No title

Iranian

Studies

Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

Volume VI (1973)

Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor

Published by The Society for IranianStudies, P. 0. Box 89, Village Station, New York, New York 10014, U. S. A. Printed at the Boston College Press US ISSN 0021-0862

The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL ErvandAbrahamian Amin Banani Ali Banuazizi James A. Bill JeromeW. Clinton Paul W. English Gene R. Garthwaite FarhadKazemi, Executive Secretary KennethA. Luther Ann Schulz, ex officio, Treasurer

Address all communications concerning the Journalto the Editor, IranianStudies, Box K- 154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A.

IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Contents:

Volume VI (1973)

ARTICLES

Daftary,

Farhad.

Development Planning in Iran:

A Historical Enayat,

Hamid.

Survey.

The Politics

Farrokhzad, Forough. Massud Farzan)

. . . . . . . . . . . of Iranology

176-228

. . . .

2-20

Two Poems (translated by . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52-57

Hooglund, Eric J. The Khwushnishin Population of Iran. . . . . . . . . . a . . a .

229-245

Keddie, Nikki R. An Assessment of American, British, and French Works since 1940 on Modern Iranian

L6ffler,

History.

Reinhold. The National of Boir Ahmad ..............

. . . . . . . .

152-165

Integration .

127-135

.

66-109

Nowshirvani , Vahid F., and Bildner, Robert. Direct Foreign Investment in the NonOil. Sectors

of the

Iranian

Economy .

.

.

Pakdaman, Homa, and Royce, William. cAbbas Mirza's Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ricks, Thomas M. Towards a Social History

of Eighteenth-Century

iii

136-151

and Economic Iran

.

.

.

.

110-126

Sheikholeslami,

A. Reza, and Wilson Dunning. .

21-51

Russell D. Patrick J. Hurley and (reviewed by American Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . Justus D. Doenecke).

172-174

The Memoirs of Haydar Khan CAmuUghla

.

BOOKREVIEWS Buhite,

Connell,

Semnan: Persian City John (Ed.). and Region (reviewed by John Gulick)

. . .

63-64

The Changing Balance of Monroe, Elizabeth. Power in the Persian Gulf (reviewed by Ann Schulz) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

166-172

Keddie,

Nikki R. Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "alBiography Afghdni," A Political (reviewed by Hamid Enayat) .246-255

Iran's Ramazani, Rouhollah K. The Persian Gulf: Role (reviewed by Ann Schulz) .166-172 (translated [Mukatibat] Rashid ad-Din. Perepiska (reviewed by Thomas T. by A. I. Falina) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Allsen).

Yar-Shater,

Ehsan.

Dialects

58-63

A Grammarof Southern Tati

(reviewed

by MohammadAli

Jazayery) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

255-259

IranianStudies

Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

Minter 1973

VolumeVI

Number1

The Society for Iranian Studies Council Ervand Abrahamian, Baruch College, City University of New York Amin Banani, University of California, Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi, Boston College James A. Bill, University of Texas at Austin Jerome W. Clinton, American Institute of Iranian Studies Paul W. English, University of Texas at Austin Gene R. Garthwaite, Dartmouth College Farhad Kazemi, New York University Kenneth A. Luther, University of Michigan Ann Schulz, ex offico, Clark University

Executive Committee Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary Ann Schulz, Treasurer Ali Banuazizi, Editor

IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor

Copyright, 1974, The Society for Iranian Studies Printed at the Boston College Press Published in the U.S.A. US ISSN 0021-0862 Address all communications to IRANIAN STUDIES, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U. S. A.

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Volume VI

Winter

Number 1

1973

ARTICLES

2

THE POLITICS OF IRANOLOGY

Hamid Enayat

21

THE MEMOIRSOF HAYDARKHAN CAMUJ UGHL0

A. Reza Sheikholeslami and Dunning Wilson

52

0 BEJEWELED LAND! I FEEL SAD FOR THE GARDEN --Two Poems by Forough Farrokhzad

Trans.

by Massud Farzan

BOOKREVIEWS

58

RASHID AD-DIN: Perepiska (Trans. by [Mukatibat] A. I. Falina

63

Semnan: JOHN CONNELL(Ed.): Persian City and Region

Thomas T. Allsen

John Gulick

THEPOLITICSOF IRANOLOGY

HAMIDENAYAT It may at first seem strange to speak of the politics of Iranology since until recently Iranology was so much confined within the limits of archaeology, linguistics,

bibliography

and other

"micro" studies

that

any sug-

gestion about its possible implications smacked of too Yet if one sets an outlook of history. conspiratorial question of deliberate or aside the often unverifiable motives, there remains little political non-deliberate doubt that Iranology has always been involved with polito prove in the tics. This statement is not difficult case of the present phase of Iranology, when an increasing in number of Iranian scholars are taking the initiative the field, and a growing number of issues relating to the life of Iranians have become contemporary sociopolitical Hamid Enayat is Professor and Chairman in the Department Science, University of Tehran. of Political This article is an extended version of a talk given by the author at the Third Congress of Iranology held in Tehran (September, 1972). The author wishes to thank Jerome W. part of the talk into Clinton for his help in translating Thanks are also due to John Gurney and Roger English. Oxford, and to Anne Enayat, Owen, of St. Antony's College, draft of this pafor their useful comments on an earlier for the content is, however, entirely Responsibility per.

the author's. IRANIAN STUDIES

2

to political The difficulty susceptible interpretation. arises with regard to the formative period of Iranology of European Orientalism when it was a preserve and whose great pioneers were long thought to be inspired by nothing less than a pure love of knowledge. It is with this formative period of Iranology that the present paper purports to deal. In any critical examination of Iranology one has to the background of Orientalism in general view it against which today has acquired a post facto political significonsciousness. cance for the new phase of Asian national This is a phase which is characterized by an intense desire to overcome all forms of alienation from traditional culture in the drive for national self-assertion. Since Orientalism, in the sense of a systematic body of scholarly knowledge about the civilizations and cultures of the East, was originally established by the Europeans, one widely-held is that it opinion about its raison d'etre was simply one of the many colonialist stratagems for subjugating the East. It is thus maintained that just as colonialist governments needed military and diplomatic so also did they reexperts to devise their expansion, conversant with the language, culture and quire scholars

character

of the people under their

rule to facilitate

As Orientalism the execution of colonialist policies. has thus been conceived in political "sin," it cannot be trusted to give an authentic account of the essence of Eastern cultures and civilizations. This may be a rather of Orientalism, naive conception of the genesis but it is

a view which cannot be easily refuted. The witnessed the emergence of some branches of alism, and the remarkable growth of others, era of colonialist expansion. Although the

period which modern Orientwas also the relations be-

tween the various branches of Orientalism and the immediate goals of colonialism the may not be readily apparent,

undeniable fact is that Orientalism was largely stimulated by, and in a sense nurtured in the bosom of,colonialism. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, events such as Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and the later 3

WINTER1973

French conquests in North Africa, the increasing importance of the "Eastern Question," the Indian Mutiny of 1857, and of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran, the intensification all combined to give a certain urgency to Oriental studies. Further stimulation was provided by the expansion of commercial relations and missionary activities, both suspected to be the disguised tools of political domination. When one adds to this politico-religio-commercial background the fact that some of the prominent Orientalists had themselves been colonial administrators before turning to academic careers, and that a number of their students were also trained for the express purpose of colonial service, one would become very skeptical of the claims about the purely scholarly motives of Orientalism. The official account of the establishment of London University's School of Oriental and African Studies, one of the largest and most authoritative institutes of Oriental studies in the West, to mention but one example, bears witness to the fact that the original consideration in creating such institutes was "the urgent need for suitable teaching... for those about to take up administrative and commercial posts in Asia and Africa."1 Even when questions of the political determinants of Orientalism are put aside, there still remain some "tangible" grounds for linking Orientalism with colonialism in the minds of politically-minded Asians, for instance, the fact that most of the Orientalists came, and still come, from those Western countries that have had long political involvement, colonialist or otherwise, in the Orient, and that the greatest institutes of Oriental studies and the most valuable collections of Oriental manuscripts and relics and documents are located in their metropolitan centers. Ever since the Second World War, condemnation of Orientalism as a handmaid of colonialism has found wide acceptance among the intelligentsia of Asian and African and has occasionally countries, given rise to controversy As early as 1956, in an apparent among Western scholars. response to such condemnation, some eighty Western and Asian historians gathered at the School of Oriental and IRANIANSTUDIES

4

African Studies to examine the state of historiography on Asia and Africa. One of the major themes broached at the was the necessity of making the participants conference of their predecessors aware of the nationalistic prejudices A more important outcome of the disand of themselves. cussions was the realization that the at the conference was historians attitude of "Asia-centred" nationalistic and even conmerely a reaction against the "patronizing of the many of the older Western oritemptuous attitude entalists.t'w2 These debates

in a series

continued

of study

con-

ferences at the School of Oriental and African Studies until 1958, and the papers submitted to the conference appeared in Historians of the Middle East, edited by Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (1962). Meanwhile, the growth of the freedom movements in Asia and Africa, and the upsurge of in the late fifties added fresh the "Third World" ideology political dimensions to such debates. Some of these political dimensions are taken up by the French scholar Vinof cent Monteil in his paper entitled "The Decolonization the Writing of History," in 1962. Here Monteil published of what some of the gave a more sympathetic explanation had termed as "the participants at the SOAS conferences Asian nationalistic response to Orientalism." "Because

of prejudices of every sort," stated Monteil, "because of a persistent fondness for the exotic...and because of the of colonialism, internal contradictions has not the history of colonial peoples been falsified, and does it not remain falsified, mutilated and consequently almost unusable?" Monteil then went on to analyze some of the typical alternative methods of historiography devised by Indian, Turkish and African historians to replace the "colonialist" method. He discerned two main schools of historiography among the new Asian and African historians, one nationalist and the other Marxist. After criticizing some of the inconsistencies and anomalies in the works of the representatives of these two schools, Monteil pinned his hopes on an emerging third school which, according to him, is "purely and simply scientific," and manifested itself in the Fourth International African Seminar in Dacca in 1961.3 5

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While such critical analyses of Orientalism have been discussed in various Asian, African and Western academic or intellectual the subjecthas received scant circles, attention in Iran. The reasons for this neglect are so complex and diverse that they perhaps deserve a separate A whole set of psychological study. reasons ranging from our oft-vaunted tendency to welcome and tolerate alien intellectual trends, to our equally oft-deprecated infatuation with Western cultural trappings, come to one's mind in explanation of this phenomenon. But one particular historio-political explanation which should be of interest to us here is the fact that, contrary to most Asian and African countries, Iran never suffered colonization at the hands of Western powers. What anti-Westernism was generated in Iran in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the work of the Shi'ite ulama who regarded Western encroachments as a grave threat to Islam. When, in subsequent efforts both by Iranian officialdom and intellithe Shilite ulama were gentsia to diagnose Iran's ills, accused of being a major stumbling block to national salvation, all that the Shi'ite ulama stood for, including antiWesternism, was discarded in the formation of the new "progressive" outlook. This further weakened our ability for critical thinking with regard to the West, perhaps on a much larger scale than in any other Muslim country. Conwriters sequently, with hardly anyone among the influential of the era of the Constitutional Revolution taking the trouble to examine the impact of the West in other than a most superficial political fashion, the cultural and conceptual aspects of this impact went largely unscrutinized. On the contrary, there were many intellectuals among the era who identileaders of the post-Revolutionary political fied the desire for reform with slavish imitation of the West, and saw such imitation as the sole hope of reforming Iran.4 The events of the First World War and, more importantly, the Allied occupation of Iran during the Second World War and the beginning of a new stage of national consciousness altered this situation to some extent. Gradually political opposition to the West took on a cultural IRANIANSTUDIES

6

aspect, although even in this phase, our political and economic dependence on the West has made us at times hesitant and circumspect in our judgments about it. When Iranian scholars in the last two decades or so gradually came to take over some initiative in Iranian studies, their greatest shortcoming was, therefore, the absence of any background of criticism and evaluation of Western Orientalism. They had no Panikkar (author of Asia and Western Dominance, London, 1953) who would revise the conventional accounts of modern Iranian history, or no Bahl (author of Al fikr al-islam; al-badith wa salatuhui bi'l isticmar al-gharb1, Cairo, 1957) who would examine the impact of the West on religious thought. AhmadKasravi's Ayin (Tehran, 1932), Sayid Fakhrud-din Shadmdn's Taskhlr-i tamaddun-i farangl (Tehran, 1946), and Jalal A1 Ahmad's Gharbzadig were far too polemical or ethico-political in their approach to impress the scholarly community which would dismiss any argument not accompanied by detailed documentation and textual citation. Iranian scholars therefore often accepted as gospel truth those same judgments which had led Orientalism into a clash with rising Asian nationalism. Evidence of this uncritical attitude can be found in the scores of books which have appeared in Iran since the war on Iranian history and culture, mostly heavily relying on the Orientalists' works. After a long period of voluntary or forced silence, Western Iranology has now come under criticism in Iran. The quality of this criticism varies from the philosophical to the pedestrian.5 But apart from its belated occurrence, this criticism seems to suffer from two main weaknesses: one is its excessive preoccupation with the personal motives of Western Iranologists, and the other is the crude polemical language employed by some of the critics. Altercations as to whether or not this or that Western Iranologist was motivated in his lifetime of scholarship by colonialist designs is not a meaningful way of assessing the products of Western Iranology. It would seem to be unwise to lump together all Western 7

WINTER1973

in Iranologists, and for that matter all Orientalists, terms of their motives or their feelings towards Iranians. of Western governments and Some of them were officials some, perhaps most, through the good fortune of aristocratic birth and inherited wealth, acquired first the opporand tunity of studying in the best Western universities, then of travelling widely in the East. There were also some who had neither private means, nor received government support. Some, like Welhausen, viewed Islam with contempt;6 others, like Le Bon waxed eloquent about the A few like McDonald glories of Islamic civilization.7 considered Iranians as "born liars,"8 or like No'ldke confessed that they did not particularly like Iranians,9 while others like Grousset and Corbin used the most colorful lanYet all of them were guage in praise of Iranian culture. or magreatly helped in their work, whether spiritually obterially, by the circumstances created by colonialism, for the study of Iranitaining in its shadow the faculties an and other Oriental cultures. Regarding the crude polemics, they are the inevitable result of the exuberance that their authors feel in a new spell of officially-tolerated opportunity utilizing for the censure of the West in both political and cultural terms. Until a decade ago, such censure was often associated in the official eyes with left-wing radicalism, and It is, of course, poswas therefore severely restricted. atmosphere of culsible that the new politically-charged tural nationalism will affect adversely the scholarly but this is quality of the works of Iranian historians, unavoidable as a transient phase of national self-consciousness. This point has often been ignored even by like Monteil who, for all their awareness of the critics Afro-Asian optique, are taken aback by the absence of oristandards in most ginal research and the poor intellectual of the products of Afro-Asian nationalistic historiography. But how can one in all fairness expect, for instance, the historians of the peoples only recently emancipated from colonialism to judge the records of their former masters and stoic equanimity? with scientific objectivity

IRANIANSTUDIES

8

The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing remarks is not that because Iranology was born of the exigencies of colonialism, one should discard in the rewriting of Iranian history the fruits of decades of labor by European and American scholars. The proper course would rather be for us to try to examine critically both the content and methods of the Orientalists' works in an effort to place our own studies on a sound basis. In the remaining portion of this paper I should like to examine briefly some of the general deficiencies of Western Iranology with a a few critical view to identifying in the methodoissues and political logy of Iranian social history. The most glaring

defect

of Western

Iranology

is

its

non-Iranian perspective. This need not be a defect, especially if by non-Iranian viewpoint is meant a scientific and universalistic approach, relieved from all manner of and racial prejudices. national, confessional Alternatively, a non-Iranian viewpoint, even when it is colored by such prejudices, may have obvious advantages for objective scholarship insofar as a scholar who is scrutinizing a foreign culture is able to judge its merits and demerits better than those located within that culture. But none of these qualifications seem to be present in the conventional methods of Western Iranology for two main reasons. Firstly, because Iranology developed along other Oriental

studies within the context of a colonialist mentality, it was tainted with European national arrogance bolstered by a belief in the unquestionable, eternal superiority of the West over the East. Secondly, outside the colonialist context, Orientalism in general was affected by the prevalent notions of history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These notions, whether they belonged to Macauley and Grote in England, Michelet and Guizot in France, or Treitschke and Meinecke in Germany, were all, in the words of Isiah Berlin, merely "national philosophies of history," informed with a sense of moral and political whether they dealt with "their own times or with direction, Even Hegelian, Marxian remote cultures and situations."110

and Weberian schools of historiography, with all their claims to universality, objectivity and "value-detachment," 9

WINTER1973

could not escape cumstances.

the

impact

of specifically

European cir-

The European-centred method of historiography may not be discernible in the meticulously-researched works of Western Iranologists on particular details of Iranian archeology, philology, numismatics, etc. But it is certainfailure of Western Iranology to ly evident in the palpable assess Iranian contribution to the development of human culture, and in its obsession with the incidental, the bizarre and the exotic of Iranin the more general studies ian history and civilization. these flaws were Ironically, of Western philosocommunicated back to the meditations phers of history and other thinkers who trusted in the data vouchsafed to them by the Orientalists. For example, of the many books written on political thought in the West, of Zoroasonly that by George Catlin notes the influence trianism on ancient Greek Political philosophy, especially on the views of Plato.11 Fortunately, Fatlhallah Mujtab-a'i of Tehran University has conducted original research on this question, the publication of which we hope will help to make good this deficiency.12 Yet if the basic and implicit assumption of Orientalism was that Western civilization was innately and eternally superior to Eastern civilization, our own Iranology ought not to commit the opposite error, and assume that everything pertaining to Iranian culture is a paradigm of It ought not to be forgotten perfection. that fanaticism begets fanaticism, and the excesses of some of our scholars in demonstrating the excellence of Iranian culture have stimulated among some Persian-speaking people undesirable cultural reactions which have sometimes taken on a political character. Iranology has to some extent been free of one of the political which have vitiated faults other branches of Orientalism. Most Orientalists, in emphasizing the linguistic, and ethnic pluralism of the various religious, Asian and African peoples, have, wittingly or unwittingly, prepared the ground for a variety of tribal conflicts,

IRANIAN STUDIES

10

wars within these nations. movements, and civil separatist the strife beof the Indian subcontinent, The partition in the Sudan and Nigeria, and tween Muslims and Christians between the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus, the hostility impact of coloniare just a few examples of the divisive has made no Orientalism alism to whose intensification But the works of Western Iranologists, mean contribution. moveon a few minority religious except for some studies have had few such results. century, ments in the nineteenth by Western Iranologists of many eleInstead, the discovery has been responheritage cultural ments of our pre-Islamic urge for sible for the growth in Iran of a nationalistic This, incicivilization. of pre-Islamic the exaltation dentally, holds true for a number of other Muslim countries, withl Pharaonic enthralment Egypt where a similar especially has sometimes been noted in the development civilization thus Taha Husain once asserted of national consciousness; from Arab that Egyptian culture was in essence different from pursue a course separate culture, and should therefore if it were to overcome its that of other Muslim countries for glorifying the prebackwardness.13 Predilections Islamic past sometimes place a heavy strain on Islamic and exert an adverse efof these countries, affiliations not to fect of their individual cultural integration, implicainternal and external speak of their political tions. 14 Another flaw of Western Iranology is that its prewith the minutiae preoccupation excessive viously-noted, of military and of philology, and the history archaeology from the has diverted its attention religious conflicts I do not of Iranian history and culture. broader features of these value and necessity mean to deny the scholarly but rather want to emphasize that the Iranodisciplines, has in most of these fields concern with details logists' of the more general tiends their vision often obfuscated and deveiopments. In this regard it is not surprising that although Islam has been studied in the West for a to the course time, most points relative very considerable of Iranian thought remain unknown.. "Many points," says of philosophy in Iran S. H. Nasr, "relative to the history

11

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have remained cloaked in obscurity, in particular the hiswhich by reason of the tory of the last seven centuries, absence of any link with European civilization and the disappearance in the Arab world of independent philosophical schools, has not been studied by Western scholars." 15 This deficiency in Western Iranology has given rise to the belief that Iranians have throughout their history lacked the capacity for critical, serious thought, and have adhered to no principle--save blind obedience to their masters, a belief that has often been accepted uncritically by large sections of our Westernized intellectuals. This notion has sometimes found a fascinating cynical expression in our contemporary literature such as in the later works of Sadiq Hidayat, although Hedayat's cynicism was more of a spirited response to exaggerated official glorification of ancient Iranian culture. It is evident that a people who believe themselves to be incapable of critical thinking will tend to be servile and submissive to tyranny. Even worse, since they see themselves as incapable of criticism or assiduous application, they will allow themselves to be torn in the crosscurrents of contemporary intellectual developments. of studying political One of the difficulties thought in Iran is that political ideas are always incorporated in ethical, theological, metaphysical, or historical works. While in the West from the time of Plato onwards, it has been a tradition among thinkers to write books and treatises specifically on politics and government, in both pre-Islamic and post-Islamic Iran discussions of society and government have always been subsumed under more general observations on religion and the world. As a consequence, a thorough knowledge of Iranian or Islamic political thought would require a careful study of very nearly every work which in some way reveals Iranian or Islamic attitudes toward the life of the individual and society, from the andarznamah's to works on theology, history, ethics and philosophy. glish

So far no more than two books have appeared in Enby Western scholars on the specific subject of Is-

IRANIANSTUDIES

12

One of these, by Erwin Rosenlamic political philosophy. thal, contains no discussion of Shi'ite political thought.16 and the other by W. Mont omery Watt summarizes it in little over a dozen pages.1' Whatever the justifications for this neglect, its connection with political considerations can hardly be denied: because Sunni Islam is embraced by the vast majority of Muslims, and because Westerners historically have had more substantial relations with them, Orientalism has regarded the study of Sunnism to be of far more urgent necessity than that of Shi'ism. Apart from its historical importance, a critical study of Shilite political ideas is particularly essential for us in evaluations of the place of Shi'ism in our nation's cultural heritage. Such an evaluation will enable us to decide a more important issue in Iran's social history, that is to say, whether some of the negative traits in our national character, such as fatalism, love of superstition, submissiveness in the face of oppression, and dissimulation, are, as has sometimes been claimed, the outcome of Shilite indoctrination,18 or whether they have been simply the by-products of sociopolitical circumstances. In fact when one carefully etudies the beliefs and practices of the Shilites throughout history, one cannot help forming the impression that Shi'ism, with its emphasis on justice as an absolutely essential of the ruler, and prerequisite its insistence on the Muslims' obligation to fight oppression, has often inspired political militancy among its adherents. Indeed, in most of the unorthodox and revolutionary movements in the history of Islam, from the Mu ctazilah to the anti-despotic movements of the 12th century A.H., the Shi'ites have either actually taken a leading part or been accused of doing so. Finally, one general lesson to be learned from the low esteem in which Orientalism is held in Asian nationalistic circles today is that scientific research in general, and research relating to social sciences in particular, cannot maintain their integrity unless they avoid dependence on governments, and subordination to transient social demands and "moods." This is particularly important since recent growing interest in history in Iran, as in most other Asian countries,

13

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by, grandiose has coincided with, and sometimes initiated of the past. Here again official schemes of glorification individual scholars may not be directly connected with goBut vernments, or consciously serving their interests. the overall orientation of their research plans, notably with regard to the choice of topics, may be determined by official expectations. Thus far, I have spoken of Western Iranology as a coherent whole, but of course there is a separate school of Iranology which, despite its reliance on Western sources and methodology, subscribes to a completely separate and But beindependent school, namely, the Soviet Iranology. the point Iranology, of Soviet a discussion fore turning to the momentous ought to be made that since the early fifties developments in Asia and Africa and the changing pattern of their relations with the West have occasioned important The great changes in the character of Western Orientalism. of the West have accommodated themselves to universities The travel and immigration of a conthese new conditions. siderable number of students and scholars from Asian countries to the West and their employment in the universities of Europe and America have resulted in a substantial number of lecturing and research positions in the departments of Oriental studies being occupied by "Orientals" themIn addition, a growing number of Orientalists selves. have now turned their attention from past history to the present situation in Asia. And, as the bases of independence of the countries of the Third World grow stronger, and the signs of weakness and strain in Western civilization become more manifest, there has been a diminution in the thinly concealed pride and arrogance that characterized Great efforts are now the older school of Orientalism. being made by some Western scholars to combine their studies on Iran and Islam with sympathy or empathy through adopting such approaches as phenomenology, or by trying to analyze Islam from the "faith perspective" of its believers. However, in contrast to a few of my colleagues, I am not convinced that this change has come about because the light of Eastern wisdom has fallen on their perplexed I believe, rather, that here again the Western hearts. IRANIANSTUDIES

14

exigencies of governmental interests continue to determine the orientation and content of much of current Oriental studies. As regards Soviet Iranology, one must say that insofar as the social history of Iran is concerned, it has to some extent been free of most of the serious flaws of its Western counterpart. In contrast to their Western colleagues, Soviet Iranologists have given proper attention to the social and economic causes of historical developments, and have grasped some of the broader issues relating to Iranian culture. In particular, they have tried to discover as much of the conditions, hopes and agonies of ordinary people as can be inferred from available literary and historical sources. More interestingly, they have paid attention to some of the unorthodox ideas and beliefs which have either gone largely unrecorded or been handed down to us in a distorted version. Pigulevskaya's study on Iranian cities,19 Dyakonov's thesis on Gaumata,20 and Petrushevsky's research on the Sarbiddrid movement of Khurasan,21 are only a few examples of the Soviet method of historiography on Iran. Whether or not we agree with the judgments of Soviet scholars on these subjects, their work has yielded one unquestionable benefit: by providing us with an interpretation of a great many events in our history different from the conventional accounts, they have helped to arouse controversy among our scholars and students, and thereby provoked them to search out the truth. It is only through such controversy that history, as an academic discipline, can change from an assemblage of crude and disjointed data into a lively intellectual exercise. But since the conceptual framework of Soviet Iranology is provided by Marxism-Leninism,22 it still suffers from that fundamental flaw of Western Iranology, namely, its non-Iranian viewpoint. Moreover, there is much in the Marxist method of historical and sociological analysis which is today the subject of dispute even among the Marxists themselves. As was indicated previously, since World War II a number of Asian and African scholars and writers 15

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have, by reason of their resentment of Western Orientalism, turned to Marxism in order to base the histories of their own countries on the writings of Soviet Orientalists and to employ the criteria of dialectical materialism in their evaluations and analyses. But owing to the impossibility of free discussion and debate, the Marxism which was accepted by a few intellectuals in these countries was of the rigid and official type known as Stalinist Marxism. One of the fundamental bases of Stalinist Marxism is the conof their viction that all human societies, irrespective national, religious, regional, cultural and other differences, have from the beginning of history down to the present moment passed through the same five stages, namely, primitive communism, serfdom, feudalism, capitalism, and chasocialism, and that the economic, social and political racteristics of each society have all been precisely the same at each of these stages. According to the advocates of this theory, it is this very uniformity in the characof human societies which makes possible the uniteristics versal application of Marxist theories to all spheres of human life, and which elevates Marxism to the status of a new science, the science of man. conFrom the time of the twentieth and twenty-first gresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, this style of historiography has been criticized by a number of Marxists. In keeping with the general drive for de-Stalinization, theories denoting the uniform development of all human societies throughout history have been rejected or largely modified by Soviet scientists and their followers. In the preface to his book, Sur le mode de production asiatique, the French Marxist writer Jean Chesneaux stresses the fact that the return to the spirit of free inquiry has meant that Marxist scholars will now study non-European societies in a manner which is both more exact and free of rigid preconceptions, and will consequently better compreAs is abundantly hend their variety and individuality.23 clear, the bulk of the work of Soviet Iranologists belongs to the rigid school of the older Soviet Orientalism in that their writers have laboriously attempted to fit each period of Iranian history into the mould of one of the five IRANIANSTUDIES

16

stages of historical severely criticized his assertion that

The late M.CA. Khunj; development. Dyakonov's History of Media, refuting the Median period of Iranian history

corresponds perfectly with the serfdom period of European history.24 Such analyses of the works of Soviet Iranologists can be most useful in understanding the essential features of Iranian society in the past. And at the same time we may look forward to the publication of new studies by Soviet scholars written from a freer point of view. This anticipation

does not, of course,

Iranian scholars from their obligation better understanding of the distinctive

and modern Iranian sociopolitical Iranology

may succeed

taking the rigorous

in this

excuse young

to work toward a features of ancient

structure. undertaking,

In order that it

must,

while

methodology of European scholarship

as

its model, avoid both the excessive concern with the deas shown by Western Iranology, tails, and the dogmatism of

its Soviet counterpart. But, it is the view of this writer that another condition is even more essential to the success of Iranian scholarship, and that is a true scholarly environment. It was the existence of such an environment which ultimately enabled Europeans to discover the methodo-

logy of scientific

research.

The most essential

indicator

of an environment proper to scientific inquiry is freedom of thought and conscience, and the possibility of criticizing whatever is accepted and taken for granted. This is an asset which is won, not merely by convening academic

congresses, strated,

but as the experience

by long struggle

of Europeans has demon-

and sacrifice. NOTES

1.

School of Oriental (London, 1970-71),

2.

Dwight Macdonald, "In Search of Asian History," Encounter, Vol. VII , No. 3 (September, 1956), pp. 16-17.

and African Studies, p. 71.

17

Calender

WINTER1973

3.

Vincent Monteil, "The Decolonization of the Writing of History," in I. Wallerstein, ed., Social Change: The Colonial Situation (New York, 1966), pp. 592-605.

4.

See an account of S. H. Taqi-zadeh's notorious remarks about the necessity of complete Westernization of Iranians in Yaby5 Aryan-Pur, Az baba ta Nlma, Vol. II (Tehran, 1350), p. 232.

5.

For some samples of recent Iranian views on Iranology, see Abulhasan Jalili, va jahan-i "Sharq-shinasi imrfiz," Vol. I, No. 2 (1347); Dariush AshuCUluim-i Ijtimacl, ri, "IIran-shinasi chist," Bar-resi-i Kitab (Tehran, 1350); Abul-Qasim Injavi Shlrazl, "cIllat-i vujidi-i istishraq va mustashriq," Negin, Vol. 8, No. 85 (Khurdad, 1351).

6.

J. W. Fiuck, "Islam as an Hiistorical Problem in European Historiography since 1800,".in Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt., eds.., Historians of the Middle East (London, 1962), p. 309.

7.

See his

8.

Duncan B. Macdonald, Development Jurisprudence and Constitutional reprint), p. 39.

9.

Fiuck,

op.

La Civilization

cit.,

p.

des Arabes

(Paris,

1884).

of Muslim Theology, Theory (Lahore, 1960;

309.

10.

Forward to F. Meinecke, Historism, Anderson (London, 1972).

11.

A History of the Political George Catlin, (London, 1950), pp. 74-75.

12.

Fathallah Mujtaba'i, "Aflatan va nizam-i tabaqati-i Hind va Irin," Sukhan, Vol. 21, No. 11, pp. 1OS3-65.

13.

Cf. Taha Husain, (Cairo, 1947).

IRANIAN STUDIES

Mustagbal

18

translated

by J. E.

Philosophers

ath thagqafah fl Miar

14.

For an example of some of the Iranian Muslim criticisms of the modern nationalist tendency to exalt preIslamic Iran, see S. H. Nasr, et al., Muhammad, Khatam-i payghambaran, the Husaynlyah Irshad publicaNo. 1 (Tehran, no date), tions, pp. 86-87.

15.

S. H. Nasr, "Barkh;1 masa'il marbut bih tarikh-i falsafah dar Iran," Rahnamaye Ketab, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sharlvar., 1345), p . 234.

16.

Erwin J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge, 1958). The author justifies this omission in the following terms: "Shi'ite doctrine is mixed with a number of extra-Islamic ideas and notions and is too complicated to be treated in this first of political conspectus thought without further research along the lines of R. Strathman's work" (p.5).

17.

W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh, 1968), pp. 110-114; there are also other sketand doctrinal chy accounts of historical aspects of Shilism in pp. 42-45 and 82-89.

18.

For an extreme Ahmad Kasravi,

19.

N. V. Pigulevskaya, Les villes de l'etat iranien epoques parthe et sassanide (Paris, 1963).

20.

I. M. Dyakonov, Thrikh-i mad, translated by Karim Keshavarz (Tehran, 1965).

21.

I. P. Petrushevsky, Nahzat-i sarbidaran dar Khurasan, into Persian by Karim Keshavarz, in Fartranslated hang-i Iran-Zamin (Tehran, 1340).

22.

USSR Academy of Sciences, "Fifty Years of Soviet Oriental Studies," History of Iranian Studies (Moscow, 1967), p. 4.

version of this critical attitude Shicigarl (Tehran, 1322).

19

into

see

aux

Persian

WINTER1973

23.

Jean Chesneaux, (Paris, 1969).

24.

M.CA. Khunji, "Bahs va tabqlq dar tarlkh-i Rahnamaye Ketab, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Shahrivar, supplement.

IRANIAN STUDIES

Sur le mode de production

20

asiatigue

mad," 1346),

THE MEMOIRSOF HA YDARKHAN ?A4MU UGHLU A. REZA SHEIKHOLESLAMI and DUNNINGWILSON In 1946 a short autobiographical account of Haydar Khan CAmuUghiu, the Caucasian revolutionary who participated in the Iranian Constitutional movement, 1905-19O9,l appeared in the Persian monthly journal, Yadig r.2 The article, which was accompanied by an introduction as well as by some concluding remarks, was unsigned. The editorial policies of the journal, however, indicate that un- 3 signed articles were written by CAbbas Iqbal, the editor. Iqbal does not attempt to establish the authenticity of this account, nor do other historians who have used it in their research. While in the absence of the document its authenticity cannot be established, it is possible to make some comments concerning the probability that this may be authentic and that the events mentioned in the autobiography took place, the role Haydar Khan played in these of these events for the Iraevents, and the significance nian political structure. Iqbal, in his introduction, writes that Haydar Khi had dictated to MLrza Ibrahim Khan Munthis autobiography shizadah.4 Munshtzadah shared many characteristics with

The introduction and notes are by A. Reza Sheikholeslami. He is a doctoral candidate in Islamic Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. The translation of the text is by A. Reza Sheikholeslami and Dunning Wilson. Mr. Wilson is the Persian Bibliographer at the University of California, Los Angeles. 21

WINTER1973

Haydar Khan: He hiad come to Iran from Russia; he resented to that of the Russian of his position the inferiority in the Persian army, as Uaydar Khan probCossack officers ably had with regard to Russians in Russian Azerbaijan; probable that It is therefore and he was a revolutionary. he would have known Haydar Khan and that Haydar Khan would The text of the autohave told him about his activities. nor is it in a comin good Persian, biography is neither for Haydar It is however too elaborate style. plicated It is therePersian.5 knew little Khan, who admittedly assertion, fore safe to assume that, contrary to Iqbal's by Ilaydar Khan to Munthis is not a text simply dictated or someone else must have but that the latter shlzadah, at least its style. changed liberally source of doubt about the authenticity One possible of the story of memoir is Uaydar Khdn's narration

of this

his bomb-throwing at cAla' al-Dawlah's house in order to fri-ghten the Anjuman-i Khidmat (The Society for Service), of which CAla' al-Dawlah was an important member. The date Iaydar Khan gives for this event is July 25, 1907. The Anjuman-i Khidmat, also known as the Anjuman-i Akabir (The Society of Elders) or the Anjuman-i Ashraf (The Socity of Nobles), was formed following the murder of Atabak, which took place on August 31, 1907. It is of course possible that Haydar Khan might have made an error in the What is odd, however, is that he date of the incident. should have made a mistake in recording the sequence of the account of the Anjuman-i the events as well---presenting Khidmat in a way which suggests that it had existed before Atabak's later

death.

of the Anjuman, as will Haydar Khan's description It will also be shown that be shown, is correct.

this particular

act agrees with Haydar Khan's general be-

havioral pattern and that he might very well have done it. the account given corroborate Independent sources actually here, i.e., that Uaydar Khan was involved in throwing a bomb at cAla' al-Dawlah's house.6 of the account can be The date of the composition The key to it is Haydar Khan's calculated rather narrowly. IRANIAN STUDIES

22

to SaniC al-Dawlah as the late UanlC al-Dawlah. reference on February 6, 1911. Haydar SaniC al-Dawlah was killed Khan himself was forced to leave Iran in late March or The memoirs must have been dictated early April, 1911.9 1911, since to Munshlzadah between February and April, in 1917 before Haydar Khdn's fatal Munsh!zRdah was killed that return to Iran in 1921, and there is no indication MIunshlzddah took any trip outside of Iran at any time afis of course tenable only on ter 1911.10 This hypothesis the assumption that persons other than HIaydar Khan did not insert

the

word "late."

Haydar Khan as presents Iqbal, in his introduction, party because he was a Muslim zealot who formed a political of the unjust treatment of his co-religionists resentful Many other Iranian writers, at the hands of the Russians.'1 Howfollowing lqbal, have come to the same conclusion. ever, neither Haydar Khan's Islamic zeal, nor his oftstand the test of closer sense of nationalism, proclaimed The error with regard to Haydar. Khan's religious scrutiny. zeal probably stems from the fact that, in Russian Azerdiffered from the exestablishment the exploiting baijan, and masses not only in class but also in religion ploited to the Russian Haydar Khdn's opposition nationality.12 be assumed to have its source establishment could therefore As far as elements. in any of the three aforementioned claim with regard to the formation of a Muslim poIqbal's there were in party by Haydar Khan is concerned, litical formed in the Caucasus parties fact two Muslim political the Himmat and the century, in the twentieth very earl of the Russian off-shoots These were basically Musavat.1 Haydar Khan, however, not only Social Democratic Party. maintained his membership as a Social Democrat (according to the memoirs),14 but he was in Iran when the two Muslim parties were formed and thus could not have been among Nor was Haydar Khan (as some Persian authors the founders. He remained a Russian suba nationalist. have suggested) he was rather disdainand, as his memoirs indicate, ject, Witness his experiful of the backwardness of Persians. lack of ence in Mashhad and his complaint of.people's maturity. 15

23

WINTER1973

In fact, the sole ideological criterion that we can usefully apply to Haydar Khan is Marxism as interpreted by the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party and by its left wing at the time of the split. It is only then that we gain insight into his cooperation with the "bourgeois nationalists" in the course of the Constitutional Movement, and his later avowed Bolshevism. The development of Haydar Khdn's course of action closely resembles the doctrinal change that the Communists underwent after the October Revolution of 1917. While Marx had predicted a socialist take-over first in the western countries, a school of Asian communists pressed for immediate socialist revolution in the East following the October Revolution. Finally, it was agreed that those countries that had experienced bourgeois nationalism for ten or more years were ready for the socialist stage.16 Iran was then such a country. From then on Uaydar Khan worked for the socialist take-over rather than a bourgeois-nationalist government. Vaydar Khdn's memoirs begin from the time of his recruitment in Baku during Muzaffar al-Din Shah's first trip to Europe in 1900 and end with the murder of Atabak, the Iranian premier, in 1907. This covers part of the first phase of Haydar Khan's political activities, namely Folhis co-operation with the "bourgeois nationalists." lowing the murder of Atabak, he is supposed to have partiterror of major sigcipated in two more acts of political nificance. These are not covered by the memoirs, but since we are concentrating on the first phase of Haydar Khdn's political life, namely his cooperation with the national we will deal with them. bourgeoisie, On August 31, 1907, the very day that the AngloRussian Agreement dividing Iran into spheres of influence was signed in St. Petersburg, Atabak was shot in front of His alleged assassin is the Majlis (Parliament) building. said to have committed suicide soon after shooting Atabak. On his body a note was found which read "'cAbb&sAqa, money changer, of Azerbaijan, member of the Anjuman, a nationalist devotee, No. 41."'17 It is an indication of the political confusion of the time that every political group was

IRANIANSTUDIES

24

for Ataeither accused of or boasted of being responsible on the subject, however, can The literature bak's murder. The friends of be broadly divided into two categories. accuse Mulammad CAlU Shah (January, 1907Atabak generally to show that Atabak July, 1909) and his court in an effort Thus, had become a true friend of the constitutionalists. of who held the portfolio Hidayat, Mukhbir al-Saltanah, under Atabak, claims that the murthe Minister of Sciences der was ordered by the Shah and carried out by the AdamlAtabak's political including Other sources, yat group.l8 by the constituthat Atabak was killed enemies, insist sources agree that it was Most reliable tionalists.19 some alleging gaydar Khan who planned the assassination, Azerbaijani that Taqlzadah, at the time a young radical was also involved.20 member of Parliament, was not a simple act of poAtabak's assassination were felt long after Its repercussions violence. litical with Parliament The Shah's relationship Atabak's death. that Atabak had beworsened, as the era of conciliation On the very day of his gun drew to an end with his death. an oath from MubammadcAll Shah death, Atabak had extracted that he would cooperate with Parliament and that he would Enjoying the highhis power to the ministers.21 delegate in the country, Atabak was the only est political stature a constitutional man who might have been able to establish Not only could he stand up against monarchy in the land. the unreasonable demands of the Shah, but he could also he had the support muster enough support in Parliament, of the merchants, of the top clergy, the representatives the Speaker as well as such moderates as Sanic al-Dawlah, of the House.22 Atabak could count on the wealth of Amin clergywhile the influential al-Zarb and Mucin al-Tujjar, man, Sayyid CAbd Allah, kept the populace under control mainly composed for him. The opposition in Parliament, of Azerbaijani was outnumbered.23 representatives, quickly The murder of Atabak changed the picture that the coalition The working majority, and completely. immediately disappeared. Atabak had formed in Parliament, joined his previous Sayyid cAbd Allah, his arch-supporter, 25

WINTER1973

enemies, namely Taqlzadah and his radical group.24 The fear instilled by "devotee No. 41" was so great that Atabak was not even given a public funeral. The moderates and the absolutists feared for their own lives. 25 The small radical minority in Parliament had received an important boost indeed. On the traditional fortieth-day commemoration of CAbbas Aqa's death, when the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 had also been made public, the population of Tehran turned out as for a holiday. Thousandf6 gathered at his tomb, swearing to follow in his path. It would seem that this single act of violence, while altering the power coalitions at the top, brought the common urban people together into one unified body. They became more hopeful about their futures, more aware of their existence as a nation, and less tolerant toward absolutism. In fact, it would seem that a new element appeared in the life of the Persians, namely patriotism. With the disappearance of Atabak from the scene, the lines of conflict became more clearly drawn. The Shah and Parliament could not agree on cabinets, and in the absence of a figure like Atabak interceding between the constitutionalists and the Shah, the two sides stood face to face against each other. The level of conflict rose, each side getting ready for the final round of the confrontation. Those who thought cooperation with the Shah was possible lost their standing among the constitutionalists, and thus the movement was radicalized and became more revolutionary. The Shah's camp also became more warlike. Fearful of the radicals, and yet keenly aware of the change in the style of politics, a group of notables united in an anjuman, which became known as the Khidmat.

