accepted the line of reasoning earlier in this paper will object that there will always be bad people and outlaw nations and groups that refuse to abide by international norms, and they must somehow be deterred. Weaker nations will especially demand that they be protected from stronger nations, if they are to give up nuclear aspirations. In order to achieve this, one can envision a system of positive and negative security assurances, supported by collective deterrence by conventional means. Although conventional weapons are more expensive than nuclear weapons for a given level of damage, groups of countries can inflict unacceptable damage without resort to nuclear weapons. Regional organizations, such as NATO, the EU and the AU come to mind. The most universal body that could threaten to inflict unacceptable damage is, of course, the United Nations itself. Conventional deterrence by collectives is more credible than nuclear deterrence, since the latter is quite properly constrained by very high thresholds and taboos. In addition, to the extent that one believes in blackmail, it would be much more difficult for an outlaw state to blackmail a large group of states than any individual state.
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Many recent examples demonstrate the consequences of the failure to apply credible deterrence, or to respond quickly and forcefully to flagrant violations of international norms. Although the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemptive/preventive war has been met with strong opposition, it is becoming clear that the international community does need to respond more quickly and more effectively to such outrages.
Conclusion Nuclear deterrence has been a fundamental factor in international relations for the entire lifetime of most of the people in this room. In recent years, the concept of nuclear deterrence has come under attack. It is said that nuclear deterrence: • • • • • • •
No longer exists Is no longer effective Is no longer necessary Is dangerous Is immoral Is inconsistent with our nonproliferation objectives Encourages irresponsible nations and organizations to acquire nuclear weapons
While there is some truth in each of these criticisms, in my view, they are too simplistic, at least as long as significant numbers of nuclear weapons exist. In retrospect, it is easy to see that the search for security led to deterrence, which led to nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence required the capability to inflict unacceptable damage, which was another name for assured destruction. With the spread of nuclear weapons, this became mutual assured destruction. Unfortunately, this led to levels and policies that were far beyond what was needed and were inconsistent with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although this process did achieve its primary goal—the prevention of nuclear war—we were lucky to survive the process. Our task now should be to reduce nuclear weapons to very low levels, relying increasingly upon collective conventional forces for deterrence, gradually pushing nuclear deterrence into the background as a last resort. If this sounds like the New World Order, it probably is. If it sounds naïve, it probably has that flaw as well. Nevertheless, it does sound preferable to the world in which we have been living for the past 60 years.12 NOTES 1. 2.
3. 4.
Washington Post, October 4, 2006, p. 18. Recent discussions of the deterrent policies of all five Nuclear Weapon States can be found in Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues, Edited by Owen C. W. Price and Jenifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2007. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Public Diplomacy Document SC99ENG0604, paragraph 46, Brussels, NATO. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 20, 2001.
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5.
Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2001. 6. For a recent analysis of extended deterrence in the post-Cold War world, see Lewis A. Dunn, “Deterrence Today: Roles, Challenges and Responses,” IFRI Proliferation Paper No. 19, Security Studies Center of the French Institute of International Studies, Summer, 2007. 7. A further recent discussion of deterring terrorists is found in Daniel Byman, “US Counterterrorism Options: A Taxonomy,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 121-150. See also M. Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” Strategic Forum No. 225, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, January, 2007. See also Dunn, op. cit. 8. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007. "The four authors elaborated their views in another article in the Wall Street Journal on January 15, 2008, as well as in a book entitled "Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons," edited by George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, published by the Hoover Institution and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (2008). 9. Margaret Beckett, Address to the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., June 25, 2007. 10. Hans Blix, “CTBT: Going the Last Mile to Banish Nuclear Testing,” CTBTO Spectrum, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (Vienna), July, 2007. 11. See, for example, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, What are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Nuclear Forces, Washington, D.C., Arms Control Association, April, 2005 (revised October, 2007). See also Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2006. 12. For a more detailed discussion of nuclear deterrence by the author, see Edward Ifft, “Deterrence, Blackmail, Friendly Persuasion,” Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 237-256, Routledge (London), September, 2007.
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-25
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Cooperative Security Management: Toward a New Approach for Managing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship Lewis A. DUNN1
Abstract. U.S.-Russian strategic relations are approaching a turning point: a continued drift toward mutual suspicion, renewed military gamesmanship, and growing political-military confrontation or an opportunity provided by presidential elections in both countries to rethink and re-craft a non-adversarial relationship. 7RGD\¶V GULIW UHIOHFWV PDQ\ IDFWRUV SDVW PLVVWHSV GLIIHUHQFHV Rf interest and approach on specific issues; misperceptions; and the inherent difficulties of breaking free from the Cold War legacy. Among other issues on the agenda, action should be taken to address Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic intentions; U.S. uncertainties about Russian commitment to preventing proliferation; and ways to build habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack.
A Turning-Point: The U.S.-Russian strategic relationship is approaching a turning point. The next years may see a continued slow drift toward mutual suspicion, renewed military gamesmanship, and growing political-military confrontation ± but there also remains WLPH IRU D MRLQW HIIRUW WR ³UHZLQG WKH ILOP´ DQG VHHN DJDLQ WR PRYH WRZDUG WKDW QRQadversarial relaWLRQVKLS DIILUPHG E\ ERWK FRXQWULHV¶ OHDGHUV 7RGD\¶V GULIW LQ WKH opposite direction reflects many factors: past missteps; differences of interest and approach on specific issues; misperceptions; and the inherent difficulties of breaking free from the Cold War legacy. That said, the upcoming presidential elections in both countries offer one of those political points in time that can ± but need not ± provide an opportunity to rethink and re-craft the relationship.
The Principle of Cooperative Security Management Assuming a mutual interest in both Washington and Moscow to use that opportunity, one starting point would be to seek joint agreement on the principle that a cooperative security management approach should be the guiding concept for governing U.S.Russian strategic relations. As the phrase states, cooperative security management ZRXOGSDUWO\HQWDLODPXWXDOFRPPLWPHQWWRPDQDJHFRRSHUDWLYHO\ERWKVLGHV¶HYROYLQJ strategic choices ± ZLWKDQH\HRQHQKDQFLQJHDFKFRXQWU\¶VVHFXULW\DVZHOODVEroader 1 Senior Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation. The views herein are those of the author not necessarily those of Science Applications International Corporation or any of its sponsoring organizations.
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global stability. It would entail as well a commitment in practice to efforts to seek a mutual accommodation of interests, while containing any all-but-inevitable differences RILQWHUHVWRUSHUVSHFWLYH,WZRXOGDIILUPLQWXUQERWKFRXQWULHV¶UHDGiness to pursue cooperatively global strategic stability. With regard to means, cooperative security management would not rule out negotiated agreements (formal or informal, legally-binding or political). But it would encompass many other types of implementing activities (parallel unilateral actions and political understandings; exchanges of information and liaison personnel; joint political-military studies, planning, and operations; establishment of jointly-operated systems; and international reporting and monitoring). Most broadly, this concept of cooperative management could be used as well to govern other key global strategic relationships. In turn, it would provide a conceptual framework for broader great power cooperation to meet global stability challenges.
Dimensions of Strategic Stability Part of a cooperative security management approach would entail serious and sustained consultations to reach agreement on a shared vision of future global strategic stability ± and on the most pressing threats to stability. Even if some differences persisted, the very process would be valuable ± assuming a high-level mandate on both sides to work the issue in earnest. Strategic stability is a long used, if ill-defined concept. It also has many dimensions.2 IQWRGD\¶VZRUOGZKDWPD\EHWHUPHGSHDFHWLPHVWDELOLW\± ensuring that conflicting interests do not spillover to undermine the overall Russia-U.S. political relationship as well as the basis for cooperative actions to meet common security threats ± is taking on increasing importance. More traditional arms race stability also seems to once again be emerging as an issue. By contrast, given the extremely low probability of a military clash between the two countries, crisis stability appears less central to the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. But it could be an area in which the two sides would seek to cooperate to dampen crises in other regions. Two other dimensions of stability today also could figure in the type of consultations being suggested ± proliferation stability and anti-terrorism stability defined respectively in terms of containing the risks and dangers of runaway proliferation and of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Three Illustrative Areas for Action: Agreement on a principle of cooperative security management and on a vision of global strategic stability, however, would only be a starting point. Implementation in practice would be critical ± both to rebuild confidence between Washington and Moscow and to work the critical challenges that could fuel the drift toward suspicion, gamesmanship, and political-military confrontation. The agenda would be a full one. Consider very briefly three examples taken from that broader agenda, examples that span the different dimensions of stability: Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic intentions; U.S. uncertainties about Russian commitment to preventing proliferation; and building 2 The following breakdown of the different types of stability draws on conversations with Leonard Spector.
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habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. 5XVVLD¶V8QFHUWDLQW\DERXW866WUDWHJLF,QWHQWLRQV Increasingly, Russian officials and experts have voiced concern about U.S. strategic intentions. Their statements point toward an alleged U.S. pursuit of nuclear primacy based on a mix of lower-yield nuclear capabilities perceived being acquired, advanced conventional strike options, and deployment of missile defenses. Some persons warn that ultimately U.S. actions ± combined with Russian inactions ± will undermine 5XVVLD¶V QXFOHDU GHWHUrent capability. Isolated voices go so far as to warn of U.S. military threats to coerce Russia in one or another area. Cooperative security management would seek mutually acceptable approaches to lessen this strategic uncertainty. A full discussion exceeds the scope of this brief presentation. Suffice it to suggest some pathways to explore. First, the possibility should be examined of putting in place sustained give-andtake strategic consultations, at multiple levels. These consultations would build on and LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]H WKH UHFHQW ³WZR-plus-WZR´ PHHWLQJV EHWZHHQ WKH 6HFUHWDULHV RI State/Foreign Affairs and Defense. These meetings could be extended to include possible exchanges of liaison officers between the two militaries and defense establishments in appropriate locations Second, a renewed but expanded effort should be made to put in place a joint Early Warning Capability. As a start this could entail bringing into effect the now moribund 2000 agreement for shared early warning (the Joint Data Exchange Center). But shared early warning could go beyond that agreement to exchange national data to explore creation of a jointly operated early warning capability, thereby providing each country with direct real-time access to comparable warning imagery. This type of step would JR IDU WR GHDO ZLWK RQH XQGHUO\LQJ URRW RI 5XVVLDQ VWUDWHJLF XQFHUWDLQW\ 5XVVLD¶V eroded early warning capability. Third, cooperative alternatives to regulate future missile defense deployments need to be pursued ± from exploration of agreed deployment guidelines to actual pursuit of a joint U.S.-Russian global missile defense capability against proliferation threats. Finally, building on the preceding, steps could be taken to put in place a set of confidence-building, transparency, and constraint measures ± technical, political, and operational ± to accompany any U.S. deployment of longer-range conventional ballistic missiles. For that matter, such measures also would be appropriate to accompany any Russian deployment of longer-range conventional ballistic missiles should Russia eventually follow suit. 868QFHUWDLQW\DERXW5XVVLD¶V&RPPLWPHQWWR1RQ-Proliferation Today, it often is remarked wistfully that during the Cold War, preventing proliferation was the one area of sustained and successful strategic cooperation between Moscow and Washington. Within some parts of the U.S. strategic community, there is a SHULRGLFVSHFXODWLRQWKDWWRGD\¶VODFNRIQRQ-proliferation cooperation actually reflects a Russian belief that more proliferation would be good ± especially as a means to tiedown and impede a United States perceived to be seeking global hegemony. Russian policies toward Iran are cited as an example. So far, strategic dialogue alone has not been sufficient to put such doubts to rest, particularly in the wider American foreign policy and defense community. Even so,
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that dialogue on proliferation challenges is essential ± particularly if as in the Cold War era, it can become a genuine give-and-take process. What is even more necessary, however, is to find ways to rebuild strong habits of non-proliferation cooperation between Washington and Moscow. This includes cooperation on the tough cases. By way of illustration, in the specific case cited of Iran, Russia and the United States ± along with other great powers ± could take the lead in signaling to the Iranian leadership that should Iran break out of the Nonproliferation Treaty and acquire nuclear weapons, the great powers would respond cooperatively to ensure that Iran did not gain from the bomb. By so doing, they could yet shift the balance of internal debate in Iran where a key question remains whether Iran ultimately would make itself less not more VHFXUHE\³JRLQJDOOWKHZD\WRWKHERPE´ Building Habits of Cooperation in Countering Terrorist WMD Attacks Russia and the United States clearly share a strong common interest in countering terrorist attacks using WMD ± chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Most narrowly, each country has been the target of WMD threats or use: in 1995, Chechyan terrorists threatened the use of radiological weapons against Moscow; in 2001, an unknown individual or group mailed letters with anthrax to targeted Americans. Both countries support the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, are co-chairs of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and have cooperated under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to enhance protection against WMD terrorism. Cooperation in specific instances, however, has sometimes been more problematic ± as it was after the 2001 anthrax mailings (when the United States sought Russian expertise), or after the 2006 seizure by Georgian authorities of smuggled highly-enriched uranium (when it proved difficult to investigate the origins of the materials). From this perspective, a key challenge for cooperative security management would be to strengthen the habits of cooperation between Moscow and Washington ± and then more widely among the great powers ± to prevent, detect, disrupt, attribute, or respond to a terrorist WMD incident. Here, too, there are a variety of potential pathways to explore. By way of example, building on the Global Initiative, joint planning and exercises could be undertaken to enhance capabilities to detect, interdict, and otherwise prevent a successful terrorist WMD attack, from near-real time exchanges of warning intelligence to joint operational deployments. Closely related, emergency response and consequence management planning and exercises also could be begun. This could include assessment of possible on-call capabilities to provide joint support to a third country that requires assistance in assessing and rendering safe a terrorist device or in dealing with the consequences of an event. In the area of cooperative attribution of the sources of a terrorist WMD attack, discussions could focus on needed authorities and procedures that would enable cooperation to ensure that the perpetrator of a terrorist WMD attack (from the leaders to the aiders and abettors) will not be able to hide. Still another area would be consultations and planning for a coordinated response to a terrorist WMD event ± not least, on the one hand, to send the right global signal, and on the other hand, to leverage the shock of a terrorist WMD attack as a means to strengthen global counter-terrorist and non-proliferation activities.
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What Next 7RGD\¶VFKDOOHQJH LVWRUHYHUVH WKH GULIWWRZDUGSROLWLFDO-military confrontation in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. For the United States, reversing that drift will UHTXLUH DFNQRZOHGJLQJ WKDW WKH SDVW KDOI GHFDGH¶V SRVWXUH RI VWUDWHJLF ³ODLVVH]-IDLUH´ has not moved the U.S.-Russian relationship ahead successfully. But it will also require not simply aGRSWLQJ D ³EDFN WR WKH WUDGLWLRQDO DUPV FRQWURO IXWXUH´ ZD\ RI confronting stability challenges. For Russia, reversing the drift will require tempering WRGD\¶V³QHYHUDJDLQ´DVVHUWLYHQHVVDVZHOODVDFRPSDUDEOHUHDGLQHVVWRWKLQNDQHZRQ some issues. For both countries the stakes are high ± from strengthening stability in its many different variants through reinvigorated cooperation to deal with proliferation, WMD terrorism, and other global security challenges, to finally putting the Cold War legacy behind the two countries. The principle and practice of cooperative security management offer a possible way forward.
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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-30
Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy Joseph CIRINCIONE1 Abstract. Three trends are converging to increase prospects for a fundamental change in global nuclear policies: the failure of the existing U.S. national security strategy to stem the growing proliferation threats; a nearly simultaneous global change in executive leadership; and a developing consensus across ideological lines for a renewed commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Leading U.S. presidential candidates have endorsed nuclear disarmament and numerous experts and non-governmental organizations are developing comprehensive proposals, most prominently George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn. These campaigns have created political space for officials to embrace a more ambitious agenda than most previously had. There is a greater likelihood of historic change in global nuclear policy now than at any other moment in the past 15 years.
For the first time in fifty-six years, the United States will conduct a presidential election in 2008 that does not include a sitting president or vice-president. This greatly increases the possibility of changes in nuclear strategic policy, particularly if the candidate of the Democratic Party wins over the Republican Party candidate, as is now widely anticipated. New leadership in the White House is one of four trends that indicate a high probability of positive changes in global nonproliferation policies. The other three are: • • •
the growing recognition that the radical counter-proliferation policies promoted by neoconservatives and adopted by the Bush administration have failed; the opportunities presented by elections that are simultaneously installing new governments in most of the leading nations or the world—a rare global political realignment; and the campaigns begun by leading non-government groups, primarily in the United States but also in Europe, that are promoting policies to increase international nuclear security.
