The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific
Editor Vinod K. Aggarwal, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Vinod K. Aggarwal Min Gyo Koo Seungjoo Lee Chung-in Moon ●
●
Editors
Northeast Asia Ripe for Integration?
Prof. Vinod K. Aggarwal University of California Berkeley Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center (BASC) 802 Barrows Hall Berkeley CA 94720-1970 USA
[email protected]
Prof. Min Gyo Koo Yonsei University Dept. of Public Administration 134 Shinchon-dong, Seodaemun-gu Seoul 120-749 Korea
[email protected]
Prof. Seungjoo Lee Chung-Ang University Dept. of Political Science 221 Heukseok-dong, Dongjak-ku Seoul 156-756 Korea
[email protected]
Prof. Chung-in Moon Yonsei University Dept. of Political Science 134 Sinchon-dong, Seodaemun-gu Seoul 120-749 Korea
[email protected]
ISBN 978-3-540-79593-3
e-ISBN 978-3-540-79594-0
Library of Congress Control Number: 2008932377 © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permissions for use must always be obtained from Springer-Verlag. Violations are liable for prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Cover design: WMXDesign GmbH, Heidelberg, Germany Printed on acid-free paper 987654321 springer.com
Preface
How will Northeast Asia’s economic and security institutional architecture evolve? Predicting the future is always hazardous business, often left to seers and wizards. Yet at the same time we believe that by examining the recent history of Northeast Asia from a theoretically informed perspective, while we may not always correctly forecast the future, this exercise can still provide useful insights for policymakers and academics. To this end, this book examines how critical changes over the last twenty or so years have transformed the institutional organization of the region. Specifically, we consider the impact of what we term the “triple shocks”: the Cold War’s end, the Asian financial crisis, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We examine how the impact of these key changes has played out in the context of China’s rise, Japan’s economic problems, American neglect of Asian developments, the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent resurgence of Russia, and the changing dynamics of the two Koreas. Examination of changes in Northeast Asia’s institutional landscape is not new. Yet we believe that this book breaks fresh ground by providing a theoretical framework that facilitates the exploration of key countries’ foreign economic and security policies in a comparable manner. By examining the significant variables that influence national responses to these individual shocks, and through consideration of the impact of cumulative changes in the region in the post-triple shocks period, we believe that we can better gauge likely future institutional trends in the region. The East Asia Foundation (EAF), based in Seoul, Korea, has generously supported this book. With its financial support, we were able to hold a conference at the University of California at Berkeley, cosponsored by the Berkeley APEC Study Center (BASC), in December 2005. This opportunity to discuss first drafts of our papers, and our subsequent interactions, have greatly benefited from the support of the EAF. It has proven instrumental in allowing us to clarify our thoughts
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Preface
and assemble this volume. Aside from the academic exchange supported by this funding, this meeting also allowed us to create a network of ties among the scholars who either contributed chapters to this volume or who commented on this work. Our meeting in Berkeley was extremely fruitful as a result of the comments that the book’s contributors received from Crystal Chang, Myung-koo Kang, Jin-Young Kim, Elaine Kwei, Kenji Kushida, Hong Yung Lee, and Jehoon Park. Without their incisive criticisms and suggestions for improvement, this book would have been much the poorer. We would like to particularly single out the help we have received from Seung-Youn Oh, who not only provided logistical and organizational support for the conference, but also lent her expertise as a discussant. The work of the staff at BASC proved crucial. Three former and current project directors—Jonathan Chow, Edward Fogarty and Kristi Govella—have shepherded the transformation of rough conference papers to carefully edited and structured book chapters. They not only furnished the contributors to this book with the collated comments of the discussants, but more importantly, with their own set of comments that pushed all of us to work harder and meet their high standards. Kristi’s management of the publication process has greatly eased the editors’ workload. In this task, she has been ably supported by the work of Robert Chen, Cindy Cheng, Ross Cheriton, Nathan DeRemer, Michelle Haq, Vaishnavi Jayakumar, Andrew Kim, and Anne Meng, undergraduates who work at BASC under the auspices of the Berkeley Undergraduate Research Apprenticeship Program. We would like to thank Niels Peter Thomas of Springer Verlag for supporting the publication of this book. We also hope that this volume will be a valuable edition to the book series entitled The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific that Vinod K. Aggarwal is editing for Springer. We, of course, remain responsible for any errors or omissions. Vinod K. Aggarwal Min Gyo Koo Seungjoo Lee Chung-in Moon
Berkeley, California Seoul Korea Seoul Korea Seoul Korea
Contents
Preface ...............................................................................................v Contributors.................................................................................... xi Abbreviations................................................................................ xiii 1 Economic and Security Institution Building in Northeast Asia: An Analytical Overview ....................................................1 VINOD K. AGGARWAL AND MIN GYO KOO 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................1 1.2 Northeast Asia’s Changing Institutional Map........................3 1.3 An Institutional Bargaining Game Approach and the Evolution of Northeast Asian Regionalism...............9 1.4 Overview of the Book ..........................................................27 1.5 Conclusion............................................................................30 2 South Korea’s Regional Economic Cooperation Policy: The Evolution of an Adaptive Strategy.......................37 SEUNGJOO LEE AND CHUNG-IN MOON 2.1 Introduction ..........................................................................37 2.2 Gains from Bilateral Security Alliance and Multilateral Trade Policy: Re-examining Cold War Legacies.................39 2.3 The Emergence of South Korea’s Regional Policy in the Early Post-Cold War Period: Achievements and Limitations.....................................................................40 2.4 The Asian Financial Crisis and Changes in South Korea’s Regional Policy ....................................................................43 2.5 The Roh Moo-hyun Government’s New Regional Policy...48 2.6 Conclusion............................................................................57
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3 Rhetoric or Vision? Chinese Responses to U.S. Unilateralism................................................................. 63 KUN-CHIN LIN 3.1 Introduction ......................................................................... 63 3.2 The PRC’s Position in the Cold War Institutional Equilibrium:1978-1989 ....................................................... 68 3.3 Negotiating New Regional Arrangements in the Post-Cold War Era: Sharpening the Survival Instinct of the Leninist Party-State................................................... 70 3.4 After the Financial Crisis: First Opportunities for Chinese Leadership of Asian Regionalism ....................................... 78 3.5 After 9/11: Broadening China’s Strategic Leeway ............. 83 3.6 Winding Roads Ahead: Scenarios for China’s Grand Strategy ............................................................................... 96 4 Under Pressure: Japan’s Institutional Response to Regional Uncertainty ......................................................... 109 SAORI N. KATADA AND MIREYA SOLIS 4.1 Introduction ....................................................................... 109 4.2 Economic Shocks and the Persistence of Security Constraints......................................................................... 110 4.3 Japan and the New Regional Trade Architecture.............. 118 4.4 Japan and the New Regional Financial Architecture ........ 130 4.5 Conclusion......................................................................... 140 5 North Korea’s Strategy for Regime Survival and East Asian Regionalism .................................................. 149 SANG-YOUNG RHYU 5.1 Introduction ....................................................................... 149 5.2 North Korea’s Development in the Cold War Equilibrium ....................................................................... 150 5.3 Early Attempts at Integration after the End of the Cold War................................................................. 151 5.4 Aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis................... 155 5.5 Post-9/11 North Korean Regionalism: The Gaesong Special Economic Zone and the Six-Party Talks .............. 157
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5.6 Security and Trade: Reluctant Coexistence Under a Fragile Equilibrium .........................................................166 5.7 North Korea and East Asian Regionalism .........................174 6 Impassive to Imperial? Russia in Northeast Asia from Yeltsin to Putin ...............................................................179 TAEHWAN KIM 6.1 Introduction ........................................................................179 6.2 The International Domestic Nexus: An Analytical Framework .........................................................................180 6.3 Post-Cold War: Neofeudal Governance and External Drift ....................................................................................183 6.4 Post-Financial Crisis: Breaking Up the Neofeudal Coalition.............................................................................191 6.5 Post-9/11: The Neoabsolutist Coalition and Russian Neomercantilism in Northeast Asia ...................................196 6.6 Scenario Analysis...............................................................206 6.7 Conclusion..........................................................................208 7 Security in Northeast Asia: Time for New Architecture?............................................................................213 ELLEN L. FROST AND DAVID C. KANG 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6
Introduction ........................................................................213 Changes in the External Environment................................216 Other Changes in the Regional Environment.....................221 The Adequacy of Existing Institutions...............................232 Institution-Building in Northeast Asia ...............................236 Conclusion..........................................................................240
8 The Future of Northeast Asia’s Institutional Architecture..............................................................................245 VINOD K. AGGARWAL, MIN GYO KOO, AND SEUNGJOO LEE 8.1 Introduction ........................................................................245 8.2 An Institutional Bargaining Game Approach: Initial Shocks, Goods, Individual Bargaining Situations, and Institutional Fit ............................................................247
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8.3 Cross-National Developments .......................................... 251 8.4 The Future of Economic and Security Institutional Building in Northeast Asia................................................ 257 Index ............................................................................................. 263
Contributors
Vinod K. Aggarwal is Professor of Political Science, Affiliated Professor at the Haas School of Business, and Director of the Berkeley APEC Study Center at the University of California at Berkeley. Ellen L. Frost is Adjunct Research Fellow at the National Defense University and a Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. David C. Kang is Professor in the Department of Government and Adjunct Associate Professor in the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College. Saori Katada is Associate Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. Taehwan Kim is Research Professor in the Division of International Education and Exchange at Yonsei University and Managing Director of the East Asia Foundation. Min Gyo Koo is Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration at Yonsei University. Seungjoo Lee is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Chung-Ang University. Kun-Chin Lin is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. Chung-in Moon is Professor in the Department of Political Science at Yonsei University.
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Sang-young Rhyu is Associate Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University and Director of the Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library and Museum. Mireya Solis is Associate Professor in the School of International Service at American University.
Abbreviations
ABMI ABF ABM ACU ACFTA ADB AFC AMF AMU APEC APT ARF ASEAN ASEM BTA CIS CMEA CMI CNPC COMECON CPR CSCAP CSCE CSTO CTBT CVID DMZ DPRK
Asian Bond Market Initiative Asian Bond Fund Asian Bond Market Asian Currency Unit ASEAN-China Free Trade Area Asian Development Bank Asian Financial Crisis Asian Monetary Fund Asian Monetary Union Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting Basic Telecom Agreement Commonwealth of Independent States Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Chiang Mai Initiative China National Petroleum Corporation Council for Mutual Economic Assistance common pool resource Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Council on Security Cooperation in Europe Collective Security Treaty Organization Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (nuclear weapons) demilitarized zone Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
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Abbreviations
EAEC EAEG EAFTA EAS EAVG EASG EFTA EOI ESFE EPA EVSL FDI FSA FSB FTA FTAA GATT GSP GWOT HEU IAEA IAP IFI IMF ITA ITAR JBIC JGB JSEPA KEDO KORUS LWR MANPADS METI
East Asia Economic Caucus East Asian Economic Group East Asian Free Trade Area East Asia Summit East Asia Vision Group East Asia Study Group European Free Trade Association export-oriented industrialization East Siberia and Russia’s Far East Economic Partnership Agreement Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization foreign direct investment Financial Services Agreement Federal Security Service (Russia) free trade area/agreement Free Trade Area of the Americas General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Generalized System of Preferences Global War on Terror (US) highly enriched uranium International Atomic Energy Agency Individual Action Plan International Financial Institution International Monetary Fund Information Technology Agreement International Traffic in Arms Regulation Japan Bank for International Cooperation Japan Government Bonds Japanese-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement light-water nuclear reactor man-portable air defense systems Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japan)
Abbreviations
MITI MOF MOFAT MERCOSUR NATO NAFTA NEACD NEACI NEASD NEAFTA NIC NIE NPT NSC OMT OSCE PLA PRC PSI PTA ROK RTA SARS SCO SEANWFZ SEZ SDF SOC SPT STAR TAC TRADP UNDP
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan) Ministry of Finance (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (South Korea) Southern Common Market North Atlantic Treaty Organization North American Free Trade Agreement Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative Northeast Asian Security Dialogue Northeast Asian Free Trade Agreement newly industrializing country newly industrialized economy Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty New Security Concept (China) Office of the Minister for Trade (South Korea) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe People’s Liberation Army (China) People’s Republic of China Proliferation Security Initiative preferential trade agreement Republic of Korea regional trade agreement Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Shanghai Cooperation Organization Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Special Economic Zone Self-Defense Force (Japan) Social Overhead Capital Six-Party Talks Secure Trade in the APEC Region Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Tumen River Area Development Plan United Nations Development Plan
xv
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Abbreviations
UNESCO UNIDO WMD WTO
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Industrial Development Program weapons of mass destruction World Trade Organization
1 Economic and Security Institution Building in Northeast Asia: An Analytical Overview
Vinod K. Aggarwal University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA Min Gyo Koo Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
1.1 Introduction1 How has regionalism evolved in Northeast Asia? This chapter focuses on the new developments in the region in the post-triple shocks period – namely the post-Cold War, the post-Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, and the post-September 11, 2001 attacks. We argue that Northeast Asia’s new appetite for preferential economic arrangements and regional security dialogues reflects a convergence of interests in securing inclusive club goods as an insurance policy to realize free trade, financial stability, and collective security as traditional mechanisms under the so-called San Francisco system stall or are dismantled.2 The growth of economic and security interdependence of Northeast Asian countries has been remarkable during the postwar period. 1
We would like to thank Jin-Young Kim, Gilbert Rozman, and Peter J. Katzenstein for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this chapter. We are deeply indebted to Jonathan Chow, Edward Fogarty, and Kristi Govella for their editorial assistance. The analytical approach of this chapter has been developed in Aggarwal and Koo 2007a and 2007b. For a broader geographic and theoretical perspective, see Aggarwal and Koo 2007c. 2 The San Francisco system was codified through the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty between the Allies and Japan. For more details, see Calder 2004; and Hara 2001.
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Yet, seen in comparative regional perspective, Northeast Asia’s economic and security cooperation has lacked significant formal institutionalization at the regional level.3 During the Cold War period, the San Francisco system defined Northeast Asian economic and security relations. Against the background of bitter memories of Japanese colonialism, unresolved sovereignty issues, and ideological divides across the region, the San Francisco system offered America’s Northeast Asian allies access to the US market in return for a bilateral security alliance. At the same time, US allies were strongly encouraged to participate in broad-based, multilateral fora in areas of security (e.g., the United Nations, or UN), trade (e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT), and finance (e.g., the International Monetary Fund, or IMF). In recent years, however, the traditional institutional order that has governed economic and security relations in Northeast Asia has come under heavy strain. The geopolitical complexity surrounding the Korean Peninsula and the novel dynamics of Sino-Japanese rivalry with the rise of China are currently shaping a new regional institutional architecture in both economic and security issue areas. In the post-triple shocks period, the increasingly visible erosion of Northeast Asian countries’ confidence in the conventional approach has manifested itself in the proliferation of preferential trade agreements, financial arrangements, and minilateral security dialogues. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 examines Northeast Asian regional trends and provides a systematic categorization of different types of economic and security arrangements. Section 1.3 develops an institutional bargaining game approach to analyze Northeast Asia’s new institutional architecture in trade, finance, and security. Section 1.4 lays out the structure of the book, highlighting the nexus between economics and security. Finally, Sect. 1.5 summarizes the argument and draws policy implications.
3
Katzenstein 1997 and 2005; Cumings 1997; Grieco 1998; Evans and Fukushima 1999; Duffield 2003; and Calder and Ye 2004.
Economic and Security Institution Building in Northeast Asia
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1.2 Northeast Asia’s Changing Institutional Map The San Francisco institutional architecture served Northeast Asia well for the Cold War period, while obviating the need for any significant regional arrangements. The US served not only as the principal architect of the regional order, but also as a power balancer between Japan and China, as well as between the two Koreas, and between China and Taiwan. US hegemony also played a critical role in gluing together its key allies through open access to its market, thus creating a unique mix of bilateralism and multilateralism. In contrast to the weakness of formal economic integration, the network of Japanese transnational corporations played a key role in forming a virtual economic community. By the early 1990s, under the rubric of the “flying geese” model, Japan exported many of its lower-tech industries to its neighbors, thereby creating concentric circles of investment, with South Korea and Taiwan in the inner circle, and Southeast Asia and China comprising the outer one.4 Alongside this Japan-centered economic system emerged an informal business network, often referred to as “Greater China,” in which Chinese communities in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and elsewhere in Asia promoted trade with, and investment in, China.5 These informal networks based on corporate and ethnic ties delivered unprecedented rates of growth during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. The openness of the US market, natural forces of proximity, and the vertical and horizontal integration of regional economies through Japanese investment and overseas Chinese capital seemed to have produced greater economic interdependence without substantial institutionalization at the regional level.6 Yet, more recently, the traditional institutional equilibrium in Northeast Asia has come under heavy strain. Although Northeast Asian countries continue to pay lip service to their commitment to transregional and global institutions such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the IMF, the erosion of their confidence is visibly indicated by 4 Bernard
and Ravenhill 1995; and Hatch and Yamamura 1996. Ernst 1997; and MacIntyre 1994. 6 Katzenstein 1997 and 2005. 5
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the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) and currency swap agreements.7 In a similar vein, there have been various official and unofficial, formal and informal, and bilateral and minilateral dialogues to resolve regional security issues ranging from the rise of China, the Taiwan Straits issue, and the North Korean nuclear crisis. Certainly, the strength and effectiveness of these security fora remain unclear, falling short of filling the organization gap that has persisted in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, the increasing number of channels for security dialogues and negotiations indicate positive and dynamic processes of exchanging information and opinions, which should be promising signs for regional peace and stability.8 As a basis for analyzing the dynamic process of institutional change in the post-triple shocks period, we systematically classify the types of arrangements that have been pursued in Northeast Asia, providing illustrating a snapshot of the institutional landscape in the region. In terms of the number of participants, these include unilateral, bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral arrangements; in terms of coverage, the range has been narrow in scope or quite broad. In addition, some arrangements tend to be focused geographically, while others bind states across long distances. Finally, other characteristics might include the strength and institutionalization of accords and their timing. Of these many possible dimensions, we focus on two in particular in order to simplify this narrative description, namely actor scope and geography.9 7
Aggarwal and Koo 2005; Pempel 2005; Aggarwal and Urata 2006; and Solis and Katada 2007. 8 Evans and Fukushima 1999; Buzan 2003; Job 2003; Prichard 2004; Park 2005; and Bullock 2005. 9 The question of how to define a region remains highly contested. Although we acknowledge that simple distance is hardly the only relevant factor in defining a geographic region, we maintain that geography matters and that a region is firmly rooted in territorial space. For us, the inverse relationship between distance and international trade/finance/security still holds due to transportation and deployment costs. Therefore, we define a pair of countries as geographically concentrated if they are contiguous on land or within 400 nautical miles (the sum of two countries’ hypothetical 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zones); otherwise, we view them as being geographically dispersed. According to our definition, Japan and Singapore are geographically dispersed although the two countries are traditionally considered “East Asian” countries. At the same time, China is geographically contiguous to both Southeast and Northeast Asian countries due to its huge land area. See Aggarwal and Koo 2005, 96.
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As shown in Table 1.1, we do not illustrate issue or product coverage and the strength or level of institutionalization of agreements for sake of presentation, although the authors of the case study chapters discuss these elements at length. Table 1.1 Modes of economic and security arrangements in Northeast Asia Number of Actors Unilateral (1) APEC Individual Action Plans (IAPs)
Bilateral Geographically concentrated (2) Japan– China, Japan– South Korea, and
Trade and Financial Arrangements
China– South Korea currency swap agreements Japan– South Korea FTA (under negotiation) China– South Korea FTA (under study)
Minilateral Geographically dispersed (3) Japan– Singapore EPA (2002) Korea–Chile FTA (2002) Taiwan– Panama FTA (2003) Japan– Mexico FTA (2004) Korea– Singapore FTA (2005) Japan– Malaysia FTA (2005) China–Chile FTA (2005) South Korea–US FTA (2007) Currency swap between Japan/South Korea and ASEAN
Geographically concentrated
Geographically dispersed
Multilateral
(4) TRADP (1992)
(5) APEC (1989)
(6) IMF (1945)
China– ASEAN FTA (2003)
EAEC (1994)
World Bank (1945)
Northeast Asian FTA (proposed)
ASEM (1996) AMF (1997) ASEAN Plus Three (1998)
GATT/WTO (1947/1995) ITA (1997) BTA (1998)
CMI (2000) FSA (1999) ABMI (2003) South Korea– EFTA FTA (2005) South Korea– ASEAN FTA (2006) Japan– ASEAN CEP (under negotiation) South Korea– EU (under negotiation) ACU (under study)
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Security Arrangements
Unilateral use of force Arms acquisition
Joint military exercises
US military treaties with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
CSCAP (1993) NEACD (1993)
UN operations (1945) NPT (1970)
ARF (1994) PSI (2003) SCO (2001) Six-Party Talks (2003)
*Adapted from Aggarwal 2001. Updated December 2007 with examples
The first column of Table 1.1 consists of unilateral measures. Unilateral trade and financial liberalization associated with Northeast Asian countries may include APEC-fostered efforts such as Individual Action Plans (IAPs).10 Yet, unilateral trade and financial liberalization efforts have been rare in Northeast Asia as in other regions. Meanwhile, unilateral security measures often involve actions that are detrimental to regional security. For example, China’s and North Korea’s respective threats of force in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula have frustrated their neighbors as well as the US, destabilizing relations in the region. Along with the bilateral currency swap agreements between China, Japan, and South Korea, the prospective Japan–South Korea and South Korea–China FTAs fall into the category of geographically concentrated bilateral subregionalism. More often than not, such agreements indicate not only geographic, historic, and cultural affinity but also complementary industrial structures. Their counterpart in the security realm can be found in the formal talks about joint military exercises between South Korea and Japan, and South Korea and China.11 The category of geographically dispersed bilateral transregionalism in trade issue areas includes the bilateral FTAs between Japan– Singapore (2002), South Korea–Chile (2002), Japan–Mexico (2004), South Korea–Singapore (2005), China–Chile (2005), and South Korea–US (2007). Various bilateral currency swap agreements between Japan–South Korea and Southeast Asian countries represent bilateral financial transregionalism. Meanwhile, the most significant 10 We define IAPs as unilateral measures since they are prepared and implemented individually and voluntarily even if the initiative was suggested minilaterally. 11 On FTAs in the Asia-Pacific, see Aggarwal and Urata 2006; and Dent 2006.
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bilateral transregional defense ties exist between Northeast Asian countries and the US As noted previously, the post-World War II US grand strategy has revolved around bilateral security and economic ties with its allies in the region. The next category is geographically focused minilateral subregionalism. In the post-Cold War period, China presented one of the first proposals for Northeast Asian economic cooperation to develop the so-called golden delta of Tumen River in 1990. In the following year, the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP) accepted the proposal as the Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP), leading to the participation of China, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and Mongolia.12 In the meantime, the Japanese foreign minister first proposed the idea of a Northeast Asian Free Trade Agreement (NEAFTA) in August 1998, which was followed by a series of feasibility studies and tripartite summit meetings on the sidelines of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT). The ASEAN–China FTA framework agreement of 2002 falls in this category as well. In sharp contrast, there exist few examples of Northeast Asian initiatives for exclusively subregional minilateral security arrangements, reflecting the still-dominant role by an outside power – the US. The next category refers to geographically dispersed transregionalism or interregionalism. Such arrangements in economics include the East Asian Economic Caucus) (EAEC, 1994), APEC (1989), the (Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM, 1996), the APT (1998), the ASEAN– Japan Closer Economic Partnership agreement (proposed in 2002), the South Korea–EFTA FTA (2005), and the South Korea–ASEAN FTA (2006). In the financial issue area, various transregional, minilateral arrangements include the ill-fated Asian Monetary Fund (proposed in 1997), the Chiang Mai Initiative (2000), an Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI, proposed in 2002), and an Asian Currency Unit (ACU, proposed in 2002). On the security front, Northeast Asia lacks the equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for the Euro-Atlantic region, leaving regional security coordination underinstitutionalized. 12 However, due to the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and the lack of coordination among participating local and national governments, this collective development plan failed to make any progress by the mid-1990s.
