No title

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

Volume III (1970)

Ali Banuazizi,Editor Jacqueline W. Mintz, Associate Editor

Published by The Society for Iranian Studies, P. 0. Box 89, Village Station, New York, New York 10014, U.S.A.

The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL Amin Banani Ali Banuazizi James A. Bill Richard W. Cottam Manoucher Parvin Roger M. Savory Majid Tehranian, Secretary-Treasurer

IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies Contents: Volume IlI (1970)

ARTICLES

Cottam, Richard W. The United States, Iran and the Cold War .... . . . . . . . . . . .

2-22

Oil and Cold Doenecke, Justus D. Revisionists, War Diplomacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23-33

Hedayat, Sadeq. Three Drops of Blood (translated . . . . . . . . by Thomas M. Ricks ....

104-114

Genesis of Party in Iran: A Razi, G. Hossein. Case Study of the Interaction Between the . .

58-90

Ann T. An Expanded Role for the Majles Committee ................ .

35-45

Mark. Persian Folksong Texts from Afghan Badakhshan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91-103

Political

Schulz, Slobin,

System and Political

Abdol-Hosein. Zarrinkoob, torical Perspective Banani) .................

Parties

Persian Sufism (with foreword

iii

in Hisby Amin .

137-220

BOOKREVIEWS English,

Paul W. City and Village in Iran (reviewed by William Irons). . . . . . . . . . 115-125

The Huretwitz, J. C. Middle Eastern Politics: Majid (reviewed by Military Dimension Tehranian). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46-50

Lambton, Ann K. S. The Persian Land Reform, 19621966 (reviewed by AhmadAshraf) .50-54 Leiden, Carl. The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East (reviewed by Philip C. Salzman).

125-128

MISCELLANEOUS Letters

to the Editor.

Note from the Editor Publications

Received.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129-131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

55-56,

136 132-133

J~dTC4~eV, s rne Soc

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COUNCIL Amin Banani of California University at Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi University of Southern California James A. Bill of Texas at Austin University Richard W. Cottam of Pittsburgh University Manoucher Parvin Hunter College Roger M. Savory of Toronto University Majid Tehranian, Secretary-Treasurer New College Iranian

Studies

Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jacqueline W. Mintz, Associate

Editor

for by the Society Iranian Studies is published quarterly to members of the SoIranian Studies. It is distributed The annual subscripciety as a part of their membership. tion rate for non-members is $5.00; the price of single the subscripcopies is $1.25 per issue. For institutions tion rate is $8.00 per annum. The opinions expressed by the contributors authors and are those of the individual of not necessarily or the editors those of the Society and all other Iranian Studies. Articles for publication should be sent communications concerning Iranian Studies to the Editor, P.O. Box 24766, Los Angeles, Iranian Studies, the 90024, U.S.A. concerning California Communications to the Secreaffairs of the Society should be addressed of Sotary, The Society for Iranian Studies, c/o Division cial Sciences, Florida 33578, U.S.A. New College, Sarasota, Cover:

Heavy Bronze Mortar Mashhad. Seljuq. 12th C. Archaelogical Museum, Tehran

SLdv

UJYttUl

Volume

III

Winter

1970

Number

1

ARTICLES 2

THE UNITED STATES, THE COLD WAR

IRAN AND

Richard

W. Cottam

23

REVISIONISTS, OIL AND COLD WAR DIPLOMACY

Justus

D. Doenecke

34

AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE MAJLES COMMITTEE

Ann T.

Schulz

BOOK REVIEWS 46

HUREWITZ:

Middle Eastern Politics: The Military Dimension

Majid

50

LAMBTON

The Persian Land 1962-1966 form,

Ahmad Ashraf

55

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

Re-

Tehranian

THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND THE COLD WAR*

RICHARD W. COTTAM

the Cold War over It would be premature to declare continues The Cold War rhetoric in the sumner of 1969. in the debates over Vietto abound in the United States confrontation nam and the ABM; dangers of Soviet-American and Soviet behaconflict; in the Arab-Israeli are serious But, as is of the Cold War mold. vior in Czechoslovakia speech at the by Richard Nixon's acceptance symbolized agreethere is widespread Convention, Republican National and that an era of negotiation ment among American leaders The Union has been entered. rapprochment with the Soviet are already strong that for Iran this portends indications will not inconflict an era in which the Soviet-American affairs. internal Iran's very significantly fluence As this

new era begins,

there

are already

signs

the Soviet-Ameriincluding that the Cold War world view, reis about to be drastically in Iran, can confrontation of the Cold War. of students by a new generation vised Policy, Weapons and Foreign in his Nuclear Henry Kissinger interan image of monolithic constructed in 1957, written goals. principal in its single-minded communism, national In 1969 this praised. His book at the time was widely Kissinger's wing diehards. view is held only by right of the the intensity one given was a natural construct That it communists. from revolutionary threat perceived is even for the mid-1950's, exaggeration was a serious But, as a new generation today. to be questioned hardly memory of the Cold War, or no real with little emerges of an infact the vital that danger is a seriuous there however threat from communism, perceived tensely

Richard W. Cottam is Professor of Pittsburgh. University

of Political

Science

at the

on the "Strucat the Conference *This paper was delivered by the Socico-sponsored Iran,' ture of Power in Islamic and the Near Eastern Center of the ety- for Iranian Studies The Conference at Los Angeles. of California University of Califwas held on June 26-27, 1969, at the University Los Angeles. ornia, IRANIAN STUDIES

2

If this is done there is will be forgotten. unrealistic, for that new myths will be substituted every likelihood fear or exaggeraeliminate Since the new analyses old. of American as a major determinant ted threat perception some vigorous at times included Cold War behavior--which substiin local Cold War arenas--some acts of imperialism Already the notion that will be sought. tute explanation of American behavior was the need the prime determinant comthe demands of a huge industrial-military to satisfy acceptance. is advanced and is gaining widespread plex, No more than a handful of Americans comprehend the in Iran's hisextent of American influence extraordinary American Yet, without question, tory in the Cold War era. trends so fundaIranian historical altered intervention for generations. that the impact may well be felt mentally and for Iranians The American role was highly visible in the United others in the Third World but unnoticed of Amerisection That even the highly attentive States. American government can public did not observe blatant blindness the perceptual acts in Iran, simply illustrates of those engaged in what they see as fundamental conflict. has no such problem, however, and there The new generation in is no reason to doubt that American Cold War policy scrutiny. Iran will come under the closest reason to doubt that AmAlso there is very little in Iran will be placed snuggly within the erican policy areas are so peculiarly Few policy new myth construct. exschool is actively Since the revisionist susceptible. American ploring that assumption

in the Cold War with the motives economic the case of Iran is were primary, these

a concern with oil was the determinsimple: deductively here is that this deductive The contention ing force. Evidence to support inductively. case cannot be supported were a significant that American oil interests the belief is prior to 1954, if it exists, in American policy factor in Iran were Actual American investments well concealed. this fact is of Admittedly minimal prior to that year. to those who see western behavior as significance little However, it trusts. by international determined largely studies is important to note that one of the few careful that of Bernard Cohen1, group behavior, of economic interest is to of such interests that the mode of behavior suggests and with very directly, objectives, seek very specific paris not closely The case he studies high visibility. to the Iranian case, but there have been studies allel relations. made of the role of oil in Iranian foreign of determinant2 as a primary see oil which Even in those advanced no evidence is virtually there interest foreign or as independently acting interests, oil that American in deterwere significant trust, part of an international

major detail mining either in Iran. can policy

or the general

3

color

of Ameri-

WINTER1970

Of course there is no difficulty at all in documenfactor ting a case that Iran's oil was seen as a vital in in demonEuropean recovery. Nor is there any difficulty and in Europe strating the belief in the United States that a major communist objective was a denial of Iranian oil to the West. was viewed as the European recovery of inprime,essential prerequisite for the containment ternational communism and the Soviets, it was assumed, were as interested in preventing this objective as the United States was in achieving American it. Official statements concerning Iran in this period rarely neglected to mention the vital European need for Iran's oil. The rhythm of American policy in Iran supports a different proposition regarding American motivations. Prior to World War II American involvement in Iran was slight. Individual Americans such as Morgan Shuster, Arthur Millspaugh and several did American missionaries have an impact on Iran and in sum left Iranians with a very favorable of the United States. impression Millsin Iran, during. World War II, paugh's second assiqnment had a closer official connection. But as Millspaugh makes clear in his book3, he received greater support from the British than from his own government. A minor effort was made on behalf of Standard Oil and of Sinclair in gaining some share of the oil consession in Iran, but in neither case was there success.4 Intense American interest in Iran did not even occur when American forces were present in Iran during World War II. Then there was a general deference to the British.5 in Iran American interest really begins in 1946 with the American acceptance of the new role as the first power in the anticommunist bloc. Iran has the distinction along with Greece and Eastern Europe of being part of the first arena of the Cold War. The Soviet-American confrontation over Iran in the United Nations was, in fact, part of the inaugural of the Cold War. The assumptional base concerning motivations in this essay, therefore, is that American interest in Iran was overwhelmingly defensive. In American eyes Soviet in Azerbaijan policy made clear beyond question, the conclusion that the Soviet Union wished in Iran a commuthe Soviet lead. nist regime which would follow closely If this objective could not be achieved fairly cheaply, the Soviet Union appeared to be willing to settle for a friendly regime in Tehran, tolerant of an autonomous communist Azerbaijan and willing to grant the Soviet Union a slight advantage in a Soviet-Iranian Company for exploiting Iran's northern oil. Evidence for these views is substantial and to this writer convincing.6 But this is not the place to explore such evidence. What is necessary to point to here is simply the official American perception IRANIAN STUDIES

4

aggressive of a highly that perception this

It in Iran. policy Soviet policy gave form to American

was in Iran.

support verbal was to grant response The American ambasits and through Nations to Iran both in the United in strength But American in Iran. George Allen, sador, as a deterto have served the area was much too slight or to a in Azerbaijan presence Soviet to continued rent What the of Iran. to gain control effort Soviet serious leaders to Soviet did do was to indicate stand American in Iran would lead to troops of Soviet the retention that and to substantial in relations deterioration serious or for reareason for this Whether rearmament. American Union did withdraw the Soviet sons not yet apparent, reAzerbaijan the communist and did permit troops Soviet army. by the Iranian gime to be ousted reappraisal. the most careful deserves This episode which led to policy of Soviet one aspect It was clearly in Union which was implicit of the Soviet the perception Affairs.7 in Foreign "Mr. X" article George Kennan's tells of the article of the premise acceptance Widespread The day. of that consensus perceptual much of American with Niazi Gerparallel Union was seen as closely Soviet the But in retrospect, intent. aggressive many in its with such minor pressure is that point startling really Such beUnion did depart. the Soviet it, against applied if Soviet Indeed, of Hitler. that parallels hardly havior few epiare to be understood in the period motivations But the importfor reappraisal. are more important sodes perAmerican here is the resultant to establish ant point comdictatorship Soviet aggressive a highly ception: opposiAmerican of vigorous in the face to retreat pelled tion. Because

its

oil,

of

its

so important

strategic

to Europe's

and because

locations

economy,

of

Iran was cer-

Furof the Cold War struggle. point tain to be a focal Union as the Cold War took form and the Soviet thermore, the potential, nuclear weapons significant developed Cold War battles the central was that probability confrontation military would not be in the form of direct of both East and West. of obliteration with the risk would be in the third of the conflict the center Rather was expectation The American states. world of developing would be in the form of subverting aggression that Soviet moving them and thereby states of these the governments regimes by communist to dominance toward and ultimately was sufevidence Supporting the Moscow lead. following

ficient nist

the American

to maintain military

net

in

Iran,

perception.

discovered

almost

The commu-

accidentally

Over four hunin 1954, is an example of such evidence. in the organization were involved dred Iranian officers 5

WINTER 1970

even though some of them mai not have been the role they were playing.

fullv

aware of

For states such as Iran, the American containment policy objective can be simply stated: to help establish and to strengthen stable non-communist, regimes capable of resisting and fully subversion aware of the dangers of communist aggression. In order to accomplish this objective, the entire spectrum of the American foreign policy would have to be mobilized. Military aid would be given as much to provide internal as to advance the security direct military contairnment policy. Economic aid was seen as essential for real stability. Information agency policies were for the purpose of constructing favorable images of the western allies and non-communist third world regimes, and unfavorable images of communist regimes or regimes seen either as under communist influence or insufficiently aware of the communist danger. both Diplomacy, overt and covert, would support internal forces working for non-communist stability and oppose those undermining that position. That this adds up to a picture of political engineering is beyond question, although few of those participating would have so described The policy was it. not articulated explicitly but the pattern soon became so distinct that it clearly reflected the basic compulsions behind the policy. However, these patterns amounted to nothing more than the stylistic content of policy. A characteristic feature of the entire third world was one of flux. Increasingly insistent counter elites were appearing everywhere. They not only demanded power but called for fundamentally different political, social and economic policies. Since a prevailing attitude of many of these counter elites was one of distrust of and anger at the imperialist policies of America's closest allies, policies of hostility to the West were very likely should those elites come to power. Yet they seemed to represent strong and virtually irreversible trends. Opposing them therefore could at best result in only temporary stability. Simply by stating the objective of non-communist stability, therefore, very little of the substance of is indicated. strategy Is stability best achieved and communism most successfully resisted if traditional elites are maintained in power or if some element of the counter elites replaces them? If the latter, which element of the counter elites is most likely to be in harmony with American objectives? The alternatives can be framed in terms of the control scheme the various elites would be likely to incorporate. The analytical device employed below9 the control system incorporated will consist IRANIAN STUDIES

6

assumes that of three

Normaand coercive. utilitarian, normative, elements: genof norms which appeal to the employment refers tive This of the population. elements or to specific erally favored which represent to symbols appeals includes by offering to people is the appeal Utilitarian norms. reCoercive or power needs. to material satisfaction or the of force the threat to the use of force, fers or sections individuals to control of deprivation threat of the population. very were of three strategies For Iran control would be to supstrategy The first varieties. different even elites of the counter section port the dominant of the distrustful would be deeply elite that though from the Sodanger of the compelling unconvinced West, forces in the security represented and poorly Union, viet per the eighty control who by and large and among those The or tribesmen. who are peasants cent of Iranians normagroup would be primarily of this method of control themselves to describe would be able Its leaders tive. and a nation Iranian independent a truly as representing and the econboth the society to transform determination with the eduprimarily would be strong This appeal omy. Its utilitarian people. and professional youth, cated class and lower middle to middle would be mainly appeal elite of the traditional who see in the ousting elements For advancement. and status for a career opportunities of land offer would be the distant there the peasantry the against would have to be applied Coercion reform. of coercion, the instruments but since elite traditional of the were under the influence the army and police, device the coercive elite, and the traditional court model an ideal This is hardly mob. would be the popular situa basically revolutionary But given for stability. alternabe made for this could argument a strong ation, At least potential. long-term the best tive as offering in the face of would not be standing States the United trends. historical and progressive strong the tradiwould be to support strategy The second here. advantages There would be clear elite. tional including experience with governmental This is the elite with the impericooperation profitable long and mutually it In self-interest Great Britain. particularly al West, of The method of control anti-communist. was naturally the counSince coercive. this group would be primarily intent their revolutionary had demonstrated ter-elites among the artiof their appeal the receptivity and also would be little there of the population, element culate of this but the control for the time being alternative was wellelite The traditional group by repression. easily and thus could forces in the security represented the instruments. Hlowever, the coercive mobilize 7

WINTER 1970

efficiency of the coercive instruments, events had indicated, would have to be improved; and for an oligarchic More centralizaserious elite this represented dangers. tion and placing power in fewer hands was called for, and this could be disruptive of harmony within the oligarchy. in the area Utilitarian devices would be employed largely and educaof infra-structure development, communications tion in particular. This would meet some of the demands but would be rather slow of the anti-traditional elements in producing even an accommodationist The apattitude. peal to norms would be narrowly restricted among the poelement could be litically aware. Only the traditional reached. The very basis of the revolutionary potential was the rejection of traditional norms. But among the peasantry this elite could be expected to operate along traditionally

accepted

normative

patterns.

Again

this

is

far from being an ideal control model for producing stability. Its primary vulnerability lies in the probability that the rising demand for new norms would far outrace the gains made through infra-structure development. A third model would stand as a compromise between these two extremes. In this model one section of the traditional elite would retain power but would move rapidly to coopt important elements while of the counter elite simultaneously dropping elements of the traditional elite. The method of control here would be, of necessity, at first primarily coercive but would turn as rapidly as possible to a primary emphasis on utilitarian. Given the in Iran in the early years of the revolutionary spirit Cold War, only the leading elements of the revolutionary elite could rule without a primary recourse to coercion. In this model, the section in of the traditional elite include at first those in critipower would of necessity cal positions in the security force. But no effort would be made even in the initial stage to maintain the power position of the traditional oligarchy. Instead the process would be one of attracting, through appeals to salmen in the counter ary and position, highly qualified elite, both into the bureaucracy generally and into the security forces themselves. At a rate harmonious with the success of the utilitarian appeal to the counter elite, there would be an alteration of norms and concomitant

symbol

manipulation.

At

first

traditional

norms

must prevail since some reliance on the traditional elite would be essential at this stage. But as important elements of the counter elite were coopted and the prevailing mood of the counter elite could be described as accommodationist, the support of the traditional elite would become less vital. At this point the leaders could turn more to norms acceptable to the counter elites and the beginnings of a stable utilitarian-normative scheme would Likewise as reliance appear. on the traditional elite as IRANIAN STUDIES

8

the primary base of support becomes unnecessary, it would be possible to inaugurate new programs, such as land reform which would have great utilitarian and normative appeal to the peasantry. The problem for this model would be the very great instability and uncertainty of the transitional period. But it offers some very significant long-term stability prospects. As some readers will have recognized, the above three "models" are in fact abstractions of the central strategies utilized by the regimes led by Mossadeq, Zahedi, and the Shah respectively. This is not to argue that the alternative strategies were articulated and the relative merits of each debated by those involved in the American decision making process concerning Iran. On the contrary, the various choices made depended heavily on the accident of personality of leading decision makers and on the opportunities perceived by very different men at different times. Although it has been observed above that few Americans comprehend the terribly important role played by the United States in modern Iranian history, most Iranians do. In fact they tend to exaggerate that role. Because of the vital importance of Iran to American security as perceived by American leaders, American interference did reach proportions that can be described as political be noted engineering. But it should that this more than political engineering amounted to little to grant In one extraordinary support to that elite. case this did amount to a major effort one to overturn But when the Mossadeqist, and substitute another. elite, Zahedi was replaced by a royal American dictatorship, support constant. of the government in power remained in Iranian Really extensive American interference the Mossadeq did not begin until era. internal affairs With the freedoms But then it was probably inevitable. a vigorous under Mossadeq, and subthe press permitted Demonstrations of stantial communist press appeared. were frequent and a Yankee Go Home camTudeh supporters within the bureauCommunist paign was launched. presence the infiltraand as mentioned was suspected cracy above, in the armed forces was much greater tion then than even feared. anti-communists Actual the more alarmist-minded was probably indicated communist accustrength fairly in the Tehran elections in 1952 which were remarkrately Then the communist candidates ably free. about polled of the vote. one-fifth the premiership, Even before Mossadeq accepted and a bitter oil was nationalized with Iran's dispute Iranian nationalists followed. were conGreat Britain that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had been a cenvinced tral instrument in an indirect and nonformal but very real 9

WINTER 1970

therecontrol of Iran. imperialist They were determined fore to stop the flow of Iran's oil rather than to permit to finresources the greatest of Iran's natural actually of the country. control Iranian-British ance the imperial which came in relations moved toward the breaking point, 1952. within which the first This, then, was the setting in Iran's American involvement major decision concerning The regime was non-communist. In affairs would be made. fact during this brief period Iran was very close to havBut it was doctrinaire ing a liberal-democratic system. in its non-aligned status, and since such freedom as desthe regime was subject cribed was granted its communists, to a charge very familiar to Americans in 1951, that of being "soft on communism." Purthermore this was a period Beneath the surface there was the staof surface chaos. bility of a regime which had attracted the enthusiastic of the public--and support of one section a most important section. But certainly there was the appearance of instability. From a control system perspective, probably few more completely on regimes in modern history have relied normative control. The symbols most successfully manipulated were those relating to Iranian nationalism. Mossbecame a symbol of new found dignity for adeq personally the ancient Other symbols, of economic and sonation. cial progress, were seen as subsequent intito, although mately connected with, the achievement of real indepenThe belief held that British dence. was solidly imperialism was the primary obstacle alterto any fundamental and must first be eliminated. ing of Iranian society Symbols of freedom and humanism, likewise, were utilized effectively. But there was very real material discomfort in Iran under Mossadeq. Foreign trade fell off and only partly as a result of a British economic blockade. The bureaucracy was always several months in arrears with its salary. Merchants felt a sharp decline in sales. What is remarkable is that with the utilitarian appeal so very weak the regime lasted as long as it did. There was coercion under Mossadeq. A strict censorship was passed and law frequently martial imposed. But judging from the violence and often obscenity of the personal attacks on Mossadeq in the opposition press, it would be hard to argue that there was a controlled press. Real coercion did exist, however, in that anyone opposing the regime was automatically charged with being in British pay. Furthermore the charge was in many cases believed. Physical intimidation was not unknown. But much of the security forces were never firmly under Mossadeq' s control. HIence IRANIAN STUDIES

10

the coercive instruments relied upon were more likely be urban mobs or the force of mass opinion.

to

Could the United States support such a regime? The answer of Ambassador Grady before his retirement in 1952 was a qualified "yes." His argument was made publicly his retirement in articles and in public aftT speeches. Central to his case for support of Mossadeq was the contention that Mossadeq represented a most powerful manifestation of Iranian national history. He symbolized the search for national dignity for many of his countrymen. But Grady argued as well that, because of his absorption in a past in which Iran was so frequently a victim, Mossadeq did not perceive the sincerity of the British search for compromise. Grady saw intransigence on both sides as tragically capable of pushing Iran into the Cold War center stage. "Support" in this case meant to grant the Mossadeq regime economic, technical and military assistance. But the Tudeh press in describing this as American interference on behalf of the Mossadeq regimell had a point. American assistance did improve the Mossadeq regime's control capability. The kind of support Mossadeq wanted, however, and in fact demanded only a few weeks before his overthrow was diplomatic support against British efforts to strangle the regime economically and to conspire it politically against within the right opposition camp.12 In making this demand, Mossadeq spelled the out clearly American dilemma: it must give diplomatic as well as material support to a regime which is non-aligned externalin a ly, "soft on communism" internally, uncompromising bankdispute with America's closest and virtually ally, The implied threat in Mossadeq's derupt economically. mand was that lacking this support, Iran would likely go communist. In a way what was surprising was that America in the early 1950's, with a fear of internal comtransfixed that its own security munist subversion and convinced non-communist regimes rested on the existence of stable, in strategic parts of the third world, should have given That it did so was any support to the Mossadeq regime. of a general policy probably more the result application But than to any special concern for the Iranian regime. the primary argument for Ambassador Grady did articulate that it was the American support of the Mossadeq regime: of an important historical manifestation trend, a trend which could be resisted only at the risk of turning Irantoward communism. ian nationalism servative

Successor to the liberal Hienry Grady was the conBefore too many months had Loy IIenderson. 11

WINTER1970

Mr. Henmodel was about to be tested. passed the second as did Mr. has not revealed his thinking publicly derson But if Hassan Arsenjani's 30 Tir can be relied Grady. to the ambassador was most receptive on, the new American elite that he traditional entreaties of members of Iran's bestow America's Since the perfavors on them. should of the and world views philosophies sonalities, political to have been important ambassadors appear two American be it should in Iran, policy determinants of American the Truman adminisduring noted that both were appointed a purposeto indicate and that is nothing there tration that It is of course possible in direction. ful change

Grady would have become so frustrated

with

Iranian

na-

he too would that and intransigence tionalist suspicion to overturn have turned ear to those seeking a willing Iranian nationalism conviction that Mossadeq. But Grady's in Iran, if profor long-term stability could be a force A major American held. perly treated, was very deeply Amin the overthrow role of Mossadeq had Grady remained of accident the role Such*is bassador was thus unlikely. in major historical events. involvement to Arsenjani, the Henderson According of Mossadeq replacement was substantial in the short-lived for so act1952. If so, the case by Ahmad Qavam in July and Qavam was a subtle ing is fairly easy to construct. to narrow docnot at all given sophisticated statesman, in the art of He and his class were experienced trine. with the street unsentimentally politics and would deal Brutal coercion would behind Mossadeq. mobs which stood be unnecessary. welcome a reThe public would in fact storation of calm and order. to the appointment But the four days of Qavam's have cast doubt on the aspermanent premiership should could provide that Iran's traditional oligarchy sumption of a style not seen in Iran since stability. Coercion the days of Reza Shah would clearly if Qavam be necessary and MossThis was not forthcoming were to stay in power. almost literally back to the premiership adeq was brought on the shoulders The first Americanof an adoring crowd. change in Iran to engineer major political backed effort had failed. 1952 until From July 19, 1953 when Mossadeq August real concealment of was finally there was little toppled, Nor was the identito Mossadeq. Anglo-American hostility General Fazlollah probable successor, ty of Mossadeq's would be no This time there Zahedi, in much doubt.13 as the primary conto make full use of coercion failure a Zahedi else would distinguish trol device. But little on the tradifrom a Qavam leadership. Both would rely hardly less support. Zahedi tional elite for primary IRANIAN STUDIES

12

of controlling with the problem than Qavam would be faced and with an oligarchic, elites counter assertive highly inauguFurthermore, system. control inefficient, hence to which would be attractive the kind of programs rating class laboring class, of the middle interest the material with the vestclash certainly would almost and peasantry any refinally, Then, oligarchy. of that ed interests imperial of western on the support gime which was founded appeal a normative utilizing would have difficulty powers It is a measregime. the ousted who had favored to those to the States in the United perceived ure of the danger in the Mossimplicit world of the non-communist security to such would have been recourse there that adeq regime, alternative. a questionable to partiwas the decision But even more audacious on It rested of Mossadeq.14 ouster in the actual cipate and resources understanding that American the assumption of a governthe replacement to engineer were sufficient That assumption following. and devoted ment with a large in 1957 as it would in Syria just to be incorrect, proved

and again

in Cuba in 1961.

But ironically

the communist

from States the United part saved in large Tudeh Party The coup was failure. the price of disastrous paying government 16, 1953 but the Mossadeq for August planned Genit. foiled of the plan and easily had been informed the country. and the Shah fled hiding Zahedi went into eral Attacks on relihand. its But then the Tudeh overplayed and much of the poputook place leaders and mosques gious was a real a red dictatorship that was convinced lation from the poor sections The mob that marched possibility. in part paid was doubtless of south Tehran to the north of sponwas an element but there money, for by American the overthrow of Mossadeq In any event, as well. taneity Agency 19 and the Central Intelligence on August occurred success by many, or blame for this full credit was given aware Iranians. politically most, probably set himself Zahedi General the coup d'etat, After a restored that the assumption to the task of disproving He control a stable system. re-establish could oligarchy corepressive what was for Iran a severely did exercise utiliBut he made no progress through control. ercive means of attracting support positive or normative tarian corelite. Rumors of official of the traditional outside belevel and were widely were on the sensational ruption the Shah very quickly began manifesting liowever, lieved. the trato manipulate that his ability indications clear as it was as artistic and to move beyond system ditional of the center of months In a matter was inept. Zahedi's to from the premiership had been transferred authority as premier Zahedi was dropped When, later, the Court. of opposition. a ripple was hardly there 13

WINTER 1970

In retrospect it is clear that from the first weeks of the royal dictatorship, there would be movement toward a new and ultimately control remarkably stable system. Certainly nothing of this was perceived by concerned Americans who were granting the Shah as much support as could be extracted from a sympathetic Cold War congress. But the Shah understood very well both the direction in which he must move and the extent of his freedom of action in doing so. The oligarchy had little reason to be pleased with the royal dictatorship. The Pahlevi family was neuveau in the eyes of Iran's great families, many of whom had blood ties with the Qajar dynasty ousted by the Shah's father, Reza Shah. In addition, many of the oligarchic families had suffered the loss of land and all had lost power during the old Shah's regime. A royal dictatorship by definition would again reduce the power of the oligarchy. Furthermore, the young Shah had on several occasions indicated his attraction to a program of land reform, and this was anathema to Iran's great landowners. The very delicate task the Shah had to perform was to attract the support of sections of the counter elites through utilitarian appeals without suffering too serious a loss of support from members of the oligarchy as their power and influence were reduced. His primary reliance in this period had of necessity to be on coercion. But members of the traditional elite were well placed in the security forces, the instruments of coercion; in any case, these organizations were inefficient and generally of low capability in dealing with internal security problems. The Shah set about immediately improving the security force capability, the office especially of Military Governor of Tehran and later the security organization, SAVAK. But in the meantime he had to rely on his own skill in the political manipulating process to keep his many opponents apart. It was in this period that American support was most vital. The contention can be well supported, in that until 1963 the regime was dependent for its fact, continued existence on the virtually unqualified and generous support from the United States. Virtually all elements of the American government's foreign policy community were involved in Iran. Military support including technical, and training; material economic and technical aid assistance; propaganda support; and diplomatic supWhereas this support helped improve the efficiency port. of the security forces and the government's ability to satisfy some of the material aspirations of the people, the primary value lay elsewhere. As described here, the overthrow of Mossadeq was the result of an Americanbacked coup effort which, although failing, sparked a Tudeh response which in turn produced the essential IRANIAN STUDIES

14

public reaction in Iran for a second coup effort to be successful. A basic assumption of this description is that no such minor effort could have been successful had the Mossadeq control system been stronger. But this picture was far from universally accepted among Iranians. As stated above, many, including many Nationalists, placed the primary responsibility for Mossadeq's overthrow with the United States. The response of followers of Mossadeq to this perception was one of anger but an anger mitigated by a feeling of helplessness. If a man of Mossadeq's broad popularity could be overturned by American intervention then clearly American capability was so great as to make futile any direct effort to reverse the situation. Iranians were unhappily familiar with foreign

intervention,

primarily

British

and Russian,

and

to them the phenomenon was sufficiently common to be thought of as an integral part of the political process domestically. As such, a major, and quite possibly the major, tactic adopted by the Mossadeqists was to persuade the Americans that a new Nationalist regime was most in their interests. In effect they argued the validity of the Grady model: real stability and invulnerability to Soviet subversion could only be achieved by a regime which had nationalist legitimacy. This tactic was well represented by the Iran Party Manifesto of 1957 which went so far as to embrace the Eisenhower Doctrine in a vain effort to attract American support. Consequently, in the period unof greatest of the royal dictatorship, vulnerability wavering American support for the regime was an essential aspect of the control system because of the perceived American capability to invoke overwhelming force and thus make futile any move without American backing. Late 1960 was the beginning of the period of Two years greatest optimism among Iranian Mossadeqists. whose control earlier Nuri as-Said, system in Iraq closely resembled that of the Shah in Iran, had been overhad been thrown and his American and British protectors Then in 1960 the Mento reverse the situation. powerless deres regime in Turkey, which had been very close to the In Iran, the was ousted by a coup d'etat. Americans, free election Shah's effort to conduct a seemingly had and the regime had been placed been exposed as fraudulent But possibly most important, on the defensive. the a new and dynamic president United States had elected who, of popit could be hoped, had a far deeper comprehension For the next two in the Third World. ular aspirations became increasingly National Front activity years, open in early 1963 of a new in the open election culminating committee. central This was indeed a critical His security forces, especially 15

period for the Shah. SAVAK, had been fashioned WINTER1970

a truly into effective coercive instrument. He was therefore able to move openly toward a disengagement with the traditional upper class which had been his chief, if reluctant, base of support. He did so by inaugurating programs of land, and economic social reform which should satisfy some of the demands of lower and middle class elements. His policy of attracting technically competent

and politically accelerated. tween

the

at least

loss

withdrawn men into the bureaucracy But there was an inevitable time-lag of

willingness

support

from

traditional

to accommodate

elements

to the regime

was beand

from

middle class elements. His discomfiture was manifest. He was compelled to allow his faithful premier, Manuchehr Eqbal, to be made a scapegoat: and he ultimately felt compelled to turn to the non-subservient aristocrat, Ali Amini, as premier. In a real sense the royal dictatorship was in temporary abeyance. In retrospect it appears that this was the last moment of possible success for the aging Mossadeq leadership. Amini was a member of the more progressive section of aristocratic politicians and had some support there. Furthermore, he was believed to be respected by and supported by Americans. But he needed a much broader base of support if anything a countervailing approaching force to the Shah with his coercive capability was to be created. This could really only have come from the Mossadeqists. But no alliance was affected. Apparently the Mossadeqists did not believe it necessary to ally with the man who had turned against and had negotiaMossadeq ted the Oil Agreement which had restored effective western control, although not ownership, of Iran's oil production. Given their increasing freedom of activity, it is not difficult to comprehend their optimism. However, since Amini had not developed a real base of support, his dismissal was easily accomplished when the economic situation improved. Then shortly after the National Front had held its elections and proclaimed the certainty of a National Front victory, the Shah struck. Virtually the entire top leadership of the National Front was jailed. A referendum was held regarding the Shah's reforms and the over 99 per cent approval was a clear manifestation of a near absolute coercive control system. This was further demonstrated a few weeks later when the security forces put down with a considerable loss of life a religious led anti-regime demonstration. Obviously American behavior conformed very little with the optimistic expectations of the Mossadeqists. Support for the Shah and his premiers was unfaltering. Reductions in aid which were taking place simply reflec-

ted Iran's recovery and the fact of an immense oil income, much of which was being used for developmental IRANIAN STUDIES

16

to is not difficult for this The explanation purposes. very much Cold were still The Kennedy years discover. only weeks occurred crisis The Cuban missile War years. Front. crack down on the National the Shah's before renon-communist for a stable, the desire Consequently There was goal. the determining gime in Iran remained ability when the Shah's in the Amini period uneasiness but with seemed to be faltering; goal this to achieve of alternatives any consideration of control his recovery to the extent Moreover, to have been dropped. appears in the Kennedy administration's was a shift there that of the Shah. it was even more supportive Iran policy, of Mossain the impression There was some justification of the Eisenanti-communism the romantic, that deqists But what was not comprehower era would come to an end. If place. which would take its hended was the doctrine and for Iranians of the Kennedys attraction the magnetic sensing world was due to their in the non-western others feelwith their to empathize of the Kennedys an ability a transto suggest is little there and aspirations, ings enin John Kennedy's to others ability of this ference seems to have been almost there On the contrary, tourage. actook into that emerged that in the doctrine nothing any or, even more broadly, aspirations nationalist count aspirations. identity poto imply here that American There is no intent from a formulated in Iran was at any time sharply licy of threat The perception base. theoretical developed well communism did lead to a Union and world from the Soviet and mainIran establish held goal of helping consistently But this is simply regime. non-communist a stable, tain an intenIt did reflect of policy. outline the skeletal in its stage for an Iran which at this of concern sity revoluand political was on the edge of a social history as described However, unstable. inherently and hence tion this goal emto achieve designed strategy American above, manifesting regimes Iranian three sequentially braced The and ideologies. systems control very different three apof these systems one or another to embrace decision of personality of accident to have been the result pears and the perception decision makers, of leading and values as the just aid programs, The economic of opportunity. formuwere ad hoc, poorly support, of political programs one by JehanTwo recent studies, and inconsistent. lated make this and the other by George Baldwin,15 gir Amuzegar most persuasively. point to was a thrust Yet there from the overall flowed naturally control had an inadequate regime on normative lied far too heavily symbols. of national manipulation 17

which American policy The Mossadeq type aim. it rein that system the especially control, of other The careers WINTER 1970

leaders, and Nkrumah, who made brilliant such as Sukarno use of nationalist the limited symbols, suggest utility of this control device. The greater longevity of a Nehru or a Nasser in part by their can be explained supplementwith efforts in the utilitarian ing normative appeals diBut reliance on positive from tradirection. support tional elements of counter with coercive control elites, was equally tenuous. which was the Zahedi model, The was paralearly of the royal control system dictatorship lel to that of Zahedi but, out of as explained above, necessity rather American than the wish of the Shah. programs tended the Shah's fairly to reinforce consistently own inclination to seek to broaden his support by utilitarian appeals to the peasantry, labor and lower middle class disaffecelements even though this would produce tion from the traditional element. In other words, given the basically conservative the United objectives, States was uncomfortable with regimes such as that of Mossadeq which involved rapid elite and normative alteration. Much preferred were regimes, such as that of the Shah in the 1960's, which would alter elites and norms more but yet would move rapidly slowly in the direction enough of social and economic to attract the necessary change popular satisfaction. This thrust was highly congruent with an era in which American intellectuals were proclaiming the end of ideology. There was little room for sentiment or for liberal doctrine among the Kennedy intellectuals. For example, Thomas Schelling, one of the intellectuals close to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, chose to speak of Dr. Mossadeq in each of his books dealing with bargaining strategies. In the first, the extraordinarily complex, subtle-minded was compared with a misbeMossadeq small having In the second,he child.16 is compared with a puppy uncontrollably wetting the floor.17 The reduc-

tionism

implicit

in advocating

child

psychology

as a mo-

del for dealing with the symbol of Iranian nationalism or in assuming that infantile irrationality characterized and gave him excellent Mossadeq bargaining is strength, only more extreme slightly than that found in other Kennedy theorists. Developmental patterns in Iran of the 1960's, for example, conformed well to the simplistic model in Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth; and the connot unlikely is surely clusion Rostow's inthat, given in the administration, fluence this was a determining factor in the pro-Shah policy. But possibly the best, although post hoc, statement of the new doctrine for developing countries can be found in Samuel Huntington's article, "Political Development and Political Decay."18 In that article Huntington glorifies the middle path of rational development. Too rapid elite or normative alterations for him can be as much a manifestation of decay IRANIAN STUDIES

18

Since the terms "developas would be no change at all. this value judgmental, ment" and "decay" are admittedly with American That it coincides doctrine. is clearly states in Iran and other client practice policy foreign of the Cold War era is probably not accidental. Development and economic tenns. system seen as the then the case could royal dictatorship problem for serious in

terms

of

can writers primary

sense

need not be thought of only in social political democratic Were a liberal for example, goal of "development," be made that in Iran the period of But a far more has been one of decay. regime is "development" the present

of

describe

identity

focus,

community

the

i.e.,

In what

identity.

society,

as traditional

largest

Ameri-

terminal, political

com-

is generalmunity to which one grants a primary loyalty, a manifest proceeds, But as development ly parochial. tendency is to focus on the nation as the object of terThe Mossadeq phenomenon was in minal, primary loyalty. Dr. Mossadeq aspect of development. this sense a vital the nation of Iran, for many Iranians came to symbolize These same and dignity. for true independence searching his having been overthrown by foreign perceived Iranians and their impotence in the face of that conintervention that It is hardly to be expected intervention. tinuing from that interthey would grant the regime benefiting legitimacy. ference nationalist terms, the problem this poses for Seen in control he has made Without question one. the Shah is a serious direction. in the utilitarian progress very significant have substanof Mossadeq, once supporters Many Iranians, Their areas. power in technical and great tial salaries In the to the regime. accommodation suggests behavior manipulate can legitimately the regime area, normative

with economic the symbols associated since But nearly a generation ment.

developand social the overturn of

especially progress the Shah has made little Mossadeq, nationalist in gaining and intellectuals among students of the articulate majority For the less legitimacy. to have he appears and urban labor, country, peasants serious economic adjustalthough been more successful, midwith the intellectual But his failure ments remain. on coercion reliance a continued necessitates dle class a American objectives, considering ironically and hence, few Seen in this perspective, instability. sub-surface for the Shah than the be more opportune could events al-Arab Shatt dispute.

in Iran, there is On the surface in the sense of the word as development Iran can stand as almost In fact, ton. in a American foreign policy successful try in the Cold War era. 19

and stability used by Huntingof the prototype coundeveloping WINTER1970

from the point of view of the archUnfortunately, in Iran, there are clear signs itects of American policy of American historians will that the next generation to this in the introduction judge them badly. As stated of the American is beginning essay, a general revision the Soviet American confrontation Cold War role including role in plays such an extraordinary in Iran. Perception can be made that the prediction foreign policy analysis that the architects of American Cold with some confidence War perspective. War policy will be judged in a post-Cold that preserved the American atThe perceptual blindness tentive public from viewing the full extent of American But is likely to pass. interference in Iran's affairs in its place there may well appear for many a view that America By now, of course, oil imperialism was the key. Given in Iran. oil interest does have a very substantial of the regime and the generally the surface stability there attitude of that regime, satisfactory cooperative to has been little reason for the American oil industry The Shah is a place demands on the State Department. the State Departhard bargainer, and in all probability ment has helped argue the oil company case with his govof any major ernment. But there is no public evidence demands from the oil industry. political policy and here is that the intensity The contention the in Iran has reflected direction of American policy implicit in perception of threat to the United States is behind the What basically Soviet ambitions in Iran. as President transformation of such formerly hard liners since 1962 and is the steady decline Nixon to negotiators of perceptions of that threat. the Cuban missile crises group pressure Since there is no ethnic or ideological are reaconcern with Iran, and since economic interests demands on situation, sonably happy with the existing Both AmeriIran are minimal. American policy concerning can and Iranian policy Not only is Sovietreflect this. but Iran is and increasing, Iranian trade substantial supplies from the Soviet Union and purchasing military thus becoming somewhat dependent for spare parts on the very government that presumably was the primary target of its earlier is the revealed Now fully armament programs. control. internal coercive central purpose of armament: and dam aid in the form of factory Also Iran is receiving with the in contrast construction. Even more startlingly little concern previous era, the United States manifests state relationThe client with these Iranian policies. ship is clearly over. for Iran, that Presumably the Cold War objective it have a stable priregime is of declining non-communist the intensity of American-Iranian ority. Consequently to the point that interference relations should decline IRANIAN STUDIES

20

beyond that of normal diplomatic American disinterest in Iran is

relations will cease. unlikely to reach the

pre-World

long

War II

And so

level.

as

the

Arab-Israeli

and the Iraqi-Kurdish crises persist American withdrawal from the area will be slow. But, having helped significantly alter the course of Iranian history, the United States appears likely now to move back toward the role of benevolent observer.

NOTES 1.

and Foreign Process The Political C. Cohen, Bernard Settlement Peace The Makin-g- of the Japanese Policy: 1957). (Princeton,

2.

L. P. Ellwell-Sutton, See (London, Politics Power

Oil

Fatemi,

A Study in Oil: Persian Saifpour and Nas-r-oah 1955);

in

Powderkeg

Diplomacy:

(New York,

Iran

1954). 3.

bein Iran Diplomacy of American account For a good UniYeselson, Abraham see period Shah the Reza fore 1883-1921J Relations, Diplomatic ted States-Persian quesoil On the 1956). New Jersey, (New Brunswick,

tion 4. 5.

6. 7.

Russia

Cottam, See "The Sources

op. of

1947,

York, 11. 12.

13. 14.

Americans

cit., So-vet

the

in

Iran

in

Persia

op.

Millspaugh,

and

Fatemi,

cit.,

Natonalism

West

124-29. pp. Conduct,"

(Washington, and

cit.,

Iran

in

cit.,

op.

(Pittsburgh,

George

New

(Ithaca,

Foreign

Affairs,

566-582.

pp.

Cottam, c1t., op. For a deveiopment

A Comparative 10.

op.

Elwell-Sutton,

Lenczowski, 1949). York, July 8. 9.

see

Cottam, and Richard 202-3. pp. 1964), C. Millspaugh, Arthur 1946). D. C., see On this subject

p. of

Analysis

237. this

scheme

of

Complex

see

Etzioni,

Amitai

Organizations

(New

1961).

and News U.S. of Grady, an interview example for See 13-17. pp. 1951, 19, Oct. Report, World p. 212. cit., op. iottam, this expressing letter of Mossadeq's text For the of The De artment see Eisenhower to President point 7 77o pp. 1953, 20, July Bulletin, State 211-221. cit., pp. op. Cottam, in print of this episode account The most complete Harkness, and Gladys the article by Richard remains Evenin The Saturday of CIA," Doings "The Mysterious an unpHowee 66-68: pp. 1954, 6, November Post, is far more complete Love by Kennett account lished witness. Love was an eye and accurate.

21

WINTER 1970

15.

16. 17.

George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore, 1967); Jahangir Amuzegar, Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran (New York, 1966). Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 13. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, 1966),

18.

p.

38.

Samuel P. Huntington, "Political litical Decay," World Politics, 430.

IRANIAN STUDIES

22

Development and PoApril 1965, pp. 386-

REVISIONISTS,OIL AND COLD WAR DIPLOMACY

JUSTUS D. DOENECKE conrecent if the be surprising indeed It would War Cold and the scholarship revisionist over troversy most two decades, the last For to Iran. not extend did inStates United that have asserted historians American to Soviet a response fundamentally was in Iran volvement Russia War II when during World made manifest penetration, Accordin Azerbaijan. regime a puppet to establish tried War scholarship, of Cold school "orthodox" to the ing in 1946. in Persia interest an overt took first America

to Stalin, the "blunt message" Truman sent his President Naand the United sharply, protested Department State The withdrawal. for Russian asked Council Security tions discussions, Nations the United boycotting Soviets, after

left

the

America,

territory.

suddenly awaken rescue.1 the

to

her

power,

a disinterested

and

responsibilities

world

had

come

to

has this tradiyears with the past several Only by a new 'revisionchallenged been interpretation tional who find that American policy of historians, school ist" own its and possessed its own dynamic from resulted often to the revisionAccording intervention. for mainspring cenof the the turn since diplomacy American school, ist thrust for marforward as a continued must be seen tury of both possession Defending and raw materials. kets and prosperity, security to national key as the elements been have McKinley of William the time her from diplomats an Open Door policy to secure effort in a constant engaged nineteenth century of the for diplomat As one her trade. In and no favor." field sought "a fair it, America put D. Rooseof Franklin war-time diplomacy this the context, to seof many steps in a history one becomes simply velt as a her takes and Iran place world, an Open Door cure almost can discover States the United where area major control. This for commercial essay opportunities unique works: Gardrevisionist Lloyd two major deal with will and of New Deal Aspects ner's Economic Diplomacy,2

D. Doenecke Justus in the New College

is Assistant Professor Florida. Sarasota, 23

of

History

at

WINTER 1970

Gabriel States

Kolko, Foreign

The Politics of War: 1943-1945.43 Policy,

The World

and United

American interest in Middle oil Eastern preceded World War II, when the State in conDepartment--working junction an accommodation with American companies--forced with the British and French extensive to permit American entry.4 For example, and the Britin 1928, the American ish, long rivals over Middle the soEastern oil, signed called 24 per cent of Red Line agreement which granted the output of the former Ottoman empire to American interests. Saudi Arabia and Iran, did not come however, under the terms of the agreement and were left open. Yet, testifying to the primacy a State of oil in his diplomacy, Department trade analyst claimed that "...a review of diplomatic history of the past 35 years show that will petroleum has historically played a larger part in the external relations of the United States than any other commodity."5 When in August, and Russia 1941, Britain occupied Iran to secure control of their supply lines, Wallace Murray, Chief of the Near Eastern Division of the American State Department, advocated the resumption of trade negotiations with Iran "for reasons of political expediency and in order to safeguard American trade interests in Iran during the post-war period." Murray told leaders of the American oil industry interested in Iran that he did not want to repeat the pattern of the past two decades, when America had been obliged to force her way into the Middle East. On January 13, 1942, less than a month after Pearl Harbor, America was indeed insisting that Anglo and Soviet pipelines, constructed with her lend-lease aid be made available to her own companies after the war. It is in this context that the financial mission of Arthur C. Millspaugh to Iran in late 1942 must be viewed, as well as the visit of Patrick Hurley to the Middle East in the middle of 1943. Kolko claims that Millspaugh, "who years earlier had worked for the Iranians," was "the most powerful man in Iranian economic affairs"--that is, until he was forced out by Iranian

nationalists torney for ternational

in February, 1945. several American oil operations.

Hurley had been an atcompanies which had in-

Upon return to the United States, Hurley told President Roosevelt that America "had to put forth a much greater and exert much more leadership effort if Iran were

to

remain

independent."

Hence

it

was

Hurley

who

secured agreement from the Big Three at Teheran pledging respect from Iranian independence, it was he who called for shifting the control of lend-lease in Iran from the British to the Americans, and who offered plans for IRANIAN STUDIES

24

building

an Iranian

democracy,

based

in

his

words

upon

a

went even furMillspaugh "system of free enterprise." program of American aid to a twenty-year ther, projecting backand stabilizing as he put it, for "developing serve, declaring, was indeed impressed, Roosevelt ward areas." with the idea of using Iran as an "I was rather thrilled American policy." example of what we could do by unselfish that he was too old for Yet Roosevelh did admit privately such a task. of Hurley and Millsdismissal Despite Roosevelt's was soon stepped American activity paugh's grand designs, recommendaIn the spring of 1944, Hurley's up in Iran. into an be transformed tion that the American legation that out, as well as his suggestion Embassy was carried When the be taken over by American agencies. lend-lease in late 1944, mission was strengthened American military that such a of War Henry L. Stimson declared Secretary and advancement of "for the protection move was necessary Admiral William D. Leahy, a top advisor our interests." in seeing that the Chief pleasure expressed to Roosevelt, toward Briwas taking "a very strong attitude Executive in Iraq, Saudi tain" concerning 5uture oil concessions Arabia,

and

Iran.