This paper briefly examines these trends, focusing on the elements likely to emerge in the next nuclear strategy of the United States.
1 President of the Ploughshares Fund. When this paper was prepared and presented he was Senior Fellow and Director for Nuclear Policy at the Center for American Progress, Washington, DC
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Policy Failure The progress made over the past twenty years in reducing arsenals of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, in reducing the number of states with nuclear weapons or weapons programs, and fortifying the nonproliferation regime with new tools and new barriers to the spread of nuclear weapons has been reversed in recent years. As a result, dangers have grown and there is now a distinct possibility of the collapse of much of the nonproliferation regime. The security strategies championed by Washington-based neoconservatives and formalized in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and the National Security Strategy of the United States have not produced the results they promised. Nearly all of the proliferation problems inherited by the Bush administration have grown worse over the past 7 years. Today, we face greater nuclear insecurity than during the 1990s, including the risk of a Middle East with several nuclear states; the possibility that Osama bin Laden will eventually get a nuclear weapon from insecure stockpiles in Russia, Pakistan or some other state; the probability that an upsurge in nuclear power programs would bring many more states to the brink of nuclear weapons capability; and the possibility that the flaws in command and control systems—including those exposed in the US system by the unauthorized August 2007 B-52 flight with 6 nuclear bombs—could result in the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The growing recognition that current approaches are counter-productive helps clear the field, providing space for policy alternatives, but does not, by itself, guarantee that more effective policies will be implemented.
New Leaders Prospects for policy change are increased by the period of political transition the world has now entered. By early 2009, four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia) will have new leaders. Other key states, including Iran and Israel, may as well. The UK and France have already made the switch, as have other major powers such as Japan, Germany and Italy. International organizations, too, will refresh their leadership, with a new Secretary-General now installed at the United Nations and possibly a new head of the International Atomic Energy Agency in two years. Rarely have the political stars re-aligned so dramatically. The photo of the G8 summit in 2009 will likely not have a single leader present at the 2006 summit save for Canada’s Prime Minister Harper. This is a unique opportunity to advance new policies that can dramatically reduce and even eliminate many of the dangers that have kept political leaders and security officials worried about a nuclear 9/11.
U.S. Nuclear Politics Several leading candidates for the presidency of the United States have already rushed to fill the policy vacuum, detailing sweeping proposals for nuclear security. Former Senator John Edwards promised in September 2007 that he would lead a charge for a “Global Compact” to eliminate nuclear weapons. Governor Bill Richardson (D.-NM)
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has given a similar pledge. Senator Barack Obama (D.-IL) has a plan to eliminate and secure all loose nuclear materials in his first term as president, effectively preventing nuclear terrorism. In an October 2007 speech he committed to the goal of a nuclearfree world, and endorsed a plan that included negotiating a verifiable global ban on the production of fissile materials, creating an international fuel bank to back up commercial fuel supplies, increasing funding for IAEA safeguards, negotiating dramatic reductions in US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, seeking a global ban on Intermediate-range missiles, and taking missiles off of hair-trigger alert. Senator Hillary Clinton (D.-NY) has promised similar presidential attention to preventing nuclear terror and shrinking global arsenals. Her article in November/December issue of Foreign Affairs, “Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first Century,” offers the first details of her plan. Senator Clinton laments the lost opportunity of the failure to build upon profound international unity created after the 9/11 attacks. She promises that she will not let her opportunity slip away, pledging to negotiate an end to the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea; secure all loose nuclear materials in her first term; establish a nuclear fuel bank; negotiate an accord to verifiably reduce U.S. and Russian arsenals, and, significantly, to seek Senate approval of the CTBT by 2009, the tenth anniversary of the Senates’ initial rejection of the treaty. This last step, Senator Clinton says, “would enhance the United States’ credibility when demanding that other nations refrain from testing.” Summarizing this trend among the Democratic candidates, former National Security staff member Ivo Daldaar and former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum, two top advisors to Senator Obama, said in an October 5, 2007 op-ed: “Although successive administrations (at least until the current one) have mouthed the words affirming this objective, few have actually made this commitment an organizing principle of their nuclear weapons policies. That may be about to change….There is much that the United States can do to lift the dark nuclear shadow over the world. It can sharply reduce its nuclear stockpile to 1,000 weapons or less, if Russia agrees to go down to the same level. It can eliminate tactical nuclear weapons to underscore that it understands that a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, no matter its size, yield, range, or mode of delivery. It can agree never to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, and accept the need for intrusive verification if other states agree to end such production as well. It can commit never again to test a nuclear device, and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” It is not clear if Senator Clinton accepts this as an organizing principle. Interestingly, in her Foreign Affairs article, she redefines the Nuclear Free World initiative of George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn (detailed below), saying they “have called on the United States to ‘rekindle the vision,’ shared by every president from Dwight Eisenhower to Bill Clinton, of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.” Republican candidates have not yet addressed these issues in detail. However, in the US Congress there is some support for these new policies, as demonstrated by legislation (SR 1977) introduced by Senators Obama and Chuck Hagel (R-NE) that
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would authorized the policies detailed by Senator Obama in his speech, plus others. Most significantly the bill would continue: “…the United States moratorium on nuclear test explosions, initiating a bipartisan process to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, working to secure ratification by other key countries, and fully supporting United States commitments to fund the international monitoring system to help detect and deter possible nuclear explosions by other countries…” The legislation also specifically endorses “pursuing and concluding an agreement to verifiably halt the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.” There is conservative opposition to these measures in the Senate. In October, in reaction to an effort by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) to link production of the so-called “Reliable Replacement Warhead” to a sense of the Senate provision in the Defense Authorization bill that the CTBT should be ratified, Senator Jon Kyl (R.-AZ) organized a letter signed by 38 Senators opposing the provision. The principle reason given in the letter was that no hearings had been held on the CTBT since 1999, therefore it was impossible to declare that there was a “sense of the Senate” in favor of ratification. Republican presidential candidates are likely to keep their positions close to this conservative line. This underscores the urgent need for a thoughtful, nonpartisan review of the core issues involved with the test ban treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and related issues. There are already bipartisan appeals for just such reviews in the U.S. House and Senate. Senators Diane Feinstein (D-CA) and Susan Collins (R-ME) introduced legislation (SR 1914, The Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007) requiring that a comprehensive nuclear weapons policy and posture review be submitted to Congress by the administration (and prohibiting funding for any new nuclear warhead development until such reviews are completed). The legislation would require that the review examine “the role of nuclear forces in United States military strategy, planning and programming,” and the “policy requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable and credible nuclear deterrence posture,” among other issues. There is similar legislation in the House, added to the Defense Authorization bill by the Chairwomen of the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D.-CA). It includes a provision creating an independent commission to examine U.S. nuclear policy. This year, there have been other bipartisan Congressional actions that generally had the effect of blocking production of new nuclear weapons and construction of new anti-missile bases in Europe, reducing funding for these anti-missile programs overall, and providing funding for an international fuel bank, and in general moving toward a more progressive national security posture.
Positive Policy Initiatives Non-government organizations are already working to provide policies the new executive could adopt. “With this leadership change,” former United Nations UnderSecretary-General of Disarmament Jayantha Dhanapala told a February conference in
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New York organized by the Center for American Progress and The Century Foundation, “it is for us in civil society to try to urge new perspectives and new opportunities for them to seize so that we all make the right choices at the right time.” Analysts at over a dozen institutes are perfecting proposals to reaffirm the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, ratify the nuclear test ban treaty, establish an international nuclear fuel bank, eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, move to zero deployed nuclear weapons and convene a global nuclear summit in 2009, among others. They are promoting their ideas in conferences, reports, testimony, blogs, interviews and film projects. Chief among them and propelling all of them, is the bipartisan appeal from Republicans George Shultz and Henry Kissinger and Democrats William Perry and Sam Nunn in their January 4, 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” Their campaign has already created political space for several leading officials to embrace a more ambitious agenda than they previously had. These four veteran cold warriors urged the United States to recommit to the vision of eliminating nuclear weapons and married their vision with a ten-point action plan including steep reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the end to the production of nuclear weapons material. The four sponsored a follow-up conference at the conservative Hoover Institute at Stanford University in October to advance this agenda. The group plans an international conference in winter 2008, and will soon announce a broad list of additional supporters of their elimination vision. The October conference demonstrated the sophisticated approach of this moderate, bipartisan group and the political support their efforts have garnered thus far. Nancy Reagan sent a personal letter of endorsement to the conference and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger provided a dramatic statement of his support. Former Secretary George Shultz read the speech for the governor, who was prevented from attending as planned only by the state emergency of wild fires then raging in southern California. He said, in part: “The words that this audience knows so well, the words that President Kennedy spoke during the Cold War, have regained their urgency: ‘The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution.’ Here in California we still have levees that were built a hundred years ago. These levees are an imminent threat to the wellbeing of this state and its people. It would be only a matter of time before a disaster strikes. But we’re not waiting until such a disaster. We in California have taken action to protect our people and our economy from devastation. Neither can this nation nor the world wait to act until there is a nuclear disaster. I am so thankful for the work of George, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger Sam Nunn, Max Kampelman, Sid Drell and so many of you at this conference. You have a big vision, a vision as big as humanity—to free the world of nuclear weapons….I want to help. Let me know how I can use my power and influence as governor to further your vision. Because my heart is with you. My support is firm. My door is open.”
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Thus, for the first time since the initial efforts of the Truman administration in the 1940s, a movement to eliminate nuclear weapons has developed, not from the political left but from the moderate middle. This promises to give the movement a political importance and policy relevance that previous efforts, even the broad-based Nuclear Freeze Movement of the 1980s, have lacked. The goals of the new movement enjoy strong support from the traditional, nongovernmental arms control and nonproliferation organizations. More than a dozen leading U.S. arms control organizations have formed the Campaign for a Nuclear-Free World to coordinate their efforts. The New American Foundation hosts a bi-partisan Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative that seeks to forge a consensus on a new policy among former senior officials from both parties. The most ambitious effort is led by World Security Institute President Bruce Blair. His plan for a Compact to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons already enjoys the support of a bipartisan group of senior experts and former officials. The campaign includes organization of a World Summit to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons in 2010 that would endorse a new treaty calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons by a date certain. The organizing document for the Compact explains: “Three circumstances have converged to create an historic opportunity to achieve this goal: a dramatic shift among conservative leaders to the belief that nuclear weapons must be eliminated; increased public awareness and support, with 82% of Americans now favoring elimination; and an unprecedented changing of the guard, with four of the five original nuclear weapons states electing new leadership between 2007 and 2009. While time is limited to act before a nuclear catastrophe occurs, history has shown that the right idea at the right time can capture the public imagination and shift the public mindset – when that happens, political change that once seemed impossible becomes inevitable.”
Towards A Comprehensive New Policy The circumstances that may make it possible for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War to move decisively towards the elimination of nuclear weapons also make it possible to secure long-sought nuclear security goals, including deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, the entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a FMCT. One of the best previews we have of what a new nuclear policy might look like in the next administration comes from the October 2007 report, “Reducing Nuclear Threats and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,” by the National Security Advisory Group. The group includes over 30 senior experts and former officials, including Madeleine Albright, Graham Allison, Samuel Berger, Thomas Daschle, Robert Gallucci, William Perry, John Podesta, Susan Rice, John Shalikashvili, and this author. The report proposes a consensus strategy for reducing all the nuclear threats – one that takes seriously the mission of preventing a nuclear 9-11, stops new states from going nuclear, deters any state from launching a nuclear strike on America and restores American leadership to the broad network of nations willing to work towards reducing nuclear perils.
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It is fair to say that this report represents the moderate middle of a significant part the American foreign policy establishment at this point. It is a balancing of the more cautious position sought by some to protect against charges that they are weak on defense, and the more ambitious agendas of those who seek dramatic policy change. The 20-page report details what the endorsers believe is an effective, realistic strategy to realize a bipartisan agenda. Key findings include: •
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For the foreseeable future, the U.S will have to maintain effective, reliable nuclear forces to deter adversaries, but deterrence can now be achieved at significantly lower force levels. By reducing the political and military salience of nuclear weapons, global support can be built for the tough actions needed to stop terrorists and hostile regimes from obtaining nuclear weapons. America and other nations can be protected from nuclear terrorism by accelerating the currently weak efforts to secure and eliminate bomb-making nuclear materials worldwide, to detect and interdict illicit shipments of such materials, and to develop nuclear forensic technologies that would hold states accountable if they knowingly assisted terrorists in acquiring or using nuclear weapons. The United States must mobilize the nations of the world to roll back North Korea’s nuclear program and head off an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. That will require increasing the financial and diplomatic pressures applied by the UN Security Council and by states outside the Council, as well as offering the positive incentive of normalized and economically beneficial relations with the U.S. The United States should develop a range of conventional weapons and operational concepts that would give the President credible and technically suitable options for dealing with any threat. This would reduce and eventually eliminate any need to resort to nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks. Given the widely-shared scientific judgment that U.S. nuclear weapons are reliable and safe, there is no urgency to proceed with any new warhead, included the “reliable replacement warhead” proposed by this administration, but questioned by the Congress. With North Korea and Iran actively seeking nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, the U.S. should pursue missile defenses. But the nation should not buy weapons that do not work. The government should continue a robust development effort and proceed with deployment only when warranted by the results of realistic test programs and the evolution of the threat. Plans to deploy new bases in Eastern Europe should be delayed until there has been a serious exploration with the NATO allies and Russia for a cooperative approach to missile defense that could help protect Europe, Russia, and the U.S. The tough verification agreements negotiated with the Russians by Ronald Reagan should not be allowed to expire in 2007. The United States should agree with the Russians to replace START I with a legally binding follow-on agreement that reduces nuclear forces significantly below the levels called for in the 2002 Moscow Treaty. The two sides should also agree to lower the current alert rates that keep thousands of nuclear warheads ready to launch
J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy
•
•
•
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within 15 minutes, reducing the risk that the weapons would be used by accident or misperception. A bipartisan effort should be pursued in the Senate to finally achieve the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that would make it illegal for any nation to test a nuclear weapon. With more nuclear tests than all the other nations combined, the United States does not need any more tests; nor should it want any other nation perfecting or developing weapons. The U.S. should restore its historic leadership role in building and strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including by strengthening the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency ability to verify strict compliance, reassuring allies that U.S. security assurances remain reliable, and joining with all other nuclear-weapon states in reaffirming their pledges to seek full nuclear disarmament. States embarking on or expanding nuclear power programs should be given incentives to forgo their own uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. The U.S. should work with the IAEA and other states on an arrangement to provide reliable assurances of nuclear fuel supply to states that do not have their own fuel cycle facilities.
Conclusion These reports and efforts are harbingers of a new policy moment. There is a greater chance to achieve dramatic, historic change in global nuclear policy in the next few years than at any other moment in the past 15 years. Those involved in these policy initiatives all believe that a world of increasing numbers of nuclear weapon states is not inevitable. Neither is a nuclear attack by terrorists. Both can be prevented, but only if their prevention becomes an overriding national priority and only with strong U.S. leadership in international arms control and nonproliferation efforts. The prospects of that developing over the next few years are already encouraging. The next president of the United States—whether Republican or Democrat—will likely have a decidedly different nonproliferation policy than the failed neoconservative strategy attempted over the past few years. There are already signs that other governments are willing to develop and promote new initiatives, such as the remarkable June 2007 speech by then-Foreign Minister Margaret Beckett at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference—by far the most dramatic reaffirmation of the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons yet delivered by any senior official in a nuclear-weapon state. This speech was approved by the incoming Prime Minister Gordon Brown and provided both vision and practicality. She said, in part: “When it comes to building this new impetus for global nuclear disarmament, I want the UK to be at the forefront of both the thinking and the practical work; to be, as it were, a disarmament laboratory. As far as new thinking goes, the International Institute of Strategic Studies is planning an in-depth study to help determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. We will participate in that study and provide funding for one of their workshops focusing on some of the crucial technical questions in this area. The study and subsequent
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workshops will offer a thorough and systematic analysis of what a commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons means in practice.” With this vision and this type of practical, detailed work, it is very possible that the policy deadlocks of the past few years can be broken. Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is—as even the most ardent proponents admit—a daunting task. By marrying the vision to pragmatic steps, however, is should be possible to implement measures that can restore the lost momentum of previous years, concretely reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism, nuclear war and nuclear use, and rebuild the global consensus to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states and drastically reduce the arsenals of the current weapon states. As Minister Beckett said: “So my commitment to that vision, truly visionary in its day, of a world free of nuclear weapons is undimmed. And although we in this room may not see the end of that road, we can take those first further steps down it. For any generation that would be a noble calling. For ours, it is a duty.”