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The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994) is virtually the only permanent regional security forum in which Northeast Asian countries and the US participate simultaneously.13 APEC remains a transregional economic forum although it has also been used as an arena in which to discuss security matters, particularly since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Yet, it is notable that non-governmental organizations are increasingly becoming active at the transregional level – the) Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP, 1993) and the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD, 1993), for instance. In the meantime, China organized the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001 to capitalize on earlier joint confidencebuilding efforts among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Given that Central Asia is abundant in gas and oil deposits, China has recently put more of its diplomatic capital into the SCO due to concerns about a global energy shortage. Most recently, the Six-Party Talks (SPT, 2003) process, initiated to resolve the second North Korean nuclear crisis, has presented the possibility of evolving into a permanent security forum in the Northeast Asian region. The final category is multilateral globalism. Trade arrangements in this realm include broad-based accords such as the GATT of 1947 and its successor organization, the WTO of 1995. Their counterparts in the financial issue area have been the IMF (1945) and the World Bank (1945). Northeast Asian countries have also been participants in multilateral sectoral market opening agreements such as the Information Technology Agreement (ITA, 1997), the Basic Telecom Agreement (BTA, 1998), and the Financial Services Agreement (FSA, 1999). In pursuit of security assurances, all the Northeast Asian countries – with the exception of Taiwan – have become UN members in the postwar period. As a result of the North Korean nuclear crisis, the importance of sectoral security arrangements within and outside the UN 13
Given the heterogeneous policy preferences of the key players in Northeast Asia during the Cold War period, this was not surprising. The U.S. remained concerned about how such a regional dialogue might constrain its military forces and weaken bilateral alliances. Japan also remained reluctant about pushing hard for more substantive regional security dialogues. For fear of international pressure on its domestic affairs, China opposed any moves in this direction as well. See Duffield 2003.
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such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1970) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI, 2003) has also grown in Northeast Asia. 1.3 An Institutional Bargaining Game Approach and the Evolution of Northeast Asian Regionalism To systematically analyze the evolution of new institutional architecture in Northeast Asia, we develop an institutional bargaining game framework, focusing on the interplay of four broadly defined causal elements, namely external shocks, goods, individual bargaining situations, and the existing institutional context.14
IMPETUS FOR NEW AGREEMENT
KEY FACTORS IN RESPONSE
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS
GOODS: Externalities and goods (public, CPR, club, and private) 1) Participants Initial impetus from changes in institutions and interactions
2) Geography INDIVIDUAL SITUATIONS: Different national reactions based on political and economic capabilities, domestic coalitions, and beliefs
3) Nature 4) Scope 5) Strength
EXISTING INSTITUTIONS
Adapted from Aggarwal (1998). Fig. 1.1 The evolution of economic and security arrangements
The process of a shift from an initial institutional equilibrium to a new one generally comes about with some external shocks that create pressure for change. External shocks may stimulate or impede the 14
Aggarwal 1998.
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supply of certain types of goods that pertain to either economics or security, or both. While there are many factors that might affect national responses to external shocks and subsequent change in the provision of goods, the most significant elements are countries’ individual bargaining positions, consisting of their international position, domestic power structures, and elite beliefs. Finally, if countries choose to create new regional institutions or modify existing ones, they must decide whether and to what extent those institutions will be linked to global multilateral institutions. Figure 1.1 illustrates the key elements and process of our institutional bargaining game approach. 1.3.1 The Post-Triple Shocks In Northeast Asia, the pressure for a shift from traditional to new institutional equilibrium has come about through three major external shocks, including the end of the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis, and the September 11 attacks. The Post-Cold War Shock
The aforementioned San Francisco system began to undergo a gradual modification from the early 1970s with the inclusion of China and other communist countries, but retained to a remarkable degree the Japan-centered and Washington-dominated form throughout the Cold War period.15 In the post-Cold War era, however, the fissure in the system became increasingly visible as a result of the changing regional balance of power. In Northeast Asia, the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle has now been replaced by a new triangular relationship between the US, Japan, and China. For all the power of the US and Japan, the past two decades have been most notable for China’s dramatic rise, and the resultant complexity of the regional power equation does not allow for a single pacesetter.16 The Cold War bipolarity in Northeast Asia acted as the source of regional reluctance to institutionalize economic and security relations, but its abrupt end has made it politically easier for Northeast 15 16
Calder 2003. Buzan 2003; Friedberg 2005; and Christensen 2006.
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Asian countries to consider institutionalizing their economic and security ties.17 The end of the Cold War reduced the significance of ideological divisions and has broken down the problem of, in Gowa’s term, the “security diseconomy” that had precluded tighter institutional integration between and within capitalist and communist blocs.18 As noted earlier, the early 1990s produced an outpouring of proposals aimed at developing economic regionalism in Northeast Asia. Various attempts focused on geographically contiguous parts of national economies located in the Russian Far East, Northeast China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Mongolia. Meanwhile, the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s called for collective efforts at persuading North Korea to abandon its secret nuclear weapons program. Aside from existing multilateral institutions such as the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) – based on the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea – assumed the important role of providing North Korea with two light water reactors and heavy fuel oil in return for North Korea’s proposal to freeze its nuclear weapons program. Despite sometimes ambiguous mandates and responsibilities of participating countries including the US, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union, KEDO functioned relatively well in fulfilling its objective of defusing the proliferation issue and providing Pyongyang with alternative energy supplies until it was suspended in summer 2003 as a result of the second nuclear crisis.19 The contribution of the end of the Cold War to Northeast Asia was more visible in the security issue area. Certainly, the potential problem of a security diseconomy has yet to be resolved in Northeast Asia. There is a deepening concern that China’s growing trade surplus with the US and Japan has yielded hard currency with which to buy weapons, foreign investment for the expansion of strategic infrastructure, and technology transfer that may improve Chinese military capabilities. As a potentially dissatisfied rising power, China would most likely challenge the existing regional order if these arrangements continued 17
Breslin and Higgott 2000; and Ravenhill 2006. Gowa 1994. 19 Stanley Foundation 2006. 18
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to favor the US and Japan. Also, China’s authoritarian regime is vulnerable to unconstrained ultra-nationalism thanks to its legitimacy deficit. At the same time, however, the presence of a security diseconomy may motivate the three major powers to promote an appropriate minilateral venue for directly or indirectly reassuring each other as well as their neighbors about their security and economic policies, while maximizing their respective national interests. During the Cold War period, the US opposed an Asian equivalent of the Council on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), primarily due to Soviet support for the idea. The US feared that the Soviet Union would use a multilateral security forum to drive a wedge between the US and its Asian allies. Japan followed the American lead in opposing proposals for establishing regional multilateral security cooperation fora in East Asia. Yet, by 1990, Japan began to fear that its fundamental security interests, including the US alliance, would be seriously undermined if Japan did not participate in the emerging process of the post-Cold War institution building in the region. Against this backdrop, Japan proposed its own initiative for a multilateral security forum – the Nakayama proposal.20 For its part, China has made a serious effort to engage the East Asian region, partly to discourage Taiwan’s quest for diplomatic recognition and partly to neutralize the possibility that international organizations might undermine China’s national sovereignty. As the 1990s unfolded, China’s relations with East Asian countries were manifested in a mix of unilateral assertiveness (over Taiwan and the inhabited islands in the East and South China Seas) and increasingly confident use of multilateral economic and security fora such as APEC and the ARF to mitigate the region-wide concern about the rise of China.21
20 In July 1991, Japan abruptly reversed its longstanding opposition to regional security institutions and proposed a minilateral security dialogue within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Post-Ministerial Conference. This initiative, known as the Nakayama proposal, represented a bold departure from Japan’s conservative regional security policy under America’s nuclear umbrella. Although it did not materialize as proposed, the Nakayama proposal did encourage the formation of the ARF by promoting the idea of a multilateral security dialogue connected with ASEAN. See Midford 2000, 367-8, 387. 21 Foot 1998; Dittmer 2002; Buzan 2003; and Shambaugh 2004/05.
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Despite its operational feebleness as a security regime, the ARF binds Japan and China together into a regional institutional framework, as does APEC. In addition, “Track Two” initiatives – involving government officials in their private capacities, academics, journalists, and others – proliferated during this period. For example, the Canadian-initiated the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD), the first major Track Two program, began in 1990. The University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation initiated the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) in October 1993. And the Council for Security Cooperation in the AsiaPacific (CSCAP) is another prominent example of Track Two arrangements.22 The Post-Asian Financial Crisis Shock
The second turning point came in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 followed by the debacle of the 1999 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle. The financial crisis and the institutional crisis of the WTO revealed a number of shared weaknesses among Northeast Asian economies.23 With respect to informal market integration, the unprecedented economic shocks proved that the seemingly dense networks of Japanese and overseas Chinese business were quite vulnerable.24 Asian economies could delay the ultimate bursting of their bubble as long as they were able to find export markets where they could sell the investment-fueled output that vastly exceeded the absorption capacity of domestic consumers. However, the structural problems finally exacted a heavy toll in the closing years of the 1990s. Concurrently, Northeast Asian countries’ commitment to a broadbased, multilateral trade regime eroded significantly. Although the July 2004 Geneva meetings restarted the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, the riots in Seattle in 1999 and the failed 2003 ministerial 22
Buzan 2003, 156; and Evans and Fukushima 1999. Aggarwal and Koo 2005. 24 Some scholars go a step further and argue that the impact of the particular pattern of Japanese and overseas Chinese investment contributed to the damaging crisis. The rapid expansion of Japanese and overseas Chinese regional production networks in East Asia in the 1980s and early 1990s began to show a tendency to follow investment fads rather than market demand, creating overcapacity in similar manufacturing sectors such as electronics and automobiles. See Hatch 1998. 23
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meeting in Cancun continued to cast their shadow over negotiations for global trade liberalization. With respect to finance, aside from many structural problems underlying the Asian model of capitalism such as its cronyism, unsound investments and overcapacity, many in Asia found fault with the adoption of Western financial liberalism, which allegedly reinforced credit bubbles, empowered currency speculators, and created unstable collective irrationalities. This concern was only heightened by the IMF’s role in the Asian financial crisis, which Asian leaders and even Western economists heavily criticized.25 At the transregional level, APEC as a formal mechanism to facilitate economic integration came under fire for its inability to deal with the financial crisis. Many in the region believed that US pressure slowed APEC’s response to the crisis. At the November 1997 APEC summit meeting, US President Bill Clinton described the Thai and Malaysian currency crises as “a few small glitches in the road.”26 But the US strategy appeared to backfire almost immediately, as the currency crisis spread beyond Thailand and Malaysia, quickly moving to the larger economies of Indonesia and South Korea. Japan took the lead in September 1997 with a proposal for an AMF, to be backed by $100 billion that they had lined up in commitments in the region. However, the IMF, supported by the US and European countries, resisted any effort to find an “Asian” solution to the crisis. In particular, the US viewed such regional funds as undercutting its preferred approach of IMF loans accompanied by strict conditionality.27 Not surprisingly, Northeast Asian countries came to recognize that tighter institutionalization of intraregional commercial and financial ties might be a better commitment mechanism for providing economic 25
Stiglitz 1998; Bergsten 2000; and Wade 2000. David Sanger, “One year later, Asian economic crisis is worsening.” The New York Times, 6 July 1998. 27 It is in this broad context that the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was developed, by the APT Finance Ministers. The accord started at a meeting in May 2000 and created a network of bilateral swap arrangements to provide short-term liquidity for countries facing financial pressures. It has continued to grow, with a host of agreements concluded by Japan and other East Asian countries. Currently, APT finance ministers have set a target of $70 billion and called for the purely bilateral accords to be multilateralized. For more details, see Chap 4 of this volume by Katada and Solis. 26
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security, and started to weave a web of preferential arrangements. The conclusion of Japan’s first post-World War II PTA, the Japan– Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA), came at this critical juncture in October 2001. Aside from standard welfare calculations, emerging interest in PTAs reflects their role as a convenient venue in which Japan and China can vie for regional economic leadership. This point was driven home most dramatically with regard to ASEAN. China signed a surprise agreement in 2003 with the 10 ASEAN countries, pledging free trade by 2010. Challenged to demonstrate a continued Japanese capability to lead within East Asia by doing the same, Japan proposed a Japan–ASEAN FTA shortly thereafter.28 The impact of the Asian financial crisis on Northeast Asian security is seemingly unclear, but the role played by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung needs to be underscored. Kim pursued a drastic reform agenda in the wake of the financial crisis. In particular, his conciliatory engagement policy toward North Korea, which culminated in the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, created a great deal of diplomatic capital for South Korea to address proactively Northeast Asia’s delicate issues of peace and stability.29 Kim also proposed a six-nation Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (NEASD) involving the two Koreas, the US, China, Japan, and Russia. The proposal was an extension of the Four-Party Talks to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and to establish a peace regime there. While Japan and Russia (excluded from the Four-Party Talks) naturally supported the six party NEASD forum, this and similar proposals for collective or cooperative security failed to gain Chinese and American approval.30
28
Aggarwal and Koo 2005; and Pempel and Urata 2006. In February 1998, Kim announced that he would pursue what he called the “sunshine policy” with North Korea, in hopes of encouraging greater discussion and cooperation with Pyongyang. The policy was inspired by the old Aesop’s fable about the sun getting more results than the fierce wind. In December 2000, the Norwegian Nobel Committee, in recognition of Kim’s “extraordinary and lifelong works for democracy and human rights in South Korea and East Asia in general, and for peace and reconciliation with North Korea in particular,” awarded him the Nobel Peace Prize. 30 Kim 2004, 15. 29
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The Post-September 11 Shock
The most recent turning point for the security order in Northeast Asia came with the September 11 terrorist attacks. Among the more fundamental shifts produced by 9/11, the American global war on terror has called into question the future of Asia’s balance of power politics. With its counterterrorism initiative, the US began reconfiguring its traditional security policy in Northeast Asia for strategic and logistical reasons, thereby significantly departing from its conventional emphasis on bilateral security ties under the San Francisco system. First, the US now solicits multilateral cooperation against terrorism. In May 2003, for instance, President George W. Bush announced the establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which created international agreements and partnerships that allowed the US and its allies to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. Existing regional institutions such as APEC and the ARF, encouraged by the US, have also adopted a series of counter-terrorism measures. Although anti-terrorism cooperation undertaken by Northeast Asian countries focuses on intelligence and information exchanges rather than substantive measures, these changes constitute a symbolically important move toward a regional security dialogue.31 Second, two key developments in the US defense posture, which had begun in the post-Cold War period, clearly accelerated in the post-9/11 period. The first defense transformation sought to shift US defense planning from the clear threat-driven model of confronting the Soviet Union in the Cold War to a capability focus that would allow the US to respond to unknown future threats. The second shift came with the 2002 Global Posture Review, which focused on realigning the positioning of US forces to cope with these unknown threats. Together, these two elements brought about significant changes in the US deployment of troops in both Japan and South Korea. Unmistakably, the issue of repositioning US forces – and possibly using these forces for intervention in hot spots in the region or elsewhere – has created tensions in US alliances with Japan and South Korea. In particular, the US decision to move away from a “tripwire” strategy by shifting 31
Dittmer 2002; Acharya 2003; and Buzan 2003.
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troops away from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to south of Seoul has raised questions about joint command issues, and the eventual number of troops in South Korea. In the case of Japan, the US focus has increasingly shifted from its current deployment of troops in Okinawa (always a sensitive domestic political issue in Japan) to its forward deployment in Guam. In a region with an already awkward balance between the US, Japan, and China, the second North Korean nuclear standoff, which culminated in Pyongyang’s announcement on October 9, 2006 that it had successfully conducted an underground test of a nuclear device, has set everyone scrambling. From an institutional point of view, the second North Korean nuclear crisis reflects the mixed results of previous multilateral efforts – such as the NPT, the IAEA safeguards agreement, and KEDO. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, therefore, the US shifted its focus on North Korea from preserving the international nuclear nonproliferation regime to preventing terrorist groups and rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons or fissile material. Yet, the US was soon to find itself lacking the support of China and South Korea, both of which preferred a conciliatory approach to the North. On the one hand, the impact of America’s neoconservative foreign policy since 2001 has accelerated Sino-American rivalry, while consolidating Washington’s relations with Tokyo and Taipei in spite of Beijing’s grievances. On the other hand, 9/11 (and the North Korean nuclear crisis) provided a convenient pretext for both the US and China to restore the minimum cordiality necessary to maintain regional stability, as a result of Beijing’s support for the grand coalition for anti-terrorism.32 In the meantime, the US focus on terrorism, combined with President’s Bush’s characterization of North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as an “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address and his neglect of President Kim’s Sunshine Policy, created a rift in US–South Korean relations. Set against this backdrop, China began to host the Six-Party Talks (SPT) in Beijing in August 2003 by extending an invitation to South Korea, Japan, and Russia to join the earlier ad hoc trilateral negotiations between the US, China, and North Korea. China’s new and 32
Dittmer 2002, 64-5.
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remarkably proactive role sits in direct contrast to its hands-off approach during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. Beijing has been particularly motivated this time, not only by its desire to pacify Pyongyang’s nuclear program, but also to constrain Washington in a regional minilateral process and prevent it from taking unilateral action as it did in Iraq.33 As such, the current SPT process has demonstrated cooperative relationships, particularly between the US and China. Certainly the SPT has yet to produce concrete results. A core stumbling block in the talks remains the question of who takes the first step. China and the two Koreas emphasize the Ukrainian example of extending security assurances and economic incentives first. In contrast, the US and Japan contend that the ball is in the North Korean court to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons infrastructure, just as Libya did, before concessions can follow.34 Such complexities notwithstanding, the current nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the formation of the SPT process to deal with the issue has given rise to the possibility that a more formal organizational framework for multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia could be established, likely in the form of a Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (NEASD).35 Indeed, the breakthrough made in the SPT in February 2007 gives rise to the promise of a more permanent minilateral dialogue mechanism in Northeast Asia.36 In economic relations, trade policy has changed dramatically in the post-September 9/11 world, although the changes in Northeast and
33
Park 2005, 76-84. Ibid, 85. 35 Pritchard 2004, 1-3. 36 On February 13, 2007, after marathon negotiations, the six parties reached an agreement that could lead North Korea to dismantle its nuclear facilities in return for the other parties’ provision of fuel oil and other aid. Although the accord left the actual removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel to an undefined moment in the future, five working groups would separately negotiate the details of denuclearization, normalization of North Korea-U.S. and North KoreaJapan relations, economic and energy cooperation, and regional peace and security mechanisms. See Jim Yardley and David E. Sanger “In Shift, a Deal is Being Weighed by North Korea,” The New York Times, 14 February 2007 34
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East Asia were not originally related to the terrorist attacks.37 Most notably, America’s new trade policy has become the driving forces behind the changes in trade dynamics in Northeast Asia. Until the end of the 1990s, the US only had FTAs with Israel (1985) and Canada (1988), the latter evolving into NAFTA with the inclusion of Mexico. In 2002, however, President George W. Bush obtained trade promotion authority (TPA) from Congress, and in 2003 completed FTAs with Chile and Singapore, which Congress passed by substantial margins.38 Although the US was slower off the mark than the and countries such as Chile and Mexico, its actions have inspired fear in Asia of a return to a bilateral world, causing Northeast Asian governments to accelerate their rapid turn toward bilateral accords. Concluded on April 1, 2007, the South Korea–US (KORUS) FTA aptly shows how the US and its Northeast Asian counterparts can simultaneously, albeit implicitly, pursue economic benefits and strategic interests in trade negotiations. In addition to the goal of maximizing the gains from trade and investment, the US realized that an FTA with South Korea would give Washington a strong foothold to maintain its strategic and economic presence in Northeast Asia, while South Korea wanted to hedge against the growing strategic uncertainties in the region by cementing its economic ties with the US. Furthermore, the KORUS FTA has the potential to alter the dynamics of the diplomatic and security relations in Northeast Asia where the balance of power is shifting due to the rise of China, the normalization of the Japanese state, and the nuclear adventurism of North Korea.39 1.3.2 Goods: Trade Liberalization, Financial Stability, and Regional Security An external shock may create either positive or negative externalities for countries that are not immediate participants in the precipitating 37 For example, the Japan-Singapore agreement was concluded in October 2001, but had already been in motion for some time. 38 The U.S. has since negotiated, or is in the process of negotiating or ratifying FTAs with Australia, Morocco, the South African Customs Union (SACU), Central America (including the Dominican Republic, Panama, Chile, Colombia, and Peru), South Korea, and Thailand. 39 Lee and Koo 2006; and United States Trade Representative 2007.
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event, thereby stimulating or impeding the supply of certain types of goods that pertain to regional institutional settings. The four types of goods are: public goods, common pool resources (CPRs), inclusive club goods, and private goods.40 Northeast Asia’s new appetite for PTAs and regional security dialogues reflects a convergence of interests in securing inclusive “club goods” in the face of growing economic and security uncertainties.41 Put differently, the political initiatives and intrinsic interest in creating regional economic and security arrangements reflect the growing need for an insurance policy to realize free trade, financial stability, and regional security when traditional mechanisms under the San Francisco System stall or continue to be steadily dismantled in the posttriple shocks period.42 By the mid-1990s, the “trade triangle” that had linked Japanese and overseas Chinese capital, developing Asian manufacturing capacities, and the US market appeared to be in trouble. One major option for the crisis-ridden countries and their affected neighbors was to secure preferential access and create a more diversified export market. With traditional mechanisms within the WTO and APEC offering no salient
40
The distinction between different types of goods is made along two dimensions: rivalry, which refers to the extent to which one actor’s consumption of goods affects that of the other; and excludability, which refers to the possibility of excluding non-contributors to the provision of goods from consuming them. For a discussion of each type of goods and actors’ motivations to provide them, see Aggarwal 1998; and Keohane and Ostrom 1995. 41 There is significant debate about how to characterize trade liberalization and international security. From one perspective, both international trade liberalization and security are seen as a public good since they are non-rival and non-excludable in consumption. Others, such as neoliberal institutionalists, see the game of trade liberalization and peace as a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, where everyone could be better off if cooperation is achieved, but where the dominant strategy is to defect. In this view, international regimes provide an institutional basis for fostering cooperation and peace that accrues only to the participants to the agreement as a club good. 42 Our claim reflects an important assumption that Northeast Asian countries have an implicit sense of their shared fate or indivisibility, which makes them seek club goods that all regional partners can benefit from, as opposed to seeking competitive, private goods. We thank Edward Fogarty for this point.
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solutions, these countries quickly turned toward FTAs to assure a market for their products.43 In the financial issue area, the success of the US and the IMF in forestalling creation of a rival financial institution, the AMF, was embodied in the November 1997 Vancouver APEC summit meeting leaders’ endorsement of the so-called Manila framework. The framework called for the IMF to take the lead in providing emergency loans to Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, with APEC member countries taking only a secondary role, if necessary, to supplement IMF resources on a standby basis without any formal commitment of funds. Thus, with APEC’s action providing a seal of approval for the US–IMF backed plan, the AMF idea was put on hold. Along with severe austerity programs imposed by the IMF, a conspiracy theory that the US was behind the IMF-led Asia bashing heightened Asian countries’ deep distrust of the “global public good” exclusively provided by the IMF. In the security issue area, the San Francisco system provided Northeast Asian countries with security as a club good made available through their alliances with the US (and the Soviet Union as well). In a post-Cold War and post-September 11 era, however, it is unclear whether the provision of this particular type of club good would continue. Whether or not security relations in Northeast Asia evolve in a cooperative or conflictual direction will depend on how the questions of North Korean nuclear adventurism and the rise of China are managed. Although this does not mean that the web of bilateral security alliances will be terminated any time soon, the traditional provision of regional security is increasingly falling short of meeting new collective security needs. As such, a variety of regional alternatives are now being considered, among which the Six-Party Talks process offers a prototype of a collective regional mechanism to deal with common security problems in Northeast Asia.
