No title

FALL, 1986

~)t

-I -7-*. -&*',...** :

'

!

'

.I

A JOURNAL OF

Femipr

Pbioopby

Hypatia A JOURNAL OF

Femirit P'ilo5op1y Fall 1986 Volume1, Number2

S+4eOhtiL(k- 4 454ej MOTHERHOOD AND SEXUALITY edited by Ann Ferguson Amherst Universityof Massachusetts,

Hypatia (Hy-pay-sha) was an Egyptian woman philosopher, mathematician, and astronomer who lived in Alexandria from her birth in about 370 A.D. until her death in 415. She was the leader of the Neoplatonic School in Alexandria and was famous as an eloquent and inspiring teacher. The journal Hypatia is named in honor of this foresister. Her name reminds us that although many of us are the first women philosophers in our schools, we are not, after all, the first in history. Hypatia has its roots in the Society for Women in Philosophy, many of whose members have for years envisioned a regular publication devoted to feminist philosophy. Hypatia is the realization of that vision; it is intended to encourage and communicate many different kinds of feminist philosophizing.

Hypatia (ISSN 0887-5367) is published by Hypatia, Inc. which assumes no responsibility for statements expressed by authors. Hypatia will publish two issues in 1986, and three issues in each successive year. Subscription rates for 1986-87 are: Institutions, $40/year; Individuals, $20/year. Foreign orders add postage: $5/year to Canada, Mexico and overseas surface; $10/year to overseas airmail. Single copies will be sold for $20 (institutions) and $10 (individuals). A 40% discount is available on bulk orders for classroom use or bookstore sales. Address all editorial and business correspondence to the Editor, Hypatia, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, Edwardsville, IL 62026-1437. Notice of nonreceipt of an issue must be sent within four weeks after receipt of subsequent issue. Please notify us of any change of address; the Post Office does not forward third class mail. Copyright © 1986 by Hypatia, Inc. All rights reserved. Hypatia was first published in 1983 as a Special Issue of Women's Studies International Forum, by Pergamon Press. The first three issues of Hypatia appeared respectively as vol. 6, no. 6; vol. 7, no. 5; and vol. 8, no. 3 of Women's Studies International Forum. They are available as back issues from Pergamon Press, Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, NY 10523.

Margaret A. Simons,

University

Assistant Editors TameraBryant KateTaylor Editorial Assistant ThorayaHalhoul Book Review Editor JeffnerAllen, EasternMontanaCollege The Forum Editor MariaLugones, CarletonCollege Associate Editors Azizah al-Hibri(Editor 1982-84),New York SandraBartky, Universityof Illinois, Chicago Ann Garry,CaliforniaState University,Los Angeles SandraHarding, Universityof Delaware Helen Longino, Mills College Donna Serniak-Catudal,Randolph-MaconCollege Joyce Trebilcot, WashingtonUniversity,St. Louis Advisory Board ElizabethBeardsley,TempleUniversity Simonede Beauvoir(France,1908-1986) GertrudeEzorsky,BrooklynCollegeof City Universityof New York ElizabethFlower, Universityof Pennsylvania VirginiaHeld, GraduateCenterof City Universityof New York GraciellaHierro(Mexico) JudithJarvisThompson,MassachusettsInstituteof Technology MaryMothersill,BarnardCollege MerrileeSalmon, Universityof Pittsburgh Anita Silvers,San FranciscoState University Editorial Board KathrynPyne Addelson, Smith College JacquelineAnderson, OliveHarveyCollege, Chicago Asoka Bandarage,BrandeisUniversity SharonBishop, CaliforniaState University,Los Angeles LorraineCode, TrentUniversity BlancheCurry,Shaw College ElizabethEames, SouthernIllinois Universityat Carbondale SusanFeathers,Universityof Pennsylvania Ann Ferguson,Universityof Massachusetts,Amherst Jane Flax, Howard University Nancy Fraser,NorthwesternUniversity Carol Gould, Steven'sInstituteof Technology Susan Griffin, Berkeley,California Donna Haraway,Universityof California,Santa Cruz Nancy Hartsock,Johns Hopkins University

SarahLucia Hoagland,NortheasternIllinois University Alison Jaggar, Universityof Cincinnati ElizabethJaneway,New York EvelynFox Keller,NortheasternUniversity Rhoda Kotzin,MichiganState University LyndaLange, Universityof Alberta Linda Lopez McAllister,Universityof South Floridaat Ft. Meyers PatriciaMann, City Collegeof New York Ann Matter, Universityof Pennysylvania KathrynMorgan, Universityof Toronto JaniceMoulton, Smith College AndreeNichola-McLaughlin,MedgarEvars College Linda Nicholson, State Universityof New York,Albany Susan Ray Peterson,New York Connie CrankPrice, TuskegeeInstitute Sara Ruddick,New School of Social Research Betty Safford, CaliforniaState University,Fullerton Naomi Scheman, Universityof Minnesota Ruth Schwarz,Universityof Pennsylvania Joan Shapiro, Universityof Pennsylvania ElizabethV. Spelman,Smith College JacquelineM. Thomason,Los Angeles Nancy Tuana, Universityof Texasat Dallas CarolineWhitbeck,MassachusettsInstituteof Technology Iris Young, WorcesterPolytechnicInstitute JacquelineZita, Universityof Minnesota

Fall 1986 Volume 1, Number 2

contents Preface 1

Ann Ferguson

Motherhood and Sexuality: Some Feminist Questions

Jana Sawicki

Foucault and Feminism: Toward a Politics of Difference

23

Female Friendship: Contra Chodorow and Dinnerstein

37

Cynthia A. Freeland

Woman: Revealed or Revelled?

49

Cheryl H. Cohen

The Feminist Sexuality Debate: Ethics and Politics

71

Feminism and Motherhood: O'Brien vs Beauvoir

87

Janice Raymond

Reyes Lazaro

3

Janet Farrell-Smith

Possessive Power

103

Anne Donchin

The Future of Mothering: Reproductive Technology and Feminist Theory

121

Should a Feminist Choose A Marriage-Like Relationship?

139

References

161

Notes on Contributors

173

Announcements

175

Submission Guidelines

179

Marjorie Weinzweig

This issue of Hypatia, a specialissue on Motherhoodand Sexuality editedby Ann Ferguson,completesour first yearof publicationas an autonomousjournal. It has been a year of many changes, beginning this springwith the deathof an honoredmemberof our Advisory Board, and friend, Simonede Beauvoir.Beauvoirgenerouslylent her supportto Hypatiaas she did to so many feministprojectsbecauseof her commitmentto the liberationof women. She believedwith a zeal that seemed to some naive and out-of-step with the style-conscious, post-modern1980'sthat the rootednessof literaturein historyshould not be an excusefor obfuscationand superficialitybut a challengefor philosophical clarity and action. Her contribution to feminist philosophy was enormous, although she never saw herself as a philosopher. The Frenchfeministphilosopher,MicheleLeDoeuff, once observed that Beauvoir'ssense of not being a "real" philosopherlike her close associate Jean-PaulSartregoes back to her experienceat the Ecole NormaleSuperior.Unlike Sartreshe was denied formaladmissionto do graduatework in philosophybecauseof her sex. Althoughshe attendedlecturesthereher senseof exclusionfromthe disciplineremained. When I asked Simonede Beauvoirabout her graduatework, she vigorously denied having been a "Normalien" since she merely "followed courses"thereas manyothershad. I askedif otherwomen had ever been admitted. "No," she replied," but women who came after me like Simone Weil were allowed to enroll." Simone de Beauvoiropened many doors for the women who followed her. She will be sorely missed. This year has also broughtexcitingnew developmentsfor feminist philosophers.Dr. Mary Ellen Waithe reportsthat two of Hypatia's three known works have survived.Her Commentaryon Diophantus' Arithmeticorumhas been translatedand Waithe has describedher Commentaryon Ptolemy's Syntaxis Mathematicain a chapter on Hypatia in A History of WomenPhilosophers, Volume I, Ancient Women Philosophers: 600 B.C. - 500 A.D.. This volume is part of a

four-volume history of women philosophers Waithe is editing for MartinMijhoff. In celebrationof this importantwork, we are issuing a call for papers for a special issue on the History of Women Philosophers. The Hypatia circulationcontinuesto grow; we hope to have 1000 subscribersby the end of the year. We have also begun bookstore distribution,so let us know about your favorite bookstores. In the coming year, we plan to expand our publication schedule to three 1

hypati issues and to begin a Book Review section under the editorshipof Jeffner Allen (See SubmissionGuidelinesfor more details on special issues and the Book Review section). We have also begun plans to reissue the first three annual issues of Hypatia and make them availableto currentsubscribers. Our success this year would not have been possible without the generoussupportof manypersons.We are especiallyindebtedto Ann Lazersonfor her efforts on behalf of Hypatia. I would also like to thank: Kim Blankenship,Tamera Bryant, J.J. DeRousse, Thoraya Halhoul, Kitty Henderson,MaureenKinsella,MariaPinckney, Dennis Pluta, Jan Scott, CathySurack,and Kate Taylor from SIUE and the surroundingcommunities;Candida Lacey and Dale Spenderof Women's Studies InternationalForum; Phyllis Hall of Pergamon Press; from the Society for Women in Philosophy, the regional Treasurers:SandraBartky, Ruth Doell, Bett Farber,Wanda Teays, and Carol Van Kirk;the SWIPNewsletterEditor, MarilynFriedman; Ti-GraceAtkinson for carryinga wreathfrom Hypatiato Beauvoir's funeral;the memberof the Core Boardwhosevital role in shapingthe course of Hypatia is finally acknowledgedwith the title of Associate Editor; Libby Potter and the other individualSWIP memberswhose personal encouragementand philosophicalexplorationshave made Hypatia a reality. Financial support in the form of loans, grants, and sustaining subscriptionshas been vital in enablingHypatiato begin autonomous publication.I wouldlike to gratefullyacknowledgethe generousgrant from HamiltonCollege;the loans and grantsfrom the variousSWIP divisions;and donations from individualsincluding:SandraBartky, KathrynBlair, ClaudiaCard, ElizabethEames, SarahFowler, Nancy Fraser,MarilynFriedman,MarilynFrye, MerrillHintikka, Lorraine Ironplow, Carolyn Korsmeyer,Rhoda Kotzin, Eleanor Kuykendall, Sharon Montgomery,MarilynNissim-Sabat,Andrea Nye, Elizabeth Potter, Sara Ruddick, Nancy Skeen, MaryellenSymons, and Terry Winant.

2

ann ferguson Motherhood and Sexuality: Some Feminist Questions This is a review essay that also serves as an introduction to the other essays in the issue. It discusses feminist theory's relation to Freud, feminist ethical questions on motherhood and sexuality, the historical question of how systems of socially constructed sexual desire connect to male dominance, the question of the role of the body in feminst theory, and disputes within feminism on self, gender, agency and power.

I. Introduction hereis a sense in whichmy motherwill alwaysbe a centralpartof me. After all, in my young days when I developedas a self, she was my all. Good and bad were defined by her. So, at one level, even when I disagree with her, she is my touchstoneof value. In the sameway my daughterwill alwaysbe a partof that partof me that In spite is definedthroughmotherhood-and-childhood. of my ambivalence about mothering and being mothered, childraisingand being childraisedhas been an intrinsicvalue. Havinga child (and stepchildrentoo) has given me an emotional security that no relations with lovers (male or female) or husbandshave done. After all, motherhoodis foreverif one wantsit to be: no other commitment in our society can provide such assurance!No marxistor liberaleconomic theory that tries to graspthe relationbetweenmy childrenand I or my mother(or grandmother)as simplya relationshipof exchange (and thus of dominanceor oppression)will have got it all. (From my diary, 11/26/85) Readingthis entrytoday, I hear my contraryvoice disagreeing.After all, thereis anotherway to see my self; or should I say anotheraspect of my self? This alter aspect is not defined in terms of either my mother or my children. Neither the same or in opposition is this aspect, just different: as a leftist, a lesbian, a feminist and an Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Ann Ferguson.

3

hypatia academic, I am unlike both my mother and my daughter.How then can I understandhow such a dividedself gains or loses power?This is the way that my own personalquest for mentalhealthconnectsto one of the importantquestions for feminist theory, i.e. the role of male dominancein relationto motherhood,genderand sexuality. One importantdirectionto look for the answer is toward an appropriationof some aspectsof Freudiantheory.Thereseemto be four popularpositionshere. Feministsby and largeagreethat Freud'sideas cannot be saved as is, for they incorporatea biologisticand patriarchal theoryof "penis envy" to explaingenderidentity.Those who are very concernedto emphasizecultural, racial and class differencesin the social constructionof parenting,genderand sexualityrejectFreud outrightas too Western-orientedand too universalisticin his theories. Feministswho are influencedby the work of post-structuralistssuch as Foucault are in this camp and Jana Sawicki'spaper in this issue reflects this tendency. The secondtendencyis representedby Nancy Chodorow(1978)and DorothyDinnerstein(1976). These theoristsacceptthe idea that there is a universalcross-culturalbase for male dominancerooted in the social constructionof genderand sexualityin asymmetricalparenting arrangements.Patriarchythus has an unconsciouspsychologicalbasis independentof economic,politicaland social structureswhichcan only be eliminatedby a radicalreorganizationof the sexual division of labor in the family and kin networks. The thirdtendency,radicalfeminism,acceptsthe idea of a universal cross-culturalbase for patriarchyand also certain aspects of Freud's thought (Firestone 1971). However, since most radical feminists are also lesbian-feminists,they are much more sharply criticalof Chodorowand Dinnerstein'sstress on co-parentingas the solutionto male dominance.Instead,they take compulsoryheterosexualiltyto be the key mechanismof male dominance,by which means the original woman-identifiederotic tie between mother and infant daughteris broken and patriarchyis installed. AdrienneRich (Rich 1976, 1980) was the groundbreakingradical feminist thinker on the connection between motherhood and compulsory heterosexualilty. Jan Raymond (1979) emphasizesin her new book, A Passion for Friends: A Philosophy of Female Affection (1986) and in her article

here, "FemaleFriendship:ContraChodorowand Dinnerstein,"that Chodorow's emphasis on women's mothering and sexual relations with men ignoresthe more importantbase of patriarchy,whichis the coercive nature of hetero-relations,whetherof kinship, sexualityor friendship.Since male bondingis the key mechanismfor reproducing male dominance, Raymondargues that women's friendshipsare the 4

ann ferguson the key to female resistanceto patriarchy. The fourthcontemporaryfeministuse of Freudianthoughis a revision whichcombinessome of his cross-culturalinsightswith concepts which allow us to historicizedifferent types of male dominanceand female resistance. We can divide these theorists further into three groups: Lacanians (Juliet Mitchell 1974, Gallop 1982), French feministsKristeva(1979, 1980), Irigaray(1974, 1977, 1979), and Cixous (1976), and Gayle Rubin's sex/gender systems theory (Rubin 1975). Mitchell and Lacan (in Mitchell and Rose 1982) give a quasihistorical rendition of Freud by combining his theory with that of Levi-Strausson the cross-culturalmale exchangeof women in marriage which defines kinshipties. Accordingto these thinkers,women then become defined as objects rather than subjects of language. Children,when developinggender identity and forming their sexual desire come to define the masculine position as the object of the mother'sdesire,hence desirableand powerful,and the feminineposition as a lack of power, hence undesirable.Though the exchangeof womenin kin ties is no longerthe centralorganizingprincipleof society, patriarchycontinuesto be reproducedby the unconsciousstructure of masculineand feminineDesire. Lacan's interpretationof Freud has been appropriatedby some French feminists to suggest a way of challengingpatriarchy.Lacan suggeststhat the woman who passivelyallows herself to be loved, to be the object ratherthan the subject of Desire, may attain a type of jouissance, mysticalsexual pleasure, not availableto women or men who seek activelyto satisfy sexualDesire. The truly femininewoman, being outside the assumptionsof patriarchallanguage, has another way of being, enjoying and knowing not bound by these limitations. Kristeva, Irigarayand Cixous, while challengingmany of Lacan's assumptions,all accept the idea that woman's unique relationto our bodies as subjects outside the assumptionsof phallic language, our uniquerelationto our mothersand our sexuality,createdthe possibility for a radicallynew feminine writing and sensibility outside the patriarchy. Cynthia Freelandchallengesthis view in her article in this issue, "Woman:Revealedor Reveiled?"She takes on the obscureLacanian theories of Desire, Self and Gender by using them to interpretthe feminine roles juxtaposed in Nathanial Hawthorne's The Blithedale Romance. Lacan's views both romanticizeand devalue women, she argues, since he presentswomen as universalvictims of patriarchy who unconsciouslyalwaysdesiretheir own oppression.The only way out of the circleof phallicdesire, he suggests,is for women to eschew 5

hypatia active sexuality(alwaysphallic)and to revel passivelyin their bodily Othernessto men, for in not actively seekingsexual pleasureit may happen to them unexpectedly!Freelandpoints out how this indirect approach to feminine liberation mars the strategies of Lacan's erstwhilefollower, Luce Irigaray,who seems to suggest that women should not seek to describe, generalizeor articulatetheir desire for fear of falling into phallocentriclogic. While I acceptFreeland'scriticismsof Lacanand of one "natural" readingof Irigaray'swork, I think there is another way of reading Irigaraywhichsaves her enterprisefrom fatalistconclusionsFreeland sees in it. I read Irigarayas seeking to revalorizewomen's bodies by reconstructingtheir meaning, while acknowledgingthe hold that phallic signifiershave had in coding the Unconscious. Irigaraywants to open a descriptivespace for women which is ironic:that is, a discoursewhichseemsto providea universaldescription of the multipleand diffuse natureof women'sbodily sexualityas opposed to men's, but in actualityinvites women to consult our own individual, diverse and multiple bodily experiences in order to reconceptualizethe individual"body and its pleasures"(as Foucault mightsay). Thus thereis a nonessentialistreadingof Irigarayin which her work, unlike Lacan's, points us in the important direction of reconceptualizingthe role of our bodies in genderand sexualityin individual and relativeterms. Irigaray'sworkis importantas a partof a more generalfeministprojectof re-assessingthe role that bodily differencesbetweenmen and women play in reproducingpatriarchyand also, potentially,in underminingit. WhileMitchelland the FrenchFeministstry to reconstructFreudin a way that can allow us to take historicaldifferencesand changesinto account, ultimatelyit seems to me that they fail in this task. Gayle Rubin's appropriationof Lacan is more promising as an overall theoreticalparadigmthan either Mitchellor Irigaraybecause of her innovative concept of "sex/gender systems." Rubin defines a "sex/gender system" in a manneranalogousto a "mode of production," that is as a historicallybased set of categories of kinship, genderand sexualitywherebya sociallyproducedsexualityand gender is createdout of biologicalsexuality.However,herown workdoes not applyherconceptof sex/gendersystemsto allow us to understandand periodize historical types of male dominances. Isaac Balbus (1982) comes closer to a historicalapplicationbut his paradigmis too neoHegelian,in my opinion, in his concentrationof the dialecticbetween autonomy and merging that different types of parenting practices create. In my own work I try to carry Rubin's analyticalinsights further 6

ann ferguson (Ferguson 1981a, 1981b, 1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1986 forthcoming). I coin the idea of "sex/affective production systems," i.e. historical systemsof parenting,sexualityand nurturance(friendships,kin relations, work bonding). I agreewith Folbre(1983, 1984)that the question of biological reproduction(fertility rates) is a key factor of economic productionthat mainstreamand Marxisteconomistshave ignored. The historicallyvariableneed for children'slabor, and the work necessary for childrearing,are part of the material base for socially constructedpatriarchalmodes of sex/affective production. These systemsorganizethe social practicesof marriage,prostitution, kin networksand stigmatizationof homosexualpracticesthat allow men's control of women's bodies. In the process men dominate women's sexuality,nurturance,an unequalexchangeof genderlabor and control of the key product, children. I argue that there are tri-systems of social domination (class, race/ethnicand gender)operatingin Americansocietytoday, each of which is semi-autonomous and which have separate dynamics. Although I have criticizedChodorowin the past, as of this momentI think it may be possible to historicizesome of both Chodorow and Mitchell's reconstructionof the Freudiantheory of gender development so as to understandthe cross-culturalbase for male dominance along her lines while at the same time not erasing important differencesin how race, ethnic, class and sexual identity position may differentlyconstructgenderdynamics(Ferguson1985, mss.)

II. Feminist Ethics of Motherhood and Sexuality Shouldtherebe a feministethicsof sexualityand motherhood?This questionis morecentralthan it mightotherwiseseemto the American women'smovementtoday. It is to be expectedthat a social movement demandingliberation of women from patriarchalvalues would be called upon to develop its own values, not only to confront conservativeswith a coherentvision of an alternativeset of ethicalstandards for personallife, but to provideguidelinesfor a feministoppositional cultureto show forth its values by attemptingto exemplifythem. Problemshave immediatelyarisen,however,with the demandfor a set of feministalternativevaluesand the insistencethat the personalis the political. It is much easier to reject male breadwinner-female housewifemarriageas the ideal way to organizeparentingand sexuality than it is to decidewhichalternativelife stylesare feminist!Should we be monogamousor non-monogamous?Livealone, in couplesor in communalhouseholds?Be lesbianor straight?And whateverhappened to bisexualityin the shuffle to claim a vanguardfeminist sexual 7

hypatia identity?Or celibacy?Or prioritizingfriendshipsover one's love life? Is prostitutiona life-style that any self-respectingfeminist should reject? Sincemotherhoodas an institutionhas beenso infusedwith male dominance, should feminists reject motherhood altogether? Or at least avoid committing themselvesto bringing up boys? (After all, motherhood involves self-sacrificeenough, and if, as some radical feministssuggest, men are incorrigible,why should one sacrificetime to bring up boys which might better be spent helping women (including oneself)? The decision to mother unavoidably requires one to define a feministethicby whichto guideone's parentingchoices. For example, should beinga motherbe a commitmentthat one makesindependently of a commitmentto a lover or mate? How should childrenbest be broughtup to have feminist values? Should we commit ourselvesto co-parentingwith a father (when he is available)on the groundsthat this is most desirablefor the childreneven when it may limit our own options, as when the mother has a new lover-mate-partnerbut has previouslyengagedin co-parentingwith the father?(Thisis often particularlydifficult when the new lover is a woman.) What about the situation of the child who has a numberof co-parents,each subsequent lovers of (one of her) mothers?(My former "house" daughter has one biologicalmother, one biologicalfatherand threesubsequent co-parentingmothers!)What do we teach them (and think ourselves) about the issues of sex education, incest, adult/child sexuality, child/child sexuality, erotica, pornography,fantasies of rape, S/M sex? Can one be feministand engagein and/or recommendsuch practices to others? With respect to a feminist sexual morality, the recent debate has been dominated by radical feminists on one pole and those I call "libertarian" feminists on the other (Ferguson 1984b). While the formercan be criticizedfor overemphasizingthe power of patriarchy to constructmen with sadisticand womenwith masochisticdesires(cf. rDworkin1974, 1982;MacKinnon1979, 1982, 1983),the latterend up validatingany consensualpracticeat all, thus slidinginto a "do your own thing" mentality(Califia 1981;Rubin 1982, 1984;Rubin,English and Hollibaugh 1981). While this stance has a certainplausibilityfor consentingadults,it is unworkableas a guide for dealingwithchildren about sex. Part of the commitmentof motherhoodafter all is to form one's children'svalues in a way one considershealthyuntil the point wherethey are consideredmatureenough to make theirown choices. While the vagueness of what counts as achieving this "maturity" createsthe possibilityof muchmisuseof parentalpower, the dilemma is a real one which is not dissolved by those who argue that mutual 8

ann ferguson consent, not age, is the sole criterionon whichsexualpracticesshould be approved. For the question simply pops up again in trying to establish under what conditions it is plausibleto assume consent is really present. Cheryl Cohen, in "The Feminist Sexuality Debate: Ethics and Politics," challengesthe libertarianposition, arguingthat feminists cannot eschewthe politicaltask of attemptingto constructa feminist sexual morality. She argues that the current sex debate in the Women's Movementneeds to take account of Gilligan's distinction betweena masculine"rights" ethic and a feminine"responsibilities" morality. Using the latter approachwe must insist on reconstructing the distinctionbetween public and privatethat early feminist theory broke down with its insistencethat the personalis the political. While feminists should support public policy which guaranteesindividuals the right to many forms of sexual expressionin their private life it does not necessarilyfollow that what is privatelymorallyacceptable (that is, should be protectedfrom being restrictedby state policy) is politically liberatoryfrom a feminist ethical point of view. While I agree with Cohen that we must reject the relativist "do your own thing" implications of the libertariansexual liberation strategy, she herself seems to underemphasize this strategy's historical importance to counteract a certain smug puritanismof radical lesbian-feministthought. Even if we agree to make the distinction she urges between feminist state policy on sexualityand our prescriptions for an oppositional liberatory feminist sexual ethics, we must find a way to permit people to challengestatus quo norms in their personal sexual interactions.Libertariansare on the righttrackwhen they insist on the value of sexualpleasurefor its own sake. But this does not imply that there are not other values (emotional intimacy, autonomy, equality, self-respect, etc.), which are also ends in themselves.We must examine sexual practicescontextually and not abstractlyto seek which of them can betterachievenot merely pleasure but these other ends as well. The search for a feministsexualliberatoryethics must find a middlegroundbetweena "nothing goes but lesbianvanilla sex" moralismand an "everything goes" sexualexperimentalism.We seek not merelya transitionalsexual morality, one which allows us autonomy from the sexual repression characteristicof 20th century capitalist patriarchy,but also a theory of self-development,tactics and strategyto change ourselves and a vision of where we are going. Otherpapersin this issue attemptto developtheoriesof autonomy, reproductionand self-developmentto providethe groundworkfor an ethics of motherhoodand sexuality. MarjorieWeinzweigdevelopsa 9

hypatia as the ideal Heideggeriannotion of "autonomous-being-with-others" mode of combiningthe feministvaluesof equality,freedomand selfdevelopment.She combinesthis with a threestage theory of development which then yields answersto when and how to engage in marriage, couple relationshipsand parenthood. Anne Donchin in "The Future of Mothering: Reproductive Technology and Feminist Theory"defendswhat she calls a "moderateinterventionist"position on the question of what feminists' stance should be on the development of reproductive technology. In "Possessive Power" Janet Farrell-Smitharguesthat feministsshould demandrights against the state whichallow for parenthoodunderconditionsof autonomy.And Jan Raymondargues, at least by implication, that heterosexualcoparenting should never take precedenceover women's friendships, and thus that the ethical injunction to co-parent, regularlydrawn from Chodorow and Dinnerstein'swork, should be rejected. For furtherdiscussionof these claims I referthe readerto sectionsbelow.

III. Sexuality and Desire Ironically,Americanradical feminist thepriesof motherhoodand eroticismof Rich(1976, 1980)and Daly (1978, 1984)manifestsome of the same over-simplificationsof the relation as does Freud's work. Eroticismin motheringis assumedto be a naturalgiven, an otherwise unproblematicjoyous connectionbetweenmothersandchildrenwhich patriarchyand compulsory heterosexualityrepresses. Like Irigaray and Flaxmy alternativereadingof sexualityassumesthatthereis a problematicinherentto mother/childeroticrelationswhichhas littleto do with the power of the father or adult lover (male or female) or the mother. This is that the inevitablepowerdifferentialbetweenmother and child createsan autonomy/eroticismconflict for childrenof both sexes which will tend to lead them to attemptto find other erotic objects in orderto establisha sense of independencefrom the mother. My view of sexualitydiffersfromFreudin that I theorizean inherent predilectionfor social relationswithothersbuiltinto humaneroticism. I agree with the emphasis of Objects Relations theory that human understandingsof self are constructionfromrelationswithothers.But unlike the Chodorowianversion, I would hold that masculine and femininegender personalitieshave no cross-cultural,cross-classand cross-racialcontent. Rather,they dependimportantlyon the natureof the familystructure(extended,nuclear,maleor femaleheaded,etc.) in whichchildrenare raised.In nuclearfamilieswherethe oppositionbetween an erotic relationto the motherand a distancedrelationto the father is present, childrenof either sex who identify with the father 10

ann ferguson may assumesuch identificationcarriesthe consequencethat no erotic relationis possible with a personof the male sex. In nuclearfamilies where the mother herself has a suppressedor ambivalenteroticism towardthe childrenand the fathera more erotic one, the conseqences may be the converse.Extendedfamilieswherethereis more than one significant female kin doing motheringmay providechildrenwith a choice of erotic objects and self-identifications. Another way that Freud's theory of gender and sexual identity developmentis mistakenis the deterministicemphasisit puts on family relations and childhood developmentas opposed to childhood, adolescentand adult peer and communityinteractions.Like the symbolic interactionists(Simonand Gagnon 1973;Plummer1975)I hold that genderand sexualidentityis a processsubjectto constantchange by one's relationswith one's peerreferencegroupsas one's earlyfamily experiences.Freud'semphasison the latterignoresthe key importance of whetherone is defined as "normal" or "deviant" by one's peers. In my view, what follows from the emphasison genderand sexual identityas an ongoing process is that oppositionalculturalnetworks for heterosexualand lesbian-feministswhichredefinethe meaningand value of "femininity," femininesexualpleasure,and lesbianidentity thus become extremelyimportantmodes of resistanceto dominant identificationswhichtie womento patriarchaland heterosexistvalues. What explains the apparentuniversalityof male dominance and compulsoryheterosexualitycross-culturally?Ratherthan locatingthe persistenceof these featuresin a repressedor tabooed mother/child sexuality, my readingof sexualityrejects the idea of a sexual drive whose major aim is bodily satisfaction, and a secondary, or sublimated,interestin emotionalor affectionaterelationswith others. Rather, human sexual energy is always both emotional and affectionate energy, what I would call "sex/affective energy." Sex/affective energy has a double-sided aim: the desire to be incorporated/unitedwith other social subjectsand in doing so to achieve bodily pleasure(e.g. not merelyorgasm:simple touching, as in hugging, satisfies this desire). Although tension reduction is achieved when orgasm is achieved, tension reductionper se is not, as Freud thought,the ultimateaim of humansexualitybut a healthyside effect. Althoughemotionalincorporationwith othersis a key aim of sex/affectiveenergy,partialsatisfactionof this desirecan be attainedby sexual practicesthat substitutean imaginaryrelationwith othersor with oneself, e.g. as in masturbation. It is my view that historicallydifferentforms of the family, embedded in different modes of sex/affective production, mesh together 11

hypatia with differenteconomic modes of productionto yield differentsocial practiceswith respectto motherhood,friendshipand sexuality.These in turn have differentgeneralimplicationsfor the strengthof patriarchy in that period, as well as for opportunitiesfor oppositionalpractices of feminist resistance(Ferguson 1984a). For example, in New Englandcolonial familiesmotherhoodand sexualitywereassumedto go togetherby Calvinistideology. Since this was evil, fatherswereexpectedto intervenein the mother/childrelationshipin orderto break the will of the child, since it was assumedthat the motherby herself would encourage the child to be lustful. Female resistancein this period no doubt consisted in persisting in eroticism with young children in spite of paternal interdictionsand, more generally, by prioritizingthe needs of the body (through "witchcraft," taught by elders to youngsters)over the presumedneeds of the soul. Other examples of a changed ideological relation between motherhood, friendshipand sexuality, and hence different forms of feministresistance,can be drawnfrom what I term 19thcentury"husband patriarchy"and 20th century "public patriarchy"(Ferguson 1984a). In the 19th century bourgeois family, "true" women in naturalmotherhoodwerepresumedto be asexual. Women'ssole goal in life was to the high vocations of wife and motherhood.Feminine resistancein this period included sexual abstinencewhich led to a reduction in fertility rates for women (called by some "domestic feminism," (cf. Scott-Smith 1974), prostitution (for working class women)and female spiritualand presumablyasexualfriendshipsthat allowed for women's peerbondingoutsideof patriarchallycontrolled families (Faderman1981;Smith-Rosenberg1975). Conditionsfor public patriarchyin the 20th centuryhave included the expansion of wage labor to include fulltime work for married women, publicwelfareprovisionsfor poor singlemothersand the expansionof statecontrolof childhoodsocializationby publicschooling and social serviceagencies. Psychoanalysiscreatedthe categoryof a homosexualidentityas well as the new ideal of the heterosexualsexually passionate companionate marriage (Jackson 1983). These changeshave weakenedthe patriarchalcontrolof individualmen over women and childrenin familieswhile strengtheningthe powerof men to control women and childrenthroughwage labor, the state and sexual liasons. One resulthas been the expansionof the feminizationof poverty through the increase of single mother-headed families. Womenhave escapedoppressivemarriagesonly to fall into increased exploitationas the sole parentassumingboth domesticand breadwinner responsibilityfor childrearing. There are many forms of feminist resistanceto this contemporary 12

ann ferguson form of patriarchy. Many women have delayed or bypassed motherhoodas a primarylife goal. In the sexual sphere some have consciouslyexpressedfeministresistanceby choosinga lesbianidentity and lifestyle. For others feminist independence has involved separatingheterosexualsexualityand motherhoodby contraceptive use. The permanentmonagamousfamily has been challengedby increasing divorces, extramaritalsex, single motherhood and singles lifestylesin general. The point of these historicalexamplesis to suggestthat since compulsoryheterosexualityand sexual repressiontake different forms in different modes of sex/affective production,we must develop a new paradigmof sexualityand sexual liberationthat itself is more social than the Libido that Freudassumes. Sexual Desire is determinedby specific, not general conditions of patriarchy:that is, by specific forms of the family, schooling,and the sexualdivisionof wage labor. The Unconsciousis continuallybeing createdand modified, not only in childhood but by the implicit "sex/affective" assumptionsof our ongoing friendship,romanticand sexual relationswith each other. Such a paradigmof Sexualitywill allow us to highlightthe current importanceof a lesbian-feministidentityas a type of feministsexual liberation without supposing that this is the universal vanguard resistanceto patriarchyas Rich (1980) seems to suggest. It will also allow us to focus on the specific historical drawbacksand opportunities that single motherhoodin the 20th centuryraises both with advanced reproductivetechnologies (cf. the Donchin article in this issue) and the changednatureof male exploitationof women in the asymmetrical relations of parenting and childcare (Brown 1981, Ferguson 1984a).

IV. Conceptualizing the Body in Motherhood and Sexuality Feministtheoristsneed to developa distinctivesocio-biologyof our

own, one which allows us, as Adrienne Rich and the French Feminists suggest, to "think the body." Yet this cannot be in the way that conservative, mainstream sociobiology proceeds. We have to come to terms with the perhaps irreversible gendered social differences that are predicated on our sex-biological differences, to seek if this will necessarily involve a different view on the social world, a different attitude toward parenting, etc. This whole area of reproductive differences between the sexes has been mostly ignored by marxists, who prefer to confuse the issue by insisting that social reproduction is the relevant category, rather than biological reproduction. The whole study of demography is thus given short shrift. For them, the question 13

hypatia of whether women's bodies, as a (re)productiveforce of economic production, set up material conditions which create, influence or cause male dominance to control these (re)productiveforces, is a study left as an interestingsidelightto economics and anthropology but not really theorized to be part of the marxist theory of the "economic" processper se (Folbre 1982, 1984). Feministtheoristscan be arrangedin a continuumin theirattitudes on the sociobiologicalimplicationsof bodily differencesbetweenmen and women,. One pole originateswith Beauvoir(1952)and is takenup by Firestone(1971). O'Brien(1981), Rich, Ruddick(1980, 1984)and Hartsock(1983)can be loosely juxtaposedon the other. The first pole treatswomen's reproductivedifferencesfrom men as a liability;while the second treats it, ultimately, as an asset. Rossi (1977), a liberal feminist, is hard to place in this spectrumsince she seems more concerned to defend the necessity of the status quo gender division of childrearingthan the relevanceof her sociobiologicaltheoryof parental and sexual differencesbetween men and women for the perpetuation of male dominance. What is distinctiveabout O'Brien is that she tries to give a nonstatic, dialecticalaccount of how it is that women's metaphysicaladvantage over men, women's species continuity via their special rela-

tion to children,causesmen to counterby creatingpatriarchalstates. These patriarchal states create a public/private split, and a nature/cultureideological division in which women are relegatedto the privatesphereas propertyof men in orderto allow men paternal control over children.Patriarchyhas been able to surviveas long as it has due to the ideology that women, as naturalreproducers,belong in the home as possessions of men. This ideology however cannot be maintainedin the face of a revolutionin the reproductiveforces of society; viz. the mass productionof contraceptivetechnology. Power for women and feminist theory grounded in our distinctivefemale reproductiveconsciousnessare now joint possibilities. Reyes Lazaro, in "Feminismand Motherhood"in this issue takes on O'Brien's argument.O'Brien claims to give us a dialecticaland materialisticaccountof women'soppressionbut it ends up being contradictoryon a numberof points. A key claim is the implausibleand ahistoricalone that humansneed "species continuity." O'Brienuses this idea as a way to valorize motherhoodand provide men with a motive to dominatewoman. Howeverthe idea boomerangsbecause, as Lazaropoints out, O'Brien'stheory ignores the specific historical features of societies which strengthenor weaken male dominance, such as the economic need for children'slabor, which exists in some modes of production(and in some classes) but not others. She thus 14

ann ferguson cannot explain why the patriarchalnuclear family is giving way, in contemporaryAmericansociety, to a vast increasein single motherheadedhouseholds.Furthermore,her technologicaland metaphysical emphasesignorethe key symbolicimplicationsof contraception,that sex as pleasurecan be moreeasily distinguishedfrom sex as reproduction. What follows, however, is not the automatic elimination of men's control over women's bodies in sexualityas O'Brienseems to suggest but a potentialshift in the way men use sexualityto control women: no longer so much to guaranteethe productionof children but ratherto control the productionof sexualpleasurefor themselves (Jackson 1983;Jeffreys 1986)! Janet Farrell-Smithdiscusses Beauvoir'scontributionto feminist theoryin herpaperin this issue. She discussesthe root meaningof "to alienate," make other, which contains both the positive value of creating and producing, and the negative estrangementsense of separationor loss of self. Beauvoirthinksthat creatinganotherself by biological motherhoodcan involve only the negativedynamic, since one cannotcreatethe valueof anotherhuman'slife (that mustbe selfcreatedby each person). Farrell-Smithdisagreeswith Beauvoiron this point. She arguesthat the necessaryexistenceof a self-other tension in mother/child relationshipsdoes not have to yield the bad aspectof possessivepower, a dominationof the other. These are not due to naturalalienationin childbearingbut to social and patriarchalpower relations.The solution is not, as some suggest, to reject motherhoodaltogether(Allen 1984),but to reconstitutethe possessivepower of motherhoodby expandingthe legal and moral rightsof women to control reproductive decisions and claim for ourselvesand others a sense of belongingin families or communities,without imposing upon others our (or my) reason for existence. PresumablyFarrell-Smithis here advocatingthe need for a strong feministcounterculturewhich may includemen as fathersand lovers but whichreservesa distinctive"mother-right"to women againstthe patriarchalstate. Her perspectivehere is an importantcorrectiveto the Chodorow/Dinnersteinideal of co-parenting,whichpresentsitself as if in an androgynousvacuum, and as if the fact that women not men bear babies were not in principlean importantdifference that must be taken into account in all plausiblereorganizationsof parenting relations. If women, because we bear the babies, always have more prima facie right to keep them in the case of divorce, in what sensecan therebe "equal" co-parenting?Is the suggestionfinallythat men have equal obligations to childbearingbut not equal rights to make reproductiveor child custody decisions? 15

hypatia Anne Donchinpursuesthe implicationsof reproductivedifferences between the sexes for feminist perspectives on motherhood and reproductive technology. She distinguishes between noninterventionists,moderateinterventionistsand radicalinterventionists on the questionof the extentto whichsociety ought to aim to develop reproductivetechnologiesthat minimizereproductivedifferencesbetween men and women. Although there are religious conservatives who are non-interventionistsbecause they assume the natural functions of sexualityand reproductionshould not be tamperedwith by humans,the feministdebateis betweenmoderateand radicalinterventionists. ThusRich(1976)and Raymond(1984)are moderateinterventionists, who value biological motherhood, fear male-dominated technologicaldevelopmentbut want to guaranteethat existing birth control technologywill continue to be availableto women. Rich and Raymond's view is at odds with radicalinterventionists Firestoneand Piercy (1976) who favor artificialreproductivetechniques which will eventullyremove the necessityof childbearingfrom women. Donchin attempts to mediate betweenthe two positions by arguingthat the woman's movementshould avoid a symbolicsplit on these policy issues which ultimately stem from totally devaluing biologicalmotherhoodand the risks that need to be taken to protect or replaceit. In my opinion, Donchin is correct that both tendencies are overblownbecausethey ignorethe existenceof contradictoryfeatures of the mother/child relationshipand its implications for feminist goals (Sayers1984). Since therewill be many women who will choose biological motherhoodin spite of its drawbacks,some who will seek other avenuesto motherhood,and some who will avoid it altogether, we should seek pragmaticways to influencereproductiveinnovations that reflect the diversityof women's needs in this area, at the same time as we challengemale control of this new technology.

V. Self, Gender and Agency The relevantmetaphysicalquestions for feminist theory all center aroundthe questionof Agency, such as, what is the natureof the Self (Subject)? Is the subject essentiallyor accidentallyrelated to other people? Are the subject's actions determinedby social structuresor voluntarilychosen (structuralismvs. voluntarism)?The mind/body question is raised by the question of the role of the biological reproductivedifferences between men's and women's bodies and whethertheseset the stage for a diferenttype of consciousness,or way of knowingthe world, that is distinctivelymasculineor feminine. 16

ann ferguson The question of Agency as it connects to different types of consciousnesscan be answeredby a phenomenologicalapproach.For example, Majorie Weinzweigtakes agency to be an "authentic" or "automatic"or "autonomous"consciousnessas opposed to an "inauthentic" or "merged" consciousness. From this point of view, agencyis not a given but a state to be strivenfor, in a dialecticalprocess with others. For there is a Hegelian "strugglefor recognition" betweenany consciousnessand any other: people need autonomyin the senseof the abilityto makeindependentchoices, whileat the same time their need to merge with, get affirmationand nurturancefrom othersimpliesthat they can only get the sense of self-worththey need whenotherssupportthemto do so. Assumingsucha dialecticbetween the need for autonomyas independencefrom othersand the need for recognitionby, and identificationwith others, whatare the best social practices(parenting,sexual/love liasons, household choice) to promote a balanceof each? Weinzweig argues that there is an ideal state for humans, autonomous-being-with-others through which the autonomy/recognition dynamiccan be overcome.This is only possible,however,if individuals go through certain stages of development.Thus for most people, living separatelyfrom a lover is an importantstrategy for establishingneededautonomy.A potentialcontradictionin needsmay arise for single motherswhose lover dynamicwould be better served by living separatelyfrom theirloversbut whose childrenmay be given a betterchance for autonomyby the kind of diversityin adult significant others offered by a communalhousehold. I have experienceda solution to this conflict: a parent cooperative learning community (ours was an alternativeschool) in which parents live in separate householdsyet create a kin-likecommunityof adult role models for the childrenand counterculturalpeer supportsfor both childrenand adults (Ferguson1981b). The phenomenologicalquestions of how to understandcertain states of consciousnessin termsof their politicaland ethical implications shades into the questionsabout the natureof the self from the psychologicaland sociologicalpoint of view. For example,thereis an analogy (if not an identity)betweenphenomenologicaltalk about a dialecticbetweenan autonomousand an embeddedconsciousnessand the psychoanalytictalk of "object relations"theoristsChodorowand Flax, who talk about a conflict betweennurturanceand autonomyin stages of infant ego development. Weinzweig'snotion of a dialecticbetweenthe autonomousand the mergedconsciousnesssharesa problemwith Chodorow'sdichotomy between permeable/rigid ego boundaries (the latter's way to 17

hypatia distinguishfemininefrom masculinegenderpersonalities).This is that (1) they are static not historicalcategoriesand (2) they assumea one dimensional theory of the Self that is problematic. Criticisms of Chodorow have centeredaround the misleadinguniversalizationof male dominancesuggested.The suggestionthat thereis some common "core" to men's and women's personalitiescross-culturallyis a slippery one indeed. If the idea of rigid/permeableego boundariesis to work at all it may need to be made relativeto differentaspectsof the personality. Let us consideras an examplehow a relativizationto aspectsof self expressedin differentsocial practicesmighthandleracialdiferencesin femininegenderidentityin America.Some Black feministsarguethat racismin Americaforces blackwomento developa strongSelf/Other dichotomy when it comes to race (Josephs 1981). But it does not follow that this Self/Other dichotomy is as strong in a male/female sexuallove bond withinthe blackcommunityas it is in black/whiteinteractionsin politics or at the workplace. Chodorow's early more sociological work (Chodorow 1974) suggests that in contexts where women's economic and social networks make them socially independentof men, they may develop a personality characterizedby "mature dependence" while if they are isolated as economicallydependenthousewivesthey may have personalitiescharacterizedby immaturedependence.This move suggests we should conceptualize different variables to explain these differences. My theory conceptualizes the Self as consisting of aspects, one of

which is an incorporativeand the other a self-interestedor oppositional aspect. The incorporativeaspect involves identification and merging with others while the bargaining,self-interestedaspect involves the separationof one's interestsfrom those of relevantothers. Theseaspectscan operateas indivividualpotentialswhichare more or less developedin particularindividualsdependingon the complex of social practicesin which they are involved. This theoryof the Self explainsdifferencesof gender,raceand class in the core identitiesof people by supposingthat a womancan have a permeableego boundary in those gender practices(e.g. sexual and family practices)where strong masculineand feminine complementaryyet incorporativerelationsare assumedyet have a rigidego boundaryin social practiceswhererace and class oppositionalinterestsare predominantfeatures (e.g. the workplace,schools, political interactions betweenblack and white communitiesetc.). There are social practicesin which many aspects of self (gender, race, class) may be involved simultaneously.Some of these practices 18

ann ferguson involve contradictoryself/other dynamicsfrom the point of view of the individualinvolved.Thus, for example,singlemothersin extended kin networksmay engage both their oppositional, bargainingaspect and their incorporativeaspectsin relationto their love. VI. Power Feministtheory must have a philosophicaltheory of power and its sources to complete a theory of human agency. Possessive individualisttheoriessee poweras possessionsof individuals,viz. their abilitiesto get others to do what they want, which should only be interferedwith by social institutionssuch as the state in extremecircumstances.Marxisttheoriesof poweron the other handtend toward structuralism,i.e the view that it is social roles and institutionalized rulesof the game that createpowerratherthan invididualabilitiesand wills.

The problem with both marxist and classical liberal notions of power is that they are too "centrist" in their approach to social power. Althoughthey differ in whetherthey see poweras a possession that some groupscan use againstothersor as a social processin which prescribedrules of the game give one set of playersgreatercontrol over goods and resourcesthan others, they both agree that thereis a central "social site," viz. the state or the economy, in which some people are enabledto be more effective in the ongoing politicaldecisions of the society than others. WhereFoucaultwoulddiffer is (1) his de-centeredunderstandingof power: power comes from social practicesin all and any social site, anarchistically.It comes throughthe quasi-accidentaldevelopmentof discoursesthat come to be used manipulativelyby agents for short term goals in ways that (2) are not merely repressive(power on the juridico-coercivemodel)but also "productive,"i.e. they allow people to "reconstitute"themselvesand their interests. Is Foucault a philosopherof power whose approachis of use for feminists or not? Radical feminists may disagree with Foucault because he refuses to universalizeany one centralized system of power, e.g. patriarchy,whichwe can say operatesin a totalist fashion cross-culturally and trans-historically. Rather than attempt to discoveran innercontinuityor logic to history, he sees social domination as discontinuous, as a matter of localized and contextualized "power-knowledge."Particulartechniques,developedto controlone population, e.g. prison techniques, are used on another, e.g. in schools and the army.Thisassumesthat it is an essentialistabstraction toclaim that men, as a sex/class, are alwaysself-consciousagentsout 19

hypatia

to control women. Rather, some men, e.g. the sexologists, create a discourse to help them control their hysterical women patients (psycho-analysis),and this discoursebecomesgeneralizedas a technique used to control those defined as "perverse"(women, homosexuals, neuroticsand psychotics,young children).The social powerthat emanatesfrom thesepracticesnot only producesthe kindof sexuality, self-identities, neuroses and psychoses so categorized, but it also generatesresistances;viz. feminists,lesbianand gay activists,who reject the characterizationof "perverse"or "deviant" implied in the discourseand set out to subvertor invertthis discourse. If we carry the implicationsof the Foucauldianapproachto their logical extreme,it would seemto follow that any theoreticaldiscourse that centers around one form of social identity as being central to humannature,social poweretc., e.g. class, race/ethnic,gender,etc., comes itself to be an exercisein the social constitutionof identitiesand interestswhich is used by some group to attemptto control and consolidatepowerover anothergroup, whichresistsand then attemptsto redefine the existing discourse, or to constitute another discourse more to their interest. An example of this, accordingto some Black feminists, is the way that not only radical feminist but also marxist and socialist-feministtheoryhave proceededto privilegeeithergender or gender and class dominaton over racial domination in terms of which is "more primary"(Josephs 1981). From this point of view, Foucault'snotion of power, in relativizing and contextualizingit, is able to promote,as Sawickisuggests,a more egalitarian "politics of difference," a politics consonant with the Aspect theory of the Self I sketchedabove. While Sawickiis correctto stressthe deconstructionof universalist discoursesin orderto respectdifferencesbetweenwomen, she ignores the fact that feministtheory also needs to explainthe continuitiesof male dominancein history as well as the discontinuities.All human discourse we know of is "genderized," in some way: gender differenceswhethercreatedsocially or biologicallystill supportsystems of male dominance.The sexual division of labor and assymmetrical parentingstill provide power continuitiesand male control of more extensivepolitical networksand economic resourcesthan women in most known societies. It is implausibleto assumewith Foucaultthat thesecross-culturalcontinuitiesin malepoweraredue merelyto an accidental conjunctureof discourseswhich create patriarchalconcepts whichin turncreatethe genderclass men as self-consciousdominators of women. Rather we need a more materialistexplanationof why males organizedin groups via the sexual, racialand class division of labor seek to gain power at the expenseof women. 20

ann ferguson It is my view that we do not need to choose betweena feministuse of Foucault and a feminist universalset of analyticalconcepts for understandingmale dominance: we can use both. Foucault's own genealogicalapproachto understandingthe power/knowledgesconstructedin the modernperiod to control the body and sexualityis a useful tool for understandingspecifichistorical"power/knowledges" that both generatedifferencesand resistancesto them. But his own history presupposesa more general marxist functionalismin which classes in certainhistoricalperiods are set generalhistorical"tasks" by economic developments(Foucault 1978, 122-127). Similarly, radical and socialist-feministtheory must continue to develop its own general analytic categories for understandingthe cross-culturalpersistenceof male dominancewhile at the same time seeking to contextualizethe applicationsof these concepts in a way which respects historical differences between women in terms of race/ethnic background,class and sexual identity. Those of us who are serious about developinga politics of differenceneed not eschew general theory. Rather, we need analytic categories that can be historicized. One examplefrom my book in progress,Blood at the Root (forth coming) is my characterizationof minoritywomen in Americatoday (e.g. Black, Hispanic, native Americanand other non-whitewomen) and deviantwomen such as prostitutesand lesbianwomen as located in contradictorymodes of sex/affective production. Each subgroup may havetheirmotherhoodand sexualitydefineddifferentlyin subordinate modes of sex/affective production(e.g. differenttypes of kinship relationsin the family, differentcodes of masculineand feminine sexual behavior,differenthousehold, communityand economiccontexts). Nonethelessall the groups are bound together under certain features of the dominant mode of sex/affective production:white supremacist,capitalist public patriarchy.Thus, we must not ignore the hegemonicrole of publicschools, mediaand the state in enforcing common standardsof "satisfactory"motherhoodand femininesexuality. What follows from this is that theoreticallywe must delve into the understandingof contextualdifferencesbetweenourselvesas women if we are to challenge the American white middle class bias under which much radicaland socialistfeministtheorylabors. On the other hand, however, the InternationalWomen's Conference in Nairobi shows that on the practical level, there are certain commonalities across modes of economicand sex/affective productionthat provide opportunities for coalition-building between women: issues of comparableworthin wagelabor, healthcare, child care, reproductive 21

hypatia rights, sexual freedom and freedom from male violence and sexual abuse, basic survivalneeds (hungerand housing)and education. Jan Raymond as well as Maria Lugones and Vicky Spelman argue (Spelmanand Lugones 1983)that our theoryand our politicscan only advance when we prioritizefriendshipswith other women as a key aspect of a feministpolitics of difference.Then, and perhapsonly by this meanscan a lastingfeministcoalitioncreatea commonalitywhich can overcomeour differences.

