No title

Spring 1986

A JOURNAL

Femipit

OF

Pbilosoply

Hypatia JOURNAL OF

Femipt

PbiIoop1y

Spring 1986 Volume 1, Number 1

Hypatia (Hy-pay-sha) was an Egyptian woman philosopher, mathematician, and astronomer who lived in Alexandria from her birth in about 370 A.D. until her death in 415. She was the leader of the Neoplatonic School in Alexandria and was famous as an eloquent and inspiring teacher. None of Hypatia's writings are extant; her work was lost, presumably, in the destruction of the library at Alexandria in 640. The journal Hypatia is named in honor of this foresister. Her name reminds us that although many of us are the first women philosophers in our schools, we are not, after all, the first in history. Hypatia has its roots in the Society for Women in Philosophy, many of whose members have for years envisioned a regular publication devoted to feminist philosophy. Hypatia is the realization of that vision; it is intended to encourage and communicate many different kinds of feminist philosophizing.

Hypatia is published by the Editors, Hypatia, a not-for-profit corporation. Hypatia will publish two issues in 1986, its first year as an autonomous journal, and three issues in each successive year. Subscription rates for 1986 are: Institutions, $40.00/year; Individuals, $20.00/year. Foreign orders add postage: $5.00/year to Canada, Mexico and overseas surface; $10.00/year to overseas air. Lifetime suscriptions are available to charter subscribers for $400. Single copies will be sold for $20.00 (libraries and institutions) and $10.00 (individuals). A 40% discount is available on bulk orders for classroom use or bookstore sales. Address all editorial and business correspondence to the Editor, Hypatia, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, Edwardsville, IL 62026-1437. Notice of nonreceipt of an issue must be sent within four weeks after receipt of subsequent issue. Please notify us of any change of address; the Post Office does not forward third class mail. Copyright © 1986 by HYPATIA, Inc. All rights reserved. Hypatia was first published in 1983 as a Special Issue of Women's Studies International Forum, by Pergamon Press. The first three issues of Hypatia appeared respectively as vol. 6, no. 6; vol. 7, no. 5; and vol. 8, no. 3 of Women's Studies International Forum. They are available as back issues from Pergamon Press, Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, NY 10523.

MargaretA. Simons, Southern Illinois Universityat Edwardsville Assistant Editors TameraBryant KittyHenderson TheresaNorman CathySurack KateTaylor Business Manager LaurenRuff Editorial Staff CindyKaman Ellen Sears Advisory Board ElizabethBeardsley,TempleUniversity Simonede Beauvoir(France) GertrudeEzorsky,BrooklynCollegeof City Universityof New York ElizabethFlower, Universityof Pennsylvania VirginiaHeld, GraduateCenterof City Universityof New York GraciellaHierro(Mexico) JudithJarvisThompson,MassachusettsInstituteof Technology MaryMothersill,BarnardCollege MerrileeSalmon, Universityof Pittsburgh Anita Silvers,San FranciscoState University Editorial Board KathrynPyne Addelson, Smith College Azizah al-Hibri(Editor, 1982-84),Cambridge,Massachussetts JeffnerAllen, CaliforniaState University,Chico JacquelineAnderson,OliveHarveyCollege, Chicago Asoka Bandarage,BrandeisUniversity SandraBartky, Universityof Illinoisat Chicago SharonBishop, CaliforniaState University,Los Angeles Donna Serniak-Catudal, Randolph-MaconCollege LorraineCode, TrentUniversity BlancheCurry,Shaw College ElizabethEames, SouthernIllinois Universityat Carbondale SusanFeathers,Universityof Pennsylvania Ann Ferguson,Universityof Massachusetts,Amherst Jane Flax, Howard University Nancy Fraser,NorthwesternUniversity Ann Garry,CaliforniaState University,Los Angeles CarolGould, Steven'sInstituteof Technology SusanGriffin,Berkeley,California Donna Haraway,Universityof California,Santa Cruz SandraHarding,Universityof Delaware Nancy Hartsock,Johns Hopkins University

Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Northeastern Illinois University Alison Jaggar, University of Cincinnati

ElizabethJaneway,New York

Evelyn Fox Keller, Northeastern University Rhoda Kotzin, Michigan State University Lynda Lange, University of Alberta Helen E. Longino, Mills College Maria Lugones, Carlton College Linda Lopez McAllister, University of South Florida at Ft. Meyers Patricia Mann, City College of New York Ann Matter, University of Pennysylvania Kathryn Morgan, University of Toronto Janice Moulton, Smith College Andree Nichola-McLaughlin, Medgar Evars College Linda Nicholson, State University of New York, Albany

Susan Ray Peterson,New York

Connie Crank Price, Tuskegee Institute Sara Ruddick, New School of Social Research Betty Safford, California State University, Fullerton Naomi Scheman, University of Minnesota Ruth Schwarz, University of Pennsylvania Joan Shapiro, University of Pennsylvania

ElizabethV. Spelman,Smith College JacquelineM. Thomason,Los Angeles

Joyce Trebilcot, Washington University, St. Louis Nancy Tuana, University of Texas at Dallas Caroline Whitbeck, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Gwen Weaver White, Roosevelt University Iris Young, Worcester Polytechnic Institute Jacqueline Zita, University of Minnesota

contents

Volume 1, Number 1

Valerie A. Hartouni Kathleen Wider

Merrie Bergmann

Diana T. Meyers Andrea Nye Kathryn Pauly Morgan

Editorial

1

Antigone's Dilemma: A Problem in Political Membership

3

Women Philosophers in the Ancient Greek World: Donning the Mantle

21

How Many Feminists Does It Take to Make a Joke?: Sexist Humor and What's Wrong With It

63

The Politics of Self-Respect: A Feminist Perspective

83

Preparing the Wayfor a Feminist Praxis

101

Romantic Love, Altruism, and Self-Respect

117

reviews Claudia Card

Oppression and Resistance: Frye's Politics of Reality

149

comment/reply Laura M. Purdy Nancy Tuana

Nature and Nurture: A False Dichotomy

167

A Response to Purdy

175

Announcements

179

Notes on Contributors

181

Submission Guidelines

183

editorial This issue of Hypatia, the first of our inaugural volume as an independent journal, reflects the breadth and depth of feminist philosophy. The articles range from discussions of the women philosophers in ancient Greece to the nature/nurture distinction in contemporary science. The authors work within traditions ranging from existentialism to analytic philosophy of language. Their subjects of interest vary from sexist humor to romantic love; from the concept of self-respect to the role of Antigone as a model for feminists. What they share is a feminst commitment to understanding and ending the sexist oppression of women, and a sense of the relevance of philosophy to that task. Members of the Society for Women in Philosophy created Hypatia to address that task, to provide a forum for dialogue on the philosophical issues raised by the women's liberation movement. Hypatia was launched in 1983 as "a journal within a journal," published as special annual issues of Women's Studies International Forum (WSIF), under the editorship of Azizah al-Hibri. WSIF published three issues of Hypatia under this arrangement from 1983-1985. As an autonomous journal, we will continue to publish a combination of general issues and special issues on a single topic, or comprising papers from a conference. We are currently soliciting papers for special issues on "Feminist Perspectives on Science," edited by Nancy Tuana, and on "French Feminist Philosophy," edited by Sandra Bartky and Nancy Fraser. In addition to publishing full length articles, we will continue to publish critical reviews of books in feminist philosophy, and critical responses to articles for the Comment/Reply section. As a new feature, we are creating a Forum section for the publication of short (2-3 page) philosophy papers on a designated topic. The Forum, edited by Maria Lugones, is designed to encourage philosophical dialogue on a single topic through the accelerated publication of short papers. The topic for the first Forum, to appear in our next general issue, is "Competition in Feminist Philosophy." For deadline dates, information on submitting a paper for the Forum, for one of the special issues, or for general submissions to Hypatia, please see the Submission Guidelines. This issue has been long in the making and would not have been possible without the generous support and encouragement of many persons. I gratefully acknowledge the support of Barbara Teters, Vice President and Provost of Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville; 1

hypatia David Butler, Dean of the School of Humanities;Galen Pletcher, Chairpersonof the SIUE Departmentof PhilosophicalStudies;and those Philosophy graduate students in the Department'sGraduate Specializationin Women's Studies who have served as Assistant Editors for Hypatia: Tamera Bryant, Kitty Henderson, Theresa Norman, Cathy Surack,and Kate Taylor. I am indebtedas well to the membersof the Hypatiaeditorialboard for their leadershipand assistanceduringthe last two years, to the authorswho have stayedwith us duringthis long transitionperiod,to the scholarswho have read manuscriptsfor us (see Announcements), and to our subscriberswhose faith in our futurehavemadethis issuea reality. I would also like to thank Phyllis Hall at PergamonPress; Clare Moses, of FeministStudies;and the following membersof the SIUE and neighboring communities for their personal support: Alice Aslind, SusanAdes, John Celuch,Pam DeCoteau,BarbaraCrowder, J.J. DeRousse, Elizabeth Eames, Paul Gaston, Edward Hudlin, Vaughnie Lindsey, Joe Melosi, Maria Melosi, Stephanie Robbins,Jan Scott, MikelsSkele, MargaretStapleton,Alvin Sullivan, Joyce Trebilcot, Jean Vassier, and with special thanks to Hypatia's BusinessManager,LaurenRuff.

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valeriea. hartouni Antigone's Dilemma: A Problem in Political Membership What constitutes an adequate basis for feminist consciousness? What values and concerns are feminists to bring to bear in challenging present standards of well-being and articulating alternative visions of collective life? This essay takes a close and critical look at these questions as they are addressed in the work of political theorist Jean Elshtain. An outspoken defender of "pro-family feminism," Elshtain has urged contemporary feminists to reclaim the "female subject" within the private sphere. Enormous problems attend Elshtain's counsel and these have as much to do with the political implications of her argument as with her reading of the Sophoclean tragedy Antigone. With an eye towards foregrounding what some of these problems are, this essay elaborates an alternative reading of Sophocles' Antigone and moves from that exposition to an examination of why it is that Elshtain's claims and conclusions are politically unsound and unsustainable.

In a recentarticle, "Antigone'sDaughters,"Jean Elshtain(1982) cautionedfeministsagainstseekingin the modernbureaucraticstatea solution to the growing economic, occupational, political, and reproductivechallengesconfronting women in America. While the state is, as she puts it, the "locus of structured,legitimatepubliclife" (Elshtain 1982, 49), both politicallyand economically,public life is "marked by bureaucraticrationalization"(Elshtain 1982, 50), increasedcentralization,and technocratization.Withinit, she contends, the "policy maker" and the bureaucratare principalactors. They "operate in conformity to impersonal, abstract and rational standards," fashion strategy according to certain technical rules, empiricallaws, and relevant,quantifiabledata, and effect policy which merely serves and enhances state efficiency and control (Elshtain 1982, 51). Lacking the technical expertise, the refined, specialized knowledgeof the elite policy makers,the citizenmemberis merelyan I would like to thank Donna Haraway, Barrie Thorne, Daniel Scripture and, especially, Peter Euben for their many helpful comments and suggestions on various drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Thelma Francis for her generous support and encouragement. Hypatia, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986). © by Hypatia, Inc.

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hypatia occasionalplayer, at best marginalto areasof governmentaldecision makingwhich increasinglyincludemost of the vital fields of human activity.' Feministswho identifytoo fully with the bureaucraticstate-either by "goingpublic"as Elshtainputs it, becomingprincipalactors"in a trulyequalpartnershipwithmen," or by seekingto employthe stateas a meansto securelegal actionon women'sbehalf-run the riskof losing the criticaldistancetheycurrentlypossessto critiqueand opposethe state'sgrowing"powersof surveillanceand controlover all aspectsof intimatesocialrelations"(Elshtain1982,49). The trendof mainstream liberalfeminismoverthe last decadeand a half can be characterized by demandsboth for full publicparticipationand for favorablestate action. The state has been calledupon to effect women'sfull incorporation in all areas of public life-to sponsoraround-the-clockday care centers, to fund abortions,to prohibitdiscrimination,to amend the constitution-therebypromotingthe possibilityof "the transformation of women into public personswith a publicidentity"(Elshtain1982, 48). For thesefeminists,as Elshtaindescribesit, the publicworldis one in which individuals"make real choices, exerciseauthenticpower and have efficaciouscontrol" (Elshtain1982, 49). In contrast,the private sphere-the sphereof the concrete,the particular,and the bodily, with which women have traditionallybeen associatedand by which they have traditionallybeen defined-is seen by these feministsas one in whichindividualsare oppressed,powerless,and dehumanized.Because women have been systematicallyexcludedfrom the sphereof historic action, from public-politicallife and participation,they argue that womenhavebeendeniedthe integrityof a fullyhumanlife. "Menhave claimedthe humanpoint of view [as both publicand privatebeings]: they authorit, they own it" (AndreaDworkin1981,48). For Elshtain,this is only partof the storyand moreby way of footnote than theme. Lost, she claims, on feministsfleeingthe home and seekingto liberateothersfrom it is the fact that full social, economic, and politicalincorporation,and by implicationthe eliminationor absorption of the privatesphereby the public realm will only enhance state intru'sioninto and control over otherwiseautonomousareas of 1. Robert Pranger (1968, 77, 27) "While some types of democratic political theory invite the audience-the large mass of ordinary citizens-to participate occasionally in certain aspects of leadership, as in periodic elections, this is something like asking a person without expertise, but with information gained from watching television on Sunday afternoon, to play for one day on a professional football team. The occasional player gathers little experience, never gains the team's confidence, contributes nothing to the joint enterprise and because of his [sic] inexperience runs the risk of serious injury."

4

valerie a. hartouni sociallife (Elshtain1982,48). Whilewomenmaygaina newpublicidentity by such incorporation,it is merelyformal,legalistic,and abstract, and not, as some feministshavethought,an alternativeidentitymarked by independence,"real"choice,authenticpower,or efficaciouscontrol (Elshtain 1982, 55).2 Citing French feminist Julia Kristeva,Elshtain warnsthatthosefeminismswhich"embracewithoutseriousqualification the governingconsciousnessand normsof socialorganizationof the currentpublicworldserveonly its advancedneedsto rationalize"(Elshtain 1982,52). In view of this, Elshtainurges feministsto reclaimthe "female subject"within the privatesphereratherthan allow or promotethe eliminationof thissphere.Shesuggeststhatwithinthisspherethereexists both the possibilityfor constructinga new base for feminist consciousnessand the possibilityfor rethinkingreceivedcategoriesand sociallife (Elshtain1982,52,57). Locatedhistorically, reconceptualizing "awarethat they have traditionsand values," womencan "bringforwardtheireverydaymaterialworld,an actuallocal and particularplace in the world"(Elshtain1982,56) to put pressureon andcritiquecontemporarypublicpolicyand identities.This wouldbe, she suggests,to reaffirmthe standpointof the mythicfigureAntigone,placingcontemporary womenin a heritageof boldlyopposingthe illegitimateuse andintrusion of state power, of sustaininglife-giving-and-preserving values and of defendingagainstthe state"thatarenaof the socialworldwherehuman life is nurturedand protectedfrom day to day" (Elshtain1982,55). It is curiousbut not entirelysurprisingthatElshtaininvokesthe figure of Antigoneas a model for contemporarywomen. Antigonedefends against the state-as Elshtain would have contemporarywomen, daughtersof Antigone,defendagainstthe state-the claims,duties,and responsibilitiesof the privatesphere. She is a woman who "breaks boundswithestablishedlaw"and "throwssandintothe machineryof arrogantpublicpower"(Elshtain1982,55). By heractionshe recreatesthe possibilityof "community,"of a shared common world that King Creon'styrannyand misuseof publicpowerthreatento destroy.While othersview her actionas "wildand futile"-for she acts againststrong powerwherewomenmustyield-her deedupholdsagainstthe state,the sanctity and integrityof human life. It is Antigone's attitude and 2. Zillah Eisenstein (1981, 343-345) says of Liberal Feminism and the problems of incorporation: "We need to rethink the very issues of Reform and Revolution and their relationship to each other. We need also to come to terms with the consciousness of women today who, as Feminists, demand reform but who, in order to really achieve Liberalism and Feminism are at odds with each equality, would need a revolution.... other given Liberalism's unequal sexual base. ... As a Feminist one has to move beyond Liberalism."

5

hypatia "standpoint"-her defense of the claims of kinship, her loyalty to family honor and to those living and dead-that Elshtainclaims is a new base for consciousnessand a new point of departurefor action. By her action, Antigone assertsthat "there are mattersof such deep significancethat they begin and end wherethe state's right does not and must not run, where politics cannot presumeto dictate to the human soul" (Elshtain 1982, 54). This assertiongains urgencyin a world in which internationalpolitics is likened to poker, chess, dice throwing, or football, or in which the health of sensuous, living human bodies continuesto be confused with the health of the body politic. Antigone is a compellingfigure who has by and large escaped the notice of contemporaryfeminisms. Her dilemma-the challengeshe puts to the state as both a womanand a citizenmemberof the private sphere-prefigures the dilemmaof contemporarywomen althoughin a way that Elshtainentirelyignores.Elshtainomits in her analysisthe controllingfact that Sophocles'dramais a tragedyand that Antigone, for all the honor she may ultimatelydeserve, is not honored in her rebellion but banished from the city, condemnedto die alone and unwept.The ambiguities surrroundingher action and her death become secondaryissues; Elshtainappearscontent to point out only that women are potentiallycapableof noble deeds and consequently fails to note at what price such deeds have often been performed. Womenlike Antigonewho strayfromtheirculturallylegitimatedroles or sphere of activity have been portrayedas corruptive,dangerous, disorderly,and threatening(Dworkin 1974;parts I and II). However noble their acts may finally appear, they are, as Antigone was, first silenced,destroyed,or nullified.A closer look at the dramaitself will bring this point into focus. Antigone illustratesthe extent to which women's status as citizen memberswithin Athenian society was a politically problematicand contested issue. While women composed "half of the free population"and werein this sensecitizenmembers,they wereneither free nor citizens in the culturally articulatedsense of the words. Citizenship was at least partially predicated upon public-political association. It was throughpublic participationand associationthat one was educatedin the obligations,duties, and habitsof livingwhich providedfor and sustainedthe possibilityof a commonlyheld world.3 Confined to the private sphere, women's obligations and duties 3. Carol Gould (1976, 23) points out that women could not be Greek citizens in any political sense of the word: "Since women could not rule or govern, since they were excluded from participation in governance and since such participation was taken to

6

valerie a. hartouni engaged them in activities which had an exclusively functional or biologicalend-the productionand reproductionof life. This activity did not transcenditself morallyor existentiallynor was it transactedin associationamongequals.Whileactivityin the privatespheresustained and maintainedthe possibility for collective life and thus constituteda necessarycondition for it, it was not in itself distinctiveof humannature."Becausemen [sic]sharedsuchnecessitywith all other species, these qualitiescould hardlybe definitiveof their humanity; what was definitive was political"-that activity which "alone permit[ted]men to live as equals, free, underno masterbut the law, givingthem the opportunityfor biography as well as biology" (Peter Euben 1978, 214). To the extent therefore that women were not educated in those things which made a "human" world possible -freedom, reciprocity, equality and justice-their action was thought, necessarily,to incline toward tyrannyand thus chaos and disorder.Yet as citizensof the privaterealm,theirkinshipobligations and religiousdutieswithinit could necessitateaction when transgression againstthis realmwas made. Thus by acting,even whencompelled by necessityto do so, womenweresimultaneouslyintrudersin and sustainersof the polis-threatening its very foundationwhile serving and preservingit (MichaelShaw 1975,266). It is just this conflict that Sophoclespresentsin its full complexityin the Antigone. The dramatells of a woman who both acts and does not act, who speaks and does not speak, who recreatesthe possibility for order withinthe polity while at the same time threateningthat orderby her deed. The natureof her action is unclearthroughoutthe dramaand remains unresolved at its end. While its consequencesare clearly political,the full meaningof this is transvaluedby the fact that she is a woman and women are not, properlyspeaking,(political)actors. Unlike most other tragicfigures,Antigone knowsthe end to which her actions destineher. She announcesthis end, as well as her intention to act despiteit, withinthe first fifty lines of the drama.4Her fate is deceptively transparent in this sense. It is unlike that of Oedipus, Clytaemnestra, Agamemnon, or Creon, for whom knowledgeof the consequenceof word and deed is partialand selfescaping even though each assumes such knowledgewith hubristic certainty.The fate, moreover,of each of these figuresembracesboth be the essence of nature of the human as zoon politikon, [political animal] women were taken to be not fully human." 4. I have relied on three translations of the Antigone, making minor changes where appropriate. These are Antigone, trans. F. Storr (1912); The Oedipus Cycle, trans. Fitts and Fitzgerald (1977); Antigone, trans. Elizabeth Wyckoff (1956).

7

hypatia the general and the particular.Creon's fate reveals to us as much about the generalnatureof tyrannyas about the particularnatureof his tyranny,and Oedipus' fate as much about the generalnatureof humanblindnessas about the particularnatureof his blindness.Antigone's actions are not disclosingin this dual sense. They revealless about her particularnaturethan about the generalnatureof obligations in the privaterealmand the relationshipof this realmto that of public affairs. From the outset the terms of her deed are clear and boundedin the same sensethat the termsof her existenceas a woman are clearand bounded.Her deed is executedby necessityas her life as a woman is bound by necessity. Yet, because she acts publicly, the consequenceof her deed is transformedas are its terms. Antigone herself is not transformed,but rather the meaning of her deed. It assumesa significancewhich far exceedsits initialintention.Seeming to be one thing, it becomesquite another. The drama opens with Antigone and her sister Ismene in counsel outside the walls of the household. Their very location outside suggests dislocation, the presenceof conflict (Shaw 1975, passim). As women and membersof the polity, their membershipis exclusively private. To be taking counsel, therefore,outside their propersphere of action prefigures a disturbancewithin it. Their two brothers, Polyneices and Eteocless, have slain each other in struggle for the throne, the one a defenderof the city, the other a traitorto it. With the warconcludedand the city tenuouslysecured,the king, Creon,has issuedan edict whichgives honor in the tomb to Eteocleswhile denying burialto Polyneices. The punishmentis death should any of the citizensdefy the decree. Declaringthat she "shallneverbe found herbrother'straitor,"Antigoneresolvesto give Polyneicesproperburial,and by this act uphold the gods' unwrittenlaws: to honor the dead as the gods have honored them. She challengesIsmeneto show herselfnoble, to join with her in labor and in deed and to cancelby this action the hatredsof a divided house (R. P. Winnington-Ingram1980, 132-133).5Ismenerejectsthis appeal, fearing that they will "perish terribly if [they] force the law/and try to cross the royal vote and power" (Wyckoff 1956, lines 59-60).As women,they are not framedby natureto contendwithmen (F. Storr 1924, line 61). To oppose Creon would be to exceed their 5. About Greek burial practice, Mary Ann Cline Horowitz (1976, n. 198) importantly points out that "a common fear of Greeks was that after death the rites would not be performed for them, and that in consequence their souls would wander about restlessly. The happiness of the dead was dependent on the continuity of descendents who would guard and respect the household hearth and ancestral tomb."

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valerie a. hartouni naturallimitations,theirsharedplace and location. Not only would it threatenfurtherdisorderwithinthe state, but, more fundamentally,it would belie theirnaturalconstitutionas women (Wyckoff 1956:lines 50-60). "We must remember,"she counsels. that we two are women, and so not to fight with men since we are subjectto strong power we must obey these ordersor any that may be worse. In these things I am forced and shall obey the men in power. I know that wild and futile action makes no sense. I shall do no dishonor. But to act againstthe citizens I cannot. (Wyckoff 1956: lines 61-64; 66-68; 78-79) Ismene'sresponseplaces her in what appearsto be a more traditional role for women. She is both submissiveand unquestioningand yields to the power of the state, howevermisdirectedit might be, on the groundsthat as womenthey are obligatedto obey (at least as much as they are obligated to honor the claims of kinship and religious duty). Her response is significantin another sense, however, for it establishesthe terms accordingto which Antigone's action will be misunderstoodas the dramaproceeds.Ismene'sconfusionmerelyanticipatesthat of the others. For she, as they, will fail to see the loss of order which succeeds Creon's resolution and which is already foreshadowed by their presence outside of the household. Ismeneis the first (but not the last) to mistakeCreon'sdecreefor law and therebyto supposethat it has its originsin the approvaland resolveof the citizenry-hence her refusalto act againstthe citizens. This confusion is sharedin turn by the Chorus-"men of the City, men rich in possessions"(Wyckoff 1956, lines 210-220;380-384).Initially they understandthe decreeas Creon'sown, but they soon confound its claims,whichenforcean exceptionto the traditionalritesof burial,with those havingpolitical-legalstatus. Eventuallyeven Creon mistakesthe will of one (himself)for the will of the many (Wyckoff 1956,: line 481), understandingAntigone to have "broke[n]bounds with establishedlaw" and thus to have defied and threatenedboth himself and the state. In responseto this charge,Antigoneappealsto the authorityof unwrittenlaws and opposes this authorityto Creon's as head of state: For me it was not Zeus who made that order. Nor did justice who lives with the gods below 9

hypatia mark out such laws to hold among mankind. Nor did I think our orderswere so,strong that you, a mortal man, could overrun the gods' unwrittenand unfailinglaws. Not now, nor yesterday's,they always live, and no one knows their origin in time So not through fear of any man's proud spirit would I be likely to neglect these laws, draw upon myself the god's sure punishment (Wyckoff 1956, lines 450-459) In these terms, the questionis one of the relationshipof the divine and human worlds and the claims appropriateto each. On the one hand, Antigoneacceptsthose whichshe takesto be divineand asks to be understoodat least in part as doing so. On the other hand, Creon sees himselfas representingand embodyingthe claimsof the state, by virtueof his powerand throne,his practiceof the governmentand the law. Each proceedsas if their claims were antitheticaland exclusive, therebysecuringnot the integrationof the divine and humanworlds, but the disintegrationof their coherence as mutually dependent realms. By appealingto a structureof divine but unwrittenlaw, Antigone appearsto locate herselfoutside of the humanworld, antagonisticto its claim for order and discipline. Yet because these unwrittenlaws frame and authorizethe claims of the privaterealm-of kinshipand religiousduty-they exist in conjunctionwith the laws of convention. In this sense, Antigone is not altogetheroutside of the human world but ratheractingconsistentlywith herresponsibilitieswithinpartof it. Although a transgressionagainst the gods occasions her deed, the obligations which motivate her to act, as well as the consequences which she effects by acting, are embeddedin the world of humanaffairs both publicand private.To regardher action strictlyin termsof the religious obligation it fulfills ignores the circumstanceswhich foster it and the political dilemmawhich it in turn fosters. As a womanand citizenof the privaterealm,Antigoneis "boundto serve the childrenof [her]mother's womb" as she is bound to serve the gods theirjust due (Wyckoff 1956, line 512). But, in orderto defend these claims and representtransgressionagainstthem, she must leave the householdand enterthe publicrealm.As Ismenecounseled, women are not naturallyconstitutedto act-to contend with men. That Antigone must so act, in order to defend the naturalclaims of the household and so avoid "the gods' sure punishment," underscoresboth the religiousand the political pollution which has 10

valerie a. hartouni befallen Thebes. Divisivenesspervadesthe city-tyranny reigns and, with it, silence. If law still mediatedand structuredthe commonworld, Antigone's deed would be, as Ismeneclaimed, "wild, futile and unintelligible," withoutproperlocationand withoutboundaries.Creonhas, however, oversteppedthe boundariesof his political authority,collapsingthe will of many into the will of one. He has robbedthe gods of what is properlytheirsand confoundedthe publicand privatespheres,claiming whatis commonas his own. "Is the town to tell me how to rule?" he asks. "Am I to rule by other mind than mine?" (Wyckoff 1956, lines 734, 736). BecauseCreonclaimswhat is common as his own, he bringsabout the politicaldisorderhis edict intendedto prevent.His rule has occasioned not order, but absolutedisorder.It is only when law bounds, mediates, and lends coherenceto human claims and actions that the common world has definition and human life and action within it, place and location. Withoutlaw, neithereffectivespeechnor effective action are possible. That a woman acts when others cannot underscoresthis political impotence. To the extent that tyranny is is effectively upon Thebes,the publicrealmor world-held-in-common nonexistent.Withconventionallaw undermined,the only law that can be appealedto is that unwrittenand divine law of which women, as citizensof the privatesphere,are the protectors.Becausethe divinely sponsoredclaims of kinship and religiousduty constitutethe terms and substanceof women'smembershipwithinthe polity, the only action which is possible in defense of them is that of a woman. As a woman and defenderof the privaterealm, Antigonemust act to defend its claims and avert the gods' wrath. Because she is a woman, however, her action is inherentlyproblematic.To give her brotherproperburial,Antigonemust go outsideof her naturallyconstitutedsphereof action;she must enterthe publicrealm.Yet by leaving the privatesphere,she exceedsher properplace. In so doing, she is understoodas havingforsakenher responsibilitieswithinit. She is no longer considereda properrepresentativeof the claims and concerns of the privatesphereand forfeitsher rightto representthese claimsto the public. BecauseAntigone is a woman, she is seen, heard, and judged as a private person-one who is not properly educated in those things which made a commonlyheld world possible. Althoughshe must denouncetransgressionsagainstthe privaterealm,her actualdefenseof that realm,publicly,undercutsher claimto do so. At the momentshe attemptsto assert, politically,the authoritywhichis hers by virtueof tradition to preserve and protect both kin and hearth, she ceases 11

hypatia to possessit. For by herdeedshe seemsto transgressnecessarilybonded spheres and recklesslyto challenge the imperativesand responsibilities of each, thus threatening the very existence of the polity. To act is to exceedher properplace. Withoutplace, Antigone is without membership,and without membershipshe is seen as one who thinksand acts alone, withoutregardfor whatis commonlyheld. These are the terms in which Antigone's deed is understood.As a result, its deepersignificancealtogetherescapesthose who witnessit. Creon condemns Antigone not only for having "broken bounds beyondestablishedlaw," but for havingceasedto functionwell in her place (Wyckoff 1956, lines 480-580).As a womanwho has acted, and by her action challengednot only the sphere of political rule and discourse, but also the sphere of (women's) household duties, Antigone has gone beyond all bounds. "Let her sing her song of Zeus who guardsthe kindred,"says Creon (Wyckoff 1956, lines 657-658), [but] if I allow disorderin my house I'd surelyhave to licenseit abroad. The man the state has put in place must have obedienthearingto his last command when it's right and even when it's not. He who acceptsthis teachingI trust, ruler, or ruled, to function in his place, I must guardthe men who yield to order, not let myself be beaten by a woman. Better, if it must happen, that a man should oversetme. I won't be called weaker than womankind(Wyckoff, 1956: lines 659-660;665-669;676-680).6 Havingleft the privaterealm, Antigoneacts without "just claim" or authority,withoutplace or location, and thus challengeslaw and the orderwhich issues from it. What both Ismeneand Creonhave failed to see, however,is that she acts only becausethe law is no longerthe coheringprinciplemediatingjust claims(bothpublicand private),and because as a consequenceall speech and action are without proper place and location. Both understandher only as havingaspiredto be other than she is. For as a woman she is not naturallyfit for public 6. Because women were not considered legal equals of men, the responsibilities for their misdeeds passed to their closest male relative. It is no small irony that, in Antigone's case, this is Creon.

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valerie a. hartouni participation. Antigoneis condemnedto die entombedoutsidethe city walls. The town grievesfor her, "unjustlydoomed if evera womanwas to die in shame for glorious deed done" (Wyckoff 1956, lines 692-697; 832-836). Yet in their sympathy, Creon's "fellow citizens"-the polis-fundamentally misunderstandthe characterof her deed and banish her from the human world as Creon has done. "Your selfsufficiencyhas broughtyou down," they reflect, yet, In death you will have your fame to have gone like a god to your fate in living and in dying alike [emphasisnot in original] (Wyckoff 1956, line 77, 834-836) To characterizeAntigone as "god-like" in life and in death-sufficientunto herself-suggests that she does not hold a worldin common with others (throughher blood relationships),even though her deed ultimatelyrecreatesthe possibilityfor such a world. Moreover,it suggests that she has lived as only beasts or gods can live, that is, as one alone. Becauseshe was not understoodas havinglived within a commonly held world, she has forfeited her right to it in death. Her banishmentfrom the city simplyechoes this pronouncement.She has lived alone and must die alone. While this reflects a fundamentalmisunderstandingof Antigone's deed, it is a misunderstandingwhich is not reconciledby the drama's end. Antigoneis not self-sufficient,nor does she understandherselfas such. She has actedin accordwith her responsibilitiesas a womanand memberof the privaterealm. At first she attemptsto enlist the support of her sister, Ismene,arguingthat if Ismeneactuallyunderstood the responsibilitieswhichattendplace and membershipshe wouldjoin in her deed. Ismenerejectsthis and thus rejectsher responsibilitiesto kinshipand the gods. In responseto the Chorus'sdepictionof her life as "god-like" and self-sufficient,Antigone mournsthat she will die unwept, "no friendto bewailher fate" (Wyckoff 1956,line 878, 881). If she were self-sufficientand understoodherself as such, she would need no friendand no tale sungof herin remembrance.Yet she recalls her mortality,and by this recognizesthe futility of her deed. Its true glory has been without audience and her life without distinction. The ambiguityof Antigone's deed and the contradictionsin her status as a woman and memberof the polity are made clear in contraposition to the words and deeds of Creon. The possibility for redemption-wisdom throughsuffering-is offered to Creonwhile it is withheld from Antigone (Winnington-Ingram1980, 118). Where 13

hypatia Creon is reconciledwith his fate, Antigone is not, even though the movement and circumstancesof action for each are symmetrically developed. The drama opens with Antigone outside the household. Once convicted, she is taken inside the house and once condemned, she is entombedoutsidethe wallsof hercity. Her sphereof actioncontracts, reflectedin her movementfrom the publicrealmto the private realm to entombmentas one alone. With Creon, there is a similar spatial development. When the drama commences he is king of Thebes;as it proceedshe becomestyrantof Thebes;and at its end he has lost both city and family. As with Antigone, thereis a movement from public to private to one alone. What distinguishes them, however,is their ultimatefate. While Creonhas suffered, his suffering becomes a source of wisdom. For Antigone, there is no such resolution. Antigonedies alone, joined in deathonly laterby Haemon,Creon's son and her husband-to-be.WhereasCreon brings Haemon's body back into the city, however, recognizingthat "it's best to hold the laws of old traditionto the end of life," Antigone is left behindwith no furthermention(Wyckoff 1956,lines 1113-1114).She perishesoutside the realmof both publicand privateaffairs, for the ultimatewellbeing of both. While her action was necessary, it nonetheless precludes her further membership. In creating the possibility for reconciliationbetween the human and divine worlds, as well as between the public and privatespheres,her action contradictsthe very principlesit re-establishes.For althoughwomen'sactivitiesultimately sustain the realm of speech and action, women themselvesdo not speak or act. They are members of the polity although invisible, citizensalthoughprivate,participantswithoutthe necessaryconcomitant of word and deed. As Antigone'sfate so clearlysuggests,women are "of the polity but not in it" (James Redfield 1977, 161). In many ways, Antigone's dilemma is still with us. Over the last three and a half centuriesthere has been a certain "constancy of prescriptiveattitudestowardswomen's place" (WilliamChafe 1977, 15), even when these attitudeshave borne only indirectrelevanceto women's daily lives. The immersionof women in the privatesphere; the conflationof theirbiologicaland social functionso that reproductive capacityhas been takento constitutea "naturally"derivedsocial role, interpretedby federal courts as recently as 1970 as women's primary"civic duty" (Susan Okin 1979);their "exclusion from the full range of possibilities and responsibilitieswithin the categories 'person' and 'citizen' because the category 'woman' has alone been sufficient to differentiate[them]from the category 'male' which has been synonymouswith 'person' or 'humanbeing' " (Elshtain 1974, 14

valerie a. hartouni 459), togetherprefigurewhatSheilaRowbothamhas called"woman's profound alienation from any culture which can generalizeitself" (Sheila Rowbotham 1974, 34). As Antigone was, contemporary womenare still "of the polity but not in it," full memberswithoutfull membershipstatus. On the basis of certain physical characteristics, women have been assignedto a status to which an automaticset of duties and responsibilitiescorrespond-duties which have comprised membershipbut have excludedwomen from full participatory,personhood status in their fulfillment.While "produc[ingas they] have [always]producedgoods and servicesfor societyat largeas well as for their families" (Joan Kelly 1979, 221), women have been denied the fundamental rights of citizenship throughout much of American history. "Even more pernicious . . . [is] a pattern of informal

discriminationwhich [has] suffused nearly all areas of life," and whichservesto reinforcewomen'ssocial and economicsubordination (Chafe 1977, 47). Althoughthe last decadehas seen discerniblechangein, for example, the judicial attituderegarding"sex as a reasonableclassification standard,"beliefs aboutthe naturalcharacteristicsof the sexesas well as about the traditionalstructureof the institutionof the family and its relationto the publicspherecontinueto frameand informjudicial opinion in such areas as pregnancyand employment,battering,and rape(Okin 1979,273; CarolPateman1980;LenoreWalker1977).The last two decades have seen "less of a change in the definition of women'splacethan an extensionof this definitionto incorporatenew features"(Chafe 1977, 29).7 7. To pursue a career or enter the workforce is one thing. To call into question the social aspects of traditional gender identities is quite another. It is true that some women now have greater access to educational opportunities and that greater numbers of women are securing jobs in previously male-dominated professions. The political gains which increased access to education or to the labor force mark, however, are merely formal. As Susan Okin observes, (1979, 3, 290) these gains have "in no way ensured the attainment of real equalities in the social and economic aspects of women's lives.... In spite of the prevalent assumption that women have it within their power to be the equals of men, simply by taking up the equal opportunities offered them, the status of women in this country, measured in terms of occupation, education and income has been gradually but persistently declining over the last few years." This raises several questions. First, what does the "attainment of real equalities" mean within a socio-economic structure in which women's principal role in the labor force is, following Zillah Eisenstein (1981, 35-351), "to provide just about the cheapest labor possible?" Second, relative to whom is the "attainment of real equalities" sought when access to societal wealth is disproportionately distributed along the lines of class and race as well as sex? And, finally, in what sense is "equal opportunity before the law," if treated as an end in itself, a solution to institutionalized inequalities (as opposed to an extension of them)?

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hypatia This is the context withinwhichElshtainurgeswomento adopt the standpointof an Antigone, to claim the privatesphere-which others besides Elshtainnow note is not a separatesphereor domain of existence but a position within social existence generally" (Kelly 1979, 221)-and from it to critique the state. Of greater political significancefor herthan women'shistoryof exploitation,oppression, and exclusion, and the claims for incorporationthat many contemporary feminismslegitimatein terms of this history, is the current threat of a radically antidemocratic state, detached from and unresponsiveto the actual conditions of human life. A government whichin principlederivesits legitimacyfrom a peopleor citizenrynow can and does operate virtuallyindependentof that citizenry. It has ceased "to be in any importantsensea governmentof, by, and for the people [and] at best functions merely as a . ..

benevolent

paternalism"(ChristopherLasch 1981, 7). Elshtain brings the issues of incorporation, the growth of the bureaucraticstate, the formulationof policy withinthis state, and its abstractand hence life-threateningapplicationof power into focus and maps these issues onto the terrainof feministpoliticaldiscourse. However, she does not consideror criticallyreassessthe problematic status of the private sphere and the equally problematicstatus of women'straditionalassociationwith this sphere.In acceptingboth as social "givens" ratherthan as social "constructions,"she leaves her feminist "account" theoretically ungrounded. While the private spheremay not constitutea separatesocial domain, it occupies and has occupied a subordinatesocial position relative to the "public" realm.Women'slaborswithinit have been devaluedand, historically, have been "harnessedto sustainand reproduce"a sex-gendersystem which prefiguressexual hierarchyand male dominance(Kelly 1979, 225).

Elshtainimpliesthat through"social feministawareness,"a certain "revaluation"of women'ssphere,of women'sactivitieswithinit, or, more generally,of "receivedcategories"can be broughtabout from withinthose categoriesthemselves.Accordingly,"maternalthought" or motheringcapabilities-"dramaticallyat odds with the prevailing norms of our bureaucraticand increasingly technological public order"-can providea base and a meansfor feministsto examineand critiquean over-controlledpublicworldwithoutenhancingits powers of regulationand control in the process(Elshtain1982, 58; SaraRuddick 1980).While fosteringvalueswhichsupportsocietallife, women as mothersmay also foster values which clash with prevailingpublic norms (Elshtain 1982). In this respect the implicationsof their activities within the privatesphereare potentiallyradical. Yet Elshtain 16

valerie a. hartouni does not considerhow this revaluation-this renamingand reconstitution of "femininity," of female childbearingand childrearingactivity-will be effected culture-wide.She does not suggest how the social aspects of traditional gender roles and identities will be significantlyaltered, nor how her "new" female subject-"located historicallyand groundedin tradition," possessing,by implication,a certainmoral superiorityto her public counterpart-differs substantially from culturally sanctioned and prescribednorms regarding womanhood.WhileElshtainmay intenda difference,it it not clearin what this difference could consist when women possess neither the culturallyrecognizedauthorityto name, to reconstitutemeaning,nor to reascribethe termsof theirmembership.Moreover,in her idealization of familial bonds and her ardent call for "the redemptionof everydaylife," her analysis remainsoblivious to the realitiesof the daily lives of many women-particularly those who are not members of the white, middle class, heterosexualsegments of society. The closest she comes to addressingthese issues is when she notes that "whilethe psychic-socialauthorityof mothersis enormous,what this could lead to will alwaysbe problematicas long as mothersare socially subordinate"(Elshtain1982,59).8The pivotalpoliticalproblematic lies in this issue of social subordination.Elshtain'sfailureto engageit critically leaves open the question of how we get from a "functionalist" reasoningof women's sphereto a "feminist"reasoningof this spherewhen the conceptswhich inform both remainuncontested and essentiallyunaltered. The challengethat Antigone puts to the state, while legitimatein terms of the traditionsit seeks to restore, is not recognizedas such either publicly or politically before or after her death. Ismene, Haemon, Creon, as well as the Chorus, all understandher as setting herself againstthe king as Creon sets himself againstthe ties of kin, but no one, despitetheirsympathies,takes her to be actinglegitimately. Because of her action, she stands apart from and outside of establishedlaw and custom. Acting to sustain both, she transgresses both. Havingleft the privatesphereto representits claims,she forfeits the rightto do so. She is withoutlocation, withoutlegitimateauthor8. I suspectthat Elshtain's"idealization"of the familygrowsout of her attempt to take what she assumesare basic, commonlysharedexperiencesof intimateassociation and relationship,and to theorizefrom these relationshipsan alternativeunderstandingof collectivelife and politics which lays the groundworkfor a more human reconstitutionof both. The point is, however,that neitherthese relationshipsnor the heterosexual,nuclearfamilymodel from whichthey are derivedare universal-or for that mattersufficientlyparticularto sustainthe politicalclaimsElshtainwantsto make in termsof them.

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hypatia ity, and without membership. Once she acts, she has no "standpoint." For by her action she displaces herself into nonexistence. The standpoint which Elshtain urges contemporarywomen to adopt, the standpoint of an Antigone, dissolves in its enactment. Within a culture that holds silence to be the condition of women's honor, as in Antigone's case, women's speech and action have no publiccontext. Both remainincoherentin the existingpoliticalterms. It is no different for contemporarywomen. Action takes its meaning from its context. And withina context in whichthe Presidenthimself attributes the currently severe unemployment rates to the large numberof women enteringthe work-force,9it is clearthat traditional reasoningswith respectto women'sproperplace and activityhave yet to undergo the revaluation which would make plausible or even noticablea "feminist" reappropriationof either. 9. In Mr. Reagan'sown wordsas reportedin Time(July 12, 1982:23): "[partof the reasonfor unemployment]is not so muchrecessionas it is the greatincreasein the people going into the job market,and Ladies, I'm not pickingon anyone, but [it is] becauseof the increasein womenworkingtoday and two workerfamilies,"

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references Chafe, William. 1977. Women and equality. London: Oxford University Press. Cocks, J. 1982. How long til equality? Time 120 (July 12): 20-24, 26, 29. Dworkin, Andrea. 1974. Woman hating. New York: E. P. Dutton. -_. 1981. Pornography: Men possessing women. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Eisenstein, Zillah. 1981. Reform or revolution: Towards a unified woman's movement. In Women and revoluton, edited by Lydia Sargent. Boston: Southend Press. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1974. The feminist movement and the question of equality. Polity 7 (4): 452-477. ---. 1982. Antigone's daughters. Democracy 2 (2): 46-59. Euben, Peter. 1978. Political equality and the green polis. In Liberalism and the modern polity, edited by M.J.G. McGrath. New York: Marcel Dekker. Gould, Carol K. 1976. The woman question: Philosophy of liberation and the liberation of philosophy. In Women and philosophy: Toward a theory of liberation, edited by Carol Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. Horowitz, Mary Ann Cline. 1976. Aristotle and women. Journal of the History of Biology, 9 (2): 183-213. Kelly, Joan. 1979. Double vision of feminist theory. Feminist Studies 5 (1): 216-227. Lasch, Christopher. 1981. Democracy and the crisis of confidence. Democracy 1 (1): 25-40. Okin, Susan Moller. 1979. Women in western political thought. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Pateman, Carol. 1980. Women and consent. Political Theory 8 (2): 149-168. Pranger, Robert. 1968. The eclipse of citizenship: Power and participation in contemporary politics. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Redfield, James. 1977. The women of Sparta. Classical Journal 72 (2): 147-161. Rowbotham, Sheila. 1974. Woman's consciousness, man's world. London: Penguin Books. Ruddick, Sara. 1980. Material thinking. Feminist Studies 6 (2): 342-367. Shaw, Michael. 1975. The female intruder. Classical Philology 70 (4): 255-266. 19

hypatia Sophocles. Antigone. 1956. Trans. Elizabeth Wycoff. Chicago: Universityof ChicagoPress. . 1912. Text with translationby F. Storr. New York: G. P. Putnam'sSons. - . 1977. The oedipus cycle. Trans. Fitts and Fitzgerald.New York:HarcourtBraceJovanovich. Walker,LenoreE. 1979. Thebatteredwoman.New York:Harperand Row. Winnington-Ingram,R. P. 1980. Sophocles-an interpretation. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

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I

kathleen wider Women Philosophers in the Ancient Greek World: Donning the Mantle This paper argues that there were women involved with philosophy on a fairly constant basis throughout Greek antiquity. It does so by tracing the lives and where extant the writings of these women. However, since the sources, both ancient and modern, from which we derive our knowledge about these women are so sexist and easily distort our view of these women and their accomplishments, the paper also discusses the manner in which their histories come down to us as well as the histories themselves. It discusses in detail the following women: the Pythagorean women philosophers of the 6th and 5th centuries B.C., Aspasia and Diotima of the 5th century B.C., Arete, Hipparchia, Pamphile and the women Epicureans-all from the 4th century B.C.the five logician daughters of a famous Stoic philosopher of the 3rd century B.C., and finally Hypatia who lived in the 4th century A.D..

The most common image for those who drawany connectionbetween women and philosophyin the ancient Greekworld is perhaps that of Xanthippe-the wife of Socrates-shut out from the sacred dialogue of the philosophers-excluded even from the deathbed scene-seen only as the naggingwife who distractsthe greatman from his thoughts.That womenactuallyparticipatedin philosophicactivity comes as a surpriseto many. But Gilles Menage (1984, 3) in the eighteenth century names sixty-five women philosophers in the Hellenisticage alone. I intendto examinewomen philosophersin the Greekworld primarilyfrom the sixth throughthe thirdcenturiesB.C. My focus will be on womenphilosophersduringthe late pre-Classical period of Greek history (sixth century), the Classicalperiod (fifthfourth centuries),and duringthe earlystagesof the Hellenisticworld (late fourth-thirdcenturies),though I will discussthe most famous of the womenphilosophersof Greekantiquity,Hypatia,who died in 415 A.D. I will look at both the lives and when possible the writingsof women philosophersduringthese periods(whichtogetherI will refer to as the ancientGreekworld). Becauseof the difficultyof findingadequateand accurateinformation on these periods of history, particularly with regard to Hypatia vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986). © by Hypatia, Inc.