43
In theory, the WTO and APEC are club goods to the extent that they require membership to benefit from trade liberalization that they materialize. Yet with the former’s global membership and the latter’s spirit of “open regionalism,” their provision of the broadest club good virtually serves as provision of global public goods. As we have argued elsewhere in more detail, the weakness of these two institutions encourages the pursuit of club goods. See Aggarwal and Koo 2005.
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1.3.3 Individual Bargaining Situations While there are many factors that might affect state actors’ individual preferences and strategies for choosing between different institutional alternatives, the most significant elements that determine national responses to external shocks and the changes in the provision of goods include: (1) an actor’s relative position within the international distribution of capabilities; (2) domestic power structures that reflect coalitions and political regime type; and (3) elite beliefs and ideas about issue linkages. International Positions
In Northeast Asia, two aspects of shifting international context have been the basis for exploring institutional cooperation in trade, finance, and security. The first international factor concerns the rise of China within the international continuum of economic development. In general, a country with a large market – either actual or potential – is more likely to entice others to seek it out as an economic partner rather than the other way around. Many East Asian countries’ approach to China as a PTA partner illustrates the importance of a large market in enticing the negotiation of trading arrangements, which in turn provides China with a stronger bargaining position.44 As to the second international factor, collective security concerns may also drive an interest in institutionalizing trade, finance, and security management. Again, the rise of China provides a focal point. More often than not, countries tend to prefer preserving trade and financial relations with their (potential) allies, while avoiding such ties with enemies because the relative gains resulting from economic interdependence can cause changes in the relative distribution of power.45 As noted earlier, the rise of China has pushed its neighbors to reformulate their trade and security policy to respond to the shifting regional balance of power. From this perspective, the question of alliance in Northeast Asia and a prospective NEAFTA really comes down to whether China and Japan could form a substantial entente through a Franco-German type of rapprochement. For Japan, the China threat 44 45
Kwei 2006. Gowa 1994; and Mansfield, Milner, and Bronson 1997.
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may reinforce its interest in the economic and security ties with the US. Yet, the greater uncertainty concerning America’s willingness to sustain its defense commitment to Northeast Asia in a post-September 11 world might prevent Japan from adopting an assertive defense strategy that would include a nuclear arsenal as well as power projection capabilities. Instead, Japan is likely to engage China more deeply in economic and security relations. Domestic Coalitions and Political Regime Type
In Northeast Asia, individual bargaining situations in terms of domestic coalitions and political regime type have changed significantly as a result of the post-triple shocks. Domestic political structures vary widely, ranging from highly democratic – that is, the US, Japan, and South Korea – to highly authoritarian – that is, China and North Korea. Though to different degrees, the governments in the region have experienced challenges to their political legitimacy and actual political turnover, albeit peaceful, by opposition groups.46 From one perspective, such developments have altered the economic and security payoffs confronting individual countries, as many, if not all, of them move toward liberalization, rendering cooperative outcomes at the regional level more likely and the requirements of institution-building less daunting. For instance, the democratic political systems of the US, Japan, and South Korea are most likely to enable business communities to pressure their respective governments not to contain China for fear of losing lucrative economic interests. To a lesser degree, the Chinese government would also be pressured by its domestic economic interests to maintain good relations with its rich neighbors.47
46
In Japan, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s electoral dominance was terminated (albeit temporarily) in 1993. In South Korea, the military rule ended in the same year and the opposition party seized power for the first time five years later in the middle of the Asian financial crisis. In the meantime, political leadership changes toward a more conservative direction coincided in the U.S., China, Japan, and South Korea in 2001-2003. 47 For more details about the positive role of internationalist coalitions in creating a regional zone of peace, see Solingen 1998.
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By contrast, recent research suggests that countries with more veto players – including a legislature, an independent judiciary, an independent central bank, and the military – are less likely to cooperate. Where leaders confront an array of domestic groups with diverse preferences and the ability to block policy initiatives, it is difficult to forge international agreements.48 As Northeast Asian countries move from authoritarianism toward greater political pluralism, the twin challenges of responding to nationalist sentiments and maintaining political legitimacy may constrain the political leeway with which to deal with complex economic and security interdependence and institution-building processes.49 Elite Beliefs and Ideas
The third factor concerns elite beliefs and ideas about the causal connections among issues and the need to handle problems on a multilateral, minilateral, bilateral, and/or unilateral basis. As noted earlier, the triple shocks have significantly eroded the traditional confidence held by Northeast Asian political and business leaders regarding global economic and security institutions. At the same time, the erosion of America’s military commitment to Northeast Asia in the post-9/11 period has made led to a scramble for alternative security mechanisms. These changes have led to the construction of new ideational formulas that support regional alternatives for economic and security cooperation. To be sure, new perceptions and ideas alone will not settle all of the enduring disputes and confrontations in Northeast Asia in the short run.50 In light of the rising pressure of assertive nationalism 48
Mansfield, Milner, and Peevehouse 2004, 3. Furthermore, the advent of the Internet and information technology has not only made national political leaders less capable of censuring the dissemination of news that might provoke ultranationalist sentiments, but also made it easier for small, poorly financed activist groups to mobilize support for their nationalist agenda. The brief but intense dispute between China and Japan in spring 2005 over Japanese history textbooks, the sovereignty question of the offshore islands in the East China Sea, and the gas deposits in their vicinity highlighted how domestic nationalist groups can hijack otherwise closer Sino-Japanese relations; see Koo 2005, 184-191. 50 Indeed, the political cleavages between China and Japan over territorial issues and historical animosities pose critical obstacles to deeper regional institutionalization. Moreover, China and Japan offer different visions of a regionally integrated economic 49
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and fluid geopolitics in the post-triple shocks period, even the mere containment of economic and security tensions, both old and new, would require the skillful diplomacy and tireless efforts of political and business leaders. Such ideational and perceptional changes will nevertheless provide Northeast Asian countries with the basic conditions for improving their relationship in the long run and lay the groundwork for a potentially robust regional institutional architecture. In this regard, there is a growing consensus that the best strategy to hedge against potentially disruptive behaviors is to engage more with each other and to empower internationalist interests by institutionalizing economic and security interdependence.51 Many experts in the region are part of an epistemic community and Track Two organizations, and share the view that regional arrangements can be trade-, investment-, and securityenhancing rather than diverting.52 As highlighted in previous sections, various formal and informal regional arrangements have provided a more pragmatic means than global multilateralism or traditional bilateralism to address regional issues. For instance, China’s nationalist domestic audience is more likely to disapprove of any bilateral compromises that China would make with the US and Japan than a diplomatic bargain in a regional minilateral setting. Similarly, the South Korean government is less likely to be constrained in Track Two diplomacy than in bilateral or multilateral interactions with the US, Japan, and/or China. In addition, Japan’s drive to become an international power is more likely to succeed without setting off regional alarm bells if such growth is managed within regional minilateral frameworks. Although their strength and effectiveness remain unclear, the variety of channels for economic and security interactions in Northeast Asia certainly indicates promising signs for regional cooperation.53
community, with Japan advocating the inclusion of external actors such as Australia, New Zealand, and India, and China preferring a more exclusively East Asian membership. See Oba 2007, 111-114. 51 Koo 2005, 252-256. 52 Job 2003; and Tsunekawa 2005. 53 Ye 2007, 148-149.
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1.3.4 Demand for Institutional Fit Our institutional bargaining game approach posits that, as countries attempt to meet their trade, financial, and security needs in a new environment, they often negotiate the number of participants, geographic coverage, scope, and strength of new arrangements or modify existing ones. At the same time, they strategically interact with each other within the context of broader institutional arrangements such as the GATT/WTO, the IMF, and the UN. The latest enthusiasm for preferential economic institutions in Northeast Asia and, more broadly, in East Asia seems to revolve around bilateral arrangements (such as FTAs and currency swap agreements) as a popular mode of participation, while there are also strong indications of minilateral participation such as the APT, the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) , the CMI, and the ABMI. To this point, Northeast Asia’s new appetite for FTAs is geographically open with a focus on both intra- and extra-regional arrangements.54 Also, many of them attempt to cover broader areas and elements beyond trade – such as labor, environment, investment, government procurements, and harmonization of standards – indicating their nature of WTO-plus or institutional division of labor. At the same time, however, these arrangements are potentially incompatible with the WTO provisions since some sensitive sectors – such as agriculture – are deliberately excluded, thereby setting up the possibility of institutional conflict.55 In the financial issue area, Northeast Asia’s nascent but promising efforts at institutionalizing their financial and monetary relations revolve around a more exclusively “Asia”-focused institutions such as the CMI, the ABMI, the ACU, and the AMF, all of which implicitly challenge the IMF-centered US dollar-based financial system. In Northeast Asia, the geographic scope of regional security dialogues is mixed. Some prominent examples – such as the ARF, CSCAP), and the NEACD – have broad-based membership beyond the geography of Northeast Asia, although the Northeast Asian membership outweighs its non-Asian counterpart – except for the US – in terms of political significance. Despite potential tensions stemming from 54 55
Solis and Katada 2007. Ravenhill 2006.
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the shifting global and regional balance of power, the goals and operations of these institutions are not necessarily incompatible with US designed global security architecture. Aside from the deep US engagement in the North Korean nuclear crisis, the invocation of the NPT and the IAEA system of safeguards in the latest breakthrough of the Six-Party Talks indicates collective efforts at nesting the regional minilateral process within a broader security regime. 1.4 Overview of the Book In the previous sections, we argued that the post-triple shocks have further enhanced a substantial degree of autonomy in regional dynamics in Northeast Asia. The authors of the country chapters in this volume conduct in-depth analysis of each of five Northeast Asian countries – Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea and Russia – and the US. In what follows, we summarize these empirical chapters and highlight that the conditions for institutionalization of trade, finance, and security affairs in Northeast Asia are more favorable now than ever before in the postwar period. In Chap. 2, Seungjoo Lee and Chung-in Moon explore South Korea’s perspective on community-building in Northeast Asia. After reviewing its global and regional strategies in the postwar period, Lee and Moon examine how and why South Korea shifted its policy focus away from multilateralism to regionalism in the post-triple shocks period. They highlight that South Korea’s dramatic policy changes have taken place at the intersection of economic and security concerns and uncertainties, as a result of the country’s unusually high trade and security dependence on the outside world. In Chap. 3, Kun-Chin Lin addresses the impact of the rise of China for the US and Northeast Asia’s institution building process. In the post-triple shocks period, China has talked a big game about Asian regionalism. Yet, according to Lin, it is not just talk: China is thinking big and pulling together elements of a grand strategy in the Asian regional context with the long-term goal of disrupting US-centered alliances in the region. He shows how China has increasingly varied its diplomatic and institutional strategies to achieve this long-term
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goal while maintaining pragmatism in pursuing opportunities to promote a regional image of China as a pacifist multilateral player. Lin argues that Chinese activism at bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral negotiations of trade and investment, energy, and security cooperation in the past five years shows a pattern of China’s opportunism in exploiting US weaknesses – particularly those revealed by American unilateral actions and the consequent willingness of Asian countries to consider changes in the nature of regional cooperation. In Chap. 4, Saori N. Katada and Mireya Solis examine Japan’s responses to growing uncertainties as a result of the “triple shocks,” focusing on trade and financial institutions. They argue that various domestic, regional, and international motivations have influenced the Japanese government’s approach to regional institutional building. Such motivations include: the domestic struggle to garner private sector support, the need to accommodate the rise of China, and Japan’s concern about the American reaction to the development of exclusively Asian regional institutions. They also explore the similarities and differences between Japan’s efforts in trade and financial issue areas, and highlight that financial institution building in Northeast and East Asia has produced a more inclusive region-wide set of nascent institutions, whereas the trade institution building process has generated a more fragmented network of bilateral FTAs linking Japan on preferential terms not only to Asian countries but also to countries outside the region. In Chap. 5, Sang-young Rhyu shows how North Korea has attempted to institutionalize its regime survival through a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) initiative. He argues that Northeast Asian regionalism cannot be completed nor sustained without resolving various economic and security issues surrounding North Korea. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, Rhyu argues that there exist various factors that have led North Korea to seek engagements with its neighbors. He then analyzes the Kaesong Industrial Complex as a pioneering project and its significance for Northeast Asian regionalism. In so doing, he stresses the interplay between security and trade as goods, which cannot be fully provided by the traditional institutional mechanisms in Northeast Asia. In Chap. 6, Taehwan Kim focuses on President Putin’s neo-mercantilist policy and its implications for Northeast Asia. Moscow has
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recently shown growing assertiveness in its foreign policy behavior, while more actively participating in regional affairs and institutions than ever before. In his analysis of this policy shift, Kim utilizes the concepts of “feudalism” and “absolutism/mercantilism” as experienced by the medieval and early modern West Europe. That is, the neo-feudal governance of the Yeltsin regime caused fragmentation of the Russian state, which in turn incurred inconsistency and drifting in its external behavior in general, and Northeast Asia policy in particular. He argues that it is only after neo-absolutism replaced neo-feudal governance that Russia began to make its headway into the region in a neo-mercantilist way. In Chap. 7, Ellen Frost and David Kang analyze Northeast Asia’s security institutions from a US perspective. For the US, Northeast Asia is home not only to two of the world’s most dangerous trouble spots (the Taiwan Strait and North Korea), but also to burgeoning non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and energy-related conflicts. The operating assumption of Frost and Kang’s analysis is that, as a hedging strategy, most Asian countries have strengthened rather than weakened their military ties with the US As such, the authors assess the prospects for “soft” institutionalization in Northeast Asia – that is, dialogue, community-building, and norms that emphasize the peaceful resolution of disputes – rather than Western-style “hard” institutionalization with legally binding rules and procedures. Despite their cautious view, Frost and Kang acknowledge that the trend toward “community-building” in Northeast and East Asia as a whole is unmistakable. Finally, in the concluding chapter, Vinod K. Aggarwal, Min Gyo Koo and Seungjoo Lee evaluate the prospects for Northeast Asian regional integration in trade, finance, and security in a rapidly changing context. In particular, the authors highlight the key links between trade, finance, and security issues in the formation and evolution of new institutions. In a more speculative vein, the authors consider likely trends and its implications for both Northeast Asia and other regions of the world.
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1.5 Conclusion We began our analysis with the observation that the postwar trade, financial, and security order in Northeast Asia remained multilayered under the San Francisco system, involving elements of bilateral alliance structures, global institutions for managing economic and security problems, and long-standing informal alternatives. In the wake of the three major external shocks of the past two decades, however, the traditional institutional equilibrium in Northeast Asia has come under heavy strain. As a result, principal actors are now pursuing greater institutionalization at the regional level, actively weaving a web of preferential economic arrangements and security dialogues. Explaining the emerging institutional architecture in Northeast Asia poses a challenge. In an effort to understand the shifting institutional dynamics, we examined external shocks, goods, countries’ individual bargaining situations, and the fit with existing arrangements. We focused on the triple shocks: the end of the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis, and the September 11 attacks. With respect to goods, we noted that the disturbances in the tradition mechanisms for providing trade liberalization, financial stability, and regional security motivate countries to seek for club goods as a viable alternative. In looking at countries’ individual bargaining situations, we focused on their international strategic and economic interests, domestic power dynamics, and elite beliefs about the value of pursuing regional alternatives. We also showed how the changing nature of broader institutions interacted with country characteristics to alter institutional payoffs in the region. Our central claim is that the pursuit of club goods replaced a more generalized commitment to public goods in the post-triple shocks period, thereby undermining the myth that the combination of bilateral and multilateral arrangements under the San Francisco system and loose-structured production networks could be a viable alternative to formal institutionalization at the regional level. With respect to trade liberalization, the weakness of the WTO and APEC opens up institutional space for a Northeast Asian trade forum like the NEAFTA by affecting the provision of public goods and thus the incentives for club goods. In a similar vein, the eroding confidence of Northeast Asian countries in the IMF-centered US dollar-based financial system
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has motivated them to seek alternative regional club goods such as the CMI, the ABMI, the ACU, and the AMF. Finally, the erosion of America’s military commitment to Northeast Asia in the post-triple shocks period has led to a search for alternative security mechanisms. In a nutshell, much of their future developments depend on the possibility of a tripartite entente among the US, China and Japan, and the resolution of the North Korean issue in both economic and security terms. In view of the tremendous political and economic uncertainties in the contemporary period, the path to deeper and wider economic and security integration in Northeast Asia is likely to be complex. We do not claim by any means that regional institutions are a magical formula for transforming power politics and economic competition into cooperative internationalism in Northeast Asia. They need to go hand in hand with greater democracy and deeper economic interdependence to generate sufficient liberal momentum. That said, we believe that they are becoming viable means for creating norms and rules of interstate behavior that are essential for establishing regional institutional architecture to manage collective trade, financial, and security issues. Yet this process is likely to evolve over decades, not years. References Acharya, Amitav. 2003. Asian Security after September 11: A View from Southeast Asia. Paper prepared for the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s Roundtable on the Foreign Policy Dialogue and Canada-Asia Relations, March. Aggarwal, Vinod K. 1998. Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Shujiro Urata, eds. 2006. Bilateral Trade Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications. New York: Routledge. Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Min Gyo Koo. 2005. Beyond Network Power? The Dynamics of Formal Economic Integration in Northeast Asia. The Pacific Review 18 (2):189-216. ———. 2007a. Northeast Asia’s Economic and Security Regionalism: Withering or Blossoming?” In Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia, edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
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———. 2007b. An Institutional Path: Community-Building in Northeast Asia. In The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order, edited by G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ———. 2007c. Asia’s New Institutional Architecture: Evolving Structures for Managing Trade, Financial, and Security Relations. New York: Springer. Bergsten, Fred. 2000. East Asian Regionalism: Towards a Tripartite World. The Economist (July 15): 23-26 Bernard, Mitchell and John Ravenhill. 1995. Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia. World Politics 47 (2):171-209. Breslin, Shaun and Richard Higgott. 2000. Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing the New. New Political Economy 5 (3):333-352. Bullock, Todd. 2005. U.S. Hopes Six-Party Talks Can Be Model for Northeast Asia: State’s Hill Says Talks on North Korea’s Weapons Programs Strengthen Ties. The Washington File. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State. Buzan, Barry. 2003. Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Levels. The Pacific Review 16 (2):143-173. Calder, Kent and Min Ye. 2003. Northeast Asia: Ripe for Regionalism? BASC News 6 (1):1-8. Calder, Kent. 2004. Securing Security through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective. The Pacific Review 17 (1):135-157. Christensen, Thomas. 2006. Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia. International Security 31 (1):81-126. Cumings, Bruce. 1997. Japan and Northeast Asia into the Twenty-First Century. In Network Power: Japan and Asia, edited by Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Dent, Christopher. 2006. New Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Dittmer, Lowell. 2002. East Asia in the ‘New Era’ in World Politics. World Politics 5:38-65. Duffield, John S. 2003. Asia-Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective. In International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, edited by G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno. New York: Columbia University Press. Ernst, Dieter. 1997. Partners for the China Circle? The Asian Production Networks of Japanese Electronics Firms. BRIE Working Paper 91. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, Berkeley. Evans, Paul and Akiko Fukushima. 1999. Northeast Asia’s Future Security Framework: Beyond Bilateralism? Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Research Advancement. Available from:
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Foot, Rosemary. 1998. China in the ASEAN Regional Forum. Asian Survey 38 (5):425-441. Friedberg, Aaron. 2005. The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30 (2):7-45. Gowa, Joanne. 1994. Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Grieco, Joseph, M. 1998. Political-Military Dynamics and the Nesting of Regimes: An Analysis of APEC, the WTO, and Prospects for Cooperation in the AsiaPacific. In Asia-Pacific Crossroads: Regime Creation and the Future of APEC, edited by Vinod K. Aggarwal and Charles E. Morrison. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hara, Kimie. 2001. 50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan’s Territorial Problems. Pacific Affairs 74 (3):361-382. Hatch, Walter and Kozo Yamamura. 1996. Asia in Japan’s Embrace: Building a Regional Production Alliance. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hatch, Walter. 1998. Grounding Asia’s Flying Geese: The Costs of Depending Heavily on Japanese Capital and Technology. NBR Briefing. Seattle, Wash.: The National Bureau of Asian Research. Job, Brian. 2003. Track Two Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order. In Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, edited by Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Katzenstein, Peter. 1997. Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective. In Network Power: Japan and Asia, edited by Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Ithaca, New York: Cornell: University Press. ———. 2005. A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Keohane, Robert and Elinor Ostrom, eds. 1995. Local Commons and Global Interdependence. London, UK: Sage Publications. Kim, Samuel S. 2004. Northeast Asia in the Local-Regional-Global Nexus: Multiple Challenges and Contending Explanations. In The International Relations of Northeast Asia, edited by Samuel S. Kim. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Koo, Min Gyo. 2005. Scramble for the Rocks: The Disputes over the Dokdo/ Takeshima, Senkaku/Diaoyu, and Paracel and Spratly Islands. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley. Kwei, Elaine. 2006. Chinese Bilateralism: Politics Still in Command. In Bilateral Trade Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications, edited by Vinod Aggarwal and Shujiro Urata. New York: Routledge. Lee, Seungjoo and Min Gyo Koo. 2006. South Korea’s Multi-Track FTA Strategy: Moving from Re-active to Proactive. Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia. MacIntyre, Andrew. 1994. Business, Government and Development: Northeast and Southeast Asian Comparisons. In Business and Government in Industrializing Asia, edited by Andrew MacIntyre. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
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Mansfield E, Helen Milner and Rachel Bronson. 1997. The Political Economy of Major-Power Trade Flows. In The Political Economy of Regionalism, edited by Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner. New York: Columbia University Press. Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2004. Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements. Unpublished manuscript. Available from: . Midford, Paul. 2000. Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: The Nakayama Proposal and the Logic of Reassurance. The Pacific Review 13 (3):367-397. Oba, Mie. 2007. Regional Arrangements for Trade in Northeast Asia: Cooperation and Competition between China and Japan. In Asia’s New Institutional Architecture: Evolving Structures for Managing Trade, Financial, and Security Relations, edited by Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo. New York: Springer. Park, John S. 2005. Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks. The Washington Quarterly 28 (4):75-91. Pempel, T.J., ed. 2005. Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Pempel, T.J. and Shujiro Urata. 2006. Japan: The Politics of Bilateral Trade Agreements. In Bilateral Trade Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications, edited by Vinod K. Aggarwal and Shujiro Urata. New York: Routledge. Pritchard, Jack. 2004. Beyond Six Party Talks: An Opportunity to Establish a Framework for Multilateral Cooperation in the North Pacific. Paper presented at the Hokkaido Conference for North Pacific Issues, October, Hokkai Gakuen University. Ravenhill, John. 2006. The Political Economy of the New Asia-Pacific Bilateralism: Benign, Banal, or Simply Bad? In Bilateral Trade Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications, edited by Vinod K. Aggarwal and Shujiro Urata. New York: Routledge Shambaugh, David. 2004/05. China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order. International Security 29 (3):64-99. Solingen, Etel. 1998. Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Solis, Mireya and Saori N. Katada. 2007. Understanding East Asian CrossRegionalism: An Analytical Framework. Pacific Affairs 80 (2):229-258. Stanley Foundation. 2006. What did we learn from KEDO? Policy Dialogue Brief. Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation. Available from . Stiglitz, Joseph. 1998. The Role of International Financial Institutions in the Current Global Economy. Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, February. Tsunekawa, Keiichi. 2005. Why So Many Maps There? Japan and East Asian Regional Developments. In Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, edited by T.J. Pempel. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
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United States Trade Representative. 2007. United States and Korea conclude historic trade agreement, April 2. Available from . Wade, Robert. 2000. Wheels within Wheels: Rethinking the Asian Crisis and the Asian Model. Annual Review of Political Science 3:85-115. Ye, Min. 2007. Security Institutions in Northeast Asia: Multilateral Responses to Structural Changes. In Asia’s New Institutional Architecture: Evolving Structures for Managing Trade, Financial, and Security Relations, edited by Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo. New York: Springer.