22

jana sawicki Foucault and Feminism: Toward a Politics of Difference This paper begins with the assumption that the differences among women pose a threat to building a unified feminist theory and practice. Utilizing the work and methods of Michel Foucault, I explore theoretical and practical implications of taking difference seriously. I claim that a politics of difference puts into question the concept of a revolutionary subject and the idea of a social totality. In the final section a brief Foucauldian analysis of the feminist sexuality debates is given.

The beginningof wisdomis in the discoverythat there exist contradictionsof permanenttension with whichit is necessaryto live and that it is above all not necessary to seek to resolve. (Gorz 1980, in Hirsh 1981, 2) It is not differencewhich immobilizesus, but silence. And there are so many silences to be broken. (Lorde 1984, 44) The questionof differenceis at the forefrontof discussionsamong feministstoday. (cf. Moragaand Anzaldua,eds. 1981;Dill 1983and Anthias and Yuval-Davis1983.)Of course, theoriesof differenceare certainlynot new to the women's movement. There has been much discussionconcerningthe nature and status of women's differences from men (e.g., biological, psychological,cultural).Theoriesof sexual difference have emphasizedthe shared experiencesof women across the divisionsof race, class, age or culture.In such theoriesthe diversityof women's experiencesis often lumped into the category "women'sexperience,"or women's caste, presumablyin an effort to providethe basis for a collectivefeministsubject. More recently,however,as a resultof experiencingconflicts at the level of practice,it is the differencesamong women (e.g. differences of race, class, sexual practice) that are becoming the focus of theoreticaldiscussion.To be sure, Marxistfeministshave consistently recognizedthe significanceof class differencesbetweenwomen, but other important differences cry out for recognition. The question arises: Do the differencesand potential separationsbetweenwomen Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Hypatia, Inc.

23

hypatia pose a seriousthreatto effective politicalaction and to the possibility of theory? Perhapsthe most influentialand provocativeideas on the issue of differencein feminismare to be found in the writingsof black, lesbian feministpoet and essayistAudre Lorde. In her work, Lordedescribes the ways in whichthe differencesamongwomen have been "misnamed and misused in the service of separationand confusion" (Lorde 1984). As a lesbian mother and partnerin an inter-racialcouple, she has a unique insight into the conflicts and divided allegianceswhich put into questionthe possibilityof a unifiedwomen'smovement.She has experiencedthe way in whichpowerutilizesdifferenceto fragment opposition. Indeed this fragmentationcan occur not only within groupsbut also withinthe individual.Hence, Lorderemarks:"I find I am constantly being encouragedto pluck out some one aspect of myself and presentthis as the meaningfulwhole, eclipsingor denying the other parts of self" (Lorde 1984, 120). Lordeclaims that it is not the differencesamong women which are the sourceof separationbut ratherour "refusalto recognizethose differences, and to examine the distortions which result from our misnamingthem and theireffects upon humanbehaviorand expectation" (Lorde 1984, 115). Thus, she appears to be saying that difference is not necessarilycounter-revolutionary.She suggests that feministsdeviseways of discoveringand utilizingtheirdifferencesas a sourcefor creativechange. Learningto live and strugglewith manyof our differencesmay be one of the keys to disarmingthe powerof the white, male, middleclass normwhichwe have all internalizedto varying degrees. In what follows I shall elaborate on the notion of difference as resourceand offer a sketchof some of the implicationsthat what I call a "politics of difference" might have for "revolutionary"feminist theory.' In order to elucidate these implicationsI shall turn to the writingsof the social philosopherand historianMichelFoucault. It is my contentionthat despite the androcentrismin his own writingshe too has recognized the ambiguous power of difference in modern society, that is, he recognizes that difference can be the source of fragmentationand disunity as well as a creativesource of resistance and change. My aim in this paperis two-fold: (1) to turnto Foucault'swork and methodin orderto lay out the basic featuresof a politicsof difference and (2) to show how such a politics might be appliedin the feminist debateconcerningsexuality.In orderto accomplishthese aims I shall begin by contrastingFoucault'spolitics with two existingversionsof Revolutionaryfeminism,namely,Marxistandradicalfeminism.I have 24

jana sawicki selected these two feminist frameworks becuse they contain the elements of traditional revolutionary theory which Foucault is rejecting.2 Other Foucauldian feminisms are developed by Morris (1979) and Martin (1982).

I. Foucault's Critiqueof RevolutionaryTheory It will be helpful to contrast Foucault's approach with Marxism, on the one hand, and radical feminism, on the other. Both Marxism and radical feminism conceive of historical process as a dialectical struggle for human liberation. Both have turned to history to locate the origins of oppression, and to identify a revolutionary subject. Yet radical feminists have criticized Marxism for its inability to give an adequate account of the persistence of male domination. They identify patriarchy as the origin of all forms of oppression. Hence, they view the struggles of women as a sex/class as the key to human liberation. The recent intensification of feminist attention to the differences among women might be understood as a reaction to the emergence of a body of feminist theory which attempts to represent women as a whole on the basis of little information about the diversity of women's experiences, to develop universal categories for analyzing women's oppression, and, on the basis of such analysis, to identify the most important struggles. When Audre Lorde and others speak of the importance of preserving and redefining difference, of discovering more inclusive strategies for building theory, and of the need for a broad based, diverse struggle, they are calling for an alternative to a traditional revolutionary theory in which forms of oppression are either overlooked or ranked and the divisions separating women exacerbated. The question is: are there radical alternatives to traditional revolutionary theory? As I have indicated, it is in the writings of Foucault that we find an attempt to articulate an alternative approach to understanding radical social transformation. Foucault's is a radical philosophy without a theory of history. He does not utilize history as a means of locating a single revolutionary subject, nor does he locate power in a single material base. Nevertheless, historical research is the central component of his politics and struggle a key concept for understanding change. Accordingly, in order to evaluate the usefulness of Foucault's methods for feminism we must first understand the historical basis for his critique of traditional revolutionary theory. Foucault's rejection of traditional revolutionary theory is rooted in his critique of the "juridico-discursive" model of power on which it is 25

hypatia based. Accordingto Foucault, this model of power underpinsboth Liberaltheoriesof Sovereignty(i.e. legitimateauthorityoften codified in law and accompaniedby a theory of rights) and Marxisttheories which locate power in the economy and the State as an arm of the bourgeoisie. The juridico-discursivemodel of power involves three basic assumptions:(1) power is possessed (e.g. by individualsin the state of nature,by a class, by the people), (2) powerflows from a centralizedsourcefrom top to bottom (e.g. law, the economy, the State), and (3) power is primarilyrepressivein its exercise (a prohibition backedby sanctions). Foucault proposes that we think of power outside the confines of State, law or class. This enableshim to locate forms of power which are obscuredin traditionaltheories.Thus, Foucaultfrees powerfrom the political domain in much the same way as radical feministsdid. Rather than engage in theoretical debate with political theorists, Foucaultgives historicaldescriptionsof the differentforms of power operatingin the Modern West. He does not deny that the juridicodiscursivemodel of power describesone form of power. He merely thinksthat it does not capturethose forms of powerwhichmakecentralized, repressiveforms of power possible, namely, the myriad of power relationsat the micro-levelof society. Foucault'sown model of power differs from the traditionalmodel in three basic ways: (1) power is exercisedratherthan possessed, (2) power is not primarilyrepressive,but productive, and (3) power is analyzedas coming from the bottom up. In what follows I will give Foucault's reasons for substitutinghis own view of power for the traditionalone. (1) Foucaultclaimsthat thinkingof poweras a possessionhas led to a preoccupationwith questions of legitimacy, consent and rights. (Who should possess power?Whenhas poweroversteppedits limits?) Marxists have problematizedconsent by introducing a theory of ideology, but Foucault thinks this theory must ultimatelyrest on a humanisticnotion of authenticconsciousnessas the legitimatebasis of consent. Furthermore,the Marxistemphasison poweras a possession has resultedin an effort to locate those subjectsin the historicalfield whose standpoint is potentially authentic, namely, the proletariat. Foucaultwantsto suspendany referenceto humanisticassumptionsin his own accountof powerbecausehe believesthat humanismhas served more as an ideology of dominationthan liberation. For the notion that power is a possession Foucault substitutesa relationalmodel of poweras exercised.By focusingon the powerrelations themselves, rather than on the subjects related (Sovereignsubject, bourgeois-proletarian),he can give an account of how 26

ana sawiki subjectsare constitutedby power relations. (2) This bringsus to the productivenatureof power. Foucaultrejects the repressivemodel of power for two reasons. First, he thinks that if power were merelyrepressive,then it would be difficult to explain how it has gotten such a grip on us. Why would we continueto obey a purely repressive and coercive form of power? Indeed, repressivepower representspower in its most frustratedand extreme form. The needto resortto a show of forceis moreoften evidenceof a lack of power. Second, as I have indicated,Foucaultthinks that the most effective mechanismsof power are productive.So, ratherthan develop a theory of history and power based upon the humanistic assumptionof a pre-socialindividualendowedwith inalienablerights (the Liberal's state of nature) or based on the identificationof an authentichuman interest (Marx's species being), Foucault gives accounts of the waysin whichcertaininstitutionaland culturalpractices have producedindividuals.These are the practicesof a disciplinary power which he associateswith the rise of the human sciencesin the nineteenthcentury. Disciplinarypoweris exercisedon the body and soul of individuals. It increasesthe power of individualsat the same time as it renders them moredocile (e.g. basictrainingin the military).In modernsociety disciplinarypower has spread through the productionof certain forms of knowledge(the positivisticand hermeneutichumansciences) and throughthe emergenceof disciplinarytechniqueswhich facilitate the process of obtainingknowledgeabout individuals(techniquesof surveillance,examination, discipline). Thus, ways of knowing are equatedwith ways of exercisingpowerover individuals.Foucaultalso isolates techniquesof individualizationsuch as the dividingpractices found in medicine, psychiatry,criminologyand their corresponding institutions, i.e. the hospital, asylum and prison. Disciplinarypractices createthe divisionshealthy/ill, sane/mad, and legal/delinquent, which, by virtueof their authoritativestatus, can be used as effective means of normalizationand social control. They may involve the literal dividingoff of segmentsof the populationthroughincarceration or institutionalization.Usually the divisions are experiencedin the societyat largein more subtleways, i.e. in the practiceof labeling one anotheror ourselvesas different or abnormal. For example, in The History of Sexuality Foucault gives an historicalaccountof the processthroughwhichthe modernindividual has come to see herself as a sexual subject. Some discourses(e.g. psychoanalysis)view sexuality as the key to self-understandingand lead us to believe that in orderto liberateourselvesfrom personality "disorders,"we must uncoverthe truth of our sexuality. In this way 27

hypatia

dimensions of personal life are psychologized, i.e. rendered problematic, and thus become a target for the interventionof experts. Again, Foucaultattemptsto show how these discourses,and the practices based upon them, have played more of a role in the normalization of the modern individualthan they have in any liberatoryprocesses. He calls for a liberation from this "government of individualization," for the discovery of new ways of understanding ourselves,new forms of subjectivity. (3) Finally, Foucaultthinks that focusingon poweras a possession has led to the location of powerin a centralizedsource. For example, the Marxistlocation of power in a class has obscuredan entire networkof powerrelations"that investsthe body, sexuality,family, kinship, knowledge, technology. . ." (Foucault 1980a, 122). Foucault's

alternativemodel is designedto facilitatethe descriptionof the many formsof powerfound outsidethesecentralizedloci. He does not deny the phenomenon of class (or State) power, he simply denies that understandingit is moreimportantfor resistance.As I haveindicated, Foucault expands the domain of the political to include a heterogeneousensemble of power relations operating at the microlevel of society. The practical implication of his model is that resistancemust be carried out in local struggles against the many forms of power exercisedat the everydaylevel of social relations. Foucault's "bottom-up" analysis of power is an attemptto show how powerrelationsat the micro-levelof societymakepossiblecertain global effects of domination(e.g., classpower,patriarchy).He avoids using universalsas explanatoryconcepts at the start of historicalinquiry in order to preventtheoreticaloverreach.He states: One must ratherconductan ascendinganalysisof power starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, whicheach have theirown history,theirown trajectory, theirown tactics, and then see how thesemechanismsof power have been-and continue to be-invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed,displaced,extended, etc., by even more generalmechanismsand by forms of global domination. It is not that this global dominationextendsitself rightto the base in a plurality of repercussions. . . . (Foucault 1980a, 99)

In otherwords, by utilizingan ascendinganalysisFoucaultshows how mechanismsof power at the micro-levelof society have become part of dominantnetworksof powerrelations.Disciplinarypowerwas not invented by the dominant class and then extended down into the micro-level of society. It originated outside this class and was 28

jana sawicki appropriated by it once it revealed its utility. Foucault is suggesting that the connection between power and the economy must be determined on the basis of specific historical analyses, i.e. it cannot be deduced from a general theory. He rejects both reductionism and functionalism insofar as the latter involves locating forms of power within a structure or institution which is self-regulating. He does not offer causal or functional explanations but rather historical descriptions of the conditions which make certain forms of domination possible, i.e. the necessary but not sufficient conditions for domination. In short, Foucault's histories put into question the idea of a universal binary division of struggle. To be sure, such divisions do exist, but as particular and not universal historical phenomena. Of course, the corollary of his rejection of the binary model is that the notion of a subject of history, a single locus of resistance, is put into question. Resistance. Despite Foucault's neglect of resistance in Discipline and Punish, in The History of Sexuality he defines power as dependent on resistance.3 Moreover, emphasis on resistance is particularly evident in his more recent discussions of power and sexuality.4 In recent writings Foucault speaks of power and resistance in the following terms: Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. (Foucault 1978, 95) I'm not positing a substance of resistance facing a substance of power. I'm simply saying: as soon as there's a relation of power there's a possibility of resistance. We're never trapped by power; it's always possible to modify its hold, in determined conditions and following a precise strategy. (Foucault 1980b, 13) There are two claims in the above remarks. The first is the weaker claim that power relations are only implemented in cases where there is resistance. In other words, power relations only arise in cases where there is conflict, where one individual or group wants to affect the action of another individual or group. In addition, sometimes power enlists the resistant forces into its own service. One of the ways it does this is by labeling them, by establishing norms and defining differences. The second claim implied in Foucault's description of power is the stronger claim that wherever there is a relation of power it is possible to modify its hold. He states: "Power is exercised only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free" (Foucault 1983, 221). Free subjects are subjects who face a field of possibilities. Their action is struc29

hypatia tured but not forced. Thus, Foucault does not define power as the overcoming of resistance. According to Foucault, when resistant forces are overcome, power relations collape into force relations. The limits of power have been reached. So, while Foucault has been accused of describing a totalitarian power from which there is no escape, he denies that "there is a primary and fundamental principle of power which dominates society down to the smallest detail (Foucault 1983, 224). At the same time he claims that power is everywhere. He describes the social field as a myriad of unstable and heterogeneous relations of power. It is an open system which contains possibilities of domination as well as resistance. For Foucault, the social and historical field is a battle field, a field of struggle. Power circulates in this field and is exercised on and by individuals over others as well as themselves. When speaking of struggle, Foucault refuses to identify the subjects of struggle. When asked the question: "Who is struggling against whom?," he responds: This is just a hypothesis, but I would say it's all against all. There aren't immediately given subjects of the struggle, one the proletariat, the other the bourgeoisie. Who fights against whom? We all fight against each other. And there is always within each of us something that fights something else." (Foucault 1980a, 208) Depending upon where one is and in what role (e.g. mother, lover, teacher, anti-racist, anti-sexist) one's allegiances and interests will shift. There are no privileged or fundamental coalitions in history, but rather a series of unstable and shifting ones. In his theory of resistant subjectivity Foucault opens up the possibility of something more than a history of constructions or of victimization. That is, he opens the way for a historical knowledge of struggles. His genealogical method is designed to facilitate an "insurrection of subjugated knowledges" (Foucault 1980a, 82). These are forms of knowledge or experience which "have been disqualified as inadequate to their task, or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down in the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity" (Foucault 1980a, 82). They include the low ranking knowledge ("popular knowledge") of the psychiatric patient, the hysteric, the imprisoned criminal, the housewife, the indigent. Popular knowledge is not shared by all people, "but it is, on the contrary, a particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity" (Foucault 1980a, 82, emphasis added). 30

jana sawicki According to Foucault, the question whether some forms of resistanceare more effective than others is a matterfor historicalinvestigationand not for theoreticalpronouncement.He would endorse feministefforts to resistthe elision of differencein the name of some abstract principle of unity-with those who resist the attempt to define a priori measuresof effective resistance.(For a similarargument against a-historicalcriteriaof effective resistancesee Addelson 1982.) Genealogyas a Form of Resistance "Freedomdoes not basicallylie in discoveringor being able to determinewho we are, but in rebellingagainst those ways in whichwe are alreadydefined, categorized and classified." (Rajchman1984, 15) The view that knowledgeis power, i.e. that the purposeof a theory of history is to enable us to control history is part of the Enlightenment legacy from which Foucault is attemptingto "free" us. For him, there is no theory of global transformationto formulate, no revolutionarysubject whose interest the intellectualor theoretician can represent.He recommendsan alternativeto the traditionalrole for the intellectualin modern political struggles. He speaks of the "specific intellectual"in contrastto the "universalintellectual,"i.e. the "bearerof universalvalues" who is the enlightenedconsciousness of a revolutionarysubject. The specificintellectualoperateswith a differentconceptionof the relationbetweentheory and practice: Intellectualshave gotten used to working, not in the modality of the 'universal,'the 'exemplary,'the 'justand-true-for all,' but within specific sectors, at the precisepoints wheretheirown conditionsof life or work situate them (housing, the hospital, the asylum, the laboratory,the university,family and social relations). (Foucault 1980a, 126) Focusingattentionon specificsituationsmay lead to moreconcrete analysesof particularstrugglesand thus to a betterunderstandingof social change. For example,Foucaultwas involvedin certainconflicts withinmedicine,psychiatryand the penal system. He facilitatedways for prisonersto participatein discussionsof prisonreformand wrote a history of punishmentin order to alter our perspectiveson the assumptionswhich inform penal practices. In part, Foucault's refusal to make any universal political, or moral, judgementsis based upon the historical evidence that what 31

hypatia looks like a changefor the bettermay have undesirableconsequences. Since struggleis continual and the idea of a power-freesociety is an abstraction,those who struggle must never grow complacent. Victories are often overturned;changesmay take on differentfaces over time. Discoursesand institutionsare ambiguousand may be utilized for differentends. So Foucaultis in fact pessimisticabout the possibilityof controlling history. But this pessimismneed not lead to despair. Only a disappointed traditional revolutionarywould lapse into fatalism at the thought that much of history is out of our control. Foucault's emphasis on resistanceis evidence that he is not fatalistic himself, but merelyskepticalabout the possibilitiesof global transformation.He has no particularutopian vision. Yet, one need not have an idea of utopia in orderto take seriouslythe injusticesin the present.Furthermore, the past has provided enough examples of theoreticalinadequacy to make Foucault'semphasison provisionaltheoreticalreflection reasonable. In short, genealogyas resistanceinvolvesusing historyto give voice to the marginal and submergedvoices which lie "a little beneath history," i. e. the mad, the delinquent, the abnormal, the disempowered.It locates many discontinuousand regionalstrugglesagainst power both in the past and present. These voices are the sources of resistance,the creativesubjectsof history.5

II. Foucault and Feminism: Toward a Politics of Difference What are the implications of Foucault's critique of traditional revolutionarytheory, his use of historyand his analysisof power for feminism? I have called Foucault's politics a politics of difference because it does not search for a unity in difference, i.e. does not assumethat all differencescan be bridged.Neitherdoes it assumethat difference must be an obstacle to effective resistance. Indeed, in a politicsof difference,differencecan be a resourceinsofaras it enables us to multiplythe sourcesof resistanceto particularforms of domination and to discoverdistortionsin our understandingsof each other and the world. In a politics of difference, as Audre Lorde suggests, redefiningour differences, learningfrom them, becomes the central task. Of course, it may be that Lorde does envision the possibility of some underlyingcommonality,some universalhumanity,which will provide the foundation for an ultimate reconciliationof our differences. Her own use of the concept of the "erotic" might be understoodas an implicitappealto humanism(Lorde 1984,53-59).As 32

jana sawicki we have seen, Foucault'smethod requiresa suspensionof humanistic assumptions.Indeed, feministshave recognizedthe dangersof what Adrienne Rich (1979, 134) refers to as "the urge to leap across feminismto 'humanliberation.'" What Foucaultoffers to feminism is not a humanist theory, but rather a critical method which is thoroughly historical and a set of recommendationsabout how to look at our theories.The motivationfor a politics of differenceis the desireto avoid dogmatismin our categoriesand politicsas well as the elision of differenceto which such dogmatismcan lead. In conclusion, I want to illustrate the value and limitations of Foucault's politics of difference by bringing it to bear on a recent discussion of difference within feminism, namely, the sexuality debate. This debate has polarized American feminists into two groups, radical and libertarianfeminists (Ferguson 1984, 106-112). The differencesbeing discussedthreatento destroy communications betweenthem. Hence, an understandingof theirdifferencesis crucial at this conjuncturein Americanfeminism. Radical feminists condemn any sexual practices involving the "male" ideology of sexual objectification which, in their view, underlies both male sexual violence and the institutionalizationof masculineand feminineroles in the patriarchalfamily. They call for an eliminationof all patriarchalinstitutionsin which sexual objectification occurs, e.g. pornography, prostitution, compulsory heterosexuality, sadomasochism, cruising, adult/child and butch /femme relations.They substitutean emphasison intimacyand affection for the "male" preoccupationwith sexual pleasure. In contrast, libertarianfeminists attack radicals for having succumbed to sexual repression. Since radicals believe that sex as we know it is male, they are suspicious of any sexual relations whatsoever. Libertariansstress the dangersof censoringany sexual practices betweenconsentingpartnersand recommendthe transgressionof socially acceptablesexual norms as a strategyof liberation. What is remarkableabout these debates from the perspectiveof a politicsof differenceis the extentto whichthe two campssharesimilar views of power and freedom. In both camps, power is representedas centralizedin key institutionswhich dictate the acceptableterms of sexual expression,namely, male-dominatedheterosexualinstitutions whoseelementsare crystallizedin the phenomenonof pornographyon the one hand, and all discoursesand institutions which distinguish legitimate from illegitimate sexual practice (including radical feminism)therebycreatinga hierarchyof sexual expression,on the other. Moreover,both seem to regardsexualityas a key arenain the struggle for human liberation. Thus, for both, understandingthe 33

hypatia truth about sexualityis central for liberation. In addition, both operatewith repressivemodels of power. Radical feministsare in fact suspiciousof all sexual practicesinsofar as they view sexualdesireas a male construct.They think male sexualityhas completelyrepressedfemale sexualityand that we must eliminatethe source of this repression,namely, all heterosexualmale institutions, before we can begin to construct our own. Libertarians explicitly operatewith a repressivemodel of powerborrowedfrom the FreudoMarxist discourses of Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse. They recognize that women's sexual expression has been particularly repressedin our society and advocate women's right to experiment with their sexuality. They resist drawingany lines between safe and dangerous, politically correct and politically incorrect, sex. Radical feminists accuse libertariansof being male identified because they have not problematizedsexual desire;libertariansaccuse radicalsof being traditionalfemale sex-prudes. There are other similaritiesbetween the two camps. In the first place, as Ann Ferguson (1984, 110) has pointed out, both involve universalisttheoriesof sexuality,that is, they both reify "male" and "female" sexualityand thus fail to appreciatethe way in which sexuality is an historically culturally specific construct. This is problematic insofar as it assumes that there is some essentialconnection between gender and sexual practice. An historicalunderstandingof sexuality would attempt to disarticulategender and sexuality and therebyrevealthe diversityof sexualexperiencesacrossgenderas well as other divisions.For example,RennieSimpson(1983, 229-235)suggests, Afro-Americanwomen's sexuality has been constructeddifferently from white women's. They have a strong tradition of selfreliance and sexual self-determination.Thus, for American black women, the significanceof the sexualitydebatesmay be different. Indeed, the relationshipbetweenviolenceand sexualitytakes on another dimensionwhen viewedin the light of past uses of lynchingto control black male sexuality.And considerthe significanceof blackwomen's emphasison issues such as forced sterilizationor dumpingDepo Provera on third world countriesover that of white Americanfeminists on abortionon demand(Amos and Parmar1984, 1-19). Yet, radical feministsstill tend to focus on dominantcultureand the victimization of women. Ann Snitow and Carol Vance (1984, 132) clearlyidentify the problemwith this approachwhen they remark: To ignore the potential for variations(in women's sexual expression) is inadvertentlyto place women outside the culture except as passive recipientsof official 34

jana sawicki systems of symbols. It continues to deny what mainstream culture has always tried to make invisible-the complex struggles of disenfranchised groups to grapple with oppression using symbolic as well as economic and political resistance. Rather than generalizeon the basis of the stereotypesprovidedby "dominantculture," feministsmust begin to explorethe meaningof the diversityof sexualpracticesto those who practicethem, to resurrectthe "subjugatedknowledge"of sexualityelidedby the dominance disclosure. Secondly,both radicalsand libertarianstend to isolate sexualityas the key causeof women'soppression.Therefore,they locate powerin a centralsourceand identifya universalstrategyfor seizingcontrolof sexuality(e.g. eliminatepornography,transgresssexualtaboos by giving expressionto sexual desire). Both of these analysesare simplistic and reductionist.While it is important,sexualityis simplyone of the many areas of everydaylife in which power operates. In sum, the critique of the sexualitydebates developed out of a politics of differenceamountsto (1) a call for more detailedresearch into the diverserangeof women'ssexualexperiences,and (2) avoiding analyses which invoke universalexplanatorycategoriesor a binary model of oppressionand thereby overlook the many differencesin women's experienceof sexuality. Although a politics of difference does not offer feministsa moralityderivedfrom a universaltheoryof oppression, it need not lapse into a form of pluralism in which anythinggoes. On the basis of specific theoreticalanalyses of particular struggles,one can make generalizations,identify patternsin relationsof powerand therebyidentifythe relativeeffectivenessor ineffectiveness,safety or dangerof particularpractices.For example,a series of links have been established between the radical feminist strategyof anti-pornographylegislationand the New Right's efforts to censorany sexualpracticeswhichpose a threatto the family.Thisis not to suggestthat the anti-pornographymovementis essentiallyreactionary, but ratherthat at this time it may be dangerous.Similarly, one ought not to assume that there is any necessaryconnectionbetween transgressionof sexual taboos and human liberation.Denying that censorshipis the answeris not tantamountto endorsingany particularform of transgressionas liberatory. In a feminist politics of difference, theory and moral judgments would be geared to specific contexts. This need not preclude systematic analysis of the present, but would require that our categoriesbe provisional.As Snitowand Vance(1984, 133)point out: 35

hypatia "We need to live with the uncertaintiesthat arise along with the change we desire." What is certain is that our differencesare ambiguous;they may be used eitherto divideus or to enrichour politics. And if we are not the ones to give voice to them, then historysuggests that they will continueto be eithermisnamedand distorted,or simply reducedto silence.

Notes 1. "Revolutionary" feminisms are those which appeal to the notion of a "subject of history" and to the category of a "social totality" in their analyses of the theory and practice of social transformation. 2. Socialist feminism is an obvious alternative to the ones that I have chosen. It represents a theoretical development in feminism which is closest to embodying the basic insights of a politics of difference. See the work of Linda Nicholson (1986) for example. 3. One feminist critic, Jacqueline Zita (1982, 173) charges that Foucault's institutionalist theory of sexuality results in a picture of the "one-dimensional" containment of sexuality by objective forces beyond our control. She claims that it obscures the "continuous struggles of women against. ..patriarchy .. ." Yet Zita's criticism begs the question since it assumes that an emancipatory theory must rest on the notion of a continuous revolutionary subject. Foucault, after all, is attempting to displace the problem of the subject altogether. 4. See Foucault's reproduction of the memoirs of a hermaphrodite for an example of his effort to resurrect a knowledge of resistance (Foucault 1980c). This memoir is an account of the despair experienced by Herculine (formerly Alexina) once a male sexual identity is imposed upon her in her "happy limbo of non-identity." This occurs at a time when the legal and medical profession has become interested in the question of sexual identity and has decided that every individual must be either male or female. 5. Linda Nicholson (1986) describes an explicitly historical feminism in which the search for origins (genealogy) involves an attempt to deconstruct (give an account of the process of construction of) our present categories (e.g. "personal," "public") and thereby free us from a rigid adherence to them. Foucault's genealogies serve the same function.

36

janice raymond Female Friendship: Contra Chodorow and Dinnerstein The author critiques two widely-used works in Women's Studies for their hetero-relational content and the ways in which they minimize the necessity for affinities between women. Dinnerstein and Chodorow give us in theory what movies such as Kramer vs. Kramer depict in the film. It is not co-parenting and the inclusion of the male in an equal parenting role that will remedy present "sexual arrangements," without first giving attention to women's relations with each other.

Feminist thoughtis at a pointin its historywhereit needsa theoryof femalefriendship-what I also call Gyn/affection.In discussingfemale friendship,however,it is also necessaryto discussits opposite-heterorelations.In developinga theoryof hetero-relations,I seekto represent the strucureof the world as men have fabricatedit for women. In developinga theoryof femalefriendship,I seekto representthe worldas women imagine it could be, and as many women have created it. Feministtheorymust take into accountthe forcesmaintainingthe survival of women as well as those that maintainthe subordinationof women.A theoryof femalefriendshipis meantto giveform,expression, and realityto the ways in whichwomen have beenfor our Selvesand each other. In this work, Gyn/affectionis definedas woman-towoman attraction, influence, and movement. In many ways, it is a synonym for femalefriendship.The word,however,has a meaningcontextof its own which politicizesthe personalmeaningof female friendship.Female friendshipis muchmorethanthe privatefaceof feministpolitics.Onthe one hand, Gyn/affectionconnotesthe passionwomenfeel for women, thatis, theexperienceof profoundattractionfor one'svital"womanist" Self, and the movementtowardother vital women. There is another meaningto affection, however,whichconveysmore than the personal movement of one woman towards another. Affection in this sense meansthe stateof influencing,actingupon,movingandimpressing;and of being influenced, acted upon, moved, and impressedby other women. VirginiaWoolf expressedthis widermeaningof Gyn/affection Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Janice Raymond.

37

hypatia in saying, "Only women stir me to action and power." Women who affect women stimulate response and action; bring abouta changein living;stirand arouseemotions,ideas, and activities that defy dichotomiesbetweenthe personaland politicalaspectsof affection. Thus Gyn/affection, as female friendship,means personal and political movement of women toward each other. One task of feminismhas been to show that "the personalis political." Female friendshipgives integrityto that claim. Female friendshipis entered into not only by two or morediscreteindividualwomen, but by two or more political beings who claim social and political status for themselvesand other women. Hetero-realityhas conferred social and political status only on hetero-relations(woman-to-manrelationships).In this work, heterorelationsis a term used to expressthe wide rangeof affective, social, political, and economic relationsthat are ordainedbetweenmen and women by men. The literature,history, philosophy, and science of patriarchyhave reinforcedthe supposedlymythicand primordialrelationship of womanfor man. Hetero-realityinstitutionalizeshetero-relations.Thus, it was expectedin the past, and still in the present,that everywomanshouldbe married,and that every woman's most meaningfuland most satisfying relationsare with men. The traditionalmodel for hetero-relations is marriage, but many revolutions in history-sexual and political-have claimed to overthrowthe hegemony of the marital bonds. What none of them have revolutionized,however, is heteroreality-the societal "given" that male-femalerelationshipsare the "reallyreal" ones for women. In any society, revolutionaryor traditionalist, hetero-relationsare the only bonds that receive social, political, and economicsanctionfor women. In hetero-reality,female friendship is regarded as second-rate, insignificant, and/or as a preludeto hetero-maturity.Hetero-realityis an overridingculturalapparatuswhich, althoughit has taken variedforms throughouthistory and in differentcultures,has vast social and politicalconsequencesfor women's relationshipswith each other. In searchingfor the historyof femalefriendship,we find important challengesto hetero-realityby groupsof womenwhose politicalbonds of friendshiphave broken the strangleholdof hetero-relations.The marriageresisters,in 19th and early 20th centuryChina, are one exampleof such women (Raymond1986, ChapterII). And surprisingly, the academic fields of hetero-relationalknowledge, although they have "disciplined"the memoryand reality of Gyn/affection out of manywomen'slives, also revealimportantand unwittinginformation about the history of female friendship.It is important,therefore,to 38

janice raymond examinethese "disciplines,"not only to specifywhat they omit about women and our relationshipswith each other, but to investigatethe unintendedclues that they give about female friendship. I have selectedone area-psychology-to analyzeat this point; and two thinkers-Chodorow and Dinnerstein.Theirwork has been used by various feminist theoristsand writers(uncriticallyI would maintain) who fail to emphasizethe hetero-relationalbias of each. At the same time, in spite of its overwhelminghetero-relationalcharacter, each work containsfragmentsimportantto the historyof Gyn/affection that are revealed especially against the backdrop of its overwhelminghetero-relationalscenario.

Clues from the Disciplines of Hetero-Relations: Psychologisms The firsttenetof Freud'stheoryof femalesexualityis that femalenessis flawed. Early in her life, the young girl realizesthis ultimatefemale adversity-thatshe lacksa penis-and thishas ramificationsfor all areas of femaleexistencein the world.It is a supposedtragedythatwill haunt the younggirl all her life. Theynoticethe penisof a brotheror playmate,strikingly visibleand of largeproportions,at oncerecognizeit as the of theirown smallandinconspicuous superiorcounterpart organ,andfromthattimeforwardfalla victimto envyfor the penis. (Freud1925, 190) In this scheme,one can say that the femalenot only developsinferiority and self-contempt,but also contemptfor otherwomen.For the girl initiallyblamesher mother"who sent her into the worldso insufficiently equipped"and who is "almostalwaysheldresponsiblefor herlack of a penis" (Freud1925, 193). Accordingto Freud,the maturingfemaledirectsherselfto men after she rejectsher own sex in the initialpersonof the mother.This is the beginningof the oedipalstage in girls. Assumingthat her motherhas castratedher, she turnsherattentionto her fatherand, throughhim, to othermen. For Freud,the majoroedipaltaskis adjustmentof the young maturinggirl to heterosexualrelationships.Freudmakesclearthat girls must be primedfor these. In fact, we infer from his workthat a whole scaffoldingmust be constructedfor matureheterosexualorientationto takeplace.Whatis alsoimportantto understand in thiscontextis thatthe is partof a largerproject-that of productionof women'sheterosexuality the constructionof hetero-relations in general. 39

hypatia The major supportsfor this scaffoldingconsist of three tiers. Not only must the girl surmounther penis envy to achievenormal female heterosexuality.She must replace her first love-mother/woman-with another, i.e. father/man. Simultaneously,she must transferher sexualityfrom clitoris(active)to vagina(passive).Freuddefinesan affinity for clitoralstimulationas "pathologicalregression"and as that whichcripples"the sexualfunctionof manywomen. .." (Freud1908, 67). Yet Freudalso states that "the leadingerotogeniczone in female childrenis located in the clitoris" (Freud 1905, 613). In order for the girl to becomea woman, she has to "repress"clitorissexualityduring puberty. Dorothy Dinnersteinin her book, TheMermaidand the Minotaur, a work that has been used widelyin Women'sStudiesand in feminist circles, adheres to Freud's theory of love transference from mother/woman to father/man, but highlights this shift quite differentlythan Freud. "The girl's originallove. .. was, like the boy's, a woman. Upon this prototypiceroticimage, the imageof man must be superimposed" (Dinnerstein 1976, 44). Unlike Freud, Dinnerstein developsthe idea that the girl's originallove was a womanand that the love of a man is secondary.Evenmorepointedly,Dinnersteinremarks "To realizethat one is a female, destinedto competewith femalesfor the erotic resourcesof males, is to discoverthat one is doomed to renounce one's first love" (Dinnerstein1976, 146). Thereis, then in Dinnerstein'swork, a sense of the actual tragedy that confronts the young girl: that she must renounceher primordial feelingsof Gyn/affection in orderto becomea "normal"female;that she relinquishes to someone else (a man), love that rightly and originallybelongedto a woman: and that "The result is that she has cut herselfoff from a continuitywith her own earlyfeeling, for which she now mourns" (Dinnerstein1976, 65). What Dinnersteinfails to note is that the young girl is also cut off from her own history and cultureof Gyn/affection and the possibilitiesfor strengtheningits present realityin her life. One can interpretfrom Dinnerstein'sanalysisof the oedipaltheory, clues that are important for a genealogy of female friendship:that love of woman is primordialfor women; that women remain angry and ambivalentat havingto suppressthat originalGyn/affection; and that women may spend lifetimes tryingto regainthat love, although often in contortedand convolutedways. However, for all of Dinnerstein's enlightening variations on the oedipal theme, what she ultimatelyhighlightsis the absenceof women'slove for otherwomen, not the presenceof it. Her book is finally directed toward the improvementof prevailing"sexualarrangements,"i.e. "the male-female 40

janice raymond collaboration to keep history mad" (Dinnerstein1976, 225, italics mine). Other Freudian commentators take a different tack. Helene Deutsch, who did even more than Freudto promulgatethe theoryof female masochism, nevertheless diverged from Freud's oedipal theory. It is erroneousto say that the little girl gives up her first mother relation in favor of the father. She only graduallydrawshim into the alliance,developsfrom the mother-child exclusiveness toward the triangular parent-childrelationand continuesthe latter,just as she does the former, althoughin a weakerand less elemental form, all her life. (Deutsch 1944, 205) Nancy Chodorow in her work, The Reproductionof Mothering, anotherwidely used text in Women's Studies, follows Deutschin accentingwhat I call the lingeringGyn/affection of women. "For girls, then, there is no absolutechangeof object, nor exclusiveattachment to their fathers" (Chodorow1978, 193). Girlsnevermake "final and absolute commitmentsto heterosexuallove, as emotional commitment, whetheror not they make final commitmentsof genitalobjectchoice" (Chodorow 1978, 140). Traditional psychology has focused on women's ambivalence towardwomen:i.e. the fact that women distrustor envy their female peers. What Chodorow emphasizesis that many women feel profoundly ambivalent about loving women, because an original and powerfulattractionto womenis constantlyat warwithinwomencompeting with a superimposedattractionto men. Girls cannot and do not 'reject' their mother and womenin favor of theirfatherand men, but remainin a bisexualtrianglethroughoutchildhoodand into puberty. They make a sexual resolutionin favor of men and their father, but retain an intense emotional triangle. (Chodorow 1978, 140) Of course, Chodorow omits the fact that many women do not "remain in a bisexualtriangle," and that this concept does not describe the realityof those womenwho do not participatein such a triangular arrangement.Further, many other women who do remain in this trianglehave not made a "resolution"in favor of heterosexualitybut have been coerced into that "resolution" or perhaps resigned themselvesto it. Chodorow theorizes that a girl's transference of love from 41

hypatia mother/woman to father/man is not completely accomplished becauseof severalthings. Comparativelyspeaking,the fatheris not as physically or emotionally available. Like Dinnerstein, Chodorow notes that through erotic identification with a man, a woman "refuses" herself with a woman. Freudtoo recognizedthis when he said that women, in heterosexual relationships, look to men for "gratifications they want from a woman."' However, because a motherdoes not confer upon the girl the same kind of love that a boy gets, the daughterlooks elsewhere(to the father)for "the sameconfirmation of her specialnessthat her brotherreceivesfrom her mother" (Chodorow 1978, 195). At the same time, a daughterseeks to escape from the mother,to developa senseof separatenessand individuality, which is also found in turningto men. "She is more able to do this becauseher distancemeans that she does not know him."2 Refutingthe societal stereotypethat women are the romanticsand men the rationalistsin love, Chodorow makes clear that "Women haveacquireda realcapacityfor rationalityand distancein heterosexual relationships,qualitiesbuilt into theirearliestrelationshipswith a man" (Chodorow 1978, 198). She cites clinical and sociological evidenceto support this claim. "Most of these studies argue. . .that women's apparent romanticism is an emotional and ideological response to their very real economic dependence(Chodorow 1978, 198). In addition to economic rationalism, Chodorow might have cited other social and psychologicalpowers that men exercise over women's lives which make women more "rationalistic"in giving an apparentprimacyto hetero-relations.As AndreaDworkinhas listed, men, besides having the power of money, have the power of self, parasiticthough it may be; the power of physicalstrength,used over and against women; the power to terrorizeand inculcate fear; the power of naming, initiallyanalyzedin Mary Daly's work; the power of owningwomenand all that issues from them;and the powerof sex, i.e. fucking-taking, forcing, conquering(Dworkin 1981, 151). To women'sdistancefrom men, Chodorowjuxtaposesthe affinities women have for each other. Womenspendmore time in the company of other women then men do in the companyof men. Citing Booth's findings, and writingsfrom men's liberationgroups, she states that women's friendships with each other "are affectively richer than men's" (Chodorow1978, 200). In many cultures,femalerelativesare each other's friends. "However, deep affective relationships to women are hard to come by on a routine, daily, ongoing, basis for many women. Lesbian relationships do tend to recreate mother-daughteremotions and connections, but most women are heterosexual"(Chodorow 1978, 200). AlthoughChodorowmentions 42

janice raymond heterosexual preference, "taboos against homosexuality," and economicdependenceon men as the reasonsthat makeprimarysexual bonds with other women unlikely, the phrase, "most women are heterosexual,"is a vast over-simplification.AdrienneRich has stated the complexitymost clearly: The assumption that 'most women are innately heterosexual' stands as a theoretical and political stumblingblock for many women. It remainsa tenable assumption, partly because lesbian existence has been writtenout of historyor cataloguedunderdisease;partly becauseit has been treatedas exceptionalratherthan as intrinsic; partly because to acknowledge that for women heterosexualitymay not be a 'preference'at all but something that has had to be imposed, managed, organized,propagandized,and maintainedby force, is an immensestep to take if you consideryouself freely and 'innately'heterosexual.Yet the failure to examine heterosexualityas an institutionis like failing to admit that the economic system called capitalismor the caste systemof racismis maintainedby a varietyof forces, includingboth physicalviolence and false consciousness. (Rich 1980, 648) On the level of personal relations, Chodorow does acknowledge that "Women's desiresfor intense primaryrelationshipstend not to be with otherwomen, both becauseof internaland externaltaboos on homosexuality,and becauseof women's isolation from theirprimary female kin (especiallymothers)and other women" (Chodorow 1978, 203-204). Further,the lack of affective responsethat women get in hetero-relations,what Chodorowcalls "contradictionsin heterosexuality," help promote these same hetero-relationsas normative. In orderto have deep affection, women seek emotionalsustenancewith children and are thus oriented toward family and mothering, says Chodorow. "Thus, men's lack of emotionalavailabilityand women's less exclusiveheterosexualcommitmenthelp ensurewomen'smothering" (Chodorow 1978, 208). Were not Chodorow'sanalysisof personalfactors so emphatically psychoanalytic,and her analysis of social factors so emphatically economic, she might have namedas "internaland externaltaboos on homosexuality"all of theobstaclesthataremarshalledagainstthewhole continuumof Gyn/affection in a hetero-relationalculture. And she mighthavenamedwomen'ssupposed"isolation"fromotherwomenas the enforced segregation and sundering of women from each other.

