Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume
X
(1977)
Ali Banuazizi,Editor Anne Enayat, Associate Editor Vahid F. Nowshirvani,Associate Editor MangolBayat Philipp,Associate Editor ErvandAbrahamian,Book Review Editor
The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL AhmadAshraf Amin Banani Ali Banuazizi Lois GrantBeck Gene R. Garthwaite Oleg Grabar EricJ. Hooglund M.A. Jazayery ThomasM. Ricks, ex officio MarvinZonis
Addressall communicationsconcerningthe Journalto the Editor, IranianStudies, Box K-154, Boston College,ChestnutHill, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A. Copyright1977, The Society for IranianStudies Printedin the U.S.A.
IRANIAN STUDIES Journial of ThteSociecy for Iranian Studies
Contents:
X
Volume
(1977)
ARTICLES
Akhavan Sales, Mehdi. Soroudi) ........ Askari,
(Trans. by Sorour ........................
Hossein; Cummings, John T.; and Izbudak, Mehmet. Iran's Migration of Skilled Labor to the United States ..... .........
Askari,
Bill,
Speech
Hossein; Cummings, John T.; and Toth, James. Land Reform in the Middle East: A Note on Its Redistributive Effects .... James A. The American Analysis of Iranian Politics ...... ..................
Friedl,
Erika. BoirAhmad Mockery: Note ....................................
Good, Mary-Jo Delvecchio. in Provincial Iran: Maragheh ........ Helfgott,
267-279
A Research 281-286
Social Hierarchy The Case of Qajar ........................
Leonard M. Tribalism as a Socioeconomic Formation in Iranian History
129-163
...
Nikki R. The Midas Touch: Black Gold, Economics and Politics in Iran Today ....
Nomani, Farhad. Notes on the Economic of Peasants in Iran, Obligations 300-1600 A.D. ....... ....................
ii*i
3- 35
164-19S
Katouzian, Homayoun. Sadeq Hedayat's "The Man Who Killed His Passionate Self": A Critical Exposition ..... .............. Keddie,
84- 86
36- 61
196-206
243-266
62- 83
BOOK REVIEWS Algar,
H. Mirza Malkum Khan: A Biographical Modernism Study in Iranian (reviewed
Mangol Bayat Philipp) Andrews,
Jr.,
0.
Askari,
The Agricultural
(reviewed
Iran
103-105
to Ottoman W. B. An Introduction (reviewed by Talat Sait Halman) ...
Poetry
Aresvik,
by ...............
.....
230-233
of
Development
by Eric J. Hooglund)
322-325
....0.
and Cummings, J. T. Middle East in the 197 0s (reviewed by M. A. H. Katouzian) ..... .................
309-311
F. The Ilghl-n5ma (translated by J. A. Boyle) (reviewed by Heshmat Moayyad) .....
211-215
H.,
Economics
CAttar,
Bamdad, B.
Women's into From Darkness Light: F translated in Iran Emancipation (edited
by F. R. C. Bagley) (reviewed . DelVecchio Good) ..............
by Mary-Jo ...........
106-109
Baraheni, R. The Crowned Cannibals (reviewed by D. A. Shojai) ...... . ................... Behrangi,
S.
Modern
The Little Black Fish and Other Persian Stories (translated by
Mary and Eric Hooglund) (reviewed Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak) ................... of Beny, R. Persia: Bridge by Jerome W. Clinton)
Boyce,
Turquoise
...............
by . 216-222
1. (reviewed O..*..
120-122
of ZoroastriA Persian Stronghold anism (revi ewed by Michael Fischer) ......
M.
Brown, L. C., logical Studies Edebiyat,
300-304
and Itzkowitz, Dimensions
(reviewed
A Journal Literatures
of
N. (Eds.). of
Near
Middle
iv
Psycho-
Eastern
by Marvin Zonis)
(reviewed
294-299
207-211
.......
Eastern
by M. A. Jazayery
..
225-230
Fesharaki,
F.
Owl" Forty
.....
The Persian
Oberling,
Raffat,
......
und sein
314-322
.................
93- 95
..................
R. E. Iran at the End of the (reviewed by Manoucher Parvin)
by Erika Friedl
233-236
(reviewed by
Gulf
Eric J. Hooglund)
Momeni, M. Malayer
Oil
"The Blind Hedayat's (reviewed by Later
Years
Minoo S. Southgate)
Looney,
Iranian
by Amir H. Ahanchian)..
(reviewed
Hillmann, M. C. (Ed.).
Long, D. E.
of
The Development
Industry
Umland
Loeffler)
Century
....
100-103
.......
(reviewed
.....
...........
112-115
P. The Qashqa'i Nomads of Fars (reviewed by Lois Beck) ..... .............
116-119
A Novel D. The Caspian Circle: (reviewed by Michel Mazzaoui) ....
312-314
Ramazani, R. K. (reviewed
Iran's
Foreign
Policy
by Shahram Chubin)
Reppa, Sr., R. B. Israel and Iran by Shahrough Akhavi) .....
Rumi, D.
Licht
und Reigen
........ 1941-1973
....
87- 92
.........
(reviewed ................
(translated
96- 99
and
(reviewed by edited by J. C. Burgel) Michael B. Loraine) ...... ................ Shaban,
Sheikh
A New InterM. A. Islamic History: pretation (reviewed by Elton L. Daniel)
..
237-240
by W. L. Hanaway, Jr.) Bighami (translated .... (reviewed by L. P. Elwell-Sutton) ....
109-111
Bighami. from
Tarikh:
324-325
the
Bulletin
University F. Safiri)
Love Firuz
of
and War: Adventures Shah Nama of Sheikh
the
Department
of Tehran (reviewed ...............................
v
of
History,
by 305-308
for the Shah (reviewed by Welch, A. Artists Milo Cleveland Beach) ...... ..............
222-225
Woods, J. J.
287-293
LETTERS
Bashiri,
E. The Aqquyunlu D. Gurney) ........
(reviewed by ....................
TO THE EDITOR
Iraj,
123-126.
vi
IranianSo Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
W
i17
Winter-Spring 1977
Volume X
Numbers 1-2
THE SOCIETY FOR IRANIAN STUDIES COUNCIL Ahmad Ashraf, Plan & Budget Organization and Universityof Tehran Amin Banani, Universityof California, Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi, Boston College Lois Grant Beck, Universityof Utah Jerome W. Clinton, Princeton University Oleg Grabar, Harvard University Gene R. Garthwaite, Dartmouth College Farhad Kazemi, New York University Thomas M. Ricks, ex officio, Georgetown University Marvin Zonis, Universityof Chicago
EXECUTIVECOMMITTEE Gene R. Garthwaite, Executive Secretary
ThomasM. Ricks, Treasurer Ali Banuazizi,Editor IRANIAN STUDIES Journalof the Society for IranianStudies Editor:Ali Banuazizi Associate Editors: Anna Enayat (University of Tehran), Vahid F. Nowshirvani (University of Tehran), Mangol Bayat Philipp (Harvard University) Book Review Editor: Ervand Abrahamian (Baruch College, City Universityof N. Y) Assistant Editor: Marcia E. Mottahedeh CirculationManager: Rosemary Gianino
Copyright,1977,The Societyfor IranianStudies Publishedin the U.S.A. USISSN 0021-0862 Addressall communicationsto IRANIAN STUDIES,Box K-154, BostonCollege,ChestnutHill, Massachusetts02167,U.S.A.
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume X
Winter-Spring1977
Numbers 1-2
ARTICLES 3
IRAN'S MIGRATION OF SKILLED LABOR TO THE UNITED STATES
HosseinAskari, John T. Cummings, and MehmetIzbudak
36
TRIBALISM AS A SOCIOECONOMIC FORMATION IN IRANIAN HISTORY
LeonardM. Helfgott
62
NOTES ON THE ECONOMIC OBLIGATIONS OF PEASANTS IN IRAN, 300-1600 A.D.
84
SPEECH
FarhadNomani
MehdiAkhavanSares (Translatedby SorourSoroudi)
BOOK REVIEWS 87
R. K. RAMAZANI: Iran's ForeignPolicy 1941-1973: A Studyof ForeignPolicy in ModernizingNations
ShahramChubin
93
D. E. LONG: The Persian Gulf: An Introductionto Its Peoples, Politics,and Economics
Eric J. Hooglund
96
R. B. REPPA, SR.: Israel and Iran: BilateralRelationships and Effecton the Indian Ocean Basin
ShahroughAkhavi
Continued on next page
Volume X
Winter-Spring1977
Numbers 1-2
(Continued) 100
R. E. LOONEY: Iran at the End of the Century: A Hegelian Forecast
ManoucherParvin
103
H. ALGAR: Mirza Malkum Khan: A Biographical Study in IranianModernism
Mangol Bayat Philipp
106
B. BAMDAD: From Darkness into Light: Women's Emancipationin Iran
109
W. L. HANAWAY, JR. (Trans.) Love and War: Adventures from the Firuz ShaTh Nama of Skeikh Bighami
112
M. MOMENI: Malayerund sein Umland: Entwicklung, Structurand Funktionen einerKleinstadtin Iran
116
P. OBERLING: The Quashqa'i Nomads of Fars
120
R. BENY: Persia: Bridgeof Turquoise
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 123
Iraj Bashiri
Mary-Jo DelVecchioGood
L P. Elwell-Sutton
ErikaFriedlLoeffler
Lois Beck
Jerome W. Clinton
IranianStudies,Volume X, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring1977.
Iran's to
Migration the
United
of
Skilled
Labor
States
Hossein Askari John T. Cummings MehmetIzbudak Introduction
The growth of Iran's economy, like that of any developing country, is dependent not only on how its natural resources are used, but also its human resources. The two together can lead to increases in both the quantity and quality of physical capital. This process does not require absolutely synchronous improvements in the way both natural and human resources are employed, but certainly changes must be parallel. If, on the other hand, exploitation of natural resources moves forward much more rapidly, considerable physical capital can be acquired in a short time. But without ample supplies of skilled labor, capital goods may or even stand idle. then be used inefficiently This problem can be partly overcome in the short run if it is possible to hire foreigners to supplement the domestic labor Hossein Askari is Associate
Professor
of International
of Business and Middle Eastern Studies at the University Texas at Austin. He gratefully the financial acknowledges support of the George Kozmetsky Fellowship Program for the present project. John Thomas Cummings and Mehmet Izbudak
are, respectively, Assistant Professor of International Busness and graduate student at the University of Texas at Austin. 3
WINTER-SPRING1977
in sufficient amounts and with the proper skills. On the other hand, if a nation's growing educational system turns out skilled people at rates faster than the growth in available jobs, then employment, underemployment, or migration are the immediate choices facing many workers and their families. The long-run solutions, in any case, lie in parallel development throughout the economy of both natural and human resources. The situation may be further complicated in societies which, like the major oil exporters in recent years, undergo an exceptionally rapid development. In such circumstances, both sorts of problems may occur simultaneously- - in some sectors of the economy, newly secured capital goods may be used well below optimal levels because of labor shortages, while elsewhere thousands of highly skilled people cannot find employment in keeping with their specialized training. Very rapid growth in overall econamy, in other words, serves to emphasize the non-homogeneity found within such general classifications as capital or labor. Our concern here will be with Iran in recent years. We will examine the migration, under various circumstances, of generally highly-trained Iranians from their own country, which compared to other less developed countries (LDCs) seems to have offered ample employment opportunities, to the developed Western economies.1 We will argue that the escalation in Iran's economic promise since 1973 may not relieve its brain drain problem. the much In fact, larger number of Iranian students abroad seeking training during the next decade or so might lead to even higher leakages to the Western economies.
that
In this paper, we will necessarily come mostly from the pre-oil price
focus increase
on data Most era.
evidence is taken from United States sources, but parallel consideration will be given to other developed countries in which significant numbers of Iranians live. Iran's needs for highly skilled people are particularTo this end, the Iranian school system has ly significant. IRANIAN STUDIES
4
To this end, the Iranian school system has ly significant. rapidly expanded in recent years.2 However, it is generally easier to staff the lower grades; as a result, the pressures of excess demand for education are stronger at the In the early 1970s, this has led to the higher levels. unusual situation where, of every four Iranians pursuing post-secondary education, one is doing so outside Iran. Since it is probable that a significant proportion of the country's brightest university students are enrolled in foreign schools, Iran's dependence on outside educational systems is even greater. In discussing Iranian migration, we shall first examine the overall structure of this migration, then analyze its composition and, lastly, consider some of the motives behind it.
Iranian
Migration:
A Profile
of Recent
Patterns
We may distinguish two types of immigrants: those who declare, in advance, their intention to change their permanent residence from their home country to another, and those who make the same decision after living temporarily abroad for some time.3 In other words, one can categorize immigrants by their original intentions declared on entering a country. Data for these categories in the United States are shown in Table 1. In the first column of Table 1 are listed those who were originally admitted as immigrants, while in the second column we can see how many adjusted to permanent resident status after having lived for some time in the United States. It is clear that the latter category is important, amounting to as much as 60 percent of the admitted immigrants in some years. Both categories peaked in 1972, and have at least temporarily declined since then. Despite the dramatic increase in Iranian national income after 1972, the decline by 1975 was less than a third, with immigration still well above the levels of the late 1960s. 5
WINTER-SPRING1977
TABLE1 IRANIANIMMIGRATION TO THEUNITEDSTATES, 1958-1975
Iranians
Year
Permanent
As Immigrants To the U.S.
1958 1960 1963 1965 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Resident
Status After Arrival in the U.S.
433 429 705 804 1,280 1,825 2,411 3,059 2,998 2,608 2,337
Total -19581975 Note:
Iranians Adjusted to
Admitted
Total
139 207 408 422 825 1,003 1, 317 1,991 1, 915 1,557 1, 147 14,443
21,,124
572 636 1,113 1, 226 2,105 2,828 3,728 5,S050 4, 913 4,165 3,484 35, 567
All U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service data are for the fiscal year ending 30 June in the year indicated. Government, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report, various issues.
Source:U.S.
It is not easy to gauge either the original intentions or the changes in intentions of aliens living in a foreign country. The data can only show overall patterns of movement, or as in Table 2, the net changes in the number of resident aliens.4 Residence registration figures show a steady climb of Iranians, even after 1972, as perIRANIAN STUDIES
6
TABLE 2 IRANIANS REPORTINGUNDERTHE U.S. ALIEN ADDRESS REGISTRATIONPROGRAM,1961-1975 Year
Permanent Residents
1961 1963 1965 1967 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
n.a. 3757 4707 6233 9400 9177 10305 12024 12502 13107
All
Residents 7454 n.a. n.a. 12868 17164 18114 18298 20904 21466 24007
Note:
"n.a." means data not available.
Source:
U.S. Government, Immigration and Naturalization Annual Report, various issues. Service,
the total number of Iranian resimanent U.S. residents; dents has risen sharply with the increase in the number 5 of students enrolled in U.S. schools playing a major role. The steady growth among Iranian residents 1975 is paralleled
by the numbers of temporary
through visitors
and students admitted from Iran during this period (Table 3); the same type of trend is found among Iranians resident in the United Kingdom (Table 4). As we will see later (Table 10), students rary residents
prominent among the tempoadjust to permanent status.
are particularly who eventually
The ultimate commitment for an immigrant is to change his or her national allegiance through naturaliza7
WINTER-SPRING1977
TABLE 3 IRANIAN TEMPORARY VISITORS ADMITTEDTO THE U.S.,
Visitors
Year Year,(Excluding 1958 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1973 1974 1975
Source:
Students)
1698 2347 3556 3834 6756 10667 13438 16870 21299
1958-1975
Students 897 997 540 1023 2201 4053 4860 7831 7795
U.S. Government, Immigration and Naturalization Annual Report, various issues. Service,
TABLE 4 IRANIAN TEMPORARY RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,1955-1975
Year
Number
Year
Number
1955 1958 1960 1963 1965 1968
1001 1530 2185 3287 3757 4277
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
5231 6685 8039 9391 11437 14807
Note:
Excluded are children under age 16, diplomats and delegates to internationalorganizations.
Source:
United Kingdom Statistical Yearbook, 1976.
IRANIAN STUDIES
8
This step, even more than immigration or adjustment tion. to permanent resident status, signals a likely complete Naturalizations loss to the country of former allegiance. lag migration by several years and many permanent resident nevertheless, step indefinitely; aliens delay this critical this indicator as well shows a steady rise (Table 5).6
TABLE5 AS U.S. CITIZENS, 1950-1975 IRANIANSNATURALIZED Year
Number of Naturalizations
1950 1953 1958 1963 1965 1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
53 93 138 260 295 334 416 501 569 578 562 601 6908
Total 1950-1975 Source:
Government, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report, various issues.
U.S.
Among those Iranians who leave home for an extended of reat least initially, period, but with the intention, turning home, by far the largest number would be students. Many of these, as we will see, stay abroad indefinitely, 9
1977 WINTER-SPRING
and thus become a major source of the outflow of human capital
from Iran.
Already
away from Iran for some time,
if and when they transfer to permanent resident status, links to their country they have social and professional of study. Thus, it is often easier for them to make the decision to settle, say, in the U.S. than it is for an an American Iranian who first leaves home after obtaining immigration visa. In 1973, more than half the Iranians engaged in (Table advanced studies abroad were in the United States The prominent position of the U.S. in Iranian educa6). tional preferences is not new (see Tables 6 and 7), but replaced over the last 15 years, the U.S. has gradually destination of Iranian Western Europe as the principal country which students.7 Turkey is the only developing is the destination of a large number of university-bound (and memIranians. Partly, this is due to its proximity for Developbership with Iran in the Regional Cooperation ment, RCD, alliance), partly to the lower costs of study in Turkey as opposed to, say, Germany or the United States, of many Iranian citiand partly to the Turkish affinities zens, such as Kurds and Azerbaijanis.8 From Tables 8 and 9, we can see some of the major of Iranians who have studied in the United characteristics male, and are only States. They remain overwhelmingly to be undergraduates than they were slightly less9likely can be 15 years ago. However, several notable shifts While the total number of seen in what Iranians study. students nearly quadrupled between 1959/60 and 1973/74, inadministration those pursuing programs in business
creased by almost tenfold. Engineering students continue to account for 42 to 50 percent of the total, while those in absolute in the medical sciences have hardly increased share has fallen by about twonumbers, and their relative thirds. Agricultural departments in American universities drew, in absolute terms, only about 64 percent as many Iranian students in 1973/74 as they had in 1959/60, demust play in Iran's spite the prominent role agriculture current and future development plans.
IRANIAN STUDIES
10
TABLE 6 IRANIAN STUDENTPOPULATIONIN MAJORCOUNTRIES OF. STUDY, 1961-1973
Country United
States
West Germany
1961
1968
1969
1971
1973
2943
4554
5175
6771
9623
2991
2777
2735
2962
n.a.
732
769
503
503
1492
1030
1206
1306
419
501
680
871d
France Turkey
n.a.
United
n.a.
279
Kingdom
Austria
852b
1037
982
867
789
Italy
120a
266
378
483
778
62
77
128
294
219
201
223
228
85
85
174c
99
87
131
n.a.
Canada Switzerland
291b
India
n.a. 28b
Belgium
n.a. 127
Pakistan
n.a.
n. a.
91
Lebanon
n.a.
116
99
99
99
n.a.
10678
12191
14500
19054
Total e Note:
n.a. indicates a1960
n.a.
101d
data not available.
bf962
c1970 d1972
1968, Source:
eTotal is for 40 countries 50 countries thereafter. UNESCOStatistical
included
Yearbook, various 11
in survey
in
issues.
WINTER-SPRING1977
TABLE 7 OF IRANIAN STUDENTSABROADIN MAJOR PERCENTAGE COUNTRIESOF STUDY, 1968-1973 1968 %
1973 %
42.6
50.5
26.0
20.4
France
7.2
7.8
Turkey
8.5a
6.9
3.9
4.6c
Austria
9.7
4.1
Italy
2.5
4.1
Canada
0.6
1.5
Switzerland
2.0
1.2
India
0.8
0.9b
Belgium
0.9
0.7
Pakistan
0.7a
O.7CC
Lebanon
1.1
0.6c
Country States
United
West Germany
Kingdom
United
a1969 b1970
cl972 Source:
UNESCOStatistical
IRANIAN STUDIES
Yearbook,
12
various
issues.
TABLE 8 OF IRANIAN STUDENTSIN THE SELECTEDCHARACTERISTICS UNITED STATES, 1959/60 TO 1973/74 (IN PERCENT) 1959/60
1963/64
1968/69
1973/74
Sex Male Female
91.0 9.0
91.7 8.3
88.3 11.7
89.9 10.1
Academic Level Undergraduate Graduate Special
76.8 15.6 4.2
72.7 20.4 4.3
71.6 23.8 3.6
71.3 22.3 2.2
Field of Study Agriculture Business Administration Education Engineering Humanities Medical Sciences Physical Sciences Social Sciences Other
5.9 3.6 2.9 43.9 12.5 9.2 11.0 6.6 0.6
3.7 5.3 2.3 42.6 12.5 6.5 15.1 9.4 0.9
2.0 7.0 2.1 42.7 12.4 3.2 16.5 10.6 0.6
1.0 9.0 1.4 45.7 10.5 3.1 9.8 6.7 0.2
Total
2507
3162
4554
9623
Number of Students
Note:
Categories may not add to 100 percent of some returns. the incompleteness
Source:
U.S. Government, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report, various issues.
13
because
of
WINTER-SPRING1977
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0 9
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= .,4s,1 W -40
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IRANIAN STUDIES
4
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PoVIt 9cd
0>
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which attract these In looking at the disciplines students, we also get some idea of the skills brought to the United States by Iranian immigrants. As we can see from Table 10, more than half of the Iranians who adjust to permanent resident status, after living in the U.S. for some time, entered on student visas.10 Those Iranians who became permanent residents in 1975 claimed their new status under various provisions of U.S. immigration law; relatively few qualified on the basis of occupational skills (see Table 11). Since few students have professional if before entering the U.S., especially qualifications they came to pursue undergraduate studies, or can obtain them, at least legally, while attending school here, this is not surprising. Nor is the fact that so many status changers have married or sired U.S. citizens, since the majority are young and single when they begin on a college campus. As we can see from Table 12, about 70 percent of the 1975 status changers adjusted within four to five For, example, for those who came years of their entry. as undergraduates, this would mean being permanent residents by graduation. If we turn our attention to the larger part (Table 1) of the Iranians who settle in the U.S., those who originally enter as immigrants, we have less specific information as to the types of skills they bring with them. Still, official data indicate the broad categories under which they qualify for admission (Table 13). About a third of the more than 2300 immigrants reported highly skilled professions; nearly three-fifths were admitted as dependents of immigrants. 1 As we have seen above in Table 1, in recent years, Iranian immigrants to the U.S. were admitted to permanent resident status, either originally or after being here as temporary residents, in a ratio of about 3 to 2. But if we allow that most of the students who are status-adjusters (Table 10) are at least at the neophyte stage of having professsional qualifications, it seems likely that close to half of the Iranians who obtained permanent resident status in the U.S. during the 1970s, some 1600 to 2300 a year, possessed notable occupational skills.
15
1977 WINTER-SPRING
TABLE 10 RESIDENTSTATUS, IRANIANS ADJUSTINGTO PERMANENT BY ORIGINALENTRYSTATUS, 1975 (PERCENTAGE)
Students spouses Students' Exchange visitors Exchange visitors' Temporary visitors
Source:
and children spouses and children for pleasure
52.6 2.9 4.0 3.0 32.7
U.S. Government, Immigration and Naturalization various issues. Annual Report, Service,
TABLE 11 RESIDENTSTATUS OF IRANIANS TO PERMANENT ADJUSTMENTS BY CATEGORY,1975 (PERCENTAGES)
preference Occupational or child of U.S. Spouse, parent, preference Non-occupational Other
Source:
citizen
8.6 49.3 27.8. 14.3
U.S. Government, Immigration and Naturalization Annual Report, various issues. Service,
IRANIAN STUDIES
16
TABLE 12 ADJUSTMENT OF IRANIANS DURING1975 to PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY YEAROF ENTRY (PERCENTAGES)
Before 1965 1966-1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 January-June
Source:
1.9 13.7 9.4 12.5 15.7 30.6 13.6 2.5
1975
U.S. Government, Immigration and Naturalization Annual Report, Service, various issues.
TABLE 13 IRANIAN IMMIGRANTS ADMITTEDTO THE UNITED STATES BY MAJOROCCUPATION GROUP, 1975 (PERCENTAGES)
Professional technical and related workers Managers, officials and proprietors Skilled workers, craftsmen, foremen and related workers Housewives, children and no occupation
Source:
17.8 5.6 10.3 57.0
U.S. Government, Immigration and Naturalization Annual Report, Service, various issues.
17
WINTER-SPRING1977
Similar data are not available on a comparable basis for other developed countries where Iranians live and study But perhaps for the period in question, it would not seem unreasonable to postulate that Iranians attending Canadian, are not very different from German or British universities either academically or socialtheir American counterparts, ly. Thus, the leakage of skilled Iranians to other developed countries in the early 1970s was similar to, though probably not larger than, that seen for the United States. A rough estimate, then, would be that three to five thousettled in qualifications sand Iranians with professional Western countries annually during this period. Given Iranian needs during, for example, *the current five-year plan period (1973 to 1978), this may seem to be only the proverbial drop in the bucket--15 to 25 thousand when as we indicated above, probably skilled individuals, 700 thousand are needed. However, actuality may match need by only 50 percent. and most of these who leave Iran are concentrated in occupations which demand extended school, Thus, the drop in the as opposed to trade, experience. 15 to 30 percent, or bucket looms somewhat larger--perhaps even more, of the accountants, economists, engineers, phyteachers, etc., that Iran public administrators, sicians, its dreams of economic dedesperately needs to fulfill velopment, may use their talents instead in the service of an adopted country in America or Europe. Additional data regarding the skills brought to the United States are available from three consecutive annual studies which were carried out by the Immigration and Service in the late 1960s as a result of Naturalization increasing interest in the brain drain problem. These who entered the U.S. as studies covered both professionals immigrants and those who changed to permanent resident status after entry--a total of some 131 thousand immigrants Of these, more than five percent were from the in all. Middle East; 1.6 percent, some 2143, were from Iran. came as immiNearly two-thirds of the latter originally Engrants (Table 14); the rest were status-adjusters. than more and dentists comprised gineers, physicians, IRANIANSTUDIES
18
TABLE14 NEWIRANIANPERMANENT RESIDENTSIN THEUNITEDSTATES BY PROFESSIONAL CATEGORIES, 1967-1969 Status Immi- Adjusters: grants Students Technological Total professionals Natural
Sciences
Engineers Others Medical Physicians Others Social Social
4 Dentists
4 Pedagogical scientists
University instructors Other educational Source:
Status Adjusters: Others
Total
1357
647
86
64
357 169
279 76
1 1
2143 150 637 246
339 128
24 38
126 2
489 168
9
8
55 102
33 65
139 --
17
--
3 1
91 168
United States, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Council on International Education and Cultural Affairs, Annual Indicator of the Immigration Into the United States of Aliens in Professional and Related Occupations, Washington,
D.C.
half those counted, with teachers and scientists accounting for nearly another 20 percent. Within each professional group, however, we can see notable differences in the method of migration. For example, about 70 percent of the physicians and dentists entered the U.S. as immigrants; less than five percent were students who adjusted their status to 19
WINTER-SPRING 1977
permanent
residents.
On the other
hand,
about 56 percent
of the engineers were immigrants, while 44 percent were student status-adjusters. The quarter of Iranian physicians who adjusted to permanent residents from other than student status were probably in large part in some phase of the overall medical educational process. As can be seen from Table 15, about half the Iranian educated physicians practicing in the United States in 1970 were interns and residents. As Table 8 shows, less than 150 Iranians were students in U.S. medical schools in 1968/69; all of the 761 interns and residents in 1970 shown in Table 15 studied outside the U.S., entering not formally as students but as recent medical graduates. Over 44 percent of the physicians listed in Table 15 were less than 35 years old--no more than ten years out of medical school.
TABLE 15 SELECTEDCHARACTERISTICS OF PHYSICIANS EDUCATEDIN IRAN AND PRACTICINGIN THE UNITED STATES, 1970 Sex
Male
Female 128
1503 Professional Activities Interns & Residents Hospital staff Private practice Teaching Research Other Source:
761 313 403 30 60 64
Total 1631
Under 30 30 to 34 35 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 & older
J. N. Haug and B. C. Martin, Foreign Medical Graduates in the United States (Chicago, 1971).
IRANIAN STUDIES
20
110 609 516 349 45 2
Throughout the early 1970s, physicians accounted people admitted as for about a third of the professional immigrants from Iran (Table 16). Although Iranians were from only about 1.4 percent of the immigrant professionals 1970 to 1975, the concentration of Iranians among immigrant physicians was nearly three times as high--about 4.2 percent. Though several developing countries sent more physicians to the U.S. (Table 17), Iran's "exports" to the U.S. were about 46 physicians per million in domestic population, compared to rates of 12, 110, 100, 95, 25, Korea, 8, and 11 per million for India, Philippines, Among Taiwan, Thailand, Pakistan, and Egypt respectively. Iranian immigrants were also the other major professions, more likely to be engineers than were either all immiin general. grants or immigrant professionals
Motives
for Immigration
in University and other higher education facilities Iran have, during the past decade, grown rapidly, in size steadiNonetheless, certainly and presumably in quality. ly larger numbers of Iranians have gone abroad to American and European universities. Furthermore, though employment in Iran for highly skilled people have exopportunities panded considerably over the last decade, the numbers of skilled Iranians electing to take up residence abroad remains high even after the oil revenue increases of 1973/74. In this section we will look at some evidence which relates to the motives for their migration decisions. The National Science Foundation (NSF) conducted a detailed survey of nearly eight thousand migrant scientists and engineers who came to the United States between 1964 and 1969;12 the total sample represented about 14 perThe cent of all such immigrants during this period.13 the responses of some 54 Iranian-Ameristudy identifies This subsample cans, about 0.6 percent of those surveyed. small but nonetheless interestis, of course, relatively ing. Table 18 presents certain selected characteristics 21
1977 WINTER-SPRING
TABLE 16 PROFESSIONALSADMITTEDTO THE UNITED STATES AS IMMIGRANTS,1970 to 1975
Iran
Total N Total immigrants Total professionals Accountants Draftsmen Economists Engineers: Civil Chemical Electrial & Electronic Industrial Mechanical Others X unspecified Nurses Pharmacists Physicians & Surgeons Scientists: Biologists Chemists Others & unspecified Teachers: Primary & secondary University Technicians Source:
U.S.
%
N
2309607 259010 21299 2997 1686
100.0 11.2 0.9 0.1 0.1
14442 4065 94 52 28
100.0 28.1 0.7 0.4 O.2
6606 3771 6076 1467 7001 13561 35869 5693 33075
0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.6 0.2 1.4
128 51 177 28 100 311 293 34 1378
0.9 0.4 1.2 0.2 0.7 2.2 2.0 0.2 9.5
1652 6162 4357
0.1 0.3 0.2
27 77 51
0.2 0.5 0.4
27088 8716 16810
1.2 0.4 0.7
225 154 238
1.5 1.1 1.6
Government, Immigration and Naturalization issues. Annual Report,various
Service,
IRANIAN STUDIES
%
22
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WINTER-SPRING1977
TABLE 18 OF MIGRANTSCIENTISTS AND SELECTEDCHARACTERISTICS UNLESS OTHERWISE ENGINEERS(PERCENTAGES NOTED) Other Middle East
All Migrants
Category
Iran
Total number surveyed of Total Percentage
54 0.6
Category Professional Engineers scientists Physical Social scientists
83.3% 16.7 0.0
68.0% 25.4 6.7
58.8% 38.5 2.7
Highest Degree Held Doctorate Master's X other Bachelor's
16.7% 38.9 44.4
20.8% 33.8 46.5
28.0% 28.6 43.4
Place of Education Graduate Level: All in U.S. Some in U.S.
51.9% 3.7
41.9% 8.5
22.4% 12.7
Undergraduate Level: All in U.S. Some in U.S.
68.5 0.0
23.2 8.8
Residence Status-Changers By Entry Status Previous Status: Student Exchange visitor/student trainee Industrial Temporary visitor Other
78.1% 10.9 3.6 3.6 3.6
61.8% 13.1 2.0 19.0 4.0
IRANIAN STUDIES
24
284 3.6
7986 100.0
6.2 6.4
27.0% 10.0 2.0 23.6 37.4
TABLE 18--Continued
Iran
Category
Job Status Immediately Preceding Migration (professional Full-time status) (professional Part-time status) Student (no professional status) work Non-professional Unemployed Employment Sector ceding Migration Manufacturing University/other non-profit Other private Government
All Migrants
23.8%
79.2%
72.0%
0.0
5.3
6.8
50.0 4.8 0.0
7.7 1.4 1.4
14.4 2.4 1.3
Pre14.3% 4.8 9.5 2.4
Salary Changes After Migration Decrease less than 100% Increase: 100-200% More than 200% Not applicable
Source:
Other Middle East
4.8% 9.5 4.8 0.0 80.1
Science Foundation, National in the United and Engineers
25
23.9%
33.3%
21.8 17.2 22.1
17.6 11.0 10.1
4.6% 2.1 9.2 32.0 52.1
1.2% 12.3 11.4 24.5 50.6
Immigrant Scientists (1973). States
WINTER-SPRING1977
of the Iranians compared to those of other Middle Easterners and of the sample as a whole. The Iranians were much more likely to be engineers--to be expected, given the emphasis on engineering seen above in Table 8. Also, the Iranians surveyed were much more likely to have completed their undergraduate studies in the U.S. and much less likely to have had any professional work experience before coming to the U.S. than were migrant scientists and engineers in general. a wide range The NSF survey asked the participants of questions designed to identify the factors in their 14 decisions to seek permanent residence in the United States. Those listed as "important" can be seen, in descending order, in Table 19. They were also asked how they thought their status had changed in various ways as a result of their decisions; Table 20 shows the results of selected questions from this part of the survey. Though the respondents' economic situations figured prominently in their answers, it is clear that other factors also played large roles. First, there are a number of non-financial aspects of employment conditions--professional opportunities, structure of the employment system, intellectual interaction with colleagues. Also cited frefactors not quently were several social and family-related directly related to monetary rewards, such as family ties for children, and the U.S. culto the U.S., opportunities tural milieu.
Immigration--An
Assessment
for
the Future
and skilled labor condition in The professional Iran may become even more critical in the future. Increasing bottlenecks could arise from both the demand and the supply sides. On the demand side, rapid industrialization programs will require more and more professional and skilled labor. In addition, economic growth increases On the the demand for professionals such as physicians. IRANIANSTUDIES
26
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WINTER-SPRING
:3 O to
1977
TABLE 20 CHANGESIN STATUS AS RATEDBY IRANIAN SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
Improvement
Worsening
No Change, Not Applicable, or No Answer
3.7%
27.8%
0.0 7.4 0.0
27.8 16.7 27.8
Aspects Professional Employment: 68.5% stimulation Intellectual General level of technical 72.2 know-how in society 75.9 Quality of own work 72.2 for research Opportunity support for Financial - research 51.9 for profesOpportunity 75.9 sional advance
13.0
35.1
13.0
11.1
Other Aspects Employment: freedom on job Administrative of work systems Flexibility Communication with superiors General working conditions
31.4 63.0 44.4 66.7
13.0 7.4 11.1 3.7
55.6 29.6 44.4 29.6
68.5 51.9
11.1 16.7
20.4 31.4
48.1 40.7 3.7
7.4 20.4 63.0
44.4 38.9 33.3
63.0 20.4 59.3
13.0 20.4 13.0
27.7 59.2 27.7
Situation Financial Standard of living Economic opportunities rewards for Financial increases skill Retirement security Taxation pressure Personal Living Standards: Chances to achieve personal goals Personal status Cultural opportunities
IRANIAN STUDIES
28
TABLE20--Continued
Improvement
63.0% 63.0 13.0
Opportunities for children Quality of social services Amount of leisure time Living Standards: Social Political Intellectual freedom Congeniality of social system Relationship between social classes Source:
National
No Change, Worsen- Not Appliing cable, or No Answer 0.0% 16.7 51.9
37.0% 21.3 35.1
and 72.2
0.0
27.8
27.8
20.4
51.2
44.4
11.1
44.4
Science Foundation,
and Engineers Characteristics
Immigrant Scientists A Study of in the United States: and Attitudes (Washington, 1973).
supply side, Iran has managed to expand enrollment in from 140.6 thousand secondary schools almost exponentially in 1955/56 to 1.73 million in 1972/73. However, enrollment in 1972/73 was 141,369. To accommodate the at universities increasing numbers at the university level, Iran has sent thousands of students abroad. But this rapid expansion at the secondary level and a slower absolute increase in university capacity will mean that even larger numbers of Iranians will be educated abroad over the next five or ten years. safety
The education of Iranians abroad could be a useful valve in alleviating this educational bottleneck.
29
WINTER-SPRING 1977
But as we have seen, many students do not return to Iran. This inclination of not going back to Iran appears to vary directly with the length of stay and/or inversely with the age at arrival abroad. Furthermore, this problem may be exacerbated in this case because Iranians start their foreign education at an earlier age than do students from many other LDCs. One possible reason for this is the incentive to leave Iran before the age of 18 to postpone military induction. Under these conditions, the government may pursue policies on at least two fronts. First, given the limited short-run capacity to educate students beyond the secondary level and both existing and expected bottlenecks, the government should make the best of the current availabilities; that is, serious manpower planning should be instituted to produce the most critically needed professional and skilled labor. Second, the government should review its policies towards the education of Iranians abroad; it must assess the reasons for both students not coming back and the migration of already educated Iranians abroad. Then appropriate policies should be formulated. We would suggest that increased economic incentives, economic security, and improved working conditions are a minimum. Clearly the education of Iranians abroad is beneficial if they return home. But the government must develop rational policies to encourage both the education of Iranians abroad and their ultimate return. In most instances, education abroad is on a subsidized basis. That is, it costs many institutions more to educate a student than they are paid by tuition alone, the rest coming from gifts and grants. Furthermore, the United States and Canada are the countries where an increasing number of Iranians will attend school. Most European countries do not have the capacity to handle the expected influx.15 Therefore, Iran should evaluate of the education of Iranians in North America policies particularly closely. Recent policies of the government, in most cases, attention given to their have been designed with little impact on the economy as a whole. Those in the field of IRANIANSTUDIES
30
education and manpower training have been no exception. to an inBut if Iran is to make a successful transition must be dustrial society, more systematic considerations In this given to all policy areas, including education. case, the reasons for migration must be evaluated and the appropriate economic and environmental incentives must be These steps need not be limited to the forthcoming. future but might be applied usefully in the cases of many Iranians already abroad. For example, in the NSF study of the Iranian scienalmost three-fourths cited earlier, tists and engineers who were permanent residents in the United States said they did not intend to stay abroad when incentives It is clear that attractive they left Iran. might not only reduce the proportion of those Iranian students who do not come home in the future, but also might bring back many of those Iranians currently abroad, those whose decisions to stay away were made particularly after leaving Iran.
NOTES
1.
For a discussion of this situation across the Middle East, see Hossein G. Askari and John Thomas Cummings, A Problem "The Middle East and the United States: Journal of Middle of 'Brain Drain,"' International East Studies, Vol. 8 (January 1977).
2.
For example, in 1955/56, about 816.5 thousand Iranian students were enrolled in about 6700 primary and intermediate schools, with 140.6 thousand in about 740 By 1972/73, there were nearly secondary schools. 3.45 million students in about 28,350 primary and intermediate schools and almost 1.73 million students in about 3280 secondary schools.
3.
This second category might be subdivided to group together those who, having lived abroad for many years, return home, but shortly leave again, this time as predetermined immigrants. Such people include those who have studied abroad and obtained 31
WINTER-SPRING1977
but return home to be disappointed in the credentials, offered them to exercise their talents. opportunities 4.
U.S. law requires that all aliens living in the country on the first of January to register their addressby the es by mail. Registrants are then classified permanence of their visas.
5.
Foreign students residents.
6.
Former Iranians represented less than 0.5 percent of in 1975. In another country all U.S. naturalizations which admits large numbers of immigrants, Australia, of Iranian-born residents rose sharpnaturalizations ly in the late 1960s, then levelled off at about 50 per year in the early 1970s. Given the relative population sizes of the U.S. and Australia, the numbers of new Iranian-Australians are comparable to those of However, former Iranians accountIranian-Americans. ed for only a bit more than 0.1 percent of Australian naturalizations
7.
generally
in the early
enter the U.S. as temporary
1970s.
Given the limited size of most western European unithat the U.S. will it seems likely systems, versity in take an even larger share of the Iranian students
foreign
schools
in the late
1970s.
However, European
of higher learning outside the university institutions of France de Technologie such as the Instituts systems, have been playof Britain, colleges and the technical
ing a growing role as an alternate route to higher education for Iranians wishing to study in Europe. 8.
of Turkish In addition, instruction in many faculties of higher learning is in English, proinstitutions ficiency in which seems to grow astronomically in esteem throughout the Middle East.
9.
The data shown in Tables 8 and 9 are different source than that in Tables Education of International Institute since surveys American universities;
IRANIAN STUDIES
32
drawn from a 6 and 7. The (IIE) annually returns are
they are necessarily voluntary, Another well-known organization
Eastern students America-Mideast
less than complete. in Middle interested
enrolled
in U.S. colleges,
Educational
and Training
the SErvices
(AMIDEAST)estimated that in 1972/73 there were about 13,500 Iranians in U.S. Schools, about 3900 more than also pointed out AMIDEAST IIE counted the same year. a sharp rise in the early 1970s of the number of Iranian government-sponsored students going abroad. IIE to U.S. schools request inforannual questionnaires mation as to the sponsorship of foreign students. However, in recent years, this question has drawn no answer in about two-thirds of the cases for both foreign students in general and Iranian students in parThus, in 1975, when IIE radically revised ticular. its census procedures, this question was eliminated. The new IIE methods also made allowances for accountIn the case of Iran, this ing for under-counting. Their meant an upward adjustment of about 25 percent. actual count for the 1974/75 academic year was 11,068 Iranian students and their estimate was 13,780 stuThis procedure closes much of the gap of dents. about 40 percent that separated IIE and AMIDEAST estimates in 1972/73. Since IIE counts only nonestimates the immigrant students, while AMIDEAST number of all Iranians who come to the United States it may well be that much and then enroll in college, of the remaining discrepancy between IIE and AMIDEAST estimates can be accounted for by Iranians who enter the U.S. as immigrants and become college students. 10.
It is not possible to estimate how many students who come to the United States eventually switch to perAbout half the status-admanent resident status. justers have already been in the U.S. two to three years and came as students (Table 12); about a sixth In the early 1970s, were here six or more years. from 600 to 1000 students became permanent residents This can be roughly compared with from annually. 1000 to 2200 Iranian students entering the U.S. for two the first time each year in the late 1960s--i.e., to eight years earlier. Perhaps a guess of 25 percent 33
WINTER-SPRING1977
would be reasonable for the number of Iranian students who adjusted their residential status to permanent during this period. When the justifications for such adjustment (Table 11) are considered, we see about half do so for family reasons--that is, marrying or siring U.S. citizens. This seems to be a clear danger signal to Iran, given the rapid increase since 1973 in the numbers of Iranian students coming to the U.S. and other Western countries and despite the improvements in Iranian economy. With so many thousands of Iranians spending what we might call their "courtship" years in North America or Europe, especially since Iranian students going abroad are still overwhelmingly undergraduates (that is, 18 or 19 years old and
leaving home unmarried),
as can be seen from Table 8,
the fact that so many also marry, while students, spouses they meet as students is hardly surprising. Thus, if the Iranian government wishes to attract
students home after completion of their matriculation, the task often becomes one of converting a foreign wife or husband to acceptance of the potential benefits of a lifetime commitment to Iran. 11.
Which does not mean that the spouses have no special skills. Immigration visas will be admitted to a family one of whose members has a skill in demand in the United States. For example, consider two hypothetical Iranian families who wish to migrate to the U.S. In the first, the husband is a mechanical engineer, the wife a commercial artist; in the second, the husband is a college professor in the the wife a registered humanities, nurse and hospital
administrator. The chances of the first family getting their visas probably hinge on the job prospects of the husband, those of the second family on those of the wife. In neither case would immigration statistics record the skills of the spouse necessarily who might have to look a bit harder for employment after arriving in the U.S. 12.
National Engineers
Science
Foundation, Immigrant Scientists
in the United
IRANIAN STUDIES
States: 34
and A Study of Charac-
teristics
and Attitudes
(Washington,
1973).
13.
The sample was not selected randomly; it focused on immigrants who settled in the northeastern states and in northern California.
14.
Of course, it is well known that people interviewed in the course of a survey may tend to give the answer they think is expected or is somehow perceived as For example, in the context of the more desirable. survey cited here, more emphasis might be placed on freedom, and motives, such as political idealistic less on those of an economic nature.
15.
In fact, Italy has recently (June 1977) put a twoyear moratorium on the inflow of new foreign students.
35
WINTER-SPRING1977
IranianStudies,Volume X, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring1977.
Tribalism
a Socioeconomic
as
Fornation
in
Iranian
History
Leonard M. Helfgott of Historians have tended to ignore the structure of Iran. the history Numerous refertribalism in writing leaders can be found in the literature ences to tribal and Qajar khans appear and reappear (Turkoman, Bakhtiyari, but history), in Iranian political as important figures that produced these leaders and the nomadic societies the contours of their actions have shaped and limited and other of anthropologists been left to the researches have undertaken deWhile historians social scientists. of urban and agrarian institutions, they studies tailed as a factor in Iranian have continued to ignore tribalism history. centuries, and the nineteenth Between the twelfth of the one-fourth nomads comprised approximately pastoral of Iran. Forming over two hundred separate population units divided into five major ethnic groupings tribal these Kurdish, Arab and Baluch), (Turkoman, Iranian, groups have been and continue to be integral pastoral Although elements in the shaping of Iranian history. with the sedentary population, interacted they constantly the nomads functioned within the context of a socioeconoqualitatively mic formation with a set of institutions
Leonard M. Helfgott Western Washington
IRANIAN STUDIES
is Associate University. 36
Professor
of History
at
of from the urban and agrarian institutions distinct This essay aims at developing a sedentary society. theory that can situate pastoral nomadism within the overall movement of Iranian history; a theory that has and their as its object the structure of these societies By adopting interaction with Iranian sedentary society. this dual objective I hope to go beyond the disciplinary and and historians of both anthropologists limitations provide
a more comprehensive
framework for
the study
of
Iranian society.1 Marx introduced the concept of socioeconomic formations in the Grundrisse (1857-58) where he divided preconfighistory into three distinct historical capitalist urations called the Asiatic, Ancient and Germanic (feudal) At the time Marx did not concern modes of production.2 of but the limitations societies, himself with pre-state must have become apparent to speculations the Grundrisse into effort him later when he undertook a massive research The result societies.3 primitive the nature of so-called Notebooks of the Ethnological of these investigations, Grundrisse are consistent in that 1880-82, and the earlier
socieMarx examined structures present in precapitalist ties that persisted from one socioeconomic formation to another and sought the underlying causes for their survival and their position within the framework of nineteenth century capitalism. from The search for relations of structural entities one socioeconomic formation to another and the attempt to in their movement placed establish causal significance Marx well within the framework of nineteenth century evoAlong with Hegel, Morgan and Spencer, lutionary thought. Marx sought
to uncover
laws of historical
But his method of analysis
differed
development.
from the other evolu-
emphasis on the tionists in its rigid materialism--its in shaping the conof the mode of production centrality and synchronically, tours of socioeconomic formations in shaping the nature changes in the mode of production
of the movement from one formation to another, cal ly.
37
diachroni-
WINTER-SPRING1977
The movement from one socioeconomic formation to another results from the generation of social, political and ideological forces as a consequence of changes in the forces of production that make obsolete the corollary social relations of production and political and ideological superstructures. According to Marx: In considering such transformation the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic--in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.4 But to see this movement as a rigid, unilinear and predetermined sequence from one specified socioeconomic formation to another is to repeat a misreading both by the bourgeois detractors of Marx and his Stalinist followers. Hobsbawmcorrectly argues that: "the general theory of historical materialism requires only that there should be a succession of modes of production, though not necessarily any particular modes, and perhaps not in any particular predetermined order."5 To Marx, a socioeconomic formation is characterized by the mode of production--a specific set of relations among the means of production, social relations of production and the corresponding political and ideological forms. For example, the capitalist mode of production is characterized by mechanized industrial production, two dominant classes, one that owns the means of production and another that sells its labor power to the property owning class, and a number of potential political and ideological forms. Parliamentary democracy is one of these forms, fascism another. The Germanic form (feudalism) is a transitory formation characterized by the petty mode of production in which independent handicraft producers own the means of production and gradually supplant the political, economic and ideological relations IRANIANSTUDIES
38
previously generated by a landed aristocracy in control of a mass of bonded peasant agricultural producers. In other words, feudalism is that socioeconomic formation that contains the germs of future development into capitalism--a free labor force, usurer and merchant capital, and specialized non-agricultural urban craft development.6 Accordingly, I will examine the structure of pastoral nomadism as a dynamic socioeconomic formation that has internal forces of development and that contains both the remnants of previous historical formations and the germs of future developments (survivals and anticipations).7 When dealing with preclass and prestate societies methodological problems arise from the classical Marxist distinction between superstructure and the economic base. The economic base is composed of the means of production and the social relations of production and has, in Marxist theory,
a generally
deterministic
of the superstructure
influence
(the juridical,
on the contours
political,
and ide-
ological structures). As Maurice Godelier points out, Marx treated the means of production and social relations of production as separate structures which together form
the economic infrastructure.8 Tribal
societies
contain
neither
a concrete
super-
structural entity such as the state nor a separate economic sphere that embody the functions articulated by Marx's model. But that is not to say that these functions do not exist or are not necessary for the reproduction of prestate societies. Rather, superstructural functions appear as embedded within the kinship system. Conversely, it is difficult to articulate a specific economic realm of existence in kinship societies that themselves "...cannot define a domain of economic activity with limits that indicate the existence of another domain, that of noneconomic social activity."?9 The Egyptian economist, Samir Amin, describes the interrelationship between economic and non-economic spheres of activity in precapitalist societies:
39
WINTER-SPRING1977
When use values are apprehended directly, it is impossible to conceptualize them as anything but a multiple reality. In precapitalist formations, the abstract concept of use value does not exist (it can be grasped only in relation to its opposite, exchange value); there are only concrete use values, in the plural. Today we understand that these are both individual and social at the same time... .All things, material or immaterial, that meet the needs of social and individual preman are use values. capitalist Thus his various foodstuffs, his tools and utensils, his clothing and shelter, his art objects and collective monuments are all use values, but in the same way so are his means of expressing his scientific ideas, his beliefs (ritual sacrifices, prayers), and his ways of satisfying his emotions and of solving his family and social problems.10 But the tribesman's inability to visualize the economy as a separate structure need not be carried over into modern scholarship. The dialectical unity exchange value/use value is part of our conceptual framework, should we choose to recognize it. The argument that economics and politics form part of an overall totality which cannot be understood in terms of the centrality of the economic base is unable to grasp the dynamic elements in these societies and defines kinship units merely as self reproducing, unchanging organic units.11 On the other hand, empirical materialists who reduce all social structures to epiphenomena of the economy which is in turn reduced to a function of environmental adaptation also cannot grasp the complexities of kinship societies. As Godelier points out: With this view of the matter, the problems presented by the dominance and the plurality of functions of kinship relations or politicoreligious relations remain inaccessible to material analysis. It is impossible to conceive of structures; the specific articulation and IRANIANSTUDIES
40
reciprocal causality is reduced to probabalist correlation and history to a series of events of greater or less frequency.12 Applying the superstructure-base framework to pastoral nomadic societies can better articulate the tensions and tendencies that shape those societies' interaction with external kinship and/or post kinship units. if Marx's model is applicable to kinship societies one recognizes the manifold functions of kinship, i.e., kinship simultaneously forms the economic base and the superstructure. Kinship is economic in that it forms the social relations of production--the actual day-by-day working relations that produce tribal wealth; it is superstructural in that kinship manifests the ideological, juridical and political functions of tribal society.13 Because the economic systems appear to be embedded in the overall relations of society, the superstructural dimension of kinship appears as the dominant characteristic of pastoral nomadic societies, while economic relations lie hidden in the complexities of kinship relations. Because the social relations
of production
are kinship
relations,
"...the
determinant role of the economy does not contradict the dominant role of kinship, but is expressed through it."14 of Marx's model for the Exploring the implications pastoral nomadic form and for Iranian history requires an examination of the nature of pastoral production. Production has two basic functions within the tribal framework: it is production for direct use and production for exchange for needed goods not produced within the tribal economy. Together these two interrelated aspects of production form the economic dimension of the reproduction of the totality of tribal society. Distinguishing between production for use and production for exchange will help articulate the internal relations of tribal society and its interaction with sedentary society because these two aspects of production have institutionalized corollaries within the tribal structure. Production for use tends to articulate economic and social dynamics within the tribe;
41
WINTER-SPRING 1977
production interaction
for exchange tends to articulate with sedentary society.