2 South Korea’s Regional Economic Cooperation Policy: The Evolution of an Adaptive Strategy
Seungjoo Lee Chung-Ang University, Seoul, South Korea Chung-in Moon Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
2.1 Introduction1 South Korea has emerged as the world’s eleventh largest economy less than four decades after the devastation of Japanese colonial rule, the Korean War, and protracted poverty and underdevelopment. Several factors account for its stellar economic performance, including the availability of qualified human capital, a timely transition to an exportled growth strategy, and the guidance of a developmental state. But few have appreciated the merits of South Korea’s external ties. A strong bilateral alliance with the United States allowed South Korea to enjoy the enormous benefits of free riding in both security and economic areas. While American troop presence and massive military assistance eased its security concerns and budgetary burdens, South Korea’s timely access to American markets within the framework of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) served as the engine of its manufactured exports. The alliance with the United States and the status of a developing country within the GATT system powerfully aided South Korea’s economic ascension. 1
We would like to thank Jonathan Chow, Edward Fogarty, and Kristi Govella for their comments and editorial assistance. We also thank Hyun Park for his research assistance.
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However, such benefits could not last forever. As South Korea began to enjoy increasing wealth (and balance of payment surpluses) after the mid-1980s, it became subject to various external constraints. Bilateral pressures from the United States and the European Union (EU) for market opening, regional integration in Europe and North America (the North American Free Trade Area, or NAFTA), and challenges of globalization forced South Korea to realign its regional economic strategy.2 After the mid-1990s, stalled trade cooperation at the WTO level and divisions among members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum on trade liberalization further demanded policy realignment in Seoul. Meanwhile, the 1997 Asian financial crisis highlighted the importance of regional economic cooperation and integration: South Korea under the presidency of Kim Dae-jung initiated the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process, which has the potential to become an “East Asia-wide” free trade area or East Asian community.3 President Roh Moo-hyun, who succeeded Kim in 2003, went further by proposing the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, which aims to institutionalize a specifically Northeast Asian community. This chapter explores the evolutionary dynamics of South Korea’s regional economic cooperation policy within this historical context. More specifically, our chapter will address the following issues: How have external factors, such as the collapse of the Cold War structure in East Asia, the region’s gradual process of institutionalization, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997, affected South Korea’s regional strategy? What domestic factors have been responsible for shaping South Korea’s regional economic policy shift? And how has the interplay of external and domestic factors influenced the formation and evolution of Seoul’s regional policy? Section 2.2 of the chapter provides a brief overview of the global and regional strategies that South Korea pursued in the postwar period. Section 2.3 examines how and why South Korea shifted its policy focus away from multilateralism to regionalism in the post-Cold War period. Section 2.4 highlights South Korea’s policy changes in the 2
Moon and Park 2000, 6; and Aggarwal and Koo 2005. Initially launched in 1998, ASEAN Plus Three has gradually turned into a formal venue for more institutionalized regional cooperation. See Stubbs 2002.
3
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wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Section 2.5 looks into the case of the Roh Moo-hyun government’s Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative. The final section discusses some theoretical and comparative implications of South Korea’s regional community building strategy. 2.2 Gains from Bilateral Security Alliance and Multilateral Trade Policy: Re-Examining Cold War Legacies After World War II, the United States emerged as the hegemonic leader in shaping the regional order governing Northeast Asian security and trade relations.4 With access to the US security umbrella and domestic market, South Korea was a primary beneficiary of these institutional arrangements and regarded them as the mainstay of its foreign policy during the Cold War period. Regionalism – regional cooperation and integration – was not yet on the table. The Cold War system polarized the Northeast Asian region into two competing ideological camps, and collective memory of Japanese colonialism prevented countries in the region from accepting or participating in a regional cooperation and community-building scheme, particularly under Japan’s leadership.5 South Korea was not an exception to this general trend. Lacking a regional option, South Korean trade policy during the Cold War period centered on multilateralism, particularly following its admission to the GATT in 1967. It was a natural outgrowth of South Korea’s export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy. Throughout the postwar period, South Korea utilized EOI as a policy tool to catch up with advanced industrial countries in the West.6 The GATT was a double blessing for South Korea’s export promotion strategy: while facilitating South Korea’s manufactured exports through preferential treatment (i.e., GSP), the GATT allowed it to protect its domestic import markets as a developing country. In this way, the GATT assisted South Korea’s further integration into the world economy.
4
Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; and Calder 2004. Katzenstein 1997. 6 Amsden 1989; and Shin and Chang 2003. 5
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By contrast, South Korea was lukewarm toward building regional institutions to ease security tensions and facilitate economic integration in the region. South Korea’s response to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad’s proposal for forming an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), the first initiative for building a formal East Asian regional economic institution, underscored its tepid interest in East Asian regionalism.7 The EAEG’s rationale reflected the changing political and economic dynamics in East Asia, such as the expansion of Japanese production networks into Southeast Asia after the Plaza Accord of 1985, growing trade conflicts across the Pacific, and newly emerging anti-American sentiment in the region. However, South Korea was reluctant to embrace the idea not only because Mahathir’s scheme excluded the United States, but also because it could have paved the way to the formation of a yen bloc under Japan’s leadership. 2.3 The Emergence of South Korea’s Regional Policy in the Early Post-Cold War Period: Achievements and Limitations The impact of the Cold War’s end did not materialize immediately in Northeast Asia, with its legacies undermining South Korea’s pursuit of regionalism. Despite the Roh Tae-woo government’s ambitious Northern policy, designed to normalize diplomatic relations with China and former communist regimes and to reduce security tensions on the Korean peninsula, the overall security milieu in Northeast Asia was not conducive to promoting South Korea’s regional cooperation strategy. While the first nuclear crisis in 1993–94 derailed Seoul’s engagement policy with North Korea, the bilateral security alliance between Seoul and Washington remained intact.8 Meanwhile, a more positive legacy of the Cold War – the GATT – also limited the scope of Seoul’s regional policy. The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO maintained South Korea’s support for multilateral trade institutions. Together with Japan and
7 8
The EAEG was quickly renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). Suh 2004, 136.
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China, South Korea remained one of the very few WTO member countries that did not enter into any preferential trading agreements.9 While the bilateral security alliance and multilateralism continued to guide South Korea’s foreign economic policy, a variety of developments prompted South Korea to seek more diversified strategies. First, the combined strategy of GATT-centered multilateralism and EOI resulted in an excessive reliance on the US market, which in turn deepened its structural vulnerability. Even a modest slowdown of the US (and world) economy led to a substantial decline of South Korean exports, destabilizing its economic performance. Second, Washington’s trade policy increasingly demanded strict reciprocity, further strengthening South Korea’s incentives to find alternative export markets. In order to overcome chronic bilateral trade deficits with South Korea, the United States aggressively pressured Seoul to open its import markets to American firms, while imposing import restrictions, mostly non-tariff barriers, on South Korean manufactured goods.10 Equally important were the advent of the European Union and the formation of NAFTA. With trade conducted within the framework of such regional preferential agreements growing from 22.5% in 1955 to 66.3% in 1997, South Korea faced increasing fears of exclusion, particularly with respect to these two huge markets. In this rapidly changing environment, East Asian countries realized that they needed to foster intraregional economic cooperation in order not to fall behind the new trend of regionalism elsewhere. Seen from this perspective, time ripened for establishing an inclusive regional framework – namely APEC – rather than a more exclusive regional grouping such as Mahathir’s )EAEG. Along with Australia, Japan was active in creating APEC. Though traditionally maintaining a low-key posture in foreign policy rather than taking leadership,11 Japan played a crucial leading role in creating APEC by not only resuscitating the APEC agenda but also by bridging differences between the United States and East Asian countries. 9
Koo 2005, 142-143. For a concise summary of deteriorating trade relationship between South Korea and the United States, see Moon 1987; Wade 1993; and Bayard and Elliott 1994. During the same period, Japan also faced U.S. pressure for market opening. See Lincoln 2001; Schoppa 1997; and Pekkanen 2005. 11 Doner 1997; and Krauss 2000. 10
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South Korea also welcomed the creation of APEC and participated actively, hosting one of its annual meetings in Seoul in November 1991. Seoul’s rationale was clear. On the one hand, APEC retained a multilateral character with the participation of a large number of countries, attenuating its exclusivity.12 The creation of an Asia-Pacific free trade area would provide South Korea with new access to export markets and resource-rich countries such as ASEAN countries, Australia, and New Zealand. On the other hand, APEC was an institutional choice that could accommodate South Korea’s interests in regionalism as well. APEC possessed a regional character, aiming to serve as a preliminary consultative mechanism for creating a free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific region. South Korea’s participation in APEC meant that it could gradually free itself from the legacies of Cold War and begin to explore the possibilities of regionalism. However, APEC would not prove an equilibrium regional solution. In the mid-1990s, South Korea was forced to reassess its policy in the face of APEC’s internal troubles. The roadmap adopted by the 1994 Bogor Declaration, which set trade liberalization for developed countries by 2010 and for developing countries by 2020, aroused dissension among the membership. At the 1997 APEC summit in Vancouver, two opposing camps, led by North American and East Asian corps respectively, came into conflict over Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL). While the United States and Canada introduced an EVSL initiative to put selected sectors on a faster track toward liberalization, South Korea, Japan, and ASEAN countries strongly opposed this plan. This conflict was symbolic in demonstrating that East Asian countries’ advocacy of an informal and consensual approach clashed with the formal and institutionalized approach favored by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Unable to effectively coordinate conflicts among member countries, APEC lost its appeal as a transregional cooperative body. Amidst APEC’s internal divisions, Mahathir’s vision of )EAEC was resurrected in the form of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) dialogue. The idea of APT was first floated by Singapore’s Prime Minister 12
John Ravenhill argues that it would be more precise to define APEC as a “transregional” body rather than a regional organization equivalent to the EU. Ravenhill 2000, 329.
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Goh Chock Tong in October 1994 when he proposed to hold the inaugural meeting of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM).13 ASEAN countries immediately approved the proposal, demanding that South Korea, China and Japan join ASEM as well. In response to ASEAN’s request, all three Northeast Asian countries participated in a series of preliminary meetings for ASEM during the second half of 1995, setting the tone for the creation of the APT.14 2.4 The Asian Financial Crisis and Changes in South Korea’s Regional Policy The outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 forced South Korea to reevaluate the efficacy of the regional economic policies it had pursued in the post-Cold War period. The way the United States and the IMF handled the crisis generated deep uneasiness throughout East Asia. Initially, American disinterest renewed concerns about the lack of US policy engagement with the region; later, the United States and East Asian countries differed on how to manage the spreading crisis.15 The IMF eventually intervened by imposing its stringent conditionalities on beneficiaries of standby loans – and in the process precipitated immense dissatisfaction with the solutions emanating from Washington. The crisis had a profound impact on East Asian regionalism. It is said that the region’s resentment over American and IMF management of the Asian financial crisis made East Asian countries aware of the need to set up regional cooperative mechanisms.16 Moreover,
13
Hoa 2003, 10. The Asia-Europe Meeting was an initiative of ASEAN to institutionalize cross-regional economic cooperation with the European Union. The first ASEM meeting was held in Bangkok in December 1997. On ASEM, see Gilson 2004. 14 Stubbs 2002, 442. 15 Higgott 1998. 16 For example, Japan floated the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in 1997 by expressing its willingness to contribute more than half of the resources for a US$100 billion fund. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore also indicated their intent to participate in the AMF, and South Korea and most other East Asian countries agreed to the idea. Even China, which was against the idea at first, changed its attitude.
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as mentioned above, APEC’s incapacity to advance cross-Pacific trade liberalization encouraged some of its member states, including South Korea, to search for alternatives.17 It is in this context that the Kim Dae-jung government began to shift its foreign trade policy from multilateralism and transregionalism, such as APEC, to regional and bilateral trade policies. The most pronounced policy initiatives were APT and free trade agreements. 2.4.1 ASEAN+3 Since its inception, thirteen nations in East Asia – the ten members of ASEAN and China, Japan, and South Korea – have striven to expand the scope of APT, rather than utilizing it merely as a preparation session for ASEM.18 The meeting was quickly elevated to the summit level in Kuala Lumpur during the annual ASEAN leaders’ meeting in December 1997. After a second ASEAN leaders’ meeting in 1998, the group turned the meeting into an annual affair. Given that the Kim Dae-jung government was beginning to contemplate a regional strategy, APT seemed to be a proper venue for South Korea to project its ambitious visions. During the 1999 APT summit, the Kim government played a pivotal role in establishing and operating the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and the East Asia Study Group (EASG). Seoul’s initiative derived from a number of factors. First, East Asian countries, still suffering in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, shared a common interest in consolidating regional economic cooperation. Second, East Asia lacked a regional bloc comparable to those in Europe and North America. Third, Kim sought an institutionalized venue for China–Japan–South Korean summits. And finally, Kim had a strong conviction that regional economic integration and cooperation would lead to common prosperity and peace in the region.19 Nonetheless, the AMF did not make any tangible progress, due to strong opposition from the United States. See Harvie and Lee 2003, 43. 17 Bergsten 2000, 20-22. 18 As a consequence, separate ministerial meetings were held under the rubric of ASEAN+3. See Stubbs 2002, 442. 19 For a concise summary of Kim Dae-jung’s policy toward APT, see Kim 2006, 11.
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Seoul’s initiative produced some meaningful changes. The EAVG and EASG set out to examine how to utilize APT as a mechanism to forge regional cooperation and ultimately transform it into a more permanent regional institution. In particular, the EAVG is credited with providing key concepts for regional integration and cooperation. For example, after conducting studies about a joint surveillance of shortterm capital movements and an early warning system in East Asia, the group proposed the establishment of an East Asian Monetary Fund and a regional exchange rate coordination mechanism, which would be geared to the creation of a common currency area in the long run. The EAVG’s principal accomplishment came at the finance ministers’ meeting at Chiang Mai, Thailand, in 2000. The Chiang Mai Initiative worked out a series of agreements among Asian central banks to lend foreign exchange reserves to one another via “swap” agreements to help them protect their currencies on foreign exchange markets.20 Since then, there has been much discussion about creating an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and common currency baskets.21 In November 2000, heads of member countries gathered in Singapore and agreed to explore the possibility of formalizing their ties and forming an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA). This agreement quickly paved the way for others. During the 2004 summit in Vientiane, the ASEAN+3 nations signed thirty-five bilateral or multilateral agreements, including the landmark free trade agreement between China and ASEAN. These agreements are seen as the building blocks toward an eventual region-wide free trade area. Finally, the leaders of the thirteen East Asian nations agreed at a meeting in Laos in December 2004 to hold the first East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005. The launch of the East Asian Summit signifies the beginning of a historic process with the objective of transforming the APT arrangement into an East Asian community.
20 For further details on the Chiang Mai Initiative, see Chap 4 by Katada and Solis in this volume. 21 See for example, Lamberte et al. 2001.
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2.4.2 Reactive Approach to FTAs Apart from APT, free trade agreements provided another alternative for South Korean policymakers.22 South Korea’s heightened interest in FTAs was prompted by a new understanding of their positive effects. The South Korean government previously held the view that FTAs created trade diversion and were not desirable for a trade dependent country such as South Korea. Because of concern over the negative effects of FTAs, South Korea took a passive approach to them in the 1990s. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, however, the Kim Dae-jung government began to claim that FTAs could serve as ‘building blocks’ toward multilateral trade liberalization. Because South Korea was a trading state and many of its largest trading partners had already jumped on the bandwagon, FTAs might have been an unavoidable choice. Indeed, the Kim Dae-jung government’s trade policy remained reactive, aiming to counter others’ FTAs.23 These proliferating FTAs generated a shared concern among the government and private firms that South Korea should not be left behind in the new fad. However, the majority of policymakers still considered multilateralism the best strategy for South Korea, and regarded FTAs as essentially an insurance policy in the case of failure of the multilateral trading regime. It is against this background that the Kim Dae-jung government began to deliberate on FTAs. Immediately after taking office in 1998, its first measure was organizational reform related to foreign economic policy. The Kim government created the Office of the Minister for Trade (OMT) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT).24 Mandated to streamline bureaucratic coordination among multiple government agencies and thereby facilitate negotiations with foreign countries, the OMT had authority over a broad scope of foreign economic policies. Particularly noticeable was the establishment of an FTA bureau within the OMT to facilitate FTA negotiations.
22
Aggarwal and Urata 2006 and Dent 2006 explore FTAs in Asia. Kim and Lee 2003. 24 Koo 2006, 141. 23
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Along with the organizational reform, the Kim Dae-jung government took concrete actions for bilateral FTAs. In November 1998, the Inter-Ministerial Trade Policy Coordination Committee formally announced that South Korea would start FTA negotiations with Chile, while conducting feasibility studies with other prospective FTA partners such as the United States, Japan, New Zealand, and Thailand. Shortly after the announcement, the Kim government created a special task force on a South Korea–Chile FTA, under which five working groups were established to deal with a variety of issues such as market access, trade rules, services, intellectual property and legal procedures.25 The Kim Dae-jung government’s negotiation strategy vis-à-vis FTAs was motivated by its efforts to minimize the negative effects of FTAs on the domestically oriented, import-competing sectors, rather than to maximize positive effects. FTAs are generally expected to generate substantial economic gains over the long run if increased competition leads to improved productivity. However, South Korea has faced two serious challenges in the process of initiating, negotiating, and concluding FTAs with its major trading partners. The first challenge was political, involving a trade-off between short-term political loss and long-term economic gains. Managing the political drama of winners versus losers posed the most critical challenge. The key point was how to deal with the visible costs to certain domestic actors that would appear in the short- to medium-term, before the long-term benefits of FTAs ultimately materialized. Second, heightened competition from imports could bring negative repercussions to inefficient sectors as well as even relatively competitive export-oriented sectors. The thrust of the Kim Dae-jung government’s FTA strategy was reflected in the profile of South Korea’s FTA partners. The Kim government aimed to form FTAs primarily with faraway countries with which South Korea had modest trade volumes. Chile ranked thirtieth among South Korea’s trading partners, accounting for a mere 0.63% of its overall trade. Seoul also negotiated or conducted joint studies with lightweight partners such as India (its sixteenth largest trading partner, with a 1.23% share) and Canada (its twenty-first largest
25
Sohn 2001, 7.
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trading partner, with a 1.11% share).26 Singapore, South Korea’s eleventh largest trading partner (2.33% share), was regarded as an ideal partner because it does not have competitive agricultural sector.27 Chile has a highly competitive and export-oriented agricultural sector, but it was assumed that seasonal difference between the two countries would mitigate negative effects on the Korean agricultural sector.28 2.5 The Roh Moo-hyun Government’s New Regional Policy The Roh Moo-hyun government initially approached the region through its Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative for Peace and Prosperity but later shifted to a more proactive FTA strategy as a more effective mechanism for realizing its strategic goals. 2.5.1 Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative for Peace and Prosperity Upon its inauguration in February 2003, the Roh Moo-hyun government proposed an ambitious regional plan, the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (NEACI). The initiative was intended to build a regional community of mutual trust, reciprocity, and symbiosis. Given developments in other regions of the world, the Roh government saw Northeast Asian regional integration as a justifiable solution to cope with the challenges of globalization and as a way to accomplish the globalization process more efficiently. With Northeast Asia trailing in the regional institution ‘game,’ the initiative aimed to facilitate an expedited process of community-building in economic and security domains. NEACI was a break from previous South Korean policy. The Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam governments undertook “internationalization” and “globalization” campaigns, and the Kim Dae-jung 26 KITA homepage. Available from . Accessed on 15 February 2006. 27 Ibid. 28 Yoo 2002.
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government championed the idea of a broad East Asian community within the APT formula. In contrast, the Roh Moo-hyun government’s initiative was much narrower in scope, focusing solely on Northeast Asia. The Roh government thought it inconceivable to assure an East Asian, Pacific, and global reach without settling immediate political, economic, and socio-cultural challenges arising from its proximate region, Northeast Asia. However, the initiative did not ignore the world beyond Northeast Asia; it foresaw a Northeast Asian focus that would be naturally tied to South Korea’s active involvement East Asia through APT, in the Pacific through APEC, and internationally through multilateral cooperative structures. What motivated the Roh government to propose the NEACI? The most critical impetus was the continuing security dilemma in the region. The dismantling of the Cold War structure led to an end to bipolar military confrontation and improved diplomatic relations among countries in the region. Yet, unlike Europe, the end of the Cold War has not brought about tangible peace dividends in Northeast Asia. The North Korean nuclear quagmire, tensions over the Taiwan Strait, major realignments of US strategic posture in the region, the ascension of China as a global power, and Japan’s move to resuscitate its military power have profoundly complicated the security landscape in Northeast Asia. The economic situation is also complex. Beneath a growing intraregional economic interdependence and division of labor lies a new pattern of intensified competition. Most East Asian countries, regardless of their developmental level, have been moving into more valueadded, capital- and technology-intensive industries. Japan, the newly industrialized economies (NIEs), and ASEAN countries have all promoted cutting-edge industries such as semiconductors and computers. As a result, in contrast to the traditional , “flying geese” model, which was predicated on a harmonious intra-industrial division of labor among countries in the region, a “swarming sparrow” pattern of development has become more prevalent, further deepening economic competition among regional rivals.29 In particular, China, Japan, and South Korea compete head-to-head in terms of export items and destinations, causing a major coordination dilemma. Despite increasing 29
Bernard and Ravenhill 1995; and Rhyu and Lee 2006.
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concerns over fierce competition, duplicated investments, and surplus capacity, the region still lacks both the institutional mechanisms to address such problems and a leading nation to furnish public goods for regional economic cooperation and integration. There also remain socio-cultural challenges. The cultivation of a common regional identity continues to be hampered by lingering parochial nationalism and deepening mutual distrust.30 Bitter historical memories of domination and subjugation still haunt the region, particularly among the people of China and South Korea. As ongoing disputes over historical distortion among Korea, China and Japan demonstrate, nationalism and subsequent cognitive dissonance pose a critical obstacle to region-building in Northeast Asia.31 These cognitive barriers, emanating from a history of bitter enmity, generate real ambivalence regarding intraregional cooperation. NEACI is intended to minimize the negative effects of old and new challenges while maximizing benefits of new opportunities. The Roh government proposed several policy measures in order to implement the initiative. It made diplomatic efforts to transform the Six-Party Talks for the North Korean nuclear crisis into a viable and lasting multilateral security regime. It not only proposed the institutionalization of the China–Japan–ROK summit apart from the ASEAN+3 process, but also initiated a Northeast Asian defense ministers’ meeting. To facilitate this process, it has been strengthening bilateral and multilateral military cooperation and expanding confidence-building measures, such as joint naval exercises, exchange of military personnel, and coordination of training programs among the Northeast Asian countries. The Roh government has also proposed several cooperative projects potentially conducive to Northeast Asian community building. They include cooperation on energy and transportation, the environment, and regional economic development, as well as social and cultural cooperation. However, these ambitious projects have not yet proceeded past the planning phase. Most importantly, failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem through the Six-Party Talks process 30 On the role of ideas and norms in the formation of regionalism in East Asia, see Acharya 2004. 31 Kim and Moon 1997; and Funabashi 2003.