43

hypatia Chodorowand Dinnersteinprovidecluesto the originsand primacy of Gyn/affection, it seems, withoutintendingto do so. Theirultimate goal, as is apparentfrom the conclusionsto both of theirbooks, is to bolsterand maintainflagginghetero-relationsand failed fathers.They wish to reorganizethe institutionof parentingso that men take more responsibility.Both arguethat the male absencefrom child rearingis responsiblefor a host of individualand social disorders.If this inequitable situation were remedied,they say, and men took an equal part in parenting, all sorts of saving graces would follow. For Chodorow: . ..this dependenceon her [mother/woman],and this primaryidentificationwould not be createdin the first place if men took primaryparentingresponsibilities. Childrencould be dependentfrom the outset on people of both gendersand establishan individuatedsense of self in relationto both. (Chodorow 1978, 218) For Dinnerstein: Whenthe child, once born, is as muchthe responsibility of man as of woman, the early vicissitudes of the flesh-our handlingof whichlays the basis for our later handlingof mortality-will bear no special relationto gender. (Dinnerstein1976, 148-49) Dinnersteinand Chodorowtell us is that once more men both What will be the saviors. When men become equal parents,the grievances and ambivalencesof childhood developmentthat are now foisted on the mother, the blame she incurs from being primarycaretaker,and the gamut of "heterosexualknots" and "sexual arrangements"will not occur. Whatthis finallymeansis that, once more, hetero-relationsmust be the focus of women's lives, and that womenshould devote themselves to re-constructingnew forms of hetero-relations.Thereis no perception, and certainlyno prescription,that women need to develop new forms of relationswith women. Having developedsome remarkable insightsinto the originalattractionof women for women, and having given us some clues as to why women re-orientthat attractionto men, both authors fail to emphasizethe importanceof women's affection for each other as primaryand paradigmatic. Insteadwhatwe get in Dinnersteinand Chodorowis an implicitand invisibleexhortationfor women, once more, to mothermen. But this time, womenmust mothermen to be mothers,for if womendo not do so, who will? This is the unacknowledged,and perhapsunforeseen, 44

janice raymond agendain both books.3 Dinnersteinand Chodorowgive us in theory what movies such as Kramervs. Krameroffer us in film. All three presentthe full-blown, "humanized,"and caringfather. None of them tells us wherehe will come from. The major problemis not that mainly women parent. Rather,the major problem is that mainly women become the visible and immediate conduits of hetero-realitywhile deriving the least benefits from such a system.4As long as women acquiescein the formationof what Dinnersteinand Chodorow would call the oedipal conflict in girls, and what I would namehetero-reality-the channelingof female love, power, and energyinto men-nothing will changeradically.Until women "mother" women to love and care for other women, the system of hetero-realitywill not be transformed. If the originalwoman, who experiencesprimarylove for hermother (women) were not confronted with the mother (women) as heterorelational and patternedinto these relations herself by the mother (women), but were instead confronted with the mother (women) as female friend who put women first in her life, then Gyn/affection would become a prevailingreality. The young girl would draw quite differentconclusionsabout her feelingsfor her Self and otherwomen. It is not co-parenting,and the inclusionof the male in equal parenting responsibilities,that will restore (among other imbalances)the lack of female friendship,because then presumablywomen will be free not to hate or be ambivalentabout other women. Rather, coparentingunderpresentconditions,enhancesmalesupremacybecause it gives men more power than they now have; this time, emotional presenceand powerwithinthe family. To continueto ignorewomen's lack of power in all other social institutionsand to prescribemale parentingas the solutionto our oppressive"sexualarrangements"is a lop-sidedvision indeed. Furthermore,wherethe male is portrayedas a sensitiveand caring co-parent, the mother is often displaced. What emerges is a more "humane" and "touching" version of male bonding. At least this is the cinematicmessagein such films as OrdinaryPeople and Kramer vs. Kramer,two popularfilms of the early 80's that depictedthe sensitive father. In the latterfilm, the motheris physicallyabsentbecause she has left husbandand son to "find her self" and her way in the world, exitingfrom a troubledmarriage.In the former,the motheris emotionallyabsent from the son, while remainingphysicallypresent as wife and mother. In both films, there are touchingand teary-eyed scenes of father-sonlove wherefatherbecomesnot the co-parentbut eventuallythe only parentwho is reallypresent.The mythicthemeof 45

hypatia male motheringis indeed made flesh. What Dinnersteinand Chodorowsend women searchingfor is the "new man." But the new man is, in manyways, the old man. First,he is a man, not a woman, and women have been traditionallyenjoined to seek men, albeitnew and sensitizedmen. Second, he bondswith his own kind, even underthe influenceof sensitization.We see this bonding at work in the new "sensitivemale" films, and we can expect a rejuvenatedform of male bonding from the fulfillmentof Dinnerstein's and Chodorow'svisions of the male as co-parent.Women are oriented to new forms of hetero-relationshere. And what is not discussedis that men will be encouragedto createnew forms of male bonding, becauseleeway for increasedintimacybetweenmen will be establishedunderthe influenceof sensitization.Male intimacy,added to the present male solidarity based on male money, power, and physical prowess, will result in the further institutionalizationof homo-relations.Women's relationshipswith each other will remain ever secondary to the imperativeto create new forms of heterorelations. Any such bonds which occur among women within this "new" hetero-relationalcontext will, as in this old hetero-relational context, be second-born.They too will not be lived as primary. For both women and men, love for womenwill continueto be kept in its properplace and not allowed to interferewith the vital ties between men. Men, havingbeen "freed up" to expressemotion, will be able to manifest their love for men in different ways than before. Women, having been re-orientedto new forms of hetero-relations, will also be directedto men again, and will be much more confined and constrainedin manifestingGyn/affection. In the final analysis, Dinnerstein'sand Chodorow'stheoriesmaintain the presentsystmof hetero-reality.They even give it a new boost. There is no conscious intent, and certainlyno articulatedprescriptions, to do this. However,male bondingwill persistand thrivein the wake of new forms of hetero-relations,since homo-relationscan only be strengthenedin the absence of any focus on the primaryimportance of women's relationswith each other. There is nothing in Chodorow and Dinnersteinthat sets primary storeon women'srelationswith women. Thereis no ultimateand concludingprescriptionin theirworksfor the enhancementof Gyn/affection that compareswith their final idealizingof hetero-relations.The girl or woman is offered nothingto encourageher originalattraction to woman. Again, but this time more subtly, she is encouragedto be for men. Much contemporary feminist theory has focused on hetero-

46

janice raymond relations, i.e. woman-to-manrelationships.The social sciences, in particular,have not studied,or have given little theoreticalweight, to female friendship.Thereare, for example,no coursesthat I know of on the sociology of friendship, as there are on the sociology (and psychology)of the family. Even in Women's Studies Programsand Departments,there are few whole courses devoted to the subject of women's relations with each other. Thus our curriculareflect our society in diminishing the importance of female friendship. Both minimizethe meaningof femalefriendship,the formerby expellingit from serious theoreticalconsiderationand the latter, by neglecting and erasingit from reality. Hetero-relationshave definedtoo muchof the theoreticalagendain feministtheory. It is time to think, in a moreexpansiveGyn/affective way, about the importance of female friendship. The works of Chodorow and Dinnersteinidealize hetero-relationsin their "salvation history" theories of co-parentingas the answer to "prevailing sexual arrangements."Both obscurethe far greaterliberatingpotential of Gyn/affection wherewomen turn to our Selvesand each other for empowerment,ratherthan once more seekinghelp from men.

Notes --. This article is adapted from my recent book, A Passion for Friends: A Philosophy of Female Affection (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986). 1. Chodorow interprets Freud on this subject. Citing his essay on "Female Sexuality" (1931), she says: "Freud speaks to the way that women seek to recapture their relationship with their mother in heterosexual relationships. He suggests that as women 'change object' from mother to father, the mother remains their primary internal object, so that they often impose on their relation to their father, and later to men, the issues which preoccupy them in their internal relation to their mother. They look in relations to men for gratifications that they want from a woman" (Chodorow 1978, 194-95). 2. (Chodorow 1978, 194-95). Carrying this point further, one might cite Beauvoir's remarks about the insincerity of what I call hetero-relations. Man and woman-even husband and wife-are in some degree playing a part before one another, and in particular woman, upon whom the male always imposes some requirement; virtue beyond suspicion, charm, coquettishness, childlishness, or austerity. Never in the presence of husband or lover can she feel wholly herself... .(Beauvoir 1949, 394) 3. Given the fact that many men have no idea of, or training for, consistent and responsible parenting, women, having been enjoined to relinquish the primary mothering of children, may now find that they will have to "mother" men into male mothering. 4. I use the words "visible" and "immediate" purposefully. Mothers, while being the visible and immediate conduits of hetero-relations, are not the primary conduits.

47

hypatia Chodorownotes: . . . from both psychoanalytic clinical reports and from social psychological research . . .fathers generally sex-type their children

moreconsciouslythanmothersalongtraditionalgender-rolelinesand . . . they encourage feminine heterosexual behavior in young

daughters.(Chodorow1978, 118) of hetero-relations is often lessvisiblethanmothers', However,fathers'encouragement becausethe formerare most often the distantand invisibleparent.

48

cynthia a. freeland Woman: Revealed Or Reveiled? My aim is to examine Lacan's views on women's sexuality and desire in general. I use Hawthorne's novel The Blithedale Romance to supply a concrete narrative context in which to understand Lacan's two modes of femininity: the "veiled lady" and the "phallic masquerader."I criticize Lacan for holding (like Hawthorne) an essentially Romantic picture of the Ideal Woman who achieves happiness or sphere of activity and peace outside the male/phallic strife.

Recent publications in English, and particularlythat of the volumeFeminineSexuality(Mitchelland Rose, eds. 1982)'havemade JacquesLacan'sviewson women'ssexualitythe focus of increasedattention here, though not necessarily of increased understanding. Despite the help of two introductoryessays by this volume's editors, Juliet Mitchell and JacquelineRose, readersmay yet find Lacan's positiondifficultto assess.This is so not only becauseof the notorious obscurityof Lacan'sprosebut even more, I think, becauseof the level of abstractnessof the psychoanalyticstudiescontainedin the volume. We know of Freud'sviewson womennot only throughhis (admirably lucid)lecturesand theoreticalessays, but also throughthe remarkable medium of the case study, with its intricateinterweavingof theory, observation,and narrativein a nearlynovelisticcontext. In this paper I proposeto supplya similarsort of concretenarrativecontextto aid in our reading and evaluation of Lacan's views-in particular,his views on feminine sexuality. I will suggest a Lacanianreading-or rather,exegesisin parallel-of a novel by NathanielHawthorne,The BlithedaleRomance(1983;henceforwardreferredto by page numbers alone). My juxtapositionis not as arbitraryas it might first appear, for Hawthorne's novel concerns the relations between men and womenmembersof a utopianfarmcommunitydesignedto overthrow class and sex distinctions.Hawthorne'snarrator,MilesCoverdale,explores reasons for the utopian experiment'sfailure, which he attributes to certain "facts" about the nature of men, women, and erotic attraction. ThoughI find in Lacan'stheorya set of conceptswhichhelpto shed Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Hypatia, Inc.

49

hypia light on Hawthorne'sbleak story, I want to emphasizethat my concern is not to do a critical analysis of Hawthorne'stext. This selfconsciouslyliterarynovel takes the form of a narrativeby a "poetromancer,"and Coverdaletreatshis romancingwith heavy, even bitter, irony. A complete study would need to consider Hawthorne's idiosyncratic use of symbolism and his peculiar attitude toward language: I have felt, a thousandtimes, that wordsmay be a thick and darksomeveil of mysterybetweenthe soul and the truth which it seeks (Hawthorne 1840, in Bell 1980, 193)2

My aim is to examineLacan'saccountof women, theirsexuality,and desire in general. I hope to uncoverthe strikingsimilarityin the visions presented by the twentieth-centuryFrenchman and the American;they sharean essentiallyRomanticpicnineteenth-century ture of an Ideal Woman who achieves "peace" outside the male/phallicsphereof activityand strife. I TheBlithedaleRomanceis at one and the same time the tragedyof the gorgeouslyexotic Zenobia, the love story of her pale half-sister Priscillaand the stern, egomaniacalHollingsworth,and the tale of its poet-creatorMiles Coverdale,the perpetualobserverseekingto interpret the mysteriousrelationsamongthe others. He spies and attempts to provokereactions,like a child longing for admissionto the sexual orderingof adults, but the othersrefuseto acknowledgehim as a participant;"Miles Coverdaleis not in earnest," declaresHollingsworth dismissively. Among the "knot of characters"occupyingCoverdale's"mental stage" (156)the two olderpartnersfunctionin parentalroles. Zenobia has arrivedfirst at Blithedaleand welcomesthe others to its hearth. Awed, Coverdale finds her the "very type" of womanhood, and likens her to the Biblicalmother: One felt an influence breathingout of her such as we might suppose to come from Eve, when she was just made, and her Creatorbrought her to Adam, saying, "Behold! Here is a woman!" (17) Though simplyattired, this lush, exotic woman retainsone luxurious adornment,a rare hothouse flower. She owns an elegant city house with an unusuallyfertilegarden(acrosswhichCoverdalewill laterspy 50

cynthia a. free/and on her). She chooses to be known by her pen name, "Zenobia," "a sort of mask," denoting the ancient, imperious-and doomed-Oriental queen of Palmyra. To complement this Arcadian Eve, Coverdale presents a crudely primeval man, almost a jungle creature, the rough-hewn Hollingsworth. He has a "rude massiveness," "shaggy brows" and "a great stalwart frame;" he is likened to a "bear," a "polar bear," even a "tiger." Hollingsworth enters Blithedale in the paternal role of protector to young Priscilla, entrusted to him by her father, Old Moodie. Like Priscilla, Coverdale has been made weak and shivering by his own journey to Blithedale, and he too seeks Hollingsworth's care. He starts his stay not with labor at dawn but by lapsing into an "effeminate" illness; and while he lies feverishly expecting to die, he becomes "piteously" dependent upon Hollingsworth's ministrations (which he prefers to Zenobia's watery gruel): Hollingsworth's more than brotherly attendance gave me inexpressible comfort. (41) But Coverdale's fantasized image of the warmly paternal Hollingsworth, and of his "womanish heart", is curtly rebuffed by the older man: I would rather say that the most marked trait in my character is an inflexible severity of purpose. Mortal man has no right to be so inflexible as it is my nature and necessity to be. (43) Hollingsworth plainly revels in his hard severity later on, when he breaks with Coverdale after the younger man refuses to become his proselyte and work toward his prison reform scheme. As Coverdale begins his recovery he embroiders a romance between his two parental figures, whom he observes strolling about the farm together, presumably plotting the site of their future home. He cannot help but link these two; in a dream he is "impotent to regulate," they exchange a kiss of passion across his bed (153). Coverdale struggles to grant Zenobia some immunity to Hollingsworth's masterful personality. He seems to seek a way to deny the "father" privileged access to Zenobia's bounty, by supposing she is already possessed. He speculates on whether she is married, sure she must have the "secret of a woman's destiny." His own desire for her remains unacknowledged, even in an exchange they have, laden with innuendo. She complains: Did you ever see a happy woman in your life? . . . How can she be happy, after discovering that fate has assigned her but one single event, which she must contrive to 51

hypatia make the substanceof her whole life? A man has his choice of innumerableevents. (60) Coverdalerepliesobliquely: A woman, I suppose ...

by constant repetition of her

one event, may compensatefor the lack of variety. UltimatelyCoverdaleconcludes, though never with any certainty, that Zenobiahas been married,to the villainousProfessorWestervelt. This beautiful man Coverdale detests with surprisingpassion, and even suspects(on the sole apparentgroundsof his false whiteteeth)of being a wizened dwarf who has magicallyconjured up his smooth handsomedemeanor.Despitehis disgust, Coverdaleadmitsto feeling some kinshipwith Westervelt.They occupy parallelpositions in relation to Zenobia,as bitterrivalsof Hollingsworthwho neverthelesswill not intervenein her self-destructivepath. Zenobia'stragedystems from Hollingsworth'srejectionof her and his unexpectedpreferencefor Priscilla.When she learnsthat she has lost to the pale half-sistershe comes to know so late in life, Zenobia drownsherself.PriscillareturnsHollingsworth'slove andbecomeshis support when his prison scheme fails and he is rackedby guilt over Zenobia'ssuicide. Like her half-sister,Priscillatoo had been entangled earlierwith the wicked Westervelt.And to completethis knot of emotions and destinies,we are told at the book's end that Coverdale himself is in love with Priscilla. II Outwardly, Zenobia and Priscilla could not be more unlike. Zenobia is dark, brilliant,graceful, full-bodied, at the height of her glorious womanhood. Priscilla is pale, gawky, coltish, an undeveloped girl. Zenobia has wealth, fame, and intellectual accomplishments;Priscillais a poor, retiringseamstress.Yet they are both daughters-although childrenof differentphases in his life-of the same father, Old Moodie. Theirroutesaway from him have taken the same path; they are enmeshedfirst with Westervelt,then fall in love with Hollingsworth. Zenobia is the child of Old Moodie's flourishingperiod when, as "Fauntleroy,"a wealthyadventurer,he speculates,is ruinedin scandal and must eventually hide away in disgrace from the world. Because of her mother's early death, Zenobia "lacked a mother's care;" and her survivingparentonly loved her "becauseshe shone" (182). Indeed, "Fauntleroy" had not even cared for his wife but rather "wore her beauty for the most brilliant ornament of his 52

cynthia a freeland outward state" (182). Following "Fauntleroy's"disappearanceand presumeddeath, Zenobia,as her uncle's heir, has an irregulareducation, so her brillianceremainsuncultivated.Still, she becomesa wellknown writer, under her pen name, an accomplishedspeaker, an elegant gracefulwoman with the naturalpresenceof a great actress. Though she does not choose the stage, she has a passion for masquerade.At Blithedaleshe organizesspringrevels and a fall masked carnival.She adornsherselfand Pricillain costumessuitedto various occasions, and she stagesstunningtableauxvivants.Once she charms a hushed audiencewith her allegoricalstory of the Veiled Lady. As Coverdalesees it, Zenobia's first love was for Westervelt,the self-styled"Professor" of unidentifiedexpertise.Though plainlyshe now detests him, she admits that she has had a "life hopelesslyentangled with a villain's" (225). Apparently referringto him, she remarksthat Beauty, in a man, has been of little account with me since my earliestgirlhood, when, for once it turnedmy head. (227) In other words, Zenobia has substitutedfor her lost father-that "optical delusion"- a lover, perhaps husband, who also has no substance. (Coverdalejudges, after Westervelt'svist to Blithedale, that he is a man "miserably incomplete, on the emotional side" (103).) Westerveltindeed has no more love for Zenobiathan did her father; he stands over her grave with no sympathy for her "full heart," bemoaninginstead the waste of her death: "Had she lived, and hearkenedto my counsels,we mighthave servedeach otherwell" (241). The sinister Westerveltis succeededin Zenobia's affections by a man no better,but one in whom Zenobiathinksshe has found a "true strong heart." She joins Hollingsworth'sprison reform program, even offering to finance it, despite her professeddislike for "philanthropists." But what binds Zenobia to Hollingsworthis, it emerges, his dominance,his antifeminism.He declaimsagainstthe freedomof woman: Her placeis at man'sside. Her office, that of a like sympathizer; the unreserved,unquestioningbeliever; the recognition,withheldin every other manner,but given in pity, throughwoman'sheart, lest man should utterly lose faith in himself;the echo of God's own voice, pronouncing, "It is well done." (122) Astonishingly,Zenobia,who beganher stay by predictinga time when 53

hypatia the "sisters" of Blithedalewill join their "brethren"in hardlabor in the fields, now respondswith abject admiration: Let man be but manly and god-like and woman is only too ready to become to him what you say! (124) Even Coverdalecannot contain his surprise,wondering: Women almost invariably behave thus . . . What does

this fact mean? Is it their nature?Or is it, at last, the result of ages of compelled degradation? And . . . in

eithercase, will it be possibleeverto redeemthem?(124) It is an amusingprospectto fancy the compulsivelyinert Coverdale envisaging himself as knight-errantpreparedto "redeem" women from their victimizationby men such as Hollingsworth.His motives will merit furtherscrutinybelow. When Zenobiaat last graspsHollingsworth'spreferences,and sees he has only been using her in anticipationof getting her money, she denounceshim in a speech of icy clarity: It is all self! . . . Nothing else, nothing but self, self, self! ... You have embodied yourself in a project. You are a

better masquerader than the witches and gypsies yonder;for your disguiseis a self-deception.(218) She bewails the "great and rich heart ... ruined in (his) breast" (219)

but, on tryingto convey to Coverdalesome messagefor him, realizes "I have no message," and concludes by passing along her jewelled hair ornament(a variationof her customaryflower) for Priscillato wear. Laterthat night she drowns herself. Priscilla will never wear that jewel. Her femininity is not representedby display and hothouse flowers, but ratherby the veil. That is, Priscillaturnsout to be the famedVeiledLady, whose performance Coverdaleis musingover at the story's start. Her identityis a mystery(and becomesthe basis for Zenobia'stale one evening).People speculatethat she is someone rich and beautiful, and so we halfexpectto learnthat Zenobiahas been playingat this game. But in fact her real identity is immediatelyclear from descriptionsof Priscilla. She enters Blithedaleas a figure "envelopedin a cloak-evidently a woman" (26). She is "unsubstantial,""secret" and "shadow-like," prompting Coverdale's "fantasy" that she is some kind of snowwraith. She turns out to be a ratherordinary,sickly seamstress,who possessesone extraordinaryskill, at craftingintricatesilk purses: Theirpeculiarexcellence,besidesthe delicacyand beauty of their manufacture,lay in the almost impossibility 54

cynthia a. free/and that any uninitiated person should discover the aperture; although to a practised touch, they would open as wide as charity or prodigality might wish. (35) Coverdale seems to resist admitting the sexual allusions so close to the surface here, and even hesitates in his own taste for becoming "initiated" into Priscilla's secrets: ... If any mortal really cares for her, it is myself; and not even I, for her realities, . . . but for the fancy-work with which I have idly decked her out! (100) Priscilla was the child of Old Moodie's ("Fauntleroy's") period of poverty and disgrace, "the daughter of my long calamity" (193); he claims to love her best, but "with shame." Priscilla too grows up motherless, but she has, unlike Zenobia, a powerful female figure in her life. Moodie tells her fairy-tales about her beautiful, princess-like sister-Zenobia herself. Priscilla worships her unknown half-sister: . . . Out of the loneliness of her sad little existence, Priscilla's love grew, and tended upward ... .It was almost like worship . . . nor was it the less humble,-though the more earnest-because Priscilla could claim human kindred with the being whom she so devoutly loved. (186) This selfless, undemanding love becomes the pattern for Priscilla's later devotion to Hollingsworth. In both cases, she asks nothing from her beloved. Once when Coverdale inquires about her desires, she replies, "I am blown about like a leaf .... I never have any free-will" (171). Like Zenobia, Priscilla is victimized by the demonic Westervelt. He hears of the young girl's reputation for "strangeness," absences, a kind of clairvoyance, and decides to capitalize upon it by staging a mesmerism show with her, entranced, under a gauzy veil. Coverdale's own reaction testifies to Westervelt's brilliant spectacle. By trapping Priscilla under this veil Westervelt prolongs her adolescence; he has preserved her purity and remoteness by concealing her identity. Even after Old Moodie has helped her to escape Westervelt for the pastoral scene of Blithedale, Priscilla seems not quite free; she still pauses, frightened and abstracted, listening to voices, somehow mysterious and remote. She is really only freed from Westervelt when, after Zenobia sends her back to the stage, Hollingsworth finds her, steps up and tells her to remove her veil. At the story's conclusion when Coverdale sees her at Hollingsworth's side, supporting him, she remains quiet and shadow-like, wearing "a look of veiled happiness" on her 55

hypatia face. As Zenobia once observes, pityingly, "Poor child! She is the type of womanhoodsuch as man has spentcenturiesin making it.... He is never content, unless he can degrade himself by stooping towards what he loves." Coverdale concurs, seeing her at Hollingsworth'sbeck and call: She seemedto take the sentimentfrom his lips into her heart, and brood over it in perfect content. The very woman whom he pictured-the gentle parasite,the soft reflectionof a more powerfulexistence-sat thereat his feet. (123) The romanticentanglementsof Blithedalepresenta nest of puzzles. Why does Hollingsworth fail to respond to the rich beauty and challenge so evident in Zenobia? Why does Coverdaletoo love the "gentle parasite," Priscilla?Why does Zenobia, ardent defenderof women's rights, immolate herself in a successionof destructiverelationships,culminatingin her passionfor the self-centeredchauvinistic Hollingsworth?What is the significanceof the two sisters' parallel paths away from their father and their homes?We may ponderthese questionsfurtheras we turn next to examineLacan'sviews of desire and femininesexuality.

III Lacan charts the development of a subject from infancy into Oedipalcomplicationsand the abstractcomplexitiesof language.He takes it as Freud'spre-eminentachievement(thoughone which could not be suitablyappreciateduntil the adventof linguistics,by whichhe means Saussure) to see that these two entries or initiations are simultaneous.Freud'slittle grandson,in the tale Lacanloves retelling, invented a simple word game to symbolize, yet master, his despair over the motherwho could not alwaysbe presentfor him. Becausethe initiationinto social structuresof languageand sexualityis the entry into subjectivity,Lacanremarksthat the (psychoanalytic)subject,like a Cartesian ego, appears simultaneouslywith doubt. In both advances, the infant encounters some uncertainty,absence, or lack. Concretely,the child realizesthat he* (*I speak of the infant as "he" for reasonswhich will, I hope, become apparent;this is important)is not the mother'sentireworld, that the motheris often absent;and he also comesto understandthat languageoperatesby substitutingwords for their absent referents,objects no longer present. More abstractly,the infant confronts two highly organizedstructures: language and the societal institutions governing sexual relations. Both are Other;they come from without(from others),they are 56

cynthia a. freeland outside of him. The child must adopt these pre-existenttools to articulate and realize his own wants (4 Concepts, 188). By the Other Lacan also refers to the unconscious,the level or mode of reality at which the subject experiencesfeelingsand desiresand "knows" this even though their expression is inhibited or repressed from consciousness.This Otherin the subjecthas knowledgecoded in another language,the code of the unconscious,with the quirkylogic, blithe endorsementof contradictions,and peculiarpictographicsymbolsuncovered by Freud. Hence Lacan sees the task of the therapistas introducingthe patient to the languagehe is alreadyspeaking(ltcrits, 81). Again following Freud, Lacan emphasizesthe archetypalpaternal role in institutingstructuresof languageand sexuality(i.e. the Oedipal taboo). This leads to his examination of the significance of the phallus,that is the symbolicphallus,not to be identifiedwith any particularbodily organ. Lacansees in this symbolthe clearestrepresentation of desire, the embodimentof a humandesiredirectedtowardno particularobject. It is somewhateasierto understandhis account of the role of this symbolic representationin the child's entry into sexuality than to see its role in language, so let us examine the sexual orderingfirst. For the child, the real paternalphallusis the first hint or parallelto the conceptual,symbolicphallus;this is why Lacancan write almost crudelyat times of the child's appreciationof this organ the mother wants and which he lacks-as, for example, in his essay on Hamlet: ... In the tragedyof Hamlet, unlike that of Oedipus, after the murderof the father, the phallusis still there. It's thereindeed,and it is preciselyClaudiuswho is called upon to embody it. Claudius'real phallusis always somewherein the picture. What does Hamlet have to reproach his mother for, after all, if not for filling herself with it? (Lacan 1982, 50) The child sees in this phallusthe reason for his mother'sabsence, for her failureto respondto his unconditionaldemandfor love. Though the mother may satisfy the infant's basic biological needs, Lacan posits that there is an overwhelming,unsatisfiabledemand for her love, her presence-a demand which would presumablynecessitate, for its fulfillment,returnto the womb (Ecrits,310-11). Demandcannot be expressed;Lacanspeaksof the subjectas being "barred"in the face of demand. "To be Barred," he explains, "means to have no 'possibilityof saying which demand" (FS, 132). What the child does articulate are its desires, but these expressions cannot succeed at 57

hypatia capturingwhat is really wanted. Desire, unlike demand, can be formulated, but it is evanescent: ". . . What we call desire crawls, slips,

escapeslike the ferret" (4 Concepts, 214). Fromthe startthe infant's problemin satisfyingneedsand expressing desiresis a relationalone, a questionof how to addressthe Other (in this case, the Mother). Lacan sees here a locus of frustration: But the child does not alwaysfall asleepin the bosom of being, especiallyif the Other,whichhas its own ideas about his needs, interferes, and in the place of that whichit does not have, stuffs him with the chokingpap of what it has, that is to say, confuseshis needswith the gift of its love. (lcrits, 263) The infant and mother are placed in a complex dual relation of seekingexpressionof desireand love: For both partnersin the relation, both the subject and the Other,it is not enoughto be subjectsof need, or objects of love, but that they must stand for the cause of desire. (lcrits, 263) Manifestationsof love thus do not succeedbecausethe mother,who is equallybarredin the face of demand,cannot make clear her desire any morethan can the child/subject.A cruelgameensues:"He is saying this to me, but what does he want?" (4 Concepts,214). It should now be more obvious just in what respect the phallus putatively possessedby the fatheris symbolic,the theorized,inferredimpossible "ratio of the other's desire" (lcrits, 288). Just as the infant is realizinghis inabliity to be the cause of the mother'sdesire, he inheritsa languagewhichis inadequateto express his own. Lacan describesit with this sour metaphor: For the unripe grape of speech by which the child receivestoo early from a father the authentificationof the nothingnessof existence, and the bunch of wrath that replies to the words of false hope with which the mother has baited him in feeding him with the milk of her true despair,set his teeth on edge more than having been weanedon an imaginaryjouissance [NB: a termto be furtherclarifiedbelowl or even havingbeen deprived of such real attentions.(Ecrits, 143) The phallusis not just the best representationof desire, according to Lacan, but it is the representationof representation,the first genuinely symbolic notion the child experiences as such. ". . . It is the

58

cynthia a. freeland signifierintendedto designateas a whole the effects of the signified,in that the signifierconditionsthem by its presenceas a signifier"(Lcrits 285). The system of signifiers, or language, forms experienceas a whole, and it is not accidentalthat the phallusitself signifiesthe preexistent, patriarchallyinstitutedmodes of conceptionin the language we use. "The signifier enters into the signified," notes Lacan (cf. lcrits, 150-54). Nowherewill pre-conceivedschemesmodify experiencesas muchas in the subjectiveexperienceof sexuality, i.e. in the constitutionof a female subject: It is the representation(Vorstellungin the sensein which Freuduses the term to signal somethingrepressed),the representationof femininesexuality,whetherrepressed or not, which conditions how it comes into play. (FS, 90)

Like Freud, Lacanseems to have becomemore and more occupied with questionsabout femininesexuality, with problemsthe terms of whichcan best be understoodby recalling,Freud's thesis, whichLacan reflectsupon, that "Thereis no libido otherthan the masculine"(FS, 151). Clearly both agree in taking masculine and feminine to be psychicallyrepresentedby an opposition between the active and the passive;and both meanto deny that the psychologicalis anatomically or biologically determined. Thus Lacan speaks about "situating" oneself "on the side of" the phallic, a choice open to (biological) women, and a position which can be renouncedby (biological)men (FS, 147). Nevertheless,and althoughhe insistentlydeniesthat thereis any such thing as "The" woman (hence writing "The Woman") Lacanrefersto and triesto elaboratefemininesexualityas profoundly Other. Other, presumably,than the phallus. Insofar as it is the phallus which pre-eminentlysymbolizesdesire, the woman-that is, women, little girls generally-must deal with the alreadydifficult problemof knowingand articulatingdesirein terms made even more difficult by the fundamental alien-ness of this signifierof desire. So Lacan writes: As is true for all women, and for reasonswhich are at the verybasisof the most elementaryforms of social exchange .. ., the problemof her conditionis fundamentally that of acceptingherself as an object of desire for the man. (FS, 68) This is how Lacan sets the problem;to it, he proposes, or discerns, two alternativesolutions. 59

hypatia On the one hand, or takingone possibleroute, the woman/girlmay activelystriveto become what is desired;she seeks to define and respond to the Other'sdesire. But, of course, this is the usual route, for all subjects; as such, it exists within the realm of the phallic. Put anotherway, this is the path for a womanwho attemptsto realizepreexistingsex roles and so, in effect, legitimatesthem;she plays at being a woman in the artificialityof what Lacan calls the "masquerade." Lacan comments: Paradoxicalas this formulationmay seem, I am saying that it is in order to be the phallus, that is to say, the signifierof the desireof the Other,that a womanwill reject an essential part of her femininity, namely all her attributesin the masquerade.It is for that which she is not that she wishes to be desiredas well as loved. But she finds the signifierof her own desire in the body of him to whom she addressesher demand for love. (FS, 290) We must note, but reservecommenton, Lacan'sclaim that this active womansets aside her "essentialfemininity."What she cannotaccept, he tells us here, is her existence as castrated;this will prove equally what makes it problematicfor men to love women (in doing so, they acceptcastration).But it should alreadybe clearthat we have sketchedhereexactlythe patternof femininityadoptedby Zenobiain Hawthorne'snovel. Zenobiadenotes herself as femininethroughthe flower emblem. She rejoices in masquerade.Even in daily life her clothing is a sort of costume, whetherit be the exaggeratedlysimple attire she adopts at Blithedale or the "costly robes" she wears, parading before her own reflection in her richly furnished home (163-4). Her very nameis a mask. In relationto men, Zenobiadefines her own value as a sort of ornamentor reflection, encouragedfrom the start by her father (". .. it is Fauntleroy that still shines through

her!", 192 ), and again by her superficiallover Westervelt. Hollingsworthcan only see herin relationto himself, as the financierof his program;but she borrowsfrom this her own self-concept,even to the point of articulatingjust whyhe ought to want her, just what she can signify to him: What can Priscillado for him? Put passionatewarmth in his heart,whenit shallbe chilledwith frozenhopes... No! but only tend towardshim with a blind, instinctive love . . . She cannot even give him such sympathy as is

worth the name. For will he never, in many an hour of darkness,need that proud intellectualsympathywhich 60

cynthia a. freeland he might have had from me? (224-5) It is intriguingthat in her delayed moment of- clarity about Hollingsworthshe finds in him a "masquerader,"a "self-deceiver"who has "embodied himself in a project" (218). Zenobia's despair and suicidemay then be promptedby herrealizationof how both men and women become trapped and frozen in the ritualized masquerade governingthe exchangeof sexual desire. Zenobia had, more than most daughters,to "learn from scratch from the Other what to do as . . . woman" in that she was raised

without a mother, in fact altogether without parental care. Lacan muses over Freud'squestionabout what the little girl wants from the mother. In one response,which he deliversin the course of a discussion of Freud'spatient Dora, Lacan exploresjust what the younger woman seeks from her beloved older woman friend-here, Frau K, the mistressof Dora's father and wife of her own lover, Herr K; she must learn from Frau K "to accept herself as an object of desire;" "This is for Dora the mysterywhich motivatesher idolatryfor Frau K" (FS 68). This too accountsfor herbitterreactionwhenHerrK protests "My wife is nothing to me;" hence her renunciation,her angry slap in his face. Priscilla,like Dora, is presentedwith an olderwoman, her rival in many senses: the beautifuldaughterher fatherworships, the apparentbelovedof Hollingsworth;and, like Dora again, Priscilla is moved toward a form of idolatrous love. Presumablythen, we ought to say that she learnsfrom Zenobiato accept herselfas an object of desirefor the man. She is given simple, straightforwarddirections for doing this, because Moodie retells his pathetic tales night after night. Priscilla, in other words, has been given the fantasized, theorized, hypothetical,symbolic object of her father's desire, what he had lost and can no longerpossessor even know-Zenobia herself. Priscillahas been expresslycreatedto listento the expressionof man's desire, without voicing her own, without demanding anything in return. Zenobia'sactive.searchfor a way to acceptthe man's desiresleads ultimatelyto suicide;Priscilla'sroute, quite strikinglyin an otherwise somber novel, produces happiness. Even in Zenobia's final action Lacan would see an affirmation of "the immediateparticularityof desire," a desire which in suicide reconquers: ... .its ineffable form, rediscovers in negation a final triumph. . . not a perversion of the instinct, but rather

that desperateaffirmationof life that is the purestform in which we recognizethe death instinct. (Pcrits, 104-5) At Blithedale,Priscillacontinuesto be a passiveadorer;Zenobiain 61

hypatia realityfurtherconspiresin makingPriscillaattractiveby supplyingthe propergarb:a garlandof flowers, a dressof purewhite. Priscillacontinues too to be a listenerreceivingmysterioussignals: ...

All at once, midway to Hollingsworth, she paused,

looked roundabout her, towardsthe river,the road, the woods, and back towardsus, appearingto listen, as if she heard someone calling her name, and knew not preciselyin what direction.(60) Coverdalejokingly supposesthat, like the young maidensin Milton, she is listeningto men's tonguesvoiced in the air (60). He laterteases her to exercisethe "sybilline"gift she denieshaving-despite his own experienceof it, in the audience at her performanceas the Veiled Lady. One other facet of Priscilla'sbehaviordeservesmention:her unexpected wildness in playing as she enjoys her first taste of outdoor freedom at Blithedale.Coverdaleobservesappreciatively: Girls are incomparablywilder and more effervescent than boys, more untameable,and regardlessof rules of limit, . . . their steps, their voices, appear free as the

wind, but keep consonancewith a strain of music, inaudibleto us. Youngmen and boys, on the other hand, play according to recognized law, old, traditionary games, permittingno capriolesof fancy, but with scope enough for the outbreak of savage instincts . . . (73)

In Priscilla,in short, it should now be apparent,we see a womanwho occupies the place of that other form of femininity described by Lacan, a woman who remainsOtherand is outsidethe phallicdomain of ritualized play and masquerade. She is, presumably, more "natural,"more genuinelyOther, this woman who has embracedher "essentialfemininity."As such, he appearsto regardher as moreconnectedto the unconscious;her status as a knowingsubjectis to know "from Beyond" (or he says, the Unconsciousknows in her)-in the way we suspect Priscillasomehow hears men's voices in the air (as it were). The hint of mysticismhere is welcomed, even toyed with, by Lacan, who speaks of how the unconsciousis in the place of "good old God;" the analystsare "laicizing"or "exorcising"God (FS, 140). Again, he explicitly links the woman's ineffable knowledge(of the Other, of her own desires)to the mystic's knowledgeof God, writing with apparent relish of the "coming" or jouissance of St. Theresa (as

imaged by Bernini) as somehow "extra," unrequested, unexpected-and, we suppose, for all that the better. He writes: 62

cynthia a. freeland It is insofar as herjouissance is radicallyOtherthat the woman has a relationto God greaterthan all that has been stated in ancient speculationaccordingto a path which has manifestlybeen articulatedonly as the good of mankind.(FS, 153) And again: Thereis womanonly as excludedby the natureof things whichis the natureof words, and it has to be said that if thereis one thingthey themselvesarecomplainingabout enough at the moment, it is well and truly that-only they don't know what they are saying, which is all the differencebetweenthem and me. It nonetheless remains that if she is excluded by the natureof things, it is preciselythat in being not all, she has, in relationto what the phallic function designates of jouissance, a supplementaryjouissance. Thereis a jouissance properto her, to this 'her' which does not exist and which signifies nothing. There is a jouissance proper to her and of which she herself may know nothing, except that she experiences it-that much she does know. She knows it of course when it happens. It does not happen to all of them. (FS, 144, 145passim) It seems to be the crowning indication of women's inability to describe,give directions,or locate their sourceof this supplementary jouissance that, no matter how often men ask them about it, they-even the womenanalysts!-can say nothingabout it. (FS, 146). What makes a woman like Priscillaone who can be desired(whose castrationis acceptable)?To understandthis we may simplynote that Lacan maintainsthat the phallus can play its role only when veiled, "as itself a sign of the latency with which any signifiableis struck, when it is raisedto the function of a signifier"(FS, 82). The veil emphasizesthe mysteryof the phallus, its existenceas a symbol, or as a "ratio" of desire. Lacan adduces the example of young Alcibiades' confession of love in Plato's Symposium: It is becausehe has not seen Socrates'prick, if I may be permittedto follow Plato, who does not spare us the details, that Alcibiades the seducer exalts in him the agalma, the marvelthat he would like Socratesto cede to him in avowinghis desire:the divisionof the subject that he bears within himself being admittedwith great 63

hypatia clarityon this occasion. And moreover,Lacancontinuesin this key passage: Such is the woman concealedbehind her veil: it is the absenceof the penisthatturnsherinto the phallus,the object of desire.( crits, 322, emphasismine) This, then, is Priscilla,belovedand "happy"behindthe veil. IV In reflectingon Lacan,we shouldnoticeparticularlyhow Coverdale's account of the "style" of femininityembodiedin Priscillaparallels Lacan's notion of the psychoanalyst. Lacan typically, even selfconsciously,disparageslove whichhe treats,as did Freud,as a form of narcissism:"To love is, essentially,to wish to be loved" (4 Concepts, 253); "The subjecttries to induce the Otherinto a miragerelationin whichhe convinceshim of beingworthyof love . .."(4 Concepts,267). In love as typicallyconceivedthe subjectfails to be relatedto a genuine Other;he is like the little child who takes the objectsof its desires(the breast,etc.) to be partsof itself, who seesonly himselfin his libidinalactivities.In the essay "FromLove to the Libido"(4 Concepts,187-200), Lacanidentifiesthe essentialintermediarystep betweenthe child'snarcissismandbonafiderelationsto theOther,namely,thelibido'soutward path towarda separateand distinctobject, the objet petit a ("other" (autre)witha small"o" ("a")). Thedriveis saidto reachout towardthis object,returning,perhapsproducingsatisfaction,alongwithrecognition of the object'sindependence,or separateexistence-'that objectaround whichthe drivemoves,... thatrisesin a bump,likethe woodendarning egg in the materialwhich, in analysis,you are darning"(4 Concepts, 257). The movementof the driveopens up a hole or "split" in the subject's completeness,promptinga realizationof "lack;"only now is the subjectin a positionto beginto recognizethe realexistenceof the Other, launchinghis entryinto the relationalphenomenonof desire. Of courseeven havingattaineda measureof realinteractionthe subjectmaylapseinto narcissisminsofaras he keepstryingto forceuponthe of the Other'sdesire.Thisoccursnot merely Othersome understanding butratherin a desperatesearchto be what fromsadismor pigheadedness the Otherdesiresthe subjectto be. As notedabove,Lacantakesthisprocessof communicationto be subjectto inevitableimpediments.Butsuch a viewmustsurelyhaveimplicationsfor hisconceptionof thetherapeutic enterprise,for "mentalhealth"generally.He remarks: 64

cynthia a. freeland In any case, man cannot aim at being whole (the "total personalilty" is another of the deviant premises of modernpsychotherapy),whileeverthe play of displacement and condensationto whichhe is doomedin the exerciseof his functionsmarkshis relationas a subjectto the signifier. (Lcrits,287) For the analyst then the task is not "healing" but establishing "good faith" with the frustrated,"divided" subject: He will simply find his desire ever more divided, pulverized,in the circumscribablemetonymyof speech. . That is why he must get out, get himself out, and in

the getting-himself-out,in the end, he will knowthat the real Other has, just as much as himself, to get himself out, to pull himselffree. It is herethat the need for good faith becomesimperative,a good faith basedon the certainty that the same implicationof difficultyin relation to the ways of desireis also in the Other. (4 Concepts, 188) The strandof pessimismin Lacan'soutlook stems from his attitude toward sexuality, which he takes to be coordinate with, even to "mean" death. We experiencesexual reproduction,and are hence unlikethe amoeba,a beingwhichattainsa form of eternitythroughits infinite divisions. This is the point of Lacan's sad tale of the lost "lamella", the homunculus(littleman, or I'hommelette)slicedoff the tops of our heads (as one slices a boiled egg) in a "cut" whichlost us our amoeba-like status and launched our existence as sexed individuals(muchas, in Aristophanes'fable, the happysphericalbeings werehalved, sufferingever after the desirefor theirlost partners).3(4 Concepts, 196ff.) The relationto the Otheris preciselythat which, for us bringsout whatis representedby the lamella-not sexed polarity, the relation between masculine and feminine-but the relation between the living subject and that which he loses by having to pass, for his reproduction,throughthe sexual cycle. In this way I explainthe essentialaffinity of everydrive with the zone of death, and reconcilethe two sides of the drive-which, at one and the same time, makespresent sexualityin the unconsciousand represents,in its essence, death. (4 Concepts, 199passim) 65

hypatia

Lacan'sposition on the equationof sexualitywith deathis what lies behind some of his fairly extravaganttalk of lofty human ideals (he speaksof "the courageand patienceof the soul in bearingthe world," (FS, 155). It also accounts for his almost peculiar requirementof detachmentfrom the analyst;he explains: The analyst'sdesireis not a puredesire. It is a desireto obtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes when, confrontedwith the primarysignifier,the subject is, for the first time, in a position to subjecthimself to it. There only may the significationof a limitless love emerge,becauseit is outsidethe limits of the law, where alone it may live. (4 Concepts, 276) ...

A man can adumbrate his situation in a field made

up of rediscoveredknowledgeonly if he has previously experiencedthe limit within which, like desire, he is bound. Love, which, it seems to some, I have downgraded, can be posited only in that beyond where, at first, it renouncesits object. (4 Concepts, 276, passim) Lacan sees a distinct resemblancebetweenthe "ethic of analysis" and certainstringentphilosophicalconceptionsof moral value. "Is it not strange,that echo we found ... betweenthe ethic of analysisand the Stoic ethic?" (4 Concepts,254). Both systemsrequirea "recognition of the absolute authority of the desire of the Other . . ." (4 Con-

cepts, 254). Again, Lacancites Kantas a predecessor;the emphasison universal law at the cost of rejecting the personal and subjective (Lacan speaks of "the sacrifice and murder of the pathological object") resultsin an achievementof . . . desire in its pure state, that very desire that culminates in the sacrifice strictly speaking, of everythingthat is the object of love in one's human tenderness.(4 Concepts, 276) Lacan struggleshere to describea desire which does not meet the conditionsof desire he himself has laid out-a desire purgedof particularity. But in its "otherness" this desire recalls that of "The Woman" who occupies the strange positon of experiencinggreat satisfactionwithoutexperiencingany particulardesire. The condition of the Lacanian analyst, then, is precisely that of Priscilla-the womanwho loves withoutmakingany demands,who acceptsand embodies her statusas a genuineOther,who suppliesan opportunityfor the man to "rest" his desire upon/in her preciselybecauseshe rests 66

cynthia a. freeland contentwith what she is, the castratedbeing, the VeiledLady. We can detect grounds for some disgruntlementon Lacan's part in assessing "The Woman," for she is naturallywhat an analystmuststriveto be. The analystmust desirenot to desire(i.e. not to dictateto the Other); recallthat the "analyst'sdesireis not a puredesire." The analystmust striveto "sacrifice... the objectof love." But "The Woman"places herselfin relationto the man as an Otherwho does not force him into a mold, refusingto projectsome conceptionof her value onto him by way of interpretinghis desire to him. In this way the woman can be there supportingthe phallus (even when it goes limp; Priscilla supports Hollingsworthin Coverdale'slast glimpse).She can be the Lacanian "friend" helpingthe man to "bear"the world. And what'smore (luckily for her) in this role she experiencesher own jouissance. Does all of this mean that Lacanenvies "The Woman?" Is Lacanthe-analystreallyLacan-as-Woman?(Is the therapistin drag?)I think not, and it is importantto see why not. Lacan'ssternand severeethic is meant for "men" who may self-consciouslystriveto meet his standards. It requiresa choice and a self-sacrifice,presupposinga clear self-conception. Given Lacan's bleak pictureof the frustratingcycle of defeated desires, and his pessimistic equation of sexuality with death, then he has laid out for the analystthe best, the "purest"desire availableto "men." But the conditionof desireso achievedis not the same as the conditionof "other" desireoccupiedby "The Woman." She seems naturally to exist in this realm; she has not arrivedat it throughself-definition.WhenPricillaexperiencesjouissanceor "happiness" (to use Coverdale'sphrase),it is somethingwhichbefalls her, not somethingshe choosesor conceivesof as a good. But Lacanvalues this conditiononly when it is the resultof a difficult self-overcoming. That is, he valorizesit, sees it as an achievement-the resultof a particularlyclever kind of phallic striving. UltimatelyLacan presentsboth men and women with an unsavory pair of options. On the one hand, we may "escape" the sphere of phallic struggleby achievingan attenuatedkind of desire, the "pure desire" of the analyst. Such a desirehas its sublimeaspects, enabling "souls" to sharethe burdenof the world. But it seems not to concern real human beings in concrete situations of pain and distress. The messagecommunicatedbetween sublime souls of analyst and analysand is itself attenuated.On the other hand, there are the Priscillas who experiencejouissance. They receivean ineffable fullnessof being withouthavingeverhad any self-conception.It is hardto imaginehow these people could understand others' real, material, day-to-day needs. Nor is it easy to see how a person unable to conceptualize herselfand her own needs might be withthe othersin whose presence 67

hypatia she (supposedly)experiencesher happiness.Perhaps,after all, Coverdale's ironywas at work againin his sunnydepictionof Priscilla'slot; he allows a shadow to pass briefly over her: Her one possible misfortune was Hollingsworth's unkindness; and that was destined never to befall her-never yet, at least-for Priscillahas not died. (242) V As I have tried to suggest, Lacan'sviews about desire, "men" and the supremephallic achievementof the therapistare not without difficulties. In the final section, however,I will concentrateon his views of women and femininesexuality,to try to revealhis most basic, and problematic,assumptions. First, there is some respect in which Lacan remains a biological/anatomicaldeterminist,in spite of his repeateddenials, as for example in his interpretationof the phallus as more than, and hence not, the bodily organ. It is nonethelesstrue that he takes this emblemof actual, real male desireas the representationof desire,and one which makes all articulationof desiresradicallyalien to women. That is, very concretely,even the individuallittle girl growingup today must learnto experienceher own desire/valuefrom conceptualizing this erect male penis. Though Lacan also repeatedlydenies that there is any such thing as "the" women, in his theory woman are treatedas a kind of naturalclass: theirsexualityis a problem;they are representedin all of language,as in his remarks,as Other;they have an "essentialfemininity;"they have peculiarproperties,such as inexplicableorgasmsand knowledgethey cannot express. We can hardly be surprisedafter this theoreticalplacementof women to find Lacan, in the Seminarof 21 January 1975, telling about a man for whom women exist after the fashion of fictional, fairy-tale creatureslike sylphs and water-sprites.(In this essay he also writesthat "A woman is a symptom," FS 168). This playingwith ambiguityalso characterizesLacan'streatmentof the woman/mother's desirefor the phallus. That is, we ought not understandthis as a literal desire of a particularwoman for "her" phallus. But if we banish this (perhapsplausible) account of what some women infact desirefrom men, Lacan'sclaim can be seen to be more and moreimplausibleand moreand morereactionary.The symbolic phalluswhich the mother is supposedto desire is, after all, the entireapparatusof patriarchy,everythingrangingfrom religiousrites to conventionalizedsex-rolesto the conceptualframeworksembedded in our language. This is what the mother wants?-even the mother 68

cynthia a. freeland who also as a lesbian, a politicalactivist,a feminist,a poor womanor a memberof an oppressedracialor religiousminorityseeks or struggles for change and redefinition?In other words Lacan is telling us that all women, even feminist women, desire the conditions of their oppression;he is exactly like Coverdalemusingover Zenobia'sturnabout docility towardsHollingsworth-only he does not go so far as to fancy redeemingwomen, as Coverdaleat least did, choosingrather to mystify their condition, to find in it the source of theirmysterious jouissance. If this is not Lacan'sintentionin declaringthat the mother desiresthe phallus,then we seem forcedto take the cruderline and say that women are after all lecherous, like Queen Gertrude,who can't wait decentlyto get "full" of herphallus(evenafter the murderof her King). Finally, in a claim which seems to have had the greatestimpacton his associates, Lacan posits that women have some alternativemode of knowingand articulatingdesiresfrom that of men. He emphasizes the dangerof male misconstrualsof female knowledgeand desire, as in his essay on Freud's "Dora" case, "Intervention on Transference."Here he remarkson aspectsof Freud'smisreadingsof Dora's utterances.This apparentsensitivityon Lacan's part to the suppression of women's speech has made his writings a natural resourcefor women critics and analysts;some of the ensuing work, such as Helene Cixous' (1983) play based on "Dora," has been rich and imaginative.One almost beginsto hope for an end to suppression of the sort promptingZenobia'spassionateplea in Blithedale: Thus far, no woman in the world has ever once spoken out her whole heart and her whole mind. The mistrust and disapprovalof the vast bulk of society throttlesus, as with two gigantichandsat our throats!We mumblea few weak words, and leave a thousandbetter ones unsaid. You let us write a little, it is true, on a limited range of subjects. But the pen is not for women. Her poweris too naturaland immediate.It is with the living voice alone that she can compel the world to recognize the light of herintellectand the depthof her heart!(120) But in point of fact Lacan leads the way not to women who voice theirheartbut to womenwho embracetheirinabilityto do so, rejoicing in their own mysteriousness.Lacan'sview here culminatesin his (one-time)associateLuceIrigaray'sremarkable,obliqueessay, "That Sex Whichis Not One": It is thereforeuselessto trapwomeninto givingan exact definition of what they mean, to make them repeat 69

hypatia (themselves) so the meaning will be clear. They are already elsewhere than in this discursive machinery where you claim to take them by surprise.They have turned back within themselves. . . . They do not ex-

periencethe same interioritythat you do and whichyou perhaps mistakenly presume they share. "Within themselves"means in the privacy of this silent, multiple, diffuse tact. If you ask them insistentlywhat they are thinking about, they can only reply: nothing. Everything.(Irigaray 1980, in Marks and Courtivron 1980, 103) Thereis a temptationhere for woman:not to describe(for descriptions falsify), not to articulatedesire (for happinesslies in renunciation), not to study sexual techniques(for the best orgasm happens unexpectedly),not to conceptualizeher own sexuality(for she is "diffusely" in touch with herselfalready),not to act (for activityis phallic and ultimatelypointless). It is easy for women to be this Lacanian kind of feminists,becauseto do so requiresdoing absolutelynothing, exceptsimplyto be and ergo be Other,and know withoutasking. But this position is again reactionary;we women who adopt this position are seekingto make our daughtersinto Priscillas.