It is at this point that American oil aims can be Kolko is Professor best put into a wider perspective. In a general discuscogent on this point. particularly during the war, he relations sion of British-American notes: was one analysis The issue in the final The power. critical strategic of Britain's had a powerful oil inAmericans in contrast excessive restricted dustry that successfully the Middle East As an oil reserve imports. Middle Eastto be reliable. was too distant repern oil to the United States ultimately to Europe and a source of exports resented to conan instrument and potentially profit, In the controversy trol European industry. were that ensued after 1943 the British for their very economic and stratebattling the Americans for profits. gic independence, both initiated Both sides were aggressive, Middle Eastthe entire until new struggles, integrated became a single, ern question illusNo other issue more vividly problem. the theory and practice trated to the British of the new world econowy the Americans said they wished to create.?U

25

WINTER 1970

Triggering

the

oil

Iranian-American

interpower

were

dispute

negotiations,

possibly

secret

not even

1943. An overture late known to Washington until between Vacuum conan Iranian and Standard commercial attache in Baluchiscerned the possibility of an oil concession discovered tan. As soon as the British this, they rapidthere to ly sent their own representatives to Teheran, The Russians the area for themselves. secure followed Alwith the demand to seek oil in all of Azerbaijan. of State the American though minister warned Secretary Cordell Hull that such American overtures "would cause toward British and Soviets to suspect that our attitude Iran is not entirely disinterested and thus weaken our Vacuum that general position here." Hull told Standard "because of the importance of petroleum, both from the

long-range looks with sources dard to

viewpoint and for war purposes, the Department favor upon the development of all possible

of petroleum." The rush to Teheran.11

State

Department

urged

Stan-

of the Soon the rivalry reached the leadership Great Powers. At the end of February, Churchill 1944, wired FDR: "There is apprehension in some quarters here that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our in the Middle East on which among other assets oil things, the whole supply of our navy depends." Roosevelt replied that he in turn was concerned the about "the rumor that British wish to horn in on the Saudi Arabian oil reserves," at which point he feared that Churchill retorted "a wide difference opening between the British and United States Governments on such a subject at this Kolko adds, time."

"The matter had become grave, for on their oil despite the alliance suf fering. "I1 1

the Americans insisted and common wartime

At the very time Roosevelt and Churchill were communicating, the State Department was alerting her embassies that "we are actively engaged in developing a firm post-war theme:

foreign

oil

policy."

The United

States

Kolko

elaborates

demanded

equal

on this rights

with other foreign nations to explore and develop foreign oil. Given United States power such a position implied America would demand control over the future development of foreign oil. time the State DeBy this partment's policy completely identified the national interest with that of American oil firms operating abroad..." Or,

told

as

Under

the embassies,

IRANIAN STUDIES

Secretary

of

"You should 26

State

render

Edward

all

Stettinius

appropriate

to the representatives assistance petroleum nies who may be seeking

of

American

oil

compa-

concessions."L3

was firm in seeking States the United Yet while she was not quite the Open Door for her own concessions, On April to others. to grant such privileges so willing "Petroleum entitled, a document was released 11, 1944, repeated The declaration States." Policy of the United access" and equal American demands for "equal familiar in exploration," enterprise for American opportunity of Western of "conservation the element while introducing of This conservation, petroleum reserves." Hemisphere of as practical, insofar implied "curtailment, course, Hemifrom Western and its products the flow of petroleum Kolko canmarkets." Hemisphere to Eastern sphere sources "Given United his own comment: from adding not restrain Hemiof Western of the vast majority States consumption mona United States output, this meant in effect spheric at that the known world reserves one-half opoly of nearly the former called for terminating The policy also time." of Middle the apportionment concerning Western agreements Further, and far more importantly, Eastern Oil reserves. of 'a by Washington guarantees it called for governmental of holding diversified and geographically substantial nationStates in the hands of United foreign petroleum to demand for would continue America als." Yet, while none she would surrender concessions from others, further "This would of her own. The report continued clearly: presentposition of the absolute the preservation involve of existprotection and therefore vigilant ly obtaining, with inStates hands coupled in United ing concessions of equal opportunupon the Open Door principle sistence in new areas." Again, companies States ity for United reresist his own interpretative Kolko cannot Professor marks: Given the already position predominant of the United States in the world oil economy, terms meant near Amerthe Open Door in these natural over the most critical ican monopoly in the world--precisely what the resource Hull for And although suspected. British trade and bilateral against inveighed years the instrument for ateconomic agreements, unwould be a "bilateral this taining policy with the United Kingdom" which derstanding to other nations for they then might present Such is the stuff agreement. multimaterial words are made.14 from which noble arrived in When the British the such talks, they told for just must provide States United proposal 27

that month Washington Americans that any for British industrial, WINTER 1970

commercial and military welfare. The Americans refused, claiming that would "conflict such assurances with our established commercial and forcing policy," through an innocuous final statement the Atlantic endorsing Charter.15 Yet Millspaugh was becoming more and more of a nuisance, despite his strong for American support oil aims. of an Iranian His unilateral revision treaty with Russia shocked the generally Mohammed Saed, pro-American who by February, 1944, was calling for his removal. Millspaugh's execution of American howaims continued, ever: he arranged for Hlerbert Hoover, Jr. and A. A. Curtis, both American oil consultants--in Kolko's words--to "define Iran's in talks interests with Anglo-Iranian Oil, Standard Vacuum, and Sinclair Oil." Finally, Millspaugh became the main subject of Iranian politics, for his oil activities and personal seemed even to American arrogance embassy officials to encourage the extreme nationalists. By the end of June, Saed was frightened of the rising strength of the nationalist leader Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, profiteers, and the Tudeh party, and stripped Millspaugh of his powers. Both Hull and Hiurley had been aware of Millspaugh's deficiencies as a diplomat, and his loss of power by no means indicated any shift in the American thrust to secure oil concessions. As Stettinius noted, America wanted "a strong and independent Iran," which would include "the possibility of sharing more fully in Iran' s commerce and the development of its resources." To guarantee these aims, America needed continuation of the advisor program, air bases, and "close interest in the present negotiations (with Hoover and Curtis) for a petroleum concession in Iran."16 It was in September, 1944, that the Russians entered the scene, a move which according to Kolko turned "what originally had been an Anglo-American conflict [into]a three-way crisis among the major Allies." At this time Sergei I. Kavtaradze, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Teheran to secure a five-year oil concession for those areas in northern Iran then under Russian occupation. Partially under American urging, Saed announced on October 9 that he would defer all concessions negotiations until the end of the war.17 As Herbert Feis, Economic Adviser to the State Department, later noted, "Any gesture intended to assist the USSR to secure control over the oil resources of Northern Iran would have been resented in Britain and reas betrayal garded by the ruling element of Iran. Besides, who knew with certainty what use the USSR would make of the concessions?" Russian funds were used in an attempt to overthrow the Saed government, and when on December 2, the Majlis took over, Mossadegh pushed through IRANIAN STUDIES

28

oil concesto discuss foreign a law making it illegal While the Russians were furisions without its consent. Leland Burnette Morris, led ambassador, ous, America's the postaccepting in willingly the American delegation told Joseph Grew, Acting Iranian diplomats ponement. to be able to that they were relieved of State, Secretary avoid the Soviet request and hoped that American compaa prominent role" Gardner's words--"play nies would--in KolYet Professor Iran's oil resources.1 in developing the whole Russian affair. ko is quite terse concerning He writes: over oil the struggle It was primarily over of American control and the extension that caused the Russians to Iranian affairs but to establish not only for oil, intervene along their borthat affairs the principle ders could no longer be determined without and security.19 regard to Soviet interests with that of George F. coincides Such a statement to the State Department embasKennan, American counselor sy in Moscow, who warned that "the basic motive of recent in northern Iran is probably not the need Soviet action peneforeign of potential but apprehension for oil itself to its Yet, without referring in that area..." tration State any clash with the Soviets,the own role in creating that to Roosevelt 1945, reported in January, Department, cooperation.20 ground for Allied Iran was a real testing for the U.S. In late 1944, John A. Loftus wrote an article in In"Petroleum entitled, Bulletin of State Department Relations," ternational over the ican hegemony said: Loftus

which world's

Kolko most

Ameroutlining sees resource. critical

by American of control The desirability is abroad properties over petroleum nationals the (a) that based on two considerations: for disoil industry talent of the American demonis historically and development covery equal, being other things (b) that strated... is nationals States by United oil controlled to the more accessible to be a little likely of in times uses for commercial States United in time of purposes and for strategic peace war.21

Hence it

is

hardly

surprising

and Britain urged the from withdrawals troop

States United for the date

that

at Yalta

for August, 1941, and Stalin fixed by Churchill had ended. By May the months after hostilities too

joined

in

such

while

requests,

29

the

to advance Russians originally Iran, Churchill

six Iranians

thought

that

WINTER1970

some British military presence might be needed.22 The United States, all the while, maintained her advisory commissions in Iran until September, 1945, and willingly responded to Iranian requests for aid in securing withdrawal of the other two great powers. To both Gabriel Kolko and Lloyd Gardner, the Azarbaijan crisis of 1946-when the United Nations Security Council secured the withdrawal of Russian forces--was the triumph of really American oil policy. Kolko says: ...From 1945 on the United States consistently urged that foreign troops withdraw far more quickly than either the Russian or British governments desired. The United States could therefore represent itself as the disinterested advocate of Iranian national

interests,

a position

(retained)

...during

the sustained crisis that recurred repeatedly after the war. In this position the United States championed Iranian rights over British and Russian imperialism, and ultimately obtained a major share in the output of the Iranian oil industry.23 Gardner comments in a similar

vein,

writing:

Although the United Nations was finally brought into the controversy, American-led Iranian soldiers replaced Soviet occupation forces in Northern Iran, and American influence probably was the determining force in the granting blocking of a Soviet oil concession in 1947. Gone were the impressive dreams of reIran. building Great Britain and Russia had withdrawn their troops, but the country's basic ills remained. Foreign ownership of oil resources led to the nationalization crisis of 1951 and 1952, at the conclusion of which the United States finally got a share of Iranian oil as part of an international consortium set up to run the fields. The continuing burden of absentee land ownership plagued the country, and the rising tide of Middle Eastern nationalism made the area unstable.24 Efforts thus far made to answer the revisionists have neither been very extensive nor very successful. Perhaps it is partly because American scholars for so long have not looked at American policy in terms of any inner dynamics, any direction of its own. Too often it IRANIAN STUDIES

30

has merely been pictured in terms of a "response" to aggression, or restoring the "balance of power." Even those who talk in terms of "awakening to world responsibilities" fail to modify the American picture of the disinterested world policeman. The revisionists, relying upon such evidence as the wartime in Iran, diplomacy fail to be satisfied with such explanations for American conduct. In the words of Professor Robert Freeman Smith, "Their works reject the view of a somewhat befuddled, defensive United States facing a world of predatory aggressors, and instead present the United States as a rather imperial-minded power with ambitions and goals which on the whole are rather similar to those of most other modern powers."25 It is only when defenders of American policy are willing to re-examine the domestic origins of their diplomacy that they can genuinely contribute to the debate.

NOTES 1.

2. 3.

Such an interpretation is repeated by Professor Richard Cottam in a paper primarily dealing with post-war Iran. In his introductory remarks, Cottam claims that before the year 1954 American diplomacy in Iran was never fundamentally motivated by a concern for oil reserves. lie denies that "American oil interests, acting independently or as part of an international trust, were significant in determining either major detail or the general color of American policy in Iran." He further asserts that even prior to World War II, American involvement in Iran was "slight," that such diplomats as Arthur Millspaugh--director of a wartime financial mission from the United States to Iran--"left Iranians with a very favorable impression of the United States," and that efforts to obtain concessions for Standard Oil and Sinclair were "minor," conspicuously lacking in success. Intense American interest in Iran, "did not notes Cottam, even occur when American in Iran forces were present during World War," when there was "a general deferin 1946. ence to the British, and only became active At that time American was "overwhelmingly depolicy the removal of Soviet fensive," involving troops from northern AzerIran and the ousting of the communist baijan regime See Richard by the Iranian army. Cottam, "The United and the Cold War," (paper States, Iran, delivered at the Conference on the'Structure of Power in Islamic Iran,' June 26-28, 1969), pp. 3-5. Madison, Wisconsin: of Wisconsin University Press, 1964. New York: Random House, 1968. 31

WINTER 1970

4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

10. 12.

13. 15. 17. 19. 20.

For a full see John A. De Novo, American description, Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1919 (Minneapolis: of Minnesota University Press, 1963.) Cited in Kolko, p. 294. Gardner, p. 227. Kolko, p. 299. According to Kolko, in fact, Millspaugh "was there to open Iranian riches to the United States" and led the American government's effort to direct much of Iranian affairs. Kolko does note that the Iranians, themselves, were "delighted" with continued American protection, then a useful counterforce to Russian and British inroads. Gardner, p. 228. Kolko elaborates Hurley's posture, noting Hurley's fear of British mono"imperialism, poly, and exploitation" and his appeal that Roosevelt work for "liberty and Democracy" in Iran by obtaining important oil concessions, maintaining a mission concerned with domestic life in Iran, and breaking the economic hold of the British. See p. 308. Gardner, p. 229. Gardner further comments, "Apparently without informing either Russia or Great Britain, the United States had moved to obtain an oil concession in Iran. Never before had American interest had a clear shot in this but now proscountry, pects were especially good." Kolko, p. 295. 11. Kolko, p. 300 Kolko, p. 301. Churchill said to Roosevelt on March 4, 1944, that "My position in this, as in all matters, is that Great Britain seeks no advantage, territorial or

otherwise, as result of the war. On the other hand she will not be deprived of anything which rightly belongs to her after having given her best services to the good cause--at least not so long as your humble servant is entrusted with the conduct of affairs." Ibid. Ibid., p. 302. 14. Ibid., p. 303. Ibid., pp. 303-4. 16. Ibid., p. 229. Gardner, p. 229. 18. Gardner, pp. 229-230. Kolko, p. 310. Ibid., p. 311. One revisionist historian, D. F. Flemsees ing, oil as an extremely strong factor in Russian demands. "For decades," he writes, "the British had been taking great quantities of oil from South Iran.

The Russians desired to exploit North Iran, partly because they feared that their own fields might be drained by wells south of the border. It was sometimes said that Russia did not need oil, but this was not true in view of the fuel needs of any large expanding economy and of the recent war damage in her own oil fields. She also naturally desired to share in Middle East oil takings, since the West had fabulous holdings in Iran, Arabia, and Iraq." See The Cold War and Its Origins, Volume I (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday

, 1961),

IRANIAN STUDIES

p.

340. 32

21. 22.

23. 25.

495. on February 6, when 496. Gardner notes that favored met, Eden and Stettinius Ministers Ete Foreign the withdrawal for Iran after concession oil a Soviet that KoIko suspects See p. 230. troops. of foreign did not just troops to maintain desire Churchill's for "but most probably from Russia any threat concern would deal only with the United the Iranians fear that P. 496. to do so." if permitted States p. 231. Gardner, 24. p. 496. Kolko, Relations, "American Foreign Freeman Smith, Robert Toward a New ed., J. Bernstein, in Barton 1920-1942," in American (New York: Past: Essays History Dissenting p. 237. 1968), Pantheon, Ibid.,

p.

SIBTl, p.

33

WINTER 1970

AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE MAJLESCOMMITTEE

ANN T.

SCHULZ

Seven years ago, a political report published by Echo of Iran raised the issue of the difficulty with which the Iranian politic l elite between distinguishes criticism and subversion. There is still only a hazy boundary separating treason from the lesser Just evil. one example of this level of debate was the suggestion by the "opposition" Mardom Party Newspaper that to attribute administrative misdemeanors to either ministers or to the Imperial was to commit treason.2 Inspectorate One of the distressing effects of the failure to make this distinction in contemporary Iran is that a generation may appear which is loyal to the monarchy but which holds attitudes counter-productive to the espoused long-run political goals of the Shah.3 The attitudes to which I refer include the rejection of policy-oriented political activity and a flexible bargaining stance in the resolution of social problems. This writer met a number of young people in Iran who saw general disorder as the only alternative to the tight rein with which the Shah attempts to guide political activity. If, in fact, there is, as the Shah maintains, growing support for the general goals of the Shah-People Revolution, the time has come to examine consciously the development of areas in which a broader segment of the can participate population in shaping public policy without raising the loyalty This observation is not, issue. in itself, a new one. Almost a decade ago, T. Cuyler Young spoke to the problem of developing a corps of young political leaders.4 By asking that leadership development be given explicit consideration, Professor Young was recognizing the existence of several problems (in addition to that mentioned above) which confront all polities and especially "developing' ones.

Ann T. Schulz is Assistant Professor at the University of New Hampshire. IRANIAN STUDIES

34

of Political

Science

of of these problems is the achievement The first goals-as developmental be described what may generally development. or socio-economic be they 'nation-building' has in policy-making The need for expanding participation on politerature in the burgeoning been amply discussed The justificadevelopment.5 and administrative litical for broadened participation tion advanced most frequently scrutiny to additional will be subjected is that policies for elites to enforce programs and that it will be easier once adopted. reason for involvcrucial, and equally A second, is ing a large number of people in policy determination The stake in the regime. the participants' to increase and treason on the part of power of criticism confusion that potenmakes it more likely almost certainly holders fashion. will respond in a similar tial counter-elites what happened prior to and immediThat was essentially There Revolution. the Constitutional ately following at issue which need of policy questions were substantive of the monarchy, but not have endangered the continuation partly because MohammadAli Shah chose to remain inflexisupport for his refinancial ble on the issue of foreign gime, he forced the issue of curbing the Shah's power by the newly established closing Majles.6 in Iran appears criticism of political The pattern Rather than consideration. somewhat unusual upon first with criticism opposition countering finding the elite is an extremethe Shah himself arguments in its defense, as well as the minisof policy execution ly vocal critic of the servants and the civil ters of their departments at persons of little directed Thus, criticism public. aulevelled at those with greater power is acceptable; unless its object is exit is less acceptable thority, between the Shah and The distinction tremely vague. The Shah is is even more profound. other politicians of the manner in his criticism to direct most likely the iniis executed because he is nominally which policy no this crucial role, Yet despite of all policy. tiator If this of the Shah is permissible. public criticism which derives maximum as a tactic is described pattern to competitors) relative prestige (increasing advantage action compa(by negative with a minimum of independent it no longer can be seen as unique to Iran, but risons), in which the stakes of found in situations is frequently are high. Thus, Iranian political activity political are immune to neither critical stance s nor to cynelites to both.' And, in susceptible icism but particularly of system, the difinition Iran, as in any other political behavior treasonous system-challenging")" (or 'negative leaders is pragmatic and most often defined by political themselves. 35

WINTER1970

The possibility of increasing a regime's legitimacy should enchant the power elite in any polity. In fact, Manfred Halpern has recognized the dual benefits of broadened participation of the Shah's in his criticism avoidance of the new middle class on the ground both of formulating good policy and of curbing alienation.9 The late Dr. Hasan Arsanjani pinpointed the sources of alienation suc 4nctly in a recent article on "The Youth Revolution." He held "society" for the responsible directions through which youth vented its abundant energies. Youth share an inherent drive to express themselves. If this drive is stymied, the youthful energies will find destructive outlets. One Azarbaijani newspaper writer indicates that there may have been some increase in participation: "In the short time that the intelligentsia has been given a chance and a better deal..."ll But whatever improvement has been made, the article concludes (as do the observers cited above) on the pessimistic note that "it is not becoming of this age of mental maturity that the people should be given childish games and expect them to accept them as so-called political exigencies." Much of the pressure for changing the "standards of admission" to decision-making circles has apparently come from the "technocrats" and the bureaucratic middle class who are anxious to see "objective achievement criteria" govern leadership recruitment.12 There are other critics of centralized decision-making who emphasize the breadth of participation rather than the use or failure to use achievement criteria. One of these critics, a writer for Neda-ye-Luristan, demanded that the Interior Ministry confront the problem of local council elections honestly. The rationale for stopping the elections "midstream" was that "unsatisfactory" representatives had been chosen in several instances. Despite the Government's justification, the writer cited felt that the elections were the pertinent end, rather than the composition of the Councils.13 (The law providing for municipal

elections

was

passed

by the

Majles

in

1955.)

In many contemporary Communist regimes today (to cite but one example) there is apparently a conflict similar to that found by Professor Bill in Iran between technocrats and planners, on the one hand, and an elite which coopts its new members on the basis of loyalty (both to persons and to "the regime") alone.14 This conflict is exacerbated because the doctrinal commitment of the elite is to universalistic recruitment criteria, thus its contradicting actual behavior. This commitment

arouses unfulfilled expectations. The Shah has made such an ideological commitment and the existence of this IRANIAN STUDIES

36

contradiction in Iran is almost certainly one reason why there is extensive cynicism among the elites and "counterelites."15 The tensions created by such contradictions (between espoused ideology and practice) ofttimes affect the prescriptive conclusions of outside observers, be they scholars or more casual onlookers. It is by no means certain that achievement criteria for leadership recruitment are untarnished gems to be coveted at any historical juncture. There is much logic in the argument that charismatic leadership, for example, might provide the kind of security and motivation needed to meet successfully the wrenching dislocations inherent in development. The more realistic question that must be asked is: Is there any middle ground which might be an acceptable compromise between open and controlled participation for all concerned? Dr. Arsanjani, in the article cited above, called for a balance between expression and control. The balance continues to hang on the side of control. There are some trends in Iranian politics which do evidence potential for stimulating political activity and we youth with leadership capabilities. Unfortunately know little about the impact of their experiences in the Literacy, Rural Development and Health Corps. Do these 'in the field" less young people emerge from their stints and more committed to activity in cynical about politics the area of public policy? If they do, other experiments in institution-building might be encouraged. Concomitant with youth involvement, however, must come the expansion of the possibility of meaningful poliIn this tical activity during extended adult careers. have direction, efforts to regularize economic decisions Yet associations. led to the formation of new business associations in such private the Government's involvement than they otherwise renders them less valuable might be in stimulating policy-oriented activity.16 institutions the existing ofSimilarly, political centers of policy discusfer little hope as alternative of the powerThe recognition sion as now constituted. lessness of the Majles and the political parties by reduces even furIranians within and without the elite to prospective in giving direction ther their usefulness or policy makers. politicians Occasionally attempts are of these institutions the legitimacy but made to increase undertaken in a quiet or even the moves are generally This approach undercuts the possibiclandestine manner. as sincere and that the measures will be interpreted lity of the elite's be due to the partiality may, in fact, foci for political alternative commitment to supporting 37

WINTER 1970

as Secretary loyalties. Ata-ollah Khosravani was removed the same time General of the Iran Novin Party at roughly of his use of criticisms that newspapers were voicing the very sito quell debate. However, pressure tactics their such moves deadens impact. lence which surrounds like Political strategies, There is planned and deliberate. for regarding political development an unmanageable variable. dependent constructs might include potential debate on policy issues while not

restrictions

on political

any others, may be no justifiable reason as a natural process-Thus, developmental to broaden strategies eliminating completely

activity.17

depolicy One such arena in which "constructive" is, I would like to bate might successfully be encouraged inCertainly, suggest, that of the Majles committee. creasing their participation in policy making will not automatically improve the regard with which the Majles is is also a held. Opening the selection of legislators commitnecessary means to that end. However, increased of tee activity might at least change the perspectives the Majles members themselves--and with 200 plus representatives and approximately a 50 per cent turnover every effect. that would have more than a little four years, proportion of The Majles itself includes an increasing as the "educated what may very generally be described as a fomiddle class," which should bolster its utility cal point for development. that the

well

One is Such a strategy entails many problems. there has never been a broad consensus concerning correct

procedures

as on their

role

for

deliberations

committee

in policy-making.

as

As one deputy

the power of active the Mossadegh during period observed, a committee policy depended, and its ability to influence even then, chairman.18 upon the power of the individual In other words, the committee has little life of its own. the lifeblood of a To carry the metaphor further, in large measure upon the parliamentary committee depends resources committee has no at its disposal. The Majles

technical or physical resources. research In fact, assistants. themselves handle the recording deliberations. legislature

Another is

potential its ability

or It has no clerical representatives individual in the committee involved

source of to draw

committee upon the

in analyzing non-legislators policy. U.S. Congress, for example, regularly have no formal ties to the Government scholarly or economic interest in the IRANIAN STUDIES

38

power in expertise

any of

Committees in the use witnesses who and who have either subject under

of however, the patterns In the Majles, consideration. of the bureauthe preponderance reinforce consultation The Majles committee comdetermination. cracy in policy and of govmonly hears only the views of other deputies between priThe actual consultation ernment witnesses. takes issues and the Government on policy vate interests For example, the Majles place within the ministries. hearing on the Fourth Plan Bill conPlanning Committee's of Plan of the Director of the testimony primarily sisted had been submitted to the Before this bill Organization. the however, meetings between the architectsl?f Majles, had taken place. industrialists Plan and private lack of constructive legislators' The contemporary then should not have mystiin policy-making participation did) in Hoveida (as it apparently fied Prime Minister under which the committees operlight of the constraints Nor is Iran exempt from the logic which has reate.20 to the overall activity in legislative lated the decline monand the simultaneous activity growth in governmental by resources and intellectual of financial opolization tasks are further And, the committees' administrators.21 encumbered by the current emphasis on gaining the "approbefore it val" of the Iran Novin Party on legislation goes to the Majles as a whole, and by the desire of the through the Majles as to push legislation Administration as possible. rapidly commita confusing problem exemplifies The latter both a strong ment on the part of the Shah to developing party and at the same time to pre"revolutionary" single within the competition a semblance of partisan serving party apparAlthough the commitment to a single Majles. such measures as the appointment ently has not dictated only, legisand deputy ministers of Iran Novin ministers is brought before party caucuses before it reaches lation into stimulate in an apparent effort the Majles floor, (December, The recent in the Party organization. terest in funds for the Fourth Plan was "expected 1969) increase as it has already been to pass the House unscathed group of the ruling Iranapproved by thl parliamentary does not guarantee This kind of activity Novin Party."2 role in developing greater to the party a substantially between but it does place one more obstacle legislation, Majles deliberation. the Government and active There are many examples of the second encumbrance cogent one is A particularly to committee deliberation. passed in the Majles the Defense Loans Bill which recently According to the Conafter only two weeks of discussion. the Majles is the focal point of budgetary powstitution The Defense Bill should have aroused exceptional er. because funds for the armed forces are, to interest 39

WINTER1970

indulge in the ultimate siderable contention.23 weeks.

a matter of conunderstatement, But passage took a scant two

indications In addition to these direct of the imthere are as constituted, potence of Majles committees means of assessing indirect the importance of committee in processing activity one of these is to legislation. examine the characteristics of the legislators who are in the committees recruited to leadership positions themA comparison of the social selves. background characteristics of Majles representatives with the Iranian population as a whole shows that particular segments of the were strongly in the legislapopulation overrepresented ture--the secularly-educated, landowners, professionals, and currently civil servants. If the committees were active in policy-making these characteristics should appear even more strongly in sought-after leadership positions.24 We studied the characteristics of committee chairmen and members of the Executive Committee in the first twenty-one sessions to determine if this funneling did The initial occur. selection criteria but were repeated only to a very slight degree. Educated deputies made up a larger percentage of the office-holders than did the non-educated.25 Among those deputies with high office holding scores, however, the advantage enjoyed by the educated deputies in obtaining chairs declined. The same held for occupation. relationship For example, in the Majles as a whole, deputies with salaried occupations overrepresented their corresponding numbers in the population to a far greater extent than they themselves wer e overrepresented within the Majles committee leadership. 6 In contrast to Frey's study of the occupants of various leadership posts within the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Cabinet, the lack of differentiation between the Majles membership and the leaders is one further indication of the lack of power attributed to the committees.27

The variation in leaders' backgrounds during the four "Constitutional periods" also speaks to the lack of independence and thus prestige enjoyed by Majles committees. Committee chairmen were more likely to be educated in the traditional Islamic schools during Reza Shah's reign and during the post-Mossadegh era than they were during either the Constitutional period or the post-World War II years. There were occupational differences as In the periods of strong monarchical well. rule, officeholding was monopolized by deputies with land-holding and government service backgrounds to the detriment of deputies in what has been termed the "persuasive" occupations IRANIAN STUDIES

40

relidefinition) writer's and (by this teaching --legal, about why One might draw a number of conclusions gious. I The only point took place. shifts particular these They indicate they did take place. wish to make is that a determs, in these is, leadership parliamentary that bethe boundaries words, or in other variable, pendent have been politics and external tween the committees vague. are

If there relatively

committees that are so many indications enterit is not then a futile powerless,

Perthem for new tasks? prise to recommend refurbishing of these same data other aspects haps not, for several about the committee's conclusions point to some positive were regarded as reand expertise Experience position. Senior depufor committee chairmen. levant attributes positions to leadership elected ties were most frequently than the averolder were slightly chairmen and committee for leadership some qualifications Thus, age deputy. was And there to be important. thought were apparently specioccupying deputies in terms of specific continuity electthe committees on the average Although fic posts. held many deputies over the session, ed one new chairman In other more than one session. during the same chair

to a particbe elected words, a deputy would frequently ular chair for one or two but not all of the organizationover a span of several in each session (jalese) al periods but is less obvious, This kind of continuity sessions. for the an opportunity providing very real, nonetheless growth of expertise. that a seat in the Rajles In arguing his thesis in policyright to participate the possessor's legitimizes that "members of the Majlis making, Leonard Binder writes to see and opportunity and senate have an unparalleled before they become law. in committee, bills discuss selfand senate members can and do insert .Majlis does not have When the bill amendments. protective they may also delay it for varying staunch royal support, The Majles Planning Committee appears to be periods."2 According to one in these terms. active particularly work, it receives newspaper account of the Committee's in projects development for specific numerous proposals by the recommending deputies.29 represented the districts this kind of actiWhether or not one wishes to disparage it is part and parcel of vity as "pork barreln politics, Morein more powerful legislatures. committee activity decision-making the independent to control over, attempts have come through the Planpower of the Plan Organization to conthat the stimulus It is doubtful ning Commission. in the Committee, but trol the planning body originated did not erode the Commitcertainly itself the exercise tee's power. 41

WINTER1970

Members of the Petitions Committee have also indicated an interest in assuming an active role in its "ombudsman" capacity. that Kayhan reported 58,000 complaints were received by the Committee the twentyduring first session of the Majles.30 Most of these complaints were not processed because of technical resource constraints and the lack of contact between Ministries and the representatives themselves. The probability that greater committee activity would be enthusiastically greeted by the representatives is high. Committee chairmen are consistently the major source of opinion in floor debate on any particular issue. In the same vein, within at least the four-man Mashhad delegation, the deputies make a conscious to diattempt vide legislation and constituent demands by subject matter on the basis of their own occupational specializations and committee assignments. The crucial missing ingredient,then, is administrative support for their expanded roles. It would be worthwhile experimenting with improved technical support (in the form of financial, staff and witness resources) in the absence of a deeper political commitment to the committees. Technical resources are just one area of stress in institution-building; however, its relatively noncontroversial character may recommend its selection as a point of departure. The renewed emphasis upon institution-building in studies of political change follows on the heels of the earlier recognition of the importance of informal negotiations and decision-making processes. While institutions may be only the visible portion of the iceberg, their characteristics are not unrelated either in shape, origin or fate to the submerged form. Most inquiry follows such a dialectic path. One student disposed toward the behavioral approach for understanding legislatures is now contemplating the possibility that such institutions themselves possess independent influence over the behavior of their members.3 Thus, although institutions with nominative similarity may exhibit marked normative differences, they are not completely formless conduits and may conceivably be shaped to elicit specific desired behavior. And, given the state of our knowledge about political development, experimentation is doubtless as efficient and reliable as theory-building. For example, the Iranian Army, a bulwark of tradition in one sense has been given an innovative role in social development.32 Data from such cases on the reciprocal influence of role, member and institution would provide an opportunity to sift through the available hypotheses.

IRANIAN

STUDIES

42

NOTES 388 (Echo of Iran,

1963).

1.

Political

2.

Mehre

3.

Throughout Mission For My Country (New York: McGrawHill, 1961), the Shah discusses the "political immadifficult. turity" which makes policy discussion 2 "Iran in Continuing Crisis," Foreign Affairs,40, (1961), p. 290. countries do not reAll prescriptions for developing as an unmiticircles gard more open decision-making seriously the gated blessing, but most consider problems presented by a narrow basis for policy devis usually elopment. In fact, political development in defined as including expanded participation decision-making. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner, Development (PrincePolitical Parties and Political ton: Pye Princeton University 1966),MLucian Press, and S. Verba, Political DevelCulture and Political 1969), Milton Princeton U. Press, opment (Princeton: of Development Administration,' Esman,i "The Politics in Wm. Siffen and J. D. Montgomery, eds., Approaches to Development Politics, and Change Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), and Lucian W. Pye, (Boston: Little, Aspects of Political Development Brown and Company, 1966). to compromise with The revolutionaries' willingness but the throne is seen not only in the Constitution also in such behavior as asking the Shah's consent before seeking bast. E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-TW90 (London: F. Cass, 1966), p. 118. Marvin Zonis, "Iran: The Politics of Insecurity" (UnPh.D. dissertation, M.I.T., 1968), pp. 531published 535. Iran: Political Development in a Leonard Binder, of California University (Berkeley: Changing Society Press , 1962), p. 288. "The Character and Scope of the SoManfred Halpern, in the Middle East," in William R. cial Revolution North Revolution: Polk, ed., The Developmental the Middle East and South Asia (Washington, Africa,, The Middle East Institute, 1963), p. 15. D. C.: It should be noted, however, Donya Almanac, 1968. in politithat the lack of meaningful participation cal life is only one cause of alienation among Iranof Student "The Politics ian youth. James A. Bill, The Case of Iran," Iranian Studies, Alienation: II, 1 (1969). Asre Novin, "Victory Should Not Be Election Goal," in Echo of Iran, XVI, 106 (1968). translated "The Iranian Intelligentsia: Class and James Bill, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Change" (Unpublished University, 1968).

4. 5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11. 12.

Reports, Iran,

May

22,

1968.

43

WINTER 1970

13. 14.

15. 16.

17.

18.

19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

Neda-ye-Luristan, January 17, 1968. and Group Conflict H. Gordon Skilling, "Leadership in Czechoslovakia," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Political in Eastern Leadership and the Soviet Euroee Union, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970). Marvin Zonis, "Iran: The Politics of Insecurity" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T., 1968). The new Export-Import rules announced by UnderSecretary of Economy Rokneddin call for the Tehrani of an exporters' formation association which business men would be required to join. Because it was stimulated by the government's in coordiinterest nating export activities, the prospective association could hardly be described as a private, voluntary organization that with all that designation implies. One example of such directed is Presidevelopment dent Nasser's deliberate expansion of the U.A.R. legislators' activity and prerogatives. R. H. Dekmejian, "The U.A.R. National A Pioneering Assembly: Experiment," Middle Eastern Studies, IV, 4 (1968), pp. 361-375. Permanence or "institutionalization" implies, by definition, no personal dependence. The concept of "institutionalization" is operationalized in Nelson Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, 1 (1968), LXII, 144-168. Kayhan, September 21, 1967. "I want to find inspiration from you, advice from you. Your criticisms should be on a much higher level." March 8, 1969. Kayhan International, Samuel H. Beer, 'The British Legislature and the Problem of Mobilizing Consent" in Elke Frank, ed., Lawmakers in a Changing World (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). Kayhan International, December 6, 1969. It is noteworthy that such caucuses take place after Cabinet action rather than before. Mlanoucher Parvin, "Military Expenditure in Iran: A Forgotten Question," Iranian Studies I, 4 (1968), pp. 149-154. Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 224. The findings reported here are presented in detail in this author's "Recruitment and Behavior of Iranian Legislators: The Influence of Social Background" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1969). The category "educated" includes all those deputies with college and Islamic schoolThe remainder ing. are termed "non-educated." This discussion is arbitrary in the sense that it reflects no judgment about the exact chronological point at which one can claim to have received an

IRANIAN STUDIES

44

26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

was overrepreThe educated population education. ; the educasented in the Majles by an index of The "index of overrepreby only 1.3. ted deputies of any characis simply the percentage sentation" to its relative found in a sub-population teristic Donald R. population. in the total distribution and Their World (Chapel Matthews, U.S. Senators 1960), of North Carolina Press, University Hill: p. 273. (government and Using the same index, the salaried in the was overrepresented population professional) by 1.2. Majles by 5.4 and in the leadership bore party membership, where relevant, Political of a committee to the attainment relationship little however, can be attriThis finding, chairmanship. to parties of political buted to the irrelevancy as well as to that of the comconsiderations policy mittees. Development in a Political Leonard Binder, Iran: of CaliforUniversity (Berkeley: qinq Society, nia Press, 1962), p. 240. Kayhan, May 15, 1967. November 22, 1967. Kaan, in The Durable Partner," "Congress, Huitt, RlhK. Studies on ConSidney Wise and Richard F. Schier, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1969). (new York: gress Bernard Gruf, "Le Role Social de L'Armee en Trau," VI (1962), pp. 49-53. Orient,

45

WINTER 1970

BOOK REVIEWS

C.

Dimension. By J. The Military Middle Eastern Politics: 1969. Frederick- A. Praeger, New York: Hurewitz. $11.50. pp. xvii+553

MAJID TEHRANIAN of military on the role literature The expanding on focused has generally countries in the underdeveloped Cold War place, In the first phenomena. post-war three deal to dump a great have led the Great Powers rivalries states. Secondly, client in their hardware of military have led of development strains and political the social and to take direct to remove the civilians the military over taken has often the military And finally, charge. The connecand slogans. banners under "revolutionary" has often however, three phenomena, these between tion or rationalized underestimated been ignored, away. Professor

Hurewitz's

study

of

the

military

in

Mid-

While it is a good case in point. dle Eastern politics data about and quantitative massive historical provides to show the connecting all three phenomena, it fails links among them. some in debunking put forth usually countries. developed

however, successful, is quite Hurewitz rationalizations of the more ingenious in the underrule of military on behalf

to include by Hurewitz defined East, The Middle to Morocco, from Pakistan stretching states the eighteen major arsenals become one of the world's has increasinqly acdecades, In the two post-war of military hardware. $11 about the area has absorbed to his estimates, cording to anoAs compared equipment. worth of military billion the regions, major arms importing ther of the world's is a staggering this America, of Latin states nineteen of area and a population over-all with a larger figure: is Associate Majid Tehranian in ence at the New College

IRANIAN STUDIES

Professor Sarasota,

46

of Political Florida.

Sci-

to the Middle East's 300 million, 250 million as compared Cuba) imported in the same periLatin America (excluding worth of weaponry. od only about $1.5 billion phenomenon is not hard to The explanation for this requirements of what is find. In addition to the normal 'internal security" or "pacificaeuphemistically called on coercion tion" by governments that depend more heavily East is also plagued with bitter than consent, the Middle endintense and seemingly regional conflicts harvesting less the Israelis, the arms races: The Arabs against the monarchies against Pakistanis against the Indians, those of the West against the republics, and the clients in some of the countries of the Soviet Union. Because and the oil exporting states) the region (notably Israel exchange earnings, have the means to pay in hard foreign for provided an enticing market the Middle East has also "the merchants of death." approach to the Hurewitz takes a comprehensive as the rewith the national as well problem. He deals aspects of the power struggles gional and international historical, in the Middle East. His method is basically to charclassification but he also provides a five-fold the Middle political systems: republics acterize Eastern and Sudan), reSyria, Iraq, under military rule (Egypt, coalitions (Pakistan, publics under military-civilian monarchies (Libyal, Algeria and Turkey), traditional modernizing monarchies Saudi Arabia and Yemen), (Iran, and non-miliand Kuwait), Morocco, Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia). tary republics (Israel, is more descriptive however, Hurewitz's typology, us wh the military It does not tell than analytical. no generIt estlishes roles. have played such diverse between variables any number of possible al correlations and their of the military in the social character polititendencies. howHurewitz, cal behavior and ideological the simplistic debunks notion--propaever, effectively on the subject literature gated by some of the comforting countries in the underdeveloped usually act --that armies of modernization. as vanguards to claims that armies have acted as the Contrary he provides substanof nationalist integration, vanguard and conscript armto show how both career tial evidence in the Middle East have actually reflected the ethies of domination in their or regional patterns nic, religious The Pakistani consists of societies. chiefly army still are still officers Moroccan Bermostly West Pakistanis; excluded from Arabs were until Palestinian recently ber; Similar in the Jordanian dissensitive army. positions characterizes In conscript armies as well. crimination 47

WINTER 1970

Iraq and Egypt, the top officers are invariably Sunni Arabs; in Turkey, they are Sunni Turks; in Israel, nonJews are excluded. Hurewitz concedes, Nevertheless, Middle Eastern conscript armies have served to some extent as instruments of national and middle class integration political aspirations. Valid as these observations are, they provide no alternative theoretical framework for understanding the meaning of Middle Eastern military in pointerventionism litics. Following Max Weber, most American social scientists have treated armies as models of rational-legal bureaucracies acting on behalf of "modern" as opposed to "traditional" values. as Hurewitz rightly Consequently, charges, they have too uncritically portrayed armies as the vanguard of nationalist integration and reform.2 The theory has also served--possibly ideolinadvertently--the ogical function of rationalizing Western aid toward the militarization of the client regimes in the underdeveloped countries. By contrast to such theorists, Hurewitz maintains that "the only generalizations that stand up against the evidence are subregional." But this is in part due to the great diversity of military in the Midorganizations dle East. Tribal, professional, conscript and guerilla armies could not be expected to act uniformly in the process of change. What is certain, however, is that the military have moved in quite a number of instances into a leadership vacuum. Having failed to lead the transition from an agrarian to an industrial the traditional society, civilian leadership has either abdicated or given in to the military. The military, in turn, has often come to power on nationalist and modernist slogans. But because of its social composition, often biased in favor of the dominant ethnic, religious or social groups, and its political disunity, inexperience and insensitivity, it has often turned away from the radical measures necessary for social and economic transformation. Instead, the military has often tried--and in some instances it has partially succeeded--to exercise reform from above. Mohammad Ali, Ataturk and Reza Shah were the earliest examples of this in the Middle East; Nasser, Boumedienne and the Libyan officers are the latest efforts; the military in Syria and Iraq represent the weaknesses and failures. In the chapter on Iran, of special interest to the readers of Iranian Studies, Hurewitz is in league with those social scientists who have shown insensitivity to the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people. "Whatever else Mussaddiq had exemplified in the early 1950's,n he writes, "political freedom was neither an achieved

IRANIAN STUDIES

48

of his two objective nor an avowed practical reality If we assume freedom of the (p. 294). governments" to be signs of political parties press and political Throughwrong. remarks are patently freedom, Hurewitz's Mosaddeq allowed even the opposiout his term of office, the Tudeh Party) to operate relation groups (including groups all real opposition By contrast, freely. tively It is true since the coup of 1953. have been suppressed to such extra-parliamentary that Mosaddeq resorted martial law and rule by decree to methods as referendums, get his way, but this was mainly because he was fighting the Shah, the Communists, the on too many fronts--against signalled His failure the and the Americans. British, It also demonstrated democracy. of parliamentary failure the conditions social reforms, that without fundamental freedom could not be sustained. for greater political With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hlureand propro-Israeli has a distinctly analysis witz's as simple nor as is neither The situation American bias. commentary by the autypical as the following one-sided thor suggests: were designed The Soviet arms policies the Arab to polarize to stir up tensions, and Israel, and to promote a settlestates ment favorable to the Arabs, in order to discredit the United States as the principal The United guardian of peace in the zone. however, tried to dampen the tensions, States, and to to prevent Arab-Israel polarization, settlement. (p. 493) urge an equitable a the book provides its shortcomings, Despite in the account of military politics and detailed lively to both the layman and the specialMiddle East, useful character of the study has its The encyclopedic ist. It provides a massive amount of data to show merits. in the area have conflicts and internal how the external the political systems in the Midcombined to militarize The data capacities. dle East well beyond their internal to claims by some social also suggests contrary that, in the Middle East has on the the military scientists, and economic developwhole slowed the process of social resources away from those channels and ment by diverting military regimes that are politically by consolidating and insensitive. insecure

NOTES 1.

As is often the case, Middle Eastern events moved After the presses. than the Western printing faster 49

WINTER 1970

2.

be recent military take-over, Libya can no longer monarchy. classified as a traditional Halas Manfred "The more the army was modernized," argued, "the more its pern has typically composition, concapabilities, and purpose organization, spirit, criticism of the existinq stituted a radical politiwas the army, modern technology cal system. Within usefulness and power appreeagerly welcomed and its showed the political system ciated. By contrast, and greed greater inertia, inefficiency, skepticism, Within of modern science. in utilizing the products In civilian polirewarded. the army, merit was often larger. nepotism, and bribery loomed tics, corruption, tranof national mission Within the army, a sense regional, or economic scending parochial, interest, deto be much more clearly or kinship ties seemed Halelse in society."--Manfred fined than anywhere The Politics of Social Change in the Middle pern, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton East and North Africa 1963). University Press,

The Persian Oxford:

Land

Reform,

Clarendon

Press,

By Ann K.S.

1962-1966. 1969.

xiii+386

pp.

Lambton. $11.75.

AHMAD ASHRAF With various system published in dard work, Landlord

ton the

essays on Iran the past three and Peasant in

has established herself as agrarian problems of Iran.

and insight, her mastery of the field observations in the 1940s combine to produce the uniqueness this area.

and its decades, Persia,

land tenure and a stanProfessor Lamb-

the foremost Her historical

authority on knowledge

Persian language, and later in the of her scholarship

and 1960s

her in

In the present work Professor Lambton's main objective is to describe in great detail the course of events of the first and second stages of the land reform of the 1960s. To enable herself to fulfill this objective, she travelled widely in Iran during the implementation of the in the reform years She visited 1962-1968. over 300 villages, inquired into the actual methods of the reform's execution, investigated the attitudes of the

Ahmad

for

Ashraf is Lecturer in Sociology Social Research, University of

IRANIAN STUDIES

50

at Tehran.

the

Institute

to their comments and complaints, by listening peasants (in some cases the land reform officials and interviewed She to villages). accompanying them on their missions and has carestatistics has also made use of the official fully examined the land reform laws and regulations. and a postchapters of seventeen The book consists contain a summary of the two chapters The first script. of the situation background and a portrayal historical Chapter three is prior to the land reform of the 1960s. of the Land Reform Law examination and detailed a careful Chapters four and five deal with the 1962. of January, of opposition, of the law, the suppression implementation and the extension of the reform to the whole country. of cover the implementation The next three chapters province of Khorasan, stage in the northeastern the first The ninth chapand the west. the south, the southeast, the second stage, governing ter deals with the regulations of the the execution detail two chapters and the following deal with the Chapters twelve and thirteen second stage. and problems of of disputes and solution investigation irrigation.

length

The cooperative

in three

chapters,

is concerned last chapter in the Finally, Trends.'

provides stage.

us with

an account

societies

fourteen

are

through

discussed

at

sixteen.