According to Dawlatabad; 's account, Saltanah,

the new Speaker

group together.27

it was Ihtisham al-

of the House,

who brought

this

Prominent among the members of this

an-

Ihtisham juman was cAla'al-Dawlah, al-Saltanah's brother. The members of this anjuman went to Parliament on September 27, 1907, and declared their loyalty to the Constitution.28 The account that is ascribed to Haydar Khan is correct insofar as it recognizes the corrupt nature of

IRANIAN STUDIES

26

Mirza Ahmad Khan cAla' al-Dawlah himself was this group. who had survived official an example of an unscrupulous and had master-minded many more, and who many intrigues of the nature of the changing 2 atterns was very conscious He around him.2 relationships of the political-power like many other late top Qajar funcstarted his career, servant to Nasir al-Din Shah (1848as a personal tionaries, and ruthlesshis father's title Later, he inherited 1896). It was he who, as the governor of ly worked his way up.30 and thus so provoked some merchants, Tehran, bastinadoed Shah, other merchants that they took refuge in the Masjid-i where, joined by Sayyid CAbd Allah and Sayyid Muhammad, they began the movSTent which developed into the Constitusucceeded, Yet, when the Revolution Revolution. tional when the constitutionalists In fact, he tried to join it. as governor of Fars, to forced his resignation effectively get their support he went to the Court as a member of a demanding that the Shah cease opposing the Condelegation stitution.32 of pecple The Anjuman-i Khidmat was a conglomeration rather than changing alliances new political establishing It was a major threat to constitutionalism their politics. Haydar Khan, in harmed it most. and the one that finally to make the movement more radical, struggle his continuous of the Khidmat group. must have been aware and resentful in one of two act could only have resulted His terroristic would have Khidmat either the group reactions: possible in which and turned to the absolutists, been antagonized case the movement would have been purged of the elements with the connections with strong emotional and social or the Khidmat ancien regime and thus more radicalized; into further and more group would have been frightened In either with the constitutionalists. cooperation radical In the case, Haydar Khan would have welcomed the result. it was the second which at least, case of cAla' al-Dawlah, took place. Six months after Atabak's murder, on the last day of February, 1908, a bomb was thrown at the Shah's motor The Shah himself happened to be in a following vehicle. Some members of the royal and escaped injury. carriage 27

WINTER1973

entourage, however, were not as lucky. The plice investigation resulted in the arrest of Haydar Khan, among others, and the accused were taken to the Shah's residence for further investigations. The fact that the police had apparently not sought a legal warrant for their arrest or for the search of their residences, and the transfer of the accused to the Shah's palace, resulted in a protest in the Majlis and among the constitutionalists outside of the Majlis. Under popular pressure not only were all of the accused released, but the chief of police and the governor of Tehran were brought in front of the courts for their handling of the case.3 At least Haydar Khan, of those arrested, was deeply involved in the plot. He in fact confessed later that he was the one who threw the bomb;34 and according to another source, he was in the habit of boasting of it. Other contemporary sources, some of them friends of Haydar Khan, agree that he was the master-mind behind the plot.36 The insistence of the constitutionalist leaders that the accused should be released must have convinced the Shah that they were also involved in, or at least in agreement with, the plan to have him assassinated. The constitutionalists showed no interest in seeking those responsible for the episode, nor did they agree that those already accused could be brought before proper tribunals. In fact, once again an open act of violence had changed the moods and orientations of the leadership of the Majlis and the "Court party." The very Majlis that was now in the forefront of the struggle for the release of the accused plotters had previously been buying royal support eagerly, and rather expensively. The bomb was thrown at a time when the relationship between the Shah and the Majlis was once again amicable. Taqlzadah, who at the time was one of the most radical members of Parliament, finds it possible to say that "the relationship between the Shah and the people was continuously growing warmer and firmer until the incident of the bomb thrown at the Shah's retinue. That single event," he says, "changed the picture. The Shah 7 disillusioned with the Majlis, resolved to destroy it." The Constitutional Revolution had so far evolved rather the constitutionalists peacefully: employed such tradiIRANIANSTUDIES

28

tional means of registering as taking sanctuary opposition or the ulama leaving the capital (bast), in self-imposed exile. The attack on the Shah's motor vehicle and the subsequent closure of the Majlis intensified the conflict to such a degree that the usual channels for expressing opposition were no longer adequate. The Shah and the constitutionalists confronted each other, armed. And for the first time in the Middle East a monarch was deposed in the name of the nation. Following the closing of the Majlis, Haydar Khan went to the Caucasus, where he aided in the supply of men and ammunition to Iran to fight the absolutists.38 Later in the course of the Revolution, he returned to Tabriz. This period of his activities is mainly marked by the bomb concealed in a parcel that he sent to Shujac Nizam, an absolutist officer stationed in the city of Marand. Shujac Nizam, upon opening the parcel, was killed by the ensuing The Shah sent another high-ranking explosion. to officer replace him, and the military situation did not change materially. But the abundant and detailed availinformation able about this incident in the contemporary sources may be an indication of the boost in morale that it gave to the constitutionalists at a difficult moment.39 When Tehran finally fell to the constitutionalists in 1909, two groups emerged, known as Dimukratlyfin-i cAmmlyian (Popular Democrats) and Ijtimaclyuin-i IctiddllyUn (Social Moderates). The Democrats were influenced by the Caucasian Social Revolutionaries of 1905.40 It was naturally with the Democrats that Haydar Khan cooperated. He was very active in setting up the branches of the Democratic Party in the provinces.41 His rare combination of charisma and his patience in establishing orgrass-root ganizations would have left an effect had his career not been cut short by the controversy over Bihbihani's death. On January 25, 1910, Sayyid cAbd Allah Bihbihnii, a powerful leader of the Moderates, was killed in his The murderer or murderers were never arrested. house. Most sources contend that Haydar Khan had master-minded the plan. MahmuidMahmiid, in whose house Haydar Khan sought 29

WINTER1973

refuge after Bihbih&ni's death, observes briefly in his42 notes that Bihbihani was killed by Haydar Khdn's group. Kasravi presents a rather complicated plot, the central theme of which was that "foreigners" set up the Democratic Party and that Haydar Khan became an unwitting agent for the Party and for Taqlzadah, one of its leaders. Whenthe ulama in Najaf declared Taqlzadah excommunicated and sent the excommunication document to Bihbihani to read in the Majlis, Taqlzadah, hoping to avoid this, instructed Haydar Khan to assassinate Bihbihani.43 Taqlzadah, just before his death, denied the allegation that he or Haydar Khan were involved. He held that copies of the excommunication document were sent many people other than Bihbihdnl.44 Whatever the facts may be, the popular opinion must have been more in line with the account that Kasravi presents, since soon after Bihbihanl's death Taqlzadah had to leave Iran. Haydar Khan was arrested, but, under pressure from the Democrats, he was released. He even participated in the disarming of Sattar Kh&an'sand Baqir Khan's bands, which formed the Moderates' armed support. However, with the supporters of Bihbihani after him,45 he spent most of his time in hiding, and his effectiveness was severely reduced. Thus, when Sipahdar became prime minister on March 11, 1911, he was able to expel Haydar Khan from the counThis marked the end of Haydar Khan's cooperation with try. the "nationalist bourgeoisie" in Iran. The following memoir is a case study of the efficacy of terror in polities marked by a low degree of instituis dominated by actors rathtionalization. Where politics er than by roles, the removal or coercing of certain individual actors can result in new patterns of political beof a figure havior. In such a setting an assassination like Atabak can be of a revolutionary magnitude, since, with his removal, the change is not limited to that of the in the patpremier, but extends to significant alterations and counter-alliances. tern of alliances In this milieu the public also identifies all its hopes and despairs with

certain selves violent Atabak,

actors. political They therefore express themin utopian revolutionary jargon, following each act. Such was the case following the death of when the populace felt that the last obstacle to

IRANIANSTUDIES

30

progress and democracy was removed. Haydar Khdn's terrorism not only helped to eradicate a sense of powerlessness felt by the majority of the people, a particular characof traditional teristic polities, but, by rendering the conservative elements insecure, made them accept a measure of political change which they would not have otherwise accepted. Text of Memoirs In Baku, I knew several Iranians. Muzaffar al-Din Shah4 was then on his first trip to Europe, accompanied by Mirza CAli Asghar Khan Atabak. He was seeking a Muslim engineer to set up an electric light factory in Mashhad. At that time, there were few Muslim electrical engineers and those that were in Baku introduced me. After purchasI set out for ing parts and equipment for 400 lights, Khurasan. Although the purchases were arranged by Hakim al-Mulk,47 I accepted this procedure. Prince Nayyir al-Dawlah48 was governor of Mashhad. I saw in that city acts of cruelty which offended the human conscience. I had been involved since the age of 12 in political activities in Russia, and I had never been able to tolerate economic exploitation. How could I witness such acts in Iran and remain silent? What surprised and affected me even more was seeing the governor moving through the streets and markets. A large number of servants and retainers, about 400 people, surrounded him. People sitting down along the path followed by the governor were raised up by force and ordered to kneel in homag I had never seen this kind of thing. The Mutivalli Bash of the Holy Shrine also practised this. He once called I me to his house to make some inquiries about my job. was taken to a room by one of his servants. The Mutivalli B&shl himself was seated above the crowd on one side of a heater. Hajl Vazir was seated on the other side. There was one chair near them. I purposely sat down on that chair although the rest of the people were sitting on their knees upon the ground.

31

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The Mutivalli manners are?" explain

Bashi asked me, "Do you know what

I answered, "Yes, I do. If you like, them in more detail for you."

He replied, manners are.1"

"Very well,

speak up.

I am ready to

Let me see what

I answered, "Manners require that a person's behavior be such that people not call him crazy. It also involves an element of morality. Not telling lies nor thieving nor defrauding are considered parts of manners. Everyone who adheres to these four conditions is said to be,a person of good manners." He said, "Correct, but there are customs requiring one to respect one's elders and superiors, aren't there? You should respect notables, shouldn't you"? I said, "Yes, we do, but not the ones of which you are thinking. A person is notable if he possesses knowledge and wisdom." I did not know Persian well, so all of our conversation was exchanged by means of an interpreter. The Mutivalli

Bashi was very offended

by such a remark,

and his

anger became apparent. Because I had sat on the chair without his permission, our conversation had shifted from one about routine matters to a personal feud. He considered my behavior an affront to his rank. I got up and, saying good-bye, went out. Being very angry, he did not answer. This gave me satisfaction that he would not want to see me again. At that time, Saham al-Mulk, who had replaced

the Mutivalli Nasir al-Mulk

Bashi was Shlrazl.

Since the electric light was something new people often came to the factory to look around. way, I became acquainted with practically all the dents in the Khurasan area, from the lowly to the

IRANIANSTUDIES

32

to Iran, In this resinotables.

My own purpose in affronting the Mutivalli Bdsh1 was to demonstrate to the people of Khurasan who lacked culture and understanding in some matters that the Mutivalli Bashi was also a man and not descended from the sky; that it was possible to behave in the same way towards him that they behaved toward other classes of people; that he had been elevated to this rank because of wealth, bribes, or other such arrangements; and that it was possible that he in no way deserved it. One evening, a man arrived at the entrance of the factory and said that His Excellency, the Mutivalli Bashi, was coming to look around and that it would be good to send on a light ahead. I paid no attention to the man's remarks. I even ordered that they shut the doors of the factory. After he had arrived and had waited a half-hour outside the gate, I agreed through one of the employees to his visit and gave permission to open the door. Once he had entered the factory, I paid no attention to him. After walking around, he left. My main intention in behim was to make the men grasp the meaning and littling value of human dignity. At the beginning of my stay in Khurasan, I witnessed a dreadful spectacle which prompted the people to admire and praise the new governor. They believed that he would be a good and cruel governor who would be able to establish law and order. However, my nature was repelled by the following sight, which I considered an act of sheer cruelty, and contrary to conscience and humanity. A body was split in two; one half hung on one side of the gate I could not erase and the other hald on the other side. this barbaric image from my mind. After a short time, another inhuman event occurred. The new, blood-thirsty governor united with the landowners to store and hoard grain in order to raise its price. They sold it in such a way that people could acquire bread only The price of with difficulty and at exorbitant rates. bread increased so much that the poor and weak were unable to purchase it. 33

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Since I was acquainted with most of the inhabitants, I used the high price of bread to incite the people against I urged them to unite and to rethe tyrannical governor. volt for the dismissal of the governor. Gradually, a great wave of turmoil began to make itself felt amongst the people until suddenly thronging together, they demanded the removal of the governor. In the midst of the excitement, several houses were sacked, one of them being the home of Na'ib al-Tawllyah. Twenty casks of wine were brought out of his residence. Na'ib was one of the chief guardians of the Shrine and had a yearly income of 40,000 tfimdns from village endowments to the Shrine. He was one of the five guards who took their turn lighting the lamps of the Shrine. It was charged also that Naqlb al-Sadat, one of the foremost landowners in Khurasan, was associated with the governor in hoarding grain and with that in mind, the people sacked his two-hundred-year-old house. Two casks of wine were placed in the entrance to the Shrine. Passers-by were told that this wine was from the house of Naqlb, a guard of the Shrine, who on the surface displayed such piety. In the turmoil, the young son of Naqib was killed and buried in the guard-house, but Naqlb himself took refuge in the I did not favor those events and did not want any Shrine. looting to take place. Since no one had informed me about the operation of government in Iran and because I did not know that all Iranian system of government was always conducted in the same manner, I imagined that after the removal of this brutal governor, his replacement would be forewarned about the previous governor and would not take part in unlawful activities. Unfortunately, the reverse was true; the next governor followed the same sort of policy, absolutely unchanged. I then understood that the government of Iran acted only on the followed no law and that its authorities principles of force and personal despotism. Whatever rulers wished to do with regard to the inhabitants, they could with complete impunity.

IRANIANSTUDIES

34

The commotion lasted about 13 days. The mob grew so great that movement in the entrance to the Shrine was Nayyir al-Dawlah was deposed and Rukn alimpossible. Dawlah50 was appointed governor and moved to Khurasan. After the arrival of Rukn al-Dawlah, no further changes took place in people's feelings and thoughts. had not got appeared. When I The idea of a constitution I was spoke to them on the subject of a constitution, broaching a totally extraordinary topic, the implications They said of which they failed completely to understand. that people could not speak with the Shah, that a person's order tongue was tied because the ruler could arbitrarily them beheaded. group in Ordered from Russia to form a political struggled for 11 months to esKhurasan, I unsuccessfully tablish one. Their minds were not ready and my endeavor They did not understand the meaning of my was fruitless. words. During that time, I found one Mashhadi with whom His name I was able to discuss the topic of the party. was Ibrahim Milni and he had imported a cigarette factory there. Since I realized that my efforts in Khurasan were I set out for Tehran on October 8, 1903. Ten useless, days later I reached N;shapiur. The deposed governor, land around Nishapiir. Nayyir al-Dawlah, owned substantial was his fief and its government under his The city itself control. After returning from Khurasan, I saw that he had ordered a person hanged. Several months after my arrival in Tehran, I took a job in a machine-shop. This way, I came to know all the My purpose was to get to know many mechanics in the city. So I resigned from the machine-shop and types of people. took employment in the Russo-Iranian Transport Company. In this job, I met most of the merchants and foreigners. After one year, I resigned and became employed in the electric light business of Haji lHusayn Aqa Amin al-Zarb. Electrical section was completely under my authority. 35

WINTER1973

In those three companies where I worked I made the I considered some of acquaintance of very many people. them capable and discussed certain things with them. For example, I said that government must be based on law and that the people elected by the nation must interpret that I also asserted of the country. law in the best interests and governors should possess that the ruler, ministers, limited power and that they should not be free to do as they wished. At this time, I found a way to some of the ulama. The people of Tehran obtained a photograph of M. Naus,51 the head of Customs, in the clothes of an Islamic preacher The situation graduand began calling for his expulsion. ally became more entangled and then the people began demanding justice and a house of justice. After the events at Jumcah Mosque and the trip to Qum,52

the first

people

to take refuge

in the British

Em-

bassy were the students of the Sipah Salar Mosque school. I sent them there after giving 5,000 dinars to each. Previously, when the Sipah Salar Mosque was being wired for I had gone along to supervise. At that time, electricity, I had had a chance to talk with the students and I was successful with them. Later, a large group gathered within the British Muzaffar al-Din Shah was comEmbassy from every class. The pelled to comply with the requests of the nation. One was a decree of a conpeople proposed several items. Another was the opening of the national assemstitution. Another demand was the return of the ulama from Qum bly. and also the removal of CAyn al-Dawlah53 from his position as the chief minister. After the ulama returned from Qum, Mu;affar al-Din However, it Shah issued a decree granting a constitution. Those who agreed with us did not achad certain defects. cept that decree and prevented the people from leaving the Embassy. Eventually the Shah conformed to the wishes of the nation, that is, those people assembled at the Embassy IRANIANSTUDIES

36

and signed the decree for the Constitution. Since those who took refuge in the Embassy had abwas or what solutely no concept as to what a constitution it required, a special group kept them informed and inI was among that group and stilled in them its own ideas. can say that, most of the fundamental ideas came from the house of the late Sanic al-Dawlah.54 The time for electing representatives arrived. We had a struggle to get knowledgable people elected, and at first we managed only to form a disorganized group of people from the bazar. They were brought together and conWe attempted to organize sulted on important occasions. them and succeeded. We also formed a Secret Committee consisting of seven people, as well as a Public Committee of which a great many of the bazar people were members. The representatives were elected and gradually formed into cliques. Our committees regressed into disorganization. Each representative became a member in a society or clique. This dispersed our Public Committee. Eventually only I remained and the seven people in the Secret Committee. We had connections with the Russian Social Democratic Party. The Russian Social Democratic Party was informed that its branch had been established in Tehran. They wrote to me personally that the necessary orders had been given to the party branch in the Caucasus and that I, having formed an offshoot of that branch, should work together with them. Several representatives who had connections with the Social Democratic Party in the Caucasus worked with me. At one meeting, after much deliberation, a decision was made to frighten the absolutists who at that time had formed a group called the Anjuman-i Khidmat, and had secret connections with Muhammad CAli Mlrz& [Shah] and were working to destroy the Constitution, by throwing a bomb at the home of the Vazir-i Makhsuls.55 37

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Several fedaeens from Baku were in Tehran and were ordered to do this. However, they did not do a good job. They left the bomb unexploded in the doorway of the house and ran away. The absolutists did not appreciate the warning, and corruption and evil practices continued. It was decided to throw a bomb at the house of CAla' al-Dawlah. The sound of this would reach the people. The intention was only to scare the absolutists. The eve of July 25, 1907, I set out alone about seven hours after sunset to I had a large bomb with me and I let carry out this task. it explode at the door of his house. Then I moved away in Two the direction of the zoo. It was a very dark night. soldiers in front of the post office came after me. Two others were in front of me. While I was on the sidewalk I intended to the four of them got together on my trail. go from Mirza CAli Akbar Khan Nazim al-Atibba' Street to the northern wall of the factory yard. There was a tall, solid pole in the yard, on top of which was some electric wiring. Beforehand, I had tied a thick rope to this pole and thrown the end of the rope over the wall to the street side. When I returned from the job, I could take the rope and swing to the top of the wall, which was about four meters high, and from there, I could swing into the yard. When I approached Mirza CAll Akbar Khan Street, I fired several shots at my pursuers to make them turn back. They ran away and I continued on. At the near end of Lukhtlha Street, an old policeman stuck his head out of his bedroll and said, "Whoare you? What's going on?" I answered, "Shut up and go to sleep." The policeman said, "Right," put his head under his ragged quilt and went back to sleep. I turned into Mirza cAll Akbar Khan Street but there were many dogs about me, barking and preventing my movement. I drove them away by all possible means and moved on. Several Cossacks were now coming after me, Since it was a very dark night, they could not shooting. see me, but they kept shooting in the direction of the The backyard of the factory was next to the back barking. of the house a Cossack officer whose name was Muhammad BaIt was from qir Khan Mirpanj and who is now a colonel. IRANIANSTUDIES

38

there

that

the Cossacks

came.

Close to Mirza CAll Akbar Khan's house there was a narrow street on the left. I needed to turn there in order to reach the rope. But because of the dogs and their I missed the street barking, and went beyond it by mistake. After turning around, I found the street. Meanwhile, bullets from the Cossack rifles were showering down around me. I finally reached the rope, according to plan, grabbed it, and jumped. Just as I did so, a dog bit my leg I drove him away with a kick but he took a from behind. piece of my trousers. There was no harm done to my leg. I quickly, reached the top of the wall and using the lamp post, immediately entered the backyard. Everyone was asleep. The offices were closed and locked. The only place I could stay unnoticed till morning was the iron-works. The floor there was very damp because it never got any sun. I went inside but could not find a dry spot in which to sit. Therefore I stood on my feet until morning and caught rheumatism in my legs from the dampness in the ground. My imagination played tricks on me. I heard the sound of footsteps on the roof and thought that the pursuers had guessed my plans and come after me. Gripping my revolver, I came out to defend myself. Meanwhile, the on the roof sounded more rapid and fleeting. footsteps I could not find even a large shadow worth worOutside, rying about. Then I realized that it was the sound of a

cat running and leaping on the roof. fidence and went back inside.

I regained my con-

About dawn, I heard the porter coming and I called out, "Open the door." He was greatly shocked and terrified at finding me there, since all the doors were closed and locked. He asked me, "How and when did you get in I answered, "I came because I had work in here. here?" I pounded on the door but you didn't wake up, so I was forced to come over this wall. Now hurry up and open the I want to get out of here." door. The porter opened the 39

WINTER1973

door and I left. I went directly to the residence of Mudir al-Sanayic to sleep. Just as I was ready to sleep, I suddenly heard pounding on the door. Again I thought that they were coming after me. I took my revolver and

prepared to defend myself.

It was unusual for anyone to

come there. Opening the door I saw two Jewish traders who wanted to buy used objects. I shut the door firmly and, stretching out flat on the bed, went to sleep. On July 25, 1907, there was a meeting of religious students and people at Sadr Madrasah,56 which it was necessary for me to attend. I That afternoon, therefore, went to the school. Hajl Khan Khayyat was also there and saw me. In front of the group and without any hesitation, he said, "What game were you playing last night at CAla' I laughed at his remark but pressed al-Dawlah's house?" his hand to signal him to be quiet. When the meeting broke up, I went with him to Laof the events. lahzar Street to see the effects They had had an extraordinary effect on the people. Moreover, the Europeans living in Tehran felt it. They were saying that it was a new Iran and no longer the old Iran, and that the which they people had now become aware of their rights, from the rulers. wanted to protect its effects About a month after this explosion, on The abthe minds of the people had totally disappeared. solutists were deeper than ever in their corrupt practices. Meanwhile, Mirza CAll Asghar Khan Atabak, whom Muhammad cAll Mirza brought back from Europe to undermine the Constitution, had secured the votes of seventy members of

Parliament, by means of bribes and promises. With this majority he was able to pass whatever he desired. His previous treasons having gone unpunished, Atabak once again embarked on an incessant series of intrigues to destroy the Constitution. For example, he bribed Shaykh Fazl Allah Mujtahid and a group of his followers to go to57

Haz.rat-i Shah CAbdal-Azim where they provoked an incident

IRANIANSTUDIES

40

The Secret Committee of Social Democrats in Tehran, in which the late Hajl Malik al-Mutikallimin and Aqa Sayyid Vaciz58 were both members, decided to do away with Atabak and sent the order to the Executive Committee. This Committee then forwarded the order to the Committee of Terror which, under my leadership, consisted of twelve people divided into three groups of four members each. A special commission was set up to decide whether the weapon should be a bomb or some other type of weapon. After much deliberation, the majority opinion deemed the bomb unwise, and it was agreed that the job should be done with a revolver. Amongthe terrorist group, lots were drawn, and the name of cAbbas Aqa was selected, along with two others as his I was with them on several occasions when assistants. they went to Atabak's summer residence in Shimiran but it was never possible to carry out the assassination. It was announced that on August 8, Atabak would come to Parliament. On Friday, the 7th cAbbas Aqa, Mirza CAll Akbar, Hasan Aqa, cAbbas' brother, and I went to the bathhouse. The next day, we went to Parliament to get a ticket for cAbbas so that he would have entree to the spectators' gallery.59 We went to the Assembly Building courtyard and gate. Several hours after dark, Atabak came out with Sayyid CAbdAllah Mujtahid. They were conversing and heading in the direction of the gate. About six feet from the gate, a sayyid interrupted Sayyid CAbdAllah to present a petition. Atabak, however, came on ahead behind the torchbearers. As soon as two and a half feet.... NOTES 1.

Haydar Khan was born in the family of Tariverdiov in Alexsandropol, currently known as Leninakan, in Armenia. His birthdate is not clearly known, but considering that he had just graduated from college when he came to Iran in 1901, he was probably born in the late 1870s. His stay in Iran coincided with a revolutionary period in Iranian history in which he participated eagerly. Following his departure from Iran 41

WINTER1973

in 1911, he continued his technical education in in During the First World War, he enlisted Paris. tock the Ottoman Army. When the Russian Revolution He helped in the organihe went to Russia. place, Iranian Communist Party. zation of CAdalat, the first In In 1921 he joined the Soviet Republic of Giln. by the more October of the same year, he was killed who resented the of the Republic, moderate faction Russian influence. 2.

The in two installments. The account was published first part, cAbb&s Iqbal, "Haydar Khan cAmujUghlii," Yadigar, Vol. 3, No. 5 (1946), pp. 61-80, covered Uaydar Khdn's life from the time of his departure for Iran until Atabak's return to Iran and his preThe second part of the account, which inmiership. cluded Atabak's assassination, appeared in Yadigar, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1946), pp. 50-51.

3.

See Yadigar, "Unsigned articles," (1948), the back cover.

4.

Ibrahim Munshlzadah came to Iran from Eriwan with his father in 1889, where both became Persian citizens. in the Cossack brigade, of Russian officers Resentful he resigned his commission in 1907 and thereupon In 1915 he formed the joined the constitutionalists. Iranian Committee, through which several Retribution During Vus5q's governstatesmen were assassinated. ment, Munshizadah was to be banished from Tehran, but was murdered en route by his gendarme guards in 1917. For his biography see Mahdi Bamdad, Shar4-i hal-i (BioIran dar garn-i 12, 13, va 14 hijri rijal-i graphies of Iranian statesmen of the 12th, 13th, and A.H.), Vol. 1 (Tehran, 1347), pp. 2914th centuries Farrukh (Farslyasi-i 31; Mahdi Farrukh, Khatirat-i rukh's political pp. 10-12; memoirs) (Tehran, n.d.), (Memoirs) (no place of CAbdAllah Bahrami, Khatirat n.d.), pp. 487-525. publication,

5.

See the translation

IRANIAN STUDIES

of the account

42

Vol.

5, Nos.

above.

1-2

Vasan ICzam Quds1, KitAb-i of my memoirs), Vol. 1 (Tehsee also MahmuidMahmuid, Fikr-i azadi (The idea of p. 334.

6.

p. 469; Bamdad, 2p. cit., man (The Book khatirat-i ran, 1963), pp. 162-163; "Memoirs" in F. Adamlyat, freedom) (Tehran, 1961),

7.

See the translated

8.

muCasirin" (Recent deaths), "Vafayat-i Mu1ammadQazvini, Yadigar, Vol. S, Nos. 4-5 (November, 1948-January, 1949), pp. 84-85.

9.

"Haydar cAmuiUghlu va Muhammad CAbd al-Husayn Nava'l, Amin Rasiulzadah," Yadigar, Vol. S, Nos. 1-2 (Septem1948), p. 56. ber-October, 4

text,

p. 32 above.

above.

10.

See footnote

11.

Iqbal,

12.

for Transcaucasia, 1917F. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle this problem 1921 (New York, 1951), p. 12, discusses The same can be said concernin regard to Georgia. ing Azerbaij'an.

13.

Ibid.,

14.

above. See also S. Jav1d, See the translation,pp.35-37 Iran va naqsh-i azadl khahan-i Nahzat-i mashritiyat-i movement and the Jahan (The Iranian constitutional (no place of freedom-lovers) role of international 1968), p. 59. publication,

15.

See the translation,

16.

Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berke1966); Walter E. Laqueur, The ley and Los Angeles, Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York, 1959), p. 18.

2p.

pp.

cit.,

p. 62.

19-22.

p. 35 above.

43

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17.

A. Kasravi, Tarikh-i mashritlyat-i Iran (History of Iranian constitutionalism), 7th Ed. (Tehran, 1967), p. 447.

18.

Mahdi Qul; Hidayat, Khatirat va khatarat (Remembrances and perils), 2nd Ed. (Tehran, 1965), pp. 157-158. See the rebuttal of the thesis of the Adamlyat involvement in the murder in F. Adamlyat, 2.* cit., pp. 256-275. In fact, on the advice of Sanic al-Dawlah, the Speaker of the House and Hidayat's brother, the governor of Tehran arrested the head of the Adamiyat group, charging him with the murder of Atabak. He was released in two days. See Adamlyat, ibid., pp. 271-273. The Adamlyat Society was a Freemasonic group. For the history of freemasonry in Iran, see Hamid Algar, "An introduction to the history of Freemasonry in Iran," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (October, 1970), pp. 276-296; F. Adamlyat, a. cit., particularly pp. 199-338. According to the memoirs of cAwn al-Mamalik, one of the founders of the Adamlyat Society, Atabak appeared before a committee of the and swore to be faithful to the Constitution. Society According to the same source, Atabak was trying to reconciliate the Shah and Parliament. See Adamiyat, op. cit., pp. 260-268. Some sources, like Khan Malik Sasani, Sijasatgardn-i dawrah-i Qajariyah (Statesmen of the Qajar period), Vol. 2 (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 309321, claim that they are in possession of "documents" proving the Shah's participation in Atabak's murder.

However, no documents have been produced so far. Sasanl claims that the Russians, finding out about Atabak's good will towards Parliament and the British, planned his assassination. Kasravi, however, seems to think that the British had previous the assassination. Kasravi, 2p. cit., 19.

knowledge of pp. 449-450.

Yahya Dawlatdabaddi,Hay4t-i Yahya (Yahya's life), Vol. 2 (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 136-145; Edward G. Browne,

IRANIAN STUDIES

44

The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 150-154. 20.

21.

Kasravi, op. cit., pp. 449-450, thinks that Taqizadah was the master mind behind the plot. Taqlzadah himself vehemently denies this. See Uasan Taq1zadah, "Akhirin difac-i Taqizadah" (Taqizddah's final defense), Rahnama-Yi Kitab, Vol. 13, Nos. 3, 4 (MayJune, 1970), pp. 223. This is an answer to accusations raised by Ibrahim Safa'l, Rahbaran-i mashriitah (Leaders of the constitutional movement) (Tehran, 1965). The rebuttal was published posthumously. While the antipathy of Kasravi, as well as of ,af'll, for Taqizadah is well known, a more impartial writer, Javad Shaykh al-Isl5ml, also insists that Taqizddah was an important member of the terroristic organization which Haydar Khan refers to (see the translation p. 21 above). See Javad Shaykh al-Isl&ml, "Ravish-i Taiqlq darbarah-yi asnad-i marbiit bi tarikh-i mashriitiyat-i Iran va shivah-i arzyabi-i daqlq-i anha" (The Methodology for the study of Iranian constitutional documents and their careful evaluation), Sukhan, Vol. 15, No. 7 (July, 1965), pp. 718-732. Taqlzadah claims that he has no knowledge of any terroristic organizations and he regards as completely baseless Haydar Khan's assertion that there was a "Secret Committee" which ordered the "Execution Committee" to have Atabak done away with (see the translation, p. 41 above). He asserts that Haydar Khan alone is responsible for Atabak's death. (See Sukhan, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1966), pp. 45-48.) In regard to Atabak's death, see also the memoirs of Sharaf al-Dawlah, who was elected to the first Majlis from Tabriz. Yahya Zaka', "Khatirat-i Sharaf al-Dawlah va jarayani qatl-i Atabak" (Sharaf al-Dawlah's memoirs and the incident of AtRbak's murder), Sukhan, Vol. 16, No. 4 (April, 1966), pp. 383-388. Dawlatabad;, o.P cit., pp. 139-140; see also the texts of Atabak's letter to the Shah demanding that he should be a constitutional monarch and the latter's 45

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acceptance in F.0. 416/33, Sir Spring-Rice to Sir EdSeptember 13, 1907, No. 200, Inward Gray (secret), closures 1 and 2. pp. 125-126.

22.

Dawlatabadi, 2k. cit.,

23.

Mahd1 Malikzadah, Tarikh-i inqilab-i mashrfitlyat (The Vol. 3 revolution), history of the Constitutional (Tehran, n.d.), p. 45.

24.

Dawlatabadi,

25.

Malikzadah,

26.

Ibid.,

27.

Dawlatabadi, op. cit.,

28.

and Persian reAnn K. S. Lambton, "Secret societies volution of 1905-6," in A. Hourani, ed., Middle EastNo. 1, St. Anthony's papers, No. 4 ern Affairs, (London, 1958), pp. 49-51.

29.

Riiznamah-i Mutammad Uasan Khan, Ictimad al-Saltanah, (Ictimdd al-Saltanah's Ictimad al-Saltanah khatirat-i ed. I. Afshar (Tehran, 1967), pp. 934-935, diary), 986.

30.

Ibid.,

31.

Browne, op.

cit.,

32.

Dawlatabadi, p. 162.

2p.

33.

Kasravi,

cit.,

34.

cAll Jamalzadah, "Taqlzadah," RahSayyid Muhammad nama-i kitab, Vol. 13, Nos. 3 and 4 (May-June, 1970), p. 167.

2p. 2p.

pp. 49-51;

pp.

221,

op.

IRANIAN STUDIES

cit.,

pp.

cit.,

180-181,

pp.

Browne,

52-53,

68.

cit.,

o.

191-194.

pp.

150-154.

pp. 148-149.

688.

pp. 112-113. cit.,

pp.

pp.

163-165;

Browne, 2p.

cit.,

548-551.

46

35.

Georges Ducroq, "La politique due gouvernment des Soviets en Perse," Revue du monde musulman, Vol. 52 (December, 1922), p. 145.

36.

Hidayat, 2p. cit., p. 151; Malikzadah, Vol. 3, pp. 213-214.

37.

va mashHasan Taqlzadah, Tarlkh-i ava'il-i ingilab of the beginnings of the rutlyat-i Iran (The history revolution and the Iranian constitution) (Tehran, 1958), pp. 58-59.

38.

CAbd al-Husayn

39.

Ibid., pp. 50-51; Kasravi, 2p. cit., pp. 800-804; Ismall Amir Khizl, Qlyam-i Azerbaijan va Sattar Khan (The Uprising in Azerbaijan and the role of Sattar Khan) (Tabriz, 1960), pp. 219-224, 233-234.

40.

A. Banani, "Hizb, Section 111, Persia," of Islam, New Ed., Vol. 3 (1971), fasc. 49-5- 1967; Adamiyat, 2o. cit., p. 324.

41.

Malik al-Shucara' Bahar, Thrikh-i mukhta?ar-i ahzab-i of polislyasl, inqirraz-i Qajarlyah (A Short history the demise of the Qajars), Vol. 1 tical parties, (1944), p. v; Navaci, 2p. cit., p. 53 .

42.

Malmiid Matmiid, "Memoirs," in Adamlyat, Mp. cit., pp. 334-335. says that MuhammadQazvlni categorically in the hands of 4aydar Khan. Bihbihanl was killed See MuhammadQazvlni, "Vafayat mucasirin" (Recent deaths), Yadigar, Vol. 5, Nos. 8-9 (March-April, 1949), p. 71.

43.

hijdah Salah-i Azerbaijan Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-i (Eighteen years in Azerbaijan history),(Tehran, 1954), 523-524. pp. 127-131,

44.

Taqizidah

Nava' , op. cit.,

"Akhirin

difac, " 2p.

47

op. cit.,

p. 48.

cit.,

Encyclopedia 49-50, pp.

pp. 221-223.

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45.

Malikzadah,

46.

Muzaffar al-Din Shah was born in 1853, acceded to the throne on June 8, 1896, and died on January 14, 1907, soon after he granted the Constitution. His reign was marked by various loans from Russia and an oil concession to the British. See Nikki R. Keddie, "Iranian politics 1900-1905: background to revolution," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 5 (1969), No. 1, pp. 3-31, and No. 2, pp. 151-167.

47.

Also known as Mirza MatmiidKhan Buriijirdi, Mu;affar al-Din Shah's personal physician. Muzaffar

9p.

al-Din

cit.,

Vol. 6, p. 219.

he was When

Shah was crowned Hakim al-Mulk

came

to Tehran with him. Upon his arrival in Tehran like the rest of the party who came to Tehran with Mu;affar al-Din Shah, he accumulated wealth and power and constituted a dangerous rival for Atabak. The latter, however, managed to send him to Gilln as the governor, where he was found dead shortly after his arrival on August 14, 1903. For his biography, see Bamdad, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 35-38; Hidayat, op. cit., p. 136;

for the conflict between Hakim al-Mulk and Atabak, see A. Mustawfl, Sharh-i zindigani-i man_ya tarikh-i ijtimaci va idari-i dawrah-i Qajdr1yah (The story of my life or the social and administrative history of the Qajars), Vol. 2 (Tehran, n.d.)., pp. 53-54. 48.

Also known as Sultan Husayn Mirza, he was the grand son of Fath cAll Shah (1797-1834). Like many other statesmen of the late nineteenth century, he started his career as a personal servant to Ndair al-Din Shah (1848-1896). Upon the death of his father in 1888, he inherited his father's title and some of his official governmental positions. This practice had genin the second half of Nasir erally become universal al-Din Shah's reign. In 1900, when Mutammad Taqi Mirza Rukn al-Dawlah, Nasir al-Din Shah's brother and governor of Khurasan, died; Nayyir al-Dawlah became

the governor. (Most governorates used to be held by members of the Qajar royal family.) He was dismissed IRANIAN STUDIES

48

in 1903 following the incident that Haydar Khan mentions in his account. See Ictimad al-Saltanah, 2p. cit.,

49.

p. 643; Bamdad, 2p.

cit.,

Vol.

2, pp. 86-91.

Chief administrator or the shrine endowments of Mashhad has been with the ruling monarch, as the mutivalli. He delegates his authority to a nii'b al-taw1_1ya, who is either governor-general of Khurasan or equal to him in rank. The day-to-day administration of the endowments was left in the hands of a functionary, usually referred to as the mutivalli bashl. For a general description of the administration of the Holy Shrine endowments just prior to lIaydar Khan's arrival, see Mustawfi's account of the trip he took to Mashhad in 1898.

See Mustawfl,

op. cit.,

Vol.

2,

pp. 38-42. 50.

CAll Naqi Mirza, the eldest son of Mu4ammad Taq1 Mirza Rukn al-Dawlah inherited his father's title in 1900 upon the latter's death. In 1903 he-became the governor of Khurasan, a position his father had held up to the time of his death in 1900. He was governor of Khurasan until 1904. See the editor's notes in A1mad CAll Khan Vaziri Kirmani, Tarikh-i Kirman (A History of Kirmdn), ed. Bastani Parizi (Tehran, 1961), pp. 440-442.

51.

In M. Joseph Naus was a Belgian financial expert. December, 1903, he was appointed Director of the Customs. In 1904, he became the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs as well. Finally, he became the High His arbitrary manner of handling the afTreasurer. fairs of the state had created much resentment. When it became known that he had himself photographed in the dress of the Muslim clergy, the resentment against him received the emotional spark which it needed to Grievances against him were a factor in explode. the movement that developed into the Constitutional Revolution. See Browne, 2p. cit., pp. 109-112, 136138.

49

WINTER1973

52.

The demands for the removal of Naus, the formation of a house of justice, as well as other demands, resulted in a riot in which 18 people were killed, two of them sayyids (believed to be descendants of the ProA large crowd took sanctuary in the Masjid-i phet). Jumcah (Friday Mosque), whence they left for the Holy Shrine at Qum. Around the same time, 5,000 people took sanctuary in the British Embassy. The demands at this point became more substantial: namely, a and a representative constitution national assembly. On August 5, 1906, the Shah acceded to the people's demands. Browne, p. cit., pp. 112-124.

53.

Sultan CAbdal-Majid Mirza, known as cAyn al-Dawlah, was Fatt CAll Shah's grand son. He was the chief minister when the Constitutional Revolution began; and his reactionary and harsh personality may indeed have accelerated the Revolution. as demanded by the constitutionalists

1906. tional 54.

55.

Yet he twice became premier in the constituperiod in 1914 and again in 1917.

Uanlc al-Dawlah and two of his brothers, Mukhbir alSaltanah and Mukhbir al-Mulk, all educated in Europe, were prominent in the Constitutional Movement. Sanic al-Dawlah helped draft the electroal law and became the first Speaker of the House. Upon the murder of Atabak, he resigned his Speakership, despairing of any meaningful reform. He was finally killed by a Georgian on February 6, 1911. See Muhammad Qazvlnl, "Vafayat-i muCairln,"' Yadigar, Vol. 5, Nos. 4-5 (November, 1948-January, 1949), pp. 84-85; Browne, 2p. cit., pp. 129, 137, 140. Ghulam Husayn Khan Ghaffarl, minister

of the court.

Vol. 2, pp. 114-115, 56.

He was dismissed, on July 24,

governor of Tehran and cit., 2.

See Dawlatabad'i,

120.

A mosque school in the southern part of Tehran, which was one of the centers of political gatherings during the Constitutional Movements.

IRANIAN STUDIES

50

57.

clergymen, led by Shaykh Fazl About 500 absolutist Allah, took bast (sanctuary) in the shrine of Shah CAbdal-Azim, whence they waged propaganda warfare The ostensible reason against constitutionalism. for their bast was that the Majlis should not interThey took fere with Islamic religious principles. bast just before Atabak became premier and upon his death they returned to Tehran. Haydar Khan's claim that Shaykh Faz,l Allah worked for Atabak is questionSayyid CAbdAllah was the main pillar among able. The enmity bethe clergy upon whomAtabak relied. tween the Sayyid and the Shaykh was so intense that they could not be in the same camp. For this very and reason the Shaykh left the constitutionalists themwas willing to rejoin them if they dissociated selves

from the Sayyid.

Vol. 3, pp. 59-62, 64-65,

See Dawlatdbddl , op. cit.,

88-91.

58.

Malik al-Mutikallimin and Sayyid Jamal Vaciz were When two radical members of the first Parliament. CAll Shah staged a coup against the constiMuhammad For dein 1908, he had them executed. tutionalists tails on the two, see the study by Malik al-Mutikallimin's son: Mahdi Malikzadah, 2B. cit.

59.

Haydar Khan seems to have made a mistake in recording the date. Atabak was murdered on August 31st.

51

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TWO POEMSBY FOROUGHFARROKHZAD

Translatedby MASSUDFARZAN

0

Bejeweled Land!

Finally I made it. I registered myself and confirmed my existence with a name and a number. Therefore, long live number 678 from the 5th Arrondisement, Tehran. Now I am all set The bosom of Motherland The lullaby of old civilization and nipple of history and the rat-rat-rattle of law's rattlebox-it is all mine I am all provided for.

Massud Farzan is Professor

of English at Pahlavi University,

Shiraz.

IRANIAN STUDIES

52

I stand by the window and inhale In ecstasy, 678 lungfuls of air, scented with dung, urine and rubbish I sign my name on 678 bills and on 678 application blanks: Forugh Farrokh-Zad. In the land of the Rose'n Nightingale a privilege it's to be merely living, is finally your existence confirmed,

let alone when with a name and a number. I can simply peep--legally Henceforth at last!--through the curtains and see 678 poet-charlatans in search of rhymes and rhythms amidst garbage cans I have but taken my first legal stroll, whereupon a flock of 678 mysterious as black nightingales, disguised crows flap their weary wings toward daylight I have only to inhale my first legal share of air and smell the odor of 678 roses: Courtesy of the great Plastico Inc. Manufacturers, Ah, yes. It is a privilege to live in the homeland of Mr. Crooner Junkie Clownson and Maestro Torchsongster film stars--opulent not to mention flocks of fleshy legs, buttocks, breasts & covergirl-cum-art & what-not; and philosophers of "to hell with it, it ain't mine" and quiz shows and--Ah, you have only to touch any soundbox or picturebox and out jumps to sing a new genius of juvenalia.... So, now that I have finally made it I'll celebrate I'll buy--and charge it--678 candles which I'll light; then I'll jump onto the shelf to deliver a few words, Ladies and Gents, on the advantages of living legally whose ground I'll break, amidst overwhelming with a shovel, with an axe or a bodkin.... 53

applause,

WINTER1973

Henceforth I can join artists' gangs but first I should inhale, in the backroom of Khachick's corner store, several grams of pure stuff and drink several cups of not-so-pure Pepsi Cola and publish several pieces of blah-blah, tam-tam-tamara Then I join the assembly of "artists" and write the outline of the project of my first great novel on the back of 678 packets of grade A native Winstons whereupon I should have become self-confident enough to extend a self-invitation to the assembly of eulogy & flattery & financial security because, Gentlemen, every month I read from cover to cover the Magazine of Art & Science & Acquiescence. Moreover, I am not too bad in "the art of good rhetoric and poetics." Oh yes, finally I made it therefore, long live number 678 from the 5th Arrondisement, Tehran who, with her will power, hard work and positive thinking has obtained such a lofty position, namely 678 meters from where she stands at the window to the ground on the sidewalk and is proud and privileged to be able to throw herself directly from the window--rather than indirectly via the staircase-onto the bosom of the motherland. Let it be her final wish and will that in return for 678 coins the great poet & official laureate Maestro AbrahamSahba compose a eulogy in her behalf in therhyme-pattern of blah.

IRANIANSTUDIES

54

I Feel Sad For The Garden Nobody is thinking about f lowers nobody is thinking about the goldfish nobody wants to believe that the flower garden is dying that the garden's heart has swollen under the sun that the garden's mind is being emptied of the memory of green that the garden's feeling is huddling in a corner, slowly rotting. The yard of our house is lonely our yard is yawning in anticipation of a rain from some unknown cloud and the pond in our yard is empty. The small inexperienced stars are falling off the treetops and from the house of the goldfish, there come, at night, our yard is lonely.

through their

faded windows

the sound of coughing.

Father says: "It is too late for me I did my work I carried my load." He sits in his room from morning till sundown reading native epics and histories. Father says to Mother: "To hell with any birds or fish what difference does it make after my death whether there is a garden or not my retirement pension will suffice."

55

WINTER1973

All

her life

Mother has been standing before her prayer-spread of the fear of hell. at the threshold At the bottom of everything of sin Mother looks for the footsteps and thinks that it is the consequence of a plant's that has spread over the garden. Everyday she says prayers and breathes them to all the flowers to all the goldfish to herself Mother is waiting for a second coming which is to descend. and the blessing the My brother calls my brother laughs at and takes statistics under the perishing my brother is hooked he thinks the garden

by the destruction he gets

sin

garden a cemetery of plants the confusion of the fish sick skin of the water on philosophy will be saved

of the garden

drunk

and punches the walls and windows so hard to say and tries that he is much pained, and talks of his ennui he takes his despair with himself wherever he goes lighter and ballalong with his ID card, pocket calendar, point pen. His despair is so little that it gets lost in the comings and goings of the beer joint. who used to be the flowers' And my sister and whenever Mother beat her She shared the secret of her heart of geraniums with the quiet gathering

bes.t friend

and sometimes she even invited the family of the goldfish for a party of the sun and candies-now she lives

on the other

and in her artificial IRANIAN STUDIES

side

house 56

of town

goldfish along with her artificial husband beside her artificial songs she sings artificial and makes natural babies whenever she comes to see us and the hems of her dress touch the poverty of the garden she takes a cologne bath every time she comes to see us she is pregnant. The yard of our house is lonely the yard of our house is lonely everyday, behind the door, there comes the sound of people being killed and the sound of explosions our neighbors are planting in place of flowers shells and grenades.... children have filled the little bombs. with little their briefcase The yard of our house is lost. *

*

*

I am afraid of the times when I have lost my heart I am afraid of thinking of so many hands about the futility of so many faces. the alienness

student who loves madly Like a little his geometry assignment I am alone

thinking that it is possible to the hospital

to take the garden

thinking thinking and the garden's heart has swollen under the sun the garden's mind is emptied slowly, and slowly, of the memory of green.

57

WINTER1973

BOOK REVIEWS

Perepiska [Mukatibat]. By Rashid ad-Din. Translated and edited by A. I. Falina (Pamiatniki Pis'mennosti Vostoka, XVII). Moscow, 1971. 498 pp. THOMAST. ALLSEN With the important exception of occasional official acts embedded in the historical and geographical narratives of JuvayniL, Rashid al-Din, Qazvlni, etc., very few original documents from the Il-Khan period have reached us. Because of the paucity of such documents, the Mukatibat of Rashid al-Din, written while he was Vazir under Ghazan (1295-1304) and Oljeitu (1304-1316), acquires a special prominence among the sources illuminating the history of Iran during the period of Mongol domination. The range of information contained in these letters is as varied and extensive as were the interests and concerns of the great scholar and statesman who produced them. We owe, however, the preservation and transmission of these letters not to their contents, important as they may be, but to the elegance of Rashid al-Din's language, which subsequent generations deemed an excellent example of the Persian epistolary style. which first Indeed, the letters,

Thomas T. Allsen is a Ph.D. candidate in Comparative Asian History at the University of Minnesota.