Production for use expresses
the nature of
the conditions
of a
natural economy, i.e., an economy oriented around production to satisfy the direct needs of the productive units. This is not to imply that there is no process of distribution within the tribal economy, but merely to stress that this process takes place within modes of social interaction unmediated by market relations.15 Although
private property in the form of moveables such as herds, tents, etc., exists within the pastoral nomadic system, it is property that is nevertheless contained by the norms of kinship relations. Property movement from one person to another takes the form of marriage agreements, division among sons when they reach a predetermined stage of maturity, redistribution through the agency of the chiefdom, valorization and exchange in kind, and in some cases shepherding arrangements with payment in kind.16 These forms of property movement are mechanisms for the reproduction of the system as well as distribution of use values for direct consumption. Since tribal production is rather uniform and the division of labor "natural,"'17 i.e., it operates along sex, age, lineage and redistributive functions, the dominant items of exchange among tribal members are grazing animals and women. As LeviStrauss asserts: "the exchange of brides is merely the conclusion to an uninterrupted process of reciprocal gifts, which effects the transition from hostility to alliance, from anxiety to confidence, and from fear to friendship.",18 Kinship perty but also grazing areas not of tivity, the framework
affirms not only the ability to own prothe ability to produce through access to that are the property of the tribal collecindividual tribal It is within members. of the collective ownership of grazing lands
and their inalienability, and the patriarchical control of the basic economic units of society, that tribal economics must be understood. Tribal members confront one another in their daily relations primarily through the mediation
IRANIANSTUDIES
42
of land ownerof kinship relations and the collectivity ship, not through the mediations of marketplace relations and monetary transactions. They confront one another not as mutually independent persons free to dispose of posbut as people sessions through free marketplace relations, is shaped by their position whose economic interaction Thus, commodity exchange within the kinship structure. relations nor is it generneither dominates intratribal ated from within the pastoral nomadic economic structure. Marx's comment on the relation of the commodity form to primitive economies sheds light on the position of exchange in pastoral nomadic communities: Objects in themselves are external to man, and consequently alienable by him. In order that it is only this alienation may be reciprocal, necessary for men, by a tacit understanding, to treat each other as private owners of those alienable objects, and by implication as independent individuals. But such a state of reciprocal independence has no existence in a primitive society based on property in common, whether such a society takes the form of a patriarchal family, an ancient Indian community, or a Peruvian Inca State. first beThe exchange of commodities, therefore, gins on the boundaries of such communities, at their points of contact, with other similar comSo soon, munities, or with members of the latter. however, as products once become commodities in the external relations of a community, they also, by reaction, become so in its internal intercourse.19 If Marx's statement is to be taken at face value, we would expect that commodity exchange, once established in external tribal relations, would then transform the tribal economy into one compatible with or duplicating the relations of commodity exchange. This would result in the destruction of kinship and the integration of tribal society into the large external society, the state. But Marx was referring to a unified process leading from primitive economies to simple commodity exchange to cap-
43
1977 WINTER-SPRING
italism. Indeed, capitalist relations are now destroying kinship systems in Iran and elsewhere. His argument does not necessarily imply the destruction of kinship systems by other precapitalist socioeconomic formations simply because the development of the commodity form is as yet incomplete in these societies. Nevertheless, certain transformations within the tribal structure occurred as a result of the economic interchange with sedentary communities. It is in this context that the superstructural functions of kinship become relevant both to internal tribal structures and to the impact of pastoral nomadic tribes on the of Iran. An examination of production history for exchange will reveal the relations between the superstructural functions of kinship and the interaction of nomadic I will first pastoralism and Iranian history. examine for exchange and then discuss production its structural implications within the tribal framework and in relation to non-tribal society. Pastoral nomadism as a concrete mode of existence did not develop until 1500-1000 B.C., probably because of the late domestication of means of transportation (camels and horses) necessary for sustaining life in the semi-arid grassland zones and because of pressure from the sedentary civilizations in China and the Middle East.20 Its late that pastoral nomadism as a structured development suggests formation developed out of a sedentary exsocioeconomic with animal husistence that combined grain cultivation nomadism The geographical loci of pastoral bandry.21 the Arabian (Central Asia, the Middle Eastern highlands, Desert, and the North African semi-arid zones) suggest a mode of existence that operated on the periphery of mixed economies and that in many ways complemented sedentary is the recoglife. What is important for this analysis interthat pastoral nomadism developed in constant nition of life. change with sedentary However, the institutions the necessities of adoptreflect these nomadic societies and seem to to semi-arid ing grazing patterns grasslands, As Cunnison sugcontain few residues of sedentary life. and nomadism are opposite "settlement gests: conditions, are a response and the institutions of a nomadic society IRANIAN STUDIES
44
to its spatial settlement.22
fluidity,
they relate
to movement and not
Goods produced in sedentary areas are necessities for the perpetuation of nomadic life. These consist primarily of agricultural and handicrafted goods, and form the economic complement to the raising of herds. Spooner points out that: It is well to remember that historical and ethnographic evidence together suggest that there has never been a totally pastoral society, but that non-pastoral products have always been an important part of the diet of pastoralists, and activities associated with acquiring them have figured largely in their annual cycle and division of labor.23 To attain the goods produced in sedentary areas tribal production must, in part, be geared to trade. This does not reflect a case of trading surplus unnecessary for perpetuation of life because the sedentarily produced goods are themselves necessary to tribal society. If the tribesmen cannot obtain these goods by trade, they must seek other means of appropriating them. A potential paucity of goods, either in the tribal or sedentary areas, or a potential breakdown of relations with the sedentary areas encouraged the pastoral nomads to maintain a strong military component capable of forcing the movement of agricultural and handicraft products into tribal hands. Therefore, competition over scarce resources combined with production for exchange were factors that regulated pastoral nomadic relations with the outside world. Because there is little evidence to suggest that the military element transformed the basic socioeconomic structure of pastoral nomadic groups, tribal military practice will not be discussed in this essay.24 Because sedentary goods are necessary for tribal life, production for exchange is an integral tribal activity, yet the means of exchange, the interaction with sedentary society, occurs on the periphery of tribal institutions. Before we can undertake an examination of 45
WINTER-SPRING1977
how this exchange occurs and of its implications for we should analyze the nature of the tribal structures, exchange itself. The exchange of animals and animal by-products for agricultural and handicrafted goods is a simple exchange of commodities from the vantage point of the
tribesman. Simple commodity exchange implies the exchange of use values through the mediation of the money form. The exchange can follow the formula C-M-C (Commodity-money-commodity) or may be a simple barter exchange of use values.25 For the non-tribesman, the exchange may have different implications depending on the degree of complexity of the sedentary society. If, for example, the exchange takes place with a merchant who then resells the tribal products at a higher rate, the exchange then becomes a capital forming transaction (M-C-M') and the tribal goods enter the sphere of marketplace relations.26 What is an exchange of use values for the tribesman becomes a means of increasing capital for the merchant. The existence of merchant capital and the concurrent marketplace conditions is not sufficient to catalyze massive institutional and structural changes in precapitalist societies. Only the transformation of merchant can force the transformato industrial capital capital to meet markettion of precapitalist economic structures
place demands. Moreover, Marx maintains that merchant as long as it operates primarily in localized capital, markets, actually hinders the development towards ca italism and tends to perpetuate precapitalist forms.7 While the merchant measures profitability excluin terms of exchange values, sively i.e., quantitatively, for the market qualitathe tribesman measures production as well. The Soviet economist A. V. Chayanov's tively units that interact work with precapitalist productive is useful the tribal with the marketplace in establishing for exchange. He arperspective concerning production
gues that:
IRANIAN STUDIES
46
In a natural economy, human economic activity is the determined by the requirement of satisfying needs of each single productive unit, which is, at the same time, a consumer unit. Therefore, budgeting here is to a high degree qualitative: for each family need there has to be provided in each economic unit the qualitatively corresponding product in natura. In other words, Chayanov argues that in the precapitalist in terms productive unit, decisions are made not strictly of profitability, but are made to assure the requisitions of basic necessities (use values) and the reproduction of notions of the economic unit according to preestablished the value of labor time. Further production tends to stop when basic needs are realized.29 Following Marx, Chayanov states that: Only with the development of an exchange and money economy does managing lose its qualitative character....As exchange and money circulation (the commodity nature of the economy) increases, quantity becomes more and more independent of quality. It begins to achieve that abstract value of being independent of quality and its specific significance for given demands.30 Chayanov based 'his conclusions about precapitalist economies on his studies of the Russian peasant farm. The agrarian family differs from the tribal productive unit in that it confronts outside society (the marketplace economy) as an isolated entity mediated only by state law, while the tribal productive unit confronts the marketplace mediated by the kinship system. The kinship system, which functions both as the social relations of production and as the means of access to the marketplace, tends to insulate the tribal economy from penetration by marketplace relations. Kinship systems maintain commodity exchange on the periphery of tribal society while perpetuating the production and movement of use values within the society forms of distribution. through established Because of 47
WINTER-SPRING1977
the mediation of the kinship system between pastoral production and the marketplace, the tribal economy tends to to undermining by commodity exchange be less susceptible relations than the privately owned agricultural unit of primary concern to Chayanov. Nevertheless, precapitalist agrarian production for the marketplace and pastoral nomadic production for exchange retain the similarity of of use values and reproducexchange for the acquisition tion of the system rather than the generalized form of commodity exchange. The kinship system regulates both the internal relations of the pastoral nomadic tribe and its relations with the external world. The first function of kinship simultaneously forms the actual social bonds active in production and ensures the perpetuation of the system by mediating the disparate interests of the individual proof the tribe. ductive units with the general interests But consanguinity is not sufficient to serve either as the mediator among the separate productive units or as the intermediary between the tribe and the outside world. Kinship merely defines who is and who is not a member of the tribal unit or of sub-units within the tribe; it contains no internal mechanism to assure tranquility other and normative lines of bride exthan blood relationship change. However, integral to kinship systems is a recognized leadership entity and a substitution process whereby the chiefdom represents the interests of the tribe both in internal and external affairs. It is not the purpose of this essay to examine the manifold origins of tribal leadership. It is, however, of the chiefdom necessary to note that the institution is rooted simultaneously in the kinship structure and in the concomitant natural division of labor, i.e., in the control of individual households and ownerpatriarchical ship of household moveable property and herds. The chiefdom, in the first instance, is an institution reflecting the mutual needs of property owners for shared access to collective the grazing pastures. property--to
IRANIANSTUDIES
48
The chiefdom originated within the context of kinblood ties in ship and serves to perpetuate and solidify the tribal unit. The chieftainship, according to Marshall Sahlins,
"...is
a political
differentiation
order--as kingship is usually a political order [state].tr3l
of a kinship
a kinship differentiation Sahlins continues:
of
and in As it is structurally, so ideologically practice the economic role of the headman is only a differentiation Leaderof kinship morality. ship is here a higher form of kinship, hence a and liberality.32 higher form of reciprocity modes of tribal interThus, not only are the traditional of the chiefdom, but action reproduced in the institution through it they are elevated to the plane of tribal ideology. In the history of Iran between the eleventh and the model outlined above operated nineteenth centuries, in the context of a formal state power that claimed ecoand ideological nomic, political hegemony over society. both relations within Thus, the chieftainship articulated the pastoral nomadic tribes and mediated between them and and the state--or more other regional corporate entities the royal power. The chieftain functioned accurately, within the tribe as: (1) the arbitrator of a system of legality that ensured the maintenance of order and reciprocity; (2) the mediator among the disparate economic units; and (3) the organizer and leader of tribal military As mediator between the tribe and the outside activities. society the chieftain functioned as: (1) the conduit for external ideological, and cultural forces; (2) religious the agency of interaction between his tribe and other tribes and sedentary groups; and (3) the representative of tribal affairs with the ruling power. The chieftain then functioned to maintain the traditional modes of interaction which were rooted in the production and the distribution of use values, and to mediate between the tribe and the outside world, a func49
1977 WINTER-SPRING
tion that was rooted in commodity exchange relations. Acting in the interests of the tribe, the chieftain entered into a number of economic and political relations with the external world which, on the one hand, acted to secure continued tribal access to the marketplace and continued tribal control of grazing lands, and on the other hand, created a private space for the chieftain in the larger, external society. Therefore, the tribal chieftain operated in each of two distinct yet interrelated socioeconomic formations, as a "public" personage in the realm of the state, and as a member, albeit chieftain, of a closed kinship unit. If we keep in mind that the chieftain acted as the representative of corporate tribal interests, we can see that the interaction of tribalism with sedentary society occurred through the "public" dimension of the chieftainship. The private space of the tribal chieftain developed primarily through relations between the tribe and the state in the following way. First, the state sought to maintain political stability between nomadic and sedentary elements--a stability that was constantly threatened by the needs of the pastoralists to extend grazing lands and to insure continued access to sedentarily produced goods. Second, the state relied on tribal military power. Finally, .the state enlisted tribal leadership to act as the governing agency in areas outside the control of the central bureaucracy. The state assigned political positions to tribal chieftains who then assumed a series of functions and established a set of relations that were external to tribal leadership and in many ways were opposed to the basic economic and political needs generated by the kinship system. As the "public" personage of the tribal khan created private opportunities for amassing wealth and political power in the larger, non-tribal society, it also created an entre into the closed kinship system of the pastoral nomadic unit for the royal power. The shah initially granted and reconfirmed each succession to tribal chieftain, and state office. tiyuldar, The cen-
IRANIANSTUDIES
50
tral authority invariably played tribal factions against one another in selecting the chieftain and in general tried to weaken the authority of the tribal khan. During periods when the royal house was unusually strong, nontribesmen actually replaced legitimate tribal khans, e.g., during the reign of Shah Abbas ghulam administrators received appointments to the chieftainship of several Turkoman tribes. A similar event occurred when Nasir al-Din Shah, finding it difficult to control the Qashqa'i, created a counter confederation (Khamseh) and appointed a member of the merchant-bureaucrat Qavami family head of the confederation.33 However, because of their dependence on tribal military levies, their need to protect frontiers and their fear of rebellion, the shahs usually conformed to normative kinship lines of succession but chose the candidate least likely to cause trouble as chieftain. The interference of the crown in tribal affairs often resulted in intra-tribal conflict and rebellion against the crown because the chieftainship entailed not only the leadership of the tribal corporate entity but also access to personal wealth and aggrandizement. The marriages made by Muhammad Hasan Khan Qajar both the tribal and "public" posi(1729-58) illustrate tions of the tribal chieftain. His first wife was a member of his own clan, the cuvanlu Qajars, the second was from the Davallu Qajars, 4 a rival clan, the third was from another Qajar clan,35 the fourth was from a Kurdish tribe in Astarabad (home province of the Quvanlu and Davallu Qajars), and the fifth from the landholding nobility of the same province.36 Later marriages included the sister of the governor of the province Gilan,37 and a woman from the landholding nobility of the area surrounding Isfahan.38 The significance of these marriages lies not in that they follow the course of Muhammad Hasan Qajar's career but in that they were actual factors in the solidification of his leadership of the Qajar tribe, his claim to the governorship of Astarabad and Mazandaran and his losing struggle for the throne. The first marriage took place within the context of immediate Quvanlu 51
WINTER-SPRING 1977
Qajar kinship relations and affirmed Muhammad Hasan's claim to the chieftainship; the second and third marriages helped in establishing control over the entire Qajar tribe; the later marriages represented an attempt to reinforce his position as governor and landowner in Astarabad and Mazandaran and his claim to the throne of Iran. The appointment to a governorship or an other administrative position extended the activities of the chieftain beyond parochial limits of the kinship system to direct involvement with the diverse elements of sedentary society. As governor, the tribal chieftain received grants of land and presided over an administration that was responsible for the collection of local taxes and the supervision of public safety. This provided the chieftain with the opportunity to amass wealth and political power outside of his tribal base, namely, through the ownership of agricultural taxation powers, villages, control over local merchants, leadership of the provincial bureaucracy, and monopoly over local legitimate military power. The chieftain's property within the tribal framework continued to be based on kinship modes of distribution, while accrual of non-tribal property resulted from his position as landowner and from his political relationship to the market sector of the ecowithin the closed kinnomy. Political responsibilities ship system persisted, while on the national level the chieftain became part of a fragmented ruling class which included other tribal leaders, large landowners, members of the upper echelon of the bureaucracy, religious leaders and members of the royal family. this situaThe following example will illustrate tion. The Qajar khans governed the provinces of Mazandaran and Astarabad (Gurgan) during the late seventeenth and As provincial throughout most of the eighteenth century. governors they controlled the administration of the important agrarian and commercial centers of the eastern in these Caspian provinces, supervised tax collection areas, received large grants of cultivated land from the
IRANIANSTUDIES
52
and their government, and employed an Iranian bureaucracy In return, forces to insure local acquiescence. own tribal the for the shahs, protected they governed these provinces from Central Asia, and proCaspian borders from invasion authorfor the central soldiers vided a set levy of tribal income and personal ity. While the Qajar khans collected there is no evidence to governors, property as provincial income from that they obtained any significant indicate because On the contrary, wealth. the surplus of tribal support on their tribe for military the Qajar khans relied and and to pursue their broader political both locally and attempted to strengthen aims, they maintained military that only after the Quvanlu tribal It is significant ties. did they attempt to regovernorships Qajar khans received solve the conflict between the two major branches of the tribe.39 the tribal group developed Through the chieftainship not the limited needs a national that reflected perspective of the chiefbut the interests of pastoral nomadic society Indeed, in ruling class. tain as a member of the national their pohave realized chieftains some cases where tribal memaccrued to the tribal ambitions, some benefits litical bers. But for the most part, these did not extend beyond of the inclusion of close kinsmen into the upper hierarchy and National the national and military. administration the balance of such as maintaining considerations dynastic of the tribal against massive extension power mitigated In tribe. and economic status of any particular political of the Qajar tribe this context we should note the decline On the other hand, the failduring the Qajar monarchy.40 ambihis political to realize ure of a tribal chieftain tions has often seriously the economic status threatened of surrounding pastorof his tribe, to the benefit usually alist groups. seem to have outweighed considerations Thus political in involving pastoral nomadic groups in economic interests to be However, what appears superficially Iranian history. the result of a process has been, in reality, politics, kinof the tribal structure generated by the socioeconomic society. with sedentary ship system and its interrelationship 53
WINTER-SPRING1977
While production for use reproduced kinship relations, production for exchange initiated contact with sedentary society through the political differentiation of kinship, the chiefdom. An interchange then developed between tribal and national superstructural entities. The chieftain vacillated between a superstructural function within a closed socioeconomic formation based on the natural division of labor and superstructural status in a highly fragmented society containing large sectors characterized by a more complex division of labor and concurrent class rule. However, sedentary society, especially the agrarian sector, approximated the tribal structure in that villages were also isolated, relatively self-contained structures 41 with their own local hierarchies (landowners and kadkhudas) But the social relations of production in the villages differed from those of pastoral In nomadic society nomadism. the kinship unit held claim to the grazing pastures, while in the villages landlords owned and controlled the means of production (the land) while the peasants worked it. Thus, the landlords appropriated a surplus, a large portion of which eventually under conentered the marketplace ditions different from those of pastoral-sedentary exchange. This agrarian surplus, along with the by-products of pastoral sheepherding, urban handicraft and the proproduction ceeds of large-scale trading activities formed the economic surplus of Iranian society. Discord over control of the limited surplus of society within the fragmented national ruling class then drew the pastoral nomadic group into the conflict for state power and the throne. Achieving royal chieftain power allowed the erstwhile tribal to claim the lion's share of the surplus, initiated but, ironically, minimal change in the structure of pastoral nomadic society. Seen in this context, Agha MuhammadQajar can no longer appear in Iranian history merely as a wizened, wealth; nor stingy eunuch greedily the national coveting can Karim Khan Zand continue to be singularly as depicted a tribal "diamond in the rough" bestowing patronage to the as well arts. and dynastic Rather, these tribal figures, as others, must be seen as manifestations of a constant reladynamic in Iranian history the structured involving IRANIAN STUDIES
S4
tions between two distinct socioeconomic formations--one characterized by the natural division of labor and kinship relations and the other characterized by a more complex division of labor and class rule. This essay has attempted to establish a framework for understanding the role of pastoral nomadism in Iranian history. Uncovering the specific manifestations of that role in specific periods of history is an enormous task dependent on expertise in particular periods and aspects of Iranian history. Nevertheless, we can draw some general conclusions if we bear in mind the following points: (1) since the eleventh century, pastoral nomadic tribes have composed a permanent element in Iranian society amounting approximately to one-fourth of the total population; (2) the structure of pastoral nomadism has been distinct from the sedentary agricultural, productive and commercial sectors yet simultaneously has interacted constantly with them on the economic and political levels; (3) pastoral nomads dominated military life from the eleventh through the nineteenth centuries (the Safavid ghulam army can be understood only as an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the military monopoly of the tribes); (4) the perpetuation of the military of the tribes strength was rooted in the pastoral nomadic mode of production; and (5) pastoral nomadism constantly reinforced the compartmentalized nature of Iranian society. Below I will sketch the dominant economic and political implications of pastoral nomadism for Iranian history. The economy: the regularized economic interchange between nomadic and sedentary elements of society did little to alter the basic economic institutions once a balance between the sectors had been achieved. However, that balance itself has been tenuous historically. Since agriculture and pastoralism competed for land and the precapitalist Iranian economy was one based primarily on land utilization, the relative strength of pastoral nomadism vis-a-vis sedentary agriculture became an important factor in determining the size of the agrarian surplus necessary to sustain urban development. The impact on the economy
55
WINTER-SPRING1977
resulting from the increased pastoral nomadic presence from in two interrethe eleventh century on manifested itself one directly affecting the technical means lated processes: of production, viz., the conversion of arable and irrigated lands to pasturage; the other affecting the social relations of production, viz., the reinforcement of landlordism by the tribal khans. In addition, pastoral nomadism strengthened geographic and ethnic localism and the structural Thus, pastoral compartmentalization of Iranian society. surplus nomadism both reduced the flow of the agricultural to to the urban areas and made that flow more difficult In summary, pastoral nomadism achieve where it did exist. simultaneously retarded primitive capital accumulation the semi-feudal relations between landwhile solidifying lord and peasant. The permanence of the nomadic sector between the eleventh and the nineteenth centuries was a factor in rendering economic development imsignificant structure of Iran remained possible and the precapitalist stagnant in comparison with its Western European counterparts. the presence of pastoral structure: The political nomadism retarded the development of a national ruling centralized monarchy. The estabclass and an effective, lishment of the absolute monarchy in late feudal Europe represented a developed stage both in the domination of of a class the landholding nobility (in its consolidation matrix and in a new institutional both in and for itself) that facilitated the gradual development of the bourgeoisie and the capitalist mode of production. By contrast, in Iran, pastoral nomadism reinforced the horizontal disunity Perry of society by further dividing the ruling elements. Anderson argues that: For the apparent paradox of Absolutism in Western Europe was that it fundamentally represented an power apparatus for the protection of aristocratic and privileges, yet at the same time the means wherehis) (italics by this protection could simultaneously of the nascent mercantile ensure the basic interests and manufacturing classes.42
IRANIANSTUDIES
56
In Iran, the aristocratic, landholding class was itself divided between native Iranian landholders, tribal chieftains and the crown. Military power, however, rested in the hands of the tribal khans who relied not on control of the peasantry to raise troops but on their role as leaders within the pastoral nomadic socioeconomic structures. Thus, the protection of their "property and privileges" was rooted in pastoral nomadism, a system that produced little in the way of real property or wealth for the tribal chieftain. This system, in itself, threatened the well-being of agriculture, and, by definition, isolated itself from other territorial kinship units (other pastoral nomadic tribes) and from the native landlordpeasant structure. The tribal khans could not successfully participate in a general and permanent alliance with the landholding elements in society, either the Iranian landholding aristocracy or other tribal khans. This made the formation of a national landholding class and a concomitant effective absolutism all but impossible. In turn, the middle classes also fell subject to the local domination of tribal khans within the context of an overall politico-economic system which mitigated against the formation of national institutions that could encourage capital accumulation and the emergence of a national middle class. Thus, pastoral nomadism served as a factor that significantly retarded the political as well as the economic development in Iran.
NOTES
Methodologically this paper relies heavily on the work of Marx and contemporary Marxist writers. The informaation concerning Iranian tribalism has been obtained primarily from published anthropological of studies various Iranian and other pastoral nomadic tribes and from my own study of the origins of the Qajar dynasty, of the Qajar Dynasty: The i.e., L. Helfgott, Origins Political
Economy
(unpublished
of
Tribalism
in
18th
Century
Persia
manuscript).
57
WINTER-SPRING1977
2.
K. Marx, Grundrisse, trans. by M. Niclaus (London: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 472-76; see also K. Marx, Pre-Capitalist
Economic
troduction Publishers, 3.
K. Marx,
The Ethnological
transcribed and edited Goreum and Co., 1972). 4.
K. Marx,
ed.
with
an in-
Karl
Marx,
by L. Krader (Assen:
Notebooks
Van
A Contribution
Economy (Chicago: 11-12. 5.
Formations,
by E. Hobsbawn (New York: International 1964), Introduction, pp. 19-27.
Hobsbawm,
to
the
Critique
Kerr and Co.,
Charles
Economic
Pre-Capitalist
of
of
Political
1904),
Formations,
pp.
pp.
19-
20. 6.
Marx,
7.
E. Terray,
Grundrisse,
497-504.
pp.
Marxism
and Primitive
Monthly Review Press, 8.
M. Godelier,
mics 107. 9.
1972),
and Irrationality
Rationality
(New York:
Societies
Monthly Review Press,
S. Amin, "In Praise of Socialism," (Sentember 1974), p. 4.
10.
Ibid.,
11.
See for example, tive
(New York:
p. 29. in Econo-
1973),
pp.
103-
Monthly Review
3-4.
pp.
Society,"
G. Dalton, American
"Economic Theory and Primi-
Anthropologist
(1961),
pp.
1-25.
xxxiv.
12.
Godelier,
13.
and Contradiction in M. Godelier, "System, Structure Capital," Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press, 1967), p. 112.
14.
Ibid.
Rationality,
IRANIAN STUDIES
p.
58
15.
distribution as "... Godelier defines operations those that determine in a given society the forms of appropriation and use of the conditions of production and of its outcome, the social product." Rationality, p. 269.
16.
in Economic Organization: A W. Irons, "Variation Yomut and the Basseri," Comparison of the Pastoral on Nomadism,
Perspectives
son-Hudson
E. J.
(Leiden:
ed.
by W. Irons
Brill,
1972),
and N. Dy-
pp. 92-94.
17.
I am succtumbing to traditional usage of the concept of of labor. the natural division There is, indeed, nothing "natural" about the sexual division of labor in pre-class societies.
18.
C. Levi-Strauss,
(London:
The Elementary
Eyre and Spottiswoode
19.
K. Marx, Capital, Vol. Publishers Co., 1967),
20.
M. Sahlins, Tribesmen Prentice-Hall, 1968),
21.
Ibid.
22.
Cunnison,
University
Ltd.,
I (New York: p. 87. (Englewood p. 33.
Nomads and the
of Hull
Structures
Press,
Cliffs,
p.
Kinship
p. 67.
International
Nineteen-Sixties
1967),
of
1969),
N.J.:
(Hull:
16.
23.
B. Spooner, "Towards a Generative Model of Nomadism," Anthropological Quarterly 44 (July, 1971), p. 201.
24.
No analysis of Iranian history since the eleventh century can omit the role of tribal military power in shaping the political of Iran, and indeed, history one finds endless of conflicts descriptions or conquests. However, the socioeconomic underpinnings of tribal both within the tribe and in Iranimilitarism, an society as a whole, remain virtually ignored.
25.
Marx,
Capital,Vol.
I,
p.
59
105. WINTER-SPRING1977
26.
Ibid.
27.
Marx, Capital,
28.
A. V. Chayanov, "On the Theory of Non-Capitalist Economic Systems," in A. V. Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy, ed. by D. Thorner, B. Kerblay and R. E. F. Smith, for the American Economic Association (Homewood, Ill.: R. D. Irwin, 1966), p. 4.
29.
See also, M. Sahlins, Stone Aldine, 1972), p. 91.
30.
Chayanov, Systems,"
31.
Sahlins,
32.
Ibid.
33.
P. Oberling, The Qashqagi' 65. 1974), p.
Nomads of
34.
M. Siphir, Lisan al-Mulk, (Tehran, 1966), p. 28.
Naslkh
35.
S.
36.
Siphir,
37.
Ibid.
38.
Ibid.,
39.
See my Rise of 1972. tation,
40.
Much is made of the Qajarization of the administration during the early nineteenth Less known was century. the murder or exile by Aqa MuhammadQajar of all of his half-brothers in order to secure the throne for
Vol.
III.,
(Chicago:
Age Economics
"On the Theory of Non-Capitalist p. 4. Stone
Age Economics,
Tirlkh-i Naflsi, Ijtimcl (Tehran, 1966), p. 39. N.T.,
p.
pp. 325-337.
p.
Economic
132.
Fars
(The Hague,
al-Tavar7kh,
va Siy3sl-i
Irann,
Vol.
I
Vol.
I, p. 28.
42.
IRANIAN STUDIES
the
Qajar
60
Dynasty,
unpublished
disser-
I
Fath Ali Qajar; it is still not clear what happened to the members of the Qajar tribe during the nineteenth as a pastoral century when the tribe itself disappeared nomadic unit. 41.
E. Abrahamian, Personal Communication, January, 1975. The Case of Qajar See also his "Oriental Despotism: Iran," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. V, No. 1 (January, 1974), pp. 3-31.
42.
P. Anderson., Lineages 1974),
of the Absolutist
State
(London,
p. 40.
61
WINTER-SPRING1977
IranianStudies,Volume X, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring1977.
Notes
the
on
Obligations 300-1600
Economic of
Peasants
in
Iran,
A.D. FarhadNomani
In a previous paper, on the basis of the definition of feudalism as a mode of production, it was shown that the of Iranian peasants in the period extra-economic obligations between the fourth and the seventeenth centuries resembled those obtaining under feudalism, though these obligations exhibited, also, certain peculiarities that could be attriIn buted to the specific conditions of Iranian history.1 the present paper, I will examine the other aspect of the exploitative feudal relations in Iran for the same period, i.e., the eccnomic obligations of peasants to landlords and the state in the form of feudal rent. I will examine, more specifically, the extent of and the forms in which rent was exacted from the peasants by the landowning class and the state during the period in question.
The
of
Development
Muzaracah
in The basic form of exploitation of the peasants Iran during most of the period under consideration was muzaracah
ing sowing).
(muzaraCah
comes from
However,
the
in certain
arabic
cases
Farhad Nomani is Assistant of Tehran. University
Professor
IRAINIANSTUDIES
62
word zar
mean-
the distributive
of Economics
at the
In all relation was based on the payment of a fixed rent. cases the landlords received the rent either in kind or in in areas close to the cities. cash, especially While the concept
of muz3racah
has undergone
some
changes in the different periods of Iranian history, it of the peashas always been the basic form of exploitation ants. To be free under Islamic law, peasants depended on the landlords as tenants or subtenants, and in most cases Their land tenure was based, in as hereditary tenants. theory, on a contract of muzaraCah, with a share of the crop serving as rent.2 This dominance
of muz3ra Cah in Iran was due to the
fact that the landowners did not have any demense farming As a result landlords of their own for grain production.3 did not play a major role in the organization of agriculFor the same reason, labor rent never tural production. It existed, however, as an became an important practice. as forced labor for the construction auxiliary rent, i.e., or repair of underground and ground canals, roads, the lord's garden, etc.4 -C
state, milk, iqta i.e., Lands of all categories, and waqf lands, were divided into small holdings worked by dependent peasants under various conditions of tenancy. However, the five-part division of the harvest between the landlord and the peasant (one part each for the land, and labor), coming indraught animals, seed, irrigation, to existence at a much later period, is not mentioned in Even in the more recent period, the medieval sources.5 Thus, acthis mode of crop-sharing was rarely observed. cording to Lambton: Traditionally, five elements are taken into account in dividing the crop: land, water, draught animals, seed, labour; in principle one share is allotted to each element and goes to whoever provides that elemore than a ment. In fact, however, this is little and the actual division, theoretical abstraction, although it is materially affected by the ownership and provision of these different elements, is seldom 63
1977 WINTER-SPRING
made on the basis of the allotment shares for each element.6
of five
equal
The exact forms of the rent during the Sassanid period are not known. However, inasmuch as the word muz5raCah is not mentioned in the Quran, it is possible that Moslems took this institution from Iranians. It is known also that Arabs entered into muzaraCah contracts with Iranian peasants in Azerbaijan,7 and crop-sharing agreements reportedly existed in Mesopotamia before the Moslem conquests.8 In the first century of the Arab occupation in Iran, was legally a short-term "contract" between the landlord and the tenant. However, in most cases in real life peasants were not treated as ordinary tenants paying rent for a fixed number of years, but held the land at the mercy of the landlord. Their dependence, as tenants, on the landlords was often of a hereditary nature, and theX could be ousted by the landlords according to his will.
muzaraCah
There were many arguments among fiqh scholars with regard to the appropriate tenancy rights and on whether a landlord should receive a fixed rent or a portion of the crop. However, in all likelihood these arguments were purely speculative and did not influence tenancy rights as practiced in the real world. Both systems were established and had their roots back in the Babylonian times.10 It is "impossible to imagine that the tradition should have been stopped by this futile pendantry."111 During the eighth century, muzara cah contracts in 12 many cases seems to have been limited to one or two years. But, there were other types of tenants, called akkar, who had no fixed leases. They had the least favorable "contracts" and usually did not own any implements of producOn the contrary, muz5tion such as draught animals.13 raC3n or barzegaran usually owned their seeds and draught animals. These two groups were the main strata within the peasant class.14 The share of muzaraC3n in their produce depended on the power of the landlords, the tradition IRANIAN STUDIES
64
of the surrounding areas and the fertility of the land. In addition, the provision of seed, irrigation, or draught animal by the landlords could reduce the proportion of the output going to the tenants.15 In regions adjacent to towns, the rent was usually half in kind and half in cash. The share of the landlord was called bahre-yi malikaneh. Besides, labor rent existed as an auxiliary rent in the form of forced labor (big5ri) for the benefit of the state and the landlords. Crop-sharing for the produce of trees was called Theoretically, musaqat was a contract between the owner of trees and the peasants in return for a specified undivided share of the produce, i.e., fruit, leaves, flowers, etc. Some of the early jurists disapproved of this contract, but it was well established during the period under consideration.16
musaqat.
Crop-sharing agreements were known to Arabs before they invaded Iran. For example, according to Abu Yusuf and Yahya Ben Adam the lands in Khaybar were divided into thirty six shares. Eighteen shares were divided among the Moslems and the prophet. The other eighteen shares were reserved for the current needs and emergencies.17 Thus,
Abiu Yiusuf, quoting
the dictum of Abu Salih,
states: When the Prophet conquered Khayber its owners asked him to leave the lands in their possession. As they had more experience in cultivation than the Muslims the prophet agreed to it against their undertaking to give half of its yield and to be ready for eviction any time it was decided.18 It is their
cording
also known that cUmar, Abui Bakr and cUthman rented lands "for a third and a fourth of the yield."119 State lands were sometimes to Yahya Ben Adam:
65
let
to muz5raC3n.
Ac-
WINTER-SPRING1977
CUmar b. cAbd al-cAziz wrote: Inquire about the safiya (state) land under your control and give it on a muz3raCa lease for half of the yield, but that which cannot be leased in this way give for a third of the crops. If it has been left without cultivation, give it (at a lower rate) until you reach onetenth.1-0 C-
At the time of the Abbassids, muzara an were liable to pay between one-half and two-thirds of the output, depending on the power of the landlords, the fertility of the land, and the tradition of surrounding regions. Furthermore, the provision of seed, irrigation or draught animals by the landlords could reduce the share of the peasants. It is known that in the ninth century A.D. the share of the output was cut to a sixth or a seventh if the tenants were provided with seeds.21 However, it is clear that despite this reduction the share of the peasants was not determined according to the five-part division of the harvest. in Not much is known about the share of peasants during the time of Iranian local dynasties (861-1040 A.D.) and Seljuqs (1021-1157 A.D.). However, it is clear that during this period crop-sharing under the system of muzaraCah existed.22 For example, in a dlv3n for the office diploma issued by Sanjar's of ra"'7s of Mazandaran, landlords and crop-sharing peasants are mentioned, and the grantee of the diploma is ordered to observe equal treatment between the arbabs and shuraka and supervise Fixed rent also over their agreements.23 existed in this period, but it was not very prevalent.24 muz5raCah
Under the Mongols, muz3raCah again was the basic form of exploitation The rent paid by of the peasants. these dependent peasants was mostly a share of the crop, and in regions adjacent to cities it was half in kind and half in money. Vassaf and Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah of the muzaraCah system in the state lands
IRANIAN STUDIES
66
give examples under the
Ilkhanids (1256-1336 A.D.).25 According to the decree of Ghazan Khan concerning military holders were fiefs,iqtdC to pay one-tenth of the produce of the land to the obliged state, and "divide the rest with their muzaraCin.tv26 Va**df informs us that at the time of Atabak Sacd Ibn Zangi the state used to receive one-half of the agricultural output in the irrigated lands if the peasants were provided seed by the d1van.27 It is also known that the peasants on the state lands, which were provisionally held by people in the Arab Iraq, received one-third of the crop. The remainder was divided equally between the state and the lease-holder.28 In general, the size of the feudal rent seems not to have been proportional to the peasants' income, but rather determined mostly by the condition of extra-economic compulsions of the peasants and the existing traditions. This peculiarity in the muzaracah is clearly observable system, and it shows the feudal characteristics of the surplus exaction (rent in kind and money) in the period under consideration.
Changes
in
Rent
and Taxation
had to pay a Landlords of private estates (milk) land tax to the government. They collected thetax in their In such cases the surplus from the land rental share. was divided between the state and the lord. Rent inclusive of tax was paid to the landlords on waqf and most of the iqt5Cs. If the iqtgc holder was not exempt from the tax, the surplus was divided between the state and the lord. However, when the producer was not confronted by a private but was directly landlord, subordinate to the state in the state lands (especially after the Arab invasion when some of the lands became state lands), rent and taxes coincided. In such cases there was no tax which differed from the ground rent. The Sassanids (227-651 A.D.) basically had two kinds of taxes: a general tax on land called kharag, and a polltax, at rates varying according to the degree of wealth and 67
WINTER-SPRING1977
status in social estates. Noblemen were exempt from these taxes.29 Kharag was paid in kind till the time of the At the time Sassanian king Qubad (early sixth century).30 of Qubad taxes were demanded in money, even though the historiem Tabarl states that this practice started under Qubad's son, Khusraw I.31 However, in practice land tax was received both in kind and money since natural economy was dominant and some of the agricultural products were put aside for the upkeep of the army and the administration. The existing sources provide very limited information on the rates of land tax under the Sassanids. According to Tabarl till the time of Khusraw I one-sixth to onethird of the produce of the land was taxed. The rate of this tax was determined by the type of the crops cultivated and the distance of the farms from the cities. At the time of Khusraw I taxes were assessed by measuring the land under cultivation for the grains, vineyards and trefoil. Taxes on date-palms and fruit trees were assessed by the number of trees. Grain paid one dirham per jari b (1.7 acres), and trevineyards eight dirhams per jarlb, foil seven dirhams per jar-lb. Persian date-palms and olives were taxed one dirham per four trees and one dirhams per six trees, respectively. Payments of these taxes were to be made in three installments per annum.32 After the Arab invasion this system seems to have been retained, though the tax rates probably increased. For example, according to Mawardi, at the time of the second Cabiph CUmar the tax rates were fixed at four dirhams for wheat, two dirhams for barley, five dirhams for trefoil, etc. on the area of land Kharaj was assessed held, and was collected in cash and in kind. This system of taxation was enforced until the reign of the Abbassid caliph Al-Mansur.33 C
Muzara ah peasants and the ahl-i zimmahs paid a poll tax in addition to the land tax, according to two different schedules. Thus, to remain exempt from the poll tax, the noble landlords declared their allegiance to the Moslem faith. The owners of flocks and bedouins also had IRANIAN STUDIES
68
4 As far as to pay a poll tax according to two schedules. land tax was concerned, the system established in the greater part of Iran was one of fixed tribute, which was to be paid by local Persian rulers who were maintained in office. These local rulers did not experience interference from the conquerors in matters of tax administration. The tax payers, therefore, continued to be charged on the basis of the Sassanid tax system. The local rulers collected the taxes at their discretion and paid the Arabs the agreed-upon tributes.35 Under the Umayyads (661-750 A.D.) extraordinary taxes were levied in addition to the poll tax and kharaj. This practice was continued under the Abbassids, and some other dues were also added to them. Until the time of the Umayyads most of the land revenues from Iran were spent within the Iranian domain. Umayyads changed this tradition. Hence the larger part of khar5j and other taxes and dues exacted from the peasants and the city dwellers left the conquered territories and was spent in Damascus and, later, in Baghdad. No doubt such a policy retarded the growth of the productive forces in the conquered countries, a state of affairs that continued until the decline of the Abbasids. Thus the rise of the first independent in Iran brought about dynasties economic and social developments in the country that could be explained, at least in part, in terms of the land revenues not leaving the country.36 According-to scholars of fiqh the land tax was paid at two rates. There were Cushr, a tenth of the produce, and the higher rate of kharaj, which varied from a fifth to two-thirds, being often half of the output.37 It appears that Cushr was paid by the Moslem landlords, whereas khar5j was paid by the non-Moslem landlords and peasants on state lands in the late seventh century A.D.38 Financial difficulties of the caliphs in the eighth century necessitated that Moslem landlords also pay a higher land tax than Cushr.39 Not much information exists about the actual rates of taxation in different regions. It is clear, however, that the rates and method of assessment were not uniform 69
WINTER-SPRING1977
It is known, of the empire. provinces in the different that in the second half of the eighth cenfor instance, tury the rates which were imposed on state lands in Sawad lands, oneof the produce on unirrigated were one-half by dal 7eh, and a quarter on land third on land irrigated by diulab. 40 Apparently cAzud al-Dawleh, irrigated the land tax in the Buyid, added ten percent to the original Taxes were mostly assecond half of the tenth century. sessed on the area of the land or as a share of the crop, and were levied in cash or in cash and kind.41 the time of the Most of the land in Fars till Buyids in the tenth century was in the hands of local These just as during the Sassanid period. aristocrats, Their to kharaj or Cushr. were milk lands and subjected from the divided the income which they received landlords tenants between the state and themselves. rates varied in difkharij According to Istakhri, The tax. Shiraz paid the highest areas of Fars. And usuof Kuvar was lower than that of Shiraz. kharaj the rate for crops crops paid one-third ally unirrigated In the same province and the same by canals.42 irrigated as a share of the time, the land tax could be assessed The taxes paid by crop, under either of two regulations. the nomad leaders who had documents from cUmar, CAll, and or one-quarter one-third, other caliphs, were one-tenth, In other places of Fars, the d'van fixed the of the crop. Royal domains in Fars lands. rate for state or private either a porwere payin to the Buyid rulers) (belonging tion of the crop or a fixed rate in money. ferent
When the iqt3C system developed under the caliphs, the tax (rent) which was rethe Abbassids, especially or officials ceived by the state was given to the soldiers was assigned rather Later, when the land itself (muqtaCs). the rent directly. received the assignees than its revenue, the income turned over to the muqtaC was, like Initially, consisted his benefice all Moslem income, subject to tithe; and the of the difference between the kharaj he collected to tithe he paid. However, it soon became very difficult Thus, the Buyids ofobtain the t ithe from the grantee. IRANIAN STUDIES
70
distributed ficially free of any financial iq13c obligaThis custom gradually tions. spread over other parts of Moslem Asia.44 Thus under the iqt5C system rent in the form of kharaj, in money or in kind, plus other either dues levied by the muqtaCs on peasants, was wholly received by the muqtaCs. However, on state domains, which became smaller and smaller as the Buyids and the Seljuqs distributed them as iqt5C, tax (kharaj or (7ushr) was still collected in cash or in kind by government tax collectors.45 Under the Mongols muzaraCah was again the basic form of exploitation of the peasants. The rent paid by these dependent peasants was mostly a share of the crop, but in regions near the cities it was half in kind and half in money.46 In general, rent and taxes remained the same as
before,
and the holders
of suyuirghal,
milk-i
hurr,
and
were exempt from the payment of any tax or due. However, the holders of these lands collected a number of other dues in addition to the rent. Neither the iqt1c landlords nor the royal family paid any taxes to the government, though the latter, having inju3 land, received taxes from the peasants themselves. However, on milk and reclaimed waste lands the income from land was divided between the state and the landlord in fixed proportion. waqf
It is known from the tax regulations of Khuzistan that the treasury took sixty percent of the harvest on state owned land and ten percent from milk lands, both in If one can assume that peasants working on milk kind. lands paid sixty percent of their crop to their landlords, one may infer that the latter derived fifty percent after the state's ten percent share had been paid to the treasThe remaining forty percent of the crop went to the ury. peasants for their subsistence and seeds. Qazvlnl states that peasants in Arab Iraq received one-third of the crop, while the remainder was divided equally between the state and the lease-holder.47 In one of the Jalayirid documents the rate of kharaj on private estates is set at twenty percent of the harvest in kind, according to the custom of the province. Apart from the basic khar5j there was also (asl) a surcharge The latter (farc). was supposed to be one71
WINTER-SPRING1977
tenth of the basic kharaj, according to Vassaf; howeVer, Nasir al-Din Tusi states that farC was one-tenth to twotenths of the basic khara j.48 Contemporary authors have maintained that, during the Mongol rule, rent in money had lost much of its importance. This is attributed to the destructive impact of the invasion on the economy and the decrease in commodity production in the cities. Rashid al-Din, aaifl and Qazvini all discussed the kharaj of Khuzistan, Khurasan, Karaj and Fars as having been in kind.49 It is evident that Rashid al-Din himself received rents from his numerous milks in kind.50 Despite the dominance of rent in kind, money rent existed in regions near the large towns. For example, land tax in Baghdad had to be paid in money.51 The same was true in Shiraz.52 It should be mentioned that the obligations of the producers were much more than paying the kharaj or the poll-tax under the Abbassids, Seljuqs and Mongols. Extraordinary levies resembling those under the Sassanids were made, including forced labor for the lord or the state, drafts made on provinces, carriage duties, presents to the lord or the officials. Such obligations existed throughout the period under consideration, but they never reached the extent of the Mongol period. In fact, during the Mongol period, the general tendency was for all taxes to increase,53 with the major burden falling on the peasants and the urban poor. The upper classes, the people of the sword and the pen, were either exempt from taxes or passed them onto the muz3raCgn of their estates.54 This does not mean, however, that taxes increased continuously from the time of the Arab invasion. Peasants' resistance or reductions in the revenues of the ruling class caused by temporary setbacks, led to reductions or adjustments in taxes from time to time. For instance, during the time of the Abbassids in the ninth century, kharaj was so ruinous that it caused great troubles for the ruling classs. Refusal of the more powerful subjects to pay this tax meant higher taxes for the producing classes. And, when the peasants refused to pay these taxes, they were collected by force. There are frequent references to the kharaj payers, mostly peasants IRANIANSTUDIES
72
Overtaxaon state lands, who refused to pay the tax.55 tion and various abuses by the ruling class caused wideamong the peasant masses, making spread dissatisfaction Thus, it more and more dangerous for the former class. for example, a decree issued in 820 A.D., under Mamuin set the maximumtax on state lands (the Abbassid caliph), In another instance, during at two-thirds of the crop.56 the time of the Ilkhans' rule in the early fourteenth century, faced with the destruction of the country's agriculture as a result of exorbitant taxes, Ghazan attempted to control the situation, though his reforms did not bring about any significant clhanges in the conditions.57 The most important of Ghazan's reforms aimed at fixing a precise sum for each particular area in money or in kind to be paid in spring and autumn, the abolition of drafts (which was only temporary) on peasants, plus the abolition or reduction of certain dues. Reasons behind these reforms are clearly expressed by Ghazan in a speech made to the Mongol-Turkish military and nomad aristocracy: If I am not on the side of the [Iranian] raCiyyat. there is a purpose in pillaging them all, there is no one with more power to do this than I. Let us rob them together. But if you wish to be certain of collecting grain and food for your tables in the future, I must be harsh with you. You must be taught If you insult the raciyyat, take to be reasonable. their oxen and seed, and trample their crops into the obediground, what will you do in the future?...The ent raCiyyat
must be distinguished
who are our enemies [i.e.,
from the raCiyyat
the rebels].58
Rashid al-Din, the viceroy of Ghazan, also sums up the reasons for the reform in this fashion: It is fitting that rulers have three exchequers; firstly of money; secondly of weapons; thirdly of food and clothing. And these exchequers are named as the exchequers of expenditure. But the exchequer of income is the raciyyat themselves, since the treasuries that I have mentioned are filled with 73
1977 WINTER-SPRING
their good efforts and their economies. And if they are ruined, the king will have no revenue... .Yet an army is created by means of taxation... .Now tax is paid by the raCiyyat, there being no tax that is not paid by the raciyyat....
59
In fact, Ghazan was not the first to initiate a reform aimed at strengthening the power of the ruling class. Khusraw I also took a number of measures aimed at the same goal after the country was ruined by irregular and high taxes. He, too, established set rules of taxation.60 Rent and taxes covered a great part of the peasant's crops during the Mongol period. This is evident from the fact that taxes were occasionally more than what they could pay, causing arrears to increase from year to year and thereby increasing the peasants' dependence.61 Methods of Assessment
Under the Sassanids (227-651 A.D.) land tax was assessed either as a fixed sum or as a "yearly variation acThe latter seems to have been the cording to the yield."62 dominant form of assessment before Khusraw's tax reform In the eighth c en tu r y t a xe s (531-579 A.D.).63 seem to have been assessed on the basis of the amount of land held. This method of assessment appears to have Under the early Abbassid originated in pre-Islamic times. caliphs in the late eighth century A.D., a change was made in the method of assessment, basing the tax on the actual produce instead of the area of land. This was due to the fact that peasants in Sawad were ruined by the former practice if they did not have good years.64 However, there were variations in tax assessment in different regions. According to Istakhri, the kharaj in Fars was assessed in three ways by the middle of the tenth century: the extent a definite of the area sown, the actual produce (i.e., share of the crop), or as a predetermined tax. At the same time, according to Istakhri, most of Fars paid a tax based on the area of land.65
IRANIANSTUDIES
74
According to Qummi, the assessment method in the Qummarea was based on measuring the land. Between 804-5 and 915-6 A.D. land plots were measured eight times, and the period for which the settlement was accepted varied considerably. For example, in Igharayn assessments were settled for a period of three years which was extended to six years. However, in MThBasrah they remained the same for ten years at the beginning of the tenth century.66 Moreover, if a considerable variety of physical conditions existed in one tax district, as in the case of Qumm,a number of tax schedules were prepared to meet different local conditions. Seven such schedules were made for Qumm..67 The kharaj of Nahavand and Hamedanwas assessed differently from that of the Qummdistrict. Their rates were fixed, but they were higher for irrigated than for unirrigated lands.68 Highest rates were paid by farmers who irrigated their lands directly through irrigation networks owned privately or by the state. It should be noted, however, that frequently these irrigation systems were built and subsequently kept in good condition by the forced labor of peasants. The responsibility for the payment of the kharaj of one. any district was, according to Qumm;, a collective This was despite the fact that assessments were made individually.69 In Qumm,for example, if anyone failed to pay the full kharaj on his land because of a bad yield, the deficit in his kharaj was divided among the other payers of kharaj. This practice had such a ruinous impact on the area that it had to be abandoned during the Buyids.70 Land taxes were collected in cash and in kind, the assessment being mostly on the amount of crop under the Seljuqs.71 The same method of assessment seems to have been used under the Mongols.72 Various methods were used The offito raise the assessment from time to time.73 cial calendar was lunar, but it was customary to collect the land tax according to the solar calendar, corresponding with the seasons. Occasionally, the tax-collectors, using the discrepancy between the official and solar calendars, managed to collect dues twice a year.74 75
1977 WINTER-SPRING
Concl usion
Muzara ah was the basic form of feudal exploitation in Iran from the fourth to the seventeenth centuries. While it seems fairly safe to maintain that muzaraCah was known in Iran under the Sassanids, its existence can be definitely established in the period between the seventh and the seventeenth centuries. Peasants depended on the landlords as tenants, and often as hereditary tenants. Tne rent paid by the peasants was a share of the crop, mostly in kind; money and labor rent had only secondary importance. In the case of state lands the government exploited the peasants directly through its financial institution. Landlords of private estates had to pay a land tax to the government which was collected in their rental share. In such cases the surplus from the land was divided between the state and the lord. Taxes and rents coincided for state or crown lands, both of which were paid wholly to the state or the king. Rent inclusive of tax was paid to the landlords on waqf and iqt5C lands. As a rule, it appears that the state was not the dominant recipient of the surplus product. The exception to this rule was the early period of Islam when state ownership of land was considerable, but even during this period crown lands and private estates were important.
Demesne farming was never of any importance in Iran. As a consequence, landlords did not have any role in the organization of agricultural All feudal esproduction. tates were divided into small holdings worked by dependent peasants under different conditions of tenancy. Hence, a characteristic of Iranian feudalism was the peculiarity combination of large-scale feudal ownership of land with small-scale peasant agriculture. For the same reason, i.e., the absence of demesne farming, labor rent never achieved as much importance as rent in kind.
IRANIANSTUDIES
76
NOTES
1.
See Farhad Nomani, "Notes on the Origins and DevelopObligations of Peasants in ment of Extra-Economic Studies, Vol. IX, Nos. Iran, 300-1600 A.D. ," Iranian 1976), pp. 121-41. 2-3 (Spring-Summer,
2.
C. Cahen, The Cambridge History
3.
in Europe has been associated Historically, feudalism estate, farming of the lords' with demesne farming: often on a considerable scale, by compulsory labor This form of feudal rent was dominant during service. in Western Europe and the early periods of feudalism and fifteenth was important again in the fourteenth with labor rent In Russia demesne-farming centuries. and concentury, became important after the twelfth until tinued to be the dominant form of exploitation the twentieth century (M. M. Postan, ed., The Camof Europe, Vol. I [Cambridge: bridge Economic History Press, 1966], pp. 305-447 and Cambridge University 660-739).
4.
Ann K. S. Lambton, Landlord Oxford University (London: 330-5.
5.
of Islam, Vol. II, ed. by P. M. Hold, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Press, 1970), Cambridge University Lewis (Cambridge: The Cambridge History p. S19; and I. P. Petrushevsky, Camof Iran, Vol. V, ed. by J. A. Boyle (Cambridge: Press, 1968), p. 525. bridge University
I.
P. Petrushevsky,
and Peasant
Press,
Iran-i
Cahd-i
Kishavarz! Mughul, Vol.
University
Press,,
1966),
dar
p.
p.
in
1969),
Persia
pp. 99 and
va munasebat-i
II 142.
(Tehran:
arzi
Tehran
306.
6.
Lambton, op.
7.
Khusraw Khusrawi, ?tMuzaracah, " Rahnema-ye Ketab, 1974), pp. Vol. XVII, Nos. 7-9 (October-December 489 and 493.
cit.,
77
WINTER-SPRING1977
8.
9. 10. 11.
Life of the Jews J. Newman, The Agricultural Press, Oxford University (London: Babylonia pp. 49-61.
Petrushevsky, Newman, op.
KishavarzI, cit.,
op.
cit.,
in
1932),
p. 142.
pp. 49-61.
in the Classical Taxation Frede Lokkegaard, Islamic (Copenhagen: Branner and Korch, 1950), p. 174.
Period 12.
Ibid.
13.
Ibid.,
14.
According to Najm-i Razi and Qummi, muzara an were Najm-i those who had some of the means of production; 1973), p. B.T.N.R., (Tehran: Razi, Mersad al-ibad Qumm(Tehran, 1934), 519; and Hasan al-Qummi, T3rlkh-i also mentions peasants Atabak al-Juvayni pp. 112-3. (Munwho had some of the implements of production cAtabat altajab al-Din Badic AtTbak al-Juvayni, Shirkat Sahami Chap, 1950], p. 67). katabah [Tehran: According to Rashid al-Din Fazl Aliah, before the owned draught Mongol invasion muz5racan of iqt5cs animals and seeds (Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah, Tar7kh-i raubgrak-i gh3zanl [London: Messrs. Luzac and Co., Vassaf also talks about peasants 1960], p. 346). during the Mongol who lost their means of production tarTkh-i period (cAbdulmuhammad Ayatl, ed., Tabrlr-i Bunyad-i Farhang-i Iran, 1967], pp. vassaf [Tehran: Many of the peasants working on 9S, 261-3 and 363). the estates of Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah did not own Rashid al-Din Therefore, any means of production. used to provide them with seed and draught animal in to land and water (Petrushevsky, Kishavarz7, addition p. 141. op. cit.,
15.
Lokkegaard,
16.
Muhaqeq-i University
pp.
IRANIAN STUDIES
175-6.
pp. 68-9
and 174.
Tehran (Tehran: Sharayac al-islam Uelli, See also LambPress, 1967), pp. 272-4. 78
ton, op.
cit.,
208, n. 2.
p.
17.
in Islam, Vol. I (Leiden: A. Ben Shemesh, Taxation Brill, 1967), pp. 38-9, and A. Ben Shemesh, Taxation 1969), pp. 102-3. Brill, Vol. III (Leiden: in Islam,
18.
Ibid.,
p.
102.
19.
Ibid.,
p.
117.
20.
Taxation
21.
Lokkegaard,
22.
For example, see Tarikh-i
in
and Mersad
Vol.
Islam, op.
I, op.
pp. 23-4.
23.
CAtabat al-katabah,
24.
See idid.,
25.
Tarikh-i t5rikh-i
mubarak, op. cit., op. cit., vassaf,
26.
Tarikh-i
mubarak,
op. cit.,
27.
Tahrlr-1
tarikh-i
vassaf,
28.
Hamdullah Mustawfl, 1958), p. 32.
29.
Richard N. Frye, The Heritage
30.
op. cit.,
p. 52. p. 306 and Tahrlr-i p. 95. p. 306. p. 95.
op. cit.,
Nuzhat
(Tehran:
al-qulUb
Company, 1963),
Abui Hanifah Dayn5rl, yad-i Farhang-i Iran,
Akhbar
Al-Tabar1, B.T.N.K.,
32.
Ibid.,
1967),
Tarlkh al-rusul 1972), p. 199.
218.
(Tehran:
Bun-
75.
va al-muluk
It is interesting pp. 199-201. to Qummi land tax was first according 79
p.
al-taval
p.
Tahoori,
(Cleveland:
Persia
of
The World Publishing
31.
pp. 112-3.
Qumm, op. cit., p. 519.
cit.,
op.
al-ibad,
53.
and 174-5.
pp. 68-9
cit.,
p.
cit.,
(Tehran: to note that and introduced
WINTER-SPRING1977
was made customary
during
the reign of the founder Qumm, cp. cit.,
of the Sassanid dynasty (T3r7kh-i pp. 82-3. 33.
Lambton, op. cit.,
p. 32.
34.
T5r!kh-i Qumm, op. cit., pp. 112-2 and 120. Those who did not embrace Islam and were not enslaved upon the conquest of the country by Moslems were called ahl al-Zimmah. Each adult male, free zimmah had to pay a poll tax which was fixed in agreement with the Moslems. His lands either became waqf for the whole or body of Moslems, and he was turned into a tenant, he held it as his own. In either case, he paid a land tax on the land and its crops. He was liable to distinguish himself from the Moslems by dress and had limited civil rights. On the other hand, the Moslems guaranteed him security of life and property, and deprotection in the exercise of his religion, fense against others (C. Cahen, "Dhimma," The Encyof Islam, 2nd ed. , Vol. II [1965], pp. clopaedia 227-31).
35.
C. Cahen, ed., Vol.
36.
TarIkh-i eds., Iran, N. V. Pigulevskaya and others, Vol. I (Tehran: Press, 1970), pp. Tehran University 177-237 and 260-70.
37.
Lokkegaard,
38.
Lambton, op. cit., p. 31. According to Aba Yuisuf lands and half the Moslems paid cushr on unirrigated cushr on irrigated lands (Taxation in Islam, Vol. III, Futuh alop. cit., p. 130; see also Baladhuri, Vol. II (New York: Columbia University Press, buldan, 1924), p. 447.
39.
Lambton, op.
40.
DNl7eh
"Djizya," The Encuclopaedia II (1965), p. 560.
op.
cit.,
and dulab
IRANIAN STUDIES
of Islam,
2nd
p. 72.
cit.,
pp.
22-4.
were a type of water-wheel. 80
31-3.
pp.
41.
Ibid.,
42.
Abu Ishaq (Tehran:
IbrThim Istakhr;, 1969), B.T.N.K.,
136-7.
p. 137.
43.
Ibid.,
44.
C. Cahen, "Ikta,I" 2nd ed., Vol. III
45.
Lambton, op.
46.
Petrushevsky,
47.
Ibid.,
48.
Petrushevsky,
49.
va mamalik
Masalik
pp.
pp.
72-3.
pp.
op.
Kishavarzi,
192-6.
pp.
cit.,
205-6.
See Lambton, op. op.
p. 531.
cit.,
op.
KishMvarz7, pp.
p. 1088.
(1970),
cit.,
Islam,
of
The Encyclopaedia
cit., cit.,
p.
pp.
94 and Petrushevsky, 194-201.
199-201.
50.
Ibid.,
51.
Lambton, op.
52.
Petrushevsky,
53.
See al-Juvayni, Brill, (Leiden:
cit.,
94.
p.
cit.,
op.
Cambridge, Tarlkh-i
1912),
p.
jahan-gusha,
pp.
229-30
531.
Vol. II and 269-78. 207-16.
54.
Petrushevsky,
55.
of Qumm, the inhabitants According to Baladhuri, Shapur and Gurgan, Tabaristan, Ray, Ardabil, Istakhr refused to pay the kharaj in the early However, their period of the Islamic occupation. rebellions were suppressed and sometimes peasants were forced to pay even higher taxes (Baladhuri, At the time pp. 41, 45, 130 and 133). op. cit., of the Abbassids also there were frequent rebelQummn,op. cit., lions according to Qummi (T5rikh-i p. 163).
KishavarzT,
81
op.
cit.,
pp.
WINTER-SPRING1977
56.
E. A.
Arabs,
Belyaev,
(New York:
Islam
Frederick
and the
Arab Caliphate
A. Praeger,
1969),
Cambridge,
op. cit.,
p. 210.
57.
Ibid.,
58.
Quoted in Petrushevsky,
59.
Ibid.,
p. 439.
60.
Ibnu'l versity
Balkh!, Press,
61.
Vol. II, op. cit., Al-Juvayni, pp. 223 and 244. Exorbitant taxes and rents made peasants flee their The poet Nlzari talks about a village villages. in Kuhistan whose peasants had deserted it because of the oppression of a tyrant landlord. Rashid al-Din also speaks of mass flights of peasants. Speaking of one of these incidences, he says: "When the tax collectors went around the locality, they found some villain or other who knew the houses, and at his direction discovered the people in corners, cellars gardens, and ruins. If they could not find the men, they seized their wives. Driving them before them like a flock of sheep, they brought them to the tax official who had them hung up on ropes .... ." Quoted in Petrushevsky, Cambridge, op. cit., pp. 527-8. Rashid al-Din also speaks of mass flights of peasants in Yazd and Bam (ibid.).
62.
Frye,
63.
Ibid,
64.
Lambton, op. cit.,
65.
Masalik
va mamalik,
66.
Tarikh-i
Qumm, op.
67.
Ibid.,
pp.
op.
216-22.
Fars-Nama (London: 1921), pp. 90-3.
cit.,
pp. 32-3.
cit.,
pp. 112-22.
IRANIAN STUDIES
Cambridge Uni-
p. 218.
op.
82
cit., pp.
p. 101-6
p. 494.
136. and 186.
120-2.
68.
Ibid.,
pp.
69.
Ibid.,
p.
152.
70.
Ibid.,
p.
143.
71.
Lambton, op. cit.,
72.
Petrushevsky,
73.
used a yardstick According to Qumm; tax-collectors in lands whose tax was shorter than regulations areas assessed by the measurement of the cultivated (Tar7kh-i
p. 72.
Kishavarzl,
Qumm, op.
op.
cit.,
p.
cit.,
p.
196.
163).
74.
the local ruler of Tabaristan, According to Tar7kh-i Amul, Chalius and Ruiyan, who was under the overlordlevied khara j three times in a ship of Tahirids, year. Such tyranny made the people flee to other Vol. I Tarikh-i Tabarist5n, places (Ibn IsfandThr, [Tehran, 1941], pp. 223-4).
75.
should that the tax collectors Ni;am al-Mulk states not "demand any tax from [the peasants] until the time comes for them to pay, because when they demand payment before the time, trouble comes upon the peasants, and to pay to tax they are obliged to sell their crops for half, whereby they are driven to (Nizam al-Mulk, extremities and have to emigrate" Press, Siyassat-Name [New Haven: Yale University 1960], p. 23).
76.
Petrushevsky,
Kishgvarz7,
83
op.
cit.,
pp.
216-22.
WINTER-SPRING1977
IranianStudies,Volume X, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring1977.
Speech
Mehdi Akhavan Sales Translated by Sorour Soroudi I am talking to you Come 0 people! You profitees and conquerors of my city, yours---now helplessly In this late gloomy afternoon you are back from your work, When weary and soul-rent in the market---the loathing struggle I want to speak to you A villager's speech this From here, on top of my tower, this tower of exile, tower of bitterness... of horror I wish to step down from this dwelling I am frightened and sorrow now by this loneliness I now wish to be like you and with you It is a good chance, even if I am but a guest for a while. I may break the spell of this madness of exile And not be so lonely in your city. 0 people! 0 people! 0 people! My heart - insane - has lost patience, My heart bursts with this horror and urges me to step down from here Where shall I flee, where, people? My heart urges, but I wish not
Sorour Soroudi is Lecturer in Persian language and literature in the Department of Iranian and Armenian Studies, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. IRANIAN STUDIES
84
Alas,
loathsome, people
I have no choice
but turning
to you,
But I son of exile The forlorn for your wise world Have no patience tower I was raised in the climate of the deserted I well know I swear not by sacred souls, of wisdom has no sacred souls That religion I have heard your talks And know what to say Gain of soul and soul of gain are equal in wisdom's bargain I swear to you profiteers soul of profit By the victorious And the soul of that golden idol that all of you, secretly, I know with all your heart Worship ravishingly everywhere in your heart and the That idol which is visible hollow of your eyes I swear to you by these That in order for me, too, accustomed to your world To become, for a while, filter air through a clean, untarnished Purify the city's Sweep the sky well Rub the darkness and the rust off all the walls and ceilings Hang a gate of gauze, imbued with musk and amber breeze On the muzzle of your dusty and stinking And these waxen trees, paper flowers as well iron toys too And those colorful --Whose smell of rust and paint turns the stomach-Throw them in a well outside the city Wash the waters clean like dusty rugs And the winds, shake them well, Off the smell of dressed up corpses --Who have silently consumed a jar of perfume-burn my nostrils And these creeping and made-up carrions and frankincence Fumigate some marjoram, wildrue, Around the city Tell the clouds to fill their spongy bags From remote, pure seas lagoons Not nearby, stinking
85
WINTER-SPRING1977
And I am amazed to see in your city Lights at every step with powerful reflectors And nights, still dark. For God's sake, hang 'a star untouched by the Earth's corruption' From the city's black ceiling, as a lantern To tear, perhaps, this ninefold darkness And let, for a while, a living light shine on the road of the city. I should tell you This,too, That I have weary and afflicted ears I wish, 0 ritous people of the bargain city, That the rumble of carriages and the clatter of wheels stop stop for some time Command that the machins rest for a while Pound not so much iron on iron, hammer on anvil And that., for a short time, files of horror not rasp the soul so much Since that year when the tribe of wolves and the clan of ours, pigs and boars Daily waged dreadful wars behind my tower And bled each other white carelessly, dauntlessly Since that time till now shrivels still my back, and my eardrums shudder At the clamor of guns and canons, that rumble, that roar And the barrage of machine-guns That lashed on nerves on and on Like a whip of fire. It is since that year That I have weary and afflicted ears And I have, since long, grown accustomed to Having to listen at nights To the silence of the stars, with the caressing, quiet song of the spheres And I must hear from time to time That very silken, sad intonation of silence Which has pleasant repeats and climaxes in the mode of 'lovers' ... Look 0 people, I am talking to you You profiteers and conquerors of the riotous city In this late gloomy afternoon From here, on top of my tower, this tower of bitterness... IRANIAN STUDIES
86
IranianStudies,Volume X, Nos. 1-2,Winter-Spring1977.