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-39
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The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian 9LHZRQKRZWR&XUHWKH³,QKHUHQW 'HIHFWV´RIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ5HJLPH Victor MIZIN1 Abstract. Due to a number of reasons, including the emerging crises in relations between Russia and the West, the urgency of global concerns regarding the proliferation of WMD and missiles appears to have diminished. But emergence of new threats brought back to life the key problem of global security: the survival of leading world powers. In the face of the new global security challenges, Russia and the West have revitalized the importance of non-proliferation. Still, the nonproliferation regime is suffering from intrinsic drawbacks and should be improved. Such improvement presupposes the close cooperation, or at least an accord, between the leading world powers as a core element.
Diminished sense of urgency Global concern regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles appears to have lost its sense of urgency in world politics lately. This was partly due to the emerging crises in relations between Russia and the West, as well as what can be termed the North-South divide, stemming from the political and diplomatic rifts in their respective foreign policy approaches. 2 New confrontations between the former Cold War rivals on almost every major issue became particularly evident after the G-8 summits in 2006-2007 and the landmark speech of President Putin at the 43 rd Munich Conference on Security Policy. Supported in certain European circles, these Russian WKHVHV RQ WKH FROODSVH RI WKH ³XQLSRODU ZRUOG´ IROORZHG E\ 0RVFRZ¶V FODLP IRU HQWLUHO\ HTXDO VWDWXV ZLWK WKH OHDGLQJ ZRUOG SRZHUV DQG LWV ³QHZ ZRUOG RUGHU´ concept seemed to have ruined all prospects for Russia actually joining the West - thus once again underlining the lingering gap in values between the two sides 3. Likewise, plans to create a kind of broad front of the states which would make meaningful efforts to stop WMD proliferation and strengthen international security and strategic stability including the arms control process seem rather bleak. 4 Still, even in the long-HVWDEOLVKHG VFHQDULR RI WKH ³ZDU RI DOO DJDLQVW DOO´ RQ WKH world arena, the issue of nonproliferation and its core element ± the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ± retain their importance. After all, 1
Counsellor, Analytical Division, Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly Andrew Kuchins, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Dmitri Trenin, ³U.S.-Russian Relations: The Case for an 8SJUDGH´&DUQHJLH0RVFRZ&HQWHU5HSRUWJanuary 20,.2005 3 %UHW 6WHSKHQV ³/LWWOH 6ZHDW\ )LVW Why is Putin now getting tough on Iran?´ Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2007 4 The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; Secretary-General's remarks at Macalester College Convocation to inaugurate Institute for Global Citizenship , St. Paul, Minnesota, 22 April 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1999 2
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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”
nonproliferation in fact relates to the key problem of global security- the survival of leading world powers, Russia and the West - in the face of new global security challenges. The current security situation is marked by the emergence of new threats the form of terrorist activities and the potential use of WMD by international Islamic IXQGDPHQWDOLVWVLQWKHLUILJKWDJDLQVWWKHµPDLQHQHPLHV¶± the so-FDOOHG³LQILGHO´:HVW and Russia, which prevent the former from attaining world dominance. 5 This SKHQRPHQRQLVODEHOHG³VXSHUWHUURULVP´E\VRPHH[SHUWV 6 Compared with other types of WMD and even subversive activities, nuclear weapons, obviously would be difficult to incorporate into the cannibalistic plans of the Islamists.7 But even the minor risk of the use of nuclear weapons, in view of their terrible destructive consequences, must be treated seriously. It is not accidental that President Putin referred to WMD proliferation as the main security threat of the 21st century.8 The advent of new actors possessing nuclear weapons in unstable regions, SDUWLFXODUO\UDGLFDO WHUURULVWJURXSVDQGLUUHVSRQVLEOHµURJXH¶VWDWHVKDVVXUSDVVHGWKH possibility of nuclear showdown between the members of the traditional nuclear SRZHUV µFOXE¶ DV WKH JUHDWHVW WKUHDW WRGD\ IRU WKH OHDGLQJ ZRUOG SRZHUV 7KLV VHW RI issues also presents the basis for the security dialogue between both East and West and North and South. Most probably it will continue to dominate the agenda in the sphere of defense and global security in the foreseeable future. In this respect, the developed countries still view the NPT of 1968 as the central, integral factor in maintaining peace and international stability. Russia, as the main successor of the USSR which was a founding member of the NPT at the very peak of WKH &ROG :DU DOVR VWLFNV WR WKLV VWDQFH 'HVSLWH DOO RI WKH GLIILFXOWLHV 0RVFRZ¶V approach is unambiguous. The Treaty, which comprises 189 member states today, has passed the test of time over its 30 year history. There is no obvious alternative to the NPT as a mechanism for containing the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthening international security on the global and regional levels. 9 In fact, there are no means for counteracting nuclear weapons¶SUROLIHUDWLRQWRGD\WKDWFRXOGEHPRUHVXFFHVVIXOWKDQ the NPT. Any other options that include the use of military force would be more costly, both in the financial and political aspects. The point is how to improve the NPT, increase its effectiveness and adjust this useful Cold War-era contraption to new realities.
5
'U .HQW +XJKHV %XWWV DQG 3URIHVVRU %HUW % 7XVVLQJ ³$GGUHVVLQJ The Conditions That Foster 7HUURULVP´8QLWHG6WDWHV$UP\:DU&ROOHJH6\PSRVLXP, Center for Strategic Leadership, CSL 1 Issue, U.S. Army War College , Volume 10-05, July 2005, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/10-05.pdf 6 Marvin J. Cetron, Terror 2000: The Future Face of Terrorism (KXG 6SULQ]DN ³7KH *UHDW 6XSHUWHUURULVP6FDUH´Foreign Policy, Fall 1998 7 ,$($'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO'U0RKDPHG(O%DUDGHL³1XFOHDU7HUURULVP,GHQWLI\LQJDQG&RPEDWLQJWKH Risks´International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global Directions for the Future , London, 16 March 2005, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n003.html 8 The BBC Interview with V. Putin, June 22, 2003, Novo-Ogarevo, http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/06/47510.shtml (Russian) 9 See /HZLV $ 'XQQ ³&RXQWHULQJ 3UROLIHUDWLRQ ,QVLJKWV IURP 3DVW µ¶:LQV /RVVHV DQG 'UDZV¶¶´ Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006
V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”
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Treaty successes Conceived in a period of optimism over ideas to prevent nuclear war, and promote arms control and peaceful coexistence of the two radically opposite social and political global systems, the NPT has proven, in general, to be a helpful instrument of international law. Taking into account the complex realities of the modern world, it has HVWDEOLVKHGDUDWKHUHIIHFWLYHOHJDOUHJLPHZKLFKFRQWUDU\WRWKHSHVVLPLVWV¶SURJQRVHV managed to prevent the emergence of dozens of new nuclear states in the world. On the whole, by the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, a certain level of international security had been reached through the enforcement of this Treaty. During this period almost 40 countries joined the NPT. Access to nuclear weapons was blocked for Iraq. Military nuclear programs were shut down in countries like Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. The authority of the nuclear nonproliferation regime had been growing steadily. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the termination of confrontation between the two antagonistic military-political blocks, the NPT gained particular significance. Newly independent nations ± Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan ± agreed to become non-nuclear states, abandoning the nuclear weapons they had inherited as breakaway parts of the former Soviet Union. Thus Russia became the only nuclear power and therefore the natural though informal political and military leader of the CIS countries. In the new phase after the end of the Cold War, the importance of the NPT grew significantly when it became the key instrument of sustaining stability in the chaotic world where no politico-military blocs existed. At the historic NPT 1995 Review Conference, the Treaty was indefinitely extended. A series of countries which had refused to join it earlier, including such nuclear powers as France and China, joined the Treaty in the years leading up to the review and extension conference.
Inherent defects Concurrent with the above-mentioned positive processes, the so-called built-in defects of the treaty appeared. They can be roughly grouped into philosophical, political and technological categories. The inherent shortcomings of the Treaty became particularly evident with the HPHUJHQFHRIWKH³SUREOHP´VWDWHVWKHQRWRULRXVµJURXSRIWKUHH¶LQFOXGLQJ,UDQ,UDT North Korea and, to some extent, Libya) which in fact circumvented the NPT-imposed constraints and covertly started to develop nuclear weapons. As India and Pakistan MRLQHG WKH ³QXFOHDU SRZHUV FOXE´ DQG 1RUWK .RUHD DQG ,UDQ SXUVXHG WKLV VWDWXV D critical point was reached. By the middle of the 1990s, it became obvious that the NPT could not become the panacea for the mushrooming spread of nuclear-weapon states that it had seemed to be in the 1970-80s. The Treaty failed to develop into a ³XQLYHUVDO´ WRRO HPEUDFLQJ DOO VWDWHV RI WKH ZRUOG ZKLOH WKH LQHIIHFWLYHQHVV RI international nonproliferation regimes was exposed. The main dilemma of the nonprolifeUDWLRQSDUDGLJPWKHNH\³SKLORVRSKLFDO´IODZYLVLEO\FDPHWRWKHIRUH 10
10
-RVHSK61\H³1377KH/RJLFRI,QHTXDOLW\´Foreign Policy, Summer 1985
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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”
Philosophical flaws First, the NPT regime discriminates between states, placing them into two unequal groups ± µRIILFLDO¶ QXFOHDU SRZHUV ZKLFK FRQGXFWHG QXFOHDU WHVWV EHIRUH DQG all others. It is thus the question of the discrepancy between the rights of the most developed and military-PLJKW\ ³ROG´ JUHDW SRZHUV SRVVHVVLQJ IRUPDO QXFOHDU VWDWXV within the NPT and new players, seeking the role of regional power centers, as well as UDGLFDO ³URJXH´ VWDWHV 7KRXJK DFFHSWHG LQ WKH WLPH RI WKH JOREDO FRQIURQWDWLRQ between two antagonist blocs with respective nuclear-weapons leaders, this formula is rejected by the developing countries today. Second, there are many states mainly within WKH ³DQWL-Imperialist, anti-JOREDOLVW´ EORF ZKLFK VWLOO YLHZ WKH 137 DV DQ LQWULQVLFDOO\ XQIDLU ³:HVWHUQ SOR\´ GHVLJQHG WR prevent them from developing nuclear weapons potentials and benefiting from nuclear energy unhindered. Most leaders of the developing countries find it difficult to concede that they are in fact compelled to forego these crucial assets of military might that are particularly significant in the regional balances of power. The motivation to acquire nuclear weapons as a means of promoting foreign policy and strategic military interests is considerably weakened but is not eliminated completely. The argument in favor of the strengthening of the nonproliferation regimes needs further theoretical development, especially after the conflicts in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Iraq. It would be very difficult to persuade a regional leader of a developing country striving to build national defense capabilities to refrain from developing the weaponry that, in his perception, is the only definitive means of preventing the hypothetical aggression of great powers against his country (in the guise of a peacekeeping RSHUDWLRQRUD³KXPDQLWDULDQLQWHUYHQWLRQ´XQGHUWKH81IODJ Political flaws Third, the NPT presumes that nuclear powers will assist non-nuclear states in mastering GRPHVWLFSHDFHIXOQXFOHDUWHFKQRORJ\LQUHWXUQIRUWKHLUUHMHFWLRQRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQV¶ GHYHORSPHQW +RZHYHU WKLV ³EDLW´ GRHV QRW DOZD\V ZRUN WRGD\ )RU VRPH ³URJXH´ VWDWHV QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV UHPDLQ DQ ³HQG LQ LWVHOI´ IDU PRUH DWtractive than peaceful technologies. Besides, the supply considerably exceeds the demand in the global markets of nuclear materials and technologies. Finally, among the political defects is the obvious fact that certain states including Russia and the USA, while being parties to the NPT, do not strictly comply with all its provisions (in particular, regarding the progress of disarmament and arms control talks and certain aspects of nuclear technology transfer). The remarkable nixing of decades of American nonproliferation policies by the US-India deal on peaceful use of nuclear energy that was declared in July 2005 by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister M. Singh, though sharply criticized by most nonproliferation and arms control ³]HDORWV´11 received unequivocal bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress, thus proving once again that economic interests tend to take precedence over nonproliferation objectives. Although some obstacles must be overcome to effectuate this sweeping agreement which has to be endorsed by the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group 11
See for example: Michael Krepon³Betting the Ranch on the US-India Nuclear Deal´June 5, 2006, ttp://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=297
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(NSG) before it can take effect, it is obvious that India was de facto recognized as a nuclear state even by the nonproliferation-conscious Washington. Technological flaws At the same time - and this LVWKHNH\³WHFKQRORJLFDO´GUDZEDFNRIWKH7UHDW\- several developing countries even ventured to start the development of nuclear weapons under the front of their membership and to profit from certain lacunas of the NPT. The point is that any state member FDQ FUHDWH DOPRVW FRPSOHWH SRWHQWLDO IRU QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV¶ production while staying within the NPT confines and formally observing its obligations ± this opportunity is historically built into the NPT. All this poses the problem of the NPT implementation and compliance anew± both on the basis of the traditional mechanisms of international law including the IAEA and the UN Security Council venues (which by no means are able to stop attempts to acquire WMD capabilities each time) and by military counter-proliferation operations WKDW DUH DOVR FULWLFL]HG DV XQLODWHUDO ³LPSHULDOLVW´ HVFDSDGHV DQG IUHTXHQWO\ SURYH themselves inefficient, as the Bush and Clinton administrations have demonstrated).