IRANIANSTUDIES

58

appear in book form shortly after the death of Rashid alDin, were in all likelihood gathered together on the initiative of his surviving sons in the hope of securing and perpetuating the memory of their father as a man of great eloquence and wisdom. The original introduction to the Mukatibat, prepared by Muhammad Abarqiihl, who had previously served as Rashid al-Din's secretary, makes the didactic nature of this enterprise abundantly clear. The use of this ornate prose, however, is normally confined to the opening salutations and is seldom maintained throughout, except in a few letters of condolence sent to bereaved friends. On the whole, the style of the correspondence is direct and unaffected, particularly in the "open letters"

intended for the edification of the inhabitants fic town or region (28, 33).1

of a speci-

Of the fifty-three letters included in the Mukatib&t, twenty-one were addressed to Rashid al-Din's sons, all of whom served as government officials within the Il-Khan realm, seventeen to other officials and dignitaries, and twelve to various theologians. Three of them were written to Rashid al Din by his associates. The subject matter of the letters extends from botany, pharmacology and agronomy to Islamic theology, Sifism and the qualities of a Muslim gentleman, a theme which Rashid al-Din treated at length in several communications to his sons (20, 21, 23). There

is also some information on the external relations of the Il-Khans with their nominal sovereign, the Grand Khan, i.e., the Emperor of the Yuan Dynasty of China (34, 49), and with their near neighbor, the Delhi Sultanate (29, 36). It is, however, the abundance of data on economic and social conditions which accords the Mukatibat its enormous value as an historical source. In almost every letter there is precise, often systematically presented information on a variety of subjects of interest to the economic historian: pensions for distinguished officials and scholars (19); regional tax tables and corvee obligations (23); improvements in the irrigation systems, including Rashid al-Din's own sketches illustrating his plans for new canal construction in Iraq (38, 39), and lists of textile products

59

WINTER1973

own estate, comprising a Rashid al-Din's by region (34). and charicommercial interests vast network of properties, touched upon in the Mukatibat and is is frequently ties, written in the form in a letter, in great detail described to a close friend (36).2 of a will, of concerns which Despite the apparent diversity of subjects and the variety letters prompted individual a consistent theme emerges from the discussed therein, This theme finds it clearest as a whole. correspondence directrepeated admonitions, in Rashid al-Din's expression and the local officials leaders, ed to his sons, religious between the gopopulace at large, that the relationship and interdependent, vernment and the governed is reciprocal and every and that it is the basic duty of every official dilitheir respective obligations citizen to discharge Rashid al-Din clearly believed gently and harmoniously. had been undermined by a corrupt that this relationship the Mongol and particularly officialdom, and tyrannical their tribal and military who had retained Turkic nobility that as a result of and he further believed traditions, often accompanied by widespread their endless exactions, and stability the internal and loss of life, destruction of the state had been severely comproexternal security as the power of the state depended upon Therefore, mised. of those who paid the taxes and the economic well-being and peasantry performed the required state services--the al-Din tirelessly argued that an efthe townsmen--Rashld system which guaranand even-handed administrative ficient of the masses also security teed the economic and personal of the ruling class. There is little served the interests doubt that it is these very concepts which supplied the for the well-known reforms initheoretical underpinnings tiated in the reign of Ghazan.3 of Rashid al-Din's Mukatibat, The present translation is based on the oldest the first one in a Western language, and most complete text available, i.e., century) (fourteenth It has been by MuhammadShafi in 1947.4 that published version dating from the sevencompared with an unpublished in the Leningrad Branch teenth century which is preserved

IRANIAN STUDIES

60

Several other manuof Oriental Studies.5 of the Institute not script and published versions of individual letters, in the preparation available to Shafi, were also utilized of this translation. Important variants are noted in the appended commenand geographitary, which also contains a full historical Obscure or unusual words are cal explanation of the text. In addition given in the footnotes in the Arabic script. apparatus, there is a lengthy introduction to the critical which outlines the life of written by the translator, Rashid al-Din, the history and transmission of the text and concludes with a close analysis of the letters as a historical source. of the Mukatibat Falina's remarks on the utilization She shows by European scholars are of special interest. that although the work had been known in the West since the early part of the nineteenth century, its research potential remained generally unrecognized until Soviet invesI. P. Petrushevskii and A. A. Alitigators, particularly zade, began exploiting its untapped riches in the 1940s. demonstrated the which conclusively These early efforts, source, were, howimportance of this work as an historical ever, only part of a wider Soviet interest in the writings of Rashid al-Din6 and in the economic and social history of Iran.7 Unfortunately, Western scholars have not exhibited the same degree of interest in the Mukdtibdt.8 This is audue, in part, to the suspicions cast on the letters' thenticity by Reuben Levy.9 His objections to the work, turned aside by Petrushevhowever, have been skillfully to this source skii,10 and continued Western indifference can no longer be justified on grounds of questionable auA better explanation for this neglect, I susthenticity. of many Western historians of pect, is the inclination Iran to pursue lines of inquiry emphasizing philological and cultural problems, an approach which frequently pays attention to the economic and social aspects insufficient of Persian history. 61

WINTER1973

Hopefully, a growing awareness of Soviet work in Iranian economic and institutional history will help stimulate Western interest in such studies. Falina's excellent edition testifies both to the high quality of Soviet scholarship in the field and demonstrates once again the importance of the Mukatibat as a source for the history of medieval Iranian society. NOTES letters

in Falina's

1.

These numbers refer to individual translation.

2.

On the basis of this data, I. P. Petrushevskii has published a valuable study on Rashid al-Din's personal wealth, "Feodal'noe khoziaistvo Rashid ad-Dina," 4, 1951, pp. 86-104. Voprosy Istorii,

3.

These reforms are studied in great detail by A. I. "Reformy Gazan-khana," Uchenye Falina in her article, Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk, 17, 1959, pp. 51-76.

4.

Mukatibat-i

5.

from this manuscript Photoreproductions of selections are given in the appendices, pp. 443-461.

6.

See A. K. Arends, "The Study of Rashid ad-Din's Jami u't-Tawarikh in the Soviet Union," Central Asiatic Journal, 14, 1970, pp. 40-61.

7.

"Izuchenie feodal'nogo obshSee I. P. Petrushevskii, chestva Irana v Rossii i v SSSR (1917-1970)," in k 2500 Iranskogo Gosudarstva i Kul'tury: Istorii letiiu iranskogo gosudarstva, Moskva, 1971, pp. 71-82.

8.

Michel M. Mazzaoui's recent study, The Origins of the Si'ism, Siufism and the GulAt (Freiburger aafawids: Islamstudien, III), Wiesbaden, 1972, does make some

IRANIAN STUDIES

Rashid1, Lahore, 1947.

62

use of the Mukatibat-i 9.

10.

Rashidi.

See pp. 23, 27, 53.

"The Letters of Rashid al-Din Fadl-Allah," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1946, Pts. 1 and 2, pp. 7478. "K voprosy o podlinnosti perepiska Rashid ad-Dina," Vestnik Leningradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, 9, 1948, pp. 124-130.

Semnan: Persian City and Region. Edited by John Connell. University College London Expedition to Iran, 1969. 105 pp., photographs, maps. No price indicated. JOHNGULICK This is a solid geographical study of Semnan, a town of 31,000 people, about 200 km. east of Tehran on the Tehran-Mashhad road. The report consists of five chapters (Physical Environment, Semnan City, the Bazar Economy, Water Use and Urban Agriculture, and a chapter on two villages in the environs of the town). Connell wrote the last chapter himself and is coauthor of the Semnan City chapter. This is evidently the report of a field team, and team research has much to recommend it in urban studies, although its results can be expressed in somewhat disjointed and inconclusive fashion, as is to some extent true of this study. Semnan grew only slightly between 1956 and 1966; it lacks the relatively large "Westernized" middle class of larger cities; its bazar economy continues to function but

John Gulick is Professor of Anthropology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

63

WINTER1973

is responding to various changes in the region and nation; living on the peripheries of the adaptations of villagers Semnan can better be understood in terms of responses to nation-wide phenomena than in terms of preconceived ruralThese are some points that impressed me as urban notions. being important ones, but I am not sure if they are the most important points as far as the editor and other authors are concerned. Geographers at the University of Durham, England, have also been producing informative and inexpensive reports on various Iranian cities during the past decade. This is a development to be welcomed and encouraged. One hopes that before too long the several studies will be synso as to yield some major hypotheses, if not conthesized, urban developments concerning twentieth-century clusions, in Iran. A practical note: no publisher of Semnan is indiI obtained my copy by ordering it directly from cated. of Development StuJohn Connell, who is at the Institute dies, University of Sussex, Brighton, England BNl 9RE. The cost was $2.00, which is a bargain.

IRANIAN STUDIES

64

Note on the English Transliteration System The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STUDIES is based on the Persian Romanization System approved by the American Library Association, the Canadian Library Association, and the Library of Congress. Copies of the transliteration table may be obtained by writing to the Editor

Iranian Studies is published quarterly by The Society for Iranian Studies. It is distributed to members of the Society as part of their membership. The annual subscription rate for non-members is $7.00; the price of single copies is $1.75 per issue. For institutions the subscription rate is $10.00 per annum. The opinions expressed by the contributors are of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Society or the editors of Iranian Studies. Articles for publication and all other communications should be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society should be addressed to the Secretary, The Society for Iranian Studies, P.O. Box 89, Village Station, New York 10014, U.S.A. The exclusive distributing agent for IRANIAN STUDIES in Iran is: Kharazmie Publishing & Distribution Co., 229 Daneshgah Street, Shah Avenue (P. 0. Box 14-1486), Tehran, Iran.

COVER: Silver Plate with Shapur II Lion Hunting Hermitage, Leningrad Sasanian. 309-379 A.D.

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

I-

Spr .IngSume

_~~~1

-L

_-. ..

-

....*It

I

1973

Voum

VI

Nubr

2i

The Society for Iranian Studies Council Ervand Abrahamian, Baruch College, City University of New York Amin Banani, University of California, Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi, Boston College James A. Bill, University of Texas at Austin Jerome W. Clinton, American Institute of Iranian Studies Paul W. English, University of Texas at Austin Gene R. Garthwaite, Dartmouth College Farhad Kazemi, New York University Kenneth A. Luther, University of Michigan Ann Schulz, ex offico, Clark University

Executive Committee Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary Ann Schulz, Treasurer

Ali Banuazizi, Editor

IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor

Copyright, 1974, The Society for Iranian Studies Printed at the Boston College Press Published in the U.S.A. US ISSN 0021-0862 Address all communications to IRANIAN STUDIES, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U. S. A.

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Volume VI

Spring-Summer 1973

Numbers 2-3

ARTICLES 66

110

DIRECTFOREIGNINVESTMENT IN THENON-OILSECTORS OF THE IRANIANECONOMY

Vahid F. Nowshirvani and Robert Bildner

A SOCIALANDECONOMIC TOWARDS HISTORYOF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY

Thomas M. Ricks

IRAN

127

THENATIONAL OF INTEGRATION BOIRAHMAD

136

CABBfSMIRZAISWILL

OF AMERICAN, 152 AN ASSESSMENT BRITISH, ANDFRENCH WORKS SINCE 1940 ON MODERN IRANIANHISTORY

Reinhold L8ffler HomaPakdaman and William Royce Nikki R. Keddie

BOOKREVIEWS K. RAMAZANI:The 166 ROUHOLLAH Persian Gulf: Iran's Role

Ann Schulz

MONROE:The Changing ELIZABETH Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf 172 RUSSELLD. BUHITE: Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy

Justus D. Doenecke

DIRECTFOREIGNJNVESIMENT IN THENON-OILSECTORS OF TE IRANIANECONOMY VAHIDF. NOWSHIRVANIand ROBERTBILDNER Introduction The world-wide expansion of multinational corporations and the concomitant rise in direct foreign investment have recently received considerable attention from econoA continuing controversy has existed over the mists.' costs and benefits of foreign investment to both the capiThe conflict between and the host countries. tal-exporting of foreign capital and the "national" inthe interests noticeable in the underdeveloped terest is particularly countries. While many of these countries have opted for the "free enterprise" path to economic growth, they lack as well as the technical and administrative expertise, to the foreign political will, to explore alternatives investment as an instrument for gaining access to the inknow-how and markets. dustrial countries' technological that the At the same time there is a gradual realization alleged benefits of foreign investment are not automatic In order to improve and that the costs may be substantial. the terms for obtaining foreign capital to their own advantage, a number of underdeveloped countries have recently

Vahid F. Nowshirvani is Associate Professor of Economics Robert Bildner graduated from Yale in at Yale University. 1973; he spent his senior year in Iran and Yugoslavia studying foreign investment in these countries. IRANIANSTUDIES

66

attempted to more closely monitor and regulate the operacorporations within their bortions of the multinational ders. The extent to which they have been and will be an open quessuccessful in achieving this aim is still tion.2 In the following pages, we shall describe the experience of one such underdeveloped country, Iran, with Our objectives are: (1) to examine foreign investment. the development of the Iranian government's policies towards foreign investment; (2) to analyze the pattern in the periof foreign investment in Iran, particularly od after 1334 (1955) when the Law for Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment was enacted; and (3) to offer some suggestions about the possible impact of foreign capital on the Iranian economy. We shall be concerned only with equity capital held by foreigners or what is known Other capital movements such as as direct investment. foreign aid, intergovernmental credit arrangements or bond As the title of the paper issues will not be considered.3 we shall exclude from our discussion the oil inindicates, position in the Iradustry which, because of its critical nian economy, would require a special study of its own.4 A Brief History direct foreign there was little Until quite recently, Nineteenthinvestment in Iran outside the oil sector. place to foreign encentury Iran was hardly an attractive The country did not have abundant agricultural trepreneurs. of the instability or mineral resources, and the political country in the previous century had ruined much of the network was inThe transportation trade and the industry. adequate, but no pressing need was felt to improve it until was generally thought the last quarter of the century--it that the expected increase in commerce would be too small to justify the high costs of road or railway construction. in trading Although foreign merchants engaged extensively within Iran, they seldom tried to set up proactivities Early in the century the British and duction facilities.5 in obtaining preRussian governments were more interested 67

1973 SPRING-SUMMER

ferential treatment for their merchants and imposing a policy of "free trade" than in acquiring special privileges for their investors. As the nineteenth century wore on, and with the growth of internal trade and its increasing integration into the international economy, the Iranian economy became more commercialized.6 At the same time European capitalists were beginning to look further afield for investment opportunities. Concession hunters saw lucrative possibilities in Iran--at least for short-term speculative ventures if not long-term investments. Nltir al-Din Shih, who ruled for most of the second half of the century, and his entourage were favorably disposed towards grants of concessions, the former for fiscal and political reasons and the latter for the opportunities they saw of obtaining bribes. These early attempts to obtain concessions in Iran were mostly for the construction of railways-, often together with the right to exploit mineral resources along the route. The only investors who could hope to obtain significant concessions were British and Russian subjects who had the active support or at least the tacit approval of their government. Unfortunately for them, the Anglo-Russian rivalry, which was both economically and politically motivated, frustrated most of their efforts. Thanks to that rivalry, Niair al-Din Sh&h and Mu;affar al-Din Shah and their courtiers were able to obtain better terms from England and Russia and to maintain Iran's precarious "independence."7 It also enabled the emerging merchant class, siding with various court factions and religious leaders, to block the penetration of foreign capital where its interests were threatened. The role of the merchants in forcing the canof the 1891 tobacco concession is too well docucellation mented to be repeated here.8 The lack of clear hegemony by either Russia or Britain is probably the most significant factor in explaining the relatively small amount of foreign capital in Iran at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth Had the 1907 Russo-British agreement to divide century. Iran into spheres of influence come sooner, we might have IRANIANSTUDIES

68

seen more British and Russian enterprises established in Iran. The political turmoil in the years immediately preceding and following the agreement precluded a major expansion of European investment in Iran. Clearly, the constitutional revolution, the Russian Revolution, and the First World War were major disruptive elements. Thus, on the eve of the Great War, there was little foreign investment of significance apart from the oil company, the Imperial Bank of Persia, the Russian Loan and Discount Bank, and perhaps the northern fisheries and the various telegraph lines. Although by that time the potential value of the D'Arcy concession was becoming apparent, the two banking operations were still the most visible sigisof foreign penetration because of their effective control of finances both private and public. Aside from these concerns, there were a number of minor foreign enterprises, primarily engaged in operating various toll roads and short stretches of railways. In certain instances mining rights were also included in the road concessions.9 As for foreign manufacturing enterprises, they were practically non-existent. The few attempts to set up modern industry failed because of competition from imports. This was to be expected given the primitive state of the Iranian economy, the absence of tariff protection, and the declining production and transportation costs in Europe.10 With the exception of certain changes in the Russian investments after the Russian Revolution, the position of foreign enterprises in Iran remained basically the same until the 1921 coup d'etat. A new era in Iran's economic life began with the coming to power of Reza Shah in 1921. The new Shah embarked on a series of programs of reform aimed at modernizing the economy. The basic elements of these programs were: (1) the establishment of a strong government; (2) legal and administrative reforms; (3) massive investment in infrastructure to improve the transportation and the communications system; and (4) the introduction of largescale modern manufacturing industry. The state took a very active role, and the policies pursued were intensely nationalistic. Although foreigners were brought in to assist in the construction and operation of many projects, 69

SPRING-SUMER1973

they came as individuals or as contractors for the government. The general economic depression in the industrial easy to recruit a nations in the 1930s made it relatively exception, no minor one With large body of technicians. In fact, most of the connew concessions were granted. cessions previously awarded were either cancelled or subcurtailed (e.g., the right of the Imperial Bank stantially The government even of Persia to issue notes was revoked). tried to change the terms of the oil concession, but the new agreement reached in 1933 was not as favorable to Iran as had been hoped. One should bear in mind that in the in the economic policies 1930s the pursuit of nationalistic regions of the world was facilitated non-industrialized economy and that by the breakdown in the international capital movethere was a sharp decline in international ment. The allied occupation of Iran during the Second and economic changes. World War produced major political Reza Shah was forced to abdicate and the power of the cenreduced. This loss of autral government was drastically thority together with material shortages caused by the war and the occupation put a virtual halt to the industrialization programs. The destruction of the monolithic politactivity and an structure led to increased political ical factions. political various intense power struggle among In Iran, as elsewhere in the Third World, the nationalist groups gained much strength during and in the years immediately following the Second World War. Since the attainment of formal independence was not an issue in Iran, the on the nationmovement focused its activities nationalist alization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which had become This goal the symbol of foreign domination in the country. takethe full of and March 1951 in achieved eventually was over of the Companytook place a few months later when Mussadiq formed his cabinet.11 Being one of the first expropriations of Western assets in an underdeveloped country, the nationalization of the oil industry met with stiff resistance from the maoil companies and the British and the jor international and economic means was U.S. governments. Every political IRANIANSTUDIES

70

employed to force a settlement on Iran. After resisting for over two years the Iranian government succumbed to the pressures and the oil industry once again came under foreign control. While these events were occurring in the oil industry, there was naturally no foreign investments in the rest of the economy. In fact, during this period the British banking concession was cancelled, and the Northern Fisheries' agreement with the Russians was not renewed when its term expired. But once foreign control was reestablished in the oil sector, the rest of the economy was also opened up to foreign capital. The 1955 Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment Mussadiq was removed from power in August 1953, and soon after that the oil dispute was settled through an agreement with a consortium of international oil companies. These developments put Iran firmly in the Western camp. The oil agreement was ratified by the Iranian Parliament in October, 1954, and a year later in November, 1955,the Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment (hereafter referred to as the 1955 Law) was enacted. From the general nature of the Law it is clear that there had been no extensive deliberation and planning prior to its pasThe main provisions of the 1955 Law are as follows: sage. 1. to set up a board to examine proposals by foreign investors which reports its decisions to the Council of Ministers; 2. to give legal protection accord it equal status with private

to imported capital domestic capital;

and

3. to guarantee repatriation of profits and the principal and in the case of nationalization to provide for compensation. 12 previous

It is interesting to note how the history or Iran's experience with foreign capital (notably with the

71

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) is reflected in the 1955 Law. It is stipulated that foreign firms cannot "transfer their share, profits and rights" to foreign governments and that all disputes are to be settled through Iranian courts. In the original law the spheres of activity for foreign capital were left rather vague. It simply stated (Article 1) that the law applied to all foreign investment "for development, rehabilitation and productive activity in industry, mining, agriculture, and transport." Attempts to be more specific were made in the Regulations for Implementing the Law which were approved nearly a year after passage of the original bill. In the Regulations, development and productive activities were defined as those "activities which help raise the production level and income of the country, directly or indirectly earn foreign exchange, or effect an economy in its expenditures" (Regulations, Article 1, Note 2). The supply of credit to Iranian firms, investment in banking and in activities subsidiary to "productive investment" (presumably trading), were also to enjoy the privileges of the Law. The bulk of the provisions of the Regulations were, however, concerned with financial matters concerning the importation of capital into Iran and repatriation of profits and of the original capital from Iran. Two limitations specified by the Regulations merit special attention. One was that the investment projects were to be in fields open to local private firms. The other stipulated that the investment did not involve any monopoly rights or special privileges. Presumably investments which did not satisfy these two conditions would reas is the case for projects in quire special legislation, the oil industry. In practice, neither of these limitaThe first provision was tions has been strictly enforced. violated when the Shell Oil Companyinvested, as a partner Since such in a joint venture, in a lubricating oil plant. an operation was at that time considered a part of the oil industry, it was not presumably open to local investors. to The National Iranian Oil Companytried unsuccessfully The second limitation is more freblock the investment.13 firms quently violated. Many Iranian and joint-venture have obtained special privileges, mainly in the context of of the government. Because the import-substitution policies IRANIANSTUDIES

72

of the high tariffs or outright bans on imports, there are many firms which have complete or near complete monopoly power. To the extent that the provisions of the Law and the Regulations reflect the goverrunent's attitude toward foreign investment, the following conclusions may be drawn. First, it is clear that the policy-makers considered the movement of funds to be the most important aspect of foreign investment.14 At a time when both foreign exchange and investible funds were scarce, it was believed that foreign private capital, in addition to intergovernmental aid, was the obvious source to tap. This preoccupation with the financial side of foreign investment is reflected not only in the various articles of the Law and the Regulations, but also in the administrative apparatus set up within the Bank Markazi Iran to deal with all matters connected with foreign investment. It was only recently, in 1971, that the Centre for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment was transferred from the Bank Markazi to the Ministry of Economy. Second, at the time that the Law was enacted, there was little awareness of the potential contributions of foreign firms to technology transfer and export expansion. In this respect, as we shall see, the government's position has recently undergone considerable change. And, third, the then recent experience of the nationalization of the oil industry made it essential that liberal guarantees be provided to dispel the fears of foreign investors. Although the provisions of the 1955 Law reflect a very permissive attitude towards foreign investment, the actual situation was more complex. In fact, there was still a good deal of suspicion and fear of foreign capital both on the part of the government and on the part of the emerging industrial bourgeoisie. For example, ever since the passage of the 1955 Law there has been an unwritten working rule that foreigners should not hold more than 50 percent of the shares in joint ventures.15 Moreover, there have always been enough bureaucratic hurdles so that the government could deny a license to any project which it considered undesirable--usually because it would threaten 73

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

existing

large-scale

domestic producers.16

Foreign Investment in Iran After the 1955 Law Table 1 presents the gross inflow of foreign capital into Iran for the period 1335 to 1350 (1956 to 1972). The figures provide only a rough approximation to the book value of foreign investment because repatriation of original capital is not accounted for (see note to Table 1) and because data coverage is incomplete. They should, however, give a reasonably accurate picture of the pattern of growth of foreign investment in Iran. At the end of 1350 (March 1972), there was also an investment of about $18.5 million in the banking sector which is not included in Table 1.17 The Ministry of Economy reports that, as of January 1973, there were 134 concerns, besides banks, operating in Iran that had some foreign participation. This figure includes only the foreign investors who obtained approval through the Centre for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment, which makes them eligible for the privileges of the Law. In addition to these firms, there are some foreign investors who have not registered with the Centre and are therefore not included in the reported statistics. Since there is no major reason (besides some red tape and the desire to remain less visible) for not seeking the approval of the Centre, onlT a handful of companies operate in Iran without a permit. 8 Of the 134 registered firms, 108 are in manufacturing industries, 10 in mining, 7 in agriculture and 9 in various services. In addition, there are 10 banks with foreign partners, one of which is a wholly-owned Russian bank, engaged primarily in foreign trade transactions. Table 2 shows the number of foreign investors by nationality and date of permit. It is clear from these two tables that in the years immediately following the passage of the Law there was no rush to invest in Iran. The total inflow for the six years up to the end of 1341 (March 1962) is of the same order of magnitude as the investments in the year 1344 (1965/66). Only after 1343 (1964/65) is there a noticeable increase IRANIANSTUDIES

74

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SPRING-u.-sER17

IN IRANAS OF OF FOREIGNINVESTORS NUMBER 1973 JANUARY (By country of origin and date of decree) (Excludes banking and oil sectors)

TABLE2.

British

American

German

French

Japanese

Other

Total

1956

0

0

0

1

0

0

l

1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

1 1 2 0 1 1 2 3 2 5 5 0 6 9 0 6

0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 4 1 1

0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 4 2 3 1 1 3 3 1

1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 1 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 4 4

0 1 0 3 2 4 0 6 3 0 1 4 3 4 3 11

2 2 3 7 3 6 3 9 10 11 12 7 16 26 12 24

44

16

21

11

17

45

154

Totals Source:

Ministry of Economy, Centre for the Attraction and Protection of Forin Iran--November Identification eign Investment, Foreign Investors' 1956-January 1973. Tehran, 1973 (mimeo.).

Note:

The total

number of

foreign

investors

in Iran

exceeds

the number of

because in a number of joint firms with foreign equity participation In cases where ventures there are more than one foreign partner. several firms in a project are closely associated with a parent company, we have treated them as one company. An example will illustrate The foreign partners of S. S. Nacet Iran are (1) The Gilette Co., this. Capital Corp., (3) The Gilette Co. Re(2) The Gilette International and (4) Gilette (Japan), Inc. We report these as search Institute, one company. When a company has invested in Iran through a foreign of the parent company. we have recorded the nationality subsidiary, of the foreign shareholders of S. S. For example, the nationality Kablsazi IKO Iran is recorded as American since the Swedish partner in this venture is in fact a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph.

IRANIAN STUDIES

76

both in the number of foreign firms investing in Iran and in the average size of each investment. There is of course an upward trend in capital inflows for the entire period. The difference between the two subperiods may be explained partly by events in the international arena and partly by conditions in Iran. The spread of multinational corporations from the industrial countries into the und;rdeveloped countries was generally slower in the 1950s than in the in the manufacturing sector. 1960s, especially Hence, it is not surprising to see a more rapid expansion in Iran Until 1343 (1964/65), when the during the latter period. Iranian economy began to rebound from its recession, neither the economic nor the political situation in Iran was particularly attractive to foreign investors. In 1341 (1962/63), per capita GNPin Iran was about $180. With about 65 percent of the population living in rural areas and an inadequate transportation network, there were no large concentrated markets to attract multinational corporations. The liberal import policies made access to the Iranian market relatively simple, and the uncertain politi c a 1 situation further inhibited foreign enterprises from owning large amounts of fixed assets in Iran. The majority of foreign firms operating in Iran during this period were consultants or contractors for various infrastructure projects such as dams, roads, and port facilities, which were proposed under the government's development plans.19 It is true that in the second half of the 1330s (1951-61) there was a boom in industrial investment which was prompted by an easy credit policy rather than high protective tariffs. Investment expanded primarily in food other light consumer products, and processing, textiles, construction materials. Since multinational corporations were not dominant in these industries, it is not surprising that they played a minor role in Iran in this period. These industries were not new to Iran and did not require sophisticated technologies. The industrial entrepreneurs-who at this time came mainly from the traditional merchant class--could acquire the necessary technology from foreign machinery suppliers and saw little advantage in forming joint ventures with foreign capital.

77

1973 SPRING-SUMMER

Two developments in the late 1330s (1951-61) should be noted. One is the foreign investment in commercial banking; the other is the establishment of the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran (IMDBI). The growing monetization of Iran's economy and the rapid rise in foreign trade offered attractive opportunities for investment in the banking sector. Between 1334 and 1339 (March 1956 to March 1961) the money supply grew from 24.95 billion rials to 41.64 billion rials. During the same period, the value of merchandise imports rose from 10.9 billion rials to 49.8 billion rials. In the short span of time between 1337 and 1339 (1958-1960), 12 new commercial banks were founded, eight of which had foreign partners (since 1339 [1960] one more has found an American partner). Another private bank which had been established The previously also set up a joint venture in this period. main activity of these banks, until quite recently, centered on foreign trade transactions. They are now beginning to expand their network of local branches in order to increase their share of the domestic credit market. Since there is a tendency for foreign companies to use the services of banks that have foreign shareholders, these banks are likely to gain an increasing share of the domestic marfirms become more prominent in the ket as international economy. The formation of the IMDBIis an important landmark in the growing cooperation between Iranian and foreign The Bank was founded in 1338 (1959), with a subcapital. stantial government subsidy, in order to provide longand mining projects. term credit for industrial Though the Bank is a privately-owned joint-stock company, it has in the formulation of industrial been very influential of the government and should really be considered policies a semi-public institution. Forty percent of the original shareholders' equity of 400 million rials was owned by This percentage foreign institutions, mainly financial. has since been reduced to 16 percent on a capital of 1,500 million rials. In the first few years, the managing direcand foreign shareholders tor of the Bank was a foreigner, had a majority vote on its board of directors. As Table 3 IRANIANSTUDIES

78

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SPRING-SUMER 1973

in IMDBIinclude some of the shows, foreign participants largest financial and manufacturing corporations in the world.20 Since the individual blocks of shares are small-ranging from fifty to several hundred thousand dollars--it is hard to imagine that such large corporations were primarily motivated by the direct monetary returns in deciding to invest in the IMDBI. Rather, they probably considered it the cheapest way to obtain, on a continuing basis, detailed information on investment opportunities and As for the possible local partners for their clients. Iranian backers of the project, they wanted foreign partiFirst, it gave a certain cipation for several reasons. Second, it provided a channel prestige to the project. for establishing contact with Western capital markets and it assured that the Bank would investors. And, finally, remain reasonably independent of the government. The foreign investment boom in banking notwithstanding, a substantial flow of private capital into manufacturThe expaning sector did not begin until 1343 (1964/65). of the government in the late 1330s (1951sionary policies and balance of payments problens. 1961) had led to inflation The adoption of some rather severe stabilization measures led to a recession in the early 1340s (1961-71).21 Since, mirelatively at that time, foreign investment was still nor, the economic slowdown simply retarded its growth rather than significantly Beginning lowering its level. with the economic recovery in 1343 (1964/65), the pace of The increased interest of foreign investment quickened. multinational corporations since then has been prompted by stathe rapid growth of the Iranian economy, its political favorable to foreign inand by government policies bility, vestment. Fueled by a steady rise in oil revenues which expanded from $466.5 million in 1343 (1964/65) to just under $2 billion in 1350 (1971/72), the economy grew in real terms at an average annual rate of over 10 percent By 1350 (1971/72), Bank Markazi Iran during this period.22 was claiming a per capita gross national product of over $420. Because much of this growth was concentrated in urban areas and in higher income groups, substantial markets consumer developed for a number of products, especially durables and some intermediate goods. Although growing IRANIANSTUDIES

80

markets were certainly important, foreign capital was attracted to Iran less by the booming economy than by the of the government. In the past industrialization policies decade, the government has tried to encourage investment in manufacturing by providing easy credit, tax incentives, restricted competition in the domestic markets, and high trade barriers. Protection from imports has probably been the most potent policy instrument used to promote importsubstituting A recent study by the World Bank industries. found that on the average customs duties in 1349 (1970) were 4.8 times their level in 1339 (1960). In addition, a whole host of import restrictions and quotas were imposed during this period. By 1349 (1970), about 70 percent (in terms of value) of the goods produced in Iran were protected by quantitative restrictions which often meant outright prohibition of imports.23 Faced with the loss of markets, or hoping to gain a share of a growing and protected market, many foreigners responded to these policies by setting up production facilities in Iran. Foreign investors found Iran particularly attractive because it did not suffer from the ills usually associated with the importsubstitution strategy for industrial growth, i.e., stagnant domestic market and balance of payment crises. The growing oil revenues provided plentiful supplies of foreign exchange and, through government expenditures, an exogenously expanding market for manufactured goods. The industrial composition of the capital inflow is shown in Table 1. As of the end of 1350 (March 1972), in terms of total value of foreign investment, the leading industries were rubber, petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals. Over time the pattern of inflow has shifted in response to changes in the structure of demand and in government policies, as in the case of agriculture (see below). As demand grew for a particular product because of rising incomes, or because the industries that use the product were established, its imports increased. Once the existence of a "reasonable" size market was recognized, steps were taken, usually initiated by the IMDBI, to set up production facilities in Iran. Since, in most cases, no domestic production existed previously and the technologies tended to be

81

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

for intermediate goods, especially somewhat sophisticated, foreign firms were brought in, often as partners in joint This has naturally led to ventures, to establish plants. in the fastest growinvestment of foreign a concentration Table 4, using a different classification ing industries. provides further evidence of this shifting of industries, It is clear that foreign firms are increasingly pattern. investing in intermediate goods, durable consumer products, and capital goods. The nondurable consumer goods manufacsector, by far the largest industrial ture, which is still had the greatest number of investments in the early subperiod, but subsequently its share of foreign investment These developments reflect has declined substantially. the changing structure of Iran's manufacturing sector. During the decade of the 1340s (1961-71) intermediate duindustries grew at an rable consumer- and capital-goods annual rate of 18 percent, against 13 percent for the light In the latter group were many consumer-goods industries.24 firms that could take advantage of domestic established growth opportunities without fear of foreign competition by the government through its because entry was restricted licensing system. agriculture Outside the manufacturing industries, and services appear as new sectors of interest in the latest has subperiod. Mining, which is primarily export-oriented, had fewer foreign investments, though they tend to be larger in average size and more evenly spread over the entire period. The national origin of the foreign capital inflow is shown in Table S. U.S. companies have by far the largest share, followed by German, British and French corporations. The dominant position of American firms has eroded over time while European and Japanese firms have increased their The same basic picture emerges, perhaps more share.25 if we examine the number of foreign investors clearly, rather than the value of assets (see Table 2). Since 1344 (1965/66), the three major European countries mentioned above have been investing more in Iran, while Japan has joined the rank of leading investors only in the last IRANIANSTUDIES

82

NUMBEROF FIRMS WITH FOREIGNPARTICIPATION ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY

TABLE 4.

63-67

68-72

Total

7

10

10

27

3

7

9

19

4

15

24

43

1

4

13

18

Agriculture

-

1

6

7

Services

2

1

6

9

Mining

2

3

3

8

58-62 Nondurable Goods Durable

Consumer

Consumer Goods

Intermediate Capital

Source:

Goods

Products

Ministry of Economy, Centre for the Attraction of Foreign Investment, Foreign and Protection in Iran, November 1956Identification Investor's January 1973.

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SPRING-SUMMER 1973

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The value of Japanese assets in Iran three or four years. is still smaller than that of such countries as Holland and Italy, but it is growing rapidly. The changing pattern of the ownership of foreign assets in Iran partly reflects what has happened in the past decade or so on a global scale to the relative position of American corporations It is also invis-i-vis European and Japanese firms26 teresting to note that the changes in the national composition of foreign investment in Iran roughly parallel the of the country's shifts in the geographical distribution imports. Germany is Iran's largest source of imports and Japan is about to surpass the United States as the second largest source. Where foreign investment occurs in importsubstituting it is not surprising to see simiindustries, larities between investment and trade patterns. Foreign firms that have invested in Iran tend on the whole to be large multinational This corporations. is especially true of the American firms. Out of 44 cases .of American investment in Iran, 35 are by corporations which appear in Fortune magazine's list of the 500 largest the 50 largest commercial banks, industrial corporations, and the 50 largest transportation companies. Among the European investors there is greater variation in size and they are on the average smaller than the American firms. Nonetheless, 40 out of 78 (i.e., over 50 percent) are listed in Jane's Major Companies of Europe.27 The 17 cases of Japanese investments include the top three, the fifth and the eleventh largest Japanese trading companies in addition to nine of the 500 largest industrial and mining corporations in Japan. Since investment by the big firms also tends to be larger than the average, the multinational corporations are even more dominant, in terms of ownership of assets, than their number would suggest. This situation is certainly not typical of all underdeveloped countries. An examination of foreign investors in Korea and Taiwan reveals that, at least in these two countries, large multinational corporations make up a significantly smaller portion of all foreign firms.28 It is true that the geographical proximity of these two countries to Japan makes it possible for more small Japanese firms to invest 85

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

in them, but the main factor that seems to explain differof foreign firms is the ences in the size distribution Iran's indusprocess. nature of the industrialization has been almost exclusively in import-subtrialization stituting industries while Korea and Taiwan, after a short phase, have relied more heavily on eximport-substitution A considerable number of foreign port-oriented activities. in the latter two firms have set up production facilities countries in order to take advantage of their cheap labor to produce labor-intensive goods destined for export. While both large and small firms are likely to invest in are more import-substitution policies export industries, firms. Since likely to attract the larger multinational market strucmost of these firms operate in oligopolistic tures, they will react to a threat of loss of market or of capturing a share of an expanding marthe possibility enough, in ket by investing in that market. Interestingly investment in import-substituting Korea and Taiwan foreign corporaindustries also tends to be by the multinational tions.

The Impact of Foreign Investment Iranian Economy

on the

conwe shall examine the possible In this section capital to Iran. sequences of the inflow of foreign private of many of the issues complexity Because of the inherent evaluation we will not attempt any quantitative involved, We of foreign of the costs and benefits investment.29 such topics as regarding simply record our impressions of funds, foreign domination of Iranian industry, transfer of foreign and the contribution of technology transfer firms to exports. From Table 1 it is clear that whatever the effects into Iran have of the spread of multinational corporations

funds cannot be considbeen, the provision of investible ered important among them. Despite its rising trend, the an inyearly gross inflow of foreign capital constitutes As a persignificant part of total annual investments. centage of total gross fixed capital formation, it has IRANIANSTUDIES

86

fluctuated between 1 percent to 2 percent in the past few years. It is difficult to compare the inflow with industrial investment for which the data is particularly defiA figure of 5 percent to 10 percent would not, cient.30 It would seem that the however, be too far out of line. magnitude of the inflow is small enough that substitute sources, either internal or external, could easily be found. Neither can capital inflows be considered to have a major effect in providing foreign exchange. Foreign exchange earnings from the oil sector alone run 50 to 100 Of course, the outflow of times yearly investment flows. funds, be they profits or the principal, further reduce the balance of payments effects of foreign capital. In the past few years, outflows have amounted to about 6070 million rials per annum, which does not seem to be excessive. The reported figures do not, however, reflect the real transfer of funds much of which goes unreported. Since there are widespread price controls in Iran, the companies are careful not to show high profits. Unreported profits are usually transferred out of the country through over-invoicing of imports or by excessive royalty and technical assistance fees. In a United Nations' Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) study previously cited (see Note 18), the author found that the chemical firms (mainly pharmaceutical) in his sample, while showing losses, were charging technical fees equivalent to 5.2 percent of sales. The corresponding figure for the foreign firms operating in India was 1.4 percent.31 The relative unimportance of capital flows notwithstanding, the position of foreign firms in Iran's economy is by no means minor, especially within large-scale modern industry. Although we do not have sufficient data on sales and assets by firms, other illustrative evidence is available. An examination of loans granted by the IMDBIreveals that, as of the end of 1350 (March 1972), out of a total of 264 companies that had borrowed from the bank, 64 or slightly under one quarter had foreign participation. In addition, 32 out of the 56 companies in which the Bank held an equity investment had foreign partners. If we consider

87

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

only loans and investments in the past portion of joint-venture firms becomes figures suggest that in the large-scale enterprises, most of which are financed foreigners' share may be substantial.

few years, thl proeven higher.3 These private industrial by the IMDBI, the

As the data presented in Table 1 show, there is considerable variation in the level of foreign investment in the various industrial sectors. Naturally, there are also differences among industries as to the share of the market controlled by firms with foreign participation. Such firms have an insignificant role in textiles and food processing, but they hold a large share of the market in petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals and electric appliances and have a dominant position in the rubber and the glass industries. If we look at more disaggregated data, we find a large number of products in which joint-venture firms control the entire market. Electric batteries, ball bearings, synthetic yam, compressors, cables, light bulbs, diesel engines, and tires may be cited as examples of industries in which no purely domestic producers exist. On the whole, foreign firms are concentrated more in the fastest growing industries. In addition to the prominent position of foreign firms in the modern manufacturing sector, there is a large foreign presence in other sectors of the economy. There are numerous foreign companies--many wholly owned subsidiaries--in consulting, construction, insurance, transportaetc. Many of these firms are regtion, data processing, istered in Iran, but because they do not usually own production facilities in the country they are not covered by the provisions of the 1955 Law. Although their total gross annual revenues far exceed the annual sales of the joint-venture manufacturing firms, no systematic data on Of course, the entire their operations are available. operation of such firms and of those in manufacturing are still dwarfed by the foreign investments in the oil sector which in 1350 (1971/72) generated over one-fifth of the gross national product. As we have already mentioned, the 1955 Law is IRANIANSTUDIES

88

primarily concerned with the financial aspects of foreign investment. It makes no explicit recognition of the potential role of foreign capital in the international transfer of technology and thus contains no provisions to ensure that capital inflows involve any technology transfers.33 This omission, though surprising in the light of Iran's insistence on including the training of Iranian employees in the 1933 and the 1954 oil agreements, does not imply that the policy makers underestimated the role of foreign investment in providing Iran with modern industrial technoIf anything, they probably exaggerated the benefit logy. and assumed that technology transfer would occur more or less automatically. It appears that they favored joint ventures over other channels for acquiring technology, such as licensing and technical agreements, in the belief that equity participation would give foreign partners a stake in running the enterprises efficiently and profitably.34 There are no indications, however, that sufficient attention was paid to the kind of technology that would be appropriate, methods for its transfer, and, above all, to the costs and benefits involved. It is, of course, very difficult, if not impossible, to measure the technological transfer that has taken place because of foreign investment. There must, undoubtedly, have been some transfers, but the evidence suggests that the costs may have been unduly high and the benefits have not been significant. The most important element in the cost of obtaining modern technology through foreign investment has been the monopoly profits (much of it unreported) that have accrued to the foreign firms from their operations in Iran. Again, we do not have precise figures, but assuming that the foreigners have enjoyed similar rates of return on their capital as the domestic industrial entrepreneurs, their profits must have been substantial. Even when profits have been modest, the consumers have borne a large burden because they have had to gay prices far above those prevailing in the world market.3 Another element of the cost is the preclusion of domestic firms from the most rapidly growing sectors of the economy, where foreign firms have established themselves and have raised the barriers to entry by domestic firms. 89

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

It is unlikely that foreign investment has done much for the development of technical expertise in Iran. It nay appear that a wide variety of technologically complex goods are manufactured in Iran, but because the local content of production has been limited in most cases to simple assembly operation, it has not required a high degree of technical sophistication. The pharmaceutical industry is a good this point. example to illustrate The operation of jointventure firms in this industry consists of combining the various basic pharmaceutical products, purchased from or through the foreign parent company, and packaging the final mixture. Even most of the therapeutically inert elements used in the industry are imported as is much of the packaging material. In an interview with one of the authors, the expatriate manager of a large foreign pharmaceutical firm admitted that his factory was no more than a "large drug store."36 The situation in the other industries is not basically different. Many firms manufacturing electric appliances, diesel engines, tractors, motor vehicles, paint and tires have set up plants in Iran to avoid import restrictions It is interesting to note on finished products. that until recently Bank Markazils statistics on foreign investment included a category labelled "assembly operations." The impact of these final processing or assembly plants is further reduced by tied-purchase agreements with foreign affiliates that preclude linkages to other sectors of the economy.37 The scope for transfer of technology is limited because even within the existing simple manufacturing processes, the more complex tasks are performed by foreign Iranian partners are often not involved parent companies. in such functions as feasibility studies, the design of products and of production techniques, and plant construction. Once the plant is in production, most of the high technical and managerial positions are staffed by expatriates. In Tables 6 and 7 we present data pertaining to firms operating in these questions for five joint-venture Iran. It is clear that the extent of local participation in the establishment and the operation of joint ventures is very limited. Moreover, there does not seem to be any systematic effort to train local staff to replace the exIRANIANSTUDIES

90

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For instance, 13 years after the establishpatriates. ment of company A, not a single top management and techniIranian employees cal position is staffed by an Iranian. are seldom sent abroad for training because the companies have found that the returnees tend to have high expectations. Not only are the training programs inadequate, but the local employees are not qualified enough to take full In any case, advantage of what little training there is. the limited learning that is acquired remains internal to to the rest of the firms and there is little spill-over the economy.38 In contrast to the earlier neglect, there has been a growing realization more recently in Iran that technology transfer has to be an important consideration in the esAt present, it is the pubtablishment of joint ventures. and private licly stated view of both government officials industrialists that Iran's objective in seeking foreign investment is to obtain modern Western technology which is now more broadly defined to include managerial know-how.39 At a recent conference to attract American investors to Iran, one of the points most often stressed by the Iranian was Iran's wish to acquire modern technology participants no one is quite through foreign investment.40 Still, clear as to the requirements for successful transfer of technology.41 It appears that it is taken for granted that the benefits will exceed the costs. It is true that, with and complexity in the the rising level of sophistication economy, greater use is made of transfer mechanisms such as licensing and technical assistance or management contracts, and technical knowledge is acquired from a wider range of sources, including East European countries. There is as yet no systematic evaluation of all possible alternatives and no attempt by the government to formulate a consistent technology policy. One area where the government's emphasis on obtaining modern technology through direct investment is particularly noticeable is agriculture and the related processing industries. Beginning with the Fourth Plan (1347-1351 [March 1968-March 1973]), agro-industrial projects became

93

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

The idea has development. the catchword for agricultural secto the agricultural investors foreign been to attract which include tax holiincentives special tor by providing water, long-term leases on land at condays, subsidized and exemption from import cheap credit, rates, cessional In addition, the government equipment. duties on capital is prepared to relax its rule of minority ownership for It is and allow wholly-owned subsidiaries. foreigners with integrated plantations hoped that large foreign-run improve productivity. plants will substantially processing in policy has been in response to the The shift For the sector. performance of the agricultural sluggish period 1340 to 1350 (1961 to 1971), this sector grew at an average rate of about 3.5 percent compared to about 9 perbetween the two The disparity cent for the whole economy. given the emphasis on industrialrates is not surprising, against agriculture. policies and the discriminatory ization stagnant rural incomes and popufood imports, With rising the government decided in the large cities, lation pressure The target growth to the rural areas. to pay more attention was set at 4.4 percent per annum durrate for agriculture

ing the Fourth Plan and has been raised to 6 percent for To the Fifth Plan (1352-56 [March 1973-March 1978]). to largewas push proposed it rates, achieve these higher scale mechanized farming with integrated processing facilThe basic assumption underlying this approach was ities. that the peasants would be slow to respond to incentives-the poor performance being blamed on the conservatism of rather the peasants the government.42

than on the discriminatory

policies

arrangements for promoting The main institutional mechanized farming are (1) farm corporations large-scale in one of peasant holdings formed from the consolidation company with and run as a joint-stock or more villages and (2) private agroconsiderable government assistance It has been in the establishing complexes.43 industrial sought of such units that the government has actively to In the Fifth Plan, most projects investment. foreign in basic food products are to make Iran self-sufficient IRANIAN STUDIES

94

of

have foreign participation. Responding to the incentives provided by the government, a number of foreign firms have At first, these were undertaken agro-industrial projects. mostly American firms, but there is increasing interest in the livefrom European and Australian firms, especially stock schemes promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Although their total number is still small, because these projects tend to be large (in one case about 125,000 hectares), they cover not an insignificant proportion of total arable land; it is estimated that by the end of the Fifth Plan, about 10 percent of the irrigated land will be under such projects, which implies that a substantially higher share of the commercialized agriculture will be controlled by foreign firms. Undoubtedly, agro-industrial complexes will raise the total output, but whether they constitute the optimum strategy for agricultural development is open to serious their private profitability is no guide question. Firstly, to their economic efficiency, since the costs of direct government subsidies, public investment in infrastructure and the displacement of peasants are not taken into account.. Secondly, their impact on the distribution of income and rural employment are adverse. Finally, their technological impact is probably very limited. Some of the firms (e.g., Chase Manhattan, Dow Chemical, Mitsui, John Deere t Co.) that originally invested in such projects had little direct experience in agricultural production and regarded their investments in agro-industrial projects as footholds in a potentially large market for their products and services. Even where foreign firms have introduced new farming practices, the probability that these will be adqpted by the Iranian peasants is small, since the technology suitable for large integrated farms (about 10,000 hectares or mori) is not usually relevant to small peasant holdings.4 The contribution of multinational firms to the expansion of manufactured exports from the underdeveloped countries is another of the alleged benefits of foreign investment. It is argued that their technological re-

95

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

sources, access to international distribution networks, and worldwide production planning enable them to locate the more labor-intensive processes in the low-wage countries and export the products to the rest of the world; the resultant increases in income and employment are the benefits that accrue to the host countries. Although in the past the search for lower production costs has not been the main motive for foreign investment in the underdeveloped countries, there is evidence that it is becoming an increasingly important consideration in a number of cases.45 In Iran, the contribution of foreign firms to the growth of manufactured exports has been small, which is to be expected given the emphasis on import substitution. Government policies have generally discriminated against exports, but in the past few years attempts have been made to reduce the distortions and encourage in particular the export of manufactured goods. The change occurred in the late 1340s (1961-1971) when, in response to balance of payment difficulties and in an effort to diversify Iran's exports, the government decided to raise non-oil exports by providing tax holidays, subsidized credit, refund of customs duties on the direct import content of exports, and, in certain cases, outright cash subsidies. The industrial licensing system became a policy instrument for the promotion of manufactured exports by requiring guarantees that a certain proportion of the output would be exported as a condition for the grant of a license both for new establishments and for the expansion of existing facilities. Since firms were willing to give such guarantees only if the domestic market was profitable enough to compensate their losses from their exports, the domestic consumers were in effect forced to subsidize exports. It is doubtful whether this policy has been very effective. It led to a slowdown of the growth of certain industries rather than the expansion of exports. The resultant shortages that appeared in the economy in 1351 (1971/72) and 1352 (1972/73) have forced a relaxation of this requirement and industrial licenses are now more readily issued. In response to government incentives and pressure and as a natural outcome of the industrialization of the IRANIANSTUDIES

96

economy, the value of nontraditional industrial exports has increased in value from $24.6 million in 1347 (1968/69) to $71.6 million in 1350 (1971/72), constituting about oneIt is fifth of total non-oil exports in the latter year. noteworthy that the rise in new exports has been in such items as chemicals, shoes, clothes and knitwear, vegetable oils, and soap and detergents, which are mainly manufactured by domestic firms. Complete data on the exports of such products by foreign companies are not available, but the fragmentary information we have indicates that they are practically In the UNIDOstudy of foreign negligible. investment in Iran, it is reported that only .3 percent of the total sales of the sixteen firms investigated came from exports, and these were generally token goodwill gestures. In another study by one of the present authors, it was found that none of the five firms in the sample had any exports in 1351 (1971/72), although one had previously exported $8,000 of its products to demonstrate their high quality to the government.46 Moreover, most of the firms in the two samples were pessimistic about the prospects of increasing their exports. They considered their scale of operation to be too small and the labor and the raw material costs to be too high in Iran. The unimpressive export performance of the joint-venture companies is not surprising. A great majority of these firms have invested in Iran to capture a share of its domestic market, and many are explicitly barred by their parent company to export to other countries. The author of a recent study of 24 licensing and technical assistance agreements, 17 of which were with joint-venture firms, reports that fifteen of the contracts completely prohibited exports, four restricted exports to particular areas, and only five had no limitations on exports.47 After the Teheran Oil agreement in December 1971 and the subsequent increases in the oil revenue, the urgency of the export promotion drive has somewhat disappeared, but the objective of achieving a wider export base remains. In negotiations with prospective foreign investors, Iran's desire to use foreign subsidiaries to promote The government points out Iran's orexports is stressed. derly if not cheap labor force, the locational advantages 97

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

of Iran in relation to Middle East markets, and the politiof the country. 48 It is unlikely that cost cal stability advantages will persuade foreign corporations to invest in environment remain the political Iran--the real attractions of Iran and the expanding and protected local market. In view of the present energy crisis in the West and Japan, it is possible that firms in high energy-using industries in Iran to be assured of will set up production facilities Pollution controls in the industrial regular oil supplies. nations may provide an added incentive. A SummingUp Over the past two decades, the role of foreign capital in Iran's economy has undergone considerable change and so have the attitudes of Iranian policymakers toward it. Whereas twenty years ago foreign capital was the symbol of colonial domination, today it is regarded as an agent of In 1955, the foreign investment law economic development. was passively accepted as part of a package of pro-Western but today foreign investors are actively sought. policies, have changed slowly and usually The attitudes and policies in an ad hoc manner in response to the changing situation. The trend has been towards greater acceptance of foreign capital within what the government claims to be a more controlled framework. The present favorable attitude is probably based more on a faith in the future contributions Our of direct investment than on its past performance. analysis does not lead us to reach a conclusion similar to that of a recent World Bank study, stating that "Iran has been extremely successful both in attracting foreign investment and ensuring that it does not play a dominant role in the economy."49 As we have argued in the main part of the paper, the cost to the economy--high prices to the consumers and the exclusion of domestic producers from certain sectors--may have been substantial without there In the past, Iran has not being commensurate benefits. always been aware of its bargaining power and has, thereHad it not been for fore, made unnecessary concessions. the rapidly rising oil revenue, the burden of these misIRANIANSTUDIES

98

takes would have been more apparent. It is increasingly realized that the country has many attractions for foreign investors, and a more concerted effort is being made to exploit this enhanced bargaining position. Although at present there are shortterm conflicts between international and Iranian capital as to which will get the larger share, the parties involved have a greater appreciation of the convergence of their long-term interests. Multinational corporations want access to Iran's human and natural resources and the local industrialists need the help of foreign firms to consolidate their position rapidly even before their own and organizational technological are develcapabilities oped.50 The investment conferences that have been held in the past several years with industrialists and financiers from the major industrial nations are designed partly to foster these alliances--usually to the detriment of small-scale producers in Iran. In the immediate future this cooperation will be reflected in increasing number of joint ventures formed by Iranian "industrial groups"' or conglomerates and multinational corporations. The government finds such arrangements acceptable because the growth of national product, now considered synonymous with progress, has become its main objective. Moreover, though the claim of political made by the government is stability an inducement to foreign investment in the short run, the expansion of that investment could become an important factor in guaranteeing that stability in the long run.. We have alluded to the greater efforts to attract foreign investors. An even more noticeable shift to a more open-door policy appears to have taken place since 1970. The various agreements that have been reached over the past three years seem to suggest that the expansion of foreign investment in the future will dwarf all that has occurred in the past. The estimates of planned investments by each of the major industrial nations during the Fifth Plan period range between $500 million and $1.5 billion and are continuously revised upwards. Many new fields, such as tourism, housing, urban development, transportation, 99

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

and retailing have been opened up for direct investment, and existing unofficial restrictions in certain sectors such as banking have been relaxed.51 The oil sector is undergoing a fundamental change. The energy crisis has vastly improved Iran's bargaining position, not only for getting better terms in its oil deals, but also for obtaining other foreign investments. Although there is a move towards greater local control of the crude oil supply, foreign investment in this sector will increase substantially in the near future. Joint ventures in exploration, petrochemical complexes, natural gas liquificarefining, tion plants, are being formed very rapidly. etc., For its part, Iran has begun to invest in downstream operations of the oil industry in other countries and has ambitions for becoming a world economic power. Riding the crest of an energy crisis, the achievement of this aim may appear posAs sible to the policy makers. We are not as optimistic. yet, there is no well-thought-out, long-term plan to deal with problems posed by a massive presence of foreign capital. It is not clear that there is much awareness of the of dependence on foreign capital and possible consequences No doubt new policies will emerge as these technology.52 is the problems arise, but at the moment Iran's strategy short-run to outside developments rather one of reacting It nmay than taking the initiative on long-term issues. turn out to be an expensive learning process since with investment the cost of the increasing magnitude of foreign mistakes will be correspondingly high.