The

"Achievements, with Professor postscript,

of the programs

and Problems Lambton

of the third

of this work is its rich The primary contribution of the events in over 300 villages. and lucid description in each vilThe author summarizes the state of affairs the reader with providing lage in one or two paragraphs, of the Persian land reform in action. a lively portrait monograph as a descriptive The work may be characterized This lack of a framework. conceptual without an explicit Lambton's refrom Professor approach derives theoretical methods, and modes of anathe theory, fusal to consider instruas useful heuristic science of modern social lysis social pheand explaining analyzing ments in describing, draw his own concluThe reader must, therefore, nomena. quessions with regard to a number of major theoretical such as 'Why was the land reform launched at this tions, "What was the moment in Iranian history?", particular politiand "What are the social, nature of the reform?", A brief of the reform?" cal, and economic consequences in order to seems necessary comment on these questions in this work. some of the problems inherent clarify With regard to the background of the reform, Promade an attempt to go beyond Lambton has clearly fessor the of formal events and to relate the narrow perimeter ideological land reform movement of the 1960s to certain 51

WINTER1970

and social, developments and political circumeconomic, stances. However, she seems to have paid insufficient within attention to some of the structural changes the Iranian social system--as well as changes on the international scene and external pressures--that undoubtedly of those who drew the thinking and decisions influenced up and implemented the Land Reform Law of 1962. Lambton points In her historical works, Professor of the land tenure out the historical specificities system in Persia, the domination of the arbitrary power of and the patrimonial rulers over the land-owning class, sociin this resulting precariousness of land ownership ety. Surprisingly, however, Professor Lambton does not relate her historical insights land into the Persian in the past of land reform tenure system to the politics decade. Thus, the chain of meaningful connections just cited is not given sufficient prominence in the author's account of "The Political, Social, and Economic Background" of the reform in chapter two, which is the main explanatory part of the work. The resumption of and rapid growth in oil revenues and the "dollar in the mid- and late-fifties shower" produced rapid growth in entrepreneurial activities and greatly strengthened the civilian bureauand military cracies. These interlocking factors have brought about basic structural changes in the Persian social system as a whole. The proportion in of agricultural production the GNP constantly decreased as the oil and enindustry trepreneurial activities replaced the functional importance of agricultural production in the basic economic structure of the society. the growing Furthermore, strength of the military and security forces and the bureaucracy decreased the dependence of political authority on the land-owning class and provided a solid ground for the revival of the total power of patrimonial authority. Ideologically, the conflicts between patrimonial nationalism, middle-class "nationalitarianism," and intelligentsia-working-class communism has been of utmost significance in influencing the decisions relevant to the land In this reform. situation, both the resistance of the declining land-owning class and their defeat were inevitthe proponents able. Therefore, of the emerging patrimonial nationalism, who were equipped with the traditional institutions of arbitrary total power and supported by the modernizinq forces of the military and civilian bureaucracies and the dependent bourgeoisie and pressured by external forces, decided to champion a land reform, both to defeat the opportunism of the land-owning class and to forestall the rise of the middle-class "nationalitarianism" and the working-class-intelligentsia communism. In summary, long-range structural developments and the IRANIAN STUDIES

52

due to the and the bureaucracy, rise of the bourgeoisie the had already diminished rapid growth in oil revenues, class and power of the land-owning economic and political housethe dependency of the patrimonial thus decreased and the enterprise agricultural hold on the traditional the land of these developments, As a result landowner. The only questions episode. reform was an inevitable of the reform. were the type and the effector context of the immediate situational The analysis economic and that the social, of the land reform reveals in the early 1960s created a situation crisis political type of land reform could be in which this particular authorof the patrimonial under the leadership realized, of the reputed "architect ity and Dr. Hasan Arsanjani, of the movement the main objective Clearly land reform." revolution was to forestall situation in this concrete development of from below and to postpone the political of the logic of objective The application the society. would reveal that without the long-range possibility and the more immediate pressures, developments structural to be set in movement was not likely even this particular leadership. motion by the patrimonial accounts of the land Turning to the descriptive suffers Lambton, the portrait reform provided by Professor In the majority of approach. from the lack of an analytical with only vague and inconclusive cases we are furnished about the improvements in housing conditions, statements of the area under the expansion the rise in productivity, the accomof fertilizers, the utilization cultivation, in the decrease of the rural cooperatives, plishments of the peaand the indebtedness practices fore-selling The reader is often left without a clear noetc. sants, of the and shortcomings the achievements tion regarding reform. of the land reform with the consequences Finally, of and economic structure political regard to the social, considcommunities have not been adequately the village of class and class conFor example, the questions ered. The ignored. are largely in these communities flict of the Iranian land reform has widstrategy" "original between those who had the ened the class differentiation at the time of the reform right of cultivation (nasaq-dlr) While the proletariat and the village MTkosh-neshin). of the land reform, former class was the sole beneficiary over 40 per cent of the populathe latter (constituting excluded from was systematically tion of the villages) the development of Furthermore, the reform measures. in and agricultural capitalism activities entrepreneurial of the land consequence as a significant Iranian villages, areas of consideration. reform, is among the neglected 53

WINTER1970

monograph reliable of this value The enormous Those who criticisms. by these not be obscured should the land and after during villages Persian have studied work is, Lambton's Professor that would testify reform of and informative description an objective in general, It and mid-sixties. in the earlyof events the course theoretical, for further ground us with a solid provides and on the causes studies and empirical interpretive, view that land reform--a of the Persian consequences share with us. Professor Lambton herself might

IRANIAN STUDIES

54

PUBLICATIONSRECEIVED

ARMAJANI, YAHYA. wood Cliffs, pp. xiv+432 BAYNE, E.A. American

Middle N.J.:

Past East: Prentice-Hall,

in Kingship Persian Field Universities

BIBLIOTHEQUE ROYALE ALBERT Ier. Ier Albert Royale liothe5jue 130 pp. 1969. Bruxelles,

Engleand Present. Inc., 1970.

Transition. Staff, InFc., Inauguration par S.M. le

New York: 288 1968. de la Roi.

pp.

Bib-

Commercial Russo-Persian Relations, ENTNER, MARVIN L. SoMonographs, of Florida (University 1828-1914. G;ainesville, 1965). No. 28, Fall Sciences, cial v+80 pp. Press. of Florida University Florida: (Paperback) indicated. No price Edition). (Revised Persia FRYE, RICHARD N. 128 pp. $4.50. 1968. Schocken Books,

New York:

INSTITUTO ITALIANO PER IL MEDIO ED ESTREMO ORIENTE (ISMEO). 19, Nos. 1-2 (MarchVol. New Series, East and West,

June 19697) .KAMSHAD, H. England: $7.50.

Prose Modern Persian University Cambridge

KAMSHAD, H. England: viii+249

Prose A Modern Persian University Cambridge $9.50. pp.

Literature. Press,

Political (Editor). KARPAT, KEMAL If. East. Middle in the Contemporary 19 8. xiii+297 ick A. Praeger,

Reader. Press,

1966.

Cambridge, xv+226

pp.

Cambridge, 1968.

and Social New York: $10.00. pp.

Thought Freder-

to Imperialism: An IslamiC KEDDIE, NIKKI R. Response Jamai adof Sayyid and Religious Writings Political Univand Los AngeleS: Berkeley Din "al-A Mani."' $7.50. xii+212 1968. pp. Press, of California ersity 55

WINTER 1970

LEIDEN, CARL (Editor). The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1969. 160 pp. $4.95. PINCUS, JOHN. and Development: Trade, Aid, Poor Nations. New York: McGraw-Hill xv+400 pp. $10.00.

The Rich and Book Co., 1967.

RICKS, THOMAS, GOUTTIERRE, THOMAS, AND EGAN, DENIS. sian Studies: A Selected of Works Bibliography

En lish Indiana

Perin

Bloomington, Indiana: (mimeographed). University, 1969. viii+266 pp.

SANGHVI, RAMESH. The Shah of Iran. Day Publishers, 1969. xxvii+390

New York: Stein pp. $10.00.

and

STAVRIANOS, LEFTON S. Middle East: A Culture Area and Bacon, Boston: Allyn 1968. Perspective. No price i-ndicated. (Paperback)

in 72 pp.

STEWARD-ROBINSON, J. East. Englewood I83Ipp. $1.95.

1966.

(Editor). The Traditional Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, (Paperback)

WILBER, DONALDN. Iran: Past and Present Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University ix+312 pp. $6.00.

IRANIAN STUDIES

56

Near

(6th Ed.). Press, 1967.

JAHAN-E NAU A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES, ARTS, & LITERATURE (IN PERSIAN) Iranian of JAHAN-E NAU is to provide objective The chief of their for the expression with a vehicle intellectuals contriThe journal's works. and creative views critical and artists, poets, of writers, primarily consist butors generation. of the younger critics social A sampling

of

articles

from

the

recent

issues

include:

in the Third World of Education The Crisis of Modernism Ideology Century Marxism in the Second Half of the Twentieth of Iran Rural Problems Era in Islamic System Social The Iranian Mode of Production The Asiatic of Rostam and Sohrab The Tragedy from Sadeq Hedayat Four Letters Ale Ahmad's Autobiography Writers Iranian by Contemporary Stories Short Azadeh, I. Khoei, Poems by M. Omid, M. Sereshk, et al. Kianoush, and other Manuscripts be should correspondence to Dr. Amin Alimard, sent Editor-in-Chief.

rate subscription The annual Subscription is $5.00. be addressed orders should Publisher Hejazi, to Hosein and Editor.

JAHAN-E NAU House Ferdowsi Printing Atabak St. Ferdowsi Ave., Iran Tehran, 57

WINTER 1970

A Journal of the Social Sciences

February 1970

Vol. I.

No. 3.

E. Naraghi The Aim and Method of Social Research in Iran Characteristics, Belicfs, and Occupational Aspirations of Peasants E. Ajami Kh. K/worovi Irrigation and Rural Community in Iran A Research on Television Audiences in Iran Population Growth and Manpower Proble Relation Between Education and Occupation among Polythecnic Graduates First Census of Tehran Emigration of University Professors and R e Third World Countrie Stereotypes Memorial Speech for Karl Jaspes Three Basic Concepts of K. G. Jung&' Psychology

Editor: Daryoosh Ashoori

Institute for Social Research, Tehran University Tehran, Iran

STUDIES

58

4. Heamvaziri M. Amani

from

4 Translations

IRANIAN

M. Kotobi F. Amirzadeh

E. Niaraghi B. Sarookhani .4. Jaiii J. SaUari

TriesoZctfor

Jrani4z*t SUdZis

ARTICLES FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIETY PERTINENT TO OBJECTIVES AND MEMBERSHIP

ARTICLE II:

OBJECTIVES

be the It shall 1. the study of Iranian encourage language, the history, cluding problems and political nomic, will mit

to Society of this purpose inand society, culture ecosocial, literature, of Iran.

as such is non-partisan. The Society 2. or candidates parties political not support policy. of public members on questions its

safeguard members

work however, shall, The Society 3. and expression of inquiry of freedom fields. in these scholars and other

nor for for

It com-

the its

ARTICLE III:

MEMBERSHIP

1. tives of this sciences social the Executive to the Society's of ten payment annual paying

the objecsharing Any person Members. Full in or study in research and engaged Society of or who by the decision and humanities, of contributing is deemed capable Committee Member upon may become a Full objectives, such by may remain and thereafter dollars dues of ten dollars.

in the famperson Another Members. Family 2. Member upon payment ily of a member may become a Family is such as long as there and may remain of two dollars, annual by paying member in the family, another Society dues of two dollars. other Each member, of Members. 3. Privileges to a copy each of be entitled Member, shaIl than a Family his membership. issued during the Society's periodical(s) fee as the of such registration upon payment All members, to atbe entitled shall may approve, Committee Executive and Meeting, Business tend and participate in the Annual of the Society. for offices or stand to vote

y

Fsgf9740onet

.Sai>

Z7 &octt*forJwf COUNCIL Amin Banani University

of California

All Banuazizi University

of Southern California

James A. Bill University

of Texas at Austin

at Los Angeles

Richard W. Cottam of Pittsburgh University Manoucher Parv in Hunter College

of the City University

of New York

Roger M. Savory of Toronto, University

Matid Tehraniant

Secretary-Treasurer

New College IRANIANSTUDIES Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jacqueline W. Hintz. Associate

Editor

Iranian Studies is published quarterly by the Society for Iranian to members of the Society as part of Studies. It is distributed rate for non-members is The annual subscription their membership. For insti$5.00; the price of single copies is $1.25 per issue. rate' is $8.00 per annum. The opinions extutions the subscription authors and are those of the individual pressed by the contributors those of the Society or the editors of Iranian not necessarily for publication and all other comnmunications Articles Studies. P.O. Box 24766, Los should be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Commiunications concerning the 90024, U.S.A. Angeles) California The of the Society should be addressed to the Secretary, affairs New Society for Iranian Studies c/o Division of Social Sciences. Sarasota, Florida 33578. U.S.A. College, Cover: Bronze incense burner in the shape of a bird. Late 11th century. Archaeological Museum, Tehran.

Volume III

Spring

1970

Number 2

ARTICLES 58

GENESIS OF PARTY IN IRAN: A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERACTIONBETWEEN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL PARTIES

91

PERSIAN FOLKSONGTEXTS FROMAFGHAN BADAKHSHAN

104

THREEDROPS OF BLOOD Translated

G. Hossein

Razi

Mark Slobin

Sadeq Redayat by Thomas M. Ricks

BOOKREVIEWS 115

ENGLISH: City

125

LEIDEN: The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East

129

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

132

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

and Village

in

Iran

William Philip

Irons

C. Salzman

GENESISOF PARTYIN IRAN:A CASESTUDY OF THEINTERACTION BETWEENTIE POLITICAL SYSTEMANDPOLITICAL PARTIES

G. HOSSEIN RAZI Identification and analysls of environmental conditions associated with the emergence and developin general, ment of political parties and different in particular, types of parties are important to an of the problems and prospects of repreunderstanding sentative in emerging nations. government This paper a study of the genesis presents and development of political parties, their possible and prototypes, their functional in Iran. substitutes

Razi is Associate G. Hossein Professor at the University of Houston, Science

of Political Texas.

An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Annual Meeting of The American Political Sixty-sixth Association, California, Science Los Angeles, September 8-12, 1970.

IRANIAN STUDIES

58

is studied Party development in terms of the characteristics of the general political system or the of opportunities."l "structure Since the analysis of the internal institutional developments is not in itself sufficient in the case of a political system such as exists in Iran, consideration will also be given to It is important to relevant influences. cross-polity with this deals that institutions emphasize paper only in their operational sense and not with the important In fact, area of attitudes. it proposes to demonstrate of the that the general institutional characteristics to the political system have been of major significance and development of political parties party types.2 Furthermore, presuming that political parties also influence the political system, t-he paper attempts to describe the functions which Iranian have parties Our reference performed. to party functions is intuitive and haphazard. This is in part due to the limin a preliminary itations of data inherent study of this nature. But it is also due to the theoretical problems involved in party salience and the fact that there are few tested of party functions hypotheses in of the availability of impressive spite inventories.3 Although our primary concern is with Iranian parties, an attempt is also made to gain further insight into the subject by comparing them with earlier parties of Europe and other developed systems. The term "party" as used here is general and refers to a myriad of groups and organizations which or nominal appeal to an electorate through actual attempt to acquire some control of the political decision-making process. This control is excercised in order to accommodate the demands of the group's leadits members, or both. It includes ership, minor parties as well as revolutionary but organizations, excludes institutional interest groups, such as the army and the bureaucracy, that are part of the formal

59

SPRING 1970

A cursory look at the structure of the government. parties in various parts of development of political between the older the world reveals a clear difference and parties of the nineteenth century and the factions and by institutionalized present parties characterized The important question is structures. mass-oriented local, how parliamentary, personal) and doctrinal parties.4 groups develop into modern political The Political

Environment and Party Prototypes

system in Iran was feudal and The old political basis was provided by ideological Its patrimonial. of the old modif'ication The and tradition. religion system was to a great extent the product of cultural contact with Europe. This contact resulted in changes influenced the politics and indirectly which directly of the country. and modern polThe line between traditional cannot always be easily drawn institutions itical since both have gone through a process of adaptation. the it is clear that the constitution, Nevertheless, modern process are the and the electoral parliament, of legitimacy because they have no meaninstitutions The monsystem. ingful precedent in the traditional tradipredominantly a is archy, on the other hand, even though it has adopted some of tional institution goals, such as reform, modernthe modern nationalist and added new authoriization and industrialization, The tarian techniques to the old ways of absolutism. this in be studies development of Iranian parties will institutions. paper in terms of these major political The first challenge to absolutism and autocracy of the sh'lhanshTh (king of kings) began with the Tomovement The consitutional bacco Revolts of 1891-92. and the civil war in the early years of this century of mashrutiyat (constitutionalbetween the followers ism and the parliament) and those of estebdad (absothe basic legitimacy lutism of the shahs) reflect IRANIANSTUDIES

60

conflict of the Iranian The Fundapolitical system. mental Law of 1906 and the Supplementary Fundamental Law of 1907 still of govconstitute the formal basis ernmental and are the oldest authority of existing In practices Middle Eastern constitutions. however, there have been substantial changes in the operation of the systems with the basic conflict between the of the parliament followers and the followers of the courts still remaining. The recent of Iran can be political history divided into four periods, of using the predominance or authoritarian either democratic institutions as the criterion. These periods are: the genesis First, of representative government (1905-1925); second, Reza Shah's dictatorship third, the re-emer(1925-1941); gence of representative government and, (1941-53); fourth, the development of Mohammad Reza Shah's dictatorship (1953-present). These classifications are obviously general, as each period has had its own variations. However, on the whole they are valid and a comparative provide context for the study of party development. The following Persian terms, with the exception of the first, refer to possible prototypes of the political party: parti, band, dowreh, anjoman, and frTaksion. The term pWrti, borrowed from French, simply means "pull" or "influence" and parti bizi (using one s pull) implies a process by which pressure is brought to bear by individuals in order to get a favfrom the bureaucracy3 orable decision the military2 or security It refers organizations.5 basically to the lobbying process and is used to secure employment, receive contracts, expedite decisions, circumvent reguor insure the application lations, of legitimate regulations. Such practice is likely to continue regardless of the emergence of political parties. Pirti has not been, and is unlikely to become, a basis for the formation of political parties, although it may conto their development. tribute In this connection, it

61

SPRING 1970

considto note that M.I. Ostrogorskii is interesting confactors as one of the possible ered corruption and English of the earlier to the formation tributing American parties .6 into a small number of prominent BWnd refers process who help each other in the political dividuals It is the but have no open or formal organization. to by It is commonly referred of a clique. equivalent members or families the name of one of its leading BTnd has played a role in the bWnd-e Masludihi). (e.g. and more personal formation of some of the smaller however, As a rule, in Iran. or friksions parties into an-jomans, which have bands have tended to develop of parties. in the formation been instrumental to and refers means a circle, Dowreh literally Its memberor both. relatives, a group of friends, take place Its meetings fifteen. ship seldom exceeds in homes of members or at some weekly or biweekly may belong to Individuals place. other designated sysa social It is primarily more than one dowreh. for providing tem of the upper and middle classes, and mutual support communication political informal geared to periods It is especially and cooperation. organizations of dictatorship when formal political Dowrehs, too, have tended to develop are repressed. into an_omans or small parties. or socmeans an association Anjoman literally It has a larger membership and more complex iety. disthan any of the groups previously organization has been a factor character Its organized cussed. transin the recurring phenomenon of its structural The anioman is into the political party. formation esof the political party, prototype the most likely in periods of representative government. pecially a term borrowed from German, is used Fraksion, Its defactions. to parliamentary in Iran to refer to the Western European parties is similar velopment

IRANIAN STUDIES

62

that grew out of parliamentary Frzksions groups. have varied in cohesiveness and stability of their memberMost have been no more than temporary factions ship. in one Majles session. Others have been of longer A few have been interlocked duration. with political parties outside the parliament. of Only the origins the National Front's are traceable to the leadership parliamentary group of nationalists formed around Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq in the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Majles. Representative

Government:

The anjomans against absolutism. Brown is illustrative:

Phase I,

played a major The following

1906-1925 role in the struggle from E.G. passage

The Anjomans were the cause of the victory, they had drawn the people together and united them in one common cause, and had organized their strength to such an extent that in the day of trial tyranny a united found, to i s surprise, front against it. Although there were some peasant uprisings in the North, and some support from the tribal Khans in other areas, the center of the constitutional movement was in the cities where An jomanha-ye Enghelibi (Revolutionary Associations) were formed by the merchants, traders, artisans and some urban workers under the leadership of the intellectuals and the clergy. The British Legation report, dated February 27, 1907, that in Tabriz: states The landed proprietors, too, find their interest directly menaced by the action of the "Enjumen" in causing the prices of grain and meat to be reduced and the mercantile and lower classes can alone be considered as whole-hearted supporters of the Committee... 63

SPRING 1970

Alui Shah and the IranIn June 1908, Mohaammad ian Cossack Brigade, directed by the Tsarist Russian A the Majles. bombarded and dissolved officers, civil war subsequently began between the royalists which lasted until the autumn and constitutionalists in the victory of the constiof 1909. It resulted MohammadAli was desposed, his minor tutionalists. son, Ahmad, was appointed kings and a pro-democratic regent was selected. parties began During the war various political Some survived through the Second Majles, to emerge. which was inaugurated on November 15, 1909. The two leading parties were the Popular Democrats and the The Alliance and Progress Moderates (EltedIlis). The Democrats a third minor party. Party constituted Tabriz the mainly by were led aniomans, comprised supported by antwere but Turks, Iranian mostly of in Tehran and Qazvin. especially mans in other cities, esThey were also helped by the Moja4hedin (fighters), those who came mainly from the Baku oilfield pecially in Russia and played a major role in defeating the The Moderates were composed of the Bakhroyalists.9 tiari khgns and tribesmen, who had supported the conduring the war, and the more conservstitutionalists ative elements among the clergy and landed gentry. The Regent, Waser al-Molk, who had studied in ins tituBritain and was familiar with representative in organizing the Majles on the tions, also assisted However, he was mainly basis of party affiliation. in insuring the minority status of the Popinterested formed a govIn 1909 he successfully ular Democrats. ernment from members of the majority party, the Moderates, which the Democrats found acceptable. Iran seemed to be well on its way to developing parties. monarchy based on political a constitutional In function. Its parties had performed the electoral elections the fact, the first committee to supervise to the Majles was formed by Tabriz aniomans immediately

IRANIANSTUDIES

64

after the news of the granting of the constitution was communicated by the telegraph office. They had also proven their ability to aggregate disparate linguistic groupss such as the Turks, the Persians, the Armenians, and the Bakhtiaris, as well as different social groups, such as the clergy, the intellectuals, the commercial class, and the tribes. Furthermore, they had demonin integrating strated some capability these groups for the purpose of formulating social goals and optimizing efforts for their achievement. Finally, they seemed to have contributed to the development and maintenance of a representative form of government. Despite this propitious beginning these parties failed to survive. The main reason was the influence of foreign powers. In most emerging nations the development of representative government and political parties has coincided with the end of colonialism. In the case of Iran the reverse process took place. This is not to deny the importance of internal cleavages which the parties had to face. But the disintegrative effect of such cleavages was exacerbated by foreign intervention. Russia had opposed the constitutional movement in Iran from the beginning. Britain had initially supported the constitutionalists because of Russia's extensive influence over the Iranian court. But in view of the rising power of Germany in Europe, Russia and Britain initiated an era of cooperation. One of the instruments of this cooperation was the Convention of August 1907 which divided Iran into zones of 0 The northern zone, which included the influence. centers of the constitutional movement, became the sphere of Russian influence; the southern zone was assigned to the British; and the central zone was to be opened to the influence of both governments. During the civil war, Russia's support of the court was not sufficient to defeat the constitutionalists. But the Russian government increased its power by dispatching military forces to Iran, and suppressing and executing some of the nationalist leaders. 65

SPRING 1970

In December 1911. Russia sent an ultimatum to of Morthe Iranian government demanding the dismissal gan W. Shuster, an American advisor, who had been commissioned by the Majles, and was implementing plans structure, of Iran's financial for the reorganization The ulpolice. and provincial customs administration, timatum was supported by the British government and the movement of Russian troops toward Tehran. The British urged the cabinet to accept the Russian demands. But Women's aniomans apthe Majles decided to resist. peared before the Majles urging the deputies to vote Besides the Democrats and the against the ultimatum. Moderates there were three minor parties in the parlithe Unionist , the Progressive, ament at this time: All were and the dashnHktsutiun Armenian parties. On Decto the ultimatum. united in their opposition ember 24, the cabinet of Sams?m was legally dissolved because the Majles had turned down its request for comBut the cabipliance with the Russian ultimatum.11 the Majles with net executed a coup dletat dissolving the deputies with execution if troops and threatening On 25, Shuster was disDecember they reassembled. missed. a major setback for These events constituted on based competitive-aggregovernment representative gative parties as well as national unity and finanfor the It was a defeat especially cial solvency. had proved more Democrats as some of the Moderates with powers0 foreign themselves to reconcile willing the not had fled who A number of liberal leaders Others country before tried to leave at this time. The Majles remained susgradually went underground. pended for three years. With the coronation of Ahmad Shah and the momof Russia with its European fronentary preoccupation life was resumed when the Third tiers, parliamentary 1914. British and Ruson November Majles convened and had the elections sian agents had influenced independents. helped the Moderates and cooperative IRANIANSTUDIES

66

But they soon The Democrats were in the minority. were able to regain their leading role because of their nationalist British-Russian rivalry, orientation and the lack of any unifying program among the majority of the members. In November of 1915, when an attempt was made to set up a pro-German government in Qum, the Majles was dissolved. The fourth Majles was not to meet until nearly six years later, in June 1921. During this period the cabinets were accused to Russia or Britain. of subordination The liberals and nationalists who had a reputation for honesty did not participate in the government. The British opposed the Democrats as irresponsible and dangerous extremists. This was understandable since the Democrats regarded Britain and Russia as Iran's treacherous enemies. The Democrats, sometimes with the help of the German and Turkish officers, engaged in an intermittent, small-scale war against Russia, Britain and the Iranian government.'2 More importantly, the Democrats and the Moderates, who could easily cooperate in the First and Second Majles, had become alienated from each other by the time the Third Majles ended because the Moderates, responding to the new structure of opportunities in the political system, had begun cooperating with the foreigners. They were accused of being a group of traitors who served the fore'ign powers and had betrayed the real nationalists to gain -control of the central Iranian government. The first communist parties in Iran emerged from two nationalist-separatist movements which were primarily a response to foreign domination of the central government. The first was the movement of the Jangalis (Woodsmen) under the leadership of a local patriot-reformer called Kuchik Khan in the wooded areas of Gilan, a province on the shores of the Casplan Sea. They fought the British forces on several occasions, asserted the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and used "Persia for the Persian" as 67

SPRING 1970

The forces of the Jangalis were mainly their slogan. and composed of the middle- and lower-middle classes The movement began in 1915 when Kuchik Khan peasants. and EhsWnullah Khan met with a number of other patriots commitIn 1917 they formed a revolutionary in Tehran. tee and by early 1918 they were in control of Gilan and The second and more parts of the nearby provinces. movement occurred in Azerbaijan which was short-lived called AzTdistin (Land of the Free). These movements reveal not only the persistence ideas but also the adoption of the constitutionalist by the Irorientation Soviet-Marxist of an exogenous and comnationalists the between The division anians. arrested was while a for which munists in this period, by Reza Shah, seems to be a preview of the later division between the National Front and the Tudeh (Masses) occurred be(Among the Jangalis this division Party. communist Kuchik Khan and-the tween the nationalist in Azerbaijan Ehsanullah Khan and Jalfar Pishevari; it occurred between MohammadKahiabani and Pishevari.13 Reza Kh2an, the commander of the Iranian Cossack an Anglophile journTabataba'i, Corpss and Sayyid.Zia staged a coup dletat in 1921 which in time realist, and changed the sulted in Reza Shah' s dictatorship It is important to system. nature of the political note that in the Fourth Majles, elected mostly under and the Fifth Majiles, elected durVosuqls influence, ing Reza Kh?an's control of the government, the largest parliamentary fraksion was the Renovation (Tajadto Hosdod), which supported Reza Khan and, accoying The other sein Makki, had more than forty deputies. and United Socialists were the Socialists friksions Furthermore, which had sixteen to seventeen deputies. Minorlty in the Fifth Majles there was a so-called FrIaksion, headed by MohammadModarres, which opposed Reza KhaInand had fourteen deputies. Democrats and Moderates conHad the original tinued to operate) Iran might have developed a twosystem with two major party system, or a multi-party IRANIANSTUDIES

68

parties. The Democrats were not too different from the earlier Liberal parties in Europe or even Latin America, especially Uruguay, where the property franchise gave rise to two-party In these cases the systems. and the clergy aristocracy the Conservatives, supported while the traders, manufacturers, intellectuals and middle classes of towns and cities the Libsupported erals. This is very similar to the socio-economic basis of Moderates and Democrats in Iran. There is also some ideological with the Conservasimilarity tive-Liberal division in Europe, where the Conservatives emphasized and authority tradition and the Liberals emphasized individualism, rationalism, liberty, and other ideological equality, components of the American and French Revolutions.15 AMother point of possible interest is the relationship between electoral laws and political parties. The original law, issued on September Iranian 6, 1906, provided for a system of representation in which the middle classes and urban areas were favored. Elections were direct in Tehran and on a two-stage in the provinces. basis A property qualification of 1,000 tomans (200 pounds) in cases of peasants and land proprietors eliminated most of the population. Nomads were excluded due to a six-month residence qualification.16 In 1914, however, a new electoral law removed the property qualification and established universal male suffrage and direct, secret ballot. Although this was a democratic victory in appearance, it greatly increased the power of the landowners and tribal leaders who controlled the majority of the population. It was done in order to increase Moderate representation. There is little doubt that the new electoral laws influenced the nature of the parliament and the parties. The voters of the former electoral system were articulate and not easily manipulated by foreign powers of the central government. The and tribes, peasants on the other hand, were unaware of the significance of their votes. Although the simultaneous assertion of Russo-British, colonialism,

69

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process, and suppression manipulation of the electoral the to isolate make it difficult of the nationalists seem changes the change; does impact of the electoral to a decline in the quality of the to have contributed gradualism Consequently, parliament and the parties. which seems to have in the extension of the franchise, in some of the Western countries, made a difference might have helped the survival of competitive-aggregagovernment in Iran. tive parties and representative On the whole, the Iranian case tends to support the system is one of the signifview that the electoral icant factors in the development of party systems. Dictatorship:

Phase I,

1925-1941

Reza Shah developed a charismatic dictatorship based mainly on the bureaucracy, the army, and the modernization took Economic and technological police. In spite of the society. in of some sectors place the regime was with partiess political some tinkering them as conand soon regarded them unable to tolerate were that functions To the extent party spiracies. institutional the at all, done by were they performed groups. interest It should be noted that the Shah did feel a for political parties or need, at least initially, were alfour groups In 19273 similar organizations. and bureauinto parties, to political lowed organize direct and to were ordered officers promote cratic them. These were: Irin-e No (New Iran), Iran-e JavWn and Tajaddod (Re(Young Iran), Taraqqi (Progress)., The motto of the Itrin-e No Party was novation). This to the Shah and devotion to progress". "loyalty that perhaps the Shah was influenced motto indicates by the example of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey and planned party to iupport his to form a majority political the without and within Majles. 7 All of these program Shah did not seem to Reza soon disappeared. parties of authinstitutions to able tolerate competing any be individual of the even some for eliminated he ority, notables who had helped in his rise to power. IRANIANSTUDIES

70

the Majles convened with Throughout his rule, scrupulous and voted for all the recommendregularity of the executive. ations The deputies were chosen by the Shah personally from a list of individuals nomlocal inated separately by governors, administrators, and secret Each proposal three times contained spies. the number of deputies to which the area was entitled. After the Shah had made his selection, the names were sent to the governors and local administrators who filled the ballot boxes, opened them at the end of the election and reported counted the votes, period, the results. As late as 1932 in an address before the deputies, the Shah stated that the absence of political in the Majles was a shortcoming parties and the formation of patriotic would be helpful. parties But nothing further came of this statement. In January 1939 the Organization for Development of Thought (Sizmian-e Parvaresh-e Afkir) was formed at the Shah's order to inform the people about government programs, to direct public opinion along approved channels, and to promote national pride. This may very well have been what Reza Shah had in mind when he spoke of political parand had now finally ties found his model in the Nazi and Fascist propaganda apparatus. The absence of political parties and a meaningful electoral process seemed to have created a vacuum which was evident by the end of Shah Reza's rule. The functional of the institutional performance interest groups was not adequate to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of the system. There was an hiatus in upward and downward political communication. Suppression and illegal practices were taking their toll, and had become endemic at all levels corruption of the bureaucracy, the army, and the police. Democracy:

dom of

Phase

II,

1941-53

With the fall of the dictatorship speech, the press, and assembly

71

in 1941, returned.

free-

SPRING 1970

and groups which had been suppressed beIndividuals attack against the police state and gan a large-scale of land in the name of purthe Shah' s confiscation The public trial of his chief of polchase or gift. ice revealed a great deal of corruption and injustices The cenincluding murders of the regime's opponents. shifted from the Shah to the ter of decision-making Majles, where cabinets were appointed and dismissed, The new and programs were discussed. and policies of the Majles although he Shah followed the verdicts through a number of loyal tried to exert his influence With respect to the Majles it is important deputies. to remember that the Twelfth Majles did not end until after the fall of Reza Shah and that the deputies to the Thirteenth had already been chosen by him before to the Futhermore, the elections his resignation. Ahmad Premier by Majles were manipulated Fifteenth electfree relatively only the Qavim. Consequently those were Mosaddeq Mohammad ions before the rise of Sixteenth, of the those and in part of the Fourteenth, the governwhen after the discovery of irregularities At any election. Tehran in the ment did not intervene the new in conducted were campaigns rate, no electoral environment until 1944. parties emerged after Reza A host of political a rule, they adopted patriotic As Shah's abdication. mostly irown newspapers, names and published their number A circulation. good and with small regularly or small groupst individuals were formed by prominent based on a bind or dowreh, disappearing without much A few had a lasting system. effect upon the political organeffect both in terms of ideology and political The purpose of this section is not to di sization. cuss

them in deigils

in other works. of these parties

as this

information

is

available

We shall give a brief description beginning with the Tudeh.

The core of the Tudeh leadership

was composed

who were intellectuals of forty-nine of the survivors been by Reza and had Erini imprisoned led by Dr. Taqi

IRANIAN STUDIES

72

Shah in 1937 on charges of communist activities. On January 302 1942, they created the first modern party of Iran. The official program of the party was neither nor communist. It was of a liberal revolutionary and moderate tone, but addressed primarily to the industrial workers, peasants, and intellectuals. It called for legalization of trade unions, progressive labor legislation, equality of minorities, bureaucratic reform, free health and educational and friendly relations services, with all of Iran's neighbors. It was not until later when the rift between the Allies became clear that the party began to openly advocate Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology and to attack the Western powers. The Tudeh has been the only mass party of Iran. (With the possible exception of the Third Force, all others have been basically cadre parties.) The party members paid fees, were issued cards, and were organized into cells (hozehs) and organs for different occupational, age) and sex groups. It also translated and published books and owned an impressive number of "front" newspapers. By 1944 the party had recruited a comparatively large number of members and controlled the majority of organized labor through its affiliated unions. The backbone of the party's leadership, however, remained the intellectuals of middle-class background. In the Fourteenth Majles it had a friksion of eight members, at that time the only organized party with constituting support in and out of the Majles. In the first cabinet of QavUl, the 'Tudeh had three members. It was made illegal by the government for the first time in 1949, but it continued its operation until the fall of Mosaddeq in 1953. During the Mosaddeq period it constituted the only popularly-based and organized group outside the National Front. In the free elections of the Seventeenth Majles it received one-third of the votes in Tehran but no seats. It engaged in a bitter fight with Mosaddeqls supporters before the latter's fall. Subsequently it went underground due to repression by the new government and its open activities have since been conducted in foreign countries. It is essential to 73

SPRING 1970

point out that in many ways the Tudeh Party set the pata number of In fact, in Iran. tern for other parties the ?ganito a response as them were formed initially the Tudeh. of influence and ideological zational Another party on the left was the separatist It was formed in 1944 by PisheAzerbai jan. Demokrat-e and whose from Azerbaijan who had been elected vari, vote in the Fourwere rejected by a single credentials doubt that this party There is little teenth Majles. and occuauthorities with the help of Soviet succeeded however, had The people of Azerbaijan, troops. pation of to the tyranny and maladministration been subjected grounds for popular providing the Tehran government, in this proThe Tudeh Party branches dissatisfaction. into the Demokrit and incorporated vince were dissolved governto set up a leftist After the attempts Party. a prothe Demokrats inaugurated ment in Tehran failed, Democracy was to be the principle vincial part of Iran. was allowed. opposition of government, but no organized but the state inviolable, was declared property Private lands and the lands of those who had fled to Tehran were Before _the Iranian and redistributed. confiscated the Demokrats had constructed the area, troops reoccupied of which founded a university--both a radio station, The Demokrit-e in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan were the first to the Tudeh and may be Party was in many ways similar howIts leaders, as the latter's tributary. regarded members of the prehard-line ever, were mostly older, last efReza Shah communist movements, who made their of before forts way to the younger generation giving Tudeh leaders. end of the political spectrum emerged On the right was that of conservathe first three types of parties: and the second and third notables, and pro-British tives and reof extreme nationalistic parties were ideological of has been None great importance orientation. ligious for becoming sufficiently agor has shown any capability In 1943, as a cadre or as a mass party. either gregative the Halgeh called later Party, the Vatan (Fatherland)

IRANIAN STUDIES

74

and still later (Circle), called the ErTdeh-ye Melli (National Will) Party was created by Sayyid ZiT, who had been the prime minister of the coup d'etat 58gime of 1921 and had been later exiled by Reza Shah. This party was at the opposite end of the political spectrum from the Tudeh and was supported by the British. It tried to equal the Tudeh Party' s attacks on the West by attacking the Soviet Union and accusing the Tudeh of being a tool of the Soviet It was too government. with the British closely and the court, associated too in ideology, conservative and too traditional in makeup to be able to sufficiently and adapt. innovate It could not become aggregative even though Sayyid ZiaT was elected to the Fourteenth Majles from the British zone and had the support of a number of deputies in the Majles. It was dissolved by Qavam in 1945. A number of its members, however, adopted other labels and continued to support the court. The extreme nationalist parties included the PanIrain, Sumka, the Aria, and the National2jalvation group of the Revolutionary Nationalism Party. As the Tudeh was heir to the an joman of Dr. Erini, the extreme nattionalists were heirs to the anioman of Dr. JahEnsuz, who was also arrested by Reza Shah. These parties showed an ideological affinity toward Fascism and had irredentist and atavistic tendencies. Their hallmark was anticommunism. Some tried to form their own small militia from among secondary school students. From time to time, they cooperated with the court, and at least one group supported the National Front for a while. On the whole, they were not successful and remained quite small since neither the international nor the Iranian environment was conducive to their development. The two active religious groups of this period were the Fed' yan-e Islam and the Mojiahedin-e Islmn. The first group was small and conducted its meetings It came to be known for its religious secretly. zeal, strong nationalistic outlook, and the belief that Shi'ite

75

SPRING 1970

It beruler. lands should be governed by a religious such Iranof assassinating as a result came well-known as Ali RazmWara, Abdol Hossein f igures ian political had formed who, incidentally, and Ahmad Kasravi, Hajir, The group to purify Shi'ism. rellgious his own little with Sayyid Abol-Qasem KashMojahedin group cooperated that the problems of Iran could be resolvaxni, and felt Neiauthorities. of religious ed only by the leadership a large number of members although ther group acquired they helped Kashani becomne an important religio-political initially KrshTni and his merchant followers figure. off from the split with Mosaddeq but later cooperated Front. National between the right and the left were a Situated may be The following parties. number of other political PeikTr (Patriots), Mihan Parastin in passing: mentioned Melli Mardan-e KWr (Men of Work), Ettehid-e (Battle), IrTn-e Unity), Irtn (Iran's Vahdat-e Unity), (National The only middleParty. Mi (Our Iran), and the Socialist were the of significance or quasi-parties parties class the component units, Front and its important National the Mardom-e and possibly Parties, and Toilers I_n with these Before dealing IrEn and the Third Force. must be made to the Demreference groups individually) from different IrWn Party, which was completely okrit-e them. Irnn Party, which was more rapid The Demokrat-e was formed by QavTm in than in its rise, in its decline to 1945 in order to provide him with a base of support, Melli Party of Sayyid Zii and to break up the Erideh-ye Creparties. rival the Tudeh and Demrnokrat-e Azerbaijan of a ated from above, this was a temporary aggregate because of who cooperated large number of individuals the separatist movements in the North, threat, the Soviet a seat in the Majles or a of receiving and the prospect to the Soviets To persuade in the government. position bea coalition withdraw from Iran, Qavam established and tween his party and the Tudeh, Iran, Socialist, to He also made a number of promises Iran-e Ma parties.

IRANIAN STUDIES

76

the Soviet

Union and to the Demokriat-e Azerbain.

In the elections of the Fifteenth Majles, Qavim and the army were in control. Most "elected" deputies either belonged to the Demoktat-e IrKn Party or were pro-Shah. Mosaddeq and his parliamentary associates of the Fourteenth Majles who had led the opposition to Soviet demands and had received the largest popular majorities before, were defeated through electoral manipulation. After the rejection of the Soviet oil concession, Qavam lost his premiership and power, although 85 of the 136 deputies were nominally from his party. The subsequent disappearance of the Demokrat-e IrIn suggests that parties of this nature are not likely to become durable

or acquire

a mass base

of support.

The National Front emerged during the elections of the Fifteenth Majles when Mosaddeq and a number of popular leaders and supporters gathered before the Shah's palace requesting that the election be nullified. This request was to no avail. This was the beginning of the rift between the Front and the court. In the elections of the Sixteenth Majles, which were free in Tehran and a few other urban areas, Mosaddeq and his supporters were again elected by large majorities. The Irnn Party, formed in 1944, began as an association of engineers in 1942. Its membership was later expanded to other professionals, mostly lawyers and professors. It continued to attract members from other groups until the height of its power during Mosaddeqls government (1951-53). It constituted the core of the National Front and remained with it until parties were repressed by the new dictatorship. The Ir,an Party was a genuine middle-class party with some aggregative capacity. Its ideology was based on socialism and liberalnationalism. Its programs called for land distribution, economic development, and the maintenance and strengthening of a democratic form of government. A wing of the Inan Party,

77

which also began as

SPRING 1970

was the Mardoman anjoman during the democratic period, in oriand Islamic It was more socialist e Iran Party. disand organization previous Because of its entation. of the leadership the it managed to capture cipline a convention Iran Party in Tehran, and it was not until that the old leaderwas called delegates of provincial of The later withdrawal the new group. ship defeated the Mardom-e Iran weakened the Irnn Party. formed by Dr. Mozaffar Baghil i, Party, The Toilers to a cadre from a personal a transformation represented complete with a origin, middle-class party of national, of his polAt the beginning group. Socialist splinter career Baghi' i was a member of the small Ettehaditical to win a e Melli Party which was formed by his father In This was to no avail. Kerman seat in the Majles. IrWn and formed a the Demokrit-e 1945 Baghil'i joined Qavam rewarded him with a seat party branch in Kerman. He soon broke off with QavAm Majles. in the Fifteenth himself to build a popular image by attaching and tried in the Majles and Front through speeches to the National of his associaAs a result of a newspaper. publication from Tehran Front, he was elected tion with the National began attacking to the Sixteenth Majles and immediately and the After Razm7ari's assassination Premier Razmari. Baghil'i formed the of the Mosaddeq cabinet, formation bazaar groups of students, Party from various Toilers This party had a program, women and KermWnis. merchants, to and traditional but Baghi'gi was too opportunistic after opgain a mass base of support for it, especially the to Mosaddeq. Although Mosaddeq accepted position he was from the beginning Party in the Front, Toilers and his mercurial of Baghi'l 'Is opportunism suspicious soon began to criticize Mosaddeq and character. Baghili fav28) he was already on the ninth of Esfand (February due Mosaddeq, however, was victorious oring the court. of of his chief to popular support and the vigilence It was at this point that General Afshartus. police, with him,and the Third Force, composed split the Toilers was formed and women's organizations, mainly of students Aside from the of Khalil Maleki. under the leadership

IRANIAN STUDIES

78

followers of BaghW i also Third Force, the religious shifted their support to the National Front. These events and the split within the Tudeh Party, when it decided to oppose Mosaddeq, demonstrate the meaningful of the National aggregative-adaptive capabilities Front. the relationship Subsequent to the split, between Baghal i and Mosaddeq became strained and a number of his militant supporters were arrested. Baghaili was in close collaboration with the court and was implicated with General F. ZThedi in the murder of General He was f5ed from prison after ZThedi beAfshartus. came prime minister. Maleki, who had once been arrested by Reza Shah as a communist, broke with the Tudeh Party and established the Socialist Association, which he later dissolved. His opposition to the Tudeh ideology was on theoretical grounds similar to those of the Titoists and West European Socialists of anti-communist orientation. Because of his knowledge and writings he became well-known as a major anti-communist theoretician. Under his leadership the Third Force showed some tendency towards becoming a mass party. Its organization was similar to the Tudehs as it had cells, action groups, and managed a number of publications. Membership cards were issued and fees collected. Financial assistance was also received from some prominent bazaar merchants with a traditional outlook. After the fall of Mosaddeq, the government dissolved the Third Force but Maleki was allowed to retain government employment and resume his anti-communist literary work. Dictatorship:

Phase II,

1953-

The fall of Mosaddeq and the return of the Shah put an end to freedom of expression and assembly. Even parties friendly to the court were not allowed to operate. Military rule was established and, for the first time since the constitution, military courts openly replaced civilian courts, trying the opponents on military 79

SPRING 1970

and political the cabinets

charges. of General

continued This situation Zihedi and Hossein Al-.

during

In 1957, at the order of Mohammad Reza Shah, two "from above" to overcome the were created loyal parties and in order which were faced in elections difficulties of freedom and legala semblance to give the elections Party was placed under (Nationalist) The Melliun ity. the prime minister, Eqbal, Manucher Dr. of leadership the Party was headed by AssadullTh and the Mardom (People) of the Shah and a later prime friend Al lam, a close and the Mardom were to The Melliun (1962-63). minister parties, minority and majority the of roles play the prime his mlnister and Shah the With respectively. approved can"free" and "clean" elections, promising and two of the parties other joined one or the didates predetermined, with the outcomes each other, ran against canto the respective communicated but not necessarily these all of In spite the elections. before didates the game which the two courthowever, arrangements, were supposed to play could not be conparties created and electionbribery, Charges of corruption, trolled. and were were publicly aired by the candidates rigging and other Front opposiadded to those of the National drawn-out and the long tion groups that were boycotting to the Twentieth Majles deputies Nevertheless, election. In from the ranks of these loyal parties. were elected Before were elected. a few "independents" addition, were these deputies however, this Majles could convene, Apordered by the Shah to hand in their resignations. that some of the army the Shah was apprehensive parently among the deputies. had too many friends generals the Shah and were who had supported (These generals, tried, later dismissed, were positions, now in important "clean" a The Shah again promised and/or imprisoned.) But the new elections process. and "free" electoral Majand the Twentieth different were not substantially les was soon dissolved.

formed

of Dr. Ali Amini was By 1960, when the cabinet was temporarily of relaxation measure and some

IRANIAN STUDIES

80

introduced, the Melliun disappeared and the Mardom became insignificant) a situation which has since continued in spite of the fact that the Mardom's leader became a prime minister in 1962.23 After the dismal experience with these parties, the regime kept the Majles suspended for nearly two and a half years in spite of the fact that Article 48 of the Consitution unequivocally requires that new elections be held no later than a month after a dissolution. During the period of suspension, the government resorted to a "popular"? referendum on a six-point program termed the Shah' s "Great" or "White" Revolution. On January 24, 1963, while preparations for the referendum were in progress, the press reported without denial a foreign news service item regarding the arrest of a new group of over 200 important leaders of the Front, university and clergy. students, On the same date, the newspapers reported that during the referendum the government would not interfere with the people's In fact, in Etteli'Tt vote. both of these items were headlined on the first page. On January 26, the referendum was held throughout Iran and on the next day the results had already been tabulated and were announced by the tss-media. The following are the official returns: Number Qualified

Per Cent

Voters

6,098,277

100.0

Enumerated Votes

5,593,826

91.7

Yes Votes

5,589,711

99.9

No Votes TOTAL

4,115 5,593,826

0.1 100.0

To arrive at the above estimate of the total number of eligible voters, the government took the total enumerated male population 18 years of age and above of

81

SPRING 1970

the 1956 census and increased it by 17.5% to account for population growth. The result of this referendum is especially significant since participation by as much as one-third of the eligible voters in Iran would have then been regarded as phenomenal, the completion of elections in Tehran alone usually had taken over a month, and the National Front and university students had recommended the referendum's boycott. Soon after this referendum there was a maj or uprising against the government in which an estimated 1,500 persons were killed. In 1963, references to parties rapidly disappeared from the mass-media and the government formed a "congress of the delegates of the peasants, workers, women, intelligentsia, and other classes of people", to nominate a single slate for the electionsO The following statement from EttelW'it before the formation published of this congress to East Eurindicates some similarity with its single opean "democratic centralisml party system. of this session The elections (21st Majles) will be conducted on the basis of a oneAnd this party, which has party system. a clear and defined program for the future parliament, is "the party of nation"' (hezbe mellat). This is the party which entered the arena and deposited its uniform votes in the "national box (the referapproval" In the past, when the country did endum). not have any program, the elections and the parliaments were the arena of confrontation of the votes and ideas of the left and right, the fast and the slow, and the and the moderates. extremists Consequentthat the ellikelihood ly, there was less which require the free expression ections, of ideas, would take place in a healthy, As his and tranquil environment.... safe, of the process Exalted Majesty has implied, is a l"national approval" (the referendum) elections.25 model for the future

IRANIAN STUDIES

82

But Iran has not since developed a mass-based party, not even a single para-military one comparable to the Nazi, Fascist, or Conmunist parties. This is to a great extent due to the aversion of the Shah and institutional interest the security groups) especially to the development of other organized and pubforces, licly based centers of authority. A single nominal party has existed for some time and is currently dominant. This is the Irln-e Novin Party which emerged with the blessing of the Shah from a number of highechelon in 1964. bureaucrats But it has not shown any to become unified tendency or popularly based in spite of the fact that most cabinet members and deputies have since been its nominal members. In fact, the lack of such attempt may well have been a factor contributing to the political survival of its leaders. On March 8, 1964 a few deputies in the Majles were also allowed to declare "the existence of the Mardom Party". Also, the I?n-IrTn Party which had from time to time been associated with the court was also recently assigned a few deputies in the Majles. None of these parties, however, have so far shown potential for developing into a mass-based political party. As the conduct of the referendum indicates, most party functions that are performed are again done by the institutional A new institutional interest groups. interest group, established after the fall of Mosaddeq, is the SAVAK, or the Sizmin-e Amniyat va Etteli'it-e Keshvar (the National Security and Information Agency).