Differing priorities It seems that the flaws and legal gaps of the NPT are obvious even to non-specialists. However, possible ways of improving the situation and eliminating these inherent defects raise much controversy as a result of the conflicting approaches between the followers of the traditional political and diplomatic methods and the advocates of the non-RUWKRGR[ DSSURDFKHV IRFXVLQJ RQ WKH WKUHDW RI IRUFH RU DG KRF ³FORVHG-FLUFXLW´ deals for any specific case of the NPT violation. Not every state ± for example, Russia or some members of the EU ± considers nuclear non-proliferation the top priority. 12 In real life, double standards are used rather often in assessing the threat of proliferation ± WKHUHLVDNLQGRI³JRRG´DQG³EDG´ proliferation.13 The world ± TXLWH IDU IURP .DQWLDQ ³HWHUQDO SHDFH´ SLSH GUHDPV - is VWLOOGLYLGHGLQWRRSSRVLQJFDPSVZKHUHFHUWDLQIDLOHGVWDWHVILJKWLQJWKHODUJHQDWLRQV¶ KHJHPRQ\ DFW LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH +REEHVLDQ SULQFLSOH RI ³ZDU RI DOO DJDLQVW DOO´ spending almost the entirety of available resources on the arms race. Owing to its inborn imperfections, the NPT failed to prevent the development of covert nuclear ZHDSRQVSURJUDPVLQWKHFKDLQRI³DQWL-V\VWHPLF´VWDWHVZKLFKXVHGWREHWKHFOLHQWVRU allies of the Soviet Union and came to be rogue states later. Clash of systems Thus the essential problem is the clash of two broad concepts of ensuring international security and strategic stability in the extreme critical circumstances. On the one hand, there is the course on establishing dialogue, using political and diplomatic means, incremental strengthening of non-proliferation regimes and arms control mechanisms, HPSOR\LQJ WROHUDQW SHUVXDVLRQ DQG HQJDJLQJ IRUPHU DQG SUHVHQW ³URJXH´ VWDWHV LQ WKH 12
George Perkovich³7KH(QGRIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ5HJLPH"´Current History, November 2006 5LFKDUG 1 +DDVV ³,QGLD ,UDQ DQG WKH FDVH IRU GRXEOH VWDQGDUGV´ Daily Times, May 14, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10685/india_iran_and_the_case_for_double_standards.html 13
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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”
international relations system as equal partners without demonizing them (for example, the traditional diplomatic rhetoric of Moscow that is shared by Beijing and most part of WKH³ROG´(XURSHQRZ 7KLVOLQHFDQEHWHQWDWLYHO\FDOOHGWKH³FDUURW´VWUDWHJ\ 7KLV ³SRVLWLYLVW´ DQG LQ PDQ\ UHVSHFWV LGHDOLVWLF DQG SURSDJDQGD-GULYHQ ³FDUURW´ modeOLVMX[WDSRVHGWRWKH³VWLFN´DSSURDFK± the policy pursued by a certain part of the conservative US elites. This new strategy is aimed at creating new mechanisms for SURWHFWLQJ $PHULFDQ LQWHUHVWV WKURXJK WKH UHYLVLRQ RI WKH RXWGDWHG ³
Nonproliferation provisions The problems with the NPT could be most visibly examined through the analysis of its specific articles. Articles I and II, which are the core of the Treaty, prohibit the transfer RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV IURP QXFOHDU VWDWHV WR ³DQ\ UHFLSLHQW ZKDWVRHYHU´ DQG EDQ QRQQXFOHDU VWDWHV IURP UHFHLYLQJ WKHP IURP ³DQ\ WUDQVIHURU ZKDWVRHYHU´ WKXV GHSULYLQJ them of any direct or indirect control over nuclear weapons. The wording of Article I FRQFHUQLQJWKHSURKLELWLRQWRWUDQVIHUQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDQGFRQWURORYHUWKHPWR³DQ\ UHFLSLHQW ZKDWVRHYHU´ LQFOXGLQJ QRW RQO\ QRQ-nuclear states but also individuals, separate groups, parties or organizations, has particular significance today. President 3XWLQ KDV UHSHDWHGO\ VWDWHG 5XVVLD¶V UHVROYH WR SUHYHQW WHUURULVWV RU WKRVH KDUERULQJ them from acquiring WMD and associated materials, equipment and technologies. In case terrorists get access to nuclear weapons and related technologies the strictest compliance with the Treaty by nuclear powers as well as the entire nuclear nonproliferation process would lose all the meaning and importance. 14 At the same time, the second part of Article I contains a provision which becomes obsolete today ± 3DUWRIWKH$UWLFOHREOLJHVRQO\WKHQXFOHDUVWDWHV³QRWLQDQ\ZD\WR assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such ZHDSRQV RU H[SORVLYH GHYLFHV´ 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ KRZHYHU D ³EODFN PDUNHW´ IRU VXFK technologies is operating today. It provides the opportunity to deliver and receive nuclear and other critical WMD-related materials and technologies, for example WKURXJK $4 .KDQ¶V LOOLFLW LQWHUQDWLRQDO QXFOHDU WUDGH QHWZRUN 15 Terrorists are also supported by a kind of international black market club of WMD-technology SUROLIHUDWLRQ VSRQVRUV ZKLFK LQFOXGHV WKH PHPEHUV RI WKH ³miserables¶ FOXE´ ± Pakistani, North Korean and Iranian and some other Asian and Middle-Eastern organizations which pose the main threat of dissemination of critical technologies in the world. Resolution 1540 adopted by the UN Security Council in April 2004 (for which Russia was one of the initiators) steers states toward preventing the acquisition of WMD and associated materials by non-state actors who seek to obtain them with 14
Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, (Times Books: 2004) David Albright and Corey Hinderstein ³7KH $4 .KDQ ,OOLFLW 1XFOHDU 7UDGH 1HWZRUN DQG Implications for NonproliferatioQ(IIRUWV´Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6, July 2006 15
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primarily terrorism-related goals. It is essential to develop effective multilateral cooperation in counteracting this danger.
Safeguards provision In the present international situation, Article III of the NPT, describing the set of IAEA safeguards, which by the cooperation of the states parties to the Treaty should ensure the verification and compliance with its provisions by non-nuclear states, acquires key importance. The IAEA safeguards are aimed at prevention or timely detection in case significant quantities of nuclear materials are diverted from peaceful nuclear activities to the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. The system of socalled comprehensive safeguards should have assured the peaceful nature of the nonnuclear states programs as an indispensable condition for the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies. Aimed at promoting cooperation in the sphere of peaceful atomic energy, the IAEA is practically the only regulatory mechanism of global control today which has played an important role in the strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. However, in the early 1990s the Agency had also failed to detect illicit nuclear programs. It is another question whether the IAEA can cope with the task of FRQWUROOLQJ KXQGUHGV RI QXFOHDU UHDFWRUV ZRUOGZLGH LI WKH ZLGHO\ GLVFXVVHG ³QXFOHDU UHQDLVVDQFH´LHWhe rapid development of peacefully oriented nuclear energy in many countries, actually takes place. After all, tens out of 189 countries of the world have not yet concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA during the 30year span of NPT enforcement. More than 90 states, including one and a half dozen states with substantial nuclear programs, have not signed or ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. The largest nuclear powers ± the United States and Russia ± belong to this group as well. Earlier in 1981, doubting the effectiveness of this international organization, Israel was forced to launch a pre-emptive strike against the Iraqi nuclear research reactor ³2]LUDN´ZLWKRXWUHFHLYLQJDQ\LQWHUQDWLRQDOVDQFWLRQV The clandestine activities in countries like North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and South Africa required a more intrusive and stricter safeguards system. After it was GLVFRYHUHG WKDW 6DGGDP +XVVHLQ¶V UHJLPH LQ ,UDT LQIULQJHG XSRQ WKH 137 FRYHUWO\ trying to produce nuclear weapons, the IAEA safeguards system was strengthened by introducing special intrusive inspections at nuclear sites. They were aimed toward ensuring access of IAEA inspectors to all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle and comprehensive information about the nuclear activities of the state. This was fixed in the model Additional Protocol to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement approved by the IAEA in 1997 and signed by all nuclear states, which became a more secure instrument of transparency for national nuclear programs (IAEA document INFCIRC/540). Today, a growing number of states are on the way to accede to this document; the procedures set in the Protocol are being implemented in practice. Unfortunately, not all countries with significant nuclear activities have acceded to the Additional Protocol under the pretext of its infringement on the sovereign rights or disregard for arms control and nonproliferation priorities.
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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”
Integrated safeguards The next step in strengthening the safeguards system should be the adoption of an integrated safeguards system based on an optimal combination of the Additional Protocol requirements and the previous safeguard system16. This measure aims at the most rational use of existing technical instruments of verification with an emphasis on tracking highly critical technologies and materials. It is devised to draw comprehensive conclusions regarding compliance by a state with its nonproliferation obligations, taking into account the entirety of its nuclear assets and relevant infrastructure. It is focused on the total nuclear activities of the state and presumes increased interaction between the Agency and the national system of nuclear accounting and control. However, it is clear that if such a system of thorough accounting for past programs is put in place, many states may be faced with serious and uncomfortable problems. Likewise, many nuclear powers including Russia are not ready to put all their nuclear sites including the military facilities under IAEA control. Verification Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the system which even nuclear powers are not ready to accept does not preclude all opportunities to conduct covert development of nuclear weapons and related research. In fact, the inspections are normally held only in order to detect the illegal activities at the nuclear sites and not in all possible venues throughout the country. However, covert nuclear activities may be conducted at various undisclosed underground sites, or duplicate or dispersed facilities as - in the case of Iran which signed the Additional Protocol in October 2003. Undisclosed facilities can be detected in theory, provided that exceptionally accurate intelligence is at hand, which most developed countries, with the possible exception of Israel, very often lack today. The complete destruction of such facilities and guaranteed nonrenewal of illicit WMD-related activities are viable only through the nation-devastating carpet bombing using nuclear weapons or next-generation earth-penetrators followed by an actual occupation of the noncompliant state and by an effective regime change with step-by-VWHS ³GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ´ 6XFK FRQWURYHUVLDO UDGLFDO PHDVXUHV DUH UDWKHU problematic today in view of the stark fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan where U.S. and NATO states have shown themselves to be completely unprepared for the daunting tasks of post-conflict rehabilitation and meaningful nation-building on the road to modernity and democracy. For this kind of operation, say, in Iran, the United States would have to deploy a 600,000-800,000-strong military contingent, with a strong grasp of the pitfalls of modern guerilla warfare and warped regional specifics necessary for winning hearts and minds in the predominantly hostile Islamic ambiance. It is obvious that although this option is highly questionable operationally and almost excluded on political grounds, other measures (for example, UN Security
16 2Q LQWHJUDWHG VDIHJXDUGV VHH ,$($ 'LUHFWRU *HQHUDO 'U 0RKDPHG (O%DUDGHL ³6WDWHPHQW WR WKH 6\PSRVLXP RQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6DIHJXDUGV 9HULILFDWLRQ DQG 1XFOHDU 0DWHULDO 6HFXULW\´ 2FWREHU 1; DOVR )ULW] 6FKPLGW ³137 ([SRUW &RQWURO DQG WKH =DQJJHU &RPPLWWHH´ Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2000
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&RXQFLOVDQFWLRQVRU³VXUJLFDO´DLUVWULNHVDJDLQVWWKHGHWHFWHGQXFOHDUVLWHVRUHYHQWKH extensive system of on-site inspections throughout the problem country with the threat of use of force in case of refusal) cannot completely assure the full dismantlement or non-renewal of proscribed nuclear programs. Moreover, even the modern technical means of verification, including outer spacebased surveillance and intelligence data collection, do not provide the states (according to the unclassified information) with the full coverage and understanding of nuclear activities in such states as Iran or North Korea. Apart from strengthening international compliance mechanisms and unifying the UN Security Council on nonproliferation issues that currently divide its leading members, the use of ad hoc schemes based on regionally-linked solutions would seem to be more effective. Improving safeguards In the past, each major crisis has led to a major upgrade in the NPT safeguards. They should be further perfected and reinforced in their intrusiveness and scope, assuring WKDWWKHVSUHDGRIQXFOHDUWHFKQRORJLHV¶EHQHILWVGRHVQRWRSHQgates or create potential loopholes for the acquisition of nuclear weapons know-how - with no prejudice to the NPT-stipulated inalienable rights of member-states. New practically achievable and regionally-based opportunities must be pursued, if the formerl\KDELWXDOSUDFWLFHVRIGLVDUPDPHQWGLSORPDF\DUHQRWZRUNLQJLQRXUµSRVWpost-FROGZDU¶HQYLURQPHQW &XUUHQWO\WKH137UHJLPHZRUNVLQWZRRSHUDWLRQDO³WUDFNV´RU³SODQHV´7KHILUVW µSODQH¶- the traditional multilateral disarmament diplomacy avenue which is based on WKH 81 ,$($ DQG RWKHU JURXSV¶ DFWLYLWLHV FDQ KDUGO\ VROYH WKH DFXWH FRQWHPSRUDU\ problems of the NPT application. The second channel - regional or ad hoc solutions, used for example in the recent settlement around the North Korean nuclear entanglement - addresses the primary problem of the drives and stimuli urging states to seek nuclear weapon capabilities. Ideally, both tracks enhance and support each other. In practice, the first one is arguably idle and limited to useless declarations, resolutions and petitions lost on potential proliferators.
Internationalizing nuclear activities Placing all nuclear activities in the problem countries under the control of international nuclear-energy consortiums and incarnating the idea of an international nuclear fuel cycle (INFC) presents another solution. Such entities could include, for example apart from reemerging Russia - representatives from the EU, primarily France, Great Britain and Germany, as well as states within close proximity like China and South Korea, and possibly Japan in the case of the DPRK, and the Gulf states or India in the case of Iran. These initiatives could be based on the suggestion of suspending the transfer of enrichment technologies made by President George W. Bush at the session of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in February 2004 and the proposal made by Director General ElBaradei to create a web of international nuclear fuel cycle centers for providing services under the IAEA aegis.
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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”
Past plans for the internationalization RI QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJLHV¶ GHYHORSPHQW OLNH Acheson-Lilienthal or Baruk Plans, President (LVHQKRZHU¶V ³$WRPV IRU 3HDFH´ DQG ³QXFOHDUVKDULQJ´LGHDVDOOIDLOHGIRUSROLWLFDOUHDVRQVLQWKHWXPXOWXRXVDQGVXVSLFLRXV environment of the Cold war. President Bush¶V LGHDV LQ SURSRVLQJ WKDW WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO PDUNHW SURYLGH D guaranteed supply of fresh fuel to states that do not possess or pursue fuel cycle facilities, or his initiative of GNEP (based on some Russian ideas) envisioning enhanced production, meeting ecological concerns and enforcing nonproliferation now look more promising and garner significant, if muted, international support. 5XVVLDQ3UHVLGHQW3XWLQ¶VLQLWLDWLYHRI-DQXDU\WRFUHDWHDQXFOHDUIXHOF\FOH center in Russia as a prototype of future global infrastructure also has been met quite positively. President Putin confirmed that Russia is ready to build such an international center on its territory, while all the problems can be solved only within the framework of the broad internationaO FRRSHUDWLRQ +H FODLPHG WKDW ³WKLV FRXOG EH D ORQJ-haul project LQYROYLQJ WKH SDUWLFLSDWLRQ RI VWDWHV SRVVHVVLQJ VLJQLILFDQW VXSSOLHV RI XUDQLXP IXHO´ Such centers could be built not only in Russia, but also in the nuclear states providing ³WKHXQGLVFULPLQDWLQJDFFHVVRIDOOLQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHV´ 17 Russian nuclear industry experts believe that if the implementation of this proposal is endorsed by the international community, it would, in the first place, ensure the development of atomic energy in the world with the strict observance of the nonproliferation regime. 18 According to the position of the former Federal Agency for the Atomic Energy of the RF (now recast into a government-run corporation) a uranium enrichment center in Russia and four or five such centers in the key regions of the world would be quite sufficient. As the head of the Agency (presently of the corporation), Sergey Kirienko, noted, it is necessary to complete several tasks including some on the international level. These are the establishment of a chain of international centers of uranium enrichment, as well as ones on the utilization (disposal) of spent nuclear fuel, and on nuclear-energy personnel training.19 The idea of ad hoc consortiums to run the nuclear complexes in each individual case implies an ideology underlying the initiative of creating international centers more comprehensively. Its crucial point is the involvement of the regional factor since nuclear ambitions of states are primarily spurred by their perception of real or alleged military threats, absence or insufficiency of security guarantees and persistent instability in a number of regions in the world. 20 Vested with extensive rights with the partial delegation of national sovereignty in establishing a kind of protectorate over nuclear programs of the relevant states, such consortiums could carry out all practical activities and research in the nuclear energy sphere in the problem states. Only small-scale pilot development programs under strict control could be allowed to save the feelings of national pride in indigenous societies. Certainly, in the beginning, not many countries will be ready to rescind INFC development rights and options. The basic argument in favor of such centers is based 17 $QVZHUVRI3UHVLGHQWRI5XVVLD93XWLQDWWKH³ELJSUHVV-FRQIHUHQFH´IRU5XVVLDQDQGIRUHLJQPDVVmedia, Moscow, January 31, 2006, http://g8russia.ru/news/20060131/1142061.html (Russian) 18 ³1XFOHDU ³5HQDLVVDQFH´ DQG WKH 1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ 5HJLPH´ *HQHUDOL]DWLRQ )HEUXDU\ http://www.rian.ru/review/20060209/43450514.html 19 Ibid. 20 *HUDOG 6WHLQEHUJ ³1RQ-3UROLIHUDWLRQ 7LPH IRU 5HJLRQDO $SSURDFKHV"´ Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 3, Summer 1994