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hypatia individuals,my thesis will be fairly minimal:there were women involvedwith philosophythroughoutancientGreekhistory.It was not a rareexceptionto find a womanin philosophy.Therewerewomenin most, if not all, the ancientschools of Greekphilosophy.We cannot alwaystell theirpositionsin these schools (thoughseveraldid become the headsof ancientschoolsof philosophy)nor can we alwaystell how influential they were in shaping philosophic doctrine and methodology. Given the lack of evidence, my argumentis not that their contributionsto philosophic thought were original (although they may well have been);but that they did contributeto philosophy as it developedin the ancient schools, by participationat least, on a fairly constantbasis throughoutGreekantiquity. The most well known philosophicalschool in pre-ClassicalGreece was the Pythagoreanschool and thereweremany female membersof this school. Although precisedates for the women Pythagoreansare unknown,we do know that some of them flourishedin the sixth and earlyfifth centuriesB.C.TheseincludeTheano, believedto be the wife of Pythagorasand the most famous of these women, as well as Myia, Damo, and Arignote who were probablydaughtersof Theano and Pythagoras.Perictione, who probablylived in the fifth centuryB.C., Melissa,whose dates are unknown,and Phintys, who may have lived in the third century B.C., were also Pythagorean philosophers. Extant writingshave been attributedto many of these women. We know the names of fewer women philosophersin the Classicalperiod. Aspasia lived from 470-410 and her philosophiccontributionis known only throughother people (most notably Socrates)who mentionher as an influence.The sourceof our knowledgeof Diotimawho flourishedin 468 is again Socrateswho claims to have been taught about love by her. Duringthe early Hellenisticage we again know severalnamesof women philosophers.Arete was the head of the Cyrenaicschool of philosophy after her father Aristippus died in 350. No dates are known for her. Hipparchiaflourishedaround 328 and is known for the fact that she abandoneda life of wealthand ease to marryCrates and live the simplelife of a Cynic. Littleis knownabout Pamphileexcept that she was a discipleof Theophrastuswho headedthe Lyceum after Aristotle. Epicurus, like Pythagoras, was noted for allowing womeninto his philosophicschool. Leontionwas the most famous of these women though only the title of a work she wrote survived.The Stoic Diodorus Cronus who was active about 315-284 had five daughters who were logicians: Menexene, Argeia, Theognis, Artemisia,and Pantacleia.The final name that survivesfrom the ancient Greekworldof a womanphilosopheris Hypatiawho livedat the end of the Hellenisticperiod. 22

kathleen wider Thereare severalthingsto keep in mind in examiningphilosophers of the ancient world. The first is that much of what we know of philosophersof this period comes throughhistorianswritingseveral centurieslater. Secondly,manyof the writingsof ancientphilosophers were lost, so our judgmentof these thinkersis often based on mere fragments of their work, or on a list of titles, or solely on the judgments of others. Thirdly, the term philosophy had a much broadermeaningthen than it does now; many of the ancientschools of philosophyhad strongreligiousovertones.Fourthly,the information on the womenphilosophersis even sketchierthanon the men;it is transmittedprimarilyby males, and the emphasis is often on the women's sexual, not intellectual,status. Even scholars of the nineteenthand twentiethcenturiestend to treatwomen figuresin a biased way: they are either overly gallant and sentimentalabout them or straightforwardlysexist. To ascertainevidence about these women philosophersthat is accurate and helpful and come to clear conclusions is like weavingone's way throughthe Minoan labyrinth. To give a context to this discussionof women philosophersin the ancientGreekworld, some familiaritywith the position of women in Greek society is needed. It is not always clear what position women occupiedin pre-Classicalsocieties,but it seemsto havebeena position higherthanthe one they occupiedin the Classicalperiod.The position of women in Homer is often given as evidencefor this view (Leanna Goodwater 1975, 3; Leonard Swidler 1976, 7). There were many strong women charactersin both the Illiad and Odyssey (Calypso, Circe, Penelope, and Andromache)and the relationshipsbetweenthe womenand men wereoften markedby loyaltyand devotion.Women, however, were still restrictedto the traditionalroles of childbearing and nurturingand Hesiod's myth of Pandora'sbox (eighthcentury) indicatesthat the culturebore withinit a fear of womenand a certain hostilitytowardthem. The Athenianlawscreatedby Solon in the sixth century while abolishing most forms of sale into slavery preserved one: the maleguardiancould still sell an unmarriedwomanif she had lost her virginity.Solon's laws also drew a legal distinctionbetween good women and whoresand regulatedthe activityof both (SarahB. Pomeroy 1975, 57). Though the status of women in pre-Classical times was by no means ideal, it seems to have worsened in the Classicalperiod, at least in Athens. To understandwomen's position in classical Greece, one must distinguish Athenian women from Spartan women and then, as Pomeroy (1975, 60) notes, distinguishthe different social classes to which women in Athens belonged. In Sparta in the fifth century, citizenwomen had more legal and politicalrightsthan citizenwomen 23

hypatia in Athens. They could inheritand bequeathproperty;they ownedand ran businessesand farmsand participatedin sportsand politics. They wore loose clothing and had the same physicaltrainingas the men. Extramaritalsex was approvedfor both men and women becauseit providedmore soldiers for the state. Though Spartanwomen's lives were for the serviceof the state, they were no differentin this respect from Spartanmen's lives. Both were equallyfree and equallybound by a society which subordinatedall citizens' lives to the defense and supportof the state. As the powerof the state declinedin Spartain the fourth century, the power of women economicallyand sexually increased. The birthratefell drasticallyduringthis period and women controlledtwo-fifths of the land and propertyin Sparta.(Goodwater 1975, 8; Swidler1976, 8; Pomery 1975, 36-38.) Womencitizensin fifth centuryAthens lacked legal, political, and educational rights. Citizen women were continuously under male guardianship.When a girl reachedfourteenor fifteen years old, her male guardian(usuallyher father)would arrangefor her to marrya much older man. If her husband died before she did, then the guardianshipof her dowryand of herselfpassed to her fatheror her sons. Athenian law protected women by protecting their dowries throughouttheir lives; no male guardianincludinga husbandcould use the principalof the dowry. But this restrictionalso appliedto the woman herself and so she had no real control over her dowry. Marriageswere arrangedby men for economicand political reasons. Though divorce was obtainable,a woman could not sue for divorce herself; a male representativehad to do this for her. This seldom occurred.Childrenwerelegalpossessionsof the fatherand so remained with him in case of divorce. A husband was legally requiredto divorce his wife if she was accused of having been raped or having committedadultery. A man, on the other hand, had only to pay a monetaryfine for rape, thougha husbandcould kill a man for seducing his wife. Extramaritalsex was allowedfor men but not for women. In the fifth century,Athenianwomen could not buy or sell land and though they could acquire it through dowries or inheritance, its managementremainedin male hands. Womenhad no politicalrights. They had no voice in the affairs of state. Women could conduct no legal businessand had the legal status of a minorall their lives. They could not testifyin a courtof law evenif they wereinvolvedin the case themselves.Citizen women had no legal right to educationand were taught only enough reading and calculation skills to manage a household. The only public area in which women had any influence was in certainreligiouscults, but thesewerecontrolledby lawscreated by men. (Goodwater1975, 5-6; Pomeroy 1975, 62-75, 86-87). 24

kathleen wider The position of Athenianwomen who were not citizens, primarily slave women and foreignborn women, was in most ways worse than that of citizen women. Slave women were under the control of the master rather than of their own family. They of course lacked political, legal, and educational rights and though they were sometimesallowed more freedomof movementthan citizen women, theirworkwas the hardestof women'sworkand theirdayswerespent primarilyindoors. Theirsexuallives werecontrolledby male masters. Foreignborn women lackedany politicalor legal rightsas well, lacking even the rightto legal marriagewith a citizen;therefore,many of them turned to prostitutionto survive. Some of these women were highly educatedand beautifuland were known as hetaerae,the companions of some of the most powerfulof the citizen men in Athens. Though the few foreign women who achievedliasons with powerful men were allowed to socialize and conversewith men about politics and philosophy,these werethe rareexceptions.And though men lost no social statusby associatingwith hetaerae,hetaeraethemselveslacked the social status of citizen women. Women's position in fifth century Athens then, whatever their social class, was far morerestrictedlegallyand politicallythan men's. Theirlives weredirectedto the breedingand careof children.The lives of men and women were separateeven to the separationof living quartersfor men and women within the home (Pomeroy 1975, 80). Womenwerenot allowedany directinfluenceon the affairsof stateor thought.That some womenmanagedwithinthis societyto participate in philosophicalaffairs is quite extraordinary.That fewerwomendid so in the Classical period than in the pre-Classicalor Hellenistic periodsis understandable. Women's position improved for the most part in the Hellenistic world. Though the position of a woman still dependedon her social class and the area of the Greek world in which she lived (Pomeroy 1975, 120), we can draw some generalizationsabout women's lot. During this period women gained economic and legal rights though not manypoliticalones. Theycould buy, own, and sell goods and property and will them to others. Graduallythe custom of allowing a woman to perform a public act (marriageor divorce, for example) only with the approval and representationof a man began to disappearin the Hellenisticworld. Educationbecamemore common for girls, and women became involved in music, sports, and crafts. They were allowed more freedom of movementand more social interactionwith men (Swidler1976, 14-18).Though Plato had women disciples and Socrates refers to his women teachers, it appears from the limited evidence we have that there were more 25

hypatia women in philosophic schools in the Hellenisticperiod than in the Classical. Epicurusis famous for allowing both men and women, slave and free, into his Garden.Theophrastus,Aristotle'ssuccessor, had both a woman disciple and a woman opponent. The Cyrenaic school had a female head. Though it is debatablewhetherthe Stoic Zeno and his followers had a significantly enlightened view of women's position, they did believethat women should be educated.' Unfortunately,much of the progressof women in Hellenistictimes left Athenian women untouched. But, for the most part, women's position in this periodwas betterthan in the Classicalperiod. This is reflectedin the increasedactivityof women in philosophy. It is often thoughtthat the only womenwho engagedin philosophy in the ancientGreekworldwerehetaerae,femalecompanions.Of the twenty-sixwomen about whom I could find some informationonly seven could possibly be classed as hetaeraeand even then this was because they were non-citizensand so could not be legally married. Thereis little or no proof that they supportedthemselvesby sexualactivity. The remainingnineteenwomenwereeithermarried,virgins,or their sexual status is unknown, but there is no indicationthey were courtesans.It has been suggestedby both ancientand modernwriters that women were in the philosophical schools to provide sexual satisfactionfor the men. Some scholarsimply that the status of these women as philosophersis tainted by their sexual status. Even when suggestionsand implicationsof this kind are absent, many scholars focus to an excessivedegreeon the sexualratherthan the intellectual status of these women. The scene of Hypatia'smurderby the mob in Alexandriacomes down to us in lurid, pornographicdescriptionsby male writers.Although it is true that the materialany writerhas to deal with in writingabout ancient women philosophersis slim, that fact does not justify or explainthis inappropriatefocus. The following discussiondeals out of necessitythen with both the women involved with philosophyin the ancient Greek world and with the mannerin which their historieshave come down to us.

The Pythagoreans The Pythagoreanswere famous for admittingwomen equallywith men into theirsocieties. Pythagoras,the founderof this religiousand 1. Leonard Swidler (1976, 19) argues that the Stoics did more than any other philosophic school in ancient Greece to encourage the betterment of women's status; Sarah B. Pomeroy (1975, 132) argues that the Stoics preserved the traditional roles of women as wives and mothers and did not break down sex distinctions. Diogenes Laertius (1853, 7-33) tells us the Stoics taught that women should be shared in common by all the wise [men] as a way of preventing homosexual liasons tween men and young boys.

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kathleen wider philosophic movement, was born around 570 and died about 509 B.C. He set up the first Pythagorean community in Crotona in southern Italy about 529 and remained there twenty years (see C. J. DeVogel 1966, 20-24 for a chronology of Pythagoras' life). "Under Pythagoras we have clear indications of a revival ... of matriarchal conditions, and with it a realization of the appeal of women to the spirit as well as to the flesh" (Jane Harrison 1961, 645-46).The Orphic tradition influenced Pythagorean thought and that tradition came out of the religion of Dionysus which involved worship of Mother and Son (Harrison 1961, 645). Iamblichus (1818, 146-47), in his Life of Pythagoras, written in the early part of the fourth century A.D., in discussing the fact that Pythagoras "learnt from the Orphic writers that the essence of the Gods is defined by number," tells us that Pythagoras in his Second Discourse says that "'Orpheus, the son of Calliope, having learnt wisdom from his Mother in the mountain Pangaeus, said, that the eternal essence of number is the most providential principle of the universe"' (emphasis mine). Diogenes Laertius (1853, 8.20-21), in a history of philosophers probably written in the early part of the third century A.D., tells us that according to Aristoxenus, a contemporary of Aristotle's who wrote on Pythagoras and his followers, Pythagoras got most of his ethical theory from a woman, Themistoclea, a priestess of Delphi. She is referred to in the Suda, a Greek lexicon compiled about the end of the tenth century A.D., as Theoclea and by Porphyry as Aristoclea (Mario Meunier 1932, 12). At his death Pythagoras entrusted his writings to a woman, his daughter Damo (Diog. Laer. 1853, 8.42). There are various explanations of why women were admitted into the Pythagorean societies which flourished during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. in southern Italy and the Greek mainland. Edward Zeller (1980, 34) argues that since the Pythagorean order rested on the doctrine of transmigration, the Pythagoreans thought that all living organisms were interrelated because they all embodied souldaemons. This belief resulted in a strong social tendency and so in the admission of women into the society on an equal basis with men. Mary R. Beard (1947, 315) notes that this strong social tendency led them to form a society of families which later grew into a "brotherhood" and so the ideal of harmonious family life was connected to the unity between families in society. According to Meunier (1932, 12-20), the Pythagoreans saw the family as well as the city as a microcosm of the universe and the order and harmony of the universe was to be reflected in the city and family. Women were given an important place in Pythagorean thought and society because they were an important part of the family and were a necessary component 27

hypatia in achieving order and harmony within it. Each person within the family was to perform her/his role well and keep her/his place assigned by nature. The place of woman turns out to be the traditional one of wife and mother, subordinate to and submissive to her husband, but a woman can perform this role well only if her intelligence is developed. The constraints on a Pythagorean woman's life-the sacrifice of oneself to the common good, obedience to authority and concern for moral beauty and divine order-were common goals of all those in the Pythagorean society. Moderation and the obedience to authority and laws were ways of guarding against chaos and evil for the Pythagoreans. Women were of course subject to one more master than were men; they were subject to their husbands. Although the reason for the respect and position given women in Pythagorean society might strike some as oppressive, it did not allow women access to learning and discussion not often available to them. Iamblichus (1818, 267) in his Life of Pythagoras lists the names of seventeen of the most illustrious of the Pythagorean women. Gilles Menage (1984, 92), writing a history of philosophers published in 1765, lists twenty-six women Pythagoreans and John Toland (2: 13) in a work published in 1726 says that the female disciples of Pythagoras were so numerous that Philochorus of Athens filled a whole volume with them. There is no doubt that there were many women among the Pythagorean philosophers. I will first look at what we know about these women and then I will look at the writings attributed to some of them. Diogenes Laertius (1853, 8.42) mentions Theano as one of the most eminent of the Pythagoreans. The exact dates of her birth and death are unknown. She was probably the wife of Pythagoras and the mother of Pythagoras' sons Telauges and Mnesarchus.2 There is some indication that she ran the Pythagorean school with her sons after Pythagoras' death at the end of the sixth century B.C.(Toland 1926, 2: 14; Meunier 1932, 32), although Iamblichus (1818, 265) says she married Aristaeus after Pythagoras' death and that he took over the school's leadership. Plutarch (1928, "Coniugalia Praecepta," 145 E-F) praised her in a letter he wrote to a newly married woman, Eurydice, in which he exhorts her to wear neither pearls nor silk which cost dearly but rather to adorn herself with the ornaments of Theano and other ancient women renowned for wisdom and learning. It appears that Theano and Pythagoras had three daughters, Myia, Damo, and Arignote, all of whom were Pythagorean philosophers in 2. There is some controversy over whether Theano was the wife of Pythagoras or of Brotinus, a disciple of Pythagoras. Some argue that there were two Theanos: one the wife of Pythagoras and one Brotinus' wife. lamblichus (1818, 267) names

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kathleen wider the latter part of the sixth century and into the first half of the fifth century B.C. Myia was well known for her elegant learning and her well-managed household and because of this the avenue to her house was called the Museum. She was the head of the young women before she married and of the married women after she married. Iamblichus (1818, 267) lists a woman Mya as a Pythagorean philosopher and wife of Milon of Crotona (see also Toland 1726, 2: 14; DeVogel 1966, 9). This is probably the same woman. There is one extant letter attributed to her. Diogenes Laertius (1853, 8.42) tells us that Pythagoras entrusted his commentaries to his daughter Damo and charged her to divulge them to no person out of his house. And she, though she might have sold his discourses for much money, would not abandon them, for she thought poverty and obedience to her father's injunctions more valuable than gold; and that too, though she was a woman. These commentaries were left at Damo's death to her daughter Bitale and Bitale's husband Telauges, Damo's brother (Iambl. 1818, 146). Meunier (1932, 32) claims Damo herself wrote a commentary on Homer, although he gives no ancient source for this. Although there are no extant writings of Damo, the fact that Pythagoras left his work to her indicates she was most likely an active and important member of that philosophic school. Arignote is said by some to be the daughter of Pythagoras and Theano, although others simply call her a disciple of the two. That she was a Samian and a Pythagorean philosopher is not disputed. She either edited or wrote a book on the mysteries of Demeter entitled The Sacred Discourse and she was the author of the Rites of Dionysos and other philosophical works (Harrison 1961, 646).3 None of her work is extant.

one Theano, the wife of Brotinus of Metgapontum but in 132 he mentions two Theanos: one Brotinus' wife and one Pythagoras'. Diog. Laert. (1853, 8.42) says Theano is Pythagoras' wife and the daughter of Brotinus of Crotona though he also says some say she was the wife of Brotinus and only a pupil of Pythagoras. Mario Meunier (1932, 31) says the Suda also calls her the daughter of Brotinus of Crotona though he says Porph. VP has her born in Crete of a father named Pythanax. Holger Thesleff (1965, 194) says Theano is listed as Pythagoras' wife in Porph. VP 4; Hermesianax ap. Athen. 13.599a; Szhol. in Plato. R. 600b; Suda s.v. 3120; Diog. Laert. 8.42. Mary R. Beard (1947, 314) says the Suda mentions another Theano, also a Pythagorean, who wrote works on virtue addressed to Hippodamus of Thurium. 3. Meunier (1932, 31-32) calls her the daughter of Pythagoras and Theano and says she wrote verses on the mysteries of Demeter. He cites Clement of Alexandria and the Suda; both mention a Sacred Discourse by this poetess.

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hypatia Becauseof the fragmentspreservedby Stobaeus,we havethe names of three other Pythagoreanwomen. Stobaeusattributeda fragment from a work entitled The Moderation WhichBecomes a Womanto Phintys, who may be the daughterof Callicrates(Thomas Taylor 1822, 69; Meunier1932, 63). In Florilegium74.53, Stobaeusalso attributedto her the view that sexual intercoursewithin marriagewith the intention of begettingchildrendoes not make one unclean, but sexual intercourseoutside of marriagedoes (DeVogel 1966, 111). Menage(1984, 61) places her in the thirdcenturyB.C.About Melissa we knowonly that she was a Samianwoman(S. K. Heninger1974,56) and the supposedauthor of a letter preservedby Stobaeus(Meunier 1932, 10). Perictionemay have been Plato's mother or sister (Beard 1947, 317; HolgerThesleff 1965, 142)and as such wouldhave lived in the fifth centuryB.C.Aristotlespoke well of her, accordingto Beard (1947, 317). RichardBentley(1874, 384), however,arguesagainsther existence because Iamblichus does not include her in his list of Pythagoreanwomen. Two fragmentsin Stobaeus are attributedto her, one from a work entitledOn Wisdomand the other from a work entitledOn the Harmonyof Women(Meunier1932, 45 and 49). The last of the Pythagoreanwomen philosophersabout whom we know more than a name is Timycha, the Lacademonianwhom Menage (1984, 54) placesin about the fourthcenturyB.C.She and herhusband Myllias, the Crotonian, had been capturedby the tyrant Dionysius who attempted to get from them the secret doctrines of the Pythagoreans.Having been unsuccessfulat doing so with her husband, he commandedthat Timychabe tortured; for he thought, that as she was a woman, pregnant,and deprivedof her husband,she wouldeasilytell him all he wanted to know, through fear of the torments. The heroic woman, however, grindingher tongue with her teeth, bit it off and spit it at the tyrant;evincingby this, that though her sex being vanquishedby the torments might be compelledto disclose somethingwhich ought to be concealedin silence,yet the membersubservientto the development of it, should be entirely cut off. (Iambl., 1818, 192-95) This story tells nothing about Timycha'sphilosophicacumen, but it does indicatean extraordinaryferocityand strength. Of the writingsof all the ancientwomenphilosophers,the only ones that are extant are some of those attributedto various Pythagorean women. Thereare severalfragmentsand lettersattributedto Theano, fragmentsattributedto Perictioneand Phintys, and lettersattributed 30

kathleen wider to Myia and Melissa.Whetherthesewritingswereindeedauthoredby these women is debatedby scholars. I would like to look both at the contentof thesewritingsand the questionof the authenticityof the attributionof thesewritings.Therearemanyworksof Theanomentioned by ancientwriters.Clementof Alexandriamentionsherpoetryand the Suda says she left philosophicalcommentaries,sentencesand epic poems. Stobaeus ascribes a book on piety to Theano and several apophthegmsare also ascribedto her. DiogenesLaertius(1853, 8.42) mentionsthereare works attributedto Theanobut he gives no titles.4 The most famous fragment often attributedto her (although not necessarilythe most interestingor profound) appears in Diogenes Laertius(1853, 8.43) in its longest version: And they tell a story of her, that once, when she was asked how long a woman ought to be absent from her husbandto be pure, she said, the momentshe leavesher own husband, she is pure; but she is never pure at all, after she leavesanyoneelse. And she recommendedto a woman who was going to her husband, to put off her modesty with her clothes, and when she left him, to resumeit again with her clothes;and when she was asked "Whatclothes?"she said, "those whichcauseyou to be called a woman." This view was expressedat a time when women were thought to be uncleanafter any act of sexualintercourse.A similarquote, "that it is lawful for a womanto sacrificeon the veryday in whichshe has risen from the embracesof her husband," is attributedto Theanothe wife of Brotinusby Iamblichus(1818, 132) though he mentions some attribute it to Theano the wife of Pythagoras. However, Iamblichus (1818, 55), earlierin his Life of Pythagoras,attributesa similarview to Pythagoraswho "is said to have madethat celebratedobservation, that it is holy for a woman, after havingbeen connectedwith her husband, to performsacredrites on the same day; but that this is never holy, after she has been connectedwith any other man." The longestfragmentattributedto Theanoby ancientwritersis supposedlyfrom her workon piety. In this fragmentTheanodisputesthe view that Pythagorasbelievedeverythingwas born of or originated from Number;she arguesratherthat Pythagoreansbelieveeverything has been formed conformingto Numbersince in Numberresidesthe essentialorder. 4. Both Meunier (1932, 32) and Thesleff (1965, 194-195) cite numerous ancient sources who either mention Theano or ascribe fragments or sayings to her.

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hypatia The rest of the fragmentsare moral dictums. For example, it is claimedTheanosaid "If the soul is not immortal,life indeedwill truly be a feast for the wicked who die after living an evil life." Another fragmentparallelsvery closely a fragmentattributedto Pythagoras; both caution us that about some mattersit is best to be silent and about others it is best to speak.5Plutarch(1928, "Coniugalia," 142 C-D) as well as other ancient authors preservedthe following fragment. It reflectsthe traditionalview of the Pythagoreanswith regard to women's place in marriageand the home, but it also reflects the moderation and reserve encouraged by the Pythagoreansin both women and men. Theano, in putting her cloak about her, exposed her arm. Somebodyexclaimed, "A lovely arm." "But not for the public," said she. "Not only the arm of the virtuous woman, but her speech as well, ought not to be for the public, and she ought to be modestand guarded about sayinganythingin the hearingof outsiders,since it is an exposureof herself;for in her talk can be seen her feelings, character,and disposition."6 The next two fragmentsreflect the same traditionalview of women. When asked about the work by which she had made herself famous, Theano is said to have replied: "In weaving cloth and sharing my bed" (Meunier1932, 42). In another fragmentTheano explains the duty of a marriedwoman: "To please her own husband" (Meunier 1932,43). The next fragmentsare bits of folkloricwisdom. "It is better to rely on a horse without a bit than on an unreflectivewoman" (Meunier1932, 44) indicatesthe importanceof reason for women as well as men. The last fragmenthas the hauntingqualityof emptiness to it: when asked what love is Theano replied,echoingHomer'sIliad 1.31: "The inclinationof an unoccupiedheart" (Meunier1932, 42 and 44).7 These fragmentsfunction as popularphilosophysimilarin kind to certain statementsattributedto Pythagoras. For example: "Do not even think of doing what ought not to be done"; "Choose 5. See Meunier (1932, 39) and Thesleff (1965, 195) for the fragment on Number, preserved by Stob. See Meunier (p. 40) for the fragment on the soul, preserved by Cl. Al.; English translation mine. Thesleff mentions it but gives no text. See Meunier (p. 41) for the fragment on silence, preserved by Stob., unmentioned by Thesleff. 6. Stob. Flor. 74.49 cites a few lines in similar terms and Cl. Al. mentions it in both Stromates 4.19 and Pedagogue 2.10 (Meunier 1932, 41-42). Thesleff (1965) mentions this fragment but gives no text. 7. None of these fragments are in Thesleff (1965); all are preserved by Stob.; English translations mine.

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kathleen wider ratherto be strongin soul than in body"; and "It is difficult to walk at one and the same time in many paths of life" (Taylor 1818, 259). Thereare also severallettersattributedto Theano.8Althoughthe subject matteris disappointing,they do reflectthe Pythagoreandesirefor orderand moderation.In Theano'sletterto Eubula,she discourseson the educationof children.She cautionsEubulanot to let her children abandonthemselvesto pleasurebut to get themusedto painand hardship. She scolds her for giving into and so spoiling her children.9In anotherletter Theano offers advice to Nicostrate,a marriedwoman who is jealousof herhusbandbecausehe has a mistress.Her approach is pragmatic.She advisesher not to try to punish her husbandbut to comply with his will, even in this. She urges her to persuadeherself that he goes to his mistressout of lust but to her out of a desirefor a Life's companionand that if she is patienthe will eventuallyreturnto her. She gives traditionalthoughnot necessarilywise femaleadvice:if you act well he will finally feel ashamedand reconcilewith you. Her final argumentdeals directlywith the hard realityof a woman's existence: If he suffers in his reputation,the world will make you likewise suffer; if he acts against his interest, your interest as joined to his, cannot escape unhurt:from all which you may learn this lesson, that in punishinghim you punish yourself.10 Her argumentsare all utilitarianin nature:fightingor divorcewill only increase your problems; obedience and patience, however, will eventuallybring the best results. In anotherletter Theano advises Callisto to use moderationin the treatmentof servants.She urgesher to be kindto herservantsbecause they are human beings. Callisto should not mistreather servantsor they will grow bitter and disloyal, but she should disciplinethem to 8. Thesleff (1965, 195-200) gives the Greek texts of eight letters attributed to Theano; Meunier (1932, 79-117) gives the French translation of eight letters attributed to Theano. Meunier's letter #10, Theano to Eurydice, is not in Thesleff's edition and Thesleff's letter #7, Theano to Timareta, is not in Meunier's. Toland (1726, 2: 18-21 & 24-27) gives an English translation of two of Theano's letters (to Eubule and to Nicostrate). See Beard (1947, 313-14) for a list of the editions of these letters from 1499 to 1815. 9. See Thesleff (1965, 195-96). I relied on Toland's translation (1726, 2: 18-21; spelling updated); Meunier (1932, 80-81) points to similiar ideas attributed to Pythagoras. 10. See Thesleff (1965, 198-200). I relied on Toland's translation (1726, 2: 24-27; spelling updated).

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hypatia preserveher own self-respect. "Act in such a way that you imitate those tools whichdeterioratewhen they are not used and whichbreak when they are used too much." EssentiallyTheano advises that one should use reason and moderationin the treatmentof servants.The rest of the letters attributedto Theano deal with subjects similarto those dealtwith in the firstthreeletters.Beforelookingat the question of the authenticityof the attributionof these lettersto Theano, let me discuss the other writingsattributedto Pythagoreanwomen. One is a letterfrom Melissato Clearetawhichgives advicesimilarto that supposedlygiven by Pythagorasto the women of Crotona. She advisesClearetato dress modestlyand to attemptto please her husband not others. Accordingto Melissa, obedienceis the best dowry one can bringto a marriageand beautiesof the mind outlast those of the body. Myia'sletterto Phyllisis filled with practicaladvice, in particularabout the choice of a nursefor one's children:choose one, she tells her, who is neat, modest, temperatein food and drink;one who has good milk, refrainsfrom sex while nursing,lacks passion and is Greek.

2

The fragments attributed to Perictione and Phintys are more substantivethan those above. Three rather long fragmentsare attributedto Perictione.The first is from a work entitled On Wisdom and arguesthat humanbeingswereborn to contemplatethe principle of universalnature;the function of wisdomis to contemplatethe intelligence manifest in reality. While mathematicsand the sciences studycertainrealities,wisdomalone studiesall modalitiesof the real. Just as sight concernsitself with all that is visibleand hearingwith all that is audible,so wisdom,Perictionesays, concernsitself with all that is real. Wisdom, unlike the sciences, studies not the propertiesattributedto certainkinds of entities but the propertiesattributableto all reality. Wisdomstudiesthat principlewhich ordersand gives harmony to all existence; to contemplate such a principle is to have "found a beautiful summitfrom which to lift one's gaze to God." The nexttwo fragmentsattributedto Perictioneare froma workentitled On the Harmonyof Women.One exhortswomen, in very lofty language, to be pious and obedient to their parents. We should 11. See Thesleff (1965, 197-98). I relied on Meunier's translation (1932, 95-99); English translation of the French by A.W. Bush. For similar ideas attributed to Pythagoras see Iambl. (1818, 194-95). The rest of the letters can be found in Thesleff (pp. 195-201) and Meunier (pp. 100-108 and 117). 12. For Melissa's letter see Thesleff (1965, 115-16) and Meunier (1932, 109-10). 1 relied on Toland's translation (1726, 2: 22-23). For similar ideas attributed to Pythagoras see lamblichus (1818, 54-57). For Myia's letter see Thesleff (pp. 123-24). I relied on Toland's translation (2: 15-17).

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kathleen wider always,urgesPerictione,speakpiouslyof our parentsand neverabandon them whetherin sicknessor in health, in war or in peace, in body or in soul, in povertyor wealth,in obscurityor fame. If a womandoes scornher parentswhen they are in need, she will be punishedfor such impietyin this life and in the next. The other fragmentfrom On the Harmony of Womenis a portrait of a woman of moderationand prudence.The portraitis drawnin traditionallines. Such a woman's soul, according to Perictione, should aspire to virtue, so she can become just, courageous, prudent, and ornate with the qualities suitable to her nature. Such virtue will be achievedwhen a woman engages in noble conduct toward herself, her husband, her children, her household, and even her city or nation if she governsthese. Such conduct involves overcomingdesireand passion, guardingher affection for her husband, her children,and her householdand avoiding "the beds of strangers."A prudentwoman will also be moderatein the care of her body: in nourishing,clothing, bathing, and anointing it. She should avoid excess and expensein food, clothing, and ornament. She must protect herself from cold and nakedness, but she shouldin doing so avoid sumptuousor immodestclothing.She should avoid gold or preciousstonesand she shouldrefrainfrombraidingher hairwith expensiveornaments,anointingherselfwith heavyperfumes or coloringher face or hair. Those who do so seek licentiousness,says Perictione. It is the beauty of temperancethat pleases the virtuous woman. If she lacks wealth and the friendshipof men of fame, she does not seek after them becausethe intelligentwoman does not feel any obstacleto the good life withoutthem. The womanof moderation must also honor the gods, obey the laws and customs establishedby the ancestors,and revereher parents. Perictionegives the age-old adviceto a marriedwoman to think of nothingfor herselfprivately,but to workto preservehermarriage.To do so she should endureall that befalls her husbandeven the misfortune whichresultsfrom his weaknessor excess. She should accepther husband's infidelities since such failures are pardoned in men and not in women. She should avoid jealousy and anger in the face of such unfaithfulnesssand conformherselfto the will and wellbeing of her husband.If she worksagainstherhusband,she will bring only ruin to herself and her household. In sum, Perictioneseemsto be urgingthe woman of moderationto mold herself into somethingindistinguishablefrom her husband. In the company of her husband, she will live in conformityto the opinions of a common life with him; she will adapt herself to the parents and friends who 35

hypatia esteem her husband and will regard as sweet and bitter the same things as her husband.'3 This fragment and others stand as unfortunate testimony that the study of philosophy and training in the exercise of reflection do not necessarily free one from the tyranny of custom. Much of this advice to women attributed to Perictione is matched by similar advice to women attributed to Pythagoras in which he advises both sexes to be faithful to their spouses, to dress simply, avoid luxury and wealth, and share all things in common. But this subservience of a woman to her husband is not urged upon men with reference to their wives. The fragment attributed to Phintys from a work entitled The Moderation Which Becomes a Woman is similar in subject matter to the second fragment from On the Harmony of Women attributed to Perictione. In it Phintys argues that the exercise of the virtue proper to a certain kind of entity gives that entity value. The proper virtue of the eyes gives the eyes excellence; the same is true she says for the ears, for a horse, for a man, and for a woman. The proper virtue for a woman (that which makes her an excellent woman) is moderation because it is through moderation that she is capable of esteeming and loving her husband. Although Phintys thinks that certain occupations are particular to men (e.g., commanding armies, governing cities, addressing assemblies) and others to women (e.g., taking care of the house, serving her husband), she does not think philosophy should be reserved for just one sex. She also argues that both men and women should exercise courage, justice, and moderation. Both men and women should strive after the virtues of the body: health, strength, delicate sensibility, and beauty; but the first two are more suited to men and the second two to women. She divides the virtues of the spirit in the same traditional way. Courage and clear-sighted determination become a man better because of the rigor of his body and spirit. Prudent self-control is better suited to a woman. Phintys gives five means to attain such selfcontrol: (1) guarding one's bed by piety; (2) conserving one's home by decency of dress; (3) conducting oneself with reserve in arguments; (4) avoiding attendance at orgiastic festivals, and (5) being temperate in one's sacrifices to the gods. The most efficacious means though, and the one that sums up the rest, she says, is refraining from sexual relations with anyone but one's husband. If a woman does sleep with 13. For my summary of these three fragments from Perictione, I relied on Meunier's French translation (1932, 45-62); English translations mine. See Thesleff (1965, 142-46) for the Greek texts.

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kathleen wider other men, she offends the gods of the family by failing to provide legitimateoffspring;she offends the gods of procreationby engaging in sex for a reason other than reproduction,and she offends her countryby violatingthe laws. Such immoderationleads only to ruin. The gods grantno forgivenessto unfaithfulwomen. A woman'smost beautiful ornamentand greatestglory is that her childrenresemble her husband. Phintys goes on to advise women of the proper dress for the virtuouswoman. She shoulddressin whitewith simplicityand without excess. Like Perictione, she advises women to avoid transparentor multi-coloredcloth, excess make-up, luxury in dress and ornament. By doing so they will refrain from stirringup other women'sjealousy and will avoid manifestingscorn for poor women. This will help to keep the city united. She thinks women should be allowed out of the house but only before nightfalland only for certain religious ceremoniesor for making domestic purchases. They should avoid the orgiasticfestivals and their attendantdrunkenness, for the mistressof the house must be full of self-control and free from all wrong-doing.'4For Phintys then the virtue of woman qua woman would appear to function as a chastity belt over the spirits and loins of moderatewomen. Apart from the question of the correctnessor significanceof the contentsof these extantwritingsattributedto Pythagoreanwomen is the questionof the accuracyof these attributions.Therearetwo standard argumentsused to show these Pythagoricwritingsattributedto women Pythagoreansare apocryphal.One is that they are not written in the Dorian dialect which was used by most of the Pythagoreans and the other is that they reflect Neopythagorean rather than Pythagorean thought. Those who contest the authenticity of the fragmentsand letters attributedto Theano point out that they are written in the Attic dialect. But other scholars argue, as Chaignet does, that "the Attic dialectin which these are writtenwill not be all alone a reason sufficient to reject them, because it has been demonstratedthat often, in order to facilitatethe readingof a work written in Dorian, copyists changed the original dialect."'5Further evidence for their inauthenticityis needed. Some argue they are 14. For my summary of this fragment from Phintys, I relied on Meunier's French translation (1932, 63-75). See also Taylor (1822, 69-74) for an English translation of this fragment. Thesleff (1965) does not mention Phintys nor attribute any writings to her. 15. Meunier (1932, 80) quoting Edmund Chaignet, Pythagore et la philosophie pythagoricienne; English translation mine. Meunier also discusses Meiners, Geschichteder Wissenchaften in Griechenland und Rom, who argues the letters are inauthentic

37

hypatia inauthentic because they reflect Neopythagoreanand not Pythagorean thought and so were probably written long after Theano lived.'6Otherscontendthis argumentdoes not work for Theano'sletters to Eubula, Nicostrateand Callisto becausethey do not conflict with the doctrines of the Pythagorean school.17 There is reason though to suspect the authenticityof some of the other letters attributedto Theano. The letter to the admirableEurydiceseems to be an imitation of Theano's letter to Nicostrate and the letter to Rhodope mentions Plato's dialogue Parmenideswhich was written after Theano died. Another letter addressedto Eurydicewas written much later by TheophylactosSimocata, who lived in Byzantiumin the seventh century A.D.'8

HolgerThesleff (1961, 7-8, 31-33, 50-59),in one of the most recent studies of these Pythagoreantexts, argues that all the writings attributedto these Pythagoreanwomen (amongmany othersattributed to male Pythagoreanwriters)are probablyapocryphal.He separates the writingshe calls the pseudepigraphafrom both the pre-Platonic Pythagoreantraditionwhichwas primarilyoral and pre-Classicaland the Neopythagoreantraditions arising in the first century B.C. in which the authors attached their own names to the writings. He argues against the standard view19 that holds that these pseudepigraphawere writtenin Alexandriabetweenthe first century B.C.and the first century A.D. by Neopythagoreans. He contends most

of them werewrittenbetweenthe fourth and the secondcenturyB.C., some in SouthernItaly and some in Athens or Alexandria.Although Thesleff would date most of the works he includes among the pseudepigraphaearlier than the scholars before him, he does not

because they are written in the Attic dialect and Orelli, Socratis et Socraticorum Pythagorae et Pythagoreorum quaeferuntur Epistolae, who defends their authenticity because they are not opposed to any of the doctrines we know of the Pythagorean school and the copyists could have changed the dialect. 16. Meunier (1932, 20) in discussing the fragments of Theano, Perictione, and Phintys cites E. Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen and F. Wilhelm, "Die Oeconomica der Neuphythagoreer Bryson, Kallicratidas, Perictyone, Phintys" in Rheinisches Mluseumton this point. 17. Meunier (1932, 80) cites Orelli on this and tries to establish the relationship between Pythagorean thought and the contents of these letters (and other writings too) in his introduction. However, if these ideas attributed to Pythagoras are also apocryphal, this line of argument fails. 18. Meunier (1932, 101, 107, 117) argues the letters to admirable Eurydice, to Timonide, to Eucleides, to Rhodope and to Eurydice are aprocryphal. Thesleff (1965, 195) says the letters, especially the ones to Eucleides and Rhodope, may be very late. 19. Thesleff (1961) attributes this view to Zeller, Praechter, Diels, and Schmekel.

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kathleen wider disputetheirinauthenticity.He arguesit is the subjectmatter,the approach, the language and the style which distinguish the pseudepigraphafrom early Pythagorean writings and from later Neopythagoreanwritings. The fragment of Perictione On Wisdomhas the same title and similarideas as a work attributedto Archytasof Tarentethough the style and order of ideas is somewhatdifferent. Some scholarshold that the Perictione fragment was modeled on Archytas'. While StobaeusattributedOn Wisdomto Perictione,Iamblichusattributed a similarfragmentto Archytas.Becauseonly Stobaeusmentionsher and becauseshe bearsPlato's mother'sname, some scholarsarguethe work attributedto her is a forgery. RichardBentley (1874, 383-84) arguesthat since the fragmentsfrom On the Harmonyof Womenattributedto her are in Ionic and the fragmentfrom On Wisdomis in Doric, she could not have writtenboth of them because there is no reasonshe would have writtenin two dialects.He thinks, in fact, that all her fragmentsare spuriousfor the reasonsgivenabove and because "Iamblichushas given us a List of all the womenof the Sect, that He everheardof" and Perictione'snameis not amongthem. If one looks at Iamblichus(1818, 267), however,one finds he is givinga list of the most illustriousPythagoreanwomen not a list of all these women. Thesleff (1961, 76) arguesthat many writingswere attributedto Archytas since he was the last head of the Pythagoreanschool and that most of these attributionsare apocryphal.Whetherthe fragmentattributedto Perictionewas modeledon the Archytasfragmentor not and who wrote either fragment remains unclear (see also Meunier 1932, 47). In summary,it appearsfrom The scholarshipto date that these extant fragments attributed to early Pythagorean women were not authored by those women but by writers a few centuries later. Thesleff (1961, 76) speculatesthat the reason for making such false attributions was not to deceive people but to indicate a certain allegiance.Those who followed the traditionof Archytaswould attribute their work to him and those who dissentedfrom that group would choose otherearlyPythagoreannamesto indicatethat dissent. We cannot of course prove that those writings attributed to Pythagoreanwomen must have been written by other women at a later period, though it is somewhathard to imaginea male writerattributinghis work to a woman. Some might argue that men could have writtenthese worksbut becauseof the subjectmatterof some of the lettersand fragments,e.g., those dealingwith an unfaithfulhusband or household management,would attributethem to women. However,men in the ancientworld often wrote works on such topics 39

hypatia as household managementand acknowledgedtheir authorship. All we can deducewith any certaintyfrom the existenceof such texts and their attributionsto women is that it must not have been uncommon or at least unheard of in the ancient world for women to write philosophical treatises, at least popular ones. If this were not the case, it is hard to imaginewhy writerswould attributetheir works to women.

A-ps-ia Aspasia, a Milesian by birth and the daughterof Axiochus, was born between 470 and 465 B.C. She became the companion of Pericles, the rulerof Athens, about 445 when she was about twenty and he fifty. She lived with him until he died in 429. Some scholarssay she marrieda General Lysiclesafter Pericles' death, but others say that is impossible because he died the same year Pericles did. (See Plutarch 1915, 24.1-7; Arthur Weigall 1932, 139-43; A. R. Burns 1962, 122-23; C.M. Bowra 1971, 192 for biographical details.) Plutarch (1915, 24.3-4) tells us that Aeschines the Socratic, who wrote a partiallyextantdialogueentitledAspasia, says "that Lysicles the sheepdealer,a man of low birth and nature, came to be the first man at Athens by living with Aspasia after the death of Pericles." But W.L. Courtney (1918, 107) says this claim cannot be taken seriously.There are no extant writingsby Aspasia. She is mentioned on more than one occasion by Socrates,but Thucydidesnever mentions her by name though he does hint he knew about her (Bowra, 1971, 193-94). Aspasia was friends with some of the most intellectually and politically powerful men of fifth century Athens, among them Socrates,Xenophon, Alcibiades,Anaxagoras,Phidias and of course Pericles (see Weigall 1932, 139-40 for a longer list of her friends). Plutarch(1915, 24.5-6) tells us that Periclesleft his wife who was a kinswomanto him and legally bestowed her upon another man, with her own consent, and himself took Aspasia, and loved her exceedingly. Twice a day, as they say, on going out and on coming in from the market-place,he would salute her with a loving kiss. This sign of affection betweenthem was unusualenough apparently for Plutarchto think it worth noting. Pericleswas unable to marry Aspasiabecausethe law prohibitedthe marriageof a noble Athenian to a foreigner.They produceda son who was not at first a citizen 40

kathleen wider becauseof a law Pericleshad proposedearlierlimitingcitizenshipto those with two Athenianparents. He later adopted this son and had him naturalizedby a special act (Willis J. Abbot 1913, 22; Bowra 1971, 192). The love betweenPericlesand Aspasiacomes down to us as one of the few recorded romantic loves between a man and a woman in classicalAthens. It is also unique, especiallyfor that time, becauseit appearsto have been based on a sharedintellectualas well as sexual life. Plutarch(1915, 24.5-6) tells us that some said Aspasia "was held in high favour by Pericles because of her rare political wisdom." And Zeno reports that people said Pericles consulted Aspasia on all matters(Weigall 1932, 141). BecauseAspasia was not an Athenian citizen and because her intellectualand sexual life were unorthodox, her reputationand position were alwaysendangered.She lived with a man to whom she was not legally married. She associated with intellectuals and artists whose views were unconventional. Her salon brought together atheists and skeptics. She was the companionof one of the most, if not the most, powerful political figures of the time against whom many plotted. She did all this in an extremelypatriarchalsociety in whicha woman'srole was restrictedto home and hearthand in which very few women had access to any educationalor intellectuallife at all and no access to sexual choice. A woman as renownedfor her intelligence,influence, and beauty as Aspasia was bound to arouseenmity and jealousy. The worst chargeswerebroughtagainsther by the Greek comedians. Aristophanesin The Archarniansaccuses her of bringing about the Peloponnesian war (Courtney 1918, 105). "Cratinus flatly called her a prostitute" (Plut. 1915, 24.6). About 432 Hermippus,a comic poet, finally broughtchargesagainsther for impiety and for procuringfree-born women for Pericles' pleasure (Bowra 1971, 194). Because younger and more advanced women startedattendingher salon and so associatingwith men, she was accused of procuringthese women as prostitutes.BecauseAnaxagoras and Socratesattendedher salon, she was attackedas a sympathizerof atheists. As an alien she had no right to even appearat the trial, so Periclesdefendedher and securedher acquittalby sheddingtearsand entreatingthe jurors (Plut. 1915, 32.1-3). In discussingSocrates'trial Zeller (1980, 104-105)says the deepest cause of the prosecutionof Socrateswas the hostilityof most Atheniansto the modernenlightenment and that this was exhibitedby a series of trials beginningwith Aspasia's. In addition to these formal charges Plutarch(1915, 25.1) tells us gossip had it that she influenced Pericles to fight the war against Samos. Samos and Miletus were waging war for the possession of 41

hypatia Priene and the Samians were winning when the Athenians ordered them to stop the war and submit the case to Athenian arbitration. They refused;so Pericleswent and broke up the oligarchyat Samos and set up a democracy.In a 1971Englishtranslationof Thucydides, Alfred French(p. 72) in a footnote to Thucydides'discussionof this war refersto this passage from Plutarchand arguesthat though few historiansadmit to believingin this story "it is not necessarilyuntrue for that reason." His only reasonfor believingit to be trueis because of "the charmand wit of this queenof the courtesans."It is this kind of loose and sexistscholarshipwhichmakesit difficultto separatethe facts of these women's lives from the fancy of the scholars. Anothernotablefriendshipin Aspasia'slife was her friendshipwith Socrates.Plutarch(1915, 24.3) tells us "Socratessometimescame to see her with his disciples." Socrates apparentlyused to advise his friendsto send theirsons to herbecauseof herremarkableintelligence (Wiegall 1932, 139). Xenophon (1889, 2.6.36) in his Memorabiliaof Socrates, in recountinga discussion Socrates had with Critobulus, quotes Socratesas saying "I have no such liberty [to say anything he pleases about Critobulus], accordingto a remarkthat I once heard from Aspasia; for she said that skillful matchmakers,by reportingwith truth good points of character,had greatinfluencein leadingpeople to form unions, but that those who said what was false, did no good by theirpraises,for that those such as weredeceived hated each other and the matchmakeralike; and as I am persuadedthis opinionis correct,I think I ought not to say, when I praiseyou, anythingthat I cannot utter with truth." In Xenophon's Oeconmicus(1857, 3.14) he again recountsa discussion betweenSocratesand Critobulusin whichthe topic is the instruction of wives and Socratestells Critobulus:"'I will make you friends with Aspasia,who will give you informationon this point moreknowingly than I."' Some scholars have taken Socrates to be speaking ironicallyin mentioningAspasia as an instructress(see J. S. Watson 1857, 84-85 who mentions such scholars). But in the discussion Socrates recommendseducation as necessary for a woman to be a good wife. Not only was Aspasia one of the few educated women in Athens (most women could read and calculatejust enough to take care of domesticwork), but she, in fact, gave instructionsto many of the wives in the upper class who came to her salon. These scholarsseem to imply that becauseAspasia was not legally Pericles' 42

kathleen wider wife and so a courtesan, she was the least suited to give such instruction. This reveals their bias more than Socrates' ironic humor. The most controversial work in which Socrates mentions Aspasia is the Platonic dialogue Menexenus. Its genuineness as a work of Plato's was once in question, but most scholars now accept it as genuine. In it Socrates recites a funeral oration which he says Aspasia taught him. He refers to her as an excellent mistress in the art of rhetoric who made many good speakers, among them Pericles. He even indicates he believes she wrote Pericles' famous funeral oration. At the end of the speech Menexenus marvels that Aspasia who is only a woman could compose such a speech. Socrates invites him to overcome his incredulousness by coming to hear her speak (1961, 235e-236c; 249d). Whether or not this praise of Aspasia is sincere depends on how one evaluates the merits of the funeral speech and how one interprets the purpose and tone of the dialogue. Edith Hamilton (1961, 186) describes the speech as "dullness unrelieved." Benjamin Jowett (1953, 4: 678) argues the speech is a satire on patriotic and sentimental funeral orations. Paul Shorey (1933, 185) says there have been many guesses as to the purpose of the dialogue and none are verifiable. Plato may have wished to prove his patriotism and propitiate those whom the attack on Athenian statesmen in the Gorgias had offended. He may have wished to compete with Isocrates and give a practical illustration of his own theory of epideictic rhetoric. He may have amused himself by yielding to a casual impulse to write. Paul Friedlander (1964, 2: 216-28) thinks the work is much more ambiguous than is usually noted. He argues there is more irony than satire in the dialogue and that by using Aspasia, Pericles' widow, Plato's Socrates can split off from himself a "somebody" behind whom he can hide. Aspasia takes the place of this "somebody" in order to establish a connection "in a fantastic kind of playfulness-between the most famous funeral speech, that of Pericles and Socrates' fiction. Aspasia inspired both." Menexenus' expression of doubt about Aspasia's authorship of the speech is used to dispel the reality of the teacher Aspasia and in this way the speech is reclaimed for Socrates, according to Friedlander. A. E. Taylor (1960, 41-45) worries that if the speech is not taken seriously but is taken as a burlesque instead, then Plato appears to be ridiculing Socrates, a person it is known he respected. Taylor argues that the speech is a satire but that Plato avoided ridiculing Socrates and Aspasia by setting the time of the speech several years after Socrates' and Aspasia's deaths. The oration is given for those who died in the Corinthian war 43

hypatia which did not begin until 395, four yearsafter Socrates'death in 399. Taylor takes this satire as an example of Plato's "freakish humor" (1960, 45). The dialogue remains a mystery. The quality of writing in the funeral oration comes nowhere near the usual quality of Plato's work. Without treatingthe speech as satirical, in part at least, it is hard to save Plato's face. However,it is perplexingwhy Plato would have Socratesattributethe authorshipof such a speechto Aspasia, a person Socratesis known to have respectedand why Socrateswould speak of Aspasia as a famous figure at the period twenty-fiveyears after Pericles' death. Given the problems of interpretation, the dialogue cannot be used to support the claim that Aspasia wrote Pericles's famous speech and was an admirableteacher of rhetoric nor the counterclaim that as a woman she could produceonly a sentimentaland overwrittenfuneralspeech. Thereare manyexamplesof such sentimentalspeecheswrittenby men duringthat time. Plutarch (1915, 24.4) tells us that "in the Menexenusof Plato even though the first part be writtenin a sportivevein, thereis at any rate, thus much of fact, that a woman had the reputationof associatingwith many Atheniansas a teacherof rhetoric."