Notes ---. I am grateful to Ann Ferguson, Tamsin Lorraine, Linda Podheiser, Andreas Teuber, Dan Warren and Tom Wartenberg for their comments; I must also thank an anonymous referee. In addition, I have learned much from the discussion of related materials in Stanley Cavell's seminar at Harvard on psychoanalysis and literary theory. This essay is dedicated to Pierre Pellegrin, who has helped me to improve my understanding of French psychoanalytic thought on these topics. 1. Henceforward references to this volume will cite it as "FS", with the page number. Other works influenced by Lacan include the French feminists represented in Marks and Courtivron, eds. 1980, and the literary critics in Felman, ed. 1982. For convenience I refer to other of Lacan's translated writings according to the following method of coded abbreviations: "Ecrits" designates Ecrits, A Selection, Sheridan, tr., 1977; and "4 Concepts" designates TheFour Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Miller, ed., 1978. 2. Coverdale's ironical manner makes it especially hard to discern the author's attitude to the feminist issues he discusses in this novel. 3. See Aristophanes' story in Plato's Symposium, 189c-193e, especially 190d-e.

70

cheryl h. cohen The Feminist Sexuality Debate: Ethics and Politics The purpose of this paper is to offer a critical evaluation of representative positions in the feminst sexuality debate and to suggest that ethical considerations are essential to the complex task of political transformation which is the goal of both sides in the debate. This paper explores both a "rights view" of ethics and a "responsibilities view" and shows, through specific examples, how an appeal to ethics might take feminist sexual politics beyond the current debate.

The feminist sexuality debate seems to focus on issues of pornography,sadomasochism,and the condemnationor defense of sexual minorities.The pointed argumentsof the debate raise a general question:what counts as politicallyvalid sexualityfor feminists? In this paperI will summarizerepresentativepositionsin the debate and attempta criticalevaluationof those positions. I will also argue that the debatelacks a feministethics that might serveas a consistent frameworkfor criticizingthe structuresand practicesof patriarchy, for formulatinga feministpolitics of sexuality,and for imaginingthe future towardwhich we struggle.

A) The Critics of Pornographyand Sadomasochism: Radical Feminists' Radicalfeministsclaim that pornographyis sexist propaganda;it is both a reflectionof patriarchalcultureand a means of perpetuating the patriarchalmodel of sexualityas male dominanceand femalesubmission. But writerslike Robin Morgan and Susan Griffin in Take Back the Night are most critical of violence in pornographyand its connectionto violence against women. Morgansays, ... the act of rape is merelythe expressionof the standard, "healthy" even encouraged male fantasy in patriarchalculture-that of aggressivesex. And the articulationof that fantasyinto a billion-dollarindustryis pornography.(Morgan 1980, 128) She claimsthat pornographyis not only associatedwith rape but also Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Hypatia, Inc.

71

hypatia with pressureto "performsexualllyin ever more objectifiedand objectifying fashion" (Morgan 1980, 130). Susan Griffin attacksthe standardliberaldefense of pornography, the catharsis theory: that men are by nature violent and that pornographicimages and fantasiesprovidea harmlessreleaseof violent impulses. The catharsis theory implies that pornographyserves a useful social function by diffusing male violence towardswomen. In opposition to this theory, Griffin claims that pornographycauses violence against women; she claims that putting sexual images in a violent context creates an association: ". . . to put violence and

women's bodies together, to associate sexuality and violence fabricates a need" (Griffin 1980, 137). If pornographywere truly cathartic,thereshouldbe an end to the need for sexualviolencerather than a continualconsumptionof violent pornography.She concludes with the suggestion that violence is not natural or innate but pathological.She says, Whatif we imaginedour true natures,male and female, as undeniablytender? Such behavior as war and rapaciousneshas not been seen as proceedingfrom illness. Such behaviorhas been termed normal, if not "animal," wild, untrammeled, uncivilizedperhaps,but not pathological.(Griffin 1980, 136, 138) Linked to the issue of violence and pornographyis the issue of sadomasochism.Against Sadomasochismis a collectionof essaysthat offers a generalcritique of culturalsadism and specific critiquesof lesbian-feministsadomasochism.KathleenBarrytracesthe historyof culturalsadism from the Marquisde Sade in the eighteenthcentury, throughFreud, to contemporarytheoriesof sociobiologythat justify an innate and biological basis for violence and hostility. The result, accordingto Barry,is a deterministicmodel of human behavior: Both sadistic and masochisticbehavior are defined in termsof unconsciousinstinctualneeds. The concept of unconscious instinct precludes morality and divorces psychologyfrom the conceptof victimor assailant.The social situationor milieu,the conditionsthat give riseto sexualviolencehave been reducedto a discussion of internalpsychologicalmechanisms.(Barry1982, 59) In the same collection, Sally Roesch Wagner questions the emergence of a lesbian-feministsadomasochisticliberation movement. She accuseslesbian sadomasochistsof following the uncritical 72

cheryl h. cohen acting out of the sexual revolution:they are simplyreactingto a rigid patriarchalmoralityby declaringthat "everythingimmoralor taboo must be healthy, fun, and worth trying" (Roesch Wagner 1982, 30). She says, Womenare certainlygoing to have sexualfantasiesthat involve dominanceand submissionbecause this is how we have learnedto experienceour sexuality.The question for feminists is, what do we choose to do about these fantasies?(Roesch Wagner 1982, 39) She suggeststhat feministsneed to questionpatternsof power in sexual relationsand developa vision of sexualliberationthat is not merely a revolt against patriarchalmodels of sexuality: "True sexual freedomwill be possible only when we breakthe connectionbetween sex and power, when there is no power componentin sexual interactions" (Roesch Wagner 1982, 30). Finally, Marissa Jonel contributes a personal attack on lesbian sadomasochismfrom her experienceas a "bottom" (masochist)in a sadomasochisticlesbian relationship. She explores her own sexual pleasuresin sm relationshipsand the fear and abuse she suffered in one of these relationships.She concludes, The continuedsupportof "feminists" is giving license to manylesbiansto practiceabusewithoutconscience.. . . Sadomasochismand the attitudes put forth by the new league of sm "feminists" are dangerousto all lesbians because they make violence and abuse, in whatever form, acceptable .... violence has no place in a love relationship. . . . (Jonel 1982, 21-22)

B) The Defenders Of Lesbian Sadomasochism, Pornography, And Sexual minorities: Libertarian Feminists Pat Califia represents the position of sadomasochist lesbian feminists who view patriarchalcontrol over sexual ideology and behavior as "erotic tyranny" and who demand that feminists "dismantlethe institutionsthat foster the exploitationand abuse of women": primarily,the family, conventionalsexuality, and gender (Califia 1981, 30). Califia defends the sm lesbian subcultureas one way to challengeconventionalsexualityand gender. She says, Sadomasochismis not a form of sexual assault. It is a consensual activity that involves polarized roles and 73

hypata intense sensations. ...

A sadomasochist is well aware

that a role adopted during a scene is not appropriate duringother interactionsand that a fantasy role is not the sum total of her being. . . . (Califia 1981, 31)

According to Califia, the realization of fantasy enhances sexual pleasurefor sm lesbiansand thus servesas a liberatingexperience.She accusesfeministswho emphasizethe "gentleand loving kind of sex," of remainingwithin the confines of repressedsexuality. Amber Hollibaugh and CherrieMoraga are more concernedwith fantasy, role-playing,and powerin sexuality.They claimthat the fear of heterosexualcontrol of fantasy has led feministsto say almost no fantasy is safe and to reject butch/femme lesbian sexuality as a reproductionof heterosexualgenderroles and oppression.Hollibaugh and Moragaclaim that it is betterto acknowledgeand play out sexual fantasiesratherthan forcingthem to remainunconsciousmotives for behavior:"If the desire for power is so hiddenand unacknowledged, it will inevitablysurface throughmanipulationor what-have-you.If you couldn't play capturer, you'd be it" (Hollibaugh and Moraga 1983, 397). Secondly, they claim that giving up power can feel "profoundlypowerfuland veryunpassive"(Hollibaughand Moraga1983, 399). They use seductionin butch/femmesexualityas an exampleof a very active and powerful role. Finally, they argue that fantasy and role-playing provide access to different forms of desire and are therefore liberatingpractices. They suggest that feminists returnto consciousness-raisinggroups that can explore sexual issues, feelings, experiences,and fantasies with sexual values suspendedin order to createa theoryof sexualitythat recognizesthe politicalimplicationsof sexual differences. Gayle Rubin, DeirdreEnglish,and AmberHollibaughcontinuethis sort of dialogue on sexuality in their article, "Talking Sex." They criticize certain feminists for holding a rigid view that fantasy and desire are socially constructedand thereforeany power, lust, or passion in sex is automaticallysuspect.They claimthat the feministaffirmationof the femalerightto be a sexualpersonis beinglost in the current tendenciestoward "vanilla sex." They argue that it is a mistake to define female sexuality exclusivelyin terms of feminist political practices.2

The authors charge the anti-pornographymovement with contributingto the repressionof sexualityby conflating a repulsionto violence with a repulsion to sex. In defense of pornography,they claim that sex is a humanneed that can be filled in some ways by pornographicmaterials. 74

cheryl h. cohen Having access to sexually explicit materialhas by and large been a male privilege.Yet ratherthan wantingto get rid of it, since women haven't been able to get it, I want women to be able to get it. (Rubin, English, Hollibaugh 1981, 55) Pornography,they argue, is a reflectionof sexismin the cultureand not the cause. The anti-pornographymovement forbids sexual experimentationand prevents making risky sexual fantasies explicit, practicesthat might be liberatoryfor femalesexuality.They conclude that we need women eroticiststo supplynon-sexistsexualimagesand that we need to separatesex and pleasure from sexism in order to make a non-sexistsexual liberation. In "Sexual Politics, the New Right and the SexualFringe," Gayle Rubin voices her concern over the feminist repudiationof sexual minorities. She cites right-wing persecution as a reason for the women's and gay movementsto defend sexual minorities from injustice. She advocatesa position of tolerancewhile feministsgain insight and understandingthrougha"consideredexamination"of the variety of sexual practiceskept alive, in some sense, in the sexual fringe (Rubin 1981, 108-115).

C) Philosophical Assumptions: Agreements And Disagreements Underlyingthis debateover politicallyappropriatefeministsexuality are certain assumptions about the self, sexuality, power, and freedom.Thoughthe two sides differ on most of these assumptions,I will argue that there are some basic agreements that might help mediatethe differences. (1) RadicalFeminists The radical feminists argue that sexuality is socially constructed, that patriarchyis the socio-politicalstructurein this culture at this time, and therefore all sexuality is constructedaround patriarchal models. This view impliesseveralthings:unreflectivehumanagencyis suspect, unexamineddesireis suspect, and sexual fantasiesand practices involving power, violence, or polarizedroles are suspect. Ideal sexuality on this view emphasizes tenderness, intimacy, and an egalitarian loving relationship. Heterosexuality is automatically suspectbecauseit traditionallyinvolvespolarizedroles and sexualobjectification and perpetuatesmale domination in the context of the patriarchalnuclear family. The result is a privileging of lesbian 75

hypatia "vanilla sex." The radical feminists assume that power is equated with dominanceand violence, is always unequal, and thereforedoes not belong in sexual relations. Freedom, in the sense of sexual liberation, requires avoidance of patriarchalforms of sexuality. (2) LibertarianFeminists Libertarianfeministsagreethat sexualityhas been underthe control and repressionof patriarchy;at least in that sense they also agreethat the self and sexualityare sociallyconstructed,but they claim that the sexualfringeis a repositoryfor repressedsexuality,that pornography, woman-constructederotica, and fantasy can help women regaincontact with represseddesires. They assume that human sexuality is a need that is best filled by a maximum of sexual pleasure;whatever contributesto pleasureis thereforepermittedunderthe minimalconstraintof mutualconsent. This view requiresthe assumptionthat the self can be a consentingautonomousagent and demands"the rightto genuinelyfeel, in my body, what I want" (Rubin,English,Hollibaugh 1981, 44). Libertarianfeminists assume that power is inherent in human relations and is part of sexual pleasure. Power is not a dominance/submissionor a have/lack relation;ratherthere is an appeal to the Hegelian master/slave dialectic in which the slave has powerbecauseof the master'sdependenceon the slave;the act of submission is thereforeviewedas powerful. Freedom,in termsof sexual liberation, is the freedom from oppression and injustice, freedom from patriarchalvalues and heterosexualreproductivenorms of sexuality, and freedom from sexual repression. It is also therefore a freedom to experiment with fantasy and desire in the pursuit of pleasure. (3) A Major Point Of Agreement Becauseof the polarizednatureof this debate,both sidestend to lose sight of a fundamentalagreement:they agree that patriarchyis oppressive,that patriarchalvaluesare personally,socially, and politically unacceptable,and that male-definedsexualityis inappropriateto women. Both sides agree that patriarchymust be dismantled;both sides advocatepoliticalpracticesfor the women'smovementto attack patriarchalinstitutionsand bring about a new vision of personaland political relationsand sexual liberation.But the two groups focus on differentaspectsof sexualityunderpatriarchyand thereforeadvocate radicallyopposed methods of change.3 The radical feminists pick violence and the objectification of 76

cheryl h. cohen women as centralto the continuingpatriarchaloppressionof women in the realm of sexuality.They thereforereject pornography,violent sexual relations,dominationas a form of power in sexuality,and the traditional masculine emphasis on pleasure; they offer instead the traditional feminine emphasis on intimacy and bonding. The libertarianfeministspick sexualrepressionand particularlythe oppression of sexual minoritiesas the place to attack patriarchaldefinitions of sexuality. They therefore defend pornographyand sexual practices that are oppressedunderpatriarchy,and they advocatethe use of sexual diversity to break compulsory heterosexualityand reclaim the richnessof repressedsexuality. They want to detach sexual pleasure from the emotionalbondingthat they claim has limitedfemale sexual experience;and they asserttheir freedomto seek sexual pleasure. In addition, both the radicaland libertarianfeministsmake universal judgementsand appealto abstractprinciplesin theirarguments:in Comingto Power (SAMOIS1982)lesbiansadomasochistsprovidean informationaland personal sharing of their sexuality, but they also defend their sexuality with a generalizedargumentbased on rights, contracts, and consent; and they justify their sexual practice as a legitimatepoliticalstanceagainstpatriarchy.It is this abstractdefense and political justification of lesbian sm that invites the equally abstractand universalcondemnationfrom the radicalfeminists.And becausethe two groupsare looking for a politics of sexuality,they fail to appreciatethat, although at the social level, universaljudgements are important,sexualityis also personaland privateand not simplya matter for political legislation. But can we developa politics of sexualitythat can accomodatepersonal variations in sexuality and sexual experimentation? Can feminists respect the individual'spersonal reflectivechoices and yet avoid a dangerouspublicpoliticalstance?I will argue,in the final section of this paper, that a feministethics could providethe answerto this question and therebysupply an essential ground for a feminist sexual politics that goes beyond the currentdebate.

D) Feminist Ethics By feministethics, I do not mean that some set of abstractrulesor universal principles could definitively settle this debate over appropriatefeministsexuality;instead,the questionof sexualityrequires carefulthinkingguidedby valuesthat shouldgrow out of the feminist struggle to overcome male domination, the struggle to insert the characteristicshistoricallyand contingentlyidentifiedas feminineinto the dominantculture.4 77

hypatia Thus Carol Gilligan's work in moral developmenttheory serves a heuristicfunctionin the developmentof an ethicsthat includesthe experienceof women. Gilligan'sresearch,In a Different Voice,suggests that the socializationof femalescauseswomento define themselvesin a context of humanrelationships,as part of a networkof caringrelations, whereasthe socializationof males leads men to focus on individuation and personal autonomy (Gilligan 1982, 17). Gilligan claimsthat thesegender-baseddifferencesin socializationand identity lead to differentconceptionsof morality:the moralityof responsibility and the traditionalmale-definedmoralityof rights: In this conception [the morality of responsibility],the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities ratherthan from competingrights and requiresfor its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrativeratherthan formal and abstract.This conception of moralityas concernedwith the activity of care centersmoraldevelopmentaroundthe understandingof responsibility and relationships . . . the morality of

rights differs from the moralityof responsibilityin its emphasis on separationrather than connection, in its considerationof the individualratherthan the relationship as primary.(Gilligan 1982, 19) Accordingto Gilligan,women'smoraljudgementsaremoreimmersed in the detailsof relationships;women tend to considerthe standpoint of the "particular other" rather than to reason abstractly about universalneedsor rights;and womenappearto developthe sensitivity and empathyfor others that this kind of moral reasoningrequires. In "A Different Reality:FeministOntology," CarolineWhitbeck develops a feminist ontology and ethics that relies on an understanding of the practiceof "mutual realization"of people. She says, I take this practiceto have a varietyof particularforms, most, if not all, of whichare regardedas women'swork and are therefore largely ignored by the dominant culture. Among these are the rearingof children, the education of childrenand adolescents, care of the dying, nursing of the sick and injured, and a variety of spiritualpracticesrelatedto daily life. (Whitbeck1984, 65)

Whitbeck is critical of "masculist ontology" and the ethics of individualismwhich views the self-other relation as one of opposition and conflict. Her feministontology is based on an understandingof 78

cheryl h. cohen the self-otherrelationas a relationbetween "analogousbeings": Sincean otheris not takento be oppositeto the self, the character of the self does not uniquely define the characterof the otherby oppositionto it: othersmay be similaror dissimilarin an unlimitedvarietyof ways.... The relation is not fundamentallydyadic at all, and is better expressedas a self-othersrelation, becauserelationships, past and present, realized and sought, are constitutiveof the self, and so the actions of a person reflectthe more-or-lesssuccessfulattemptto respondto the whole configuration of relationships . . . the self-

others relation generates a multifactorial interactive model of most, if not all, aspects of reality. (Whitbeck 1984, 75-76)

Whitbeck goes on to defend the adequacy of this relational and historical model of the person and then outlines a "responsibilities view" of ethics that is compatible with the self-others ontological viewpoint. She contraststhis view of ethics with "the rightsview" of ethics: Accordingto the rightsview of ethics, the conceptof a moral right is the fundamentalmoral notion, or at least the one of preeminentsignificance. People are viewed as social and moral atoms, armed with rights, reason, and actuallyor potentiallyin competitionand conflict with one another. ...

If any attention is given

to relationshipson the rightsview, it is assumedthey exist on a contractualor quasi-contractualbasis and that the moralrequirementsarisingfrom them are limitedto rights and obligations. In contrastto obligationsthat generallyspecify what acts or conductare morallyrequired,permitted,or forbidden, responsibilities(in the prospective sense of "responsibilityfor") specify the ends to be achieved ratherthan the conductrequired.Thus, responsibilities require an exercise of discretion on the part of their bearers. . . . What I call "the responsibilities view" of

ethics takes the moral responsibilitiesarising out of a relationship as the fundamental moral notion. ...

In

general, relationships between people place moral responsibilities on both parties, and these responsibilities change over time with changes in the parties and their relationship. . . . Each party in a relationship 79

hypati is responsiblefor ensuringsome aspect of the other's welfare or, at least, for achievingsome ends that contribute to the other's welfare or achievements. (Whitbeck1984, 79-80) The denialof egoism and individualismimplicitin the responsibilities view of ethics does not imply the acceptanceof a morality of selfsacrifice;ratherit implies the choice to be unselfish, to give careful considerationto one's own needs and take the interestand needs of othersinto account. Whitbeckclaimsthat "the rightsview of ethics" fails to account for the special responsibilitiesthat are part of affectional and occupationalrelationshipsand is thereforean inadequate view of the moral status of persons. Nevertheless,she does not discard human rights: "Human rights are claims upon society and upon other people that are necessaryif a person is to be able to meet the responsibilitiesof her or his relationships" (Whitbeck 1984, 80). Furthermore,although she claims that the descriptionof a relationshipand its attendantresponsibilitiesmust beginwith the experienceof the personsinvolved,sucha descriptionis still criticizableby others. Unfortunately,Whitbeckonly offers an example to support this claim; she says: ". . . for example, there may be

groundsfor sayingthat a child is being abusedeven if initiallyneither the child nor parentsees the relationshipthat way" (Whitbeck1984, 80). But I think her descriptionof the self-othersrelationas a relation betweenanalogousbeings actuallysuppliessome generalgroundsfor criticalevaluationof the relationshipsof others:sharedattributesand needs determinehumanwelfarein general,and the descriptionof the individuals and the context of their relationshipdeterminehuman welfare in particularcases. Thus the responsibilitiesview of ethics is preferableto the rights view of ethics becauseit includesfemaleexperiencewithoutexcluding male experience:all human beings experiencecaring relationships, such as family relations, friendship,occupationalrelations(and sexual relations),in whicha sense of moralresponsibilityis derivedfrom caringand concernfor the welfareof particularpersonsand not from an abstractobligationto respectrightsor abide by implicitcontracts. Furthermore,empathy is a human capacity that grows out of our abilityto expressourselvesthrougha commonlanguage,our abilityto create, choose, feel, and act purposefully,and our abilityto be other than self-interested.If we can share in the feelings of others, we can also sharein the motivationto act in the interestsof others. If we are all fundamentallyconnectedthrough our life together, if a sense of self develops through identificationand relation with others rather than through alienation from others, then we all have good reasons for respectingothers, for attendingto the needs of others, and for 80

cheryl h. cohen expectingthat our needs will receiveattention. In order to determinethe role of ethics in the feminist sexuality debate, a distinctionmust be madebetweenthreeareasof concern:(1) the problem of State control over sexuality (including legislation against fringe sexual practices,possible censorshipof pornography, and problemsof rape and adult-childsexuality;(2) feministcriticism and condemnationof specificsexualpractices,and (3) countercultural transformation of sexuality through experimentationwith sexual practices.The rightsview of ethics, becuaseit is basedon atomisticindividualism, relies on abstract conceptions of social contracts and derivativeduties and obligations. At the level of public policy and state legislation,an appealto abstractrightsand criteriasuch as equal consensualrelationsbased on implicitcontractsis essentialto protect individuals from the violation of rights on the part of other individualsor the state. Thus for example,feministsmightuse the rights view of ethics to defend the legal rightof adultsto participatein consensual fringe sexual practices,but they would also retaina justification for laws against rape and sexual abuse of children. On the other hand, the responsibilitiesview of ethics generates generalcriteriafor evaluatingrelationshipsand yet involvesa detailed and contextualjudging.We can applythis view of ethicsin the current sexualitydebate to distinguishbetweendangerousand dehumanizing sexual practicesand those that are experimentaland liberatory.Any sexualpractice(and any social practiceor politicalpractice)that does not recognizethe connectionsbetweenpersonsand the responsibilities entailed by those connections would be unacceptable. Thus the responsibilitiesview of ethics could be used as a basis for feminist criticismand condemnationof specificsexualpracticesand as a guide for experimentationand transformationof sexuality. In the case of pornography,there is the problemof distinguishing pornography from erotica. Eva Kittay suggests the following characterizations: Pornographydeals in the representationof violence, degradation,or humiliationof some persons(most frequentlyfemale)for the sexualgratificationof otherpersons (almostexclusivelymale).... To call a workerotic is to focus, specifically, on the following condition: That we regardit as being apt to evoke what we thinkto be the appropriateresponseof sexual interestwhich is more sensuous and voluptuous than lewd or prurient. (Kittay 1984, 148-149) But if pornographyis merely a representationof fantasy, imagined 81

hypatia and actedout, can it be harmfulin any way?Pornographyuses images of people, and most of the imagesimplythat some kindof relatingaccompaniesthe image:someone,even if an unseensomeone, had to put the subject in the uncomfortableposition, or tie the ropes, or fasten the chains, or use the whip. And because pornographyis only a representationof a relation,it may not mean to the consumerwhat it means to the participantsin such sexual practices;pornographycannot portray the caring and concern that could prevent apparently violent or degrading sexual practices from being humiliating and harmful. If this caring and concern is somehow included in the representation(in a writtentext for example), then the work would not necessarilybe pornographic. Pornographicimages often misrepresentthe desiresof the subjects portrayed,yet they contributeto the fantasiesof the consumerand influencethe consumer'sexpectationsand desires.The consumptionof pornographyis not a relationship,but it does affect one's self-image and imagesof sexualpartners,and thereforeit affects relationshipsto others. To use anotherhumanbeing (even the image of a humanbeing) for sexualsatisfactionis to concentrateon self-interestand to exclude any considerationof concern or responsibilityfor the other. One might arguethat this view also prohibitsthe use of erotica for sexual pleasureand satisfaction.But becausethe responsibilitiesview of ethics demandscareful considerationof context and details, and beginswith the experienceof the individualsengagedin a practice,its political use (its use for purposesof proposinglegislationor even for public condemnation) should be limited to clear cases of harm, humiliation,and neglectof responsibilityfor the welfareof others.5It remainsthe task of individualswho choose to use eroticato evaluate the effect on their personalpractices,desires, and fantasies. Similarly, lesbian sadomasochismis first of all a personal, and therefore private, sexual practice. The publication of Coming to Power, for example,is an attemptto shareinformationabout lesbian sm relationships,and many of the contributorsto that book offer their personalexperiences,fantasies, and feelings. But when lesbian sm is advocatedas a politicalpractice,as a way to escape patriarchal constructionsof sexuality, as a public protest against sexual repression, thereis a dangerousloss of the care, concern,and responsibility that may be presentin personalsm relationships.Of course, it is not sufficient to criticizelesbian sadomasochismfor its apparentuse of patriarchalmodels of violence and power; the sm lesbians simply arguethat the retreatto nonviolent"vanillasex" is a compliancewith patriarchalconstructionsof sexuality.The mistakeis to describesexual relationsas though they werea matterof personaltaste (i.e. yours 82

cheryl h. cohen is vanilla, mine is wild cherry,and you have no rightto tell me which flavor to choose), and then to argue that sexual practicesare also political tools. What becomespublic and political loses its groundin the personal:viewed from outside the personalcontext of caringand responsibility, lesbian sm creates an explicit association of sexual pleasurewith powerlessness,pain, humiliation,and violence. The sm defendersargue that sadomasochismis a ritualizedenactment of fantasy,that these fantasyrolesdo not extendbeyondthe sexual interaction, and that experimentingwith fantasy is one way to breaksexual repression.But if sexualityis part of identity,if all relations to othersare part of identity,then even these ritualfantasyrelations are part of identity. The sm defenders argue that lesbian sadomasochismis safe in the sm subculture;but just as lesbiansand gay men createa safe subculturefor themselvesand therebyidentify themselveswith their subculture,so too, the sm subcultureis a form of social identity, and the ritual roles are no longer confined to personal relationsbut extend to social interactions. The public displayof whips, chains, and swastikas,for example,is dangerousbecausethese are all symbolsof dehumanization.Similarly, the public self-identificationof mistressand slave and the acting out of these roles suggestsinequalityand abuse that may not be present in the personalrelationship.Of course, sm defendersare quickto point out that objectificationand abuseareall an illusionand that sm, as it is experienced, is safe and pleasurableand even potentially therapeutic,that it involvesa high level of trustand requiresthe kind of caringfor one's partnerthat I have arguedshouldbe presentin sexual relations. A responsibilitiesview of ethics that condemnssm sexuality as an unacceptablepoliticalchallengeto patriarchycould clearly be used to validatesm sexualpracticeswhen these are criticallyexaminedas personaland privatesexualpractices.Just as in the case of erotica, the persons engaged in lesbian sm could use the responsibilitiesview of ethics to legitimatetheir fantasies, desires,and practices; but they could not advocate sadomasochismas a feminist political stance. Finally, to return to Rubin's plea for justice, tolerance, and understandingof the sexualminoritiesand herclaimthat muchof this "fringe" sexuality is worth reclaiming-I think an appeal to ethics could answer what Rubin does not answer: which practicesshould stay in limbo and which shouldbe reclaimed.She admitsthat thereis danger, violence, and even psychopathyin the sexual fringe, yet she offers no means of critically examining these sexual practices. In another article, "The Leather Menace: Comments on Politics and S/M," (Rubin 1982) Rubin suggests that any evaluation of sexual 83

hypatia behaviormustreston the actualexperienceof the individualsinvolved in it. She appealsto constraintsof consentand pleasurein fringesexuality, claiming that the issue of consent is not as troublesomefor fringe sexual practicesas it is for conventionalsexual practices.6 But if we take our social connectednessseriously, then we need more than the notion of a consentingautonomousagent to evaluate sexual practices.And if our desiresare socially constructed,then we must at least be willing to undertakea criticalself-evaluationof our fantasies and desires. I think that the responsibilitiesview of ethics provides fundamentalgrounds for limits to desire, the grounds that connect us to others and make us responsible for the "object of desire" as a personwith needsand not simplyas a free agent who can consent to almost anything.Whethersexual relationsare undertaken for pleasureor parentingor emotionalbonding,the qualityof the personal interactionscan and should be evaluated. A feminist responsibilitiesview of ethics would allow us to evaluate the relationsbetween sexual partnersin all forms of sexualityand in the context of personalexperience;it would allow us to distinguishbetweenabusive or dehumanizingsexualityand liberatorysexuality, between what is publiclyand politicallydangerousand whatis privatelyand personally valid. We may appealto rightsand talk of consentin orderto defend sexualminoritiesfrom injustice,but theseare not adequategroundsto advocate a political use of fringe sexual practices.Consent does not make a relationshipgood; and a history of oppression is neither necessarynor sufficient to make a sexual practiceliberatory.

E) Conclusion: The Ethics of Political Transformation Whenfeministsare primarilyconcernedwith the threatof statecontrol over sexualityand with questions of privacyand freedom from censorship,then an appeal to the universalrights of consentingand autonomousagents is valid. The defense of sexual minoritiesagainst injusticeand advocacyof the rightsof adults to experimentwith sexual practicesis necessaryto createthe spacein whichcounter-cultural feminist transformationsof sexualitycan begin. But when feminists focus on politicallyappropriatesexuality,and particularlywhen they advocate specific sexual practices as liberatory and as political challenges to patriarchalsexuality, then I think the responsibilities view of ethicsmust enterinto the debate. I thinka politicalmovement that uses any means to its end is doomed to achieve an undesirable end. A feminist political praxis that uses any means to tear down patriarchymay find that the practicesit advocates ultimately constructthe personalitiesof the next generations.If feministsadvocate 84

cheryl h. cohen sexual practiceswhich, when removed from a context of caring, can becomeobjectifyingand dehumanizing,they may therebybe responsible for an experimentalismwith desirethat sets no limits and gives no guidelines for constructiveand healthy relations between persons. They may succeed in dismantlingpatriarchy,they may succeed in escaping from patriarchalconstructionsof sexuality, but they may also therebydestroythe humancaringand responsibilitythat give us hope for a better world. I think ethics is essentialto all politics but particularlyin the traumatictransitionto an unknownfuture. The complexity of human sexuality, psychology, and sociality demands a complex evaluationand complex guidelinesfor political practice; and the responsibilitiesview of ethics could supply the framework for this critical thought and constructive action. A feminist ethics must make a distinctionbetweenwhat is publiclyacceptable and what is privately acceptable, a distinction between political action and personalchoice. Generalpolitical guidelinesfor liberatorysexualpracticesmust be primarilynegativeguidelines-any sexual practicethat can be judged within a particularcontext to be harmful to the persons involved could never be a valid political challengeto patriarchy.Furthermore,positive generalizationsabout what is liberatoryare ruled out because the responsibilitiesview of ethicscan only judge a practiceby its implicationsin a context. When sexualpracticesbecome political, they tend to lose theirpersonaland particularcontext; they become generalizedand distorted(as in the case with fringe sexual practicesand with both lesbian sm sexuality and lesbian "vanilla sex"). Thus a feminist ethics might affirm the right of individualsto consensualexperimentationwith sexual practices, but it could not advocate any particularpracticeas political. Rather, feministswould have the responsibilityto examinethe social and political implicationsof sexual practicesin concretecontexts in order to distinguishthe dangerousfrom the liberatory. A feminist ethics also provides guidelines for personal choice, demandinga criticalself-examinationof fantasiesand desiresand an ongoing evaluationof sexual practicesby the particularpersonswho choose to engagein them. The fact that a particularpracticehas been oppressedunderpatriarchyor judgedto be a deviantform of sexuality could never be a sufficient criteriafor liberation. In a personaland privatecontextwhatis liberatorymustpromotea depthof caring,sensual satisfaction, mutual personaldevelopment,and human connection. Again, individualshavethe rightto experimentwith sexualpractices, but they also have a fundamentalresponsibilityfor their sexual partnerand for others affected by their personalchoices. The kind of public/privateapplicationof ethics permittedby the 85

hypatia responsibilitiesview, impliesthat there can be room for variationsin sexual preferenceand sexual practicewithout advocatingthe use of oppressedsexualityas a political challengeto patriarchyand thereby convertinga personalchoiceinto a politicalobligation.'Thepoliticsof sexualitywould thereforeinvolve critical,reflectiveevaluationof personal relationsand their social manifestationsand consequences.It is the complex task of political transformation that requires the guidanceof ethicalconsiderations.Thusfeministshavethe rightto experimentwith sexuality, to explore female sexual pleasure, and to escape from sexual repression.But we have the simultaneousresponsibility to respectour relatednessto others, and to create a new sexuality, sociality,politics, and economicsthat reflectsour fundamental human connectionsand responsibilities.

Notes 1. I rely on Ann Ferguson's discussion of the sexuality debates for the labels "Radical feminist" and "Libertarian feminist." See Ferguson 1984b. 2. For example, that the radical feminist notion of the "Woman-identifiedWoman" which made lesbianism a political practice for feminists lost sight of the liberation of female desire; lesbianism was no longer primarily an expression of repressed female desire but became a rebellious sexuality, defined in terms of its relation to patriarchy. 3. For a brief historical summary of feminist sexual politics and the current political split, see Freedman and Thorne 1984. 4. Carol Gould reminds us that some men display more of these historically "feminine" traits than some women, and more importantly, that the whole range of character traits are human traits which may be appropriated for one's own selfdevelopment (Gould 1984). 5. Here again, the distinction between the three areas of concern in the sexuality debate is important. A rights ethic would prevent state censorship of pornogaphy and erotica, but it might also justify some form of legislation against certain kinds of pornographic images used in public places (especially violent pornography). A responsibilities view of ethics could then extend feminist criticisms to all forms of pornography, and also provide guidelines for the creation and use of erotica as a means of transforming and liberating human sexuality. 6. Rubin says, "One may more reasonably ask if anyone truly 'consents' to be straight in any way. Coercion does occur among perverts, as it does in all sexual contexts. One still needs to distinguish rape and abuse from consensual situations. But the overwhelming coercion with regard to S/M is the way in which people are prevented from doing it. We are fighting for the freedom to consent to our sexuality without interference, and without penalty" (Rubin 1982, 223).

86

reyes kizaro Feminism and Motherhood: O'Brien vs Beauvoir I argue that both Mary O'Brien's celebratory analysis of motherhood and Simone de Beauvoir's critical one fail, due to biologism and a lack of historical sense. Both approaches, I claim, are need be analysed both as motherhood complementary: for as a potential ground alienating-Beauvoir-and feminism-O'Brien. I conclude by suggesting that feminism can only reappropriate the female reproductive experience in a critical way.

Patriarchal thought has limited female biology to its own narrow specifications. The feminist vision has recoiled from female biology for these reasons; it will, I believe, come to view our physicality as a resource, rather than a destiny. In order to live a full human life we require not only control of our bodies (though control is a prerequisite); we must touch the unity and resonance of our physicality, our bond with the natural order, the corporeal ground of our intelligence. (Adrienne Rich 1976, 39) In this article I analyze Mary O'Brien's attempt to recover "the corporeal ground of our intelligence." She argues against feminist views which following Simone de Beauvoir present a negative picture of motherhood. On the contrary, she holds that the reproductive process is the basis of a female reproductive consciousness which necessarily underlies feminist theory. I will attempt to show that O'Brien's attempt to recover motherhood for feminism-with which I absolutely sympathise-is flawed by biologism and ahistoricism, notwithstanding her claims to the contrary. Futhermore, I believe that Beauvoir's most important insight concerning motherhood, namely, that it can be alienating for women, cannot be dismissed as O'Brien does, even though Beauvoir's analysis presents serious problems.' In her pioneering book The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir claims that female reproductive capacities are-partially, at least-the cause of patriarchal oppression. She says: The fundamental part that from the beginning of Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Hypatia, Inc..

87

hypatia historydoomedwomanto domesticworkand prevented her taking part in the shaping of the world was her enslavement to the generative function. (Beauvoir 1953,117) In The Politics of ReproductionMary O'Brienargues, on the one hand, against Beauvoir'sviews, that male, not female, reproductive capacitiesare the sourceof the patriarchaldominationof women. On the other hand, she claims that female reproductiveprocessprovides the materialbase for feministtheory. She says, "Wheredoes feminist theory start? I answer:within the process of human reproduction" (O'Brien 1981, 8). Accordingto her, a feministtheory based on the reproductiveprocess would allow, on the one hand, a criticism of traditionalpatriarchaltheory-which in her scheme becomes an attempt on the part of males to compensatefor the lack of continuity with the species which they experiencein reproduction-and, on the other, the recoveryfor feminismof the denigratedfunction of giving birth. O'Brien,furthermore,arguesthat the appearanceof a feminist theory based on reproductionis now possible, for the first time, thanks to the developmentof contraceptivetechnology. I believe that O'Brien's position presents a deeper challenge for feminismthan Beauvoir's.In a way whichis inconsistentwith her own intimation that the denigrationof female reproductivecapacitiesis culturally created, Beauvoir repeatedly states that females are biologicallydoomed; she, in other words, assumes the very cultural values which are contemptuousof motherhood,as O'Briencorrectly points out. However, O'Brien presentsan analysis which is, against her own claims to the contrary2,heavily biologistic and ahistorical and, as a result,it is also internallycontradictory.In section(I) I show the two main inconsistenciesin O'Brien'swork. First, her claim that feminist theory must have its materialbasis in the reproductiveprocess contradictsher views on contraception.Secondly, her theory inconsistentlyfavors historyover nature. In section (II) I arguethat the contradictionsin her analysis are due to the fact that it is ahistorical and biologistic. In (III) I criticize O'Brien's view that female reproductiveconsciousness is not alienated. I claim that she must broadenher notion of alienationto analyzean aspectof motherhood which Beauvoirpoints out, namely, motherhoodas alienating.Finally, I offer my own conclusions. I O'Brien's view that feminist theory must be based on the female reproductiveexperienceis incompatiblewith her claim that only after 88

reyes klzaro contraceptivetechnologycan a feministconsciousnessarise. In a nutshell, the contradictionis the following: she holds that feministconsciousness is based on female reproductiveconsciousness,which is, accordingto her, unitary;on the otherhandshe claimsthat contraception breaksthe unity of reproductiveconsciousnessand, furthermore, that only after "the age of contraception" can a feminist consciousness arise, thus contradictingher first point: she asserts both that feministconsciousnessis, and yet cannot be, based on a unitary reproductiveconsciousness. As opposed to Beauvoir's negative analysis of motherhood for women, Mary O'Brien claims that reproductiondoes not alienate women but, rather, men. O'Brien argues that males' alienation in reproductionacounts for patriarchaldomination. Accordingto her, the reproductiveprocess produces two gender-differentiatedconsciousnesses,one male, one female. She says: Both processes, production and reproduction . . . con-

tribute to the dialectical structure of human consciousness. There is a reproductive genderic aspect of

consciousness,just as thereis a productive,class aspect of consciousness.(O'Brien 1981,8) Male and female reproductiveconsciousnessesdiffer, accordingto O'Brien, in that the male is-and feels-naturally alienatedfrom his seed, whereasthe femaleis not; she experiencesreproductionas a continuousprocess.This is due to the fact that malesexperiencesexuality as disconnectedfrom reproduction,whereas,in the case of women, the gap is mediatedthroughgestation3.In O'Brien'swords: . . .this negation [male negation]rests squarelyon the alienation of the male seed in the copulative act. The unity of seeds is experientiallypresentin an immediate way only to female reproductive consciousness. (O'Brien 1981, 9) As a result, the alienatedmale reproductiveconsciousness,according to O'Brien, lacks a sense of continuity with the human species. However, O'Brien adds, allegedly following Hegel, human consciousnessresistsalienation. She says: "When Hegel claims that . . . humanconsciousnessresistsalienationand negationof the self, he is makinga claim about the structureof consciousnesswhich is vital to the theory of reproductiveconsciousnessdeveloped here" (O'Brien 1981, 20). Males, accordingto her, turn to the theoretical,economic

and political realms, in order to create artificial continuity principles

and thus overcome their natural alienation. Examples of those 89

hypatia principlesare the notion of paternity,hereditarymonarchyand constitutionallaw. Moreover,accordingto O'Brien, males have created the necessaryjuridicalcorpusto protectthe institutionswhichembody these principles, as well as a public/private split, all of which perpetuatesmale domination. She says: What I hope to show is that suchtheories[artificialcontinuity principles]are not merelyanaloguesof generational continuityand procreationbut take social forms which meet in quite practicalways the problemsof the integrity of male reproductive consciousness . . . pro-

blems which are posed by the actual process of reproduction.(O'Brien 1981, 11, emphasisadded) O'Brien does not explain what she means by "female reproductive consciousness."She presumablymeansthat, becauseof the continuity with the natural process which mothers experience,accordingto her, they have a perceptionof the world which differs from males. She, moreover, believes that female consciousnessallows women to have a perceptionof the worldwhichis closerto the truththan males. She states, for instancethat "historyis indubitablya continuousprocess;" thus, she indicates that the female continuous perceptionof time is more true than the male discontinuous one. This superior female reproductiveconsciousness, O'Brien claims, is the basis for feministtheory. On the otherhand, O'Brienclaimsthat the technologicalchangesin contraceptionallow, for the first time in history, for a change in the reproductiveprocesswhichwill resultin a feministchallengeto gender inequality.She says: The institutionsof patriarchyare vulnerablebecausethe Age of Contraception has changed the process of reproductionand the social relations of reproduction must thereforeundergotransformation.(O'Brien1981, 32) This statement,however,conflicts with her view that reproductionis the basis for a feminist consciousness. O'Brien hardly develops her views on the specific impact of contraceptivetechnologyon women. As a matterof fact, she devotesjust a couple of pages to explain the way in which contraceptive technologymakes possible the appearanceof a feminist theory. She holds that contraceptionhas changed the reproductiveprocess. It follows from her own analysis that it must also have changed both female and male reproductiveconsciousnesses. For, as she says, 90

reyes lazaro process and consciousnessof process are inseparable(O'Brien 1981, 21). It would thus follow that there is a difference between female reproductiveconsciousnessbefore and after the appearanceof contraceptivetechnology.For the purposesof this paper,I call the former female reproductiveconsciousnessand the latterfeminist reproductive consciousness.As it turns out, in one of the rare occasions in which O'Brien suggests the specific changes in female reproductiveconsciousnesswhich technology bringsabout, she states that contraception separatessexualityfrom reproduction.As she puts it: Unlike men, women have had no objectivebasis for a separationof gendericcontinuityfrom human history. Now, we do have such a challenge to meet, for the separation of sexuality and reproduction which nature decreed for men, technology has now decreed for

women. (O'Brien 1981, 160, emphasisadded)

O'Brien clearlyindicates that feminist theory is based on a feminist reproductiveconsciousness. ThroughoutPOR she claims, however, thatfemale reproductiveconsciousnessis constitutedby the unitysexuality/parturitionwhich women experiencein reproduction.But this unity is eliminatedby contraception.Thus the first contradictionin POR: O'Brienholds at the sametime that feministtheoryis and is not based on female reproductiveconsciousness. A second importantinconsistencywithin O'Brien'sanalysisis that it favors the natural over the historical, a concession to traditional

patriarchalthought which she criticizesin Beauvoir.O'Brienargues that male reproductiveconsciousnessis alienated,and, furthermore, that this is due to the fact that males perceivesexualityas separated from reproduction.She also claims that contraceptionproduces a discontinuousfemale reproductiveconsciousness,as well. It follows that contraceptionmust also alienatewomen. She acknowledgesthis fact. However, she points out that female and male forms of alienation differ from each other. She says: For women, the historical,technologicalseparationof sexuality from parturitionis an objective equalization with men, but not an identity with men. . . . (O'Brien

1981, 191, emphasisadded) The gender disanalogy which O'Brien's argument creates, withoutofferinganyjustificationsfor it, is enoughto alreadymakeus feel uneasy4.Her argument,however,shows a still deeperflaw: when pressedto specifywhatthis differencebetweenmalesand femalesconsists in, O'Brien surprisinglyinvokes the nature/historydichotomy, 91

hypatia and states that female reproductivealienation is historical, whereas male alienationis merelynatural. In her own words, The access to a destiny, with its concomitantcompulsion to createa second naturewhichcan cope with it, is now presentedto women by historicalaction, the creation of a technology ...

and women must mediate this

separationhistorically.For men, mediationis historical, but the alienation is natural. (O'Brien 1981, 191, 192, emphasisadded) Even thoughO'Brienis not veryexplicitat this point, it is clearthat she believes that reproductivealienation is positive for females and negativefor males, sinceit, on the one hand, forces malesto createartificial continuity principlesand, on the other, turns women into a progressivesocial force. (cf. O'Brien1981,63.) It seemsthat, sincethe only differences between both kinds of alienation are that one is natural and the other is historical, female reproductivealienation must be superiorprecisely by virtue of the fact that it is historical. Moreover,female reproductiveconsciousness-i.e., beforecontraception-also is natural, in the same sense that male reproductiveconsciousness is-since both are directly based on biological reproduction-, whereasfeminist reproductiveconsciousness-i.e., after contraception-is, accordingto O'Brien,historical.It follows, then, from O'Brien'sanalysis that, in order for a feminist consciousnessto appear, nature must be overcome. But this is precisely the approach which she criticizesin thinkerslike Simone de Beauvoir. O'Brien,for one, criticizesBeauvoirfor identifyingthe naturalwith the valueless and the irrational, on the one hand, and history with anti-physis,rationalityand values, on the other. She says: As dualismis perceivedas natural,the mediationwhich men must performto overcomethis conditiontakes the form of resistanceto nature, and De Beauvoirargues that the significant movement in masculine history is anti-physis..... Life by itself, withouthumanlycreated values, can have no meaning. (O'Brien 1981, 68, emphasis added) O'Brien claims that the consequence of Beauvoir's view is that women, who are traditionallyassociated with the natural and with biology, are relegatedto the category of the irrational.As O'Brien puts it, "They [women]remainimmuredin naturalprocess,by definition irrational"(O'Brien 1981, 68). It is paradoxicalthat O'Brien,who, as pointedout above, basesthe 92

reyes lazaro superiorityof female reproductiveconsciousnesson women's special rapportwith the naturalprocess,ends up groundingthe superiorityof feminist consciousness precisely on its being historical. Why does O'Brien, who so opposes the dichotomy natural/historicaland the relegationof women to the formercategory,end up advocatingit? I suggest that this is precisely due to the fact that O'Brien, like Beauvoir, presents an analysis which is heavily biologistic. O'Brien allegedlyattempts to presentbiology in a historicalkey, in order to mediate the natural/historicaldistinction. However, she is unsuccessful, since the undesirabledichotomyreappearstime and again in her work. II O'Brienclaims that her analysisis not based on " crudebiology." She states: Our feministperspectiveis a materialperspectivein that it attempts to root this long oppression in material, biologicalprocess, ratherthan in mute, brute biology. (O'Brien 1981, 44, emphasisadded) She furthermorearguesthat her analysisis historical.As she puts it: The generalthesis which is to be proferredhere is that the reproductiveprocessis not only the materialbase of the historicalforms of the social relationsof reproduction, but that it is also a dialectical process, which changes historically. (O'Brien 1981, 21, emphasis add-

ed) She specifies that by "historical" she means "not merely biological," or not biological "in a crude sense." In her words: The processchangeshistorically.This contentiousproposition rests upon the neglected consideration that human reproductionis inseparablefrom human consciousness ...

the strong historical tendency ...