NOTES See, for example, R. Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay (New York: Basic Books, 1971); S. Hymer, "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development," in J. Bhagwati, ed., Economics and World Order (New CorYork: Macmillan, 1972); R. Caves, "International The Industrial Economics of Foreign Inporations: vestment," Economica, Vol. 38, No. 149 (September 1971), pp. 1-27.

IRANIAN STUDIES

100

2.

The most serious attempt to formulate a consistent policy for foreign investment is by a group of Latin American countries known as the "Andean Group."1

3.

For a discussion of direct investment and other forms of international capital movements, see C. P. Kindleberger, American Business Abroad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).

4.

The oil industry has received considerable attention elsewhere. See, for example, W. H. Bartsch, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Economy of Iran," in R. F. Mikesell, ed., Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case Studies on Investor-Host Country Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), or L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (London: Lawrence,

lS5) S.

For instance, foreign rug merchants in some cases had their own factories, but mainly they relied on domestic suppliers. See A. G. Edwards, The Persian Carpet (New York: Humanities Press, 1967).

6.

For an interesting account of some of these developments, see R. A. McDaniel, "Economic Change and Economic Resiliency in Nineteenth Century Persia," Iranian Studies, Vol. IV,No. 1 (Winter 1971), pp. 36-49.

7.

For a detailed account of the British-Russian rivalry in Iran during this period and the various attempts to obtain concessions by European promoters, mainly Russian and British, see F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), especially Chapters 2-5.

8.

The events connected with this concession are analyzed in A. K. S. Lambton, "The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution," Studia Islamica, Vol. 22 (Autumn 1965), pp. 119-157, and Vol. 23 (Winter 1966), pp. 71-90; 101

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

F. Kazemzadeh, 2B. cit., Chapter 4; N. R. Keddie, Relijon and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 (London: Athlone Press, 1966). 9.

For a list of Russian and British concessions in Iran, see C. Issawi, The Economic History of Iran, 18001914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 358-361.

10.

See also J. Bharier, Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 170.

11.

For an account of the nationalization of the oil incit., or N. S. dustry, see L. P. Elwell-Sutton, 2p. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy: Powder Keg in Iran (New York: Whittier Books, 1954).

12.

For the text of the Law and subsequent regulations for its implementation, see Bank Markazi Iran, Investors' Guide to Iran (Teheran: 1969). A legal analysis of the Law can be found in John Westberg, "Foreign Investment in Iran: A Short Analysis of the Law for Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment in Iran," Business Lawyer, Vol. 24 (July 1969),

pp.

1263-1273.

in an-

13.

Since then the Exxon Corporation has invested other lubricating oil plant.

14.

It is now believed by most economists that the actual transfer of capital is secondary to other consideraSee tions in a firm's decision to invest overseas. S. Hymer, "The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Investment," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technopj. cit., logy, 1960; also, C. P. Kindleberger, Chapter 1.

15.

An important exception has been investments maceutical industry, where majority control

IRANIAN STUDIES

102

in the pharor wholly-

have beenallowed. In the past few owned subsidiaries years, the government has pressured such companies to find Iranian partners or increase their share. 16.

case arose soon after the passage of An interesting the Law. Unilever wanted to invest in the manufacturing of vegetable oil and soap in Iran but was refused a license after a handful of local producers of these commodities complained that foreign competition would ruin them. This information was supplied to one of the authors by a person involved in the with the goverrunment. negotiations

17.

Note that all the investment also excluded.

18.

In a United Nations' Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) study of foreign investment in Iran, the author reports that some shares held nominally by Iranians were in fact owned and controlled by foreigners. See S. Lall, Balance of Payments and Income Effects of Private Foreign Investment in Manufacturing: Case Studies of India and Iran (Geneva: 1972). This was to evade government pressure to get majority shareholding for Iranians.

19.

For an analysis of the second and the third development plans and the economic policy of the government during this period, see G. Baldwin, Planning and Economic Development in Iran (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967).

20.

Of the 14 financial institutions, 11 appear (or are of firms) in Fortune's lists of SO subsidiaries largest commercial banks in the U.S. and 50 largest commercial banks outside the U.S., while 3 out of 4 manufacturing firms are listed in Fortune's 300 largest industrials outside the U.S. There have been some changes in the foreign ownership of shares in the bank. Notably, Lazard Freres 4 Co., which was one of the original sponsors, no longer owns stocks 103

in the oil

industry

is

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

in the bank, while two large Japanese banks became shareholders in 1972. This latter development is in the light of Japan's rising industrial significant investment in Iran. 21.

See F. Daftari, "The Balance of Payments Deficit and the Problem of Inflation in Iran, 1955-1962,"' Iranian Studies, Vol. V3 No. 1 (Winter 1972), pp. 2-247f~-

22.

The oil revenue figures do not include purchase of foreign exchange from the oil companies. The growth rate given here is an approximate figure because of in the GNPdata provided by the Bank inconsistencies Markazi Iran. See Annual Reports of Bank Markazi Iran for 1349 and 1350.

23.

Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopSee International Iran, Vol. ment, Industrial Policies and Priorities: IV (Washington: 1971), Tables 38, 39, and 40. This report provides a detailed account of the industrial of the Iranian government. See also, D. policies of Iran: The records, Abromovic, "Industrialization the problems and the prospect," Ta_qjq&t-e Egte?_di, Vol. VII, No. 18 (Spring 1970), pp. 14-47.

24.

IBRD, 2j.

25.

The large U.S. investment in 1348 (1969/70) was mainly in petrochemicals and a large portion of it has since been taken over by the National Iranian Oil Company.

26.

Rowthorn and Hymer have argued that what J. J. ServanScheiber has called "The American Challenge" should rightly be labelled "the Non-American Challenge." They maintain that much of America's investment in Europe should be considered as defensive investments on the part of American corporations because European investments in the rest of the world corporations' had changed the balance of power against the U.S. See S. Hymer and R. Rowthorn, "Multinational CorporaThe Non-American Oligopoly: tions and International

cit.,

IRANIAN STUDIES

Annex A, Table 4.

104

Challenge," in C. P. Kindleberger, ed., The International Corporation (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970). 27.

This publication is roughly comparable to Fortune's list of top U.S. corporations. We have used this list in preference to Fortune's list of top corporations outside the U.S. because the latter is too limited and excludes many of the large multinational corporations.

28.

Information on foreign investors in these two countries was obtained from Foreign Invested Enterprises in Taiwan, Republic of China (Taipei: Industrial Development and Investment Centre, 1972), and Total Foreign Equity and Loan Funds Authorized for Projects Approved under the Foreign Capital Investment Law Since 1962, Investment Promotion Branch TID, USAID/ Korea, no date (ca. 1972).

29.

No satisfactory evaluation of the cost and benefits of foreign investment is possible without a specification of alternatives. In the final analysis the choice among alternatives is often a political one.

30.

Bank Markazi Iran publishes a series on investment in machinery and equipment,and the Ministry of Economy provides some data on industrial investment. Neither of these series, however, can be considered to be accurate.

31.

S. Lall, 2p. cit., p. 119. This study also attempts to arrive at a quantitative measure of the balance of payments effect of foreign investment in Iran. Another recent study in Iran has found extensive evidence of overpricing of purchases from parent companies. See G. Salehkhou, "Commercialization of Technology in Developing Countries with Special Reference to the Process of Technology Transfer to Iran," Ph.D. dissertation in progress, The New School for Social Research.

105

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

32.

See IMDBI, Annual Report for 1350 (1971/72).

33.

In the license application for the importation of capital, there is a small section requiring information on the number of foreign technicians to be employed and the proposed training of Iranian personnel. In another section on know-how and royalties, the only questions asked concerns royalties and technical fees.

34.

It is of course an illusion to think that the mere ownership of equity capital is an incentive for a foreign partner to help run an enterprise efficiently. A foreign parent firm can make its profits through overpricing of raw material supplies or overcharging for the capital equipment. Such practices are commonin Iran. A number of foreign machinery suppliers have invested in joint ventures: General Glass Equipment Co.'s holding in S. S. Shisheh Ghazvin and Salzgitter Machinen A. G.'s investment in S. S. Ghand Kermanshah may be cited as examples. Reference to tied purchase agreements is given in footnote 31.

35.

This is also true of some manufactured products which are produced by domestic firms and is the result of of the government. the import substitution policies

36.

See R. Bildner, "Strategies and Effects of Multinational Corporations in Iran and Yugoslavia," unpublished Scholar of the House Essay, Yale University, 1973

37.

The government has acknowledged the existence of this Since 1970 the Ministry of Economy resituation. quires that in every new project either the value added should be greater than 35 percent or the local content of the final product to be more than 65 perBecause it is not specified whether domestic cent. or world prices are to be used in the calculation, this requirement may be easily bypassed.

IRANIAN STUDIES

106

above description is based on interviews with firms in Iran. For a more extenjoint-venture discussion of these questions, see R. Bildner, cit., Chapter 6.

38.

The five sive 2p.

39.

In fact, it is this ill-defined managerial know-how which, in the minds of Iran's policymakers, tips the balance in favor of direct investment as opposed to other channels for obtaining technology. However, with recently, there has been some disillusionment the "foreign manager." It is argued that because of lack of familiarity with local conditions, foreigners are not always the best managers. See A. Rezai, "The Role of Capital and Foreign Investors in Iran's Economy," Journal of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Mines of Iran, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Ordibeheshtl3S2), pp. 88-96.

40.

See Proceedings of Iran Investment Conference, Teheran, May 18-20, 1970 (New York: distributed by Chase Manhattan Bank, ca. 1971).

41.

Some influential policy makers believe that once the first plant is physically located in Iran, the reis more or quired domestic technological capability less automatically created. See speech by A. Kheradjou in the Proceedings of Iran Investment Conference, Note that fifteen years after the establish2p. cit. ment of the first tire factory in Iran and after several years of production by three tire firms, when a fourth company was recently set up, it still had to seek a foreign partner.

42.

It was also argued that large-scale farming would be more economical in the use of water. It is hard to see, however, how subsidized water encourages economy in its use.

43.

Originally these were to be situated on land below dams to be assured of regular and adequate water. In 1968 an act of Parliament put 400, 000 hectares of such 107

SPRING-SUMNER1973

land at the disposal of the Ministry of Water and Power to lease out on long-term basis. 44.

For a discussion and evaluation of the government strategies for agricultural development, especially agro-industrial see International Labour projects, Office, Emplymnent and Income Policies for Iran (Geneva: 1972), Vol. B, Appendix D.

45.

The role of multinational firms in the promotion of manufactured exports is discussed in G. K. Helleiner, "Manufactured Exports from Less Developed Countries and Multinational Firms," The Economic Journal, Vol. 83, No. 329 (March 1973), pp. 21-42, and B. I. Cohen, "Comparative Behavior of Foreign and Domestic Firms," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 55, No. 2 (May 1973), pp. 190-197.

46.

See S. Lall, 2p. cit., Chapter 4.

47.

See G. Salehkhou, 22. cit.

48.

See, for example, The Proceedings ment Conference, . cit.

49.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Industrial Policies and Priorities: Iran (Washingtcn: 1972), p. 36.

50.

In the past decade or so, partnerships with foreign firms have also enabled a number of persons with political influence to join the rank of "industrial entrepreneurs."

51.

Since 1339 (1960), there had been no foreign investment in banking except for one instance for which it was argued that the foreign partners connection would allow penetration into the Persian Gulf's lucrative market. Two of the four banks that have been established recently have foreign partners.

IRANIAN STUDIES

p. 116; and R. Bildner,

108

2j.

cit.,

of the Iran Invest-

S2.

For an analysis of the likely consequences of multinational corporations' expansion, see S. Hymer, "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development," in J. Bhagwati, ed., 2o cit

109

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

TOWARDS A SOCIAL ANDECONOMIC HISTORY OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY IRAN THOMASM. RICKS Research in Iranian social and economic history is still unknown.1 This situation is puzzling in relatively view of the social and economic research in Arab and Turkish history, particularly from 1955 onwards.2 In the past ten years, social and economic research in these two areas of Middle East history have produced some excellent results.3 But similar research in Iranian history has not This state of affairs is disappointing when we developed. recall the words of Vladimir Minorsky in his "Foreword" to the Tadhkirat al-muluik in 1943: The study of the Islamic period of the history of Iran--which alone covers thirteen centuries--is still in its infancy, not so much for want of useful outlines of single periods as because of the limited methods of research which were so long employed. Studies of political events, chronology, literature,

Thomas M. Ricks is currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of History at Indiana University. Portions of this article were presented at a panel on "Problems of Iranian Historiography," co-sponsored by The Society for Iranian Studies and the Middle East Studies Association, held in Binghamton, New York, November, 1972. The author wishes to thank Professor Gene Garthwaite and the S.I.S. for that opportunity. IRANIAN STUDIES

110

religion and art all have their importance, but the picture is likely to remain incomplete and to lack unity until there has been a more thorough examination of the ethnological factors, the economic backas they do, ground and the institutions, reflecting, the respective positions of the social groups.4 In the present paper, I examine the problems of Iranian historiography for the eighteenth century,5 and suggest metihds of overcoming some of the difficulties in research on Iran's social and economic history. I The Persian sources for the eighteenth century are primarily the court histories of the genre of the late medieval period.6 While concepts of chronology and perspective were evident in these histories, little effort was made to investigate events outside the court or their causes and effects, to examine the oral and written sources carefully, or to interpret the data.7 Economic documents (such as tax records, land grants, income lists, import and export records, etc.) were maintained but subject to political interference as in the case of cAdil Shah in 1748 who burned all the tax records from the Nadir Shah period (along with the accountants) in both a symbolic and literal attempt to inaugurate his reign of non-oppression in Iran. Accounts such as salaries for provincial administrators, customs duties, income from the tuyiils and suytirghals, the khaiah, and the gold, copper, and turqoise mines as well as the silk monopoly were maintained, but, except for the Tadhkirat al-mulilk and scattered manuscripts in private libraries, these are not generally to be found. Personal diaries, official and unofficial letters of provincial authorities, travelogues, and commercial accounting lists are yet to be discovered, although there are a number of edited and published tarmans and suyirghals of Nadir ShAh and the Zandsf8 While records are still preserved in a number of awq&f offices for the eighteenth century, difof access to these documents continue to prevent ficulties adequate investigation. Finally, no cadastral survey of 111

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

either rural or urban property nor census of part or all of the country exists for the eighteenth century so that tax and demographic data must be painstakingly gleaned fmn East India companies' recourt histories, the travelogues, cord, etc.9 for the researcher are not only in the Difficulties use of the unpublished manuscripts (such as in the reading of the script, access to new sources, obtaining permission etc.) but even in the use of the to use private libraries, many are printed When available, published manuscripts. unedited, or with neither a commentary nor an invirtually In many cases, where all dex to the original manuscript. use come together, the results are of little three failings Their except for comparison with other known manuscripts. and only advantages lie, of course, in their legibility ready availability. Since extensive diplomatic relations were not begun with the European countries until the nineteenth century, asdiplomatic correspondence offers the researcher little sistance for the late Safavid to early Qajir periods as However, while sources for social and economic history. diplomatic relations did not exist formally with Iran, the great number of commercial memoranda, diplomatic correspondence between the European powers and the Ottomans, and the in India and correspondence between the British officials as well as the await thorough investigation London still English, Dutch, and French East India companies' records and the Catholic mission letters.10 In the past, the use of European travelogues by historians of the eighteenth century has generally been unSome of critical and excessive for the stated purposes. have not been even when used carefully, the travelogues, studies for purposes of social and economic history, but history. rather for political The continued practice of historians to view Iran of the eighteenth century as a cohesive unit has led to a To assume that Iran during number of misinterpretations. that time functioned economically and socially as the Iran IRANIANSTUDIES

112

of today is to distort the high degree of semi-autonomous and autonomous social and economic development of the provinces so often attested to in both Iranian and European sources.11 These developments were generally uneven and non-uniform. Furthermore, it was more the rule rather than the exception to find one province different in social and economic development than another. Therefore, to view the capital and the reigning monarch as the major sources of information for the country as a whole or the provinces in particular during the eighteenth century is slightly myopic. While certain limited information can be gleaned from the court histories regarding provincial authorities and polilittle can be said or investigated tical structures, in regard to the social and economic life of those same provinces.12 Except for the research on the valis of the Ardalin and Mushacshac families, no extensive study has been carried out on the important families, tribes, or social groups of provincial Iran (such as on Haji Tbrihim Shirizi and his family in Fars, the Georgian princes of the late Safavid period, the Qashqiis of Southern Iran, the Arab tribes of the Persian Gulf, the Turkoman of Khurasan, the Armenians of New Julfa, the Kurds of Azerbaijan, etc.).13 Finally, a major task facing economic and social historians is periodization. The present practice is decidedly biased towards political and literary history. This approach has many difficulties in accounting for (1) the decentralization generally found in the social and economic structures of the provinces, (2) the tribal economic and social developments, (3) the rise of villages and towns, (4) the evolution of technology in the rural and urban sectors, and (5) the growth of the social stratification of groups such as merchants, landlords, guild-systems, etc. Rather than a chronological ordering of reigning monarchs alone, it will become necessary to consider the successive stages in the entire society as well as the uneven course of social and economic developments in the different sectors of the society and regions of Iran. These stages of development in Iranian historiography are extremely difficult to identify and presume a general theoretical orientation so far lacking in monographs in eighteenth-century Iranian history.14 113

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II While there are many problems in the historiography of eighteenth-century Iran, it is still possible to undertake a social and economic history, to outline some topics for research, and to indicate the sources to be used. The following discussion will concentrate primarily on the Zand period (1750-1795) with general reference to modern Iranian history. Hadl Hidayati is the first Iranian historian to write a monograph on the Zands using the principal Persian and European sources (the Giti gush4, Gulshan-i Murad, Mujmal al-tavRrikh bacd Nadiriyyah, cAlam Nidirt, Jahngush&-yi ira-yi Nadiri, Tarikh-i N&dirLyyah, Tazkirah -i Shiushtar and the TIrikh-i Zandiyyah as well as the French East India Company records and the French diplomatic correspondence).15 Hidlyatils monograph successfully the limitaarticulates tions of his primary sources and attempts to integrate political-administrative history of the Karim Khin period with social, economic, and cultural The brevity of his history. work and the lack of clarity in organization and priorities result in too general a treatment of Karim Khin and the eighteenth century. While there are shortcomings in his work, Hid&yati did attempt to lay the foundation for a social and economic history. Karim Khan Zand va khalij-i Almad Farimarzils Fars (Tehran, 1346/1967), is valuable for the author's concepof Southern Iran as an integral tualization part of the Persian Gulf region; a concept so far lacking in other Persian and European works. Nonetheless, an absence of clearand undue emphasis on the political ly stated objectives of Karim Khan in explaining policies the economic structures of Southern Iran and the Gulf lessen the initial value of the monograph considerably. Recently, two published dissertations by Parvlz Rajabi and Mehdi Roschanzamir and a series of articles by both historians in the journal, Bar-rasih&-yi T&rikhl, contribute to our knowledge of eighteenth-century Iran.16 ProIRANIAN STUDIES

114

fessor Rajabils work is not as successful as that of Roschanzamir; the latter's commentary on one of Rajabi's articles details several of the challenges to Zand historiography and corrects some of the misunderstandings of Rajabils study which have resulted from problems of periodization of regional perspective. But, neither author historiography of completely breaks with the traditional political history and therefore must be seen as a continuation of that tradition. European and American historians also concentrate primarily on the political-administrative history of the Zand period. Even when the emphasis is economic, as in the case of A. A. Amin's British Interests in the Persian Gulf (Leiden, 1967), the result is essentially a political history of the East India Company. Only in the works of Ann K. S. Lambton, Hamid Algar, and Gavin Hambly have historians begun non-political research for this period, albeit in a very summarymanner. III Two important matters must be considered before social and economic history is attempted, that is, the need for a new system of periodization and for the establishment of a regional approach. The accepted method for periodization, for example, from 1700 A.D. to 1800 A.D., catalogues six distinct periods for historical research: The The The The The The

late Safavids (1700-1722) Afghans (1722-1729) Safavid-Afshars (1729-1736) Afshars (1736-1750) Zands (1750-1795) Qajars (1795 onwards)

Implicit in this listing is the belief that with the advent of a new ruling family came a new administration and political rule accompanied by a different approach to the 115

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

Iranian political systems and, furthermore, that the social and economic conditions within the country differed with each successive ruling family. An examination of the Persian and European primary sources does not allow for such general assumptions which have characterized the eighteenth century as a "'time of troubles"' and ''a period of anarchy.' Rather, the continuation of the administrative functions of both capital and provincial offices, the rule of important positions in the hands of provincial family dynasties, the continued presence of European and Persian merchants in competition with each other and with others (such as the Armenians, Jews, Arabs, and Gujaratis), and the little disruption of the social strata of towns and villages (except perhaps for the 1745-1753 period) indicate that other approaches and interpretations of eighteenth-century Iranian history would be more fruitful, and that dynastic periodization ought to be supplemented by either a thematic or disciplinary approach. Thematically, for example, the artisan technology within Iran was distinctly affected both by Shah CAbbis and by the arrival of the English East India Companyin the Persian Gulf; that is, a new market for export was acof protection companied by the favorable economic policies by the monarch and the granting of certain monopolies to Iranian merchants. The economic encouragement from the monarch in need of capital for military conquests along with the presence of European merchants in the Gulf not only developed new ideas in artisan trade and technology (such as the growth and expansion of the carpet, textile, but also coincided with the and handicraft industries) rise of a new merchant group within Iran, the Armenians of New Julfa. These developments within Iran's market-oriented economy continued until the 1750s when the Dutch left Bandar cAbbas, the French raided that port, the Dutch and English East India companies closed their trading houses in Kirman and Isfahan, and the Persian and Armenian merchants migrated to Baghdad, Basra, and India. The basic stimuli for the artisan trade and technology of the 1600 period had declined to such an extent by the 1750s that the trade and technology within Iran declined as well; that is, the trade and technology of Isfahan and Southern IRANIANSTUDIES

116

Iran. Furthermore, Nadir Shah's economic and political of the currency, policies during the 1740s--revaluation excessive of the merchant community, taxation, neglect harassment of the Armenian and Persian trading families structures as well as readjustments in the provincial of of certain Southern Iran by abolishment family dynasties the economic structures of Southand positions--weakened From 1747-1753, the ern Iran but did not destroy them. from Afshars to the Zands, trade conperiod of transition tinued (the port-towns, caravan routes, and merchant houses and artisan work remained active in continued to function), the bazaars. The major difference between 1600 A.D. and 1750 A.D. was the absence of monarchical and protection the external both of which accounted for the rise stimuli, in artisan trade and technology. Thus, one phase of Iranian social had come to an end. and economic history By the end of the 1750s, however, new forces were to rejuvenate With the rise of Karim the old structures. and economic stability was Khan, a return to some social Karim Kh&nls pleas for the return of the Persian begun. and Armenian merchants, his interest in assisting the English East India Company in establishing a port-trading house at Bandar Bushire, and his policies regarding the export of Iranian currency indicate that he was intent on reestablishing the former vitality in the Safavid systems. While some merchants did return and caravan trade commenced once more in Southern Iran and the Zagros regions, in a return to artisan resulting trade and technology (such as the Kirmani wool industry, the carpet and textile inof Shiraz, dustries the building of bazaars, administrative quarters, the external etc.), stimuli of the English East India Company declined in trade and currency exchange, Karim Khin renewed past grievances with the Ottomans and the cUmanis, and Russian interests in the Caspian and Northern Iranian regions revived. In the post-Karim Khan period (1779-1795), the Zands followed Karim Khan's economic policies maintaining relative prosperity and stability in Southern Iran but lacked the ability to stimulate the social-economic systems to function in the 1600-1750 A.D. manner. By the 1790s, new internal forces such as the silk trade to north, the increase of the cotton export 117

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trade from the Caspian and Khurasan regions, and the rise of the Qajars coincided with Russian interest in these sane areas and a shift of the Erzerum-Aleppo trade to ErzerumThe ascendancy of Northern Iran over Black Sea trade. Southern Iran was further insured by the decline in Persian Gulf trade and the rise of British interest in the Gulf. By 1850, the second period of modern Iran's artisan technology and trade had ended. such as the social groups withUsing other criteria in Iran during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries as the rewell as the tribes, the rise of towns and villages, and the bureaucracy, the division preligious institutions, viously outlined (1600-1750 A.D. and 17S0-18S0 A.D.) can be For example, during the 1600s in more detail. substantiated the several prominent provincial families of Western Iran came to power under the aegis of the Safavids (the Ardalans of Sanandaj, the valls of Luristan, and the Mushacshacs of Arabistan) only to decline around 1750 whereas the Qashqais and Bakhtiyaris along with the Arabs of the Gulf littoral grew in importance rather than declined during this same The latter development coincided with the rise in period. power of the Zand family under Karim Khan who sought out and obtained assistance from the Qashqais and the Baktiso carefully constructIn addition, the alliances yaris. ed between Karim Khan and the Gulf shaikhs soon were weakened with his death, finally collapsing with the rise of Afthe British treaty system in the nineteenth century. ter the 1820s, the Gulf shaikhs had very few ties with the central government of Iran. During the second period (1750struggles within Iran ended in astrong1850), the religious er position for the ulama by the 1830s; also, first Shiraz and then Tehran became the capital of the country as the and economic shift in power moved from the south political to the north; the trade routes within Iran moved away from the Gulf towards the provinces of Azarbaijan, the Caspian and Khurasan; those Armenians remaining in the littoral, southern region of Iran either moved on to India after the Zands' power collapsed or to the northern regions; greater village and town depopulation occurred in the south during and towns of the northern this period while the villages even the provinces grew (as in Azerbaijan); and finally, IRANIANSTUDIES

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such as HajiT Ibrah'im Shirazli, were Zand administrators, incorporated into the northern Qajar bureaucracy of Fatb CAll Shih. Externally, Russian commercial and military interests in the Caspian Sea and northern Iran were realized in the Treaty of Turkomanchai (1828) while Britain's Treaty of Paris (1852) consolidated the latter's military considerations with Iran vis-a-vis the Gulf and the southern Provinces; the cumanis and the Ottomans ceased any militaryeconomic expansion into the south and west of Iran; and the decline of Britain's merchants in the Gulf was as conspicuous as the continued growth of Russia's merchants in the north. Therefore, by a consideration of the economic and social developments, it is possible to establish a periodization not related to dynasties only. The social-economic factors of tribes, urban families, villages and towns, trading routes, and rural and urban technologies, as well as the increase of economic and political pressures from the foreign powers, allow for a reclassification of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries into two distinct socioeconomic periods; that is, (1) from 1600 to 1750 A.D. and (2) from 1750 to 1850 A.D. Other criteria may be used and other periodization may result. The above is one example based on the rise of artisan trade and caravan trade patterns. As we noted earlier, constant emphasis on eighteenth century Iran as a cohesive unit can lead to some misunderstandings of the events, the social groups, the ethnological factors, and the economic institutions of the eighteenth century. Vladimir Minorsky clearly demonstrated in his Introduction and Commentary to the Tadhkirat al-mulik that Iran in the eighteenth century can best be viewed as parts (provinces) interacting with the whole (central government).17 An examination of Iranian and European sources for the eighteenth century confirms this point of view. Taking our cue from Minorsky, we might begin to study Iran's social and economic history in the following manner:

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Northern, northwestern, and northeastern Iran Eastern and southeastern Iran Southern, southwestern, and western Iran Central Iran In the periodization previously discussed, the first period,from ca. 1600 to 1750 A.D.,swould be, politically speaking, the central plateau or Isfahan period of capital rule while the second period,from ca. 1750-1850 A.D., that of southern Iran and then northern Iran; the sources of power for the ruling families would be in those respective regions. The administrative structures of the provinces were not based solely on the political control of the capital but also on the social and economic structures of the province. The reshaping of Arabistan into Khuzistan is an excellent example. From ca. 1530 A.D. to 1730 A.D., the vali of Arabistan came from the Mushacshac family at Haviza; a position they held due to Safavid favor as well as to their own economic influence in the Gulf-Karun RiverBasra region. After 1750, the Mushacshac lost not only their political power (Nadir Shih had appointed his own vali from among his generals) but economic influence with the shift of trade routes from the Gulf to Azerbaijan. Furthermore, during the second period (1750-1850 A.D.), eastern Khuzistan grew in importance with the rise of social groups and towns due to the port of Bushire under Zand rule as well as due to the growing threats of the Muntafiq Arabs to the west of Arabistan. Finally, the demise of Arabistan (western Khuzistan) and the incorporation of Kuhglliyah (eastern Khuzistan) into the province of Fars insured the position of Bushire and the decline of Bandar Rig as a major port of entry to southern Iran. After 1800, the growth of towns and expansion of trade in Azerbaijan accelerated the decline of the Mushacshac as the northwestern regions began to dominate over the southwestern province of Arabistan-western Khuzistan. These diverse developments would otherwise be unexplainable in traditional historiography which views Iran as developing in a cohesive and uniform fashion. of economic and social The basic interrelationships Iran may not only provide structures of eighteenth-century IRANIANSTUDIES

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a criterion for periodization and for regional studies but also themes and topics for research. Topics such as technology, labor, tax systems, trade, irrigation, social groups and town economies may be investigated or tribal, village, as each relates to the other, or as separate subjects, bearing in mind that they are interrelated with the other social and economic phenomena. The urban sector of eighteenth-century Iran, for example, contained social groups (army and police officials, provincial and local administrators, religious officials, artisans, quarter leaders, and merchants) whose payment of taxes, class structure, labor, and technology differed from that of the rural sector. Their rise and development as social groups should be considered within the two periods already discussed as well as within the regions outlined. Thus, descriptions of the eighteenth-century officials such as the kalantar or darughah should consider the function of the office both within the various regions (provinces) as well as within the different periods of its development. Also, research into demographic history may reveal that population density militated for or against economic development as was the case in eighteenth-century Southern Iran (highly tribal with scattered village and town settlements) and eighteenthcentury Northern Iran (highly settled with scattered tribal societies). In the former region, scattered village and town settlements, balanced population growth amongthe tribes, and prosperous port-towns along the Gulf littoral generally encouraged long-distance caravan trade while, in the latter region, numerous village and town settlements, large-scale farming, and few tribal groupings allowed for more "turban" industries such as silk production and shortdistance trade. Research into other disciplines such as ethnohistory can be pursued for eighteenth-century Iran according to the regions and-periods previously outlined. This research may lead to investigations into the rise of villages and towns, the settlement patterns of semi-nomadic groups, the social and economic roles of the gajs and shaykhs in tribal and village societies, the mullas in the villages, and the interrelationships of tribes, villages, and towns. While relying on the traditional historical sources, the 121

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ethnohistorian oral tradition,

could also use the techniques and linguistics. archaeology,

of folklore,

of and economic history The sources for a social to the PerIran are many. In addition eighteenth-century there ae and few Persian travelogues, sian court histories records prethe farmans, accounting the awqatf records, geograand the many regional libraries, served in private The Armeniin manuscript form. still phies and histories and Gujarati sources both in Iran and India an, Zoroastrian, contain important material along with the Ottoman archival Research into the European travelodata. social-economic (such as the East India of foreign residents gues, letters and the Catholic Mission correspondcompanies' residents ence at the Propaganda Fide, Rome), and the diplomatic from Istanbul and the Levant must be supcorrespondence plemented with a thorough search into the records of the and Dutch) as well East India companies (French, English, The as the records of the Levant and Muscovy companies. at Baghdad commercial memoranda of the French consulates ofof the British and Basra along with the correspondence for fund of information in India are an additional ficials since many of these sources Finally, century. the eighteenth uxban Islamic cities, have already been used in researching of other areas of the Middle East, groups, and technologies and economic monographs can serve as models those social of Iran. for the historians social Vladimir Minorsky's words of 1943 concerning The establishand economic research need not go unnoticed. for Iranian ment of a Guiding Committee within the Society of North Studies and the Middle East Studies Association bibwhose purpose would be to compile syllabi, America and economic etc. on social research lists, liographies, much of Iran would move Iranian historiography history closer to resolving many of its present difficulties.

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NOTES 1.

The terms "social" and "economic" are used throughout the paper in the sense generally employed by historians today and not by social scientists as such; that is, "social" history as used by E. J. Hobsbawn and G. Rude and "economic" history as used by D. S. Landes. To date, only the monographs of historians such as I. P. Petrushevsky, N. V. Pigulevskaya, A. Yu. Yakubovsky, and A. A. Alizadeh would begin to qualify as "social and economic" history within Iranian historiography. The research by Ann K. S. Lambton and C. Issawi, particularly the latter's recent work, Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914 (Chicago, 1972), are extremely useful but lack the general theoretical background needed in the research discussed in this paper. The same comment applies to the two recent Persian publications by_Abiual-Qasim Ttiirl, T&rlkh-i siyasi va ijtimaci-i Iran: az marg_i Tlmir t& marg-i Shah tAbb&s (Tehran, 1347/1968) and CAdnan Mazaraci, Thrikh-i igti?di va ijtim&ci-i Iran va IrAni2yfn az agh&z t& Safaviyyah (Tehran, 1348/1969).

2.

See Claude Cahen, "L'Histoire economique et sociale de l'Orient musulman medieval," Studia Islamica, III (1955), pp. 93-115.

3.

See A. H. Hourani and S. M. Stern, ed., The Islamic City (Oxford, 1970); D. S. Richards, ed., Islam and the Trade of Asia (Oxford, 1970); P. M. Holt, ed., Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt (London, 1968); M. A. Cook, ed., Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East (London, 1970); Gabriel Baer, Egyptian Guilds in Modern Times (Jerusalem, 1964) and idem, "The Administration, Economic and Social Functions of Turkish Guilds," International Journal of Middle East Studies, I, Part 1 (January, 1970), pp. 28-50.

4.

Anonymous, Tadhkirat al-mulilk, trans. Vladimir Minorsky, Gibb Memorial Series, n.s., XVI (London, 1943), p.

1. 123

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S.

The term "historiography" is used in the sense of hiswriting. torical techniques as well as historical

6.

See Hidi Hid&yati, "Mukhtisarl darbArah-i vaqayicnifirs! marbuit bih tav&rikh-i girihi va nusakh khatti-yi qarn-i davazdahum-i hijra" (A Summaryof the Chronicles and Persian Manuscripts concerning eighteenth-century D&nishkadah- i Adabi it-i TihHistories), Mjallah-i 3 Part rin, II, (November, 1333_1954), pp. 17-46.

7.

See Fereydoun Adamiyat, "Problems in Iranian Historiography (trans. Thomas M. Ricks)," Iranian Studies, IV, Part 4 (1971), pp. 132-156.

8.

See the various issues of Bar-raslha-yi T&rlkhi and Rahnama-yi Kitab as well as Jahingir Qayimmaqimi, ed., Yik sad va panjph sanad-i t&rikhi az Jal&yiriyan ta Pahlavi (Tehran, 1348/1969).

9.

See Gavin Hambly, "An Introduction to the Economic Organization of Early Qajar Iran," Iran, II (1964), pp. 69-81 for an example of demographic data-collectsources. ing from historical

10.

See Laurence Lockhart, Nadir Shah (London, 1938); idem, The Fall of the Safavid Dynasty (London, 1958); John R. Perry, "Karim Khan Zand," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Pembroke College, Cambridge University, 1969); idem, "The Banfi Kacb: An amphibious brigand state in Khuzistan," Le monde iranien et llIslam, I of re(1971), pp. 131-152 for useful applications Also search into the East India companies' records. see M. E. Yapp, "The India Office Records as a Source for the Economic History of the Middle East," Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M. A. Cook (London, 1970), pp. 501-513 for some insights into this area of research.

11.

"Artish-i Iran For example, Parviz Rajabils article, VI, dar durah-i Zandlyyah," Bar-rasihf- i flnikhi, Part 3 (1972), pp. 3-26 and Mehdi oschanzam'r, "Kh&-

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nandigan va ma," Bar-raslh&-yi T&rikhl, VII, Part 4 (1972), pp. 175-178 where the authors view eighteenthcentury Iran as a centrally administered state with controls over the Persian Gulf similar to present-day is overcome in Mu4ammad Iran. The difficulty Kashmirl's article, "Tassaruf-i Ba?rah bidast-i Iraniyan dar zamin-i shahryari-yi Zand (The Occupation of Basra by the Iranian People in the Time of Zand Rule)," Barraslha-yi TArtkhi, VI, Part 1 (1970), pp. 87-126 and VI, Part 2 (1970), pp. 69-104. 12.

An excellent example is the Tadhkirat al-muluik and the many difficulties Vladimir Minorsky had in analyzing the social and economic conditions of provincial Iran from the scanty information in a manual of Safavid administration.

13.

See B. Nikitine, "Les valis d'Ardalan," Revue du monde musulman, IXL (1922), pp. 70-104; V. Minorsky, 'MushaCshac," Encyclopedia of Islam, Supp., pp. 160-163. Also see B. Nikitine, "Les Afshars d'Urumiyeh," Journal Asiatigue (January-March, 1929), pp. 67-123; Ahmad Kasravi, Thrlkh-i panad s&lah'-i Khtizistan, 3rd Edition (Tehran, 1330/1951); and _All Mu4ammad Saki, Juva tar!kh-i t&rikhi Luristin (Tehran, 1343/ ghr&fiy&-yi_ 1964) for additional research into families in Western Iran. The general exceptions in Iranian historiography have been the Russian monographs. See I. P. Petrushevsky, History of Iranian Studies," Fifty Years of Soviet Oriental Studies (Brief Reviews) (Moscow, 1968), pp. 3-30.

14.

15.

Hadi Hidayati, Thrlkh-i Zandlyyah, I Iran dar zam5ni Karlm Khan (Tehran, 1331/1952), pp. 30-64.

16.

Parviz Rajabi, Iran unter Karim Khan (Gottingen, 1970); idem, "1Artish-i Iran dar durrah-i zandlyyah"; Mehdi Roschanzamir, Die Zand-Dynastie (Hamburg, 1970); and idem, "Puzhfihishl naw darb&rah-i ravabit-i Iran bl big&nig&n dar sadah-i davazdahum-i hijra (New Research

125

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on the Relations between Iran and Other Countries in the 18th Century)," Bar-rasih&-yi T&rikhl, VI, Part 6 (1971), pp. 53-72 and VII, Part 3 (1972), pp. 23-44. 17.

Tadhkirat al-mulilk, pp. 24-26 and 162-163.

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THENATIONAL INTEGRATION OF BOIR AHMAD REINHOLDLOFFLER

Boir Ahmadis the territory of the largest tribe (or confederation of tribes) of Kohklliiyah in South Iran, located roughly south of the Bakhtiyiar and west of the QashqA'i. Its population (75,000 in 19661) subsists on a mixed economy of agriculture and animal husbandry, which in the a vahighly segmented mountainous topography necessitates riety of nomadic and transhumant adaptations.2 The political position within the wider Iranian context of the area presently called Boir Ahmadhas had a variegated history. Under the rule of the Atabegs of Lur-i Buzurg (12th-14th cent.) it was fairly well integrated and administered, with a flourishing economy and a largely sedIn the following centuries, entery population.3 less stable "'anarchic" forms of political organization seem to have prevailed, until the Q&jar rulers tied the area to the center by appointing the local khans as tax collectors and through interfering in their power struggles. It is at that time and partly through this interference that the

Reinhold L6ffler is Assistant Western Michigan University.