This semi-clandestine intelligence agency is presently one of the most important functional units of the regime. Conclusions We have tried to demonstrate that the configu-ration of the political for system has been significant the development of political parties. The Iranian case suggests the existence of a possible relationship between a genuine electoral process, no matter how limited

83

SPRING 1970

the electorate, and the emergence of competitiveaggregative parties. It also indicates that in their initial stages such formations are highly unstructured and fluid, resembling the situation in Western Europe, where various political clubs, groups around notables, and cliques within or outside the legislature found it necessary to convert their loose structures into parties in order to appeal to the expanding electorate. As expected, periods of dictatorship in Iran have impeded the development of parties. This is the case whether we refer to the competitive-aggregative parties of the Western type, the dominant-oligarchic parties of the Mexican type, or even the para-military single parties comparable to those of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the USSR. Even in periods of party repression, however, the need for them has been periodically expressed and attempts at creating comparable organizaThis tions have been made, albeit without much success. suggests that although political parties are not a refor the political quisite system, a need for them may It may be worthwhile be inherent in modern polities. to note in this connection that similar systems, such as Mustafa Kemal's Turkey and Franco's Spain, have sucIt ceeded in develop'ing subservient single parties. is true that these parties3 the National Republican and to minor roles vis-a-vis the Phalanges, were relegated But the Iranian the bureaucracy and security forces. monarchy has not even produced parties such as these.26 of the difficulty is in part a reflection This inability dictators to institutionalize other cencharismatic of But it may also be a reflecters of public authority. tion of the nature of monarchy as an ultimate ruling in a system based nominally on representainstitution Presidential dictators tive government. may feel a more a procompelling need than kings for political parties, that seems to be suported by the Jordanian and position Ethiopian political systems. however,

In the periods of representative governments a number of party functions appear to have been

IRANIANSTUDIES

84

performed. Aggregation, integration, socialization, contribution to the development and maintenance of the representative of the monarchial system) limitation powers) and even governings were done to varying extents by different In the periods of dictatparties. orship, party functions have been relegated mainly to institutional interest groups, although attempts at utilizing subservient parties have also been made. However, in the absence of a meaningful electoral system or similarity of political the gathering of ideology, a few political around a dominant decisionopportunists maker has not resulted in a functioning political party, at least not in the short run. In the area of functions, innovation has mainly come from the parties and groups outside the goverrnment. The Popular Democrats, the Tudeh, the Iran, the Toilers, and the National Front have been the source of political innovation. They have also inspired technological, economic and administrative modernization. Many of Reza Shah's reforms were proposed by the parties before he became dominant, just as the six-point program of the present regime's "White Revolution" were proposed by the parties before. The Iranian case seems to corroborate Theodore LowiIs findings that innovatign has mainly come from the minority or the g2ut-party and Duverger's

"catagion

from the

left."

y

n

Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner have proposed that once political parties have emerged in a system, their suppression is not likely to automatically terminate their activities, and that this suppression usually results in clandestine and conspiratorial character for the repressed parties.29 This proposition, which is supported by the history of the Bolsheviks in Russia and the F.L.N. in Algeria, seems to find further support in the Iranian case. The suppression of the Popular Democrats resulted in guerrilla warfare, clandestine and support for radical activities, separatist movements. The suppression of Erini and Jahansuz groups resulted in the later formation of pro-Communist and Fascist

85

SPRING 1970

parties. tributed factions, adoption models.

of the Tudeh has conthe suppression Finallys Communist of pro-Chinese to the development in the seems to result repression In short, and inf luences exogenous of the more radical

that suscepticase also indicates The Iranian is not necideology communist or leftist the bility to socio-econand lower with poverty associated essarily number of active the largest In fact, omic status. members of the Tudeh have come from the urban middleworkers and proincome groups such as the white collar and even military officers. students, fessionals, laws of the electoral of the effects A comparison in Western of franchise of 1906 and 1914 with a history that gradualism suggests Europe and the United States, might have been helpful of franchise in the extension and parties of competitive-aggregative to the success Furin emerging areas.30 institutions representative the more power within by keeping political thermore, such gradof the system; and modern sectors articulate of dictatthe justification ualism might have obviated reas the means for economic and technological orship forms. in powers' policies of the foreign The effects But in general they from time to time. Iran have varied of the competto the development have been detrimental and representative instituparties itive-aggregative in the of colonialism The abnormal appearance tions. period of Iran tended to deepen early constitutional of early parand make the operation societal cleavages that insularThis suggests ty system more difficult. intervention might have been a major ity from foreign of Britain, parties the early native enabling factor and Western Europe to overcome the the United States, In the case of the United States difficulties. initial it should be noted that the history, with a colonial of a factor to leave the system) Tories were encouraged emphasized. which has not been adequately importance

IRANIAN STUDIES

86

it has often been suggested that to Finally, achieve representative government in emerging nations to it is necessary first expand educational facilities, improve technology and raise the standard of living. Some have gone so far as to argue that it does not matter how such requisite of democracy are conditions achieved and that dictatorship may be the fastest method of bringing them about and thus enhancing the prospects for a successful representative democracy in the future. The case of Iran does not substantiate this proposition. Educational, economic, and technological developments did characterize both periods of dictatorship. They did not, however, contribute to the development of representative institutions. In fact, the reverse appears to have been the case. The lessons of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the USSR are not different. Expanded literacys economic development, high rate of employment, and improved standard of living in these polities did not make their people or leaders more democratic. Rather, they became stauncher supporters of their respective authoritarian systems.

NOTES 1.

Joseph A. Schlesinger and Harry Eckstein, "Parties, Political,t Inter-National Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968 ed., vol. II, p. 430.

2.

For the influence of various environmental factors upon political parties see: George E. Lavau, "Partis politiques et realites sociales: Contribution a une etude realiste des partis politiques,TM Cahiers de la Fondation des Sciences Nationale Politigues, no. 38 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1953); Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Acin the Modern State, tivity trans. Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen; New York: Wiley, 1955); Moisei I. Ostrogorskii, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, trans. Frederick Clarke

87

SPRING 1970

3.

4. 5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

(London and New York: Macmillan, 1908), 2 vols.; Ferdinand A. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press , 1941); Theodore Lowi, "rToward Functionalism in Political Science: The Case of Innovation in Party Systems,' The American Political Science Review, vol.57 (1963), pp. 570-583; Schlesinger and Eckstein, pp. cit., pp. 447-450; Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967); Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, and Stein 1956); and Seymour M. Lipset Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1967). Lowi, op. cit., pp. 572-573; Schlesinger and Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 432-435; 451-452; and Valdimer 0. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed., New York: Crowell, 1964), ch. 8. Duverger, op. cit., pp. xiii-xxxvii; and Schlesop. cit. inger and Eckstein, pp. 450-451. An extensive discussion of pirti is available in Leonard Binder, Iran: Political in a Development Changing Society and Los Angeles: (Berkeley Univof California ersity Press, 1964). and Duverger, Ibid., p. xxvi. op. cit., The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1910), pp. 167-168. Great Britain, Correspondence the Affairs Respecting of Persia, December 1906 to November 1908 (Cmd. 4581) and Papers, vol. Accounts 105, (London: H.M.S.O., 1909), p. 28. Peter Avery, Modern Iran (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 139-162. This work contains the best account in English available of the earlier party movements. See also Mehdi Malekzgdeh, Tarikh-e EnrelTab-e Mashof the Constitutional Iran (The History rutiyat-e Revolution in Iran), in Persian (Tehran: Soqrat and Ibn Sina, 1949-1954),7 vols.

IRANIAN STUDIES

88

10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16.

Roger P. Churchill, Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Torch, 1939). Morgan W. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (New York: The Century, 1912), pp. 157-167. Avery, op. cit., pp. 185-188, and Malekzideh, 2j. cit., vol. 4. For a comprehensive account of these movements see: George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949); Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); Avery, op. cit., pp. 212-220; and Manucher Dowlat-e Showravi dar Iran (The Gorgani, Siasat-e Policy of the Soviet Government in Iran), in Persian (Tehran: Mazaher, 1947). Ta?rikh-e Encelib-e Mashrutiyat-e Irnn (The History of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran), in Persian (Tehran: Mazaher, 1945-1946); vol. 2, pp. 337339; vol. 3, pp. 4-10. Duverger, op.cit., pp. 212. According to this electoral law, the membership of the Majles was set at 150 (with the maximum constitutional limit of 200), of which sixty members were allocated to Tehran and the rest to the provinces. The electors were divided into six classes: (1) Princes and the Qajir tribe, (2) doctors of divinity and students, (3) nobles and notables, (4) merchants, (5) land proprietors and peasants, and (6) trade guilds. Each class voted for its representatives separately to the Majles. Elections in Tehran were direct and in the provinces through the college of electors. The actual division of votes reflected the triumph of the middle and upper-middle classes, especially the business class. The following was the distribution for the 60 representatives allocated to Tehran: Princes and members of the QaIjir family, 4; doctors of divinity and students, 4; merchants, 10; landowners and peasants, 10; trade guilds, 32 in all. The third of the above six categories was

89

SPRING 1970

17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

not defined or represented. Donald Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 68, 77. accounts of the various For the best available L.P. Ellwell-Sutton, parties in this period see: The Middle Parties in Iran: 1941-1948,' "Political East Journal, vol. 3 (1949), pp. 45-61; Richard UnivW. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: ersity of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), and "Political Party Development in Iran,' Iranian Studies, vol. 1 Lenczowski, (1968), pp. 82-94; Binder, op. cit.,; Op.. Cst W.; Avery, op_. cit.; Wilber., op. cit.; and Zabih, op. cit. and Zabih, op. cit. Lenczowski, op. cit.; op. cit. Elwell-Sutton, pp. 216-221; Cottams Nationalism Binder, op. cit., in Iran, pp. 267-281. For the best account of the Toilers and the Third pp. 212-215; Cottam, Force see: Binder, op. cit., Party Development in Iran," pp. 89-91, "Political and Nationalism in Iran, pp. 264-265, 293-294; and pp. 93, 148. Wilber, op. cit., Institutions See G.H. Razi, "The Press and Political and KtyA Content Analysis of Ettela'at of Iran: han", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 22 (1968), pp. 471-474. EttelUlIt, January 30, 1963. Ibid., July 30, 1963. Order in Cf., Samuel P. Huntington, Political (New Haven: Yale University Changing Societies Press, 1968), pp. 417-419. Ibid. p. xxvii . Op. cit., Political Parties and Political Development (PrincePress, 1966), pp. 22-24. ton: Princeton University The importance of the electoral process for politby ical parties was first expounded extensively See also Duverger, oR. cit., Hermens, op. cit. and Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 216-228; and Schlesinger pp. 438-439.

IRANIAN STUDIES

90

PERSIANFOLKSONGTEXTSFROMAFGHAN BADAKHSHAN MARKSWOBIN This study is based on fieldwork undertaken in Badakhshan province of Afghanistan in 1968 for the purA sunmary of the pose of collecting musical data. basic musical styles and instruments current in the area can be found in the author's Instrumental Music in Northern Afghanistan. The focus of the present article is the type of Persian verse set to music by the folk singers of Badakhshian. Principally) this includes a description of the texts of the most comnon folksong form of the region, the felak, drawn from singers of the Faizibid Darwaz (northern), (central), Shughnan (northeastern),

Mark Slobin completed fieldwork in 1967-69 in Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia under a Foreign Area Research for the present article Fellowship. was undertaken under a Wenner-Gren Foundation post-doctoral Dr. Slobin is currently Vislting grant. Assistant Professor at School of Music, University of Michigan, Professor of Music at Wesleyan and will be Assistant University beginning Fall, 1971.

91

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and Keshm (western) regions of BadakhWakhin (eastern) Reference will be made to current Pershian province. sian and Uzbek folksong texts of other areas of northern Afghanistan and the Tajik SSR. The task of linking the contemporary quatrains of Afghan (and Soviet) Badof fourtradition akhshan to the Iranian historical line folksong texts lies in the province of a specialist in Persian poetry; the present author, whose main concern is the music of the rubVli, is content to bring the existence specialists of literary to the attention folksemi-improvised of a still vigorous tradition o5 song texts in BadakhshXn today. Badakhshan is a mountainous zone, lying at the point of the Hindu Kush, at the headnortheasternmost waters of the Oxus. It is linked to the rest of Afand is road and air traffic, ghanistan by unreliable thus often cut off due to poor road and weather conof the region isolation Hence the traditional ditions. Badchange. technological maintained despite has been an old Iranian by populated akhshan is principally termed Mountain Tajiks in the litpopulation generally At the Soviet-Afghan border along the Panj erature. a number of secluded Iranian peoples known live river as Pamir Tajiks, speaking archaic Iranian collectively to the Persianwhich are unintelligible languages and Pamir TajBoth Mountain Mountain Tajiks. speaking SSR (Tajin the live Tajik of the same extraction iks border across the of movement populations ikistan); stopped in ca. 1940. charbaiti) play an imporSongs (bait, ruba'i, of Mountain life They may in the Tajiks. tant role a of si'at-tiri means ("time-passing,' serve as 1) workers, for shepherds and itinerant "diversion") and in towns, 3) to dance villages 2) accompaniment of the urban center in the province, entertainment times, e.g. the anat festival FaizfbWd, especially (Jeshn) held late in August. nual Independence Festival

IRANIANSTUDIES

92

differs the

The most common type of up-country songs which from the standard urban style, considerably is

felak

(lit.

"fate,'

luniverse"r).

Felaks

form an

important component of the repertoire of purely instrumental music in Badakhshan when performed without words; few other modifications are made beyond the mere absence of text. When sung) fel?aka may be performed solo or with the accompaniment of three indigenous Badakhshani musical instruments: the dambura (a two-stringed fretless lute), the gfichak (a two-stringed spike and the tulI (a type of recorder).3 fiddle) Felaks are sung to melodies of extremely limited melodic compass with the musical structure depending on the verse form, e.g. important lines (usually the last) are marked off by caesuras, etc. The songs are set for the most parts with rarely more than syllabically two notes allotted to a syllable. Final syllables are invariably lenghthened, with vowels or consonants transformed into long vowels like E or i that may be prolonged for several measures. Bearing this background in mind, let us turn to analysis of the songs themselves. Ten representative felaks have been chosen for discussion, with a total of forty-four verses, yielding an average of 4.4 verses per song. Of these, thirty-eight verses are in quatrain form, leaving only six anomalous verses; three three-line stanzas and one each of two, five and seven lines. We are dealing, then, with a repertoire that falls into the old Iranian tradition of quatrain folksong

texts.

Aside from this high degree of uniformity in one feature, other traits of the felaks under study display a remarkable heterogeneity of structure in terms of type of rhyme scheme, number of syllables per line and shared vocabulary of stock words or phrases, features to be discussed below.

93

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percentIn regard to rhyme scheme, a significant age of the felak verses in quatrain form deviate fro the AABApattern considered standard for the rubiYi. follow twenty-five quatrain verses, Of the thirty-eight six variant representing this norm, but thirteen, These rhyme-schemes, deviate from the AABApattern. Five verses break down into the following patterns: with AAAArhyme scheme, three with AABB, two with AABC Among and one each with AAAB, ABCAand ABCDpatterns. those with three lines the six non-quatrain verses, is the two-liner follow either an AAAor AMBpattern, an AABBBand the single sevenan AB, the five-liner line verse (of which more below) contains no apparent These findings do not tally with JilYi rhyme scheme. Cejpek's statement regarding Persian quatrains for "So-called singing quatrains (rubT-i tarfolksongs: ana with rhyme pattern aaaa) do not occur very often, but the rhyme formula aabb appears fairly frequently."15 However, Cejpek's remarks as to the metric structure of folksong quatrains bears quite closely on the Badakhshani case: Among the various genres of rhythmigenucal poetry the quatrain (rubali) inely has its roots among the people, Each verse is usually made up of eleven sylone finds though occasionally lables, Not until later was twelve or fourteen. imthe metric system of polite literature (most composed upon the folk-quatrains mon is the incomplete eleven-syllable hazai. in though not a specialist The present writer, to agree with Cejpek in is inclined Persian metrics, his view that folksong quatrains are only loosely with the classical aruz system of Persian associated verse, and can more properly be analyzed according to awkward It is certainly per line. number of syllables to scan most of the felak texts under study the way IRANIAN STUDIES

94

one would scan a verse

of polite

literature.

Cejpek's estimate of eleven and twelve-syllable predominance is borne out by the Badakhshani material, although fourteen-syllable lines are not as common as he indicates. Singers clearly prefer eleven- and twelve-syllable lines; next come lines of ten and thirteen syllables. structures, Fourteen-syllable however, are definitely less favored in Badakhshan. Less homogeneous than the overall distribution of syllable-number is the patterning of lines within a given verse. Only four of the forty-four quatrains are isosyllabic, and overall there are thiry-one different combinations of syllable-numbers in the sample, only three of which occur more than once. Lopsided quatrains such as one with the pattern 11,11,11,6 syllables are common. The heterogeneity of patterning in rhyme scheme, number of syllables per line and combination of syllable-number in lines of a given verse delineated above bespeaks the semi-improvisatory nature of felak songtexts as well as a generally nonchalant attitude towards fixed form among folk singers. Looking over the entire body of texts, one finds a continuum of precision in verse structure which can be roughly correlated in certain cases with the degree of professionalism and/or cosmopolitanism of the singer. At one end, an amateur backwoods singer may prefer a style which is in approach, frequently with autoalmost narrative biographical content, while at the other extreme of the poetic range a much-traveled professional singer may employ subject-matter and verse structures reminiscent of polite literature. We will examine these features of the BadakhshTni song texts as we look at sample poems. Our first example is of the extreme amateur variety cited above. This is a felak sung by GhulTm Husayn of the Shughnian region, where Mountain and Pamir Tajiks 95

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live side by side; Ghulam Husayn is of the former group. His song illustrates a blend of tightly and looselystructured verses. The verses accordare transcribed ing to Badakhshani pronunciation from the recorded performance. The author was assisted in the translation of song texts by Mr. E. Yaftali a (Kabul University), native of Badakhshan. Passages considered obscure by the present writer and/or Mr. Yaftali in are enclosed parentheses. Example

1:

Ghuain Husayn's

Felak

Verse

1:

Az xaneie padar, ei mardom, digar raftam Ba sad alam du didei geryan raftam. Yaran o baradara?n salamat ba?shid. Shughn7an be shoma, man dar badaxshan megardum.

Verse

2:

Xa-be didam, az in xab elahi didam dust. Xud ma wa tura xubtar be bolin didam. Az xibe labe dar shodam wa xabe didam. Dar dashte bad or margi namad z pase rum Man kiyam, man begiram be xane resam. Be xane resam ke madaram darra? w?az sazad. Girad labe dandan barayad nafasam.

Verse

3:

Nozuk badane (mushqe xotan) miyaye. Az rThe ghariba watan miyaye. Yaqub pesare gum shodara (ki shenid) Ku yusufi nazanin be watan miya?ye.

Verse

4:

Be mulqake shughnan fitadam gharib. Bimar shodam ba? sar nay?af tam tabib. Ku xohar ku madar ku ya-ram aziz Girad xabare ma.

Verse

1:

I left my father's house, o people. With a hundred sorrows and two tearful eyes. and brothers, be well! Friends in Shughnan is for you; I'm going to travel Badakhshan.

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96

Verse 2:

I had a dream, oh God, and saw my friend. I saw you and myself better in sleep I slept near the door and dreamed. Anyone who goes to the desert of Evil and Death doesn't return. Who am I , that I can reach home So that when I reach my home my mother will open the door So that she kisses me and my soul escapes.

Verse 3:

body (with musk of Khotan) is The delicate coming. He is coming home f rom af ar. Jacobs who lost his son (who has heard of him) is coming home. Yusuf the beautiful

Verse 4:

1 live poorly in the land of Shughnrn. I became ill but didn't find a doctor. my mother, my friend Where is my sister, To f'ind out how I am.

Readily apparent is the variety of verse-types Verse 2 stands out, in its in Ghulim Husayn's felak. stanzas. rambling form, from the other, four-line Verses 1 and 3 offer examples of the more standard, AABA-rhymed quatrain of Badakhshin, while Verse 4 The thread running throughtakes a middle ground. account of wanout the song is the autobiographical many dering and longing for home, which characterizes It is interesting to note that Shughnin is felaks. country than Badakhshrn treated as being a different nature of sub-regions proper, emphasizing the isolated of Badakhshan. Even Ghulia Husayn's felak is not free from a cliches: note the certain number of quasi-literary in Verse 3 and the possible phrase Biblical references l"mushqe xotan" ("musk of Khotan"). elaksa are partly or an by the singer's solidified memorized verses) and partly improvised to suit audience's approbation, 97

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Verse 3 is probably one of Ghuthe mood or occasion. lTm Husayn's fixed quatrains that he fits into many felaks; Verse 2, on the other hand, bears an improvisatory mark, and was strung together without a break in the sung performance. Some of GhulWmHusayn's cliches are those found though there are remarkably few such in numerous felaks, One which Badakhshani folksongs. in phrases recurring o barT"YSrSn appears in Verse 1 is quite popular: adbeing parties as and brothers") darTn" ("lovers stereotyped of use the than More coimnon dressed. phrases and similes in fgLlaks is the recurrence of a work, etc. In to agricultural allusions given locale, to short, singers rely on homespun material relating musician. the daily life of the non-professional At the other end of the creative continuum stands the work of performers such as Baiz Gul Badakhmusician who has made a regional shi, a professional across the North and has even been broadreputation for a a rare distinction cast by Radio Afghanistan, Baz Gul hails from the Keshm Badakhshani singer. area of (western) region, which is the least isolated Here is one of his well-known songs: the province. Example 2:

Baz Gul Badakhshils

Felak

Verse 1:

Seibarga beguft dar zamin sabza manam. Benafsha beguft jawTni azTda manam. Sadbarga beguft lafi behuda nazan; Yak daste guli jawWni pur maza manam.

Verse 2:

Ashuq shodara tegh be sar bayad xord. Gar zahr bedish mesle shakar bayad xord. Ruze be gonihi isheqi koshte shawam. Darya darya xune jigar bayad xord.

IRANIANSTUDIES

98

Verse 1:

I am the only greenery on Clover said: earth. Violet said: I am the perfect youth. don't boast The centifolious rose said: in vain; I am a wreath of young joyous flowers.

Verse 2:

The lover must be ready a blade. If you give him poison, like sugar. Someday I may be killed love. He should drink rivers

to be pierced

with

he must eat it for the sin of of liver's

blood.

Here we have two tightly structured, unrelated verses which stand in sharp contrast to Ghulam Husayn's rambling but thematically connected stanzas. Baiz Guls quatrains follow the standard AABApattern, down to recurrence of as long a closing phrase as "bWyad xord". Further, both stanzas have a central theme carried out In the first, strictly. the "beguft" motive and allegorical use of flowers clearly bespeaks a close connection to the cliches of polite Persian verse, while in the second the dangers of love are stated in the traditional style. Bfz Gul's quatrains Significantly, also seem metrically related to standard rubali meters of classical Persian verse, though a fair amount of metric "compensation" is required to make the lines fit the patterns. The meters are:2._vuuF.u l-a..vu for Verse I and for Verse 2, based necessarily on a classical Persian reading of the text. This is the extent of metric formalization in Badakhshani folksong texts, though one cannot precisely say that other quatrains do not admit to metric scansion. As Masse has noted, "No Persian metre admits to so many variants as the rubai.,"8 Between the extremes

of Ghulim Husayn's 99

and Baz

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Gulls style lies the large middle ground of felak feature of this Perhaps the most interesting verse. body of material is the insight it affords extensive to the into Badakhshani life through the references and the continuing probdaily round of activities and love encountered by Mountain lems of subsistence Here, for example, are two verses of a felak Tajiks. by Baba Naim, a Badakhshani musician who has become a Radio Afghanistan performer of non-Badakhshani music recalls many of the tunes of in Kabul, but who still The tight structure of the his native province. verses may be a result of Baba Naim's professional stature and his wide travel and residence in various areas of Afghanistan. Example 3:

Baba Naim's Felak

Verse 1:

Charxe felak mara be charx aiwordi. Kulab budim mara dar baix awordi Janam dar KulTabbudim u mixurdim ibe shirin Az Xbe shirin bar 7abe talx awordi.

Verse 2:

Dar kotile ruberu bastam shudgar GowhXye hartmnzda nemikard noxshar Sange bezadim o beshekast yugh or separ GowhXbe cherar raft, ma didane yar.

Verse 1:

0 wheel of fortune, I was in Kulib, you Dear, I drank sweet You brought me from

Verse 2:

down the passo I was plowing straight The damn cows weren't chewing their cuds. I threw a stone and broke the yoke and plow. The cows fled and I ran to my lover.

you spun me around. brought me to Balx. water in Kulib; sweet water to bitter.

the common reference to "felak" Verse I displays or "icharkh-i felak" in Badakhshini songs, and explains IRANIANSTUDIES

100

how the term felak was given to the entire genre of songs. Here the singer describes the plight of refugees from Soviet Tajikistan the Kul(specifically ab region) to the Afghan side, probably during the Basmachi uprisings of the 1920's and 1930's. Balx, in Afghan Turkestan, is here made to stand for the whole of northern Afghanistan. Verse 2, on the other hand, is a rather bitter rustic scene with some elements of pastoral Both verses comedy. of Baba Naim's felak typify the concerns of felak singers. The of a given locale, stressing as in Verse 1, is found in four of the ten songs under discussion, and specific to agricultural reference or pastoral occupations appear in five of the felaks. The third motive mentioned earlier, Biblical references, occurs in five texts, and the fourth common topic, travel and separation, comes out in three of the sample songs. Among other folk poetry genres of Afghanistan, the felak of Badakhshan is most like the Uzbek quatrain of Afghan Turkes tan, Though the language (and language family) obviously differ, the semi-improvised functional nature of the Uzbek songs is quite close to the Tajik quatrain.9 The Uzbek songs are generally heard among professional in teamusicians houses across the North, and have the same immediacy of content and lack of formal metric structure that characterize many felak texts. Folksong in Pertexts sian heard in the same teahouse context tend to follow the ghazal, rather than rub'ali, form, and are usually composed by semi-professional urban poets who produce texts specifically for musicians, to be set to stock melodies. In these verses, the cliches and concerns of polite Persian literature predominate, down to mere parody of classic poetic style. Rarely, however, are classic poems themselves (e.g. works of Saladi and Hafez) used as song texts. Classically-oriented town ghazals are also composed in Uzbek in certain towns of Afghan Turkestan, notably Andkhoi, and are analogous to Persian verses of the same urban variety.

101

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of the Badakhshani felak relatives The closest are to be found across the border in southern Tajikistan, where the other half of the Mountain Tajik popIn Dansker's valuable study of the ulation lives. music culture of the Tajiks of the Karategin and Darwiz regions (adjacent to Afghan Badakhshlan) one finds the word gharibi ("poor"t songs) used much the way Afghan as a generic term for i.e., Badakhshanis uig felak, These songs, both in terms of their types of song. manner of performance, accompanying instrufunction, to the ments and melody typess correspond closely The most confelak described in the present study. between these vincing proof of the "blood-relationship" motives is the appearance of identical two repertoires and lines in the texts of songs in Soviet and Afghan Below is a Soviet Tajik quatrain quoted Badakhshan by Dansker ; the Afghan versian can be found as Verse 4 of GhulTm Husayn's felak (Example 1). KulTAbgharib o Bimar shodam o Ku madar or ku O bigonfi hamin

mulke Kulib gharib. be sar nayoftam tabib. padar biyarand tabib? guft o kuj-K mord gharib.

KulTab is poor and the land of Kulab is poor. I fell ill and couldn't find a doctor. Where are my mother and father, to bring a doctor? 0 thus spoke the unfortunate one and where did the poor fellow die. of lines is not accithe coincidence Clearly, of dental, and demonstrates the continued closeness among the Mountain Tajiks despite the repertoire border over the last closing of the Afghan-Soviet The term fellak, though not cited years. thirty-odd as in use in Tajikistan, in Dansker's study, is still the present author was informed by Nizam Nurdianov, of the Tajik Academy of in Tajik folklore speclalist in Dushanbe. Sciences, IRANIANSTUDIES

102

In summary, while Browne has so aptly stated proth? oldest that the rubi' i is "almost certainly genius of Persia, 12 the present duct of the poetical that this does not mean to indicate study has attempted it is on the contrary, that the rubil'i has vanished; areas of the Iranian world. in the eastern flourishing

NOTES 1,

2.

3. 4.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

11. 12.

Slobin, M., Instrumental Music in Northern AfghanPh.D. dissertation istan, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1969). For a recent regional folk study of the Persian quatrain, see Mardom-i KhorasTn by Ibrahim Shukurz5de (Tehran: Nihad-i Farhang, Pashto 1967). folk poetry has its classic in presentation Darmsteter's Chants Populaires des Afghans (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1888-90); one important Pashto genre, the lundali has recently been described by a Pashtoon poet, Saduddin Shpoon ("Paxto and the Landey,"in Folklore Afghanistan XX, No.4 1968, 40-49). in Slobin, Illustrations 1969. Cejpek, Jiri, "Iranian in J. Folk-Literature,' Rypka, ed., History of Iranian Ljterature (Dordrecht: Reiden, 1968), 607-710. 695. Ibid., Ibid., 694. I am indebted to Prof. G. Windfuhr, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan, for the metric analysis of Biz Gull s felak. Masse , H., "Rubaill in The Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1936), 1167. Slobin, M. a Notes from the record album "Afghanistan Vol. I: Music of the Uzbeks,0 Anthology of the World's Music Series, 1969. Dansker, O., "Muzykal'naia kulltura tadzikov Karai Darvazal" in Iskusstvo tegina tadXikskogo naroda Vol. 3 (Dushanbe: Donish, 1965, 236. Ibid. Quoted in Masse, 1936, 1167. 103

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THREEDROPS OF BLOOD

SADEQ HEDAYAT Translated

by Thomas M. Ricks

they changed my room. Yesterdays Am I completely cured now? Will I be free to leave next week as the superintendent promised? Have I been sick at all? For one years they wouldn' t give me a pen and paper which I wanted more than anything else. I always thought about the many things I would write once they gave me a pen and paper. without Yesterday) asking, they brought me paper and a pen...something I longed I waited for so long. for so much...something But what's I have been able to the use? Since yesterday, write nothings no matter how hard I try. It's as someone were me back, as though my arm though holding Now, as I read over the garbled were paralysed. which are etched into the paper, the only words lines I can make out are ... "three drops of blood." *

Thomas H. Ricks ment of History

IRANIAN STUDIES

*

*

is a doctoral candidate at Indiana University.

104

in the Depart-

The sky is azure, the garden green, the flowers and a soft gentle blooming on the distant knoll, breeze carries their to this very spot. fragrance And for what? I'm no longer able to enjoy such things; things meant for poets, and second childchildren, hoods. It's one year since I came here. Night and day, I have been kept awake by the crying of a cat; these terrifying these grating cries, sounds bring my heart to my mouth. In the morning, my eyes are hardly open when the damned injection...! How long the days have been and how weary the hours... herded together underground during the summertime, or decked out in our yellow and pants while seated shirts alongside the garden during the winter to enjoy the For one year, I've lived among these sunshine. strange and peculiar people. We have nothing in common; I'm as different from them as the earth is from the sky. Still, the groans, the stillness, the curses, the tears, and laughter of these human beings continue to fill my sleep with nightmares. *

*

*

In another hour, we eat ... the same old food ... yogurt, pudding, rice, bread, and cheese...enough to live on, or rather enough not to die. Hassan has but one desire and that is to eat a bowl of rich soup and four flat loaves of fresh bread. When he leaves this place, they'll bring him a bowl instead of a pen and paper! He's one of the happier people here. Short in stature, he has a foolish laugh, thick nieck, bald head, and rough, arthritic hands, deformed from hod-carrying cell ..every of his body and his stupid look prove he was born for carrying hod. If MIohammadAli didn't stand there at lunch and dinner, Hassan would have taken all of us right up to God but Mohammad Ali is also a citizen of this world. They say whatever they want in this place but this is another world, beyond the world of ordinary men. We have a doctor who doesn't understand anything about the power of God. If I were in his place, I'd pour poison in all their food some evening and give it to them to eat. Then, 105

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the next mornings I'd stand off in the corner of the garden with my hands on my hips and count the dead as when they brought At first, they were brought out. of them poisonfear overpowering this had I me here, Mountil lunch or dinner my touch I didn't ing me. I Terrified, ate. I it...then hammad Ali tasted they were going to thinking stayed awake at nightst are very far away) matters these of all me. Now, kill the same food, same the .always time.. faded by people) halfway up coming blue darker a room, the same blue the wall. Two months ago, they threw a mad man into that He tore open his at the end of the courtyard. prison and began marble jagged of own stomach with a piece They say same that tool. with opening his intestines stomachs. out tearing to accustomed he was a butcher, Then, there was another one who popped out his own had to tie his hands eye with his fingernails...they The blood from He was screaming. behind his back. I know that all these dried up. his eye had already people are under the head supervisor. Not all of these people here are like these if cured and Many of them would be miserable two. Sughra Sulthere's For instance, to leave. allowed she Two or three times, tan in the women's section. but She's old They caught her. wanted to escape. and uses the smears her face with plaster-of-paris She also thinks of hergeranium flower for rouge. .if she were cured and as a fourteen-year-old.. self But then she'd have a stroke. looked into a mirror, there is good old Taqi who wants to turn the world that women are the reason He believes upside-down. for man's misery and to save the world, every woman He's become the lover of Sughra must be killed. Sultan. All of these people are under our head superall the hands of the insane behind He ties visor. he always and beady-eyeds Large-nosed their backs. under the pine tree at the far end of the strolls IRANIAN STUDIES

106

he bends over to examine the foot garden. Sometimes, of the tree. Anyone seeing him might wonder how such man fell into the grip of a a harmless, helpless But I know him. I also know group of raving idiots. that under the tree are three drops of blood. There's The cage is a cages hanging in front of his window. To take his a cat devoured the canary. empty because revenge, he left the cage there to attract greedy them. cats in order to execute Just as the he spied a tabby cat. Yesterday) beast reached the top of the pine tree directly in front of his window, he ordered the guard to shoot. These three drops of blood belong to that cat. But, he claims they belong to the Bird when questioned, of Truth. and neighbor... of all is my friend Strangest Abbas. About two weeks ago, they brought him here. He warmed up to me immediately. He thinks he's a prophet and poet. He believes that everything, particularly prophecy, depends on good luck and chance. Everyone needs foresight. If he's a dunce, he shall If he's the wisest succeed. man in the world and doesn't have foresight, he'll fall on bad days. Abbas also thinks of himself as a tar expert. He a wire across streched a piece of wood and thought he had a tar. He also composed a poem which he recites eight times a day to me. One might say they brought him here because of this poem... the poem, the peculiar ditty which he composed... Alas, once more, night comes Upon all the world, blackness comes Upon all creatures, stillness comes Except on me, pain and grief will no joy in a world like mine There's The remedy is not sorrow, but death is Now in that corner beneath the pine There, in the dirt, three drops 107

flood.

mine of blood.

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Abbas rewe walked in the park. Yesterdays this very same poem when a woman, a man, and cited Till now, they have a young girl came to see him. them. I now know them and recognize come five times. She The young girl brought a bouquet of flowers. she loved me. From the laughed at me. Certainly, to me. Abbas' pock-marked she was attracted beginning But, as the woman spoke face wasn't goodlooking. I saw Abbas take the girl aside and with the girl, kiss her. *

*

*

Until now, no one came to see me and no one The last been one year. It's brought me flowers. time, Siavush came to see me. Siavush was my best Every days we went to We were neighbors. friend. talktogethers and returned together the university During the recess) together. ing about our lessons Rokhsara, Siavush's tar lessons. I gave Siavush used to take part in our sescousin and my fiancee, thought about marrying Siavush seriously sions. one month before but, suddenly, sister Rokhsarals she broke off the engagement and Siathe wedding, I went to inTwo or three times, sick. vush fell forbut they said the doctors quire about his health Every time I came, bade anyone to speak with him. gave up. I finally they gave me the same answer. it was close to examinations. I now remember.. home and dumped to dusk, I returned One day, close on the table. my pile of books and school note-pads shot a pistol As I was about to change my clothes, it made me jump, esThe shot was so close rang out. when I remembered the moat behind our house pecially I in our neighborhood. and the rumors of a thief from the table drawer and went into the took a pistol Then, closely. I stood there listening courtyard. As see a thing. I climbed up on our roof but didn't courtdown, I glanced over into Siavush's I started There, in the middle of the yard, stood Siayard. I called and underpants. Surprised, vush in his shirt is that you?" "Siavush, out to him:

IRANIAN STUDIES

108

one else

He saw me and yelled is here."

back:

"Come on over,

no

"'Did you hear the shot?" I asked. He put his to his lips and motioned for me to come with a finger nod of his head. I quickly climbed down and went to the front door and knocked. He opened the door himself. His head was down and he stared at the ground. "Why didn't you comne to see me?"

they

"I came two or three times said the doctor forbade it,"

"They think he mumbled.

I'm not well

"Did you hear

the

pistol

to visit you but I answered. but

they're

wrong,"

shot?"

Without answering, he took my hand and led me to the foot of the pine tree. He pointed to something. Bending over, I saw ...three drops of fresh blood on the ground. Then, he took me to his room and closed the door. I sat down in a chiar while he lit the lamp. He then came over to me and pulled up a chair in front of me next to the table. His room was simple; blue in color, a darker blue coming halfway up the wall. There was a tar on one side of the room. A pile of books and school note-pads were scattered across the table. Then, opening the table drawer, Siavush took out a pistol and showed it to me. It was one of those antiques pearl-handled pistols. He stuffed it into his pocket and said: "I used to have a female cat, named Nazee. Maybe you saw her around. She was one of those common tabby cats with two big eyes.. .larger than usual as if she wore eye-liner. The color and shapes on her back were very even as if poured on like water onto a paper blotter and then folded neatly in the middle. Every day, when I returned from school,

109

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Nazee ran out to me, purring and meowing as she rubbed When I sat down, she climbed over my against my leg. head and down my back, poking her nose into my face and licking my forehead with her rough tongue; begOne could see that a female cat was ging for a kiss. than a male more crafty, more kind, and more sensitive Besides me, Nazee was on the best of terms with cat. But she the cook since she got her food from her. kept her distance with the old housemaid who was most and who said her prayers and disliked conscientious Nazee believed that human beings cat hair. Certainly, were more clever than cats since they hoarded all the tasty food and kept the warm, cozy places for themCats, therefore, had to resort to flattery selves. in order to get along with them. and cajolery were most noticeable "Nazee's animal instincts when a bloody head of a rooster fell into her grasp. Her She was then transformed into a vicious beast. and out, and her claws came gleamed, large eyes grew Then, as if she snarled at anyone who came near her. it was only a toy, she began frolicking realizing Puthead to be allve. about imagining the rooster's ting her paw under it, she stroked it and then hid nearby, lying in ambush. Twice she attacked, herself leaping and capering with all the strength and agilattacks and quick retreats. ity of her kind, feinting Soon, she would tire of sporting with the head and For someappetite. would devour it with a ferocious time, she would prowl around looking for the rest of her sweet disposition the rooster to kills forgetting for the next one or two hours; not coming near anyone, not parading

around,

not even

attempting

flattery.

"Nazee was good at expressing her likes and She was both wild and reserved, not divulgdislikes. She knew full well ing her secrets or views on life. If a strange cat happened that our house was hers. by our gates she would snarl and hiss and her cries if it had would linger on for some time, particularly been a female cat. IRANIANSTUDIES

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"Nazee' s cries for food were quite distinct from her other wooing sounds. Her cries of hunger, rages or passion were all quite different. The tone of her vo'ice would change gradually. First, the cry rasped from her lungs, then it was a cry of revenge and angers followed by a pained sound which rose from a primeval urge which finally drove her running to her mate. Moreover, Nazee's looks were more significant than anything else. Often, she almost showed human feelings so much so that people asked themthat fuzzy head and behind those mys'Inside selves, terious green eyes, what thoughts and feelings must be welling up?' "'Last springs a terrible thing happened. As you know, this is the season when all animals swoon and make love. It is as if the spring breeze injected into all moving beings a bit of insanity. Our Nazee was no exception. The first wave of love went to her head and she trembled so much her whole body shook and her cries became more prolonged. Tomcats, hearing her calls, happily went off in her direction. After the squabbles and fighting, Nazee chose the one who was the strongest and the noisiest to be her mate. When animals make love, smell is most important to them, particularly among tame and clean cats who face other females like themselves. This is not so for the cats on the walls, the alley cats, the thins thieving; lazy emaciated cats who give off their own natural small so attractive among their kind. All day and particularly at night, Nazee and her lover sang out together. Nazee's soft body contracted while her mate's arched like a bow and together they purred in joy. Into the early hours of dawn, they continued their labors. Then, ruffled, tired, bruised but content, Nazee made her way back into the room. "Nazee's nocturnal lovemaking kept me awake. At last, I lost my patience. One day, I was working in front of this very window and spotted the Lover and Beloved strutting abou t the garden. I took this pistol which you see, went three steps, and took aim.

111

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The gun fired and a bullet tore into Nazee's mate. You might say he was torn in two. He took one jump a sound, darted for the gate, and, without uttering in front of the garden's clay wall and collapsed died. "The drops of blood trickled off in a straight Nazee searched for him for some time until she line. She smelled his blood and went found his prints. for his dead body. For two days and two straight she kept watch over her dead one. Often, she nights, nudged him with her paw as if to say, 'Wake up, it's Why are you sleeping at a time for Spring. still lovemaking? Why don't you budge? Get up! Get up! Nazee didn't understand death and didn't realize her lover was dead. "The following day, both Nazee and her mate I asked everyI searched everywhere. disappeared. Was Nazee that angry It was no use. one about her. with me? Have people and lovemaking ceased to have meaning for her? When one mate dies, what becomes of the other? "Then, one night, I heard the wailing of that The next He cried until daylight. very same tomcat. night was the same except he stopped his cries at dawn. On the third night, I again took the pistol of the pine tree in front and fired in the direction of my window. The flash of his eyes in the dark was and then stopped. the cries faded gradually, clear, Since that nights he comes and begins his wailing in The others sleep well and the same way as before. don't hear him. Whenever I tell them, they laugh at me but I know. ..I'm sure it's the voice of that Since that night until now I haven't cat I murdered. been about to sleep a wink. I move around, sleeping screams in every room. All night long, the terrible of this cat ring out, calling his mate. "Todays when the house was empty, I went out to the place where the cat sits every night and cries. IRANIANSTUDIES

112

I took aim at the spot where the flash of his eyes in the dark. was clear The bullet was fired in the direction where I heard the cat's and, then, cries three drops of blood splashed down from above. You saw them with your own eyes. Aren't you my witness?" At that moment, the door of the and Rokhsara and her mother came in.

room opened

Rokhsara was carrying a bouquet of flowers in her hand. I stood up to greet them but Siavush laughingly said: "Of course, you know Mr. Mirza Ahmad Than better than I. No introduction is necessary. He gave me his word that he saw the three drops of blood with his own eyes at the foot of the pine tree." "'Yes, I saw them," I quickly added. Then Siavush came towards me, chuckling. He reached into my pockets took out my pistol, and put it on the table. "You know Mirza Ahmad Khan is not only good at playing the tar and reciting poetry, he's also an expert hunter....his aim is very good." Then he nodded I too got up and said: towards me. "Yes, this afternoon I came to get my school notebooks from Siavush. To pass the time, we were aiming at the pine tree.. .but those three drops of blood don' t belong to the cat, they belong to the Bird of Truth. You know that the owl who eats three grains of wheat belonging to a child must scream every night until three drops of blood trickle out of his throat. Perhaps a cat has devoured the neighbor' s canary and they have shot it and it happened here. Now I'm going to recite a new lyric poem which I've brought with me." I picked up the tar, tuned it, and then recited this poem: Alas, once more, night comes Upon all the world, blackness

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comes stillness Upon all creatures, Except over me, pain and grief flood.

will

There's no joy in a world like mine The remedy is not sorrow but death is mine Now in that corner beneath the pine There, in the dirt, three drops of blood. At that point of the poem, Rokhsarals mother stormed Rokhsarals eyebrows went out of the room in a huff. up and she said, "This one' s mad." She then took Siavushl s hand and they both burst out laughing. They left the room, slamming the door behind them. In the courtyards they stopped under my lamp below the window panes I saw them put their arms around each other and kiss.

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B O

OK

RE

V IEW

S

and Economy in in Iran: Settlement City and Village Madison, Wisc.: the Kirman Basin. By Paul W. English. 1966. 204 pp. Press, The University of Wisconsin .75. $6

WILLIAM IRONS an excelThis study by a geographer provides and of the influence of environment lent description on settlement economy, and social pattern) technology in one of the more arid regions of the Iranstructure ian Plateau. research conducted It is based on field in 1961-62 over a period of eleven months in Kirman, and preceded by seven months of library research and preparatory work in London, Tehran, Yazd and Isfahan. of the study is unique in that the The perspective of investigation is not a single community subject an urban center and a but rather a region including and rural area of small urban subcenters surrounding

Professor William Irons is Assistant of Social Relations at Johns Hopkins

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in the Department University.

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is focused on the relationAttention communities. ship between these communities rather than on the inof a single community. The ternal organization author is convinced that such an approach can yield new insight which cannot be gained by investigations of his focused on a single community, and the results study presented in this book bear out this conviction. Extension of this regional approach to certain other parts of Iran, such as Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, or the of the Caspian Sea will probably southern littoral in defining regional involve greater difficulties borders than were encountered in this study of the however, will probSuch difficulties, Kirman Basin. ably prove only to be minor problems, and undoubtedly there will be a number of future studies in Iran which will apply such a regional approach with conprofit. siderable of his study English begins the presentation of the physical environment of the with a description Kirman Basin pointing out that because of a number of extreme temperatures) ruggedfactors such as aridity, and poor soil the region presents ness of terrain, Hie then to human habitation. very serious obstacles reviews the history of human occupation of the basin, showing that because of its marginal character as an and its remoteness from area for human habitation in early Irancenters of commerce and administration ian history (Achaemenian and Parthian periods) the area was not permanently settled until early Sassanas a ian times, when Kirman City was established By this time qanat technology was outpost. frontier of Kirman well developed in Iran and the settlement The vagwas based on this means of supplying water. economic, and demographic political, aries of shifting of the Kirman Basin from on the inhabitants conditions to the present are then settlement the time of first reviewed brief ly.

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this is a description Following of settlement and land use, and an examination pattern of the facof Kirmani society. tors shaping these aspects Until of deep wells, introduction the only rethe recent and human conliable source of water for cultivation sumption in the Kirman Basin was the qanat, and this fact has been of overriding in determining importance settlement and the means of land utilization. pattern influThe way in which reliance on qanats strongly and internal ences the location, size, structure of settlements and the pattern of land use in the irrigated fields surrounding each settlement is made clear in this very interesting of the book. section The author's examination of these matters leads very natto an analysis of the impact of settlement urally and on the local land use patterns economy and social It is from this analysis structure. that English's most important a conclusion conclusion arises, which he feels can be generalized to the rest of Iran: "The villager of Iran, whether sharecropper, weaver, or herder, is inextricably in an urbaninvolved dominated, regional economic organization and probably was so in the past" (p. 88). The high cost of qanat construction and maintenance results in a conof the ownership centration of water resources and of arable land as well in the hands of a small wealthy upper stratum of the regional urban center, Kirman City. Share-cropping arrangements cause surpluses of rural produce beyond what is necessary for a very modest subsistence of the rural population to flow into the hands of this urban elite, and, thus, capital for investment in other activities, such as the extensive carpet weaving industry of Kirman, and livestock and wood production are also concentrated in urban hands. Closely associated with this situation is a concentration of mercantile and administrative activities in the regional urban center. To a very limited extent smaller regional subcenters such as Mahan and Jupar share in the conduct of these administrative and mercantile affairs. This condition in

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which a small urban elite monopolizes control of the economic activities of the entire and in which region, administration and trade are concentrated in the regional urban center, is characterized by the author as urban dominance. This is a condition which English feels can be generalized not only to the rest of Iran, but also to the entire Middle East (pp. 111-114). While English's demonstration that urban dominance is a salient feature of Kirmani society is a very substantial achievement, his suggestion that urban dominance is a characteristic general to the Middle East, both past and present, could be misleading if it is assumed to imply that conditions throughout the Middle East closely parallel those of Kirman. It is certainly true that there is no community in the modern Middle East, even the most isolated of nomad camps or the most inaccessible of mountain vilin some lages, whose population does not interact At a very significant way with some urban center. minimum such interaction consists of some form of trade with urban markets and recognition of the auof government officials based in urban centhority in various ters to collect taxes and to intervene ways However, the extent of urban conin local affairs. trol of rural economic resources described by English for Kirman is by no means universal. Agricultural in which local cultivators own all or most communities of the land they farm are not unknown in Iran, or In the majority of other parts of the Middle East. the local herders own all or pastoral communities, for which they care. most of the livestock Recogninow universal tion of government authority although Until very recently, has not been so in the past. tribal there have been various groups which have only In the tenuously accepted government authority. the tribal of such cases, majority people have recognized the urban-centered government as having only a to make demands on them, such as very limited right with a small body of militia to be supplied the right

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or to collect a light tax while leaving in tribal often the hands considerable authority including of the right to make war and peace independently numerous instances records in government. History resisted which such groups successfully by military its means attempts by the government to increase The extent to which tribal control over them. groups of urbanhave acted as political entites independent based governments has frequently gone even farther A fairly of the dynasties than this. large portion arose in Middle Eastern history recorded originally as a result of tribal conquests of urban centers. Are such tribal groups to be described as urbandominated? The condition of urban dominance which English has very ably demonstrated as characteristic of the Kirman Basin can be generalized to the rest of Iran and to other parts of the Middle East only with certain It is certainly limitations. true that for several millenia all rural communities in the Middle East have had important economic and political relations with urban centers. However, the extent to which the urban population has been the dominating group in these relations has varied considerably. The in the degree of urban dominance observed by English Kirman Basln in 1961-62 while not unusual is not universal. There is another feature of English's discussion of urban dominance in Kirman which deserves brief mention. This is his continual criticism of the "traview that Middle Eastern ditional" society is divided into isolated and self-contained communities. At the of the study, very beginning he states: It is customary for writers to divide Middle Eastern society into three sectors--city, village, and tribe--each

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enviphysical a different exploiting such authors preInvariably, rornent. by warning face their discussions that one must not view these readers economic realms, segments as discrete the mutto illustrate examples and cite city of each sphere: ual interdependence crops; depend on village-grown dwellers such basic commodities, receive villagers from the city; as salt, sugar) and cloth, supply wool and mi lk products tribesmen Havin return for grain. to marketplaces these writers this warning, ing delivered each segment as a proceed to discuss are viewed cities system: self-contained in a barren land, linked by as islands and networks of roads and caravan trails, who and processors by traders occupied as opposed to 'folk' share in 'urban' selfare isolated3, villages cultures; peasant comsufficient, inward-looking relations; with few external munities groups political and/or are ethnic tribes in prescribed periodically who migrate (p. xvii). patterns a number of monographs which use The author cites of or a tribe as a unit a village, a city) either misleadthis of influence the for as evidence study Yet the stuview on scholarship. ing "traditional" to a uniform adherence dies cited by no means present cited do exaggerate Some of the studies such a view. and nomad camps from urban of villages the isolation for example Fredof those cited, but others centers, deal very explicNomads of South Persia, rik Barth's of the with the relationship and insightfully itly environsocial group under study to its external urban cenamong other things, ments which includess or tribe but which focus on a village Studies ters. of of the relationship cognizance which take full

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the group under study to other groups including urban centers are not as rare as many of English's comments on the "traditional" view imply. Following his discussion of urban dominance, the author devotes his final substantive to chapter in Kirman. modernization In view of the condition of urban dominance described in the book, it earlier is not surprising in this section of the to discover study that modernization of the local economy--the of such things introduction and deep wells as tractors and the consequent change in settlement and pattern economic organization--is a matter almost entirely in the hands of the upper stratum of Kirman' s urban population. The urban elite introduces such innovations only when they are advantageous in terms of their own interests. As a result suchJinnovations tend not to alter the most basic feature of the regional economic organization, namely the concentration of wealth and control of economic activities in the hands of the urban elite. There are a number of other interesting conclusions presented in this section of the book which are given only brief and which are definitely attention worthy of investigation in future studies. (This comment is intended as a matter-of-fact observation rather than a stricture; there is nothing wrong with an author's being brief on topics that are peripheral to his focus of interest.) One such conclusion is that in the area of modernization Kirman is Tehrandominated: Numerous forces of modernization are challenging traditional patterns of Kirman's life, but few changes have been generated in the city or towns of Kirman. internally Modern concepts and materials spead from Tehran .... The urban elite and the middle class mimic the tastes and decisions of their counterparts in Tehran; there is little creative energy in this provincial city (p.