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on the prohibitively high costs of the local pursuit of nuclear cycle capabilities in the dilapidated conditions in the third world. At the same time, artful PR should demonstrate the potential benefits and acquisitions in the case of entry into international cooperative schemes. In return for the partial surrender of national sovereignty, nuclear powers would stimulate the flow of novel technologies and Marshall-plan-level investments in the non-nuclear industries of developing countries. Such projects could serve as a hedge against arbitrary forceful actions of such countries as the USA, and at the same time ensure strict enforcement of the NPT and international nonproliferation norms. 21 $WWUDFWLYH ³VWLFNV DQG FDUURWV´ DQG HFRQRPLF DVVLVWDQFH SDFNDJHV VKRXOG IXUWKHU promote this type of system in the world and win support of national nuclear bureaucracies and politico-military elites. The development of an international fuel F\FOH FHQWHUV¶ ZHE FRXOG OHDG WR WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D QHZ LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQ assuring a guaranteed supply of nuclear services (most probably, under the IAEA aegis or linked to it). The problems surrounding this endeavor seem immense. Among them: How to enforce compliance? How to foster credibility and trust to this body? Is the IAEA powerful enough to substitute this new organization or itself for current individual national projects promoted by fiercely competing companies in the field of nuclear technology? Expected outcries from third world states that such plans border on re-introducing ³DSDUWKHLG´ LQ FLYLO QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJLHV FRXOG EH FKDOOHQJHG ZLWK DUJXPHQW WKDW extending INFC services to developing nations, primarily on a discount basis of relevant agreements, serves the far-reaching objectives of the sustained development paradigm. However, it is clear that these initiatives go beyond the traditional conceptual framework of the NPT ± foregoing nuclear-weapons programs in exchange for the right WRGHYHORSSHDFHIXODWRPLFHQHUJ\RQRQH¶VRZQZLWK,$($RYHUVLJKW
The right to peaceful nuclear energy Today, when developed countries make serious attempts to deny terrorists, their supporting regimes and international structures the access to WMD technologies, Article IV of the NPT which codifies the right of all the states party to the Treaty to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, gains paramount importance. Historically, the commitment of non-nuclear states not to create nuclear weapons in return for the assistance of nuclear powers in developing peaceful nuclear energy programs (thH VR FDOOHG ³QXFOHDU GHDO´ ZKLFK ZDV SURPRWHG E\ WKH GHYHORSLQJ countries and actively supported by the USSR, became a major incentive that ensured the acceptance of the very concept of the treaty by the third World. 21 About the possibility of creating such consortium for Iran see: Charles D. Ferguson and Victor Mizin, ³Russia can help resolve Iran crisis´ The Baltimore Sun , May 22, 2006; Victor Mizin and Brian Finlay, ³Pride or Prejudice: The Interplay of Domestic and Foreign Policy in Russia on the Iranian Nuclear 3URJUDP´ The Stimson Center Cooperative Nonproliferation Program, http://www.stimson.org/?SN=CT200611161136; *HRIIUH\ )RUGHQ DQG -RKQ 7KRPVRQ ³,UDQ DV D 3LRQHHU &DVH IRU 0XOWLODWHUDO 1XFOHDU $UUDQJHPHQWV´ 0,7 6HSWHPEHU http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Iran%20as%20a%20pioneer%20case%20for%20multilateral%20nuclear%20agr eements%20v2.pdf
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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”
The balance between the rights and obligations of the NPT parties regarding the peaceful use of atomic energy is a rather contentious issue between the developed countries possessing nuclear technologies and the developing countries seeking to acquire them. These differences come to the fore at the NPT Review conferences and pose as an important theme in the bilateral contacts. This is all due to the fact that YDULRXV µSHDFHIXO¶ QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJLHV PD\ EH XVHG IRU WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI QXFOHDU weapons. It is still a theoretically unresolved issue whether all states should enjoy equal rights to participate in international affairs regardless of the nature of their political regime, level of development of democratic institutions, foreign policy specifics, H[LVWHQFH RI µFKHFNV DQG EDODQFHV¶ V\VWHP and operational transparency of governmental institutions. This concerns membership in international organizations including the UN as well as access to sophisticated technologies leading to the creation of nuclear weapons and other kinds of WMD and modern combat missiles. In SDUWLFXODU FDVHV WKH TXHVWLRQ LV ZKHWKHU GLFWDWRUVKLS RU µURJXH¶ WHUURULVW UHJLPHV - if Iran and North Korea are to be classified as such - have a right to develop peaceful nuclear programs or biotechnologies at all. Or they should be totally ostracized in a sort of international ghetto, even if not by the whole international community then, at least, by key world powers, thus systematically driving the regime-change and followup step-by-step national recovery and democratization? This approach is vehemently debunked by hordes of left-leaning and Third-World-obsessed experts asking why, in the times of sweeping globalization, the West and U.S. in particular should be anointed as the world judge and constable. However, a new core of world democracies and economic powerhouses is evidently forming that is bound to govern the global development and must be efficiently protected against loony terrorist infringements on its security. Even communist China, currently slated to take the leading global role of economic powerhouse that Britain played in the 18th century, will inevitably become truly democratic or face internal turmoil and painful confrontation with the West. Finally, this could lead to the substitution of this democratic core group to the now DOPRVW RSHUDWLRQDOO\ GHIXQFW 81 V\VWHP EDVHG RQ WKH DQDFKURQLVWLF ³
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and consulted on major issues, it would be hard for the Kremlin to resist such an offer. Nonproliferation and the fight against global terrorism could provide a natural avenue for achieving such entente cordiale. This could be sealed by a new meaningful legallybinding US-Russian agreement on further reductions of strategic offensive weapons (say, to the ceiling of 1,000, presently loathed by military planners in both states), limited collaboration on strategic defenses starting with confidence-building, transparency and reciprocal control measures, and a general outline of the new tenets RIVWUDWHJLFVWDELOLW\EDVHGRQWKHFRQFHSWRIDFRKHUHQWGRFWULQHIRUWKH³FROODERUDWLYH non-provocative, low-level nucleDUGHIHQVH´WREHHODERUDWHG Despite the generally shared vision of a democratic and stable international community comprised of equally empowered states, our world - this is the fact of life is divided into leading and non-essential states in terms of global influence. There exist two groups of states - QXFOHDU ³KDYHV´ DQG ³KDYH-QRWV´ &XUUHQWO\ LW LV LPSRVVLEOH WR assure equal rights for all states or non-state actors. The nuclear domain is dominated by a few states - donors of technology and fissile materials -USA, Russia, France, Canada and probably Japan with China and India arguably in the offing. Other players so far have limited chances to develop their indigenous nuclear technology potentials - thus depending on the group of nuclear ³SULQFLSDOV´
Regulating nuclear transfers At the same time, if forceful counter-proliferation actions which undoubtedly antagonize the world community are to be avoided, certain additional measures could be undertaken in order to strengthen Article IV of the NPT. 24 This could also supplement the right of non-nuclear states to the greatest possible access to nonmilitary nuclear technologies, which is stated in part II of the article. The key issue of discussion could be the further increase of effectiveness of the Additional Protocol so that the transfer of nuclear technologies and materials could be carried out only by the states which subscribe and strictly comply with it and any violators would be deprived of the right to develop peaceful nuclear programs. Another point could consist of a further strengthening of the safeguards system based on improved intelligence, as paragraph III of Article III states that safeguards should not hamper international cooperation. 25 At the same time, efforts to prevent nonnuclear states from acquiring access to critical technologies would be continued through the strengthening of international system of nuclear export control. In fact, another essential point could include a further increase of effectiveness of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee by the improvement of their control lists and guidance documents with the potential harmonization of their already
24 Lawrence Scheinman, ³$UWLFOH ,9 RI WKH 137 %DFNJURXQG 3UREOHPV´ 3DSHU SUHSDUHG IRU WKH Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, June 7, 2004, http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No5.pdf 25 ³Nuclear Weapons, Energy, and Nonproliferation: Pressures on the Global Community, 41st &RQIHUHQFHRQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVRIWKH1H[W'HFDGH´6SRQVRUHGE\WKH6WDQOH\)RXQGDWLRQ-XQH-21, 2006, Enchantment Resort, Sedona, Arizona, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/UNND06.pdf
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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”
overlapping structures, and formally fixing their status as the international nuclear exports control system under the IAEA aegis.26 As to the efforts aimed at strengthening the international nonproliferation controls in the technological sphere, the Russian initiative concerning the development of proliferation-resistant nuclear cycle technologies proposed at the Millennium summit in 2000 should be noted. The first phase of the international project implementing the idea that was similar to the Russian initiative has already been completed under the IAEA auspices within the INPRO project (Task Force for Innovative Nuclear Reactor and Fuel Cycle). Apparently, cooperation this and similar projects (primarily, the program ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO )RUXP ± )RXUWK *HQHUDWLRQ´ DOORZV IRU WKH HODERUDWLRQ RI D FRPPRQ vision of the future development of atomic energy. In June 2004, Russia joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at the detection, prevention and suppression of illegal transactions and cross-boundary WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ WKH ³EODFN PDUNHW´ RI :0'-related materials and means of delivery using coercive inspections of sea, air and land transport and communications. Moscow views the PSI as a potentially useful mechanism of WMD counterproliferation consistent with the UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Russian naval forces participate in the MediterUDQHDQ LQ VXFK PDQHXYHUV DV ³$FWLYH (QGHDYRXU´ Nevertheless, this general concept of forceful interception of suspicious cargoes has many critics within Moscow government circles.
Disarmament obligations In contrast to the now outdated Article V on peaceful nuclear explosions (the USSR planned to use them for fire extinguishing), Article VI of the NPT is of fundamental importance for the whole structure of the Treaty today. Some of the formulation of the Article sounds nostalgically naïve as, for example, the requirement to carry on QHJRWLDWLRQV ³RQ D WUHDW\ RQ general and complete disarmament under strict and HIIHFWLYH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQWURO´ 5XVVLDQ GLSORPDF\ SOD\V RXW WKLV $UWLFOH YHU\ skillfully underlining the fact that as opposed to the USA de facto obstruction, Moscow adheres to its commitment to observe the obligations undertaken in the nuclear disarmament sphere. 1HYHUWKHOHVV$UWLFOH9,LVFRPSOLHGZLWKRQO\FXUVRULO\ ZKLOHQXFOHDUZHDSRQV¶ reductions of the major nuclear powers have almost no relation to the NPT obligations. 7KXV WKH ³ 6WHSV´ DFWLRQ SODQ DGRSWHG E\ WKH 137 5HYLHZ &RQIHUHQFH LV widely ignored by the leading NWSs as an idealistic overly-demanding agenda imposed on them by the developing countries. Nuclear weapons and nuclear strikes planning are becoming more prominent in nuclear doctrines or military training of leading nuclear weapon states, as a tool to FRXQWHURUGLVVXDGH:0'SUROLIHUDWLRQRULWVXVHE\WKH³URJXHV´RUWHUURULVWHQWLWLHV At the same time, despite the criticism and concern on behalf of the developing countries or zealous Nonalignment movement members, the nuclear disarmament process is evolving successfully in general, as far as it is possible in the modern world. Besides, this article as it is does not demand immediate disarmament ± it only relies on the obligation to conduct negotiations that approximates the set goal bona fide. 26 Russian Federation and the Situation in the Sphere of Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Their Delivery: Threats, Evaluations< Tasks and Ways of Solution, National report, http://www.government.ru/government/presscenter/new/2290e5589d7648a98063e532d70c6995.doc
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One of the significant steps in this direction is the ratification of Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty which foresees a mutual reduction of the overall quantity of strategic nuclear warheads by up to 1,700-2,200 units by December 31, 2012 ± which is about three times less than the level established by the START-1 Treaty. The process of destroying Russian and American deactivated ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, launchers, strategic atomic submarines and heavy bombers as well as tactical nuclear weapons is continuing successfully and incrementally and in accordance with the physical amortization. Since the early 1990s, Russia and the United States have reduced their strategic nuclear forces in warheads by 50% (and are to reduce by 60% by 2012); taking into consideration tactical nuclear weapons, the reduction of nuclear arsenals has reached 80%. :DVKLQJWRQ¶V SROLF\ DLPHG DW WKH FUHHSLQJ GLVPDQWOHPHQW RI WKH QXFOHDU GLVDUPDPHQWWUHDWLHV¶V\VWHPZDVVKDUSO\FULWLFL]HGE\PRVW81PHPEHUVSDUWLFXODUO\ E\WKHVWDWHVWKDWDUHSDUWLHVWRWKH137$VDFRQVHTXHQFHRI3UHVLGHQW%XVK¶VSROLFLHV such documents as the ABM Treaty, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, START-2, the framework agreement on START-3, the agreement delineating the strategic and tactical ABM systems, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and other agreements have been buried. It is still unclear whether the US administration would actually extend the duration of START-1 which expires in 2009. On the other hand, Russian potential withdrawal from the INF and actual walk-out IURP WKH &)( 7UHDW\ ZRXOG SUREDEO\ XQGHUPLQH 0RVFRZ¶V DXWKRULW\ as a consistent proponent of arms control and suit American hardliners quite well. Moreover, this would demonstrate the adherence to the concept of eternizing nuclear deterrence what would lead to the further weakening of the NPT since such measures could be regarded as the violation of the spirit, if not the letter of nuclear powers obligations on nuclear disarmament stipulated in Article VI of the Treaty. Developing countries consider the development of new types of nuclear weapons, particularly the intention of the Bush administration to develop new types of low-yield nuclear weapons (to substitute for the tactical B-61 Mod.11 warhead) designed for the liquidation of terrorist formations and fight against groups and regimes proliferating WMD as a serious threat to the NPT viability. Russia is also reprimanded for her increasing emphasis on the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons as a deterrent of potential large-sale aggression under the pretext of OLQJHULQJ ZHDNQHVV RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V FRQYHQWLRQDO IRUFHs. The importance of nuclear weapons has been only growing recently and Russian doctrinal documents, military exercises and military building, as far as they can be assessed on the basis of open sources, are the evidence of it. Contrary to the expectations of international experts Russia does not intend to scrap tactical nuclear weapons or reduce its stockpiles in the near future ± once again referring to the NATO policies on these weapon systems. Both the United States and Russia continue working out new systems of nuclear weapons. Russia keeps on testing new strategic offensive arms systems elaborated as an asymmetric response to the USA ABM plans. All these facts reveal that the difference between nuclear and non-nuclear states will remain ± like the differences between the rich and poor, technologically developed and developing countries. Even the next wide±ranging agreement between Russia and WKH86RQIXUWKHUVWUDWHJLFZHDSRQV¶FXWVDQGFORVHUFRRSHUDWLRQRQVWUDWHJLFVWDELOLW\ issues might not allHYLDWHWKLVGLVFRQWHQWRIWKH³JOREDOSHULSKHU\´UHJDUGLQJWKHDFWXDO disarmament-oriented reticence of the leading nuclear nations.
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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”
Steps outside the NPT So far, the threat of dumping other key arms control agreements as a result of nuclear powers politics has not been eliminated. For example, further strengthening of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could become possible only if it is ratified by the USA thus ensuring that such problem states as India, Pakistan and Israel join the Treaty. Up until now, it has been impossible to start negotiating about the elaboration of the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) owing to the strict positions of the US and China. It is unlikely that the nuclear disarmament program agreed at the NPT review conference in 2000 would induce nuclear powers to adhere to the new disarmament measures within the action plan for the13 steps in the foreseeable future. The creation of nuclear free zones envisaged in Article VII of the NPT provides an effective measure (including the purely psychological effect) of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It leads to the strengthening of regional and international security and the increase of mutual confidence. At the same time, after nuclear free zones had been established in Latin America (the Tlatelolko Agreement), South Pacific Ocean (the Rarotonga Agreement), Southeast Asia (the Bangkok Agreement) and in Africa (the Pelindaba Agreement) there is no progress in creating them in other regions of the world, such as the Middle East. Apparently, only the fact that the elaboration of the agreement on the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Central Asia has reached final phase can be regarded as a certain success in this direction. Russia had managed to set in Article 12 of this agreement the right to the transportation of nuclear weapons through the zone in case of threat to the security of the country or its allies as well as the invocation of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty signed by the CIS countries. Therefore three nuclear powers abstained from signing the Agreement. Russia also supports the endeavors of non-nuclear states parties to the NPT to receive legally obliging security guarantees that the nuclear powers would not use nuclear weapons against them and had already provided such guarantees to more than 100 states which joined the corresponding agreements on nuclear free zones. However, these guarantees are not in place so far and, as it is a question of national security of the states, they require mandatory anchoring in the international law including the binding resolutions of the UN Security Council. It is not even clear how much importance all WKHVH VDIHJXDUGV¶ GHFODUDWLRQV KDYH LQ WKH OLJKW RI QXFOHDU SROLFLHV RI WKH OHDGLQJ powers including RussLDLQSDUWLFXODUWKHLUUHDGLQHVVWRGHOLYHU³FRXQWHUWHUURULVW´SUHemptive strikes and launch force operations against the WMD threat which is rather a warning to certain developing countries not to follow the example of such problem states like North Korea. Though, according to Russia, the elaboration of international DJUHHPHQW RQ ³QHJDWLYH´ VHFXULW\ JXDUDQWHHV SUREDEO\ ZLWKLQ WKH IUDPHZRUN RI WKH Conference on Disarmament) had become impending long ago. However, such an agreement should also include the clauses concerning the cases in which nuclear weapons can be used in response to the large-scale aggression and must be applied only to those countries which strictly observe the WMD non-proliferation obligations.