Diotima of Mantinea We know little about Diotima other than through her appearance as a central character in Plato's Symposium (1961). After Aristophanesand Agathon have given their views of love, Socrates begins to talk about some lessons he was once given by a Mantinean woman called Diotima, a priestessand prophetess: a womanwho was deeplyversedin this and manyother fields of knowledge. It was she who brought about a ten years' postponementof the great plague of Athens on the occasion of a certain sacrifice, and it was she who taught me the philosophyof love. (1961, 201d) He even attributesthe so-called Socraticmethod to her: "I think the easiest way will be to adopt Diotima's own method of inquiry by questionand answer"(1961, 201e). Socratestells us that love, according to Diotima, lies mid-waybetweenthe gods and mortals. On the day of Aphrodite'sbirth, Need (penury),a mortal, seducedResource (Poros), a god, in orderto overcomeher need and out of this union was begotten Love. Love, born to follow the beautiful, follows her who is beauty itself, Aphrodite with whom he shares a birth date. Born of need and resource,love 44

kathleen wider will be now, when all goes well with him, alive and bloomingand now dying, to be born again by virtueof his father'snature,while what he gains will alwaysebb away as fast. So love is never altogetherin or out of need. (1961, 203e) The centralimagesin Diotima's teachingson love are pregnancyand birth. She tells us, accordingto Socrates,that love is a longingfor immortalityand that this longing is expressedthrougha desire to procreate.Thosewhosedesireto procreateis of the body take a womanas the object of their love and raise a family to gain immortality.But those whosedesireis of the spiritconceiveand bearvirtuesof the spirit like wisdom. To do so one must climb up a laddertowardthe highest goal of love: first one must fall in love with the beauty of one individualbody, then with bodily beautyitself, then with the beautyof the lawsand institutions,and finallyone mustlove beautyitself. When that occurs one becomes a friend of God and puts on immortality. Socrates presents this powerful and arrestingvision of love as the teachingof a woman trainedin wisdom and prophecy. Whether Diotima was an actual historical figure is debated by scholars.The argumentssupportingthe viewthat she is a fictitiouspersonage inventedby Plato are weak. However, even given the strong probabilityof herexistence,the questionstillremainshow muchif any of this view of love is the view of the historicalDiotima, how muchif any is the view of the historialSocrates,and how much if any Plato's view. Scholars give all kinds of reasons for Plato's invention of Diotima. F. M. Cornford(1967, 71) speculatesthat Diotima was invented as a device by which Socratescould avoid offending his host Agathon while criticizinghis views. By puttinghis views of love into the mouth of a fictitious woman who corrects Socrates' mistaken views, the focus is on Socrates'ignoranceand not Agathon's. "This is sufficientreason for the inventionof Diotima," adds Cornford.If it were already an establishedfact that Diotima was fictitious and a reasonwere neededto explainthat fact, Cornfordmight indeedhave suppliedus with a sufficientreason. But the reasongiven is certainly not sufficientto prove in the first place that she was fictitious. R. G. Bury (1932, xxxix-xl)arguesthat Diotima must be fictitious becausePlato would not put his vision of Eros into the mouth of any historicalperson since that would imply it was derived ratherthan original.He uses the nameof Diotimaof Mantineaboth to suggestthe associationwith "mantic" art which deals with the conversebetween men and gods and becauseDiotimameansliterally'she that has honor from Zeus' which suggests, according to Bury, the possession 45

hypatia of wisdom and authority. The obvious weakness in this argument is that Plato puts most of his other theories into the mouth of an historical person-Socrates. Even in this case, if he were trying to avoid the criticism that his theory was derivative, why would he have it come first from Diotima and then Socrates and so have it be twice removed from himself as author? Bury notes Theodor Comperz's suggestion that the chief object for Plato of this "etherealized affection" discussed by Diotima is Dion of Syracuse "to whom Plato dedicated an epitaph replete with memories of passionate feeling." If Gomperz is right, says Bury, then another significance attaches to the name Diotima because both names begin with the same three letters. The reader is certainly asked to stretch her/his "principle of charity" here. Martha Nussbaum (1979, 144-45) takes for granted Diotima's fictitious nature and then wonders why Plato chose the name Diotima. Alcibiades had a mistress Timandra whose name meant 'honor the man' and so, Nussbaum speculates, by giving Socrates a mistress whose name means 'honor the god', Plato shows Socrates taking to himself a priestess rather than a courtesan, a woman who prefers the intercourse of minds rather than bodies, one who honors the divine over the human. None of these analyses give us any good reason (and most no reason at all) for thinking Diotima is fictitious. A. E. Taylor (1960, 224-25) argues against the widespread view of her fictitiousness: I cannot agree with many modern scholars regarding Diotima of Mantinea as a fictitious personage; still less in looking for fanciful reasons for giving the particular names Plato does to the prophetess and her place of origin. The introduction of purely fictitious named personages into a discourse seems to be a literary device unknown to Plato, ... and I do not believe that if he had invented Diotima he would have gone on to put into the mouth of Socrates the definite statement that she had delayed the pestilence of the early years of the Archidamian war for ten years by "offering sacrifice" at Athens. As the Meno has told us, Socrates did derive hints for his thought from the traditions of "priests of both sexes who have been at pains to understand the rationale of what they do," and the purpose of the reference to the presence of Diotima at Athens about 440 is manifestly not merely to account for Socrates' acquaintance with her, but to make the point that the mystical doctrine of the contemplative "ascent" of the soul, now to be set forth, was one on which the philosopher's mind had been brooding ever since his 46

kathleen wider thirtiethyear. This, if true, is very importantfor our understandingof the man's personality,and I, for one, cannot believe that Plato was guilty of wanton mystificationsabout such things. At the same time, we may be sure that in reproducing a conversation a quarter of a century old, Socrates is blending his recollectionsof the past with his subsequentmeditations upon it.

Taylor concludes, therefore, that we should treat this speech as a speech of Socratesand Diotima as an historicalperson. In looking at scholarlyanalyses of this speech, we find some interestingexamplesof sexual stereotyping.Stanley Rosen (1968, 203) claims that in Diotima we are given "a masculine woman, who dominates Socrates, prefers children of the psyche to those of the body and herself aspires to synoptic vision." He later contradicts himselfby arguingthat Diotimaas a representationof the femaleand propheticelementis passivewith respectto the gods. She is a mid-wife who assistsothersin givingbirthto theirdivinerevelation(1968, 225). Thus she does not aspire to and seems incapableof the synoptic vision, incapableof love, thoughthe vision of Eros comes throughher. In her speech she claims that love is the longing for immortalityand that the highestexpressionof this is spiritualpregnancy,the delivery of an idea into the world. However,on Rosen'sanalysis,Diotimais a midwifewho only assistsothersin givingbirthto theirimmortalitybut is incapableherself of direct communionwith the eternal. The problemwith this analysisis not so muchin assigningthis role to Diotima (Socratesis often cast in the role of spiritualmidwifeas well); but in assigningher to that role, as Rosen does, because she is female and then confining her to that role for the same reason. HarryNeumann(1965, 39), in an article on Diotima's concept of love, discusseswhat he calls Diotima's novel theory of childbirth which eliminates the role usually ascribed to the male. . . . Where common sense

finds masculine initiative resulting in fertilization, Diotima perceivesthe feminine need to give birth .... The salientpoint is that pregnancydoes not come about by the agency of an externalbegetteror male element, since it is innate. (Emphasisis mine). Neumannmisses Diotima's point. She says love is a longing for propagation. It is not pregnancywhich is innate in women and men, but the longing (desire)to reproduce,bring forth, create out of oneself somethingeternal.In Diotima'saccountan externalagent does bring 47

hypatia to fruitionthis desireand the agent is beauty. Neumannseems angry or hurtbecause,on his view, Diotima'saccountof pregnancyhas left out the masculinerole. Neumannseems to forget Diotima is talking about the spirit which for Plato is asexual. She is speaking of the human desire for eternitywhich exists in all souls. Pregnancyof the spiritcomesabout by a union betweenthe soul and beautyratherthan betweena man and a woman. These examples of how the sexual bias of scholars can influence their scholarshipshould warn us to treat with caution their work in areassuchas this one. ChristinePierce(1975),in an articleon the fifth book of Plato's Republic,reviewsseveralscholars'interpretationsof Plato's feminism. The contortions of these writersin the face of a Platonicpositionthey cannotstomachis amazing.She remindsus that philosophershave often been accusedof defendingthe mores and beliefs of societiesin whichthey live as eternal truths. Both Plato and Aristotlearguedin favor of slavery,and Kantarguedfor the necessarycharacterof Euclidean space. The same tendency may pervade philosophicalscholarship,the tendencyto superimpose the moresand beliefs of one's own society on figuresof philosophy'spast. It may be just this tendencywhichaccounts for questionableinterpretationsof passages in RepublicV which are clear and straightforward.Thus examiningviews on Plato may illustratethe extent to which beliefs about the intrinsicinequalityof the sexes have permeatedour own society. (1975, 10) We should be careful then about accepting without scrutiny the scholars'viewson the fictitiousnessof Diotimaand her significancein the dialogue. The evidenceis not strong enough to defend the view that she is fictitious. How much of her speechis reallythe view of the historical Diotima remains a mystery. The most profitable interpretativestanceis the one takenby Taylor;he treatsthis speechas expressing the view of the Platonic Socrates. However, the fact that Plato put Socrates'vision of Eros into the mouth of a woman lends plausibilityto the thesisthat womenengagedin philosophicthoughtin ancient Greece.

Arete Arete, a fourth century B.C. philosopher, was the daughter of Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaicschool of philosophy. She became the head of this school after her father's death. Diogenes 48

kathleen wider Laertius(1853, 2.65) gives Aristippus'dates as about 435-350,but no exact dates are given for Arete. Diogenes Laertius(1853, 2.72, 2.81) says she was one of her father'sdisciplesand that he trainedher well though he treated his son rather poorly. Diogenes Laertius (1853, 2.86) also tells us that Arete's son was known as Metrodidaktos (Mother-taught).The Cyrenaicschool was one of the Socraticschools which emphasizedthat the knowledgeof values was more important than speculativeknowledgeand so they taughtthat logic and physics were valuable only with regard to ethics. They were relativists, however,with regardto ethics and taught that "the personalsubjective impressionis the value of our ends and the rule of our action" (Leon Robin 1928, 171). The final end is pleasureand so pleasureis the measureof all other values. Unfortunatelyall the works of this school have been lost (Gomperz1905,2: 229). All we knowof Areteis that she was trainedas a philosopherand trainedher son likewiseand that she headed one of the schools of ancientphilosophy.

Hipparchia What little we know of Hipparchiacomes to us from Diogenes Laertius(1853, 6.96). She was a fourth-thirdcenturyB.C.philosopher, the wife of Crates,an eminentCynicwho lived about 340-260and the sister of Metrocles, also a Cynic. Both she and her brother were nativesof Maronea.She fell in love with Cratesand his doctrinesand would not be dissuadedfrom her decision to marryhim despite the fact that he had neitherwealthnor high birthnor personalbeauty.She threatenedsuicide if her parents did not allow her to marry him. Crates, at her parents' request, also tried to dissuade her, finally throwingall his earthlypossessionsbefore her declaring"This is the bridegroomwhom you are choosing, and this is the whole of his property;considerthese facts for it will not be possiblefor you to become his partnerif you do not also apply yourselfto the same studies, and conform to the same habits that he does." Hipparchiachose Crates for her husbandand, dressedas he did, went about with him freelyin public. Diogenes Laertius(1853, 6.97-98) tells of Hipparchia'sattacking Theodorus,the atheist, at a supperat Lysimachus'.She proposed to him the following sophism:"WhatTheodoruscould not be called wrong for doing, that same thing Hipparchia ought not to be called wrong for doing. But Theodorus does no wrong when he beats himself; therefore Hipparchiadoes no wrong when she beats Theodorus." 49

hypatia Theodorus made no reply, but ripped off Hipparchia's clothing instead. She was neitheroffended nor ashamed, as many a woman would have been, but when he said to her: - "Who is the woman who has left the shuttleso near the warp?" "I, Theodorus,am that person," she replied;"but do I appear to you to have come to a wrong decision, if I devote that time to philosophy, which I otherwise should have spent at the loom?" And these and many other sayingsare reportedof this female philosopher. To be a woman and a philosopherwas apparentlynot an easy task in ancient Greece.

Pamphile All we know of this woman is that she was a disciple of Theophrastus (Swidler 1976, 19), who headed the Lyceum after Aristotle's death in 322 B.C. Theophrastuslived from 370 to 287, so Pamphileprobablylived at the end of the fourth centuryand during the first half of the third century. Diogenes Laertius(1925, 3.46), in listingPlato's disciples,mentionstwo womenby name "Lastheneiaof Mantineaand Axiothea of Phlius, who is reportedby Dicaerachusto have worn men's clothing." So therewerewomen studentsin the two most importantand influentialancientschools of philosophy:Plato's Academyand Aristotle's Lyceum.

Epicurean Women Epicurus'Garden,as his school was called, flourishedin the third centuryB.C.Though we know no dates for any of the women in the Garden,Epicurushimself was born in 341 and died in 270. Epicurus allowed both women and slaves into his school. The most famous of the womenwas Leontion(literally'lioness'). DiogenesLaertius(1925, 10.5) quotes a line from a letterwrittenby Epicurusto Leontion: "0 Lord Apollo, my dearlittle Leontion, with what tumultuousapplause we were inspired as we read your letter." Diogenes Laertius(1925, 10.7) lists other women who lived with Epicurusand Metrodorus,his disciple:Mammarion,Hedia, Erotion, and Nikidion. Plutarch(1928, "Non Posse," 1097E) adds Boidion to this list. Women were consideredequal to men in the Gardenand Epicurusthought friendship betweenmen and womenwas possible. Becauseof the largenumberof women in Epicurus'school, many of whom were hetaerae, rumors spread that these women were there to satisfy the men's desire for 50

kathleen wider pleasureand not to study philosophy. Diotimus, a Stoic, published what he said were fifty letters between Epicurusand his mistresses. Leontionespeciallywas attacked.The school deniedeach accusation (William Wallace 1880, 55-56). Diogenes Laertius (1925, 10.9) discussesthese attacksand says, "But these people are stark mad." ThoughPliny (1938, 35.00, 35.144) refersto Leontionas Epicurus' mistress,DiogenesLaertius(1925, 10.23)says she was the mistressof Metrodorus.Plutarch (1928, "Non Posse," 1098B)refers to her as Metrodorus' wife (though they were denied the right to legal marriageby Athenian law). Plutarch refers to the message of congratulations sent to them on the occasion of their wedding by Metrodorus'motherand sister. Leontionhad a daughterDanae who at the court of Antiochus II saved her lover's life by sacrificingher own (Norman WentworthDeWitt 1954, 95). Though no works of Leontionare extant, thereare referencesamong the ancientwritersto a book she wrote refuting the views of Theophrastus,the head of Aristotle'sLyceum.Cicero(1933, 1.93) praisesher style though he is outragedby the fact that a woman, and a loose one at that, would write a book refuting Theophrastus."Her style no doubt is of the neatest of Attic, but all the same!-such was the licence [sic] that prevailedin the gardenof Epicurus."Pliny (1938, Praefatio29) refers to this work in a negativeway as well: But as if I didn't know that Theophrastus,a mortal whose eminenceas an orator won him the title of "the divine," actuallyhad a book writtenagainst him by a woman - which was the origin of the proverbabout "choosing your tree to hang from." Unfortunatelyher work has not survived. A contemporaryscholar refers to this woman opponent of Theophrastusbut says she is anonymous (Swidler 1976, 19). How quickly the names of women philosophersdisappear.

The Stoic Logicians: Menexene, Argeia, Theognis, Artemisia, and Pantacleia These women were the daughtersof DiodorusCronuswho was active in Athensand Alexandriaabout 315-284B.C. thoughthereis some controversy over these dates (David Sedley 1977, 107, n. 23; pp. 78-80). He was part of a branchof the Megarianschool founded by Euclid,a followerof Socrates.This branchconsistedof Eubulides, ApolloniusCronus,DiodorusCronus,and Philo. "The lattertwo are very importantin connectionwith Stoic logic, mainly for their views 51

hypatia on the truth-conditionsof conditionals" (Benson Mates 1953, 5). DiodorusCronuswas a nativeof Iasusin Cariaand lived at the court of Alexandriain the reignof PtolemySoter. His nickname"Cronus" came perhaps from his teacher, Apollonius Cronus, but eventually becamehis surnamewhichhis five daughtersalso bore. He was known for his dialecticalskills and indeed was called "the logician" or "the most logical one" (Mates 1953, 5-6). All his five daughters,who were featuredin Philo's Menexenus,becamedialectitians(Sedley1977,81). It was not until KlausDoring publishedfor the first time in 1972the collected fragmentsof Diodorus that Diodorus' importanceor influence could be judged (Sedley 1977, 74). Since thereare no similar extant fragmentsattributableto the daughters,their place in ancient philosophymust remaina mystery.Still the existenceof five women logicians adds evidence to the view that women were involved in philosophicalpursuitsin the ancient world. (My thanks to Charlotte Witt for pointingout the existenceof these women.)

Hypatia Hypatiais the most renownedof the womenphilosophersof the ancient Greek world. She lived at the very end of the Hellenisticage. Though her exact birth date is unknown, recent studies indicate she was born about 370 A.D. in Alexandriaand died there in 415 (A. W. Richeson 1940, 74; J. M. Rist 1965, 215). She was the daughterof Theon of Alexandria,a well known mathematicianand astronomer duringthe reignof EmperorTheodosiusI. Sinceher fatherwas director of the Museumat Alexandria,Hypatiawas rearedin close connection with the Museumthough she probablyreceivedher early education from her father. The ArabianphilosopherPhilostorgiustells us that she latersurpassedher fatherin astronomy(AugustineFitzgerald 1926, 96). The Suda, a Greeklexicon mentionedearlier,and Socrates Scholasticus,her contemporary,both commenton Hypatia'sphysical and moral beauty (Richeson 1940, 74). She was probablyunmarried thoughthereis some controversyon this point. The Sudasays she was the wife of Isidorusthe philosopher,though it later says she died a virgin (Rist 1965, 221). According to Damascius, Isidorus' biographer,Isidoruswas marriedto Danna. SinceHypatiadied in 415 and it is fairlywell establishedthat Isidoruswas not born until412, it is unlikelythat they were married(Richeson1940, 75). Damasicius(1911, 97, lines 13-14,32-35)says that Isidorusstepped into Hypatia's footsteps after her death and that he excelledher as a man does a woman and as a geometerdoes a philosopher.Earlier, however, in his Life of Isidorus (1911, 31, lines 29-30) he tells us she 52

kathleen wider was "by naturemore refinedand talentedthan her father" and her noble fervour led her to the other branches of philosophy. She took the mantle of philosophy and wandered through the city, lecturing to whomever would listen, in public address, on the philosophy of Plato or Aristotle or other philosophers. . . . She was

righteous and demure and remaineda maiden during her whole life. And she was also very prettyand had a fine figure. (1911, 31, lines 33-38; 32, lines 1-5) He also tells us she was eloquentand trainedin dialecticsand that she was treatedwith respectby the administratorsof the city (1911, 32, lines 33-39; 33 lines 1-2). Damascius(1911, 32, lines 6-32) relatesa story of Hypatia dealingwith a studentwho had become infatuated with her and was not, as Damasciuspolitely puts it, "able to control his love and showed his desire for her." Damasciusclaims she cured him of his desireby drawing forth a soiled blood-stainedwoman's cloth, referredto the distinctivework of the defiled world of Creation, and replied:"Trulythis is the objectiveof your longing love, youngman, but not lovely."....To the youngman the shame and the astonishmentin the indecent presentation brought a spiritualtransformationand conversion to chastity. (All English translations from Damasciusare by EleanorW. Thun.) The Sudagivestwo versionsof this samestory. In one versionHypatia wardsoff any furtherexpressionsof passionon the partof herstudent by remindinghim of the natureof culture;the other versionparallels Damascius'(see Rist 1965,221 who thinksthe moregenteelversionis the true one). Socrates Scholasticus(1953, 380), in his Ecclesiastica Historia, tells us that Hypatia excelledall the philosophersof that time-and not only succeeded in Plato his school, the which exercise Plotinus continued,but also expoundedto as many as came to hear her the preceptsand doctrinesof all sorts of philosophers.Whereforeas manygave theirstudyto the knowledgeof philosophicaldisciplineflocked unto her lessons from everycountry.Moreoverfor her grave courage of mind, the which she gathered out of the fountainsand bowelsof philosophicalliterature,for her modestand matronlikebehavior,she sticked[sic]not to 53

hypatia presentherself before princesand magistrates.Neither was she abashed to come into the open face of the assembly.All men did both reverenceand had herin admirationfor the singularmodesty of her mind. Unfortunatelygallantryand bias haunt most of the sourcesabout Hypatia includingthe ancient sources and so we are left to view her through a distorted mirror. Edward Gibbon (1940, 4: 646), after listing Hypatia's intellectualaccomplishments,tells us that "in the bloom of beauty and in the maturityof wisdom, the modest maid refusedher loversand instructedherdisciples."Morethan one source speculatesthat the reason for the popularityof her lectureswas her greatbeauty(JulianL. Coolidge 1951,21; Beard1947,36). In orderto account for the story of Hypatia'sallegeduse of a sanitarynapkinto quiet a boy's passion, one scholar (Rist 1965, 220) writing in the 1960'sexplainsthat The robe of Athena did not prevent many of the auditorsof such blue-stockingsfrom thinkingin terms of the Birth of Venus. Generallyspeaking famous intellectualwomen of antiquityare free and easy in matters of sexual morality for the mere act of being a philosopher would involve abandoningthe traditonal pursuitsof women and enteringdebate with men. Men for their part protectedthemselvesby treatingsuch intrusionsas acts of immodesty;the female philosophers tended to retaliate by shocking their frivolous male detractorsor distractorsinto respectfulsilence. Not only is the causal connectionthis author drawsbetweenbeing a woman philosopherand being sexuallyloose ludicrousbut it is based on only two stories:the story just mentionedabout Hypatiaand the story of Hipparchia'sargumentwith Theodorus, though the author seems to forget that in that story it is the man who tries to shock the woman into respectfulsilenceby rippingoff her clothing. The most perverted source of the modern view about Hypatia comes from CharlesKingsley'snovel Hypatia. Kingsleywas a nineteenth century writer of popular novels as well as a professor of ModernHistory at Cambridge.The book is laden with pornographic descriptionsculminatingin a lewd descriptionof Hypatia's murder. Kingsleyhimselfapparentlyhad ratherstrangesexualattitudes.For a weddinggift he gave his bridea book he had writtenfor her about St. Elizabeth of Hungary. In the pornographicdrawings with which Kingsleyillustratedthe book, St. Elizabethis depictedas rejectingthe pleasuresof a sexual life with her husbandand submittinginsteadto 54

kathleen wider self-tortureat the commandof her confessor. The survivingillustrations show an association drawn between torture and sexual love (MeriolTrevor 1962, 326-28). Regrettably,much of our information about Hypatiacomes from sourceswho view her life throughthe mist of theirown prejudices.Indeed,much of her popularityseems to rest upon the fact that she was a murderedvirgin:a sacrificialoffering to the ChristianGod. Hypatiawas educated,at least in part,at the Museumin Alexandria and so would have come in contact with Roman, Greek, and Jewish scholars from various countries. Both the speculativephilosophyof the Neoplatonists, the religious philosophy of the early Christian fathers, and the gnosticismof Orientalphilosophy flourishedthere. There is some debate about whethershe also studiedin Athens. The Suda says she receivedpart of her educationthere, but some scholars think the Suda has been misinterpretedon this point. The Suda also says that besides studyingunder her father Theon, Hypatia studied underanotherphilosopherat Alexandriathough it does not mention this philosopherby name. Some speculateit mighthavebeenPlotinus. Whateverthe detailswere, it is clearshe receiveda strongeducationin literatureand scienceand that the majorphilosophicinfluencein her educationwas Neoplatonism(see Richeson1940, 78-79 on her education). The Suda is the only ancient source that gives any information about her writings, none of which have survived. The Suda names three:(1) a commentaryon the Arithmeticaof Diophantusof Alexandria;(2) a commentaryon the Conicsof Apolloniusof Pergassus;and (3) a commentaryon the Astronomical Canon probablywritten by Ptolemy (Richeson1940, 81; Rist 1965, 216). Some authorsspeculate that she must have writtenmore thanjust threeworksin twentyyears of teachingand that she musthave writtenphilosophicalworksas well as mathematicaland astronomicalones. They conclude these works must have been lost when the Libraryat Alexandriawas destroyedin 640 (Richeson1940, 82; RoraF. Iacobacci1970, 317). However,with the lack of any hardevidence,we must acknowledgeignoranceon this point. Hypatiawas the headof the NeoplatonicSchool at Alexandria.The exact date that she took over the leadershipis unknown, though the Suda says she flourishedunder Arcadius, who was Emperorof the Eastern Roman Empire from 395 to 408 (Richeson 1940, 79). The AlexandrianSchool of Neoplatonism in distinction from the enthusiasticmysticism which prevailed in the Athenian School . . . preferred sober 55

hypatia research and replaced abstract metaphysical speculation by the study of mathematics and the exact sciences. Its exegesis of Plato and Aristotle is sensible and objective. In systematic philosophy it showed a preference for the latter, especially his logic. (Zeller 1980, 311) Many of the ancient writers speak highly of Hypatia's eloquence and skill as a teacher. The Suda praises her teaching method and tells us that because of her ability as a teacher Orestes, the civil ruler of Alexto her for training. Socrates Scholasticus and andria, came Philistorgius tell us that not only Egyptians but students from other parts of Africa and from Europe and Asia as well came to her classes (Richeson 1940, 80). She probably lectured on philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and mechanics. Among her pupils were well-known men of the day: Synesius of Cyrene, who became Bishop of Ptolemais in 411; Euoptius, brother of Synesius and probably Bishop of Ptolemais after Synesius' death; and Troillius, teacher of Socrates Scholasticus. Also included among her pupils were Herculianus, Olympius, Hesychius, and Herocles, who was Hypatia's successor as head of the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria (Richeson 1940, 80). The writings of Hypatia's most famous pupil, Synesius, are the only source we have from which to piece together her thought. Synesius was educated at the Museum of Alexandria to which he came about 394. It was there he met and formed a lifelong friendship with Hypatia (Fitzgerald 1926, 15). Most critics agree that his philosophical views are an accurate reflection of Hypatia's teachings. Synesius (1926, 108) himself tells us he was "destined to play the part of the echo. Whatever sounds I catch, these I repeat." Unfortunately Synesius was, at best, a mediocre thinker. Few if any of his writings are philosophical in any real sense. About all we can tell from them is that he avoided the occultist and mystical qualities of the Athenian School and stressed the rational aspects of Neoplatonism (Henri Irenee Marrou 1963, 138-39). The letters he wrote to Hypatia are the major source of our knowledge about Hypatia's thought and they too are disappointing in that respect. Seven of these letters have survived. Though they show Synesius' great respect for Hypatia, they tell us little about her thought. Synesius talks mostly about himself, his problems, his works. In one letter Synesius (1926, 95-96) bemoans the fact that he has not heard from her; another letter (1926, 99) is a request for an hydroscope (an instrument for determining the weight of water) followed by an exact description of the instrument. In another letter Synesius (1926, 99) calls Hypatia "mother, sister, 56

kathleen wider teacher,and withalbenefactress."He tells her that "if any of my affairsinterestsyou, you do well, and if any of themdoes not so interest you, neitherdoes it me" (1926, 100). The final letteris the only one with any discussionof philosophical ideas. Synesius(1926, 250-54) requestsHypatia'sjudgmenton three books he has written. The first book is apparentlyan answerto his critics.Fromwhathe mentionsof its contents,it appearsNeoplatonic: Only those receive flashes of the emanationsof the intellect, for whom in the full health of the mind's eye God kindlesa light akin to his own, that light which is the cause of knowledge to the intellectual, and to knowablethings the cause of theirbeing known. (1926, 253)

Of the next book he says only that he wrote it in one nightand it was as if divinity wrote through him. "It contains an inquiry into the whole imaginativesoul, and into some otherpointswhichhave not yet been handledby any Greekphilosopher"(1926, 254). The final work is an essayhe addressedto an influentialmanin orderto help a friend. About all we can glean from these letters about Synesius' philosophical position is that he, like his teacher Hypatia, was a Neoplatonist. Some claim that Hypatia's fame rests more on the mannerof her death than on her statureas a philosopher.There may well be some truth to that. She was killed in a vicious and blood-thirstyway by a mob of Christianmonks. The exact reasonfor her murderis unclear, but it was probablydue to a combinationof factors.At the time of her death therewas considerableoppositionbetweenCyril, the Christian bishop of Alexandria,and Orestes,the civil ruler.Therewas also frequent riotingbetweenpagansand Christians,among others. Hypatia was a close friend of Orestes and ancient sources (Socrates Scholasticus, Damascius, the Suda) think that fact along with the Christians'belief that she preventeda reconciliationbetweenOrestes and Cyril was a major reason for her murder. In addition to that, many people (includingCyril)werejealous of her intellectualabilities and her popularityamongthe rich and famous. WhetherCyrilactually orderedher deathor not is debatedby the historians,but he did not attemptto stop it and afterwardshe did try to hush it up with bribes. Whateverthe exact details of her murder,it seems clear that the motivationwas at least partlypoliticaland that she was a part of the toll in the struggle between the Christian Church and the pagan culture of Alexandria.(See Richeson 1940, 76-78; Gibbon 1940, 4: 646; SocratesScholasticus1953, 380; Damascius1911, 33, lines 1-29; 57

hypatia Rist 1965, 224.) Socrates Scholasticus (1953, 380) describes her murderthis way: They pull her out of the chariot:they hail her into the Churchcalled Caesarium:they stripped[sic] her stark naked:they raze the skin and rendthe flesh of herbody with sharp shells, until the breath departedout of her body: they quarterher body: they bringher quartersinto a place called Cinaronand burn them to ashes. Damascius(1911, 33, lines 28-29) adds that they blindedher as well. BertrandRussell(1945, 368) says that "after this, Alexandriawas no longer troubled by philosophers." Though Russell is wrong and philosophywas not silencedso easily, the death of Hypatiadid signal the end of the Hellenisticage. It is dishearteningto see how the names and histories of these women philosophersfloat in and out of our culturalconsciousness. One must in many cases go back at least to the last wave of feminism in the earlypart of this centuryand in manycases much furtherback to the eighteenthand nineteenthcenturiesto find any mentionof their namesmuchless any informationabout them. We lose our historyso easily. Althoughwe have little more than the namesof many of these ancient women, we must preservethem and with them the memory that women were a part of the intellectuallife of the ancient world from which our civilizationand culturespring.

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kathleen wider references Abbot, Willis J. 1913. Notable women in history. Philadelphia: John C. Winston. Beard, Mary R. 1947. Women as force in history. New York: Macmillan. Bentley, Richard. 1874. Dissertations upon the epistles of phalaris. Ed. Wilhelm Wagner. Berlin: S. Calvary & Co. Bowra, C. M. 1971. Periclean Athens. New York: Dial Press. Burns, A. R. 1962. Pericles and Athens. New York: Collier Books. Bury, R. G. 1932. The "Symposium" of Plato. 2nd ed. Cambridge, England: W. Heffer and sons. Cicero. 1933. De Natura Deorum. In Rackam, Harris, trans., "De Natura Deorum" and "Academica." Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Coolidge, Julian L. 1951. Six female mathematicians. Scripta Mathematica 17 (1 & 2): 20-31. Cornford, F. M. 1967. The doctrine of eros in Plato's Symposium. In Guthrie, W. K. C., ed., The unwritten philosophy and other essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Courtney, W. L. 1918. Old saws and modern instances. London: Chapman and Hall. Damascius. 1911. Das leben des philosophen Isidoros von Damaskios aus Damaskos. Trans. into German by Rudolf Asmus. Liepzig: Felix Meiner. DeWitt, Norman Wentworth. 1954. Epicurus and his philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. DeVogel, C. J. 1966. Pythagoras and early pythagoreanism. The Netherlands: Royal Van Gorcum. Diogenes Laertius. 1853. The lives and opinions of eminent philosophers. Trans. C. D. Yonge. London: Henry G. Bohn. ---. 1925. The lives of eminent philosophers. Trans. R. D. Hicks, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Fitzgerald, Augustine, trans. 1926. The letters of Synesius of Cyrene. London: Oxford University Press. French, Alfred, trans. and commentator. 1971. The Athenian halfcentury: 478-431 B.C. Sidney, Australia: Sidney University Press. Friedlander, Paul. 1964. Plato. Trans. Hans Meyerhoff. 2 vols. New York: Pantheon Books. Gibbon, Edward. 1940. The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. 6 vols. New York: A. L. Burt Co.

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hypatia Gomperz, Theodor. 1905. Greek thinkers: A history of ancient philosophy. Trans. G. G. Berry. 4 vols. London: John Murray. Goodwater, Leanna. 1975. Women in antiquity: An annotated bibliography. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press. Hamilton, Edith and Huntington Cairns, eds. 1961. The collected dialogues of Plato. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Harrison, Jane. 1961. Prolegomena to the study of Greek religion. London: Merlin Press. Heninger, S. K., Jr. 1974. Touchers of sweet harmony: Pythagorean cosmology and Renaissance poetics. San Marino, CA: Huntington Library. Iocobacci, Rora F. 1970. Women of mathematics. Arithemetic Teacher 17 (April): 316-24. Iamblichus. 1818. Life of Pythagoras. Trans. Thomas Taylor. London: A. J. Valpy. Jowett, Benjamin, trans. 1953. The Dialogues of Plato. 4th ed. rev. 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Marrou, Henry Irenee. 1963. Synesius of Cyrene and Alexandrian Neoplatonism. In Momigliano, Arnaldo, ed., The conflict between paganism and christianity in the fourth century. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mates, Benson. 1953. Stoic logic. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California. Menage, Gilles. 1984. A history of women philosophers. 1765. Trans. Beatrice H. Zedler. New York: University Press of America. Meunier, Mario. 1932. Femmess pythagoriciennes: Fragments et lettres de Theano, Perictione, Phyntys, Melissa, et Myia. Paris: L'Artisan Du Livre. Neumann, Harry. 1965. Diotima's concept of love. American J. of Philology 86 (January): 33-59. Nussbaum, Martha. 1979. The speech of Alcibiades: A reading of Plato's Symposium. Philosophy and Literatures 3 (2): 131-72. Pierce, Christine. 1975. Equality: Rebublic V. Monist 57 (1): 1-11. Plato. 1971. Menexenus. In Jowett, Benjamin, trans. and Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., The collected dialogues of Plato. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. . 1961. Symposium. In Joyce, Michael, trans. and Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., The collected dialogues of Plato. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pliny. 1938. Natural history. Trans. Harris Rackham. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Plutarch. 1915. Pericles. In Perrin, Bernadotte, trans. Plutarch's lives. New York: Macmillan. 60

kathleen wider ---. 1928. Coniugalia praecepta. In Babbitt, Frank Cole, trans., Moralia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. .1928. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum epicurum. In Babbitt, Frank Cole, trans., Moralia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pomeroy, Sarah B. 1975. Goddesses, whores, wives and slaves: Women in classical antiquity. New York: Schocken Books. Richeson, A. W. 1940. Hypatia of Alexandria. National Mathematics Magazine 15 (November): 74-82. Rist, J. M. 1965. Hypatia. Phoenix: The J. of the Classical Assn. of Canada 19 (3): 214-25. Robin, Leon. 1928. Greek thought and the origins of the scientific spirit. Trans. M. R. Dobie. New York: Russell and Russell. Rosen, Stanley. 1968. Plato's "Symposium". New Haven: Yale University Press. Russell, Bertrand. 1945. A history of western philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster. Cronus and Hellenistic Sedley, David. 1977. Diodorus philosophy. Proc. of the Cambridge Philological Soc. 203: 74-120. Shorey, Paul. 1933. What Plato said. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Socrates Scholasticus. 1953. Ecclesiastica historia. Excerpted in Fremantle, Ann, ed., A treasury of early Christianity. New York: Viking Press. Swidler, Leonard. 1976. Women in Judaism: The status of women in formative Judaism. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press. Synesius. 1926. The letters of Synesius of Cyrene. Trans. Augustine Fitzgerald. London: Oxford University Press. Taylor, A. E. 1960. Plato: The man and his work. 7th ed. London: Methuen and Co. Taylor, Thomas, trans. 1818. lamblichus' "Life of Pythagoras" and a collection of pythagoric sentences. London: A. J. Valpy. trans. 1822. Political fragments of Archytas, Charondas ---, Zaleucus, and other ancient pythagoreans and ethical fragments of Hierocles. England: C. Whittingham, Chiswick. Thesleff, Holger. 1961. An introduction to pythagorean writings of the Hellenistic period. Finland: Abo Akademi, Abo. . ed. 1965. The Pythagorean texts of the Hellenistic period. Finland: Abo Akademi, Abo. Toland, John. 1726. A collection of severalpieces. 2 vols. London: J. Peele. Trevor, Meriol. 1962. Newman: Light in winter. London: Macmillan & Co. 61

hypatia Wallace, William. 1880. Epicureanism.New York: Pott, Young, & Co.

Watson, J.S., trans. 1857. Minor works. By Xenophon. London: Henry G. Bohn. Wiegall, Arthur. 1932. Personalitiesfrom antiquity. New York: H. W. Wilson. Xenophon. 1857. Oeconomicus.Minor works. Trans. J. S. Watson. London: Henry G. Bohn. ---. 1889. "TheAnabasis" and the "Memorabiliaof Socrates." Trans. J. S. Watson. New York: Harper& Brothers. Zeller, Edward. 1980. Outlinesof the history of Greekphilosophy. 13 ed. rev. 1931. Trans. L. R. Palmer. New York: Dover Publications.

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merrie bergnann How Many Feminists Does It Take To Make A Joke? Sexist Humor and What's Wrong With It In this paper I am concernedwith two questions:What is sexist humor?andwhatis wrongwithit? To answerthe firstquestion,I briefsexist humoras ly developa theoryof humorand then characterize humorin whichsexistbeliefs(attitudes/norms) arepresupposed andare necessaryto the fun. Concerningthe secondquestion,I criticizea commonsort of argumentthatis supposedto explainwhysexisthumoris offensive:although theargumentexplainswhysexisthumorfeelsoffensive,it doesnot place responsibilityfor the offense in the humoristor audiencethat enjoys sexisthumor. I developan alternateaccountof the offense in sexist humorthatplacesresponsibility for offensein preciselythose quarters.

I

For anyonewho refersto feministsas "women'slibbers"or, betteryet, as "ladies' libbers," it typicallytakes only one feministto make a joke. In fact, she is the joke.' The joke is complex, for she is both a woman and a personcommittedto a particularpoint of view. Women are traditional objects of humor in our culture (and in numerous other cultures). We have countless jokes about dumb blondes, scatter-brainedredheads,myopic wives, mothers, mothersin-law, lady drivers,and college co-eds. Becauseshe is a woman, a feministis an amusingcreatureindeed. The complexity of the joke enters precisely where the feminist distinguishesherself from nonfeministwomen. For while she is unwillingto acceptthe stereotypesof women's ignorance,irrationality, irresponsibility,and so on, or to accept the fate ordainedby such stereotypes,she is still a woman and hence subsumedunder those stereotypes in the eyes of many beholders. Her challenge to the stereotypes then merits serious consideration only if she can

demonstrate that she is an exception to the stereotypes, that is, only if

she can demonstratethat the challengedoes not come from ignorant, irrational, and irresponsiblequarters. There are rich sources for 1. Althoughcurrentusuageallowsthat males,as well as females,may be referred to as "feminists,"I shall use the termto referonly to femalefeministsin this paper. Hypatiavol. 1, no. 1 (Spring1986). © by Hypatia,Inc.

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hypaia humorhere. I shall describethree. First, if the feminist does establishherself as an exceptionto the stereotypes,she may be laughable(funny, ridiculous)for just that reason. Kantsaid that [a] woman who has a head full of Greek, like Mme. Dacier, or carrierson fundamentalcontroversiesabout mechanics,like the Marquisede Chatelet,mightas well even havea beard-for perhapsthat wouldexpressmore obviouslythe mien of profundityfor which she strives (ImmanuelKant 1960, 78). It is a small step from Kant'sastutepremiseto Nietzsche'sconclusion that [i]t betrays a corruptionof the instincts-quite apart from the fact that it displaysbad taste-when a woman adducesMadameRolandor Madamede Stael or Monsieur George Sand, of all people, as if they proved anythingin favor of "woman as such." Among men these three are the three comical women as such-nothing more!-and preciselythe bestinvoluntary counterargumentagainst emancipation and feminine vainglory.(Beyond Good and Evil, quoted in Carolyn Korsmeyer1977, 141). Here, a womanis laughablefor not livingup to the stereotypes. Second, the stereotypesmay be confused for fact ratherthan the normsthat they are, and the feministnow becomeslaughableby virtue of havingthe ironicallystupidnotion that she is knowledgeable,the irrationalnotion that she is rational,and so on, whenthesebeliefsare so obviously false. At the beginningof my first term of residenceas a graduatestudent,a fellowstudent(male,I willadd)laughedat me when I told himthat I intendedto specializein logic. We do laughat stupidity thatmanifestsitself in the face of the obvious,andthe womanwho supposes herselfto havecertainvirtueswhenin fact she has the corresponding defectsis a case in point. Third, there is the syllogism: everythingthat a feminist does is somethingthat a womandoes; everythingthat womandoes is trivialor ridiculous; therefore, everythingthat a feminist does is trivial or turnsout to be a fancynamefor ridiculous.Thus, consciousness-raising women's gossip and babble; a feminist is a frustratedwoman who couldn't catch her fellow; and we are assuredthat there is indeed a genericuse of the word "man" that appliesto females, as well as to males, on the strengthof the formula"Man embraceswoman." Here 64

memie bergmann the fun is in deflatingspecific feministviews and practices,as if they did not merit seriousconsiderationin their own right.2 The feministwho does not smile when faced with this plethoraof humor may be dubbeda "killjoy" or worse. And what reply is adequateto attemptsat appeasementlike: "What'sthe matter?Can'tyou take a joke?" or: "It's all in fun. Where'syour sense of humor?"It used to be said that women have no sense of humor. More recently, the targethas been refined:feminists have no sense of humor. But ingenious empiricalresearchhas disprovedboth claims.3Nevertheless, despite her excellentsense of humor, the feminst still isn't laughing. She, along with many people who do not identify themselves as feminists, thinks that all this humor is a serious matter. It is that thought that motivates the questions I am concerned with in this paper, namely:What is sexist humor, the humor about women that the feministobjectsto? and Whatis the natureof the offense in sexist humor? II

Becausethere can be no adequateaccount of sexist humor, nor a fair estimationof its offense, without a prior account of humor, the projectof this section is to providesuch an account. I use 'humor'to denote episodes-situations, objects, words, statements and stories-that are funny and that are producedwith the intentionthat they be funny. What makes for funniness?Thereis a family of theoriesof humor that state that the sourceof funninessin a humorousepisodeis the incongruous, and I believe that this claim is correct. Although incongruity is explicated differently from theory to theory, John Morreallhas neatly summedup incongruitytheoriesas follows: The basic idea . . . is very simple. We live in an orderly

world where we have come to expect certain patterns among things, properties, events, etc. When we experiencesomethingthat doesn't fit these patterns, that violatesour expectations,we laugh. (John Morreall1982, 244-245)4 2. The last example is from Casey Miller and Kate Swift (1977, 19). Roberta Salper noted in 1973 that "the woman's movement has the distinction of being the only major social movement in the history of the United States that is regarded by its opponents as a joke" (Introduction to Female Liberation, quoted in Korsmeyer 1977, 152). 3. See the chapter on "Joking Matters" in Cheris Kramarae 1981. 4. Proponents of incongruity theories include Kant, Schopenhauer, Bergson, and possibly Aristotle.