Professor

of Anthropology at

An abridged version of this paper was read at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association in Binghamton, New York, November, 1972. 127

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Boir Atmadi kh&ns ascended to power and the Boir Ahmadibecame the dominant tribe of the area, giving their name to The policy absorbing the other tribes.4 it, and politically of forced national integration gained intensity under Reza Shah, but it is only in the last 20 years that it has become a sustained and comprehensive process. In the following I shall describe of this process.5 the characteristics Political

briefly

some of

History

In the beginning of this century, Boir Ahmadwas system consisting in a feudalistic organized politically of three structural levels, viz., the khin at the top, a number of tribal chiefs, kadkhudas, at the intermediate level, and the peasants at the bottom. The khan depended on the allegiance of the kadkhud&s, who, as landlords, were in direct control of manpower and economic resources, while they themselves depended on the khan as the central power The khan and kadkhudas were figure and unifying force. tribal warmainly responsible for the internecine strife, fare, and raiding of settled areas which gave Boir Atmad The area participated its renowned, lawless reputation. in the general, wider Iranian culture but was economically This period, which is remembered largely self-sufficient. by the families of the former kh&ns and kadkhudas as the heroic age of tribal strength and independence, came to losses, an end in 1930, when Reza Shah, after heavy initial eventually succeeded in subduing the region through the intervention of his Minister of War, Sardar Ascad (a Bakhand exiling Shukrullah Kh&nand Sartip KhMn,the tlyArl), strongest leaders of Boir AhmadSardsir, to Tehran where The region was, thus, effectivethey were duly executed. ly pacified although the landholding system remained unof nomadic groups was then inichanged. Sedentarization tiated, and the area was tied more closely to the national government through the presence of governmental forces and and through the gradual introduction of a institutions, These innovations secular education and national culture. were abruptly halted with the collapse of Iran's military IRANIANSTUDIES

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force with the Allied intervention of 1941. Shukrullih Khan's son, CAbdull&h Khan, instantly left his exile in Tehran and returned to Boir Atmad, where he was eagerly state of opwelcomed by the kadkhudas. The pre-existing pression, raiding, and warfare was revived. cAbdullah Khan waged a long struggle for power against his educated and more liberal half-brother, Khusraw Kh&n, whomhe eventually succeeded in killing in 1953. By that time, however, traditional khanship was already doomed to disappear. The central government--more suspicious of rival powers than ever before--had reestablished its power in Boir Ahmadand was in the process of gaining ultimate control. Oppression of the peasants beas the physical exertion of difficult came increasingly power by the landlords was greatly curtailed, and "progreslike teachers and peasant leaders, utisive" individuals, to challenge the traditional lized government institutions A decisive showdown came in the beginning power figures.6 of 1963 when the pending land reform became a certainty. cAbdullah Khan--supported by most of his kadkhudas and by conservative circles in Tehran opposed to the land reform program--mustered a rebel tribal army and challenged the governmental authorities. He ambushed and annihilated an army unit and raided a gendarmerie post, but as the kadknudas were forced by the government to withdraw their support, he was soon deserted and was finally killed by a servant at the commandof an influential kadkhuda. This last tribal insurrection of Boir Ahmadwas an anachronistic act of despair in view of the fact that the government's military power by now had become far superior to that of the tribes, and the fact that the ever-increasing spread of education and modern national values had changed the outlook, affiliation, and aspirations of large sections of the populaticn of Boir Almad. The event marks the end of any sort of tribal political independence. Since then the central government has held undisputed power, and Boir Almad is being integrated into the nation of Iran. The processes which are concomitantly involved in this integration are, however, scarcely controlled by the government.

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The Current Integrative

Process

Boir Atmad has been integrated to 1. Politically, the extent that tribal power has been replaced by state power administered through the extensions of various minisHowever, no viable substitute has been made for tries. organizations which formerly were supplied by local-level the kadkhudas in an autocratic fashion, and are now conThe tribe and the village are currently spicuously absent. mere agglomerations of small, loose kinship and neighborhood groups, lacking any overall coherence; they are handeddown frameworks without the embracing organization of the This lack of organization implies, among other past. (b) functions, things, the absence of (a) social-control mechanisms, and (c) patterns of decidispute-settlement sion-making and change management at the level of the vilI shall examine each of these in somewhat greater lage. detail below. like the crop(a) Traditional functionaries Invasions of watcher and the mir-&b have disappeared. crop fields by grazing animals now occur frequently, causof and stifling ing damage to production, social friction, a peasant needs the assistWhen irrigating, innovation. ance of two other men, who must patrol the sides of the canals to keep guard that his share of water will not be drained off by others. (b) Disputes are no longer settled locally. are taken to the controversies trivial Even relatively gendarmerie and from there to the court in the expectation In many cases, of obtaining legal support of one's claim. both parties get caught up in a costly, and ultimately inprocedure. consequential, organization (c) The absence of a village-wide also precludes the implementation of innovative ideas like of agriculture and animal husbandry, inrationalization crease of irrigation capacity, introduction of new crops, fusion of fragmented landholdings, cooperative forms of etc. production and marketing, pooling of capital, IRANIANSTUDIES

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2. Socially, the Boir Aiyadi are being integrated into the lower classes of the nation. Few are landless laborers while most of them are subsistence peasants and nomads, who, in 1971, were receiving titles to their landholdings in the course of the land reform. In return for the land they are required to make compensatory payments in twelve annual installments which are only slightly lower than the former tributes. These terms have created considerable discontent, continuing the burden of most peasants for the rest of their lives. Moreover, many peasants believe that the land on which they work to be their rightful property, even though it was forcefully--and thus illegitimately--usurped by the landlords in fairly recent times. The frustration arising from having to pay for what they consider as their own affects their image of, and attitude toward, the government. Even with the execution of the land reform, certain processes inherent in free-enterprise conditions have been operating in the direction of widening socioeconomic distances among peasants. Those with little land are inevitably bound to fail in the competition, and their impoverishment is aggravated by the fact that with the growing individualism, the decline of religion as a motivating force, and the dissolution of kinship networks traditional obligations to help provide only marginal support for them. Though socially placed on the lower rungs, the Boir A2madliare increasingly adopting the values, material symbols and aspirations of the urban lower-middle and middle classes. Given their inferior economic potential and access to education, their chances of attaining these goals are, of course, minimal. The ensuing attitude is characterized by feelings of discontent with their present way of life. There is no enthusiasm in embarking on a migration, and it is considered merely an inescapable hardship. Routine daily work is seen as drudgery. Nevertheless, they are not as yet showing the feelings of hopelessness and despair which are typical of a "culture of poverty." Rather, they seem to be confident that hard work and frugal living will--if God wills--bring about a better life for their children. 131

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The socioeconomic position of the families of the former kadkhudas and khans is considerably better, a fact which is not surprising when we consider some of the characteristic features of Iranian social structure. Some of them have received compensation for their land (which are enormous sums by peasant standards), while others have amassed large tracts of land by appropriating tribal land and cultivating it mechanically in order to exclude it from the land reform. Still others have received government support in the form of salaried positions, e.g., as labor contractors in the local oil production. 3. Economically, BoirAtmad has been nationally integrated through the introduction of cash crops, migrant labor, development programs, and dependency on urban markets for the sale of milk products and the purchase of consumption goods that have become indispensable over the last decades: tea, sugar, clothing, household gear. For example, locally manufactured containers of wood, leather, or wool are being replaced by plastic-ware (or, as LeviStrauss puts it, "our garbage, thrown in the face of mankind"). The processes that are set in motion by this breakdown of economic self-sufficiency appear to be favorable neither to the national nor to the local economy. Regarding economic change, the aspirations and conceptions of the government and the peasants lack any significant articulation. While the peasant's main interest is to improve his own economic situation and raise his standard of living, the government is primarily concerned with national and domestic security, some aspects of health, school houses, and other symbols of development which do not rank high among peasants' priorities. The government has so far failed to induce a basic transformation of the processes of production that would meet the peasants' desires. Fertilizers and insecticides, although sold at reduced prices, are affordable only by the better-off peasants, thus reinforcing the involution of the traditional economy. Veterinarian services are No still unsuccessful in controlling animal epidemics. IRANIANSTUDIES

132

long-range development program has as yet been designed for the region. No concerted effort is being made to introduce higher yield crops and more scientific procedures of agriculture and animal husbandry. Land consolidation and cooperative production seem not to be even visualized. Dependable marketing facilities have not been created. No mechanisms have been instituted that would safeguard the peasant from the ever menacing fate of becoming indebted to, and exploited by, urban money-lenders and traders. The material needs of the peasants are stimulated deliberately in the private enterprise system, a process that is sanctioned by the government in the expectation that greater needs would motivate the peasant to work harder. This idea is based on the image of the lazy and indolent peasant as the cause of all backwardness. Actually, the reasons for non-development are located--as has been pointed out--in the failure of the government to provide a viable political, social, and economic framework in which the peasant could better employ his efforts. In the face of this failure the individual peasant is rather left alone in his efforts to achieve a better living. In this endeavor he has available no capital for investment, no competent advice, no secure market facilities, and no support from an effective tribal or village-wide organization. Inevitably he deploys his efforts within the traditional economic system in a typical form of economic involution. He will try to squeeze more out of the land by exploitation or by putting in more labor. He will try to improve his fields by clearing out more stones. He might enlarge, with the help of a neighbor, kinsman, or partner, the capacity of an irrigation canal. And with his flocks he will turn upon the pastures, inevitably overgrazing them to their final ruin. Migrant labor seems only to relieve but not to solve the problems of land shortage and overpopulation. In comparison to conditions twenty years ago, the peasant's lot has improved considerably. But this change has resulted from the check placed on the abusive powers of the kadkhudas and khans--thus ending the general insecurity and the excessive extraction of tribute, while 133

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stimulating investment of labor in production--and not because of an introduction of new, constructive forms of development. In the absence of these, the predicament of the peasant seems to worsen. Resources become scarce; the population soars but can only be absorbed minimally in the urban areas; the cost of living increases in disproportion to the peasant's income; his debts seem to increase rather by the urban moneythan to decrease; the exploitation lenders is momentous and ultimately leads to expropriation of the tribesmen (it has been estimated that more than onethird of the flocks of Kohkllfiyah are no longer owned by the tribesmen themselves but by urban traders).7 He beYet, the Boir Ahmadi trusts in the future. lieves--if not in the government--in a merciful God. "For every door that is closed," he says, "God opens five others. NOTES 1.

National Census of Population and Housing, November, 1966; Vol. 138: Kohkiluyeh Shahrestan, and Vol. 164: Boyer Ahmadand Kohkiluyeh Farmandarikol (Tehran: Centre, 1968). Plan Organization, Iranian Statistical

2.

R. Loffler und Erika Friedl, "Eine ethnographische Sammlung von den Boir Ahmad, Sudiran," Archiv fur Volkerkunde, Vol. 21 (Wien, 1967), pp. 97-99.

3.

For summaries of the history see: V. Minorsky, "Lur" and "Lur-i Buzurg," Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. III (London, 1936), pp. 44-48. M. S. Ivanov, Plemena Farevisa (Moskva, 1961), pp. 60-61. The archaeological this point. dence substantiates

4.

H. H. Fasil', T&rlkh-i F&rsn&mah-iNairi M. Baver, Kihgillyeh 1314), pp. 271-273. (Gachsaran, 1324), pp. 93-99.

5.

The fieldwork which provided the following material was gratefully supported by the Social Science Research

IRANIAN STUDIES

134

(Shiraz, va Ilat-an

Council and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. 6.

R. Loffler, "The Representative Mediator and the New Peasant," American Anthropologist, Vol. 73, No. 5 (October, 1971), pp. 1077-1091.

7.

N. A. Naderi, I1 Bahme'i (Tehran: Institute of Social Research and Studies, University of Tehran, Tribal Section, Report No. 7, 1347), p. 121.

135

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

CABBAS MIRZA'SWILL HOMAPAKDAMANand WILLIAMROYCE The document translated below is a will written by CAbb&sMirz&, the Heir Apparent, in July, 1830, three years before his death in Khurasan. This will Writis important because of its style and content. in Persian, in ten in a hasty manner, and originally some places it gives the impression of having been translated from Azarl Turkish. The author has paid little attention to grammatical rules and literary embellishments. The force of the document derives from the author's deep feelings of hope (for future and sorrow (for past defeats), military success), uncertainty and worry (for the destiny of his childevents ren). References are made to the political of the times, not directly, but and personalities in connection with the author's personal concerns. On the whole, cAbbas Mirzfls major preoccupations in this document are to justify past errors, to be buried as a man of God, and to be remembered as a national hero.

Homa Pakdaman is Associate Professor of History at the University of Tehran. William Royce is currently a doctoral candidate in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.

IRANIANSTUDIES

136

In the Name of the Merciful and Most High God Today, Friday the eleventh of the holy month of Mubarram, 1246 [July 3, 1830], having considered the changing times and turning fate, it came to my mind to write down what occupies my thoughts, so that my burden will be lightened. First of all, with God's will wait until I have liberated Shicah of Khurasan and Astarbibd ones), by force or negotiation, beks and Turkomans, so that this buried in my heart.2

graces, I hope that death and restored the captive (the old as well as recent from the hands of the Uzdesire will not remain

If the promised hour of death arrives, I do not wish my body to be moved. My desire is to be carried to the east side of the prayer pulpit3 and to be buried under the bench,4 or under the first step of the pulpit, so that perhaps, once, a man of God will step upon my grave, and by his passing reduce my sins. And, of course, on the days of prayer, those present will pray for me and bless me, so that I will not pass away from their tongues and merciful hearts. of the The expenses of my burial, the purification pulpit, and the strengthening of the tomb so that the slightest thing will not harm it should be covered only by the small remains of some legitimate presents which have been sent to me by the Kings of Europe. They should be sold, and the money spent for this purpose: with jewels from the The decoration inlaid Tsar of Russia, one item. 5 The remainder of the belongings of Shaybak Khan. The telescope, gun, and carriage should be sold, and the income spent. Two thousand guns in the citadel, and other similar items. The mares presented by General Paskevitch.6 Other items such as the chests, samovars, etc. 137

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

It should be known that I do not consider myself in debt to anyone. Those debts that do exist are the debts of The ac[hisab-i daftar]. the government account registers Since it is countants, themselves, must answer for these. a matter of the expenses of the province and the government, for example, the indemnity the government is responsible: of the war with Russia.7 Also, I once borrowed some money from a native of Mazanderan through the intermediation of ImamCAll Sult&n They said that he was a partner of those men who Khu'il.8 Khan] [in had taken money from the late Shah [Aq&Muhammad Later on, I more or less satisGod knows best! Sdri].9 fied his son with about one hundred and fifty tumans.10 However, the truth of the matter is not known to me. The If such an event did happen, justice Shah knows better. If it was not true, his heirs should be satisoccurred. fied. The jewels and belongings of the Shah, according to Uathe lists of Hijl IHaydar cAll KhAnll and $ilji Mubammad san Khln,12 must be returned to him, except the gold objects which I was compelled to pay as the ransom for Khul1. The Shah's snuff-box was presented to Nesselrode14 by Khusraw Mirz&.15 It is up to the Shah to decide upon The rest of his belongings remain undiminthis question. ished and intact. The total amount of money I possess is listed below. To claim a larger amount would be a calumny. The people should not be persecuted in vain on this matter. Seven thousand one hundred and fifty tumans. With HIjl Aqa, the money changer: two hundred tumans 16 two hundred tumans. With Husayn-i Mar&ghah'i: Shcabnn: five hundred tumans. With (ij one hundred tumans. With Mlrzd Yusuf, the naiir:17 With cAll Asghar Khu'll: 18 one thousand tumans. The value of the plaster, bricks, and lime with Sayf al-Mulilk Mlrza:19 five hundred tumans. IRANIANSTUDIES

138

With my wife, the mother of Bahr&mMirza:20 old gold and silver coins, about one hundred and fifty tumans. Also, whatever money remains in the account Hasan.21 of Aq&Muhammad Whatever is found in the jewel-box kept by Hasan. Aqa MuJammnad The girdle, caftan, and jeweled dagger. The pair of armlets. The pearl buttons. Likewise, These are all the jewels I possess. should not be bothered in vain on this matter.

the people

is the Shah. HowMy executor and representative ever, he ought not to show negligence as he did towards CAll Mirz&,22 whose children were ruined, and Muhammad towards Ibrahim Khdn,23 my uncle, whose descendants and possessions were swept away by the wind. Of course, in he should look favorexchange for my services and efforts, ably upon my children. Most of my possessions are materials which I have acquired in order to maintain and defend our frontiers negligence is shown, years [with Russia]. If the slightest Where is will go by before they will be gathered again. another man who would be interested in spending his money on such projects? In short, neither negligence nor carelessness should occur. I have rendered due honor to Mirz& Abuial-Qisim [Qa'im Maqdm].24 As long as he is alive, these tasks should be entrusted to him, to Amir Niz.m,25 and HIjl Aqa.26 However, the positive and negative aspects of every decision should be checked with Mirz& Abii al-Qasim, because I know no one among the people as honest as he. The account of what there is or is not should be with him. He will know how to deal with his own God. what cannot be of any use to the Of my possessions, May it reach them government should go to my children. 139

1973 SPRING-SUMMER

with the authorization of the Shah! That which is of use to the government and the Muslim community should be turned over to them. Properties

and the rest:

The village of Chihraqn,27 which I have purchased for ten thousand b&jighlii.28 The garden of Shumal,29 and its mill and ganit [underground water channel], which I have restored. The garden of Saf&,30 which together with its ganit and mill I have given as a donation to Jahingir Mirza.31 However, the north side of the garden beyond the building, as well as the side near the marsh is not included in this donation. I have bought the andariin building [women's quarters], the garden of the andarun, the house of Sultin,32 the house of Maniichihr Mirzi,33 and many other houses within and outside the city. I have permitted people to reside in them, but they all are my property. Whatever books I possess, I have left to Firldtin MirzA.34

They must be delivered

to him.

Whatever is in the possession of my wives, both the permanent and temporary ones, has been granted to them, by myself, and can be kept by them. I don't want anyone to bother them on this matter. It is their own property. I also have property in Tehran: I have bought the andaruanof zill al-Sultin,35 and the village of Dawlat&bid,36 of which three shares were bought from Mirz& Shafic37 by the late Shah [Aqa Muhammad Khan], and granted to me. The purchase was legalized by Muhammad.Husayn-i Mulli Bishi and Shaykh Mubammad-iBalrayni. The other half was granted to me by Mihdi Quli Khin Q&j&r39as an exchangeable donation [hibahyi mucavaz]. However, when he left for Mecca, IRANIANSTUDIES

140

the Glorious, I purchased it from him as a Now it is my own property. precaution. of Kazra Sang, iajlaibad, and The villages ~afar Khwijah40 are my property by purchase. I bought them from tUjl CAbdal-tUamid, a merchant from Qazvln, and paid him in cash. of Shahnim, Bakkih, Concerning the villages Sahlayn, and Tang Kam&l,41 I don't remember if they were granted to me or purchased by me. of the Qalim Maqim and Mirzi The secretaries Taqi42 know best. Credit must be given to their words. Concerning the village of Kulih Klya in Mazanderan, the Shah knows best whether it has been granted to me or not. I would expect the Shah to care for my children, and not to neglect them, so they will not be in need of help from others. All of them must obey the commandsof Mu4ammad Mirza,43 as if they were his servants. Whoever disobeys him is no longer my son. Also, those among the servants who should act otherwise are disloyal. I have granted the horse, Sar Khunak, which had been presented to me by CAll Khin44 along with two hundred tunans from my own belongings, to Naqi Khan Barchallui.45 It must be turned over to him. I have also granted the horse, Stfi, one of my own tirmah robes, and two hundred tumans. These gifts must be delivered without any negligence. A letter in my name must be sent to the Tsar of Russia, stating that he should keep all those promises he used to make to me and my sons during my lifetime. The Commanderof the Army46 holds some money relating to the frontier of Chihriq,47 which was obtained through the intermediation of Aqi Mu1ammad Hasan Khan, the merchant and Zayn al-cAbidin Khan. It should be returned. Otherwise, it should be obtained and given to my children, according to the Divine Law.

141

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

I am responsible for two thousand tumans taken from the paternal and maternal inheritance of my wife, the mother of Mbi4ammad Mirza, which I took and used for the third installment of the indemnity. It must be returned to her, unless she considers it a gift. MutammadMirzi must be kind to my close servants, and look after them, unless he notices any misbehavior on their If he does otherwise, I will not be satisfied part. with him. He must follow this commandvery closelyA8 Concerning the presents of the King of England: he still I expect him either to owes me ten thousand rifles. present them to me or to pay their value to my children.49 The same applies for the following lists of presents from the Governor General of Sind, which should be sold. They should have been presented to me by the Ambassador, MacDonald.50 However, he died, and they were given by Campbell. 51 Three crystal Binoculars.

chandeliers

of the finest

quality.

NOTES 1.

The text of CAbbas Mirzi's well known will can be found in several Persian works. Recently it has been (a) By Jah&ngir reproduced in two Iranian journals: Q&lim Maq&mi,under the title, "Va?iyyat-nAmah mansflb in Bara_h4-i bi cAbb&s Mirza, N&lib al-Saltanah," T&rikhl, VI, No. 4 (Mihr/Aban, 1350/October/November, 1971), pp. 201-136, based on a manuscript which can be found in the archives of Prince MalkumKhan, Biblioteque Nationale de Paris, Sup. Persan, 1996, folios 141-166; (b) By AhmadSuhayll Khwi4nsart, under the title,, "Va5iyyat-n&mah-yi CAbbas Mlrz&t," in Va4id, X, No. 4 (Tir, 1351/July, 1972), pp. 455-464, based on Hasan Tab&tabili, Tab?irat the text found in Mutannmad Both versions are Tehran: 1308/1892 al-Musaffirin in perexcept for a few differences almost identical,

IRANIAN STUDIES

142

sonal and place names. We have used the Suhayll text, which we have found to be more reliable, as the basis of this translation. 2.

cAbbas Mirza began the campaign against the Turkomans of Khurasan in 1833, at the suggestion of the Russians. See, for example, Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence Relating to Persia and Afghanistan (Lon: don: J. Harrison and Son, 1839), p. 338. Also, this campaign was a means whereby cAbbas Mirz& could weaken the military power of his brother, Vasan cAll Mirz& (Shujac al-Saltanah), the governor of Khurasan, who was one of the major proponents of the third war with Russia, and who did not recognize the claims of CAbb&s Mirz& and Muhammad MirzA to the throne, as later events showed. The fact that cAbbas Mirz& mentions the Khurasan campaign in the first paragraph of his will, shows the importance of this question for him. This cruel and barbarous campaign was of a particularly character. cAbb&s Mirza, within his own country, acted as if he were on enemy soil, and his troops devastated all villages and cultivated lands along their route. See J. P. Ferrier, Caravan Journeys and Wan(London: John Murry, 1857), p. derings in Persia... 71. Fraser, who visited Khurasan shortly after the completion of the campaign, found the province "the next thing to a desert." See J. B. Fraser, A Winter's Journey (Tatar) from Constantinople to Tehran (2 vols.; London: Richard Bently, 1838) II, p. 208.

3.

mualla,

4.

~uffah-yi

a place of public prayer. _afa,

the "bench of sincerity."

S.

Shaybak Khan was employed by cAbbas Mirz& to work the mines of Azerbaijan. See Suhayli, "1Va?iyyat-nAmah,"1 p. 456, n. 1.

6.

Ivan Fedorovitch Pasketvitch (1782-1856), Russian army officer and administrator. He was the commander of Russian forces in the second war with Iran (18261828). 143

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

7.

According to article six of the Treaty of Turkomanchay (February, 1828), the indemnity owed to Russia was ten of one half million kuruir (each kurir the equivalent (a) three tumans), to be paid in four installments: kuriir within eight days of the signing of the treaty; days later; (c) three kuruir in (b) two kuruir fifteen The April, 1828; (d) two kurtir before March, 1830. until Russians occupied the city of Khu'l as security the payment of the third installment, which is known as the kuriir of Khu'i. The Russians reduced the fourth from two to one kuruir, following Khusraw installment in 1829, to offer Mirz&ls mission to Saint Petersburg the apologies of the Iranian Court for the murder of For the question Russian envoy to Iran. Griboyedoff, of the indemnity, see cAbbis Iqbal, "Qar&mat-i Turko1323/Augustmanchay," Y&dig4r, I, No. 2 (Shahrivar, September, 1944), pp. 21-36, and Mlrz& Mu5tafa Afshar, edited Safar-n&mah-yi Khusraw Mirz& bi-Ppytirsburgh, Kitabkhanah-yi Mustawfl, by Mulammad Gulbun (Tehran: 1349/1971).

8.

of CAbbis one of the officers Iman cAli Sultan Khu'll, Zanbil Mirz&. See Farhad MirzA (MuCtimid al-Dawlah), p. 161. (Tehran: 1329/1911),

9.

For an account of the S&ri incident, p. 214, n. 3. "Vasiyyat-namah,,"

see Q&lim Maq&mi,

10.

J. H. Stocqueler, Iran in 1831, gives the who visited See to one shilling. value of one tuman as equivalent through Fifteen Month's Pilgrimage J. H. Stocqueler, Untrodden Tracts of Khuzistan and Persia (2 vols.; London: Saunders and Otley, 1832), I, p. 166.

11.

the Keeper of the Seal I&jji Haydar cAll Khan Shirizl, in the Court of cAbb&s Mirz&. He was the nephew of vazir of Aqa Ibrihim Khan (Ictimad al-Dawlah), Uijji Hajji Ibrihim fell Mu4ammadKhan and Fat? cAll Shah. and was killed by order of Fath CAll into disgrace, Shah in 1802. For Hajjl IbrThim, see Sir John Malcolm, The Sketches of Persia from the Journals of a Travel-

IRANIAN STUDIES

144

ler (London: John Murry, 1828), pp. 153-154; Muhammad Ulasan Khan (ICtimad al-Saltanah), Khalsah, mashhfr biKhwiL-ndmah, edited by MalmuidKatir&'i (Tehran: Kitibkhinah-yi TJhuri, 1348/1969), pp. 22-23; Muhammad tisan Khan (ICtimad al-Saltanah), Uadr al-tav&rlkh..., edited by MabmfldKatirl'i (Tehran: Sazman-i intisharat-i Vatild, 1349/1970), pp. 12-43. 12.

Ij&ji MutammadHasan Khgn, the treasurer of CAbb&s MlrzA. See Farhad Mirza, Zanbil, p. 163.

13.

See note 7.

14.

Count Karl Robert Nesselrode statesman: Foreign Minister (1822-56).

15.

Khusraw Mirzi, the seventh son of CAbbas Mirzi. He was sent to Saint Petersburg in 1829 to offer the apologies of the Iranian Court for the murder of A. S. Griboyedoff, Russian envoy in Iran. See Mirza Mutafa Afshdr, Safar-nmahi Khusraw Mirz&.

16.

Musayn-i Maraghahl'i (Ajudin Bashi), one of the commanders of CAbb&sMirzVls army in the second war with Russia (1826-28). See Mihdi B&mdad,SharW-i t&1-i rijal-i Iran dar qarn-i davazdahum, slzdahum, va chahardahum (4 vols.; Tehran: Zavvwr, 1347/1968), I, Mushiri, Shari-i malmiiriyatpp. 426-429; Muhammad Ajiid&n Bishi dar sifarat-i Utrish, Faransah, Ing1istjn, ba inzimAm-i matn-safar-nimah-yi vay (Tehran: CIlml, 1347/1968).

17.

The term nazir was used for the officials responsible for the internal financial affairs of the households of the ruling class.

18.

CAll Asghar Khu'll could not be identified.

19.

Sayf al-Mulilk MirzA, son of Zill al-Sultrn, brother of CAbbas Mirz& and governor of Tehran. In 1248/1833 he 145

(1780-1862). Russian for thirty-four years

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

served as governor of Kerman. See B&md&d,Rij&1, II, p. 134. 20.

Bahrim MIrz& (MuCizz al-Dawlah), the second son of CAbbis Mirzi, held many provincial governorships during the Qijir Period: Khu'i (1827-28); Kermanshah (1835-37); Qazvin (1837-38); Fars (1838-48). He also served successively in Azerbaijan, Khuzistan, and Maazanderan until his death in 1886. See B&md&d,Rijal, I, pp. 192-195; George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian uQestion (2 vols.; London and New York: Longman, Green, and Co., 1892), I, p. 583.

21.

See Note 12.

22.

CAll Mirz& (Dawlatshah) (1203/1788-1237/1821). Mubammad He was the eldest and most able of the sons of Fath CAll Shah, but was eliminated from succession to the He served throne because his mother was not a Qijir. as governor of Qazvin in 1213/1798, and as governor of Kermanshah from 1221/1807 until his death in 1237/1821. He led two successful campaigns against the Ottomans in 1226/1812 and in 1237/1821. He died in the cholera epidemic of 1237/1821, on his return from the second campaign against the Ottomans. He was a great rival and bitter enemy of CAbbis Mirz&. Until his death, he was strongly supported by the Russians in his claims to the throne. See General Yermeloff's letters on this matter in General Prince Stcherbatow, Le Fled Mar6chal Prince Paskevitch (4 vols.; St. Petersberg: Trenke et Fusnot, 1888), II, p. 16. For his biography cAll MuCallim Hablb&b&dl, Makarim see Mlrzd Mu4ammad al-as&r dar alvfl-l rij&l-i dawrah-yi2Qaj1r (2 vols.; Isfahan: Matba ah-yi Muhammadi), I, pp. 135-139. For examples of Dawlat$$hts poetry, see Riza Quli edited by Mazahir Kh&nHidiyat, Majmac al-fuah&, Mu~aff& (6 vols.; Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1336-1340/19571961), I, pp. 46-50; MaimiidMlrz& Qajar, aaflnat alMabpuid,edited by cAbd al-Rasiil Khayy&mpur(2 vols.; Tabriz, 1968), I, pp. 24-27.

IRANIAN STUDIES

146

23.

Ibrahim Khln (?ahlr al-Dawlah), cousin and son-in-law of Fatt CAli Shih. He served for some time as governor of Kerman and Zabolistan. See CAbd al-Razziq Dunbuli, Tazkirah-yi Nig&ristln-i Dir& (Tabriz: Shirkat-i Chap-i Azerbaijan, 1342/1963), p. 37.

24.

Mirz& Abii al-Q&sim (Qa'im Maqam), born in 1193/1773, son of Mirzi CIsi Farihinl, called Mirza Buzurg, the first vazir of cAbb&s Mirz& in Azerbaijan. He succeeded his father in this post in 1237/1821. He served for a short time as Muhammad Shih's grand vazir, until he was executed at Mu4ammad Shah's command in 1251/1836. He is remembered as a reformer, writer, and poet. For his biography, see ICtim&d al-Saltanah, Khalsah, pp. 27-29; ICtimid al-Saltanah, 2adr altav&rikh, pp. 117-151; Baqir Qi'im Maq&ml,Q&'im Maqgimdar jahan-i adab va siyasat (Tehran: 1320/1941); Khan Malik Sasani, Dast-i pinhAn-i siyasat-i Inglls dar Iran (n.p.: 195?), pp. 7-12; Mir .HusaynYikrangian,

Zindii-yi

sis

va adabi-yi

Qa;im

m

(Teh-

ran: cIlmi, 1334/1955). For examples of his writings, see Mirza Abu al-Q&sim (Q&'im Maqim), MunshiC&ti Q&'im Magcm, edited by Jahangir Qalim Maqami (Tehran: Ibn-i Sina, 1337/1959). 25.

Muhammad Khan Zanganah (Amir Ni;am). He held a number of important posts during the governorship of CAbbis Mirz& in Azerbaijan, such as commander of the army and steward (pishkir). He accompanied Khusraw Mirza on his mission to Saint Petersburg in 1829. During the reign of Muhammad Shah he served as governor of Azerbaijan. He died in 1257/1842. See Mirz& Mu?tafa Afshar, Safar-namah-yi Khusraw Mirza, pp. 166-169, and pp. 232 ff.; CAbbis Iqbial, Mirz& Taqc Khan Amir-i Kabir (Tehran: D&nishg&h-i Tehr&n, 1340/1960), pp. 16-24; Nadir Mirza (Shahzadah), T&rikh vajuishrafi-yi dar al-saltanah-i Tabriz (Tehran: 1323/1905), pp. 4346.

26.

HUjJ CAll A?ghar (Khw&jahBashi Mazanderani), one of the trusted

servants

of CAbbas Mlrza. 147

He was the

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

founder of Masjid and Madrasah-yi H&jl Xq&in Tabriz. See Q&'im Maqlmi, "1Va?iyyat-nAmah,"1p. 220, n. 20. 27.

of Shabastar, a town near Tabriz. One of the villages See CAll Razm&ra, Farhang-i jughr&fly&-yi Iran (7 IV, p. 166. vols.; Tehran: 1328-1331/1949-1952),

28.

At this

29.

Bagh-i Shum&l, a garden dating from the fifteenth cenSee tury, located in the southern part of Tabriz. Nadir Mlrza, Tabriz, pp. 188-189.

30.

Bigh-i Saf5, a garden in the northern part of Tabriz, built by cAbbas Mirza. See Nadir Mirza, Tabriz, p. 194.

31.

the third son Jahangir Mirz& (1225/1811-1269/1854), of CAbbas Mlrz&. He fought alongside his father in For a short the second war with Russia (1826-1828). time, in 1247/1832, he served as governor of Ardebil. Shah in 1250/ He was blinded by his brother Mui4ammad He 1835, and imprisoned in the fortress of Ardebil. is the author of the T&rikh-i naw, edited by CAbbas Iqbal (Tehran: 1327/1848), a history of Qaj&r Iran from 1824 to 1850.

32.

Sultan could not be identified.

33.

Manfichihr Mirza, the fourteenth son of cAbbas Mlrza. Shah appointed him governor of Gulpaygin and Muhammad See Bamdad, Rijal, IV, p. 163. Khwansar in 1251/1836.

34.

Firiduin Mirz&, the fifth son of cAbbas Mirz&. He was Shah in appointed governor of Azerbaijan by Mubammad In 1252/1837, he served as governor of 1251/1836. Fars with the title Farman Farmx. In 1270/1855, he became governor of Khurasan. He died in Khurasan in See Bimd&d, Ri'&l, III, pp. 92-94. 1272/1857.

time the equivalent

IRANIAN STUDIES

148

of one gold tuman.

35.

CAll Shah (1210/1795-1271/1856), the tenth son of Fatl CAll Shah. In 1225/1810, he was sent to the Caucasus to fight the Russians. He was given the title Zill al-Sultan and was appointed governor of Tehran in 1232/1817. He claimed the throne on his father's death and ruled in Tehran for forty days as CAdil Shah until he was defeated by Muhammad Shah. See MuCallim Hablb&b&di, Makarim, II, pp. 369-371; Mutiammad klasan Khan (ICtimad al-Saltanah), Thrlkh-i muntazam-i Na?iri (3 vols.; Tehran: 1298/1881-1300/ 1883), III, p. 159; MutammadTaqi Sipihr (Lisan alMulk), Nasikh al-tav&rikh {dawrah-yi kamil-i t&rikh-i QgEjriyyah), edited by Jah&nglr Q&lim Maqami (Tehran: Amlr-i Kabir and Tahirl, 1337/1958), I, p. 318.

36.

A village near Shahr-i Ray. nimah," p. 460, n. 2.

37.

Mirz& Shafic became Fath CAll Sh&hls grand vazlr in 1215/1801. He died in 1234/1819. For his biography see ICtim&d al-Saltanah, jadr al-tav&rlkh, pp. 46-51.

38.

MuhammadHusayn-i Mull& Bashi and Shaykh Muhammad Bairayni could not be identified.

39.

Mihdi Quli Khan-i Qajar, one of the commanders of the army of CAbbas Mlrza. He was appointed governor of Irivan in 1220/1806. See Bamdad, Ri>jl, IV, p. 176.

40.

Villages in the Tehran region. "Vasiyyat-nPmah," pp. 223-224,

41.

Sahlayn and Tang Kam&lare in the Tehran region. Shahnam and Bakkah have not yet been located. See Ql'im Maqami, "'Vasiyyat-ndmah,"1 p. 224, notes 41-42.

42.

Mirz& Taqi Khan Ashti&ni served in cAbb&s Mirz'ls administration in Azerbaijan. Later, under Mubammnad Shah, he served as governor of Fars with the title Qavam al-Dawlah. See Farhad Mirz&, Zanbil, p. 162.

149

See Suhayll,

"Vasiyyat-

See Q&lim Maqami, notes 36-39.

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

43.

Muhammad Mirz&, the eldest son of CAbbls Mirzi. He succeeded his grandfather, Fath CAIl Shah, to the throne, and reigned until 1848.

44.

CAlj Khan. CAbbas Mirza is referring to his brother, CAll Shah, Zill al-Sultan, governor of Tehran. See note 35.

45.

CAIJ Naqi Khan Qara Papaq. He served under CAbbas Mlrz& in Azerbaijan. See Farhad Mlrz&, Zanbil, p. 162.

46.

Sar Askar, Commanderof the Army, most likely ring to Muhammad Khan Zanganah (Amir Nizam). note 25.

47.

A village in the Sh&hpur region of Azerbaijan. Razmara, Farhang-i Jughr&fiya, IV, p. 166.

48.

Mirz& can The very same recommendations to Muhammad be found in CAbbas Mtrzals last letter, written shortly before his death in Khurasan. See Abu al-Qasim Lachini, Ahv&l&t va dastkhat-h&-yi CAbb&sMirzd, Nalib al-Saltanah (Tehran: Bungih-i MatbOCatl-yi Afsharl, 1326/1947), pp. 60-61.

49.

For the arms agreement with the British Government, see the Public Records Office documents reproduced by M. E. Yapp, "The Control of the Persian Mission, 1822-1836," University of Birmingham Historical Journal, VII, No. 2 (1960), pp. 162-180.

referSee See

SO. Sir John MacDonald Kinneir, chosen envoy in Iran from 1823, died in Tabriz in 1830, and his body was sent He is the to Irivan to be buried at Itchmiadzin. author of A Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire (London: John Murray, 1831). Qalim Maqami, "Va?iyyatnamah,," p. 226,

n. 51, basing

his

argument on Riza

Quli Khan Hidayat, Tarlkh-i rawzat al-Lafa-yi N1iri (Tehran: 1339/1920), IX, p. 264, and Sipihr4 Nisikh, I, pp. 274-275, mistakenly places MacDonald Kinneiri s

IRANIAN STUDIES

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Condeath in 1831, after the writing of this will. sequently, Qa'im Maqimi argues that this document Suhayll, "Va?iyyatcould possibly be a forgery. ndmah," p. 462, n. 1, who also used the above menas sources, is also mistaken in tioned histories writing that MacDonald Kinneir came to Iran in 1826. 51.

Captain J. N. R. Campbell came to Iran with MacDonald in 1823, and took MacKinneir as second assistant Donald's place after his death.

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N, BRITISH, OF AMERICA AN ASSESSMENT AND FRENCHWORKSSINCE1940 ON MODERNIRANIANHISTORY NIKKIR. KEDDIE The history of modern Iran, like that of most of the Middle East, is a very underdeveloped field when compared not only with the history of the West, but even with that of the Far East. When we speak of the United States' scholars, the reasons for this underdevelopment are not far to seek. Far more than scholars would like to admit, scholarship follows the geography of the national interAs long as the Middle rulers. ests of the United States' East, Africa, and South Asia were colonies or spheres of influence of other powers, American scholars ignored them It is only since World War II that Near almost totally. Eastern, African, and South Asian centers and institutes were set up, usually with the help of foundation, business and government money, and these centers gave the greatest The impetus to the studies of the areas under question. national interest of the United States in these areas encouraged scholars to be concerned with them. Even after interest was awakened, however, there remained many serious obstacles to the study of modern Iran, which could be duplicated for many of the other aralFirst there was the stylistic, eas of new interest. of the not Persian though grammatical, difficulty language,

Nikki R. Keddie is Professor Los Angeles . of California, IRANIANSTUDIES

of History at the University

152

which made many nineteenth and early twentieth century documents difficult More important was the reto decipher. lative scarcity of documents, and the complete lack of organized Iranian archives, the usual tools of serious historians. Iranian historians had to rely heavily on the documentation and information included in memoirs and histories contemporary with the times they were written, or on interviews and old Western language accounts--none of them really satisfactory sources; but even these sources are far from being mined to the fullest extent. Only recently have documents become more available, but the wait for true organized archives still continues. Scholars have had better luck with British, French, German, and Italian archives, but ideally these should be supplements rather than main sources, as they now so often are. The concentration of study in Middle Eastern Centers and the difficulties of Middle Eastern languages have meant that the graduate student must often be a double specialist--he must learn several languages, some of them difficult, in order to work effectively, but to be a really good historian he or she should have some grounding in historical and even social science methodology and literature, and in the history of areas other than the Middle especially East to provide some sophistication and basis for comparison. One of the faults of Middle Eastern history both inside and outside the United States has been that it has been written by Orientalists with a concentrated training and interest in language, literature, or theology; thus all sorts of things have been considered peculiarly Islamic or peculiarly Iranian that a comparative study would show were really typical of many traditional or feudal societies. "Islam" or "The Iranian Spirit" thus become the putative source of a whole range of happenings, faults, and virtues, on the basis of very little of a comparative knowledge that might weaken or destroy the author's hypothesis, or, in some rare cases, help to prove it. When looking for really good historical works on Iran written since 1940, one is reduced to a very small number. None of the comprehensive histories is really

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I myself choose to use Joseph M. Upton's The adequate. (Cambridge, History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1961) which has considerable insight into the nature and causation of recent Persian history, although it suffers from a very brief on the treatment of the early period, too much insistence supposed special "Iranian" features of recent Iranian hisThe author, tory, and lack of use of the Persian sources. like many others, makes much of the violent deaths of high ministers in recent Iranian history; to a degree this is but after watching the recent "Wives of Henry justified, VIII" and "Elizabeth R." series on TV I am unconvinced that this is really an Iranian or Middle Eastern peculiMuch of the same phenomenon can be found in the arity. pre-modern or early modern history of many countries. Peter Avery's Modern Iran (London, Ernest Benn, 1965) has used some of the Persian sources and has considerable inIt sight into certain aspects of modern Persian history. has so many errors, however, that it is an unreliable guide to put into the hands of the beginning student; and even the advanced student is at a loss to know how much of the Stumaterial that is new to him or her is to be trusted. dents of Iran are eagerly awaiting the three volumes that Professor Ann Lambton is reportedly writing on Qajar Iran. There is need for an overall modern history of quality, to plow through but to write this would take a willingness many rarely rewarding or overlong Persian books to extract Only in one field of a few nuggets of real information. concentration, that of the period of the constitutional number of does there now exist a significant revolution, reliable Persian books, plus really good and relatively memoirs and an overabundance of newspapers, literature, to other documents, including foreign ones, sufficient form a solid background for a really good history going of writing The difficulties classes. beyond the official a general history, hopefully, will not continue to face I myself have recently recareful scholars indefinitely. nounced such a project, and from this vulnerable position I appeal to others to subject themselves to the inevitable of those like myself who lack the guts or masocriticisms chism necessary to embark on this important work. Before IRANIANSTUDIES

154

leaving the subject of general books, one should also mention the modern chapters in Yahya Armajani's Iran (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1972), which provide a generally reliable if somewhat old-fashioned account of Iran's recent history; the relevant parts of Donald Wilber's Iran: Past and Present, 6th ed. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967); and of H. H. Vreeland, ed., Iran (New Haven, HumanRelations Area Files, 1957). L. P. Elwell-Sutton's Modern Iran (London, G. Routledge and Sons, 1941) contains a good account of the Reza Shah period, and William Haas, Iran (New York, Columbia University Press, 1946), can still be consulted. Even when all the Western language material is covered, enormous gaps remain in our knowledge of contemporary and modern Iran. There has been a small amount of good to excellent monographic work in English, however. Perhaps the best of the post World War II scholarly books in English is Hamid Algar's Religion and State in Iran 17851906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qa ar Period (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969). This book makes extensive use of sources in Persian and many other languages to write a convincing historical account of the growing tension between the ulama and the secular government in Iran during the nineteenth century. Its value for the general historian goes beyond what its title might suggest, as, in the absence of any excellent general history, it gives considerable insight into the character of the various Qajar rulers and their reigns, as well as the development of the revolutionary movement in Iran, to name only two topics. Also of excellent quality is Firuz Kazemzadeh's massive study Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1968). The author has combed the British and available Russian documentary material as well as what he could find in Persian, and has produced a very careful interpretive study of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran, which sheds considerable light on internal developments as well. Although I disagree with the author's insistence on the political and non-economic motivation of Russian imperialism, there is no gain-saying the importance of his contribution. 155

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

Another excellent work, on a smaller scale, is Amin Banani's The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941 (Stanford University Press, 1961), which is the best study of Reza Shah's reform programs available. Although the author emphasizes the positive aspects to the point of overlooking some of the important negative features of Reza Shah's reign, his book is generally well-balanced, analytical, and well-written enough to put it among the very best available. In a similar class as an excellent monograph covering a large topic is Sepehr Zabihls The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966), which covers the movement from the Bolshevik Revolution until the time of writing. This will soon be supplemented by Ervand Abrahamian's dissertation. Also of high quality are the relevant parts of A. K. S. Lambton's Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London, Oxford University Press, 1953) and her The Persian Land Reform 1962-1966 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969). Both books suffer from an overdensity of style, a certain difficulty in seeing the forest for the trees, and the land reform book also suffers from a scanty use of what statistics are available in order to make some large generalizations, but both books are extremely rewarding in their abundance of detailed information, based on extensive use of primary sources and close observation. Other monographs of interest include L. P. ElwellSutton's Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1955), written from a pro-Persian and anti-imperialist point of view, and R. L. Greaves' Persia and the Defence of India 1884-1892: A Study in the Foreign Policy of the Third Marquis of Salisbury (London, The Athalone Press, 1959). As the subtitle suggests, this latter book is written very much from the British of viewpoint, notwithstanding the American nationality the author. This may be because the author has limited and private to British official herself almost exclusively documents. Thus, for example, the mission of Henry Drummond Wolff to Iran in the late 1880s is deemed a success, even though it might more reasonably be said to be among the causes of the Persian tobacco protest of 1891-92, which IRANIANSTUDIES

156

ended in a great diminution of British interests in Iran. the British are said to have wanted reform in Similarly, Iran, which they did to the extent that reform would facilitate their trade and politics. When reforming nationalists threatened British imperial interests, however, as in the tobacco movement or even more in the constitutional revolution of 1905-1911, the British decisively opposed them, and helped, for example, bring about the forced dismissal of Morgan Shuster, who was working for reform. On these points Kazemzadeh's book is more judicious than Greavesl',

for its

although

greater

hers

detail

still

deserves

to be consulted

about the period she covers.

Among the monographic works I can do no more than mention my own books, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 (London, Frank Cass, 1966); An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamil ad-Din "al-Afghan!" (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968); and Sayyid Jam&l ad-Din al-Afghfni: A Political Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972). There are three papers on Iran by Algar, Thaiss, and myself in the book I recently edited, Scholars, Saints, and Sufis (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972). On Afghani in Iran, and for translations of more of his Persian writings, it is worth referring to the very good book by HomaPakdaman, Djamal-ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani (Paris, G. P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1969). Other monographic works include George Lenczowski's Russia and the West in Iran: 1918-1948 (Ithaca, New York, Cornell,

of value although somewhat vitiated by its 1949), still Cold War viewpoint and non-use of Persian sources; Abraham Yeselson's very good United States-Persian D4plomatic Relations (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1956); N. S. Fatemi's Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-23 (New York, Russell Moore, 1952) and his Oil Diplomacy (New York, Whittier Books, 1957); and Bradford G. Martin's GermanPersian Diplomatic Relations, 1873-1912 (The Hague, Mouton and Company, 1959).