to see

reproductionas 'pure'biologicalprocesscarriesthe implication that reproductionis all body without mind. O'Brien, thus, claims that her analysis is biological but not biologistic,

i.e., not biological-determinist,and, moreover,that this is due to the fact that it is historical.Theseare herclaims:the realityof heranalysis contradictsthem. O'Brien fails to bridge the nature/historygap because she fails to make the natural(biological)reproductiveprocess 93

hypaia historical.Her theory on contraceptionis a result of this flaw in her analysis. Thus, in order to introduce history into reproduction, O'Brien extemporaneously introduces the technological element which, as has been shown above, conflict with the rest of her analysis. O'Brien's mishandlingof the question of biology leads her into the view of reproductionwhich she criticizes,namely, one which opposes nature to history and which suggests, against her own views, that womenmustovercometheirnaturalconditionas childbearersin order to become feminists. I have said that both O'Brienand Beauvoirfail to give a historical accountof biology. ThoughBeauvoirclaimsexplicitlythat biology by itself is not a sufficient factor to explain the domination of women underpatriarchy,otherpassagesbelie this assertion.Thus, thoughshe says: Biology is not enough to give an answerto the question that is before us: why is woman the other? (Beauvoir 1953, 37) and, Thus we must view the fact of biology in the light of an ontological, economic and psychological context. (Beauvoir1953, 36) She also makesopenlydeterministicstatements,such as that "woman is doomed to the continuationof the species" (Beauvoir1953, 429). O'Brien'sattemptto reinterpretthe date of biology from a feminist perspective,does not take her much further. Some feminist authors (Hardingand Byaya 1982, 361-363) claim that she is successful. In what follows I take the opposite view. O'Brien states that reproduction is a historical phenomenon. However, of the ten different moments of the reproductiveprocess whichshe presents,seven are heavilybiological.O'Brienmakesno attempt whatsoever to explain how they can be historical. She, moreover,does not attributechildrearingany import in the development of reproductiveconsciousness5.The reproductivemoments,accordingto O'Brien, are the following: menstruation,ovulation, conception, gestation, labor and birth, copulation, nurtureor childrearing and, finally, alienationand appropriation.The first six are purely female moments;the seventhis shared;nurtureis, by and large, only female; the last two are, in this view, male reproductivemoments. O'Brien does not offer us a historicalreadingof these moments; yet, such readingis necessary. Clearly, menstruationis viewed very differentlyin 20th centuryUSA than it was viewedin the colonial era. 94

reyes lzaro Speakingof menstruationin generalas an abstractunchangeablemoment within the reproductiveprocess intimatesthat it has a value in itself, which somehow applies cross-culturallyand transhistorically. Similarlygestation, for example, can, under certain conditions, be empoweringfor women. It can confer on them, for instance,political power or prestige or moral status within a specific community. However, underdifferentconditions-such as those which prevailin most currentsocieties-gestation can be a liability.O'Brienfails to explain that. Thus in her analysis, as in Beauvoir's,reproductionends up being biological "in a crude sense." Moreover,her disregardfor childrearingshows that her analysisis more groundedon "crude biology" than she herselfis willing to admit. Even though she includesit among the moments, she practically ignoresit in her analysis. However,nurtureis the one momentwhich is less groundedon biology. It is also one which, as opposed to the first six, can also be experiencedby males. Most feminist theorists who have analyzedmotherhoodattributeto it extremeimportance, preciselybecauseof its historicity,which allows them to go beyonda crude biologicalapproach. Besidesbeing biologistic,O'Brien,like Beauvoir,bases her analysis on the ahistoricalpremisethat women'sdominationis due to a universalprinciple of consciousness. Beauvoir claims that woman has always

been definedin oppositionto man; she is "the other." As she puts it, "He is the subject, he is the Absolute-she is the Other" (Beauvoir 1953, xvi). She furtherstates that this is due to the universalprinciple that says: "The category of the Other is as primordial as consciousness itself" (Beauvoir 1953, xvi). She adds, as pointed out above, that women have become 'the other' due to theircapacitiesas reproducers.O'Brieninvokesanotheruniversaland ahistoricalprinciple of human consciousness,that it resistsalienation. Both O'Brienand Beauvoirconceiveof consciousnessahistorically. The consequencesof their views are quite discouraging,in political terms. If males are compelledto searchfor an other, as Beauvoirhas it, and if, on the otherhand, womenare the best candidatesbecauseof their reproductiverole, then women will always be seen as inferior, unless they renouncechildbearingaltogether.Similarly,if males are, on the one hand, both biologically doomed to alienation and metaphysicallycompelledto overcomeit and if, on the other, the oppressionof women is the only meansby whichmalescan overcomeit, then the conclusion is equally obvious and disturbing: men are metaphysicallycompelled to oppress women. These universalprinciples close the door to a solution other than withdrawal from reproduction.If, on the contrary, male compulsion to control the 95

hypatia productof humanreproductionis based on reasonswhich are social, not metaphysical,then we can provide a much more all-embracing analysis. Such analysiswould allow for a more wide-rangingscope of political action. A historizationof O'Brien's views requiresa concrete analysis of the relations between the process of production and the process of reproduction6.It is absolutelynecessaryto show that the principlethat male consciousnessyearnsfor artificialcontinuityis not metaphysical but grounded on real, material needs. It is a fact that males have claimed their right to their offspring throughout much of history. However,this needto appropriatechildrenmustbe explainedin terms of the needs which it satisfies within a specific mode of prodution, ratherthan in metaphysicalterms. It can be arguedthat in societiesin whichkinshipis the way to ensurea social networkwhichsatisfiescertain materialneeds-such as economic and sexual needs, a need for social bonding, etc.-men need to control women's reproductive capacities.In certainsocieties, for instance,the desireto acknowledge paternitymay come from the fact that childrenare necessaryas labor force; they might also be necessaryin order to take care of their parentsin their old age, and so on. The advantageof the approach suggestedhere over O'Brien'sis that the formerallows us to account for changes in male attitudes with respect to paternity. Such an analysis can explain, for example, the current voluntary disengagementsby males in twentieth century USA from the appropriationof children. It can be arguedthat in societies where the state has taken over the role of the offspring in taking care of their parentsand where, besides, childrenare not useful as a labor force, men tend to disengagethemselvesfrom paternity.The progressiveincreasein single-motherhouseholdsin the US supportsthis hypothesis. O'Brien'smetaphysicaluniversalprinciplecannotprovidean explanation for cases such as these since, accordingto her, the need which malesexperienceto mediatetheiralienationthroughpaternityapplies universally. A feministanalysiswhich wants to escape biologism must account for the fact that the data of biology are differentlyvaluedin different societies. Beauvoir'sclaim that biology is not a sufficient reason for the dominationof women should be given much more attentionthan she herself gives. There is nothing inherentlygood or bad in the capacityto bear children;rather,society assignsa value to it and differentsocietiesassigndifferentvalues. A shovel in the handsof an independentfarmer, for example, is a tool which advancesher/his efforts towardsindependentproduction;however,the sametool used to producefood for the feudal lord is part of an oppressiveproduction 96

reyes lazaro process which limits the possibilitiesfor independentproductionof the peasant.In a parallelfashion, havinga body whichbearschildren has differentimplicationsfor a femaleslavethan it has for herlady. A woman who is free to choose or reject motherhoodhas a different relationshipto her body than one who is forced-the degreeof force can varylargely,from social pressureto sheerviolence-to reproduce. It follows from this that if, as O'Brien contends, process and consciousnessof processare inseparable,we cannot any longer speak of one reproductiveconsciousness,as she does; we must speak, instead, of reproductiveconsciousnessescorrespondingto differenthistorical and cultural conditions. The reproductiveconsciousnessesthat are formed under patriarchy, I want to argue, are-at least partially-alienated. This leadsus into the thirdsection. We havedismissedas biologistic O'Brien's claim that women are not alienated in reproduction.In what follows I hold that O'Brien'snotion of alienationin reproduction-which, according to her, applies only to males-must be expanded. In particularI argue that she needs to incorporateto her theory Beauvoir'snotion of alienationas lack of control, both over reproductionand over society. At the same time, her own views on male alienationas separationfrom continuitywiththe species mustbe retained,althoughreformulatedand expanded. I want to argue that both males and females can be alienatedin reproduction.Males are naturally deprived from a sense of continuity with the species; females, on the other hand, lack control both over their bodies and over public affairs.

III Beauvoirpoints out two differentaspectsof women's alienationin reproduction.In the first sense, women are alienateddue to a lack of control over theirbodies; in the second sense, they are alienatedfrom social control. Womenare alienatedfrom theirbodiesboth biologically and socially. Biologically, there is a certain sense in which a woman's body is beyond her control, unless she uses contraceptive technology.Beauvoirpoints out this first senseof femalereproductive alienationas follows, . . .instead of integratingthe powerful drives of the speciesinto her individuallife, the femaleis the prey of the species. (Beauvoir1953, 375) This biological condition, however, does not explain the fact that women lack social control over their bodies; for most women, the 97

hypatia decisionto becomemothersis more a matterof social pressurethan a free decision. Nor does it explainthe fact that women are deniedparticipationin the public spherebecause of their role in reproduction. Becauseof theirreproductivecapacities,patriarchyassociateswomen with nature and then nature with the irrational,and uses this identification to justify the denial of entrance in the public sphere to females and their domination by 'rational'males. Biological alienation does not doom women; moreover, contraception allows heterosexualwomen to control their bodies. It is the patriarchal historicalinstitutionof motherhoodthat dooms women, in the second and third senses, since all women are culturally associated with motherhood,which is underestimatedin most cultures. Beauvoir, thus, distinguishestwo aspects of reproductivealienation, one biological,one social. The problemwith herargumentis that she equatesboth and concludesthat both kindsof alienationaredetermined by biology. As a result, as pointed out above, her emphasisis contradictory:statingon the one hand, that biology is not a sufficient reason to explainthe dominationof women, and, on the other, that "the fundamentalreason" for women's oppressionis "her enslavement to the reproductivefunction" (Beauvoir1953, 117). While she initiallycondemnsthe patriarchaldenigrationof female reproductive capacities,ironicallyshe falls into a biologicaldeterminismwhichimplies such a denigration. A political, strategicreason compels O'Briento criticizeBeauvoir and offer an alternativeexplanation.O'Brienattemptsto recoverthe richness of female reproductiveconsciousness,which male thought has relegatedto the realm of irrationality.She criticizesBeauvoirfor eliminatingmotherhood from her project for female liberation. In O'Brien'swords: De Beauvoir falls into the trap of subjective determinism,just as she succumbsto the more seriousfailure to relate female authenticityto reproduction.(O'Brien 1981, 74) In this sense, she is right: Beauvoir'sdeprecationof motherhoodis a clearcase of 'bad faith'7.In her attemptto avoid Beauvoir'smistakes, however, O'Brien throws away the baby with the bath water. She denies the double sense in which motherhoodcan trap women. She says, "What does it mean to be trapped in a natural function?" (O'Brien 1981, 20). O'Brien correctly argues that Beauvoir simply reformulatesthe traditionalview that women are doomed by biology. She says that Beauvoir accepts this premise but alters the traditionalconclusion; 98

lazaro reyes I,~zaro

reyes

thus, whereas traditional thought infers that women cannot participate in social life, Beauvoir concludes that they must repudiate motherhood. O'Brienfurtherarguesthat it is thepremisethat womenare naturally trappedin childbearingthat is wrong, not the conclusion. She is correct in that the premise that women are naturally alienated misrepresents the problem; however, O'Brien's conclusion that women are not at all alienatedin reproductionis wrong: women are socially alienated. O'Brien's and Beauvoir's notions of alienation complementeach other. O'Brien'sdefinitionof alienationis both extremelybroadand narrow.She defines it as "separationand the consciousness of negativity" (O'Brien 1981, 52). This definition is too vague. Withrespectto the reproductiveprocess,however,O'Brienapplies it in a veryrestrictiveway. Alienationwithinreproductionmeans for O'Brienexclusivelythe separationbetweensexualityand parturition which only males experience.This peculiarinterpretationallows O'Briento deny the fact that women are alienatedin reproduction. Reproductionis not simply an option for most women. Biologically, it is a compulsionfor women who are heterosexuallyactive, unless she has the 'unnatural'means to avoid it. Furthermorethe goal of motherhoodis culturallyimposed on women:8A woman is brought up, first by her mother and then by teachersand society in general, knowing that motherhoodis expectedfrom her. Thus, most women lack control over their reproductivecapacities. This estrangement from the controlof one's own body, is not a naturalalienation,but it is a type of alienationnonetheless. It is hard to understandthe fact that O'Brien brushes away the alienation factor in reproduction.This major hole in her analysis becomesmanifestwhenshe feels compelledto acknowledgethat, with respectto reproduction,men are 'in some sense' more free. In herown words: Men are free both in the sensesof freedomwhichliberal thought has developed:there are positive and negative aspects of paternal freedom, freedom from and freedomto. Men are awareof parenthoodbut free from reproductivelabor. Theyare also free to choose paternity. (O'Brien 1981, 52) How is it, then, that she considerssuch a lack of freedomon the part of women non-alienating?O'Brien provides a very unsatisfactory answer:she rendersmale freedomproblematic.She claims that men are, on the one hand, free to choose paternityand, on the other, metaphysically compelled to acknowledge it. Thus, they are, 99

hypatia accordingto O'Brien, "forced to be free." In her words, "This is a furthercontradictionfor, of course,to be forcedto be free is to render that freedomproblematic(O'Brien1981,52). This explanation,which is consistent with her account, does not explain away the fact that women are neither free from nor free to reproduce.From the claim that males are not free in reproductionit does not follow that women are. As mentionedbefore, Beauvoirbelievesthat females are alienated in reproductionin a double sense: first, they are pressuredto become mothers-thus lackingcontrol over reproduction-and, second, they are relegatedto the privatesphere.O'Brien'sdefinitionof alienation does not apply to either of these situations. On the one hand, O'Brienacknowledgesthe fact that patriarchyexploits women's reproductivecapacitiesand that it relegateswomento the privatesphere;but, on the other hand, she believesthat patriarchal oppressionand the prevalentsocial views about reproductiondo not affect femalereproductiveconsciousness.This is inconsistentwith her claim that process and consciousnessof process are inseparable. Our consciousness does not arise in a vacuum; it is socially constructed.Similarly,women's reproductiveconsciousnessis formedin the midst of specific social valuations of motherhood, which create theirperceptionof motherhood.In this respect,Beauvoir'sanalysisis much more sensitive: she acknowledges the fact that the female reproductiveconsciousnesscan be alienated, because many women come to see themselvesin the way in whichthey are viewedby society.9 There is a sense in which males are alienatedin reproduction:the fact that they cannotbearchildrencuts them from a part of reproductive experience which can be immensely enriching. In this sense, womenhavebeen biologicallygiven an option whichmen lack. On the other hand, the fact that men, by and large, do not participatein childrearing,is an equally important source of male alienation. A broader notion of alienation is necessary, which combines both O'Brien's and Beauvoir's. This new inclusive notion of alienation opens politicalperspectivesthat did not exist in eitherone of the two previousnotions. In fact, the only politicalmeasurewhichcomes out of Beauvoir's analysis is that women must renounce childbearing. O'Brien,on the other hand, excludesmen from the reproductiveprocess and minimizesthe social implicationsthat motherhoodhas for women. My alternative unified perspective maintains that motherhood,i.e. childrearing,concernsmalesas well as females,since both sexes can be alienatedin the reproductiveprocess. Thereare no simplesolutionsto the problemof reproductivealienation, as shouldbe clearby now. Technologyprovidesa partialsolution 100

reyes lzaro to female natural alienation: contraceptionallows women to overcome biology and achieve a natural control over the body. Technology,althoughit is not a universalpanacea,opens unsuspected in fact not doors which are potentially-although necessarily-liberating.'° On the other hand, participationas equal childrearersin the reproductiveprocesscould allow malesto achievea feeling of "continuitywith the species," assumingthat we redefine this value as a social ratherthan a metaphysicalneed. On this view, males are alienated in reproduction not merely becausethey do not gestate, but also because,they do not participate in childrearingby and large. A participationin that process would allow men to make up, at least partially, for their separationfrom speciescontinuity.Co-parentingcould help destroythe devaluationof women which results from their being associated with motherhood. Finally, if we acceptthat women's reproductiveconsciousnesscan be alienated, then feminism must perform a criticism of such a consciousness: only after a feminist critique can reproductive consciousnessbecome incorporatedinto feministtheory. Many patriarchalmechanismsare internalizedby women in the mothering process. Feminist psychoanalysis points out some of them." Feminist theory faces the task of dismantlingthe works of patriarchywithin reproductiveconsciousnesswhile, at the same time, pointingout the feministpotentialwithinit-for example,the potential for a non-patriarchalkind of thought (Hartsock 1983;Whitbeck 1984; Ruddick 1984). Female reproductiveconsciousness, I have arguedhere, is not feminist per se. A final point. The narrowlink which O'Brienestablishesbetween feminism and motherhood is prima facie disturbingfor those who, like Beauvoir,are awareof the perversewaysin whichpatriarchycontrols women's reproduction.On the one hand, I firmly agree with O'Brien's attempt to reclaim for women the capacityto reconstruct biology-which is always socially constructed 2--in a feminist key. However,I also believethat her focus on motherhoodis too restrictive and too acritical.With respectto the first point, O'Briendisregards entireaspects of women's lives-such as sexuality,women's position in the sexual division of labor-which are absolutelyrelevantfor the developmentof a feminist theory; as to the second point, I have attemptedto show here that her notion of a superioruniversalfemale reproductiveconsciousness is too biologistic and romanticized;it underestimatesthe fact that, underpatriarchy,such consciousnessis partiallyalienatedand that it mustbe subjectto a feministanalysis,in order to actualizeits feminist potential. 101

reyes Azaro

Notes 1. Most feminist writers on motherhood can be classified along the O'Brien/Beauvoir lines: Nancy Hartsock, Sara Ruddick and Catoline Whitebeck represent the positive approach (for Ruddick and Whitbeck, see Trebilcot ed. 1984; for Hartosock, see Harding and Hintikka ed. 1983). Shulamith Firestone (1971) offers a radical version of Beauvoir's approach. 2. Both O'Brien and Beauvoir claim to be doing something very different from what they actually do in their respective analyses. Both criticize biological determinism; however, their analyses are deterministic. This complicates an exposition of their arguments greatly. 3. In a personal communication, Christine DiStefano suggested to me a different reading of O'Brien's notion of male alienation. In her interpretation, O'Brien is not saying that men experience sexuality as disconnectedfrom reproduction, but that male experience of reproduction itself is disconnected. If correct, this new reading would invalidate some of the criticisms to O'Brien's argument presented in this paper. I believe, however, that my interpretation is supported by textual evidence. 4. O'Brien pushes the disanalogy so far as to claim that males, not females, are doomed by biology. She says, "Men are necessarily rooted in biology, and their physiology is their fate" (O'Brien 1981, 192). 5. Most feminist thinkers who hold that there is a specifically female viewpoint/thought/consciousness give childrearing a primordial role in its development. See Ruddick and Hartsock. 6. Zillah Eisenstein (1979) provides an analysis of this sort. Martha E. Gimenez (1979) and Ann Ferguson (1984a) offer a similar approach. 7. O'Brien paraphrases Beauvoir's existentialist concept of 'bad taith' as tollows: ".. accepting the measuring of an individual existent's experience in the light of another's values" (O'Brien 1981, 76). 8. Sociologist Martha Gimenez argues, against the Reproductive Rights movement, that speaking of reproduction as if it were a right for women obscures the fact that most women do not have freedom of choice as to whether they want to become mothers or not. Gimenez quotes sociologist Judith Blake: "People make their 'voluntary' reproductive choices in an institutional context that severely constrains them not to choose non marriage, not to choose childlessness, not to choose only one child and even not to limit themselves solely to two children" (Gimenez 1984, 288). 9. Mary Lowenthal Felstiner points out that The Second Sex starts with an exposition of the patriarchal myths-biological, historical, literary, psychological-which surround motherhood in order to indicate that such myths precede and conform the image that women have of themselves. Felstiner (1980, 248) poses the question: "Why did she [Beauvoir] choose this sequence which emphasizes man-made myths and history before it focuses on women's experience?"; she answers that, according to Beauvoir, it is because "women imagine themselves in response to being imagined." 10. Linda Gordon's (1979) analysis shows that contraception under patriarchy is not necessarily liberating for women. 11. It follows from Chodorow's (1978) analysis, for example, that it is much harder for females to develop an autonomous sense of self (see also Flax 1978). Dinnerstein (1976), on the other hand, suggests that children of both sexes inevitably project hostility onto the mother because she cannot meet their insatiable demands. 12. As biologist Ruth Bleier puts it: ". .. the historical and ethnographic reality is that the significance of woman's biology, of her reproductive capacity, is itself culturally constructed" (Bleier 1984).

102

janet farrellsmith Possessive Power The concept of possessive power as it manifests in reproduction is the focus of criticism in this paper. The analysis utilizes both positive insights and illustrative mistakes from Beauvoir's account of maternity. An alternative notion of power is proposed to replace possessive power as proprietary control.

Introduction Possessive power, the power to claim what is "mine or "ours," goes deepinto the rootsof humanpersonalityandculture.Claimedover persons, it is the-often-corrupted-expression of the normalhuman need to belong, to be relatedintimatelyto someoneor somethingwho carriesoneself outside the self and into the future. But the sense of "mine" whichexpressesbelongingand connectionoften gets boundup with the sensewhichexpressesproprietarycqntroland possession.This proprietarycontrol, whichinvolvesdominatingpower, is the focus of my criticismhere. To say that somethingis "mine"is also to say in most casesthat it is alienable.Whethersuchalienabilityalso involvesalienationis a question raisedby Simonede Beauvoir.For reasonsthat have much to do with possessivepower,Beauvoirconsiderswomen'sreproductivebiologyand motherhoodbasicallyalienating.I arguethat, whileBeauvoir'sthesisis historicallydescriptiveof woman'sstatusas "the other," this does not mean that woman'sbiologicalnatureis inherentlyalienating. In constructingan alternativeviewof powerin procreativesituations, I take up some of Beauvoir'spositiveinsightsabout possessivepower, namelythat it is impossibletrulyto possessanotherperson.Childbearingitselfcannotbe a creativeact, in at leastone sense,becausewe cannot reallycreateanotherhumanbeing. Each person must be allowed the freedomto createthemselves. Despitecontradictionsin possessivepowerin oursociety,certainbasic elementsin possession,namelypreservationandprotection,yielda basis for modifyingthe notion. Sucha modifiednotionmay be usefulon the politicaland legal level to protectreproductiverightsand familialintegrity,subjectof courseto constraintson parents'arbitrarypowerover offspring. Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Janet Farrell Smith

103

hypatia I Basic Concepts Possessive power can be provisionallycharacterizedas fpllows: it is the powerto call a thing or person "mine" (or "ours") and (a) to retain it or themwithinmy (our)domainof decision-making,interestor control;and (b) to have a connectionwith it or themby social convention or biologicalreproductionsupportedby social conventionwhich other personsdo not have in the sameway, and wherethis connection is one of "belongingto me (us)" or beingtied to me in some exclusive or uniqueway. Condition(b) holds by virtueof some sociallygrounded practice.In other words, the mereclaim that somethingis "mine" is not adequateto groundpossessivepower, which is not to be taken as a "state of nature"but is alwayssocially formed(cf. Laslett 1963, 13). Collectivities(families, clans, communities)may hold possessive power, but for the sake of simplicitythis paper considersmainly individualpossessivepower. WhenVirginiaWoolf claimed"a room of one's own" as a precondition for creativework she drewon notions associatedwith sense(a). Whenpersonsapplythe terminologyof "my" or "mine" to othersin their care they draw on sense (b), and sometimesalso expressa sense of responsibilityas well as belonging. The power to call something 'mine' is not deservingof globalcondemnation,as thesetwo examples show. Possessive power, on the other hand, does call for a negative valuationwhen either (i) I use my possessivepower over a person to justify my own existenceand directtheirs, as Beauvoirarguesin her commentson inauthenticmotherhood(SectionsII and V, below), or (ii) possessivepowerleadsto dominatingpowerover personsin a way which oppressestheir humanity, constrainstheir abilities or undermines their development(SectionsIV and VI, below). The notion of possessivepoweris connectedto the social institution of property.' Propertyin contemporarywestern democraciesis not simplya materialthing, but a complexset of phenomenaconsistingof relations, interests and rights (cf. CB MacPherson 1973, 136ff). Possessivepoweris a kind of dominatingpower in the sense that it is power over things or persons, in contrast to power in the sense of energy,competence,development,or cooperative,activatingrelations among persons(Hartsock1974, 1983, ch. 9, 10). Whilethe above notion of power is provisionallydescribed as a characteristicof individuals or collectivities, it must be noted that power itself is not simplya characteristicpredicatedof someone,but "a complexfield of shiftingrelations"withina givensociety(Foucault1972, 1982;Fraser, 1981).In orderto comprehendthe workingof powerwe mustscrutinize 104

janet farrell smith not just the individualwhich exerts it or is subject to it, but the network of relationswhich manifeststhe whole phenomenon. The many levels in the notion of possession-ontological, social, political, psychologicaland legal-are intertwinedin a given culture. Possession will show markedvariation among culturesespeciallyin symbolicand expressivemeanings.Here, my focus is on the concept as it occursin the westerntraditionsincethe 17thcentury.In addition, an examinationof forms of powermust take into accountdifferences in social structurein various historicalperiods as well as genderdifferences within these periods. For example, during the time John Locke was writingin Englandin the 1600's,the fatherheld possessive power in the family by his control over his progeny's occupation, monies, etc.2 The father's possessive power was then a kind of proprietarycontrol by rightwhereasthat of the mother,who lackedpropertyrights,was one of responsibilityfor herchildren'semotionaland characterdevelopment,as well as their physicalcare. Withinparenting these genderdifferencesin possessivepower are crucial Alienabilityhas typicallybeen takenas one characteristicof property. It is importantto define its neutralphilosophicalsense in contrast to alienation which immediately conveys a negative evaluation.3 Alienabilityis the capacityto "make other" or to "make separate" that whichwas once a partof oneself, or belongedto oneself (e.g., one can give away, sell or lease propertywhichbelongsto oneself). This is the capacityfor alienabilityof property.Alienationimpliesa making other, where the other stands in a negative or hostile relation to oneself or wheresome negative,estrangingcondition occursin social relationsor in oneself.4 Merealienabilityneednot implythis negative,estrangingcondition, as for example, when farmersin tribal societies make alienablethe fruits of their labor by exchangingtheir grains for salt or meat. In a more fundamentalsense, humangenerativitymanifestsalienabilityin its root meaningof 'makingother'. The creationof sculpture,musical compositionsor mathematicaltheoriescan be seen as 'makingother' what was once a part of oneself, as in externalizinga creativeidea or impulse.Humanreproductioncan also be takenas alienabilityof procreativecapacityin this root sense. It is the makingof separatehuman beings what was once a part of the self through the processes of childbearingand childrearing.But this is not to say tht human procreation is inherently alienating in the sense of producing estrangements.Biosocialmodesof procreationin differenterascan be more or less alienating(i.e. estranging)dependingon the underlying cultural and material conditions which allow for lesser or greater human and humanecontrol of these processes. 105

hypatia

II Beauvoir's Philosophical Viewpoint "The very concept of personal possession," says Beauvoir, "can be understood only with reference to the original condition of the existent," namely the "whole person" (Beauvoir 1953, 62).5 She appeals to two significant elements of this "original condition." First is the inclination of the subject to think of himself or herself as "basically individual, to assert the autonomy and separateness of his existence." Possession, on Beauvoir's analysis, is a means to carry forth this subjective feeling into the objective, practical world. In creative work, made visible in property, the individual finds "courage to see himself as an autonomous, active force, to achieve self-fulfillment as an individual" [62]. But even this urge to individualize oneself is not enough to explain property and its attendant concept of interest. Beauvoir claims that a second condition, namely alienation, is necessary: "The existent succeeds in finding himself only in estrangement, in alienation; he seeks through the world to find himself in some shape, other than himself, which he makes his own." Only by recognizing this estranging relation can man's interest in his property become an "intelligible relation" [63]. To see the full significance of Beauvoir locating alienation both in possessor and possessed, we must understand how her philosophical perspective informs her analysis. Her central view is that activities which are freely chosen "projects" lift the human subject above the mundanity of life. Following Sartre, she calls engagement in these projects "transcendence." Without this striving toward liberty, which is achieved only through a "continual reaching out for other liberties," human life "falls back into immanence, stagnation," and "degradation of existence into the 'En-soi,'-the brutish life of subjection to given conditions-and of liberty into constraint and contingence" [xxxiii]. Such was the nature of life for woman bound to her reproductive functions under the domination of patriarchy, especially in ancient times when she was reduced almost to the status of an animal, according to Beauvoir. Because engagement in projects requires authentic choice in freedom, and reproduction under patriarchy allowed woman no choice, woman "in maternity . . . remained closely bound to her body, like an animal," whereas for man, "the support of life became ... an activity and a project through the invention of the tool" [73]. Activities imply projects which are chosen as an assertion of liberty. Facticity, in contrast, implies failure to go beyond the given 106

janet farrell smith circumstancesof one's life, and an inabilityto asserthumanvaluesfor one's life above these circumstances,i.e. what Beauvoir calls 'immanence' [73].6

Authenticityand choice are preconditionsfor freely chosen projects. These elements are notably missing from woman's traditional reproductiverole. It is not incidentalthat after emphasizingauthentic choice in her Introduction, Beauvoir begins her chapter on Motherhoodwith a discussionof the importanceof woman's ability to choose birth control and abortion [540-55].Authenticexistencein Beauvoir'sterms is not to be found in any fixed essence or nature, "but with self-creation through choice." Since most of women's traditionalpracticeshave been chosen for her ratherthan freely by her, this philosophicalemphasis "helps to explain why women's activity has been (rightly,in her opinion) (Gardiner1983, 7) devalued." The theme of 'the other' is central to Beauvoir'sanalysis in The Second Sex. She follows Hegel in finding "in consciousnessitself a fundamentalhostility toward every other consciousness;the subject can be posedonly in beingopposed-he setshimselfup as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential,the object" [xx]. Although Beauvoirappearsnot to rejectthis fundamentalviewpointthroughout The Second Sex, we can say that she regardsit as capable of being mitigatedif not overcome in the authenticachievementof Mitsein. Mitsein('being-with')is true reciprocitybetweenhumanbeings. In Beauvoir'sterminologyin TheSecondSex the makingof woman into "the other" impliesnot only alienabilitybut alienation,whichis the sourceof women'sculturaland social estrangement.Beauvoirexplicitly connects "dominatingactivity" with the "subordinationof natureand woman," in particularthe controloverwoman'sreproductive and maternalactivity.Chief amongthese formsof dominatingactivity is man's sense of transcendencesecuredthroughthe networkof propertyrelationswhichprojectshis senseof himselfbeyondthe limits of his finite life [92]. The materialon which this dreamof transcendenceis realized,accordingto Beauvoiris woman's body and her reproductivecapacity. Beauvoir accepts Engels' thesis that the passage from community ownershipto privatepropertyinvolved the enslavmentof woman to the service of the patriarchalfamily, though she is critical of how, precisely, this transition occurred. Engels also "assumes without discussion the bond of interest which ties man to property," an assumption Beauvoir thinks is inexplicablewithin the confines of economic explanation[62]. 107

hypatia

III Beauvoir on Woman's Biology and Maternity Beauvoir'sdiscussionin TheSecondSex revealsspecificwaysin which possessivepoweraffects women'sexperience.Part of her revelationis deliberate and critical. Part is unwitting. For the first part, her awarenessof historicaland culturaleffects of propertyrelationssupports her thesis on how woman-as wife and mother-has been cast into the role of "the other." For the second part, her discussion of the so-called "naturalfunctions" of reproductivebiology and maternity, presents her view that they are a form of alienation. She apparentlyconsidersthis alienationinherentor essential,even claiming at one point that "maternityas a natural phenomenonconfers no power." In her discussion of woman's reproductiverole this view seems definitive, despite her denial that the biological facts about women "establishfor her a fixed and inevitabledestiny" [29]. Beauvoir'soscillationbetweenthese two viewpointscan be seen in The Second Sex. The theme of alienationof oneself from one's body and one's reproductivecapacities emerges very strongly from the following passages in which Beauvoir gives her own picture of women's experienceof the menses, pregnancyand birth: "Woman, like man, is her body; but her body is somethingotherthan herself." "It is duringher periods that she feels her body most painfully as an obscure, alien thing" [33]. "Woman experiencesa more profound alienationwhen fertilizationhas occurredand the dividing egg passes down into the uterus." "True enough, pregnancyis a normalprocess,whichif it takes place under normalconditionsof health and nutrition, is not harmful to the mother ... however, gestation is a

fatiguing task of no individualbenefitto the womanbut on the contrarydemandingheavysacrifices[33], "Nursing is also a tiring service" [34]. "The conflict between species and individual, which sometimesassumesdramaticforce at childbirth,endows the femininebody with a disturbingfrailty. It has well beensaid that women"have infirmityin the abdomen"; and it is true that they have within them a hostile element-it is the species gnawingat their vitals" [34]. "Here we find the most striking conclusion of this survey: namely that woman is of all mammalian creatures(female) at once the one who is most profoundly alienated" [36]. (Emphasis added through above quotes.) 108

janet farrell smith It is truly remarkablethat one of the major feministtheoristsof the mid-twentiethcenturycould paintsucha negativeportraitof woman's experienceof her body, her reproductivecapacitiesand capacity to give birth. Whataccountsfor it? Beauvoirhas said that motherhoodis a classically enslaving role for women, even today. Society gives women the bulk of the responsibility,but little support.7 One could also take the view that Beauvoir is describing motherhood still under patriarchal dominaton. However, as MarguriteDuras remarks, "even if men (or social conditions) are responsiblefor this enslavingform of motherhood,is this enough to condemn maternityitself?" (Cahill 1982, 10). While we can understand Beauvoir'spoints on the oppressiveand alienatingaspects of motherhood,it is also importantto look at the deeperreasonsfor her portrayal. These, which I discuss in the next section, concern her underlyingphilosophicalviews on human biology and gender. IV

Critique of Beauvoir on Maternity As Beauvoirhas remarkedin recentyears, she would have taken a more historicaland materialistapproachto her theses in The Second Sex. Indeed,we can isolate two basic mistakesin her originalposition based on its insufficiently historical perspective. The first is a philosophicalmistake. The second is a social or historicalmistake, due to herunderestimatingthe powerwhichwomenhavederivedfrom motheringeven if this is sometimesdistortedby oppressiveconditions. The 19th centuryview of motherhoodin the U.S. took it as "the highest office a woman could attain." This view did indeed restrict women and made access to public leadershipvery difficult. Nevertheless it carried with it a recognition of moral superiority and demandedsocial attention. Even if, today, we regard this ascribed moral superiorityas a dubious distinctionborn out of social restriction, it did at least give women an edge they could exploit to theiradvantage (Cott 1977, Showalter 1971). It was also a source of selfesteem. On the philosophicalaspectsof Beauvoir'stheses, considerherview that alienationis inherentin women's biological nature. Her reasons for takingthis position are, first, that she attributespossessivepower over women's reproductive capacities to a generalized "species-drive."This mistake lies in taking what is a social notion, namely alienation, and locating it within nature, in this case the generalizednatureof the specieswhichhas possessivepower over the inner natureof woman. 109

hypatia But naturealone does not "possess." Humanbeingsinterpretit as possessing. Beauvoir's view results from the failure to realize that possession,like liberty,is a humannotion built up out of sociallyconstructed values and belief sysems. Her notion of alienation is thus flawed by its inadequatesocial components. In addition, Beauvoirimplicitlydrawsa master-slavedialecticinto the female body and its reproductivecapacitywherethe speciesdrive is the masterelementand the woman's inner, biological natureis the slave or servant element. The trouble with this assumptionis once again that it imputes a social structureto the basic characteristicsof natureor biology (Hubbard1982).This aspectof her argumentcan be seen in her discussionof pregnancy In pregnancy,on Beauvoir'sportrayal,the universalagencyof the species-drivebecomesfocusedin the form of the fetus: "Pregnancyis above all a drama that is acted out within the woman herself .... The

fetus is part of her body and it is a parasite that feeds on it; she possesses it, and she is possessed by it" [553, emphasis added].

Althoughpregnancyappearsas a kind of creation,the bringingforth of a "new life which is going to manifest itself and justify its own separateexistence," Beauvoirremarksthat it is a "strange kind of creationwhich is accomplishedin a contingentand passivemanner" [553]. The woman becomes subject to the process, as an object. She appearsto fit Hegel's definition of the servantstatus [73]. The positive side of the "ambiguoussignificance"of pregnancyis the potentialof the flesh for transcendence,as Beauvoirputs it, namely a "stirringtowardthe future"in the form of newlycreatedlife. The mother-to-benow experiencesherself, not as object, but as a "human being in herself, a value." She has undertakena project, the creation of a child. But this impressionthat one has undertakena project, as Beauvoiremphasizes,is an illusion. There are two basic reasonswhy woman's impressionthat she has undertakena creativeproject in childbearingis an illusion according to Beauvoir.One, dealingwith humanlibertywill be discussedin the next section. The other has much to do with possessivepower: The pregnantwomanhas come to the equivocalrealizationthat "herbody is at last her own, since it exists for the child who belongs to her.

Society recognizesher right of possession and invests it, moreover, with a sacredcharacter"[554, emphasisadded]. But this realizationis equivocal, because as Beauvoirobserves, "she does not really make the baby, it makes itself within her" [554]. Beauvoircould also have reasonedthat the illusorinessof projectingoneself onto a childcarries the remnantsof the propertyrelationwhich she has alreadyasserted alienates the existence of the possessor "onto his property . . . it can 110

janet farrell smith be his [sic] beyond death only if it belongs to individualsin whom he sees himself projected,who are his" [92]. Now I would agreewith Beauvoirthat reproductivesocial relations are permeatedthrough and through in our culture with possessive power and various other evidenceof propertyrelations. But she has misconstruedthe originand the characterof thesepossessiverelations by failing to emphasizetheir social source which she then projects upon an asocial 'nature.' This projectionis, I think, partiallydue to Hegel, whose metaphysicsappearsto influenceBeauvoir'sontology.8 In ThePhenomenologyof Mind Hegel positeda differential"nature" for the female and male genders (cf. Landes 1982). Whereas the masculineprinciplein the form of the husbandassertsits individuality in the civic realm, the femininefeels a generalized,not an individual, allegiance"to a husband,to childrenin general,not to feeling, but to the universal"(Hegel 1931, 476). Hegel is explicit about the lack of autonomy and particularityin woman's traditonalrole (Hegel 1931, 477). Similar assumptions about gender can be found in Beauvoir's philosophyof biology, especiallyin her descriptionof women'sstruggle for individualitypittedagainstthe generalizeddriveof the species.9 Just as Hegel held that the traditionalwoman, bound into her biology and familyties, does not riseto an individualizedconsciousnessof the ethicallife, so, for Beauvoirsuch a womandoes not riseto the level of authenticaction in projectsundertakenin liberty. Beauvoirstressesthe obstaclesto realizingauthenticlibertywithin woman's biological condition, thereby accepting an implicit nature/cultureduality. Woman's reproductiveactivityis confined to the former. This view of course drops out the enormityof women's work involved in childrearing,domestic, agriculturaland nurturantaffective areas. These factors, in which women's activity is crucial, renderreproductionin the humanspeciesirreduciblysocial (Ferguson 1984a). Beauvoir's discussion of woman's psychology exhibits hints of a similarly conservativestance. She frequentlycites Helene Deutsch whose views on women'spassivitywerestronglyinfluencedby Freud, and whose account might have quoted Hegel on woman's "inherent implicit inwardnature" (1961, 476). However, Deutsch's views contradict Beauvoir's own view that woman's nature is a created phenomenon,not a constant. Similarly,psychoanalystsMalkahNotman and Carol Nadelson point out that "femininity itself (and masculinity as well) is a shifting and variable concept, intimately related to woman's awarenessof the capacity to bear and nurture children, but not invariably dependent on this capacity for self111

hypatia realization" (Notman and Nadelson 1984, 40). Contemporary feminists have criticized Beauvoir's views as masculinist, rationalist, and based on competitive individualism (Hartsock 1983; Culpepper 1985; Ehrenreich 1978).'° The deeper reason for their dissatisfaction lies in the following philosophical premise: Beauvoir's primary criterion for liberty is located in the selfchosen and self-determined projects. But, by both her Hegelian view of gender and woman's biology and her background psychological theory, it follows on Beauvoir's view that woman's peculiarly female activity, namely that connected with her reproductive capacity and biology, cannot achieve such liberty and is condemned to facticity. Hence, Beauvoir's only consistent line of reasoning is to affirm the liberation of woman by projects which have traditionally been identified with male activity. For examples, see Simons (1984). The solution to this bind is not necessarily to drop the theory of liberty and woman's overcoming the status of the 'other,' but to revise the background theories and the practices associated with them. This is not a simple project. It involves re-structuring a notion of autonomy as well as one of power. In the next section I make some brief observations on how contemporary psychological theory has begun such a reconstruction. In sum, Beauvoir can be criticized for failing to take the positive potential of women's experience as the centerpiece of her theory, and for acceding to an implicit theory of power as dominance within her analysis of reproduction. She does recognize another kind of power, but this does not figure strongly in her analysis of woman's biology. In some ways one could say that she takes the most distorted and oppressed aspects of women's reproductive experience, aspects which are real historical experiences, and mistakes these for an inherent condition of human (woman's) nature. Adrienne Rich (1976) has clarified the matter by distinguishing between the institution of motherhood, which is (or can be) oppressive, and the experience of motherhood, which itself has the potential for beauty and joy. We must therefore recognize clearly that the sources of oppressive conditions are cultural and historical, rather than inherent conditions of nature. V

Beauvoir's Argument on Inauthentic Motherhood Beauvoir denies that childbearing is a truly creative act in her sense of authentically created values. She argues that the mother cannot give the created object-in this case, the child-an essential value by her (the mother's) act of childbearing, even if she undertakes it freely. 112

janet farrell smith This is because what the mother brings forth is another human being. And each human being must give themselves, by themselves, for themselves, the authentic reason for their own existence. To attempt to do otherwise is to attempt to impose possessive power upon another human being. And a human being cannot be possessed without the very result of alienation which Beauvoir has so vividly described in woman's subjugation to patriarchal systems. The child, in other words, cannot justify the mother's creative project, because the child is the sort of creature which must justify its own existence:" A mother can have her reasons for wanting a child, but she cannot give to this independent person, who is to exist tomorrow, his own reasons, his justification, for existence. [554] Beauvoir has stated here what I think is a positive insight about mothering, parenting and nurturing children. Her point could apply not just to the birth mother but to any parent who cares for a child. It is also worth stating that Beauvoir is not denying that bearing or rearing a child could be creative in any way. She would of course affirm this point. What she is denying is that authentic creative activity can result from making another human being my "project." Beauvoir has said that one cannot create one's own value in a child because this is to wrest from the child the opportunity to create his or her own values. The catch, of course, is that a child is not an "independent person," but a dependent creature, especially in infancy, who requires years of physical care and emotional nurturing to become a fully human person. So how is it, one could ask, that true reciprocity between subjects, as Beauvoir characterizes Mitsein, could occur between mother and child? Or between any nurturing adult and child? How is it possible to overcome elements of the master-servant struggle for dominance, a tendency which surely threatens to invade all relationships in societies patterned on dominating power? Beauvoir says: "It is possible to rise above this conflict if each individual being freely recognizes the other, each regarding himself and the other simultaneously as object and as subject in a reciprocal manner [158]. If this condition, which Beauvoir calls Mitsein, or being-with others, cannot be immediately and fully realized with a very young child, it is at least possible to lay its foundations in an environment of care which recognizes the integrity of the child's needs and its growth towards independence.12 A clinging "love" manifesting on the psychological level a claim to possessive power leads to an inconsistent pattern of attention on the parent's part and undermines such growth to independence. 113

hypatia These observationson possessivepowerapplyto other love, friendship and familial relations as well. In fact, Beauvoir stresses that "possession can never be positivelyrealized" [213]. "In truth," she says, "one neverhas any thingor person;one triesto establishownership in a negativefashion. The surestway of assertingthat something is mine is to prevent others from using it" [174]. Jealousy, which could be characterizedas the attemptto keep others away from the loved one, is, accordingto Beauvoir,insatiable.It is so because"Even if all others are forbidden to dip therein, one never possesses the springin which one's thirstis quenched:he who is jealous knows this full well" [213]. Theseinsightsimplya contradictionin the verynotion of possession in human relations. To insulatea loved one from othersis to underminetheircapacityto relatein a reciprocalmannerto oneself and thus to frustratethe very aim of possession. In order to possess, I must makewhat I possess 'other,' or else the relationof possession(i.e. this belongs to me) could not occur. On the other hand, the impulse to possess is an impulseto appropriate,to make somethingor someone my own.13 The impulse to possess simultaneously distances or separateswhat is 'other,' i.e. 'not-me,' in orderto effect the relation of possession to me, and then appropriatesthat 'not-me' or other, back into what is 'mine,' i.e. myself and its extension. In this dialectical contradictionlies another reason why possession is ultimately frustrated. Issues of autonomymay be crucialfactors in precipitatingexercise of possessivepower over others, particularlyover offspring. Gender differencesoften occur here. A man in the traditionalmasculinerole may exertpossessivepowerbecause,assuminghis autonomy, he feels he has the prerogative. On the other hand, a woman who exerts possessivepowermay be compensatingfor her felt lack of autonomy. Similarly,lack of a sense of autonomy may be a factor in persons' allowing themselvesto be subjectto possessivepower. In such situations,what would be a neutralalienabilityin reproductive situations often becomes alienation. Without the psychological, or as Beauvoirmight (rightly, I think) say, ontologicalgroundingof an establishedself, woman'screationof a new life becomesa process precariouslyvulnerableto another's control. At least the woman's sense of this processwithinher experiencemay more likely be a sense of being possessedby forces outside herself.'4She is not participating in a processin which she is the centralhuman factor. Beauvoirmakesautonomy, understoodas independence,a precondition for her sense of exercising liberty or engaging in projects. However, she criticizesthe isolating sense of autonomyas that which 114

janet farrell smith propels individuals to extend their interest into property. In a corresponding sense, we may distinguish (a) autonomy as independence of the self, an independence which still allows the self to establish intimate and reciprocal relations with others; (b) autonomy as the boundaries of an isolated and separate self which impedes the self in establishing intimate and reciprocal relations with others. Autonomy in sense (b) has been associated with male development, whereas sense (a) has been identified by psychologists as more closely paralleling woman's development. Gilligan's third perspective in women's moral development, the self-in-relation-with-others, more closely describes Beauvoir's sense of the independent woman engaging in reciprocal relations with others, than does the usual philosophical sense of autonomy as self-legislation (Gilligan 1982, Ch. 3). These senses of autonomy, however must be understood in connection with the power structure in the larger society. Jane Flax, for example, describes female conflicts regarding autonomy and nurturance. What often emerges as a mother's possessive power, e.g. a controlling activity over a son, or a clinging, symbiotic closeness to a daughter, results, perhaps as compensation, from factors which include women's lack of power in the culture. As Flax puts it, the child perceives that men are valued and women are devalued, that the mother is held in lower social esteem than the father (Flax 1976, 173,177). These observations signify that possessive power in its distorted or alienated form is itself a symptom of a more deeply rooted malaise. The problem comprises among other things, a gender-differentiated power struture in the society. This power structure takes the form of a hierarchy in which women are subordinate. Its effects are felt in the concept of self and in self esteem. In a female-devaluing culture, female sexuality is often denied or ignored, and hence the female selfconcept, including woman's sense of efficacy, energy, and esteem for her body and reproductive capacity, suffers. This in turn affects the quality and drive behind women's contribution to society, as well as woman's experience of herself and its consequences in mothering. Two dangers thus threaten the autonomy [in sense (a) of autonomy] of both the mother and the growing child. One is the possibility of what Beauvoir has called immanence, the lack of authentic selfcreation. The other is the possibility of domination in the form of possessive power intruding into the encounter between two free human beings. Liberty is impossible on the former, while Mitsein or true reciprocity is undermined on the latter. If Beauvoir had put more stress on the social roots of alienation in the parenting relationship, particularly the effect of possessive power on women, she would have 115

hypatia been better able to articulate an alternative concept of maternal power, i.e. one which has its historical and ontological basis within women's culture. Such an alternative concept would also incorporate her notion of reciprocity.