BOOK Iran's Policy
REVIEWS Foreign Policy in Modernizing
1941-1 973: A Study of Nations. By Rouhollah
Virginia: Charlottesville, 1975. xiv + 507pp. $20.
University
Press
Foreign
K. Ramazani. of Virginia,
Shahram Chubim
on the foreign detailed studies Until recently, of non-Western states have been sadly lacking. policies Where they have existed case studies (e.g., as individual the volumes on Burma, Cambodia, Nigeria and later Ghana and Turkey) they have tended to be non-additive, generatanalyses of for the comparative ing few propositions who On the other hand, those scholars foreign policy. about comparaon theorizing have focused their attention tive foreign policy have tended to produce long checklists and exhaustive inventories of variables, which inareas of inquiry, but give little suggest fruitful sight as to how these might be used or what the prioritie should be. has focused on Another branch of scholarship small-state of behavior, attempting to provide analyses how basically actors use limited "system-dependent" power to achieve their values. though concentrated
Shahram Chubin is Research Associate at the InternationalInstitute for StrategicStudies in London.
87
WIINTER-SPRING 1977
With the waning of bipolarity, the emergence of a politically multi-polar world, and the proliferation of new states as actors in world politics, attention has turned to the foreign policy of states that lie outside the central strategic balance. Constraints on the use of the rise of welfare issues, force, and the loosening of coalitions on their peripheries have given regional actors increased room for maneuver. For students of international politics the behavior of these states assumes new importance. some are Their nature and status varies: new (Jordan); some are an amalgamation of tribes (Nisome are older but never had been fully integeria); grated into the European state-system (Iran, Thailand, Venezuela); some are old but had been partially integrated (Turkey, Mexico); some possess strategical significance (Iran); some are strategically insignificant (Chad); some have been colonized (Morocco); some were thoroughly penetrated by imperialism (Egypt); others were merely subject to imperialism (Iran); some are old states with historical legacies (Iran, Thailand); others are new constructs with a foreign policy which is, in effect, a tabula rasa (Indonesia, Nigeria). Without exception all of these states, old or new, large or small, colonized or not, strategically exposed or sheltered, chose the path of "modernization," but with varying emphasis and differing affordable margins of error. This, perhaps, sets the background for Professor Ramazani's Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973: A Study of in Modernizing Foreign Policy Natlons, a sequel to his earlier volume on The Foreign of Iran 1500-1941. Policy Although the present volume covering 23 years is longer than the earlier volume covering 441 years, it is an extension of the earlier work in conceptualization and It continues style. the author's emphasis on the impact of modernization on foreign policy and retains the solid chronological-narrative approach. The value of this volume is that it is a worthy companion-piece to its predecessor, and that, taken together, they comprehencover the past five centuries sively of Iran's diplomacy in a coherent fashion. Painstaking in attention to dethe new volume is a useful, tail, extremely detailed IRANIAN STUDIES
88
in the last three compendium of Iran's foreign policy with the superin its relations particularly decades, Ramazani thus augments his claim as Professor powers. of Iran's foreign the foremost English language historian of Iran in his debt. policy and places students However, the problem with the book is that it of Iran's foreign claims to be more than a modern history in about "foreign policy policy and attempts to theorize No fashion. in an unsophisticated developing nations" are made between modernization distinctions satisfactory development," and general propositions and "political and between domestic politics about the relationship with little elaboration, foreign policy are presented abroad is of self-respect for example, "...restoration of self at to redefinition interrelated inextricably between the levels home." While noting the interaction Ramazani leaves us none the wiser of analysis, Professor that developing He suggests as to how to approach it. share a common value in the quest for autonomy societies or restoration which is "the need for the construction even this goal is pursued Presumably, of self-respect." that are among states with varying degrees of intensity but Ramalegacy, according to historical "modernizing," this point. zani does not elaborate the impact of its strategic Nor does he assess state. We are told that location on a "modernizing" for Iran has the single most important subenvironment Ramazani of East-West relationships. been the character of conaspects "One of the most interesting observes: temporary Iranian foreign policy has been the convergence subof the East-West subenvironment and the 'contiguous' of the Soviet Union's extensive environment as a result the boundaries with Iran" (p. 19). Apart from belaboring differobvious, Ramazani does not analyze the critical Does the ence this makes for Iran's foreign policy. (in Raymond Aron's phrase) of fatality" "geo-political Iran's foreign differentiate to the U.S.S.R. proximity (its primacy, its narrow margin for policy concerns choice and error, its hyperdependency on the international state like from that of another "modernizing" environment) 89
WINTER-SPRING1977
Senegal?
If so, how?
Quite apart from calling into question the "value of discussing foreign policy generally in "modernizing nations" (thereby equating India with Upper Volta) this approach fails to illuminate both the impact of systemic transformations on particular states and the range of to generate choices available to them. It does little insights about the interaction of "modernizing" states Ramazani is especially among themselves. unconvincing in the sequence of his argument: because the newer states have not shared the West's historical and extraditions periences, they do not share its assumptions and premises, and that consequently their values, strategies and instruments of foreign policy will be different. A cursory glance at the foreign policies of Israel, Iran, Egypt, or even Brazil, suggests quite the opposite. A more detailed analysis of the history of international relations, or even of a contemporary international relations theory, might have prevented such an error. If this volume does not make an appreciable contribution to the literature on the foreign policy of modernizing nations, it also leaves something to be desired in the following areas: in its overall appraisal of international politics; in the shift to multi-polarity; in the increasing importance of regional actors in some issue-areas; in the practical and prudential constraints on the use of force and the relationships in contemporary international politics between arms, influence and power (given the latter's in the specificity); and finally, autonomy of some regions on one range of issues and their interpenetration with other regions on others, and on the increased opportunities which detente would offer Iran, but at the risk of increased uncertainty. In discussing Iran's options, Ramazani reiterates the four major "strategies" in his earlier he identified volume: negative equilibrium, third-power strategy (i.e., alliance), positive nationalism and independent national He fails to demonstrate how these are, indeed, policy. or to note that elements of each may co-exist "strategies" IRANIANSTUDIES
90
his discussion of Iran's at any given time. Nevertheless, is both comprerelationship with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. hensive and valuable, and is worth the price of the book in itself. Apart from the "conceptualization," the book is weakest on regional politics which it barely treats-perhaps because the interaction of "modernizing" nations could strain the rather labored theoretical construct. The reader is thus left with a vague discussion which does not highlight the connection between trends in regional politics (e.g., inter-Arab politics), constraints and choices in policy in the region, and their reciprocal impact on relations with the superpowers. Nor does the book clarify whether Iran's regional diplomacy is comon the parable (and in what ways) with its counterpart superpower level. For example: Ramazani's style if often weak. "The foreign policy of all nations interact with the environment" (p. 15); "The foreign policy of Iran is penetrated by the quest for autonomy" (p. 453). His use of sources is both questionable and inadequate, in his failure particularly to use unpublished theses and in his too frequent citations of dubious newspaper accounts wherein leaders "embracing warmly" is cited as substantive evidence (p. 413). The bibliography is a very thin fare. Between the Scylla of synchophancy and the Charybdis of doctrinaire that plagues many opposition views of today's contemporary observers' Iran, Ramazani, a tenured professor in the United States, comes closer to the former. In treating emerging problems he tells us that the "most profound future challenge to Iran's This foreign policy will be philosophical" (p. 454). is a remarkable conclusion in the light of the transformation in Iran's foreign policy environment in the 1970s, the progressive linkages among Persian Gulf politics and those of the Indian subcontinent and the ArabIsrael zones. The increasing complexity of foreign relations issues and the extraordinary of diversification Iran's foreign relations have increased the loads on the available The need for coordinagovernmental machinery. tion between and within existing whether institutions, the Ministry of Economy and the Foreign Ministry on oil91
WINTER-SPRING1977
diplomacy issues, the Foreign and Defense Ministries on security policy, and the Defense Ministry (military. procurement office) and the Plan and Budget Organization on arms procurement and manpower planning, emphasizes the of a system which has until the precosts and fragility sent displayed resilience and stability among those in modernizing states. A foreign policy, however innovative in conception, fails unless it is effeCtively implemented. The highly personalistic system of decision making, the ad hoc method of implementation, and the failure to create institutions that are functionally combine to overload differentiated, the foreign policy system. It is probable that, in the future, decisions will be made by default and valuable resources will be wasted. The availability of oil revenues in recent years has protected the foreign policy system from serious shocks. But the failure to devise, encourage, and persevere in the establishment of foreign will in time become costly. In policy institutions Iran's case the definition of crisis is likely to be a state of immobilism; in such a state, power is so diffuse that it is stalemated, many have the influence to counteract others, but few the power to initiate policy, and even innovative policies have no channels through which they can be implemented.
IRANIANSTUDIES
92
to Its Peoples, An Introduction Gulf: The Persian Boulder, By David E. Long. tics, and Economics.
Westview
Press,
1976.
Poli-
Colo.:
172pp.
Eric J. Hooglund
Increasingly
in recent years the Persian Gulf has
an assynonymous with the word "oil," become virtually reinforced by the fact that all eight of the sociation bordering upon the Gulf produce countries independent are and collectively in varying quantities, albeit oil, of the world's as much as two-thirds to possess estimated While awareness of the Persian known petroleum reserves. of the area-the culture is widespread, Gulf's resources unknown relatively of Iran--is with the obvious exception This East. Middle the of parts in comparison to other is being remedied with the publicasituation gradually and focusing upon economic, political, tion of studies on the Arab side of countries aspects of select social The contribution of these books towards helpthe Gulf.1 the lacunae in knowledge about contemporary ing to fill however, cannot be overstated; Persian Gulf societies they do not provide an overview of the Gulf as a distinct and thus a need has remained for a Irano-Arab sub-region, survey of the area. good introductory to be "a Gulf attempts David Long's The Persian broad survey study" (p. ix) of the region such as has The book, however, does not lacking. been heretofore Although geography and ethnic groups achieve its aim. are briefly mentioned (Chapter one) and there is a rethe primary focus (Chapter six), view of economic issues Thus, the scope of is political. of the seven chapters would imply. than the subtitle the book is more limited
Professor Eric J. Hooglund is Assistant Science at Bowdoin College in Maine.
93
of Political
WINTER-SPRING1977
The political discussion, itself, is neither informed nor substantive. The author's writing style, however, is clear and concise, and he does try to examine several interrelated political dimensions: the internal political dynamics of the eight Persian Gulf countries (Chapter two); interstate in the region (Chapter three); politics the role of international politics in the Gulf (Chapter four); oil politics and United States policy (Chapter five); in the area (Chapter seven). Mr. Long offers Nevertheless, no new insights, and neither analyzes nor interprets the information which he presents. There is no evidence that any non-English language sources were consulted. At best one can say that the book is a summarized version of material investigated more thoroughly in several readily available studies about individual Gulf countries. The Persian Gulf is replete with some recurring problems which could have' been avoided by more careful research and editing. Factual errors are disturbingly numerous. Some of them may seem to be minor such as saying that the Persian Gulf stretches "from Turkey to Oman" (p. 1), a geographical fact which has not been true at least since 1918; or claiming that Tehran was "a mudbrick city of 100,000" in 1945 (p. 6), whereas its population was over 500,000 at that time and there were buildings of fired brick, marble, and concrete as well as adobe. Other errors obviously derive from the author's a non-exmisunderstanding such as apparently confusing istent "legal aid Equity Corps" (p. 106) with the Rural Houses of Justice set up as part of Iran's White RevoluMore serious are erroneous statements tion. which could lead an unsuspecting reader to simplistic non-specialist or even inaccurate interpretations of current political developments. For example, Mr. Long contends that the Ba'th "government of Iraq is a branch of the same party that rules Syria" (p. 26); while both parties have had a common origin, two quite independent-they are obviously and mutually hostile--entities now. In another instance, Movethe author alleges that "the ANM (Arab Nationalist ment) began as a small group of militant Marxist-socialists" the ANMbegan as a rightist(p. 53); in fact, nationalist oriented, anti-Marxist, party which did not
IRANIAN STUDIES
94
begin until
moving towards the left the late 1950s.
of the political
spectrum
Less serious criticism can be made of the book's editorial shortcomings. These latter, however, appear with such variety and frequency as to raise doubts about how carefully the text was reviewed prior to publication. Typographical for example, are much too numerous. errors, There are also instances of date transposition, such as 1973 as the year of the overthrow of Prime Minister citing Mussadiq (p. 24)! It is unclear what, if any, system has been employed for the transliteration of Arabic and Persian names and there are inconsistencies; in one case the name of the ruler of Ras al-Khaymah is spelled "Saqr" on pp. 39-40 and "Sagr" on p. 49. Sometimes grammar is inappropriate: on p. 71 the pronoun "its" is used three times to refer to "the British," even though the context clearly indicates a plural referent. Finally, it should be noted that the initial sentence(s) beginning the paragraph at the top of p. 77 is (are) missing. In summation, I would say that David Long's The Gulf most definitely is not the introductory survey of the area for which there is need. the Hopefully, oil-inspired in the region will encourage such interest a study. Meanwhile, the best "introduction" remains the rather inefficient, but rewarding, consultation of several country studies. For those readers who still insist upon a single, concise I would suggest the present overview, volume only with the reservations discussed above. Persian
NOTES
1.
See, Lower
for
J. D. Anthony, Arab States example: (Washington: Middle East Institute,
Gulf
of
the
1975);
J. A. Bill, The Politics of Iran (Columbus: Charles Merrill, 1972); F. Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans (London: Penguin Books, 1974); (London: Oxford University
Iraq
M. Khadduri, Republican Press, 1969); Ramon
Knauerhase, The Saudi Arabian Economy (New York: Praeger, 1975); E. Nakhleh, Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society (Lexington: Heath, 1976). 95
WINTER-SPRING1977
Israel and Iran: the Indian Ocean
York:
Praeger,
Bilateral and Effect on Relationships Basin. By Robert B. Reppa, Sr. New
1974.
187pp.
$16.50. Shahrough Akhavi
The literature on the foreign policy of small powers continues to evolve, with some recent material from the Middle East field. Among these should be cited Shahram Chubin
(Berkeley: Ramazani, Foreign
and Sepehr
University
Zabih,
The Foreign
of California,
Relations
1973);
of
Iran
Rouhallah
Iran's Foreign 1941-1973: A Study Policy, in Modernizing Policy Nations (Charlottesville,
K. of
Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1975); and Michael Brecher's two important volumes: The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), and Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). Numerous essays have also come out of some of the strategic studies "think tanks," including the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in London; the American Enterprise Institute, in Washington; the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University in Washington; and this is not to mention the efforts of the international in relations institutes Israel and Iran--the Leonard Davis Institute in Jerusalem and the recently organized Institute for International Political and Economic Studies in Tehran. of the authors Although the quality of the writings in terms writing about Iran and Israel varies and differs of their analytical approaches and general scope, they are mainly characterized by the attempt to be systematic. Among the variables that are central to these studies-the structure especially the books mentioned above--are
of Government Professor Shahrough Akhavi is Associate and International Studies of the University of South Carolina. IRANIAN STUDIES
96
of the Middle East regional international system, interactional analysis, elite perceptions, penetration, stratification. In a word, they go beyond the traditional method used by observers of Middle East foreign policy: descriptive narrative. Therefore, this is a disappointing book. There are three reasons for this: (1) the title is misleading, as the discussion deals with Israel and Iran discretely and seldom in terms of their bilateral relationship; (2) it is analytically weak; (3) its tone and style, at least in the early part of the book, are jejune. To begin with the last item first, Reppa employs a breezy rhetoric that can be very disconcerting. On p. 68 the 1963 riots in Iran are considered "this mullah-inspired rebellion." Such a characterization glosses over the very real involvement of urban professionals, inbureaucrats, On p. 45 he tellectuals, tribal'-elements and the bazaar. gratuitously makes a distasteful comment about the word, Aryan "--a name well-known in Europe in the 20th century after Adolph Hitler made it synonymous with 'master race."' And again, on the same page: "It gives one a start to-be of Iran today as a relatively lessthinking insignificant er developed country and then notice on the cover of an Iranian's passport the French words: 'L'Empire d'Iranl"' [sic]. Errors also mar his presentation, such as his assertion on p. 68 that the January 1963 referendum on the Shah's "White Revolution" in the acceptance of resulted "the twelve reforms." In fact, the referendum was called to decide six reform projects, and the others have been added gradually in the years since. is On p. 111, Stalin credited with arming the Arabs, and although the Jerusalen Post, May 25, 1970, is cited as evidence, no further exIt is normally considered planation is given. that Stalin's attitude toward Middle East regimes was that they were either the creatures of the British or that they were fascist. Certainly it was not Stalin's policy to arm Arab On p. 66, Dr. Reppa oversimplifies governments. in rehis porting that the Shah's third marriage consolidated 97
WINTER-SPRING1977
ties with the military because his bride's family had an army background. This might be so if the family were highly regarded by the officer elite, but how is one to know if this be the case? Indiscretions on every page. They the reader to wonder where was he getting to the editors?
lurk of this kind do not necessarily appear often enough, however, to cause what the author was thinking of, some of his data, and what happened
The analytical weakness of the book stems from the of the state-cenauthor's consistent implicit utilization tric model of international relations without ever spelling out his reasons for its relevance for the study he has embarked upon. In other words, he does not explicitly adopt a methodology and apply it. Instead, states are implied to be the actors in Middle East politics, and little, if any, attention is given to the political behavior of decision makers. This comes close to anthropomorphic of the sort conveyed by "Iran is intercharacterization, ested in security" or "Israel needs petroleum." Political interaction in the Middle East and beyond is treated as just so many billiard balls darting among and colliding with one another. Dr. Reppa's main thesis is that Israel and Iran have commoninterests in oil and security, but his presentation of data supporting this is brief and too reliant on secondary sources. Perhaps he is at a disadvantage on this score, since much of Iran-Israel relations remains obscure owing to the deliberate withholding of information by both sides. In consequence, he is detoured from exploring Iran-Israel relations into historical sketches of each country that are unproductive, given the intent of the book. In separate chapters entitled the "Indian Ocean Basin" and "Israel, Iran and the Major Powers" he discusses the evolution of geopolitical theory (Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman, et al.) and the interests of a variety of Indian Ocean powers. However, he unaccountably does not relate this discussion to Iranian and Israel policy and relations except for two short paragraphs on American IRANIANSTUDIES
98
In fact, as the pages turn, his preoccupation policy. with Soviet and Chinese actions becomes the dominant motif. And this brings us to our third point about the irrelevance of his title. This seems less a work on Iran-Israel relationships and more of a sort of geopolitical primer on the Middle East and South Asia. Neither does it address the effect that the bilateral of the two Middle East relationship states has on the Indian Ocean area--although the subtitle of the wo-k appears to hold out the promise of doing so. Dr. Reppa's background includes in experience the Defense Intelligence Agency of the Department of DeHe may have intended his manuscript to be read by fense. a military audience being introduced to Middle East and South Asian politics. If this is the case, one wonders why the particular forum of the Praeger Special Studies Series was selected. This series has gained the reputation of providing research in international analytical relations and international economics and is thus not the for this book. appropriate vehicle In conclusion, this book is unfortunately not the one to read if one is interested in foreign policy relationships between Israel and Iran, the claims of its author notwithstanding.
99
WINTER-SPRING1977
Iran at the End of the Century: A Hegelian Robert E. Looney. Lexington, Massachusetts: Books, D. C. Heath, 1977. 155pp.
Forecast. By Lexington Manoucher Parvnm
This work is an overview of the economic development of Iran focusing on planning programs, their implementation, and possible future outcomes. The author studies economic growth and planning but not the instiThe book is well tutional aspects of the Iranian economy. organized, clearly written and presents important developmental issues even if not fully exploring their implications. Although presenting valuable information, the book is flawed by conceptual problems which limit the scope of the analysis. The author states at the beginning that the work is to serve as "...a the economic framework for forecasting future of Iran based both on Hegel's method and system and on other essential to the economy" (p. factors integral xiii). He then proceeds to obtain forecast figures from a simple Keynesian model. Assuming alternative growth rates of exports and the value added from the oil sector, the other components of GNP--consumption, and investment imports--are determined. The equations used for simulation stretching to the year 2000 are given in Appendix B (not A). Two critical points should be stated at once. If the major task of the book is a forecast of the Iranian economy, why is the system of equations used for prediction not fully discussed and alternative systems not offered? Further, why are they given a minor role in the study, only being offered in an appendix after all is said and done? Since Hegel's dialectical logic or Marx's his-
Manoucher Parvin is a Visiting Associate Economics at Columbia University.
IRANIAN STUDIES
100
Professor
of
torical materialism it seems that their out a cause.
have no input in the forecast results, spectre is being evoked once more with-
The only justification appears in pages 111-112, where a Hegelian approach to developmental planning in Iran is discussed. In the author's use of Hegelian terminology, the Plan and Budget Organization presents a plan (thesis) which is opposed by a counter-plan of the Shah and his aides (antithesis), both of which are constructed and argued for from the same data bank (the essence). Finally "the Shah as an--observer of the conflict--will integrate [the two plans] and form a new and expanded world view (the synthesis)" (p. 112). This synthesis would explore hidden assumptions and embody a new conceptualization of the planning problem of the country. Thus this "Hegelian" system serves as a format for evaluating opposing plans, not as a forecasting tool as claimed. But given the political in Iran, the emersituation gence of genuine opposing plans is highly improbable, if not virtually However beneficial impossible. the medicine, it has been prescribed for the wrong patient. In Chapter 8, a "Hegelian-Marxian of the Analysis" economy is presented in six pages. The main point of this brief analysis, which owes little debt to Hegel and stands unsupported by any system, is that " .... the members of the Iranian professional middle class resent what they believe to be a deliberate attempt by the Shah to exclude them from the White Revolution...[since] none of their demands for fundamental change in the political system have been addressed, and their hopes for improvements in such fundamental areas as educational have reform and social justice been omitted from the revolution" (p. 117). While building his Hegelian-Marxian the analysis, author has sidestepped other important issues. Instead of a statement of goals and priorities, the author considers the optimal method of allocating "oil revenues as the crux of the development planning problem in Iran" In this manner, and at this point, (p. 119). the means take supremacy over the ends. The statistics of oil re101
WINTER-SPRING1977
venue allocation over time are not presented and the reasons for the assertion that "In the past, the results obtained from the government's [oil] expenditure were un." (p. 119), are not offered. satisfactory.. However, he does contribute the important distributional observation that, contrary to expectations, projects financed by oil revenues have failed to "trickle down" to the less fortunate portion of the population. Also, conclusions are frequently insufficiently supported, and statements are left to the reader's predilections,
for
example:
"... detailed
and rigorous
plan-
ning will be required to ensure that the optimum pattern of industrialization emerges" (p. 42). A speculative glimpse, however abstract and general, of the feasible optimum developmental patterns--given the historical and resource specificity of the Iranian economy--is required here. The description and criticism of the five plans already implemented reveals a lack of comprehensiveness, consistency, and cost benefit analysis of alternative competing projects. The author correctly notes that observing such basic planning criteria "...is essential if the national objective of achieving by the end of the century a dynamic, self-sufficient (from oil revenues) economy capable of creating high levels of employment and a more equitable distribution of income is to be reached." The author only briefly and cautiously looks at the political and social aspects of development; however he does ask the pertinent question:"Can a modern industrial state be run as a patriarchy? Do the means contradict the ultimate objective [maintenance of the regime]?" (p. 25). Iran is not threatened from abroad "...but by problems at home, by the need to balance the desire for freedom and civil rights with rapid gains in the standard of living and material progress" (p. 25). Important questions, such as the interaction of the political and economic side of development in Iran, especially in relation to the decision-making process, the nature and purpose of past for their implanning decisions and the accountability plementation, are not satisfactorily analyzed.
IRANIANSTUDIES
102
Thanks to the author's skills, familiar topics are well-organized and clearly written. The remaining ambiguities as discussed are conceptual rather than communicative. The statistics are well-organized and presented throughout, if not critically evaluated or examined. The author seems unfamiliar with Persia and with the propensity of messengers (in this case statisticians)--in true Iranian tradition--to sacrifice factual accuracy for the joy of lofty fantasy. All in all this book is more realistic in comparison with similar works published recently. Planners and students of the Iranian economy can all learn something (if not the same thing) from this study. While the book does not fully achieve its stated purpose, it is worth reading for what it does achieve.
Mirza
ism.
sity
Malkum
Khan:
A Biographical
By Hamid Algar. Berkeley of California Press, 1973.
Study
in
Iranian
and Los Angeles: 327pp.
Modern-
Univer-
Mangol Bayat Philipp
Ever since the Constitutional Revolution, and perhaps even before, Mirza Malkum Khan was hailed as the"father of Constitutionalism" in Iran, the "Iranian J. J. Rousseau," the "enlightened Reformer." In more recent historical works in Persian, however, and more specifically a decade long reappraisal following of the role played by the revolutionary leaders, doubt has been cast on the sinand validity cerity of Malkum's reforming ideas. There is now a tendency to depict his, and others' like him ("those as Al-i Ahmad sarcastically national Montesquieus" nicknamed them), call for modernization as a treacherous, unpatriotic "sell out" to the enemy, namely the West.
Mangol Bayat Philipp Harvard University.
is Assistant
103
Professor
of History
at
WINTER-SPRING1977
Hamid Algar's study falls into that category. He brings to light the sordid aspects of Malkumn'slife, his dubious financial deals with the various European concession-mongers of the time, the selfish opportunistic motives behind some of his "lofty" ideas, the personal anger and frustration that underline the shift from a reforming to a revolutionary political stand later in his life. The author's case against Malkum "the charlatan" is devastating, for the reader is provided with ample proof drawn from meticulous gathering of sources, published and unpublished, in Persian, Arabic, Turkish, French, English, German, and Russian languages. The trial, however, involves other charges. Algar, turned prosecutor, is firmly determined to accuse Malkumof irreligiosity. He thus mobilizes all his talents, linguistic and literary, to find enough "important pieces of circumstantial evidence" (to use his own terms) to pronounce him, posthumously, a kafir! Busy as he is in pointing at Malkum's "charlantanry," "dilettantist nature," "dishonesty," "duplicity," in examining "the mechanics of his hypocrisy," and in exploring the heresy of his ideas "so repugnant to Islamic orthodoxy" (Shici or Sunni), Algar fails to present the reader an objective critical analysis of Malkum's thought. In fact, this so-called "contribution to the nineteenth century Iranian intellectual history" (as he announces it himself in the prologue), turns out to be an unfair, biased trial, bearing the author's own prejudices and intolerance. The case is in need of a defense, especially since he regards Malkum's career as "an illustration of the moral and intellectual level of Iranian modernism." Nineteenth century Iranian intellectual history still needs to be written not, however, in order to expose "the obscure world where skepticism, heterodoxy, and opportunism all coexisted and increased in mutual fructification behind a show of concern of Islam and the prosperity of the Muslims" (p. 227). But to study the intellectuals' mood that made them so receptive to new ideas, and so impatient with the inherited ones; to analyze the spiritual restlessness revealed in their quest for a new truth, a new ideal, a new model, and their opposition to the tradiIRANIANSTUDIES
104
tional ones; to ask, not whether they were believers, in the orthodox sense, or non-believers, but why and how they refuted, or transformed, the existing system of values; and to question the feasibility of expressing new thought in non-Islamic terms, given Iran's social and religious environment at that time. The characteristic feature of modernity is, above all, criticism: what is new is set over and against what is old, without, however, bringing about a total break with tradition. Unlike in the past, when it consisted in the imitation or preservation of tradition, in continuity modern times takes the form of negation or opposition to tradition. But the dialogue between generations is not broken off. Thus, Malkum's ambitious project, his new religion Adamiyat, blends August Comte's Religion de 1'Humanite (which Algar fails to notice, surprisingly enough!) with some more traditionally Iranian mystical notions of a Perfect man. Akhundzadeh's rejection of Islam and adoption of Science, European Science, is accompanied by an interest in Iranian pre-Islamic culture. Mirza Aga Khan Kirmani's conversion to Babism reflects a similar refutation of "Arab" Islam and a search for a more "authentic" Iranian religion. Algar's final judgment that Malkum's influence "in the long run condemned Iran to an unsatisfactory state of suspension between traditional values that no longer receive much more than lip service and a process of external westernization that has signally failed to produce a true regeneration of the country" (p. 263) completely misses the point. The book is a complete disappointment. For indeed, its end result does no justice to the author's scholarly qualifications as shown in both this and other publications: his ability for thorough research work, his vast knowledge of modern Iranian history, not to mention his command of several Western and Middle Eastern languages. It by no means meets the high standard that he had set for himself
in his excellent 1785-1906:
ley
first
The Role
and Los Angeles,
book: of
the
Religion and State Ulama in Qajar Period
in
Iran,
(Berke-
1969). 105
WINTER-SPRING1977
From Darkness
into
Light:
Women's
Emancipation
in
Iran.
By Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad. Edited and translated by F. R. C. Bagley. Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1977. 140pp. $8.00. Mary-Jo DelVecchioGood
Bagley's translation of Bamdad's two volumes on the feminist movement in Iran has brought to the general reader a chatty and personal account of the earliest attempts by more privileged women to change the social status of women in Iran. Although Bamdad may be criticized for glossing over the contemporary status of the majority of Iranian women, which differs little from her descriptions of 'past conditions,' she does bring us an interesting series of anecdotes and short biographies of pioneering women. These vignettes from her personal experience and those of her colleagues in the movement might best be treated as pieces of data. Her history of activities which led to changes in women's status (from 1905 to 1968), while incomplete, offers a personal perspective of a member of the first of Iranian feminists. generation Women in the vanguard of feminist movements, in Iran as elsewhere, are frequently from the society's more privileged classes, and Bamdad is no exception. Her own on the changing status of Iranian women perspective throughout the twentieth century and her participation in the struggles to change that status is a consequence of her social position as a member of the upper-middle class, as an educator, and as a politically active woman. As noted in a short biography of the author by Shams ol-Moluk Javaher Kalam, which is included in the
Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good is Assistant Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Davis. IRANIAN STUDIES
106
introduction, Mrs. Bamdad's background is typical of many of the earliest feminists about whomshe wirites. Born in 1905, she was the daughter of an ardent constitutionalist, Hajj Aga Khan Tekini. Her family provided her with private tutors, a rarity in Qajar Iran, and apparently supported her involvement in later years in the Ladies Center (1935) where her father was one of the earliest speakers to the group (p. 93). Clearly Mrs. Bamdad's career in education and in the feminist movement owes much to her family's enlightened support. She was one of the first students to attend the Women's Teacher Training College, one of the first twelve females admitted to Tehran University (in 1936), a student at Columbia University, and a young author (age 20) of a domestic science textbook for girls. Later in her career she edited Zan-e Emruz from 1944-1945 when it was banned. She was also an advisor to Tehran Radio on family guidance programs. In the mid1930s she began her involvement in women's organizations as a member of the executive committee of the Ladies Center, an organization formed with the Shah's encouragement to further the education of women and the abolition of the veil. She continued her prominent involvement in women's rights organizations concerned with education, civil rights and the 1967 family protection laws. Bamdad's account of the historical women's movement, from the "Constitutional
phases of the Revolution and
Women's Awakening" to the "White Revolution," although is tied together anecdotal, by several recurrent themes. One theme focuses on the tension between the lower classes, the "street urchins," "louts" and clergy who hold tra-
ditional
religious
values,
and the upper-class
women who
were trying to modernize women's roles. Her recounting of ruffians attacking schoolgirls (p. 61), invading a theatrical performance (p. 67), and insulting women who
dared to appear in public unveiled, captures the everyday quality of a struggle not merely between religious conservatives and modernists but also between upper and lower classes. She tries to accommodate more popular religious sentiments by pointing to the religiosity of the early feminists in an effort to discredit the religious conservatives. However, the cultural distinctions of class be107
WINTER-SPRING 1977
come more prominent. A second theme, which appears throughout these anecdotes, is that womenmust be educated if they are to shed men and thus the veil as the their servile status vis-a-vis Education is viewed as the symbol of 'ignorant servitude.' them contributing citimake to and women vehicle to free zens of a modern Iran. Bamdadreviews the origins of many schools for girls sponsored by private inof the earliest Her disthe government, and foreign missions. dividuals, (The Patriotic cussion of various women's organizations Women's League, The Ladies Center) focuses on their role for women. in providing educational opportunities character A third theme emphasizes the patriotic of Iran's women from early involvement in the Constitustruggle to women's support for the White Retionalist volution referendum. The author ties patriotism to the struggle for women's rights, including discarding the veil A nice addition to the anecdotal rights. and electoral accounts are several poems by women "patriots" about unveiling which Bamdadclaims assisted the progress of the movement. The anecdotal material about phases in the movement is interspersed with brief biographies of Iranian changes in education, feminists who sought institutional civil rights, and areas of public involvement (the arts, publishing) previously reserved for men. These biograbecause they suggest several phies are most interesting commontraits among these women who were early pioneers the arts, civil rights and in education, publishing, Each of the women Bamdaddiscusses received politics. some education, often from private tutors or their own fathers. Many were the daughters of upper-class ulema who were enlightened enough to believe women should be Others were members of the Qajar nobility, literate. whose upper-class status exposed them to European notions of educated "wives and mothers." Still others came from families with foreign experiences and exposure to "modern" attitudes on women's status in Russia, Europe and Istanbul. Indeed, while many of these women were not of the political IRANIANSTUDIES
108
elite, they were of the privileged classes and had the in progrespersonal and financial freedom to participate sive activities. Bagley's introduction is somewhat disappointing given that Bamdad's work is more of a memoir than a serious analysis of changes in the status of Iranian women. One would have liked Bagley to treat the work as a memoir, and to place Bamdadand the women and organizations about whom she writes in the broader context of recent Iranian social and political history. For in spite of the official rights won and institutional changes made by Iranian feminists, their impact on the lives of the vast majority of Iranian women continue to be slight.
Love and War: Sheikh Bighami.
Adventures
from
the
Firuz
Shah
Nama of
from the Persian by William Translated L. Hanaway, Jr. Persian Heritage Series No. 19. Delmar, New York: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1974. 208pp. L. P. Elwell-Sutton
Until recently so little account was taken of Persian oral literature, in the West as much as among the more classically-minded intelligentsia of Iran, that the extent and variety of this section of the Persian corpus was not appreciated by any one. Even when folklorists like Arthur Christensen began to interest themselves in the traditional literature of Iran, they confined themselves for a long time to the oral material of the villages and tribes--and indeed some folk tale collectors to this day are guilty of an almost pedantic insistence on pure oral tradition to the exclusion of anything that
L. P. Elwell-Sutton is Professor versity of Edinburgh. 109
of Persian
in the Uni-
WINTER-SPRING1977
it might form, however "authentic" has acquired a written to realize So it has taken some time for scholars be. not merethat the whole range of Iran's popular literature but must ly covers a very wide spectrum of subject-matter, Hanaway very cogently points out, be as Professor also, part of Persian literature, as an integral considered classics from the recognized shading off imperceptibly form until and passing through various grades of literary tribesthe and peasant the of tales it reaches the naive man. of the counThus side by side with the folk-tales the family storywe find the urban narrators, tryside, housenurses, the women (grandmothers, especially tellers, and--disappearig of the coffee-houses, maids), the naqqals patronentertainers now, but not so very far distant--the It is ized and employed by royal and noble households. that in particular the work of these last two categories a sooner or later came to be written down, thus acquiring This process is by no fixed rather than a fluid form. a number of roHanaway lists Professor means complete. committed to writing only in the mances that were first and are even in some cases attricentury, mid-nineteenth authors; but this is no ground for butable to specific as is very evident from denying them a popular origin, their style and content. Hanaway has made availThe example that Professor world is a good deal earlier able to the English-speaking it than these, and in the form in which he has translated when the first century, dates from the end of the fifteenth written down from the dictation two parts were apparently The work is not Sheikh Bighami. naqqal, of a professional copied exists, a further part form; extant its in complete a subbut there is evidently century, in the eighteenth subsequent epistantial lacuna before this and possibly All this must have sodes that have not yet come to light. Hanaway's task of making a bookProfessor complicated to sufficient from a body of material length translation sucis a considerable The result ten such volumes. fill it makes a coherent and cess. Judged purely as a story,
IRANIAN STUDIES
110
readable, even gripping, narrative. Although it has not been possible for the present reviewer to collate the translation with the original text, only part of which has in any case been published, it seems evident that the translator has had due regard to the fluctuating style of his text, and that the often abrupt changes from nearto high literary, from heroic or sentimental colloquial to earthy and prosaic, use as well as the intermittent as of slang, all represent what happens in the original, it certainly does in similar texts of a later date and in the living narrations of professional naqqals. For the folklorist it constitutes a splendid anthology of traditional motifs in Persian folk-literature, and it is to be hoped that someone will now undertake the study and analysis of the work along both Aarne-Thompson and Proppian lines. Professor Hanaway's admirable introduction would provide a suitable point of departure. The translator has provided a useful cast of characters, but it might have been worthwhile also to introduce and and cross-headings into the body of the text, chapterto incorporate for the benethese into a list of contents of fit of readers who may get lost in the complexities the plot.
111
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Malayer
tionen
und sein
einer
Kleinstadt
in Iran.
und Funk-
Structur
Entwicklung,
Umland:
By Mostafa
Momeni.
Marburg/Lahn: Marburger Geographische Schriften, 68, 1976. 208pp.
Heft
ErikaFriedlLoeffler
In this study on cultural geography, which is based the author has set two goals for himon his dissertation, development of a to trace the historical first, self: Middle Eastern town from its founding to the present with regard to its physiognomy and socioeconomic structure; and between second, to define the nature of the relationship the town and its surrounding communities, and to determine is either rent-capitaliswhether the dominant relationship dominance of the town based on a "parasitic" tic (i.e., or else one in which the town is the over its hinterland), impulses of the and social of economic source essential In the past, both approaches have been used to villages. and, in this work the author networks, analyze town-village
attempts to evaluate
their
respective
merits by applying
of a wealth of information them to new data which consist of 28,000 on concerning Malayer, a town with a population the road between Hamadan and Buriudjird in western Iran. is comprised of 2S5 vilToday Malayer's hinterland in evolved from such a village and the town itself lages, 1808, when the governor of Kermanshah developed it to pro50 years tect the caravan route to Hamadan. For the first was "Dawlatabad," as it was then called, of its existence, It derived its main instronghold. a military primarily which come from taxes levied on the surrounding villages the and from agricultural soldiers provided wages for the The small bazaar was of of its inhabitants. activities
is Assistant Erika Friedl Loeffler ogy at Western Michigan University.
IRANIAN STUDIES
112
Professor
of Anthropol-
only minor importance, fits from the town.
and the villages
derived few bene-
In the second phase which extended to approximately 1920, the town rapidly developed into an economic center, as the wealthy landowners from the villages began to move there and to channel the surplus income from their land in the form of rents into the town. Together with the merchants who had been attracted by the growing town, the in landowners not only invested in commercial enterprises the expanding bazaar, but also in new irrigation facilities, which increased the arable land and resulted in greater agricultural profits. As a parallel to this economic growth, the population of Dawlatabad increased as a consequence of immigration, and a variety of social and administrative institutions developed, often founded by endowments from wealthy merchants and landed rich citizens. In this period, the villages not only furnished a large part of the town's income directly through the rents paid to their absentee landlords in a rent-capitalistic fashion, but were further dependent on it because it was the only town that could provide many of their daily needs. The third phase started in the reign of Reza Shah. It was marked by a change in the name of the town and, of centraligreater consequence, an increased administrative zation and the results of the building of the Tehran-Gulf highway, which eventually brought about profound changes in every aspect of the town's existence. With the establishment of truck service and overland connections, the commercial network rapidly replaced former local ties, and the importance of local crafts diminished. The major commercial enterprises moved from the bazaar to locations to the trucks. In addition, the craftseasily accessible men became retailers or workers, and the caravanserais were used only for storage or else were left to decay. The town underwent an "urban removal" as new roads and a central square were built in its old quarters. A small industry developed and the increased immigration of villagers, who were attracted by the new employment possibilities, led to overcrowding in the town's residential areas. Wealthy townspeople moved out of the city and the living 113
WINTER-SPRING1977
quarters in town began to reflect the economic and social standing of its inhabitants. With the increasing demand for land for housing developments, agricultural land in and around Malayer diminished, and more so than before, the town had to rely on food supplied by the outlying villages. Simultaneously, the villagers became more dependent on the town for services such as schools and medical facilities which they had come to regard as indispensable. Moreover, they became increasingly dependent on the retail market, as their economic self-sufficiency decreased. Thus, in this phase, the town-village relationship was one of increased mutual dependence, with the town exhibiting both rent-capitalistic and "central-place" characteristics. However--and this is a point the author does not sufficiently emphasize--although the town gave to the villagers as well as receiving from them, the villagers had to pay dearly for the services received in Malayer, and thus even more capital was channeled into the town. In the fourth and last phase, extending to approximately 1970, there has been little change, despite the land reform and village-oriented development programs. in rural areas, scarcity Undeveloped marketing facilities of capital for agricultural investment, and bureaucratic centralization increase the villagers' dependence on the resources of the town more than previously, although the trader and moneylender have now replaced the landlord as channels through which surplus from the rural hinterland is funneled into the town. Although rural development programs, agricultural advising, and other services which reach the villages by way of the town primarily benefit and development policies the former, most legislation still seem to favor the town over the villages whether intentionally or accidentally. Thus, although the renthas capitalistic aspect of the village-town relationship diminislhed and the town increasingly has developed into a source of benefits for the village, the profit balance between town and villages is still weighted in favor of the former. For one who is at all familiar with village-town in Iran, this conclusion was predictable relationships IRANIANSTUDIES
114
from the beginning, and Malayer proves to be just another case in point. In fact, the study's theoretical conclusions are rather modest, while its major contribution consists of the detailed and careful description of many geographical, social and economic details, and of the wealth of quantitative information presented in the form of tables and maps, dealing with soil qualities and rainfall, the floor plans of houses, and the number of telephones in different residential areas of Malayer. Most of the information comes from Iranian governmental census materials of varying reliability, but is supplemented by data the author himself collected in Malayer and is interpreted very cautiously. (Indeed, some of the interpretations are so carefully phrased as to be almost pedantic. For example, for 1966, the census shows that 89.3% of all households had only 1-4 rooms. The author concludes: "Since an average household consisted of five persons, the conclusion that the majority of Malayer's inhabitants ... lived in crowded living conditions is urgent and justifiable" [p. 66].) However, in addition to a few stylistic errors, these are minor shortcomings. In short, it is beneficial to have another sound study of an Iranian town and we can only wish we had a comparable work about the cultural concomitants of village-town interrelationships and some socio-cultural that focusstudies ed on the village-end of these networks. As it stands, with the publication of this book, the social geographers have taken the lead in the study of Iranian towns.
115
WINTER-SPRING1977
The Qashqa'i Nomads of Fars. Hague: Mouton, 1974. 277pp.
By Pierre
Oberling.
The
Lois Beck In The Qashqa'i Nomads of Fars, Pierre Oberling provides a detailed history of one of the largest and most powerful tribal confederations in southwest Asia. The book is not really on "nomads," as the title would indicate, but rather on historical events that involved some Qashqa'i political leaders and some of their followers. It explains the role of confederacy leaders in regional, national, and at times international affairs, in a chronological fashion, from the time of the supposed arrival and consolidation of the Qashq-ai in the southern part of the Zagros mountains (fifteenth to eighteenth to the mid-1960s. centuries) The concern of the book is on the external relations of the tribe and confederacy; it is an account of the struggle for power and autonomy among the strong and well-developed leadership of this tribe, that of other tribes in the area, and various sedentary forces, which include national and provincial and a political elite, prominent provincial families, consulate host of foreigners (army officers, officials, The commercial agents, spies and agents provocateurs). and sometimes book details the history of these various, in which Qashrather peculiar, and conflicts, alliances qa'i khans, Shiraz merchants, government-appointed province governors, German spies, and armed British consuls, in ever-changing troops are involved intrigues, political As a result, the book is an machinations, and battles. excellent resource for those interested in eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century Iran, for we have here a discussion, from the perspective of local, provincial, and tribal affairs, of such things as foreign political and German and economic interests in Iran, the British
Lois Beck is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Middle East and Iranian studies at the University of Utah. IRANIAN STUDIES
116
presence, the Constitutional era, the programs of Reza Shah, the impact of the World Wars, the Mossadeq era, and The reader does, however, need a prior knowledge so forth. of the times, or of these events and the circumstances of the needs to read the book along with a written history names, and political times, to sort out all the events, and to place titles (which otherwise would be confusing) and economic context. Hasan-e them into a wider political by Fasa'i's F5rsnama-ye Naseri (in English translation of Persia Under Qajar Rule, ColumHeribert Busse, History interesting supplebia University Press, 1972) provides mental reading. The Qashqa'i tribes occupy a large tract of land in the southern parts of the Zagros mountain chain, which is the setting and political aof complex land use patterns that ocdaptations on the part of the various populations affairs of one of the cupy it. In sorting out the external many tribal groups in the chain, Oberling opens the way for a more complete understanding of of the interrelations tribal groups in the area. Belonging to a tribe is to a leader (or primarily an act of political affiliation set of leaders), recognition of and Oberling's consistent the diversity of groups within the Qashqa'i population and operation. shows the flexibility of tribal organization of Iran is a The movement of tribespeople in the history book contains fascinating subject for study, and Oberling's useful source material. on historical documents, Basing his book primarily Oberling has found references to the Qashqa'i in many nonplaces, English sources and not always readily-accessible and hence has provided a service He for other scholars. has been careful in using these sources in his attempts to of Qashqa'i history. reconstruct the past few centuries with Other sources of data for Oberling were interviews leading Qashqa'i figures (some are in exile abroad) and Iran, who were able to others of prominence in southwest in written sources provide some information not available and who could substantiate acor contradict published counts of Qashqa'i involvement in various past events.
117
WINTER-SPRING1977
The issue of the date and circumstances of the first on the paramount khan of conferral of the title of ilkhani the Qashqa'i by the central government (and the title of is not resolved in the book. ilbegi on his assistant) Hasan-e Fasa'i in the Farsnama writes that the first appointment was in 1819, but Oberling uses the title of for a Qashq&'i leader in the early 1700s and conilkhani tinues to use it from then on, without giving sources or There may be no error here, since the Qashexplanation. qV i may have referred to their paramount khan in this way in the early 1700s, while governmental conferral of the aftitle later may have simply recognized this position, firming the use of the title and, more importantly, defining the relation between the paramount khan (and the tribe) and the central government. However, an explanation, even if data are lacking, is in order. I have two further general comments to make about the focus of the book. First, although Oberling did conduct personal interviews with Qashqa'i leaders and others detail, most of what who could provide him with historical he writes about as "Qashqa'i history" is an account of what various English, French, German, Russian, and American writers had to say in print about the QashqVli. Although Oberand even sympathetic towards the ling is clearly sensitive apparent in the concluding Qashqa'i (this is especially sections of the text), one who has done research on Qashqa'i khans and Qashqa'i nomads feels that "Qashqa'i hisof the tory" as viewed from the eyes and perspectives Qashqa'i themselves would be a different kind of history This is not the case than that which Oberling presents. of a now, lost-to-time, tribal confederacy (as, for example, with the Aqquyunlu); there are many people who can speak informatively about Qashqa'i history, and these data and points of view can be integrated with those of the available written sources, enriching and enhancing our understanding of the events of the past. in the book to indicate Secondly, there is little the relations between the Qashqa'i leaders and the hundreds is of thousands of QashqVli nomads. The book's orientation even more narrow, for Oberling writes almost entirely about IRANIANSTUDIES
118
those specific Qashqa'i khans who were drawn to the attention of foreigners in a position to write about them (i.e., those Qashqa'i khans who played major roles in national and who dealt with provincial affairs, and national authorand foreign agents and officers). We do not find ities material on other Qashqa'i political and we-do not leaders, discover much information about the past and present relaof khans and tribespeople. tionships Oberling's intentions for the book were obviously and he had a full elsewhere, task in doing the research he did do, but the reader may want to know more about these areas. Beyond the brief outline provided by him, we need a discussion of the mutual rights and obligations of khans and subjects. How and under what circumstances do tribespeople switch allegiance, and with what flexibility? On what, exactly, is tribal leadership based? What are the connections between control of resources land use) and labor, on the one (especially hand, and political power and authority, on the other? How and under what conditions are tribal and triaffairs bal leadership controlled or directed by outside forces? The book contains some answers to these questions in the of historical unraveling but we need a general disevents, cussion of the principles and processes of tribal political organization. These two general points do not mean to suggest that the effectiveness of the volume is impaired; rather, they suggest that many historians and anthropologists can rely more heavily on the methods and orientations of both disthan they have in the past. ciplines Oberling's book is extremely informative in many subjects not covered at all or not covered in depth in other written sources. It is carefully and clearly written; its chronological approach is useful; and the appendices (on tribal sections, population estima.tes, genealogies), bibliography, maps, and photographs are of assistance to the reader and to those who wish to pursue the book's subjects further. Especially for those who study Middle Eastern or Iranian political elites, and for those who are interested in the history of the interrelationships of tribes and nation-states, the book is an important and useful contribution. 119
WINTER-SPRING1977
Persia:
Bridge
of
Turquoise.
Anthology by Seyyed Hossein plates by Mitchell Crites. ety, 1975. 367pp. $55.00.
By Roloff Beny. Essay and Nasr. Historical notes on the Boston: New York Graphic Soci-
Jerome W. Clinton
Several years ago the New York Graphic Society pubPersia: a handsome work on Iranian history entitled The Immortal Kingdom (1971). It is a profusely illustrated volume, with a substantial proportion of its plates in color. are all, Yet these illustrations as that term implies, extensions and amplifications of the text and anto it. The desire to provide an introduction to cillary Iranian culture that transcends the limits of print has been harnessed to the historian's belief in the primacy of narrative context. lished
The Society's latest publication on Iran, Roloff of Turquoise, Beny's Persia: Bridge responds to that same desire as well, but does so by taking quite a different apof text and photograph is reproach. Here the relation is provided as amplification of versed, and narrative the ph ot og rap h . The point is worth stressing, since for all the elaborate and impressive scholarly apparatus with which Bridge of Turquoise is provided--an introduction by a noted scholar, careful identifications of each plate and separate, extensive comments published as an appendix, and further appendices on the texts quoted, the transliteration used, and a select bibliography--the of substance of the book is a single artist's perception Iran and his realization of that vision in still photographs.
in the Department Jerome W. Clinton is Assistant Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.
IRANIAN STUDIES
120
essays on There have been other such photographic Iran,' but none to my knowledge that can a.pproach Beny's inof photographs work in either the number and variety cluded, or the care and expense with which they have been The format of the book is one which Beny has presented. in a number of earlier books on countested and refined Phototries as varied as Japan, Ceylon, Italy and Canada. graphs are grouped in "books" of broad thematic categories, The Sacred Place." as "Book Two: Life," or "Book Three: quite general; that are still Within these are subdivisions for example, or "City and Village," "Mosque and Ritual," of works are from a variety Brief translations and "Joy." of photographs both to balance between clusters interposed the effect of allthat color and to keep the reader from This rushing through the book at too headlong a pace. for especially and translated anthology has been selected The to it. this volume and makes a handsome contribution nearly all in color and all stunthemselves, photographs rhythm of in a pleasing are presented ningly beautiful, that makes turning each page a sizes and proportions pleasure. The appeal of Beny's book is principally to the newcomer who has never been to Iran, or has seen it only His perspective is that of an eager and keenfleetingly. While determined somehow to see everything. eyed tourist, are given their due here, the monumental and the historic so also are the ordinary and fleeting phenomena of the life Holy places are not shown with that flows around them. with and tombchambers empty, but well-filled courtyards We are shown not only the object of the worshippers. but scenes along the way as well. journey, If the virtue of the book lies in its scope and qualities lies in the neighboring its limitation variety, of disparateness At times the juxtaand fragmentation. of pictures appears to have been determined more position and texture than of color, of light, by considerations content. This seems to be the case on pages 259-60 where the play pictures of a man posed by an antique windmill, of light over the surface of Shahbanu Farah Dam at Manjil, the sun are silhouetted against and a modern sculpture 121
WINTER-SPRING1977
brought together under the rubric "Power of the Land." A similar limitation lies in the nature of the notes; while they usually add only a welcome but dispensable refinement of information, at times, with no warning, they take on a critical importance. What neophyte would guess that those squat towers looming ominously beside a misty river on page 250 contained only pigeons? Those who have traveled in Iran may also become suspicious of the ecstatic effect of so much color. In his preface Beny speaks of some of the difficulties he faced in his own journeys through Iran, but there is no reflection of them in his photographs which give the most In this regard, Seyyed ordinary scenes a luminous beauty. Hossein Nasr's essay accurately reflects the tone of the book, since he stresses in it the spiritual mode of existence of the Iranian people to the virtual exclusion of the mundane. On seeing Beny's sumptuous display, the first impulse of all those amateurs who have traveled throughout Iran camera in hand will surely be to burn their own slides and snapshots in disgust. They should check that impulse, is a masterful introduction however. Bridge of Turquoise to Iran, and worth every penny of its considerable price. But it hardly exhausts the possibilities even within its own genre. Nor attempt either to examine anything it touches on in depth, nor to present the pedestrian and ordinary as any mnorethan what they are.
1.
For example, A. Costa's Lockhart (London, 1957), to Iran. With notes by 1960), and Roger Wood's Wright (London, 1969).
IRANIANSTUDIES
122
With notes by L. Inge Morath's From Persia Edouard Sablier (New York, Persia. With notes by Denis Persia.
IranianStudies,Volume X, Nos. 1-2, Winter-Spring1977.
Letters
to
the
Editor
TO THE EDITOR: with my study, reMichael Beard, vaguely familiar views a work on structure as if it were a translation Disregarding (Iranian Studies, Vol. IX, No. 1, p. 80). the restrictions Hedayat's Ivory Tower, imposed (Bashiri, points, draws inpp. 23, 170), he emphasizes irrelevant accusations. accurate conclusions and makes unsubstantiated He fails description proposed and to review the structural time both Hedayat's ignores the fact that for the first and Buddlife, and the Rilkean, Khayyamian, Zoroastrian are put into proper perhistic influences on the novella criticism" (Beard, spective. "Old-fashioned allegorical ibid., p. 83) sums up his review of the chapters on analysis. Given his anti-linguistics, anti-analytical attitude, of these techniques even in the light of the contributions to the elucidation of world literatures, one could hardly reaction. expect a different It is a working transMy translation is literal. lation with the major aim of providing the scholars unIt is an with all the data. familiar with the original book into collohonest attempt at rendering a difficult It retains the laconic, quial American idiom intact. sentences of the incoherent and even the incomprehensible There as they are perceived Iranians. by native original and they are being is, of course, room for improvements, made as our understanding of Hedayat and his work increases. A final, annotated translation is possible only when the are worked out (Bashiri, semantic matrices of the novella of Hedayat's ibid., p. 170), and when a sound understanding philosophy is achieved. It is towards this end that an description were made interim translation and structural 123
WINTER-SPRING1977
available. This being the case, will it not be foolhardy to even speculate on Arabic loan words such as rajjaleha and jama', which obviously no longer retain their exact, original Arabic meaning? As a teacher of Beard who started Persian in 1968, and with two decades of involvement in English language, literature and linguistics, I should be able to distinguish borderline grammar in these languages. The question, however, is academic: Should the translator euphemize the abusive language of a very frustrated author (Bashiri, ibid., pp. 41-47)? As is evident Costello euphemized, and Beard, who could have obliged us with his exdecided to assume the grandstand quarterback pertise, position. Hedayat strove for documentation in the colloquial, a feature on which the tone, and the atmosphere, of the work draws heavily. I have suggested that Costello has failed to harmonize the vital elements that conspire to convey the atmosphere of the original (Bashiri, ibid., pp. 18ff). My objection to the translation of the last sentence of the novella still holds. It is an objection based on practicality rather than on procedures as Beard I have argued that the exclusion of the comma infers. makes the realization of the deep structure philosophical of the sentence obscure. ramifications Without the comma, the work could not yield its be, do, become assessment of life, nor could it emphasize Hedayat's fine distinction If between body and Self (Bashiri, ibid., pp. 22ff). Beard would like to consider these philosophical distinctions minimal, fine. Let us turn to some of the tongue-in-cheek assertions on structure. Anyone knows that the recent use of binary feature analysis for character identification has little to do with Levi-Strauss, that etymology is not image correlation or sequence formation, and that although many features may remain a constant, a scene transformed is different from a scene repeated. his Beard establishes own premises, draws his own erroneous conclusions, and He demonstrates a justly calls them naive and simple. lack of erudition, and evinces ample proof for a dislike and ignorance of theoretical and analytical procedures. IRANIANSTUDIES
124
the appearance of the Naga-king For instance, correlating and at the end of the Buddhaserpent at the beginning environments carita, with the appearance of nag in similar I postulated the exin the second part of the novella, Through the between the two works. istence of a relation I showed that incorrelation, mechanism of step-by-step (Bashiri, ibid., 161ff). relation existed deed a structural on nag, Beard labors my logic for focusing Misinterpreting on the etymology of this word only to announce that nag is the Hindi word for serpent!! works of art can be As multi-level compositions, perspecspecialists from different examined by different I have suggested a that no matter how enigmatic tives. it draws on a coherent inwork may seem on the surface, ternal structure. Hedayat's work, which almost borders If Beard could fathom is an example. on hallucination, of the work, the structural and philosophical complexity on literature and if he were familiar with the critical that a it (Bashiri, ibid., pp. 4-8), he would not assert of readers have found brilliance and proportion generation in The Blind Owl (Iranian Studies, ibid., p. 83, Beard, May 1975). Let me quote the Hedayat critic Books Abroad, of the generation about whom Beard speculates: or the reader) starts reading (The critic approach, with a determined critical creeps an atmosphere of obscurity but gradually of uncritical acin, and in the end an attitude kur is of buf-i The critic ceptance prevails. like a surgeon who becomes affected by the anaesto operate (Kamshad, thetic every time he starts 1966, p. 164). Modern Persian Prose Literature,
He (the Blind
Owl)
in the work and brilliance There is, of course, proportion But were they able to find the ibid., p. 50). (Bashiri, analysis of the network of Zoroastri"key" to a systematic Khayyamian, and Rilkean themes and images an, Buddhistic, I have and proportion? which bring about this brilliance and I have demonisolated these elements structurally, strated that the same mechanism which gives The Blind Owl
125
WINTER-SPRING1977
its hallucinatory infra-structure can, when analyzed, dissipate the atmosphere of obscurity referred to by Kamshad. Beard methodically misinterprets some and systematically ignores my other assertions. His review is, at best, a "hatchet job." Iraj Bashiri University of Minnesota
IRANIAN STUDIES
126
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
In Manuscriptssubmittedfor publication,only those words need be transliteratedwhich do not appearin the thirdedition of Webster'sNew InternationalDictionary.The system of transliterationused by IRANIAN STUDIES is the PersianRomanizationdeveloped for the Libraryof Congressand approved by the American LibraryAssociation and the Canadian LibraryAssociation. Copies of this table (CataloguingService Bulletin 92) may be obtained by writingdirectlyto the Editor.
IranianStudiesis publishedby The Societyfor IranianStudies.It is distributedto membersof the Society as part of their membership.Annual membershipdues are $12.00 ($7.00 for students). The annual subscriptionrate for librariesand otherinstitutionsis $12.00. A limited supply of the back volumes of the Journal (1968 to present)is availableand may be orderedby writingto the Editor. The opinions expressedby the contributorsare of the individualauthorsand not necessarilythose of the Society or the editorsof IranianStudies. Articlesto be consideredfor publicationand all othercommunicationsshouldbe sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies,Box K-154, Boston College, ChestnutHill, Mass. 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society shouldbe addressedto the ExecutiveSecretary,The Society for IranianStudies, c/o Department of History, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, U.S.A.
COVER: BazaarVakil, Shiraz.Photo by N. Bonyadi,Social Historyof Shiraz Project,Iran PlanningInstitute(Tehran).
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies *I o.W49S:>
.