121

98).

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with Iran to all those familiar obvious It is surely such as modernization, of life, that in some spheres as Tehran-domiIran is not so much urban-dominated with its many this condition and certainly nated, inis as worthy of systematic ramifications social as is urban-dominance. vestigation briefly that is discussed Another proposition has changed more drastically structure is that social than economic organization: of nineteenth-century The twin pillars exthe patrilocal life, Kirman's social clergy, tended family and the Islamic in the face resilience have shown little Surprisinglys of change. of modern forces has wrought scant the magic of technology of the heart the economy.... change in (p. 99 ). but one that is suggestion, This is a very interesting of the on the basis (or reject) to accept difficult The author gives no in the study. offered evidence realistifrom which to evaluate evidence substantial Most of of social change in Kirman. the extent cally change sound more like comments on social English's emfrom careful derived than like statements cliches for example this Consider investigation. pirical statement: of the Among all but the lowest classes and economic a desire for social city, the intense advancement has superseded and practice faith concern with Islamic the preceding cenwhich characterized (p. 101 ). tury that there was no concern for socclear Is it really century in nineteenth advandement and economic ial for reconcern that clear it and is really Persia, in nature? was not often perfunctory matters ligious

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If current conditions among the more conservative ments of Iran's population provide any indication social conditions in the nineteenth the century, swer to these questions would have to be negative.

eleof an-

In a number of other areas, English's statements about social change appear not to be the result of thorough, For example, systematic investigation. English states that social mobility was "virtually nonexistent" in nineteenth century Persia. (p. 99 ) However, the literature on Iran in the last available century indicates that movement in and out of the privileged upper stratum of landowners and government administrators was extensive. In general) the author's about socstatements ial change appear not to be based on a careful investigation of social in the last century, conditions and without such an investigation it is difficult to know to what extent current conditions represent change and to what extent they represent continuity with the In the area of economic change the author's past. investigations appear to be more thorough. Perhaps it is unfair to be too critical of comments that are peripheral to the author's main focus of attention, settlement pattern and economy. Nevertheless, if the author's comments on social change were offered on the assumption that peripheral impressions are worth recording, as they often are, then he might have prefaced his comments on these matters with a warning to the effect that they were not based on extensive investigation. Brief mention should also be made of the appendices. There are six appendices which present data which could not be presented in detail in the main body of the text but which are, nevertheless, important both because of their intrinsic interest and because they substantiate some of the more basic

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These appendices in the study. presented propositions animal carpet weaving) data on agriculture, present and the occupaland ownership, qanats, husbandry, in Kirman. of settlements structure tional noted above to the minor strictures In addition that small criticisms there are three especially use of the word English's First, should be made. as is certainly Kirman's society "tfeudal" to describe since it implies, as to enlighten to mislead likely ruwith a substantial a society among other things, urban-domithan a thoroughly rather ral aristocracy the author refers in places, Second, nated society. marriage, for "cross-cousin preference to a traditional Among many Islamic or simply "cousin marriage." some groups in Iran, there is an exincluding peoples cousirs, for patrilateral parallel preference plicit partas marriage children, brother's that is father's studying anthropologists and in a few instances ners, a high statistical groups have demonstrated Islamic of marriage partchoices of such preferred frequency much of Iran the preference ners. However, throughout and paral(cross of any variety is simply for cousins So far as I know there is as marriage partners. lel) in Iran which class or social group, tribe, no ethnic Third, as marriage partners. cross cousins prefers at the in a separate section the footnotes placing The book some inconvenience. end of the book causes and bibliography is well documented and the footnotes but the value to scholars, will be of considerable if they could have been used more easily footnotes had been placed at the bottom of each page. above are not criticisms offered The various is other than anything meant to imply that the study to Iranand contribution substantial a very valuable of the The author's tracing ian studies. insightful on of reliance ramifications qanat irrimany social of the and environment arid in the difficult gation in itachievement a very significant Kirman Basin is of the predominating His demonstration self.

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of Kirman City in the economic and social influence life of the entire region of the Kirman Basin is and his suganother very important accomplishment gestion that such urban dominance may be characteristic of much of the Middle East will provide a valuable stimulus to future research. The concept will undoubtedly stand of a regional study) however, as the author's most valuable contribution, and probably will inspire a number of future studies employing a similar perspective.

The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East. Edited with an Introduction by Austin: Carl Leiden. The University of Texas, 1966. 160 pp. $4.95.

PHILIP C. SALZMAN The papers brought together in this volume were originally in 1965 at a conference presented sponsored by the Middle East Center of the University of Texas. They can be conveniently grouped for purposes of exposition into those presenting the past and current thought of Middle Easterners, as conin theological, tained and social legal statements, and those examining Middle Eastern phenomena, including historical movements, and cultural institutions, orientations, from the outside, with the perspective of the unbiased analyst. Papers presenting Middle Eastern thought: AlNowaihi describes "The Battle of the New Poetry" in Egypt and defends the new literary trends as breaking through clicheed and creatively forms expressing

Philip pology

C. Salzman is Assistant Professor at McGill University, Montreal.

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of Anthro-

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and resnew forces the national within tradition, Nawaz and subversive. than being alien rather ponses, of Islamic for "a sociological calls interpretatlon meaning of the precise Law... in order to determine the ledelimit the norms of the Koran" and "properly Makdisi discusses gal norms of the Koran and Sunna." and conflict the historical between Traditionalism arguing that traditionalism in Islam, Rationalism if not matters in practical pragmaticll was "tbasically in matters of theoin theory. "Rigid and inflexible of law... in matters and adaptable it is flexible logy, of that since "law is the vehicle Makdisi concludes Traditionalism theological in Islam," development Amin sees the impede progress. does not necessarily indeand ijtihad, imitation, battle between taglid, one in the history as a continuing pendent thought, the true as representing of Islam, with the latter of "1inward consisting of Islam and currently spirit pracOther "spurious values." religious idealistic and "mater ialist and irreligious t'ices and beliefs" al-jabr, fatalism, were introincluding doctrines,' He conpurposes. for malicious duced from outside in the Middle East is a matter that progress cludes than rather to its true place, of restoring iitihad a Rosenthal presents European "modernism.* applying of "Muslim Definicatalogue researched meticulously literature. tions of Knowledge" from the traditional trends in Islamic Von Grunebaum summar'izes recent of Fyzee and the formulations and presents thought, Lahbabi as examples of modern reconstructions. Middle Eastern phenomena: Papers examining of Muslim armies, and points the role discusses Glubb the armies that gave to out the traditional support authboth and secular who were religious the rulers as of were Soldiers thought customarily orities. to in contrast of religion and morality, upholders and welcomed by the West, and were thus prestigious of Westin general. The inapplicability the populace from difin the Middle East "arise ern institutions traditions, between our national characters, ferences

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climate"; and problems which arise in the Middle East of adherence "are not the result of 'backwardness,' or of conflict with 'modernism"' but to tradition, of the rather "result from the racial characteristics English presents data from his Muslim peoples." field study of Kirman to demonstrate the change in and the reculture, economy, and ethnic relations, class structure. Lenof the traditional silience the development of national regimes. czowski outlines conThe democratic model developed out of a colonial text, and threw off the "reformist-authoritarian,' deviand "confessional" "authoritarian-oligarchial" ations. Failures in attempts to apply the democratic model led to the current "radical-revolutionary" He concludes that the phase with pan-Arab aspects. deal with disArabs, trying to develop an identity, of immal poverty, and "survive in an encirclement placable enemies,' will continue for some time in Pfaff argues that phase. the "radical-revolutionary" and modern of Islamic traditionalism the dialectic "technicism" has led to a "nationalist synthesis.' of technicism as a means toward a politiconsisting in which the nation has taken the cized salvation place of God and immortality is seen as the nation's march through

history.

"Progress

becomes

synonymous

with national fulfillment--and the fruits of techniStodof that progress." cism become the milestones dard gives an account of the Turkish Teskilat-e Mkaha&Eawhich seems to be an early attempt at an based on a Western model. intelligence organization Capsule evaluations the variance

in the

quality

are of limited of

these

essays

use,

but

requires

comment. The papers of Von Grunebaum, Glubb, Lenczowski and Pfaff attempt synthetic overall views. Von Grunebaum's masterly paper succeeds through balthe classificaancing the general and the specific) More, it provides a creative tory and the synthetic. synthesis, giving new insights by asking questions perspecdifferent and quite fruitful from a slightly tive. The Lenczowski and Pfaff papers provide usewith the former erring ful if not original overviews,

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on the and the latter on the side of classification can provide adequate Neither side of generality. Glubb's disspace. i.n the allotted substantiation is points, descriptive with some useful cussion, in the area of causality) poorly argued1 especially to climate references and is marred by inappropriate Nawaz, Amin and The papers of Al-Nowaihi, and race. by perhaps Makdisi can best be viewed as responses insofar by informants rather than reports subjects a social meant to propogate as they are primarily Alaccount. view rather than to give a scholarly plea with no schopaper is a well-written Nowaihils Those of Nawaz and Amin do have pretensions. larly badly in achieving but fail scholarly pretensions, of propoganda intent the Whatever canons. scholarly a out and sets argued well it is Makdisi'ls paper, data. of the historical interpretation provocative are Stoddard and Rosenthal The papers of English3 useful a presents case studies. English specific backed by hard data and convincaccount of one city; material is little Rosenthal's ing interpretation. with no literature from the culled more than a list to comit difficult which is about interpretation, specific sketchy, link his Stoddard does not ment. In sum, to any broader problem or issue. material followed by is excellent, the Von Grunebaum article The and Makdisi. Pfaff Lenczowski, those of English, value. are of very limited others Part of book. This is, then, a disappoint'ing articles, of the the shortness stems from the trouble notes and ref erfourteen pages including averaging no attempt article, There is no introductory ences. there is Furthermore, together. to draw the material identities of the uninitiated) the (for no indication of the authors beyond their names, or of their backAnd there are more than a few typographical grounds. from this the proceedings To say the least, errors. As hand. a editorial far heavier needed conference of a current to use the result phrase is, it stands, non-book a and not non-book, a very good reviewers, at that.

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LETTERSTO THE EDITOR

A statment in Professor Parvin's review of my of the Middle East needs correctings Economic History "not even one (essay) to discuss viz. the attempts from the Marxist point of view.' question Actually, I translated, from the Russian, three long essays by Soviet authors--but for all I know Soviet scholars Marxist. are no longer considered One more point--I did not intend to certainly aid to Middle Eastern countries deny that Soviet and Chinese) would (like American, British, Japanese promote their economic growth. I merely suggested that, again like other aid, it would increase the donor's political I do not think the evinfluence. ents of the last ten years have proved that particular forecast wrong. As for the more general question raised by Professor Parvin, of course I do not imagine that I have satisfactorily explained the causes of the economic decline of the Islamic Middle East. I am not sure such an "explanation" will ever be found--think of the numerous and contradictory theories that have been advanced, during the last three hundred years, to account for the decline of Rome. In the present

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state of knowledge on the Middle East, the most one and the can hope for is some tentative suggestions gathering of material that can stimulate further research. This is all I aimed at in my book. CHARIESISSAWI (Charles Issawi is Professor of Economics at Columbia University. His Economic History of the Middle East was reviewed in the Fall 1969 issue of Iranian Studies.) THE REVIEWER REPLIES: This is in response to a letter written by Professor Charles Issawi concerning my review of his book, Economic History of the Middle East. I have no quarrel with Professor Issawi on the I have acknowfirst point he makes in his letter. which his book conledged the Russian translations tains; however, what is Marxist is a moot question. The second point raised by Professor Issawi is most important and thus the main reason for this reply. It is true that political influence generally follows But aid. (or even precedes) economic and/or military it is the nature and the extent, and thus the impliof the political influence exercised which cations, are of importance, not its mere existence. Surely the influence exerted by the United States in political Western Europe through the Marshall Plan cannot be are concerned, compared, as far as its implications in American aid to the dependent milto that implicit itary regimes of Latin America through the Alliance for Progress and other means. the book due I have neither meant to criticize of a of the economic to the absence convincing theory decline of the Middle East nor can this be read into I agree with Professor Issawi that this the review. IRANIANSTUDIES

130

is what is stated in my review--that after this book the phenomenon of economic decline remains one of the mysteries of the mysterious Middle East. MANOICHER PARVIN

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PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

AFSHAR, IRAJ. Vol. I.

Y-dgI?rha-ye Yazd (The Monuments of Yazd), Tehran: Anjoman-e Melli, 1348 (1970).

754 pp. ALGAR, HAMID. Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of Ulami in the Q jar period. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California + 286 pp. Press, 1969. xviii $9.50. ARMAJANI, YAHYA. Middle East: Past and Present. glewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,

En1970.

BANK MARKAZIIRAN LIBRARY. Fehrest-e Mozu' i Magfl1t-e of Articles Egtesadi, 1345-1346 (Bibliography in Persian on Economics, 1345-1346/March 1966March 1968). Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran Library, xxvii + 261 pp. 1348/1969. Commercial Relations, Russo-Persian ENTNER, MARVINL. of Florida 1828-1914. (University Monographs2 No. 28, Fall 1965). GainesSocial Sciences, Florida: of Florida Press. ville, University No price indicated. v + 80 pp. (Paperback) FRYE, RICHARDN. Persia (Revised Edition). 128 pp. $4.50. Schocken Books, 1968.

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New York:

KAMSHAD, H. Modern Persian Prose Literature. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1966. xv + 226 pp. $7.50. H. A Modern Persian Prose Reader. KAMSHAD2 England: Cambridge University Press, + 249 pp. $9.50.

Cambridge, 1968. viii

KARPAT,KEMALH. (Editor). Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. xiii + 297 pp. $10.00. KEDDIE, NIKKI R. An Islamic Response to Imperialism: and Religious Writings of Savyid Jamal Political ad-Din llal-Afyghani"l. Berkeley and Los Angeles: of California University Press, 1968. xii + 212 pp. $7.50. SANGHVI,RAMESH. The Shah of Iran. New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1969. xxvii + 390 pp. $10. STAVRIANOS,LEFTONS, Middle East: A Culture Area in Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969. Pers2ective. 72 pp. No price indicated. (Paperback) STEWART-ROBINSON, J. (Editor). The Traditional Near East. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 183 pp. $1.95. (Paperback) SWEET,LOUISE. (Editor). Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East. 2 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: The American Museum of Natural History, The Natural History Press, 1970. Vol. I: Depth and Diversity, xv + 437 pp. $3.95; Vol. II: Life in the Cities, Towns, and Countryside, xv + 438 pp. $3.95. (Paperbacks) WILBER,DONALDN. Iran: Past and Present (6th Ed.). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967. ix+312 pp. $6.00 133

SPRING 1970

CENTRE(IRANDOC) IRANIANDOCUMENTATION ANDSCIENTIFIC PLANNING INSTITUTEFOREDUCATIONAL AND RESEARCH MINISTRYOF SCIENCEANDHIGHEREDUCATION P. 0. Box 11-1387,

Tehran

The Ministry of Science and Higher Education has established the Iranian Documentation Centre to bring modern to phyinformation and reference services and extensive chemists, agriculturalists, sicians, engineers) lawyers, Irandoc provides and social scientists. scientists, loans, inter-library photocopies, searches, literature circuroom and book reading open-shelf translations, stateof information, dissemination lation, selective in person, and reference service, studies, of-the-art telephone calls. by mail or by long-distance is being developed A large book and serial collection In materials. and Western Asian, Iranian, to include and docucooperating closely with Iranian libraries Irandoc supplements their collect'ions mentation centres, is provided in several Representation and services. and information organizationss scientific international is brought to bear on national and and staff expertise problems. international Irandoc is publishing material useful to Iranian researAlready it has manuand librarians. chers, professors, bookstores, of Iranian libraries, for directories scripts and is compiling and periodicalss newspapers publishers, a union list of Iranian social science and science serials. will be published: An abstract bulletin Also, two serials covering Iranian science and social science periodicals, service reproducing the contents pages of and an alerting Iranian science and social science journals. significant Irandoc's Director is Ali Sinai and its Technical Director is John F. Harvey.

IRANIANSTUDIES

134

Qwrtrly Jouna of

ECONOMICRESEARCH

eglesidi Iabgigitme Vol.

CONTENTS

Nos. 19 & 20

VII

HOSSEIN PIRNIA

Thought

The Nature of Scientific

MANSUR FR1OZAN,et al.

The Development of the Gas Industry in Iran

AJID TEHRANIN

of Entry Strategies Iran: Alternative Petroleum into the International Industry The Comparative Evaluation Contracts, Concessions, Joint Ventures

STAUFFER THKOMAS

of Oil and

of Oil Agreements

A Comparative Analysis

ESMA'IL ERFANI P. MINA

A Comment on Mr. Stauffer ERAP-Type vs. Fifty-Fifty A Further Comment

MANSUR FRDOZAN

Agreement--

The Burden of the Public Debt and Long-Run Growth Cooperation between the USSR and the Developing Countries in the Promotion Exports of Industrial

Assistance

Bibliography

in Theory and Practice

of Economic Publications

Published University

ROV G. PROTHO

RESEARCH GIR)UP

A Survey of the Rural Economic Problem of Baluchestan and Sistan Technical

AHMED KOORO)S

on Iran

FERYDOON FIRDOZI HOSSEINAZIMI

in English by the Faculty of Economics, of Tehrans P.O. Box 14-13229 Tehran. $5.00 Annual Subscription

J->ffSvua2c

1 97

S<mnr~,f.t,1970

6t

VoCul-o X

fltLAs

3ankAf

riw,& soct1for

s 2t-aru*n $tudii

COUNCIL

Amin Banani University Ali

of California

at Los Angeles

Banuazizi Boston College

James A. Bill University

of Texas

at Austin

Jerome W. Clinton of Minnesota University Richard W. Cottam of Pittsburgh University Farhad Kazemi, Executive New York Univeristy

Secretary

Kenneth A. Luther of Michigan University W. Mintz Jacqueline New Haven, Connecticut Ann T. Schulz, University

Treasurer ex officio, of New Hampshire

Majid Tehranian Tehran, Iran

IRANIAN STUDIES

Editor Ali Banuazizi, Editor Associate Jerome W. Clinton, Editor W. Mintz, Associate Jacqueline Assistant Editorial Sharon Stilo,

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Volume III

&nntX.wScvsCw

Summer-Autumn 1970

Numbers 3-4

CONTENTS

136

NOTE FROMTHE EDITOR

137

FOREWORD

139

PERSIAN SUFISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Amin Banani

by Abdol-Hosein

Zarrinkoob

NOTEFROMTHE EDITOR Since the inception of Iranian Studies three years ago, one of our primary objectives has been to present the work of Iranian scholars on the various facets of Persian studies. Perhaps in no of Persian researchother area of scholarship has the contribution ers been more prodigious and significant than in the field of Islamic philosophy and culture. Ironically, however, this is an area in which their work has received only scant recognition in the West. It is thus a great and timely privilege for our journal to be able to present an outstanding example of this scholarship in its current issue. Professor Abdol-Hosein Zarrinkoob, one of Iran's foremost historians and literary critics, is currently on the Faculties of Theology and Letters of Tehran University. His prolific publications include Tarikh-i Iran bacd az Islam (History of Iran after Islam), Du Qarn Sukdt (Two Centuries of Silence), Ba Karavan-i Hullah (With a Caravan of Silk), Naqd-i Adabi (Literary Criticism), Arzish-i MIrath-i Jffyyah (An Evaluation of the Legacy of Sufism), Shicr-i bI Durigh, Shicr-i bi Nigab (Poetry without Falsehood, Poetry without Mask), and most recently, Az Kiichah-i Rindan (From the Street of the Debauched). The present essay, "Persian Sufism in its Historical is based on a series of lectures Perspective," delivered by Professor Zarrinkoob at Princeton and the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1969-1970. Ali Banuazizi

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FOREWORD Professor Abdol-Hosein Zarrinkoob is one of the few creative scholars of Islamic humanities who has achieved a happy resotraditional education and a critical lution between a prodigious approach and method in his works. His writings are the results of penetrating original research and synthesis of current scholarship. Of the several fields in which he has attained eminence none is of to his western readers than the hiswider and more timely interest tory of mysticism in Islam. As modern man experiences with growing bitterness and deepening anguish the fragmentation of his own being and his alienation from all that surrounds him, the seeming wholeness of another era The focus upon the primacy beckons to him with increasing allure. of the spiritual dimension in man, which enabled the Sufis to overcome their sense of separation with exuberant joy, reenters into the vision of our time. potential The recapturing of our spiritual Yet as the history of Sufism depends upon awareness of ourselves. is and self-delusion illustrates the line between self-awareness between a "Godvery thin and elusive. The fundamental difference of intoxicated" Sufi like RumI and a mystic-enamored representative his our generation is that while the former strove to "annihilate" But we note also the large number of self, the latter asserts his. and arrived Sufis who travelled the circular path to selflessness at self-indulgence. Professor Zarrinkoob's overview suggests a basic turning point in the history of Sufism from a spontaneous, vital and creatdogmatized and sterile phase. ive epoch to an institutionalized, H.e is, of course, the first to avow that his overview is from a If we consider the seldom refuted assertion Persian vantage point. of Islamic mysticism that the most sublime and enduring expressions are to be found in Persian poetry, then we may also note a correlation between the end of the creative epoch of Sufism and the dePersian poetry. cline of classical Studies

It is a signal honor and a landmark achievement for Iranian of Professor to devote this special issue to publication

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Zarrinkoob's lectures on the history of Sufism. Those of us who to witness the genuineness of his humanity and were privileged experience the warmth of his personality while hearing these lectures are doubly grateful and to share to have them in publication them with all who are interested in Iranian culture. Amin Banani of California, University Los Angeles

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*g

tZarrmfZo6

PREFACE The eight sections of the present essay are drawn from the I delivered at Princeton University and at the University lectures Because of the diverse Los Angeles, in 1969-1970. of California, that would be nature of the audience I did not go into the details problem. Instead, my necessary in a new approach to a traditional principal aim was to present a brief sketch of the contents of what may be called Persian mysticism, while showing at the same time the remarkable role that this variety of Islamic mysticism has played in the cultural development of Persia. The origins of Sufism--as Islamic mysticism is generally a very controversial problem indeed, but that called--presents Persia was the cradle of early Sufism is beyond doubt. Moreover, if mysticism is taken to be--as it usually is--an expression of in direct connection with the godhead, the well-known man's belief deed whom every particular ethical concepts of the Zoroastrians--for good or bad, is the joint product of man and either of daily life, also be considered as unconthe principle of Good or of Evil--might Thus, while type of mysticism. scious expressions of a pantheistic interactions occurring a series of social, and political religious, in the late Sasanian period prepared Zoroastrian minds for a new faith introduced by the Muslim conquest of Persia, the converted Zoroastrians of the early Islamic period were able to retain some tenets in the Sufi philosophy. of their former ethical soil Sufi philosophy found a most hospitable The Persian poetry of classical of Persian poetry.

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in the domain times was so

extensively influenced by Sufi philosophy that almost every great lyric poet of that period was a Sufi, as nearly every great Sufi of the time was a poet. the influence Indeed, of Sufism on Persian poetry was so considerable that if the Sufi poets had not appeared on the literary stage, Persian literature would have remained for no more than a court literature long centuries limited to a panegyric character. It was in the works of Sang'i, and RUrl cAttar, that the oppressed classes were finally given a voice in literature, and social on which hardly a word could be uttered injustice, by a was sharply court-poet, criticized in the bons mots of the "wise fools" (dIvanigan-i who figured as heroes in a number of the agil), tales of the Sufi poets. The role of Sufi orders in the development of social ethics was by no means of lesser importance. Attempts at reform were also undertaken by various groups of Sufis. Although these were of no single character, the socio-political movements of the Sarabadarls and the Safavids represent outstanding examples. Finally, the wellknown system of Persian chivalry, called and its tradijavanmardi, tional rules of athleticism have remarkable links with the Sufi tradition. Such a diverse set of problems must be treated in any outline of Persian mysticism, no matter how brief. Unfortunately, however, lack of time did not permit me to discuss a number of questions that are of importance in the development of Persian Sufism. Although there exists a considerable number of Western contributions on the Sufi heritage of Persia, this short essay may be of interest in that it offers, at least on certain particular questions, a Persian point of view.

Abdol-Hosein Los Angeles June 1970

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Zarrinkoob

SUIMMER-AUTUMN 1970

I Opinions differ on the origin of Islamic mysticism, but that At the cradles cannot be questioned. Persia was one of its earliest time of the emergence of Islam in the Near East, Mesopotamia and Khurasan were the two windows through which the fresh air of ideas could penetrate the fenced enclosure that was the Sasanian Empire-through northern Mesopotamia, ideas and Semitic religions Hellenistic through Khurasan. and Indian and Chinese influences In the decades immediately before the Muslim Arabs appeared banished at the gates of the Sasanian Kingdom, Greek Neo-Platonists, from the Byzantine Empire in 529 A.D., had found refuge in the Sasanian Court, for the famous Medical Academy of Jundlshapiir had been time an active center for the medical sciences-for a considerable The Medical Academy tradition. including those of the Hellenistic was probably founded in the late third or fourth century of the Christian era, and from the fifth century unto early Islamic times, it served as a refuge for the Nestorians driven from Edessa in 489 A.D. a few Elements of the Chinese and Indian cultures--including Indian books and elements of Chinese Buddhism--had also crossed the of Khurasan in early Sasanian times. eastern and northern frontiers The origin of the story of Barlaam, introduced at that time, may be of the Sasanian The state religion found in such eastern sources. sometoward its final days, was Zoroastrianism, Empire, especially and, times in Zurvanite form. Zurvanism tended to be monotheistic despite its temporary predominance in the third century, was generCommunally regarded as a heresy by orthodox Zoroastrian priests. freedom, but Chrisities of Jews and Christians enjoyed religious tianity was not strong enough at that time to replace Zoroastrianism, even if Islam had not appeared there.

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Zoroastrian priests were cruelly zealous about persecuting heretics and putting down what they called "bad-faith" or heretical tendencies. The execution of Mani and the persecution of the followers of Mazdak for which the Sasanian government has often been accused, comprise only a part of these priests' acanti-heretical tivities. A well-known high priest of early Sasanian times, Mobad Kartir, has described his own anti-heretical in a famous exploits on the so-called inscription Kaa'ba of Zoroaster, near Persepolis.1 With much joy and pride, this high priest of the early Sasanians relates in this Pahlavi inscription how he has succeeded in expelling Jewish, Christian, Buddhist, and Brahman monks, together with other non-Iranians of "bad-faith," from within the Empire. Nevertheless, there was a turmoil in the consciences of some of the elite concerning religious problems. The case of Salman-i Farsi may be considered illustrative of this religious crisis. This holy man, in whom early mystics of Persia later found a forerunner of Sufism, was a Persian Zoroastrian of the late Sasanian period. According to the Islamic legend, the quest for a new faith led this Zoroastrian youth to adopt Christianity, took him later to Syria and then to Medina, where he became a fervent Muslim and a faithful companion to Muhammad. The same religious crisis may have affected the conscience of a physician of King Anushiravan named Burzoe, who had perhaps been influenced by exposure to Manichean or Buddhist thought. He has described his own religious crisis and the perplexity of his generation concerning religious matters in a preliminary chapter of his Pahlavi translation of the Indian fables of Bidpay. Although Burzoe is supposed to have been a vizier to the Sasanian King and Salmin a wandering monk, and though Salman was a companion of Muhammadand the physician Burzoe a contemporary of Muhammad's father, both nevertheless are believed to have lived in the same religious milieu and to have undergone nearly the same crisis of conscience. In the few decades just prior to the advent of Islam, others like them became receptive to Christian teachings in Mesopotamia, and to Buddhist practices in Khurasan. The greater part of Mesopotamia had not only been the site of the Persian metropolis of Ctesiphon, over several centuries in pre-Islamic times, but also the arena of some of the most important political and social events in Persian history. Even the modern name of the area, Iraq, is probably a loan word from the Pahlavi Erag, meaning low-land or south-land. It corresponded to

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the Sasanian province of Suristan, which was considered the heart While this western portion of the Iranshahr). of Eranshahr (dil-i Sasanian Empire was influenced by the Semitic and Greek worlds, the larger satrapy of Khurasan, was a conjuncits eastern sector, Toward the end of tion of Chinese, Indian, and Iranian cultures. the Sasanian Empire, the heart of Eranshahr was undergoing a reworks theological Controversial crisis. ligious and intellectual such as the Denkart and gkand Gumanik ViYar, by Zoroastrian priests even though belonging to later periods, clearly reveal the seriousturmoil within the Zoroastrian community in ness of the religious Faced with the turmoil and disorder of the late Sasanian times. late Sasanian period, the Zoroastrian hierarchy was in a perpetual struggle against all that was felt to be "bad-faith" or of a heretical tendency. were engaged in a While Zoroastrianism and Christianity latent struggle for supremacy, Manichaeism, which had been expelled as a dangerous heresy from Persia proper, found refuge in Egypt and As a matter of fact, the spread of Manichaeism in Transoxania. Transoxania was such that in 732 A.D. the edict of a Chinese emperor, Huan-Tsung, considered "the teaching of Lord Mani" as "the inof western Barbars," which were none other than ternal religion the Iranians of Transoxania.2 of course, could be found in most Some kind of mysticism, Generally then in vogue in the Persian world. of the religions speaking, mysticism is an attempt to attain direct and personal communication with the godhead. Therefore, mystical experience is perhaps as old as humanity and is not confined to any race or reit of mysticism can be accepted--and If this definition ligion. seems as good a starting point as any--then one would be justified in finding in the Central Asian shamans the forerunners of Christian and Muslim mystics. of northeast Asia Until recent times, among some inhabitants the shaman was a type of medicine-man, combining certain functions of priest and doctor, who was believed to have the authority to emto serve his purposes, for instance, ploy or persuade the spirits of to leave the body of a sick man. The ceremonies and rituals these medicine-men as described by W. Radloff3 in the late nineteenth century, represent the painful endeavor of the shaman to trances of the shaman, communicate with the godhead. The ecstatic dances, reveal a rough kind of mysproduced by means of religious It is no wonder then that the shaman occurs so tical experience.

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as an example of often in Persian Sufi and even profane literature a fervent worshipper in non-Muslim lands with whom Persian poets may have been acquainted.4 The mystery of Mithra offers one of the most ancient cult of Iran. examples of a mystical religious Though some schothe Iranian Mithra with the Mithra lars have refused to identify that is depicted in the mystery, the name itself is strongly sugThe seven grades through which gestive of its Iranian origin. the initiate in this cult had to pass symbolized the passage of his soul through the seven heavens to the abode of Light--apparently a forestate of mystical union with the Divine. Mithraism is believed to have some influence on the early Christianity, to which it later became the most popular rival in the Roman World. While it is true that Zoroaster himself cannot reasonably be viewed as the tgpe of mystical shaman that H.S. Nyberg5 has sought to find in him, his teachings nevertheless do not lack mystical elements. Zoroaster's central theme was the dualism of good and the dualism of light and dark. According to his teachings, evil, man is free to choose between good and evil in the battle between these two powers in the present world; if he chooses the good, his good work will enlarge and strengthen the realm of good, and vice versa. Zoroastrianism maintains that Ahriman, the God of Darkness, and Ormazd, the God of Light, are competing for the control of the of his having the option of world, and man's free will consists helping the one or the other. The dualistic distinction that Zoroaster made between the sources of good and evil is extended by Mani to hold between the natural and the supernatural, and between the soul and the body. Although this dualism is perhaps not rationally justified, yet the distinctions that we make between good and bad, intelligence and matter, and the like seem to demand an explanation that cannot be given by strict monism. In fact, religious dualism often emerges as an answer to the problem of evil in a belief system that assumes one good and omnipotent God; it is an attempt to answer the question as to why everything in the world does not go according to the will of this creator and ruler.7 Zoroaster's

trysticism

is

inherent

in his

view

of

the

relation-

ship with Ormazd and is based on personal endeavor against the devil. The essence of his teachings, in which man's good work is considered his contribution to the construction of a better world, is a degree

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of personal communication with the godhead. It is not, however, for this particular reason that some scholars of past generations have sought to find the origin of Muslim Sufism in Zoroastrianism. Although Zoroastrianism refuses to consider the soul apart from the body, or the external apart from the temporal, it nevertheless maintains that existence begins as a duality and ends in a unity,8 conclusion that the Muslim and this is almost the same philosophical mystic poet cAttar (d. 1220) reaches in his Parliament of Birds (Mantiq al-7ayr). The Journey into heaven and hell depicted so differently by al-MacarrI, Sana'i, and Dante may have its oldest pattern in a similar description by a Zoroastrian priest, Ardly Wlraz Namag. The very concept of paradise and hell set forth in the vast Zoroastrian literature is in itself essentially mystical. The final passage of the righteous soul to the sublime abode of good, the vision of God which is the greatest joy of heaven, is a real mystical realization in Zoroastrianism. Ardiy Viraf, whose journey into the realms of heaven and hell has been described in the Pahlavi book bearing his name, is to be regarded as the type of Zoroastrian holy man-mystic. His emergence into the presence of the All Highest, as the end of his journey, is a mystical experience, which he reports thus: "When Ormazd spoke in his manner, he said, 'I was astonished; for I saw a light, but no body did I see. A voice I heard, and I knew that this was Ormazd."'9 This reminds one of the description of the ascension of the Msulim B3yazid of Bistam. A gnostic component in Manichaeism gives this kind of Persian dualism a more visible mark of mysticism. The gnosticism of the early Christian centuries, whlich was by no means a single, organized movement but a syncretism of kindred tendencies emanating from different sources, considered the world of matter, including man's body, the creation of an evil deity; it sought the deliverance of the soul by religious and mystical rites and expected its realization through the coming of a special emissary of light. Mani, the prophet of Manichaeism, presented himself as this His teachings survived him and spread with emissary of light.10 world. amazing rapidity westward and eastward in the civilized Manichaeism, in whose origins scholars like H.C. Puech have found mystical gnosis rather than theological knowledge, expresses a kind of dualistic mysticism, based on a secret gnosis that is supposed final salavation.11 to lead to the rescue of light from darkness--the As a matter of fact, gnosticism is supposed to have arisen out of

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the debate over the question of evil: when the gnostic man finds his world surrounded by evil, he feels himself to be alien and a prisoner in such a world; he thus feels a nostalgia for a world of light and revolts against the dark one. For the Manichaean,

the material

principle

and everytning

that emanates from it is considered essentially The soul, evil. being a fragment of the godhead, a spark of divine fire, is imprisoned in the body, and its rescue is to be attained by gnosis, which is co-natural with the soul to the point of identity. Thus, may be defined as Manichaeism, being a gnostic type of religion, a mysticism of transformation, in which knowledge brings immediate and definitive of rebirth into light.12 liberation Like other kinds of gnosis, the gnosis that was supposed to underlie Manichean teachings consisted of a knowledge that was not a mental acquisition arrived at through the exercise of observation and reason so much as mystical enlightemnent received by the supernatural process of revelation. This feature of Manichaeism is to be seen in those Manichaean literary works that have been preserved. In the Manichaean hymn-cycles in Parthian, for example, there sometimes runs a strong mystical theme.13 The crude ascetism of this "Apostle of Light" considered man's soul to be imprisoned by his body, to be finally rescued in death. One is tempted to compare this teaching of Mani with what the Muslim Suf is call annihilation. The same concept is also of great importance in the teachings of Buddha. In fact, what Manichaeism had to struggle against in Transoxania and eastern Khurasan at that time was the continuous advance of the teachings of Buddha, the spread of which into Khurasan probably dates from pre-Sasanian times. An early Sasanian governor of this province, Peroz, who was a son of Ardashir Papakan, the founder of the Sasanian dynastry, apparently deemed it necessary to call himself a Mazda worshipper and a Buddhist at the same time.14 Nevertheless by the end of the Sasanian period, when a Chinese pilgrinm, Hsuan Tsang (602-664 A.D.), was visiting the area, the religion of Buddha had been to some extent driven from the region of the North Oxus to the south.15 Even in early Islamic times there was a market in Bukhara, fge Bizar-i Makh, where idols representing the Buddha were sold. The Persian word but, indicating idol in general, probably finds its origin in this context. Moreover, the glittering Balkh, the Balkh-i Bamik, on the south side of the Oxus remained a holy place for Buddhist pilgrims of the east for a long time.

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The word Buddh or Buddha as used by such Muslim writers as means the founder of BudMasCudi, and al-Shahrist5nT, al-Biruni, dhism, the Sakyamnuni, who was born about 560 B.C. in the foothills Nirvana as the way of of the Himalayas, and preached the so-called (mukshi). deliverance the rank of the of Budis'ya,17 description Al-Shahristanl's men who seek the path of truth, as attained by, for example, patof the world, and abstention from wordly deience, renunciation reminds us of what, at a later time, the Sufis considered sires, gnosis, and ecintuitive Thus, the ascetic life, ascetic ideals. in Sufism were already known, more so essential static experiences Persia. in pre-Islamic or less, so highly of revelation, interpretation Moreover, esoteric in pre-Islamic appreciated by the Muslim Sufis, also had a parallel interCertain features of the Muslim use of allegorical Persia.18 (ca. 20 pretation may be traced to the influence of Philo-Judaeus B.C. - 50 A.D.) and other scholars of Alexandria.19 This method of Qur'anic exegesis was viewed with abhorrence by Islamic orthodoxy, and considered dangerous and tending toward This term was widely used in Muslim criminal zandaqa or heresy. dangerlaw to describe the heretic whose teaching was potentially ous to the state, and was borrowed in Iraq from the vocabulary of and is thought to derive from the the Sasanian administration, Sasanian ZandIk, which referred to those who based their teaching on the Zand, the commentaries on the Avesta, rather than on the to us here is that mystical What is of interest Avesta itself.20 elements of pure contemplation have been discerned in the teaching ZandlksI21 of some of the pre-Islamic Persia offered a variety of Thus, the world of pre-Islamic all of which contained elements of mystical and beliefs, religions crisis Into this world of social disorder, religious experience. the final Islam forced its way, delivering and mystical aspiration, of the ancient Near East and bearing blow to the civilizations When Persia was conto the world. fresh ideas and new aspirations of the state, was the religion quered by the Arabs, Zoroastrianism, two However, it was not till defeated along with the state itself. centuries later that most of Persia became converted to Islam. preached by Muhammadurged man's absolute The new religion the expression of which was believed to submission to God's will, be contained in the Qur'an. This God was unique and close at hand:

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"We have created man and we know what his soul whispers within him, for we are nearer to him than his jugular vein." (Qur'an, 50:15). this verse reAlthough, according to some non-Suf i interpreters, fers to Allah's knowledge of man, rather than the latter's union with him, it has been often mystically as an allusion interpreted to man's union with God. The human soul through which God had granted life and intelligence to man was considered in the Qur'an as something mysterious, From a psysomething noble and divine. chological point of view, this soul was seen as the "commanding soul" (al-nafs al-'amm5rah) (12:53), i.e., commanding the evil and physical desires, while from the ethical standpoint it was called the "blaming soul" (al-nafs al-lawwEmah) (75:2), corresponding to the conscience morale. But when viewed from the purely mystical standpoint, it was called the "tranquil soul" (al-nafs al-mutma'innah) (89.9:27), ready to join its Lord. This is the Qur'anic basis of the return to God in which Muslim mystics have sought justification for their teachings. Islam laid great stress on the divine unity and on man's dependence on God. It urged penitence on the sceptical and Epicurean of Mecca and threatened them with the coming of divine aristocracy wrath and the tortures of hell. In such a system of theocentric cosmology, Allah was considered as the reality, al-haqq--a word which was later used in Sufi terminology and which played an important role in the persecution of the martyred lallTj. This word was originally used in the Qur'anic text to mean fixed reality, and it was later that pantheistic tendencies ascribed absolute reality to it. A rather pantheistic interpretation was made also of the following passage in the Qur'an: "Allah's are the East and the West; wherever ye turn, there is the face of Allah." (2:115). This, together with several other passages of the Qur'an, reveal the mystical character some critics of past generations have failed to recognize in Islam.22 Absolute devotion to God, as preached by Muhammad,demanded that man should honor and serve solely God, and required selflessness in connection with man's relation to God.23 This mystical selflessness has found an especial expression in the Muslim notion of the obligatory daily prayer or salat, one of the five pillars of faith in Islam. The humble attitude with which Muslim daily prayer is performed reveals the strange feeling that the believer may experience in finding himself in the presence of his Creator.24 It may be considered as a real, though formal, experience of man's direct communication with the Deity. In fact, there is a divine tradition which divides the Ualat between man and God, as though

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That is why the ialat has often it were two parts of a dialogue.25 been styled the ascension of the believer in God's presence. Allah, of whom Muhammadwas but a servant and messanger, was not just an omnipotent deity to be feared but also a compassionate one. Accordingly, Muhammad'smessage was not only a message of the vision of Nevertheless, fear but a gospel of hope as well.26 of the world, together with the coming judgthe final destruction ment of Allah on mankind on the Day of Resurrection haunted the minds of the early Muslims of Mecca and did not leave them even during their warlike days in Medina. The sharp contrast generally drawn between the Prophet's justilife in his Meccan and Medinan periods is not historically contained problems situation fied, even though the post-emigration This did and diplomatic talent. that required much flexibility not, however, turn him away from the passionate endeavor begun in Even the conception of the ideals. Mecca to preach his religious negation of the world was not erased from his mind by the spoils of of war that came to him in Medina. The joys and blessings paradise being the main goal of the ordinary Muslim, fear of hell toward paradise remained the leading conceptions and aspirations of the community with regard to Allah. to which there is but one brief reference in Monastic life, As the Qur'an (57:27), was by no means denigrated in early Islam. of "no monasticism in tradition a matter of fact, the oft-cited and seems to have Islam" does not occur in canonical collections Although Muhammaddid not praise been introduced in later times.27 That the epithet it. extreme monasticism, neither did he criticize "monk" (rahib) was given in early Islamic times to various pious individuals reveals that there was nothing odious about it at that in The fear of God, for which there is some justification time.28 encouraged some of the Prophet's companions to practhe revelation tice strict ascetism. It should be borne in mind that Muhammad's entire life was and companions as the unexcelled model regarded by his disciples of purity and piety, so that even Muslim warriors of later times to carry this new message throughout the world who were fighting endeavored to follow and imitate his pious deeds in their daily When the unexpected conquest of Syria, Egypt, and Persia-life. all yielding a vast amount of rich spoils of war--turned some Arabs toward the search for of Jihiliyah-minded spoil-hunters pious followers of the Prophet did not hesitate worldly pleasures, Great A result of this protest was the.so-called to protest.

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of the Mutiny, which ended in the overthrow and assassination third caliph and led to the notorious conflict between Ali and civil wars, secMucawiyah, and eventually gave rise to terrible and the rise of the Persian sectors of Iraq and the tarianism, Shicites of Khurasan against the Umayyads. During all these epiremained in protest, believers and the eversodes, faithful increasing tendency toward non-conformism led by prominent ascetics was one manifestation of this protest. Moreover, Sufism appeared as a protest against a disturbed society, its traditionalism and its intellectualism.

II The death of Muhammadin 632 A.D. left his community face to face with problems of various kinds, the first and most fundamental being the question of the succession and the nature of the social and religious leadership of the Muslim world. Although the emergence of a number of more crucial events caused this problem to be neglected for a while, the question of succession later resulted in divisions within the Islamic world that led to a series the Shicites, of civil wars. One faction, who were partisans of Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad,took serious issue with the orthodox position that considered the legitimacy of the elections of the first three caliphs as unquestionable. There were also the who opposed both Ali and his Syrian rival. Kharijites The civil wars, in which these politico-religious opposition with each of parties were all involved, created new difficulties these parties claiming to be the only true Muslims and considering others unbelievers. Moreover, all viewed the ruling Umayyad calrulat least as usurpers and unqualified iphs, if not as godless, ers. That these rulers did not hesitate to violate certain Islamic rules was beyond question; the question was whether the committing of such mortal sins excluded them from the Islamic community. The Kharijites maintained that a Muslim who committed a mortal sin must be excluded from Islam, and that even an Imam, if guilty of a mortal sin, ceased to be a Muslim and must be ousted. The opposite view was held by the Murji'ites who contended that mortal sin did not exclude a Muslim from his faith, and that an imam, even if guilty of mortal sin, did not cease to be a Muslim. As a matter of fact, the Murji'ites found their name ("postponers")

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in their argument that judgment on the Umayyads and on all sinners the Islamic faith should be postponed to the life hereprofessing declined to pass judgment after and to God. Thus the Murji'ites as a good Muslim and thereby, in to salvation on who was entitled gave support to the Umayyads, whom they probably recognized effect, as no more than the de facto rulers of the Muslim community. even maintained that, This compromising school of Murji'ites both sides were right, in the well-known Ali-Muciwiyah conflict, in imagining that two caliphs and that there was no inconsistency parts of the Muslim le at the same time in different might the Shicites On the question of caliphs and sinners, world. that the commission of mortal shared the view of the Murji'ites sins did not exclude a Muslim from his community; but this view did not prevent them from judging and condemning the Umayyads as godless rulers with heathen tendencies. Thus no possible connection can be made between the Murjieven though they shared more than one point 'ites and the Shicites, in their creeds; and the position of Laoust, for example, that the a may have had connections with Muhammadal-ljanafiyah, Murji'ites The son of Ali was justified.3 son of Ali cannot be historically the patron of one of the most ancient schools of Shicism, which inpart in the fall of the Umayyads. evitably played a considerable beThe Shicites held--and this was the primary distinction the office of imam was by tween them and other Islamic sects--that no means something that God would leave to men's choice, but that divine decree would determine who would become Muhammad'ssuccessor as the legal imam. This divinely appointed imam could not be Abu Bakr, whom men had recognized as the first caliph at the Ali, the Prophet's death of Muhammadbut, rather, the more qualified who later was elected the fourth caliph. The cousin and son-in-law, of imams in their proShicites also believed in the infallibility Thus, the Shicite imam was benouncements on faith and morals. lieved to be guided by God in all his acts. problems wrestled with in Murji'iteAmong other theological was the question of free the most controversial Kharijite circles, In this connection, opposite positions will versus predestination. by the Jabarite and Qadarite schools. The were taken, in particular and for this reason, despite Qadarites believed in man's free will, the Christian elements in the views of some of their fore-runners, they were looked on by orthodox Muslims as being tied to Zoroastrian That they considered man as creator of his own actions was beliefs.