VI Alternate Concepts of Power and Maternity Dominating power operates over persons, whereas cooperative or energizing power operates among, rather than over, persons. There is an enormous power in motherhood, but it is not accurately characterized by a notion of dominating power. Under a notion of power as creative energy (Gilligan 1982), "effective action" (Hartsock 1983), or "a capacity to implement" (Miller 1976), however, women's power emerges more clearly.'5 The power in woman's procreative capacity is of a different sort from dominating power. It is the power to create and nurture life, a power which is necessary to the reproduction of life. The mother has enormous power to give or to withold nourishment and therefore survival, which sustains the reproductive processes of society itself (Rich 1976, 44-52). Such power is not merely biological. It is also social. The relation between mother and child is the first relation between human beings. It is not only the first psychological and physical relationship, but the first social relation between two human beings, or, if you prefer, between two beings, one of whom is in the process of being socialized. Creative or energizing power includes "the strengths of interdependence, building up resources and giving, . . . which characterize the mature feminine style," as these are portrayed in the myths of Persephone and Demeter in the ancient Greek Mysteries (Gilligan 1982, 22). These qualities, characteristic of groups of persons rather than separate individuals, are rarely recognized in discursive philosophical analyses of power, but they are preserved in the culture through the symbolic expression in myth and literature. They are a neglected, but central part of the meaning of power.'6 Both the mystery which lies at the core of creation of life and the tremendous power woman has by participating in this process are recognized by Beauvoir in her chapter on Motherhood. Here she is more inclined to recognize the positive potential of maternity. Beauvoir appeals to mythic symbolism when she recognizes the "mystery of the incarnation" which "repeats itself in each mother." Beauvoir points out that "The mother lends herself to this mystery but she does not control it, it is beyond her power to influence what . .. 116

janet farrell smith will be the true nature of this being," herebyexcludingdominating power and proprietarycontrol from authenticmaternalpower [555]. Beauvoirhas, therefore,despiteher negativeview of women'sbiology and reproductivecapacity, provided crucial insights into possessive power and human relations. On the social-historicallevel Beauvoir has accurately described many distortionswhicharise from possessivepower, even though she has misidentifiedtheir source in some cases as inherentlybiological. Thesedistortionsincludethe woman'slack of freedomand autonomy and the subsequentdegenerationof humanrelationsinto dominating power over others. On the ontologicallevel, Beauvoirhas argued,correctlyas I see it, that no humanbeing, even a helplessinfant, can becomeanotherperson's project.A projectcreatesthe reasonfor one's own existence.No one can do that for anotherhumanbeing. A personcan derivea sense of identityfrom devotingtheir lives to educationor nurtureof others in a compassionatemanner.But that does not make the humanbeing one nurturesthe project. These two levels, the ontologicaland social, are closely connected. When authenticself creationis denied in social life the temptationis strongto seek a substitutefor it, to cling to or dominatethose around one in a possessivemanner,or to allow oneself, like Ibsen'sNora, to be directed,howeverbenevolently,by another. One way to lessen the dilemmas of possessive power, if not eliminatethem completely,is to reclaimpossessivepower in its root notion of preservationand survival.'7At the same time, we would keepin mindthat the affectiveties whichbond peopletogethershould not fall prey to possessiveand dominatinginfluences. Then, on the politicallevel, to claimpossessivepowerin the senseof retaining something in my domain of decision-making,interest or control, [sense(a) above in SectionI]might be to retainreproductive rightswithinindividualdecision-making.Examplesmightbe the manner in which women give birth. Or the custody of childrenwhen it is threatenedunjustlyby othersor by the state. Theseclaimsdrawon the originalsense of possessionas a claim or right to exclude, expecially where unjustified intrusion would underminethe cooperative and joint survivalof woman and child or of families. Ratherthan relyingon an individualisticnotion of interestand an atomisticsocial philosophy(Taylor 1979), however,the notion of interestwould be revisedto includethe interdependenceof social beings whose sense of themselvesdepends on their relationswith others. A notion of joint and interdependentinterestrejectsthe narrowview of self-interestand emphasis on freedom from dependenceon others. 117

hypatia Each of these views is presupposed in the western tradition of possessiveindividualism(MacPherson1962, 263). We can now returnto sense [b] of possessivepowerstatedin Section I; The power to have a connectionwith personsby social convention or biologicalreproduction,wherethis connectionis one of "belonging to me" or beingtied to me in some uniqueway. On the view suggested here, a new kindof powerwouldbe to claimfor ourselvesand othersa sense of belonging, in relationships, families and communities, withoutimposingupon othersour reasonfor theirexistence.In other words, the attempt to avoid the estrangingconditions of making 'other,' or imposing one's own project upon the life of a child (or lover, spouse, familymember)is the attemptto avoid the dehumanizing effects of possessivepower. Beauvoirhas vividlydesribedthe pitfalls of such attemptsin her argumenton inauthenticmotherhood.Of course, she does not condemnall motherhoodto inauthenticity,nor all forms of intimateattachments,but only the kindswhichattemptto find the reason for my existencein your existence. On our modifiedapproach,the uniquetie betweenparentand child for example,could remain.Such a tie facilitatesthe developmentand growth of children.But it would not allow the arbitraryexclusionof others(i.e. the possessiveexclusion)from the social worldof the loved one. It would preclude the arbitraryexercise of dominatingpower wherethis underminesthe developmentof persons. To redefinesuch a notion of possessivepower is to bring it within the social interestsof preservation,growthand survival.Preservation and growth, as Sara Ruddick points out, have historically been characteristicof maternal practice.'8For the interest of profit we could substitutethe interestof preservationand survival.For the interst of appropriationwe could substitutethe humanecontinuationof the life cycle. We might then find a model for humansocial relations in maternalpractice free from the influences of possessive power, namely cooperativesocial relationshipssupportingthe development of self and others.'9

118

janet farrellsmith

Notes I. For a discussion of how a property model, that is, a cluster of rights and in-

terests,affectsthe family,see my "Parentingand Property(FarrellSmith1984).In that article I argue that a property model is ethically deficient when applied to fathering or mothering. 2. Locke argued that such "paternal power" should cease with adulthood. 3. One difficulty in distinguishing alienability from alienation lies in their frequently overlapping terminology in the English language, e.g. the verb "to alienate" is used for both notions. Nevertheless they are distinct philosophical concepts and should not be conflated. 4. For example, consider Marx's characterization of the worker: "The life he has given to the object confronts him as hostile and alien" (Marx 1967, 290). The notion of alienation here owes much to Hegel, as does, I believe, Beauvoir's notion of alienation and the other in The Second Sex. Alienation of persons from themselves and from other persons is the third aspect of alienation in the 1844 Manuscripts. 5. Hereinafter, page references to this work follow in brackets within the text. In the above quote, I have taken the liberty of changing Beauvoir's "whole man" to "whole person", because I wish to stress the consequences of women as well as men standing in relations of possession. 6. The contrasting concepts of transcendence and immanence imply a duality on the social level which some, including myself, have trouble understanding. Here I emphasize Beauvoir's notion of freely chosen projects and creativity rather than transcendence. 7. Beauvoir speaks of her own personal esape from "many of the things that enslave a woman, such as motherhood and the duties of a housewife." She advises women to be on their "guard against the trap of motherhood and marriage. Even if she would dearly like to have children, she ought to think seriously about the conditions under which she would have to bring them up, because being a mother these days is real slavery. Fathers and society leave sole responsibility for the children to the mothers" (Schwarzer 1984, 36,73). 8. Beauvoir could be interpreted as following a typically Hegelian dialectic in her analysis of women in her reproductive role subject to patriarchal systems. First, there is the stage of women being "sunk in nature," to use Hegel's phrase. For Hegel this is a "happy consciousness" in simple unity. For Beauvoir, woman in this stage appears as a bound and miserable consciousness, stuck in repetitive maternity, devoid of choice and authentic activity. The second stage is woman as 'the other,' with all the cultural overtones of estrangement from patriarchal culture which she describes. In the third stage, if we take her vision of liberation seriously, this alienation of woman as 'other' can be overcome in true reciprocity with other human beings. This third stage can be realized only if woman ceases any complicity with what perpetuates her devalued status and realizes her liberty by seizing the opportunity to create her own independent projects. See Hegel 1931, Ch. 6. 9. See Margaret Simons (1984, 352) for an analysis supporting this view. She interprets Beauvoir as leaving her work describing women's experience "without adequate philosophical foundation," and as devaluing female experience, e.g. Beauvoir's comment that the male activity of warfare is superior to giving birth. My interpretation on the other hand sees Beauvoir as implicitly drawing upon Hegelian assumptions about women's experience. Beauvoir attributes an inherent lack of individual to peculiarly female activities, i.e. those which involve female reproductive function, such as childbearing.

119

hypatia 10. These views need to be supplemented by a greater awareness of Beauvoir's ontological viewpoint, e.g. she stresses individuality, but explicitly criticizes the institution of private property and its attendant individualism. 11. On the notion of establishing one's own existence, we might compare Heidegger's notion of Jemeinigkeit ("I, myself") in Being and Time: "Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine." But this first-person existence is found also in being-with-others; "In the end an isolated 'I' with Others is just as far from being proximally given" (Heidegger 1962, 150, 152). 12. For example, one element of successful mothering or parenting with very young infants is the ability to recognize and respond to the infant's needs (feeding, sleep). Although this may not constitute reciprocity in the sense of two equal adult beings it does provide a basis for reciprocity in the sense of respect for the other's needs, a basic condition which can be met either with an infant or with an adult. 13. Jacques Derrida speaks of property and possession as appropriation. In French, he uses "Propre" to emphasize the appropriation to oneself. See his hermeneutical discussion of Nietzsche in Derrida 1978, 109ff. 14. Fumiko Enchi's novel Masks (1983) explores women "possessed" by spirits outside their control. My thanks to Carol Gilligan for this reference. 15. These notions bear a resemblance to MacPherson's notion of developmental power of persons "as the ability to exercise and develop their human capacities," as distinguished from "the power to control others" (1973, 50). See also the critical analysis in Gould 1980. 16. In societies like the Iroquois, woman's political importance was marked by respect for women's agriculture. "The earth was thought to belong to women which gave them religious title to the land and its fruits" (Sanday 1981, 25). This sense of 'belonging' clearly differs from the western European notion of private property, a concept the Iroquois did not have. 17. Locke originally defined 'property' as the right which all human beings have to things necessary for their subsistence. This right is distinguised from the individualized property which a person comes to have from the common gift (Locke 1963, Ch. 5). One need not appeal to natural law to return to those notions. The point is to broaden the notion of property from the narrowing to material possession which it received after the 17th century. 18. See Ruddick 1984. In place of her third maternal interest, acceptability, I would emphasize instead survival, which under certain conditions might include acceptability. It is also distinct from preservation, e.g. one might preserve the life of a child, who nevertheless does not develop the psychosocial and physical skills to survive then or later. 19. My thanks to the editor and referees of this issue of Hypatia, as well as to E. Kuykendall and C. Watson for helpful suggestions.

120

anne donchin The Futureof Mothering: Reproductive Technology and Feminist Theory An exploration of (I) alternative perspectives toward recent innovations in reproductive technology: support for new techniques for the sake of the kind of feminist future they facilitate; unqualified opposition despite therapeutic benefit to individual women; or qualified opposition depending upon specific threats to women's interests and (II) relationships between these positions and values bound up with mothering practices.

The nurse said I would have to show you, but you reachedright for my breast. You suckledright away. I rememberhowyougrabbedwithyoursmallpursedmouth at mybreastandstarteddrawingmilkfromme, howsweet it felt. How could anyone know what being a mother meanswho has nevercarrieda child nine monthsheavy underherheart,who has neverbornea babyin bloodand pain, who has never suckled a child . . . What do they

knowof motherhood? ConnieRamos,a motherof our time. It was part of women'slong revolution.When we were breakingall the old hierarchies.Finallytherewasthatone thingwe hadto giveup too, theonlypowerwe everhad,in returnfor no more powerfor anyone. The originalproduction:the powerto give birth.Causeas long as we were neverbiologicallyenchained,we'd neverbe equal. And malesneverwouldbe humanizedto be lovingand tender. So we all becomemothers.Everychildhasthree.To break the nuclearbonding. Luciente,a 'mother'from a possiblefuture. Connie'sdialoguewith Lucientetakesplacewithinthe imaginativeter-

ritory explored by Marge Piercy in Woman on the Edge of Time (1976,

105-106).Hers is a culturallyandrogynoussociety based on feminist values and organized about a commitment to the extinction of all systematicsex-roledistinctionsand the eliminationof biological Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Anne Donchin.

121

hypaia reproduction by females. Instead genetic material taken from human males and females is stored in 'brooders' where it is fertilized and the embryos are grown until ready for birth. The bond between genes and culture is deliberately broken. Knowledge of genetic origin is obliterated. Still the citizens of Luciente's world remain divided over the desirability of genetic intervention. They watch for birth defects, for genes linked wth disease susceptibility, but they do not yet breed for selected traits. The 'shapers' among them push for selective breeding; the 'mixers' "don't think people can know objectively how people should become." They see the 'shapers' proposal as a 'power surge' (Piercy 1976, 226). The breeding practices adopted in Piercy's utopian society bear a remarkable resemblance to the reproductive arrangements instituted in Aldous Huxley's dystopian Brave New World (1932), though in this imaginative future, not only eugenics, but dysgenics, as well, is practiced systematically. In their laboratories they gestate both biologically 'superior' embryos and, in far larger numbers, biologially 'inferior' embryos which are subjected to the Bokanosky Process (ninety-six identical twins from a single ovum) and treated prenatally with toxins. When decanted they are barely recognizably human, but are useful in performing unskilled work and, with appropriate conditioning, can be relied upon to docilely follow the commands of superiors. Reproduction has been brought wholly within control of the state. Since Huxley's dystopian fantasy appeared, the feasibility of such a world has drawn increasingly nearer to us. Researchers have made substantial strides in both genetic research and reproductive technologies. Artificial insemination has become a commonplace occurrence. In vitro fertilization and ovum transfer, though only marginally successful, are widely practiced. Economically disadvantaged women are readily available to serve as surrogate mothers for a modest fee. When mastery of the processes of extra-uterine gestation is achieved, they will be dispensible too. Already extra-corporeal membrane oxygenation (an adaptation of the heart-lung machine) is being applied successfully to infants weighing even less than one kilogram (Bartlett 1984). Once the functions of the placenta have been successfully mimicked, perpetuation in vitro to viability (ectogenesis) will render the biological process of pregnancy technically obsolete. Though the mere fact of technological feasibility might suggest possible development within either a Piercean or a Huxleyan social framework, subsequent achievement of effective political control over larger, more diffuse populations than even Huxley envisaged only sharpens the vision of the more portentous future. And were extrauterine gestation to become available, the potential for such a concen122

anne donchin tration of political power would be immeasurablyenhanced. Those who control the instrumentalitiesof power would command the means to bring either futureinto being. If women's long-terminterestsare to be representedin determining the future directionof reproductivetechnology, women will need to participatecollectivelyin shaping public policy. Unfortunatly,there has been too little discussion among women about either the fundamentalvalues at stake or the social goals that would best promote women's well-being. Though many feminist writers have expressed concern retrospectively about the increased dominance of medically

controlledchildbirthtechnologiesand some have pointedto the direction in whichprevailinginterestsare pushingreproductivetechnology, this discussion has taken place in virtual isolation from both the general context of feminist theorizingand the backgroundof social theory with which feministtheory is intertwined.'Thereis need now to integrategrass-rootfeminist concernsabout medicallycontrolled reproductionwith feministtheorists'attemptsto reconstructthe social frameworkof women's collective past and draw out connectionsto possible feministfutures.We need to think collectivelyabout the sort of social policy that would best servewomen's most fundamentalinterests:whetherthe capacityto give birthis of such paramountvalue that no social aim achievablein any technologicalfuture could supplant it; whetherall technologicalinnovationsin reproductivepractices should be opposed despite their therapeuticbenefit to some women individually;or if specific technologicaladvances might be supportedstep by step until their deleterioussocial effects become clearlymanifest. In the following pages I should like to sketch out a framework within which such a feminist dialogue might proceed. First, I shall briefly discuss the utilizationof reproductivetechnologieswithin the present social context, then describethe principalethical and social positions regardingemergingreproductivetechnologies, considering the social values and policy alternativesimplicitin each position, attemptingto ferretout the implicationsof these developmentsfor the interestsof women. Next I will raise some conceptualand theoretical questionsabout the veryidea of a utopianfeministfuture,considering first, the argumentsof feministtheoristswho have taken exceptionto the sort of utopiananalysisShulamithFirestoneoffers and then those feministcommentatorswho share Huxley's dystopianprognosisof a future where the bond betweenpregnancyand procreationhas been severed: Finally, I will contrast their positions with the utopian feministsin order to better understandthe basis of presentfeminist reactionto reproductiveinnovation,whetherit stemsprincipallyfrom 123

hypatia reservationabout the nature of technologicalinterventionitself or from fears about the more probable consequencesof such a technological future. I will end with some observationsabout the presuppositions underlyingtheoreticaldifferencesamong feministsand suggest an interimcourse of action to meet the presentsituation.

The Present Social Context Although Great Britain and Australia have establishednational commissionsto investigatethe ethical and social implicationsof the new reproductivetechnologies and recommend appropriatesocial policy, in the United States the development and utilization of reproductiveinnovations is left to the discretionof individualsand physicians.Though there has been some considerationat the federal level of ethical issues involving in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, the Ethics Advisory Board which undertookthis work was disbandedafter submittingits initialreportin 1979.Though federally supportedresearchinto these processescannot proceed without the approval of the disbandedcommittee, both private researchefforts and commercialmarketingof new reproductivetechniquescontinue to go forward with virually no ethical constraintsother than those researchersthemselves choose to impose.2 Individuals seeking to benefit from the fruits of reproductiveresearch are left free to negotiatewith individualphysicianssubjectonly to the constraintsof privateconscienceand economic resources.In instancesof artificial insemination, a low-tech 'cottage' industry, medical and economic constraint virtually fall out and individual choice becomes the exclusivedeterminant.Recipientchoiceis limited,however,by available information which lies principally within the control of 'donors' (more accurately'sperm vendors,' since in most instances they are paid for their product). Because of possible legal liability their anonymityis usuallyprotected.Though most recipientswould prefer to receivespermfrom geneticallyscreeneddonors, access to such informationis frequentlydenied them. Wherewomen attemptto procure spermthroughnon-medicalchannelsfrom known donors, they risk the possibilitythat the donor may later claim paternity. Hence some controls are desirableboth from the perspectiveof those seeking to suppress the dissemination of reproductive technologiesaltogetherand in the interestsof unmarriedand infertile womenwho hope to benefit from reproductiveinnovations.The principal issues, then, centeraroundthe natureof these controls and the goals towardwhich they are to be directed.Would women's interests be better servedby continuingalong the presentfreewheelingcourse 124

anne dJ,,hin that maximizes'reproductivefreedom,'limitedonly by the capacityto find a cooperativephysicianand by the patient's ability to bear the cost of the service?Or should the availableoptions be limitedby circumscribingchoices, either at the level of service deliveryor in the process of furtherresearchdevelopment? Both of these positions are defendedby their supportersas options which maintaincontinuitieswith social and political traditions.One emphasizes individual freedom; the other gives centralityto traditional patterns of reproductionand parenting. However, emphasis upon individualistic values tends to push in the direction of technologicalinnovation.Attentionto the focal role of the biological family in social organization,in effect, subordinatesindividualinterestsand would suppressunfetteredtechnologicaldevelopment. Social reactionsto innovativereproductivepracticesdivideroughly into threecamps:the noninterventionists,who questionthe advisability of any practicewhich tamperswith either nature's way of doing things or traditionalsocial institutions;the moderateinterventionists, who give primacyto reproductivefreedomwhile acknowledgingthat some weightshouldbe attachedto othervaluesas well;and the radical interventionistswho divide into two distinctivefactions: those who support advances in knowledge of reproductiveprocesses for their own sake without regardto possible technologicalapplicationsand those who favor reproductive research for the sake of the technological future such researchwill facilitate. Advocates of the first versionof the radicalposition are to be found principallyamong researchersand some philosopherswho arguethat we shouldpush the frontiers of knowledge forward now and concern ourselves about undesirableapplicationsonly as the need becomes manifest.3Most conspicuousamongsupportersof the secondversionare MargePiercy and her model, ShulamithFirestonewhose 1970work: TheDialectic of Sex: TheCasefor FeministRevolution,first focusedfeministattention on the political significance of reproductivebiology. Ursula LeGuin's fantasy: The Left Hand of Darkness (1976) and Joanna RussTheFemale Male (1975) also borrow their centralthemes from Firestone'sproposal. All look with favor upon reproductiveinnovations which free women from their traditionalbiological role.

The Noninterventionists Among the most eloquentand articulateof the noninterventionists is Protestant theologian Paul Ramsey, who participated in the deliberationsof the now defunctEthicsAdvisoryBoard.He objectsto all forms of reproductiveinnovation other than medical or surgical 125

hypatia treatmentof infertility(Ramsey1972).In supportof his positionhe offers three arguments.(1) It is a violation of the receivedcanons of medicalethics to expose a possible human being to any unnecessary risk. Since a merelypossiblehumancannot grantconsent, thereis no grounduponwhichit is morallypermissibleto jeopardizeits futurewell being. (2) The properrole of medicineis the correctionof 'medicalconditions,' such as infertility.However,if there are no remediesfor the physicalconditionitself, then it is not appropriateto intervenefurther. (3) Procreationand parenthoodare 'coursesof action' appropriateto humansas naturalobjectstowardwhoman attitudeof 'naturalpiety'is appropriate.They cannot without violation be disassembledand put together again. Instead we should work accordingto the functions operatingin the whole of the naturalorderof whichwe are a part. Increasingmasteryover naturebringsincreasedpowerover humansand even greaterrisk of abuse. Each of Ramsey'sargumentsincorporatescontroversialpresuppositions: (1) that the canons of medicalethics are extendableto merely possiblehumans,and (2) that medicine'sproperfunctionis the reversal of a physicalcondition.Manyphysicaldeficitscannotbe reversed,but wherethe functionis highlyvalued, ways are found to circumventthe incapacity,e.g. prostheticlimbs, or eyeglasses,etc. Manywomenexperiencesterilityas suchan incapacity.Havinglearned from infancy to associatefemininitywith fertilitythey look upon their barrennessas a mutilation. The apparenteagernessof many women to endure considerablepain and suffering at the hands of technologicalexperts in an often futile attempt to bring about a pregnancycannot be understoodapartfrom this largersocial context. Othersfully intendto bearchildrenbut arevictimsof 'familyplanning' technologiesor environmentalpollutantsinjuriousto theirreproductive capacities.The social obligationto such women cannot be dismissed merelyon the ground that patient desire is not the properobject of medicalintervention.That argumentfails to speakto the morallyrelevant featuresof the situation.4 Ramsey's final argumentis complex, incorporatingpresumptions about both the placeof humansin natureand the tendenciesof human nature.Thereare seriousambiguitiesherewhichmeritcarefulexamination. It is not clearwhy the bare fact that somethingis naturalshould give it any moral weight. Why moral force shouldbe attributedselectivelyto normalprocreationwhilehumanintervention,say, in the useof respiratorsfor prematureinfantsis unquestioninglysupportedcalls for furtherexplanation.Forsuchan appealto natureto standit wouldhave to reston some otherground,possiblythe fearthat humanpowerover reproduction,in particular,would invite seriousabuse.5 126

anne donchin Despite the fragmentarycharacterof Ramsey'sargumentsthey do point to severalwidely sharedconcernsabout the directionin which reproductiveinnovationis leadingtechnologicallyadvancedsocieties. His allusion to a relationshipbetweenpower over natureand power over humans, in particular, captures a concern widely shared by feminist critics of technologicalinnovation, a theme which I shall return to later and examine in detail within the context of feminist criticism. Leon Kass, a physician and influential writer on medical ethical issues, also frameshis principalobjectionto reproductiveinnovations on traditionalistgrounds, but unlike Ramseywho sees the principal threatin the violationof 'nature,'Kassemphasizesvaluesattachedto humanrespect.However,his notion of 'respect'bearsthe markof an origin closely linked to Ramsey'sconceptionof 'nature.' Though he claimsthat what is at stakeis the idea of the humannessof humanlife and the meaningof humanembodiment,these conceptionsappearto borrowtheirmeaningfromtheiraffinity with social practicesassumed to be naturallygiven ratherthan socially derived. On the basis of these assumptionsKass favors legislativeintervention to regulate the dangers of in vitro fertilization and embryo transferwhich, he argues,"erode fundamentalbeliefs, values,institutions and practices"(Kass 1979). He proposesthat the use of embryo transferbe restrictedto the marriedcouple from whom the embryo derivesin orderto sustaintraditionalbondsamongsexuality,love and procreation. Like Ramsey, Kass proposes that furtherresearchbe restrictedto the treatmentof infertilityor othermeasuresthat supportthe desireto have a child of 'one's own' (by implicationpresupposinga distinction betweenlegitimateand inappropriatedesires).He opposes use of embryos in investigativeresearch,donationto other couplesor commercial transactions(such as surrogatemotheringarrangements),claiming that such practicesviolate the traditionalhumansense of our sexual nature and the experienceof relatednessto our ancestors and descendants. He, too, fears the concentration of power such technological developments would place within the control of researchersand special interests, but his fear, unlike Ramsey's, is couched within an appealto culturalpracticesratherthan to nature. However,sincehis culturalarrangementsseeminglyowe theirauthority to what is 'natural'the differencesbetweenthem are not so greatas would first appear. ThoughKass is undoubtedlycorrectin observing that certain innovative practices, were they to become widespread, would threatenpresentconceptionsof historicalconnectedness,it is not self-evidenteitherthat such innovationswould be widelyadopted 127

hypatia or that prevailingnorms are more desirablethan any that might supplant them. Moreover, there are other well established traditions whichtend to give primacyto individualautonomousdecision-making over collectivesocialinterests,traditionsfrequentlyappealedto by advocates of innovativereproductivepractices.

Moderate Interventionists The right to procreateis firmly imbedded in the Westernliberal tradition. However, the desire to have a child of 'one's own' is not harboredexclusivelyby couples as pairs, as Kass' view suggests, but may extendto individualsone by one. Noel Keane(1981),6an attorney involvedin facilitatingsurrogatemotheringarrangements,relatesthe story of a 59 year old lawyerwho came to his office. He and his 61 year old wife had no children.She had been infertilethroughouttheir marriage.He had plannedto leave his estateto his niecesand nephews but then becameintriguedby the renewedpossibilitythat he mightstill be able to will his propertyto a child of his own. He asked Keaneto find a couple willing to assist him. The wife would be artificiallyinseminated with his semen and bear his child. He would guarantee financial arrangementsfor the child and provide for its education. Keane pursuedhis requestand made suitable arrangements.He has also established a surrogatemothering agency and is lobbying for legislativereformthat would facilitatelegal enforcementof surrogate contracts.7Decisions either to support such individualisticpractices within the law or discourageoptions of this kind will have an important bearing on future social policy determinations,marking the boundarybetweenthe permissibleexerciseof personaldesireand the sphereof collectivesocial interests.Thoughthe desireto pass on one's genetic endowment seems a predominantly male preoccupation, women's interestsin bearingand rearingchildrenoutside the institution of marriagemight also be servedby a social policy that allows individuals free space to construct alternative childrearing arrangements. However, the legal advantages presently available to marriedcouples, such as Keanerepresents,are not so readilyextended to the unmarriedwho seek to fulfill comparabledesires. Recentjudicialdecisionshave repeatedlyaffirmedthe 'right'of individuals,at least within marriage,to control their own reproductive activity.This freedomis takento be derivedfrom the rightto privacy, to a domainwithin whichindividualsmay pursuetheirown life plans with a minimum of societal interference.Supportersof innovative reproductivetechnologies are by implicationadvocatingapplication of these individualisticnorms to an increasinglybroader range of 128

anne donchin circumstances.Extension of the scope of reproductivefreedom to gratificationof a desire to parent (either biologicallyor socially) by technologicalinterventionis highlyproblematic.Legalrulingssupporting reproductive freedom have leaned principally on rights of noninterference,on the liberty not to procreate. However, at issue here, is legal support for service demandedfrom other parties. In such instances,the use of innnovativetechnologiesis likelyto impinge on otherpersons'rightsof noninterferenceand on othersocial values, some that are preconditions for the very exercise of personal autonomyand othersthat would commandcomparableweightin any just social ordering. George Annas, in testimonyto the U.S. House of Representatives Committeeon Scienceand Technology(U.S. 1985), recentlypointed out that if childrenresultingfrom such techniquesas surrogateembryo transfer(to a woman other than the egg donor) and the use of frozen embryosare to be adequatelyprotected,governmentwill have to interveneinto the arenaof humanreproduction.Failureto regulate privatecontractualagreements,he argues,jeopardizesthe integrityof the family and threatensthe interestsof children.The claimsof some infertile couples, he contends, are outweighedby the interestof the potentialchild. For the sake of protectingthese interestshe advocates legal action: (1) defining maternityand paternityat the moment of birth, preservingthe current legal presumptionthat the gestation motheris the legal motherso that it will be conclusiveand cannot be overriddenby private contractualarrangements,and (2) protecting the human embryo from commercialexploitation by restrictingthe freedomto use frozen embryosto the purposespecifiedby the donors (Annas 1984). The WarnockCommissionReport incorporatescomparablerecommendations. However, some object to the modesty of such regulatoryrecommendations, particularly those noninterventionists who accept Ramsey's and Kass' arguments in defense of early embryos and traditonalconceptionsof the family. Some feministsreach the same conclusions,too, though for other reasons.They fear furthererosion of women's decisionmakingpowers if reproductivetechnologiesare allowed to proliferateso freely. Radical Interventionists Incorporationof Marge Piercy's thought-experimentinto consideration of policy options for the more immediatefutureshould promote us to consider more carefully the grounds for hesitancyto support reproductiveinnovations, where what is principallyat issue is the natureof the activity itself or fears about the likely consequencesto 129

hypatia follow. Luciente,Piercy'sprotagonistfrom Mattapoisett,her utopian feministworld, readilyacknowledgesthat the institutionof their new reproductivearrangementsrequiredwomento relinquishthe powerto give birth. However, they judge the benefit well worth the sacrifice since all power relationshave been abolishedas well. Within such a social context the choice seems obviously sensible. There is reason to wonder, though, whether such a social frameworkis plausible, or even intelligible?Apart from the obvious difficulty in understandinga set of social circumstancesunderwhich the socially and politically advantaged would agree to relinquish power, it is far from clearthat we can even comprehendthe meanings of the radicallynew roles envisagedfor such a society. The astonishment of MargePiercy'scharacter,Connie Ramos, is sharedby all her readerswho wonder what the word 'mother' could mean divorced from both the facts of biological motheringand the set of social expectations imbedded in traditional mothering practices. Within a social traditionthat ungrudginglygrantswomen little status and few gratificationsapart from the motheringrole, thereis no solid ground upon which so radically novel a conception can get a foothold. Presentedwith such a set of facts about alternativesocial structures Connie is at a loss to understandwhat value to place upon them. Her plight dramatizes the reaction of many feminists to Shulamith Firestone's case for feminist revolution: The Dialectic of Sex. Firestone's proposals for the "abolition of all cultural categories" (1970, 182) and the transformationof procreationso that "genital distinctions between the sexes would no longer matter culturally" (1970: 11) boggle the imagination;for without the mediationof a set of culturalroles and expectationswe cannot know whatvalue to place upon our experiences. ThoughFirestone'sadvocacyof technologicalreproductionaims to serve feministsinterests,it rests on conceptualfoundationsthat have much in common with the presuppositions of researchers and policymakerswho would pursuegoals antagonisticto her own, who would supporttechnologicalinterventionfor the sake of the monopoly of power it would make possible. Both sorts of interests view technologyas "a victoryover nature." They favor not only reproductive technology but the technologicaltransformationof production and the eliminationof labor as well. Both see human biology as a limitationto be overcome-for Firestone,becauseshe takes the relations of procreation to be the base of society and the source of women's oppression; for those who would support "a brave new world," because the diffusion of power among women and families threatenstheir own power hegemony. 130

anne donchin

Feminist Reaction In this section I will try to isolate the issues of deepest concernto feministthinkerswho see advancesin reproductivetechnologyas furtherencroachmentson the social statusof women. Some of theseconcernsrelateto the theoreticalunderpinningsof Firestone'stheoryand, by implication,to similaranalysesof the causesof and correctivesfor women's cultural subordination.Others focus instead on the more probable consequences of technological transformationswithin a social context still dominated by male power structures. In most feminist commentaries both kinds of concerns are intertwined. However, here I will attemptto disentanglethem so that detachable claims can then be examinedone by one on their own merits. I will focus first on one issue that entersimportantlyinto the expressionof these concerns: the presumptiveneutralityof technology to gender specific social practices.Then I will briefly alludeto a second significant issue: the possibilityof makingmeaningfuldistinctionsbetween the biologicallygiven and the culturallyacquired.FinallyI will offer a tentativeinterpretationof the importanceof the motheringdebatefor feminist theory, ending with some remarksabout conditions for the participationof feministtheoristsin shapingreproductivepolicy. Firestone'sinfluence on subsequentfeministsis a matter of some controversy, particularlywith regard to her principal claims: that motheringis more a barrierto women's self-fulfillmentthan a vehicle for it and that biologicalmotherhoodlies at the heartof women'soppression. Hester Eisenstein,in her most recent work, Contemporary Feminist Thought (1983), credits Firestone with considerable influence over subsequentfeminist theorists, particularlyin the early 1970's when feminism and motherhood were widely held to be in diametrical opposition. She attributes opposition to Alice Rossi's (1977) advocacy of women's nurturingrole (the position that the capacityto nurtureis shapedby biologicalas well as social factors)to sympathy for Firestone's position. However, Alison Jaggar in her Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983) points to a lack of enthusiasmfor Firestoneamong grass-rootsfeminists,probablyspringing, she speculates, from a widespread suspicion of advanced technology, from the observationthat technology has so often been used to reinforcemale dominance. Hence these feministsdo not see how womencould take control of technologyand use it for theirown ends. This latter position is given futher supportby Azizah al-Hibri, who arguesthat: Technological reproductive does not equalize the natural reproductivepower structure-it inverts it. It 131

hypatia appropriatesthe reproductivepower from women and places it in the hands of men who now control both the spermand the reproductivetechnologythat could make it indispensable . . . it 'liberates' them from their

'humiliatingdependency'on women in order to propagate.(1984,266) Further,she argues, were cloning techniquesto be perfectedas well, men would finally be freed from their need to share their genes with women. Her argument challenges both the claim that it is women's biological function that lies at the root of their oppressionand the derivative implication that technological reform can eliminate oppressive social practices. It rests on a very different analysis of the basis of male domination, the presumptionthat envy of women's reproductivecapacitiesand fear of their powerscreatea male need to control women, limiting the free exercise of those powers. Several featuresof the presentsituationsupportsuch an alternativeanalysis. If the root of women's oppression were their biological role, then enormous male resistance to the technologization of procreation might be expected;for each step toward its perfectionwould further threaten male power. However, the contrary is the case: male dominated social institutionsprovide the principalbasis of support for technologicaltransformationof reproductivepractices.Moreover, al-Hibri's analysis is compatible with conclusions reached by numerous other feminist theorists. Though some, like Mary O'Brien (1981), sharea similarstartingpoint, otherssuch as Nancy Chodorow (1978)and Dorothy Dinnerstein(1976), reachthe same conclusionby verydifferentroutes, derivingsupportfrom disciplinesas disparateas psychoanalysisand anthropology. Recent criticismof Firestone'sposition has not focused solely on her analysis of the sources of women's social subordinationbut extends to her remedyas well. Of course, exposureof weaknessesin the argumentfor the biologicalbasis of social stratificationwould, itself, underminesupport for Firestone's solution. But the remedy is also suspecton independentgrounds.CarolMcMillan(1982),for instance, has noted that Firestone'stheory of social institutionspresupposes that relations between individualsand society are exclusivelyfunctional. Firestonesees all barriersto the achievementof desiredgoals as technical problems, presuming that the ends sought can be fully knownin advanceand we needonly figureout the most technicallyefficient way to get there. This presuppositionstems, McMillanthinks, from the presumption that reproduction is analogous to the 132

anne donchin production and manufactureof goods, where the means to bring about a desired end have no significanceof themselvesapart from theirinstrumentalvalue(McMillan1982,77). Oncethe expertiseto accomplishthe aim more efficientlyis at hand, earliermore 'primitive' methods can be abandonedwith no loss of value. Close readingof Firestonesupportsthis interpretation.She compares development of artificial reproduction to the future of cyberneticsand speculatesthat the same reticenceunderlyingreservations about the benefitsof artificialreproductionpervadesour thinking about a work world wheremachinethinkingand problemsolving have displaced human efforts. She attributes this reticence to the presentlyprevailingdistributionof power;to envisageeitherpossibility "in the hands of present powers is to envisage a nightmare" (Firestone 1970, 90). But within 'post-revolutionary'systems both reproductivetechnologyand cyberneticswould be left free to play a wholly differentrole in social life. Hence, within Firestone'sconceptual frameworktechnologyplays an instrumentalrole twice over, first by transformingthe means to achieve socially desiredgoals without itself affectingthe characterof the goal, and second, by neutrallyserving the interestsof whicheverparty happensto control the means of productionor reproduction. McMillan shares company with the vast predominanceof both feminist and nonfeministwomen who presentlyhold a markedlydifferent assessmentof values bound up with childbearingand rearing practices as human activities. Unlike Firestone and the utopian feministswho presumethat the values attachedto motheringcan be detached,lifted off and reappliedto a radicallydifferentset of social practices,they see the values identifiedwith motheringas integralto procreationand nurturing.RobynRowland,for instance,has remarked that: a groundswell of women within the movement has begunto reassesthe value of biologicalmaternity.Reacting against the feeling that the women's movement coercedthemto give up havingchildren,many feminists are striving to create the experienceof maternityand family in a non-exploitiveway. (Rowland 1984, 358) She points to Adrienne Rich's contention that the problem is not

motherhood

itself

but the

patriarchal institutionalization

of

motherhood(Rich 1976, 369) and arguesthat the sourcesof women's oppression lie in the nature of the social structureswithin which motherhoodis experiencedratherthan in motherhooditself-which embodies within it a network of affirmative values which women 133

hypatia ought not to abandon. She and the many women writersshe cites all see technologicalcontrol of these practicesas usurpationof a body of values central to the fundamental interests of women. She appropriatesLeon Kass' (1979) argumentsto her own cause, citing his admonitionthat "some men may be destinedto play God, to recreate other men in their own image," in supportof her own fear that the new reproductivetechnologieswill ultimatelybe used for the benefit of men and to the detrimentof women (Rowland 1984, 356). Writingin the samevolume JaniceRaymond(1984)not only decries the technologicalfuture that new modes of reproductionwill impose on women, but the presentsocial context "in whichwomensupposedly 'choose' such debilitatingprocedures"as in vitro fertilizationand embryotransfer. Such technologies,she believes, only give scientific and therapeutic support to female adaptation to the patriarchal ideology that reproductionis women's prime commodity, thereby reinforcing women's oppression. She, too, echoes the fears first voiced by noninterventionists,such as Paul Ramseyand Leon Kass, that submissioneven to presentlyestablishedmodes of technological interventiondehumanizeswomen, imposingupon them 'choices' not of their own making and forcing them to submit to a technology whose developersseek ultimatelyto rendertheir motheringrole obsolete. The argumentsof Rowlandand Raymonddrawtogetherboth issues: that women's historical and social capabilitiesincorporated within childbearingand childrearingpractices possess independent value wholly apart from their patriarchal context and that technologicalinterventioninto reproductionwould only removefrom women occasion to developthese capabilitiesunderthe guise of serving their interests. Recognizingthis, women need to voice their own interestsin accordwith the moral and social values that supporttheir sense of the good life. Unlike noninterventionistsfrom Ramsey's backgroundor criticsof feminismsuchas CarolMcMillan,their 'conservatism' attempts to avoid appeal to women's natural function. Theirobjectionsto alternativeforms of reproductionare not couched in allusionsto theirsupposed'unnaturalness'but focus on a profound sense of dis-ease, stemmingfrom the threatof furtherconsolidation of power structures which purport to speak for women while simultaneouslyunderminingwomen's control of their own reproductive activities.Nonetheless,despitetheirdeliberateeffort to base their case on a directappealto women's own expressionof their interests, their argumentsappear to rely on a theoreticaldistinctionvery like AdrienneRich employs in her analysisof motherhood.She wrote: I try to distinguishbetween two meanings of mother134

anne donchin hood, one superimposedon the other:the potentialrelationship of any woman to her powersof reproduction andto children;andthe institutionwhichaimsat ensuring that that potential-and all women-shall remainunder male control. (Rich 1976, 13) If the institutionof motherhood-the "symbolic architecture"that derives from male control-could be lifted off, the experienceof motherhood would be revealed in its true nature, grounded, Rich believes,in women'sbiology. In arguingthat we have by no means yet exploredor understoodour biological grounding,the miracle and paradoxof the femalebody and its spiritualand political meanings, I am really asking whether women cannot begin, at last, to think throughtheir body, to connect what has been so cruellydisorganized-our greatmental capacities,hardlyused;ourhighlydevelopedtactilesense; our genius for close observation;our complicated,painenduringmulti-pleasured physicality.(Rich 1976,24) Rich's argument,like Firestone's,presupposesthat we can thinkintelligiblyaboutmotheringexperiencesdetachedfromtheirsocialcontext andthattheycanbe liftedoff andopenedto viewapartfromanyinstitutional structures.She assumes,too, that we can imaginethemtransposed into a radicallydifferentcontext,withinwhichthe affirmativevalues imbeddedin motheringwould be freed from the negativeassociations bound up with presentmotheringarrangements. The foundationfor thesepresumptionsneedscloserscrutiny.Despite her penetratingcriticismof "malecreateddualisms"her own workappears to reintroduceanalogous dualisms, relying, as it does, on the of the sourcesof women'sexperiences,on the assumpdistinguishability tion that we can tracethe derivationof certainexperiencesto women's biology and that others owe their origin to patriarchalinstitutions. Thoughsuchscrutinyof the logicof herworkmightseemto overlookits most obvious intent: to preparea space within which to celebrate motherhoodas a source of women's most cherishedexperiences,I wonderwhetherthis aim can be givensecuresupporton sucha foundation. I wouldlike to suggestnow that a commonthreadlinks Rowland, Raymondand Rich'spositionstogetherand, whetheror not thatthread connectsthem all to a nature/culturedualism, they do share certain commonpsychologicalassumptionsthat hold all of them togetherand apartfrom Firestoneand her company. Like many other contemporaryfeminists they see the relation betweenthe infant and motheras essentiallya positiveone and look to 135

hypatia this relationshipfor images of what relations between woman and woman might be once women have-been freed to give expressionto their own values and shape social institutionsthat foster their unfetteredexpression.Theirvision standsin markedcontrastto the perceptions of Firestone and her generation of feminists who looked to sourcesoutside of the mother-childrelationshipfor models on which to build sense of the unity and solidarityof women. In a recentpapercriticalof Rich'sposition, JanetSayers(1984)has argued that any attempt to ground relationshipsbetween women in imagesof the infant-motherbond rests upon a fantasy, that in reality this relationshipis marked by contradiction,by both positive and negativeelements. She writes: The meritsof MelanieKlein'sworkas far as feminismis concernedis that it drawsattentionto the way we often deny contradictionsin personal relationshipsthrough the defensivemechanismof splitting, and drawsattention to the hatredas well as love that inheresin the early infant-motherrelationship-an ambivalencethat is not only overlookedin feminist writingthat celebratesthis relationas the basis of women's solidarityas a sex, but that is also overlookedin that writingwhichby contrast sees in this relationthe very sourceof women's oppression and alienation. (Sayers 1984, 240) By way of exampleshe cites Luce Irigarayas illustrativeof the latter view, though she could as easily have cited many other feminists,including Firestone. Though her reliance on the Kleinianperspective might be called into queston, her cautionarywarningought not to go unheeded.Both attitudestowardthe mother-infantrelationare amply representedwithinfeministwriting.Neithercan be claimedto capture the true expressionof feminism.Her appealto Kleinis an attemptto drawtogetherboth positionswithina more inclusiveframework.The developmentof such a frameworkleaves muchtheoreticalwork to be done but the need for feministaction cannotbe delayeduntil we have workedout an adequatetheory of intergenerationalrelationships. For the present, lacking any feminist theory capable of providing unambiguousdirection in guiding the developmentof reproductive technology, these options lay before us: (1) we might commit ourselves unequivocallyto a Richian position, accept Rowland and Raymond'sanalysis of the consequencesof reproductiveinnovation and oppose all use of reproductivetechnology despite its short-term benefits to some women individually;8(2) we could join forces with the heirs of ShulamithFirestone,though it is by no meansclear what 136

anne donchin implicationsthis might have for present social policy consideringthe extent to which powerfulinstitutionaland commercialinterestscurrentlycontrolthese technologies;or (3) we could workto integratethe plurality of feminist positions into an interim policy, commit ourselvesto intensifieddialogueand attemptto influencethe present direction of reproductiveinnovation in much the same pragmatic ways feminists are now participatingin framing economic policies. Thoughpursuitof the thirdoption is likely to put the cohesivenessof the feministcommunityto its most severetest, adoption of eitherof the remainingoptions would alreadypresupposea cleavagefar more irreconcilable.Overthis issue eitherthe current'wave'of the feminist movementwill lose its momentumand disintegrateor feminismwill emerge a far stronger,more unitary force for social transformation than ever in its prior history.

Notes 1. A notable exception is a recent collection edited by Joan Rothchild (1983). 2. In the summer of 1984 the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversights heard testimony on the new reproductive technologies with the intent of eventually introducing appropriate regulative legislation (U.S. 1985). 3. See, for instance, two recent philosophical works: Glover (1984) and Singer and Wells (1984). 4. Comments of Simone Novaes have been most helpful to me in efforts to understand the complex motivations of women seeking these technologies. I am grateful, too, for the valued insights of two unnamed reviewers. 5. This argument was first suggested to me in a discussion of Ramsey's position by Samuel Gorovitz (1982). 6. I do not discuss other individual 'moderate interventionists' at length here only because their arguments are not directly pertinent to the issues I emphasize. However, the regulatory bodies that I do refer to-the British Warnock Committee and the Australian and Canadian commissions-all adopt versions of a moderate interventionist position. Also, most legal commentators and scientific researchers fall into this category. Some have no principled objections to the new technologies at all; others support innovations only selectively. All of them seek regulation principally to maintain continuity with prevailing liberal values. 7. Several states have already considered legislation that would bind both parties to surrogate contracts. Both Kentucky and Michigan have ruled against it. 8. Gena Corea (1985) offers much empirical evidence in support of this position.

137

hypatia

138

marjorieweinzweig Should a Feminist Choose A Marriage-LikeRelationship? Is "living together" in a marriage-like relationship compatible with the feminist ideal of individual self-development? Paradoxically, while the structure and social-historical context of marriage-like relationships seems in fundamental conflict with the goal of autonomous self-development, the development of individuality also seems to be better fostered by living with a significant other in a committed relationship than by living alone. This paradox is resolved through the suggestion of a three-stage account of self-development: inauthenticity, autonomous being oneself, and autonomous being with others. At the third stage, living together in a marriage-like relationship is one social format in which autonomous relating to others is possible. Unless the partners have attained the second stage, however, such a relationship will be destructive rather than conducive to individuality.

I. The Issue In traditionalmale dominatedwesternsociety, women'ssexuality has been channelledexclusivelyinto monogamousmarriage,because of the perceivedneed to raisechildrenin "families" based on this institution. With the women's and sexual liberationmovementsof the past twenty years, feminists frequentlyreject marriageas the appropriateinstitutionfor satisfyingtheirneeds for sexuality,friendship and "family," but insteadchoose to "live together"with a singlesexual partnerin a relationshipof long term commitmentand duration. In such relationships,whichmay be eitherlesbianor heterosexual,the partnerssharea householdand the detailsof their daily lives in much the same manneras do the partnersin a marriage(whenthe latterare dedicatedto the eliminationof the traditionalgender-basedroles in their marriage).They may raise childrenin such households.Among heterosexualcouples dedicatedto women's liberation, the debate is betweenmarriageand "livingtogether";lesbiansfrequentlychoose to "couple" in marriage-likehouseholds. Such individualsmay fail to consider the question of whether a marriage-likearrangementand relationshipis appropriateand conduciveto their realizationof the feministideals to which they are committed. This paperdeals with the issue of the relationshipof marriageor a Hypatia vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1986) © by Hypatia, Inc.

139

hypatia marriage-likearrangementto feminist ideals. Three ideals will be adoptedas centralto the goals of feminism:equality,freedom,and individual self development.'Two questionswill be asked about marriage in relationshipto these goals: (1) Is there any form of marriagewhich is compatible with the achievementof these values?(2) If so, are thereany reasonsto choose sucha relationshipover suchalternativesas livingalone or livingcommunally? Thereis an importantrespectin whichthe notion of individualself developmentor autonomyis the most fundamentalvalueof the three. For without this attribute women will be unable to achieve and preservefreedom and equality, or to benefit from them if the latter should happen to be bestowed on them without their efforts. Thereforethe discussionwill focus primarilyon self-development. I define autonomy or individualityas a charactertrait which combines the two central features of independenceor responsibilityfor self and self-actualizationor developmentof potentialities.2 An autonomous individualis one who is able and willing to take care of herself, and who has adopted or affirmed her values of her own free choice for reasonswhichshe would acknowledgeas her own. She is thus able to stand up for herself and her values in the face of adversityand externalpressure.The abilityto standup for oneself and what one believesin is essentialif an individualor group is to achieve equalityand freedomin the economic, politicaland social spheres.It is also essentialif an individualis to attainequalityand avoid domination and exploitationin close inter-personalrelationships(Mill 1962; Bishop 1979). "Living together" will be defined as a sexual relationshipbetween two personswhich is accompaniedby the following features:(a) the assumption by the partners of joint responsibility for a shared household; (b) a commitmentby the partnersto generallyshare the other details of their lives, (c) the mutual understandingby the partners that these commitmentswill be of indefinite duration. "Living together"contrastswith "living alone." In the lattersituation, one is not committedto sharingthe detailsof her daily life for the indefinite future with a single sexual partner.Thus an adult who "lives alone" might share a household with roommates, friends or relatives, but such a situationwould not involvea sexualrelationshipor features(b) and (c) of a "livingtogether"relationship."Livingtogether"thus encompasses both a certain type of "life style": sharinga household consistingof just the two sexual partnersand a certaintype of commitmentby the partners:to share the details of their lives for the indefinite future. While this commitment does not imply sexual 140

marjorie weinzweig exclusivity,the combinationof features(a) and (b) does implythat the relationshipbetweenthe partnerswill be the primaryrelationshipfor each in terms of the amount of time and energy invested, and probably thereforealso in terms of overall emotionalimportance. Marriageis a special form of "livingtogether"in whichheterosexual partnersmay publiclyand formallyundertakea speciallegal commitmentwhich incorporatesthe externalsociety's rules for the structuring of the relationship(Ketchum 1977; O'Driscoll 1977, 260-1). While this additional feature may change the relationshipin ways which are importantfor the issues to be discussedin this paper, the differencesbetweenliving togetherand living alone are far more fundamentalfor presentpurposesthan those betweenmarriageand other forms of living together. The marriedand unmarriedforms of living together will therefore be treated together. "Living together" relationshipsmay be either heterosexualor homosexual. The questionof the compatibilityof marriageor "living together" with feminist ideals is asked from the view point of a contemporary feminist: an individualwhose beliefs, values and goals are those of feminism,but who is strivingto achievethesevaluesas social and personal goals not yet realized. Feminism arises in the context of a prevailingsystemof patriarchalvaluesabout the role of womenwhich it rejects, and feministsare individualswho have been profoundlyinfluenced in their own upbringingby those traditional patriarchal values. Just as our presentsociety is at best in a transitionalstate between its past oppressionof women and the realizationof feminist ideals, so do most feministsthemselveslive as individualsin a transitional state between their past upbringingand the goals they would like to achieve.