\
Sumimer1977
Volume X
Num-ber3
THE SOCIETY FOR IRANIAN STUDIES COUNCIL Ahmad Ashraf, Plan & Budget Organizationand University of Tehran Amin Banani, University of Califomia, Los Angeles Ali Banuazizi, Boston College Lois Grant Beck, University of Utah Oleg Grabar,Harvard University Eric J. Hooglund, Bowdoin College M.A. Jazayery, University of Texas at Austin Thomas M. Ricks, ex officio, Georgetown University MarvinZonis, University of Chicago EXECUTIVECOMMITTEE Gene R. Garthwaite, Executive Secretary Thomas M. Ricks, Treasurer Ali Banuazizi, Editor
IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of the Society for Iranian Studies Editor: Ali Banuazizi Associate Editors: Anna Enayat (University of Tehran), Vahid F. Nowshirvani(University of Tehran),Mangol Byat Philipp (HarvardUniversity) Book Review Editor: Ervand Abrahamian(Baruch College, City University of N. Y.) Assistant Editor: Marcia E. Mottahedeh CirculationManager: Rosemary Gianino
Copyright, 1978, The Society for IranianStudies Published in the U.S.A. USISSN 0021-0862 Address all communications to IRANIAN STUDIES, Box K-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts02167, U.S.A.
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
VolumeX
Summer1977
Number3
ARTICLES IN PRO129 SOCIALHIERARCHY VINCIALIRAN:THECASE OF QAJARMARAGHEH ANALYSISOF 164 THEAMERICAN IRANIANPOLITICS 196 SADEQHEDAYAT'S"THEMANWHO SELF": KILLEDHISPASSIONATE EXPOSITION A CRITICAL
Mary-JoDelVecchioGood
JamesA. Bill HomayounKatouzian
BOOKREVIEWS 207 L.C.BROWNANDN. ITZKOWITZ: PsychologicalDimensionsof NearEastemStudies 211 F. cATTAR: TheIlahi-nama (Translatedby J.A. Boyle) 216 S. BEHRANGI:TheLittle BlackFish andOther ModemPersianStories (Translatedby Maryand EricHooglund)
MarvinZonis
HeshmatMoayyad
AhmadKaimi-Hakkak
Continued on next page
Volume X
Summer 1977
Number 3
222
A. WELCH:Artists for the Shah
225
EDEBIYAT, A JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN LITERATURES
M.A. Jazayery
230 W.G.ANDREWS,JR.: An Introduction to Ottoman Poetry
TalatSait Halman
233
F. FESHARAKI: The Development of the Iranian Oil Industry
237 M.A. SHABAN: Islamic History, A New Interpretation
Milo ClevelandBeach
Amir H. Ahanchian
Elton L. Daniel
'luliiic I-anlitcttSimf"cd , Vo
Social The
1977. X. No. 3. SLnTi1mer
Hierarchy Case
of
in
Provincial
Iran:
QajarMaragh eh
Mary-Jo I)elVecchio Good
in Iran, as in other modernizing Social hierarchy has undergone major changes in the twentieth nations, cenof social hiertury.1 Nevertheless, contemporary patterns of inequality archy are rooted in the traditions that prevailed during the Qajar era. In provincial Iran, these of hierarchy and inequality traditions were structured in part by the form of political In the nineteenth authority. many provincial regions were ruled by local notacentury, bles who maintained varying degrees of independence from the royal court. Along with leading landowning families, and clergy, merchants, they formed the elite of provincial society. The culture of social hierarchy was also shaped by traditional Islamic and Persian views of society and by the meaning attributed to the distribution of wealth, power, and prestige in Iran. Remnants of the culture of social hierarchy of Qajar Iran are most salient today in provincial regions where relationships among social groups have changed more slowly than in the rapidly modernizing metropolitan and industrializing centers of the country. In many provincial areas, the definition of status communities and their boundaries, the characteristics of status-enhancing resources, access Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good is Assistant of Sociology Professor in the Department of Psychiatry, University of California, Davis. 129
SUMMER 1977
to social relations traditional
aspects of social and the status-marked mobility, in a community continue to be deeply rooted in hierarchy.2 of social patterns
of Iranian the traditions The present paper analyzes comof a provincial from the perspective hierarchy social of Basic Iranian principles munity, the town of Maragheh. which persisted and differentiation, stratification social for and continue to have significance through Qajar history Iran, are examined in in provincial relationships social The first of Qajar Maragheh. history terms of the social of focuses on the social history of the discussion section poliof local organization and the social the ruling elite the culture analyzes The second section authority. tical In parin the late Qajar era. hierarchy of Iranian social status groups that conthe social it describes ticular, of Maragheh from the Qajar hierarchy the social stituted and the status-enhancing century, era into the twentieth and influence that were the basis of prestige, resources group.. Although the dispower, and wealth of each social accounts of the from historical material cussion includes the vivid recolrelies upon analysis much of this period, and upon the inhabitants of the town's elderly lections The use of social groups. categorization townspeople's of the terms "status communities" and "status groups" indistinceconomic, and political the cultural, corporates groups imamong social tions that define the boundaries categories.3 plied by these indigenous
The Setting:
Provincial
Maragheh--A
Iranian
Town
in East Azerbaicapital Maragheh, a sub-provincial town, rich in social fascinating jan, is a particularly hierarchy. in which to study the culture of social history, the town in 1813, he noted that When James Morier visited it as one of their most ancient consider I... .the Persians city of the Mongol em."4 It was the capital cities... century and has pire for a brief period in the thirteenth and commercial agricultural, long been an administrative, town to undergo land reform It was also the first center. has grown from approximateThe town's population in 1962. IRANIAN STUDIES
130
ly 15,000 in 1900,5 to over Maragheh are predominantly though a small community of til after the Second World
The people of 63,,000 in 1974. Shilite Azerbaijani Turks, alArmenians flourished there unWar.
Until recently, the town's political and economic institutions have been dominated by several major landof Azerbaijan, owning and commercial families many of whom resided in the town and in surrounding villages. For over a century, the town and province during the Qajar reign, were governed by one of these prominent families, the Moand tribal leaders as qaddam notables, who were military and well as landowners and governors. As an agricultural the town also had an extensive bazaar commercial center, of social hierarchy were community. The town's traditions shaped by this political and economic organization. In and particular, the tradition of rule by local notables the presence of large landowning and commercial families influenced its culture of social stratification. Today, the townspeople characterize Maragheh as a conservative town that has changed little since their childhood. Although they acknowledge that the school system has been secularized and expanded, roads have been built and paved, government offices have proliferated, and municipal services (water, electricity, etc.) have been introduced, many people still claim that Maragheh lies outside the mainstream of progress and change. The people of Maragheh, they say, have allowed the frenetic economic and industrial boom, the social advances and upheavals experienced by metropolitan areas to pass them by. Some express pride in the resiliency of the town in the face of burgeoning developments at the national center and in metropolitan areas. Others, often non-natives, express frustration at the town's lack of participation in economic and social progress and industrial development. These inhabitants assert that the town remains a backwater because of its inherent traditionalism, the "laziness" of its people, and the continuing domination of the town by what some like to call "feudal" or "reactionary" elements.
131
SUMMER 1977
in The study of the culture of social hierarchy awareQajar Maragheh was enhanced by the townspeople's in the contemporary ness of remnants of these traditions relaof past social era and by their vivid recollections And because Maragheh has been somewhat marginal tionships. and in metropolitan changes experienced to the rapid social of principles traditional the Iran, of regions industrial and imcontinue to have great salience hierarchy social portance. The Mogaddam Notables and Provincial IMaragheh
Rule in
The rule of Maragheh and its environs by the Moqadthe Qajar rule of paralleled almost exactly family dam the Moqaddams ruled in governors, As provincial Iran. enjoyed autonomy from fashion and generally patrimonial Their congovernment for five generations. the central governors with considerable as provincial tinuous authority of the was in part a function in local affairs independence administrapolitical of provincial structure decentralized It was also a function of tion and rule under the Qajars. in the proand economic strength the Moqaddams' political and special leaders and of their loyalty vince as tribal The family's loyalty to the Qajar Shahs.6 relationship to to the Qajar dynasty appears to have been sufficient from autonomy without interference maintain their political the throne or from the Crown Prince seated in Tabriz only century, For throughout the nineteenth away. 80 kilometers judge, the Moqaddams monopolized the roles of governor, In addition, they and troop commander. tax collector, extendtherefore continued to acquire lands and villages, in the ing their domination over the peasant population No direct controls their wealth. region and increasing over Moqaddam rule, government were imposed by the central aid them in their nor did the Qajar Shahs significantly Kurds the rebellious campaigns against frequent military the Moqaddams In fact, their territories. who threatened in areas over which Tehran were able to maintain security or no control. had little
IRANIAN STUDIES
132
Initial attempts to rationalize administrative rule under Nasr al-Din Shah had little impact on the style of rule of the Moqaddams. Just as reforms were provincial in other parts of the kingdom beyond the unsuccessful fringes of Tehran, so too were they unsuccessful in Maraof provincial gheh. The independence governors such as the Moqaddams illustrates the weakness of the Qajar dynasty, their need to rely on provincial and notables, their tenuous control over provincial areas in contrast to the Pahlavis who succeeded them. This independence also indicates the dominant position such notables held in the social of provincial hierarchy communities.
The Governors:
1800
to
1925
The Moqaddam family's origin is unclear, but all descendants in Maragheh, as well as other townspeople, trace the origin of the governing family to Ahmad Khan Moqaddam, who ruled Maragheh in the early nineteenth century.7 The family apparently migrated to Iran from the Caucasus in the late eighteenth century as leaders of a tribal group. But the family was a settled people, owning vast numbers of villages by the early nineteenth century. One descendant claimed that after numerous struggles with Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834), Ahmad Khan was appointed governor of the province of Maragheh. In 1813, Morier described Ahmad Khan as the wealthy governor of Maragheh, who owned the house in Tabriz in which the English ambassador and his party stayed during their visit to the Crown Prince Abbas Mirza. Morier related in his journal a meeting with Ahmad Khan and described him as follows: The day after our arrival at Maragheh the Ambassador (British) was visited by Ahmed Khan, who had quitted his expedition against the Courds [Kurds] to perform the offices of hospitality to his guest. This Chief is one of those personages frequently met with in the East, who realize and illustrate many of the facts recorded in holy writ of the lives and habits of the Patriarchs. Like Isaac, 133
SUMMER1977
he had possession and great herds,
of and possession of flocks, Genesis, of servants. store
xxiv. 14. His manners and appearance are those a plain in tents. id. man dwelling of Jacob, and ten, Although verging to fourscore xxv. 27. he is the p i c t ur e of health and activity His beard is quite white, and his dress is scarceHis ly superior to that of his own shepherds. however for riches is very great; for reputation that of it, it is affirmed, among other instances of grain he sows 700 kherwar (nearly 500,000 lbs.) much he breeds a race of hardy horses, annually; He is one of the exteemed throughout Persia. being called the Reishelders of Persia, greatest sefeed (White Beard) of Aderbigian. 8 and flocks owned In addition to the vast number of villages by Ahmad Khan in the region of Maragheh, some which were land and governing in the environs of Tabriz, his family's His sons were goprovinces. role extended to neighboring vernors of Hashtrud and Saraskand, to the east of Maragheh. required defense domination of these provinces The family's to the south the Kurdish tribes against of their territories of bandit and tribal insecurity the constant and against was derived in large part raids. The Moqaddams' authority troops to insure tribal from the maintenance of sufficient and caravan routes cities, of the villages, the security Although the Crown Prince seated in under their control. tax sent troops to execute particular Tabriz occasionally in the area,9 it appears the bulk of governing policies to the Moqaddams. The duties of duties were relinquished a prerea provincial governor were to maintain security, of of taxes and the stability for the collection quisite trade and commerce, and to farm his province for his own and that of his prince and landed clients. profit fell to Ahmad Khan's governorship Succession son Hosein Pasha Khan (circa 1830 to after 1848).10
IRANIAN STUDIES
134
to his Hosein
Khan's son, Iskander Khan, became governor of Maragheh under Nasr al-Din Shah (1848-1896). Some family members claim he also acted as governor of Rezaiyeh and Tabriz during periods when the Crown Prince was not seated in Tabriz.
Throughout the nineteenth c e n t u r y, t he family's authority was concentrated in Azerbaijan, partiin the area immediately cularly south of Tabriz, west of Lake Rezaiyeh (Shah Goli), and east of Mianeh. In the 1890s, Iskandar Khan's sons, Fathollah Khan and Samad Khan were governors of Zanjan and Maragheh, respectively, and during the Russian occupation, Samad Khan was acting governor of Tabriz and Azerbaijan. Fathollah Khan also acted as military commander for a period under Muzaffar alDin Shah (1896-1907). Thus during the late nineteenth century, the Moqaddams' authority expanded to include extensive areas in Azerbaijan that were not consistently under their control. The last Moqaddam to be governor of Maragheh was Fathollah's son, Iskandar Khan Sadar Nasr (1911-1925) . He and one of his brothers became Majlis representatives during Reza Shah's reign while another brother became a general, famous for his support of Mohammed Reza Shah and for his role in developing the national police which he headed in 1956. The family also became noted members of the national political elite in Tehran. Patterns
of
Provincial
Administration
in
Qajar
Maragheh The Moqaddam governors ruled in classic patrimonial style with a household retinue of servants, administrators, and troops, and with overseers and client horsemen in the villages. The offices directly attached to the household were largely undifferentiated, although by the late nineteenth century there were separate offices of the treasury and urban police. The military retinue, upon which the Moqaddams based their authority and relied for the maintenance of security, consisted of two types of troops. 135
SUMMER1977
There were those troops who were attached to the governor's under his command; they were based household and directly In wherever the governor went. in the town and travelled there were irregular to these household troops, addition and overseers landlords forces supplied by village tribal These village of the governor. who were often relatives the "Pashas," "Khans," "Soltans" and overseers, landlords by the governors in rewere granted titles and "Salars," serand security support, mutual military turn for gifts, the with men these invested turn in governors The vices. in their peace and security of maintaining responsibility and of supplying mounted troops to the villages, respective Some were supplied with arms and governor upon request. network of obligaAn elaborate horses by the governor. ties of patronage and kinsupported by privileges, tions, help to explain the titles ship, and grants of prestigious conIn addition, system. the of and resilience longevity forces to the south made from Kurdish tribal stant threats But the Moqaddam govera necessity. cooperation military Pashas or "rebel" village nors were not beyond attacking This them. or imprisoning executing Khans and occasionally of their governing powers served to bring the cliexercise to emown policies, ent Khans in line with the governors' or to impose the governor's loyalty, phasize their requisite The governors were also inrule of law. own particular rebels in against occasional volved in personal vendettas their domain. when absent from town, would The Moqaddam governors, One inappoint one of their family as acting governor. a formant told us that during Samad Khan's governorship, the or landlord taifeh arbab the from cousin Moqaddam branch of the family acted as governor for a short period Other kin while Samad Khlan was campaigning in Ardebil. in "governparticipated occasionally from the arbab taifeh (as purto the governing taifeh as assistants ment" either of troops. However, or as suppliers chasers and the like), was never given the right to inherit the landlord taifeh and its members were always kept of governor, the office by the governing taifeh. positions in subordinate
IRANIAN
STUDIES
136
The law under Moqaddam rule continued to be, as in the rest of Iran, a combination of secular and sacred law, of urf (customary law and at times arbitrary patrimonial or shariah law. The present mayor rule) and of religious of Maragheh, in talking of Samad Khan, commented: "He was the law. He was lawmaker and judge; it was arbitrary law. and a treasury, In his administration there were only a police he was the law." In reality, the legal system was more into a religious court and legal sharply differentiated system, and the court of the governor and his representatives. The religious court was headed by a religious judge or qazi whom the people of Maragheh called "'mujtahid." These qazis were usually Azerbaijanis who were educated in the Shi'ite religious center in Najaf, Iraq. In addition to the chief qazi, who judged major disputes and made decisions regarding major land inheritances, additional religious-legal functionaries (mahzar-dar) performed duties as notaries from their homes. These men made out deeds of purchase and sale of land and goods, wrote out papers for loans, judged minor disputes, and performed the legal duties required by personal status law (marriage contracts, divorce, etc.). The older people of Maragheh still recall the high reputation of some of these religious in judges, particular that of Agha MohammedAnsari. The governor's court included the governor as chief judge, arbitrator, and law maker. During Samad Khan's rule, major disputes between landlords and complaints related to government business were brought before the governor. Lesser complaints and disputes were resolved by his chief of police. Bazaar complaints and disputes were judged either by secular or religious courts. The bazaar also had a group of elders who would join with the chief of police to decide cases internal to the bazaar. And one suspects that some disputes within the bazaar were resolved by these elders acting independently of the governor's representatives.11 The actions of the governors were only limited by custom and religious law, and most of the town's people considered the era of Moqaddam rule as one marked by unchecked arbitrary rule. Indeed, Samad Khan's whims led to a number of people's deaths, particularly during the Constitutional struggle. 137
SUMMER 1977
of the patriarchs The Moqaddams' role as political community was complimented by their role as Maragheh's Their patronage role extended to patrons par excellence. and charitable activiof community religious sponsorship century and until the era of In the late nineteenth ties. Reza Shah, the Moqaddam governors were noted for their supgroups who performed the and hay'at port of the ta'ziyeh Moharram passion plays in commemoration of Imam Hosein's as a retheir residence The governors offered martyrdom. their animals to the Moharand contributed theater ligious They also fed large numbers of people as ram processions. to the mainteand contributed charity acts of religious Through their patronage of schools. nance of religious actiand the community's religious the Moharram rituals at the center of Maragheh's they placed themselves vities, sacred symbol s. The Latter Years of Moqaddam Dominance: Period through 1925 Constitutional
The
marked the period (1905-1911) The Constitutional authority erosion of the Moqaddams' patrimonial initial the in Maragheh. Samad Khan Shoja al-Dowleh inherited Iskander his from of father, the province governorship Khan, in the late 1890s and ruled the province until 1911, of Azerbaij an. At one when he became governor-general time, prior to becoming governor of Tabriz, he was goverHe was highly comMianeh and Maragheh. nor of Ardebil, and interests mitted to the Qajar Shahs, and the family's FatholHis brother, those of the Qajar Shahs coincided. as lah, was also involved with the royal administration an army commander for Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896-1907), and was governor period, during the Constitutional possibly viewed the Constitutional of Zanjan. Samad Khan clearly movement as a threat to his rule, his autonomy, and to his Thus the movewith the Qajar Shahs. relationship special sustained met with was in and Azerbaijan ment in Maragheh that subsided only after Samad and hostility resistance Khan's death.
IRANIAN STUDIES
138
The period 1890-1914 was one of turmoil and strife for Azerbaijan, in which Kurdish and Shah Savan raids and were freand Ottoman and Russian incursions uprisings, to the quent. Samad Khan was kept busy bringing security It was also an inteloutlying areas under his control. lectually exciting in Tabriz, as conperiod, particularly stitutional and parliamentarian ideas spread throughout the more intellectual, and progressive relipolitical, gious communities. Maragheh, while not a center of the Constitutionalist movement, was also affected by the Constitutionalist fervor and agitation. However, Samad Khan quickly sought to quash the movement in Maragheh. Several elderly informants who remember stories of the period recalled Samad Khan's outraged reaction to the Constitutionin Maragheh. alists One elderly bazaari a Constitution (1906):
told
of the early
agitation
for
The democrats and constitutionalists began to amass. They were led by a very learned, very open-minded, and good mujtahid named Mirza MohammedHareligious, He made people understand and resan Moghaddas. alize the wrongs committed by the Qajar Shahs. The other Constitutionalist leader was Mirza Abdul Hosein Khan, also a learned mujtahid. Both these men and other religious leaders of the town encouraged the people to agitate for a Constitutionalist government and to become Constitutionalists. At this time, Shoja al-Dowleh was in Ardebil when he heard about [the movement] in Maragheh. He made a speedy return to the city with his mounted troops, covering the usual week long journey in three days. On the day before Shoja al-Dowleh arrived, Moghaddas sensing perhaps unconsciously that something might go wrong, set out for Kerbala on his donkey. Although he informed no one of his intentions to leave, a huge crowd of 300 or so people went to see him off. But all were scattered by horsemen and government troops, and Moghaddas was forced to return to Maragheh. The next morning, Shoja al139
SUMMER1977
Dowleh returned to town, and rode his horse through father's the Chay Usti Bazaar [where the informant's He then gave orders for the shop was located]. Mirza Mohammed arrest of the Constitutionalists. Hasan Moghaddas and Mirza Abdul Hosein Khan were It house. seized and brought to Shoja al-Dowle's There they were submerged naked in a was autumn. pool of cold water, and beaten with sticks by Shojals men until the water turned red with blood. and dragged They were then taken, half alive, they were hung upthrough the bazaar. Finally, side down from the branches of the big tree in Nalband Bazaar,12 and left hanging there for sevThe rest of the imeral days [until they died]. were imprisoned. portant constitutionalists of this story may have been embellished While the details was only ten years or altered over time (our storyteller has been confirmed by its main outline old at that time), and it is part of the community's oral history. others, of the depth of hostility It is also an accurate indicator that the Moqaddam governor felt toward the Constitutional against actions Samad Khan Shoja al-Dowleh's movement. of the movement continued until his departhe supporters ture for Moscow for reasons of health in 1914. the Constitutionaagainst Samad Khan's activities with his cooperation lists in Tabriz (1908, 1911-1914), MohammedAli Shah's attempts to destroy the movement and his throne after his forced abto recapture subsequently with the Russian dication (1909, 1911), and his collusion are occupying forces and government in Tabriz (1911-1914) that contemporary deof Moqaddam family history aspects Neither did our elderly scendants prefer to gloss over. the immeoutside bazaari know of Samad Khan's activities While several of the landed diate environs of Maragheh. to Samad referred elite from other important families in reference especially Khan's behavior as traitorous, few were with the Russians, clearly to his association the ConKhan's activities Samad all during of of aware movement. stitutional IRANIAN STUDIES
140
During the period of the first Constitutional Samad Khan's hostility to the "new Assembly (1907-1909), order" was illustrated to attempts at by his resistance reform in law and education in Maragheh. The religious courts were ostensibly for applying new legal responsible codes of the Constitutional regime, but Shoja al-Dowleh continued to dominate the legal institutions in Maragheh. The Constitutionalists in Maragheh also attempted to establish a "new" school in 1907 (in contrast to the traditional Samad Khan closed it almost religious maktabs). immediately and imprisoned its founder. After the abdication of MohammedAli Shah (1909), the school was reopened with the title of "The New School" (Dabestan-e No). It continued to operate until 1911, when under Russian pressure and Moqaddam hostility it was again closed. Samad Khan's anti-Constitutionalist activities in other areas of Azerbaijan were in collaboration with the activities of MohammedAli Shah. The Shah's bombardment of the Iranian Majlis in June 1908 led to civil strife in which pro-royalists battled Constitutionalists throughout Iran. Samad Khan participated in the first siege of Tabriz with pro-royalist forces. He nearly succeeded in defeating Sattar Khan, the head of the provisional government in Tabriz, and in entering the city. In November 1908, Samad Khan suffered a set-back when Maragheh and Binab, the urban centers of his province, were captured by the Constitutionalists. In the winter of 1909 (January through April), Samad Khan again regrouped with pro-royalist forces in the second seige of Tabriz. As one Maraghehi commented, "He made the Tabrizis eat grass" in his efforts to starve the nationalists into submission. Samad Khan's troops, in conjunction with other Qajar forces (Rahim Khan's Shahsavans), had occupied the environs of Tabriz by the spring of 1909 and directly threatened the city proper. The siege was broken by the occupation of Tabriz by Russian troops, ostensibly to alleviate the suffering of foreign nationals. Samad Khan appears to have returned to Maragheh after the abdication of MohammedAli Shah in September 1909, but there is no indication that he relinquished his control over captured territory around Tabriz or cut his ties with
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who continued to wield the Russians, Tabriz and the northern provinces.13
their
influence
in
Assembly The period of the second Constitutional of rule in impact on the patterns had little (1909-1911) Russian interfercenters of Azerbaijan. the provincial reof the North and the persistant ence and occupation the such as Samad Khan to recognize fusal of notables to the instacentral government in Tehran contributed In July 1911 MohammedAli bility of the new government. Shah returned to Iranian shores from his European exile in a Russian instigated attempt to regain his throne and Once again, Samad Khan to destroy the Constitutionalists. his troops to MohammedAli Shah's cause and again offered with troops in conjunction fought the Constitutionalist the Shah's brother in Hamedan. The failSalar al-Dowleh, and those of his royal ure of MohammedAli Shah's efforts, and defeat in led to the former Shah's flight "rebels," Meanwhile, the Russian government under the October 1911. troops to ocof restoring order sent additional pretense cupy Tabriz and Azerbaijan. Samad Khan culminated his anti-Constitutionalist of Russian-occupied Azerbaijan career as governor-general from 1911 to 1914.14 Both Avery and Arfa claim that Samad of a puppet and collaborator Khan was a Russian appointee, While he clearly had Russian support, his the Russians. with the with them stemmed from his alliance collaboration former MohammedAli Shah, and with a concern for his own the reand the autonomy of his rule vis-a-vis position of of a new order. During his governorship presentatives Tabriz he continued his vicious attacks on the ConstituHe also ignored the central tionalists. government in from Tehran were Tehran, and Arfa notes that "officials to the cowed and expelled."'5 Samad Khan's antipathy case in a country Tehran government was not a special and civil from divisiveness, strife, that was suffering and overt control. interference foreign
ceeded
IRANIAN
When the central government in sending the Crown Prince
STUDIES
142
sucin Tehran finally (the young Ahmad Shah's
brother) to Tabriz to take his seat as governor general of Azerbaijan in 1914, Samad Khan relinquished his post and spent his last days in Moscow being treated for an illness the townspeople now call cancer. He died there and was returned to Maragheh with the full honors of a Shi'ite dasteh accompanied by religious funeral, processions and mounted troops. After his ritual return to Maragheh, his body was taken to Karbala for burial in the final pilgrimage of a Shi'ite patriarch. Samad Khan's role as governor included patronage of Maragheh's community rituals, particularly public religious rituals. It was a significant dimension of his role as political ruler of the province, and it helps- to explain his popular support throughout the hostilities of the Constitutional period. Moqaddam descendants recall that Samad Khan, who was childless, relinquished his governorship of Maragheh to his brother's son, Iskandar Khan Sadar Nasr, who was married to a Qajar princess. Iskandar Khan was governor of Maragheh from 1914 to 1925, and quite likely was acting governor from 1911 to 1914 while Samad Khan remained in Tabriz. Iskandar Khan participated with his irregular troops in Reza Shah's campaign against the Kurdish rebel chief, Simko, in 1921.16 He and other prominent Moqaddams in his generation shifted their allegiance to the Pahlavis in 1925 and were duly rewarded with positions of political influence and military prominence. The Culture
of Social
Hierarchy
in Qajar Maragheh
A society's pattern of social hierarchy and social differentiation reflects the subjective meaning each culture gives to inequalities in power, wealth, and prestige. In Maragheh at the turn of the century, social differentiation and hierarchy were characteristically Irano-Islamic in form. Although changes in the meaning and form of inin power, wealth, equalities and prestige were beginning to affect social structure at the national center, the impact of outside influences and internal changes was less clearly evident in provincial regions such as Maragheh 143
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until after the First World War. Thus, the pattern of of below was characteristic described hierarchy social century throughout the nineteenth Azerbaijan provincial and the reign of the Qajar Shahs. form, was orderin Irano-Islamic Social hierarchy, government, comcategories--of ed in terms of functional Within each of these and agriculture. merce, religion, The of groups. hierarchy a was there broad categories, medieval to totally dissimilar not were groups functional from European medieval estates Yet they differed estates. ranked along any one in that they were not hierarchically c 1o s e d nor were t h e y criterion common evaluative from to mobility in legal theory or in actuality, either While groups within the category of governother sectors. with the royal ment were often more powerful than others, groups withof position dominance, ultimate in the family were often more prestigious, in the category of religion and commerce perhaps more wealthy. those within agriculture group was derived from a status of a social The particular (see below). resources of status-enhancing constellation groups to of various social Even though the relationship in sowas an important criterion the means of production basis sole the means no by was it cial differentiation, groups in the or ranking functional for distinguishing Irano- Islamic context. and distinctions basis of social The functional century Iran, as opposed to social in nineteenth hierarchy illusis clearly in the Marxian sense, strata or classes Assembly Constitutional the groups trated by the social law of the Persian Constielectoral included in the first were to come from Electors tution (September 9, 1906). (1) royalty, groups: social the following and represent governors, princes and the Qajar tribe and (2) provincial were from the functiontribal khans, nobles and notables repre(3) ulema and students al category of government; members and (5) merchants (4) category; the religious sented of trade guilds were from commerce; and (6) landed propri17 As this categori etors and peasants were from agriculture. the Constitutionalists groups illustrates, zation of social or strata within a single classes social included several IRANIAN STUDIES
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These groupings are more than occufunctional category. pational Within the functional distinctions. grouping of the landlords are dominant, the peasants agriculture, subordinate. Within the category of religion, the ulema are more learned and prestigious than their students. Urban and the were excluded from unskilled laborers, servants, these social groupings altogether. Neither Islamic law nor Iranian custom formally prevented mobility into or out of any of the social groups noted above, except for the royal family whose position was defined by ascriptive kinship characteristics. There was no ideologically formalized hierarchy that structured broad relationships among the religious, commercial or agricultural groups on the basis of a single criterion of evaluation,such as purity in the Indian caste system. Rather relationships fluctuated depending upon the resources of wealth, influence and prestige held by social groups within each category. While those in government, particularly members of the royal household and provincial notables, were at the apex of the political hierarchy, their legitimacy of rule and their right to exercise could be questioned authority by prestigious religious figures and their supporters, and could be challenged by other notables, tribal khans, and members of the royal tribe. The functional characteristics of Irano-Islamic social differentiation emphasized the structural importance of occupational as well as inequalidistinctions, ties of wealth, power, and prestige, in the formation of social groups or status communities in Weberian terms. This perspective on social differentiation and hierarchy continues to influence the way Iranians, in particular Maragheh's inhabitants, perceive their nation's social structure and their community's social organization. However, relative rankings of status communities within the overall social hierarchy of a provincial town are derived from the constellation of status-enhancing resources that are controlled by various group members.
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Parti,
Pul,
"Pilav":
Status-Enhancing
Resources
The status-enhancing resources in provincial Iranian are often jokingly referred to by Iranians as "parti, pul, and pilav" or influence and power, money, and firice."1 "Pilav" is the banquet rice, either offered to guests as part of a sumptuous or ritual repast in one's home, or given to the mosques to dispense to the needy. "Pilav," in Maragheh, implies one's ability to lavishly entertain one's peers from which one desires favors and on occasion, one's superiors such as the royal retinue. It also implies a patronage role by which one acquires and prestige supporters or clients through the distribution of favors and largess.18 An additional resource particular to religious prestige is learnedness or sacred knowledge. Personal characteristics such as being holy pure (tamiz) and religious are also status-en(mo'men), hancing resources for those in the religious hierarchy. Iranians recognize that these status-enhancing resources form a constellation of interconnected elements that not but only distinguish one's place in the social hierarchy also fluctuate with the whims of historical circumstance and interpersonal relationships.19 society
In more analytic terms, the bases for the constellations of status-enhancing resources at the turn of the cenand/or tury in Maragheh included closeness to national prowealth in villages vincial political centers, or commercial and to sacred closeness enterprises, and education symbols, skills. Closeness to national or provincial political figwithin provinures led to positions of power and influence to cial government (parti), to increased opportunities and tax farming acquire wealth in the form of villages grants, and to central patronage roles within the commuin village lands and commercial nity. Wealth, usually led to opportunities to enterprises, especially trade, within the local government. purchase influence Ownership of villages implied domination and patronage of the peasant of authority. and thus led to minor positions population and influence within Commercial wealth gave one prestige withthe bazaar community. Patronage roles and obligations of wealth. in the town frequently accompanied positions IRANIAN STUDIES
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Closeness to sacred symbols, especially of the and to poliof moral authority ulema, led to positions within the bazaar tical and moral influence, particularly within the community as community, as well as to prestige a whole. were the least developed Education and skills in Qajar Maragheh. status-enhancing resources They were significant scholars sources of prestige for religious and for certain royal scribes who were granted titles and lands in exchange for their services. However, skills in crafts, and administration, agriculture, trade, military and traditional medicine were also valued and evaluated by a society that stressed the functional of each perutility son's role in the workings of the community's economy and government. In the twentieth the increasing century, significance of formal secular and technical education as a resource marks the change from a pattern status-enhancing of social differentiation and hierarchy traditionally Irano-Islamic in form to one that is clearly Iranian but also modern in form.
Status
Groups in Qajar Maragheh
Status communities in Maragheh grew out of the unequal distribution of various status-enhancing resources and from Irano-Islamic social or functional differentiation. The traditional status groups described below continue to form a significant element in the contemporary social hierarchy of the community, but they have been partially transformed because of the introduction of new functional roles and new bases of status-enhancing resources. Social hierarchy in Qajar Maragheh included the following status groups: the ruling elite--the ruling branch of the Moqaddam family; an upper stratum20 of wealthy landlords (arbabs), wholesale merchants (tajirs) and prestigious religious scholars and leaders (mujtahids, pishnamazes, Imam Jumcahs) who constituted the agricultural, commercial and religious elites; a middle stratum of government functionaries (scribes, police), garden owners and village overseers (mubashirs), shopkeepers and craftsmen (bazaaris) and religious functionaries (mullas, rozeh147
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khans,
mahzardars,
maktab teachers);
of marginal bazaaris and apprentices, servants, and peasants.21
and a lower stratum
urban laborers,
The Rulers
Membership in the Moqaddamfamily was not sufficient to attain the position of "ruler." The family was divided into two taifehs or branches: those that became provincial governors, military commanders, and later under the Pahlaand those who and Majlis representatives; vis, politicians remained landlords in the Maragheh and Hashtrud areas. kin. Rulership was therefore inherited through patrilineal As noted above, the sources of the Moqaddamgovernor's authority were many. Among the most important were tribal control the ability to establish initial chieftainship, over the region with their own troops, recognition of their power by the Qajar Shahs in return for service to the Qajar and armed dynasty, and continued control over villages The family's continuous monopolization of the troops. governorship enabled its members to extend their land ownership thus their wealth, and to expand their troops. By maintaining patronage ties with the ruling branch of the family, the arbab branch enhanced their position as The Moqaddamslost their position as village landlords. autonomous provincial rulers after the rise of Reza Shah, when the provincial government was integrated into the Although the most prominent members national center. they began to were incorporated into the national elite, Neveraffairs. lose their power in provincial political the Moqaddamsand other families of the landed theless, and commercial elite continued to exert considerable influence over Reza Shah's appointees in the provincial adin and At the same time, they participated ministration. supported his regime. The Moqaddamswho remain in Maragheh are still quite wealthy but have lost much of their roles. and political prestige along with their villages
IRANIAN STUDIES
148
The Landlords
(Arbabs)
landed families, This group included the "elite" who were at the pinnacle of Maragheh at of the social hierarchy landthe turn of the century as well as a number of lesser of lords. In the mid to late nineteenth century several these families migrated as tribal groups to the environs of Maragheh, while others originally came as merchants. land grants in the area from the Some received their first for whom they provided various services, Qajar crown princes to the court. Others were members or most often as scribes married to members of the royal family and its lesser prinreAll maintained patronage ties and mutual security ces. lationships with the ruling Moqaddams. There was some intermarriage between these families. The elite status of of their ownership of vast these landlords was a function of the agricultural tracts of land, of their monopolization sector, and of their association with the ruling and royal in this group most ownOf the elite households. families ed over 20 villages, and prior to land reform in 1962 several families each. In their roles owned over 60 villages as rural patriarchs, they also controlled and dominated large segments of the rural peasant population. The influence of those landlords who lived in Maragheh was also in town society, where they were often involved extensive in commercial as well as agricultural activities. They also acted as central figures in urban patronage networks. of these families The power and influence began to be diffused Their more advenduring Reza Shah's reign. turesome and successful children began to migrate to Tehran, and many remained in the Tabriz, and abroad for schooling, national center and became involved in national politics and modern professions. While the power base of many of the families shifted to Tehran, some remained powerful Reza Shah appointed several of the provincial notables. most prominent local family members as Majlis representatives, governors of various sub-provinces in Azerbaijan, and military commanders. In addition, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the landed elite continued to amass villages, buying them from absentee and lesser landlords. Until the early 1960s the families of the 149
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over the continued to wield great influence landed elite and government offices. Alurban courts and political and influence power, prestige, though the landed elite's of execution only after the successful sharply diminished land reform in 1962, the process for many landed families of land because of the fractionalization had begun earlier to and, since the 1930s, the tendency of children holdings leave the town.
The Merchants
(Ta jirs)
Prominent merchants in Maragheh at the turn of the As noted century were often large landowners as well. began their landed families of the elite above, several of wealth from trade, which they then investaccumulation Thus there was some overlap between mered in villages. among intermarriage and considerable chants and landlords themselves however, distinguished The merchants, them. who were part of the Moqaddam from the landed families Although network for the province. security governors' of "Khan" they did not use the title they owned villages, but rather that of "Hajil" or "Agha." As one descendant of the most prominent and famous merchant family commented: We "Our family was never connected with the government. were never involved in government work." between commercial and government The distinction was endeavors and between commoner and government titles spheres of influence an acknowledgment of the separate The bazaar and power of the rulers and of the merchants. acted as mediators beoften wealthy merchants, elders, disputes tween the government and the bazaar and settled and power within the Their prestige within the bazaar. the bazaar community, stemmed from community, especially trade, their control of wholesale wealth, their extensive Most of and their patronage roles and personal qualities. and their trade merchants owned caravansaries, the elite took them with Russia and the Ottoman Empire frequently At times they were joined by lesser merchants abroad. A number of leading merchants from the town. and traders through their support of represtige acquired additional IRANIAN STUDIES
150
One famous merchant, ligious and charitable activities. Haji Qaffar, is still remembered for having initiated and sponsored the Moharram passion plays and religious dastehs and for developing the religious dramatic organizations, the Hoseiniyehs in the late nineteenth century. Prominent merchants gave to religious trusts (vaqf) and on religious holidays distributed meals in the mosques for the needy. The identification of religious and commercial interests served to enhance the merchants' and influence prestige within the urban community. The loss of wealth and status by many merchant families began to occur as the centers of economic modernization impinged on traditional commercial activities. The of borders with Russia after the Revolution closing and the refocusing of trade with Europe also diminished the commercial significance of the traditional While some of tajirs. the traditional merchants of Maragheh have tried to adjust to the new economic order through the development of small manufacturing most have been limited to tradiconcerns, tional agricultural commerce. Present government policy is attempting to limit that trade through agricultural marketing cooperatives and through its media campaigns against the "middle men." As one member of the wealthiest merchant family claimed, "My father was a very rich and big merchant. But things have changed in the family now. We don't have the same trade anymore." extensive The pattern of change is illustrated by what has happened to the offspring of another prominent merchant family. The eldest son, a man of 6S, to manage the family's continues commercial activities and to operate a large caravansary. The other offspring have joined government banks as managers or have entered the professions and the bureaucracy. These sons with modern educations and occupations still maintain their orchards, and in some cases, they have expanded them. More recently, other merchant families have established business enterprises and extended their commercial agricultural investments and activities.
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The Religious
Leaders
(Mujtahids)
Exceptional religious scholars, the head of the religious court, and several charismatic ulema were members of the religious elite. Our informants noted that while none were particularly wealthy (they might own gardens and manage vaqgf land), all who gained such preeminence were extremely learned and educated in one of the Shi'ite religious centers such as Najaf. The influence of the prominent ulema was extensive. Their close association with the merchants and bazaaris, and on occasion with the ruling household, placed them in mediating positions. As noted in the elderly bazaarils account of the Constitutionalist movement, these prominent ulema were capable of arousing a crowd to political action against the government. Their judgment in areas of religious law and land inheritance was also sought after by the landed elite. One elderly informant recalled the way cases of land inheritance were settled. "If an arbab (landlord) died in the village, his family would come to Mujtahid Agha (the chief qazi) and request that he oversee the division of land among the family. He would send his aides to divide the land. They would also put one share aside for Mujtahid Agha." The prestige and material wealth of these ulema stemmed from the high evaluation the community held for religious pursuits and religious knowledge. These three status groups constituted the traditional elite of Maragheh. Although they were not a class in a certain the strictly Marxian sense, they did exhibit This amount of solidarity and community of interests. solidarity was particularly apparent between the landed The prominent religious and commercial elite. figures, while enjoying high prestige in the community, were marginal men to the Maragheh community. They were most often who came from the Shi'ite centers of outsiders religious in Azerbaijan to from other cities Najaf and originally fill offices. as religious They had no lengthy history nor did they marry into the elite Maragheh residents, In contrast, families.22 Maragheh's landed and commercial merchants were involved interests: elite had overlapping in commercial activities. in landownership and landlords IRANIAN STUDIES
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These cross-cutting economic ties reinforced ity and emphasized their common interests. there was also factionalism and competition and their arenas of greatest lies, influence 23 differed.
their solidarNevertheless, between famiand power also
As noted above, the merchants were most influential in the bazaar community, while the landlords were most influential within the government and in the rural reas. In addition, the networks based on kinship and non-kin associates did not always overlap. Cousin marriage contributed to the continuation of these elite families as separate kinship entities. Although there is evidence that intermarriage between these elite families occurred in the first half of the twentieth century, the genealogies of the most prominent families indicate a pattern of elite intermarriage that maintained a number of separate kinship clusters in which there were no cross-cutting marriages.
The Bazaaris,
the
Garden
Owners,
and the
Ulema
As the agricultural and commercial center of the province, Maragheh had a vital bazaar. The bazaaris, shopkeepers and craftsmen, constituted the bulk of the town's middle strata, and in a real sense they were the cultural and religious core of the urban community. The bazaaris were organized into guilds, or asnaf, specific to each occupational specialty. The bazaar was also organized into occupational or functional sectors with shops specializing in similar goods or crafts clustered together. A similar pattern of organization exists today with minor alterations. Garden owners, 1 i k e many of the large landowners, often participated in commercial activities. And a number of bazaaris also owned vineyards and orchards. Small traders in agricultural products frequently had village origins and used the capital from their vineyards and gardens to get their start in commerce. Conversely, well-to-do craftsmen, traders, and shopkeepers invested in small plots of land in the vineyards that surrounded the town. Thus there was an extensive overlap between these two groups. 153
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were closely The ulema, or religious functionaries, associated with the bazaar, and the town's major mosques and religious schools were located within the bazaar quartsupport ers. The ulema acquired most of their financial and following from the bazaaris, and in return played cenfor commercial transtral roles in the guilds, as notaries and as arbiters actions between and judges of disputes spokesmen for bazaaris. The ulema acted as the political period. the bazaar, especially during the Constitutional with those of the The identification of bazaar interests ulema was exemplified by the role the bazaar played in The bazaaris rituals. were the primary community religious and participants in the community's religious organizers and in the Moharram passion plays. They were organizations responsible for the development and success of the Moharram rituals as central and sacred symbols of the community.
The Government
Functionaries
officials--the The governors' retinue of lesser urban police, scribes, and others atvillage overseers, also part of the middle tached to the administration--were The strata. Our data for this group are quite limited. that information we have on Samad Khan's rule indicates made up the mathe security force and village overseers of of government officials. Several descendants jority lands village overseers were able to amass agricultural during Reza Shah's reign and to work their way into the Overin terms of wealth if not prestige. landed elite seers for the landed elite and for the governors usually share of the crops. earned 10 percent of the landlord's Colonel Esfandiari, started as a groom The most notorious, landed families and became a larger for one of the elite He had the dubilandholder than his original employers. ous fame of being the first landlord to have his villages under the land reform program in 1962. distributed of the middle stratum of The cultural solidarity by comulema, and garden owners was reinforced bazaaris, that integrated interests mon commercial and religious Interand ulema into a market community. the bazaaris IRANIAN STUDIES
154
marriage among the various occupational groups also served to knit this stratum into a status community.24 Yet various forms of social and competition organization within the bazaar led to divisions within the stratum. Bazaaris identified with the separate asnaf (guilds) organizations that divided the market into occupational groups. They also identified with mahalleh factions and (neighborhood) competing religious The town's four mahalorganizations. lehs or quarters, each associated with a particular gate of the town, met in the center of the bazaar. A major mosque was associated with each quarter and was located in the bazaar where the quarters joined. Although factional conflict between the mahalleh and religious organizations was infrequent, this latent divisiveness was expressed each year during the early stages of the Moharram religious rituals. The youth of the neighborhoods, primarily of bazaaris children and younger bazaar members, would gather in groups to contest each other in mock combat that occasionally led to serious conflict and injuries. During this time, the bazaar also split into two religious factions, the Heydari and Nelmati. These usually latent factional groupings represented two religious orders or factions that formed in Iran since the Safavid era. Additional religious and movements, such as associations the Sheikhi, Dervish and Sufi orders and the Hoseiniyehs exacerbated internal divisions within the bazaar and religious community. Remnants of community factionalism have persisted into the contemporary era. The town's youth still form into competing neighborhood gangs during Moharram, although their activities have been curtailed and moderated by police surveillance. The Hoseiniyehs, the religious drama have proliferated organizations, and continue to compete with each other for prestige. The guilds are still organized on the basis of occupational differentiation although they are now unified under a Chamber of Guilds Asnaf) and regulated by the central (Otagh-e government. The Ne'mati and Heydari factions and the various religious orders have largely disappeared as consequential sources of factionalism within the bazaar community. They have been replaced by aspects of cultural diversity that are peculiar to the modern era. 155
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Urban Laborers,
Apprentices,
and Servants
Although the lower stratum of the town's population a major segment of the urban community in Qajar constituted history. on their social information Iran, there is little of the working class lack depth, and The family histories However, short.25 family memory tends to be exceedingly with the were associated and apprentices urban laborers and peasants who fled bazaar and the guild organizations, war, bad harinternational strife, the ravages of tribal swelled taxation and excessive landlords, rapacious vests, in market cenand servants this stratum of urban laborers century Throughout the twentieth ters such as Maragheh.26 have been the maj'or source of Maragheh's migrant villagers burgeoning working class.
The Peasants
in hierarchy of the pattern of social A discussion without mention of the Qajar Maragheh would be incomplete popuwho make up the majority of the province's peasants the town's wealth and center, As an agricultural lation. of its agricultural on the strength commerce was contingent and merThe wealth and status of the landlords sector. sigof the bazaar, and the political the vitality chants, of the province were derived from the agriculturnificance in Maragheh's rural environs. of the peasants al production lands around Maragheh are among the most The agricultural in Iran, and even in the late Qajar era the area fertile was noted for its dried fruit and nuts, which were exported In the early twentieth to Russia. century7 the peasants Their relain Maragheh were noted as good husbandmen. was generally by regulated to their landlords tionship were noted for their ar28 landlords custom, although certain treatment of their peasants. bitrary rule and for oppressive the peasants who were shareUnder customary conditions, of the irrigated grain and two-thirds croppers received and fruit crops, while the landlord received vegetable and between one-fifth The landlord received one-third. In some areas wheat crop. of the unirrigated one-third which were rights, of Maragheh, peasants also held jivar IRANIAN STUDIES
156
customary rights of occupation that were granted to peasants who brought land into cultivation and who planted and mainNot all peasants were tained orchards and vineyards.29 or tenant farmers. sharecroppers Some worked directly for the landlords as laborers and held no customary rights. Although prior to land reform this distinction was of no practical the latent significance in terms of village hierarchy, distinction emerged with land reform because most agricultural laborers did not receive land grants.30 The peasants in the environs of Maragheh were apparently politically passive throughout the nineteenth century. They coped with extreme misfortune and hardship by fleeing their villages, migrating to the town or to other villages. It was not until the Pishevari era (19441946) that Maragheh's peasants participated in a political movement. During the war years a number of landlords fled to Tehran, and the peasants, supported by the Pishevari government, refused to relinquish the landlords' share of crops. These social groups, with the exception of the ruling notables, the Moqaddams, are still found in contemporary Maragheh. They constitute the traditional status community to which the majority of the town's population belongs. Although there have been some changes in the distribution of status-enhancing resources among these groups, their relative positions in the traditional social hierarchy follow the pattern of the Qajar era.
Conclusion
The preceding discussion hasexamined the history of the governing elite and the culture of social hierarchy in Qajar Maragheh. Remnants of this traditional culture continue to structure many social relationships and to define the status of traditional social groups in the town today. However, several major changes in Iranian social which began under the Pahlavi Shahs, have organization, altered the traditional culture of inequality. First, the centralization and bureaucratization of political 157
SUMMER1977
authority in Iran transformed the position of the provinIn Maragheh, the local Moqaddam cial governing elite. independent governors, and pronotables were relatively power was concentrated in their hands. vincial political elite of Maragheh In contrast, the contemporary political power with representanow share much of their political The provincial polititives of the national bureaucracy. cal base of elite landed families who played central roles for many years has gradually diminished, in local politics in part because of land reform, and in part because of the increased importance of the central government. Land reof the old elite form also contributed to a deterioration social prestige in the community. Thus the old families' elite of Maragheh no longer monopolize the town's politihold the most prestical offices nor do they necessarily gious social positions in town society. Secondly, the modernization of Iranian economic and introduced new occupational roles organizations political resources to provincial communiand new status-enhancing ties such as Maragheh. This led to the emergence of a system of status communities, one traditional dualistic and one modern, which presently coexist in provincial towns. includes status community still In Maragheh, the traditional social groups that existed during the Qajar era. Social ranking within this status community continues to be based and presof social inequality; principles upon traditional largely evaluated in terms of traditional tige is still forms of resources such as traditional status-enhancing and sacred knowledge. In wealth, patronage positions, contrast, the modern status community consists of new social groups that formed in conjunction with political The social prestige of inand economic modernization. in edudividuals in these new roles', in the professions, cation, and in the bureaucracy, is evaluated in terms of resources such as education, promodern status-enhancing salaried income and rank within large fessional skills, traditional Nevertheless, bureaucratic organizations. such as membership in elite families or landqualities presownership may still enhance a modern professional's tige in Maragheh.
IRANIAN STUDIES
158
The transformation of the culture and structure of social stratification in Maragheh is a continuing process, shaped by the responses of a community that still maintains many traditional principles of social hierarchy. Yet, as older and more traditional generations die, the community's definition of social prestige, the meaning of social inand the structure of social hierarchy equality, will become more modern in form.
NOTES
1.
In the decades since World War II, studies of newstates in the Near East, Asia, and Africa have frequently focused on two developmental trends that shape contemporary patterns of social in these societies: hierarchy (1) the strengthening of the state through bureaucratization and centralization of control; and (2) the emergence of a new middle class of bureaucrats, salaried men, technicians, and businessmen professionals, and industrialists, as a consequence of political and economic modernization. See Lloyd Fallers, Inequality: Social Stratification Reconsidered (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); Clifford Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965); and Ezra Vogel, Japan's New Middle Class (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).
2.
For a more complete discussion, see Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, "Social Hierarchy and Social Change in a Provincial Iranian Town" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1977). I wish to thank the Social Science Research Council for a Foreign Area Fellowship; it made the dissertation research possible. Field work took place in Maragheh from December 1972 to August 1974 in cooperation with my husband, Byron Good.
3.
Ibid.,
4.
James Morier,
p.
and Asia
275.
Minor
A Second
Journey
(London:
through
Paternoster-Row, 159
Persia,
Armenia,
1818), p. 293. SUMMER 1977
5.
Julian
Bharier,
Iran, 1900-1966,"1
"The Growth of Towns and Villages Middle
Eastern
Studies
8:51-61
in
(1972),
p. 53. 6.
One of Ahmad Khan's sons was sent to the Qajar court Members of this branch of to serve the royal family. for the family remained in Tehran and were responsible of the Qajar policies implementing various military in the figures Several were prominent military Shahs. that one of Qajar court, and the family acknowledges for the death of its Tehran members was responsible has been confirmed by This information Amir Kabir. members of the Tehran Constance Cronin who interviewed branch of the family.
7.
It name but means "1chief." "Moqaddam" is not a tribal Some is unclear from what tribe the family originated. a branch the Moqaddams were originally have suggested are primariThe data in this section of the Afshars. of the ly drawn from the genealogy and family history Moqaddams as told to us by three family informants. members, parIt also included accounts by non-family Famfor the period from Samad Khan's rule. ticularly of the landed and comand histories ily genealogies also helped to round and from bazaaris mercial elite century. for the late nineteenth out the picture
8.
Morier,
9.
Ibid.,
pp.
293-294.
p. 297.
10.
Many of the Moqaddam governors and other family members in branch of the family participated in the military See, battles throughout Qajar Iran. various military Dowfor example, Khan Malik-e Sasan, Siyasat-gar3n-e Tahtirl, n.d. ca l9SOs), p. 170. Qajar (Tehran: reh-yi
11.
without were often resolved that disputes One suspects The pattern is still recourse to government officials. to a dispute Within the town, parties common today. scholar take their case to a religious will frequently Within the vilinstead of to the government court. elders or by village are often settled lage, disputes
IRANIAN
STUDIES
160
There is younger men of influence. tect the community from unnecessary ference.
a desire to progovernment inter-
12.
The tree from which the Constitutionalists were hung It is said to be still stands in the Nalband Bazaar. and that angels (firishtiler) a place for "fright," jinns frequent the place at night.
13.
Edward G. Browne, The Persian Frank Cass and Co., (London: Ch. 9.
Revolution
1966),
of
1905-1909
p. 265; also
see
14.
John Murray, Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (London: 1964), p. 48; and Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1965), pp. 157, 170.
15.
Arfa,
p. 48.
16.
Ibid.,
pp.
17.
Browne, p. 355.
18.
This notion of pilav is peculiar to the provinces. In Tehran and in sophisticated circles the third "lp" is pur-ruyi or audacity. The Shah is said to have all three "p' s ."'
19.
See James Bill, The Politics of Iran (Columbus, Ohio: of parti Charles E. Merrill, 1972) for a discussion in Iranian political networks. His notion of a perfor web of influence sonalistic networks is effective at the national Iranian politics analyzing level and for contrasting via mobility by merit versus mobility
119-120.
parti.
20.
I have used the term stratum instead of class to deof prestige, signate the unequal distribution money, influence and power, which led to the pattern of traditional in this section. hierarchy portrayed The Iranian term tabagheh (stratum) is usually translated as "class"; its meaning is closer to the popular usage 161
SUMMER 1977
of class of class. Iran. 21.
in American culture than to a Marxian notion recent to The concept of "class" is fairly
Poliand Carl Leiden in The Middle East: (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), pp. 81-83, place bazaar craftsmen in the lower class of in Middle Eastern societies. This is a distortion the pattern of hierarchy in Middle Eastern societies such as Iran and Turkey (and probably most other Midthe pattern dle Eastern societies). It misrepresents and of distribution of wealth, power and influence, from Bill's focus on the elite prestige and results class. and the "new" bureaucratic and professional in the Bill also places bureaucrats and professionals same class, and further oversimplifies stratification of these societies.
James Bill tics
and Power
22.
of were unlike those families Maragheh's mujtahids in Tabriz such as the alem family religious scholars and who monoof Javadi who owned numerous villages polized high religious posts for generations.
23.
century strife In the early decades of the twentieth was not uncommon. One between the landed families would notable recalled that his grandfather elderly always take a guard of troops with him when he went and that struggles over land his villages, to visit between landlords and water rights were not infrequent However, no clear pattern of and their "troops." This lack and formal factions emerged. long lasting of formal factional groups seems to have persisted until today.
24.
The bazaari families appear to have been less of the elite. gamous than the families
25.
who had working class origins Most workers or bazaaris Most of their genealogies. in relating had difficulty were only two generations deep. those we collected
IRANIAN STUDIES
162
endo-
26.
Elderly peasant farmers in Rezaiyeh told us that they abandoned their villages and fled to Maragheh during the Kurdish revolts, Turkish invasions (early 1900s), of World War I. and battles They worked there as servants until the environs of Rezaiyeh were safe to return to.
27.
Ann K. S. Lambton, The Persian 1966
(Oxford:
Clarendon
Press,
Land Reform: 19621969), p. 88.
28.
Stories of oppressive landlords still abound, and the townspeople point out those ex-landlords who were known for their cruelty prlor to land reform.
29.
Ann K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant (London:
30.
Oxford University
Press,
1953),
in Persia p. 296.
The emergence of latent hierarchy after land reform is discussed by Ismail Adjami in "Land Reform and Modernization of the Farming Structure in Iran," in The Social
Sciences
and Development,
ed. K. Farman-
farmian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Program in Near Eastern Studies, 1976), pp. 189-207; his reference is to Fars province. Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Ali Banuazizi, Ervand Abrahamian, and William Royce for their suggestions and critical readings of earlier drafts of this paper.
163
SUMMER 1977
liani
i(iS
The Iranian
dics,
A
Voliuime X. No. 3, Sutmmi1 ler 1977
merican
Analysis
of
Politics
James A. Bill process The rich subtlety of the Iranian political attempts to comprehend and exhas long defied scholarly Native Iranian writings have been stunted both by plain. chronology over analysis a traditional tendency to stress deterrents that have deflectas well as by sociopolitical system. away from the political ed the academic searchlight upon the has seldom focused directly European scholarship with hisitself Iranian polity but has instead preoccupied discussion This historical tory very broadly conceived. followed the Persian sources both in method has closely and substance. This thrust has been joined with the Eurodeand cultural structures pean concern with formal-legal has often been descriptive history terminants. The result viewin which the political component has been ultimately heritage, traits, religious ed as a by-product of cultural actors. of particular political or the idiosyncracies that Beginning in the 1960s, an embryonic literature with the Iranian political purported to grapple directly This litprocess began to develop in the United States. by developing erature attempted to proceed scientifically of rigorouslyapplication through the systematic analysis tools and approaches. theoretical Although in conceived James A. Bill is Professor of Government and Associate of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the director of Texas at Austin. University IRANIAN STUDIES
164
in theoretical some cases this trend resulted apparatuses of the maand obscured the understanding that cluttered a major terial under scrutiny, it nevertheless represented of the breakthrough in the advancement of our understanding Iranian political system. Today, almost two decades later, however, this literature remains limited to less than a handful of published volumes focusing upon the domestic About the same number of studies now exscene. political in the international ist that analyze the Iranian position In short, American studies of Iranian arena. political politics remain relatively scattered and few.l In an understudied and less understood part of the world, Iran remains the major Middle Eastern society about and indepth systemwhich we have the least comprehensive true of the political atic knowledge. This is particularly of the political While dozens of studies system. processIran rates only ahead es of Turkey, Egypt, and Israel exist, as Afghanistan, of such countries Sudan, and Yemen in this This is the case despite respect. the ease of access which Western political scientists have had to Iran for the last in the face of the continuthree decades. It also exists of Iran in the world economic and poally growing stature litical scene. American interests in Iran have escalated ever since World War II until today approximately 45,000 It is estimated that by 1985, Americans reside there. in Iran as diplomats, 80,000 Americans will be living and bankers. teachers, advisers, businessmen, Yet, the two studies of Iranian politics prepared in the decade of the 1960s have been followed by only two more in the 1970s. The interest has been a sputtering one at best. This relative poverty of the political analysis of Iran is sometimes not evident since there has been a mushrooming development of a great deal of political commentary in the press, semi-popular journals, magazines, television, and various governmental documents. Much of this literature has been polemical in tone and superficial in understanding. American journalism has faltered especially noticeably in its coverage of Iranian politics. For years, the country was ignored as the major American newspaper and relied press services on sporadic reportage by a correspond165
SUMMER 1977
in Beirut or on part-time Iranian representaent stationed slanted the news according to their tives who understandably the More recently, preferences.2 and political own personal neglect has given way to one of an policy of journalistic Some coverage. but often shallow and filtered accelerated to the sparse scholarly of the problems that are relevant system have also plagued to the Iranian political attention reprediscussion The following of journalism. the field the readiscuss and briefly sents an attempt to catalogue state of our knowledge of the sons for the underdeveloped process. Iranian political
The Obstacles
to Analysis
in Iran and recorded Gertrude Bell traveled three years later as in a diary published - A Book of Travel. In this Pictures Safar Nameh - Persian book, Miss Bell oflittle and elegantly-written perceptive secrecy and complex depths the sophisticated ten describes "a life, Iranian social and political that characterize According to life into which no European can penetrate.",3 Iran "is full of secrets ... .and beauthoress, this talented surshe is full of entrancing cause she is full of secrets brilMany fine things there are upon the surface: prises. solemn loneliness, lianice of colour, splendour of light, upon the clamorous activity; these are only the patterns of Eastern curtain which floats forever before the recesses The lasting of these comments by Gertrude life.",4 relevance that comprocesses Bell are documented today in the elusive system. pose the Iranian political
In 1891, her impressions
reprocess is magnificently The Iranian political observers of political to the analytic sistant penetrations and processes of power in and scholars. The real structure where of society Iran are embedded in the deepest recesses flux. The in a state of constant exists their configuration making is the final outcome of conflicting vital decision that flow out from complexly inand influences pressures and webs of personalities, families, cliques, terlaced Final power ultimately at the cencoagulates friendships. ter of the system where the formal and informal components IRANIAN STUDIES
166
In order to understand the meet in the person of the Shah. political unsystem, it is essential that the researcher cover the interrelationships that link the center of the Woven into the system to all vital social forces. outlying fabric also are the obvious voices and forces of opposition. and conflict Anonymous and covert coalition are among the essential that fuel the system. Such a system ingredients is inordinately difficult to understand and explain. An integral part of the privacy of the system is the can apparent but deceptive ease with which the researcher observe the political process. Because of cultural hospiand the formal concentration social tality, of generosity visible power in a dramatically obpolitical institution, servers too seldom seriously attempt to cut deeper into the labyrinth within which the political process is in fact In short, the facade of the Iranian political played out. is easily structure observed and enjoyably contemplated. in print. In such a situaIt lends itself to description researchers are easily lulled into a false tion, sense of understanding and begin and end their studies at the periphery of the political field. Despite this, there have been observers obviously who have felt the need to penetrate the formal glaze of government that coats the basic political dynamics that energize the system. But although the will is sometimes present, the requisite capacity is often lacking. The research tools essential to the successful analysis of Iranian politics are many and difficult to come by. They include a fluent knowledge of the Persian language, a deep and comprehensive understanding of Iranian culture and history, a personal perseverance and lengthy research stint within Iran, and a learned acquaintance with Middle Eastern and Islamic history in general. The facade of the political system is easily studied without these tools: the actual dynamics of power and authority relations that are the essence of the system are impossible to understand without this background. Unlike the anthropologists and some social historians, American political scientists have been less willing to make this kind of scholarly investment.