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of Zoroastrian dualism. The oppoas a new expression interpreted denied man's freedom of site view, held by the Jabarite school, no distinction in this connection between man will and made nearly and inanimate nature, viewing man's acts as subordinate to the compulsion of God. Passages relating to both free will and predestination are to be found in the Qur'an but by no means does their content permit one to agree with Hubert Grimme and Golziher that the passages dealing with free will and responsibility may belong to the irresponsible period of Muhammad's life in Mecca, whereas during the period in Medin31 his revelations contained only the concept of predestination. The point is that the position of the Qur'an concerning this problem was more ethical than theological in nature. As a matter of fact, the theological aspect of the problem was raised outside the Mecca and Medina experiences of the Mluslims, perhaps primarily in Iraq and Khurasan, where the problem had been pondered long before the advent of Islam. The new discussion proof the ancient bably represented a revival problem of Zurvanite Zoroastrian scholasticism. The fact that, in accordance with a pseudo-prophetic tradition, the Qadarites have been called the Magians of the Muslim community may suggest their connection with Persia. There is no wonder then that an early ascetic pre-Islamic with Sufi inclinations, al-Muhasibi, refused to accept al-Hkarith his inheritance who professed ideas. As from his father, Qadarite Islam forbade members of different religions to inherit from one this saintly in poverty another, youth elected to live his life rather than accept his inheritance father. from a Qadarite of the Jabarites The first Muslim to hold the position is said to have been Jahm b. Safwan, a Persian of late Umproselyte Arab rule and was killed ayyad times who rose in rebellion against The doctrine circa 764 A.D. in Khurasan.32 of free will was first who was probably a disciple Macbad al-Juhanl, taught by a certain of the well-knowm Uasan al-BasrT. the claim that Hasan-Moreover, a supposed forerunner of Sufism--may have held this stand himself of this is probably justifiable, but he was not a fervent preacher doctrine.3 The Qadarites formed a kind of politico-religious party that some of is supposed even to have played a part--though limited--in the dynastic of the Umayyads.34 affairs During the period of religious and social chaos when Umayyad rule was being replaced by the Abbasid caliphate, Muslim society witnessed the growth of a kind of

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school which later developed into the real mystical theosophical movement represented This theosophical dimension of Islam--Sufism. as speculations in its early days a reaction against theological As a matter of fact, tratraditionalism. well as against strict had been in opposition and now both and rationalism ditionalism ordinances of worof belief, Concerning articles were in decline. matters, the prophetic tradition was reship and other religious less reverence than the Qur'an, and was garded with only slightly But the authority after it. always considered the most reliable who rejected anthropomorphic tendencies in Islamic Muctazilites, and stressed that everything in tradition and tradition, revelation This, indeed, in accord with reason. must be interpreted revelation some of the firm emphasis oreffect in shattering had considerable thodox Muslims laid on tradition. when the Ashcarites began their campaign Nevertheless, doubts were cast on the value and limits of against Muctazilism, The doctors of the Ashcarite school went so far as to conreason. to the process of creas non-applicable sider the law of causality used to call the Law ation, so that even for what the rationalists Divine the notion of the so-called of Nature, they substituted It was not a law, they maintained, but simply the habit Habit. laid on nature by God, that makes certain things follow others. Thus, the predominance of Ashcarism was to some extent a factor in domains. the decline of reason in religious nor reason to inspire great confiWith neither tradition only certitude, dence, there remained, in the search for religious of which the Sufis were fervent advoinner light, the so-called their These were pious people who were unable to satisfy cates. Muslim orand intellectual needs within the traditional religious services and rituals only competed To them, traditional thodoxies. with the search for paradise as reward; the exoteric sciences of and thelogians were nothing but the normal path to presthe jurists mere ar0 of building the worldly stable as tige and wealth--the Traces of these early Islamic sects. Jalal al-Din Rumi would say. The well-known relihowever, can be found in the Sufi heritage. of the Murof the Sufis reminds us, for instance, gious liberalism The idea of trust in God, to postpone judgment. willingness ji'ite seems also to bear the on which early Sufis laid so much stress, theories preached by the incarnation Similarly, Jabarite imprint. some early Sufis were probably borrowed from the extremist Shicites. that the ways leading to God are as their firm belief Nevertheless, numerous as human souls did not allow them to follow those sects

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who claimed that the slightest and individuals deviation from traditional Islam led to heresy. Indeed they found truth, in greater or lesser measure, in all creeds and faiths. Among the earliest individuals on whom the name Sufi was bestowed, there was Jibir b. Hayyan, known as Geber rex Arabum to the Medieval West, who reportedly was a contemporary of the early Abbasid caliphs. This grandfather of modern chemistry was an outstanding exponent of hermetic knowledge in Islam. As a matter of fact, the hermetic nature of writings bearing the name of Jabir caused him to be regarded as a mysterious personality. There is not, however, sufficient evidence to cast serious doubt on his historicity. True, much of this hermetic legacy in the ancient Near East, which existed centuries before Jabir was born, was concerned with alchemy, astrology, and other occult sciences, but there was also a philosophical, mystical aspect with which another Sufi of a somewhat later time, the Egyptian Dhu al-Nun, was connected. Indeed, Jabir (d. 776) reportedly had close connections with the same Shicite circles that the well-known Sufi martyr al-Hall&j was linked to in his early days. Al-Hallaj is also said to have been an alchemist for a while, but his Sufi vocation predominated. Whereas Jabir was more inclined to alchemy, his Egyptian colleague, Dhu al-Nun, was inclined to mystical experience. A Muslim Negro, Dhu al-Nun (d. 850) preached asceticism and was a father of mystical theory. He is credited with the knowledge of the secrets of hieroglyphic as well as with the authorship of some inscriptigns 6 He is said also to have belon ed to books on occult sciences. the same school of occultism to which Jabir had belonged.3 It was this hermetic feature of his teaching, rather than his supposed Muctazilite tendencies, that may have caused his arrest in Cairo and his imprisonment in Baghdad. The mystical teaching of Dhu alNun was based on gnosis or intuitive knowledge, which was esteemed by the Suf is as the best path to the knowledge of God, neither reason nor tradition being comparable to it. The spiritual purification that Sufis expected to attain and the renunciation through self-mortification of worldly pleasures was believed to end in the enlightenment of their hearts, which they termed safa ("purity of heart") and from which they sometimes claimed the word "Sufi" was derived. However, whereas the name of a similar group with mystical and hermetic features known as the "Brethren of Purity" (Ikhwan can actually be said to derive from this mystical concept al-Safi)

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of purity, the same etymology cannot be applied to the name Sufi. Among the etymologies proposed for this word, the most probable is "fwool." Suf is wore from the word , no doubt its derivation mendicancy. coarse woolen garments as a sign of their religious These woolen robes, usually made of rage, were as much the mark of a Sufi as bushy hair and bare feet are the signs of an American It should be added that a few mystics refused to wear any hippy. distinctive mark, and there were persons who maintained with Hujwiri that, "It is inward glow (hurqa] that makes the Sufi, not the habit [khirqah l."38 religious Sufis of worldly pleasures, rejection Despite their strict did not regard the formal devotion of orthodox Muslims as of great Moreover, for the formal knowledge of learned theoloimportance. When Macrtif, an early Sufi of gians they had nothing but contempt. Baghdad (d. 815), tried to argue that Sufism consisted of grasping and of renouncing what was in the hands of created the realities beings, he seems to have found even the devotions of the orthodox to be worldly and among the unreal things to be and the theologians renounced. When asked by a young prince what the way to God was, Dhu al-Nun replied that there was a lesser way and a greater way. Anyone who desired the lesser one should abandon the world and give up But he who chose the greater one must abandon everything sinning. Thus, a formal tradbut God and empty his heart of all things.39 itional devotion was far from being the greater way to God. that God should not be worshipped out of The Sufi insistence hope or fear but solely for God's sake was the point that differen(zahid), for whom hell and paradise contiated the ordinary ascetic the main concern, from the mystic (c5rif) whose sole constituted This concept of divine love, based on disincern was divine love. terested devotion to God, received greatest stress in the teachings This saintly woman (d. 801) was a prototype of Rablcah of Basrah. of the mystic, an Islamic Santa Teresa, who is believed to have Her extreme asceticism and celibacy. spent her life in seclusion and her mystical teachings brought her several devoted disciples among whom were such pious men as al-Hasan al-Basri and associates and Sufyan al-Thawri. devotees of Sufism, somewhat earlier One of the earliest than Rablcah, was Ibrahim b. Adham (d. ca. 777), the princely saint of Balkh whose legend reminds us of the story of Buddha. According to his well-known legend, he was the son of an independent prince

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Influenced by some kind of divine voice, of Balkh of Arab stock. or impressed by the exhortation of some divine messenger, he gave up his throne, chose the life of poverty and became a wandering dervish living on his own labor. A more celebrated Sufi of Persia was B3yazId of Bistam (d. 875), who is considered to have held the same high rank among the Suf is as Gabriel had among the angels.40 Ecstatic paradoxes connected with his name reveal great boldness of conception that someOne day, in a state of mystimes manifested pantheistic features. tical trance, he cried out: "Glory to me! How great is my majesty. ' In a similar case he uttered with strange boldness: "Beneath my cloak there is nothing but God." Pantheism or incarnation, these utterances underwent elaborate interpretations that made them acceptable to orthodox Muslims. Nevertheless, when a few decades later almost the same utterance was made by the younger HallTj (d. 922), it did not receive such a favorable response. Like BEyazld of Bist&m, HallZj probably also had a Zoroastrian grandfather. Up till the age of forty, he had lived with Sufi companions. Then he travelled in Khurasan, Turkistan, India, and finally settled in Baghdad, where he got in touch with Muctazilites, Shicites, and several other religious and social sects. Arrested for unknown involvements, he spent eight years in prison, and then after a seven-month trial, he was mutilated, crucified, decapitated, and burned to ashes. His crime, according to later Suf is who recognized him as their martyr par exwas that he had divulged the divine secret. cellence, He had uttered, during an ecstatic trance, but before those who could not "I am the Truth." understand it: While the disciples of Hallaj later gathered around Ablu cUmar al-Hashimi in Ahwaz and around Faris al-DInawarl in Khurasan to continue his teachings, the Sufi school of Baghdad, formerly headed by the well-known al-Junayd, did not show great sympathy for this eccentric martyr. Thus, while the disciples of Hallij succeeded later in finding an echo of his teachings in the voice of Abu Sacid in Khurasan, the Sufi school of al-Junayd (also called the Master of the Way) leaned increasingly toward intellectualism and traditionalism. This mystical school of Baghdad, however, did for Sufism what the Shaficl school did for traditionalism in estabThe main topics of this school lishing its fundamental principles. were gnosis, love, and the unity of God (taw id) so that its teachings on these topics were worked out and developed in a speculative mysticism.

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Al-Junayd, the inspired teacher of this school, held that elements that should not be revealed Sufi truths contained esoteric ceaselessly In his correspondence he insisted to the uninitiated. and with caution. to his friends that they talk to people carefully Sufis as ShiblI and Nuri, His school contained such distinguished in his early career had connections with it. and even al-Hallaj The caution with which the Master of the Way used to teach spared him from what happened later to Hallij and his friend Ibn cAta', whereas what he actually taught could also seem to the uninitiated According to his teachpeople as a pure incarnation of pantheism. of being with God with no atings, Sufism consisted essentially So, when the Sufi was wholly present tachment to anything else. and this was what the Sufis in God, he was wholly lost to himself, Al-Junayd (d. 910) did not live to witness called annihilation. had in fact left but al-Hallij the tragic episode of al-Hall5j, the latter being too alive, the school while the master was still conservative for the tastes of this eccentric mystic. With the decline of the Sufi school of Baghdad, following cliKhurasan offered a more hospitable the execution of al-1jallaj, mate for the movement. In fact, this eastern province of Persia to the development of Sufism, with had never ceased to contribute like Ibrahlm Adham (d. 777), Shaqlq-i BalkhI great personalities (d. 810), Almad b. Varb (d. 849), AImad b. Khadruyah (d. 864), Abu VafQ-i Haddad (d. 879), and many others. its climax was attaining At the time that Persian literature One of in Khurasan, Sufism was also producing great leaders there. these was IJakIm of Tirmidh, to whom the Sufi sect bearing his name (Iaklmiyah) paid homage, and who is said to have devoted the larger and Sufi meditation in his part of his life to ascetic practices native town, located in the Upper Oxus not far from Balkh. He was author of many interesting books, including his autobiography. His ideas on sainthood were greatly esteemed by later Sufis, and (d. 1111). his psychological writings may have influenced al-Ghazzall his ideas on sainthood are supposed to have had some inFinally, ideas on the subject. fluence on Ibn al-cArabTIs a While this great Sufi of Khurasan was a traditionalist, the famous Abu al-Hasan-i Khariqani, who and a theologian, jurist, who had spent his lived a century later, was nearly an illiterate his imposing dignity Nevertheless, early days as a donkey-driver. was such that even learned people who came into his presence could scarcely utter a word before himA41 Though but a simple peasant he was viewed by his fellow Sufis to be from the Bistim district, His sayings, a collection of continuing Bayazid's experiences.

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which is extant, reveal an experience v6cue of mystical acquisiHe inspired such reverence in the famous Shaykh AbU Sacid tions. 4 that, when the latter came into his presence, he did not utter a AbU Sacid anword. Abu al-Hasan asked him why he kept silent. is enough for one theme." Thus, so swered that "one interpreter Abii Sacld was silent.43 long as Abui al-Hasan was talking, Abui Sac-d b. Abiu al-Khayr (d. 1048) was regarded as the exgreatest Sufi leader of his time, and had a wonderful religious Moreover, power of thought-reading. perience with the extraordinary he was the first Sufi shaykh to recite poetry in the course of his A large part of sermons instead of the Qur'an and traditions. these poems were compositions of earlier Sufis, and his own compoit was chiefly sitions were very few in number. Nevertheless, through this great shaykh of Khurasan that Persian poetry became He is also said to have corresmore closely linked with Sufism. ponded with the philosopher Avicenna, and according to a biographer, own he even had a personal meeting with the sage in the latter's According to a popular story, after they monastery at Nishapur. had conversed with each other for three days, the philosopher said "All that I know, he sees," while the of him to his disciples: "All that I see, he knows." mystic declared to his followers: recorded in various sources and This encounter, differently the idea that basis, illustrates probably lacking an historical Attempts to Suf is had about the character of their own teachings. mysticism within and anti-traditional bring this anti-intellectual of orthodox Islam scholasticism the scope of the newly established were undertaken by a Sufi scholar of the same century, the famous Imam Qushayrl (d. 1074) who is 4laimed to have disapproved of Abu Sacid's supposed extravagance. In contrast with Abu Sacid, who did not like to waste his Imam Qushayri was a prolific time in the tedious task of writing, writer and his works, together with a few remnants of the treatises, Sufi teachings contributed to crystallizing of some precursors, Imam Qushayri 's tract on Sufism, speculations. into scholastic was a real handbook of Sufi knowledge, al-Qushayriyah, al-Ris3lat and scholars. to theologians making the Sufi doctrines available His (d. 1089), ite scholar, clined him collection

younger contemporary, Khwajah cAbd Allgh Ansari of Herat He was a Hanbaltoward Sufism. held a similar attitude whose encounter with Abu al-Hasan-i Khariq5nT had inHe wrote books on Sufism, among which his to Sufism. much enjoyed the Munajat, is still of mystical litanies,

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in practice he remained a Hanbalite schoNevertheless, in Persia. lar rather than a Sufi, and it was as a theologian that he was persecuted and exiled in his last years. tendencies of the late eleventh century in Intellectualist This in turn and systematization. Islam led Sufism to speculation gave rise to Sufi orders, now scattered throughout the Muslim world. These orders, however, came into being just when living Sufism was thus marking a new stage in the development on the road to decline, of this movement.45

III taught the Suf is to avoid Whereas the execution of al-Hallaj the conversion of the thewhat can be called unorthodox attitudes, to Sufism caused the orthodox Muslims to regard ologian al-Ghazzall is said Al-Ghazzill Sufism with more respect and greater interest. to have spent his last years in a Sufi monastery which he built for speculation abandoning scholastic close to his former college, It was almost half a century after his death mystical intuition. His conversion to that the first orders of Suf is came into being. Suneffect on reconciling the mystical way no doubt had a decisive nism to Sufism--an achievement without which the Sufi orders would not have had the opportunity for missionary activities. The founding of Sufi monasteries had begun much earlier. built in financed by pious endowments were originally Institutions But when Ni;im al-Mulk of the Islamic world. the remote frontiers in the Saljuq (d. 1092), founder of the first great universities kingdom, also built a series of Sufi monasteries in the bosom of other grandees, even princes and caliphs, Near Eastern capitals, followed his example and, within a few decades, Sufi monasteries These were to be seen in nearly the whole of the Muslim Near East. for those Sufis who did not monasteries had a peculiar attraction like to give up urban life and preferred to have a connection with and jurists. of theologians activities scholastic was nearly over, there flourWhen the Sunni-Sufi conflict ished in Iraq and Khurasan a number of Sufi teachers to whom fol(d. Such Sufi leaders as CAbd al-Qidir al-GIlnI lowers flocked. 1166), CUmaral-Suhrawardl (d. 1234), and Najm al-Din Kuhbr (d. numbers of 1221) had their own monasteries with considerable

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and adepts, but even though the great Shaykh Suhrawardi disciples had received a caliphal diploma which recognized him as the Great Master of all the Suf is, the system of the orders was not yet fully established in this period. a Moreover, long before the orders came into existence, series of Sufi sects had been recorded in the works of HujwTrl, These sects were essentially Qushayri, SarrEj, and other authors. In other words, such mystical the result of doctrinal schism. groups as the Nurls, Hulil's, cIshqls, and Wasills are to Sufism what Murji'ites, Jabarites, Muctazilites and Qadarites are to orin tenets and principles rather thodox Islam, denoting differences than divergences in worship and rituals. It was only in the last days of SaljUq rule that the first Sufi orders emerged in the Muslim Near East, though still a bit Nevermore time was needed before they found their final shape. theless these orders later formed a network of Sufi organization that gradually spread from one end of the Muslim world to the other, with their own hierarchies, customs and rituals. Their system, however, was considerably influenced by both orthodox traditionalism and formal scholasticism in the course of its development. Religious rituals were usually observed with almost the same carefulness as in the mosques, and Sufi teachers-in orthodox schools--were transmitters just like the traditional not considered reliable unless they had received formal authority from their masters--Khirqah and Wil5yah in the case of Sufis. The founding of the orders was in one sense a definite triumph of Sufism in the obstinate struggle it had undertaken long before for recogof Sufism within the conventional nition, 46 but the systematization frame of orders also put an end to its spontaneity and its ecstatic character. That some Sufi thinkers like cAyn al-Qudat-i HamadanI (d. 1163), Ibn al-cArabi (d. 1240), and Ibn Sabcin (d. 1270) could from time to time reveal their intuitive had little to do speculations with the usual life of the orders, and their influence did not extend beyond the literary works of Sufis, which was still open to ecstasy and intuition. The formation of Sufi orders, moreover, provoked schisms and differences against which Sufism had originally emerged as a reaction. The critical remarks of the liberal Sufi, Sacdi of Shiraz (d. 1292), probably refer to this change. He claimed that in the

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early days of Islam, the Suf is were outwardly scattered but inwardly united, whereas they later became apparently organized yet This was perhaps the reason for which SacdI-really dispersed.47 of Suhrawardi and also naturally disposed to himself a disciple Sufism--did not openly join any of the numerous Sufi orders of his time. At thg time that Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) was writing the Muqaddimah,4 Sufism, no doubt under the influence of the order system, had become not so much a set of doctrines as 4 mode of This canlife--a metodo de vida as M. Asin Palacios calls it. not explain however the whole development of Sufism--particularly in the period before Ibn Khaldun. Although the Sufi life on the whole was a contemplative one, differed from order to order, from teacher to it nevertheless A Sufi order was an organized brotherhood, formed around teacher. a Sufi teacher who was believed to have the gift of miraculous powto lead others in the divine path, ers and therefore to be qualified of a Sufi orfrom which fact is derived the commonest designation der, tari ah, which means "pathway." Sufi explained by different differently These tariqahs, It is no separate various Sufi orders from each other. teachers, wonder, then, that in the course of time a large variety of Sufi orders developed in various countries ranging in their mode of life The orders differ in pantheism. from ascetic pacifism to militant whose observance is required of every inicustoms and in rites, tiate.

receives his formal admission into the order The initiate through a series of ceremonies supervised by his Sufi teacher, usThis symbolism gives a mysterious ually of a symbolic character. according to and differs aspect to the life of Sufi monasteries, reIn one order, for example, the initiate orders and rituals. ceives an earring from the shaykh, reminding him probably of the total submission the shaykh urges on him. In another case, he is a black cloth or belt, which will bound--on shoulder or waist--by Hanging remind him always of his continual contest with the devil. total submisa small stone on his neck symbolizes the initiate's the contentment stone-i.e., sion--whence the Turkish taslim-tash, both used by the Turkish order called Bektashi. levis

The Sufi dance so greatly appreciated by the Turkish MevThis symbolic feature displays also a symbolic character.

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is also to be found in the attire of Sufis. Sufi orders differ even in this respect. While some wear caps in the shape of a rose, like orthodox tulip or heart, others may wear turbans--just There are Suf is wearing caps with five, twelve, or eightpriests. een sections, whereas others walk through the streets with long in the air. The shape of their caps, the color of hair floating their garments display a variety of different however, tastes--all, bearing their peculiar symbols. The spiritual teachers of several orders wore the turbans of orthodox jurists, symbolizing their claim to supreme knowledge, the gnosis. This supreme knowledge is what the Suf is claimed to be the esoteric teaching of the Prophet inherited by them through their shaykhs. of It was however only the intuitive acquisition early Sufis that was systematized and formulated in a form acceptable to orthodox formalism. That all the Sufi orders trace their spiritual patronship, through either Abu Bakr or Ali, to the person of Muhammadindicates not only their attempt to establish their ritual tradtions on the same authority as that used by orthodox traditionalists but also reveals their claim to inheritance of the supposed esoteric teachings of the Prophet. The Sufis claimed that Muhammad's teaching was twofold: the exoteric one was addressed to all Muslims whereas the esoteric was disclosed only to some intimate companions. The Sufis pretended to have inherited the latter from these intimate companions to whom they believed their shaykhs were connected. The possession of this esoteric knowledge so elevated the Sufi teachers in the eyes of their followers that not infrequently cults formed around them, and their tombs became, in many cases, places of pilgrimage. Moreover, the transmission of such sacred knowledge was uson the part of the shaykh. ually accompanied by great discretion was to be met by the traditionalists (A similar situation in another way.) This feature added a mysterious appearance to some Sufi orders--which might suggest why rulers were suspicious of them. Whereas most Sufi orders avoided political involvements, some had a certain interest in what can be called political affairs. It is conceivable that the pretention to the prophetic wisdom-supposedly inherited from Muhammad--mayhave led some of the Sufi shaykhs to assume a political mission. That they sometimes used to call their felt hat the crown of poverty and to add the titles

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Shah or Sultan to their them suspect in the eyes popularity of Sufis and a loss, and not a small high position they5beld against the Sufis.

humble names could have sufficed to make The of some narrow-minded sovereigns. their success in Muslim society by causing and in the one, in the prestige of jurists anger in Muslim eyes, excited the latter's

politithere were Sufi shaykhs with definite Nevertheless, to disposition The Kharijite-Shicite cal or social pretensions. rulers never ceased to launch open warfare against unqualified haunt pious Muslims, so that an ambitious shaykh could well repreor sovereign as a religious sent a revolt against an unqualified This is the reason that Sufi orders occasionally social necessity. and have been involved in fighting against invaders, oppressors, even unjust rulers. The history of Persia, like that of several other Islamic countries offers several cases of the involvement of Sufi .orders example, which goes back to One interesting in such activities. pre-Mon&ol times, is the case of the Kizarunid order, founded by Abu Ishaq-i Kazaruini (d. 1033), a well-known saint of Persia.51 AlHe was an ardent preacher and his order lasted for centuries. he made great efforts though he came of a family of Zoroastrians, The order bearing his to convert Zoroastrians of Firs to Islam. Owing name spread through Persia to India, China, and Anatolia. role in it played a very considerable character, to its militant Another example the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth century. The founder, Sufism was the case of the Juriyah order. of militant a certain Shaykh Hasan-i Jurl (d. 1338), succeeded in preparing the call the "Shici republic" of Sarbidway fo what some historians irids7w2 But the best example in the history of Persia is the case of the Safavids, a dynasty of Persian rulers, named after the title of its founder's grandfather, the well-known Shaykh SafI al-Din of Although Shaykh Safi himself, like so many Ardabil (d. 1335). other shaykhs of his time, was an orthodox Sunni, his successors and son p embraced Shicism and later made it the state religion of The Mongol invasion (ca. 1219) witnessed the militant Persia.3 During this struggle response of the Kubrawiyah in Transoxania. the founder of this order Shaykh Najm al-DIn Kubra (d. 1221) met that having obstinately his death. We are told by some historians refused the Mongol offer of a compromise, this saint preferred the gallant death of a militant martyr to a servile life of submission After his death, his order counted a galaxy of saints, to infidels. among whom CAll' al-Dawla-i Simnini (d. 1336) founded the branch called Rukniyah; Sayyid MuhammadNurbakhsh started a branch called

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the Nurbakhshi order, and a certain a new order called Dhahabis.

Sayyid CAbdallh

established

An ex-commissioner of the Mongol state, afterwards converted docto Sufism, cAl.t al-Dawlah stood fast against the pantheistic trine of Ibn al-cArabi, a doctrine which was appreciated greatly by Shaykh cAbd al-Razzaq of the Suhrawardi school, which had a special He had, however, enough tolerance attraction for Sufis in Persia. to seek spiritual He guidance even from Mongol monks of his time. al-Din Hamiisucceeded, as did his other Kubrawi predecessors--Sacd yah (d. ca. 1252) and Sayyid Ali HamadanTI(d. 1385)--in establishing closer connections between Shicism and Sunnism in their Sufi teachings. His other Kubrawi colleague, Sayyid MuhammadNurbakhsh, (d. This Sufi teacher had, however, 1463) openly embraced Shicism. other aspirations of a more ambitious nature. Several times he was proclaimed caliph by his followers, and several times arrested, banished, or imprisoned by the sultan contemporary with him, the Timurid Shah Rukh. His order, despite various persecutions, found its way to India where for a long time it held a considerable position in Kashmir. Golden The last offshoot of the Kubrawiyah was the so-called It openly professed Shicism and preserved-Order, the Dhahabis. even during the unfavorable Safavid period--its supremacy in south Persia. Among its teachers the most celebrated was one Sayyid Qutb His Sufi Nayrizi (d. ca. 1759) who wrote Persian and-Arabic poetry. teaching reminds us of that of Ibn al-cArabi, whereas his Arabic poetry betrays the influence of the Egyptian Ibn al-Farld and his Persian verses reveal something of the style of CAttir. Some of his theosophical views have been criticized by the later Nicmat Allahi. Among the Sufi orders that gained a certain popularity in Persia in the wake of the Mongol invasion, one should also name the The former, whose founder Shaykh Suhrawardis and the Qalandaris. CJUmar al-Sahrawardi (d. 1234) was a friend and favorite of the lost its influence in Persia probably with Abbasid Caliph al-Nasir, the fall of Baghdad. As a matter of fact, the friendship between the caliph al-Nasir and the Sufi Suhrawardi was such that the caland sent him iph appointed him the chief of all Sufi monasteries, as his ambassador to the court of Muslim sovereigns. That Suhrathe name of this caliph as an authority in support of wardi-cites tradition is a curious point. Although the original order found

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in Afghanistan and India, its offshoots remained more disciples active in Persia long after the episode of Baghdad. Among these sub-branches are the Khalwatl order of Khurasan and the Jamalis of The Safawiyah order also was an offshoot of Isfahan. the district of Suhrawardlyah but later it gradually developed into an independent order. The Qalandarls, and the Naqshbandis as well, enjoyed only a The former was not really an organized limited success in Persia. could not being of a rigid Sunni character, order and the latter, land of the Great a firm foothold in the pro-Shicite establish Sophy. The Qalandarlyah, mentioned in the Arabian Nights, were a They had no sort of wandering dervish sect rather than an order. fixed rule or ritual and used to show--somewhat like the earlier and social conventions. Malamatis--an utter disregard for religious in central Asia and were influenced by They probably originated It is said that a Persian, Jamal al-Din Sawaji, Indian ideas. in fourteenth century Perof this discipline preached the beliefs sia, which would explain why the members5Vf this sect were so numThat they had no enerous in the early days of the Safavids. Some thusiasm for orthodox Sunnism is probably another reason. sources, however, trace them bags to the Naqshbandis--though probThe Naqshbandis enjoyed great evidence. ably with no reliable just before the rise of popularity in Transoxania and Afghanistan, The founder of the order was a Baha' al-Din the Safavid dynasty. Muhammad(d. 1389) called Shah-i Naqshband. He had spent several years in the service of a Tatar prince, but, once converted to SufHis order was closely connected with ism, he led an ascetic life. an older one--that of Nasir al-Din b. MaImud Shashi called Khwa ahteacher of i Ahrgr (d. 1490), who was the patron and spiritual JamI. 6 After the death of the Shah-i Naqshband, however, the distogether with the advent of putes of his descendants on succession, The the Shicite Safavids, put an end to their influence in Persia. Safavid order was but the Azari branch of Suhrawardis, whose founder, the famous Shaykh SafI, was a well-known Sufi teacher of his some legends may have been introduced later time. Nevertheless, to make him a suitable ancestor for a royal dynasty of the Shicite faith--a sayyid. Whereas the SafawiLyah order gave rise in Persia to the royal Safavid dynasty, in Asia Ninor it developed into minor sub-divisions number among which the Jalwatis or Hudals recruited a considerable of followers in the Ottoman Empire. The founder of the latter was a cerWin Pir-i Uftadah (d. 1628) whose followers used to wear long hair. IRANIANSTUDIES

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Once ascended to the throne, the Persian Safawiyah felt insecure amidst the bigoted and undisciplined Sufi militia, whose in religious lack of interest matters could be harmful to an inexperienced government whose support was based mainly on its state These considerations, religion. together with the hostile attitude of the Shicite ulama toward Sufism, led the Safavid kings to look on Sufis as a threat to the religion and to the state as well. Thus, Sufism was vanquished in the "Land of the Great Sophy," and outside the ancestral order and its titular of Shaykh custodianship Safi al-Din's tomb, there remained nothing of Sufism in the Safavid realm. Their fall (1738) provided the Nicmat-Allahi order of India an opportunity to launch anew a Sufi movement in Persia. This Sufi order is still one of the most extensive, if not the largest, existing in Persia today. Its founder, Shah NiCmat-Allih Vall (d. 1431), is said to have enjoyed the favors of the Timurid, Shlh Rukh, but during the Saf avid rule his descendants and successors remained in the Deccan, far from Persia. Shah Nicmat-Allah, author of more than three hundred Arabic and Persian treatises on mystical subis famous in Persian literature jects, for his apocalytic sayings concerning the troubles of the last days of the world, with some messianic prophecies. He was born in Aleppo, spent several years in Mecca and Egypt, journeyed in Khurasan and Transoxania, and finally settled down in Kirman, where his tomb is still visited by groups of pilgrims. His poetical work, even though well appreciated by some Sufi readers, lacks great literary value; it is a rather monotonous and mediocre poetry with strong pantheistic ideas. During the Safavid reign his descendants either migrated to India or remained in Persia under clever camouflage. They succeeded for a while, nevertheless, in finding a welcome response to their call in the chaotic situation of post-Safavid Persia. We are told that some thirty thousand followers gathered around the Indian Mir Macsum Ali Shah, a Nicmat-Allahi teacher who arrived in Shiraz in the happy days of Karim Khan Vakil (d. 1779). But, at the instigation of hostile ulama, the rulers of the Zand dynasty persecuted them and obliged them to go to Mesopotamia. Toward the beginning of the Qajar period, the Nicmat-Allihis made an attempt to establish their master's cult in Kirman where his shrine was erected but this was met by the opposition of the ulama and resulted in chaos during which a fervent Sufi, Mushtiq Ali was killed (1792). Also, the saintly poet, Nur Ali Shah (d. 1789), who had recruited a considerable number of followers in Isfahan and Kurdistan, was accused in the meantime of dynastic ambitions and is said to have met his death in wandering exile, reportedly poisoned.58

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It was not until the middle of the Qajar period that the The their order in Persia. could establish finally Nicmat-Allihis the prime minister Hiji Mirza Aqasi (d. 1849) had in keen interest Later their cause may have been a reason for their success. Sultan Ali Shah (d. 1909) in Khurashaykhs, however, particularly san, and ?afi Ali Shah (d. 1898) in Tehran, gained a part of their as both wrote commentaries popularity through their traditionalism, on the Qur'an. Generally speaking, if the order system of Sufism has not met in Persia the fervent welcome it has received in India, Turkey, Egypt and North Africa, one reason, no doubt, lies in the hostility groupings; this factor, howof the Persians to organized religious the anti-hierarchical Nevertheless, ever, must not be exaggerated. Sufism of the period before and during Hallaj's time has always and its reflection been kept alive throughout Persian literature is to be found in Persian lyrics up to the present. So, even if to the devcontributions the Sufi orders did not make considerable has reelopment of Sufism in Persia proper, Persian literature mained the mirror for Sufi thought for even a longer time.

IV Muslim mystical experience has found its best expression, Was that because in Persian poetry. with perhaps a few exceptions, mystical visions seemed more congenial to Persians that mystical rites? was addressed much more to the reader's This literature elements were preheart than to his mind and therefore intuitive Although it is true that its entire content may not valent in it. aseven in its ethical and didactical be considered intuitive, follow the conventions of secular litpects, it does not strictly erature. the Sufi poet has no great resconventions, For traditional as veils separating his mind from pect, viewing them essentially "Don't think of aught except the the object of continual vision. vision of me" was the bitter rebuke Rumi thought he received from his divine lover, who did not like him to be preoccupied with rhyme and prosody.59 Thus, rhyme and all other conventions of prosody were regarded by Sufi poets as barriers to divine contemplation,

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and therefore to be avoided. This kind of vision, not uncommon among other Sufi poets, led them to consider everything as mere images of that supreme beauty which was the goal of all their This notion in turn led to a symbolic emphasis in much quests. of Sufi poetry. Divine love, the main object of mystical experience, found an expression in human love, and images borrowed from secular literature were abundantly used to describe mystical experiences. When physical love became the primary motif of mystical symbolism, wine and the tavern constituted its other elements, and all played a considerable role in the later development of mystical literature. The cult of love was considered a Sufi way to purification of the heart. Does not even physical love require an utmost altruism without which there can be no true love? But when Sumnun al-Muhibb (d. 913) maintains that love is the foundation of the way to God, and thereby raises it above the gnosis, he means that disinterested love in which the Sufi can find a bridge to pass to the realm of spiritual love.60 Lovers of this kind admire, adore, and enjoy the object of their love as something intrinsically precious and worthy of worship. And it is just this point which divides the formal ascetic who worships his God through fear or hope and the mystic devotee whose worship is only for God's sake. With this disinterested love there remains but a few steps to the divine love in which the final connection demands total sacrifice of the lover. An allegorical tale of the poet CIraqi (d. 1309) illustrates this final annihilation of the lover in such a disinterested love. There was a miserable man, he recounts, who had spent most of his days amidst the ash-heaps of bath-house furnaces. He went once on an excursion to a field--a green field with beautiful meadows and fragrant flowers. Suddenly a beautiful youth passed by, mounted on a horse, as though going hunting. The poor man was immediately seduced by his beauty and fell in love with him. There was, of course, no hope for the poor beggar in such a love affair with a prince, and this hopeless passion kept him for some time in a desperate state. Two weeks passed, with the wretched man knowing no way to find his beloved prince. One day the youth reappeared in the field, in hunting garb, riding his beautiful horse, and the poor man had a strange idea as to how to gain his desire. He secretly slaughtered a deer, clad himself in its hide, and exposed himself in such a way that the prince took him for a deer. Wounded by his beloved's

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But when the prince arrow, he fell down nearly lifeless. to him and laid the wounded man's head on his own breast, passed away in joy and contentment.

came up the man

The only path the poor beggar could find to his beloved Thus, also, the human soul, himself. prince was by sacrificing whose whole life has been spent in the ash-heaps of earthly pleawith the godhead only through abnegation sure, can enjog1connection That the object of love is represented here in and sacrifice. because the Sufis pictured in itself a male person is significant i.e., characteristics, the supreme beauty with rather virile Moreover, this conception was also a restrength and jealousy. of homosexual tendencies developed in the course of time flection for homosexuality was not uncommon in their own wandering life, AwEven Sufi poets like Sang'i, among the Suf is of monasteries. toward lad-i Kirmani, and cIraqi are said to have had an inclination "Greek love," with Sania' and Kirmani reported to be specifically It is said that boys. in the companionship of beautiful interested when already a venerable shaykh, could often be found jokclriqi, ing and playing with teenagers. However, despite the enthusiasm with which wine had been instance of an actual praised in Persian Sufi poetry, no reliable Wine has occupied, from orgy is ever recorded by these Sufi poets. rituals of the time immemorial, a central place in the religious In Persia, its invention goes back to a grandancient Near East. son of the legendary first king of Iran, Jamshld, and the Persian wine-cult may be traced back to haoma, the mysterious intoxicating In Greece, the God of Wine had an time. drink of pre-Zoroastrian of the ancient Hebrews also concult and the religion influential The expression "blood of grapes" tained elements of wine worship. frequently occurring in Persian lyrics was used as early as in Genesis (49:11) and the Christian Eucharist sublimated it into an apt symbol of divine presence, the presence of one who called himself

the

"true

vine"

(John

15:1).

Long before Muslim Sufis began their Bacchic songs, Philo of Alexandria 8 hilo Judaeus) had compared mystical ecstasy with inproand Plotinus also had found in the intoxication toxication, whence the contemplation, duced by wine, the symbol of spiritual (sobria ebrietas).63 concept of sober intoxication symIs there any possible relation between the Eucharistic bolism of wine and the Sufi one? In Persian poetry, just as in early Muslim Arabic poetry, the Christian monastery is always connected with the custom of wine drinking, but even ancient Magians

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are also credited with dealing in wine in countries where the prohibited wine could not openly be brought to market except by these religious Muslim mystics usually depict minorities. Nevertheless, Christians as far from enjoying this mystical intoxication and Ibn al-Fariq tells us that these monastic folk could never truly ach4ve a mystical state in imbibing wine but only aspired to do so.

There was, however, a Qur'anic source for this symbolic wine in the reference to the pure drink of paradise (Qur'an, 76:21) which was interpreted by the Sufis as the beatific vision. It was mainly to this symbolic wine that the wine-songs of Ibn al-Farid and at least a considerable part of those of Hafiz allude. This explains why Ibn al-Farid goes sometimes as far as to claim that not only is it no sin to drink that wine, as some allege, but it is a sin not to taste of it. Thus, the use of this symbol for spiritual drunkeness was so common in the Islamic world that one might wonder if there was any prohibition against wine drinking in Islam. Moreover, exaltation of wine sometimes is so expressed that it is unclear whether the poet is presenting himself as a drunkard or a mystic. In the works of some Persian poets, especially H5fiz and CIraqi, the tavern is sometimes a tavern and sometimes a symbol of the Sufi monastery. With all these symbols, Sufi poetry became essentially a symbolic literature in which God is called the beloved, spiritual ecstasy the wine, and the Sufi cloister the tavern. Such symbolic language has found explanations in a celebrated didactical poem of Shykh-i Shabistari (d. 1320), who explicitly points out that in Sufi language "to become a haunter of the tavern is to be set free from self" and states that when the gnostics speak of wine, tavern, and sweetheart, who in these are all "symbols of the one reality, every form is manifested in his glory." 65 The same explanation is also given by Ibn al-cArabi, sometimes called the Doctor Maximus of the Muslim Sufis, whose Tarjuman al-Ashwaq--a collection of Arabic poems dedicated to a Persian a mystical symbolism that reminds us to Dante's Beatrice--reveals In an introductory songs. chapter of this work, the great Shaykh tells us that all the profane works in it are to be considered as having esoteric meanings. A third work in the same vein is the celebrated poem Tarjiband of the Persian poet Hatif of Isfahan (d. 1784). What Hatif

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tells us in this connection has such close resemblance to the words of the Doctor Maximus that one wonders if the Persian poet was not actually influenced by the Arab master: 0 Hatif,

the meaning of the Gnostics, whom they sometimes call drunk and sometimes sober, (When they speak of) the Wine, the Cup, the Minthe Cupbearer, the Magian, the Temple, strel, the Beauty, and the Girdle, Are those hidden secrets which they sometimes declare in cryptic utterance. If thou shouldst find they way to their secret thou wilt discover that even this is the secret of those mysteries, "He is One and there is naught but He: There is no God save Him alone!",66 In any case, this poetical symbolism served as leitmotif for esoteric interpretations the Sufi theoreticians made of the ecstatic utterances of Sufis, a task begun with the well-known Sufi school of Baghdad and continued very elaborately by al-Sarraj. A careful interpretation of these "inspired paradoxes" was also undertaken by the Persian Ruzbihan al-Baqli (d. 1209), whose work had some role in enhancing the posthumous prestige of Hallaj, and to Sufism in general. Explanations of these inspired paradoxes were based in particular on allegorical These alinterpretati-ons. legorical symbols, moreover, were used as the basic canvas in Sufi romances and epics, sometimes with ethical or didactical features. The well-known "Parliament of Birds" (Mantig al-Tayr) of CAttar, a masterpiece of Persian Sufi literature, provides an outstanding example of this allegorical type. In this allegorical the Persian poem of some 4,600 couplets, poet relates how the birds under the guidance and leadership of the hoopoe set out in quest of their sovereign, the Simurgh. This unseen sovereign of the birds was supposed to dwell in the Caucasus whose crossing would entail great mountains beyond seven valleys, Of all the birds who set out on this dangers and difficulties. dangerous quest, thirty birds survived to reach the sovereign's palace only to learn that the Slmurgh (literally, "thirty birds") was nothing but their own thirty persons. In fact, they finally found their unseen sovereign in the reflection of their own faces and found themselves and the Simurgh to be one. That out of all IRANIANSTUDIES

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kinds of birds only thirty constituted the supreme being of Simurgh was due to the fact that only those who had really sought their God were destined to attain that perfection. the journey of the mystic Sufi Thus this allegory represents to God. The hoopoe, which in the Qur'an is emissary of King Solomon to the Queen of Sheba, represents the Sufi shaykh, whose presence is supposed to be indispensable in the Sufi journey to God. cAttar, of whom Shaykh-i Shabistari said that his like would not reappear for a hundred centuries, was born in a village near Nishapur, an old citadel of Sufism. His father was a pharmacist a profession (ca4pr), the poet also followed, whence his pen-name. He kept a pharmacy where he was consulted by patients to whom he dispensed prescriptions. When he felt called to follow the religious life, he gave up his profession, went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, then lived in seclusion, and spent most of his time in self-mortification, until he met his death at the hands of the Mongols during their sack of Nishapur. cAttar also wrote other longer mystical poems with a didactical character. His poetry, even if poetically inferior to that of Sanai'i, is superior to it in charm and effect. With Sani'i and Rumi he constitutes the summit of Persian mysticism. cAbd al-Rahman Jiml (d. 1492), though having equally great mystical gifts, has never been placed in their high rank Compared to the work of CAttar, the style of Sana'i seems a It has nevertheless bit more didactical been highly and turgid. appreciated by later Sufis, who probably found in the poet's personal conversion something extraordinary and divine. A professional panegyrist of the Ghaznavid court for a long time, he finally was was converted to Sufdigusted by that silly work, did pentience, ism, renounced the world, and went so far as to walk barefooted in the streets. He wrote several philosophical and lyrical poems and anticiof a heavenly journey in a short pated Dante in his description poem called "The Journey of the Servants of God to the Place of ReBut his most famous work was turn" (Sayr al-cibad ila al-Macad). "The Garden of Truth" (Hadiqat al-Haqigah), a long poem of some divided into ten chapters dealing with mystical 10,000 couplets, This great monument of Sufism is not, however, an even subjects. and homogeneous work. As the poet's death evidently left it unfinished, other posthumous works--all written in the same meter as the yadigah were probably incorporated. This explains the chaotic arrangement of the ljadigah where some chapters do seem scarcely to be properly placed.

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by Sana'i's work was much esteemed by RiIII and especially This Muhaqqiq-i TirmidhI. teacher--Sayyid Riimi's first spiritual eminent Sufi used to quote from the poet Sana'? in his own discourses, and Rumi himself referred to or commented on SanVI's work of long very often in his Mathnawi. The Hadiqah is a collection by tales sometimes didactic chapters on Sufi subjects interspersed Some of these tales have been retold by character. of allegorical cAttir

or RumI, both

of whom recognized

in him a master

and pre-

cursor. the climax of Persian Sufism, if not that of Nevertheless, the whole Muslim world, was reached neither by SanVi nor by cAttar but by Jal5l al-Din Ruimii,whose famous Mathnawi is one of the giratJalil al-Din, however, did not est literary monuments of all time. consider poetry and art as an object but as a means of expressing his explosive fervor and his unlimited passion. which opens the Mathnawi, reveals His song of the reed-pipe, the complaints of the soul, whose separation from its divine abode is represented by the metaphor of the reed-pipe being cut off from The whole of the Mathnawi--a long poem of some 25,631 its reed-bed. The reedof this idea. be considered an illustration couplets--may the human soul, imprisoned in the earthly body, for pipe represents This is of course not the which the final rescue lies in death. animal death with which animal life ends in this world, but the rebirth. which leads to a spiritual death of earthly desires, Besides the Mathnawi, Jalil al-Din also wrote lyrical poems-the Dlv5n-i Shams-i of some 40,000 couplets--called a collection As a matter of fact, the unusual grandeur and depth of Tabrizi. these lyrical poems echo the unequaled passion of the poet for his leader, to whose memory most of these poems have been spiritual dedicated. That cAbd al-Rahman-i Jami (d. 1492) was the last great bard But his works are of classical Persian Sufism is beyond question. He by no means to be considered as of a purely mystical character. is rather to be placed in the same class as Nizami Ganjawl and Amir Khusraw, whose works, though profane, are not lacking in mystical As a matter of fact, Jami was converted to the Naqshbandi spirit. order in Khurasan but remained all his life a scholar and poet, rather than an ascetic mystic. his "Golden Chain" (Silsilat al-Dhahab) sounds Nevertheless, at several points like the Madiqah, though it lacks the unequalled His Salaman-u Absil is also an allegorical poem vigor of Sani'i. of Muslim theosophy probably written after a well-known tradition IRANIANSTUDIES

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begun by Avicenna. "Rosary of the Pious" (Sub]iat al-Abrir)introduces a new meter for long peoms on mystical subjects. His death, however, marks the end of the classical age of Sufi poetry and the works of such modern Sufis as Nur Ali Shah and Safi Ali Shah expose only a new kind of Sufi poetry, that of pure Shicite tendencies. Prose works of Persian Sufis, though of a larger variety and quantity, are not of such great literary interest. This prose heritage consists of mystical sermons, theosophical dissertations, biographies, memoirs, and letters, of differing literary value. Among the earliest specimens of theosophical achievements, Hujwlrl's Kashf al-Mahji-b and Mustamli's Sharh-i Tacarruf67 are typical. They contain nearly all the kinds of material to be found in later prose works of Sufis. As a matter of fact, such works as Miftah al-Nijat, Mi?bah al-Hid yah, Mirsad al-cIbgd, and Maqgad-i Aqga are later developments of this same tradition. The same can be said of biographies and memoirs dealing with the lives and works of Sufi saints. CAttgr's Tadhkirat al-Awlia', undoubtedly based on works already at hand in his time, is the prototype of this genre, so that Jamit's Nafahat and other similar works are only continuations of the same tradition of CAttar. Moreover, nearly every great shaykh of the past has found at least one admirer to write down his acts and sayings. Works like the Asrir al-Tawhid68 on the life of Shaykh Abii Sacid and Mag`amat-i ZindahPulb9 on the works and life of Shaykh Ahmad-i Jim are but two celebrated spcimens of a whole genre. These biographies of saints are chiefly based on records of their acts and words taken down during their lives by their own disciples. we do Unfortunately, not possess a large number of these notes on the great shaykhs. there are quite a few preachers whose sermons Nevertheless, have been written down and collected in the wellby their disciples known fashion of the old traditionalists. Al-Shahristinl and Sacdl are among non-Sufi preachers whose Persian sermons have been preIn the case of Rumi we even have a collection of his famserved. or "table talk," the content of which is best exiliar discourses, "There is what is therein" (Fihi ma FThi).70 pressed by its title, This custom of writing down the table talk of the shaykhs were as collections seems to have been current in RiumiL'scircle, of his-two spiritual also made of the discourses teachers, Sayyid Burhan-i Muhaqqiq and Shams-i Tabrizi, as of those of his father, Baha -i Walad. Among these, only those of Shams-i Tabrizi have remained unpublished.