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In a somewhat different category from these monographs is R. K. Ramazani's The Foreign Policy of Iran 15001941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs (CharlottesUniversity Press of Virginia, 1966), which attempts ville, to cover a much longer period. Despite the title, all but the first 32 pages of this book deal with the period since 1801, and on this period there is considerable insight and comprehensiveness. The book suffers from a general lack of primary source documentation, however. In the field of economic history, Charles Issawi has of documents, artijust provided us with a fine collection of books in his The Economic History of cles, and sections Iran, 1800-1914 (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1971). Students can be particularly grateful for his translations from the Russian, Persian, and German, and Italian, for his careful culling of British consular and other documents. when this book is compared with the Nonetheless, far more revealing collection by the same editor on the Middle East, it is easy to see how difficult it is to acdequire materials on Iran's internal economic and social velopment. Perforce a great deal of Issawils material tells of things of importance to foreigners, and there was apparently not enough material available to him on Iran's internal economic structure. It is to be hoped that Persian available. documents on this topic will soon be more readily When I was last in Iran, in 1966, Asghar Mahdavi was catawho Amn- al-Zarb, loguing the papers of his grandfather, was probably the wealthiest merchant in Iran in the late and who had a network of Persian and nineteenth century, international connections that were represented in the Mahdavi was cataloguing. The voluminous correspondence Amin al-Zarb (mint master) saved copies of many things in large notebooks by a water-transfer process that was new to me when Mahdavi demonstrated it, but was the nineteenth It is to be hoped century's closest approach to xeroxing. scholars will make use of this that Persian and foreign student now in London workirg source. There is one Israeli of the Persian constitutional revoluon economic aspects For work. and this should prove to be a valuable tion, as an excellent the present, monograph on economic history

IRANIAN STUDIES

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one can point only to Marvin Entner's brief Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1828-1914 (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1965), which makes up for a lack of Persian documentation by its thorough and intelligent use of a variety of Russian sources, and overturns some established ideas on its subject. There is nothing of comparable quality on the history of internal economic developments, which would be much more difficult to write. Issawi's and Entner's books both point up the importance of Russian as a language for the study of Iranian history; it is unquestionably more important than German for the study of modern Iran, and probably more important than Italian, despite the excellence of the varied Orientalist work of Bausani, Scarcia, Piemontese, and a few others. In any case, anyone with a good knowledge of French or Spanish should be able to struggle through an Italian work with the aid of a dictionary and grammar, with outside help for the difficult points, while Russian has to be studied for a significant period of time by itself. Reference to Issawils, Kazemzadeh's and Etner's books will indicate some of the important studies and sources available in Russian, and I would like to single out as a revealing published document the diary of the Russian head of the Persian Cossack Brigade in the late nineteenth century, V. A. Kosogovskii, Iz tegeranskozo dnevnika polkovnika V. A. Kosogovskogo (Moscow, Izdatel'stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1960). Russian secondary studies are often tendentious, but there is a growing volume of serious scholarly work, much of which concentrates on the fields of economic and social history, which have been relatively neglected in the West ern world. Some of the important monographic work is still in press or in the dissertation stage. My own knowledge inif perhaps over-critical, cludes Hamid Algar's excellent, biography of Malkam Khan; Mangol Bayat Philipp's "Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani: Nineteenth Century Persian Revolutionary Thinker" (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, UCLA, 1971); Gene Garthwaite's "The Bakhtiyari Khans: Tribal Disunity in Iran, 1880-191511 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA,

159

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on the Qajar 1969); and S. Bakhash's Oxford dissertation All of these are very valuable works. Still bureaucracy. on the London dissertation in the future are Ken Burill's and Azriel Karny's UCLAdisserrevolution, constitutional tation on Mirza Hosain Khan Moshir al-Dawlah, and some others at Princeton and Chicago especially. in memoir literature In the field of historical English, Hassan Arfa's Under Five Shahs (London, John Murray, n.d.), and MohanmadReza Shah's Mission for My Countq deserve mention. Unfortunately we lack memoir books in point of view, alEnglish that reflect a less official material may be garnered from The though some interesting Autobiography of H.I.H. Princess Soraya, tr. from the German by C. Fitzgibbon (London, Arthur Barker, 1963). science, but Technically in the field of political material and still containing much important historical are Richard W. Cottam's fine book, Nationinterpretation alismin Iran (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, information going 1964), which contains much historical good on the understudied back to 1890, and is especially Mosaddeq period, and James A. Bill's excellent The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization (Columbus, Ohio, Charles E. Merrill Company, 1972), which has some historical suggestions going back as far as interesting Other political science books of inthe Safavid period. comparisons are Marvin Zonis's enterest for historical Elite of Iran (Princeton, Princelightening The Political ton University Press, 1971), and Leonard Binder's Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1962). The economic, and cultural history of the 1960s political, are covered in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the Seventies (New York, Praeger, 1971). science books As mention of the above political suggests, some of the books of greatest interest to the outside the field of history. historian are technically Among these are Fredrik Barth's Nomads of South Persia, an outstanding analytic study which may be supplemented IRANIANSTUDIES

160

and eventual books in some cases by Brian by articles, Spooner, Willion Irons, the Tappers, and a few other anIn economics one may point especially thropologists. to George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), a fine study of the failure of the planning mechanism to bring about essential development in Iran; what development there was in the years before the author wrote he attributes primarily to Also of interest are Jahanfactors other than planning. gir Amuzegar's Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran (New York, Praeger, 1966); J. Amuzegar and M. Ali Fekrat, Iran: Economic Development under Dualistic Conditions (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971), and various books on Middle Eastern oil. Deserving special mention is the excellent and provocative book by a geographer, Paul Ward English, City and Village in Iran: Settlement and Economy in the Kirman Basin (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1966). This book actually combines historical, sociological, and geographical perspectives to give a unified view of the ecological, economic, and social structure and interaction of a whole region that sheds light on Iranian history and soI wish only that ciety far beyond the region it studies. the author had chosen a region that included nomadic tribes, so that we would learn not only of city dominance of the sedentary countryside but also where the tribes fit into this pattern. I understand he is working on such a region now. I found English's book far more useful than The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. I, The Land of Iran, ed. W. B. Fisher (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968), a very uneven work. In sociology we are almost limited to books that have been deservedly criticized, despite their partial I refer to Norman Jacobs's The Sociology of insights. Development: Iran as an Asian Case Study (New York, Praeger, 1966), and the various books by Reza Arasteh. Iran:

Standing by itself as a book is BahmanNirumand's The New ImRerialism in Action (New York, Monthly 161

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

account of recent Review Press, 1969), a highly critical Iranian history written by an Iranian in Germany. It is insights, a provocative mixture of leftist facts, and inof and should probably be read by all students accuracies, point of view, Iran to become acquainted with the author's One are sympathetic. with which so many Iranian students would wish, however, that one of these students would unthat dertake to do a book from this general perspective would be more solid than Nirumand's book. category is Ann K. S. Lambton's In another special and in Persia (London, School of Oriental Islamic Society sums up the 1954), which intelligently African Studies, and modern, in both traditional nature of Iranian society, the short compass of 31 pages. which is literature, for the historian Also relevant role in Iran, both as a reflechas tended to play a social Two postthereof. and a criticism tion of the society, H. Kamwar books cover the subject of modern literature: (Cambridge,Cambridge shad's Modern Persian Prose Literature 1966), and Munibar Rahman's Post-RevoluPress, University Institute of Islamic Studies, tion Persian Verse (Aligarh,

1955). The only Persian novel I know of in English translation is Sadeq Hedayat's The Blind Owl (London, John Fortunately there is also an excellent Calder, 1957). Persian novelist who writes in English, F. M. Esfandiary, (New York, McDowell, Obolensky, whose The Day of Sacrifice 1959), and Identity Card (New York, Grove Press, 1966) cast a searching light on the faults of Iranians and their soThere are also good novels in English by outsiders: ciety. James Aldridge's The Diplomat (Boston, Little Brown, 1950) account of postwar diplomatic leftist gives an excellent of postwar some depiction maneuvers in Iran, including Leo Vaughan's The Jokeman (London, Eyre and Azerbaijan. in almost unavailable 1962) is unfortunately Spottiswoode, it deserves repubthe United States and is out of print; Written by a young in paperback. here, preferably lishing at the old UniverCanadian who spent two years teaching under a pseudonym, the book sity of Shiraz and published IRANIAN STUDIES

162

gives an amusing and bitingly accurate account of the political and social mores of Iranians and foreigners in the mythical country of "Kojast." Some understanding of the Qashqai and, by extension, of other tribes, can be gained by reading Vincent Cronin's The Last Migration (New York, E. P. Dutton, 1957). Although this paper has dealt with books, chiefly in English, published since 1940, it seems incomplete without reference to some of the books published before then which are most useful to the scholar of Iran. Among these one must place first of all the works of E. G. Browne: A Literary History of Persia, Vol. IV (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1924; reprinted in 1964); Materials for the Study of the Babi Religion (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1918); The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1910); The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1914); and A Year Amongst the Persians (London, Adamand Charles Black, 1893; new ed., London, 1950). Although too often careless with facts and details, Browne displayed a breadth of knowledge and scholarship which has perhaps yet to be equalled in the Persian field. He also provides an example of a scholar who was not afraid to enter into day-to-day political battles in behalf of the democratic and anti-imperialist forces in Iran, even when this meant taking unpopular stands against the Liberal government of Sir Edward Grey, which had entered into an agreement with Russia in 1907 at the expense of Iran. Just because Browne's book on the Persian revolution is a partisan one, it breathes a life that is too rarely found in scholarly monographs and articles. Much the same can be said of W. Morgan Shuster's book, whose full title is: The Strangling of Persia: Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue that Resulted in the of Twelve Million Mohammedans: A PerDenationalization sonal Narrative (New York, The Century Company, 1912). As Firuz Kazemzadeh has remarked, a study of the British and Russian documents has revealed the essential accuracy and astuteness of Shuster's "personal" and seemingly partisan account. 163

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

Two older books that are not often enough read or pointed to as excellent sources of information are F. A. C. Forbes Leith, Checkmate: Fighting Tradition in Central Persia (New York, Robert M. McBride and Company, 1927), and R. G. Watson, A History of Persia from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Year 1858 (London, Smith, Elder and Company, 1866). Both were written by men who spent some time in Iran. Watson's history in its later this personal experience, and Forbesphases reflects Leith's is an entirely personal account. As such, it presents a vivid picture of the famine in Iran after World War I and of conditions on one large semi-feudal property that the author was hired to help manage. Amongthe partially personal accounts one cannot omit the weighty and information packed two volumes by George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (2nd printing, London, Frank Cass and Company, 1966). Also in the valuable category of books reflecting both personal experience and scholarship is the second volume of Sir John Malcolm's The History of Persia from the Most Early Period to the Present Time: Containing an Account of the Religion, Government, Usages, and Character of the Inhabitants of that Kingdom (London, John Murray, 1815). Malcolm's account is still an invaluable source for Iranian social, political, and religious life and customs early in the nineteenth century. There are also excellent eyewitness accounts in French, among which one may single out Arthur de Gobineau, Religions et philosophies dans l'Asie centrale, 10th ed. (Paris, Gallimard, 1957) and his Trois ans en Asie (Paris, B. Grasset, 1922). Although both books must be used with caution, owing to the author's carelessness with facts, they tell much about Iranian religious and philosophical currents, as well as For a later period of the nineteenth century social life. there is Dr. Feuvrier's Trois ans a la cour de Perse, new ed. (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1906), which is particularly notable for its vivid presentation of the tobacco protest of 1891-1892. This brief survey of books about Iran since 1800, those in English, has indicated that Iranian particularly history has achieved a solid start in this country from IRANIANSTUDIES

164

almost non-existent beginnings, as far as modern history is concerned, to a steady flow of books since World War II. of documentation that stand in the way of The difficulties more adequate studies of Iranian history have already been pointed out, but these should not be overemphasized. It is possible for an imaginative scholar with a really good knowledge of Persian to do significant studies of nineteenth century Iran by combining foreign documentation, Persian books and articles, published documents (there are now several such collections, and what mostly by Safa'i), a scholar can dig up for himself if he or she goes to Iran. The fields of economic and social history have barely been scratched. For the twentieth century there should be much more use of interview techniques, so far mostly used by the political scientists for current studies. The whole period since 1921 cannot be dealt with honestly in books published in Persia, but through a combination of interviews and materials from outside Iran much more could be done with this most significant period.

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BOOKREVIEWS The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role. By Rouhollah K. Ramazani. Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1972. 157 pp. $7.50. The Changing Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf: An International Seminar Report. By Elizabeth Monroe. New Field Staff, Inc., 1972. York: American Universities 69 pp. $4.95. ANN SCIIULZ "Timely" is a print-worn adjective with which to describe a book. Yet, it is the most fitting for Professor This Ramazani's second work on Iranian foreign policy.1 volume appears when our awareness of the Gulf's economic is at a peak. The author's approach to his significance however, which is an unsubject tends to be descriptive, fortunate discovery for those hoping for a long-needed anapolitics in that diverse and potenlysis of international tially volatile region. Two major themes run through the book. The first, study which grows out of the author's larger, historical is that Iran's current interest in the Gulf is not a new

Ann Schulz is currently Visiting Research Scholar in the Relations at Department of Government and International Clark University. IRANIANSTUDIES

166

phenomenon, but one which has roots as far back as the SasHe briefly traces this history from Ardesanid dynasty. shir's conquest of Bahrein to Shah Abbas' victory over the Portuguese in Hormuz, and, finally, to the conflict between Iran and Great Britain for hegemony over the Gulf in the nineteenth century. As Ramazani points out, much of what is known about the Sassanid period is legend. Thus, the reader who is particularly interested in the history of Gulf politics will probably find this book of less value than the other, more detailed volumes on later periods which are available? His introduction does, however, create a useful backdrop for the discussion of current Gulf affairs. The second theme is that Iran's ability to sustain a presence in the Gulf is, and has been, dependent upon the strength of its economy and the Shah's dominance over The current high rate of economic growth internal politics. enables the regime both to maintain a strong defense posture and to increase its trade with other littoral states. (Simultaneously, industrialization has heightened the value of the Gulf to Iran for its oilfields and as a shipping avenue.) There is little here which would invite disagreement. Certainly the amount of economic wealth controlled by any country influences its ability to achieve a wide range of national goals. The "guns-or-butter" choices which will determine the allocation of Iran's wealth are the real issues. These are, for the most part, political choices and thus well within the realm of political analysis. Here, the Shah's attitudes and his role in decision making are of central importance to Ramazani's theme and should have been discussed more fully. The author points out that the Shah has some supporters and fewer opponents, but he does if any, such internal conflict not say what relationship, has to specific foreign policy choices. ternal

He seems to argue that the relative absence of indissent has given the Shah greater external maneu167

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

evidence in the book verability. However, there is little In fact, the such a position. which would substantiate overall impression which the book creates is that intraIran's sense are fixed, not flexible. Gulf relationships and its determination to "go it of cultural distinctness alone" in the Gulf makes conflict with its Arab neighbors unavoidable. virtually might have been eliminated with Such contradictions of framework. The subdiscipline the aid of an analytical has spawned numerous theories, each politics international Ramazani neither with its attendant explanatory variables. adopts nor refers to any of these. which was made The author's prediction of conflict, is neither unique nor, nethan explicitly, more implicitly The years immediately prior to 1971 mistaken. cessarily, were filled with rather gloomy assessments of the future of the Gulf after Britain closed its "protective umbrella" and withdrew from the area. The "vacuum" which would be at least sane created would exacerbate intra-Gulf conflict, of which would be Soviet-inspired.3 The recent (and enormous) arms purchases by Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait do indicate a high level of reHowever, the British "withdrawal" was gional insecurity. All something less than a watershed in Gulf politics. three states bought their arms from the West. In many respects, the vacuum is an elusive one. If there has been in any change, there are more, not fewer, participants today. And this places the single-country Gulf politics As a matter of foreign policy study at a disadvantage. about the other littoral Ramazani writes when necessity, it is most often in terms of their reactions to states, Iranian moves rather than their own foreign polispecific Areas of mutual interest or of potential hoscy goals. are underplayed. tility For example, a major goal for all the littoral into and out of the Gulf moving. states is to keep traffic to its spokesmen, Saudi government's However, according IRANIANSTUDIES

168

Arabia is far less dependent than is Iran upon maintaining a high level of oil exports. It might, therefore, be more tolerant of a blockade of the Gulf straits, were such an event to occur in the future. Moreover, Iran's continued willingness to supply oil for the Saudi Arabian to Israel makes it far more difficult regime to justify its ties with Iran to its Arab constituency. Ramazani discusses Iran's de facto recognition of Israel, but not other aspects of Iranian/Israeli relations which are equally provocative from the Arab standpoint. A number of years ago, Saudi Arabia refused to participate in a regional defense pact which excluded Iran In July, 1973, however, (and which was proposed by Iraq). the Saudi monarch publicly expressed his opinion that Iran's successful seizure of the Greater and Lesser Tumbs was not to be regarded as permanent. And, more recently still, the Shah's unilateral announcement of Gulf oil price increases has been severely criticized by other OPECmembers. Ramazani discusses several problem areas in Iran's relations with the other littoral states. However, the reader might well wish that he had at least attempted to answer such difficult but critical questions as1 "Howmuch is compatible with Iran's regional objectives?" isolation One of the snags which students of international politics (as well as politicians) often find themselves caught is a working definition of "national security." Few would deny that it is likely to be the "overriding goal of Iran's foreign policy" (p. 88). The real questions are (1) how do the participants in the Iranian policymaking system view national security, and (2) how can the desired goals best be achieved? The author has described the goals and strategies which characterized Iran's past foreign policy. However, he does not discuss either present alternatives or potential policies If Iranian foreign policy for the future. is flexible,- such alternatives should be discussed; if not, 169

SPRING-SUlIMER 1973

there is little

justification

for writing

a book about it.

Professor Ramazani's most valuable contribution is and clear presentation of source materials, his collection those from the Arabic-language press, which particularly It is to be hoped have not been brought together before. that future writers will carry the subject farther. Far less useful is The Chaning Balance of Power. seminar report," indi"an international As the subtitle, cates, this book is a synopsis of the proceedings of an meeting of administrators and diplomats which international was held in Rome in June, 1971. Although the meeting was conceived of as an opportunity to have varied points of view presented on the future of the Persian Gulf, twentycame from Britain three of the twenty-seven participants or the United States. The substantive quality of the report was equally For example, Iran's seizure of the straits disappointing. islands was treated as a natural evolution of that country's power. Opposition to that move from the other side concluOne of the few political of the Gulf was ignored. dissent could be quelled if only adequate resions--that were provided for the dissenters so creational facilities that they might express themselves in other ways--indicates an arrogant attitude. Most of the conference, however, was devoted to topics related to social and economic progress rather than Despite the fact that it was devoted to "the politics. changing balance of power," the conference turned only cursory attention to the arms race in the Gulf. One of the economic issues which was frequently states might absorb their raised was how the littoral Recent press coverage of the revenues. oil mounting energy crisis seems to suggest that the revenues would be better held in Western accounts because the producing the seminar states have fewer investment possibilities; Investment in petrochemireport takes a similar stance. IRANIANSTUDIES

170

cals is dismissed as uneconomical, although no evidence was presented to substantiate such a claim. The Bechtel Corporation and the Saudi-Arabian stateowned Petromin Companyare currently negotiating a fivebillion dollar industrial complex which would be devoted largely to petrochemicals. This is not to say that petrochemicals are the wisest investment outlet for Gulf states, but that the question of whether they can "absorb" the monies is a straw-man. In summary, the A.U.F.S. book falls short of its intent to illuminate international political and oil affairs in the Gulf and does little justice to the usual high quality of their publications. The dearth of scholarly attention given to Gulf politics is striking; therein lies the real "vacuum." The Indochina War has produced a spate of studies of South East Asian politics, but must political analysis always be post-mortem accounts of diplomatic failures.? NOTES 1.

The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941 (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1966).

2.

The deja vu aspect of international rivalries in the Gulf is well detailed in Arnold T. Wilson's The Persian Gulf (London: George T. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1928). Wilson was the British Consul at Ahwaz. He deals primarily with the nineteenth century, but has included some material on the seventeenth and eightOf particular interest is his reference to eenth. Franco-Russian attempts to keep Britain out of the Gulf in the 1880s and the corresponding British attempts to woo Nasir al-Din Sh&h.

3.

A few citations which readers might find interesting, but which are less well-known, are: P. Meyer-Ranke, "Iran's Neue Rolle: Ordungsmacht in Mittlelost,"1 171

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

Aussenpolitik 19 (May, 1968), 298-306; J. Pigasse, "Geopolitique due Petrole et Strategie des Grandes Puissance dans le Golfe Persique," Strategie 19 (JulySeptember, 1969), 47-82; and, Sir William Luce, "A Naval Force for the Gulf: Balancing the Inevitable Russian Penetration," The Round Table 59 (October, 1969), 347-356.

By Russell Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973. D. Buhite. 342 pp. $14.50. JUSTUS D. DOENECKE In January, 1944, President Roosevelt found himself "rather thrilled with the idea of using Iran as an example He of what we could do by an unselfish American policy." had just received a lengthy memorandumfrom his roving emissary General Patrick Hurley, the subject of Professor BuHurley had outlined an "Iranihite's excellent biography. an Plan," by which massive American technical assistance would make Persia the model for democratic modernization. The State Department (in the person of Eugene Rostow) dismissed the proposal as "hysterical messianic globaloney," and it was soon tabled. This would be neither the first nor last time Patrick Hurley would be an object of controversy. The book covers far more than the title would indicate and ranges from Hurley's impoverished upbringing in role as AmChoctaw Indian territory to his controversial bassador to China. In his time Hurley was a prominent lawbusinessman, Secretary of War, friend yer, a millionaire

Justus D. Doenecke is Associate New College. IRANIANSTUDIES

172

Professor

of History at

of President Hoover, and personal Rooseenvoy of President velt. By formal standards, Hurley was poorly prepared for Educated at a primitive such awesome responsibilities. Indian mission school and a lesser-rated Washington law schooL an extroverted Hurley compensated by a burning ambition, and a strikingly personality, distinguished profile. Brash, oversensitive, bombastic, Hurley went far on modest talent. Although Hurley's name has usually been associated with America's disastrous China policy, his Middle East inHe soon entangled himvolvements were also controversial. self in the complex worlds of Zionism and oil politics. In 1943, Roosevelt asked him to serve as a "fact-finder" on conditions in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia. Hurley soon drew the hostility of American Zionists (and columnist Drew Pearson) by telling Ibn-Saud that he opposed a Jewish state in Palestine. He was friendly to the plan of Nuri al-Said, Iraq's prime minister, who wanted an Arab Federation which--among other things --would limit Jewish immigration to Palestine while granting Jews autonomy in the areas in which they possessed a minority. Buhite, however, finds no evidence to support the rumor that the Oklahoman had negotiated an agreement that would permit a pipeline from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean in return for American pressure to curb the influx of Jews to Palestine. oil policies were equally provocative. In Hurley's June, 1943, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were conoil shortage to promote cerned enough about a possible United States' in the Middle East. concessions Although a retainer Hurley was then receiving from Sinclair Oil, he that the American government buy into American suggested companies. By such means the United States itself would insure against the kind of truculent business practices which led to nationalization in Mexico (and which, incias a Sinclair had forced Hurley himself, dentally, representative, to negotiate with the Mexican government). Iran,

however,

to both her vital

was Hurley's

oil resources 173

primary

focus.

and her strategic

Alert

position,

SPRING-SUMMER 1973

Hurley fostered the Big Three's resolution, advocating Iranian independence. Hurley himself went much further, calling for both "free enterprise" and "self-government" in Iran and demanding American control of all land-lease distribution in the area (an obvious hold over America's Such dogged efforts to implement the leading allies). Atlantic Charter would halt British and Russian penetration and helped secure Iran for American oil interests. (Sinclair, his employer, was vigorously working for an oil concession in Iran.) It would also, in Hurley's mind, reveal the United States as genuinely altruistic. In Professor Buhite's eyes, Hurley's wartime role On in the Middle East reveals a general American duality. the one hand, there are the universal goals of democracy On the other, there is the realand self-determination. Like most of his politik of inmmediate self-interest. countrymen, Hurley could never resolve this ambivalence.

IRANIANSTUDIES

174

Note on the English Transliteration System The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STUDIES is based on the Persian Romanization System approved by the American Library Association, the Canadian Library Association, and the Library of Congress. Copies of the transliteration table may be obtained by writing to the Editor

Iranian Studies is published quarterly by The Society for Iranian Studies. It is distributed to members of the Society as part of their membership. The annual subscription rate for non-members is $7.00; the price of single copies is $1.75 per issue. For institutions the subscription rate is $10.00 per annum. The opinions expressed by the contributors are of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Society or the editors of Iranian Studies. Articles for publication and all other communications should be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society should be addressed to the Secretary, The Society for Iranian Studies, P.O. Box 89, Village Station, New York 10014, U.S.A. The exclusive distributing agent for IRANIAN STUDIES in Iran is: Kharazmie Publishing & Distribution Co., 229 Daneshgah Street, Shah Avenue (P. 0. Box 14-1486), Tehran, Iran.

COVER: The Citadel of Bam Photo by Mehdi Khonsari From a forthcoming volume on the old city of Bam by Mehdi Khonsari and Hosein Ziai

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

Autumn

1973

Volume

VI

Number

4

The Society for Iranian Studies Council Ervand Abrahamian, Baruch College, City University of New York Amin Banani, University of California, Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi, Boston College James A. Bill, University of Texas at Austin Jerome W. Clinton, American Institute of Iranian Studies Paul W. English, University of Texas at Austin Gene R. Garthwaite, Dartmouth College Farhad Kazemi, New York University Kenneth A. Luther, University of Michigan Ann Schulz, ex offico, Clark University

Executive Committee Farhad Kazemi, Executive Secretary Ann Schulz, Treasurer Ali Banuazizi, Editor

IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Editor A. Reza Sheikholeslami, Associate Editor

Copyright, 1974, The Society for Iranian Studies Printed at the Boston College Press Published in the U.S.A. US ISSN 0021-0862 Address all communications to IRANIAN STUDIES, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U. S. A.

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Volume VI

Autumn 1973

Number 4

ARTICLES 176

DEVELOPMENT PLANNINGIN IRAN: A HISTORICALSURVEY

229

THE KHWUSHNISHIN POPULATION OF IRAN

Farhad Daftary Eric J. Hooglund

BOOKREVIEWS 246

NIKKI R. KEDDIE: Sayyid Jamal ad-DIn "al-Afghani, " A Political Biography

255

EHSANYAR-SHATER: A Grammar of Southern Tati Dialects

Hamid Enayat

MohammadAli Jazayery

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN IRAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY FARHAD DAFTARY

By the time the Fifth Development Plan was adopted in 1973, Iran had already experienced more than three decades of governmental efforts towards economic development. These efforts first started in the early 1920s and culminated, in the postwar period, in the country's First Development Plan. Before discussing the second and subsequent plans, it will be useful to review the main features of the initial efforts at planning in Iran. First

Efforts

at Planning

The Prewar Period The development policies of the government during the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941) did not constitute development planning as the term has come to be understood in the postwar economic literature. The prewar policies were restricted to partial investment programs for the public sector only, with little consideration concerning the activities of the private sector. Furthermore, even

Farhad Daftary, former Head of the Economic Research Department of the Central Bank of Iran, is currently the Director of Yekom Economic Consultants.

IRANIAN STUDIES

176

the public sector programs did not reflect any explicitly defined set of policy objectives. As a result, the allocation of resources was not determined on the basis of any A number of specific particular investment criterion. investment projects in different sectors were implemented, without giving sufficient consideration to their interrelationships, or their overall effects on such things as the level and distribution of national income. More specifically, the primary development objectives of the period under consideration were rapid industrialization and the development of the country's infrastructure, while agriculture was by and large ignored. The most important policy instruments of the prewar period, aside from the investment programs, included tax rates and wage and price controls, as well as government controls over the various aspects of foreign trade. Between 1925 and 1941, total development outlays of the government accounted for about 30 to 40 percent of total public expenditures.1 It is estimated that the investment expenditures amounted to about $750 million, at then-current prices, during this entire period. The industrial and transport sectors absorbed $260 million (35 percent) each, while the remaining 30 percent was essentially used in public construction projects which largely took the form of impressive government buildings in Tehran.2 The composition of the investment program for indetermined by a desire for selfdustry was basically and import-substitution sufficiency with respect to a number of consumer goods, such as textiles and sugar. By the early 1940s, the government owned and operated some 100 manufacturing establishments related to the above-mentioned commodities, food processing, and one cement plant. The state enterprises, however, began to decay soon after their establishment, because of shortages of technical personnel, managerial inexperience, poor locations and the subsequent wartime shortages of imported raw materials and spare parts.3 It should also be added that, during the 1930s, foreign trade became a government monopoly, and foreign competition 177

AUTUMN 1973

was very tion and dustries ficiency production

effectively ruled out through high tariff protecthe state-owned inimport quotas. Consequently, had no incentive to improve their production efeven if they could, and, as a result, unit costs remained rather high.

The investment program for the transport sector was dominated by one project, overwhelmingly the Transviz.,

Iranian railway which extended over a distance

of 1388

kilometers (863 miles) from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. The completion of this project took about ten years (1927-38), and its cost is conservatively estimated at some 2.5 billion rials (about $150 million), which would amount to more than $500 million in 1960 prices.4 This was the most monumental and capital-intensive project of the prewar period; it absorbed almost 20 percent of total public investment expenditures during the entire period under consideration. In addition, the road capacity of the country was expanded from around two thousand miles in 1925 to about twenty thousand miles (none of them paved) in 1938.

financed

level

The prewar government-investments from internal sources, primarily

of private

consumption through:

were essentially by checking the

(1) restricting

imports of consumer goods, (2) heavy taxation, and (3) wage controls. Oil revenues were rather insignificant during this period and were largely used for the purchase of military commodities, although small amounts were also used to meet the foreign exchange components of the various investments projects. Be that as it may, the development activities of the government came to a halt with the Allied occupation of Iran in September, 1941. This event marked the end of an era and ushered in a period of political uncertainty and economic instability.

IRANIAN STUDIES

178

The Abortive First

Development Plan

The most outstanding economic consequence of the wartime conditions in Iran was a severe inflation that completely disrupted the Iranian economy. The inflationary pressures which had already gained momentumin the late 1930s were rapidly accentuated after 1941 and reached their peak in 1944.5 For all intents and purposes, the Iranian economy remained in a chaotic state until the end of the war and the departure of the foreign military forces from the country. The idea of reconstructing the Iranian economy, through government initiative, gained fresh ground during the immediate postwar years. In 1946, the governappointed a commission for the purpose of preparing a development plan for the country. Eventually, after almost three years of preparatory work, which involved also *the services of several foreign countries and consultants,6 the implementation of the First Plan began in 1949. In its final form, the First Plan called for public investment expenditures in the total amount of 21 billion rials ($656 million), later raised to 26.3 billion rials; to be undertaken during a seven-year period, from 1949 to 1956. However, the implementation of the First Plan never really got underway. The first two years of the plan period were mainly devoted to the setting up of the Plan Organization and related administrative matters. Meanwhile, with the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951 and the ensuing crisis, the Plan Organization lost its main source of finance and foreign exchange. Subsequently, for a period of more than three years during the oil crisis, little could be done to execute the Plan. Indeed, for all practical purposes, the First Plan proved to be abortive. With the resumption of activities in the oil industry, following the settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute in 1954, the government decided to make a fresh start on the basis of a new plan, a plan which would also be more in line with the country's increased oil revenues under the Oil Consortium agreement. 179

AUTUMN 1973

Needless to add that the actual results of the First Plan were rather disappointing. During the "nominal" plan period, from 1949 to 1954, actual expenditures amounted to 4.1 billion rials, or only 16 percent of the planned total for the whole seven-year period.7 The Second Development Plan, 1955-1962 As indicated already, the First Plan, which had never gained any momentum, collapsed almost completely with the loss of the country's oil revenues in 1951. The ensuing political and economic crises seriously disrupted the Iranian economy and necessitated the adoption of many emergency measures. The disruptions had been so great that when the oil dispute was finally settled in 1954, the government

decided to adopt a new development plan as soon as possible. Consequently, the draft of the Second Plan, for the sevenyear period from September 1955 to September 1962, was completed in less than nine months. Content

and Methodology

of Planning

The Second Plan, like its predecessor, was not a comprehensive plan; it did not concern itself with the overall rate and pattern of development in the economy. The partial nature of the Second Plan was not merely due to the exclusion of the private sector, regarding which nothing was said, but also because it did not cover all of the activities of the public sector. The Plan consisted of an investment exclusively program, covering merely that portion of public investments which was to be controlled by the Plan Organization. This portion accounted for only about one-half of total public investments during the plan period. The line of demarcation was based on a rather arbitrary arrangement for dividing the country's total oil revenues between the Plan Organization and the Ministry of Finance for the purpose of financing their respective expenditures. The Plan said IRANIAN STUDIES

180

nothing

about how the investments

were to be coordinated ment; nor did it

of the Plan Organization

with those of the rest of the govern-

concern

itself

with

the general

economic

policies of the government. This narrow approach to planning seriously impeded the effectiveness of the government's development effort. A few remarks concerning some broad aspects of the investment program embodied in the Second Plan, especially in terms of its methodological design and soundness,might be helpful at this point. Generally speaking, the Second Plan was too partial and micro-oriented to be considered optimal in terms of the whole economy. This remark should not be taken to imply that an "optimum" plan must necesLack of comprehensivesarily be a "comprehensive" plan. a drawback for development ness per se is not necessarily policies; what matters is to draw up a file of good investment projects and invest accordingly, and this can be done without a comprehensive plan.8 In any event, in the absence of all types of statistical information, comprehensive planning was not possible in the mid-1950s. There is no evidence suggesting that the planners adopted any clearly defined planning method, including a method of ensuring internal consistency in the plan. Needless to say, no planning models or programming techniques were used in designing the Second Plan. Under these ciris the lack of any plancumstances what can be criticized ning methodology for formulating the Second Plan. In other words, the investment decisions were made largely in an arbitrary fashion and reflected primarily the subjective judgments of the planners. The Second Plan was simply a list of investment the selection of which did not follow programs and projects, from the application of any specific investment criteria,9 including any type of cost-benefit analysis. The only mandate of consistency and balance observed in designing the file of the projects was that the sum of financial outlays on the projects was not to exceed the total financial resources available to the Plan Organization during the plan 181

AUTUMN 1973

period. However, even this ly satisfied.

relationship

was never adequate-

It cannot be denied, however, that the task of designing a "good" development plan in Iran was, indeed, a The lack of both statisdifficult one in the mid-1950s. tical data and familiarity with planning methodology and In addition, at the techniques were some of the problems. time, the overriding aim of the government was to launch an It was investment program of some sort as soon as possible. the size, rather than the composition, of the investment program which received the highest official consideration.10 As a result, most of the basic planning issues were not even raised, and the Second Plan was destined from its very inception not to satisfy the attributes (such as efficiency and internal consistency) of a well-designed development plan. The planning machinery, as in the case of the First Plan, did not follow the traditional administrative set-up of the government. Both the formulation and execution of the Second Plan, as envisaged in 1955, were largely the responsibility of the Plan Organization. The reason for adopting this procedure was related to the tacit admission that the ministries and regular agencies were neither comIt should, petent nor trustworthy to plan or execute.'1 however, be added that some improvement in the machinery of planning took place during the plan period. In 1957, a planning unit was established for the first time, in the Plan Organization. This was the Economic Bureau which was also supported for a few years by a team of foreign advisers, the so-called Harvard Advisory Group. The importance of the Economic Bureau increased very rapidly. It undertook a mid-period evaluation of the Second Plan, designed projects for the second half of the plan period, explored different approaches for formulating the Third Plan, and finally, by 1961, formulated a comprehensive framework for the Third Plan.

IRANIANSTUDIES

182

The Investment Program In this section we shall describe and appraise the Second Plan in more specific terms. Whether or not the government has a definite development strategy embodied in a long-range perspective plan, development planning, in general, must be based on a clear understanding of the development objectives. Indeed, the specification of these objectives is the first logical step in formulating a development policy, since the objectives are the prime determinants of the character and direction of the planning effort. Development plans usually include a number of obThe mere listing of various objectives, jectives. however, is not to set them in the sense required for deriving criteria for resource allocation, there are usually possibilities of conflict among objectives.12 Consequently, it is necessary to make clear choices in the form of explicit value judgments regarding the relative priority of the different goals to be attained.13 The objectives of the Second Plan were both general and vague, without any quantitative targets. The Plan aimed at "increasing production, developing exports, preparing public necessities within the country, developing agriculture and industries, discovering and exporting mines and subterranean resources, improving and completing means of communication, improving public health, fulfilling any operations designed for the development of the country, raising the educational and living standard of the people and improving living conditions."14 No more specific statement of the objectives is A glance at this list, which includes just aavailable. bout everything, reveals that it cannot be used as a guide to action. The main reason, of course, is that the list does not reflect any choices or priorities: In sum, by avoiding explicit choices, and due to the failure to distinguish between autonomous and derived aims,15 on the one hand, and primary and secondary objectives, on the other, it was not made clear what objective, or objectives, were to be given precedence in designing the Second Plan.

183

AUTUMN 1973

The unsatisfactory manner in which the objectives were stated was, of course, bound to affect other aspects of plan formulation, especially the size and allocations of the investment program embodied in it. The investment program, both in terms of its size and allocations, was revised several times during the plan period. The revisions were necessitated largely because of the underestimation of costs and the successive declines in the Plan Organization's share of the oil revenues. As formulated in 1955, the Second Plan envisaged total investments amounting to 70 billion rials (about $933 million) for the whole plan period.16 In 1957, it was realized that, due to the underestimation of costs, the implementation of the original schedule of projects would require significantly more than 70 billion rials. the Plan Organization Consequently, obtained parliamentary approval for a 20 percent increase in its investment expenditures, so that the size of the investment program was raised to 84 billion rials ($1.1 billion). Subsequently, it became apparent that, due to still further increases in costs as well as the addition of some new prothe full execution of the investment jects, program would require even more than 113 billion rials ($1.5 billion). Meanwhile, the Plan Organization's actual share of the oil revenues had fallen short of what had been significantly intended. As a result originally of these adverse developments on the side of both costs and revenues, finally the investment program had to be cut down substantially in 1959. The downward revision put a celing of 84 billion rials on total investments for the entire seven-year Conperiod.17 sequently, many investment projects had to be dropped, including some with considerable merit. The rational allocation of capital and other scarce resources among alternative uses constitutes the essence of development planning. This allocation problem involves several, more or less interrelated, choices: (1) the amount of investment to be made in the various sectors of the econ-

omy; (2) selection

of particular

projects

in each sector;

and (3) selection of production techniques for a particular project (product). As already noted,-in the mid-1950s the aim of the Iranian government was to launch an overriding IRANIAN STUDIES

184

investment program as soon as possible. fore, an overwhelming lack of attention tern of investments or the intersectoral allocations.

There was, thereregarding the patand intrasectoral

The core of the Second Plan was a certain volume underwent several revisions, of investment, which itself to four (1) financial allocations consisting merely of: major economic sectors, and (2) a partial list of investThe broad sectoral allocations ment programs and projects. of total investments under the Second Plan are shown in Table 1. These data can be taken to represent sectoral targets. Out of the original total of 70 bilinvestment as planned in 1955, transport received the lion rials, largest share, 23 billion rials (33 percent), while agriand services received 18 culture (including irrigation) billion rials (26 percent) each. On the other hand, inits share being only dustry received the lowest priority, about 11 billion rials, or 15 percent of total investments. This program, as we have seen, was revised several times. The larger size of the revised program does, therefore, in the reflect higher reestimation of costs (especially transport sector) rather than the addition of new projects. higher cost estimates Aside from the substantially for the transport sector, another principal change in the revised program was the addition of a regional development Some of for the Khuzistan province. program, essentially the projects of the regional program, including its major project

(Dez Dam), had already

been included

program; but the new program reflected regional development planning.

in the original

a new approach to

All in all, the outstanding feature of the investment program, which was more accentuated in its final revised form, was a very heavy emphasis on the development This emof infrastructure and social overhead capital. phasis becomes all the more evident in view of the fact of three that the irrigation program consisted essentially big multi-purpose dams. Thus planned expenditures for and dams accounted for almost twotransport facilities 185

AUTUMN 1973

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On the other hand, thirds of total planned expenditures. both industry and agriculture in absolute proper received, The proas well as relative terms, very low priorities. gram, thus, reflected an overwhelming emphasis on social as compared to directly actioverhead capital productive vities.18 In terms of broader classifications, commodity producing programs received less than 20 percent of total investments. This investment program implied a very high capital-output ratio, and it can be stated that increases in both production and employment during the plan period received very low valuations by the planners. The work of filling the grams with concrete investment in an arbitrary manner. There that projects between sectors, Nor compared with each other. if any, was used in criterion,

revealed

by actual

choices,

sectoral investment prowas also handled projects is no evidence to suggest were and within each sector, is it clear what investment As ranking the projects.

it seems that the overall

tend-

with low valueency of the planners was to select projects added returns and low employment generating As effects. a result, the investment program was dominated by a relafew capital-intensive tively projects. In sum, the inof an unintevestment program had all the shortcomings grated public investment program prepared on the basis of the so-called project-by-project approach, which charac9 the lack of a clearly terizes defined development policy. Plan Implementation In the absence of clear objectives, quantitative or any sort of physical it is not postargets, planning, sible to measure the results of the Second Plan in any manner. precise In such circumstances, the appraisal will to a comparison between the actual and have to be limited planned investment But even this type of expenditures. is of limited usefulness evaluation in the case of the Second Plan, because it will not reflect the drastic downward revision of the investment program, which occurred halfway during the plan period. 187

AUTUMN1973

A more revealing picture of the achievements and shortcomings can be conveyed only by examining the extent to which the originally planned list of projects and programs was actually implemented during the plan period. This would be an enormous task which is clearly beyond our Our discussion has made it clear that even if the scope. revised investment program were fully implemented, the acshort tual results would have still fallen substantially of the original intentions. Therefore, in what follows we shall limit our discussion to some general remarks regarding the extent of plan implementation and some general difficulties which restricted the achievements of the Second Plan. Data on planned and actual expenditures under the Second Plan are shown in Table 1. A comparison between actual expenditures and expenditures envisaged under the revised program reveals a high degree of plan fulfillment (about 90 percent); the same also applies to sectoral investment programs. This high degree of success, however, is more apparent than real because the revised program itself had resulted, in 1959, from a drastic reduction in the original investment program so as to bring the plan more in line with actual developments. Aside from cost over-runs, the reduction in the scope of the investment program was necessitated by the successive reductions in the Plan Organization's share of oil revenues.20 The gap between original intentions and actual performance was, therefore, as much due to bad planning as to the shortage of financial resources available to the Plan Organization. There was, indeed, a great deviation between the are original plan and its actual outcome. The shortfalls very clearly revealed in the few cases where the programs were expressed in precise quantitative terms. The best example of this sort is to be found in the road program, which absorbed the largest share of investments under the Second Plan. It was originally intended to construct or improve 10,700 kilometers of roads with 10.6 billion rials, while IRANIANSTUDIES

188

actually only 5,503 kilometers were completed at the much In other words, much higher cost of 18.2 billion rials.21 compared to origless was achieved at higher expenditures, The same remark is applicable to the ininal intentions. vestment program as a whole. Furthermore, actual investments were largely aband this projects, sorbed by a few big capital-intensive There were envisaged. tendency was greater than originally other problems of implementation which reflected the nature of public administration in Iran and the role of the Plan The speciOrganization within the governmental structure. fic problems were related to the overwhelming inefficiency of the regular minisinability of public administration, and lack of cotries to implement development projects, operation and coordination between the Plan Organization and other government agencies.22 Another group of problems, which were very detrimental to the overall development effort, was related to the lack of coordination between the government's developthe As a result, ment policy and other economic policies. pressures and Iranian economy witnessed both inflationary These a severe foreign exchange crisis during this period. developments were in turn followed by a recession which plagued the economy until 1964.23

The Third Development Plan, 1962-1967 The Third Plan, covering the period from September 1962 to March 1968, was to be Iran's first comprehensive This broadening of the planning scope development plan. had come about as a result of the main findings of the Second Plan's evaluation undertaken by the Economic Bureau. According to these findings,24 the bulk of the country's economic problems during the Second Plan period was attributed to: (1) lack of coordination between the activities of the various government agencies, and (2) lack of a comand use of reprehensive view regarding the availability sources in the whole economy. 189

AUTUMN 1973

Machinery and Content of Planning When the Economic Bureau, subsequently renamed the Division of Economic Affairs, was made responsible for designing the Third Plan, the decision was also made to bring the machinery of planning more in line with the traditional structure of the government. As a first step administrative in planning, the Division of Economic Affairs was to prepare, with the help of the regular government agencies, a tentative statement, called the "plan frame," of the Third Plan. Upon the approval of such a frame by the cabinet, the regular government agencies were then to proceed with the work of proposing and preparing specific investment Eventually, projects within their own fields of activity. together with the plan frame and the detailed projects, of the government, statements on general economic policies were to appear in a single document that would constitute the final version of the Third Plan. The actual process of planning, however, fell short of what had been originally envisaged, and serious planning efforts did not go bestage of preparing the plan frame. yond the initial The plan frame contained development objectives, and broad programs for each tentative sectoral allocations, by of the major sectors, and it was prepared essentially the Division of Economic Affairs in the Plan Organization. It was at the sectoral planning level that the regular gov(through an elaborate network ernment agencies participated of the of committees consisting of the representatives in the planDivision of Economic Affairs and ministries) these committees The purpose of establishing ning effort. was not merely to provide a basis for preparing sectoral programs, but also to spread the basic concepts of planIn many cases, this idea proved ning to the ministries. to be very successful as revealed by the capability of various ministries to contribute to the formulation of the Fourth and Fifth Plans. In sum, the Third Plan, as the country's first comprehensive plan, was to be concerned with the overall rate and pattern of development in the whole economy. As noted already, however, many of its details were never IRANIANSTUDIES

190

worked out. The Plan consisted essentially of an investment program for the public sector, together with some forecasts for the private sector. The Third Plan Law, however, brought about a major change regarding the responsibility for plan implementation. The principal change envisaged was that all development projects, after being considered and approved by the Plan Organization, were to be implemented directly by the minisA High Econtries and other relevant government agencies. omic Council, outside of the Plan Organization, was also created "in order to coordinate economic activities of different government organizations and to secure the Plan's proper enforcement." 5 Main Objectives

of the Third Plan

The Third Plan frame was based on an overall growth rate target. The target chosen was to increase real GNPat an average annual rate of 6 percent, or a total increase of 35 to 40 percent during the five-and-one-half years of the The growth target, which was the primary deplan period. velopment objective of the Third Plan, implied a per capita growth rate target of about 3 to 3.5 percent. A number of secondary objectives were also specified in general terms, among which the most important were: (1) to create an appropriate number of employment opportunities, (2) to achieve a more equal distribution of income and opportunities, and (3) to maintain relative price stability and equilibrium in the balance of payments. 26 The growth target was not set on the basis of very careful reasoning or reliable statistics.27 The lack of the required statistics, indeed, created many difficulties at every stage of planning. In fixing the growth target consideration was given to the actual rate achieved during the earlier part (1955-59) of the Second Plan, the availability of resources, and the efficiency with which these resources were expected to be utilized.28 A further consideration which did not favor setting higher targets for 191

AUTUMN 1973

capital accumulation and overall growth was related to the aim of the planners to achieve a better balance between the production of investment and consumption goods during the plan period.29 the employment Compared with the growth objective, low and income distribution objectives received relatively marginal weights. The planners clearly stated that the Third Plan should not be expected to create maximumemployor appreciable shifts in income distriment opportunities, and bution.50 The objectives of relative price stability external balance were treated very inadequately.31 Size of the Third Plan The size of a development plan, of course, refers to the investment requirements for achieving the plan's In theory, the reobjectives, notably the growth target. levant magnitude can be determined, given a fixed growth rate target, through the application of an overall marginal the task was made very capital-output ratio. In practice, difficult in Iran due to the absence of the various types of statistics needed for macro-planning. In determining the size of the Plan, the planners first estimated the volume of gross investments during the Second Plan period. The estimated figure for the base It was year in the late 1950s was 42.8 billion rials. felt that this volume of investment had been sufficient for generating a 6 percent rate of growth. Then the assumption was made that if the volume of investment is increased by 6 percent annually during the plan period, the rate of growth of total output would also be of about the same order.32 This, of course, implied the assumption that the marginal capital-output ratio would remain relatively Consequently, total unchanged during the plan period. fixed investment requirements were estimated by compounding the investment figure (42.8 billion rials) of the base On this basis, year, at 6 percent through the plan period. years of the gross fixed investments, for five-and-one-half IRANIANSTUDIES

192

In dividplan period, were estimated at 290 billion rials. ing the total between the public and private sectors, the planners aimed at maintaining roughly the same proportions which had existed during the earlier years of the Second Plan. The total size of the Plan33 implied investing anwhich nually about 19 percent of GNP (at market prices), ratio of ain turn implied an incremental capital-output bout 3:1. At the beginning of the plan period, the size of the public sector program was reduced by 26 percent, from Subsequently, the public sector 190 to 140 billion rials. program was expanded on two occasions, its size was finally fixed, in 1966, at 230 billion rials, while nothing was said about the size of the private sector program. The rationale of these revisions was never explained, nor were the effects and the of these changes on private investment activities overall growth target ever discussed. The Investment Program The investment program of the Third Plan was the only policy program specified in the plan frame, which conand other tained no statements regarding monetary, fiscal, of the government. These poligeneral economic policies cies were to be specified in the final plan document, which was never drawn up. Consequently, the Plan did not specify how private investments, accounting for almost 50 percent of the total, would be realized. Indeed, with few the Third Plan did not even consider the secexceptions, All of this, toral distribution of private investments. of course, contributed to the "open-endedness" of the conThird Plan. In what follows, we shall, therefore, sider only the investment program for the public sector. More specifically, we shall appraise the optimality of the pattern of investments envisaged in the Plan. This will be mainly done by considering the actual methods and techniques used in designing the Third Plan, or more specifically the public investment program contained in it.