167
SUMMER1977
at any major unitraining science Today, political education intensive in the United States involves versity of substantive method, and at least three fields in theory, relainternational comparative politics, (e.g., interest American government, public philosophy, political tions, The scholar is expected or public law). administration, empirical of science, in the philosophy to be knowledgeable survey research techniques, statistics, or formal theory, literawith related An acquaintance and computer science. aneconomics, of history, ture in the fields sociology, Few students is also essential. and psychology thropology, to this already crushing to add significantly are willing a concenacademic program by at the same time attaching program. trated language and area studies that research consideration A separate but related politof American attention the to divert both has tended away from the Iranian system and to dilute ical scientists is studies power of some of the existing the explanatory movement that gained ascendancy in the the "behavioral" is best defined as the Behavioralism 1950s and 1960s. through the carepatterns of political analysis systematic that can be tested and of generalizations ful construction as possible. By emphasizing the need measured as precisely beinvestigation, political and systematic for rigorous much to helping further the undercontributed havioralism This is most systems everywhere. standing of political of Iran which were developed evident in the few studies behavioralism Yet, in many circles, during this period. became narrowly defined as a kind of "methodism" that Scienticounting. more than sophisticated meant little Such an aprigidity. fic rigor gave way to quantitative like Iran to countries ill-suited proach was obviously are not easily packed and patterns political where elusive the availnecessitated This view of behavioralism crated. became prescientists of hard data and political ability This obvioussuch as voting behavior. occupied with issues such as Iran where away from societies ly drew attention to or trivial data were either unobtainable the necessary of the system. an understanding
IRANIAN STUDIES
168
analysis of their The absence of serious political and the scientists own political system by Iranian social equaincreasing importance of Iran in the world political of American political scientists tion make the contribution all the more necessary. There are a handful of core studies.
The Basic
Books
scientists in the United Professional political States have written four books on the Iranian political on Iran within the intersystem and four books focusing These studies are backed by national political system. dissertations as well numerous articles and unpublished and as by studies journalists, prepared by historians, travelers all of which touch on the Iranian political This brief survey will system in one way or another. of political scientists primarily emphasize the analyses as books. which have been published
The Domestic
Political
Process
In 1962, the University of California Press pubIran: Political a book by Leonard Binder entitled in a Changing Society.5 This study was writDevelopment in the study with behavioralism ten when the preoccupation of comparative politics was just reaching its most elaborate stages. Although the Binder study eschewed the use of any sophisticated techniques, it, quantitative theoretical nevertheless, contained some rather intricate confined to the trappings most of which were fortunately first chapter--certainly one of the most roundly condemned in the field of comparative chapters of any book written in the last 25 years. reAlthough the negative politics the is explainable, action of historians and orientalists similar of fellow political scientists, many of criticism whom are known for their own sometimes tortuous presentation of theory, to rationalize. Fred W. is more difficult Riggs, for example, while judging Binder's book as "clearwork" also criticizes its "complex and ly a path-breaking lished
169
SUMMER1977
sinuous exposition" not only confusing
which, as he writes "6 but confused....
later
"is
sometimes
his early tendency to obfuscate, Despite Binder's to the a monumental contribution book on Iran represents process. of the Iranian political understanding systematic of Iran but not only as an analysis It has been valuable in what has now bealso as one of the early case studies on the issue of politibody of literature come a sizable arguAlthough one may make a convincing cal development. and focus on "legitimization" ment that the theoretical one cannot deny misplaced, is severely "trationalization" into the that the book is packed with important insights Iranian system. actual workings of the Iranian political and, unlike some of the is not neglected history political there is an more recently, books that have been published upon influences of the international discussion explicit system. the Iranian political The Binder book is hard to read; it is conceptually and it fails thrust is off target; cloudy; its theoretical way. Still, to tap the Persian sources in any significant attempt to analyze the Iranian political it is the first And yet it manner. systematic system in a scientifically intuiown political is perhaps due more to the author's framework that than to his theoretical tion and insight and timely source of underthe book remains a valuable system. standing of the current Iranian political in Iran was In 1964, Richard W. Cottam's Nationalism This imPress. of Pittsburgh by the University published focus ideological a sophisticated portant study contained was nationalism. book of idea the as the major organizing system is viewed through a multiThe Iranian political each facet of whi-ch reprefaceted prism of nationalism Reof nationalism. manifestation sents one particular and a perspective both a stronger historical flecting than the on Persian source materials greater reliance of a classic remain long Binder volume, this study will idea-ideoAlthough the emphasis is heavily its genre. of podiscussions there are occasional logical oriented, if brief. dynamics and events that are excellent litical IRANIAN STUDIES
170
The primary example is a measured, informed, and sensitive discussion of the political movement led by Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq. The Cottam analysis here sets the record straight an important political concerning movement that has long been misinterpreted and distorted and scholby journalists ars alike. In the end, Nationalism in Iran is a competent although very specialized study of the Iranian political process. There is little indepth analysis of the complex system of power and authority relationships that make up the actual dynamics of the Iranian polity. The research focus is on political philosophy and not on empirical theorybuilding and explanation. Actually there is considerable overlappage between the Binder and Cottam books since the former also treats the ideational realm of politics through its conceptual concern with legitimization. Nationalism in Iran, however, is the work most concerned with the superstructure of the political process in Iran. The earlier Binder book is, in fact, the transition between these two earliest studies and the two volumes produced in the 1970s, both of which represent explicit attempts to penetrate the actual social structure and political interaction among groups, classes, and elites. The methodological dimensions of the behavioral movement in American political science were most fully put into practice in the Iranian case by Marvin Zonis in his 1971 The Political study entitled Elite of Iran. Zonis utilized survey research techniques including interviews and questionnaires in identifying and analyzing the characteristics of the Iranian political elite. In the end, he interviewed 167 of the 307 individuals his reputational rankings designated as politically most powerful. The basic conclusion of the exercise is that the attitudes of Iranian elite members are characterized by what the author terms political personal mistrust, cynicism, manifest insecurity and interpersonal exploitation. The methodology applied in this book is impressive if inadequate as Zonis was very sensitive to the inherent impossibility of fitting a rigid Western-developed framework upon a society supremely resistant to any theoretical straitjacket. The irony of this 171
SUMMER1977
study is that in through personal most exclusively ed the impact of
his methodology to reinforce attempting (aland documentary success observation weakenthe author seriously in English), his effort.
It goes of this book is sound. Yet, the integrity far beyond both Binder and Cottam in answering the attiat the tudinal and actual dimensions of power that prevail It is system. echelons of the Iranian political highest elite not only a useful handbook on the Iranian political of their orientaand explanation but is also an analysis And it stands as an imactivities. tions and political on focusing portant case study in the growing literature As such, it worldwide. study of elites the comparative helps bring Iran more into the mainstream of comparative Although the Zonis book concentrates science. political of the Iranian power at the very pinnacle its analysis soon thereafter another book was published structure, which attempts to analyze the Iranian class structure and of conflict emphasis upon the patterns with special between the ruling that mark the relations collaboration This middle class. professional class and the challenging Groups, Iran: of Politics The entitled is my own study Classes,
which was published
and Modernization The Politics
of
Iran
in 1972.
resembles the Zonis book in
and the Binder with power relations its preoccupation change. study in its concern with the issue of political an hisboth from outlined is briefly The class structure The network of perand contemporary perspective. torical that run through the class syssonal and group relations The rest tem is analyzed and portrayed as a "web-system." of the gripping politianalysis of the study is a detailed middle between the burgeoning professional cal struggle clerks, engineers, writers, teachers, class of students, and the hand the one on officers army and middle-ranking The on the other. elite political monarchically-directed and elite of both the political and strategies profiles middle class are examined in professional the challenging and of modernization The related challenges great depth.
IRANIAN STUDIES
172
political development are highlighted in this book through the study of the conflict between classes which is mediated and molded by the mellowing impact of a complex network of informal groups, cliques, and families. The 1972 analysis of The Politics of Iran which documented the struggle for in Iran then is even more applicable political survival to the situation in Iran today where the lines of confrontation have continued to harden in the direction indicated when this book was published.
Although The Politics
of
Iran
draws much more ex-
tensively upon the relevant Persian sources than any of the earlier three studies, it lacks the detailed and more comprehensive of the others. analysis Its very compactness mitigates against the thorough exploration of the new it discovers. terrain As a result, the discussion of classes other than the professional middle class is brief and inadequate. The scholarly of the web-system penetration is not carried through to the most interesting depths where intricate personal and familial power relations combine and conjoin. Nor is there any discussion of the international influences that affect the domestic constellations of power in Iran. Nonetheless, through the use of an integrated groupclass analysis, The Politics of Iran is able to confront critical questions the fundamental challenge concerning of revolutionary change. Both the Binder and Zonis theoretical approaches result in an emphasis more upon system continuity and elite-inspired modification.7 In this sense, the Binder, Zonis, and Bill studies complement one another very well. Along with Cottam's Nationalism in Iran, these books represent a strong beginning in our understanding of the fascinating world of Iranian politics. The authors of the above four core studies have been distinguished by the lack of follow-through in their original analysis of the Iranian political system. Although each has published additional articles or chapters in books on Iran (see bibliography for a complete list of these selections), with the partial exception of Bill, they have 173
SUMMER1977
Binder, Cottam, in the field. not continued to do research theoretiother books of strongly and Bill have published cal complexion while Zonis has moved forward in his constudies. and personality psychology cern with political priIran was utilized In the case of all four scholars, marily as a case study designed to advance comparative to By adding the Iranian experience theory. political developof such fundamental issues as political analyses our and class conflict, behavior, elite ment, nationalism, of these important problems surely has been understanding have left Yet, at the same time, such strategies enhanced. unportrait many major areas of the Iranian political in the form has been forthcoming Assistance sketched. of considof other American researchers of the writings erable competence. such as Cholam Hossein scientists Veteran political Razi, Sepehr Zabih, and Ervand Abrahamian have contributed past and of Iranian politics, much to our understanding are backed articles Razi's published Professor present. in Iran and politics on religion by his 1958 dissertation study entitled unpublished as well as by his excellent Sepehr Leadership and Social Change in Iran."8 "Political dichotomy Zabih's work bridges the domestic-international is evident in his 1966 book of both contexts and analysis Abrahamian is entitled The Communist Movement in Iran. in involved perhaps the most active American researcher Although he is a political the study of Iranian politics. department and has into a history scientist transplanted with the works meticulously as yet to publish a book, he Persian sources and has produced a number of excellent This work has been supplemented by the recent articles. such as Ann Schulz, Farhad research of younger scholars Kazemi, and Eric Hooglund all of whom have produced dison various important aspects of the Iranian sertations process.9 political the American study of the Iranian polity Finally, of various disand scholars owes a debt to many observers stand Four volumes in particular and backgrounds. ciplines The History of Modern is Joseph Upton's, The first out. Iran:
An Interpretation,
IRANIAN STUDIES
which was published 174
in 1960 and
as a concise, remains unexcelled pithy political history. This is the first book that should be read by anyone seeking to develop an understanding of contemporary Iranian society and politics. A year later, Amin Banani produced his The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941. Although a somewhat uncritical study, Banani's volume is carefully-resource for all who seek searched and is an indispensable to understand the Pahlavi period of Iranian history. Hamid and State in Iran was published in 1969. Algar's Religion of the This book is indispensable reading to all students and accurately Iranian political system as it effectively destroys a stubborn host of myths concerning the important in the Iranian relationship between Shi'ism and politics context.10 In 1968, E. A. Bayne wrote a book built around his numerous personal interviews with the Shah of Iran. Persian Kingship in Transition remains a mine of information about the personality and attitudes of one of the last five major absolute monarchs left in the world. The Shah's recentrality to the Iranian political process certainly of this enigmatic quires a modicum of understanding leader. The Bayne book remains the best source available upon which one might begin to build such an understanding.11 Iran and the International
Political
System
In 1949, George Lenczowski, a political scientist a European legal education, wrote a book entitled Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948. It would be nearly 20 years before another volume on Iranian foreign policy would be written by an American political Meanscientist. while, the Lenczowski book, complemented by the same author's well-known The Middle East in World Affairs (first in 1952), stood as the standard source concernpublished ing Iran's role in the world political arena. Despite its early cold war tone which may now appear quaint, Russia and the West in Iran is a rather remarkable study. As a political history written prior to the era straightforward of behavioralism, it makes no attempt to construct any elaborate theoretical scaffold. In this study, Lenczowski makes good use of Persian sources and does not hesitate to incorporate detailed description of political dynamics
with
175
SUMMER 1977
own words in Yet, in the author's on the domestic front. only inare treated developments "... internal his preface, relations."'l2 sofar as they have bearing upon international of the Lenczowski study rests priThe contribution of the international introduction marily in its prescient Its value today importance of Iran to American readers. history is more in the line of a somewhat dated diplomatic of Iranian foreign policy vis-aanalysis than in a living doubt that theThere is little vis great power rivalry. rapid to the relatively contributed barrenness oretical howin the relevance of the study. Lenczowski, decline that ever, has produced a body of subsequent literature touches in many places on the role of Iran in the interto avoid Although he continues political system. national schema and tends to approach his organizing theoretical perspective, formal-legal subject matter from a strongly and are always cogently presented writings Lenczowski's argued. carefully Policy In 1966, Rouhollah K. Ramazani' s The Foreign Press of Virginia. by the University was published The period that Ramazani attempts to analyze in this study Since the first 400 covers nearly 450 years (1500-1941). 80 pages of this 313-page years are covered in the first placed priemphasis is obviously volume, the scholarly four marily upon Iranian foreign policy during the first to the book, In the Introduction decades of this century. his "theoretical approach" which is the author discusses and defines in fact a conceptual framework that presents "ac"objectives," such key concepts as "foreign policy," The approach and "modernization." "situation," tions," is a rather crude one focusing upon three sets of "interinternal situexternal action": situation-foreign policy, situation-forand internal-external ation-foreign policy, eign policy.
of
Iran
nature of the approach, the Despite the unrefined stride along the the maj or first Ramazani book represents of the politics of understanding path to the systematic This is clearly seen in the variIranian foreign policy. that the author generates in ous important generalizations IRANIAN STUDIES
176
that the course of his study. Among the various techniques marked Iranian diplomacy throughout the period under examias playing one rival nation, for example, were such tactics and power off against another, political procrastination, multilateral diplomatic bargaining. This book set the stage for the appearance of the two major Iranian foreign policy studies of the 1970s. These are Shahram Chubin and Sepehr
Zabih's 1974 volume entitled
The Foreign
Relations
of
Iran
book. Entiand Rouhollah Ramazani's sequel to his first tled Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973, this study was published in 1975 after an extended period of preparation. It is somewhat ironic that after 30 years in which American political science had produced little concerning Iranian foreign policy in contemporary times, two major books should appear on the subject at approximately the same time. The authors of the books had labored for nearof one another. ly a decade quite independently Yet, the final products of their work are extraordinarily similar in both approach and substance. Indeed, they share many and weaknesses. of the same strengths Both studies cover the post-World War II period and end textual discussion in early 1973; both make brief and passing reference by way of updating to the dramatic economic and political events developing as a result of the October 1973 war. Yet neither book is able to analyze the post-1973 world of energy politics, burgeoning oil revenues, Kissinger diplomacy, the Kurdish collapse, Iran-Iraqi rapprochement, shifting Saudi-Iranian and the unprecedented relations, levels of Iranian domestic violence and discord. Both books are comprehensive in their detail and in their documentation. meticulous They are well-written and make good use of the Persian source materials. Both studies attempt to do more than diplomatic history and to this end they at the very beginning introduce theoretical discussions and analytical frameworks. Despite this scientific both books fall somewhat short of consciousness achieving the difficult goal involving the systematic application of theory to reality in a way that furthers political explanation. The Chubin/Zabih study seems more successful in this venture while the Ramazani volume con177
SUMMER1977
tains
the stronger
substantive
discussion.
through their material Chubin and Zabih introduce all of which center upon variseven hypotheses, positing from the one-person deriving ous important implications According to control of foreign policy making in Iran. "His Imperial Majesty, the Shah, makes every the authors, and most of the minor ones. major foreign policy decision except at the tolerance a public position No one occupies or indirectof His Majesty and all are dependent directly This basic assumply on the monarch for continuance."'t3 sound study is basically the entire tion which underlies of the decisional the complexity but does underestimate Although this theweb within which the Shah operates. applied throughframework is not systematically oretical reappear in the conout the study, the seven hypotheses analand profitably clusion where they are provocatively Thus, although much of the book is sophisticated yzed. the sensitivity to the need to generhistory, diplomatic that will alize is strong enough to ensure a contribution one. be a lasting Ramazani 1941-1973, Policy, In Iran's Foreign framework he first the conceptual refines thoughtfully Despite the new sophistiten years earlier. introduced the addition among other things, cation which includes, of a central new concept termed "autonomy," the study in nature. The bulk pretheoretical remains basically of the theof the book will stand on its own regardless at the beginning which is not really discussion oretical The real contribution until the conclusion. utilized not in its breaking new theoretical of this study resides and compelobjective, ground but rather in its skillful, of the complex story of Iranian foreign ling presentation And on the policy during these tumultuous recent years. questions: very last page, Ramazani does raise the critical In other words, is there any scheme of higher values foreign policy will try that Iran's emergent national The founding fathers of the United States, to serve? for example, are said to have sought to use foreign policy as a means to such higher ends and purposes IRANIAN STUDIES
178
as individual and the rights to life, liberty, pursuit of happiness. What are those higher ends beyond self-interest to which Iran aspires? How does Iran define the "self" it tries to realize at home and within the international system?14 Between them, the Chubin/Zabih and Ramazani books provide an indispensable record of Iranian foreign policy since 1953. They will long remain valuable handbooks to students and scholars interested in the Iranian position in the regional and international system. But they are more than that. They are descriptive case studies which can now be consulted by other political theoreticians as they proceed with the construction of more general models of international Like its analysis political behavior. of the domestic political system of Iran, American scholarship concerning the role of Iran in international politics has recently made impressive contributions. And also like the situation with respect to the study of internal Iranian much remains to be done. politics, Our knowledge of both of these analytically distinct but actually intertwined political experiences remains underdeveloped. Fundamental questions such as these posed by Rouhollah Ramazani at the very end of his 507-page book need to be raised. But even before they can be answered, a great deal of difficult ground work remains to be done.1
Directions
for
Future
Research
Research into the Iranian political system has yet to penetrate seriously into the following general areas. For both a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of the Iranian body politics, it is essential that serious and rigorous study be undertaken in these areas.
1.
Personal
and
Familial
Power
Skeleton
of
Society.
Since the actual decision-making structures of Iran are informal and personalistic in nature, this sophisticated "websystem" must be probed and analyzed. Thus far, social scientists have only briefly and sporadically studied Iran at 179
SUMMER 1977
this
level.16
is devoid of The literature The Bureaucracy. 2. of the Iranian adminstudies and systematic any serious have not yet scientists Political system.17 istrative informal dimensions even begun to explore the formal Among the important and of the contemporary bureaucracy. of this research would be an analysis aspects illuminating that colPersian expressions of the hundreds of intricate proceeds and political how administration describe orfully are made in Iran. decisions
3.
The Security
System.
Our current studies
of
ignore but unfortunately understandably Iranian politics intellivarious and gendarmerie, police, the military, to the continued exthat are central gence organizations Because of the obsystem. of today's political istence scipolitical nature of such research, sensitive viously One subject. avoided the entire have carefully entists of unsubstantihas been the constant publication result of myths concerning these ated rumors and the perpetuation one can excuse the absence of Certainly organizations. knowledge here but the price that is paid for this ignorance is very high indeed in terms of any firm grasp of situation. political the overall It is consid4. Law and the System of Justice. science has avoidwhy political erably less understandable A conof the Iranian system of justice. ed the analysis such about much reflect would here certed research focus as freedom and equality. issues fundamental political to open a willingness have indicated Iranian authorities of their legal and penal system to scholmajor sections and obthat they deem legitimate ars and organizations of a A recent case in point is the publication jective. Commission study by the International remarkable little of Jurists entitled Human Rights and the Legal System of If two lawyers with no background in Iranian Iran,18 reason Studies can produce such a work, there is little of Iranian experscientists political why professional tise cannot do likewise.
IRANIAN STUDIES
180
Peasant and Worker Politics. American political S. has made a major contribution in the analysis analysis of the sociopolitical role of the upper and middle classes in Iranian society. Not so with respect to peasants and workers. Since the lower classes still compose the overwhelming majority of Iranian society and since it is from these classes that the critical movements support for political often come, a research focus here is of critical importance. Although the work of historians, ethnographers, and anthroa special pologists can be of immense assistance, concern for the political orientations of these imand activities portant groups is imperative. of An area of investigation special urgency concerns the political of urconsequences banization and the mushrooming growth of squatter settlements tlhat increasingly cluster about the largest Iranian cities, esTehran. pecially Although Farhad Kazemi has begun to carry out important research here, much field work remains to be done. The Political 6. Opposition. Impediments to the analysis of political opposition movements are formidable in most societies. In Iran, the difficulties in doing such research are of much the same order as those discussed with reference to the military and political system. an Still, and tactful imaginative researcher who makes it a point to acquaint himself with Iran can develop an underintimately standing of the various forms and figures in of opposition the country. 7. Religion and Politics. Although the political scientists have recognized the very special relationship that exists between Shi'i Islam and politics, the detailed investigation of this linkage remains to be carried out. Our best information in this respect has been provided by American historians such as Nikki Keddie and Hamid Algar, and by Ann Lambton of Great Britain. Contemporary political analysis of religious leaders and doctrine is especially
lacking.19
The Politics of Economic Development. 8. The economic growth, industrial dynamism, and burgeoning oil revenues of Iran have commanded much national and internation-
181
SUMMER1977
less underand considerably Less visible al attention. process that dedecisional stood has been the political The and distribution. of production termines the policies and economics in Iran between politics interface crucial or ecoif either the political indepth analysis requires on IraniThe literature nomic system is to be understood. any serious an economic development has sadly neglected The result has been superfiof politics. consideration predictive and sterile cial glimpses of economic realities have also been guilty of scientists Political exercises. There sometimes writing economics out of their studies. in this area?0 research is a glaring need for collaborative arena is more Although Iran in the international studied and has been the subject of considerable easily much remains to be done here attention, recent scholarly concerns A major problem area in the literature as well. dypolitical much more of the internal the need to inject The scholars of foreign policy. namics into the analysis this need recognize of Iranian foreign policy explicitly an omisis case there every in their work but in almost of the domestic political analysis sion of any penetrating important area for future study is the A related scene.21 of A profile of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. analysis process in the MinIranian diplomats and the policy-making istry might very well explode a number of myths concerning the easy equation that the Shah equals foreign policy.; theory off of it is now time to begin building Finally, gathered and orof facts so painstakingly the multitude Ramazanis, Chubins, and Zabihs. ganized by the Lenczowskis, will necessiThe future study of Iranian politics tate the movement into more important and more difficultlyand severe possibilities The fascinating areas. researched dividends great in this research promise inherent challenge of the Iranian understanding in the form of more sensitive that would imOne suggestion peoples and their future. of this study and one the quality measurably strengthen colfor at this time is for more scholarly worth pleading and Iranian scientists among American political laboration research stands to Such collaborative scientists. social IRANIAN STUDIES
182
benefit everyone involved, significantly the frontiers ciety and politics.
and in the end, could push back of our knowledge of Iranian so-
American political science has contributed much recently to the body of systematic knowledge of the Iranian political system. At the risk of immodest exaggeration, I would strongly suggest that the American scholarship in this respect is the most advanced in the world. Yet, it is this very advancement that reveals the fascinating political expanse that remains to be explored. Iranian political leaders often express puzzlement over why American political scientists should focus their research on Iran. Why should American scholars concern themselves with Iran and, what is more, how can such outsiders hope to understand the inordinately complex world of Iranian politics? In 1970, the Empress of Iran privately confronted me with this question in typically charming Iranian fashion, i.e., through weaving a Persian proverb into our discussion: "Kal agar tabib biudl, sar-e khod dav3 nem5di," i.e., "If the bald-headed man were a physician, he would have cured his own head." In other words, Americans might do well to study their own continuing political problems before attempting to concern themselves with Iranian politics. The answer to this legitimate query is, of course, that the problems of power and change that confront the Iranian political system are not unique to that country. They are fundamental issues that challenge all societies including more highly modernized societies such as the United States. The Iranian experience carries lessons for others just as the experience in other societies contains lessons for Iran. Also, in an increasingly interdependent world, one country's political successes or failures have a way of producing a meaningful impact upon other societies in the world arena. Finally, outside observers can sometimes teach those on the inside something about their own system. Americans can help Iranians understand their own social and political process in much the same way that outside observers such as James Bryce and Alexis de Tocqueville have assisted generations of Americans to understand their political culture.22 The 183
SUMMER 1977
continuing hospitality and research accessibility that American political scientists enjoy in Iran is proof that the Iranian leaders are not unaware of these considerations.
NOTES
1.
This survey will focus only upon the contributions have made to our scientists that American political the writSurely, of Iranian politics. understanding persuasions, of other disciplinary ings of scholars scientists, native Iranian and non-American social comtogether American non-academics and occasional concerning pose an important part of the literature system. the Iranian political
2.
coverage of the Iranian domestic A survey indicates scene is a major case in point. that in the decade 1965-1975 this newspaper carried to the Iranian domestic scene. but 195 references there were 1114 discussions Over the same time period, Even Ethiopia merof Israel. affairs of the internal Quality has been as sadly ited 263 such references. The pattern of the Times lacking here as quantity. resuperficial coverage of Iran has been a sporadic, ediby an occasional interspersed portage of trivia Now that the the Shah. or scolding torial praising on the spot, one might hope Times has a correspondent The best analysis will improve. that this situation of Iran that has appeared in this newspaper over the done in November-December last 20 years was a series The It stands alone. 1961 by Harrison Salisbury. and biits superficial Post demonstrated Washington events of the ased coverage of Iran during the violent and uncritAt the time, it consistently fall of 1978. with no of the government the defended policies ically and poattempt to understand the roots of the social that then shook Iran to the core. discontent litical than In so doing, its coverage was far less critical Persian press during the even that of the controlled Over the years, far and away the best same period. coverage of Iran in the American Press has been found Its reporters have Science Monitor. in The Christian The New York Times
IRANIAN STUDIES
184
scene there with a discerning viewed the political eye. of the Monitor's on Tran Yet even the calibre reporting has plumTneted over the last several years. 3.
Gertrude Bell, Persian Pictures Ernest Benn, 1947), p. 31.
4.
Ibid.,
5.
of the books discussed in For the complete citations the text, at the please see the Selected Bibliography end of the chapter.
6.
See Riggs, "The Theory of Developing World Polities," 16 (October 1963), pp. 147-171. In 1964, Politics, T. Cuyler Young described the Binder work as "perhaps the single most important study of contemporary Iran in the last decade." Yet, Chapter 1 left the reviewer "dismayed and disturbed." it Among other things, struck Young as "so highly abstract, often stylistically opaque, and in a few places grammatically inSee Young's review in The Middle comprehensible." East Journal, 18 (Autumn, 1964), pp. 507-509.
7.
For a lively dialogue between Bill and Zonis concerning their respective theoretical approaches to the study of Iranian politics, see Iranian Studies, 8 (Fall 1975), pp. 134-163.
8.
This study was based on survey research and interviews that Professor Razi carried out in Iran in the early 1960s. As a systematic analysis of the Iranian political elite, it pre-dates the work of both Zonis and Bill. The reference to the Razi dissertation is G. H. Razi, "Religion and Politics in Iran: A Study of Social Dynamics" (University of California at Berkeley, 1958).
9.
The relevant references are Ann T. Schulz,, "Recruitment and Behavior of Iranian Legislators: The Influence of Social Background" (Yale University, 1969); Farhad Kazemi, "Social Mobilization and Domestic Violence in Iran" (University of Michigan, 1973); and
p.
(3rd ed.;
London:
25.
185
SUMMER1977
Eric J. Hooglund, "The Social and Economic Consequences of Land Reform in Iran" (John liopkins University, 1974). Two recent dissertations produced in Departments of Near Eastern or Islamic Studies that present very provocative analyses of the Iranian political system in the Qajar period are John H. Lorentz, "Modernization and Political Change in Nineteenth-Century Iran: The Role of Amir Kabir" (Princeton University, 1974), and A. Reza Sheikholeslami, "The Central Structure of Auin Iran, 1871-18961" (University thority of California at Los Angeles, 1975). profesAnother accomplished sional political scientist who has done field work in Iran is Richard H. Pfaff. Although Pfaff's publications on Iranian politics have been few, they have been distinguished. His article "Disengagement from in Turkey and Iran," Western Political Traditionalism 16 (March 1963) has been widely quoted and Quarterly, reprinted. A much more recent convert to the study of Iranian politics is Marvin Weinbaum who comes to in the field Iran after building a solid reputation of American political The bibliography reanalysis. flects Weinbaum's embryonic but growing grasp of the Iranian scene. Like Pfaff, he has done research in Iran. 10.
historical in nature, Although Algar's book is strongly its analysis as much today as it does to the applies For a too little-known discussion Qajar period. by enAlgar of the contemporary scene, see his article Role of the Ulama in Twentitled "The Oppositional Iran" in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, tieth-Century Saints and Sufis Los Angeles and London: (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972), pp. 231-255. The editor of this volume, Nikki R. Keddie, has writsoten voluminously and ably about Iranian history, are and politics. Several of her articles ciety, and in their exposition of Iranian social definitive KedLess known is Professor religious relationships. of Iran. die's support for younger American scholars Her weighty recommendations along this line have helped encourage the careers of more than one young poThe late T. Cuyler Young quietly litical scientist.
IRANIAN
STUDIES
186
but enthusiastically performed this same important It is somewhat ironic that non-social scifunction. so much entists such as Keddie and Young contributed to the development of our systematic understanding of the Iranian polity. They did so not only in terms of their own research but also by their willingness to stand behind the newcomers to Iranian studies. 11.
to the four works discussed of Modern Iran: An Interpretation Harvard Univer(Cambridge, Mass.: of sity Press, 1965); Amin Banani, The Modernization 1921-1941 Stanford University Iran, (Stanford: Press, 1961); Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 17851906 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969); and E. A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1968).
The complete
here are:
12.
13.
Lenczowski, Russia
and the West in Iran, 1918-48 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), p.ix. In 1954, Lenczowski prepared a supplement entitled "The Anglo-Iranian Crisis" which was added to the volumes then on sale. The most recent printing of the book was in 1968 by Greenwood Press; unfortunately this printing does not include the 1954 supplemental chapter.
Chubin and Zabih, The Foreign keley:
14.
15.
references
Joseph Upton, The History
University
Ramazani, University
Iran's
Press
of California Foreign
Policy
of Virginia,
Relations Press,
of Iran (Ber1974), p. 10.
(Charlottesville: 1975), p. 454.
Another political who has made an important scientist to our understanding contribution of Iran's international role is J. C. Hurewitz. See especially his "Iran in World and Regional Affairs" in Ehsan YarShater (ed.), Iran Faces the Seventies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 117-142. One study that deserves mention is a critical, special needed view from the left by Bahman Nirumand entitled Iran: 187
SUMMER 1977
(New York: The Monthly in Action The New Imperialism A close reading of this book is 1969). Review Press, required for those who seek to balance out much of the Among the literature. or pseudo-critical uncritical in that have been published many Ph.D. dissertations recent years and that touch on Iranian foreign relamenfour are worthy of special tions, the following tion: Mehdi Heravi, "Certain Aspects of U.S.-Irani1967); an Relations, 1883-1945"1 (American University, toward the U.S. during Keyvan Tabari, "Iran's Policies 1941-1946" (Columbia Occupation, the Anglo-Russian 1967); MohammadAli Fardanesh, "Foreign University, A Developmental Politics: and Internal Relations of Colorado, 1970); and (University Analysis--Iran" Hormoz Hiekmat, "Iran's Response to Soviet-American A Comparative Study" (Columbia 1951-1962: Rivalry, Dr. Heravi's study has been pub1974). University, Diplomacy of Iranian-American lished under the title (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Theo. Gaus' Sons, 1969). 16.
entitled "The Plastian article In 1973, I published The Case of Iran," The city of Informal Politics: 27 (Spring 1973), pp. 131-151. Middle East Journal, Although this piece only begins to probe the personal networks and the patterns that prevail therepolitical in, it remains the maj'or research work devoted entireThe relationlevel. ly to this most basic political and the political proship between family structures important dimension of this cess is a particularly I have been wandering in this jungle "web-system." of names and kinship ties for the last decade and here one day hope to chart some of the key terrain soon. Constance Cronin has also done Anthropologist in this important area. considerable research
17.
here is a sensitive Perhaps the only major exception entitled paper written by Wayne Untereiner unpublished Environment of Iran" which was "The Administrative prepared over a decade ago.
18.
William and
IRANIAN
the
J.
Butler
Legal
STUDIES
and Georges
System
Iran
of 188
Human Rights Levasseur, International (Geneva:
sciThe lone political 1976). Commission of Jurists, interest in Iranian miliwho has a specialized entist law is E. Burke Inlow of the University tary and civil of Calgary in Canada. 19.
by filled This gap in our knowledge will be partially of the work of Professors the forthcoming publication These two Michael M. J. Fischer and Shahrough Akhavi. amount of original did an impressive social scientists and in Qom and Tehran in 1975 on politics research source Another useful Shi'ism in contemporary Iran. is a dissertation by a number of inaccuracies despite "A Mosaic of Mullahs Jr. entitled George W. Braswell, in Iranian Shi'ah and Politics Religion and Mosques: of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Islam" (University study was prepared in the DepartBraswell's 1975). ment of Anthropology.
20.
study of the politics In 1974, I carried out a pilot This involved in Iran. of economic entrepreneurship who had with a dozen entrepreneurs indepth interviews out of perand commercial fortunes financial built This is soon to of abject poverty. sonal situations that will include be expanded into a major project of both an American and an the collaborative efforts Iranian economist.
21.
The maj'or exception tial as a Regional
is Leonard Binder, "Iran's PotenPower," in Paul Y. Hammond and
Sidney S. Alexander (eds.),
Political
Dynamics
in
1972), (New York: American Elsevier, narfrom a slightly Another exception pp. 355-394. is Richard W. Cottam's "The United rower perspective III Studies, Iran and the Cold War," Iranian States, (Winter 1970), pp. 2-22. the
22.
Middle
East
in their own progress scientists As Iranian social to the analthey may very well contribute research, A number of process. ysis of the American political for example, are in the process, Iranian universities of establishing American Studies Programs.
189
SUMMER 1977
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Self":
Exposition Homayoun Katouzian T
Sadeq Hedayat's life and works have been subjected to numerous comments and criticisms of both a general and particular nature. But, with the possible exception of The Blind Owl, there have been very few detailed studies of his individual short stories. This has created two major defects in the understanding of the man and his works: on the one hand, it has resulted in a serious neglect of many of Hedayat's stories which are well worth studying in their own right; and, on the other hand, it has contributed to an imbalance in the overall assessment of his socio-literary achievements. Indeed, it can be argued that a full appreciation of The Blind Owl itself is not quite possible without a careful study of Hedayat's earlier and--to some extent--later works. This paper is part of a longer study of Hedayat's life and works with a comprehensive of his fictional critique and an analwritings
lIomayoun Katouzian is a Lecturer versity of Kent at Canterbury.
in Economics
at the Uni-
The author is grateful to John Gurney and WVilliam Hanaway for their helpful comments on the earlier drafts of this paper, although the usual disclaimers are in order.
IRANIAN STUDIES
196
ysis of their development, interrelations and change. In this larger (and still incomplete) study, a cross-sectional classification of Hedayat's works has been proposed which attempts to categorize his plays and short stories according to some basic common characteristics. One of these categories is described as the group of psycho-fictional stories. It consists of such pieces of prose fiction as The Blind Owl, "Seh qatreh khiin" ("Three Drops of in which the basic question Blood"), etc., or theme is onrather than sociological. tological In these stories the main characters ask questions which know no cultural boundand seek solutions to problems which are not speciaries, fic to any given sociohistorical framework; they look for a raison d'etre, or at least an excuse for living which cannot simply be achieved by the removal of speific socioeconomic constraints or a change in social atmosphere. "The Man Who Killed His Passionate Self" is one of the most interesting of those stories which fall into this category. A schoolmaster becomes interested in sufism and tries to "kill" all his worldly desires, in the hope of attaining the ultimate truth; but, in the end, he gets disillusioned and kills himself. What remains of the story is typically some minimum character development of the salik ("seeker") and his hypocritical murshid ("guide"), a modest background and a number of quotations from some masters of classical Persian mysticism. Nonetheless, this must be regarded as one of the most profound pieces of Hedyat's prose fiction. It is simple, lucid and--putting aside its rather repetitive and disproportionate use of classical verse--quite terse. And it uses an authentically Persian setting for the exposition and analysis of a remarkably universal predicament. Like The Blind Owl., the psychophilosophical undercurrent is developed in such a way that it becomes almost indistinguishable from the narrative. Unlike TheBlind Owl, the narrative does not betray any "hallucinatory," "psychodelic" or sur-realistic quality. It gives a familiar theme an unfamiliar ending with a simple, unsubtle, but realism. devastating
197
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II Mirza Hussein All was an intellectual who believed that the secrets of life had been discovered by the great sufis. As a child he had displayed a noticeable tendency and talent for learning sufi literature and philosophy. This had been greatly encouraged by his private tutor who himself had a deep knowledge and interest in the subject. For example, he had been told by his tutor how, upon leading a pure and ascetic life, Hussein, son of Mansflr-i Halof claiming to be laj, had reached the exalted position The Truth even from the top of the gallows: "Mansfir-i HalIAj, that whale of the high seas," who (in the quartrain of Abi Sacid) "when crying from high on the gallows 'I am The Truth, was Manstur no more but god incarnate."' And this cry--described by Hafiz as "revelation of the "The offence" secrets"--was for which he was precisely punished.2 But Hussein Ali was still a novice, and he had only begun the process which Hallaj- had completed by his martyrdom: he was still on the road to discover the Secrets. So, unlike his younger brother (and in spite of his tauntings), he decided to shun material, ends and became a schoolmaster. But a mere preference for a materially modest, though intellectually rewarding, life of scholarship3 in itself would be no more than a declaration of intent for the great In his candid gropings for ltimate Reality, "tenterprise."1 the seeker is in need of the guidance of a pir or murshid who would goad him on to the correct path at successive And our seeker discovers this guide stages of the process. the opinionin the person of Sheikh Abulfazl (CAbulfazl) ated Arabic master at the same school. However, we are of the Sheikh's leadertold that his acceptance spiritual In particular he ship is not quite without reservation. finds the sheikh, "hardly capable of anything else than the rules and, when faced with a difficult setting problem, a child, as if addressing that it was as yet too declaring, it.",4 The reader is left wondering why in early to discuss to accept his leadership. that case Hussein Ali continues
IRANIAN STUDIES
198
to imagine why it difficult It is not, of course, occur to our seeker to join one of the does not apparently quite active within numerous sufi orders which are still He is not merely looking frameworks. their traditional however spiritual for some kind of comfort or reassurance, he would not have looked the truth Otherwise, that may be. of end with the same seriousness in the eye at the bitter if he had At any rate, purpose with which he had begun. method, there would have been adopted the institutionalized It is well-known harvest. chance of such a bitter little and purhistory have a life, character, that institutions in accord with the origpose of their own, not necessarily Hussein Ali is one of of their founders. inal intentions seek to those few mystics who, in the words of Tolstoy, and he "the kingdom of God within themselves"; discover to do so outside be excused for prefering might therefore odd that But it is still the channels of any institution. he embarks upon his search under the guidance of someone Perhaps he ascribed fit the role. who does not perfectly which reflectto a highmindedness shortcomings the sheikh's hoping that in later stages the ed his own inexperience, he might Alternatively, master would be more forthcoming. have regarded the sheikh as no more than an enlightened, in associaaudience, and morally acceptable sympathetic manage to clear up some tion with whom he would indirectly it is perFinally, of the problems which he encountered. that he did not have much choice in the matfectly possible ter, and the sheikh was "all the guide that he could have." the point remains rather obscure and it may well be Still, weakness which leaves vague the nothing but a structural for us to beand makes it difficult pattern of motivation Such to unfold the story. lieve the author as he continues in Hedayat's psyare not unfamiliar weaknesses" "technical works where his primary aim is not to produce cho-fictional a piece of prose fiction but to use this as a cover for his own ontological reflections. are contributions"l "positive Indeed, the sheikh's for his main (or sole) guideither, not all that impressive is the latter ance to Hussein Ali is rather commonplace:5 or simply advised to embark on a process of subjugating, In classical self." "passionate his nafs--his "killing," 199
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Arabic the word nafs simply means person or "soul." For example, it occurs in the Quranic verse "he who kills a nafs on purpose shall be punished by Hell,",6 which prohibits murder and, by implication, suicide too. But, in its sufi usage, this word acquires a very special, if not wholly different, significance. For, in this context, nafs is the symbol of all that is materialistic and this worldly in the desires, hopes and aspirations of a person. This is not merely the arithmetic sum of an individual's worldly needs and passions, but a person's own self with an identity of its own. It is not his real self, however. It is the product of estrangement, of banishment, of the fall; and its continued existence justifies the persistence of the exile and alienation. It is a "cage" which imprisons man's real self--that "bird of the heavenly garden" of which Hafiz speaks--for as long as he is content to be busy painting The bird would be free to its walls. fly away only if--as us--"The door of the eterRuimi tells nal prison cell" is "smashed into pieces." Man's passionate self, his confusion his false sense of identity, of of the "false love" with the "true appearance with reality, love"; and his struggle for the fulfillment of his deceptive desires, of the needs of the flesh, of all that is worthless, perishable and passing--these are the very which blind him to the vast horizons of verity, qualities love and eternity and--in short--of the realization of his Hence the "killing" of the one is "true" or "real" self. of the other. a necessary condition for the realization Sacadi "You co-habit with an enemy which is your own nafs," enetells us, "why then do you bother to fight the external my?". It must be emphasized that it is not only the "killbut the which is intended, ing" of the individual passions which is regarded of a whole personal destruction identity as the false self. Thus, the seeker does not merely set has been rendered out to kill his "passion"--as its title in any in some English translations of this story--since, in the which shall be destroyed case, it is the passion of his the totality he aims at destroying process;7 rather, self. his carnal and carnivorous, passionate,
IRANIAN STUDIES
200
Hussein Ali set about to kill his passionTherefore, ate self, as he found ample evidence for the especially sheikh's guidance in the works of leading sufi classics.8 He did not exactly become a hermit, for he lived in "a small clean house just like an egg,"1 which he probably owned, and he had two domestic servants.9 This is a point which is worth a moment's pause. Hussein Ali clearly comes from a if not aristocratic, comfortable, background, or he would not have had a private tutor in his childhood. It is therefore likely that his present mode of existence--though far from being ascetic--is modest. One way of comparatively interpreting his psychology is to claim that he was rejecting what he could afford because he had realized that there was no salvation in material power and possession; another way is to argue that he could afford the luxury of such a rejection itself. Perhaps his comfortable background gave him a natural advantage in realizing, sooner than the less that the pursuit of material fortunate, and the ingoals, dulgence of mortal passions would afford no lasting solution to the basic problem of existence (or a reason for it). On the other hand, he might have been simply spoiled by his upbringing, and even bored with the possession of what he had not really earned. But the latter possibility becomes less and less likely as the story develops, although it retains some validity as a partial explanation of Hussein Ali's mental processes. Hussein Ali becomes, if not a perfect recluse--which would have been impossible in the circumstances--then at least an internal emigr6e. He lives virtually alone and talks only to the Arabic master.10 He subjects himself to hardship, so we are told, but these are not spelled out in much detail: he did not go out, did not drink, and certainly did not indulge in normal sexual gratification. But we learn that sometimes in his sleep "all sorts of demons would begin to tempt him." Had he ever experienced a normal sexual relationship? This is a crucial question to which no answer may be found in the text. The problem is very familiar from many of Hedayat's short stories, and those which make up his psycho-fictional especially works. In The Blind Owl the recluse is likely to be impotent although he nowhere admits it; in "S.G.L.L." the man is ac201
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satisfaction cused of loving merely for its psychological to go invitation his belirved's and, in any case, declines in "Puppet Behind the Curtain" a soulto bed with her;ll less manikin becomes the object of the hero's obsessive to consummate his in "Dead End" the man fails passion;12 marriage on the wedding night for some obscure reason;13 to turn up on the Persian student fails in "Buried Alive," to visplans girlfriend his French which day on the first And there it his room, without adequate explanation.14 are plenty of other examples. in However, Hussein Ali is the only such character with self-denial Hedayat's works who is claimed to practice normal pera sexually that he is otherwise the implication If this had not been the case, we would not have son. at the moment his years of self-denial found him regreting Yet, how can a young man abstain of his disillusionment. refor twelve years and still from normal sexual relations Was this perhaps the cauise rather normal? main sexually an of his attempt at "self-purification": than an effect which would urge to adopt a mode of existence unconscious camouflage and, indeed, raise to a high moral level what depsychological was after all nothing but an incurable mere a not all was it briefly, the question fect? To put And if this is true, are we not justilie in the soul? himself on that that he must have failed fied in thinking he broke all disappointment fateful night when in bitter home to bed? And took a prostitute his vows and finally kill himself not as an act if so, did he not subsequently world (which and hypocritical a shallow against of defiance but in disgust interpretation) the author's is apparently Or, to put it more subtdisability. with his own pathetic on the discovery himself ly, was this not a revolt against hypocrisy which he might have reof his own unconscious than the sheikh's, who, though garded as being even uglier honest with himself? had been perfectly others, deceiving but whatare perfectly plausible, All these speculations suicide was ever may have been the truth, Hussein Ali's intended as a judgment on man and his predicament. Some of the above hypotheses that, in spite of his the discovery IRANIAN STUDIES
202
by may be strengthened Husbest intentions,
sein Ali had never become wholly convinced of the rightness of his course. And, they may be even further reinforced was generally bound up when we find that his self-doubt is the only with his carnal desire. This, at any rate, "having been to be found in the text itself: reference of youth, he was now completedeprived from the pleasures idea."115 The delooking for an illusory ly empty-handed, of him in his sleep, and the quartrains mons kept visiting Omar Khayyam tended to encourage general philosophical skepticism. (or In fear of losing everything through a "slip" house, was he asking for one?) he rushes to the sheikh's without previous warning, to seek further guidance and accused reassurance. But he hears the sheikh publicly in front of his own house of having made his maid-servant he goes in to investiAnd, when in disbelief pregnant. gate, he watches the cook running to take a roasted partridge off the mouth of a hungry cat, whereupon the sheikh to be having bread and onions for supdrops all pretense that, according to per and joins the chase, explaining Islamic law, "if a cat causes more than seven-hundred is obligatory.",16 dinars worth of damage, its execution depresThe rest we have seen already: disillusionment, and suicide. sion, rebellion III in that it contains The story is rather eventless much more reflection than action. There are structural Its real value weaknesses and formal errors of syntax. is not so much in its fictional, let alone formal, appeal as it is in the psycho-philosophical undercurrent. short stoin similar Unlike most of the characters search for the "lost pararies by Hedayat, Hussein Ali's dise" is conscious and deliberate. He sets out to kill his nafs not only to escape from "the rotten human socidoes the recluse in "The House of Darkness"'17-ety"--as but to reach out beyond the needs of the flesh, to dishis real self. cover the Hidden Truth, and so to realize 203
SUMMER1977
his method is entirely Perhaps even more significantly, in this approach There is nothing original conventional. this is a fafails him. On the contrary, which finally and institutionalized miliar and, in some ways, established In nearly all the similar method of approaching the problem. the "heros" have already given up the search short stories They are already convinced of the when the story begins. of rottenness both of human society and, more especially, Their problem is not so much where to reach life itself. case is differas it is how to escape. But Hussein Ali's that there is a road to salent. He begins by believing free from doubt; vation, even though he is not completely that even this is nothing but an and he ends by concluding The Rumi verse which the author has illusion among others. apquoted as the epitaph is singularly rather ironically propriate for the occasion: The nafs (merely)
It is is a dragon how can it be dead? lying dormant for lack of opportunity!
self" in to kill his "passionate Hussein Ali tries He negates in order order to attain a higher existence. But the simple diin order to achieve. to prove, rejects He therefore ends turns out to have been false. alectic short stories bein the similar up where other characters He intends gin; that is , in complete negation and denial. himself. There to kill his nafs and he does so by killing are no noble Truths hidden behind the ugly "appearance," This is a highly origbut death. and there is no salvation and merciless, judgment upon inal, even though devastating you can only the whole idea of mystic self-purification: The rest is either kill your nafs by killing yourself. or self-deception. hypocrisy
NOTES
of Hedayat's
1.
This is typical only.
2.
misunderstood The author has apparently comes. quotation from which the latter
IRANIAN STUDIES
204
psycho-fictional
works
the Hafiz verse He does not
to Hallaj, reference seem to be aware of its implicit it so as to mean that the seeker and he interprets the must always ask for advice before he reveals ra kusht" ["The keh nafsash "isecrets" ! See, "Mardi-i in Se qatreh Self"] Man Who Killed His Passionate Parastu Books, Tehran: khun [Three Drops of Blood]. 1344 (1965), p. 200. of a schoolmaster of the position of modern educolleges elitist
3.
true This was still in the few and still cation in Tehran.
4.
Op. cit.,
S.
This may be another example of structural a touch of realism, it may also represent part. icism, on the author's
6.
Wa man qatala
7.
E.g., J. W. Clinton, pp. 38-52.
8.
It is rather strange that he had had to wait for the sheikh's guidance to take such an obvious course of of in the writings or to find it suggested action, This may be and practitioners. classical theorists for flaw" or further evidence yet another "technical a technicallack of interest in telling the author's on the (as opposed to reflecting story ly consistent In it is even more this connection, subject matter). strange when we read that a week after Hussein Ali he was pondering upon "the had received his guidance, himself to twelve years" in which "he had subjected See MardY ka, op. cit., and hardship." suffering p. 204.
9.
Mardl
10.
p.
ka,
op.
198.
naf sin
cit.,
camdran fajizaCihu
in The Literary
p.
fault, though or even cyn-
Jahannam! Review:
Iran,
196.
The fact that the sheikh "happens to bel" an Arabic since we know that master is not without significance towards the Arab the author had a strong antipathy 205
SUMMER 1977
Arabic language and the nation, development of Persian society. 11.
See "sin gaf (chiaroscuro).
Islamic
lam lAm" ("S.G.L.L.11)
impact on the
in Siyeh
rushan
Amlr Kablr, 1342 (1963), p. 23.
Tehran:
pardeb" ["Puppet Behind the Curop. cit., pp. 79-96.
12.
See "Arusak-i pusht-i Sayeh rushan, tain"],
13.
[Stray See "Bunbast" ["Dead End"] in Sag-i vilgard Amir Kabir, 1342 (1963), p. 55. Tehran: Dog].
14.
See "Zindeh beh g5r" ["Buried gur [ Buried Alive] . Tehran:
15.
Mardi keh...,
16.
Ibid.,
17.
See "'Tarik-khanehll op. cit., Vilgard,
op. cit.,
in zindeh beh Alive"], Amir Kabir, 1342 (1963).
p. 204.
p. 209.
IRANIAN STUDIES
("The House of Darkness"), pp. 127-141.
206
in Sag-i
Iran/iant Stuidies,Volume X, No. 3, Sumiimer1977.
BOOK Psychological
REVIEWS Dimensions
of
Near
Eastern
Studies.
by L. Carl Brown and Norman Itzkowitz. Princeton, The Darwin Press, 1977. 382 pp. $16.95.
Edited
N.J.:
MarvinZonis This collection of eleven papers with introductions and a bibliographical essay by the editors grows out of a Princeton conference held in May of 1973. Reading them some five years later, one is struck by their freshness, the topicality of their substantive and methodological conand the challenges for further work presented tributions, in almost every piece. (One wishes this were a comment on the prescience of the authors, solely so adept at identifying the central issues in the study of the Middle East through the use of psychology and psychiatry. It is that, but all too often is, as well, a commentary on the paucity of skilled workers and the basic intractability of the subject matter.) Despite the geographical scope of individual essays-NMorocco to Iran--and the disciplines claimed by the authors--history, political as well as sociology, science, and psychiatry--and psychology the diverse subject matter of the essays--e.g., problems in the psychobiography of T. E. Lawvrence to the personalitv of Saudi college students to the practice of psychiatry in Turkey--certain
Marvin Zonis is Director Studies at the University
of the Center of Chicago. 207
for Middle Eastern
SUMMER1977
aspects in the psychological commonalities shine through. ern Islamic cultures
of Middle East-
Most of the authors write with assurance about the Enough has by now been written on of males. psychology the subject of women in the Middle East (and the United from to alert us to the dangers of generalizing States) encountermales to females as well as to the difficulties by predominantly particularly ed in the study of females, But it is also well in the Middle East. male investigators to remember that the basic theory which, however remotely, predominantserves as the basis for these essays was itself did the American (Only recently of males. ly a psychology for example, issue a special Association, Psychoanalytic of females.) and psychoanalysis volume on the psychology to a if only in passing, Many of the essays refer, in Middle Eastern men--between passifundamental conflict In a and domination. vity and dependence and activity A. Bouhdiba of the University piece, successful daringly of relations how the nearly exclusive of Tunis describes seven or eight the mother to the male child for the first years of his life followed by an abrupt change in the naand responsibilities relationships ture of his social of the boy to an almost exclumarked by the introduction male world, leaves the Arab male with a longing for sively a return to the ". . .world of mothers.. .buried in the depths (p. 131). past, and enveloped in fantasies" of an idealized "The most mature man, the most masculine, will As a result, or to reto restore, to re-create, never miss an occasion realm of mothers ..A veritable the uterine milieu.. discover is founded.. .the Arab woman becomes queen of the unconscious" (p. 133). is the perpetual longing One personal consequence of instate to that blissful male to return the Arab of and dependence with all the compensatory fantile passivity "Don Juanism" of domination, hypersensitivity, behaviors is the One social consequence (p. 134), and aggressivity. that to ''the depths of its existence'' observation surprising with women using their is matriarchal Arab-Moslem society search for revenge against the dominasons in a life-long IRANIAN
STUDIES
208
tion
of their
husband-fathers
(p.
133).
of activity/passivity, These themes of the conflict independence/dependence appear, in almost a passing fashion, Sharabi and Ani, and Ozthroughout the volume. Melikian, in different all refer to such isturk writing contexts sues. These essays as well as other materials relevant to the psychology of the Middle East (e.g., the powerful work by H. Amnar, Growing Up In an Egyptian Village, Silwa, Province of Aswan, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), suggest that different cultures produce different core conflicts in the individuals raised in them. Whereas Freud found conflicts of sexuality at the core of his patients and Kohut has suggested that conflicts over issues of narcissism are central to contemporary Western man, psychic conflict over passivity and dependency seem to be at the core of the personal dilemma of, at least males, in the Islamic Middle East. The consequences for the individual male and female, the family, as well as social and political institutions remain to be spelled out. Other issues of considerable substance are raised by the authors. Gerald D. Miller demonstrates quantitathe extent to which primary education tively in Morocco at least,dampens innovative behavior and generalizability of knowledge while fostering respect for authority and rote memorization. Sharabi and Ani discuss the absence of guilt and the apparent lack of a super-ego among Arab Moslems. Bouhdiba refers to the prototypical Arab male as "Jawdar" after a character in the Arabian Nights--an Oedipus "shorn of all guilt" (p. 136). Bateson, Clinton, Kassarjian, Safavi, and Soraya demonstrate the confusion for Iranians which surrounds the notion of safa-yi batin, the culturally valued ideal of "inner purity." In one sense, an individual is valued whose intentions are pure, whose heart is "clean." On the other hand, the term also conveys the notion that there is between inner intentions conformity and outward behavior. But under a variety of conditions, the latter meaning is 209
SUMMER1977
of dropped in favor of the former, reducing the intensity the ideal and the power of the value to generate idealistic behavior. to a psychological fascinating Issues of substance approach to the study of the Middle East could be cited at to important contributions But there are as well, length. tangles which have imand methodological the conceptual peded the development of such studies. how a deep familiarity John E. Mack demonstrates with the very private musings of T. E. Lawrence would and on the nature of his role in often did mislead scholars himself to be That Lawrence believed the Arab rebellion. does not mean that he was nor does it denia "charlatan" What it does do is to alert us to the grate his role. evidence for psychologiissue of what constitutes crucial which and what are the nature of the inferences cal studies drawn from what types of evidence. may be legitimately in Lebanon, of Armenian villagers In his studies of makon the difficulties Herant Katchadourian reflects data judgments on the basis of quantitative ing clinical for the interpretasensitivity and the need for cultural tion of "the various cues and clues that the clinician contact with the patient" gathers in his face-to-face (p. 115) of a large number of works In an incisive critique one by the authincluding on Iranian "tnational character" the illustrates or of this review, Ali Banuazizi deftly reductionism. of psychological pitfalls John Racy and Orhan Ozturk and Vamik Volkan in arin the Arab East and in Turkey both on psychiatry ticles is adequate to capture argue that Western nomenclature in the Middle East; that of mental illness the expressions of mental illness by type appears compathe distribution in the West, and that the forms rable to the distribution in the Middle East are expressed in which mental illness class. vary by social
IRANIAN STUDIES
210
of his unfolding Manfred Halpern in a continuing in Islam" demonof human relations scheme of "repertoires a concern with achieving intellectual distance from strates on his method and his scheme to gain a sense of perspective his evidence. of insights and issues As with issues of substance, and methodological importance could be elaboconceptual it to say that this volume, while rated at length. Suffice and content, remains an imporuneven in scope and quality study tant and significant contribution to the psychological of the Moslem Middle East. But I continue to wonder what happened to sexuality in the Middle East. Its near total absence from the volume leaves me puzzled. Most likely it is one more of those crucial areas of knowledge in the Middle East to which, serious scholars have yet to turn their attenamazingly, tion.
The Il3h-nama
or Book of
Translated by J. A. Boyle, UNESCOCollection, Persian
By Farid al-Din CAttdr. with a foreword by A. Schimmel. Herititage Series, 1976. 392 pp.
God.
L9.95.