II. Feminism vs Marriage and "Living Together" There is no doubt that traditionalmarriage,as it existed in this country before the developmentof the women's movement, was incompatiblewith the achievementof freedom,equalityand individuality for women. First, because marriagehas been the sole life style available to women, women have been denied the freedom to exerciseother options. In this respect they have also been treatedunequallyto men, who have always been free not to marry without adverse social, economic and sexual consequences. Second, in traditional marriage, the woman was treated as the man's sexual and economic property. Thus as late as the nineteenth centurysuch diversethinkersas John StuartMill and FriedrichEngels 141

hypatia describemarriageas a state of slaverybecauseof the completelack of economic and political rights for women, both in fact and underthe law, and becauseof the acceptanceof the "double standard"of sexual morality.Underthese conditionsa womanis not treatedas a person equalin her humanityto otherpersons.She does not possessbasic human rights such as the right to equal treatmentunderthe law and the legal and moral right to self-determination,but is a mere object for male satisfaction,in sex and the bearingand rearingof children.3 Thus the relationshipbetweenthe partnersis that of dominationand exploitationratherthan one based on respectfor personsand equality. Finally, the rigid distributionof roles in traditionalmarriageand the personalitycharacteristicswhich women have had to develop in order to fulfill these roles have made it very difficult for women to develop themselves as individualswith interests and ideas separate from those of the membersof their families. In theirtraditionalroles as exclusive homemakersand child rearers,4women have been expected to sacrificetheir personalinterestsfor those of their families, deriving their satisfaction from the knowledge that they are contributingto the latters'interests.In orderto performthese roles, they were expectedto acquirethe "feminine" characteristicsof altruism, patience, self sacrifice, compliance, passivity, and dependence on others for direction and control. They were to give in rather than assertthemselves,and to look to theirhusbandsto makethe decisions ratherthan participatingin them as equal partners.While a woman who failed to develop these personality traits was chastized as "unfeminine," one who does develop these characteristicsmay have little sense of self.5 She may thus find it difficult to exerciseindependent choice even if giventhe opportunityor if requiredto do so: if, for example,she becomeswidowedor divorcedand must supportherself and make her own life. Becauseshe has learnedto look to others for directionratherthan allowingher own intereststo be expressedin free choice, she may have become incapableof even recognizingher own interests, let alone promotingthem. On the other hand, nineteenth centuryfeministliteratureshows that suicideand madnessweremany times the only options available to women whose desire to assert themselvesindependentlymade them incapableof or unwillingto fit these traditionalroles (Chopin 1972; Gilman 1973). Today some couples are attemptingto restructurethe division of labor and roles in their relationshipsso as to eliminateor mitigatethe obstaclesposed by the traditionalroles to woman's freedom,equality and self-development.Such couples do not base their relationshipon the assumptionthat the wife will deriveher sole identityfrom her role 142

marjorie weinzweig as wife and mother. She is ratherregardedas a separateindividual with interests and needs-professional and otherwise-of her own, which deserve equal consideration to those of the other family members.The partnersattemptto sharechild-rearing,householdand economic responsibilitiesand decision making, and to interactin a manner involving communication and co-operation rather than dominanceand submission(Bernard1972, Ch. 10, 11). In addition, some of the externaleconomic, social and legal obstaclesto equality and freedomhave been alleviatedif not eliminated. However, there is a fundamental conflict between the goal of autonomous self-developmentand even a "liberated" form of marriageor livingtogetheras describedin the precedingparagraph.There are severalaspectsto this conflict: (a) Suchan intimate,committedrelationshipcombinedwith the living together arrangementprovides a greater opportunity than is availableif one lives alone to slip into sexuallystereotypedroles. Thus one partnermay easily assumethe role of the "stronger"member,or the "leader," who makesthe decisionsand assumesprimaryresponsibility for the couple's economicwelfare,,while the other may take a less remunerativeor significantjob than she would if she were living alone, or may stay home and dependon the other'sincomein orderto performhouseholdtasks and be availableemotionallyfor the partner who has the demandingjob. Such decisions, which are by no means limited to partners in a legally sanctioned marriage, leave the economically and psychologically dependent partner even more vulnerableto being abandonedthan if she had the legal protections providedby marriage. Thus marriage or living together is conducive to the kind of dependencyrelationshipin which one gives part of the responsibility for herselfto the other. It is easierto avoid this type of dependencyif one lives alone, and thus has no alternativebut to take full responsibility for herself in all areas: economic, professional,physicaland psychological.Falling into the stereotypedroles, on the other hand, leads to a failure to develop an autonomousself, a lack of equality betweenthe partners,and curtailmentof one's freedom. While some thinkersbelievethat this particulardangerdoes not exist in same-sex living-togetherarrangements,even these relationships involve the possibilityof destructivedependencyrelationships.For despite their sexual preferences, the partners may have been socialized into "masculine"or "feminine" roles (Martin1977, 67). (b) Livingwith a personin a committedrelationshipgreatlyrestricts individualchoice with regardto patternsof dailylife, formsof recreation and social life, and even profession. From the ultimatedecision 143

hypatia of whetherto sacrificeor endangerthe relationshipwhenone receives a better job offer or opportunity for promotion in a different geographicallocationthan that in whichone is livingwithher partner, to such less immediatelysignificantdecisionsas whetherto give up a ski weekendor an eveningof folk dancingin orderto spendtime with one's partner,the individualcommittedto a "living together" situation is constantly faced with the need to compromise in matters relatingto her choices, to limit her activitiesin orderto take into account the needs and preferencesof the partner.Insteadof being able to develop or discover herself through free choice, her range of activities is limitedto those acceptableto the partner.If the partnerhas assumeda "dominant"role as describedin (a) this limitationmay be very significant.To anyonewho has lived comfortablyby herself, the necessity to constantly consider the other's interests, to constantly consult with the other in workingout routinesregardingthe detailsof daily life can be felt as a severeimpingementon herpersonalfreedom. One feels the need for "breathing space," and treasures those moments when she is alone in the house and can do whatevershe pleases.

(c) Livingwith anotherin this kind of arrangementcan violate the individual's need for physical and psychological "distance" from others. This distance is importantto maintainingthe concept of the self as separatefrom others(Goffman 1961,Ch. 1). The pervasiveness of the livingtogethersituation,however,makesit difficultto distance oneself from the roles played with the spouse in order to regainthe sense of self whichmay have been "put down" or violatedin interactions with the partner.6This factor is seen in its most extremeform in the case of batteredwives, whose husbandsor boyfriendsoften keep them at home and isolated. In this way the woman never gets away from the effects of the abuseon her sense of self, and may stay in the relationship for years because she sees no alternativeor feels she deservesno better. The phenomenonof "battering" also occurs in homosexual relationships(Martin 1977, 66-7). Thus in addition to promoting the persistenceof sexually stereotypedroles, the "living together"situationwill exacerbatethe effects of whateversex roles or other inequalitiesdo persistbetweenthe partners. (d) Livingtogetherin a committedrelationshipmay paradoxically interferewith that aspect of self-developmentwhich comes through relatingto other individuals. (1) To the extent that one's commitmentto her partnerin her primary, "living together," relationshipinterfereswith her entering into or developingother relationships,sexual or otherwise,she loses the spontaneityof discoveringthese new relationships,togetherwith 144

marjorie weinzweig the new discoveriesof the self that these would involve. (2) Given their commitmentto and investmentin their shared lives, the partnersmay tend to "put up with" each others' bad habits for the sake of preservingthe relationship.In this way, however,each individualis denied the opportunityto learn of and respond to the naturalreactionsof othersto his or her behavior.The bad habits are blindlyperpetuated,and each individual'sabilityto relateto otherindividuals-who are not going to put up with them-is diminished (Blum, Homiak, Housemanand Scheman1973-4,234-5). In this way the partnersbecome furtherseparatedfrom other individuals. (3) Becauseof the long-termcommitmentto the partner,one may feel that she or he is stayingwith her partneror consideringhis or her interestsbecauseshe is obligatedto, not becauseit feels rightand she wants to. In this way the values of spontaneousaffection and freely chosencompanionshipwhichare to be achievedin the relationshipare interferedwith. While some writersregardthis as a specificdrawback of marriage(Bishop 1979, 15; McMurtry1975, 170-1),the same sort of effect could operate in an unmarried"living together" situation, whetherlesbian or heterosexual. These restrictionson personal developmentare not a contingent fact about some living together arrangements which could be remediedby simplyrestructuringthe arrangementso as to allow more room for separate activities, separate relationships, and time and space alone. Ratherit is the structureof the "living together" relationship, with respectto both "life-style" and commitment,whichis the source of its incompatibilitywith individualself-development.7 The peculiarrestrictivenessof this institutionalarrangementis due to two differentkindsof factors:(1) the essentialstructuralfeaturesof the arrangementitself, and (2) the historicaland contemporarysocial context in which the institutionoccurs. The featuresincludedunder (1), in particularthe long-termcommitmentto a shareddestinycombined with the intimaciesof householdsharingand sex, are sufficient by themselves to broadly restrict choice and thus to impede selfdevelopment. These effects become much worse, however, when taken in combinationwith the second set of factors. For we choose marriageor "livingtogether"today in the contextof a long historyof sexual stereotypeswhich it has played a major role in perpetuating, significantvestigesof whichstill persisttoday and haveinfluencedour own upbringing. However egalitarian our intentions may be, the structureof the institutionmakesit easierto slip backinto or persistin these roles, and harderto break with them, than would a life-style which deviatedfrom the past more drastically. Factors(b) and (d) above are primarilydue to the structureof the 145

hypatia "living-together"relationship,while features (a) and (c) are due to both the historicalpatriarchalinstitutionalizationof sexual love and to the structuralfeaturesof the relationship.The problemswouldpersist, due to the structuralfeatures,however,even if the effects of the past historyof patriarchywereeliminated,for the pervasivenessof the contactand commitmentbetweenthe two partnersnecessarilyrestricts choice and makes possible destructivedependencyrelationshipswith their resultantpersonalitymutilation. Thesequestionsof autonomyare relevantas well for childrengrowing up in such a nuclearhousehold. This is the reasonwhy the traditional extendedfamily, in which a numberof differentadults in different roles are availableto the childrenfor advice, comfort and role models, is often regardedas preferable to the two or one-parent nuclearfamily as a settingfor child-rearing.In the biological family, the child is "thrown" (Heidegger1962, 172-188)in with its particular parentsby chance;in the nuclearbiological family thereis no escape hatch for the child if its relationshipwith those particulartwo individualsis destructiveto it. For this reason many feministslook to collectivehouseholdsas a preferablesettingfor child rearingthan the nuclearbiological family (Firestone1970, 256-262). For all these reasonsit appearsthat a person who chooses the lifestyle which I have called "living alone": who chooses to satisfy her needs for friendship,sex and companionshipin such a manneras to avoid the broad restrictions on individual choice of "living together"-may be betterable to developher sense of self or "identity." Such an individualwill be compelledto become independentby assumingfull responsibilityfor herself. On the other hand she will be free to choose activitiesand personalrelationshipson the basis of her own interestsand inclinationsto a degreewhichis simplynot compatible with a committed"living together" relationship.In this way she will have opportunitiesto develop her "individuality"which do not exist for those involved in "living together" relationships.

III. Autonomy and Commitment On the otherhand, thereare importantreasonswhy developmentof individualityseems to be better served by living with a significant other in a committedrelationshipthan by living alone. Such a relationshipcan provide: (a) A stable frameworkin which one's needs for affection, sex and companionshipare comfortablymet. This leavesthe individualfree to devote herself to the kind of longer term projects which are constitutiveof professionaland personalself-development.On the other hand those who live alone often must either forgo gratificationof 146

marjorie weinzweig some of these needs or expendmore time and energyin findingways of satisfyingthem. (b) A caringperson who sees the individualfavorablyand is sympatheticto her basicvaluesand goals providesher with neededvalidation which enhances her sense of her own identity. Although a feministdoes not want to be dependenton others' perceptionsof her for her senseof identity,it is difficultto maintaina self-conceptwhich is completelyat odds with the way one is perceivedby others (Berger & Luckmann1966, 149). (c) A committed,day to day relationshipcan lead to "freedomto be oneself," to expressoneself without fear of rejection(assumingthat the relationshipis not basedon economicdependency).This can lead to the kind of personalgrowth that comes from honest communication, and to the developmentof more egalitarianrelationshipsbased on recognition of the other as the individualshe is, instead of on deceptive"role playing"or "gameplaying."8An individualwho does not undertaketo sharethe detailsof her life in a committedrelationship with another may thus lack the opportunityfor an important aspectof self-development,in whichthe self is enrichedthroughan intimate but open relationshipwith another based on mutual respect and consideration.9

IV. Two Kinds of Autonomy? Thus we seem to be faced with a dilemma, or "dialectic" in the Hegelian sense of equally valid argumentsleading to contradictory conclusions: (1) Livingwith a significantother may interferewith the exerciseof individualchoice and thus with the developmentof individualityin Mill's sense. It seems that autonomy is best provided for by living alone. (2) On the other hand, the facts that (a) we have needs for such things as affection, sex and companionshipwhichmust be satisfiedif we areto "functionwell," (b) we havea need for externalvalidationof our self-perception,and (c) we do commonly regard the ability to relateto othersas part of what it is to be a well-developedindividual, would suggest that autonomy requiresan intimate, committedrelationshipwith another.It is possiblethat theserequirementsmightalso be met in some other kind of living togethercommittedarrangement such as group marriage,but they seem to be better served by living with a significant other or others in an arrangementof intentional long-termdurationthan by living alone. These contradictoryconsiderationslead to the speculation that 147

hypatia there may be two different notions of autonomy underlying them. We might call these two notions "autonomous being oneself" and "autonomous relating to others." The former would be the notion characterized by Mill and Sharon Bishop: the ability to make choices which express the self and to develop one's own life plan. The latter would take account of that sense of self-development which requires the ability to have harmonious or satisfying intimate relations with others. ' Behind these two notions of autonomy lie two different metaphysical conceptions of the self which have been held by modern philosophers. 1. The self as an independent substance: On the views of such philosophers as Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and John Stuart Mill, the self as mental substance is an independent entity, identifiable in isolation or abstraction from its relations to things other than it. Its relations to other entities are not logically constitutive of its identity, but are super-added to an already constituted entity. Thus for Mill, when an individual acts freely he will develop into a strong person whose self-interested actions will result in good consequences for others. The latter state of affairs, however, is regarded as a desirable consequence of, not as an ingredient in, the development of individuality. The self as relational: The view of the self as a relation appears in nineteenth and twentieth century continental philosophy. For Hegel (1931, 229) selfconsciousness exists only by being recognized by another selfconsciousness. For the early Marx the self is defined in terms of its life activity: spontaneous, creative, "production." In this activity a person "externalizes" herself in the social product, and thus relates to nature, to other people, and to the "species life" (1961, 95-103, 181-2). The phenomenologists develop the concept of the intentionality of consciousness, according to which the self is related through its cognitive activities to objects in the world (Husserl 1931 #84-7, #90, #94, #124; 1960, #17, #44-5; Merleau Ponty 1962, Part I). This world is a social world in which the presence of others like the self is essential to its constitution (Husserl 1960, Meditation V; Heidegger 1962, 149ff). On each of these views the individual is so closely connected with certain things other than herself (other people, nature, her product and other objects in the social world) that this connection is 148

marjorie weinzweig constitutiveof her identity. This casts light on the need for external validationof the self, and on the importanceof being with others to good functioningand to individualdevelopment. These two concepts of the self lead to two different views of the significanceof relationswith others to autonomy. (1) If the self is conceivedof as an independent,self-subsistententity, one does not need a close committedrelationto anotherin orderto be an individual,and sucha relationshipmay be a significantthreatto independence.Two examplesof this view are the tracts of Ti-Grace Atkinson(1969),who arguesthat feminismcalls for the eliminationof sexuallove and of the institutionof sexualintercoursebecausesexual love is a destructive dependency relationship incompatible with human autonomy, and the contention of the psychologistLawrence Casler(1973)that a healthypersonneed not love or be loved, that our society's emphasison love is both an effect and a cause of insecurity, dependencyand a lack of self-respect.This view of autonomy is attractive to a budding feminist, because a person who has excessive need of love and approval from others is unable to function independentlyon her own, and is vulnerableto exploitationby others who can manipulateher by threateningto withdrawtheir love. (2) On the "relational" concept of the self, on the other hand, autonomy requiresrelation with others, since the proper relatingto those things which are constitutiveof the individual'sidentityis part of what it is to be a healthy,well-functioningperson. On this account autonomousbeing with others must then be distinguishedfrom nonautonomous being with others (Gilligan 1982, 61, 78, 82-5, 92-4). Such an account is not easy to provide. For as every feministknows, our relationshipswith othersare also notoriouslythe sourceof our not being ourselves. Since society still defines women in terms of their relationshipto a significantother, they still tend to do, think and be what they think the significantother and society wants them to be in this role. The existenceof the two differentconceptionsof autonomyleaves us with the question of the relationship between them. Are autonomousbeingoneself and autonomousrelatingto otherstwo differentwaysof living whichare incompatible,or can the claimbe made that the relation to others is so essential to autonomous selfdevelopmentthat the latter necessarilyincludes autonomous being with others? If the latter, then the claims of our right to individual choice would be absorbedinto the accountof autonomousbeing with others, and would have to be done justice to in that account. We may shed some light on this question by consideringthe hints concerningthe relationalconceptof autonomyset forth by Heidegger 149

hypatia in Being and Time. Heidegger begins with an account of nonautonomousrelatingto the world and other. In inauthenticityone (Dasein)is "disburdened"by the "they" and loses herself in "average everydayness." When I am "lost in the 'they" I am concernedto do and be just what everyoneelse does and is. It is not "I" who decides how to dress, talk, and think-it is "they": the "generalizedother."" I do not have a self and am not an individualbecause I do not make (or take responsibilityfor) my own choices. This descriptionis a good characterizationof the situationof women who have been brought up in and unthinkinglyaccept the stereotypesof traditionalpatriarchalsociety withoutconsciouslyconsideringtheiralternatives.Such women do, choose and act in the way that all women are told or "expected" to be: to please me'2to bear children,to care for others, to be sex objects or beauty objects. No one in particulartells them that they as individualsmust do these things and act in these ways: it is just what everyoneexpects. Heideggergives only suggestivehints as to the appropriateway of relatingto othersand the world, whichwould constituteauthenticexistence. For Heideggerhuman existenceor "Dasein" is a relationto the world, called "Being-in-the-world."Thus an isolated subject without a world is nevergiven, and neitheris an isolated "I" without others. The solution to inauthenticitythereforecannot be to "get out of" relations with others as so to "become oneself." Authenticexistence ratherinvolvesa "modification"of the "they-self":a seizing of "everydayness"in a differentway (1962, 224). In that shift, Dasein brings itself back from the "they" in such a way that it becomes authenticbeingoneself (1962, 313). This involvesa disclosureof one's ownmost potentiality for being, from which one was alienated in "falling" into "average everydayness"(1962, 222). Thus attaining "authenticity"involves a modificationof both the way the world is is disclosed,and the way the Dasein-withof others(Being-with-others) disclosed.In attainingauthenticity("resoluteness")one perceivesand relatesto the work worldand to other humansin a differentway than when one was absorbedin the world of "averageeverydayness;"it is only in such relatingthat one's "ownmost potentialityfor being" is "disclosed." Since we are in the world with others for Heidegger,our relations with others are necessarilycharacterizedby "solicitude" (1962, 159). The transition to authenticityinvolves the transition to "authentic solicitude" in our relationswith others. Heidegger'sremarkson this topic are particularlysuggestive for the issues under consideration here. Authenticsolicitudeis termed "leapingahead of the other," in contrast to inauthenticsolicitude, referredto as "leaping in for the 150

marjorie weinzweig other." In "leaping in for the other" one takes over for her and throws her out of her position. In this form of solicitude the other becomes dominatedand dependent: . . . he steps back so that afterwards,when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely. In "leapingaheadof" the other, on the other hand, one gives back to her "care" (her "being-in-the-world")authentically,and helps her to be in her ownmost potentialityfor being: . . .there is also the possibilityof a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him-not in order to take away his care but ratherto give it backto him authenticallyas such for the first time. This kind of solicitude . . . helps the Other to

becometransparentto himselfin his careand to become free for it. (1962 158-9)

In this kindof solicitude,one helps the otherto attainauthenticity:to become her "own" self. In the first kindof "caring"for others,one takesoverfor themand dominatesor manipulatesthem. In this kind of care, one's concern for the other is reallyconcernfor oneself: the "helper"becomespersonally involved in seeing that the helped individualdoes what she thinksis rightor best, or herconcernfor herselfdistortsin otherways the qualityof the caring. In their article"Altruismand Women'sOppression," Blum, Homiak, Housmanand Schemangive examplesof this kind of "caring"in theirdiscussionof waysin whichthe unequal power balance and the traditionalrole expectationsfor a woman in marriagemay interferewith her exerciseof genuinealtruismtowards her husband.Becausethe wife is expectedto be completelydependent on her husbandfor her economicand social status, she may push him to achievea kind of "success"he does not reallywant, or may fail to give him constructivecriticismfor fear of alienatinghim and thus losing her own status (Blum, Homiak, Housemanand Scheman 1973, 234-5). In both these casesthe wife's concernis to enhanceor preserve her own economicand social position;this preventsher from genuinely attendingto her husband'sneedsin the situationat hand. Similarly, a woman in a traditionalmarriagemay wish to live "through her children."Such a mothermay be unableto separateher needs for her childrento be successful,well-adjusted,a certaintype of person, etc. or her needs for the continuingpresenceof the childrenin proximity 151

hypatia to her, from their needs as individuals.In these circumstances,her caringfor them will be of the "leapingin" type. SaraRuddick(1984, 223) uses Weil and Murdoch'snotion of "fantasy" to describethis kind of caringin regardto children. In the second kind of caringdescribedby Heidegger,"authentic" caring, the first individualis able to genuinelysupportthe second in termsof the latter'sneeds and circumstanceswithoutthe intervention of her ownpersonalneeds. Thusshe is ableto be sympathetic,helpful, available,and to give adviceout of concernfor the other alone, with attention to'the latter's particularsituation, problems and needs. Since she cares for the second individual,she is concernedabout and personallyinvolved in the latter's well being. However, she is not so personallyinvolvedin any one particularmeansto that well being or solution to the cared for individual'sproblemsas to be incapableof entertaining other alternatives which would be more genuinely beneficialto that individual.Thus a wife may want her husbandor childto be successfulif he or she wantsthat successbut she will also be able to entertainthe alternativeof less ambitiousor prestigiousends on the partof the caredfor personbecauseit is not essentialto her (the carer's) self image or image in the community that her husband and/or childrenbe successful. It is obviouslyessentialto the possibilityof this kind of caringthat the givernot sacrificeherselfor her own needsin her solicitudefor the other, for it is only then that she will be able to retain the requisite degreeof personaldetachmentto be able to genuinelyassist the recipient. Ruddickcalls the capacityfor this kind of caringthe capacity for "attentivelove": Attention to real children ... seen by the 'patient eye of

love ... teachesus how realthings(realchildren)can be looked at and loved without being seized and used, without being appropriatedinto the greedyorganismof the self'. (1984, 223) The recipientof the first kind of caring, which involves manipulation, domination and control, is likely to be diminishedratherthan enhancedby the other's care, since such care is not centeredaround the discoveryand satisfactionof her own individualneeds and concerns. Thereforean individualwho has receivedonly the "leapingin for" kindof caringis likelyto be suspiciousof close relationshipswith others, and to feel a need for isolation from othersin orderto protect his or her individualidentityand ability to act for herself. The recipientof the second kind of caring,by contrast,can be open to the solicitude of others, for he or she can be genuinely helped, 152

marjorie weinzweig enriched or supported by sharing his concerns with the giver of care. This recipient is able to be comforted by the emotional support of the carer, and to take or reject the latter's advice or help freely without the suspicion that the giver has her own motives for the "care." If the relationship is a close one, the caring will enable the recipient to grow as an individual in the manner described above, providing support for the recipient's creative activity and enhancement of her self concept. The giver of the second kind of caring is enriched as well. The giving of help which is directed solely towards the needs of one's friend, family member or lover, just as to those of a client, student or patient) out of concern for the latter as an individual, is a creative project of the type described by Marx as constitutive of personal identity. As a result of her spontaneous activity, working together with the recipient, the giver or carer is able to "produce" something in the social world: an improved state of affairs for the recipient. This in turn enhances the personal identity and well being of the "giver." If the giver and recipient are partners in a close personal relationship and are able to "reverse roles" so that giver becomes recipient on other occasions, then their relationship will be one enriched by mutual respect and reciprocity in sharing each others' concerns (cf. Held 1973-4, 172-3). It is under these circumstances that a close relationship between two individuals is able to enhance the autonomous development of each; this is the autonomous relating to others referred to above. In the context of his discussion of the difference between authentic and inauthentic solicitude, Heidegger makes an observation which is crucial for our question about the relation between autonomous being oneself and autonomous relating to others. Not only is it the case that authentic solicitude and authentic being-with allows the other to "discover and become herself," but also it is only if I achieve independent selfhood that I am able to help the others whose relation to me is an aspect of my identity to discover and achieve their individuality.'3 The reason for this very important point is that only if I have my own "identity" or "individuality" can I care for those close to me without getting so tied up in them that the development of their individuality becomes a threat to my concept of myself. Only if I am "secure" in my own knowledge of who I am can I help those I care about to "be free for" and develop their own independent identity. Heidegger's point thus implies that it is only if I am already an autonomous individual possessed of my own identity that I can relate to others authentically and achieve the kind of "living together" relationship which would be consistent with feminist ideals. That is, only if I have autonomy in the first sense ("autonomous being oneself") is 153

hypatia it possible for me to have autonomyin our secondsense (autonomous relatingto others). On the other hand, Heidegger'sclaim that I do not achieveauthenticity by isolating myself from relations with others and with the everydayworld, but only by "seizingupon these" in a differentway, and his characterizationof "authentic solicitude," suggest that autonomy is to be achievedonly throughrelatingwith others. These two points would mean that the two senses of autonomyunderconsiderationare intrinsicallyinterrelated:autonomousbeing with others is both an essential ingredient in and a causal condition of autonomousbeing oneself, but the latterin turn is a necessarycondition of autonomousbeing with others. However,this interrelationshipand Heidegger'stwo-stageaccount of the developmentof individualityleave us with a paradox. Heidegger does not tell us exactlyhow one makesthe shift from "lostnessin the 'they' " to seizing on the world of "averageeverydayness"in a way whichdiscloseshis or her ownmostpotentialityfor being, or how the authenticsolicitudeof othersmakesit possiblefor me to makethe shift from inauthenticbeing-in-the-worldto authenticity.Presumably he would not wantto claimthat I am dependenton beingthe recipient of others' solicitude in order to achieve authenticity.When we ask how I am able to make the shift, however,we find that I can achieve my own identityonly throughrelatingto others;yet I needto havemy own identityin orderto relateto them authentically.Thus we are left with a circularaccountof the achievementof authenticity,according to which we must alreadybe authenticin orderto become authentic.

V. Conclusion: A Three-Stage Model For the Development of Individuality I shall attemptto resolve this paradoxby suggestinga three-stage account of the development of the self.'4 On this account an intermediatestage of developmentis interposedbetween Heidegger's first stage (lostnessin the "they") and his final stage(authenticbeingin-the-worldand being-withothers). I startwith Heidegger'sview that individualdevelopmentnecessarily starts with "averageeverydayness":The public world into which Dasein is "thrown." The "they" is the necessary first stage of developmentin order for the individualto learnthe publicmeanings, includingsocial norms and roles, which are constitutiveof a public world (Dreyfus 1975). For womenthis meansthe genderrole expectations of current society: not as stark as those in previous eras or decades, but still reflecting the influence of contemporarypatriar154

marjorie weinzweig chal, capitalistsociety. At the secondstage, however,whichI will call "Being-for-oneself," one pulls oneself out of the "they" and being-withothersin the mode of average everydaynessand in a certain manner withdrawsfrom being-withothers. Insteadof doing and being what those around us expect us to do and be, we now choose and actfor ourselvesalone, in orderto discoverwhatwe ourselveswantand enjoy, whatwe aregood at, and who we are. This stage will involve a certain healthy "selfishness":we act for ourselvesratherthan for others. By abandoningthe "security"offered by the sociallydefinedrolesat the stage of "average everydayness"and choosing "freely," the individual discoverswho she is and achieveswhat I havecalled "autonomousbeing oneself." An appropriatelife style for this stage will be what I have called "living alone," where the exerciseof individualchoice necessaryto the discoveryand/or developmentof one's individualitywill not be impededby the assumptionof a long termcommitmentto shareone's life with a partnerwith whom one is intimatelyinvolved. The "living together" arrangement is inappropriate at this stage, because for an

individualwho is just emergingfrom the "they," the ubiquitousness of the sexualpartnerwill interferewith herabilityto choose freely.An individualat this stageof developmentwill not be withoutrelationsto others:friends,lovers, family, colleagues-but will not be involvedin the particulartype of relationshipwhichis the subjectof this paper.In Heidegger'slanguage,the self is still relationalontologically,for "being with" othersis an ontologicalor necessary,a priori,characteristic of Dasein. The progressionto stage two ratherinvolves a change in our particularmode of being with others:a changein what Heidegger calls an "ontic" or "existential"characteristicchosen by a particular Dasein at a particulartime (1962, 31-3). If Heidegger'sversionof the relationalconcept of the self and the argumentspresentedabove are correct, the developmentof full individualitywill requireautonomous or authenticbeing-withothers, and thus the attainmentof stage III. At this stage the individualand the world which is constitutiveof her identity are enhancedby the mutualityof respectand concernin her relationswith others, in the mannerdescribedabove. However, stage II, in which one withdraws from the social expectationsof the "they," is a necessarypre-requisite to stage III, for if individualautonomy is not achievedfirst, the individualwill be in dangerof being "takenover" by the careof others and by self-sacrificein caringfor others. In this way being-withothersmay becomea meansof avoidingthe realizationof individualautonomy, in which one acquiresthe ability 155

hypatia to choose and be responsiblefor one's own courseof action, actingon the basis of one's own interests,needs and sense of responsibilityto others, rather than to please others, because others expect it, or because we hope that somebodyelse will take care of us if we act as they wish. Thus a provisional or partial individual autonomy is achieved at the end of stage II. This provisional autonomy, "autonomous being oneself," requirescompletion or confirmation throughthe furtherdevelopmentof autonomousbeing with othersat stage III, but it is the developmentof the formerwhichmakesthe latter possible. Authenticbeing with otherscan be achievedin a varietyof types of relationships,not just by being togetherwith a sexual partner.Such relationshipsmight includethose with family, friends, children,professional colleagues,or sexualpartnersin a non-livingtogethersituation. The claim that autonomousbeing oneself must be completedby autonomousbeingwith othersdoes not implythat any particularform of the latter type of relationshipis necesary, but only that an individualwho never learnsto care for and receivecare from others in the manner described above, but whose relations with others are characterizedby a struggle to dominate and control, or to create distance in order to keep the other at bay, has failed to achieve the highest level of developmentof which humans, as relationalbeings, are capable.That is a relationshipwith anotherhumanbeingin which each is enhancedby the concernand care of the other. Whatthis accountaddsto Heidegger's,throughthe interpositionof the intermediatestage, is an explanation of what makes the move from "lostness" to authenticitypossible. By withdrawingfrom the "they" and choosing for herself,the individualdoes somethingwhich changesher: she "finds herself," or gains a sense of her own identity which does not dependon the approvalof others. She now becomes an independentperson, able to take responsibilityfor her own health and growth,and to relateto othersfrom a positionof strength.15Since she is differentthan at stage I, she can now relateto othersand to the world in a different way than when "fallen": she can relate without losing herself. The account is different from Heidegger's in that stage II is a necessarypre-requisiteof, but not identicalor necessarilyconcurrent with, stage III. At stage II the individualchooses for herself alone without her choices' being affected by close intimate involvements with other people; at stage III she is able to choose together with others in a way that still expressesand thus enhancesher "ownmost potentialityfor being." She can now be part of a largersocial unit without loss of her identity. While there is no guaranteethat stage II 156

marjore we/nzweig will be followed by stage III ratherthan a regressionto stage I when one undertakesto relateto othersin a moreintimatemannerin a relationshipsuch as livingtogether-both stage II and stage III autonomy can be lost as well as gained-the achievement of stage II is a necessary condition for the achievement of stage III. Given the developmentof autonomousbeingoneself, it is then both possibleand desireableto enter into relations with others which enhance rather than destroyindividualautonomy. On Heidegger'saccount the two changes-discovery of self and ability to relateautonomouslyto others-occur together,logicallyas well as temporally.The interpositionof stage II does justice to Mill's insight: that one develops an identity by making one's own choices. The fact that autonomous being oneself must be completed by autonomousbeing with others at stage III, however, does justice to Heidegger'sinsight that the two senses of autonomy require each other:that ultimatelya totallyself-orientedexistenceis not the highest developmentof humanpotentiality.The accountis thus in accordance with the relationalratherthan the atomisticconcept of the self. Jessie Bernard(1972, 108, 308) claims that becausehuman beings want and need both securityand freedom,thereare limits to the happiness that may be achievedin marriage(which providessecurityat the expense of freedom). The present three-stageschema gives us a way of reconcilingtheseopposites,whichcorrespondto the contradictory argumentsabout autonomyand livingtogetherin SectionsII and III of this paper, in such a way as to avoid some of the more destructive aspectsof "security."Havingtakenadvantageof the possibilities for individualdevelopmentat stage II, the individualcan then return to a mode of livingwhichoffers "security"and makesomethingmore enrichingand less destructiveout of it than at stage I. At stage three, "living together"is one appropriatelife style, since this arrangement is one socially available format in which autonomousrelatingto othersis possible. HoweverI do not mean to imply that autonomous being with others is possible only in what I heredefine as a "livingtogether"situation-that is, as a memberof a pair. Hopefully the women's and gay liberationmovementswill lead to the developmentof a numberof psychologicallyand socially feasible alternativelife-styles in which individualsmay conjointly satisfy their needs for affection, sex, companionship,"sharing," and selfvalidation, and thus conjointly achieve autonomyand individuality. The answer, then, to the question of whether a feminist should choose a marriage-likerelationshipis as follows: 1. Only after achieving"autonomousbeingoneself" at what I have describedas stage two of individualdevelopment. 157

hypatia 2. Only if it is the kind of relationshipin whichthe partnerscan attain autonomousbeing-together,as describedherein and designated as stage three of individualdevelopment. 3. Not necessarily,even if conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, but then she should choose some other form of close committedrelationship in order to achieve the fullest human development through "autonomousrelatingto others."'"

Notes * I am grateful to Sandra Bartky, Virginia Warren, Vicki Levine and Merrill Ring for their comments on earlier versions of this paper, which were read at the Societyfor Women in Philosophy Southern California meeting, the Philosophy Department Colloquium at California State University, Fullerton, and the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love meetings held in connection with the Eastern Division American Philosophical Association meetings, Boston, Mass, December 1983. 1. "Oppression" has been defined in recent philosophical literature as the absence of these three characteristics (Tormey 1973-4, 216; Bartky 1979, 34). 2. The notion is derived from such thinkers as John Stuart Mill (1962, 192) and the existentialists, e.g. Camus (1955, 46-47); Sartre (1969, 67-72) and Kierkegaard (1956, 70-1, 122, 142). Bishop (1979, 68-77) argues that if children are to be able to exercise the right to self-determination as adults they must be trained to develop those personality traits which involve the capacity of making choice autonomously. Carol Gilligan (1982, 78, 82, 85, 165) has recently stressed the importance of a woman's taking responsibility for herself to her moral development. 3. For examples of philosophers' espousal of the "double standard" of sexual morality see Rousseau (1911, 321ff) and Fichte (1869, 398 ff). 4. Even such'a feminist as Mill assumes that this is the best arrangement for married women (1970, 178-9). 5. Jessie Bernard (1972, 41-43, 56-7) argues that for women marriage involves a "re-definition of the self." Studies show that personality changes take place involving a "more negative self-image." See also Seidenberg 1973, 53ff). 6. Mill recognized this particular oppressiveness of the living together situation when he claimed that the slavery to which women are subjected is worse than that of But it cannot be so with other slaves: "'Uncle Tom' has his own life in his 'cabin'.... the wife" (1970, 159-60). 7. Nor are these restrictions merely the same in nature as those which inevitably accompany any choice, as MerrillRing has brought to my attention. While it is true that any choice which one makes restrictsthe range of her other choices, the nature of this particular social arrangementis such that it imposes, both by explicit fiat and as its unavoidable consequences, a broad range of restrictionson other choices. These restrictionsare therefore of a more profound nature than those which are implied in the making of just any choice. 8. This kind of role playing is central to Firestone's critique of "romantic love" (1970, ch. 7). See also Masters and Johnson (1975, 203) on the benefit of the "sense of being mutually commited" with respect to the sexual responsiveness of both partners. 9. These benefits of "committment" for the development of individuality give rise to an argument for marriage over simply "living together." In marriage the commitment of the partners is recognized and sanctioned by society, and is regarded as a more substantial commitment than simply living together (O'Driscoll 1977, 260-1 and Wasserstrom 1975, 244-5). On the other hand, there are various reasons why living

158

marjorie weinzweig together may be more conducive to the development of autonomy and individuality than is marriage. (1) Since in having such a relationship the individuals are not doing what society wants, they may feel less obligated to live up to society's expectations of the format which a relationship should take. This would be particularly true of lesbian relationships. (2) The legal restrictions placed by the state on the form a marriage relationship must take may interfere with the development of equality in the relationship. For example, the state does not allow for complete financial independence of married partners from each other. (3) There might be less "falling into bad habits" in the unmarried situation: since each individual is legally free to leave, one would be more careful to behave well towards him or her. 10. Gilligan (1982, 131-2, 156-7, 159-160) discovers a similar duality between male and female constructions of identity, where male identity is built on separateness from others, self-expression and achievement, whereas female identity is based on care and responsibility within the context of relationships. 11. "The 'they', which is nothing definite, and which all are . . . prescribes the kind of Being of every-dayness .... That tendency of Being-with ... is grounded in the fact that Being-with one-another concerns itself as such with averageness .... This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the 'leveling down' of all possibilities of Being . . . because the 'they' presents every judgement and decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability. ... In these modes one's way of Being is that of inauthenticity and failure to stand by one's Self." (Heidegger 1962, 164-6). 12. Richards (1980, 184-193, 284) criticizes "feminists" for deliberately making themselves unattractive to men, thereby making feminism an "unpopular movement." For a critique of Richards' position, see Weinzweig (1983, 133-135). 13. "Dasein's resoluteness towards itself (its attaining authenticity) is what first makes it possible for it to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality for being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. . . . Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another." (Heidegger 1962, 344, parenthetical addition mine). 14. This account is based on the model of the Hegelian dialectic, in which the development of self and society proceeds by a series of moves from a given condition to its opposite, and then back again to the first condition but in such a way that a higher position is reached which "synthesizes" the two opposites. See e. g. Kierkegaard (1956); Marx (1961, 1959). 15. According to Bernard (1972, 259-61) these characteristics are necessary to having a good relationship with others. An account of this type could explain Carol Gilligan's analysis of the development of morality and identity in females. Adopting Chodorow's (1978, 174) discovery that the fact that women have been responsible for child care results in females defining themselves in terms of their relations to other people, Gilligan stresses the importance of women's learning to care for themselves as a pre-condition to being able to truly care for others (1982, 78, 82, 85). Until this step is taken, women lose themselves in self-sacrifice and equivocation (84-5, 157, 159). However, Gilligan does not explain how it is possible for females, while still defining themselves primarily in terms of their relationships, to make the move whereby the self acquires importance instead of being subordinated to others. The interposition temporally and logically of my intermediate stage explains how it is possible for a woman to reclaim her self and thus reorient herself in her relationships so as to avoid loss of self. Although the details of personal development are different for men and women, the formal structure of the development process is the same: the individual first absorbs, then rejects, society's generalized (and gender opposite) expectations for him or her, finally making out of them something of "her own." At the third stage the results for

159

hypatia men and women thus converge, with men appreciating the importance of positive caring in intimate relationships, and women the importance of self assertion and differentiation. Furthermore, if the account of this paper is correct, males also "sacrifice themselves'" at the initial stage of their development, denying the emotional and relational sides of their nature, and their true interests, in order to conform to the generalized expectations that they "achieve", etc. in competitive society. 16. It is the position of this writer that a marriage type relationship is not an appropriate setting for the raising of children, even if both partners have achieved the third stage of autonomy and are thus able to care for chidren with what Ruddick calls "attentive love." Because children necessarily begin by depending on others for their sense of self, it is important not only that they be provided with a variety of role models and ways to choose autonomy but that they be protected from the pressures of being swept up into the parents' way of life when that is the only life style practiced in the household. A household consisting of a number of adults is more likely to provide a number of alternative ways of daily living, and thus ways of being, from which the child may choose, and thus to provide the child with some protection from the pressures of conformity to the life style of the couple. In addition to recognizing the danger of such pressures to conformity in a dyad, Chodorow's work points to the importance of having males as well as females in the roles of primary providers of child care (1978, 128, 227). Such an arrangement is more likely to be realized in a household consisting of a number of adults, as described by Firestone.

160

references Addelson, Kathryn Pyne. 1982. Words and lives. In Feminist theory: A critique of ideology, ed. Nannerl Keohane, et al. Chicago: Chicago University Press. al-Hibri, Azizah. 1984. In Research in philosophy and technology, V. VII. ed. Paul T. Durbin. London: JAL Press. Allen, Jeffner. 1984. Motherhood: The annihilation of women. In Mothering: Essays in feminist theory, ed. Joyce Trebilcot. NJ: Rowman and Allenheld. Amos, Valerie and Pratibha Parmer. 1984. Challenging imperial feminism. Feminist Review 17: 1-19. Annas, George. 1984. Extracorporeal oxygenation in neonates. Hospital Practice April: 139-151. Anthias, Floya and Nira Yuval-Davis. 1983. Contextualizing feminism-gender, ethnic and class divisions. Feminist Studies 15: 62-74. Atkinson, Ti-Grace. 1969. Radical feminism; and The institution of sexual intercourse. Both in Notes from the second year, Boston: Women's Liberation. Arditti, Rita, Renate Duelli Klein and Shelley Minder eds. 1984. Test tube women: Whatfuturefor motherhood? Boston: Pandora Press. Balbus, Isaac. 1982. Marxism and domination. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Barry, Kathleen. 1979. Female sexual slavery. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. . 1982. On the history of cultural sadism. In Against sadomasochism: A radicalfeminist analysis, ed. Robin Ruth Linden, Darlene Pagano, Diana Russell, and Susan Leigh Star. East Palo Alto, CA: Frog in the Well Press. Bartky, Sandra. 1979. Psychological oppression. In Philosophy and women, eds. S. Bishop and M. Weinzweig, 33-41. Belmont: Wadsworth. Bartlett, R.H. 1984. Extracorporeal oxygenation in neonates. Hospital Practice April: 139-151. Beauvoir, Simone de. 1953. The second sex. Trans. H.M. Parshley. NY: Knopf. Bell, Michael Davitt. 1980. The development of American romance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The social construction of reality. Garden City: Anchor Books. Bernard, Jessie. 1972. The future of marriage. NY: Bantam Books. Bishop, Sharon. 1979a. Self-determination and autonomy. In Philosophy and women, eds. S. Bishop and M. Weinzweig, 68-77. Belmont: Wadsworth. 161

hypaia -. 1979b. Love and dependency. In Philosophy and women, eds. S. Bishop and M. Weinzweig, 147-154. Belmont: Wadsworth. Bleier, Ruth. 1984. Science and gender: A critique of biology and its theories on women. NY: Pergamon Press. Blum, Larry, Marcia Homiak, Judy Housman, and Naomi Scheman. 1973-4. Altruism and women's oppression. Philosophical Forum V: 222-247. Brown, Carol. 1981. Mothers, fathers and children: From private to public patriarchy. In Women and revolution. See Sargent 1981. Cahill, Susan, ed. 1982. Motherhood. NY: Avon Books. Califia, Pat. 1981. Feminism and sadomasochism. Heresies 3 (4): 30-34. Camus, Albert. 1955. The myth of Sisyphus. Trans. J. O'Brien. NY: Vintage Books. Casler, Lawrence. 1973. Toward a re-evaluation of love. In Symposium on love, ed. M.E. Curtin. NY: Behavioural Publications. Chodorow, Nancy. 1974. Family structure and feminine personality. In Women, culture and society, eds. Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. .1978. The reproduction of mothering: Psychoanalysis and the sociology of gender. Berkeley: University of California Press. Chopin, Kate. 1972. The awakening. NY: Avon Books. Cixous, Helene. 1983. Portrait of Dora (trans. by Sarah Burd). Diacritics. Corea, Gena. 1985. The mother machine: Reproductive technologies from artificial insemination to artificial wombs. NY: Harper and Row. Cott, Nancy. 1977. The bonds of womanhood: Women's sphere in New England 1780-1835. New Haven: Yale University Press. Culpepper, Emily. 1985. Simone de Beauvoir and the revolt of the symbols. Trivia, 6. Daly, Mary. 1978. Gyn/Ecology: The metaethics of radical feminism. Boston: Beacon. .1984. Pure lust: Elemental feminist philosophy. Boston: Beacon. Derrida, Jaques. 1978. Eperons, les styles de Nietzsche (Spurs, Nietzsche's styles). Trans. B. Harlow. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Deutsch, Helene. 1944. The psychology of women: A psychoanalytic interpretation, I. NY: Grune & Stratton. 162

references 1945. The psychology of women, Vol. II. Motherhood. NY: Bantam Books. Dill, Bonnie Thornton. 1983. Race, class and gender: Prospects for an all inclusive sisterhood. Feminist Studies 9 (1): 131-150. Dinnerstein, Dorothy. 1976. The mermaid and the minotaur. NY: Harper and Row. Dreyfus, Hubert. 1975. The priority of the world to my world: Heiddegger's answer to Husserl (and Sartre). Man and World 8 (2). Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow. 1982-83. Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and Hermenentics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dworkin, Andrea. 1974. Womanhating. NY: Dutton. --. 1981. Pornography: Men possessing women. NY: Perigee/G.P. Putnam & Sons. Duras, Margaret. 1982. From an interview. In Motherhood, ed. S. Cahill. NY: Avon Books. Eisenstein, Hester. 1983. Contemporary feminist thought. Boston: G.K. Hall and Co. Eisenstein, Zillah, ed. 1979. Capitalist patriarchy and the case for socialist feminism. NY: Monthly Review Press. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1982. The family in political thought. Amherst MA: University of Massachusetts Press. Enchi, Fumiko. 1983. Masks. NY: Vintage Books. Engels, Friedrich. 1973. The origin of the family, privateproperty,and the state. In Thefeminist papers, ed. A. Rossi. NY: Bantam Books. Faderman, Lillian. 1981. Surpassing the love of men: Romantic friendships and love between women from the Renaissance to the present. London: Junction. Felman, Shoshana, ed. 1982. Literature and psychoanalysis: The question of reading: Otherwise. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Felstiner, Mary Lowenthal. 1980. Seeing The Second Sex through the second wave. Feminist Studies 6 (2); 247-276. Ann Ferguson. 1981a. Patriarchy, sexual identity and the sexual revolution. Signs 7 (1):158-72. 1981b. The Che-Lumumba School: Creating a revolutionary ----. family-community. Quest 5 (3): 13-26. ---. 1984a. On conceiving motherhood and sexuality. In Mothering. See Trebilcot 1984. ---. 1984b. Sex war: The debate between radical and libertarian feminists. Signs 10 (1): 106-112. ---. 1985. mss. Public patriarchy and how to fight it: A tri-systems view. ---.