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hypatia On my account,an episodeor elementof an episodeis incongruousif it is contraindicated by our beliefs,attitudes,and/or norms.(I'll referto this clusteras "our beliefs.") Contraindicationby our beliefs is not simplya matterof somethingthatourbeliefshavenot preparedus for. It is a matterof somethingthat our beliefs prohibit:somethingthat we believeis absurd,improbableor implausible,somethingthatjust doesn't makesenseto us, or somethingthat we believeis clearlyinappropriate. Whetherthereis incongruityin an episodedependsupon the perceiver. Some incongruitieswill be incongruitiesfor a whole community,while otherswill be found only by a subgroupof that communityor by an idiosyncraticindividual. The seventh page of a book that is called A Book is headed "Contents,"andit containsa list thatbegins:"Words,numerals,punctuation, diacriticalmarks, art-work(a trace), paper, glue, ink .. ." to (CromwellKent1970).Thatis an incongruouslist-it is inappropriate list those contentson the contentspage of a book. It is also funny. In general,an episodeis funnyto us if it presentsus with an incongruity that we attendto in fun. We are interested,but we are amusedrather than puzzledor concerned,entertainedratherthan insulted.Manyincongruitytheoriesdemandmorethanincongruityin funnyepisodes,but I believethat this is due to a confusion. Advocatesof these theories mistakethe variousmethodsby whichhumoristsget us to attendto incongruities,and methodsthat are conduciveto our havingfun in doing so, for necessaryingredientsin funnyepisodes.5I shallillustrateby way of example. Considersimplenonsensehumor:"No gnusis good gnus"or "Is this Picadillyor is it Thursday?"(both from Max Eastman1937, 134 and 223). What makes these bits of nonsensefunny, while other bits of nonsense-like "No lambchopseat good apples"-are not? According to "hiddensense"theories,the firsttwo sentenceshavethe appearance of sensewhilethe thirddoesnot, andit is thisappearancethatmakesfor funninessin the formercases.6The firstowesthe appearanceof senseto the phoneticsimilarityof "gnus" and "news," the secondto the fact that the sentencewouldbe one of a sort that we runacrosseveryday if anothernamesuch as "Kensington"weresubstitutedfor "Thursday" 5. Morreall (1977) and Max Eastman (1937) have been instrumentalin convincing me of this point. In this paragraph I have identified an incongruity without stating for whom it is an incongruity. Here and throughout the paper I omit the qualification for whom when the incongruity is one that I expect the reader to perceive along with me by virtue of shared community-wide beliefs. 6. "Hidden sense" incongruity theorists include D.H. Monro (1951) and Arthur Koestler (1975).

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meri begmnn at the end of the sentence. Hidden sense incongruitytheories claim that in all humorwe will find eithersome apparentsensein or behind the incongruity,or some elementthat makesthe incongruityplausible. Thus, the apparentsense behind the incongruityin A Book is that words, diacriticalmarks, etc., are, in some sense of the expression, "contents" of the book. Or considerDick Gregory'sstory: "On the first day of integrationa black gets on a bus and sits on a front seat. The driveris so angryhe drivesaroundtown backwards"(quotedin CharlesR. Gruner1978, 13). Drivingaroundtown backwardsout of angeris the incongruityhere. The apparentsense comes as we realize that the driverhas ensuredthat, as in the old days, the black will still be the last passengerto arrive. However,thereare cases of incongruousepisodesthat we find funny but that do not have the appearanceof "sense." We laugh when, after searchingfor a hat for a few minutes, we discoverthat it is on our head, or when someone who has just completedcareful installation of a burglaralarm turns and accidentallysets off the alarm. Overlookingthe obvious is a type of incongruity-since anythingthat is obvious is somethingno one could miss. Hence thereis incongruity in such cases to account for the funniness.But whereis the apparent sense? In attemptingto answer this question, hidden sense incongruity theoristsgradeoff into "hiddenmoral" theorists.7Hiddenmoral incongruitytheories maintainthat behind the incongruityin a funny episode, there is always a moral-a point to the joke. The moral in cases of overlookingthe obvious-or when anyone does something that is ineptor stupid-is that the personin questionis ineptor stupid. When we laugh at ourselvesin cases where we have done something that is inept or stupid, we are taking the stance of an observerwho concludesthat, after all, we are what we appearto be. In Gregory's story, the moralconcernsthe stupidityof rednecks.Muchhumordoes seemto have a point or hiddenmoral. Considerthe followingstory:a little boy was ...

left in the playroom of a department store while his

parentsshopped.Whenthey werereadyto go, he refused to get off the rocking-horse on which he was mounted. It was time for the store to close, but he still would not leave. His parents, the floor-walkers, the managingdirector,cajoledand bribedhim, but in vain. Finally a young man in the crowd said to the child's 7. The arguments of Monro (1951) vacillate between these two kinds of incongruity theory.

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hyp at father "May I try? I have made a special study of child psychology." "Please do," said the father. Whereupon the young man stepped forward and whispered in the child's ear. The boy immediately slid off the horse and said, quite quietly: "Take me home, please, Daddy." Afterwards the young man was asked if he would mind revealing the magic formula. "Not at all," he said, "I or I'll just said: "Get off that horse, you little knock your head off!" (Monro 1951, 250). The young man's method was certainly incongruous, given his selfdescription. But this story also leaves us with a moral about the various schools of psychology. With a little work, we can attribute the fun even in nonsense humor to hidden morals. Perhaps we have just shown our stupidity or gullibility by consuming the nonsense. Or we may attribute stupidity to the implied author of the nonsense. There are incongruity theories of humor that maintain that disparagement is necessary to humor.8 However, neither a hidden moral theory nor a disparagement theory can account for the funniness in the following story: Jones, seated in a movie house, could not help being aware that the man immediately in front of him had his arm around the neck of a large dog which occupied the seat next to him. The dog was clearly observing the picture with understanding, for he snarled softly when the villain spoke, yelped joyously at the funny remarks, and so on. Jones leaned forward and tapped the man in front of him on the shoulder. He said, "Pardon me, sir, but I can't get over your dog's behavior." The man turned around and said, "Frankly, it surprises me too. He hated the book." (Isaac Asimov, A Treasury of Humor, quoted in George M. Robinson 1979, 6) There is no hidden moral to this story, nor is either man-nor the implied author nor the audience-belittled. Neither the appearance of sense, nor a hidden moral nor disparagement, is necessary to our finding funniness, but each of these may help us to do so, by enhancing the fun in attending to an incongruity; and so humorists, in their attempts to amuse us, may rely on one or more of these devices. The appearance of sense in nonsense may interest us 8. These include the "superiority theories," of which Thomas Hobbes is the best-known proponent. Monro (1951) contains several excellent chapters on these theories.

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merrie bergnann in the nonsense-catch our fancy-long enough for us to be amused. Discoveringan apparentsense in an incongruity,as in the case of Gregory'sstory, may add to the amusementor fun. It is like puzzlesolving. Discoveringa hidden moral may similarlybe fun, if we like the moral. And all of us enjoy harmlessdisparagement-even if we are the target.Thereare othermethodsthat humoristsmay use to add to our fun in contemplatingincongruities,e.g., tellingus jokes about one of our favorite "naughty"topics like sex or sacrilege.Although allowing us one or more of these satisfactions adds to the fun in humor, however,none is necessaryto humor. All that is necessaryis that we contemplate,or attend to, an incongruityin fun. Wherethe humorsucceeds,we do attendto the incongruityin fun. Of course, this does not always happen. For example, many humor theorists have noted that our moods may affect our receptivityto humor. If we are melancholy, say, we may be unable to accept anythingin fun. (Althoughwe may still be able to say sincerely:"I see that the story was funny; I'm just not in the mood for jokes.") But regardlessof our mood as the humor begins, even the methods of humoristsmay fail to achieve the goal of our attendingto the incongruousin fun if our engagementwiththe incongruityis not detached, in the following ways. The incongruitymust not be a sourceof pain to us. We do not find it funny when a man who slips on a banana peel is obviously hurt-unless we desirehim to be hurt, or are indifferentto his suffering, or believe that he deservedit. We may also laugh afterwardsin recollectingthe bananapeel episode, evenif the man was hurtand this concernedus at the time. But when we laugh in this case, we recollect the episodein isolation from his pain, as if therewereno painfuloutcome. We can do so, say, if the man is fully recovered,no longerhas vivid recollectionsof his pain, and hence can laugh along with us. Nor do we find it funny when we see the incongruousas a serious challenge to our beliefs or norms. Philosophersmay find it funny when they are told that "philosophy is systematicabuse of a terminologyspeciallyinventedfor that purpose"(ArthurKoestler1975, 89), but not if they discernbehindthose wordsa gravequestionabout their discipline.On the home front, our own stupid or inept actions are funnyto us only if we are not puzzledby our havingso acted, that is, only if we do not seriouslywonderhow or why we could everhave done such a thing. In short, our confrontationwith the incongruous, if we are to find it funny, must not simultaneouslybe the cause of seriousor painful concerns.9 9. Bergson said that "to produce the whole of its effect ...

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the comic demands

hypatia Ill With that accountin hand, it is a simplematterto characterizesexist humor. Sexist humor is humor in which sexist beliefs, attitudes, and/or normseithermust be held in orderto perceivean incongruity or are used to add to the fun effect of the incongruity.In the latter case, sexist beliefs may allow someone to uncoveran apparentsense behindan incongruity,to discoverhiddenmorals, to enjoy disparagement, or to treatcertaintopicsas "naughty."(I am not going to give a criterionthat tells us whichbeliefsare sexist. The examplesthat follow are, I believe, straightforward.)I shall illustratethese differentways in which sexist beliefs can play a role in generatinghumor. 1. Incongruitiesgeneratedby sexist beliefs. The funninessmy fellow student found when I told him that I intendedto specializein logic came from his perceptionof an incongruitybased on a sexist belief: women do not think logically. Humoristscan rely on shared sexist beliefsto generateperceptionsof incongruity.Hereis a descriptionof a comic postcard: "Hyper-attractivefemale sunbathing with a newspaperacrossher midriff. Headlinereads, 'Today'sSport' " (Anthony J. Chapmanand Nicholas J. Gadfield 1976, 144). Perceivingan incongruityhere depends upon having a sexist attitudetowardwomen.'0In our culture,thereis nothingincongruousin a newspaperrestingon the body of a sunbather.Nor is thereanything incongruousin a newspaper'shavinga pageheaded"Today'sSport." Whatis incongruousis that the newspaperheadlineshouldreferto, or label, the body that is shaded by the paper, that is that "Today's Sport"is the femalebody in question.And perceivingthis incongruity depends on seeing the female's body as a sex object. I use 'body' deliberately,for it is clearlynot the personwho is labelledin this case, and that is what is sexist in seeing women as sex objects. (In this something like a momentary anesthesia of the heart" (Henri Bergson 1956, 64). The point that detachment is necessary to finding something funny has been made, in different ways, by many humor theorists. Morreall sums up situations in which we laugh (including those in which the stimulus is not funny) with the formula: "Laughter results from a pleasant psychological shift" (Morreall 1977, 249). It follows that in situations in which we are pained, or puzzled, we will not laugh at an incongruity. Conversely, positive affective involvement with an incongruous episode, as in the case where we desire that someone be hurt, will enhance our laughter. 10. I distinguish between perceiving an incongruity and seeing an incongruity. When from our point of view an episode is incongruous, we perceive the incongruity. When we discern a point of view from which an episode would be incongruous, we see the incongruity. I can see the incongruity in this cartoon; but I do not perceive the incongruity.

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merrie bergmann example,as well as in the examplesthat follow, the fun effect may be heightenedby virtue of certain sexist beliefs beyond the ones that I point out. For example,it may add to the fun if it is thoughtthat the woman is a typicaldumb blond who didn't notice that she was labeling herself.) 2. Apparentsense or plausibilitygeneratedby sexist beliefs. Most examplesof sexist humorthat I have seen or heardare sexist in their relianceon sexistbeliefsto generatethe appearanceof sensebehindan incongruity.This is not surprising.Typicallyfemininefoibles are well known:women are spendthrifts,can't see the forest for the trees, are sentimental,are illogical. The chucklesattending"You thinkjust like a woman" depend on drawing our attention to something incongruousthat a woman has just said, in a way that simultaneously "explains"why she has said it. Hencethe heightenedfun in a cartoon showinga middle-agedwoman standingbefore a group of the same, with the caption "I just wanted to say that I'm perfectlywilling to serveas treasurer,providedeverypennydoesn't have to come out exactly even" (Helen Hopkinson, The New Yorker,1942, reprintedin Naomi Weisstein1973, 50). That is an incongruousthing to come out of the mouth of a candidatefor treasurer,but it "makes sense" (is plausibleor quite understandable),given commonsexistbeliefs about women and money. Much of the fun in the followinglines from a studentnewspaperis also due to the "sense" that can be made of an incongruityon the basis of a sexist belief: MargaretTrudeaugoes to visit the hockey team. When she emerges she complains that she has been gangraped. Wishful thinking. The last commentis certainlyincongruous,sinceit is inappropriateto the experienceallegedlyreportedby Trudeauin this story. But in this case, the incongruityshouldbe a sourceof concernto anyone who is sensitiveto the seriousnessof rape. The hiddensense comes from the belief that Trudeauwantedto be raped.And this makessenseagainst the backgroundbeliefs that Trudeauis sexuallypromiscuous(not in itself a sexist belief) and that "rape is just a variant form of sexual intercourse.""The last belief is clearlysexist. 11. The turn of phrase is from de Sousa (1981, 19). De Sousa's paper is my source for the story about Trudeau (he found it in the University of Toronto's Engineering School newspaper). De Sousa also claims that the joke is funny only if certain sexist beliefs are held. It is one of a class of jokes that require that we share certain beliefs, if we are to find them funny; we cannot "hypothetically assume" those beliefs expect to find the fun.

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hypatia 3. Hiddenmoralsgeneratedby sexist beliefs. Hiddensense, whenit hinges on sexist beliefs, may often be turned into a hidden moral. Whatgoes into "makingsense" of the episodeis at once confirmedby the episode. The laughs provokedby "Women will be women" and the eye-rollsaccompanying"Ah, the ladies" typicallydependon the belief that somethinga woman has just said or done is incongruous combinedwith the view that the episode is anotherconfirmationof women's ignorance,irrationality,and irresponsibility. This meansthat humorin whichsexist beliefs are not necessaryfor perceivingan incongruity,or for findingapparentsense behindan incongruity, may nevertheless be sexist because it confirms sexist stereotypesor beliefs. A joke about a particularwoman's stupidity can at once be takenas a joke with a point about womenin general.A woman says: "Gee, did I fool that fellow. Imaginetryingto make me pay him $5000.00 for a fur coat." "But I saw you sign the check." "I know, but he'll neverbe able to cash it." "Why not?" "I didn't fill in the amount!" (David Freeman,quoted in Eastman1937, 308). There are jokes about stupid men, but for effect they typically characterizethe men as morons,as car mechanics,as politicians,or as membersof an ethnic group of which stupidityis part of the current stereotype.The fur coat joke-by virtue of the incongruityand the apparent sense in the check-writer'sreasoning-may be funny no I am pleasedto reportthatmanypeoplewithwhomI havediscussedthis particular joke havebeenunableto see whatis supposedto be funnyaboutit. I offer the following sitcom-typestory, wherethe incongruityis parallelin structure,to show why adoption of the beliefs noted in the text mightmake the Trudeaujoke funny: John's wealthyspinsteraunt gave him an extraordinarily ugly painting, sayingthat it was one of her favorites,and that she knewthat he wouldappreciateit and that it wouldlook marvellousin her favorite nephew'sden. Not wishingto lose his future inheritance,John reluctantlyhung the paintingin his den. The day before the aunt comes to visit, John enters his den and discoversthat the paintinghas disappeared.He runs to his wife, exclaimingin a painedvoice: "Thepainting-the one that my auntgave me-it's been stolen!" Whereuponthe butler appears and calmly says, "Wishfulthinking.The maid has removedit for a cleaning." Thebutler'scomment,"Wishfulthinking,"is an incongruousreplyto a reportof theft, but it makessenseon the assumptionthat it wouldbe a good thingif the paintingwere stolen.

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merrie bergmann matter who is writing the check, but the fun is heightenedif the episodeconfirmsa popularstereotype.In this case, the dumbwoman is everywoman-and the moral is not to trust her with a checkbook. 4. Disparagementenjoyedbecauseof sexist beliefs. The statement, "A feministis a woman who couldn't catch a man, " is incongruous, given the real motivations for feminism. The statementis, for that veryreason, also disparagingto feminists.Manyquipsabout feminist goals or activitiesare similarlydisparaging.But it is not only feminists who suffer disparagementbecauseof sexist beliefs. For example, some people believe that the typical woman who reportsa rape has not been forced to have sexualintercourseagainst her will. If she reports rape, then, she does so in order to retaliate againsta man with whom she has just quarrelledor, say, to relieveher own guilt after sexualintercourse.Accordingto this view, the alleged rapist is the real victim. Anyone who holds such a belief may find satisfactionin an episode that makes a fool of a woman who reports rape: Lawyer inquires of a hefty woman how she could possibly be raped by the diminutiveaccused. "Well, your Honor," she answers, "I stooped a bit." (Chapman and Garfield 1976, 144) 5. Senseof "naughtiness"generatedby sexist beliefs. Somethingis "naughty"for adultswhenthey believeit to be forbidden,prohibited, or not spokenof and they also thinkthat indulgingin it or alludingto it is harmful fun. For many people, premaritalheterosexualsexual relationsare naughtybut extramaritalor homosexualsexualrelations are simplywrong. Jokes about the formerare then fun becausethey are naughty, while jokes about the latter are fun because they are disparagingor conveya hiddenmoral. The prevalenceof rapejokes in our culture may be due, in part, to the aura of naughtinesssurroundingrape for many people: it is prohibited,but harmlessfun. I believe that a sense of naughtinessis needed to explain the fun reportedin the following story: ... a Tri Kap brother decided to tell me the nickname of

the female mannequinthat hung by a noose from a moose..... "Her nickname,"he said with a twinklein his eye, "is 'The BitchSaid No.' " My silenceand glare stilled the laughterthat threatenedto bubble up from his belly. "Aww Maria," his frustrationwas not masked, "the trouble with you being a feminist is you have no sense of humor!" (Maria 1981, 8) 73

hypati There are two incongruitiesin this episode: nicknamesare typically names,not declarativesentences,andthe fate of the woman-mannequin is inappropriateto the "offense" of saying"no." We haveto fill in a littlehere:the occasionfor saying"no" wassome sexual advancefrom a young man. Unfortunately,some young men seem to believethat a womanis not entitledto say "no" undercertain circumstances,for example,if she has gone to a man'sdormitoryroom or if she and a manhavebeennecking.She is responsiblefor havingled him on and turnedhim on, and she is consequentlyobligatedto satisfy his sexual demands. If he forces himself on her he is being "naughty"-he has done somethingthat is prohibited(she has said "no"), but nonethelessharmlessfun (as in "Sheknewwhatshe wasgetting into," "She probablyenjoyed it," "Chickslike to be fucked"). Thissameattitudeof harmlessfun is neededto deflectanyserious,painful concernin contemplatingthe idea of hanginga woman who says "no." The air of proprietyin the mannequin'snicknameis thenjust an exaggerationor parodyof the naughtinessof youngmenin lessdramatic episodes.Andthatsenseof "naughtiness,"whichmakestheincongruity fun, dependson ignoringor denyingthe integrityof the woman. Sexistbeliefs,then,can playdifferentrolesin humor.Whentheyplay therolesdescribedabove,thehumorthatresultsis sexist.I wantto stress thatnot all humorthatincorporatessexistbeliefsis sexist-in fact, much feministhumorusessexistbeliefs.A feministcartooncontainsframesof a womanin reflectiverepose,with the runningcaption: If all womensecretlywant to be raped,you'renot a real woman if you don't want to be raped. But since you alwaysget whatyou reallywant, if I haven'tbeenraped, maybeI secretlydon't want to be a woman [Thewoman sits up.] I've got to find a shrink to help me get raped.(Cartoonby EllenLevine,in GloriaKaufmanand Kay Blakely,eds., 1982, 105) That final statementis funny-it is incongruous,and the reasoning that "leads"to the conclusionaddsto the fun. The sexistbeliefthat all womensecretelywantto be rapedplaysa role in generatingthe humor, but not by beingone of thebackgroundbeliefsassumedby thehumorist. In fact, the moralto be drawnis thatthisparticularbeliefis stupid.The humorhereis abouta sexistbelief,whilesexisthumorpresupposessexist beliefson the part of the audience. IV

Beingawareof a sexistbeliefis not the sameas holdingit. Becausea 74

merrie bergmann feministis awareof sexistbeliefs,shemayseewhyparticularepisodesare thoughtto be funnyyet neverthelessnot find them funny herself.But whenwe do not find a particularbit of humorfunny,our stanceis often one of indifference.Feministsand sympathizersalikebelievethat sexist humoris offensive. In this sectionI examinethe natureof the offense. Here is the sort of discussionthat often follows laughterat a sexist joke. A feministwho is presentobjectsto the joke. Thejoke-telleror a laughingmemberof the group (I'll use 'he' to refer to either)says, "What'sthe matter?Where'syour senseof humor?"She says, "That wasn't funny. It's offensive to women." He says, "But it was only a joke. No offense intended."She says, "It's not only a joke-you are havingfun at a woman'sexpense."He says, "Comeon, therearejokes aboutmentoo." Shesays, "Yes, but theydon't belittlemen." He says, "Of coursetheydo. Haven'tyou heardthe one aboutthebigshotlawyer who putshis foot in his mouth?!I'm a lawyertoo, and I'm a man, but I can still laughat thatjoke." Thisdiscussionhasnot gottento theheartof thematter,namely:What is it aboutsexisthumorthatis offensive?And it won'tget to the heartof thematterif themangoeson to makethepointthatwe're allthebuttof a joke at some time or otherand asks why it is that only feministsdon't laughwhenthey'rethe butt of a joke. The questionis rhetorical,for he has an answer: Feminists are too sensitive. They take offense at everything,evenwhenno offenseis intended.Thisbringsthe discussion full circle.She is offended;he maintainsthat no offense is intended. Yetit appearsthatalongthe way, themanhasraiseda legitimatequestion. Anyoneof us canbe the buttof a friendlyjoke, andwe areexpected to acceptthe fun in the joke in good nature.We do not havemuchpatienceor sympathyforthepersonwhotakesoffensewheneversheor heis teasedor is the buttof a friendlyjoke. Whyarefeministsso different?12I stressthe word "friendly"here, for it seemsthat whethersexisthumor can be friendlymay be the point at issuebetweenthe feministand that man. In an article entitled "Why We Aren't Laughing . . . Anymore,"

Naomi Weissteinexplainsthe feminist'spositionas follows.

It is . . . extraordinarily difficult to understand what it

meansto be out of powerwhenyouraren'tthere.... It is very difficult for someone not under personal or 12. There is a special sting in the claim that feminists have no sense of statementbuta criticalone. I havelongthoughtthatthe humor;it is notmerelya descriptive accusationis not simplyone of oversensitivity, butthatit is also one of dogmatism.Peter Jones (1982)pointsout that fanaticsare characteristically humorlessand explainswhy. Thanksto Jones'discussion,I nowrealizethatthespecialstingin theclaimis thatit is anaccusationof fanaticism.

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hypatia physical threat to understandwhy someone else is so nervous, so jumpy, so dumb, so slow moving, so "dizzy." . .. It is a commonplace in the Women's Move-

ment to tell men that if they really want to understand what we mean by our total oppression, they should "pass" for women for a day and see what happens.Ignoredin conversation,patronizedat work, hello-babied by strangers,ogled in the street,followedinto buildings, fondledin crowdedbuses, attackedin elevators;objects of ridiculeand contempt, even the most neutraltransaction is usually accompaniedby abuse: "Hey, Dutch, she says do we have any pork chops. Did you hear her? Do we have any pork chops? Lady, what's your problem? Can't you see that we don't have any pork chops?" As women, we live in a coercive,threatening,unpleasant world;a worldwhichtoleratesus only whenwe are very young or very beautiful. If we become stupid or slow, jumpy or fast, dizzy or high-pitched,we are simply expressingthe pathology of our social position. So when we hear jokes against women, and we are asked why we don't laugh at them, the answeris easy, simple, and short. Of course, we're not laughing .... Nobody

laughs at the sight of their own blood. (Weisstein1973, 51 and 58) To the feminist who constantly and continuously encounters situations in which she feels oppressed,belittled,and harmedbecauseof social attitudestowardsher as a woman, sexist humordoes not seem that friendly at all. A man who is not a memberof a target ethnic group can typicallyaccept friendlyteasingor ridiculeas just that, for he knows that it will end momentarily.On the other hand, a sexist joke is not an isolatedevent in whicha womanis harmlesslyteasedor ridiculed;it is ratherone instanceamong many in which women are belittledor disparaged.13 However,this only explainswhy the feministfeels offended by sexist humor. What if a person who finds fun in sexist humor makes it 13. A variation of this explanationof the feminist's position maintainsthat women have been the butt of jokes for so long that it is impossiblefor them to take these jokes as "friendlyteasing." Too many jokes add up to the messagethat the jokes are quite seriousin theirridicule,or disparagement,of women. The conclusions I draw about this variationare the same as the conclusion I shall draw about the position presentedin the text.

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-~ii bwvgmwmn absolutely clear that when she or he enjoys it, no offense is intended? What if that person argues that the humor is merely intended as friendly teasing or ridicule, that there is no hidden message of belittlement or disparagement? It seems that the ends do not quite meet here, if the feminist's position is that sexist humor is offensive and not merely that it is felt to be offensive. That is, in any situation in which sexist humor is shared, it can be made clear by parties to the humor that it is only a matter of a joke. And if this is so, there should be no offense felt in such cases. If a feminist does feel offended, it is not the humor that is responsible for the offense. Rather, she is offended because she is psychologically unable to separate what goes on in the parlor room from what she experiences outside of the parlor room. I shall argue for a stronger conclusion. The offense felt in sexist humor is not simply a by-product of the feminist's psychological inability to compartmentalize different segments of her social life or to distinguish between friends and enemies. The offense is a real offense committed by the person who finds fun in sexist humor. Consider the claim that a particular bit of humor is only a joke, that no offense is intended. Saying "it's only a joke" is a common way of begging off responsibility for something that we have said or done, even if it was not originally intended as a joke. In the case where we say "it's only a joke" of a joke, what we mean is something like: "I don't really believe that so-and-so is as dumb as she or he is made out to be in the joke." We are begging off responsibility for any hidden morals or disparagement that others may find in the joke. We are not, however, denying that there is fun in the joke; we are merely trying to confine the fun within respectable limits. This maneuver of begging off responsibility for offense still leaves the offense in sexist humor, precisely because sexist humor is offensive in what it takes to be fair grounds for fun. Sexist humor does not just incidentally incorporate sexist beliefs-it depends upon those beliefs for the fun. The "Today's Sport" cartoon is funny only if women's bodies count as sport; the story about Trudeau is funny only if rape is desirable to women; etc.'4 Is the offense of sexist humor, then, merely the offense of sexism? Certainly, having sexist beliefs is requisite to finding the fun in sexist humor. But put this way, it looks as if sexist humor is merely a 14. Actually, this is not true of some of the humor I have labelled "sexist." For example, I pointed out that the fur coat joke could still be funny if the check-writer were a man. If a hidden moral about woman is not drawn from the joke, it no longer counts as sexist. In the argument that immediately follows, I concentrate on humor that will not be found funny at all in the absence of the requisite sexist beliefs. I shall return to "ambiguously" sexist humor, like the fur coat joke, in note 15.

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hypatia symptomof whichsexismis the cause, and as if sexisthumoris offensive only becauseit evincessexist beliefs. I do not believethat this is the whole story. The offense of sexist humoris not just the offense of sexism. Sexisthumoradds an offense that is additionalto the offense of sexist beliefs, attitudes,and norms. As Weisstein'sillustrationsshow, sexistbeliefs hurt. They are painful to feministsand like-mindedpeople. They are also the motivating factor behind many painful and harmful situationsthat women encountereveryday in the social and political sphere.Sexist humor, in takingsexist beliefs as fair groundsfor generatingfun, adds insult to the injuryof sexism.To understandthe natureof the insultclearly,let us returnto the bananapeel. Recallthat if a man slippingon a bananapeel wereobviouslyhurt, there were still several alternativeconditions under which we could find fun in the episode. Eachconditionrequiredour detachmentfrom seriousconcern, or if we were, we could still later appreciatethe fun by recallingthe episode in isolation from his pain. But now suppose that we had contributedto the episode, say, by intentionallydropping that bananapeel on the sidewalk,and that the man wereseriouslyinjured. The episode is no longer funny to us unless we just are not seriously concerned about his injury. We can no longer view the episodein isolation from his pain and our responsibilityfor that pain. (Here I am makingan empiricalclaim about psychologicallyhealthy humanbeings.) If we try to find the fun in that episode, it is an insult to the man we have injured. The insult of finding fun in sexist humoris very much like this insult, although it is not quite the same. First, let me draw out the parallel.The person who finds fun in sexist humor is like the person who deliberatelyplaces the bananapeel on the walk; both contribute to the stage-settingfor the fun. In the latter case, the person contributesthe bananapeel that is a necessarycondition for the fun. In the case of sexist humor, the contributionis simply having the requisite sexist beliefs. Short of those beliefs, there is no fun in sexist humor. Moreover, the item contributedin each case is a source of pain. But when we ask "Whose pain?" a disanalogyemerges. The pain in the banana peel episode is the pain of a participantin that episode. But the pain causedby sexist beliefs need not be the pain of any character in the episodes portrayed by sexist humor. Those charactersare by and large fictional, while the pains causedby sexist beliefs are the pains of real people outside of those episodes. Consider,then, the case of creatinga funny episode that ends up causinginjuryto someone other than the participantsin the episode. A professorcommentsthat he would like to live the life of Socrates; 78

merrie bergmann the next day a studentpresentsthe professorwith a bottle of hemlock. The professor finds this funny, as the student had intended, and, chuckling, carries the hemlock home. The following morning he discoversthat his young daughterhas crept into his study and drunk the hemlock. In this case, it would be an insult to the child (to put it mildly),if the student,after hearingthe news and offering sympathy, were to slap a classmate on the back and say, with a belly laugh, "Still, it was funnythat I thoughtof givinghim that hemlock,wasn't it?" It would also be an insult if the classmatelaughedalong. The insult of findingfun in sexist humoris formallythe same. It is the insult of finding fun in an episode when part of the stage-setting that we have contributedto the episode, and that is necessaryto the fun, hurts someone. I offer the hemlock example as a magnifying glass throughwhichthe insultin sexisthumorcomesout in relief. Sexist beliefs are not just harmlessprops for jokes. Wheneversomebody tells or laughsat a sexistjoke it is an insult to those people who have been hurt and who will be hurt by sexist beliefs, whetherthe insult is intendedor not.'5 This insult is the specialoffense of sexism. 15. There is also the fact that laughing at sexist humor may suggest to others that it is acceptable to hold the beliefs that are presupposed by the humor, that those beliefs are just harmless stage-props for the fun of the moment. Hence a person who indulges in "ambiguously" sexist humor (see the previous note) can commit an offense even if that person does not her- or himself draw any hidden morals concerning women, as long as she or he is aware that others might draw such conclusions to enhance the fun. The social functions of humor have been widely studied, particularly insofar as humor can foster a sense of community of belief and values. Humor that communicates certain values, in the sense that holding those values enhances or is itself responsible for the fun in the humor, can serve the function of reinforcing those values. This has often been pointed out in connection with sexist, racist, and ethnic humor: such humor reinforces sexist beliefs, racist beliefs, or unfair stereotyping of ethnic groups and is on that count objectionable. Thus Korsmeyer states in connection with ridicule of women and of feminism: Laughter, [Bergson] claims, occurs in situations where the spectators are relatively uninvolved, at least temporarily, with the subject of their mirth. ... Whether or not all instances of laughter follow this design, certainly this is a component of the ridicule that serves a political purpose in the chivalrous resistance to "women's lib." It keeps sympathy at a distance and allows one to dismiss the subject of laughter as not deserving consideration. (Korsmeyer 1977, 148) Korsmeyer's claim applies directly to the examples of humor in Secton I of this paper. For further discussion of the fostering of community through shared humor, see de Sousa (1981) Ted Cohen (1978) and Morreall (1983, 9). Wayne Booth's discussion of the achievement of community through the use of irony is also applicable to humor (Wayne Booth 1974, 27-31 and 39-44).

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hypatia Herethe argumentof this paperdrawsto an end. But it is clearthat the argumentdependsupon another.AlthoughI haveclaimedthat the offense of sexisthumoris not just the offense of sexism,it is clearthat the offense of sexist humor is parasiticupon the offense of sexism. Any personwho still does not believethat sexistbeliefshurtwill not be convincedby my argumentthat there is an offense in finding fun in humorthat reliesupon those beliefs. In full appreciationof this point, I concludewith the epilogue:How Many FeministsDoes It Take?'6 16. I am grateful to Peter Jones for discussing various theories of humor with me as I was developing the account in Section II.

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merrie bergmann references Bergson, Henry. 1956. Laughter. In Comedy edited by Wylie Sypher. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Booth, Wayne. 1974. A rhetoric of irony. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapman, Anthony J. and Nicholas J. Gadfield, 1976. Is sexual humor sexist? Journal of Communication 26 (3): 141-153. Cohen, Ted. 1978. Metaphor and the cultivation of intimacy. Critical Inquiry 5(1): 3-12. De Sousa, Ronald. 1981. The ethics of laughter. University of Toronto. Manuscript. Eastman, Max. 1937. The enjoyment of laughter. London: Hamish Hamilton. Gruner, Charles R. 1978. Understanding laughter. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Jones, Peter. 1982. Laughter. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61 (Supp. vol.): 213-228. Kant, Immanuel. 1960. Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime. Trans. John T. Goldthwait. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Kaufman, Gloria and Mary Kay Blakely. 1982. Pulling our own strings. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kent, Cromwell. 1970. A book. Scarborough, Ontario: The Vanity Press. Koestler, Arthur. 1975. The act of creation. London: Pan Books. Korsmeyer, Carolyn. 1977. The hidden joke: Generic uses of masculine terminology. In Feminism and philosophy, edited by Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick H. Elliston and Jane English. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co. Kramarae, Cheris. 1981. Women and men speaking. Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House. Maria (surname unpublished). 1981. Do feminists laugh? Open Forum (Dartmouth College) (Nov. 1). Miller, Casey and Kate Swift. 1977. Words and women. Garden City, NJ: Anchor/Doubleday. Monro, D. H. 1951. Argument of laughter. Victoria: Melbourne University Press. Morreall, John. 1982. A new theory of laughter. Philosophical Studies 42: 243-254. - . 1983. Taking laughter seriously. Albany: State University of New York Press. 81

hypatia Robinson, George M. 1980. Towards a cognitive model of humor. Smith College. Manuscript. Weisstein,Naomi. 1973. Why we aren't laughing.. .anymore.Ms 2 (5): 49-51 and 88-90.

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diana t meyers The Politics of Self-Respect: A Feminist Perspective Recent liberal moral and political philosophy has placed great emphasis on the good of self-respect. But it is not always evident what is involved in self-respect, nor is it evident how societies can promote it. Assuming that self-respect is highly desirable, I begin by considering how people can live in a self-respecting fashion, and I argue that autonomous envisaging and fulfillment of one's own life plans is necessary for self-respect. I next turn to the question of how societal implementation of rights may affect self-respect, and I urge that discretionary rights, which allow people to decline the benefits they confer, support self-respect more effectively than mandatory rights, which forbid people to refuse the benefits they confer. I conclude by examining the import of these contentions for feminist theory. I believe that my arguments are of particular concern to women because women have traditionally been victimized by a mandatory right to play a distinctively "feminine" role which has undermined their selfrespect.

In A Theoryof Justice (1971), John Rawls gives the classical liberalthemeof individualdignitya new twist. Althoughhis emphasis on reciprocalrespect among the membersof society draws on this tradition in a familiar way, his granting paramountimportanceto self-respectin his inventoryof primarysocial goods is an important departure(Rawls 1971, 62). For the purposesof this paper, I shall assume that self-respectis highly desirableand explore some devices throughwhich societiespromoteor inhibit it. As a basis for dealingwith this broadersocial and politicalissue, it is necessaryto clarify what is involvedin being a self-respectingperson. After arguingthat autonomousenvisagingand fulfillmentof life plansis a necessaryconditionfor self-respect,I contrastthe impactof mandatoryrights and discretionaryrights on individual life plans. Thoughdiscretionaryrightsare subjectto some forms of criticismin this regard,mandatoryrightsare particularlyinimicalto self respect. I am indebted to Mary Katzenstein, John Bennett, and Judith Lichtenberg for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I have also benefited from the suggestions of Hypatia's referees. -Hypatia vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986). c by Hypatia, Inc.

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hypatia It is importantfor feminists to appreciatethis antagonismbecause women have customarilybeen assigneda mandatoryright to play a distinctly "feminine" role. Apart from the liabilitiesof the inferior status and power characteristicof this role, the mandatoryright I describebelow preemptswomen's conceivingand pursuingtheir own life plans and thereby victimizes them by underminingtheir selfrespect.

1. The Problem of Self-Respect and Rights A self-respectingperson has due regardfor her dignity. According to John Rawls's widely discussedview, the self-respectingperson's state of mindcouplesthe convictionthat herplan of life is worthwhile with confidencein her ability to executethis plan (Rawls 1971, 440). By contrast,a notablecriticof Rawls'sposition, DavidSachs, focuses on a set of characterologicalresponsesinstead of a self-referential belief to accountfor self-respect.On Sachs'sview, the self-respecting person feels resentmentwhen others gratuitouslyignore her wishes and feels shame when she submits to degradingtreatment (Sachs 1981, 352-353). Nevertheless,it is evident that self-respectingpeople not only have the relevant beliefs and responses, but also they generallyact on them. They pursuetheirlife plans, and they resistattempts to humiliatethem. Thus, self-respectissues in characteristic types of behaviorboth in hospitableand in adversecircumstances. It seems clear that there are some constantsin self-respectingconduct. People who sheepishlyacquiesce in violations of their rights lack self-respect (Sachs 1981, 352), as do needlessly secretive or dissimulatingindividuals(Boxhill 1976, 69). Still, once these broad parametershave been markedout, it remainsnecessaryto ask what a self-respectingpersonis like in everydaylife. Supposingthat a person is not compulsivelyevasive and that this person's rights are not in jeopardy, is there any positive way in which self-respectenters into her conduct of her life? Despite their differences,Rawls and Sachs concurin thinkingthat self-respectingpeople must have life plans-collocations of more or less articulatedinterests, needs, values, wishes, and so forth-that they intend to satisfy.' Rawls regards a person's life plan as the 1. B.C. Postow gives a modified formulation of Rawls's account of self-respect: ". . the person's conviction that the long-range satisfaction of her or his own needs and desires is valuable and worth achieving" (Postow 1978-79, 182) I agree with Postow's concern that the expression 'life plan' connotes an excessively self-conscious and deliberate approach to life; however, I shall use Rawls's familiar terminology with the understanding that this connotation is not intended.

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diana t meyers foundation of her self-respect, and Sachs could not explain why people should resent others' dismissiveness without appealing to the life plans such treatment obstructs. For the purposes of this essay, I shall set aside the discrepancies between these two accounts of self-respect and examine the import of this common feature. Specifically, I shall urge, a person could have a worthwhile life plan, pursue it assiduously, and yet fail to exhibit self-respect. In other words, if a person's life plan cannot be described as her own life plan, her fulfilling it does not evidence respect for her self. Suppose that a parent discerns exceptional intellectual gifts in her very young child, relentlessly cultivates this potential, and firmly guides the child into a suitable occupation. Suppose further that the child eventually makes a brilliant career. Still, as an adult, she faces a troubling situation, for she is carrying out an imposed plan of life. However valuable she may believe her contribution to be and however greatly others may admire it, she still may suffer from self-contempt. If she regards her life plan as an alien, albeit illustrious, exercise-if she does not see in it an expression of her deepest convictions, affections, and the like-she may despise herself for hewing to this course. Indeed, it is altogether possible that she persists in this direction precisely because she does not respect herself enough to believe that she should control her own life. Self-respect requires self-knowledge and self-direction.2 It presupposes that the individual has chosen a life plan which is congruent with her self. There are two spheres in which this congruency may hold or fail to hold: the moral and the personal. Following Kant, Rawls identifies moral autonomy with the idea of free and equal rational beings adopting principles for themselves (Rawls 1971, 252-255). Thus, the principles selected in Rawls's original position are expressions of the freedom, equality, and rationality that all selves share. For Kant, any other rules or objectives a person might choose are heteronomous. Rawls is sufficiently influenced by Kant's captivation with pure reason to reserve the term 2. It may be objected that self-knowledge and self-direction are illusory phenomena, residual forms of the discredited belief in free will. Introspection merely reveals a socialized self, and voluntary action is largely a product of social forces. Though I cannot adequately address this contention here, I would urge that socialization is not as pervasive as this objection supposes; in some respects-language acquisition is a case in point-socialization is open-ended. Moreover, children can be taught to attend to such self-referential responses as shame, frustration, pride, and gratification, and they can be helped to guide their lives in accordance with the insight they gain in this way. There is a voluminous literature on this subject. I have particularly benefited from Feinberg 1980; Frankfurt 1976; Dworkin 1976; and Benn 1975-76.

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hypatia 'autonomy' for principled adherence to ethical and political standards. Nevertheless,Rawlswiselyextendshis understandingof self-respect beyondthese realms.Self-respectdependson life plans, and life plans includethe individual'spersonalaims as well as moralityand justice. Once individualshave chosen principlesfrom the standpointof the originalposition, they must go on to plan the course their own lives will take. To explain this further choice situation, Rawls offers a theory of deliberativerationality(Rawls 1971, 407-424). This theory articulatesthe idea of the congruencebetweena person's distinctive self and herlife planby settingout groundrulesfor the processof personal planning. Though I would not endorse Rawls's theory of deliberativerationalityin its entirety-among otherthings,it does not deal adequately with the role of nonrational factors in personal choice-I would nonetheless emphasize that it establishes the rudimentsof an accountof what I proposeto call personalautonomy. Deliberativerationalitydoes not entail that every person's life plan will be astonishinglyunconventional,but it does entail that no selfrespectingperson can follow conventionsimply because doing so is sociallyexpected.To havedue regardfor one's dignityin everydaycircumstances,then, is to conductone's life in a morallyand personally autonomousfashion. As a result of this link to autonomy, self-respect is naturally associated with rights, which classical liberal thought advanced as political guarantors of autonomy. The connection between selfrespectand rights is often said to be a consequenceof the fact that havinga particularrightentitlesa personto presscertainclaimsand to protest refusalsto respectthese claims (Held, 1973;Feinberg, 1970). Sincea personwho has a righthas equal standingin any decisionprocess that may affect respectfor her right, she cannot legitimatelybe obliged to adopt a postureof servilepetitioningfor favors or mercy. On the contrary, her right justifies her in demanding that it be respectedor that restitutionbe made for violations.The idea is that a personwho is assertingrightsagainstthose who woulddenythemis in a betterpositionto respectherselfthan a personwho mustrely on appeals to the benevolenceor forgivenessof her pretendedsuperiors. This explanationof how rightsshoreup self-respect,whilenot to be dismissed,is limited. It considersonly one kind of right, and, as we shall see below, not all rights are aptly labeled guarantors of autonomy. In addition, this account is overly preoccupiedwith victims. Either an individual's rights are denied and she is seeking recognitionfor them, or herrecognizedrightshavebeen abridgedand she is seeking compensationfor her loss. In both cases, her rights86

diana t. meyers based claims are her weaponsagainstinjusticeand may be viewed as affirmationsof her own worth. Still, some writers(Rawlsamong them, 1971, 544) have contended that possessionof recognizedrightsthat are not in any way threatened promotesself-respect.Yet, the merefact that othersrespecta person's basicrightsand in so doing acknowledgeherhumanitycannotprovide her with a reason to respect herself. Strangerswho know almost nothing about us can only be expectedto respectour humanity,but self-respect involves more intimate scrutiny and appraisal of our distinctiveattributes.We do not respectourselvesfor being persons but ratherfor our selves.3The problemof how rightscan enhanceselfrespect,then, is the problemof how a politicalinstrumentgrantedto classes of individualswithoutregardfor their idiosyncraciescan promote the incomparablypersonalgood of self-respect.

2. Prerogatives Thoughit is plausibleto think that recognizedand respectedrights promoteself-respect,it is not obvioushow they do this. The preceding discussion of self-respectsuggests an explanation of this relation: rightspromoteself-respectby creatinga socialenvironmentconducive to the autonomouscreationand pursuitof life plans. Assumingthat this is a major contributionestablishedrightsmake to self-respect,I now want to arguethat some rights,the discretionaryones, are better suited to sustainself-respectthan others which are mandatory.4 A mandatoryright is a right which confers its object on the rightholderwilly-nilly.It consistsof a duty on the part of the right-holder to do x or to have y correlatedwith a duty other individualsor the state have to allow the right-holderand, if necessary,to compelherto 3. It is worth noting, however, that David Sachs's treatment of this issue seems to leave no room for a personal account of self-respect. He reduces self-respect to an elemental respect for the fact of selfhood (Sachs 1981, 350). I believe he is able to maintain such a limited view of the matter because he focuses exclusively on how a selfrespecting person behaves when challenged and ignores the question of how a selfrespecting person conducts her life the rest of the time. It is only when this latter question is posed that the importance of distinctively personal life plans comes to the fore. In addition, it should be mentioned that Thomas E. Hill, Jr. bases his account of the relation between self-respect and rights on the idea that each of us has rights befitting our personhood and that in respecting our own rights we respect ourselves (Hill 1979, 142). Still, Hill's argument does not entail that respecting one's own rights is sufficient for self-respect. Consequently, his position is not in conflict with mine. 4. The distinction between discretionary rights and mandatory rights is drawn by Joel Feinberg (Feinberg 1978, 104). In an earlier article, Martin Golding draws a similar distinction using different terminology (Golding 1968, 546).