Heshmat Moayyad 113h7-nama is one of the four main mystical mathnawis of CAttar which he composed in ca. 600/1204. In terms of content and form it is closest to his Mantiq ut-Tayr, although its frame story--a king who, presented with the worldly demands of his six sons, tries to show them the senselessness of their desires with the help of a large
Heshmat Moayyad is Professor of Persian Language and Literature in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilization of the University of Chicago. 211
SUMMER1977
work lacks that of the latter number of stories--unlike of ca. 6500 diConsisting any movement and development. as well some of the most fascinating it includes stiches As a mystic overshadowed as some of the oddest stories. by Maulawi and as a poet not nearly comparable with a score cAttarys poems have hardly ever won an of eloquent masters, and rethe great affection audience despite enthusiastic enjoyed. has always man holy a as spect which his image research on his life and work was done by M. Pioneering However, the by S. Nafisi. Qazwlnl and, in great detail, for first field owes more to H. Ritter than anybody else, and then for his unique and monuarticles his Philologika For the eminent sufi scholar mental Das Meer der Seele. to cAttir came late and yet the attraction Furfizanfar of his excellent the production early enough to stimulate
monograph, Sharh-i
Abwil
etc.,
Teh. 1340.1
(Lucknow 1892 and Teh. Following two popular prints was published edition critical first 1937) Ilhi-n5ma's He was followed by F. Rouby Ritter in 1940 in Istanbul. hani (Teh. 1960), who had access to more and better manuto handle them. and ability but lacked the skill scripts, is based on both editions, translation literal The present Page numavoiding each one's mistaken readings. carefully Ri and Ro. Exbers of both texts are shown by the initials passages and notes (pp. 354-384) explain difficult tensive The and allusions. for stories show sources of reference Like all such is clear and correct. itself translation inideas and stories cAttarls it transfers translations, It is a but leaves the "tpoet" behind. to a new culture, matter of debate, whether Khayy?m has been lucky in this It is the old question of etc. process or Rfimi, cAttar, In any or yearn for beauty! whether you admire loyalty for having found a translator case cAttar is fortunate well and has rendered who knows the language excellently his not seldom clumsy Persian into an English which rareWe should rethe ambiguity of the original. ly discloses confessed honesty in his typical Ritter member that even (Introd. not to have understood the text in every detail which folThus the few corrections, to his ed., p. 15). low, are not in the least meant to minimize the value of Prof. Boyle's achievement. IRANIAN STUDIES
212
B(oyle) 31/Ri 32.1, shast means "hook," not "sixty" misleads. to which the word panjah, fifty, B 32/Ri 32.20, = not for a moment did he .... B 33/Ri dam. . .ebar-nayimad 34.9.2, the subject of d7d is the same as in 9.1, and iu B 37/Ri 38.9.2, refers to the woman, not the bedouin. rasid is imperative: "help me against his unjustice." B 46/Ri 47.17.2, "from the Fish to the Moon" (not "from B 46/Ri 48.10, zi shahwat nist khalwat month to month"). hich matlub on the contrary means: lack of carnal desire is not commendable (repetition of the idea emphatically, "Heaven forbid," uttered in the opening line). B 47/Ri 48.19.2, "moon," i.e., his face, and not "Moon," the ceB 92/Ri 96.8.2 to 9.2, the text is obscure. lestial body. The translation violates the grammar without solving the problem. sar5t Perhaps in 8.2 pul-i is alluded to, which "lies beyond the stream" (the real river in question, or the stream of our present life?). 9.1, "if thou wilt not take this gold and wilt over-look it, how cant thou have me cross the bridge? (i.e., I shall not cross it). B 95/ Ri 99.3 and 4, maj3z denotes this world and things belonging to it, majJzi means "feigned or false" (not "allegory," Verse 3 omit "and." "allegorical"). B 116/Ri 121.3.2, tan zan = abstain (from eating more), not "be silent." B 132/Ri 138.3, dam = deceit (not "friend"), ay hama dam = 0 all deceit! B 195/Ri 206.7.2, bi yakh bar man nivis means, I suggest: "write on me (my body) with the ice" (not: "write on ice"). The idea is that when the body, after a warm bath, feels well the touch of ice on it makes the blind man discern the riddle and solve it. B 284/Ri 308.14, a typical example of Th5m or amphibology. The context makes the intended meanings of zlr-5hang and Parda obvious. B 325/Ri 355.16.2, "become all vision," not "face" (read
ru'yat,
not
ruyat).
As for the notes the following additions.
and explanations,
may I suggest
P. 7, n(ote) opened his eyes, 20, That Adam, when he first saw Muh's name inscribed on the empyrean, stems from a hadith quoted by al-Haikim Nisabtiri, Riad 1968, al-Mustadrak, Vol. 2, 615; see also al-Kisal', Qisas al-AnbTya, ed. EiBrill 1922, 26 and 47. senberg, 213
SUMMER1977
P. 23, n. 168: "Mub called CUmar the lamp of paradise," is in al-Suyuiti, Vol. 2, 65 (Cf. Furual-cimicas-.aghlr, 108); see also San'iT, Had qa 234.5 and zinfar, op. cit., 235. 13. P. 26, n. 183, The Prophet said at-Talib f7 Mangqib cf. Kifayat 1970, 314-16.
"IOlight
to cAll: CAll
b.
AbT Tal ib,
etc." Najaf
d3d-ast n. 189, Ki law kashf al-ghi#a Rouhani 23.565/B26, me5dastam/Khud3 r5 t5 nablnam key parastam, for the first 249.4; correct the second rac see also Sanad', op. cit., "I do not worship God without seeing Him," a misrac as: see e.g., quoted in literature; saying of cAll frequently 350; SuhAba Nasr Sarraj, Kitib al-LumaC, ed. Nicholson, rawardil, Bust3n al-Qul ub, ed. H. Nasr, 376; Sanad', 95, ed. M. Mucin, Teh. 1340, 14-15; cAwfl, Jaw3miC al-rHik3yat, ed. I. Afshar, vol. 2,300. p. 59; BAkharzi, Awrad al-Ahbib, is also to be woman, B 31ff., The story of the virtuous by (Das Papageienbuch) found in TutTn3ma, German trans. Insel Verlag, 1957, 65-95 (the name Georg Rosen, reprint is given as marhEma, not marjUuma; the story is lacking in The story of Nulshirvan, B Jawahir al-Asmar, Teh. 1352). is also in cAwfl, op. cit., ed. Bana Musaffa, Teh. 53ff., no. 1561 1352, vol. 1, 63 = Muti. Nizamud-Din, Introduction, Farhang, Teh. ed., pub. by Wizarat-i (In the Muntakhab3t, for Nfishir1324, p. 277, Haran ar-Rashid is substituted see alB 70ff., hindi, For the story of Sarpatak-i van). no. 1053 ("Sarnab or Sarbat"). so CAwfl, Introduction, IX, 2, 1956, 330. About the name see F. Meier, Oriens, For Hiruit and Miruit hang(Rouhiani's Sartapak is wrong). in a well, B96, see al-Kisl'i, ing head downwards thirsty 45-46. The story of Buzurjmihr no. 778. duction,
B 194,
etc.,
of Nimrfid, B 207, in al-Kisa'l, op.
IRANIAN STUDIES
in CAwfi, Intro-
B 198, see Furuizanfar, Mathnawl, 144; Jaw3hir
For the story of Shacbi etc., akhidh-i Qisas wa Tamthllit-i Asmar, 93f. The story ferences,
also
Ma'al-
with certain difis recorded, cit., 123-24; see also cAwfi,
214
Adno. 1927; Furuizanfar, Ma'aJkhidh, 226ff. for some other stories are prosource references ditional vided by Prof. F. Meier in Oriens, IX, 1956, 2, 319-30 B 251; 327 the 323 the story of the falcon etc., (e.g., B 201; and 329, B 124 last verse). story of the man etc., have been explained Some other allusions by Furfizanfar, 105-108; see also RouhInil, p. 335, v. 529 and 336, v. 551. is Apart from several typographical errors the production flawless. Numbering of the verses would have been a help to researchers. Introduction,
NOTES
1.
in his Furuizanfar admits (P. Chahir) that earlier life CAttdrYs poems had never attracted him and he had read them without any liking. The statement confirms the aversion which a modern poet and critic, Hamidi Shirazi, feels for cAttar. He wrote a series of articles against the poet (Yaghma, Vol. 19/1345, and protest several issues) which caused indignation in many circles CAttar-nama, (cf. also al-Qaysi, Baghdad, 1969, p. 977).
215
SUMMER1977
The Little
Black
Fish
and Other
Modern Persian
Stories.
by Mary and Eric Hooglund, Translated By Samad Behrangi. Essay by Thomas Ricks. with a Biographical-flistorical 133 pp. Three Continent Press, 1976. Washington, D.C.: $14.00. Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak
modern Persian merits, Whatever its purely literary bodies of relevant is one of the most socially fiction As in any other example of century literature. twentieth evaluit often embodies the author's literature purposive By imposproblems and prospects. ation of the society's on his work the modern Persian ing pattern and structure to the exand gives significance writer organizes fiction His technique and style deteraround him. ternal reality coherent relato create an organically mine his ability and the matter of his story. between that reality tionship his enables him to translate ultimately His sincerity in the incipient into form. From its beginnings vision and modernism of the late nineteenth of nationalism spirit has always been shaped, in the Persian fiction century, last analysis, by what the author has seen in the society Much of the story of contemand the way he has seen it. can be told from this vantage ground. porary Persian fiction From the liberal optimism of Jamalzadeh, to the socialist of disillusionment of Alavi, to the progressive idealism ambivalence of Ale Ahmad, a high Hedayat, to the defiant marks the peaks to social experience degree of fidelity Closer everywhere. of twentieth century Persian fiction to us in this range, looms the figure of Samad Behrangi action as revolutionary emphasize outright whose stories the author's vision of the soluition to the problem of social injustice.
Ahmad Karimi-Hlakkak is a Ph.D. candidate at Rutgers University. Literature
IRANIAN STUDIES
216
in Comparative
The Little Black Fish is at once the culmination and the conclusion of Behrangi's short but productive caAll discussions of whether reer as a writer of fiction. this short story of about twenty pages (in the translation under review) is to be viewed in the genre of children's or not stem from irrelevant literature superimpositions of Western categories alien to the Persian tradition of itself story telling, rooted in the ancient idea largely of instruction In its barest skelthrough animal fables. eton, The Little Black Fish is the story of a fish's quest for the remaking of the destiny of the fish-folk. The story begins amid the ultimate ennui of the race of the fish and a little black fish's to settle in the refusal stream of everyday life. Despite its mother's pleas, the hero leaves the little stream in search of the sea. In a masterly depiction as knowof the dialectics of experience ledge, knowledge as action and action as movement, the little fish goes through both benign and malignant sides of life, always learning, always acting upon his knowledge, always moving closer to the object of his quest. The Little Black Fish finally succeeds in murdering the heron, the arch-enemy of the race of fish. His own fate is left undetermined, but the continuity of the struggle is emphasized in no uncertain terms. The whole story is framed in a gathering of the fish at the bottom of the sea where the grandmother fish is narrating the heroic story of the Little Black Fish to twelve thousand of her children and grandchildren. In what is a vivid, if slightly too forced an ending, Samad concludes:
Eleven thousand, nine hundred and ninety-nine little fish said goodnight and went to sleep. The grandmother fell asleep too. But try as she red fish couldn't might, a little go to sleep. All night long she thought about the sea.... In Samad's other stories, too, action is defined as the organizing of life. principle Kurughlu's Robin Hood which Samad has retold from various style adventures, Turkish folk songs and oral tales, depict him as a proletarian hero fighting in the face of inindefatiguably credible odds to eradicate and human exploitsocial ills 217
1977 SUMMER
ation. writes:
In his
introduction
to The Epic
of
Kurughlu
Samad
Kurughlu's power is the power of the masses; that endless power which is the source of all power. is his trust in this virtue Kurughluls greatest even for one moment, power... .He does not forget, and what the who he is, for whom he is fighting, He is always mindful is. object of his struggle of his people whose backs are bent in slave labor beneath the pressure of the Khans and the ruling class. Hours," a glimpse at "124 Restless In another short story, ubiquiin big city, boy the a village the wanderings of as the source of all is identified injustice tous social turns into a vivid rage which eventually the righteous The same general as the final arbiter. of violence vision all of including theme pervades his many other stories, of Samad Behin the present collection those gathered Black Fish and Other Modern The Little rangi's stories, Persian
Stories.
available to The idea of making Samad's fiction is indeed a readers of literature the English-speaking in view of the prominence his work noble one, particularly apparatus. the Iranian censorship has achieved despite and all those and culture, Students of the Iranian society can provide a penethat true literature believe who still into social dynamics, will have Mary and inlet trating as well as Dr. Ricks, Eric Hooglund, the translators, Essay" appendthe author of the "Biographical-Historical availed to the book, to thank for making this collection able to them. To ease the way for those readers relativeand therefore with modern Persian fiction ly unfamiliar works to plunge into reading literary unable or unwilling is provided in the front in a vacuum, ample information Aside from the "Acknowworks. to Behrangi's material of a bioportion consists ledgment," the introductory Introduction" note on Samad, the "Translators' graphical Iranian and a "Memorial Essay" written by the celebrated all this Useful as Sa'edi. Gholamhossein playwright, IRANIAN STUDIES
218
from organizational material is, however, it suffers defiFact and opinion are not separated. The conciencies. the writing tents of various essays overlap, is not always and finally, clear, many mistakes have gone unnoticed. For example, in the biographical note on Samad Behrangi the opinion is expressed that the author's stories "deal with powerless individuals, especially children, to survive physically and mentally who... must struggle in a society nawhich has long ignored their vulnerable tures." Whereas in the "Acknowledgment" we learn that Samad's works "were officially banned by the branch of the security in charge of censorship." police Also, the objective facts of Samad's life, and such as his education his occupation are mentioned not in his biography but in the "Translators' Introduction." In all of this front matter, bad prose complicates the situation. The biographical note, for example, contains the following paragraph: Behrangi died at age 29 while swimming in a swift Azarbayjan river. This, plus his warm-hearted qualities, his pioneering stories, and his strong social ficonsciousness, have made him a central gure in contemporary Persian literature and culture. The use of "This" at the beginning of the second sentence is not exactly the example of lucid, communicative prose. Now, readers who are aware of the suspicious circumstances of Behrangils death may be able to grasp the point, i.e., that Samad's rise to prominence and popularity as a revolutionary writer was largely due to the general public perception that he had been silenced secretly by the government. However, as it stands the prose is far from explanatory. The translators fare much better in the actual translation of Behrangi's stories. For the most part, the stories recapture the mood of Behrangi's fiction and perceptively. Hiis style is not altered vividly much and his images are evoked faithfully, at times even with admirable skill. The fact that I will list certain in-
219
SUMMER 1977
should here, therefore, adequacies merits of Mary and Eric Hooglund's (p. 4)
in no way blur translation:
the
Since "It served him right to be killed." committed with a murder is not generally perhaps to the victim, view to its service would have been "he deserved to be killed" preferable.
(p.
16)
"Caught in the heron's long beak, the little get free." fish kicked and waved but couldn't kicking and waving imply the To me, at least, use of feet and hands, none of which the fish might Perhaps "wiggled and jiggled" possess. and more vivid. have been less straining
(p.
22)
"Once in a while I sold wrapped rial chewing In an gum, charms and other such things." of this nature, perhaps the extreme instance phrase "wrapped rial" could have been omitted of meanof much needed clarity in the service ing.
(p.
26)
'That's enough dice throwing. "Mahmud.. .said, By translating Let's play foot of the wall.' "Bikh Divrri" as lfoot of the wall" the transraised the level of ablators have really can in translation surdity that literalness bring about.
(p.
31)
"The houses are all large and pretty as a The image of large and bouquet of flowers." to a bouquet of flowcompared houses pretty in English as to appear ers is so abstract quite out-of-place.
the whole book sufIn fact, can go on. The list copyfers from what seems to be the absence of editing, and Numerous misspellings and proof-reading. editing of any careful errors try the patience typographical reader, and stand in the way of further enj'oyment of the IRANIAN STUDIES
220
stories. flagrant
The following is only of these mistakes:
a partial
list
of the most
1. Thomas Ricks' essay is listed as "Bibliographical-Historical in the Table of Contents and the back cover, while the heading for the essay itself on p. 95 of the book calls it a "Biographical-Historical Essay." 2. The name of the protagonist in one of the stories, "The Bald Pigeon Keeper," is spelled Kachel in the "Translators' Introduction" and Kachal in the story itself. 3. spiritual exists]
"Today (1967) more than ever before, a close union exist between my nation and myself" [i.e., (p. 95).
4. sami" (p.
"Parvin 102).
Iltisami"
is
also
spelled
"Parvis
Ilti-
Many mistakes of this kind could have been avoided through better editorial supervision. Indeed, all of the writings in this book--stories, biographies and critical essays alike--could stand editorial revision to enhance lucidity and therefore enjoyment. It would be unfair, however, to expect perfection where it simply cannot exist. Samad Behrangi's prose is largely unconcerned with those subtler stylistic characteristics which guide the steps of the translator. Hidden layers of meaning and covert turns of phrase designed to fool the government censors while at the same time convey their true meaning to an audi-en-ce who seeks political statement in the heart of any literary work, makes his fiction all but untranslatable. The fact that we do have a fairly readable translation of Samad's stories is an impressive achievement. Thomas Ricks' "BiographicalHistorical Essay," serving as an epilogue to the book, attempts to place Behrangi in the tradition of modern Persian fiction. As an overview of the evolution of modern Persian prose-fiction in relation to the social and political movements of the last century or so, it is doubt221
SUMMER1977
The tool for the neophytes in this field. less a valuable however, is at times becloudoutlook, progressive essay's and classicategorization ed by problems of periodization, use of undeand an excessive Long digressions fication. seem, at times, to stand in the fined terms of reference Thomas Ricks Nevertheless, and coherence. way of clarity Samad Behrangi not only finally succeeds in establishing writers of modern conscious as one of the most socially artist." Iran but as "a totally involved revolutionary The Little
Black
Fish
and Other
Modern Persian
to the growing is a welcome addition in available contemporary Persian literature and scholars, can only hope that translators task before them, try to achieve the historic with as much care and commitment as jectives authors. the original inspired
Stories
for Artists the Imperial
and London:
the Shah: Court of
Late Iran.
Yale University
Sixteenth-Century
corpus of One English. mindful of their obhave always
Painting
at
New liaven By Anthony Welch. xvi + 233 pp. 1976. Press, MNloCleveland Beach
as century, of the later sixteenth Iranian painting time, in a transitional Anthony Welch points out, existed moving from a state of feudal overwhen Iran was itself The redespotism." to a period of "enlightened lordship not was patronage artistic that was arts, the for sult, and many painters, of the rulers, always a major interest and arthe rich, vital in fact, migrated elsewhere--to court of the Mughal emperors of Ininnovative tistically
Milo Cleveland Beach is an Associate History at Williams College. IRANIAN STUDIES
222
Professor
of Art
dia, for example. Iranian traditions There, longstanding came into contact with new and challenging interests that led to a profound transformation of the style. A comparison of late sixteenth in Iran and century Islamic painting India alerts us to the isolated, character of the elitist Iranian works which Welch discusses. In comparison to Mughal India, where Hindu and European works, among others, were sought out and made visually influential, in painting Iran was almost totally in-bred. This is the context against which works of the later sixteenth century must be seen, for it was a situation which demanded change. That this study can fairly center on only three painters (Siyavush, Sadiqi and Riza) is itself this symptomatic; would be inconceivable for the early years of the century, when the imperial workshops were enormous, the sources of styles wideranging, and the shahs' involvement virtually obsessive. The author has furthermore carefully delineated the historical and political context of these artists, and shown how this contributed to the move from the epicurean aestheticism of Tahmaspls rule to the more broadly based images made for Shah 'Abbas I and seventeenth century Isfahan. The three painters discussed in detail are not of equal importance to the author, however. The first, Siyavush the Georgian, is the least interesting as a personality, although his style is the most consistent and recognizable. Discovered by Tahmasp, he worked steadily and reliably in the royal ateliers until his retirement sometime in the 1590s. Riza, however, the youngest of the three, and the greatest aTid most influential was subject to shifting attitudes and interests. Unlike Siyavush, he was unreliable; he chose socially unacceptable occupations and companions, and in every way challenged the standards to which his artistic compatriots conformed. The vitality and quality of his work, however, affected those around him, especially Sadiqi; and Riza's originality released Iranian painting from its dependence on the early Safavid A major portion of his career postdates style. 1600, the cut-off date for this study, and consequently the presentation of his career and importance is necessarily incomplete.
223
SUMMER1977
Sadiqi Bek, a man This leaves us with the third painter, who deserves his role as focus of the book, and whose exhelp to make him a humane about painting writings tensive Welch argues that much of Sadifigure. and sympathetic of the young came from the challenge qils inspiration of his works, SadiAside from the quality Riza's talent. from himself a major manuqi is noted for commissioning dated 1593--an unprecedented the Anwar-i-Suhaili script, hints at It is a work that finally act of patronage. Iranian awareness of the development of Mughal painting inroads into in India, and one wishes that such possible for had been mentioned, Iranian tradition the imperial such openness to new ideas is important to our understandin Iran around 1600. ing of painting not attempted to disThe author has understandably to the three painters; cuss all the major works attributed a small number of examples and ilindeed, he has selected of perbasing his arguments and definitions lustrations, and comanalysis on close visual sonalities and styles and one wishes This is an admirable procedure, parisons. could sustain the kind the quality of the reproductions for the author's by the reader, necessary of observation many plates Instead, judgments are extremely perceptive. are are out of focus, and black and white illustrations little mat paper that yields printed on an inappropriate in the origiWhat is crisp and precise sense of detail. This is, however, the only nal is made dull and bland. to the work. objection serious of making sense is given of the difficulties Little Many illustraof knowing who painted what. attributions, or are either signed by the artist, tions in manuscripts in the margin, and this tends to by a librarian inscribed The drawings and of authorship. information be reliable became increasingly popular album pages that independent century also often bear inscriptions in the later sixteenth opbut these are more frequently later, naming an artist, or dealers than added by collectors attributions timistic This is particularly factual contemporary inscriptions. sense is given to Riza, and little true of works relating IRANIAN
STUDIES
224
here of the controversy that has surrounded the investigation of his personality and oeuvre. Doubtless the author wished to avoid yet another repetition of too familiar arguments, but for scholarly reasons some indication of the problems and opinions would seem warranted. In fact, one wonders why only Sadiqi is supplied with an appended list of principal works; such would have been of great interest and value for the discussions of Siyavush and, most especially, Riza, as well. In summary, this is the first serious study of a pivotal period, and is an important, informative and sensitive work, giving us a clear perception of individual human responses to a period of political and artistic turmoil.
Edebiyat,
a Journal
of
Middle
Eastern
Literatures,
Edited by William L. Hanaway, Jr. Philadelphia: East Center, University of Pennsylvania, 1976.
Vol. 1. Middle
M. A. Jazayery
At last there is a journal devoted to Middle Eastern literatures--a long overdue development. According to the editorial in the first issue, Edebiyat has three aims: (a) "to contribute to the knowledge and appreciation of Middle Eastern literatures.," (b) "to contribute to literary study in general through the examination" of these literatures, and (c) "to entertain its readers with examples of" these literatures. It plans to publish articles in the areas of "icriticism, literary theory and aesthetics, some original
M. A. Jazayery and Literature
is Professor of Persian Linguistics and at the University of Texas at Austin. 225
SUMMER1977
works, creative translations, and surveys of the reviews, Volume one current literary scene in the Middle East." the second contains examples in several of these areas: Analysis part of Kamal Abu Deeb's "Towards a Structural of Pre-Islamic Poetry," subtitled "The Eros Vision"; Wiland an Essay," liam Hickman's "Sait Faik: Three Stories translations of four pieces of the Turkish writer's work, preceded by an introduction; Michael Beard's "Character and Psychology in Hedayat's Buf-e Kur"; Mounah Khourils "Prose Poetry: A Radical Transformation in Contemporary Arabic Poetry"; are all informative Michael and useful. (pp. 93-110), Hillmann's "'Manflchihrli: Poet or Versifier"
comments on Jerome W. Clinton's The Divan of Manuchihri A Critical Study (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca
D3mghhni:
deIslamica, 1972). It is a sound piece of scholarship, courteous. At tailed, well-documented, well-written--and Hillmann's invitation, Clinton provided brief comments The exchange is (pp. 111-12) on the former's criticism. welcome, and I hope such exchanges will become a more-orless regular, or at least frequent, Hillmann's feature. to the paper combines several of the areas of interest journal--including bibliographical comments, comments on general literary theory, on prosody, and a few comments on Clinton's translation. Other scholars included are Roger Allen, Bernard Lewis, C. M. Naim, James T. Monroe, Annemari Schimmel, Charles D. Smith, Andros Hamori, Gert J. J. DeVries, and the writers Iqbal Majeed, Jald Al-e Ahmad, and Raymond P. Scheindlin. Most of the major languages of the Middle East are in the first volume (Persian, Turkish, and represented Arabic, as well as Urdu, which, despite its geographical and is "Middle Eastern" in cultural, literary situation, of fiction, the essay, polinguistic terms). Discussions The Arabic-, Persian-, Turkish-, etry and drama appear. areas are all included. What gaps exist and Urdu-speaking (A notable gap in future issues. will presumably be filled I also hope that languages and areas so far is Hebrew.) in discussions often left out, or treated only marginally, of Middle Eastern literatures in the West, will have adeI might mention Afghanistan quate space devoted to them.
IRANIAN STUDIES
226
and Tajikistan in terms of geography, and Armenian, Pashto, and Kurdish, linguistically--though these lists are not meant to be exhaustive. This journal will facilitate communication among scholars in different Middle Eastern literatures--a great justificiation in itself for a new journal. I also hope it will do much to improve communication between native scholars in the Middle East, and those elsewhere living in the world (especially in the United States). Furthermore, it should make conscious efforts to inform the nonMiddle Eastern scholars of literary activities going on in the Middle East. In this connection, I urge periodic publication of surveys such as Roger Allen's "Egyptian Drama and Fiction in the 1970s."1 I also suggest, in addition, publication of translations of chief papers on literary theory and criticism published in Middle Eastern languages. This will help inform Western scholars of developments in the Middle East. It also provides a badly needed means for scholars in each Middle Eastern country and language to learn of what their counterparts and colleagues are doing in the rest of the area: for English is today more of a lingua franca in the Middle East than Arabic was even at the peak of its status. And it does something Arabic could not do even then: it is fast becoming--many would say it has become--the international language of scholarship throughout the world, not in only a portion of it as was the case with Arabic (or Latin, for that matter). The journal is the brainchild of William L. Hanaway, Jr., who is its editor , and Roger M. A. Allen and Walter G. Andrews, who are the other members of the Ed-itorial Board. The major languages of the area not covered by the editors are represented on the editorial advisory board, consisting of Clinton, Talat S. Halman, Hillmann, James T. Monroe, and Michael J. Zwettler, all affiliated with American universities, and Ahmet 0. Evin and Massud Farzan, from Turkey and Iran respectively. The editorial group is thus made up of scholars of a wide range of experience and comand justifies petence, optimism for the future of this journal. The addition of a scholar or two from Europe to the Advisory Board would enhance it even further. The 227
SUMMER1977
issue acknowledges the in the first editorial University and timely aid" of its publishers, Indeed, everyone Middle East Center. vania's in the work of this journal j oins the editors of Pennsylvania ing thanks to the University possible. its publication
"generous of Pennsylinterested in expressfor making
needs time to Edebiyit Like any new enterprise, I conclude my mature, and to make a place for itself. those supplementing suggestions, comments with several already made in passing. I hope Edebiyat will devote more space to the 1. A scene. recent and contemporary Middle Eastern literary and a point meriting conof this suggestion, corollary of avoidfor its own sake, is the desirability sideration However, of rehashes of old materials. ing the publication reand encourage, I also hope the journal will publish, and cliches. of old assumptions examinations of translation 2. There is a need for studies What I have Middle Eastern languages. problems involving of specistudies critical are detailed in mind primarily should not studies though theoretical fic translations, be neglected. of a Middle Eastern literary 3. When translation to make sure it is I urge the editors piece is published, aids, such as an supplementary accompanied by sufficient is Hickmann's this of An example adequate introduction. Lewis' and Naim's transto above. translations referred A from similar treatment. lations would have benefitted and its with what he is translating, familiar translator, of the need for such background, is not always conscious (and their However, the editors materials. explanatory should keep this point in mind, and make approadvisors) when necessary. to the contributors suggestions priate not spescholars From time to time, literary 4. those especially in Middle Eastern literatures, cializing should be inorientation, with a comparative-literature papers on current trends and theories. vited to contribute IRANIAN STUDIES
228
are in general uninformed It is true that these scholars It is also true, informed) of our field. (or inadequately in Middle Eastern literatures however, that many scholars are not always up to date on what is going on in the out(as seen exceptions There are, of course, side world. but so far), published even in the two issues of Edebiyit I believe great. the need for what I suggest is still and space, should be devoted 5. attention, Special in languages scholarship to current and recent literary other than those of Western Europe and the United States. must be made to publish efforts concerted In particular, in Russian and other East European surveys of scholarship languages. the might imply, I believe 6. As these suggestions contrieditors of Edebiy3t should not wait for volunteered of aror series but should commission articles, butions, Advance planning long-range on specific topics. ticles, and comcombining volunteered on the part of the editors, to serve its missioned articles, should enable Edebiy3t and literary most usefully and lastreaders, scholarship, ingly. A j ournal such as Edebiyat In a has one drawback. its own purpose (or one of its own purit defeats sense, to those already in the Midposes) by appealing primarily that there is But there is no question dle Eastern field. for our a need for it, since there are not many outlets Middle use. The solution to the problem is twofold. papers on Middle Eastshould contribute Eastern scholars ern topics with wider appeal and broader audito journals ence (such as PMLA); and Edebiyat should develop into such appeal to a high-quality that it will itself publication in other fields. We need a journal to which scholars in all language areas will turn enthuscholars literary To suggest and entertainment. siatically for edification is that journal would be an exaggeration. that Edebiy3t to beBut not to suggest that it does have the potential come such a journal would be to ignore what is more than is on its way to such a a mere possibility. Edebiy3t 229
1977 SUMMER
future; however, that future will not come by the work of its editors alone; but, of equal or more importance, through the constant and willing cooperation of all scholars in the field.
An Introduction
Jr.
Minneapolis
to
Ottoman
Poetry.
and Chicago:
By Walter
Bibliotheca
G. Andrews,
Islamica,
1976.
x + 195 pp.
Talat Sait Halman
Persian poetry was to Ottoman classical verse what Greek literature was to Roman literature or, more recently, British literature to American. Perhaps the most frequentOttoman verse is ly repeated observation about classical that it copied Persian poetry, which in turn had drawn E. J. W. heavily upon Arabic forms, meters, and rhetoric. Gibb (1857-1901), the indefatigable British orientalist who wrote a six-volume Poetry, stated it with
study
entitled
A History
of
Ottoman
devastating forcefulness: "Turks forthwith appropriated the entire Persian literary system down to its minutest detail, and that in the same unquestioning and wholehearted fashion in which they had already accepted Islam. Here again they did not pause to consider whether this Persian culture were really in harmony withl their own genius, they did not even attempt to modify it to suit that genius; on the contrary, they sought to adapt the latter to it, and to force themselves to think upon Persian lines and to look upon things through Persian eyes... .The Turks knew but one literature, that of Persia on which they had been reared. And thus this brilliant literature became, not by selection, but by force of circumstances, the model after which the Turks should fashion that they were about to found."
Talat Sait Halman teaches Turkish language, literature, and history of culture at Princeton University. IRANIAN
STUDIES
230
Molded by Persian aesthetic values, most Ottoman elite poets considered producing a divan in Persian to be the ultimate achievement. As they came into their own, in terms of Persian models, they measured their success often expressing pride about having emulated them. Some, in fact, spoke of their superiority. the great Nef'i, master of the ghazal and the qasidah who died in 1635, to three compared himself, with elaborate double entendre, Persian figures in the fakhriyya section of his best-known "I am Khaqani (the King); Muhtasham (the Magpanegyric: nificent) is a sergeant in my retinue / When my pen, like the plectrum, Hafiz (the Reciter) touches the strings, is tongue-tied." The couplet by Nefli is symptomatic of how the Ottomans were enamored of Persian literature. Be that as it may, the tendency on the part of some scholars, including Turks and non-Turks, to treat Ottoman poetry as a mere Persian version has caused them and their readers to overlook the large body of autochthonous Turkish folk poetry, with its original themes, forms, meters, and style,, and to minimize the Turkish poetic that expressed faculty itself in the Arabo-Persian molds for six centuries. An Introduction to Ottoman Poetry by Walter G. rather survey of the craft, Andrews, Jr. is a meticulous than the art, of Ottoman poetics as practiced by the educated elite. The author, who holds the promise of becoming a prominent authority, has tirelessly scrutinized and categorized the types of devices that went into the making of the formalistic, rolyrical, hypertrophic, abstract, mantic, mystical, and metaphysical classical verse of the Turks. Such concentration might have yielded a better unof what is "Ottoman" or "Turkish" in it, but derstanding does not. In fact, if the illustrative Turkish poems are replaced by comparable Persian poems, the book could easily accommodate the title of An Introduction to Persian Poetry. It is regrettable that the-author, who commands a superior ability to analyze and interpret Ottoman poems, reduces them, in the context of this particular study of to formal aspects poetics, and the three R's--rhythm, rhyme, rhetoric--as though Ottoman verse consisted of molds and mechanics without ideas, themes, emotions, faith, concerns, social ethical values, cultural etc. substance, 231
SUMMER1977
This is an Introduction to the anatomy of Ottoman verse, not to the life of Ottoman poetry. Within its proscribed the Andrews' study limits, I cannot think of a more achieves impressive success. systematic or more comprehensive analysis in any language including Turkish. It will serve as a very useful guide to scholars, students, and translators who have to deal with the complexities of classical Turkish verse. It includes textual analyses of several major poems, which constitute, in this reader's opinion, models for the right approach and appreciation. Prof. Andrews' work, however, is not free of errors and glaring omissions. Several lines are misread; due to wrong transliteration a few lines do not scan properly; there are many mistakes marks in the use of diacritical and especially macrons. A number of essential technical terms are missing, e.g., bahr, ibham, muamma, telmi and mulemma, garabet, fasila, etc. Discussions of imale and zihaf are less than adequate. Prof. Andrews has chosen not to use a number of major books and articles: L. P. The Persian Metres came out too late, Elwell-Sutton's but several earlier studies (particularly some in Turkish) might have enabled Prof. Andrews to do better justice to some of the topics. The Introduction undertakes the occasional attempt differed in certain to determine how the Ottoman poetics ways from the Perso-Arabic models: "The lack of any developed intrinsic study of Ottoman poems, however, means that we have only a very hazy idea of how the system actuhas pointed out the fundaally worked. Recent scholarship mental differences between the Arab and Persian concepts or non-existence of an Ottoof rhythm, but the existence man concept has never been explored." But, one notes with reregret that the book fails to explore the "concept," mains content to make references t o "Perso-Ottoman of the fundamental asoffers no analysis adaptations," pects of Turkish phonology and poetic euphony, equates the rhythm with prosody, and does not seem to recognize of fact that genuine poetry is larger than the sum-total IRANIAN STUDIES
232
its
technical
devices. An Introduction Consequently, to perhaps unwittingly, perpetuates the fallacy that Ottomans simply aped the Persians. 1, for one, long for a scholarly study which, after documenting the borrowals and influences, will undertake an objective assessment of what the differences and the original aspects of Ottoman poetry were within the context of a political system that lasted more than six centuries, of a culture whose synthesis transcended the Islamic faith, and of a language which nurtured its own literary dimensions and poetic integrity.
Ottoman
Poetry,
Development and Domestic
Praeger;
of the Iranian Oil Industry: International Aspects. By Fereidun Fesharaki. New York:
London:
Martin
Robertson,
1976.
315 pp.
$19.50.
Amir H. Ahanchian The past decade and the period following the oil price increases of 1973 correspond very closely with the rise of oil as the most important world energy resource and as one of the most important commodities in international transactions, respectively. In addition throughout its history, oil has been a political resource as well as an economic and financial resource for both the producer and the consumer countries. Naturally, a significant number of studies have been carried out on the historical, political, financial and economic aspects of oil resources and the international oil industry. To this list, one must add the recent studies dealing directly with the historical development of the oil industries in various individual oil producing states and the changes in the relations between
Amir H. Ahanchian Political Science
is a Ph.D. Candidate at Purdue University. 233
in the Department
SUMMER 1977
of
the oil tions.
and the multinational oil corporaproducing states within the latter Fesharaki's book falls category.
By dividing his work into three main parts, Fesharaki, a Research Associate for Economic Affairs at the Institute for International Political and Economic Studies in Tehran, traces the evolution, administrative and structure, achievements of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its affiliated companies; describes changing relations between NIOC and the Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs);and interprets the significant contributions oil has made to Iran's five development plans. In this context, Fesharaki reviews the economic and, to a lesser political implications extent, of the early oil concessions in the period 1901-1951; describes the domestic oil market and the structure of supply and emand; discusses the process through which NIOC and the Iranian government succeeded in asserting Iran's control of the oil industry the nationalization of 1951, the (e.g., Consortium agreement, joint venture and service contracts); examines the role of Iran in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); and evaluates the domestic activities of NIOC with respect to exploration, production, distribution and transportation. Oil In tracing the evolution of the Anglo-Iranian Company (AIOC), Fesharaki provides the reader with informative accounts of the patterns of operations and investments of the foreign dominated company in the Iranian oil industry. The development impact on the Iranian economy was also negligible. Iran's oil revenues were small compared to the domestic budget and development expenditure, as well as U.K. taxes and AIOC profits. There was practically no direct effect, through forward and backward linkages, on the Iranian ecoennomy. The oil industry was a foreign-oriented tity superimposed on an agrarian structure. Fesharaki's discussion of the methods of employment in expanding the by AIOC and the company's lack of interest network also provides a good inlocal oil transportation of AIOC. Fesharakils sight about the operations analysis, IRANIAN STUDIES
234
in nature. however, for the most part remains historical The inconsistencies of AIOC's patterns of operations with respect to taxes, profits and obligations are not fully of the foreign elaborated nor are the negative aspects in a local industry. Moredominated company's interests and Iran's over, analysis of AIOC's political manipulations alternative toward the company are limited. strategies accounts of the In comparable fashion, the author's nationalization period and Iran's search for more symmetric is brief relations with the MNOCs, although informative, and requires further discussion in view of their importance as a prototype for oil producing and other developing (i.e., conraw material countries. producing) Important studies are disregarded of its resources cerning Iran and control in the discussion and the footnotes. On the other hand, Fesharaki's treatment of the oil prices and the reasons for their downward trend, as well as his discussion of the MNOC's influence in determining oil production rates, clearly illustrate the magnitude of the MNOC's power and conseoil quences of vertical integration in the international industry. Also, Fesharaki's discussion of the various nonconcessionary contracts (i.e., joint venture and service which Iran has signed with the independent oil contracts) companies is explicit even though his evaluation of their takes into profitability primarily account economic factors. With respect to OPEC and Iran, Fesharakils main emphases are the results of cooperation between the oil-exHe evaluates in terms of porting countries. the results the satisfaction of the stated objectives of the parties concerned. The objectives are embodied in OPEC's statutes and are summarily described as aiming at maximizing longrun benefits. Fesharaki sees OPEC's power stemming from its surplus funds and asserts that in case of a confrontation with the West, considering 1973's production rate of 31 million OPEC could b/d and revenues of $23 billion, sustain a cut in production of 80 percent on the basis of the 1975 government take of $10 per barrel--"la situation that OPEC can accept but the world economy cannot."
235
SUMMER1977
Taking into account recent developments in Iran and other OPEC countries, one can only say that Fesharakils projection tends to be highly optimistic. Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as Iraq, Libya, and to some extent Algeria and Kuwait, have committed a good part of their revenues for purchasing sophisticated military hardware and defense networks. Iran, Iraq and Venezuela along with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Nigeria (and Kuwait and Libya to a Algeria, lesser extent) are committed to long-term development plans and are thus in need of substantial oil revenues. Even if chose to relinquish their commitment to forthese countries eign aid and foreign investment, a situation that is highly improbable, under normal circumstances the OPEC countries could not sustain an 80 percent cut in their production and still meet their expenditures on the basis of 1973 revenues. In the subsequent chapters, Fesharaki present detailed of the impact of oil on the Iranian explanations and the domestic economy, the problem of petrodollars operations of NIOC. The chapter on the problem of petrodollars is well timed. The author's treatment of various issues is reflected within the national of the OPEC policies countries. His observation of the new developments and his analysis of the trends in international financial circles are interesting and rewarding. Fesharaki, however, fails to make a convincing case against the undertaking of downstream operations by the oil producer countries. His analysis in this respect is one-dimensional; financial returns are chiefly considered while other advantages that this process may bring the producer countries, such as advanced technology, and marketing skills--are transport almost disregarded. Finally, Fesharaki's discussion of the impact of oil on the Iranian economy and the various activities of NIOC, and valuable, folalthough highly informative essentially of official and his interpretalows the direction policies On in this sense, remain somewhat less objective. tions, Fesharaki's work is opportune and provides premium balance, information about the international as well as domestic dimensions of the Iranian oil industry. IRANIAN STUDIES
236
I. a New Interpretation: History, Islamic Cambridge: By M. A. Shaban. (A.H. 132).
University 197 pp.
Press,
1971 (paperbound
edition,
A.D.
600-750
Cambridge viii 1976).
+
Elton L. Daniel
paperin a convenient In this volume, now available the process by which an Dr. Shaban explores bound edition, Pursuing this theme, he Islamic empire came into being. of the problems surrounding the implementation describes and of a new umma based on cooperation Muhammad's vision and to which all Muslims would belong "on an equal justice in the Makkan/Madinan commonwealth, in Arabia, and footing" conquered by the in the vast new territories particularly Shaban prehis "new interpretation" Arabs. In elaborating There ideas. and controversial sents a host of provocative here, and we may encourage are too many of these to list them for himself. reader to discover the prospective to Many of Shaban's comments will be of interest Shaban has a clear understudents of Iranian history. standing that the Islamic empire was not a monolithic and often long entity but a complex amalgam of diverse He also justly in Iran). unabsorbed regions (especially the points out that one of the great problems confronting of non-Arabs into Arab new empire was not the assimilation worked rather (for which the mawalT system actually society with the of the Arab colonists well) but the integration Much in a new Muslim community. populations indigenous is Shaban's contention expressed (first less satisfying in that the 'Abbasid revolt in The 'Abb3sid Revolution) in the Marv oasis. Khurasan was the work of an Arab faction throughfor his attitude Indeed, Shaban must be criticized were passive out this work that the non-Arab subjects role in the events of agents who played no significant
Elton L. Daniel is writing Iran during 743-842 A.D.
a book on rebellions
237
in Eastern
SUMMER1977
the period. this it is a major one--in flaw--and The greatest on to base his interpretation book is Shaban's failure solid research into the sources and secondary literature. the Armenian and other non-Muslim to exploit Shaban fails disapof Iran will be especially and students sources, Persian the valuable pointed to find that he neglects Even and others. Narshakhl, works by Bal'ami, Gardizi, He is not beyond reproach. his use of Arabic material in his list of works cited, lists the Akhbar al-'Abbas His citations but it does not appear in any of his notes. the one example (p. 131) may illustrate are often askew: He argues that 'lUmar II was opposed to further point. from outexpansion and thus ordered a retreat military posts on the Byzantine front and a general withdrawal from Baladfor this, Yet of the sources he cites Transoxiana. hurl makes no such point (saying that 'Umar was in fact the dissuaded from abandoning the fort in question), the and be could texts differently, interpreted Tabari eror completely is either misprinted Ya'quibi citation tendency to use roneous. Shaban also has a regrettable They seem to be cited to supambiguously. his footnotes event when in fact they are an of his interpretation port fact only of a general nature or refer to some specific He also ignores the problem of accounthe has mentioned. to contradictory and material ing for variant traditions flatly that Abfu MusFor example, he states his argument. lim was called amir a1 muhamrnad. Would it not be better appears on some of his coins to point out that this title sources as ammn 31 muhammad? but is given in most literary secondary use of the relevant Shaban makes little Finally, much of what he has to say is literature. As a result, (His comments on Iraq already outdated or questionable. and Ziyid b. Abihi should be compared with Michael Morony's to Boshe should have referred work on the same subjects; to A. Dixon's on 'Abd al-Malik, worth's work on Sistin, Shaban does say he chose this In fairness, and so on.) but this reviewapproach so as not to confuse the issues, than more in credibility er feels he loses considerably he gains in clarity.
IRANIAN STUDIES
238
These technical some inadequacies problems parallel in the argument itself. While not necessarily incorrect, or docuthere are many points which need clarification mentation. Shaban says that Muhammadwas not a true religious innovator. How then are we to account for the unique and strong religious content of what is, after all, Islamic society? He says that "events of this period have too often been explained on the basis of imaginary tribal he jealousies." Yet he has to admit that the factions describes seem to have followed To get tribal divisions. around this, he resorts to his favorite device of redefining the objectionable terms. In this case, he argues that Yamanite and Qaysite served as names for the competing in a manner akin to the English use of Whig and factions Tory. Yet the only proof of this he can offer is that there is some doubt as to which group a few clans belonged. He suggests, plausibly, that the ahl al-ayyam became the ahl al-qurra' that the qurra' later , but his contention became the khawarij of ~iffln, and that these were not "heretics" and were unrelated to all later Kharijite is astonishing. If it is true, where is the proof? sects, He suggests a connection between the Qadarites and the Yamanite reform platform since Yazid III was a Qadarite. But if so, why was 'Umar II (whom Shaban makes the leading proponent of the Yamanite position) so vociferously antiQadarite? Having told us that Sulaymin and his faction opposed military adventures, Shaban explains away the military activity of Sulayman's reign by claiming that Sulaymrn supported only campaigns of "consolidation" not conquest, and that he wanted to send a major expedition against Constantinople only in order to capture that city and thus put an end to future wars with Byzantium! We are told (pp. 79-80) that Mu'awiya learned from 'All's failure and avoided any claim of "religious authority." Yet it is never quite clear what Shaban means by "religious authority"' or how 'All used it, much less how it contributed to his defeat. Indeed, Shaban himself argues that 'All wanted "religious authority" only to strengthen his secular authority, that 'All lost support by not exercising his "religious and that 'All's authority," cdnflict with Mu'awiya was an expression of the regional conflict between Iraq and Syria, not the question of the im&mate (pp. 62, 239
1977 SUMMER
74, 77). Finally, there are several thorny problems (e.g., the murder of 'Umar and 'All) which Shaban simply evades. and others (his interpretation of the reasons the shuira selected 'Uthman over 'All) which are based on a drastic oversimplification of the sources. Perhaps the greatest irony is that Shaban's interpretation holds that those wonderfully altruistic Arabs in Marv who supported the Abbasids stood for assimilation, Muslim egalitarianism, social justice, an end to military adventures, and a dimunition of caliphal power. Yet the Abbasids proved no less autocratic than the Umayyads; they at least maintained Umayyad military policy on the Byzantine, Khazar, Caspian, and Central Asian fronts; it was under their rule that the shu'Ebl controversy became exacerbated; and obviously they did not usher in the millenium. Did the revolution fail in all its objectives? We may conclude with the hope that Shaban will address himself to these and other paradoxes and problems in his future work, and with the hope that he will give his ideas the supporting scholarship that they deserve.
IRANIAN STUDIES
240
Historyof the Armnenians MosesKhorenats'i RobertW.Thomson, Translator and Editor Thisclassicaccountof the origins and earlyhistoryof the Armenians is now translatedintoEnglishfrom the critical1913editionpublished in Tiflis.Thomsonestablishes Moses sourcesand citesbiasand uncorroborated statements.He identifiespeople and places, explainsallusions,and refersto publishedscholarshipon specific questions.Thomsondiscusses Moses'methodsand purposes,and establishesthe compositiondate-a hotlydebatedissue. $22.50
HarvardUniversityPress Cambridge,Massachusetts02138
.v-
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FROM X DARKNESS Z - w? WOMEN'S inurE,^
.UAUE.lY
by
Dadr
L
EMANCIPATION
ull:
ol-Moluk
Dhhndad
Editedand Translatedby F. R. C. BAGLEY
For centuries, Iranian women were virtual prisoners, confined to the home, the cloak and the veil. In their ignorance and isolation, they remained unaware of their own capabilities and spiritual worth. They could look forward to nothing except enslavement to the wishes of husband or obedience to the orders of father and brother. Finally, after centuries of darkness, the light of liberation dawned in the 20th century under the progressive policies of Reza Shdh the Great. The winds of change blew the veils and cloaks away and ushered in a new era in which Iranian women took their rightful places in society beside their men. The author, Mrs. Bamdad, has been an energetic leader in the Iranian women's movement since its inception. Her firsthand account of its growth is a powerful _.
testament to both her intense love of country and passionate conviction that Tran's women must be free. $8.00 r-
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A NOTE OF TRANSLITERATION In manuscripts submitted for publication, only those words need be transliterated which do not appear in the third edition of Webster'sNew Intemational Dictionary. The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STUDIES is the Persian Romanization developed for the Library of Congress and approved by the American Library Association and the Canadian Library Association. Copies of this table (Cataloguing Service - Bulletin 92) may be obtained by writing directly to the Editor.
Iranian Studies is published by The Society for Iranian Studies. It is distributed to members of the Society as part of their membership. Annual membership dues are $12.00 ($7.00 for students). The annual subscription rate for libraries and other institutions is $15.00. A limited supply of the back volumes of the Journal (1968 to present) is available and may be ordered by writing to the Editor. The opinions expressed by the contributors are of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Society or the editors of Iranian Studies. Articles to be considered for publication and all other communications should be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box K-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass. 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society should be addressed to the Executive Secretary, The Society for Iranian Studies, Cdo Department of History, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, U.S.A.
COVER: Fereydun spurns the ambassador from Sahm and Tur, from the 1587-97 Shahnamah. Chester Beatty Library, Dublin. Photo from A. Welch, Artists for the Shah (courtesy of Yale University Press).
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
I 12~~~~~~~/
99,
Au
Autumn 1977
Volume X
Number 4
THE SOCIETY FOR IRANIAN STUDIES COUNCIL AhimadAshrat, Plan & Budget Organizationand University of Tehran Amin Bananii,UniivcrsityoJ C'alibrniia,Los Angcles Ali Banruazizi,Boston College Lois Grant Beck, Universit; of Utah Oleg Grahar, IlarvardlUniiversity I tLnd, Bovtloit C'ollege Eric J. Hoogi M.A. Jazaycry, University oJ Texas at Atustini ThomiiasM. Rticks,ex officio, Georgetown University Marlvint Zonis, Univcrsitiv oJ (Clicago
EXECUTIVECOMMITTEE Gene R. Gartliwaite, Executive Secretary ThomllasM. Rticks,Treasurer Ali Banuazizi, Editor
IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of the Society for Iranian Studies Ediror: Ali Banuazizi Book Review Editor: Ervand Abrahamian Associate Editors: Anne Enayat Vahid F. Nowshirvani Mangol Bayat Philipp Copy Editor: Naomi Schorr CirculationManager: Rosemary Gianino
Copyright, 1979, The Society for Iranian Studies Published in the U.S.A. USISSN 002-0862 Address all communications to IRANIAN STUDIES, Box J-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts02167, U.S.A.
Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
VolumeX
Autuimn 1977
Number4
ARTICLES 243 THEMIDASTOUCH:BLACKGOLD, ECONOMICS ANDPOLITICS IN IRANTODAY 267 LANDREFORMIN THEMIDDLE EAST:A NOTEON ITSREDISTRIBUTIVEEFFECTS 281 BOIRAHMADMOCKERY: A RESEARCH NOTE
NikkiR. Keddie
HosseinAskari John ThomasCummings andJamesToth ErikaFriedl
BOOKREVIEWS 287 J. E. WOODS:TheAqquyunlu:Clan, Confederation, Empire 294 M. BOYCE:A PersianStrongholdof Zoroastrianism 300 R. BARAHENI:TheCrownedCannibals 305 TARIKH:BULLETINOF THEDEPARTMENTOF HISTORY,UNIVERSITYOF TEHRAN 309 H. ASKARIAND J.T. CUMMINGS: MiddleEastEconomicsin the 1970's 312 D. RAFFAT:TheCaspianCircle: A Novel
J.D. Gurney MichaelFischer D.A. Shojai F Safiri
M.A.H.Katouzian MichelMazzaoui
Continued on next page
Volume X
314
Autumn 1977
M.C. HILLMANN,Ed.: Hedayat's "The Blind Owl" Forty YearsAfter
322 0. ARESVIK:TheAgricultural Develop-
Number 4
Minoo S. Southgate
EricHooglund
ment of Iran 325 D. RUMI: Licht und Reigen (Trans. by J.C. Burgel)
Michael B. Loraine
IraniianStudies, Volume X, No. 4, Autumn 1977
The
Touch:
Midas
and
Economics in
Iran
Black
Gold,
Politics
Today Nikki R. Keddie
Near Eastern The legendary King Midas was the first that untold mineral wealth would ruler to cherish the belief enable him to realize all his dreams and ambitions. But just because all he touched turned into gold, he soon discovered The moral of this legend may becomnhe could no longer eat. countries, which are ing home to various regimes in oil-rich decline, overrapid encountering problems of agricultural income distribuinflation, increased rural-urban migration, tion gaps, and so forth. Nowhere have the expected achievefrom oil income been more touted than in ments to result the "Shah-People (later Iran, where the "White Revolution" proclaimed from Revolution") and the "Great Civilization" the throne since the early 1960s were not only to provide for all, but also to put Iran and economic well-being social powers before the end of among the world's top industrial going to be among the the century (whether it was seriously five top world powers varied from statement to statement, but this was said at one time). Today all this lies inobvious ruins, but the ruin did not begin with oppositional dated from January, 1978, but was demonstrations generally years.1 there for many to see in the preceding
large
but Oil income is clearly not an evil in itself, oil income often tempts governments into overambi-
Nikki R. Keddie is Professor of California, Los Angeles. 243
of History
at the University AUTUMN 1977
that bring projects urban-centered tious capital-intensive Oil income tends temporarily to on a host of difficulties. the power and armed might of those in power, but increase of the ways in which oil income is used may help the effects or disfamanipulated, among uprooted, build up opposition grew in and opposition Social tension groups. vored social as oil income shot up, since contemporary Iran precisely Although the 1974, and the two phenomena are interrelated. predate 1974, they inand many of its grievances opposition creased thereafter. in the Middle East-Iran has the longest oil history was granted in 1901, national to a British an oil concession in 1908, and before World War I the Britoil was discovered governish navy converted from coal to oil and the British Oil ment bought the majority of shares in the Anglo-Persian Petroleum). after 1935; now British Company (Anglo-Iranian of Iran under Reza Shah in the Before the centralization 1920s and 1930s, oil income was probably more useful to the Bakhtiari and Arab tribes who got some roysemi-autonomous from the company than it was to the alties and privileges still Under Reza Shah, oil revenues, central government. After World quite low, were used mainly for arms purchase. low royagainst the high profits, War II, Iranian sentiment Oil Company of the Anglo-Iranian and other practices alties, National Front govcame to a head, and the widely-supported It oil in 1951. ernment of MohammadMosaddeq nationalized 1953 when it was overthrown with US help and ruled until ruler. as autocratic Shah MohammadReza was reinstalled by the US ambassador, Henry Grady, Based partly on statements Mosaddeq expected the US to support him; instead the US cut off or denied various forms of aid from his government, and the world oil cartel of major companies operated an interWithout oil revenue Iran national boycott of Iranian oil. took an outside-supbut it still was in economic straits, ported plot to overthrow Mosaddeq.2 signed by the Shah The oil agreement subsequently but left all of nationalization a fiction (1954) retained oil a the hands of multinational in decisions significant Gradualconsortium dominated by the major oil companies. leaving ly the Shah got back control over key decisions, IRANIAN STUDIES
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the foreign companies the profitable downstream and marketing operations. With the growth of OPEC, a world oil shortage, and the immediate efficacy of the Arab oil boycott of 1973 (the boycott was probably a less crucial factor than is generally said), Iran was ready to encourage OPEC in a near quadrupling of oil prices in late 1973, which would bring Iran's oil revenues to approximately a $20 billion year and apparently open the royal road to the "Great Society." In fact, however, the subsequent intensification of existing economic strategies may have created more problems than real achievements.