193

1973 AUTUMN

At the outset it should be mentioned that no comprehensive planning model was used in preparing the Third Plan. The essential method of planning was one of trial and error, or successive approximations, rather than a simultaneous solution of the complete set of interrelated planning problems. In many respects, especially in terms of dividing the task of planning into stages, the method used resembled Tinbergen's "stage method" of planning, 34 although the available statistical data were insufficient for adopting the latter method in its entirety. This, of course, reveals how inadequate the available statistical information was in Iran, since Tinbergen's method itself does not require detailed statistics. For this and other reasons, it has become generally accepted that some form of planning in stages is better suited to the needs of most underdeveloped countries than a single comprehensive analysis.35 In preparing the Third Plan, the task of planning was broken down into a number of stages, similar to the principal planning stages in Tinbergen's model. As indicated, the process started from the top by estimating total investment requirements on the basis of the overall growth rate target and some simplifying assumptions. In Tinbergen's model, the sectoral investment allocations are determined on the basis of sectoral production targets and sectoral capital coefficients. The production targets are derived on the basis of existing capacities and the prospective development of final demand for the products in The relatively question. simple data required for these calculations were not available to the Iranian planners. Consequently, much of the planning work was done intuitively, and often on the basis of no more than informed guesses. As in the Second Plan, four broad sectors were distinguished for the purpose of planning: agriculture, industry, transport, and social affairs. Due to the lack of data, however, sectoral production targets could not be fixed prior to determining the sectoral investment allocations. The sectoral allocations of public investments were determined by successive trials.3E IRANIANSTUDIES

194

As noted earlier, for the plan frame, the sectoral investments were not supposed to be completely filled with specific projects. Only some key programs and projects A more detailed project appraisal were to be specified. stage was to begin after the completion of the plan frame. This final stage of planning, for which the ministries had was to ensure that sectoral investbeen made responsible, ment targets would be filled completely with investment projects. This phase, however, never really got underway. The shortage

of concrete

investment

projects

has

indeed constituted one of the main obstacles to development planning in Iran. The difficulties were particularly severe in connection with the Third Plan. Therefore, instead of screening investment proposals, the Plan Organization spent much of its time trying to generate specific projects for inclusion in the Third Plan. In order to improve the optimality of the investment program, the planners also attempted to compare the investment of the different projects sectors. In principle, this was to ensure that the marginal projects in different sectors made the same contribution, in terms of national income, per unit of investment. In view of our discussion regarding the preparation of the plan frame, or rather the public investment program embodied in it, one cannot attribute a high degree of opand internal to it. timality consistency However, this was not due to the methods used in reaching the investment de-

cisions. These methods were perhaps the best ones possible under the given circumstances. to repeat, The deficiencies, were essentially due to lack of more complete and precise data and the absence of a backlog of specific investment as well as the broad governmental projects, within which the task of planning proceeded.

position

environment

We shall now say a few words concerning the comof the investment program for the public sector.

One of the interesting features of the plan frame was the designation of certain programs in each sector as "core." This designation had resulted from the concern with identifying

the marginal

projects

in each sector.

The "core"

195

AUTUMN 1973

accounted for aprograms, which were given top priority, The "nonabout 60 percent of planned public expenditures. core" programs contained the marginal and less desirable capitalprojects, including the bulk of the relatively About 50 percent of the "core" prointensive projects. jects were designed directly for the rural areas--a major shift of emphasis compared to the Second Plan.37 of the public investThe broad sectoral allocations ment program for the whole plan period are shown in Table 2. Agriculture, industry, and services were equally emphasized in the plan frame, and the transport sector did not receive the high priority accorded to it in the Second Plan. All of the plan frame reflect in all, the sectoral allocations a sort of balanced growth strategy. In particular, unlike the Second Plan, the plan frame implied balance between investments in social overhead capital and in directly productive activities. On the basis of a closer look at the individual programs, however, one can detect an overall tendency towards more directly productive activities.38 Plan Implementation The implementation of the Third Plan was completed in March, 1968. In this section we shall evaluate the Plan First, we in terms of its results and actual achievements. shall appraise the achievements of the Plan in terms of its overall objectives; then we shall extend our analysis to the investment program contained in the Third Plan. of the Third Plan was to real rate of growth in GNP. figures published by the Cen-

The primary objective achieve at least a 6 percent On the basis of the official

tral Bank of Iran, it is safe to assert that the actual rate of growth amounted to 8 to 9 percent during 1961-67. Thus, the measured growth rate exceeded by 2 to 3 percentage units the lower bound specified for the growth rate target. Except

for agriculture,

IRANIANSTUDIES

196

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AUTUMN1973

\

targets were specified in the Third Plan frame. The planned rate of 4.1 percent for agriculture, however, was not realized, as the actual rate of growth of total agricultural production fell short of 3 percent.39 The failure to attain the agricultural growth target was essentially due to the fact that the government's agricultural policy changed drastically at the very beginning of the plan period. More specifically, land reform became the primary concern, thus deemphasizing the Third Plan frame's policies for increasing production and productivity in agriculture. In terms of major industrial classifications, agriculture indeed had the lowest growth rate during the plan period. On the other hand, petroleum and industry had the highest rates; they were followed by the services sector, especially government services. The construction sector also expanded rapidly during the period under consideration. As a result of these developments, some structural transformation took place in the economy. The outstanding feature of this change was the decline in the relative position of agriculture rather than any appreciable increase in the relative importance of industry. This development occurred because the decline in the position of agriculture was largely offset by the rise in the relative position of the oil sector, while services maintained their relative share in aggregate output. it is not Concerning the employment situation, possible to make comparisons between the actual and planned developments, because of both the lack of data on actual developments as well as the Third Plan's vague employment targets. There is general agreement, however, that the employment-generation effects of the Third Plan were Total employment increased by about 500 rather limited.40 thousand from 1962 to 1967; the bulk of this increase occurred after 1964, following the termination of recessionary conditions in the economy. The actual expansion of employment, though its extent is subject to much uncertainty, compares rather unfavorably with the Plan's target of roughly one million new jobs.

IRANIANSTUDIES

198

The overall level of prices remained relatively stable during the Third Plan period. The first two years of the plan period were years of recession. Subsequently, with economic recovery and increases in development outlays, the domestic supply of goods also increased significantly during the latter part of the period, not to mention the rapid rise of imports. A significant portion of the increased domestic output resulted from the utilization of idle capacity as well as the fact that some of the capital-intensive projects of the Second Plan began to give some results in terms of output. In addition, during the last two years of the plan period, the government actively pursued a price stabilization policy by directly importing those products for which significant shortages had occurred in the domestic markets.41 Finally, the government also pursued a more cautious monetary policy as compared to the late 1950s. The combination of all these factors helped to prevent the appearance of any general excess demand situation and overall pressures on prices. *As indicated already, no fixed target had been specified in connection with the balance of payments, but relative external balance was mentioned as one of the secondary objectives. In terms of actual developments in the balance of payments, the Third Plan period can be divided into two subperiods, viz., 1962-63 and 1964-67. During the former period, as a result of the recessionary conditions prevailing in the economy and the implementation of the stabilization program of the early 1960s, the balance of payments was favorable. This condition was essentially due to reducing imports, especially in the private sector. Following economic recovery, especially after 1965, both investments and imports increased very rapidly. As a result, despite increased foreign exchange earnings of the oil sector, the balance of current payments showed increasing deficits, from $58 million in 1964 to $212 million in 1967. During these years, the net inflow of foreign loans, although substantial, was not sufficient to cover the growing deficits. As a result, foreign exchange reserves declined. Cumulative balance of payments deficits on current account amounted to $421 million during 199

AUTUMN 1973

1962-67, out of which $274 million by foreign loans.

(65 percent)

was covered

In the remainder of this section we shall make comparisons between the actual and planned development of investments, in terms of the totals and then by extending the analysis to the developments by sectors. As we have seen, according to the plan frame, total fixed investments for the entire plan period were set at 290 billion rials (at 1960 prices), out of which the shares of the public and private sectors were set at 158 billion (54.5 percent) and 132 billion rials (45.5 percent), respectively. In addition to fixed investments, certain recurrent development outlays were also allowed for in the Plan, as a result of which targets for the so-called development expenditures of the public and private sectors were raised to 190 billion and 158 billion rials, respectively. Subsequently, the investment target for the public sector was revised several times, while nothing was said regarding the private sector. Implicitly, at least, the total fixed investment target for the private sector continued to be 132 billion rials as specified originally. This, then, is the figure which has to be compared with the actual development of total investments in the private sector. The investment target for the public sector was fixed at 230 billion rials (at current prices), according to the final revision of the Plan. This target referred to development outlays without giving a breakdown in terms of fixed investment and recurrent development outlays. In view of the fact that in the original calculations contained in the plan frame the recurrent development outlays were estimated at 20 percent of fixed investments, it is safe to assume that about 38 billion rials. of the 230 billion program were for recurrent development purposes. On this basis, the fixed investment target for the public sector would amount to 192 billion rials (at current prices). IRANIANSTUDIES

200

At current prices, total public fixed investments amounted to 16S.5 billion rials during the whole plan period, as against the final target of 192 billion rials.42 These figures imply a shortfall of 26 billion rials. In other words, about 86 percent of the revised public investment program was actually fulfilled. In real terms, total public fixed investments added up to 165.2 billion rials, which would imply that the original target (158 billion rials) was only slightly exceeded, despite the fact that oil revenues turned out to be much larger than projected in the plan frame.43 The same picture is conveyed by making comparisons between the actual and planned public development outlays (including both fixed investments and recurrent development outlays). At current prices, the actual development outlays amounted to 204.6 billion rials, as against the final target of 230 billion, implying an 89 percent plan fulfillment. On the other hand, actual private investments turned-out to be significantly in excess of the planned magnitude--namely, 248.6 billion rials (at constant prices) as against 132 billion rials for the entire five-and-one-half years of the Third Plan. In other words, the private sector invested almost twice as much as originally expected. Taking investments of both sectors into account, total fixed investments at fixed prices amounted to 413.8 billion rials, compared to the original target of 290 billion. The over-fulfillment of the original target was almost exclusively due to developments in the p*rivate sector. Actual investments by both sectors also exceeded the final target; in this case, too, the over-fulfillment of the Plan was related to the performance of the private sector. The private sector actually accounted for about 60 percent of total fixed investments, as compared to about 45 percent envisaged in the Plan. We shall now make comparisons between the planned and actual developments in the public sector in more specific terms. Table 2 shows the actual and planned sectoral outlays for the whole plan period. Comparisons between the actual outlays and outlays planned under the final revised.

201

AUTUMN 1973

form of the Third Plan imply a high degree of fulfillment of the sectoral investment targets. The largest shortfall (41 percent) occurred in the case of the industrial sector. In terms of the sectoral distribution of development outlays, once again with the exception of a relatively large deviation in the case of the industry proper, the actual and planned distributions were in close agreement. It is not possible to make comparisons between the originally planned and actual outlays, since the former are at 1960 prices and the latter at current prices. In this can be compared. case, only the sectoral distributions Here, too, the largest deviation was related to the industrial sector. Industry proper absorbed 8.2 percent of total public development outlays, as against the originally planned share of 18.1 percent. On the other hand, the irrigation program absorbed a much larger share (46 percent) of the actual expenditures on agriculture and irrigation, as compared to the original intentions (28 percent). Transport and services absorbed almost the same shares as envisaged under the plan frame. We shall now take a closer look at the actual intrasectoral allocations (for the major sectors) and see to what extent they were in line with the original intentions. In agriculture, actual developments departed significantly from the situation in the plan frame. envisaged In the main, aside from the implementation of a major land reform program which had not been foreseen by the planners when the plan frame was being prepared, the deviations resulted from the type of irrigation projects actually implemented.44 These developments in effect a major shift in represented the agricultural As indicated, policy of the government. the irrigation program absorbed a much higher share (46 percent) of investments in agriculture and irrigation than the share (28 percent) in the plan frame. envisaged This situation was mainly due to the type of irrigation improjects plemented during the plan period. The Third Plan had emphasized small-scale irrigation projects (deep wells, qanat and small dams), as compared to the largeimprovements, scale multi-purpose stressed in the Second Plan. projects IRANIAN STUDIES

202

In practice, however, the emphasis was once again given to big capital-intensive As a result, projects. the construction of six new major dams began during the period under review. In addition, the completion of the unfinished dams of the Second Plan absorbed a much higher share of outlays on irrigation than originally expected. As a result of these developments, 80 percent of the actual investments in irrigation were absorbed by the large-scale systems. On the other hand, only about 4 percent of this sub-sector's investments were used for deep wells, qanats, and small dams. In sum, there was little connection between the actual and planned developments in agriculture and irrigation. Out of the actual development expenditures of 47.3 billion rials on agriculture and irrigation projects, almost 50 percent w a s absorbed by a drastically different type of irrigation program, while another 30 percent was related to the land reform programs.45 In industry, too, actual developments represented some major departures from the industrial policy of the Third Plan. The deviations occurred largely in the public sector, but due to the high level of investment activity in the private a relatively sector, high rate of growth was achieved in the industrial sector as a whole. The industrial policy of the Third Plan aimed at minimizing direct public investment in industry, while providing for every possible kind of assistance to the private sector. In addition, the industrial program of the Third Plan stressed the development of small- and medium-scale industries rather than heavy industries. These guidelines were based to a great extent on comparative advantage considerations.4 As a result, the public program for industry essentially of credit provisions consisted for the private sector. The private sector did, in fact, receive assistance, in various forms, from the government and responded favorably. However, contrary to the situation in envisaged the Plan, credit extension to the private sector did not constitute the main component of the public sector's industrial program. Out of total public development expend-

203

AUTUMN1973

to private itures of 17.1 billion rials, long-term credits absorbed 4.4 biland equity share participation investors while another 733 million or only 26 percent, lion rials, with technical was used in connection (4.2 percent) rials Furthermore, sector.47 given to the private assistance a establishing in 1965, the government started beginning and complex innumber of new, highly capital-intensive making, aluminum, machine-tool dustries, such as steel, These indusand petrochemicals. manufacturing, tractor made to the account for the bulk of the allocations tries sector in the Fourth Plan, and they also absorbindustrial outindustrial ed the major share of the public sector's the Third rials (or 56 percent),during lays, 9.6 billion Plan period.

In the transport sector the discrepancies between unlike those actual performance and original intentions, in agriculture and industry, were not related to drastic The basic reasons policy changes during the plan period. similar to those which occurred (espewere essentially with of costs) in connection the underestimation cially The problems were, once again, largely the Second Plan.48 absorbed Road construction to the road program. related secof the transport a much greater share (67 percent) origthan the share (48 percent) tor's total investments of despite the intentions In addition, intended. inally the plan frame, main roads, rather than feeder roads,

clearly

received

the major emphasis.49

In the field of education and manpower training, improvethe Third Plan, basically emphasized qualitative system, while the quaneducational ments in the country's titative expansion was supposed to take place only at the expanhowever, quantitative In practice, primary level. once again dominated the actual develsion at all levels The expansion of primary education absorbed 64 opments. as compared percent of total public outlays on education,

As a result,

with a planned share of 48 percent.50 respondingly

less

was spent

(in both absolute

terms) on secondary and tertiary crucial

manpower training

IRANIAN STUDIES

program. 204

levels

cor-

and relative

as well as on the

The target

for primary

education was to increase the number of pupils attending these schools by 681 thousand. The target was surpassed as the enrollment at the primary level increased by 1,181 thousand, of which 816 thousand were enrolled in regular primary schools while the remaining 365 thousand attended the so-called Education Corps classes.51 The Education Corps program essentially consists of sending high school graduates, who have been drafted for military service, to rural areas to spread literacy among children and adults. This program, which is an important component of the White Revolution, has been one of the most beneficial programs adopted by the government.52 At the secondary level, contrary to the development envisaged in the plan frame, once again quantitative expansion was stressed at the expense of qualitative improvements. Enrollment in the secondary schools reached 658 thousand, compared to the more modest target of 400 thousand. With respect to higher education, almost no quantitative expansion had been foreseen in the Third Plan. However, several new universities were established during the plan period. In conclusion, it remains to add thataside from the reasons cited above, to some significant extent the deviations between the actual and planned developments in most sectors were due to the new manner in which the Third Plan was implemented. Unlike its predecessors, the Third Plan was implemented by the regular ministries and government agencies. The results, of course, varied significantly, depending on the previous experience of the ministries.53

The Fourth Development Plan, 1968-1972 The Fourth Plan, covering the period March 1968 to March 1973, was Iran's second comprehensive development plan. In this concluding section we shall briefly describe and appraise the Fourth Plan.

205

AUTUMN 1973

Main Objectives overall

of the Fourth Plan

The Fourth Plan was formulated in terms of several These were (1) an increase in the objectives.54

the relaincreasing rate of economic growth by gradually of raising the productivity tive importance of industry, (2) of production; and using advanced techniques capital, of income; (3) a decrease in distribution a more equitable

the dependence on foreign countries and the diversification serof exports; and (4) improvements in administrative vices by the introduction of basic changes in the adminisof advanced managerial trative system and the extension orand public and private to all ministries techniques ganizations. the speaking, and quantitatively More specifically growth rate target. Fourth Plan was based on an overall real GNP at an average The target chosen was to increase of 57 or a total increase annual rate of about 9 percent, This target, plan period. during the five-year percent, implied a growth rate of 2.6 percent, with a population

per capita

GNPgrowth rate target

of about 6.4 percent per

annum.

The Fourth Plan also specified a number of secondary balobjectives regarding employment, income distribution, The ance of payments, and the general level of prices. objective of the Fourth Plan regarding employment was "the employment for the of maximum full-time productive creation will purpose of (1) absorbing those seeking employment...who unproconverting enter the labor market, and (2) gradually jobs into stable and productive ductive or low-productive

employment. "55

speaking,

Quantitatively

total

employment

was to rise from 6,932 thousand in 1967 to 7,898 thousand On the other hand, of 966 thousand. in 1972, or an increase to only 61 thouopen unemployment was expected to decline This implied a quasi sand by the end of the plan period.56 since as planned the rate of open policy, full-employment to about one percent of the unemployment would decline labor force.

IRANIANSTUDIES

206

In terms of the country's balance of payments, the Plan envisaged an overall cumulative surplus for the entire plan period. More specifically, the net current account would show a total deficit of about $880 million, while the capital account would have a total surplus of around $1,524 As a result, million. Iran's foreign exchange reserves were planned to increase by about $600 million over the five-year period of the Plan.57 The objective of relative price stability was treated rather inadequately. The Plan essentially stated that "by following sound financial, monetary and foreign exchange policies and controlling the supply of essential agricultural commodities...it is expected that relative price stability will be preserved."58 Finally, it can only be added that the objective of improved income distribution was also handled rather inadequately. For all intents and purposes, the "distribution" aspects of the Fourth Plan were overshadowed by the "growth" considerations. Size of the Fourth Plan The total size of the Fourth Plan was originally fixed at 810 billion rials. Of this total, 743 billion rials (92 percent) were to be financed domestically,while the remaining 67 billion rials (8 percent) would be financed by the net utilization of foreign resources.59 It is not exactly clear how the magnitude of the total fixed investment requirements of the Fourth Plan were estimated. The planners, however, felt that about 810 billion rials would be required to achieve the Plan's growth rate target. The total size of the Plan implied an incremental capital-output ratio of about 2.7:1. In order to realize the planned investments, the Fourth Plan specified that the average annual rate of increase of consumption expenditures by the public and private sectors should not exceed 10 percent and 7 percent, respectively, during the plan period. The size of the public sector program was fixed at 480 billion rials,60 or about 59 percent of total develop207

AUTUMN 1973

ment outlays, while the share of the private sector amounted to the remaining 330 billion rials (41 percent). The size of the public sector program was increased several times. Finally it was fixed at 555 billion rials, while nothing was said about the size of the private sector program. In this respect, the Fourth Plan, like its predecessor, proved to be rather "open-ended."

The Investment

Program

The public investment program was the main policy program specified in the Fourth Plan. Some details regarding private investments, especially in industry, were also specified. However, the Plan was by and large open-ended in terms of private investments and the policies required for calling forth the planned private responses. This, indeed, can be regarded as one of the main defects of devel-

opment planning in Iran.

Unlike the Third Plan, however,

the Fourth Plan did contain some statements regarding monetary, fiscal and other general economic policies of the government.61 As in the case of the Third Plan, the od of formulating the Fourth Plan was one of ror. The task of planning, which was broken number of stages, was undertaken entirely by of the Plan Organization. The process started

ing total

investment

requirements

essential methand ertrial down into a the economists by estimat-

on the basis

of the

overall growth rate target.62 The sectoral investment allocations were fixed on the basis of sectoral production targets. Five broad sectors of planning: agriculture, and services. electricity,

were distinguished for the purpose oil and gas, water and industry, Sectoral production targets

were fixed prior to determining

the sectoral

investment al-

locations. An attempt was also made to fill the sectoral investments with key investment programs; but the planners still faced the difficulty created by the shortage of an All in adequate number of concrete investment projects. IRANIAN STUDIES

208

all, for the same reasons mentioned in connection with the Third Plan, a high degree of optimality and internal consistency cannot be attributed to the Fourth Plan. The broad sectoral allocations of the Fourth Plan are shown in Table 3 and a more detailed picture of the public investment program is given in Table 4. The outof these tables is the high priority standing feature given to services, especially transport and communications, while agriculture received a very low emphasis in comparison with industry. Thus, unlike the Third Plan the sectoral allocations of the Fourth Plan implied an unbalanced growth strategy. In particular, the Plan emphasized investments in social overhead capital as against directly productive activities. Plan Implementation The implementation of the Fourth Plan was completed in March, 1973. In this section we shall appraise the Plan's results in terms of its overall objectives and then its investment program. The primary objective of the already, was an annual real rate of percent. The actual rate of growth cent, indicating an overfulfillment about 2 percentage units.

Fourth Plan, as noted growth in GNPof 9.4 amounted to 11.6 perof the target rate by

The planned and actual sectoral growth rates are shown in Table 5. With the exception of agriculture and construction, all the sectoral value added targets were either attained or surpassed. In terms of major industrial classifications, agriculture, with 3.9 percent per annum, had the lowest growth rate during the plan period. Oil and services had the highest rates. Indeed, the actual growth rate of the services sector was almost twice the planned rate; this was mainly contributed by government services. Industry proper grew at an average annual rate of almost 14 percent.

209

AUTUMN 1973

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In terms of final expenditure flows, as shown in Table 6, the main deviation between the planned and actual situation is related to the public consumption expenditures. Public consumption increased at almost 23 percent per anThis was the num, as against a planned rate of 10 percent. main reason that the actual rate of increase of total consumption expenditures surpassed the planned rate by 4.5 Gross domestic fixed capital formation percentage units. grew at an average rate of 13.4 percent. Public sector accounted for about two-thirds of the increase in total investments during the plan period. As a result of these developments, the share of the public sector in total investment outlays increased from 48 percent in 1967 to 57 percent in 1972. actual employConcerning the employment situation, ment increased by 1.2 million as against the target of 966 thousand. Agricultural employment actually declined by 202 thousand persons as against a planned increase of 226 thousand. On the other hand, industrial employment increased more than envisaged in the Fourth Plan, 737 thousand as against the planned figure of 417 thousand. Finally, employment in the services sector increased by 720 thousand persons, or 60 percent of the total increase in employment during the plan period.63 The objective of attaining relative price stability was not fully realized over the period under consideration. The GNPimplicit price deflator rose at an average annual rate of 4.3 percent during the Fourth Plan period, as compared to 0.6 percent for the Third Plan period. Between 1968 and 1970 the overall level of prices remained relatively stable, while in the final two years of the plan period prices increased at about 6 percent per annum. More specifically, the wholesale and the consumer price indices rose, respectively, by 7.1 and 5.5 percent in 1971 and by All in all, during the 5.5 and 6.3 percent in 1972.04 Fourth Plan period, the general price level was positively correlated with the overall shortage of supply, especially in agriculture and construction sectors, and the extent of the "imported inflation."

213

AUTUMN 1973

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In terms of the country's balance of foreign exchange, the Fourth Plan's forecasts were not realized. Although Iran's oil revenues increased much more rapidly than expected, especially in 1971 and 1972, nevertheless the cumulative surplus on the balance of foreign exchange for the entire five-year period was less than planned, about $277 million compared to $633 million. This was mainly because current payments increased more rapidly than envisaged, amounting to a cumulative total of $12,759 million as against $10,328 million, while $600 million in exports of petrochemicals

was not realized.65 In this final section we shall briefly discuss the of the investment fulfillment program embodied in the Fourth Plan. As noted already, total fixed investments were originally set at 810 billion rials (at 1965 prices), out of which the shares of the public and private sectors were to be 443.5 billion and 366.5 billion rials, respectively. Subsequently, the investment target for the public sector was raised, while nothing was said regarding the private sector. The target for the public sector was finally set at 554.5 billion rials (at current prices). Data on actual investments are given in Table 6. Total fixed investments amounted to about 789 billion rials (at 1959 prices) during the plan period as against the original target of 810 billion rials,implying a shortfall of 21 billion rials. The shortfall was entirely due to developments in the private sector. The public sector actually accounted for about 58 percent of total fixed investments as compared to 55 percent originally envisaged in the Fourth Plan. Table 7 gives more information on the planned and actual developments in the public sector. Comparisons between the actual and planned development outlays show a high degree of the total (91.4 percent) as well as the sectoral investment The largest targets. shortfall was related to agriculture. In terms of the sectoral distribution of development outlays, once again the actual and planned distributions agreed rather closely. 215

AUTUMN1973

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since the mid 1960s, Iran has been very successful, a high rate of economic growth. and sustaining in initiating Iran's development and planning problems are, therefore, from those faced by most developing different significantly other oil producing nations of the countries, including Iran has now reached the important trade-off Middle East. choices have to be made between the phase where delicate of of growth, on the one hand, and the quality quantity on the other; not to mention the ineconomic development, with the high growth of the flationary problems associated in are recognized Fortunately, the choices recent years. Iran's Fifth Development Plan, which has assigned high important programs yet vitally priorities to less tangible It is, health and agriculture. in areas such as education, benethat the socioeconomic indeed, through these fields fits of economic growth will come to be more equitably total population. shared by the bulk of the country's a high rate Whether or not Iran can succeed in maintaining price stability of growth while attaining also relative of national and improving the distribution income, however, remains to be seen.

NOTES 1.

United Nations, Public Finance Information Papers: Iran (New York: United Nations, 1951), pp. 7 and 21.

2.

Plan Organization, Review of the Second Seven Year Plan Program of Iran (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1960), p. 55.

3.

George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 12.

4.

Ibid., p. 106; and National Bank of Iran, The ThirtyYear History of the National Bank of Iran, 1307-37 (1928-58) (in Persian; Bank of Iran, Tehran: National 1959), p. 200.

5.

Between

1936 and 1939,

the cost

217

of living

index

rose

AUTUMN1973

by 43 percent. National Bank of Iran, Bulletin, Vol. 24, No. 172 (1956-57), p. 346. The major factors responsible for the inflationary pressures were the stagnation of agricultural production, restriction of consumer good imports, and the overall high level of public investments, particularly in transport and construction projects, which were partly financed through borrowing from the domestic banking system. Between 1941 and 1944, wholesale prices increased by more than 200 percent, and the cost of living index rose by about 300 percent. National Bank of Iran, The Thirty-Year History of the National Bank of Iran, p. 219.- The main fuel for the wartime inflation was provided by the military expenditures of the Allied forces in Iran. of all types At the same time, the unavailability of imported commodities as well as serious food shortages limited the aggregate supply of goods. Aside from successive crop failures during this period, the main reason for food shortages was the fact that not much was left after the requirements of the Allied forces were satisfied. Furthermore, the limited available supplies of food and other commodities could not be distributed within the country, since Iran's transport facilities were also monopolized for For a brief review military purposes by the Allies. of the main economic events of this period, see E. M. H. Lloyd, Food and Inflation in the Middle East, 194045 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), pp. 157-69; and H. Pirnia, A Short Survey of the Economic Conditions in Iran (Tehran: Economic Information Bureau, 1945), pp. 25-30. 6.

Including the Morrison-Knudsen International and the Overseas Consultants Incorporated.

7.

For more details on the limited results of the First Plan, see Plan Organization, Review of the Second Seven Year Plan, p. 5; and H. Motamen, "Development Planning in Iran," Middle East Economic Papers, Vol. 3 (1956), pp. 100-108.

.RANIANSTUDIES

218

Company

8.

Lessons See Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), of Experience (Baltimore: pp. 61ff; and Bent Hansen, "Planning and Economic Growth in the UAR (Egypt), 1960-65, " in P. J. Vatikiotis, ed., Egypt Since the Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 20.

9.

Henry J. Brutton, "Notes on Development in Iran," Economic Development

(July,

and Cultural

Change,

Vol.

9

1961), p. 633.

10.

Review of the Second Seven Year Plan Organization, Plan, pp. 3 and 14-15, and idem, Progress Report on Plan Tehran: the Second Seven Year Plan (in Persian; Organization, 1964), p. 10.

11.

P. Bjorn Olsen and P. N. Rasmussen, "An Attempt at State: Iran," in Everett E. Planning in a Traditional Hagen, ed., Planning Economic Development (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 226.

12.

For a brief discussion see of some of these conflicts, H. Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries (New York: Hutchinson and Co., 1964), pp. 167-68.

13.

There are different,

but essentially

equivalent,

methods of specifying the relative importance of the See Stephen A. Marglin, Public various objectives. Investment Criteria (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), pp. 23-26. 14.

Law of the Second Seven Year Development Plan of Iran (Tehran: Government of Iran, 1956), Article 1.

15.

On these important distinctions, see Jan Tinbergen and Hendricus C. Bos, Mathematical Models of Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 113-14.

16.

Law of the Second Seven Year Development Plan, Articles 1 and 2. 219

AUTUMN1973

Review of the Second Seven Year

17.

Plan Organization, Plan, pp. 6-7

18.

adopt a deAlthough the planners did not consciously the planned pattern of investments velopment strategy, via emimplied an unbalanced development strategy, This implied overhead capital. phasis on social in common with the however, had very little strategy,

in the sense-of

unbalanced growth strategy

Hirschman.

of, is based on the recognition strategy The latter of technoand the emphasis given to, the existence between linkages) (vertical logical complementarities As a stages of production. at different industries it favors a development policy that concenresult, where the linkon particular sectors strategic trates where the network of viz., are strongest, age effects The kind of deis thickest. relations input-output imbalance proposed by Hirschman is one that liberate by linkage effects, aims at maximizing the total It alinvestment projects. choosing the appropriate a sequence of expansion that so aims at determining making in the economy. will maximize induced decision from any consideration These issues did not receive the Iranian planners. In any event, it is interesting to note that, due to weak backward and forward Hirschman of the transport sector, linkage effects

himself

does not favor the strategy

of unbalanced

in transport faciligrowth via emphasis on investment of EconoSee Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy ties. Press, mic Development (New Haven: Yale University 1958), pp. 76-119. 19.

See Waterston,

20.

The Second Plan,

2o.

cit.,

pp.

as originally

61-63. intended,

been entirely

financed domestically

oil

no foreign

revenues;

borrowing

was to have

by the country's A

was envisaged.

scheme was formulated for dividing the oil revenues among the Plan Organization, the Ministry of Finance, and the National

this

Iranian

Oil Company.

arrangement, Plan Organization

IRANIAN STUDIES

220

According

to

would have received

rials from the a total of 88 billion ($1.2 billion) total oil revenues during the whole sevencountry's This compared rather favorably year period. with the rials 70 billion original cost estimate, ($933 million), of the investment program. But the actual development turned out to be quite different from the original intentions. As a result of rises in the ordinary of the government, the original expenditures scheme for the al'location of oil revenues was changed drason two occasions, both at the expense of the tically share going to the Plan Organization. In 1958, the Plan Organization's share was reduced from 80 to 60 percent for the remainder of the plan period. This lowered total oil revenues of the Plan Organization, for the whole seven-year period, to about 76.5 billion In March 19S9, the government once again rerials. duced the Plan's share, limiting it to 10 billion rials ($130 million) for 1338 (1959-60) and 55 percent of total oil revenues for the remaining two and onehalf years of the plan period. These two successive reductions meant that the Plan Organization's refrom oil revenues, for the seven-year ceipts period, would not exceed some 65.8 billion rials ($860 million); thus necessitating foreign borrowing by about 18 billion rials ($240 million) to finance the 84 rials program. billion However, the actual amount of foreign loans utilized by the Plan Organization during the entire seven-year period amounted to 25 rials billion (about $330 million). In sum, approximately one-third of the investments were foreign financed. Had the Plan Organization received 88 rials from oil revenues, billion as originally planned, no long-term foreign borrowing would have been required. But, during the plan period only about 50 instead of the originally percent, specified 70-80 of the oil revenues were used for financing percent, the Plan. On the other hand, about 40 percent of the country's total oil revenues during the plan period were used in financing the ordinary expenditures of the government--substantially more than the share, about 15 percent, originally intended for the Ministry of Finance. See Law of the Second Seven-Year Develop221

AUTUMN1973

Review of the 8, Plan Organization, ment Plan, Article Second Seven-Year Plan, annex 2; idem, Economic Report, 1962), p. 6; and Plan Organization, 1961 (Tehran: National Iranian Oil Company, Role of the Oil Industry Iranian Oil ComNational in Iran's Economy (Tehran: pany, 1967), Tables 2 and 6. 21.

Review of the Second Seven-year Plan Organization, Plan, pp. 34, 41-42, and annex I-3; idem, Progress RePlan, pp. 29-33 and port on the Second Seven-year Table 14; and idem, Third Plan Frame: Transport and 1961), Plan Organization, Communications (Tehran: p. 23.

22.

pp. 226-31; and See Olsen and Rasmussen, 2o. cit., J. Amuzegar "Iran's Economic Planning Once Again," Middle East Economic Papers, Vol. 4 (1957), pp. 1-11.

23.

and of these developments, discussion For a detailed see Farhad Daftary, "The causes, their underlying and the Problem of InflaBalance of Payments Deficit Vol. 5 Iranian Studies, tion in Iran, 1955-1962," (Winter 1972), pp. 2-24.

24.

Plan Organization, Plan, pp. 15-18.

25.

"Legal Decree on the Third Plan, passed by the Council of Ministers on September 6, 1962," Central Bank of Vol. 1 (November-December,1962). Iran, Bulletin,

26.

Plan Organization, Plan Organization,

27.

Olsen

28.

Outline of the Third Plan, pp. 37Plan Organization, 39; and N. Islam, "Methodology of Development PlanA Case Study of Iran," Pakistan Economic Journing: p. 2. nal, Vol. 12 (December,1962),

and Rasmussen,

IRANIAN STUDIES

Review of the Second Seven-year

Outline of the Third Plan 1961), pp. 35 and 40. op.

cit.,

222

(Tehran:

p. 237.

29.

George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran, p. 169.

30.

The role of these objectives, as guides to resource was stated by the planners as follows: allocation, "Where a choice must be made between two projects whose contributions to national income are approximately equal, the choice runs in favor of the one that offers more employment or a better pattern of income distribution." See Plan Organization, Outline of the Third Plan, p. 41.

31.

Ibid.,

pp. 40-41.

32.

Ibid.,

p. 45.

33.

In addition

to fixed

investment

expenditures,

the

supplementary Plan also made allowance for certain expenditures, and the sum of the two was defined as expenditures development outlays. The supplementary were allowed for at the rate of 20 percent of total fixed investments planned for each of the two sectors. Thus, the overall magnitude of the development ex-

penditures was raised 34.

originally envisaged under the Third Plan to 348 billion rials.

Jan Tinbergen has expounded his original stage method of planning in many places; for example, see his Vol. "Planning in Stages," Statsokonomist Tiddskrift, 76 (March, 1962), pp. 1-20; and idem, "Simple Devices for Development Planning," in E. A. G. Robinson, ed., Problems in Economic Development (New York: St. Martin's This model is sumPress, 1965), pp. 373-83. marized and appraised in Bent Hansen, Lectures in Part II, the Theory of Economic Economic Theory: 1967), Policy and Planning (Lund: Student Litteratur, pp. 106-9.

35.

See J. Tinbergen, Development Planning (New York: B. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), p. 75; and Hollis in Chenery, "Approaches to Development Planning,"

223

AUTIJMN 1973

E. A. G. Robinson, ed., ment, p. 391.

Problems in Economic Develop-

36.

For more details, see Farhad Daftary, Economic Development and Planning in Iran, 1955-1967 (Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley, 1971), University of California, pp. 433ff.

37.

the expenditures of the On the basis of reclassifying revised Second Plan, the "core" programs of the latter would account for only about 18 percent of the total. Plan Organization, Outline of the Third Plan, p. 66.

38.

allocations, For a discussion of the intra-sectoral see Daftary, Economic Development and Planning in Iran, pp. 441-55.

39.

The target rate of 4.1 percent was quite realistic, since the actual rate attained during 1950-59 had See Plan Organization, Outbeen about 3.3 percent. line of the Third Plan, p. 113.

40.

See, for example, William H. Bartsch, Problems of Employment Creation in Iran (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1970), pp. 29-30 and 56-57.

41.

pronounced for agriculShortages were particularly The imports of tural products of animal origin. these products increased from 974 million rials in 1963 to 1,883 million rials in 1967. Imports of grains also rose rapidly during the same period of time. See Plan Organization, Fourth National Development Plan, 1968-72 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1968), p. 19; and Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as at March 20, 1968, pp. 104-105.

42.

Actual investment figures are the estimates of the Central Bank of Iran as published in National Income of Iran, 1962-67 (in Persian; Tehran: Central Bank of Iran, 1969).

IRANIAN STUDIES

224

43.

44.

Actual developments proved to be quite different from the situation envisaged in the plan frame in that both revenues and current expenditures of the public sector increased at much higher rates. Such was particularly the case for the oil revenues, which during 1963-67 increased at an average rate of 18 percent as compared to 5 percent assumed in the plan frame. As a result, during the plan period oil revenues accounted for almost 50 percent of total public revenues, as against the forecast of 38 percent contained in the plan frame. Therefore, although non-development expenditures had also increased at a much higher rate (12 percent) than assumed initially (5 percent), actual public savings were larger than the relevant forecasts of the plan frame. It was due to these developments that the size of the public sector program was raised. During the Third Plan period about 67 percent of the country's oil revenues, amounting to 145 billion rials, were used in financing the public development program. Abstracting from the Plan Organization's non-development outlays, these oil revenues actually financed about 70 percent of the public development outlays. Thus, one-third of the country's oil revenues (not to mention almost all of the oil bonuses) was used in meeting the rising current expenditures of the government. See Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as at March 20, 1967, pp. 55-56, and 67; idem, Annual Report as at March 20, 1968, pp. 219-27; Plan Organization, Outline of the Third Plan, pp. 50-51 and 54-57; and idem, Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan (in Persian; Tehran: The Majlis Press, 1968), p. 22. See Plan Organization, Third Plan Frame: Agriculture (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1961); J. Price Gittinger,

Planning for Agricultural Development: The Experience of Iran (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1965); and idem, "Planning and Agricultural Policy in Iran - Program Effects and Indirect Effects," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 16 (October,1967), pp. 107-17.

225

AUTUMN1973

45.

Plan Organization, Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan, pp. 37 and 59-63; and Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as at March 20, 1968, p. 112.

46.

See D. Avramovic, "Industrialization of Iran: The Records, the Problems and the Prospects," Tahqiqat-e Egtesadi, Vol. 7 (Spring,,1970), pp. 14-46; and Plan Organization, Third Plan Frame: Industries and Mines (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1961).

47.

Plan Organization, Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan, p. 82.

48.

See Herman G. Van Der Tak and Jan de Weille, Reapof a Road Project in Iran (Washington, D.C.: praisal International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1969).

49.

All in all, some 3,800 kilometers of main roads were constructed or improved, including the completion of work on some 1,250 kilometers of the Second Plan's road program. This represented a 75 percent fulfillment of the Third Plan's target of 5,054 kilometers. Plan Organization, Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan, pp. 135-42 and 154-63.

50.

Plan Organization, Third Plan Frame: Education (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1961), p. 34; and idem,

Progress Report on the Third.National Plan, p. 187.

Development

51.

Plan Organization, Progress Report on the Third National Development Plan, p. 188.

52.

For further details, see Richard Blandy and Mahyar Neshat, "The Education Corps in Iran: A Survey of its Social and Economic Aspects," International Labor Review, Vol. 93 (May,1966), pp. 521-29.

53.

It should

also

IRANIAN STUDIES

be mentioned 226

here that

perhaps

the most

important development since 1955 in Iran's public finances (aside from the unprecedented importance acquired by the oil revenues) has been related to a major change in 1964, in the budgeting system of the country. In 1973, additional steps were taken towards improving Iran's budgetary system. For details, see Farhad Daftary,"Development Planning and Budgeting in Iran," in CENTOSeminar on Budget Administration (Ankara: Central Treaty Organization, 1973), pp. 221-32. 54.

Plan Organization, p. 39.

55.

Ibid.,

p. 48.

56.

Ibid.,

pp. 68-69.

57.

Ibid.,

pp. 53-59.

58.

Ibid.,

pp. 55-56.

59.

Ibid..,

p. 41.

60.

More specifically, the total planned public development outlays consisted of (1) 380.2 billion rials in fixed investments, (2) 64.9 billion rials in recurrent development outlays, and (3) 34.9 billion rials in the form of financial assistance, out of the Plan Organization's funds, for fixed investments by the private sector. On this basis, total planned fixed investments of the private sector would amount to about 366 billion rials. Ibid., pp. 60 and 63; and The Law of the Fourth National Development Plan (in Persian; Tehran: Imperial Government of Iran, 1968), pp. 3 and 17-18.

61.

Plan Organization, pp. 53-60.

62.

Initially

Fourth National

Fourth National

three different 227

Development Plan,

Development Plan,

growth targets

were conAUTUM 1973

sidered. See Julian Bharier, Economic Development Iran, 1900-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 99. 63.

Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report as at March 20, 1973, pp. 12-13 and 93-94.

64.

Ibid.,

65.

For further

p. 55.

Organization,

66.

in

details,

see ibid.,

Fourth National

pp. 168-70; and Plan Development

Plan,

p. 57.

On the basis of the estimates by the Central Bank of Iran, whereas in 1971-72 Iran's GNPgrew at the average annual rate of about 14 percent with 6 percent annual rise

in prices,in

1973 the real

growth rate

to almost 34 percent with a 13 percent rise general level of prices.

IRANIAN STUDIES

228

amounted

in the

THE KHWUSHNISHIN POPULATION OF IRAN ERIC J. HOOGLUND

social

Iranian villages generally contain two distinct classes: (1) peasants who cultivate land they own

and/or rent, and (2) landless who engage non-farmers in various commercial, service, and labor activities appropriate to an agricultural economy. Peasants generally employ one term to designate all landless villagers; the most widely used is "khwushnishin."l Although for peasants this term is useful, it poses some difficulty for the so-

cial scientist since khwushnishins do not comprise a homogeneous class,but rather are a collectivity of diverse occupational groups sharing in commononly a landless status. Included among the khwushnishins are as well est, as some of the poorest,

some of the wealthiof all villagers.