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hypatia exercisethe rightand, in addition, to provideanythingshe may need to exercisethe right. In the United Statespersonsbetweenthe ages of five and sixteen have a mandatoryright to education. Similarly,the People's Republicof Chinahas in the past granteda mandatoryright to work on ruralcommunesto universitystudents.Sincea mandatory rightimposesa presumptivebenefit on the right-holderwhichthis individualis not entitledto decline, mandatoryrightsand their objects are both inalienable. The fact that mandatoryrightsconfer only one option mightbe adduced to argue against classifying them as rights; however, two features of mandatoryrights suggest that this restrictionon usage would be artificiallynarrow.First, the mandatoryright-holderis the prime beneficiary of her own duty; duties thought to be purely altruisticdo not generatemandatoryrights.Thus, a mandatoryrightholder may have occasion to assert her right, for she may encounter opposition in exercisingit. Second, mandatoryrights can be constructedso as to allow considerablelatitudein theirexercise-for example,in the UnitedStatesthe rightto educationcan be exercisedat a public or a privateinstitution-in which case they do not completely determinewhat a personmust do. The only option a mandatoryright cannotcompassis that of refusingto do the action it specifiesor have the benefit it secures.Thoughmandatoryrightsare not paradigmatic rights,they have enough in commonwith model rightsto warrantthe appellation. A discretionaryright provides the right-holderwith options with respectto the object of the right:she may choose to do x or to have y or not, and othersare obligatedto honor herdecision. In otherwords, a discretionaryright secures a measure of freedom for the rightholder. Whethershe presses claims predicatedon the right or does nothing,she is actingwithinthe boundsof the freedomallottedby the right. Examplesof discretionaryrightsincludethe rightto vote in the United States, the rightto medicalcare in England,and the rightto a religiously sanctified marriage in Israel. Like mandatory rights, discretionaryrights confer an inescapablebenefit, but it takes the form of freedomwith respectto the object of the right. This is to say that the object of a discretionaryright is alienablethough the right itself may not be. The areas of freedom delineatedby discretionary rights preemptcomplaintsagainst the state alleging that citizens are unjustly deprivedof the object of the right, but these rights do not force any right-holderto accept the benefit made available by the right.5 Though a discretionaryright-holdermay have a duty with 5. It should be noted that some rights do not fall neatly into the discretionary or

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diana t meyers respectto the objectof herright,this dutymustariseindependentlyof the right. For discretionaryrightsconfer only prerogatives. It is becausethey do not secureequallyextensiveprerogativesthat mandatoryrightscan be inimicalto self-respect.A hypotheticalsociety, dividingits membersinto a hereditaryslave class and a hereditary masterclass, might grantto each memberof the masterclass a mandatoryright to own at least one slave. In this society, theremight be masterswhose qualms about slaveryare compromisedby the slaves they are obliged to own. Though they could contrive to treat their slaves as much like compeersas possible, the mere possessionof the right to a slave would remainmorallyrepugnantto them and force them to participatein a social systemthey shun. Sincethis mandatory rightwouldconflict with theirmoralconvictionsand could not finally be eluded, it would subverttheir life plans and along with them their self-respect. At best, a mandatoryright will prove neutral in regard to selfrespect.Concurrencewith the dictatesof a mandatoryrightallowsthe right-holderto comply in good conscience,but her conduct does not enhance her self-respect. Though such conduct may be unobjectionable, no one may pride herself on obeying the law or following strict conventionsince she cannot convincinglyclaim (exceptwhen a law or a social normis knownto be unenforceableor unenforced)that her obedience is not prompted by fear of punishmentor habitual social conformity.Wherethereis no apparenttension betweena person's life plan and her exerciseof a mandatoryright, the coercive characterof the rightcircumventspersonalinitiativeand thus drivesa wedgebetweenthe person'sconductand her self.6 Such rightsundercut the requirementthat conductbe partof the agent'sown life plan if it is to evidenceself-respect.

the mandatory category. For example, the right to a fair trial is mandatory inasmuch as the law requires that trials be conducted in accordance with procedures designed to ensure fairness but is discretionary to the extent that actual trials may be mishandled and appeals are not compulsory. Rights of this sort span the two categories because they are complex and their constituent elements require different classifications. 6. At this point, it is necessary to note that social and legal strictures do not have the same effects on everyone. A requirement addressed to all of the members of a specified class but which few of these individuals felt compelled to fulfill would not count as coercive. But a requirement can be coercive although some members of the target class feel free to defy it. Individuals who are endowed with exceptional volitional fortitude may be able to transcend the pressures exerted upon them and thus to live autonomously. However, since such people are by definition atypical, their experience could only be used to develop an elitist account of autonomy, rights, and selfrespect.

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hypatia Of course, some mandatory rights do not completely obviate autonomy. A twelve-year-oldAmericanwhose parentsinsist that she attend school and whose peers are not truantscannot respectherself for going but can respectherself for excellingacademically.Because mandatory rights often require conduct that may be carried off passablyor superlatively,and because skillfulnessof a relevantsort may be amonga person'sautonomouslydeterminedaspirations,mandatoryrightsmightbe thoughtto promoteself-respectby securingopportunitiesto shine. Yet, many possible mandatoryrights-among them a mandatoryright to vote in single-partyelections and a mandatory right to an annual chest X-ray-could occasion neither especiallycommendablenor especiallyexecrableperformances.Furthermore,mandatoryrights which do allow right-holdersto exhibit their strengthsare no improvementon similar discretionaryrights. Whethermandatoryor discretionary,a rightto vote in contestedelections affords the same opportunitiesto investigatethe issues and appraise the platforms of the rival candidates,in short, to be a good citizen.Thus, as stimulito virtue,mandatoryrightscannotbe credited with any distinctivecontributionto self-respect. Still, it might be urged that mandatoryrights ministerto another dimension of self-respect, namely, self-confidence. Without selfconfidence,a personwill have little reasonto take her own ideas and inclinations seriously and will lack the audacity to express herself through her life plan. Since individualslacking confidence typically seek to mold themselvesto fit the image of an exemplaryfigureor to fit into a social milieu, they skirt the issue of autonomy. Whereas frustrateddedicationto a cause is rare, the objection continues, insecurity is sadly common and deserves relief. Thus, a firm infrastructureof mandatoryrightsmay be put forwardas a promisingantidote for anxiousimitation.By puttinga social stampof approvalon selected life orientationsand assigningone to each individual,these rightsassurecompliantright-holdersthat they are launchedon acceptable courses. Once endowed with this cushioningbase of security, persons will presumablyhave sufficient confidencein themselvesto act on their own beliefs and desires. The assignmentof social and economic positions throughlegal or customarymandatoryrightsis mildly attractivebecausethis arrangement gives everyindividuala place whereshe belongs. For those who meshwell with the operativesystem,crisesof identitynevererupt,and crisesof confidencecannot penetrateto the individual'sbasic plan of life. No doubt, it is a blessingto be sparedthesealarms.However,for those whose temperamentsand abilities lead them to scorn their designatedrolesand to yearnfor otheropportunities,socialascription 90

diana t meyers is a form of oppressionthat poisons the individual'sentire life. Accordingly,to advocatemandatoryrightson the groundsthat they instill self-confidenceand therebypromote self-respectis to disregard the potentialvictimsof social calcificationwhose developmentwould be stuntedand whose self-respectwould be suppressed. Fortunately,there are means other than mandatoryrightsthrough which self-assurancecan be cultivated. Child-rearingmethods emphazingtoleranceand delightin diversity,familiaritywith a common heritage,and emotional openness in a supportiveatmospherefoster self-confidence.Moreover,associationsof adults whose talents and interestsoverlap help to sustain this sense of personalcompetence.7 Whereasmandatoryrightsnurturethe self-confidenceof some at the expenseof the autonomyof others,educationaland associationalsupports for self-confidencedo not have damagingsecondaryeffects on autonomy. Mandatoryrightsare not necesaryto impartself-confidenceto normal adults, and they may place obstaclesin the way of autonomous life plans. Scruplesabout the moral presuppositionsor the practical consequencesof a mandatoryright leave a person with a choice betweencomplyingin bad faith or courtingsanctionsby refusingto comply. The possibility of working for change through the exercise of other rights is irrelevanthere both because denial of basic political rightsor personallibertiescan deprivepersonsof this tactic and also because the presence of extraneousrights that soften a mandatory right'soffense to autonomycannottransformthe mandatoryrightinto a promoterof self-respect.Sincea person'sactingin a mannerthat contradictsher own plan of life will inevitablydamageself-respect,it appearsthat mandatoryrightsonly increaseself-respectwhenpersons flout conventionto resistthem. We cannot, however,sustaina case in supportof mandatoryrightsby advertingto the fact that they might conceivablyoccasiongreaterself-respectfor conscientiousdissenters. This would be like advocatingwar and faminebecausethey bringout the courageand generosityin people. Discretionaryrights, unlike mandatoryrights, generate no occasions for risky conscientiousrefusual since one of the options they guaranteeis that of decliningto do x or have y. Yet, discretionary rightsare not beyond protest. They can be condemnedfor being too restrictiveor too broad, that is, for providingtoo few or too manyoptions. The complaintthat a discretionaryrightis too permissiveneed not detain us since anyone who objects to the breadthof a right can 7. John Rawls stresses the need for this type of support for self-respect in a liberal society (Rawls 1971, 440-442).

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hypatia avoid harmto her own self-respectby confiningher conductto the set of options she condones. However, the position of personswho consider a discretionaryright too narrowis worrisome;for they may be obliged to reluctantlycomply with or secretlydefy the stricturesimposed by the right. Neither of these alternativesis satisfactoryfrom the standpointof self-respect. There is no a priori way to absolve all discretionaryrights of chargesthat they restrictfreedomin a mannerincompatiblewith the self-respectof some persons.8A discretionaryrightcan be formulated so restrictivelythat it is equivalentto a single-optionmandatoryright with an abstinenceclause attached. VictorianEnglandtaught Oscar Wildethat sexualpreferencewas a discretionaryrightof this stultifying sort. But it can be said in defense of discretionaryrightsthat the options they comprisetend to expand ratherthan contract. Because people find it less disturbingto agree that more options should be countenancedthan that a duty should be demotedto the status of an option, it is easier to argue successfully that a discretionaryright should be amendedto permit additional options than it is to argue that a mandatoryright should be convertedinto a discretionaryone. That discretionaryrights may fail to sustainthe self-respectof some individualsmust be conceded. Nevertheless,that they are superiorto mandatoryrightsin theiractualand potentialsupportfor self-respect is indisputable. In principle,discretionaryrightsrepresentan indefinitelylarge and variedset of opportunitiesfor people to determinetheir own courses of action and to judge the adequacyof these plans as projectionsof their abilitiesand aspirations.It must be remembered,however,that these rights represent a correlative set of opportunities to belie autonomouscommitmentsand to dismissthis self-betrayalas trivial. Discretionary rights do not discriminate between genuine and fraudulent self-representations.Moreover, they do not exact admirable conduct, and they do not inhibit ignoble conduct. These choices are all left to the right-holderwho is permittedbut not compelled to avow herself. Thus, the role of discretionaryrightsvis-a-vis self-respectis essentiallya negativeone, namely, that of circumscribing domains throughoutwhich autonomy will not be thwarted. Self-respectis not a good that societies can simply bestow upon 8. Indeed, it may not be possible for a society to tolerate the self-respect of all its members. If evil people must commit atrocities to respect themselves, societies will be obliged to repress the very conduct that would secure these individuals' self-respect. The practical aspect of this problem is, of course, distinguishing between gratuitous suppression of unconventionality and necessary suppression of harmful perversity.

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diana t. meyers theirmembers.For people can neitherbe forcedto freelydevisetheir own life plansnor to adopt sensibleexpectationsabouttheirsuccessin fulfillingtheseplans. Societiescan protectautonomy,but they cannot ensurethat anyonewill use it well. Whata societycan do is to establish a context in which individualsare grantedas many opportunitiesas possiblefor expressingthemselveswithoutfear of incurringpenalties. The prerogativessecuredby discretionaryrightsare uniquelysuitedto reduceneedlessself-censorshipand therebyto promoteself-respect.

3. Political Implications Once it has been concededthat the good of self-respectstandsat a removefrom politicalmeasures,the appropriatenessof countingselfrespectas a political issue can be called into question. Discretionary rightsfosterself-respectbut only by not quashingautonomy.Furthermore, discretionaryrights differ in their support for self-respectin practice,and some mandatoryrightswould rarely,if ever, undermine anyone'sself-respect.Some rightsentitlepersonsto goods that hardly anyoneneedsto disownas a matterof conscienceor settledpropensity. If these rights are mandatory, few persons will suffer from their overzealousbeneficence,and many personsmay be restrainedfrom rashly foregoing goods which they would eventually regret losing. Moreover, some discretionaryrights, like the right to vote and the rightto speakwithoutcensorship,explicitlyentitlepersonsto expressa wide range of their intellectualand affective commitments,whereas others, like the rightto a minimallyadequateincomeand the rightto medicalcare, implicitlyentitlepersonsto expressthemselvesregarding only a narrowmatter,namely, how extensivetheirentitlementought to be and whetherthey will avail themselvesof it. Sincethe impactof diverserightson self-respectvariesso much, it mightbe askedwhy we should attendto the generalrelationI have delineated. One thrust of my argumentis cautionary.It establishesa presumption in favor of discretionaryrightsand thus specifiesone sort of objection that must be overcomebefore implementationof a mandatory rightcan be justified. Since discretionaryrightspromoteself-respect, advocatesof mandatoryrights must show that their proposedrights advance some good superior to self-respector that they will only obstructinadmissibleself-representations.The onus of justification, then, lies with the paternalisticallyinclined. Moreimportantly,my analysisenablesus to understandhow people can be victims of mandatoryrights: when individualsare legally or customarily saddled with goods that their convictions or feelings abhor, they are condemnedto a life of social ostracismor to one of 93

hypatia self-contempt, and, when these impressed goods interlock with the right-holder's life plan, these individuals gain no self-respect from accepting them. Social injustice is most glaring when it involves arbitrarily withholding from the members of one social group discretionary rights which are granted to others-slavery together with its progeny, segregation, is a notorious example of this type of injustice. However, social groups can be victimized by mandatory rights-examples range from a right compelling the children of atheists to pray at school to a right compelling adult citizens to vote in one-party elections. Both of these forms of injustice are condemnable for wrongfully depriving individuals of sources of self-respect. However, a society that uses mandatory rights to disguise an illicitly repressive social order is particularly insidious because mandatory rights purport to confer benefits on right-holders. In concert with this ostensible beneficence, apparently innocent legal sanctions and customary patterns are especially resistant to criticism and reform. The history of the social and economic position of women in the United States and similar countries provides an instructive case of customary mandatory rights victimization. Though it is well-known that women have been legally denied sundry discretionary rights, including the franchise and the right to do strenuous or dangerous work, it is arguable that the dominant mode of injustice has been the customary conferral of mandatory rights. With characteristic acuity, John Stuart Mill summed up the predicament: "In the case of women, each member of the subject class is in a chronic state of bribery and intimidation combined" (Mill 1971, 26). The role of wife, mother, and homemaker can reasonably be portrayed as an advantageous one. The wife whose husband is legally obligated to support her is relieved of financial responsibilities; the mother makes a valuable social contribution and performs demanding and rewarding services for her children; and the homemaker manages her own domain. What is curious about marital norms, then, is that they arguably confer privileges on women, and yet feminists have rightly objected to them. To address this paradox, it is first necessary to examine the historical record. Although the role of housewife and mother has been imposed on virtually all women, only a small percentage of the alleged right-holders have enjoyed the benefits this right is supposed to confer (Berg, 1978; Rubin, 1976). It was not until recently, it must be remembered, that unionization enabled many male workers to provide adequately for their families. If the family is impoverished, it is no benefit for the wife to be barred from alleviating this predicament by working outside the home. Nor is it a benefit, if she is forced to enter the labor market, to be segregated into stereotypically feminine jobs 94

diana t meyers which are underpaidbecausethey are done by women. In addition, circumstanceshave often deprivedwomen of the satisfactionsof caring for their children. Before child labor was prohibited,economic necessitycommonlytook childrenout of the home and prematurely haltedmaternalnurture.But even after legislationendedthe exploitation of children,women who lacked birth control and could not afford nursemaidsoften found that they had so manychildrenthat they could hardlycare for any of them. Finally,it is importantto recognize that withouta comfortableincome domesticsovereigntyreducesto a desperateand incessantstruggleto feed and clothe the family and to keep marginalhousingas clean as possible. Plainly, the femininerole cannot be counted a mandatoryright-it is Sisypheanduty-in the absenceof considerableeconomicmeans. In lightof the historyI havejust sketched,it is bafflinghow the idea of the femininerole as a mandatoryrightcould have persistedas long as it did. After all, many women neverbenefitedfrom it. Why was it not dispatchedlong ago? Needlessto say, this is much too complexa questionto deal with fully here, but I shallpoint out how the idea of a mandatoryright helps to explainthe longevityof this conception. Although it is true that countless women have not reaped the benefits of the mandatoryright to be a housewife and mother, it is also true that a highlyvisiblegroup of affluent womenhas. The mass media have depicted this relatively small group of women as exemplary bearers of a mandatoryright (Berg 1978, Ch. 4; Friedan 1963, Ch. 2; Lerner1979,26-29). Widedisseminationof this view has facilitatedthe spuriousinferencefrom the claim that certainwomen benefit from this assigned social position to the claim that other women should blame their drudgeryon their lack of ingenuityand charm.The femininerole, it may be urged,is like compulsoryeducation. Society bestows a splendidgift upon the right-holder,but the right-holdermust have certaintalents and must exerta certaineffort in order to avail herselfof this bounty. Whatthis comparisonoverlooks,as we haveseen, are the socialand economicconditionswhichmakeit impossiblefor manywomen,their abilitiesand determinationnotwithstanding,to benefit from enforcement of the femininerole. Economicallydeprivedwomen who strive to replicatean idealized vision of the housewife and mother suffer diminished self-respect when, inevitably, they fail. Furthermore, disadvantagedwomen who regardthis mandatoryright as a travesty resent the undeservedfortunes of affluent women and may ridicule the latter's claims to be oppressed(Bunch, et. al 1981, 157; Myron 1974, 38-39). Thus, the injury to self-respectthis mandatoryright has inflicted on poor women who embraceit and the cleavageit has 95

hypatia reinforcedbetweenwomen of differentclasses providetwo bases for feministcriticismof it. Still, whetheradvantagedwomen suffer any genuineinjusticeas a resultof this mandatoryrightremainsto be considered.Here, it seems advisable to leave aside such burdens as sexual subordinationand vulnerabilityto domesticviolence. Thoughthese liabilitiesare serious and not unrelatedto the woman's dependencyin the traditionalmarriage, they could in principlebe correctedwithout freeing women from theirconventionalrole. The troublewith this role is not limited to the price that is exacted for the benefits it grants. To see why enforced housewifery and motherhood would remain objectionable, even supposing the hidden disadvantageswere removed, attention must be focused once more on mandatoryrightsand theirdeleterious effects on self-respect. Because mandatory rights impose the desiderataof the femininerole, women whose self-conceptsconflict with the requirementsof these rights are obliged to sacrifice their autonomywhilewomenwho wouldchoose this courseanywaygain no self-respectfrom embarkingon it. Thus, these women are at once beneficiariesand victims. A possible rejoinderto this account of the injustice mandatory rightsinflict on womenstems from the evidencethat some housewifemothers have lost self-respect as alternative roles have become available to them. (Andre 1981, 125-26;Oakley 1974, 104, 124-25; Lerner1979, 136). These reportsare certainlycause for concern. For if the prognosis for self-respectis improvedby discretionaryrights, the shift over the last decade away from compulsory marriage, motherhood, and homemakingshould have been accompaniedby commensurateadvances in self-respectamong women. Yet here is testimonythat the reversehas occurred.Furthermore,otherclassesof individuals,notably seventeenth-centuryEuropeanaristocrats,have held mandatoryrights assigningthem rigid social roles, but no one classifiesthem as victimsof cruelinjustice.The implicationthat they suffered from diminishedself-respectseems incredible. Takingthe broad questionof injusticefirst, the suggestionthat an aristocracyis victimizedby mandatoryrightsseems frivolousbecause these rights are self-imposed. If the idea of self-inflicted, selfaggrandizinginjustice is intelligibleat all, these wrongs surely constitute the least disturbingkind of maltreatment.Nevertheless,a disjuncturebetweenthe social and the individualperspectiveshould not be overlooked. Despite the fact that a person belongs to a powerful social class which accords itself a mandatoryright, that individual may reject the right and either undergo the penalties for non96

dina t. meyers conformityor conceal her disagreement.If the mandatoryright unjustifiablyconstrainsindividualautonomy, this personis treatedunjustly regardlessof her privilegedbackground.Though the damage mandatoryrightsdo to some individuals'self-respectdoes not always stand in foremost need of rectification,it remainsunjust. To graspthe effects of mandatoryrightson willingaristocrats,the limits of the relation between self-respectand rights must first be underscored.Mandatoryrights do not renderself-respectimpossible unless they leave no decisionsto the individual.As long as the rightholder enjoys some flexibilityin executingan assignedrole, this individualmay use the role's opportunitiesfor self-expressionto give voice to herown beliefs, values, needs, and so forth. Moreover,a person whoserole is highlyspecifiedmay earnsome degreeof self-respect frommeetingthe role's requirementswithexceptionalflairor efficiency. Mandatoryrightswrestfrom compliantright-holdersthe possibility of respectingthemselvesfor theirchoiceof a socialrole, but they injure self-respectonly insofar as they preventpersons from forming their own life plans or when they oblige personsto reversedirections they themselveshave chosen. Accordingly,thereis no mysteryin the observationthat aristocrats were not given to despondentself-contempt.Since these individuals did not consider their inheritance of their exalted status to be undeserved-they thought they had blue blood-democratic principles did not pricktheirconsciences.Thus, they wereable to assume theirroles and, in some cases, to fulfill them brilliantlywithoutbelying their beliefs or sacrificingtheir standards.Still, it is by no means evidentthat mandatoryrightsdid no damageto thesearistocrats'selfrespect. Since many of these individualsunthinkinglyabsorbedthe prevailing hierarchical view of society, their beliefs about the legitimacyof theirpatrimonywerenot strictlytheirown. In occupying their expected positions, then, many of them conformed to social normswhich had preemptedself-expression.Furthermore,to the extent that an aristocrat'sself-approvaldependedon uncriticalespousal of highly implausibledistinctionsin the social ranks, well-varnished self-delusionsupplantedself-respect.(Saint-Simon'smemoirsof life at the courtof LouisXIV recountmanysuchdeparturesfromreality.) To be sure, mandatoryrights did not strip Europe's aristocracyof self-respect.Nevertheless,egotism and the consolationsof fitting in must not be mistakenfor self-respect. The plightof the womenwhose automaticsubmissionto the role of housewife-mother has recently been called into question is analogous in one respect to that of an aristocrat struck by the realizationthat her blood was the same as everyone else's. What 97

hypatia this modernwomanhad regardedas a naturaland inevitabledivision of labor, feminists have declaredan option. Women who were receptive to this challengedespite long-standing,traditionalmarriages often discoveredthat their major life choices had been made unreflectivelyand acquiescently.Some of thesewomenthen wenton to accuse themselvesof self-betrayaland cowardicewhile others became convincedthat they had settled upon satisfyingand worthwhilelife plans. Whateverthe outcome, these individualsmoved from viewing self-respectas a superficialquestionabout how well a person does a pre-determinedtask to viewingit also as a profound question about whethera person'slife is consonantwith her self. A person'sdiscerninga mismatchin this latterregardwhichthe person is powerlessto remedydetractsfrom self-respect.Insofaras mandatoryrightsor undulyrestrictivediscretionaryrightssubjectpersons to a contractedsense of self-worth,the society enforcingthese rights owes theseindividualsa reappraisalof the optionsit countenances.Of course, nothing I have said entails that societies are obligatedto ensure that every member'sdreamscan come true. Matureindividuals modulate their aspirations and expectationsin accordancewith a realisticassessmentof what is possible. However, if obdurate prejudice imposes unwanted benefits on some individualsand forces them to classifyreasonableprojectsas idle fantasies,the societysponsoringtheserestrictionswrongssome of its members.It compelsthem eitherto distort their personalitiesor to become pariahs. While it is clear that self-respectis too personal a good to hold societies accountable for their members' failures to respect themselves,it is also clear that the sensitivityof self-respectto all kinds of regimentationmakes self-respecttoo vulnerableto societal stricturesto be ignored by the political process. Concretely, selfrespectis properlyviewedas a politicalissue becausesocial and legal stipulations can be injurious to it without inflicting conspicuous deprivationsand becauseconversionto discretionaryrightsfacilitates self-respect.It may not alwaysbe feasiblefor a societyto give priority to the problem of self-respect,but societies that persistentlysubordinate self-respect to other objectives deprive their members of autonomousdignity.

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diana t meyers references Andre, Rae. 1981. Homemakers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Benn, S.I. 1975-76. Freedom, autonomy, and the concept of a person. Aristotelian Society Proceedings 76: 109-130. Berg, Barbara J. 1978. The remembered gate: Origins of American feminism. New York: Oxford University Press. Boxhill, Bernard R. 1976. Self-respect and protest. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 58-69. Bunch, Charlotte, et. al. 1981. Building feminist theory. New York: Longman. Dworkin, Gerald. 1976. Autonomy and behavior control. Hastings Center Reports 6: 23-28. Feinberg, Joel. 1970. The nature and value of rights. The Journal of Value Inquiry 4: 243-257. ---. 1978. Voluntary euthanasia and the inalienable right to life. Philosophy and Public Affairs 7: 93-123. ---. 1980. The child's right to an open future. In Whose child?, edited by William Aiken and Hugh Lafollette. Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield and Adams. Frankfurt, Harry. 1976. Identification and externality. In Identities of persons, edited by Amelie Oksenberg. Berkeley: University of California Press. Friedan, Betty. 1963. The feminine mystique. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Golding, Martin. 1968. Towards a theory of human rights. The Monist 52: 521-549. Held, Virginia. 1973. Reasonable progress and self-respect. The Monist 57: 12-27. Hill, Thomas E., Jr. 1979. Servility and self-respect. In Today's moral problems, edited by Richard Wasserstrom. New York: Macmillan. Lerner, Gerda. 1979. The majority finds its past. New York: Oxford University Press. Mill, John Stuart. 1971. On the subjection of women. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications. Myron, Nancy. 1974. Class beginnings. In Class and feminism, edited by Charlotte Bunch and Nancy Myron. Baltimore: Diana Press. Oakley, Ann. 1974. Women's work. New York: Pantheon Books.

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references Postow, B.C. 1978-79. Economic dependence and self-respect. The Philosophical Forum 10: 181-205. Rawls, John. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Rubin, Lillian Breslow. 1976. Worlds of pain: Life in the workingclass family. New York: Basic Books. Sachs, David. 1981. How to distinguish self-respect from self-esteem. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10: 346-360.

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andrea nye Preparingthe Way For a Feminist Praxis Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex identifies the philosophical vantage point from which she will survey the situation of women as existentialist. The ways in which she must later compromise that committment to theory in order to remain true to her feminist insights foreshadow recent developments in feminist ethics and epistemology.

Simone de Beauvoirhas been deeply involved in the intellectual currentsof her time, both by way of a rigorouseducationin the classics of Western philosophy and by association with leading intellectuals.In particular,she workedin close collaborationwith Sartre, sharingmanuscripts,convictionsand criticisms.Groundbreaking work involves not so much detachedinspirationas a painful process of disentanglementand disengagementfrom the presuppositionsthat define any intellectualenvironment.This Beauvoirhas been in a unique position to accomplish. Not only is she a philosopherand an existentialist, but also a practicing feminist, and over the years her deepeningcommitmentto women's causesmade any facile repetition of Sartrean,existential,or philosophicalpositions impossible. It is the argumentof this paper that it is this conflict between philosophicalheritageand practicalfeminismthat makes Beauvoir's work so valuable.As feministphilosopher,she must addressnot only topical issues but also the deeper intellectualconstraintsthat inhibit change; as practicing feminist, she cannot allow her theorizing to obscurethe contradictoryfacts of her experienceas a woman. If the resultis often incoherenceor inconsistency,it is an incoherencethat beginsto underminethe structuresin Westernthought that hold sexism in place. So Beauvoirbegins to clear the way for an authentic feministtheory and practice. The weaknessof The Second Sex, a weaknessthat Beauvoirwas later to frankly acknowledge, was its neglect of practice. The difficulty of moving from theory to action had been endemicto the The research for this paper was made possible by a grant from The National Endowment for the Humanities (Fellowship for College Teachers). Hypatia vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986). © by Hypatia, Inc.

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hypatia existentialismthat Beauvoirannouncedas her "perspective."In the first place there was the existentialist'salways theoretical starting point:a concernnot practicalbut ontological.Until Sartre'simprisonment by the Germans,both he and Beauvoirconsideredthemselves "leftish" but basciallyapoliticalphilosophersand writers,not politicians. Sartredefinedthe problemshe addressedas a questionof what there was in the world aside from any political commitmentsor any ethics. The questionof whatone shoulddo was posteriorand reserved in Being and Nothingnessfor the fragmentarylater chapters.'It was in the same spiritof objectiveinquirythat Beauvoirfirst approached the problemof women. She began researchfor The Second Sex not becausethere was a problemin her life to be solved, but in order to producea theoreticalexercisein existentialism-an exerciseproposed not by inconsistenciesin her experiencebut by Sartreas an interesting applicationof existentialism.2 In the second place, existentialismby its very termsrenouncedbinding standardsof action. There was no absolutely good goal conceivable to which feminist action or any other action could be directed.Sartrehad struggledwith this emptinessor lack at the center of humanlife. No specificaction could be finallydeterminedrightor wrong;the only possible always rightchoice would be for one's own freedom, but that freedommust not have any restrictingcontent. A concrete decision-and here, interestingly enough, Sartre used feminineexamples,such as MaggieTulliver'sin TheMill on the Floss to give up her sexualpassionor Sanseverina'sin The Charterhouseof 1. The problem of an ethics is left dangling at the end of Being and Nothingness, supposedly reserved for a later work. It is much easier to develop a self-realizing existentialist psychotherapy than to devise an ethics that could include concern for others. The full later treatment never appeared. Although Sartre began work in 1946-8, the project never went beyond notes (these notes have just been published in Cahierspour une morale (1983). Sartre finally addresses the issue in a debate with the communists published as L'existentialisme est un humanisme (1960). There, Sartre's differences with the communists, who accuse him of impotence and of having no ethics at all, are clear. Sartre's characteristicdefense is theoretical, not moral. The Cartesian "point de depart," the individual consciousness, is necessary because it is "true"-there cannot be any other truth. It is "the absolute truth" and "any other theory supptesses the truth" (p. 64). 2. In fact at first Beauvoir demurred that she never herself felt any different from a man, and it is Sartre who urges that after all, being a woman, there must be some difference in her perspective. Much, much later in an interview in L 'Arc (1975), there is again this longing in Sartre for a different point of view. Admitting his "phallocentricity" goodnaturedly, he questions the egalitarianism of The Second Sex-perhaps certain feminine qualities should not be lost, maybe it was men that should change, not women; the perspectiveof women might have the advantage of avoiding so much male pomposity and pretention. Cf., in addition, Beauvoir's admiring biographer, Francois Jeanson, who was also more willing than Beauvoir to admit that the "masculine life" might be frustrating and restrictive (Simone de Beauvoir ou l'enterprise de vivre, 1966, 206).

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andrea nye Parma to indulgeit-is not judgeable(Sartre1960, 86-87). CertainlySartre'sassertionof "une moralede la liberte"did not by itself solve the problem.Even Sartrecould not see such a moral as a simple adherenceto personal assertion excluding interventionwith and for others. At the same time, such an interventionwould always be problematicgiven the existentialiststartingpoint. If everyoneis to be freeto choose, then any actionon another'sbehalfmustrestrictthe freedomof the beneficiaryof that action. Alternately,how is it that tyrants do not have the freedom to oppress when the mastery of another'ssubjectivityis the most basic and necessaryof humanprojects? These are the problemsthat Beauvoirtakes on squarelyin The Ethics of Ambiguity. How can existentialistpolitical decisions be made? The argument that exploiters must be free to exploit was perhaps a conservativediversion, but in any revolution didn't the liberatorshave to, in turn, treat the old oppressorsas things in order to becomemastersthemselves?3Evenwhenit is a questionof savinga suicide from jumping into the Seine, or a friend from a disastrous marriage,the same theoreticalbrake on involvementremains: "To want to prohibita man from erroris to forbid him to fulfill his own existence,it is to deprivehim of life" (Beauvoir1948, 138).By existentialist reasoning,it would seem that to intervenein anyone'schoice is a kindof violence;it is to appointoneself, as does Judge, for his wife, in Claudel's The Satin Shoe, someone's "gardener." On the other hand there are times such as the case of suicide where to fail to intervene would seem morally indefensible. However, neither of Beauvoir'stwo tentativeand somewhatincoherentsuggestionsin The Ethics of Ambiguitycan solve the problemexistentially.The first is that one must act to keep futurepossibilitiesopen, a guide that only makes sense if the futureis, as the Marxistsassume, necessarilyprogressive, introducingan existentiallyimpermissibleabsolute. The second, more interesting but even less existentialist, is that "love authorizesseverities" (Beauvoir 1948, 137) and allows intervention whereit would be otherwisean intrusion. Therefore, the problematicstatus of a feminist practice in The SecondSex is not, as Beauvoirseemedto suggestlater, a simplequestion of neglect;it is an integralpartof herexistentialism.Eitheran existentialistcould act in bad faith and "seriously,"or she could simply act, allying herself politically only with the understandingthat the 3. This was the difficult issue on which Sartre and Camus would quarrel. Cf. Beauvoir's Les Mandarins (1960) for a sensitive fictional account of this disagreement in the characters of Robert (Sartre) and Henri (Camus). In The Ethics of Amlbiguity (1948, 154), Beauvoir repeats the rather weak Sartrean apology for the Soviet police state: the whole situation must be taken into account.

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hypatia commitment could be withdrawnat any time by a new decision. Moreover,a choice betweenthese two unsatisfactoryalternativeswas necessary.Certainlyin the difficultpost-waryearsin a Franceclose to civil war over the Algerianquestion, Beauvoirfound it difficult to remain the apolitical writer. Beauvoir's first political interventionindependent of Sartre and perhaps her real entrance into feminist politics was on behalf of an Algeriangirl torturedby the French.She was asked by the girl's lawyer, Gisele Halimi, later prominent in French feminism, to write an article and continued with Halimi to militateon the girl'sbehalf, activitieswhich,in the increasinglyhostile atmospherein Paris, werenot withoutdanger.Somewhatlater, asked to supportthe protest against laws restrictingthe right to abortion, havinghad an abortionherself, again she cannot refuseinvolvement. By way of the abortion issue she is then drawninto the feminist activitiesof the FrenchM.L.F. (Movementde Liberationdes Femmes). However,the practicalweaknessof the theoryof TheSecondSex is evidentin continuedinconsistenciesas to the basis of feministaction. In The Second Sex, after a powerfulcritiqueof Marxism,but faced with the necessityfor some sort of final prescription,Beauvoirclaimed, astonishingly,that only the institutionsof socialismwould bring about women's liberation.In the ongoing logic of The Second Sex it was individualwomen who had to act, who had to assertthemselves and maketheirmarkon the world. At the sametime, the call for "collective" action is often interjectedinto the argumentwith no discussion. Later "clarification"only makes the situation worse. In 1966 Beauvoirargues for a dual struggle:on the one hand an individual self-realizationand on the othercollectiveaction. Again, the collective is not defined or its rapport with the individualdescribed.The individual may, she says, have no means for a collective struggle. In fact, it is not clearhow the two are to be even consistentwheninvolvementin collectivecausesmighteasilytake time away, as it wouldhave for Beauvoirherself, from self-realizingprojectsof novel writingand autobiography.Later(1974, 1720)she calls it an "alibi" to think that sexism could have been transcendedon an individualbasis or that answering letters and supporting friends was enough. In 1972 (Beauvoir1972a),with her entranceinto feministpolitics, she claims that her position was "evolved." Now she would base the analysisin The Second Sex" on a materialistbase, not idealist "antagonismsof consciousnessess,"but at the same time she shows no sign of abandoningthe centralexistentialistpositionor of resolvingthe theoretical incompatibilitybetween materialismand self-assertion. Patriarchal oppressionratherthan class oppressionis more essentialfor women, she says in 1972,but admitsthat the theoreticallinks betweensocialist 104

andrea nye action and feminist action are not clear. Now, she say, she realizes that she was wrong to have embracedsocialism at the end of The Second Sex.4 Otherpracticalissues suffer from the same vertiginousconfusion. Often Beauvoirhad claimed that she was not against men, that she disliked intensely the attitude of "challenge" of many American feminists.At the sametime this avoidanceof confrontationis strangely out of step with the implicationsof an existentialismthat must prescribe assertion for women. Wouldn't women have to rise up againsttheirmasters,againstmale pretensions?And wouldn'tmen be sure, given the confrontationalcharacterof all humanexperience,to resist?She herself describeshow much men had to lose: It is no longer a question of a war betweenindividuals closedeach in his or her sphere:a casteclaimingits right goes over the top and is resistedby the privilegedcaste. Here two transcendencesare face to face; instead of displayingmutualrecognitioneach free being wishesto dominatethe other. (Beauvoir1974, 798) Though mutual recognition might be hoped for, certainly some unpleasantnesswill be necessary before it is possible. By 1972 Beauvoirrathertentativelyallowsa place for challenge,some selective distrustof men, and also a degreeof separatism.At the same time, in her own life, she continuesto deny any antagonismwith men. In fact, Beauvoir'sexistentialismis inadequateto deal with the conflicts and tensionsin her experienceas a womanand in her efforts on behalf of women. Acting for others or with others would always be problematic given an existentialist metaphysics of separate consciousnessesswho must see each other as threats.Sartrein Being and Nothingness(1975)had explainedthe limits of any assertionof "we" or "us."5 These pronouns could not indicate any direct experience of 4. Beauvoirand Sartreboth seemedto be afflictedwith a peculiarkindof blindnessin respectto the communists.Sartrecouldneverquitesee whytheydid not wantto debateand dialogue.Beauvoirrathertouchinglyconfessesthat, givenher nod in their directionat the end of TheSecondSex, she thoughtthey shouldhavewelcomedher to their ranks. Instead they criticize, even ridicule her. It must have been their "leftishness"that Sartreand Beauvoirthoughtto sharewith the communistswhen in fact there is no theoreticalrapproachmentpossiblebetweenthe positions of existentialism and communism,which is made more than clear in L'existentialismeest un humanisme. 5. Cf. Part III, Chapter 3, III, " 'Being-with' and the 'We' " in Being and Nothingness. By L 'existentialisme est un humanisme, Sartre also thought that his posi-

tion had "evolved." Now, he says, he can count on comradesin a struggle,that is if he is moreor less in controlof the partyor group.This, however,mightonly amountto

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hypatia an other. We experienceothers first always as objects, and then as looks to be put down. After that initial encounter,certainsecondary perceptionsmay give riseto a "we." We may all find ourselvesstaring at the same show or accident.More importantly,we may also all find ourselves the object of someone else's look, the Third, as Sartre dramaticallyputs it. However,as soon as we act and assertourselves against the Third, we lose the "us" and are again separate consciousnesses.Feministsolidaritywould alwaysbe difficult, if not impossible, to derive from such a metaphysics.Sometimes, Sartreadmits, we find ourselves,as when we are changingsubwaylines, with identicalprojects.This does not meanthat we experiencethe other as subject;it is only that we perceivethat we are all, as it were, marching in step. Subjectivities,in the end, remainout of touch and radically separated,committed only to their own "projects." The organizations, parties, action groups, united fronts, into which they ally themselvesare alwayscapriciousand unstable." It is thereforeuseless for human-realityto seek to get out of this dilemma:one musteithertranscendthe other or allow oneself to be transcendedby him. The essence of the relationsbetween consciousnessis not the Mitsein; it is conflict. (Sartre1975, 555) Practice must always be a kind of gratuitous import, a choice among alternativesthat an existentialistmay make, a choice that can alwaysbe rescinded.Sartre'smanyand conflictingaffiliationsare not a personal"faiblesse"but a predictableresultof existentialisttheory, in fact predictedby Sartrehimself in Being and Nothingness.Similar is Beauvoir'sinterjectionof a gratuitouscollectivity,or referenceto the class struggle,at momentswhen a prescriptionfor feministaction seemsnecessary.It is not that action cannot be taken;it is that it can never be integralto theory but must be borrowed, only the choice itself, strippedof content,havingany necessaryconnectionto theory.6 another individual project or manipulation. Later he admits that we can understand each other because we all have the same project of self-realization, but again this may involve only the projection of our own project onto others, or a contingent "marching in step.' 6. This practical weakness is inherited by a whole generation of post-war feminists. In Kate Millett, Betty Friedan, Germaine Greer-American feminists whom Beauvoir rightly saw as carrying on the standard raised in The Second Sex-there is the same lack of a coherent praxis. These feminists shared Beauvoir's determination to overcome sexual stereotypes, to reestablish woman's humanity and involve her in masculine projects. Moreover, although none of them considered themselves existentialists or even

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andrea nye The result is that in The Second Sex and in Beauvoir'swritings, practiceis left to vacillatebetweenunrealizableideals. The conflict in practice between individual liberation and the plight of masses of women is not resolved, nor does the professionalsuccess of women like Beauvoirseem to liberatethem from the disadvantagesin their personal lives described so eloquently by Beauvoir herself in The Second Sex.7 Not only could the suffering of poor or uneducated women not be ignored without bad faith; there also was a growing sensein Beauvoirand othersthat the liberatingself-assertionand selfdevelopmentof even a few superiorwomen would be illusoryas long as masses of women were still oppressed.Such an intuition is completely at odds with the Sartreantheory of separate warringconsciousnesses.This disparitybetweenfeministinsightand existentialist theory was already evident in The Second Sex at several sensitive points. The most strikingis Beauvoir'sassertionof reciprocity.Her announcementof reciprocityas a feministgoal is completelyoutsideexistentialisttheory. Sartrehad made it clearthat respectfor another's freedom was only empty words, a kind of contradictionin terms. Even if the threatenedsubject could manage it, it would itself be a constrainton the other as restrictingas indifferenceor hatred. Here Sartre'sconsistencymust be comparedto Beauvoir'soptimism:"Between two adversariesconfrontingeach other in their pure liberty, an agreementcould easily be reached:the more so as the war profits neither"(Beauvoir1974, 799). This optimismBeauvoirherself quicklycompromises.The fact is, she says, the situation is complex, the woman dreams of "demission," the man of alienation, neitherof which can bring happiness. philosophers, their analyses depended on the relations of power described more abstractly by Beauvoir. Although this exposure of male power and of the ways in which women were kept in their place led to renewed militancy, at the same time, the existential underpinnings of postwar American feminism offered few possibilities for innovative prattical action. The one logical possibility, that women assert themselves as ruthlessly and aggressively as men, was almost always resisted. Instead, for want of a better course of action, they returned to the old remedies of legal reform. 7. In one of the strongest sections of The Second Sex (p. 75ff), Beauvoir describes the inevitable conflicts between "femininity" and professional success. Cf., also, the relationships depicted in Beauvoir's novels, relations which often mirrored faithfully changes in her personal life. Women characters lose themselves in a man (Blood of Others 1948), want to end their lives when they are rejected by a lover (The Mandarins 1960), are afflicted with paralyzing if not criminal jealousy (She Camteto Stay 1954), while the male characters either treat sex as a casual pleasure or demand a total commitment impossible for a professional woman to give (Lewis in The Mandarins).

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hypatia Insteadof giving up these no-win projects,each blamesthe other for their failure. The male, always in control of the sex act, attemptsthe Hegelianresolution.He demandsthat the womanplay her part in the "comedy." She mustbe the otherbut in such a way so that he remains subject. Just as for Hegel's consciousnesses,othernessmust be made to negate itself; the woman must give herself as sexual object. The wrong kind of look, the wrong kind of taking of pleasure, could reasserther subjectivityand ruin the pleasureof the male. Still the woman must not be too much of an object. She must seem to experiencesexualpleasure,recognizeapparentlysincerelythe meritsof the male, play activelythe comedy of passivity. Given this Sartreanscenario, there are only two possible alternatives for women, to take the male role and dominate, or to find some sort of transcendencein passivity. Both are considered by Beauvoir.The first is projectedinto a distant, perhapsunrealizable future, when patriarchyhas been overcome;that women could win, seduce,provide,as men do, or that men wouldaccepttheirdominance is more a dream than a prediction. The alternativeactive passivity returns women to making the best of a bad situation. But neither masculinetranscendencenor active passivityis the reciprocitythat is more often proposed by Beauvoiras the real ideal, but that is still unassimilatedtheoretically. Even more inadmissableexistentiallyis Beauvoir'soccasionalsuggestion that women may experiencesexual pleasuredifferentlyfrom men. Given the "sembability"of men and women, given Beauvoir's rejectionof femininespecificity,given the commonhumanprojectof transcendence,a different femininepleasurewould seem impossible. Still, in 1966 (Jeanson 1966, 261), she admits that men and women may have differentmannersof livingthe sex act, of experiencingsexual pleasure.8Often she also suggests that women have a different relationto their bodies than that describedby Sartre.For Sartrethe physicalityof the body is akin to whathe calls the "slimy," to whatis alien and slightly disgusting. In Sartre's description of this "common" symbol, the femininereferencesare obvious. The slimyis docile, but when, at the last moment,one thinksone possessesit, by a curious reversalit possesses the possessorwith a peculiar"feminine sucking." The slimyis the contrary,the nemesis,of the male project. It cannot be possessed. It is a "sickly, sweet, femininerevenge."9 8. Cf., also, The Second Sex, p. 160. 9. This extraordinary discussion can be found in Being and Nothingness, Part IV, Chapt. 2, III. The hole for Sartre has similar associations: "the obscenity of the female sex" is that it gapes open.