Oil,
Planning,
and Development
Strategies
From the first post-World War II Plan through the Fifth Plan, ending in March, 1978, there have been close ties between oil income and planning, with roughly 55 to 90 percent of Plan Organization funds coming from oil (the low figure is for the Second Plan and the high one for the Fifth Plan). The vast majority of government receipts now come from oil, and the percentage for plan funds is even higher. Outside the Communist world the vogue for real or projected plans is mostly a post-World War II phenomenon. Reza Shah did not talk of planning, but a huge long-term project involving heavy expenditures like the Trans-Iranian Railroad would now be considered a phenomenon of planning. On the opposite side, many have doubted that the first two or three Iranian plans were real plans, since they mostly grouped together disparate government projects with no means to enforce an effective government strategy toward the economy as a whole.3 Despite these caveats, the period since 1949 will be discussed briefly under the heading of planning, since it had some elements of planning and shows many consistent trends in government economic and social strategies. Iran's first plan was a seven-year plan for 1949-56, to be financed mainly from oil revenue. It was heavily influenced by advance studies made by the American engineer245
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ing consultants Morrison-Knudson Company, and by Max Thornburg, an important US private oil man. It emphasized agriand like and infrastructure culture, private enterprise, later plans foresaw no major socioeconomic transformations. It was largely vitiated by bureaucratic and private interests even before the cutoff of its main source of income, oil revenues, effectively killed it in 1951. sophisticated Later plans have become increasingly comprehensive in personnel and technique and progressively in coverage, although a running battle between the "independent" Plan and Budget Organization and the ministries that often prefer to develop their own projects has been In the late a frequent cause of delay and immobilization. 1950s, an Economic Bureau was set up for the Plan Organization assisted by a qualified group of Western advisers under the The only general work pubauspices of Harvard University. lished by a member of this bureau is negative regardingwhat planning had accomplished in Iran, and notes that Iran's main economic advances occurred not through planning but evinced in increasing control of because of nationalism, It is thus etc.4 relations with foreigners, oil, tariffs, best to be wary when talking of planning in Iran. The government has, indeed, followed a general economic strategy, and this strategy has been much influenced by the growth of It seems likely, though, that much the same oil revenues. strategy might have been followed without the mechanisms of planning, although the latter has at least the ideological role of making it appear that the government is thinking ahead for the benefit of the whole country, and using the most modern mechanisms to insure economic and social progress. The de facto government strategy at least since the early 1960s has been rapidly to develop large enterprises of all kinds, using as much modern labor-saving technology Extremely large profits have been encouraged as possible. for both domestic and foreign private companies; in thename have ofof rapid development, corruption and inefficiency ten been more rewarded than punished in both private and has been done for those little state firms; and relatively The above policy line on the bottom of the economic scale. IRANIAN STUDIES
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has been justified by some involved Iranians and Westerners according to an economic theory that holds that in the early must worsen, and stages of development income distribution those at the top of the scale should be favored, since they save and invest more than those at the bottom. The rival theory that, at least in Iran's current stage, much greater development income equality is needed for self-sustaining in order to achieve balanced production and a mass consumer market where people can buy back what they produce, is rareThe strategy for investing oil money has enly stressed. couraged the lopsided development of large firms whose large and favors, profits depend on specific governmental policies or productively enough and which do not operate efficiently to compete on international markets. The preference for bigness and modernity affects agriculture as well as industry, dubious and and a mechanization that is often ecologically unproductive on a per-hectare and on a countrywide basis has and driven hundreds of thousands of former agriculturalists findwhere they have difficulty nomads to towns and cities, Governmental ening housing, proper food, and often jobs. while small couragement of a policy of "big" agriculture, farmers are starved for help and credit, deserves as much study as the more highly publicized and studied land reform.5 The essential mechanisms of the above economic strategy are fairly simple, although not well-known to non-specialists. First, oil income is one factor in a generally regressive tax structure, and encourages the government not to enforce its mild progressive income tax and not to institute other progressive taxes. The government can essentially do without tax income, and does not try seriously to use taxation either as one means for more just income distribution or to prepare Iranians for the day, probably not long hence, when the oil will start to run out. More seriously, the impetus given by oil to the dramatic economic boom since 1963, with per capita GNPrising from approximately $200 to $1000 in real terms, and with one of the world's highest growth rates, has increased the already wide income gap between the rich and the poor, even though some people have been able to rise into the middle and upper classes. Gains have been concentrated at the up247
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per levels, and this has been in large part the result government policies.
of
In the field of industry the government, at least since the 1960s, has built some government-owned basic inbut also has dustries unlikely to be rapidly profitable, expensive confavored the private production of relatively sumer durables with a concentrated market in Tehran. Offiencouraged the concentration have indirectly cial policies of economic enterprises in or near Tehran. Government polwho icies have helped both Iranian and foreign investors, to send money by law are free to repatriate their profits, as when the abroad. Oil income is used in these policies, government foregoes or lowers industrial taxes to favor certain industries on the basis of its oil revenues, or itself builds producer goods industries and an infrastructure that The government can alencourage large private industries. so, because of oil income, pay high salaries to the higher echelons, enabling them to purchase consumer administrative in Tehran. durables and elegant services, especially include high preThe relevant government policies ferential tariffs to lower foreign competition; prohibition of some imports for the same reason; subsidized loans for large firms only; tax holidays; licensing of only a few intreatment of fordustries in each field; and preferential Some economists who have studied eign capital and experts. may have been needed in some Iran believe that high tariffs cases at an initial stage in order to launch an industry, are rarely lowered, so there is but they note that tariffs or to direct capilittle incentive to operate efficiently tal toward those branches of production using more local A bewildering variety of unneeded, deadly, and inputs. polluting automobiles are assembled in Iran, while many simpler, cheaper goods that could be made for popular use in small plants are either imported or handmade in insufficould rationalize Lowered tariffs procient quantities. duction by reducing the production of complex goods requiring many imported elements and encouraging the production of intermediate goods and of simpler, more popular goods, which should need less tariff protection as their manufacless expensive. Capital and intermediture is relatively IRANIAN STUDIES
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ate goods are even now often made in small plants in Iran, and some economists feel that more protection for these goods and less for fancy consumer goods would be a more efficient and egalitarian policy. Credit policies are similarly designed to favor large firms and the rich who own and run them. Before the fluctuations of 1978, rates of 4 to 9 percent, considerably below the market price of money, were generally available only to large enterprises, while small shopowners and craftspeople were starved for bank credit, since their plant did not provide sufficient collateral for a loan. They were usually not even eligible for normal bank rates of approximately 12 percent, but had to borrow in the bazaar for 25 to 100 percent. Many observers feel that in Iran, at least, small firms are more efficient and productive than large ones, and they certainly provide more employment and can help reverse the trend toward growing income inequality. It might thus be reasonable to reverse the governmental loan policy, charging free market rates to large firms and subsidizing loans to small ones. (The lack of bank credit for small producers and consumers may have more to do with the various attacks on banks in 1978 than the Koran's prohibition of interest; bazaari merchants and money lenders charge higher interest rates, not always "disguised," thando banks, and they have not been attacked. Banks are, of course, also a symbol of and participant in various governmental and Western policies in Iran.) Tax holidays have also been given to encourage foreign investors, or investors in certain regions of Iran. Although this policy has been publicized, no doubt sincerely in part, as a way to decentralize industry out of the Tehran region by offering tax inducements to factories built at least 120 km. from Tehran, in fact the concentration of industry in the Central Province, where Tehran is, increased after the policy was enunciated, with a kind of ring of industries built about 120 km. from Tehran. Licenses are not mandatory in order to operate a business, but any sizable company needs one to import, export, deal with the government, etc. Government licenses 249
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Their are awarded to only a few companies in each field. rationale is to keep a field from getting main theoretical so overcrowded that companies overbuild, overproduce, or In fact, the need to get and cannot operate to capacity. like many other government rules, requires keep a license, that top persons in a company spend much time in Tehran dealing with leading personages in order to ensure thereRegardceipt of a license and other favorable treatment. which cannot all ing licenses and other rewards, stories, be inventions, circulate of Iranians of the highest status and ties who take, say, 10 percent of a new company's stock gratis in return for using their influence to deliver a like most of the industrial praclicense. Such practices, tices listed above, and along with other forms and levels of corruption, significantly increase the sale price of Iranian goods, thus limiting their domestic and ultimately necessary foreign markets. They also further skew inanalysis does come distribution. (Although this article's not put special emphasis on corruption, mainly because it has been fairly widely publicized in the media to the exclusion of its socioeconomic context, corruption may be seen as an integral part of a system that is controlled from the top and that keeps wealth running upward and outward far more than it trickles down.) As to foreign capital, although foreigners may legally own only a minority partnership share in Iranian inand dustries, they are subject to few other restrictions they may repatriate profits quite freely, which may ultimately be a problem. Brochures for foreign investors proclaim that profits on capital investment of 30 percent, far higher than the US norm, are normal in Iran. In fact, economists crises, before recent economic and political who know Iran often spoke of 50 percent profits as quite standard, and profits in trade and industry of 100 to 200 it is not percent are not unknown. Given this situation, Middle Eastern reluctance surprising that the "traditional" to invest in industry, which usually involves much capital and low initial return, gave way to an industrial boom, but it was a boom almed largely at a restricted, relatively wealthy market, and which carried within it numerous problems. IRANIAN STUDIES
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It is within the context of these general industrithat favor large profits by a few capital-inal policies campaigns tensive industries that the occasional official or for shareholding by factory workers, against profiteers, which are given more publicity than the above policies, Such measures are at best minor palshould be evaluated. income inequalliatives taken in the face of huge profits, (since 1974), and the failure to ity, galloping inflation meet government promises of greater economic and social They have often involved unfair, and sometimes equity. whose attacks on small or medium-sized retailers, violent, or onmiopens them to blame for "profiteering," visibility Official schemes nority or otherwise unpopular businessmen. that favor factory workers are largely designed to allay the discontent of a class that evinced, even before 1978, its and unreported discontent through fairly frequent, illegal, strikes--the factory workers. Partly due to such government favoring of factory workers by shareholding and other measures that are, however, less dramatic than they are proclaimed to be, and partly due to their rising wages, workers in factories and in certain trades have become a relatively One cannot, however, favored group in the past few years. take reports regarding categories of workers whose wages have, say, tripled in a few years, as typical of the popular classes in general. From the viewpoint of the needed ultimate competitiveness of Iranian goods on the world market it would have been, and still would be, better for a government to have concentrated much more investment on such things as education, including job training for both males and females, health care, and programs that would increase production of small shops and farms, rather than pushing so many large plants and consumer durables, and trying to buy off workers. The large plants now produce inefficiently and expensively and drastic devaluation, which has already begun as of late steps needed to get 1978, may be only one of many difficult the economy in working order. The above remarks do not mean that the government's have produced only negatilve results. industrial policies growth has been one of the highest The rate of industrial 251
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with the impact of huge oil revein the world, especially nues since 1974. In addition, it is possible that in a nonframework in a country without a strong record of socialist investment, a policy of favoring such inprivate industrial guarantee of large provestment through a partial official fits was one means of promoting the first stage of private Even from this viewpoint, however, industrial development. policies one may question the continuation of preferential disthe established; been had industries once profitable favoring of small crafts and industries which contribute to production, to employment, and to greater significantly income equality; the favoring of foreign investments and of plants to which foreigners must contriultrasophisticated bute heavily; and the underwriting of the production of conof sumer durables that contribute to the overcentralization production and consumption in Tehran, and to the development of a kind of consumer demand that has meant that "import subhas led to a rise in imports of capital goods stitution" and intermediate goods, and even of many consumer goods, especially food. Thus, many of the problems noted not only by the opposition but by many governmental planners--such in Tehran and a few other cities, too as overcentralization many automobiles and luxury imports, and the growing income gap have been fed by the government's policies.6 distribution such as programs with the encouragement of Counter-efforts, the queen to help craftspeople have not seriously counterParticularacted the main thrust of government policies. ly since 1974 the regime has nourished the illusion that everything could be done at once--huge arms purchases, favoring foreign investbuilding ultramodern industries, ment, etc., and all the while supposedly pushing social welfare. Agriculture
and Nomads
Similar points may be made about the government's which like its industrial policies policies, agricultural are largely supported by oil income and by the increased Since the launching of central power it has generated. Land Reform in two main stages since 1962 Iran's agrarian have generally been discussed in terms of Land Repolicies IRANIAN STUDIES
252
clear that this important reform, but it is increasingly form has been fitted into a general agrarian and agriculLand tural policy that should be discussed as a totality. reform was the first phase of this policy (although it may not have been conceived as such by its original framers) and hence will be discussed first. Only since World War II has there been serious governmental consideration of Land Reform. Mosaddeqls increase in the peasants' share of the crop and the Shah's sale of most of Reza Shah's (disputed) crown lands to their peasants may be seen as preliminary, but not very comprehensive, reform measures. A more serious reform bill in 1960 was eviscerated by parliament, and reform was launched in 1962 by decree, when parliament was dissolved and a reformist government under Ali Amini had been appointed to meet a seriThe first crisis. ous economic recession and political phase of land reform, planned and promoted by Agriculture Minister Hasan Arsanjani, sold to peasants on the basis of above the (low) tax evaluations of landlords all villages, owned by larger landlords. one village or its equivalent, rights got land, thus elimOnly peasants with cultivating In the second phase of land reform, iminating laborers. much more conservaplemented after Arsanjani's dismissal, tive means were used to settle lands of landlords with one village or less, but many of the peasants with cultivating rights have got some land, though not as much as they precertain pastures, Orchards, plantations, viously cultivated. and mechanized lands were exempted from reform. All new landholders were to become members of newly formed cooperaAlthough many landlords predated tive credit societies. sales or gifts of land to family or friends, a few were influential enough to escape reform, many lands on slight evidence were called "mechanized" and hence untouchable, and peasant shares might vary greatly even within one village, the first phase of reform inay be regarded, on a comparative To become a real successful. world scale, as relatively success in terms of rising peasant production and income, however, it would have been necessary greatly to increase government aid and inputs, and also to encourage peasant self-management of expanding multi-purpose cooperatives. Neither of these things has been done. 253
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Instead one finds both a relative neglect of agriculture by the government and, in the government's limited infollowed in investments, a close parallel to the policies dustry, with by far the most government economic and techunits while nical aid going into very large agricultural the small and middle peasant, to say nothing of the agristarved of government cultural laborer, are increasingly managing their own help and discouraged from effectively affairs through comprehensive cooperatives. Government bias in favor of big units was manifested a few years after land reform in two major laws and programs. One was the law encouraging the creation of Farm Corporaonly (occasionally In these units several villages tions. one) are combined into a corporation with a majority of peasants somehow persuaded to turn over their recently won lands to a corporation, in return for which they get one or more shares, depending on how much land they give in. Wages are based on a combination of land and labor, but since Farm Corporations use modern machinery not all shareholders can be employed, and former laborers can very rarely be employed, and these groups contribute to the massive migration to the Farm corporations are run by governovercrowded cities. and bureaucrats sent from Tehran, and inment specialists housing volve large expenditures for machinery, salaries, Farm Corporaand other buildings for the non-farmers, etc. tion heads and others often claim that their enterprises are do not include all the but their calculations profitable, and overhead expenses, and claims of government's initial Peasants often are scarcely credible. real profitability although no published resist joining corporations at first, Investment in corstudies indicate their later attitudes. porations is so much greater than in small or middle farms that corporation farmers are probably economically better It is more than doubtful, howoff than their neighbors. ever, that peasants put as much effort into a farm corporation as they would into their own farms, andthe governmentIs heavy investment in farm corporations would almost surely have been more productively spent on technical and credit There are over aid to small farmers and their cooperatives. and no halt to their planned increase 100 farm corporations, has been announced. IRANIAN STUDIES
254
The other form of large production promoted by the government until recently has been huge agribusinesses, usually owned and operated by multinational corporations with a US component. These farms of tens of thousands of acres have generally been built below new dams, especially in Khuzistan. Despite their supposed concentration on ""new land, they too have cleared off many small peasants, and those who did not become agricultural laborers joined the rural exodus. Agribusinesses have farmed only a small part of the land they held, and their relative contribution to the Iranian economy was dangerously small--well below that of middle peasants. Since 1976 several large agribusinesses have been taken over by the government, largely because of poor performance, but it is unclear what policies will be adopted toward their lands. Official policy also favors private mechanized farms. To the reformed villages, however, the government has given little economic or technical aid, or aid in forming multiIn certain spheres there has been purpose cooperatives. some progress, notably the (military) literacy corps and some health and development efforts, but these have touched a minority of villages. In direct aid to production, the government has done little. Few of the productive benefits of the "green revolution" have been diffused; there are few efforts to pool peasant resources to improve production; and extension services, including agricultural education, are The cooperatives are mostly purely for very inadequate. credit and do not give the aid in marketing and other spheres that a multi-purpose society with more capital could give. Cooperative loan policies favor the wealthier farmers, some of whomborrow and re-lend at high rates, and many cooperatives retain the rule that loans go only to landholders for agricultural purposes, so that the large army of village carpet weavers (mostly female) and craftspeople are denied access to low-interest loans despite their credit-worthiness. Also, there are inadequate controls to insure that loans go for productive uses, even though these loans cover only a small share of peasant needs for productive credit, the rest of which are met at the old usurious rates. Cooperative loan policy thus favors a growing income gap within villages, which is also favored by the much-touted digging of deep 255
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By drawing off the water that once fed the more wells. democratically divided underground channel, the owner of Deep wells are also a well can sell a precious resource. lowering the watertable and creating greater aridity in many areas. A recent article indicates that the capitalization per household in farm corporations is 400 times greater (The former capitaliwith cooperatives. than in villages It also cites anzation is almost entirely governmental.) demonstrates that nearly all other study that "forcefully land labour productivity, the indices of performance--e.g., higher in the etc.--are total productivity, productivity, case of peasant farming than farm corporations, which in companies."8 turn have performed better than agri-business The government, in favoring a policy of mechanized, extensive farming and disfavoring the small and middle peashas adopted a policy ant, despite the latter's productivity, that might be rational in a country with large cultivable In Iran, however, the cultispaces and a labor shortage. vable surface is too small for an underemployed rural labor force, and the promotion of large mechanized farms, rather than intensive techniques operated by peasants with a stake The record of both in the land, has been counterproductive. agribusiness and farm corporations has been bad, especially in view of the large amount of capital invested in them, which could better have been invested in aid to smaller farmers. on agricultural prostatistics Although official duction say that it has risen approximately 4 percent a year, this figure is considered unreliable--constructed production has risen to mask the fact that agricultural not only much more slowly than demand, but more slowly A reasonable estimate is that agriculthan population. tural production has risen 2 to 2.5 percent a year (and With agricultural mechanization, population 3 percent). unemployment, low income, and population growth, there is especiala rapid stream of rural migrants into the cities, finding where migrants have difficulties ly Tehran--cities The agrarian situation housing, amenities, and even jobs. IRANIAN STUDIES
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plus a growth in food consumption has meant a rapid rise food, imports, which will creespecially in agricultural, ate a major problem when oil income begins to run out. that have encouraged encroachGovernmental policies ment on the lands of nomads and forced many of them to setMeat protle or migrate to towns have had similar effects. duction has stagnated, pasture lands have been reduced, and many nomads have joined the urban or rural sub-proletariat.9 have favored the big over the If government policies small in both city and countryside, they have also favored wealthier and more powerful--over the the cities--already This is seen in price controls on food procountryside. ducts, which for a time helped assuage the discontent of urban masses. Although partly supported the more volatile these controls also involve fixed by government subsidies, products-low prices to producers for some agricultural incomes relative prices that further depress agricultural to urban ones. Income
Distribution
In view of the above, it is not surprising that income gaps have widened since the 1960s. Although no good income surveys exist, there are expenditure surveys, and based on these Iranian and foreign economists have come to Briefly, since the 1960s income insimilar conclusions. in Iran, which were already great, have increased, equalities and this increase, like most of the trends discussed above, has been most dramatic since 1974, when oil income shot up The size and the increase in after the great price rise. gap are great whether the top decile or the distribution or whether one takes two are compared with bottom deciles, which measures deviation from the the GINI coefficient, An important scale. norm all along a normal distribution recent Iranian study also shows increases in income inequalbetween the top and the ity in all the major dimensions: bottom; between the cities and the countryside; within the All this has occurred and within the countryside.10 cities; determination to reduce income despite reiterated official 257
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inequalities. are subsidized
It follows that it is mostly the rich who by oil and the poor much less so.
This does not mean that "the poor are getting poorer,.. since the mass of the population have received some economic benefits from oil income. Given the huge increase in GNPper capita the rich can get much richer and the poor slightly so. The poorer classes have suffered from uprooting and from Iran's massive urban and rural problems, however, and they also witness the conspicuous consumption of the wealthier classes. Along with the grandiose and often unfulfilled promises made around the "White Revolution" and the "Great Civilization," this was bound to lead to increasingly active discontent. The consumption pattern encouraged by wealth at the top, along with the dizzy growth of recent years, create a host of national problems: constantly increased spending on imports; orientation of the economy toward consumer durables and fancy consumer services centering in Tehran; the rapid migration into overcrowded cities; the lack of lowcost housing and the skyrocketing of housing costs, partly caused by the growing presence of foreigners involved in While under current military and economic affairs, etc. conditions higher wages might create further problems by increasing domestic and export prices, a new concentration in government spending on ultimately productive expenditures on public health, education, job training, low-cost housing, credit for small firms and farms, etc. could improve popular living standards, decrease class and regional dlsparities, raise production, and prepare Iran for a less forced, internally generated, technical modernization that could reduce the division between the upper, Westernized classes and the "traditional" popular classes. Oil
Wealth,
Economic
Policies,
and Politics
Oil wealth long has provided the Shah with the means to build up huge armed forces and security organizations, From the including SAVAK,and a concentrated bureaucracy. riots of 1963 through 1977 the government religiously-led IRANIAN STUDIES
258
This conof power. to its concentration faced few threats of power was supported by a carrot and stick polcentration high wages and good treatment for those with icy--relatively such who might become or remain oppositional, needed skills factory workers, and skilled as those with advanced education political of oppositional while those accused or convicted and someoften tortured, jailed, acts might be threatened, Despite the temporary success of such poltimes executed. above and problems outlined the economic inequities icies, freedoms and for greater political combined with a desire trends to produce oppositional regulation less governmental and movements even before 1978. groups were large numbers of uniAmong oppositional male and female, who engaged in many unstudents, versity Ideologiwell before 1978. and protests reported strikes strict despite cally many students were Marxist-oriented, of of the publication and the prohibition press censorship leaned increasingly Other students openly Marxist works. while many tried to combine opposition, toward the religious from new interpreinspiration taking and leftism, religion like Dr. Ali Shariati of Islam offered by thinkers tations (d. 1977). Islam accommodating ideas of progress A liberalized was, in the 1960s and 1970s, adWesternization and partial like Mehdi Bazargan and, especially, vocated by lay thinkers was great both among students and whose influence Shariati, beyond and among many who might read little intellectuals Although some of the higher ulama disputed their writings. of Islam, there interpretation Western-influenced Shariati's of the to the revival seems no doubt that it contributed within contained idea that Islam, if properly understood, all that is needed for a good economic, political, itself In late 1978 the life in the modern world.11 and social of Shariati and that of the more orthodox following but their origiunited, Khomeini is politically Ayatullah different. are still positions nal ideological Khomeini has commanded respect not only Ayatullah but also because of position, due to his high religious to the Shah and the monarchy his unswerving opposition 259
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Ayatullah Ideologically, since even before his 1963 exile. Khomeini has expressed himself in an Islamic fundamentalist In an important treatise published manner until recently. in 1971 he speaks out in favor of Koranic taxes, laws, and and says that it was punishments; rejects the constitution imposed on Iran by the British and mostly copied from the (the latter is largely true); and says Belgian constitution in the sense that Islamic government is not constitutional on the of passing laws by majority vote, but is conditional Koran and the Sunna. God is the only law giver, and the but for creating a program to majlis is not for legislation enforce Islam. He also says that government should be in education and the hands of those with a higher religious In the same period Ayatullah Khomeini wrote opfunction.12 posing the Family Protection Law of 1967 which gave greater rights to women in the family, and wrote that marriages and On one question that divorces under this law were illegal. he innovated, however. He arconcerned him particularly gued, going beyond most other writers on this point, that Islam is fundamentally opposed to monarchy.13 This argument has more basis in early Islam, both Shi'ite and Sunnite, than many other Islamic modernists' arguments, as it is true that the early caliphate was not monarchical or inwhile the Shilite imaherited, but in some sense elective, mate, although inherited, was not a monarchy. In 1978, Ayatullah Khomeini and his spokesmen have expressed themselves in more moderate terms on some of the above questions (although not on the monarchy). These moderate terms, however, tend sometimes to be vague; Islam is said to accord women equality, but this equality, while perhaps including votes and separate education, does not change Islamic family law or women's subordination to male family members, and may remind one of the "separate but equal" docAyatullah Khomeini has not recently trine in US history. and he has said that attacked parliament or legislation, thus changfigures should not rule directly, high religious A recent joint stateing somewhat his earlier positions. ment by Ayatullah Khomeini and others of the opposition favoring both Islam and democracy is unclear in its implications unless one knows his probable position if a demoelected regime acted in ways he considered countcratically IRANIAN STUDIES
260
er to Islamic
law.14
Clearly a period of mass oppositional struggles like 1978 is not a period for ideological niceties, but rather one in which ideologically divergent elements try to form a commonfront, a task in which they have recently had conThe classes among whomopposition movesiderable success. ments first began in 1978 were classes who were economically and culturally disfavored by the regime, and were also in concentrated urban locations where opposition could grow most easily. These groups and classes included religious and students and ulama, who have seen their livelihoods status undermined; the bazaar classes (petty bourgeoisie and bazaar merchants), who have been hurt by the competition and official favoring of large foreign and Iranian firms (including governmental or royally-owned ones); and university students, who had many grievances. These groups were often joined in their demonstrations by the urban poor. All of these groups, except for part of the students, had for years expressed their grievances in religious gatherings and processions, which were the only kind of implicitly oppositional gatherings permitted. Although it is fashionable in the Western press to say that "rapid modernization" caused the religiously led opposition movement, it would be more just to attribute opposition largely to the way modernization was accomplished, as discussed above, and its religious leadership partly to the effective outlawing and suppression of the non-religiously led opposition, which left religious leaders ina stronger relative position than they otherwise might have been. In the first half of 1978 factory workers, secular intellectuals, and government employees scarcely joined in opposition protests, but since the fall of 1978 this has changed. Factory workers, who already engaged in many unreported strikes before 1978, began to strike and demonstrate in large numbers. The secular educated classes revived a weakened and persecuted National Front (the name of Mosaddeqls coalition) under a liberal active in the Mosaddeq period, Karim Sanjabi. Ayatullah Khomeini moved from Iraq to France, and Sanjabi went to see him there and emerged with a brief statement of commonprinciples, stressing Islam and democracy. What 261
AUTUMN1977
these principles mean in practical terms, and how long the which now stretches from the left to religious coalition, may survive any partial or total victory fundamentalists, are questions that only the future can answer. On some economic and social matters, however, the groups and even leftist members of this diverse coalition have much in common, and much that support the opposition, of what they say is congruent with the economic critique and the independently formulated above. Both the religious secular opposition speak out against favors to foreigners, huge arms purchases, stress on expensive ultramodern, foreign-bought technology, the ruin of agriculture and agriand the disfavoring of the poor and of small culturalists, and emphases declared New economic policies entrepreneurs. by the government late in 1978 reflect not only lack of a group of expensive profunds but also such criticisms; injects involving foreign technology has been cancelled, cluding nuclear power plants, and the choice of what to cancel given the economic need to cancel some things appears reasonable, except perhaps for the Tehran metro, which could have helped ordinary people and lessened the awful traffic. The government also announced greater emphasis on local ones. including labor-intensive projects, nationally-based How this emphasis will be carried out in practice depends situation. in large part on the development of the political The coalition diverges on various issues around the monarchy, including whether any monarchy is permissible (Ayatullah Khomeini is thus far adamantly against it); on the in role of women, despite the papering over of differences many public statements; on the need of enforcing various and on other matters. Islamic laws and practices; There is no space here for an extensive analysis of groupings in Iran today, but it may be said that political all the political opposition favor a reordering virtually that could meet some of the major and priorities of policies socioeconomic problems analyzed above. On the other hand, Iran's economic problems have become so exacerbated in the problem has bemonths of crisis that an already difficult are now aware that billeast all At parties come more so. make. lions from black gold do not a great civilization IRANIAN STUDIES
262
NOTES
1.
A more extensive paper on which this article is largely based, "Oil, Economic Policy, and Social Change in Iran,"i was written in the spring of 1977 for a conference in the fall of 1977, before oppositional movements became important in Iran. Other critical studies written before recent demonstrations are Fred Halliday, Iran, Dictatorship and Development (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1979); Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978); and R. Looney, The Economic Development of Iran (New York: Praeger, 1973).
2.
The 1902-1953 period is Keddie, "Oil..."; in N. of Iran, 1800-1914, and view," Iranian Studies,
3.
This point
treated in more detail in Keddie, "The Economic History its Political An OverImpact: V (Spring-Summer 1972), pp. 58The Great 78; and Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: Oil Companies and the World They Shaped (New York: Bantam paperback, The Mosaddeq period, 1976). for which US official documents shoula now be available, and British documents in a few years, deserves thorough scholarly study. The best discussion now available is in Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), which is out of print and should be reissued in paperback.
esting Iran
is made in several
works. The most interand Development in Johns Hopkins Press, 1973).
is G. B. Baldwin, Planning (Baltimore:
4.
Ibid.,
5.
below of the government's rural Although the analysis and urban economic policies is my own, it takes many facts and some ideas from numerous other works, published and unpublished, as well as from observation I would like to thank collecand interviews in Iran. if anonymously, as they would prefer, all who tively and insights gave me important information orally. Among important published general works on the economy
p.
196.
263
AUTUMN 1977
are Looney, Economic Development, I.L.O. Employment and Income Policies for Iran (Geneva, 1973); and David Housego, "Quiet Thee Now and Rest," The Economist (Au-
gust 28, 1976). The recent books by R. Grahamand F. Halliday, cited in note 1, also make useful points about the economy. On agriculture see the works cited in note 7. A thus-far unpublished study on farm machinery and mechanization by Vahid Nowshirvani is also useful. 6.
Some of these points have been made in various unpublished reports on Iran made by the World Bank and the I.L.O.,which have limited distribution--e.g., Jiri Skolka and Michael Garzuel, "I.L.O. Working Paper" (September, 1976).
7.
On agrarian trends see A. K. S. Lambton, The Persian Land Reform 1962-1966 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Nikki R. Keddie, "Capitalism, Stratification, and Social Control in Iranian Agriculture, before and after Land Reform," in R. Antoun and I. Harik, eds., Rural
Policy
and Social
Change
in
the
Middle
East
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1972); and Paul Vielle, La f6odalite et 1l'Etat en Iran (Paris: Anthropos, 1975). Eric Hooglund has a dissertation, unfortunately unavailable through University Microfilms, on land reform that merits publication, and has written good papers and articles on agrarian subjects. Published and unpublished studies done in Persian, especially by members of the Institute of Social Studies and Research of the University of Tehran, are also important. See also the published studies in Persian by Javad Safinezhad,
Boneh
(Institute
of Social
Studies
and Research, University of Tehran, 1972); and Esmail Ajami, Shieshdangi (Shirazi: Pahlavi University Press, 1969). 8.
Both the 400 to 1 figure and the quotation are in M. A. Katouzian, "Oil versus Agriculture: A Case of Dual Resource Depletion in Iran," The Journal of Peasant Studies, V (3) (April 1978), pp. 347-369. The conclusions summarized in the quotation are from the almost com-
IRANIAN STUDIES
264
of Fatemeh Etemad-Mogpleted Oxford Ph.D. dissertation hadam, who made field studies of small farmers, farm corporations, and agribusinesses. If she is correctly cited as showing that even labor productivity, which should mean productivity per manhour regardless of machinery used, is higher on peasant farms than in farm corporations this would be a striking and unique result. It may be that what is referred to is productivity given a certain set of tools or machines, however, and even this is important. (Katouzian's article I read only after writing the central economic draft of this article in 1977, but his analysis and conclusions are nearly all congruent with mine, and he gives more details and evidence regarding the agricultural sphere.) On agriculture see also Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Agricultural Policy and Development Politics in Iran," Middle East Journal, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 434-450. 9.
10.
On economic changes among a major tribe see, in the forthcoming book on social change in modern Iran, edited by Michael Bonine and Nikki Keddie, the article by Lois Beck, "Economic Transformatlon among Qashqali Nomads, 1972-1978."1 The economic effects of the government's tribal and agrarian policies are discussed in T. Brun and R. Dumont, "Imperial Pretensions and Agricultural Dependence," MERIP Reports, No. 71 (October 1978), pp. 15-20. M. H. Pesaran and F. Gahvary, "Growth and Income Distribution in Iran," in press. Pesaranhas done in Iran a series of outstanding studies on income distribution, as has F. Mehran; most of the latter are distributed in mimeo by the I.L.O. On income distribution see also and his Income Distribution Policies Looney, op. cit., and Economic Growth in Semiindustrialized Countries Employment andIncome....
York: Praeger, 1975), and I.L.O., 11.
On Shariati see especially the article by Mangol Bayat Philipp, "Shilism inContemporary Iranian Politics: The Case of Ali Shariati," Middle East Studies, forthcoming. and criticisms of him by the traditional ulama, Shariati, is also discissed in the Michael Fischer's unpublished "The QumReport." 265
AUTUMN1977
12.
13.
n.p. (preSayyid Ruhollah Khomeini, Hokumat-e Eslmi, sumably Najaf), 1971. This book appears to be difficult to obtain now. Sayyid Ruhollah Khomeini, Nehzat-e e Eslam bi Shahanshahan
va rezhim-e
Eslami 3: Taziddshahanshahi, n.d.,
n.p. (A speech given on June 22, 1971 in Najaf directed against the Shah's big celebration stressing the 2500th anniversary of the first Persian monarchy.) On family law see his Tauzih al-Masa 'il, Najaf, Chapkhaneh Adib, n.d. 14.
The chief recent statement by Khomeini available in English is the "Transcript of the French Radio and given Television's Interview with Ayatullah Khumayni,"I' on September 21, 1978, partially printed in Le Monde, October 17, 1978, and completed by the Muslim Students' Association of the U.S. and Canada (Solon, Ohio, 1978). In it he says religious leaders should not administer In his works Khomeini often answers implied the state. the Shah does worse; thus in criticism by insisting Hokumat-e Eslami he says the Shah's punishments are much more violent than Koranic ones, which he favors, while here regarding women he attacks the Shah and says nothing on his own program, but only that women have fought along with men recently for their freedom and independence and against the Shah. (Received for publication,
IRANIAN STUDIES
266
December 22, 1978)
IranianStudies, Volume X, No. 4, Autumn 1977
Land
Reform
East:
A
Redistrib
Note utive
in on
The
Middle
Its Effects Hossein Askari, John Thomas Cummings and James Toth
In any program of land reform, the method of determining compensation for the land to the former landlord and the cost to the peasant can be of great social and economic This possibility significance. arises from the fact that land-the officially determined value of redistributed whether it is below, equal to, or above the true market value--could have a considerable direct effect on the distribution of wealth among the various socioeconomic classes. Especially in more traditional where the societies, tax system is not well developed, such a one-time redistribution of wealth may be the most dramatic option open to the policy maker who wishes to mitigate income inequalities. Furthermore, such a change in income distribution, in turn, will influence many other economic variables. For instance, an increase in rural incomes, ceteris would tend paribus, to slow down rural-urban migration; this would then lower urban unemployment and raise urban incomes. In this short paper, we propose to evaluate only effect of land reform in the comparative redistribution four Middle Eastern countries--Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
Hossein Askari is Professor of International Business and Middle Eastern Studies at The University of Texas at Austin, John Cummings is Assistant Professor of International Business at The University of Texas, and James Toth is a Graduate Student. 267
AUTUMN 1977
These countries present a very interesting contrast in land reform. In Egypt and Iraq, land reform followed political revolution; in Syria, land reform came after a short-lived unification with Egypt; and finally in Iran, it was the result of deliberate policy by the existing monarchical government.1 There are many factors which affect the redistribution of wealth and income in a program of land reform, but we will restrict ourselves to those that are quantifiable. First, we will see what percent of the arable land was redistributed. Second, we will analyze how the price of the land was determined, and, finally, what was the exact "term" of the payment (period and interest rate) to the landlord and by the peasant. Several details showing the overall scope of land reform in these four countries can be seen in Table 1. As a measure of the impact of redistribution on a society's wealth and income patterns, the critical statistic from this table would be the land distributed as a percent of land under cultivation. Though the data shown are not for the same year in each case, it seems that in Iraq, the largest proportion of pre-reform cultivated land has been followed by Iran, then Egypt and Syria. redistributed, Though the Iraqi program has been frequently criticized as poorly executed, especially during its first decade, by this criterion it has had more impact than those of neighboring countries. In Iran, we do not have data available showing landholdings by area, but the cruder measure of numbers of villages still indicates redistribution of approximately a fifth of the country's farm land. The lack of cadastral information caused problems in carrying out the details of the Iranian reform program. Nevertheless, within a comparatively short period (1962 to 1966), the bulk of its redistributive provisions were executed. By contrast, neither Egypt nor Syria had seen as large a portion of land transferred to cultivators over considerably longer In the first five years or so of the land reintervals. the proportion of form programs in the latter countries, IRANIAN STUDIES
268
TABLEI SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF MIDDLEEAST LANDREFORM PROGRAMS
Total cultivated land (1000's hectares) Land available from state holdings and excess estates (1000's hectares)
Egypt
Syria
Iraq
2,430 (1952)
3,930 (1961)
5,545 52,000a (1964)
2,995
2,105
1,728 a (1970) 12,921 2,414 (1973)
485
Land actually expropriated (1000's hectares)
397 (1964) 500 (1970)
1,580 (1969)
Land actually redistributed (1000's hectares)
433 (1970)
696 (1969)
342,000 (1970)
52,504 (1969)
Number of recipient
families
Hectares per family
1.27
841 (1970) 1,316 (1973)
13.26
11.09 (1970) 9.22 (1973)
84 (1952) 42 (1961) 21 (1969)
120400
250500
Ratio of redistributed cultivated land
0.178 (1970)
0.177 (1969)
0.152(1970) 0.238 (1973)
Notes:
sources:
n.a.
indicates
not applicable.
n.a.
9,888
75,846 431,743 (1970) 142,675 (1973)
Miaximumsize of holding per family - unirrigated) (irrigated
land to
Iran
anumber of villages; available.
n.a
n.a.
0.190 (1966)
area data not
Askari and Cummings, op. cit.; Mabro, The Egyptian Economy, 1952-1972; Lambton, The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966.
269
AUTUMN1977
redistributed land was far below that seen in Iran--only Iraq's early about 6.5 percent in both Egypt and Syria. performance was somewhere in the middle; about 11 percent of the cultivated land was handed over to peasants between land, how1959 and 1964. The proportion of redistributed ever, is only one measure of the shift of wealth within an economy. It is not a criterion for determining the success or failure of a land reform program per se, but only of the magnitude of its impact. For example, before land reform in Egypt, and to a lesswas initiated, peasant cultivators er extent in Syria, were much more likely to be landowners than their compatriots in Iran and Iraq. Thus the latter two programs faced greater initial degrees of concentation of wealth, and their relative success required a larger proportion of land to be transferred to the cultivators. The next criterion for the wealth redistribution effect of land reform is the pricing of the land. The determination of the "fair" market value of the land is much in parts of Iran more difficult. In many areas, especially and Iraq, little land was actually sold on the market. Concentration of land in the hands of a few landowners, a of real estate, and a low return on limited circulation capital improvements characterized the ownership of land in the Middle East prior to the implementation of land reform. Land values could hardly be said to have been determined by a free market; prices were heavily influenced by political factors, in addition to having their value adjusted according to the type of production, the cost of labor, and the proximity of urban markets. Many plots of land were transferred by non-market means: inheritance, of ownStability mortgage, endowment, and confiscation. Thus an assessership might be low and prices uncertain. ment of the market value of land prior to land reform is if not impossible; more important, its signidifficult, In those areas where ficance is of questionable value. few peasants owned their land, a comparison of pre- and meaning expost-reform land prices would have very little cept for considering those who did own family farms. In evaluation of prices, credit these cases, a cost-benefit and production, both before and after reform, might identify the gains from reform. IRANIAN STUDIES
270
programs inFor the most part, the redistribution volved giving land to peasants who heretofore had rented land from large estate owners, either on a fixed rent or Thus the task becomes one of comparcrop-sharing basis. ing previous rent or share divisions with the market value In many cases, this of land and the cost of land purchase. comparison is far easier to make than determining the actual price of real estate. In Egypt, the price of land was set at ten times the This basic formula was subsequently used in annual rent. other land reform programs (with the possible exception of altered to conform to the geographic Iraq) but slightly In 1952, a fifteen percent variations within the country. charge was levied, which was then reduced administrative to ten percent in 1958, and totally abolished in 1964. In to fifty peraddition, in 1961 the payment was restricted cent of the valuation and this was further reduced to twenty-five percent in 1964.2 This can be viewed as a reThe pricduction in the cost of the land to the peasant. ing formula adopted in Egypt in 1952 resulted in a large undervaluation of the land. As Warriner has noted: Tax assessments were low, amounting to L2-L4 per acre, and the rental value fixed on this basis is therefore much lower than the real rental value. The legal rental value would range from 1140 to L280 per acre, whereas land prices before the reform ranged from L400 to L600 per acre.3 Thus, in 1952, land was valued at approximately to forty-five percent of its market value; thirty-five in later years, this was reduced even further. In Syria, the same basic formula of pricing the However, while land at ten times the rent was applied. the rent figure used by Egyptian land reform officials was calculated to be seven times the annual tax rate, and thus was artificially low because of undervalued assessments, the Syrians used actual rental costs, which meant the landlord rather benefiting a relative overvaluation, than the peasant. In addition, a ten percent administra271
AUTUMN1977
tion charge was added. In Iran, the price of land was set at 100 times the tax paid on the income generated by the land. Since this tax was ten percent of the annual rental, the formula can be reduced to ten times the annual income. However, since income and taxes were undervalued (the last tax evaluation was conducted in the 1920s), the resultant land prices were charge was low. A ten percent administrative artificially also added to the price of the land. Geographical variations within Iran were also taken into account by includwhich varied from 1.02 to 1.8. ing a regional coefficient, Thus, land prices varied anywhere from 10.2 to 18 times the annual income of the original owner. The ket values transferred 20 percent
Iraqi government used what were termed fair marto determine the price of land. When it was to its new owners, they paid an additional service charge.
Thus, as far as the factor of land evaluation is concerned, we can see that in comparison with Iran and Egypt, who generally underpriced land, Syria especially Iraq, falling beoverestimated the prices. relatively tween these two extremes, offered the land affected by to the peasants, at least theoretically, redistribution on a par with market prices. To calculate the impact of the "term" of payment on the landlord and the peasant, we will assume that the This aspricing formula was the same in all countries. sumption is clearly necessary since we are now examining only the term of payment. It is important to examine both the term of payment to the landlord and the term applied to the peasant since these did not match. As such, both methods of payment (to the landlord and by the peasant) of income. will have an impact on the redistribution Therefore, assuming a similar pricing of the land, the between these various land reforms were only differences the time period of the payment and the interest rate that was applied; the details for each country are shown below: IRANIAN STUDIES
272
Counta
Egypt
Time Period (Years)
Interest Rate Per Annum
30 40 15 15
3.0% 1.5% 4.0% 0.0%
(1952) (1958) (1961) (1964)
15 20 or 40* 15**
Syria Iraq Iran
1.5% 1.0% 6.0%
*Payments under ID 1000 received cash; between ID 1000 and ID 10,000, 20 year bonds at one percent; greater than ID 10,000, 40 year bonds at one percent. **Amended from ten to fifteen
years in 1963.
is felt in two ways. First, The impact of these differences the higher the interest rate paid to the landlord, ceteris That is, with a given price the more he benefits. paribus, for the land, and since the payment is made over time, the landlord benefits from the higher interest rate that is apSecond, since all of plied to the outstanding balance. these interest rates were far below interest rates available in the market, the landlord would gain by recovering his principal more quickly, which he could then reinvest at the higher rate. We can make a rough comparison of the relative value to the landlord (in each country) of the income streams the annual payments in each country. by first calculating (15 percent), Then, assuming a market rate of interest which is in the range of the probably available rates, we can calculate the discounted value of the income stream from land payments. Thus, we can identify the discrepancy (in discounted values) among the payments to the landlords in each country; specifically (assuming a price of ten times rental income X in each country), we know that the annual payments to the landlord are:
273
AUTUMN1977
in Egypt and and and in Syria in Iran in Iraq4 and
(for (for (for (for (for (for (for (for
30 40 15 15 10 15 40 20
years years years years years years years years
at at at at at at at at
3 percent) 1.5 percent) 4 percent) 0 percent) 1.5 percent) 6 percent) 1 percent) 1 percent)
= = = = = = = =
0.51X; 0.33X; O.90X; 0.07X; 1.08X; 1.02X; 1.8X; 0.30X; 0.55X.
Next we can calculate the discounted value (at 15 percent) of this stream of payments to the landlord: for Egypt, the discounted value of the stream and and and for Syria, the discounted value of the stream for Iran, the discounted value of the stream for Iraq, the discounted value of the stream and
= = = =
(6.56)(0.51X)=3.34X; (6.64)(0.33X)=2.18X; (5.85) (0.90X)=5.26X; (5.85) (0.07X)=0.41X;
= (5.02)(1.08X)=5.42X; = (5.85)(1.02X)=5.97X; and 10.53X; = (6.26)(0.55X)=3.44X; = (6.64)(0.30X)=1.99X.
We can also calculate what would have been the discounted value (at 15 percent) of the continued rental income if no as 6.67X. land reform was instituted we can see that in From this set of calculations, case the landlord fared less well than if he had been able to keep his land; in every case the discounted value of the stream of repayments by the government is less than In the discounted value of the status quo continued rent. addition, we can see that Iran and Syria had the least re(in terms of wealth and income generated) distributionary land reform programs, while Egypt and Iraq had the most. only takes However, we must again add that this calculation
every
IRANIAN STUDIES
274
into account the terms of payment to the landlord. Our next concern is with the wealth redistribution effect of the term payments made by the peasants in the In Egypt, the peasant was required to various countries. pay for the land (including a 15 percent surcharge) in 30 annual installments at an interest rate of three percent per annum. This resulted in annual payments of 0.58 times the previous rental price. However, in 1958, the interest rate was reduced to 1.5 percent, the administrative surcharge to ten percent, and the period of payment was exIn 1961, the payment was limited to tended to 40 years. one-half of the valuation with the remaining conditions staying fixed. Finally, in 1964, the payment was again reduced, this time to one-quarter of the valuation with no interest payment or administrative charges, and a 40year period of payment. Clearly, from 1961 on, we can include the lower price for land as a reduction in price or as a more favorable term of payment. We have chosen to treat it in the former manner. In Syria, the peasant paid installments of 0.37 tines the 1958 rent in order to retire his debt in 40 years at an interest rate of 1.5 percent per annum. In Iran, the peasant was given 15 years to pay off the cost of land, which included a ten percent administrative charge. Given that the fund was to be self-sustaining, an implicit interest rate was also charged; this implicit rate can be assumed to be approximated by the interest rate paid to the landlord, which was six percent. Taking into consideration the extremes of the pricing formula (which spanned the range of geographical variation in Iran), annual installment payments ranged from 1.14 to 2.02 times the original rent. In the case of Iraq, where we do not have data for the exact relationship between rent and land price, we have approximated the price as a function of the rent by discounting (at 15 percent) the value of the rental income over all future periods to arrive at a market value of 6.67 times the rental value. With the addition of a 20 percent administrative charge, this value is about eight times the rental value. Given these assumptions, then, the peasant was required to make 40 installments of 0.24 times the rent 275
AUTUMN1977
at an interest rate of one percent per annum. Again, these annual installment payments must be discounted to the present, at approximately a 15 percent rate, in order to arrive at comparable figures for each country, since the time span varies from country to country. The results are shown in Table 2. These figures show that Iraq initially emerges as the most revolutionary of the four countries in that its program provided land to the peasant at the lowest total cost. Syria was not too far behind Iraq. Egypt was, under the conditions in 1952, far behind Iraq and even Syria in providing land at a low price to the peasants. However, after 1961, newly-distributed land became extremely attractive for the Egyptian peasant. This change in the law also improved the conditions imposed on those who had previously received their land. Iran's land distribution is by far the least advantageous to the peasants from the point of view of income. All of these "partial" income redistribution effects of land reform--percent of land redistributed, the selling price, the term of payment to the land and the term of payment by the peasant--are summarized in Table 3. Each column shows one of the aspects of this redistribution of wealth through land reform. In each category the numbers in parentheses indicate which country had the most redistributionary effect, with (1) being the highest. In the case of Egypt, given the various changes in the law, we have weighted the term of each payment by the amount of land redistributed to arrive at an average figure. In order to calculate an overall ranking of all four categories, we would have to also weight each factor by its importance. This, however, is an impossible task since it involves subjective value judgments. But from a casual glance it would appear that Egypt and Iraq were the most revolutionary, followed at some distance by Iran and Syria. less quanConsidering the conclusions of historical titative contributions to the literature on Middle Eastern land reform, our results are clearly consistent. In both Egypt and Iraq, land reform and its implementation followed IRANIAN STUDIES
276
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revolution whereas in Syria and Iran there was no such pressure. Thus the income redistribution effect of land reform in the latter countries was much less pronounced, and what might well be most observers' initial reaction in comparing the programs of these four countries proves to have some factual basis. NOTES
1.
Middle East land reform has been discussed in considerable detail by many authors; for example, Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), and Land Reform in Principle and Practice (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Gabriel S. Saab, The Egyptian Agrarian Reform 1952-1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Ann K. S. Lambton, The Persian Land Reform 1962-1966 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Robert Mabro, The Egyptian Economy 1952-1972 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); Hossein Askari and John Thomas Cummings, The Middle East Economies
(New York:
in the 1970s:
A Comparative
Praeger Publishers,
Approach
1976).
pp. 65-66.
2.
Mabro, op. cit.,
3.
Warriner, 1962, op. cit.,
4.
For the purpose of this calculation we will assume that the first 1000 dinars was also payed over the period in question.
5.
The assumption is made here that the net income of the landowner accrued from the rental payments of his tenants.
279
p. 32.
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Iranian Stuidies, Volume X, No. 4, Autumn 1977
Boir A
Ahmad Research
Mockery: Note
Erika Friedl
Although contemporary Persian folk poetry does not attention presently, this is not receive much scientific a sign that it is of little necessarily importance among renown arts in Iran. In fact, folk poetry seems to be quite alive and thriving in tents and behind mud walls-still alive, one probably has to caution, in spite of the rapidly changing channels of creativity in Iran. The ephemeral folk songs and poems can, indeed, be found everywhere, in cities as well as in camps and villages. However, it is in the countryside where they often take on special significance as the only truly "popular" art, the only means for many people to be, as we say, artistically expressive. In Boir Ahmad,Xa tribal area in the Southwest, for example, a student of folk art finds himself in a void, after his initial rapture over spectacular tribal rugs has calmed. The Boir Ahmadi do not paint, do not draw, do not carve, do not play musical instruments, do not mold pots, do not embellish their tools, and rarely dance. They seem to manipulate almost no forms or colors. On closer inspection one realizes that even their bag and rug weaving, a craft done only by women--and few women at that-utilizes well-established patterns that leave little choice
Erika Friedl is Assistant Professor Western Michigan University. 281
of Anthropology at
AUTUMN1977
expressions Indeed, studying artistic in color or design. in Boir Ahmadis as rewarding as squeezing a dry lemon that is, until one learns to appreciate the songs and poetry.1 One may be introduced to song-poetry at weddings, where, with almost painfully high-pitched voices, men and women sing of love and beauty, or at mourning ceremonies where lonely, tear-choked songs rise above the sobbing and It takes some careful listening until one becomes wailing. attuned to the rhythm and sound of this music and poetry, and can recognize it in the humming coming from rooftops, so casual as to deny, at courtyards, and gardens--usually any significance. first, creativity Yet, in the total spectrum of artistic in Boir Ahmad, poetry is the most important, both in terms of quantity of output, as well as in emotional involvement. in Boir thousands of verses circulating There are literally Ahmad,2 to be recited or else sung to a few melodies, and new ones are being added as older ones lose their popularMost of them, in measured twoity and are forgotten. of love, bravery, and liners, expound the tribulations if somewhat limited subjects, death, truly inexhaustible, occasions.3 best fit for weddings and other spirit-lifting In fact, the repertoire would be somewhat monotonous were it not for the Boir Ahmadis' delight in airing uncharitable feelings in rhyme. As it stands, a lot of enjoyable mockpoetry is created all the time, spurred by provocative incidents. This kind of poetry is highly personal, made to and shortcomings of the infit the particular situations If names are not spelled out forthdividuals involved. the subjects? identity is only thinly veiled. rightly, Created spontaneously and seemingly without effort, these poems usually die a painless death of oblivion as the scandal that inspired them fades from the memories of those who enjoyed--or loathed--it. Some of the mock-verses, however, survive their original stimulus and become standbys of mock-poetry, models of fun-poking in rhyme. All of these attack the violations of good more frequent, or the stereotypical, recited withare often conduct. They taste and approved IRANIAN STUDIES
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out provocation, just for the fun of it. If intended to rile a particular person, anybody's name can easily be substituted for the subject in the poem, provided one dares risk being offensive (or the victim is out of earthe butt of shot). Through this censorship-by-ridicule, the joke finds his unpopular aspirations dampened, or, if a failure is mocked, shame added to his discomfort. In any case, the wise victim will pretend not to have noticed, or will join in the laughter, and he usually will pursue his own plans unmodified: although sometimes sharp, hurtful darts, the songs are not potent devices of social control. Here, then, are thirteen of the more popular, timeless mock-shock-laugh gems. All are from Sisakht, a large and lively village rich in conflicts--and the wit to exThe singled-out victims are the ploit their lighter side. lusty widow, the lecherous old man, the meddling, skinny old hag, the besotted lovers, the tea addict--well worn characters, exaggerated enough to be laughable, and familiar enough to fit, at times, the circumstances of many a good neighbor. The Widow: Bivezan ye gei da dasht dash ye gandom gerde roughanesh kerde si kurre mardom. One cow had the widow, she sold it for wheat, Made a nice fat omelet for some young manto eat. Bivezan ye gei da dasht dash ve mikhak gol gombulesh kerde zash ser nefash. Her cow for some cloves did the widow trade in, Under her skirt on her belly they hang on a string. (That is, a widow will invest her last possession girlish to lure a man. Cloves are worn for their as necklaces by girls and young women.)
283
and act fragrance
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Bivezan men pasa tu cei dem ikerd. Rengereng eskanalesh jahel jam ikerd. The widow's brewing tea in the back of her den. The clink-clink of her tea glass is a call for young men. Bivezan gulom mazan to pil nadari darvazei romesei to dam nadari. Don't you fool me, widow, you have no gold! Your gate is in shambles, no door to behold! (That is, a widow is usually poor and is not a virgin, thus does not have much going for her.)
and
Sere kal seil izanom ou ru sheluye. Mace duar kereye, in bive duye. I look down from the mountain, muddy are the rivers. Like butter is a girl's kiss, like dugh is a widow's. The Old Man: Piremerd rish kuzali dendune kanda niteri busesh koni bia besha banda. You old shoddy beard, no tooth left has he! Can't kiss her anyway, give her to me! Vou kho4a beresht beza zamin bekhise piremerd bacei sava tei gol verise. If God only let it rain to soak all the land, To make get up from the girl's side this childish old man. Ve khoca kho4a khoca berei bdlatar ke di4i das piremerd ser nafe duar. IRANIAN STUDIES
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I pray! Oh God, God, oh God, bear witness, Do you see the old man's hand on her bellyplay!
The Old Woman: Kepar mun ye kepari Ye dalou sag pederi
hune mun ye hune pahende mune.
My hut is your hut, my house is your house. A bitch of old woman is spying on us. Shale kurr tombun duar hardosh ye taqa. Ar tombun vash na4ein va pa cemaqa. A shawl and a skirt If you had no skirt,
both use a bolt fabric. you'd be just a thin stick.
The Lovers: Omru ye ruze saba do ruze yarom neumad dellom isuze. One day today, two days tomorrow that my love has not come and my heart sorrow.
is
full
lovers cannot bear to be separated, (This is a subtle joke: someeven for a short time, and will even lament foolishly thing that has not yet happened.) Gardanet livan bolur porresh golabe. Ye kurr o ye duar si yek kebabe. Your neck Is like a glass full of rosewater. Boy and girl in love are kebab for each other. (That is, they "eat" each other. em, in which a young man expresses the "wolf" for his "white lamb."
285
There is also a love pothe fervent wish to be
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The Tea-Drinker: Rate Shiraz mulla Mahmad bazgasht Ardakun. Sad o si fenjun khari4e si cei ikharun. Mulla Mahmad went to Shiraz, soon back was he, With hundred-thirty new glasses to drink all his tea. (Ardakan lies on the old Shiraz-Sisakht road. mentioned only to facilitate the rhyme.)
Here it
is
NOTES
1.
The anthropological fieldwork during which the songs were collected was carried out in Sisakht, northern Boir Ahmad, in southwest Iran, and was supported by grants from the Social Science Research Council, and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.
2.
They are called "beit.' In Sisakht alone I collected over 900 between 1969 and 1971. Most of them are love songs.
3.
For a thematic analysis of all songs, see Erika Friedl, "Folksongs from Boir Ahmad," in Mardomshenasi, Vol. 2 (1978).
4.
Luri is a non-written Persian dialect. It is here transcribed like Farsi, except 4 - voiced dental ala very soft "'d" that tends to get lost in rapveolar, id speech. The Sisakhtis' rhymes are often crude; so are the translations We had fine too, we are afraid. fun while we were at it, albeit our qualifications are only those of spare-time poets.
IRANIAN
STUDIES
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International Society for Iranian Studies
Review: [untitled] Author(s): J. D. Gurney Reviewed work(s): The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire. A Study in 15th/9th Century Turko-Iranian Politics by John E. Woods Source: Iranian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 287-293 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of International Society for Iranian Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4310283 Accessed: 28/01/2009 08:54 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=isis. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
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http://www.jstor.org
Iranian Stiudies, Volume X, No. 4, Autumn 1977
BOOK
REVIEWS
The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire. A Study in 15th/9th Century Turko-Iranian Politics. By John E. Woods.
(Studies in Middle Eastern History, No. 3), xv Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica,
+
348 pp. 1976.
J.D. Gurney
In the patchwork of medieval Iranian historiography, the ninth/fifteenth century has been one of the most threadbare. There is no reliable study of Timiur, nor of his successors in Khurasan, nor (apart from Faruk SUmer's work on the Qar&quyiinlii) of their rivals for the control of the Iranian plateau. Only in the last few years, have two themes, the change in religious consciousness and affiliwith that perennial ation, together the rise of favourite, the $afavids, captured the serious attention of scholars. Now at last, there is a detailed, well-researched monograph on the other leading Turkman dynasty, the Xqquyuinli, usually (though not necessarily accurately, p. 239) known as the White Sheep. For the first time in a European language, a coherent, clear narrative has been cut through the bewildering confusion of ninth/fifteenth century political history. With an economical, terse style, a fine sense of the pace of events, the origins of the confederation are traced from a loosely-formed Ulis around Bayburt and Arzinjan in the eighth/fourteenth century, through the maze of political fragmentation in eastern Anatolia after
J. D. Gurney is University Oxford University.
Lecturer
287
in Persian
History
at
AUTUMN1977
to the rise of Qara CUJman,the the Ilkhanid collapse, from a semi-nomadic tribal confederacy to a transition the disputed principality, semi-sedentary territorial The second succession and Uzun Uasan's eventual success. to empire," describes Uzun Haphase, "from principality over the Qaraquyfinlu san' s somewhat fortuitous victories and AbuiSacid, the move of his capital to Tabriz and the control as far eastwards as extension of his territorial Kirman, Sistan and the borders of Khurasan. After his defeat at the hands of the Ottomans at Baskent, the days of expansion were over, none of his successors was able to establish a hegemony among their kin, and the last phase sees Uzun Hasan's legacy eventually fall to the 5afavids after more than two decades of internecine war. The general outline of this chronology has long but never laid out with such detail been well-established or placed in its topographical setting so and clarity, terExcellent maps of the confederation's effectively. development; every stage of its political ritory illustrate the topography of the borderlands from which the clan first noted rose is succinctly described, and its significance Widely separated narrative. throughout the political in winter and summer grazing lands, situated respectively the plains around Diyar Bakr, Diyar Rabicah and Diyar MiWar, and the high mountains of Arminiye from the Murad Sii as far as Bayburt, with a subsidiary area south of Amid, explain the need to control neighbouring urban centres, strongholds, as well as lucrative trade smaller strategic Even in its "imperial" phase, the exigencies of routes. nomadic life seem to have been paramount, and the time of It military campaigns made to fit in with these seasons. these of of the many that rapidity is this too explains groups of men moving swiftly over this expeditions--small large area, on raids or short campaigns, detached from but still regulated in a wider sense by the ebb and flow of tribal migration. It is another basic aspect of tribal society to which Dr. Woods has devoted much of his meticulous renamely search and made his most valuable contribution, the compilation of careful genealogies of the Aqquyiinlii IRANIAN STUDIES
288
clan throughout the one-and-a-half centuries of their political significance, from Tiir CAll to Sultan Murad. From the painstaking study of these relationships, and supported by a clear, highly relevant model of the functioning of a "corporate dynasty," it is clear that from amongst all the male members of the royal house in each generation, a new "dispensation" was achieved, founded not on primogeniture or direct descent from the previously accepted ruler, but on the military skill and strength of anyone within this wider category. Within this clan, the Qard-cUAmdnidbranch were for the most part predominant in the ninth/fifteenth century, but that was by no means a matter of course; it had to be won, a "dispensation" created anew in each generation through the ordeal of civil war or by "cutting the bonds of the womb." By concentrating on this fundamental principle, tracing it throughout the many disputed successions and inter-clan rivalries and conflicts, inevitably other aspects of tribal there is an society have received less attention--though in the introduction, ingenious formulation of relationships and many intriguing references in the text to the hierarchy of the "elite council," the ranking of appanages, the activities of the "superior administrative council," the seniority of the confederate clans (described at length in an appendix), the breakdown of the appanage system, the growth of tribal enclaves, and the strengthening of clans such as the Pirnak, Bayat and Afshar at the expense of the khaviE. More discussion of some of these themes might have provided another dimension to the explanation of Aqquyrfunlui success and rapid disintegration. At times it seems as if it is only the Qara cUAmanids, moving rapidly over the length and breadth of the borderlands between the Ottomans and Iran, between Bayburt and Ruha, that have captured Dr. Woods' interest. Settled society, neither in the AqquyQnl1 heartlands, nor in those large areas won from the Qariquyunlu and Timiirids, comes clearly into focus. The "tremendous expansion and elaboration of the administration" after 1469 impinges on the political narrative only when it had an immediate role to play in political events--such as in the threecornered power struggle of Yacqiibls reign. Yet it is 289
AUTUMN1977
exactly at this point in the establishment of a new impewhen government has to take the place rial dispensation, of warfare, that poses one of the most absorbing problems Each of the rulers, Uzun Hasan, in Aqquyiunlu history. Sultan Khalil, Yacqtib and Ahmad, experienced the dilemma of how much to curb the reckless behaviour of their amirs and so weaken their own clan and confederate support. From Uzun Ijasan's last years until AIumad'sreign, the tendency dues on the lands of the Turkman amirs to exact illegal they came to regard as their own posed a fiscal and economic problem as well as one of order. According to Ghiyathi, Uzun Hasan's attempt to revoke the tamghi was not accepted by his amirs, though the land-tax was settled. A decade or more later, in the 1480s, a more thorough attempt was made by Yacqfb's vazir, Q?Il CIsa Savaji, and again, in the 1490s, Ahmadtried to do the same in his of Dr. Woods' categoric interpretation brief reign. reforms as "shifting the entire state revenue SavajI's of commerce by system from the predatory exploitations the nomadic elite to the orderly taxation of a sedentary, agrarian oriental society" ignores the earlier Aqquyinlt amalgam of different kinds of taxation (including kharaj) and mlnimizes previous attempts both to re-order it as well as to check the excesses of the "Turk.min-i buzorg chamziq. Moreover, for his account of S&vaji's reforms, he necessarily has to rely on the one source that alludes to them in any detail, Failallah ibn Ruizbih&nKhunji's T3rlkh-i Amini, but Minorsky's conclusion that Khunji, CAlam-.r3-yi extremely hostile to the Sdvijis, would have been connected to those families (such as the Sacidis or the descendants of Riizbihan Baqli) who would suffer from the resumption remains very pertinent. or better regulation of suyUrghils, to the complexity of It is this same insensitivity settled society that leads Dr. Woods to suggest a sharp religious between the ulama ("the traditional distinction classes") and the "bureaucrats," and a "community of inestablishment and military terest between the religious elite." The main sources for this hypothesis are unconsame partisan remarks in Khunji and anecdotes vincing--the jeruf-i from the much later hagiographical work, Menikib-i or If any one of the religious Hazret-i Gu-qeni. Sult3n IRANIAN STUDIES
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bureaucratic families had been examined with the same care that had been given to clan genealogy, it would be evident is spurious and the conflict that such a distinction illusionary; representatives of the Sdvdj-is, Bayhaqis, Kujfijls or Daylamis held religious as well as administrative Their rivalries positions. and temporary alliances took place at a level of urban society that Dr. Wood's military and political coup d'oeil does not penetrate. On the other hand, the different sources of religious authority, the learned, urbanized tradition and the more frenetic, populist piety and exuberance of the Sufi orders or individual darvishes, are well described. Both were favoured by Ozun Hasan, whose efforts to despatch the cIraqL mahmil to Mecca vividly illustrates his awareness of the importance of religious prestige. Sometimes in the ninth/fifteenth century, the divisions between these major kinds of religious tradition and expression are blurred; for example, CAla' al-Din CAll Bayhaqi was Uzun Hasan's chief magistrate for twenty years and then a member of the Khalvatl order, or the Naqshbandi Siraj al-Din Qasim held such important positions as mihmandar and parv5nach7. Both in this patronage of darvishes as well as in their more private religious beliefs, the AqquyQnl reflected the consciousness of the ninth/fifteenth changing religious century, just as the Qaraquyuinlii or Timflrids did, or those less elevated levels of society that Jean Aubin's studies have reconstructed so brilliantly. In this then the Xqquyiinlii were not unique and scarcely deserve such grand as "an Aqquyunlu 'Sunni-Sufil flourishes ideological synthesis" (p. 35). The titles devices apand cabalistic plied to them were part of the same tradition of empty honorific and bombast, necessary for the ulama whose material well-being depended on secular patronage; it would be naive to argue that mabC5u, Imam or Zillall3h, had any real substance when applied to the Aqquyinlii rulers, even though used by the great Davdni himself. This scarcely contributed to "a new religious ideology" (p. 96), any more than the period as a whole can be called "an era of great experimentation and innovation in political thought" (p. 5). 291
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There is something of this special pleading for the Aqquyiinli in the way Dr. Woods has taken up and skilfully elaborated Minorsky's suggestion that the Safavids represent the third wave of Turkm&nconquests. His neat formulation is that "the establishment of the Safavid dynasty by Shah Isma'il in the early years of the tenth/sixteenth century may be considered the foundation of a new political dispensation to the Turkmans of Anatolia and Iran by a cognate branch of the Bayandur clan integrated by a new Shi'i ideology" (p. 139); Junayd's marriage (only inconclusively mentioned here), Haidar's alliance with Uzun Hasan's daughter, the part played by Sultan cAll in the subsequent disputes between Rustam and Baysunghur, as well as the number of confederates that later joined the Safavids, support such an interpretation. But there were Turkman in Anatolia not included in the Aqquyrunludispensation, and it was these that provided the so-called "Qizilbash legions," the "paramilitary millenarial forces." Such terminology suggests a one-sided view of the mobilization of the support for the young Ismmcil, a result again of the excessive concentration on the Bayandur clan, which might possibly have been modified if Sohrweide's useful analysis on the background of Safavid tribal support in Anatolia or the implications of Michael Cook's stimulating monograph on the economic forces behind the "third wave," had been studied. In the light of these, it is hard to claim that the Uafavid success saw the "eventual triumph of the nomadic old order" (p. 169). Those who immediately gained most, besides the Safavid dudman itself, were those Turkman tribes outside both the Xqquyiinli and Qaraquyiinliu, but even then within the first decade of Safavid rule that triumph was greatly modified with Ismcillls remarkable change of policy in 915/1509 and reliance on the Iranian bureaucratic class. It took several decades after Kujiiji had directed the young Ismacil after a successful ghaza against the Shirvmnsh&h, towards Tabriz and the open road to Empire, before this conflict between different political and cultural traditions was resolved into a more diverse, richer symbiosis in which the authentically Iranian contribution was again dominant.