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Although keeping personal diaries was not much in vogue of one in possession among Persian Sufis, we are, nevertheless, large character--a specimen which seems to be of a very original part of the intimate journal of Bahi al-Din Valad, the venerable father of Jalil al-Din Riimi, who tries to analyze his daily acts saint to write down his What has led this celebrated and thoughts. deeds and thoughts was probably a desire to check his acts in order We read in Ibn conscience. to avoid any offense to his religious Futuhit7l that the teachers of that Spanish saint used al-cArabils also to write down all they did and said, and used to read it If Harith al-Muhasibi kept a through after their nightly prayers. journal, it was to account for his sins in order to perform formal "the accountant." penitence for them--whence his name, al-Muhasibi, Moreover, Hakim-i Tirmidhi. and Fadl-i Astarabadi wrote down their dreams, and Ibn al-cArabi kept a Aareful record of his mystical exBut the case of Baha al-Din periences in his Meccan revelations. Although it sometimes sounds like Valad is somewhat different. fea"Stages" in its ecstatic Bayazid's "Ascension" and Niffril's tures, his work is unique in the freshness of his ideas and the depth of his analysis. prose the personal corresponAmong minor genres of literary of The epistles dence of some Suf is is also of some importance. of Abu Sacid shed new light on the deval-Junayd, and the letters of letThere also exist collections elopment of Sufi doctrines. belonging to both Ghazzili and Rumi, which have ters and epistles value. great literary composed by CAyn al-Qu4at But the huge number of letters this of Ghazzili, disciple A spiritual deserve special mention. In addition to excelwriter. ga4j of Hamadan was also a prolific to Khayyim, he wrote in which he is not inferior lent quatrains, As a Sufi teacher, works both in Arabic and Persian. theosophical addressed moreover, he used to preach his ideas through long letters and admirers. Among these admirers there was to his few disciples a vizier of the Saljuqs whose fall provided an opportunity to the ulama of Hamadan to engineer the arrest of cAyn al-Qudat. hostile He was arrested under suspicion of heresy, sent to Baghdad for trial, imprisoned there for some months, and returned to Hamadan to be exand burned in 1127 A.D. In one of his most imecuted, crucified sent to the ulama of Islam while imprisoned in pressive letters, claims his innoBaghdad, the poor ga4i of Hamadan very explicitly cence and explains the esoteric meaning of the ideas for which his called "The Complaint This epistle, enemies have caused his arrest. of which was recently pubof the Stranger,"i an English translation works of the lished by A.J. Arberry, is one of the most brilliant

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and contains a brief but precise exposition of his teachings. CAyn al-Qudat is supposed to have written more than 120 letters, in Arabic and Persian, all dealing with mystical problems. A parallel course in this method of teaching was followed by Qutb b. Muhl al-Jahruml, some four centuries later. This saintly leader is supposed to have founded a utopian community in Persia He used to teach and around the beginning of the Safavid period. lead his followers by means of correspondence--just as did cAyn alonly a selection of which has been published, Qudat. His letters, show that his socialistic community was located in a place called Ikhwan Xbad somewhere in the neighborhood of Jahrum. His letters in Ikhwan Ab5d or to others are mostly addressed to his disciples concerning their spiritual problems, and are of considerable mystical and ethical interest.

V

Before the Sufi orders came into being, and especially in the early days of the ascetic movement in Islam, Sufism rather tended to individualism. Nevertheless, the early Sufis did not go so far as to detach themselves from social life and to abandon society as doomed to corruption and destruction. Temporary retirement or wandering in remote places did not always prevent them from taking part in congregational Friday prayer, in pilgrimages to Mecca and occasionally in holy wars. The performance of such religious duties, however, did not lead them to urge asceticism on other Muslims as a recipe for collective life. Even the Sufi story tellers who used to threaten the common folk with descrip(guaH) devotions of hell, urged only personal penitence and individual tion. Unlike the Anchoretes of Egypt and the Syrian Sons of the Covenant (Bena- Qey-ma), no organization linked them in their ascetic endeavors. The assumption that every person has a direct and personal that there are as connection with the godhead, and the conviction many ways to God as there are human souls, did not permit the fervent penitents--in revolt against the extravagances of the community--to spend their time on the salvation of others. markets,

and There were ascetics who avoided frequenting societies To seeing in them barriers to disinterested devotion.72

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an admirer who once expressed the desire to live for a while with the ascetic Shucayb b. al-Harb, the pious man pointed out that worship does not permit collaboration and sharing.73 Ibn al-MIubgrak was asked what the heart's remedy was. "Not seeing men' was his answer. Another Sufi remarked that union with God is sepay tion from all else and separation from all else is union with Him. Hence the well-known Sufi definition for the gnostics: ki'in'n ba'in, i.e., a detached being, one who outwardly lives with men but is inwardly detached. This explains why some early Sufis like Rabi ah and Ibrahim-i open to all.

Adham did

not

endeavour

to preach

Sufism

as a way

Nevertheless, the fact that the Suf i movement originated among common folk and represented a reaction against the rigid formalism of jurists and traditionalists made it more attractive for common people, and especially for the men of the bazaar. In fact, a number of Sufi teachers arose from among the bazaar people. Parasitism, occasionally in vogue among the ulama, was never heard of among early Suf is, who preferred to earn their daily bread by their own labor. It is no wonder then that out of some sixty persons Hujwiri named as the forerunners of Sufism, fifteen were connected to the crafts and business.75 Uways al-Qarani was a shepherd; Habib b. Salim was a shepherd; Bayazid was a water carier; Sari al-Saqati was a hucksterShaqiq-i Balkhi was a merchant; Abiu Hafs al-Nishaptiri was an ironsmith; Hamdun al-Qasslr was a laundrymaA; Al-Junayd was a glass dealer; Sumnun al-Muhibb was a date merchant; Abu Bakr al-Warraq was a book dealer; Abii Sacid al-Kharraz was a haberdasher; Khayr was a weaver; Abiu al-cAbb5s al-Nassaj al-Amull was a butcher; Abii was a date dealer; Abu Hamzah al-Baghd5di Isbaq al-Khawwa was a cloth dealer. Among other celebrated artisans of every kind, such fisherman (sammak), plasterer donkey driver (khar-bandah), flour an!), dealer (daggig),

Suf is there are also craftsmen and as baker (khabbiz), barber (muzayyin), shoemaker (khaffaf, , iadhdha), (Qatir%), saddler (sarrij), pharmacist (5aydaland many others.

The conversion of some craftsmen to Sufism may have led to mass conversions of various local or provincial guilds and corporations, who would find in the new teaching moral support against the tedious formalism of the ulama, so alien to their psyche. But there remains the question whether this membership did not later serve as a stone weight attached to the bird's wing and thereby

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prevent it from distant flight. Inasmuch as pure mystical ence is concerned, the answer must be affirmative.

experi-

Nevertheless, this was not the only factor in the later development of Sufism, and its effect appeared only in the course of time. It was with the conversion of artisans and craftsmen however that Sufism gained the concept of both brotherhood and initiation. This led to the idea that no individual can expect perfection in the Sufi path unless he is guided by an authoritative master--an idea evidently connected with traditions of both guild corporations and the IsmaCIlT Karmathians. But this notion was indeed essentially inconsistent with the original Sufi belief in personal and direct communication with God. Nonetheless, theoreticians soon appeared to incorporate the theory of sainthood (wilayah), through which Sufism could develop Sufi orders. That Abi Bakr, Ali, and especially Salmgn-i F5rsI, have been credited by the Suf is as their patrons also bears witness to the influence of guild corporations in the development of the system of Sufi orders. All three were, of course, linked in one way or another to the concept of labor and craft. Abu Bakr is said to have continued his business even during his caliphate; Ali is reported to have been a hired worker in palm groves, and Salman is believed to have lived by weaving reed baskets even when already the governor of Ctesiphon. Moreover, each of them represented qualities which commonMuslims required for spiritual leadership: Abu Bakr was representative of orthodox faith, Ali the paragon of pious knighthood, and Salman the prototype of sincere devotion. the individualist Nevertheless, trend of early Sufism held some Sufi saints aloof from relations with common folk. It is true that later generations of Sufis found in Uways al-Qarani an eponym for their individualist position also, but they themselves founded no actual order or sect and remained faithful to their original individualism. An early prototype of this group was the well-known Ribicah al-Adawiyah (d. 801). Even if-some ascetics like tiasan alBasri, Sufyin al-Thawri, and Malik-i Dinar paid occasional visits to her, they were neither her disciples nor companions. Devotion to God with the utmost of disinterested love was the only result of her teaching. The following anecdote illustrates her stand in connection with formal ascetism: one day she was running along quickly, carrying fire in one hand and water in the other. When asked what she meant by such an action, she replied: "I am going to set fire to paradise and pour water on hell so that people will cease to worship God in the hope of paradise or from fear of hell."

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Even if a similar procedure can also be found in the act of a legendary woman of Alexandria, one cannot help comparing the human aspect of this mystical stand with the fury of tne religious position of a Catholic preacher who used to threaten sinners with words of a German poet: the terrifying If hell were going out, then would I with any breath blow up the last glimmering coals till they should blaze up again into all the first fury of their f lame.76 love for God left no place in her Ribicah's disinterested concern either She even had little heart for any other passion. for the holy person of the Prophet or for the evil spirit of Satan. energy to It is no wonder then that Suf is like her devoted little There is no doubt, preaching, much less to the founding of orders. however, that there were also Sufis to whom, besides the beatific vision of heaven, the pious and honest life on earth mattered as The optional poverty which they professed attracted some opwell. pressed people as a way to peace of mind. Whereas more sophistiways to cure cated people resorted to medicine and other practical inadthe common folk--possessing and difficulties, their illnesses out Sufi saints to cure them and equate material resources--sought to be their mediators and advocates with God. This explains why the Sufi saints were more highly esteemed by common folk than the That this law or the governing class. of religious representatives did not hold true in Safavid Persia may be due to the situation law were not only agents of religious fact that the representatives of the Hidden Imam to of the ruling class but also representatives whom the ruling class also claimed connection. In any case, instead of the scrupulous care the representalaw urged in the actions of the bodily members tives of religious the Suf is advocated stress on the deeds of the heart. in rituals, for impatient workmen who This also could have more attraction required naturally had no time to wory about the scrupulous rituals position the Suf is held The anti-intellectual by formal jurists. from time to time led them gradually to claim connection with the of revelinterpretation and hence their esoteric (ghtyb), "'unseen" ation. supWhereas moderate Sufis were trying to find traditional there were also extremist Sufis port for their mystical beliefs, traditions. for religious who always sought mystical interpretations They soon claimed that the outward acts were nothing more than symThis sounded, indeed, similar to bols of the inward feelings.

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Karmathian and IsmaCili ideas, and despite the great divergences between the Sufis and these groups concerning the problem of teaching (taclim), the theory of wilayah (sainthood) also worked to bring Sufism and IsmaCilis together so that esoterism became a familiar common ground for both. The pilgrimage to Mecca, to mention offers an interesting illustration only one instance, of this afadvanced by the Nearly the same esoteric interpretation finity. IsmiaCilis concerning the mysteries related to the Kaa'ba has been maintained by some Sufi teachers. There is, for instance, a wellknown qagidah in the Diwan of Nasir-i Khusraw in which this IsmiCliI poet attempts to give an esoteric interpretation to every single process of the Islamic hajj. The poet describes therein how he goes out to meet and welcome a friend just returning from the pilgrimage. After the formal greetings he then starts to inquire of his friend about his pilgrimage. He asks him whether he had perceived the symbolic meaning of all the ritual acts he had performed. These symbolic meanings are, of course, what the IsmiCilis think to be75he actual meaning of such rites as ihrCam, rajm, talbiyah, etc. When the poor baji remarks that he never perceived such hidden meanings for the rituals connected with the pilgrimage, the poet points out that he then has not performed a true pilgrimage, but has solely succeeded in going to Mecca, in seeing the Kaa'ba and in buying the fatigues of the desert for silver. The same dialogue, in a shorter form, is 7geported by Hujwiri to have occured between al-Junayd and a friend. The similarity of both dialogues is such that were not the Ismacilis credited with esoterism as one essential tenet of their creed, one would think that the poet had plagiarized the theme from his Sufi predecessor. This esoterism developed later into the strange belief expressed by some Sufis that religious law is only for common folk so that the elect Sufis are to be considered about it. Even though no particular person has been accused of such belief,79 preachers of this opinion have been called ibakis, "libertines," and criticized both by orthodox Sufis and orthodox ulama. This Sufi opinion also had an Ismacill flavor and was considered by some also to reveal some Manichaean tendencies (zandagah). If the orthodox Suf is excluded these libertines from their brotherhoods, they also did not consider blameless the members of another unorthodox group called the "people of blame." This group did not consider religious law below their dignity but neither did they show great interest in its ordinance in public. Nevertheless,

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law, though only in private. they were supposed to observe religious to their apattention The "people of blame" not only paid little to the judgment pearance but also manifested extreme indifference On the contrary, they are said to have committed of public opinion. the most shameless deeds simply to draw upon themselves disapproving They reportedly thought that public or unfavorable public opinion. blame directed against them would have a great effect in making their devotion more sincere and more disinterested. however, was not uncommon among ChrisThis kind of attitude, The famous story of Theophile and Mary as tians of the Near East. related by Syriac sources depicts these two holy per ons so that they appear to be forerunners of the Muslim Malamis.OO These two saints of the Syrian church are believed to have lived a long time of blameworthy appearance, whereas publicly as buffoons and jesters This was of course in accorlived as real ascetics. they secretly dance with that maxim of the Christian faith which teaches believ"that they may be seen of men" (Maters not to pray in the streets thew 6:5). This Sufi school, however, did not survive its early shaykhs and in the following centuries of the ninth and tenth centuries, tenet. rather than practical Sufis spoke of "blame" as a theoretical The way in which Ibn al-cArabi and Jalal al-Din Mulawi speak of Sufi order. to an existing "blame" does not suggest_any allusion Malami order in the Ottoman Empire does not seem Even the so-called to have an actual connection with the old school of Khurasan. The notorious Shaykh Hamzah (d. 1575), to whom the founding of this is said to have been executed by Sultan Murad order is attributed, tendencies. III for pro-Christian Was there really any connection between the "people of blame" and the order called Fityan in later times? Contrary to what A. B. Furuzanfar cAfifi81 has advocated in favor of such a connection, He points out that while the Fityan evidence for it. finds little boasted about their good deeds, the "people of blame" concealed their good deeds and used to draw public blame on themselves.82. from the the Fityin movement seems to have originated Nevertheless, connection between Sufism and the guild corporations--sometimes even through the cAyy5rs. connected with the sacred memory of Imam Ali-Originally recognized as the unequaled Knight of whome the Prophet allegedly Islam--the movement was encouraged, if not actually conducted, by some branches of Alids who considered themselves the true

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representatives of this sacred knighthood. That the Caliph Nasir (d. 1225), who was credited with pro-Alid tendencies, placed himself at a later time at the head of this wide-spread organization may bear witness to its link with the Alids and Abbasids. Among the Sons of Imam Ali, Muhammadal-Hanaflyah, who dreamed of his father's of the knighthood, had connections with the forefathers Abbasids. That a Shicite sect called Kayslinites gathered around his name and became the nucleus of Abbasid propaganda is significant because not only does Muhammadal-Hanafilyah develop later as the hero of an epic popular among artisans and craftsmen but also Abbasid propaganda was connected with the guild corporations of Kufah (for which reason the warrior aristocracy of the Arabs had always despised them). These so-called freed-men, mainly non-Arab peasants, artisans and craftsmen, had marked the anti-Umayyad movements of both alMukhtar and Abu Muslim with their Kaysanite tenets. These provincial and urban classes of non-Arab stock, regarded for a long time by the tribal Arab nobility as non-qualified for the noble task of war, proved their organized power in their anti-Arab revolts. They had inherited, in fact, a certain organizing experience from the past days of MadZ'in (Ctesiphon) when their fathers had had to deal with corporation problems such as tax distributions under the Sasanians. The barber-governor of post-Sasanian MadVin, Salman-i Farsl, may have served as a link in this supposed Mada'in-K5ufah connection. The predominance of artisans and craftsmen in the formation of Abu Muslim's partisans was so great that the general and his soldiers were all, not without some derision, surnamed the Saddlers. Even later it was a coppersmith of Sistan who raised almost the first open revolt against the Abbasids in Persia, this time with the cooperation of a new organization, the cAyyars. These were voluntary warriors, grouped together under a knighthood ethic with a discipline similar to that of guild corporations, putting the "initiate" under the tutelage of the "pioneer," and appearing in urban and rural centers either for the purpose of holy wars or simply to represent a front of opposition against local powers. Later, when Sufism could gain some converts among craftsmen and artisans, these losely organized groups--sometimes also called rindin--found their way into Sufi ranks, and hence the frequent use of rind in Persian poetry as a synonym of Sufi. Clad in soldiers' uniforms and bound by almost no special discipline, the secular elements of CAyyars, the true libertines as the epithet rind may depict them, were often a real threat to the security of towns, especially during peace time. This explains why the soldier garb

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inspired such hatred and terror among common folk that the "people and esteeming of blame" used it to deter the public from respecting them. of the cAyyars concerning generosity However, the principles and chivalry sometimes reached such a high standard that the moral as ideals of a certain Nuh-i cAyyar seems as pure and disinterested those of the "people of blame."183 That some shaykhs of the Malgais--Ahmad b. Khadriiyah for ingarb instead of The Sufi wool garto wear soldier's stance--used ment may give support to the supposed connection of the "people of blame" with the CAyyars, who had made a rule to wear warrior garb like sarhang (colotitles by military and to call their chieftain nel) and sardar or salgr (general). connection led them later to frequent parThe cAyy5r-Fityin retirement into ribats-in holy wars and to occasional ticipation of the frontier barracks built for war use in remote frontiers world but gradually becoming peaceful dwellings for ascetic retiretradiment. Moreover, this connection developed in the athletic tions of Persian gymnasiums (zuirkhanahs) where the Imam Ali was highly respected as the sovereign of-men (shah-i mard5n), and a was honored as poet of Khwlrizm, called Piurya-i Vali or Qit-li, Afterwards the wrestling exertheir most eminent Sufi-athelete. cises also became a symbol of their inward struggle or spiritual of the gymnasium offers The organization war against the Devil. with the Sufi khaniqghs and their initiation striking affinities to that of the Fityan and the Sufi orders rituals bear likeness alike. Another survival of the Sufi-cAyygr tradition was the wellknown Haydari-Nicmatl quarrels in Safavid and Qajar Persia, which ceased only one hundred years ago. This was a Persian version of which divided the chief conflict, the notorious Gwelf-Ghibellines of Safavid Persia into wards and excited continual outbursts cities That both parties were of violence between quarters and parties.85 credited with Sufi eponyms--the Haydaris with a certain Qutb al-Din their relaHaydar and the Nicmatis to Shah Nicmatallih--denotes tions with the Sufi-cAyyars. have noted, the custom Despite what some European travellers was by no means an invention of Shah CAbb5s the Great but a continuation of the town-wars (shahr Jan ) I accounts of which may be found times. in historians of pre-Safavid

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That the ethical value of Fityan tenets was of a higher stature than that of the CAyyars is, indeed, beyond question. The futflwah, being more urban, seemed more refined that the CAyyirs, who offered something more rude. Nevertheless, the early Sufis recruited converts from both. Thus, for instance, whereas Fu4ayl b. Iyad was a highwayman, Hamdiin-i Qassar was an artisan of urban origin. The doctrine of "blame" was greatly appreciated by the latter who is reported to have said, "Blame is the abandonment of welfare."87 Did the Qalandaris continue the traditions of the "people of blame"? It is indeed, in the late tenth century, during the decline of the "people of blame" as a group, that the earliest mention of Qalandars occurs in Sufi literature. They also used to wear soldier's garb, though not as a special costume. Moreover, they regarded their opposition to rigid formalism as a revolt against hypocrisy. Nevertheless, the Qalandars seem to have been more cynical in social behavior and less careful in religious matters than the "people of blame. " The use of hashish and henbane was widespread among them, and instead of soldier's garb they sometimes wore the skins of lions or leopards to inspire fear and respect among rustic folk. Moreover, contrary to most Sufi orders, whose members had long hair or wore felt caps, they used to shave their heads, beards and even eyebrows. They probably represented, at least in their prime, a reaction against the order system already in vogue, and especially against their rigid and too formalistic regulations.

VI The inner light on which the Suf is had based their theory of knowledge developed gradually into a rationalist anti-rationalism. reason was considered by the Sufis as unqualified Speculative for the quest of the unseen and regarded as no more than a useful tool for getting on in the world. Confined to such an elementary level, speculative reason was considered alien to the sublime truth of the unseen, which was deemed beyond its access. The theologians and the philosophers who use speculative reason in search of higher truth are compared by one Sufi thinker88 to the blind, who use their sense of touch in order to get an idea of what is to be seen. This attempt is, of course, a failure since it cannot result in certainty.

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Moreover, what can the blind man's touch grasp out of the and vague that is the unseen? A very superficial reality infinite this point they often quote a wellTo illustrate idea, indeed. a Pali version of which known parable, probably of Indian orijin, goes back to the second century A.D.89 The parable, which appears in Ghazzali, Hadigah, Mathnawl, and a prose work of cAziz al-Nasaf i, tells us that once and applications, details with rather different of elephants to find out a group of blind men came to an exhibition As they could not see the animal, each .what an elephant was like. One felt idea of it. one felt it with his hand and got a different only its trunk and found the beast to be like a waterspout, another A third who had handled its ear and pictured it to be like a fan. rubbed against its leg thought the elephant to be similar to a pillar, and the fourth who had laid his hand on its back imagined it It is true that each one of these to be something like a throne. persons in some sense spoke the truth, but the idea they got of its wrong. The palm of the blind man, to which is whole was inevitably cannot cover the reason of individuals, likened the speculative to speculative That kind of knowledge, inaccessible whole truth. reason, is such that once taught by the teacher, the disciple's conception of it may be equal to that of the teacher,90 whereas the knowledge acquired by the heart cannot be taught, and each disits appellaciple and teacher must have his own taste of it--hence tion cilm-i dhawqgi. Such is the higher knowledge that the Suf is call macrifah or Cirfan, i.e., gnosis, and claim to be above specIt is not to be acquired by reasoning and ulation and teaching. but by emptyin? the heart of thought, and by reaching speculating gifts. to it for spiritual This explains why the Sufis don't regard bookish knowledge of the as necessary for high knowledge, and urge only purification That learned people like cAyn al-Qudat and Jalal al-Din heart.92 folk like Shaykh-i Barakah and Salab Mawlawi chose some illiterate the minimal conleaders indicates al-Din Zarkub as their spiritual We are told and formal learning. cern they had for speculation that neither Shaykh-i Barakah nor 5alah al-Din could speak good As a matter for fact, the spiPersian, but only dialect or slang. the disritual teacher has no teaching role but has only to assist journey and to keep him within the path. ciple in his spiritual It is no wonder then that a well-known Sufi thinker like that the "knower" whom one CAzTz al-Nasaf i points out explicitly may trust in the Sufi path is neither to be found among the bookish preachers nor even among the Suf is of convents, who are of selfIn other words, the role of nature.93 conceited and egotistical

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teacher is rather like that of the Socratic the Sufi spiritual Maeutic, who is to help the disciple's heart to give birth to its esinner gnosis, and nothing more. If some spiritual teachers, of orders, have been regarded as pecially after the establishment something more, that is rather in connection with their sainthood and with their place in the Sufi hierarchy of saints. Sufi knowledge derives from the heart, on which the whole psychology of the Suf is is based. By the heart, they conceived nearly the whole of man's inner life, including knowledge and action. This concept was based on the Qur'an,94 but nearly all the Semitic peoples of the pre-Islamic Near East had a similar concept. Thus, not only in the Old Testament Psalms, 95 but also in the New Testament, the heart denotes the inner man. It is used in nearly the same sense throughout the whole of the biblical writings. Even the "heart of God" has been used97 to denote the center of divine designs and will.98 The Suf is considered the heart as both the theologian's in evidently the same way that the French ratio and intellectus, mystic Pascal"" often made use of it, perhaps with still greater character. To the Suf is the heart is rastress on its intuitive ther a transcendental subtlety (latifah-i rabbani), connected in a mysterious way to the "cone-shaped fleshy organ situated in the The Sufi knowledge has, of course, no left side of the chest." connection with this physical heart. The relationship between its psychological aspects and its physiological functions has led the Sufis to consider the heart the real meaning of the glass lantern (zujajah) installed in the mysterious niche (mishkat), allegorically depicted in the Qur'an The Suf is, of course, interpreted the Qur'anic niche as (24:35). the Qur'anic lamp Qpisbak) therein the human body and identified as the heart with its hidden innermost aspects.luu Among these hidden aspects which form the "wonders of the the the Sufis make special mention of the spirit (U) the hidden (kh-afi), and the most hidden (akhfa), secret (sirr), all concepts being borrowed from revelation. These are considered of one and the by some Sufis to be merely different appellations same thing,101 whereas others view them as ordered according to their increasing separateness from the body or just in accordance with the dependence of each element to its superior.102 They, howrather as a mystical ever, may be taken as vague reflections--or expression--of the modern psychological concepts of the conscious and the subconscious.

heart,It

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That the heart has been compared by the Sufis to a light in to the fact that the midst of the well of naturel03 bears allusion the heart should not be regarded simply as a mirror that reflects but rather as a well, the clearness of the images it receives, which comes from its own depths,104 and which only need be kept face of Yusuf clear and pure. Like the well in which the beautiful the beauty of the divine bethe heart also reflects was reflected, is a favorite site.105 loved, for whom the heart of the believer This explains why the inner light, being of a divine nature, As a matter of fact, other knowledge expels all other knowledge. comes only from physical senses whereas that of the heart comes and remains beyond directly through the world of divine certainty Thus, conceived as a living mirror endowed with any doubt.lU1 the divine truth, the posthe heart reflects thought and feeling, the real essence of man (taqiqat-i sessions of which realizes adami). This real essence of man is the gnosis through which the This heart can consume its earthly part in the divine essence. of the earthly part of the heart into the divfinal annihilation according to Sufis, by the process ine essence is to be realized, For this purpose, the Sufi has of the heart. of the purification and to keep it from being darkto watch the heart very carefully Hence the perpetconnection to earthly desires. ened by excessive ual watching of the heart practiced by the Sufis, for which reason This continuous they call themselves the "people of the heart." watching of the heart provided the Suf is with the opportunity to peruse the inner man and to observe its changes and evolutions. aware of this continuous change of the They were so scrupulously heart that they thought its name (qalb) to be derived from the very It was this perusal of the heart root that means "change."107 between time (waqt), occurrence (khawhich led them to distinguish and station state (jal), (magqm) in their mood. These terms tir), and bear witness to their are of frequent use in Sufi literature By "time" they mean problems. deep experience of psychological instant in which the heart enjoys the present with the spiritual It differs no memory of the past and no thought about the future. with the from what ordinary folk think in that Sufi time is filled thought of God whereas the common people may feel the happy instant Besides this, the present instant is either empty from any concern. "station." "state" o0 spiritual under the pressure of a spiritual remarks that the Concerning these two kinds of mood, Hujwlrl istate" has overwhelming supremacy over "time" and makes it happy or unhappy. The "occurrence" (khatir) is a passing thought which comes to the mind and is quickly removed.109

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sleep.

Sufis do not abandon their watch over the heart even in on the unreal charYet they do not really put much stress

between sleeping and waking is, acter of dreams. The difference like the difference between the according to a Sufi writer,110 of a person who has seen everything during the night by feelings light and his feelings when the sun rises and he experiences everyThis explains why they thing as it was, but in a stronger light. visions "the happening" (wagicah), whether called their veridical or awake.112 The dream was considered by most Sufi asleepill kind of inspiration shaykhs as the usual path to a Sufi miracle--a they used to give The explanations to Sufis. occurring especially For inof dreams were sometimes of Platonic or Indian origin. and Jalal al-Din Mawlawi, the bestance, according to al-Ghazzall lief that the soul abandons the body during sleep and roams where the Nevertheless, it likes can be traced to the Upanishads.l13 on prophetic and divine tradiSufis based their own explanations tions. In fact, the stress placed on the belief in the prophetic feature character of dreams is an important though not exclusive of Sufism. In a dream, the soul was believed to wander in higher The and inspiration. spheres, during which it received directions life of Sufis suggests role that dreaming played in the spiritual Babylonian (Gilgamesh) and Zoroastrian (Arday Viraf) influence. The Sufis had faith in the truth of dreams and founded a part of on it. their mystical revelation experiences was reA whole series of mystico-psychological of the vealed to the Sufis in the course of these inspections between "absence" and "presence,." between They distinguished heart. between various They differentiated t'contractiontt and "expansion." cerunconsciousness, degrees of knowledge, such as consciousness, knowledge was a reetc., and felt that all this intuitive tainty, vision supported The beatific sult of their inward experiences. in the form of accounts and tradition--especially by both revelation of nocturnal ascent--was also considered by the Sufis as a result of gnosis. was believed to occur both Divine manifestation (tajalli) This, howin essences and attributes dhat wa sifat). (tajallT-i with ever, did not mean that a creature could actually be identified iron and fire, God. Even the well-known comparison of the moli illustrating current almost from the early Christian period, in the godhead, does not presuppose the change man's annihilation of essence.115

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The absence of mind (ghaybat) in which condition the heart forgets all except Allah, expressed on the other side by the presence of God (btuur), as well as the contraction of the heart (abd) in the state of being veiled from the divine presence, and its expansion (bas;) in the state of revelation, all are preparatory to the beatific vision that leads to the mystical experience in which the mystic is unconscious of his self and conscious solely of God. It is in this way that he finally rids himself of the Satanic scatteredness (tafriqah) and reaches the apostolic state of concentration (jam) in the divine presence: a long and painful way for a poor human to attain the beatific vision! Another result for the Sufis of their continuous watch over the heart was a moral system based on the careful analysis of human moods and characters. They used this analysis also for the purification of the heart, i.e., its moral purification. The purification of the heart as practiced by Sufis often led them to examine themselves very carefully in order to detect any trace of hypocrisy or latent polytheism, and by this self-examination they acquired, among other practical benefits, a secure comprehension of the human It was this knowledge that gave them success in gaining heart. more followers and that enabled them to found their engavors (muand ethical considerations.1 Jiahidit) on psychological Most of their moral system, however, was based on the practical emphasis by Sufi shaykhs on certain virtues to be sought or certain vices to be fought. Abu Sacid Kharraz, for instance, urged (idq) should be observed that trustfulness and sincerity (ikhlia) in all deeds and thoughts.17 But Abu al-Husayn Nunr insisted that the preference of others to oneself (Ithar) was to be regarded as acts.118 the cornerstone of all ethical and religious The most elaborate system that the Sufis produced in ethical knowledge was Ghazzali's work, whose influence on Islamic thought was unequalled. According to his theory, because man's salvation is in his spiritual he must permit the divine part of perfection, This aim his being--his become more developed and vital. heart--to may be attained only by morality based, not on philosophical specbut on following the way of the prophets and saints--the ulation, religious path of the orthodox Sufis. The ethics of these orthodox Sufis was by no means a pessimThe horrible hell in which Macarri and Khayyam had sufistic one. to GhazzilI fered did not offer such a disheartening perspective ideas and Mawlawi. One immediate result of their quasi-pantheistic When the whole universe becomes perfect in was their optimism.

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itself everything therein must also be a perfection in its context.1-l Thus, the world of the Sufi does not offer itself as the valley of tears that the former monks and ascetics depicted. Even human beings are so tightly connected in one body in such a world from a pain, his pain, to use the that, if one mem?&ris suffering words of Sacdi,l will leave no rest for the other members. Amidst all the horror of the Crusaders and the Mongols, did this message not offer new hope for the human heart? Neither wealth nor women were regarded by the orthodox Sufis as traps of the devil. Concerning worldly wealth, the well-known debate which Sacdl had with his rivall21 was discussed everywhere. The debate centered on whether the rich man who prays to his God and avoids what religious law prohibits represents a higher ideal than the poor man who faces dire needs and fails to follow religious laws strictly. The orthodox Sufis held that wealth was not bad in itself; what was bad was that it diverted man from his God. In an oft-quoted passage of the Mathnawi}22 the poet likens wealth to water in its relationship with a boat. Whereas water beneath the boat supports it, if it comes inside the boat it may destroy it. The same is to be said of wealth. If one's heart is not attached to it, great support may be derived from it, but once love of it enters the heart, wealth destroys the heart's purity.123 Such a convenient rationale was of course exploited by Sufi shaykhs who were the spiritual kindred of some medieval popes. This explains why a famous shaykh like Abu al-Maf3khir-i Bakharzl (d. ca. 1378) could boast of his poverty even though he was wealthy enough to dedicate from his own possessions tens of villages and hundred! 2f landed properties to the khanigqh of his own grandfather. With women, the case was the same. The idea of celibacy was evidently so alien to the life of orthodox Suf is that even the rumors that Abu cAbd Alla b. al-Khafif had contracted four hundred marriages ,125 or that Shaykh Ahmad-i Zindah Pil had married a fourteen-year old girl while in his eighties, caused no great scandal. Moreover, even music and dance could not be excluded from the program that the orthodox Suf is had planned for the purification of the heart. As a matter of fact this custom, called "audition" ;amac), was considered one of the main features of Sufi Abu al-cAla' life. 4' al-MacrrI finds gluttony to be another of their features. The stories told about Abui Sacid-i Abu al-Khayr provide illustrations of both characteristics. Abu Sacidrs enthusiasm for music and dance made his disciples precursors of the

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contrary to what biographers of Nevertheless, whirling dervishes. Abu SaCid have remarked, Imam Qushayri did not condemn "audition" absolutely. Despite the objection of opponents, however, "audition" held for the ordinary Sufis. So, not only in the an obvious attraction social hall (jam5cat khanah) of the khinigqhs, but also in the large in the halls of private houses in nearly all medieval Muslim cities of the Sufi "audiNear East and elsewhere, did the lively activity Drums, cymbals, and reed-pipes in their oritions" take place. The poems were played during these performances. ental varieties sung or recited by qawwalan were usually accompanied by exclamaThe Sufi s danced, moved tions or the moving of heads or limbs. around, jumped, clapped hands and gradually forgot themselves. Some One would shriek and another wept, others beat on their faces. A shaykh of Baghdad is would tear his garments or take them off. said to havre compared the Suf is in the "audition" to flocks of sheep the object of attacked by wolves.127 According to Sufi thinkers, to the music was not solely pleasure and dethe Sufis in listening light, but, rather, the inward feeling of something close to their hearts. Ecstasy already existed and could only be strenghthened by hearing the musicA128 Thus, the "people of the heart," as the Sufis liked to call themselves, based on the heart not only their faith and knowledge, but even their pleasure and recreation.

VII With the development of the system of orders, a theory of sainthood was also developed by the Sufi shaykhs, based mainly on This was particularly needed a pyramid-shaped hierarchy of saints. in a period when the Sufi orders required an internal measure by Since the saints were which to check their spiritual achievements. likened to the Qur'anic companion-teacher of Moses, whose words were to be obeyed without any argument,129 and since they were occasionally compared to the mountain echo of God's voice, i13 the shaykhs of khaniqahs, who generally envisioned themselves at the top of the pyramid, acquired undisputed authority. Thii1 of course, strengthwithout which no orened the rigid discipline of the khaniqahs, Although the position of the top man--or the top der could exist. and timidly dismen--of the hierarchy had on occasion been secretly puted

even

among some early

Sufis,132

it

was especially

times that a significant number of shaykhs insisted sive superiority as the top saint.

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in later

on their

exclu-

A theory of sainthood had of course existed in Islam long before the orders came into being, though it fell upon the Sufi orders to develop it later and to give it practical value. The concept of sainthood in Islam was perhaps as old as Islam itself; the Qur anl33 speaks of the saints (awliya-i as the friends 'alllh) of Allah, who will not be afraid or subject to grief. Much has been related in the traditions concerning these "friends of God," but nothing in particular in support of their ability to work miracles. As a matter of fact, there is no claim of miraculous power even for the Prophet himself in the Qur'an, even though the Qur'an itself is claimed to have the miraculous character of divine revelation. Nevertheless, Muslim creeds supported by later traditions speak of prophetic miracles as performed by Allah in order to prove the authenticity of his Prophet. Theologians styled as miracles (mucjizah) every supernatural act performed by a prophet which no the devil (shaytin), challenger can duplicate. Nevertheless, pharoah (fircawn), and the anti-Christ (da jjl) are also reported to have performed some supernatural acts. These were not considered as acts of divine grace, but rather as what by Muslim theologians may be called divine deception (istidraj) to lull them into false confidence for a while.13 As for the Sufis, they didn't fail to offer excuses even for Satan and the pharaoh. True that the faith of Satan and the pharoah had been discussed long before the Sufist by various sects like the Kharijites, Murji'ites and Muctazilites,I35 but the Sufis went ocas far as expressing sympathy--if casionally not admiration--for them. Thus, not only was the pharoah's dispute with Moses re arded as being based on surface and color by Jalal al-Din Mawlawl 6 but Ibn al-cArabi went as far as declaring the pharoah a saint.137 As for Satan, the Sufis looked on him as a true lover who had given his reverence only to his beloved, whence his obstinate refusal to prostrate himself before Adam. This is what he himself explains to us in a passage of the Mathnawl,138 where Jalal al-Din himself. In his Ta SIn algives him the opportunity to justify 139 Hallaj recognized in pharoah and IblIs (SaAzal wa al-Iltibas tan) his own teacher and declared them to be true knights in divine love.140 that everyone who does not Ahmad al-Ghazzali asserts141 learn the true monism (tawhid) from Satan is an atheist. According to cAyn al-Qu4at, this poor, damned being was in fact a passionate lover who did not hesitate to call contempt and blame down upon himself, for his beloved's sake.142 That Sufi speculation provided with such a paradoxical but brilliant

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the two damned characters defense naturally incited

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ulama's wrath against them. Did this sympathy for the devil, taught by Sufi preachers, have any relation to the soso enthusiastically That particular question requires called devil wymhipping Yazldls? exposed the increasingly further study,l 3 but that this position and suspicion of orthodox Muslims is beyond Sufis to the hostility doubt. requires In fact, the concept of divine deception (istidraj) that Satan and pharaoh thuld be considered mere tools for the fulIndeed, their deeds were in full agreefillment of God's will. ment with God's foreknowledge of them. Whether obedient or disobient to God, they were carrying out his eternal will in the way dedecreed by creed by Him. Since their disobedience was eternally divine will (mashlyah, iradah), how could they obey? Moreover, upon true lovers delight in the anguish their beloved may inflict them. If it is true that the lover's pleasure is to be the means then Satan and the pharaoh of the expression of his beloved's will, cannot be recognized as anything else. To return to sainthood and the gift of the miracle: whether this supernatural power was or was not bestowed upon the friends point for various sects and groups. of God was always a controversial may Whereas the Hashiwlyahs maintained that such special privilege have been conferred on some pious people of the past, but that such thought that no the Muctazilites people no longer exist, privileged than another, and therefore there are Muslim can be more privileged neither special friends o Allah nor any kind of supernatural deeds denied to be performed by them.1 5 The free thinkers (zindigs) that even things contrary to the usual course of things can happen. as The orthodox Muslims (Ashcarls) thoutht it evidently possible, Neverlike Avicennal 6 and Ibn Khaldun.47 did some philosophers on this point when he tells us that is sceptical al-Biruni theless, all people who hold doctrines like incarnation (tuliul) and identiare naturally and who live in extreme asceticism (itta4ad) fication unacceptable. 14 disposed to claim things that are logically Providing a welcome answer to a natural need of the ordinary man, the belief in saints and their miraculous power spread throughbeIts influence in Muslim territories out the whole Muslim world. came so great that in India it gave birth to the strange cult of Panchon Pir, the worship of five elders, which spread among some Indian castes that were partly or wholly Hindu, 9 but who enlisted some Sufi saints like Baha al-Haqq, Shah Shams-i Tabriz and others, of their five elders. among the varying lists

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The great popularity of the early ascetics had left such an impact on the memory of the common folk that they gradually became centers of a cult--with their tombs serving as its temples. Frequenting graves and especially those of pious men was always regarded as a source of blessing (barakah) and spiritual profit In spite of numerous traditions against performing prayers (fayl). near the tombs,150 the tombs of some pious people became sanctuaries with domes (qubbahs) upon them and with gardens (rau4ah) around them. A number of tomb-mosques (mashhads) were erected in the course of time, especially around the tombs ascribed to early martyrs, prophets, Alids, miracle workers and even great ulama. In the case of Sufis they often became central mohasteries (khaniThe holy men buried in these tomb-mosques and khaniqahs were believed to be spiritually alive, even though bodily emtombed. Miraculous powers were ascrfeld to their earth (turbat), to their shadow, and to their names. 1 This supernatural power was first accorded to these dead immortals and was gradually extended to their spiritual heirs, the Sufi shaykhs. This miraculous power ascribed to Sufi shaykhs, and occasionally also to some pious ulama, included unusual gifts like thought reading, telepathy, prophecy, and hypnotic power. They are believed, moreover, to possess other extraordinary powers such as the ability to transform themselves into various shapes, to transport themselves instantly to distant places, to walk on the sea and on air, to transmute copper into gold and to check rains and floods. Their prayers are believed to be heard and accepted by God, their presence is considered to be beneficient and divine--hence the public belief in their blessings. This blessing (barakah) was occasionally sought in the dust on which they walked or rode.152 Nevertheless the trampling (daws) ceremonies, during which a number of dervishes lay down with their faces to the ground so that the shaykh could ride over them on horseback and thus give them blessing, was not performed anywhere except in Cairo and Syria, and that almost exclusively by Sacdl brotherhoods in Mawlid ceremonies. This blessing by the shaykhs attracted the poor people to seek and place their spiritual welfare in the persons of these supposed holy men, who were believed to have a hand in the government of the universe. Is there a possible link between this Sufi idea with that of the Brahman ascetics who thought also of gaining complete power over nature? The point is that the Brahmans earned this power through personal asceticism, whereas the Suf is thought to gain it chiefly through what they called divine grace (minnah). Moreover, the Muslim

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saints considered this miraculous power as a tempatation and did not like to boast of it.153 This Sufi concept has scarcely any connection with the notion of charismata of the early Christian churches. The supposed phonetic and semantic resemblance seems to be accidental. The miraculous

power of

the

stints

was regarded

to have been

derived chiefly from divine race,15 and bestowed upon the saint as a generous gift from God, 55 whence its name karamah (generosity). The Suf is themselves regarded miracles as divine acts, believing that man could only perform a miracle as the representative of God.156 Thus, whereas Avicenna and the theologians explained the miraculous acts of the saints on the grounds of the existence of still unsolved mysteries of nature, the Sufis themselves explained it as a result of their divine connections--their so-called vicegerency. That they are considered the governors of the universe, the men for whose sake the rain falls and the plants grow on the earth,157 is evidently in their capacity of vicegerency, their quality of being "perfect men." The concept of the "perfect man" as represented in the works of Ibn al-cArabi, cAbd al-Karim Jili, and-with a slight difference--in the works of Jalal al-Din Mawlawi, CAzIz-i Nasafi, and Shaykh-i Shabistari denotes the highest type of human being, one who has realized his oneness with God. In other words, the perfect man was regarded as the universal spirit or the universal reason which united within himself inward and outward reHe is the medium through whom God knows himself and his ality. the microcosm that reflects creatures, the divine perfection with the whole macrocosm in his miniature being. The Shicite Suf is based the concept of sainthood (wilayah) on the word mawla, a mysterious epithet uttered by the Prophet in Ghadir, on his way back from Mecca in 633 A.D. The perfect man was thus represented by the twelve Alid Imams. The cult of saints as conceived by the orthodox Suf is, however, was linked to the Prophet There was not only a prophetic tradition, based on the himself. the hierarchical authority of Ibn Masciud, that would legitimize system of Sufi sainthood but also the concept of the nur-i Mubammadi i.e., the light of Muhammad,which would make him the central figthis "light ure of Sufi sainthood. Conceived as the first creation, of Muhammad"was regarded somewhat like logos in its twofold relation with God and the world. The side immanent to God received divine emanation that is transmitted to the world through the side is the Godadjacent to the world. Thus, while wilgyah (sainthood) is the prophecy. its world-side side of "Muhammad'slight,"

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Does this mean that sainthood is superior even to prophecy, The orthodox and that the prophets are lower than the saints? Suf is held that the end of sainthood is only the beginning of prophecy,158 but there were extemist Sufis who maintained that the importance of a prophet is due to his sainthood rather than his prophecy. It was a view similar to this that Hujwiri159 found in vogue among some extremist Sufis of Khurasan, and which he critiThis extremist idea of sainthood cized as inspired by the devil. of the legend of was supported by a more extremist interpretation KhiQr and Moses. That Moses had still more to learn from this good "servant" of God160 was considered by extremist Sufis to indicate Moreover, they claimed of saints to prophets.161 the superiority that saints receive inspiration directly from God, whereas prophets The orthodox Suf is conreceive it only through an intermediary. They maintained that the supsidered all these statements false. posed superiority of Khidr to Moses is only a misunderstanding of gifts to various the Qur'an since God has granted various spiritual persons, and this does not mean that He has favored one of them The miracles of saints are granted to them by over the other.162 Furthervirtue of their obedience to the prophet of their time. the inspiraof prophets is continuous, more, while the inspiration tion of saints is only occasional. According to Hujwlri the sublime contemplation which a saint reaches after he has attained his utmost perfection is only the first step of prophets.163 Al-Sarraj points out that Khidr could never bear a single moment of the illuThus, despite the preference mination which Moses had enjoyed.164 of the extremist Sufis for sainthood, the orthodox Sufis held that one moment of a prophet is better than the whole life of a saint. state (hal) of a saint is the permaIn other words, the fleeting nent station (mag,a) of a prophet and that which is just a veil station to a saint. (hijab) to a prophet is a spiritual The immortal Khidr represents for the Suf is the prototype of the spiritual teacher whose knowledge cannot be taught by words but can be gained only by personal experience of the disciple himself. That he forbade Moses to ask him anything meant that the spiritual should wait unteacher could not explain all and that the disciple till his own inner eyes were opened.165 A regular or even occasional meeting with this typical teacher of saints has always been considered by Suf is as a privilege of the Sufi saints.166 Although Ibrahim b. al-Adham is reported to have met Khidr several times on the way to Mecca,167 and Hakim al-Tirmidhi is said to have geceived a private lesson from him every day for several yearsP,16 another Sufi, Ibrihim al-Khawwas, refused to accompany

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Khidr who desired his company, fearing that his mind might become engaged by someone other than God.169 His refusal was later conThis was sidered as progress toward a greater spiritualism.170 what happened to the Mulla Shah Q5dirl, a Sufi of India, who refused offered him by Khidr. 111 to accept assistance The problem of sainthood had been discussed by early Suf is such as Ibrahim-i Adham and Bayazid, but it was through Hakim alThis philosopherTirmidhi that it developed into a full theory. saint was mostly preoccupied with his visions and contemplations. sketches depict his wife also as being absorbed His autobiographical of Isin mystical dreams. He was one of the great theoreticians lamic mysticism and tended toward a contemplative kind of philofact we know of his life is that, driven sophy. The only historical out from his native town, he fled to Nishapir, where, in 898 A.D., His last days, however, were evidently teaching. he was still visited.172 spent in Tirmidh where the ruins of his Combare still His theory on sainthood, as explained in his book on the "seal of the saints," which was later propounded by Ibn al-cArabi and others, (c5mmah) and particdivided the saints into two categories--common a compromise with formal asceticism. representing ular (kh-a8h), his wife, or an imam had the "seal of the But whether he himself saints" is not clear .13 probably (cilm al-turuf), lore of letters The so-called at the beginning of some linked in one way or another to the letters and Qur'anic suras, assigned numerical values to the Arabic letters It was occasionally future events. involved methods of predicting 4 and together with al-kImy , it concalled al-simia and al-ja Messianic ideas as exthe secret knowledge of the saints. stituted like yalsymbolic designations pressed in Hurufi- Nuqtawi sects, like expressions lali for Ali and mim for Muhammad,and esoteric ta sin al-azal of HallHj and h3mim al-lidam of Abu Bakr al-Wasiti, number of esoteric writings of cabaltogether with a considerable are the results of this occult lore of the saints. istic character, in system, with some variation The pyramidal hierarchical and denomination, fixes the total number of living classification saints for each time at nearly the numbers of days in the lunar year (354 days), and thus imputes their supposed link with the cosmic orthe saints of der. Unknown to the public and even to themselves, They men" (rijal al-ghayb). the hierarchy are called "the invisible the substiare also called the abdal, abdHl5n, and budalV, i.e., tutes, since when one of them passes away, his place is immediately filled by another saint.