163

hypata . 1986. forthcoming. Blood at the root: Motherhood, sexuality and male dominance. London and Boston: Routledge. Ferguson, Ann and Folbre, Nancy. 1981. The unhappy marriage of capitalism and patriarchy. In Women and revolution. See Sargent 1981. Fichte, Johann. 1869. The science of rights. Philadelphia: Lippincott. Firestone, Shulamith. 1970. The dialectic of sex. NY: William Morrow & Co. Flax, Jane. 1978. The conflict between nurturance and autonomy in mother-daughter relationships. Feminist Studies 4 (2). Folbre, Nancy. 1983. Of patriarchy born: The political economy of fertility decisions. Feminist Studies 9 (2): 261-284. ---. 1984. mss. A patriarchal mode of production. Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish. Trans. Alan Sheridan. NY: Pantheon Press. ---. 1978. The History of Sexuality, 1: An Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. NY: Pantheon Press. 1980a. Introduction to Herculin Barbarin: Being the recently -----. discovered memoirs of a nineteenth century French hermaphrodite. Trans. Richard McDougal. NY: Pantheon Press. ---. 1980b. The history of sexuality: An interview. Trans. Geoff Bennington. Oxford Literary Review 4 (2): 3-14. 1980c. Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other ----. writings. Ed. Colin Gordon. NY: Pantheon Press. ---. 1982-83 On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of work in progress. In Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. See Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982-83. ---. 1983. The subject and power. Afterword. In Dreyfus and Rabinow. Fraser, Nancy. 1981. Foucault on modern power: Empirical insights and normative confusions. Praxis International. 1 (3). Freedman, Estelle B. and Barrie Thorne. 1984. Introduction to the feminist sexuality debates. Signs 10 (1): 102-105. Freud, Sigmund. 1905. The transformations of puberty. In Three essays on the theory of sexuality, ed. James Strachey. NY: Basic Books. --. 1908. On the sexual theories of children. In Collected Papers, II. NY: Basic Books. - . 1925. Some psychological consequences of the anatomical distinctions between the sexes. In Collected Papers, V, 190, ed. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press. Gallop, Jane. 1982. The daughter's seduction: Feminism and psychoanalysis. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ---

164

references Gardiner,Linda. 1983.Choiceand change.Paperdeliveredat Eastern Division, APA, Baltimore. Gilligan,Carol. 1982. In a different voice. Cambridge,MA: Harvard UniversityPress. Gilman, CharlottePerkins. 1973. The yellow wall paper. Old West bury, NY: The FeministPress. Gimenez,MarthaE. 1979.Theoriesof reproductivebehavior:A marxist critique.Review of RadicalPolitical Economics 11: 17-24. --. 1984. Feminism, pronatalismand motherhood. In Mothering. See Trebilcot 1984. Goffman, Erving. 1961. Asylums. NY: Anchor. Glover, Jonathan. 1984. Whatsort of people should there be? NY: Penguin Books. Gordon, Linda. 1979. The struggle for reproductivefreedom. In Capitalistpatriarchy and the case for socialist feminism. See Eisenstein1979. 1982. Woman'sbody, woman'sright. NY: PantheonBooks. ---. Gornick,Vivian,ed. 1971. Womenin sexistsociety. NY: BasicBooks. Gorovitz, Samuel. 1982. Doctor's dilemmas.NY: Macmillan. Gorz, Andre. 1980. See Hirsh, 1981. Gould, Carol. 1980. Contemporarylegal conceptions of property. Journal of Philosophy. ---. 1984. Private rights and public virtues:Women, the family, and democracy. In Beyond domination, ed. Carol Gould. Totowa, NJ: Rowmanand Allanheld. Griffin, Susan. 1980. Sadism and catharsis: The treatment is the disease. In Takeback the night, ed. LauraLederer.NY: William Morrow. Harris,D. R. 1961. The concept of possessionin Englishlaw. In Oxford essays in jurisprudence,ed. A.G. Guest. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress. Harding, Sandra and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds. 1983. Discovering reality. Boston: D. Reidel PublishingCompany. Harding, Sandra and Shakuntla Byaya. 1982. Review of O'Brien. Signs, Winter82: 361-363. Hartmann, Heidi. 1981. The unhappy marriage of marxism and feminism. In Womenand revolution. See Sargent1981. Hartsock, Nancy. 1974a.Money, sex and power. NY: Longmans. 1974b. Political change:Two perspectiveson power. Quest, ---. 1 (1).

- . 1983. The feminist standpoint:Developingthe ground for a specificallyfeminist historicalmaterialism.In Discoveringreality. See Hardingand Hintikka 1983. 165

hypatia Hawthorne, Nathaniel. 1983. (First published in 1852) The Blithedale Romance. ----. 1840. Love letters to Sophia Peabody. In The development of American romance. See Bell, 1980. Hegel, G.W.F. 1931. The phenomenology of mind. Trans. S.B. Baillie. London: Allen and Unwin. Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and time. Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. NY: Harper and Row. Held, Virginia. 1973-4. Marx, sex and the transformation of society. Philosophical Forum V: 168-184. Hirsh, Arthur. 1981. The French New Left: An intellectual history from Sartre to Gorz. Boston: South End Press. Hollibaugh, Amber and Cherrie Moraga. 1983. What we're rolling around in bed with: Sexual silences in feminism. In Powers of desire, ed. Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharon Thompson. NY: Monthly Review Press. Honore, A.M. 1961. Ownership. In Oxford essays in jurisprudence, ed. A.C. Guest. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hubbard, Ruth. 1982. Have only men evolved? In Biological womenThe convenient myth, ed. Hubbard et al. Boston: Schenkman. Husserl, Edmund. 1931. Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology. Trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. London: Allen and Unwin. . 1960. Cartesian meditations. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Nighoff. Irigaray, Luce. 1985. This sex which is not one. Trans. Claudia Reeder. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. - . 1974. Speculum de I'sutrefemme. Paris: Editions de Minuit. Jackson, Margaret. 1983. Sexual liberation or social control? Women's Studies International Forum 6 (1): 1-17. Jaggar, Alison. 1983. Feminist politics and human nature. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld. Jeffreys, Sheila. 1986. The spinster and her enemies: Feminism and sexuality 1880-1930. London & NY: Routledge. Jonel, Marissa. 1982. Letter from a former masochist. In Against sado-masocism:, A radical feminist analysis, ed. Robin Ruth Linden, Darlene Pagano, Diana Russell, and Susan Leigh Star. East Palo Alto, CA: Frog in the Well Press. Josephs, Gloria. 1981. The incompatible menage a trois: Marxism, feminism and racism. In Women and revolution. See Sargent 1981. Kass, Leon. 1979. Making babies revisited. The Public Interest 54 (Winter): 32-60. Keane, Noel P. and Dennis L. Breo. 1981. The surrogate mother. NY: Everest House. 166

references Ketchum, Sara Ann. 1977. Liberalism and marriage law. In Feminism and philosophy, eds. M. Braggin, F. Elliston and J. English, 264-276. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield Adams & Co. Kierkegaard, Soren. 1956. Fear and trembling and the sickness unto death. Trans. W. Lowrie. NY: Anchor Kittay, Eva Feder. 1984. Pornography and the erotics of domination. In Beyond domination, ed. Carol C. Gould. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld. Kitzinger, Sheila. 1978. Women as mothers. Random, NY: Vintage Books. Kristeva, Julia. 1980. L'Autre du sexe, Sorcieres 10. ---. 1979. About Chinese women. Paris: Urizen Press. Kontos, Alkis. 1979. Powers, possessions and freedom. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Lacan, Jacques. 1980. Desire and the interpretation of desire in Hamlet. Trans. James Hulbert. In Literature and psychoanalysis. See Felman 1982. ---. 1977. lcrits, a selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. NY: W.W. Norton and Company. ---. 1978. The fourfundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Alan Sheridan. NY: W.W. Norton and Company. Landes, Joan. 1982. Powers, possessions and freedom. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Laslett, Peter. 1963. Introduction to Two treatises of government by John Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. LeGuin, Ursala. 1976. The left hand of darkness. NY: Harper and Row. Locke, John. 1963. Two treatises of government. Ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lorde, Audre. 1984. Sister outsider. NY: Crossing Press. Lugones, Maria C. and Elizabeth V. Spelman. 1983. Have we got a theory for you! Feminist theory, cultural imperialism and the demand for the 'woman's voice'. Women's Studies International Forum 6 (6) 573-581. MacKinnon, Catharine. 1979. The sexual harassment of working women. New Haven: Yale University Press. -. 1982. Feminism, marxism, method and the state: An agenda for theory. Signs 7 (3) (Spring 1983): 515-44. ---. 1983. Feminism, marxism, method and the state: Toward feminist jurisprudence. Signs 8 (4): (Autumn): 635-658. MacPherson, C.B. ed. 1978. Property: Mainstream and critical positions. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. - . 1973. Democratic theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 167

hypatia ---.

1978. The meaning of property. In Property, MacPherson, ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ---. 1962. The political theory of possessive individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marks, Elaine and Isabelle de Courtivron, eds. 1980. New French feminisms. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. Martin, Del. 1977. Battered wives. NY: Pocket Books. Martin, Biddy. 1982. Feminism, criticism and Foucault. New German Critique (27): 3-30. Marx, Karl. 1959. Manifesto of the Communist Party. In Marx and Engels, ed. L.S. Feuer. NY: Anchor. -- -. 1967. 1844 Economic and philosophical manuscripts. In Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, eds. and trs. Lloyd Easton, and Kurt Guddat. NY: Doubleday. Mansfield, Harvey. 1979. On the political character of property in Locke. In Powers, possessions and freedom, ed. Alkis Kontos. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Masters, William and Virginia Johnson. 1975. The pleasure bond. NY: Bantam Books. Mauss, Marcel. 1967. The gift. Trans. Ian Cunnison. NY: Norton. McMillan, Carol. 1982. Women, reason and nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. McMurtry, John. 1975. Monogamy: A critique. In Philosophy and Sex, eds. R. Baker and F. Elliston. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1962. The phenomenology of perception. Trans. Colin Smith. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Mill, John Stuart. 1962. On liberty. Cleveland: Meridien Books. ---. 1970. The subjection of women. In Essays in Sex Equality, ed. A. Rossi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Miller, Jean Baker, 1976. Toward a new psychology of women. Boston: Beacon Press. Mitchell, Juliet. 1974. Psychoanalysis andfeminism. NY: Pantheon. Mitchell, Juliet, and Jacqueline Rose, eds. 1982. Feminine sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the ecolefreudienne. Trans. Jacqueline Rose. NY: W. W. Norton and Company. Moraga, Cherrie and Gloria Azaldua, eds. 1981. This bridge called my back: Writingsof radical women of color. Boston: Persephone Press. Morgan, Robin. 1980. Theory and practice: Pornography and rape. In Take back the night, ed. Laura Lederer. NY: William Morrow. Morris, Meaghan and Paul Patton, eds. 1979. The pirate's fiancee: Michel Foucault: Power, truth, and strategy. Australia: Feral Publications. Nicholson, Linda. 1985. Feminism and socialism. 168

references 1986. Gender and history: The limits of social theory in the age of the family. NY: Columbia University Press. Nietzche, Friedrich. 1956. The geneology of morals. Trans. F. Golffing. NY: Doubleday Anchor. Notman, Malkah and Carol Nadelson. 1984. Changing views of the relation between feminists and reproduction. In Notman and Nadelson, 1984, Vol. II. Notman, Malkah, and Carol Nadelson. 1978. The Woman Patient: Vol. I, Sexual and Reproductive Aspects of Women's Health Care. 1982. The Woman Patient: Vol. II, Concepts of Femininity and the Life Cycle. 1984. The Woman Patient: Vol. III, Agression, Adaptation and Psychotherapy. Plenum Press. O'Brien, Mary. 1981. The politics of reproduction. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. O'Driscoll, Lila. 1977. On the nature and value of marriage. In Feminism and philosophy, eds. M. Braggin, F. Elliston and J. English, 249-263. Totawa, NJ: Littlefield Adams & Co. Pennock, J. Roland. 1980. Property. Nomos XXII. NY: New York University Press. Piercy, Marge. 1976. Woman on the edge of time. NY: Fawcett Crest. Plummer, Kenneth. 1975 Sexual stigma: An interactionist approach. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Raymond, Janice. 1979. The transsexualempire: The making of the shemale. Boston: Beacon. .1984. Feminist ethics, ecology and vision. In Test tube women. See Arditti, Klein and Minden 1984. ---. 1986. A passionforfriends: Toward a philosophy offemale affection. Boston: Beacon. Rajchman, John. 1984. The story of Foucault's history. Social Text (8): 3-24. Ramsey, Paul. 1972. Shall we reproduce? Parts I and II. Journal of the American medical Association 220: 1346-1350 and 1480-1485. Rich, Adrienne. 1976. Of woman born. NY: Norton. -. 1979. Toward a woman-centered university. In On lies, secrets and silence: Selected prose 1966-1978. NY: W.W. Norton & Company. 1980. Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence. Signs: ---. Journal of Women in Culture and Society 5 (4): 631-60. Richards, Janet Radcliffe. 1980. The sceptical feminist. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rossi, Alice P. 1977. A biosocial perspective on parenting. Daedulus 106, #2 (Spring): 1-32. ---.

169

hypatia Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1911. Emile. Trans. BarbaraFoxley. London: J.M. Dent & Sons. Rothchild, Joan. 1983. Machina ex dea: Feminist perspectives on technology.NY: PergamonPress. Rowland,Robyn. 1984.Reproductivetechnologies:The final solution to the woman question? In Test tube women. See Arditti, Klein and Minden 1984. Rubin, Gayle. 1975. The traffic in women. In Towarda new anthropology of women, ed. RaynaReiter.NY: MonthlyReviewPress. 1981. Sexual politics, the new right and the sexual fringe. In ---. Theage taboo: Gaymalesexuality,power and consent,ed. Daniel Tsang. Boston: Alyson Publications. Coming to Power. See SAMOIS 1982. ---. 1984. Thinkingsex: Notes for a radicaltheory of the politics of sexuality.In Pleasureand danger:Exploringfemale sexuality. See Vance 1984. Rubin, Gayle, Deirdre English, and Amber Hollibaugh. 1981. Talking sex. SocialistReview 11 (4): 43-62. ---. 1982.The leathermenace:Commentson politicsand S/M. In Ruddick, Sara. 1984. Maternal thinking. In Mothering:Essays in feminist theory. See Treblicot 1984. ---. 1984. Preservativelove and militarydestruction:Some reflections on motheringand peace. In Mothering:Essays in feminist theories. See Trebilcot 1984. Russ, Joanna. 1975. Thefemale male. NY: Bantam. SAMOIS. ed. 1982. Coming to Power: Writingsand graphics on lesbian S/M. Boston: Alyson Publications. Sanday, Peggy Reeves. 1981. Female power and male dominance. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Sargent,Lydia, ed. 1981. Womenand revolution.Boston: South End Press. Sartre,Jean Paul. 1969.Beingand nothingness.Trans.Hazel Barnes. London: Methuen. Sayers,Janet. 1984.Feminismand mothering:A Kleinianperspective. Women'sStudies InternationalForum 7 (4): 237-242. Schwarzer,Alice, ed. 1984.After the SecondSex: Conversationswith Simone de Beauvoir. NY: Pantheon. Scott-Smith, Daniel. 1974. Family limitation, sexual control and domesticfeminism. In Clio's consciousnessraised,eds. M. Hartman and L.W. Banner.NY: Harperand Row. Seidenberg,Robert. 1973. Marriagebetweenequals. NY: Anchor.

170

references Shanley, Mary Lyndon. 1982. Marriage contract and social contract in seventeenth century political thought. In Thefamily in political thought. See Jean Bethke Elshtain 1982. Showalter, Elaine. 1971. Women writers and the double standard: Victorian notions of motherhood. In Women in sexist society. See Gornick 1971. Simon, Wm. and John H. Gagnon, 1973. Sexual conduct: The social sources of human sexuality. Chicago: Aldire. Simons, Margaret A. 1984. Motherhood, feminism and identity. Hypatia. Women's Studies International Forum, 7 (5): 349-359. Simpson, Rennie, 1983. The Afro-American female. In Power of desire: The politics of sexuality, eds. Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharo Thompson. NY: Monthly Review Press. Singer, Peter and Deane Wells. 1984. The Reproductive revolution: New ways of making babies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, Janet Farrell. 1983. Parenting and property. In Mothering: Essays in feminist theory. See Trebilcot 1984. Smith-Rosenberg, Carol. 1975. The female world of love and ritual: Relations between women in nineteenth century America. Signs 1 (1):1-29, Snitow, Ann and Carole Vance. 1984. Towards a conversation about sex in feminism: A modest proposal. Signs 10 (1) 126-135. Stillman, Peter. 1980. Property, freedom and individuality in Hegel's and Marx's political thought. In Property. Nomos XXII. See Pennock 1980. Stone, Lawrence. 1977. The family, sex and marriage in England, 1500-1800. NY: Harper and Row. Taylor, Charles. 1979. Atomism. In Powers, possessions and freedom. See Kontos 1979. Tormey, Judith Farr, 1973-4. Exploitation, oppression and selfsacrifice. In Philosophical Forum V: 206-221. Trebilcot, Joyce, ed. 1984. Mothering: Essays in feminist theory. NJ: Rowman and Allanheld. Tully, James. 1980. A discourse on property. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. U.S. House of Representatives. 1985. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology. No. 142, August 8-9, 1984. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. Vance, Carol S., ed. 1984. Pleasure and danger: Exploring female sexuality. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

171

hypatia Wagner,Sally Roesch. 1982. Pornographyand the sexualrevolution: The backlashof sadomasochism.In Againstsadomasochism,ed. Robin Ruth Linden, DarlenePagano, Diana Russell, and Susan Leigh Star. East Palo Alto, CA: Frog in the Well Press. Wasserstrom,Richard. 1975. Is adulteryimmoral?In Today'smoral problems, ed. Wasserstrom.NY: MacMillan. Weinzweig, Marjorie. 1983. Philosophy, femininity and feminism. Philosophicalbooks XXIV (3): 129-136. Whitbeck,Caroline. 1984a.A differentreality:Feministontology. In Beyond domination. See Gould 1984. -. 1984b. Love, knowledge and transformation. Hypatia. Women'sStudiesInternationalForum, 7 (5): 393-405. Woolf, Virginia. 1929. A room of one's own. NY: Harcourt,Brace and World. Zita, Jacqueline.1982.Historicalamnesiaand the lesbiancontinuum. In Feminist theory:A critiqueof ideology, eds. Nanerl Keohane et al. Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress.

172

notes on contributors CherylH. Cohenis a second-yeargraduatestudentin philosophyat the Universityof Massachusettsat Amherst.She has a BS in philosophy from PortlandStateUniversity,Portland,Oregon.Sheis also the single motherof a six year old. Anne Donchin is assistantprofessor of philosophyand former Coordinatorof the Women'sStudiesProgramat IndianaUniversity/Purdue University at Indianapolis. A founding "mother" of the SouthwesternSociety for Women in Philosophy, she teaches and publishesprincipallyin the areasof feministphilosophyandbiomedical ethics.Sheis the motherof fournon-technologically producedchildren. Ann Fergusonteachesphilosophyand Women'sStudiesat the University of Massachusetts/Amherstwhere she is a member of a new graduate program in .Social, Political and Recent Continental Philosbphy.The latteris uniquein thatits students,severalof whosearticles are in this volume, specializein feministphilosophyat the Ph.D level. She is a lesbianmotherand step-mother,a socialist-feministand an activistagainstU.S. interventionin CentralAmerica.Suchoverlapping politicalcommunitiesas these createconstantstruggle,feelingsof anxietyand ambivalence,yet greathope. She is currentlyworkingon a book entitled Blood at the Root: A Tri-SystemsApproach to Motherhood, Sexuality and Male Dominance (to be published by Routledgeand KeganPaul). CynthiaA. Freeland receivedher Ph.D from the Universityof Pittsburgh. Since 1978, she has been at the Universityof Massachusettsat Amherst where she teaches and does researchin Greek philosophy, aestheticsand philosophicalissues of psychoanalysis. Reyes Lazarowas born in Bilbao, the BasqueCountry,in 1956. She graduatedin philosophy from the Universityof Bilbao and studied journalismin Barcelona.In 1979, she receiveda scholarshipto the AmericanStudiesDiplomaProgramat SmithCollege.She is currently a Ph.D candidate in the AlternativeTrack in Social and Political Philosophyat the Universityof Massachusettsat Amherst. 173

hypati Janice Raymond is Associate Professor of Women's Studies and MedicalEthics at the Universityof Massachusettsin Amherst.She is the authorof The TranssexualEmpire: The Makingof the She-Male (Boston:Beacon Press, 1979)and of the recentlypublishedA Passion for Friends:A Philosophyof FemaleAffection (Boston:BeaconPress, 1986).She is also a co-founderof FINRRAGE,the FeministInternational Network of Resisitance to Reproductive and Genetic Technologies. JanaSawickiteachescontinentalphilosophy,philosophyof scienceand feministtheory at the Universityof Maineat Orono. She is currently developing a feminst frameworkbased on hermeneuticand poststructuralistmethods. JanetFarrellSmithis AssociateProfessorof Philosophyat the University of Massachusettsin Boston. She receivedher Ph.D at Columbia University.Her writingsinclude articles in philosophy of logic and languageas well as articleson social philosophy. MarjorieWeinzweig,formerlyprofessorof philosophyat California StateUniversityat Fullerton,is an attorneywith the CaliforniaDepartment of IndustrialRelations. She is co-editor of Philosophy and Womenand author of various articlesin phenomenology,theory of knowledgeand feministtopics in philosophy.Her presentinterestsin law includelabor relations,employmentdiscrimination,and constitutional law of equal protectionand due process. She graduatedfrom StanfordLaw Schoolin 1981at the age of 46, the oldestmemberof her class by several years. Her most interestingcases include a school desegregationsuit againsta NorthernCaliforniaschool district,work on the litigationregardingCalifornia'spregnancyleave requirement, and a sexualharrassmentsuit againsta Bakersfieldcar dealer. She is currentlyservingon a CaliforniaStateBarLaborLaw Sectioncommittee on comparableworth and is working on a paper on pregnancy leaves, comparableworth and the conceptof equality.

174

announcements Work and Caring editors announce a call for papers Women, to be included in a collection of essays exploring both the experience of providing care and the social context within which caregiving occurs. They welcome essays which examine caregiving in both the informal sector and the formal wage labor force (in such occupations as teaching, childcare, nursing and social work). Send papers or abstracts to Emily K. Abel, Research Associate, UCLA Center for the Study of Women, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024, or to Margaret K. Nelson, Associate Professor, Department of Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT Sociology/Anthropology, 05753. An Interdisciplinary Conference on Gender/Culture/Politics, April 10-12, 1987, is announced by The Program in Comparative Literature and Theory and the Women's Studies Program at Northwestern University. Sessions included will be on Masculinity, Femininity, and Cultural Constructions of the Political; Sex, Race and Class; Women as Culture-Makers and the Politics of Cultural Transmission; and The Politics of Sexuality. For more information contact Program in Comparative Literature and Theory, 150 Kresge Hall, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201. Women and health is the theme of the Upstate New York Women's History Organization's annual meeting to be held October 24-25, 1986, at the State University of New York at Plattsburgh. The conference will include a session where scholars may present works in progress for comment. To participate, send a brief description of your work and note that it is for this special session. Proposals for papers, panels and workshops should be sent to Anita Rapone, Department of History, SUNY-Plattsburg, Plattsburg, NY 12901. Feminist Teacher is a non-profit, multidisciplinary magazine committed to combatting sexism and other forms of oppression in the classroom. The magazine is published three times a year and is designed for teachers at all grade levels, preschool through graduate school, and those in traditional as well as nontraditional settings. Feminist Teacher is published by an editorial collective whose members believe that politics and teaching do mix. For more information write to Feminist Teacher Magazine, Ballantine 442, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405. 175

hypatia The Women's Bulletin Board is a free service for the women's community. While electronic communication will never replace face-to-face interaction, it is another way to organize and publicize events, inform ourselves about women's issues, and share technological skills. The WBB is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, feminist computer network and does not discriminate in terms of religion, color, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. The Women's Bulletin Board can be reached at (212) 885-0969 at 300 or 1200 baud, 24 hours a day. Women's organizations, as well as individuals, are encouraged to access the WBB to organize us and inform us about your events. If you need help getting on-line, call (212) 885-1687 (Angela: voice/answering machine). The Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Davis, announces a faculty position for a distinguished philosopher at the senior level. AOS: contemporary metaphysics or theory of knowledge. AOC: philosophy of mind or philosophy of language. Normal load: five courses/year, quarter system, dissertation supervision. Candidate must have a record of significant publications and a genuine interest in teaching at the undergraduate as well as the graduate level. Salary to $68,000 or overscale in special cases. Appointment begins September 1987. Send application to Joel Friedman, Chair, Philosophy Department, University of California, Davis, CA 95616. 916/752-0607. Society for Women in Philosophy: Pacific SWIP: Executive Secretary Rita Manning, UC San Jose State; San Jose, CA 95192. TreasurerRuth Doell, San Francisco State University, Dept. of Biological Sciences, 1600 Holloway Ave., San Francisco, CA 94132. Midwest SWIP: Executive SecretaryNancy Skeen, University of South Dakota, Dept. of Philosophy, Vermillion, SD 57069. Treasurer Carol Van Kirk, Ohio University, Dept. of Philosophy, 310 Gordy Hall, Athens, OH 45701. Eastern SWIP: Executive Secretary Libby Potter, Hamilton College, Dept. of Philosophy, Clinton, NY 13323. Treasurer Jana Sawicki, University of Maine, Dept. of Philosophy, Orono, ME 04469. The Directory of Women in Philosophy is available from the Executive Secretary in each division. Cost is $2.00. The fall meeting of the Midwest SWIP will be hosted by the University of Wisconsin in Madison, Wisconsin, and will take place Oct. 10-12, 1986. For information about local arrangements, contact Terry Winant or Claudia Card, Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706. 176

annorncements The 1987 National Women's Studies Association Conference, "WeavingWomen's Colors: A Decade of Empowerment,"will convene at SpelmanCollege in Atlanta, Georgia, June 24-28, 1987. The conference,sponsoredby SpelmanCollege, Agnes Scott College, and EmoryUniversity,will explorethe intersectionof raceand gender.The call for proposalsare availablefrom the conferenceoffice. Proposal submissiondeadlineis October15, 1986. For more informationplease contact NWSA '87, EmoryUniversity,P.O. Box 21223, Atlanta, GA 30322, (404) 727-7845. TheCanadianJournalof FeministEthicsannouncestheirfirstissue. The co-editors, who work in departmentsof religious studies and English,have taughtcoursesin feministtheoryand feministethicsand have felt a need for a forum in print in which to discussthese areas. Sincethe contentsof this publicationare intendedto reflectthe needs and interestsof the readers/participants, we might also includeshort book reviews,abstractsof recentwork in the field, and communications aboutwomen'sstudiescoursesandaboutconferencesin this field. To receivethe nexttwo issuesof CanadianJournalof FeministEthics pleasesend $5.00 to: CanadianJournalof FeministEthics, Concordia University,C/O Dept. of Religion,1455De MaisonneuveBlvd. West, Montreal,QuebecH3G 1M8. AIDS The Societyfor the Philosophyof Sex and Love will be meetingin San Francisco,CA, in March 1987, in conjunctionwith the Pacific Divisionof the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation. The Societywill be devotingits sessionto AIDS. We welcomepapers on the ethical,legal, social, cultural,and politicaldimensionsof AIDS. Papersshouldhave a readingtime of roughlytwentyminutes(10-12 pages,excludingfootnotes,double-space).Sendtwo copiesof the paper to the addressbelow, preparedfor blind reviewing.Includepostageif returnof manuscriptsis desired.DEADLINE:October15, 1986.(May be extendedin specialcases.) Alan Soble, P.O. Box 493, St. Joseph, MN 56374-0493. The 8th Annual PolarityTherapy,HealthyPsychologyand Traditional Mexican Healing Seminar,will be held near Puerto Vallarta, Mexico January10-24, 1987. Taughtby Leslie Korn MA, MPH and JanetSchreiber,two feministswho foundedthe Centerfor Traditional Medicinein Mexico in 1975. For a brochureor informationon other seminarscontact: Center for TraditionalMedicine;P.O. Box 1526; Cambridge,MA 02238;(617)489-3806. 177

hypatia San Francisco State University announces a tenure-track opening in the Philosophy Department. AOS: Philosophy and Religion, with ability to teach a selection of courses on philosophy of religion, religious thinkers,, and comparative religious thought. AOC: Ability to teach courses in some philosophical fields and/or historical periods. Also must be able to teach informal logic/critical thinking. Ph.D. or ABD in Philosophy required. Earned doctorate required for award of tenure. Responsibilities: Four courses a semester (distributed among the Philosophy Department's three degree programs and the University's Religious Studies minor), coordination of Philosophy and Religion B.A. program and Religious Studies minor, some committee and research obligations. Rank: Assistant or Associate Professor, depending on previous experience and record of achievement. Salary: $24,168-$36,672. San Francisco State University is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer. We especially encourage members of protected classes (minority, disabled, women, and Vietnam veterans) to apply. We will interview on campus, and at the 1986 Pacific Division and Eastern Division meetings. Please send letter of application, vita, letters of recommendation, and any other supporting materials to Professor Donald Provence, Chair, HRT Committee, Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132. Closing date: November 10, 1986. Appointment to begin in the Spring semester, 1987, or, if successful candidate is unable to take up the appointment at that time, in the Fall semester, 1987.

178

__

submission guidelines Hypatia solicitspaperson all topics in feministphilosophy.We will regularlypublishgeneralissuesas wellas specialissueson a singletopic, or comprisingtheproceedingsof a conferencein feministphilosophy.All papersshouldconformto HypatiastyleusingtheAuthor/Datesystemof citingreferences(seethe ChicagoManualof Style).Papersshouldbe submittedin duplicatewiththe author'snameon the titlepageonly for the anonymousreviewingprocess. The Forwm,edited by MariaLugones, will publishshort papers(2-3 pages)on a designatedtopic,in orderto furtherdialoguewithinfeminist philosophy. Papers on the topic Celibacy should be submittedby December1, 1986to MariaLugones,BoxY, Valdez,NewMexico,87580. 7he ook Review sectionwillpublishreviewsof publicationsin feminist philosophy.To proposepublicationsfor review,querythe Book Review Editor:JeffnerAllen,Women'sStudies,EasternMontanaCollege,1500 N. 30thSt., Billings,Montana,59101.

SpecialIssues History of Womenin Philosophy. We welcomeabstracts,papers,and proposals for guest editing issues on specific historical periods, philosophers,or researchquestions. Papers should conform to the Hypatiastyle.All materialsshouldbesubmittedin duplicateto: Margaret A. Simons, Editor,Hypatia, SouthernIllinoisUniversityat Edwardsville, Edwardsville,IL 62026-1437.Deadlinefor abstractsandissueproposals:May 1, 1987. French Feminist Philoophy, edited by Sandra Bartky and Nancy Fraser.Paperson any aspectof Frenchfeministphilosophyshouldbe submittedto: SandraBartky,Departmentof Philosophy,Universityof Illinoisat Chicago,Chicago,IL60650;andto NancyFraser,Department of Philosophy,NorthwesternUniversity,Evanston,IL 60201.Deadline for submissions:December1, 1986. FeminnistPerspecives on Scince, edited by Nancy Tuana. We welcomesubmissionson topicsin thehistory,philosophy,andsociology of thenaturalandbehavioralsciencesapproachedfromfeministperspectives. We are also interestedin discussionsand critiquesof current feminist scholarshipin these areas. Papers should be submittedin duplicateto: NancyTuana,Artsand Humanities,JO 3.1, Universityof Texasat Dallas,Richardson,TX 75083-0688.Papersmustbe receivedby October1, 1986. Papersfor generalsubmissionand all othercorrespondence concerning Hypatiashouldbe addressedto: MargaretA. Simons,Editor,Hypatia, SouthernIllinoisUniversityatEdwardsville, IL62026-1437. Edwardsville, 179

NW

-

.

\ \ \\\

zvF.cA feministreviewof literature, artsandculture $9. Writeforsamplecopy. Subscriptions: 207 LindHall,207 ChurchSt. S.E, Mpls.55455

ISSUES FEMINIST

A Publication of the Feminist Forum, Berkeley, California

Feminist Issues is a journal of feminist social and political theory, devoted to an internationalexchange of ideas. It includes articles by English-languagefeminists as well as translationsof feminist texts by women of other countries.

Current and Forthcoming Articles On Radical Feminist Theory, Women in Contemporary World Cultures, Sociological Interviews, Sexual Bias in Scholarly Disciplines, Theoretical Focus on Urgent Issues in Women's Everyday Lives Published biannually, Founded 1980. Subscription Rates: Individuals $15/1 yr., $28/2 yrs.; Institutions $25/1 yr., $47/2 yrs.; Domestic first class add $3.50/yr.; Outside the U.S.A. add $2/yr. surface mail, $7/yr. airmail. Single copies (min. order $10): $7.50/individuals, $12.50/institutions. ISSN:0270-6679 Pleaseaddressinquiriesand ordersto: TransactionPeriodicalsConsortium Department 7010 Rutgers-TheStateUniversity New Brunswick,NJ08903

__

JOURNALOF FEMINIST STUDIESIN RELIGION The JOURNAL OF FEMINISTSTUDIES IN RELIGION is a channel for the disseminationof feministscholarshipin religion and a forum for discussion and dialogue among women and men of differingfeminist perspectives. The JOURNAL has two parents:the academy,in which it is situated, and the feminist movement, from which it draws its nourishment and vision. Its editors are committed to rigorousthinkingand analysisin the service of the transformationof religiousstudies as a disciplineand the feminist transformationof religious and cultural institutions. Two issuesper year.

EDITORS: Judith Plaskow, Manhattan College, and Elisabeth SchUsslerFiorenza,EpiscopalDivinitySchool

Subscriptions:

Individual$15, Institutions$25, Student $12. Address inquiries to membership services, Scholars Press, P.O. Box 1608, Decatur, GA 30031-1608

Editorial Correspondence Judith Plaskow, JFSR, Dept of Religious

and ManuscriptStudies,MahattanCollege, Bronx,N.Y. 10471 Submissions: (4 copies)

new

from guide

your

searching

to ^,

-A

.

I

|s-*

a using personal

computer Our recentlypublished20-page bookletwill show you how to turnyour personalcomputerinto an effective researchtool. Youcan have access to morethan180,000 citationsand abstracts fromthe worldwideliteratureof sociology as fast as you can type "symbolicinteractionist"(or, if you prefer,"structural functionalist").

To receive your free copy, simply returnthe coupon below.And,ifyou wish to attendan SA online user workshop, please be sure to markthe appropriatebox. Mail to: sociological ubsh^.,, inc. P.O. Box 22206 San Diego, CA 92122-0206 Please send me o ne copy of

~ S~~ your guide to cmnagsoaoguca sgaa ptersonal computer. abstracts usinig __

The Guide contains: * Hints on search strategies * A review of Boolean logic * Sample searches conducted on user-friendly systems

_

__

___

_

_

e

Send to: Name-please print Institution StreetAddress City

· A glossary of terms, and more...

L

State

Zip

I wishto attendan csnlinetrainingsessionin myarea 0. The best timefor me wouicdbe (give month)

* ISSN 0023-8295

guide

your

to

Our recentlypublished20-page bookletwillshow you how to turnyour personalcomputerintoan effective researchtool. Youcan have access to morethan80,000 citationsand abstracts fromtheworldwideliterature of sociology as fastas you can type"sociolinguistics" (or,if you prefer,"discourseanalysis"). The Guide contains: * Hints on search strategies * A review of Boolean logic * Sample searches conducted on user-friendly systems * A glossary of terms, and more... r-----------------------^-----I I ORDERFORM and LanguageBehavior Linguistics Abstractsis publishedquarterly.Each I issue is fully-indexed. $147 1-yearsubscription, L Separateyearlycumulativeindex,$53 with ordered (if , regularsubscription, $48) (iforderedby non-subscriber, $90) I i i [ User'sManual,2nd edition,$26.50 i I (Allcited pricesincludepostage and handling) L- ---_---_---------------

-_

J_

searching

using

a

personal computer To receiveyourfree copy, simply returnthecouponbelow.And,ifyou wish to attendan LLBAonlineuserworkshop, please be sureto markthe appropriate box.

Please send me one copy of

your guide to Linguistics & Language Behavior Abstracts using a personal computer. Send to: Name - please print Institution StreetAddress State

City

Zip

Iwish to attendan onlinetrainingsession in myarea 1. The best time for me would be (give month) mm_m m m m

m

m

m

LINGUISTICS ANDLANGUAGE BEHAVIORABSTRACTS P.O. Box22206, San Diego, CA 92122

mm

mmlm

Co##i##4j(' ELLES QUIACTIVE UNEREVUE SON MILIEU Traitede sujets relies a la condition des femmes 3585, St-Urbain,Montreal,Que. H2X2N6 T61.(514)844-1761 Individuel: 12$/an. Institutions: 18$/an.

Research Philosophyand Phenomenological AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY FOUNDED BY MARVIN FARBER

Editors:ERNEST SOSA and RODERICK

M. CHISHOLM

in cooperation with a distinguished group of American and foreign scholars

PPR publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required in submissions. An abstract not exceeding z50 words and two nonreturnable copies of any manuscript submitted for publication are required. Address All Communications to: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research BROWN UNIVERSITY, BOX I947 RHODE ISLAND 02912

PROVIDENCE,

Annual subscription rates: $I7.00 (foreign, $i8.50) for libraries and institutions $13.oo for individuals; single copies $4.25 (double issue, $8.50) and $3.z5 (double issue, $6.o5), respectively. There is an additional charge for postage and handling on all back issues. A circular listing the main contents of the journal and a list of available back issues will be sent upon request.

IDEALISTIC

STUDIES

Journalof Philosophy AnInternational Press PublishedbyClarkUniversity Editor:WalterE.Wright

Issued three times a year, Idealistic Studies is a journal for studies of philosophical idealism. Both historical and contemporarystatements of idealistic argumentation are welcomed, as are also critical studies of idealism. EditorialAdvisoryBoard:John P. Anton (Emory),Peter A. Bertocci (Boston),J.N. Findlay(Boston),ErrolE. Harris(Northwestern),Klaus Hartmann,(Bonn), ReinhardLauth(Munich),H.D. Lewis (London), PaulRicoeur(Paris),GeorgeA.Schrader, NicholasRescher(Pittsburgh), W.H.Walsh(Edinburgh). Jr.(Yale),CharlesE. Scott (Vanderbilt), individuals, for $10.00; libraries and Yearly subscription rates institutions,$20.00. Single copies: $4.00. All communication regarding manuscripts, subscriptions, and publication should be sent to the Editor,Department of Philosophy, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts 01610.

DIALOGUE Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie Vol. XXV, No. 1, Spring/printemps 1986 Editorial Articles Dialogue ou les bienfaits du pluralisme / VENANT

CAUCHY

Dialogue: 1961-1986/ H. M. ESTALL Canadian Philosophy from a Cosmopolitan Point of View / J. T. STEVENSON

Two Concepts of Community or Moral Theory and Canadian Culture / WESLEY CRAGG

The Natural History of Philosophy in Canada / THOMAS MATHIEN Canadian Philosophy: The Nature and History of a Discipline? A Reply to Mr. Mathien / LESLIE ARMOUR

Aspects of the Philosophy of Kai Nielsen / HUGO MEYNELL Redacteur francophone: Francois Duchesneau, Departement de philosophic, Universit6 de Montreal, C.P. 6128, succ. A, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7

Canadian Idealism, Philosophical Federalism, and World Peace / J. DOUGLAS RABB

The Faces of Reason and Its Critics / ELIZABETH TROTT and LESLIE ARMOUR

Entre la philosophic et la science: le reconstructionnisme hermeneutique de J. Habermas / CLAUDE PICHE Structuralisme et empirisme: l'approche ensembliste des theories physiques / JEAN LEROUX

Le fascisme ne serait-il ni a gauche ni a droite? A propos d'un livre de Sternhell / JOSEPH PESTIEAU

English-language editor: Michael McDonald, Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3GI

Teaching

Philosophy Contents

September, 1986

Stephen Satris KathrynRussell& LynRobertson EugeneHargrove VirginiaKlenk John Portelli M.W. Jackson David Hitchcock& EliasBaumgarten Fransvan der Bogert Reviews

m Vol. 9/3

StudentRelativism TeachingAnalyticReading and Writing Moria:A ComputerSimulationfor IntroductoryPhilosophy Self-Paced Logic WithoutComputers On Reed and DiscussingPhilosophy withChildren Using the LockeGame ConflictingAffairs TheCase of "TheBorrowedSyllabus"

Subscriptions (4 issues):$16 individuals;$35 others.Add $2 forpostage outside the USA.Send ordersto the PhilosophyDocumentationCenter,BowlingGreen State University,BowlingGreen,OH 43403-0189. Edby ArnoldWilson,Universityof Cincinnati,Cincinnati,OH 45221-0206.

THE OUIUNALOF THE ICBtTISH SOCIETY FOR CPHEIOMENOLOY An InternationalReviewof Philosophyandthe HumanSciences EDITOR:WOLFEMAYS

Volume 17, Number2, May 1986 Articles Gaston Bachelard- Phenomenologueof ModernScience,by AlfonsGrieder Gadamer and the Ontology of Language:What RemainsUnsaid, by FrancisJ. Ambrosio A Critiqueof Criticismof Husserl'sUse of Analogy,by KathleenM. Haney Towarda ConcreteOntologyof PracticalReasonin Lightof Heidegger'sLectures on HumanFreedom,by FrankSchalow Heidegger'sContributionto a Phenomenologyof Culture,by GregorySchufreider Temporalityin Dreams:A HeideggerianCritiqueof Dennett'sDreamTheory,by GordonG. Globus Reviewsand Notes The JBSP publishespaperson phenomenologyandexistentialphilosophyas well as contributionsfromother fieldsof philosophy.Papersfromworkersin the Humanities andhumansciencesinterestedin the philosophyof theirsubjectwillbe welcome. All papersandbooksforreviewto be sentto theEditor:Dr. WolfeMays,Department of Philosophy,Universityof Manchester,ManchesterM139PL, England.Subscription and advertisementenquiriesto be sent to the publishers:Haighand Hochland Ltd., The PrecinctCentre,OxfordRoad, Manchester13,England.

D1o1sr Ily v:y

lyyun

A Hebrew PhilosophicalQuarterly Founded by Martin Buber, S. H. Bergman, Julius Guttmann, S. Ucko PUBLISHED by the S. H. Bergman Centre for Philosophical Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in collaboration with the Jerusalem Philosophical Society. EDITOR:

David Heyd

Y. Yovel (Chairman), G. Bar-Elli, A. Z. EDITORIAL BOARD: Bar-On, M. Dascal, D. Heyd, S. Pines, M. Shalgi, R. Sigad, E. Talmor, E. M. Zemach.

IYYUN publishes articles, critical studies and reviews in all fields of philosophy,irrespectiveof the author'sphilosophical school or methodof inquiry.English summariesare appended. Annual subscriptionfor individuals $10, for institutions $15. Foreign Postage: add $1 to subscription. Back issues are available.

the

of

review

metaphysi a philosophical quarterly MARCH 1986

I

VOL. XXXIX, No. 3

articles S. J. WILSMORE SARAH WATERLOW BROADIE W. W. TAIT DANIELT. DEVEREUX PAUL STERN

ISSUE No. 155

1

$8.00

The Normative Structure of Art On What Would Have Happened Otherwise: A Problem for Determinism Plato's Second Best Method Particular and Universal in Aristotle's Conception of Practical Knowledge The Problem of History and Temporality in Kantian Ethics

textual commentary THOMAS PRUFER JANICE FLOERSCHand Staff philosophical

abs tracts

IndividualSubscriptions $21.00 The Catholic

The Dramatic Form of Phaedo Summaries and Comments

announcements

index

InstitutionalSubscription $32.00 Jude P. Dougherty, Editor University of America, Washington,

D.C. 20064

Student Subscriptions

$10.00

W

hat'sthebestmen's - theonethat magazine withhow dealsmosthonestly menrelateto eachother,to womenand to kids;theonethat'sgay-affirmative andopposessex-rolestereotypes; the onethatmovingly men'shurts explores andjoys?Esquire? Soldier of Playboy? Fortune? Uh-uh.It'sChanging Men. . . a hostof Recentissueshaveaddressed topics(some"taboo" intriguing malerape,gay elsewhere), including work,and fiction,porn,blue-collar Americans in helpingthe Contras Thisis a magformenwho Nicaragua. their reallycareaboutthemselves, brothers andtheirsisters - everywhere." - SanfordBerman,

in theUtneReader Regularsubscription$16 (4 issues) Samplecopy of currentissue $4.50

Issues in Gender, Sex & Politics 306 N. Brooks Madison, WI 53715

·

The

Journal

of

II

Philosophy

SUBSCRIPTIONS

Individuals Librariesand institutions Students, retired/unemployed philosophers Postage outside U.S.

$20.00 $25.00 $15.00 $ 5.00

BACK VOLUMES

Published bi-monthly 1904-1976, monthly thereafter. All back volumes and individual issues are available, also a Cumulative Fifty-year Index, 1904-1953 and a Ten-year Supplemental Index, 1954-1963. Back volumes 1976present also available in microform. Please inquire for price lists and shipping charges on back orders. 720 PHILOSOPHY HALL, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NYC 10027

FEMINIS STUDIES

__

ThreeIssuesAnnuallyBack/Single 1 2 3 Issue

year years years Individuals$19.50 $35.80 $ 52.00 Institutions$39.00 $73.70 $108.50

$8 $16

ForeignOrders Addpostage Surface: $4/year Airmail: $14/year

.

c

t

MailOrders To: FEMINIST STUDIES

Women's Studies Program Universityof Maryland CollegePark,MD20742 9-:

Volume 12,1986: andInformal Elizabeth Barbara Careto theFrailElderly. Abel,AdultDaughters Caine,TheSistersof Beatrice Madeline DavisandElizabeth Webb. andtheStudyofSexuality OralHistory Kennedy, Lapovsky in theLesbian NewYork,1940-1960. Rosario Kitchen: How Buffalo, Ferre,TheWriter's Community: FallfromtheFryingPanintotheFire,trans.byDianaVelez.SusanStanford to LetYourself Friedman, andtheChildbirth Gender inLiterary Difference Discourse. Gear,The Josephine Creativity Metaphor: inSmall-Town Woman asImage-Maker America. ofRevolt Hall,TheWriting Jacquelyn Baby'sPicture: Barbara Women's of Prison. Mervat Third World Narratives Harlow, Hatem, againstChivalry. Sexuality andGender inSegregated Patriarchal The Case of and Systems: Eighteenth- Nineteenth-Century Egypt. Feminist Friends: andtheEmergence ofWomen's Quakers NancyHewitt, Agrarian Rights.JamesOliver FreeBlacks.HilaryKlein,Marxism, GenderConventions Horton, amongAntebellum Psychoanalysis, andMotherNature.BethKowaleski-Wallace, WomenWritersandthe Lockean Eighteenth-Century Educational Judith Walzer American Women's to DeathandDebility Fears Leavitt, Responses Paradigm. inNineteenth-Century of Women TheDilemma Traders inSouthIndia. Childbirth. Johanna Lessinger, of Production in and Mode 1860-1950. Household Central Johnson Florencia Bernice Peru, Mallon, Reagon, African Women: ofCultural Workers. Claire AnAfrican TheMaking Women's Robertson, History, Diaspora in the Transition to the The Review,andProspectus. Memoir, SonyaRose,Gender Factory: Segregation 1850-1910. Deborah A Letterto MyDaughter/Myself onFacing Samuelson, EnglishHosieryIndustry, theCollective Fearof BeingDifferent. JudithSealander, TheRiseandFallof Feminist Organizations inthe1970s: TheStatusofWomen NiaraSudarkasa, inIndigenous African AzarTabari, Societies. Dayton. TheWomen's Movement in Iran.REVIEWS FeeandRuthFinkelstein, RubyRich,Louise byElizabeth Yelin.CREATIVE WORK Varo. by JaneLazarre, LyndaSchor.ARTby Eleanor Antin,Remedios

of the Organizationfor Researchon inmJoural Womenand Communicationof the Western Speech CommunicationAssociation Featuringdescriptive and empirical studies, book reviews, and syllabi concerning gender and communication derivingfromsuch perspectives as interpersonalcommunication,small group communication,organizationalcommunication, the mass media, and rhetoric YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION (Includes membershipin the Organizationfor Research on Womenand Communication) $8.00 Student $12.00 Regular $15.00 Institutional Send check to: Sonja Foss, Departmentof Speech Communication,Universityof Denver, Denver,CO80208 MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSIONS Send four copies preparedin accordance with The MLAStyle Sheet to:

KarenA. Foss, Departmentof Speech Communication,HumboldtState University, Arcata,California95521

,r, S : ':

S~~

· ..........:... s'-.:...:

:.

.

...>.. .

'

J

. . ....'*'ftftAS*

"':: 2fsSs^^ .'f

..I

.

H: H:

9

^

'

^

A

^A

^ .^ OF JOURNAL

g^1

· :.. .,s .. .....:..

.

..

.

...:

:..

' .:.:.. ; *vA:

>

.

.

w ^^ gi.

..

FALL 1986

/Ij; I z

MOTHERHOOiiAW fc, 3 edite

W

;... .

..

7i

...

" .s io |i Subs'

l duals$20

-::i~ttions

-,::X-X-f:.··:

v : -.:H . a
:£

'

'yerguson

y of Massachusetts,Amherst

Unive

- ;-.,

eI

:'·::~i j R~

:

SEXUALITY

~.~::

:..':~

:

Editor'::H.-' ai

-.

$10*airnail.

......................... .: ..

' i. Southern.Illinois. iversityat Edwardsville ' ..Sf Edwards-flle,J ,.''''''' l|l...I1c26-1437... .,, t

!,:i:!~!:R.

-

-

:..

GRADUATE WOMEN'S

STUDIES

SPECIALIZATIO In The M.A. in Philosophy * Earn credentials in both Philosophy and Women's Studies in one 12-month program * Assist in and qualify to teach both subjects * Engage in independent feminist research * Workclosely with highly qualified interdisciplinary faculty * Gain valuable experience in women-oriented institutions and activities * Assistantships available

Writetoday:

Dr. Sheila Ruth Graduate Women's Studies Advisor Dept. of Philosophical Studies Box 1433 SOUTHERN ILLINOISUNIVERSITY AT EDWARDSVILLE Edwardsville, IL62026-1433 An AffirmativeAction, Equal Opportunity Employer