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It would not be too harsh a criticism that this oresided emphasis on the BMyandurclan, the rigid view of the rest of settled society, the absence of economic analysis, of reveals a deeper lack of any overall interpretation In this respect, it falls Iranian history in this period. kind of history, closely into a severely "orientalist" based on the texts, an exact, meticulous mosaic of fragments of information pieced together to make a convincing It is a tradition that has events. narrative of political as Martin Dickson's produced such excellent dissertations Shih Tahmisb and the Uzbegs individual Zand; dynasties,
or John Perry's
Karlm Khin
rulers or a slice of complex history are taken, the chronology established political economic or social aspects cursorily and wider cultural, It is easy to be disparaging about this approach, surveyed. but at this stage in the development of Iranian historioThis basic "depouillements graphy it is extremely useful. des sources," so capably and comprehensively accomplished here, together with an expert analysis of the interdependence of the sources (modelled on Dickson's masterly exposition for a later period), has made the task of those At times it seems that that follow Dr. Woods far easier. he himself is aware of more exciting themes, but deliberately restrains himself, secreting ideas and evidence in his footnotes (e.g., p. 279, fn. 31; p. 290, fn. 111). For those that want to follow such details the level of the wrestling with a difscholarship is usually reliable, obtuse range of source material so thorough, that ficult, his notes and references provide a rich store of recondite and immensely valuable information (cf. on silk; p. 267, fn. 88; p. 270, fn. 108; p. 280, fn. 37, 45; on artillery, p. 273, fn. 132; p. 275, fn. 7; p. 285, fn. 75). By giving priority to hammering out an acceptable political contribution, chronology, Dr. Woods has made a substantial an invaluable guide to the materials, major events and of this confused period, and a safe platpersonalities research. form on which to build other kinds of historical
293
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A Persian
New York:
Stronghold
of Zoroastrianism.
Oxford University
Press,
1977.
By Mary Boyce. 284 pp. $19.95.
Michael Fischer Everyone interested in Zoroastrianism will be dehere at last is the long-awaited account of lighted: Professor Mary Boyce's year's stay (1963-64) in the village of Sharifabad-e Yazd. Sharifabad is said to be the most in Iran, which of the Zoroastrian villages traditional makes it of prime interest for anyone wanting to use contemporary practices to help fill in the fragmentary histo demonstrate the continutorical record, or, inversely, The fact ity of customs today with those of ancient times. that Prof. Boyce based herself in Sharifabad relieved me, working in Yazd seven years later as an anthropologist (1970-71), from having to pursue again the shades of traassured since her stream of articles dition, particularly me not only that whatever she put her hand to was usually but more importantly that she had first rate scholarship, And yet something of interest to say to non-Orientalists. who temporarily abandoned one wondered: this Orientalist the dusty bookshelves to do some intensive fieldwork, how would her ethnography differ from that of an anthropoloilluminate and encourage a Might the differences gist? fruitful and complementary exchange between anthropology and the history of religions? The prejudices of what to expect from an Orientalist are worth laying out: (1) if a custom occurs among both Muslims and Zoroastrians, it will be assumed to be (2) There will be a romantic stress on the pre-Islamic. minimal degree to which anything important to the reli(3) There will be gion has changed over the centuries. a flatness to the account which will describe belief as
Michael Fischer is Associate Harvard University. IRANIAN STUDIES
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Professor
of Anthropology at
canonically sound or as ignorant, with little attempt to sift out the ideological differences by status; and struggles between groups within the religious community will be downplayed. (4) There will be an apologetic tone about things which strike modern sensibilities as irrational. None of these Orientalist biases are entirely overcome in the present volume but they are not dominant. Prof. Boyce stresses the continuity of Zoroastrian practice since antiquity (a battle she has waged not against anthropological perceptions that religion tends to adjust itself to changing conditions, but against older Orientalists speculating about the early history of Zoroastrianism and suggesting that it involved a series of interruptions and radical reorientations). She speaks essentially of only two major sources of change: (a) the calendrical reforms introduced by the Sassanians which led to the altering of the meaning of the seasonal rites, to ritual redundancy, expansion, re-interpretation, and to subsequent attempts at correction and reform; (b) the rapid erosion of traditional practices under the impact of twentieth century modernism. Yet the careful reader will find in asides and footnotes numerous references to other changes. reSecond, while we get a vivid picture of a ritualistic ligion on the brink of abandoning many ill-understood practices, Prof. Boyce provides a sympathetic and sensitive description of how individuals of varying temperaments and knowledge pragmatically practice their religion, and how it in turn gives them a sense of dignity in a hostile world, and the honesty and moral forthrightness which has been remarked of them by almost all observers. Indeed on these grounds alone the book is worthy of being recommended highly: it is warm, lively, rich in detail, and an ode of both thanks and respect to Prof. Boyce's informants, above all the Bellevani family and the priest Khodadad Sheriar Neryosangi (whose portrait appropriately graces the dust jacket). ("Informant" in ethnographic usage merely means people who know enough about their own culture to serve as teacher and guide for systematically curious outsiders; but more anon.)
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that The book begins with an elegant brief history: it took Islam three centuries to become the dominant faith of Iran, that the Zoroastrians who did not convert or flee to India were pushed eastwards towards Yazd and Kerman, that the great fires of Fars (Azar Farnbag) and of the royal house (Istakhr) may have been taken to Turkabad-e Meybod (the seat of the priests from the eleventh to the eighteenth centuries) and thence to Sharifabad, that in the late nineteenth century until World War Two there was a kind of golden age under Parsi protection and aid, and that from that period on there has been a rapid erosion of indexed perhaps by the decline from practices, traditional a reputed 200 priests in Yazd in the 1930s to less than ten by 1964. There is also a very brief introduction to the belief system. The rest of the book then is concerned to what extent they have been kept with ritual practices: up.
Along the way, there are a number of speculations that Zoroaster origins and processes: about historical was a priest, that the shrine of Bibi Shahbanu at Rey and of Banu Pars behind Meybod once were dedicated to Anahita (Boyce has tried to support these first two speculations that local shrines with Muslim in separate articles), shrines to Zoroastrian yazatas (some names were originally perhaps, others all the evidence says no), that the centrality of cattle in Zoroastrian and Hindu rituals is because the commonancestors of these peoples herded cattle on the Central Asian steppes (despite the fact that today country; the specuthose steppes are sheep, not cattle, lation would require climatic change), that Muslims illtreat dogs because Zoroastrians treat them well, that Zoroastrians treat dogs well because dogs once helped herd the cattle (despite the fact that contemporary nomads in Central Asia use dogs for privacy around their tents and as night watchdogs, but not to herd stock), that the effect on the Zoroastrian dialect Dari had an isolating community (despite the fact that it is but one of the Such etc. closely related Central Plateau dialects), speculations are necessary stimulants for further thinking but must be received with appropriate sceptical care.
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of ritual practices which comprise The descriptions the substance of the book provide a sense of being on the brink of the abandonment of many medieval, if not older, not only customs. The chapter on rites of purity, f.i., speaks of the recent abandonment in Yazd city of the ninenight bareshnum ceremony, but captures for us, in a superb description of this ceremony in Shahrifabad, details which by my time in Yazd were already becoming hazy. Boyce's valuable both because they are particularly descriptions of wine are observant of changes such as the substitution reParsi of and example bull's pressure urine (under for formers and the exhaustion of locally consecrated nirang) and because they are sensitive for internal purufication; fears and attitudes of individual partito the feelings, cipants, such as the girl who was so upset by being caught by her menses in a holy place that "despite hospital treatment she remained prostrate and in pain for nearly a year" Boyce thus iluntil a curing rite helped her recover. lustrates how concern with the links between physical purity and morality creates for these Zoroastrians a disciplined ethical code. The above accomplishments are certainly more than sufficient for any single volume. In addition, the book to take it is detailed enough to allow an anthropologist apart and reconstruct it, asking of the material somewhat The result would be a different book; different questions. and the suggestion is not that one way is better, but on rich that the contrary that social life is sufficiently our understanding is ever deepened by seeking alternative There are three areas of potential reconperspectives. and individustruction: social history, ritual analysis, al psychology. would note the strikFirst of all, an anthropologist ing lack of any analysis of demography, land tenure, migradispute--all tion patterns, power structure or ideological those parameters of social existence which frame one's understanding of how communities change. There are a few scattered clues for the forewarned: the Kayanians had a brother-intenant farmer in Mazra' Kalantar, Bellevani's law was a tenant farmer, Hasanabad was built by merchants, 297
AUTUMN1977
the village was emptying of Zoroastrians, Bellevani' s father was on the losing side of the reformers with respect to calendar changes, and somewhat more frequent references to Parsi efforts to reform their Irani brethat Banu Pars, to stop the ofren (to stop cow sacrifice fering of fat to the fire, to introduce white dress at But there is no discussion the naujote ceremony, etc.). to Bombay in the migrations great the of of the context: of the bitter late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, struggles to introduce modern education and other reforms led by such men as Ostad Master Khodabaksh (assassinated for his pains) and Sohrush Lohrasp (alive and well in Teheran); nor the bitter conversion of many to Bahaism in response to what was perceived as blind traditionalism Or another tack: the mutuand anti-modern conservatism. al borrowings with Islam are played down. Again for the conclues are scattered about. The hysterical initiate version reaction mentioned above was cured by a chergha-e no ceremony, normally a Muslim rlte and so consigned to That local shrines have Muslim names, and a footnote. sofrehs are similar among Muslims and Zoroastrians, is acknowledged, but not that the Muslim and Zoroastrian legends are transformations of one another, or that contemporary Zoroastrians generally refer their sacrifices rather than to to the legend of Abraham and Issac/Ismail Oddly the Sharifabadis the ancient Zoroastrian rites. call their pilgrimages hajj, whereas the Yazdi ZoroastriOther ans I knew always were careful to call them ziarats. Boyce relates are to be expected: such minor discrepancies that Mashad is an occasional site of Zoroastrian pilgrimage because of the belief that the Imams have Sassanian blood (see her superb article on the legend of Bibi Shahbanu in the BSOAS1967 and my comments on it in my 1973 dissertamythic--cultion); I was given an alternative--equally tural solution, that the ImamReza shrine is the site of Zoroaster' s assassination. While one would not expect Prof. Boyce to try her hand at structural analyses of the rituals she describes, she might have elaborated further the popular interpretaThus, while she describes the yasht tions of the rituals. daur-e dakhme, an optional death memorial apparently introIRANIAN STUDIES
298
duced only since the seventeenth century, she does not discuss its use as a conflict-resolving device. As to individual interpretations, psychology, and the use of informants, Dastur Khodadad was one of her chief informants, a delightful repository of lore (much like Seyyed Reza, the old cook of the American Institute who will be fondly remembered by many readers of this journal). His idiosyncratic views, much disputed by other less interesting priests, are occasionally referred to: that he goes to the shrine of Pir-e Narake only when a dream so directs him, his story that there is a Cleft of God above Banu Pars where heroes sleep until Resurrection and where if one prays, one's sins will be forgiven, etc. A volume or article devoted to his life history and perspectives would be most worthwhile, as indeed would also a life history of Dastur Hormuzdiar, briefly mentioned as "a little troubled in his mind," yet, whom I found quite lucid and engaging. There are many other characters whose idiosyncracies help compose the rich vitality of Zoroastrian village life, and again would provide another rewarding perspective. In sum, I hope my queries, alternatives and reconstructions will not only encourage an inquisitive and critical reading of Boyce's ethnography, but will serve as a complimentary recommendation. What other historian of Zoroastrianism would inspire an anthropologist to respond? That Prof. Boyce can so directly speak to anthropological interests is an indication of the excellence of the volume. Hopefully Oxford will issue it in paper so it may be of classroom use as well.
299
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The Crowned
Cannibals:
Writings
on Repression
in
Iran.
By Reza Baraheni. With an introduction by E. L. Doctorow. New York: RandomHouse/Vintage Books, 1977. 279 pp. $3.95. D.A.Shojai In the introduction to this book, E. L. Doctorow refers to Reza Baraheni as the "chronicler of his nation's torture industry and poet of his nation's secret police force." Both as chronicler and poet, Baraheni paints a horrifying picture of repression in Iran. The major objects of his attack are the Shah, SAVAK,"cultural disand censorship crimination" aimed at "ethnic minorities," --and behind these the kind of mentality that allows a For a police state is how Barapolice state to function. heni depicts Iran here. The main characters are policemen, (including protorturers, thugs, and government officials minent Americans), all of whomact in collusion to keep a As such, the book is an indictment: sordid world thriving. an expose of what Baraheni calls the "last bulwark of Asiatic Despotism in its final stage of corruption." That rather overdrawn statement bespeaks the tone of this book, which is not apt to win over the reader who is looking for a dispassionate argument. But then Baraheni has his reasons for writing as he does: he writes as a man who has been imprisoned and cruelly tortured, never allowing the reader to lose sight of that fact. His aim is not to curb his anger, but to unleash it in a storm of defiance: here is one victim of his nation's secret poAnger and writlice force who refuses to stay victimized. just ing, in that sense, have a symbiotic relationship: as anger had helped keep the writer alive, the process of writing keeps the anger alive.
D. A. Shojai is Associate Professor of English and Comparative Literature at San Diego State University.
IRANIAN STUDIES
300
How could one to read. The book is not a pleasant that it forwith brutality it be, given the confrontation John Leonard, in a review which apces on the reader? after the book's pubpeared in The New York Times shortly of The details story." it "a sickening called lication, Baraheni's Moreover, and revolting. are painful torture rhetorical, caustic, harsh, bitter, style is unremittingly all fixed: remains unabashedly his viewpoint even jeering; badgered at times. of which makes the reader feel needlessly of Nor is the reading made easier by the book's looseness elsewhere, most of the chapters were published structure: periods of time, in either English or Perover different which gives audiences, sian, and intended for different quality. the work as a whole a somewhat potpourri focus of the book comes to Even so, the ultimate and the state--as torture issue: rest on one overriding Doctorow's well as the state of mind--which allows it. this point with a moving plea for underscores introduction an end to all such practice. in making his case against Is Baraheni successful analytidefinitely; Descriptively, in Iran? repression only partly so. cally, The prose portion of the book is divided into six "Terror in Iran," is a conchapter, The first chapters. It demnation of the current regime and its malpractices. a has who reader Western the for essentially is written in Iran. situation of the political limited perception in Index on CensorParts of the chapter appeared earlier ship, The New York Review of Books, and were delivered in Basito the U.S. Congress in September 1976. a statement the intent here is to make the reader aware of "the cally, in Iran, and of the irony that of despotism" injustices greed," fashions of its "excessive out democratic America, in Specialists a foreign policy to support such a state. here that is new--which is not the field may find little All the argument. from the force of Baraheni's to detract was missed here (or at least somewhere same, an opportunity the circumstances in the book) for the author to elucidate Throughout the book, Baraheni reiterbehind his arrest. 301
AUTUMN1977
ates the point that he was arrested for writing an article critical of the government's policy concerning ethnics groups: it would have been helpful for the reader to have that article before him, not only to judge the contents for himself but also to gain additional insight into theauthor's own case against "cultural discrimination." The second chapter,
"Masculine History,"
is the major
literary--as well as psychohistorical--essay of the book. This was written originally in the sixties and published in Iran in considerably abridged form (thanks to the censors) in 1972. Baraheni posits the view that "All Iranian myth, legendary history, religion and religious cults start with the supremacy of men over women." Along with this, he examines "the cultural disintegration" which came about "as a result of monarchy" as a superimposed system. The essay has some keen literary insights. Baraheni's analysis of the inverse Oedipus complex as an underlying motif in Iranian literature is particularly intriguing and worth giving attention to. But again Baraheni weakens the validity of his argument by overstatement and a tendency to drift off the subject. This essay, one feels, could have been conhad the focus been kept to literature, siderably tightened a wide enough scope. offers which, in itself, The third chapter, "My Images of the Shah," does not say anything particularly profound about either the author or the Shah; rather it attempts to tarnish the latter's Its principal inimage by means of anecdote and ridicule. tent is to shatter the reader may have of a any illusion benign monarchy. "The Strangulation of Iranian The fourth chapter, and inWriters," on the other hand, is both more objective himself to be a conformative. Indeed, Baraheni reveals He on the problems of censorship. siderable authority account of its history gives a compact and instructive the years into three from 1953 to the present, dividing significant periods and showing how the last (from 1971 This was the time when the "govon) was "the darkest." and of as 'terrorists' ernment began to think of writers The reader, in the process, 'terrorists' as writers." IRANIAN STUDIES
302
of the troubles comes away with a clear picture Iranian writers. and talented plagued serious
that
have
The real heart of this book, however, lies in its Here argument gives way to the voice last three segments. And Baraheni is not the sort of writer to of experience. what he knows about terror. shrink back from revealing Chapter Five, "Prison Memoirs," is an account of the auand torture by SAVAKin the Comite prison, thor's detention on September 11, interrogation, from the night of his first on December 22: a 1021973, till the day of his release history. day ordeal which is now a grim part of literary novelistic narrative, The account is not a smoothly-wrought, such as the hauntingly elegiac Diary of a Chilean Prison rather it is a documentary depicCamp by Hernan Valdes; There is told as remembered. tion of a savage experience, The genre is the if any, "art" in the telling. little, And the to actual experience. memoir, the one closest "factual" the details barer the genre, the more glaringly the of terror, Compared to the Chilean portrayal appear. Iranian one is even more brutal. is put into historiBaraheni's experience personal in the final prose chapter, "Memoirs of cal perspective of the Pahlavi Period," which reads like Other Prisoners wreaked over a period of a roll call of human atrocities Here each ghostly figure steps forward some forty years. to give witness briefly to what kind of torture he either a Baraheni reinforces In the process, underwent or saw. in that the nature of repression point he made earlier: Or past. Iran in his time had its roots in a particular was the miras he himself puts it, "Nineteen seventy-three ror of 1937."1 of of the book is a collection The last section "Masks and Paragraphs." poems in English titled thirty-four the various faces of terror: The "masks" are, in essence, or a scream, being simuleach, like a frozen contortion from the others and yet alike. They distinct taneously as Doctorow exare variations on a theme--or a "subtext," which "always has to do with the degrees of death plains, "a new art, with in life." The poems, he goes on, belongto 303
AUTUMN1977
its own rules," one which "is being generated in the twenThe the Lieder of victims of the state." tieth century: point is a valid one: for it is in his poetry that Baraheni's voice ultimately merges in with a universal cry. For all the grimness of the "prison" section of the book, though, there is one positive note, which bursts on the reader, as it must have on the author, like a sudden telethis is the welcome, out-of-the-blue ray of light: gram from Jerzy Kosinski, president of PENAmerican Center, pressing the prime minister of Iran for the author's reSuch pressure Before long another plea follows. lease. on the part of an outside human rights agency and its subsequent result in the author's release sound the one real note of triumph in this book: that repressive measures That message, in itself, can indeed be brought to a halt. is no small tribute to the efforts of Amnesty International, which likewise had been working on the author's case, and which, fittingly enough, shared the Nobel Peace Prize the same year as the book's publication. As for the author who survived the ordeal, his words at the end of "Prison Memoirs" spell out his purpose: "My to force the kings, the autocrats and mission is simple: to release their political prisoners and their the fascists prisoners of conscience. One can be sure that this hear on the subject from him.
IRANIAN STUDIES
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is not the last we will
Bulletin of the Department of History, Faculty of Letters and Humanities. Tehran: University of Tehran. Vol. 1, Nos. 1-2 (1976-77). Tarikh:
F. Safin as prefaced by E. Negahban, The aims of this Bulletin, are to reaffirm the need and to provide a forum for the furtherance of responsible, thorough research into the history of Iran, especially by Iranian scholars. Each of the two volumes feature about eight contributors and carry abstracts of some of the articles in the English or French languages. The timespan covered stretches from the pre-Islamic to the late Qajar periods and it is perhaps not surprising that the main body of the articles relate directly to Safavid and Qajar history considering that the source material for these two epochs is relatively rich. However, the absence of a unifying mode of approach (thematic or otherwise) to the treatment of the material, lessens the impact of the Bulletin as an integrated piece of work. The individual contributions may be loosely divided into two broad categories: the first is concerned with the reproduction, in facsimile of fairly inaccessible and of unpublished or transcription, and some edihistorical material, with short introductions torial remarks woven in the text; the second is comprised of essays which use both original and secondary sources for analytical purposes. They attempt to modify in some ways conventional interpretations of Iranian history. In the first category, perhaps the most eye-catching documents are the political memoranda of Shaikh Fazlollah Nuri, reproduced by M. I. Rezvani, who explains the circumin the course of 1907, stances which led to their publication the second year of the Constitutional Revolution. Shaikh Fazlollah was an impressively learned and powerful repre-
F. Safiri is Lector at the Oriental Institute, Oxford and Assistant Librarian of the Persian ColUniversity, lection at WadhamCollege. 305
AUTUMN1977
opinion,which of that body of absolutist Shilite sentative law and of Constitutional the introduction rejected totally Whether he was at the same time into the country. practice as Mr. Rezvani suggests, also an opponent of Qajar despotism, At the very most, he and question. is a highly debatable favored the initiation mojtahid colleagues his like-minded of some reforms which would curb the power of the monarch At the very least and in efremove tyranny. and hopefully rallied the constitutionalists his campaign against fect, rule around him and strengthened of despotic the supporters Ulama and their The constitutionalist the latter's cause. The war of words, reacted with intense vigor. lay supporters arose between the opposwhich among other confrontations, of the traditionaling camps centered on the fundamentals ist and the modernist approaches to the process of demoand reflected cratic change embodied in the constitution The constiwithin the community. wider social conflicts of Closer studies won the day. fortunately tutionalists underworked aspect of the and relatively this significant would further our of the Constitutional history Revolution, and contradictions tensions of those social understanding the development of modern Iranian which have characterized and which have now emerged as a major dimension of society the present crisis. document is that reproduced Yet another interesting preThis is a copy of the deed or scroll by M. Sutudeh. pared by Shaikh Ali Khan Zangeneh, vazir of Shah Solaiman of the Madresin detail the vagf holdings listing Safavi, and deseh-e Bozorg-e Hamadan (which he himself built) attached to, and regulations govthe conditions scribing of Mutavalli or Keeper to the office the succession erning, One of the interesting points is that of this endowment. to succeed to were equally qualified if two individuals by a draw. then the matter would be resolved this office, was at One would like to know how widespread this practice or legal docuof sijillat A series the time and later. in a Qazi court the vaqf and witnessed ments constituting through the passage of time, is also attached to this docugroup of papers, M. T. Danesh-PazStill in the first ment. a specimen of chronology compiled shortly huh introduces after the reign of Shah Soltan Hosain Safavi and provides IRANIAN STUDIES
306
the importance of a manuIraj Afshar stresses an index. of Azarto the epoch of the Ildegezids script pertaining Mansureh Nezam-Mafi exbaijan and their contemporaries. of events in Western Iran after poses some of the details the Muhajerat episode of 1915 and up to 1917, as chronicled first, in the notes of Abbas Mirza Salar Lashkar and second, in the anonymous Tarikh-e mukhtasar-e Karand, a valuable reBoth items in Karand during these years. port on conditions papers of Salar Lashkar, son of were drawn from the private Abdol Mirza Farmanfarma. mention must Of the second category of contributions, In one, based on Ibn Mirza be made of two by Ehsan Eshraqi. the downTohfat ol-Alam and other sources, Baig Fendereski's in the context of a mulis explained fall of the Safavids rather than and economic factors titude of socio-political of Shah Soltan Hosain shortcomings in terms of the personal Safavi. In the second paper, the importance of the personafter a comof Khan Ahman Khan Gilani is recognized, ality and impact of his origins of the social analysis prehensive authority, headed by Shah revolt the Safavid central against In both cases Eshraqi succeeds in broadening the Tahmasp. it from and in freeing analysis of historical perspective which has tended to characterize much of the emotionalism Homa Nategh's article tradition. Iranian histotiographic of cholera in Iran during consequences on the socioeconomic evithe 19th century, gathers a wide range of interesting dence (especially those from the archive of Haj Muhammad in support of Albert Camus' observaHasan Amin ol-Zarb), tion that cholera like plague is an "economic and social"t She argues how a badly governed, deprived sophenomenon. political under strict ciety which holds its population ground for the chronic turns into a fertile quarantine, Iran during the outbreak of epidemics such as cholera. of this 19th century is depicted as a good illustration case. Other items, too long to list here, include a piece on the conquest of Bastani-ye Parizi, by the resourceful the first part of an article, Finally, Qandahar in 1649. by E. Negahban, with extensive references, bibliographical 307
AUTUMN1977
is entitled the History and Civilization of Elam. This is a work reconstructed chiefly from archaeological evidence, aiming to develop, or rather to prove the theory that the start of Iranian history proper may be traced back to the third millineum B.C., engulfing the formation of the Elamite kingdom in its stride. Thus, the Iranian Kingship heritage is dated back, not merely to 2,500 but to approximately 5,000 years ago. Whether findings of this type, however contentious, are satisfying to the demands made upon archaeology by historians is a matter of opinion. All in all, however, this is a useful collection which could have been improved by placing the documents presented in the wider context of the historical events and issues to which they relate.
IRANIAN STUDIES
308
Middle
East
Economies
in
the
1970 's:
A Comparative
Approach.
By Hossein Askari and John Thomas Cummings. New York: Studies in Internation(Praeger Special Praeger Publishers + 581pp. xxxiii 1976. al Economics and Development). M.A.H.Katouzian
of the Middle East conEven though the consequences for the future of far more serious flict are potentially the area, and indeed mankind, it is perhaps not surprising more of 1973 has attracted that the "oil price revolution" to the Middle EastWestern academic (and popular) attention of to the list This book is an addition ern countries. attempt in their rather indiscriminating Praeger Publishers on the to mediate between the supply and demand for studies of seven parts The book consists Middle Eastern countries. Manpower, Trade, the Industry, covering Oil, Agriculture, alThe study includes Role of Government and Conclusion. to Iran in the area in addition most all the Arab countries This is of Turkey. and Israel, but with the exclusion like Turkey is neither an Arab country, rather odd. Israel economy; but Turkey is nor a Middle Eastern oil-exporting a developing country like all the other (rich and poor) The is not. countries of the Middle East, whereas Israel that the case of Israel has been reader gets the impression included perhaps in order to teach a lesson to her neighIt is clear, bors in the art of economic development. that Israel's relative success has had though implicit, in manpower superiority something to do with her initial it is not so clear, however, that Israel and technology; of free or receipts owes part of her success to sustained was loans from abroad which, until recently, low interest in per capita terms than the probably no less impressive of exporters enjoyed by many of her neighboring royalties oil.
M. A. H. Katouzian is Lecturer sity of Kent at Canterb-ury.
309
in Economics
at the Univer-
AUTUMN 1977
set The authors are well aware of the limitations to their study because of its wide geographical scope and and cultural--difpolitical the many important--economic, Their countries included. the among ferences which exist development of agricultural emphasis on the significance for this area as a whole, and each individual country within it, is wise and commendable. But their discussion of and is too descriptive land reforms and land distributions One does not need to "meddle with politics" too uncritical. comparison between avowed poin order to make a critical This is objectives and their actual achievements. litical on the observations their of extent--true lesser a also--to role of various governments in their respective economies, for public investment, the choice of techthe strategies nique and, in general, the strategy of the disbursement of countries of the area. the oil revenues in the oil-exporting and prospects for indusTheir discussion of the policies and somewhat superficial trial development is, likewise, the of feature amusing An lacks any important insight. effort to section on manpower is their heroic statistical indicate by what means the Middle Eastern countries could reverse the trend of "the brain drain" and attract their skilled emigrants to Europe and North America back to the area. The conclusion of such an "analysis"t is predictably we do not really know! an anticlimax: and staAlmost the entire treatment is descriptive This approach added to the wideness of the tistical. of the countries heterogeneity scope, and the statistical concerned, could only amount to a scratching on the surface of the relevant economic problems, regardless of how such a study may be conductand skillfully conscientiously their analyses are, in fact, tables and ed. The statistical individual country, than for each value informative of more Thus, the book can become of comparative value for all. every businessman's favorite handbook for a quick guide features of one to some general economic and statistical But it is of doubtful or more of the countries included. value for serious academic study, except insofar as it brings together data, and data sources, which could be of Going use for further academic endeavor in this field. through the book, one is constantly frustrated by the fact IRAIAN
STUDIES
310
that little comparative knowledge is gained in an inteand therefore, meaningful form; otherwise any series of statistical observations between any group of countries--noting the similarities and diversities--could conceivably make up a "comparative study." A genuine comparative study in this context would have required much more analytical work, and a more critical approach. Indeed, such a purpose could be usefully and meaningfully served in either of the two following contexts: (1) a theoretical as well as empirical study of the special countries features and problems of the oil-exporting in the area; (2) a similar study of the Arab Middle East with reference to the interdependence of the Arab oil-exporters and their less privileged brethren. The mixture of countries studied by the authors answers to neither description, and their almost purely descriptive approach does not compensate for this defect in their choice of counIn one word, they have catered for too many tastes tries. too simply.
grated,
The Arab countries, the oil countries, and the Middle Eastern countries in general, badly need serious academic studies of their socioeconomic problems and prospects, if only because their own indigenous efforts in this direction seem to have been regretfully modest. The present of such a task, study has no claim to the fulfillment which, in any case, may require a greater collective effort. It is, however, a reasonable effort within its own scope and method; and it would be used by the general reader: for a broader knowledge of the subject; and the research worker, for its statistical tables, data sources and bibliographical material.
311
AUTUMN1977
The Caspian
Circle:
Houghton Mifflin,
By Donne Raffat. 350 pp. $10.
A Novel.
1978.
Boston:
MichelMazzaoui
This is not "a novel" as the title maintains; it is There is no hero, or heroine; no central theme, not fiction. no no catharsis, no building-up to a climax; no villain, final judgment. It is a rambling tale of well-to-do Iranian families, told with ease and compassion by an outside observer who The storyis an uninvolved and detached member himself. teller is sympathetic, has a keen memory and vivid analytical faculty, and a powerful ability to draw the characters and involve the reader in their colorful everyday life. Yet he remains on the periphery. The story opens in the lush Caspian provinces of north Iran--at the famous old world hotel in Ramsar, sometime after the Second World War, and ends some ten or fifteen years later in one of the big houses in Niavaran in Firuz Momtaz north Tehran. Between the two locations, (who is no doubt the author Donne Raffat the story-teller himself, possibly a pseudonym) takes the reader to Hamburg, If you love Iran Germany, and to Cambridge, Massachusetts. and the Iranians, as I do, you stay up till daylight to find out what finally happens to your friends! Perhaps the heroes of the story, "a saga of upperclass Iranians" as the dust jacket says, are the three AshNasrin, Bijan, and Nasrin's son, Parviz. rafi children: is an Amuzegar (his father being Majid Parviz Actually, Amuzegar, a colonel in the Iranian army, a powerful and devastating character at the opening of the narrative, and a Chief of Staff at the end), but his grandfather, Amin
Michel M. Mazzaoui is Associate Professor Studies at the University of Utah. IRANIAN STUDIES
312
of Iranian
Ashrafi,
thinks of him as a batcheh
and not a naveh.
Nasrin is the most haunting character of the entire Circle. She is a tragic figure (drawn consciously or otherwise from O'Neil's Mourning Becomes Electra--Momtaz did English literature at Harvard). The author handles her with the utmost of care and sympathy from the time he furtively touches her breast as a young adolescent in the Caspian setting till she locks herself up in her father's villa in Niavaran following the tragic death of her son Parviz. Momtaz is in love with this paragon of Persian beauty; but only that and nothing more. It is the touchiest part of the story. Caspian
Bijan, on the other hand, is a Heathcliff of sorts-a rebellious child at first who loses one eye due to his mischief, but at the end almost redeems himself in an eloquent defense of Iranianism when he lashes at Momtaz's gharbzadegi. The argument sounds very convincing: it is after all the author's reflections on his own position in this regard. Bijan's "idealistic" love of Mahin and his "realistic" marriage to her cousin Zohre is in the final analysis unacceptable on moral grounds. It does however match his character, and leaves him much room to maneuver as the perennial playboy. Finally, Parviz is the Iranian young man of the future, the new entrepreneur who returns to Iran, after a professional education in the West, to help vigorously in the industrial He is acdevelopment of his country. tive, energetic, the alter ego of the practical--perhaps His untimely death brings the narrative to a close. author. But not before the reader is treated to a feast of Iranian characters, young and old, masters and servants, and businessmen, relatives and stranggovernment officials The political ers, western and eastern. scene of Iran in is touched upon rather the fifties and very early sixties in a decidedly neutralist lightly, unobtrusively, but very The author's observations on the sofashion. intelligent cial mores of Iranians, with which he punctuates his narrative, are delightful. They will be most appreciated by 313
AUTUMN1977
readers who had the good fortune of spending an extended stay in the country. We all want to There will, hopefully, be a sequel. know what happened to Bijan and Zohre, to Mahin and some of the older generation, to Karbalai and the Kazimzadehs, to Omid and Simin Momtaz, and most of all to Nasrin and to Firuz Momtaz himself during these past fifteen years.
Hedayat's
'The Blind
Owl'
Forty
Years
After.
Compiled and
Center for Middle edited by Michael C. Hillmann. Austin: Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1978. 215 pp. Minoo S. Southgate
Sadeq Hedayat is Iran's best known modern writer. His novel The Blind Owl was published in Iran in 1941. of it was published in Roger Lescot's French translation Paris in 1953 and was received with great enthusiasm. The by D. P. Costello appeared in London English translation and New York in 1957. Numerous essays and books have been published in Iran and abroad about Hedayat and especially proves that the inThe present collection The Blind Owl. The volume includes alive. terest in Hedayat is still fourteen essays (all but four being printed for the first of two Hedayat and translations time), a bibliography, short stories. In the words of its editor Michael C. Hillmann, this volume "attempts, through the separate essays and translations it contains, to deal both with specific problematic aspects and with larger questions of structure, theme, and
Minoo S. Southgate is Assistant Baruch College, City University IRANIAN STUDIES
314
Professor of English at of New York.
(p. 6). The contributors reassess the exsignificance" views on The Blind Owl and examine aspects isting critical "With of the novel that have not been discussed elsewhere. all the attention The Blind Owl has received in Iran and abroad," says Hillmann, "it has not once been subjected to inquiry or even and comprehensive critical a dispassionate de texte to determine what the story is all an explication about, that is, what the themes of the story are and what to the reader may bel" (p. 3). their significance book, diffiThe Blind Owl is a complex, illusive cult to come to terms with, to analyze, and to criticize. Hillmann finds Hassan Kamshadl and Iraj Bashirils2 lengthy Kamshad treatments of The Blind Owl in English deficient. reading of The Blind Owl is imbelieves that a critical As he puts it, possible. ..the reader, despite all his awareness, is conHe stantly driven into a hypnotic dream state. approach, starts reading with a determined critical but gradually an atmosphere of obscurity creeps in; the thread of events becomes blurred, and at the acceptance prevails.3 end an attitude of uncritical I agree with Kamshad's view, having experienced this "hypnotic dream state" even during the second and third The atmosphere of obscurity prevails even when readings. with critical insight one returns to the novel fortified etc. Hillinto its themes, sources, imagery, structure, mann, however, thinks that Kamshad's caution "vitiates his (p. 3). Bashiri, on the attempt to fathom the novel..."l of Kamshad, but other hand, avoids the indecisiveness "Ultimatereaches incorrect and farfetched conclusions. reader needs the caution ly," says Hillmann, "the critical of Bashiri"l (p. 6). of Kamshad and the conclusiveness novel Reaching a conclusive reading of Hedayat's illusive 'The Blind Owl' Forty was, perhaps, the aim of Hedayat's Years After.
Hillmann summarizes Bashiri's
threefold
thesis4
that: 315
AUTUMN1977
(1) "The Blind Owl is a combination of two short stories of different lengths"; (2) that the latter of the stories "includes the whole narrative of the Buddhacarita, and follows the Buddhist belief of the many lives of the Buddha before achieving nirvana," there, in fact, being "a one-to-one correspondence between the episodes in the second part of The Blind Owl and the developments in the life of the Buddha," (3) that ''some parts'' of the second section of The Blind Owl "are imitations of The Notebooks of Rilkel" and that "there is an almost one-to-one correspondence between the characters, events and symbolism of The Blind Owl and The Notebooks" (p. 4).
These contentions are challenged in the introduction and 'The Blind Owl' Forty in a number of essays in Hedayat's Years
After.
In "Buddhism and the Structure of The Blind Owl," Richard A. Williams examines Bashiri's contention that the that of the Buddhastructure of The Blind Owl parallels that although there and concludes "structurally, carita are parallels, we need not reach across the Himalayas for In terms of content there at times appears the original. an Indian overlay, but one filtered through the consciousEurope and perhaps refined ness of early twentieth-century Indian during the author's sojourn on the subcontinent.... thought may have discovered many principles first, but it never claimed a monopoly" (p. 106). Bashiri's view that The Blind Owl is composed of two short stories is refuted by Leonardo P. Alishan in "The M6nage a Trois of The Blind Owl." His contention that the two sections are "different reports of the same events" (p. 170) is supported in a chart which demonstrates, for example, that the ethereal girl, who visits the narrator in part one of the novel, and the bitch (Lakkatah), who is married to the narrator in part two, share many and are two aspects of one character. qualities The influence of Rilke on Hedayat, another part of is examined in Manoutchehr Mohandessi's Bashiri's thesis, IRANIAN STUDIES
316
"Hedayat and Rilke." from The Blind
Mohandessi cites
Owl and Rilke's
parallel
The Notebooks
passages
of Malte
Brigge and concludes that "the great similarity, in some cases complete identity of language cannot be mere In addition to verbal similarity, the chance" (p. 119). two works share certain motifs and ideas, and their narrators have some attitudes in common. Mohandessi believes also that the rhythmic prose of The Blind Owl could have been inspired by Rilke's prose. howThese similarities, ever, do not justify Bashiri's v'iew that there is "almost a one-to-one correspondence between the characters, events and the symbolism of The Blind Owl and The Notebooks."
Lourids
Rilke, Kafka, Poe, Dostoevski, Nerval and others have been named as influences on Hedayat by several critics none of whomoffers a comparative study of Hedayat and these authors. The present volume is therefore valuable because it attempts to clarify the nature and degree of some major influences on Hedayat. The influence of Nerval and Poe on The Blind Owl is discussed in Janette S. Johnson's "The Blind Owl, Nerval, Kafka, Poe and Surrealists: Affinities." Johnson suggests affinities between Nerval's poem "Fantasie" and The Blind Owl. She finds the obsessive love of Hedayat's narrator for the ethereal girl similar to the love of Nerval's narrator for the heroine of Aurelia. In both works the men's love is "more spiritual than sexual" (p. 128). Johnson also finds correspondences between Nerval and Hedayat in their presentation of themes like the link between the exterior and interior world, the real and the spiritual world, reality and dream. In her discussion of Poe and Hedayat, Johnson observes that "similarities of theme, tone, narrative structure, and even some minor details, which one might even suspect were borrowed from Poe's tales, all contribute to the Poesque atmosphere so prominent in The Blind Owl" be(p. 130). Her parallel quotations show similarities tween The Blind Owl and Poe's "The Black Cat," "The Man of the Crowd," "The Tell-Tale Heart," and "The Fall of the House of Usher." Moreover, observes Johnson, "the ethereal beauties in Poe's tales--Berenice, Legeia, Morella, and many others--have a resemblance to the lovely girl 317
AUTUMN1977
in The Blind
Owl"
had no influence
(p. 131). Johnson believes on The Blind Owl.
that Kafka
Mohandessi and Johnson's essays are valuable additions to Hedayat scholarship. It seems, however, that they have used the English translations of Hedayat, Rilke, and Nerval and the original English of Poe as the basis of their comparative studies. Perhaps the Persian text of The Blind Owl, the French original of Nerval, and the French translations of Poe and Rilke (which Hedayat must have read) should have been used. Several essays in Hedayat's The Blind Owl deal with the Eastern influence on Hedayat. In "The Khayyamic influence in The Blind Owl," Leonard Bogle contends that "many of the ideas expressed in The Blind Owl were inspired by Khayyamic quatrains and ideas" (p. 87). This view is also held by the editor in the introduction (p. 8). Another Eastern influence is the subject of Richard A. Williams' "Buddhism and the Structure of The Blind Owl." In "Hindu Imagery in The Blind Owl" David C. Champagneexamines the role and the nature of Hindu imagery "to determine whether [images of Hindu origin] are essential parts of the plot and indispensable to critical appreciation of the story, or whether they are basically devices used to enrich the fabric of the narrative" (p. 109). Champagnestates that Hedayat may be using Saivite imagery in his description of the hunched-up old man and the girl who stands before him, offering him a lotus (a morning glory in the original PerHe believes that the old man "exhibits characterissian). tics of [the god] Siva's different aspects (p. 110) and the girl seems like ?Lvals wife, Devi (p. 111). While Champagne is guarded in his discussion, his comparisons seem a bit extreme. Nevertheless, his conclusion that "Hedayat's use of Indian imagery emphasizes the narrator's concern with love and mortality" (p. 116) is most sound. Psychological analysis of the novel is carried out in two essays. Carter Bryant's "Hedayat's Psychoanalysis of a Nation" provides a Jungian approach to The Blind Owl. "Oedipus and the Owl," by Bahram Meghdadi and Leo Hamalian gives a Freudian analysis of the novel. Here the authors IRANIAN STUDIES
318
state that the novel presents a split image of the woman, which, they contend, "has its roots in the Oedipus complex, for in the literature of classical cases of Oedipal obsession, the neurotic has a split image of the dominant female figure or the mother 'surrogate' (or mother): on one side is the pure, 'ethereal' womanwho should be placed on a pedestal and worshipped from a distance; on the other is the 'bitch' mother who goes to bed with the father whenever he demands her company" (p. 143). It is true that the first and the second parts of the novel are dominated, respectively, by the ethereal girl and the narrator's wife, Lakkatah (the bitch). But it seems a bit extreme when later in the essay the male characters (the hearse driver, the butcher, the odds-and-ends man) are identified as father figures and the ethereal girl and the narrator's wife as mother figures. Thereafter, the narrator's wife and the ethereal girl are referred to as his mother! In an introduction, which is not adequately integrated into their Freudian analysis, the authors offer a "fresh interpretation" of the novel (p. 142). They believe that "The Blind Owl warrants comparison to The Divine Comedy. For its structure bears an interesting resemblance to Dante's masterpiece. That is to say, The Blind Owl is Hedayat's vision of hell, purgatory, and paradise. But Hedayat reverses the order of Dante's vision" (p. 142). Hedayat's heaven (sections one and two of the novel), the writers too glibly suggest, "parallels Dante's paradise because it is primarily removed from harsh reality and revolves around the image of an undefiled, beautiful, unattainable woman..." (p. 142). It seems to me that the second section of the novel, which contains a bottle of poisoned wine, an old man with a frightful laugh, a chopped-up bleeding corpse, maggots, the smell of decomposed flesh, and a maccabre journey to a graveyard, is very unlike Dante's Paradise. Almost all of The Blind Owl is The third section of the novel (pp. 44gloomy despair. 45 in the paperback Grove Press edition), according to Meghdadi and Hamalian, parallels purgatory because it is "the transitional stage between heaven and hell"--never mind that the content of these two pages has no relation
319
AUTUMN1977
to purgatory. To them any three-part structure is "Dantesquell and any three characters are a "trinity." (It should be mentioned that Hedayat divided The Blind Owl into four parts.) Fortunately these extreme views are balanced by more controlled studies of the novel. Al-i Ahmad's "The Hedayat of The Blind Owl" and William Kay Archer's review shed light on the social content of what seems to be a very personal book. These and sections by Kamshadand Mohandessi are reprinted from other sources, but all are worthy additions to the collection. Only positive criticism of Hedayat is included in this volume. In the words of its editor, "the view implicitly affirmed is that The Blind Owl is a major work of the twentieth century fiction" (p. 9). (I must admit that I do not share the editor's enthusiasm for The Blind Owl. When I reread it in order to review this volume, I was even slightly bored by it.) One wishes that there were more harmony among the essays, especially since, according to the editor, "the contributors graciously adjusted thematic thrusts and aims in individual essays to give the volume a measure of. integration" (p. viii). The volume includes incompatible views and interpretations of the novel's themes, symbolism, and structure. For example, both Hillmann (p. 8) and Bogle (pp. 86-98) believe that Hedayat was inspired by and espoused Khayyamic views, but Mehrjooi contends that Hedayat's outlook on life was very "different from that of Khayyam, to whom some have compared it" (p. 194). Similarly symbolic meanings vary. Wine, for example, is seen differently in different essays. According to Bogle, in The Blind Owl, las in Khayyam, wine causes forgetfulness and alleviates the pain of life" (p. 93). Champagne, howof Hindu ever, sees wine as one of the five essentials worship (p. 111). Bryant has the most unique interpretahe says, "illuminates tion. "The following anecdote...," one of the central symbols of The Blind Owl, namely the jar of the poisoned wine: asked once whether he intended to have children, Hedayat took a glass full of semen from its hidden place in his room and announced that its conIRAIAN
STUDIES
320
tents were his children"
(p. 159).
The ethereal girl, who is the central figure of the as the first part of the novel, has been seen differently rose of Dante god Siva's wife (p. 111), the multifoliate (p. 143), the Madonna (p. 143), Beatrice (p. 144), Nervalls heroines Aur6lia and Silvie (pp. 128, 129), and some of Poe's heroines (pp. 131-32). Such contradictions occur also in the larger question of the book's structure. The Blind Owl is composed of two long monologues, each preceded by another two-tothree-page monologue. The relation between the two long monologues is obscure and perhaps haphazard. In the present volume, several writers attempt to discover the relationship between the two parts, with the premise that sound and serves a purpose. the division is artistically The second part is seen by Meghdadi and Hamalian as "the of consciousness objective world, which represents reality of the writer, his daily hell" (emphasis added, p. 142). the Hillmann, however, states that "the reader anticipates second part of the book may reveal the anterior, external much events which prompt or stimulate the interior...but of what appears in part two may strike the reader asequally internal, that is, as pieces other level of consciousness"
of another dream world or an(emphasis added, p. 7).
In Alishan's essay, the second part is said to be the narrator's "dream of the real world and his crime, which emerhe has sunk into an opium ges from his subconscious...when induced state, a state between 'sleep and coma"' (p. 169). Does such diversity of the novel?
help or hinder our understandirg
In addition
to the essays, Hedayat's 'The Blind Owl' of "Three Drops of includes translations Blood" and "Buried Alive," Hedayat's earlier experiments These transwith characters narrating their own stories. lations are hoped to further the reader's understanding of The Blind Owl, also a first person narrative.
Forty
Years After
321
AUTUMN1977
There are a few minor errors in the translations. In "Three Drops of Blood" (p. 61), the sentence "He has tied the hands of all the lunatics behind them" is a too literal translation of a Persian idiomatic expression which here means "He is madder than the lunatics." In "Hedayat of The Blind Owl" p. 34, "That which has authenticity are the dreams" should read "is the dreams." Elsewhere in the volume, "hopefully," an adverb, is used instead of "I hope," or "it is hoped" (pp. 9, 136, 159). All in all, this volume is a welcome addition Hedayat scholarship.
to
NOTES
1.
Modern Persian
University 2.
Hedayat's 1974).
3.
Modern Persian
4.
Hedayat's
The Agricultural
New York:
Prose
Press, Ivory
Ivory
Literature
Tower (Minneapolis: Prose
Literature,
Cambridge
Manor House,
p. 167.
Tower, pp. 2, 10, 15.
Development
Praeger,
(Cambridge:
1966).
1976.
of
Iran.
By Oddvar Aresvik.
271 pp. Eric Hooglund
This book is a study of Iranian agriculture which tries "to explore the maximumfeasible potential rate of agricultural development,.. .evaluate proposed policies and Eric Hooglund is Assistant at Bowdoin College. IRANIAN STUDIES
Professor 322
of Political
Science
programs, and to indicate appropriate adjustments and an optimal development of changes that will facilitate The author is a Norwegian agagriculture..." (p. vii). ricultural economist who has visited Iran on several occasions between 1958 and 1975. His primary field research has dealt with the introduction of new methods of wheat technology, and thus he has been able to acquire considerable firsthand experience about farming conditions and This background is utilized practices. well to examine a subject which previously has been somewhat neglected, in comparison to "industrialization," in the economic literature about Iran. Mr. Aresvik's main theme is that Iran is a country of "igreat agricultural but development in this potential," area has not progressed as well as government officials and In order for international specialists have anticipated. agricultural production to develop up to its optimal possible level it is necessary to remove certain obstacles which have constrained agricultural growth in the past. These obstacles are social and political, as well as economic, in nature. Poverty is the major social problem in Iranian agriculture. The author points out that 84% of all farms are under 11 hectares (27 acres) in size and "provide less than 20 percent of the marketed agricultural produce"; most of them are thus "purely subsistence operaIn the past, government credit, subsidy tions" (p. 100). and technical education programs have not been adequate to provide sufficient resources to enable the small farmers to increase yields and thus alleviate some of the poverty.
A major economic obstacle has been credit. While the author believes that credit available through the cohas "had a significant operative societies impact, the amount of credit provided has been grossly inadequate compared with the needs" (p. 238). Mother economic constraint has been the lack of private investments in improvements that would lead to greater productivity. Aresvik sees both the opportunity of higher profits in the urban areas and the uncertainty over governmental agricultural policies as motivations for the reluctance of commercial farm323
AUTUMN 1977
In ers to make appropriate investments in agriculture. addition, long-term credit such as is required for productive investments has been "very scarce" (p. 240). development The political obstacles to agricultural which tend to conflict with have been government policies For example, one major governaims to raise productivity. mental objective has been to assure low and stable food prices for urban consumers. Consequently, floor prices for basic commodities such as wheat have been established; supported these however, the government has successfully prices only in. poor harvest years and failed to purchase As a result, durall produce during bumper crop periods. ing good harvests farmers have received for their wheat on the open market "up to 40 per cent less than the announced floor prices" (p. 147). Under these circumstances there is little, if any, incentive for farmers to try to increase their yields. of many agricultural Although Aresvik is critical policies, his purpose is not to assign blame. Rather, he is hopeful that by understanding the mistakes of the past, future programs can be modified so that they more effectively encourage, and not discourage, optimal productivity. He believes that Iran is now in a favorable position to undertake such adjustments in its development plans because of large oil revenues since 1974 obviate the availability in the national budget. any need for sectoral priorities adoption of the "KickThus, Aresvik advocates the official This would inOff Approach" to agricultural development. volve a concerted government effort to increase production through the extensive introduction of: economic incentives and technology; for farmers; high-yield seed varieties cadres of trained general mechanization; rural industries; and decentralization of planning, specialists; agricultural pricing, and investments in agriculture. While this reviewer does not share Aresvik's option balance The mism nor agree with all his conclusions, of Iran is both an interesting Development Agricultural and useful book. The text is not overly technical and should be easily comprehensible to anyone with limited or IRANIAN STUDIES
324
no knowledge about rural economics. Although the author does not present any new data to the knowledge of Iran, he has gathered together in more than 90 statistical tables considerable material previously dispersed in not readily available reports by international consultants. Thus, the book is a valuable reference source for people doing research on any aspect of contemporary rural Iran. A select bibliography of English language sources also is included, but its coverage is too limited. Some typographical errors are scattered throughout the text, but they are too few in number to detract seriously from the book. In summation, I would recommend The Agricultural Development of Iran to anyone interested in Iran, especially its rural society and economy.
Dschalaluddin Rumi, Licht und Reigen: Divan des grossten mystischen Dichters
Gedichte aus dem persischer Zunge.
Selected, translated and explained by Johann Cristoph Burgel. UNESCO Collection of Representative Works. Masterpieces of Persian Literature Series, No. 26. Bern, Herbert Lang, and Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 1974. 191 pp. MichaelB. Loraine
The fanciful title, Light and Dance, is, of course, Biurgel's, not R5nmi's. It is part of the manner of presentation, of haute vulgarisation, through which the Swiss Professor aims to reveal the poetry and mystical ideas of Ruimito a public that reads German but knows no Persian. The word, Reigen, refers to dancing in a ring, and has associations with folklore or children's dancing. Here, it is illustrated on the cover by the reproduction of a page
Michael B. Loraine is Associate Professor in the Departnrnt of Near Eastern Languages and Literature at the University of Washington. 325
AUTUMN1977
of text with a miniature showing the early mystic, Abfi In SaCid ibn Abill-Khayr dancing with his disciples. samac, representing, it often translates the translations as the note on the inside flap suggests, the dance of all The ms. reprocreation around the divine source-light. duced, to judge by the script and the miniature, is much later even than Riimi, and proves nothing by itself about the use of music and dancing before Rilmi, though a note Such cavilling may seem pedantic, inside implies it does. found in some other but it is relevant to a carelessness parts of this book. on the whole, is exintroduction, The translator's to "all those Though it offers the translations cellent. who are not prepared to end the heavenward flight of the soul in the fetters of dogmas, old and new," it does introduce the general reader to the contrast between official Islam, a religion of law, and Islamic mysticism, which transcends all law. The explanation is good, if inThe importance of Neoevitably somewhat oversimplified. of Platonism is well presented, as is the significance Ibn al-cArabl, whose life and ideas are summarized before The diRimils own life and works are briefly discussed. van, lyric works of Riimi are dealt with in rather more deHere, Buirgel describes also the manner of his own tail. His aim is to display the presentation in translation. broadest possible range of Riimils (lyric) poetry, in such an order that, roughly, follows the soul's journey from its heavenly origins down to the material world and back again through death and the grave to its heavenly home and union with the One--BUrgel writes almost as an adept himAll this might safely be recommended to general self. readers and students reading Rfiml's works in the original for the first time. The brief bibliography at the end, containing works both old and quite recent, in English, French and German, is also designed to help the serious The final paragraphs of the introduction general reader. "Rimil's message," are presumably for those not wishing to Some end their heavenward flight in dogmatic fetters. which verse, the ghazal are explained: matters technical corresponds to a pair of German verses or a strophe in the how inner rhyme is rendered, and the use of translation; IRANIAN STUDIES
326
A list of names is given, with indications of capitals. It should be noted that pronunciation and syllable stress. Arabic stress patterns are given, even when different from Persian. the one-hundredAs suggested in the introduction, and-six translations are in German verse. Some ghazals and the thirty-three quatrains are rendered whole, but many ghazals are translated only in part. The German verses are fluent and skillfully made, despite the use of rhyme to match that of the original in most cases. When comparison with the original is made, it is surprising to see how little change the translator has had to make in details of meaning, in order to re-create the rhyme-scheme, not, merthe metres, of the original verses. cifully, Most of the translations are followed by helpful commentaries. The scholarly translator, or his assistant, perhaps, has provided not only an index of first lines to his versions, but of the corresponding numbers in the Persian edition and an indication of sources in the order of the translations, which also shows what lines have been translated, and in what order. It is here that something has gone seriously wrong. It is not only that misprints have occurred in some numbers referring to lines of the original; three of the ghazal translations, nos. 17, 44 and 48 have wrong references, and all of the quatrain references are similarly wrong. It is clearly stated at the head of these source references that the numbers refer to the edition of Furuizanfar, Tehran 1336-40 h.s., and the quatrains are marked by R (= Rubdci). The dates given are those of the first six volumes of Furfiz&nfar's edition. There are no quatrains in these volumes, for the quatrains were published in 1342 h.s. While all the ghazal translations come from the six volumes, none from the seventh, published in 1345 h.s., where can the quatrain versions, almost a third of the translations in this book, be traced? One of the German quatrains is ascribed to no. 1988, while the highest number in Furuizanfar's eighth volume of 1342 h.s. is 1983. A pure accident revealed that translation no. 70 corresponds to no. 1248 in that volume, not 1142, as the source indications show. 327
AUTUMN1977
All this means that, through someone's carelessness, a serious work of scholarly popularization has been compromised, for while the Persian scholar does not need these the general reader, for whomthe book is intranslations, tended, cannot be sure whether a third of this fundamentaluntil some ly helpful book is even genuine translation, inquisitive person, who knows both German and Persian, is willing to hunt down the correct references.
IRANIAN STUDIES
328
A NOTE OF TRANSLITERATION In manuscripts submitted for publication, only those words need he transliterated which do not appear in the third edition of Wehster'sNew International Dictionary. The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STUDIE,S is the Persian Romanization developed for the Library of Congress and approved by the American Library Association and the Canadian Library Association. Copies of this table (Cataloguing Service - Bulletin 92) may be obtained by writing directly to the Editor.
IranianStudies is published by The Society for IranianStudies. It is distributed to members of the Society as part of their membership. Annual membership dues are $15.00 ($10.00 for students). The annualsubscriptionrate for libraries and other institutions is $15.00. A limited supply of the back volumes of the Journal (1968 to present) is available and may be ordered by writing to the Editor. The opinions expressed by the contributors are of the individualauthors and not necessarilythose of the Society or the editors of IranianStudies. Articles to be considered for publication and all other communicationsshould be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box K-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass. 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society should be addressed to the Executive Secretary, The Society for Iranian Studies, c/o Department of History, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire03755, U.S.A.
COVER: "Oh Brother Soldier!. 1978.
Drawingby ArdeshirMohasses.Tehran,