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has not only critically undermined inter-Korean relations, but also derailed efforts to institutionalize multilateral security cooperation in the region. Moreover, precarious inter-Korean relations have blocked the implementation of such cooperative regional projects as energy and transportation networks. Unpredictable external events have also prevented the Roh government’s Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative from making meaningful progress. For example, in December 2005, deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations culminated in a clash at the ninth APT summit at Kuala Lumpur, which was followed by the first East Asian Summit (EAS). Seoul’s relations with Tokyo have also deteriorated in recent years. Aside from the thorny issues such as Japanese history textbooks and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine, the perennial territorial dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands has plagued bilateral relations.32 2.5.2 Proactive FTA Strategy With its ambitious regional vision in trouble, the Roh government realized that FTAs might be a more effective mechanism for achieving its strategic goals. Although the policy shift toward FTAs under President Kim Dae-jung had marked a dramatic departure from South Korea’s traditional trade policy, it was not until President Roh entered office in 2003 that the roadmap for FTAs and detailed action plans for its FTA strategy were prepared.33 The Roh Moo-hyun administration consolidated Kim’s FTA agenda by outlining a comprehensive roadmap for South Korea’s multitrack FTAs. Under the roadmap, South Korea’s FTA partners are classified into three broad groups: (1) immediate FTA partners such as Chile, Singapore, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and Japan; (2) mediumterm FTA partners such as Mexico, Canada, ASEAN, and China; and (3) long-term FTA partners such as the United States, the EU, and India. The roadmap emphasized that FTAs were an important part of South Korea’s goal to become an “open trading state.”34 In 32
Rozman 2006. Lee 2006, 5; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea 2006. 34 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea 2006. 33
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contrast to its rather peripheral status in President Kim’s economic and strategic agenda, FTA policy became a core element of President Roh’s foreign economic policy vision. As shown in Table 2.1 below, South Korea’s FTA track record has been remarkable. After ratification of the South Korea–Chile FTA in 2004, South Korea signed and ratified FTAs with Singapore, the EFTA, and ASEAN in 2004–2005. These four FTAs would likely cover about 14% of South Korea’s total trade, if fully implemented.35 South Korea also signed an FTA with the United States in 2007, which currently awaits ratification, and has been negotiating FTAs with Japan, Canada, and Mexico. In addition, a number of feasibility studies are currently underway with China, India, the EU, South Africa, and MERCOSUR. If these prospective FTAs were concluded successfully, they would likely cover up to 65% of South Korea’s total trade.36 Table 2.1 Current status of South Korea’s FTAs37 Under joint study
Under negotiation
Korea–China Korea–China–Japan Korea–GCC Korea–MERCOSUR Korea–SACU
Korea–Canada Korea–EU Korea–Japan Korea–India Korea–Mexico
Awaiting ratification Korea–US
Concluded Korea–Chile Korea–EFTA Korea–Singapore Korea–ASEAN
A careful examination of the Roh Moo-hyun government’s FTAs reveals two interesting anomalies. One is the lack of policy efforts to expedite a FTA among China, Japan, and South Korea, and the other is an unexpectedly early push for the ROK–US FTA. One might expect rapidly rising intraregional trade and FDI in Northeast Asia to spur South Korea to prioritize institutionalized economic cooperation with China and Japan. South Korea is expected to realize significant tangible and intangible benefits from bilateral and/or trilateral FTAs among the three countries. Nonetheless, it has 35
KITA homepage. Available from . Ibid. 37 MOFTA FTA Homepage. Available from . 36
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made very little progress on these fronts, which is puzzling given these countries’ geographic proximity and economic interdependence. Three factors have combined to hinder the formation of FTAs in Northeast Asia. The first and most important factor is historical animosity and its legacies lingering in the minds of the people in the three countries.38 One might think that this antipathy would not have a direct impact on the creation of a China–Japan–Korea FTA. In reality, however, the success of a trilateral FTA depends on domestic consensus and the absence of veto players. Collective memory of the past and clashes of national identities can easily disrupt efforts to institutionalize the trilateral FTA by mobilizing political opposition. It took about five years for South Korea and Japan to launch formal government-level negotiations in 2003. Bilateral talks stopped after the sixth round of negotiations in November 2004.39 Second, rivalry between China and Japan is another obstacle. China and Japan have not yet entered a head-to-head collision, but a delicate pattern of rivalry between the two countries has hampered the formation of a trilateral FTA. Whereas Beijing has favored the FTA approach, Tokyo has been reluctant due to fear that China would be the major beneficiary. Likewise, intensified rivalry between the two countries can severely hurt the momentum for institutionalizing broader economic integration in East Asia, as illustrated by their competitive efforts to attract ASEAN as an FTA partner. This rivalry is highly likely to mitigate against the formation of a Northeast Asian FTA for the foreseeable future. Third, countries are concerned about the distribution of benefits from bilateral FTAs in the region (see Table 2.2). A China–Japan FTA would make South Korea a loser, and a Korea–Japan FTA would hurt China. But a China–Japan–South Korea trilateral FTA is expected to produce positive-sum outcomes for all, even though there is a problem of relative gains. Judged from the matrix of mutual gains emerging from the Northeast Asian FTA, it seems irrational for the three countries not to expedite the formal institutionalization of regional cooperation through an FTA. In South Korea, it is generally believed that an FTA in Northeast Asia would balance its trade profile, while reducing 38 39
Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003; and Pempel 2005. MOFTA FTA Homepage. Available from .
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its trade deficits with Japan and at least maintaining the status quo with China. Table 2.2 Balance sheet of FTAs between and among Korea, Japan, and China (%, millions of US dollars)40 Korea–Japan FTA China–Japan Korea–China– Korea–China FTA FTA Japan FTA GDP* Economic GDP* Economic GDP* Economic GDP* Ecogains gains gains nomic gains Korea 3.2 12644.5 2.4 10687.8 1.1 3682.8 −0.2 −1189.6 China 1.3 8191.2 0.2 917.0 0.0 1.1 7335.3 −358.0 Japan 0.2 12265.1 0.0 119.9 0.0 2184.7 0.2 10289.8 * Effect on GDP growth rates in percentage
But some pessimists in South Korea claim that a Northeast Asian FTA would sandwich South Korea between horizontal competition with China and vertical pressures from Japan. This concern is particularly palpable in the agricultural sector, in which liberalization seems inevitable in the formation of the Northeast Asian FTA. Given that political opposition from the agricultural sector still remains quite formidable, it is a daunting task for the South Korean government to push for the Northeast Asian FTA. Competitive economic structures create another hurdle to intraregional cooperation. China, Japan, and South Korea have maintained rather complementary economic structures in the past. In 1996, for example, there was no overlap among the top ten export items among the three countries. Only five items overlapped in the top 50 export items, and eight in the top 100. But by 2002, two items overlapped in the top ten, ten items in the top 50, and 15 items in the top 100. Japan and South Korea have shown a relatively steady trend in overlapped export items (e.g., from four to five in the top ten export items, and from 34 to 39 in the top 100 export items). But China is changing the overall landscape of East Asian competition. China’s ascension is literally threatening Japan and South Korea. There were no overlapping items between the two pairs of countries in their top ten export items in 1996, but this rose to four items in 2002. In short, the number of competing items in the top 100 also increased from 15 40
Japanese Cabinet Secretariat. Quoted in Dong-A Ilbo, 11 January 2002.
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in 1996 to 29 in 2002.41 The increasingly competitive nature of these countries’ economic structures has made the subregional idea less attractive to them. Table 2.3 Overlapping export items between and among Korea, Japan, and China Overlapping top export items 1996 2002 0 2 China–Japan–ROK 4 5 Japan–ROK 0 4 China–Japan + China–ROK Countries
10Overlapping top export items 1996 2002 8 15 34 39 15 29
100
Under these conditions, China, Japan, and South Korea have adopted an “ASEAN first, and Northeast Asia later” posture. Because China and Japan were each more interested in an FTA with ASEAN, South Korea had to follow the path they set. This “detour regionalism” is likely to delay the process of Northeast Asian economic community building. With Northeast Asian regionalism stagnating, in February 2006 the Roh government surprised the Korean public by announcing that it would embark on FTA negotiations with the United States, becoming the first Northeast Asian country to do so. South Korea’s entrance into the “KORUS” FTA negotiations signaled that the focus of its FTA policy had profoundly changed from a reactive and gradualist strategy to minimize the negative effects of FTAs, to a proactive and aggressive strategy aimed to maximize their benefits. Overall, the two countries’ complementary industrial structures suggest that South Korea is not likely to suffer serious negative repercussions. Benefits would be concentrated in South Korea’s major industries such as auto and other manufacturing products, realized at the expense of South Korea’s less competitive agricultural and service sectors.42 Yet despite the political sensitivity of issues such as screen quotas in the film industry, government subsidies to farmers, and restructuring of the financial sector, the Roh Moo-hyun government pressed forward with the negotiations.
41 42
KITA press release, 12 September 2002. Schott and Choi 2001.
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What accounts for the policy shift? First, the Roh government believed that the KORUS FTA has the potential to improve not only economic ties but also overall diplomatic and security relations between Seoul and the Washington. In light of the changing security outlook in Northeast Asia – China’s growth, Japan’s normalization, and most importantly North Korea’s nuclear adventurism – the Roh government might have seen few options but to strengthen its ties with the United States. Second, an ideological shift within the South Korean government also played a role. Traditionally, South Korean bureaucrats have had a mercantilist mindset. Although bureaucrats in the Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung governments championed globalization and neoliberal reforms, their mercantile ethos remained rather intact. But under the Roh Moo-hyun government, economic policymakers have become sufficiently liberal to proactively initiate FTA negotiations with a government that would clearly demand greater market access. Kim Dae-jung’s neoliberal reforms focused on the domestic arena, clearly articulating the linkage between these domestic reforms and foreign economic policy; Roh’s government used the FTA negotiations to expedite this restructuring of the Korean economy by introducing new competition in inefficient sectors. This view – that FTAs can be tied explicitly to the purpose of locking in economic reform – has become prevalent within the Roh Moo-hyun government.43 For this purpose, the Roh government highlighted the previously undersold potential benefits of FTAs: decreasing prices of imported goods, increasing productivity, growing employment, attracting foreign capital, and so on. Third, reflecting this ideological shift, the OMT emerged as the chief government agency in charge of FTA policymaking within the government. Its institutional legitimacy was not firmly established under the Kim Dae-jung government. But with its enhanced status under the Roh Moo-hyun government, OMT gradually took a leadership role in foreign trade affairs that in turn led to changes in the bureaucratic balance of power. Furthermore, as a champion of neoliberal economic ideas, the OMT was well positioned to fend off domestic 43
Indeed countries often use FTAs to expedite the economic adjustment process. See Pempel and Urata 2006; Solis and Katada 2005; and Ravenhill 2006.
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opposition as well. As an agency in charge of foreign economic policymaking, the OMT is relatively free from pressure from special interest groups.44 In addition, when NGOs and interest groups from sensitive sectors, such as the film industry, agriculture, and service sectors, raised their voices opposing the KORUS FTA,45 the Roh government responded by establishing a presidential committee to effectively shield the OMT from mounting domestic opposition in August 2006.46 To summarize, South Korea’s FTA strategy under the Roh Moohyun government has turned more proactive, as evidenced by its efforts to conclude FTAs with a number of countries, including the United States. In contrast to the reactive approach taken by the Kim Dae-jung government, the Roh government consciously attempted to link a KORUS FTA to domestic economic reforms, while placing it within a broader context of bolstering strategic partnerships between the two countries. 2.6 Conclusion We have examined how South Korea’s regional policy has evolved in the face of external factors such as the collapse of the Cold War structure in East Asia, the region’s slowed progress of institutionalization, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997. As a primary beneficiary of the Cold War structure, epitomized by the bilateral security alliance with the United States and GATT-centered multilateralism, South 44 Of course, this does not mean that the OMT operates in a political vacuum. Aside from its critics and public opinion, the OMT closely consults various private business councils as well as the National Economic Advisory Council under the President’s Office. Yet in contrast to its counterpart ministries in the government, such as the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MOCIE), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MOAF), the OMT rarely consults small firms and individual farmers directly, while putting much more emphasis on the feedback from big business and industry associations, such as the Federation of Korean Industries, the Korea International Trade Association, and the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business. See Lee 2006, 7. 45 Joongang Daily, 3 February 2006. 46 Chosun Daily, 24 July 2006.
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Korea took a passive approach to building regional institutions to ease security tensions and to facilitate economic integration in Northeast Asia. After the end of the Cold War, the lethargic progress of multilateral trade liberalization spurred South Korea to explore complementary strategies. At the time, APEC was an optimal choice: a regional body with a multilateral character. But the Asian financial crisis prompted South Korea to make another policy turn. The region’s resentment over American and IMF management of the crisis prompted East Asian countries to pursue cooperative mechanisms at the regional level. In accordance with this changing milieu, the Kim Dae-jung government became keenly interested in a new version of East Asian regionalism. Specifically, the Kim government took initiative in institutionalizing the ASEAN+3 process, expecting that it had a potential to lead to an East Asia-wide free trade area or East Asian community. With the international trading environment in flux, the Kim government also embraced bilateral FTAs. Inspired by its predecessor’s vision and strategy, the current Roh Moo-hyun government has actively explored ways to build and enhance a regional community in Northeast Asia, while redefining FTA strategies in a more proactive way. The Roh government has aimed to solve perennial regional problems, such as palpable security tensions, economic competition, and socio-cultural conflicts, by unveiling an ambitious plan for a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia. However, this ambitious regionalist vision withered in the face of stalemate in the Six-Party Talks, Sino-Japanese rivalry, and deteriorating bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan. In the face of policy gridlock, the Roh government decided to take advantage of FTAs as a policy tool for realizing its strategic goals. With this policy objective in mind, the Roh government took a proactive approach to FTAs, in stark contrast to its predecessor.
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———. 2006. The Political Economy of the New Asia-Pacific Bilateralism: Benign, Banal or Simply Bad? In Bilateral Trade Agreements in the AsiaPacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications, edited by Vinod K. Aggarwal and Shujiro Urata, 27-49. London, UK: Routledge. Rhyu, Sang-young and Seungjoo Lee. 2006. Changing Dynamics in Korea–Japan Economic Relations: Policy Ideas and Development Strategies. Asian Survey 46 (2):195-214. Rozman, Gilbert. 2006. South Korean-Japanese Relations as a Factor in Stunted Regionalism. Paper presented at a conference entitled “Northeast Asia’s Economic and Security Regionalism: Old Constraints and New Prospects,” Center for International Studies, University of Southern California. Schoppa, Leonard. 1997. Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can Do and Cannot Do. New York: Columbia University Press. Schott, Jeffrey and Inbom Choi. 2001. Free Trade between Korea and the United States? Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics. Shin, Jang-Sup and Ha-Joon Chang. 2003. Restructuring Korea Inc. London, UK: Routledge. Sohn, Chan-hyun. 2001. Korea’s FTA Developments: Experiences and Perspectives with Chile, Japan, and the U.S. Paper presented at a conference entitled “Regional Trading Arrangements: Stocktake and Next Steps,” Trade Policy Forum, Bangkok. Solis, Mireya and Saori Katada. 2005. The Japan-Mexico FTA: A Cross-regional Step in the Path towards Asian Regionalism. Paper presented at a conference entitled “East Asian Cross Regionalism,” Center for International Studies, University of Southern California. Stubbs, Richard. 2002. ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism? Asian Survey 42 (3):440-455. Suh, J. J. 2004. Bound to Last? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Analytical Eclecticism. In Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, edited by J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, 131-171. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Wade, Robert. 1993. Managing Trade: Taiwan and South Korea as Challenges to Economics and Political Science. Comparative Politics 25 (2):147-167. Yoo, Hyun Seok. 2002. Han-cheele jayoomooyeokhyeopjeongui gooknaejeongchi: gooknaehyeopsangui ihaejipdangwa gooknaejaedoreul joongsimeuro [The Domestic Politics of Korea-Chile Trade Agreement Negotiation: Interest Groups and Domestic Institutions in Domestic Negotiations]. Korean Political Science Review 36 (3):198-221.
3 Rhetoric or Vision? Chinese Responses to U.S. Unilateralism
Kun-Chin Lin National University of Singapore, Singapore
3.1 Introduction1 In the post-Cold War era, and in particular with the onset of the USled global War on Terrorism, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has talked a big game about Asian regionalism. But it is not just talk: the PRC is thinking big and pulling together elements of a grand strategy in the Asian regional context. Its core foreign policy interests in the post-Cold War era derive directly from the post-Mao political elite’s formative experience of witnessing the collapse of international communism and fellow communist regimes, and have remained constant to the present.2 These core interests center on the long-term goal of disrupting US-centered alliances in the Asia-Pacific, as these structures are perceived to restrain China’s inevitable rise to great power status. Beijing sees this primary goal as necessarily long-term because in its own estimation it is weak in both hard and soft power and continues to face enduring American ties in the region. However, 1
I would like to thank Jonathan Chow, Edward Fogarty, and Kristi Govella for their comments and editorial assistance on this chapter. 2 For more information about Chinese leaders’ nationalism and self-understanding as a rising power since the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, see Friedman 2005. I have benefited greatly from discussions with Professor Friedman (University of Wisconsin). Yuen-Foong Khong at Nuffield College also offered helpful insights, drawing on his expertise at The Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, NTU, Singapore.
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in the punctuated “post-triple” period, China has increasingly varied its diplomatic and institutional strategies to achieve this long-term goal while maintaining pragmatism in formulating its short-term or corollary goals and promoting a regional image of China as a pacifist multilateral player. This chapter examines variations in these goals and tactics in the context of the Asian Financial Crisis and the War on Terrorism. Chinese activism in bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral negotiations on trade and investment, energy, and security cooperation in the past five years shows a pattern of PRC opportunism in exploiting US weaknesses – particularly those revealed by American unilateral actions during the above crises, and the consequent willingness of Asian countries to consider changes to the nature of regional cooperation. Indeed, China’s specific preferences regarding Japan’s remilitarization, the Korean Peninsula face-off, and the Taiwan question – issues often discussed separately with much cultural or historical gloss – are embedded in the long-term goal of overcoming US-based obstacles to China’s rise to regional hegemony. Generally speaking, in the short run, Chinese initiatives have generated welfare gains for all actors in Asia. Nonetheless, Beijing’s essentially Cold War mentality – even in its latest doctrine of China’s “peaceful rise” – will undercut its own efforts at multilateralism and reduce the likelihood of peaceful solutions to the most explosive situations in the region. The current positive-sum game will fall apart with increasing power asymmetries between China and the rest of Asia. 3.1.1 A Process Framework for Analyzing Chinese Strategies The analytical framework for this chapter stresses the centrality of the PRC–US relations in motivating China’s efforts to shape the regional architecture. The PRC’s relationship with the United States looms large in conventional accounts of uneasy stability across a wide range of issues in Asia, whereas China’s relations with other countries are accorded a second-order importance. This premise remains largely accurate. It follows that over time changes in China’s intentions and strategies toward regional arrangements will reflect Chinese responses
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to perceived inadequacies in US-centered relationships and institutions in Asia. Drawing on social mobilization theories and insights from gametheoretical institutional analysis, I argue that ideational and institutional adaptations may neither have clear nor beneficial payoffs for the innovating state in the short-run (per realist theories), nor represent genuine, substantive changes in belief systems (per liberalcosmopolitan theories).3 Instead, they may constitute time-contingent framing and signaling devices useful for Beijing to explore opportunities to project power amid regional dissatisfaction with US leadership. For China, cultivation of a pacifist multilateral image opens up maximally flexible margins for testing issue linkages previously nested under Cold War security alliances and thus immune from its manipulation. In the social movement literature, “framing” is a process through which policy entrepreneurs or activists produce and disseminate meanings that differ from and often challenge the status quo in order to “mobilize potential adherents and constituencies, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists.”4 To increase the scope and commitment of the mobilized coalition, as well as their influence over multiple movements, activists construct “master frames.” These are broad frameworks that articulate shared understandings of problem diagnostics, attribute reward or blame, and generate desirable solutions, 3
Here I differ from Kang 2003, who also argues against realist predictions of arms races and power politics in post-Cold War Asia, noting instead that China’s neighbors have chosen to bandwagon rather than balance against China. Similarly invoking deep-rooted cultural memories of a hierarchical and informal regional order in Asia, Teo 2004 claimed that imperial China gave more to its tributary states than it received from them. I doubt that this asymmetry characterizes contemporary China-Southeast Asian relations, and caution against adopting this debatable historical characterization of China as a soft-power hegemon, with the implication that smaller Asian countries must choose allegiance between China and the United States. 4 Snow and Benford 1988, 198. Also see McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; and Tarrow 1998 for background concepts and theories. Tarrow 2001 applies framing analysis to anti-globalization social movements; there is no reason why states cannot apply the same techniques, or their words cannot be assessed closely for attempts to provoke others to act on their behalf, which would accord with the classic definition of power.
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alternatives, and arrangements to coordinate collective action.5 Adroit application of framing in the international arena helps to reveal other players’ preferences and options and assess how far and fast China could advocate changes in regional organizations. To ground the framing innovations in tangible form, China attempts through overlapping bilateral and multilateral negotiations to manipulate “self-reinforcing institutional dynamics” through repeated games and trust mechanisms that support its posture as a rising power without overt hegemonic ambitions.6 Framing issues in a way that highlights US neglect or indifference can allow China to forge new relationships with its neighbors and alter the “quasi-parameters” of existing regional institutions. Over time, such interactions will reduce the range of situations in which the pre-existing behaviors are self-reinforcing, allowing China to “condition” Asian economic and security arrangements to react to an exogenous shock in a favorable path-dependent manner. 3.1.2 Basic Components of Chinese Strategic Innovation I argue that the PRC’s emerging grand strategy did not gain coherence until after the Asian Financial Crisis. Since then, it has consisted of: (1) disarming regional fears of a rising China, (2) gathering information about former members of the US-led Cold War coalition, and (3) creating a new regional dynamic accommodative of China’s great power aspirations. First, China expresses a formal doctrinal acceptance of American global hegemony, the liberal nature of the global trade, investment, and finance regimes, and their associated environmental, human rights, and equity qualifications. Within this context, it advertises a new, postCold War security paradigm emphasizing China’s “peaceful rise” as a historical inevitability. An open declaration that China does not oppose American hegemony also implies that it does not seek to upset the regional balance of power – that is, no new arrangements are necessary to help China ascend the regional hierarchy, become the hub of regional trade and investment pacts, or gain decisive control over the 5 6
Benford and Snow 2000, 613. Greif and Laitin 2004.
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Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. To the extent that it can persuade the United States and others of this vision, China gains room to formulate new linkages between the emerging non-traditional security concerns and conventional economic issues.7 This is the psychological disarming component of China’s grand strategy. Second, China expresses confidence that time is on its side, touting Asian countries’ mutual interests in fostering economic interdependence while brushing off tough questions of relative gains, trade and investment diversion, and power asymmetries between itself and others. Since the early 1990s, the growth of the Chinese domestic market has created favorable interdependencies with neighboring countries: a surge in trade and investment flows with Japan; investment outflows from Taiwan; increasing reliance of the Republic of Korea’s (ROK’s) economy on Chinese growth; lock-in of Hong Kong’s special role in promoting coastal growth; and (politically favorable) trade deficits with Southeast Asian countries. Furthermore, the first wave of China’s outward FDI has motivated intensified diplomacy. Economic interdependence centered on the differentiation and expansion of the Chinese domestic market draws immediate cooperation from Asian countries even as they risk “obsolescent bargaining” (to liberally apply Raymond Vernon’s term) in face of China’s economic boom.8 Waiting for its neighbors to come to grips with its rising economic influence, China commits to regional institutionalization to help consolidate its position. This is the preference revealing and preference formation component of China’s grand strategy. Third, after two decades of participation in liberal IOs, China has acquired sufficient experience to emulate a certain sophistication regarding regime building. This sophistication involves a keen awareness of the relative costs and benefits of tinkering with perceptions and institutions and their underlying power and social relations – in contrast to a crude attitude of merely choosing to follow, opt out, or
7
As Alastair Johnston has noted, “security dilemmas are socializing experience” through which leaders of nations redefine their interests, the nature of security goods in contention, and issue linkages. Johnston 2003, 56. 8 Obsolescent bargaining refers to a situation where the original agreement between parties becomes obsolescent as one or more parties seek to improve their position.