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There is, of course, great discrepancy concerning their catwith some systems divided into six grades and others egerization, into seven. The pseudo-prophetic tradition of Ibn-Masci3d divides them into a group of three hundred people with hearts like that of Adam, forty people with hearts like that of Abraham, seven with hearts like that of Moses, five people with hearts like that of Gabriel, three people with hearts like that of Michael, and one person with a heart like that of Israfil.175 The head of the hierarchy is called gu$b (the pole). He is the man whose help is sought by all--including saints. This explains why he is also called ghawth (succour), though this title has also been given on occasion to a saint immediately below the "tpole" in the pyramid. Despite the fact that the saints are usually considered to be hidden from the public eye, some shaykhs of the khiniqahs have claimed to have become the "pole" (succour), or "subThe comparison of the heart of the quyb to the heart of stitute." Israfil denotes that the former, like that archangel, will give new spiritual life to the dead. The concept of gu;b has been connected by various Sufis to the idea of the Shicite imam, in whom some Shicite Suf is have also recognized the "seal of the saints."l176 The Shicite Sufis of today regard the Hidden Imam to be at the head of the hierarchy so that the great Shaykh of the Gunibadi Order--to take a modern example--acts t7 his name and even accepts pledges of allegiance on his behalf. Sainthood, however, is not always confined to wise and serious people. Insane and lunatic men have also been occasionally accepted among their sacred ranks. These are the so-called attracted ones, (majdhUban) whose bold utterances are sometimes considered to be inspired. Peculiar representatives of these people are the so-called wise fools (cuqa1.-i maj:nIn, shiirldagan), to whom cAttar has devoted a number of his poetical stories. Contrary to Jewish tradition, which considered the "fool" impious or wicked,178 the Muslims regarded them as people who were excused and freed from religious Their insanity was and social duties. sometimes recognized by the Sufis as a divine madness (junun-i ilihi). They were regarded by some Suf173hinkers as being partly or A prototype of these holy completely conquered by the "unseen." fools was the well-known Buhlul (d. ca. 814 A.D.), whom legend has made a cousin of the Caliph Harun al-Rashid (d. 809 A.D.). Although stories about him have been partly confused with those of Ulayyan, Anbawa, Taq al-Baqal and other notorious fools,180 he undoubtedly had Shicite tendencies, and had addressed remonstrances to the Caliph Hariun. A number of his stories are recorded in Sufi literature, and have thoughtful features. He is said to have been a contemporary of Fu4ayl. 198

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of these wise fools is the martyr Another representative quatrains and his traSarmad (d. 1661-2), known for his exquisite to Converted to Islam, this Jew of Kashan travelled gic death. It was there that he became a fakir, India and embraced Sufism. was lost his control and went about naked. His unconsciousness such that he used to utter unorthodox words and to pronounce only the negative part of the Muslim faith, claiming that he had not passed the stage of negation to reach the state of affirmation. to draw public wrath against Such daring utterance was sufficient him. Having been admired by the Prince Dara Shukiuh, he later was after the fall of that arrested and put to death as a heretic--just Prince. ill-starred as represented by Buhljul, Luqman-i saints Thge wise-fool and Sarmad, remind us in several respects of the Syriac Sarakhsi9 for whom the best way to follow the Christ was to act gate ascetics (contempt). like a fool in order to be exposed to the public ituta are to be considered as a Christian pre- 82 Thus the ?ate ascestics cursor of both "the people of blame" and the wise fools of Islam.1 they were probably not regarded with the same compasNevertheless, sionate eyes as their Muslim counterparts were later regarded in Muslim countries. These wise fools of Islam are also depicted in the poetical works of cAttar, who has no less than 115 stories concerning their deeds and words in the course of his MathnawiyHt.183 They express their bold and daring opinions concerning the godhead, creation, of fortune and good, in ways that the distribution and especially stand Their critical harsh, and sometimes cynical. are pessimistic, A toward God and creation reminds us of the heretic Ibn al-Rawandi. also with some addiwell-known q_scah of cAyy8-l-Qudat attributed may be considered as a list of the obtions to Ni?ir Khusraw, frequently raised by these wise fools of cAttir against the jections godhead.

VIII The atmosphere in which the Sufi thinker used to live was had enhaunted by the overwhelming idea of God. The "Infinite" chanted him and he could do nothing but concentrate on it, submit When awake his heart was preoccupied with to it, and enjoy it. this idea, and when asleep his dreams were filled with divine

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visions. When he tended his heart, he found that it was the favorite throne of God; and whenever he neglected it, even for a short atmoment, he would feel that it has fallen prey to the devil's When speaking to other tempts to lure it away (waswas, waswasah). men, his speech was in one way or another connected with God; when silent his thoughts were directed to the same idea. His best moments were mostly spent in his dhikr, the regular ritual glorifying Allah with certain fixed phrases repeated in a definite order, either aloud (dhikr-i jall) or whispered (dhikr-i khafi), often with peculiar breathing and physical movements. When he gave in to earthly pleasure, he would hear the bodiless voice of the heavenly herald (hatif) rebuking him. This auditory hallucination, which reminds us of the Zoroastrian srush and the Socratic daimon, would lead him back to his fixed idea. This fixed idea pursued him, tortured him and sometimes reduced him to sacred delirium. Although he was kind, quiet, and wise in his general comportment, his behavior manifested certain pathological signs when observed by the layman. His involvement in the divine affair absorbed nearly all of his time and attention. Every time Abi Hamzah-i Sufi (d. 902 A.D.) heard the wind whistling, the water murmuring or the cock crowing he used to sa: "Yes, here I am," as if in everything he heard a divine call.l8 Long before his persecution, Hallaj used to go to the market places of Baghdad and shout helplessly: "O folk, help me to get rid of the One [God] who does not leave me to myself to enjoy, nnr does he take me away from myself so that I may live in peace."186 Such an internal condition did not permit the Sufi to experTo him ience anything but God in all of his external environment. compared God was the absolute reality, the creative truth (saq), to which everything else seemed to be unreal, vain and of a shadowy existence.187 With such a concept of God, he naturally was not inA well-known traclined to seek logical proof of God's existence. dition that the Prophet had urged Muslims to think of the mercies to keep him away of God rather than His existenc!, ould suffice from metaphysical speculations. What can one gain from all such useless speculations? How should the gnat know--asked Jalil al-DIn Mawlawi ingeniously--of how old the garden is? The poor creature, continues the poet, has just been born in the spring and will see its death the following winter.189 If the miserable worm, born inside the timber can know the wood when it was a young tree, then the philosopher may also know the beginning of the world.

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As a follower of revelation the Sufi disliked the Hellenistic philosophy introduced in the Muslim world by MuCtazilite theologians, but as a preacher of the divine path he could rethink its problems within the limits of revelationi. The presence of God in the universe is, of course, as evident as the brightness of the sun, as impossible to overlook as the fact of man's own existence. Concerning this problem, however, a number of speculative proofs were to be found in every formal credo of orthodox Islam.190 Theologians and philosophers have presented their well-known arguments on novitate mundi (1,udiJth-i Calam), or on contingentia mundi (imkan-i C5lam), but all these skillful arguments have sought in the imperfect a reason for the perfect, in the unreal a witness to the real. But a mystic cannot share such reasoning. If there is something whose existence needs to be demonstrated, it is by no means the perfect being; it is rather the unreal being of the world. The philosopher who proves the existence of the necessary by means of the contingent is like the foolish man who seeks, to use the word of the blazing sun by the dim light of a torch in the desShabjfiari, ert. A critical remark made by Shams-i Tabrizl (d. ca. 1247) in this connection represents the Sufi stand on such problems. We read in FTh ma FIh that Shams was present one day in a meeting where an arrogant scholar claimed to have convincing proof for the existence of God. The following day Shams proclaimed ironically before the same audience that he had seen the angels come down to earth the night before to thank the scholar for proving the existence of their God. Then Shams reproached the arrogant philosopher in his sarcastic way: If there is anyone who requires a reason for his being, it is not the Creator of all things, it is the poor creature whose being depends on the will and providence of his Creator. l92 When al-Ghazzali and Mawlawl accused the philosophers of there was no doubt in their minds that Greek philosophy disbelief, was a direct threat to the true faith. But they didn't have the eliminate their own more accurately, the capacity--to courage--or, and developed in speculation interest that was so clearly reflected This explains why they rein their exposition of the Sufi path. even in their declared anti-rationalmained somewhat rationalistic ism.

Moreover, some earlier Suf is like Hakim-i Tirmidhi , al-Junayd and Hallaj also had philosophical tendencies, just as some philosophers like al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Shaykh-i Ishraq did not lack It is for this reason then that Avicenna mystical inclinations.

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speaks so highly of the mystics,193 and that Shaykh-i Ishraq assures us that Aristotle in the Shaykh's illumihimself--appearing native vision--had declared people like Biyazid and Sahl-i Tustari to be the real philosophers who had not stopped on the edge of formal sciences but had reached intuitive and contemplative knowledge. 194 The common point at which the mystic and the philosophers usually met was the metaphysical region, the realm of the unseen, their common concern being knowledge, the soul and God. Nevertheless, unlike the philosophers who sought to know God only through His own existence, the mystics' guide to this knowledge was His undeniable Omnipresence. This kind of proof was hence called lida Qur'anic appellation the Suf is used to employ-195 digin, The true knowledge that lies beyond the reach of reason is accessible only to the heart, which is a window onto the realm of the "unseen." It is through this inner light that the Sufi can explore the hidden realm, which is closed to reason. The philosopher who tries to force his way through this closed region is like a man who sees a shadow and deduces that the shadow belongs to a person but is unable to judge what that person is like. Only the inner light can penetrate into the forbidden area and recognize the person to whom the shadow may belong.196 This knowledge of the "unseen," denied to mortals and belonging only to God,-97 is occasionally granted to the saints, through his inner light, from God's side. It is therefore called Cilm-i ladunni, "knowledge from the side of God." Thus, the world of the unseen, forbidden to both the external senses gnd speculative reason is, nevertheless, an object of Islamic 8 and no Muslim is allowed to doubt its existence. faith, Whereas the external world, open both to sense and reason, is also called the world of creation (cUlam.i khalq) and the world of sovereignty (calam-i mulk), the unseen world is styled the "world of command' (cilam-i amr) and the invisible world (cilam-i ghayb). This hidden realm includes the world of divine authority (cllam-i malakut), the world of divine power (Cilam-i jabarUt) and the world of divine being (cilam-i lihut). Even though there existed some ambiguity concerning the relation among these three worlds, there was no doubt, however, about their existence. To the Sufi's mind, the perceptible world has no real existence so that, compared to the "unseen world," it is but a mere shadow. Therefore everything that belongs to the perceptible world is

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whose ultiveil for the Sufi traveller considered as an illusory mate goal is to attain the one reality beyond the shadowy world. cosmology, the present world is of little With such a spiritualist value to the Sufi, not even worth "the wing of a midge," to use he in his happy instants, Nevertheless the usual Sufi expression. may find this same vain world an emanation of God. Hence his lack Through his mystical experiences he finds, moreover, of pessimism. all other bethe only truth, the "One" compared to whose existence Here we find the mystic Ibn ings have only a shadowy existence. What Ibn alal-cArabi one pace from what may be called pantheism. cArabl meant by His "unity of being" (wabdat al-wujud) is not really very clear, and the ambiguous way in which he has explained his His unity of beideas has invited confusion and misunderstanding. ing, in any case, seems to be closer to panentheism rather than One may call it a monism very far from both panmere pantheism. cosmism and acosmism. Even if Ibn al-CArabi taught what may be called a pure pantheism, his teaching did not tail to encounter obstinate opponents 9 And his teaching did not become even among his fellow Sufis. acceptable to orthodox Sufis until Sufi scholars like Uadr al-Din and Qaysari in Turkey, cAbd al-Razzaq and Jami in Persia and TransSufi kind of panentheism oxania brought it within the established already familiar to early Sufi s. offered by the Indian mystic A well-known reinterpretation Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) suggests it to be an experimental rather than ontological unity (wabdat al-shuhUd), of psychological nature, in the course of which the gnostic "sees" nothing but God. when he turns to his normal state, he finds that his Nevertheless, and that the "being" is realization experience is but a subjective A faint reby no means to be confused with the "non-being."200 have called "the unity of witness" of what the ILall5jites flection The Hallajites explained may be seen in this new interpretation. It was, that the union with God was experienced by al-Hall5j. however, achieved in God's bearing witness to his own unity in the mystic's heart. (1ThUt), however, even though fully manifested The divinity in its unity, and remains transcendental in humanity (nasut),Lu? the gulf separating the being ahd the non-being remains unbridged. As a matter of fact, even in his mystical moments, the human soul its "I-ness" (anniis veiled from the godhead by its very esseg, these Nevertheless, which keeps it away from the divinity. y) to enjoy the beatific happy moments do provide rare opportunities vision.

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The sincere crossing of the mystic through an innumerable series of "veils," separating him from his "sublime goal" is what ascension (micraj). In addition to the Sufis call the spiritual writing on the lnocturnal ascension of the Prophet, which was by the Sufis also reported on far the most sublime type of ascension, ascnesions. their own spiritual Whether the Prophet's ascension did or did not inspire Dante's Divine Comedy does not concern us here, but on the Sufi ascension reports, that of Bayazid left a visible mark. Numerous records have been preserved of this heavenly jourinterpretations. In one acney, including some even with esoteric count he is reportedly to have pitched his tent opposite God's throne. In another passage, finding himself at the very throne of God, he asks in a friendly fashion: they tell us that "o throne, God rests upon thee," and the throne answers: "O Bayazid, we are In another passage he told that He dwells in a humble heart." makes use of the well-known mystical symbols of a bird and its wings to narrate his spiritual "I became a bird with adventure. a body of oneness and wings of everlastingness." The fact that the "spiritual bird" flew further on, crossed the "field of eternity," and reached the "tree o oneness,"t only to find at the end that "all this was a fraud,"20 denotes that the mystic can never succeed in crossing the impossible gulf separating him from the godhead. One may recall cAttar's "thirty birds," which, even though one with the STmurgh, could they found themselves to be essentially not penetrate the curtain where the godhead remained, beyond their tone occasionally reach. Hence the sceptical expressed in Sufi and even love to be a poetry, describing gnosis to be an illusion, deception. In view of such a desperate a real

mystical

union?

not really as easy this tragic aspect could be attained easily achievable, words.

prospect,

When Hlfiz

assures

what hope remains for us that

the

"love"

is

a task as it tirst appears, he is explaining Even if the mystical union of Sufi love.204 for a perfect man, its expression would not be given the limited possibilities of ordinary

Sacdi tells us in a brilliant passage of a mystic who once bowed his head in holy meditation and was plunged deep in the sea of divine contemplation. When he came back to himself, one of his companions asked him, "What gift did you bring us from the garden you have been enjoying?" He answered, not without desperation: "First, I had the intention of filling my skirt with roses for

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friends, but when I reached there the flgwers' me that my skirt slipped from my hand."2

perfume so ravished

A strikingly similar account was given by Ibn al-cArabI, who describes in a less poetical way the same desperate attitude of the mystic. "A diver who was endeavoring to bring to the shore the red jacinth of deity hidden in its resplendent shell, emerged from that ocean empty-handed with broken arms, blind, dumb, and dazed...1" When he was asked "What has disturbed thee and what has happened," tone of Sacdi, "Far is he answered with almost the same sceptical None ever attained to God and neither spithat which you seek.... rit nor body conceived the knowledge of him.",206 This desperate attitude, however, does not prev-ent the mystic These moments are from having his rare moments of Supreme Delight. of one's individual filled with the experience of dissolution conscience into an alleged cosmic one. Such an unusual experience of having joined the cosmic brings about the pleasant hallucination conscience. It is in the latter that the mystic recognizes the socalled universal truth--whence his claim to utmost certainty. This mystical certainty--a characteristic of Sufi thought-denotes firm faith in the "unseen"t and in the life hereafter. It requires the believer to be so sure of the existence of the unseen that according to an oft-quoted expression, ascribed by some wrk7 ters to AmIr Ibn cAbd-i Qays and by others to Ali b. Abi Talib, even if the veils which separate the perceptible world from the t'unseen't were lifted, the Sufi's certainty would not be increased. This explains why the fear of death, of fate, and of men so abundantly found in pre-Islamic minds is not to be seen in Sufi literature.208 When no real existence, but only a shadowy one, is ascribed to the whole perceptible world, what then remains to inspire fear in the Sufi's heart? We read in Asrir al-Tawhid that once Abu Bakr-i Wasiti said to his disciples that The sun is shining through the window and motes of dust have appeared. Then the wind blows in and the motes begin to move in the sunlight. Can all this inspire in you any fear? In the eyes of the believer, that is, the true Sufi, [continued the holy man] the whole of the perceptible worig9is naught but that worthless dust moved by the wind.

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Three degrees of certainty are mentioned in the Qur'an of which there are many different Sufi interpretations indeed.210 They consist of the knowledge of certainty the intui(cilm al-yaqin),a tion of certainty (cayn al-yagin), and the realization of certainty (haqq al-yagIn), of which the first concept represents knowledge, the second sight, and the third reality. Thus, whereas the knowledge of certainty denotes the firm belief in what the revelation has urged as the object of creed, the intuition of certainty describes the mystical contemplation with which the Sufi intuitively perceives the object of the belief, and the realization of certainty refers to the state in which the Sufi experiences the actual happening of what he had intuitively perceived before. These different degrees of certainty coincide also with the different aspects of religious life as conceived by the Sufis. The knowledge of certainty belonging to the common (clmmah) conforms to the religious law (sharicah), the intuition of certainty, which belongs to the elect (kha?), coincides with the mystical path and the realization (yarigah), of certainty, which belongs to the super-elect (khas al-kha:$q), coincides with the mystical truth In other words, while the knowledge of certainty re(4aqIqah). of the body, the intuition quires the purification of certainty is based on the purification of the heart, and the realization of demands the purification certainty of the soul.211 The mystical experience styled the "unity of witness," which Shaykh Ahmad Sirhind? proposed against the so-called unity of being of Ibn alcArabi belongs also to the concept of the intuition of certainty just mentioned above.212 Whereas the orthodox theologians held that there is no distinction between the "law" and the "truth," so that they did not recognize in Muslim religious life any special title for the "path." the extremist Suf is claimed that the "law" itself was nothing but a way to the "truth," and, once the "truth" is attained, the "'law"i is eliminated. The orthodox Suf is, however, maintained that the "law" is a guiding light without which the traveller cannot find his way along the path, and so every deviation from the "law" is also a deviation from the "path.",21This explains why Shaykh-i Jim argued for his so-called authoritative license (magam-i muba according to which the Sufi can do onli that for which bi-Wujlat), 14 he is able to find an authoritative justification. To the question of whether religious observance (takllf) prescribed by the "law" may or may not be eliminated for the mystic 206

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who has attained the truth, the famous Shaykh-i Kubr5 answers "yes" because for such people the religious observancg is in no way a painful obligation in fact, it is a (mashagqah, taklif shaqq); delight rather than a tiresome task. This sagacious shaykh remarks elsewhere that, in the spiritual quest undertaken by the Suf is, the "law" is like t6 vessel, the "path" like the sea, and the "truth" like the pearl. Thus, anyone who desires to gain the pearl has to embark on the vessel and to sail the sea. Despite the great weight the Suf is put on religious observances, they did not Ereach any discrimination in matters of religion. For Jalal al-Din Mawlawi religious quarrels, which at that time took such horrible shape as in the Crusades, were judged to be based on essentially mere verbal disputes. Long before him, alIslam and even other Hallaj taught that Judaism, Christianity, creeds were only different appellations of one and the same truth.217 This view was shared by many Sufi thinkers. cAyn al-Qudat remarks, for instance, that if a Muslim could see in Christ what the Christians see in him, he would inevitably be a Christian.218 And Shabistari tells us with much more emphasis that if the Muslim knew what faith meant, he would see that real faith is idol-worship, and that if the idol-worshipper knew what the idol was, how would his faith be misplaced?219 Thus, not only did they advocate the ultimate unity of religions, but they also thought, with Hallaj,220 that religions are No one imposed by God on men rather than cho4en by men themselves. is to be reproached for his religion, and therfore the concept of was enthusiastically the unity of religions taught by the Sufi shaykhs. Even the Hindu thinkers Kabir (d. 1518) and Nanak (d. 1539), in a country where religious who preached the "unity of religions" differences had produced unnumerable troubles, really found their The idea of the unity of reliin the Muslim Suf is. true inspirers gions did not succeed, of course, in producing religious peace in India but made of the Hindu poet, the mystic Kabir, a holy man. After his death Hindus and Muslims contended25yr his body and disThe new Sikh reliputed whether it should be buried or burned. gion founded by Nanak, though based on this tolerant concept, failed on several occasions to end disputes between Muslims and Hindus. A stronger version of this idea, however, was the religious policy of the Mongol Emperor Akbar (d. 1605), who thought that every person according to his condition may give the Supreme Being

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a different name, and urged that religious disputes cease. This in his Divine Religion high ideal was not best realized (Din-i Ilahi), which he founded as a new faith, but in the person and the of his great-great-grandson, the Prince Dira Shukuh, whose teaching to realized this idea cost him his life. personal attempts

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EPILOGUE There is every reason to believe that Sufism has gradually as an intellectual force in modern Persia. lost its significance vexed by contempt, and split by sectarian Tired of persecution, it has finally succumbed to the pressures of circumstances. strife, such as Safi Ali Shah Respectable shaykhs of past generations, (d. 1899) and Haj Mulla Sultan Gunib5dI (d. 1934), have passed Mendicant away, leaving behind nothing but quarrels and chaos. and Khaksari types have come to represent dervishes of the Jalili and they are almost the only remnants of the wandering dervishes, regarded as idle beggars in popular eyes. and Dhahabis are Although certain groups of Nicmatullahis still strong enough to absorb even elements of higher society into their ranks, the mystical mood no longer plays any major role in Polemical writings concerning their pretentions their actual life. the living to succession to the dead shaykhs have also discredited ones in popular esteem. Kayvan-i Qazvlnl (d. 1938), a renegade of the GunabadIs, accused the shaykhs who were his contemporaries of Some of his books, especially rapacious and ambitious intentions. Kitab-i Ustuvir, Kitgb-i R5z-Gush,, and Kayvan-Namah, have caused irreparable damage to the prestige of Sufi shaykhs. ulama at the present time Needless to say, the fanatical criticize Sufism as severely as the ulama of Qajar and Saf avid written by a religA mordant pamphlet, for instance, times did. accusations against such ious writer of Qum, has raised heretical poets as Hafiz and RUmi.2z2 and religious Kasravi (d. 1946), a modern Persian historian reformist, regarded the Sufi teachings as an opiate which Western imperialism has infused into the East to prevent its awakening. He insisted that, even, in the past, the teachings of H5fiz, Sacdi, and Rumi had only encouraged ignorance and idleness among their admirers. Kasravi's pamphlet223 has been regarded by many as a bill of indictment against Sufism.

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The so-called progressive groups, also, frown upon Sufism. The Marxists, for instance, regard Sufism as a weapon used by the classes against the anti-capitalist reactionary struggle of the proletariat. A well-known essay by Ahmad Qazi (= T. Erani, d. 1940) on mysticism,224 although based on a very incomplete knowledge of the subject, represents an example of the critical attitude that Persian materialists have adopted regarding Sufism. From the philosophical standpoint, logical objections, though not always of a coherent and profound nature, have been raised against the Sufi epistemology. A dilettante lawyer, to mention just one example, who has recently published a book against Sufi philosophy,225 points out that the intuitive knowledge on which Sufism is based can be but a mere illusion. He has maintained that the pantheistic theory of the Sufis is a hasty and superficial interpretation of existence derived chiefly from the ancients' erroneous conceptions of the world. Even the very few scholars who now work on critical editions of classical Sufi texts treat these texts as sources for philological analysis, rather than as sources of mystical lore. This kind of approach is to be seen very clearly in the notes, remarks, and prefaces in their editions of Sufi texts. While we must not expect to find suitable successors to Ghazzali and RUmI in such a secular time as ours, the contemporary literature of Sufism, it should be noted, displays nothing of that freshness which characterized the Sufi creations of classical times. It is true that a pessimistic melancholy, so frequently experienced in modern poetry, reveals a certain resemblance to the work of some Sufi poets of the past, but Sufism is no longer able to hold its position even on the edges of modern society.

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NOTES has been rendered into Eng1. The text of this inscription lish by M. Sprengling, Third Century Iran: Sapor and Kartlr (Chicago, 1953). See also J. de Menasce, Xkand Gum5nik Vigar: La solude Fribourg tion decisive des doutes, text et tradution (Universite en Suisse, 1945), pp. 242-43. 2. H.H. Schaeder, "Der Manichaesmus und sein Weg nach Osten, in Festschrift Glaube und Geschichte," fuOrFriedrich Grogarten (Giessen, 1948), p. 248. 1893), pp. 3. W. Radloff, Aus Sibirien, Vol. II (Leipzig, 20 ff. Further information on Siberian Shamanism may be found in A. Friedrich and G. Budruss, Schamanengeschichten aus Sibirien (Munchen, 1955) and H.N. Michael, Studies in Siberian Shamanism (ToronShamanism almost ceased to exto, 1963). Although as a religion, are still recognizable in ist, remnants of its rites and practices popular magic and folk tales of India and Central Asia. 4. V.G. Biuchner, "Shaman,I" in Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. 4, pp. 302-03, finds no connection between the Persian Shaman and the idea of the sorcerer-priest among the Northeast Asian peoples, but the descriptions of shamanism in Persian poetry leave no doubt for me that they are identical. Persian poets like Rudaki may have from Tungus slaves in the court learned about such sorcerer-priests of Bukhara. 5. H.S. Nyberg, Die Religionen des Alten Iran (Leipzig, 1938). or Witch-doctor? 6. W. Henning, Zoroaster, Politician (Oxford, 1951). 7. The dualism of Zoroaster is perhaps best understood, as or Witch-doctor?, Henning has pointed out in Zoroaster, Politician of this For a further discussion as a protest against monotheism. The Western Response to Zoroproblem, see J. Duchesne-Guillemin, aster (Oxford, 1958). 8. R.C. Zaehner, The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism (London and New York, 1961), p. 275. 9. Ibid., p. 306.

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10. Mani was born in South Babylonia in 216 A.D. He preached throughout activelv the Persian the Sasanian empire until Great King and thrown into prison Bahr5m I had him fettered earl.y in 276 A.D. According to Manichaean sources, a month of Mani died there within account of his life and beliefs his imprisonment. For a detailed see G. Widengren, Mani and Manichaeism (London and New York, 1965).

Papers

11. 12. from 13.

H.C. Puech, Le Manichaeisme (Paris, 1948), p. 70. H.C. Puech, "The Concept of Redemption in Manichaeism," the Eranos Yearbook, Vol. VI, pp. 249-50. M. Boyce, The Manichaean Hymn-Cycles in Parthian (Oxford,

1954). 14. E. Herzfeld, Monument and Inscription of the Paikuli, Empire, 2 vols. Early History of the Sassanian (Berlin, 1924), p. 43. See also Menasce, op. cit., p. 243, note 2. 15. W. Barthold, "Der Iranische Buddhismus und sein Verhaltnis zum Islam," in Oriental Studies in Honour of Cursetji Erachji Pavry, ed. by Jal Dastur Cursetji Pavry (London, 1933), p. 29. 16. Narshakhl, The History of Bukhara, trans. by R.N. Frye (Cambridge, Mass., p. 20. 1954), 17. Muhammad al-Shahrastani, Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects, Cureton edition (London, 1846), p. 418. In Islam, 18. this method of interpretation was largely used by Shicites, the Ikhwin al-*afa, and Sufis who philosophers, wished to bring Qur'anic revelation into agreement with their own tenets. I. Goldziher, 19. Die Richtungen der Islamischen Koransle1902), p. 210. guns (Leiden, 20. op. cit., p. 196. Zaehner, 21. R.A. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism (Cambridge, p. 133. 1921), 22. L. Massignon, Essai sur les origines du lexique de la mystique musulmane (Paris, 1922), pp. 117-20. 23. This was the so-called inclusive devotion of faith to li-allih. al-dnIl See the Qur'an, 4:146, God--ikhlia 7:29, 10:22, 21:65, 39:11, 14:40, 12:65. 24. See for example E.W. Lane, Manners and Customs of Modern Egyptians (London, 1895), p. 98. Ahmad b. Hanbal, Musnad, vol. 25. II, ed. by A4mad Shikir (Cairo, 1948-present), p. 460. See also al-Bukhiri, Sa4hI, ed. by L. Krehl and T. Juynboll 1862-1908), blb 39. (Leiden, 26. H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (Oxford, 1949), p. 40. 27. Massignon, cit., p. 124. See also M.M. Khwansirl, aj. Rawcit al-Jinnat fi ahwal aiTCulamia wa al-Sidit, Vol. II (Tehran, p. 232. 1287),

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p. 124, note 4, where he makes men28. Massignon, P. cit., tion of, among others, Abu Bakr al-Makhzuml (d. ca. 94 A.H.) who was teacher, was called "rihib of the Quraysh." Murdar, a Muctazilite sense, the "rihib of Kufah." also called, and not in a pejorative the position of Muhammadb. Kar29. This was in particular ram, a Jurji'ite of the early Abbasid period whose views manifest some Sufi features. Cf. H. Laoust, Les schismes dans l'Islam (Paris, 1965), pp. 121-22. 30. Ibid., p. 29-30. 31. Cf. I. Goldziher, Muhammadand Islam (New Haven, 1917), pp.

99-100.

of God--as 32. He is said to have denied the mercifulness in so doing he may an attribute resembling human attributes--and wise fool mystics of Islam. be considered similar to the so-called He is reported (see H. Ritter, Muslim Mystics' Strife with God," to visOriens Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 1-15) to have taken his disciples it lepers and other sufferers. He would then say, pointing to these Was people, "This was all done by the Most Merciful of Mercifuls." under the influence of his former creed, this converted Persian still He is rewhich attributed all these kinds of evils to the Devil? puted to have been killed under suspicion of heresy. 33. Cf. H. Ritter, Der Islam Vol. XXI, pp. 1-83. 34. Laoust, 2p. cit., pp. 48-49. 35. Jalal al-DIn Riumi, Mathnawl, Book IV, ed. and trans. by R.A. Nicholson, Gibb Memorial Series, New Series, IV (London, 1929), lines 1515-1519. ed. by Fligel (Leipzig, 36. Ibn al-Nadim, Kitab al-Fihrist, 1871-2), p. 358. Tarikh al-Hukama', ed. by J. Lippert 37. Ibn al-Qifti, (1903), p. 183. 38. Abfl al-Hasan CAli b. cUthmfn Hujwiri, Kashf al-MatjUb 2nd ed., Gibb Memorial Series, Vol. trans and ed. by R.A. Nicholson, XVII (London, 1967), p. 47. (Tadhki39. FarId al-Din cAttir, Muslim Saints and }?ystics rat al-Awli' )trans by A.J. Arberry (Chicago, 1966). p. 106. 40. Hujwiri, op cit., 41. Ibid., p. 163. 42. S. de Laugier de Beaurecueil, Khawadja cAbdullih Ansari (Beirut, 1965), p. 66. 43. Hujwlrl, op. cit., p. 163. 44. B. Furuzinfar, ed., Tarjumah-i Risilah-i qushayriah (Tehran, 1345), pp. 129-130, casts doubt on this point. 45. The recent work by J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford, 1971) reached me too late for inclusion here.

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students to it, and in particular However, I refer interested to Professor Triminaham's comprehensive glossary of Sufi and Islamic orders of Iran see: R. Grllmterminology. Concerning the Shi'ite lich, Die Schiitischen Derwischorden Persiens (Wiesbaden, 1965). 46. A.J. Arberry-, 'TSufism," Handbuch der Orientalistik, Abt. I: VIII Band: 2 abs. (Leiden and KBon, 1961), p. 465. 47. Gulistan, Chapter 2, Story 25. 48. For an English translation of his views on Sufism, see "The Science of Sufism," The Mugaddima, Vol. 3, trans by F. Rosenthal (New York, 1958), pp. 76-102. 49. Algzel: Dogm tica, moral y asc6tica (Saragossa, 1901), p.

101.

50. Ibid., p. 104. 51. A.J. Arberry, "The Biography of Shaikh Abiu Ishaq alKazaruni , Oriens, Vol. III (1950), pp. 163-182. 52. A. Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," Cambri4ge History of Iran, Vol. 5 (Cambridge, 1968), p. 547. 53. For a more detailed discussion concerning the Shicite development in Persian Sufism, see M. Mole "'Les Kurbrawiya entre Sunnisme et Shiisme," Revue des Etudes Islamigues (1961), pp. 61142. 54. F.C. Schillinger, ed. Persianische und Ost-Indianische Reiseschreibung (Hamburg, 1710), p. 685. 55. MacsUmAli b. Rahmat cAll Nicmat-Allahl al-Shlrazi (MacsUmAlishah), Tara'ig al-Haqga'iq, 2nd ed., ed. by M. Mahjub (Tehran', 1339), p. 354. 56. Jami dedicated his Tu1fat al-Atrar to Khwajah-i Ahrar. 57. H.A. Rose, The Dervishes (London, 1927), p. 87; this is a new edition of J.P. Brown's The Dervishes (Istanbul, 1868). 58. For a detailed account of these events see Sir John Malcolm, The History of Persia, Vol. II (London, 1815), pp. 417r22. 59. Rumi, c. Vol. I, line 1727. cit., j cit., 60. Hujwlrl, pp. 308-309. 61. cIraqi, The Song of Lovers (cUshshaq-n5mah), ed. and trans. by A.J. Arberry, (London, 1939), pp. 33-39. 62. Philo Judaeus, On a Contemplative Life, in Works trans. by C.D. Youge (London, 1855), Vol. 4 , p. 3. 63. For further details, see H. Lewy, Sobria Ebrietas: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der antiken Mystik (Giessen: A. Topelmann, 1929). 64. A.J. Arberry, The Mystical Poems of Ibn al-Farid, pp. 81-90. 65. Shaykh MahmudShabastarnl, Sharh-i Gulshan-i Raz, ed. by E.H. Whinfield (London,, 1880), pp. 42, 27, 29.

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66. E.G. Browne, A Literary of Persia (Cambridge, History Vol. IV, p. 297. 1928), Pp. 284-297 contain both the complete text of Hatif's Tarjic-band and Browne's translation of it. 67. Khwajah AbU Ibrahim IsmlcTl b. Muhammad Mustamli BukhShart wa Tarjumah al-Tacrruf ari Limadhhab al-Tasawwiuf (Lucknow, 1933, 4 vols. 68. Muhammad b. al-Munawwar, Asr5r al-Tawhld fTl Maqamat al1934-5). Shajykh Abi Sacid (Tehran, 69. andapil (A1mad-i tain); Persian text from 4th Maqcmit-i 7 cent. A.H. by Sadid al-Din Muhammad Gaznavi, ed. by H. Moayyed, 1961. 70. Numerous editions, most recent 1340). (Tehran, 71. Abii Bakr Muhammad, known as Ibn al-cArabli, Al-Fut5hat 2nd ed., Vol. II (Cairo, 1293), p. 275. al-Mskkiyahh, 72. For cases see Ibn al-Mubarak, Kitab al-Zuhd (Indian edition, 1966), pp. 4-5. 73. qo. cit., p. 158. Qushayrl, 74. Hujwiri, op. cit., p.131. 75. Ibid., pp. 82-160. 76. Heinrich Heine, Die Stadt Lucca, Chap. IX. This prayer has also been voiced in Persian verse; see Sacdi, Bustan Chap. II; cf. the prayer of Suhrawardi, which has greater than moral intensity R5bicah's. of these rites, 77. For detailed descriptions conslut the article "Hadjdj" in Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. II, 1st ed. 78. cit., p. 328. Huj'wlri, p. see Najm al-Din 79. For the case of Hidrimi, Kubra, Die Fawaih al-Jamil des Najm ad-Din Kubra, ed. by wa Faw5tih al-Jalal F. Meier (Wiessenbaden, 1957 translation of this ac80. For the Syriac text ania English "John of Ephesus, Lives of the Eastern see E.W. Brooks, count, Vol. 19, pp. 164-79. Saints III,"I Patrologia Orientalis, 81. al.-Malimatlyab, ed. Abu ?Abd al-Rahmin S lami, Risalat wa Ahl alCAf if?l as Al-Malaamatiyah wa al-Soflyah by Abu al-CAlah Futuwah (Cairo, 1945). 82. B. Furuzanfar, Sharh-i Sharlf (Tehran, Mathnawl-i 1347 A.H. Sol.), II, p. 735. See the dialogue between this Nflb-i CAyyar and the Sufi 83. where the in Hujwiri,_2. pp. 183-84, Shaykh Hamdun al-Qassar cit., cAyyar takes what is very much a MalImati stand on the problem of behavior. gentlemanly 84. Ibid., p. 119. pg. cit., 85. Vol. Malcolm, CAli b. Zayd-i Bayhaqi, Abiu al-Hasan 86. See, for instance, Cizz al-Din Tarikh-i Bayhap, ed. by A. Bahmanyar (Tehran, 1317); trans Al-Kimil fi al-Tarikh, Abu al-Hasan, known as Ibn al-Athir,

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by J.T. Reinaud and C.F. Defremery into French as Extrait de la... des Croisades.. .Historiens Orientaux, Kamel, Recueil des Historiens tombs. I, 2, 4, 5 (Paris, 1872-); A.K.S. Lambton, Islamic Society in Persia (London, 1954). p. 66, which gives a detailed ex87. Hujwiri, op. cit., planation of this saying. Ch. 17. 88. cAyn al-Qudat al-Hamadani, Zubdat al-Haqa'iq 89. See Rhys Davids, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1911, pp. 200-01; cf. Abu Hayyan, Muqabaslt, p. 259, where the Arab thinker quotes this parable immediately following a reference to Plato. Ch. 61. op. cit., 90. CAyn al-Qu4it, I, p. 70. 91. Ibn al-cArabi, p2. cit., 92. See Mathnawl, II, line 159; cf. Hafiz, Diwan, ghazal no. 162. Kashf al-Haqagiq, Persian text ed. by 93. CAzzi al-Nasafi, A.M. Damghani (Tehran, 1965), p. 28. 94. See, for instance, 5:27, 2:97, 26:194. 95. 83:3. 96. Luke 16:15. 97. Gen. 6:6; cif. Ps. 32:11. in later 98. That the Hebrew leb (heart) was translated by the Greek words nous and kardia, biblical writings alternately to distinguish its rational and emotional aspects, was evidently a Hellenistic influence. To the average Semite, such distinctions on the use of this concept remained unknown. For further details in biblical see Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Thought, writings, pp. 83-124. Les Pensees ed. by Brunschwicg, p. 99. See, for instance, 459. see 100. For more details on this esoteric interpretations, Shaykh Najm al-Din Razi, Mirsad a1-cIb3d (Tehran, 1312 A.H.Sol.) pp. 69.70; cf. cAyn al-QuQgt, Tamhidit, No. 342, where other interpretations are given as well. 101. Shabastari, p. 4. p2. cit., p. 134; cf. passages quoted by F. 102. Qushayri, op. cit., Meier, Die Fawi'ih, p. 170. Nos. 14, 139. 103. Kubrl-Meier, Die Fawia'ih, op. cit., of such a comparison, see 104. For a detailed illustration Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, Mizan al- Amal (Cairo, 1328), p. 109; cf. The Mystic (London, 1944), p. 73. Margaret Smith, Al-Ghazzali, often quoted by Sufis is usually re105. A divine tradition See, for example, Abu Nasr lated to support the latter statement. CAbdallah b. CAll al-Saraj al-Tiusi, Al-Lumac fT al-Tasawwuf, ed. by R.A. Nicholson (Leiden, 1914), p. 594; and al-Ghazzali, IyacUlum al-Din (Cairo, 1272), 3:12.

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10' cf. 125.

106. See GhazzilT:, oa, p . cit., cAj Iib al-Qalb, Bayan A.J. Wensinck, La Pensee de Ghazali (Paris, 1940), pp. 122-

107. See, for instance, No. 16. Kubra, RpR. cit., 108. Hujwlrl, op. cit., p. 369; cf. p. 367. 109. p. 387. Itid., 110. Qushayrl, o. cit., p. 698. 111. See, for instance, Firdaws al-Murshidiyah, pp. 270, 474, 480, etc. 112. RAzi, pj. cit., p. cit., pp. 160-65; and Shabastari, pp. 91, 96, 228, 368. 113. Upanishads IV, 3, 9-14. 114. See, for instance, A.J. Wensinck, "New Data Concerning Syriac MAystic Literature," p. 25. 115. Hujwlri, p. 245; cf. Mathnawl, II, 830, 1347. 116. For an illustrative example see the story of Shaykh pp. 211Abu Sacid and Hasan Mu'addib in Asrar al-Tawhid, op. cit., 212. 117. See "Kitab al-Sidq," IRA, 1937. 118. Hujwlirl, P2. cit., pp. 190-05. on this point see Shabastari, 119. For further details P. cit., p. 461. 120. Gulistan, Ch. I, Story 10. 121. Gulistan, Ch. 7. 122. Mathnawl, 1, 983-85. 123. Cf. Miftib al-Nijit, pp. 146-49. 124. See O.D. Tcheschovitch, Bukharskyj dokumenti XIV veka (Tashkent, 1965). p. 247. 125. Hujwiri, p. cit, Abijal-Husayn al-N5rT' s view in 126. See, for instance, . cit.,p. 272. Sarraj, p. 288, quoted by F. Meier, Vom 127. See Sarraj, p. cit., Wesen der islamischen Mystik (Basel, 1943), pp. 19, 49. 128. Sarraj, op. cit., pp. 296-97. 129. Qur'an, 18:65-78. 130. See, for instance, Mathnawi I, 3191: V, 1899; cf. also I, 224, 237. Die vita des 131. Cf., for example, Firdos al-murshidiyya: ed. by F. Nieier (Leipzig, 1948), Scheichs Aub Ishaq al-Kazeruni, pp. 340-41. 132. Muhammadb. Munawwar, Asrar al-Tawhld, ed. by Z. Saf a (Tehran, 1332 A.IH. Sol. ), pp. 48, 93, 291. 133. Qur'an, 10:62. pj. cit., 134. See Tari'iq al-Haqa'iq, p. 1171; cf. Hujwiri, pp. 220-35; A.J. Wensinck, Muslim Creed, Its Genesis and p2. cit.,

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Historical

Development (Cambridge, 1932), p. 226. 135. See Abii al-Mughith b. Mans-ur (al-Hallaj), al-Husayn Kitab al-Tawasin, ed. by L. Massignon (Paris, pp. 172-73. 1913), 136. Mathnawl, I: 1246-7; cf. also index. 137. See Ibn al-CArabi, I: 307; IV: 615. 2j. cit., 138. Mathnawl, II: 2642-3. 139. Kitfb al-Tawisin, IV: 24. 2p. cit., 140. Ibid., pp. 20-22; cf. 288. A-yn al-Qu4it,_yR. .,_No. 141. See Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam fT Tirikh al Muluk wa alUmam (Haydarabad, Vol. 9, p. 261. 1359), 142. See CAyn al-Qudat, Xp. cit., p. 283. 143. See R. Lescot, de Syrie et du Enquete sur les yasidis (Beirut, Djebel 1938), pp.51 ff. Sinjar 144. Cf. Mathnawi, I1: 2645-9. 145. See Hujwlrl, p. 213. 2k. cit., 146. See Avicenna, Kitab al-Isharat wa al-Tanluhit trans. into French by A.M. Goichon (Paris, 1951), pp. 503-06, 519-20. 147. lbn Khaldun, pp. cit., Quatremere ed., Arabic text I: 109, 199. 148. See "Kitib Batanjal al-Hindi,"i ed. by H. Ritter, Oriens 1956, Vol. IX, p. 199. 149. For further see D.S. Margoliouth, details, "Panj Pir," Encyclopedia of Islam. 150. See Muhammad b. Ismicil al Bukhirl, bibs 48, 52, Salat, 54; Jani'iz, bib 62; and several others mentioned by Ibn Taymiyah, Contributions a une Etude de la Methodologie trans. Canonique, by

H. Laoust (Cairo, 1939). 151. Firdos al-Murshidiyya, pp. cit., Ch. 40. 152. For illustrations see the accounts of travels sions

places

of Abu Ishaq

Shirazi

and Shihib

al-Din

Suhrawardl

and mis-

in various

in the Near East.

153. See Sarraj, 'p cit., pp. 323-25. 154. See, for instance, Tirmidhi, Khatm al-Awliya', ed. by U. Yahya (Beirut, 1965), pp. 116-216. 155. Kubra, op. cit., No. 167. 156. LihijI, Sharh-i Gulshan-i Riz, ed. by K. SamiCi (Tehran, 1337 A.H. Sol.) pE 441. 157. See Hujwirl, p. 213. pp. cit., p. 236; cf. cAzIz al-Nasafi, 158. Ibid., cit, p. 80. 159. Ibid. 160. Qur'an, 18:64-82. 161. See Sarrij, cit., ?. pp. 422-24. 162. p. 423. Ibid., 163. iS, pp. 236-37. HuTjwlrT, op. 164. Sarraj, loc. cit. 165. See cAyn al-Qudit, Ch. 61; cf. Ch. 68. Zubdah, op. cit.,

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166. Tirmidh, cit2., op. p. 361; cf. Ghazzali, Ihya, p . III: 25. pp. cit., 167. Tadhkirat al-AwlIya', I, pp. 88-90. 168. Ibid., II, pp. 91-93. 169. Hujwirl, op. cit.. 153. 170. See Awrad al-Ahbab, II, pp. 339-40. 171. Dara Shukiih, Safinah (Tehran, 1965), pp. 160-61. 172. W. Barthold, Turkistan down to the Mongol Invasion, tr. in Gibb Memorial Series, V., 2nd ed. (1928), pp. 75-176. 173. Concerning the possibility that his wife was perhaps the beneficiary of that privilege, see his autobiography, Kitab = the seal) Khatm, where she is supposed to receive a gem (niin from God together with the knowledge of the "formers" and the "latters" (ulum-i awwalin wa akhirin). 174. Cf. Ibn Khaldun , op. cit., III, p. 137. 175. See Nasafi, 2pj cit., p. 315. 176. See Lihiji, p. 315. op. cit., 177. See Haj Mulla Sulifn, Wilayat-Namah, pp. 23-25. 178. See, for instance, Deut. 32:21; Ps. 13:1, 52:2; cf. Job 30:8; Isa. 32:5, Sir. 50:28. 179. See Ibn al1-cArabl, 2,. cit., I, Ch. 44. 180. See P. Loosen, Zeitschrift fUr Assyrologie, Vol. 27, 1912, pp. 196-201. 181. Cf. Asrir al-Tawhid, 2p. citi., ndex. 182. M. Widengren, Orientalia Suecana, Vol. 2 (1953), pp. 41; cf. M. Mole, Les mystiques musulmans, (Paris, 1965), p. 12. 183. B. Furuzanfar, Sharh.-i Ahwal-i cAttar, p. 68; cf. H. Ritter, Das Meer der Seele, Mensch Welt und Gott in Den Geschichten des Fariduddin cAttar (Leiden, 1955), pp. 159-180. p. 189; cf. 184. See cAyn al-Quqit, Tamhidat, pp cit., Niair Khusraw, DIwln, p. 364. 185. Pages from Kitab al-Lumac of Abu Nasr al-Sarraj, ed. Cf. 26,30. by A.J. Arberry (London, 1947), pp. 6-7. 186. Akhbar al-Halaj, 3rd ed., No. 38; cf. 10, 36. 187. Qur'an 10:32; 20:114. 188. See Lihij i, op. cit., p. 87. 189. See Mathnawl, II: 2321-2 190. For a concise survey of these theological proofs concerning the existence of God see A.J. Wensinck, "Les preuves de 1'existence de Dieu dans la theologie musulmane," Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie (Amsterdam, 1936). 191. See Shastari, po. cit., p. 87. 192. Mawlna Jalail al-Din Mawlawi, FT ma Fih, ed. by B. Furuzanfar (Tehran, 1330), p. 92. et remarques, Nouveau 193. Ibn Sina, Livre des directives groupe. 194. Shaykh-i Ishriq, Opera Metaphysica et Mystica, ed. by H. Corbin (Istanbul, 1945), p. 74. cit.,

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219

195. Ibn Sina, 2i. cit., pp. 371-72. 196. For more details on this comparison see Qaysaril's introduction in the commentary to the Ta'Iyat al-Kubra, quoted by cUthm2mn Yahya, ed., in Khatm al-Awlya, Q. cit., Appendix 492. 197. Qur'an, 10:20. 198. Ibid., 2:3. 199. See, for instance, correspondences between CAbd alRazzaq-i Kashani and cAla' al-Dawla-i SimnanI, in CAbd al-Rahman Jami, Kitab Nafahjat al-Uns, ed. by M. TawhIdIpur (Tehran, 19i9). 200. For a further discussion of this theory see Burhan Ahmad, The Mudjaddid's Concept of Tawhid, (Lahore, 1940). _ 201. For al-Hallij's remarks on this point, see Kitab alTawasin, Li' cit., pp. 129-141; cf. pp. 78, 198-199. 202. See Akhbar al-Halla;, No. 50. 203. See Sarraj, op. cit., p. 384. 204. DIw5n, ghazal No. 1. 205. Gulistan, introductory chapter. 206. Ibn al-cArabI, Futuhat, op. cit., as quoted by Fleischer in Catalogue of Oriental Manuscripts in the Leipzig University Library, p. 493. 207. See the discussion cit., in Sarraj, p. 70; and p. 98. cAyn al-Qud-at, TamhIdat, op. cit., 208: For a concise study of the pre-Islamic background of the Qur'anic concept of fear, see H. Ringgren, "Die Gottesfurcht im Koran,"o Orientalia Sueccana, Vol. III, pp. 2-4. 209. Munawwar, Li' cit., p. 274. 210. Qur'an, 65:95; 69:51; 102:5, 7. 211. For further details on this point, consult Razi, Li. cit., Ch. 3, 5, 7, 8. 212. Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, Maktibat, No. 43. 213. MathnawI, V, preface. 214. See, for details, Miftih al-Nij:t, Ch. 5. 215. See Kubra, Li. cit., No. 39. 216. Ris5lat al-Safinah, quoted by F. Meier in Fawaih, Lp. cit, p. 282. 217. See Akhbar al-lalli, No. 45. 218. cAyn al-Qu4at, Tahdt, p. cit, No. 370. 219. Shabastarl, opL cit., verses 872-73. 220. Akhbar al-Hallj, cit. 221. Sir Charles Elliot, Hinduism and Buddhism, Vol. II (London, 1921), p. 265. 222. Sayyed Abul-Fazl Burqaci Quml, Al-Taftish dar Maslak-i Sufi va Darvlsh (1377 A.H.) 223. S.A. Kasravi, Sufifari (Tehran, 1332) 224. A. Qazi (= T. Erani), Irfan va Usul-i Maddi (Tehran, 1323). 225. M. Javan, Kitab-i Radd-i Tasavvuf va Hikmat al-Ishrl (Tehran, 1347). 220

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