In

Eric Hooglund is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University and is employed by the Middle East Commission of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. An earlier version of this paper was presented in the SIS Population Panel of the MESAConvention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in November, 1973. The author wishes. to express his appreciation to John Anthony, Ali Banuazizi, Mary Hooglund, Thomas Ricks, and Dennis Williams for reading preliminary drafts of the paper and offering helpful suggestions for its revision. 229

AUTUMN1973

terms fy at paper their

of economic and social stratification, one can identiIn this least three separate groups of khwushnishins. I propose to describe these three groups and analyze unique roles in the villages.

fact about the khwushnishins is The most significant a significant proportion of total vilthat they constitute Although no complete occupational census lage population. of rural Iran has yet been undertaken, reliable surveys indicate that 40 to 50 percent of all inhabitants in villages In many of of under 5,000 population are khwushnishins.2 the larger villages (pop. over 1,000) the khwushnishin element tends to predominate, while in the smallest villages (pop. under 200) there may be few or no khwushnishins. and shopkeepers clerics, Blacksmiths, carpenters, religious are some of the typical khwushnishins; the overwhelming majority, however, are laborers who must depend upon seasonal jobs in agriculture in order to earn a living. A thorough study dealing with the composition, function, and position of the various groups of khwushnishin considerable has yet to appear.3 Nevertheless; villagers knowledge about the landless has been acquired during the past decade through the publication of several excellent These studies have revealed the wide invillage studies.4 of income and status existing among the khwushequalities nishins, and thus have demonstrated a need to subdivide However, no them into more socially meaningful strata. consensus appears to exist regarding a classification scheme. Currently, the tendency is to subdivide the khwushnishins into either two or three separate groups. Khusrou Khusrovi, an anthropologist who has done divides the extensive research in Iranian rural sociology, khwushnishins into two groups.5 The first group is the "rural bou'rgeoisie" and includes moneylenders, peddlers, and shopkeepers.6 The second group is the "rural proletariat" which comprises the majority of khwushnishins earning cash or kind remuneration for specific work and for anaThese terms clearly have some utility services. for One can identify, lyzing khwushnishin stratification. IRANIANSTUDIES

230

a group "rural bourgeoisie," i.e., example, a distinct and lending are buying, selling, whose primary activities Also, since the non-bourgeois elements of the for profit. landless population do not farm, are comprised of various preand live in relatively kinds of workers and artisans, carious economic circumstances, they may appropriately be However, lumping all the called a "rural proletariat." latter together tends to obscure some very significant among occupational groups social and economic differences included in the rural proletariat. among the In order to account for the differences non-bourgeois khwushnishins, it is necessary to classify them into at least two separate groups. This is exactly what Javad Safinejad, another leading scholar of rural system for classification Iran, does in his tripartite first group is the "murSafinejad's landless villagers.7 those "living in easy circumliterally, rafah al-hal," stances," and it corresponds to Khusrovi's rural bourgeoiHis second group consists of all the "indirect sharers sie. of the harvest," i.e., people who provide peasants with regular services for which payment is rendered,by mutual agreearound harvest time. The ment, at fixed intervals--usually third group is made up of wage earners, who are mostly seasonal agricultural laborers working for daily wages. In the course of my own field research, I found that as belongall khwushnishins can be conveniently classified I have relabeled three groups. ing to one of Safinejad's (2) (1) the rural bourgeoisie, these groups as follows: workers, and (3) the agricultural the non-agricultural I believe permits one to study laborers. This division, Howin Iran somewhat more easily. village stratification ever, it should be pointed out that neither peasants nor recognize the validity of this, khwushnishins necessarily or any other, classification system.8 The Rural Bourgeoisie About six percent of all khwushnishins are village In this category are itinerant peddlers, entrepreneurs.9 231

AUTUMN 1973

shopkeepers, merchants, wholesale dealers, moneylenders, grist mill owners, and rentiers of specialized services such as work oxen and agricultural machinery. As a group they control a major portion of rural capital and credit, and thus have an influence upon the whole production system. The largest number and greatest variety of these khwushnishins are found in those villages which serve as area market centers. In general, any village of at least fifty families contains one small store whose proprietor is also a primary creditor. A majority of the rural bourgeoisie are shopkeepers who operate the tiny one-room stores. Although their inventories include a wide variety of goods, the most important items are such essential commodities as tea, sugar, rice, and cotton cloth, none of which are locally produced in most villages. Near the towns trade is generally on a cash basis, but in more isolated areas shopkeepers still accept grain and other produce in exchange for their wares. Typically, goods are sold on credit; interest rates generally average 5 to 7 percent per month in villages of the Central Plateau, Azerbaijan, and Khurasan. Since most credit is extended for a nine-month period, the effective interest rate can be as high as 63 percent. Although such the general paucity of more reacharges are exorbitant, sonable credit sources and their own poverty compel villagers to accept these unfavorable terms. Shopkeepers, especially those in the larger villages, the also engage in the profitable business of salaf-kharl, advance purchase of unharvested crops.10 Negotiations usually take place in late winter when peasants have consumed To peasants who cannot all their food supplies. virtually obtain credit because of an already heavy debt burden, salaf-khars offer immediate cash in return for the promise of receiving a fixed measure of the crop when it is harAdvance crop sales average from 30 to 60 percent vested. less than the prices which normally prevail during the regular harvest season. benefit

of the rural bourgeoisie also Other representatives from their economic transactions with the peasants.

IRANIANSTUDIES

232

Most notable are those khwushnishins who monopolize the ownership of cattle, grist mills, and agricultural machinery. Since oxen, flour mills, and more recently tractors have important functions in the production process, men who are in a position to rent any of these services to the peasants usually earn considerable income from the fees charged. In larger villages these capitalists make good profits which are sometimes invested in short-term, high-interest loans to the peasants. These are primarily productive loans which the peasants must contract in order to finance the annually recurring costs of cultivation. The credit practices described above amount to an undeniable economic exploitation of the peasants. There are two main reasons why this situation exists. The first reason is the general poverty of the peasantry. Some 70 percent of all peasants farm less than five hectares (12.35 acres) of land annually.11 Except in those areas of the North where rainfall is abundant, five hectares is not sufficient to provide a peasant family with more than the barest subsistence livelihood in a country as arid as Iran. Thus, most peasants must obtain loans to meet their consumption deficits and to finance future production. Repayment, then, reduces the amount of the harvest available for personal consumption, forcing more borrowing to pay for basic necessities; indebtedness keeps accumulating, ensnaring peasants in a cycle that often lasts until death. The second reason is the near monopolistic control the rural bourgeoisie have over rural credit sources. Although the government has been encouraging the growth of rural cooperative societies, the lending capabilities of these associations are not yet sufficiently developed to offer any serious competition to traditional village creditors.12 As long as shopkeepers, moneylenders, and similar individuals realize that peasants have no alternative loan sources, they will continue to maximize their profits through high-interest, short-term credit policies.

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The Non-Agricultural

Workers

all villages of fifty or more families In virtually at least one individual earns a livelihood from essentialwork. The occupations found in rural ly non-agricultural bathareas are quite varied; commonexamples include: house attendant (hammami), barber (salmanl), blacksmith and (ahangar), coppersmith (mesgar), shoemaker (kaffash), The largest number and most representcarpenter (najjar). workers generally reof non-agricultural ative varieties side in those villages which serve as local market centers. According to a recent study, a maximumof seven percent of jobs.13 adult males are employed in non-agricultural workers fall into two categories: Non-agricultural (1) those who provide personal services to the peasants, which peasants and (2) those who produce various artifacts Individuals who render services to use in everyday life. are generally considered to rank low in other villagers Their low status jobs provide only the barest status.14 opportunity of subsistence-level incomes and offer little for mobility. As a consequence, younger men in these lines of work prefer to migrate into urban areas where opportunities are more promising. Unlike barbers and bath-house attendants, the khwushnishins who manufacture various goods do not suffer any social stigma because of their work. Indeed, individual craftsmen who have acquired a reputation for skill often Traditionally, village artisans enjoy local prestige. all the non-food products utilized by the made virtually earthenware, shoes, clothing, copper utensils, peasants: tools. However, cutlery, wooden furniture, and agricultural of inexpensive, factorysince World War II the varieties made goods available in the villages have increased conThese products not only compete with, but ofsiderably. This developten undersell, their hand-made counterparts. ment has adversely affected rural craftsmen throughout Iran. The fate of the village blacksmiths is illustrative of what is happening to most rural artisans. Traditionally

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blacksmiths made the iron shoes for horses and work oxen as well as all metal implements utilized in agriculture. Mechanization, which has been gradually extending into the is eliminating countryside, the need for all his services. The bicycle, which represents a relatively ininexpensive vestment and is economical to maintain, has largely replaced the horse as a dominant mode of intraand intervillage travel in many villages. The use of oxen for plowing, however, is still relatively widespread since the cost of tractors and other machines is often prohibitive for the average peasant. Thus, blacksmiths continue to provide oxen shoes, plowshares, and the metal parts used to yoke the animals into teams. But, in some cases, men village are investing in tractors, plows, and combines, and renting out their machines at fees which are competitive with animal and human power. Thus, the use of oxen for agricultural labor is gradually declining, and likewise the need for blacksmiths to make them work-worthy. Blacksmiths are also losing their function as manufacturers of various metal agricultural implements. Many of the tools used in farming are now mass-produced in towns and sold in the local bazaars; often they cost less than the price of unfinished iron out of which a blacksmith fashions similar tools. It is above all this inability to compete with cheap factory-made goods which blacksmiths share with all other rural craftsmen. Shoemakers, coppersmiths, even carpenters find it increasingly difficult to earn a livelihood from their trades. The artisans most seriously affected are those working in villages located in relatively close proximity to large towns and cities. In more isolated villages the traditional craftsmen tend to be somewhat insulated from many of the technical changes in the country as a whole. occurring However, examples of urban consumer goods are found even in the most remote villages. When it is no longer possible to earn a satisfactory in a particular living village, craftsmen, those especially who are young and have families to support, migrate to the towns. Since they have some skills, craftsmen have an

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easier time finding work than does the typical villager. Carpenters and shoemakers are sometimes fortunate enough Blacksmiths, on to obtain jobs suiting their own skills. the other hand, are even less needed in the cities than some find work in construction they are in the villages; or factories. The Agricultural

Laborers

workers and the rural bourgeoiThe non-agricultural sie discussed above are similar in the sense that both The groups have definite occupations within villages. overwhelming majority (more than 80 percent) of khwushnishins, however, do not have any regular work. These are With their families they number laborers. the agricultural more than six million, or fully one-third of Iran's total Since they do not own land, do not have rural population. fixed jobs, and must earn their living through seasonal work, these laborers barely exist at a subagricultural the poorest of all villagers. sistence level and constitute laborers must depend upon whatever seaAgricultural sonal and/or casual jobs are made available by peasants and landowners. The peak work season extends non-cultivating from about mid-May through mid-September in most of the During this period there are numerous and varied country. which require intensive tasks associated with cultivation For example, peasant families who farm at labor inputs. least two hectares (5.9 acres) need help with the weeding Those few prosperous peasants and harvesting of crops. who cultivate at least eight hectares (19.8 acres) not only need to employ additional help, but also often consider to pay laborers to do most, or even all, of it prestigious their field work. Despite the division and redistribution non-farming absentee owners still of many large estates, control considerable tracts of land and customarily hire laborers on daily or monthly bases to cultiagricultural vate under the supervision of salaried bailiffs. Within any given area work conditions and wage rates regardless whether a laborer is employed by a vary little IRANIANSTUDIES

236

Working small peasant owner or a large absentee landlord. hours are usually long, lasting from dawn to sunset with a two-hour lunch and rest break at noontime. For such a day an experienced man earns between 60 to 90 rials ($.80 to $1.18); women and children receive from one-half to twoit is also custothirds this amount.15 In some villages mary for employers to provide lunch for their workers. A laborer who is able to work every day during the season can earn between $80 and four-month agricultural $120. If he is married and his wife and children also work, another $50 to $100 can be added to the family income. need for khwushnishin workSince there is generally little ers in the other months of the year, $150 to $220 represents the total annual wages of most khwushnishin families. Taking the average family size as five (according to the 1966 National Census), this amounts to a per capita income of $30 to $45. When one considers that the 1973 per capita income for the country as a whole was about $500, the poverty of this rural group becomes more striking. laborers often exist below what would Agricultural They sustain normally be considered subsistence levels. themselves through charity, casual jobs, and work outside of northern Iran where rural In villages the villages. living conditions are generally superior to the rest of the country, many khwushnishins own one or two sheep, providing a net income of about $10 to $15 per animal in adMen dition to the milk products consumed by the family. near towns or road construction sites who live in villages generally apply for whatever temporary, unskilled jobs become available from time to time. Although the main source of employment remains to for khwushnishin work, actual opportunities be agricultural laborers have been declining since the Land Reform Program which began in 1962. Two factors have contributed to this (1) the small size of peasant holdings, and development: Although seven hectares (2) the increasing mechanization. (17.3 acres) is considered the minimumamount of land a peasant family must farm in order to maintain an adequate

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living standard, 70 percent actually obtained less than five hectares of annually cultivated land as a result of Peasants subsist off such small areas redistribution.16 by limiting production costs and finding additional sources of income. Thus, they not only have to work hard in order laborers, but they also comto avoid hiring agricultural pete with the khwushnishins for the work which is available undistributed estates that employ villagers. on the still However, these jobs are diminishing as more and more large It is significant landowners mechanize their production. that land worked by tractors and combines requires less than one-half the manpower needed prior to the introduction of machines.17 The competition between peasants and agricultural Allaborers has at times led to rivalry and hostility.18 is basically economic, it of interests though the conflict For example, dimensions. is acquiring social and political laborers from memberpeasants usually exclude agricultural ship on the elected village councils and rural tribunals. between peasants social relationships In larger villages, and laborers are discouraged; marriages between peasant daughters and the sons of landless khwushnishins, for exAgricultural laborers ample, are very rare occurrences. They resent their inferior position in village society. feel their only hope for improving their lot lies in the of land. In numerous interviews in different acquisition areas of the country many said that they were waiting for the break-up and rethe completion of Land Reform, i.e., distribution to the khwushnishins of the several hundred large estates on which most of them presently find work.19 Since there is currently no policy to expand the Land Rethe hopes form Program to include the landless villagers, of the agricultural laborers do not seem to be realistic. Since land reform has brought no expansion of econoworkers, agricultural for the traditional mic opportunities many khwushnishins seek to improve their lot through seaDuring the past ten years, sonal or permanent migration. to more khwushnishins have migrated in two directions: Rural migraprosperous rural areas, and to urban centers. IRANIANSTUDIES

238

common. Typically, unemtion has always been relatively ployed khwushnishins travel around the countryside at harvest time in search of work in those villages with insufficient manpower. Although this migration is seasonal, agricultural laborers do undertake permanent moves. The most dramatic examples occurred during the 1960s, when several thousands of khwushnishins left their villages in Baluchistan, Sistan, and southern Khurasan to settle in the more fertile plains of the Dasht-i Gurgan.20 In some districts villages lost up to one-half of their total popula-. tion through emigration.21 Migration of agricultural laborers from one village to another still seems to be more prevalent than their migration to urban areas.22 On possible reason is the familiarity, and perhaps even preference, for village life and agricultural work. However, a far more important reason must be the lack of employment opportunities in the towns which serve as the primary market centers for the majority A typical example is Marand, a small town of of villages. 2S,000 which serves as the primary commercial and administrative center for a district of nearly 200 villages to the northwest of Tabriz in East Azerbaijan. With the exception of a few small-scale artisans' workshops, there is no industry in the town. Villagers who migrate to Marand can only find temporary jobs, often as unskilled construction workers. Since possibilities are so limited, most agricultural laborers do not consider migration to Marand (and similar towns) to be a promising way of improving their circumstances. 23 Khwushnishin laborers would usually migrate to towns where they believe there is chance for finding work. The experience of the few towns in which factories have been established in recent years illustrates the attraction of employment opportunities. For example, Mianduab in West Azerbaijan and Turbat-i Jam in Khurasan are both relatively small towns (15,000 to 20,000) which have grown considerably since sugar beet processing mills began operations. Landless villagers have migrated to these towns, lured by the hope of permanent work in the factories or in the 239

AUTUMN 1973

rapidly expanding service sector. However, in both towns the number of khwushnishin immigrants far exceeds the numA majority reber of jobs which are presently available. main without steady work, while the presence of a large unemployed and underemployed labor force serves to keep wages low for those who do find jobs.24 If the few towns with factories draw khwushnishin all job seekers, the ten largest cities in which virtually Iranian industrialization is concentrated are even more alluring to villagers frustrated by the lack of opportuniIn this respect, Tehran more than any ties in rural areas. other place acts as a magnet attracting all those who dream of escaping poverty. Immigration rates are very high (around three percent per year), resulting in heavy competition for every available job. Unlike village artisans, the typical agricultural laborer brings no useful skills to the city; also, he is usually illiterate. Thus, if he is able to find steady, unskilled work he is extremely fortunate. The majority of khwushnishins are not lucky and must eke out a day-to-day existence from temporary jobs in construction or from casual labor service. A majority of former agricultural workers not only fail to find adequate employment in Tehran, but they often live in worse conditions than those prevailing in the villages. Thousands of rural immigrants are crowded into squatter settlements in the southern and eastern sections of the city. Living quarters frequently consist of small, one-room mud huts which may be shared by more than one family. Sanitary conditions are far below even the most minimal standards; usual urban services such as piped water, At garbage collection, and electricity are non-existent. any given time many lack even these squalid dwellings for a home and must sleep on the sidewalks or in the city's Khwushnishin laborers encounter similar problems parks.25 in Isfahan, Mashhed, Tabriz, and smaller cities, although perhaps on a smaller scale.

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Conclusion Our discussion

has attempted to demonstrate that the

is not really a homogenous social khwushnishin population groups. but composed of three distinct or economic class, the condition of the rural bourgeoisie, With the exception seems to have worsened since the Land of the khwushnishins The overwhelming majoriReform Program of the early 1960s. The ty live in poverty or confront economic insecurity. of rural Iran does structure present economic and social The to improve their lives. not offer them an opportunity and the landless between the peasants existing disparities into class differences. are being consolidated khwushnishins and how real progress to foresee it is difficult Presently without some program in the villages is possible prosperity of of the condition which would encourage the amelioration

the majority

Migration to the cities

of khwushnishins.

is

are not sufficientsince the cities solution not a feasible to close to offer employment opportunities ly industrialized stricken khwushnishins. to six million

NOTES 1.

means "he who The term khwushnishin, which literally sits comfortably" is commonthroughout the Central Plateau. Different terms are used to designate landless villagers in other areas; for example, aftabnishin in much of Khurasan, karaneshin in parts of Kurdistan, and gharibah in some Azerbaijan districts. For the sake of consistency khwushnishin has become the generally accepted term in scholarly research and publications.

2.

A 1960 government survey of some 1800 villages in all parts of the country found that khwushnishins comprised an average 45 percent of all inhabitants. Since 1960 subsequent government surveys and several University of Tehran sponsored research projects have found similar patterns in a sample of several hundred villages. See Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Census of

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1339; Sample Survey of 14 Areas (Tehran, 1340/1961-62); Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Barrisiha-yi Masa'il-i Nirui-yi Insani, Vol. III (Tehran, 1344/196566), pp. 2343-2438; and Plan Organization, Mushkilat dar Rustaha-yi Iran (Tehran, 1350/1971-72). 3.

This situation should be remedied soon. The Iranian government has become concerned about the condition of landless.villagers and in 1973 extended to the University of Tehran's School of Social Sciences a research grant for an intensive study project on the This project is being conkhwushnishin population. ducted by the Rural Studies Group, a research department whose previous publications have made significant to knowledge about social and economic contributions aspects of Iranian villages.

4.

Two excellent monographs which discuss the khwushnishin problem are: Javad 5afinezhad, Talib&bad (Tehran, University of Tehran Press, 1345/1966-67); and Ismacil CAjami and Muhammad Muhajer-Yazdani, Bihabad (Tehran, University of Tehran Press, 1346/1967-68).

5.

See, for example, his article "La stratification social rurale en Iran," in Etudes rurales, No. 22-23-24 (Juli-dec., 1966), pp. 243-247; and his recent book, Jamicah-shinasi Riista'i Iran (Tehran, University of Tehran Press, 1351/1972-73), pp. 130-136.

6.

In Jamicah-shin&si, Khusrovi uses the term "Sudagaran" (the profit workers) instead of the "rural bourgeoisie" which he has used consistently in his articles in French and Persian scholarly journals.

7.

is implicit in his recent Safinezhad's classification study of the organization of production in village society, Bunih (Tehran, University of Tehran, 1351/ 1972-73). He outlined his views more fully in several discussions in Tehran during 1972. I am very grateful for a complete exposition of the three khwushnishin groups provided in a personal communication of February 12, 1974.

IRANIAN STUDIES

242

8.

Peasants, of course, consider all khwushnishins as one group separate from themselves. However, whenever I asked peasants how many kinds of khwushnishins there were, the inevitable response would be "two": the rich ones and the poor ones. In conversations in which I would inquire about the appropriateness of dividing the poor khwushnishins into two categories of agricultural and non-agricultural workers, about one-third of all peasants interviewed would agree that this was valid; one-fifth would be stimulated to subdivide this group into three or more types; and roughly one-half would insist there was no reason to divide them. Interestingly, the khwushnishins, themselves, do not identify with a broad landless group. Indeed, there is an intense dislike of being in any way equated with those considered to be inferiors; shopkeepers, for example, generally feel superior to all others, while carpenters tend to look down upon barbers and laborers. Virtually all khwushnishins whom I have interviewed identify themselves along occupational lines and would divide non-farming villagers according to their jobs.

9.

This is the estimate of the Rural Studies Group researchers based upon preliminary data obtained during a 1973 survey. See Note 3 above.

10.

For a detailed discussion of salaf-khars and the practice of salaf-kharT, see Khusrou Khusrovi, "La reform agrarire et l'apparition d'une nouvelle classe en Iran," Etudes rurales, 34 (1969), pp. 122-126.

11.

Plan Organization, Mushkilat dar Rustaha-yi (Tehran, 1350/1971-72), p. 5.

12.

For information on the problems of the rural cooperatives, see University of Tehran, Shirkath_-yi Tacavuni Rustd'f dar Shish Manja_ah (Tehran, n.d.), pp. 95-100; 140-148; 189-191; 202-204.

13.

See Note 9 above.

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Iran

AUTUMN1973

14.

For a discussion of peasant judgments regarding social status see, R. C. Alberts, Social Structure and Cultural Change in an Iranian Village (Madison: University of Wisconsin Ph.D. Dissertation, 1963), pp. 727797.

15.

These were the prevailing wages when I conducted field research in 1971-72; generally, the lowest wages were found in the south and southeast and the highest ones in the north and northwest. The pre-1973 exchange rate of 76.25 rials to one $US is used in this paper; the rial has been revalued by about 9 percent since 1973.

16.

For a fuller discussion see Chapter III, "The Transfer of Tenure," in my Ph.D. dissertation, The Social and Economic Consequences of Land Reform in Iran (Washington: Johns Hopkins University, 1974).

17.

Interviews with large landowners in the Varamin area of Tehran, Summer, 1972.

18.

of Iran See further James A. Bill, The Politics (Columbus: Charles Merril, 1972), p. 46

19.

In interviews which I conducted in 1971-72,khwushnishin laborers gave two consistent responses when queried about their own evaluation of their future: either (1) they would find some work in a nearby town, Tehran or some other city; or (2) they would obtain land through government aid.

20.

See Shoko Okazaki, The Development of Large-scale Farming in Iran: The Case of the Province of Gurgan of Asian Economic Affairs, (Tokyo: The Institute 1968), pp. 18-21.

21.

Arzi Narraghi, ed., Barrisi-yi Natayij-i I?la,ht-i dar Shish Mantagah (Tehran: University of Tehran, n.d.), pp. 19-24.

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244

22.

Ibid.

23.

See Further, "A Study of the Rural Economic Problems of East and West Azerbaijan," Ta_bqlhat-e Eqtesadi, Vol. 5 (January, 1968), pp. 165-180.

24.

On Mianduab see ibid., pp. 181-195 passim; on Turbat-i Jam see Andre Singer, "Social Organization Among the Timuri of Khurasan." Paper presented at the British of Persian Studies, Tehran, 12 June,1972. Institute

25.

Although the University of Tehran has been doing research in the slums and squatter settlements of the capital since 1972, no scholarly publications can ever capture the essence of life in these areas the way it has been recorded in the realistic sociological stories of the late Samad Behrangi; especially recommended is his novella about the life and dreams of a young khwushnishin boy, Bist-u-chahar Sacat dar Khwab-u Bidari (Tabriz, 1348/1969-70).

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BOOK REVIEWS Biography. Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani," A Political University By Nikki R. Keddie. Berkeley and Los Angeles: of California Press, 1972. 496pp. $20.00 HAMID ENAYAT

Professor Keddie's new book on the life and works of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din is undoubtedly the most comprehensive study that has so far been carried out on this outstanding figure of the Muslim world in the nineteenth in various languages The amount of literature century. on the Sayyid's biography now surpasses, perhaps, that on leader of contemand religious any other Muslim political And yet a good deal of the mystery surporary history. stubbornly refuses to be still rounding his personality Professor Keddie's book, by furnishing us with unravelled. ample data about Jamal ad-Din's life throws its more obscure aspects into greater relief. placchronological, The author's method is strictly ing the main stress on the sequence and details of events, and doctrinal with only occasional reference to ideological analysis of their background. issues, or to sociological

Hamid Enayat is Professor and Chairman of the Department Science, University of Tehran. of Political

IRANIANSTUDIES

246

With unrelenting care and patience, she traces Jamal adfrom their recondite beginnings in Iran Din's activities (1838-1866), through his adventures in Afghanistan (186668), Instanbul (1869-71), Egypt (1871-79), India (1879-82), Paris (1883-84), London (1885-86), Iran, Russia and again Iran (1886-92), to his final years in Baghdad, Basra, London and Istanbul (1892-97). However indispensable this method of study may be for meeting the demands of straightforward, chronological history, for thoseinterested in the study of ideas, it is less helpful inasmuch as it often ignores the dialectics of the process of thought, and imposes upon it a structure necessitated by chronological seriality. Its greatest disadvantage in a biographical study is its failure to offer a comprehensive account of the mental life of the individual under study. Thus there is abundant data about Jamal ad-Din's intellectual development scattered throughout Professor Keddie's book, but it often remains unintegrated. This results, occasionally, in repetitiveness, but rarely in an overall critical assessment. For instance, we are told on numerous pages that Jamal ad-Din's conception of religion was instrumental, and, always subordinated to political considerations (pp. 95, 112, 126, 140, 180, 195, etc.). This naturally raises the question of Jamal adDin's religious sincerity (a question that Professor Elie Kedourie has discussed in his controversial study, Afghani and Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam, London, 1966). It also brings us up against the problem of the relationship between Jamal ad-Din's ideas and Islamic modernism in general. Given the structure of the book, the only section in which the reader would expect such problems to be discussed at length is the Conclusion, but this is disappointingly short (pp. 42123) and fails to synthesize the author's scattered remarks. There are, of course, sections in the book which partially discuss these issues, such as those on the "Refutation of the Materialists" (pp. 171-81), and the "Answer to Renan" (pp. 189-99), the former justifying the Sayyid's atypical, traditionalist criticism of the modernists in India, and the latter justifying his modernist criticism of the tra-

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AUTUMN 1973

in Paris. But these give the impression ditionalists of being related to isolated cases. It would have been better to integrate the essential arguments of such sections into a separate, final chapter on the presumed or real inconin Jamal ad-DIn's religious ideas. sistencies However, as has been mentioned before, Professor Keddie is less concerned with the genesis and development of Jamal ad-Din's thought than with the biographical facts about him. The most notable among these is the problem of Jamal ad-Din's nationality. Besides devoting Chapter Two

(pp. 10-36) and Appendix 1 (pp. 428-33) to an elaboration of the proofs of the Iranian origin of the Sayyid, the author uses every opportunity in the book to emphasize these proofs. In fact, the whole book may be said to be in a way a vindication of the claim about the Sayyid's Iranian origin. It can now be said that with the publication of this book, which rounds up the impressive array of evidence previously produced by the Documents inedits concernant Seyyed Jamal al-Din AfghAni (Tehran, 1963), and Homa Pakdaman's Djamal ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afgh_ni (Paris, 1969), the case for the Sayyid's Iranian origin has become almost unassailable. In Professor Keddie's presentation, evidence for the birth and early education of Jamal ad-Din in Iran can be divided roughly into two accounts and correspondence categories: first, personal

whether by Jamal ad-Din himself

or his relatives

and ac-

in Iran quaintances, attesting to his birth and activities from 1833 until 1866 when he presumably made his first apcarpearance in Afghanistan. Second, the investigations to ried out by Western diplomats, especially the British, ascertain his nationality. As regards the opposite claim of an Afghan origin, the evidence produced so far by its of Jamal ad-Din's own proexponents consists exclusively nouncements which have served as the basis of the 'standard' biographies by Jurjl Zaidan and MuhammadCAbduh. Professor Keddie dismisses these pronouncements as 'untruths' (p. 8) motivated by Jamal ad-Din's "desire to present himself to the Muslim world as a Sunni rather than a Shici, as the Sunnis formed the majority of Muslims outside Iran" (p. 428). IRANIAN STUDIES

248

All this sounds plausible, but there is at least one episode in Jamal ad-Din's life which cannot be explained if one assumes him to be an Iranian. This is his sudden involvement in Afghan politics after his alleged immediately first appearance in Afghanistan in 1866. How was it possible for a young man in his early twenties, with no prior in politics, to achieve immediate prominence in experience the highest political circles of an alien country? Professor Keddie's answer to this question somewhat taxes her readers' credulity. According to her, the available documents indicate that "the British at that time were concerned about the sudden appearance in the high counsels of the then Amir of Afghanistan, Aczam Khan, of a foreign Sayyid, who was advising the Amir to follow an anti-British course" (p. 40). Jamal ad-Din appears in these documents "as a purely political agent possibly having ties to Russia or

at least carrying papers from someone outside Afghanistan. Presumably it was these papers and/or arguments by Jamal ad-Din which convinced the Amir to take this young foreign almost immediately into his highest counsels..." (p. 47). But perhaps realizing that these explanations are not enough, Professor Keddie introduces another argument further on: "His sudden influence with Aczam Khan may be explained by the papers he is reported to have brought with him, and/or by the extraordinary personal magnetism and mental ability that continued throughout his life to gain him access to men of power and intelligence" [emphasis added] (p. 52). Once Jamal ad-Din's personal magnetism is invoked, the solution of many riddles in his life becomes, of course, considerably easier. But this style of riddle-solving is at variance with Professor Keddie's otherwise vigorous method of sifting data, and admitting only the most concrete and well-documented facts as the basis of her judgments. Taken in itself, the controversy about Jamal adDin's nationality sounds at times to be trivial, especially when it becomes embroiled in the prejudices of Iranian or Afghan nationalism (during a visit to Afghanistan two years ago I was surprised to find that resentment at the claim about Jamal ad-Din's Iranian origin is a recurrent theme

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AUTUMN1973

in the complaints Iranians).

of even socialist-minded

Afghans against

But Professor Keddie tries to diminish the impression of triviality by reminding us that the controversy is important because the nationality question is tied to the question of Jamal ad-Din's orthodoxy. Throughout his life there were incidents which were interpreted to be an indieven of his cation-of his unorthodoxy, and occasionally irreligion, "which his Muslim followers have been at pains to explain away" (p. 2). If it were proved that Jamal adDin was born and educated in Iran, this would, in the author's view, account for his religious unorthodoxy. That is why, in addition to biographical evidence referred to before, Professor Keddie also draws our attention to a number.of features in Jamal ad-Din's religious outlook which reflect traditional Iranian and Shi'ite influence, such as his philosophical frame of mind, his considerable knowledge of Sufism, his advocacy of ijtihad, his practice of taqiyyah, and his interest in Shaykhism and Babism (pp. 18-22, 86, 163, 393). Two points must be made here: first, if by Jamal ad-Din's unorthodoxy is meant his non-Sunni views, Professor Keddie's explanation is valid. But since some instances of his unorthodoxy have been interpreted as sheer irreligion (such as his Answer to Renan), the question of his nationality becomes irrelevant to the nature of his religious thought. Any Muslim from any nationality is of becoming a heretic or an atheist, equally susceptible unless it is assumed that Iran is a more fertile breeding ground than any other Muslim country for heresy and atheism. This assumption seems to be indeed held by the author, as can be inferred from some of her remarks in the book, the following reminiscence being one of them: "The late Sayyid Hassan Taqizadeh told me in 1960, perhaps ironically, that he sometimes doubted Jamal adDin was an Iranian because he [Jamal ad-Din] was apparently a believing Muslim, and he [Taqizadeh] had never known an Iranian with modernized ideas who was a real believer IRANIANSTUDIES

250

in Islam." She then adds: "Afghani's actual religious beliefs tend to argue for rather than against an Iranian origin" (Footnote 7, p. 428). (See also pp. 18-22 which lead to the conclusion on p. 22 that the Sayyid's early education in Iran meant that he grew up in an environment where doctrinal innovations were more in the air in the religious circles than they were in most of the Sunni world.) Assuming this to be true, the question then arises as to why in nineteenth-century Iran there were so few people adhering to a religio-political outlook similar to that of Jamal ad-Din? Was Jamal ad-Din's unorthodoxy due to his upbringing in Iran, or to the impact of Western culture as filtered through his own mental characteristics? Secondly, just as there are elements in Jamal adDin's thought which reflect shi'ite influences, one could also point to elements which denote Sunni indoctrination. Chief among these are his catholic and irenic conception of Islam, which at least in the nineteenth century was more likely to develop within a Sunni rather than Shi'ite environment, his salafi tendencies which have endeared him to such fundamentalist groups as the Muslim Brothers (p. 2), and were perhaps responsible for causing him to be once accused of Wahhabism (p. 53), and his republicanism (p. 108) which is more adjustable to the Sunni political theory and institution of baycah and cahd than to the Shi'ite notion of a divinely-designated imamah. It is perhaps in deference to such considerations that Professor Keddie, after summarizing her arguments in support of the Sayyid's Iranian origin, admits that "none of this indicates that Afghani as an adult regarded himself as a Shi'i" (p. 433). But her reasoning would have been more convincing to the skeptic had she answered more fully and explicitly the case against her thesis. All this brings us to a more general question about Jamal ad-Din: what was it in his character and conduct that gained him such almost unparalleled influence among the Muslim elite? Professor Keddie answers this question in the second chapter of her book which concerns the most

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fruitful period of the Sayyid's life, that is, his stay in Egypt from 1871 to 1879. She recognizes four reasons for First is his already-mentioned Jamal ad-Din's popularity. magnetism and charisma which, as the author points out, more content of his teachings, assured him than the intellectual (p. 85). of an extraordinary influence among his disciples Second was his attachment to the ideas and methods of the which enabled him to "point a path Islamic philosophers, of Islam-science and fresh interpretation to rationalism, a path indigenous to the Islamic world and not involving a wholehearted acceptance of the superiority of the aggressive and threatening foreigner" (p. 86). Third was his British encroachments hatred for Western and particularly in Muslim lands "which coincided with a growing mood in the Fourth was his lively and original diMiddle East"(p. 87). dactic methods which consisted in replacing "rote repetition of the texts, and and memorization" with new interpretation encouraging his students to do the same. Coupled with this was his belief in the existence of different levels of meanwhich enabled him to talk in difing and interpretation ferent terms to different audiences (p. 91). Thus it was that his disciples included such divergent figures as the Islamic reformist cAbduh, the Jewish Sanuca, the Christian Ishaq, and the atheist Shumayyil. Of these qualities, Jamal ad-Din's charisma and antiimperialism might be considered to be the ever-present reaBut sons for his popularity in almost all Muslim lands. his philosophical and scientific leanings proved on several occasions to be a severe drawback, as was shown in his clash with the traditionalists in Turkey, and in his Indian posture experience when he had to adopt an anti-scientific to combat the pro-British influence of Sir Sayyid Akmad in the later Khan. In Iran his preoccupation with politics periods of his life did not leave him much opportunity to as a modernizing teacher. display "his excellences" In addition to these acknowledged, positive qualities of Jamal ad-Din as a religious leader, there and political are also highly unfavorable accounts about his personality. quotes Professor Keddie as an honest biographer dutifully IRANIANSTUDIES

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these but does not care to comment upon them. The most damaging one is the claim about his superficiality. At least three statements are cited in the book to this effect: one by the correspondent of the London Times in Cairo indicating that "there was certainly no originality in his views...his views were crude and general," but adding that he had certain well-defined ideas and "knew how to express them with force" (p. 117). Second is a report by Sayyid Husain Bilgram-1, a liberal shi'ite from Delhi, stating that "I found him to be a well-informed man for a Herati...though rather shallow in his acquirements" (p. 144). Third is Amin ad-Dawlah's remark in his memoirs that "Jamal ad-Din's knowledge was based mainly on a powerful memory of popular sources like newspapers and speeches rather than on profundity, but that in an ignorant country like Iran he seemed a fountain of knowledge" (p. 281). How is one to reconcile these judgments with the repeated accounts, either by Professor Keddie or others, of the Sayyid's intellectual abilities? It would be unfair to dismiss such unfavorable judgments as stemming from illwill, and to accept the favorable ones as authentic accounts of the Sayyid's personality. The Sayyid's own available tracts and articles do not offer a solution either, since none of them appear to be infused by an outstanding or exceptional intelligence. While the truth about the Sayyid's intellectual stature may perhaps never be known, one must not forget that, as Professor Keddie points out (p. 422), his reputation and influence have been largely posthumous, and his enthusiastic followers among the later generations of Muslim writers and politicians have sometimes attributed to him qualities that he may not have really possessed. But the best way to avoid inconsistency in judging Jamal ad-Din is to refrain from exaggerated praise, and to rest content with acknowledging him not as an heir of Avicenna, but, in Professor Keddie's phrase, as "a pioneering political writer, speaker and activist" (p. 423). We are on firmer ground when assessing Jamal ad-Din's political ideas. Professor Keddie consistently adheres to the position that all that appears devious and contradic-

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in the light tory in Jamal ad-Din's life can be justified of his ideals of independence and military strength of Islamic states and the unity of Muslims. If he engaged in in Egypt, it was not for selfdubious Masonic activity If the change (p. 12). advancement, but to plot political his other religious contradicts Refutation of Materialists an expedistatements, the reason is that it is primarily express the ent political tract which does not necessarily real opinion of its author, but is meant to foster the uniIf (pp. 180-81). ty of all Indians against the British it is because in "Answer to Renan" smacks of atheism, Western Paris, Jamal ad-Din wanted to impress "an elite view of history audience" with his advanced, evolutionary of the (p. 195), and thus presumably enhance the prestige Muslims. vividly show the main weakness These explanations of Islamic modernism--its excessive concern with politics in the at the expense of facing some fundamental issues This was relationship between Islam and the modern world. imrequirement of the fight against perhaps an inevitable in the nineteenth But what proved later century. perialism to be more harmful was some of the modernists' special

style

of politicking.

Since the Muslim masses at that

time were much more ignorant

literate their

and enlightened struggle

than they

are today,

and the

who had the capacity

elite

was tiny

for independence

to lead

and powerless,

some modernists, and most notably Jamal ad-Din, often saw their best chance of achieving their progressive ideals in rulers. When this did not work, appealing to traditional (Jamal ad-Din is politics they resorted to conspiratorial reported to have expressed his belated regret that instead of such maneuvers with the Sultans and Amirs, he had not directly appealed to the people themselves, p. 419). Subsequent

generations

of modernists

inherited

all

renThus intellectual these weaknesses from the pioneers. activism, and clique to political aissance was sacrificed education of the intrigues took the place of the political masses.

IRANIANSTUDIES

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has not written her book Keddie obviously Professor But about Jamal ad-Din. to answer all these questions her book is an indispenthanks to its rich documentation, of modern Islamic History for sable source for students about Jamal ad-Din, and the right questions formulating whole. a as Islamic modernism

A Grammar of Southern Tati The Hague: Mouton, 1969.

Dialects. By Ehsan Yar-Shater. 277pp; two maps. MOHAMMAI) ALI JAZAYERY

This book contains a phonological and morphological of nine Iranian dialects description spoken in an area to the south and southwest of Qazvin. The dialects are called Chali, Danesfani, Ebrahim-abadi, Esfarvarini, Eshtehardi, Sagz-abadi, Takestani, Xiaraji, and Xoznini, together making up the Southern Tati, which, with Northern Tati, comprises a branch of Northwestern Iranian. Professor YarShater has been working on these dialects at least since the mid-1950s, articles and writhaving published several ten a doctoral dissertation of London), (1960, University before publishing the work under review. He has continued his work since the publication of this work, and, it is to be hoped, will publish other major statements on the other Tati dialects, as well as improved revisions of this book. The book opens with a "Preface" (pp. 7-8), detailed "Contents" (pp. 9-14), "List of Abbreviations," followed by "Conventions" (pp. 15-16), and two maps. These prefatory materials are followed by "Introduction" (pp. 17-28), whose

MohammadAli Jazayery is Languages and Literatures Austin.

Professor of Oriental and African at the University of Texas at

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major section headings, after some introductory remarks, are: "Villages and Villagers," "General Features of the Dialects, " "Dialect Variations," "Dialect Materials," "Problems of Phonemization," and "Method and Scope." Next comes the grammatical description, in two parts: "Phonology" and "Morphology." The book ends with a "List of the Main Informants" (pp. 276-6), and a very short "Bibliography" (p. 277). Syntax is not included, except to the extent that some materials in the section on morphology are relevant to syntax. The section on phonology is quite sketchy (less than 30 pages), while morphology takes up the bulk of the space (210 pages). The description Danesfani, Esfaravini,

of Chali is most detailed, and Xoznini the least.

those of

Among the good features of the book is the abundance of examples, with very infrequent exceptions--no doubt inI have advertent (here and there a gloss is missing). noticed only one typographical error (p. 49, line 13, where s should be corrected to s), though there may be a few more. I miss an index, though there seems to be fairly extensive cross-referencing. Some texts, however short, would have been welcome. These shortcomings will hopefully be remedied in a later volume of texts promised by the author (p. 25). The inclusion of a vocabulary in that volume, or yet in a third volume will be most welcome. The grammatical sketch presented represents primarily an analysis of the speech of 29 informants interviewed in the area between 1955 and 1963. The informants' speech was in some cases transcribed directly and in others from tape recordings made by the author. The list of informants gives the name, age, education and occupation for each. Acall but two of the informants range cording to this list, in age from 25 to 67, each decade represented by three, five or seven informants; one informant was seventy, and another The various ages, or decades, are not evenly diseighty. but such distribution would tributed among the dialects, IRANIANSTUDIES

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to achieve. Four dialects quite likely have been difficult are represented by two informants each, two by three each, With one excepone by four, one by five, and one by six. tion, all informants were male. Eight are listed as illiterate. In addition to the informants, some written and published materials were used. The treatment of phonology (pp. 31-61), especially is quite brief. The author himfor some of the dialects, self is aware of this (pp. 26-27), but even so, some of the "In cases statements are not clear enough. An example is: of doubt I have allowed for variations of pronunciation in rather than deciding my otherwise phonemic transcription, grounds" (p. 27). Variaon a phoneme without sufficient affect the phonetion in pronunciation does not necessarily mic status of a phone. His examples (p. 27, footnote 36) are buma/boma "he came," mi-/me- (the imperfective morpheme), and 9L/qul "ram" which may occur in the same diBut why is this a problem? The situation is no alect. different from the variation seen in such Persian words as , rh/rah, or for that matruft/roft, firuz/p fars/pa, we have be-/bo-/ Similarly, ter, baradar/beradar, yek/yak. bu-/bi- (the imperative morpheme), and na-/ne- (the negative morpheme) in Persian. None of these groups of morphemes represents problems in the phonemic analysis; they variation (with various degrees of freesimply illustrate dom). The author states that h disappears in Persian loan(p. 34). The words in final and preconsonated positions fact is that, in spoken Persian, h rarely occurs in these except in the most deliberate or affected speech; positions, thus, gons, sa:r, a:ya, etc. (to cite some of the author's Since borrowings examples) are quite normal in Persian. in these dialects must have been made primarily from informal spoken Persian, there is a great likelihood that the words were borrowed without h. The compensatory lengthening replacing h is a very commonPersian phenomenon. At one point, [e:] is considered an allophone of e (p. 37, footnote 10). The term "allophone" relates to in-

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dividual What is meant here, apparently, phonemes. is that [:] is an allophone of y. Even this interpretation would since [:] and [y] are themselves be objectionable, two separate phonemes--at least y is--by virtue of occurring elsewhere in the language independently. Another tion or change Takestani, [6] (p. 40), while phoneme in its

example of confusion of pronunciation variawith allophonic is seen when, in variation is listed as a more central allophone of e on the same page it is also listed as a own right.

The section on morphology (pp. 65-274) is the most comprehensive. Rather than discuss this section in detail, I shall point out a few morphological features which are of interest to Persianists because they represent phenomena not found in Persian. These include grammatical gender (in nouns and verbs, and less predominantly in adjectives), case distinctions, frequent use of postpositions (and the corresponding rareness of prepositions, all of them appearing in affected speech influenced by Persian), the use of the Persian adjectival suffix -tar for the superlative as well as the comparative, the existence of proximate and remote demonstrative pronouns, number agreement between a noun and the related predicative and the presence of pasadjective, sive verb stems (based on active stems). The morphological description covers nouns, postand pre-positions, adjectives, pronouns, verbs, conjuncand suffixes. The last two categories tions, are treated the section on the verb is the most comprehensive. briefly; Most sections (e.g., "Nouns," etc.) and subsections (e.g., "Case," etc.) begin with "General Remarks," followed by on individual statements dialects. Syntax, as already indicated, has been left out (exTo some cept for more or less incidental observations). these days--at least in the United States--linlinguists is almost nothing but syntax. guistics This, of course, is an objectionable view, and I am glad the author of the book being reviewed does not subscribe to it. However, I IRANIAN STUDIES

258

hope that he will a separate work.

cover syntax in the next edition,

or in

Similarly, there is no statement on word formation, with the exception of brief mentions of some derivational suffixes and a scattering of other phenomena (pp. 138-9, 142-4, 266-7, 274). One aspect of word formation--"Verbal Nouns" (pp. 250-55)--is discussed under "Verbs." Though this is in keeping with accepted tradition, a more appropriate place for them (in the absence of a separate section on word formation) would be under "Nouns." Throughout the.work, one notices a great many similarities between Southern Tati and Persian. Nor is this surprising since they are related genetically and close Some of the similarities geographically. are due to borrowing, both in vocabulary and in grammar. An instance of grammatical borrowing is the ezafa construction, which, however, is 'found only occasionally (p. 74). Another is the suffix -tar, which is used for comparative as well as superlative (p. 140). Still another is the ordinal numeral suffixes -om and -om-in (p. 145). The similarity is greatest in the vocabulary, and that is precisely the area where it is very difficult, in the case of linguistically related geographically close dialects, to distinguish between borrowings and cognates. This work is the result of painstaking research by a scholar with a first-rate record of scholarship. Although some areas, as pointed out, need improvement, he is aware of that fact. His major purpose was apparently a description of the morphology, and here he has done an excellent job. Omissions, generally speaking, were by design. To make too much of them would be to show ingratitude where gratitude and encouragement are clearly called for. For although a number of studies of Iranian dialects spoken in Iran exist in print, practically none--even, or especially, among those by native Iranians--would meet the required standards of methodology, exactness and reliability. Here, in Professor Yar-Shater's meticulous work, we have an example to be held up for others to see and emulate. I look forward to other studies by him on the "Median" dialects. 259 AUTUMN 1973

IRAJ BASHIRI

HEDAYAT'S Structuiral IVORY Anialysisof TOWER The BliindOwl

Since its publication in 1937 THE BLIND OWL has remained an The structural analysis enigma in Persian and world literature. presented in Hedayat's Ivory Tower is an attempt to * prove that the dream-world

of the Owl is not the result of narcotic hallucinations. * shed light on the life of Hedayat, find a place for THE BLIND OWL in Persian fiction and bring Hedayat studies into focus. * evaluate Hedayat's synthetic approach to Eastern and Western literatures. Such insights plus the step by step reconstruction of the writing of the book have been possible only through the use of the Persian version of THE BLIND OWL- a new translation of which is included in the Tower.

1974 xvii 221 pp. $6. 00

Libraryof Congress Catalog Card Order Number: 73-620244 *

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Note on the English Transliteration System The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STUDIES is based on the Persian Romanization System approved by the American Library Association, the Canadian Library Association, and the Library of Congress. Copies of the transliteration table may be obtained by writing to the Editor

Iranian Studies is published quarterly by The Society for Iranian Studies. It is distributed to members of the Society as part of their membership. The annual subscription rate for non-members is $7.00; the price of single copies is $1.75 per issue. For institutions the subscription rate is $10.00 per annum. The opinions expressed by the contributors are of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Society or the editors of Iranian Studies. Articles for publication and all other communications should be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box E-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society should be addressed to the Secretary, The Society for Iranian Studies, P.O. Box 89, Village Station, New York 10014, U.S.A.

COVER: Silk With Rooster VaticanLibrary,Rome Sasanian. VI-VII Cent.A.D.