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Withdrawal clause Article X of the NPT, which determines the conditions of withdrawal from the Treaty, acquires new relevance under modern conditions.27 It is obvious that member states should not apply this right selectively. Those states which break Article IV and intend to use nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes should be deprived of such a right. From the other side, those states which withdraw from the Treaty arbitrarily without holding any consultations should be deprived of the rights within Article IV and any cooperation with them at least in the nuclear sphere, if not in general, should be ceased with the possible dismantling of their already created facilities. At the present moment, the NPT does not provide any legal mechanism to regulate actions towards the states which arbitrarily decided to withdraw from the Treaty as was the case with North Korea. On the whole, the question of sanctions against states violating the NPT remains the most difficult problem of Treaty enforcement. Some of the experts propose to complicate the withdrawal procedures from the NPT thus impeding problem states like North Korea from freely walking away from the Treaty. Supposedly, the state should prove the feasibility of threat to its national interests and start intensive inspections within the IAEA framework in order to detect possible earlier violations. It is also proposed to prohibit the state withdrawing from the Treaty to use the materials, technologies and industrial capabilities it had received within the NPT and to leave them under the IAEA control. The UN Security Council is supposed to ensure compliance with these conditions and could impose sanctions including use of force against the state in case it refuses to allow IAEA inspections. All these proposals are very interesting and innovative. However, the experience of the political struggle around the Iranian nuclear program demonstrates that they can only become feasible if the international relations acquire new dimensions that the disarmament experts and leftist politicians so strive for. It is obvious that the implementation of these proposals requires unity both within the UN Security Council as well as between the developing and the developed countries within international organizations which is, deplorably, mostly impossible today. In this respect, the incremental steps based on the decisions in every single case seem more realistic. 0HDQZKLOHWKHUHDUHVWLOOSOHQW\RIUHDVRQVIRURSWLPLVP1RQHZ³URJXHV´KDYH HPHUJHGDIWHUWKH,UDQLDQRU1RUWK.RUHDQEUHDNRXWV´'RPLQR-theor\´SUHGLFWLRQVRI rolling weaponization in problem regions (with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, and many others getting nuclear weapons potentials) EHFDPHKLJKO\LPSUREDEOH$QGWKH³PRUHLVEHWWHU´FRQFHSWLQ QXFOHDUSUoliferation studies advocating the merits of the unbridled spread of regional nuclear-weapons states that had been promoted by some theorists in the early 1980s today stands out as an absurdly incorrect vision. 3UHVHQWO\ WKH 137 PHPEHUV DUH DOPRVW µIL[HG¶ ZLWKLQ WKH 7UHDW\ FRQILQHV DQG would hardly venture to withdraw from the Treaty without consequences. That is why no amendment or strengthening of the NPT Article X provisions on walkout rights of its members is necessary today. At the same time, the potential of the most daring ideas which can be implemented LQWKHQHZ³JROGHQDJH´VKRXOGEHXQGRXEWHGO\DFFXPXODWHG Today, it is almost impossible to take any measures against countries obviously violating the NPT (like Iran or the DPRK) because of the contradictory interests and practical absence of consensus in the UN Security Council and the IAEA Governing 27
George Bunn and John Rhinelander ³7KH 5LJKW WR :LWKGUDZ IURP WKH 137 $UWLFOH ; LV 1RW 8QFRQGLWLRQDO´Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 79, April/May 2005
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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”
Board ± which significantly undermines the efficiency of the Treaty. It is essential to create a clear mechanism assuring that the IAEA has all the required competences to investigate violations of the NPT and immediately transfer the results of the inspections to the UN Security Council in order to take the appropriate actions provided in the UN &KDUWHU DQG &RXQFLO¶V UHVROXWLRQV 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ LW is a utopia as of yet, with the position of Russia being one of the reasons for it. Perhaps it would be advisable to hold an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the states which are party to the NPT to examine the withdrawal notification; however it is doubtful that any serious measures against the violators could be taken at such conference.
Looking for a breakthrough 7KH³LQFDQWDWLRQV´PDGHE\5XVVLDQH[SHUWVWKDWWKH7UHDW\LV³EHWWHUDOLYHWKDQGHDG´ can hardly solve the problem of the NPT efficiency. Up until now, Russia has not proposed any clear or feasible ideas of strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The adaptation of the Treaty to the new post-Cold War world and the reality after the 9/11 terrorist attacks require the amendments in Article VIII or something radically new as the extension of the NPT scope. Thus, the provisions of the safeguards Additional Protocol can become part of the NPT. At the same time it is clear that despite the legalistic plans of developing states or the pacifist ideas of developed countries proposed at international conferences, it is very hard to expect any serious progress in strengthening the NPT viability at international forums. In spite of the positive efforts of Russia and other nuclear powers in the nonproliferation and arms control sphere, there has been no visible breakthrough since 2000. The NPT Review Conference in 2005 thus turned out a complete failure. 28 Most probably, further nonproliferation efforts ± as well as the peacekeeping RSHUDWLRQV DQG KXPDQLWDULDQ LQWHUYHQWLRQV LQ WKH VLWXDWLRQ RI ³SDUDO\VLV´ RI WKH 81 Security Council ± would be focused on regional factors, particularly the activities of NATO and European Union and other regional organizations. In a sense, it can be observed already in the debate round the six-party talks on the non-nuclear status of 1RUWK.RUHDRUWKHGLSORPDWLFDFWLYLWLHVRIWKH³(8WURLND´LQFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK5XVVLD concerning the Iranian nuclear program. On the whole, radical reconfiguration of the NPT when all the nuclear energy services would be rendered through the above-mentioned system of global and regional consortiums on the international basis should not be discarded. Somehow, the latest developments round the DPRK nuclear program and the considered options of solving the Iranian nuclear problem shape the further evolution of the NPT after the end of the Cold War and the exposed failure of the multilateral diplomacy within its legalistic framework. Various options including counter-proliferation measures based on the ad hoc principle seem also possible. In general, the ways of improving the NPT can be grouped in several categories: strengthening the IAEA and safeguards system; implementing conscious exports 28
See three DUWLFOHV E\ 5HEHFFD -RKQVRQ ³Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed´ Disarmament Diplomacy,VVXH1R$XWXPQ³Looking Towards 2010: What does the Nonproliferation Regime Need?´, Disarmament Diplomacy 1R6SULQJDQG³Back from the Brink? The 2007 NPT PrepCom Report´ Disarmament Diplomacy No. 85, Summer 2007
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control policies; creating consortiums and concluding regional agreements; developing active counter-proliferation policies; further armaments reduction and preventing a new arms race. Notwithstanding the evident deficiencies the NPT remains an important element of international law and a measuring scale, in a sense, which allows for the determination of the degree of danger posed by nuclear programs of certain states and the organization of activities of the IAEA and other international institutions in the nuclear sphere. This scale only needs to be clearly calibrated ± ZLWKRXW WKH XVXDO ³SROLWLFDO FRUUHFWQHVV´RIWKH&ROG:DUSHULRG± in order to define the parameters of violation of the nonproliferation norms inevitably entailing international sanctions. All this presupposes the close cooperation or at least the accord between the leading powers of the world. The status and direction of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century would depend on how actively Russian leadership would be involved in the various global nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the nuclear and other WMD-related sphere.
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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-58
NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision Michael RŰHLE1 Abstract. NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit in 2009 is likely to launch the elaboration of a new Strategic Concept, to replace the 1999 document. The new Concept will have to reflect NATO’s more operational nature and its more global orientation. It may also feature new language on nuclear matters, reflecting both the new proliferation landscape and renewed arms control concerns. Despite fundamental changes in these areas, and subsequent modifications of the nuclear doctrines and postures of the US, Britain and France, the statements on NATO’s nuclear aspects are likely to remain conservative, with an emphasis on nuclear sharing and the maintenance of a small number of European-based tactical nuclear weapons.
Introduction: preparing for a new strategic concept In 2009, the year of NATO’s 60th anniversary, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance are likely to task the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to draft a new Strategic Concept. Replacing the 1999 document, this new Strategic Concept would probably be published at the subsequent Summit, possibly in 2010. The new Strategic Concept will have to cover a lot of ground. In describing the new strategic environment, this document will have to put a much stronger emphasis on post-“9/11” developments: international terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and failed states. In addition, one can expect the document to say something about NATO’s potential role in cyber defence and energy security. In setting out the basic approaches to NATO’s missions and operations, the new document will also have to reflect the fact that, compared to the 1999 Strategic Concept, the range of NATO’s engagements has broadened further. It now includes combat in Afghanistan, peacekeeping in the Balkans, anti-terrorist naval operations in the Mediterranean, providing support for the African Union, training Iraqi security forces, and providing humanitarian relief after natural disasters. Moreover, NATO’s partnership policies, which featured prominently in the 1999 Concept, have also broadened significantly since then; they meanwhile include several Gulf States as well as new ties with countries from the Asia-Pacific region. In line with the need for a more comprehensive approach to crisis management, NATO’s links with other international institutions, notably the European Union and the United Nations, will have to be defined. And, last but not least, the new Strategic Concept will need to give specific guidance on the direction of NATO’s military transformation.
1
Head, Speechwriting and Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Planning Unit, NATO. Personal views only.
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The nuclear conundrum It is widely assumed that a new NATO Strategic Concept will also feature new language on the role of nuclear weapons. In the 1999 Concept, the approach to this issue was conservative: the document took note of the positive changes after end of the Cold War, and stressed that they had paved the way for huge cuts in NATO’s European-based nuclear forces. It also noted that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated were now “extremely remote.” 2 With respect to the rationale for NATO’s nuclear forces, however, the language was largely the same as that of the previous Strategic Concept from 1991. The conservatism of the 1999 Concept was not without reason. After all, statements on nuclear matters, very much like everything else in NATO, must be approved by all Allies (France constituting an exception in certain cases). Conservatism is thus an inherent feature, all the more so in areas that do not appear to require radical and/or imminent changes. Another factor that naturally tilts the balance in favour of conservatism is the multi-purpose nature of any NATO Strategic Concept: it not only seeks to explain NATO to a wider public, both inside and outside the NATO nations; it also provides strategic guidance for NATO’s military authorities (who then work out more detailed follow-on documents); and, above all, it serves to provide a snapshot of an intra-Alliance consensus on the key elements of NATO’s agenda. In other words, a Strategic Concept is as much about internal “housekeeping” as it is about public diplomacy. Thus, while public diplomacy requirements may suggest bold, far-reaching policy statements, the need for political consensus within an Alliance of sovereign nations will eventually compel the Allies to settle for the lowest common denominator. This is all the more true for sensitive nuclear matters. Still, the drafters of the next Strategic Concept might not get away quite so easily. The changes in the strategic environment since the publication of the 1999 Concept may prove to be too fundamental to allow for a simple cut-and-paste job. In 1999, when NATO was still a “Eurocentric” organisation, its nuclear pronouncements were justifiably influenced by an improving security situation in Europe. Today, however, such a focus would appear far too limited. With NATO acting outside of its traditional European perimeter, with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related technologies constituting a “second nuclear age”, and with the non-proliferation regime under threat from various directions, a mere repetition of the 1999 language on nuclear issues would fall short of current requirements. Worse, as the new Strategic Concept is likely to feature much new, forward-leaning language on many other parts of NATO’s agenda, a conservative approach would make the nuclear part of the new Concept stand out as “retro”, thereby inviting interpretations that the Allies were shying away from revisiting this part of their defence policy.
What Has Changed? Several issues stand out. The first is a further improvement of the security situation in Europe, which has lead to a further disentanglement of NATO’s nuclear weapons from 2
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. of 23rd and 24th April 1999, para.64, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/p99-065e.htm (accessed on 6 December 2007).
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the conventional sphere. The absence of Cold War antagonisms and the overall military situation in Europe with respect to conventional forces make the logic of resorting to nuclear weapons to compensate for weaknesses in NATO’s conventional posture a rather hypothetical issue. Current disagreements between NATO Allies and Russia of the future of the CFE Treaty or on missile defence are not likely to change this positive picture. The second development is the proliferation of WMD and related technologies. Essentially a by-product of globalisation, this trend had been visible throughout the 1990s, yet it became a major international issue only in the late 1990s. Key events include the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998; North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes and its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003; and the revelation of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which now threaten a nuclear domino effect in the Middle East. Moreover, the A. Q. Kahn nuclear supply network indicated that proliferation may exceedingly happen outside the classical NPT/interstate regime. Finally, the difficulties of establishing a strong sanctions regime against Iran and the US-India nuclear deal indicate that other considerations, such as economic and geopolitical interests, may ultimately override non-proliferation concerns.3 These developments have lead to the third factor of change: the crisis of nonproliferation and arms control. The non-proliferation optimism of the early 1990s has meanwhile been replaced by a deepening schism between the NWS and some NNWS. Differences between the NWS and many NNWS on whether to put the emphasis on compliance or disarmament (Art VI) have been exacerbated in the recent past. This has led to increased pressure on the NWS, notably from the NGO community, to rejuvenate the non-proliferation regime by undertaking major disarmament steps. As the new NATO Strategic Concept may be published in 2010, the year of the next NPT Review Conference, its language on nuclear matters, particularly on arms control, will be the subject of much public scrutiny. Finally, one might also add a more general recognition of the limits of nuclear deterrence. “9/11” and the rise of Al Qaida have re-focussed international attention away from classical scenarios of interstate conflict and towards non-state actors bent on inflicting mass casualties. Once religious fundamentalism is factored into the nuclear equation (witness the debate about a “Talibanisation” of Pakistan), the chances of erecting a stable, long-term mutual deterrence regime in a multinuclear world appear slim indeed. These doubts about the reliability of deterrence in new scenarios have also contributed to the return of missile defence, notably in the United States.
Reactions: Changes in US, British and French Nuclear Doctrines How would these changes in the security environment since the end of Cold War influence the language on NATO’s nuclear forces in a new Strategic Concept? Recent changes in the nuclear policies of the three Nuclear Weapons States in NATO – the US, the UK and France – might provide one part of the answer.4
3 See Michael Ru hle, Order and Disorder in the Second Nuclear Age, Internationale Politik (Transatlantic Edition), vol.7, no.4, 2006, pp.18-24. 4 See David S. Yost, New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France and the United States, International Affairs (Chatham House), vol.81, no.1, 2005, pp.83-114.
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Clearly, the arsenals and policies of these three nations differ substantially, reflecting the considerable differences in size, geography, culture, and self-perception, as well as different levels of political-strategic ambition of these countries. The US arsenal, in particular, stands out in many ways: its size trumps those of the two European Allies; its missions – notably to provide extended deterrence for NATO and other US allies – are far more ambitious; and the public debate about US nuclear strategy is far more lively, provocative and intellectually challenging than the debates on the UK and French deterrents, which are conducted within a much smaller strategic community. The US debate is also far more explicit, both in naming potential threats as well as in discussing specific employment options. Notwithstanding these differences, however, all three nations have affected changes in their nuclear policies that appear to follow roughly similar patterns. With a view to NATO’s future Strategic Concept, three elements of change are particularly noteworthy. First, a further reduction of the centrality of nuclear weapons for national security. This is most obvious in the case of the United States. International criticism of the Nuclear Posture Review (and the project of a new warhead for underground targets) has been vocal, yet it has obscured the fact that the trend towards a lesser reliance on nuclear weapons has not changed, let alone been reversed. The UK and France, given the smaller size of their arsenals, have far less leeway in this regard, as they have always stressed the eminently political function of their nuclear weapons. Yet both London and Paris have also stressed that the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons remains remote. Second, the need to make nuclear arsenals more flexible. This trend is as much a reflection of opportunities created by advancing technology as of strategic necessity. While critics have traditionally charged the development of high accuracy/low yield nuclear weapons as a dangerous desire to “conventionalise” nuclear war, the trend towards more selective employment options is fully in line with a view of nuclear weapons as predominantly political tools of war termination rather than “normal” warfighting instruments. Reducing self-deterrence and limiting damage in case deterrence fails are two more factors that make nuclear flexibility a value per se. Third, and perhaps most importantly, a more explicit link between nuclear deterrence and new and emerging threats: the use of biological and chemical weapons by an adversary, and, most recently, the deterrence of (or reprisals against) states that sponsor terrorism. These threats of nuclear retaliation against an attack with other weapons of mass destruction do not constitute a radical departure from past policy. The United States, for example, articulated threats of nuclear retaliation in response to chemical (and conventional) attacks during the Cold War in the NATO-Warsaw Pact context. By the same token, the UK and France (and Russia) have also long maintained that their nuclear arsenals were also intended to deter WMD other than nuclear. In recent years, however, Washington, London and Paris have been more explicit about the need to deter not just nuclear weapons, but also other WMD. The role of nuclear deterrence in the context of terrorism is largely a result of “9/11” and its aftermath. While there is widespread agreement that suicidal terrorist non-state actors cannot be deterred by threatening nuclear retaliation, states that sponsor them may well remain susceptible to nuclear threats. Hence, all three NATO NWS seem to agree that there is a role for nuclear deterrence. As then British Prime Minister Tony Blair put it in December 2006, “[i]t is true that our deterrent would not deter or prevent terrorists. But it is bound to have an impact on governments that might
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sponsor them.”5 For all these reasons, some analysts maintain that the policies of all three NATO NWS are, in fact, much more similar than the general discussion might suggest.6 Would these three elements – reduced reliance on nuclear weapons; more flexibility of remaining weapons; and a more explicit definition of the role of deterrence against other WMD and states sponsoring terrorism – find their way into a new NATO Strategic Concept? At first glance, it would seem logical to assume that a new document would indeed somehow have to amalgamate these developments. However, NATO’s nuclear doctrine cannot simply be derived by analysing the nuclear policies of the three NWS. After all, the large majority of NATO is made up of nations that have foresworn a nuclear status by signing the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). This fact will significantly influence the language of the future NATO Strategic Concept, regardless of doctrinal innovations in the US, the UK or France. It will also ensure that considerations of doctrine will be influenced by factors other than the question of what constitutes effective deterrence. At least since the London Declaration of July 1990, when NATO introduced the “last resort” formula as a political signal to the Soviet Union (to allow for a united Germany in NATO), NATO’s nuclear pronouncements must be seen as major political statements, where general political principles may ultimately be more important than explanations of specific military postures.