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andrea nye It is impossiblethat Beauvoir,being femaleand beingthe flesh that so attractsand at the same time repulses,could agree. Certainlysuch an attitudetowardthe body is consistentonly with sexualencounters that are both distancedand transitory.Beauvoir,on the other hand, finds it difficult to maintainsuch a distancefrom flesh, one's own or other's. When, for example,she considerswhetherwomen could use men as sex objects the way men use women, for carnal release, she immediatelydemurs. For women such a mechanicalrelease would not be satisfying(Beauvoir1974, 763-4). The female cannot take the male position, becauseshe does not experiencepleasurein the same way, nor does she share the male's fascinated disgust with female flesh. A transgressionof existential boundariesis evident also in The Ethics of Ambiguity.Worryingthe problemof the justificationof interventionthroughall the inadequateSartreansuggestions,Beauvoir arrivesuneasilyat some novel suggestions.Certainlyan existentialist must deny a crude utilitarianism.To plead the necessityof means to ends, is a bad faith way to avoid responsibility.Beauvoirhad shown the deficienciesin such a moralityin her play UselessMouthswherea community refuses the traditional expulsion of useless women, children,and aged from a city underseige. Thereshe had seemedto arguethat feelingsof love, of relation,must prevailover calculation of advantage.Again, in The Ethics of Ambiguity, in order to find some basis for interventionin other'slives, Beauvoirreturnsto those same "feelings" which in an existentialistethics can only be a bad faith excuse for denyingone's freedomto choose; For the existentialistpeople compete for Being. The worldwhichthey revealis a battlefieldwherethereis no neutral ground and which cannot be divided up into parcels;for each individualprojectis assertedthrough the world as a whole. (Beauvoir1948, 118) On such a battlegroundaffective ties can exist only as strategiesof dominance. The world, the existentialistBeauvoirmust admit, will alwaysbe at war, and to think otherwiseis to be in bad faith. Whatis important is the assertion of the individualself. To intervene for others must be a violence to the other's freedom;it is to assertyour project over and against theirs. But how then can interventionin a suicide attempt be justified? Or the action of a social worker or a friendwho saves a child from mistreatment?"Love," Beauvoirfinally concludes, "authorizesseverities." There is a differencebetween the removed disinterestedsocial worker with her own projects of reform and the interventionout of relation whether of friendship, 109

hypatia family, or even nationality (Beauvoir 1948, 144). This acknowledgementof a duty inherentin relation,based on affectiveties, must be outside an existentialiststruggleof wills. In The Ethics of Ambiguity there is yet another such departure, though even more tentative. Beauvoirhas describedthe inevitability of struggle,of competition,the necessityof a politicalsystemlike the democraticthat acknowledgesand accommodatesstrugglebetween individualswho are separateand alone. The anxietiescausedby such an existenceare obvious, but thereis, Beauvoirpoints out, a possible escape:the festival. Herein music, dance, celebration,it is possibleto break out of the endlesspress of one's own self-assertion,to have a rest from the continualnecessityto defend one's own territory,both physical and intellectual, from the other's encroachment. In the festival celebrationone capturesthe eternal in the present, achieves oneness with others, loses the terrifyingseparationand alonenessof the Cartesianego. For Beauvoir,the breakcan be only temporary.The subjectmust quicklyreturnto the struggleof ascendency:"The tensionof existence ...

must be immediately enjoyed in a new undertaking, it must dash

off toward the future" (Beauvoir 1948, 126). The moment of participation is gone, but Beauvoir acknowledgesthat much art, and especiallythe theater,is an attemptto fix, to recover,that momentof festival, or participation,of grace, so out of place, so ephemeralin a worldwheresubjectivitiesstrugglefor power.Thus, mysticaloneness, deniedby existentialism,and deniedby Beauvoirin TheSecondSex as femininebad faith, is herereinstatedas a necessaryreleasefrom an intolerablesituation. These four suggestionsthen strike discordantnotes in Beauvoir's existentialism:first, the goal of intersubjectivityor reciprocity;second, the still imprecise notion of a feminine pleasure neither masochistor sadist; third, the possibilityof affective ties which involve ethical obligations;and last, the possibilityof a breakdownof the boundariesof a closed self in celebratoryparticipation.That these feministintuitionsremainundevelopedshows not only the influence of Beauvoir'sexistentialismbut also restraintsof the philosophical traditionwithin which she, as existentialist,places herself. The seventeenthcenturyphilosophicalrevolutionthat accompanied both the new empiricalsciencesand the social and economicchanges of capitalismtook as its startingpoint the separateclosed-off consciousness. That the only correct reasoning is from that objective removedperspectivewas acceptedas necessarytruth.This was not only Sartre's position, it was also the starting point of modern philosophy, the first truth that any philosophermust acknowledge 110

andrea nye regardlessof how he or she managedto later negotiatea problematic epistemology or ethics. The premise that we are individual consciousnesses,knowing immediatelyonly our own thoughts and impressionsand irrevocablyseparatedfrom the physicalworld, was inherited by both Beauvoir and Sartre. Closed in our own consciousness, separated from our common physicality, it was a philosophicaltruth, as Sartrestates it, that we can never experience others directly,neverbe sure they feel like us, neverexperiencetheir needs and desiresas we experienceour own. Sartre,as existentialist, only addedthe inevitableconclusion:givenour isolationfrom an alien physical world and the problematic existence of other consciousnesses,theremust resulta hostilitybetweenself and others, between self and the physicalworld, transcendableonly in a varietyof strategems,none of which can be finally successful. It is as Beauvoirattemptsto speak within the boundariesof this philosophic necessity that its incompatibilitywith her feminism intrudes. These truths, that circumscribedwhat there was, what it was possibleto know, and what could be acceptedas truth, werethe successful male modelsthat Beauvoirwas so anxiousthat womennot reject, but they blockedthe possibilityof a feministpraxisat everyturn. Central was the notion of subjectivity. Beauvoir admits that individualitymust not mean solipsism;we are only individualthrough others. Still, this being-through-others is alwaystemperedby the fact of our being-as-separate,and by the fact that in the end we must alwaysuse others for our projects. It is as subjects,that is, by way of failureto so projectand appropriate,that Beauvoirconceptualizesthe oppression of women. Their freedom or in-itselfhood is not acknowledged,in fact cannot be acknowledged,because it would always, on the assumptionof separation,be seen as threateningto masculinefreedom. Only a philosophicallyinadmissibleintersubjectivity, wherethereis no longerany unbridgeablegap betweenself and others, could make mutualitypossible. Alienatedsubjectivityis also the startingpoint for knowledge.In TheEthics of Ambiguity,Beauvoiracceptsthe standarddualisticaccount of knowledge.Knowledgemust be scientific,that is to say, the result of a detached,objective, view of phenomenon.It is, Beauvoir agreeswith Sartre,so that the physicalworldcan be revealedthat man makes himself hold the distance, so that these phenomena "exist before me." It is this power to bringthe objective, quantifiedworld into existence that allows me to exist "as man." This withdrawal recreatesthe hostile, antagonisticstrugglefor survivaland domination that makesany mutualityor common cause impossible.Each, taking the step away from phenomena,takes it alone and then must defend 111

hypatia their grasp and masteryagainstpossible rivals. At the same time as she asserts the necessity of this alienated knowledge,Beauvoirsuggestsanotherpossibility,an initial tendency nostalgicallydescribed: I should like to be the landscape which I am contemplating,I should like this sky, this quiet water to thinkthemselveswithinme, that it mightbe I whosebeing they expressedin flesh and bone. (Beauvoir1948, 12) However, such a mysticalexperience,such a minglingof mental and physical,is closer to the forbiddenreleaseof the festivalthan consistent with Beauvoir'sphilosophicalcommitments. Nowhere in the phenomenology of subjectivity intricately articulatedby Sartreand others, could there be found any theoretical basis for the non-appropriatingdesire, the non-delusivereciprocity, the non-arbitraryethics, the non-alienated knowledge, to which Beauvoirinstinctively,as feminist, returns.No matterhow complex the maneuveringof "subjects," their very subjecthood, their very status as knowersand agents, the status that oppressedwomen supposedly lack, prevented the development of these very "unphilosophical"suggestions. As a descriptionof typical "male" behaviorand typical "female" behavior,the theoryof the subjecthad proveninvaluable,but subjectivity was not simply taken as a descriptivetool. It was assertedas universal.The subjectwas not male but human, and that humanity, deniedto women, must then determinethe perimetersof theirliberation. Furthermore,once conceptualizedas the projects of subjects, oppressionachievedthe statusof philosophicalnecessity.If everyconsciousness must either fight or be dominated, recognition of the viciousnessof patriarchalstrategiescould never lead to remedialaction, but only to despair.Womenstrugglingthroughto theirown selfassertionwould find it necessaryto also resortto the subjugationof some new "other," perhaps unliberated women, men, straights, radicals,or simplyrivalsin businessor scholarship.In practice,sucha liberationmight seem no liberationat all. In fact, the existentialsubject whose ontologicalisolation blocked reciprocityand common cause had alreadybeen compromised,even by Beauvoir'spredecessors.Sartre,himself painfullyworryingpractical problems through troubled political affiliations, admits reluctantlythat a breakdownin the boundariesbetweenconsciousnessesis always possible. There is, he says, one real restrictionon freedom; that is in respectto what othersthink of us. Theirthinkingcan never, indeed, make us do anything,but in the area of thought alone their 112

andrea nye opinion is a threat. For what I am to myself, the other's view of me can be an absolutelimit: .. a dimensionof alienationwhich I can in no way remove from the situation any more than I can act directlyupon it. This limit to my freedomis, as we see, posited by the others' pure and simple existence-that is, by the fact that my transcendenceexists for a transcendence.(Sartre1975, 501) My understandingof myself is essentiallyconnectedwith others'view of me, and any attemptto ignorethe fact of theirsubjectivityis itself bad faith. All we can do, Sartreconcludes,is turn this alien presence to our advantage. We can become proud to be a "Jew" or a "woman." We cannot, however,completelybecomeeitherbecauseto do so would be to lose ourselves. Such a threatenedsubversionof the self was already present in Hegel's classic statementof the dilemma of subjectivity.After the Phenomenologyof Mind, the self could no longer be thought of as any kind of simplepresence,and muchof the Phenomenologyis concerned to accomodate the complicatingpresence in the subject of otherness, both the othernessof an independentexteriorworld and the otherness of other consciousnesses. In Hegel, as in Sartre, othernessis a problem, an interruption,a threat for which defensive measuresare necessary.The classicmaneuveringdescribedby Hegel, of encouraging the threatening other to negate itself and so resourcefullyneutralizebut not destroyis echoed in Sartre'sdescription of the flirting, impressing,obligating, nullifying lover. As the most typical of patriarchalstrategiesit is also documentedover and over in The Second Sex. Women must be presentfor men, and once women have been convincedthat they are passive, inferior, natural, their necessarypresencecan be made tolerable. The theory of subjectivityrests not, as argued by Sartre, on a recognitionof the necessaryseparatenessof humanexperience,but on the impositionof an unstableideal self againsta verydifferenthuman reality, a reality that is acknowledged but not accepted. All knowledge,Hegel agreed,must be of some independentotherand not a self-certainprojection.All subjectivityis vulnerableto others. The starting point of the master-slaveconflict in the Phenomenology beginsone step further,basednot on this acknowledgedtruthbut on a particularresponseto it. An object, if independent,presentsa threat, and so I desire to "sublate " it.

Self-consciousnessis thus only assuredof itself through sublating this other, which is presented to self113

hypatia consciousnessas an independentlife; self consciousness is Desire. (Hegel 1967, 225) What is necessaryhere is not the strategyof sublation, for other responsescould be substituted,but the essentialdependence,openess, insecurityof humanexperience.Hegeliansubjectivity,as it folds back on itself in response,is only the generalizedform of a refusalto admit disquietingotherness except as degradedand dominated and is, as such, directlytranslatableinto practiceswhereself identificationis only accomplishedby way of stigmatizationof some other. Practicehere illuminatestheory, itself revealedas practiceand as such availableto ethical or prudentialcritique.Since the theory of the subjectalready involvesthe practiceof subjection,it is not surprisingthat no coherent feminist practice can result when subjectivity is taken as starting point. A new generationof feministtheorists,more waryof acceptancein a male conceptualuniverse,and, perhapsmore confidentof feminine allies, would take on the critiqueof subjectivityand reconsider"male models" so importantto Beauvoiras proof of her humanity.The existentialistcommitmentsof Beauvoirwould beginto seemless a proof that a womancould be rational,thancomplicitywith a masculineview of the world that compromisedfeminist perspectivesand action. In Sartre and Hegel, feminists begin to hear not the disinterested measuresof necessarytruth,but humanvoices, frightened,posturing, defensive,determinedto preservea threatenedself-confidence,a safe distance from attractions and temptations that compromise independence.The "subject" was not the necessarystartingpoint of philosophybut the centralnotion in a dangerous,possibly neurotic, project of avoidance: of others, of physical existence, of moral responsibility. '0

It is never possible by a simple act of will or application of theoreticalacumento overthrowlong-acceptedcategoriesof thought. A purelytheoreticalreflectioncould only reworkthe superficiallogic of establishedpositions. Insteadit is reflectionsuch as Beauvoir's,acceptingthe prevailingphilosophicalnecessitybut at the sametime taking seriouslypracticalissues, that strainstheory againstpracticeand so revealsthe deficiencieswhere critiquecan take hold. Then, only then, the project becomes conceivableof clearingaway inadequate philosophicalconcepts for a new feminist praxis in ethics, politics, sexualpractice,writing,religion.Certainly,such critiquewould never 10. Cf. eg. Jane Flax's (1980) psychoanalytic interpretation of philosophic epistemology.

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andrea nye come from theoreticalinconsistencyalone, but only from troubledinvolvementssuch as Beauvoir'sthat force theorytowardsapplication. The proof is that already,evenin TheSecondSex, can be glimpsedthe shadowypropheticbeginningsof conceptsthat will laterbe so central to feminist thought: a relational, affective ethics, the possibilityof non-appropriativerelation, a feminine "jouissance," a non-agressive relationshipwith the physicalworld." 11. Examples of recent work developing these possibilities: Carol Gilligan's critique of traditional moral categories in In a Different Voice (1982), Julia Kristeva's and Helene Cixous' exploration of feminine pleasure or "jouissance," and in general the new epistemological and metaphysical perspectives proposed in collections such as Hardin, S. and M.B. Hintikka, eds, Discovering Reality (1983); Sherman, Julia and E.T. Beck, eds, The Prism of Sex: Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge (1979).

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references Beauvoir, Simone de. 1948. The blood of others. New York: Alfred Knopf. ---. 1948. Ethics of ambiguity. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. New York: Philosophical Library. - . 1954. She came to stay. Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co. ----. 1960. The mandarins. Translated by Leonard M. Friedman. New York: Meridian Fiction. --. 1972a. La femme revoltee. Nouvel Observateur. no. 379 (14-10 fevrier): 47. ---. 1972b. The second sex. Translated by H. M. Parshley. New York: Vintage Books. - . 1974. Presentation for "Les femmes s'entetent." Les Temps Modernes 30 (333-334): 1719-1720. ---. 1975. Interview L'Arc, no. 61: 3-12. Beck, E.T. and Julia Sherman, eds. 1979. The prism of sex: Essays in the sociology of knowledge. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Flax, Jane. 1980. Mother-daughter relationships: Psychodynamics, politics, and philosophy. In The future of difference, edited by Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardin. Boston: G. K. Hall. Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a different voice: Psychological theory and woman's development. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Harding, S. and M. B. Hintikka, eds. 1983. Discovering reality. Boston: D. Reidel. Hegel, G. W. F. 1967. Phenomenology of mind. Translated by J. B. Baille. New York: Harper & Row. Jeanson, Francois. 1966. Simone de Beauvoir ou l'enterprise de vivre. Paris: Seuill. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1960. L'existentialisme est un humanisme. Paris: Les Editions Nagel. - . 1975. Being and nothingness. New York: Washington Square Press. - . 1983. Cahiers pour une morale. Paris: Gallimard.

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kathryn pauly morgan Romantic Love, Altruism,and Self-Respect: An Analysis of Simone De Beauvoir I examine Beauvoir's moral assessment of Romantic Love in The Second Sex. I first set out Beauvoir's central philosophical assumptions concerning the nature and situations of women, setting the framework for her analysis of the intersubjective dynamic which constitutes the phenomenology of romantic loving. In this process four double-bind paradoxes are generated which can lead, ultimately, to servility in the woman who loves. In a separate analysis, I ask whether it is wrong for a woman to aspire to and/or choose this form of servitude. I distinguish two kinds of considerations: (1) those having to do with the intrinsic moral nature of the commitment or decision, and (2) those based on considerations of harm: first, to the woman who loves; second, to the loved Other; third to the nature of the relationship; and fourth, to society in general.

In the chapter "The Woman in Love" in The Second Sex Beauvoircites threemen who celebratedeep genderdifferencesin the natureand significanceof humanlove. Balzacsays, Among the first-rate,man's life is fame, woman'slife is love. Womanis man'sequalonly whenshe makesherlife a perpetualoffering, as that of man is perpetualaction. (Beauvoir1952, 742) Similarly,Byronclaims, Man's love is of man's life a thing apart; 'Tis woman'swhole existence.(Beauvoir1952, 712) Third, from Nietzsche'sThe Gay Science: The single word love in fact signifies two different I wish to thank the following feisty, passionate friends and colleagues for their encouragement of this research and their spirited critical conversations on this topic: Paula Caplan, Ronald de Sousa, Chaviva Hosek, Barbara Houston, David Nyberg, Mary Nyquist, Nancy Otter, Kathleen Okruhlik, and Jan Zwicky. I also wish to express my appreciation to the women in the Society for Women in Philosophy, Western Division, the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy, and the Toronto Women's Research Colloquium for their suggestions. The challenging comments and irrepressible optimism of my students and various university audiences should also be noted. Hypatia vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986). © by Hypatia, Inc.

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hypatia things for man and woman. What woman understands by love is clear enough: it is not only devotion, it is a total gift of body and soul, withoutreservation,without regard for anything whatever. This unconditional natureof her love is what makesit a faith, the only one she has. As for man, if he loves a woman,whathe wants is that love from her; he is in consequencefar from postulating the same sentiment for himself as for woman;if thereshould be men who also felt that desire for completeabandonment,upon my word, they would not be men. (Beauvoir, 1952:658-9) Beauvoir'sown view is that the womanlyvocationof loving involves massiveself-deceptionwhichcan lead to personalannihilationfor the woman involved. In the first part of this paper I highlightcentralphilosophicaland empiricalassumptionswhich constituethe frameworkfor Beauvoir's discussion.In the secondpart, I examineheraccountof the processof loving, underscoringfour devastatingparadoxesfaced by the woman in love. I endorseher conclusionthat this kind of "vocation" leads ultimatelyto maximumservilityin the womanwho loves. In the third part of my discussion, I move away from the frameworkof existentialist ethics and ask whetherother moral perspectivesentail that it is wrong for a womanto aspireto and choose this form of servitude.In my response, I distinguish two kinds of moral considerations:(1) those havingto do with the intrinsicmoral natureof the decisionand the moralcharacterof the life to whichone is therebycommitted,and (2) consequentialistconsiderationsbasedon the notion of harm:harm to the womanwho loves; harmto the loved Other(whetherwomanor man);harmto the qualityof the relationshipundertaken;and, finally, harmfulsocial consequences.

I: The Philosophical and Empirical Framework ThreeConstitutiveClaimswhich Define Patrrchal Ro,na,,tic Love: Beauvoirexploresthe conceptualassumptionsin the writingsof the authorscited earlier.Such thinkershold that, for men, love must be seen merelyas a diversion,as a phenomenonto be experiencedonly on the peripheryof a real man's life. At no time must love be seen as definitionalof his identity and his worth. And at no time may it be allowed to interferewith his real life and aspirationswhich must be focused on action and recognitionin some public realm. From Plato onward, romantic love for men has been seen as a dangerously privatizingemotion, and men who are caughtup in its throes and its 118

kathryn pauly morgan exercise are pitied, endured, ridiculed, or scorned. In some situations their very manliness is stripped from them. Not so for women. Analysing these authors' remarks, Beauvoir argues that they entail three important claims which constitute the ideological core of patriarchal romantic love. Once a woman comes to believe these claims-and many women do believe them ardently-she is likely to aspire to and evaluate her sense of self-worth in terms of her success as a woman committed to a great love. The three claims are these: 1) that loving is woman's central vocation, i.e., that it is the most important form of life a woman, qua woman, can engage in, that it is her fundamental purpose in life.' 2) that loving is what confirms a woman in her womanliness (as contrasted with her biological femaleness which is confirmed through maternity and lactation). Without the experience of full commitment to a Great Love to a superior being2 a woman is likely to feel unfulfilled as a woman. 3) that the moral principle proper to this ideology of love is that of unconditional person-specific altruism as a life-governing principle (as contrasted with simply a flurry of altruistic acts). According to this principle a life of self-sacrifice to her lover is not only a woman's highest glory as a woman, it is also her moral fulfill1. Beauvoir distinguishes this from nurturance which is simply one form that this loving might take. This claim interestingly parallels Carol Gilligan's research findings concerning the question of whether the parameters of women's moral judgments are the same as those of men. Gilligan argues that a concern for interpersonal relation and affiliation dominates women's moral judgments, as contrasted with the more individualistic, potentially adversarial, rights-oriented models of moral thinking which appear to be dominant in (North American white) men. For the most recent statement of her theory see Gilligan (1982). 2. For the remainder of this paper I will be using the term 'man' in place of 'superior being' because Beauvoir assumes (uncritically) a heterosexist model throughout. Insofar as the socialization of males is directed toward producing a sense of superiority and male supremacy as an ideal and state, an "appropriately" socialized male will be more likely to be perceived as the "proper" recipient of love. However, I do not belive that Beauvoir's analysis applies solely to heterosexual situations. What is necessary to generate the dynamic under discussion is the presence of someone (more likely a woman) who has internalized these three central tenets. That this same dynamic can be generated between two women is clear from Kate Millet's account in Sita (1977). Whether it is likely to be generated between two men neither of whom has been socialized into this set of beliefs is an open question at this point, although recent discussion in The Body Politic suggests that it occurs in the gay community as well.

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hypaia ment. She is obliged by Rousseau and subsequent generationsof moraliststo "StandBy Her Man" as her highest unconditionalmoral duty. These three claims forge a crucial link between altruism, selfrespect,and womanliness:The womanin love gains moralself-respect as a woman throughthe devoted self-abnegationwhich is centralto her commitmentto her lover. As a consequence,any self-regarding dispositionor action comes to be labelled"selfish" and is regardedby herself and others as a moral flaw. Three Duaisms: In The Second Sex, Beauvoirworks with threeimportantdualisms in addition to the central dualism of Self and Other. Each of these dualismsis gender-polarized.Beauvoirsees men as identifiedwith the life of the Spirit, aspiringto psychologicaland moral transcendence throughtheir actual life situations. Women, on the other hand, are seen as normatively focused on the less valuable domain of lifeprocesses and consigned to lives of psychological immanence and physicalclosure. In The Second Sex Beauvoirurgeswomento escape from permanentexclusiveassignmentto the categoryof a secondary "Other". She rejectswoman's categorizationas a "second" sex and arguesthat women, as conscioushumansubjects,are entitledto move into the space of authenticself-originatingactivity. For Beauvoirthis meansaspiringto a life of transcendencefoundedon the valuesof the life of the Spirit. Dualism 1: Life vs. Spirit The first dualism involves a distinction between a life oriented towards Life as its primaryfocus and a life of the Spirit (Beauvoir 1952:69-73). For an individualcommittedto life and life processes, life-givingand life-sustainingare the dominantvalues. Activitiessuch as giving birth, nursinga child, and preparingfood are paradigmatic life-orientedactivitiesaccordingto Beauvoir.Centralto the focus on life is a commitment to the domain of the temporal and the ephemeral.Moreover,the processesof organic life-the ripeningof fruit, the risingof dough, the momentof birth;growth, aging, decaying, going moldy-are processeslargelyout of one's control, requiring waitingand passivity. For Beauvoir,a life orientedtowardlife is essentially a life lived in common with other animals because its ultimate goal is simply the replicationof life. It is not a genuinely creative, properlyhuman life. Thus, to the extent that the lives of women are defined in terms of biological and social reproductionof 120

kathryn pauly morgan life, those lives not truly humanlives.3 By contrast, the life of Spirit rises above the biological level. Beauvoir uses fishing to illustrate her distinction. Someone who regardsfishing as a life-sustainingactivity to be undertakenin harmony with naturewould simplygo fishing, sit on the bank, catch the fish, clean them, cook them and eat them. This ritual could conceivablybe repeatedday after day with no thought of change in the life-orientedcatcher of fish. Contrastthis individualwith a person who thinks of the water as a domain to be mastered,and of fish as alien speciesto be conquered.Suchan individualmightinventcanoes or boats and fashion various fishing implements, subtle detecting devices and forms of bait and lures (Beauvoir 1952, 85). This individual would be interestedin creative adventure,in experimentation, perhapseven to the point of riskinglife. We can identify a life committedto Spirit,Beauvoirsuggests,by noting the primacyplaced on inventions,technology,symbolsand idealizedvalues, i.e., entities whose permanenceoften outlaststhe perishabledomainof biological life, whetherit be that of the individualor the species.4This commitment is manifestin situationsin whichan individualis willingto risk life for a highervalue such as the Nation or Peace or the PublicGood or Justice,the implicationof this riskbeingthat therearevaluesmore importantto human life than biologicallife. Since Beauvoirregards the life of the Spirit as the only genuinelyhuman life, one of her primarygoals in The Second Sex is to fight for women to have full legitimateaccess to this life. As she says, . . . it is regardlessof sex that the existent seeks selfjustification through transcendence-the very submission of womenis proof of that statement.Whatthey demandtoday is to be recognizedas existentsby the same rightas men and not to subordinateexistenceto life, the humanbeing to its animality.(Beauvoir1952, 73)5 3. Cf. Ortner (1974) for a discussion of the theme of the partial identification of women with Nature, accepting Beauvoir's devaluation of the natural domain. It should be noted that there are at least two critical ways of dealing with the claim that women are closer to Nature and therefore inferior. One way is to argue against the primary association of women and Nature; the second is to challenge the consequent assessment of inferiority alleged to follow from this association. Griffin (1978) adopts this second tactic in Women and Nature. 4. In the Chapter on "Situation and Character," Beauvoir expands this distinction into a full theory of human consciousness in which characteristic feminine and masculine sensibilities are sharply differentiated along cognitive, emotional, physical, moral, political, and metaphysical lines. 5. To many contemporary feminist thinkers, much of Beauvoir's discussion of this dualism with its Platonic commitment to the non-corporeal appears to be not only

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hypatia Dualism 2: Imnma,ence

vs. Tra,riwceod ce

Whereasthe previousdualismplaces primaryemphasison central values and value-laden activity, this distinction emphasizes the underlying psychological structure of consciousness, their metaphysicalcorrelates,and the accompanyingexistentialemotions. Like the previousdistinction,it, too, is experiencedand observedin actual gendered life situations of men and women and is systematically relatedto the previousdistinctionthough not identicalwith it. Beauvoir's second dualism is the distinction between immanence and transcendence.The sphere of immanenceinvolves lived repetition.6 Accordingto Beauvoir,the physicallyconfined and repetitious life of many women is simply the material replica of their psychologicalconfinement.Psychologically,the life of immanenceis a life in whichone thinks withinpredeterminedlimits, withinalready established conditions and conventions, submitting to identitydeterminingroles which are perceivedas necessaryand given. It is a life without adventure,without risk. Its chief attractionis security throughpredictability.Metaphysicallyspeaking,it meansliving a life immersedand trappedwithin the domain of the given-the present and the immediate-which is then equated with all that is real. Optimally, it is a life undisturbedby thoughtsor situationswhichwould introduce genuinely new possibilities. Thus carried to its ultimate limit, it approximatesthe predictablelife of the non-humanobject. For Beauvoir,a life of immanenceis a life of human stagnationand living death. But it is also a life whichat a deep level many of us find temptingbecauseof its very predictabilityand security. It is clearthat althoughthey may be highlycorrelatedin fact a life oriented towards Life and a life of immanenceare not equivalent. Often a life orientedtowards Life involvesthe raisingof children.It would not involve leading a life of immanenceif spontaneity, uniquenessand novelty were encouragedin this process. However, in a life of immanence,the child would be regimented,disciplinedand stereotypedin an attempt to reduce them too to the metaphysical status of a deterministicobject.

somatophobic but misogynistic. See, for example, Lowenthal Festiner's discussion (1980). I concur with this assessment. 6. An example which Beauvoir examines at length is the situation of a housewife in industrialized societies whose labor is entirely of a domestic sort. She is involved in noncumulative cyclical processes of cleaning and cooking with no obvious product of any sort to show for this labor. Clearly Beauvoir's account needs revision in the light of Marxist and socialist feminist re-evaluations of reproductive domestic labor.

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kathryn pauly morgan A life directedtowardstranscendence,by contrast,is a life open to the future, a life self-originatedratherthan based on a pre-existing identity. Transcendentsubjectsinvent, act, make choices. They view the future as something indeterminateto shape and bring into existenceratherthan as a fate to whichone can only submit.Individuals orientedtowardtranscendencetest theirown limits, experiment,take risks in order to define themselvesin terms of future projects, not through past accomplishments.They think of themselves as selfdetermining,as havingthe powerto create. Metaphysicallyspeaking, the transcendentsubjectis orientedtowardsthe domainof the possible. Concomitantwith this experienceof the self, however, is a pervasive feelingof dreadat the resultingresponsibilityfor one's life and identity. Again it is clearthat Beauvoirregardsonly the life of transcendence as worthyof human respect.As she put it, Everysubjectplays his part as such specificallythrough exploits or projects that serve as a mode of transcendence;he achieveslibertyonly through a continual reachingout toward other liberties.There is no justificationfor presentexistenceother than its expansion into an indefinitely open future. Every time transcendencefalls back into immanence,stagnation, there is a degrationof existenceinto the "en soi"-the brutish life of subjectionto given conditions-and of liberty into constraintand contingence.This downfall representsa moralfault if the subjectconsentsto it; if it is inflicted upon him, it spells frustrationand oppression. In both casess, it is an absolute evil. (Beauvoir 1952, xxxiii) She also notes that one or anotherform of life of immanenceis built into virtuallyall the acceptableroles open to women. Dualism 3: Life Situations of Women and Men As Beauvoir studies the life-determiningsituations and roles of adolescent girls, marriedwomen, mothers, and aging widows, she argues that the acceptableroles open to women constantlydirect a woman's consciousnessto concernswhich are concrete, immediate, and particular.Moreover,when women'sconcernsare no longerseen as transcendingthe limits of the given, women are committedto lives of immanence.7 7. Note that one can accept Beauvoir's descriptive analysis of women's situations

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hypaia Further,she claims that the actual life situationsof women define the hetereosexuallydesirablefemininewoman in terms of dependency, vulnerability,and submissivenessalong witha commitmentto selfsacrifice.Insofaras a life of autonomyor self-determinationcalls for independence,strength,a sense of personalintegrityand a deep commitment to development of self, the notion of an autonomous desirablefeminine woman is a living impossibility.On the contrary, the social situationsof men characteristicallyrequirea "masculine" boy or man to strive to be independent, achievement-oriented, courageous,assertive,and decisive;to have a sense of adventureand risk-taking;and to be rational. As Beauvoirnotes, all these qualities can (and must be) integratedinto growingvirility. The advantageman enjoys, whichmakesitself felt from his childhood, is that his vocation as a humanbeing in no way runs counterto his destinyas a male. Through the identificationof phallusand transcendence,it turns out that his social and spiritualsuccessesendow him with a virileprestige.He is not divided.Whereasit is requiredof woman that in orderto realizeher femininity she must make herself object and prey, which is to say that she must renounceher claimsas sovereignsubject. It is this conflict that especiallymarksthe situationof the emancipatedwoman. She refusesto confine herself to her role as female, becauseshe will not acceptmutilation; but it would also be a mutilationto repudiateher sex. (Beauvoir1952, 758). Intellectually,Beauvoirsees the consciousnessof men as permeated with abstractions,theories,and universalprinciples.Menareexpected to live and think in a world which is essentially constructed by transcendingthe particularand the personalin order to generatethe universalsrequiredby scienceand other forms of theorizingnecessary for a life of transcendence.Thus Beauvoirconcludesthat as the world has been and is presentlystructured,it is only the situationsof men's lives which begin to allow for the possibilityof fully human, revolutionarylife.8 and roles without accepting her value judgements. Such an approach has been attempted recently, with admirable success, in Ruddick (1980). For a subtle philosophical collection of papers on this topic see Trebilcot (1983). 8. This is not to say that the actual lives of all men are those of authentic human subjects-Beauvoir herself cites the example of the petit bourgeois white collar male worker as exemplifying some of the worst aspects of a life of immanence. Rather, it is a

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kathryn pauly morgan Beauvoir'streatmentof these three dualismsrevealsher profound commitmentto whatmightbe calleda Platonicpreferencefor the permanent, the transpersonal,and the self-transcending.She associates these characteristicswith a life of existential transcendence,the human life of the Spirit whose highest manifestationsare found in lasting human inventionsof technology, theory and aestheticsymbols. She sees the world so structuredas to encouragethis life in men and discourageit in women. Insofar as the worlds of women are variantworldsof immanence;insofaras women'slives are committed to personalaltruisticsupportthroughtemporal,perishablelife processes, Beauvoirsimultaneouslydevaluesand mournsfor the lives of women. Three ContributingFactors Withinthis generaldualisticframework,Beauvoirarguesthat three furtherfactorsoften combineto generatein womendesirefor romantic love: (1) the generalhumandesireto avoid a life of responsibleselfdetermination(the phenomenonof bad faith or mauvaisefoi); (2) the concretesocial and economiccircumstancesof many women, and (3) romanticideology which is carefully inculcatedin girls and women from an earlyage. I shallexamineeach of thesein turnbeforedescribing the phenomenologyof the intersubjectivedynamic of romantic love and its multipledouble binds. Bad Faith: The first factor contributingto women desiringromanticlove is what Beauvoirand otherexistentialistthinkerssee as a primary,defining form of motivation in human subjects, viz. the desire for inauthenticity, objectification or bad faith (mauvaise foi). Basically,

this notion refersto the desireof any conscioussubjectto flee from a life of self-determinationin whichwe continuallystriveto surpassour given self. Glimpsingthe uncertaintyand concomitantdread which characterizethis work of self-determination,we sink softly and securelyinto some self-deceptiveform of objecthood.We relaxinto a state of cripplingcontentmentbased on some illusion of necessity. Althoughthe desirefor inauthenticityis seen as a universalhuman desire, it can assumeany of a myriadof possible forms. Thereare at least four ways in whicha womancan be temptedinto bad faith. Unclaim that it is only within the kind of situations which, until now, have been regularly available only to (white) men, that any form of a life of transcendence is possible. Whether this caveat ultimately saves Beauvoir from the charge of male identification is unclear.

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hypata fortunately these ways are not mutually exclusive.9 The first form involves regarding the received values which permeate and regulate ones life as absolute and necessary. For example, a woman might think, "As a woman, I must be nurturant, compassionate, self-sacrificing. I have no choice." Beauvoir argues that this is a self-deceptive frame of mind because all human values are of human origin and are, consequently, open in principle to revision and change. Pretending that these values are necessary and absolutely binding is simply one way of abdicating responsibility for having chosen them. A secondform of bad faith consists in completely identifying with a role or set of roles and, again, pretending that role is normatively binding. For example, the woman who says that "As a good Christian mother, I must do X, feel Y ..." or that "As the wife of Professor X, I must always say . . ." or thinks "As a feminist, I must feel .. ." would be practicing self-deception. For many women, the roles of 'good wife' and 'good mother' appear to have this kind of selfdeceptive binding power. A third form of bad faith involves subordinating oneself to the status of instrument or object. The "doormat" view of motherhood or the singular perception of women in the Napoleonic Code as subhuman breeders would be instances of this. A woman who experiences pleasure when hearing her husband say, expansively, "These are my fields, my livestock, my wife . ." may be experiencing herself as a treasured possession, an object which confers status on the possessor but as mere possession denies her own subjectivity. The fourth form of bad faith which particularly tempts women is that of becoming an identity parasite. Women are tempted to deny their uniqueness and their separateness by identifying themselves with and committing their lives to the support of a superior male and his offspring. This fourth form, Beauvoir argues, must be invoked in order to explain the desire that some women have for a great romantic love either with a human being or, through mysticism, with a divine being. It is this fourth form that particularly interests Beauvoir in her discussion of the woman in love.'° 9. This notion of bad faith has recently been lifted out of its existentalist theoretical framework and is marketed in a current best seller, The Cinderella Complex (Dowling 1981). 10. In general, I believe it is fair to say that the second half of The Second Sex consists of an extended analysis of the ways in which various roles ascribed to women, as lived by "normal women," generate situations of bad faith, lives which are less than fully human, Beauvoir is convinced that the "normal," "good" woman, as defined in patriarchal cultures, must live in bad faith and cannot be fully human. Her analysis of

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kathrynpauly morgan Concrete Social and Economic Circumstances of Women: In explaining the appeal of romantic love to women, it is important to note common oppressive features of women's lives which lead women in many cultures to see romantic love as one form of salvation. At least three such circumstances need to be mentioned. First, women are often relegated to the essentially repetitive low status tasks of domestic labor. This assignment is often justified as the "obvious" correlative of the "natural demands" of biological maternity and the requirements of nursing. Secondly, women are devalued because of their primary familial definition in an ideological context which views the family as primitive, pre-cultural and private. Often those whose labour involves the care of young children are assumed to be similarly emotional and irrational. Thirdly, young girls are taught that their lives as women are, properly, lives destined to be lived for others. In many cultures a girl's social position and her economic security are essentially bound up with the social and economic position of her father, husband, or some significant male kinship figure. Her own situation, as an individual woman, is usually one of minimal public power. In this context, falling in love and being loved by a superior being may come to be seen as a desirable way of acquiring identity and access to power. Experienced within an oppressive set of social and economic circumstances romantic love comes to be seen as a way of escaping this oppression. Beliefs Which are Central to a RomnwrticIdeology: ... it is agonizing for a woman to assume responsibility for her life. It is man's good fortune to be obliged to take the most arduous roads, but the surest; it is woman's misfortune to be surrounded by almost irresistible temptations; everything incites her to follow the easy slopes; instead of being invited to fight her own the woman in love is simply one form of a much larger sustained feminist project. The careful reader of Beauvoir must be ever on guard against uncritically adopting a Victimization Model of woman's history and social situation. As Marilyn Frye points out (1983, 99) "... one can conjure the appearance of the female as parasite only if one takes a narrow view of human living-historically parochial, narrow with respect to class and race, and limited in conception of what are the neccessary goods. One can and should distinguish betwen a partial and contingent material dependence created by a certain sort of money economy and class structure, and the nearly ubiquitous spiritual, emotional, and material dependence of males on females ... females provide and generally have provided for males the energy and spirit and living; the males are nurturedby the females. And this the males apparently cannot do for themselves, even partially."

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hypatia way up, she is told that she has only to let herselfslide and she will attainparadisesof enchantment.(Beauvoir 1952, 715) Accordingto Beauvoir,girls and women, particularlyin Western cultures,are bombardedwith a complexbelief set whichone can refer to as a RomanticIdeology. ThroughoutTheSecondSex, Beauvoirattempts to expose the central precepts of this ideology which seizes hold of the younggirl and pervadesthe consciousnessof womenof all ages. As mentionedat the beginning, three beliefs constitute a patriarchal conception and dynamic of romantic love. These are: (1) the belief that loving is a woman's central vocation; (2) the belief that loving is what confirms a woman in her womanliness;and, (3) the belief that the propermoralprinciplein this situationis unconditional person-specificaltruism. Many women come to accept these beliefs and so deeplyinternalizethemthat they permeatetheirconsciousness. To account for this process Beauvoir argues that two additional beliefs and feelingsare necessary.First, it is necessaryto convincethe young girl that throughouther life she will be seen as less important and less valuablethan a male, becauseshe is female, and to assureher that this situationis normal. As a consequence,the young girl learns to attend to and to prize the wishes and companionshipof men over those of women. This is the crucialassumptionof male supremacy. Second, it is crucialthat she come to experienceherselfas essentially incompleteas a single woman. She is urged to believe, and feel, that priorto or lackingaffiliation with a male, she is passingher life in a state of suspensionbecausethe locus of her identityhas not yet appearedor, perhaps, never will. Encouragedby the popular and religiousmythologiesof the culture,she dreamsof being found by the appropriatePrince Charming(Charles?)who will confer a sense of achievedand privilegedheterosexualidentityupon her along with, in many cases, social and economic status." This is the crucial heterosexistassumptionof asymmetriccomplementarity. 11. This view of the formation of female identity has been labelled "normal" by the influential psychologist Erik Erikson (1959). Erikson claims that women cannot resolve their primary identity crisis until their primary relationship with a man has been determined. Who she is and what her life will be await the formation of this primary relationship. This entails that women who remain single never really form an identity (which, unfortunately, still appears to be true in many cultures which deny an identity to unmarried women). The danger in advocating such a theory as normative is that girls and women who strive to acquire an identity of their own apart from a male will be labelled "abnormal" and "masculine" and subjected to various forms of clinical and social disapprobation.

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kathryn pauly morgan Beauvoirargues that if these beliefs are internalizedit is easy to understandwhat motivates a woman to want love. First, a woman wants to fall in love to find out who she is. Women are taught that until they fall in love with a superiorbeing who has alreadyformed an identityof his own, they do not have an identity.Beauvoirasks us to witness Catherine in Wuthering Heights, who says "I am Heathcliff": ". . . her own world collapse(s) in contingence, for she

really lives in his." (Beauvoir 1952, 725). For Beauvoir, this is the fatal mirageof the ideal of romanticlove: transcendenceby way of immersionin the transcendenceof the Other, the superiormale who is perceivedas free. A woman'ssecond importantmotiveis that in the processof loving and acquiringher identity,a woman'spast andpresentbecomemore meaningfulin relationto the loved one. Love is the developerthat brings out in clear, positive detail the dim negative, otherwiseas useless as a blank exposure. Through love, woman's face, the curves of her body, her childhood memories, her former tears, her gowns, her accustomed ways, her universe, everythingshe is, all that belongs to her, escape contingencyand become essential. (Beauvoir1952, 718) What had been indeterminatenow has significance.Think for example, of positivevalue assignedto Lady Diana Spenser'svirginityprior to her marriageto Prince Charles.As a simple fact of an organism, virginitymight be regardedas a value-neutralproperty.In the eye of the royal lover, it obviously became of prime importance.By being loved, the woman in love is no longer in a state of suspensionof her significance-if he prizesher giggle, her blush, then these are part of her desirability;if he deploresher tomboy youth, her historyis written in that light. The third importantmotive for the woman to love is that it provides for the possibilityof legitimizingand integratingher sexuality with her sense of her own identity. Beauvoirpoints out that in a situationdevoid of affection and commitment,manywomenwho are taught to regardtheir own erotic responsesas forms of animal-like debasementfeel used by men as sexualinstruments.Sexual fervorin the context of love legitimizes a woman's erotic passion; sexual pleasurecan be experiencedin a genuinelyhuman way. Herfourth importantmotive is to acquirea locus of values. Ideally, the womanin love looks to her loverto be her world.The extentto which this can take place is limitless. As Beauvoirdescribesit, The measureof values, the truthof the world, are in his 129

hypatia consciousness;hence it is not enoughto serve him. The woman in love tries to see with his eyes; she reads the books he reads, prefers the picturesand the music he prefers;she is interestedonly in the landscapesshe sees with him, in the ideas that come from him; she adopts his friendships, his enmities, his opinions; when she questions herself, it is his reply she tries to hear; she wantsto have in her lungs the air he has alreadybreathed; the fruits and flowers that do not come from his handshave no taste and no fragrance.Her idea of location in space, even, is upset:the centreof the worldis no longer the place whereshe is, but that occupiedby her lover; all roads lead to his home and from it. (Beauvoir 1952, 724) In sum,for the womanin love, her loverbecomestheperson who is the source of meaningand significancein her world, the person who legitimizesher erotic nature, whofunctions as the limitsof her world, the infalliblejudge of her life, and the locus of her ownfreedom.12 Becauseof the significanceof this commitmenta womanis urgedto exercisesome prudentialjudgmentin her choice of a lover. In order for the woman in love to find maximumtranscendencein her identification with her lover she must seek out a superiorman, one who will representthe essence of transcendentmanhood. As a consequence, the woman in love holds back on her commitmentuntil she has evidencethat the man in questionis genuinelyworthyof her love and her devotion. Virility, physical strength,distinctionof manner, wealth, cultivation, intelligence,a sense of authority, social status, and the couragesuggestedby militaryuniforms- these are taken as signs of superiorityby women (Beauvoir 1952, 714). Moreover,the womanin love has been taughtto demandsome sort of proof that she is valued or treasuredbefore abandoningherself to love - given the totality of her commitment, it is foolhardy not to demand some assurance. Beauvoir argues that what is particularlytreacherousabout this whole situation is that inauthenticityand self-deceptionare being 12. Although Beauvoir's descriptions here might seem to be hyperbolic, something like her theory is needed to account not only for media-created "mirror image" women like Nancy Reagan, but also for the accounts of the profound loss of identity experienced by women who are suddenly abandoned or widowed, a loss which does not always diminish with time. Translated into a social practice, the suttee as it is practiced and understood in India illustrates the total identification expected of a wife with her husband.

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kathryn pauly morgan directlycamouflagedin the powerful guise of "freedom." For the woman in love, loving is perceivedas a move towardsher own selfrealization,as one of the few avenuesopen to herto escapethe stultifying worldsof feminineimmanence.Thewomanin love desiresandseeks love as a form of liberation,as one of the few genuinelycreativeacts opento her.Sheseeslovingas the closest,gender-appropriate wayof approximatingthe Life of the Spiritto whichshe, as a naturallyinferior humansubject,can aspire. Ratherthan being identifiedas a form of temptation,the ideal of the womanin love is advancednot only as an idealworthyof anywoman,butas the highestformof existentialaspiration open to her. This is why Beauvoir'scritiqueis so ruthless.She is committedto exposingromanticlove as an existentialfraud. Whereas the womanin love seesin herlove a formof transcendence, a formof genuineliberation,Beauvoirsees it as an inevitabledownwardspiralinto abjectservilityincompatiblewithany survivingremnantof self-respect.

I1: The Phenomenology of Romantic Love: Problems and Paradoxes Having sketched out the backgroundassumptionsof Beauvoir's analysis,I now turnto her examinationof the intersubjectivedynamic of romanticlove. Phase One: dentification In describingthis processBeauvoirdistinguishesvariousphrasesor momentswhich generatedevastatingparadoxes.As noted in Part I, Beauvoirholds that the deepest,most importantmotiveswhichlead a woman to seek out a great love are the acquiringof identity,value, eroticintegration,and meaning.In herlove for a superiorbeingwho instantiatesall that is desiredby way of freedom,the womanin love sees herself as creative, as transcendingher initial situation of feminine powerlessness.Moreover, in glorying in her love and serving this superiorperson,she gloriesin her essentialwomanliness.Thisis the initial experiencedstate of loving. Confidentthat she is treasuredby the superiorpersonshe loves, the womanin love abandonsherselfto her vocationof loving. This leadsto thefirst paradox:the womanin love abandonsherself, in a blazeof unconditionalaltruisticsplendour,in orderto save herself from a lifetimeof contingencyand irrelevance.Such salvationcan be achievedonly throughloving immersionin and identificationwith the loved one, so that her transcendenceis achievedthroughparticipation in his. So that this metamorphosis of identity can take place, submissiveness and passivity are required on her part. 131

hypata However, through this process the woman in love succeeds only in becoming a metaphysical dependent for genuine transcendence requires action, a sense of authority, and independence. As the woman in love identifies more and more with her lover-which is how she defines "falling in love"-she loses and destroys the very possibility of ever having her own identity. The more deeply she loves, the more she eliminates the necessary conditions for genuine transcendence. Believing that just the opposite is taking place, the woman in love has moved into an enveloping state of self-deception which will be celebrated and approved of by any culture which celebrates romantic love. This is, then, the first paradox: that in seeking transcendence, the woman in love chooses precisely those means which annihilate the possibility of her transcendence (Beauvoir 1952, 722). The course of love is not, however, a static one. Often an initial euphoric romantic beginning shades into some more painful phases of the relationship. The most important phase to succeed the first one is, in crucial ways, an inverson of it. Phase Two: Inversion As mentioned in Part I, Beauvoir believes that every human subject desires to experience self-determination. Although the woman in love initially celebrates her vulnerability and dependency as proof of the intensity of her love, she gradually comes to perceive her need for some power and control in her relationship. The desire becomes more urgent as the woman in love comes to see the fragility of her situation. Having given all, she is in a position to lose all should her lover abandon her. In response to a resurgence of her desire for genuine transcendence, the woman in love strives to invert the power situation through her sacrifice.'3 She conveys to her lover the magnificence of the gift of her love, the totality of the gift of herself and the absoluteness of her devotion. Ever more sensitively, more completely, the woman in love expresses her devotion. The clever woman in love strives to become indispensable to her lover, sometimes even cultivating wants in him that only she can satisfy.'4 Should the lover feel uneasy about this situation, he has little recourse. It is virtually impossible for him to resist without appearing brutishly ungrateful. Nevertheless a mortal struggle is taking place here: ". .. the woman 13. In this and other sections of The Second Sex, Beauvoir's debt to Hegel's analysis of the master-slave dialectic in The Phenomenology of Mind is clear (Hegel 1967). 14. The devastating moral consequences of this process have been explored in a perceptive article by Larry Blum, Marcia Homiak, Judy Houseman, and Naomi Scheman (1976).