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sit on the fence.9 Beijing has showed an understanding of other actors’ needs and sensitivities to Chinese initiatives in its framing efforts, exploiting ambiguities in Asian countries’ support of the US dominant roles in the Asian Financial Crisis and War on Terrorism. China realizes that while all have chosen to bandwagon, they would prefer to hedge if given a feasible option safe from American retaliation. At a minimum, China’s neighbors would be willing to explore the tactical linkages of non-US alliances; at most, they would shift from hedging to bandwagoning with China. Drawing on strong substantive linkages established by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) experiences, and galvanized by shared formative experiences during the Asian Financial Crisis and the rise of China, Asian countries express more than a passing curiosity in redirecting the “tactical linkages” of issues and the “nesting” order of institutional forums.10 China has taken advantage of this creative reality, making strides in the power realignment component of China’s grand strategy. The following sections trace how the Cold War, the Asian Financial Crisis, and the War on Terrorism created enabling conditions for a new Chinese approach to regional order. External security shocks, along with China’s economic expansion and the region’s growing interdependence, created uncertainties that pressured Asian countries to reexamine their conceptions of transnational issues such as security, trade and investment, energy, and territorial disputes. China has steered these explorations toward new relations and institutions that challenge the power structures based on US-centered alliances. 3.2 The PRC’s Position in the Cold War Institutional Equilibrium: 1978–1989 After the Maoist era and prior to the implosion of the Soviet bloc, China maintained a critical attitude toward institution building in Northeast Asia. Its disengagement stemmed from a Cold War understanding of itself as a victim of American-based alliances in 9 See Medeiros and Fravel 2003 for an alternative view of China’s “sophistication” in regional diplomacy. 10 On tactical linkages and nesting, see Aggarwal 1998.
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Asia.11 Preoccupied with normalizing relations with the two superpowers, China interpreted its diplomacy toward Japan, the ROK, and North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) largely through the calculus of these countries’ contributions to stabilizing Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations.12 In the first ten years of the post-Mao reforms, China was not susceptible to forces of interdependence or globalization. China’s trade dependency ratios (export/GDP and import/GDP) ranked second lowest in East Asia after Japan, and the proportion of net FDI inflows to total investment in China was the lowest among newly industrializing countries.13 Interregional income multiplier effect analysis shows that China was somewhat affected by investments within Taiwan, the ROK, the United States, and Hong Kong, but hardly affected by investments within ASEAN countries. At the same time, Chinese domestic investment affected income growth in Japan and the United States, but hardly anywhere else. Overall, the newly industrializing countries (NICs) – Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and the ROK – had a far greater impact on the region than did China. As compared to the period after the late-1990s, growth in China and other East Asian countries helped to spread economic clout more evenly across the region. The PRC managed its economic vulnerability through the partystate’s default option of scaling back market incentives and open borders and reimposing planning mechanisms at the first signs of economic trouble. It also lacked sensitivity from reliance on crude oil and other raw material from abroad, and on foreign capital and tourism to generate urban growth. It took US sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident to make policymakers aware that China’s
11
For basic texts on Chinese foreign policy, see Ross 1995; and Dittmer 1992. For further reading, see Dittmer 2005; Mann 1999; and Dittmer and Kim 1993. “Stabilizing” by no means implied conflict avoidance or moderation in negotiations— as evidenced by China’s demand that Gorbachev remove the “three fundamental obstacles” (Sino-Russian border disputes and the Russian military presence in Mongolia and Afghanistan) and its attempts to pressure the United States to adopt the PRC’s version of the One China Policy and reduce military support for Taiwan. 13 The following analysis is based on Osada 1997/8. 12
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continuing reform was in fact dependent on an export-oriented sector within a mercantilist framework. During this time, the PRC’s approach to regional and international organizations was a “mini-max” strategy of minimizing commitments and maximizing gains (ideally, through free-riding).14 The strategy drew on extreme suspicion and pessimism regarding organizations in which the United States participated.15 While IOs were considered to be instruments of “peaceful evolution” by the United States and its allies, China viewed its relations within all of Asia through a particular realist lens that ignored the dynamics of interactions between members of cooperative institutions. Prior to the end of the Cold War, China preferred to act on a bilateral basis. In the 1970s, Japan was the first country to approach China with the market in mind, largely due to its relative security under the US alliance as well as Japanese and Chinese leaders’ recognition of the complementarities in their economies.16 In the 1980s, while being wooed by both the United States and the Soviet Union, China started moving toward a “no-nuke” stance for the Korean Peninsula and commenced bilateral negotiations that would lead to the settlement of most border disputes within twenty years. To achieve economic development and social stability at home, China maintained three main foreign policy goals of reducing border tensions, espousing a peaceful environment under the superpower détente, and deterring US interventions on behalf of Taiwan. The Chinese Foreign Ministry pursued these goals almost exclusively through bilateral ties or through the exercise of veto powers in a handful of global forums. 3.3 Negotiating New Regional Arrangements in the Post-Cold War Era: Sharpening the Survival Instinct of the Leninist Party-State The following section addresses the fall of the Soviet Empire from the perspective of Chinese leaders and China’s early participation in regional organizations during the 1990s. 14
Kim 1994. Pearson 1999. 16 For an excellent analysis of China’s economic diplomatic history, see Reardon 2002. 15
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3.3.1 The Fall of the Soviet Empire and the Worldview of Chinese Leaders The end of the Cold War hit home for China’s political leadership. The spontaneous mass support of students’ protests coinciding with Gorbachev’s visit of Beijing, and the aftermath of the brutal crackdown in Tiananmen Square, instilled a powerful sense of vulnerability in the Chinese national consciousness.17 Chinese leaders reacted by shutting the gates to the Middle Kingdom and spewing vitriol against the US-led trade sanctions and the regular condemnations of its human rights record. Edward Friedman has persuasively demonstrated that the near simultaneity of the international communist bloc’s collapse and the domestic uprising profoundly shaped the basic worldview of Deng Xiaoping’s successors.18 In contrast to the marked cognitive flexibility and cosmopolitanism of the first generation of Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zeminand his cohort fundamentally interpreted world events from a fixed metanarrative of deliberate American efforts to contain China’s return to the world stage.19 The triumphalism of neoliberal market ideology and expectations for an inevitable sweep of non-democratic regimes, as captured in Fukuyama’s “The End of History,” further confirmed this harsh worldview.20 It would be fair to say that China might have 17
For cultural and psychological analyses of the Tiananmen Square Incident, see Wang 2004; Fewsmith 2001; and Mila 1996. It could be argued that the lasting impact of 1989 was even more concentrated on the elite consciousness, as the populace was deprived of information, legitimacy, or social space to grieve, soulsearch, and mobilize in commemoration. The elite continue to grapple with the implications of a nationally repressed memory, as indicated by their caution in honoring the passing of the disgraced leader Zhao Ziyang in 2005. 18 Friedman 2005. 19 See Reardon 2002 for documentation of Mao’s and Zhou’s pragmatism in the early-1970s in engineering China’s exit from the self-imposed autarkic order. Going back to the first few years of the PRC, the CCP made efforts to lure Japan away from alliance with America, including making historical revisions to blame the Nanjing Massacre on the American missionaries who set up the safety zone which saved Chinese lives. (Author’s email correspondence with Edward Friedman, 10 August 2006.) One simply cannot imagine similar flexibility from Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao toward Japan. 20 Fukuyama 1992.
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regressed to near-autarky for an extended period if it were not for the sober commitment of Deng Xiaoping to the continuation of export-oriented reform as symbolized by the special economic zones.21 Certainly, no politician spoke positively of international engagement, and the campaign to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) was unceremoniously dropped.22 At the same time, the reality of the US preponderance of economic and military might, and even ideological persuasion, demanded a new Chinese strategic response. Rudely awakened after its dalliance with the two superpowers in the early 1980s, and with Russia incapacitated by its own transition, China found a renewed justification for seeking a “multipolar world.” Beyond frequent exegeses in the People’s Daily and Xinhua wires to the foreign media, however, there appeared no obvious and feasible steps to realize this global power realignment.23 Even as Japan quickly resumed economic relations with China, it did not seriously consider forsaking its security pact with the United States. The Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated American military superiority and its willingness to use this superiority in regions of strategic importance. As a result, Chinese leaders muddled along with defensive foreign policy reactions in a security environment perceived as latently uncertain and hostile, while focusing on developing domestic economic strength and military capabilities, and on repairing the party-state controls over the administrative apparatus and social interests.24 Starting in 1989, China reversed its decade-long downgrading of military spending, posting double-digit annual growth rates in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) budget.25
21
Gallagher 2005. For a catalogue of key events, see “China’s Long March to WTO Entry.” Available from . Accessed 10 December 2001. 23 Kim 1991. 24 Osada 1997 and 1998 shows that trade dependency ratios and the weight of FDI net inflows to the overall investment amount scaled new heights after 1993—the former increased more rapidly and the latter doubled in that year. 25 For exact estimates, see “China’s Defense Budget—China’s ‘Official’ Budget.” Available from . 22
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3.3.2 Early Participation in Regional Organizations: Toward Greater Multilateralism Chinese leaders displayed lukewarm interest and cautious involvement in regional economic and security institutions in the first half of 1990s. At this point, the Chinese understood cooperation on security, trade, investment, and energy issues to be approximating “club” goods under US control. In China’s public statements, the desire for multipolarity translated into a unifying theme reiterating China’s perception of the Asia region as “relatively peaceful” and deserving of a more multilateral approach to regional security issues – that is, one less dominated by Washington. Based on this understanding, China relied strongly on unilateral actions and bilateral agreements that emphasized state sovereignty and expressed wariness of multilateralism. On Northeast Asian security issues, China expressed little willingness to compromise, insensitivity to differentiations among the interests of US allies, and a lack of readiness to work collectively to provide solutions. China upset Japan by conducting nuclear testing before signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, leading the latter to suspend the grant portion of its loans to China from 1995–97 and to seek closer ties with the United States.26 As a result, the April 1996 US–Japan Declaration on Security went beyond bilateral cooperation to cover defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and justify a Japanese military buildup. Meanwhile, by conducting missile launches in the Taiwan Strait during Taiwan’s March 1996 presidential election, China triggered US defensive responses and galvanized Taiwanese voters to vote for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party. Furthermore, during various negotiations among the DPRK, ROK, and United States in 1991–1996, China declined to participate, leaving Washington in the pivotal role of sole intermediary.27 A 1993 statement in the Beijing Review illustrated Beijing’s typically aloof attitude, proclaiming, “the [denuclearization] issue was a direct matter between DPRK and the three sides – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States, and the Republic of Korea.”28 China declined to participate in the Korean 26
Dittmer 2005, 11. Pritchard 2005. 28 Cited in Wu 2005, 36. 27
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Energy Development Organization (KEDO), established in 1994 to engage DPRK with incentives of heavy oil and light water reactors.29 Even after it joined the Four-Party Talks upon the Clinton Administration’s invitation in 1996, China acted as if it were an intruding outsider in an informal process controlled by the United States. Ok-Nim Chung characterizes China’s participation in multilateral security forums in the mid-1990s as follows: In principle, Chinese officials support the idea of multilateral dialogues to exchange views and promote mutual understanding. In practice, they have been cautious at multilateral meetings, acutely sensitive to perceived intrusions into Chinese sovereignty, sometimes rigid in presenting their views, and frequently anxious about perceived coalitions operating against them. China’s participation in any kind of multilateral regimes tended to be reluctant and defensive. Frequently China wants a seat at the table but attempts to limit the pace and scope of discussions, especially in areas related to transparency and specific regional conflicts.30
Alternatively, China’s relationships with Russia and Central Asia were reviving.31 Russia found it profitable to outfit the PLA with its military hardware, and revived consultation with Beijing after President George H.W. Bush’s declaration of a New World Order in 1991.32 China held up the Sino-Russian partnership as a model of its new strategic relationship with regional powers. The 1996 formation of the “Shanghai Five” consisting of China, Russia, and the Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kygyzstan offered a confidence-building measure in which member states could cooperate on border delineation issues.33 The association did not produce any significant norms or institutional dynamics, but established the platform for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, discussed in detail later in this chapter. While Southeast Asian countries did not yet figure prominently in China’s worldview, the reverse was not true. Plagued with historical 29
Chung 2000. Chung 2000. 31 See Tang 2000 regarding the “post-Cold War conundrum.” 32 Dittmer 2005. 33 Yom 2002. 30
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memories of Chinese border incursions, intervention in domestic ethnic politics, promotion of Maoist radicals, and unresolved territorial disputes, Southeast Asian countries held decidedly negative opinions of China.34 While these countries expressed muted opinions of the Tianan-men Square Incident, the unfolding of conflicts across the Taiwan Straits and the PLA’s 1995 seizure of Mischief Reef in the South China Sea caused widespread alarm.35 Southeast Asian countries saw regional institutions such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC as venues to lock the PRC into consultative and peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms.36 While its Track Two dynamics gained some momentum in building trust and facilitating the exchange of ideas, however, ARF made few inroads in affecting China’s priorities or actions, beyond occasional agenda-setting agreements.37 It was only when China was granted admission into the most dynamic of Track Two groups – the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) – that Beijing began to upgrade its engagement with ARF.38 Within two years of participation, representatives from the Chinese Foreign Ministry became “more agnostic and more open to learning about [ARF institutions],” in particular after realizing that American involvement in ARF was erratic and dismissive.39 While China resumed its bid for WTO membership in the mid1990s by unilaterally reducing tariffs and liberalizing its trade policies, the United States and other regional powers were caught up in the fever of regionalism and pushed for progress through APEC. China grudgingly accepted its admission in 1991 alongside Taiwan and Hong Kong. Until the late-1990s, China expressed no significant independent initiative and harbored reservations about deeper integration and institutional development beyond the soft parameters of “open regionalism” 34
Shambaugh 2004/5. For an overview of regional debates on China’s rise and impetus for collective action, see Roy 2002. 36 Simon 2004, 263; and Johnston and Evans 1999. 37 Foot 1998. 38 Cossa 1998 of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)—a founding member of CSCAP—offers a detailed insider’s analysis from the US point of view. 39 Shambaugh 2004/5, 69. 35
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and “Asian style” state-centric, voluntary, consensus-based and consultative processes.40 As with their colleagues at ARF, Chinese representatives learned that the United States might not be effectively using APEC to promote China’s “peaceful evolution.” Instead, Washington seemed curiously uninvolved, under-publicizing Sino-American relations in this context and even showing signs of being flustered by institutional dynamics beyond its control.41 These observations lent credence to “Asian-style” institutions in the eyes of Beijing. Beijing’s attitude toward regional cooperation warmed somewhat in the second half of the 1990s. Prompted by its own rapid economic growth, China plugged into regional production networks, expanded competition with the NICs, and increased exports to the US market, leading to heightened interests in liberal trade and investment regimes. As Deng Xiaoping lived out his last years, his emphasis on the need for a peaceful international environment for China’s development took root in Chinese foreign policy. By 1997, the PLA expressed a notably different assessment of regional security needs that emphasized sufficient grounds for the PRC and United States to work on issues of mutual interests:42 The Chinese probably judge that direct opposition to a developing US.-Japan security tie would only increase Beijing’s current strategic liabilities and set it in opposition to the thinking of most regional states. On the other hand, a softer, more indirect approach [of advocating multilateralism and wooing individual countries to act more independently from the constraints of the US.-centered alliance system], which is in any case the only practical option, might pay some future strategic dividend.43
However, I would underline once more that the Chinese proved bounded by their Cold War mentality in focusing on relationships with Washington and worrying about US containment through US– Japan and US–ROK ties.44 40
Morrison 2002, 125–130. Ibid., 126. 42 See Montaperto and Binnendijk 1997 for a summary of the PLA position. They argue that this novel position reflected an evolving party-state consensus for a new security paradigm. 43 Montaperto and Binnendijk 1997. 44 Of course, the US mentality was no different in trying to strengthen its bilateral security ties. 41
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The New Security Concept (NSC), unveiled in 1997, marked a substantive departure from China’s past operational principles in foreign policy, even if it had no immediate impact. Reworking Zhou Enlai’s Five Cardinal Principles from 1955, the NSC advocated cooperative security, mutual benefit in economic relations, respect for sovereignty, and reliance on consultative and trust-building mechanisms to settle disputes.45 Critically, this “pitch for multipolarity” claimed respect for international organization norms established under US hegemonic leadership and did not explicitly challenge the existing global order.46 Despite several reiterations by Chinese leaders in international forums, the NSC lacked influence until 2002.47 The key operational challenges to this framing device were: How would China solicit cooperation given a paucity of formal security institutions in Asia? How could China bring about change within institutions such as APEC and ARF founded on the basis of US alliances? Most Asian regional institutions excluded China, India, and Russia at their formation, or implicitly held balancing goals against China (e.g., ASEAN). Should China invest in maintaining and improving the current order or attempt to create a new one? More importantly, an underlying cognitive barrier needed to be overcome before China could even begin to address the above institutional challenges. As long as Chinese policymakers failed to critically reassess their perception that international institutions were thinlyveiled mechanisms through which the United States and its allies checked expanding Chinese power, it would be difficult not to create a self-fulfilling prophecy of perpetuating implied hostility and fragility of regional forums. To make a credible commitment to multilateralism, China needed to reframe its expressed worldview in a fashion accommodating its strategic mindset and capable of rallying other countries around its leadership.
45
Shambaugh 2004/5, 69; and Roy 2003a. Shambaugh 2004 and 2005 places a different interpretive emphasis on NSC as an alternative to traditional alliances. 47 Roy 2003a. 46
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3.4 After the Financial Crisis: First Opportunities for Chinese Leadership of Asian Regionalism This section discusses the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis on China and the country’s subsequently deepening engagement with minilateral institutions. 3.4.1 Silver Linings of the Asian Crisis for China The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98 left three legacies favorable to the PRC’s drive to promote its regional role and institutional vision. First and foremost, China’s apparent immunity to the contagion effect and quickly resurgent growth rates boosted the confidence of Chinese leaders. Witnessing the once-racing East Asian tigers hobbled by global markets’ attacks on their developmental states’ frailties, China strengthened its resolve to deepen market reform and attract foreign capital through enterprise restructuring, massive layoffs, banking sector discipline, stock market regulations, and currency controls.48 Notably, China did not resort to protectionism and competitive devaluation, hence gaining the appreciation of its crisis-ridden neighbors.49 China also began to relax restrictions on outward FDI in 1999 to take advantage of asset acquisition opportunities at fire-sale prices, opening the floodgates for the first wave of outward Chinese investments that would later prove influential on its regional diplomacy.50 Second, Washington’s heavy-handed actions and unilateral expectations reinforced region-wide resentment of American disrespect for the economic diversities and “soft” institutional norms of Asia. The United States soured its Asian relations by rejecting the Asian Monetary Fund and defending the IMF’s centrality (and imperiousness). Concurrently, US attempts to arm-twist weaker partners on EVSL initiatives halted the momentum of sectoral liberalization negotiations generated by the
48 For closer analysis of Chinese domestic responses to the Asian Financial Crisis, see Lin 2003; Rudolph 2002; and Shih 2004. 49 Shambaugh 2004/5, 68. 50 On the evolution of the Chinese FDI regime, see Gallagher 2005. Zweig and Bi 2005 focus on outward FDI trends.
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1996 Information Technology Agreement.51 Indeed, the United States may simply have run out of ideas for its regional diplomacy, and moved toward a more reactive posture.52 A 1999 report by the National Intelligence Council of the CIA characterized the regional situation as “static but stable,” predicting that Asian countries would “actively pursu[e] additional options and sources of security in the event the status quo changes… [resulting] in high-level diplomatic and military interchange among regional powers that arguably increases mutual understanding but thus far does not provide sufficient common ground for institutionalized multilateral security mechanisms.”53 Third, the crisis precipitated a structural shift away from the Japanled , “flying geese” pattern of regional growth inputs and supply chains and toward what a 2003 ADB Institute Research Paper termed “bamboo capitalism,” based on horizontal networks of trade and capital leading to a new division of labor and production centered on China.54 As a result, China’s steady economic growth increasingly generated spillover effects for the ROK and Southeast Asian economies, aiding their recoveries as well as Japan’s emergence from a decade-long slump.55 In addition, as an IMF report argues, since 1993 China’s trade competitiveness (measured by shifts in market share) had come at the expense of newly industrialized economies rather than of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.56 The crisis also exacerbated interstate differences in Southeast Asia. The Indonesian economy and society suffered tremendously and Thailand and Malaysia also fell on hard times, with politicians taking draconian measures and religious politics gaining salience. As a result, Singapore found itself threatened from all sides by instabilities that could very well spill over.57 51
Aggarwal and Lin 2002, 106-110. However, the State Department and Office of the US Trade Representative sensed the political risks pressing forward with the US conception of regional integration, showing restraint in the face of separate Chinese and Japanese proposals for the expansion of the ASEAN bloc. Author’s interview of a senior Japanese diplomat in London, October 2004. See Severino 2005. 52 Aggarwal and Lin 2002; and Sutter 2004. 53 National Intelligence Council 1999. 54 As discussed in Teo 2004a. 55 Shambaugh 2004/5, 85. 56 Loungani 2000, 35. 57 Sanders 2000.
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Meanwhile, ASEAN was expanding rapidly, which had complex implications for China–ASEAN relations.58 On the one hand, the consolidation of Southeast Asia created the potential for a united front against China on disputes over the South China Sea and trade and investment diversions. On the other hand, ASEAN’s enlargement diluted the organization’s anticommunist tradition and offered China potential allies.59 Nevertheless, in the short run, all could agree that regional trade and investment cooperation urgently needed a new impetus, starting with the opening of Japan and China’s markets to their crisis-ridden neighbors.60 3.4.2 China’s Deepening Engagement with Minilateral Institutions The Asian Financial Crisis created opportunities for China to test its new framing devices and explore cracks in the traditional hierarchy of issues for US allies in East Asia. From 1998 to 2001, China attempted to de-link as many issues as possible from the region’s post-Cold War security framework, even as Washington assiduously updated its security ties with Northeast and Southeast Asian allies and continued implementing the “places not bases” deployment.61 China continued to perceive key transnational goods of security (both traditional and nontraditional), trade and investment, and energy cooperation as chiefly private or club goods, but no longer demonstrated wariness or reactive posturing toward regional institutions. The American loss of interest in regionalism, combined with China’s market expansion and rising interdependence with Asian neighbors, induced a sense of cautious 58
Against its founding anti-communist ethos, ASEAN admitted Vietnam in 1995 and Cambodia, Burma, and Laos in 1997, despite their authoritarian and communist regimes and the Clinton Administration’s sanctions against Burma. See Dalpino and Lin 2003. 59 Phillip Bowring “ASEAN shouldn’t admit Cambodia, Laos and Burma Now,” International Herald Tribune, 21 April 1997. 60 Dalpino and Lin 2003; and Roy 2002. 61 Simon 2004. This notion came into being since the closure of US’ Subic Bay base in the Philippines in 1992. In 2001, Singapore built the Changi naval base, at which aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk of the US 7th Fleet docked. See Trish Saywell, “Will New Naval Base Cause Waves?” Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 May 2001.