Some Enduring Principles Taking into account the changes in the international security environment, the adjustments in US, British and French nuclear policies, and the compromise nature of any Alliance document, this author would suggest that a new NATO Strategic Concept might contain the following elements: First, more explicit references to an emerging strategic environment characterised by the proliferation of WMD and delivery means. Since the 1999 Strategic Concept already covers a lot of ground, highlighting proliferation dangers and even non-state actors, this should not be too difficult to agree on. Moreover, the 2006 “Comprehensive Political Guidance” also contains strong wording to this effect. 7 It will be interesting to see, however, whether NATO Allies will also agree on more explicit language regarding the implications of this environment for their own nuclear deterrent posture – for example, whether nuclear weapons are given a specific role in deterring other kinds of WMD. Second, an endorsement of European-based US nuclear systems. The logic of maintaining a small number of highly secure US theatre nuclear weapons (TNW) in
5
Tony Blair, Parliamentary Statement on Trident, 4 December 2006, http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page10532.asp (accessed on 6 December 2007); see also The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of her Majesty, Cm 6994 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, December 2006), p.19, par.3-11. 6 See Bruno Tertrais, “A Comparison between US, UK and French Nuclear Policies and Doctrines,” Centred’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Cntre National De La Recherche Scientifique, March 2007, http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/mars07/art_btpdf (accessed on 6 December 2007). 7 Comprehensive Political Guidance, endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006, http://nato.int/docu/basictxt/bo61129e.htm (accessed on 6 December 2007).
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several European NATO countries is likely to prevail. Ritualistic claims by the NGO community that this particular aspect of NATO’s sharing arrangements circumvents the NPT and thus should be abandoned, or that these systems no longer serve any militaryoperational purpose, will not prove convincing enough to effect major changes. To be sure, current fears about a further deterioration of the NPT regime may make such claims appear timely, and some NATO governments and parliamentarians may well be sympathetic to such views. However, the principle of Allied risk sharing (a principle that is currently under severe strain in Afghanistan) and not least the low number of remaining systems will ultimately trump arms control arguments – all the more so as the latter appear rather specious. If the past is any guide, no change of NATO’s nuclear doctrine or posture will enamour the arms control community, nor is a withdrawal of NATO sub-strategic nuclear forces likely to put pressure on Russia to do engage in TNW arms control. On the contrary, Russia is likely to argue that it has long completed the return of its TNW to its own territory and that, hence, the onus is on the US and NATO to do the same. Third, an endorsement of nuclear sharing arrangements. Nuclear sharing, as institutionalised in the Nuclear Planning Group and other bodies, enables non-nuclear Alliance members to have an active role in shaping the evolution of strategic policy. It allows for consultation and coordination in an unparalleled way and thus constitutes an important aspect of the very notion of “alliance”. Moreover, the non-proliferation aspects of US extended deterrence – conveniently ignored by the NGO community – may well be “rediscovered” once a nuclear armed Iran will lead to heightened fears of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.8 If such a “domino effect” were to occur, Europe, and notably Turkey, would be faced with a neighbourhood in which any conventional skirmish would carry the risk of nuclear escalation. The answer to the question of how to safeguard security in view of such a nuclearised neighbourhood without recourse to a national nuclear option might well be a reconfirmation of the US “nuclear umbrella”. In sum, despite arguments that US extended deterrence does not require Europeanbased nuclear systems, that the British and French nuclear deterrents would be sufficient, or that NATO should provide a major impulse for the rejuvenation of nuclear arms control, a new Strategic Concept is likely to reemphasise the sharing principle. For some observers, the above elements may confirm the risk that was mentioned at the outset of this paper, namely that the nuclear language of a new Strategic Concept would be overly conservative. However, in this author’s view, the basic principles of NATO’s nuclear doctrine are eminently sound and require very little change. What a new NATO Strategic Concept should primarily aim for is to provide a more cogent rationale for nuclear deterrence and risk-sharing in the 21st century. The Allies should resist the temptation of “balancing” strategy and arms control elements in the faint hope that this would make it acceptable to a broader audience. Instead, the language should be firm and unapologetic. Allies should make it clear that nuclear deterrence, as understood and implemented within the NATO framework, remains an intelligent way of dealing with the realities of the second nuclear age. 8 The “intangibles” of NATO’s sharing mechanisms also deserve mentioning even though they would probably never feature explicitly in a NATO document. A credible nuclear protection provided by the United States also serves to equalize the military-political status of individual Alliance members and thus facilitates political integration. In this author’s view, at least, the principles of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence help to play down the differences between European Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States, thus preventing weapons from becoming purely a means of national power and prestige.
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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-64
British Nuclear Strategy1 Jeremy STOCKER2
Abstract. In 2007 the British Government announced that the UK strategic nuclear deterrent is to be maintained until the 2050s, by which time Britain will have been a nuclear weapons state for almost a century. During the Cold War Britain need to deter the Soviet Union, but the UK's relationship with the United States was at least as important in determining the country's nuclear stance. Today the Soviet threat has been replaced by a less threatening but more uncertain strategic environment. Nuclear ties with the US remain as important as ever, and enable the UK to remain a nuclear power at modest cost.
The last three years have seen the re-emergence of an active public debate about nuclear weapons in Britain. The catalyst for this debate and subsequent Government policy was the need to decide on the renewal of the British nuclear deterrent capability over the next 20 years. As a result of decisions announced earlier this year, the UK will remain a small nuclear weapons state, a status enjoyed by the country for over half a century and now set to continue for another half-century. Britain was the first country to seriously investigate the use of atomic energy for military purposes, as early as 1940. Its efforts were soon subsumed into the much larger Anglo-$PHULFDQµ0DQKDWWDQ¶SURMHFWZKLFKOHGWRWKHERPEVGURSSHGRQ-DSDQ in 1945. After the abrupt termination of Anglo-American atomic cooperation the following year, the UK chose to pursue its own national programme. The first British GHYLFH ZDV GHWRQDWHG LQ 2FWREHU DQG %ULWDLQ WKHUHE\ EHFDPH WKH ZRUOG¶V WKLUG nuclear weapons state. 7KURXJKRXW WKH &ROG :DU \HDUV %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU FDSDELOLW\ SHUIRUPHG D WULSOH SXUSRVH,WSURYLGHGWKHµXOWLPDWHJXDUDQWHH¶RI security in the face of a much larger, hostile and nuclear-armed superpower, the Soviet Union. It gave the UK some LQIOXHQFH DQG D KDELW RI FRRSHUDWLRQ ZLWK WKH UHDO µXOWLPDWH JXDUDQWHH¶ WKH 8QLWHG States. And nuclear weapons preserved some element of %ULWDLQ¶VIRUPHU*UHDW3RZHU status, a means of levelling the otherwise enormous and growing disparity in conventional military capability as compared to the two superpowers. One can argue that whilst in an operational sense the British nuclear deterrent was DLPHGDWWKH6RYLHW8QLRQVWUDWHJLFDOO\LWZDVDLPHGDW:DVKLQJWRQ7KDWLV%ULWDLQ¶V modest nuclear capability was designed to influence American, at least as much as 5XVVLDQEHKDYLRXU7KRXJK%ULWDLQUHWDLQHGDµPLQLPDO¶QXFOHDUGHWHUUHQWDVDKHdge against the failure (real or perceived) of the US nuclear guarantee of Europe, its main purpose was to exercise influence over the much larger American nuclear arsenal which provided the best basis of security for the UK. 1 This paper summarizes many of the argumentVSUHVHQWHGLQWKHDXWKRU¶VUHFHQWPRQRJUDSKThe United Kingdom and Nuclear Deterrence, Adelphi Paper 386 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, February 2007) 2 Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute
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7KHHVVHQFHRI%ULWDLQ¶VQXFOear policy has been a complex mix of independence, interdependence and dependence, all expressed in relation to the United States rather than the physical target of British nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union. Once the United States itself became vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear strike, the credibility of an American willingness to use, or threaten the use of, nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe became a matter of potential uncertainty. A British ability to strike the Soviet Union independently provided an insurance against the failure of an American promise WRGRVR,WDOVRSUHVHQWHGDµVHFRQGFHQWUHRIGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ¶WRFRPSOLFDWH5XVVLDQ calculations as Moscow would need to take British, as well as American, actions into account. +RZHYHU %ULWDLQ¶V PRGHst deterrent capability could be no substitute for the US QXFOHDU µXPEUHOOD¶%ULWDLQ¶VRZQQXFOHDU IRUFH ZDVWKHUHIRUHD ZD\RI VKRZLQJWKDW WKH 8. ZDV µSXOOLQJ LWV ZHLJKW¶ DQG WKDW LWV YLHZV DQG LQWHUHVWV VKRXOG EH WDNHQ LQWR account. Once the UK had independently demonstrated a nuclear capability (its bomber-delivered atomic weapons became operational in 1956) the US had an incentive to co-ordinate its own plans with its only nuclear-armed ally, and close Anglo-American nuclear cooperation was re-established in 1958. It has endured to this day. Interdependence with the United States also implied a growing dependence, as the UK could only ever be a junior partner in this relationship. This was not just a function of relative numbers. The resumption of nuclear cooperation has enabled Britain to develop its warheads at more modest cost and, perhaps more importantly, obtain American delivery systems. %ULWDLQ¶VH[SHULHQFHVLQFHWKHHDUO\VKDVFRQVLVWHQWO\GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWIRUD small nuclear power acquisition of an adequate delivery system is at least as challenging as developing the warheads themselves. After several false starts, in 1963 the UK settled on the only delivery system which really satisfies the strategic requirements of a small, densely-populated island state ± the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Development of such a weapon was beyond British resources at the time, especially after the cancellation of British-developed land- and air-launched missiles.3 The US Administration of John F Kennedy agreed to supply the Polaris V\VWHPRQIDYRXUDEOHWHUPVDQGWKLVEHFDPHWKHEDVLVRIWKH8.¶VVWUDWHJLF deterrent in 1968. Polaris solved the problem of vulnerability to a pre-emptive strike, as to date no means of reliably detecting ballistic missile-firing submarines (SSBNs) whilst on patrol has been devised. The ballistic missile itself is much the most difficult delivery system to intercept once launched. But Polaris GLG QRW VROYH DOO %ULWDLQ¶V SUREOHPV LQ LWV asymmetric nuclear relationship with the Soviet Union. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system deployed around Moscow could not undermine the ability of US nuclear forces to devastate the Soviet Union, but it did pose a severe challenge for the much more modest (if technically sophisticated) British force. This became apparent even before Polaris entered service. The answer to this conundrum was the Chevaline Polaris Improvement Programme. Chevaline drew on some earlier American research and made extensive use of US test facilities, but was a unique British technical success. It substituted a complex system of decoys for one of Polaris¶VWKUHHZDUKHDGVDQGPHDQWWKDWHDFKRQH
3
Blue Streak and Blue Steel Mk2, respectively
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J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy
of the 16 missiles carried per submarine presented over 40 objects to the Moscow defence system, instead of just three. No other nuclear weapons state has, to date, deployed such a comprehensive system of missile defence countermeasures. Chevaline entered service in 1982, the same year that the British Government selected the Trident D5 missile as its eventual replacement. The latter entered service in the mid-1990s, purchased from the US under the same terms as the original Polaris Sales Agreement. It should be emphasised that while the UK is completely dependent upon the United States for the provision of the missiles, and benefits from some American assistance in relation to warheads and submarines, both the latter are designed and built in Britain. Most importantly, operational control of the British Trident force, including navigation and targeting, is in exclusively British hands. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union removed the single, over-ULGLQJ UDWLRQDOH IRU WKH H[LVWHQFH DQG RSHUDWLRQDO SRVWXUH RI %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU forces. Ironically, however, the Trident system, ordered during the Cold War, was just coming into service. Other than the unlikely option of complete nuclear abandonment no major decisions were required about the strategic deterrent. Several nuclear reductions were made, including the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons and the cancellation of an Anglo-French stand-off air-launched missile designed to perform µWKHDWUH¶QXFOHDUWDVNV%XWTrident itself, already largely paid for, was retained though with reduced numbers of missiles and warheads. By 1998 all other nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from service and for the first time since the 1950s Britain came to rely on a single nuclear delivery system. Subsequent reviews have resulted in further reductions so that the UK today has fewer operational warheads than at any time since the early 1960s. 7RGD\ %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH LV WKH VPDOOHVW RI WKH ILYH 1XFOHDU :HDSRQ 6WDWHV (NWS) recognised by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). British nuclear weapons account for about 1.5% of the world's total stock of nuclear warheads. Four Vanguardclass submarines entered service between 1994 and 2001. Each can carry 16 Trident D5 SLBMs though usually deploy with fewer, probably about 12. Each missile can carry up to 12 Mk.4 re-entry vehicles (RVs) with a 100-kiloton (kt) warhead, though the British Government has stated that no more than 48 warheads are carried per boat. With the withdrawal from service of Britain's other nuclear systems, Trident was reconfigured in the 1990s to include a 'sub-strategic' role in addition to its main strategic task. Officially, this was achieved by varying the number of warheads carried per missile and introducing a reduced yield for some of the warheads. Though the Government will not publicly confirm further details, it is widely believed (and not officially contradicted) that 'sub-strategic' configured missiles carry a single warhead with a reduced yield in the range of 1-10 kt. As part of the British Government's review of future nuclear policy in early 2007 the term 'sub-strategic' was quietly dropped, recognising that any use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons would be firmly Strategic with a capital 'S'. 4 Instead, flexibility in the number and yield of warheads provides more targeting options and, arguably, greater deterrence credibility in the face of 'limited' nuclear threats. Given that the newest of the Trident submarines entered service as recently as 2001, it came as a surprise to many when in 2003 the British Government announced that "...decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed [in] this Parliament [ie 4 Michael Codner "Britain's Nuclear Deterrent: Keeping the Options Open" in RUSI Newsbrief Vol.25 No.8 August 2005 p.88
J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy