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kathryn pauly morgan requireshim to accept gratefullythe burdenswith which she crushes him" (Beauvoir1952, 729). But the woman in love cannot logically emergevictorious in this struggle.This is the secondparadox:If she succeedsin gainingcontrol at this stageof the relationship,if she takescamouflagedpossessionof her lover, then he ceases to be a worthyobject of her love. She has destroyedthat transcendencewhich attractedher to him in the first place. Having guaranteedthe continuedpresenceand interestof her lover througha masqueradeof devotion and self-sacrifice,she finds herselfwithouta worthylover. She is lost. Sheis degradedand unhappy. She knows that a truly transcendentfree subjectcould not be so controlled.Consequently,if she succeeds,she demonstratesher own poor judgmentin her choice of a mediocrelover, the relationshipis shattered,and her sacrificeis exposed as worthless. If, on the other hand, the woman in love fails, her lover remains free of the tyrannyof her devotion, the womanin love faces her own powerlessness,her failureas a free subject.Thus, she is unhappywith this second alternativeas well. Once she knows that she is unableto possesshim, her fearand existentialanxietyintensify.Sherealizesthat she is in greaterjeopardy than before her attempt at inversion. In short, either way she loses. Accordingto Beauvoir,the womanin love is subjectto two powerful temptationsat this stage. Tet,ptation 1: Lying Acknowledgingher own vulnerability,the woman in love tells herself that their love is a genuinely reciprocatedrelationshipof mutuality,that her lover is just as dependenton her as she is on him. But the relief and satisfactionprovidedby this state of deceptionis short-lived.It cannotbe sustainedwithoutgeneratinga thirdparadox similarto the second. It is this: what attractedthe woman in love to her lover initiallywas his sense of separateand completeidentity,his sense of superiorityand independencewhich had been achievedquite apart from her. Postulating a relation of mutual interdependence destroyspreciselythose featuresof the lover which she believesmake him worthy of her love. Asymmetryof both power and significance was requiredat the outset. Demonstratedreciprocitywould destroy the verygroundsof her commitment.Her inessentialityto her loveris necessaryfor him to be, genuinely, a free subject. If the woman in love catchesherselfout in this lie, she returnsto her originalstate of fearful servility. Suppose, on the other hand, that what she is telling herself is the truth,namely,that her lover is dependentupon her, that herexistence 133

hypaa and identityarejust as centralto his senseof himselfas his areto hers. In an existentialistcontext of interpretation,what this means is that the lover reallyhas lost the strength,the senseof independence,of the transcendentsubject. He is no longer free. In his dependenccyhe too has been destroyedby the relationship.Seen throughthe lens of orthodox patriarchalromanticideology, he has become a fallen idol no longer worthy of her love. In short, if her love is to continueat all, the lie mustbe exposedas a lie. But if the lie is recognizedas a lie, it signalsher returnto a state of fear and dread. If the lie is not a lie, or is not recognizedas a lie, then the conditions for romanticlove are no longer satisfied and her love shatters. Temptation 2: Jea's Manipulation Beauvoirarguesthat the experienceand significanceof jealousyare metaphysicallydifferent for the woman in love than for her lover.' The lover's identityand sense of self-worthis presumedto be formed prior to enteringinto this relationship.Thus, the loss of his loved woman, at best, might be akin to the loss of an ego-incorporatedservant, mirror,or highly-treasuredpossession.If all threeare involved, we would have some explanation for the consuming violence of jealous male behaviorwithoutpostulatingthe separatesubjectivityof the womanconcerned,especiallywhen the outcome of such behavior is the annihilation of that woman's subjectivity. Thus while the jealous lover may be moved to rage or violence, the definition of romanticlover necessarilypreventshis loss from being of any greater intersubjectivesignificancefor him. (Thinkof his behaviorwhen his prized car or stereo equipmentis threatenedor damaged.) Again, should the loss prove more profound, this would testify to his lack of transcendentcompletenessand wouldbe evidenceof his existentialinferiority. Such a lover would not be worth feeling jealous over. The woman in love, on the other hand, . . loving her man in his alterity and in his transcendence,feels in dangerat every moment. There is no greatdistancebetweenthe treasonof absenceand infidelity. ..

. Her entire destiny is involved in each

glance her lover casts at anotherwoman, since she had 15. For interesting alternative accounts of jealousy see de Sousa (forthcoming, 1986), Moi (1982), and Neu (1980). It should be noted that alternative readings of this situation are possible. Frye (1983), for example, claims that the panic, rage, and hysteria that men display is evidence of the man's parasitism on the woman and indicates his response to the thought of being abandoned by women.

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kathryn paWy mogan identified her whole being with him. ... She has receiv-

ed all from love, she can lose all in losing it. (Beauvoir 1952, 736) The slightestindicationof interestin anotherwomancan triggerfeelings of jealous terrorin the woman in love. Becauseshe has, literally, come into existencethroughthis relationship,if she loses it, she loses all that she is: her sense of identity,her sense of herselfas a personof value, her social world and often her sense of economic security. Becauseof the natureof her experienceof jealousyand her fear of its consequences,the womanin love sees the worldas a competitiveplace in which it is crucialfor her to perceiveand then assess other women as potential rivals. If such feelings are sparkedby the perceptionof waningintereston the part of the lover, the womanin love is tempted to engagein one of two manipulativetactics. She might try returning to the manipulationsinvolved in the inversionstage of the relationship, this time in more hyperbolicform using more gentleness,more devotion, more smiles, more mystery. Even a proud woman is forced to make herself gentle and passive; maneuvering,discretion,trickery,smiles, charm,docility, are her best weapons.... Her hairwas carefullydone, her lips and cheeks had unaccustomed coloring, she was dressedup in a lace blouse of sparkling white. Party clothes, weapons of war! (Beauvoir 1952, 738) This tacticis likelyto fail. This time, the veryservilityembodiedin the tacticitself will undermineherefforts. For, as Beauvoirnotes, "giving herselfblindly, the woman has lost that dimensionof freedomwhich at first made her fascinating.The lover seeks his reflectionin her; but if he beginsto find it altogethertoo faithful, he gets bored" (Beauvoir 1952, 738). A slightlymore subtlemaneuveris for her to feign a lack of interest in the loverin orderto conjureup a tantalizingdimensionof freedom. Often she will simultaneouslyengagein flirtationand seductionwith othersin hopes of rekindlinghis interest.But this situationleadsto the fourth paradox:If eitherof thesemanipulativestrategiessucceedsand the lover fails to see throughthem, she cannot help but see how gullible and lackingin perceptionhe is. So althoughshe is a successas a manipulator, she again leaves the lover exposed as a pseudotranscendentfraud. Thus she ultimatelysees herselfand her commitment as a failure. If, on the other hand, her maneuversfail and the perceptivenessof the lover is thereby revealed, so, too, are her manipulationsseen for what they are, gamesplayedby an abjectand 135

hypatia fearful dependent.Consequently,her identityand existencecontinue to be imperiledand she is left without recourse. In sum, though praisedand celebratedfor her love, the woman in love becomes, in reality, pitiful, insecure,dependent,and powerless through her loving. Her own life tends toward one of servility, increasinglydevoid of even the conditions of the possibility of selfrespect. While romanticlove is also a dehumanizingrelation for her lover, she is the only one whomit can completelydestroy.As Beauvoir puts it, It is, again,one of the lovingwoman'smisfortunesto find that her very love disfiguresher, destroys her; she is nothingmore than this slave, this servant,this too ready mirror,this too faithfulecho.... Her salvationdepends on this despoticfree beingthat has madeher and can instantly destroy her ... love is a supreme effort to survive

by acceptingthe dependenceto whichshe is condemned; butevenwithconsenta life of dependencycanbe livedonly in fearand servility.(Beauvoir1952,738, 742) Thus far the discussionof the moralityof romanticlove has taken place within the frameworkof existentialistethics. Seen in this context, the moral assessmentof romanticlove is clear. As noted earlier, Beauvoirbelievesthat if a woman genuinelychooses romanticlove, she choosesa clearmoralevil. If it is not a choicebut is experiencedas a personal,social, or economic "necessity"resultingfrom oppressive social and economic circumstancesand the internalization of a mythology of romantic love, it is still a destructiveform of selfdelusion. In eithercase, it is morallywrong. The question then arises: Does the negative moral assessmentof romanticlove proceedthroughthe value systemof existentialistethics alone?Supposewe leaveasidethe lofty languageof transcendenceand immanenceand the model of human nature which depends upon a theory of objectifying self-deceptionas a universal human desire. Whatmoralassessmentshouldwe makeof romanticlove? Beauvoir's moral condemnationof romaticlove is powerfuland clear. But what of those individualswho do not operatewithin an existentialistconceptualand moral universeof discourse?They might maintainthat a life of romanticlove is either morally neutralor, like Balzac, claim that it is the unique source of woman's genuine equalitywith man. Although I believe that the explanatorypower of an existentialist frameworkis eloquentlydisplayedin Beauvoir'sanalysisof romantic love, I do not want to arguefor its fundamentalacceptancehere. Nor do I believe that a negative moral assessmentof romantic love is 136

kathryn pauly morgan entailedonly by an existentialistethic. As a moral eclecticI now turn to a furtherexplorationof the moralityof romanticlove as described in this paper. Il. Assessment

by A Moral Eclectic

One might well acknowledgethe psychologicaldemands and the likely emotionalcomplicationsof romanticlove and yet feel that the fundamentalmoral question has not yet been fully addressed:Is it morallywrongto aspireto and to choose a life commitmentof romantic love? At the first stageof assessmentit is importantto determinewhether or not the choice is reallya choice. That is, we need to know whether the necessarypre-conditionsof genuinechoice have been satisfied.As a minimum,genuinechoice requiresknowledge,freedomfrom coercion, and accessto other real alternatives.Therefore,we need to ask whetherthe choice of romanticlove satisfiesthese conditions. Turning first to the question of coercion, one can distinguishat least two types. One is the obvious gun-at-your-head,razor-at-yourvulvavarietyof overtphysicalcoercion.Usuallythis form of coercion is not at work in romanticlove. Two other forms need to be considered: covert deliberatecoercion, and unintentionalinstitutional coercion (See also Wasserstrom,1977). Both can take subtle and insidious forms. Humanbeingsgrow up and are socializedin a culture which indoctrinatesthem into a complex set of beliefs about what their essentialnatureis, what their correspondingpermittedand proper roles will be, and how accessto economicand social privilegescan be gained. Describedin a formalway, this processappears(relatively) morally neutral. Consider, however, someone being socialized in a culturein which an assumptionof white supremacyis generallyacceptedas an "empiricaltruth." Whenfaced with a significantchoice, a personof color who believesin white supremacymay believethat it is "fitting and right" to choose an inferiorself-effacingposition on the groundsthat this is what is commensuratewith their abilities.To do otherwisewould be a display of deplorableand punishablesocial and moral arrogance.Deferenceand institutionalizedinferiorityare seen as the appropriateposturesfor them to assume.'6 In this situation, the invidivudal'sself-imagehas been shaped in powerfulways. 7 Even if we omit the negativesocial consequencesof 16. I am grateful to Thomas E. Hill for suggesting an analogous example. See his exceedingly ovarian article, Hill (1973). 17. Bem and Bem make this point in their discussion of the socialization of American woman. They say, in their discussion of the claim that American women are

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hypatia choosing otherwise,I think it is fair to say that althougha particular choice is allegedto be "open," a personof color who had been indoctrinatedinto a belief in white supremacywould experiencestrong internal psychological pressure in the direction of an inferior alternative. Not all female babies are given complete sets of Harlequin Romancesat birth.Nevertheless,womenin manyculturesare socialized, profoundlyand sometimesviolently, into heterosexistideologies of male supremacy.In some culturesand some historicalperiods,this ideology is supportedby the more specific patriarchalideology of romanticlove. Again, centralto this romanticideologyis the axiomof male supremacyand essential female inferiority.'8Raised in a male supremacistsociety, a womancomesto have an imageof herselfas inferior. This internalizedperceptionis lived out in the selectionof inferior roles and alternatives.'9Such "choices" then reinforce the perceptionof women as inferiorand providematerialsupportto existing male supremacistpractices. In such circumstancesa woman's "choice" of romantic love, defined as including affiliation with a superiormale, is not a genuinelyfree choice. Similarly,a strongcase can be made that in many cultureswomen do not have genuinelyhumanalternativesfrom whichto choose. Any culture which defines women totally in terms of reproductiveand domesticrolesand analogousservicerolesin the domainof paid labor cannotbe said to offer womena full rangeof alternatives.If romantic love is in fact a necessarycatalystin leadinga womaninto her life as a domesticreproducerand that is the only legitimatelife held open to her, then the choice of romanticlove is, again, not a genuinechoice. Finally,it is clearthat whereknowledgeof the consequencesis lacking, a person cannot be said to have made an informed free

perfectly free to choose amongst a variety of roles, that "this argument conveniently overlooks the fact that the society which has spent twenty years carefully marking the woman's ballot for her has nothing to lose in that twenty-first year by pretending to let her cast it for the alternative of her choice. Society has controlled not her alternatives, but her motivation to choose any but one of those alternatives. The so-called freedom to choose is illusory. . ." (Bem and Bem 1971, 88-9). See also Bartky (1979). 18. This consideration leads me to distinguish morally and politically between heterosexual romantic love and lesbian romantic love. Although lesbian romantic love may involve some of the same emotional and moral pitfalls from the point of view of Beauvoir's analysis, the situation of a woman committed profoundly and completely to another woman challenges at its very core the premise of male supremacy. 19. Think of the documented tendency of women in sexist capitalist societies to name lower starting salaries for themselves than their male counterparts as a result of an internal devaluation of themselves as workers.

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kathryn pauly morgan choice. In manycultures,the allegedgloriesof romanticlove are sung, celebrated and eulogized. The actual consequences often remain camouflaged.20A woman who has acceptedthe illusory messageof romanticlove as literaltruthcannot be said to be informedabout the situation. Again, her choice is not a free one. Suppose, however,that we considerthe morallydifficult case. Let us assumea womanwhose choice has not been coerced,eitherovertly or covertly,who has other significantalternativesin her life, and who has knowledgeof the consequencesof her choice. She has read and understoodTheSecondSex; she has evenreadthis paper.Shehas seen numerousfriendsdisappearinto the quagmiresof romanticservility and she does not regardherselfas, in some way, idiosyncraticallyexempt from the servileconsequences. Is it immoralfor her to choose a life of romanticlove if HE (or SHE) comes along? I believeit is immoralfor two very differentsorts of reasons:first becausethe choice of romanticlove is ultimatelythe choice of an intrinsicthoughoften camouflagedevil; and, second, becausethe life of romanticlove leads to significantharm. Claim 1: Romantic Love is IntrinsicallyEvil. This type of objectioncan be found in the writingsof a varietyof moral theorists. For example,in On LibertyJohn StuartMill argues that one cannot, with moral approbation,knowinglyenter into a relationship or situation which will terminatethe very possibility of moral choice.2 That is, voluntaryservitudeis always immoral. This moral evaluationis based on a view of human nature (not entirely dissimilarto that of Beauvoir)in whichthe makingof moralchoicesis centralto any life properlyregardedas a humanlife. The voluntaristic stressin both classicalKantianmoral theory and in Mill's formation of liberalismprohibitschoosinga life of committedinevitableservility whetherit is in the form of romanticself-abasingattachmentor in some other form of servitudesuch as economicslaverywhenone has other real options which might preserve and even enhance one's capacity and range of choice.22If one accepts the stress on the 20. An analogous point can be made concerning the anomaly of participating in a marriage contract which neither of the participants sees. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Ketchum (1977). 21. See Chapter V of Mill (1978) for Mill's discussion of this issue. It is interesting to note that Mill objects less to actual suicide than to lives of voluntary servitude. 22. This is a crucial assumption. The actual life situation of any particular woman must be carefully looked at to determine whether real alternatives exist before one passes moral judgement. For many women, this condition may not be met although, to

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hypatia importanceof human choice, it follows that it is immoral for any humanbeing to use their humancapacityfor choice in such a way as to annihilatethat capacityfor choice. Any choice which by virtue of the completenessof the servilityrequiredis humanity-destroying must be regardedas immoralif there are humanity-preserving alternatives available.Fromthis perspective,then, the choice-ofromanticlove as a life-determiningform of voluntaryservitudemust be regardedas an intrinsicallyimmoralchoice if it satisfies the conditions for genuine choice. One might also argue that the choice of romantic love is bad because of the consequencesof the choice which are lived out by lovers in situationsof romanticlove. This line of argumentleads to the second type of moral assessment,a consequentialistanalysis. Claim2: Romantic Love is Harmful,Therefore It Is Bad. As mentionedat the beginningof this paper, we can distinguishat least four possible categoriesof harm: (1) harmto the woman who loves (2) harmto the lover (3) harm to the quality of the relationship (4) harmto the social community("the greatestnumber") (1) Ronb akticlove harms the woman who loves. As noted in Part II, whenthe womanin love beginsto fear the loss of herlover, she often usesthe only formof powerusuallyavailableto her: manipulativepower. This can be roughlycharacterizedas power the successfulexerciseof which dependsessentiallyon its remaining unperceived. The effect of the exercise of covert power on the manipulatoris a complicatedissue but in this context the following point is crucial.tAnyone who uses manipulativepower in a situation in whichno other forms of powerare availableto them (becausethey are not of the "right"genderor the "right"race)will be crippledand mutilatedthroughthe very use of that power. be sure, girls and women in many cultures enter into-or are entered into-marriages devoid of romantic love and completely circumscribed by domestic toil. Whether this latter situation is a more or less desirable form of servitude than advanced romantic love is an open question. My present feeling is that in relationships devoid of romantic love at least a woman stands a chance of having her identity left more intact. The extent to which her situation is one of social and economic oppression coupled with domestic violence will be determining factors here. tSee my forthcoming paper, "The Morality of Manipulative Power."

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kathryn pauy morgan The manipulatingwoman must stimulate a posture of weakness and vulnerablity.This has the harmfulconsequencethat even though the particularmanipulativetactic may work, the woman herself can only continue to be falsely perceivedas weak and powerless and, hence, open to exploitation. Often the woman internalizes this perception of herself (this may be precisely why she turns to manipulationin the first place) and comes to see herselfas genuinely weak. Moreover, because she will be seen as a typically "weak woman," a normalmemberof the "weakersex," the propertyof being naturallyweak will continue to be ascribedto other women as well. Secondly, the use of manipulativepower is seldom cumulative. Becausethe manipulativewomanis not perceivedas powerulby those whom she manipulates,she is not accordedthe minimalamount of respectwhichis directedtowardindividualswho use powerin publicly acknowledgedways. This lack of poweris underscoredin the situation of romantic love which, at its core, emphasizes a woman's vulnerability,her childlikeweaknessand awesomedependencyon the lover. Reinforcingthesereal weaknessesin the nameof 'lovingattraction' is obviously harmful to the woman concerned. To the extent that she has recourseto manipulativetactics in orderto preserveand intensifyher relationshipof dependency,she is harmingherselfeven further. Needless to say, the person manipulated,in this case the lover, is also harmedby this use of power, since by being deceived their own capacityfor self-determinationis being undermined. (2) Ro antic Love is harmful to the lover.23

As seen in Part II, the ideology of romanticlove calls for the lover to be an incarnationof an ideal transcendenthero. Romanticlove requires that the appropriateloved person be a world-constituting, meaning-conferring subject. This cannot help but be a deeplyfalsifying picture of her lover. Even when the social acceptabilityof the demands of masculinity support the development of such characteristicsin males, it is difficult to imagine any human being able to satisfy, unwaveringly,the demandsmadeof themby a woman in love. In short, no one can be the transcendentexistentialisthero that the woman in love requiresto justify her passion and her commitment. This is the first sort of harm that is done to the lover: impossible and falsifying demandsare placed upon that person. 23. I am speaking here specifically of a male lover because it is not clear to me that the same harm is done to a lover who is a woman.

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hypatia Moreover,the loveris invitedto participatein a situationof double metaphysicalduplicity. If the lover is male, he is encouraged,often both by the cultureand by the woman who loves him, to believethat he reallyis the "Hero," this superiorbeing. Forbiddenany weakness he himself may well forget that he too, like any other subject, is vulnerable,fragile, and subjectto anguish.Thus not only is he being forced into a mold by his lover (and his culture) as a foil for her weakness;he is praised for accepting this falsifying perceptionof himself. Although some beneficial consequencesmight result from this false picture (for example, he might be likely to act more courageouslyor more steadfastlythan if he did not have this view of himself), this situation is harmful because it makes genuine selfknowledgeimpossible. More seriously, this perception encourages and legitimizes exploitativearrogancein the name of "normal" love. As noted above, the woman who is socializedto desireromanticlove often feels that she should tolerateand accept servilitybecauseshe has internalizeda view of herself as essentiallyinferior. In complementaryfashion, the romanticideology instructsa male, as the potential legitimaterecipient of this love, to regardhis arroganceas the normalbehaviorof a superiorindividual.In a situationlike this, the avoidanceof arrogant exploitationis almost impossible.24 Thus, romanticlove requiresa falsificationof the lover which is harmful because it prevents genuine self-knowledge. Moreover it camouflagesthe vice of arroganceas a praiseworthyvirtue. Though less oppressiveto the subjectthan servility,arrogancecan be just as morallycorrupting. (3)Romntic Love harms and can desy any reltonshp of love. I have alreadyarguedthat the relationshipof romanticlove is based on multiple deeply destructiveillusions which harm each of the participants.I now want to argue that the relationshipof love itself suffers accordinglywith yet more resultantharmto the participants. One way in which the quality of the relationshipmight be harmedis in a situationof romanticlove wherethe woman in love attemptsto carryout her inversionof the originalpowerrelationshipby preserving or even cultivatingemotional primitivenessin her lover. This is designedto establishthe woman'sindispensabilityas a kind of expert in the life of the emotions, an expertiseoften convenientlyalready 24. An analogous argument is made by Hare (1979) regarding the moral wellbeing of slave owners.

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kathryn pauly morgan assigned to her in many western capitalist societies (See Zaretsky, 1976). Using a feminine stereotype entrenchedin a social context which routinelyassigns emotional maintenancework to women, the woman in love can encouragea perceptionof herself as an indispensable empathiccompanion. Blum et al (1976)discussthe harmfuleffects this process can have for wife and husband. This dynamiccan occur in a relationshipof romanticlove as well. Althoughthe woman in love may be successfulin cultivatingsuch emotional dependency, in so doing, she harms the quality of the relationship(as well as herself)in the process. Such an asymmetricalrelationshipis bound to remain emotionally primitivewhile potential for emotional growth and intimacyis stuntedand thwartedfor both participants.I see this as a clear case of harm.25 Moregenerallythe relationshipof romanticlove is claimednot only to be a love relationship,but, for a woman, her most significant and fulfillingadultrelationship.26 I wouldhold that, at the minimum, any genuinelove relationshipshouldprovidesupportand caringin an atmosphereof mutual trust and communication.The lover should strive to be presentto the other in a forthrightway so that the relationship can be based on sharedand mutual knowledge-albeit partial and open to change. Whenunderthe influenceof romanticlove, however,loversare incapableof satisfyingthese minimumconditionsfor genuinelove. So the relationshipof love suffers. Insteadof knowledge,we find double illusions necessaryto sustain the dynamicof romanticlove. Instead of trust, we find, at best, an interminglingof dependency,fear, and manipulationon the part of the woman in love, and a prohibitionof genuine intimacy and sharing by the lover. Instead of mutual support, we find a situation of double-victimizationinvolving the woman whose total dependenceis encouragedand in the lover whose solitaryself-sufficiencyis requiredas the raisond'etreof the relationship. If we regardthe love relationshipas just sketchedto contain morallygood and beneficialcharacteristicsin itself, then the effects of romanticlove can only be seen as noxious. Romanticlove is a clear case of harmboth to the potentialityand actualexistenceof genuine love. 25. Similarly, if the woman in love is led to overlook real difficulties in the relationship or to excuse them because sustaining that relationship is the most important part of her life, then she is undercutting the potential for change and growth in the relationship. A similar point is made by Blum et al (1976). 26. This is to be distinguished from a possible relationship she might have with a child which many (of the same) theorists argue is-or ought to be-a woman's most fulfilling relationship per se.

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hypatia (4) Romantic Love protces social harm. In this section I assumethat interpersonalalienationis bad. I further assumethat any processthat producesalienationon a large scale by creatingan atmosphereof fear and hostility should be avoided if possible. More specifically, where participation in a particular dynamicdiminishesthe potential for caringand trust among human beings and intensifieslonelinessand dependency,I would argue that this dynamicis harmful. I would, like Beauvoir, argue that the situation of romanticlove providesan illustrationof such a dynamic.As mentionedabove, in the discussionof jealousy, the woman in love is likely to fear abandonment. Her situationis, psychologically,a life and death situation for her. Thus, at the very least, prudencewould seem to requirethat she monitorher environmentfor potentialthreats.Givenboth identity and a feelingof worththroughher love, the womanin love exists in a state of metaphysicaland valorizationdependencyupon her lover. Should he leave her for another, in an importantsense she qua individuallydefined consciousnessperishes.For the most part, women form the threateningsocial group. In this context, it is importantthat the heterosexualwomanin love be able to assess other women in male-identifiedterms using those categorieswhich she knows attract her male lover (which might be quitedistinctfrom those categoriesshe herselfemployswhenshe finds anotherwomanattractiveand valuable).27In this evaluationprocessit is criticalthat the womanin love be able to see other women through her lover's eyes. Two categoriesof women emerge:women who are assessedas (potential,illusory,or real)threatsand those women who appearto be "safe." The woman in love knows that this latterjudgmentis neverinfallible.Thereis alwaysthe lurkingsuspicionthat even "safe" women are capableof being metamorphosedby the "right" loverinto potentialthreats.Thus, in principle,no womanis completely safe for the woman in love. This leads to at least two harmful consequences. First, as mentionedabove, the woman in love employs-and must employ27. Here again important gender differences might be drawn between heterosexual and lesbian romantic relationships. In a lesbian relationship, although the potential for abandonment may be present, the woman in love does not need to use male generated criteria of assessment in calculating her risks. This removes at least one layer of alienation from the situation. In a male supremacist society, the woman in love in a heterosexual relationship must adopt the criteria of assessment of the dominant group. This entails a devaluation and rejection of values that women may hold important.

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kathryn pauly morgan standardsof assessmentderivedfrom male criteriaof attractiveness and desirability(and is herself continuallybeing evaluatedby these criteriaby other women in love). In the best of all possible worlds, male-derivedcriteriaof assessmentcan lead only to a partialperception of any individualwoman. What is more likely is that in a male supremacistculturethese criteriaof evaluationare seen, both by the woman in love and the culture at large, as the only standardsof evaluationworthemploying.Thus the use of these standardsnot only distortsbut simultaneouslydevalueswomen on a large scale thereby reinforcingmale supremacistattitudesand practices. Secondly, since the woman in love carries out this process of monitoringin the name of assessingthreats,any positive assessment of anotherwoman by her is bound to generatefeelingsof suspicion, fear, and hostility-feelings which make it impossibleto form relationships of support and affection with any of these women. Any positivesignificantrelationshipwith anotherwomanis therebyclosed off. Since in our culture and in many others romantic love is encouragedon a largesocial scale (rememberthe universalisticlanguage of Byron, Nietzsche, and Balzac), the resultingsocial alienationand hostilitybetweenwomen is potentiallymassive.The politicalimplications of this situation-the inhibition of woman-identificationand collectivefeministaction-are not incidental.As I suggestedabove, if we know that a particularprocess is likely to generateconsiderable social harm and we can avoid participationin that process we are morallybound to do so. Thus, I concludethat romanticlove should be avoided because of its profoundly harmful effects to the social communityat large.28 In sum, I have arguedin this section that the choice of romantic love can be seen as morally bad. If other alternativesare open to women (and men), romanticlove should be avoided because of its harmfuleffects to the womanin love, herlover, the qualityof the relationship itself, and the social communityat large. 28. It may be that the prevention of significant forms of political and social bonding among women is precisely one of the main consequences desired in a patriarchal situation. It is important to test the hypothesis that a stress on the importance of heterosexual romantic love is inversely correlated with high social expectations and approval of friendships between women. For work already done in this area, see, for example, Faderman (1981), Rich (1980) and Smith-Rosenbrg (1976).

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hypatia Concluding Remarks: Are There Alternatives? Beauvoirclearlyaffirms the possibilityof a relationshipof genuinely reciprocated human love which preserves both self-respect and autonomy. As she puts it, As a matterof fact, man, like woman,is flesh, therefore passive, the plaything of his hormones and of the species, the restless prey of his desires. And she, like him, in the midst of the carnalfever, is a consenting,a voluntarygift, an activity;they live out in their several fashionsthe strangeambiguityof existencemade body. If ... both should assume the ambiguitywith a clearsightedmodesty, correlativeof an authenticpride, they could see each other as equals and would live out their erotic dramain amity. (Beauvoir1952, 728) For such amity to be possiblein all its fullnessBeauvoirrequiresthat complete social and economic equality be achieved. I share this vision.29 29. Again, while Beauvoir's critical point about the degenderizing of human subjectivity is well taken, her actual language appears to carry with it at least a tacit heterosexist suggestion of the primacy of heterosexual pairing. But, clearly, one of the direct corollaries entailed by a principle of degenderized subjectivity is the liberation and legitimizing of all forms of passionate amity unrestricted by sex.

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kathryn pauly morgan references Bartky, Sandra. 1979. On psychological oppression. In Bishop, Sandra and MarjorieWeinzweig, eds. Philosophy and women. Belmont, CA: WadsworthPublishingCo. Ber, Sandraand Daryl Bem. 1971. Traininga woman to know her place: The power of a nonconscious ideology. In Garskof, Michele,ed. Roles womenplay: Readingstowardwomen'sliberation. Belmont, CA: WadsworthPublishingCo. Blum, Larryand MarciaHomiak, JudyHouseman,Naomi Scheman. 1976. Altruism and women's oppression. In Gould, Carol and MarxWartofsky,eds. Womenandphilosophy. New York: G.P. Putnam'sSons. Beauvoir, Simone de. 1952. The second sex. Translated by H. M. Parshley.New York: RandomHouse. De Sousa, Ronald. 1986(forthcoming).The rationalityof emotions. Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. Dowling, Colette. 1981. The cinderella complex, women's hiddenfear of independence.New York: Simon and Schuster. Erikson, Erik. 1959. Identity and the life-cycle. Psychological Issues. no. 1. Faderman, Lillian. 1981. Surpassing the love of men: Romantic friendshipand love between womenfrom the Renaissanceto the present. New York: WilliamMorrowand Company, Inc. Festiner,Mary Lowenthal. 1980. Seeing The second sex throughthe second wave. FeministStudies. 6 (2). Frye, Marilyn. 1983. On separatism and power. In The politics of reality:Essays in feminist theory. Trumansburg,New York: The CrossingPress. Firstpublishedin SinisterWisdom(6) 30-39. Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development.Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press. Griffin, Susan. 1978. Woman and nature, the roaring inside her. New York: Harperand Row. Hare, R.M. 1979. What is wrong with slavery. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 8 (2). Hegel, G. W. F. 1967. Phenomenology of mind. Translated by J.B. Baille. New York: Harperand Row.

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hypatia Hill, ThomasE. 1973. Servilityand self-respect.TheMonist. 57 (1). Ketchum,Sara Ann. 1977. Liberalismand marriagelaw. In Vetterling Braggin, Mary and FrederickElliston, Jane English, eds. Feminism and philosophy. Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams. Mill, John Stuart. 1978. On liberty. Edited by ElizabethRapaport. Indianapolis:Hackett PublishingCompany. Millet, Kate. 1977. Sita. New York: Farrar,Strausand Giroux. Moi, Toril. 1982.Jealousyand sexualdifference.FeministReview 11. Neu, J. 1980. Jealousthoughts. In Rorty,Amelio O., ed., Explaining emotions. Berkeley,CA: Universityof CaliforniaPress. Ortner, Sherry. 1974. Is woman to man as nature is to culture?In Zimbalist,Michelleand Louise Lamphere,eds. Women,culture and society. Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversityPress. Rich, Adrienne. 1980. Compulsoryheterosexualityand lesbian existence. Signs: Journal of Womenin Cultureand Society 5 (4): 631-60. Ruddick,Sara. 1980. Maternalthinking.FeministStudies6 (2). Smith-Rosenberg,Carroll. 1976. The female world of love and ritual:Relationsbetweenwomen in nineteenth-centuryAmerica. Signs: Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society 1 (1). Trebilcot, Joyce. 1983. Ed. Mothering:Essays in feminist theory. Rowan and Allanheld. Wasserstrom, Richard. 1977. Racism, sexism, and preferential treatment:an approach to the topics, U.C.L.A. Law Review. Feb., 1977. Reprinted in Bishop, Sharon and Marjorie Weinzweig, eds. Philosophy and women. Belmont, CA: WadsworthPublishingCo. Zaretsky, Eli. Capitalism, the family and personal life. New York: Harperand Row.

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review

claudia card Oppression and Resistance: Frye's Politics of Reality Marilyn Frye's first book, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, presents nine philosophical lectures: four on women's subordination, four on resistance and rebellion, one on revolution. Its approach combines a lesbian perspective with analytical philosophy of language. The major contributions of the book are its analysis of oppression, highly suggestive discussions of the roles of attention in knowledge and ignorance and in arrogance and love, a defense of political separatism not based on female supremacism, and a development of the idea of lesbian epistemology. Its proposal for resisting White racism will be controversial. Its treatment of gay rights is not balanced by an acknowledgement that drag queens, like "totaled women," are products of oppression, not simply of intolerance. The most philosophically problematic aspect of the book is its analysis of coercion and of the roles of coercion in women's subordination. This creates an unresolved tension with the positive message of the second half of the book. Despite this difficulty, these essays are an outstanding contribution to contemporary feminist theory.

N ine lectures, most of them new, comprise The Politics of Reality:Essays in FeministTheory(1983),MarilynFrye'sfirst book.' They combine a passionatelesbian perspectiveon the oppressionof women with the analytic disciplineof philosophyof language. Like Mary Daly, Frye explores the roles of language and thought in women's subordinationand liberation. The result is a metaphysics and epistemology of feminist politics. Her writing is lucid and economical. Technical terms are minimal and explained as introduced. The argumentationis clean and straightforward.Concreteillustrations abound. The material is directly accessible to thinkers 1. Two essays were published previously (Frye 1978: Frye 1981) and one is a revised, shortened version of "Male Chauvinism: A Conceptual Analysis" (Baker and Elliston 1975). The book includes a preface and introduction by the author and concludes with a biographical paragraph about the author. It presently lacks an index, which would be useful to have in a future edition. Further references are to this book unless otherwise indicated. Hypatia vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986). © by Claudia Card.

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hypatia steeped in neither the history of philosophy nor feminist theory, althoughit contributesimportantlyto both. The topics addressedform a naturalprogression.First come four essays on women's subordination-oppression, sexism, enslavement, exploitation. Next are four on resistance and rebellion-anger, separatism, a feminist perspective on White racism, a feminist perspectiveon the Gay Rightsmovement.Concludingis the title essay exposing the revolutionary potential of "lesbian epistemology," which was claimed in an inspiringaddressby Sarah Hoagland five yearsearlier.2The lesbianis the hero of this book, althoughonly the last essay focuseson her. There,in a movingand eloquentpassage,we read: The event of becominga lesbianis a reorientationof attention in a kind of ontological conversion . . . characterizedby a feeling of a world dissolvingand ... of disengagementand re-engagementof one's powersas a perceiver.Heterosexualityfor womenis not simplya . . . sexual preference . . . [but an] orientation of attention.... Attention is a kind of passion.... When one's

attentionis on something,one is presentin a particular

way with respect to that thing. This presence is ... an element of erotic presence. ... If the lesbian sees the

woman, the womanmay see the lesbianseeingher. With this there is a flowering of possibilities .... Phallocratic

realityrequiresthat the attentionof women be focused on men. . . . Woman-loving, as a spontaneous and

habitualorientationof attention,is then ... inimicalto the maintenanceof that reality(pp. 171-72). The book does not explicitlydefine itself in relationto the various ideologicalstrandsof contemporaryfeministthoughtsuch as Marxist feminism or liberal feminism. Some may be disappointed;I found that refreshing.The authoraddressesthe issues as she sees them with her philosophicaleye, leavingit to othersto decide if they can which "ism" is appropriate.It is not my interestto do that. My interestin reviewing this book is primarily to explore a certain important philosophicaltension which I find in it and in my own thinking as well. It is a kind of tension which I think needsto be faced by anyone seriouslyconcernedabout how to respond to oppression, especially from the perspectivesof the oppressed.The tension lies betweenthe 2. To the Midwest Society of Women in Philosophy, Spring Convention, Chicago, February 1978.

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claudia card implicationsof oppressionand the possibilitiesof resistance,or even liberation. Frye's essays address aspects of oppression or of resistance.I think of the formeras the negativepart of her work and the latter as the positive part. The problem is how to put them together. One reasonI am drawnto the workof philosopherslike MaryDaly and MarilynFrye is that they seem able to show us that, in the words of Emma Goldman, "true emancipation begins . . . in woman's soul."3 Reading them often feels like a liberating experience. But how

is liberation from within even possible if what they tell us about women'soppressionis also true?Both philosopherspresentthe forces of oppressionand liberationas castratingwomen's very souls. Thus Daly has revealed"the total woman" (Daly 1978,65 and passim)and Frye, the female Pinnochio. The readerbegins to wonder how the motivationfor getting angry, separating,or in general, resistingand rebelling,can arise. Both philosophersoffer the same answer:from woman-lovingwomen. This pushesthe questionback a step (to put it in Frye's terms):what accounts for the existenceof the lesbian seer and for a woman'sabilityto appreciatethat she is seen?Whatdo lesbians see in women?What is thereto be seen? On the positiveside of women's situation,Frye is remarkablyconcrete and helpful. Thinkingabout resistanceand rebellion,she offers some highly suggestiveideas about attention(as the act of attending) and its relationshipto such things as knowledgeand ignorance,arrogance and love. Developmentof this theme alleviatesthe tension betweenthe positiveand negativematerialof the book. It also carries to a philosophicallevel the work of demystifyingthe lesbianbegunso powerfullyby AdrienneRich (1980). Looking at the negative side of women's situation, two things would contributeto a further alleviation of the tension. One is a recognitionof the ambivalenceof the oppressedin mattersof bonding. Rich capturedit among women in relationto other women: "Womenhave always lied to each other." "Women have always whispered the truth to each other." Both of these axioms are true. 3. "True emancipation begins neither at the polls nor in the courts. It begins in woman's soul" (Goldman 1969, 224). In this essay Goldman took feminists to task for continuing to live by Puritan sexual mores. The "tragedy" was loneliness. She does not mention the lesbian possibility, perhaps as a result of the "censorship" to which she refers in her autobiography (Goldman 1971, II, 555-56) from "some of my own comrades because I was treating such 'unnatural' themes as homosexuality" in public lectures.

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hypatia "Womenhavealwaysbeendividedagainsteach other." "Women have always been in secretcollusion." Both of these axioms are true. (Rich 1979, 189) The same point applies to the tendencyof the oppressedto identify with their oppressors.This ambivalenceis exploitablein the interests of resistance.The other thing is a cleaner definition of "coercion" and anotherhard look at the roles of coercionin oppressionand exploitation. Like "oppression"-which Frye analysessuperbly(more anon)-the concept of "coercion" is one that should be "sharp and sure" when we need it. I will spendsome time explainingwhat I have in mind here. The extensivenessof coercion, although I think probably not that of oppression,is consistentlyoverstatedin a way that tends to underminesome of the main contributionsof the book. This particularoverstatementis very common, however, and so I think it worth going into in some detail. An essay entitled "In and Out of Harm's Way: Arroganceand Love," the longestand most ambitiousin the book, exploresthe relationshipsamongcoercion,enslavement,exploitation,and oppression. It argues that women who are not "literallyenslaved" are neverthelesscoercedinto the serviceof men by the "ArrogantEye," which (by contrast with the "Loving Eye") sees everythingas either "for me" or "against me" and therebymanipulateswomen's perception and judgment,"mislabelingthe unwholesomeas healthy,and what is wrong as right" (p. 70). Missingis a recognitionof the manipulated perceiveras a developingagent who can catch onto the process and cease to be taken in by it-the sort of recognition Frye has demonstratedforcefullyin othercontexts,as, for example,in addressing men on the Gay Rights movement or academicwomen of the National Women's Studies Association, to whom she said not long ago: I want to ask heterosexualacademic feminists to do some hard analyticaland reflectivework. To begin, I want to say to them: I wish you would notice that you are heterosexual. I wish you would grow to the understanding that you choose heterosexuality. I would like you to rise each morning and know that you are heterosexual and that you choose to be heterosexualthat you are and choose to be a member of a privileged and dominant class, one of your privileges being not to notice. (Frye 1980, 5)

If a woman can catch on, is she really coerced? Is she oppressed? What does it mean to be either? 152

audia card Coercionis firstpresentedby Fryeas so arranginganother'soptions that the "least unattractiveor the most attractive"is just the one you want that personto perform(Frye 1983, 56). The fact that the victim is choosing does not imply that she is not coerced (contraryto the presuppositionof narrowunderstandingsof rape). The armedrobber who says, "Your money or your life" coercesme into handingover my wallet by tamperingwith my options. Frye's characterizationof the tampering,however,is too broad. It obliteratesthe distinctionbetween briberyand extortion. Only extortionis coercive.Temptedby the least unattractiveor most attractiveoption, I may be bribed.In being coerced, however, I am confronted with an "offer" I cannot refuse except on pain of being irrational,or by choosing martyrdom or some other form of supererogation.Both the offererof a bribeand the extortionistcount on my evaluatingoptions in certainways. But only the extortionistcounts on my havingscruples.Coercionreduces my acceptableoptions;that is, the numberof things I can do without doing in eitherothers or myself. The armedrobberleft me with only one acceptableoption; it was not simplythat handingover my wallet was made the most attractiveor least unattractivepossibility. In a recent essay Joyce Trebilcot (1983, 21) points out that heterosexualityis both compulsoryand chosen, referringthe readerto Rich(1980)and to Frye(1980).Thismay soundlike eithera contradiction or an applicationof Frye'spoint about coercion. It is neither.To note that somethingis compulsoryis not to judgethat anyoneis coerced into doing it. An activitiyis compulsorywhenpenaltiesare attached to its rejection.Penaltiesarenot necessarilycoercive,althoughthey can be. Sometimes they make a choice very unattractivewithout renderingit unacceptableor less acceptable than its alternatives. Trebilcot'sobservationappearsto leave it open whetherthe penalties attached to the rejection of heterosexualityare coercive-with the resultthat the lesbianoption becomeseitherirrationalor heroic-or arenot coercive,in whichcase opting for heterosexualitymay be more like succumbingto a bribe.Takingresponsibilityfor somethingcan be an act of supererogation.Presumably,Trebilcotdoes not regardtaking responsibilityfor one's sexualityas an act of supererogation,since she argues that feminism requiresit. To the extent that it is not supererogatoryto take that responsibility, however, compulsory heterosexualityis not coercive. Frye's accountof coercioncan be amendedto focus on the reduction of acceptableoptions. Fewertamperingswill then appearcoercive, depending, naturally, on one's principles. Emphasizingthe evaluationthat entersinto judginga choiceto be coercedis important to being able to argueabout whethera particularchoice was coerced 153

hypaia or not. It makes more sense to argue about the acceptabilityof an option than about its attractiveness. The next stage of Frye'sargumentis to extendthe idea of coercion from tampering with another's external environment to include manipulationof another'sperceptionandjudgment"throughvarious kinds of influence and deception" (p. 57). As she points out, the advantageof suchmanipulationis that it reducesthe needto deal with resistanceand rebellion. Is that coercion?Or is it an expedientthat makes coercion less necessary?The difference is important. If the forces relied upon are not coercive, it remainspossible to resist or rebel without being irrational, heroic, or saintly. It is not that uncoercedone is necessarilyfree. Both Sartreand Frye exaggerate. Freedom,in the sense of autonomy,is somethingone can develop or fail to develop in the absenceof coercion. Can one's judgment or perceptionbe coerced? Can the woman, unlikethe horse, not only be led to waterbut also be made to drink? Let's distinguishsome cases. My judgmentand perceptionare often influencedby desiresand expectationsof others which I deliberately take into account in making up my mind. There need be nothing coerciveabout this. SometimesI realizemy judgmentand perception have been influencedby those of others which I did not deliberately take into account, and sometimes that influence is irrational. This may be my fault, for not being sufficientlyalertor attentive,or theirs, for being devious about the presence of the influence. Subliminal advertisingtakes unfair advantageof the viewer's trust in what is displayed.No amountof alertnessin the act of viewingwill revealthe influencingmaterial.Is it coercive?Its presencesuspected,it may no longerwork. The viewerno longertrusts.Subliminaladvertisinghas a causal influence without being coercive. It no more forces us to do what we do than does the force of gravity,althoughboth resultin our doing things in what Aristotle wanted to distinguish as a "not voluntary" way-meaning neither voluntary nor yet involuntary. "Everythingthat is done by reasonof ignoranceis not voluntary;it is only what producespain and repentancethat is involuntary"(Aristotle 1925). Becomingawareof a "force," that is, a kind of causality, we can sometimesturn it to our advantageinstead of being hurt or surprisedby it. The case of male arrogance,as Fryepresentsit in her wonderfulportrayalof "The ArrogantEye" whichfails to pay attention to whatis there,is an example.Doesn'tthe lesbian,in Frye'sfinal essay, exploit that arrogance,with all its blindness,in the interestsof women's liberation-just as the Black prisoner, Odessa, in Sherley Anne Williams'"Meditationson History," exploitsthat of her White jailers in successfullyplotting her escape? (Washington1980; Frye 154

alauda card 1983, 119-20). Our evaluationsof options are heavily influencedby the arrogant expectationsof men until we realizethis and reassess.The efficacy of theirexpectationsand desiresdependsupon our naivete,our trust,our readiness to take people "at face value," our innocence. We are therebymanipulatedbut not coerced. That is encouraging.It leaves room for us to take responsibilityfor our own perceivingsand valuings. We can ceaseto be so manipulable.Fryeteachesus somethingof what it meansto take such responsibilityin her sketchof the "Loving Eye": we learnto attendto whatis there,whichinvolvesthe discipline of self-knowledge;we learn to investigate(p. 75). Bettercandidates(thanothers'desiresand expectations)for the role of coerciveforces are the meansby whichour attentionwas captured in the first place. Frye acknowledgesin a footnote (p. 72) that the "ArrogantEye" is "supportedby a culture"whichplaceswomen in positions of economic dependenceon men and createsa community that threatenswomenwith rapeat everyturn. Thisis coercion.In such positions, we are forced to pay attentionto men. Our attentionis a necessaryconditionof the efficacy of theirexpectations.Fortunately, it is not sufficient.Whenwe becomemoreproficientat attending,the game is up.

Frye's paradigmof coercivemanipulationof perceptionand judgmentis the case of the womanor girlliterallyenslavedfor prostitution by the processes of abduction or seduction, "seasoning," and "criminalization,"describedat length in KathleenBarry'sFemale Sexual Slavery(1979). "Seasoning," like the breakingof a horse, is intendedto breakthe victim's will "and distorther perceptions."As one researcherwas told, "Turningout a squarebroadmeansyou must literallychangeher mind" (Barry,p. 80). In "seasoning"the captive is isolated and brutalizedby "rape, beatings, verbal and physical degradation,deprivation,intense and enduringdiscomfort, credible threatsof murder."The result is a "radicalloss of self-esteem,selfrespect,and any senseof ... agency"(p. 62-63).The invasivenessand intensityof the one-on-onecontactestablishesan intimacyreinforced by the captive's gratitudefor such intermittent"rewards"as being permittedto urinatewhen she needs to. She is gradually"restoredto agency ... at a removefrom her own interests"by being allowedto discoverwhatpleasesand displeaseshercaptor(p. 63). And with what result? The result Frye has in mind was called "brain-washing"in the 1950's and a "mind-fuck" in the 1960's. But different results are possible, dependingon what the victim alreadyknows. Femalesabductedfor prostitutionare typicallygirls. An older, moreexperienced 155

hypatia woman's spirit may be broken without her perceptionor judgment being corrupted.She will not make nearlyso good a slave. An example is Sophiain Alice Walker'srecentnovel, TheColorPurple(1982). Sophia is "seasoned" by White law enforcementofficers but retains her own perspectiveand becomes a cynic. She knew too much to be manipulated.The "lesson" she learned was the limits of her own power. Her perceptionand judgmentwere sharpened,not distorted. She becomesa maid. Can we be preventedfrom comingto understandthe processesand thereby becoming "too smart" to be taken in? Dostoyevsky's "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" charges the Roman Catholic Churchwiththe attemptto do just that to "the masses"by way of the burning of heretics during the "Renaissance"(Dostoyevsky 1950). One's attention may be so occupied by the immediaciesof survival that reflection is not possible. Physical exhaustionleaves no energy for curiosityor ambition. Repeatedfailuretakes away hope. But age and experience have a way of sharpening women's wits under moderatelyoppressivecircumstances.4As Gloria Steinem observed recently,women grow more radicalwith age: Men, in general, rebel when they are younger and become steadily more conservative . . . because their

powergrowsgreater,and it accrues.Womenare the opposite ... when we are young, we are the most powerful, we are treatedwith the most equality.... We have not yet discoveredthe wage differentials,and the promotion differentials. ... We have not yet been married. ... We have not yet had children.... We have not yet

aged-still a greaterpenalty for women than for men. Consequently,we have not gone throughthe four great activatingexperiencesof a woman'slife, and we are less likely, therefore, to be active. - National Women's Political Caucus, 1983 The "greatactivatingexperiencesof a woman'slife" vary-for a lesbian, they may include "coming out," the decision not to have children,the decision not to marry-but the point remains. If the successfulmanipulationof our perceptionsand judgmentis not coercive,however,it does not follow that we are to blame for the distortions.To borrow and extend an insight of Kant's, when it is a person's virtuesthat are exploitedby another,the exploiter,if either, 4. To parody Aristotle, who presents the exercise of virtue as pleasant under moderately favorable circumstances (Aristotle 1925).