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optimism among the Chinese about realizations of regional ambitions through a position of relative regional strength. On the security front, China stepped up its constructive engagement in the Korean Peninsula multilateral talks, joined a long-standing Southeast Asian anti-nuclear regime, and co-organized a new Central Asian forum with Russia. In marked contrast to Beijing’s lackluster presence during the US-mediated Korean dialogues the early-to-mid 1990s, China accepted “in principle” South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s invitation in 1998 to participate in the June 2000 Summit, gaining further involvement when Kim Jong-il visited Beijing just days before the Summit.62 While China’s basic objectives for the Korean Peninsula cannot be said to have changed significantly in the second half of the 1990s, its cost–benefit analysis of entering into a multilateral forum with Japan and the United States seems to have tipped in favor of greater involvement. Earlier Chinese apprehensions of American ulterior motives in multilateralism and of Japan’s direct role in Northeast Asian security negotiations apparently gave way to a more realistic calculus of the economic and refugee-related costs and regional military tensions if the United States were to strike the DPRK. China was hoping for tactical gains from its involvement – reducing perceptions of the “China threat,” loosening US bilateral alliances, and supporting its multipolar vision for Northeast Asia.63 However, China’s participation at this point did not amount to leadership or even brokering, as the 2000 Joint Declaration primarily represented ROK– DPRK efforts mediated by Washington.64 China expressed support for the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), signed in Bangkok in 1995, but did not actually sign the protocol on security assurances to the Treaty’s signatories. China’s basic objection was that the treaty’s geographical scope included portions of the South China Sea, which it claims as its territorial waters.65 However, at the 1999 ARF meeting in Singapore, China adjusted its position and signed the protocol, making 62
Chung 2000. Ibid. 64 Kim 2001. Pritchard 2005 argues that DPRK was mainly interested in improving relations with the United States. 65 “Spokesman Assesses Support For Southeast Asian Nuclear Free Zone,” Kyodo, 7 December 1995. 63
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it the first declared nuclear weapon state to do so. This represented the “early harvest” of a long negotiation process to settle disputes over the South China Sea, which would culminate in a 2002 agreement discussed in the next section. Finally, during the summer of 2001, China and Russia took a big step forward in regional cooperation by forming the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Comprising the “Shanghai Five” plus Uzbekistan, SCO aimed to strengthen members’ ties toward collective security in Central Asia. Yom argues that SCO reflected the convergence of Russian and Chinese interests in crushing internal Islamist and separatist movements, to use their outsized economic and military powers to bring smaller states in line with their goals such as anti-US hegemony, territorial sovereignty, and energy cooperation.66 To further consolidate the relationship between China and Russia, Jiang Zemin and Vladimir Putin concluded a Twenty-Year Friendship Treaty that contained provisions for common defense, technological cooperation, coordination in international organizations, and further high-tech weapons sales.67 On the economic front, China and Japan each rallied Asian countries to create new regional trade and investment institutions. Beijing and Tokyo pushed the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) agenda at the Second ASEAN Informal Summit in Malaysia in 1997. Two years later, with Washington adopting a more passive stance, the ASEAN summit produced a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, institutionalizing the APT process (consisting of 48 mechanisms) and laying out a framework for cooperation across a broad range of issues (comprising 16 areas).68 China and Japan competed for leadership within this framework. Building on the goodwill of its neighbors toward its currency stability and its extension of low-interest loans to Indonesia and Malaysia, China moved rapidly to discuss bilateral ties and ASEAN–China arrangements that would support its centrality in a “hub and spoke” formation of a Northeast and Southeast Asian trading zone.69 Japan 66
Yom 2002. Dittmer 2005, 14. 68 Available from . 69 Shirk 2003. 67
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countered with its own assiduous cultivation of bilateral ties (starting with negotiation of a PTA with Singapore), also proposing a regionnal currency swap arrangement (the Chiang Mai initiative) and an ASEAN–Japan FTA. Officially, Japan expressed confidence that overlapping bilateral FTAs would yield (or yield to) a multilateral framework for regional integration.70 Despite its regional networking, China focused mainly on negotiating its accession to the World Trade Organization. After the deep freeze in the early 1990s, China started unilaterally pursuing tariff and trade regime reforms to increase its WTO chances. US President Clinton responded, leading to the signing of a joint statement committing the United States and China to complete a WTO deal by the end of 1999. This expectation was derailed temporarily with the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, but at the APEC meeting in September, Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton agreed to resume negotiations; as a result, a WTO pact was announced in November 1999. However, US domestic debates over farm subsidies and permanent normal trade relations with China delayed entry until two years later. While China staked its future economic success on the global multilateral regime and its foundational bilateral agreements with the EU and United States, APEC stagnated. 3.5 After 9/11: Broadening China’s Strategic Leeway This section examines the effects of the 9/11 attacks on China’s strategy with specific reference to tensions in the Sino-American and SinoJapanese relationships, changing mindsets and Chinese responses to the attacks, and China’s new initiative in regional arrangements. 3.5.1 Tensions in Sino-American and Sino-Japanese Relations Prior to 9/11 In the periods after and immediately preceding the 9/11 attacks, both the Bush Administration in the United States and Koizumi government in Japan found themselves at odds with China. Although the Bush 70
Mochizuki 2004, 126.
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Administration did not come to office proclaiming China as an adversary, early signs did not bode well for Sino-American relations. On the Taiwan issue, Bush stated on television in April 2001 that he would do “whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself,” and more generally replaced Clinton’s “comprehensive engagement” with a posture of wary detachment.71 Meanwhile, the Koizumi administration expressed its intention to participate in the US missile defense program and develop its nuclear-weapons capability with potential uses of deterring China and North Korea.72 Japan also incurred the displeasure of China in obliquely expressing security interests over Taiwan.73 Tensions between these two powers threatened to derail Beijing’s plans for regional institution building, given other East Asian countries’ longstanding ties to each of them. Since 2001, Sino-American relations have been beset by asymmetric perceptions. In a interview with the Wall Street Journal in 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed that relations were “the best…that the United States has had with China in over 30 years.”74 Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen had made a similar assessment in November 2003, but published a byline in the China Daily on November 1, 2005 condemning the United States for aggressive expansionism based on unreformed hegemonism.75 Beijing’s persistent Cold War mentality emerged in a speech on Taiwan by Minister of Defense General Chi Haotian at a Central Military Commission (the top military policymaking body) meeting in November 2003: 71
Johnson 2005. Taniguchi 2005. 73 Roy 2004a. 74 Secretary Colin L. Powell, Interview on The Wall Street Journal Report, November 13, 2004. Available from. 75 Given the Bush administration’s relative equanimity toward China and concessions to China’s position on Taiwan in 2004, Qian’s forthright anti-Americanism was remarkable. Qian stated, “The troubles and disasters the United States has met do not stem from threats by others, but from its own cocksureness and arrogance. The 21st Century is not the American Century. That does not mean that the US does not want the dream. Rather, it is incapable of realizing the goal.” Quoted from “The Qian Qichen Op-ed: Official Discontent or Just one Man’s Opinion?” by Harvey Stockwin for Association for Asian Research, 1 November 2005. Available from . 72
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If war in the Taiwan Straits erupted, the power to make decisions would not be in our hands, nor in the hands of those who advocate Taiwanese independence, but in the hands of the United States and Japan. If such a war erupted, it would not be simply a war of unification, as the deeper implication is that the United States and Japan are determined to deprive China of its right to development… If we failed to win the Taiwan Straits war, the results would be worse than those following the Sino-Japanese War. Therefore, there must be no war, or we will have to comprehensively destroy Japan and cripple the United States, and this could only be achieved with a nuclear war.76
These public relations fluctuations and strategic volatility over Taiwan became linked to US–PRC bargaining on other matters.77 But their consequences were not entirely negative: mutual insecurities over Taiwan’s assertiveness might have helped at times to nudge Washington and Beijing to engage in multilateral talks on the Korean Peninsula. 3.5.2 Changing Mindsets and Chinese Responses in the Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks The events of 9/11 focused East Asian countries’ attentions on their vulnerabilities to similar attacks.78 While conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait remained at the forefront, Asian countries began to shift security priorities toward transnational 76
According to La Nueva Cuba, “The War Is Approaching Us” was first posted on the Internet in January 2003 with title “A recent speech from a high ranking official in PLA” on web sites such as . On 11 October, it was published at with the title “The War Is Approaching Us—Chi Haotian.” It was also posted with the title “China, do you still have ten years’ peace time?” It was most recently published on 23 April 2005 at . I obtained the version published online by La Nueva Cuba on 6 October 2005. 77 For further development of this thesis, consistent with or deviating from mine, see articles by Thomas Christensen and Robert Suettinger in various issues of China Leadership Monitor from 2002–2005, available from . It is arguable that Taipei’s leverage vis-a-vis Beijing suffers a decline when PRC–US interests on Taiwan can be horse-traded over other issues. See Sutter 2004, 48, 52. As a result, US support for Taiwan fluctuated dramatically, increasing in 2003, then declining after Chen’s reelection in 2004. See Roy 2003b. 78 Tellis 2004.
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terrorist threats in the form of local conflicts with spillover effects and related threats such as maritime disruptions and proliferation of WMDs. One could say that “substantive linkages” gained importance across a wide range of transnational exchanges. The high global price of crude oil and rising regional economic interdependence stacked the cards further in favor of collective or coordinated solutions. On the economic front, East Asian interdependencies increasingly tipped in China’s favor. Continuing competitiveness in labor-intensive goods and rapid upgrading in technological and production processes in electronics and machineries intensified China’s regional trade impact.79 Between 2000 and 2004, Japan became increasingly reliant on trade with China, while the opposite was true for China. As regional production networks became more vertically integrated and China sought raw materials from its neighbors, Southeast Asian countries increased exports to China and welcomed the first wave of Chinese FDI.80 Yet China was diversifying not only its production profile and composition of trade but also its trading partners: by 2004, the EU had emerged as China’s biggest trading partner.81 At the same time, China’s growing demand for energy led to active diplomacy in North Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, often with countries deemed troublemakers by the United States. This post-9/11 political and economic climate presented China with a strategic opportunity to advocate a new paradigm of regional relationships. With the United States deeply engaged first in Afghanistan and then Iraq, China had an opportunity to consolidate its position by exploiting the declining American political, ideological, and military capital in the region.82 Manifesting a first-level compliance with the US-led War on Terror, China engaged in second-level competition with 79
For a detailed analysis of trends in China’s trade with Asia in 2000-2003, see Prasad 2004. Updates for 2003–2004 are provided by the US–China Business Council website. Available from . 80 Dalpino and Lin 2003; and Prasad 2004. On Chinese outward FDI and the increasing trade deficit with Southeast Asia, see Xinhua 15 May 2004; and ARFCCPIT 2005. 81 Nevertheless, the EU denied China the largely symbolic “market economy” status. See Wong 2005 for an analysis of prospects for a common European policy on China. 82 Tellis 2004, 25.
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Japan over regional leadership and institutional reform. As the US global campaign seemed to take on an anti-Muslim, unilateral, and militaristic form with the invasion of Iraq, Asian countries harbored mixed feelings about American intentions and showed willingness to hedge their bets.83 Instead of rallying its neighbors under the old banners of sovereignty, multipolarity, and consensual-voluntaristic Asian norms to counter American unilateralism, China employed a pathbreaking framing strategy emphasizing the reality of China’s rise and the utility of binding multilateral solutions. Party Secretary Hu Jintao’s “peaceful rise” doctrine, still very much in effect today, is a brilliant framing device by any measure. Expressly acknowledging U.S. leadership in Asia and the world for the foreseeable future, the doctrine explains why China’s rise will have a benign impact on the global security climate and why China will seek to promote partnerships (as opposed to Cold War-type alliances) consistent with the New Security Concept.84 The doctrine simultaneously argues on one hand that China’s profile stance follows from its cultural-historical identity and current preoccupation with economic development, and on the other that future Chinese leadership would differ markedly from the American variety. Accordingly, China showed a genuine effort to tone down its anti-American tendencies even as complaints increased in 2004 over Taiwanese politics. China held further military exchanges and displayed acceptance toward provocative US actions in the name of counterterrorism.85 Susan Shirk described China as “bending over backward to accommodate the U.S.”86 More accurately, applying a classic Chinese adage, China “backed up a step, and found the horizon opening before it.” The doctrine seemed to have the desired 83
Wadi 2004. See Sutter 2004, 49–51 for a recapitulation of the “imperial overreach” thesis. 84 The doctrine did not escape domestic debates and manipulations by factions. Swaine 2004, 73. 85 Roy 2003. See Van Ness 2004/5 for specific Chinese responses to the Bush Doctrine. For insights into the adaptation of the PLA to the new frame, see “China's National Defense,” White Papers published in 2000, 2002, and 2004 by the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Available from . 86 Shirk 2003.
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effect on the United States: the Bush Administration started to pay attention to China as a major contributor to its War on Terrorism.87 Scholars debate whether China’s nominal bandwagoning stance bought any favors with Washington or offered any additional flexibility for Chinese leadership in Asia. Some have argued that mobilization for wars abroad readied the United States for interventions anywhere, rejuvenated alliances with or military presence in Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, undermined any semblance of American respect for international institutions and norms, and increased its sensitivity to any signs of counter-hegemony.88 Security concerns might also bring Russia back into the Asian arena and reduce the threshold for Japanese rearmament. If so, China’s bandwagoning strategy would prove counterproductive. However, the Chinese gambled on the following payoffs: (1) an opportunity to vie with Japan for regional influence, and more generally to probe tensions among traditional US allies without incurring US retaliation; (2) improved legitimacy in advancing Chinese interests such as quelling irredentism and opening regional investment opportunities, (3) gains from cooperation with Washington on issues of common interest such as antiterrorism and WMD controls, (4) an increase in China’s experience and capacity for leadership in international institutions, and (5) concessions on the Taiwan issue, such as getting Washington to explicitly withhold political (and potentially military) support from any Taiwanese independence movement.89 China’s capacity to achieve these objectives, and more generally disarm suspicion and potential mobilization against the perceived “China threat,” depends on its capacity to sell its peaceful rise doctrine. The PRC signaled its readiness to assume the mantle of a responsible power by offering settlements to territorial disputes, new options in multilateral negotiations, and support for existing norms and institutions. China has made progress in resolving territorial conflicts in South and Southeast Asia. In 2007, China and India initiated drafting principles to resolve all aspects of their boundary disputes together with a security and foreign policy dialogue to consolidate discussions 87
Sutter 2005, 42. Baviera 2004, 3-6; and Swaine 2004, 75. 89 Swaine 2004, 76. 88
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related to the boundary issues, regional nuclear proliferation, and tensions in Kashmir.90 In 2002, China and ASEAN issued a “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” which created a basis for easing tensions in the Spratly Islands, although it did not provide for a legally-binding code of conduct. In practice, Chinese national oil companies have entered into joint projects with their counterparts in the Philippines and Vietnam on marine seismic activities. Concurrently, China and Vietnam made gradual progress in demarcating their boundary. And, much to the chagrin of its nationalists, China settled for a division of the islands in the Amur, Ussuri, and Argun Rivers to end a long-lasting border dispute with Russia. Given the presence of major powers and/or alliances to its north and east, China has good reason to consolidate its relations with Southeast Asian countries. Ideally from a Chinese perspective, Southeast Asian countries will naturally lean toward China, offering it a free trade zone, secure sea routes, and collective weight in international forums. A supportive ASEAN coalition could free Beijing’s hands to launch bolder actions on the Korean Peninsula and, even more critically, on Taiwan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.91 Any crises in the Taiwan Strait, trade and pipeline security, or even Chinese naval presence in the Malacca Strait would alter the US calculus greatly.92 In this dynamic security context, China has strong incentives to prioritize and redefine non-traditional security issues as club goods or common pooled resources, which also offers a politically appealing contrast to US unilateral actions and beefing up of military presence in Philippines and Indonesia.93 90
For information on the current status of the following disputes, see . 91 China’s disputes with Japan over these islands remain outstanding. Japan has complained bitterly to Washington about China’s establishment of at least one drilling platform patrolled by warships, while the Chinese denounced the Japanese government for issuing an exploration license to Teikoku Oil Company. Both countries characterized these moves as encroachments on national sovereignty, and bilateral talks to construct a framework for cooperation have faltered. See “The Japan-China Oil Slick,” BusinessWeek Online, 7 Nov 2005. 92 Given the collective patrol of the Malacca Strait by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, China is also exploring alternative transport routes through Thailand and Burma. 93 Sutter 2004, 57.
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In fact, China’s signaling games aim in part to play upon the increasing perception of American alienation in Asia after the disintegration of the fragile regional consensus for the War on Terrorism after the US invasion of Iraq.94 One observes among US analysts a near-universal critique of the Bush Administration’s Asia policy, blaming the United States’ inattentiveness to national regional trends in Asia for its marginalization in regional forums such as ARF, the defection of North Korea from negotiations, proliferating feuds between Asian states after the Asian Financial Crisis, and inability to predict the sentiments of a new generation of Asian voters.95 In this climate of discontent, China finds receptivity to its advocacy for new bilateral and multilateral relationships. 3.5.3 China Takes Charge: New Initiatives in Regional Arrangements The PRC’s goals in the Korean Peninsula are complex. Despite the declining importance of North Korea in the post-Cold War era, Beijing seeks the survival of the DPRK regime and overall stability on the peninsula.96 China does not necessarily intend to remove WMDs, as long as their proliferation can be contained, but is even less likely to defend the DPRK ideologically and pledge unconditional support.97 While agreeing broadly with US aims, China has criticized the Bush Administration’s rhetorical framing of the “axis of evil”, as well as its 94
Sutter 2004, 46, 49; and Simon 2004, 264. See critiques by Sanders 2000; Swaine 2003; Shirk 2003; Sigal 2005; and Berkofsky 2005. Roy 2003b offers a more sanguine view. 96 Some debates remain over the relative weight of these two core objectives: Harrison 2005 endorses Ambassador Stephen Bosworth’s characterization of “no nukes, no war, no collapse.” Kang 2003 believes that stability is as important as nuclear weapons. Roy 2004b argues that a concern for DPRK’s regime stability trumps even nuclear capabilities. Chung 2003 points out that Chinese attitudes toward Korean reunification remain unclear. See Wu 2005 for specifics of the Chinese demands on the DPRK from the perspective of a middle-level diplomat, which Selig Harrison 2005 has found credible. 97 In 2002, Beijing and Pyongyang had a serious diplomatic falling out when China arrested a Chinese-born businessman—one Mr. Yang, a self-made man of the cultivated flower business—hand-picked by Kim Jong-il to administer a new economic zone near the border. He was nominally charged with tax evasion. 95
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brinkmanship and threats of sanctions. Faced with increasing involvement by Russia and Japan, China moved forward to secure a niche role in the multilateral negotiation process.98 Beijing has deepened its engagement despite its awareness that the Japan–ROK–US trilateral alliance provides the main impetus for pushing negotiations ahead (despite cracks in this united front), and that multilateralism may not prevent armed conflict – in fact, it may increase the risks if the US and the DPRK engaged in a game of “chicken.” However, the Chinese hope that confidence-building measures can reduce the chance of miscalculation and encourage restraint.99 The multilateral framework provides an added benefit of potentially straining US alliances. For example, when the DPRK defected from the Agreed Framework in 2002, the ROK expressed unhappiness with the Four-Party Talks and sought to improve bilateral relations with Russia and China and reduce its reliance on Washington. Deciding between “remaining ‘anchored’ within the US alliance framework or cutting ‘adrift’ in the direction of a continental accommodation with China,” over time the ROK arguably will favor the latter.100 In 2003, Chinese strategies began to pay off. It cut off its oil supply for three days to the DPRK (ostensibly because of technical problems), thus seeming to punish Kim Jong-il for reneging on his commitments. China further earned American appreciation by privately working to bring the United States and the DPRK back to the negotiating table, which represented a facing-saving measure for both parties.101 By 2004, China was brimming with confidence, as evidenced by calls by Chinese academics and high-level officials to expand the agenda of the Six-Party Talks to include the “Korean nuclear issue, economic integration, antiterrorism, non-traditional security threats, environmental protection, energy security, infectious disease prevention and 98 For analyses of Russia’s muddled view of its global and regional status, see Hanson 2004, 185. Swaine 2003 argues that Russia was interested in the Korean Peninsula for railroad routes and sought to project a good image in the G-8 forum. 99 In this sense, China’s motivation in multilateralism differs from that of the US, which consists mainly of sharing the cost of pressuring North Korea with others. Shirk 2003. 100 Cha 2004, 141. 101 Shirk 2003. For details of the Six-Party Talks process from the eyes of a seasoned diplomat, see Pritchard 2005.
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crackdown on cross-border crimes.”102 “Even after the nuclear problem is resolved, the six-party dialogue meeting and its workgroup should still continue functioning to explore ways to build up mutual political trust between the United States and North Korea, prompt the two countries to normalize relations and finally establish diplomatic ties and clear up the Cold War-style standoff on the Korean Peninsula,” a participating official proposed.103 Finally, China achieved perhaps its greatest innovation in collective security in the form of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In the aftermath of 9/11, Russia and China both bandwagoned with the United States, yet also took up the anti-terrorist commitment within SCO’s anti-hegemonic agenda.104 China supported both the SCO’s Charter, signed in June 2002, which gave the organization for-mal legal status, and a proposal to attain recognition by the United Nations.105 Iran, India, and Pakistan (at China’s insistence) were admitted as observers to the SCO in 2005.106 The SCO shows potential as an effective “second pillar” in Chinese foreign policy with the incorporation of energy cooperation into the agenda, and with a recent unified demand that US troops withdraw from Pakistan.107 According to one observer, the SCO “has become a de facto podium for its member states, especially Russia and China, to express their political views to an international audience.”108 It is important not to overestimate the potential of the SCO based on a simple projection of its current activities. Generally speaking, Northeast Asian security forums have been weak and lacking in widespread regional support.109 However, the substantive linkage of energy and security cooperation may offer a solid foundation for 102
As quoted in “Framing NE Asia Security: Six-party talks on Korean nuclear issue lay a foundation for multilateral security cooperation” by Ni Yanshuo, Beijing Review. Available from . 103 Ibid. 104 Swaine 2004, 85; Hanson 2004, 179-80; and Sergei Blagov, “Shanghai Group Aims to Keep US in Check,” Asia Times, 19 June 2004. 105 Ralph A. Cossa, “Asian multilateralism gets a lift,” Taipei Times, 2 Aug 2002. 106 David Wall, “Bound by a common cause,” The Japan Times, 1 August 2005. 107 Ibid.; and Herberg 2004, 367. 108 Yom 2002. 109 Chung 2003; and Shirk 2003.
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Sino-Russian partnership and allow for the SCO’s expansion to incorporate new partners such as other resource-rich Central Asian countries and Japan.110 If so, the SCO could help resolve highly contentious issues such as Chinese and Japanese competition over Siberian oil and resource-driven territorial disputes in the East China Sea. Russia would benefit from promoting Japanese, Korean, and Chinese imports of Russian oil and gas.111 The United States has kept its market relatively open while expressing cautious optimism about China’s efforts in implementing WTO terms.112 Initially ambivalent about China’s rise and the distribution of economic benefits of APT, individual ASEAN countries have increasingly echoed the narrative of “China as a powerful engine of regional growth” over successive meetings and trade shows anticipating the FTA with China.113 Compared to the late 1990s, ASEAN seems more inward looking and more detached from its ties with the United States, Canada, and Latin America.114 Recognizing the diversity of members’ economic conditions, both ASEAN and APEC have introduced mechanisms to allow countries to liberalize at different rates. In April 2002, ASEAN announced the implementation of the “10 minus X” formula, which borrowed from the notion of the “pathfinder approach” publicized in APEC’s Shanghai Ministerial the year before. Basically, it reassured countries faced with China’s competitiveness, allowing them to go slower in liberalization, while others forged ahead to capture their complementarities with the booming Chinese economy. While still keeping up the appearance of collective 110
For case studies of NEA energy cooperation, see Rozman 2005; and Christoffersen 2005, 2000, 1998. 111 Chung 2003. For a detailed analysis of existing gas cooperation arrangements, see Chen 2004. 112 See progress reports from the US–China Business Council. Available from . 113 Roy 2002. For a recent authoritative statement, see “Asia and China: Growing Together?” Keynote Speech by Haruhiko Kuroda, President of the Asian Development Bank, given at the Center for Global Development/Institute for International Economics, 23 June 2005, Washington, DC. Also, “Rise of China an opportunity rather than threat: Deputy PM of Thailand,” People’s Daily, 19 October 2005. 114 For an analysis of the economic dynamics of ASEAN, see Palanca 2005. Also see survey results of Chinese outward FDI from ARF-CCPIT, 2005, which showed Chinese firms to hold little interest in investing Canada.