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the period 2001-2005] but are likely to be required in the next one".5 By the end of 2006 initial studies were complete and the Government announced that "...we have...decided to take the steps necessary to sustain a credible deterrent capability in the 2020s and beyond...We have...decided to maintain our nuclear deterrent by building a new class of submarines".6 After a short period of public consultation, in March 2007 the House of Commons voted to support Government policy. The need to make decisions on the future of the nuclear deterrent is driven by two factors. First, the submarines have a design life of 25 years which, for a range of technical reasons, can only sensibly be extended by a further five years. The first new boat will therefore be required in service by around 2022 (the clock starts ticking when the submarines are launched, rather than when they enter operational service). Design work therefore needs to start now. Secondly, the United States is undertaking a lifeextension programme for the Trident missile, which will keep it in service into the 2040s. If the UK wants to join this programme, a commitment is required in 2007. A further decision will be required in later years as to whether a new warhead will need to be designed, in which case the UK can be expected to cooperate with the US in the development of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), which does not require explosive testing. Nuclear weapons tests are now banned by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which the UK has ratified. All of this begs the question as to why, with the Cold War a fading memory, the British Government has committed some £15-20 billion over a 15-year period for the renewal of a submarine-based nuclear deterrent. Though this sum represents less than 0.25% of overall Government expenditure, it carries a significant opportunity cost in terms of the conventional military capabilities that might otherwise be funded. Part of the explanation lies in domestic politics. The ruling Labour Party adopted an antinuclear stance in the 1980s, a position which is widely believed to be a significant factor in Labour being out of power for 18 years. Though the now-governing party still contains many anti-nuclear MPs, the Party leadership would not want to risk repeating the unilateralist experiment, preferring a commitment to eventual, multilateral nuclear disarmament. But domestic political calculations come nowhere near fully explaining current British policy. Long-term strategic considerations dictate a retention of the 'minimal' nuclear GHWHUUHQW 'XULQJ WKH &ROG :DU %ULWDLQ¶V GHWHUUHQFH UHTXLUHPHQW ZDV H[SUHVVHG LQ WHUPV RI WKH µ0RVFRZ &ULWHULRQ¶ 7KRXJK 0RVFRZ ZDV QHYHU Whe only target for British nuclear weapons, the ability to hit the Soviet capital was indicative of the scale of deterrent effect demanded. ,Q WRGD\¶V µ6HFRQG 1XFOHDU $JH¶ WKH 0RVFRZ &ULWHULRQ REYLRXVO\ QR ORQJHU applies. Nor does any other target suggest itself as a realistic substitute. Instead %ULWDLQ LV OHIW ZLWK ZKDW KDV EHHQ GHVFULEHG DV D µ7R :KRP LW 0D\ &RQFHUQ¶ requirement. The UK does not currently need to deter any defined state, but nuclear weapons remain salient and a specific threat could well re-emerge. The British Government puts it this way: ...the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently 5 6
Cm 6041-I Delivering Security in a Changing World London: TYSO, December 2003 p.9 Cm 6994 The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent London: TSO, December 2006 p.7
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represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security.7 Put another way, retention of the nuclear deterrent is a prudent hedge against an unknown and uncertain future. In particular, any decision to abandon nuclear weapons would quickly become, for all practical purposes, irrevocable. Should a future crisis or more gradual worsening of the international security scene warrant a reversal of policy and the re-creation of a nuclear weapons capability, it could never be achieved sufficiently quickly for it to be an adequate response to the changed conditions that made it necessary in the first place. This is especially so in terms of an adequate delivery system. Moreover, following a decision to abandon nuclear weapons, no British Government could take for granted a resumption of close Anglo-American cooperation. ,QWKHDEVHQFHRIDQREYLRXVQHHGWRGHWHUDKRVWLOHVXSHUSRZHU%ULWDLQ¶VQXFOHDU VWDQFHLVQRZPRUHRSDTXHRIWHQGHVFULEHGDVµVWXGLHGDPELJXLW\¶7KH*RYHUQPHQW says little about who might need to be deterred, and under what circumstances. It does say that We deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities.8 6XFFHVVLYH %ULWLVK *RYHUQPHQWV KDYH DOVR GHFOLQHG WR PDNH D µQR ILUVW XVH¶ declaration. This stems from two considerations. First, in the extreme circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons might be considered, advance declarations of this W\SHKDYHOLWWOHLIDQ\FUHGLELOLW\7KH\DUHQRWLQRQHWHOOLQJSKUDVHµORDG-EHDULQJ¶ Such was certainly true, for example, of Soviet no first use statements during the Cold War. Second, such a declaratory policy could serve to encourage non-nuclear aggression, secure in the knowledge that a nuclear response would not be forthcoming. The UK has issued a Negative Security Assurance, which states that British nuclear weapons will not be used against a non-nuclear state provided it is not in DOOLDQFH ZLWK D QXFOHDU SRZHU 7KLV H[SODLQV IRU H[DPSOH ZK\ %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU capability had no role WRSOD\LQGHWHUULQJ$UJHQWLQDLQDKHDGRIWKHODWWHU¶VLQYDVLRQRI the Falkland Islands in 1982. Whilst the UK has a distinct national policy in relation to the retention and use of nuclear weapons, it is also signed-XS WR 1$72¶V QXFOHDU GRFWULQH %ULWish nuclear IRUFHVDUHDOVRIRUPDOO\DVVLJQHGWR1$72H[FHSWµZKHUH+HU0DMHVW\¶VJRYHUQPHQW PD\GHFLGHWKDWVXSUHPHQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVDUHDWVWDNH¶2IFRXUVHWKHXVHRIQXFOHDU weapons could only be contemplated under just these circumstances so assignment of the UK deterrent to NATO may be more formal than substantive. Nonetheless, Britain DFFHSWV1$72¶VSRVLWLRQZKLFKLVWKDWµWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSXUSRVHRIWKHQXFOHDUIRUFHV of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kiQGRIZDU¶9
7
Cm 6994 p.12 Cm 6994 p.18 9 NATO 7KH$OOLDQFH¶V6WUDWHJLF&RQFHSW Washington DC: NATO, April 1999 p.20 8
J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy
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This makes it clear that, re-HPSKDVLVLQJ WKH SRLQW DERXW µVWXGLHG DPELJXLW\¶ nuclear weapon deter more than just the use of other nuclear weapons. The µIHDUVRPHQHVV¶ RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV LQGXFHV FDXWLRQ DOO URXQG DQG DFWV DV D SRZHUIXO inhibition to the onset of hostilities between nuclear-armed states. It is often said that democracies do not fight each other. The same may be true of nuclear weapon states. The British approach to nuclear deterrence has always focussed exclusively on deterrence by punishment that is, the threat of a retaliation the costs of which would vastly out-weigh any possible gains from aggression. In the nuclear age, successive British governments have been deeply sceptical about the possibilities for deterrence by defence, the ability to ward off the initial blow rather than hit back in response. Whilst Britain was worried by Soviet missile defences, it never saw active defence as having much to offer the UK. The scale of the Cold War threat and the limited resources available to counter it made only a retaliatory posture feasible. In the face of threats that are much more limited (in terms of both numbers and sophistication), defences may be able to reinforce deterrence and serve to mitigate the consequences of deterrence failure. Britain is today much more sanguine about the strategic implications of American missile defence programmes, and even participates in some of them (for example, the use of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) at Fylingdales). But resource constraints continue to dictate that the UK is reluctant to spend any of its own defence budget on active missile defence, apart from some research programmes designed, as much as anything, to assess the efficacy of US developments. MentiRQVKRXOGDOVREHPDGHRIWKH8.¶VVWDQFHRQQRQ-proliferation. Britain is active in all arms control and non-proliferation forums and has unilaterally reduced its own nuclear forces to the bare minimum consistent with a credible deterrence capability. Like the other NPT nuclear weapons states, it pays lip service to the goal of eventual and complete nuclear disarmament. It is often alleged that retention of nuclear weapons is at odds with non-proliferation efforts, even hypocritical. But the 8.LVµDOORZHG¶QXFOHDU ZHDSRQVXQGHUWKHWHUPVRIWKH137DQGPRUH LPSRUWDQWO\ non-proliferation serves to reduce the number and scale of potential threats that might need to be deterred. The UK continues to see a role for nuclear weapons in preventing war and specifically in deterring the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD. Its own forces have been reduced to a single system with modest numbers of warheads. Britain is committed to extending the life of the Trident system into the middle years of the century, a time likely to look very different to today. The British nuclear posture is a good deal less clear-cut than during the Cold War, but Britain will remain, for the foreseeable future, a nuclear weapons state.
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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-70
Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: a Russian perspective Petr ROMASHKIN1
Abstract. Nuclear doctrines of the United Kingdom and France have their own specific features, but to a great extent reflect the national consent on principal issues. But in broader terms, the three allied nuclear powers ± France, the USA and the UK ± have in fact come out with a coordinated position which reveals a break from the doctrine and rhetoric of the defensive nuclear deterrence of the Cold War period and the shift to the doctrine of pre-emptive and coercive use of nuclear weapons. The position of these three states, at the same time, determines the outlook of NATO in this sphere.
First of all, it seems appropriate to review the history of nuclear weapons development in the UK and France, in order to improve our understanding of their contemporary nuclear doctrines. After the end of the World War II, the United Kingdom aimed at the closest nuclear cooperation with the USA which had been already been foreseen in the wartime agreements. In the November 1945 Washington summit in which the USA, Great Britain and Canada considered consigning the nuclear problem to the UN, the United States and %ULWDLQ VLJQHG D VHFUHW PHPRUDQGXP RQ ³IXOO DQG HIIHFWLYH´ QXFOHDU FRRSHUDtion. However, the USA later disavowed this document and in 1946, the US Congress adopted the McMahon Act, which prohibited the release of atomic technology to other nations. In the summer of 1945, British Prime Minister C. Attlee established a topsecret FRPPLWWHH ³-HKQ-´ ZKLFK ZDV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU SODQQLQJ DQG EXLOGLQJ WKH capacities for the development of an atomic bomb. Britain had developed the plutonium bomb and successfully tested it on October 3, 1952 on the Monte-Bello Islands in the Indian Ocean, which Australia lent the UK for this purpose. The bomb was detonated on a frigate. If the USA-USSR nuclear balance of power is taken as a starting point that determined Post-Cold War international relations and laid the basis for the, more-orless, completed political division of the world, then the answer to the question about the first nuclear proliferant-state raised above could be reconsidered. In this view, the UK may be regarded as the first serious violator of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It seems that one of the main motives which induced Britain to pursue nuclear weapons was the desire to remain a great power using all the advantages of victory in World War II. British nuclear weapons as well as American ones were developed, 1
Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS
P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective
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within the NATO framework on the basis of common views on and interests in the key nuclear issues and not in compensation for any sense of vulnerability. In May 1957, the United Kingdom conducted its first hydrogen bomb test. Since 1961, the first US atomic submarines had been based in Scotland. Later on, the United States agreed to Britain conducting a series of nuclear tests on the American polygon in Nevada. The maximum quantity of UK warheads was 350 between 1975 and 1981. Currently, UK nuclear weaponry consists primarily of the American submarinelaunched ballistic missile Trident-II (D5) equipped with British Multiple Reentry 9HKLFOHV ZKLFK DUH GHSOR\HG RQ IRXU GRPHVWLFDOO\ PDQXIDFWXUHG 66%1V %ULWDLQ¶V nuclear capability is the smallest among other nuclear poZHUV¶DUVHQDOVHVWLPDWHGWREH some 185 warheads within the maritime component only whereas in the 1950s the United Kingdom possessed a whole triad of nuclear weapons. British nuclear capabilities were traditionally oriented in accordance with the US missile attack warning system. $V QRWHG DERYH %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU FDSDFLW\ FRQVLVWV RI IRXU QXFOHDU VXEPDULQHV with 12 Trident-II missiles per submarine. Thus the United Kingdom has 48 missiles with four warheads per missile. Each missile is armed with one to three warheads of 100 kiloton weight. The number of operationally available warheads is 160, with another 35 warheads in stock, bringing the total number of warheads to 185 units. All submarines have a dual subordination ±national and under the US ± and act according to the single plan. One of the four submarines is on patrol, while another two are at the base or in territorial waters and can be deployed relatively quickly. The fourth submarine is in repair. According to UK Foreign Office documents, Britain just like the USA is ready to review counter-proliferation instruments. On March 20, 2002 the Defense Minister VWDWHG WKDW ³%ULWDLQ LV UHDG\ WR XVH QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV WR SURWHFW LWV DUPHG IRUFHV IURP ZHDSRQVRIPDVVGHVWUXFWLRQ´ A 2003 British Defense White Paper stated that the nuclear deterrence potential of WKH 8. ³UHPDLQV WKH HVVHQWLDO HOHPHQW RI RXU VHFXULW\´ $FFRUGLQJ WR 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ hearings, the document also revealed plans to consider replacing the existing deterrent forces based on American Trident-II SLBMs. Although the four Vanguard class SSBNs can operate for another 20 years before their nominal retirement date, the British government must decide now if the ageing warheads are to be modernized or totally replaced. Submarines of this class could be also configured for use with nonnuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles or for special force operations. The United Kingdom is the only nuclear power which had openly assigned its 66%1VWR³VXEVWUDWHJLF PLVVLRQV´ $OWKRXJKUDWKHUOLPLWHGLQWKHVHOHFWLRQ of nuclear weapons, such missions should be powerful enough to convince an aggressor who had XQGHUHVWLPDWHGWKH%ULWDLQ¶VFDSDFLWLHVDQGDWWDFNHGLWWRVWRSDQDWWDFNDQGUHWUHDWRU encounter a destructive strategic strike. Similar to the US and Russian doctrines, the UK nuclear doctrine emphasizes the new role of deterrence or retaliation for attacks non-nuclear states employing chemical or biological weapons. 7KLV LGHD DSSHDUHG DIWHU WKH *XOI :DU LQ ZKHQ WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH ³QHZ limited nuclear war´ZDVLQWURGXFHGILUVWLQWKHIRUPRI³WKHQXFOHDUUHWDOLDWLRQIRUD non-QXFOHDU :0' DWWDFN´ DQG WKHQ XQGHU WKH VORJDQ RI ³WKH OLPLWHG XVH RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQVDJDLQVWDWHUURULVWRUWRWDOLWDULDQUHJLPHV´GUDIWQXFOHDUGRFWULQHRIWKH8QLWHG Kingdom).
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P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective
In 2002, in an Appendix to the Strategic Defense Review of 1998 the role of QXFOHDU ZHDSRQVLQGHWHUULQJ³WKHVWDWHVRIFRQFHUQDVZHOODVWHUURULVWRUJDQL]DWLRQV´ was expanded. The advocates of nuclear disarmament criticize the UK government for its position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The plan to build new facilities for the production of warheads violates Article VI of the Treaty and the ongoing active cooperation with the USA (including the intended prolongation of the Cooperation Agreement, joint research activities, participation in sub-critical tests and building the ABM system) violates Article I. The Labor Party position on the development of nuclear weapons and their possible use in substrategic missions (delivering limited strikes against non-nuclear states that are parties to the NPT) contradicts the Prime 0LQLVWHU¶V VWDWHPHQWV DERXW PRYLQJ DZD\ IURP QXFOHDU DQG RWKHU ZHDSRQV RI PDVV destruction and the implementation of practical initiatives in the nuclear disarmament sphere. Opponents oI%ULWDLQ¶VFRQWLQXHGUHOLDQFHRQQXFOHDUDUPVEHOLHYHWKDWWKURXJKRXW its 50-year history, British nuclear weaponry did not play any role in armed conflicts and the United Kingdom did not receive any advantages from possessing it. Therefore, if Britain gives up its nuclear weapons capability, its security would not decrease. They argue that London should declare that it would not develop new means of delivery after the operational life of the existing submarines expires. In 2006, the Defense Committee of the British Parliament decided to make radical changes in the UK strategic nuclear doctrine and stop the 24-hour patrolling of the nuclear submarines in international waters. The Committee also discussed the forthcoming replacement of the ageing Vanguard class submarines armed with the Trident-II ballistic missiles. The Labor government has considered various options for the modernization of nuclear strategic forces. One of the options entails the renewal of the nuclear submarine fleet. However, the costs may be as high as 25 billion pounds. According to officials, the costs may be less if the 24-KRXUDOHUWGXW\LVFDQFHOOHG³7KH&ROG:DULV RYHUDQG ZHGRQRWQHHGWRNHHSWKHVXEPDULQHVLQWKH:RUOG2FHDQDOOWKHWLPH´ ± claimed the head of the committee, J. Arbuthnot. However, the government hurried to reject this proposal. A representative of the Defense Ministry stated that 24-hour duty RIWKHQXFOHDUVXEPDULQHVLVHVVHQWLDOIRU³WKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHVWDELOLW\LQWKHJOREDO VHFXULW\«:HFDQQRWEHVXUH how other states would react if our submarines are on the DOHUWVWDWXVRQO\ZKHQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOWHQVLRQLQWHQVLILHV´KHFODLPHG The UK naval forces possess four nuclear Vanguard class submarines armed with American SLBMs Trident-II. By 2023-2024, they should be removed from service. Currently, the government is considering what the new generation maritime component of the British nuclear weaponry may look like. Moreover, while previous UK policy limited the launching of nuclear strikes only against nuclear weapon states, current policy does not rule out the possibility of nuclear attacks against non-nuclear states which possess or are suspected of possessing other weapons of mass destruction. The policy also allows for nuclear attacks against states that pose a strategic threat.
P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective
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French nuclear forces The development of British nuclear weapons did not seriously influence the global balance of power. However, after France had joined the nuclear club, the level of strategic stability decreased as the confrontation