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claudia card bearsresponsibilityfor the bad consequencesand the personexploited is responsiblefor, at most, the good ones; whereas,when it is a person's vices (such as arrogance)that are exploited, the person exploited, if either, bears responsibilityfor the bad consequencesand the exploiter, for at most, the good ones.5 It is the virtues of youth-spontaneity, trust, openness,optimism-that are exploitedby male arrogance. If deceptionis a formof coercion,we are stuckwiththe paradoxical implication that the oppressed are regularlycoercive of their oppressors, which is what oppressors would like us to believe. As Schopenhauer(1965, 158-62)and Nietzsche(1969, 29-30) and more recentlyAdrienneRich (1979, 185-194)have pointedout, deceptionis a mode of self-defensecharacteristically reliedupon by those who are relatively powerless, paradigmatically, the oppressed, such as women.6What Schopenhauerand Nietzscheappearnot to see is the extentto whichthe powerof the powerfulis accumulatedby the use of deception,not as a mode of self-defensebut as an expedientin gaining the servicesof others. The oppresseddo learnto manipulatetheiroppressors,but in so doing, they arenot coercive.The latterarenot forced to relyuponthe former;they only choose to do so. Are the oppressed forced to rely upon their oppressors? What is oppression?Frye's analysis of oppressionis one of the book's most valuablecontributions.She beginsby remindingus that to press is to mold, to reducein bulk, to immobilize(p. 2). The "op," like "ob," contributesthe idea of "opposition," with the resultthat "oppression"suggestsa kindof molding,immobilizing,and reducing by catching between opposing forces or barriers.She then analyses political oppressionas a reducing,immobilizing,and moldingof the membersof a groupbecausethey are membersof that groupby a network of social barriersand forces which constantly catch them in double-binds.Whethersomeoneis oppressedis not determinable"by how loudly or how little the person complains"(p. 14). Using this definition, Frye exposes what is wrong with the claim, often provokedby the "fundamentalclaim of feminismthat women are oppressed"(p. 1), that "men are oppressed,too," wherewhat is meant is what Simone de Beauvoirassertedin 1949: 5. At the very end of Kant's Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals he says, "The good or bad effects of a due action, like the effects following from the omission of a meritorious action, cannot be imputed to the subject. . . . The good effects of a meritorious action, like the bad effects of an unlawful action, can be imputed to the subject" (Kant 1964). 6. Schopenhauer, like Frye, treats deception-"cunning," "the lie"-as a form of coercion, an alternative to (physical) violence.

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hypatia . . . in oppressing, one becomes oppressed. Men are

chainedby reasonof theirverysovereignty;it is because they alone earn money that their wives demandchecks, it is becausethey alone engage in a businessor profession that their wives require them to be successful. (Beauvoir1969, 481) As Frye points out, not every limitationor source of sufferingis oppressive,i.e., belongs to a networkthat reducesand immobilizesthe sufferer.Limitsexperiencedby men as a resultof women'soppression enable them to grow in other directions,and when they suffer, there are resourcesfor healing(frequentlysuppliedby women). Many men areoppressedby racismand by economicinstitutions,but that is a differentpoint. Although Frye takes the position that it is neveras men that men are oppressed,I wonderabout that in the case of men who are same-sex lovers. Her essay on the Gay Rights movement acknowledgesthat "gay" men are less alienatedfrom theirmanhood than others, and that it is for this that they arepenalized.Perhapsshe does not regardthe penalizationas oppressive.Regardless,her definition of "oppression"enablesus to sort out our reasonsfor identifying forces as oppressiveor not. How does coercion enter into oppression?Oppressiveforces catch us in double-binds.Oppressionappearscoerciveto the oppressed:one feels forcedto do somethingunacceptable,no matterwhat. And often that is true. However, where one's perception of a situation as a double-bind depends upon correctibleerrors, misplaced trust, rationallyrevisablevaluations,escapebecomespossible. As Fryepoints out, exploitationrequiresa certain flexibilityand mobility in those who are exploitedin order for them to be very useful, and it thereby exists in tension with oppression(p. 59). This flexibilitymay lead to the requisiterevaluation.To take one of her examples:the woman who is damnedif she is "heterosexuallycelibate"and damnedalso if she is not may notice the presumptionof heterosexualorientationin both options and begin to evaluatethat. And it may be as a consequence of having learnedto be sexually flexible for the pleasureof men that she notices. She may still suffer consequenceswhatevershe does. But the sufferingmay cease to oppress her. She may begin to grow, become mobilized,start determiningher own shape. Frye'sessay on separatism,whichcontinuesto be the essay on that topic from which I have learned the most, calls attention to many ways in which women can re-evaluate and reorient. It presents separatismnot as a theory but as a theme distinguishingtheories, practices,and actions as radicalratherthan reformist-basically, an 158

claudia card alternativeto assimilationism.Posing the question, "Whatis it about separation... that makesit so basicand so sinister,so excitingand so repellent?"(p. 96), she answersthat separationis a seizingof power and is therebyranklyinsubordinate.This seems to me exactly right. Further,separationmay be requiredto end one's dependenceupon an oppressorfor "validation"and ultimatelyfor one's senseof identity. Analyzedand defendedas in this essay, separatismdoes not rest upon female supremacism.The considerationsraised, however,may apply as forcefullyto racialand to class separationsas to sexualones. This raiseshard questionsnot addressedin the essay. What are the consequencesof combiningsuch separations? The essays entitled "Sexism" and "The Problem That Has No Name" both seemto me to be about sexism.The formertreatsit is as kind of oppression-institutionalizedsexism.7The lattertreatsit as a prejudicecharacteristicof the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviorof individuals.It wouldbe helpfulto acknowledgeexplicitlythis ambiguity of "sexism." The distinctionbetweeninstitutionalizedsexismand sexism as a prejudicecan be usefulto Frye'sprojectof clarifyingwhy sexism is as invisibleas it is to so many. It is partly,as she pointsout, that sexist institutionsare not easy to identifywhen those who administer and participatein them are not particularlyprejudiced.It is also, however,that manypeople think they have identifiedsexismwhen all they have identifiedis sexist prejudicein individuals,and they may rightly judge that such prejudice is not necessarilyoppressive.The truthsunderlyingFrye'sclaimthat "the locus of sexismis primarilyin the systemor framework,not in the particularact" (p. 19) appearto be first, that it is primarilyas institutionalizedthat sexism becomes oppressive,and second, that the oppressivenessof sexistinstitutionsis not (or need not be) particularlya function of the prejudiceof those who administerand participatein them. An encouragingconclusion one might drawis that the eliminationof oppressionmay not require the eliminationof prejudice.Prejudiceis probablymuch more difficult to eradicate.It is less subjectto being affectedby those who are its objects. Frye presents institutionalizedsexism as consisting essentiallyin "cultural and economic structures which create and enforce the elaborateand rigidpatternsof sex-markingand sex-announcingwhich divide the species, along lines of sex, into dominatorsand subordinates" (p. 38). The resulting "enculturation"then "forms our skeletons, our musculature,our central nervous systems" with the consequencethat "by the time we are genderedadults, masculinity 7. Cf Wasserstrom (1979, 89) on "institutionalized racism."

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hypatia and femininityare 'biological'," meaningnot "geneticallydetermined" nor "inevitable" but "of the animal" (p. 37).8 Severe and obligatorymarkingbecomescrucialin maintainingthe oppressionof a group who might otherwise not be readily identifiable-women, Jews, homosexuals.Stereotypesplay a similarrole insofar as people can be drawninto living up to them. Is it true, however, that "sexmarkingand sex-announcingare equally compulsoryfor males and females" (p. 29)? It was the Jews, not also the Gentiles, who were compelled to wear badges in Christiancountries of Europe. It is "gay" men, not "straight" men, for whom there exist stereotyped gestures, such as the limp wrist. Isn't it also women who bear the primaryburdenof sex-markingand sex-announcing,for example,in clothingdesignedmore for communicationthan for comfort or practicality? What is requiredof men is not so much that they identify themselvesas men as that they not identifythemselvesas women(or is it that they identifythemselvesas "not women"?). Recognitionof this assymmetryseemsneededto accountfor that otheroutstandingaspect of sexism, which otherwiseseems incompatiblewith severemarking practices, consisting in the general failure of men to identify themselvesand their experiencesand points of view as anythingbut "human."This failureto "mark"themselvesis also institutionalized, for example, in university courses on "literature" and "history" which are actually on the literatureand history of White christian men. The identificationof Man with men, discussedin "The Problem That Has No Name," presentsan obstacleto the promotionof a genuinely androgynousideal, toward which one might otherwise be drawnas a reactionagainst severesex-marking. An analogousproblemexists for the dramaticproposalof the essay "On Being White" that a White woman in a White racist society might seriouslyconsiderceasing to be White. Do we who are White yet appreciatewhat it means to be White? I doubt it. If not, we risk defeatingthe end of ceasingto supportracism,perpetuating,instead, the arroganceof conflating "human" with "White." One form of racism is failing to recognize one's own ethnicity as an ethnicity among others, neitherbetternor worse in many ways than those one 8. Compare Gilman (1966, 45): "Woman's femininity... is more apparent in proportion to her humanity than the femininity of other animals in proportion to their caninity or felinity or equinity. 'A feminine hand' or 'a feminine foot' is distinguishable anywhere. We do not hear of 'a feminine paw' or 'a feminine hoof."' Chapters 2-3 of this work contain a delightful discussion of the human animals as "over-sexed" (by which she means severely gender-dichotomized). She does not, however, distinguish clearly between the "enculturated" and "genetic"interpretations of the "evolution" she presents.

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claudia card does recognizeas enthnicities.Surpisingly,Frye seemsnot to connect "Whiteness" with ethnicity. What, then, does she understandby "race"? "Whiteness," she says-and,

presumably, "race"?-"is

. . . a

social or politicalconstruct"elaboratedprimarilyby "a certaingroup of males" upon conceptionsof a common ancestry(p. 114). In attributingthis work to men and in focusing upon its political nature, she appearsto be thinkingprimarilyof the modernWhitelegalhistory of rules assigningracialidentityto childrenof mixed parentage. A question motivating this inquiry is formulated at the outset: "Does being Whitemake it impossiblefor me to be a good person?" The questionemergedfrom the realizationthat individualWhitepeople seldom have the option of refusingrace privilege.If you cannot refusethe benefitsof raceprivilege,and if you also lack the poweras a womanto determinewhat being White "gets you," perhapsthe only honorable course remaining is to provoke those who have the power-White men-to disinherityou. You might refuse, for example, to marryany of them, refuse to have White babies, violate and undermine other rules for the proper deportment of White women-become a lesbian. I found the most interestingdiscussionin this essay the analysisof compulsoryWhite motherhood,connecting the abortionissue with White racism. A slightly different approach, putting the emphasis more upon racismthan upon individualhonor, would be to ask, "What responsibilities, if any, does one have as a White woman in a White racist society?" Part of an answermight be, again:cease to produceWhite babies; do what you can to undermine compulsory White motherhood.Even if ceasingto be Whiteis not a realisticoption, one may be able to undermine the politics of Whiteness, engage in sabotage.At one point Fryecharacterizeswhat she has in mind as being "disloyalto Whiteness"(p. 126).9But this may presupposeone's "membership"ratherthan involve the analogue-if there is one-of ex-Communicationor ex-Patriation.The termshe uses most is "disaffiliate." One mightbecomea disaffiliatedWhitewomanwithoutceasing to be White. Alternatively,one might take responsibilityfor one's Whiteness. Much of what White women are justifiably proud of, including radicalesbianfeminism,is as White as White racism.'0Consider,for example,how muchcontemporary"women's" musicis White. If it is not only one's vices but also one's virtuesthat are White, one might 9. The idea appears to be suggested by Rich (1979, 275-310). 10. I owe what appreciation I have of this point to discussion with Sharon Keller.

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hypatia do better to try disowningracism than to try disowningWhiteness. The rulesby whichmembershipin the "race" is determinedare only a small part of what it means to be White. One might say they are, rather, the definition of what it means to become White, or even a (not the only) definition of that; perhaps that definition might be specificallyattacked.If the group sharesa commonheritage,ways of speakingand thinking,gestures,culinaryhabits,suchthingsas a sense of humor, in short, an ethnicidentityor familyof ethnicidentities,it is much less plausible to attributeits "definition"-its shape, contours-to the work of men. Applyinga point Fryedevelopedin "The ProblemThat Has No Name," one might arguethat Whitemen have failed to recognizethe relevant"linguisticcommunity"for determining what it means to be White, insofar as it is simply White men's usage that has prevailed. Frye finds it arrogant of White people to be self-defining as a group. She gives as an exampleof such self-definitionWhitepeople's insistenceupon identifyingas Whiteor not White anyone who comes along, without waiting for them to identify themselves.I sense two confusions here. First, to identify is not to define. Identifyingan individual as White or not White is not the same as defining "Whiteness."By theirown definitions,Whitepeople (and heterosexuals, herothermainexampleof such "arrogance")are often mistaken in theiridentificationsand often not eagerto bendthose definitionsto accomodatethe mistake. The arrogancelies in the assumptionthat anyone would naturallyprefer to be a memberof one's own group, regardlesshow it is defined. Blacksin the U.S. and "gays," who also like to be self-defining, often do not manifest this particulararrogance.Second,defining"Whiteness"does not implydefining,e.g., "Blackness." It is only the latter that strikes me as arrogantwhen White people do it. White people, and heterosexuals,have not only defined themselves but have presumed to define others, such as Blacks, "gays," lesbians. The latter have had to fight for acknowledgementfrom the former of their own definitions of themselves.I see no morearrogancein this thanin a person'sdeciding how her or his name is to be pronounced(or spelled),althoughthere are limits to what will be believedin both cases. White people have no patent on racism. As long as there are "races," or ethnicities, there will be the possibility of racism and ethnocentrism.Are we to generalizeFrye'sproposalto the suggestion that everyoneabandontheirracialidentity,to whateverextentthat is possible? Should Black women, for example, also disaffiliate from Blackness?Wouldn't that worsen one of the profoundesteffects of racism,whichhas been the alienationof people from theirhistoryand 162

laudia card culture? Or is the idea to try to envision a world in which everyone's history and culture belongs to everyone? The parallels with the idea of androgyny are striking. After surveying the Gay Rights movement, Frye concludes that what "gay" men need to do is "reinvent maleness" (p. 150) (redefine manhood?), "invent what maleness is when it is not shaped and hardened into straight masculinity, gay hypermasculinity or effeminacy" (p. 146). She urges the "gay" man to be "disloyal to phallocracy," to "be the traitor to masculinity that straight men always thought he was" (p. 146) instead of seeking equal masculine privilege, failing to appreciate that the stigma of "effeminacy" relies upon sexism. She also urges them to choose marginality instead of denying that homosexuality is chosen or worthy of choice (p. 149). The advice is excellent. The characterization of the movement itself I disliked, although much that she says rings true. In detailing how "gay" men are more consistently loyal to manhood than "straight" men, she leaves the impression that the former are worse sexists. On the whole, I have not found this to be so. What I find missing in this essay is the sensitivity displayed earlier in such observations as that "how one sees another and how one expects the other to behave are in tight interdependence, and how one expects another to behave is a large factor in determining how the other does behave" (p. 67). To what extent are the same seers who have given such bad press to women responsible for the contemporary public image of "gay" men, including the activists? To what extent does even the "gay" press not adequately represent the lives of men who are same-sex lovers, men who do not hang out in bars, for example, and whose ordinary lives it has never been in the interests of a sexist society to publicize?1 Perhaps such men are not aptly identified as "gay." But the Gay Rights movement purports to speak for their rights, and I would wager they contribute money to it. Of course, they are no more forced to acquiesce in such images than are women. At least half a dozen of the nine essays making up this book are outstanding as philosophical inquiries-the first four, the sixth, the last. The fifth, on anger, which I have not discussed, makes some nice points succinctly. All have generated lively discussions in my university classes on contemporary moral issues, feminism and sexual politics, and lesbian culture. Students who began with curiosity about feminism have become passionately involved in feminist thought through these essays. They are an excellent place to begin for any 11. See, e.g., the discussion of "on-going relationships" in Tripp (1975, 141-59).

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hypatia philosopherinterestedin thinkingabout feminismbut should also be "requiredreading" for long-timefeministinquirers.

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references Aristotle. 1925. Thenicomacheanethics. Trans.W.D. Ross. London: UniversityPress. Baker,Robertand FrederickElliston, eds. 1975.Philosophyand sex. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus. Barry, Kathleen. 1979. Female sexual slavery. Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Beauvoir,Simone de. 1969. The second sex. Trans. H.M. Parshley. New York: ModernLibrary. Daly, Mary. 1978. Gyn/Ecology; The metaethics of radical feminism. New York: ModernLibrary. Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. 1950. The brothers Karamazov. Trans. ConstanceGarnett.New York: ModernLibrary. Frye, Marilyn. 1980. Assignment NWSA-Bloomington-1980, Speak on 'Lesbian Perspectiveson Women's Studies.' Sinister Wisdom(14): 3-7. Frye, Marilyn. 1983. The politics of reality; Essays in feminist theory. Trumansburg,N.Y.: The CrossingPress. xvi+ 176 pp. $7.95 ISBN 0-89594-199-7;ISBN 0-89594-099-x(pbk.). Frye, Marilyn. 1978. Some thoughts on separatism and power. Sinister Wisdom(6): 30-39. Frye, Marilyn. 1981. To be and be seen: Metaphysicalmisogyny. Sinister Wisdom(17): 57-71. Gilman,CharlottePerkins. 1966. Womenand economics:A study of the economic relation between men and women as a factor in social evolution. Ed. Carl Degler. New York: Harper. Goldman, Emma. 1969. Anarchism and other essays. New York: Dover. Goldman,Emma. 1971. Living my life, 2 vols. New York: Dover. Kant, Immanuel. 1964. The doctrine of virtue. Trans. Mary J. Gregor.New York: Harper. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1969. On the genealogy of morals. Trans. WalterKaufmann.New York: Vintage. Rich, Adrienne. 1980. Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence.Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society V(4): 631-60. Rich, Adrienne. 1979. On lies, secrets, and silence: Selectedprose 1966-1978.New York: Norton. Schopenhauer,Arthur. 1965. On the basis of morality.Trans.E.F.J. Payne. Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill.

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hypatia Trebilcot,Joyce. 1983. Takingresponsibilityfor sexuality.Berkeley, CA: Acacia Books. Availableas a pamphletfrom Acacia Books, P.O. Box 3630, Berkeley,CA 94703, $2.50 + .50 postage/handling. Tripp,C.A. 1975. Thehomosexualmatrix.New York:New American Library, Walker,Alice. 1982. The color purple. New York: Harcourt,Brace, Jovanovich. Washington, Mary Helen, ed. 1980. Midnight birds; Stories of contemporaryblack women writers.New York: Anchor. Wasserstrom,Richard,ed. 1979. Today's moral problems, 2d ed. New York: Macmillan.

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comment/reply laura purdy Nature and Nurture:A False Dichotomy? Nancy Tuana holds that the nature/nurture dichotomy does not accurately represent the world and hence that a whole series of assumptions about human nature is mistaken. She rejects both biological determinism and alternative interactionist views. I argue that although her arguments and political concerns do rule out any kind of simple biological determinism, they do not show that the alternative interactionist view is untenable: in fact, she uses the distinction in her attempt to demolish it. I argue that the assumption that "nature" implies fixity is the source of difficulties here, not the dichotomy itself.

Introduction

A

t times our entire world view seems built upon a series of dichotomies,and some lend themselvesto questionabledoctrineslike biological determinism.Feminists are well-advisedto submit these basic assumptionsto thorough scrutinyand Nancy Tuana's examination of the nature/nurturedichotomy is therefore most welcome (Tuana, 1983). Tuana first discussesthe role of the nature/nurturedichotomyin buttressingintellectuallydubious and socially regressivetheories of biological determinism.She then goes on to lay out the traditional understandingof the dichotomyalong with two othersupportingconcepts: the essential/accidentaldichotomy and the notion of the "natural"as good. After pointingout the close relationshipbetween these ideas and the sex/gender dichotomy, she proceedsto her main argument. She holds that the nature/nurturedichotomy, as a descriptionof two mutuallyexclusiveaspects of reality, does not accuratelyrepresent the world and hence that a whole series of assumptionsabout humannatureis wrong. However,it seemsto me that she fails to provide evidencefor herthesis;indeed,she is forcedto use the dichotomy in her attemptto demolishit. A carefulreadingof her papersuggests that the real problem is not the nature/nurturedichotomy, but the view that elementsdeterminedby natureare wronglybelievedto be fixed. Hypatia vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986). © by Hypatia, Inc.

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Tuana's Main Argument Tuana first describes a traditional view of the relationship between nature and nurture that assumes that elements determined by heredity are fixed and unchangeable but those determined by the environment can be changed. This position both implies and is required by popular theories of biological determinism. A more sophisticted alternative view attempts to remedy the simplistic equation between nature and unalterability. According to it, biology and the environment both affect all traits to a greater or lesser degree, whereas in the traditional view each affects different traits. According to Tuana this view is unsatisfactory because it still sees nature as a distinct and separate mechanism from the mechanism of nurture. Also, it continues to assume that innateness implies fixity. She frames the issue in terms of choice between the theories of preformation and epigenesis. She defines preformation as "the hypothesis that an organism develops by unfolding the growth of entities already present at its conception," and epigenesis as "the concept that an organism develops by the new appearance of structures and functions through interaction of gene and surrounding conditions" (p. 626). She rejects preformation and argues that neither the standard nature/nurture distinction nor the alternative view adequately support the preferable epigenetic theory: "both continue to hold that individuals unfold structures or actualize potentials present at conception and thereby are versions of a preformation thesis" (p.628). Poblems

with this View

First of all, Tuana's use of "preformation"and "epigenesis" is a bit confusing in light of the usual uses of the words. A standard account is provided by Richard Davenport, in An Outline of Animal Development: Preformation held that the egg and the adult both possess the same form and differ only with respect to size. Consequently, the structure of the adult was believed to be preformed in miniature in the gametes .... The idea of preformation was doomed to a rather short existence, however, since it could not withstand a careful examination of the ontogenetic process. . . . Wolf observed that, in the egg, as well as early stages of the embryo, there was no evidence for the existence of any form or even of any organs resembling those of the adult. What he did observe were granules, layers, and other structures that 168

laurapury he could not correlatewith any knownbiologicalstructure. . . . Wolf concluded that properties of the adult

arise anew duringthe ontogeny of each individualand termed the process by which this occurredepigenesis. (Davenport,1979) This debateis surelya deadissue. Nor, on the face of it, does the matter have any relevancefor Tuana'sworries.Developmentdescribedby both preformationand epigenesis could be, but is not necessarily, wholly genetically-determinedwith no environmentalinput apart from the requirementthat basic survival conditions be met. (This assumesthat by "environment"we are referringto all directlynongenetic influences.) Hence Tuana's preformation-epigenesisdebate is not the classic one: she addsto it a contrastbetweenpreformation,held to be entirely biologicallydetermined,and epigenesis,whichinvolvesenvironmental input. So the argumentsthat won the day for epigenesis do not necessarilysupporther position becauseof its new emphasison that environmentalinput. Developmentis preordained,regardlessof environment,according to the standard nature/nurtureaccount; Tuana's alternativeview allows for a rangeof responses.But accordingto her, neitherof these accounts break free of the biological determinismof preformation. Sincethe nature/nurturedichotomycan provideno theorycompatible with her view of epigenisis,the dichotomymustgo. But how can it go when it is solidly incorporatedin her definition of epigenesis? In short, she is arguingfor a position (developmentdeterminedboth by genesand environment)that assumesthe dichotomyshe is tryingto reject. Another problemwith her position is her definition of preformation: developingindividuals"unfold structuresor actualizepotentials present at conception" (p. 628). This is indeed a broad conception-so broad as to describe any possible course of development whichis at all constrainedby genes. Conversely,then, her description of epigenesiswould appearto deny that genes constraindevelopment in any serious way. Tuanasays that both traditionaland alternativeviews fail to reflect the "interactive view of development prevalent amongst bioloogists" (p. 628). She arguesthat proponentsof these two views "fail to acknowledge that all observable features of an individual (phenotype) result from the genetic makeup of the individual (genotype)interactingwith the environmentin which the genotype develops. This interactionmust be seen as dynamic and nonlinear. 169

hypatia Contraryto previoustheories, genotype does not determinea set of characteristicsor potentials(a human nature),but specifiespatterns of reaction of a developing organism to the environment it encounters"(p. 628). It seems to me that "determininga set of characteristicsor potentials" amounts to the same thing as "patterns of reaction of a developingorganismto the environmentit encounters"once you add to the former "whichmay differ for differentenvironments,but for a givengene will havethe sameoutcome, giventhe sameenvironment." The crucial point here is that proponents of the alternativeview sometimesforget that the expressionof a givengene will vary with its environment.But this theory hardlyrules out the possibilitythat different environmentsmay cause a gene to express itself in different ways. What it says is that, given a certainenvironment(say "q"), a particularresult (say "q*") will follow. qwSuprting Arguments

Although Tuana holds that essentialismand the nature/nurture dichotomyentail each other, it is arguablethat they are logicallyindependent.Essentialpropertiesarethose propertiesnecessaryand sufficient for somethingto be what it is. So the set of essentialproperties for a given class will be those universaland uniqueto it. Suchproperties have been thoughtof as inherent,and thus cannotbe acquired(p. 624). Essentialismis the belief that thereis "a particularset of properties or potentialwhich all individualsof a group necessarilyhave and whichthey will continueto possessas long as they remainmembersof that group " (p. 628).

Wherein lies the logical dependence of essentialism and the nature/nurturedichotomy?Tuana claims that the "nature" part of the dichotomy entails essentialism,i.e. geneticallytransmittedtraits are static and comprisethe unchangingessenceof the organism.But surely this connection is not a necessaryone: artificial objects can have essences-essential characteristicswithoutwhichthey would not be examplesof the thing in question.For example,if an object has no blade (or somethingthat functionslike a blade), it cannot be a knife. This need not be an entirelystatic view, for we could amendour notion of what is requiredof knives, such as blade of certainlength or sharpness. Furthermore,"biologicaltraits" need not be the ones which determine an object's essence. First, they can determine accidental characteristics,like eye color. Second, essentialcharacteristicscan be providedby the "environment."It couldbe argued,for example,that fully humanpersonsare largelycreatedby environment:educationis 170

required to produce them and, without it, therefore, no set of biologicaltraitswill producean organismwe recognizeas human.The capacity for education is biological, of course, but its content and results are not. If personhood arises due to mental characteristics, such as capacityfor consciousness,it would be logically possible to constructa personof artificialmaterials.Such a creaturewould have the essentialcharacteristicsof a personwith no "biological" basis at all. In short, to be an object of a certaintype, one need only have certain characteristics,and it is irrelevanthow those characteristicscame to be acquired.Thereis no necessaryconnectionbetweenbeing a certain sort of thing and having gotten to be it in any particularway. Hence biological theories recognizingthe nature/nurturedistinction do not necessarilylead to essentialismnor does essentialismnecessarily assumeany biological thesis. Tuana holds that "[e]volutionarytheory entails a rejectionof any accountbased on an essentialistmetaphysicbecauseorganismswhich evolve will have no eternalimmutableessences"(p. 628). The foregoing argumentshows that essentialismneed not imply that there are "eternalimmutableessences" (in the sense requiredto reject evolution), only that to be a certainkind of thing, you need to have certain characteristics.Nothing rules out the possibility that one kind of organismcan evolve into another.Henceevolutioncan be compatible with essentialism: it is up to us to decide when an organism's characteristicsare sufficientlychangedto call it somethingnew. Tuanaalso arguesthat thereare close linksbetweenthe nature/nurture dichotomy, essentialism,and the idea that some outcomes of developmentare more "natural" than others and hence better. But neither essentialismnor the alternativeview of the nature/nurture dichotomy necessarilyimplies that one genetic outcome is "more natural" than another. Presumablysuch a view arises because one kind of environmentpredominatesor becauseone outcomeis deemed more desirableand thereforelabeled "natural." But to say that it takes a given set of characteristicsto constitutea humanpersondoes not imply anythingabout eitherthe likelihoodor the desirabilityof a fertilizedegg developinginto such a person.Onlyadditionalempirical and moral premisescould do so. Withoutthem, we could know only that given environment"q," that outcome "q*" would ensue. It seems to me that Tuana underminesher whole argumentwhen, on p. 629, she assertsthat "[t]o supporta process interpretationof epigenesisdoes not mean that no distinctionscan or should be made. But it is importantto recognizethat such distinctionswill not create dichotomies.A sense of 'inherited'can even be retained,as long as it 171

hypatia is divorced from a notion of fixity and combined with the acknowledgment of the complexity of the developmental interaction." Surely this concedes the point that it is not the nature/nurturedichotomy,per se, that is problematic,but ratherthe notion that "nature"impliesfixity. The kind of interactionshe takes as a true account of developmentis compatiblewith the dichotomy, and in fact requiresit to be intelligible:the dichotomyis presupposed wheneverone talks about genes or environment.To discussthe complexity of interactionbetweengenes and environment,or natureand nurture,we musthave clearlabels for the variouselementsthat we are talking about. A gene that has been affected by environmental pressureis a gene, nonetheless,and an environmentwhich has been moldedby geneticcharacteristicsis still an environment.Recognizing that a gene's expressionin a subsequentenvironmentwill be the result of many past interactions of gene and environment undermines biological determinism,yet is compatible with the nature/nurture dichotomy. Finally Tuana argues that both the standardand the alternative views entail that "there is a 'natural' or 'true' state of the genotype-they still imply a notion of humannature.Theyboth then involve a notion of essential propertiesor potential which all individualsof a group necessarilyhave and whichthey will continueto possess as long as they remainmembersof that group" (p. 628). A sophisticatedalternativeposition, however,is immuneto this accusation. It can envision a range of radicallydifferentpossibilities.How different they are would depend on the diversity of possible environments,the flexibilityof the originalgenotype,and the length of time the organismis studied. This more complexunderstandingof the nature/nuturedichotomy may well shed new light on the sex/genderdichotomy.The foregoing mightsuggestthat a much smallernumberof traitsthan has generally been supposedis fixed in the two sexes. How smallthat set mightbe is a matter for speculation, especially with regardto the question of whetherthere might be more than two sexes. But that is a topic for anotherday!

Conclusion I share Tuana's dismay at the unsoundnessof biological determinismand its politicalconsequences.HoweverI do not believethat the nature/nurturedichotomyis the sourceof the problem:a careful alternativeview of the dichotomyprovidesan accuratereflectionof realitywhile at the sametime precludingassertionof biologicaldeterminism. To throw the dichotomyout is to dispose of both baby and 172

aura purdy bathwater.However,the topic is a criticalone for all concernedwith understandingthe worldas well as changingit in desirablewaysand it clearlydeservesfurtherattention.

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references Davenport, Richard. 1979. An outline of animal development. California: Addison-Wesley. Tuana, Nancy. 1983. Re-fusing nature/nuture. Hypatia 3, published as a Special Issue of Women's Studies International Forum 6(6): 621-632.

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comment/reply nancy tuana A Reply to LauraPurdy This essay is a response to the comments and critique of Laura Purdy to my earlier paper "Re-Fusing Nature/Nurture" (1983, 621-632). In it I re-emphasize that the traditional nature/nurture dichotomy is based upon an unacceptable ontology and briefly note the type of metaphysic that would serve as a more appropriate basis.

am pleased to have this opportunityto continue a dialogue I which I believeto be centralto the developmentof a new worldview. As has been well demonstrated by Kuhn (1957) and others, metaphysicalchangesoften lag behindempiricaldevelopmentsin the sciences. In my essay "Re-FusingNature/Nurture"(1983) I argue that current attitudes toward nature and nurture are tied to a metaphysicinappropriateto contemporaryscientific theory, thus illustratingthe need for a new metaphysic.Though I gesture in the directionin whichsucha changemightoccur, the complexityof sucha change demandsongoing dialogue in this attemptto see anew. If it wereonly a matterof exposinga few factualor conceptualerrors,the discussion would be soon over. But as Laura Purdy so correctly observesthe matteris ingrainedin our modes of understanding,both scientificand commonsensical. A centralissue upon which Purdyand I agreeis that the notion of the fixityof traits,upon whichtheoriesof biologicaldeterminismhave been founded, cannot withstandmodern biological theory. Any attempt to understandnature/nurtureor sex/genderin termsof such a notion, fails to accuratelyaccount for the processof evolutionor for how individualsdevelop and exhibittheir abilities. The focus of my article,however,was not the illustrationof a belief which needed revision. I was trying to lay out and make sense of a worldviewwhich has served as the basis for a numberof incorrect beliefs centralto the oppressionof women. It is this metaphysicthat we haveinheritedand continueto live whichis the focus of my discussion. But to critiquea way of being in the world is not to questiona set of first principlesleadingto a clearset of deductiveconsequences. Hypatia vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986). ( by Hypatia, Inc.

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hypatia Rather,I hopedto evoke in the readera vision of the fabricof connections whichwe have unquestioninglylivedand beenvictimizedby. My goal in the paperwas to unravelsome of these badly knit connections in orderto encouragethe re-weavingof a new fabric of being. I arguedthat the traditionalnature/nurturedichotomyis a part of an essentialisticworldviewwhich rests on a substanceontology. This is not to say that the nature/nurturedichotomyis a logicalentailment of the essence/accidentdichotomy or that it is a necessaryconsequenceof a substanceontology. Ratherit is to illuminatethe ways in which these three have been woven together to create a fabric of beliefswhichhave negativelyaffectedthe lives of women. The triadof dichotomies which are a part of this world view-nature/nurture, essence/accident,sex/gender-are not merely distinctionsmade for pragmatic convenience, but are seen by their defenders to be metaphysicallyor ontologically basic. Thus, under this view, it is nonsense to talk of "deciding that an organism's essence had changed," or of "amendingour notion of what was requiredof an object."' An ontological dichotomyis an unbridgeablesplit, totally divorcedfrom linguisticdecisions. The centralclaimof my essay is that currentbiologicaltheoriescall for a new metaphysic.Brieflystated, I arguethat the interactiveview of developmentwhichis arisingfrom modernbiologicaltheoryargues for a metaphysiccompatiblewith currentunderstandingof the relation of gene, environment,and organism.I suggestthat only a process metaphysic,embodyinga rich notion of interaction,is adequateto serve as a basis for the view that all observablefeatures of an individualresult from the interactionof the genetic makeupof the individualand the environmentin whichit develops.That is, we need a worldviewwhichwill allow for a notion of interactionsfar more complex than that of two things, what is inheritedand the environment, acting upon one another. Rather, we need a basis for understanding an interactionbetweenthe whole organismwith its historyand the environment,wherethe organismitself is transformedby each such interaction.The traditionalworldviewallowedonly for interactionsbetween solid unchanging units and an environment. A process metaphysicwould transformthis view to one of interactionsof interactions.The interactionsgoing on in us and aroundus then being what there is. This still allows for continuity and identity, for sometimes these repeated interactions have a sufficiently similar abstractpatternto makeus say that they are the same. Stillthis is a far cry from traditionalnotions of fixity or innateness. 1. Purdy, Laura, "Nature and Nurture: A False Dichotomy?" 170, 171.

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iiaricy tuana In this way I argue for the rejectionof a worldviewwhich treats nature and nurtureas dichotomous. The continuity of interactions allows for distinctions,but it fuses the dichotomyof nature/nurture. We can continueto employ the distinctionof gene and environment, but we must be carefulto do so throughthe eyes and heartof a new metaphysic.The distinctioncan be very useful for certainpurposes, but we must recognizethat it is a pragmaticdistinctionand not an ontological dichotomy.To repeatmy earlierclaim: "distinctionscan be made, but they will be time, situation,and valuerelative"(1983, 631). Just as we continueto use the words "fact" and "value" althoughwe now recognizethat each presupposesthe other, so we will doubtless continueto use the words "heredity"and "environment"in specific contextsof research.But we must keep in mind that these are merely abstractionsfrom a dynamicinteractingwhole. On such a view, there is no ontological import in insisting that ".. . a gene that has been af-

fected by environmentalpressureis a gene, nonetheless,and an environmentwhichhas been moldedby geneticcharacteristicsis still an environment,"2although there may be situations in which such statementsare convenientabstractionsfrom the actualdynamicevent. As long as we rememberthat we are indeed making convenient abstractionsand know what presuppositionsare involvedin such use, no harm and much good can be done. Still we must be cautiousthat we do not slip back into the old worldviewand treatsuch abstractions as ontologically significant. Part of this change will be a linguistic change. We will cease to talk of genes or environmentand talk rather about the interactionof the gene/environment/organismcomplex. We would not say that "genesconstraindevelopment"but ratherthat developmentarisesfrom the gene/environment/organisminteraction. However it is importantto rememberthat such linguistic changes would arise from a change in metaphysics.A direct consequenceof such a change would not be that "a much smallernumberof traits than has generallybeen supposedis fixed,"3but that the notion offixity itself is nonsense. In conclusionI wouldliketo thankPurdyfor continuingthisdialogue. I can, at best, only gesturein the directionof a new metaphysic.The developmentandembodimentof thatmetaphysicwillrequiremanyconversations-both dialoguesamong ourselves,as well as those between ourselvesand the world-in orderto weavethe worldanew. 2. Purdy, Op. Cit., 172 3. Ibid, 172. 4. Purdy's position seems to be a version of the alternative interpretationof the nature/nurturedichotomy discussed in "Re-Fusing Nature/Nurture," and is thus subect to the same critique. For a full treatmentof these issues see Tuana (1983, 626-627).

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references Kuhn, Thomas. 1957. The copernican revolution: Planetary astronomy in the development of western thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Purdy, Laura. 1986. Nature and nuture: A false dichotomy? Hypatia 1(1):167-173. Tuana, Nancy. 1983. Re-fusing nature/nurture. Hypatia 3, published as a Special Issue of Women's Studies International Forum 6(6): 621-632.

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announcements Over the next five years, the University of Utah Press will be publishing a series of approximatelytwenty-five titles on the ethical implications of scientific research. Each volume in the series will address a specific area of research, and will include both detailed accounts of the relevant scientific information and significant ethical analysis. Topics in progressrangefrom geneticengineering,new reproductivetechniques,and organ transplantationto geological hazardrisk assessment. The serieswill appear in paperback, with a highly expedited production schedule. For further information or manuscript proposals, contact the series editors, MargaretBattinand LeslieFrancis, Departmentof Philosophy, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112, phone (801) 581-8161. Feminists Concerned for Better Feminist Leadershipis an advocate for the improvement of feminist citizenship and feminist leadership in the community and the population of Americanwomen at large. FCBL acts as an open network of feminist colleagues concerned about quality feminist leadership,and has availablea feminist educational cassette for interested women. To contact pleasewrite:FCBL, c/o Mia Albright, P.O. Box 1348, Madison Square Station, New York, NY 10159. The Radical Philosophy Association and the Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism are jointly sponsoring a Philosopher's trip to Nicaraguain mid-July 1986. Informal discussionswith Nicaraguan philosophersand other intellectualsare being arranged.For furtherinformation contact Edward D'Angelo, Universityof Bridgeport,Bridgeport, CT 06602, phone (203) 933-0883. The Cuban Institute of Philosophy has invited the Radical Philosophy Association and the Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism to jointly sponsor a Conference on North American and Cuban Marxist Philosophy in Havana, Cuba, January 1987. Philosophers and social scientistsand social activistswith a philosophicalorientationare invited to participate in formal paper sessions and informal discussions. Theme: "Human Being and Social Progress." Contact Cliff Durand, Morgan State University, Baltimore, MD 21239, phone (301) 243-3118. The National Women's Studies Association Eighth Annual Convention will be held at the Universityof Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,June 11-15, 1986. For more information writethe National Women's StudiesAssociation, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. 179

hypatia Lesbian Philosophy: Explorations, by Jeffner Allen is available from the Institute of Lesbian Studies. P.O. Box 60242, Palo Alto, CA 94306. Price is $9.95. "A stunning articulationof lesbian consciousness. Jeffner's essays are original, moving and profoundly radical;they bring liberation closer."-Joyce Trebilcot. Lesbian Philosophy is a significantcontribution to radical lesbian theory-simultaneously outrageous and sensitive, critical and poetic."-Alison Jaggar. The Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love announces a call for papersto be read at its meetingsat the Pacific Division APA (March 1987). Papers should be 10-12 pages in length, standard spacing and margins, submittedin duplicate, and preparedfor blind reviewing.Enclose SASE if return of paper is desired. Send papers to: Professor Alan Soble, Philosophy Department, St. John's University, Collegeville, MN 56321. Deadline: September 15, 1986. Membership in the Society for Women In Philosophy is through its regional divisions. For information on membership, which includes program announcementsand a subscriptionto the national SWIP Newsletter, as well as a subscsriptionto Hypatia, contact: Pacific SWIP: Executive SecretaryRita Manning, UC San Jose State, San Jose, CA 95192. TreasurerRuth Doell, San Francisco State University, Dept. of Biological Sciences, 1600 Halloway Ave., San Francisco, CA 94132. Midwest SWIP: Executive Secretary Clare Bright, Women's Studies, Box 64, Mankato State University, Mankato, MN 56001. TreasurerCarol Van Kirk, 1401 N. 58th St. Omaha, NE 68106. Eastern SWIP: Executive SecretaryKathy Addelson, Departmentof Philosophy, Smith College, Northampton, MA 01063. Treasurer Bett Farber, 10 Jewett Lane, S. Hadley, MA 01075. The Directory of Women in Philosophy is available from the Executive Secretaryin each division. Cost is $2.00. We wish to thank the many individualswho have contributedtheir time and expertiseto reviewingmanuscriptssubmittedto Hypatia. In addition to our editorialconsultants, the following have read for us in the past: Pam Armstrong, Evelyn Beck, Linda Bell, Jann Benson, Elly Bulkin, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, Arlene Dallery, Jane Duran, Zillah Eisenstein, Nancy Frankenberry, Marilyn Frye, Joan Gibson, Beverly Harrison, Suzanne Jacobitti, Sara Ann Ketchum, Noretta Koertge, Carolyn Korsmeyer, Joan Leguard, William McBride, Mary Ellen MacGuigan, Mary Mahowald, Lyla O'Driscoll, ChristinePierce, JoAnn Pilardi, Francine Rainone, Merrilee Salmon, Linda Singer, Holly Smith, Joan Straumanis, Carla Thomas, Alexandra Todd, Terry Winant, Kate Winiger, Joan Whitman, Hoda Zaki. 180

notes on contributors Merrie Bergmann will join the Computer Science faculty at Smith College in Fall of 1985. She is currentlya Visiting Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Wright State University, where she is writing her thesis for an M.S. degree in the same field. She received a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto and taught philosophy at Dartmouth College from 1976-1983. She has published articles on topics in formal semantics and philosophy of language and is co-author of The Logic Book. Claudia Card is Professor of Philosophy and Courtesy Professor of Women's Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. She teaches and writes in the areas of feminist philosophy, ethics, social and political philosophy, and lesbian culture. Her recent articles include "Sadomasochism and Sexual Preference" (The Journal of Social Philosophy, 1984). Valerie Hartouni is a Lecturerin the Western Culture Program at Stanford University. She holds a B.A. in Politics from Pitzer College of the Claremont Colleges and recently received her Ph.D. in the History of Consciousness from the University of California-Santa Cruz. Diana T. Meyers is the author of Inalienable Rights: A Defense and is an editor of Economic Justice: Private Rights and Public Responsibilities and Women and Moral Theory. She is currentlywriting a book on personal autonomy, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (forthcoming, Columbia University Press). She is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Montclaire State College. Kathryn Pauly Morgan has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Johns Hopkins University. She is currently an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at the University of Toronto. At present she is completing a collection of essays on feminist social ethics and working on a book defining the field of philosophy of sexuality. She has published philosophical papers on imagination, sexual identity, androgyny, and numerous articles in the area of philosophy of education. She lives in a heterogeneous collective with seven other adults and children.

181

hypatia AndreaNye is a facultymemberin the Departmentof Philosophyat the Universityof Wisconsin-Whitewater.Her researchinterestsinclude Frenchfeminismand feministtheory. Laura Purdy was a PostdoctoralAssociate in Cornell University's Programon Science, Technology,and Society and is now at Wells College where she is Associate Professor of Philosophy. Her main researchinterestsare in bio-medicalethicsand feminism. NancyTuanais AssistantProfessorat the Universityof Texasat Dallas offeringcoursesin the areasof Women'sStudies,Philosophy,and the Historyof Ideas.She receivedherPh.D fromthe Universityof California-Santa Barbara.Her researchinterestsincludefeministtheoryand philosophy of science. Kathleen Wider is a free-lance philosopher teaching in the Detroit area, primarily at the University of Michigan-Dearborn and the Center for Creative Studies-a College of Art and Design. She received her Ph.D. from Wayne State University with a specialization in epistemology and philosophy of mind. She is presently working on a book on Sartre and Wittgenstein tentatively titled Hell and the Private Language

Argument.

182

submission guidelines Hypatia solicits papers on all topics in feminist philosophy. We will regularlypublish general issues as well as special issues on a single topic, or comprising the proceedings of a conference in feminist philosophy. All papers should conform to Hypatia style using the Author/Date system of citing references (see the Chicago Manual of Style). Papers should be submitted in duplicate with the author's name on the title page only for the anonymous reviewing process. In order to further the process of dialogue within feminist philosophy, Hypatia will publish short papers on a designated topic under a Forum section. Short papers (2-3 pages) on the topic "Competition in Feminist Philosophy" should be submitted to the Forum Editor: Maria Lugones, Department of Philosophy, Carleton College, Northfield, MN 55057 by September 1, 1986.

special issues Frnch Feminist Phibsophy, edited by Sandra Bartky and Nancy Fraser. Papers on any aspect of French feminist philosophy should be submitted to: Sandra Bartky, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60650; and to Nancy Fraser, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201. Manuscripts should conform to Hypatia style, and have the author's name only on the title page, for the anonymous reviewing process. To be considered for this issue, papers must be received by August 1, 1986. Feminist Perspectives on Sciene, edited by Nancy Tuana. We welcome submissions on topics in the history, philosophy, and sociology of the natural and behavioral sciences approached from feminist perspectives. We are also interested in discussions and critiques of current feminist scholarship in these areas. Papers should be submitted in duplicate to: Nancy Tuana, Arts and Humanities, JO 3.1, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083-0688. Manuscripts should conform to Hypatia style, and have the author's name only on the title page, for the anonymous reviewing process. To be considered for this issue, papers must be received by October 1, 1986. Papers for general submission and all other correspondence concerning Hypatia should be addressed to: Margaret A. Simons, Editor, Hypatia, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, Edwardsville, IL 62025-1437.

183

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