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action according to “Asian style” norms, these operational principles have altered the “quasi-parameters” of APEC and ASEAN. If pursued to their logical conclusion, the separate ways of pathfinders and laggards could reduce ASEAN Plus Three or the ASEAN–China framework to little more than a series of bilateral agreements.115 In November 2002, China and ASEAN signed a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which aims to establish a FTA in ten years.116 Do these bilateral agreements look the same as those signed in the 1990s? The trade and wider economic partnership agreements of ASEAN countries vary in coverage, specificity, and length.117 More significantly, compared to the WTO liberalization agreements, these agreements seem to fulfill several roles at once, from customized and niche country-to-country negotiations in which parties can pick the issues and choose the form to provisions for long-term consultative and dispute settlement mechanisms to incorporation of non-trade issues.118 These customized bilateral agreements aim to build encompassing relationships, representing a different approach than the economic bilateralism of the United States or the EU, and even differing from agreements between Asian countries in the past. By raising issues above and beyond the WTO scope (partly to fulfill gaps in the multilateral regime, such as in competition policy, investment, and mutual recognition), these Asian bilateral ties may seriously complicate future tasks of “nesting,” even if they do not necessarily prevent forward momentum in multilateralism. Furthermore, China does not suffer from domestic coalition mobilization issues that make sectoral agreements problematic for United States.119 One may also wonder if these Asian bilateral agreements would be susceptible to weakness of implementation stemming from the voluntarist Asian norms, or if
115
Severino 2005, 16. See Antkiewicz and Whalley 2004 for a review of Chinese’s new regional trade agreements. 117 Banda and Whalley 2005, 6. Also see Antkiewicz and Whalley 2004. 118 Banda and Whalley 2005, 7. 119 See Aggarwal and Ravenhill 2001. 116
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in fact they are created precisely to overcome those collective inclinations.120 In the midst of the bilateral boom, China has continued to support APEC and the WTO, showing its readiness to lead liberalization on all fronts. Given that China started with very few bilateral agreements in 2000 – only Russia and Papua New Guinea within APEC had fewer RTAs, existing or under negotiation – it is sensible for China to distribute its eggs in several baskets.121 The 2001 APEC ministerial in Shanghai led to the adoption of the Shanghai Accord, which generated some momentum toward the Bogor goals.122 In addition to outlining the “pathfinder approach” mentioned above, the Shanghai Accord issued APEC’s first counterterrorism statement, launched a symbolic regional fund for financial crises, and took the Osaka agenda one step further in placing greater importance on trade and business facilitation.123 Over the next few years, China reduced its tariff rates by about half, from around 36% to 10.5% in 2005, lowered non-tariff barriers, and signed the Information Product Protocol. China has also endorsed a shift in APEC’s focus to “business mobility, anti-corruption, intellectual property rights and secure trade,” which either reflects general satisfaction with achievements in the traditional tariff reduction and market access concessions, or a sense of wait-and-see in face of stagnating WTO negotiations. Also consistent with China’s new framing device and its agenda in the SCO
120
Simon 2004, 263, 283. Outside of Asia, China has shown similar enthusiasm for exploring various levels of regional institutions with little tactical regard for consistency, assuming that market forces and ideological agreements will keep things in order. On PRC’s grand strategy in Latin and Central America, see “Prepared Statement of Dr. June Teufel Dreyer before the Commissioner, US–China Economic and Security Review Commission,” Wednesday, 6 April 2005. Available from . 121 For a table of China’s FTA/RTA agreements, see . 122 In 1994, APEC Leaders at Bogor, Indonesia, set the goals of reaching free trade and investment by 2010 for developed economies, and 2020 for developing economies. 123 For a Chinese assessment, see “Shanghai APEC: A Focus of World Attention” by Hu Si, Beijing Review. Available from .
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and bilateral agreements, APEC has broadened its definition of nontraditional security under a new rubric of “human security.”124 Even with the increasingly complex agenda, China and ASEAN members reiterated the consensus-based, non-binding nature of Individual Action Plans and Collective Action Plans made under APEC.125 Taking regionalism one step further, China called for an East Asian Summit to consider forming an “East Asian Community” which would be a rough equivalent of the EU, NAFTA, and NATO all rolled into one in scope and nature (but surely not strength). Washington has interpreted this initiative as a Chinese attempt to comprehensively marginalize the United States in Asia.126 In the round of the WTO Ministerial held in Hong Kong in December 2005, the PRC expressed support for Doha, even in the face of diminished expectations since the collapse of talks at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial over the impasse over agriculture between the US, the EU, and Brazil. Concurring with Hong Kong officials’ do-or-die statements on the outcome of this ministerial, the Chinese Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai expressed firm commitment to multilateralism at the Informal Ministerial Meeting in Dalian in July 2005, and praised APEC’s collective support of the “Swiss Formula” in tariff calculations.127 3.6 Winding Roads Ahead: Scenarios for China’s Grand Strategy It is too early to determine whether China’s strategic shift since the Asian Financial Crisis has created a regional dynamic favorable to a new, anti-US institutional equilibrium. APEC and ARF feature many 124
See Joint Statement issued at the 17th APEC Ministerial Meeting at Busan. Available from . 125 See “Joint Statement of the Seventeenth APEC Ministerial Meeting, Busian, Republic of Korea, 15-16 November 2005.” Available from . 126 Berkofsky 2005. 127 “China Makes Proposals on Doha Trade Talks,” Xinhua News Agency, 9 May 2005; “China Committed to Promoting Multilateral Trade System,” China Daily, 12 July 2005.
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agendas and meetings but have made few influential decisions and avoided the creation of stronger enforcement mechanisms.128 However, a stronger network of bilateral ties might tip the balance against the “Asian way.” New regional mechanisms such as the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Market would decisively rely on China’s management of its foreign reserve and currency controls.129 Similarly, if the SCO succeeds in pressuring Washington to withdraw troops from Pakistan, and if energy needs bring Japan and the ROK into dialogue with the PRC and Russia, perhaps the focal point of negotiation and dispute settlement will shift eastward in the Northeast. Finally, all parties on the Korean Peninsula have come to expect China to play a niche role of brokering and using its significant leverage over the DPRK. If so, one can readily imagine a new geopolitical landscape favorable to the expansion of Chinese influence. Over the next several years, external shocks could exert a powerful impact on China’s grand strategy. First, a macroeconomic or price shock, either from a downturn of the American economy and the ensuring protectionist pressures or from the continuing escalation of global natural resource prices, would necessitate a shift in the Chinese approach. If China fails to adjust and its domestic growth is affected, as nearly happened in the summer of 2005 when soaring prices in an overheating economy provoked heavy-handed control measures from Beijing, it may lose patience in responding to American calls for revaluation of the yuan and other trade-related measures. If other Asian countries are similarly affected, their economic complementarity with China may erode, resulting in intensified regional competition. In particular, economic and resource competition between China and Japan or India may undermine the expansion of ASEAN.130 Second, a crisis involving Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula could polarize American and Chinese positions. Even in the case of “soft landing” or non-militarized collapse of the Kim regime in North Korea, 128
Tellis 2004, 11. “Asia and China: Growing Together?” Keynote Speech by Haruhiko Kuroda, President of the Asian Development Bank, 23 June 2005, Washington, DC. Also see “China, Japan, S. Korea, ASEAN Makes Moves for Asian Monetary Fund” by AFP. Available from . Accessed 6 May 2005. 130 Simon 2004, 244. 129
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China would have to pay the indirect transition costs of reunification, such as accepting trade and investment reductions from South Korea while also pumping money into the North Korean economy. Lastly, China’s strategic options could depend on twists in the USled War on Terrorism. For example, should China be asked to choose a side between Pakistan and India – such as if Pakistan falls short of satisfying the US objectives in Afghanistan – then it may be forced to turn away from an old friend to appease the United States and India, with negative implications for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The latter two scenarios would render it more difficult for smaller powers in the region to hedge against uncertainties in Sino-American competition. In the medium term, countervailing US responses, particularly to Chinese attempts to strengthen its ties to other East Asian countries, may test China’s new strategy.131 Washington has strongly supported Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In December 2005, President Bush visited Mongolia, praising its ex-communist regime for implementing democracy. He delivered a similar statement for Taiwan. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned Singapore against supporting an inward-looking regional agenda at an East Asian Summit.132 The deterioration of SinoAmerican relations in 2005 may redouble China’s framing and signaling game strategy with its neighbors, but at the same time it would increase the risks of other countries to respond to China.133 If so, China’s bandwagoning strategy may unravel. More generally, Washington has three potential responses to China’s bid for leadership in Asia: maintain its preponderance; enter into a “sphere of influence” pact with China; or relinquish its regional hegemonic position to China. The first option is the most likely, while 131
Former US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called for China to bridge a “gulf of perception” in becoming a truly responsible world power, which he defined as being cooperative with US actions and supportive of US values of democracy, property rights, and labor protection. “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks of Robert B. Zoellick before the National Committee on US–China Relations, 21 September 2005. 132 Berkofsky 2005. 133 Christensen 2005; and David Shambaugh and Wu Xinbo, “Sino-American bridges need to be repaired,” Financial Times, 29 August 2005.
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the last is the least likely.134 However, one should carefully consider the prospects for the second option, given the emerging conditions and dynamics discussed in this chapter. The inadequacies of mechanisms such as APT, the East Asia Summit, and the WTO’s Doha Round will not prompt a return of the Asia-Pacific to its pre-Asian Financial Crisis state of US-centric impetus for liberalization tempered by “Asian style” norms. Instead, China’s rise will pose a complex and uncertain reality too taxing for any single, integrative logic of nesting or security-economic linkages. China’s attempts to implement a grand strategy will further offset any such logic offered by the global hegemon. The United States may de facto “lose” Southeast Asia if ASEAN members remain divided and susceptible to bilateral buyouts by Beijing, or consolidate and join China to oppose US security ties with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. As a basis for Sino-Russian partnership, the SCO has the potential to expand Chinese influence on energy and security issues in South and Northeast Asia. In any case, Japan and the ROK seem to face limited set of choices. Nevertheless, no amount of effort by Beijing to depict itself as a benign power will dispel American and East Asian doubts about China’s intentions. Over time, several conditions may constrain China’s implementation of a grand strategy. First, for the foreseeable future China will lack the power to compel its weaker partners’ compliance with Chinese objectives. Second, China’s present inclination to mix-and-match issues in bilateral negotiations to generate a sense of encompassing relationships may fail to produce specific agreements on individual issues. Third, Beijing is aware of the gap between the ‘fundamentals’ of its domestic market and those of a mature capitalist market, which will require the government to engage in export promotion and/or protectionism of home industries.135
134
I wish to thank Yuen-Foong Khong for contributing this insight, and apologize for my simplification. 135 For case studies of recent US and Chinese bilateral agreements that show differences in their approaches, see Garnaut 2005; Hufbauer and Wong 2005; and Soesastro 2003. For a case study of Chinese industrial policy in response to international pressures, see Lin 2006 on the national oil companies.
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A potentially disruptive “nesting” problem lies in the institutional choices China has made to address the above conditions.136 Institutional inconsistency could emerge in three ways. First, China’s customized, encompassing relational agreements and the US Trade Representative’s exacting template for “competitive liberalization” represent two contrasting models of trade and investment negotiation, which would pose barriers to integration at higher-level APEC or WTO frameworks. Second, bilateral FTAs necessarily raise barriers against third parties, compelling some countries to consider signing more agreements to correct for trade diversion.137 However, this rationale for proliferating bilateral FTAs does not necessarily lead to a broader open trade association or a regional free trade bloc.138 Furthermore, bilateralism represents an “obsolescent bargain” – as more bilateral FTAs are signed, each additional agreement represents lesser value for the trade partners.139 Third, domestic beneficiaries of bilateral FTAs may lose incentives for future multilateral, multiproduct trade liberalization.140 In short, if bilateral preferential trade agreements continue to serve as a means through which Washington and Beijing vie for regional influence, we may expect continuing flagging interest in both APEC and the WTO, and increasing tensions from nesting problems.141 This bilateralism is ultimately counterproductive for both
136
China’s flexible approach to bilateral and multilateral negotiations is superficially reminiscent of the United States’ “strategy without vision” in the 1990s toward APEC, in which Washington’s enthusiasm for regional forums created not only problems of consistency with higher order institutions but also tempting targets to further certain short-term U.S. interests. See Aggarwal and Lin 2002. 137 See Garnaut 2005 for Australia’s desire for an FTA with China to counterbalance the US–Australia FTA. 138 Evenett and Meier 2006; and Hufbauer and Wong 2005. 139 Evenett and Meier 2006. 140 Aggarwal 2006; and Evenett and Meier 2006. 141 Bergsten 2002 generally argues in favor of bilateral agreements as providing a positive impetus for multilateral negotiations. However, recently Bergsten 2005 acknowledges the potential for a devastating trade war between China- and UScentered preferential trade blocs. Yet he believes that regional powers will push for an FTA of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) to avoid “drawing a line down the middle of the Pacific.”
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China and the United States – the world’s two largest economies – because they benefit the most from free trade and multilateral economic institutions. References Aggarwal, Vinod K. 1998. Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. ———. 2006. The Political Economy of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific: A U.S. Perspective. Business Asia 14 (2):10-16. Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Kun-Chin Lin. 2002. Strategy without Vision: The U.S. and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation In Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): The First Decade, edited by Jurgen Roland, Eva Manske, and Werner Draguhn, 87-118. London, UK: RoutledgeCurzon. Aggarwal, Vinod K. and John Ravenhill. 2001. Undermining the WTO: The Case Against ‘Open Sectoralism.’ Asia Pacific Issues 50. Antkiewicz, Agata and John Whalley. 2004. China’s New Regional Trade Agreements. Working Paper 10992. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research. Baviera, Aileen S. P. 2004. International Terrorism, U.S. Foreign Policy and Great Power Relations. In Before and After September 11, 2001: An Asian Perspective, 9-20. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo Center for Asian Studies. Banda, O. G. Dayaratna and John Whalley. 2005. Beyond Goods and Services: Competitive Policy, Investment, Mutual Recognition, Movement of Persons, and Broader Cooperative Provisions of Recent FTAs Involving ASEAN Countries. Working Paper 11232. Stanford, Calif.: NBER Working Paper Series. Benford, Robert and David Snow. 2000. Framing Processes and Social Movements: an Overview and Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology 26:611-4. Bergsten, Fred. 2005. A New Strategy for APEC. Speech at the 16th General Meeting of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) Seoul, South Korea, September 6, 2005. Available from . Berkofsky, Axel. 2005. China’s Asian Ambitions. Far Eastern Economic Review July/August. Cha, Victor. 2004. Korea: A Peninsula in Crisis and Flux. In Strategic Asia 2004-5: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power, edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Willis, 139-162. Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research. Chen, Xavier. 2004. Gas Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Issues and Institutional Barriers. A presentation for BP China, March Seoul, Korea. Available from . Chung, Ok-Nim. 2000. Solving the Security Puzzle in Northeast Asia: A Multilateral Security Regime. CNAPS Working Paper. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
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Rhetoric or Vision? Chinese Responses to U.S. Unilateralism 103 Greif, Avner and David D. Laitin. 2004. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. American Political Science Review 98 (4):613-632. Hanson, Stephen E. 2004. Russia: Strategic Partner or Evil Empire. In Strategic Asia 2004-5: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power, edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Willis, 163-196. Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research. Harrison, Selig S. 2005. China, North Korea and the United States. Written testimony prepared for a hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on China’s Role in the North Korea Nuclear Crisis, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. Available from <www.uscc.gov/ hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_03_10wrtr/harrison_selig_ wrts.htm>. Herberg, Mikkal E. 2004. Energy: Asia’s Energy Insecurity—Cooperation or Conflict? In Strategic Asia 2004-5: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power, edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Willis, 339-377. Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Yee Wong. 2005. Prospects for Regional Free Trade in Asia. Working Paper 05-12. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Available from: . ———. 2003. Is China a Status Quo Power? International Security 27 (4):5-56. Johnston, Alastair Iain and Paul Evans. 1999. China’s Engagement in International Security Institutions. In Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, 235272. London, UK: Routledge. Kang, David C. 2003. Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks. International Security 27 (4):57-85. Kim, Samuel S. 2001. 1991. Peking’s Foreign Policy in the Shadows of Tiananmen. Issues and Studies 27 (1):39-69. ———. 1994. China and the Third World. In China and the World: China’s Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era 3rd ed., edited by Samuel Kim. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. ———. The Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia Security: U.S. Policy Options. In Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia – U.S. Strategies for Regional Peace. Report of the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference, edited by Michael Kraig and James Henderson. Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation. Available from . Lin, Kun-Chin. 2003. Corporatizing China: Reinventing State Control for the Market. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley. ———. 2006. Disembedding Socialist Firms as a Statist Project: Restructuring the Chinese Oil Industry 1997-2002. Enterprise & Society: The International Journal of Business History 7 (1):59-97.
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4 Under Pressure: Japan’s Institutional Response to Regional Uncertainty
Saori N. Katada University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA Mireya Solis American University, Washington, DC, USA
4.1 Introduction1 The “triple shocks” – the end of the Cold War, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), and 9/11 – encouraged the Japanese government to formalize for the first time its regional trade, monetary and financial affairs. The Japanese government’s approach to regional institutional building has been influenced by the domestic struggle to garner private sector support, the regional challenge of accommodating China’s interests, and the potential American reaction to the development of exclusively Asian regional institutions. We argue that these factors’ differential impact in trade and finance has given rise to contrasting trajectories in Japan’s approach to regional institution building in these two issue areas. In this chapter, we first analyze the genesis of the shift in Japanese policies and strategies toward regional institutions by focusing on the shocks and disequilibria experienced by Japan and the region in the 1990s. In the third and fourth sections, we analyze Japan’s role 1
We thank Jason Enia for his excellent research assistance. We also appreciate comments from the participants of the conference on “Northeast Asia’s New Institutional Architecture and Community Building in a Post 9/11 World,” especially our discussant Steven Vogel. Jonathan Chow, Edward Fogarty, and Kristi Govella provided valuable feedback and editorial assistance during the revision process.
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in the evolution of both trade and financial architecture in the region and beyond. Finally, we compare Japan’s efforts in these two areas, and address the reasons behind the dissimilarities observed. 4.2 Economic Shocks and the Persistence of Security Constraints Traditionally, informality characterized Japanese leadership in regional entities, partly due to continued distrust on the part of its Asian neighbors over the events of World War II and due to the opposition of the US to organizations which might exclude it. Japan, therefore, was supportive of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum’s “open” and “voluntaristic” approach to trade facilitation and liberalization,2 and was comfortable with the ASEAN Regional Form (ARF) for security affairs since it included the United States and other extraregional partners.3 Japan’s urge to formalize the regional economic architecture was influenced by two of the three shocks considered in this volume – the end of the Cold War and the AFC – while the improvement of US–Japanese relations post-9/11 has given Japan more leeway to pursue its regional economic initiatives. The first instance, the end of the Cold War made the Japanese government increasingly unsure of the US commitment to East Asian security. In addition, the rise of China, an indirect outcome of the end of the Cold War, began to put pressure on the Japanese government to take an assertive leadership role in the region. The second shock, the AFC, revealed the vulnerability of monetary and financial arrangements in East Asia and affirmed Japan’s inability to act as the leading crisis manager. Nevertheless, the crisis opened new “political space” for Japan to pursue more assertive trade integration strategies without triggering much distrust from its Asian neighbors, at least initially. After 9/11, Japan’s immediate support for the Bush Administration’s War on Terrorism 2
Ashizawa 2004. Since discussing the concept of region per se is beyond the scope of this paper, we simply adopt the definition of region in Pempel 2005, 4: a “contiguous territorial area having sufficiently clear internal cohesion and definitive external boundaries.” By this definition, the United States fails to qualify as a regional partner to Japan.
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muted negative American reaction to Japanese pursuit of a regional institutional structure that might exclude the United States. 4.2.1 The End of the Cold War and the Rise of China Reevaluating the US–Japan Security Relationship
The San Francisco System established in the 1950s long benefited Japan. Viewed by the United States as the bulwark of “the West” in Asia in its confrontation against the Communist bloc, Japan became the most important US ally in the region. Despite the “alliance dilemma” caused by such a tight bond,4 this security arrangement allowed the Japanese government to pursue a low-profile, low-risk, and low-cost defense policy and to concentrate on the country’s economic recovery and growth.5 During the Cold War years, the Japanese government was shielded from overt conflict with East Asian countries thanks to the US presence in the region, which reciprocally assured East Asian governments of Japan’s peaceful behavior. The end of the Cold War affected this stable balance. Although the Clinton Administration reaffirmed in 1994 the US commitment to East Asian security by maintaining its troops in the region,6 the dramatic reduction of the security threat, especially from the Soviet Union, still triggered in Japan a “fear of abandonment.”7 Moreover, two nearly contemporaneous with the end events of the Cold War put Japan at odds with its post-WWII low-profile political and security posture: the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and the 1990–91 first Gulf Crisis. The former forced Tokyo to follow the G7 consensus on business and foreign aid suspension against China, despite Japan’s wishes to avoid alienating the Chinese government. The latter served as a somber learning experience for the Japanese government, as the country’s $13 billion financial contribution to the war efforts against Iraq was not even kindly acknowledged, and instead, led to criticism 4
Snyder 1997; and Drifte 1998. On the “Yoshida Doctrine” see Pyle 1992, 21. 6 Nye 1995. 7 The fear of abandonment is one of the two security dilemmas; the other is the fear of entrapment. 5
112 Saori N. Katada and Mireya Solis
of Japan’s “checkbook diplomacy.”8 A bill was passed in 1992 to allow the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) to be dispatched under stringent conditions in support of UN peacekeeping operations.” Reformers” like Ichiro Ozawa insisted on Japan becoming a “normal country” (futsu no kuni) with an adequate military capacity to contribute independently to international peacekeeping efforts and wean itself from dependency on the American security umbrella.9 Even with this post-Cold War security environment and some signs of fissure between the two governments,10 the US–Japanese bilateral security arrangement remained intact. In the 1997 New Defense Guidelines, the Japanese government agreed to provide logistical support to American troops in conflicts in surrounding areas.11 Regionally, the Japanese government welcomed the Clinton Administration’s policy to foster a security framework to reduce regional tensions and enhance confidence building. The Japanese leadership fully endorsed the ARF as a unique entity to provide the region’s leaders with increased opportunities to engage in dialogue regarding security matters.12 North Korea, China, and Japan’s Security Dilemma
Two primary security threats have characterized Japan’s post-Cold War regional security environment. The first arose in 1998, when North Korea test-launched a missile over Japan that landed in the Pacific Ocean, prompting fears of nuclear attack.13 The heightened security threat led the Japanese government to engage in joint research on theater missile defense with the United States in August 1999. The Six-Party Talks contained this renewed crisis during the early 2000s, allowing Japan to engage multilaterally in regional security dialogue. 8
Green 2001. Ozawa 1994. 10 For example, the 1995 incident of three marines raping a 12-year old girl in Okinawa led to a high-profile national and bilateral debate on the validity (and the fairness) of US military presence in Japan (especially concentrated in Okinawa). 11 Due to heated and prolonged debates, it took almost two years to pass three pieces of legislation that would enable Japan to provide broader support to the US military forces. 12